UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES 
 
 SCHOOL OF LAW 
 LIBRARY
 
 LIBRARY OF 
 
 W. A. ALDERSON 
 LOS ANGELES
 
 CODE EEMEDIES
 
 CODE REMEDIES: 
 
 REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS 
 
 BY THE CIVIL ACTION 
 
 ACCORDING TO 
 
 THE REFORMED AMERICAN PROCEDURE 
 
 A TREATISE ADAPTED TO USE IN ALL THE STATES AND TERRITORIES 
 WHERE THAT SYSTEM PREVAILS 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, LL.D. 
 
 AUTHOR OF " A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE," ETC. 
 
 JTourtf) lEtiition 
 
 EEVISED AND ENLARGED 
 
 THOMAS A. BOGLE 
 
 PROFESSOR OF LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
 
 BOSTON 
 
 LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY 
 
 1904
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the years 1876. 1883, 
 
 By John Xohton Pomeroy, 
 
 Id the Office ol the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 
 
 Paltered according to Act of Congress, in the j'ear 1893, 
 
 By Annie R. Pomeroy, 
 
 Id ihe Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 
 
 Copyright, 1904, 
 Bt Little, Brown, and Company. 
 
 y)rintriB 
 
 .*<. J. rAKBIHLL A Co.. noSTON. V. S.
 
 TO 
 
 AARON J. VANDERPOEL, Esq., 
 
 OF THE NEW YORK BAR, 
 
 THIS BOOK IS INSCRIBED ALIKE AS A TRIBUTE TO HIS HIGH PROFESSIONAIi 
 
 CHARACTER, AND AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE AUTHOR'S 
 
 PERSONAL REGARD.
 
 PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION. 
 
 The last edition of this work was published in 1894. Since 
 that time so many decisions upon important questions of Code 
 Pleading have been reported that another edition has become 
 necessary. To collect, cite, and classify these decisions with 
 reference to the topics discussed in the text, and thus place them 
 at the convenient disposal of members of the legal profession, 
 as well as students of the law, has been the main purpose of the 
 present editor. This required a large amount of space, but as 
 the original text included considerable matter that was theoreti- 
 cal rather than of present practical value, as well as extended 
 quotations that properly belonged in the notes, it has been possi- 
 ble to do much in the way of omission and condensation. At 
 the same time everything essential to the subject has been in- 
 cluded, and it is believed that the text as so amended presents a 
 more concise and systematic view than in its original form. 
 
 In some cases the text has been re-written, such altered por- 
 tions being indicated by brackets, and in a few instances verbal 
 changes have been made without being indicated. The para- 
 graphs of the text have been supplied with appropriate black- 
 letter headings. Many of the notes of the author and of the 
 previous editor have been condensed, but the cases have all been 
 retained. Nearly three hundred pages of new matter have been 
 added, while the new cases cited number over four thousand, 
 with dates and references to both the official Reports and the
 
 X PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION. 
 
 National Reporter system. New topics have been treated in the 
 notes, with suitable italic or black-letter headings, and in all cases 
 the new notes, as well lus the new portions of the text, have been 
 distinguished by brackets. 
 
 The statutory references and citations have been fully revised, 
 the references now being made to the latest revisions of the 
 statutes. These notes on the statutory provisions are believed 
 to present the most complete view of the details of the various 
 Code^ now conveniently available to the profession in a work of 
 tliis kind, and it is hoped they will prove useful in determining 
 the vidue of cases decided in the different States, The Table of 
 Contents has been wholly re-written, and made more complete, 
 while the Index and the Table of Cases have also been recon- 
 structed. The paragraphs of the text as they now stand have 
 been numbered consecutively, but the original numbers have 
 been retained, and distinguished by stars. 
 
 (iranted that Professor Pomeroy's criticisms of Common Law 
 Pleading were not always just, his eulogies of the " Reformed 
 System '' not always deserved, and that he was too much given 
 to tlieoretical discussion of practical subjects, still it may justly 
 be said that as a writer upon the Code he stands without a rival. 
 
 Tiie facts make it my duty to acknowledge here my deep 
 obligation to Kdson R. Sunderland, assistant professor of law in 
 the University of Michigan, for most valuable assistance rendered 
 me throughout the preparation of this edition. 
 
 THOMAS A. BOGLE. 
 
 Ukivkksity ok Michigan, 
 
 Ann AitiK.K, .Fulv *J7. 1004.
 
 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 A SECOND EDITION of this work has for some time been 
 needed, and the delay in preparing it must be attributed to an 
 overwhelming pressure of other engagements. In now present- 
 ing it to the profession, I desire to express my sincere thanks for 
 the favor with which the book has been received by the Bar and 
 the Bench. The work, when originally published, was to some 
 extent an experiment. It was, I believe, the first attempt pro- 
 fessedly to treat of those features which are common to all the codes 
 of procedure, and which constitute the essential elements of the 
 new system. In it I ventured to call that system the "Reformed 
 American Sj^stem of Procedure," and was gratified to know that 
 the name was accepted by one of its principal authors as distinc- 
 tive and appropriate. The abbreviated title by which my book 
 is commonly known, — " Remedies," — and which it is now too 
 late to change, is in some respects misleading ; for it fails to in- 
 dicate the real subject-matter and purpose of the work. In the 
 full title given to it, the words " by the civil action " were meant 
 to be the most emphatic and important. The work is intended 
 to be both a scientific and a practical treatise of the fundamental 
 principles and essential elements of the " Civil Action," as the 
 instrument for administering justice established by the Reformed 
 Procedure in all the Code States of our own country, and in Eng- 
 land, and in many of the British colonies. Whatever varieties of
 
 Xn rREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 detail in matters of mere practice may be found in the different 
 State codes, these principles and elements are fundamental and 
 essential, and are inherent in the Reformed Procedure wherever 
 it prevails, whether in the United States or in Great Britain. 
 They are the union of legal and equitable rights of action and 
 remedies in the same civil action, resulting from the abolition of 
 the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and 
 of the forms of legal actions ; the equitable instead of the legal 
 theory of parties ; the general principles of pleading, including 
 the union of causes of action in the same complaint or petition ; 
 the mode of stating causes of action; the answer of "denial," 
 and what defences may be proved under it; the answer of " new 
 matter,"' and what defences it embraces, and equitable defences ; 
 the counter-claim, including all affirmative relief, legal or equita- 
 ble, to the defendant : the final reliefs, or judgments. In adjudi- 
 cating upon these most important matters, the courts of the vari- 
 ous Code States have, with a remarkable unanimity, substantially 
 reached the same conclusions. At the inauguration of the new 
 system, it is not surprising that there should have been some 
 discrepancy of judicial opinion ; but every year has shown a 
 stronger tendency towards a complete agreement, so that the 
 unity of the system throughout the Code States is now virtually 
 established. It would be a source of the highest gratification if 
 I might believe that my own book had contributed anything to 
 the attainment of this result. These are the subjects with which 
 it deals ; and by citing and comparing the corresponding sections 
 of the codes, as well as the decisions interpreting them, in differ- 
 er»t Stetes, it endeavors to present all that is essential to the 
 reformed procedure, as one complete whole, and as both scien- 
 tifically and practically superior to the common-law methods 
 which it has displaced. 
 
 In preparing tliis edition, I have not thought it expedient to 
 alter in any substiintial manner the original text ; a few mistakes 
 and omibsions have been corrected, but the text stands virtually
 
 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. xiii 
 
 unchanged. I have seen no sufficient reason to modify any of 
 its theoretical conclusions, and several of its practical conclusions 
 have been sustained by the courts ; none, so far as I am aware, 
 have been distinctly condemned. The new matter is, therefore, 
 chiefly confined to the notes ; and it brings the discussions of the 
 text, as illustrated by judicial opinion, down to the present day. 
 The important decisions in each of the Code States and Territo- 
 ries, made since the publication of the first edition, have been 
 collected and arranged in the notes in connection with the doc- 
 trines and rules to which they relate. Some cases may have 
 been overlooked, but I believe the additions will enable the 
 reader to discover the present condition of the law and of judi- 
 cial authority upon all the important topics discussed in the text. 
 A new and much fuller Index has also been added. I had re- 
 ceived complaints from several sources that the Index of the first 
 edition was too meagre for the wants of the practising lawyer ; 
 I trust it will be found that this defect has been cured. All 
 other substantial additions, and new materials or modes of treat- 
 ment, are reserved for the supplemental work on the Civil Action, 
 by which I still hope to complete my original design. 
 
 The Reformed Procedure is no longer an experiment. It is 
 certain to become universal wherever the common law and equity 
 jurisprudence is found. The fact that it was accepted, in all of 
 its essentials, by the ablest judges, lawyers, and statesmen of 
 England, shows that it rests upon a scientific as well as practical 
 basis. It has been adopted, since the publication of this work, 
 by two additional American States, Colorado and Connecticut; 
 its adoption in substance by all is, in my opinion, a mere ques- 
 tion of time. There is, however, one grave defect in the legis- 
 lation of all our American commonwealths, — with the single 
 exception of Connecticut, — to which I would earnestly call the 
 attention of all judges and lawyers who are interested in the im- 
 provement of the law : a defect which is the immediate cause of 
 nearly all the uncertainties, discrepancies, and conflicts of judicial
 
 II V PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 opinion that have arisen under the system. By the union of 
 legal and equitable rights and remedies in the single civil action, 
 courtii were necessarily confronted with the direct opposition 
 between many doctrines and rules of the common law and of 
 equity, applicable to exactly the same condition of facts ; and 
 the question at once arose, How is this opposition to be dealt 
 with in the practical administration of justice ? Every lawyer 
 who has carefully considered this matter, and especially every 
 lawyer who has examined the course of judicial decision through 
 all the Code States, will agree with me that this conflict between 
 equitable and legal rules concerning the same state of facts has 
 been the source of all the real difficulty in interpreting and set- 
 tling the Reformed Procedure. Some courts have evaded the 
 difficulty by retaining the distinctions between legal and equita- 
 ble actions, and legal and equitable remedies, practically as broad 
 and well defined as under the former system ; but this method 
 jtlainly violates both the spirit and the letter of the codes. The 
 whole difficulty and its cause might be removed by a brief addi- 
 tion to the codes, which would cany out to its final results the 
 clear intent of the reform. The same difficulty presented itself 
 to the advocates of the new procedure in England while the 
 measure was pending in Parliament ; it was obviated by insert-* 
 ing in the " Supreme Court of Judicature Act " the following 
 clause : " Generally in all matters in which there is any conflict 
 or variance between the rules of eciuity and the rules of the com- 
 mon law, witjj reference to the same matter, the rules of equity 
 shall pnvaiiy The State of Connecticut has incorporated the 
 clause into it,s recent reformatory legislation. If the provision, 
 or one substantially the same, were added to all the codes, the 
 union of legal and equitable remedies would be made perfect, 
 and the Keformed Procedure would l)e freed from the only 
 practical difficulty which it has encountered ; until such an 
 amendment is cfTected, it must remain somewhat crippled in 
 iU oi^erations, and imperfect in its results.
 
 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. XV 
 
 In conclusion, I desire to acknowledge the aid which I have 
 received, in preparing this edition, from my former students, 
 Mr. Charles W. Slack and Mr. Marcellus A. Dorn, members of 
 the San Francisco Bar. 
 
 JOHN NORTON POME ROY. 
 
 San Francisco, Feb. 17, 1S83. 
 Hastings College of the Law: University of California.
 
 PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 
 
 The new procedure which was devised by the codifiers and 
 inaugurated by the Legislature of New York, in the year 1848, 
 now prevails in more than twenty other States and Territories of 
 this country, and may, therefore, be properly termed " The Re- 
 formed American System of Procedure." After a most careful 
 consideration, and the most cautious and deliberate examination 
 by a commission composed of the ablest judges and barristers, it 
 has finally been accepted in its essential features and elements by 
 the British Parliament, and has recently displaced the time-hon- 
 ored methods of the common-law. and the equity courts in Eng- 
 land. This fact alone may be regarded as decisive of its intrinsic 
 excellence, as conclusively demonstrating that it is founded upon 
 natural and true principles ; that it embodies rational notions in 
 respect to the manner of conducting judicial controversies be- 
 tween private litigants ; and that, in its conception and design, 
 it is far superior to the artificial, technical, and arbitrary modes 
 which had so long been looked upon as perfect by generations 
 of English and American lawyers. It is shown in the Intro- 
 ductory Chapter of the present work that this whole course of 
 reform is but a repetition, not simply in a general outline, but 
 even in the minute details, of what took place in the jurispru- 
 dence of Rome ; so that the modern legislation has, in this re- 
 spect, merely followed an inevitable law of progress, which
 
 xviii PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 
 
 always works out the same results under the same social con- 
 ditions and circumstances. 
 
 Althousrh the codes which have been enacted in the various 
 States and Territories sometimes differ slightly from each other 
 in respect to the minor measures and steps of practice, and al- 
 though some of them, in reference to certain special matters, have 
 more freely carried out the original and underlying theory to its 
 logical results, and have by distinct provisions expressly abro- 
 gated particular dogmas of the old law, which in other States 
 are only included in the general language of the statute, and are 
 thus left within the domain of judicial construction, yet in all its 
 essential notions and fundamental doctrines the reformed pro- 
 cedure is one and the same wherever it prevails, either in the 
 United States or in England. The " Civil Action " which it has 
 created and introduced as the single and sufficient instrument 
 for the trial of all judicial controversies between private suitors 
 and for the pursuit of all judicial remedies is the same in concep- 
 tion, in form, and in substance, possessing the same characteristic 
 features, governed by the same elementary rules, and embodying 
 the same organic principles. How completely the reformed sys- 
 tem is severed from the ancient common-law modes, how entirely 
 it abandons all the arbitrary, formal, and technical notions which 
 were their very essence and life, and how firmly it rests upon 
 natural and necessary facts as its foundations, is shown in the 
 Introductory Chapter and in other portions of this work. It is 
 imjtossible, therefore, that its full benefits can be attained, and 
 that full scope can be given to its original purpose, until the 
 courts and the profession shall accept it in its simplicity, and 
 shall cease to obstruct its efficient operation and to interrupt its 
 free movements by antiquated dogmas and rejected doctrines 
 drawn from the system which it has thoroughly overthrown and 
 bupplanled. 
 
 The design of the author is to present the entire remedial 
 defiartment <jf the law — the remedies and remedial rights —
 
 PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. Xi . 
 
 according to the reformed procedure. The volume now sub- 
 mitted to the profession, although in itself a complete and inde- 
 pendent work, accomplishes' a part of this full purpose. It treats 
 of the " Civil Action," which is the central fact of the new pro- 
 cedure, and which, as has been said, is everywhere the same in 
 all its distinctive features and elements. It is not a treatise upon 
 " Practice ; " but it discusses in a thoroughly practical manner 
 those features and elements which constitute the Civil Action, 
 and which differentiate that judicial proceeding from the action 
 at law and the suit in equity. The discussions and conclusions 
 which it contains are not theoretical ; they are everywhere and 
 always based upon an exhaustive examination, analysis, and com- 
 parison of the decided cases : and the author has freely drawn 
 upon the judicial decisions of the States, and by this means 
 presents to the reader a body of authority which fully indicates 
 the action of the courts and their theories and modes of interpre- 
 tation throughout the commonwealths in which the system pre- 
 vails. Although it cannot be pretended that every case referring 
 to the Civil Action has been cited, — in fact, many of them are 
 unworthy of citation, since they are the reflections of crude and 
 incorrect opinions long since rejected, while others are the mere 
 repetitions of points already well settled, — yet it is believed 
 that none are omitted which contain the statement of a new and 
 correct principle. The author has endeavored to collect all the 
 leading cases in every State, — all those which have been finally 
 accepted as authoritative, and which represent the mature 
 thought and convictions of the judiciary ; and in no other work 
 can be found such a mass of judicial opinion gathered from 
 courts of the various States, giving a construction to the statu- 
 tory provisions which describe the Civil Action, and building 
 up an harmonious and consistent system of procedure upon the 
 reform legislation. While the author has everywhere endeav- 
 ored to reach the true principles of interpretation, and to extract 
 from the cases a statement of universal doctrines which shall
 
 XX PKEFACL TO THE FlliST EDITION. 
 
 aid in the solution of all future questions, and has not scrupled 
 to express his own views and opinions, such speculations and 
 arguments are always plainly indicated and represented in their 
 real character, so that the reader need never confound them with 
 the results of actual judicial decision, and be thus led to accept 
 as settled law what is only a personal conviction or suggestion of 
 the author. 
 
 While the work is thus intended to be a practical handbook 
 for the lawyer, as an aid in the every-day duties of his profession, 
 it is hoped that its use may tend to bring the procedures of the 
 different States into closer relations, and may finally produce 
 the perfect identity of method and form which is possible from 
 the legislation itself, and which was, beyond doubt, the design 
 of the several legislatures in adopting the reform. Such an iden- 
 tity is entirely practicable, and the full beneficial results of the 
 change will not be attained until it is reached. In every State 
 there has accumulated a growing amount of judicial interpreta- 
 tion which would be of the greatest assistance to the Bench and 
 Bar of all the other States ; and in several of them certain spe- 
 cial rules and methods have been wrought out and finally estab- 
 lished, which need only to be known in order to be universally 
 followed. Such a reform, founded on the nature of things, and 
 not upon artificial and arbitrary assumptions, never goes back- 
 ward : and the time will surely come when the system that 
 has already spread so widely will be introduced into every com- 
 monwealth, and when the distinction between legal and equita- 
 ble modes of pursuing remedies will disappear, and finally be 
 forgotten. 
 
 The central conception of the reformed procedure, and the one 
 from which all the elements of the Civil Action are developed, is 
 the abolition of the distinction between legal and equitable suits, 
 and the substitution of one judicial instrument, by which both 
 legal and equitable remedies may be obtained, either singly or in 
 combination. The full scope and effect of this grand principle
 
 PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. XXI 
 
 are exhaustively discussed in the opening chapter, while the 
 necessary limitations upon its operation which inhere in our judi- 
 cial institutions are also carefully pointed out. Having thus laid 
 the foundation upon which the whole superstructure rests, the 
 remaining parts of the Civil Action are examined in turn, and 
 the practical rules which control their use are minutely explained 
 in the light of judicial authority. These general features are the 
 parties to the Civil Action, plaintiff and defendant, the presenta- 
 tion of the cause of action by the plaintiff, and of the defence or 
 claim of affirmative relief by the defendant. The two latter 
 divisions include, among other important particulars, the princi- 
 ples of the reformed pleading ; the scope and effect of the gen- 
 eral denial, with the defences which may be proved under it; the 
 nature and object of specific denials ; the answer of new matter, 
 and the defences which must be specially pleaded ; and the coun- 
 ter-claim. The discussion of these special topics, being of the 
 greatest practical importance, has been purposely made very full 
 and minute. An attempt has also been made to obtain, in a 
 general and complete form, the true meaning of certain phrases 
 found in all the codes, upon which the interpretation of most 
 important provisions, and the practical rules resulting therefrom, 
 so closely depend. Among the statutory phrases are " the cause 
 of action," " the subject of action," " transaction," " causes of 
 action arising out of the same transaction," and the like. If the 
 author has succeeded in ascertaining the true meaning of these 
 and similar expressions, and the legislative intent in their use, 
 he is confident that he will have rendered a substantial aid to the 
 profession, and even to the courts, in the difficult work of statu- 
 tory interpretation. The treatise, as a whole, if its purpose has 
 been properly carried out, will be a practical handbook, adapted 
 to the use of the profession in every State and Territory where 
 the reformed procedure prevails. It is also designed as a text- 
 book for students, whether in offices or in law schools ; and to 
 that end frequent reference has been made to the common-law and
 
 xxil TKEFACK TO THE FIIIST EDITION. 
 
 equity systems of i:)rocedure, in explanation of their more general 
 doctrines and principles, and in comparing them with those which 
 have been substituted in theii- place. 
 
 JOHN NORTON POMEROY. 
 Rochester. X. Y., December, 1875.
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 Section Page 
 
 1. Necessity of remedial law 1 
 
 2. Remedies and remedial rights and duties. Definitions and 
 
 illustrations 2 
 
 3. Distinction between public and private remedies 3 
 
 CHAPTER FIRST. 
 
 Abolition of the Distinctions between Actions at Law and Suits 
 IN Equity, and of all the Common Law Forms of Action. 
 
 4. Statutory provision 5 
 
 SECTION FIRST. 
 
 The General Principles as to a Union of Legal and Equitable 
 Methods which have been adopted by the Courts. 
 
 5. Purpose of Section One, Chapter One. General principles of 
 
 construction 7 
 
 6. Narrow interpretation by some judges. This interpretation overruled 7 
 
 7. How interpreted in most of the States. Criticism of interpreta- 
 
 tion in these States 10 
 
 8. No change in rights, duties, or liabilities 11 
 
 9. No change in remedies or remedial rights 13 
 
 10. The differences that have been abolished. What is established ? . 14 
 
 11. Rule settled herein. Familiar rule in old system 16 
 
 12. Struggle in establishing rule. Missouri doctrine 19 
 
 lo. Summary of foregoing discussion. Fundamental principle stated . 21 
 
 14. Pleading at common law and in equity 22 
 
 15 Two schools of interpretation respecting modes of pleading under 
 
 the code 23 
 
 SECTION SECOND. 
 
 The Combination by the Plaintiff of Legal and Equitable Primary 
 Rights and of Legal and Equitable Remedies in one Action. 
 
 16. Principles of unity applied to particular cases 27 
 
 17. Both equitable and legal relief awarded. Illustrations 28
 
 xxiv TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 SecUon Page 
 
 IS. Docirine in Missouri and Wisconsia 30 
 
 lit. Legal relief only actually awarded. Illustrations 33 
 
 2u. Legal relief awarded, but equitable relief denied. Illustrations . . 34 
 •2\. Where equitable remedy only is demanded, and legal remedy only 
 
 is granted. Doctrine in Missouri and Wisconsin 36 
 
 22. Where allegations and proof entitle to equitable relief only, but . 
 
 only legal relief is prayed for, equitable relief will be awarded. 
 Rule in Missouri 37 
 
 23. Where allegations entitle to equitable relief, and not to legal 
 
 relief, and equitable relief alone is asked, and proof fails to 
 establish case alleged, but does establish legal cause of action, 
 suit must be dismissed Converse of this rule. Principle herein . 38 
 
 24. May invoke equitable right in aid of legal action 39 
 
 25. Mode of trial when both legal and equitable causes of action are 
 
 alleged. How waive right to jury trial 40 
 
 SECTIOX THIRD. 
 Equitable Defences to Actions HRoronT to enforce Leg.\l Rights 
 
 AND TO obtain LeGAL REMEDIES. 
 
 26. Former system. Illustration. Criticism. Subject matter of 
 
 Section Third 42 
 
 27. Meaning of the terms "equitable" and "defence." Restriction 
 
 imposed by some courts herein 44 
 
 28. Meaning of equitable defence. Definition by New York Court of 
 
 Appeals 45 
 
 29. Ca5es holding that facts entitling to equitable relief against legal 
 
 cause of action can be interposed only upon the condition that 
 affirmative relief is demanded. Criticism 46 
 
 30. Correct construction. Limitation upon the interposition of equi- 
 
 table defences to legal causes of action 47 
 
 3L Illustrations and examples 48 
 
 32. In actions to recover land. Three classes of cases. Illustrations . 49 
 
 33. In actions by vendors against vendees to recover possession of 
 
 lands. Illu.strations 51 
 
 34. Other actions to which such defences are applicable 52 
 
 35. Affirmative relief upon facts alleged in answer. Cross-complaints. 
 
 Different positions contrasted 53 
 
 SECTION FOURTH. 
 
 A Lf.gai. Remedy Ohtained upon an Equitable Ownership or 
 Equitable Primary Right. 
 
 ■\(t. Statement of question discussed herein. Ejectment at common 
 
 law 55 
 
 37. Arbitraryand technical character of old rule. Distinction abolished 
 
 by code. View still entertained by some courts. Criticism 37
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXV 
 
 Section Page 
 
 38. Question stated in Paragraph Thirty-six answered upon principle. 
 
 Argument 57 
 
 39. Conclusion 58 
 
 40. Result of discussion upon principle compared ^\•ith doctrine of 
 
 decisions. Concession by Author. Rule in Missouri, Wisconsin, 
 Indiana, California, and Iowa 61 
 
 41. Conflict in New York. Phillips v. Gorham. Rule in Kansas . . 63 
 
 42. Another class of actions herein. Partner against copartner. 
 
 Familiar rule herein. Holding in Indiana. In Missouri. Inmost 
 of the States. Case herein referred to contrasted with one pre- 
 viously discussed. Argument. Conclusion reached 64 
 
 43. Additional instances 68 
 
 44. Importance of subject-matter dwelt upon in Section Fifth. Final 
 
 object of reformed system. Author's prediction 69 
 
 SECTION FIFTH. 
 
 The Nature of Civil Actions and the Essential Differences 
 
 between them. 
 
 45. Features of civil actions that are really different and which the 
 
 new system does not change 70 
 
 46. Actions still differ in substance. Statement of this doctrine by the 
 
 courts 70 
 
 47. Illustrative examples of doctrine reached. Difference in form of 
 
 discussion under the old system and the new. Danger herein . . 73 
 
 48. Distinction between actions ex contractu and those ex delicto pre- 
 
 served. Election. This distinction relates to cause of action . 74 
 
 49. Conclusion. Criticism of the author. Difference in the two 
 
 systems of procedure 75 
 
 CHAPTER SECOND. 
 The Parties to the Civil Action. 
 
 SECTION FIRST. 
 The Statutory Provisions and their General Principles. 
 
 50. Introductory. Fundamental difference between legal and equi- 
 
 table actions in respect to parties. Intention shown in the codes 
 
 to adopt equitable theory 77 
 
 51. General code provisions 78 
 
 52. Same subject 79 
 
 53. Same subject 80 
 
 54. Same subject 80 
 
 55. Same subject 81 
 
 56. Same subject 81
 
 XXVi TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Section ^ Page 
 
 57. Same subject 83 
 
 58. Special code provLsious 83 
 
 59. Same subject 84 
 
 60. Statutory provi.sions. Interpretation. Two views 85 
 
 61. More radical statutes in a few States. Outline of treatment of parties 86 
 
 SECTION SECOND. 
 The Rfai. Party in Intkkkst to bk madk Plaintiff. 
 
 62. Statutory provision as to real party in interest 87 
 
 63. Principal effect of statutory provision 88 
 
 64. Legal assignment. Action in name of assignee. Illustrations . . 88 
 
 65. Equitable assignment. Same rule. Illustrations 89 
 
 66. Effect of statute in case of negotiable instruments. Conflict in 
 
 opinion 91 
 
 67. New York decisions 93 
 
 68. The rule in New York 93 
 
 69. Rule in other States 94 
 
 70- Absolute assignment made conditional or partial by contemporane- 
 ous and collateral agreement 96 
 
 71. Instances of action by assignee as real party in interest .... 99 
 
 72. Same subject 100 
 
 73. Joinder of assignor in some States 101 
 
 74. Assignment pendente lite. Substitution of assignee 102 
 
 7.J. Assignment of part of demand. Action by grantee on covenants . 103 
 
 76. Suing " to the use of " another. Beneficiaries under express trusts 104 
 
 77. Actions by third persons for whose benefit contracts have been 
 
 made 105 
 
 78. Commercial paper. Action by legal promisee 112 
 
 79. Instances of real party in interest. Actions on bonds, actions by 
 
 principals and agents, etc 114 
 
 iiO. Particular injury to plaintiff essential in certain cases. People 
 
 cannot maintain action to redress private wrong 117 
 
 81. Special provision in New York respecting action by grantee of land 
 
 held by disseisor at time of conveyance. Partnerships .... 119 
 
 SECTION THIRD. 
 
 Thk Ekkkct of an Assignment ok a Thing in Action upon the 
 Defences thkukto. 
 
 1-'. ."^i.'nutory provisions respecting the effect of assignment upon 
 
 defences 120 
 
 83. Defetif-es and counter-claims distinguished 121 
 
 84. Interpretation of the statute 121 
 
 85. The rule, as existing prior to the codes, stated. Assignee takes 
 
 subject to equities and legal defences 122 
 
 86. Doctrine ajtplies also to second and subsequent assignees .... 123
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXVil 
 
 Section Page 
 
 87. Illustrations 123 
 
 88. Doctrine of estoppel applied against tiie assignor in case of quasi- 
 
 negotiable demands 125 
 
 89. Extension of doctrine of estoppel to all things in action, making 
 
 them all practically negotiable 127 
 
 90. Recapitulation of rules established independently of the codes . . 129 
 
 91. Effect of code provision upon defence of set-off. No substantial 
 
 change 129 
 
 92. Illustrations 132 
 
 93. Right of set-off may be available although once suspended. 
 
 Illustration 1.35 
 
 94. California rule. Set-off of demand accruing after assignment but 
 
 before notice 136 
 
 95. Nature of notice necessary to protect assignee. Defendant's rights 
 
 as against assignee purely defensive 137 
 
 96. Actions to wind up insolvent corporations. Doctrine of set-off 
 
 complicated by other considerations 138 
 
 97. Right of set-off in actions by personal representatives. Rule in 
 
 New York 139 
 
 98. Rules as to set-off apply to other defences, except that it is notice, 
 
 not assignment, which cuts off availability 140 
 
 SECTION FOURTH. 
 When a Person other than the Real Party in Interest may sue. 
 
 99. Statutory provisions 141 
 
 100. Meaning of term, " trustee of an express trust." Theoretical view 142 
 
 101. Judicial view . . 145 
 
 102. Same subject. New York cases 147 
 
 103. Statute includes an agent with whom an express contract is 
 
 made. Illustrations 148 
 
 104. Actions on bonds given to protect other persons. Obligee may sue 151 
 
 105. Actions on contracts made for undisclosed principals. Agent may 
 
 sue 152 
 
 106. Other classes of trustees 153 
 
 107. Actions brought by public officers 154 
 
 108. jNleaning of phrase " persons expressly authorized by statute " to 
 
 sue. Classes of persons included 156 
 
 109. Actions by executors and administrators 158 
 
 110. Actions by general guardians 159 
 
 SECTION FIFTH. 
 Who may be joined as Plaintiffs. 
 
 111. Statutory provisions 161 
 
 112. Scope of statutory provisions. The provisions respecting plaintiffs 
 
 compared with those respecting defendants. Apply to legal as 
 well as equitable actions . . . . , 162
 
 XXViii TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Section Tage 
 
 llo. The statute in effect an enactment of the equity doctrine. 
 
 Practical question herein 163 
 
 114. Statutory provisions confirm common-law rules to a certain 
 
 extent 164 
 
 115. Code allows a freer union of parties plaintiff than under the 
 
 common law 165 
 
 116. Joinder of holders of interests which are several 166 
 
 117. Recapitulation of foregoing theoretical analysis 167 
 
 l\t>. General theory of judicial interpretation. Introductory .... 108 
 11'.*. Interpretation given by the courts of New York and Ohio. 
 
 Liberal construction 169 
 
 120. Same liberal \ievf adopted in Indiana 171 
 
 IJI. In Missouri and California. Statute held to apply only to 
 
 equitable actions 173 
 
 122. Recapitulation of judicial views. Cases in which there is an 
 
 election 175 
 
 1J3. Manner of raising question as to proper parties plaintiff. Defect 
 
 of parties means too few 176 
 
 1J4. Question of defect of parties must be raised by demurrer or 
 
 answer 178 
 
 125. Meaning of want of legal capacity to sue 180 
 
 120. Kffect of misjoinder of parties plaintiff. Common law and 
 
 equity rules 181 
 
 127. Same subject under the codes. Preliminary analysis 182 
 
 128. Misjoinder of plaintiffs no defence in an equitable action . . . 184 
 
 129. Doctrine that demurrer will lie or dismissal as to party improperly 
 
 joined 180 
 
 130. Misjoinder fatal as to all the plaintiffs in a legal action. View of 
 
 some courts 186 
 
 131. New York ca.ses. Criticism 189 
 
 132. True interpretation of the codes as to consequences of misjoinder 190 
 
 133. Whf'n objection may be made by demurrer or answer against 
 
 party improperly joined 192 
 
 Rules a.< to Plaintiffs in Particular Classes of Cases. 
 
 134. Order of proi)0.sed tieatment 193 
 
 First : Legal Actions. 
 
 135. Lei,'al actions by joint owners and owners in common of land. 
 
 Modern statutes. Common-law rules 194 
 
 130. Decisions under the codes 195 
 
 137. Same subject 196 
 
 138. Legal actions by joint owners of chattels. At common law. Under 
 
 the codes 199 
 
 139. Code decisions. Part-owners of ships 201 
 
 140. Joint owners of chattels 201 
 
 141. Surviving partners 203
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXIX 
 
 Section rage 
 
 142. Extreme limits to wliich some courts have carried doctrine as to 
 
 joint rights 203 
 
 143. Legal actions by persons having joint rights arising from con- 
 
 tract 204 
 
 144. Same subject. Illustrations 207 
 
 145. Criticism of cases holding that a joint promisee cannot be made 
 
 a defendant = 209 
 
 146. Legal actions by persons having several rights arising from con- 
 
 tract 210 
 
 147. Legal actions by persons having joint rights arising from personal 
 
 torts .0 214 
 
 148. Legal actions by persons having several rights arising from per- 
 
 sonal torts 215 
 
 149. Actions in special cases 216 
 
 150. Actions by parents or guardians for the seduction of, or injury to, 
 
 their children or wards • 219 
 
 Second : Actions by and between Husband and Wife. 
 
 151. Common law and equity rules 221 
 
 152. Statutory provisions 221 
 
 153. Wife must sue alone in some States 224 
 
 154. Result of New York statutes 225 
 
 155. Actions for personal torts and for fraud and deceit 226 
 
 156. Actions for personal torts to wife 228 
 
 157. Actions for torts to wife's person in New York and States having 
 
 similar statutes 230 
 
 158. Actions for torts to wife's property 231 
 
 159. Tort actions between husband and wife 232 
 
 160. Desertion by husband as affecting wife's capacity to sue .... 233 
 
 Third: Equitable Actions. 
 
 161. 'Grand principle underlying equity doctrine. Scope of inquiry . . 234 
 
 162. Equity rules more explicit respecting defendants than plaintiffs. 
 
 Two classes of co-plaintiffs in equity 235 
 
 163. Statement of fundamental principle and what it assumes. Special 
 
 subject of inquiry stated 237 
 
 164. Subordinate general principles herein. Where actual plaintiff holds 
 
 only equitable right or title, holder of legal right or title should 
 
 be made co-plaintiff 238 
 
 ]*i5. Case of suits by assignees. Change effected by codes . • . . . 239 
 160. Case of suits for administration of decedents' estates 240 
 
 167. Rule applicable to persons having legal demands arising out of 
 
 same subject-matter 241 
 
 168. All holders of concurrent equitable rights against the defendant 
 
 should be made co-plaintiffs 241 
 
 169. Doctrine extends to actions relating to personal property. Illustra- 
 
 tions 244
 
 XXX TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Section Pago 
 
 170. Suits to redeem 246 
 
 171. ■ Suits for accouutiug. All persons interested in having an account 
 
 taken, or in its result, should be made co-plaintiffs 247 
 
 172. Residuary legatees, distributees, and next of kin. Statement of 
 
 general rule herein 249 
 
 173. Same subject. Exceptions. Statement of distinction herein re- 
 
 ferred to 250 
 
 174. Special applications of general principles above stated. General 
 
 rule. Important exceptions 251 
 
 175. Case of suits by executors and administrators, and suits by as- 
 
 signees in insolvency. Important exceptions continued . . . 253 
 
 176. General principle applicable to those having future and expectant 
 
 interests. Equity doctrine. Illustrations 254 
 
 177. General rule in suits for specific performance. Illustrations . . 255 
 
 178. Co-plaintiffs in suits to enforce the trusts of a will . . . 256 
 
 179. Principle underlying special rules. Connecting link. General 
 
 principle 257 
 
 180. Distinct claims not necessarily inconsistent. Conflicting decisions 258 
 
 181. Case of creditors' suits 259 
 
 182. All beneficiaries under a trust should join in a suit to enforce it. 
 
 Different rule in suits to overthrow a trust 260 
 
 183. Joinder of persons owning distinct parcels of land 262 
 
 184. Miscellaneous cases. Joinder of holders of separate liens. Creditors 
 
 of corporations 265 
 
 SECTION SIXTH. 
 Who may be joined as Defendants. 
 
 185. Statutory provisions 266 
 
 186. Subject-matter and plan of treatment herein 267 
 
 187. Intent and object of legislation. Principle of construction. Con- 
 
 clusions reached in preceding section adopted and repeated here. 
 Changes made should apply to all actions. Position of courts . 268 
 
 Particular Rules and Doctrines. 
 
 188. How take advantage of nonjoinder of defendants. Waiver. Power 
 
 of court herein 270 
 
 180. Consequences of nonjoinder of defendants 273 
 
 19<i. Misjoinder of defemlants. Two cases herein. Two aspects of 
 
 true case of technical misjoinder .'71 
 
 191. Situation of defendants properly sued. Change in common-law 
 
 rule liorein Doctrine t-stablished l)y the cases 275 
 
 19'-'. How question of misjoinder may be raised by defendants ini- 
 projHirly juined. DtMnuner interposed l)y whom. Waiver 
 
 herein 277 
 
 193. Ki'capitulation of code reforms respecting misjoinder of defend- 
 ants. Critici.sm 270
 
 TABLE OF CONTEXTS. XXXI 
 
 Section Page 
 
 194. Same respecting nonjoinder. Less liberal interpretation here. 
 
 Case of nonjoinder and misjoinder compared. Criticism and 
 recommendation 280 
 
 First: Legal Actions. 
 
 195. Actions against owners or occupants of land. Limitation herein. 
 
 Distinguished from common-law action of ejectment .... 281 
 
 196. Who should be joined. Illustrations 282 
 
 197. Who should not be joined. Illustrations 285 
 
 198. Actions against owners or possessors of chattels. In actions 
 
 to recover possession of chattels. Common-law rule not changed 286 
 
 199. Ship-owners 287 
 
 200. Actions upon contract; joint liability. Common-law rules un- 
 
 changed in legal actions. Exceptions 288 
 
 201. One of two or more joint contractors incapacitated. Retired 
 
 partners 290 
 
 202. Case of implied contracts. Illustrations 291 
 
 203. Survivorship. In States containing no special statutory provi- 
 
 sions respecting joint liability, common law rule unchanged. 
 Practical result herein 292 
 
 204. States whose codes contain provisions changing common-law 
 
 rule. Result 294 
 
 205. Criticism of general rule 296 
 
 206. Actions upon contract; joint and several liability. No change 
 
 by general language in most codes. Illustrations 297 
 
 207. Actions upon contract; several liability. No change in common- 
 
 law doctrines — except 299 
 
 208. Liability in actions for tort. Common-law doctrines unchanged. 
 
 General rule as to parties defendant herein. Illustrations . . 300 
 
 209. Joint liability must rest upon community in wrong-doing . . . 303 
 
 210. Case of joint conversion of chattels 304 
 
 211. Case of replevin and detinue 304 
 
 212. Common carriers 305 
 
 213. Lessor and lessee. Principal and agent 305 
 
 214. Cases where joint liability is impossible 306 
 
 215. Joint tort may give rise to many actions, but only one satisfac- 
 
 tion 306 
 
 216. Statutory actions in the settlement of decedents' estates .... 308 
 
 217. Some special actions 310 
 
 218. Joinder in case of substituted debtor 311 
 
 Second: Actions against Husband and Wife or either of them: Parties Defendant 
 as Affected hy the Marriage Relation. 
 
 219. General extent of statutory modification of common-law rules. 
 
 No change in suits against wife for her torts, frauds, and 
 other wrongful acts 311
 
 Xxxii TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Section ''•''g« 
 
 J2ll. Result ^12 
 
 '221. The settled rule. Tort committed in presence or by conipulsioa 
 
 of husband 313 
 
 •_'22. Where tort is committed by wife in the use or by means of her 
 
 sopanite property 314 
 
 22'i. Under New York statutes 315 
 
 224. Wife as party in actions concerning the homestead 316 
 
 225. Defence by wife when both are sued together 316 
 
 Third : Equitable Actions. 
 
 226. General principles. Distinction between necessary and proper 
 
 parties 317 
 
 227. Distinction between necessary and proper parties illustrated. 
 
 Practical test 318 
 
 228. Equity doctrine herein. Statutory provision 319 
 
 229. Persons consequentially interested 321 
 
 230. Actions to foreclose mortgages. Introductory. Statutory distri- 
 
 bution of parties 321 
 
 231. Object of the judgment in foreclosure. Necessary and proper 
 
 parties herein 323 
 
 232. Variations in practical rules due to differences in local law as 
 
 to nature of interests in land 324 
 
 233. Mortgagor and his grantee as parties 325 
 
 234. Successive grantees of mortgaged premises as parties. Adminis- 
 
 trator and heirs of mortgagor . 328 
 
 235. Personal representative of owner of mortgaged premises neces- 
 
 sary party in California. Judgment creditors of mortgagor. 
 Assignor of secured debt 330 
 
 236. Special statutes making assignor of a thing in action a necessary 
 
 party 331 
 
 237. ^\'he^e holder of less than all of a series of notes secured by same 
 
 mortgage brings foreclosure suit 331 
 
 238. Occupant of premises as party. Averments of petition as to each 
 
 ptMson nia<le defendant 332 
 
 239. Subsequent and prior incumbrancers as parties. Husband in 
 
 ca-st; of mortgage on wife's land 333 
 
 240. Joinder of wife of mortgagor 335 
 
 241. Joinder of wifi- of murtgaj:or in foreclosure of purchase-money 
 
 m<irti;a;ie ;?36 
 
 212. Parti<'.s in foreclosure of mortgage uiion homestead. Adverse 
 
 claimant as party- Otiier ca.ses 337 
 
 243. Partien in creditors' actions; and actions by or on behalf of 
 
 creditors to set aside fraudulent transfers by their debtors. 
 General remarks 338 
 
 244. Parties <i<'f<Midant in action by judgment creditor to n-ach equi- 
 
 table assets; and to reach property fraudulently transferred . . 33!)
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. Xxxiii 
 
 Section Page 
 
 245. Assignee of judgment debtor a necessary party. Where legal 
 
 title is in third person and equitable ownership in debtor . . 341 
 
 246. Assignees of separate parcels of property should be joined. Reason 
 
 herein 342 
 
 247. Other cases. Trustees of an express trust. Innocent third parties 342 
 
 248. Actions relating to the estates of deceased persons 343 
 
 249. Illustrations 344 
 
 250. When administrator is not a necessary party. Illustration . . . 345 
 
 251. When legatees and next of kin are neither necessary nor proper 
 
 parties 346 
 
 252. When a different rule applies 347 
 
 253. Trusts. Actions to enforce performance of express trusts. Trus- 
 
 tees and survivors necessary parties 348 
 
 254. Joining beneficiaries. Distinction between actions in opposition 
 
 to, and in furtherance of, the trust 349 
 
 255. Same subject 351 
 
 256. Implied trustee necessary party in actions to reach property im- 
 pressed with implied trustor to enforce a lien thereon. Examples . 352 
 
 257. Actions against corporations and stockholders and between part- 
 
 ners. Introductory " 354 
 
 258. Receivers. Creditors. Directors 354 
 
 259. Judgment creditors. Stockholders 355 
 
 260. Corporation, officers, and assignee 356 
 
 261. Assignor of stock. Rule in Indiana. In New York 356 
 
 262. Accounting by one partner against another and by surviving 
 
 partner 357 
 
 263. Actions for specific performance. Conflict of opinion herein . . 358 
 
 264. Holder of adverse claim. Personal representative of deceased 
 
 vendor. Heirs. New York and Iowa cases 359 
 
 265. Prior mortgagee. Agent of vendor. Person making redemption . 361 
 
 266. Actions to quiet title. Scope of statute herein in Western States. 
 
 Multiform use of 361 
 
 267. Illustrations of action and its form 363 
 
 268. Same subject 363 
 
 269. Case in New York 304 
 
 270. Actions for partition. Their general purpose. General creditors. 
 
 Holders of liens on entire tract 365 
 
 271. Holders of liens on undivided shares 366 
 
 272. Different rule where object of suit is to sell land and divide 
 
 proceeds 368 
 
 273. Joinder of wife of tenant in common. Administrator of deceased 
 
 tenant in common. In New York 370 
 
 274. In Indiana and California 371 
 
 275. Actions for various miscellaneous objects. Partnership matters 
 
 and accounting 372 
 
 276. Rescission and cancellation 373 
 
 277. Same subject 373
 
 XXxiv TABLE OF CONTKNTS. 
 
 Section Page^ 
 
 'Jib. Same subject 374 
 
 279. Enfurceiiieut of liens 375 
 
 280. Same subject 376 
 
 281. Same subject 376 
 
 282. Ck)ntribution 377 
 
 283. Actions by taxpayers 377 
 
 284. Actions to redeem 378 
 
 SECTION SEVENTH. 
 
 When One Person may sue or be sued on Behalf of all the 
 Persons interested. 
 
 285. Statutory provision • , . . 379 
 
 280. Author's analysis of language of statute. Two distinct cases. 
 
 Essential elements of each case 380 
 
 287. Necessary allegations herein 382 
 
 288. Judicial interpretation of statute. Order pursued in examination 
 
 of decided cases 383 
 
 289. Statute re-enacts equity rule. Must be some connection between 
 
 parties represented in both cases. Test 384 
 
 290. Aj«i>licable both to legal and equitable actions. Number of parties 
 
 in second case 385 
 
 291. Particular instances 386 
 
 292. Same subject 387 
 
 293. Nature of such action. What essential on part of those not named 
 
 in order to become parties 388 
 
 294. Equity rule. Rule in Kentucky 389 
 
 29."j. Question whether one has made himself a party may present itself 
 
 in two aspects 389 
 
 29G. Same subject 391 
 
 297. Conclusion of author from discussion 391 
 
 298. Necessary averments of complaint or petition 392 
 
 SECTION EIGHTH. 
 Persons severally Liable upon the same Instrument. 
 
 299. Reasons for separate treatment. Two classes of statutory pro- 
 visions 393 
 
 800. Quotation of statutory provisions 393 
 
 301. Two classes of st;itutory jirovisions compared and distinguished . 396 
 
 302. Turning-point of decisions herein. Illustrations 397 
 
 303. Forms of contract inchided in statute. Illustrations. Form of 
 
 judgment 398 
 
 301. Form of judgment continued. Jiiscussion by Wisconsin Supreme 
 
 Court 399 
 
 305. Joint and several liability may be treated by promisee or obligee 
 
 as several under statute herein 401
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS XXXV 
 
 Section Page 
 
 306. Case of guarantor and principal debtor. Weight of authority. 
 
 Rule in Iowa 402 
 
 307. When liability arises from same instrument 403 
 
 SECTION NINTH. 
 Bringing in New Parties : Intervening. 
 
 308. Two types of code provisions herein 404 
 
 309. Statutory provisions of first form 405 
 
 310. Statutory provision of second form 406 
 
 311. Three transactions herein. First of said transactions. Moving 
 
 party 407 
 
 312. Second of said transactions. Scope of statutory provision herein. 
 
 Moving party 408 
 
 313. Intervention in Iowa and California. Origin of 408 
 
 314. Third of said transactions. Interpleader. How distinguished 
 
 from other of said transactions 409 
 
 315. Bringing in additional parties. When the court must act . . . 410 
 
 316. Same subject . ". 412 
 
 317. Same subject Limitations herein 413 
 
 318. Examples and illustrations. Pleadings. Rule in Indiana in refer- 
 
 ence to assignors 414 
 
 319. Author's suggestions herein 415 
 
 320. Intervention. Need not be necessary pai'ty. Discretion of court. 
 
 Time of application 417 
 
 321. Statutory provision limited. Illustrations 417 
 
 322. Additional illustrations 419 
 
 323. The Iowa and California system of intervening. Illustrative 
 
 examples 420 
 
 324. Author's statement of the doctrine 427 
 
 325. Concluding remarks ^ . 428 
 
 CHAPTER THIRD. 
 
 The Affirmative Subject-Matter of the Action: The Formal Statement of the Cause 
 of Action by the Plaintiff. 
 
 SECTION FIRST. 
 The Statutory Provisions. 
 
 326. Introduction 430 
 
 327. Statutory provisions as to complaint 430 
 
 328. Statutory provisions applicable to all pleadings 436 
 
 329. Statutory provisions respecting amendment 439 
 
 330. Order of proposed treatment 442
 
 XXX vi TABLE OF CuNTENTS. 
 
 SECTION SECOND. 
 
 Joinder ok Causes of Action. 
 Section Page 
 
 331. Subdivisions for discussion herein o . . . . 443 
 
 I. The Statutory Provisions. 
 
 332. Language of the codes herein 443 
 
 333. Features common to many codes. States in which these features 
 
 are wanting 446 
 
 334. Departures from original type 449 
 
 335. Scope and meaning of statutory provisions. Difficulties of inter- 
 
 pretation 449 
 
 II. The Forms and Modes m which a Misjoinder may occur, and the Manner in 
 
 which it 7nust be objected to and corrected. 
 
 336. Separate statement of different causes of action 450 
 
 337. How question of misjoinder of causes of action is raised. Effect of 
 
 sustaining demurrer upon this ground 451 
 
 338. Effect of misjoinder in some States 452 
 
 339. Motion by adverse party requiring correction of pleading . . . 454 
 
 340. Possible forms of misjoinder 4.54 
 
 341. First form of misjoinder not ground of demurrer. Remedy is by 
 
 motion 454 
 
 342. Remedy when second form of misjoinder occurs 456 
 
 343. Rule in few States 4-57 
 
 344. Remedy when third case of misjoinder occurs 458 
 
 345. Author's criticism and suggestion herein 458 
 
 III. Meaning of the Term '■'■Cause of Action;'''' where one Cause of Action 
 only is stated, although several Different Kinds of Relief are demanded. 
 
 346. Confounding " cause of action " with " remedy." Decisions herein. 
 
 Definition obtained by analy.si.s 4.59 
 
 317. Remedy. Elements of every judicial action. Elements constitut- 
 
 ing cause of action 460 
 
 318. Cause of action and remedial right differentiated. Examples . . 462 
 
 349. Test in determining whether different causes of action have been 
 
 stated. Caution in ajiplying test 465 
 
 350. Two or more <li.stinct rii^^hl.s each invaded by distinct wrongs, and 
 
 two rights invadtd by one and the same wrong, or one right 
 broken by two separate wrongs 467 
 
 351. General principle drawn from analysis of essential elements of a 
 
 judicial action 467 
 
 352. Cause of action not to be confounded with relief. Illustrative 
 
 cases 471 
 
 3.53. Saiue subject 472
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXX VI l 
 
 Section Page 
 
 354. Same subject 475 
 
 355. Cases in Missouri 470 
 
 356. Summary 477 
 
 IV. The Joinder of Causes of Action arising out of the same Transaction or 
 Transactions Connected with the same Subject of Action ; Legal Meaning of 
 the Terms " Transaction " and " Subject of Action.' ' 
 
 357. Most frequent applications of this class. Includes legal con- 
 
 troversies 477 
 
 358. Controlling words herein. Neces.sity of judicial definition of . . 478 
 
 359. Language of Comstock, J., and author's criticism 479 
 
 360. Observations made by courts respecting meaning of these terms . 481 
 
 361. Author's criticism 482 
 
 362. Same subject 484 
 
 363. Same subject 485 
 
 364. Same subject 486 
 
 365. Jones r. Steamship Cortes 487 
 
 366. Observations of the author. Two alternatives 488 
 
 367. Meaning of " transaction " 488 
 
 368. Same subject 489 
 
 369. Meaning of " subject of action " 492 
 
 370. Exajiiples of causes of action held to have arisen out of the same 
 
 transaction 494 
 
 371. Examples of causes of action held not to have arisen out of the 
 
 same transaction 497 
 
 372. "What facts must be averred herein 497 
 
 V. Instances in tohich the Proper Joinder of Causes of Action is connected loith 
 the Proper Joinder of Defendants ; Discussion of the Provision that all the 
 Causes of Action must affect all of the Parties. 
 
 373. Statement of question examined in this subdivision 498 
 
 374. Effect of code provision requiring that causes of action joined in 
 
 one complaint must affect all the parties 499 
 
 375. Illustration 500 
 
 376. lUusti-ations 501 
 
 377. Causes of action so joined must also affect all the plaintiffs. Illus- 
 
 trations 502 
 
 378. The doctrine, as stated by the New York Court of Appeals, re- 
 
 specting a cause of action against an executor, administrator, or 
 
 trustee united with one against him in his individual capacity . 504 
 
 379. Illustrations 505 
 
 380. Discussion of questions under consideration in Wilson v. Castro . 505 
 
 381. Calvert's observations upon the distinction between " subject " and 
 
 " object " of the action 509 
 
 382. Same subject 512
 
 XXXviii TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Section Page 
 
 383. Author's criticism of Calvert's theory 513 
 
 384. Application of Calvert's analysis to the language of the codes . . 514 
 
 ^'I. Instances in which all the Causes of Action are against a Single Defendant, 
 or against all the Defendants alike. 
 
 385. Questions discussed in this subdivision pertain wholly to joinder 
 
 of causes and not to parties 514 
 
 380. Joinder of causes arising out of contract. Illustrations .... 515 
 
 387. When tort is waived and suit is brought upon implied promise. 
 
 Illustrations 515 
 
 388. Additional illustrations 516 
 
 389. Causes for injuries to property. Illustrations 517 
 
 390. Malicious prosecution and slander or libel 518 
 
 391. Special cases 519 
 
 392. Rule in Iowa 519 
 
 393. Illustrations from Indiana and California 520 
 
 394. Cause of action upon contract cannot be joined with one to re- 
 
 cover damages for a tort. Illustrations. Author's criticism . . .521 
 
 395. Illustrations 522 
 
 396. Cause of action against one in personal character cannot be united 
 
 with one against him in representative character. Reason. 
 
 Author's criticism. Illustrations 523 
 
 397. Some unclassified cases. Author's criticism 525 
 
 398. Grouping of actions for injuries to the person in some States. 
 
 Illustrations 526 
 
 399. Holding of Wisconsin court in action to quiet title 527 
 
 SECTION THIRD. 
 The General Principles of Pleading. 
 
 400. The three types of pleading prior to the reformed system. Plead- 
 
 ing by allegation 527 
 
 401. The equity .'system of pleading 528 
 
 402. The common-law system of pleading. Introductory 531 
 
 403. Technicality of the system 532 
 
 404. Essential principles and elements of common-law pleading . . . 533 
 
 405. Same subject 534 
 
 406. History of the action of assumpsit 536 
 
 407. Outline of jiropo-sed discussion of reformed procedure 539 
 
 408. Two theories as t(j the relation between the new and old systems . 539 
 
 409. The theory generally adopted 541 
 
 410. K.s8ential principles of reformed system of pleading. Introductory 541 
 
 411. Manner of averring material facts 542 
 
 412. The term " cause of action " 547 
 
 413. True signification of the term 548
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXxix 
 
 Section Page 
 
 414. Complete statement of entire cause of action would include legal 
 
 rules and rights and duties 549 
 
 415. Term as applied to legal actions 550 
 
 416. Term as applied to equitable actions 551 
 
 417. Nature of the facts constituting a cause of action when term is 
 
 applied to both legal and equitable suits 552 
 
 418. Elements omitted and retained when cause of action is set forth 
 
 in the complaint 553 
 
 419. Cases where facts showing primary right are omitted because 
 
 presumed 554 
 
 420. Only ultimate facts are to be alleged 555 
 
 421. The doctrine as applied to equitable suits 557 
 
 422. This distinction between material facts in legal and equitable 
 
 actions sustained by the courts 559 
 
 423. Facts should be alleged as they actually existed or occurred, not 
 
 their legal effect 560 
 
 424. Cases supporting doctrine that facts, not legal conclusions, are to 
 
 be stated 561 
 
 425. Same subject 563 
 
 426. Cases supporting doctrine that material, not probative, facts are 
 
 to be stated 565 
 
 427. Instances of allegations approved or condemned by the courts . . 570 
 
 428. Same subject .572 
 
 429. Same subject 573 
 
 430. Attitude of courts in instances cited largely due to liberal rule of 
 
 construction 576 
 
 431. Doctrine that facts pleaded should be stated as they occurred 
 
 or existed. Two questions presented 577 
 
 432. Necessity or propriety of alleging a promise in actions upon 
 
 implied promises 577 
 
 433. Case of Booth v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank (N. Y.) . . . 580 
 
 434. Conclusions 581 
 
 435. Criticism of Booth v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank 582 
 
 436. Common counts under the codes 584 
 
 437. Use sanctioned also where obligation is express 586 
 
 438. Criticism of doctrine 588 
 
 439. Further rules of pleading to be considered. Outline of dis- 
 
 cussion ... 590 
 
 440. Strict construction of pleadings superseded by liberal construction 590 
 
 441. Judicial approval of liberal construction 591 
 
 442. Insufficient, imperfect, incomplete, or informal allegations, and 
 
 the mode of objecting to and correcting them. Distinction 
 
 between imperfect and wholly deficient allegations .... 595 
 
 443. Motion the proper method of attacking pleadings which are 
 
 merely imperfect 596 
 
 444. Demurrer, or dismissal of petition at the trial, proper when 
 
 allegations are wholly deficient 6O0
 
 xl TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Section Page 
 
 ■145. Retlundaiit, immaterial, and irrelevant allegations, and the mode 
 
 of objecting to and correcting them. Distinctions 009 
 
 446. Motion, not demurrer, proper method of objecting to superfluous 
 
 allegations - 6J.1 
 
 447. The doctrine that the cause of action proved must correspond 
 
 with the one alleged. Degrees of variance between allegations 
 
 and proof 61o 
 
 448. Consequences of different degrees of variance 614 
 
 440. In.'^tances where variance has been held immaterial 616 
 
 450. Instances of complete failure of proof 620 
 
 451. Examples of fatal disagreement between cause of action pleaded 
 
 and proved 621 
 
 452. Variance fatal where cause of action in tort alleged and one in 
 
 contract proved 623 
 
 453. How nature of cause of action is determined. Illustrations of 
 
 causes ex contractu 627 
 
 4.'>4. Illustrations of causes ex delicto 629 
 
 455. Further examples of variance where tort is alleged and contract 
 
 proved 630 
 
 456. Amendments allowed by the code 632 
 
 457. Conflict of authority on right to amend by substituting different 
 
 cau.><e of action 634 
 
 458. Election between actions ex delicto and actions ex contractu . . . 638 
 
 459. New procedure makes no change in doctrine of election . . . 646 
 
 460. Chi.'jses of cases where election is allowed. Conversion. Conflict 
 
 of authority 648 
 
 461. Actions against common carriers for loss or injury to goods. 
 
 Other cases 650 
 
 462. Principle which determines when a promise is implied .... 651 
 
 463. Method of indicating election. Averment of promise as a test . . 652 
 
 464. No difficulty where promise is express. Summons suggested as 
 
 means of indicating election in case of implied promise . . . 653 
 
 SECTION FOURTH. 
 The Form of tiik Comi-laixt ok Petition. 
 
 4'i.'i. Introductory 656 
 
 466. .Si'parat«* statement of difi"crent cau.scs of action. Inducement 
 
 and prayer need not be repeated 657 
 
 467. Hule as to statement of same cause of action in different counts . 659 
 408. Effect of demurring to entire complaint when made up of several 
 
 counts. Joint demurrers by two or more defendants .... 060 
 
 469. Adtniftsion Ijv failure to deny 662 
 
 47<i. Defective complaint aided by averments in answer 663 
 
 471. I'raver for relief 065
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. xli 
 
 CHAPTER FOURTH. 
 
 The Defensive Subject-Matter of the Action; The Formal Presentation of his 
 Defence, or of his Claim for Affirmative Relief, by the Defendant. 
 
 SECTION FIRST. 
 
 Statutory Provisions concerning Matters of Defence. 
 
 Section Page 
 
 472. Statutory provisions relating to answers 691 
 
 473. Statutory provisions respecting union of defences 692 
 
 474. Same subject 696 
 
 475. Statutes providing for set-off 698 
 
 476. Statutory provisions as to cross-complaints and sham answers . . 700 
 
 477. Statutes allowing demurrer to entire answer or to separate defence 
 
 or countei'-claim 701 
 
 478. Code provisions respecting reply 701 
 
 479. Same subject 702 
 
 480. Miscellaneous statutory provisions 703 
 
 481. Liberality of the codes in furtherance of justice 704 
 
 482. Outline of treatment of code theory of defence 705 
 
 SECTION SECOND. 
 
 The General Requisites of an Answer, and the General Rules 
 Applicable to all Answers. 
 
 483. Introductory 705 
 
 484. Two kinds of answer — denials and new matter 706 
 
 485. Two kinds of questions. Those of form 706 
 
 486. Questions of substance 707 
 
 487. Purpose of demurrer. Special demurrer abolished. Motion sub- 
 
 stituted 708 
 
 488. Conflict of decisions 714 
 
 489. Same subject 716 
 
 490. Defects of form are curable by motion 717 
 
 491. Defects of form are waived by neglect to move, and going to trial. 
 
 Test of formal defects 719 
 
 492. Case of Simmons v. Sisson 720 
 
 493. Additional cases 721 
 
 494. Doctrine that defects of substance are waived by failure to demur 723 
 
 495. Liberal rule of construction not always followed 723 
 
 496. Case of Lefler v. Field 724 
 
 497. Pleadings by joint defendants 724 
 
 498. Partial defences 725 
 
 499. Partial defences should be pleaded as such 726 
 
 500. Criticism of foregoing rule 727
 
 xlii TABLE OF CONTENTS, 
 
 SECTION THIRD. 
 
 Section The Defenck of Denial. Page 
 
 501. Species of denial 728 
 
 502. Outline of proposed treatment 729 
 
 503. Same subject 729 
 
 504. External form of denials, general and specific 729 
 
 505. Issuable facts as distinguished from evidentiary facts and from 
 
 conclusions 731 
 
 506. Function of the specific denial 731 
 
 507. Illustrative case 733 
 
 508. Allegations admitted by failure to deny 734 
 
 509. Xegative.s pregnant. How they may arise 737 
 
 510. Illustrations 738 
 
 511. Illustrations 738 
 
 512. Illustrations 739 
 
 513. Conflict of authority as to whether a negative pregnant raises an issue 741 
 
 514. Tile better doctrine 742 
 
 515. Denials cannot properly contain new matter 742 
 
 516. Pleading new matter equivalent to a denial 743 
 
 517. Same subject 743 
 
 518. Remedy for such a denial is by motion under the codes .... 744 
 
 519. Illustrations of argumentative denials 744 
 
 520. Where answer contains general denial and also a special defence 
 
 of new matter equivalent to general denial 745 
 
 521. Combination of general and argumentative denials 746 
 
 522. Practice in Indiana in respect to argumentative denials .... 747 
 
 523. Same subject 747 
 
 524. General denials of all allegations not otherwise admit rod or re- 
 
 ferred to " 748 
 
 525. Proper distinction to be observed between general and specific 
 
 denials 749 
 
 526. Difficulty arising from this form of answer 750 
 
 527. This form sanctioned by some courts 750 
 
 528. Facts, not conclusions of law, should be denied 752 
 
 529. Illustrations 754 
 
 530. Denial of conclusions of law is unnecessary 754 
 
 531. Denials of knowledge or information. Formula prescribed by 
 
 statute should be followed • . . . 755 
 
 .'>32. When a denial of knowledge or information is not allowed . . . 757 
 
 633. Outline of proposed treatment of i.s8ues raised by denials . . 759 
 
 534. Iin|)ortance of questions suggested 759 
 
 5:i5. The general denial. McKyring v. Bull 760 
 
 530. Further illustrations 761 
 
 637. Neci'ssity of reply depends upon nature of defence 763 
 
 53H. Anything tending directly to controvert allegations in complain i. 
 
 a<lmls.sible under general denial 763
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. xliii 
 
 Section Page 
 
 5o9. Same subject 764 
 
 540. Same subject 7G5 
 
 541. Construction adopted in California 766 
 
 542. Twofold office of general denial. No exact statement possible of 
 
 particular defences admissible under it 7G7 
 
 543. Only material averments put in issue by general denial .... 769 
 
 544. Only issuable facts are material. Test to distinguish them from 
 
 evidentiary facts 770 
 
 545. Allegations of legal conclusions not controverted by general denial 771 
 
 546. General nature of evidence admissible under denials 772 
 
 547. Evidence proper under denials may be affirmative or negative . . 773 
 
 548. Distinction between general issue and plea of confession and 
 
 avoidance at common law not the same as that between general 
 
 denial and new matter under the code 774 
 
 549. Same subject 775 
 
 5.50. Particular defences admissible under the general denial. In 
 
 actions for compensation for services 776 
 
 551. In actions for negligent injuries 777 
 
 552. Assignment, want of consideration, etc 778 
 
 553. In actions for conversion 779 
 
 554. In actions to recover possession of goods 780 
 
 555. In actions to recover possession of land 781 
 
 556. In actions in which malice is an essential ingredient 782 
 
 557. In actions for specific performance 783 
 
 558. In actions on covenants and judgments 784 
 
 559. Special statutory provisions as to denying existence of corporation 
 
 and partnership 785 
 
 560. Special statutory provisions as to denials in actions on written 
 
 instruments 786 
 
 561. General denial cannot be struck out as sham 787 
 
 SECTION FOURTH. 
 
 The Defence of New Matter. 
 
 562. Introdudtory 788 
 
 I. Hoio Defences of New Matter should be pleaded. 
 
 563. Statement of new matter in answer governed by same rule as state- 
 
 ment of cause of action in petition 788 
 
 564. Further illustrations 790 
 
 565. Averments of new matter as basis for affirmative relief .... 791 
 
 II. The Getieral Nature of New Matter ; Defences in Mitigation of Damac/es, 
 
 and in Abatement. 
 
 566. Introductory . 792 
 
 567. Denials and new matter distinguished 792 
 
 568. New matter as confession and avoidance 794
 
 xliv TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Section ^ Page 
 
 bay. Defences in mitigation of damages. Common-law theory . . . 795 
 
 r»70. Theory of the codes as to pleading matter in mitigation .... 795 
 
 571. New York doctrine as to pleading matter in mitigation .... 797 
 
 572. Doctrine in Indiana and Kentucky 798 
 
 573. Defences in abatement. Common-law doctrine 799 
 
 574. Formal distinction between pleas in abatement and in bar removed 
 
 by the codes 799 
 
 III. Some Particular Defences of New Matter Classified and Ai-ranged. 
 
 575. Introductory 801 
 
 57G. Payment 801 
 
 577. What may be shown under the defence of payment 803 
 
 578. Arbitrament and award. Former recovery 804 
 
 579. Actions for the recovery of chattels 804 
 
 580. Actions for tort 805 
 
 581. Same subject 80G 
 
 582. Actions concerning lands 807 
 
 583. Actions upon contract 809 
 
 584. Defence of illegality 810 
 
 585. Further illustrations of new matter 812 
 
 586. New matter distinguished from denials by Supreme Court of 
 
 Missouri 813 
 
 587. Examples of defences in abatement 813 
 
 588. Miscellaneous defences 815 
 
 589. Statute of Limitations 818 
 
 590. Same subject 820 
 
 SECTION FIFTH. 
 Thk Union of Defences in the Same Answer. 
 
 591. Introductory 823 
 
 I. How the Separate Defences should be stated. 
 
 592. Each defence must be complete in itself 823 
 
 593. Suggested method of pleading specific denials. Common-law 
 
 theory 825 
 
 59 i. Objections to the code answered 820 
 
 595. Same subject 827 
 
 596. Same subject 828 
 
 II. What Kiruls of Defences may he joined in one Answer; those in Abatement, 
 
 and those in Bar. 
 
 597. Defences in abatement and in bar may be joined in one answer . 829 
 .'i98. Inconsistent defences 830 
 
 599. Same subject 832 
 
 600. I'fTect of admissions in one defence upon issues raised in another . 834 
 •■"! Facts jtleaded as both defence and ciunter-claim 834
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. xlv 
 
 SECTION SIXTH. 
 
 Counter-Claim, Set-off, Cross-Complaint, and Cross-Demand. 
 
 Section Page 
 G02. Statutory provisions. Two groups. Special provisions of Indiana 
 
 and Iowa codes. Similarity of code provisions 835 
 
 G03. Arrangement of subject-matter for discussion 837 
 
 604. Counter-claim to be compared with cross-demands of former system 838 
 
 605. The cross-demands allowed by the former procedure 838 
 
 606. Discussion of New York statute of set-off 840 
 
 607. Origin of set-off and recoupment. Resemblances and dissimilarities S41 
 
 608. Illustrations of recoupment 842 
 
 609. Mere defences distiuj^uished from set-off or recoupment, counter- 
 
 claim or cross-demand 844 
 
 I. A General Description of the Counter- Claim; its Nature, Objects and Uses. 
 
 610. Scope of inquiry herein 845 
 
 Oil. One class of cases included in term "set-off" under former procedure 
 
 not included in counter-claim. Mere defence Dot a counter-claim 846 
 G12. Recoupment a species of counter-claim. How modified and en- 
 larged 846 
 
 613. Counter-claim broader than set-off au'l recoupment. Kinds of 
 
 causes of action that may be interposed as counter-claims . . 847 
 014. Essential elements and test of counter-claim. Must be a cause of 
 
 action 849 
 
 615. Implies an opposing claim Limitation herein 851 
 
 616. Cause of action alleged must exist in favor of defendant who pleads 
 
 it. Exception hereto in codes of Indiana and Iowa .... 8.32 
 
 617. Cause of action must exist against the plaintiff 853 
 
 618. Subject-matter of counter-claim. General classes. Statutory re- 
 
 strictions as to scope and character. Analysis of statutory 
 
 provisions 853 
 
 619. Illustrative opinions 855 
 
 620. Doctrine that counter-claim must be antagonistic to, and tend to 
 
 defeat, lessen or modify, the claim of plaintiff 8.56 
 
 621. Application of doctrine. Limitation established by New York 
 
 courts. Purely judicial. Criticism 859 
 
 622. Decisions in other States 860 
 
 623. Cause of limitation upon counter-claims 862 
 
 624. How plead counter-claim. Characteristic marks. Reason herein 863 
 
 II. The Parties in their Relations icith the Counter-Claim. 
 
 625. Relations of defendant to counter-claim. Must be a demand in 
 
 favor of defendant who pleads it. Test 868 
 
 626. Case of surety. Relief in equity 868 
 
 627. Rule not confined to sureties. Other instances 870
 
 xlvi TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Section Page 
 
 G26. Relations of plaintiff to couuter-claiin. I\Iust ])e a demand against 
 
 plaintiff. Test. Application of rule nicst fre(iueut in what cases 871 
 
 G29. Counter-claim must be a cause of action ; merely defensive matter 
 
 not sufficient 873 
 
 03u. In actions by married women ; by widows. Must be again.st plain- 
 tiff' in capacity in which he sues. Against plaintiff' alone and 
 against all the plaintiff's. Exception 873 
 
 tJ31. When the counter-claim may be in favor of one or more of several 
 defendants, and against one or more of several plaintiffs. When 
 possible. Question herein stated 875 
 
 632. Against one or some of the plaintiff's. Illustrative case .... 876 
 
 633. Several judgment between some of the parties. Inquiry presented 
 
 herein. Conflict of opinion 878 
 
 634. In favor of one or some of the defendants. Settled rule herein . 880 
 
 635. Where partnership may be sued in firm name. Illustrative cases . 881 
 630. Construction given to language of Iowa code in Musselman v. 
 
 (ialligher 882 
 
 637. Rules established in most of the States 883 
 
 638. Counter-claim may fail for want of necessary parties, especially 
 
 those of an equitable character. Illustrative case 884 
 
 III. The Subject- Matter of Counter-Claims, or the Nature of the Causes of 
 Action which may be pleaded as Counter-Claims. 
 
 639. Introductory 885 
 
 A. Whether a Counter-Claim may he an Equitable Cause of Action, and the 
 Means of Obtaining Equitable Relief ; or whether it must be restricted to Legal 
 Causes of Action and Reliefs. 
 
 640. An equitable counter-claim may be interposed in an equitable or 
 
 legal action 885 
 
 041. Limitation upon equitable relief granted to defendant : in actions 
 of equitable character ; in actions of legal character. Doctrine 
 
 maintained by Supreme Court of New York. Illustrative case 887 
 
 642. Additional instances 889 
 
 643. Is counter-claim possible in action to recover possession of chattels ? 890 
 
 li. 77,r I'urliculnr Questions which arise under the First Clause or Branch of the 
 
 Statutory Definition. 
 
 014 Language of the first clause. The three subjects embraced within 
 this language. Particular phrases requiring construction. 
 Method of interpretation adopted by the courts 892 
 
 645. Illustrativeca.se. Meaning of term " Transaction " 893 
 
 646. Case of Scheunert v. Kaehler. Criticism 896 
 
 647. Cawes in Indiana and Kentucky. Discussion of the meaning of 
 
 the phrases "arising out of," "connected with," and "transac- 
 tion " in these cases 898
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. xlvii 
 
 section Page 
 l;-18. Cannot defeat counter-claim by choice of form of action. Thomp- 
 son r. Kessel 900 
 
 049. Xenia Branch Bank i-. Lee 901 
 
 (i.jO. Meaning of term " transaction." Diiferences of opinion as to the 
 
 import of statutory terras 903 
 
 051. Meaning of "subject of action." No agreement in judicial 
 
 opinions. Construction proposed by author 904 
 
 652. The phrase " connected with.'' Connection must be immediate 
 
 and direct 906 
 
 I. Cases in which the Cause of Action Allefjed as a Coimter- Claim arises out of 
 the Contract Set forth in the Complaint or Petition as the Foundation of the 
 PlainiifTs Claim. 
 
 053. First and second subdivisions of statute overlap to a certain extent 906 
 
 054. General proposition stated. Illustrative examples 90S 
 
 055. Examples continued 910 
 
 056. Examples continued 911 
 
 II. Cases in which the Cause of Action AJlecjed as a Counter-Claim arises out of 
 the Transaction Set faith in the Complaint or Petition as the Foundation 
 of the Plaintiffs Claim. 
 
 057. Plan of discussing this subdivision 911 
 
 658. Classification and arrangement of cases to be cited 912 
 
 659. First class. AVhere tlie plaintiff's cause of action and the defend- 
 
 ant's counter-claim are in form debt or damages upon contract 
 
 express or implied 912 
 
 660. Cases in which the plaintiffs cause of action is upon contract, and 
 
 the defendant's counter-claim is for damages arising from a tort 913 
 
 661. Damages from trespas.ses, nuisances, negligences, and the like . . 915 
 062. Same subject 916 
 
 663. Damages arising fiom fraud 917 
 
 664. Cases in which the plaintiff's cause of action is for a tort and the 
 
 defendant's counter-claim is in form upon contract 917 
 
 665. Same subject 919 
 
 666. Cases in which the demands of both parties are for damages aris- 
 
 ing from tort 920 
 
 667. Second class. Legal actions in which the judgment is other than 
 
 for money 921 
 
 068. Third class. Cases in which the plaintiff's cause of action or the 
 
 defendant's counter-claim, or both, are equitable in tlieir nature . 923 
 
 III. Cases in ivhich the Cause of Action Alleged by the Defendant as a Counter- 
 
 claim is or is not connected tvith the Subject of the Action. 
 
 669. References to cases already cited 924 
 
 670. Construction of the phrases " subject of the action," "connected 
 
 with," and "arising out of." 925
 
 xlviii TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 C. Counter-Claims Embraced within the Second Subdivision of the Statutory 
 
 Dejinition and Set-offs, 
 Section Page 
 
 671. Statutory provision. Limitation upon the discussion herein . . 928 
 G7l'. Statute enlarges former legal "setoff " and is broader in its opera- 
 tion than •' equital)Ie set-off." Difficult questions herein. Order 
 
 of treatment 928 
 
 i»73. Requisites of counter-claim under this clause of the statute . . . 930 
 
 674. May, but need not, counter-claim unliquidated danoages. Claim 
 
 for contribution by surety. Pleading 932 
 
 675. May set up as a counter-claim the following : A judgment against 
 
 the plaintiff ; rights of actions allowed only by statute and re- 
 garded as arising on an implied promise ; demand growing out 
 
 of unsettled partnership transactions 934 
 
 670. Counter-claim against an executor de son tort. In an action by a 
 
 pledgor 935 
 
 677. Statement of established doctrine. Question of doubt herein . . 936 
 
 678. Illustrative examples in equitable actions 937 
 
 079. Counter-claim of money demand on independent contract inter- 
 posed in action to foreclose mortgage 937 
 
 IV. Some Miscellaneous Proi'isions in Relation to Counter-Claims. 
 
 680. Opportunity to interpose counter-claim not a bar to another suit 
 
 thereon 938 
 
 6S1. Form of verdict, finding, and judgment 940 
 
 682. Cross-complaints. Provisions of the codes. Difference in practice. 
 
 Illustrative cases 941 
 
 683. Illustrative cases continued 944 
 
 084. Code provision in Indiana. Procedure. Iowa and California . . 945
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the kkferences are to the pages.] 
 
 A. 
 
 Abadie v. Carrillo, 02 Cal. 172 684 
 
 Abba V. Smyth (1899), 21 Utah, 109, 
 
 59 Pac. 756 818 
 
 Abbe V. Clarke, Ol Barb. 238 178, 818 
 
 Abbot V. Chapman, 2 Lev. 81 701 
 
 Abbott V. Blossom, 66 Barb. 353 049 
 
 V. Gaelics (1899), 20 Wash. 517, 
 
 56 Pac. 28 320, 754 
 
 r. Jewett, 25 IIuii, 603 412 
 
 i;. Monti, il Colo. 561 55, 942 
 
 Abcel V. Van Gelder, 36 N. Y. 513 284 
 
 Abell Note, etc. Co. r. Ilurd, 52 N. W. 
 
 Kep. 488 94 
 
 Abendroth u. Boardley, 27 Wis. 555 658 
 Aberaman Iron C!o. v. Wickens, L. R. 
 
 4 Ch. App. 101 255 
 
 Abiel V. Harrington, 18 Kan. 253 570 
 
 Abilene Nat. Bank r. Nodine (1894), 
 
 26 Ore. 53, 37 Pac. 47 070 
 
 Abrahanison v. Lamberson (1898), 
 
 72 Minn. 308, 75 N. W. 226 917 
 
 Acer V. Hotchkiss, 97 N. Y. 395 805 
 
 Achey v. Creech (1899), 21 Wash. 
 
 319, 58 Pac. 208 470 
 
 Acker v. McCullough, 50 Ind. 447 007 
 Ackley v. Tarbox, 31 N. Y. 564 185, 224 
 Ackroyd v. P.ri^ijs, 14 W. R. 25 242 
 
 Adair v. New liivcr Co., 11 Ves. 429 363, 
 
 885, 389 
 Adams v. Adams, 25 Minn. 72 576 
 
 y. Adams (1903), —Ind. —,66 
 
 N. E. 153 816 
 
 V. Baker (1898), 24 Nev. 162, 55 
 
 Pac. 8(i2 877, 881, 934 
 
 V. Bissell, 28 Barb. 382 485, 495 
 
 V. Castle (1896), 64 Minn. 505,67 
 
 N. W. 687 618 
 
 V. Curtis, 4 Lans. 164 ' 226 
 
 V. Farr, 5 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 59 218 
 
 V. Hall, 2 Vt. 9 
 V. Hayes (1897), 120 N. C. 383, 
 
 27 S. E. 47 594, 665 
 
 V. Holden (1900), 111 la. 54, 82 
 
 N. W. 468 608 
 
 V. HoUey, 12 How. Pr. 326 584 
 
 V. Honness, 62 Barb. 820 225, 315 
 
 Adams v. Loomis, 8 N. Y. Suppl. 
 
 17 928 
 
 V. Osgood (1898), 55 Neb. 766, 
 
 76 N. W. 446 867 
 
 V. Rodarmel, 19 Ind. 339 131, 134 
 
 V. Trigg, 87 Mo. 141 881 
 
 r. Warren (1900), 27 Col. 293,61 
 
 Pac. (!09 913 
 
 Adams Ex. Co. v. Darnell, 31 Ind. 20 707, 
 
 786, 778, 748, 769 
 
 V. Hill. 43 Ind. 157 78;". 
 
 Adnms Oil Co. v. Christmas (1897), 
 
 101 Ky. 564, 41 S. W. 545 640 
 
 Adamson c Raymer (189(i), 94 Wis. 
 
 243, 68 N. W. 1000 602 
 
 r. Wiggins, 45 Minn. 448 809, 880 
 Addicken w. Schrubbe, 45 Iowa, 315 499 
 Ades V. Levi (1893), 137 Ind. 500, 37 
 
 N. E. 388 593 
 
 Adkins v. Adkins, 48 Ind. 12 727 
 
 r. Loucks (1900), 107 Wis. 587, 
 
 83 N. W. 934 466, 468, 493 
 
 A. K. Johnson Co. v. White (1899), 
 
 78 Minn. 48, 80 N. W. 838 421, 661 
 
 TEtna Ins. Co. v. Glasgow Elec. Co. 
 (1899), 107 Ky. 77, 52 S. W. 
 975 672 
 
 V. Simmons (1896), 49 Neb. 811, 
 
 69 N. W. 125 790 
 
 A'ltna Iron Works v. Eirmenicli Mfg. 
 Co. (1894), 90 la. 390, 57 N. W. 
 904 618 
 
 ^Etna Life Ins. Co. r. Sellers (1899), 
 
 154 Ind. 37(1, 50 N. E. 97 181 
 
 A. F. Sli!i[)l('ig!i ll.'irdware Co. v. 
 Hamilton (1902), 70 Ark. 319, 68 
 S. W. 490 626 
 
 Agar V. Fairfax, 17 Ves. 542 308 
 
 Agard v. Valencia, 39 Cal. 292 359 
 
 Agate V. King, 17 Abb. Pr. 159 868 
 
 Ah Doon u. Smith (1893), 25 Ore. 
 
 89, 34 Pac. 1093 810 
 
 AIhtu r. Collins, 39 Mo. 145 641 
 
 Aiken c. Bruen, 21 Ind. 137 661 
 
 Aikeus v. Frank ( 1898), 21 Mont. 192, 
 
 63 Pac. 538 736 
 
 Ainsley r. Mead, 3 Lans. 116 316 
 
 Ainslie r. Boynton, 2 Barb. 258 122
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the REFEaENCES ARE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Ainswortli v. Bowen, 'J Wis. 348 897, 
 
 910, 915 
 
 Akerlv f. Vilas. 15 Wis. 401 923 
 
 r'Vilas, 21 Wis. 8S 897,937 
 
 Albany r. Cunliff. 2 N. Y. ICo 663 
 
 Albany i H. Iron, etc. Co. c. Lund- 
 
 berj. 121 r. S. 451 150 
 
 Alberc r. Kingsland, 13 N. Y. Suppl. 
 
 794 113 
 
 Albers v. Western Union Tel. Co. 
 
 (1896), 98 la. 51, GO N. W. 1040 671 
 Albion Millinj: Co. v. Firt;t Nat. Bank 
 
 (1902), 04 Ni'b 110. 89 >". W. 038 737 
 Albrecht I'. Milwaukee, etc. Co. 
 
 (1894), 87 Wis. 10.5, 58 N. W. 72 069 
 Alden <•. Christianson (1901), 83 
 
 Minn. 21, 85 N. W. 824 850, 863 
 
 Alexander, AV, 37 Iowa, 454 226 
 
 i: Alexander, 85 Va 353, 303, 
 7 S. K. 335, 3.39, 1 L. R. A. 
 125, 127 508 
 
 V. Barker, 2 Tvr. 140 
 V. Cana, 1 DeG. .<: Sm. 415 361 
 
 V. Gaar. 15 Ind. 89 178 
 
 r. Grs'.n.l l.o.l-e (1903), 119 la. 
 
 519, 93 N. W. 508 606 
 
 f. Hurd, 64 N. Y. 228 218 
 
 I'. Jacoby, 23 Ohio St. 358 206, 211 
 V. Overton (1893), 36 Neb. 603, 
 
 64X. W. 825 117 
 
 V. Quiglev, 2 Duvall, 300 341 
 
 V. Thackcr, 3 Nebr. 614 452, 601 
 
 Alford r. Bariium, 45 Cal. 482 815 
 
 Alkire r. Alkire( 1892), 134 Ind. 350, 
 
 32 N. E. 571 709 
 
 Allaire i'. Wliitnev, 1 Hill, 484 843 
 
 Allen r. Brown, 44 X. Y. 228 91, 97 
 
 r. Buffalo, 38 N. Y. 280 181, 185 
 
 1-. Carolina Cent. Ky. Co. (1897), 
 
 120 X. C. 548, 27 S. E. 76 599 
 V. Chicago & Xortliwestern Ry. 
 Co. (1896), 94 Wis. 93, 68 
 X. W. 873 599, 709 
 
 V. Chouteau, 102 Mo. 309 665 
 
 p. Church (1897), 101 la. 116,70 
 
 X. W. l-_'7 717 
 
 D. City of Davenport (1901), 115 
 
 la. 211. HI N. W. 743 433 
 
 V. Coates, 29 .Minn. 40 920 
 
 r. Cooley (l8'.tHi, 53 S. C. 414, 
 
 81 S. K. 034 177, 358 
 
 V. Cooley (1898), 6;J S. C. 77, 30 
 
 S. K. 721 179 
 
 f. Douglass, 29 Kan. 412 873 
 
 V. Fosgate, 11 How. I'r, 218 300, 402 
 f. Frawlev. ( 19(Kl), 100 Wis. 038, 
 
 h2 X. W. 593 066 
 
 r. Hollingnhcad (litOO), 165 Ind. 
 
 \~x, 57 X. ]•:. 917 717 
 
 r. Jerauld, .31 Ind. ;i72 310 
 
 f. Knight, 6 Han-, 272 252 
 
 I'. .Macon, etc. It. R. Co. (1809), 
 
 1(»7 (J«. h;5K, ;j:j s. E. 090 621 
 V. Madox, •!(» Iowa, 124 875 
 
 w. Miller, 11 Ohio .St. 374 101 
 
 Allen V. Olynipia Light & Power Co. 
 (1895), 13 Wash. 307, 43 
 Pac. 55 832 
 
 V. Patterson, 7 N. Y. 476 26, 584, 586 
 V. Randolph, 48 Ind. 496 727, 748, 
 
 918 
 V. Ranson, 44 Mo. 263 285 
 
 V. Saunders, Neb. 436 793 
 
 V. Shackelton, 15 Ohio St. 145 800, 
 
 923 
 V. Smith, 10 N. Y. 415 .357 
 
 i\ State, 61 Ind. 208 499 
 
 c. Stephens (1899), 107 Ga. 733, 
 
 33 S. E. 651 641 
 
 V. Thomas, 3 Mete. 198 105, 109 
 
 AUend v. Spokane Falls, etc. Ry. 
 
 Co. (1899), 21 Wash. 324 505, 643 
 
 Alliance Elevator Co. v. Wells (1890), 
 
 93 Wis. 5, 00 X. W. 796 494 
 
 AUis V. Leonard, 46 N. Y. 688 733, 751 
 1-. Nanson, 41 Ind. 154 798 
 
 Allison I'. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 
 
 42 Iowa, 274 801 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 9 Bush, 
 
 247 U9 
 
 V. Robinson, 78 N. C. 222 240 
 
 V. Weller. N. Y. Sup. Ct. 291 340 
 
 Allred i-. Brav, 41 Mo. 484 301 
 
 U.Tate (1901), 113 Ga. 441, 39 
 
 S. E. 101 511 
 
 Almance Cy. Com'rs v. Blair, 70 
 
 N. C. 136 037 
 
 Alnutt V. Leper, 48 Mo. 319 276 
 
 Alpert V. Bright ( 1902), 74 Conn. 614, 
 
 ylAtl. 521 773 
 
 Alspaugh r. Ben Franklin Ir. Ass., 51 
 
 Ind. 271 439 
 
 V. Reid (1898), Idaho, 223, 55 
 
 Pac. 300 702 
 
 Alston V. Wilson, 44 Iowa, 130 002 
 
 Altenius v. Aslier (1903), Ky., 74 
 
 S. W. 245 543 
 
 Alter f. Bank of Stockham (1897), 
 
 63 Neb. 223, 73 N. W. 667 35 
 
 Althouse 1-. Rice, 4 E. D. Smith, 
 
 347 806 
 
 V. Town of Jamestown (1895), 
 
 91 Wis. 46, 04 N. W. 423 751 
 Alvey V. Wilson, 9 Kan. 401 290 
 
 Alvonl r. Essner, 45 Ind. 150 727 
 
 Alward c. Alwanl, 2 X. Y. Suppl. 42 226 
 Alworth r. Seymour, 42 Minn. 520 067 
 Amador Cy. r. Butterfield, 51 Cal. 
 
 526 709, 831, 834 
 
 American Accident Co. v. Carson 
 
 (IB'.iO), 9'.) Kv. 441, 30 S. W. 169 672 
 American B. 11., 0. S. & S. Mach. 
 
 Co. V. Gurnee, 44 Wis. 49 661 
 V. Thornton, 28 Minn. 418 471 
 
 American Book Co. r. Kingdom 
 Publishing Co. (1898), 71 Minn. 
 303, 73 N. W. 1089 003, 680 
 
 Am. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Rain- 
 bolt (1896), 48 Neb. 434, 07 N. W. 
 493 768
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references a 
 
 American Contract Co. v. Bullcn 
 
 Bridge Co. (189G), 29 Ore. 549, 46 
 
 Pac. 1.38. 
 Am. E.xch. Bank r. Davidson (1897), 
 
 69 Minn. .'JIB, 72 N. W. 129 
 American Fire Ins. Co. v. Landfaro 
 
 (1898), 56 Neb. 482, 76 N. \V. 
 
 1068 
 Am. Freeliold Co. v. McManus (1900), 
 
 68 Ark. 263, 58 S. W. 2-50 
 Am. M. A. Sue. v. Helburn, 85 Ky. 1 
 American Savings and Loan Associa- 
 tion V. Burgiiardt (1897), 19 Mont. 
 
 323, 48 Pac. 391 
 American Shoe Co. v. O'Kourke 
 
 (1900), 23 Mont. 530, 59 Pac. 910 
 American Trust, etc. Bank «. McGet- 
 
 tigan (1899), 152 Ind. 582, 52 N. E. 
 
 793 
 American Water Works Co. v. State 
 
 (1895), 46 Neb. 194, 64 N. W. 711 
 Ammerman v. Crosby, 26 Ind. 451 
 
 690 
 
 942 
 
 593 
 
 543 
 
 567 
 
 474 
 
 672 
 
 181 
 
 709 
 
 769, 
 783 
 
 Amos V. Humboldt Loan Ass'n, 21 
 
 Kan. 474 940 
 
 Anders v. Life Ins. Co. (1901), 62 
 
 Neb. 585, 87 N. W. 831 689 
 
 Anderson v. Alsetli (1895), 6 S. D. 
 
 566, 62 N. W. 435 593, 625 
 
 v. Bank (1895), 5 N. D. 80, 64 
 
 N. W. 114 639 
 
 V. Bank (1896), 5 N. D. 451, 67 
 
 N. W. 821 649 
 
 V. Case, 28 Wis. 505 626, 630, 683 
 V. Chilson (1895), 8 S. D. 64, 65 
 
 N. W. 435 8, 89 
 
 V. Davis (1898), 18 Utah, 200, 
 
 55 Pac 363 231 
 
 V. Fitzgerald, 51 Fed. Rep. 294 112 
 V. Foster (1898),' 105 Ga. 563, 32 
 
 S. E. 373 656 
 
 V. Gaines (1900), 156 Mo. 664, 
 
 57 S. W. 726 542 
 
 V. Groesbeck (1899), 26 Colo. 3, 
 
 55 Pac. 1086 639 
 
 V. Hayes (1899), 101 Wis. 519, 
 
 77 N. W. 903 688 
 
 V. Hill, 53 Barb. 238 313, 458, 482, 
 490, 492, 497 
 V. Hilton & Dodge Co. (1899), 
 
 110 Ga. 263, U S. E. 365 712 
 V. Hunn, 5 Hun, 79 15, 29 
 
 V. Joimson (1900), 106 Wis. 218, 
 
 82 N. W. 177 98, 916 
 
 I'. Martindale. 1 East, 497 231 
 
 V. Mayfield, 19 S. W. Rep. 598 933 
 V. Nicholas, 28 N. Y. 600 12.3, 124 
 
 V. Orient Fire Ins. Co. (1893), 
 
 ■ 88 la. 579, 55 N. W. 348 878 
 V. Rasmussen (18941, 5 Wyo. 
 
 44, 36 Pac. 820 ' 782 
 
 V. Scandia Bank (1893), 53 
 
 Minn. 191, 54 N. W. 1062 444, 
 
 4.58, 498, 503 
 
 V. Sutton, 2 Duv. 480 245 
 
 RE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Anderson v. Union Terminal Rv. Co. 
 (1901), 161 Mo. 411, 61 
 S. W. 874 625 
 
 r. Wabash, etc. Ry. Co., 65 Iowa, 
 
 131 209 
 
 V. War Eagle IMin. Co. (1906), 
 
 Idaho, 72 Pac 671 12, 17 
 
 V. Watson, 3 Mete. 509 160 
 
 V. Yosemite Mining Co. (1894), 
 
 9 Utai), 420, 3o Pac. 502 96 
 
 Andre v. Railway Co., 30 la. 107 714 
 
 Andreas c. Holcombo, 22 Minn. ?>^,9 bio 
 Andres ;;. Kridler (1896), 47 Neb. 
 
 585, 66 N. W. 649 671 
 
 Andrews v. Bond, 16 Barb. 033 762, 772, 
 
 778 
 V. Brown, 21 Ala. 437 248 
 
 V. Carlile (1894), 20 Colo. 370, 
 
 38 Pac. 465 283 
 
 V. Gillespie, 47 N. Y. 487 52, 122, 357, 
 
 V. McDaniel, 68 N. C. 385 90 
 
 V. Mokelumne Hill Co., 7 Cal. 
 
 330 175, 178, 204, 209 
 
 I'. Pratt, 44 Cal. 309 118 
 
 V. Runyon, 65 Cal. 629 234 
 
 V. School District (1896), 49 
 
 Neb. 420, 68 N. W. 631 608 
 
 Angier v. Equitable Bldg. Ass'n 
 (1899), 109 Ga. 625, 35 S. E. 64 687, 
 
 757, 818 
 Angle v. Manchester (1902), — Neb. 
 
 — ,91N. W. 501 680 
 
 Anglin v. Conley (1903), — Ky. -, 
 
 71 S. W. 926 466 
 
 Anglo-Am. Land, etc. Co. i\ Broh- 
 
 man, 33 Neb. 409 809 
 
 Angus r. Craven (1901), 1.32 Cal. 
 
 691, 64 Pac. 1091 40 
 
 Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. 
 Peterson (1894), 41 Neb. 897, 60 
 N. W. 373 819 
 
 Ankrum i^. City of Marshalltown 
 
 (1898), 105 la. 493, 75 N. W. 360 638 
 
 Annett v. Kerr, 28 How. Pr. 324 152 
 
 Anonymous, 3 Atk. 572 259 
 
 8 How. Pr. 434 798 
 
 3 Swanst. 139 242 
 
 1 Veru. 261 347 
 
 1 Ves. 29 51 1 
 
 Anson r. Anson, 20 Iowa, 55 326, 333, 
 
 338, 379 
 V. Dwight, 18 Iowa, 241 789 
 
 Anthony v. Norton (1899), 60 Kan. 
 
 341, 56 Pac. 529 220 
 
 r. Nve. 30 Cal. 401 333, 335, 336 
 
 r. Slayden (1900), 27 Colo. 144, 
 
 60 Pac. 826 640 
 
 V. Stinson, 4 Kan. 211 935 
 
 Antisdel v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. 
 
 Co., 26 Wis. 145' 572,605 
 
 Apperson's Adm. v. Triplett, 13 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 791 916 
 
 Applegate v. Tvson, 39 N. J. Eq. 
 365 ' 239
 
 lii 
 
 TABLt: OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the RtFERENCCS ABE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 r. Fox Hiver 
 111 Wis. 465, 
 
 Ali.lc-tMii Mlg. Co 
 l'ui>LT Co. (1001) 
 
 67 N. \V. 4.J8 856 
 Archibald v. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 38 
 
 Wis. 542 88 
 
 Aretuiell r. MLukwi'll. Dl-v. F.q. 354 249 
 
 Argard .•. I'arkiT, SI Wis. 5»l 737 
 
 ArgersingtT c i.t'vor, 54 Hun. (il3 637 
 
 ArgDtsinger r. \ ines, 82 N. Y. 308 575 
 
 Arguello" -•. Eiliii;;er, 10 Cal. 150 52 
 Arinionii c (ircen IJay & Miss. Canal 
 
 Co.. 31 Wis. 316 499 
 Armagost r. Hising (1898), 54 Neb. 
 
 76;^. 75 N. W, 534 686 
 Armour Packing Co. r. (Jrrick 
 
 ( 1896), 4 Okla. (KU. 46 Pac. 573 642 
 Armstcad r. Neptune (lt<H6),56 Kan. 
 
 750, 44 Pac. W8 710 
 
 Armstrong r. Armstrong, 27 Ind. 186 890 
 c. Dunn (IH'.to). 143 Ind. 433, 41 
 
 N. E. 540 662 
 
 1-. Hall. 17 How. Pr 76 525 
 
 V. Hinds, 8 .Minn. 254 494, 516 
 1-. Huftv (1901), 156 Ind. 600, 
 
 55 N. E. 443 326 
 i;. Mayer (1903), — Neb. —, 95 
 
 N. W. 51 887, 942 
 j>. Penn (1898), 105 Ga. 229, 81 
 
 S. E. 158 659 
 
 V. Vroman, 11 Minn. 220 151 
 
 V. Warner, 31 N. E. Rep. 877 132 
 
 Arnold v. Angell, 62 N. Y. 508 38, 614, 620 
 
 r. Bainbrigge, 2 UeG. F. & J. 92 247, 
 
 334 
 575 
 832 
 292 
 111 
 
 V. Baker, Neb. 1-34 
 
 V. Dimon, 4 Sandf. 680 
 
 V. Morris, 7 Daly, 498 
 
 V. Nicliols, 04 N. Y. 117 
 
 1-. Passavant (1897), 10 Mont. 
 
 575. 49 Pac. 400 831 
 
 v. Suffolk liank, 27 Barb. 424 300 
 Arrington r. Arrinuton (1894), 114 
 
 N. C. 116, 19 .S. E. 278 624 
 
 Arthur r. Homestead Ins. Co., 78 
 
 N. Y. 402 40 
 
 Arthurs r. Thompson (1895), 97 Kv. 
 
 218. .30.S. \V. 028 849,865 
 
 Arts r. Guthrie, 75 Iowa, 674 190 
 
 Ary r. Chesmore (190D, 113 la. 63, 
 
 84 N. W. 965 071 
 
 ARchermann v. Brewing Co., 45 Wis. 
 
 '^^^ 018 
 
 Asevado r. Orr (1893), 100 Cal. 293, 
 
 04 Pac. 777 001, 602, 712 
 
 A»li r. City of Independence (1902), 
 
 109 Mo. 77. 6H .S. W. 888 679 
 
 Ashhy r. Win»ton. 20 Mo. 210 457 
 
 Ashcraft >: Knobhwk (1896), 146 
 
 Ind. 169. 45 N. E. 09 ,301 307 
 
 Ashe r. Bfa«ley (1890), 6 N. D. 191. 
 
 09N. W. IKH G18 
 
 Ajher » . .St. Louis, etc. li. Co., 89 
 
 -Mo no 103 
 
 Ashland .'. W. C. R. R. Co. (1902), 
 1 1 1 Wi». 104, 89 N. W. 888 702 
 
 Ashland Land, etc. Co. >•. May 
 
 (1897). 51 Neb. 474. 71 N.W. 67 802 
 c. Woodford (1897), 50 Neb. 118, 
 
 09 N W. 709 866 
 
 Ashley v. Little Rock, 19 S. W. Rep. 
 
 1058 358 
 
 v. Marshall. 29 N. Y. 494 927 
 
 Ashton v. Shepherd, 120 Ind. 69 587 
 
 i: Stuv (lb95), 90 la. 197, 04 
 
 N. W. 804 003 
 
 Askew V. Koonce (1896), 118 N. C. 
 
 526, 24 S. E. 218 703, 849 
 
 Askins v. Hcarns, 3 Abb. Pr. 184 894,920 
 Asplund r. Mattson (1896). 15 Wash. 
 
 328, 4(i Pac. 341 703 
 
 Aspy >: HMiki:is (1003),— Ind.— , 66 
 
 N. E 402 673 
 
 Atcheson. Topeka, etc. Ry. Co. v. 
 Anderson (1902), 65 Kan. 
 202, 69 Pac. 158 305 
 
 V. Atchison Grain Co. (1902), 
 
 — Kan. — , 70 Pac. 933 601 
 
 r. Benton, 42 Kan. 698 359 
 
 I. Coninir's of Sumner Co. 
 (1893), 51 Kan. 017, 33 Pac. 
 312 444, 455, 498 
 
 r. Hucklebridge (1901), 62 Kan. 
 
 506, 04 Pac. 58 179 
 
 v. Marks (1901), 11 Okla. 82, 65 
 
 Pac. 996 613 
 
 V. Potter (1899), 60 Kan. 808, 58 
 
 Pac. 471 004 
 
 Atkinson v. Cawley (1900), 112 Ga. 
 
 485, 37 S. E. 715 155 
 
 V. Collins, 9 Abb. Pr. 353 587 
 
 i: Wabash R. R. Co. (1895), 143 
 
 Ind. 501, 41 N. E. 947 568 
 
 Atlanta Elevator Co. v. Cotton Mills 
 
 (1898), 106 Ga. 427, 32 S. E. 541 470 
 Atlanta Real Est. Co. v. Atlanta Nat. 
 
 Bank, 75 (ia. 40 388 
 
 Atlantic Brewing Co. v. Bluthenthal 
 
 (1897), 101 Ga. 541, 28 S. E. 1003 641 
 Atlantic, etc. R. R. Co. v. Southern 
 Pine Co. (1902), 116 Ga. 224, 42 
 S. E. .500 2.57 
 
 Atteberry r. Powell, 29 Mo. 429 831 
 
 Attorney-General v. Craddock, 3 
 
 Mylno & C. 85 509 
 
 r. Mayor, etc., 3 Duer, 119 413 
 
 V. Stephens, 1 K. & J. 724 243 
 
 V. Wynne, Mos. 126 241 
 
 Atwater >\ Schenck, 9 Wis. 160 932 
 
 V. Spalding (1902), 80 Minn. 101, 
 
 90 N. W. 370 687 
 
 Aubuchon r. Lory,. 33 Mo. 99 196 
 
 Auburn, Nat. Bank of, r. Lewis, 81 
 
 N. Y. 15 908 
 
 Auburn Theol. Sem. Trs. i: Kellogg, 
 
 16 N. Y. 83 .344 
 
 Aucker r. Adams, 2) Ohio St. 543 270 
 Audsley ;•. Horn, 26 Beav. 195 247, 334 
 Aulbach v. Dahler (1896), Idaho, 43 
 
 Pac. 322 058 
 
 Auld V. Butcher, 2 Kan. 135 831
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [tqe references are to the pages.] 
 
 AuU V. Jones, 5 Xeb. 500 
 
 AuU Sav. Bk. v. Lexington, 74 Mo. 
 
 104 
 Aultman r. Case, 68 Wis. 612 
 
 V. Mills (1894), y Wash. 68, 
 
 36 Pac. 1046 
 r. Shelton (1894), 90 la. 288, 57 
 
 N. W. 857 
 V. Stichler, 21 Neb. 72 
 Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Mead 
 (1901), 109 Ky. 583, 60 S. W. 294 
 Aultman Co. r. McDonougli (1901), 
 
 110 Wis. 263, 85 N. W. 980 890, 922, 
 Aurora v. Co.x (1895), 43 Neb. 727, 
 
 62 N. W. 66 
 Aurora Water Co. v. Aurora (1895), 
 
 129 Mo. 540, 31 S. W. 946 
 Ausk!'. KailwavCo. (1901), 10 N. D. 
 
 215, 86 N. W. 719 
 Austin V. I^acon, 49 Hun, 386 
 
 V. Marcli (1902), 86 Minn. 232, 
 
 90 N. W. 384 
 17. Munro, 47 N. Y. 360 
 V. Murdock (1900). 127 N 
 
 454, 37 S. E. 478 
 V. Rawdon, 44 N. Y. 63 
 V. Schluyster, 7 Hun, 275 
 Austin Mfsr. Co. v. Decker (1899), 
 
 109 1a. 277, 80 N. W. 312 
 Austin, Tomlinson, & Webster M. 
 Co. V. Heiser (1894), 6 S. D. 429, 
 61 N. W. 445 455, 
 
 Averbeck r. Hall, 14 Busli, 505 
 Avery v. Dougherty, 102 Ind. 443 
 Axiom Mill. Co. v. Little (1894), 6 
 
 S. D. 438, 61 N. W. 441 
 Aydelott v. Collings (1895), 144 lud. 
 
 602, 43 N. E. 867 
 Ayers v. Lawrence, 59 N. Y. 192 118, 
 V. Wolcott ( 1902), — Neb. — , 92 
 N. W. 1036 
 Aylesworth v. Brown, 31 Ind. 270 
 Ayres v. CoviU, 18 Barb. 264 
 r. Duggan (1899), 57 Neb 
 
 78 N. W. 296 
 V. Lawrence, 63 Barb. 4.54 
 V. O'Farrell, 4 Robt. 668 
 V. Wiswall, 112 U. S. 187 
 
 B. 
 
 505, 
 C. 
 
 628, 
 
 750, 
 
 597 
 
 658 
 911 
 
 734 
 
 638 
 
 780 
 
 753 
 924 
 
 683 
 
 608 
 
 570 
 314 
 
 410 
 524 
 
 302 
 633 
 576 
 
 655 
 
 456 
 575 
 916 
 
 867 
 
 643 
 119 
 
 625 
 289 
 663 
 
 271 
 118 
 915 
 327 
 
 361 
 
 B V. Waif ord, 4 Russ. 372 
 
 Baas V. Chicrtf,'o & N. W. Ry. Co., 
 
 39 Wis. 296 337, 412 
 
 Babbage v. Sec. Bap. Church of Du- 
 buque, 54 Iowa, 172 734 
 Babbett v. Young, 51 Barb. 466 871 
 Babcock v. Maxwell (1898), 21 Mont. 
 
 507, 54 Pac. 943 702, 849, 864 
 V. Murray (1894), 58 Minn. 385, 
 
 69 N. W. 1038 812 
 
 Bach V. Montana Co. (1894), 15 
 
 Mont. 345, 39 Pac. 291 740 
 
 Backus V. Clark, 1 Kan. 303 821 
 
 Bacon v. O'Keefe (1896), 13 Wash. 
 
 655, 43 Pac. 886 332 
 
 Badger /•. Benedict, 4 Abb. Pr. 176 495 
 Badgiey v. Decker, 44 Barb. 577 220, 225 
 Badham v. Brabham (1899), 54 S. C. 
 
 400, .32 S. E. 444 715 
 
 Baggott V. Boulger, 2 Duer, 160 152 
 
 Bagshaw v. E. Union R. Co., 7 Hare, 
 
 114 240 
 
 Bailey v. Bayne, 20 Kan. 657 784 
 
 V. Bergen, 4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 642 47 
 V. Inglee, 2 Paige, 278 348 
 
 !'. Myrick, 36 Me. 50 246, 379 
 
 r. Swain, 45 Ohio St. 657 781, 805 
 V. Wilson (1899), 34 Ore. 186, 
 
 55 Pac. 973 641, 668 
 
 Bailey Loan Co. v. Hall (1895), 110 
 
 Cal. 490, 42 Pac. 962 278 
 
 Bainbridge r. Burton, 2 Beav. 539 261 
 Baines v. Babcock, 27 Pac. 674 266, 355 
 V. Coos Rav Nav. Co. (1902), 
 
 41 Ore. "135,68 Pac. 397 832, 834 
 Bains r. Bullock (1895), 129 Mo. 
 
 117, 31 S. W. 342 230 
 
 Baird v. Citizens' Ry. Co. (1898), 
 
 146 Mo. 265, 48 S. W. 78 592, 594 
 )•. Morford, 29 Iowa, 531 831, 875 
 Baken v. Harder, 6 N. Y. S. C. 440 315 
 Baker r. Bailey, 16 Barb. 54 738 
 
 I'. Bartol, 7 Cal. 551 115, 260 
 
 V. Brvan, 64 Iowa, 561 112 
 
 V. Connell, 1 Daly, 469 910 
 
 V. Dessauer, 49 Ind. 28 614 
 
 V. Hornick (1897), 51 S. C. 313, 
 
 28 S. E. 941 642 
 
 V. Jewell, 6 Mass. 460 233 
 
 V. Kistler, 13 Ind. 63 736, 801 
 
 V. Peterson (1899), 57 Neb. 375, 
 
 77 N. W. 774 735 
 
 V. Riley; 16 Ind. 479 419 
 
 V. Union Stock Yards Nat. Bank 
 (1902), 63 Neb. 801, 89 
 N. W. 269 819 
 
 Balbach v. Frelinghuysen, 15 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 685 132 
 
 Balch V. Jones, 61 C.il. 234 200 
 
 V. Wilson, 25 Minn. 299 576 
 
 Baldwin?'. Boyce (1898), 152 Ind. 46, 
 
 51 N. E. 334 676, 684 
 
 V. Burt (1895), 43 Neb. 245, 61 
 
 N. W. 601 566, 754 
 
 r. Canfield, 26 Minn.43 178 
 
 V. Martin, 14 Abb. Pr. n. s. 9 820 
 
 V. Second St. Cable Ry. Co., 
 
 77 Cal. 390 234 
 
 V. U. S. Tel. Co., 54 Barb. 505 824 
 Baldwin Fertilizer Co. u. Carmichael 
 (1902), 116 Ga. 762, 42 S. E. 
 1002 641 
 
 Balk V. Harris (1902), 130 N. C. 381, 
 
 41 S. E. 940 433 
 
 Ball V. Beaumont (1900), 59 Neb. 631, 
 
 81 N. W. 858 25 
 
 V. Beaumont (1901), 63 Neb. 215, 
 
 88 N. W. 173 752
 
 liv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [tbe references i 
 
 BaU I'. Beaumont (1902), 63 Neb. 215, 
 
 92 N. W. 170 640 
 
 r. Bennett, 21 Ind. 427 313, 314 
 
 V. Ceiiar Vallev Creamery Co. 
 
 (lS'.'0),i'8 la. Ib4, 07 N. W. 
 
 232 418 
 
 V. Dou<l (1894), 26 ( »re. 14, 37 
 
 Pac. 70 685 
 
 p. Fulton Cy., 31 Ark. 379 584, 597 
 V. Putnam (1898), 12:3 Cal. 134, 
 
 55 Pac. 773 770 
 Ballard v. Burjiett. 40 X. Y. 314 124, 126 
 Balle r. Mosslev, 13 S. C. 439 607 
 Balletine r. .loplin (1898), 105 Ky. 
 
 70, 48S. W. 417 202 
 
 Ballin v. Dillaye. 37 N. Y. 35 393 
 
 c. Merchants' Excli. Bank(1895), 
 89 Wis. 278, 61 X. W. 
 1118 942,946 
 
 Baltimore v. Gill. 31 Md. 562 118 
 
 Baltimore, etc. R. H. Co. i\ Glenn 
 (1902), H6 0. St. 072, 64 
 N E. 438 229 
 
 v. Kreaper (1899), 61 O. St. 312, 
 
 56 X. E. 203 682 
 V. Young (189U), 146 Ind. 374, 
 
 45 X. E. 479 673. 681, 682 
 
 Bambrick r. Simms (1895), 132 Mo. 
 
 48, 3:) S. W. 445 65 
 
 Hancrolt Co. r. Haslett (1895), 100 
 
 Cal. 151, 39 I'ac. 602 569 
 
 Bandmann r. Davis (1899), 23 Mont. 
 
 382, 59 Pac. 856 456, 458 
 
 Banfield c. Rumsey, 4 N. Y. S. C. 
 
 :i:^2 316 
 
 Bank <■. Rank (1902), 64 Kan. 134, 
 
 (t7 I'ac. 4r>8 619 
 
 r.ank ..f Antipo r. Rvan (1899), 105 
 
 Wis. 37. 80 X. W. 440 816 
 
 Bank of Arkansas City r. Hasie 
 (1897), 57 Kan. 754, 48 Pac. 
 22 836, 931 
 
 Bank of Brit. Xo. Am. v. Grain Co. 
 (189b), 60 Kan. 30, 65 Pac- 
 277 478 
 
 V. Kuvdam. 6 How. Pr. 379 351 
 
 Bank of California v. Dyer (1896), 14 
 
 Wa^li. 279, 44 Pac. 534 666 
 
 Bank of ('iia<ir(in r. Anderson (1895), 
 
 Wyo. 518, 48 I'ac. 197 433 
 
 Bank of (Miariotte v. Britton, 66 
 
 X. C. :J05 810 
 
 Bank of Columbia v. Gadsden 
 
 ( 1899). m S. r. .313, .33 S. E. 575 867 
 Bank of f'onimerce r. Ilaldeman 
 i\W\). KK» Ky. 222, 58 
 S. \V. .087 734 
 
 . . Humphrev (1894),6 S. D. 415, 
 
 01 N. \V. 444 787 
 
 r. Timbrell (1900). 113 Iowa, 
 
 713. H4 X. W. 519 418 
 
 Bank of f ienogsee i'. Patchin Bank, 
 
 13 X. Y. :VKt 541 
 
 liank of fJIrncoe r. Cain (190.']), 
 ^9 Minn. 473, 95 N. W. :M)8 834 
 
 BE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Bank of Havana v. Magee, 20 N. Y. 
 
 355 177 
 
 Bank of Lowville v. Edwards, 11 
 
 How. Pr. 216 181 
 
 Bank of Malvern i;. Burton (1900), 
 
 67 Ark. 426, 55 S. W. 483 641 
 
 Bank of Rome ;,•. Haselton, 15 Lea, 
 
 210 389 
 
 Bank of Shasta r. Boyd (1893), 99 
 
 Cal. 604, 34 Pac. 337 803 
 
 Bank of Stockham v. Alter (1901), 
 
 01 Neb. 359, 85 N. W. 300 95 
 
 ]5ank of Stockton r. Howland, 42 
 
 Cal. 129 293 
 
 Bank of Woodland r. Heron (1898), 
 
 122 Cal. 107, 54 Pac. 537 045 
 
 Hanker's Reserve Life Ass'n r. 
 Finn (1902), 64 Xeb. 105, 89 
 N. W. 672 602 
 
 Banks v. Johnson, 4 J. J. Marsh. 649 564 
 V. Moshier (1900), 73 Conn. 448, 
 
 47 Atl. 056 756 
 
 Banning r. Marleau (1894), 101 Cal. 
 
 238, 35 Pac. 772 890, 922 
 
 Bannister v. Bull, 16 S. C. 220 198 
 
 r. Grassy Fork D. Ass'n, 52 Ind. 
 
 178 748 
 
 Banta v. Siller (1898), 121 Cal. 414, 
 
 53 Pac. 9.35 831 
 
 Baptist Church at Lancaster v. 
 
 Presb. Ch., 18 B. Mon. 635 262 
 
 Barbee -. Green, b6 X. C. 158 874 
 
 Barker v. Crowell (1898), 55 Xeb. 
 
 571, 75 X. W. 1109 674 
 
 Barbre v. Goodale (1896), 28 Ore. 
 
 465, 43 Pac. 378 661 
 
 Barclay v. Quicksilver Miniiiir Co , 
 
 6 Lans. 25 ^ 814 
 
 V. Yeomans, 27 Wis. 682 283 
 
 Barden v. Columbia Cv. Sup., 33 
 
 AVis. 45 ■ 821 
 
 Bardes v. Hutchinson (1901), 113 la 
 
 610, 85 X. W. 797 849, 867 
 
 Bardstown & L. R. Co. v. Metcalf. 4 
 
 Mete. (Ky.) 499 154,384,387 
 
 Barilwell-l^obinson Co. i: Brown 
 
 (1894), r,- .Minn. 140. 58 N. W. 872 787 
 Barham >-. Bell (1893), 112 X. C. 
 
 131, 10 S. K. 903 116 
 
 V. Hostetter, 67 Cal. 272 503 
 
 Barhvte v. Ihighes, .33 Barb. .320. SM, 
 
 920 
 Baring v. Nasli, 1 Ves. & B. 551 242, ,368 
 Barker r. Bradley, 42 X. Y. 316 105, 111 
 ''. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 
 
 24 Wis. 030 910 
 
 r. Prizer (1897), 150 Ind. 4,48 
 
 X. E. 4 432 
 
 V. Ring (1897), 97 Wis. 53, 72 
 
 N. W. 222 864 
 
 /■. Walters, 8 Beav. 92 389 
 
 V. Wheeler (1900), 60 Xeb. 470, 
 
 83 X. W. 678; 8. c. (1901), 
 
 62 Xeb. 150, 87 N. W. 20 802 
 
 Barlow /•. Burns, 40 Cal. 351 658
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Iv 
 
 [the REPEaENCUS ARE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Barlow r. Mvers, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 
 183 " 105, 109, 111, 131, 133, 135 
 V. Scott, 24 N. Y. 40 36, 475, 623 
 
 V. Scott's Adm., 12 Iowa, 63 293 
 Barnacle v. Henderson (1894), 42 
 
 Neb. 169, 60 N. W. 382 942 
 
 Barnard, Rfi, L. K. 32 Cli. D. 447 872 
 V. Gantz (1893), 140 N. Y. 249, 
 
 35 N. E. 430 433 
 
 Earner v. Morehead, 22 Ind. 354 661 
 
 Barnes v. Beloit, 19 Wis. 93 264 
 
 f. Blake, 59 Hun, 371 278 
 
 V. Crawford (1894), 115 N. C. 76, 
 
 20 S. E. 386 638 
 
 V. Hekla F. Ins. Co., 75 Iowa, 11 637 
 V. Hekla Fire Ins. Co. (1893), 
 
 56 Minn. 38, 57 N. W. 314 107 
 
 V. Martin. 15 Wis. 240 228 
 
 V. McMullins, 78 Mo. 260 936 
 V. Packwood (1894), 10 Wash. 
 
 50, 38 Fac. 857 639 
 V. Quigley, 59 N. Y. 265 626, 629, 630 
 
 V. liacine, 4 Wis. 454 262 
 
 u. Smith, 16 Abb. Fr. 420 501 
 
 v.. Stephens, 02 Ind. 226 658 
 V. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 54 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 87 820 
 
 Barnett v. Leonard, 66 Ind. 422 178, 229, 
 
 234 
 V. Pratt (1893), 37 Neb. 349, 55 
 
 N. W. 1050 107 
 Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205, 
 
 215 509 
 Barnhart v. Ehrhart (1898), 33 Ore. 
 
 274, 54 Pac. 195 625 
 Barnstead v. Empire Min. Co., 5 Cal. 
 
 299 38, 66 
 
 Barr v. Birkner (1895), 44 Neb. 197, 
 
 62 N. W. 494 734 
 V. City of Omaha (1894), 42 
 
 Neb. 341, 60 N. W. 591 638 
 
 V. Deniston, 19 N. H. 170 118 
 
 V. Hack, 46 Iowa. 308 831 
 V. Little (1898), 54 Neb. 556, 74 
 
 N. W. 850 709 
 V. Post (1898). 56 Neb. 698, 77 
 
 N. W. 123 806, 924 
 
 V. Shaw, 10 Hun, 580 496 
 Barrere v. Somps (1896), 113 Cal. 
 
 97, 45 Pac. 177 585 
 
 Barret v. Goodshaw, 12 Bush, 592 758 
 Barrett v. Baker (1896), 136 Mo. 
 
 512, 37 S. W. 130 719 
 
 V. Brown, 86 N. E. Rep. 556 261 
 V. Des Moines, etc. Ins. Co. 
 (1903), 120 la. 184, 94 N. W. 
 
 473 689 
 
 V. Leonard, 66 N. Y. 422 598 
 V. Tewksbury, 18 Cal. 334 227, 231 
 V. Village of Hammond (1894), 
 
 87 Wis. 654, 58 N. W. 1053' 570 
 
 V. Watts, 13 S. C. 441 470 
 
 Barron v. Frink, 30 Cal. 486 563 
 Barrv v. Equit. L. Ins. Soc, 59 N. Y. 
 
 587 123 
 
 Barry v. Wachosky (1899), 57 Neb. 
 534, 77 N. W. 1080 444, 498 
 
 Bartgcs v. O'Neil, 13 Ohio St. 72 187, 227 
 
 Barth v. Kansas City Ry. Co. (1897), 
 142 Mo. 535, 44 S. W. 778 041 
 
 Barthol r. Blakin, 34 Iowa, 452 90, 99, 
 
 596 
 
 Bartholomew Cy. Com'rs v. Jame- 
 son, 86 Ind. 154 89, 91, 95 
 
 Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y. 587 260, 343 
 V. Iowa State Ins. Co., 77 Iowa, 
 
 86 no 
 
 V. Judd, 21 N. Y. 200 50, 55 
 
 V. Pickersgill, 1 C.>x, 15 239 
 
 V. Scott (1898), 55 Neb. 477, 75 
 
 N. W. 1102 644 
 
 Bartow v. Northern Assurance Co. 
 
 (1897), 10 S. D. 132, 72 N. W. 
 
 1135 757 
 
 Bass V. Comstock, 38 N. Y. 21 334, 455 
 
 Bassett v. Crowell, 3 Robt. 72 287 
 
 V. Haren (1895), 61 Minn. 346, 
 
 63 N. W. 713 
 I'. Hughes, 43 Wis. 319 
 V. Lederer, 1 Hun, 274 
 V. Shares (1893), 63 Conn. 39, 27 
 
 Atl. 421 
 
 V. Warner, 23 Wis. 673 345, 457, 473 
 Rastable v. Poole, 1 C. M. & R. 410 116 
 Bate V. Graham, 11 N. Y. 237 605, 664 
 V. Sheets, 50 Ind. 329 ^ 769 
 
 Bateman v. Margerison, 6 Hare, 496 254 
 Bates V. Cobb, 5 Bosw. 29 
 
 V. Drake (1902), 28 Wash. 447, 
 
 68 Pac. 961 
 V. Richards Lumber Co. (1893), 
 
 56 Minn. 14, 'u N. W. 218 
 
 V. Rosekrans, 37 N. Y. 409 865. 871 
 
 V. Ruddick, 2 Iowa, 423 326, 333 
 
 Bates-Farley Bank v. Dismukes 
 
 (1899), 107 Ga. 212, .33 S. E. 175 
 Bates-Smith Inv. Co. c. Scott (1898) 
 
 56 Neb. 475, 76 N. W. 1063 
 Bathgate v. Haskin, 59 N. Y. 533 
 
 930, 938 
 Batterman v. Pierce, 3 Hill, 171 842 
 
 Battery Park Bank i'. Loughran 
 
 (1898), 122 N. C. 668, 30 S. E. 17 821 
 Bauer i'. Dewey (1901), 166 N. Y. 
 
 402, 60 N. E. 30 413 
 
 V. Wagner. 39 Mo. 385 813, 833 
 
 Baughman v. Louisville, etc. R. R, 
 Co. (1893), 94 Ky. 150, 21 S. W 
 757 
 Baum V. Mullen, 47 N. Y. 577 
 
 I'. Trantham (1895), 45 S. C 291 
 23 S. C. 54 
 Baxter v. Camp (1898), 71 Conn. 
 
 245, 41 Atl. 803 105, 466, 659 
 V. Hart (1894), 104 Cal. 344, 37 
 
 Pac. 941 89 
 
 V. McDonnell (1897), 154 N. Y. 
 
 432, 48 N. E. 816 709 
 
 V. Sherman (1898). 73 Minn. 
 
 434, 76 N. W. 211 870 
 
 615 
 
 112 
 801 
 
 659 
 
 584 
 
 72 
 
 153 
 
 580 
 
 179 
 880, 
 
 214 
 314 
 
 334
 
 ivi 
 
 i.vi.j, OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the kepcbbnces 
 
 Bav View Bn-wing Co. v. Grubb 
 (1901), 24 Wash. 163, 03 Pac. 
 1001 567, 772 
 
 Bavlev r. Best. 1 lluss. & My. 659 243 
 Bavly'c Muelie. MS Cal. 345 329, 330 
 
 Bavnard r. Wool lev. 20 Beav. 583 252 
 Bav8 r. Trulsoii (18l'o), 25 Ore. 109, 
 
 35 Pac. 20 816 
 
 Bazemore r. Bridgers, 105 N. C. 191, 
 
 10 .S. E. t<88 897 
 
 Beacanon r. Liebe, 11 Oreg. 443 310 
 
 Beach r. Bra.llev. 8 I'aige, 140 348 
 
 t: Spokane Hancli Co. (UK)1), 25 
 
 Muut. 37y, 05 Pac. Ill 190, 262, 
 271 
 Beagle r. Smith (1897), 50 Neb. 440, 
 
 69 N. W. 956 702 
 
 Beale v. Barneil's Adm (1901), Ky., 
 
 04 S. W. 838 452 
 
 Bealev r. Blake (1900). 153 Mo. 657, 
 
 55 .'^. W. 288 809 
 
 BeaU V. Cobb, 51 Me. 348 378 
 
 Beaiiian v. Ward (1903), 132 X. C. 
 
 08. 43 S. E. 545 678 
 
 Bean f. Edge, 84 X. Y. 514 111 
 
 V. Gregfi. 7 Colo. 499 66 
 
 v. Laniprev (1901). 82 Minn. 
 
 320. 84 X. W. lUie 783, 818 
 
 V. Percival Copper Mining Co. 
 (1901), 111 Wis. 598, 87 
 N. W. 465 626 
 
 V. Stoneman (1894), 104 Cal. 49, 
 
 37 Pac. 777 038 
 
 Beane r. Givens (1898), 5 Idaho, 774, 
 
 51 Pac. 987 498 
 
 Beard v. Dedolph. 29 Wis. 136 
 
 c. Tilghinan, 20 X. Y. .Suppl. 7.36 744 
 Beardslee r. Morgner, 73 Mo. 22 103 
 
 Beardslev ,: Clem (1902), 137 Cal. 
 
 .•"ib, 70 Pac. 175 816 
 
 V. Morrison (1899). 18 Utah, 
 
 478, 50 Pnc. .303 815 
 
 Bearss v. Montponierv, 40 Ind. 544 102 
 Bcattie Mfg. ("o. r. Gerardi (1901), 
 
 106 Mo. 142, (w S. W. 1035 040 
 
 Beatty !•. Bartholomew Cy. Agr. 
 
 Soc, 70 Ind. 91 814 
 
 Bealy r. Atlantic, etc. R. R. Co. 
 
 (1890), 100 Ga. 12.3, 28 S. E. .32 042 
 V. JohnHton (1899), 00 Ark. 529. 
 
 52 S. W. 129 933, 940 
 
 r. Swarihout, 32 Barb. 293 702, 772. 
 
 815 
 Beau V. Kiah, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 404 225 
 Beaiidette i;. Fond du Lac, 40 Wis. 
 
 44 229 
 
 Beaver Dam r. Frings, 17 Wis. 398 1.5.') 
 
 Belx-e I-. IIiitc:hin>on, 17 B. Mon. 496 218 
 
 Beck r. Haas. ."1 Mo. A|ii>. IW) l.^O 
 
 '•. Milfopl. '.KUn.l. 291 815 
 
 Becker -•. Boon, 01 X. Y. 317 71.j, 79] 
 
 r. Crow, 7 lUmh, 198 ' 002 
 
 r. Xorthwnv, 44 Minn. 01 H70 
 
 V. Sanduikv City I5k., 1 Minn. 
 
 311 ' 52 
 
 AKE TO TBI PAGES.] 
 
 Becker r. Stmeher (1902), 107 Mo. 
 
 300, 00 8. W. 1083 
 
 r. Sweetzer, 15 Minn. 427 728, 
 
 Beckett v. Lawrence, 7 Abb. Pr. 403 
 
 Beckner v. Beckner (1898), 104 Ga. 
 
 219, 30 S. E. 022 
 Beckwith v. Dargets, 18 Iowa, 303 
 
 371 
 751 
 797 
 
 715 
 270, 
 364 
 
 V. Union Bank, 9 N. Y. 21 1 122, 131 , 
 
 132 
 Bee Publishing Co. v. World Pub- 
 lishing Co. (1900), 59 Xeb. 713, 
 82 X. W. 28 £68 
 
 Beebe v. Latimer (1899), 59 Xeb. 
 
 305, 80 X. W. 904 064, 718 
 
 Beeler v. First Xat. Bk. of Larned, 
 
 5 X. W. ]{ep. 857 178 
 
 Beers v. Kuehn. 54 N. W. Rep. 109 455 
 
 r. Shannon, 73 X. Y. 292 181 
 
 r. Wattrburv, 8 Bosw. 300 865 
 
 Beeson v. Howard, 44 Ind. 413 727, 812 
 
 Beetle v. Anderson (1897), 98 Wis. 
 
 5, 73 X. W. 560 215 
 
 Behlow V. Fischer (1894), 102 Cal. 
 
 208, 36 Pac. 509 504 
 
 Belknap i;. Mclntyre, 2 Abb. Pr.S66 
 
 874, 877 
 V. Sealey, 14 N. Y. 143 630 
 
 Bell 1-. Brown, 22 Cal. 071 831 
 
 r. City of Spokane (1902), 30 
 
 Wash. 508, 71 Pac. 31 619 
 
 V. Clark, 30 Mo. App. 224 821 
 
 V. Donohoe, 8 Sawy. 435 372 
 
 V. Mendenhall (1898), 71 Minn. 
 
 331, 71 X. W. 1086 179, 180 
 
 V. Oher & Sons Co. (1900), 111 
 Ga. 008, 36 S. E. 904 887 
 
 r. Peterson (1900), 105 Wis. 007, 
 
 81 X. W. 279 
 V. Rice (1897), 50 Xeb. 547, 70 
 
 X. W. 25 
 V. Stowe (1895), 44 Xeb. 210, 62 
 X. W. 456 
 Belleau c. Thompson, 33 Cal. 495 
 Belleville Sav. Bk. i: Winslow, 30 
 
 Fed. Rep 488 290, 
 
 Bellevue Imp. Co. v. Kaj'ser (1903), 
 
 _ Xeb. — . 05 X. W. 499 
 Bellinger i-. Craigue, 31 Barb. 534 
 
 Belloc c. Rogers, 9 Cal. 123 326, 
 
 Bellows v. McCJinnis. 17 Ind. 04 
 
 V. Rosenthal, 31 Ind. 110 
 Belmont Nail Co. v. Columbia Iron, 
 
 etc. Co , 46 Fed. Rep. 336 
 
 Bern I', .^^hoemaker (1895), 7 S. D. 
 
 510, 04 X. W. 544 
 
 V. Shoomaker (1898), 10 S. D. 
 
 453. 74 X. W. 239 
 
 Bender ?-. Zimmerman (1896), 135 
 
 Mo. 53, .30 S. W. 210 044, 
 
 Benedict v. Benedict, 85 X. Y. 025 
 V. Driggs, 34 Hun, 94 
 V. Farlow, 1 Ind. App. ICO 
 
 918, 
 928 
 
 681 
 
 822 
 
 809 
 845 
 
 821 
 
 567 
 852, 
 939 
 327 
 
 389 
 181 
 
 158 
 
 715 
 007 
 1'20 
 002
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ivii 
 
 [the keperences are to the pages.] 
 
 Benjamin v. Loughborough, 31 Ark. 
 
 210 350 
 
 V. Veith, 80 la. 149, 45 N. W. 
 
 731 716 
 
 Benkard v. Bahcock, 2 llobt. 175 009 
 
 Bennett;;. Bennett (1902), —Neb.—, 
 
 91 N. \V. 409 251, G71, 680 
 
 V. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584 225 
 
 V. Edison Elec. Co. (1900), 104 
 
 N. Y. 131, 58 N. E. 7 
 V. Lathrop (1899), 71 Conn. 613, 
 
 42 Atl. 634 
 V. Mattingly, 10 N. E. Rep. 299 
 V. McGrade, 15 Minn. 132 
 V. McGulre, 5 Lans. 183- 
 V. Minott (1896), 28 Ore. 3-39, 44 
 
 Pac. 283 
 
 V. Preston, 17 Ind. 291 177, 666 
 
 'v. Titherington, 6 Bush, 192 42, 53 
 
 V. Whitcomb, 25 Minn. 148 428 
 
 Benolkin v. Guthrie (1901), 111 Wis. 
 
 554, 87 N. W. 466 
 Bensieck v. Cook, 19 S. W. Rep. 642 
 Bensley v. McMillan, 49 Iowa, 517 
 Benson v. Keller (1900), 37 Ore. 120, 
 
 60 Pac. 918 
 Bent V. Barnes (1895), 90 Wis. 631, 
 
 64 N. W. 428 
 Bentley v. Bustard, 16 B. Men. 643 
 
 V. Jones, 7 Oreg. 108 
 Benton y. ColHns (1896), 118 N. C. 
 
 196, 24 S. E. 122 
 Benton Cy. Com'rs v. Templeton, 
 
 51 Ind. 266 
 Bentz V. Thurber, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 
 645 
 Bercich v. Mayre, 9 Nev. 312 
 Berdell v. Parkhurst, 19 Hun, 358 
 Berdolt v. Berdolt (1898), 56 Neb. 
 
 792, 77 N. W. 399 
 Berg V. Stanwood, 43 Minn. 176 
 Berkin v. Marsh (1896), 18 Mont. 
 
 152, 44 Pac. 528 
 Berkshire v. Shultz, 25 Ind. 523 177 
 
 187, 188, 246 
 Borkson v. Kansas City Rv. Co. 
 
 (1898), 144 Mo. 211, 45 S.W. 1119 302 
 Berly v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577 648, 649 
 
 Bernhardt v. Walls, 29 Mo. App. 
 
 206 
 Bernheitner v. Wallis, 11 Hun, 16 
 Bernstein v. Coburn (1896), 49 Neb. 
 734, 68 N. W. 1021, 
 V. Downs (1896), 112 Cal. 197, 
 44 Pac. 557 
 Beronio v. So. Pac. R. Co., 86 Cal. 
 415 
 V. Ventura Lumber Co. (1900), 
 129 Cal. 2.32, 61 Pac. 958 
 
 840 
 
 687 
 327 
 101 
 341 
 
 603 
 
 592 
 283 
 662 
 
 508 
 
 656 
 791 
 576 
 
 482 
 
 119 
 
 293 
 127 
 
 226 
 
 942 
 
 499 
 
 181 
 
 181, 
 
 783 
 895 
 
 872 
 
 659 
 
 517 
 
 Berry r. Barton (1902), 12 Okla. 221, 
 17 Pac. 1074 
 
 473 
 
 608 
 935 
 111 
 
 V. Brett, 6 Bosw. 627 
 
 V. Brown, 107 N. Y. 659 
 
 V. Dole (1902), 87 Minn. 471, 92 
 
 N. W. 334 601, 676 
 
 Berthold v. O'Hara (1893), 121 Mo. 
 
 88, 25 S. W. 845 887 
 
 Bertles (•. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152 226 
 
 Besser v. Hawthorne, 3 Ore. 129 333 
 Best v. Zutavern (1898), 53 Neb. 
 
 604, 74 N. W. 64 819 
 Bethany v. Howard (1899), 149 Mo. 
 
 504, 51 S. W, 94 104 
 Bethel v. Wilson, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 
 
 610 249 
 Bethune v. Cleveland, etc. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1899), 149 Mo. 587, 51 S. W. 465 375 
 
 Bettinger v. Bell, 65 Ind. 445 378 
 
 Betts 1-. Baclie, 14 Abb. I'r. 279 584 
 
 Beudell v. Hettrick, 45 How. Pr. 198 207 
 
 Bevier v. Dillingham, 18 Wis. 529 270 
 
 Beville r. Cox, 109 N. C. 265 181 
 Bevins v. Eisman (1900), Ky. 56 
 
 S. W. 410 340, 341, 688 
 
 Beyer v. Reid, 18 Kan. 86 637 
 V. Town of Crandon (1898), 98 
 
 Wis. 306, 73 N. W. 771 180 
 
 Biddle v. Ramsay, 52 Mo. 153 597 
 ('. Spatz (1903), — Neb. — , 95 
 
 N. W. 357 684 
 Bidwell r. Astor Mut. Ins. Co., 16 
 
 N. Y. 263 15, 17, 33, 34, 472, 497 
 
 V. Babcock, 87 Cal. 29 658 
 
 V. Madison, 10 Minn. 13 932 
 
 V. Overton, 26 Abb. N. Cas. 402 756 
 
 Big Blackfoot Co. r. Bluebird Co. 
 
 (1897), 19 Mont. 454, 48 Pac. 778 677 
 
 Bigelow V. Bush, 6 Paige, 343 326 
 
 V. Gove, 7 Cal. 133 527 
 V. Town of Washburn (1898), 
 
 98 Wis. 553, 74 N. W. 362 606, 
 
 714 
 
 Biggs V. Biggs, 50 Wis. 443 352, 611 
 
 V. Penn, 4 Hare, 469 352 
 
 V. Williams. 66 N. C. 427 100 
 
 Bignold V. Carr (1901), 24 Wash. 
 
 413, 64 Pac. 519 271 
 
 Bill V. Cureton, 2 M. & K. 503 258 
 
 Billings V. Drew, 52 Cal. 505 831, 834 
 
 Bilmver v. Sherman, 23 W. Va. 656 389, 
 
 392 
 Bingham i: Kimball, 1 7 Ind. 396 769, 812 
 V. Lipman (1902), 40 Ore. 363, 
 
 67 Pac. 98 689 
 
 Birch V. Hall, 3 N. Y. Suppl. 747 919 
 V. Metrop. Elev. Ry. Co., 8 
 N. Y. S. 325 
 Bird V. Kendall (1901), 62 S. C. 178, 
 
 40 S. E. 142 809 
 
 V. Mayer, 8 Wis. 362 544, 578 
 
 V. McCoy, 22 Iowa, 549 870, 881 
 
 V. Sellers, 21 S W. Rep. 91 821 
 V. St. John's Episcopal Church 
 (18J9),154Iud. 138,56N.E. 
 
 129 543, 818 
 
 Birdsall i\ Birdsall, 52 Wis. 208 658 
 Birlant v. Cleckley (1896), 48 S. C. 
 
 298, 26 S. E. GOO 588 
 Birmingham v. Cheetham (1898), 19 
 
 Wash. 657, 54 Pac. 37 181
 
 Iviii 
 
 TAKLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [tas REFERENCES ARE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Biron i-. Scott, t>0 Wis. 20(3 
 
 V. St. Paul \V. Comrs, 41 Minn. 
 519 
 Bishop r. Averill (1808), 19 Wash. 
 400, 53 Pac. 72t) 
 .-. Baisley (1895). 28 Ore. 110, 41 
 
 Pac. 037 
 V. Bishop, 54 Conn. 232 
 V. Chicago & N. W. Ky. Co., 67 
 
 Wis. 610 
 V. Davis. Hun. 342 627, 
 
 r. Edniistun, 16 Abb. I'r. 46G 
 r. Gritiitli, 4 Col. 68 614, 
 
 t: H.irt (1901), 114 la. 96, 86 
 
 N. \V. 218 
 V. Mathews (1899), 109 Ga. 790, 
 
 35 S. K. 161 869, 
 
 V. Mi.l.lleton (1894), 43 Neb. 10, 
 61 N. W. 129 
 Bisiiop of Winchester v. Mid Hants 
 
 Rv. Co.. L. K. 5 Eq. 17 
 Bitter r. IJatiiman, 61 N. Y. 512 
 Bitting 1-. Thaxton, 72 N. C. 541 
 
 Blachford v. Frenzer (1895), 44 Neb. 
 
 829, 62 N. W. 1101 
 Black c. Drake, 28 Kan. 482 
 V. Duncan, 60 Ind. 522 
 V. Elmer, 54 Ind. 544 
 Blackburn v. Sweet, 38 Wis. 578 
 Black Hills Bank r. Kellogg (1«93), 
 
 4 S. I). 312, 56 N. W. 1071 
 Black River Imp. Co. c. Holway, 55 
 
 N. W. Kep. 418 
 Blackstorie c. Central of Georgia Ry. 
 Co. (1H98), 105 Ga. 380, 31 S. E. 
 90 
 Black well i-. British-American Co. 
 (1902). 65 S. C. 105, 43 S. E. 
 395 
 Blaine v. Knapp & Co. (1897), 140 
 
 Mo. 241, 41 S. W. 787 542, 
 
 Blair r. Brown (1897), 17 Wash. 570, 
 50 Pac. 483 
 v. Puryear, 87 N. C. 101 
 1-. Shelby Cy. Agr. Soc.,28 Ind. 
 175 
 Blake v. Bufifalo Creek R. Co., 56 
 N. Y. 485 
 V. Johnson Cy. Com'rs, 18 Kan. 
 
 266 
 r. .Jones, 3 Anst. 651 
 r. Van 'niborg, 21 Wis. 672 473, 
 Blakeley <: Adams (1902),— Ky. — , 
 68 .S. W. 393 
 V. I a; Due. 22 Minn. 476 
 Blakely .•. Hlakelv, Ht» Cal. 324 
 r. BorufT, 71 'ln<l. 93 
 V. Frazicr. 2<) S. C. 144 
 I-. Smock (1M!>7), 90 Wis. 611,71 
 N. W. 1052 443, 444, 
 
 Blaker .. Morne (1898), 60 Kan. 24, 
 
 65 I'ac. ii74 
 BlakfHife ,-. MiHHoiirl Pnc. Ry. Co. 
 (1894), 43 Neb. 01. 61 N. W. 118 
 
 351 I Blanc v. Paymaster Min. Co., 95 Cal. 
 
 524 
 576 Blanchard >: Ely, 21 Wend. 342 
 
 r. Jefferson, 28 Abb. N. Cas. 236 
 638 Bland r. Fleeman, 29 Fed. Rep. 669 
 
 r. Winter, 1 Sim. & S. 246 372, 
 818 ' Blanke r. Brvant, 55 N. Y. 649 
 66 Blankenship r. Rogers, 10 Ind. 333 
 
 660 Blankman v. Vallejo, 15 Cal. 638 
 
 629 Blanshard v. Schwartz ( 1898), 7 Okla. 
 
 201 23, 54 Pac. 303 
 
 620 Blasdel v. Williams, 9 Nev. 161 596, 
 
 810 Bledsoe r. Irvin, 35 Ind. 293 
 
 V. Rader, 30 Ind. 354 
 , 870 V. Simms, 53 Mo. 305 284, 781, 
 
 Bless r. Jenkins (1895), 129 Mo. 647, 
 
 565 31 S. W. 938 
 Blethen v. Blake, 44 Cal. 117 
 
 255 Blew v. Hoover, 30 Ind. 450 
 225 Bliss V. Cottle, 32 Barb. 322 
 019, V. Sneath (1894), 103 Cal. 43,36 
 
 927 Pac. 1029 
 
 r. Sneath (1898), 1 19 Cal. 526, 51 
 677 Pac. 848 
 
 617 Blizzard v. Applegate, 61 Ind. 368 
 271 Bloch Queens ware Co. i-. Metzger 
 908 (IWl), 70 Ark. 232. 65 S. W. 929 
 
 277 Blodgett c Mc.Murty (1894), 39 Neb. 
 
 210, 57 N. W. 985 832, 
 
 299 Blood v. Fairbanks, 48 Cal. 171 38, 
 
 911 Bloomer v. Sturges, 58 N. Y. 168 
 
 Blossom V. Barrett, 37 N. Y. 434 
 
 566 Blotckv r. Miller (1902), Neb., 91 
 N \V. 523 
 
 Blount V. Burrow, 3 Bro. C. C. 90 
 180 V. Rick, 107 Ind. 238 
 
 Blue r. Capital Nat. Bank (1896), 
 709 145 Ind. 518, 43 N. E. 655 896, 903, 
 
 Bluedorn r. Mo. Pac. ]{y. Co. (1893), 
 822 121 Mo. 258, 25 S. W. 943 
 419 Blue Valley Lumber Co. r. Couro 
 
 (1900), 61 Neb. 39, 84 N. W. 402 
 387 Blum r. Robinson, 24 Cal. 127 
 
 Bluinauer r. Clock (1901), 24 Wash. 
 47 596, 64 Pac. 844 
 
 Blumenthal v. Pacific Meat Co. 
 662 (1895), 12 Wash. 331, 41 Pac. 47 
 240 
 
 497 Bluthenthal v. Moore (1898), 106 
 Ga. 424, 32 S. E. ;344 
 
 109 Bly den burgh v. Thayer, 3 Keyes, 
 178 293 122, 
 
 942 Boales v. Ferguson (1898), 55 Neb. 
 852 565. 76 N. W. 18 
 415 Board v. First Presbyterian Church 
 (1898). 19 Wash. 456, 63 
 
 498 Pac. 671 
 V. Walbridge, 38 Wis. 179 
 
 655 Board, etc. of St. Louis Public 
 Schools V. Broadway Sav. Bk. Est., 
 565 84 Mo. 58 
 
 340 
 842 
 659 
 249 
 377 
 315 
 881, 
 935 
 739 
 
 375 
 598, 
 599 
 289 
 845 
 821 
 
 783 
 817 
 935 
 562 
 
 853 
 
 819 
 784 
 
 872 
 
 833 
 372, 
 637 
 333, 
 379 
 457 
 
 668 
 254 
 
 866 
 
 914 
 
 819 
 
 816 
 52 
 
 160 
 
 692, 
 695 
 
 131 
 816 
 
 819 
 470 
 
 935
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [the referbnces are to the pages.] 
 
 lix 
 
 Board of County Commissioners v. 
 
 Candler (1898), 123 N. C. (582, 31 
 
 S. E. 858 
 Board of Education r. Prior (1898), 
 
 11 S. I). 202, 77 N. W. 106 740 
 
 Board of Scliool Commissioners r. 
 
 Center Townsliip (1805), 14-'} Ind. 
 
 391, 42 N. K. 8n« 
 Board of Supervisors c. Decker, o4 
 
 Wis. 378 
 Boardman v. Beclvwitli, 18 Iowa, 292 
 V. Griffin. 52 Ind. 101 
 V. Lake S. & M. S. K. Co., 84 
 N. Y. 157 
 
 Boaz V. Taie, 43 Ind. (iO 791, 805 
 
 B()l)b V. Woodward, 42 Md. 482 20, 31 
 Bockes V. Lansing, 74 N. Y. 437 38, 637 
 Bo.lali V. Town of Deer Creek (1898), 
 
 yy Wis. 509, 75 N. W. 75 
 Boden V. Maher (1897), 95 Wis. 65, 
 
 69 N. W. 9S0 
 Bodine v. Killeen, 53 N. Y. 93 
 Boeckler v. Mo. Fac. Rv. Co., 10 Mo. 
 
 App. 448 
 Boehme v. Snme, 5 Neb. 80 
 Bogaard v. Ind. Dist. of Plainview 
 
 (1895) , 93 la. 269, 61 N. W. 859 565, 566 
 
 640 
 
 58 
 
 54 
 
 036 
 153 
 614 
 
 470 
 
 675 
 
 671 
 315 
 
 658 
 576 
 
 Bogardus v. Parker, 7 How. Fr. 305 
 
 369, 
 894 
 151 
 
 V. O'Regan, 1 E. D. Smith, 590 
 Bogart r. Bogart (1896), 138 Mo. 419, 
 
 40 S. W. 91 371 
 
 Bogert V. Gulick, 65 Barb. 322 315 
 
 Boggess V. Boggess (1894), 127 Mo. 
 
 305, 29 S. W. 1018 510 
 
 Bohall V. Diller, 41 Cal. 532 575 
 
 Bohannon v. Travis (1893), 94 Ky. 
 
 59, 21 S. W. 354 233 
 
 Bohart v. Buckingham (1901), 62 
 
 Kan. 658, 64 Pac. 627 96, 100, 419 
 
 Boil V. Siraras, 60 N. Y. 162 918 
 
 Boland v. O'Neil (1899), 72 Conn. 
 
 217, 44 Atl. 15 643 
 
 V. Ross (1893), 120 Mo. 208, 25 
 
 S. W. 524 ■ 278 
 
 Boldt 1-. Budwig, 19 Neb. 739 177 
 
 jBolen V. Crosby, 49 N. Y. 183 101 
 
 V. San Gorgonio Fl. Co., 55 Cal. 
 
 164 614 
 
 Boles V. Bennington (1896), 136 Mo. 
 
 522, 38 S. W. 306 735 
 
 Boley V. Allred (1903), 25 Utah 402, 
 
 71 Pac. 869 202 
 
 Bolles V. Bolles, 44 N. J. Eq. 385 (14 
 
 Atl. 593) 509 
 
 Bollman v. Gemmill (1900), 155 Ind. 
 
 33, 57 N. E. 542 712 
 
 Bolt V. Gray (1898), 54 S. C. 95, 32 
 
 S. E. 148 612 
 
 Bolton V. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1903), 
 
 172 Mo. 92, 72 S. W. 53 764, 793 
 
 Bomar v. Means (1896), 47 S. C. 190, 
 
 25 S. E. 60 433 
 
 Bond V. Bond (1903), 175 Mo. 112, 74 
 
 S. W. 975 783 
 
 Bond V. Corbet, 2 Minn. 248 728, 763 
 
 V. Kenosiia, 17 Wis. 284 118 
 
 V. Smith, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 239 293, 
 
 301 
 V. Wagner, 28 Ind. 462 801, 829 
 
 Bondurant v. Bladen, 19 Ind. 160 300, 
 310, 402, 748, 779 
 Bone V. Tharp, 63 Iowa, 223 135 
 
 Bonestecl v. Bonesteel,28 Wis. 245 II 
 
 Bnnfoy r. Goar (1894), 140 Ind. 292, 
 
 39 N. E. 56 718 
 
 Bonham v. Craig, 84 N. C. 224 662 
 
 Bonnell v. Allen', 53 Ind. 130 667 
 
 r. Jacobs, 36 Wis. 59 736, 908, 910 
 Bonney v. Reardin, 6 Rush, 34 457 
 
 Booco V. Man.sficld (1902), 66 O. St. 
 
 121,64 N. E. 115 8.33 
 
 Booher v. Goldsborough, 44 Ind. 490 
 Bool v. Watson, 13 Ind. 387 
 l)Oomer v. Carter, 19 Kan. 135 
 
 V. Koon, 6 Hun, 645 772, 
 
 Boone Cy. v. Keck, 31 Ark. 387 
 Boornian r. Wis., etc. Co., 36 Wis. 207 
 Boos V. Dulin (1897), 103 la. 331,72 
 N. W. 533 
 V. Gomber, 24 Wis. 490 
 V. Morgan (1806), 146 Ind. Ill, 
 
 43 N. E. 947 
 Booth V. Farmers' & Mecli. Bank, 1 
 
 N. Y. S. C. 45 516, 523, 581, 
 
 V. Langlev Co. (1897), 51 S. C. 
 
 412, 29 S. E. 204 
 V. Powers, 56 N. Y. 22 
 V. Sherwood, 12 Minn. 426 
 Borah i\ Archers, 7 Dana, 176 
 Borchsenius v. Chicago, St. P., etc. 
 
 Ry. Co. (1897), 96 Wis. 448, 71 
 
 N. W. 884 
 Bordeaux v. Greene (1899), 22 Mont. 
 
 254, 56 Pac. 218 565, 
 
 Borden v. Gilbert, 13 Wis. 670 
 Borders v. Williams (1900), 155 Ind. 
 
 36, 57 N. E. 527 
 Bort ('. Yaw, 46 Iowa, 323 
 Bosch I'. Kassing, 64 la. 312 
 Boseker v. Chamberlain (1903), — 
 
 Ind. — , 66 N. E. 448 179, 
 
 Bosley v. Mattinglcy, 14 B. Mon. 89 
 Bostick V. Barnes (1900), 59 S. C. 22, 
 
 37 S. E. 24 
 Boston Mills v. Eull, 6 Abb. Pr. n. s. 
 
 319 
 Bostwick V. Bryant, 113 Ind. 448 
 
 V. McEvov, 62 Cal. 496 
 Bosworth V. Allen (1901), 168 N. Y. 
 
 157, 61 N. E. 163 
 Botey V. Griswold, 2 Mont. 447 
 Botkin V. Cassody (1898), 106 la. 334, 
 
 76 N. W. 722 
 Botsford r. Burr, 2 Johns. Ch. 409 
 V. Wallace (1899), 72 Conn. 195, 
 
 44 Atl. 10 
 Bottorf r. Wise, 53 Ind. 32 
 Bolts c. Patton, 10 B. Mon. 452 
 
 611 
 935 
 452 
 779 
 340 
 376 
 
 639 
 231 
 
 744 
 
 651, 
 653 
 
 640 
 780 
 833 
 242 
 
 683 
 
 566 
 475 
 
 676 
 189 
 603 
 
 180 
 53 
 
 466 
 
 855 
 
 98 
 
 293 
 
 444 
 
 662 
 
 625 
 239 
 
 25 
 517 
 348
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the keferences are to the pages.] 
 
 Bougher v. Scobev, 16 Ind. 151 457 
 Buuscaren v. Brown (1894), 40 Neb. 
 
 722, 5y N. W. 385 735 
 
 Bouslog V. Uarrett, 39 Ind. 338 584, 727 
 
 Bouton V. Brooklyn, 15 Barb. 375 173 
 
 r. < >rr, 51 Iowa. 473 178 
 
 Bowdoin i: Coleniiin, 3 Abb. I'r. 431 100 
 Bowdoin College v. Merritt, 54 Fed. 
 
 Kep. 55 238, 248 
 
 Bowen r. Aubroy. 22 Cal. 5G6 15, 25, 544 
 
 r. Crow, 10 Neb. 550 291 
 
 r. Emnierson. 3 Ore. 452 544, oSo 
 
 r. Hoach, 78 Ind. 3(31 200 
 
 1-. State, 121 Ind. 235 29 
 
 V. Sweeney, 63 Hun, 224 G37 
 Bower v. Cassels (1900), 59 Neb. 620, 
 
 81 X. W. 022 271 
 
 Bowers i-. Keeseclier, 9 Iowa, 422 269, 
 
 345, 473 
 f. Schuler (1893), 54 Minn. 99, 
 
 55 N. W. 817 600 
 
 !•. Smitli, 20 S. W. Rep. 101 502 
 Bowles i: Sacramento Turnp. Co., 
 
 5 Cal. 224 527 
 Bowling Green Stone Co. v. Capshaw 
 
 (1901), Kv., 04 S. W. 507 818 
 Bowman v. Bowman (1899), 153 Ind. 
 
 498, 55 N. E. 422 732 
 
 V. Bran.<nn, 19 S. W. Rep. 634 213 
 1-. Eur .Mt': Co. (IH'.'o), 96 la. 
 
 IHS. 04 X. W. 77.J 726, 783 
 
 V. Slieldon. 5 Sandf. 007 610 
 
 1-. Van Kiiren, 29 Wis. 209 636 
 Bowser c. Mattler (1893), 137 Ind. 
 
 649, 35 X. E. 701 96 
 Box r. Cliicaco, R. I & P. Ry. Co. 
 
 ( 189',t), 107 la. 600, 78 N. \V. 094 463, 493 
 Bo.\ Butte f'ouiitv V. Noleman 
 
 (1898), 54 Xel.. 239, 74 X. AV. 582 615 
 
 Boyce v. Bradv. 61 Ind. 432 598 
 
 r. Brown, '7 Barb. 80 541 
 
 Bovd r. Beaudin. 54 Wis. 193 887 
 
 ' c Blaisdell. 15 Ind. 73 229 
 
 r. Foot, 5 B().*w. 110 872 
 
 r. Ilovt, 5 Paige, 65 342, 506 
 
 V. Jon'es, 44 Ark. 314 239, 251 
 
 v. Mu(ual Fire Ass'n (1903), 
 
 116 Wit.. 155, 94 X. W. 171 643 
 V. Oddous (181*3), 97 Cal. 510, 
 
 32 Pac. 509 673 
 V. Paul (1894). 125 Mo. 9, 28 
 
 S.W.I 71 783 
 V. Roanoke Lumber Co. (1903), 
 
 132 X. C. 184. 43 S. E. 631 645 
 
 V. ScliIiMMger, 59 X. Y. 301 908 
 Bnvd'g Adm'r v. Farmers' Bank 
 
 ( 1902). Ky.. 69 S. W. 964 625 
 
 Boyer v. Clark, 3 Xeb. 161 933 
 V. Commercial Building Co. 
 (1900), 110 la. 491, 81 N.W. 
 
 "20 607 
 r. Robinson (1901), 26 Wash. 
 
 117. 66 Par. 110 929 
 Boyle V. Mo Williams (1897), 69 
 
 Conn. 201, iil Atl. 501 732 
 
 Boyle V. Bobbins, 71 N. C. 130 91, 103 
 Bovnton r. Clinton, etc. Ins. Co., 16 
 
 Barb. 254 207 
 
 Brace v. Burr, 07 X. Y. 237 831 
 
 Bradburne v. Botfield, 14 M. & W. 559 
 
 Bradbury v. Cronise, 46 Cal. 287 735, 
 
 738 754 
 Bradfield v. Sewall (1899), 58 Neb. ' 
 
 637, 79 N. W. 015 735 
 
 Bradford r. Tonev. 30 Ark. 763 290 
 Bradford Inv. Co.";-. Joost (1897), 117 
 
 Cal. 204, 48 Pac. 1083 686 
 Bradliurst c. Townsend, 11 Hun, 
 
 104 895 
 
 Bradley v. Aldrich, 40 X. Y. 504 38, 575, 
 
 667 
 
 I'. Angell, 3 N. Y. 475 133 
 1-. Bailcv (1895), 95 la. 745, 64 
 
 X. W. 758 343 
 V. Borin (1894), 53 Kan. 628, 36 
 
 Pac. 977 675 
 r. Bradlev (1900), 165 N. Y. 183, 
 
 58 X. E. 887 257 
 V. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. (1896), 
 
 138 Mo. 293, 39 S. W. 763 613 
 V. Miller (1890), 100 la. 169, 69 
 
 X. W. 426 712 
 
 V. Parkhurst, 20 Kan. 462 598 
 i\ Piiuni.x Ins. Co., 28 Mo. 
 
 A pp. 7 637 
 
 Bradshaw v. Outram, 13 Vcs. 234 329 
 
 Brady v. Ball, 14 Ind. 317 301 
 
 V. Brennan, 25 Minn. 210 649, 894, 
 
 901, 916 
 
 V. Chandler, 31 Mo. 28 104 
 
 V. Xally (1890), 151 X. Y. 258, 
 
 45X. E. 547 615,618 
 
 V. Nat. Supply Co. (1901), 64(). 
 
 St. 267, 60 N. E. 218 674 818 
 V. Peck (1896), 99 Ky. 42, 34 
 
 S. W. 906 542, 638 
 
 V. Pinal County (1903), Ariz., 71 
 
 Pac. 910 638 
 
 V. Weeks, 3 Barb. 157 262 
 Braithwaite v. Akin (1893), 3 X. D. 
 
 365, 56 X. W. 133 649, 654, 914 
 
 i\ Britain, 1 Kern. 219 294 
 
 V. Power, 1 N. Dak. 455 151 
 
 Brake r. Corning. 19 Mo. 125 935 
 
 V. Payne (189;3), 137 Ind. 479, 37 
 
 N. E. 140 661 
 
 Braker v. Devereau.v, 8 Paige, 513 242 
 
 Branch v. Booker, 8 Munf. 43 250 
 V. Chappeil (1896), 119 N. C. 
 
 81, 25 S. E. 783 924 
 
 r. Wiseman. 51 Ind. 1 784 
 Brandenburg r. .Mc(;uire (1898), 105 
 
 Kv. 10, 44 .S. W. 96 821 
 
 Bran.lou i-. Allison, 66 N. C. 532 874 
 Brannaman v. Palmer, Stanton's 
 
 Code (Ky.), 90 865 
 
 Brannan v. Patv, 58 Cal. 330 865 
 Brannon v. White Lake Tp. (1903), 
 
 — la.—, 95 X. W. 284 116 
 
 Branskill i: James, 11 N. Y. 294 291
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixi 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Brashear v. Citv of Madison (1895), 
 
 142 Ind. 685, 30 N. E. 252 569 
 V. Lacey, 3 J. J. Marsh. 93 242 
 
 Brass i: Ratlibone (1807), 153 N. Y. 
 
 435, 47 N. E. 905 080 
 
 nrassell o. Silva (1897), 50 S. C. 181, 
 
 27 S, E. 622 853, 802 
 
 Brassey v. Chalmers, 4 DeG. M. & 
 
 G. 528 242 
 
 Brauchle v. Notlilic4fer (1900), 107 
 
 Wis 457, 83 N. W. 053 803 
 
 Braxton v. State, 25 Ind. 82 269, 289, 294 
 Bray i-. Blaclt, 57 Imi. 417 181, 415 
 
 I'. Booker (1897), 6 N. D. 526, 
 
 72 N. W. 933 418 
 
 V. Fromont, 6 Mad. 5 250 
 
 V. Marshall, 75 Mo. 327 815 
 
 Brazil v. Isham, 12 N. Y. 9 804 
 
 V. Moran, 8 Minn. 236 313, 314 
 
 Breault v. Merrill & R'mg Lumber 
 Co. (1898), 72 Minn. 143, 75 N. VV. 
 122 191 
 
 Breeding v. Tobin, 18 S. W. Rep. 773 310 
 Bretnner v. Leavitt (1895), 109 Cal. 
 
 130, 41 Pac. 859 474 
 
 Brennan v. Ford, 46 Cal. 7 821 
 
 P>renner v. Egly, 23 Kan. 123 499 
 
 Brent v. Long (1890), 99 Ivy. 245, 35 
 
 S. W. 640 781 
 
 Brett V. First Univ. Soc, 5 Hun, 
 
 149 1S9, 205, 211, 769, 778 
 
 Brewer v. Maurer, 38 Ohio St. 550 110 
 V. McCain (1895), 21 Colo. 382, 
 
 41 Pac. 822 455 
 
 V. Temple, 15 How. Pr. 286 482, 497 
 Brevfogle t: Stotsenburg (1897), 148 
 
 Ind. 552, 47 N. E. 1057 726 
 
 Bricken?'. Cross (1901), 163 Mo. 449, 
 
 64 S. W. 99 641, 642 
 
 Brickey v. Irwin, 122 Ind. 51 684 
 
 Bridge v. Payson, 5 Sandf. 210 271, 800, 
 
 829 
 Bridge Co. v. Fowler (1895), 55 Kan. 
 
 17, 39 Pac. 727 179, 349 
 
 V. Wyandotte, 10 Kan. 326 265 
 
 Bridges v. Paige, 13 Cal. 640 777 
 
 V. Thomas (1899), 8 Okla. 620, 
 
 58 Pac. 955 686 
 
 Bridget v. Hames, 1 Col. 72 252 
 
 Briggs V. Briggs, 15 N. Y. 471 291, 879, 
 
 881 
 
 V. Daughertv, 48 Ind. 247 65 
 
 V. Penninian, 8 Cow. 387 213 
 
 r. Seymour, 17 Wis. 255 871, 923 
 
 I'.right V. Ecker (1890), 9 S. D. 192, 
 
 69 N. W. 824 613 
 
 V. First Nat. Bank (1899), 106 
 
 Ky. 702, 51 S. W. 442 041 
 
 Brighton, etc. Irrigation Co. v. Little 
 
 (1896), 14 Utah, 42, 46 Pac. 208 864 
 Brinkerhoff v. Brown, 6 Johns. Cli. 
 
 139 - 342, 345, 378, 509 
 
 Brinkman v. Hunter, 73 ]\Io. 172 660 
 
 Brinsmead v. Harrison, L. R. 7 C. P. 
 547 307 
 
 Briscoe v. Kenrick, 1 Coop. 871 . 247 
 
 British No. Am., Bk. of, v. Suydani. 
 
 6 How. Pr. 379 351 
 
 Brittain i: Payne (1890), 118 N. C. 
 
 989, 24 S. E. 711 649 
 
 Britton i\ Ferrin (1902), 171 N. Y. 
 
 235, 03 N. E. 954 918 
 
 Brock V. Des Moines Ins. Co. (1895), 
 
 90 la. 39, 64 N. W. 685 671 
 
 Brockett v. Fair Haven, etc. R. R. 
 Co. (1900), 73 Conn. 428, 47 Atl. 
 703 230, 466, 673 
 
 Brockmeyer v. Wash. Nat. Bk., 40 
 
 Kan. 370 153 
 
 Brodek V. Farnum (1895), 11 Wash. 
 
 505, 40 Pac. 189 881 
 
 Broderick v. Poilton, 2 E. D. Smith, 
 
 554 597 
 
 Brodnax y. Groom, 64 N. C. 244 118 
 
 Brogden r. Henry, 83 N. C 274 713 
 
 Broiestedt v. South Side R. Co., 55 
 
 N. Y. 220 29 
 
 Brokavv v. Brokaw's Ex., 41 N. J. 
 
 Eq. 215 251, 351 
 
 Brook V. Bayless (1898), 6 Okla. 
 
 568, 52 Pac. 738 191 
 
 Brooke v. Cole (1899), 108 Ga. 251, 
 
 33 S. E. 849 626 
 
 Brookfield v. Tooey (1897), 141 Mo. 
 
 619, 43 S. W. 387 565 
 
 Brookmire r. Rosa, 51 N. W. 840 181 
 
 Brooks r. Chilton, 6 Cal. 640 766, 788 
 
 V. Hager, 5 Cal. 281 428 
 
 V. Harris, 42 Ind. 177 147 
 
 V. Peck, 38 Barb. 519 386 
 
 V. Schwerin, 54 N. Y. 343 225 
 
 Brookville & C. Turnp. Co. v. Pum- 
 
 phrey, 59 Ind. 78 598 
 
 Broome v. Taylor, 9 Hun, 155 576 
 
 Brosnan i\ Kramer (1901), 135 Cal. 
 
 36, 66 Pac. 979 907 
 
 Brossard v. Morgan (1900), Idaho, 
 
 61 Pac. 1031 644 
 
 V. Williams (1902), 114 Wis. 89, 
 
 89 N. W. 832 98, 671, 676 
 
 Brothers v. Brothers (1901), 29 Colo. 
 
 69, 66 Pac. 901 606 
 
 Brotherton v. Downey, 21 Hun, 436 730, 
 
 758 
 Broughel v. So. New Eng. Tel. Co. 
 (1900), 72 Conn. 617, 45 Atl. 
 435 462 
 
 Brower Lumber Co. v. Miller (1896), 
 
 28 Ore. 565, 43 Pac. 659 106 
 
 Brown v. Allen, 35 Iowa, 306 203 
 
 V. Baker (1901), 39 Ore. 66, 65 
 
 Pac. 799 600, 703, 787 
 
 V. Baruch (1901), 24 Wash. 572, 
 
 64 Pac. 789 703 
 
 17. Benson (1897), 101 Ga. 753, 
 
 29 S. E. 215 625 
 
 r. Birdsall, 29 Barb. 549 292 
 
 V. Board of Education (1894), 
 
 103Cal. 581,37Pac. 503 584,585 
 r. Bridges, 31 Iowa, 138 218
 
 Ixii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references ark to the pages.] 
 
 Brown 1-. Brown (1897), 121 N. C. 8, 
 
 27 S. E. 1198 234 
 
 V. Brown, 4 Robt. 688 15, 29, 30, 475 
 V. Brown, 32 N. Iv Kep. 1128 576 
 V. Buckingham, 11 Abb. Pr. 387 922 
 V. Canal ami Reservoir Co. 
 
 (1899), 26 Colo. OU, 56 Pac. 
 
 183 196, 2G2, 320 
 
 V. Champlin. 66 N. Y. 214 576 
 
 1-. Ciierrv. 38 How. Pr. 352 150 
 
 V. Citv of Webster Citv (1902), 
 
 115 la. 511, 88 N.W. 1070 802 
 V. Coble, 76 N. C. 391 499 
 
 V. College Cor Gt. Co., 56 Ind. 
 
 110 773 
 
 i;. Curtis (1900), 128 Cal. 193, 
 
 60 Pac. 773 779 
 
 r. De Tastet, Jac. 384 2"0 
 
 V. Dowihwaite, 1 Mad. 446 347 
 
 V. Doyle (1897), 69 Minn. 543, 
 
 72 X. W. 814 626, 679 
 
 V. Fldmunds (1896), 9 S. D. 273, 
 
 68 X. W. 734 639 
 
 V. Farnham (1893), 55 Minn. 27, 
 
 56 X. W. 352 214 
 
 i". Freed, 43 Ind. 253 03, 782 
 
 V. Fresno Raisin Co. (1894), 101 
 
 Cal. 222. 35 Pac. 639 870 
 
 r. Gallaudet, 80 N. Y. 413 939 
 
 r. (Jinn (1902), 66 Ohio St. 316, 
 
 04 X. E. 123 91, 98 
 
 i;. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 99 
 
 Mo. 310 575 
 
 r. Hotel Ass'n of Omaha (1901), 
 
 63 Xeb. 181, 88 N. W. 175 
 
 323, 326 
 r. 111. Cent. R. R. Co. (1897), 100 
 
 Ky. 525, 38 S. W. 862 600 
 
 r. Iowa Legion of Honor (1899), 
 
 107 la. 43'.t, 78 X. W. 73 666 
 
 r. Kohout (1895). 61 Minn. 113, 
 
 63 X. W. 248 102 
 
 V. Latham (1893). 92 Ga. 280, 
 
 18 S. E. 421 29 
 
 i: I.eigh, 12 Abb. Pr. n. s. 193 635 
 r. Leigh. 49 X. Y. 78 636 
 
 V. Markland (1898). 16 Utah, 
 
 360, 52 Pac. S97 109 
 
 r. Orr, 29 Cal. 120 766,767 
 
 V. Penfield. 36 X. Y. 473 94 
 
 V. Perrv. 14 Ind. 32 584, 587 
 
 r. Phillips, 3 Bush, 656 936 
 
 V. Porter (1893). 7 Wash. 327, 
 
 34 Pac. 1105 787 
 
 t-. Railway Co. (1898), 59 Kan. 
 
 70. 52 Pac. 65 015 
 
 V. Ready, 20 S. W. Rep. 1036 812 
 V. Rhinehart Bros. (18'.)3). 112 
 
 N. C. 772. 16 S. E. 840 645 
 
 V. Rice. 51 Cal. 489 520 
 
 V. Ricketts, 3 Jolins. Ch. 553 249, 
 
 385, 387 
 
 V. Shnrkov (1894), 93 la. 157, 61 
 
 X. W'. :>.(', I 116, 149 
 
 I'. Stale, 44 Ind. 222 439 
 
 Brown v. Stillman, 43 Minn. 126, 45 
 
 N. W. 2 108 
 
 r. Treat, 1 Hill, 225 650 
 r. Volkening, 64 X. Y. 76 334, 337 
 
 V. Warren, 16 Xev. 228 196 
 
 V. Weatherby, 12 Sim. 6 2;)4 
 1-. Wilco.x (1900), 73 Conn. 100, 
 
 46 Atl. 827 659 
 V. Wilson (1895), 21 Colo. 309, 
 
 40 Pac. 688 30 
 r. Woods, 48 .Mo. 330 276, 278 
 
 Browning r. .Marvin, 22 Hun, 547 88 
 V. Smith (1894), 139 Ind. 280, 
 
 37 X. E. 510 362 
 Brownwcll & Wriglit Car Co. v. 
 Barnard (1897), 139 Mo. 142, 40 
 
 S. W. 762 410 
 Broyhill v. Xorton (1903), 175 Mo. 
 
 190, 74 S. W. 1024 593 
 
 Bruce r. Benedict, 31 Ark. 301 725 
 
 1-. Kellv, 5 Hun, 229 27 
 f. Phoenix Ins. Co. (1893), 24 
 
 Ore. 486, 34 Pac. 16 816 
 
 Bruck V. Tucker, 42 Cal. 346 46, 52, 748, 
 
 781 
 
 Brugman v. Burr, 30 Neb. 406 916 
 
 Bruguier v. U. S., 1 Dak. 5 618 
 Bruil V. Northwestern M. R. Ass'n, 
 
 72 Wis. 430, 39 N. W. 529 462, 463 
 
 Bruley v. Rose, 57 Iowa, 651 783 
 
 Brumback v. Oldliam, 1 Idaho, 709 97 
 
 Brumble r. Brown, 71 N. C. 513 931 
 
 Brumskill i: James, 11 N. Y. 294 276 
 Brundage r. Burke (1895), 11 Wash. 
 
 679, 40 Pac. 343 809 
 V. Domestic & For. Miss. Soc, 
 
 60 Barb. 204 325 
 Brunsden r. Humphrey, L. R. [14 
 
 Q. B. 1).] 141 468, 470 
 
 Brunson r. Ilenrv (1894), 140 Ind. 
 
 455, 39 N. E. 256 188 
 Brunswick & Western R. R. Co. v. 
 Hardey (1900), 112 Ga. 604, 37 
 
 S. E. 888 687 
 Bryant v. Davis (1899), 22 Mont. 
 
 534. 57 Pac. 143 643, 669 
 
 r. Erskine. 55 Me. Ii53 378 
 Buchanan ;•. BlackhawkCoal Works 
 
 (1903), 1191a. 118,93N.W. 51 608 
 »;. Tilden (1899), 158 N. Y. 109, 
 
 52 X. E. 724 107 
 
 Buchtel r. Evans, 21 Ore. 315 811 
 
 Buckingham v. Waters, 14 Cal. 146 456 
 
 Buckles f. Lambert, 4 Mete. (Ky.)330 301 
 Buckley v. Carlisle. 2 Cal. 420 38, 66 
 
 Bucklin v. Ford. 5 Barb. 393 463 
 Buckman v. Hatch (1903), 139 Cal. 
 
 53, 72 Pac. 445 605, 680 
 
 Buckmaster v. Kellev, 15 Fla. 180 526 
 
 Bucknall i-. Story, 36 Cal. 67 118 
 
 Bucknam v. Brett, 35 Barb. 596 205 
 
 Buckner v. Ries, 34 Mo. 357 66 
 
 Budd V. Bingham, 18 Barb. 494 526 
 V. Meriilen Elec. R.R. Co. (1897), 
 
 69 Conn. 272, 37 Atl. 683 800
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 BiKlile V. Kebenack (1896), 137 Mo. 
 
 179, 38 S. W. 910 371, 444, 510 
 
 Buddington v. Davis, G How. Pr. 401 541 
 Budilress c. Schafer (1895), 12 Wash. 
 
 ;}10, 41 Pac. 43 734 
 
 Buechner v. Columbia Slioe Co. 
 
 (1895), 60 Minn. 477, 62 N. W. 
 
 817 220 
 
 Buell V. Brown (1900), 131 Cal. 158, 
 
 63 Pac. 167 624 
 
 Buena Vista, etc. Co. v. Tuohy 
 
 (1895), 107 Cal. 243, 40 Pac. 386 676 
 Ruftitigton V. Harvey, 95 U. S. 103 340 
 Bufilkins V. Eason (1893), 112 N. C. 
 
 162, 16 S. E. 916 676 
 
 Buff mil V. Chad wick, 8 Mass. 103 116 
 Bugbee v. Sargent, 23 Me. 271 345 
 
 Buhne v. Cliism, 48 Cal. 467 63 
 
 V. Corbett, 43 Cal. 264 831, 834 
 
 Buie (•. Mech. Ass'n, 74 N. C. 117 279 
 
 Building & Loan Ass'n r. Cameron 
 
 (1896), 48 Neb. 124, 66 N. W. 
 
 1109 456 
 
 Buist v. Fitzsimons (1891), 44 S. C. 
 
 130, 21 S. E. 010 802 
 
 c. Melchers (1894), 44 S. C. 46, 
 
 21 S. E. 449 604 
 
 V. Salvo (1H94),44 S. C. 143, 21 
 
 S. E. 615 712 
 
 Bull V. Read, 13 Gratt. 78 118 
 
 BuUard v. Jolinson, 65 N. C. 436 636 
 
 V. Raynor, 30 N. Y. 196 
 
 V. Sherwood, 85 N. Y. 253 667 
 
 Buller 1-. Sidell, 43 Fed. Rep. 116 753, 
 
 758 
 Bullis (.'. Montgomery, 50 N. Y. 352 301 
 Buncq v. Pratt (1893), 56 Minn. 8, 57 
 
 N. W. 160 278 
 
 Bunch V. Potts (1893), 57 Ark. 257, 
 
 21 S. W. 4.37 868 
 
 Bungenstock v. Nishnabotna Drain- 
 age Dist. (1901), 163 Mo. 198, 64 
 
 S. W. 149 718 
 
 Bunker v. Tavlor (1900), 13 S. D. 
 
 433, 83 N. W. 555 158 
 
 Bunnell v. Berlin Iron Bridge Co. 
 
 (1895), 66 Conn. 24, 33 Atl. 533 276, 
 
 401, 683 
 Bunting v. Foy, 66 N. C. 193 376 
 
 Burbank v. Beacli, 15 Barb. 326 157 
 
 Burchard v. Roberts, 70 Wis. Ill 283 
 
 Burdsall v. Waggoner, 4 Cal. 256 614 
 Burford v. Aldridge (1901), 165 Mo. 
 
 419, 63 S. W. 109 346 
 
 Burge V. Gandv (1894), 41 Neb. 149, 
 
 59 N. W. 359 929, 981 
 
 Burgess v. Helm (1898), 24Nev. 242, 
 
 51 Pac. 1025 588 
 
 Burgoyne i'. Ohio L. Ins. & Tr. Co., 
 
 5 Ohio St. 586 296, 400, 402 
 
 Burhans v. Burhans, 2 Barb. Ch. 
 
 398 368 
 
 Burhop V. Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 431 270 
 Burke r. Baldwin (1893), 54 Minn. 
 
 514, 56 N. W. 173 638 
 
 Burke r. Inter-State Savings Ass'n 
 (1901), 25 Mont. 315, 69 Pac. 
 879 752 
 
 V. Thorn, 44 Barb. 363 845, 865 
 
 V. Unique Printing Co. (1901), 
 
 63 Neb. 264. 88 N. W. 488 681 
 Burkett v. Lehmen-Higginson Co. 
 
 (1899), 8 Okhv. 84, 56 Pac. 856 165 
 
 Burkhani v. Beaver, 17 Ind. 367 326, 
 
 327 
 Burkliardt v. Burkhardt (1899), 107 
 
 la. 369, 77 N. W. 1069 ^ 638 
 
 Burley v. German-Am. Bk.,111 U. S. 
 
 216 751 
 
 Burlington Indep. Dist. v. Merch. 
 
 Bk., 68 Iowa, 343 815 
 
 Burlington Ins. Co. v. Campbell 
 (1894), 42 Neb. 208, 60 N.W. 
 699 689 
 
 V. Lowery (1895), 61 Ark. 108, 
 
 32 S. W. .383 217 
 Burlington Voluntary Relief Dept. 
 
 *•. Moore (1897), 52 Neb. 719, 73 
 N. W. 15 642, 819 
 
 Burlington & Mo. Riv. R. Co. v. Lan- 
 caster Cy. Com'rs, 7 Neb. 33 793 
 Burnap v. Cook, 16 Iowa, 149 316, 338, 
 
 379 
 Burnet v. Cavanagh (1898), 56 Neb. 
 
 190, 76 N. W. 578 702 
 
 Burnett v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. 
 Co. (1903), 132 N. C. 261, 
 43 S. E. 797 676 
 
 V. Crandall, 63 Mo. 410 103 
 
 V. Hoffman (1894), 40 Neb. 569, 
 
 58N. W. 1134 332 
 
 V. Milnes (1897), 148 Ind. 230, 
 
 46 N. E. 464 6.38 
 
 V. Stearns, 33 Cal. 473 563 
 
 Burney v. Spear, 17 Ga. 223 251 
 
 Burnham v. Boyd (1902), 167 Mo. 
 
 185, 66 S. W. 1088 678 
 
 Burns v. Ashworth, 72 N. C. 496 190 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. (1900), 
 
 110 la. 385, 81 N. W. 794 830 
 V. Iowa Homestead Co., 48 Iowa, 
 
 279 620 
 
 V. Scooffy (1893), 98 Cal. 271, 
 
 33 Pac. 86 645 
 Burnside v. Matthews, 54 N. Y. 78 814 
 
 V. Wayman, 49 Mo. 356 519 
 
 Burr V. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178 110 
 
 V. Brantley (1893), 40 S. C. 538, 
 
 19 S. E. 199 662 
 
 V. Woodrow, 1 Bush, 602 616 
 
 Burrage v. Bonanza, G. & Q. Min. 
 
 Co., 12 Ore. 169 938 
 
 Burrall v. De Groot, 5 Duer, 379 865 
 
 Burrell v. Hughes (1895), 116 N. C. 
 
 430, 21 S. E. 971 217, 498 
 
 V. Kern (1899), 34 Ore. 501, 56 
 
 Pac. 809 158 
 
 Burris v. People's Ditch Co. (1894), 
 
 104 Cal. 248, 37 Pac. 922 746 
 
 Burrows v. Holderman, 31 Ind. 412 458
 
 Ixiv 
 
 TABLE Or CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references are to tub pages.] 
 
 Burrows v. McCiUev (1897), 17 
 
 Wash. 2<iy. 4!t Tiie. 508 
 Burriis r. Citv of Columbus (1898), 
 
 105 Ga. •12.'31 S. E. 124 
 Burt c. Wilson, 2b Cal. (532 
 Burton «•. Anderson, Stanton's (Ky.) 
 Code, 34 
 V. Larkin, .36 Kan. 246 
 V. Koseniarv Co. ( 1903), 132 N. C. 
 17, 43S.E. 480 684, 
 
 r. Speis. 5 Hun, 60 300, 402, 
 
 r. Wilkes, m N. C. 604 
 Burwell Irrig. Co. c. Laslimett (1900), 
 
 59 Ni-b. 60.'), 81 N. W. 617 
 Busenius r. Coffee, 14 Cal. 91 
 Busii r. Brown, 49 Iiid. 573 784, 
 
 v. Cella, 52 A'k. 378 
 V. Froelifk (1890), 8 S. D. 353, 
 
 66 \. W. 939 
 r. Groom, 9 Bush, 675 
 V. Haeussler, 26 Mo. App. 265 
 V. Hicks, 00 N. Y. 298 
 V. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535 122, 
 
 Bushey r. Reynolds, 31 Ark. 057 
 
 Butler <•. Ashworth (1895), 110 Cal. 
 614, 43 Pac. 386 
 v. Barnes, 61 Conn. 399 
 v. Dunham, 27 111. 474 
 v. Edgerton, 15 Ind. 15 748, 
 
 i: Gage, 23 I'ac Rep. 462 359, 
 V. Kirbv, 53 Wis. 188 
 V. Lee, 33 How. Vr. 251 
 c. Titus, 13 Wis. 429 843, 911, 
 V. Wentworth, 9 How. Pr. 282 
 r. Williams, 27 S. C. 221 327, 
 Butt r. Cameron, 53 ISarb. 642 
 
 1-. Carson (1896), 5 Okla.160,48 
 Pac. 182 
 Butte V. Peasley (1890), 18 Mont. 
 
 303, 45 Pac. 210 
 Butte & Boston Co. v. Montana Co. 
 (1900). 24 Mont. 125, 60 Pac. 1039 
 Buttcrfield >: Graves (1902), 138 Cal. 
 
 l.>j, 71 Pac. 510 
 Buttles r. DeBaun (1903), 116 Wis. 
 
 ■,i-S4, 93 N. W. 5 
 Button V. McCauley, 38 Barb. 413 
 
 Butts r. Collins. 13 Wend. 139 
 v. Genung, 5 Paige, 254 
 V. Kingman & Co. (1900), 60 
 Neb. 224. 82 N. W. 854 
 Buxton V. .Sargent (1898), 7 N. I). 
 
 603. 75 N. W. 811 
 Byers c Ferguson (1902), 41 Ore. 77, 
 (\H I'ac. 5 
 V. Hodabaugh, 17 Iowa. 53 
 IJyington '•, Woods, 13 Iowa, 17 
 HyliT r. .Jom-K, 79 Mo. 2<H 
 P.yrd r. Byrd (1895), 117 N. C. 623, 
 
 23 S. E. 324 
 Byxbie v. Wood, 24 X. Y. 010 028, 
 
 651 
 
 710 
 
 680 
 519 
 
 260 
 112 
 
 587 
 499 
 911 
 
 816 
 739 
 791 
 
 ' 598 
 
 494 
 202 
 213 
 364 
 123, 
 124 
 592, 
 713 
 
 307 
 29 
 118 
 779 
 360 
 471 
 14 
 913 
 831 
 329 
 520 
 
 642 
 
 612 
 
 669 
 
 669 
 
 566 
 769, 
 810 
 052 
 372 
 
 593 
 
 645 
 
 685 
 270 
 520 
 830 
 
 346 
 
 033, 
 653 
 
 Cabe 2-. Vanbook (1900), 127 N. C. 
 
 424, 37 S. E. 464 117 
 
 Cable c. yt. Louis Marine Ry. Co., 
 
 21 Mo. 133 102, 103 
 
 Cade r. Head Camp W. 0. W. (1902), 
 
 27 Wash. 218, 07 Pac. 603 678 
 
 Cadematori v. Gauger (1901), 160 
 
 Mo. 352, 01 S. W. 195 816 
 
 Cadiz V. Majors, 33 CaL 288 46 
 
 Cady r. Case (1895), 11 Wash. 124, 
 
 39 Pac. 375 669 
 
 V. South Omaha Nat. Bank 
 (1896), 46 Neb. 756, 65 
 N. W. 900 793, 802 
 
 Cagger v. Lansing, 64 N. Y. 417 28, 28 H 
 Cahill >: Palmer, 17 Abb. Pr. 196 611 
 
 Gaboon v. Bk. of Utica, 7 N. Y. 
 
 486 29, 471 
 
 Cain v. Codv, 29 Pac. Rep. 778 637 
 
 V. Hunt, 41 Ind. 406 748 
 
 Caine v. Seattle & Northern Rv. Co. 
 
 (1894), 12 Wash. 596, 41 Pac. 904 815 
 Cairns v. O'Bleness, 40 Wis. 469 155, 
 
 293 
 Calderwood v. Pyser, 31 Cal. 333 
 Caldwell V. Auger, 4 Minn. 217 815 
 
 r. Bruggerman, 4 Minn. 270 728, 763, 
 
 780 
 v. Mcshew, 44 Ark. 564, 53 Ark. 
 
 263 637 
 
 Caleb i: Morgan, 83 N. C. 211 908 
 
 Calhoun v, Ilallen, 25 Hun, 155 751 
 
 California v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 
 
 157 U. 8. 229 318 
 
 California Navigation Co. v. Union 
 Transp. Co. (1898), 122 Cal. 641, 
 55 Pac. 591 594 
 
 California State Bank r. Webber 
 
 (1«95), 110 Cal. 538, 42 Pac. 1000 810 
 Cal. Steam Nav. Co. r. Wright, 8 
 
 Cal. 585 814 
 
 Calkins v. Smith, 48 N. Y. 614 190 
 
 Callaghan r. McMahan, 33 Mo. Ill 496 
 
 Callaiian v. Davis, 90 Mo. 78 283 
 
 V. Longhran (1894), 102 Cal. 
 
 476, .'16 Pac. 835 594 
 
 Callanan i;. Edwards. 32 N. Y. 483 122 
 V. Williams, 71 Iowa, 363 753 
 
 Callcn V. Rose (1896), 47 Neb. 038, 
 
 00 N. W. 039 625 
 
 Calnan Construction Co. i*. Brown 
 
 (1899), 110 la. 37, 81 N. W. 163 714 
 Calteaux r. Mueller (1899), 102 Wis. 
 
 525, 78 N. W. 1082 815 
 
 Calverley v. Phelp, 6 Mad. 229 252, 837 
 Calvin r. Duncan, 12 Bush, 101 676 
 
 V. Woollen, 60 Ind. 464 439 
 
 Calvo i: Davies. 73 N. Y. 211 598 
 
 Cameron i-. Brvan (1893), 89 la. 214, 
 
 66 N. W. 434 625 
 
 r. Mount (1893), 86 Wis. 477, 
 
 56 N. W. 1094 678 
 
 Camp r. ,McGillicu(My, 10 Iowa, 201 412
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixv 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Camp V. Pollock (1805), 45 Neb. 771, 
 
 64 N. W. 231 688 
 
 V. Pulver, 5 Barb. 91 652 
 
 Campbell v. Brosius (1893), 30 Neb. 
 
 792, 55 N. W. 215 570, 689 
 
 V. Campbell, 121 Iiul. 178 181 
 
 V. Equitable Loan & Trust Co. 
 (1901), 14 S. D. 483, 85 
 N. W. 1015 520, 612 
 
 V. Fox, 11 Iowa, 318 936 
 
 V. Genet, 2 Hilt. 290 870 
 
 V. Irvine (1895), 17 Mont. 476, 
 
 43 Fao. 626 103 
 
 V. Jones, 25 Minn. 155 340, 866 
 
 V. Linder (1897), 50 S. C. 169, 27 
 
 S. E. 648 809 
 
 V. Mackay, 1 Myl. & Cr. 603 507, 
 508, 510 
 V. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1893), 121 
 
 Mo. 340, 25 S. W. 036 612 
 
 V. PattOM (1893), 113 N. C. 481, 
 
 18 S. E. 687 787 
 
 V. Perkins, 8 N. Y. 430 650 
 
 V. Perry, 9 N. Y. Suppl. 3.30 
 V. Routt, 42 Ind. 410 835, 862, 867 
 V. Stakes, 2 Wend. 137 650 
 
 V. Stokes (1894), 142 N. Y. 23, 
 
 36 N. E. 811 371 
 
 Candrian v. Miller, 98 Wis. 168 519 
 
 Canefox v. Anderson, 22 Mo. 347 89 
 
 Cannon v. McManus, 17 Mo. 345 829 
 
 V. Smith (1896), 47 Neb. 917, 66 
 
 N. W. 999 614 
 
 Cantwell v. Herring (1900), 127 
 
 N. C. 81, 37 S. E. 140 669 
 
 Cape V. Plymouth Congregational 
 Church (1903), 117 Wis. 150, 93 
 N. W. 449 239 
 
 Capitol Lumbering Co. v. Learned 
 
 (1899), 36 Ore. 544, 59 Pac. 454 735 
 Caplis V. Am. Fire Ins. Co. (1894), 
 
 60 Minn. 376, 62 N. W. 440 790 
 
 Capuro V. Builders' Ins. Co., 39 Cal. 
 
 123 789 
 
 Carder v. Weisenburgh (1893), 95 
 
 Ky. 135, 23 S. W. 964 42 
 
 Carey v. Brown, 92 U. S. 172 253 
 
 V. Cranston (1896), 99 Ga. 77, 24 
 
 S. E. 869 641 
 
 Carey-Lombard Lumber Co. v. Bier- 
 bauer (1899), 76 Minn. 434, 79 
 N. W. 541 326 
 
 Cargar v. Fee (1894), 140 Ind. 572, 39 
 
 N. E. 93 191,455,459 
 
 Carkeek v. Boston Nat. Bank (1897), 
 
 16 Wash. 399, 47 Pac. 884 781 
 
 Carle v. Wall, 16 S. W. Rep. 293 200 
 
 Carlile v. The People (1899), 27 
 
 Colo. 116, 59 Pac. 48 831 
 
 Carlson c. Presbyterian Board (1897), 
 
 67 Minn. 436, 70 N. W. 3 601 
 
 Carman v. Plass, 23 N. Y. 286 398, 402, 
 
 403 
 
 Carmichael v. Dolan, 25 Neb. 335 637 
 
 V. Moore, 88 N. C. 29 152 
 
 Carmien v. Cornell (1897), 148 Ind. 
 
 83, 47 N. E. 216 830 
 
 V. Whitaker, 36 Ind. 509 277 
 
 Carnahan v. Tousey, 93 Ind. 561 112 
 
 Carney v. Gleissner, 62 Wis. 493 233 
 
 V. Lacrosse & M. K. Co., 15 Wis. 
 
 503 270, 375 
 
 Carpenter v. Brenham, 50 Cal. 549 667 
 V. Chicago, etc. Ky. Co. (1895), 
 
 7 S. 1). 584, 64 N.W. 1120 816 
 V. Cincinnati, etc. Ry. Co., 35 
 
 Ohio St. 307 387 
 
 V. Hewel, 67 Cal. 589 865, 922 
 
 V. Ingalls, 51 N. W. Rep. 948 333 
 V. Leonard, 5 Minn. 155 858, 871 
 
 V. Manhattan L. Ins. Co., 22 
 
 Hun, 49 895 
 
 V. Manhattan L. Ins. Co., 93 
 
 N. Y. 552 928 
 
 V. Mann, 17 Wis. 155 118 
 
 V. McCord Lumber Co. (1000), 
 
 107 Wis. 611, 83 N. W. 764 674 
 V. Miles, 17 B. Mon. 598 95 
 
 V. O'Doughertv, 50 N. Y. 660 315 
 V. Ritchie, 2 Wash. St. 512 753 
 
 V. Smith (1894), 20 Colo. 39, 36 
 
 Pac. 739 602 
 
 V. Stilwell, 3 Abb. Pr. 459 650 
 
 V. Tatro, 36 Wis. 297 88 
 
 V. Town of Rolling (1900), 107 
 
 Wis. 559, 83 N. W. 953 740 
 
 Carpentier v. Williamson, 25 Cal. 
 
 161 326 
 
 Carr v. Collins, 27 Ind. 306 414 
 
 V. Waldron, 44 Mo. 393 270, 377 
 
 Carrere v. Spofford, 15 Abb. Pr. n. s. 
 
 47 205 
 
 Carrico v. Tomlinson, 17 Mo. 499 14 
 
 Carriers. Bernstein (1898), 104 1a. 
 572, 73 N. W. 1076 444, 498, 503, 
 
 569 
 Carrillo v. McPhillips, 65 Cal. 130 160 
 Carrington v. Omaha Life Ass'n 
 
 (1899), 59 Neb. 116, 80 N. W. 491 678 
 Carroll v. Fethers, 82 Wis. 67 304 
 
 V. Fethers (1899), 102 Wis. 436. 
 
 78 N. W. 604 639, 655 
 
 V. Paul's Ex., 16 Mo. 226 584, 587 
 Carskaddon r. Pine (1899), 154 Ind. 
 
 410, 56 N. E. 844 178, 180 
 
 Carson v. Butt (1896), 4 Okla. 133, 
 
 46 Pac. 596 666 
 
 V. Fears (1893), 91 Ga. 482,17 
 
 S. E. 342 641, 662 
 
 Carson-Rand Co. v. Stern (1895), 129 
 
 Mo. 381, 31 S. W. 772 815 
 
 Carson's Executors v. BuckstafE 
 
 (1898), 57 Neb. 262, 77 N. W. 670 914 
 Carswell v. Neville, 12 How. Pr. 445 417 
 Carter v. Dilley (1002), 167 Mo. 564, 
 
 67 S. W. 232 643 
 
 V. Gibson (1896), 47 Neb. 655, 66 
 
 N. W. 631 614 
 
 I'. Mills, 30 Mo. 4.32 256,417,419 
 V. Sanders, 2 Drew, 248 258
 
 Ixvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Carter r. Seattle (1898), 19 Wash. 
 597, 5;; Pac. 1102 
 V. Southern Uy. Co. (1900), 111 
 
 Ga. 38, 3G S. E. 308 
 r. Tipping ( l'.H)l ), 1 13 Ga. 636, 38 
 
 S. E. y46 
 r. Wakenian (1902), 42 Ore. 147, 
 
 70 Pac. 393 
 1-. Wann (Ib^'J), Idaho, 67 Pac. 
 
 314 
 V. Wilmington, etc. R. R. Co. 
 (1900). 126 N. C. 437, 36 
 S. E. 14 
 I'. Zenblin, 68 Ind. 436 
 Carver v. Carver, 97 Ind. 497 
 
 V. Shellev, 17 Kan. 472 
 Cary r. Allen, 39 Wis. 481 
 
 .-. Wiieeler, 14 Wis. 281 
 Casad v. Iloldri.li:e, 50 Ind. 529 
 
 V. Hughe.<, 27 Ind. 141 
 Case f. Carroll. 35 X. Y. 385 
 
 673 
 152 
 870 
 687 
 661 
 
 217 
 
 661 
 
 602 
 
 930 
 
 576 
 
 458, 475 
 
 784,811 
 
 138 
 
 177.261 
 
 Casey r. Gibbons (1902), 136 Cal. 
 368. 68 Pac. 1032 
 c. Mason (1899), 8 Okla. 665, 59 
 
 Pac. 252 • 688 
 
 Casgrain r. Hamilton ( 1896), 92 Wis. 
 
 179. 66 N. W. 118 872 
 
 Cashman r. Wood, 6 Ilun, 520 159, 219 
 easier i-. Chase (1901), 160 Mo. 418, 
 
 60 S. W. 1040 
 Cason V. Cason. 79 Ky. 558 
 Cass r. Higenbotam, 100 N. Y. 248 
 Cass Cy. Com'rs v. Adams, 76 Ind. 
 
 504 
 Cassiday i-. McDaniel, 8 B. Mon. 519 238. 
 
 348 
 Cassidy v. Caton, 47 Iowa, 22 
 
 V. Woodward, 77 Iowa, 354 
 Cassin v. Delaney, 38 N. Y. 178 
 Ca.>*tagnino r. Balletta, 82 Cal. 250 
 Castile i-. Ford (1897), 53 Neb. 507, 
 
 73 N. W. 945 
 Castle V. Houston, 19 Kan. 417 
 
 1-. Madison (1902), 113 Wis. 346, 
 89 N. W. 156 183, 188 
 
 382, 392 
 Castleberry c. Johnston (1893), 92 
 
 Ga. 499, 17 S. E. 772 
 Castner r. .Sumner, 2 Minn. 44 
 Caswell V. West, 3 N. Y. 8up. Ct. 383 
 
 Cate V. Hutchinson (1899), 68 Neb. 
 
 232, 78 N. W. 500 644, 832, 833 
 
 Catlin r. f Junior, 1 Duer. 253 769, 809 
 
 I'. Pedrick, 17 Wis. 8« 658 
 
 r. Wheeler, 49 Wis. 507 219 
 
 Caulfleld /•. Sanders, 17 Cal. 669 739 
 
 Cauoey c. Causey (1H98), 106 Ga. 
 
 188, 32 S. E. i:]8 640 
 
 Cavnllaro v. Texas, etc. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1896), 110 Cal. 348,42 Pac. 918 
 
 [the REFEKCNCeS ARE TO TUB PAGES.] 
 
 Cave c. Gill (1900), 59 S. C. 256, 
 
 37 S. E. 817 
 Cavender v. Smith, 8 Iowa, 360 
 Cavitt i: Tiiarp, 30 Mo. App. 131 
 Cawtteld r. Owens (1902), 130 N. C. 
 
 641, 41 S. E. «91 
 Cawker City Bank v. Jennings 
 
 (1^93), 89 la. 230, 56 N. W. 494 
 Ca wood's Adm. v. Lee, 32 Ind. 44 
 Cedar Rapids Nat. Bank v. Lavery 
 
 (1900), 110 Iowa, 575, 81 N. W. 
 
 775 177, 
 
 Cederson r. Oregon Nav. Co. (1900), 
 
 38 (Jre. 343, 02 Pac. 637 
 Center Creek Water Co. v. Lindsay 
 
 (1900), 21 Utah, 192, 60 Pac. 659 
 Center School Tp. v. State ex rel. 
 (1897), 150 Ind. 168, 49 N. E. 961 
 Central Bank of Wis.'u. Knowlton, 
 
 12 Wis. 624 
 Central City v. Treat (1897), 101 la. 
 
 109, 70 N. W. 110 
 Central City Bank r. Rice (1895), 
 
 44 Neb. 594, 63 N. W. 60 638, 
 
 Central City First Nat. Bk. v. Hum- 
 mel, 14 Colo. 259 
 Central Kentucky Asvlum v. Penick 
 
 (1898), 102 Ky. 633', 44 S. W. 92 
 Central Nat. Bank v. Doran, 109 Mo. 
 40 
 i;. Haseltine (1900), 155 Mo. 58. 
 55 S. W. 1015 
 Central of Georgia Ry. Co. i-. Brown 
 
 (1901), 113 Ga. 414, 38 S. E. 989 
 Central R. R. Co. v. Cooper (1894), 
 95 Ga. 406. 22 S. E. 549 
 V. Ha.sselkus (1893), 91 Ga. 382, 
 17 S. E. 838 
 Centre Turnpike Co. v. Smith, 12 
 
 Vt. 217 
 Cerf r. Ashley, 68 Cal. 409 
 Certwell r. Hoyt, 6 Hun, 575 
 Chadbourn r. Johnston (1890), 119 
 
 N. C. 282, 25 S. E. 705 329, 
 
 Chadbourne v. Coe, 51 Fed. Rep. 
 
 479 
 Chadwick v. Hopkins (1893), 4 Wyo. 
 379. 34 Pac. 899 
 V. Maden, 9 Hare, 188 256 
 
 Challiss V. Wvlie, 35 Kan. 506 
 Chalmers v. Trent (1894), 11 Utah 
 88, 39 Pac. 488 368, 371 
 
 Chamballe v. McKenzie, 31 Ark. 155 
 
 245 
 
 664 
 
 865 
 915 
 
 821 
 
 702 
 147 
 314 
 584 
 
 178 
 609 
 
 235, 
 
 375 
 97 
 
 33, 
 34 
 
 Cavalli i-. Allen, 67 N. Y. 
 Cave V. Crapto, 63 Cal. 135 
 
 619. 
 
 623 
 
 508 61,52, 
 
 869, 886, 891 
 
 804 
 
 Chamberlain r. Burlington, 19 Iowa, 
 395 
 V. Hihhiird (1894), 26 Ore. 428, 
 
 :'.S I'ac. 437 
 V. Mensing, 51 Fed. Rep. 511 
 V. Painesvilie & H. R. Co., 15 
 
 Ohio St. 225 
 I'. Woolsev (1903), — Neb. — , 
 95N.W. 38 
 Cli.imberlin v. Winn, 1 Wash. St. 
 oOl 
 
 643 
 285 
 833 
 
 782 
 
 6.59 
 780 
 
 191 
 
 682 
 
 849 
 
 816 
 
 785 
 
 666 
 
 734 
 
 167 
 
 677 
 
 815 
 
 936 
 
 302 
 
 615 
 
 625 
 
 652 
 214 
 220 
 
 336 
 
 340 
 
 295 
 361 
 936 
 
 413 
 618, 
 649 
 
 118 
 
 800 
 637 
 
 722 
 
 115 
 
 780
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixv 
 
 [the referencks 
 
 Chamberlin Banking House i\ Kem- 
 per, etc. Co. (1"J02), Neb., 92 
 N. W. 175 785 
 
 V. Noyes (1002), — Neb.— , 92 
 
 N. W. 175 684, 754 
 
 Chambers i\ Gold win, 9 Ves. 269 378 
 
 V. Lewis, 2 Hilt. 591 (548, 649, 653 
 V. Lewis, 28 N. Y. 454, 11 Abb. 
 
 Pr. 210 918 
 
 V. Nicholson, 30 Ind, 349 325, 335 
 Chanibersbiirtr, N. Bk. of, i'. Grimm, 
 
 109 N. C. 93 872 
 
 Chamblee v. McKenzie, 31 Ark. 
 
 411 112 
 
 Chambovet v. Cagney, 35 N. Y. Sup. 
 
 Ct. 474 226 
 
 Champion v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. 
 
 402 360 
 
 Cliance v. Indianapolis & W. G. Road 
 
 Co., 32 Ind. 472 785 
 
 V. Isaacs, 5 Paige, 592 133 
 
 V. Jennings (1901), 159 Mo. 544, 
 
 61 S. VV. 177 640 
 
 Chancellor v. Morecraft, 11 Beav. 
 
 252, 352 
 51 
 
 Chandler v. Neil, 46 Kan. 67 
 
 V. Parker (1902), 65 Kan. 860, 
 
 70 Pac. 368 641 
 
 Channon v. Lusk, 2 Lans. 213 199 
 
 Chan Sing v. City of Portland (1900), 
 
 37 Ore. 68, 60 Pac. 718 593 
 
 Chaperon v. Portland Elec. Co. 
 
 (1902), 41 Ore. 39, 67 Pac. 928 682 
 
 Chapin v. Babcock (1896), 67 Conn. 
 
 255, 34 Atl. 1039 302 
 
 Chapman v. Callahan, 66 Mo. 299 376 
 
 V. Forbes, 123 N. Y. 532 406, 412, 
 
 414, 417 
 
 ;;. Hunt, 1 McCarter, 149 246 
 
 V. J.iraes (1895), 96 la. 233, 64 
 
 N. W. 795 626 
 
 V. Jones (1897), 149 Ind. 434, 
 
 47 N. E. 1065 433, 641, 685 
 i>. Plummer, 36 Wis. 262 131,930, 
 
 931 
 361 
 
 V. West, 17 N. Y. 125 
 Chappell V. Rees, 1 DeG. M. & G. 
 
 393 
 Charboneau v. Henni, 24 Wis. 250 
 Cliarles v. Halleck Lumber Co. 
 (1896), 22 Colo. 283, 43 Pac. 
 548 
 V. Haskins, 11 Iowa, 329 
 Charles Baumback Co. v. Laube 
 (1898), 99 Wis. 171, 74 N. W. 96 
 
 379 
 310 
 
 375 
 100 
 
 642, 
 671 
 Charleston, etc. Ry. Co. i>. Miller 
 
 (1901), 113 Ga. 15, 38 S. E. 338 641 
 Charlcstown School District v. Hay, 
 
 74 Ind. 127 610 
 
 Charlotte, Bank of, v. Britton, 66 
 
 N. C. 365 810 
 
 Charlton v. Tardy, 28 Ind. 452 886, 938 
 Charter Oak L. Ins. Co. v. Cum- 
 
 mings, 90 Mo. 267 283 
 
 ARE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 I Chase o. Abbott, 20 Iowa, 154 316, 326, 
 
 333, 335 
 V. Dodge (1901), 111 Wis. 70, 86 
 
 N. W. 548 98 
 
 V. Long, 44 Ind. 427 815 
 
 V. Peck, 21 N. Y. 581 51 
 
 V. Vandi'rbilt, 62 N. Y. .307 354 
 
 Chatfield v. Frost, 3 N. Y. S. C. 357 617 
 
 Chautauqua v. Gifford, 8 Hun, 152 165 
 
 Chautauqua Cy. Bk. v. White, 6 
 
 N. Y. 236 473 
 
 Cheatham v. Young (1893), 113 N. C. 
 
 161, 18 S. E. 92 781 
 
 Cheelv's Adm. v. Wells, 33 Mo. 106 458, 
 
 504 
 Cheeseman v. Wiggins, 1 N. Y. Sup. 
 
 Ct. 595 249 
 
 Cheltenham Fire-brick Co. v. Cook, 
 
 44 Mo. 29 149 
 
 Chenault v. Bu.sh, 84 Ky. 528 134 
 
 Cheney v. Crandell (1901), 28 Colo. 
 
 383, 05 Pac. 56 49 
 
 Chesapeake & Ohio Rv. Co. v. Han- 
 mer (1902), Ky., 66 S. W. 
 375 601 
 
 r. Riddle's Adm'x (1903), Ky., 
 
 72 S. W. 22 709 
 
 V. Smith (1897). 101 Ky. 104, 42 
 
 S. W. 5:!8 817 
 
 V. Thieman (1895), 96 Ky. 507, 
 
 29 S. W. 357 665, 668 
 
 Cheshire Iron Works v. Gay, 3 Gray, 
 
 531 259 
 
 Chester v. Dickerson, 52 Barb. 349 301 
 V. Halliard, 36 N. J. Eq. 113 388 
 
 V. Leonard (1897), 68 Conn. 495, 
 
 37 At). 397 816 
 
 Chesterson r. Munson, 27 Minn. 498 609 
 Clietwood V. California Nat. Bank 
 
 (189(;), IL'j Cal. 414, 45 la. 704 623 
 
 Chicago, etc. Land Co. v. Peck, 112 
 
 III. 408 387 
 
 Chicago & O. Coal, etc. Co. v. Nor- 
 man, 32 N. E. Rep. 857 576 
 Chicago & S. W. K. Co. v. N. W. 
 
 Union Packet Co., 38 Iowa, 377 544, 663 
 Chicago Bldg. Co. c. Creamery Co. 
 
 (1898), 106 Ga. 84, 31 S. E. 809 712 
 Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Grab- 
 lin (1893), 38 Neb. 90. 56 
 N. W. 796 682, 683 
 
 V. Haywood (1897), 102 la. 392, 
 
 71 N. W. 358 466, 594 
 
 V. Kelloffg (1898), 55 Neb. 748, 
 
 76 N. W. 462 683 
 
 V. Martelle (1902), —Neb.—. 
 
 91 N. W. 364 638, 666 
 
 V. Oyster (1899), 58 Neb. 1, 78 
 
 N. W. 359 602, 082, 683, 818 
 
 V. Spirk {18'.)7), 51 Neb. 167, 70 
 
 N. W. 926 593, 612 
 
 V. Thomas (1896), 147 Ind. 35, 
 
 46 N. E. 73 681 
 
 V. Thomas (1900), 155 Ind. 634, 
 
 58 N. E. 1040 683
 
 Ixviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references 
 
 Chicago, Cin , & L. R. Co. i-. West, 
 
 37Ind. 211 745,748,772 
 
 Chicago House Wrecking Co. r. Lum- 
 ber Co. (1902),— Neb. —,'J2 N. W. 
 1009 615 
 
 Chicago, K. & W. Rv. Co. v. Evans 
 
 (ISiHil, 57 Kan. 286, 46 Pac. 303 G24 
 Chicago, -M. & St. P. R. R. Co. >: 
 Phillips (1900), 111 la. 377, 82 
 N. W. 787 732 
 
 Chicago, R. L & Pac. liy. Co. r. 
 Frazier (1903), — Kan. — , 
 71 I'ac. 8:51 704 
 
 v. O'Neill (1899), 58 Neb. 239, 
 
 78 N. W. 521 456 
 V. Sliaw (1901), 63 Neb. 380, 88 
 
 N. W. 508 638, 817 
 
 V. Shepherd (1894), 39 Neb. 523, 
 
 58 N. W. 189 607, 688 
 
 r. Young (1899), 58 Neb. 678, 
 
 79 N. W. 556 683 
 V. Young (1903), — Neb.— ,93 
 
 N. W. 922 639, 642 
 
 Chicago, St. Louis, etc. R. R. Co. v. 
 Wolcott (1894), 141 Ind. 267, 39 
 N. E. 451 601 
 
 Childers v. First Nat. Bank (1896), 
 
 147 Ind. 430, 46 N.E. 825 744, 
 751 
 V. Verner, 12 8. C. 1 592 
 
 Childsr. Alexander. 22 S.C. 169 90,91,104 
 c. Harris .Man. Co., 68 Wis. 231 515 
 c. Hyde, 10 Iowa, 294 293 
 
 r. Kansas City, etc. R. R. Co. 
 (1893), 117 Mo. 414, 23 
 S. W. 373 433, 455 
 
 V. Ptomcy (1895), 17 Mont. 502, 
 
 43 Pac. 714 818 
 
 Childs Lumber Co. v. Page (1902), 
 
 28 Wash. 128. 68 Pac. 373 703 
 
 Chiles V. Drake, 2 Mete. 146 457 
 
 ChiUon V. Bank (1899), 9 N. D. 96, 
 
 84 N. W. 354 606 
 
 Chin Kem You c. Ah Joan, 75 Cal. 
 
 124 153 
 
 Chinn -•. Trustees, 32 r)),io St. 236 15 
 Chipman v. Montgomery, 63 N. Y. 
 
 ^21 240, 256 
 
 Ciiippewa Falls r. Hopkins (1901), 
 
 109 Wis. 611, 85 N. W. 553 816 
 
 Chitlv v. St. Louis, etc. Rv. Co. 
 ( 1899), 148 Mo. 64, 49 S. W. 868 614, 
 
 682 
 Cholniondelev v. Clinton, 2 Jac. & 
 
 W. i:}4 246, 258, 379 
 
 Chouquette v. Southern Elec. R. R. 
 Co. (1899), 152 Mo. 257, 63 S. W. 
 897 618 
 
 ChriBtennen v. Hollingsworth (1898), 
 
 Idaho. 87. 53 I'ac. 211 4^55, 472 
 
 Chri«Ujn8(>n <•. Nelson (1901), 38 
 
 Ore. 473, 63 Pac. 0^18 042 
 
 Christian r. Conn. Mut. Ins. Co. 
 (1K)8), 14.'i Mo. 460, 45 S. W. 
 268 616 
 
 ARE TO TUE PAGES.] 
 
 Christian v. Williams, 20 S. W. Rep. 
 
 96 830 
 Christie v. Iowa Life Ins. Co. (1900), 
 
 111 la. 177,82 N. W. 499 433 
 
 Christy v. Dana, 42 Cal. 174 754 
 Chun c. Receivers (1901), Ky., 64 
 
 S. W. 649 623 
 
 Chung Kee v. Davidson, 73 Cal. 522 112 
 
 Chunot c. Larson, 43 Wis. 536 018 
 Church V. Pearne (1903), 75 Conn. 
 
 350, 53 Atl 955 704, 834 
 
 7-. Smith, ?>0 Wi.<. 492 244, 326, 376 
 
 r. Spiegelberg, 31 Fed. Rep. 601 911 
 
 Churchill c. Baumann, 95 Cal. 541 815 
 
 V. Churchill, 9 How. Pr. 552 660 
 
 r. Lauer, b4 Cal. 233 262 
 V. Stephenson (1896), 14 Wash. 
 
 620, 45 I'ac. 28 418 
 
 r. Trapp, 3 Abb. Pr. 306 400 
 Cicero Hvg. Dr. Co. r. Craighead, 
 
 28 In(l.'-.i74 785 
 Cincinnati v. Emerson (1897), 57 0. 
 
 St. 132, 48 N. E. 667 656 
 
 Cincinnati & Chicago R. Co. v. 
 
 Washburn, 25 Ind. 259 
 Cincinnati Dailv Tribune Co. v. 
 Bruck (1900), 61 Ohio St. 489, 56 
 N. E. 1^8 924 
 
 Cincinnati, H., & D. R. Co. v. Ches- 
 ter, 57 Ind. 297 525 
 Cincinnati, etc. R. R. Co. v. Barker 
 (1893), 94 Ky. 71,21 S. W. 
 347 741 
 V. McLain (1897), 148 Ind. 188, 
 
 44 N. E. 306 570 
 
 Cincinnati Tobacco Warehouse Co. 
 V. Matthews (1903), Ky., 74 
 
 S. W. 242 641 
 
 Cinfel V. Malena (1903), — Neb. —, 
 
 93 N. W. 165 201 
 
 Citizens' Bank v. Closson, 29 Ohio 
 
 St. 78 831 
 
 V. Pence (1900), 59 Neb. 579, 81 
 
 N. W. 623 711,819 
 
 V. Stewart (1894), 90 la. 407, 57 
 
 N. W. 957 676 
 
 V. Tiger Tail Mill Co. (1899), 
 
 152 Mo. 145, 53 S. W. 902 24 
 Citizens' Loan & Trust Co. v. Witte 
 (1901), 110 Wis. 545, 86 N. W. 
 173 666 
 
 Citizens' Nat. Bank r. City Nat. 
 Baidi (1900), HI Iowa, 211, 
 82 N. W. 464 423 
 
 V. Judy (1896), 146 Ind. 322, 43 
 
 N. E. 259 685 
 
 Citizens' St. R. R. Co. v. Sutton 
 (1897), 148 Ind. 169, 46 N.E. 
 462 682 
 
 V. Willoeby (1893), 134 Ind. 
 
 563. 33 N. E. 627 665 
 
 City Bank of New Haven v. Perkin.s, 
 
 29 N. Y. 554 93 
 City Carpet Beating Works v. Jones 
 
 (1894), 102 Cal. 506, 36 Pac. 841 455
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED, 
 
 Ixix 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 City Nat. Bank v. Thomas (1896), 46 
 
 Neb. 861, 65 N. W. 895 810 
 
 Claflin V. Jaroslauski, 1 Barb. 463 788 
 
 V. Ostrom, 54 N. Y. 581 105, 109, 111 
 
 V. Reese, 54 Iowa, 544 756 
 
 V. Taussig, 7 Hun, 223 562, 568, 651, 
 
 704 
 V. Van Wagoner, 32 Mo. 252 
 Clague V. Hodgson, 16 Minn. 329 611 
 
 Claiborne v. Castle (1893), 98 Cal. 
 
 30, 32 Pac. 807 669 
 
 Clapp V. Cunningham, 50 Iowa, 307 702 
 V. Greenlee (1897), 100 la. 586, 
 
 69 N. W. 1049 641 
 
 V. Preston, 15 Wis. 543 299, 402 
 
 V. Wright, 21 Hun, 240 930 
 
 Cliirissy i'. Metrop. Fire Dep., 7 Abb. 
 
 Pr. N. s. 352 156 
 
 Clark V. Allen (1899), 125 Cal. 276, 
 
 57 Pac. 985 625 
 
 V. Bates, 1 Dak. 42 74, 541, 546 
 
 V. Boyer, 32 Ohio St. 299 314, 806 
 V. Cable, 21 Mo. 223 204, 209 
 
 V. Carey (1894), 41 Neb. 780, 60 
 
 N. W. 78 180 
 
 V. Clark, 5 Hun, 340 791 
 
 V. Commercial Nat. Bank (1903), 
 
 — Neb. — , 94 N. W. 958 288 
 V. Crawfordsville Coffin Co., 125 
 
 Ind. 277 177 
 
 V. Dillon, 97 N. Y. 370 751 
 
 V. Eltinge (1902), 29 Wash. 215, 
 
 69 Pac. 736 317 
 
 V. Fensky, 3 Kan. 389 584 
 
 V. Finnell, 16 B. Mon. 337 753, 936 
 V. Fosdick, 118 N. Y. 7 154 
 
 V. Harwood, 8 How. Pr. 470 611 
 
 V. Langwortiiy, 12 Wis. 441 633 
 
 V. Lineberger, 44 Ind. 223 454, 561 
 V. Lock wood, 21 Cal. 222 46, 63 
 
 V. Reyburn, 8 Wall. 318 337 
 
 V. Ross (1895), 96 la. 402, 65 
 
 N. W. 340 657, 715 
 
 V. St. Louis Transfer Co. (1894), 
 
 127 Mo. 255, 30 S. W. 121 641 
 V. Sherman, 32 Pac. Rep. 771 620 
 V. Stanton, 24 Minn. 232 412 
 
 V. Storv, 29 Barb. 295 934 
 
 V. Siilli'vau, 2 N. Dak. 103 870 
 
 V. Taylor, 91 Cal. 552 942 
 
 V. Wick (1894), 25 Ore. 446, 36 
 
 Pac. 165 684, 802 
 
 Clark et al. v. Ins. Co., 52 Mo. 272 510 
 Clark's Adm. v. Han. & St. Jo. R. 
 
 Co., 36 Mo. 202 455, 517 
 
 Clarke v. Baird (1893), 98 Cal. 642, 
 
 33 Pac. 756 417 
 
 V. East Atlanta Land Co. (1901), 
 
 113 Ga. 21, 38S. E. 323 715 
 
 r. Hancock Cy. Sup., 27 III. 305 118 
 V. Huber, 25 Cal. 593 52, 815 
 
 V. Railroad Co., 28 Minn. 71 565 
 
 Clarkson u. De Peyster, 3 Paige, 320 260 
 V. Kennett (1895), 17 Mont, 563, 
 
 44 Pac. 88 025 
 
 285 
 
 Clason V. Baldwin, 129 N. Y. 183 
 Clause Printing Co. v. Chicago, etc. 
 Bank (1896), 145 Ind. 682, 44 N. E. 
 256 
 Claussen v. La Franz, 4 Greene, 224 
 Clay V. Edgerton, 19 Ohio St. 549 
 
 592, 596, 
 V. Mayr (1898), 144 Mo. 376, 46 
 S. W. 157 
 Clay Cy. v. Simonsen, 1 Dak. 403 
 
 540, 562, 
 Clay Cy. Com'rs v Markle, 46 Ind. 
 
 90 
 Clay County Land Co. v. Alco.x 
 1902, 88 Minn. 4, 92 N. W. 464 
 
 Clayes v. Hooker, 4 Hun, 231 618, 
 Clayton v. City of Hemlerson ( 1898), 
 103 Ky. 228, 44 S. W. 667 
 
 V. School District, 20 Kan. 206 
 Clayton County v. Herwig (1897), 
 
 100 la. 631,69 N. W. 1035 
 Clegg V. Rowland, L. R. 3 Eq. 368 
 Oleghorn v. Postlewaite, 43 111. 428 
 Clemens v. Clemens, 37 N. Y. 59 
 
 V. Hanley (1895), 27 Ore. 326, 
 
 41 Pac. 658 
 V. Luce (1894), 101 Cal. 432, 35 
 Pac. 1032 
 Clemons v. Elder, 9 Iowa, 272 351 
 Cleveland '-. Barrows, 59 Barb. 364 
 V. McCanna (1898), 7 N. D. 455, 
 75 N. W. <)08 
 Cleveland, etc. Ry. Co. v. Berrv 
 (1898), 152 Ind. 007, 53 N.E. 
 415 599, 682 
 
 V. Gray (1897), 148 Ind. 206, 46 
 
 N. E. 657 677 
 
 V. Kiee (18'.)9), 154 Ind. 430, 56 
 
 N. E. 234 673 
 
 V. Miller (1897), 149 Ind. 490, 49 
 
 N. E. 445 673 
 
 V. Parker (1899), 154 Ind. 153, 
 
 56 N. E. 86 664 
 
 Clifford V. Dam, 81 N. Y. 52 806 
 
 Clift V. Newell (1898), 104 Ky. 396, 
 
 47 S. W. 270 681 
 
 V. Northrup, 6 Lans. 330 934 
 
 Clifton V. Lange (1899), 108 la. 472, 
 
 79 N. W. 276 806 
 
 Cline V. Cline, 3 Ore. 355 544, 545 
 
 Clink V. Thurston, 47 Cal. 21 745, 815 
 Clinton i-. Eddv, 1 Lans. 61 855, 913 
 
 Cloon V. City Ins. Co.. 1 Handy, 32 288 
 Close V. Hodges, 44 Minn. 204 150 
 
 CIosz V. Miracle (1897), 103 la. 198, 
 
 72 N. W. 502 671, 689 
 
 Cloud V. Malvin (1899). 108 la. 52, 
 
 75 N. W. 645, 78 N. W. 791 676 
 
 Clough V. Bennett (1896), 99 la. 69, 
 
 68 N. W. 578 638 
 
 V. Holden (1893), 115 Mo. 336, 
 
 21 S. W. 107 678, 790 
 
 712 
 
 11 
 
 573, 
 
 598 
 
 63 
 541, 
 508 
 
 119 
 
 109, 
 
 410 
 
 .791 
 
 444, 
 
 41)8 
 784 
 
 520 
 347 
 118 
 366, 
 
 368 
 
 638 
 
 754 
 
 , 374 
 
 518 
 
 934
 
 Ixx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [tbe repe&enxes a&e to the pages.] 
 
 Ciciugli V. Rocky Mountain t»il Co. 
 (Ibyb). 25 Colo. 620, 55 
 Fac. bUO 521 
 
 f. Tliomas, 53 Ind. 24 310 
 
 riow c. Brown (1897), 150 Ind. 185, 
 
 4^ N. E. 1034 599 
 
 CiMif t: Johnson (18ti4), 4 N. 1). 92, 
 
 'm N. \V. 512 506, 687 
 
 CoiikU-v f. Chamberlain, 8 Abb. Pr. 
 
 N. s.';;: 276,286 
 
 Coales l: Day, 9 Mo. 315 341 
 
 Coats (. McKee. 22 Inii. 223 
 Coatsworth r. Leiiijrli Vallev Ky. Co. 
 
 ( Ib'Jc'j. loo N. Y. 401, 61 N. E. 301 592 
 
 Cobl) . . Dows, 9 Barb. 230 622 
 
 V. 111. Cent. K. Co., 38 Iowa, 601 453, 
 
 457 
 r. Lindell Ry. Co. (1899). 149 
 
 Mo. 135. 50 «. W. 310 593 
 
 V. Smith, 38 Wis. 21 301, 305 
 
 Cobbev r. Buchanan (1890), 48 Neb. 
 
 391, 07 N. \V. 176 816 
 
 Coburn i: Smart, 53 Cal. 742 428 
 
 C<K'hise County v. Copper Queen 
 
 Mill. Co. (19(33). Ariz., 71 Pac 940 678 
 Cochran v. Coodell, 131 Mass. 464 244 
 / . Thomas (1895), 131 Mo. 258, 
 
 33 S. W. 6 371 
 
 Ciifhrane /■. Qnackenbush, 29 Min. 
 
 376 215 
 
 Cock f Evans, 9 Yerp. 287 360 
 
 Cockburn >: Thompson, 16 Ves. 328 249, 
 
 388, 392, 511 
 
 Cocker. '^lausen (1900), 67 Ark. 455, 
 
 55 S. W. 846 54 
 
 CockeriU V. Stafford, 102 Mo. 571 598 
 Cockrill .-. Hutchinson (1896), 135 
 
 Mo. 67. 30 S. W. 375 816 
 
 V. Jovce ( 1896). 62 Ark. 216, 35 
 
 S. W. 221 613 
 
 Codd /•. Rathbone, 19 N. Y. 37 817 
 
 Coddint' '•. Mimson (1897), 52 Neb. 
 
 5H0. 72 N. W 846 656 
 
 Coddinirton r Canadav (1901), 157 
 
 Ind. 248, 61 N. K. 567 181. 271. 302. 
 
 621, 699,613, 711 
 
 Co.ly V. Remis, 40 Wis. 666 018 
 
 Coe V. Anderson (1894). '.^ Iowa, 
 
 516, 01 N. W. 177 179 
 
 r. R..ckwith. 10 Abb. Pr. 296 387 
 <•. Lindlev. 32 Iowa. 437 946 
 
 Ci.for V. Riselinir (1900), 153 Mo. 
 
 «.!.i. 66 S. \V. 236 715 
 
 CofTcv r. C,r«-i'nflcld. 65 Cal. 382 423 
 
 r. Norwood. 81 Ala. 512 340, 360 
 
 Coffin v. Black {\Hm), 67 Ark. 219, 
 
 64 S W. 212 731 
 
 I'. Grand Rapids Hvdr. Co., 18 
 
 N. Y. Suppl. 782 150 
 
 r. McLean, W) N. Y. 660 809 
 
 Coffmnn r. KciKhtley. 24 Ind. 509 118 
 Coifdcll I'. Wilminftton. etc. R. R. 
 Co. (IWJ). 130 N. C. 313. 41 S. E. 
 641. 817 (VM'j), 132 N. C. 852, 44 
 S E. 018 817 
 
 Coggswell V. Griffith, 36 N. W. Rep. 
 
 538 364 
 
 Coghill V. Marks, 29 Cal. 673 428 
 
 Cogswell V. Murphy, 46 Iowa, 44 279, 
 
 303, 499 
 Cohen v. Cont. L. Ins. Co., 69 N, Y. 
 
 300 502, 568 
 
 1-. Kno.x, 90 Cal. 266 665 
 
 c. Wolti- (1893), 92 Ga. 199, 17 
 
 S. E. 1029 215 
 
 Cohn i: Lehman, 93 Mo. 574 830 
 
 r. Wright, 89 Cal. 86 570 
 
 Cohoon r. Fisher (1890), 140 Ind. 
 
 583, 44 N. E. 004 641 
 
 Cohu i: Hussoii, 113 N. Y. 062 665 
 
 Colbv r. Spokane (1895), 12 Wash. 
 
 090, 42Pac. 112 755 
 
 Colcord V. Conger (1900), 10 Okla. 
 
 458, 02 Pac. 276 934 
 
 Cole c. Bovd (1899), 125 N. C. 496, 
 
 34 S. E. 557 669 
 
 i;. Getzinger (1897), 96 Wis. 559, 
 
 71 X. W. 75 266 
 
 V. Noerdlinger (1900), 22 Wash. 
 
 51, 00 Pac. 57 740 
 
 V. Reynolds, 18 N. Y. 74 11. 16, 173, 
 210, 310 
 V. Turner. 6 Mod. 149 
 Colegrove v. N. Y., etc. R. Co., 20 
 
 N. Y. 492 302 
 
 Coleman /•. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17 22t) 
 
 c. Drnne (1893), 116 Mo. 387,22 
 
 S. W. 801 781, 783 
 
 V. Elmore, 31 Fed. Rep. 391 881 
 
 V. nines (1902), 24 Utah,. 360, 07 
 
 Pac. 1122 688 
 
 V. Perry (1903), 28 Mont. 1,72 
 
 Pac. 42 703 
 
 Coles r. Forrest, 10 Beav. 562 337 
 
 V. Soulsby, 21 Cal. 47 759, 816 
 
 Colgrove V. Koonce, 76 N. C. 363 417 
 
 Collart V. Fisk, 38 Wis. 238 758 
 
 CoUett V. Hover, 1 Coll. 227 256 
 
 V. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (1900), 
 
 23 Wash. 000, 63 Pac. 225 081 
 V. Wollaston, 3 Bro. C. C. 228 
 Collev r. Gate Citv Co. (1893), 92 
 
 Ga. 064, 18 S. E. 817 640 
 
 Collier v. Ervin, 3 Mont. 142 061, 917, 
 
 926 
 Collins V. Butler. 14 Cal. 223 930 
 
 V. Cowen. 62 Wis. 634 470 
 
 V. Gregg (lb99), 109 la. 506, 80 
 
 N. W. 602 703 
 
 V. Groseclose, 40 Ind. 144 935 
 
 V. Morrison (1895), 91 Wis. 324, 
 
 G4N. W. 1000 890,919 
 
 V. O'Laverty (1902), 130 Cal. 31, 
 
 68 Pac. 327 671 
 
 V. Rogers, 63 Mo. 615 49 
 
 Colorado Cent. R. Co. v. MoUandin, 
 
 4 Colo. 154 748 
 
 Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. v. Four 
 Mile Ry. Co. (1901), 29 Colo. 90, 
 66 Pac. 902 600
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxi 
 
 [toe refebences are to the pages.] 
 
 Colorado Man. Co. v. McDonald, 15 
 
 Colo. 510 373 
 
 Colton r. Hanchett. 13 111. 615 119 
 
 V. Onderdonk, (39 Cal. 155 219 
 
 Colton L. & VV. Co. v. Kaynor, 57 
 
 Cal. 588 704 
 
 Coltzhauser i\ Simon, 47 Wis. 103 713 
 Columbia Nat. Bank v. German Nat. 
 Bank (1898), 5<) Neb. 803, 
 77 N. W. ;i4(j 832 
 
 V. Western Iron & Steel (^o. 
 (1896), 14 Wash. 1G2, 44 
 Pac. 145 738,802 
 
 ■Columbia Water Power Co. v. Elec- 
 tric Co. (18'.t4), 4:3 S. C. 154, 20 
 S. E. 1002 243 
 
 Columbus, etc. llv. Co. >•. Gaffnev 
 
 (P»01), d5 O. St" 104, 64 N. K 152 (324 
 Colvvell V. N. Y. &E. U. Co., 9 How. 
 
 Pr. 311 5-22 
 
 Combes v. Chandler, 33 Ohio St. 178 123 
 €ombs V. Union Trust Co. (1896), 
 
 146 Ind. 688, 46 N. E. 16 800 
 
 V. Watson, 32 Ohio St. 228 821 
 
 Comer v. Knosvles, 17 Kan. 436 575 
 
 Comins y. Jefferson Cy. Sup., 3 N. Y. 
 
 Sup. Ct. 296 118 
 
 -Commercial Bank v. Colt, 15 Barb. 
 
 506 122 
 
 V. Fire Ins. Co. of Phil., 54 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 109 910 
 
 V. Red River Bank (1899), 8 
 
 N. D. 382, 79 N. W. 859 95 
 
 Com. Elec. Light & Power Co. v. 
 Tacoma (1897), 17 Wash. 661, 50 
 Pac. 592 703 
 
 -Commercial Nat. Bank v. Gibson 
 
 (1893), 37 Neb. 750, 56 N. W. 616 638 
 Commercial State Bank v. Rowley 
 
 (1902), Neb., 89 N. W. 765 94 
 
 Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. 
 Shoemaker (1901), 63 Neb. 173,88 
 N. W. 156 478 
 
 Commissioners of Almance County, 
 etc. ; Bartholomew County, etc. 
 See Almance Cy. Com'rs, etc. 
 Commonwealth v. Cook, 8 Bush. 220 561, 
 
 594 
 V. Robinson (1895), 96 Ky. 553, 
 
 29 S. W. 306 333 
 
 V. Scott (1901), 112 Ky. 252, 65 
 
 S. W. 596 263, 378, 385, 388 
 
 V. Todd, 9 Bush, 708 873 
 
 Commonwealth Title Ins. Co. v. 
 Dokko (1898), 71 Minn. 533. 
 
 74 N. W. 891 593, 651 
 r. Dokko (1898), 72 Minn. 229, 
 
 75 N. W. 106 781 
 Compton V. Davidson, 31 Ind. 62 113 
 Computing Scale Co. v. Churchill 
 
 (1901), 109 Wis. 303, 85 
 N. W. 337 868, 871 
 
 V. Long (1903), — S. C. — 44 
 
 S. E. 963 600 
 
 Comstock V. Hier, 73 N. Y. 269 649 
 
 Conant v. Barnard, 103 N. C. 315 662 
 
 ?;. Frary, 49 Ind. 530 417 
 
 V. Jones (1893), Idaho, 32 Pac. 
 
 250 737 
 
 I'. Storthz (1901), 69 Ark. 200, 
 
 62 S. W. 415 521 
 
 Conaughty i;. Nichols, 42 N. Y. 83 75, 
 
 628, 630, 633 
 
 Conawav i\ Carpenter, 58 Ind. 477 887 
 
 Cone f. Cone (1901), 61 S. C. 512, 39 
 
 S. E. 748 179, 813 
 
 V. Ivinson (1893), 4 Wyo. 203, 
 
 33 Pac. 31 •^o, 566, 592, (iOO, 815 
 V. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 60 N. Y. 
 
 619 29,34,110,111 
 
 Conev V. Home (1894), 93 Ga. 723, 
 
 20S. E. 213 822 
 
 Conger v. Crabtree, 83 la. 536, 55 
 
 N. W. 335 716 
 
 V. Parker, 29 Ind. 380 46, 727 
 
 Conklin v Bishop. 3 Duer, 646 419 
 
 Conley v. Arnold (1894), 93 Ga. 823, 
 
 20 S. E. 762 796 
 
 r. Buck (1896), 100 Ga. 187, 28 
 
 S. E. 97 509 
 
 Conlin V. Cantrell. 64 N. Y. 217 316 
 
 Conn. Fire Ins. Co. v. Erie R. Co., 
 
 73 N. Y. 399 117, 217 
 
 V. O'Fallon (1896), 49 Neb. 740, 
 
 69 N. W. 118 804 
 
 Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Cross, 18 
 
 Wis. lOit 474 
 
 V. McCormick, 45 Cal. 580 790 
 
 Connell v. Che.sapeake, etc. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1900), Ky., 58 S. W. 374 681 
 
 Conner v. Ashlev (1897), 49 S. C. 
 
 478, 27 S. E. 473 660 
 
 V. Scott (1897), 16 Wash. 371,47 
 
 Pac 761 928, 932 
 
 V. Win ton, 7 Ind. 523' 899, 911, 914, 
 
 916 
 Connor v. Becker (1901), 62 Neb. 
 
 850, 87 N.W. 1005 593 
 
 V. Knott (1896), 8 S. I). 304, 66 
 
 N.W. 461 781 
 
 t'. Raddon (1898), 16 Utah, 418, 
 
 52 Pac. 764 640 
 
 V. St. Anthony Bd. of Ed., 10 
 
 Minn. 439 472 
 
 Connor's Adm. v. Paul, 12 Busli, 
 
 144 159 
 
 Connoss i'. Meir, 2 E. D. Smith, 314 663 
 Conolly V. Wells, 33 Fed. Rep. 205 343, 
 
 347 
 Conrad v. De Montcourt (1896), 138 
 
 Mo. 311, 39 S. W. 805 681, 682 
 
 Conrad Nat. Bank v. Great Northern 
 Ry. Co. (1900), 24 Mont. 178, 61 
 Pac. 1 579, 584, 595 
 
 Conro V. Port Henry Iron Co., 12 
 
 Barb. 27 259, 260 
 
 Considerant v. Brisbane, 22 N. Y. 
 
 389 147, 149 
 
 Considine v. Gallagher (1903 , 31 
 Wash. 669, 72 Pac. 469 072
 
 Lwii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [IBE REFERE.NCES ARE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Consol. Barb-wire Co. r. Piircell, 48 
 
 Kan. 2U7 150 
 
 Con*olidated Canal Co. r. I'eters 
 
 (1896), Ariz. 4o Pac. 74 007 
 
 Contolidateil Steel &. Wire Co. r. 
 liurnhani (1899), 8 Okla. 514, 58 
 Tac. 054 038, 645 
 
 Continental Ins. Co. r. Phillips, 53 
 
 N. W. Kep. 774 637 
 
 Converse c. .^cott (1902), 137 Cal. 
 
 •J3'J, 70 Pac. 13 668 
 
 Conway r. Mitcliell (1807), 97 Wis. 
 
 290, 72 N. W. 752 804 
 
 r. Smith. 13 Wis. 125 932 
 
 r. Wharton, 13 Minn. 158 831 
 
 Conyngham c. Smith, 10 Iowa, 471 00, 
 
 113,931 
 Cook r. Am. Ex. Bank (1901), 129 
 
 N. C. 149. 39 S. E. 746 605 
 
 V. Basom (1901), 164 Mo. 594, 
 
 65 S. W. 227 351 
 
 V. Chambers, 107 Ind. 07 821 
 
 1-. Citv of Menasiia (1899), 103 
 
 Wis. 6, 79 N. W. 26 104 
 
 V. Doty (1894), 91 la. 721, 59 
 
 N. W. 35 608 
 
 Estate of (l'.»02), 137 Cal. 184, 
 
 69 Pac. 1124 543 
 
 V. Find), 19 Minn. 407 831 
 
 V. Guirkin (1890), 119 X. C. 13, 
 
 25 S. i:. 715 736 
 
 V. llorwitz, 10 Hun. 586 499 
 
 r. .Ii-nkins. 79 N. Y. 575 886, 908 
 
 f. Kittson (1897), 08 Minn. 474, 
 
 71 N. W. 070 608 
 
 V. Klink, 8 Cal. 347 231 
 
 V. Lovell. 11 Iowa. 81 936 
 
 r. Morris (1895), 06 Conn. 196, 
 
 ;« Atl. 994 607 
 
 V. Putniim Cy., 70 Mo. 668 508 
 
 V. Smith, 54 Iowa, 636 736 
 
 V. Smith (1896), 119 N. C. 350, 
 
 25 S. E. 958 498 
 
 V. Smith (1903), — Kan. — , 72 
 
 Pac. 524 712 
 
 r. Soule, 50 N. Y. 420 909 
 
 V. St. Paul's Church Wardens, 
 
 5 Hun. 293 198 
 
 Cookinjiliani r Laslier, 2 Keyes, 454 292 
 Coolev .-. AhlK'V (1900), 111 Ga. 
 
 4.39, 36 S. E. 780 730 
 
 r. Brown, 30 Iowa, 470 253 
 
 r. Howe Mach. Co., 53 N. Y. 
 
 020 105 
 
 CoolidKe I'. Parrig, 8 Ohio St. 694 313, 
 
 317 
 Coomlie r. Kno.x (UXJ3),28 Mont. 202, 
 
 72 Pac. 041 375 
 
 Coomb* CommisBion Co. v. Block 
 (1895), 130 Mo. 668, 82 8. W. 1139 543, 
 703, 800 
 Coon l)i«t. Tp. !•. I'rovidence Dist. 
 
 Tp. Dir,. .^2 Iowa, 2H7 597 
 
 Cooniz '■. .Mifhouri i'ac. Kv. Co. 
 (1893), 115 Mo. 669, 22 S. W. 572 075 
 
 Cooper V. Birch (1902), 137 Cal. 472, 
 
 70 Pac. 291 685, 687 
 
 f. Blair, 14 Ore. 255 303 
 
 V. Frencl), .52 Iowa, 531 502, 611 
 
 r. Mohler (1898), 104 Iowa, 301, 
 
 73 N. W. 828 421 
 
 r. The People (1900), 28 Colo. 
 
 87, 03 Pac. 314 180 
 
 r. Portner Brewing Co. (1900), 
 
 112 Ga. 894, 38 S. E. 91 658 
 
 r. Thomason (1896), 30 Ore. 161, 
 
 45 Pac. 295 178 
 
 Coos Bay K. R. Co. v. Siglin (1894), 
 
 20 Ore. 387, 38 -Pac. 192 805 
 
 Cope V. Parrv, 2 Jac. & W. 538 2.39, 256 
 V. Tvpe Foundry Co. (1897), 20 
 
 Mont. 07, 49 Pac. 387 671 
 
 Copeland v. Cheney (1902), 116 Ga. 
 
 085, 43 S. E. 59 666 
 
 V. Young, 21 S. C. 275 881 
 
 Copis V. Middleton, 2 Mad. 410 342 
 
 Coppard v. Allen, 2 DeG. J. & S. 
 
 173 348, 354 
 
 Corbett i-. Hughes, 75 Iowa, 281 882 
 
 V. Wrenn (1894), 25 Ore. 305, 35 
 
 Pac. 658 452, 521 
 
 Corbev c. Rogers (1898), 152 Ind. 
 
 169, 52 N. E. 748 058, 822 
 
 Corbitt V. Harrington (IS'.fO), 14 
 
 Wash. 197, 44 Pac. 132 833 
 
 Corby V. Weddle, 57 Mo. 452 778 
 
 Corcor;m i: Sonera Mm. <^ .Mill Co. 
 
 (1902), Idalio, 71 Pac. 127 711 
 
 Cord V. Ilirsch, 17 Wis. 403 270, 326 
 
 Cordill V. Minn. Elevator Co. (1903), 
 
 89 Minn. 442, 95 X. W. 306 674 
 
 Corey v. Rice, 4 Lans. 141 213 
 
 V. Sherman (1895), 96 la. 114, 
 
 64 N. W. 828 387 
 
 Corkery v. Security Ins. Co. (1890), 
 
 99 la. 382, 68 N. W. 792 818 
 
 Corlett V. Ins. Co. (1899), 00 Kan. 
 
 134, 55 Pac. 844 822 
 
 Corn Exch. Ins. Co. r. Babcock, 42 
 
 N. Y. 613 315 
 
 Cornelison r. Foushee (1897), 101 
 
 Ky. 257, 40 S. W. 680 085 
 
 Cornelius i: Kessel, 58 Wis 237 928 
 
 Cornell V. Dakin, .38 X. Y. 253 816 
 
 V. Donovan, 14 Dalv, 295 933, 934 
 
 r. Radway, 22 Wis.' 200 346 
 
 Corning r. ( orning, \. Y. 97 719 
 
 V. Smitli, 6 N. Y. 82 3-37 
 
 Cornish v. Gest, 2 Cox, 27 242 
 
 Cornley )•. Dazian, 114 N. Y. 101 153 
 
 Corns i-.CIouser( 1893), 137 Ind. 201, 
 
 30 N. E. 848 001 
 
 Cornwall v. McKinney (1896), 9 S. D. 
 
 213, 08 N. W. .333 702 
 
 Corpeiuiy v. Sedalia, 57 Mo. 88 596, 598 
 Cortelyou v. Jones (1901), 132 Cal. 
 
 1.31, 64 Pac. 119 94,97 
 
 V. McCarth V ( ls!)8), 53 Neb. 479, 
 
 73 X. \V. 921 0(i2 
 
 Cor win V. Ward, .35 Cal. 195 936
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxiii 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Coryell v. Cain, 16 Cal. 567 
 
 Cosby 's Heirs r. Wickliffe, 7 B. 
 
 Moil. 120 
 Coster V. Brown, 23 Cal. 142 
 c. Mavor, 43 N. Y. 399 
 V. N. Y. & E. R. Co., 3 Abb 
 
 QOO 
 
 Cottle V. Cole, 20 Iowa, 481 
 
 Co. 
 
 105, 
 
 I'r. 
 
 201, 
 
 DO, 1)4 
 
 113, 426, 
 
 Raynor, 57 
 
 Cotton L. & W 
 
 Cal. 588 
 Cottrell V. Cramer, 40 Wis. 555 
 Couglianour r. Hutchinson (1902), 
 
 41 Ore. 419, 09 Pac. 68 
 
 Coulter V. Great Northern Rv. Co. 
 
 (189G), 5 N. D. 568, 67 N. W. 1046 
 
 Council Bluffs Savings Bank v. 
 
 Griswokl (1897), 50 Neb. 753, 70 
 
 N. W. 376. 290, 298, 
 
 County of Cochise v. Copper Queen 
 
 Min. Co. (1903), Ariz., 71 Pac 946 
 
 County of Mono v. Flanigan (1900), 
 
 130 Cal. 105, 62 Pac. 293 
 Coursen v. Hamlin, 2 Duer, 513 
 Courtney v. Black well (1899), 150 
 
 Mo. 245, 51 S. W. 668 
 Covert V. Hughes, 8 Hun, .305 
 Covington & Lex. R. Co. v. Bowler's 
 
 Heirs, 9 Bush, 468 238, 
 
 Cowan V. Abbott, 92 Cal. 100 
 Cowhick V. Shingle (1894), 5 Wyo. 
 
 87, 37 Pac. 689 
 Cowin i;. Toole, 31 Iowa, 513 544, 
 Cowles V. Cowles, 9 How. Pr. 361 
 
 V. Warner, 22 Minn. 449 
 Cow Run Co. V. Lehmer, 41 Ohio 
 
 St. 384 
 Cox V. Bird, 65 Ind. 277 
 
 V. Gille Hardware Co. (1899), 
 
 8 Okla. 483, 58 Pac. 645 
 V. Henry (1901), 113 Ga. 259, 
 
 38 S. E. 856 543, 
 
 V. Jordan, 86 111. 560 
 V. Peltier (1902), 159 Ind. 355, 
 
 65 N. E. 6 
 V. Ratcliffe, 105 Ind. 374 
 V. West Pac. R. Co., 47 Cal. 89 
 V. Yeazel ( 1896), 49 Neb. 343, 68 
 N. W. 483 
 Coy V. Downie, 14 Fla. 544 
 Coyle V. Ward (1901), 167 N. Y. 240, 
 
 60 N. E. 596 
 Craft V. Jackson Cv. Com'rs, 5 Kan. 
 
 518 
 Craft Refrigerating Machine Co. v. 
 Quinnipiac Brewing Co. (1893), 
 63 Conn. 551, 29 Atl. 76 466, 491, 
 Cragg V. Arendale (1901), 113 Ga. 
 
 181, 38 S. E. 399 
 Craig f. Chipman (1900), Ky., 57 
 S. W. 244 
 V. Cook, 28 Minn. 232 
 V. Frazier, 127 Ind. 286 
 V. Fry, 68 Cal. 363 
 V. Heis, 30 Ohio St. 550 
 
 544 
 
 259 
 428 
 110 
 
 521 
 97, 
 931 
 
 704 
 
 713 
 
 615 
 570 
 
 395 
 
 678 
 
 641 
 
 885 
 
 640 
 316 
 
 251 
 519 
 
 819 
 
 568 
 878 
 620 
 
 919 
 
 178 
 
 288 
 
 641 
 
 866 
 
 579 
 
 52 
 
 457 
 
 606 
 
 987 
 
 726 
 118 
 
 493 
 
 649 
 
 734 
 518 
 
 748 
 213 
 908 
 
 Craig V. Miller (1893), 41 S. C. 37, 19 
 S. E. 192 
 V. Welch-Ilaekley Coal & Oil 
 Co. (1903), Ky., 74 S. W. 
 1097 
 Cramer v. Benton, 60 Barb. 216 
 V. Morton, 2 .Molloy, 108 
 0. Oppensteiii, 16 Colo. 504 
 Crandall v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 
 16 Fed. Rep. 75 
 V. Great Northern Ry. Co. 
 (1901), 83 Minn. 190, 86 
 N. W. 10 
 Crane v. Crane, 43 Hun, 309 
 
 V. Hardman, 4 E. D. Smith, 448 
 
 V. Morse, 49 Wis. 368 
 
 V. Powell (1893), 139 N. Y. 379, 
 
 34 N. E. 911 
 V. Ring, 48 Kan. 58 
 r. Turner, 67 N. Y. 437 
 Cranmer r. Kohn (1898), 11 S. 
 
 245, 76 N. W. 937 
 Crary v. Goodman, 12 N. Y. 266 
 
 379 
 
 46 
 253 
 
 660 
 
 217 
 
 678 
 751 
 
 807 
 
 737 
 
 714, 818 
 290 
 123 
 D. 
 
 543 
 15, 17, 
 50 
 Craven v. Russell (1896), 118 N. C. 
 
 564. 24 S. E. 361 640 
 
 f. Walker (1897), 101 Ga. 845, 
 
 29 S. E. 1.52 640 
 
 Graver v. Norton (1901), 114 la. 46, 
 
 86 N. W. 54 799 
 
 Crawford v. Adams, Stanton's Code 
 
 (Kv.), 91 831 
 
 V. Aultman & Co. (1897), 1.39 
 
 Mo. 262, 40 S. W. 952 614 
 
 i". Furlong, 21 Kan. 698 576 
 
 V. Gunn, 35 Iowa, 543 195 
 
 V. Neal, 56 (^al. 321 160, 576 
 
 v. Whitmore (1893), 120 Mo. 
 
 144, 25 S. W. 365 32, 63 
 
 Crawfordsville i\ Barr, 65 Ind. 367 37S 
 Creager v. Walker, 7 Bush, 1 42, 51 
 
 Creecy r. Joy (1901), 40 Ore. 28, 66 
 
 Pac. 295 566 
 
 V. Pearce, 69 N. C. 67 
 Creed v. Hartman, 29 N. Y. 591 .301 
 
 Creighton v. Newton, 5 Neb. 100 784 
 
 Cremer v. Miller (189.3), 56 Minn. 
 
 52, 57 N. W. 318 624 
 
 V. Wimmer, 40 Minn. 511 150 
 
 Crete v. Hendricks (1902), Neb., 90 
 
 N. \V. 215 730 
 
 Crew V. Hutcheson (1902), 115 Ga. 
 
 511, 42 S. E. 16 607, 708 
 
 Crews V. Lackland, 67 Mo. 619 277 
 
 Crittenden r. Southern Home Ass'n 
 
 (1900), 111 Ga. 266, 36 S. E. 643 711 
 Crocker v. Craig, 46 Me. 327 258 
 
 Croco V. Oregon Short Line R. R. 
 Co. (1898), 18 Utah, 311, 54 Pac. 
 985 679, 817 
 
 Croft V. Northwestern Steamship 
 Co. (1898), 20 Wash. 175, 55 
 Pac. 42 683 
 
 V. Waterton, 13 Sim. 653 240 
 
 Crogau V. Spence, 53 Cal. 15 237
 
 Ixxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the BKFEREN'CKS ABE TO TUB PAGES.] 
 
 Croniartie v. Parker (1897), 121 N. C. 
 
 198, 28 S. E. 2'J' 452 
 
 Crone v. Stiiide (I'JOO), 156 Mo. 2G2, 
 
 55 S. W. 8<}.S 108 
 
 Crook V. TuU, 20 S. W. Rep. 8 203 
 
 Cropsev v. Sweeney, 27 Barb. 310 11, 
 
 578, 581 
 Crosby V. Clark (1901), 132 Cal. 1, 
 
 03 I'ac. 1U22 54 
 
 V. Davis, '.» Iowa, 98 361 
 
 V. FaniKTs' Bank, 107 Mo. 436 667 
 V. Uitcliev (1^96), 47 Neb. 924, 
 
 60 N. \V. 1005 678 
 
 r. Timolit, 52 N. \V. Kep. 526 310 
 V. Wriglit (1897), 70 Minn. 251, 
 
 7o N. \V. 102 688 
 
 Crosier v. Mcl.augliliii, 1 Nov. 348 15, 69 
 
 200 
 105 
 213 
 
 666 
 
 737 
 65 
 
 908 
 326 
 
 664 
 
 Cross «-. Huleit, 53 Mo. 397 
 V. Trnes<lale, 28 Ind. 44 
 r. Williams, 72 Mo. 577 
 Crossen c. Grandy (1902), 42 Ore. 
 
 282, 70 I'ac. 906 
 Crossland r. Admire (1899), 149 Mo. 
 
 650, 51 S. W. 463 
 Crossley c. Taylor, 83 Ind. 337 
 Croiimger v. Parze, 48 Wis. 229 
 Crow V. Vance, 4 Iowa, 434 
 Crowder v. McDonnell (1898), 21 
 
 Mont. 367, 54 Pac. 43 
 Crowley v. Hicks (1898), 98 Wis. 
 
 566, 74 N. W. 348 524, 602, 678, 
 820 
 V. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 
 (1902), 29 Wash. 268, 69 
 Pac. 784 869 
 
 Crown Cycle Co. r. Brown (1901), 
 
 3'.t Ore. 285, 46 Pac. 451 649, 703 
 
 Crowns V. Forest Land Co. (1898), 
 
 99 Wis. 103, 74 N. W. 546 98, 800 
 
 Cruger v. .McLaurv, 41 N. Y. 219 195, 197 
 Crum V. Stanley (1898), 55 Neb. 
 
 351, 75 N. W. 851 89 
 
 Cudlipp V. Whipple, 4 Duer,610 584, 597 
 Cuff r. Dorlan.i, 55 Burl), 481 37 
 
 Culberijoii Irrigating, etc. Co. r. 
 Cox (1897), 52 Neb. 684, 73 
 N. W. y 568, 802 
 
 Cuibert8(jn, etc. Power Co. v. Wild- 
 man (1895), 45 Neb. 663, 03 N. W. 
 947 685 
 
 Cullen V. Qucensbury, 1 Bro. C. C. 
 
 101 248, 385 
 
 Cullison r. Downing (1903), 42 Ore. 
 
 377, 71 Pac. 70 810 
 
 Culp r. Stocre, 47 Kan. 746 626, 636 
 
 Cumber v. Sclim-nfeld. 16 Daly, 454 637 
 Cumberland Tel. Co. r. Ware's 
 Admx. ( 1903), — Ky. — , 74 S. W. 
 289 
 Cumberland Valley I'.ank's Assignee 
 r. Slusher (1897), 102 Ky. 415, 43 
 S. W. 472 
 Cumbey c Lovett (1899), 76 Minn. 
 
 '227, 79 N. W. 99 
 Cumings v. Morris, 3 Bosw. 560 
 
 302 
 
 600 
 
 780 
 872 
 
 Cumins r. Lawrence Cy., 46 N. W. 
 
 Kep. 182 766 
 
 Cumisky v. Williams, 20 Mo. App. 
 
 006 811 
 
 Cummings v. Gleason (1900), 72 
 
 Conn. 587, 45 Atl. 353 585 
 
 i". Helena, etc. Smelting Co. 
 (1902), 26 Mont. 434, 68 
 Pac. 852 673 
 
 r. Hoffman (1893), 113 N. C. 
 
 267, 18 S. K. 170 643 
 
 V. Long, 25 Minn. 337 620 
 
 v. Morris, 25 N. Y. 625 173, 872, 885 
 i\ Thonipson, 18 Minn. 246 790 
 
 r. Town of L;ike Uralty Co. 
 (1893), bt) Wis. 382, 57 
 N. W. 43 662 
 
 V. Vorce, 3 Hill, 282 052 
 
 Cummins v. Barkalow, 4 Keyes, 514 153 
 Cunningham v. Pell, 5 Paige, 607 252 
 V. Uoush (1900), 157 Mo. 336, 57 
 
 S. W. 769 764 
 
 Curd V. Dodds, 6 Bush, 681 313, 314 
 
 V. Lackland, 43 Mo. 139 20, 31, 477 
 Curl V. Foehler (1901), 113 la. 597, 
 
 85N. W. 811 642 
 
 Curnow v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (1895), 
 
 46 S. C. 79, 24 S. E. 74 737 
 
 Curran v. A. H. Stange Co. (1898), 
 
 98 Wis. 598, 74 N. W. 377 679 
 V. Curran, 40 Ind. 473 584, 727, 935 
 V. Stein (1901), — Ky. — , 60 
 
 5. W. 839 276, 278. 395 
 Currie v. Cuwles, 6 Bosw. 453 855, 937 
 
 V. Fowler, 5 J. J. Marsh. 145 564 
 
 Curry r. Gila County (1898), Ariz., 
 
 53 Pac. 4 115 
 
 V. Keyser, 30 Ind. 214 790 
 
 V. Railway Co. (1897), 58 Kan. 
 
 6, 48 Pac. 579 206 
 V. Roundtree, 51 Cal. 184 277 
 
 Curtis r. Barnes, 30 Barb. 225 932 
 
 V. Del., L. & AV. R. Co., 74 N. Y. 
 
 116 225,232 
 
 1-. Gooding, 99 Ind. 45 814 
 
 I'. Herrick, 14 Cal. 117 159 
 
 1-. Lathrop, 12 Colo. 169 426, 428 
 
 r. .Mohr, 18 Wis. 015 97 
 
 V. Moore, 15 Wis. 134 658, 060 
 
 r. Riciiards, 9 Cal. 33 753, 756, 758 
 r. Sprague, 51 Cal. 239 94 
 
 Cuslinian r. Henry, 75 N. Y. 103 316 
 
 f. Jewell, 7 Hun, 525 649 
 
 Cutts V. Guild, 57 N. Y. 229 123, 124 
 
 V. Thodey, 13 Sim. 206 256 
 
 Cythe V. La Fontain, 51 Barb. 186 51 
 
 D. 
 
 Daby v. Ericsson, 45 N. Y. 786 205 
 
 Daggett V. Gray (1895), 110 Cal. 169, 
 
 42 Pac. 568 6G4 
 
 Daggs V. Phoenix Nat. Bank (1898), 
 
 Ariz., 53 Pac. 201 787, 850
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxv 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Dahms i\ Sears, K> Ore. 47 
 Dahoney v. Hall, 20 Ind. 264 
 Dail V. Harper, 83 N. C. 4 
 Dailey r. Burlington, etc. Ry. Co. 
 (1899), 58 Neb. 396, 78 
 N. W. 722 502, 
 
 i;. Houston, 58 Mo. 361 178,228, 
 314, 601, 503, 
 V. Kinsler, 47 N. W. Rep. 1045 
 Daily v. Litchfield, 10 Mich. 29 
 Daisy Roller Mills v. Ward (1897), 
 
 6 N. D. 817, 70 N. W. 271 
 Daking r. Wliimper, 26 Beav. 568 
 Dale V. Hall (1897), 64 Ark. 221, 41 
 S. W. 761 
 V. Hunneman, 12 Nebr. 221 
 V. Masters, Stanton's Code (Ky.), 
 97 911, 
 
 V. Tliomas, 67 Ind. 570 
 Daley u. Cunningham, 60 Cal. 580 
 
 V. Russ, 86 Cal. 114 
 Dalryniple v. Hillenbrand, 62 N. Y. 5 
 u. Hunt, 5 Hun, 111 784, 
 
 V. Security Loan Co. (1900), 9 
 N. D. 306, 83 N. W. 245 
 
 662, 
 Daly V. Brennan (1894), 87 Wis. 36, 
 57 N. W. 963 
 V. Burchell, 13 Abb. Pr. n. s.264 
 V. Everett Pulp & Paper Co. 
 (1903), 31 Wash. 252, 71 
 Pac. 1014 
 V. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 64 Ind. 1 
 V. New Haven (1897), 69 Conn. 
 
 644, 38 Atl. 397 
 V. Proetz, 20 Minn. 411 
 V. Ruddell (1902), 137 Cal. 671, 
 20 Pac. 784 
 Dambnian v. Schulting, 4 Hun, 50 
 
 V. White, 48 Cal. 439 
 Damon v. Damon. 28 Wis. 510 
 
 V. Leque (1896), 14 Wash. 253, 
 44 Pac. 261 
 Dandridge v. Washington's Ex., 2 
 
 Pet. 370 
 Danenbaum v. Person, 3 N. Y. Suppl. 
 
 129 
 Daniels v. Clark, 38 Iowa, 556 
 
 V. Fowler (1897), 120 N. C. 14, 
 26 S. E. 635 493, 610, 600, 
 Danihee v. Hyatt (1897), 151 N. Y. 
 
 493, 45 N. E. 939 
 Dann n. Gibson, 9 Neb. 513 
 Darby v. Callaghan, 16 N. Y. 71 
 
 V. M. K. & T. Ry. Co. (1900), 
 156 Mo. 391, 57 S. W. 550 
 Dare ". Allen, 1 Green, Ch. 288 
 Darlington v. Effey, 13 Iowa, 177 
 
 329, 
 Darnall v. Bennett (1896), 98 la. 410, 
 
 67 N. W. 273 
 Darrah v. Gow, 77 Mich. 16 
 Dart V. McQuilty, 6 Ind. 391 
 Darwent v. Walton, 2 Atk. 510 
 Dashavvay Ass. v. Rogers, 79 Cal. 211 
 
 303 
 361 
 713 
 
 593 
 229, 
 617 
 373 
 359 
 
 343 
 255 
 
 925 
 52 
 
 913 
 598 
 207 
 620 
 811 
 811 
 
 160, 
 671 
 
 887 
 326 
 
 642 
 942 
 
 615 
 811 
 
 255 
 704 
 568 
 471 
 
 17 
 
 347 
 
 810 
 426 
 
 601 
 
 285 
 661 
 225 
 
 466 
 254 
 326, 
 338, 
 
 626 
 576 
 415 
 248 
 
 684 
 
 Daugherty v. Deardorf, 107 Ind. 627 327 
 Daulton v. Stuart (1902), 30 Wash. 
 
 562, 70 Pac. 1096 410 
 
 Davanay i-. Eggenhoff, 43 Cal. 395 766, 
 
 767, 803 
 
 Davenport i\ Ladd, 38 Minn. 545 751 
 
 i: Murray, 68 Mo. 198 470 
 
 V. Short, 17 Minn. 24 821 
 
 V. Turpin, 43 Cal. 597 325, 782 
 
 David V. Frowd, 1 Myl. & K. 200 392 
 
 Davidson v. Elms, 67 N. C. 228 154 
 
 V. Gregory (1903), 132 N. C. 
 
 389, 43 S. E. 916 543,712 
 
 V. King, 47 Ind. 372 
 
 V. Remington, 12 How. Pr. 310 
 
 725 
 855, 
 872 
 232 
 227 
 249 
 253 
 
 123,178 
 112 
 
 565 
 
 112 
 
 02 
 
 V. Smith, 20 Iowa, 466 
 Davies v. Cole, 28 Kan. 259 
 
 V. Davies, 11 Engl. & Eq. R. 199 
 V. Williams, 1 Sim. 5 
 Davis V. Bechstein, 69 N. Y. 440 
 v. Calloway, 30 Ind. 112 
 V. Clements (1897), 148 Ind. 605, 
 
 47 N. E. 1056 
 V. Clinton W. Works, 54 Iowa, 
 
 59 
 V. Crookston, etc. Co. (1894), 57 
 
 Minn. 402, 59 N. W. 482 
 V. Culver (1899), 58 Neb. 265, 78 
 
 N. W. 504 780, 890, 922 
 
 V. C. & W. W. R. Co., 46 Iowa, 
 
 389 611 
 
 V. Davis, 26 Cal. 23 815 
 
 V. Davis, 20 Ore. 78 820 
 
 V. Eppinger, 18 Cal. 378 428 
 
 V. Erickson, 3 Wash. 654 94, 104 
 
 V. First Nat. Bank (1899), 57 
 
 Neb. 373, 77 N. W. 775 
 V. Ford (1896), 15 Wash. 107, 45 
 
 Pac. 739 704, 832, 834 
 
 V. Goodman (1896), 62 Ark. 262, 
 
 35 S. W. 231 
 V. Hadden (1902), 115 Ga. 466, 
 
 41 S. E. 608 
 V. Hamilton (1902), 85 Minn. 209, 
 
 88 N. W. 744 
 V. Hardy, 76 Ind. 272 
 V. Holbrook (1898), 25 Colo. 493, 
 
 55 Pac. 730 
 V. Hoppock, 6 Duer, 254 
 V. Jacksonville, etc. Line (1894), 
 
 126 Mo. 69, 28 S. W. 965 
 V. John Mouat Lumber Co., 31 
 
 Pac. Rep. 187 
 
 735 
 
 646 
 
 871 
 
 680 
 311 
 
 49 
 779 
 
 67 
 
 375 
 
 V. Lamberton, 66 Barb. 480 29, 30, 
 
 475 
 V. Leeper (1900), Ky., 66 S. W. 
 
 712 624 
 
 V. Lottich, 46 N. Y. 393 200 
 
 I'. Mason, 3 Ore. 154 587 
 
 V. Mayor, etc., 2 Duer, 663 413 
 
 V. Milburn, 3 Iowa, 163 936 
 
 V. Morris, 36 N. Y. 569 19, 36, 41 
 
 V. Mutual Fire Ins. Co. (1895), 
 
 96 la. 70, 64 N. W. 687 818
 
 Ixxvi 
 
 TABLb: OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the reteresces are to tqb pages.] 
 
 Davis r. Nebraska Nat. Bank (1897), 
 
 51 Neb. 401, 70 N. W. 063 734 
 r. Xeligli, 7 Neb. !54 131 
 
 V. N. Y., L. K. & W. K. Co., 110 
 
 N. V. 040 637 
 
 V. Netware. 13 Nev. 421 880 
 
 V. Novutiiev (li'Ol), 15 S. D. 118, 
 
 87 N. \V. oS-J 502 
 
 V. Payne, 45 Iowa, VH 702 
 
 V. Ueynolds, 5 lliiii. 051 93 
 
 V. Seattle National Bank (1898), 
 
 19 Wa.^li. 05, b-J. Vac. 526 852 
 r. Shuler, 14 Fla. 438 748 
 
 r. Stovi-r, 5^ N. Y. 473 874, 935 
 
 V. Sutton, 23 Minn. 307 131 
 
 V. Toiilniin. 77 N. Y. 280 852, 869 
 V. Tubbs (1^95), 7 .S. D. 488, 64 
 
 N. W. 534 656 
 
 V. Van Buren, 72 N. Y. 587 293 
 
 V. Van de Mark, 45 Kan. 130 286 
 V. \Vartielil, 38 Ind. 401 779 
 
 Davison ;-. Associates, 71 N. Y. 333 42 
 r. Harmon (1896), 05 Minn. 402, 
 
 67 N. \V. 1015 289 
 
 V. Rake, 45 N. J. Eq. 767 347 
 
 Davoue c. Fanning, 4 Johns. Cli. 199 249 
 
 Dawlev v. Brown, 9 Hun, 461 801 
 
 Dawson v. Kads (lb94), 140 Ind. 208, 
 
 39 N. E. 919 714 
 
 r. Equitable Mortgage Co. (1899), 
 
 109 Ga. 389. 34 S. E 608 179 
 V. Graliam, 48 Iowa, 378 667 
 
 I'. Marjli (1902), 74 Conn. 498, 51 
 
 Atl. 529 466 
 
 Day V. Brenton (1897), 102 la. 482, 
 
 71 N. W. 538 470 
 
 V. Buckingbam, 87 Wis. 215 384 
 
 V. Goodwin (1898), 104 la. 374, 
 
 73 N. W. 804 374 
 
 V. HaninioMJ, 57 N. Y. 479 817 
 
 V. Mountin ( 1903), 89 Minn. 297, 
 
 94 N. \V. S87 710 
 
 V. Palter.-ion. IH Ind. 114 105 
 
 V. Pool, 52 N. Y. 416 91) 
 
 V. Scbnei.ler (18!)6), 28 Ore. 457, 
 
 43 Pnc. 650 460 
 
 V. Vallettc, 25 Ind. 42 058, 824 
 
 V. Wamsley, 33 Ind. 145 746, 748. 
 
 779 
 Dayhuff i- DayliuflPs Adm'r, 27 Ind. 
 
 158 ■ 935 
 
 Dayton r. Wilkes, 5 Bosw. ({55 418 
 
 Dayton Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 24 Ohio St. 
 
 345 604 
 
 Deacon v. Central la. In v. Co. (1895), 
 
 95 la. 180, 03 N W. 673 085 
 
 Dean v. Chamberlin, 6 Dner. 091 208 
 
 V. Knglisb, 18 B. Mon. 135 101, 218, 
 
 453 
 f. God<lard (1893). 55 Minn. 290, 
 
 56 N. W. 10(KJ 618 
 
 V. Ix-onard, 9 Minn. 190 737 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. By. Co. (1803), 
 
 53 Minn. 504, 55 N. W. 628 104 
 r. Yates, 22 Ohio St. 388 026, GSl 
 
 De Baker i-. Southern Cal. Rv. Co. 
 
 (1895), 100 Cal. 257, 39 Pac. 010 008 
 Debolt V. Carter, 31 lud. 355 181, 187, 
 
 188 
 De Camp v. Thomson (1899), 159 
 
 N. Y. 444, 54N. E. 11 934 
 
 Decatur r. Simpson (1902), 115 la. 
 
 348, 88 N. W. 839 673 
 
 Decker v. Gaylord, 8 Hun, 110 402 
 
 I'. Mathews, 12 N. Y. 313 611 
 
 V. McSorley (1901), 111 Wis. 91, 
 
 86 N. W. 554 684 
 
 r. Schuize (1895), 11 Wash. 47, 
 
 39 Pac. 261 688 
 
 I'. Trilling, 24 Wis. 610 398, 401, 402 
 Deegan v. Capner, 44 N. J. Eq. 3.',9 347 
 V. Deegan (1894), 22 Nev. 185, 37 
 
 Pac. 300 178, 813 
 
 Deere v. Eagle Mfg. Co. (1896), 49 
 
 Neb. 385, 08 N. W. 504 417, 422 
 
 Deere, Wells & Co. v. Morgan (1901), 
 
 114 la. 287, 80 N.W. 271 655 
 
 Deering v. Keilly (1901), 167 N. Y. 
 
 184, 00 N. E. 417 197 
 
 Deery v. McClintock, 31 Wis. 196 37 
 
 Deford v. Hutchinson, 45 Kan. 318 780 
 De Forest v. Holum, 38 Wis. 516 326, 
 
 329 876 
 De Golls V. Ward, 3 P. Wms. 311 ' 254 
 De Graw v. Elmore, 50 N. Y. 1 544, 620, 
 
 020, 631 
 De Hart v. Etnire, 121 Ind. 242 598 
 
 De Haven v. De Haven's Adm'r 
 
 (1898), 104 Kv. 41, 46 S. W. 215 687 
 De Iloghton v. Money, L. R. 2 Ch. 
 
 App. 164 255, 256 
 
 Delabere v. Norwood, 3 Swanst. 144 334 
 De la Gucrra v. Newliall, 55 Cal. 21 578, 
 
 De la Mar v. Hurd, 4 Col. 442 
 Delancy v. Murphy, 24 Hun, 503 
 Delaplaine v. Lewis, 19 Wis. 470 
 
 581 
 065 
 412 
 326, 
 327 
 018 
 
 r. Turnley, 45 Wis 31 
 Delashmutt v. Sellwood, 10 Ore. 
 
 319 333 
 
 De la Vergne i\ Evcrtson, 1 Paige, 
 
 181 201 
 
 De Lay r. Carney (1897), 100 la. 
 
 687, 69 N. W. 1053 026 
 
 De Leyer t-. Michaels, 5 Abb. Vr. 
 
 203 867, 891 
 
 De Lissa v. Coal Co. (1898), 59 Kan. 
 
 319, 52 Pac. 880 831, 832 
 
 De Loach Mill To. r. Bonner (1897), 
 
 64 Ark. 510, 43 S. W. 504 605 
 
 Delsman /•. Friodlander (1901), 40 
 
 Ore. 33, 06 Pac. 297 570 
 
 Demarest v. Holdeman (1901), 157 
 
 Ind. 407, 62 N. E. 17 269, 510 
 V. AVickham, 63 N. Y. 320 118 
 
 Demartin i;. Albert, 68 Cal. 277 942 
 
 Diinby r. Kingston, 60 Hun, 294 228 
 
 Diiiiing c. Kemp, 4 Saiulf. 147 843 
 
 Dempsey v. Rhodes, 93 N. C. 120 817
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxvii 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Donn r. Peters (1900), 30 Ore. 4cSG, 
 
 5it I'ac. 1100 570 
 
 DcMiney v. Cole, .22 Wash. 372, Gl 
 
 Pac. 38 323 
 
 V. Stout (1900), 59 Neb. 731, 82 
 
 N. W. 18 793 
 
 Dennis v. Belt, 30 Cal. 247 911, 913 
 
 V. Kolni (1901), 131 Cal. 91, 63 
 
 Pac. 141 423 
 
 V. Nelson (1893), 55 Minn. 144, 
 
 66 N. W. 589 565 
 
 V. Spencer, 45 Minn. 250 428 
 
 Dennison v. Chapman (1895), 105 
 
 Cal. 447, 39 Pac. 61 665 
 
 t'. Willcut (1894), Idaho, 35 Pac. 
 698 161 
 
 Dent V. Railroad (1901), Gl S. C. 329, 
 
 39 S. E. 527 612 
 
 Denten v. Logan, 3 Mete. (Ivy.) 434 811 
 Denton v. Nanny, 8 Barb. 624 326 
 
 Denver i: Spokane Falls (1893), 7 
 
 Wasli. 226, 34 Pac. 926 730, 785 
 
 Denver, etc. K. R. Co. v. Smock 
 
 (1897), 23 Colo. 456, 48 Pac. 681 817 
 Denver Power & Irrigation Co. v. 
 Denver, etc. Co. (1902), — Col. — , 
 69 Pac. 568 418 
 
 Denzler r. Kieckhoff (1896), 97 la. 
 
 75, 66 N. W. 147 639 
 
 I)e Pay r. Strong, 37 N. Y. 372 178, 195 
 Di-rbv r. (J.dliip. 5 Minn. 119 831 
 
 Derham v. Lee, 87 N. Y. 599 412 
 
 De Uid;i(.-r v. Schernierliorn, 10 Barb. 
 
 638 300, 402 
 
 Derr v. Stubbs, 83 N. C. 539 940 
 
 Derrick n. Cole (1894), 60 Ark. 394, 
 
 30 S. VV. 700 570, 689 
 
 De Silver v. Holden, 50 N. Y. Super. 
 
 Ct. 2.% 518 
 
 Des Moines v. Polk County (1899), 
 
 107 Iowa, 525, 7» N. VV. 249 117 
 
 Des Moines Ins. Co. v. Lent, 75 Iowa, 
 
 522 428 
 
 Desmond v. Brown, 33 Iowa, 13 799 
 
 Despard v. Walbridge, 15 N. Y. S74 53, 
 
 54 
 Detroit Heating Co. v. Stevens (1897), 
 
 16 Utali, 177, 52 Pac. 379 624 
 
 Deuel V. Newiin, 30 N. E. Rep. 795 95 
 
 De Upvev r. De Uprev, 27 Cal. 329 316, 
 
 371 
 Denster r. Mittag (1900), 105 Wis. 
 
 459, 81 N. W. 643 689 
 
 Devaynes v. Robinson, 24 Beav. 86 352 
 Devereux v. McCrady (1895), 46 
 
 S. C. 133, 24 S. E. 77 714 
 
 Devin v. Walsh (1899), 108 la. 428, 
 
 79 N. W. 133 520 
 
 Devlin v. Mavor, etc., 63 N. Y. 8 88 
 
 Devol V. Barnes, 7 Hun, 342 93 
 
 V. Mcintosh, 23 Ind. 529 105, 109, 
 
 110 
 Devor v. Rerick, 87 Ind. 337 821 
 
 Devore v. Devore (1896), 138 Mo. 
 181. 39 S. W. 68 783 
 
 Devotie v. McGerr, 15 Colo. 467 815 
 
 Devries r. Warren, 82 N. C. 356 916 
 
 Devvr v. Schaefer, 55 N. Y. 446 725 
 
 Dewey v. Hoag, 15 Barb. 365 46 
 
 V. Lambier, 7 Cal. 347 
 V. Moyer, 9 Hun, 473 238, 260, 340, 
 
 350 
 De Witt V. Cliandlcr, 11 Abb. Pr. 
 
 459 157 
 
 V. Hays, 2 Cal. 463 11, 15 
 
 De Wolfe v. Abraham (1896), 151 
 
 N. Y. 186, 45 N. E. 455 489 
 
 D'Wolf V. D'Wolf, 4 R. I. 450 250 
 
 Dexter v. Iviors, 183 N. Y. 551 637 
 
 Deyo V. Morss (1894), 144 N. Y. 216, 
 
 39 N. E. 81 635 
 
 Dezell V. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 
 
 (1903), 176 Mo. 253, 75 S. W. 1102 752 
 Dezengremel v. Dezengremel, 24 
 
 Hun, 457 820 
 
 Dias I'. Bouchaud, 10 Paige, 445 348 
 
 V. Merle, 4 Paige, 259 338, 379 
 
 Dice V. Morris, 32 Ind. 283 944 
 
 Dickens v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 13 How. 
 
 Pr. 228 505 
 
 Dickerman v. New York, etc. R. R. 
 Co. (1899), 72 Conn. 271, 44 Atl. 
 228 714 
 
 Dickerson v. Spokane (1901), 26 
 
 Wiish. 292, 66 Pac. 381 15, 271 
 
 Dickey r Gibson (1898), 121 Cal. 276, 
 
 53 Pile. 704 329 
 
 r. Northern I'ac Rv. Co. (1898), 
 
 10 Wasli. 3o0, 53 I'ac. 347 625 
 Dickinson r. Vanderpoel, 6 N. Y. Sup. 
 
 Ct. 168 179 
 
 Dickinson Co. v Fitterling (1898), 72 
 
 Minn. 483, 75 N. W. 731 107 
 
 Dickson ;;. Cole, 34 Wis. 621 11, 18, 37, 
 
 663 
 V. Do-.vs (1902), 11 N. D.404, 407, 
 
 92 N. VV. 798 418 
 
 V. Mercliants' Elev. Co., 44 Mo. 
 
 A pp. 498 
 
 Diddell v. Diddell, 3 Abb. Pr. 167 890 
 
 Dietrich v. Koch, 35 Wis. 618 859 
 
 V. Steam Dredge (1894), 14 
 
 Mont. 261,36 Pac. 81 418 
 
 Dietrichs v. Lincoln & N. W. R. Co., 
 
 13 Neb. 43 814 
 
 Dieiz V. City Nat. Bank (1894), 42 
 
 Neb. 584, 60 N. W. 896 640 
 
 Dill V. Yoss, 94 Ind. 590 189 
 
 Dillahunty r. Railway Co. (1894), 59 
 
 Ark. 629, 28 S. W. 657 569 
 
 Dillaye v. Niles, 4 Abb. Pr. 253 872 
 
 V. Parks, 31 Barb. 132 178, 814 
 
 Dillon V. Bates, 39 Mo. 292 347, 352 
 
 V. Darst (1896), 48 Neb. 803, 67 
 
 N. W. 783 779, 811 
 
 V. Lee (1899), 110 la. 156, 81 
 
 N. W. 245 769 
 
 V. Starin (1895), 44 Neb. 881, 
 
 63 N. W. 12 625 
 
 Dimmock v. Bixby, 20 Pick. 368 607
 
 Ixxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Dimond v. Minnesota Sav. Bank 
 
 (l^yi). 70 Min. 2'J8. 73 N. W. 1^2 684 
 Dinan r. Coneys (1894), 143 N. Y. 
 
 544, 08 N. E. 715 493, 923 
 
 Dinees v. Riggs (1895), 43 Neb. 710, 
 
 02N. W. 74 478.494, 
 
 Dinkkr '■ \hwr (1893), 02 Ga. 432, 
 
 17 S. I.: •.•.3:5 640 
 
 Dirk» r.l'alitDniia Safe Deposit Co. 
 
 ( l'.MJ2), 13(5 Cal. 84. (38 Pac. 487 681 
 Di.»l)r<i\v c. B>i:iril of Supervisors 
 
 (I'J()3), 119 la. 538, 93 N. W. 585 817 
 Dislineau r. Newton (1895), 91 Wis. 
 
 199. 04 N. W. 879 293, 604 
 
 l)i.stii-r r. Dabney, 3 Wash. 200 620 
 
 District Township -ice Coon Dist. 
 Tp., etc. ; Wliitc Oak Dist. Tp., etc. 
 Dix r. Akers. 30 liul. 431 153 
 
 r. Briggs, 9 I'aige, 595 342 
 
 Dixey v. Pollock, 8 Cal. 570 428 
 
 Dixon V. Cardozo (1895), 106 Cal. 
 
 506, 39 Pac. 857 160 
 
 V. Caster ( 1903), — Kan. — , 70 
 
 Pac. 871 804 
 
 Dlaubi V. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1897), 139 Mo. 291, 40 S. W. 890 682 
 Doan r. Hollv, 26 Mo. 186 475 
 
 Dobhcrstein'--. Murphy (1896), 64 . 
 
 Minn. 127, 66 N. W. 204 99 
 
 Dobb.-i r. Kellogg, 53 Wis. 448 52, 865 
 V. Puriiigton (1902), 136 Cal. 70, 
 
 68 Pac. 323 278 
 
 Dobrv r. Western Mfg. Co. (1899), 
 
 58 Neb. 667, 79 N. W. 559 718 
 
 Dobson r. Diickpond D. Ass , 42 
 
 Ind. 312 439 
 
 V. llallowell (1893), 53 Minn. 
 
 98, 54 N. W. 939 787 
 
 V. Owens (1895), 5 Wyo. 325, 40 
 
 Pac. 412 781 
 
 V. Pearce, 12 N'. Y. 156 15,45,46, 
 49, 54 
 r. Southern Ry. Co. (1901), 129 
 
 N. C. 289, 40 S. E. 42 415 
 
 Dodd r. Denney, 6 Ore. 156 618 
 
 Dodds r. McCorniick Harvesting 
 Macii. Co. (1901), 62 Neb. 759, 87 
 N. W. 911 604 
 
 Dodge r. Cornelius (1901), 168 N. Y. 
 
 242, 01 N. E. 244 815 
 
 V. Dunham. 41 Ind. 186 727 
 
 V. Kimple (1H98), 121 Cal. 580, 
 
 54 Pac. 94 684 
 
 V. McMahan (1895), 61 Minn. 
 
 175, (;3 N. W. 487 763 
 
 Dodge's Adin. v. Moss, 82 Ky. 441 112 
 Dodson r. Loinax, 21 S. VV. Rep. 
 
 '25 117 
 
 Doeg .-. Cook (1899), 126 Cal. 213, 
 
 58 I'ac. 7<t7 302 
 
 Dotring r. Kenainore, 86 Mo. 588 
 Doernor I'. Doi-rner (1901), 161 Mo. 
 
 407. 01 S. W. H02 064 
 
 Dohcrtv .•. Holliday (1893), 137 Ind. 
 282. .-'/J N. E. 315 259 
 
 Dolan V. Citv of Milwaukee (1895), 
 89 Wis. 497, 61 N. W. 564 
 r. Hubiiiger (1899), 109 Iowa, 
 408, 80 N. W. 514 177, 
 
 Dolbeer r. Stout (1893), 139 N. Y. 
 
 480, 34 N. E. 1102 853, 
 
 Dole V. Burleigh, 1 Dak. 227 662, 
 
 Doll V. Crume ( 1894), 41 Neb. 655, 
 
 59 N. W. 806 
 Dolph V. nice, 21 Wis. 590 
 Donahue r. Meister, 88 Cal. 121 
 
 r. Prosser, 10 Iowa, 276 
 Donald i: Bather, 10 Beav. 20 
 Donaldson r. Butler Cy., 98 Mo. 103 
 Donellan v. Hardy, 57 Ind. 393 
 Doniian r. Intelligencer Co., 70 Mo. 
 
 108 
 Donnell v. Walsh, 33 N. Y. 43 179, 
 V. Wright (1899), 147 Mo. 639, 
 49 S. W. 874 
 Donnelly v- San Francisco Bridge 
 Co. (1897), 117 CaL 417, 49 Pac. 
 559 
 Donovan v. Dunning, 69 Mo. 436 
 V. Hannibal & St. J. Ry. Co., 89 
 
 Mo. 147 
 V. Kibbler (1902), Neb., 92 N. W. 
 637 
 Doody r. Higgins, 9 Hare, Ap. .32 
 Doolittle V. Broome Cy. Sup., 18 
 N. Y. 155 
 V. Greene, 32 Iowa, 123 592, 
 
 V. Lay cock (1899), 103 Wis. 334, 
 79 N. W. 408 
 Doran v. Cohen, 147 Mass. 342 
 Dormitzer v. German Savings Bank 
 (1900), 23 Wash. 132, 62 Pac. 802 
 Dorothy v. Pierce (1895), 27 Ore. 
 
 373, 41 Pac. 668 
 Dorr Cattle Co. r. Jewett (1902), 116 
 
 la. 93, 89 N. W. 109 
 Dorris v. Sullivan, 90 Cal. 279 
 Dorsett c Adams, 50 Ind. 129 
 
 V. Clement-Hoss Mfg. Co. (1902), 
 131 N. C. 254. 42 S. E. 012 
 i: Hall, 7 Neb. 400 
 V. Reese, 14 B. Mon. 157 53, 
 
 Dorsey Macli. Co. c. McCaffrey 
 (1894), 139 Ind. 545, 38 N. E. 208 
 Dor win v. Potter, 5 Denio, 300 
 Doud r. Duluth .Milling Co. (1893); 
 
 55 Minn. 53, 56 N. W. 463 
 Doughty r. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co., 
 
 78 N. C. 22 
 Douglas ('. Coonley (1898), 156 N. Y. 
 521, 51 N. E. 283 
 V. Corry, 40 Oiiio St. 349 
 V. First Nat. Bank, 17 Minn. 35 
 V. Forrest, 4 Bing. 704 
 V. Haberstro, 25 Him, 202 55, 
 V. Horsfall, 2 S. & S. 184 
 Douglas County v. Bennett (1901), 
 
 01 Nob. 000, 85 N. W. 833 
 Douglas Cy. Sup. v. Wallbridge, 38 
 Wis. 179 321, 
 
 623 
 
 191 
 
 856 
 737 
 
 106 
 871 
 42 
 936 
 240 
 (505 
 609 
 
 178 
 201 
 
 470 
 
 677 
 470 
 
 778 
 
 639 
 254 
 
 118 
 741 
 
 682 
 468 
 
 605 
 
 087 
 
 113 
 
 52 
 
 576 
 
 817 
 597 
 936 
 
 821 
 843 
 
 736 
 
 521 
 
 712 
 820 
 932 
 403 
 793 
 252 
 
 735 
 
 482
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxix 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Douglass V. Bisliop, 27 Iowa, 214 r.25, 327 
 V. Ins. Co. (1893), 138 N. Y. 200, 
 
 33 N. E. 938 825, 834 
 
 V. Placerville, 18 Cal. GI3 118 
 
 V. Railway Co. (1894), 91 la. 94, 
 
 58 N. W. 1070 302 
 
 Dounce v. Dow, 57 N. Y. IG 910 
 
 Dousman v. Wis., etc. Min. Co., 40 
 
 Wis. 418 265, 388 
 
 Doutliit V. Hipp, 23 S. C. 205 333 
 
 Douthitt r. Smith, 69 Iiul. 463 895 
 
 Dowdell V. Carpy (1902), 137 Cal. 
 
 333, 70 Pac. 167 913, 926 
 
 Downer v. Smith, 24 Cal. 114 52 
 
 Downey v. Dillon, 52^Ilul. 442 576 
 
 Downing i\ Gibson, 53 Iowa, 617 131 
 
 V. Le Du, 82 Cal. 471 42 
 
 Downs V. Finnesjan (1894,) 58 IVIinn. 
 
 112, 59 N. W. 981 646 
 
 V. McComlis, 16 Ind. 211 786 
 
 Dows V. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108 119 
 
 V. Kidder, 84 N. Y. 121 412 
 
 Doyle V. Franklin, 48 Cal. 537 663 
 
 V. rhffinix Ins. Co., 44 Cal. 264, 
 
 268 563, 595, 608, 609 
 
 Drage v. Hartopp, L. R. 28 Ch. I). 
 
 414 248, 251 
 
 Dragoo v. Levi, 2 Duv. 520 457,482, 497 
 Drais v. Hogan, 50 Cal. 121 598 
 
 Drake v. Avanzini (1894), 20 Col. 
 
 104, 36 I'ac. 846 875 
 
 V. Cockroft, 4 E. 1). Smitli, 34 894, 
 
 916 
 V. Phillips, 40 111. 388 119 
 
 Draper v. Brown (1902), 115 Wis. 
 
 361, 91 N. W. 1001 9, 11, 12,19, 
 33, 72, 444, 498 
 V. Clarendon, 2 Vern. 518 333 
 
 V. Macon Dry Goods Co. (1898), 
 
 103 Ga. 661, 30 S. E. 566 686 
 V. Stouvenel, 35 N. Y. 507 224 
 
 r. Taylor (1899), 58 Neb. 787, 
 
 79 N. W. 709 718 
 
 V. Van Horn, 15 Ind. 155 373 
 
 Drew V. Ferson, 22 Wis. 651 39 
 
 L\ Harman, 5 Price, 319 378 
 
 Dreyer v. Hart (1896), 147 Ind. 604, 
 
 47 N. E. 174 17 
 
 Driver v. Salt Lake Gas Co. (1900), 
 
 22 Utah, 143, 61 Pac. 733 909 
 
 Drury v. Clark, 16 How. Pr. 424 326,327 
 Drvden v. Parrotte (1901), 61 Neb. 
 
 339, 85 N. W. 287 819 
 
 Dry Dock E. B. & B. R Co. v. N. & 
 
 E. R. Ry. Co., 22 N. Y. Suppl. 556 803 
 Duanesburgh v. Jenkins, 46 Barb. 
 
 2'.i4 155 
 
 Dubbers v. Goux, 51 Cal. 153 412 
 
 Dul)ois V. Hermance, 56 N. Y. 673 779, 
 
 790, 812 
 Dubuque Lumber Co. v. Kimball 
 
 (1900), 111 la. 48, 82 N. W. 458 606 
 Duck V. Abbott, 24 Ind. 349 65, 357 
 
 Duckwail r. Brooke (1901), Ky., 65 
 H. W. 357 " 640 
 
 Duckw^orth v. McKinney (1900), 58 
 
 S. C. 418, 36 S. E. 730 812 
 
 Dudenhofer v. Johnson (1895), 144 
 
 Ind. 631, 43 N. E. 868 946 
 
 Dudley v. Duval (1902), 29 Wash. 
 
 528, 70 Pac. 68 456, 515, 615, 
 616,703 
 V. Johnson (1897), 102 Ga. 1, 29 
 
 S. E. 50 923 
 
 V. Pigg (1897), 149 Ind. .363, 48 
 
 N. E. 642 816 
 
 V. Scranton, 57 N. Y. 424 909 
 
 Duell V. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1902), 115 Wis. 516, 92 N. W. 269 625 
 Duerst v. St. Louis Stamping Co. 
 
 (1901), 163 Mo. 607, 63 S. W. 827 605 
 Duff V. Fire Ass'n (1895), 129 Mo. 
 
 4(iO, 30 S. W. 1034 672, 689 
 
 Duffy c. Duncan, 35 N. Y. 187 873 
 
 V. O'Donovan, 46 N. Y. 227 51 
 
 Dufrene v. Anderson (1902), Neb., 
 
 90 N. W. 221 639 
 
 V. Anderson (1903), — Neb. —, 
 
 93 N. W. 139 605, 822 
 
 Duggeri;. Dempsey (1895), 13 Wash. 
 
 396, 43 Pac. 357 924 
 
 Duke L-. Brown (1901), 113 Ga. 310, 
 
 38 S. E. 764 612 
 
 V. Griffith (1894), 9 Utah, 469, 35 
 
 Pac. 512 50 
 
 Dulaney v. Buffum (1903), 173 Mo, 1, 
 
 73 N. W. 125 307 
 
 Duncan r. Berlin, 5 Robt. 457 291 
 
 V. Gray (1899), 108 la. 599, 79 
 
 N. W. 362 • 587 
 
 V. Stanton, 30 Barb. 533 • 872 
 
 V. Whedbee, 4 Col. 143 159 
 
 V. Wickliffe, 4 Scam. 452 360 
 
 V. Willis (1894), 51 0. St. 433, 
 
 38 N. E. 13 213 
 
 Duncombe v. Hansley, 3 P. Wms. 
 
 333 329 
 
 Dundee Mortg. Co. v. Hughes, 20 
 
 Fed. Rep. 39 112 
 
 Dunderdale v. Grymes, 16 How. Pr. 
 
 195 177 
 
 Dunham v. Bower, 77 N. Y. 76 778 
 
 V. Greenbaum, 56 Iowa, .303 428 
 
 V. Holloway (1895), 3 Okla. 244, 
 
 41 S. W. 140 543, 677, 679 
 
 V. Ramsey, 37 N. J. Eq. 388 872 
 
 V. Travis (1902), 25 Utah, 65, 69 
 
 Pac. 468 866 
 
 Dunlap r. Snvder, 17 Barb. 561 798 
 
 Dunn V. Bozarih (I8'.i9), 59 Neb. 244, 
 
 80N. W. 811 638,646,832,833 
 V. Dewey (1898), 75 Minn. 153, 
 
 77 N. W. 793 379 
 
 V. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 68 
 
 Mo. 268 178 
 
 V. McCoy (1899), 150 Mo. 548, 
 
 52 S W 21 32 
 
 V. Nat. Bank (1898), 11 S. D. 
 
 305, 77N.W. Ill 421 
 
 V. Remington, 9 Neb. 82 541, 546
 
 Ixx 
 
 TAlJLi; uF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the referemccs are to thb pages.] 
 
 Dunn V. Uvalde Asphalt Paving 
 (l'.H)8|. 175 X. Y. 214, 67 
 N. K. 4r.O 
 r. Wolf. 81 I(iwa. f.88 
 Dunnett i-.Tliornton (1900), 73 Conn. 
 
 1. 4(") At). l.')8 
 Dunning' '•• Leavitt, 85 X. Y. 30 
 r. ( >cean Nat. Bk., Ul N. Y. 497 
 
 9.34 
 340 
 
 25 
 111 
 117. 
 219 
 
 V. Rumbaugli, ."(i Iowa, 500 734, 778 
 V. Thomas. 11 How. Pr. 281 600 
 
 Dupoiit r. Amos (1896), 97 la. 484, 
 
 • iO N. \V. 774 417 
 
 l)u Pont i: Davis, 35 Wis. 6-34 42, 46, 885, 
 
 886 
 Durant r. Gardner, 10 Abb. Pr. 445 
 Durbon >: Ki-llv's A.lm., 22 Ind. 183 
 Durell r. Al.l.oU (1805), Wvo. 265, 
 
 44 Pac. 647 
 DurHinjier r. Baker (1897), 149 Ind. 
 
 375. 49 N. E. 276 
 Durgin r. Ireland, 14 N. Y. -322 
 
 r. Neal, 82 Cal. oii5 
 Durham r. Bischof, 47 Ind. 211 112 
 
 505 
 935 
 
 568 
 
 690 
 01, 97 
 575 
 311, 
 3(i4 
 212 
 
 r. Hall. 67 Ind. 123 
 Durham Fertilizer Co. r. Pagett 
 
 (1893), 39 S. C. 69, 17 S. E. 563 810 
 Durkee r. Citv Bk. of Kenosha, 13 
 
 Wis. 216, 222 658, 661 
 
 Diirlaiid r. I'itcairn, 51 Ind. 426 576 
 
 Durnford /•. Weaver, 84 X. Y. 445 618 
 Durnherr .-. Kau, 32 X. E. Rep. 491 111 
 Duryee r. Friars (1897), 18 Wash. 
 
 55. 50 Pac. 583 608 
 
 Dutcher >: Dutcher,.39 Wis. 651 155, 785, 
 
 801, 813, 821,830 
 
 Dutil r. Pacheco, 21 Cal. 438 428 
 
 Duval r. Am.T. & T. Co. (1902), 113 
 
 Wis. 504, 89 X. \V. 482 625 
 
 Duvall V. Tinslev, 54 Mo. 93 475, 477 
 
 Duzan /•. Meserve (1893), 24 Ore. 
 
 52:^, 34 l^ac. 548 687 
 
 Dwelling House Ins. Co. i;. Brewster 
 
 (1895), 43 Neb. 528, 61 N. W. 746 
 
 832, 
 834 
 526 
 254 
 
 Dyer r. Barstow, 5 Cal. 052 
 Dyson v. H..rnby. 7 DeG. M. & G. 1 
 
 V. .Morris, 1 Hare, 413 253, 347 
 
 >•. Ream, 9 Iowa. 51 769, 780, 806 
 
 E. 
 
 Engle '•. Swayze, 2 Daly, 140 314 
 
 ICagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Lent, 6 Paige, 
 
 6;i7 337 
 
 Eagle Iron Works )•, Railway Co. 
 
 (1H97). 101 la. 289, 70 X. \V'. 193 466 
 Ean r. Chicago. .M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1897), 95 Win. 70, 69 X. W. 997 083 
 Earl Orchard Co. v. Fava (1902), 
 
 138 Cal. 76. 70 Pac. 1073 043 
 
 Earle >: Hull. 15 Cal. 421 910 
 
 r. Burch, 21 Neb. 702 173 
 
 Earle v. Hale, 31 Ark. 473 942 
 
 r. Patterson, 67 Ind. 503 598 
 V. Sayre (1806), 99 Ga. 617, 25 
 
 S. E. 943 800 
 
 Earlc's Adni. ;-. Hale, 31 Ark. 473 55 
 East Georgia R. R. Co. v. King 
 
 (1893), 91 Ga. 519, 17 S. E 939 600 
 
 Eastman v. Linn, 20 Minn. 433 862, 886, 
 
 923, 927 
 V. St. Anthony's Falls W. P. 
 
 Co., 12 Minn. 137 821 
 
 V. Turman, 24 Cal. 379 474 
 I'^aston r. Somerville (1900), 111 la. 
 
 164, 82 X. W. 475 655, 656, 821 
 East River Hank r. Rogers, 7 Bosw. 
 
 493 869 
 East Riverside Irrigation District ?•. 
 Holcomb (1899), 126 Cal. 315, 58 
 Pac. 817 409,411 
 
 Eaton V. Alger, 47 N. Y. 345 93, 94, 400 
 
 V. Burns, 31 Ind. 390 294 
 
 V. Smith, 19 Wi.s. 537 63 
 
 r. Tallmadge, 22 Wis. 526 937 
 Eayrs v. Xason (1898), 54 Neb. 143, 
 
 74N.W. 408 819 
 
 Eddie v. Parke, 31 Mo. 513 347 
 
 Edcrlin r. Judge, .36 :\Io. 350 458, 523 
 
 ICdgell V. Sigersoii, 20 Mo. 494 790 
 Ed'.'erlv '•. Farmers' Ins. Co., 43 
 
 Iowa", 587 COO 
 
 Edgerton i-. Pace, 20 N. Y. 281 894, 916 
 V. Power (1896), 18 Mont. 350, 
 
 45 Pac. 204 740 
 
 I'. Smith, 3 Duer, 614 61 1 
 
 Edic 7-. Green, 38 Hun, 202 112 
 Edmunds v. Black (1896), 13 Wash. 
 
 490, 43 Pac. 330 804 
 
 Edwards r. Bohannon, 2 Dana, 98 245 
 
 V. Campbell, 23 Barb 423 93 
 
 V. Edwards, 24 Ohio St. 402 808 
 
 V. Hellings (1893), 99 Cal. 214, 
 
 33 Pac. 799 680 
 V. Smith (1897), 102 Ga. 19, 29 
 
 S. E. 129 565, 566 
 r. Williams (1893), 39 S. C. 86, 
 
 17 S. E. 457 871 
 Eel River R. R. Co. r. State er rel. 
 (1895), 143 Ind. 231, 42 N. E. 
 
 617 819 
 Efird >: Land Co. (1899), 55 S. C. 
 
 78, 32 S. E. 758 872 
 E. G. L. Co. !• McKcige (1893), 139 
 
 N.Y. 273, 34 X. E. 898 410 
 Egaard r. Dahlko (1901), 109 Wis. 
 
 366, 85 X. W. 369 444, 498 
 
 Egberts v. Woods, 3 Paige, 517 249 
 
 Egdell r. Haywood, 5 Atk. 357 260 
 
 Ehle V. Haller, 6 Bosw. 661 523 
 Ehrlich r. ^Etna L. Ins. Co., 103 Mo. 
 
 231 576, 620 
 
 Eisely r. Taggart (1897), 52 Neb. 
 
 658, 72 X. W. 10,39 681 
 
 Eisenhouer r. Stein, 37 Kan. 281 455 
 
 Elam r. Garrard, 25 Ga. 557 261 
 
 Elder v. Frevert, 18 Xev. 446 306
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxxi 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Elder v. Rourke (1895), 27 Ore. 363, 
 
 41 Pac. 6 814 
 
 V. Spinks, 53 Cal. 293 568, 769 
 
 V. Webber (1902), — Neb. — , 92 
 
 N. W. 126 704 
 
 Eldredge v. Putnam, 46 Wi8. 205 211, 
 
 238, 248 
 
 71 
 
 779 
 
 673 
 
 597 
 576 
 
 709 
 
 818 
 284 
 
 543 
 
 614 
 655 
 
 215 
 
 Eldridge v. Adnms, 54 Barb. 417 
 
 V. Mather, 2 N. Y. 127 
 Elenz V. Conrad (1901), 115 la. 183, 
 
 88 N. W. 337 
 Elfrank r. Si-iler, 54 Mo. 134 
 Eliot I'. Eliot, 77 Wis. 634 
 Eliot's Appeal (1902), 74 Conn. 58(3, 
 
 51 Atl. 558 
 Eller V. Lootnis (1898), 106 la. 276, 
 
 76 N. W. 686 
 EUicott V. Mosier, 7 N. Y. 201 
 Elliot r. Roche (1896), 64 Minn. 482, 
 
 67 X. W. 539 
 Elliott V. Carter White-Lead Co. 
 (1898), 53 Neb. 458, 73 
 N. W. 948 
 V. Collins (1898), Idaho, 65 Pac. 
 
 301 
 V. First Nat. Bank (1902), 30 
 
 Colo. 279, 70 Pac. 421 
 V. Pontius (1893), 136 Ind. 641, 
 35 N. E. 562 
 Ellis V. City of Indianapolis (1897), 
 
 148 Ind. 70, 47 N. E. 218 432, 
 433, 644 
 V. Flaherty (1902), 65 Kan. 621 
 
 70 Pac. 586 626, 639 
 
 i". Harrison, 104 Mo. 270 112 
 
 V. No. Pac. R. Co., 77 Wis. 114 365 
 V. Pullman (1894), 95 Ga. 445, 
 
 22 S. E. 568 
 V. Soper (1900), 110 la. 631, 82 
 N. W. 1041 
 Ellison V. Rix, 85 N. C. 77 
 EUithorpe v. Buck, 17 Ohio St. 72 
 Ells V. Pacific R. Co., 55 Mo. 278 
 Ellsworth V. Rossiter, 46 Kan. 237 
 Elmore v. Elmore (1896), 114 Cal. 
 516, 46 Pac. 458 
 r. Hill, 46 Wis. 618 
 Elmquist v. Markoe, 45 Minn. 305 
 EUon V. O'Dowd, 40 Iiul. 300 
 Elwell V. Skiddv, 8 Hiin, 73 
 Emeric i'. Penniman, 26 Cal. 119 63, 159 
 Emerson >: Miller (1902), 115 la. 31-3, 
 88 N. \V. 803 
 V. Schwindt (1900), 108 Wis. 
 167, 84 N. W. 186 179, 
 
 260 
 
 703 
 801 
 18 
 742 
 455 
 
 624 
 
 713 
 
 94 
 
 814 
 
 908 
 
 619 
 
 413, 
 868 
 V. Schwindt (1902), 114 Wis. 124, 
 
 89 N. W. 822 642 
 
 Emery v. Pease, 20 N. Y. 62 17, 38, 39, 
 
 66, 633 
 Emigrant I. Sav. Bk. v. Goldman, 75 
 
 N. Y. 127 334 
 
 Emily v. Harding, 53 Ind. 102 784, 807 
 Emison v. Owyhee Ditch Co. (1900), 
 37 Ore. 577, 62 Pac. 13 601 
 
 Emmerson's Adm'r v. Herriford, 8 
 
 Bush, 229 
 Emniert ;-. De Long, 12 Kan. 67 
 Emmitt c. Brophy, 42 Ohio St. 82 
 Emmons v. Kiger, 23 Ind. 483 
 Empire Canal Co. v. Rio Grande 
 
 County (1895), 21 Colo. 244, 40 
 
 Pac. 449 
 Empire Transp. Co. v. Boggiano, 52 
 
 Mo. 294 91 L 
 
 Emporia Nat. Bank i\ Layfeth 
 
 (1901), 63 Kan. 17, 64 Pac. 973 
 Eniry r. Parker, 111 N. C. 261 
 Emslie i: Leavenworth, 20 Kan. 562 
 
 681, 
 Enderby, Ex p., 2 Barn. & C. 389 
 Enders v. Beck, 18 Iowa, 86 
 Endress v. Shove (1901), 110 Wis. 
 
 133, 85 N. W. 653 474, 
 
 Enewold v. Oisen (1894), 39 Neb. 
 
 59, 57 N. W. 765 
 Engel V. Dado (1902), — Neb.—. 
 
 92 N. W. 629 179. 
 
 Enger r, Lofland (1896), 100 Iowa, 
 
 303, 69 N. W. 526 
 Engi.mder v. iiogers, 41 Cal. 420 
 Eniilebreciit r. Rickert, 14 Minn. 
 
 140 
 Englis V. Furniss, 4 E. D. Smith, 587 
 English V. Grant (1897), 102 Ga. 35, 
 
 29 S. E. 157 734. 
 
 Enix V. Iowa Cent. R. R. Co. (1901), 
 
 1 14 la. 508, 87 N. W. 417 
 Ennis v. Harmony F. Ins. Co., 3 
 
 Bosw. 516 
 Enos V. Sanger (1897), 96 Wis. 150, 
 
 70 N. W. 1069 
 Enright v. Grant, 5 Utah, 334 
 Enter v. Quesse, 30 S. C. 126 
 Epperson v. Postal Tel. Co. (1900), 
 
 155 Mo. 346, 50 S. W. 795 
 Equitable Building, etc. Ass. v. Hol- 
 lo wav (1901), 114 Ga.780, 40 S. E. 
 
 742 
 Equitable Ins. Co. v. Stout (1893), 
 
 1.35 Ind. 444, 33 N. E. 623 
 Equitable Life Ass. Soc. v. Cuvler, 
 
 75 N. Y. 511 
 Equitable Trust Co. r. O'Brien 
 
 (1898), 55 Neb. 735, 76 N. W. 
 
 417 
 Erickson r. Compton, 6 How. Pr. 
 471 
 V. First Nat. Bank (1895), 44 
 Neb. 622, 62 N. W. 1078 
 Erie Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 45 N. Y. 637 
 Ermentrout v. American Fire Ins. 
 
 Co. (1895), 60 Minn. 418, 62 N. W. 
 
 543, 63 Minn. 194, 65 N. W. 270 
 
 Ernst V. Kunkle, 5 Ohio St. 520 
 Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & N. Co., 35 
 
 Hun, 544 
 V. State ex rel. (1897), 150 Ind. 
 
 332, 48 N. E. 249 
 
 932 
 
 351 
 
 111 
 
 11 
 
 276 
 933 
 
 641 
 
 277 
 678, 
 584 
 877 
 229 
 
 482 
 
 680 
 
 ,286 
 
 423 
 
 575 
 
 890 
 310 
 
 757 
 
 606 
 
 217 
 
 108 
 260 
 9.30 
 
 605 
 
 641 
 
 601 
 
 865 
 
 735 
 
 152 
 
 818 
 46 
 
 207, 
 645 
 871 
 
 97 
 
 686 
 
 /
 
 Ixxxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the RErE&EKC£8 
 
 Erwin i-. Cent. Union Tel. Co. (1897), 
 
 148 Ind. 305. 4G N. E. 607 601 
 V. Scotten, 40 Ind. 3S\) 277 
 
 Esch f. Home ins. Co. of N. Y., 78 
 
 lovvH, 334 637 
 
 c. Wliite (liKJl), 82 Minn. 462, 
 
 «5N. \V. 238, 718 95,814 
 
 Eskridge v. Lewis (1893), 51 Kan. 
 
 376, 32 Pac. 1 1U4 229 
 
 Ess V. Griffith (1804), 128 Mo. 50, 30 
 
 S. \V. 343 304 
 
 Estabrook u. Messersmith, 18 Wis. 
 
 545 187, 204 
 
 r. Omaha Hotel Co., 5 Neb. 76 576 
 Estate of, see name of party. 
 Estep r. llammons (1898), 104 Ky. 
 
 144, 4G S. \V. 715 444 
 
 Esterlv Harv. Mach. Co. v. Berg 
 
 (1»<J7|, 52 Neb. 147, 71 N. W. 952 614 
 Estes V. Desnovers Siioe Co. (1900), 
 155 .M'o. 677, 56 S. \V. 310 
 
 ARE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Everett ;;. Lockwood, 8 Hun, 856 
 V. O'Leary (1903), — Minn. — , 
 
 95 N. W. 901 
 i: Waymire, 30 Oliio St. 308 
 Eversdon v. .Mayiiew, 85 Cal. 1 
 Eversole v. Moore, 3 Busli, 49 
 Ewen V. Chicago & N. \V. Ky. Co., 
 
 38 Wis. 64 
 Ewing r. Patterson, 35 Ind. 326 942, 
 Excelsior Coal Co. i\ Virfiinia Coal 
 
 Co. (1902), Ky., 66 S. W. 373 
 Excelsior I)raiiiin<,' Co. i-. Brown, 38 
 Ind. 384 
 I'. Brown, 47 Ind. 19 
 E.xcelsior Petroleum Co. v. Lacey, 
 
 63 N. Y. 422 
 Exchange Bk. i-. Ford, 7 Colo. 314 
 
 536, 
 542 
 V. Nell (1897), 140 Mo. 639, 41 
 
 S. W. 940 371 
 
 Estrada v. Murphy, 19 Cal. 272 52 
 
 Estrella V'iiievard Co. v. Butler 
 
 (1899), 125 Cal. 232, 57 Pac. 980 059 
 Etcheborne r. Auzerais, 45 Cal. 121 815 
 Etchison Ditchin}^ Ass. v. Busen- 
 
 l.ack. 39 Ind. 302 4.39 
 
 Etheridge i: Vernoy, 71 N. C. 184 245, 
 329. 335, 336 
 Etscheid v. Baker (1901), 112 Wis. 
 
 129, 88 N. W. 62 108 
 
 Ettlinger i: P. R. & C. Co. (1894), 
 
 142 N. Y. 189, 36 N. E. 1055 117 
 
 Eureka v. Gates (1898), 120 Cal. 54, 
 
 52 Pac. 125 413 
 
 Evans v. Clermont, etc. Co., 51 Ind. 
 
 160 4.39 
 
 i: Fall River County (1896), 9 
 
 S. D. 130. 68 X. W. 196 662 
 
 1-. Fulton (1896), 1.34 Mo. 653. 
 
 36 .S. W. 230 638, 670 
 
 V. Harris, 19 Barb. 416 584, 587 
 
 r. lluphisCountv (1893), 4. S.D. 
 
 33. 5} N. \V.' 1U49 643 
 
 r. Job, 8 Xev. 322 562 
 
 V. M(:(\)nn{-ll (1896), 99 Iowa, 
 
 .3:i6, 68 X. \V. 790 6 
 
 f. Xeale, 69 Ind. 148 592 
 
 V. Schafer, 119 Ind. 49 177 
 
 V. ' outhern Tump. Co., 18 Ind. 
 
 101 786 
 
 r. Tripp, 35 Iowa. .371 376 
 
 r. Willijims, 60 Barb. 346 765, 779 
 
 Evansville «;. Evans 37 Ind. 229 769,809 
 
 r. Tliayer, 69 Ind. 324 598 
 
 Evam^villi-, etc. U. (;<>. v. lliatt, 17 
 
 Ind. Ui2 778 
 
 <•. Krapf (1895), 143 Ind. 047, .30 
 
 N. i;. 901 673 
 
 t: Mnd.lox (189.3), 134 Ind. 671, 
 
 33 X. E. .345 643 
 
 Evenu f Hall, 1 Handy, 434 933,9.35 
 
 r. Kice, 107 Mass. 37 
 Exline r. Lower^-, 46 Iowa, 556 
 Eyre (•. Cook, 10 Iowa, 6b6 
 
 Fabricotti r. Lannitz, 3 Sandf. 743 
 Faesi v. Goeiz, 15 Wis. 231 
 Fagan v. Barnes, 14 Fla. 53 358, 
 
 504, 
 Fain v. Hughes (1899), 108 Ga. 637, 
 
 33 S. E. 1012 
 Fairbanks v. Long, 91 Mo. 628 781, 
 Fairchild v. Amsbaugh, 22 Cal. 572 
 
 Fairfield c Adams, 16 Pick. .381 
 Fairlee v. Bloomingdale, 67 How. Pr. 
 
 292 
 Fairmont v. Meyer (1901), 83 .Minn. 
 
 456, 86 N. W. 467 
 Fairplay v. Board of Comm'rs (1901), 
 
 29 Colo. 57, 67 Pac. 152 
 Faithful r. Hunt, 3 Anst. 751 
 Faivre v. Gillan, 51 N. W. Kep.46 499 
 y. Mandirsdiied (1902), 117 1a. 
 724, 90 N. W. 76 
 Falck V. Mar^ll (1894), 88 Wis. 680, 
 
 61 N. W. 287 
 Falconio i'. Larsen (1897), 31 Ore. 
 
 137, 48 Pac. 703 
 Fall V. Jolm-son (1890), 8 S. D. 163, 
 
 66 N. W. 909 
 Falls of Neuse Man. Co. t'. Brooks, 
 
 106 X. C. 107 
 Fankboner t-. Fankboner, 20 Ind. 62 
 
 789, 
 Fanning i-. Ilibernia Ins. Co., 37 Oliio 
 
 St. 344 
 Fares r. Gleason (1896), 14 Wash. 
 
 657, 45 Pac. 314 
 Fargo V. Ames, 45 Iowa, 494 
 
 V. Vincent (1894), 6 S. D. 209, 
 60 N. W. 868 
 Farley v. Basket and Veneer Co. 
 
 (1897), 61 S. C. 222, 28 S. E. 193 
 Farlow c. Stott, 24 .\. Y. 40 
 
 801 
 
 819 
 725 
 457 
 936 
 
 787 
 946 
 
 816 
 
 439 
 725 
 
 181 
 290, 
 396 
 111 
 852 
 936 
 
 611 
 475 
 414. 
 517 
 
 710 
 , 821 
 7li6. 
 803 
 116 
 
 226 
 
 684 
 
 818 
 
 337 
 
 ,520 
 
 303 
 
 923 
 
 97 
 
 802 
 
 821 
 661, 
 935 
 
 804 
 
 599 
 736 
 
 787 
 
 466 
 17
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxxiii 
 
 [tkb references are to the pages.] 
 
 Farman v. Chamberlain, 74 Ind 82 
 Farmer v. Calvert, 44 liul. 209 211, 
 
 V. Curtis, 2 Sim. 4fJ(J 247, 
 
 Farmers', etc. Ins. Co. v. Peterson 
 (1896), 47 Neb. 747, 66 
 N. W. 847 
 V. Wiard (18i)9),oy Neb. 451, 81 
 N. W. 3\2 
 Farmers' & Cit. Bk. v. Sherman, 33 
 
 N. Y. 69 722, 
 
 Farmers' & Morch. Bk. of Baltimore 
 
 V. Charlotte Bd. of A Id. ,75 N.C.45 
 
 Farmers' & Merchants' Ins. Co. n. 
 
 Dobney (1901), 62 Neb. 213, 86 
 
 N. W. 1070 
 
 Farmers' Bank v. Saling (1898), 33 
 
 Ore. 394, .54 Pac. 190 
 Farmers' Bank of Mo. v. Bayliss, 41 
 
 Mo. 274 465, 
 
 Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. San Diego 
 
 Street-car Co., 40 Fed. Kep. 105 
 Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Fletcher, 44 
 Iowa, 252 
 V. Fonda, 65 Mich. 533 
 V. Hunter (1899), 35 Ore. 188, 
 57 Pac. 424 801, 
 
 Farnham v. Campbell, 10 Paige, 598 
 Farrar v. Triplet, 7 Neb. 287 
 Farrell v. Burbank (1894), 57 
 395, 59 N. W. 485 
 V. Cook, 16 Neb. 483 
 V. Hennesy, 21 Wis. 632 
 V. Smith, 2 Ball & B. 337 
 Farris v. Jones, 112 Ind. 498 
 Farron i: Sherwood, 17 N. Y. 227 
 
 578, 581, 584, 
 Farwell v. Davis, 60 Barb. 73 
 V. Jackson, 28 Cal. 105 
 ;;. Murray (1894), 104 Cal. 464, 
 38 Pac. 199 
 Farwell Co. v. Lykins (1898), 59 Kan. 
 
 96, 52 Pac. 99 
 Fasnacht v. Stehn, 53 Barb. 650 
 Fauble v. Davis, 48 Iowa, 462 
 Faulkner v. Mammoth Min. Co. 
 (1901), 23 Utah, 437, 66 Pac. 799 
 Fay V. Cobb, 51 Cal. 313 
 
 V. Davidson, 13 Minn. 523 
 V. Grimsteed, 10 Barb. 321 
 V. Steubenraucli (1903), 138 Cal. 
 656, 72 Pac. 156 
 Fayetteville Waterworks Co. v. Til- 
 linghast (1896), 119 N. C. .343, 25 
 S. E. 960 
 Fear v. Jones, 6 Iowa, 169 
 Feder v. Abrahams, 28 Mo. App. 354 
 Feeley v. Shirley, 43 Cal. 369 
 Felch V. Beaudry, 40 Cal. 439 
 Feldman v. McGuire (1899), 34 Ore. 
 
 309, 55 Pac. 872 
 Feldmann v. Shea (1899), Idaho, 59 
 
 Pac. 537 
 Fell v. Brown, 2 Bro. C. C. 278 247, 
 
 Minn. 
 849, 
 
 347. 
 
 661 
 
 779, 
 780 
 379 
 
 817 
 817 
 804 
 756 
 
 703 
 
 642 
 
 502 
 
 337 
 
 123 
 651 
 
 835 
 260 
 597 
 
 865 
 181 
 663 
 392 
 658 
 544, 
 587 
 292 
 474 
 
 584 
 
 665 
 610 
 620 
 
 817 
 713 
 301 
 809 
 
 102 
 
 831 
 116 
 286 
 739 
 754 
 
 107 
 
 742 
 829, 
 379 
 
 Fellows V. Fellows, 4 Cowen, 082 
 
 V. Webb, 43 Iowa, 133 
 Fells V. Vestvali, 2 Keyes, 152 584, 
 Feltou V. Dunn (1901), Ky., 00 S. W. 
 
 298 
 Fenncr r. Crips (1899), 109 la. 455, 
 
 80 N. W. 526 
 
 Fenstermaker v. Tribune' Pub. Co. 
 
 (1895), 12 Utah, 439, 43 Pac. 112; 
 
 .s. c. (1896) 13 Utah, 532, 45 Pac. 
 
 1097 799 
 
 Fenton v. Hughes, 7 Ves. 288 
 
 Fenwick u. Bulman, L. R. 9 Eq. 165 
 
 Fera v. Wickham, 01 Hun, 343 132 
 
 Ferguson v. Daltou (1900), 158 Mo. 
 
 323, 59 S. W. 88 
 
 V. Davidson (1899), 147 Mo. 664, 
 
 49 S. W. 879 
 V. Ferguson, 1 Hayes & J. 300 
 V. Hogan, 25 Minn. 135 
 v. McMahon, 52 Ark. 433 
 V. Ramsey, 41 Ind. 511 748, 
 
 V. V. & T. R. Co., 18 Nev. 184 
 Fernside v. Rood (1900), 73 Conn. 83, 
 
 46 Atl. 275 
 Ferreira v. De Pew, 4 Abb. Pr. 131 
 
 Ferrer v. Barrett, 4 Jones Eq. 455 
 
 Ferrin i'. Myrick, 41 N. Y. 315 505, 
 Ferris v. Am. Brewing Co. (1900), 
 155 Ind. 539, 58 N. E. 701 
 V. Armstrong Man. Co., 10 N. Y. 
 
 Suppl. 750 
 V. Carson W. Co., 16. Nev. 44 
 V. Dickerson, 47 Ind. 382 
 Ferst's Sons v. Bank of Waycross 
 (1900), 111 Ga. 229, 30 S. E. 
 773 
 V. Powers (1900), 58 S. C. 398, 
 
 36 S. E. 744 
 V. Powers (1902), 64 S. C. 221, 
 41 S. E. 974 35, 
 
 Fetherly ;;. Burke, 54 N. Y. 646 
 F. G. Oxlev Stave Co. v. Butler 
 County (1894), 121 Mo. 014, 20 
 S. W. 367 
 Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Vandyke 
 
 (189i3), 99 Ga. 542, 27 S. E. 709 
 
 Fidelity & Deposit ('o. v. Parkinson 
 
 . (1903), — Neb. — , 94 N. W. 120 
 
 342, 
 
 ,510 
 
 662 
 
 587 
 
 638 
 603 
 
 806 
 572 
 255 
 133 
 
 801 
 
 704 
 
 253 
 575 
 153 
 779 
 592 
 
 832 
 869, 
 872 
 372, 
 377 
 524 
 
 107 
 
 918 
 112 
 244 
 
 Field V. Andrada (1895), 106 Cal. 107, 
 39 Pac. 323 
 V.Austin (1901), 131 Cal. 379, 
 
 63 Pac. 292 
 V. Brown ( 1896), 146 Ind. 293, 45 
 
 N. E. 464 
 V. Hahn, 65 Mo. 417 
 V. Hurst, 9 S. C. 277 
 V. Mayor, 6 N. Y. 179 
 Fields V. Bland, 81 N. Y. 2.39 75, 
 
 V. Fowler, 4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 598 
 Fifield V. Sweeney, 62 Wis. 204 
 
 819 
 
 482 
 
 200 
 812 
 
 350 
 
 595 
 
 107, 
 830 
 
 600 
 
 872 
 
 20 
 877 
 457 
 140 
 049 
 161 
 516
 
 Ixxxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references ABE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Filbey r. Carrier, 44 Wis. 469 219 
 
 Filer v. N. Y. Central K. Co., 49 N. Y. 
 
 47 503 
 
 Finch i: Finch, 2 Ves. Sen. 492 255 
 
 V. Gregg (1900). 12G N. C. 176, 
 
 o.j S. E. 251 415 
 
 V. Kent (1900), 24 Mont. 268, 61 
 
 I'ac. 65:i 623 
 
 Findlay v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. 
 (1899), 104 Wis. 375, 80 N. W. 
 4;iO 645 
 
 Finken r. FJm City Bras> Co. (1900), 
 
 73 Conn. 423. 47 Atl. 070 659 
 
 Finlev v. Citv of 'i"iu>i)u (1900), 
 
 Ariz.," 00 Pac. 872 607 
 
 V. Haves, 81 N. C. 368 452 
 
 V. Quirk, 9 Minn. 194 763, 811 
 
 Finncgan -•. Carnilicr, 47 N. Y. 493 285 
 Finnell r. Neshitt, 10 B. Mon. 354 936 
 Finiiey c. Brant, 19 Mo. 42 212 
 
 Fiore r. Ladd (1890), 29 Ore. 528, 46 
 
 Pac. 144 714 
 
 Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia r. Kuby 
 ( 1900) , 00 Neb. 216, 82 N. W. 629 593, 
 594, 670 
 Fire Extinguisher Co. i\ City of 
 Perry (1899), 8 Okla. 429, 58 Pac. 
 635 712, 790 
 
 First Div. St. Paul & Pac. R. Co. v. 
 
 Rice, 25 Minn. 278 666 
 
 First Nat. Bank v. Beebe (1900), 62 
 
 O. St. 41, 56 N. E. 485 410 
 
 l: Dakota Eire Ins. Co. (1894), 
 
 6 S. D. 424, 61 N. W. 439 543 
 r. Engelbercht (1899), 58 Neb. 
 
 639, 79 N. W. 556 5^3,718 
 
 r. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank 
 (1898), 56 Neb. 149, 77 
 N. W. 50 674 
 
 V. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank 
 
 (1903), Neb., 95 N W. 1062 711 
 V. Gaddis (1903), 31 Wash. 596, 
 
 72 Pac. 400 074 
 
 V. Gibson (1900), 60 Neb. 767, 
 
 84 N. W. 259 740 
 
 V. Gibson (1903), — Xeb. — , 94 
 
 N. W. 905 340 
 
 V. Greger (1901), 157 Ind. 479, 
 
 62 N. E. 21 543 
 
 V. Hattenbach (1900), 13 S. T>. 
 
 365, 83 N. W. 421 288, 681 
 
 V. Jones (1894), 2 Okla. 353, 37 
 
 Pac. 824 543 
 
 1-. Lambert (1895), 03 Mmu. 263, 
 
 05 N. W. 451 474 
 
 V. Laughlin (1894), 4 N. D. 391, 
 
 61 N. W. 473 866 
 
 V. Lewis (1895), 12 Utah, 84, 41 
 
 I'ac. 712 353 
 
 V. McKinney (1896), 47 Neb. 
 
 149, 06 N. W. 280 625, 656 
 
 V. Martin (1898), Idaiio, 55 Pac. 
 
 802 757 
 
 V. Myers (1895), 44 Neb. 306, 62 
 
 N. W. 459 505 
 
 First Nat. Bank v. Pennington 
 (1899>, 57 Neb. 404, 77 
 N. AV. 1084 593 
 
 V. Ragsdalp ( 1900), 158 Mo. 668, 
 
 5:^' S. W. U«7 087 
 
 V. Renn (1901), 63 Kan. 3-34, 65 
 
 Pac. 098 920 
 
 V. Riggins (1899), 124 N. C. 534, 
 
 32 S. E. 801 930 
 
 r. Shuier (1897). 153 N. Y. 163. 
 
 47 N. E. 202 340, 341 
 
 V. Smith (1893), 36 Neb. 199, 54 
 
 N. W. 254 599 
 
 V. Stoll (18U9), 57 Neb. 758, 78 
 
 N. W. 254 787 
 
 V. T<);npi<iiis ( 1903), — Neb.— , 
 
 OlN. W. 717 593 
 
 V. Tootle (1899), 59 Neb. 44, 80 
 
 N. W. 264 656 
 
 V. Watt (1901), Idaho, 64 Pac. 
 
 223 757 
 
 V. Wisdom's Ex'rs (1901), 111 
 
 Ky. 135, 03 S. W. 461 833 
 
 r. Zeims (1894), 93 la. 140, 61 
 
 N. W. 483 681, 715 
 
 First Nat. Bank of Central City v. 
 
 Hummel, 14 Colo. 259 167 
 
 V. O'Connell. 51 N. W. Rep. 162 913 
 First Nat. Bank of Indianapohs v. 
 Indianapolis Piano Man. Co., 45 
 Ind. 5 307 
 
 First Nat. Bank of Kansas City v. 
 
 Hogan, 47 Mo. 472 742 
 
 First Nat. Bank of Memphis r. Kidd, 
 
 20 r^Iinn. 234 873 
 
 First Nat. Bank of Mt. Vernon v. 
 
 Sarlis, 129 Ind. 201 262 
 
 First Nat. Bank of New BerHn v. 
 
 Church, 3 N. Y. S. C. 10 718 
 
 First Nat. Bank of Northampton v. 
 
 Crafts, 145 Mass. 444 251 
 
 First Nat. Bank of Salem v. Salem 
 Cap. Flour M. Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 
 580 334 
 
 First Nat. Bank of Snohomish v. 
 Parker (1902), 28 Wash. 234, 68 
 Pac. 756 926 
 
 First Nat. Bank of Sutton v. Gross- 
 bans (1901), 61 Neb. 575, 85 N. W. 
 592 566 
 
 Fischer v. Holmes, 123 Ind. 625 414 
 
 r. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 
 (1901), 167 N. Y. 178, 60 
 N. E. 431 818 
 
 Fish V. Berkcy, 10 Minn. 199 497 
 
 V. Howland, 1 Paige, 20 238, 251, 
 385 387 
 V. Redington, 31 Cal. 185 ' 739 
 
 V. Smith (1900), 73 Conn. 377, 
 
 47 Atl. 711 103 
 
 Fisher r. Bouisson (1893), 3 N. D. 
 
 493, 57 N. W. 505 687 
 
 V. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416 178, 197 
 
 r. Hamilton, 48 Ind. 2-39 778 
 
 V. Hepburn, 48 N. Y. 41-55 284, 305
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxxv 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Fislier v. HubbcU, 65 Barb. 74 219, 241, 
 
 289, 310 
 V. Kelly (1896), 30 Ore. 1, 46 
 
 Pac. 14(5 680 
 
 V. Moolick, 13 Wis. 321 886 
 
 V. Patton (1895), 134 Mo. 32, 33 
 
 S. W. 451 669 
 
 V. Stevens (1898), 143 Mo. 181, 
 
 44 y. \V. 769 834 
 
 V. Sweet. 67 Cal. •228 66 
 
 risk ;;. Guiliford ( 1 '.)03) , — Neb. — , 
 
 95 N. W. 494 6S<1 
 
 ?;.Tank,12Wis.276,301 476,616,785 
 Fitch V. Applegate (1901), 24 Wash. 
 
 25, 64 Pac. 147 543, 599 
 
 I'. Bvall (1897), 149 Ind. 554, 49 
 
 N. E. 455 543 
 
 V. Cesser, 54 Mo. 267 218 
 
 V. Rathbuii, 61 N. Y. 579 88, 225 
 
 Fite V. Orr's Ass., 1 S. W. Rep. 580 562 
 Fithian v. Monks, 43 Mo. 502 20, 31 
 
 Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, etc. Co. 
 (1895), 44 Neb. 463, 02 
 N. W. 899 271 
 
 V. Quann, 109 N. Y. 441 314 
 
 Fitzsrerald's Estate r. Uiji<ji! Bank 
 
 (1902), 64 Neb. 260, 90 N. W. 994 433 
 FitZiribbon v. Barry, 78 Va. 755 351 
 
 \'. Chicago, etc. liy. Co. (1899), 
 
 108 la. 614, 79 N. W. 477 623 
 Fitzpatrickr. Simonson Bros. (1902), 
 
 86 Minn. 140, 00 N. W. 378 601, 751 
 Fitzsimmons v. City Fire Ins. Co., 18 
 
 Wis. 234 727 
 
 Fitz water v. Bank (1901), 62 Kan. 
 
 163, 61 Pac. 684 421 
 
 Flack V. Dawson, 69 N. C. 42 309, 728 
 Flanagan v. Tinen, 53 Barb. 587 314 
 
 Flanders u. Cottrell, 36 Wis. 564 618, 636, 
 
 637 
 
 V. McClanahan, 24 Iowa, 486 364 
 
 V. McVickar, 7 Wis. 372 596, 718 
 
 Fleischman v. Stern, 90 N. Y. 110 744 
 
 F. L. & T. Co. I- Siefke (1894), 144 
 
 N. Y. 354, 39 N. E. 358 812 
 
 Fleishman r. Woods (1901), 135 Cal. 
 
 256, 67 Pac. 276 
 Fleming v. McDonald, 50 Ind. 278 
 
 942 
 301, 
 307 
 265 
 
 791 
 
 I'. Mershon, 36 Iowa, 413 
 
 V. People, 27 N. Y. 329 
 
 r. Roberts (1901), 114Ga. 634, 40 
 
 S. E. 792 
 Flesh r. Lindsay, 21 8. W. Rep. 907 
 Fletcher i'. Brown, 53 N. W. 577 
 V. Co-Operative Publishing Co. 
 
 (1899), 58 Neb. 511, 78 
 
 N. W. 1070 
 V. German-American 
 
 (1900), 79 Minn 
 
 N. W. 647 
 V. Holmes, 25 Ind. 458, 40 Me. 
 
 364 258, 326, 336, 945 
 
 Flint V. Nelson (1894), 10 Utah, 261, 
 
 37 Pac. 479 817 
 
 607 
 314 
 517 
 
 668, 674, 785 
 Ins. Co. 
 337, 82 
 
 672 
 
 Flint r. Spurr, 17 R. xMon. 499 389 
 
 Florence i: Pattillo (1898), 105 Ga. 
 
 577, 32 S.E.642 661 
 
 Flour City Nat. Bk. v. Wechselberg, 
 
 45 Fed. Rep. 547 355 
 
 Flowers v. Barker, 79 Ala. 445 336 
 
 Flovd V. Wilev, 1 Mo. 430 649 
 
 Flynn v. Bailev, 50 Barb 73 497 
 
 Foerst v. Kel.so (1901), 131 Cal. 376, 
 
 63 Pac. 681 470 
 
 Foerster v. Kirkpatrick, 2 Minn. 
 
 210 585 
 
 Fogle ;;. St. Michaels Church (1896), 
 
 48 S. C. 86, 26 S. E. 99 347 
 
 Poland V. Johnson, 16 Abb. Pr. 235 797 
 v.Townof Frankton (1895), 142 
 
 Ind. 546, 41 N. E. 1031 565 
 
 Foley V. Holtry (1894), 43 Neb. 133, 
 
 61 N. W. 120 703 
 
 Follendore v. Follendore (1896), 99 
 
 Ga. 71, 24S. E. 407 887,918 
 
 Follett V. Heat]), 15 Wis. 601 46 
 
 Folsoni V. Carli, 6 Minn. 420 936 
 
 V. Palling ( 1899), 58 Neb. 478, 78 
 
 N. W. 926 877 
 
 Fond du Lac Harrow Co. v. Haskins, 
 
 51 Wis. 135 326 
 
 Foot L\ Bronson, 4 Lans. 47 262 
 
 Foote V. Burlington Gaslight Co. 
 (1897), 1031a. 576, 72 N.W. 
 755 432 
 
 V. Lathrop, 53 Barb. 183 317 
 
 Foote & Davis Co. v. Malony (1902), 
 
 llSGa. 985, 42 S. E. 413 844 
 
 Forbes v. Cooper, 88 Ky. 285 933 
 
 V. Petty (1893), 37 Neb. 899, 56 
 
 N. W.' 730 600 
 
 V. Union Central Life Ins. Co. 
 (1898), 151 Ind. 89, 51 N. E. 
 84 543 
 
 Ford V. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. (1898), 
 
 106 la. 85, 75 N. W. 650 817 
 V. HoUoway (1900), 112 Ga. 851, 
 
 38 S. E. 373 41 
 
 V. Ind. Dist. of Stuart, 46 Iowa, 
 
 294 265, 310 
 
 V. Mattice, 14 How. Pr. 91 660 
 
 r. Steele, 31 Neb. 521 51 
 
 V. Williams (1896), 98 Ga. 238, 
 
 25 S. E. 416 641 
 
 Ford Lumber Co. v. Clark (1902), 
 
 Ky., 68 S. W. 443 640 
 
 Fordvce v. Hathorn (1874), 57 Mo. 
 
 120 800, 829 
 
 V. Nix (1893), 58 Ark. 136, 23 
 
 S. W. 967 458, 654 
 
 Foreman v. Boyle, 88 Cal. 290 196, 503 
 Forepaugli i-. Appold, 17 B. Mon. 
 
 632 412 
 
 Forkner v. Hart, Stanton's Code 
 
 (Ky.), 60 454 
 
 Forsyth v. Edmiston, 2 Abb. Pr. 
 
 430 306 
 
 Fort V. Penny (1898) 122 N. C. 230, 
 29 S. E. 362 470, 800
 
 Ixxxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the referesces are to the pages.] 
 
 Fort Dearborn Bank v. Security 
 Bank (1902). 87 Minn. 81, 91 
 N. W. 257 764 
 
 Fort Dodge, F. N. Bk. of, r. O'Con- 
 
 nell, 51 N. W. Kep. 1G2 913 
 
 Fort Stanwix Bk. r. Leggett, 51 
 
 X. Y. 552 238, 260, 271, 276 
 
 Fort Wavne r. Christie (190C), 156 
 
 Ind. 172, 5y \. E. 385 676 
 
 Fort Wavne, J. & S. K. Co. c. Mc- 
 Donald", 48 Ind. 241 584 
 Fosgate c. Herkimer Man. Co., 12 
 
 X. Y. 580 284, 285 
 
 Foss V. Newburv. 20 Ore. 257 923 
 
 Foste f. Standard Ins. Co. (1894), 
 
 26 Ore. 449, 38 Pac. 617 641 
 
 Foster v. Brown, 65 Ind. 2:^4 153 
 
 V. Conger, 61 Barb. 145 315 
 
 *-. Elliott, 33 Iowa, 216 196. 218, 592 
 I'. Fidelity, etc. Co. of New York 
 (1898). 99 Wis. 447, 75 
 N. W. 69 689 
 
 r. Henderson (1896), 29 Ore. 
 
 210, 45 Pac. 898 642 
 
 r. Hickox. 38 Wis. 408 335, 336 
 
 V. Landon (1898), 71 Minn. 494, 
 
 74N. W. 281 511 
 
 I'. Lvon County (1901), 63 Kan. 
 
 ■43, 64 Pac. 1037 178 
 
 V. Missouri Pac. Rv. Co. (1803), 
 
 115 Mo. 165, 2'l S. W. 916 651 
 i: Posson (1899). 105 Wis. 99, 81 
 
 X. W. 123 466, 493 
 
 V. Townshend, 12 Abb. Pr. n. s. 
 
 469 342 
 
 V. Trowbridge, 44 Minn. 290 334 
 
 V. Wati-on, 1(3 15. .Mon. 377 37,42 
 
 Foulkes c. Davies, L. R. 7 Eq. 42 258 
 
 Pniilks /•. Rli.Mk-^. 12 Xev. 225 930 
 
 Fourtii Xat. Bunk v. Meyer (189G), 
 
 100 Ga. 87, 26 S. E. 83 271 
 
 Fowle r. House (1896), 29 Ore. 114, 
 
 44 Pac. 692 677 
 
 Fowler v. Frisbie, 37 Cal. 34 206, 211 
 V. Houston, 1 Nev. 469 293 
 
 V. Plid-nix Ins. Co. (1899), 35 
 
 Ore. 559, 57 Pac. 421 593 
 
 V. Seaman, 40 N. Y 592 315 
 
 Fox V. Barker, 14 Ind. 309 935 
 
 t: Duff, 1 Dalv, 196 225 
 
 f. EaMer (19(i0), 10 Okla. 527, 
 
 62 Pac. 283 584 
 
 V. Graves (1890), 46 Neb. 812, 
 
 05 X. W. 887 655, 666 
 V. Kerper, 61 Ind. 148 160 
 1;. Mackey (1899), 125 Cal. 54, 
 
 57 Pac. 672 594 
 
 r. Mover, 54 N. Y. 125, 130 238, 
 260, 340 
 '•. Rogers (1899), 8 Idaho, 710, 
 
 59 Pac. 638 455 
 
 I . Webster. 46 Mo. 181 790 
 
 Foy '. Haughton, 8:', X. C. 467 791 
 
 Fniin f. Burgeit (1898), 152 Ind. 55, 
 
 50 X. E. 873 660, 599, 810 
 
 Fraker v. Galium, 24 Kan. 679 
 Fraler v. Sears Union W. Co., 12 
 
 Cal. 555 
 Francis v. Edwards, 77 N. C. 271 
 
 908 
 
 518 
 852, 
 940 
 753 
 131 
 
 V. Francis, 18 B. Mon. 57 
 c. Leak, 33 N. E. Rep. 807 
 Francisco v. Hatch (1903), 117 Wis. 
 
 242, 93 N. W. 1118 8,72 
 
 Franco v. Franco, 3 Ves. 77 252 
 
 Franey v. Wauwatosa Park Co. 
 
 (1898), 99 Wis. 40, 74 X. W. 548 655 
 Frank v. Cobban (1897), 20 Mont. 
 
 168, 50 Pac. 423 818 
 
 r. Dunning, 38 Wis. 270 576 
 
 V. Jenkins (1895), 11 Wash. 611, 
 
 40 Pac. 220 734 
 
 V. Kessler, 30 Ind. 8 505 
 
 V. Pennie (1897), 117 Cal. 254, 
 
 49 Pac. 208 779 
 
 Frankel v. Garrard (1903), — Ind. 
 
 — , 06 N. E. 687 662 
 
 V. Michigan Mutual Ins. Co. 
 (1902), 158 Ind. 304, 62 
 X. E. 703 543 
 
 Franklin v. Kelley, 2 Neb. 79 781 
 
 Franklin Bank-Xote Co. r. Augusta, 
 etc. Rv. Co. (1897), 102 Ga. 547, 
 30 S. E. 419 641 
 
 Franklin Tp. Sup. r. Kirbv, 25 Wis. 
 
 498 ' 155, 573 
 
 Frans v. Young, 24 Iowa, 375 187, 204 
 Eraser v. Bean, 96 N. C. 327 329 
 
 V. Charleston, 13 S. C. 533 340 
 
 Frazer v. Frazer, 70 Ind. 411 825 
 
 Frear v. Bryan, 12 Ind. 343 414 
 
 I'recking v. RoUand, 53 X. Y. 422 315 
 Fred 1: Travlor (1903), — Kv. — . 72 
 
 S, W. 768 ■ 518 
 
 Fred Miller Brewing Co. r. Capital 
 
 Ins. Co., 1 1 1 la. 590 603 
 
 Frederick v. Daniels (1902), 74 Conn. 
 
 710, 52 Atl. 414 909 
 
 r. Douglas Co , 96 Wis. 411 384 
 
 Fredrickson v. .Ji)linson (1894), 60 
 
 Minn. 337, 62 .\. W. 388 080 
 
 Freeman r. Brewster (1897), 70 
 
 Minn. 2(13. 72 X. W. 1(»08 49 
 
 r. Brown (1902), 115 Ga. 23, 41 
 
 S. E. 385 646 
 
 V. Carpenter, 17 Wis. 126 800, 829 
 V. City of Huron (1^97), 10 
 
 S. I). 308, 73 X. W. 260 507 
 
 V. Engelman Transp. Co., 36 
 
 Wis. 571 791 
 
 r. Grant, 132 X. Y. 22 626, 636,637 
 V. Lazarus (1895), 61 Ark. 247, 
 
 32 S. W. 080 639 
 
 r. Lorrillard, 61 N. Y. 612 872, 877 
 V. Seitz (1899), 126 Cal. 291, 58 
 
 Pac. 69U 867 
 
 V. Sprague. 82 N. C. 346 784 
 
 V. Webb. 21 Xeb. 160 478 
 
 Freeman's Ajjpeal (1899), 71 Conn. 
 
 708, 43 All. 185 659,712
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxxvii 
 
 [the REFEEEN0E3 ABB TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Freer v. Denton, 61 N. Y. 492 
 
 455, 
 
 627, 
 
 Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641 
 Freitag v. Burke, 45 Ind. o8 
 French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 148 2G1, 
 
 V. Saile, Stanton's Code (Ky.), 
 
 9(3 
 V. Salter, 17 Hiin, 546 482, 
 
 V. Turner, 15 Ind. 59 310, 326, 
 V. Woodruff (1898), 25 Colo. 
 339, 45Pac. 416 463,665, 
 Freser v. Charleston, 11 S. C. 486 
 Friburk r. Standard Oil Co. (1896)-, 
 
 66 Minn. 277, 68 N. W. 1090 
 Frick V. Kabaker ( 1902), 110 la. 494, 
 90 N. VV. 498 
 V. White, 57 N. Y. 103 131, 
 
 Friddle v. Crane, 68 Ind. 583 
 Friend v. Allen (1900), Ky., 56 
 
 S. W. 418 
 Friermutii v. Friermuth, 46 Cal. 42 
 Frisbee v. Langworthy, 11 Wis. 375 
 
 Frisch v. Caler, 21 Cal. 71 766, 769, 
 Fritz V. Fritz, 23 Ind. 388 458, 
 
 Frobislier v. Fifth Ave. Transp. Co. 
 (1897), 151 N. Y. 431, 45 N. E. 
 839 
 Frost V. Hartford, 40 Cal. 165 
 
 V. Witter (1901), 132 Cal. 421, 
 64 Pac. 703 462, 636, 
 
 Frout V. Hardin, 56 Ind. 165 74, 76, 
 Frum V. Keeney (1899), 109 la. 393, 
 
 80 N. W. 507 
 Fry V. Bennett, 5 Sandf 54 541, 
 
 V. Evans, 8 Wend. 530 140, 
 
 V. Rush (1901), 63 Kan. 429, 65 
 
 Pac. 701 
 V. Street, 37 Ark. 39 
 Frybarger v. Cokefair, 17 Ind. 404 
 
 Fuchs I'. Treat, 41 Wis. 404 
 Fugate V. Pierce, 49 Mo. 441 
 FuUiani v. McCarthy, 1 H. L. Cas. 
 
 703 
 Fulkerson v. Davenport, 70 Mo. 511 
 V. Mitchell, 82 Mo. 13 781, 
 
 Fuller V. Benjamin, 23 Me. 255 
 
 V. Cox (1893), 135 Ind. 46, 34 
 
 N. E. 822 
 V. Fuller, 5 Hun, 595 189, 
 
 V. FuUerton, 14 Barb. 59 
 V. Seiglitz, 27 Ohio St. 355 
 Fuller Warren Co. v. Harter (1901), 
 
 110 Wis. 80, 85 N. W. 698 
 Fullerton r. Bailey (1898), 17 Utah, 
 85, 53 Pac. 1020 
 V. McCurdy, 4 Lans. 132 
 Fulmer v. Mahaska County (1894), 
 
 92 la. 20, 60 N. W. 207 
 Fulton i: llvau (1900), 60 Neb. 9, 
 
 82 N. W. iOj 703, 
 
 Fulton F. lus. Co. v. Baldwin, 37 
 N. Y. 648 
 
 516, 
 ,649 
 226 
 723 
 351, 
 356 
 
 910 
 526 
 331 
 
 818 
 
 784 
 
 231 
 
 608 
 933 
 676 
 
 594 
 
 587 
 780, 
 805 
 803 
 621 
 
 603 
 764 
 
 639 
 
 626 
 
 608 
 663 
 
 874 
 
 510 
 
 190 
 769, 
 812 
 865 
 831 
 
 258 
 373 
 821 
 
 248 
 
 543 
 202 
 162 
 131 
 
 655 
 
 819 
 369 
 
 606 
 
 814 
 
 181 
 
 Fultz i: Wycoff, 25 Ind. 321 718 
 
 Furber v. McCarthy, 7 N. Y. Suppl. 
 
 613 933 
 
 Furbush v. Barker (1894), 38 Neb. 
 
 1, 56 N. W. 996 615 
 
 Furguson v. Henry (1895), 95 la. 
 
 439, 64 N. W. 292 626 
 
 Furman v. Van Sise, 56 N. Y. 435 220 
 
 G. 
 
 Gaar, Scott, & Co. v. Brundage 
 
 (1903), 89 Minn. 412, 94 N. W. 1U91 625 
 Gabe V. McGinnis, 68 Ind. 538 611 
 
 Gadsden v. Thrush (1898), 56 Neb. 
 
 665, 76 N. W. 1060 735 
 
 Gagan r. City of Janesville (1900), 
 
 106 Wis. 662, 82 N. W. 668 623 
 
 Gage I'. West (1901), 62 Neb. 612, 87 
 
 N. W. 344 638 
 
 Gager v. Marsden (1899), 101 Wis. 
 
 598, 77 N. W. 922 180, 234, 468 
 
 Gaines v. Chew, 43 U. S. (2 How.) 
 
 619 509, 610 
 
 V. Childers (1901), 38 Ore. 200, 
 
 63 Pac. 487 334 
 
 V.Union Ins. Co., 28 Ohio St. 418 618 
 V. Walker, 16 Ind. 361 325, 333 
 
 Gainey v. Gilson (1897), 149 Ind. 58, 
 
 48 N. E. 633 365, 356 
 
 Galbreath v. Gray, 20 Ind. 290 284 
 
 Gale V. Battin, 16 Minn. 148 343 
 
 V. James, 11 Colo. 540 753 
 
 V. Shillock, 30 N. W. Rep. 138 426, 
 
 428 
 Gallagher v. Germania Brewing Co. 
 (1893), 53 Minn. 214, 64 
 N. W. 1115 , 871 
 
 V. Mjelde (1898), 98 Wis. 509, 
 
 74 N. W. 340 313 
 
 V. Nichols, 60 N. Y. 438 88, 101 
 
 GaHick v. Bordeaux (1899), 22 
 
 Mont. 470, 56 Pac. 961 780 
 
 Galliers r. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1902), 116 la. 319, 89 N. W. 1109 734 
 Galligan ik Fannan, 9 Allen, 192 866 
 
 Gallimore «. Amnierman, 30 Ind. 323 791 
 Galloway v. Jenkins, 63 N. C. 147 118 
 
 V. Stewart, 49 Ind. 166 618 
 
 Gallup V. Albany R. Co., 7 Lans. 
 
 471 916 
 
 Galusha v. Galusha, 33 N. E. Rep. 
 
 1062 629 
 
 Galvin V. Britton (1898), 161 Ind. 1, 
 
 49 N. E. 1064 605, 606 
 
 v. I\Iac Mining Co. (1894), 14 
 
 Mont. 608, 37 Pac. 366 649 
 
 V. Woollen, 66 Ind. 464 609 
 
 Garnet v. Simmons (1897), 103 la. 
 
 163, 72 N. W. 444 260 
 
 Gammage v. Powell (1897), 101 Ga. 
 
 640, 28 S. E. 969 419 
 
 Gammon v. Johnson (1900), 126 
 N. C. 64, 35 S. E. 186 331
 
 l::.\xviii 
 
 TALLK OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the RErEREKCES 
 
 Ganceart v. Henrv (1893), 98 Cal. 
 
 281,33Pac. 'J2 ' 608 
 
 Gantler v. State, 50 Ind. 539 G09 
 
 Gandv «•. Pool, 14 Ntb. 98 780 
 
 Gannon c. Dougherty, 41 Cal. 661 931 
 
 V. Laclede Gas. Co. (1898), 145 
 
 Mo. 502, 40 S. W. 908 625 
 
 Gansner i*. Franks, 75 Mo. 64 871 
 Gjirardr. G.irard (1893), 135 Ind. 15, 
 
 34 N. E. 442 599 
 Garberius r. Koberts (1893), 109 Cal. 
 
 125, 41 I'ac. 857 566 
 
 Gardinier v. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 605 154 
 
 Gardner i-. Clark, 21 N. Y. 399 800, 
 
 829, 830 
 V. Continental Ins. Co. (1903), 
 
 Kv., 75 S. VV. 283 543 
 V. Gardner (1896), 23 Nev. 207, 
 
 45 Tac. 139 452 
 
 V. Kebo, 80 Ala. 497 256 
 V. McWilliams (1902), 42 Ore. 14, 
 
 69 Pac. 915 825 
 
 V. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327 501 
 
 v. Uislier, 35 Kan. 93 933 
 I.-. Samuels (1897), 116 Cal. 84, 
 
 47 Pac. 9.35 275, 277 
 r. Southern liv. Co. (1903), 65 
 
 S. C. 341,43S. E. 816 303 
 
 V. Walker, 2U How. Pr. 405 301 
 Garland v. Gaines (1900), 73 Conn. 
 
 602, 49 Atl. 19 758 
 Garneau v. Kendall (1901), 61 Neb. 
 
 396, 85 N. W. 291 .329 
 
 Garner t: Cook, 30 Ind. 331 113 
 f. Jones (1893), y4 Ky. 135, 21 
 
 S. W. 047 9.33 
 
 V. McCullough, 48 Mo. 318 563, 
 
 572, 604 
 
 V. Wright, 24 How. Pr. 144 351 
 
 Garnsey /■. Rogers, 47 N. Y. ?33 111 
 
 Garret c. Gault,13 B. Mon. 378 11, 15 
 
 Garretson c. Farrall (1894), 92 la. 
 
 728, 61 N. \V. 251 830 
 
 V. Seaman, 54 N. Y. 652 315 
 
 Garrett ;•. Trotter, 65 N. C. 4.30 664 
 V. Weinberg (1897). 50 S. C. 
 
 310, 27 S. E. 770 599, 606 
 Garrison r. Clark, 11 Ind. 369 95, 748, 814 
 
 V. Howe, 17 N. Y. 4.58 213 
 r. .Vlurphv (1902), Neb., 89 
 
 N. \V.'766 802 
 Gartin r. Meredith (1899), 153 Ind. 
 
 16, 53 N. E. 836 673 
 
 Gartlaiid r. Dunn, 11 Ark. 720 508, 509 
 (Jartn.r /•. Corwine (1897), 57 O. St. 
 
 'SU>, 4K N. E. '.M5 17 
 
 (Jarver r. Kent, 70 Ind. 428 15.3, 155 
 
 C;arvey v. Jnrvis, 54 Barb. 179 889 
 
 (iaa Co. i: Snn Francisco, 9 Cal. 453 755 
 
 G.i*kell r. Gaskell, Sim. 643 243 
 (.a«.kin« r. Davin (1804), 115 N. C. 
 
 H.">. 20 S. E. 188 065 
 
 (Jashiier i . Marquardf. 70 Wis. 679 286 
 
 (;«8»<in >•. Bn>lu'ett, Biisli, '.tT .395 
 
 Gnston v. .McLeran, 3 Ore. 389 723, 791 
 
 ARE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Gaston v. Owen, 43 Wis. 103 620 
 
 Gatch r. Garretson (1896), 100 la. 
 
 252, 69 N. W. 650 6 
 
 Gates 1-. Avery (1901), 112 Wis. 271, 
 
 87 N. W. 1091 833 
 
 V. Boomer, 17 Wis. 455 258, 260, 
 
 473 
 V. Kieff, 7 Cal. 124 29 
 
 V. Lane, 44 Cal. 392 374 
 
 r. No. Pac. 11. Co., 64 Wis. 64 97, 102 
 V. Paul (1903), 117 Wis. 170, 94 
 
 N. W. 55 640 
 
 V. Salmon, 46 Cal. 361 371, 544, 
 
 568, 663 
 Catling )•. Carteret Cy. Com'rs, 92 
 
 N. C. 536 933 
 
 Gattis r. Kilgo (1899), 125 N. C. 133, 
 
 34 S. E. 240 452, 736 
 
 V. Kilgo (1901). 128 N. C. 402, 
 
 38 .S. E. 931 736 
 
 Gay r. Havermale (1902), 27 Wash. 
 
 390, 07 Pac. 804 818 
 
 Gaylc V. Johnston, 80 Ala. 395 243 
 
 Gay lord l: Neb Sav. Bank (1898), 
 
 54 Neb. 104, 74 N. W. 415 816 
 
 Gaylords r. Kelsiiaw, 1 Wall. 81 340 
 
 Gaynor r. Clements, 10 Colo. 209 815 
 
 Geer v. Holcomb (lai'O), 92 Wis. 601, 
 
 66 N. AV. 793 639 
 
 Geiger v. Payne (1897), 102 la. 581, 
 
 69 N. W. 654, 71 N. W. 571 670 
 
 Geilfus w. Gales (1894), 87 Wis. 395, 
 
 58 N. W. 742 715 
 
 Gelatt V. Ridge (189.3), il7 Mo. 553, 
 
 23 S. W. 882 604 
 
 Gelshenen t-. Harris, 26 Fed. Rep. 
 
 680 874 
 
 Gem Chemical Co. v. Youngblood 
 
 (1900), 58 S. C. 56, .36 S. E. 437 678 
 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Williams (1898), 123 
 
 N. C. 51, 31 S. E. 288 839, 845, 867 
 
 Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Benson, 5Duer. 
 
 108 251 
 
 Genesee, Bank of, v. Patcliin Bank, 
 
 13 N. Y. 309 
 Geneva v. Burnett (1902), — Neb. — , 
 
 91 N. W. 275 682 
 
 Gentz V. Martin, 75 Ind. 228 598 
 
 Geophegan v. Ditto, 2 Mete. (Kv.) 
 
 443 ' 936 
 
 George v. Benjamin (1898), 100 Wis. 
 
 622, 76 N. W. 019 381, 384, 386 . 
 V. Edney (1893), 36 Neb. 604, 
 
 54 N. W. 980 714 
 
 r. State (1899), 59 Neb. 163, 80 
 
 N. W. 486 612 
 
 George Fowler, Sons & Co. v. 
 Brooks (1902), 65 Kan. 801, 70 Pac. 
 COO 833 
 
 Georgia R. R. Co. v. Roughton 
 
 (1899), 109 Ga. 604, 34 S. E.1026 641 
 Gcnltzen v. Cockrell (1893), 62 Minn. 
 
 501,55N. W. 58 871 
 
 German Am. Bk. of Hastings r. 
 White, 38 Minn. 471 737
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxxix 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 German Ins. Co. v. Frederick (1890), 
 
 57 Neb. 538, 77 N. W. 1106 
 German Nat. Bank r. First Nat. 
 Bank (1898), 55 Neb. 80, 75 N. W. 
 531 
 German Savings Bank v. Cady 
 (1901),lUla.228,86N. W. 
 277 
 V. Citizens Nat. Bank (1897), 101 
 Iowa, 530, 70 N. W. 769 
 
 Germania Spar & Ban Verein v. 
 Flynn (1896), 92 Wis. 201, 60 
 N. W. 209 
 Gerner v. Ciuirch (1895), 43 Neb. 690, 
 
 62 N. W. 51 
 Gertler v. Linscott, 26 Minn. 82 496, 
 Gettings r. Buchanan (1898), 17 
 
 Mont. 581, 44 Pac. 77 
 Getty V. Binsse, 49 N. Y. 385 
 
 V. Devlin, 70 N. Y. 504 248, 
 
 V. Hudson River R. Co., 6 How. 
 Pr. 269 
 Gharky, Est. of, 57 Cal. 274 
 Ghirardelli v. Bourland, 32 Cal. 585 
 Gianella v. Bigelow (1897), 96 Wis. 
 
 185, 71 N. W. Ill 259, 355, 
 
 Gibbs V. Southern (1893), 116 Mo. 
 
 204,22 S. W. 713 
 Gibson v. Gibson, 41 Wis. 449 229 
 V. Trow (1900), 105 Wis. 288, 
 81 N. W. 411 
 Giffen v. City of Lewiston (1898), 
 
 Idaho, 55 Pac. 545 
 Giffert v. West, 33 Wis. 617 617, 
 
 Gila Vallev, etc. Ry. Co. v. Gila 
 County (1903), Ariz., 71 Pac. 913 
 Gilbert v. Allen, 57 Ind. 524 
 
 V. Hewetson (1900), 79 Minn. 
 
 326, 82 N. W. 655 
 V. James, 86 N. C. 244 
 V. Loberg, 53 N. W. Rep. 500 
 V. Loberg (1894), 86 Wis. 661, 57 
 
 N. W. 982 491, 612, 903, 
 
 V. Pritchard, 14 Hun, 46 
 V. Rounds, 14 How. Pr. 46 
 V. Sage, 5 Lans. 287 
 Gilbert's Est., Be, 104 N. Y. 200 
 Gildersleeve v. Burrows, 24 Ohio St. 
 
 204 
 Giles v. Austin, 62 N. Y. 480 46, 51, 
 V. Bank of Georgia (1897), 102 
 
 Ga. 702, 29 S. E. 600 887, 
 V. Lyon, 4 N. Y. 600 
 Gill V. Jolinson's Adm., 1 Mete. 
 
 (Ky.) 649 101, 
 
 Gillam v. Life Ins. Co. (1897), 121 
 N. C. 369, 28 S. E. 470 642, 
 
 V. Sigman, 29 Cal. 637 271, 
 
 Gilland v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. (1895), 
 
 6 Wyo. 185, 43 Pac. 608 
 Gillen waters v. Campbell (1895), 142 
 
 Ind. 529, 41 N. E. 1041 455, 925, 
 
 674 
 816 
 
 718 
 
 117, 
 422 
 
 670 
 
 100 
 
 521 
 
 645 
 
 293 
 ,372 
 
 15 
 
 562 
 502 
 
 350 
 
 600 
 ,667 
 
 871 
 
 229 
 618, 
 910 
 
 780 
 271 
 
 822 
 
 518 
 
 920 
 471 
 798 
 815 
 331 
 
 131 
 939 
 
 918 
 15 
 
 311 
 
 645, 
 665 
 813 
 
 179 
 
 941 
 
 Gillespie ;;. Alexander, 3 Russ. 130 
 c. Gillespie (1896), 64 Minn. 381, 
 
 67 N. W. 20 
 V. Torrance, 25 N. Y. 306 869, 
 Gillett V. Hill, 32 Iowa, 220 
 
 ('. Ins. Co. (Ib94), 53 Kan. 108, 
 
 36 Pac. 52 
 V. Treganza, 13 Wis. 472 20, 63, 
 
 Gilliam v. Black (1895), 16 Mont. 
 
 217, 40 Pac. 303 
 Gillian v. McDowell (1902), — Neb. 
 
 — , 92 N. W. 991 
 Gillies V. Improvement Co. (1895), 
 
 147 N. Y. 420, 42 N. E. 196 615, 
 
 Gillilan i-. Norton, 6 Robt. 546 
 Gillis V. Hilton & Dodge Co. (1901), 
 
 113 Ga. 622, 38 S. E. 940 
 Gillispie c Fort Wayne & So. R. 
 
 Co., 12 Ind. 398 
 Gilman >■. Filmore, 7 Ore. 374 
 
 V. McClatchy (1896), 111 Cal. 
 606, 44 Pac. 241 
 Gilmer v. Hill, 22 La. Ann. 465 
 Gilmore r. Fox, 10 Kan. 509 
 V. Norton, 10 Kan. 491 
 V. Skookum Box Factory 
 (1899), 20 Wash. 703, 56 
 Pac. 934 
 Gilpin V. Wilson, 53 Ind. 443 865, 
 Gilreath v. Furman (1898), 53 S. C. 
 463, 31 S. E. 291 
 V. Furman (1900), 57 S. C. 289, 
 35 S. E. 516 756, 
 
 Gimbel v. Pignero, 62 Mo. 240 
 Ginochio v. Amador Can. «& Min. 
 
 Co., 67 Cal. 493 
 Gipps Brewing Co. v. De France 
 (1894), 91 la. 108, 58 N. W. 1087 
 Giraldin v. Howard, 103 Mo. 40 95, 
 Girard v. St. Louis Car Wheel Co. 
 (1894), 123 Mo. 358, 27 S. W. 648 
 Giraud v. Beach, 3 E. D. Smith, 337 
 
 Gise V. Cook (1898), 152 Ind. 75, 52 
 
 N. E. 454 
 Gjerstadengen v. Hartzell (1899), 8 
 
 N. D. 424, 79 N. W. 872 710, 
 
 Glacken v. Brown, 39 Hun, 294 
 Glade v. White (1S94), 42 Neb. 336, 
 
 60 N. W. 556 
 Glasgow V. Hobbs, 52 Ind. 239 
 Glass V. Murphy (Ind. App. 1892), 
 
 30 N. E. Rep. 1097 
 
 Glaze V. Bogle (1898), 105 Ga. 295, 
 
 31 S. E. 169 
 
 Glazer i'. Clift, 10 Cal. 303 
 Gleadell v. Thomson, 56 N. Y. 194 
 Gleason v. Moen, 2 Duer, 639 855, 
 
 902, 
 Gleckler v. Slavens (1894), 5 S. D. 
 
 364, 69 N. W. 323 
 Glen V. Hope Mut. L. Ins. Co., 66 
 
 N. Y. 379 105, 
 
 392 
 
 232 
 
 939 
 823 
 
 689 
 633, 
 667 
 
 375 
 
 680 
 
 618, 
 624 
 298 
 
 95 
 
 667 
 
 818 
 118 
 265 
 265 
 
 403 
 
 895 
 
 709 
 
 825 
 178 
 
 97 
 
 567 
 814 
 
 702 
 187, 
 216 
 
 668 
 
 788 
 50 
 
 66 
 618 
 
 661 
 
 641 
 
 781 
 
 911 
 
 872, 
 
 ,940 
 
 703 
 
 111
 
 xc 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the beferekces 
 
 Glen & Hall .Man. Co. v. Hall, Gl 
 
 X. Y. 220 858, 88(3, 889, 927 
 
 GlencToss r. Evans (1894), Ariz., 36 
 
 Vac. 212 730 
 Glenn i: Gerald (1902), G4 S. C. 236, 
 
 42 S. E. 155 6-42 
 V. Waddell, 23 Oliio St. 605 263, 265 
 
 Glide r. Dh yer, 83 Cal. 477 392 
 Globe Loan & Trust C'o. v. EUer 
 
 (1901), 61 Neb. 226, 85 N. W. 48 334 
 Glover «-. Hargadine-McKittrick 
 Drv (io.-ds Co. (1901), 62 
 Nel). 488, 87 X. W. 170 340, 714 
 V. Henderson (1893). 120 Mo. 
 
 367, 25 S. W. 175 584 
 f. Narev (1894), 92 la. 286, 60 
 
 N. W. 531 466 
 V. Keinley (1898), 52 S. C. 492, 
 
 30 y. E. 405 456 
 r. St. Louis, etc. Co. (1896), 138 
 
 Mo. 408, 40 S. W. 110 815 
 Goble r. Swobe (1902), 64 Neb. 838, 
 
 90 N. W. 919 191, 239 
 
 Gock r. Keneda, 29 Barb. 120 179, 202 
 
 Goddard r. Fulton, 21 Cal. 430 769 
 
 Godfrey v. Cliadwell, 2 Vern. 601 333 
 
 i: Town>.end, 8 How. Pr. 398 419 
 
 Goebel v. Hou^Oi, 26 Minn. 252 916 
 
 Goelth V. Wliite, 35 Barb. 76 584 
 
 Goetzman r. Whitakor, 81 Iowa, 527 428 
 Gofif V. Marsden Co. (1900), Ky., 56 
 
 S. \V. mi 594 
 r. Outagamie Cy. Sup., 43 Wis. 
 
 55 ' 665 
 
 Going r. Dinwiddle, 86 Cal. 633 562 
 
 Goings I'. White, 33 Ind. 125 574 
 Goldberg i-. Kidd ( 18!»4), 5 S. D. 169, 
 
 58 N. W. 574 49 
 
 r. Utlev. 60 N. Y. 427 458 
 Golden i: Hardesty (1895), 98 la. 
 
 022, 61 N. \V.:nZ 816 
 
 Goldman v. Bashore. 80 Cal. 146 942 
 Goldsniid v. Stonehewer, 9 Hare 
 
 A pp. 38 337 
 
 Goldsmith v. Boersdi, 28 Iowa, 351 6:^2 
 V. Cbipps (1899), 154 Ind. 28, 
 
 55 N. E. 855 709 
 
 V. Gilliland, 24 Fed. Uep. 154 365 
 
 I,-. Saclis. 8 Sawy. 110 212 
 Gold water v. IJowen (1000), Ariz., 
 
 62 I'ac. 091 607 
 1-. Burnside (1900), 22 Wash. 
 
 215, 60 I'ac. 409 735 
 
 GoUer v. Fett, 30 Cal. 481 199 
 
 Goneelier r. Forct, 4 Minn. 13 262 
 (Jood r. Blewit, 19 Ves. 3.36 248, 389, SCrj 
 Goodall 1-. Mopley, 45 Ind. 355 244, 245, 
 
 am 
 
 Goodell I'. Bloomer, 41 Wis. 436 758 
 
 Gooding V. MeAllister, 9 How. Pr. 
 
 12:5 472 
 
 Goodman c. Alexander (1901), 165 
 
 N. Y. 289. 59 N. E. 145 584 
 
 Gooflnight V. Goar, 30 Ind. 418 172. 186, 
 
 188,212,289 
 
 ARE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Goodricli v. Alfred (1899), 72 Conn. 
 
 257, 43 Atl 1041 462 
 
 V. BIdg. Ass'n (1895), 96 Ga. 803, 
 
 22 S. K. 585 814 
 
 V. Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 422 153 
 
 V. Stanton (1899), 71 Conn. 418, 
 
 42 Atl. 74 659 
 
 V. Williamson (1901), 10 Okla. 
 
 588, 63 Pac. 974 418 
 
 Goodson V. Goodson (1897), 140 Mo. 
 
 206, 41 S. W. 737 678, 708 
 
 Goodwin I'. Caraleigh, etc. Co. 
 (1897), 121 N. C. 91, 28 
 S. E. 192 643 
 
 r. Fertilizer Works (1898), 123 
 
 N. C. 162, 31 S. E. 373 640 
 
 V. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 73 
 
 N. Y. 480 811 
 
 V. Tyrrell (1903), Ariz., 71 Pac. 
 
 906 326 
 
 Good wine v. Cadwallader (1901), 
 
 158 Ind. 202, 61 N. E. 939 664 
 
 Gordon i-. Bruner, 49 Mo. 570 648, 649. 
 
 900,911,913, 916 
 
 r. Carter, 79 Ind. 386 310 
 
 V. City of San Diego (1895), 108 
 
 Cal. 264, 41 Pac. 301 433 
 
 V. Horsfall, 5 Moore, 393 247 
 
 V. Swift, 46 Ind. 208 881 
 
 Gores v. Field (1901), 109 Wis. 408, 
 
 84 N. W. 867 340 
 
 Gorham v. Gorham, 3 Barb. Ch. 32 162 
 Goring r. Fitzgerald (1898), 105 la. 
 
 507,'' 75 N. W. 358 821 
 
 Gorlcy r. City of Louisville (1901), 
 
 — Kv.— , 65 S. W. 844 387 
 
 Gorman v. Kussell, 14 Cal. 531 385, 388 
 Gorrell v. Gates, 79 Iowa, 632 260 
 
 Gosnian v. Cruger, 7 Hun, 60 316 
 
 Goss i;. Boulder Cv. Com'rs, 4 Colo. 
 
 468 ■ 75, 626 
 
 Gossard v. Ferguson, 54 Ind. 519 887 
 
 Gossom r. Badgett, 6 Bush, 97 2!)() 
 
 Gott c. Powell. 41 Mo. 416 20, 31, 477 
 Gotthauer i'. Cunningham (1896), 4 
 
 Okla. 551, 47 Pac. 479 877 
 
 Cottier V. Babcock, 7 Abb. Pr. 392 922 
 Gould V. Glass, 19 Barb. 179 155 
 
 V. Gleason (1895), 10 Wash. 476, 
 
 39 Pac. 123 639 
 
 V. Gould, 8 Cow. 168 225 
 
 V. Hayes, 19 Ala. 438 254, 261 
 
 y. Williams, 9 How. Pr. 51 611 
 
 Goulet V. Asseler, 22 N. Y. 225 71 
 
 Gourlev >: St. L. &, S. F. Ry. Co., 35 
 
 Mo. App. 87 637 
 
 Gowan V. Bensel (1893), 53 Minn. 46, 
 
 54 N. W. 934 601 
 
 Gowen V. Gilson (1895), 142 Ind. 328, 
 
 41 N. E. 594 645 
 
 Gower v. Howe, 20 Ind. 396 310,325, 
 
 331 
 Grace v. Ballon (189:1), 4 S. D. 333, 
 
 56 N. W. 1075 687 
 
 V. Terrington, 1 Coll. 3 249
 
 TABLK OF CASES CITED. 
 
 XCl 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Gradwohl v. Harris, 29 Cal. 160 
 
 90, 97, 
 428 
 
 499 
 
 227 
 596 
 
 637 
 
 805 
 
 277 
 
 708 
 
 378 
 
 Grady v. Maloso (1806), 92 Wis. 666, 
 
 66 N. W. 808 
 Graff v. Kinney, 1 How. Pr. n. s. 
 
 59 
 Graiiann r. Catnman, 5 Dner, 697 
 V. Cliicasjo, etc. Ky. Co., 49 Wis. 
 
 532^ 
 V. Harrower, 18 Hnw. Pr. 144 
 V. Heniierson, od Ind. 195 
 !;. Marks (1893), 98 Ga. 67, 25 
 
 S. E. 931 
 
 V. Minneapolis, 40 Minn. 436 
 
 i;. Hinyo, 67 Mo. 824 300, 376, 402 
 
 V. Tilford, Stanton's Code, 98 936 
 
 Graham Tp. Indep. Scli. Dist. r. 
 
 Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 50 Iowa, 
 
 322 189, 212 
 
 Grain i-. Aldricli, 38 Cal. 514 11, 17, 90, 
 
 104 
 Gran v. Houston (1895), 45 Neb. 813, 
 
 64 N. W. 245 
 Granby Mining Co. ;•. Davis (1900), 
 
 156 Mo. 422, 57 S. W. 126 
 Grand c. Drevfus (1898), 122 Cal. 
 
 58, 54 Pac. 369 
 Grand Lodjie v. Hall (1903), — Ind. 
 
 App. — , 67 N. E. 272 
 Grand Valley Irrigation Co. v. 
 Lesher (1901), 28 Col. 273, 65 Pac. 
 44 740, 756 
 
 Grandona v. Lovdall, 70 Cal. 161 470 
 
 Grange r. Gilbert, 44 Hun, 9 927 
 
 Granger v. Granger, 2 N. Y. St. Rep. 
 
 211 
 Grannis v. Hooker, 29 Wis. 65 
 Grant v. Baker, 12 Ore. 329 
 
 V. Bartholomew (1899), 57 Neb. 
 
 673, 78 N. W. 314 
 V. Clarke (1899), 58 Neb. 72, 78 
 
 N. W. 364 
 V. Commercial Nat. Bank (1903) 
 
 — Neb. — , 93 N. W. 185 
 V. Grant (1893), 53 Minn. 181, 
 
 793 
 615 
 680 
 671 
 
 226 
 584 
 778 
 
 702 
 
 735 
 
 600 
 
 54 N. W. 1059 
 V. McCarty, 38 Iowa, 
 
 525, 666 
 453, 457, 
 495, 520 
 576 
 
 16 
 
 834 
 159 
 
 603 
 
 V. Sheerin, 84 Cal. 197 
 Crash v. Sater, 6 Iowa, 301 
 Grattan v. Wiggins, 23 Cal 
 Graves v. Barrett (1900), 126 N. C 
 267, 35 S. E. 539 
 V. Clark (1897), 101 la. 738, 69 
 
 N. W. 1046 686, 714 
 
 V. Merchants' & B. Ins. Co., 82 
 
 Iowa, 6-37 209 
 
 V. Norfolk Nat. Bank (1896), 49 
 
 Neb. 437, 68 N. W. 612 768 
 
 V. Spier, 58 Barb. 349 36, 37, 575 
 
 V. Waite, 59 N. Y. 156 75, 627, 630 
 Gray v. Coan, 23 Iowa, -344 592 
 
 V. Dougherty, 25 Cal. 266 29, 496 
 V. Durland. 50 Barb. 100 220 
 
 V. Fretwell, 9 Wis, 186 805 
 
 Gray v. Garrison, 9 Cal. 325 
 V. Givens, 26 Mo. 291 
 V. Palmer, 9 Cal. 616 
 V. Payne, 43 Mo. 203 20, 31, 
 
 V. Scbenck, 4 N. Y. 460 
 V. Tyler, 40 Wis. 579 
 V. Worst (1895), 129 Mo. 122,31 
 S. W. 585 
 Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N. Y. 491 
 Great West. Compound Co. v.JEtna 
 Ins. Co., 40 Wis. 373 177, 189, 
 
 211, 
 Great West. Ins. Co. v. Pierce, 1 
 
 Wyom. 45 870, 
 
 Greely v. McCoy (1893), 3 S. D.624. 
 
 64 N. W 659 
 Green v. Clark, 12 N. Y. 343 
 
 V. Clifford, 94 Cal. 49 375, 
 
 V. Conrad, 21 S. W. Kep. 839 
 
 870, 
 V. Dixon, 9 Wis. 532 325, 
 
 V. Gilbert, 21 Wis. 395 584, 
 
 V. Green, 69 N. C. 294 190, 
 
 V. Green (1897), 50 S. C. 514, 
 
 27 S. E. 952 
 I'. Hughitt School Tp. (1894), 
 5 S. D. 452, 59 N. W. 224 
 
 V. Lake Sup. & Pac. Fuse Co., 
 
 46 Cal. 408 
 V. Louthain, 49 Ind. 139 
 V. Lyndes, 12 Wis. 404 
 V. Marble, 37 Iowa, 95 
 V. Morrison, 5 Colo. 18 
 V. Palmer, 15 Cal. 411 
 V. Putnam, 1 Barb. 500 
 V. Richardson, 4 Col. 584 
 V. Southain, 49 Ind. 139 
 V. Tidball (1901), 26 Wash. 338, 
 
 67 Pac. 84 
 V. Tierney (1901), 62 Neb. 661, 
 
 87 N. W. 331 
 V. Walkill Nat. Bk., 7 Hun, 63 
 261 
 Green's Adm'r v. Irvine (1902), Ky., 
 
 66 S. W. 278 
 Greenbaum v. Turrill, 57 Cal. 285 
 Green Bay, etc. Canal Co. v. Kau- 
 kauna, etc. Co. (1901), 112 Wis. 
 32.3, 87 N. W. 864 
 Green Bav Lumber Co. v. School 
 Dist. (1902), — la. — , 90 N. W. 
 504 
 Greenbergr. Whitcomb Lumber Co. 
 
 (1895), 00 Wis. 225, 63 N. W. 93 302 
 Greene v. Breck, 10 Abb. Pr. 42 386 
 
 V. Finnell (1900), 22 Wash. 186, 
 
 60 Pac. 144 271 
 
 r. Niagara Ins. Co., 6 Hun, 128 88. 
 
 93 
 r. Nunnemacher, 36 Wis. 50 301, 303, 
 
 499 
 r. Republic F. Ins. Co., 84 N. Y. 
 
 572 117 
 
 V. Sisson, 2 Curtis, 171 261 
 
 99 
 197 
 
 358 
 477 
 341 
 2»3 
 
 656 
 633 
 
 207, 
 ,270 
 
 880 
 
 643 
 
 149 
 658 
 132, 
 9.36 
 333 
 587 
 274 
 
 606 
 
 787, 
 830 
 
 718 
 609 
 234 
 90 
 112 
 544 
 368 
 111 
 576 
 
 602 
 
 833 
 260, 
 .340 
 
 819 
 713 
 
 679 
 
 107
 
 XCll 
 
 TALLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [tBE REFfaENCES ARE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Greene <•. Warwick, 64 N. Y. 220 123 
 
 Greenebaum <•. lavlor (1894), 102 
 
 Cal. 024, 36 Pae. 057 699 
 
 Greeiifielil r. Mass. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 
 
 47 N. V. 4.)0 150, 751, 764 
 
 Greenfield Lumber Co. v. Parker 
 
 ( 1902), 159 Ind. 571, 65 N. E. 747 106 
 Greenlee r. Home Ins. Co. (1897), 
 
 103 la. 484, 72 X. W. 676 638 
 
 Greeuman v. Chicago Nortiiwestern 
 U. K. Co. (1898), 100 Wis. 188, 75 
 N. W. 998 676 
 
 Greentlial r. Lincoln, Sevms, & Co. 
 (1896), 67 Conn. 372, 3o Atl. 266 615, 
 
 828 
 Greentree r. Rosenstock, 61 N. Y. 
 
 bb-.i 75, 627, 628 
 
 Greenville Nat. Bank r. Evans Co. 
 
 (I'.HX)), 9 Okla. 353, 60 Pac. 249 678 
 Greenwood r. Atkinson, 5 Sim. 419 321 
 v. Inpersoll (1901), 61 Neb. 785, 
 
 »6 N. W. 476 422 
 
 Greer *-. Covington, bo Ky. 410 756 
 
 I'. Greer, 24 Kan. 10 930 
 
 V. Laiimer (lb96), 47 S. C. 176, 
 
 25 S. E. 136 565, 812 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. 
 (18931,94 Ky. 169, 21 S. W. 
 64'.i C39 
 
 r. Waxell.num (1902), 115 Ga. 
 
 866, 42 S. E. 200 288 
 
 Gregoire ;•. IJourke (lb95), 28 Ore. 
 
 275. 42 Pac. '.'90 673 
 
 Gregorv v. Greuory, 09 X. Y. 522 368 
 i: High. 29 Ind. 527 371 
 
 1-. Kaar (lb93), 36 Neb. 533, 54 
 
 N. W. b59 703 
 
 V. McCormick (1893), 120 Mo. 
 
 657. 25 S. W. 505 159 
 
 1-. Woodwortii (1895), 93 la. 246, 
 
 61 N. W. 962 673 
 
 /•. Woodwf)rili (1899), 107 la. 
 
 151, 77 N. W. 837 711 
 
 Greifs V. State Inv. Co. (1893), 98 
 
 (^il. 241,33 Pac. 195 790 
 
 Grciiher v. Alexander, 15 Iowa, 
 
 470 474 
 
 fJr.iitner >• Fi-hrenscliield (1902), 04 
 
 Kan. 704, 08 Pac. 619 056 
 
 Gress r. Evans. 1 Dak. 387 15 
 
 Grever & Son.* r. Taylor (1895), 53 
 
 <». Sf. 021,42 N. E. 829 685 
 
 Grihitic r. ' oliinil)U8 Brewing Co. 
 
 (1893). 100 Cal. 07. 34 Pac. 527 757 
 
 Gridler r. Farmers' & 1). Bank, 12 
 
 Bu8h, .'i^i:] 758 
 
 Gridley »•. Gridley. 24 N. Y. 130 515 
 
 Griffin >: Cox, 30 Ind. 242 935 
 
 i: Curtis (1K07), 50 Neb. 334. 
 
 09 N. W. 964 566, 688 
 
 V. Griffin, 23 How. Pr. 183 890 
 
 r. L. I. R. Co., 101 N. Y.848 751, 780 
 
 I'. .Moore, 52 Iixi. 295 908 
 
 Griffith r. ("romlev (1900), 58 S. C. 
 
 448, 36 S. E. 73» 715 
 
 Griffith V. Maxwell (1898), 20 Wash. 
 
 403, 55 I'ac. 571 619 
 
 )•. Vanlievthuysen, 9 Hare, 85 258 
 V. Wright ( 18119), 21 Wash. 494, 
 
 58 Pac. 582 565, 812 
 
 Griggs v. Staplee, 2 DeG. & S. 572 258 
 
 Grignon v. Black, 76 Wis. 674 923 
 
 Grigsby v. Barr, 14 Bush, 330 665 
 
 V. Barton County (1902), 169 
 
 Mo. 221, 69 S. W. 296 375, 644 
 Grimes v. Cullison (1895), 3 Okla. 
 
 268. 41 S. W. 355 543, 000 
 
 ?-. Duzan, 32 Ind. 301 886,923 
 
 1-. Grimes. 88 Ky. 20 942 
 
 Grimm v. Town of Washburn (1898), 
 
 100 Wis. 229, 75 N. W. 964 740 
 
 Grinnell v. Buchanan, 1 Daly, 538 15 
 
 r. Schmidt. 2 Sandf. 706 152, 173 
 
 Griswold v. Pieratt (1895), 110 Cal. 
 
 259, 42 Pac. 821 b07, 913 
 
 Groat V. Phillips, N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 
 42 
 Grocers' Bk. v. O'Korke, 6 Hun, 18 
 
 291 
 756, 
 
 787 
 
 Grosovsky v. Goldenberg (1902), 86 
 
 Minn. 378, 90 N. W. 282 
 Gross V. Miller (1894), 93 la. 72, 61 
 N W. 385 
 V. Sclieel (1103), — Neb.— ,93 
 N. W. 418 676 
 
 Grossman r. Lauber, 29 Ind. 018 
 Grosvenor v. Allen, 9 Paige, 74 
 
 V. Atlantic F. Ins. Co., 1 Bosw. 
 469 
 Grotte V. Nagle (1897), 50 Neb. 363, 
 
 69 N. W. 973 
 Grove ?'. Schweitzer, 36 Wis. 553 
 Grover & B. S. JI. Co. v. Newbv, 
 
 58 Ind. 570 
 Groves v. Marks, 32 Ind. 319 
 
 V. Tallman, 8 Nev. 178 
 Grubb V. Elder (1903). — Kan.— 
 Pac. 790 
 V. Lookabill, 100 N. C 207 
 Grubbe r. Grubbe (1894), 26 Ore. 363, 
 
 38 Pac. 182 
 Grulm V. Stanley, 92 Cal. 86 
 Gude r. Dakota'pire Ins. Co. (1895), 
 
 7 S. T) 044, 65 N. W. 27 
 Gudgcr r. Western N. C. H. Co., 2l 
 
 Fed. Rep. 81 
 Guedici v. Boots, 42 Cal. 452 
 Guernev r. Moore (1895), 131 Mo. 
 
 050, 32 S. W. 1132 
 Guernsey v. Am. Ins. Co.. 17 Minn. 
 "104 20, 41 
 
 V. Tuthill (1900), 12 8. D. 5b4, 
 82 N. W. 190 
 Guidery v. Green, 95 Cal. 630 
 Guild V. Railroad Co. (1896), 57 Kan. 
 
 70, 45 Pac. 82 
 Guilford v. Cooley, 58 N. Y. 116 
 Guille /-. Wong Fook, 13 Ore. 577 
 Guirxl v. Giiiod, 14 Cal. 506 
 Gulick V. Connely, 42 Ind. 134 
 
 160 
 
 711 
 
 752 
 935 
 
 260 
 
 810 
 
 042 
 940 
 
 930 
 03 
 544, 5C2 
 72 
 
 080 
 219, 360 
 
 233 
 278 
 
 080 
 
 301 
 50 
 
 96 
 
 472 
 
 104 
 637 
 
 790 
 155 
 
 805 
 231 
 727
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 xcni 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Gullickson v. Madsen (1894), 87 Wis. 
 
 19, 57 N. W. 905 714 
 
 Gulliver u. Fowler (1894), 64 Conn. 
 
 55(5, ;50 Atl. 852 638, 849 
 
 Gund ('. Parke (189G), 15 Wash. 393, 
 
 46 I'ac. 408 421 
 
 Gunder v. Tibbits (1899), 153 Ind. 
 
 591, 55 N. E. 762 466 
 
 Gunderson v. Tliomas (1894), 87 Wis. 
 
 406, 58 N. W. 750 89. 444, 515, 657, 670 
 Giinn V. Madigan, 28 Wis. 158 571, 592 
 Giiptill r. City of Red Wing (1899), 
 
 76 Minn. 129, 78 N. W. 970 433 
 
 Gurney v. Atlantic, etc. K. Co., 58 
 
 N. Y. 358 910 
 
 Gurske v. Kelpin (1901), 61 Neb. 517, 
 
 85 N. W. 557 836, 849, 863, 906, 928 
 Gustin r. Concordia Ins. Co. (1901), 
 
 164 Mo. 172, 64 S. W. 128 593 
 
 Gutchess ('. Whiting, 46 Barb. 139 629 
 Guthrie v. Bacon, 107 N. C. 337 820 
 
 V. Siiaffer (1898), 7 Okla. 459, 
 
 54 Bac. 698 599 
 
 V. Treat (1902), — Neb. — , 92 
 
 N. W. 595 332 
 
 Guthrie, City of v. Lumber Co. 
 (189"7), 5 Okla. 774, 50 Pac. 
 84 733 
 
 V. Nix (1895), 3 Okla. 136, 41 
 
 Pac. 343 605 
 
 Guttman v. Scannell, 7 Cal. 455 
 Gutzman v. Clancy (1902.), 114 Wis. 
 
 589, 90 N. W. 1081 491, 921 
 
 Guy V. Blue (1896), 146 Ind. 629, 45 
 
 N. E. 1052 678 
 
 V. McDaniel (1897), 51 S. C. 436, 
 
 29 S. E. 196 592 
 
 Guyer v. Minn. Thresher Co. (1896), 
 
 97 la. 132, 66 N. W. 83 638 
 
 Gwaltney r. Cannon, 31 Ind. 227 580, 584 
 
 Gwathney v. Clieatham, 21 Hun, 576 940 
 
 Gyger v. Courtney (1900), 59 Neb. 
 
 555, 81 N. W. 437 115, 288 
 
 H. 
 
 Haasler v. Hefele (1898), 151 Ind. 
 
 391, 50 N. E. 361 401 
 
 Habel v. Union Depot Co. (1897), 
 
 140 Mo. 159, 41 S. W. 459 641 
 
 Habicht V. Pemberton, 4 Sandf. 657 175, 
 
 386 
 Hivblitzel v. Latliam, 35 Iowa, 550 53, 55 
 llacliett V. Bank of California, 57 Cal. 
 
 335 626 
 
 Hackett v. Carter, 38 Wis. 394 499, 517 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. 
 (1894), 95 Ivy. 236, 24 S. W. 
 871 656 
 
 V. Schad, 3 Bush, 353 799 
 
 V. Watts (1896), 138 Mo. 502, 40 
 
 S. W. 113 783 
 
 Hackley v. Draper, 60 N. Y. 88 354 
 
 l: Ogmun, 10 Plow. Pr. 44 833 
 
 Haddix v. Wilson, 3 Busli, 523 936 
 Haddock v. Salt Lake City (1901), 
 
 23 Utah. 521, 65 Pac. 491 810 
 
 Hade V. McVay, 31 Ohio St. 231 908 
 Haden c. Sioux City, etc. R. R. Co. 
 
 (1896), 99 la. 735, 68 N. W. 733 606 
 
 Plagadorn v. Raux, 72 N. Y. 583 155 
 
 Hagan v. Burch, 8 Iowa, 309 815 
 
 r. Walker, 14 How. U. S. 37 334 
 
 Hagely v. llagely, 68 Cal. 348 718 
 Hagerman v. Thomas (1901), — Neb 
 
 — , 96 N. W. 631 685 
 
 Haggard v. Hay, 13 B. Mon. 175 753 
 
 V. Wallen, 6 Neb. 271 665 
 
 Haggerson v. Phillips, 37 Wis. 364 246 
 
 Haggerty r. Wagner (1897), 148 
 
 Ind. Qio, 48 N. E. 366 370 
 
 Haggin v. Clark, 51 Cal. 112 922 
 V. Lorenz (1895), 15 Mont. 309, 
 
 39 Pac. 285 676 
 
 Hagman r. Williams, 88 Cal. 146 758 
 Hague V. Niphi Irrigation Co. (1898), 
 
 10 Utah, 421, 52 Pac. 765 687 
 Hahl V. Sugo (1901), 169 N. Y. 109, 
 
 62 N. E. 135 15, 16, 27, 29, 41, 461, 470, 
 
 473 
 
 Haigiit V. Badgeley, 15 Barb. 499 815 
 Hain w. N. W. Gravel R. Co., 41 Ind. 
 
 196 563 
 
 Haines v. Beach, 3 Johns. Ch. 459 .333 
 i: HoUister CA N. Y. 1 260, 340, 470 
 V. Stewart (1902), — Neb. —, 91 
 
 N. W. 539 418 
 Hairalson r. Carson (1900), 111 Ga. 
 
 57, 36 S. E. 319 666 
 Haire v. Baker, 5 N. Y. 357 48, 54, 181 
 Hale V. Grogan (1896), 99 Ky. 170, 
 
 35 S. W. 282 810, 818 
 
 V. Hale (1901), 14 S. D. 644, 86 
 
 N. W. 650 608 
 V. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1893), 36 
 
 Neb. 266, 54 N. W. 517 677 
 V. Omaha Nat. Bank. 49 N. Y. 
 
 626 29, 596, 660, 666, 667 
 
 V. Walker, 31 Iowa, 344 790 
 
 Haley v. Baglev, 37 Mo. 363 364 
 
 Hall V. iEtna Man. Co., 30 Iowa, 215 786 
 
 V. Austin, 2 Coll. 570 352 
 
 V. Bank (1^98), 145 Mo. 418, 46 
 
 S. W. 1000 345 
 
 r. Clayton, 42 Iowa, 526 940 
 
 V. Gale, 14 Wis. 54 937 
 
 V. Hall, .38 How. Pr. 97 475 
 
 V. Klepzig, 99 Mo. 83 329 
 V. Law Guarantee, etc. Co. 
 (1900), 22 Wash. 305, 60 
 
 Pac. 643 604 
 
 V. Lonkev, 57 Cal. 80 667 
 
 V. Nelson, 23 Barb. 88 326 
 
 V. Olney, 65 Barb. 27 801 
 
 V. Plaine, 14 Ohio St. 417 104, 116, 
 
 151 
 
 V. Roberts, 61 Barb. 33 110 
 V. Roberts (1903), Ky., 74 S. W. 
 
 199 688
 
 XCIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the REFERE.NCE3 ABB TO THS PAOES.] 
 
 Hull c. Soutliern T'iic. Co. (1899), 
 
 Ariz., 57 I'ac 617 593 
 
 r. Woodward, oU S. C. 504 635, 758 
 .-. Woolory (lb9b), 20 \Vasli.440, 
 
 55 Pac. 602 592 
 
 Hall Jt Brown Co. r. Barnes (1902), 
 
 1 15 (Ja. it45. 42 S. E. 270 625 
 
 Hallalian r. Uerhert, 57 N. Y. 409 88 
 
 Hallani c. Asliford (1902), Ky., 70 
 
 S. \V. 197 354 
 
 Halleck v Streeter (1897), 52 Neb. 
 
 827. 78 N. W. 219 
 
 CO 
 
 Halleit c. Hallett, 2 Paige. 15 249. 254, 
 385, 387, 889, 392 
 V. Larcoin (1897), Idalio, 51 Pac. 
 
 108 039 
 
 Hallock V. De Munn, 2 N. Y. S. C. 
 
 350 315 
 
 V. Smith, 4 Johns. Cli. 049 247 
 
 Ham r. Greve, 34 Iiid. 18 790 
 
 I'. Henderson, 50 Cal. 367 159 
 
 Hamill r. Bank of Clear Creek 
 County (1890), 22 Colo. 384, 
 45 Pac. 411 48 
 
 r. Copcland (1899), 20 Colo. 178, 
 
 50 Pac. 901 834 
 
 r. Thompson, 3 Colo. 518 18, 37, 38, 
 
 39, 321 
 
 Hamilton v. Fond du Lac, 40,Wis. 47 310 
 
 V. Great Falls Ky. Co. (1895), 
 
 17 Mont. 334, 42 Pac. 860 605 
 r. Huson (1898), 21 Mont. 9, 53 
 
 Pac. 101 752 
 
 V. Lamphear, 54 Conn. 237 103 
 
 V. Love (1898), 152 Ind. 641, 53 
 
 N. E. 181 669 
 
 1-. Mclndoo (1900), 81 Minn. 324, 
 
 84 X. W. 118 671 
 
 1-. Mandle (1898), 103 Ga. 788, 
 
 30 S. E. 058 20, 72 
 
 V. Wright, 30 N. Y. 502 119 
 
 Hamlin r. Wriglit, 23 Wis. 491 260, 342 
 Hainiii '■. Honiiiie, 98 Ind. 77 
 Hammell c. Queen Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 
 
 240 207, 217 
 
 Hammer v. Downing (1901), 39 Ore. 
 
 604, 65 Pac. 17 136, 585, 668, 
 703, 867 
 1-. Hammer, 39 Wis. 182 63 
 
 Hammon.l /■. .Muskwa, 40 Wis. 35 229 
 V. Pennock, 61 N. Y. 145 248, 373 
 V. Perry, 38 Iowa, 217 49, 55 
 
 I'. S. C. & P. U. Co., 49 Iowa, 
 
 450 637 
 
 '•. Terry, 3 Lans. 186 934, 935 
 
 I lamp c. Uobinuon, 3 DeG., J. & S. 
 
 97 347 
 
 Hampson i'. Fall. 64 Ind. 382 887 
 
 Hampton >: Webster (1898), 66 Neb. 
 
 02H, 77 N. W. 50 670, 678 
 
 Hancock >: Hancock's Adm'r (1902). 
 
 — Ky. — . 09 S. W. 757 913, 932 
 »'. Johnson, 1 Mete. 242 457 
 
 r. IJitchie, 11 Ind. 48 99 
 
 I'. Woolen, 107 N. C. 9 351 
 
 Hand i-. City of St. Louis (1900), 158 
 
 Mo. 204, 59 S. W. 92 709 
 
 1-. Scodeletti (1900), 128 Cal. 
 
 074, 61 Pac. 373 231 
 
 Hanenkratt r. llamil (1900), 10 
 
 (»kla. 219, (jl Pac. 1050 661 
 
 Haner r. Nortliern Pac. Ky. Co. 
 
 (1900), 62 Pac. 1028 673 
 
 Haney r. People, 12 Colo. 345 756 
 
 Hankinson c. Ciiarlotte, etc. R. R. 
 Co. (1893), 41 iS. C. 1, 19 S. E. 
 206 180, 785 
 
 Hanley v. Banks (1897), 6 Okla. 
 
 79, 51 Pac. 664 909 
 
 Ilanlin v. Martin, 53 Cal. 321 010 
 
 Hann ;;. Van Voorhis, 5 Hun, 425 260 
 Hanna v. Emerson (1895), 45 Neb. 
 
 708, 04 N. W. 229 822 
 
 I'. Jeffersonville, etc. R Co., 32 
 
 Ind. 113 821 
 
 v. Reeves (1900), 22 Wash. 6, 
 
 60 Pac. 62 53 
 
 Hannan r. Greenfield (1899), 36 Ore. 
 
 97, 58 I'ac. 888 689 
 
 Hannegan v. Roth (1896), 12 Wash. 
 695, 44 Pac. 256 179, 242, 272, 274, 
 
 413, 417 
 Hannibal & St. Jos. R. Co. i-. Knud- 
 
 son, 62 Mo. 569 439 
 
 V. Nortoni (1900), 154 Mo. 142, 
 
 55 S. AV. 220 364 
 
 Hanning i*. Bassett, 12 Bush, 361 575, 
 
 737 
 Hanover Fire Ins. Co. ?•. Stoddard 
 
 (1897), 52 Neb. 745, 73 N. W. 291 642 
 Hansford v. Iloldam, 14 Bush, 210 667 
 Hanson v. Anderson (1895), 90 Wis. 
 
 195, 62 N. W. 1055 470, 679, 683 
 V. Cheatovich, 13 Nev. 395 815 
 
 V. Cruse (1900), 155 Ind. 176, 
 
 57 N. E. 904 712 
 
 r. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28 118 
 
 Hansteiii r. Jolinson (1893), 112 N. C. 
 
 253, 17 S. E. 155 290 
 
 Harbison v. Sanford, 90 Mo. 477 369 
 
 Hardcastle v. Smithson, 3 Atk. 245 363 
 Hardee v. Hall. 12 Bush, 327 271 
 
 Harden v. Atchison, etc. R. Co., 4 
 
 Neb. 321 737 
 
 V. Corbett, 6 Hun, 522 627, 628 
 
 V. Lang (I'.tOO), 110 Ga. 392, 36 
 
 S. E. 100 887, 918, 928 
 
 Hardin v. Emmons (1898), 24 Nev. 
 
 329, 53 Pac. 854 711 
 
 V. Helton, 50 Ind. 319 88, 95 
 
 V. Mullin (1897), 16 Wash. 647, 
 
 48 Pac. 349 605, 600 
 
 Hardin County r. Wells (1899), 108 
 
 la. 174, 78 N. W. 908 802 
 
 Hard wick v. Atkinson (1899), 8 
 
 Okhi. 008, 58 Pac. 747 787 
 
 r. Ickler (1K'.)7), 71 Minn. 25, 
 
 73 N. W. 519 822 
 
 Hardwood Log Co. r. Coffin (1902), 
 130 N. C. 432, 41 S. E. 931 203, 205
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 XCV 
 
 [the referencbs are to the pages.] 
 
 Hardy v. Blazer, 29 Ind. 220 289, 311 
 
 ;;. Miles, 91 N. C. lol 241 
 
 V. Milkr, 11 Neb. 395 271, 452, 455 
 c. Mitchell, 67 Ind. 485 260 
 
 V. Purinston (1894), S. D. 382, 
 
 61 N. \V. 158 752 
 Hardy Implement Co. v. South Bend 
 
 Iron Works (1895), 129 Mo. 222, 
 31 S. W. 590 810 
 
 Hare v. Murphy (1895), 45 Neb. 809, 
 
 64 N. W. 211 108 
 
 Hares v. Strinj^er, 15 Ueav. 206 249, 250 
 Hargadine c. Gibbons, 45 ]\lo. App. 
 
 460 203 
 
 Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods 
 Co. ('. Warden (1899), 151 Mo. 
 578, 52 S. W. 593 656 
 
 Hargan v. Purdy, 20 S. W. Rep. 432 519 
 Hargreaves v. Tennis (1901), 63 Neb. 
 
 356, 88 N. W. 486 946 
 
 Harkey v. Tillman, 40 Ark. 551 286 
 
 Harlan v. Moore (1895), 132 Mo. 483, 
 
 34 S. W. 70 641 
 
 V. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 31 
 
 Minn. 427 911 
 
 Harlan County v. Hogsett (1900), 00 
 
 Neb. 862, 83 N. W. 171 735 
 
 Harlin v. Stevenson, 30 Iowa, 371 341 
 
 Harlow d. Hamilton, 6 How. Pr. 475 603 
 
 V. Mills, 58 Hun, 391 628 
 
 V. Mister, 04 Miss. 25 239 
 
 V. Supreme Lodge (1901), Ky., 
 
 62 S. W. 1030 507 
 Harman v. Harman (1899), 54 S. C. 
 
 100, 31 S. E. 881 825 
 
 Harney v. Charles, 45 Mo. 157 118 
 
 V. Dutcher, 15 Mo. 89 150 
 
 V. Indianapolis, C. & D. R. Co., 
 
 32 Ind. 244 118 
 
 Harp V. Abbeville Investment Co. 
 
 (1899), 108 Ga. 108, 33 S. E. 998 29 
 Harpending v. Shoemaker, 37 Barb. 
 
 270 648 
 
 Harper v. Carroll (1895), 62 Minn. 
 
 152, 64 N. W. 145 387 
 
 V. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365 617 
 
 V. Pinkston (1893), 112 N. C. 
 
 293, 17 S. E. 101 229 
 
 Harrall v. Gray, 10 Neb. 186 20, 37, 38 
 Harrell v. Davis (1899), 108 Ga. 789, 
 
 .33 S. E. 852 191 
 
 V. Warren (1898), 105 Ga. 476, 
 
 30 S. E. 426 309 
 
 Harrington v. Bruce, 84 N. Y. 103 75, 627 
 V. Connor (1897), 51 Neb. 214, 70 
 
 N. W. 911 638 
 
 V. Foley (1899), 108 la. 287, 79 
 
 N. W. 64 818 
 
 V. Eortner, 58 Mo. 468 49 
 
 V. Higliam, 15 Barb. 524 276, 299 
 Harris v. Avery, 5 Kan. 146 482, 492, 497 
 V. Bryant, 83 N. C. 568 240, 343 
 
 V. Burwell, 65 N. C. 584 135,878, 
 
 879 
 1-. Frank, 81 Cal. 280 816 
 
 Harris r. Ilalverson (1901), 23 Wash. 
 
 779, 63 Pac. 549 505, 567 
 
 V. Harris, 61 Ind. 117 193, 219 
 
 r. HiUegass, 54 Cal. 463 568 
 
 V. Kasson, 79 N. Y 381 620 
 
 V. Randolph County Bank 
 (1901), 157 Ind. 120, 00 
 N. E. 1025 849, 863, 917 
 
 r. Rivers, 53 Ind. 216 869, 870, 916 
 ;;. Shontz, 1 Mont. 212 739 
 
 V. Tavlor, 53 Conn. .500 874 
 
 r. Todd, 16 Ilnn, 248 611, 027 
 
 V. Turnbridge, 83 N. Y. 92 637 
 
 I'. Vinyard, 42 Mo. .568 61, 55 
 
 V. White, 81 N. Y. 532 791 
 
 V. Zanone, 93 Cal. 59 575 
 
 Harris County v. Brady (1902), 115 
 
 Ga. 767, 42 S. E. 71 661 
 
 Harris Man. Co. v. Marsh, 49 Iowa, 
 
 11 576 
 
 Harrison v. Garrett (1903), 132 N. C. 
 
 172, 43 S. E. 594 664 
 
 r Juneau Bk.. 17 Wis 340 42, 472 
 V. Martinsville & F. R. Co., 16 
 
 Ind. 505 786 
 
 V. McCormick, 69 Cal. 616 942 
 
 1-. McCormick (1898), 122 Cal. 
 
 651, 55 Pac. 592 276 
 
 V. Pusteoska (1890), 97 la. 166, 
 
 66 N. W. 93 588 
 
 V. State Banking & Trust Co. 
 (1902), 15 S. D. 304, 89 
 N. W. 477 863, 872 
 
 V. Stewardson, 2 Hare, 530 26], 351, 
 363, 386, 387 
 Harrison Bldg. Co. r. Lackey (1897), 
 
 149 Ind. 10, 48 N. E. 254 690 
 
 Harrison Cy. Com'rs v. McCarty, 27 
 
 Ind. 475 lis 
 
 Harsh v. Griffin, 72 Iowa, 608 329 
 
 V. Morgan, 1 Kan. 293 265, 503 
 
 Harshman v. Rose (1897), 50 Neb. 
 
 113, 69 N. W. 755 675 
 
 Hart v. Accident Ass'n (1898), 105 
 
 la. 717, 75 N. W. 508 671 
 
 V. Coffee, 4 Jones Eq. 321 372, 377 
 V. Crawford, 41 Ind. 197 718, 804 
 
 V. Cundiff, Stanton's Code, 61 457 
 V. Metrop. Elev. Ry. Co., 15 
 
 Daly, 391 196, 525 
 
 V. Phenix Ins. Co. (1901), 113 
 
 Ga. 8.59, 39 S. E. 304 819 
 
 V. Robertson, 21 Cal. 346 196 
 
 V. Young, 1 Lans. 417 315 
 
 Hart Lumber Co. i'. Everett Land 
 Co. (1898), 20 Wash. 71,54 
 Pac. 767 689 
 
 V. Rucker (1898), 20 Wash. 383, 
 
 55 Pac. 320 638 
 
 Harte v. Houchin, 50 Ind. 327 131, 159, 
 
 791, 874, 930 
 
 Ilarter v. Crill, 33 Barb. 283 798 
 
 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Kahn 
 
 (1893), 4 Wyo. 364, 34 Pac. 895 543, 
 
 565
 
 XCVl 
 
 TABLE OF C.VSES CITED. 
 
 [the REFEREXCES ABE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Hartfoni Fire Ins. Co. v. Landfare 
 (l!t<.»2), ti3 Neb. 559, i>8 N. W. 779 
 Ilarttorii Lite & Aniiuitv Ins. Co. :: 
 Cuniinings (1897), 50 Neb. 236, 69 
 N. \V. 782 
 Hartley v. Brown, 46 Cal. 201 03, 
 
 Hartso'n /•. Haniin, 40 Cal. 264 
 Hartwell r. Vage, 14 Wis. 49 
 Hartzell r. MrC'lursj (1898), 54 Neb. 
 
 ai3, 74 N. W. 025 90, 592, 
 
 Harvar.l r. Stiles (1898), 54 Neb. 26, 
 
 74 N. W. :;'.I9 
 Harvey v. K.xclianjjc Bank (1896), 
 97 la. 187. GO N. W. 152 
 r. Harvev, 4 Beav. 215 
 V. \Vjilke'r,59 Hun, 114 
 V. Wilson, 44 In.l. 231 
 Harwell '•. Leliman, 72 Ala. 344 
 Uarwood v. Davenport (1898), 105 
 la. 592, 7o N. W. 487 
 V. Kirby, 1 I'aige, 40'.> 
 V. Marve, 8 Cal. 580 326, 
 
 r. Quinby, 44 Iowa, 385 
 Hasbrouck v. Bunce, 3 N. Y. Sup. 
 
 Ct. 309 
 Haseltine v. Smith (1900), 154 Mo. 
 
 404, 55 S. W. 633 
 Haslieagen r. Speaker, 36 Ind. 413 
 Haskell r. Haskell, 54 Cal. 262 526, 
 
 /•. Moore, 29 Cal. 437 
 Haskell Co. Bank v. Bank of Santa 
 Fe (1893), 51 Kan. 39, 32 Pac. 624 
 458, 499, 
 Haslnm r. Haslain (1899), 19 Utah, 
 
 1, 56 I'ac. 243 
 Has.-ler ..-. Helele (1898), 151 Ind. 
 
 391, 50 N. E. 361 276, 278, 
 
 Hastings >•. Anacortos Packing Co. 
 
 (1902), 2'.* Wash. 224, 69 Pac. 776 
 
 Hatch i: Central Bank, 78 N. Y, 487 
 
 1-. Dana, 101 U. S. 210 
 
 V. Leonard (1901), 165 N. Y. 
 
 4.35. 59 N. E. 270 
 r. Thompson (1895), 67 Conn. 
 74, .34 All. 770 
 Hatcher v. Briggs, 6 Ore. 31 47, 55, 
 HatHeld >: Cummings (1898), 162 
 
 In.l. 280, 50 N. E. 217 
 Hathaway r. Baldwin, 17 Wis. 616 
 V. Cincinnatus, 62 N. Y. 434 
 V. Quinby, 1 N. Y. S. C. 386 
 
 595, 608, 
 r. Toledo, etc. Ky. Co., 46 Ind. 
 25 ^75, 
 
 HauenRtein '■. Kull, 59 How. Pr. 24 
 Hang V. Kail way Co. (1898), 8 N. I). 
 
 23, 77 N. W. 97 
 Hauger >: Bonua (1899), 153 Ind. 
 
 642, 53 N. E. 942 
 Haughton c Newberry, 09 N. C. 450 
 
 Haun r. Burreil (1896), 119 N. C. 
 
 544. 26 S. E. Ill 
 Haiipt V. Burton (1898), 21 Mont. 
 
 672, 56 Pac. no 
 
 089 
 
 410 
 807 
 821 
 663 
 
 735 
 
 674 
 
 254 
 758 
 310 
 334 
 
 025 
 
 367 
 330 
 
 428 
 
 197 
 
 604 
 
 658 
 935 
 
 443, 
 501 
 
 942 
 
 301 
 
 604 
 636 
 355 
 
 584 
 
 832 
 942 
 
 685 
 758 
 155 
 574, 
 609 
 
 ,778 
 100 
 
 683 
 
 806 
 72, 
 286 
 
 783 
 
 100 
 
 Ilaupt V. Independent Tel Co. (1900), 
 
 25 Mont. 122, 63 Pac. 1033 639 
 
 Hausman v. Mulheran (1S97), 68 
 
 Minn. 48, 70 N. W. 866 834 
 
 Ilausniann Bros. Mfg. Co. r. Komp- 
 fert (1896), 93 Wis. 587, 67 N. W. 
 1136 336 
 
 Havana, Bk. of, v. Magee, 20 N. Y. 
 
 355 177 
 
 Hawarden v. The Yonghioghenv & 
 Lehigh Coal Co. (1901), 111 Wis. 
 545, 87 N. W. 474 381, 382, 444, 501, 
 
 523 
 
 Hawk V. Thorn, 64 Barb. 164 516 
 
 Hawkins v. Borland, 14 Cal. 413 769, 779 
 
 V. Craig, 1 B Mon. 27 254, 261 
 
 r. Donnerherg (1901), 40 Ore. 
 
 97, 66 Pac. 691 821 
 
 V. Hawkins, 1 Hare, 543 249 
 
 1-. Overstrcet (1898), 7 Okla. 
 
 277, 54 Pac. 472 25 
 
 Hawley v. Bank (1896), 97 la. 187, 
 
 66 N. W. 1.52 107 
 
 r. Favetteville, 82 N. C. 22 310 
 
 r. Wilkinson, 18 Minn. 525 660 
 
 Hawley Bios. Hardware Co. v. 
 Brownstone (1899), 123 Cal. 643, 
 56 Pac. 4(18 915 
 
 Hawse r. Burgmere, 4 Colo. 313 609 
 
 Hawthorne c. State (1895), 45 Neb. 
 
 871, 64 N. W. 359 709 
 
 Hay V. I lav, 13 Hun, 315 482, 519 
 
 V. Siiort, 40 Mo. 139 844, 861, 911, 
 
 913, 940 
 
 Haycock v. Haycock, 2 Ch. Cas. 124 242, 
 
 244, 347 
 Hay den r. Pearce (1898), 33 Ore. 89, 
 
 52 Pac. 1049 456, 498 
 
 Hayes v. Candee (1902), 75 Conn. 
 
 131. 52 Atl. 826 619 
 
 V. Hill, 17 Kan. 360 378 
 
 I'. Lavagnino (1898), 17 Utah, 
 
 185, 53 Pac. 1029 821 
 
 Haygood v. Boney (1894), 43 S. C. 
 
 63, 20S. E. 803 868,910 
 
 Haynes r. Harris. 33 Iowa, 516 219, 241 
 r. Spokane Chronicle Pub. Co. 
 (1895), 11 Wash. 503, 39 
 Pac. 969 799 
 
 Hays r. Crist, 4 Kan. 350 202 
 
 r. Crutcher, 54 Ind. 260 295 
 
 V. Dennis (1895), 11 Wash. 360, 
 
 39 Pac. 658 543 
 
 V. Hathorne, 74 N. Y. 486 93 
 
 t;. McLain (1899), 66 Ark. 400, 
 
 50 S. W. 1006 906, 925, 928 
 
 V. Miller, 12 Ind. 187 439 
 
 Ilavsler i-. Dawson, 28 Mo. App. 631 97 
 Ha'yward r. Stearns, 39 Cal. 58 326, 333 
 Haywood r. Ovey, 6 Mad. 113 377 
 
 Hazard v. Duraiit, 19 Fed. Hep. 471 
 Hazleton v. Union Bank, 32 Wis. 34 592, 
 
 596, 598 
 H. B. C.Co. V. N. Y. C, etc. R. R. Co. 
 (1895), 145 N. Y. .390, 40 N. E. 86 375
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 XCVll 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 II. B. Claflin Co. v. Simon (1898), 18 
 
 Utah, 153, 55 Pac. 370 659, 790 
 
 Heacock v. Heacock (1899), 108 la. 
 
 540, 79 N. W. 353 233 
 
 Headington v. Smith (1901), 113 la. 
 
 107, 84 N, W. 982 871 
 
 Healy v. O'Brien, 66 Cal. 517 782 
 
 In re Healy 's Estate (1902), 137 Cal. 
 
 474, 70 Pac. 455 345 
 
 Hearst c. Hart (1900), 128 Cal. 327, 
 
 60 Pac. 846 669 
 
 Heartman u. Franks, 86 Ark. 501 99 
 
 Hearty u. Klinkhammer, 39 Minn. 
 
 488 304 
 
 Heaston v. Cincinnati & Ft. W. Jl. 
 
 Co., 16 Ind. 275 786, 792 
 
 Heath v. Heath, 31 Wis. 223 821 
 
 V. Morgan (1895), 117 N. C. 504, 
 
 23 S. E. 489 314, 681 
 
 V. Silverthorn Min. Co., 39 Wis. 
 
 146 334, 499 
 
 V. White, 3 Utah, 474 753 
 
 Heaton v. Dearden, 16 Beav. 147 242 
 
 Heavenridge v. Mondy, 34 Ind. 28 181, 
 
 147, 660 
 Heavilon ;'. Heavilon, 29 Ind. 509 65 
 
 Heclit V. Caugron,46 Ark. 132 112 
 
 V. Snook (1902), 114 Ga. 921,41 
 
 S. E. 74 914, 918 
 
 V. Stanton (1895), 6 Wyo. 84, 42 
 
 Pac. 749 624 
 
 Heckman v. Swartz, 55 Wis. 173 920 
 
 V. Swett (1893), 99 Cal. 303, 33 
 
 l^ac. 1099 365 
 
 Hecla Gold Mining Co. v. Gisborn 
 
 (1899), 21 Utah, 68, 59 Pac. 518 587 
 Hector Min. Co. v. Valley View 
 Min. Co. (1901), 28 Colo. 315, 64 
 Pac. 205 816 
 
 Hedees r. Pollard (1899), 149 Mo. 
 
 216, 50 S. W. 781 
 
 Heebner v. Shepard (1895), 5 N. T>. 
 
 56, 63 N. W. 892 910 
 
 Heegaard v. Dakota Loan & Trust 
 Co. (1893), 3 S. D. 569, 54 N. W. 
 656 638 
 
 Heenev v. Kilbane (1899), 59 O. St. 
 
 499, 53 N. E. 262 • 680 
 
 Heermans v. Robertson, 64 N. Y. 332 49 
 Hees V. Nellis, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 118 178, 
 
 213 
 Heffernan v. Howell, 90 Mo. 844 820 
 
 Hefner v. Urton, 71 Cal. 479 337 
 
 Hegard v. Cal. Ins. Co., 11 Pac, Rep. 
 
 594 665 
 
 Hegier v. Eddy, 53 Cal. 597 801, 811, 816 
 Heidel v. Benedict (1894), 61 Minn. 
 
 170, 63 N. W. 490 717 
 
 Heidenreich v. Aetna Ins. Co. (1894), 
 
 26 Ore. 70, 37 Pac. 64 818 
 
 Heigel v. Willis, 3 N. Y. Suppl. 497 921 
 Heilbron v. King's River & F. Canal 
 
 Co., 76 Cal. 11 942 
 
 Heimstreet r. Winnie, 19 Iowa, 480 326, 
 
 333, 334 
 
 Heine r. Meyer, 61 N. Y. 171 940 
 
 HcinmuUer r. Gray, 13 Abb. Pr. N. s. 
 
 299 301 
 
 Helena Nat. Bank v. Tel. Co. (1898), 
 
 20 Mont. 379, 51 Pac. 829 608 
 
 Hellams v. Prior (1902), 04 S. C. 296, 
 
 548, 48S. E. 25 179 
 
 r. Switzer, 24 S. C. 39 189, 196, 216 
 Heller r. Dverville Mfg. Co. (1897), 
 
 116 Cal. 127, 47 Pac. 1010 594 
 
 Hellstern r. Katzor (1899), 103 Wis. 
 
 391, 79 N. W. 429 518 
 
 Helm r. Hardin, 2 B. Mon. 232 251, 351 
 Helman v. Withers, 30 N. E. Rep 5 280 
 Helmer v. Yetzer (1894), 92 la. 027, 
 
 61 N. W. 206 849, 863 
 
 Helms (;. Harclerode (1902), 65 Kan. 
 
 736, 70 Pac. 866 930 
 
 Helphrey r. Strobach (1895), 13 
 
 Wasli. 128, 42Pac. 537 043 
 
 Heman v. Glann (1895), 129 Mo. 325. 
 
 31 S. W^ 589 608, 640 
 
 Hembrock v. Stark, 53 Mo. 588 911 
 
 Hemine v. Hays, 55 Cal. 337 713 
 
 Hemmings v. Doss (1899), 125 N. C. 
 
 400, 34^S. E. 511 714 
 
 Henderson v. Dickey, 50 Mo. 151 20, 29, 
 31,87,61,477 
 V. Henshall, 54 Fed. Rep. 320 
 V. Keutzer (1898) 50 Neb. 400, 
 
 70 N. W. 881 816 
 
 V. Tiirngren (1894), 9 Utah, 432, 
 
 35 I'ac. 495 271, 606 
 
 Hendon v. North Carolina R. R. 
 
 Co. (1900), 127 N. C. 110, 37 S. E. 
 
 155 665 
 
 Hendrick r. Lindsay, 93 U. S. 143 105 
 
 Hendricks v. Decker, 35 Barb. 298 769, 
 
 804 
 
 V. Robinson, 2 Johns. Ch. 283 .392 
 
 Hendrix v. Gore, 8 Ore. 406 791 
 
 ;;. Money, 1 Bush, 306 387 
 
 Hendry v. Hendry, 32 Ind. 349 455, 934 
 
 Henke v. Eureka Endowment Ass'n 
 
 (1893), 100 Cal. 429, 34 Pac. 1089 565, 
 
 600 
 Henkle. See Hinkle. 
 Henley v. Stone, 3 Beav. 355 379 
 
 V. Wilson, 77 N. C. 216 594 
 
 V. Wilson (1902), 137 Cal. 278, 
 
 70 Pac. 21 313 
 
 Hennessey v. Paulsen (1895), 147 
 
 N. Y. 255, 41 N. E. 516 285 
 
 Hennessy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
 Co. (1902), 74 Conn. 699, 52 Atl. 
 490 825 
 
 Henricus v. Englert, 83 N. E. Rep. 
 
 550 104 
 
 Henry v. Cass Cv. Mill, etc. Co., 42 
 
 Iowa, 3.3 428 
 
 V. Earl, 8 Mees. & W. 228 701 
 
 V. Henry, 3 Robt. 614 525, 890, 920 
 V. Marvin, 3 E. D. Smith, 71 649 
 
 V. Mt. Pleasant Tp., 70 Mo. 500 205 
 V. Sneed, 99 Mo. 407 065
 
 XCVIU 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [tqi references arb to the pages.] 
 
 Henshaw v. Salt Kiver Canal Co. 
 
 (1S98). Ariz., 54 Tac. 577 
 Ilensley r. Whiffin, 54 Iowa, 555 
 Hentz c. Miner, 58 Hun, 428 
 Heppe i: Johnson. 73 Cal. 265 
 Herbert c. Wortendvke (1896), 49 
 
 Neb. 182. 6!^ N. W. 350 
 Herbst Importing Co. v. Hogan 
 (1895), 16 Mont. 384, 41 Pac. lo5 
 Hereth i-. Smith, 33 Ind. 514 95, 791 , 
 
 814 
 Herman J'. Citv of Oconto (1898), 100 
 
 Wis. "391, 70 N. W. 364 116, 149 
 f. Felthoiisen (1902), 114 Wis. 
 42;3, 90 N. W. 432 
 Hermiston i: Green (1898), 11 S. D. 
 
 81. 75 X. W. 819 
 Herrick r. Ward well (1898). 58 O. 
 St. 294, 50 N. I-:. 903 
 r. Woolverton, 41 N. Y. 581 
 Herring c. Xeely, 43 Iowa, 157 
 
 V. Yoe, 1 Atk. 290 
 Herrine-lIall-Marvin Co. v. Smith 
 
 (1903), 43 Ur*!. 315. 72 Pac. 704 
 Herrington v. Robertson, 71 N. Y. 
 
 280 
 Ilerron >: Cole. 25 Xeb. 692 
 Herschfield v. Aiken, 3 Mont. 442 
 Ilervey i-. Saverv. 48 Iowa, 313 
 Hess 1-. Adler (1900), 67 Ark. 444, 
 55 S. W. 843 
 <■. Union State Bank (1900), 156 
 
 Ind. 523, 60 N. E. 305 
 I'. Young, 59 Ind. 379 575, 918 
 
 Hession v. Linastruth (1895), 96 la. 
 
 483, 05 X. W. 399 666 
 
 Heusinkveid r. Capital Ins. Co. (1895), 
 
 95 la. 504, 04 N. W. 594 689 
 
 lleutig r. S. W. Mut. Benev. Ass., 45 
 
 Kan. 462 499 
 
 Hewett V. Swift, 3 Allen, 420 306 
 
 Hewlett V. Owens, 51 Cal. 570 200, 202 
 Hevdenfeldt c. Jacobs (1895), 107 
 
 Cal. 373, 40 Pac. 492 
 Heyer >: Rivenbark (1901), 128 N. C. 
 
 270, 38 S. E. 875 
 1 lev wood r. Huffalo, 14 N. Y. 534 
 
 511 
 333 
 
 811 
 402 
 
 819 
 
 599 
 
 467 
 619 
 
 137 
 
 18, 667 
 
 255 
 
 735 
 
 37 
 
 94 
 
 665 
 
 942 
 
 664 
 
 773 
 
 11. Feltman Co. r. Tiiompson (1900), 
 Ky., 58 S. W. 693 
 (lit r. Town of Darlington (1898), 
 152 Ind. 570, 53 X. E. 825 719, 
 
 752 
 
 822 
 37 
 
 641 
 
 Ilifitt 
 
 1 
 Hil.bard r. Trask (1903), — Ind. — , 
 
 67 N. E. 179 
 Hibben V. Soyer, 33 Wis. 319 
 Hibernia Savings and Loan Society 
 r. ('hurciiili (litOO), 128 Cal. 
 '■-33, 61 Pac. 278 
 f. Herbert, 53 Cal. 375 
 p. Ordway. 3H Cal. 679 457, 458 
 
 Hichcns >: Kelly, 2 Sm. & G. 264 239 
 
 Hickman v. Link, 97 Mo. 482 781 
 
 Hickory County >: Fugate (1898), 143 
 
 Mo. 71, 44 S. W. 7H9 543, 670 
 
 Hickox i: Elliott, 10 Sawy. 415 253, 
 
 340 
 
 744 
 
 702 
 
 784 
 
 417 
 329 
 
 Hicks r. Ream (1893), 112 N. C. 642, 
 
 17 S. E. 490 180, 785 
 
 V. Doty, 4 Bush, 420 101 
 
 1-. Drew (1897), 117 Cal. 305, 49 
 
 Pac. 189 798 
 
 V. Hamilton (1898), 144 Mo. 495, 
 
 46 S. W. 432 108 
 
 V. Reigle, 32 Ind. 360 786 
 
 V. Sheppard, 4 Lans. 335 46, 886 
 
 V. Southern Ry. (1902), 03 S. C. 
 
 559, 41 S. E. 753 612 
 
 r. Whitmore, 12 Wend. 548 116 
 
 Hicksville & C. S. B. R. Co. v. Long 
 
 Island R. Co., 48 Barb. 355 886 
 
 Hier v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing 
 Ass'n (1900), 60 Neb. 320, 
 83 N. W. 77 934 
 
 V. Grant, 47 N. Y. 278 769, 773,' 779 
 r. Staples, 51 N. Y. 136 271, 315 
 
 Higbee v. Trumbauer (1900), 112 la. 
 
 74, 83 N. W. 812 668 
 
 Higert v. Trustees, 53 Ind. 326 684 
 
 Higgins V. Crichton, 11 Daly, 114 499 
 
 i: Germaine, 1 Mont. 230 579, 584, 
 
 734, 753 
 
 V. Havden (1897), 53 Xeb. 61, 73 
 
 X. W. 280 626 
 
 V. Jeffersonville, etc. R. Co., 52 
 
 Ind. 110 575 
 
 V. Senior, 8 M. & W. 834 116, 152 
 
 r. Wortel, 18 Cal. 330 754 
 
 High r. Worley, 32 Ala. 709 261 
 
 Higler v. Eddy, 53 Cal. 597 807 
 
 Higley v. Burlington, etc. Rj'. Co. 
 (1896), 99 la. 503, 68 N. W. 
 829 702 
 
 v. Gilmer, 3 Mont. 90 575 
 
 Hildebrand v. Tarbell (1897), 97 Wis. 
 
 446, 73 X. W. 53 655 
 
 Hiles V. Johnson, 67 Wis. 517 517 
 
 V. Rule (1893), 121 Mo. 248, 25 
 
 S. W. 959 371 
 
 Hill r. Adams, 2 Atk. 39 378 
 
 r. Barrett, 14 H. Mon. 83 71, 72, 544 
 V. Butler, 6 ( )hio St. 207 860, 923 
 
 V. Campbell Commission Co. 
 (1898), 54 Xeb. 59, 74 N. W. 
 388 566, 688 
 
 V. Dade (1900), 08 Ark. 409, 59 
 
 S. W. 39 347 
 
 V. Davis, 3 N. II. 884 649 
 
 V. Den (1898), 121 Cal. 42, 53 
 
 Pac. 642 433 
 
 V. Duraiid, 50 Wis. 354 350 
 
 V. Fairhaven, etc. R. R. Co. 
 (1902), 75 Conn. 177, 52 Atl. 
 725 682, 683 
 
 V. Frink (1805), 11 Wash. 562, 
 
 40 Pac. 128 942 
 
 r. Gibbs, 5 Hill, 56 195 
 
 ' V. (iolden, 16 15. Mon. 551 874 
 
 V. Groesbeck (1901), 29 Colo. 161, 
 
 67 Pac. 167 831 
 
 V. Hill (1893), 24 Ore. 416, 33 Pac. 
 
 809 785
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 XCIX 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Hill V. Lewis, 45 Kan. 162 373 
 
 V. Livingston Cv. Sup., 12 N. Y. 
 
 52 ' 155, 310 
 
 V. Marsh, 46 Ind. 216 174, 177, 204, 
 209, 270 
 V. Meyer Bros. Drug Co. (1807), 
 
 140 Mo. A?,Z, 41 S. W. OOU 817 
 V. Perrott, 3 Taunt. 274 652 
 
 V. Ragland (1002), — Ky. — , 70 
 
 S. W. 634 593 
 
 V. Road Sup., 10 Ohio St. 621 622 
 V. Rosselle, 6 Hun, 631 316 
 
 V. Smith, 32 N. J. Eq. 473 256 
 
 V. Townley, 45 j\Iinn. 167 329 
 
 V. Walsh (1804), 6 S. I). 421, 61 
 
 N. W. 440 713, 733 
 
 V. Wilson (1899), 8 N. D. 309, 79 
 
 N. W. 150 675 
 
 Hillhouse v. Jennings (1901), 60 
 
 S. C. 373, 38 S. E. 599 606, 783, 818 
 Hillman v. Allen (1898), 145 Mo. 
 
 638, 47 S. W. 509 783 
 
 V. Hillman, 14 How. Pr. 456 225, 660 
 V. Mcwington, 57 Cal. 56 301 
 
 Hills V. Barnard, 152 Mass. 67 
 V. McRae, 9 Hare, 297 
 V. Nash, 1 Phil. 594 
 V. Putnam, 152 Mass. 123 
 V. Sherwood, 48 Cal. 386 
 
 372 
 248, 250 
 387 
 46,241, 
 259, 260 
 Hilton V. Hilton's Adm'r (1901), 110 
 
 Ky. 522, 62 S. W. 6 444, 498 
 V. Lothrop, 46 Me. 297 379 
 
 V. Waring, 7 Wis. 492 97 
 
 Himes v. Jarrett, 2 S. E. Rep. 393 499 
 Hincliman i'. Point Defiance Ry. 
 Co. (1896), 14 Wash. 349, 44 Pac. 
 152 619 
 
 Hinckley ;;. Smith, 51 N. Y. 21 315 
 
 Hindman v. Eilgar (1888), 24 Ore. 
 
 581, 17 Pac. 862 825 
 
 Hinds V. Tweddle, 7 How. Pr. 278 648, 
 
 649 
 
 Hinkle v. Davenport, 38 Iowa, 355 216, 
 
 453, 457, 520 
 
 V. Margerura, 50 Ind. 240 47, 52, 
 
 439,886, 908 
 
 V. San Francisco & N. P. R. Co., 
 
 55 Cal. 627 620 
 
 Hinman i\ Bowen, 5 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 
 234 111 
 
 Hinson ;;. Adrian, 86 N. C. 61 334 
 
 Hinton v. Pritchard, 102 N. C. 94 52 
 
 Hintrager v. Richter, 52 N. W. Rep. 
 
 188 I'S? 
 
 Hirsch V. Mayer (1901), 165 N. Y. 
 
 236, 59 N. E. 89 410 
 
 Hirsheld v. Fitzgerald (1898), 157 
 
 N. Y. 166, 51 N. E. 997 102 
 
 V. Weill (1898), 121 Cal. 13, 53 
 
 Pac. 402 662 
 
 Hirshfeld v. Bopp (1895), 145 N. Y. 
 
 84, .39 N. E. 817 686 
 
 Hirst r. Ringen Real Estate Co. 
 (1902), 169 Mo. 194, 69 S. W. 368 684 
 
 Hitchcock r. Baughan, 44 Mo. App. 
 
 42 940 
 
 Hitc V. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. 
 
 ( 1895), 130 Mo. 132, 31 S. W. 262 614 
 Hixon V. Gurge, 18 Kan. 253 702 
 
 Hoagland i\ Han. & St. Jos. R. Co., 
 
 39 Mo. 451 455, 522 
 
 r. Van Etten, 23 Neb. 462 98 
 
 Honglin v. Henderson (1903), 119 la. 
 
 720, 94 N. W. 247 871 
 
 Hobart v. Abbott, 2 P. Wnis. 643 379 
 V. Frost, 5 Duer, 672 181 
 
 Hobbs V. Bland (1899), 124 N. C. 
 
 284, 32 S. E. 683 911 
 
 V. Duff, 23 Cal. 596 936 
 
 Hobson V. Cummins (1899), 57 Neb. 
 
 611, 78 N. VV. 295 822 
 
 V. Ogden, 16 Kan. 388 637 
 
 Hockaday v. Drve (1898), 7 Okla. 
 
 288, 54 Pac. 495 410 
 
 Hocks V. Sprangers (1902), 113 Wis. 
 
 123, 87 Pac. 1101 643 
 
 Hocutt r. Wilmington, etc. R. R. 
 Co. (1899), 121 N. C. 214, 32 S. E. 
 681 191 
 
 Hodgdon v. Heidman, QQ Iowa, 645 329 
 Hodge V. Sawyer, 34 \\'is. 397 636 
 
 Hodges V. Kimball, 49 Iowa, 577 412 
 
 V. Nalty (1899), 104 Wis. 464. 
 
 80N. W. 726 117,381,382,384, 
 386, 392, 398, 399 
 V. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 105 
 
 N. C. 170 522 
 
 Hodgman v. Chicago & St. P. R. 
 
 Co., 28 Minn. 48 119 
 
 Hodgson, Re, L. R. 31 Ch. D. 177 372 
 Hodowal ('. Yearous (1897), 103 la. 
 
 32, 72 N. W. 294 6 
 
 Hoester v. Sammelmann, 101 Mo. 619 575 
 
 Hoffa V. Hoffman, 33 Ind. 172 909, 910 
 
 Hoffman v. Eppers, 41 Wis. 251 730 
 
 V. Hoffman's Executor (1894), 
 
 126 Mo. 486, 29 S. W. 603 470 
 V. McCracken (1902), 168 Mo. 
 
 337, 67 S. W. 878 605 
 
 Hoffmann v. Koppelkora, 8 Neb. 344 611 
 V. Wheelock, 62 Wis. 434 457, 499 
 Ilofmann r. Tucker (1899), 58 Neb. 
 
 457, 78 N. W. 941 625 
 
 Hogan V. Black, 66 Cal. 41 140 
 
 V. Shorb, 24 Wend. 458 877 
 
 r. Shuart, 11 Mont. 498 940 
 
 Hogendobler v. Lvon, 12 Kan. 276 209 
 
 Hogueland v. Arts (1901), 113 la. 
 
 634, 85 N. \V. 818 646 
 
 Holbrook v. N. J. Zinc. Co., 57 N. Y. 
 
 616 126 
 
 Ilolcraft V. Mellott, 57 Ind. 539 713 
 
 Holden i\ Great Western Elevator 
 Co. (1897). 69 Minn. 527, 72 
 N. W. 805 674 
 
 V. N. Y. & Erie Bk., 72 N. Y. 
 
 286 154, 238 
 
 Holdridge v. Sweet, 23 Ind. 118 310, 
 
 325, 331
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references 
 
 Holeran i-. Scliool Dist., 10 Neb. 406 499 
 
 Holgate r. Broome, 8 Minn. 243 933 
 
 c. Downer (1899), 8 Wyo. 334, 
 
 57 Pac. 918 607, 875 
 Holland r. Baker. 3 Hare, 68 351, 363 
 
 v. Drake, "29 i)!)io St. 441 340 
 
 V. Johnson, 51 Ind. 346 46, 52 
 
 V. Oregon 81iurt Line U. R. Co. 
 (1903), — Utah — , 72 Pac. 
 940 817 
 
 Hollenbeck r. Clow, 9 How. Pr. 289 831 
 Hollidav r. Hrown. 33 Neb. 657 317 
 
 l: MoMullan, 83 N. C. 270 872, 918 
 HoUings r. Bankers' Union (1902), 
 
 63 S. C. 192, 41 S. E. 90 819 
 Hollingswortii r. Howard (1901), 
 
 1 13 Ga. 1099, 39 S. E. 465 307 
 
 r. Moulton, 53 Hun. 91 150 
 
 r. Swedenbortr, 49 Ind. 378 220 
 1-. Warnock (19(11), 112 Ky. 96, 
 
 65 S. W. 163 832, 834 
 
 HolHster ;•. Bell (1900), 107 Wis. 
 
 198, 83 N. W. 297 20, 312 
 
 V. Hubbard (1899), US. D. 461, 
 
 78 N. W. 949 104 
 Hollmann r. Lange (1898), 143 Mo. 
 
 100, 44 S. W. 752 626 
 Holman v. De Lin (1897), 30 Ore. 
 
 428, 47 Pac. 708 603 
 
 Holmberg >: Dean, 21 Kan. 73 781, 805 
 
 Holmes i-. Abbott, 53 Hun, 617 494 
 
 V. Bovd, 90 Ind. 332 150 
 
 V. Davis, 21 Barb. 265 516 
 
 V. Fond du Lac, 42 Wis. 282 228 
 
 r. Kring, 93 Mo. 452 781 
 V. Lincoln Salt Lake Co. (1899), 
 
 58 Neb. 74, 78 N. W. 379 816 
 V. Richet, 56 Cal. 307 865 
 V. Williams, 16 Minn. 164, 168 504, 
 
 517, 595, 605, 608 
 Holt r. Pearson (1895), 12 Utah, 63, 
 
 41 Pac. 560 594 
 
 Ilolt County Bank r. Holt Co. 
 
 ( 1898), 53 Neb. 827, 74 N. W. 259 543 
 Holter Hardware Co. r. Ontario 
 
 -Mining Co. (1900), 24 Mont. 184, 
 
 01 Pac. 3 645 
 
 Holton r. Waller (1895), 95 la. 545, 
 
 64 N. W. 6.33 625 
 Holtz >: Hanson (1902), 115 Wis. 
 
 2.36, 91 N. W. 663 593 
 
 Holwersun r. St Louis, etc. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1!H)0). 157 Mo. 216, 57 S. W. 770 689 
 Holzbauer >■. Heine. 37 Mo. 443 861, 873 
 Home Fire In.s. Co. ?•. Arthur 
 (1K90), 48 Neb. 401, 07 N. W. 
 440 543 
 
 V. Berg (1890). 46 Neb. 600, 05 
 
 N. \V. 780 793 
 
 V. Decker (1898), 55 Neb. 346, 
 
 75 X. W. 841 832, 833 
 
 V. Johansen (18(K^),59 Neb. 349, 
 
 80 N. W. 1047 794 
 
 V. Murray (1894). 40 Neb. 001, 
 
 59 N. W. 102 638 
 
 ARE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Railroad Co. 
 
 (1893), 19 Colo. 46, 34 Pac. 281 40 
 
 Home Ins. Co. v. Gilman, 112 Ind. 7 172, 
 
 173,207 
 Home Mut. Ins. Co. r. Oregon Rv. 
 
 & Nav. Co., 20 Ore. 569 ' 217 
 
 Homer r. Bank of Commerce (1897), 
 
 140 Mo. 225, 41 S. W. 790 131 
 
 Hood V. Cal. Wine Co., 4 Wash. 88 310 
 v. Nicholson (1896), 137 Mo. 
 
 400, 38 S. W. 1U95 592, 594 
 
 Hook r. Craighead, ."2 Mo. 405 792 
 
 V. Garfield Coal Co. (1900), 
 112 la. 210, 83 N. W. 
 963 158 
 
 r. Turner, 22 Mo. 333 783 
 
 V. White, 36 Cal. 299 767 
 
 Hooker r. Green, 50 Wis. 271 830 
 
 Hooper r. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 
 
 27 Wis. 91 149 
 
 Hoosier Stone Co. v. McCain, 31 
 
 N. E. 956 748 
 
 Hoover v. Donnally, 3 Hen. & M. 
 
 316 255 
 
 Hope L. Ins. Co. r. Taylor, 2 Robt. 
 
 278 153 
 
 Hopewell v. McGrew (1897), 50 Neb. 
 
 789, 70 N. W. 397 606 
 
 Hopf V. U. S. Baking Co., 21 N. Y. 
 
 Suppl. 589 636, 637 
 
 Hopkins r. Contra Costa Co. (1895), 
 
 106 Cal. 566, 39 Pac. 933 658 
 v. Dipert (1901), 11 Okla. 630, 
 
 69 Pac. 883 779, 825 
 
 V. Gilman, 22 Wis. 481 633, 942 
 
 V. Lane, 87 N. Y. 501 881 
 
 V. Orcutt, 51 Cal. 537 614 
 
 V. Organ, 15 Ind. 188 310 
 
 V. Warner (1895), 109 Cal. 133, 
 
 41 Pac. 868 326. 327, 328 
 
 V. Washington Cotmty (1898), 
 
 56 Neb. 596, 77 N.W. 53 11 
 
 Hopkinson v. Lee, 6 Q. B. 971 
 Hoppe V. Fountain (1894), 104 Cal. 
 
 94, 37 Pac. 894 337, 418 
 
 Hopper r. Hopper (1901), 61 S. C. 
 
 124, .39 S. E. 366 801 
 
 Iloppough v. Struble, 60 N. Y. 
 
 430 49, 50 
 
 Hopwood V. Patterson, 2 Ore. 49 829 
 
 Horbach v. Marsh (1893), 37 Neb. 
 
 22, 55 N. W. 286 639 
 
 Ilord V. Bradbury (1900), 156 Ind. 
 
 .30, 59 N. E. 31 14 
 
 V. Chandler, 13 B. Mon. 403 71, 457 
 Horkey v. Kendall (1898), 53 Neb. 
 
 522, 73 N. W. 953 768 
 
 Horn V. (^hicago & N. W. Rv. Co., 38 
 
 Wis. 463 576 
 
 V. Ludington, 32 Wis. 73 37, 544, 
 
 548, 559, 596 
 V. Volcano Water Co., 13 Cal. 
 
 02 409, 426 
 
 Hornby v. Gordon, 9 Bosw. 656 417, 418, 
 
 419
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Horner v. Bramwell (189fi), 23 Colo. 
 
 238, 47 Pac. 402 375 
 
 V. IMcConnell (1002), 158 Ind. 
 
 280, 63 N. E. 472 686 
 
 Hornisli v. Ringen Stove Co. (1902), 
 
 116 la. 1, 89 N. W. 95 191 
 
 Horsley v. Fawcett, 11 Beav. 565 252, 253 
 Horstkotte v. Menier, 50 Mo. 158 3/5 
 
 Horton v. Pintchunck (1900), 110 Ga. 
 
 355, 35 S. E. 663 921 
 
 V. Ruhling, 3 Nev. 498 810 
 
 V. Smith (1902), 115 Ga. 66, 41 
 
 S. E. 253 641 
 
 Hortzell i: McClurg (1898), 54 Neb. 
 
 313, 74 N. W. 625 802 
 
 Hoskins v. Southern Nat. Bank 
 
 (1903), Kv., 73 S. W. 786 709 
 
 Hosley v. Black, 28 N. Y. 438 271, 584, 
 
 587 
 V. Wisconsin Odd Fellows Mu- 
 tual Life Ins. Co. (1893), 86 
 Wis. 463, 57 N. W. 48 462 
 
 Hotaling v. Tecuraseh Nat. Bank 
 
 (1898), 55 Neb. 5, 75 N. W. 242 887 
 Hough V. Grant's Pass Power Co. 
 (1902), 41 Ore. 531,69 Pac. 
 655 682 
 
 V. Hough (1894), 25 Ore. 218, 35 
 
 Pac. 249 466 
 
 Houghton r. Allen, 75 Cal. 102 337 
 
 V. Lvnch, 13 Minn. 85 151 
 
 V. Townsend, 8 How. Pr. 447 541 
 
 House V. Dexter, 9 Mich. 246 360 
 
 V. Lowell, 45 Mo. 381 455, 458 
 
 V. Marshall, 18 Mo. 368 935 
 
 V. Meyer (1893), 100 Cal. 592, 35 
 
 Pac. 308 673, 681, 682 
 
 Houston V. Blackinan, 66 Ala. 559 360 
 r. Levy's Ex., 44 N. .J. Eq. 6 347 
 
 Houts V. Bartle (1901), 14 S. D. 322, 
 
 85 N. W. 591 643 
 
 Hovland v. Burrows (1893), 38 Neb. 
 
 119, 56 N. W. 800 825 
 
 Howard v. Johnston, 82 N. Y. 271 908 
 V. Seattle Nat. Bank (1894), 10 
 
 Wash. 280, 38 Pac. 1040 666 
 
 y. Shores, 20 Cal. 277 936 
 
 V. Singleton (1893), 94 Ky. 336, 
 
 22 S. W. 337 63, 161 
 
 ?'. Tlirockmorton, 48 Cal. 482, 
 
 490 735 
 
 r. Tiffany, 3 Sandf. 695 541 
 
 Howard Iron Works i: Buffalo Ele- 
 vating Co. (1903), 176 N. Y. 1, 68 
 N. E. 66 867 
 
 Howe V. Gregg (1897), 52 S. C. 88, 
 
 29 S. E. 394 351 
 V. Harper (1900), 127 N. C. 356, 
 
 37 S. E. 505 179 
 
 V. Northern Pac. Rv. Co. (1902), 
 
 30 Wash 569, 70 Pac. 1100 302 
 V. Peckham, 10 Barb. 656 476, 497 
 
 Howell V. Howell, 15 Wis. 55 821 
 
 Howe Machine Co. v. Reber, 66 Ind. 
 489 908 
 
 Howes r. Racine, 21 Wis. 514 
 Howie r. Bratrud (1901), 14 S. D. 
 
 648, 86 N. W. 747 
 Howland r. Fish, 1 Paige, 20 
 V. Howland, 20 Hun, 472 
 V. Jeuel (1893), 55 Minn. 102, 56 
 
 N. W. 581 
 V. Needham, 10 Wis. 495 71, 
 
 Howland Coal, etc. Works v. Brown, 
 
 13 Bush, 681 
 Ilowse V. Moody, 14 Fla. 59, 449 
 
 CI 
 
 118 
 
 600 
 254 
 226 
 
 674 
 633 
 
 665 
 
 374, 473, 
 
 502 
 
 Howsmon v. Trenton Water Co. 
 (1893), 119 Mo. 304, 24 S. W. 784 
 
 Ilowtli 
 
 106, 
 107 
 
 343, 
 348 
 
 Owens, 29 Fed. Rep. 722 
 34 
 Hoxsie V. Kempton (1899), 77 Minn. 
 
 462, 80 N. W. 353 703 
 
 Hoye i\ Raymond, 25 Kan. 665 499 
 
 Hoyer r. Ludington (1898), 100 Wis. 
 
 441, 76 N. W. 348 565, 567 
 
 Hoyt V. Beach (1897), 104 la. 257, 73 
 N. W. 492 
 r. McNeil, 13 Minn. 390 
 Hubbard v. Burrell, 41 Wis. 365 
 
 710 
 821 
 211, 
 251 
 
 277 
 
 612 
 
 118 
 
 340 
 
 310 
 
 51 
 
 49 
 
 639 
 
 V. Gurney, 64 N. Y. 457 
 
 V. Haley (1897), 96 Wis. 578, 71 
 
 N. W. 1036 
 V. Johnson Cy. Sup., 23 Iowa, 
 
 130 
 
 V. Moore, 132 Ind. 178 375 
 
 Hubbell V. Lerch, 58 N. Y. 2.37 197, 504 
 
 « i>. Medburv, 53 N. Y. 98 149,261 
 
 V. Meigs, 50 N. Y. 480 301, 523 
 
 V. Merchants' Bk. of Sj'racuse, 
 
 42 Hun, 200 
 V. Skiles, 16 Ind. 138 
 V. Von Schoening, 49 N. Y. 330 
 Hubble I'. Vaughan, 42 Mo. 138 
 Hubenka v. Vach (1902), 64 Neb. 170, 
 
 89 N. W. 789 
 Huber v. Egner (1901), Ky., 61 S. W. 
 
 353 137, 933 
 
 Hubler v. PuUen, 9 Ind. 273 801 
 
 Huckelbridge v. Atcheson, etc. Ry. 
 Co. (1903), 66 Kan. 443, 71 Pac. 
 814 642, 819 
 
 Hudelson >;. First Nat. Bank (1897), 
 
 51 Neb. 557, 71 N. W. 304 605, 
 684, 688, 802 
 V. First Nat. Bank (1898), 56 
 
 Neb. 247, 76 N. W. 570 613, 
 718 
 Hudson V. Archer (1893), 4 S. D. 128, 
 
 55 N. W. 1099 149, 666, 713 
 
 V. Atchison Cy. Coni'rs, 12 Kan. 
 
 140 265 
 
 V. Baratt (1901), 62 Kan. 137, 61 
 
 Pac. 737 96, 102, 646 
 
 V. Caryl, 44 N. Y. 553 29, 30 
 
 V. Eisenmayer Milling, etc. Co., 
 
 79 Tex. 401 351 
 
 V. McCartney, 33 Wis. 331 621
 
 Cll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references 
 Hudson V. Scottish Union Ins. Co. 
 (UK)l), 110 Kv. 7-J2, 62 
 S. \V. 513 
 V. Wabash W. Ky. Co., 101 Mo. 
 
 lo 
 Ilueston 1-. Mississippi & liuni River 
 
 Boom Co. (180'.*), 70 Minn. 251, 
 
 T'.i X. \V. 92 
 llulT.iiverc. Nat. Bank. 12 Busli, 287 
 liuffinim r. Knitjiit (1900), 36 Ore. 
 
 581, 00 I'lic. 207 
 llufnagel c. Mt. Vernon, 49 Hun, 
 
 2b0 
 Hughes t: Boone, 81 N. C. 204 
 
 54i 
 
 466 
 
 758 
 
 470 
 
 225 
 173, 219, 
 
 248 
 
 Co. 
 30 
 
 52,78 
 
 1-. Chicaco & Alton R. R 
 (1894), 127 xMo. 447 
 S. W. 127 
 V. Davis, 40 Cal. 117 
 V. Diinlap, 91 Cal. 385 
 r. Uav (1903), 132 N. C. 50, 43 
 
 S". E. 539 
 r. Ilunner (1895), 91 Wis. 116, 
 
 04 N. W. 887 444, 408, 711 
 
 V. Lansing (1898), 34 Ore. 118, 
 
 55 Pac. 95 
 V. McCollough (1901), 39 Ore. 
 
 372. 65 Pac. 85 
 V. McUivitt, 102 Mo. 107 
 V. Oregon I^v. & Nav. Co., 11 
 
 Ore. 437' 
 i>. Pratt (l'.)OO), 37 Ore. 45, GO 
 Pac. 707 
 Huchsen /•. Cookson, 3 Y. & C. 578 
 llulbert r. Brackett (1894), 8 Wash. 
 438, .30 I'ac. 264 
 c. New Nonpareil Co. (1900), 111 
 la. 490, «2 N. W. 928 
 llulce i". 'rh(ini])son, 9 How. Pr. 113 
 Hull l: Carter, 83 N. C. 249 
 
 V. Vreeland. 18 Abb. Pr. 182 
 Humbert c. Brisbane, 25 S. C. 500 
 
 817 
 82 
 42 
 
 338 
 
 689 
 
 604 
 037 
 
 298 
 
 712 
 244 
 
 638 
 
 818 
 526 
 713 
 519 
 916, 
 928 
 661 
 
 Hume r. Dessar. 29 Ind. 112 
 
 V. Kelly (1896), 28 Ore. 398, 43 
 
 Pac. 380 638, 644 
 
 Hunimel r. Moore, 25 Fed. Rep. 380 831 
 lliiniphrev r. Carpenter, 39 Minn. 
 
 l"l5 820 
 
 r. Fair, 79 Ind. 410 576 
 
 I'. .Mcrritt, 51 N. Y. 197 918, 930 
 
 V. Ringler (1H95), 94 la. 182, 62 
 
 N. W. 685 
 
 Humphrevs v. Crane, 5 Cal. 173 
 
 .-. Hullis, .lac. 73 
 Humplon r. Unterkircher (1896), 97 
 
 la. 509, 60 N. W. 776 
 
 Hun (• Cary, H2 N. Y. 65 301, 354 
 
 Hunt V. AtTf, 2H Ala. 580 257 
 
 V. Brown, 146 Mass. 253 939 
 
 V. Chapman, 51 N. Y. 555 858, 87.3, 
 
 ' . City of Dubuque (1895), 96 
 
 la. 314, 65 N. W. 319 026 
 
 I'. Ilayt, 15 Pac. 410 b20 
 
 056 
 293 
 255 
 
 670 
 
 ARE TO TUE PAGES.] 
 
 Hunt r. Johnston (1898), 1051a. 311, 
 
 75 N. W. 103 703 
 
 V. Peacock, Hare, 361 250 
 
 I'. Rooney, 77 Wis. 258 379 
 
 r. Winfield, 36 Wis 154 229 
 
 Hunter v. Grande Ronde Lumber 
 Co. (1901), 39 Ore. 448, 65 
 Pac. 598 778, 817 
 
 I'. Hathawav (1900), 108 Wis. 
 
 620, 84 N. W. 9'.t6 (909, 913 
 
 v. Hunter (1900), 58 S. C. 382, 
 
 36 S. E. 743 818 
 
 r. Macklew. 5 Hare, 238 247 
 
 r. Martin, 57 Cal. 365 753 
 
 r. .Matliis, 40 Ind. 356 769, 783 
 
 >: McCoy, 14 Ind. 528 472 
 
 c. McLaughlin, 43 Ind. 38 792 
 
 V. Mercer Cv. Cora'rs, 10 Ohio 
 
 St. 515 " 151 
 
 r. Powell, 15 How. Pr. 221 522, 610 
 Hunter's Appeal (1898), 71 Conn. 
 
 189,41 Atl. 557 711 
 
 Huntington v. Folk (1899), 154 Ind. 
 
 91,44N. E. 759 643 
 
 r. Lombard (1900), 22 AYasli. 
 
 202, 60 Pac. 414 812 
 
 i: Mendenhall, 73 Ind. 460 618 
 
 Ilurd r. llotchkiss (1900), 72 Conn. 
 
 472, 45 Atl. 11 191 
 
 >•. Simpson, 47 Kan. 372 190 
 
 llurlburt r. Palmer (1894), 39 Neb. 
 
 158, 57 N. W. 1019 819 
 
 Hurlbut c Leper (1900), 12 S. D. 
 
 321, 81 N. W. 631 579, 584 
 
 v. Post, 1 Bosw. 28 292 
 
 Hurlbutt V. N. W. Spaulding Saw 
 
 Co., 93 Cal. 55 38 
 
 Hurley ;;. Rvan (1897), 119 Cal. 71, 
 
 51 Pac. 20 684 
 
 V. Ryan (1902), 137 Cal. 461, 
 
 70 Pac. 292 683 
 
 Huron v. Mevers (1900), 13 S. D. 
 
 420, 83 N. W. 553 865, 866 
 
 Hurst V. Litchfield, 39 N. Y. 377 584, 587 
 V. Sawyer (1894), 2 Okla. 470, 37 
 
 Pac. 817 661 
 
 Hurt r. Barnes, 24 Neb. 782 651 
 
 Huse V. Ames, 104 Mo. 91 131, 135 
 
 Huson V. McKenzie, Dev. Eq. 463, 249 
 Huston r. Craisrhead, 23 Oliio St. 
 
 198 ^ 821 
 
 V. Plato, 3 Colo 402 ■ 649 
 
 V. Stringham, 21 Iowa, 36 326, 327, 
 
 329 
 V. Twin & C. C. Turnp. Co , 45 
 
 Cal. 550 754 
 
 V. Tyler (1897), 140 Mo. 252, 36 
 
 S. W. 054 24, 588 
 
 Ilutchcroft r. Herren (1898), 33 Ore. 
 
 1,52 Pac. 692 629 
 
 Ilutchcrson v. Durden (1901), 113 
 
 Ga. 987, 39 S. E. 495 679 
 
 HutchiuKs r. Castle, 48 Cal. 152 718, 724 
 
 v. Moore, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 110 865 
 
 V. Weems, 35 .Mo. 285 104
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cm 
 
 [tee references 
 
 Hutchinson v. Ainsworth, 73 Cal. 
 
 4o2, 15 Vnc. Hep. 82 463 
 
 V. Hoberts, 67 N. C. 223 250 
 Hutchison V. Myers (1893), 52 Kan. 
 
 290, 34 Pac. 742 141, 607 
 
 Hutson V. King (1894), 95 Ga. 271, 
 
 22 S. E. G15 658 
 
 Hyatt V. Cocliran, 85 Ind. 231 189 
 
 Hyde v. Hazel, 43 Md. App. 668 801 
 V. Kenosha Cv. Sup. 43 Wis. 
 
 129 " 6(51 
 
 V. Lambersoi). 1 Malio, 536 820 
 
 V. Mansran, 88 Cal. 319 51, 782 
 
 Hynds v. Hays, 25 Ind. 31 611 
 
 Hynes v. Farmer's L. & T. Co., 9 
 
 N. Y. Siippl. 260 499 
 
 Iba V. Central Ass'n of Wyoming 
 
 (1895), 5 Wyo. 355, 40 Pac. 527 781 
 Idaho Gold Reduction Co. v. Cro- 
 ghan (1899), 6 Idaho, 471, 56 Pac. 
 164 354 
 
 Iliff r. Brazill, 27 Iowa, 131 935 
 
 Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Mat- 
 thews (1903), — Ky. — , 72 S. W. 
 302 117 
 
 Illinois Steel Co. v. Budzisz (1900), 
 
 106 Wis. 499, 82 N. W. 534 638 
 
 lUsly V. Grayson (1898), 105 la. 685 
 
 75 N. W. 518 866, 909 
 
 Imhoff V. House (1893), 36 Neb. 28, 
 
 53 N. W. 1032 614 
 
 Imperial Shale Rrick Co. v. Jewetc 
 ( 1901), 169 N. Y. 143, 62 N. E. 167 20, 
 30, 466, 473 
 Indep. Sch. Dist., etc. See Graham, 
 
 etc. 
 Indiana, etc. Ass'n v. Crawley (1898), 
 
 151 Ind. 413, 51 N. E. 466 850, 
 863 
 r. Plank (1898), 152 Ind. 197, 
 
 52 N. E. 991 543 
 
 In re. See name of party. 
 Indiana & 111. Cent. R. Co. v. McKer- 
 
 nan, 24 Ind. 62 310, 357 
 
 Indiana Natural Gas Co. v. O'Brien 
 
 (1903), — Ind. — 66 N. E. 742 778 
 
 Indiana Trust Co. i: Finitzer (1903), 
 
 — Ind. — , 67 N. E. 520 783 
 
 Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Center 
 Townsliip (1895), 143 Ind. 
 6.3, 40 N. E. 134 643 
 
 V. Price (1899), 153 Ind. 31, 53 
 
 N. E. 1018 196 
 
 Indianapolis, First Nat. Bank of, v. 
 Indianapolis Piano Man. Co., 45 
 Ind. 5 307 
 
 Indianapolis & Cin. R. Co. v. Ballard, 
 
 22 Ind. 448 935 
 
 r. Rutherford, 29 Ind. 82 748, 778 
 Indianapolis & V. R. Co. v. McCaf- 
 ferv, 72 Ind. 307 609 
 
 ARE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Indianapolis, B. & W. R. Co. v. 
 Adamson, 114 Ind. 282 
 V. Milligan, 50 Ind. 393 
 v. Risley, 50 Ind. 60 713, 
 
 Indianapolis, C. & L. R. Co. v. Robin- 
 son, 35 Ind. 380 
 Indianapolis, E. R. & S. W. R. Co. 
 
 r. Hyde, 122 Ind. 188 
 IndiauMpolis F. & M. Co. v. Her- 
 kimer, 46 Ind. 142 
 Indianapolis St. Uy. Co. v. Robinson 
 (1901), 157 Ind. 414, 61 N. E. 936 
 
 Ingle V. Jones, 43 Iowa, 286 
 Ingles 
 
 428, 
 546, 
 Patterson, 36 Wis. 373 
 
 Ingols V. Plimpton, 10 Colo. 535 
 Ingraham v. Disbrough,47 N. Y. 421 
 
 V. Lyon (1894), 105 Cal. 254, 38 
 Pac. 892 592, 
 
 Inslee v. Hampton, 8 Hun, 230 939, 
 Insley v. Shire (1895), 54 Kan. 793, 
 
 39 Pac. 713 
 Insurance Co. /-. Bonner (1897), 24 
 Colo. 220, 49 Pac. 366 605, 
 V. BuUene (1893), 51 Kan. 764, 
 
 33 Pac. 467 
 V. McLeod (1896), 57 Kan. 95, 
 45 Pac. 73 
 Internal Imp. Fund Trs. v. Gleason, 
 
 15 Fla. 384 
 International Bank of St. L. n. 
 
 Franklin Cy., 65 Mo. 105 
 Interstate Savings, etc. Ass'n v. 
 Knapp (1898), 20 Wash. 225, 55 
 Pac. 48 
 Iowa & Cal. Land Co. v. Hoag (1901), 
 
 132 Cal. 627, 64 Pac. 1073 
 Iowa & Minn. R. Co. v. Perkins, 28 
 
 Iowa, 281 
 Iowa, etc. Tel. Co. v. Schamber 
 
 (1902), 15 S. D. 588, 91 N. W. 78 
 
 Iowa Savings, etc. Ass'n v. Selby 
 
 (1900), 111 la. 402, 82 N. W. 968 
 
 Iowa Sav. Bank v. Frink (1902), 
 
 Neb., 92 N. W. 916 
 Ireland v. Nichols, 1 Sweeney, 208 . 
 Ireson v. Denn, 2 Cox, 425 
 Ireton v. Lewes, Finch, 96 
 Irish V. Snelson, 16 Ind. 365 
 
 V. Sunderhaus (1898), 122 Cal. 
 308, 54 Pac. 1113 
 Irvin V. Wood, 4 Robt. 138 
 Irwin V. Richardson (1894), 88 Wis. 
 429, 60 N. W. 786 
 V. Walling (1896), 4 Okla. 128, 
 44 Pac. 219 
 Isaacs V. Holland, 1 Wash. 54 
 Iselin V. Rowlands, 30 Hun, 488 
 V. Simon (1895), 62 Minn. 128, 
 64 N. W. 143 
 Isham V. Davidson, 52 N. Y. 237 
 
 205 
 575 
 
 753 
 
 563 
 
 727 
 785 
 
 am, 
 
 673 
 541. 
 751 
 51, 
 886 
 878 
 122, 
 124, 
 
 ,594 
 ,940 
 
 498 
 
 ,606 
 
 470 
 
 672 
 
 350 
 
 609 
 
 816 
 
 91 
 
 520 
 
 711 
 
 758 
 
 780 
 15 
 246 
 248 
 935 
 
 687 
 305 
 
 20 
 
 286 
 
 592 
 
 93 
 
 764 
 874, 
 911
 
 CIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the bcfeeences are to the pages.] 
 
 Islais, etc. Water Co. v. Allen (I'JOl), 
 
 132 Cal. 432, G4 Pac. 713 867 
 Island Coal Co. v. Streitlemier 
 
 ( 18144), 13y Ind. 88, 37 N. E. 340 946 
 
 Isler c. Koonce, bi N. C. 55 412 
 
 Islev r. lluher, 45 Ind. 421 701, 805 
 
 Iverson c. Cirkel (18D4), 56 Minn. 
 
 25iy, 57 N. W. 800 818 
 
 Ives V. Miller, lit Barb. 196 935 
 r. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1901), 
 
 12y X. C. 28, 39 8. E. 031 158 
 
 1-. Van Epps, 22 Wend. 155 842 
 
 Jack v. Ilosmer (1806), 97 la. 17, 65 
 
 N. \V. 1009 930 
 
 Jackins i-. Dickinson (1893), 39 S. C. 
 
 436, 17 S. E. 990 455, 466 
 
 Jackson r. Allen, 30 Ark. 110 283 
 
 V. Dacigett, 24 Ilun. 204 88 
 
 V. Featiier River Co., 14 Cal. 18 778 
 V. Fosbender. 45 Ind. 305 727 
 
 V. Ha mm, 14 Colo. 58 97 
 
 V. Jackson, 94 Cal. 446 637 
 
 V. McAulev (1895), 13 Wash. 
 
 2;tt<, 43 Pac. 41 276, 715 
 
 V. Rawlins, 2 Veni. 195 372, 377 
 
 1-. .Scliool Dist. (1900), 110 la. 
 
 313. 81 N. \V. 596 794, 825 
 
 V. Whedon, 1 E. D. Smith, 141 814 
 Jackson Sliarp Co. v. Holland, 14 
 
 Fla. 384 718, 758 
 
 Jacob c. Lorenz (1893), 98 Cal. 332, 
 
 33 I'ac. 119 4.33 
 
 -•. Lucas, 1 Beav. 436 258 
 
 Jacob .Sultan Co. r. Union Co. (1895), 
 
 17 Mont. 61, 42 Pac. 109 599, 600 
 
 Jacobi r. .Mifkle (1894), 144 N. Y. 
 
 237, 39 N. E. 66 334 
 
 Jacobs r. First Nat. Bank (1896), 15 
 
 Wash. 3o8, 46 Pac. 306 816 
 
 I'. Gilreatii (1893), 41 S. C. 143, 
 
 19 S. E. .308 644 
 
 V. Ho^'an {UiOO), 73 Conn. 740, 
 
 49 Atl. 202 676, 757 
 
 r. Oren (1897), .30 Ore. 693, 
 
 48 Pac. 431 687 
 
 r. Remsen, 12 Abb. Pr. 390 805 
 
 1-. Vaill (1903), — Kan. — , 72 
 
 Pac. 530 709 
 
 Jacobson >■. Tallard (1903), 116 Wis. 
 
 602, 93 X. W. 841 639 
 
 Jacot .•. Boyle, 18 How. Pr. 106 342 
 
 Jat'ircr r. .Sunde (1807), 70 Minn. 
 
 :W,. 73 X. W. 171 271 
 
 Jaffe I-. I>ilientlial, Hf, Cal. 91 594 
 
 Ja^'l•r» r. .lagers, 40 In<l. 165 439 
 
 Janus - . ( halmers, 6 X. V. 209 93 
 
 I-. City of St. Paul (1898), 72 
 
 Minn. 138, 75 X. W. 5 703 
 
 V. Cutter, 03 Cal. 31 895 
 
 V. Kellcy (1H!>9), 107 Ga. 446, 33 
 
 «. E. 425 678 
 
 James v. McPhee, 9 Colo. 486 737, 
 v. Mutual Lite Ass'n (1899), 148 
 
 Mo. 1, 49 S. W. 978 
 V. Western N. C. IJ. K. Co. (1897), 
 
 121 N. C. 530, 2b S. E. 537 
 r. A\'ilder, 25 Minn. .305 
 James River Bank r. Purchase (1900), 
 9 ^^ D. 280, 83 X. W. 7 606, 
 
 Jameson r. Bartlett (1002), 03 Xeb. 
 638, 88 X. W. 860 205, 
 
 V. Coldwell. 31 Pac. Rep. 279 
 V. King, 50 Cal. 1-32 
 Jamison v. Coplier, 35 Mo. 483 
 
 V. Culligan (1899), 151 Mo. 410, 
 52 S. W. 224 444, 
 
 Janes v. Williams, 31 Ark. 175 321, 
 Jaques v. Dawes (1902), — Neb. — , 
 
 92 N. W. 570 
 Jarrell v. Railroad Co. (1000), 58 
 
 S. C. 491, .36 S. E. 910 
 Jarvis v. Xorthwestern Mutual Re- 
 lief Ass'n (1899), 102 Wis. 
 546, 78 X. W. 1089 
 V. Peck, 10 Wis. 74 861, 
 
 Jaseph V. People's Sav. Bank, 22 
 
 N. E. Rep. 980 
 Jasper r. Hazen, 2 X. Dak. 401 
 Jasper County Rv. Co. r. Curtis 
 
 ( 1900), 154 Mo. iO, 55 S. W. 222 
 Jaucli V. Jaucli, 50 Ind. 1.35 
 Javcox V. Caldwell, 51 N. Y. 395 
 .Jeffers v. Forbes, 28 Kan. 174 242, 
 Jefferson v. Asch (1893), 53 Minn. 
 446, 65 X. W. 604 106, 
 
 V. Hale, 31 Ark. :^86 
 Jefferson Cy. Com'rs r. Lineberger, 
 3 Mont. 31 
 V. Swain, 5 Kan. 376 290, 
 
 Jeffersonville. etc. Co. r. Riter (1896), 
 
 14(1 Ind. 521, 45 X. E. 697 
 Jeffersonville M. & I. R. Co. r. 
 Bowen, 40 Ind. 545 
 r. Dunlap, 29 Ind. 426 
 V. Oyler, 60 Ind.. 383 
 V. Vancant, 40 Ind. 233 
 V. Worland, 50 Ind. .339 
 Jeffrie r. Walsh, 14 Xev. 143 
 .Jemison ;•. Walsli, 30 Ind. 167 
 Jenkins r. Long, 19 Ind. '28 
 
 V. McCarthy (1895), 45 S. 
 
 278, 22 S. E. 883 
 V. Mitcliell (1804), 40 Xeb. 004, 
 
 59 N. W. 90 
 V. N. C. Ore Dressing Co., 65 
 
 N. C. 663 
 V. Smith, 4 Met. (Ky.) 380 
 r. Steanka, 19 Wis. 126 
 V. Taylor (1900), Ky., 59 S. W. 
 
 853 
 V. Thompson, 32 S. C. 254 
 Jcnks y. Lansing Lumber Co. (1890), 
 07 la. 342, 66 X. W. 231 520, 
 
 V. Opp, 43 Ind. 108 
 
 btb, 
 748, 
 
 060, 
 
 789, 
 C. 
 
 874 
 
 689 
 
 703 
 452 
 
 607 
 
 461 
 811 
 598 
 457, 
 523 
 
 498 
 ,343 
 
 410 
 
 608 
 
 642 
 
 886 
 
 29 
 658 
 
 816 
 707 
 316 
 503 
 
 107 
 609 
 
 155 
 299 
 
 620 
 778 
 887 
 725 
 614 
 637 
 65 
 811 
 
 625 
 
 780 
 
 662 
 245 
 736 
 
 473 
 457 
 
 796. 
 
 822 
 289
 
 TABLE OF CASES CUED. 
 
 CV 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Jenney Electric Co. v. Branhai) 
 (1896), 145 Ind. 314, 41 N. E. 448 584, 
 
 587 
 Jennings v. Kiernan (18U8), 35 Ore. 
 
 349, 55 Pac. 443 670 
 
 i;. Parr (1808), 54 S. C. 109, 32 
 
 S. E. 73 035 
 
 r. Paterson, 15 Bcav. "28 347 
 
 r. Reeves, 101 N. C. 447 29 
 
 Jennings Cy. Coni'rs v. Verbarg, 63 
 
 Ind. 107 584 
 
 Jepsen r. Beck, 78 Cal. 540 66 
 
 Jerome c. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734 334 
 
 Je.sse V. Bennett, 6 DeG. M. & G. 
 
 600 253, 352 
 
 Jessup V. City Bank, 14 Wis. 331 475 
 
 Jewett r. Honey Creek Dr. Co., 89 
 
 Ind. 245 661 
 
 V. Maloct, (1899), 60 Kan. 509, 
 
 57 Pac. 100 641 
 r. Tucker, 1.39 Mass. 566 254 
 
 J. I. Case Thresliing Co. ;;. Pederson 
 (1894), 6S. D. 140, 60 N. W. 747 96, 714 
 
 J. K. Orr Co. r. Kimbrough (1896), 
 99 Ga. 143, 25 S. E. 204 356 
 
 Joergenson v. Joergenson (1902), 28 
 Wasli. 477, 68 Pac. 913 819 
 
 Joest V. Williams, 42 Ind. 565 790 
 
 Johannesson i\ Borsclienius, 35 Wis. 
 131 69, 72, 626, 631 
 
 John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Drug- 
 gists' Ass'n (1903), 175 N. Y. 1, 
 67 N. E. 136 709 
 
 John R. Davis Lumber Co. v. The 
 First National Bank of Mil- 
 waukee (1894), 87 Wis. 435, 
 
 58 N. W. 743 410, 642 
 V. Home Insurance Co. of New 
 
 York (1897), 95 Wis. 542,70 
 N. W. 84 498 
 
 Johns V. Northwestern Mut. Relief 
 Ass. (1891), 87 Wis. 111,58 
 
 N. w. 76 657, em 
 
 V. Potter, 55 Iowa, 665 611 
 
 V. Wilson (1898), Ariz., 53 Pac. 
 
 583 328 
 
 Johnson v. Ashland Lumber Co., 44 
 
 Wis. 119 576 
 
 V. Bamberger, 19 S. W. Rep. 
 
 920 112 
 
 V. Bank (1898), 59 Kan. 250, 52 
 
 Pac. 860 703 
 
 V. Bellingham Bay Co. (1896), 
 
 13 Wash. 455, 43 Pac. 370 673 
 V. Britton, 23 Ind. 105 271, 325, 333 
 V. Chandler, 15 B. Mon. 584 413 
 
 V. C. R. L & P. R. Co., 50 Iowa, 
 
 25 575 
 
 V. Cuddington, 35 Ind. 43 769, 805, 
 
 806 
 V. Detrick (1899), 152 Mo. 243, 
 
 53 S. W. 891 819, 830 
 
 V. Dicken, 25 Mo. 580 229 
 
 V. Douglass (1894), 60 Ark. 39, 
 
 28 S. W. 515 600 
 
 Johnson v. Filkington, 39 Wis. 62 637 
 V. Foster, 60 Iowa, 140 327 
 
 V. Geneva Pub. Co. (1894), 122 
 
 Mo. 102, 26 S. W. 676 872 
 
 V. Colder, 132 N. Y. 116 470, 473 
 
 V. Gooch ( 1894), 114 N. C. 62, 19 
 
 S. E.62 178,170,813 
 
 V. Gunter, 6 Bush, 534 870 
 
 V. Ilesser (1901), 61 Neb. 631, 85 
 
 N. W. 894 794 
 
 V. Hosford, 10 N. E. Rep. 407 333 
 V. Keeler, 46 Kan. 304 375 
 
 V. Kent, 9 Ind. 252 881, 936 
 
 V. Kilgore, 39 Ind. 147 564, 584 
 
 V. Kirby, 65 Cal. 482 499 
 
 V. Knapp, ."'6 Iowa, 616 105 
 
 V. Miller, 47 Ind. 376 814 
 
 V. Monell, 13 Iowa, 300 326, 327 
 
 V. Moss, 45 Cal. 515 622 
 
 V. Greg. Nav. Co., 8 Ore. 35 576 
 
 V. Oswald, 88 Minn. 550 779 
 
 V. Polliemus (1893), 99 Cal. 240, 
 
 38 Pac. 908 665 
 
 V. Puritan Min. Co. (1.^96), 19 
 
 Mont. 30, 47 Pac. 837 669 
 
 V. Reed (1896), 47 Neb. 322, 66 
 
 N. W. 405 735 
 
 V. Robinson, 20 Minn. 170 365, 596, 
 
 599 
 V. Strader, 3 Mo. 359 649 
 
 V. Tyler, 1 Ind. App. 387 801 
 
 V. Vance, 86 Cal. 128 562 
 
 V. White, 6 Hun, 587 704 
 
 V. Wynne (1902), 64 Kan. 138, 
 
 67 Pac. 549 709, 822 
 
 Johnson-Brinkman Co. v. Bank 
 
 (1893), 116 Mo. 558,22S.W. 
 
 813 584 
 
 V. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1894), 126 
 
 Mo. 344, 28 S. W. 870 656 
 
 Johnston y. Don van, 106N. Y.269 326,406 
 V. McDuffee, 83 Cal. 30 332 
 
 V. Meaghr (1897), 14 Utah, 426, 
 
 47 Pac. 861 594 
 
 r. Neville, 68 N. C. 177 413, 414 
 
 V. Northwestern Live Stock Ins. 
 
 Co. (1896), 94 Wis. 117,68 
 
 N. W. 868 599, 817 
 
 V. Ohver (1894), 51 0. St. 6, 
 
 36 N. E. 458 410 
 
 V. Pate, 83 N. C. 110 576 
 
 V. Spencer (1897), 51 Neb. 198, 
 
 70 N. W. 982 693, 678 
 
 Joliet Iron, etc. Co. v. Chic. C. & W. 
 
 R. Co., 51 Iowa, 300 428 
 
 Jolly V. Terre Haute, etc. Co., 9 Ind. 
 
 421 541 
 
 Jones, A'e (Supreme, 1888), 1 N. Y. 
 
 Suppl. 127 870 
 
 V. Accident Ass'n (1894), 92 la. 
 
 652, 61 N. W. 485 672 
 
 V. Billstein, 28 Wis. 221 240 
 
 v. Burtis (1894), 88 Wis. 478, 60 
 
 N. W. 785 676 
 
 V. Cin. Type Foundry, 14 Ind. 89 786
 
 CVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [thb referesces are to the pages.] 
 
 Jones I'. Citv of rortland (1899), 35 
 
 Ore. 512. 58 Pac. 657 682 
 
 V. Driscoll (18Ho), 40 Neb. 575,65 
 
 N. W. 104 OSl 
 
 r. Ed.lv, 90 Cal. 147 739 
 
 V. Feldi. 3 Bosw 63 195 
 
 V. Frust, 51 Ind. 69 675, 713, 727, 
 
 791 
 V. Goo(lcliil(l, 3 P. Wms. 33 253 
 
 V. H-.ar, 5 Pick. 285 649 
 
 V. How, 7 Hare, 2(57 347 
 
 v. Jones, 3 Atk. 110 348 
 
 V. Keep, 23 Wis. 45 293 
 
 V. Lantihorne ( 1893), 19 Colo. 206, 
 
 34 Phc. 997 288 
 
 V. Lu.Uum. 74 N. Y. 61 730 
 
 V. McQuueii (1896), 13 Utah, 178, 
 
 45 Pac. 202 780 
 
 V. Mial, 79 N. C. 164 578, 581, 584 
 
 V. Moore, 42 Mo. 419 861, 886, 917, 
 
 927, 935 
 
 V. Pacific Drerlfring Co. (1903), 
 
 Idaho, 72 I'ac. 95t) 674 
 
 1-. Palmer. 1 Abb. Pr. 442 6(;0 
 
 r. Pearl Min. Co. (1894), 20 Colo. 
 
 417, 38 Pac. 700 002 
 
 r. Perot (1893), 19 Col. 141, 34 
 
 Pac. 728 756 
 
 V. Piening, 55 X. W. Rep. 413 132 
 V. Rahillv, 16 Minn. 320 779 
 
 V. Rush "(1900), 156 Mo. 364, 57 
 
 S. W. 118 • 764, 773 
 
 V. Seward Cy. Com'rs, 10 Neb. 
 
 154 769, 772 
 
 r. Shaw, 67 Mo. 667 791 
 
 v. Sheboj-gan, etc. R. Co., 42 Wis. 
 
 307 778, 785 
 
 1-. Smith, 2 Ves. 372 , 246 
 
 V. Steamship Cortes, 17 Cal. 487 71, 
 
 488, 495 
 
 V. Stoddart (1902), Idaho, 67 Pac. 
 
 650 638 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. Rv. Co. (1896), 
 
 16 Wash. 25, 47 Pac. 226 605 
 f. Swank (18!);;), 54 Minn. 259, 
 
 55 N. W. 1126 913, 928,931 
 
 V. Vantress, 23 In.l. 533 413, 415 
 
 V. Williinns, 31 Ark. 175 238 
 
 r. Witousi-k (1901), 114 la. 14, 
 
 86 N. W. 59 938 
 
 Jones' Admr. «•. 111. Cent. R. R. Co. 
 
 (1902), Ky., 66 S. W. 609 641 
 
 Jone.s Co. ,-. Daniel (1899), 67 Ark. 
 
 20<}. 53 S. W.890 655 
 
 Jonesbfiro & F. Turnp. Co. v. Bald- 
 win. 57 Ind 86 778 
 Jopp -•. Wood, 2 DeG. J. & S. 323 258 
 Jordan r. Coulter (1902), 30 Wash. 
 
 110, 70 Pac. 257 612 
 
 r. Estate of Warner (1900), 107 
 
 Wis. 539, 83 X. W. 940 466, 493 
 
 V. Kavanaugh, 03 Iowa, 152 112 
 
 V. While, 20 Minn. 91 105 
 
 JofRenson r. Btitte Co. (1803), 13 
 
 Mont. 288, 34 Pac. 37 643 
 
 Joseph Des-xert Lumber Co. i-. Wad- 
 leigh ( 1899), 103 Wis. 318, 79 N. W. 
 237 8. 72 
 
 Josey I'. Union Loan & Trust Co. 
 
 (1898), 106 Ga. 608, 32 S. E. 628 292 
 Joshua Hendv, etc. Works c. Dillon 
 
 (1901), 135 "Cal. 9, 66 Pac. 960 422 
 
 Joslin V. Williams (1901), 61 Neb. 859, 
 
 86 N. W. 473 337 
 
 Joubert v. Carli, 26 Wis. 594 573. 592 
 
 Joyce !-•. Growney (1900), 154 Mo. 
 
 253, 55 S. W. 466 943 
 
 V. Whitney, 57 Ind. 550 942 
 
 Judah r. Vincennes Univ. Trs., 16 
 
 Ind. 56 919,927.937 
 
 V. Vincennes Univ. Trs , 23 Ind. 
 
 272 745 
 
 Judd V. Grav (1900), 156 Ind. 278, 59 
 
 N. H. 849 807 
 
 V. MosL-lev, 30 Iowa, 423 360 
 
 r. Young," 7 How. Pr. 79 418 
 
 Judv r. Farmers' & Tr. Bk., 70 Mo. 
 
 407 412 
 
 Julian V. Hoosier Drill Co., 78 Ind. 
 
 408 
 Justice V. Phillips, 3 Bush, 200 178, 202 
 
 Kahier v. Iowa, etc. Ins. Co. (1898). 
 
 106 la. 380, 76 X. W. 734 816, 819 
 
 Kahn v. Kahn, 15 Fla. 400 29, 470 
 
 V. Southern Bldg. Ass'n (1902), 
 
 115 Ga. 459, 41 S. E. 648 819 
 V. Traders' Ins. Co. (1893), 4 
 
 Wyo. 419, 34 Pac. 1059 804 
 Kahnweiler v. Anderson, 78 N. C. 
 
 133 117 
 
 Kahrs r. Kahrs (1902), 115 Ga. 288, 
 
 41 S. E. 049 849, 864 
 
 Kain v. Larkin (1894), 141 X. Y. 144. 
 
 39 X. E. 9 592 
 
 Kalckhoff v. Zoehrlaut, 40 Wis. 427 
 
 597, 649 
 Kalfus V. Kalfus, 18 S. W. Rep. 366 232 
 Kaline v. Stover (1893), 88 la. 245, 
 
 55 X. W. 346 625 
 
 Kamerick v. Castleman, 23 Mo. App. 
 
 481 901,918 
 
 Kaniinski v. Tudor Iron Works 
 (1902), 167 Mo. 462, 67 S. W. 221 778, 
 
 818 
 Kanini v. Ilarkcr, 3 Ore. 208 289 
 
 Kansas & C. P. Ry. Co. v. Fitz- 
 gerald, 33 Xeb. 137 428 
 Kansas City v. File (1899), 60 Kan. 
 
 157, 55 Pac. 877 303 
 
 r. Gamier (1896), 57 Kan. 412, 
 
 46 Pac. 707 677 
 
 V. Hart (1899), 60 Kan. 684, 57 
 
 Pac. 938 ■ 041 
 
 1-. King (1902), 05 Kan. 64, 68 
 
 Pac. 1093 96 
 
 V. Ridenour, 84 Mo. 253 933
 
 TABL?: OF CASES CITED. 
 
 evil 
 
 [the repbrences are to the pages ] 
 
 Kansas City, etc. Co. r. Osborne 
 
 (1903), — Kan. — , 71 Pac. 838 70.3 
 
 Kansas City, etc. H. R. Co. v. Becker 
 (1899), 67 Ark. 1, 53 S. W. 
 406 051 
 
 V. Pace (1901), 69 Ark. 256, 63 
 
 S. W. 62 817 
 
 Kansas City, First Nat. Bk. of, v. 
 
 Hogan, 47 Mo. 472 742 
 
 Kansas City Hotel Co. v. Sauer, 65 
 
 Mo. 279 662 
 
 r. Sigement, 53 Mo. 176 476 
 
 Kansas City Sewer Pipe Co. v. 
 Thompson (1893), 120 Mo. 218, 25 
 S. W. 522 107 
 
 Kansas Loan, etc. Co. v. Hutto, 48 
 
 Kan. 166 895 
 
 Kansas Nat. Bank v. Quinton (1897), 
 
 57 Kan. 750, 48 Pac. 20 831 
 
 Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. McBratney, 
 
 12 Kan. 9 64 
 
 V. McCormick, 20 Kan. 107 568 
 
 Karnes v. Rochester & G. Val. R. 
 
 Co., 4 Abb. Pr. N. s. 107 355 
 
 Kassing v. Ordway (1897), 100 la. 
 
 611, 69 N. W. 1013 6 
 
 Kasson v. People, 44 Barb. .347 301, 307 
 Kaster v. Kaster, 52 Ind. 531 598 
 
 Katzhausen v. Koeiiler, 42 Wis. 232 736 
 Kaufman v. Schoefliel, 37 Hun, 140 226 
 ('. U. S. Nat. Bk., 31 Neb. 661 112 
 Kaufmann v. Cooper (1896), 46 Neb. 
 
 644, 65 N. W. 796 106 
 
 Kaukauna Co. v. Kaukauna (1902), 
 
 114 Wis. 327, 89 N. W. 542 856 
 
 Kausal v. Minn. Farm. Mut. F. Ins. 
 
 Ass., 31 Minn. 17 209 
 
 Kavanaugii v. Barber, 131 N. Y. 211 225 
 I'. -Janesville, 24 Wis. 618 228 
 
 V. Oberfelder ( 1893), 37 Neb. 647, 
 
 56 N. W. 316 687 
 
 Kay V. Pruden (1897), 101 la. 60, 69 
 
 N. W. 1137 643 
 
 V. Whittaker, 44 N. Y. 565 325, '333, 
 
 740 
 Kaye v. Fosbrooke, 8 Sim. 28 254 
 
 Kayser v. Sichel, 34 Barb. 89 562, 651 
 Keairnes v. Durst (1899), 110 la. 
 
 114, 81 N. W. 288 612 
 
 Kearney Stone Works v. McPherson 
 (1894), 5 Wyo. 178, 38 Pac. 920 455, 
 515, 661, 702 
 Kear}' v. Mut. Res. Fund L. Ass., 
 
 30 Fed. Rep. .359 213 
 
 Keehn v. Keehn (1902), 115 la. 467, 
 
 88 N. W. 9.57 417 
 
 Keeler v. Keeler, 3 Stockt. 458 254, 261 
 Keens v. Gaslin, 24 Neb. 310 365 
 
 I'. Robertson (1896), 46 Neb. 837, 
 
 65 N. W. 897 776 
 
 Keen v. Kaufman, 56 N. Y. 332 522 
 
 Keifer v. Summers (1893), 137 Ind. 
 
 106, 35 N. E. 1103 934 
 
 Keightley v. Walls, 24 Ind. 205 9.35 
 
 Keim v. Avery, 7 Neb. 54 791 
 
 Roister r. Myers, 115 Ind. 312 
 Keitel v St. Louis Cable & W. Ry. 
 
 Co., 28 Mo. Ai)p. (i57 
 Kell V. Lund (1896), 99 la. 15-3, 68 
 
 N. W. 593 355, 
 
 Kellar v. Beelor, 5 Monr. 573 
 
 V. Pagan (1899), 54 S. C. 255, 
 32 S. E. 352 
 Keller v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 117 
 Ind. 556 
 V. Blasdel, 1 Nev. 491 
 V. Boatman, 49 Ind. 104 452, 
 
 r. CitvofSt. Louis (1899), 152 
 
 Mo. 596, 54 S. W. 438 
 V. Hicks, 22 Cal. 457 
 V. Johnson, 11 Ind. 337 
 V. Strong (1898), 1041a. 685, 73 
 
 N. W. 1071 
 V. Tracy, 11 Iowa, 5.30 
 V. Williams, 49 Ind. 504 
 Kelley v. Nebraska Exp. Ass'n 
 
 (1897), 52 Neb. 355, 72 
 
 N. W. 856 
 V. Thornton, 56 Mo. .325 
 V. Wehn (1902), 63 Neb. 410, 88 
 
 N. W. 682 
 Kellogg V. Adams, 51 Wis. 138 
 
 V. Aherin, 48 Iowa, 299 55, 
 
 V. Baker, 15 Abb. Pr. 286 
 
 V. Malin, 62 Mo. 429 
 
 V. Olmsted, How. Pr. 487 
 
 V. Oshkosli, 14 Wis. 623 
 
 V. Scheuerman (1897), 18 Wash. 
 
 293, 51 Pac. 344 
 V. Schuyler, 2 Uenio, 73 
 V. Sweeney 1 Lans. 397 
 V. Window (1897), 100 la. 552, 
 
 69 N. W. 875 290, 
 
 Kelly V. Bernheimer, 3 N. Y. S. C. 
 
 140 
 V. Cable Co. (1893), 13 Mont. 
 
 411,34 Pac. 611 
 V. Clark (1898), 21 Mont. 291, 
 
 53 Pac. 959 
 V. Dee, 2 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 286 
 V. Newman, 62 How. Pr. 156 
 
 •356 
 249 
 
 734 
 
 920 
 289 
 521, 
 727 
 
 220 
 516 
 789 
 
 655 
 3^6 
 310 
 
 785 
 
 V. Perrault (1897), Idaho, 48 
 
 Pac. 45 
 V. Strouse (1903), 116 Ga. 872, 43 
 
 S E 280 
 V. Thuey, 102 Mo. 522 104, 
 
 V. Town of Darlington (1893), 
 
 86 Wis. 482, 57 N. W. 51 
 V. Town of West Bend (1897), 
 101 la. 669, 70 N. W. 720 
 Kelsey i^. Bradbury, 21 Barb. 531 
 V. Henry, 48 Ind. 37 562, 
 
 r. Murray, 28 How. Pr. 243 417, 
 V. Welch (1896), 8 S. D. 255, m 
 N. W. 890 329, 
 
 Kelty V. Long, 4 N. Y. S. C. 163 
 Kemp V. Folsom (1896), 14 Wash. 
 16, 43 Pac. 1100 
 
 665 
 117 
 
 942 
 833 
 178 
 308 
 118 
 
 783 
 
 151 
 
 395 
 
 833 
 
 625 
 
 612 
 
 49 
 
 499, 
 
 502 
 
 819 
 
 607 
 153 
 
 683 
 
 602 
 
 400 
 661 
 418 
 
 330 
 31 -^ 
 
 667
 
 CYUl 
 
 TArSLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references a 
 
 Kemper v. Renshave (1899), 58 Neb. 
 
 513, 78 X. W. 1071 605,678 
 
 Kenastoi) v. Lnri;.' (1900), 81 -Minn. 
 
 454. 84 N. \V. ">23 666 
 
 Ken.iig r. Marble, 55 Iowa. SS6 _ 791 
 Kenniure Slioe Co., Ex jmrte (1897), 
 
 50 S. C. 140, 27 S. K. H82 421 
 
 Kcnnan v. Smitli (1902), 115 Wis. 
 
 468. 91 N. \V. 986 639, 643 
 
 Kennard <•. Sax. o Ore. 263 814 
 
 Kennedy c. Dickie (1902), 27 Mont. 
 
 ' 70, 69 l^ac. 672 738 
 
 V. Eilau, 17 Abb. Pr. 73 151 
 
 r. Gibson. 8 Wall. 498 261 
 
 V. McQuaid (1894), 50 Minn. 450, 
 
 58 N. W. 35 809 
 
 r. Railway Co (1901), 59 S. C. 
 
 535, 38 S. E. 169 778 
 
 V. School Dist. (1893), 20 Wash. 
 
 399, 55 Pac. 567 818 
 
 V. Shaw, 38 Ind. 474 779, 780 
 
 V. Williams, 11 Minn. 314 821 
 
 Kennenberg c. Neff (1901), 74 Conn. 
 
 62, 49 Atl 853 638 
 
 Kennett v. Peters (1894). 54 Kan. 
 
 119. 37 Pac. 999 25,688 
 
 Kenney r. Bevilheimer (1902), 158 
 
 Ind. '653, 64 N. E. 215 671 
 
 Kent V. Agard, 24 Wi.«. 378 46 
 
 V. Cantrali. 44 Ind. 452 873 
 
 r. Muscatine, etc. Uv. Co. (1902), 
 
 115 Im. 383, 88"N. W. 935 734 
 r. HoL'ers>. 24 .Mo. 306 935 
 
 V. Snvder, 30 Cal. 666 789 
 
 v. Tut lie (1897), 20 Mont. 203, 
 
 50 l^ic. 559 672 
 
 Kentfield v. Hayes, 57 Cal. 409 47 
 
 Kentucky Cent. K. Co. v. Thomas, 
 
 79Ky.'l64 778 
 
 Kentucky Flour Co.'s Ass. v. Merch. 
 
 Bk., 13 S. W. Hep. 910 133 
 
 Kwitucky Uiver Nay. Co. v. Com- 
 monwealth, 13 Bush, 435 753, 756 
 Kenyon v. t^uinn, 41 Cal. 325 46 
 V. West Union Tel. Co. (1893), 
 
 100 Cal. 454, 35 Pac. 75 666 
 
 V. Youlen, 53 Hun, 691 51 
 
 Keown r. Vogel, 25 Mo. App. 35 153 
 
 Kerr v. Topping (1899), 109 la. 150, 
 
 80 N. W. .321 612 
 
 Kerslake r. Mclnnis (1902), 113 Wis. 
 
 659. 89 N. W. 895 
 Kerstetter r. Haymond, 10 Ind. 199 
 
 830 
 584, 
 587 
 
 Kerstner v. Vorweg (1895), 130 Mo 
 
 VMV, 32 S. W. 298 32 
 
 Kcrwood r. Ayers (1898), 59 Kan. 
 
 343,53 Pac. 184 779 
 
 Kettenbach v. Omaha Life Ass'n 
 
 ( IHfK!), 49 Neb. 842. 69 N. W. 135 790 
 Kettle V. Crary, 1 Paige, 417 249 
 
 Kewaunee (.'y. Sup. r. Decker, 30 
 
 Wis. 624 29, 37. 626, 630, 635, 030 
 
 Kewaunee Sup. c. Deiker, 30 Wis. 
 
 624, 626 631 
 
 RE TO THE P.^GES.] 
 
 Keyes v. Little York Gold, etc. Co., 
 
 53 Cal. 724 262, 305 
 
 Kevs et <il. v. MoDermott (1903), — 
 
 Wis. 93 N. W. 553 236, 473 
 
 Kidder County -•. Foye (1901), 10 
 
 N. I). 424. 87 N. W.'984 787 
 
 Kiefer v. Klinsick (1895), 144 Ind. 
 
 46, 42 N. K. 447 816 
 
 Kiernan r. Kraiz (1902), 42 Ore. 474, 
 
 69 Pac. 1027 703 
 
 V. Terry (1894), 26 Ore. 494, 
 
 38 Pac. 671 676 
 
 Kiff r. Weaver, 94 N. C. 274 99 
 
 Kill.ourn >: St. John, 59 N. Y. 21 118 
 
 Killian c. Eigenuian, 57 Ind. 480 658 
 
 Killman r. Gregory (1895), 91 Wis. 
 
 478, 65 X. W. 53" 703 
 
 Killmore >: Culv-..-, 24 Barb. 656 93 
 
 Kilpatrick-Kocli aDry-Goods Co. v. 
 Box (1^96), Itriitah, 494, 45 Pac. 
 629 23, 584, 686 
 
 Kilsey v. Henry, 48 Ind. 47 576 
 
 Kimball v. Darling, 32 Wis. 675 572, 596 
 V. Lyon (1893), 19 Colo. 266, 35 
 
 Pac. 44 586 
 
 V. Xoyes, 17 Wis. 695 105, 109, 110 
 
 V. Spfcer, 12 Wis. 668 154 
 
 V. Whitney, 15 Ind. 280 293 
 
 Kimberlin v. Carter, 49 Ind. Ill 702 
 
 Kimble r. Bunny (1900), 61 Kan. 
 
 665, 60 Pac. 746 734 
 
 Kincaid v. McGowan. 88 Ky. 91 366 
 
 King V. Anderson. 20 Ind. 385 195 
 
 c. Chicago. M. & St. Paul Ry. 
 Co. (1900), 80 Minn. 83. 82 
 X. W. 1113 461,468,460, 470 
 1-. Conn, 25 Ind. 425 935 
 
 f. (^itts, 24 Wis 625 161 
 
 V. Dudley (1893), 113 X. C. 167, 
 
 18S. E. 110 640 
 
 V. Enterprise Ins. Co., 45 Ind. 
 
 43 544, 568, 611 
 
 V. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 499 
 V. Howell (1895), 94 la. 208, 62 
 
 N. W. 738 626 
 
 V. Kehoe (1894), 91 la. 91, 58 
 
 X. W. 1071 206 
 
 V. Knapp, 59 N. Y. 462 908, 91 1 
 
 V. Lawrence, 14 Wis. 238 84(i 
 
 V. Martin, 2 Ves. 643 512 
 
 u.McGhee (1896), 99 Ga. 621, 25 
 
 S. E. 849 641 
 
 V. Montgomery, 50 Cal. 115 610 
 
 I'. Orser, 4 Duer, 431 302 
 
 V. Pony (iold Mill. Co. (1903), 28 
 
 Mont. 74, 72 Pac. 3(J9 730 
 
 i". Powell (1900), 127 X. C. 10, 
 
 37 S. E. 62 820 
 
 r. Talbot, 40 X. Y. 76 
 r. Waite (1K'.J7), 10 S. I). 1, 70 
 
 X. W. 1056 787 
 
 V. Westbrooks (1902), 116 Ga. 
 
 753, 42 S. E. 1002 679 
 
 Kingman r. Pixloy (1898), 7 Okla. 
 
 351, 54 Pac. 494 711
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CIX 
 
 [the references 
 
 Kingman r: Sievers (1898), 143 Mo. 
 
 519, 45 S. W. 266 32, 63 
 
 KiriiTsbury v. Cliicago, etc. Hy. Co. 
 
 (1^97), 104 la. 03, 73 N. W. 477 79.3 
 Kingsland v. Braisted, 2 Lans. 17 271, 
 
 273, 292 
 Kingsley r. Oilman, 12 Minn. 515 728, 
 
 751 
 Kinkead v. Holmes, etc. Co. (1901), 
 
 24 VVasli. 216, 64 Pac. 157 822 
 V. MoCormick. etc. Co. (1898), 
 
 106 la. 222, 7G N. W. 663 702 
 Kinsella r. Sliarp (1896), 47 Neb. 
 
 664, 6Q N. W. 634 87, 117 
 
 Kiasev v. King. 53 N. W. Rep. 842 135 
 Kinslev r. Kinslev (1897), 150 Ind. 
 
 67, 49N. E.819 181 
 Kipp V. Rullard, 30 Minn 84 782 
 Kippen r. Ollasson (1902), 136 Cal. 
 
 640, 69 Pac. 293 229 
 
 Kirby v. Jameson (1896), 9 S. D. 8, 
 
 67 N. W. 854 836, 932 
 
 V. Muencli (1900), 12 S. D. 616, 
 
 82 N. W. 93 432 
 
 V. Western Union Tel. Co. 
 (1893),4S.D. 463,57N. W. 
 202 566 
 
 V. Western Union Tel. Co. 
 (1894), 6 S. D. 1, 60N. W. 152 
 
 684 
 Kircher r. Peder^on (1903), 117 Wis. 
 
 68, 83N. W. 813 118,318 
 V. Clark, Prec. Ch. 275 
 
 Kirk v. Woodburv Co., 55 Iowa, 190 702 
 V. Youni?, 2 Abb. Pr. 453 386 
 
 Kirkland v. Dryfus (1897), 103 Ga. 
 
 127, 29 S. E. 612 818 
 
 Kirkpatrick v. Corning, 38 N. J. Eq. 
 
 234 337 
 
 V. State, 5 Kan. 673 118 
 
 Kirton v. Bull (1902), 168 Mo. 622 
 
 68 S. W. 927 793 
 
 Kischman v. Scott (1901), 166 Mo. 
 
 214, 65 S. W. 1031 308 
 
 Kiskadden v. Jones, 63 Mo. 190 800 
 
 Kittle V. Fremont, 1 Neb. 329 118 
 
 V. Van Dvck, 1 Siindf. Cii. 76 331 
 
 Klais V. Pulford, 36 Wis. 587 791 
 
 Kleckner r. Turk ( 1 895 ) ,45 Neb . 1 76, 
 ^ 63 N. W. 469 638 
 
 Klein v. Liverpool & London Ins. Co. 
 
 (1900), Ky., 57 S. W. 250 783 
 
 Kleineck v. Keiger (1899), 107 la. 
 
 325, 78 N. W. 39 673 
 
 Kleiner v. Third Ave. R. R. Co. 
 (1900), 162 N. Y. 193, 56 N. E. 
 497 675 
 
 Kleinschmidt r. Binzel (1893), 14 
 
 Mont. 31, 35 Pac. 460 710 
 
 V. Kleinschmidt (1893), 13 Mont. 
 
 64, 32 Pac. 1 625 
 
 r. Steele (1894), 15 Mont. 181, 
 
 38 Pac. 827 665 
 
 Kley V. Healey (1896), 149 N. Y. 346, 
 44 N. E. 150 623 
 
 ARE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Kline r. Ilanke (1894), 14 Mont. 361, 
 
 36 Pac. 454 
 Klinker v. Schmidt (1898), 106 la. 
 
 70, 75 N. W. 672 
 Klipsteii) V. Uaschein(1903), 117 Wis. 
 
 248,94 N. W. 63 
 Klonnc v. Bradstreet, 7 Ohio St. 322 
 
 833 
 
 28.3 
 
 640 
 11, 
 55 
 
 716 
 294 
 89 
 803 
 801 
 
 276 
 
 798 
 798 
 
 Klotz V. James (1896), 97 la. 337, 66 
 
 N. W. 190 
 Klussman v. Copeland, 18 Ind. -306 
 Knadler v. Sharp, 36 Iowa, 232 
 Knapp V. Roche, 94 N. V. 329 
 V. Ruimells, 37 Wi.«. 135 
 V. St. Louis (1900), 156 Mo. 343, 
 
 56 S. W. 1102 565, 566 
 
 V. Walker (1900), 73 Conn. 459, 
 
 47 Atl. 655 454, 491 
 
 Knarr r. Conaway, 42 Ind. 260 824 
 
 Knatz V. Wise (1895), 16 Mont. 555, 
 
 41 Pac. 710 
 Kneedler v. Sternbergh, 10 How. Pr. 
 
 67 
 Kniffen ,: McConnell, 30 N. Y. 290 
 Knii,dit V. Denman (1902), 64 Neb. 
 
 814, 90 N. W. 863 730, 740 
 
 V. Denman (1903), — Neb. — , 
 
 94 N. W. 622 . 741 
 
 V. Finnev (1899), 59 Neb. 274, 
 
 80N. W. 912 615,735, 812 
 
 V. Knight, 3 P. Wms. .333 321 
 
 V. Le Bea (1897), 19 Mont. 223, 
 
 47 Pac. 952 
 r. Pocock, 24 Beav. 4.36 
 Knott V. Dubuque & S. C. R. Co., 51 
 N. W. Rep. 57 
 V. Stephens, 3 Ore. 269 
 Knour v. Dick, 14 Ind. 20 881, 9.35 
 
 Knowles v. Gee, 8 Barb. 300 541 
 
 I'. Murphy (1895), 107 Cal. 107, 
 
 40 Pac. Ill 740 
 
 V. Rablin, 20 Iowa, 101 326, 333, 338, 
 
 379 
 i Knowlton r. Mickles, 29 Barb. 465 
 
 Kno.x V. Laird (1893), 92 Ga. 123, 17 
 I S. E. 988 
 
 I V. Pearson (1902), 64 Kan. 711, 
 
 i 68 Pac. 613 678, 685 
 
 Kno.xboro, Presb. Soc. of, r Beach, 
 
 8 Hun, 644 147, 149 
 
 Koboliska v. Swehla (1898), 107 la. 
 
 124, 77 N. W. 576 
 Koch V. Peters (18971, 97 Wis. 492, 
 
 73 N. W. 25 
 Koempel v. Shaw, 13 Minn. 488 852, 911, 
 
 913 
 Koenig r. Steckel, 58 N. Y. 475 307 
 
 Koeniger v. Creed, 58 Ind. 554 206, 212 
 Koepke >: Milwaukee (1901), 112 
 
 Wis. 475, 88 N. W. 238 604 
 
 Kolb V. City of Fond du Lac (1903), 
 
 118 Wis. 311, 95 N. W. 149 623 
 
 KoUock r. Scribner (1897), 98 Wis. 
 104, 73 N. W. 776 11, 849, 888, 941, 
 
 942 
 
 181 
 245 
 
 112 
 358 
 
 373 
 642 
 
 604 
 
 815
 
 ex 
 
 TABLE OF -CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 KdiiigsbLTger r. Ilarvcv, 12 Ore. 
 
 ■286 ' 806 
 
 Korradv >: L. S. & M. S. Ky. Co., 
 
 l:n liid. 261 667 
 
 Kor^.nu■ye^, etc. Co. r. McClay 
 
 ( ItiySi, 43 Neb. 649. 62 N. W. 50 106 
 
 Koshlaiid r. Fire Ass. (18'J7), 31 Ore. 
 
 o02, 40 I'ac. 865 642 
 
 Kostuba r. Miller (1S96), 137 Mo. 
 
 161.^8 S. W. 946 47 
 
 Kowing r. .Manly, 57 Barb. 579 313 
 
 Kramer r. liebman, 9 Iowa, 114 15 
 
 Krause r. Llov<l (1897), 100 la. 666, 
 
 69 N. W. 1U62 608, 711 
 
 Kreiclibaum c. Melton. 49 Ind. 50 942 
 Kretser r. Carey, 52 Wis. 374 665 
 
 Kreuger v. .Sylvester (1897), 100 la. 
 
 647. Oy N. \V. 1059 641 
 
 Krnizinski r. Neuendorf (1898), 99 
 
 Wis. 264. 74 N. W. 974 362, 444, 498 
 Kruider v. Kllison, 47 N. Y. 36 149 
 
 Kucera v. Kucera (1893), 86 Wis. 
 
 416, 57 N. W. 47 185 
 
 Kuelm V. Wilson. 13 Wis. 104 596 
 
 Kuli, Nathan & Fisher Co. (•. Gluck- 
 
 liok (1903), 120 la. 604, 94 K W. 
 
 1105 679 
 
 Kuhl r. Pierce County (1895), 44 
 
 Xeb. 584, 62 N. W. 1066 40 
 
 Kuhland v. Sedgwick, 17 Cal. 123 739 
 Kulin r. McKay (1897), 7 Wyo. 42, 
 
 49 Pac. 473 615 
 
 c. Sol. Havenrich Co. (1902), 
 
 115 Wis. 447, 91 N. W. 994 908, 
 915, 924 
 Kunneke v. iM.ipel (1899), 60 O. St. 
 
 1. 53 N. E. 259 66 
 
 Ktinze '■. Kunze (1896), 94 Wis. 54, 
 
 08 N. W. .391 680 
 
 Kupfer r. Sponhorst, 1 Kan. 75 299 
 
 Kurtz V. McGuire, 5 Duer, 660 915 
 
 Kyd V. Cok (1898), 56 Neb. 71, 76 
 
 N. W. 524 599, 604 
 
 r. Kxcliange Bank (1898), 56 
 
 Neb. 557. 75 N. W. 524 819 
 
 Kyes r. Wilcox (1900), 13 S. D. 228, 
 
 83 N. W. 93 415 
 
 L. 
 
 Lace V. Fixen (1888), 39 Minn.- 46, 
 
 38 \. W. 762 866 
 
 I^cev r. Lacey (1893), 95 Kv. 110, 
 
 2:\ .S. W. 673 ■ 849, 866 
 
 Lackey »■. Vanderbilt, 10 How. Pr. 
 
 155 660 
 
 Lackland v. Walker (1899), 151 Mo. 
 
 210, .72 S. W. 414 350 
 
 La Crosse -•. .Melrose, 22 Wis. 459 155 
 Ladd - . .fame-., 10 Ohio St. 437 475 
 
 i: NvHtol (1901). 63 Kan. 23, 64 
 
 Pae 985 678 
 
 r. StevenHon. 112 N. V. 325 406 
 
 La Farge v. Halsey, 1 IJ-jsw. 171 869 
 
 La Fayette v. Fowler, 34 Ind. 140 118 
 Lafayette & I. li. Co. v. Ehman, 30 
 
 Ind. 83 769 
 
 V. Huffman, 28 Ind. 287 575 
 
 Lafayette Cy. v. Ilixon, 69 Mo. 581 117. 
 
 155 
 La fever v. Stone, 55 Iowa, 49 575 
 
 La France v. Kruger, 42 Iowa, 143 310 
 Lago V. Walsh (1898), 98 Wis. 348, 
 
 74 N. W. 212 676, 7>5 
 
 Lahiff V. Hennepin County, etc. 
 Ass'n (1895), 61 Minn. 226, 63 
 N. W. 493 887, 925 
 
 Lain v. Shepardson, 23 Wis. 274 781 
 
 Laird i.Farwell (1899), 60 Kan. 512, 
 
 57 Pac. 98 638 
 
 Laird-Norton Co. r. Herker (1895), 
 
 6 S. D. 509, 62 N. W. 104 Cm 
 
 Lake v. Albert, 37 Minn. 453 150 
 
 V. Cruikshank, 31 Iowa, 395 786 
 
 Lake Erie & W. K. R. Co. v. Char- 
 man (1903), — Ind. — , 67 
 N. E. 923 661 
 
 V. Priest, 31 N. E. Rep. 77 22y 
 
 Lake Ontario Shore R. Co. v. Cur- 
 
 tiss, 80 N. Y. 219 HI 
 
 Lake Shore & M. S. Rv. Co. v. Van 
 
 Auken, 1 Ind. A pp. 492 920 
 
 Lamb v. Brolaski, 38 Mo. 51 935 
 
 V. Elizabeth City (1902), 131 
 
 N. C. 241, 42 S. E. 603 675 
 
 V. Harbaugh (1895), 105Cal. 680, 
 
 39 Pac. 56 229, 449, 527, 675 
 
 V. Ward (1894), 114 N. C. 255, 
 
 19 S. E. 230 830 
 
 Lambert v. McKenzie (1901), 135 
 
 Cal. 100, 67 Pac. 6 640 
 
 Lamberton v. Shannon (1896), 13 
 
 Wash. 404, 43 Pac. 336 832, 834 
 
 Lamming v. Galuslia, 31 N. E. Rep. 
 
 1024 458, 494 
 
 Lamon v. Hackett, 49 Wis. 261 661 
 
 Lanioreux v. Atlant. M. Ins. Co., 3 
 
 Duer, 680 611 
 
 Lanipkin r. Chisom, 10 Ohio St. 450 276 
 Lanipman v. Hammond, 3 N. Y. Sup. 
 
 Ct. 293 '2'.:0 
 
 Lamson >■. Fall.«. 6 Ind. 309 95, 814 
 
 «;.Pfafif, 1 Handy, 449 11 
 
 Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Monroe 
 
 (1897), 101 Kv. 12, 39 S. W. 434 744 
 Lancaster r. Gould, 40 Ind. 397 241, 310 
 Lancaster liapt. Church, i". Presb. 
 
 Church, 18 B. Mon. (i.35 250, 251 
 
 Lancaster Cy. v. Rush, 52 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 390 100 
 
 Lancaster, etc. Man. Co. v. Colgate, 
 
 12 Ohio St. 344 835, 910 
 
 Land, etc. Co. of G. B. v. .Williams, 
 
 14 S. E. Rep. 821 756 
 
 Landau v. Levy, 1 Abb. Pr. 376 524 
 
 Landers r. Bolton. 20 Cal. 393 7:'.'.i 
 
 r. Douglas, 46 Ind 522 814 
 
 Landes r. State ( 1903), — Ind. — , 67 
 
 N. E. 189 567
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXI 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Laiidon v. Burke, 3G Wis. 378 111 
 
 Lane v. Hrvaiit ( 1896), 100 Ky. lo8, 
 
 37' S. W. 584 832, 834 
 
 V. Cameron, 38 Wis. 013 020, 62!) 
 
 r. Doty, 4 Barb. 534 2y3 
 
 v. IJowd (l'.M)3), 172 Mo. 167, 72 
 
 S. W. 032 443, 455, 456, 458 
 
 r. Gilbert, 9 Mow. Pr. 150 798 
 
 V. Lane (1899), 106 Ky. 530, 50 
 
 S.W. 857 375 
 
 y. Miller, 27 Ind. 534 596 
 
 V. Salter, 51 N. Y. 1 289 
 
 f. Sehomp, 20 N. J. Eq. 82 118 
 
 V. Spariis, 75 Ind. 278 780 
 
 V. State, 7 Ind. 426 661 
 
 V. State, 27 Ind. 108 458, 502 
 
 Laney v. Ingalls (1894), 5 S. D. 183, 
 
 58 N. W. 572 910 
 
 Lang V. Brady (1900), 73 Conn. 707, 
 
 49 Atl. 199 676, 682 
 
 i;. Oppenlieimer, 96 Ind. 47 65 
 
 r. Waring, 25 Ala. 625 248 
 
 Lange i'. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 12 662 
 
 Lansievin i-. St. Paul. 51 N. W. Hep. 
 
 817 499 
 
 Langford v. Langford (1902), 136 
 
 Cal. 507, 69 Pac. 235 946 
 
 Langsdale v. Girton, 51 Ind. 99 181, 713 
 
 V. Woollen, 120 Ind. 16 
 Langton v. Hagerty, 35 Wis. 150 
 
 616 
 799, 
 805 
 871 
 293 
 
 Lanier v. Branson, 21 S. C. 41 
 V. Irvine, 24 Minn. 116 
 V. Union Mortgage Co. (1897), 
 64 Ark. 39, 40 S. W. 466 
 Lansdale i-. Mitchell, 14 B. Mon. 350 
 Lansing v. Commercial Union As- 
 surance Co. (1903), — Neb. — , 93 
 N. W. 756 
 Lansingh v. Parker, 9 How. Pr. 288 
 Lapham v. Osborne, 20 Nev. 168 922, 928 
 La Plant v. Firemen's Ins. Co. 
 (1897), 68 Minn. 82, 70 N. W. 856 
 Lapointe T. Sup. v. O'Malley, 46 
 
 Wis. 35 
 
 Lapping v. Duffy, 47 Ind. 56 91, 103 
 
 Large v. Van Doren, 1 McCarter, 208 246, 
 
 251, 378 
 Larimore v. Wells, 29 Ohio St. 
 Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis. 82 
 Lamed i-. Hudson, 57 N. Y. 151 
 
 565 
 936 
 
 657 
 833 
 
 800 
 660 
 
 13 
 
 713 
 683 
 
 465, 494, 
 517 
 
 124, 
 
 V.Jordan (1895), 55 Kan, 
 
 39 Pac. 1080 
 V. Renshaw, ."JT Mo. 458 
 Larsen v. Oneslte (1900), 21 Utah, 
 
 38, 59 Pac. 234 
 V. Utah Loan & Trust Co. 
 
 (1901), 23 Utah, 944, 05 
 
 Pac. 208 
 L;irson i:. First Nat. Bank (1902), — 
 
 Neb. — , 92 N. W. 729 669, 677 
 r. Reynolds, 13 Iowa, 579 316 
 
 V. Winder (1896), 14 Wash. 647, 
 
 45 Pac. 315 788 
 
 655 
 369 
 
 6ri3 
 
 Larue i'. Hays, 7 Bush, 50 564 
 
 La Kue r. Smith (1897), 153 N. Y. 
 
 428, 47 N. E. 796 624 
 
 Larum v. Wilner, 35 Iowa, 244 815 
 
 Lash V. Christie, 4 Neb. 262 597 
 
 i: McCormick, 17 Miim. 403 873 
 
 r. Kendell, 72 Ind. 475 826 
 
 Lasher v. Williamson, 55 N. Y. 019 869 
 La Societe' Franyaisc v. W'eidmann 
 
 (1893), 97 Cal. 507, 32 Pac. 583 643 
 
 Lassitcr v. Roper (1894), 114 N. C. 
 
 17, 18 S. E. 946 - 23, 822 
 
 Lataillade v. Orena, 91 Cal. 565 75 
 
 Latenser v. Misner (1898), 56 Neb. 
 
 340, 76 N. W. 897 605, 606 
 
 Latham v. Harby (1897), 50 S. C. 
 
 428, 27 S. E. 862 35 
 
 Lathrop v. Dearing (1894), 59 Minn. 
 
 234, 61 N. W. 24 433 
 
 V. Godfrey, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 96 131, 
 718,873 
 V. Heacock, 4 Lans. 1 317 
 
 V. Knapp, 37 Wis. 307 153 
 
 I'. Schutte (1895), 61 Minn. 196, 
 
 63 N. W. 493 220 
 
 Latimer v. Woodmen (1901), 62 S. C. 
 
 145, 40 S. E. 155 817, 818 
 
 V. York Cotton Mills (1903), 66 
 
 S. C. 135, 44 S. E. 559 796 
 
 Latonia v. Hopkins (1898), 104 Ky. 
 
 419, 47 S. W. 248 641 
 
 Latshaw v. State (1900), 156 Ind. 
 
 194, 59 N.E. 471 684 
 
 Lattin v. McCarty, 41 N. Y. 107 11, 29, 
 
 30, 473, 497 
 
 Laub ;;. Buckrailler, 17 N. Y. 620 15, 17, 
 
 29, 30, 473, 497 
 
 Laughlin v. Fariss (1897), 7 Okla. 1, 
 
 50 Pac. 254 75 
 
 V. Greene, 14 Iowa, 92 164 
 
 Lauraglenn Mills v. Ruff (1900), 57 
 
 S. C. 53, 35 S. E. 387 872 
 
 Laurence v. Congregational Church 
 (1900), 164 N. Y. 115, 58 N. E. 24 97, 
 
 271, 931 
 Laurent v. Lanning (1897), 32 Ore. 
 
 11, 51 Pac. 80 677 
 
 Lavery v. Arnold (1899), 36 Ore. 84, 
 
 58 Pac. 524 594 
 
 Law Trust Society v. Hogue (1900), 
 
 37 Ore. 544, 62 Pac. 380 734, 756 
 
 Lawe V. Plyde, 39 Wis. 345 29, 39, 47, 
 
 886, 922 
 Lawley v. Walden, 3 Swanst. 142 243 
 Lawrence v. Bk. of liepublic, 35 
 
 N. Y. 320 340 
 
 V. Doolan, 68 Cal. 309 293 
 
 V. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 110 
 
 V. Montgomery, 37 Cal. 183 196, 207, 
 
 457 
 V. Nelson, 21 N. Y. 158 139 
 
 V. Peck (1893), 3 S. D. 645, 54 
 
 N. W. 808 830, 834 
 
 r. Rokes. 53Me. 110 248,251 
 
 Lawson v. Barker, 1 Bro. C. C. 303 347
 
 CXll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 [the refeeences are to the pages.] 
 
 Lnv Gas ^I.u iiine Co. v. Neuse Falls 
 
 Man. V,,., ill N. C. 74 756 
 
 Lavboiirn c. Sevmour (1893), 53 
 
 Minn 105. 54 >f. W. H41 131, 132 
 
 Liivin^' '•. Mt Shasta Mineral Spring 
 
 ('"... (I'.'Ol ), 135CmI. 141,07 Pac.48 818 
 I^zar.l r. Wheeler, 22 Cal. l-S'.t !>'.» 
 
 Leal.o c. Detrick, 18 In.l. 414 658, 824 
 Leach r. Hill (1H98), 100 Iowa, 171, 
 
 7() N. W. mi 140 
 
 r. Hill (18(i«),»7 la. 81, 66 N. W. 
 
 ■OH 64.J 
 
 V. Knndson (1896), 97 la. 643,06 
 
 N. \y. 913 6 
 
 V. Leach, 2 N. Y. S. C. 657 516. 
 
 648 
 V. Rains (1897), 149 Ind. 152, 48 
 
 N. E. 858 946 
 
 r. Ul.uiifcs, 49In.l. 2n 562,576 
 
 Leader rriiitiii^' Co. v. Lowry (1899), 
 
 9()kla. 89. 59 Pac. 242 
 Leadviile Water Co v. Leadville 
 (1890), 22 Colo. 297, 45 Pac. 362 
 Leahy r. Leahy (1895), 97 Kv. 59,29 
 
 S. W. 852 
 Lcaird r. Smith, 44 N. Y. 618 
 Leary r. Melcher, 14 N. Y. Suppl. 689 471 
 Leasure r. Forquer (1895), 27 Ore. 
 
 334, 41 Pac. 665 678, 679 
 
 Leavenson v. Lafontane, 3 Kan. 523 131, 
 
 135, 138 
 Leavenworth v. Packer, 52 Barb. 132 855, 
 
 909 
 
 674 
 
 601 
 
 566 
 51 
 
 Leavenworth, etc. Co. v. Atchison 
 
 (1896), 137 Mo. 218, 37 S. W. 913 
 
 Leavenworth, L. & G. R. Co. v. Van 
 
 Ril)er, 19 Kan. 317 
 Leavenworth Light, etc. Co. v. 
 Waller ( 1902), 65 Kan. 514, 70 Pac. 
 ot>5 
 Leavitt r J\o]\ (1898), 55 Neb. 57, 75 
 N. W. 524 
 r Caller. 37 Wis. 46 
 V. S. D Mercer Co. (1902), 64 
 Neb. 31, )S9 N. W. 42'i 
 Lebanon Steam Lanndrv '•. Dyck- 
 
 nian ( 1900), Ky., 57 S. W. 227 868, 876 
 Lebanon Trs. v. P'orrest, 15 B. Mon. 
 
 16K 
 Lebcher c Lambert (1900), 23 Utah, 
 
 1, 03 Pac. 628 
 Le Clare r. Thibault (1902), 41 Ore. 
 601, 69 Pac. 552 850, 851 , 863, 87 1 , 888, 
 
 927 
 Lederer v. Union Sav. Bank (1897), 
 
 52 Neb. 133, 71 N. W. 954 711, 714 
 
 Lediard r. Boucher, 7 C. & P. 1 761 
 
 Ledwieh r. McKim, 53 N. Y. 307 75, 126, 
 
 629 
 Ledwith r. Campbell (1903),— Neb. 
 
 — , 95 N. W. K3H 
 Lee /•. Davis, 70 Ind 464 
 r. Khas 3 Sandf. 730 
 f. Meliew (1K'.)9,, H Okla. 136, 50 
 Pac. U)4(S 
 
 641 
 637 
 
 833 
 
 353 
 811 
 
 829 
 
 42 
 656 
 
 638 
 598 
 611 
 
 733 
 
 Lee r. Partridge, 2 Duer, 463 495 
 
 I'. Simpson, 29 Wis. 333 457, 633 
 
 Lee Bank r. Kitching, 7 Bosw. 664 Oil 
 
 Leedy v. Nash, 67 Ind. 311 271, 310 
 
 Leeke /•. Hancock, 76 Cal. 127 584 
 
 Leese r. Sherwood. 21 Cal. 151 103 
 
 Letter r. Field, 52 N. Y. 621 724, 790 
 Leggett '■. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 64 Barh. 
 
 23 325 
 Lehigh Val. R. R. Co. v. McFarlan, 
 
 31 N. J F.q. 706. 758 509 
 Lehinair z\ Gi iswold, 4U N. Y. Super. 
 
 Ct. lUO 927 
 
 Lehman v. Schmidt, 87 Cal. 15 649 
 
 Lehnen v. Purvis, 55 Hun, 535 471 
 Lehnhardt r. Jennings (1897), 119 
 
 Cal. 192, 48 Pac. 66 666 
 
 Leliow V. Simonton, 3 Colo. 346 112 
 
 Leigh V. Thomas, 2 Ves. 312 392 
 
 Leighton v. Grant. 20 Minn. 345 790 
 Leihy v. AshLuid Lumber Co., 49 
 
 Wis. 165 576 
 
 Leitch r. Wells, 48 N. Y. 585 126 
 Lo May v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 105 Mo. 
 
 361 575 
 
 Lemon v. Trull, 13 How. Pr 248 910 
 Lenaghan v. Smith. 2 Phil. .301 249, 250 
 Lenhardt v. French (1900), 57 S. C. 
 
 493, 35 S. K. 701 655 
 Lenno.x v. Eldred, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 
 140 315 
 
 Leno.x >: Reed, 12 Kan. 223 325 
 Lent r. N. Y. & Mass. Ry. Co., 130 
 
 N. Y. 504 801 
 Leonard c. Bovd (1903), Kv., 71 S. W. 
 
 508 ' ■ 641 
 V. Roberts (1894), 20 Colo. 88, 36 
 
 Pac. 880 659 
 V. Rogan, 20 Wis. 5-10 17, 37, 633 
 Leonhardt >: Citizens' Hank (1898), 
 
 cl] Neb. 38, 70 N. W. 472 662 
 
 Leopold )\ Vankirk, 27 Wis. 152 617 
 Lerdall v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 51 
 
 Wis. 426 713 
 
 Leroux v. Murdock, 51 Cal. 541 737 
 Le Roy v. Shaw, 2 Duer, 626 300, 402 
 Le.sh V. Meyer (1901), 03 Kan. 524, 
 
 66 Pac. 245 95. 814 
 
 Leslie i'. Maxey (1902), Ky., 67 S. W. 
 
 8?9 735 
 
 i\ Wiiev, 47 N. Y. 648 292 
 Lester v. Mcintosh (1897), 161 Ga. 
 
 675, 29 SE. 7 757 
 
 Lestra.le r. Barth, 19 Cal. 660 52 
 j Lett r. ILinmiond (1899), 59 Neb. 
 
 339, 80 N. W. 1042 20 
 
 Leutv r. Ilillas, 2 De(;. & J. 110 256 
 Level Land Co. >: Sivver (1901 ), 1 12 
 
 Wis. 442, 88 N. W. 317 406, 407, 511, 666 
 
 Levering r. Schnell, 78 Mo. 167 499 
 
 Levi >: Haversteck, 51 Ind. 236 801 
 Levister r. Railwav Co. (1899), 56 
 
 S. C. 508, 35 S. E. 207 702 
 
 Levy V. Brannan, 39 Cal. 4S5 783 
 
 'r. Loeb, 85 N. Y. 305 908
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxin 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Levy V. Metropolis Mfg. Co. (1900), 
 
 73 Conn. 559, 48 Atl. 429 000 
 V. Noble (190'2), 135 Cal. 559, G7 
 
 Pau. 1033 6G6 
 
 Lewis V. Bortsfield, 75 Ind. 390 GIO 
 
 V. Clyde S. S. Co (1902), 131 
 
 N. C 052, 42 S. lO. 909 819 
 
 V. Clyde S. S. Co. ( 1903), — N. C. 
 
 — , 44 S. K. 600 818 
 
 V. Duncan (1903), 06 Kan. 300, 
 
 71 Pac. 577 819 
 
 V. Dunne (1901), 134 Cal. 291 445 
 V. Edwards, 44 Ind. 333 596, 748 
 
 V. Graham, 4 Abb. Pr. 106 1-53 
 
 V. Greider, 51 N. V. 231 207 
 
 V. Harwood, 28 Minn. 428, 10 
 
 N. W. 580 422, 426, 428 
 
 V. Henley, 2 Ind. 332 118 
 
 V. Hinson (1902), 64 S. C. 571, 43 
 
 S. E. 15 283,454,459 
 
 V. Marshall, 56 N. Y. 663 155 
 
 V. McMillan, 41 Barb. 420 869 
 
 V. Piekeviuij (1899), 58 Neb. 63, 
 
 78 N. \V 368 871 
 
 V. Rhodes (1899), 150 Mo. 498, 52 
 
 S. \y. 11 32 
 
 V. St. Paul, etc. Ry. Co. (1894), 
 
 5 S. D. 148, 58 N. W. 580 154 
 V. Schultz (1896), 98 la. 341, 67 
 
 N. W. 266 025 
 
 V. Scotia Bldg. & Loan Ass'n 
 
 (1894), 42 Neb. 439, 60 N.W. 
 
 881 614 
 
 V. Sheaman, 28 Ind. 427 935 
 
 V. Soule, 52 Iowa, 11 37, 42 
 
 V. Town of Brandenburg (1898), 
 
 105 Ky. 14, 47 S. W. 862 
 V. Whitten, 20 S. W. Rep. 017 
 V. Williams, 3 Minn. 151 271 
 
 712 
 150 
 
 278, 
 375 
 
 Lewis Adm'r v. Taylor Coal Co. 
 
 (1902) , 112 Ky. 845, 66 S. W. 1044 
 Lexington & B. S. R. Co. i'. Good- 
 man, 15 How. Pr. 85 35 
 V. Goodman, 5 Abb. Pr. 493 
 Ley V. Miller, 28 Neb. 822 
 Levde /•. Martin, 16 Minn. 38 
 Lilibv '•. Norri.s 142 Mass 246 
 Liedersdorf v. Flint, 50 Wis. 401 
 
 V. Sec. Ward Bk., 50 Wis. 406 
 Liesc V. Meyer (1898), 143 Mo, .547, 
 
 45 8. W. 282 477, 644, 646 
 
 Lieuallen v Mosgrove (1898), 33 Ore. 
 282, 54 Pac. 200 
 V. Mosgrove (1900), 37 Ore. 446, 
 61 i'nc. 1022 
 Lifler v. Sherwood, 21 Hun, 573 
 Lightly V. Clouston, 1 Taunt. 113 
 Lignot y. Redding, 4 E. D. Smith, 285 
 
 525 
 
 501 
 353 
 113 
 728, 751 
 387 
 29, 470 
 458 
 
 623 
 
 636 
 618 
 
 652 
 355, 
 
 9:-;9 
 178 
 
 Lillie V. Case, 54 Iowa, 177 
 
 Lilly V. Farmers' Nat. Bank (1900), 
 
 Kv., 56 S. W. 722 822 
 
 V. Menke (1894), 120 Mo. 100, 28 
 
 S. W. 643 252, 371, 005, 671 
 
 Limberg v. Higginbotham, 11 Col. 
 
 310 426, 428 
 
 Limited Inv. Co. ?•. Glendale Inv. 
 Ass. (1898), 99 Wis. 54, 74 N. W. 
 633 655 
 
 Lincoln Mortgage & Trust Co. v. 
 Ilutciiins (1898), 55 Neb. 
 158, 75 N. W. 538 543, 013 
 
 r. Parker (1902), 65 Kan. 819, 70 
 
 Pac. 892 822 
 
 Linden w. Green, 81 la. 365, 46 N. W. 
 
 1108 710 
 
 V. Hepburn, 3 Sandf. 668 29 
 
 Linden Land Co. v. Milwaukee, etc. 
 Co. (1900), 107 Wis. 493, 83 N. W. 
 851 196, 263 
 
 Lindh v. Crowley, 26 Kan. 47 499 
 
 Lindholm r. Itasca Lumber Co. 
 
 (1896), 64 Minn. 40, 05 N. W. 931 934 
 Lindley v. Cross, 31 Ind. 106 352, 505 
 
 Lindsay r. Mulqueen, 26 Hun, 485 626 
 V. Pettigrew (lb'.>4), 5 S, 1). 500, 
 
 59 N. W. 726 618 
 
 Lindsay, etc. Co. v. Carpenter (1894), 
 
 90 la. 529, 58 N. W. 900 846, 849 
 
 Liney v. Martin, 29 Mo. 28 504 
 
 Lingeiifeiser u. Simon, 49 Ind. 82 290 
 
 Linn i: Kugg, 19 Minn. 181 872 
 
 Linton v. Jansen (1903), — Neb. — , 
 
 95 N. W. 675 814 
 
 Lipman r. Jackson Arch. Iron 
 
 Works, 128 N. Y. 58 858 
 
 Lipperd v. Edwards, 39 Ind. 165 187, 
 
 188 
 Lipprant v. Lipprant, 52 Ind. 273 576 
 
 Litchfield v. Flint, 104 N. Y. 543 111 
 
 V. Polk Cy., 18 Iowa, 70 118 
 
 Littell I'. Harrington, 71 Mo. 390 830 
 V. Savre, 7 Hun, 485 277, 343, 372 
 Little V. City of Portland (1894), 26 
 
 Ore. 235, 37 Pac. 911 470 
 
 r. Johnson, 26 Ind. 170 271 
 
 V. Va. & G. H. Water Co., 9 Nev. 
 
 317 636 
 
 Little Ne.stucca Road Co. v. Tilla- 
 mook County (1897), 31 Ore. 1, 48 
 Pac. 465 672 
 
 Little's Adm'r r. Citv Nat. Bank 
 
 (IDOS), — Ky. — , 74 'S. W. 699 932 
 
 Littlefield r. Wm. Bergenthal Co. 
 
 (1894), 87 Wis. 394, 58 N. W. 743 715 
 Littman v. Coulter, 23 Abb. N. Cas. 
 
 60 916 
 
 Livermore r. Biishiiell, 5 Hun, 285 293 
 Livesey v. Livesey, 30 Ind. 398 783 
 
 V. Omalia Hotel Co., 5 Neb. 50 575 
 Livingston v. Tanner, 12 Barb. 481 510 
 Livingstone t:. Lovgren (1902), 27 
 
 Wash 102, 67 Pac. 599 000 
 
 r. Ruff (1903), 65 S. C. 284, 43 
 
 S. E. 678 565, 687 
 
 V. School Listrict (1898), 11 
 
 S. D. 150, 70 N. W. 301 584 
 
 V. Wagner, 23 Nev. 53, 42 Pac. 
 
 290 588 
 
 h
 
 CXIV 
 
 TABLK OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the keperesces are to the pagbs] 
 
 Llovd V. Liuuler, o Madd. 289 512 
 
 V. liawl (l'JU2), t)3 S. C. 219, 41 
 
 S. E. 312 822 
 
 Locke c. Chicago Chronicle Co. 
 ( 1899), 1071 a. o90, 78 N. W. 
 49 783 
 
 r. Klunker (1898), 123 Cal. 231, 
 
 65 Pac. 993 159, 180 
 
 V. Mouhoii (1895), 108 Cal. 49, 
 
 41 Pac. 28 782 
 
 i;. Skow (1902), Neb., 91 N. W. 
 
 572 G77 
 
 Lockhart v. Bear (1895), 117 N. C. 
 
 298, 23 S. H 484 664 
 
 Lockmaii i-. Heilly, 95 N. Y. 64 334 
 
 Lockwood V. Bridge Co. (1901), 60 
 
 S. C. 492, 38 S. E. 112 599 
 
 r. Quackeiibush, 83 N. Y. 600 75, 620, 
 
 629 
 r. AVoods, 3 Ind. App. 258 809 
 
 Lodge r. Lewis (1903), 32 Wash. 191, 
 
 72 Pac. 1009 91 
 
 Loehr r. Murpliy, 45 Mo. App. 519 594 
 Loewenberg v. Hosentiial, 18 Ore. 
 
 178 918 
 
 Loftus I'. Fischer (1895), 106 Cal. 616, 
 
 39 Pac. 1064 736 
 
 Logan V. Hale, 42 Cal. 645 340 
 
 r. Smith, 70 Ind. 597 328 
 
 r. Wallis, 76 N. C. 410 516, 521, 525, 
 
 649 
 Logan Conntv Nat. Bank v. Barclay 
 
 (1898), KU'Ky. 97. 46 S. \V. 675 802 
 Lopan.^port r. Kihm (1902), 159 Ind. 
 
 68, 64 N. E. 595 603 
 
 Lohmiller i-. Indian W. Co., 51 Wis. 
 
 683 301, 305 
 
 Lokken v. Miller (1900), 9 X. D. 512, 
 
 84 N. W. 368 802 
 
 Loniax r. Bailev, 7 Blackf. 599 587 
 
 r. Hide,2 Vern. 185 333 
 
 Lombard v. Cowham, 34 Wis. 486 46, 782, 
 
 807, 880 
 r. McMillan (1897), 95 Wis. 627, 
 
 70 N. W. 673 815 
 
 London v. Perkins. 4 Bro. P. C. 158 363 
 r. Hiciimond, 2 Vern. 421 241 
 
 Louergan r. LonLTgaii (1898), 55 
 
 Neb. 641, 76 N. W. 16 735 
 
 Long V. Collins (1901). 15 S. D. 259, 
 
 88 N. W. 571 934 
 
 V. Constant. 19 Mo. 320 99 
 
 V. Doxev, 50 Ind. 385 614 
 
 V. Eisenbeis (1901), 23 Wash. 
 
 556. O.-i Pac. 219 6.38 
 
 i<. Ilcinrich. 46 Mo. 603 89 
 
 1-. Mellftt (1895), 94 la. 548, 63 
 
 N W. 190 608 
 
 I'. Morrison. 14 Ind. .j95 229 
 
 V. Osborn (1894), 91 la. 100, 59 
 
 N. W. 14 685 
 
 V. Hallway Co. (1897), 50 S. C. 
 
 49, 27 S. E. 531 817 
 
 v.lUuM (1K'.(7), 148 Ind. 74, 47 
 
 N. E. l.:0 718 
 
 Long V. Scanlan (1898), 105 Ga.424, 
 31 S. E. 436 
 f. Swindell, 77 N. C. 176 
 V. Yancey ville, Bk. of, 81 N. C. 41 
 Long Beach, etc. District c. Dodge 
 
 (1902), 135 Cal. 401, 67 Pac. 499 
 Long Creek Bldg. Ass'n r. State Ins. 
 Co. (1896), 29 Ore. 569, 46 Pac. 
 366 689, 
 
 Longendyke v. Longendyke,44 Barb. 
 
 366 
 Longley v. Hudson, 4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 
 fJO'J 
 
 V. McVey (1899), 109 la. 666, 81 
 N. W. 150 
 Longshore Printing Co. r. Howell 
 
 (1894), 26 Ore. 527, 38 Pac. 547 565, 
 Looby c. West Troy, 24 Hun, 78 
 Lookabaugh r. La Vance (1897), 6 
 
 Okla. 358, 49 Pac. G5 
 Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion 
 Hotel & B. Ky. Co., 109 N. C. 568 
 Loomer v. Thomas (1893), 38 Neb. 
 
 277, 56 N. W. 973 
 Loomis V. Brown, 16 Barb. 331 169, 
 
 206, 
 V. Eagle Bank, 10 Ohio St. 327 
 V. Kollistcr (1902), 75 Conn. 275, 
 
 53 Atl. 579 
 V. Mowrv, 8 Hun, 311 627, 
 
 V. O'Neal, 73 Mich. 582 
 V. Kobinsoii, 76 Mo. 488 
 V. Ruck, 56 N. Y. 620 123, 
 
 V. Youlc, 1 Minn. 175 
 Loranger v. Big Missouri Mining Co. 
 (1895), 6 S. D. 478, 61 N. \V. 686 
 Lord V. Dearing, 24 Minn. 110 
 
 V. Ilorr (1902), 30 Wash. 477, 71 
 
 Pac. 23 832, 
 
 V. Lindsay, 18 Hun, 489 
 V. Peaks (1894), 41 Neb. 891, 60 
 
 N. W. 353 
 V. Russell (1894), 64 Conn. 86, 
 
 29 Atl. 242 
 V. Tiffany, 98 N. Y. 412 
 ?-. Underdunck, 1 Sandf. Ch. 46 
 Lorillard i: Clyde, 122 N. Y. 498 
 Lorney v. Cronan, 50 Cal. 610 
 Los Angeles v. Signoret, 50 Cal. 298 
 Los Angeles Cv. i-. Babcock, 45 Cal. 
 
 252 
 Lottman v. Barnett, 62 Mo. 159 
 Loughborough v. McNevin, 74 Cal. 
 
 2.50 
 Louis V. Brown, 7 Ore. 326 
 Louis Snyders Sons Co. v. Arm- 
 strong, 37 Fed. Rep. 18 
 Louisville v. Snow's Adm'r (1900), 
 
 107 Ky. 536, 54 S. W. 860 
 Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. r. 
 Brantlcv's Adm'r (1894), 96 
 Ky. 297, 28 S. W. 477 
 r. Coi)as (1894), 95 Ky. 460, 26 
 S. W. 179 
 I V. Thompson, 18 B. Mon. 735 
 
 816 
 303 
 820 
 
 675 
 
 671 
 226 
 119 
 64S 
 
 709 
 
 785 
 
 642 
 375 
 
 913 
 
 189, 
 211 
 138 
 
 179 
 649 
 649 
 103 
 315 
 611 
 
 787 
 517 
 
 833 
 891 
 
 66- 
 
 565 
 307 
 255 
 111 
 737 
 598 
 
 575 
 637 
 
 428 
 753 
 
 132 
 
 665 
 
 159 
 
 817 
 932
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxv 
 
 [the references aSe to the pages.] 
 
 Louisville & P. Canal Co. v. Murphy, 
 
 9 Bush, 522 544, 546, 005, GG4 
 
 Louisville lly. Co. »•. Will's Adm'r 
 
 ( 1902), — Ky. — 06 S^ W. G28 525 
 
 Louisville, etc. M. K. Co. " Bates 
 (1896),14GLid. 5G4,45N. E. 
 108 682 
 
 V. Beauchamp (1900), 108 Ky. 
 
 47, 55 S. W. 71G 6o9 
 
 V. Berkev (180;;), 1^6 Ind. 181, 
 
 35 N: E. 3 082 
 
 V. Bloyd (1900), — Ky. — , 55 
 
 S. VV. 694 681 
 
 V. Ft. Wavne Elec. Co. (1900), 
 
 108 Ky. 113, 55 S. W. 918 600 
 V. Kemper (189G), 147 Ind. 561, 
 
 47 N. E. 214 601 
 
 V. Lawes (1900), Ky., 56 S. W. 
 
 426 590 
 
 V. Lynch (1896), 147 Ind. 165, 
 
 44 N. E. 997 682 
 
 V. Pittman (1901), Kv., 64 S. W. 
 
 460 ' 664 
 
 i>. Pointer's Admr. (1902), — Ky. 
 
 — , 69 S. W. 1108 642 
 
 V. Treadway, 143 Ind. 689 401 
 
 Louisville, N. A., etc. Ry. Co. v. Cau- 
 
 ley, 119 Ind. 142 804 
 
 Louisville, St. L. & T. Ry. Co. v. 
 
 Neafus, 18 S. W. Rep. 1030 470 
 
 Loustalot V. Calkins (1898), 120 Cal. 
 
 688, 53 Fac. 258 300, 398, 402 
 
 Louvall V. Gridlev, 70 Cal. 570 470, 473 
 Love r. Oldiiam, 22 Ind. 51 910 
 
 Loveday v. Anderson (1897), 18 
 
 Wash. 322, 51 Pac. 463 613 
 
 Lovejoj' V. Howe (1893), 55 Minn. 
 
 353, 57 N. W. 57 107 
 
 V. Isbell (1900), 73 Conn. -368, 47 
 
 Atl. 682 604 
 
 V. Robinson, 8 Ind. 399 920, 9.36 
 
 Loveland v. Garnar, 74 Cal. 298 758 
 
 V. Garner, 71 Cal. 541 471 
 
 Lovell V. Hammond Co. (1895), 66 
 
 Conn. 500, 34 All. 511 688, 920 
 
 Lovensohn v. Ward, 45 Cal. 8 892 
 
 Lovering v. Kincr, 97 Ind. 130 329 
 
 Lowber v. Connil, 36 Wis. 176 20 
 
 Lowe V. Morgan, 1 Bro. C. C. .368 244 
 V. Ozmnn (1902), 137 Cal. 257, 
 
 70 Pac. 87 674 
 
 V. Prospect Hill Cemetery Ass'n 
 (1899), 58 Neb. 94, 78 N.W. 
 488 794 
 
 V. Riley (1898), 57 Neb. 252, 77 
 
 N. W. 758 819 
 
 V. Turpie (1896), 147 Ind. 6-52, 
 
 44 N. E. 25 686 
 
 Lowell V. Lowell, 55 Cal. 316 734 
 
 (;. Parkinson, 4 Utah, 64 103 
 
 Lower v. Denton, 9 Wis. 268 06 
 
 Lowman v. West (1894), 8 Wash. 355, 
 
 36 Pac. 258 661, 815 
 
 Lowry v. Button, 28 Ind. 473 666 
 
 V. Harris, 12 Minn. 255 270 
 
 Lowry v. Hurd, 7 Minn. 356 937, 940 
 
 V. .Jackson, 27 S. C. 318 177, 278, 348, 
 
 360 
 V. Megee, 52 Ind. 107 570, 748 
 
 V. Moore (1897), IG Wash. 476. 
 
 48 Pac. 238 677, 678 
 
 I). 8hane, 34 Ind.495 804 
 
 Lowville, Bank of, v. Edwards, 11 
 
 How. Pr. 216 181 
 
 Lubert r. Chauviteau, 3 Cal. 458 71, 936 
 V. East Stroudsburg Glass Co. 
 
 38 Hun,. 581 134 
 
 Lubker v. Grand Detour I'low Co. 
 
 (1897), 53 Neb. Ill, 73 N. W. 457 615 
 Lucas V. N. Y. C. U. Co., 21 Barb. 245 525 
 Luce V. Foster (1894), 42 Neb. 818, 
 
 60 N. W. 1027 614 
 
 Ludington v. Fatton (1901), 111 Wis. 
 
 208, 86 N. W. 571 655 
 
 Ludwig V. Blackshere (1897), 102 la. 
 
 36(), 71 N. W. 356 643 
 
 V. Gillespie, 105 N. Y. 653 153 
 
 Luke V. Marshall, 5 J. J. Marsh. 356 202 
 Lull V. Anamosa Nat. Bank (1900), 
 
 110 la. 537, 81 N. W. 784 191, 
 276, 278, 39.5 
 V. Fox, etc. Co., 19 Wis. 100 499, 502 
 Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v. City of St. 
 Paul (1899), 77 Minn. 410, 80 
 N. W. 357 326 
 
 Lumbert v. Palmer, 29 Iowa, 104 621 
 
 Lundberg v. Davidson (1897). 68 
 
 Minn. 328, 71 N. W. 71, 395 934 
 
 Luse V. Oaks, 36 Iowa, 562 313 
 
 Lustig V. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co., 
 
 65 Hun, 547 6-39 
 
 Lutes V. Briggs, 64 N. Y. 404 118, 262 
 Lux V. McLeod (1893), 19 Colo. 465, 
 
 36 Pac. 246 787 
 
 Lyford v. Martin (1900), 79 Minn. 
 
 243, 82 N. W. 479 686, 704 
 
 V. No. Pac. R. Co., 92 Cal. 93 205 
 Lyman v. City of Lincoln (1894), 38 
 
 Neb. 794, 57 N. W. 531 106 
 
 V. Kurtz (1901), 166 N. Y. 274, 
 
 59 N. E. 903 642 
 
 Lynch v. Bechtel (1897), 19 Mont. 
 
 548, 48 Pac. 1112 665 
 
 v. Free (1896). 64 Minn. 277, 66 
 
 N. W. 277 853 
 
 Lynd v. Picket, 7 ^linn. 184 737 
 
 Lyon i\ Bunn, 6 Iowa, 48 786 
 
 V. Powell, 78 Ala. 351 337 
 
 Lytle V. Burgin, 82 N. C. 301 283 
 
 V. Lytle,' 2 Mete. (Ky ) 127 90, 101, 
 
 104, 311 
 
 V. Lytle, 37 Ind. 281 544, 568 
 
 M. 
 
 Maas V. Goodman, 2 Hilt. 275 
 Mabnry v. Ruiz, 58 Cal. 11 
 McAhee v. Randall, 41 Cal. 136 
 
 122, 131 
 337 
 
 865, 867, 
 946
 
 CXVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references are to tbe pages.] 
 
 McAdam v. Scudder (1894), 127 Mo. 
 
 ;>45, 30 S. W. 1()8 599, 602 
 
 McAdams c. Sutton, 24- Oliio St. 333 617 
 McAdow I- Koss. 53 Mo. 199 833, 927 
 McAllister v. Jolmson (1899), 108 la. 
 
 42. 78 X. W. 790 783 
 
 i: AVi-lkiT. 89 Minn. .J8.3 592 
 
 McArdle r. McArdle. 12 Minn. 98 821 
 McArthur r. (lark (1902i, SG Minn. 
 
 ItJ.j, 90 N. W. 369 687 
 
 V. Clarke Dnip Co (1896), 48 
 
 Xeb. 899, 07 N. W. 861 592, 068, 
 
 v. Drvden (1897), N. 1). 438, 
 
 71 N. W. 125 
 V. Franklin, 15 fJliio St. 485 Sll 
 
 709 
 
 109 
 , 325, 
 335 
 V. Green Bav & Miss. Can. Co . 
 
 34 Wis. "139 920,927 
 
 c. Scott, 113 U. S. 340 249, 350 
 
 McBeth V. \'an Sickle, Nev. l:!4 114 
 McBrayer r. Dean (1897), 100 Kv. 
 
 398, 38 S. W. 508 ' 97 
 
 McBride v. Farmers' Bank, 20 N. Y. 
 
 450 100 
 
 McCabe v. Grey, 20 Cal. 509 137 
 
 V. I-Iealv (1902), 138 Cal. 81, 70 
 
 I'ac. 1008 345 
 
 McCall V. Porter (1903), 42 Ore. 49, 
 
 71 Pac. 926 604 
 
 V. Yard, 1 Stockt. 358 378 
 
 McCallister's Adm. v. Sav. Bk. of 
 
 Louisville, 80 Ky. 684 178 
 
 McCandless v. Inland Acid Co. 
 (1902), 115 Ga. 968, 42 S- E. 449 462, 
 
 640 
 McCann i-. City of Louisville (1901). 
 
 — Ky. — , 63 S. W. 446 263, 378, 
 
 383, 388, 390 
 
 V. Pennie (1893), 100 Cal. 517, 35 
 
 I'ac. 158 712 
 
 McCarnan v. Cocliran, 57 Ind. 106 
 
 McCarthy v. Garraj^hty, 10 Uuio St. 
 
 438 
 McCarlin v. Traphagen's Adm., 43 
 
 N. J. Kq. 323 
 McCartnev /• Welcli, 44 Barb. 271 
 McCartv r. Fremont, 23 Cal. 106 
 r. Kinsey (1899), 154 Ind. 447, 
 
 57 N. E. 108 
 V. IJoberts, 8 Ind. 150 
 V. Hood Hotel Co. (1898), 144 
 Mo. 397, 46 S. W. 172 
 McCarville r. Bovie (1895), 89 Wis. 
 
 651,62 N. W. 517 
 McCauKhey i-. Scliuette (1897), 117 
 Cal. 22.3, 40 Pac. 606, 48 Pac. 1088 
 
 818 
 658 
 
 349 
 316 
 
 804 
 
 808 
 
 082 
 568 
 
 569, 
 007 
 McClaine r. Fairchild (1901), 23 
 
 Wanli. 758. 63 Pac. 517 043 
 
 McClane r. White, 5 Minn. 178 46, 51 
 
 McClellan f. Chippewa Valley Elec. 
 
 Ky. Co. (1901), 110 Wis. 326, 85 
 
 N. W. lOlH 625,089 
 
 -McClellnnd r. Nichols, 24 Minn. 170 784 
 
 McClendon v. Hernando Co. (1896), 
 
 100 Ga. 219, 28 S. E. 152 000, 674 
 
 McClintic's Adm. v. Cory, 22 Ind. 
 
 170 940 
 
 McCIoskey r. San Francisco, 06 Cal. 
 
 104 140 
 
 McClure v. Dee (1902), 115 la. 546, 
 
 88 N. VV. 1093 
 
 1-. La Plata Countv (1896), 23 
 
 Colo. 130, 46 Pac. 677 665 
 
 McClurg i: Phillips, 49 Mo. 315 472 
 
 V. State Bindery Co., 53 N. W. 
 
 Kep 428 426, 428 
 
 McColgan >• Territory of Oklalioma 
 
 ( 1897), 5 (Jkla. 5<.7,'49 P.ic. 1018 081 
 McCollister r. Willey, 52 Iml. 382 821 
 McComb v. Spangler, 71 Cal. 418 337 
 
 McConihe v. Hollister, 19 Wis. 269 -865, 
 
 872 88.5 
 McConnell v. Brayner, 68 Mo. 461 'l78, 
 
 205 
 r. Spicker (1901), 15 S. D. 98, 
 
 87 N. W. 574 822 
 
 McConniff v. Van Dusen (1898), 57 
 
 Neb. 49, 77 N. W. 348 417, 421 
 
 McCord r. Hill (1899), 104 Wis. 457, 
 
 80 N. W. 735 712 
 V. Seale, 56 Cal. 262 614 
 
 McCorkell v. Karhoff (1894), 90 la. 
 
 545, 58 N. W. 013 606 
 
 McCorkle v. Mallory (1903), 30 Wash. 
 
 632, 71 Pac. 186 515, 703 
 
 McCorniick r. Basal, 46 Iowa, 236 598 
 V. Interstate, etc., Ry. Co. (1900), 
 
 154 Mo. 191, 55 S. W. 252 587. 
 624 
 i: Lawton, 3 Neb. 449 376 
 
 v. Penn. Cent. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 
 
 303 232 
 
 McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. ". 
 Belfanv ( 1899), 78 Minn. 370, 
 
 81 N. W. 10 668 
 V. Cummins (1899), 59 Neb. 330, 
 
 80 N. W. 1049 822 
 
 r. Gust;ifson (1898), 54 Neb. 276, 
 
 74 N. W. 576 911 
 
 V. Iliatt (1903), — Neb. —, 95 
 
 N. W. 627 838 
 
 McCormick Mach. Co. v. Ilovey 
 
 (1899). 36 Ore. 259, 59 Pac. 189 740 
 McCormick, etc Co. v. Markert 
 
 (1899;, 107 la. 340, 78 N. W. 33 6 
 
 McCotter v. Lawrenc, 6 N. Y. Sup. 
 
 Ct. 392 239, 255, 256, 358 
 
 McCown V. McSween, 29 S. C. 130 718 
 V. Sims, 69 N. C. 159 472 
 
 McCoy V. Iowa Ins. Co. (1898), 107 
 
 la. 80, 77 N. W. 520 819 
 
 V. Jones (1899), 01 O. St. 119, 
 
 55 N. K. 2 19 607 
 
 V. Yager. 34 Mo. 134 455 
 
 McCrary r. Deming, 38 Iowa, 527 873 
 
 McCreary v. Marston, 56 Cal. 403 807 
 
 McCrorv r. Parks, 18 Ohio St. 1 !« 
 
 V. Vibbard, 51 Hun, 227 872. 87!J
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXVU 
 
 [the references are to tue pages.] 
 
 McCulloch's Adai. v. lloUingsvvorth, 
 
 27 Ind. 115 24U 
 
 McCullougli r. Colfax County 
 ( 1903), — Neb. — , 95 N. W. 
 29 671, 686 
 
 V. Dovey (1001), 61 Neb. G75, 85 
 
 N. W. 8'.io 102 
 
 V. Lewis, 1 Disnev, 564 935 
 
 V. Plioenix Ins. Co., 113 Mo. 606 689 
 
 McDiUiiel V. Carver, 40 Ind. 250 814 
 
 I'. Pressler, 3 Wasli. 636 94, 727 
 
 McDearnian r. McClure, 31 Ark. 550 377 
 
 McDearmott r. Sedgwick (1897), 140 
 
 Mo. 172, 39 S. \V. 776 811 
 
 McDevitt V. City of St. Paul (1896), 
 
 66 Minn. 14, 68 N. W. 178 228 
 
 McDill V. Gunn, 43 Ind. 315 311 
 
 McDonald v. American Nat. Bank 
 { 1901 ), 25 Mont. 456, 65 Pac. 
 806 107 
 
 V. Backus, 45 Cal. 262 376 
 
 V. Bankers' Life Ass'n (1900), 
 
 154 Mo. 618, 55 S. W. 999 678 
 V. Bice (1901), 113 Li. 44, 84 
 
 N. W. 085 822 
 
 V. Davey (1900), 22 Wasli. 366, 
 
 60 Pac. 1116 106 
 
 V. Holmes, 22 Ore. 212 66 
 
 V. Kneeland, 5 Minn. 352 91 
 
 V. Mackenzie (1887), 24 Ore. 573, 
 
 14 Pac. 868 877 
 
 V. Plncus (1893), 13 Mont, 83, 
 
 32 Pac. 283 787 
 
 V. Second Nat. Bank (1898), 106 
 
 la. 517, 76 N. \V. 1011 444, 453 
 V. Southern Cal. R. K Co. 
 (1894), 101 Cal. 206, 35 Pac. 
 643 825 
 
 McDonell v. Buffum, 31 How. Pr. 
 
 154 778 
 
 McDonough v. Carter (1896), 98 Ga. 
 
 703, 25 S. E. 938 196 
 
 V. Craig (1894), 10 Wash. 239, 
 
 38 Mac. 11)34 317 
 
 V. Great Nortiiern Rv. Co. 
 (189ft), 15 Wash. 244, 46 
 Pac. 334 639 
 
 McDougal V. Maguire, 35 Cal. 274 920 
 McDougald v. Hulet (1901), 132 Cal. 
 
 154, 64 Pac. 278 865 
 
 McDoucjall V. Wallinur, 48 Barb. -364 934 
 
 McDowell >: Clark, 68 X. C. 118 309 
 
 V. Hendrix, 67 Ind. 513 219 
 
 V. Law, 35 Wis. 171 111 
 
 McEldowney v. Madden (1899), 124 
 
 Cal. 108, oQ Pac. 783 421 
 
 McElfresh v. Kirkendall, 36 Iowa, 
 
 224 313 
 
 McElwaine v. Hosey (1893), 135 Ind. 
 
 481, 35 N. E. 272 615 
 
 McElwaine-Richards Co. v. Wall 
 
 (1902), 159 Ind. 557, 65 N. E. 752 601 
 McEntee r. Cook, 76 Cal. 187 562 
 
 McFadden v. Santa Ana, etc. Ry. Co., 
 
 87 Cal. 464 229 
 
 McFadden v. Stark (1893), 58 Ark. 
 
 7, 22 S. W. 884 699, 604 
 
 V. Swinerton (1900), 36 Ore. 336, 
 
 59 Pac. 816 410 
 
 McFarland r. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. 
 (1894), 125 Mo 253, 28 
 S. W. 590 817 
 
 V. West Side Improvement 
 Ass'n (1898), 5b Neb. 277, 
 76 N. W. 581 567 
 
 McGannon v. Millers' Nat. Ins. Co. 
 
 (1902), 171 Mo. 143, 71 S. W. 160 671 
 McGavock i'. City of Omaha (1894), 
 
 40 Neb. 64, 58 N. W. 543 615 
 
 McGean v. Metrop. Elev. Ry. Co., 
 
 133 N. Y. 9 103 
 
 McGillivrav v. McGiilivray (1896), 
 
 9 S. D. 187, 68 N. W. 316 612,666 
 
 McGlamory v. McCormick (1896), 
 
 99 Ga. 148, 24 S. E. 941 198 
 
 McGlasson v. Bradford, 7 Bush, 250 592 
 McGlauriin i-. Wormser (1903),— 
 
 Mont. — , 72 Pac. 428 671 
 
 McGlothlin v. Hemery, 44 Mo. 350 476 
 
 McGonigal v. Colter, 32 Wis. 614 276, 
 
 278, 662, 725 
 
 McGonigle v. Kane (1894), 20 Colo. 
 
 292, 38 Pac. 367 682 
 
 McGovern v. Payn, 32 Barb. 83 630 
 
 McGrath v. Balser, 6 B. Mon. 141 635 
 McGregor v. Auld, 53 N. W. Rep. 
 
 845 911 
 
 McGrew v. Armstrong, 5 Kan. 284 780 
 V. Lamb (1903), 31 Wash. 485, 
 
 72 Pac. 100 . 685 
 
 McGuire v. Lamb, 17 Pac. Rep. 749 931 
 McHale v. Maloney (1903), — Neb. 
 
 -^, 93 N. W. 677 657 
 
 McHard v. Williams (1896), 8 S. D. 
 
 381, 66 N. W. 930 492, 493, 913, 924 
 McHugh V. Louisville Bridge Co. 
 
 (1901), Ky., 65 S. W. 456 666 
 
 Mcllvame v. Egerton, 2 Robt. 422 872 
 Mclntire v. Caliioun, 27 Mo. App. 
 
 513 830 
 
 V. Weioand, 24 Abb. N. Cas. 
 
 312 832 
 
 Mcintosh V. City of Omaha (1002), 
 
 Neb. 91 N. W. 527 756 
 
 I'. Ensign, 28 N. Y. 169 276, 299, 301, 
 
 ^ 305 
 
 V. Mcintosh, 12 How. Pr. 289 525, 
 
 526 
 V. Rankin (1896), 134 Mo. 310, 
 
 35 S. W. 995 466, 620 
 
 V. Zaring (1897), 150 Ind. 301, 49 
 
 N. E. 164 185, 188, 203, 205, 
 
 206, 215 
 McKasy r. Huher (1896), 65 Minn. 
 
 9, 67 N. W. 650 785 
 
 McKay v. Broad, 70 Ala. 377 256 
 
 V. McDougal (1897), 19 Mont. 
 
 488, 48 Pac. 988 657 
 
 u. Ward (1899), 20 Utah, 149, 57 
 
 Pac. 1024 108
 
 cxvm 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references a 
 
 McKee r. Eaton, 26 Kan. 226 177 
 
 r. Lineberger. 09 N. C. 217 151 
 
 c. Pope, 18 B. -Mon. 54S 457 
 
 McKeen c. Naugliton, b8 Cal. 462 815 
 
 McKegnev i: "VVidekuul, 6 Bush, 107 911, 
 
 913 
 McKeighan i-. Hopkins, 10 Xeb. 
 
 33 637 
 
 McKensie v. Farrell, 4 Bosw. 192 916 
 McKenzie r. L'Amoureux, 11 Barb. 
 
 516 380, 384, 387 
 
 f. Pendleton's Adm., 1 Busli, 
 
 164 935 
 
 McKetlian /•. Kay, 71 N. C. 165 348 
 McKibbeii r. Worthington's Ex'r 
 (1898), 103 Kv. 356, 45 S. W. 
 
 233 ■ 333 
 McKibbin r. Ellingson (1894), 58 
 
 Minn. 200, 59 X. W. 1003 678 
 
 McKillip V. McKillip, 8 Barb. 552 161, 
 
 162 
 
 McKinley v. Irvine, 13 Ala. 681 348 
 ^IcKinney '■. McKinney, 8 Ohio St. 
 
 423 821 
 
 /•. West. Stage Co., 4 Iowa, 420 220 
 McKinnon v. McKinnon, 81 N. C. 
 
 201 111, 154 
 
 r. Morrison, 104 N. C. 354 913 
 V. Palen (1895), 62 Minn. 188, 64 
 
 N. W. 387 870 
 
 McKissen v. Sherman, 51 Wis. 303 791 
 McKnight v. Bertram Heating, etc. 
 Co. (1902), 65 Kan. 850, 70 
 
 Pac. 345 102 
 c. Dunlop, 4 Barb. 36 648, 649 
 
 f. M'Cutchen, 27 Mo. 436 66 
 
 McKoon V. Ferguson, 47 Iowa, 636 620 
 McKune v Santa Clara, etc., Co. 
 
 (1805), 110 Cal. 480. 42 Pac. 980 228 
 
 McKvriiig V. Bull, 16 N. Y. 297 706, 797, 
 
 798, 801, 802 
 
 McLachlan ;•. Staples, 13 Wis. 448 476 
 
 McLain v Maracle (1900), 60 Neb. 
 
 359, 83 N. W. 820 025 
 McLamb r. McPhail (1900), 126 N. C 
 
 218. 35 S. E. 426 831 
 McLane v. Bovee, 35 Wis. 27 782, 807 
 r. Kellv (1808), 72 Minn. 395, 
 
 75'N. W. 001 051 
 McLaughlin /•. Deadwood First Nat. 
 
 Bk., 6 Dak. 406 150 
 V. Great W. Ins. Co., 20 N. Y. 
 
 Suppl. 536 153 
 
 r. McLaiighiin. 16 Mo. 242 504 
 V. Webster (1804), 141 N. Y. 76, 
 
 35 N. E. 1081 015, 642, 803 
 
 r. Wiueler, 47 N. W. Rep. 816 754 
 
 I-. Winner, 63 Wis. 120 874 
 McLe»:n v. Baldwin (1902), 136 Cal. 
 
 565, 69 Pac. 259 804 
 V. City of Lewiston (1902), Ida- 
 ho, 60 Pac. 478 509 
 i: Dean (18961, 66 Minn. 369, 69 
 
 N. W. 140 160 
 
 i;. Leach, 68 N. C. 95 874 
 
 RE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 .McLeod i: Scott, 38 Ark. 72 206 
 
 r. Snyder, 10 S. W. Rep. 494 103 
 
 McMahan i-. Canadian Ky. Co. 
 
 (1901) 40 Ore. 14b, 66 Pac. 
 
 708 614, 615. 636 
 
 V. Miller, 82 N. C. 317 618 
 
 r. Spinning, 51 Ind. 187 727, 908 
 
 McMahon r. Allen, 3 Abb. i'r. 89 412, 
 
 414, 524 
 McMaken v. McMaken, 18 Ala. 576 257 
 McManamee i\ Mo. Pac. Kv. Co. 
 
 (1896), 135 Mo. 440. 37 S. W. 119 682 
 McManus v. Smith, 53 Ind. 211 49, 887 
 V. Walters (1901), 62 Kan. 128, 
 
 61 Pac. 686 641 
 
 McMaster r. Booth, 4 How. Pr. 427 541 
 McMenomy r. Talbot, 84 Cal. 279 576 
 McMillan v. Baxley (1893), 112 N. C. 
 
 578, 16 S. E. 845 191 
 
 V. Boyles, 14 Iowa, 107 118 
 
 V. Gambill (1894), 115 N. C. 352, 
 
 20 S. E. 474 734 
 
 McMurphy i-. Walker, 20 Minn. 382 738 
 McMurrav, In re Estate of (1899), 
 
 107 la. 648, 78 N. W. 691 612, 713, 822 
 McMurray-Judge, etc. Co. v. City of 
 St. Louis (1896), 138 Mo. 608, 39 
 S. W. 467 565, 656 
 
 McNamara v. Crystal ^lining Co. 
 ( 1900), 23 Wash. 26, 62 Pac. 
 81 417,418 
 
 v. Lyon (1897), 60 Conn. 447, 37 
 
 Atl. 081 781 
 
 V. McDonald (1897), 69 Conn. 
 
 484, 38 Atl. 54 585 
 
 r. McNamara, 9 Abb. Pr. 18 890 
 
 McNamee v. Carpenter, o(» Iowa, 276 205 
 
 McNeady v. Hyde. 47 Cal. 481 35 
 
 McNear r. Williamson (1902), 106 
 
 Mo. 358, 66 S. W. 160 198 
 
 McNeil V. Tenth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y. 
 
 325 123, 124, 126 
 
 McNider v. Sirrine, 50 N. W. Kep. 
 
 200 637 
 
 McNulty V. Citv of New York (1001), 
 
 168 N. Y. 117, 61 N. E. Ill 777, 819 
 McPeak v. Mo. l^ac. Kv. Co. (1895), 
 
 128 Mo. 017, 30 S. W. 170 605, 676 
 
 McPhail V. Hyatt, 20 Iowa, 137 725 
 
 McPherson v. I'eatherstone, 37 Wis. 
 
 632 42 
 
 V. Meek, 30 Mo. 345 873. 874 
 
 V. Weston. 64 Cal. 275 15, 94 
 
 McQuade i'. Chicago & N. Y. Ry. 
 
 Co., 68 Wis. 616 778 
 
 r. Collins (1894), 03 la. 22, 61 
 
 N. W. 213 70.3, 710 
 
 McQueen v. Babcock, 13 Abb. I'r. 
 
 268 635 
 
 McKae, Re, L. R. 25 Ch. D. 16 372 
 
 McReady v. Rogers, 1 Neb. 124 301, 307 
 McRoberts v. So. Minn. R. Co., 18 
 
 Minn. 108 178 
 
 McVean v. Scott. 46 Barb. 370 301 
 
 McVey v. Cantrell, 70 N. Y. 295 316
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXIX 
 
 [tbe keferences are to the pages.] 
 
 McWilliams v. Bannister, 40 Wis. 
 
 489 769 
 
 Macey v. Stark (1893), IIG Mo. 481, 
 
 21 S. W. 1088 781 
 
 Madien v. Tel. Co. (1902), 63 S. C. 
 
 363, 41 S. E. 448 454 
 
 Machinery Co. v. Laev (1898), 100 
 
 Wis. 644, 76 N. W. 596 681 
 
 Mack V. Burt, 5 Hun, 28 284 
 
 V. Snell (1893), 140 N. Y. 193, 
 
 35 N. E. 493 908 
 Mackay v. Sniitli (1902), 27 Wash. 
 
 442, 67 Pac. 982 665 
 
 Mackenzie v. Edinburg Scii. Trs., 
 
 72 Ind. 189 178 
 
 Mackey i'. Auer, 8 Hun, 180 38, 581, 578, 
 
 667 
 Macon v. Paducah St. Ry. Co. (1901), 
 
 110 Ky. 680, 62 S. W. 496 674 
 
 Maddox v. Central of Georgia Ry. 
 Co. (1899), 110 Ga. 301, 34 
 S. E. 1036 641 
 
 V. Teague (1896), 18 Mont. 593, 
 
 47 Pac. 209 421 
 
 V. Teague (1896), 18 Mont. 512, 
 
 46 Pac. 535 703 
 
 V. Wagner (1900), 111 Ga. 146, 
 
 36 S. E. 609 588 
 Maders v. Lawrence, 49 Hun, 360 910 
 Madison Av. Bp. Ch. v. Oliver St. 
 
 Bp. Ch., 73 N. Y. 83 29 
 
 Madison Cy. Com'rs v. Brown, 28 
 
 Ind. 161 118 
 
 Madox V. Jackson, 3 Atk. 406 372, 377 
 Maflfett V. Tliompson (1898), 32 Ore. 
 
 546. 52 Pac. 566 867, 887 
 
 239 
 
 155 
 
 584 
 
 611 
 685 
 
 817 
 
 jee V. Cutler, 43 Barb 
 V. Kast, 49 Cal. 141 
 V. Waupaca Cy. Sup., 38 Wis. 
 247 
 Maggs V. Morgan (1903), 30 Wash. 
 
 604, 71 Pac. 188 
 Maguire v. Eichmeier (1899), 109 la. 
 301, 80 N. W. 395 
 V. Vice, 20 Mo. 429 11, 20, 38 
 
 Magwire v. Tyler, 47 Mo. 161 20, 29, 31 
 Mahan v. Ross, 18 Mo. 121 935 
 
 Mahaska Cy. State Bk. v. Christ, 82 
 
 Iowa, 56 942 
 
 Maher v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 
 
 283 34 
 
 Mahoney v. Hardware Co. (1897), 19 
 
 Mont. 877, 48 Pac. 545 735, 740 
 
 I'. McLean, 26 Minn. 415 279 
 
 V. Robins, 49 Ind. 146 791 
 
 Mahon's Adm'r ;;. Sawyer, 18 Ind. 
 
 73 
 Main v. Jolinson (1893), 7 Wash. 
 321, 35 Pac. 67 
 V. Ray (1900), Ky., 57 S. W. 7 
 Maine v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. 
 (1899), 109 la. 260, 80 N. W. 315 
 Maire v. Garrison, 83 N. Y. 14 
 Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia 
 (1899), 71 Conn. 369, 42 Atl. 67 
 
 786 
 
 398 
 665 
 
 604 
 255 
 
 451 
 
 Maitland v. Zanga (1896), 14 Wasli. 
 
 92, 44 Pac. 117 811 
 
 Maize v. Bradley (1901), Ky., 64 
 
 S. W. 655 809 
 
 Majors v. Taussig (1894), 20 Colo. 
 
 44, 36 Pac. 816 421 
 
 Makepeace v. Davis, 27 Ind. 352 270, 278 
 Maldaner v. Beurhaus (1900), 108 
 
 Wis. 25, 84 N. W. 25 494 
 
 Malin v. Malin, 2 Johns. Ch. 238 238, 251 
 Mallinckrodt Chemi(;al Works v. 
 
 Nemnich (1902), 169 Mo. 388, 69 
 
 S. W. 355 565 
 
 Mallory Commission Co. v. Elwood 
 
 (1903), 120 la. 632, 95 N. W. 176 911 
 Malloy V. Chicago & Northwestern 
 
 R. R. Co. (1901), 109 Wis. 29, 85 
 
 N. W. 130 822 
 
 Malm V. Thelin (1896), 47 Neb. 686, 
 
 66 N. W. 650 677 
 
 Malmsten v. Berryhill (1895), 63 
 
 Minn. 1, 65 N. W. 88 433 
 
 Malone v. Kelly (1897), 101 Ga. 194, 
 
 28 S. E. 689 641 
 
 V. Stilwell, 15 Abb. Pr. 421 501 
 
 Manaudas v. Heilner (1896), 29 Ore. 
 
 222, 45 Pac. 758 671 
 
 Manchester v. Sahler, 47 Barb. 155 315 
 Manders v. Craft, 32 Pac. Rep. 836 660 
 Mandlebaum v. Russell, 4 Nev. 551 301 
 Manette v. Simpson, 15 N. Y. Suppl. 
 
 448 153 
 
 Maney v. Hart (1895), 11 Wash. 67, 
 
 39 Pac. 268 639 
 
 Mangles v. Dixon, 3 H. L. Cas. 702 123 
 Mangold v. Oft (1901), 63 Neb. 397, 
 
 88 N. W. 507 806 
 
 Mangum v. Bullion, etc. Co. (1897), 
 
 15 Utah, 534, 50 Pac. 834 594,603, 629 
 Manhattan Brass &. M. Co. v. Thomp- 
 son, 58 N. Y. 80 315 
 Manly v. Howlett, 55 Cal. 94 807 
 Mann v. MinB. F. Ins. Co., 38 Wis. 
 
 114 117 
 
 V. Fairchild, 2 Keyes, 106 37 
 
 V. Marsh, 35 Barb. 68 225 
 
 V. Pentz, 3 N. Y. 415 213 
 
 V. Rich Hill. 28 Mo. App. 497 229 
 Manney v. Ingram, 78 N. C. 96 872, 918 
 Manning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399 945 
 V. Manning, 79 N. C 293 232 
 
 I'. Monaghan, 23 N. Y. 539 304 
 
 V. Tyler, 21 N. Y. 567 723, 791, 809 
 V. Viers (1894), 38 Neb. 32, 56 
 
 N. W. 719 638 
 
 V. Winter, 7 Hun, 482 772 
 
 Manry v. Waxelbaum Co. (1899), 
 
 108 Ga. 14, 33 S. E. 701 565 
 
 Mansur-Tebbetts Co. v. Willet 
 
 (1900), lOOkla. 383, 61 Pac. 1066 678 
 Manuf. Nat. Bk. v. Russell, 6 Hun, 
 
 375 753 
 
 Manwell v. Burlington, etc. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1894), 89 la. 708, 57 N. W. 441 602, 606 
 Maple V. Beach, 43 Ind. 51 172
 
 cxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references 
 
 :Maples r. Oellcr. 1 Nev. 233 293 
 
 Mares r. Woriniiipton (1899), 8 
 
 N. 1). ;rJ9, 7!t N. \V. 441 640 
 
 Margraf c. Muir, 57 N. Y. 159 29 
 
 Marie i: Garrison, tio N. Y. 14 189, 205, 
 
 598 
 Jlarine & F. Ins. Bk. of Ga. v. Jaun- 
 
 cey. 1 Barb. 486 122 
 
 Marine Ins. Co. r. St. Louis, etc. Ky. 
 
 Co.. 41 Fed. Hep. 64o 217 
 
 Marion Bond Co c. Mexican Coffee 
 
 Co. {190-!),— Ind. — , 65N.E. 748 671 
 Maris c Cle vender (1902), 29 Wash. 
 
 895, 6y Pac. 1089 711 
 
 Mark r. North (1900), 155 Ind. 575, 
 
 57 N. E. 902 657 
 
 Mark Paine Lumber Co. v. Improve- 
 ment Co. (1«96), 94 Wis. 322, 68 
 N. W. 1013 662 
 
 Marker v. School District (1899), 58 
 
 Neb.' 47^1, 78 N. W. 932 565, 568 
 
 Marks r. Marsh, 9 Cal. 96 316 
 
 r. Savward, 50 Cal. 57 807 
 
 Mark well" v. Mark well (1900), 157 
 
 Mo. 326. 57 S. W. 1078 350 
 
 Marley v. Smith, 4 Kan. 183 736, 769, 
 
 801, 803 
 Marlow v. Barlew, 53 Cal 456 316 
 
 Marquat i\ Marquat, 12 N. Y. 336 17, 
 36, 276, 475 
 Marr v. Lewis, 31 Ark. 203 55, 942 
 
 Marriott v. Ciise, 12 Colo. 561 942 
 
 Marsii V. Backus, 16 Barb. 483 302, 306 
 r. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 
 413 119 
 
 V. Falker, 40 N. Y. 562 629 
 
 V. Goodrell, 11 Iowa, 474 293 
 
 V. OHver, 1 McCarter, 262 253 
 
 V. Pugh, 43 Wis. 597 662 
 
 i;. Waupaca Cy. Sup., 38 Wis. 
 
 250 177, 240, 270 
 
 Marshall v. Gray, 57 Barb. 414 629, 630 
 V. Mo8elev,"21 N. Y. 280 195 
 
 V. Hugg (1896), 6 Wyo. 270, 44 
 
 Pac. 700 655 
 
 V. Shafter. 32 Cal. 176 781 
 
 Marshall &. lUley Bank v. Child 
 (1899), 76 Minn. 173, 78 N. W. 
 1048 801 
 
 Marshall Field Co. v. Oren Kuffcorn 
 Co. (1902), 117 la. 157, 90 N. W. 
 618 734 
 
 Marshburn v. Lashlie (1898), 122 
 
 N. C. 237, 29 S. E. 371 809 
 
 Martin v. Am. Exp. Co., 19 Wis. 336 785 
 V. Bank (1902), 131 N. C. 121, 
 
 42 S. E. 558 040 
 
 V. Clay (1899), 8 Okla. 46, 56 
 
 Pac. 715 191 
 
 1-. Eastman (1901 ), 109 Wis. 286, 
 
 H.', N. W. 359 867 
 
 V. Erie Preserving Co., 48 Hun, 
 
 HI 768 
 
 V. Home Bank (1809), 100 N. Y. 
 
 190. 54 N. E. 717 642 
 
 ARE TO THE PAG«S.] 
 
 Martin v. KunzmuUer, 37 X. Y. 396 131, 
 
 133 
 V. Luger Furniture Co. (1898), 
 
 8 N. I). 220, 77 X. W. 1003 638 
 V. Martin (1902), 130 X. C. 27, 
 
 40 S. E. 822 669 
 
 V. Mattison, 8 Abb. Pr. 3 519 
 
 V. Mobile & O. R. Co., 7 Bush, 
 
 116 11 
 
 !•. Xoble, 29 Ind. 216 326, 333 
 
 V. Pillsbury, 23 Minn. 175 131 
 
 V. Pugh, 23 Wis. 184 801, 913 
 
 i: Railway Co. (1897), 51 S. C. 
 
 150, 28 S. E. .303 817 
 
 r. Richardson, 68 N. C. 255 135 
 
 r. Shannon (1897), 101 la. 620, 
 
 70 X. W. 720 643 
 
 r. Sherwood (1902), 74 Conn. 
 
 475, 50 Atl. 504 676 
 
 V. Thompson, 63 Cal. 3 428 
 
 V. Turnbaugh (1899),' 153 Mo. 
 
 172, 54 S. W. 515 32, 48, 61 
 
 V. Wells F. & Co.'s Exp., 28 
 
 Pac. Rep. 958 137 
 
 Marvin v. Adamson, 11 Iowa, 371 300, 
 
 403 
 V. Wilber, 52 X. Y. 270 292 
 
 V. Yates (1901), 26 Wash. 50, 
 
 66 Pac. 131 455, 456 
 
 Marx V. Gross, 58 X. Y. Super. Ct. 
 
 221 832 
 
 Marye v. Jones, 9 Cal. 335 936 
 
 Mashburn v. Innian (1895), 97 Ga. 
 
 396 914 
 
 Mason r. Hey ward, 3 Minn. 182 843, 
 
 852, 911, 913 
 r. Lord, 40 X. Y. 476 123, 124 
 
 V. Mason, 102 Ind. 38 47 
 
 V. Ponieroy, 151 Mass. 164 387 
 
 V. St. Paul Fire Ins. Co. (1901), 
 
 82 Minn. 336, 85 X. W. 13 178, 
 179 
 V. Vestal, 88 Cal. 396 805 
 
 Mass. Benefit Ass'n v. Richart 
 
 (1896), 99 Ky. 302, 35 S. W. 541 593 
 Mass. Loan & T. Co. r. Welch, 47 
 
 Minn. 183 910 
 
 V. Weston, 29 Ind. 561 658, 824 
 
 V. Whitelv, 1 Abb. Pr. 84 635 
 
 Massie v. Stradford, 17 Ohio St. 596 42, 55 
 Massillon Engine & Thresher Co. ;•. 
 Carr (1903), Ky., 71 S. W. 
 859 703 
 
 V. Prouty (1902), — Xeb.— 91 
 
 X. W. 384 640, 669 
 
 Masten v. Blackwell. 8 Hun, 313 293 
 
 Masters v. P^reenian, 17 Ohio St. 
 
 323 187 
 
 Masterson v. Botts, 4 Abb. Pr. 130 157 
 Masterton v. Hagan, 17 B. Mon. 325 114 
 Masury v. Southworth, 9 Ohio St. 
 
 340 101 
 
 Mather v. Dunn (1898), 11 S. D. 
 
 196, 76 X. W. 922 179, 195 
 
 ?•. llutciiinson, 25 Wis. 27 781
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXXl 
 
 [the refeben'ces are to the pages.] 
 
 715 
 821 
 
 908 
 232 
 526 
 
 229 
 
 Mathews ;;. Ferrea, 45 Cal. 51 809 
 
 V. Weiler, 22 8. VV. Hep. 569 933 
 Mathis V. Fordliam (1901), 114 Ga. 
 
 364, 40 S. E. 824 
 Matlock V. Todii, 25 Iiul. 128 12 
 
 Matney v. Ferrill (1897), 100 Ky. 
 
 361, 38 S. W. 4'.I4 
 Matson v. Matsoii, 4 Met. (Ky.) 262 
 Mattair v. Payne, 15 Fla. 082 
 Matthew ;.•. Cent. Pac. K. Co., 63 
 
 Cal. 450 
 Matthews v. Bank (1901), 60 S. C. 
 
 183, 38 S. E. 437 452, 456, 466 
 V. Cady, 61 N. Y. 651 75, 626, 629, 
 
 630 
 V. Cantey (1896), 48 S. C. 588, 
 
 26 S. E. 894 102 
 
 V. Copeland, 79 N. C. 493 499 
 
 V. Matthews (1897), 154 N. Y. 
 
 288, 48 N. E. 631 686, 818 
 
 V. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 26 Mo. App. 
 
 75 
 V. O'Shea (1895), 45 Neb. 299, 63 
 
 N. W. 820 
 V. Sheehan, 69 N. Y. 585 
 V. Weiler (1893), 57 Ark. 606, 22 
 S. W. 569 
 Matthiesen v. Arata (1897), 32 Ore. 
 342, 50 Pac. 1015 
 V. Schomberg (1896), 4 Wis. 1, 
 68 N. W. 416 
 Mattis V. Boggs, 19 Neb. 698 
 Mattison i-. Childs, 5 Colo. 78 
 Mattoon v. Baker, 24 How. Pr. 329 
 V. Fremont, etc. R.R. Co. (1894), 
 6 S. I). 301, 60 N. W. 69 
 Mauch V. Hartford (1901), 112 Wis. 
 
 40, 87 N. W. 816 
 Maule V. Beaufort, 1 Russ. 349 
 Mauney v. Hamilton (1903), 132 N. C. 
 
 295, 303, 43 S. E. 903 
 Mavrich u. Grier, 3 Nev. 52 325, 337 
 
 Maxcy v. New Hamp.shire Fire Ins. 
 Co. (1893), 54 Minn. 272, 55 N. W. 
 1130 
 Maxon v. Scott, 55 N. Y. 247 
 Maxwell v. BoUes (1895), 28 Ore. 1, 
 41 Pac. 661 
 V. Campbell, 45 Ind. 360 
 r. Dudley, 13 Bush, 403 
 V. Farnain. 7 How. Pr. 2-36 
 V. Foster (1902), 64 S. C. 1, 41 
 
 S. E. 776 
 V. Higgins (1893), 38 Neb. 671, 
 
 57 N. W. 388 
 V. Northern Trust Co. (1897), 
 70 Minn. .334, 73 N. W. 173 
 V. Pratt, 24 Hun, 448 
 May V. Hanson, 6 Cal. 642 
 V. Selby, 1 Y. & C. 565 
 Maybee v. Moore, 90 Mo. 340 783, 815 
 Mayes v. Stephens (1901), 38 Ore. 
 
 512, 63 Pac. 760 703 
 
 Mavliew v. Robinson, 10 How. Pr. 
 162 800, 829 
 
 220 
 
 614 
 123 
 
 887 
 
 542 
 
 638 
 197 
 293 
 
 858 
 
 751 
 
 679 
 326 
 
 939 
 
 107 
 315 
 
 832 
 
 49 
 
 667 
 
 526 
 
 817 
 
 735 
 
 942 
 179 
 293 
 252 
 
 Maynard v. Locomotive, etc. Ass'n 
 (1897), 16 Utah, 145, 51 Pac. 
 259 
 V. Sigman (1902), — Neb. — , 
 
 91 N. W. 576 
 1-. Waidlich (1900), 156 Ind. 562, 
 60 N. E. 348 
 Mayo V. Davidge, 44 Hun, 342 
 V. Madden, 4 Cal. 27 
 V. Spartanburg, etc. R. R. Co. 
 (1894),43S. C.225, 21S.E. 
 10 
 Mavor of Albany v. Cunliff, 2 N. Y. 
 
 165 
 Mayor of N. Y. v. Mabie, 13 N. Y. 
 
 151 842, 843 
 
 I'. Parker Vein Stp. Co., 12 Abb. 
 
 Pr. 300 852, 894, 916 
 
 Mayor v. Cameron (1900), 111 Ga. 
 
 110, 36 S. E. 462 600 
 
 I'. Smith (1900), 111 Ga. 870, 
 
 36 S. E. 955 230. 661 
 
 Mays w. Carman ( 1902), Ky., 66 S.W 
 
 603 
 
 783 
 
 661 
 931 
 527 
 
 642 
 663 
 
 1019 
 Mea V. Pierce, 63 Hun, 400 
 Mead v. Bagnall, 15 Wis. 156 
 V. Brown, 65 Mo. 552 
 V. Mitchell, 17 N. Y. 210 
 V. Pettigrew (1899), 11 S. D. 529 
 78 N. W. 945 
 Meade v. Gilfoyle, 64 Wis. 18 
 Meadowcraft v. Walsh (189o), 15 
 
 Mont. 544, 39 Pac. 914 
 Meadows v. Goff, 14 S. W. Rep. 
 
 535 
 Meagher v. Morgan, 3 Kan. 372 
 Mealey r. Nickerson, 44 Minn. 430 
 Meating v. Tigerton Co. (1902), 113 
 
 Wis. 379. 89 N. W. 152 
 Mebane v. Mebane, 66 N. C. 3-34 
 Mechanics' Bank v. Gilpin, 105 Mo. 
 17 
 u. Woodward (1902), 74 Conn. 
 689, 51 Atl. 1084 640 
 
 Medano Ditch Co. r. Adams (1902), 
 
 29 Colo. 317. 68 Pac. 431 
 Medland r. Connell (1898), 57 Neb. 
 10, 77 N. W. 437 
 V. Walker (1895), 96 la. 175, 64 
 N. W. 797 715, 
 
 Medlock v. Merritt (1897), 102 Ga. 
 
 212, 29 S. E. 185 188, 206 
 
 Medsker v. Pogue, 1 Ind. App. 197 821 
 Meegan v. Gunsollis, 19 Mo. 417 
 Meeh ;;. Railway Co. (1900), 61 Kan. 
 
 630, 60 Pac. 319 
 Meehan v Bank (1895), 44 Neb. 213. 
 62 N. W. 490 
 V. Harlem Sav. Bank, 5 Hun, 
 
 439 
 V. Watson (1898), 65 Ark. 216, 47 
 
 S. W. 109 6 
 
 Meeker v. Claghorn, 44 N. Y. 349 91, 97 
 V. Waldron (1901), 62 Neb. 689, 
 
 87 N. W. 539 94 
 
 594 
 
 626, 637 
 
 457 
 
 452 
 
 05, 368 
 
 752 
 823 
 
 95 
 
 417 
 584 
 871 
 
 802 
 160 
 
 178 
 
 711 
 
 179 
 
 793 
 
 867 
 
 314 
 702 
 329 
 
 756
 
 cxxu 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the 
 
 BEFERENCES 
 
 
 
 159 
 
 48 
 
 Wis. 
 
 229 
 151 
 
 53 
 
 804 
 
 815 
 
 S ARE TO THE PAOES.] 
 
 Meeks v. Hahn, 20 Cal. 620 
 Meese r. Fond du Lac, 
 
 32.S 
 Meier «-. Lester, 21 Mo. 112 
 Meiss r. Gill, 44 Ohio St. 253 
 Melilrum i: Kenetiok (1902), 15 S. D. 
 
 .>7i>, 89 X. \V. bo3 
 Mellott v. Downing !l901), 39 Ore. 
 
 218, C4 Pac. 3y.3 595,805 
 
 Melson r. Thornton (1901), 113 Ga. 
 
 9".t, oS S. E. 342 
 Memphis, First Nat. Bk. of, v. Kidd, 
 
 20 Minn. 2:J4 
 Men.lelsulm r. Banov (1900), 57 S. C. 
 
 174, 35 8. E. 499 
 Jlendenhall i-. Wilson. 54 Iowa, 589 
 
 499, 520 
 Mengert r. Brinkcrhoff (1903), — O. 
 
 St. — , 66 N. E. 530 823 
 
 Mercein v. Smith, 2 Hill, 210 140, 874 
 Mercer i-. Dyer (1895), 15 Mont. 317, 
 
 39 Pac. 314 9-30, 887 
 
 Mercer Cy. Sup. v. Hubbard, 45 111. 
 
 139 118 
 
 Merchants & Mech. Bk. v. Hewitt, 3 
 
 Iowa. 93 99 
 
 Merchants' Bank v. McClelland, 9 
 
 Col. 608 150 
 
 V. Thomson, 55 N. Y. 7 326, 335 
 
 V. Union & T. Co., 69 N. Y. 
 
 615 
 
 302 
 
 873 
 
 714 
 279, 
 
 804 
 
 704 
 
 134 
 
 619 
 945 
 
 618 
 
 Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Stephens 
 
 (1901), Ky., 59S. W. 511 
 Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Barlow 
 (1900), 79 Minn. 234, 82 
 N. \y. 364 
 1-. Robinson (1895), 97 Ky. 552, 
 31 S. W. 1.36 
 Mercier v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (1901), 
 
 24 Wash. 147. 04 Pac. 158 
 Meredith v. Lackev, Ki Ind. 1 
 
 1-. Lyon (1902), — Neb. — , 92 
 N. W. 122 
 Merguire i;. O'Donnell (1894), 103 
 
 Cal. 50. 36 Pac. 1033 
 Merkle r. Bennington, 68 Mich. 133 
 Merrick v. Gordon, 20 N. Y. 93 856, 875 
 Merrill v. Hearing, 22 Minn. 370 517 
 
 V. Equitable Farm & Stock, etc. 
 Co. (1896), 49 Neb. 198,68 
 N. W. 365 693 
 
 f. Green, 55 N. Y. 270 111,131 
 
 I'. Miller (1903), 28 Mont. 134, 72 
 
 Pac. 423 641 
 
 V. Nightingale, .39 Wis. 247 908, 910 
 V. Plainrteld, 45 N. II. 126 118 
 
 r. Suing (1902), — Neb. — , 92 
 
 N. W. 018 703 
 
 1-. Wedgwood, 25 Neb. 283 780, 781, 
 
 845 
 Merrirnan v. McCormick Harvesting 
 M. Co. (1893), 86 Wis. 142, 
 56 N. W. 743 24 
 
 V. WalK.n (is'.t.'d. 105 Cal. 40:?, 
 
 38 Pac. lioa 15 
 
 Merritt v. Briggs, 57 N. Y. 654 777 
 
 V. Gliddon, 39 Cal. 559 584 
 
 V. Gouley, 58 Hun, 372 937 
 
 V. Seaman, 6 Barb. 330 874 
 
 V. Seaman, 6 N. Y. 168 140 
 
 I'. Walsh, 32 N. Y. 6»5 179, 201 
 
 V. Wells, 18 Ind. 171 245 
 
 Merritt Milling Co. v. Finlay, 110 
 
 N. C. 411 911,916 
 
 Mertens i'. Loewcnberg, 69 Mo. 208 
 Merwin v. Ballard, 65 N. C. 168 396 
 
 Mesechaert v. Kennedy, 4 McCrary, 
 
 133 244 
 
 Messenger i-. Northcutt (1899), 26 
 
 Colo. 527, 58 Pac. 1090 640 
 
 Messmer v. Block (1898), 100 Wis. 
 
 664, 76 N. W. 598 584 
 
 Metropolis Mfg. Co. v. Lynch (1896), 
 
 68 Conn. 459, 36 Atl. 832 39 
 
 Metrop. Life Ins. Co. v. Meeker, 85 
 
 N. Y. 614 562, 568, 704 
 
 V. Smith (1900), Ky., 59 S. W. 24 
 
 638, 643 
 Metropolitan T. Co. v. Tonawanda, 
 
 etc. K. R. Co., 43 Hun, 521 927 
 
 Metzger v. Attica & A. Arc. R. Co., 
 
 79 N. Y. 171 119 
 
 Mew V. Railway Co. (1899), 55 S. C. 
 
 90, 32 S. E. 828 466 
 
 Mewherter v. Ilatten, 42 Iowa, 288 225 
 
 V. Price, 11 Ind. 199 95 
 
 Meyer v. Amidon, 45 N. Y. 169 609, 629 
 
 V. Barth (1897), 97 Wis. 352, 72 
 
 N. W. 748 96, 180, 714 
 
 V. Brooks (1896), 29 Ore. 203, 44 
 
 Pac. 281 645 
 
 V. Dubuque Cy., 43 Iowa, 592 39 
 
 V. First Nat. Bank (1902), 63 
 
 Neb. 079, 88 N. W. 867 688 
 
 V. Garthwaite (1896), 92 Wis. 
 
 571, 66 N. W. 704 714 
 
 V. Koehring (1895), 129 Mo. 15, 
 
 31 S. W. 449 625 
 
 !•. Lowell, 44 Mo. 328 105, 109 
 
 V. McLean, 1 Johns. 509 719 
 
 V. McLean. 2 Johns. 183 721 
 
 V. School District (1893),4S. D. 
 
 420, 57 N. W. 68 568 
 
 V. Shamp (1897), 51 Neb. 424, 
 
 71 N. \y. 57 107 
 
 v. Zotel's Adni'r (1895), 96 Ky. 
 
 362, 29 S. W. 28 683 
 
 Meyers v. Field, 37 Mo. 434 11, 20, 25, 
 
 37 38 
 I'. Menter (1902), 03 Neb. 427, 
 
 88N.W. 062 688 
 
 r. Smith (IbOlt), 59 Neb. 30, 80 
 
 N. \V. 273 35 
 
 Michael v. St. Louis Mut. F. Ins. Co., 
 
 17 Mo. A pp. 23 102, 207 
 
 Michalitschke Bros. v. Wells, Fargo 
 & Co. (1897), 118 Cal. 683, 60 Pac. 
 847 817 
 
 Michener v. Springfield, etc. Co. 
 (1895), 142 Ind. 130, 40 N. E. 679 35
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxxm 
 
 [the befebences are to the pages.] 
 
 Mickle V. Heinlen, 92 Cal. 596 803 
 
 Mickletliwait v. Winstanlev, 13 
 
 W. U. -210 ' 347 
 
 Midland Co. v. Broat, 52 N. W. Kep. 
 
 972 932 
 
 Milbank r. Jones, 127 N. Y. 370 811 
 
 V. Jones (1894), 141 N. Y. 340, 
 
 36 N. K. 388 762 
 
 Milburn v. Glynn County (1890), 109 
 
 Ga. 473, 34 S. E. 848 671 
 
 Miles V. Du Bey (1894), 15 Mont. 
 
 340, 39 I'ac. 313 320 
 
 V. Durnford, 2 DeG. M. & G. 
 
 641 258 
 
 V. Lingerman, 24 Ind. 385 781 
 
 V. Mutual lieserve Fund Life 
 Ass'n (1901), 108 Wis. 421, 
 84 N. W. 159 667, 671 
 
 V. Smith, 22 Mo. 502 326, 329 
 
 V. Woodward (1896), 115 Cal. 
 
 308, 46 Pac. 1076 831 
 
 Milford Sch. T. v. Powner, 126 Ind. 
 
 528 748 
 
 Miliani v. Tognini, 19 Nev. 133 112 
 
 Millan v. Railway Co. (1899), 54 S. C 
 
 485, 32 S. E. 539 831 
 
 Miller r. Anderson, 19 Mo. App. 
 
 71 815 
 
 V. Ballerino (1902) 135 Cal. 566, 
 
 67 Pac. 1046 670 
 
 V. Bank (1897), 49 S. C. 427, 27 
 
 S. C. 514 335 
 
 V. Bayer (1896), 94 Wis. 123, 68 
 
 N. W. 869 592, 593 
 
 V. Bear, 3 Paige, 467 357 
 
 V. Beck (189'J), 108 la. 575, 79 
 
 N. W. 344 304 
 
 V. Bottenberg (1895), 144 Ind. 
 
 312, 41 N. E. 804 543 
 
 V. Brigiiam, 50 Cal. 615 734 
 
 V. Crigler (1899), 83 Mo. App. 
 
 895 202 
 
 y. Cross (1900), 73 Conn. 538, 
 
 48 Atl. 213 713, 800 
 
 V. Curry, 53 Cal. 665 299 
 
 V. Florer, 15 Ohio St. 149 105, 138, 
 
 935 
 V. Freeman (1900), 111 Ga. 654, 
 
 36 S. E 961 65 
 
 (;. Fulton, 47 Cal. 146 46 
 
 V. Gaither, 3 Busli, 152 936 
 
 V. Hall, 70 N. Y. 250 310 
 
 V. Hendig, 55 Iowa, 174 618 
 
 w. Hirsciiberg (1895), 27 Ore. 
 
 522, 40 Pac. 506 593, 626, 810 
 V. Hunt, 3 N. Y. S. C 762 315 
 
 V. Losee, 9 How. Pr. ,3.56 866 
 
 V. Rapp (1893), 135 Ind. 614, 34 
 
 N. E. 981 662, 665 
 
 V. Van Tassel, 24 Cal. 458 71 
 
 V. Warmington, 1 Jao. & Walk. 
 
 484 243 
 
 V. White, 6 N. Y. S. C. 255 664 
 
 Milligan v. Poole, 35 Ind. 64 369 
 
 Millikin v. Cary, 5 How. Pr. 272 25 
 
 Mills V. Buttrick, 4 Col. 53 55, 364, 
 
 942 
 V. Callahan (1900), 126 N. C. 
 
 756, 36 S. E. 164 415 
 
 V. Carrier, 30 8. C. 617 933 
 
 V. Cartilage, 31 Mo. App. 141 813 
 r. Collins, 67 Iowa, 164 790 
 
 V. Fletcher (1893), 100 Cal. 142, 
 
 34 Pac. 637 946 
 
 V. Geer (1900), 111 Ga. 275, 36 
 
 S. E. 673 923 
 
 V. Malott, 43 Ind. 248 200 
 
 V. Murrv, 1 Neb. 327 89 
 
 V. Rice,'3 Neb. 76 596, 597 
 
 V. Rosenbaum, 103 Ind. 152 821, 
 
 865 
 V. Van Voorhies, 20 N. Y. 412 326, 
 335, 336 
 Mills' Estate (1902), 40 Ore. 424, 67 
 
 Pac. 107 757 
 
 Milner v. Harris (1903), — Neb. — , 
 
 95 N. W. 682 593 
 
 Milroy V. Quinn, 69 Ind. 406 598 
 
 Milwaukee v. Zoehrlaut Co. (1902), 
 
 114 Wis. 276, 90 N. W. 187 714 
 
 Minard v. McBee (1896), 29 Ore. 225, 
 
 44 Pac. 491 704 
 
 Miner v. Bacon, 131 N. Y. 677 637 
 
 V. Smith, 53 Vt. 551 327 
 
 Ming Yue v. Coos Bay R. R. Co. 
 
 (1893), 24 Ore. 392, 33 Pac. 641 18 
 
 Minier r. Minier, 4 Lans. 421 225 
 
 Mining Co. v. Huff (1901), 62 Kan. 
 
 405, 63 Pac. 442 689 
 
 Minnaugh v. Partlin, 67 Mich. 391 939 
 Minneapolis, etc. Ry. Co. i'. Fire- 
 men's Ins. Co. (1895), 62 
 Minn. 315, 64 N. W. 902 638 
 V. Home Ins. Co. (1896), 64 
 
 Minn. 61, 66 N. W. 1.32 703 
 
 Minneapolis Harvester Works v. 
 
 Libby, 24 Minn. 327 181 
 
 V. Smith, 53 N. W. Rep. 973 823 
 
 V. Smith (1893), 36 Neb. 616,54 
 
 N. W. 973 678 
 
 Minneapolis Stockyards Co. v. Cun- 
 ningham (1894), 59 Minn. 325, 
 
 61 N. W. .329 639 
 Minneapolis Threshing Co. v. Dar- 
 
 nall (1900), 13 S. I). 279, 83 N. W. 
 
 266 890, 922 
 
 Minnesota Oil Co. v. Palmer, 20 
 
 Minn. 468 119 
 
 Minnesota Thresher Man. Co. v. 
 
 Heipler, 52 N. W. Rep. .33 94 
 
 Minor r. Baldridge (1898), 123 Cal. 
 
 187, 55 Cal. 783 584,586 
 
 xMinturn i: Main, 7 N. Y. 220 151 
 
 Minzer r. Willman Mercantile Co. 
 
 (1899), 59 Neb. 410, 81 N. W. 
 
 307 736 
 
 Miser v. O'Shea (1900), 37 Ore. 231, 
 
 62 Pac. 491 737, 787 
 Missoula Co. v. O'Donnell (1900), 24 
 
 Mont. 65, 60 Pac. 594 737
 
 CXXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITKD. 
 
 [the aEF£RE>'C£S A 
 
 Missouri, etc. Kv. Co. i'. Garrison 
 
 (l«X»;j), — Wan. — , 72 Pac. 225 623 
 
 Missouri, etc. Trust Co. r. Clark 
 (I'JOO), 60 Neb. 406, 83 
 N. W. 202 639 
 
 r. Kiclianlson (1899), 57 Neb. 
 
 017, 78 N. W. 273 334 
 
 Missouri, K. & T. Hy. r. Bageley 
 
 (l't02), 05 Kan. 188, O'.l Pac. 189 642 
 M. K. & T. Hv. Co. I', llaber (1890), 
 
 50 Kan. 094, 44 Pac. 632 303 
 
 Missouri Lumber, etc. Co. v. Zeitin- 
 
 ger, 45 Mo. -A pp. 114 637 
 
 Missouri Pac. Uv. Co. v. Heming- 
 way (1902), 03 Neb. 610,88 
 N. W. 07.) 509, 819 
 
 «. Ilenrie (1901), 63 Kan. 330, 
 
 05 Pac. 665 507, 041, 655 
 
 V. :Moffat (1899), 00 Kan. 113, 
 
 55 Pac. 837 642 
 
 r. Palmer (1898), 55 Neb. 559, 
 
 76 N. W. 109 703 
 
 Missouri Vallcv Land Co. v. Bush- 
 
 nell, 11 Neb.' 192 600 
 
 Mitchell 1-. Allen, 25 Hun, 543 301, 303, 
 
 308 
 V. Am. Ins. Co., 51 Ind. 396 4.39 
 
 V. Bank of St. Paul, 7 Minn. 252 270, 
 278, 351, 356, 476 
 V. Clinton, 99 Mo. 153 502 
 
 V. Dickson, 53 Ind. 110 88 
 
 1-. Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 92 118 
 
 V. Mitchell, 61 N.Y. 398 570 
 
 I'. Mitciiell, 1 S. E. Rep. 648 499 
 
 I'. New Farmers' Bank's Trus- 
 tee (1901), — Kv. — , 60 
 S. W. 375 ' 460 
 
 r. O'Neale, 4 Nev. .504 41.3,414 
 
 V. St. Marv (1897), 148 Ind. Ill, 
 
 47N.K. 224 146,149 
 
 V. Smith (1901), 74 Conn. 125, 
 
 125, 49 All. 909 645 
 
 V. Thorne, 57 Hun, 405 242 
 
 Mix V. Fairciiiid, 12 Iowa, 351 300, 
 
 403 
 Mizzell r. Kuffin (1890), 118 N. C. 
 
 O'.i, 23 S. !•:. 927 603, 005, 040, 644 
 
 Moberly >: Alexander, 19 Iowa, 
 162 
 c. Hugan (1895), 131 Mo. 19, 32 
 S. \V. 1014 
 Mobile V. Waring, 41 Ala. 1.39 
 Modern Wooiimen i- Noyes (1901>, 
 
 l.';8 Ind. .Vi3. 61 N. E. 21 
 Modlin r. N. W. Turnp. Co., 48 Ind. 
 
 ■192 
 Moen r. Eldred, 22 Minn. 538 
 Moffat c. Karquharson, 2 Bro. C. C. 
 338 
 
 >: Van Doren, 4 Bosw. 009 891, 922 
 Moffct r. Sackett. 18 N. Y. 522 845 
 
 Moffitt r. ( hicago Chronicle Co. 
 
 (1899). 107 la. 407, 78 N. W. 45 783 
 Mohr r. Barnes. 4 f"olo. ."..50 602 
 
 Mole V. Smith, Jacob, 490 358 
 
 923 
 
 684 
 
 118 
 
 672 
 
 248 
 
 RE TO THE P.\OES.] 
 
 Moline, Milburn & Stoddard Co. v. 
 Hamilton (1898), 56 Neb. 132, 76 
 N. W. 455 419 
 
 Molineux c. Powell, 3 P. Wms. 268 255 
 Molino V. Blake (1898), Ariz., 52 
 
 Pac. 366 704 
 
 Mollvneaux v. Wittenberg (1894), 
 
 39 Neb. 547, 58 N. W. 205 702 
 
 Momsen r. Atkins (1900), 105 Wis. 
 
 557, 81 N. W. 647 853, 936 
 
 V. Noyes (1900), 105 Wis. 565, 
 
 81 N. W. 800 887, 931 
 
 Monaglian v. Randall Sch. Dist., 38 
 
 Wis. 100 220 
 
 Mondran v. Goux, 51 Cal. 151 614 
 
 Mono County v. Flanigan (1900), 130 
 
 Cal. 105, 62 Pac. 293 641 
 
 Monroe v. Cannon (1900), 24 Mont. 
 
 316, 01 Pac. 863 051 
 
 V. Reid (1895), 46 Neb. 316, 64 
 
 N. W. 983 815 
 
 Monson 1-. Lathrop (1897), 90 Wis. 
 
 380, 71 X. W. 596 306 
 
 Montana Mining Co. v. St. Louis Co. 
 
 (1897), 19 Mont. 313, 48 Pac. 305 114 
 Montesano v. Blair (1895), 12 Wash. 
 
 188, 40 Pac. 731 593 
 
 Montfort v. Hughes, 3 E. D. Smith, 
 
 59 306 
 
 Montgomerie v. Bath, 3 Ves. 560 244 
 
 Montgomery v. Gorrell, 51 Ind. 309 439 
 
 V. McEwen, 7 Minn. 351 29, 494 
 
 V. Rief (1897), 15 Utah 495, 50 
 
 Pac. 623 ; 106 
 
 V. Shockey, 37 Iowa, 107 617 
 
 Monti r. Bishop. 3 Colo. 605 55, 942 
 
 Montour r. Purdy, 11 Minn. 401 728 
 
 Montserrat Coal Co. v. Coal Mining 
 Co. (1897), 141 Mo. 149, 42 S. W. 
 822 510 
 
 Moody V. Arthur. 10 Kan. 419 609 
 
 V. Belden, 00 Hun, 582 756 
 
 V. Ins. Co. (1894), 52 O. St. 12, 
 
 38 N. E. 1011 071,672 
 
 Moomey ';. Maas, 22 Iowa. 380 326, 335 
 Moon V. McKnight, 54 Wis. 551 471 
 
 Mooney v. H. Riv. R. Co., 5 Robt. 
 
 548 302 
 
 V. N. Y. El. R. Co. (1900). 123 
 
 N Y. 242, 57 N. E. 496 419 
 
 Moore r. Beauthamp, 5 T^ana, 70 250 
 1-. Bevier (1895). 00 Minn. 240, 
 
 62 N W. 281 179 
 
 y. Brownfield (1894), 10 Wash. 
 
 4-39. 39 Pac 113 816 
 
 V. Caruthers. 17 B. Mon. 609 940 
 
 V. (ilea ton, 23 <;a. 142 254 
 
 V. Halliday (1903), 43 Ore. 243, 
 
 72 Pac. 801. 605, 657 
 
 V. Harmon (1895), 142 Ind. 555, 
 
 41,N. E. 599 178, 800 
 
 V. Ilarrod (1897), 101 Ky. 248, 
 
 40 S. W. 675 043 
 
 V. Hegeinar. 6 Hun, 290 850 
 
 i;. Hobbs, 79 N. C. 535 562, 578, 581
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxxv 
 
 [the REFEllENCES 
 
 Moore v. Flolmes (1897), 68 Minn. 
 
 108, 70 N. W. 872 758 
 
 V. Jackson, 35 Ind. oGO 20S 
 
 V. Lowry, 25 Iowa, o3G t'O 
 V. May (lOOo). 117 Wis. 192, 94 
 
 N. W. 45 787 
 
 V. Metrop. Nat. Bk., 55 N. Y. 41 129 
 
 V. Moberly, 7 B. Mon. 299 377 
 
 V. Moore, 47 N. Y. 467 226 
 
 V. Moore, 56 Cal. 89 592 
 1-. Morris (1895), 142 Ind. .354, 41 
 
 N. E. 796 800 
 
 V. Noble, 53 Barb. 425 626, 629, 631 
 V. Parker (1899), 59 Neb. 29, 80 
 
 N. W. 43 677 
 
 V. Bingo, 82 Mo. 468 811 
 V. Ripley (1898), 106 Ga. 556, 32 
 
 S. E. 647 3.56 
 
 V. Smith, 10 How. Pr. 361 496 
 V. Spurrier (1899), 55 S. C. 292, 
 
 33 S. E. 352 25 
 V. Willamette Transp. & L. Co., 
 
 7 Oreg. 355 381 
 
 Moorehead v. Hyde, 38 Iowa, 382 154, 
 
 871 
 
 Moorehouse v. Ballou, 16 Barb. 289 293 
 Moorman v. Collier, 32 Iowa, 138 89, 114 
 Moran v. Bentley (1897), 69 Conn. 
 
 392, 37 Atl. 1092 615 
 Mordecai v. Seignious (1898), 53 
 
 S. C. 95, 30 S. E. 717 35 
 
 More V. Elmore County Irr. Co. 
 
 (1893), 3 Idaho, 729, 35 
 
 Pac. 171 542 
 
 V. Massini, 32 Cal. 590 518 
 
 V. Band, 60 N. Y. 208 872, 908, 911 
 
 Moreau v. Detchemendy, 41 Mo. 431 20, 
 
 31, 477 
 Morehead v. Halsell, Stanton's Code 
 
 (Ky.), 96 910 
 Morehouse v. Throckmorton (1899), 
 
 72 Conn. 449, 44 Atl. 747 15, 802 
 
 Morenhaut v. Wilson, 52 Cal. 263 198, 
 
 807 
 Morey v. City of Duluth (1897), 69 
 
 Minn. 5, 71 N. W. 694 666 
 
 Morgan v. Booth, 13 Bush, 480 737 
 V. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 37 Iowa, 
 
 359 789 
 V. Hayes (1898), 98 Wis. 313, 73 
 
 N. W. 786 864 
 V. Hudnell (1895), 52 0. St. 552, 
 
 40N. E. 716 196 
 V. King (1900), 27 Colo. 539, 63 
 
 Pac. 416 356 
 V. Morgan (1894), 10 Wash. 99, 
 
 38 Pac. 10.54 639, 643 
 
 V. Morgan, 2 Wheat. 290 255 
 V. Eandolph, etc. Co. (1900), 73 
 
 Conn. 396, 47 Atl. 658 105, 106 
 
 V. Reid, 7 Abb. Pr. 215 150 
 
 V. Smith, 7 Hun, 244 869, 908 
 
 - V. Wattles, 69 Ind. 260 769 
 
 V. Wickliffe (1901), 110 Ky. 215, 
 
 61 S. W. 13 686 
 
 ARE TO TnE PAGES.] 
 
 Morgau r. Wickliffe (1903), — Ky, 
 
 — , 72 S. W. 1122 330 
 
 Morganthau v. King, 15 Colo. 413 877 
 Morley r. xMorley, 25 Beav. 253 245 
 
 iMornan v. Carroll, 35 Iowa, 22 177, 270 
 Morning c. Long (1899), 109 la. 288, 
 
 80 N. W. 390 817 
 
 Morningstar v. Cunningham, 110 
 
 Ind. 328 189 
 
 Morrell v. Irving F. Ins. Co., 33 
 
 N. Y. 429 298, 801, 804 
 
 Morret v. Westerne, 2 Vern. 663 333 
 
 Morrill v. Little Falls Co. (1893), 53 
 
 Minn. 371, 55 N. W. 547 678 
 
 Morris v. Tuthill, 72 N. Y. 575 88 
 
 o. Wheeler, 45 N. Y. 708 325, 333 
 Morrison v. City of Eau Claire 
 (1902), 115 Wis. 538, 92 
 N. W. 280 608 
 
 V. Herrington (1894), 120 Mo. 
 
 665, 25 S. W. 568 32 
 
 V. Kramer, 58 Ind. 38 887, 908 
 
 V. Lovejoy, 6 Minn. 319 843, 852, 933 
 V. Morrison (1898), 122 N. C. 
 
 598, 29 S. E. 901 197 
 
 V. Rogers, 2 111. 317 649 
 
 V. Snow (1903), 26 Utah, 247, 72 
 
 Pac. 924 612 
 
 Morrissey v. Board of Education 
 (1895), 7 S. D. 553,64N. W. 
 1126 615,624 
 
 V. Faucett (1902), 28 Wash. 52, 
 
 68 Pac. 352 642 
 
 Morrow v. Bright, 20 Mo. 298 131, 134 
 
 V. Lawrence, 7 Wis. 574 348 
 
 Morse v. Oilman, 16 Wis. 504 592, 597, 
 
 696 
 
 V. Morse, 42 Ind. 365 347, 373 
 
 V. Sadler, 1 Cox, 352 254 
 
 Mortimer v. Chambers, 63 Hun, 335 866, 
 
 881 
 Mortland v. Holton, 44 Mo. -58 935 
 
 Morton v. Coffin, 29 Iowa, 235 753 
 
 V. Dickson, 14 S. W. Rep. 905 51 
 
 V. Green, 2 Neb. 441 63 
 
 V. Morton, 10 Iowa, 58 725 
 
 V. Waring's Heirs, 18 B. Mon. 
 
 72. 82 735 
 
 V. Weil, 11 Abb. Pr. 421 342 
 
 V. Western Union Tel. Co. 
 (1902), 130 N. C. 299, 41 
 S. E. -184 216, 444, 452, 503 
 
 Moser v. Cochrane, l-'i Dalv, 159 887 
 
 r. Cochrane, 107 N. Y."35 911 
 
 Moses i-\ Kearney, 31 Ark. 261 119 
 
 Mosher r. Bruhn (1896), 15 Wash. 
 
 332, 46 Pac. 397 593, 606 
 
 Mosier c. Beale, 43 Fed. Rep. 503 
 
 Moss V. North Carolina R. R. Co. 
 (1898), 122 N. C. 880, 29 
 S. E. 410 623 
 
 V. Warner, 10 Cal. 296 316, 337,428 
 Motes V. Gila Valley Ry. Co. (1902), 
 
 Ariz., 68 Pac. 532 640, 642, 819 
 
 Motley V. Griffin, 104 N. C. 112 782
 
 CXXVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the beferen'ces ahe to the pages.] 
 
 Mott r. Bunieit, 2 E. D. Smith, 50 
 
 V. Mott. 8-J Cal. 413 
 Moultun i: C'liafee, 22 Fed. Hep. 26 
 
 V. Cornish, 01 Hun, 438 
 
 o. Nortt)n, 5 Barb. 280 
 
 r. Thompson, 20 Minn. 120 
 
 831 
 ','42 
 358 
 338 
 302 
 709, 
 784 
 821 
 11, 15 
 
 V. Walsh, 30 Iowa, 301 
 Mowry r. Hill. 11 Wis. 14G 
 
 V. McQueen (11X)0), 80 Minn. 
 
 385. 83 N. W. 348 823 
 
 r. Wareliam (lb97), 101 la. 28, 
 
 09 N. W. 1128 643 
 
 Moyle c. Porter, 51 Cal. 639 887, 922 
 
 Mozlev r. Reagan (1899), 109 Ga. 
 
 182," 34 S. E. 310 817 
 
 Muiitrett r. Gager, 52 Me. 541 248, 251 
 MiUileiibertc r. Tacoma (1901), 25 
 
 Wash. 30, 04 Pac. 925 421 
 
 Muir V. Gibson, 8 Ind. 187 271, 273, 325, 
 
 329, 348 
 
 MulbergLT V. Koenig, 62 Wis. 558 
 
 903, 
 927 
 
 Muldoon r. Brown (1899), 21 Utah, 
 
 121. 59 Pac. 720 
 Mulliall c. Mulhall (1895), 3 Okla. 
 304. 41 Pac. 109 
 V. Mulliall (1895), 3 Okla. 252, 41 
 Pac. 577 
 
 Mulholland r. Uapp, 50 Mo. 42 455, 458 
 Mullallv r. Townscnd (1897), 119 
 
 Cal. 47, 50 Pac. 1060 
 Mullen 1-. Hewitt. 103 Mo. 639 
 
 r. McKim (1890), 22 Colo. 468, 
 
 45 Pac 416 
 r. Morris (1895), 43 Neb. 596, 62 
 N. W. 74 
 Mullendore v. Scott, 45 Ind. 113 
 Mulock r. Wilson (1893), 19 Colo. 
 MiUlin's Appeal, 40 Wis. 154 
 
 90 
 
 636 
 
 802 
 
 499 
 
 463 
 
 801 
 727. 
 932 
 159 
 
 296, 35 Pac. 532 
 Munch r. Cockerell, 8 Sim. 219 
 
 261, 
 
 Muhford >■ Koet (1900), 154 Mo. 36, 
 
 55 S W. 271 
 Muiiirer -•. Shannon, 61 X. Y. 251 
 .Munn '■. Marsii. 38 N. J. Eq. 410 
 .Miiiuis r. Loveland (1897), 15 Utah, 
 
 •2VI. 49 Pac. 74;; 
 Muiizesheimer v. Byrne, 19 S. W. 
 
 Kci». 320 
 .Miirden r. Primenf, 1 Ililt. 75 842, 
 M unlock '•. Cox, 118 Ind. 260 
 Murphy i\ Branaman (1900), 156 
 In<l. 77. 59 N. E. 274 
 V. Colton (1896), 4 Okla. 181,44 
 
 Pac. 208 876, 
 
 V. Ganey (1901). 23 Utah. 633, 
 
 66 Pac. 190 
 >•. Uussell (1901), Idaiio,67 Pac. 
 
 427 832, 
 
 >: Wilson, 44 Mo. 313 
 Murray r. Bardon (1903). 132 N. C. 
 130, 43 S. E. 600 
 
 30 
 348, 
 352 
 
 657 
 713 
 329 
 
 780 
 
 114 
 920 
 002 
 
 543 
 
 881 
 
 642 
 
 939 
 301 
 
 822 
 
 326, 
 173, 
 
 Murray v. Biacklcdge, 71 N. C. 492 
 r. Booker (1900), Ky., 58 
 
 S. W. 788 
 V. Catlett, 4 Greene, 108 
 V. Ebright, 50 Ind. 362 
 V. Hay, i Barb. Cii. 59 
 V. Live Stock Co. (1895), 12 
 
 Wasli. 259, 40 Pac. 942 
 V. Loushman (189U), 47 Neb. 256, 
 
 66 N. W. 413 
 ?'. McGarigle, 69 Wis. 483 177, 
 I'. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. 85 N. Y. 
 
 236 662, 
 
 V. Polglase (1899), 23 Mont. 401, 
 
 59 Pac. 439 
 V. Shoudy (1896), 13 Wash. 33, 
 
 42 Pac. 031 
 V. Tingley (1897), 20 Mont. 200, 
 50 Pac. 723 
 Murrell i: Henry (1902), 70 Ark. 161, 
 
 66 S. W. 647 
 Musselman v. Cravens, 47 Ind. 4 
 
 V. Galligher, 32 Iowa, 383 231, 
 882, 
 Musser r. Crum, 48 Iowa, 52 
 
 V. King (1894), 40 Neb. 892, 59 
 N. W. 744 
 Muth V. Frost, 75 Wis. 166 
 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Presbyterian 
 Church (1900), 111 Ga. 677, 36 
 S. E. 880 
 Muzzy r. Ledlie, 23 Wis. 445 
 Myer v. Van Collem, 28 Barb. 230 
 Myers v. Bauahman (1901), 01 Neb. 
 818, 80 N. W. 507 115 
 
 r. Berry (1895), 3 Okla. 612, 41 
 
 Pac. 580 
 r. Burns, 35 N. Y. 269 
 V. Chicairo, etc. Rv. Co. (1897), 
 09 Minn. 476, 72 N. W. 694 
 V. Davis, 22 N. Y. 489 122, 131, 
 V. Dougla.ss (1896), 99 Kv. 207, 
 
 35 S. W. 917 
 v. First Presbyterian Church 
 (1901), 11 Okla., 544, 69 Pac. 
 674 
 V. Longstaff (1900), 14 S. D. 98, 
 
 84 N. W. 233 
 V. Machado, 6 Abb. Pr. 198 
 V. Stale, 47 Ind. 293 
 [Src Meyers.] 
 Mygatt V. Wilcox, 1 Lans. 55 
 Mynderse r. Snook, 1 Lans. 488 
 
 157, 
 
 874, 
 
 64 
 
 452 
 327 
 277 
 262 
 
 812 
 
 638 
 181 
 
 753 
 
 418 
 
 678 
 
 640 
 
 599 
 153 
 313, 
 875 
 825 
 
 688 
 911 
 
 641 
 0(50 
 403 
 
 152 
 
 680 
 909 
 
 677 
 133 
 
 669 
 
 640 
 
 806 
 181 
 295 
 
 291 
 878, 
 879 
 
 N. 
 
 Naplee >: Minturn, 8 Cal. 540 936 
 
 V. Palmer, 7 Cal. 543 936 
 
 Nalle V. Parks (1903), 173 Mo. 616, 
 
 73 S. W. 596 32, 63 
 
 V. Thompson (1903), 173 Mo. 
 
 595, 73 S. W. 599 32, 63 
 
 Napa V. Ilowland, 87 Cal. 84 285 
 
 Nash V. McCauley, 9 Abb. Pr. 159 660
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxxvu 
 
 [the IlEFERENOES ARE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Nash V. Mitchell, 71 N. Y. 1',)<J 316 
 
 ,: St. Taul, U Minn. 174 7Go, 811 
 Na.sliville, etc. li. K. Co. o. Carrico 
 
 (1894), i)5 Ky. 489, 20 S. W. 177 757 
 Nat. Bank v. Harkalow (18'J4), 53 
 
 Kan. 08, 35 Tac. I'M 780 
 
 V. Quinton (1897), 57 Kan. 750, 
 
 48 Tac. 20 802 
 
 Nat. Bank of Auburn r. Lewis, 81 
 
 N. Y. 15 908 
 
 Nat. Bank of Cham v. Grimm, 109 
 
 N. C. 93 872 
 
 National Bank of Deposit v. Rogers 
 (1901), 106 N. Y. 380, 59 N. E. 922 376, 
 
 045 
 Nat. Bank of Michigan v. Green, 33 
 
 Iowa, 140 658, 826 
 
 Nat. Bank of Paris v. McKay, 21 
 
 N. Y. 191 779 
 
 V. Nickel 1, 34 Mo. App. 295 858, 877 
 National Distilling Co. v. Cream City 
 Importing Co. (1898), 86 Wis. 352, 
 56 N. W. 864 96, 71.3, 814 
 
 National Fire Ins. Co. v. Eastern 
 Building & Loan Ass'n 
 (1902), 63 Neb. 698,88 N. W. 
 863 593 
 
 v. McKay, 21 N. Y. 191 857, 858 
 
 National German-American Bank c. 
 Lawrence (1899), 77 Minn. 282, 79 
 N. W. 1016 352 
 
 National Life Ins. Co. v. Martin 
 
 (1899), .57 Neb. 350, 77 N. W. 760 756 
 Nat. L. Ins. Co. of U. S. A. v. Robin- 
 son, 8 Neb. 4.52 814 
 Nat. Lumber Co. v. Ashby (1894), 
 
 41 Neb. 292, 59 N. W. 913 702 
 
 Nat. Pahquioque Bk. v First Nat. 
 
 Bk. of Bethel, 36 Conn. 325 261 
 
 Nat. Park Bank v. Goddard, 131 N. Y. 
 
 494 114 
 
 National Savings Bank v. Cable 
 
 (1900), 73 Conn. 568, 48 Atl. 428 413 
 Nat. State Bank v. Nat. Bank (1895), 
 
 141 Ind. 352, 40 N. E. 799 678 
 
 Nat. Trust Co. v. Gleason, 77 N. Y. 
 
 400 ' 651 
 
 Natoma W. & M. Co. v. Clarkin, 14 
 
 Cal. 544 518 
 
 Nat. Wall Paper Co. v. McPherson 
 
 (1897), 19 Mont. 355, 48 Pac. 550 744 
 Nave V. lladley, 74 Ind. 155 279 
 
 0. KiuiT, 27 Ind. .356 118 
 
 Neal i'. Blecldey (1897), 51 S. C. 506, 
 
 29 S. E. 249 662 
 
 V. Lea, 64 N. C. 678 878, 879 
 
 V. Wideman (1894), 59 Ark. 5, 
 
 26 S. W. 16 48 
 
 Nealis v. Am. Tube & Iron Co. 
 
 (1896), 1.50 N. Y. 42, 44 N. E. 944 356 
 Nebraska Loan & Trust Co. r. Kroener 
 
 (1901), 63 Neb. 289, 88 N. W. 499 680 
 Neb. Mortgage, etc. Co. v. Van Klos- 
 ter (1894), 42 Neb. 740, 60 N. W. 
 1016 816 
 
 Needliam v. Wright (1894), 140 Ind. 
 
 190, 3y N. E. 510 800 
 
 Neftel );. Liglitstone, 77 N. Y. 96 75,626 
 Negley v. Cowell (1894), 91 la. 250, 
 
 59 N. W. 48 675 
 
 Neier r. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 12 Mo. 
 
 App. 35 658 
 
 Nelson i: Brodhack, 44 Mo. 596 781, 831, 
 
 833 
 r. Great Nortliern Ry. Co. 
 (1903), 28 Mont. 297, 72 
 Pac. 642 543 
 
 r. Johnson, 18 Ind. 329 310 
 
 V. Hart, 8 Ind. 293 269, 309, 346 
 
 V. Merced County (1898), 122 
 
 Cal. 644, 55 Cal. 421 712 
 
 V. Murray, 23 Cal. 338 753 
 
 ;;. Nixon, 13 Abb. Pr. 104 150 
 
 Netcott V. Porter, 19 Kan. 131 702 
 
 Netzer v. Crookston City (1894), 59 
 
 Minn. 244, 61 N. W. 21 819 
 
 Neuberger v. Webb, 24 llun, 347 756 
 
 Neudecker v. Kohlberg, 81 N. Y. 296 75, 
 
 310, 620, 629 
 
 Nevada Cy.. etc. Canal Co. v. Kidd, 
 
 43 Cal. 180 456 
 
 Nevada Ditch Co. v. Bennett (1896), 
 
 30 Ore. .59, 45 Pac. 472 942 
 
 Nevil V. Clifford, 55 Wis. 161 180 
 
 Neville v. St. Louis, etc. Rv. Co. 
 
 (1900). 158 Mo. 293, 59 S. W. 123 625 
 New Bank v. Kleiner (1901), 112 
 
 Wis. 287, 87 N. W. 1090 678 
 
 New Berlin, First Nat. Bank of, .'. 
 
 Church, 3 N. Y. S. C. 10 718 
 
 Newberry v. Garland, 31 Barb. 121 225 
 Newcomi) ?;. Crews (1895), 98 Ky. 
 
 339, .32 S. W. 947 809 
 
 r. Dewev, 27 Iowa, .381 326, 333 
 
 V. Horton, 18 Wis. 560 258, 264, 378, 
 
 388 
 Newcombe ?'. Chicago & N. W. Ry. 
 
 Co., 8 N. Y. Suppl. 366 
 Newell V. Mahaske Cy. Sav. Bank, 
 51 Iowa, 178 
 I'. Roberts, 54 N. Y. 677 
 V. Salmons, 22 Barb. 647 810, 881 
 New England Com'l Bk. v. Newport 
 
 Steam Factory, 6 R. I. 154 
 New England Loan & Trust Co. v. 
 Browne (1900), 157 Mo. 116, 57 
 S. W. 760 
 Newhall V. Hatch (1901), 134 Cal. 
 
 269, 66 Pac. 266 
 Newhall-IIouse Stock Co. r. Flint & 
 
 V. M. Ry. Co.. 47 Wis. 516 
 New Haven, Bank of, v. Perkins, 29 
 
 N. Y. 554 
 New Haven & N. Co. v. Quintard, 6 
 
 Abb. Pr. N. s. 374 
 New Idea Pattern Co. i: Whelan 
 (1903), 75 Conn. 445, 53 Atl. 953 
 
 615, 864 
 Newkirk v. Marshall, .35 Kan. 77 51 
 
 471 
 
 637 
 315 
 
 321 
 
 621 
 816 
 801 
 93 
 778 
 543, 
 
 V. Neild, 19 Ind. 194 
 
 931
 
 OXWIll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references 
 
 ^i-wlaml r. Morris (1902), Uo Wis. 
 
 207, '.•! N. W. 604 923 
 
 New London i\ Brainard, 22 Conn. 
 
 i>o2 118 
 
 2sewniiin c. Buzard (1901), 24 Wasli. 
 
 22.J, G4 Pac. loy 639 
 
 V. liomu Ins. Co., 20 Minn. 422 364 
 V. Newman (1899), 152 Mo. 398, 
 
 54 S. W. ly 350 
 
 V. Otto, 4 San.lf. 068 603 
 
 V. PtTiell, 73 111. I. 1.33 610 
 
 r. Spriimtield F. & M. Ins. Co., 
 
 17 -Minn. 12-i 110, 736 
 
 Newport c. Coinnmnwealth (1899), 
 
 106 Ky 434, 50 S. \V. 845 641 
 
 Newport Lijilit Co. r. Newport, 19 
 
 S. \V. Kep. 188 598 
 
 Newton r. Allis. 12 Wis. 378 633 
 
 r. Eginont, 4 Sim. 574 337,363 
 
 I-. Keech, 9 Hun, 355 119 
 
 r. Lee (1893), 13y N. Y. 332, 34 
 
 N. E. 905 868, 871 
 
 Newton's Executor r. Field (1895), 
 
 98 Ky. 186, 32 S. W. 623 588 
 
 New Whatcom v. Beliingliam Bay 
 Imp. Co. a«96), 16 Wash. 138, 47 
 I'ac. 1102 871 
 
 New York Breweries Corporation v. 
 Baker ( 1896), 68 Conn. 337, 36 Atl. 
 785 585 
 
 New York, Mayor, etc. of, v, Mabie, 
 
 13 N. V. 151 842, 843 
 
 r. Parker Vein Stp. Co., 12 Abb. 
 
 I'r. 300 852, 894, 916 
 
 N. Y. & N. 11. R. Co. »•. Schuyler, 17 
 
 N. Y. 592 276. 277, 342, 363, 480 
 
 New York, etc. B. U. Co. v- Ilunger- 
 ford (1902), 75 Conn. 76, 52 Atl. 
 487 552 
 
 N. Y. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Nat. Protec- 
 tion Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. 85 15, 17, 53 
 N. Y. Ice Co. V. N. W. Ins. Co., 23 
 
 NY. 357 472, 497 
 
 r. Parker, 8 Bosw. 688 874 
 
 N. Y. Milk Pan Co. v. Kemington 
 
 Works, 25 Hun, 475 412 
 
 New York News Publishing Co. i\ 
 Steamship Co. (1895), 148 N. Y. 
 39, 42 N. E. 514 642, 619 
 
 Nichol r. McCallister, 52 Ind. 586 725 
 
 Niciiolaus r. Ciiicago, etc. Ky. Co. 
 
 (1894), '.(0 la. 85, 57 N. W. 694 817 
 
 Nicholl r. Willianjs, 2 M. & W. 758 761 
 Nicholls r. Hill (1KH4), 42 S. C. 28, 19 
 
 S. E. 1U17 849, 863 
 
 Nichols /•. Hardwell Lodge (1898), 
 
 105 Ky. 168, 4H S. W. 426 686 
 V. Boeruni, 6 Abb. Pr. 290 910 
 
 r. Burton, 5 Bush, 320 290 
 
 V. Cliicau'o, etc. Ry. Co. (1895), 
 
 94 la. 202, 62 N. W. 769 703 
 
 V. Chicago, etc. Hy. Co., 36 
 
 Minn. 452 103 
 
 V. Drew, 19 Hun, 490 499 
 
 >'. Michaels, 23 N. Y. 264 286, 305 
 
 ARE TO TBE PAGES-] 
 
 Nichols V Nichols (1896), 134 Mo. 
 
 187, 35 S. W. 577 542, 557 
 
 V. Nichols (1898), 147 :\Io. 407, 
 
 4» s. W. <J47 r:i2 
 
 i: Peck (1898), 70 Conn. 439, 
 
 3'.t Atl. 803 .^02 
 
 V. Randall (1902), 1-36 Cal. 420, 
 
 (JU Pac. 26 ,-,84 
 
 r. Randall, 5 Minn. 304 278, 325, 330 
 V. Scranton Steel Co., 137 N. Y. 
 
 471 637 
 
 V. Stevens (1894), 123 Mo. 96, 
 
 25 S. W. 578 7'.i0 
 
 V. Townscnd, 7 Hun, 375 908, 910 
 Nichols & Sliei)ar(l Co. i\ Dedrick 
 (1895), 61 Minn. 513,63 N. 
 W. 1110 619 
 
 V. Hubert (1899), 150 Mo. 620, 
 
 51 S. W. 1031 601 
 
 V. Minnesota Thresher Co. 
 (1897), 70 Minn. 528, 73 
 N. W. 415 780 
 
 r. Wiedemann (1898), 72 Minn. 
 
 344, 75 N W. 208 666 
 
 Nicholson ?•. Louisville, etc. Ry. Co., 
 
 55 Ind. 504 273 
 
 Nickell v. Pliceni.x Ins. Co. (1898), 
 
 144 Mo. 420, 46 S. W. 435 689 
 
 Nicklace r. Dickerson (1898), 65 Ark. 
 
 422, 40 S. W. 945 646 
 
 Nickum v. Bnrckbardt (1897), 30 
 
 Ore. 464, 47 Pac. 888 076 
 
 Nicolai r. Krimbel (1896), 29 Ore. 
 
 76, 43 Pac. 865 593 
 
 !-. Lyon, 8 Oreg. 56 575 
 
 Nightingale v. Scannell, 6 Cal. 506 204 
 Nill V. Jenkinson, 15 Ind. 425 118 
 
 Nimrock v. Scanlin, 87 N. C. 119 336 
 
 Nims :Mfg. Co. r. tilvthe (1900), 127 
 
 N. C. 325, 37 S. E" 455 640 
 
 Ninde r. Oskaloosa, 55 Iowa, 207 756 
 
 Ninman v. Suhr (1895), 91 Wis. 392, 
 
 64 N. W, 1035 817 
 
 Nippel V. Hammond, 4 Colo. 211 55 
 
 Nipper r. Jones, 27 Mo. App. 538 877 
 Niver r. Nash (1893), 7 Wash. 558, 
 
 35 Pac. 380 929, 932 
 
 Nix V. Gilmer (1897), 5 Okla. 740, 50 
 
 Pac. 131 752 
 
 Noble V. Aasen (1898), 8 N. I). 77,76 
 
 N. W. 990 860 
 
 v. Atcheson, etc. R. R. Co. 
 (1896), 4 Okla. 534, 46 Pac. 
 483 626 
 
 V. Burton, 38 Ind. 206 584 
 
 Nodine r. First Nat. Bank (1902), 41 
 
 Ore. 386, 68 Pac. 1109 668 
 
 Noe I'. Christie, 51 N. Y. 270 149 
 
 Noel V. Kinney, 31 Alb. L. J. 328 226 
 
 Noesen c. Port Washington, 37 Wis. 
 
 168 119 
 
 Nolan )'. Ilazen, 44 Minn. 478 356 
 
 Noland v. Great Northern Ry, Co. 
 (1903), 31 Wash. 430, 71 
 Pac. 1098 626
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXXIX 
 
 [the refeeences are to the pages.] 
 
 Noland?;.Hentig (1903), 138 Cal. 281, 
 
 71 Pac. 440 734 
 
 P. Turner, 5 J. J. Marsh. 179 '249 
 
 Nolle r. Thompson, 3 Mete. 121 911, 927 
 NoUman v. Evenson (1895), 5 N. D. 
 
 344, 65 N. W. 6«6 861 
 
 Noonan v. Orton, 21 Wis. 283 32 
 
 V. Orton, 34 Wis. 259 518 
 
 Norcross r. Bahlwin (1897), 50 Neb. 
 
 885, 70 N. W. 511 688 
 
 Norden v. Jones, 33 Wis. GOO 650,911, 
 
 936 
 Nordliolt V. Nordholt, 87 Cal. 552 576 
 
 Norfolk Beet Sugar Co. v. Hight 
 (1898),56Neb. 162, 76N.W. 
 566 593 
 
 V. Hight (1899), 59 Neb. 100, 80 
 
 N. W. 276 642 
 
 Normand r. Otoe Cy. Com'rs, 8 
 
 Neb. 18 119 
 
 Normile v. Oregon, etc. Co. (1902), 
 
 41 Ore. 177, 69 Pac. 928 619, 623 
 
 Norris v. Amos, 15 Ind. 365 769, 791, 804 
 
 V. Glenn, 1 Idaho, 590 737 
 
 Norris Safe & Lock Co. r. Clark 
 
 (1902), 28 Wash. 268, 68 Pac. 718 639, 
 
 642 
 North V. Bloss, 30 N. Y. 374 292 
 
 0. Bradway, 9 Minn. 183 342, 473 
 North Carolina Land Co. v. Beatty, 
 
 69 N. C. 329 497, 504 
 
 Nortli Hudson Bldg. & Loan Ass'n 
 V. Child (1893), 86 Wis. 292, 56 
 N. W. 870 276 
 
 North Neb. Fair, etc. Ass'n v. Box 
 
 (1899), 57 Neb. 302, 77 N. W. 770 794 
 North Pacific Lumber Co. v. Lang 
 
 (1895), 28 Ore. 246, 42 Pac. 799 410 
 North Point Irrigation Co. v. Canal 
 Co. (1900), 23 Utah 199, 63 Pac. 
 812 674 
 
 North Powder Mill Co. v. Coughan- 
 
 our (1898), 34 Ore. 9, 54 Pac. 223 813 
 North St. Louis Bldg. Ass'n v. Obert 
 
 (1902), 169 Mo. 507, 69 S. W. 1044 704 
 North Star Boot Co. v. Stebbins 
 
 (1893), 3 S. D. 540, 54 N. W. 593 619 
 Northampton, First Nat. Bk. of, v. 
 
 Crafts, 145 Mass. 444 251 
 
 Northern Assurance Co. v. Hotch- 
 kiss (1895), 90 Wis. 415, 63 N. W. 
 1020 672 
 
 Northern Trust Co. r. Healy (1895), 
 
 61 Minn. 230, 63 X. W. 625 131 
 V. Hiltgen (1895), 62 Minn. 361, 
 
 64 N. W. 909 835, 868, 872 
 
 Northern Kan. T. Co. v. Oswald, 18 
 
 Kan. 336 562 
 
 Northern Pac. R. Co. v. McCormick, 
 
 55 Fed. Rep. 601 781 
 
 Northrup v. A. G. Willis Lumber 
 Co. (1902), 65 Kan. 769, 
 70 Pac. 879 180 
 
 V. Miss. Valley Ins. Co., 47 Mo. 
 
 435 764, 792, 813 
 
 North W. Cement, etc. Co. v. Norwe- 
 gian-Dan. Ev. L. A. Sem.. 43 
 Minn. 449 375 
 
 North W. Conf. of U. v. Myers, 36 
 Ind. 375 147 
 
 North W. Union Packet Co. v. 
 Shaw, 37 Wis. 655 635, 637 
 
 Northwestern, etc. Bank v. Ranch 
 (1901), Idaho, 66 Pac. 807 934 
 
 Northwestern Cordage Co. r. Gal- 
 braith (1897), 9 S. D. 634, 70 
 N. W. 1048 787 
 
 Northwestern Loan Co. v. Muggli 
 (1895), 8 S. 1). 160, 65 N. W. 442 383 
 
 Northwestern Steamship Co. ;;. Dex- 
 ter Ilorton & Co. (1902), 29 Wash. 
 565, 70 Pac. 59 678 
 
 Northwestern Telephone Co. v. Rail- 
 way Co. (1900), 9 N. D. 339, 83 
 N. W. 215 413 
 
 Norton v. Foster, 12 Kan. 44 131, 135 
 
 V. Scruggs (1899), 108 Ga. 802, 
 
 34 S. E. 166 641 
 
 Xorvell V. Mecke (1900), 127 N. C. 
 401, 37 S. E. 452 470 
 
 Nosier v. Coos Bay R. R. Co. 
 (1901), 39 Ore. 331, 64 Pac. 644 639 
 
 Notre Dame Univ. v. Shanks, 40 
 Wis. 352 609 
 
 Nourse v. Weitz (1903), 120 la. 708, 
 95 N. W. 251 565 
 
 Nowlin r. State ex rel. Board of 
 Commissioners (1903), — Ind.—, 
 66 N. E. 54 712 
 
 Noyes v. Longhead (1894), 9 Wash. 
 
 32.5, 37 Pac. 452 710 
 
 r. Sawyer, 3 Vt. 160 244 
 
 Nudd V. Thompson, 34 Cal. 39 834 
 
 Nugent V. Powell (1893), 4 Wyo. 
 173, 33 Pac. 23 735 
 
 Nunn r. Jordan (1903), 31 Wash. 
 506, 72 Pac. 124 812 
 
 Nutter V. Johnson, 80 Ky. 426 865 
 
 Nye v. Bill Nye Min. Co. (1903), 42 
 Ore. 560, 71 Pac. 1043 593 
 
 Nys V. Biemeret, 45 Wis. 104 713 
 
 Nystuen c. Hanson (1902), — la. — , 
 91 N. W. 1071 > 608 
 
 o. 
 
 Oakes v. Ziemer (1901), 62 Neb. 
 
 603, 87 N. W. .350; s. c. (1900), 61 
 
 Neb. 6, 84 N. W. 409 787, 832 
 
 Oakley r. Valley County (1894), 40 
 
 Neb. 900, 59 N. W. 368 709 
 
 Gates V. Gray, 66 N. C. 442 544 
 
 V. Kendall, 67 N.C. 241 618,626, 636 
 O'Banion v. Goodrich (1901), Ky., 
 
 62 S. W. 1015 782 
 
 Oberlander v. Spiess, 45 N. Y. 175 629 
 O'Blenis v. Karing, 57 N. Y. 649 869, 870 
 O'Brien v. Fitzgerald (1894), 143 
 
 N. Y. 377, 38 N. E. 371 667
 
 cxxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [tde beferences are to the pages.] 
 
 O'Brien v. McCann, 58 N. Y. 373 798 
 
 r. O'Connell, 7 Hun, 228 238 
 
 f. Smith, 42 Kan. i'J 06 
 
 r. St. Paul, 18 Minn. 176 622 
 V. Stambac'li (1897), 101 la. 40, 
 
 UON. \V. 1133 818 
 
 O'Callaghan v. Bode, 84 Cal. 689 181 
 Ucean Steamship Co. r. Anderson 
 
 (lltOO), HJ Ga. b3-J, oS S. E. 102 730 
 Ockenden c. Uarnes,43Iowa,615 562, 575 
 
 U'Counell v. Cotter, 44 Iowa, 48 637 
 O'Conner r. City of Fond du Lac 
 
 (1898), 101 Wis. 83, 76 N. \V. 1110 072 
 O'Connor v. Chicago & Nortliwest- 
 ern Rv. Co. (18%), 92 
 
 Wis. 612, 66 N. W. 795 639 
 
 r. Frasher, 53 Ind. 435 942 
 V. Irvine, 74 Cal. 435 201, 273 
 
 V. Koch, 56 Mo. 253 611 
 
 Oconto Cv. Sup. V. Hall, 42 Wis. 59 155 
 O'Day f.Conn. (1895), 131 Mo. 321, 
 
 32 S. W. 1109 32 
 O'Donnell v. Sargent & Co. (1897), 
 
 69 Conn. 476, 38 Atl. 210 712 
 O'Donohoe v. Polk (1895), 45 Neb. 
 
 510, 63 N. W. 829 605 
 
 Oechs f. Cook, 3 Duer, 161 663 
 Oester r. Sitlington (1893), 115 Mo. 
 
 247, 21 S. W. 820 579, 780 
 
 Oevermann r. Loebertmann (1897), 
 
 68 Minn. 162, 70 \. W. 1084 579, 821 
 
 O'Fallon v. Clopton, 89 Mo. 284 273 
 Offley V. Jennev, 3 Ch. Hep. 92 253, 347 
 Ogden V. Coddington, 2 E. D. Smith, 
 
 317 855 
 r. Ogden (1894), 60 Ark. 70, 28 
 
 S. W. 796 664 
 V. Prentice, 33 Barb. 160 131, 134 
 Ogdensburgii & L. C. R. Co. r. Ver- 
 mont & (an. R. Co., 63 N. Y. 176 482 
 Ogilvie /•- Lightstone, 1 Daly, 129 936 
 Ogle 1-. Cloiigh, 2 Diiv. 145 341 
 Oglesby v. Mo. Pac. Rv. Co. (1899), 
 
 150 Mo. 137, 37 S. W. 829 612 
 
 O'Gorman v. Lindeke, 26 Minn. 93 298 
 V. Sabin (1895), 62 i\Iinn. 46, 64 
 
 N. W. 84 640 
 O'Hara c Parker (1895), 27 Ore. 156 
 
 39 I'ac. 1004 566, 710 
 
 Ohio & Mi.«s. R. Co. v. Collarn, 73 
 
 Ind. 201 229, 598 
 
 V. Hemberger, 43 Ind. 462 748 
 
 V. Nickless, 71 Ind. 271 439 
 
 V. Tindall, 13 Ind. 360 229 
 
 Ohweiler r. Lohnianii (1894), 88 
 
 Wis. 75, 59 N. W. f,7H 817 
 Oil Well Supply Co. ,-. Wolfe (1894), 
 
 127 Mo. 016, 30 S. W. 145 816 
 
 Olcolt .•. Carroll. 39 N. Y. 436 591 
 
 < ildhum r. ( ■ollinR. 4 J. J. Marsli. 50 249 
 f)lev r. .Miller (1901), 74 Conn. 304, 
 
 50 Atl. 741 659 
 
 nliphint V. Manstfic-ld, 36 Ark. 191 190 
 Oliver r. Dougherty (1902), Ariz., 
 
 68 Pac. 553 024 
 
 Oliver v. Keightley, 24 Ind. 514 118 
 
 V. La Vaile, 36 Wis. 592 229 
 
 i: Piatt, 44 U. S. (3 How.) 333, 
 
 412 509 
 
 Olmstead v. Citv of Raleigh (1902), 
 
 130 N. C. 243, 41 S. E. 292 703 
 V. Henry Cy. Sup., 24 Iowa, 33 118 
 Olmsted c Keyes, 85 N. Y. 593 117 
 
 Olsen c Cloquet Lumber Co. (1895), 
 
 61 Minn. 17, 63 N. W. 95 715 
 
 Olson I'. City of Seattle (1903), 30 
 
 Wash. 687, 71 Pac. 201 619, 623 
 V. Phanix Mfg. Co. (1899), 103 
 
 Wis. 337, 79 N. W. 409 599, 604 
 V. Snake l\iver Valley R R.Co. 
 (1900), 22 Wash. 139, 60 
 Pac. 156 ■ 013, 621 
 
 Omaha w. Redick (1901), 61 Neb. 
 
 103, 85 N. W. 46 655 
 
 Omaha & R. V. Co. v. Crow (1898), 
 
 54 Neb. 747, 74 N. W. 1066 681, 
 682 
 V. Moscliel (1893), 38 Neb. 281, 
 
 56 N. W. 825 638 
 
 V. Wright (1896), 49 Neb. 456, 
 68 N. W. 618 (overruling 
 same case, 47 Neb. 886, 66 
 N. W. 842) 681 
 
 Omaha Bottling Co. r. Theiler 
 
 (1899), 59 Neb. 257, 80 N. W. 82 642 
 Omaha Coal, Coke & Lime Co. i-. Fay 
 
 (1893), 37 Neb. 68, 55 N. W. 211 675 
 Omaha Consolidated Co. i-. Burns 
 (1895), 44 Neb. 21, 62 N. W. 301 614, 
 
 621 
 Omaha Fire Ins. Co r. Berg (1895), 
 
 44 Neb. 523, 62 N. W. 862 144 
 1-. Dierks (1895), 43 Neb. 473, 61 
 
 N. W. 745 834 
 
 Omaha Nat. Bank r. Kiper (1900), 
 
 60 Neb. 33, 82 N. W. 102 593 
 
 Omaha S. & R. Co. v. Bee son (1893), 
 
 36 Neb. 361, 54 N. W. 557 418 
 
 Onson V. Cown. 22 Wis. 329 51 
 
 Ontario Bk. i\ N. J. Steamboat Co., 
 
 59 N. Y. 510 784 
 
 Ord V. McKee, 5 Cal. 516 149 
 
 Oregon & Cal. R. R. Co. v. Jackson 
 Countv (1901), 38 Ore. 589, 64 
 Pac. 307 595 
 
 Oregon Gold-Mining Co. v. Schmidt 
 
 (1901). Ky., 60 S. W. 530 871 
 
 Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Hertzberg 
 
 (1894), 26 Ore. 216, 37 Pac. 1019 808 
 Oren ;•. Board of Conmiissioners 
 
 (1901), 157 Ind. 158. 00 N. E. 1019 744 
 Orgall i: Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. 
 
 (1895), 46 Neb. 4. (U N. W. 450 683 
 Orient Ins. Co. r. Clark (1900), Kv., 
 
 59 S. W. 863 ■ 703 
 
 Ormond r. Sage (1897), 69 Minn. 
 
 523, 72 N. W. 810 679 
 
 Orinsby >•. Douglas, 5 Duer, 665 833 
 
 Orn Fitio. etc. Min. Co. v. Cullen, 1 
 Idaho Ter. 113 412. 637
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXXXl 
 
 [the references ABE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Oroville & Va. R. Co. v. Plumas Cy. 
 
 Sup.. 37 Cal. 354 789 
 
 Orr V. Rode, 101 Mo. 387 821 
 
 Orr W. Ditch Co. v. Larcombe, 14 
 
 Nev. 53 576 
 
 Ortley c. Mcssere, 7 Johns. Ch. 139 102 
 Orton V. Noonan. 19 Wis. 350 063 
 
 O'Rourke v. Citv of Sioux Falls 
 (1893), 4 S. D. 47,54 N.W. 
 1044 712 
 
 V. Noonan, 25 Wis- 672 782, 821 
 
 Osborn v. Bell, 5 Denio, 370 652 
 
 V. Ketchum (1894), 25 Ore. 352, 
 
 35 Pac. 972 685 
 
 I'. Logus (1895), 28 Ore. 306, 42 
 
 Pac. 997 178, 179, .326, 334 
 
 V. Portsmouth Nat. Bank (1899), 
 
 61 O. St. 427, 50 N. E. 197 819 
 Osborn & Co. r Evans ( 1894), 91 la. 
 
 13,58 N. \V.920 810 
 
 Osborne v. Endicott, 6 Cal. 149 783 
 
 V. Lindstrom (1899), 9 N. D. 1, 
 
 81 N. \V. 72 823 
 
 V. Metcalf (1900), 112 la. 540, 
 
 84 N. W. 685 606 
 
 V. Stevens (1896), 15 Wash. 478, 
 
 46 Pac. 1027 687 
 
 V. Taylor, 12 Gratt. 117 254 
 
 Osborne & Co. r. Hanlin (1902), 158 
 
 Ind. 325, 63 N. E. 572 812 
 
 Osbourn v. Fallows, 1 R. & M. 741 337, 
 
 378 
 
 Osgood V. De Groot, 36 N. Y. 348 139 
 
 V. Laytin, 5 Abb. Pr. n. s. 1 213, 355, 
 
 363 
 V. Maguire, 61 N. Y. 524 265, 354 
 V. Ogden, 4 Keyes, 70 139 
 
 Oskaloosa St. Rv. Co. r. Oskaloosa 
 
 (1896), 99 la. 490. 68 N. W. 808 702 
 Oslin r. Telford (1899), 108 Ga. 803, 
 
 34 S. E. 168 673 
 
 Osmun V. Winters (1896), 30 Ore. 
 
 177, 46 Pac. 780 6.38 
 
 Osten *;. Winehill (1894), 10 Wash. 
 
 333, 38 Pac. 1123 703 
 
 Osterhoudt v. Ulster Cy. Sup,, 98 
 
 N. Y. 239 273 
 
 Ostrom V. Bixby, 9 How. Pr. 57 833 
 
 V. Greene (1900), 161 N. Y. 353, 
 
 55 N. E. 919 157 
 
 Otis V. Shants, 128 N. Y. 45 874 
 
 O'Toole V. Faulkner (1902), 29 
 
 Wash. 544, 70 Pac. 58 605 
 
 V. Garvin, 3 N. Y. S. C. 118 812 
 
 Otitcalt r. Collier (1899), 8 Okla. 
 
 473, 58 Pac. 642 289 
 
 Over V. Siiannon, 75 Ind. 352 784 
 
 Overstreet i\ Citizens' Bank (1903), 
 
 12 Okla. 383, 72 Pac. 379 G66 
 
 Owen V. Cawley, 36 N. Y. 000 315 
 
 »;. Cooper, 46 Ind. 524 662 
 
 V. Frink, 24 Cal. 171 255 
 
 V. Meade (1894), 104 Cal. 179, 37 
 
 Pac. 923 625 
 
 V. Owen. 22 Iowa, 270 232 
 
 Owen V. St. Paul, etc. Ry. Co. (1895), 
 
 12 Wash. 313, 41 Pac. 44 042 
 V. State, 25 Ind. 107 1^95 
 
 Owens V. Colgan (1893), 97 Cal. 454, 
 
 32 Pac. 519 417 
 
 V. R. Hudnol'i; Piiarmacy, 20 
 
 Civ. Pro. \ivp 145 751 
 
 Owensboro & Nasliville Ry. Co. v. 
 Barclay's Adm'r (1897), 102 Ky. 
 10, 43 S. W. 177 656 
 
 Owsley V. Bank of Cumberland 
 (1902), Ky., 06 S. W. 33 877 
 
 P. 
 
 Packard v. Slack, 32 Vt. 9 476 
 
 V. Snell, 35 Iowa, 80 622 
 
 Paddock v. Somes, 102 Mo. 226 20, 29, 37 
 
 Paddon v. Williams, 2 Abb. Pr. n. s. 
 
 Padley v. Neill (1890), 134 Mo. 364, 
 
 35 S. W. 997 
 Paducali Lumber Co. v. Paducah W. 
 
 Supply Co., 89 Ky. 340 
 Page V. Citizens Banking (,^o. (1900), 
 111 Ga. 73. 30 S. E. 418 
 
 91, 
 115 
 
 335 
 
 112 
 
 302, 
 525 
 872 
 502 
 748 
 829 
 815 
 037 
 
 V. Ford, 12 Ind. 46 
 V. Kennan, 38 Wis. 320 
 V. Merwin, 54 Conn. 426 
 V. Mitchell, 37 .Minn. 368 
 I'. Smith, 13 Oreg. 410 
 V. Williams, 54 Cal. 502 
 Pahquioque Bk. v. First Nat. Bk., 36 
 
 Conn. 325 261 
 
 Paige V. Fazackerly, 36 Barb. 392 155 
 
 V. Willett, 38 N. Y. 31 663 
 
 Paine v. Comstock, 57 Wis. 159 823 
 
 V. Foster (1900), 9 Okla. 213, 53 
 
 Pac. 109 320 
 
 V. Hunt, 40 Barb. 75 874 
 
 Painter v. Painter (1902), 138 Cal. 
 
 23, 71 Pac. 90 358 
 
 Palen v. Bushnell, 46 Barb. 24 486, 495 
 
 V. Lent, 5 Bosw. 713 501 
 
 Palk V. Clinton, 12 Ves. 58 246, 247, 379, 
 
 511 
 Palmer iJ. Bank of Ulysses (1899), 59 
 
 Neb. 412, 81 N. W. 303 718 
 
 V. Bank of Zumbrota (1896), 65 
 
 Minn. 90, 67 N. W. 893 423, 662 
 V. Breed (1890), Ariz., 43 Pac. 
 
 219 001 
 
 V. Carlisle, 1 S. & S. 423 244,378 
 V. Cay wood (1902), 64 N^eb. 372, 
 
 89 N. W. 1034 606 
 
 V. Davis, 28 N. Y. 242 177, 181, 186, 
 190, 224 
 V. Fort Plain, etc. Plk. R. Co., 11 
 
 N. Y. 376 148, 155 
 
 V. Hartford Dredging Co. (1900), 
 
 73 Conn. 182, 47 Atl. 125 659 
 V. Lavigne (1894), 104 Cal. 30, 
 
 37 Pac. 775 543
 
 CXXXll 
 
 TABLI-: 01' CASES CITED. 
 
 [rat 
 
 Palmer v. Mt. Sterling Nat. Bk., 18 
 S. W. Kep. 234 
 1-. Palmer (1894), 90 la. 17, 57 
 
 N. \V. t345 
 i;. Stevens, 100 Mass. 461 
 r. Wad.lell. "22 Kan. 352 
 V. Winona Kv. & Light 
 (1001), b"3 Minn. 85, 
 N. W. 941 
 r. Yager, 20 Wis. 01 
 Palmer Oil Co. v. Blodgett (1899), 60 
 
 Kan. 712, 57 I'ac 047 
 Pancoast r. Hurneil, 32 Iowa, 394 
 Parcliin c. Peck, 2 Mont. 567 
 Pardee <■. Stewaid, 37 Hun, 259 
 
 c. Treat, 82 X. Y. 385 
 Paris V. Stronp, 51 Ind. 339 
 Paris Nat. Bk. c. Nickell, 34 Mo. 
 
 A pp. 2!»5 
 Parke v- Bonlware (1901), Idaho, 63 
 Pac. 1045 
 V. Kiliiam. 8 Cal. 77 
 Parker v. Beasley (1895), 110 N. C. 
 1, 21 S. E. 955 
 V. Berrv, 12 Kan. 351 
 V. Carolina Bank ( 1898), 53 S. C. 
 
 58;i, 31 S. E. 673 
 V. Clayton, 72 Ind. 307 
 V. Cochran (1895), 97 Ga. 249, 
 
 22 S. E. 961 
 V. Dacres, 1 Wash 
 V. Ues Moines 
 (1899), 108 
 N. \V. 826 
 V. Harden (1898), 122 N 
 
 28 S. E. 962 
 V. Fuller, 1 Kuss. & My. 656 
 
 95 
 
 890, 922 
 248, 251 
 196 
 Co. 
 85 
 
 179 
 190 782, 815 
 Life Ass'n 
 la. 117, 78 
 
 790 
 
 cm, 
 
 640 
 247, 
 334 
 V. Jackson, 16 Barb. 33 276, 293, 299," 
 
 400 
 
 112 
 26 Ore 
 
 V. Jacobs, 14 S. C 
 r. Jefferv (1894), 
 
 37 Pac. 712 
 r.Jewett (1893), 52 
 
 55 N. W. 56 
 V. Laney. 58 X. Y. 469 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. R. 
 
 (19(X»), 79 Minn. 
 
 X. W. 673 
 V. Small, .58 Ind. 349 
 
 V. Tavlor (1902), Neb., 91 N. W. 
 
 537 102 
 
 r. Thomas, 19 Ind. 213 661 
 
 Parmelee t-. Egan, 7 Paige, 610 260 
 Parno r. Iowa. etc. Ins. Co. (1901), 
 
 114 la. 1.32, 86 X. W. 210 703 
 
 Parrolt r. Hughes, 10 Iowa, 459 326, 333 
 
 Parrv r. Kellev, 5'J Cal. 334 316 
 Parrv Mfg. Co. >: Tohin (1900), 106 
 
 Wis. 'iHij, H2 X. W. 154 911 
 
 Parhhall r. Moodv, 24 Iowa, 314 353 
 
 Parsley >■. XidioUon, 05 N. C. 207 618 
 Parson."* r. (Jrand Lodge, etc. (1899), 
 
 108 la. 6. 78 X. W. 676 703 
 
 REFERENCES AEE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Parsons v. Neville, 3 Bro. C. C. 365 249 
 V. Sutton, 66 N. Y. 92 933 
 
 r. Wright (1897), 102 la. 473, 
 
 71 X. W. 351 734 
 
 Partridge c. Blanchard, 23 Minn. 69 576 
 Pass V. Pass (1&96), 98 Ga. 791, 25 
 
 S. E. 752 819 
 
 Patchin r. Peck, 38 X. Y. 39 178 
 
 674 Pate r. Allison (1901), 114 Ga. 651, 
 337 40 S. E. 715 825 
 
 Paterson v. Long, 5 Beav. 186 255 
 
 816 Patnode >■- Westenhaver (1902), 114 
 231 Wis. 460, 90 N. W. 467 470 
 
 178 Paton v. Murray, 9 Paige, 474 326 
 
 333 Patrick Land Co. v. Leavenworth 
 111 (1894), 42 Neb. 715, 60 N. W. 
 769 954 
 
 Patterson v. Clark, 20 Iowa, 429 
 19 V. Lynde, 112 111. 196 
 
 V. Patterson, 59 X. Y. 574 874, 
 735 V. Patterson ( 1902), 40 Ore. 560, 
 
 195 67 Pac. 664 
 
 Pattillo r. Jones (1901), 113 Ga. 330, 
 41 38 S. E. 745 
 821 Pattisoni-. Richards, 22 Barb. 143 
 
 855, 894, 
 872 Patton r. Fox (1902), 169 Mo. 97, 69 
 610 S. W. 287 
 
 V. Koval Baking Powder Co., 
 114 X. Y. 1 
 Paul v. Fulton, 25 Mo. 156 
 Pavey v. Pavev, 30 Ohio St. 300 
 Paving Co. v.' Botsford (1896), 56 
 
 Kan. 532, 44 Pac. 3 
 Pavisich v. Pean, 48 Cal. 364 271, 
 Paxton V. Learn (1898), 55 Xeb. 459, 
 75N. W. 1(196 
 V. Wood, 77 X. C. 11 
 Payne r. Bovd (1890), 125 N. C. 499, 
 34 S. E. 631 
 38 V. Briggs, 8 Xeb 75 
 
 Johnson's Ex'ors (1893), 95 
 106 Kv. 175,24 S. W. 238 
 
 McCormick Co. .(1901), 11 
 790 Okla. 318, 66 Pac. 287 
 
 19, 30 r. McKinlev, 54 Cal. 532 
 
 R. Co. V. Treadwcll, 16 Cal. 220 
 
 •2- 82 Peabody r. Beach, 6 Duer, 53 
 
 688 V. Bloomer, 5 Duer, 678 870, 
 
 193, 246 V. Washington, etc. Ins. Co., 20 
 
 Barb. 329 
 Peacock *•. Monk, 1 Ves. 127 
 
 r. I'enson. 11 Beav. 355 
 Peak V. Lemon, 1 Lans. 295 313, 
 
 Peake r. Buell (1895), 90 Wis. 508, 
 
 186, 
 Minn. 514, 
 
 V. Na»h, 8 How. Pr. 454 
 
 879, 880 
 
 63 N. W. 1053 565, 
 
 V. Ledger, 8 Hare, 313 252, 
 
 Peaks V. Graves. 25 Xeb. 235 
 
 ('. Lord (1894), 42 Neb. 15, 60 
 N. W. 349 
 Pearce »•. Ferris's Ex., 10 N. Y. 280 
 
 I'. Hitchcock, 2 N. Y. 388 
 
 V. Mason, 78 N. C. 37 
 Pearkes v. Freer, 9 Cal. 642 
 Pearson r. Cummings, 28 Iowa, 344 
 
 942 
 780 
 356 
 930 
 
 595 
 
 673 
 859, 
 926 
 
 764 
 
 911 
 350 
 831 
 
 790 
 
 584 
 
 688 
 526 
 
 669 
 702 
 
 344 
 
 780 
 562 
 71 
 880 
 880 
 
 177 
 259 
 255 
 314 
 
 566 
 253 
 215 
 
 702 
 2H4 
 206 
 665 
 521 
 99
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXXXlll 
 
 [the references are to the PACEa.] 
 
 Pearson v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 45 
 
 Iowa, 2o9 660 
 V. Neeves (18'J5), 02 Wis. 319, 06 
 
 N. W. 357 787 
 V. Switzer (1898), 98 Wis. 397, 
 
 74 N. W. 214 588 
 
 Pease v. Hannah, 3 Oreg. 301 792 
 
 V. Rush, 2 Minn. 107 99 
 
 V. Smith, 61 N. Y. 477 576 
 
 Peatman v. Centervilk' Light Co. 
 
 (1896), 100 la. 245, 69 N. W. 541 708 
 Peav V. Salt Lake City (1894), 11 
 
 Utah. 331,40 Pac. 206 626 
 Peeha v. Kastl (1902), 64 Neb. 380, 
 
 89 N. W. 1047 752 
 Peck I'. Beloit Sch. Dist. No. 4, 21 
 
 Wis. 516 264 
 r. Easton (1902), 74 Conn. 456, 
 
 51 Atl. 134 710 
 
 V. Elder, 3 Sandf. 126 262 
 
 V. McLean, 36 Minn. 238 201 
 V. Newton, 46 Barb. 173 11, 19, 64 
 V. N. Y. & N. J. Ry. Co., 85 N.Y. 
 
 246 618, 667 
 
 V. Parcliin, 52 Iowa, 46 417, 727 
 
 V. Root, 5 Hun, 547 629, 630 
 
 V. Shick, 50 Iowa, 281 637 
 
 V. Snow, 47 Minn. 398 877 
 
 V. Ward, 3 Duer, 647 414 
 
 Pecker v. Cannon, 11 Iowa, 20 293 
 
 Peckham v. City of WatsonvilLe 
 
 (1902), 138 Cal. 242, 71 Pac. 
 
 169 678 
 
 Peddicord v. Whittam, 9 Iowa, 471 300, 
 
 403 
 Peden v. Cavins (1892), 134 Ind. 494, 
 
 34N. E. 7 704 
 
 Peel V. Elliott, 7 Abb. Pr. 433 156 
 Peerless Stone Co. r. VVray (1898), 
 
 152 Ind. 27, 51 N. E. 326 642 
 
 Peet V. O'Brien, 5 Neb. 360 727 
 Pekin Plow Co. v. Wilson (1902), — 
 
 Neb.-, 92 N. W. 176 641 
 
 Pelly V. Bowyer, 7 Busli, 513 169, 219 
 V. Naylor (1893), 139 N. Y. 598, 
 
 3oN. E. 317 678 
 
 Pelton V. Farmin, IS Wis. 222 337 
 V. Powell (18U7), 96 Wis. 473, 71 
 
 N. W. 887 921 
 Pemberton i^. Simmons, 100 N. C. 
 
 316 823 
 
 Pence v. Aughe, 101 Ind. 317 181 
 
 V. Croar, 51 Ind. 329 575 
 
 r. Sweeney, 28 Pac. Rep. 413 428 
 
 Pender v. Mallett (1898), 123 N. C. 
 
 57, 31 S. E. 351 314, 600, 601 
 Pendergast v. Greenfield, 40 Hun, 
 
 494 874 
 Pendleton v. Beyer (1896), 94 Wis. 
 
 31, 68 N. W. 415 888, 9-34 
 
 V. Dalton, 77 N. C. 67 219 
 
 Penfield v. Wheeler, 27 Minn. 358 412 
 
 Pengra v. Munz, 29 Fed. Rep. 830 517 
 
 V. Wheeler (1893), 24 Ore. 532, 
 
 34 Pac, 354 817 
 
 Penn Coal Co. i-. Blake, 85 N. Y. 226 713. 
 
 75i 
 
 V. Del. & H. Can. Co., 1 Keyes, 72 36 
 
 V. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Con- 
 
 oughv (1898), 54 Neb. 128, 
 
 74 N. W. 422 . 586 
 
 Pennie v. Hildreth, 81 Cal. 127 659 
 
 Pennoyer v. Allen, 50 Wis. 308 46, 47, 
 
 49, 885 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Holderman, 69 
 
 Ind. 18 658 
 
 V. Sedgwick, 59 Ind. 336 598 
 
 Penny r. Penny, 9 Hare, 39 352 
 
 V. Waits, 2 Phil. 149 240 
 
 Penrose v. Winter (1901), 135 Cal. 
 
 289, 67 Pac. 772 565, 56G 
 
 People V. Albany & Susq. R. Co., 57 
 
 N. Y. 161 41, 119 
 
 r. Albany & Vt. R. Co., 77 N. Y. 
 
 232 354, 406, 414, 417 
 
 V. Brandretli, 3 Abb. Pr. n. s. 
 
 224 - 869 
 
 V. Clark, 21 Barb. 214 152 
 
 V. Cram, 8 How. Pr. 151 880 
 
 V. Crooks, 53 N. Y. 648 181, 193 
 
 V. Curtis, 1 Idaho, 753 756 
 
 V. Denison, 84 N. Y. 272 626, 
 
 629, 894, 918 
 V. Edwards, 9 Cal. 286 399, 402 
 
 f. Fields, 58 N. Y. 491 119 
 
 V. Ha gar, 52 Cal. 171 728 
 
 V. Haggin, 57 Cal. 579 193 
 
 f. Ingersoll, 58 N. Y. 1 119 
 
 v. Jenkins, 17 Cal. 500 293 
 
 V. Kendall, 25 Wend. 399 650 
 
 V. Laws, 3 Abb. Pr. 450 152 
 
 V. Lothrop, 3 Call, 428 831 
 
 V. Love, 25 Cal. 520 402 
 
 V. Marlboro H. Coni'rs, 54 N. Y. 
 
 276 561, 663 
 
 r. Mayor, 32 Barb. 102 118 
 
 V. Norton, 9 N. Y. 176 152 
 
 V. Ryder, 12 N. Y. 433 25, 541, 544, 
 559, 596 
 V. Sexton, 37 Cal. 532 428 
 
 V. Sherwin, 2 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 528 1 19 
 i,'. Slocum, 1 Idaho, 62 149 
 
 V. Sloper, 1 Idaho, 158 289, 609 
 
 V. Stevens, 51 IIow. Pr. 235 711 
 
 V. Talmage, 6 Cal. 256 428 
 
 I'. Townsend, 37 Barb. 520 152 
 
 V. Tweed, 63 N. Y. 194 470 
 
 People e.r re/, v. District Court (1893), 
 
 18 Colo. 293, 32 Pac. 819 185 
 
 V. Railway Co. (1900), 164 N. Y. 
 
 289, 58 N. E. 138 305 
 
 People's Bank v. Mitchell, 73 N. Y. 
 
 406 38 
 
 V. Scalzo (1894), 127 Mo. 164, 
 
 29 S. W. 1032 593 
 
 People's Nat. Bank v. Geisthardt 
 (1898), 55 Neb. 232, 75 
 N. W. 582 832 
 
 V. Myers (1902), 65 Kan. 122, 69 
 
 Pac. 164 615
 
 CXXXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references 
 
 Penria, etc. Ry. Co. i-. Attica, etc. 
 Ry. Co. (1899), 154 Iiul. 218, 56 
 N. E. 210 G87 
 
 Pepper r. Donnelly, 87 Kv- 260 710 
 
 Percifull i: Piatt, 36 Ark." 456 63 
 
 Perego c. Dodge (1893). 9 Utah, 1, 
 
 33 Pac. 221 805 
 
 Perkins v. Krnit-l, 2 Kan. 325 769 
 
 v. Lewis, 24 III. 208 119 
 
 r. Marrs. 15 Colo. 262 103 
 
 v. Perkins, 02 Barb. 531 226, 315 
 
 V. Port Washington, 37 Wis. 177 886 
 V. RoKers, 35 Ind. 124 821 
 
 c. Stimmel, 114N. Y.359 181 
 
 Perkins County v. Miller (1898), 55 
 
 Neb. 141, 75 N. W. 577 288, 639 
 
 Perkins Windmill & Ax Co. i'. Till- 
 man (1898), 55 Neb. 652, 75 N. W. 
 1098 669 
 
 Perry v. Chester, 12 Abb. Pr. n. s. 
 
 131 872, 881 
 
 V. JeEferies (1901), 61 S. C. 292, 
 
 .39 S. E. 315 466 
 
 V. Knott, 4 Beav. 179 250, 252 
 
 V. Seitz, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 122 309, 311 
 V. Turner, 55 Mo. 418 289, 311 
 
 V. Whitakcr, 71 N. C. 477 388 
 
 Person r. Merrick, 5 Wis. 231 247, 334 
 c. Warren, 14 Barb. 488 161, 162 
 
 Peter i: Farrel, etc. Co. (1895), 53 
 
 Ohio St. 534, 42 N. E. 690 888, 941 
 
 Peters v. Jones, 35 Iowa, 512 2-56, 360 
 y. McKay (1902), 1-36 CaL 73, 
 
 68 Pac. 478 818 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. II. Co., 24 Mo. 
 
 586 99 
 
 Petersen v. Chemical Bank, 32 N. Y. 
 
 21 100 
 
 Peterson i-. Bean (1900), 22 Utah, 43, 
 
 61 Pac. 213 734, 857 
 
 V. Hopewell (1898), 55 Neb. 670, 
 
 76 N. W. 451 593 
 
 V. Manni.v (1902), Neb., 90 N. \V. 
 
 210 679 
 
 V. Roach, 32 Ohio St. 374 562 
 
 r. Seattle Traction Co. (1900), 
 
 23 Wash. 615, 63 Pac. 539 768 
 Pete V. Hammond, 29 Beav. 91 326 
 
 Petre v. Dimcombe, 7 Hire, 24 255 
 
 Petrie v. Petrie, 7 Lans. 90 248, 249, 372 
 Pettibone r. Edwards. 15 Wis. 95 245 
 V. Hamilton, 40 Wis. 402 262 
 
 Pettit r. Hamlyn, 43 Wis. 314 570 
 
 Petty V. Malier, 15 B. Mon. 604 42, 51 
 Peyton r. Hosie, 41 Mo. 257 20, 31, 477 
 Pfaendi r r. Winona, etc. R. R. Co. 
 
 {\:m ). 81 Minn. 224, 87 N. W. 018 787 
 I'fau '•. .State <x rel. (1897), 148 Ind. 
 
 639, 47 N. E. 927 613 
 
 Pfefiferkorn v. Haywood (1896), 65 
 
 Minn. 429. 68 N. W. G8 290 
 
 Pfiffner r. Krapfel, 28 Iowa, 27 544, 546 
 I'fiBter /•. Wade, 56 Cal. 43 412 
 
 r. Wi-llg (IB'.Hi), 'J2 Wis. 171, 65 
 
 N. W. 1041 787 
 
 ARE TO THK PAGES] 
 
 Pfohl V. Simpson, 74 N. Y. 137 2.38, 248 
 Phalen c. Dingee, 4 E. D. Smith, 379 
 
 300, 402 
 Pharis v. Carver, 13 B. Mon. 230 517 
 
 Phelps V. Skinner (1901), 63 Kan. 
 
 364, 65 Pac. 607 773 
 
 V. Wait, 30 N. Y. 78 301, 306 
 
 Phelps, etc. Co. v. Halsell (1901), 11 
 
 Okla. 1, 65 Pac. 340 24 
 
 Phifer c. Travelers' Ins. Co. (1898), 
 
 123 N. C. 410, 31 S. E. 716 669 
 
 Philip f. Durkee (1895), 108 Cal. 300, 
 
 41 Pac. 407 89 
 
 Phillipi V. Thompson, 8 Oreg. 428 784 
 Phillips V. Carver (1898), 99 Wis. 
 
 561, 75 N. W. 432 593, 655 
 
 r. Dorris (1898), 56 Neb. 293, 76 
 
 N. W. 555 365 
 
 ?•. Gorham, 17 N. Y. 270 15, 17, 3-3, 
 34, 64, 473, 497 
 r. Hagart (1896), 113 Cal. 552, 
 
 45 Pac. 843 746 
 
 V. Jarvis, 19 Wis. 204 801 
 
 V. Phillips, 107 Mo. 369 283 
 
 V. Van Schaick, 37 Iowa, 229 111, 622 
 
 Phillipson v. Gatty, 6 ILire, 26 251 
 
 Philomath v. Ingle (1902), 41 Oreg. 
 
 289, 68 Pac. 803 593 
 
 Phipps r. Wilson (1899), 125 N. C 
 
 106, 34 S. E. 227 892, 922 
 
 Phoenix v. Lamb, 29 Iowa, 352 718 
 
 Phoenix Bank r. Donnell, 40 N. Y. 
 
 410 181, 814 
 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Bachelder (1894), 
 
 39 Neb. 95, 57 N. W. 996 702 
 V. Carnahan (1900), 03 O. St. 
 
 258. 58 N. E. 805, 88, 208 684, 832 
 V. Omaha Loan & Trust Co. 
 (1894), 41 Neb. 8-34,60 N.W. 
 133 110 
 
 Phoenix Iron Works r. McEvonv 
 
 (1896), 47 Neb. 228, 6(5 N. W. 290 679 
 Phoenix Miit. L. Ins. Co. r. Walrath, 
 
 53 Wis. 609 780 
 
 Pickens v. Polk (1894), 42 Neb. 267, 
 
 60 N, W. 566 375 
 
 Pickering i-. Miss. Val. Nat. Tel. Co., 
 
 47 Mo. 457 455, 458 
 
 Pickersgill v. Lahens, 15 Wall. 140 293 
 Pickett V. Fidelity Co. (1901,, 60 
 
 S. C. 477, 38 S. E. 160 640, 818 
 
 Pickle Marble & Granite Co. r. Mc- 
 Clay (189S), 54 Neb. 661, 74 N. W. 
 1062 106 
 
 Pico v. Cuyas, 47 Cal. 174 66 
 
 Piedmont Bank r. Wilson (1899), 124 
 
 N. C. 561, 32 S. E. 889 836, 846 
 
 Pier V. Finch, 29 Barb. 170 806 
 
 V. Fond du Lac, 38 Wis. 470 265, 283 
 
 V. Heinrichofifen, 52 Mo. 333 544, 
 
 545, 621 
 
 Pierce v. Carey, 37 Wis. 232 75, 62G, 
 
 629, 630 
 V. Conners (1894), 20 Colo. 178, 
 
 37 Pac. 721 220
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED.. 
 
 CXXXV 
 
 [the references are to thk pages.] 
 
 Pierce v. Faunce, 47 Me. 507 
 
 C64 
 
 V. Great Falls, etc. llv. Co. 
 (1S99), 22 .Mont. 445, 50 
 Pac. 8t57 
 V. Milwaukee Coiistr. Co., 38 
 Wis. 25;-S 200, 
 
 Piercy v. Sabin, 10 Cal. 22 
 Pierson v. Fuhrmaiui, 27 Pac. 1015 
 V. KobinsDii, 3 Swaiist. 13i) u. 
 V. School District (1898), lOG 
 Iowa, 1)95, 77 N. W. 494 
 Pierstoff r. Jorires (1898), 80 Wis. 
 
 128, 50 N. W. 735 077, (iaO, 
 
 Pietsch V. Krause (1903), 110 Wis. 
 
 344, 93 N. W. 9 
 Pike V. Kiiigr, 10 Iowa, 49 
 
 V. Sutton (1895), 21 Colo. 84, 39 
 Pac. 1084 
 Pilger V. Harder (1898), 55 Neb. 113, 
 
 75 N. W. 559 
 Pillow V. Sentelle, 39 Ark. 01 329, 
 Pinckney v. Keyler, 4 E. D. Smith, 
 
 469 
 Pine Tree Lumber Co. r. McKinlev 
 (1901), 83 Minn. 419, 86 N. W. 414 
 
 Pine Valley r. Unity, 40 Wis. 682 
 
 Pinkham v. Pinkham (1901), 61 Neb. 
 
 330, 85 N. W. 285 782, 
 
 Pinkum v. Eau Claire, 81 Wis 301 
 Pioneer Fuel Co. a Hager (1894), 57 
 
 Minn. 76, 58 N. W. 828 584, 
 
 Pioneer Press Co. v. Hutcliinson 
 (1896), 03 Minn. 481, 05 
 N. W. 938 908, 
 
 V. McClay (1898), 54 Neb. 003, 
 74 N. W. 1063 
 Piper V. City of Spokane (1900), 22 
 Wash. 147, 60 L^ac. 138 
 V. Hoard, 107 X. Y. 67 
 V. Woolman (1895), 43 Neb. 280, 
 01 N. W. 588 
 Pirsson v. Gillespie, 4 N. Y. Suppl. 
 
 691 
 Piser V. Stearns, 1 Hilt. 86 
 Pitcher v. Hennessey, 48 N. Y. 415 
 Pitkin V. New York & New England 
 R. R. Co. (1894), 64 Conn. 482, 30 
 Atl. 772 612, 
 
 Pitman v. Ireland (1902), 64 Neb.675, 
 
 90 N. W. 540 
 Pitts Agricultural Works v. Baker 
 (1898), 11 S. I). 342, 77 
 N. W. 586 
 V. Young (1895), S. D. 557, 62 
 N. W. 432 
 I'ittsburah, Cin. & St. L. R. Co. o. 
 Keller, 49 Ind. 211 
 V. Moore, 33 Ohio St. 384 
 V. Nelson, 51 Ind. 150 
 V. Theobald, 51 Ind. 239 
 Pittsburgh, etc. Ry. Co. v. Praze 
 (1898), 150 Ind. 570, 50 N.E. 
 576 
 
 082 
 
 354 
 
 804 
 277 
 372 
 
 600 
 
 714 
 
 443 
 833 
 
 830 
 
 115 
 942 
 
 881 
 
 943, 
 946 
 155, 
 576 
 
 822 
 661 
 
 585 
 
 924 
 
 106 
 
 619 
 823 
 
 703 
 
 273 
 
 915 
 
 49 
 
 039 
 421 
 
 181 
 
 780 
 
 561 
 562 
 575 
 570 
 
 Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co. v. Moore 
 (1898), 152 Ind. 345, 53 
 N. E. 290 
 V. Sullivan (1894), 141 Ind. 83, 
 
 40 N. E. 138 
 V. Wilson (1903), — Ind. — , 06 
 N. E. 899 
 Pitzer 1-. Territory of Oklahoma 
 
 (1890), 4 Okla. 86, 44 Pac. 210 
 Pixley r. Van Nostern, 100 Ind. 34 
 I'lacke V. Union Depot R. R. Co. 
 (1897), 140 Mo. 634, 41 S. W. 915 
 Plankinion v. llildebrand (1895), 89 
 Wis. 209, 61 N. W. 839 277, 328, 443, 
 444, 458, 474, 501, 511 
 Piano Mfg. Co. v. Daley (1897), 6 
 
 N. D. 330, 70 N. W. 277 
 Plant V. Carpenter (1898), 19 Wash. 
 
 621, 53 Pac. 1107 
 Plass V. Plass (1898), 121 Cal. 131,53 
 
 Pac. 448 
 Plath V. Braunsdorff, 40 Wis. 107 
 Piatt I'. Colvin (1893), 50 O. St. 703, 
 36 N. E. 735 
 V. Iron E.xch. Bk., 53 N. W. Rep. 
 
 737 
 V. Jante, 35 Wis. 629 
 V. Town of Milford (1895), 06 
 Conn. 320, 34 Atl. 82 
 Pleasant r. Samuels (1896), 114 Cal. 
 
 34, 45 Pac. 998 
 Plumb V. Curtis ( 1895), GO Conn. 154, 
 33 Atl. 998 
 V. GrifRn (1901), 74 Conn. 132, 
 
 60 Atl. 1 570, 689 
 
 Plumer v. Clarke, 59 Wis. 048 637 
 
 Plummer v. Mold, 22 Minn. 15 660 
 
 Plummer, Perry & Co. v. Rohman 
 
 (1900), 61 Neb. 61, 84 N. W. 600 703, 
 
 822 
 880 
 
 712 
 
 656 
 
 682 
 
 735 
 189 
 
 680 
 
 780 
 
 710 
 
 736 
 801 
 
 384 
 
 207 
 283 
 
 675 
 
 584 
 
 677 
 
 Plver V. Parker, 10 S. C. 464 
 Plympton v. Hall (1893), 55 Minn. 
 
 22, 50 N. W. 351 
 Poehlman v. Kennedy, 48 Cal. 201 
 Pollard V. Lathrop, 12 Colo. 171 
 Pollock V. Association (1896), 48 
 
 S. C. 05, 25 S. E. 977 450, 478 
 V. Stanton County (1899), 57 
 
 Neb. 399, 77 N. W. 1081 
 V. Whipple (1895), 45 Neb. 844, 
 64 N. W. 210 
 Polster ?•. Rucker, 16 Kan. 115 
 Poly i: Williams (1894), 101 Cal. 648, 
 
 36 Pac. 102 
 Pomeroy v. Benton, 57 Mo. 531 
 
 161 
 428 
 414 
 
 688 
 
 660 
 609 
 
 650 
 596. 598. 
 599 
 Ponca Mill Co. v. Mikesell (1898), 
 
 55 Neb. 98, 75 N. W. 46 455, 
 
 456, 493 
 V. Nichols (1899), 61 Kan. 230, 
 
 59 Pac. 257 64 
 
 Pond V. Davenport, 45 Cal. 225 813 
 
 I--. Waterloo Agric. Works, 50 
 
 Iowa, 593 942 
 
 Poole V. Gerrard. 6 Cal. 71 231
 
 ex XXVI 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Poole V. Marsli, 8 Sim. 528 24.S 
 
 Poore V. Clarke, 2 Atk. 515 243,511, 592 
 
 Pope v. Cole, 55 X. Y. 124 2'J3 
 
 V. Kan:-as City Cable Rv. Co., 
 
 itl» .Mo. 400 575 
 
 V. Meloiie. 2 A. K. Marsh. 239 248 
 V. Porter, 3« Fed. liep. 7 110 
 
 Pope Mfg. Co. r. Cycle Co. (1899), 
 
 55 S. C. 528, 33 S. E. 787 870 
 
 Popp r. Swanke, 68 Wis. 364 783 
 
 Port c. Kiissell, 30 Ind. (JO 748 
 
 Port Huron, etc. K. Co. r. Clements 
 (1902), 113 Wis. 249, 89 N. W. 
 160 812 
 
 Porter v. Allen (1002), — Idaho — , 
 
 09 Pac. 105 542, 543 
 
 c. Blciler, 17 Barb. 149 195 
 
 c. Dunn, 131 N. Y. 314 225 
 
 V. Fillebruwn (1H07), 119 Cal. 
 
 235, 51 Pac. 322 641 
 
 V. Fletcher, 25 Minn. 493 178, 205 
 V. Garrissoraio, 51 Cal. 559 428 
 
 V. International Bridge Co. 
 (1900), 163 N. Y. 79, 57 
 N. E. 174 494 
 
 r. Sherman County Banking Co. 
 (1893), 36 Neb. 271, 54 
 N. W. 424 452 
 
 r. Woo<ls (1896), 138 Mo. 539, 39 
 
 S. W. 794 107 
 
 Portland r. Baker, 8 Oreg. 356 576 
 
 Post r. Campbell (1901), 110 Wis. 
 
 37^, 85 N. W. 1032 642 
 
 I'ost-Intelligencer Co. c. Harris 
 (1895), 11 Wash. 500, 39 Pac. 965 615, 
 
 619 
 Postlewaitc i: Howes, 3 Iowa, 365 341 
 Potter r. Aiax Min. Co. (1900), 22 
 
 Utah. 27.S, 61 Pac. 999 817 
 
 f. Benge (1902), Ky., 67 S. W. 
 
 1005 710 
 
 V. Earnest, 45 Ind. 416 558, 824 
 
 V. Ellice. 48 N. Y. 321 271, 360 
 
 V. Neal, 62 How. Pr. 158 199 
 
 V. Pliillips, 44 Iowa, 357 340, 373 
 
 Pottgieser -•. Dorn. 18 .Minn. 204 737 
 
 Potts r. Baldwin, 67 App. Div. 434 293 
 t: Domice (1903), 173 N. Y. 335, 
 
 m N. E. 4 293, 296 
 
 Powder t: Bowdle, 54 X. W. Rep. 
 
 404 861, 862, 923, 927 
 
 I'owder River Live Stock Co. v. 
 Lamb (1893), 38 Neb. 339, 56 
 N. W. 1019 686, 714 
 
 Powell f. Banks (1898), 146 Mo. 620, 
 
 4H .S. W. 66 1 191 
 
 1-. Davton, etc. R. Co., 13 Oreg. 
 
 446 499 
 
 r. Finch, 5 Duer, 666 413, 414 
 
 I'. Flanary (1900), 109 Ky. 342, 
 
 59 S. W. 5 810 
 
 r. Nolan (1902), 27 "Wash. 318, 
 
 07 Pac. 712 103, 934, 042 
 
 V. Powell, 48 Cal. 234 299, 396, 403 
 V. Ro88, 4 Cal. 197 325, 336 
 
 Power c. Bowdle (1893), 3 N. D. 107, 
 
 54 .\. W. 404 642 
 
 r. Hambrick (1903), Ky., 74 
 
 S. W. 660 95 
 
 V. Sla (1900), 24 Mont. 243, 61 
 
 Pac. 468 49, 818 
 
 Powers V. Armstrong, 35 Ohio St. 
 
 357 784, 807 
 
 i;. Bumcratz, 12 Ohio St. 273 177 
 
 Powis V. Smith, 5 B. & A. 851 
 Poynter r. Chipnian (1893), 8 Utah, 
 
 442, 32 Pac. 690 816 
 
 Prader v. Nat. Ace. Ass'n (1899), 
 
 107 la. 431, 78 N. W. 60 520 
 
 Prall V. Peters, 32 Neb. 832 790, 814 
 
 Pratt V. Collins, 20 Hun, 126 877 
 
 V. Hawes (1903), 118 Wis. 603, 
 
 95 N. W. 965 816 
 
 V. Howard (1899), 109 la. 504, 
 
 80 N. W. 546 815 
 
 r. Menkens, 18 Mo. 158 935 
 
 r. Radford, 52 Wis. 114 202 
 
 Pratcliett v. .Marsh (1895), 52 Ohio 
 
 St. 494, 40 N. E. 200 97 
 
 Pray v. Life Indemnity Co. (1897), 
 
 104 la., 114, 73 N. W. 485 934 
 
 Preferred Accident Ins. Co. i\ Stone 
 
 (1899), 61 Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986 443 
 
 Prentice c. Janssen, 7 Hun, 86 470 
 
 Prentiss v. Bowdeii (1895), 145 N. Y. 
 
 342, 40 N. E. 13 341 
 
 Presb. Soc. >: Beach, 8 Hun, 644 147, 149 
 
 Prescott V. Grady, 91 Cal. 518 575 
 
 President, etc. of Ins. Co. v. Parker 
 
 (1902), 64 Neb. 411, 89 N. W. 1040 913, 
 
 924 
 Preston v. Roberts, 12 Bush, 570 575, 787 
 Prettyman t'. Tazewell Cy. Sup., 19 
 
 111.406 119 
 
 Pretzfelder v. Merchants' Ins. Co. 
 
 (1895), 116 N. C. 491, 21 S. E. 302 498 
 Prcw*itt V. Missouri, etc. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1896). 134 Mo. 615, 36 S W. 667 570 
 Prey v. Stanley (1895), 110 Cal. 423, 
 
 42 Pac. 908 231 
 
 Price V. Brown, 10 Abb. N. Cas. 67 519 
 V. Grand Rapids, etc. R. Co., 18 
 
 Ind. 137 786 
 
 V. Price (1894), 91 la. 693, 60 
 
 N. W. 202 303 
 
 r. Price's E.xecutor (1897), 101 
 
 Kv. 28, 39 S. W. 429 588 
 
 w. Sanders. 60 Ind. 310 661 
 
 V. Scott (1896), 13 Wash. 574, 
 
 43 Pac. 634 639 
 
 V. Water Co. (1897), 58 Kan. 
 
 551, 50 I'ac. 450 682 
 
 Price Baking I'owder Co. r. Rinear 
 
 (1897), 17 Wasli. 95, 49 Pac. 223 639 
 Prichard's K.xecutri.x i'. Peace (1895), 
 
 98 Kv. 99. 32 S. W. 296 179, 850, 863 
 Prince "r. 'lakash (1903), 75 Conn. 
 
 616. 54 Atl. 1003 666 
 
 Prindle ;;, Aldrich, 13 How Pr. 466 6-35 
 
 V. Caruthers, 15 N. Y. 425 596
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxxxvn 
 
 [the references are to tue pages.] 
 
 Printup V. Patton (1893), 91 Ga.422, 
 
 18 S. E. 311 
 Prior r. Madigan, 51 Cal. 178 
 Pritohard v. Hicks, 1 Paige, 270 
 
 Pritchett v. McGaiitfhey (1898), 151 
 
 Ind. 038, 52 N. E. 397 
 Privett V. Railroad Co. (1899), 54 
 
 S. C. 98, 32 S. E. 75 
 Proctor y. Baker, 15 Itid. 178 326, 
 V. Cole, 66 Ind. 57(5 
 V. Cole, 104 Ind. 373 
 V. Georgia Ins. Co. (1899), 124 
 
 N. C. 265, 32 S. E. 716 
 V. Irvin (1899), 22 Mont. 547, 57 
 
 Pac. 183 
 V. Rief, 52 Iowa, 592 
 V. Southern Ry. Co. (1901), 61 
 S. C. 170, 39 S. E. 351 
 Prost V. More, 40 Cal. 347 755, 
 
 Protection Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 6 Ohio 
 
 St. 553 
 Prouty V. Eaton, 41 Barb. 409 
 
 V. Lake S. & M. S. R. Co., 85 
 
 N. Y. 272 
 V. Prouty, 4 Wash. 174 
 V. Swift, 61 N. Y. 594 
 Pruyn v. Black, 21 N. Y. 300 
 Pryor v. Brady (1902), 115 Ga. 848, 
 42 S. E. 223 
 V. Kansas City (1899), 153 Mo. 
 135, 54 S. W. 499 466, 
 
 Pugli V. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. 
 (1897), 101 Ky. 77, 39 S. W. 
 695 
 V. Currie, 5 Ala. 44G 
 V. Oregon Imp. Co. (1896), 14 
 
 Wash. 331, 44 Pac. 689 
 V. Ottenheinier, 6 Oreg. 231 
 Pugmire c. Diamond Coal & Coke 
 Co. (1903), 26 Utah, 115, 72 Pac. 
 385 
 Pugsley V. Aikin, 11 N. Y. 494 
 Pullen u. Heron Min. Co., 71 N. C. 
 5(57 
 i\ Wright, 34 Minn. 314 
 PuUiam v. Burlingame, 81 Mo. Ill 
 PuUins' Adm'r v. Smitli (1899), 106 
 
 Ky. 418, 50 S. W. 833 
 Pulver V. Skinner, 42 Hun, 322 
 Punteney-Mitchell Mfg. Co v. North- 
 wall Co. (1902), — Neb. — , 91 
 N. W. 863 911, 
 
 Purity Ice Works v. Rountree (1898), 
 
 104 Ga. 676, 30 S. E. 885 
 Purnell v. Vaughan, 80 N. C. 46 
 Putnam v. Ross, 55 Mo. 116 
 V. Tennyson, 50 Ind. 456 
 V. Wise, 1 Hill, 234 648, 
 
 Putt r. Putt (1897), 149 Ind. 30, 48 
 
 N. E. 356 
 Pyle V. Peyton (1896), 146 Ind. 90, 
 
 44 N. E. 925 
 Pyncent v. Pyncent, 3 Atk. 571 
 
 305 
 737 
 249, 
 347 
 
 711 
 
 643 
 3;j3 
 598 
 
 881 
 
 207 
 
 740 
 620 
 
 089 
 812 
 
 150 
 845, 
 
 852 
 
 412 
 526 
 631 
 400 
 
 661 
 
 070 
 
 302 
 
 248 
 
 815 
 
 642 
 470 
 
 331 
 
 737 
 780 
 
 817 
 111 
 
 913 
 
 641 
 940 
 375 
 
 727 
 649 
 
 947 
 
 565 
 255 
 
 Q. 
 
 Quaid r. Cornwall, 13 Bush, 601 665 
 Quassaic Nat. Bk. v. Waddell, 3 N. Y. 
 
 S. C. 680 315 
 Quayle (•. Bayfield Co. (1902), 114 
 
 Wis. 108, 89 N. W. 892 711 
 Quebec Bk. of Toronto v. Weyand, 
 
 30 Oliio St. 126 47, 55, 852 
 Queen City Printing Co. i'. McAden 
 
 (1902), 131 N. C. 178, 42 S. E. 575 605 
 
 Q'ligley r. Merritt, 11 Iowa, 147 834 
 
 Quillen v. Arnold, 12 Nev. 234 117, 515, 
 
 Quilty (;. Battle, 01 Hun, 164 314 
 Quin V. Havenor (1903), 118 Wis. 53, 
 
 94 N. W. 642 680 
 
 V. Lloyd, 41 N. Y. 349 769, 780, 802 
 
 (iuinn V. Smith, 49 Cal. 163 930 
 Quinney v. Stockbridge, 33 Wis. 
 
 505 563 
 
 (Juintard v. Newton, 5 Robt. 72 628 
 Q. W. Loverin-Browne Co. v. Bank 
 
 (1898), 7 N. D. 569, 75 N. W. 923 638 
 
 K. 
 
 Rabb p. Albright (1894), 98 la. 50, 
 
 61 N. W. 402 ■ 6 
 
 Rabe v. Sommerbeck (1895), 94 la. 
 
 656, 63 N. W. 458 673 
 
 Rabone v. Williams, 7 Durnf. & E. 
 
 T. R. 360 n. 877 
 
 Racine Cy. Bank v. Keep, 13 Wis. 
 
 209 911, 913 
 
 Racouillat v. Rene, 32 Cal. 4.50 733, 736 
 Radabaugh v. Silvers (1893), 135 
 
 Ind. 605, 35 X. E. 694 181 
 
 Radant v. Werheim Mfg. Co. (1900), 
 
 106 Wis. 600, 82 N. W. 562 178, 179 
 Radde v. Ruckgaber, 3 Duer, 684 748, 
 
 783 
 Radford v. Gaskill (1897), 20 Mont. 
 
 293. 50 Pac. 854 643 
 
 V. So. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 12 
 
 Bush, 434 666 
 
 Ragan v. Simpson, 27 Wis. 355 633 
 
 Ragsdale v. Railway Co. (1901), 60 
 
 S. C. 381, 38 S. E."609 610 
 
 Railroad Co. v. Stark, 38 Mich. 714 676 
 Railway Co. v. State (1894), 59 Ark. 
 
 165, 26 S. W. 824 569 
 
 V. Taylor (1893). 57 Ark. 13(3, 
 
 20 S. W. 1083 117 
 
 Railway Officials, etc. Ass'u v. 
 Drummond (1898),- 56 Neb. 235,' 
 76 X. W. 502 664, 672, 817 
 
 Rain r. Roper, 15 Fla. 121 360 
 
 Rainbolt v. Strang (1894), 39 Neb. 
 
 339, 58 N. W. 96 809 
 
 Rainey v. Sniizer, 28 Mo. 310 174, 204, 
 
 209 
 Rainsford v. Massengale (1893), 5 
 Wyo. 1, 35 Pac. 774 703
 
 CXXiVlU 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the REFEBENCES ABE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Ralphs >: Ilensler (1896), 114 Cal. 
 
 \M. 45 Pac. 1062 643 
 
 Kalvu r. Atkins (1901), 157 Ind. 
 
 ■■jh, h\ N. K. 126 730 
 
 Kaming v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. 
 (1900), 157 Mo. 477, 57 S. W. 268 613, 
 623, 684 
 Ramsdell >: Clark (1897), 20 Mont. 
 
 103, 49 Pat'. 591 466 
 
 Ramsev /•. .Jolmson (1897), 7 Wvo. 
 
 392, 42 Pac. 10><4 058, 673 
 
 Randall v. City of Hoquiam (1902), 
 
 30 Wash. 435, 70 Pac 1111 673 
 V. Persons (1894), 42 Neb. 607, 
 
 60 N. W. 898 623 
 
 V. Reynolds, 20 J. & S. 145 140 
 
 V. Simmons (1902), 40 Ore. 554. 
 
 67 Pac. 513 787, 832 
 
 Rankin c. Collins, 50 Ind. 158 452 
 
 I'. Major, 9 Iowa, 297 245, 325, 332 
 V. Newman (1895), 107 Cal. 602, 
 
 40 Pac. 1024 736 
 V. Railroad Co. (1900), 58 S. C. 
 
 532. 36 S. E. 997 709 
 
 Ransom i'. Stanherry, 22 Iowa, 334 622 
 Ranson r. Anderson, 9 S.C. 438 713, 787 
 Rasmussen v. Levin (1901), 28 Colo. 
 
 44S, 65 Pac. 94 819 
 
 Rathbone r. Frost (1894), 9 Wash. 
 
 162, 37 Pac. 298 678 
 
 V. Hooney, 58 N. Y. 463 333, 334 
 
 r. McConnell, 20 Barb. 311 806 
 
 Rathbone, etc. Co. v. Wheelihan 
 
 (1900), 82 Minn. 30, 84 N. W. 638 674 
 Raunia v. Bailey (1900), 80 Minn. 
 
 336. 83 N. W. 191 675 
 
 Ravicz V. Nickells (1900), 9 N. U. 
 
 536. 84 N. W. 353 866 
 
 Rawley r. Woodruff, 2 Lans. 419 909 
 
 Rawlings v. Fuller, 31 Ind. 255 146 
 
 Rawson t-. Penu R. Co., 2 Abb. Pr. 
 
 .V. s. 220 225 
 
 Ravan r. Dav, 46 Iowa, 239 659 
 
 Rayburn v. Ilurd, 20 Ore. 229 131 
 
 Raymond v. Hanford, 6 N. Y. S. C. 
 
 312 584, 587 
 
 V. Johnson (1897), 17 Wash. 
 
 232, 49 Pac. 492 757 
 
 V. Miller (1897), 50 Neb. 506, 70 
 
 N. W. 22 688 
 
 V. Morrison (1894), 9 Wash. 
 
 156, 37 Pac. 318 285, 734 
 
 V. Pritchard, 24 Ind. 318 791, 814 
 
 V. Railway Co. (1897), 57 O. St. 
 
 271, 48 N. E. 1093 642,643 
 
 1-. Richardson, 4 E. D. Smith, 
 
 171 777 
 
 V. Watiifin (1895), 142 Ind. 367, 
 
 41 N. E. 815 643, 601 
 Rayner r. Julian, Dickens, 677 345 
 Ravnor r. Wilmington Seacoast 
 
 Ry. Co. (1901), 129 N. C. 196, 39 
 
 S. E. 821 806 
 
 Ro. .>'e<' name of party. 
 
 Kcab r. McAlister, 8 VVend. 109 842 
 
 Read v. Beardslcy, 6 Neb. 493 637 
 
 V. Brown, 22 "q. B. Div. 128 463 
 
 V. Decker, 5 Hun, 646 784, 793, 908 
 r. Jeffries, 16 Kan. 534 299 
 
 r. Patterson, 44 N. J. Eq. 211 347 
 
 V. Sang, 21 Wis. 678 177, 227, 270 
 
 Reading Township >: Telfer (1897), 
 
 57 Kan. 798, 48 Pac. 134 673 
 Ready i-. Smith (1902), 170 Mo. 163, 
 
 70 S. W. 484 340 
 
 r. Sommer, 37 W^is. 265 713 
 
 Real V. Honey (1894), 39 Neb. 516, 
 
 58 N. W. 136 642 
 Realty Revenue, etc. Co. i'. Farm, 
 
 etc Co. (1900), 79 Minn. 465, 82 
 N. W. 857 543, 658 
 
 Redford r. Spokane St. Rv. Co. 
 
 (1894), 9 Wasli. 5'., 36 Pac. 1085 683 
 Redin v. Branhan, 43 Minn. 283 360 
 
 Redman v. .Vlalvin, 23 Iowa, 296 875, 878 
 Redmond v. Peterson (1894), 102 
 
 Cal. 595, 36 Pac. 923 353 
 
 Red River Vallev Investment Co. v. 
 Cole (1895), "62 Minn. 457, 64 
 N. W. 1149 
 Reed v. Chubb, 9 lowra, 178 
 
 V. Corrigau (1901), 114 la. 638, 
 
 87 N. W. 676 
 1-. Equitable Trust Co. (1902), 
 
 115 Ga. 780, 42 S. E. 102 
 V. Finton, 63 Ind. 288 
 I'. Garr, 59 Ind. 299 
 V. Harris, 7 Robt. 151 
 V. Howe, 28 Iowa, 250 
 1-. Lane (1895). 90 la. 454, 65 
 
 N. W. 380 
 r. McConnell, 133 N. Y. 425 
 V. McRill (1894), 41 Neb. 206, 
 
 59 N. W. 775 
 V. Newton, 22 Minn. 541 55, 922 
 
 V. Pi.xley, 25 Minn. 482 609 
 
 V. Poindexter (1895), 16 Mont. 
 
 294. 40 Pac. 596 659 
 
 V. Reed, 93 N. C. 462 831 
 
 V. Robertson, 45 Mo. 580 20, 61 
 
 V. Stryker, 12 Abb. Pr. 47 342 
 
 V. Union Central Life Ins. Co. 
 (1900), 21 Utah, 295, 61 
 Pac. 21 796 
 
 Reeder v. Savre, 70 N. Y. 180 202, 637 
 
 687 
 936 
 
 666 
 
 543 
 310 
 310 
 104, 154 
 520 
 
 6 
 620 
 
 687 
 
 Reedy v. Smith, 42 Cal. 246 
 
 Reeg V. Adams (1902), 113 Wis. 175. 
 
 87 N. W. 1067 
 Rees V. Cupp, 59 Ind. 566 
 
 V. Shepherdson (1895), 95 la. 
 431, 64 N. W. 286 
 Reeve i-. Fraker, 32 Wis. 243 
 Reeves v. Kimball, 40 N. Y.299 
 
 472 
 
 443 
 
 598 
 
 665 
 573, 596 
 122, 123, 
 124 
 Reeves & Co. r. Cress (1900), 80 
 
 Minn. 466, 83 N. W. 443 638 
 
 Register Printing Co. v. Willis 
 
 (1894), 57 Minn. 9,3, 58 N. W. 825 817 
 Rcichert r. Lonsberg (1894), 87 
 Wis. 543, 58 N. W. 1030 069
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXXXIX 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Eeichert v. Stilwell (1902), 172 N. Y. 
 
 83, 64 N. E. 790 474 
 
 lleid V. Evergreens, 21 How. Pr. 319 385, 
 
 387 
 I'. Gifford, Hopk. 416 262 
 
 V. Sprague, 72 N. Y. 457 123 
 
 Reilly v. Cullen (1900), 159 Mo. 822, 
 
 60 S. W. 126 536, 642 
 
 V. Rucker, Ki Ind. 303 935 
 
 V. Sicilian Asphalt Paving: Co. 
 (1902), 170 N. Y. 40, 62 
 N. E. 772 461, 468, 470 
 
 Eeindl v. Heath (1901), 109 Wis. 570, 
 
 85 N. W. 495 515 
 
 Reinhardt r. Wendeck, 40 Mo. 577 369 
 Reiser v. Gigrich (1894), 69 IVlinn. 
 
 368, 01 N. W. 30 318, 347 
 
 Reiss r. Argubright (1902), Neb., 92 
 
 N. W. 988 730 
 
 Reisz V. Supreme Council (1809), 103 
 
 Wis. 427, 79 N. W. 430 689 
 
 Reizenstein v. Clark (1897), 104 la. 
 
 287, 73 N. W. 588 303, 625 
 
 Remillard ;;. Prescott, 8 Oreg. 37 815 
 
 Remington v. Hudson (1902), 64 
 
 Kan. 43, 67 Pac. 636 655 
 
 V. King, 11 Abb. Pr. 278 935 
 
 Reray i-. Olds, 88 Cal. 537 457 
 
 Renaker r. Smith (1901), 109 Ky. 
 
 643, 60 S. W. 407 920 
 
 Rennebaura v. Atkinson (1898), 103 
 
 Ky. 555, 45 S. W. 874 922, 890 
 
 Renner Bros. i\ Thornburg (1900), 
 
 111 la. 515, 82 N. W. 950 641 
 
 Rensberger v. Britton (1903), — Col. 
 
 -, 71 Pac. 379 924,925 
 
 Renshaw v. Taylor, 7 Oreg. 315 329 
 
 Reubens v. Joel, 13 N. Y. 448 8, 9, 10 
 
 Revalk v. Kraemer, 8 Cal. 66 316, 337 
 Revelle v. Claxon, 12 Bush, 558 609 
 
 Revere F. Ins. Co. v. Chamberlin, 66 
 
 Iowa, 508 928 
 
 Reynolds v. Craus, 16 N. Y. Suppl. 
 
 792 787 
 
 V. Hosmer, 45 Cal. 616 199 
 
 V. Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. 
 (1895), 143 Ind. 579, 40 N.E. 
 410 91, 107 
 
 V. Lounsburv, 6 Hill, 534 719 
 
 V. Pascoe (1901), 24 Utah, 219, 
 
 66 Pac. 1064 816 
 
 V. Price (1900), Kv., 56 S. W. 502 567 
 V. Reynolds, 45 Mo. App. 622 810 
 V. Robinson, 64 N. Y. 589 225, 503 
 V. Roth (1895), 61 Ark. 317, 33 
 
 S. W. 105 458 
 
 V. Smith, 28 Kan. 810 930 
 
 Reynoldson v. Perkins, Amb. 564 365 
 
 Rhea r. Bagley (1899), 06 Ark. 93, 
 
 49 S. W. 492 849 
 
 Rhoades v. Higbee (1895), 21 Colo. 
 
 88, 39 Pac. 1099 754 
 
 Rhoads v. Booth, 14 Iowa, 575 216 
 
 Rhode V. Green, 26 Ind. 83 748, 784 
 
 Rhodes r. Alameda Co., 52 Cal. 350 576 
 
 Rhorer v. Midillesboro Co. (1898), 
 
 103 Ky. 146, 44 S. W. 448 354, 566, 685 
 Ricard v. Sanderson, 41 N. Y. 179 105, 
 
 110 
 Rice V. Ashland County (1902), 114 
 
 Wis. 130, 80 N. W. 908 815 
 
 V. Dorrian (1893) 57 Ark. 541, 22 
 
 S. W. 213 421 
 
 V. Hall, 41 Wis. 453 370 
 
 V. O'Connor, 10 Abb. Pr. 362 931 
 V. Savery, 22 Iowa, 470 105, 109, 
 
 113, 149,212 
 r. Smith, 9 Iowa, 570 118 
 
 Rich v. llobson (1893), 112 N. C. 79, 
 
 16 S. E. 931 G76 
 
 Richards v. Am. Desk & Seating Co. 
 (1894),87 Wis. 603,68N.W. 
 787 849 
 
 v. Cooper, 5 Beav. 304 334 
 
 V. Darly, 34 Iowa, 427 135 
 
 V. Jefferson (1898), 20 Wash. 
 
 106, 54 Pac. 1123 802 
 
 V. Lake View Lan<l Co. (1897), 
 
 1 15 Cal. 642, 47 Pac. 683 566 
 r. Union Vil., 48 Hun, 263 135 
 
 Richardson r. Bates, 8 Ohio St. 257 51 
 V. Carbon Hill Coal Co. (1895), 
 
 10 Wash. 648, 39 Pac. 95 455 
 V. Doty (1895), 44 Neb. 73, 62 
 
 N. W. 254 754, 887 
 
 V. Hadsall, 106 111. 476 332 
 
 r. Hittle, 31 Ind. 119 790 
 
 I'. Hoole, 13 Nev. 4y2 609 
 
 r. Hulbert, 1 Aiist. 65 348 
 
 V. Mackay (1896), 4 Okla. 328, 
 
 46 Pac. 546 823 
 
 V. Means, 22 Mo. 495 11, 38 
 
 V. Moore (1902), SO Wash. 406, 
 
 71 Pac. 18 644 
 
 V. Opelt (1900), 60 Neb. 180, 82 
 
 N. W. 377 470, 474, 680, 815 
 
 V. Penny (1900), 10 Okla. 32, 61 
 
 Pac. 584 907, 928 
 
 V. Steele, 9 Neb. 483 714 
 
 Richardson's Adm. v. Spencer, 18 
 
 B. Mon. 450 253 
 
 Ricliey -■. Bly, 115 Ind. 2-32 936 
 
 V. Branson, 33 Mo. App. 418 213 
 
 Richmon.l r. Bloch (1900), 38 Ore. 
 
 317, 60 Pac. 388 934 
 
 V. Dubuque, etc. R. Co., 33 
 
 luwa, 422 19, 42 
 
 r. Latiin, 04 Cal. 273 938 
 
 V. Post (1897), 69 Minn. 467, 72 
 
 N. W'. 704 680 
 
 V. Voorhees (1894), 10 Wash. 316, 
 
 38 Pac. 1014 668 
 
 Richmond & L. Turnp. Co. v. Rogers, 
 
 7 Bush, 532 H, 71 
 
 Richter v. Leibv (1898), 99 Wis. 512, 
 
 75 N. W. 82 155 
 
 r. Poppenhansen, 42 N. Y. 373 293 
 
 Richtmeyer v. Remsen, 38 N. Y. 206 807 
 
 Richtmyer c. Richtmver, 50 Barb. 
 
 55 ' ■ 177, 249, 475
 
 cxl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [IHE BEFERESCES ARE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Rich wine v. Presbyterian Church 
 
 (l«y3|, 135 Ind. bb, 34 N. E. 737 
 Rickard i: Kohl, '22 Wis. 500 
 Ricker c Pratt, 48 Ind. 7o 
 Ricketson r. City of Milwaukee 
 (1900), 105 Wis. 591, 81 
 N. W. 804 
 c. Richard.son. 19 Cai. 330 
 Ricketts r. Hart (18U9), 150 Mo. 64, 
 
 51 S. W. 825 
 Ricks V. Pope (1901), 129 N. C. 52, 
 
 39 S. E. 038 
 Riddell v. Priciiard (1895), 12 Wash. 
 
 GOl, 41 Pac. 905 
 Riddick v. Walsh, 15 Mo. 538 326, 336 
 Ridenour v. Mayo, 29 Ohio St. 138 702 
 r. Vv'iierritt, 30 Ind. 485 350, 353 
 
 Rider Life Raft Co. v. Roacli, 97 
 
 N. Y. 378 289 
 
 Ridgteway v. Herbert (1899), 150 Mo. 
 
 606, 51 S. W. 1040 41, 47 
 
 521 
 
 931 
 
 46 
 
 800 
 936 
 
 G64 
 
 197 
 
 94 
 
 Riemer v. Johnke, 37 Wis. 258 
 Riggs V. Am. Tract Soc, 84 N. Y. 
 330 
 V. Home Fire Ass'n (1901), 61 
 S. C. 448, 39 S. E. 614 
 Rigsbee r. Trees, 21 Ind. 227 
 Riif V. Riibe (1903), — Neb. — , 94 
 
 N. W. 517 
 Riley v. Corwin, 17 Hun, 597 
 V. Norman, 39 Ark. 158 
 i". Schawacker, 50 Ind. 592 
 Rinard r. Omaiia, etc. Ry. Co. 
 (1901), 164 Mo. 270, 64 S. W. 124 
 
 455 
 
 811 
 
 713 
 472 
 
 820 
 457 
 310 
 
 602, 
 
 659 
 
 68 
 
 Rindge v. Baker, 55 N. Y. 209 
 Rinehart c. Rineiiart, 2 McCarter, 
 
 44 
 Riner r. New Hampshire Fire Ins. 
 
 Co. (1899). 9 Wyo. 81, 60 Pac. 262 
 Ring V. Ogden, 44 Wis. 303 
 Rio Grande West. R. R. Co. v. 
 
 Power Co. (1900), 23 Utah, 22, 63 
 
 Pac. 995 
 Rippstein v. St. Louis Mut. L. Ins 
 
 Co., 57 Mo. 86 
 Risdon v. Davenport (1894), 4 S. D. 
 
 555, 57 N. W. 482 
 Riser v. Snoddy, 7 ind. 442 
 Risk V. Hoffman, 69 Ind. 137 
 Risiey i-. Wightman, 13 Hun, 163 
 Rissler v. Ins. Co. (1899), 150 Mo. 
 
 36<5, 51 S. W. 755 
 Ritchie V. Hay ward, 71 Mo. 560 901,918 
 Rittenhouse v. Clark (1901), 110 Ky. 
 
 147,01 S. W. 33 
 Rivers v. Blom (1901), 163 Mo. 442, 
 
 63 S. W. 812 
 Rizer v. Davis Cy. Com'rs, 48 Kan. 
 
 389 
 Roach V. Privett. 90 Ala. 391 
 Roback v. Powell, 30 Ind. 515 
 Robl.ins V. Clicek, 32 Ind. 328 
 
 r. Codnian, 4 E. D. Smith, 325 
 
 253 
 
 770 
 918 
 
 816 
 
 829 
 
 789 
 786 
 112 
 178 
 
 466 
 
 I'. Deverill, 20 Wis. 142 
 
 179 
 
 818 
 
 499 
 939 
 723 
 113 
 663 
 98, 146 
 
 Robbins r. Dishon, 19 Ind. 204 
 V. Lincohi, 12 Wis. 1 
 V. Wells, 18 Abb. Pr. 191 
 
 Roberts v. Carter, 38 N. Y. 107 131, 
 
 r. Chamberlain, 30 Kan. 677 
 V. Donovan, 70 Cal. 108 
 V. Evans, 43 Cal. 380 648, 
 
 r. Indianapolis St. Rv. Co. 
 
 (1902), 158 Ind. 634, 64 N. E. 
 
 217 
 V. Johannas, 41 Wis. 616 725, 
 V. Johnson, 58 N. Y. 613 301, 
 
 V. Leak (1899), 108 Ga. 806, 33 
 
 S. E. 995 
 r. Lovell, 38 Wis. 211 
 V. New York Elevated R. R. Co. 
 
 (1898), 155 N.Y. 31,49 N.E. 
 
 262 
 V. Samson (1897), 50 Neb. 745, 
 
 70 N. W. 384 
 V. Treadwell, 50 Cal. 520 
 V. Tunstall, 4 Hare, 257 
 V. Wood, 38 Wis. 60 
 Robertson v. Burrell (1895), 110 Cal. 
 
 568, 42 Pac. 1086 
 V. Gr. West. R. Co., 10 Sim. 314 
 
 113 
 
 738 
 159 
 135. 
 935 
 304 
 881 
 649 
 
 612 
 734 
 306 
 
 587 
 575 
 
 V. Robertson'(1900), 37 Ore. 339, 
 
 02 Pac. 377 770, 
 
 V. Rockford, 21 111. 451 
 V. Soutiigate, 6 Hare, 536 
 Robinson v. Allen, 37 Iowa, 27 
 
 1-. Berkey (1896), 100 la. 136, 
 
 69 N. W. 433 
 V. Brown (1901), 166 N. Y. 59, 
 
 159 N. E. 775 
 V. Crescent City Mill, etc. Co., 
 
 93 Cal. 316 
 V. Dickey (1895), 143 Ind. 205, 
 
 42 N. E. 679 
 V. Eau Claire Stationery Co. 
 
 (1901), 110 Wis. 369, 85 
 
 N. W. 983 
 V. Ferguson (1903), — la.— , 93 
 
 N. W. 350 
 V. Frost, 14 Barb. 536 769, 
 
 V. Gleason, 53 Cal. 38 
 V. Hill (1902), Ky., 66 S. W. 623 
 
 V. Hintrager, 36 Fed. Rep. 752 
 V. Howes, 20 N. Y. 84 131, 
 
 V. Jennings, 7 Bush, 630 
 V. Kind (1896), 23 Nev. 330, 47 
 
 Pac. 1 350, 
 
 V. Rice, 20 Mo. 229 
 v. United Trust (1903), — Ark. 
 
 — 72 S. W. 992 
 V. Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 252 
 V. Willoughby, 67 N. C. 84 
 Robson V. Comstock, 8 Wis. 372 
 
 596, 697, 
 Roby V. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. 
 (1894), 142 N. Y. 176, 36 N. E. 
 1053 
 
 349 
 
 592 
 576 
 352 
 337 
 
 203 
 255, 
 358 
 
 803 
 119 
 258 
 821 
 
 565 
 
 473 
 
 428 
 
 712 
 
 642 
 
 602 
 779 
 412 
 832, 
 834 
 203 
 136 
 291 
 
 413 
 504 
 
 640 
 218 
 636 
 592, 
 598 
 
 285
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxli 
 
 [the references are to tub pages.] 
 
 Roclie I'. Baldwin (1902), 135 Cal. 
 
 5-22, 05 Pac. 459 587 
 
 V. Spokane County (1900), 22 
 
 Wash. 121, 60 Pac. 59 710 
 
 Rochester v. Alfred Bk., 18 Wis. 432 118 
 Rochester City Bk. v. Suydam, 5 
 
 How. Pr. 216 23, 541, 559 
 
 Rock r. Collins (1898), 99 Wis. 630, 
 
 75 N. W. 426 639 
 
 V. Wallace, 14 Iowa, 593 118 
 
 Rockford Watch Co. i\ Manifold 
 
 (1893), 36 Neb. 801, 55 N. W. 236 678 
 Rockwell V. Geery, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 
 687 347 
 
 V. Holcomb, 31 Pac. Rep. 144 150 
 Rodenbarger v. Bramblett, 78 Ind. 
 
 213 112 
 
 Rodgers v. Association, 17 S. C. 406 463, 
 
 493 
 V. Baltimore, etc. Ry. Co. (1897), 
 
 150 Ind. 397, 49 N. E. 453 682 
 i;. Parker (1902), 136 Cal. 313, 
 
 68 Pac. 975 867 
 
 V. Rodgers, 11 Barb. 595 502 
 
 Rodini v. Lytle (1896), 17 Mont. 448, 
 
 43 Pac. 501 398 
 
 Roe V. Angevine, 7 Hun, 679 772, 793 
 V. Rogers, 8 How. Pr. 356 832 
 
 Roehring v. Huebschmann, 34 Wis. 
 
 185 476 
 
 Roemer v. Striker (1894), 142 N. Y. 
 
 134, 36 N. E. 808 778 
 
 Rogers v. Castle, 53 N. W. Rep. 651 50 
 v. Duhart (1893), 97 Cal. 500, 32 
 
 Pac. 570 15, 218 
 
 V. Felton (1895), 98 Kv. 148, 32 
 
 S. W. 405 ' 741 
 
 V. Gallowav (1898), 64 Ark. 627, 
 
 44 S. W. 454 117 
 
 V. Gosnell, 58 Mo. 589 105 
 
 V. Lafayette Agr. Works, 52 Ind. 
 
 296 181, 265, 667 
 
 V. Levy (1893), 36 Neb. 601, 54 
 
 N. W. 1080 180 
 
 V. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 610 544. 567 
 V. Penniston, 16 Mo. 432 65 
 
 V. Scliulenburg (1896), 111 Cal. 
 
 281, 43 Pac. 899 662 
 
 V. Shannon, 52 Cal. 99 594 
 
 V. Smith, 17 Ind. 823 229, 458, 525 
 i: Truesdale (1894), 57 Minn. 
 
 126, 58 N. W. 688 682 
 
 V. Wolfe, 104 Mo. 1 360 
 
 Rogge V. Cassidy, 13 S. W. Rep. 716 99 
 liohman v. Gaiser (1898), 53 Neb. 
 
 474. 73 N. W. 923 106, 735 
 
 Rohrer v. Turrill, 4 Minn. 407 95 
 
 Rolleston v. Morton, 1 Dr. & W. 171 333 
 
 Rollins V. Forbes, 10 Cal. 299 474 
 
 V. Humphrey (1897), 98 Wis. 66, 
 
 73 N. W. 331 670 
 
 I). Rolliqs, 76 N, C. 264 283 
 
 Rome, Bk. of, y. Haselton,15Lea,216 389 
 
 Romer v. Center (1893), 53 Minn. 
 
 171, 54 N. W. 1052 609 
 
 Romine v. Roniine, 59 Ind. 346 
 Honnow v. Delmue (1895), 23 Nev. 
 
 2!t, 41 Pac. 1074. 
 Rood r. Taft (1890), 94 Wis. 380, 69 
 
 N. W. 183 8, 72, 864, 908, 913, 
 
 Roosevelt v. Draper, 23 N. Y. 318 
 ;;. Ulmer (1898), 98 Wis. 356, 74 
 N. W. 124 
 Root V. Ciiilds (1897), 68 Minn. 142, 
 70 N. W. 1078 
 V. Taylor, 20 Johns. 137 
 V. Wright, 84 N. Y. 72 
 Roots V. Merriwetlier, 8 Bush, 397 
 Roper V. McFadden, 48 Cal. 346 
 Rose V. Hurley, 39 Ind. 77 
 l: Madden, 1 Kan. 445 
 1-. Page, 2 Sim. 471 247, 
 
 V. Trcadway, 4 Nev. 455 
 V. Williams, 5 Kan. 483 290, 
 
 Roseburg Ky. Co. v. Nosier (1900), 
 
 37 Ore. 299, 60 Pac. 904 
 Rosecrans v. Asay (1896), 49 Neb. 
 512, 68 N. W. 627 
 V. Elsworth, 52 Cal. 509 
 Rosekrans v. White, 7 Lans. 486 342, 
 Roselle v. P'armers' Bank (1893), 119 
 
 Mo. 84, 24 S. W. 744 
 Rosenau v. Syring (1894), 25 Ore. 
 
 386, 35 Pac. 845 
 Rosenberg v. Staten Island Ry. Co., 
 
 14 N. Y. Suppl. 476 
 Rosenberger a. Marsh (1899), 108 la. 
 
 47, 78 N. W. 837 615, 
 
 Rosenthal v. Sutton, 31 Ohio St. 406 
 Rosewater v. Horton (1903), — Neb. 
 
 — , 93 N. W. 681 
 Ross V. Charleston, etc. Co. (1894), 42 
 S. C. 447, 20 S. E. 285 
 V. Cornell, 45 Cal. 133 
 V. Crary, 1 Paige, 416 
 V. Howard (1901), 25 Wash. 1, 
 
 64 Pac. 794 
 i\ Johnson, 1 Handy, 388 
 W.Jones (1896), 47 S. C. 211, 25 
 
 S. E. 59 
 V. Under, 12 S. C. 592 178, 
 
 V. Mather, 51 N. Y. 108 75, 626, 
 
 i--. Page (1902), 11 N. D. 458, 92 
 
 N. W. 822 179, 
 
 V. Purse, 17 Colo. 24 
 V. Ross, 25 Hun, 642 
 V. Wait (1894), 4 S. D. 584, 67 
 N. W. 497 
 Rosser v. Georgia Home Ins Co. 
 
 (1897), 101 Ga. 710, 29 S. E. 286 
 Rossiter v. Loeber (1890), 18 Mout. 
 
 372, 45 Pac. 560 
 Rost V. Harris, 12 Abb. Pr. 446 748, 
 Roth V. Palmer, 27 Barb. 652 562, 
 
 Rothe V. Rothe, 31 Wis. 570 
 Rothschild v. Mack, 42 Hun, 73 
 r. Whitman, 132 N. Y. 472 
 r. Whitman, 57 Hun, 135 
 
 626, 
 
 .061 
 
 262 
 
 932 
 118 
 
 669 
 
 671 
 140 
 111 
 564 
 807 
 827 
 299 
 334 
 792 
 299 
 
 593 
 
 428 
 370 
 
 410 
 
 676 
 
 495 
 
 638 
 377 
 
 642 
 
 612 
 
 66 
 
 249 
 
 703 
 935 
 
 457 
 271 
 630, 
 631 
 
 180 
 667 
 718 
 
 452 
 
 800 
 
 730 
 783 
 651, 
 652 
 630 
 133 
 920 
 920
 
 cxlii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Rounow f. Delmue (1895), 23 Nev. 
 
 29. 41 Pac. 1074 
 Houiitree v. lirinson, 98 N. C. 107 
 lioiisli V. First Nat. Bank (1897J, 102 
 
 Ga. lO'J, 2'J S. E. 144 
 Kow c. Row ( 1«95), 53 0. St. 249, 41 
 
 N. E. 239 
 Kowe i;. Barnes (J897), 101 la. 302, 
 70 N. W. 197 
 V. Beckett, 30 Ind. 154 
 V. Moon ( 11»02), 115 Wis. 566, 92 
 
 N. W. 263 
 v. Parsons, 6 Hun, 338 
 V. Sniiili, 38 How. Pr. 37 
 Roweli V. Janvriii (1896), 151 N. Y 
 
 60, 45 N. E. 398 
 Kowland r. Phalen, 1 Bosw. 43 
 Kownd V. State (1898), 152 Ind. 39 
 
 51 X. E. 914 
 Roy V. Haviland, 12 Ind. 364 
 Roys V. Vilas, 18 Wis. 169 101, 203 
 
 Ruberg r. Brown (1897), 50 S. C. 
 
 397, 27 S. E. 873 
 Rucker c. Hall (1895), 105 Cal. 425, 
 38 Pac. 962 
 V. Steelman, 73 Ind. 396 
 Ruckman v. Pitcher, 20 N. Y. 9 
 
 196 
 b09 
 
 041 
 
 IGl 
 
 703 
 63 
 
 108 
 111, 117 
 314 
 
 077 
 149 
 
 661 
 373 
 
 644 
 
 659 
 852 
 116, 
 
 148 
 
 Rudd V. Fosseen (1900), 82 Minn. 41, 
 
 84 X. W. 496 318 
 
 Ruffatti c. Lexington Mining Co. 
 (1894), 10 Utah, 386, 37 Pac. 591 
 
 275, 276, 278, 397, 639 
 Ruffing V. Tilton, 12 Ind. 259 260 
 
 Ruggles r. Fond du Lac Cy., 63 Wis. 
 
 205 823 
 
 Rugland r. Thompson, 48 Minn. 539 910 
 Rumbough ;•. Young (1896), 119 
 
 N. C. 567, 26 S. K. 143 849, 867, 872 
 Rumsey i-. People's Ry. Co. (1898), 
 
 144 Mo 175,46 S. W. 144 614 
 r. People's Hy. Co. (1900), 154 
 
 Mo. 215, 55 S. W. 615 348, 
 350 
 Rank >: St. John, 20 Barb. 585 153 
 
 Runkle '■. Hartford Ins. Co. (1896), 
 
 99 la. 414, 68 X. W. 712 703 
 
 Rush I'. Cobbett, 2 Jolins. Cas. 256 721 
 
 V. Thompson, 112 ind. 168 877 
 
 Russell f. Allen, 13 N. Y. 173 204 
 
 i: Amundson (1894), 4 N. D. 112, 
 
 59 X. W. 477 757 
 
 r. Bvn.n & Ford, 2 Cal. 86 38, 66 
 V. Cunwav, 11 Cal. 93 936 
 
 V. Easterbrook (189«), 71 Conn. 
 
 50, 40 A tl. 905 
 
 
 850 
 
 V. Grimes, 46 Mo. 410 
 
 
 66 
 
 1-. Kooiice, 104 X. C. 237 
 
 
 930, 931 
 
 V. Lennon, 39 Wis. 570 
 
 
 202 
 
 V. Loomis, 43 Wis. 545 
 
 
 618 
 
 V. Mi.xcr. 42 Cal. 475 
 
 
 596 
 
 V. State liiB. Co., 55 Mo. 
 
 585 
 
 697 
 
 Rust r. Goff, 94 Mo. 511 
 
 
 284 
 
 Rutenberg >: Main, 47 Cal. 213 
 
 271,276. 
 
 
 
 278 
 
 Rutenic v. Ilamaker (1902), 40 Ore. 
 
 444, 67 Pac. 192 065 
 
 Ruth 1-. Smith (1901), 29 Colo. 154, 
 
 68 Pac. 278 686 
 
 Rutherford v. Aiken, 3 N. Y. Sup. 
 
 Ct. 60 89 
 
 r. Johnson (1897), 49 S. C 465, 
 
 27 S. E. 470 599 
 
 r. Williams, 42 Mo. 18 20, 31 
 
 Rutledge i-. Corbin, 10 Ohio St. 478 170, 
 
 208 
 r. Vanmeter, 8 Bush, 354 635 
 
 Ruyter v. Keid, 121 N. Y. 498 332 
 
 Ryan r. HoUiday (1895), 110 Cal. 
 
 335, 42 Pac. 891 565, 566 
 
 V. Jacques (1894), 103 Cal. 280, 
 
 37 Pac. 186 355 
 
 V. MiddIesl)orough Co. (1899), 
 
 106 Ky. 181, 50 S. W. 13 790 
 
 V. MuUin, 45 Iowa, 631 178 
 
 v. Riddle, 78 Mo. 521 209 
 
 V. Spieth (1896), 18 Mont. 45, 44 
 
 Pac. 403 687 
 
 V. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co., 
 
 46 Wis. 671 618 
 
 r. State Bk , 10 Neb 524 277, 289 
 Rychlicki v. City of St. Louis (1893), 
 
 115 Mo. 662, 22 S. W. 908 624 
 
 Ryder r. Thomas, 32 Iowa, 56 946 
 
 Kverson v. Hendrie, 22 Iowa, 480 217, 
 
 290, 299, 875 
 
 V. Ryerson, 55 Hun, 191 226 
 
 Rylanderf. Laursen (1902), 113 Wis. 
 
 461, 89 N. W. 488 863 
 
 Sabin v. Austin, 19 Wis. 421 658 
 
 Sachleben v. Heintze (1893), 117 Mo. 
 
 520, 24 S. W. 54 47 
 
 Sachra i-. Town of Manilla (1903), 
 
 _ la. _, 95 N. W. 198 640 
 
 Sackman v. Sackman (1898), 143 
 
 Mo. 576, 45 S. W. 264 G07 
 
 Sacramento Lumber Co. v. Wagner, 
 
 67 Cal. 293 110 
 
 Sacramento Savings Bank v. Hynes, 
 
 50 Cal. 105 575 
 
 Safely v. Caldwell (1895), 17 Mont. 
 
 184, 42 Pac 766 417 
 
 Sage V. City of Plattsmoiith (1890), 
 
 4» Neb. 553, 67 N. W. 455 605 
 V. Culver (1895), 147 X. Y. 241, 
 
 41 N. E 513 592 
 
 Sager v. Blaine, 44 N. Y. 445 626, 631 
 r. Nichols, 1 Daly, 1 271, 287 
 
 Sainstry v. Grammer, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 
 
 1(J5 241 
 
 St. Anthony Falls Co. f. King Bridge 
 
 Co., 23 Minn. 186 751 
 
 St. Anthony Mill Co. v. Vandall, 1 
 
 Minn. 246 153 
 
 St. Clair v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 29 Mo. 
 
 App. 76 778
 
 TABLK OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxliii 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 St. Clara Female Academy r. North- 
 western Nat. Ins. Co. (189"J), 101 
 Wis. 464, 77 N. W. 893 
 
 St. John V. Griffith, 2 Abb. Pr. 198 
 
 G39 
 110, 
 611 
 415 
 504 
 
 V. Ilardwick, 11 Ind. 251 
 V. Pierce, 22 Barb. 362 
 St. Joseph Uuion Depot Co. v. 
 Chicago, etc. K3^ Co. (1895), 131 
 Mo. 291, 31 S. W. 903 
 St. Louis V. Weitzel (1895), 130 Mo. 
 
 600, 31 S. W. 1045 
 St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Hall (1903), 
 — Ark. — , 74 S. W. 293 
 V. Holladay (1895), 131 Mo. 440, 
 
 33 S. W. 49 
 V. State (1901), 68 Ark. 561, 00 
 
 S. W. 654 
 V. Sweet (1897), 63 Ark. 563, 40 
 
 S. W. 463 
 V. Trigg (1897), 63 Ark. 536, 40 
 S. W. 579 
 St. Louis & S. E. R. Co. v. Mathias, 
 
 50 Ind. 65 
 St. Louis & S. F. Ky. Co. v. French 
 (1896), 56 Kan. 584, 44 Pac. 
 12 
 I,-. Ludlum (1901), 63 Kan. 719, 
 
 66 Pac. 1045 
 V. Snaveley, 47 Kan. 637 
 St. Louis F. & W. R. Co. v. Chenault, 
 
 36 Kan. 51 
 St. Louis, F. S. & W. R. Co. i'. 
 
 Grove, 39 Kan. 731 
 St. Louis Gas L. Co. v. St. Louis, 86 
 
 Mo. 495 
 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. o. 
 Brown, 49 Ark. 253 
 V. Camden Bk., 47 Ark. 541 
 St. Louis Nat. Bank v. Gay (1894), 
 101 Cal. 286, 35 Pac. 876 130, 134, 137, 
 841, 846, 932 
 St. Louis Trust Co. v. Bambrick 
 (1899), 149 Mo. 560, 51 S. W. 
 706 675 
 
 St. Mark's Church v. Teed, 120 N. Y. 
 
 583 111, 112 
 
 St. Paul & Pac. R. Co., First Div., 
 
 v. Rice, 25 Minn. 278 666 
 
 St. Paul, etc. Trust Co. v. Leek 
 (1894), 57 Minn. 87,58 N. W. 826 131, 
 133, 134, 930 
 St. Paul Fire Ins. Co. v. Dakota 
 Land Co. (1897), 10 S. D. 191, 72 
 N. VV. 460 
 Salazar v. Taylor (1893), 18 Colo. 
 
 538, 33 Pac. 369 
 Sale V. Aurora, etc. Co. (1896), 147 
 Ind. 324, 46 N. E. 669 
 
 682 
 V. Bugher, 24 Kan. 432 873, 940 
 
 V. Crutchfield, 8 Bush, 636 42, 453, 
 
 457 
 Salem Traction Co. v. Anson (1902), 
 41 Ore. 562, 69 Pac. 675 676 
 
 703 
 455 
 718 
 354 
 594 
 
 594 
 
 302 
 
 602 
 
 640 
 
 598 
 
 919 
 
 801 
 
 659 
 
 820 
 310 
 
 741 
 615 
 
 67 
 
 Saline Co. v. Sappington, 64 Mo. 72 666 
 Salinger v. Gunn (1895), 61 Ark. 414, 
 
 33 S. W. 959 358 
 
 r. Lusk, 7 How. Pr. 430 738 
 
 Salladin c. Mitcliell (1894), 42 Neb. 
 
 859, 61 N. W. 127 887 
 
 Salmon Falls Bank v. Leyser (1893), 
 
 116 Mo. 51, 22 S. W. 504 593 
 
 Saloy V. Bloch, 130 U. S. 338 243 
 
 Salt Lake Loan & Trust Co. v. Mills- 
 paugh (1898), 18 Utah, 283, 54 Pac. 
 893 677 
 
 Saltus V. Kip, 5 Ducr, 646 798 
 
 Salvidge V. Ilvde, 5 Madd. Cii. 
 . 138 ' 506 
 
 Sample v. Griffith, 5 Iowa, 376 936 
 
 (;. Rowe, 24 Ind. 208 886 
 
 Sampson v. Mitchell (1894), 125 Mo. 
 
 217, 28 S. W. 768 32, 143 
 
 V. Stiaeffer, 3 Cal. 196 71 
 
 Sams r. Derrick (1898), 103 Ga. 678, 
 
 30 S. E. 668 525, 812 
 
 r. Price (1897), 121 N. C. 392, 
 
 28 S. E. 486 641 
 
 Sams Car Coupler Co. v. League 
 (1898), 25 Colo. 129, 54 Pac. 042 191, 
 
 666 
 Samuels v. Blanchard, 25 Wis. 329 196, 
 
 211, 633 
 San Benito Cy. i-. Whitesides, 51 Cal. 
 
 416 155 
 
 Sanborn v. People's Ice Co. (1900), 
 
 82 Minn. 43, 84 N. W. 641 241 
 
 Sandberg v. Victor Mining Co. 
 
 (1901), 24 Utah, 1, 66 Pac. 360 669 
 
 Sanders i?. Chartrand (1900), 158 Mo. 
 
 352, 59 S. W. 95 816 
 
 V. Clason, 13 Minn. 379 105,109, 
 
 502 
 V. Sanders, 30 Ind. 207 727 
 
 V. Yonkers, 63 N. Y. 489 373 
 
 Sandford r. Jodrell, 2 Sm. & Giff. 
 
 176 238 
 
 V. Travers, 40 N. Y. 140 923 
 
 Sandmeyer v. Dak. F. & M. Ins. Co., 
 
 50 N. W. Rep. 353 153 
 
 Sands v. Gund (1908), — Neb. — , 93 
 
 N. W. 990 462 
 
 V. St. John, 36 Barb. 628 663, 820 
 V. Wood, 1 Iowa, 263 325, 330 
 
 Sandwich Mfg. Co. v. Earl (1894), 
 
 56 Minn. 390, 57 N. W. 938 815 
 
 Sanford v. Jansen (1806), 49 Neb. 
 
 766, 69 N. W. 108 674 
 
 V. Lichteriberu^er (1901), 62 Neb. 
 
 501, 87 X. W. .'.(ly 599 
 
 V. McCreedy, 28 Wis. 103 787 
 
 V. Wood, 49 Ind 165 439 
 
 San Francisco Gas Co. r. San Fran- 
 cisco, 9 Cal. 453 755 
 Sanger v. French (1898), 157 N. Y. 
 
 213, 51 N. E. 979 818 
 
 Sanguinett v. Webster (1900), 153 
 
 Mo. 343, 54 S. W. 563 602, 644 
 
 Sannoner v. Jacobsson, 47 Ark. 31 667
 
 cxliv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the BEFERBKCES ABE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 San Te'lro Lumber Co. r. Rcvnolds 
 
 (ISiUi). Ill Cal. 588, 44 Pac. 309 473 
 Santa Barbara r. Eldred (1895), 108 
 
 Cal. ■2'M, 41 Pac. 410 591), 601 
 
 Santa Fe, etc. Ky. Co. r. Hurley 
 
 (1894), Ariz., 36 Pac. 210 594 
 
 Sarber v. McConnell (1897), 04 Ark. 
 
 450, 43 S. W. 395 639 
 
 Sargent r. (^liio >.<; Miss. R. Co., 1 
 
 Handy, 52 118 
 
 V. Steuhenville, etc. R. Co., 32 
 
 Oliio St. 449 713,791 
 
 v. Wilson, 5 Cal. 504 316, 337, 
 
 428 
 Satterlund >: Beal (1903), — N. D. 
 
 — , 95 N. W. 518 646, 819 
 
 Satterthwaite v. Beaufort Cy. 
 
 Com'rs, 76 N. C. 153 321 
 
 Sauer v. Steinbauer, 14 Wis. 70 474 
 
 Sauerherins: r. Iron Ridge & M. R. 
 
 Co., 25 Wis. 447 118 
 
 Saulsburv i'. Alexander, 50 Mo. 142 596, 
 
 598, 604 
 V. Corwin, 40 Mo. App. 373 97 
 
 Sautnarez v. Saumarez, 4 M. & C. 
 
 336 258 
 
 Saunders v. Chamberlain, 13 Ilun, 
 
 568 793 
 
 I'. Druce, 3 Drew. 140 241 
 
 V. United States Marble Co. 
 (1901), 25 Wash. 475, 65 
 Pac. 782 656 
 
 Savage v. Corn Exch. F. Ins. Co., 4 
 
 Bosw. 2 95, 814 
 
 V. Davis (1902), 131 N. C. 159, 
 
 42 S. E. 571 921 
 
 V. O'Neil, 44 N. Y. 298 316 
 
 V. Savage (1899). 36 Ore. 268, 59 
 
 Pac. 461 656 
 
 Savannah Ry. Co. v. Hardin (1900), 
 
 110 Ga. 433, 35 S. E. 681 543 
 
 Saville V. Tancred, 1 Ves. Sen. 101 252 
 Savings Bank v. Burns (1894), 104 
 
 Cal. 473, 38 Pac. 102 543 
 
 Sawtelle v. Ripley, 55 N. W. Rep. 
 
 156 2.39 
 
 Sawyer v. Baker, 66 Ala. 202 .360 
 
 V. Chambers, 11 Abb. Pr. 110 414 
 V. Wabash Ry. Co. (1900), 150 
 
 Mo. 408, 57 X. W. 108 669 
 
 V. Warner, 15 Barb. 282 733 
 
 Saxton r. Seiberling, 48 Ohio St. 554 181 
 
 Sayles r. Bi-niis, 57 Wis. 315 470 
 
 V. FitzGerald (1^99), 72 Conn. 
 
 391.44 A tl. 733 757 
 
 Saylor v. Coinnjonwealth Banking 
 
 Co. (1000), 38 ( )re. 204. 02 Pac. 652 800 
 Sayres r. I.inkart, 25 Iiid. 145 727, 935 
 Scantlin r. Allison, 12 Kan. 85 149 
 
 Scarborough >: Mvrick (1896), 47 
 
 Neb. 794. 60 X. W. 807 680, 681 
 
 Scarry r. Eldridge, 63 Ind. 44 328 
 
 Schaake r. Eagle Automatic Can Co. 
 
 (1902), i:;.j Cal. 472, 03 Pac. 1025 038 
 Schadt i: lleppe, 45 Cal. 4-» 326 
 
 336 
 
 738 
 124 
 887 
 
 639 
 
 772 
 
 Schaefer v. Purviance (1903), — Ind. 
 
 — , 66 N. E. 154 
 Schaetzel '•. Germantown, etc. Ins. 
 
 Co., 22 Wis. 412 
 Schafer v. Reilly, 50 N. Y. 67 123 
 
 v. Schafer, 68 Ind. .374 
 Schaller v. Chicago & Northwestern 
 
 Ry. Co. ( 1897), 97 Wis. 31, 71 N. W. 
 
 1042 
 Scharz v. Oppold, 74 N. Y. 307 
 Schaus ?•. Man. Gas Co., 14 Abb. Pr. 
 
 N. s. 371 769, 778 
 
 Schawacker v. McLaughlin (1897), 
 
 139 Mo. 333, 40 S. W. 935 644 
 
 Schee v. McQuilken, 59 Ind. 269 852 
 
 Scheer v. Keown, 34 Wis. 349 769, 783, 
 
 806 
 Scheffer v. Hines (1897), 149 Ind. 413, 
 
 49 N. E. 348 
 Schehan v. Malone, 71 N. C. 440 
 Scheldt V. Sturgis, 10 Bosw. 606 
 Scheland r. Erpeldins, 6 ,Oreg. 258 
 Schenck v. Putsch, 32 Ind. .338 
 
 V. Ellingwood, 3 Edw. Ch. 175 
 V. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 
 28 
 Schenectady v. Furman, 01 Hun, 171 
 
 676 
 728 
 417 
 942 
 476 
 251 
 
 Scherar v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1902), 
 
 63 Nell. 530, 88 N. W. 687 
 Schermerhorn v. Barhydt, 9 Paige, 
 28 
 V. Van Allen, 18 Barb. 29 709, 
 
 065 
 852, 
 858 
 
 638 
 
 347 
 772, 
 777 
 
 Scheunert r. Kaehler, 23 Wis. 523 633, 
 
 896,918 
 
 SchiefEelin v. Hawkins, 1 Daly, 286 935 
 
 SchifEer v. Eau Claire, 51 Wis. 385 173, 
 
 177, 196,061 
 
 Schiffman v. Schmidt (1900), 154 Mo. 
 
 204, 55 S. W. 451 678, 670 
 
 Schilling r. Mullen (1893), 55 Minn. 
 
 122, 56 N. W. 686 104 
 
 V. Rominger, 4 Col. 100 18, 38, 39. 
 562, 508 
 Schirmer v. Drexler (1901), 1.34 Cal. 
 
 134, 66 Pac. 180 618 
 
 Schlageck v. Widhahn (1900), 59 
 
 Neb. 541, 81 N. W. 448 639 
 
 Schlicker v. Hemenwav (1895), 110 
 
 Cal. 579, 42 Pac. 100.3 605 
 
 Schmidt v. Coulter, 3 Minn. 492 933 
 
 1-. Mitchell (1897), 101 Ky. 570, 
 
 41 S. W. 929 644 
 
 v. Oregon Gold Min. Co. (1895), 
 28 Ore. 9, 40 Pac. 406, 
 1014 615 
 
 r. Zahrndt (1897), 148 Ind. 447, 
 
 47 N. E. 335 946 
 
 Schmitt v. Hager (1903), 88 Minn. 
 
 41.3, 93 N. W. 110 822 
 
 r. Schneider (1899), 109 Ga. 628, 
 
 35 S. E. 145 666 
 
 Schnaderbeck v. Worth, 8 Abb. Pr. 
 37 894, 920
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxlv 
 
 [the refeeen'ces are to the pages.] 
 
 Schneider v. Schultz, 4 Sandf. GG4 
 
 V. White, 12 Oreg. 503 
 Schnier v. Fay, 12 Kan. 184 
 Schnitzer v. Cohen, 7 Hun, CG5 499, 
 Sclioeilhaiuer r. Roinetsch (181)4), 26 
 
 Ore. 394, 38 Vac. 344 
 Schoenleber v. Buvlchart (1896), 94 
 
 Wis. 575, 69 N. W. 343 
 Schoenrock v. Farlev,49 N. Y. Super. 
 
 Ct. 302 
 Schoepflin v. Coffey (1900), 162 N.Y. 
 
 12, 56 N. E. 502 
 Scholefield v. Heafield, 7 Sim. 667 
 Scholey v. Demattos (18'.)8), 18 
 Wash. 504, 52 Pac. 242 
 
 L\ Halsey, 72 N. Y. 578 
 Schoraberg v. Walker (1901), 132 
 
 Cal. 224, 64 Pac. 290 
 School District i'. Flanigan (1901), 
 28 Colo. 431, 65 Pac. 24 605, 
 V. Holmes, 16 Neb. 486 
 V. Pratt, 17 Iowa, 16 
 V. Sheidley (1897), 138 Mo. 672, 
 
 40 S. W. 656 
 c. Shoemaker, 5 Neb. 36 
 School District ex rel. v. Livers 
 (1899), 147 Mo. 580, 49 S. W. 507 
 School Dist. No. 9 v. School Dist. 
 No. 5 (1903), 118 Wis. 238, 59 
 N. W. 148 
 School Sec. Trs. v. OdUn, 8 Ohio St. 
 
 293 541, 
 
 Schoonover v. Hinckley, 46 Iowa, 
 207 
 v. Quick, 17 Ind. 196 
 Schouweiler i-. Hough (1895), 7 
 
 S. D. 163, 63 N. W. 776 
 Schowalter v. Beard (1900), 10 Okla. 
 
 454, 63 Pac. 687 
 Schrandt v. Young (1901), 62 Neb. 
 
 254, 86 N. W. 1085 
 Schreiner i'. Stanton (1901), 26 
 Wash. 563, 67 Pac. 219 
 
 Rockford Ins. Co. 
 Minn. 291, 79 N. W. 
 
 Schrepfer 
 (1899), 77 
 1005 
 
 Schroeder v. 
 la. — , m N 
 
 Schubart 
 
 Schroeder (1903),— 
 W. 78 
 Harteau, 34 Barb. 447 
 
 877, 879, 
 Schubert v. Richter (1896), 92 Wis. 
 
 199, 66 N. W. 107 
 Schuchman v. Heath, 38 Mo. App. 
 
 280 
 Schular v. Hudson River R. Co., 38 
 
 Barb. 653 769, 
 
 Schulte l: Coulthurst (1895), 94 la. 
 
 418, 62 N. W. 770 
 Schuhz V. Griffith (1897), 103 la. 
 150, 72 N. W. 445 
 V. Schultz, 27 Hun. 26 
 V. Winter, 7 Nev. 1-30 262^ 
 
 Schumpert v. Southern Ry. Co. 
 (1903), — S. C— 43S. E. 813 
 
 112 
 
 89 
 
 526 
 
 678 
 
 710 
 
 779 
 
 615 
 372 
 
 644, 
 
 777 
 293 
 
 783 
 
 606 
 
 831 
 270 
 
 811 
 769 
 
 107 
 
 684 
 
 596 
 
 611 
 935 
 
 433 
 
 395 
 
 781 
 681 
 
 672 
 
 819 
 855, 
 9.32 
 
 680 
 
 833 
 
 778 
 
 703 
 
 675 
 226 
 503 
 
 689 
 
 Schurick v. Kollman, 50 Ind. 336 576 
 
 Schurmeier v. English, 46 Minn. 300 910 
 Schurtz V. Colvin (1896), 56 O. St. 
 
 274, 45 N. W. 627 816 
 Schuster v. Myers (1899), 148 Mo. 
 
 422, 50 S. W. 103 680 
 
 Schuttler v. King, 30 Pac. Rep. 25 637 
 Schutz r. Morette (1895), 146 N. Y. 
 
 137, 40 N. E. 780 668 
 Schwartz v. Stock (1901), Nev., 66 
 
 Pac. 351 641, 644 
 
 V. Wechler, 20 N. Y. Suppl. 861 273 
 Schwartzschild, etc. Co. r. Weeks 
 
 (1903), 66 Kan. 800, 72 Pac. 274 625 
 
 Scliwarz v. Oppold, 74 N. Y. 307 784 
 
 Schweickhart v. Stuewe, 71 Wis. 1 911 
 Scofield V. Clark (1896), 48 Neb. 
 
 711, 67N. W. 754 735 
 
 r. Doscher, 72 N. Y. 491 784 
 V. Eighth School Dist., 27 
 
 Conn. 499 118 
 
 V. State Nat. Bank, 9 Neb. 499 702 
 
 V. Whitelegge, 49 N. Y. 269, 261 604 
 
 605, 008, 665 
 
 Scott V. B. & S. W. R. Co., 52 Iowa, 
 
 18 562 
 
 V. Chickasaw Cy., 54 Iowa, 47 637 
 V. Cleveland, etc. Rv. Co. 
 (1895), 144 Ind. 125, 43 
 
 N. E. 133 657 
 
 V. Conway, 58 N. Y. 619 292 
 
 V. Crawford, 12 Ind. 411 15 
 V. Flowers (1900), 60 Neb. 675, 
 
 84 N. W. 81 302, 494, 519 
 
 V. Gill, 19 Iowa, 187 105 
 
 V. Guernsey, 60 Barb. 163 242, 371 
 r. llallock (1897), 16 Wash. 439, 
 
 47 Pac. 968 271 
 V. Indianap. Wagon Works, 48 
 
 Ind. 75 340 
 
 V. McGraw, 3 Wash. 675 286 
 
 i;. Menasha. 64 N. W. Rep. 263 911 
 
 V. Morse, 64 Iowa, 732 769, 772 
 
 V. Norris, 32 N. E. Rep. 332 47 
 
 r. Robards, 67 Mo. 289 541, 546, 562, 
 
 568, 658 
 V. Spencer (1895), 44 Neb. 93, 
 
 62 N. W. 312 640 
 
 V. Timherlake, 83 N. C. 382 869 
 Scott-Force Hat Co. v. Hombs (1894), 
 
 127 Mo. 392, 30 S. W. 183 410, G69 
 Scottish Union Ins. Co. v. Strain 
 
 (1902), Kv., 70 S. W. 274 640 
 
 Scribner v. Allen, 12 Minn. 148 118 
 Scroggin v. Johnston (1895), 45 
 
 Neb. 714, 04 N. \V. 236 640, 816 
 v. Nat. Lumber Co. (1894), 41 
 
 Neb. 196, 59 N. W. 548 822 
 Seaboard Air Line Rv. Co. v. Main 
 
 (1903), — N. C. — 43 S. E. 930 599 
 
 Seager v. Burns, 4 Minn. 141 278, 359 
 Seal V. Cameron (1901), 24 Wash. 
 
 62, 63 Pac. 1103 669 
 Seals V. Augusta Rv. Co. (1898), 
 
 102 Ga. 817, 29 S."E. 116 20, 72, 666 
 
 .;
 
 cxlvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the beferknces are to the pages.] 
 
 Seaman c. Goodnow, 20 Wis. 27 519 
 
 1-. Jolinson, 40 Mo. Ill G6 
 
 1-. Reeve, 15 Barb. 454 935 
 
 V. Slater, 18 Fed. Hep. 485 293 
 
 V. Slater, 49 Fed. Rep. 37 881, 911 
 Searls i-. Knapp (1894), 5 S. D. 325, 
 
 58 N. W. 807 822 
 
 Sears v. Ackerinan (1903), 138 Cal. 
 
 583, 72 Pac. 171 102 
 
 V. Hardv, 120 Mass. 524 387 
 
 V. Martin, 29 Pac. Rep. 890 938 
 
 i: Tavlor, 4 Col. 38 576 
 
 i". Williams (1894), 9 Wash. 428, 
 
 37 Pac. 665 106 
 
 Seaton v. Davis, 1 X. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 
 91 160 
 
 r. Grimm (1899), 110 la. 145, 81 
 
 N. W. 225 825 
 
 Seattle v. Pearson (1896), 15 Wasli. 
 
 575, 46 Pac. 1053 684 
 
 Seattle Nat. Bank r. Carter (1895), 
 
 13 Wash. 281. 43 Pac. 331 832 
 l: Meerwaldt (1894), 8 Wash. 
 
 630, 36 Pac. 768 740, 756 
 
 Sebbitt V. Stryker, 62 Ind. 41 598 
 
 Sebree Deposit Bank r. Moreland 
 
 (1894), 96 Ky. 150, 28 S. W. 153 601 
 Sebring i*. Mersereau, Hopk. 501 367 
 
 Seckinger v. Philibert Co. (1895), 
 
 129 Mo. 590, 31 S. W. 957 606 
 
 Secor c. Keller, 4 Diier, 416 207 
 
 V. Lord, 3 Keyes, 525 105, 111 
 
 V. Sturgis, 16 N. Y. 548 470 
 
 Security Co. c. Harper County 
 
 (1901), 63 Kan 351, 65 Pac. 060 567 
 Security Loan ami Trust Co. v. Mat- 
 tern (1901), 131 Cal. 326, 63 Pac. 
 482 474 
 
 Security Nat. Bank r. Latimer 
 
 (1897), 51 Neb. 498, 71 N. W. 38 642 
 Seeleman >: Hoagland (1893), 19 
 
 Col. 231, 34 Pac. 995 780 
 
 Seeley v. Engell, 13 N. Y. 542 52, 718 
 Segelke & Kohlhaus Mfg. Co. v. 
 Hulberg (1896), 94 Wis. 106,68 
 N. \V. 653 639 
 
 Segelken r. Mever, 94 N. Y. 473 219 
 
 Seibert r. Blooilifield (1901), Ky., 63 
 
 S. W. 584 816 
 
 V. Minneapolis, etc. Ry. Co. 
 (1894), 58 Minn. 39, 59 
 N. W. 822 593 
 
 Selby r. I'onifrt-t, 1 J. & H. 336 246 
 
 Selden i-. I'ringle, 17 Barb. 458 100 
 
 Sell V. .Mi>i!ii«sippi River I>ogging 
 Co. (1894). 88 Wis. 581, 60 N. W. 
 10(55 24 
 
 Seliar r. Sage, 12 How. Pr. 531 611 
 
 Selleck »•. (iriswold. 49 Wis. 3'.t 865 
 
 Sellers r. First Presl)yterian Church 
 
 (1895), 91 Wis. 32H.64 N. W. 1031 670 
 
 Sellon r. Bra.len. 13 Iowa, 365 296, 299 
 
 Sells /•. Hubbcll. 2. Johns. Ch. 394 348 
 
 Sellwood c. Ik-nnenian (1!>00), 36 
 
 Ure. 575, 60 Pac. 12 685 
 
 12 
 
 95 
 
 Sclover v. Coe, 63 N. Y. 438 308, 
 
 Selp V. Tilghman, 23 Kan. 289 
 Selz V. Tucker (1894), -10 Utaii, 132, 
 
 37 Pac. 249 
 Semple r. Lee, 13 Iowa, 304 325, 
 
 Sengfelder v. Mut. Ins. Co. of N. Y., 
 
 31 Pac. Rep. 428 
 Senn c. Southern Ry. Co. (1894), 
 124 Mo. 621, 28 S. W. 66 
 v. Southern Ry. Co. (1896), 135 
 Mo. 512, 36 S. W. 367 
 Sentinel Co. v. Thomson, 38 Wis. 
 
 489 
 Service i-. Bank (1900), 62 Kan. 857, 
 
 62 Pac. 670 96, 102, 
 
 Settembre v. Putnam, 30 Cal. 490 
 
 372, 
 Seward v. Derrickson (1895), 
 Wash. 225, 40 Pac. 939 
 V. Huntington, 94 N. Y. 116 
 Sexton V. Rhames, 13 Wis. 99 
 V. Shriver (1903), — Neb. - 
 N. W. 594 
 Seybold r. Bank (1896), 5 N. D. 460, 
 
 67 N. W. 682 
 Seymore v. Rice (1894), 94 Ga. 183, 
 
 21 S. E. 293 
 Se3"mour v. Carpenter, 51 Wis. 413 
 V. Davis, 2 Sandf. 239 
 V. Dtiniiam, 24 Hun, 93 
 V. Pittsburg, C, & St. L. Ry. Co., 
 
 44 Ohio St. 12 
 V. Smith, 114 N. Y. 481 
 Shabata v. Johnston (1897), 53 Neb. 
 
 12, 73 N. W. 278 
 Shafer v. Bronenbcrg, 42 Ind. 89 
 r. Moriartv, 46 Ind. 9 
 V. State, 49 Ind. 400 
 Shain ;;. Bclvin, 79 Cal. 262 
 Shale 1-. Schantz, 35 Hun, 622 
 Shalter i\ Caldwell, 27 Ind. 376 
 Shambaugh r. Current (1900), 111 
 
 Iowa, 121. 82 N. W. 497 
 Shamp r. Meyer, 20 Neb. 223 
 Shanahan c. Madison, 57 Wis. 276 
 Shane r. Francis, 30 Ind. 92 88 
 
 V. Lowry, 48 Ind. 205 271 
 
 Shank v. Pearson. 10 Iowa, 588 
 
 r. Teeple, 33 Iowa. 189 
 Shannon v. (Jrindstaff (1895), 11 
 Wash. 536, 40 Pac. 123 
 V. Portland (1900), 38 Ore. 382, 
 
 62 Pac. 50 
 V. Wilson, 19 Ind. 112 931 
 
 Sharon v. Sharon, m Cal. 29 
 Sharp V. Johnson (1895), 44 Neb. 
 165, 62 N. W. 466 
 V. Kinsman. 18 S. C 108 906 
 I'. Miller. 54 Cal. 329 
 Sharpe r. Larson (IS'.I7). 70 Minn. 
 
 209, 72 N. W. tOl 
 Sharpless v. Giffen (1896), 47 Neb. 
 
 146, 06 N. W. 285 
 Shartle v. -Minneapolis, 17 Minn. 
 308 
 
 343 
 202 
 
 678 
 327 
 
 665 
 
 220 
 
 683 
 
 455 
 
 646 
 357, 
 414 
 
 638 
 111 
 663 
 
 702 
 
 95 
 
 656 
 196 
 843 
 131 
 
 820 
 150 
 
 931 
 791 
 289 
 661 
 942 
 215 
 65 
 
 101 
 112 
 228 
 , 104 
 ,311 
 834 
 592 
 
 687 
 
 566 
 
 , 935 
 
 811 
 
 928 
 658 
 
 680 
 
 812 
 
 665
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxlvii 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Shaver v. Brainard, 29 Barb. 25 271 
 
 340 
 l: West. Un. Tel. Co., 57 N. Y. 
 459 
 Shaw V. Iloadlev, 8 Blackf. 165 
 
 V. Jones (I'iuO), 156 Iiid. 60, 59 
 
 N. E. 106 
 V. Merchants' Bank, 60 Ind. 83 
 V. Tracy, 95 Mo. 531 
 Shavvyer v. Chamberhiin (1900), 113 
 
 la. 742, 84 N. W. 661 
 Sheafe v. Hastie (1897), 16 Wash. 
 
 563, 48 Pac. 246 
 Sheahan v. Shanahan, 5 Hun, 461 
 
 Shearer v. Evans, 89 Ind. 400 
 
 r. Mills, 35 Iowa, 499 
 Sheehan r. Hamilton, 2 Keyes, 304 
 
 I'. Pierce, 23 N. Y. Suppl. 1119 
 
 Sheehan & L. Transp. Co. v. Sirams, 
 
 28 Mo. App. 64 
 Sheeks v. Erwin, 130 Ind. 31 
 
 V. State ( 1900), 156 Ind. 508, 60 
 N. E. 142 
 Sheibley v. Dixon County (1901), 61 
 
 Neb. 409, 85 N. W. 399 896, 924, 
 Shelby Cy. v. Simnionds, 33 Iowa, 
 
 345 
 Sheldon v. Sabin, 12 Daly, 84 
 
 ('. Stp. Uncle Sam, 18 Cal. 626 
 Sheldon Co. v. Mayers, 81 Wis. 
 
 627 
 Shell V. West (1902), 130 N. C. 171, 
 
 41 S. E.65 
 Shelly V. Vanarsdoll, 23 Ind. 543 
 Shelton v. Conant (1894), 10 Wash. 
 193, 38 Pac. 1013 929, 
 
 V. Wilson (1902), 131 N. C. 499, 
 42 S. E. 937 197, 
 
 Siiepard v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 117 
 
 N. Y. 442 195, 196, 
 
 Shepherd v. Evans, 9 Ind. 260 
 Sheppard v. Green (1896), 48 S. C. 
 165, 26 S. E. 224 340, 341, 
 
 V. Starke, 3 Munf. 29 
 V. Stevens, 2 S. W. Rep. 548 
 Sheridan v. Jackson, 72 N. Y. 170 
 
 V. Mayor, etc., 68 N. Y. 30 81 
 V. Nation (1900), 159 Mo. 27, 59 
 S. W. 972 
 Sherman v. Boehm, 13 Daly, 42 
 V. Hale, 76 Iowa, 383 
 V. Osborn, 8 Oreg. 66 
 V. Parish, 53 N. Y. 483 
 Sherod v. Ewell (1897), 104 la. 253, 
 
 73 N. W. 493 
 Sherrin v. Flinn (1900), 155 Ind. 422, 
 58 N. E. 549 466 
 
 Sherrit v. Birch, 3 Bra C. C. 229 
 Sherwood v. Saxton, 63 Mo. 78 
 Sliewalter v. Bergman, 123 Ind. 
 155 
 
 273, 
 ,413 
 
 90 
 326 
 
 703 
 598 
 283 
 
 811 
 
 872 
 627, 
 628 
 306 
 821 
 40 
 895, 
 920 
 
 290 
 
 598 
 
 599 
 927 
 
 151 
 
 756 
 230 
 
 910 
 
 642 
 920 
 
 932 
 
 781 
 
 242 
 
 160 
 
 462, 
 466 
 249 
 457 
 
 562, 
 609 
 
 i, 97 
 
 87 
 758 
 875 
 756 
 417 
 
 816 
 
 665 
 249 
 
 815 
 
 821 
 
 Shields v. Fuller, 4 Wis. 102 60 
 
 V. Jolinson County (1898), 144 
 
 Mo. 76, 47 8. W. 107 709 
 
 Sliigley i: Snyder, 45 Ind. 541 576 
 
 Shilling i\ Rominger, 4 Col. 100 666 
 
 Shipman v. Lansing, 25 Hun, 290 131 
 
 r. State, 43 Wis. 381 713 
 
 Shippen v. Kimball, 47 Kan. 173 326 
 
 Shipton r. Rawlins, 4 Hare, 019 3;'')2 
 
 Shirks. Mitchell (1893), 137 Ind. 185, 
 
 36 N. E. 850 670 
 
 V. Neible (1900), 156 Ind. GG, 59 
 
 N. E. 281 812 
 
 Shirley v. Jacobs, 7 C. & P. 3 761 
 
 V. Stephenson (1898), 104 Ky. 
 
 518, 47 S. W. 581 567 
 
 Shively v. Semi-Tropic Land Co. 
 
 (1893), 99 Cal. 259, 33 Pac. 848 664 
 
 Shockley v. Shockley, 20 Ind. 108 245 
 Shoemaker v. Goode"(1902), Neb., 92 
 
 N W. 629 681 
 
 V. Smith, 74 Ind. 71 942 
 
 Shore v. Smith, 15 Ohio St. 173 519 
 
 V. Taylor, 46 Ind. 345 662 
 
 Shorter v. Nelson, 4 Lans. 114 315 
 
 Shortle v. Terre Haute & I. Ry. Co., 
 
 131 Ind. 338 727 
 
 Shove V. Shove, 69 Wis. 425 310 
 
 Showalter v. Rickert (1902), 64 Kan. 
 
 82, 67 Pac. 454 678 
 
 Shrigley v. Black ( 1898), 59 Kan. 487, 
 
 53 Pac. 477 455 
 
 Shroeder v. Webster (1893), 88 la. 
 
 627, 55 N. W. 569 711 
 
 Shropshire v. Conrad, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 
 
 143 936 
 
 V. Ryan (1900), 111 la. 677, 82 
 
 N. W. 1035 656 
 
 Shuler v. Millsap's Ex., 71 N. C. 
 
 297 231 
 
 ShuII V. Arie (1901), 113 la. 170, 84 
 
 N. W. 1031 668 
 
 V. Barton (1898), 56 Neb. 718, 77 
 
 N. W. 132 216 
 
 I'. Barton (1899), 58 Neb. 741, 79 
 
 N. W. 732 216 
 
 V. Caughman (1898), 54 S. C. 
 
 203, 32 S. E. 301 179, 271 
 
 Shute V. Austin (1897), 120 N. C. 440, 
 
 27 S. E. 90 664 
 
 Sibila V. Bahney, 34 Ohio St. 399 618 
 Sichler v. Look, 93 Cal. 600 333 
 
 Sickels V. Pattison, 14 Wend. 257 842 
 
 Sickman i'. Wollett (1903), — Colo. 
 
 — , 71 Pac. 1107 452 
 
 Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. 
 Improvement Co. (1899), 
 20 Utah, 267, 58 Pac. 843 326, 
 330 
 V. South Ogden Land Co. (1899), 
 
 20 Utah, 267, 58 Pac. 843 245 
 Sidway v. Missouri Land, etc. Co. 
 (1901), 163 Mo. 342, 63 S W. 705 601, 
 
 603 
 Siedenboch u. Rilev, 111 N. Y. 560 780
 
 cxlviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Siesel r. Town of Liberty {1901), 111 
 
 Wis. 470, 87 N. W. 487 666 
 
 Siever r. Union Pac. Kv. Co. (1903), 
 
 — Neb. — . 93 N. W."943 235, 320 
 
 Sifton I-. Sifton (189ii), 5 N. D. 187, 
 
 05 N. \V. 670 787 
 
 Sigel Sell. Dir. v. Coe, 40 Wis. 103 117, 
 
 155 
 Sigmund ;•. Bank of Minot (1894), 
 
 4 N. D. 164, 59 N. W. 966 756 
 
 Siliiman i'. Tattle, 45 Barb. 171 115, 202 
 Silsbee r. Smith, 60 Barb. 372 348, 374 
 Silver v. Foster, 9 Kan. 56 290 
 
 Silvers v. Junction R. Co., 43 Ind. 
 
 435 658, 661, 725 
 
 Sim V. Hurst, 44 Ind. 579 189 
 
 Simar v. Canady, 53 N. Y. 298 187, 190, 
 
 227, 228, 496, 879 
 
 Simmons c. Eldridge, 29 How. Pr. 
 
 309 611 
 
 V. Law, 8 Bosw. 213 663 
 
 V. Sisson, 26 N. Y. 264 720, 754 
 
 v. Spencer, Fed. Rep. 581 300, 304 
 Simon r. Sabb (1899), 56 S. C 
 
 o3 S. E. 799 35, 329 
 
 Simonds v. East Windsor Elec 
 
 [tub eefeeexces aee to the pages.] 
 
 Skidmore c. Collier, 8 Hun, 50 
 
 720, 
 300, 
 . 38, 
 
 35, 
 Rv. 
 
 Co. (1900), 73 Conn. 513, 48 Atl. 
 210 
 Simons r. Fagan (1901), 62 Neb. 287, 
 
 87 N. W. 21 
 Simonton v. First Nat. Bk., 24 Minn. 
 
 216 
 Simpson v. McArthur, 16 Abb. Pr. 
 302 748, 
 
 V. Remington (1899), Idaho, 59 
 Pac. 360 
 Simpson Cent. Coll. v. Bryan, 50 
 
 Iowa, 293 
 Sims V. Bond, 5 B. & Ad. 389 116, 
 f. Clark (18'.»2), 91 Ga. 302, 18 
 
 S. E. 158 
 V. Goettle, 83 N. C. 268 
 V. McLure, 52 Ind. 267 
 V. Mutual Fire Ins. Co. (1899), 
 101 Wis. 586, 77 N. W. 908 
 Simson r. Brown, 68 N. Y. 355 
 
 V. Satterlee, 64 N. Y. 657 244, 
 Sintrer Mfg. Co. v. Potts (1894), 59 
 
 Minn. 240, 61 N. \V. 23 
 Singleton i:. O'Blenis, 125 Ind. 151 
 
 825 
 656 
 153 
 783 
 
 '•. Scott, 11 Iowa, 589 544, 
 
 Sinker v. Floyd, 104 Ind. 291 
 Siou.x City Sch. Dist. Tp. v. Pratt, 
 
 17 Iowa, 16 
 Sii)perly i-. Troy &, B. R. Co., 9 How. 
 
 Pr. 83 505, 
 
 Siskiyon Lumber Co. i'. Rostel 
 
 (1898). 121 Cal. 511, 53 Pac. 1118 
 Sisty V. Bebee, 4 Col. 52 
 Siter /;. Jcwett. 33 Cal. 92 736, 
 
 Sizer v. Millor, 9 Paige, 605 
 Skaggs r. CJiven, 29 Mo. App. 612 
 Skcllv V. W.-.rren (1903),— S. D. — , 
 
 94 X. W. 408 
 
 713 
 153 
 
 300 
 417 
 310 
 
 703 
 111 
 326 
 
 675 
 104, 
 
 576 
 568 
 104 
 
 270 
 
 ,660 
 
 594 
 55 
 834 
 342 
 930 
 
 923 
 
 104 
 
 646 
 596 
 
 206 
 862, 
 
 343, 372, 
 
 470 
 
 Skiff V. Cross, 21 Iowa, 459 209 
 
 Skinner r. Clute, 9 Nev. 342 662, 753 
 
 c. Skinner (1894), 38 Neb. 756, 
 
 57 N. W. 534 12, 25 
 
 Skobis V. Ferge (1899), 102 Wis. 122. 
 
 78 N. W. 426 
 Slater v. Estate of Cook (1893), 93 
 
 Wis. 104, 67 N. W. 15 
 Slatterv i'. Hall, 43 Cal. 191 
 Slaughter r. Davenport (1899), 151 
 
 Mo. 26, 51 S. W. 471 
 Slayback v. Jones, 9 Ind. 470 843 
 
 872, 881, 911, 9Iti 
 Sleeman r. Hotchkiss, 13 N. Y. Suppl. 
 
 98 637 
 
 Sleeper v. Goodwin, 07 Wis. 577 356 
 
 Sloan V. Hunter (1899), 56S.C. 385, 
 
 34 S. E. 658 341 
 
 1-. McDowell, 71 N. C. 356 878, 879 
 V. N. Y. C. R. Co., 4 N. Y. Sup. 
 
 Ct. 135 225 
 
 r. Railway Co. (1902), 64 S. C. 
 
 .389, 42 S. E. 197 466, 712 
 
 v. Rose (1899), 101 AVis. 523, 77 
 
 N. W. 895 
 V. Thomas (1899), 58 Neb. 713, 
 79 N. W. 728 
 Sloane i-. Southern Cal. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1896), 111 Cal. 668, 44 Pac. 320 
 Slocum V. Barry, .34 How. Pr. 320 
 Sloman i: Sclimidt, 8 Abb. Pr. 5 
 Slone V. Slone, 2 Met. .339 
 Slutts V. Chafee, 48 Wis. 617 
 Sly V. Palo Alto Mining Co. (1902), 
 
 28 Wa.-^h. 485, 68 Pac. 871 
 Small V. Atwood, 1 Younge, 458 2.39, 512 
 V. Cohen (1897), 102 Ga.248, 29 
 
 S. E. 430 822 
 
 V. Kennedy (1893), 137 Ind. 299, 
 
 .33 N. E. 674 867 
 
 i: Lutz (1899), 34 Ore. 131, 55 
 
 Pac. 529 18 
 
 V. Robinson, 9 Hun, 418 212, 649 
 
 V. Sandall (1896), 48 Neb. 318, 
 
 67 N. W. 156 680, 681 
 
 Smart v. Bradstock, 7 Beav. 500 254 
 
 Smead v. Chrisfiold, 1 Disney, 18 913, 935 
 Sinelker v. Chicago & Northwestern 
 R. Co. (lyOO), 106 Wis. 135, 81 
 N. W. 994 
 Smctters ;•. Rainey, 14 Ohio St. 247 
 Smiley t: Dewcese, 1 Ind. App. 211 
 
 866 
 
 332 
 
 7.57 
 153 
 584 
 921 
 027 
 
 714 
 
 470 
 270 
 470, 
 476 
 315 
 
 Smith >: Allen, 1 Lans. 101 
 
 V. Allen (1901), 63 Neb. 74, 88 
 
 N. W. 1.55 731, 757, 942, 946 
 
 V. Atkinson (1893), 18 Colo. 255, 
 
 .32 Pac. 425 103 
 
 V. Barron Cy. Sup., 45 Wis. 686 609 
 r. Bodine, 74 N. Y. .30 38 
 
 V. Bolden, 33 Beav. 262 253 
 
 V. Bowers (1902), Neb., 89 N. W. 
 
 590 796
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxlix 
 
 [the refebences are to the pages.] 
 
 Smith r. Bradstreet (1902), 63 S. C. 
 
 525, 41 S. E. 7G3 599 
 
 V. Brockett (1897), 69 Conn. 
 
 492, 38 Atl. 57 781 
 
 V. Building, etc. Ass'n (1895), 
 
 116 N. C. 102, 21 S. E. 33 614 
 i;. Building Ass'n (1896), 119 
 
 N. C. 257, 26 S. E. 401 845, 908, 
 920, 925 
 V. Buttner, 90 Cal. 95 575 
 
 V. Champion (1897), 102 Ga. 92, 
 
 29 S. E. 160 757 
 
 V. Chicago & N. W. K. Co., 23 
 
 Wis. 267 102 
 
 V. Citv of St. Paul (1896), 65 
 
 Minn. 295, 68 N. W. 32 422 
 
 V. Citv of Sioux City (1903), 119 
 
 la. 50, 03 N. W. 81 638 
 
 V. Coe (1902), 170 N. Y. 162, 63 
 
 N. E. 57 735, 744, 863 
 
 V. Columbia Jewelry Co. (1901), 
 
 114 Ga. 698, 40S. E. 735 641 
 V. Continental Ins. Co. (1899), 
 
 108 la. 382, 79 N. W. 129 817 
 V. Countryman, 30 N. Y. 655 611 
 
 V. Daw ley (1894), 92 la. 312, 60 
 
 N. W. 625 853, 871 
 
 ?;. Day (1901), 39 Ore. 531, 65 
 
 Pac. 1055 303, 456, 498, 819, 820 
 V. Den man, 48 Ind. 65 748 
 
 V. Dennett, 15 Minn. 81 596, 598, 599 
 V. Des Moines Nat. Banlc (1899), 
 
 107 la. 620, 78 N. W. 238 685 
 V. Diamond (1893). 86 Wis. 359, 
 
 56 N. W. 922 870 
 
 V. Dickinson (1898), 100 Wis. 
 
 574, 76 X. W. 766 259, 355, 887 
 V. Dohertv (1901), 109 Ky. 616, 
 
 60 S. W. 380 832, 833 
 
 V. Douglass, 15 Abb. Pr. 266 660 
 
 V. Dragert, 60 Wis. 139 823 
 
 V. Dunning, 61 N. Y. 249 315, 316 
 V. Estey Organ Co. (1897), 100 
 
 Ga. 628, 28 S. E. 392 790 
 
 V. Felton, 85 Ind. 223 
 V. Felton, 43 N. Y. 419 102, 133, 869 
 V. Fife, 2 Neb. 10 916 
 
 V. Fox, 48 N. Y. 674 132 
 
 V. Freeman, 71 Ind. 229 598 
 
 V. Gale, 12 Super. Ct. 674 426, 428 
 V. Griswold (1895), 95 la. 684, 
 
 64 N. W. 624 703 
 
 V. Hall, 67 N. Y. 48 784, 806, 894, 
 
 918 
 V. Holmes, 19 N. Y. 271 815 
 
 V. Jones, 18 Neb. 421 254 
 
 V. Jones (1902), — S. D. — , 92 
 
 N. W. 1084 456 
 
 V. Kaufman (1895), 3 Okla. 568, 
 
 41 Pac. 722 565, 566 
 
 V. Kennett, 18 Mo. 154 99 
 
 V. Kibling (1897), 97 Wis. 205, 
 
 72 N, W. 869 711, 713, 714 
 
 V. L. & N. R. R. Co. (1893), 95 
 
 Kv. 11, 28 S. W. 652 702 
 
 Smith V. Lisher, 23 Ind. .500 798 
 
 y. Long, 12 Abb. N. Cas. 113 120 
 
 r. Martin (1901), 135 Cal. 247, 
 
 67 Pac. 779 
 V. Mason (1895), 44 Neb. 610, 63 
 
 N. W. 41 
 V. McCarthy, 39 Kan. 308 
 f. Meyers (1898), 54 Neb. 1, 74 
 
 N. W. 277 
 V. Moberlv, 15 B. Mon. 70 
 I'. Moim, 87 Cal. 489 
 V. Moore, 49 Ark. 100 
 V. Nelson, 62 N. Y. 286 
 V. Orser, 43 Barb. 187 
 v. Peckham, 39 Wis. 414 
 V. Pedigo (1896), 145 Ind 
 
 33 N. E. 777 
 V. Phelan (1894), 40 Neb. 765, 
 
 59 N. W. 562 
 V. Pinnell (1895), 143 Ind. 485, 
 
 40 N. E. 798 
 V. Portland, 30 Fed. Rep. 734 
 V. Prior (1894), 58 Minn. 247, 
 
 59 N. W. 1016 
 V. Putnam (1900), 107 Wis. 155, 
 
 82 N. W. 1077 
 V. Rodecap, 31 N. E. Rep. 479 
 V. Rowe, 4 Cal. 6 
 V. Runnels a896), 97 la. 55, 65 
 
 N. W. 1002 
 V. St. Joseph, 55 Mo. 456 228, 229 
 V. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. (1899), 
 
 151 Mo. 391, 52 S. W. 378 
 V. Schibel, 19 Mo. 140 
 V. Schulting, 14 Hun, 52 
 V. Security Co. (1899), 8 N. D. 
 
 451, 79 X. W. 981 96, 
 
 V. Smith, 80 Cal. 323 
 V. Smith, 33 Mo. 557 
 V. Smith (1897), 50 S. C. 54, 27 
 
 S. E. 545 462, 559, 610 
 
 V. Snow, 3 Madd. 10 249, 250, 512 
 
 819 
 
 678 
 936 
 
 612 
 
 42, 53 
 
 576 
 
 379 
 
 575 
 
 457, 495 
 
 181, 801 
 
 361, 
 
 800 
 
 615 
 
 712 
 253 
 
 639 
 
 452 
 
 798 
 
 11 
 
 623 
 
 354 
 
 89 
 
 260 
 
 714 
 
 782 
 66 
 
 V. Spingler, 83 Mo. 408 
 
 V. Steinkamper, 16 Mo. 150 
 
 V. Summerfield, 108 N. C. 284 
 
 v. Theot)nld, 86 Kv. 141 
 
 V. Usher (189:);, 108 Ga. 2.31, 33 
 
 S. E. 876 
 V. Van Osrrand, 64 N. Y. 278 
 V. Waite (1894), 103 Cal. 372, 37 
 
 Pac. 232 
 V. Wall, 12 Colo. 363 
 V. Watson, 2 B. & C. 401 
 V. Weaee, 21 Wis. 440 
 V. Wells, 20 How. Pr. 158 
 V. West's Ex., 5 Litt. 48 
 V. Wetmore (1901), 167 N. Y. 
 
 234, 60 N. E. 419 
 I'. Whitney, 22 Wis. 438 
 V. Wis. Inv. Co. (1902), 114 Wis. 
 
 151, 89 N. W. 829 
 V. Young, 109 N. C. 224 
 Smith-McCord Drv-Goods Co. ' v. 
 Burke (1901), 63 Kan. 740, 66 Pac. 
 1036 
 
 132 
 935 
 611 
 783 
 
 708 
 219 
 
 676 
 911 
 877 
 415 
 831 
 245 
 
 643 
 636 
 
 685 
 936 
 
 200
 
 cl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the reperesces are to the pages.] 
 
 Smithies v. Harrison, 1 Ld. Raym. 
 
 727 761 
 
 Smock V. Carter (1897), 6 Okla. 300, 
 
 50 Tac. -iG'i 642 
 
 r. Harrison, 74 Ind. 348 610 
 
 Smvthe i: Brown, lio S. C. 89 331 
 
 ' r. Scott, 100 Ind. 245 084 
 
 Snapp f. Stanwood (1898), 65 Ark. 
 
 222, 45 S. \V. 546 584, 585 
 
 Snedager c. Kincaid (1901), Ky., 60 
 
 S. W. ry2-2 233 
 
 Siiell r. Harrison (1895), 131 Mo. 495, 
 
 32 S. W. 37 141 
 
 Suidcr r. Adams Exp. Co., 77 Mo. 
 
 533 149, 153 
 
 1-. Newell (1903), 132 N. C. 614, 
 
 44 S. E. 354 220, 086 
 
 Snook r. Cit}' of Anaconda (1901), 
 
 20 Mont. 128, 60 Pac. 756 673 
 
 Snow ,.'. Holmes, 71 Cal. 42 910 
 
 *-. Howard, 35 Barb. 55 298 
 
 V. Rich (1900), 22 Utah, 123, 61 
 
 Pac. 336 822 
 
 Snowden /•. Waterman (1897), 100 
 
 Ga. 588, 28 S. E. 121 625 
 
 V. Wilas, 19 Ind. 10 596, 718, 815 
 
 Snyder v. Baber, 74 Ind. 47 598 
 
 V. Johnson (1903), — Neb. — , 95 
 
 N. \V. 692 703 
 
 V. Parker, 19 Wash. 276 (53 Pac. 
 
 59, 67 Am. St. Rep. 726) 926 
 
 V. Pliillips, m Iowa, 481 103 
 
 Societa Italiana r. Snlzer (1893), 138 
 
 N. Y. 468, 34 N. E. 193 830 
 
 Solder v. Williams, 1 Curtis, 479 255 
 
 Solm V. Marion, etc. Co., 73 Ind. 78 667 
 Solomon c. Bates (1896), 118 N. C. 
 
 311, 24 S. E. 746 452, 493 
 
 Solt V. Anilerson (1901), 62 Neb. 153, 
 
 86 N. W. 1076 702 
 
 >: Anderson (1902), 63 Neb. 734, 
 
 89 N. W. 306 614 
 
 V. Anderson (1903), — Neb. —, 
 
 93 X. W. 205 614 
 
 Somerset v. Banking Co. (1900), 109 
 
 Ky. 549, 60 S. W. 5 934 
 
 Sopris r. Truax. 1 Colo. 89 780, 805 
 
 Sorensen r. Sorensen (1903),— Neb. 
 
 — , 94 N. W. 540 744 
 
 Sortore v. Scott, fi Eans. 271 201, 472 
 
 Soule V. Mop!x, 35 Ilun. 79 202 
 
 Sourse v. Marshall. 23 Ind. 194 392 
 
 Southal r. Shields, 81 N. C. 28 372, 412 
 Southard '• Sutton, 68 Me. 575 246 
 
 South Bend v. Turner (1900), 156 
 
 Ind. 418, 60 N. E. 271 603, 005 
 
 South Bend Chilled Plow Co. c 
 Gr-orpe C. Cribh Co. (1900), 
 105 Wis. 443, 81 N. W. 675 15, 
 461. 467,408.511 
 r. Geo. C. Cribb Co. (1897), 97 
 
 Wis. 230, 72 X. W. 749 592 
 
 South Varolina, etc R. R. Co. r. 
 Auunmta R. R. Co. (1900), 111 Ga. 
 420, :i6 S. E. 593 30 
 
 South Milwaukee Boulevard Co. v. 
 
 Ilartc (1897), 95 Wis. 592, 70 
 
 N. W. 821 
 
 South Milwaukee Co. v. Murphy 
 
 (1902), 112 Wis. 614. 88 N. W. 583 
 
 South Omaha r. Cunningham, 31 
 
 Neb. 316 
 South Portland Land Co. v. Munger 
 
 (1900), 36 Ore. 457. 00 Pac. 5 
 South Side Ass'n v. Cutler, etc. Co., 
 
 04 Ind. 560 
 Southern Kan. Farm, etc. Co. r. 
 Barnes (1901), 63 Kan. 548, 66 
 Pac. 638 
 Southern Kansas Rv. Co. v. Gritlith 
 
 (1894), 54 Kan. 428, 38 Pac. 478 
 Southern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Turnley 
 
 (1896), 100 Ga. 200, 27 S. E. 975 
 Southern Pac. R. U. Co. c. Pixley 
 (1894), 103 Cal. 118, 37 
 Pac. 194 
 V. Terry, 70 Cal. 484 
 Southern Rv. Co. i\ Covenia(1896), 
 10(J Ga. 40. 29 S. E. 219 
 V. Dyson (1899), 109 Ga. 103, 
 
 34 S. E. 997 
 V. Marshall (1901), 111 Ky. 560, 
 
 64 S. W. 418 
 V. O'Brvan (1900), 112 Ga. 127, 
 37 S. E. 161 
 Southey v. Dowling (1898), 70 Conn. 
 
 153, 39 Atl. 113 
 Southward v. Jamison (1902), 66 
 
 Ohio St. 290, 64 N. E. 135 
 Southwick V. First Nat. Bank of 
 
 Memphis, 84 N. Y. 420 
 Sowards V. Moss (1899), 58 Neb. 
 
 119, 78 N. W. 373 
 Sowin V. Pease (1895), 6 Wyo. 91, 
 
 42 Pac. 750 
 Spalir r. Nicklaus. 51 Ind. 221 
 Spalding r. Alexander, 6 Bush, 160 
 V. AUred (1901), 2:3 Utah, 354, 
 
 64 Pac. 1100 
 V. Black, 22 Kan. 55 
 f. Murphv (1901), 03 Nib. 401, 
 
 88 N. W. 489 
 V. St. Joseph's School (1899), 
 107 Ky. .382, 54 S. W. 200 
 Spaiti r. Blunier (1894), 56 Minn. 
 
 523, 58 X. W. 156 
 Spanish Fork City i'. Hopper, 26 
 Pac. Rep. 293 196 
 
 Spargur v. Romine (1893), 38 Neb. 
 
 736, 57 N. W. 523 
 Sparks v. Heritage, 45 Ind. 06 748, 
 
 !•. Nat. Accident Ass'n (1896), 
 100 la. 458, 69 N. W. 678 
 
 Sparling i\ Conway, 75 Mo. 510 
 Sparman r. Keim. 83 N. Y. 245 75, 
 Sparrow v Rlioadcs, 70 Cal. 208 
 Spaulding r. C. St. P. & K. G. Rv. 
 Co. (1896), 98 la. 205,67 N.W. 227 
 
 830 
 543 
 778 
 43 
 515 
 
 787 
 614 
 543 
 
 867 
 51 
 
 709 
 
 684 
 
 206 
 
 683 
 
 814 
 
 943 
 
 620 
 
 686 
 
 640 
 517 
 
 886 
 
 789 
 202 
 
 422 
 
 821 
 
 337 
 
 ,823 
 
 594 
 779, 
 780 
 
 671, 
 814 
 
 783 
 627 
 
 782 
 
 625
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cil 
 
 [the references are to tbe paoes.] 
 
 Spauldiiict V, Xorlli Milwaukee Town 
 Site Co. (1900), 100 Wis. 481, 81 
 N. VV. 1064 302 
 
 Spaur V. McBee, 19 Oreg. 76 820 
 
 Spears r. Ward, 48 Ind. 541 659 
 
 Specht V. Allen, 12 Oreg. 117 790 
 
 Spect V. Spect, 88 Cal. 437 49 
 
 Speer v. Bishop, 24 Ohio St. 598 618 
 
 V. Crawter, 2 Meriv. 410 243 
 
 Spence v. Hogg, 1 Coll. 225 256, 359 
 
 V. Spence, 17 Wis. 448 718 
 
 Spencer v. Babcock, 22 Barb. 326 872 
 V. Johnston (1899), 58 Neb. 44, 
 
 78 N. W. 482 815, 931, 934 
 
 V. Papach (1897), 103 la. 513, 
 
 70 N. W. 748, 72 N. W. 665 816 
 I'. Society of Shakers (1901), 
 
 Ky., 64 S. W. 468 833 
 
 V. Turney (1897) 5 Okla. 683, 
 
 49 Pac. 1012 741, 753 
 
 Speyer v. Ihmels, 21 Cal. 280 428 
 
 Speyers i-. Fisk,6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 197 293, 
 
 299 
 Spicer v. Hunter, 14 Abb. Pr. 4 342, 343 
 Spiers v. Duane, 54 Cal. 176 713 
 
 Spink V. McCall, 52 Iowa, 432 637 
 
 Spinners v. Brett, 38 Wis. 648 635, 637 
 Spires v. South Bound R. R. Co. 
 
 a896), 47 S. C. 28, 24 S. E. 992 600 
 Sp'offord V. Rowan, 124 N. Y. 108 878 
 Spokane & Idaho Lumber Co. v. 
 Boyd (1902), 28 Wash. 90, 68 
 Pac. 337 
 Spooner v. Keeler, 51 N. Y. 527 
 
 V. Ross, 24 Mo. App. 599 
 Spousenberger v. Lemert, 23 Kan. 
 
 55 
 Spragg V. Binkes, 5 Ves. 587 
 Sprague v. lioonev, 104 Mo. 360 
 
 V. Wells, 47 Minn. 504 
 Sprigg V. Am. Cent. Ins. Co. (1897), 
 
 101 Ky. 185, 40 S. W. 575 
 Springer v. Cabell, 10 Mo. 640 
 V. Clay Cy., 35 Iowa, 241 
 V. Dwyer, 50 N. Y. 19 831, 
 
 V. Kleinsorge, 83 Mo. 152 
 V. Vanderpool, 4 p:dw. Ch. 362 
 Springfield n. Weaver (1896), 137 
 
 Mo. 650, 37 S. W. 509 
 Springfield, etc. Co. v. Donovan 
 (1899), 147 Mo. 622, 49 S. W. 500 
 
 Springs v. Southern Ry. Co. (1902), 
 
 130 N. C. 186, 41 S. E. 100 
 Springsteed v. Lawson, 14 Abb. Pr. 
 
 328 
 Spurlock V. Mo. Pac. Rv. Co. (1894), 
 
 125 Mo. 404, 28 S. W'. 634 
 Squires v. Seward, 16 How. Pr. 478 
 Srader v. Srader (1898), 151 Ind. 339 
 
 51 N. E. 479 
 Stack V. Beach, 74 Ind. 571 
 Stadler v. First Nat. Bank (1899), 
 
 22 Mont. 190, 56 Pac. Ill 131, 
 
 133, 
 
 106 
 797 
 200 
 
 915 
 254 
 811 
 206 
 
 734 
 6(5 
 821 
 870 
 783 
 348 
 
 102 
 
 32, 
 718 
 
 674 
 
 521 
 
 643 
 
 806 
 
 675 
 562 
 
 132, 
 134 
 
 Stadler v. Parmelee, 10 Iowa, 23 936 
 
 Stafibrd v. London, 1 P. Wms. 428 242 
 V. Nutt, 51 Ind. 535 277, 769, 801 
 Stalm V. Catawba Mills (1898), 53 
 
 S. C. 519, 31 S. E. 498 602, 830 
 
 Stair V. Cragin, 24 Ilun, 177 736 
 
 Stalcup V. Garner, 26 Mo. 72 504 
 
 Staley v. Ilousel, 52 N. W. Rep. 288 780 
 
 V. Ivory, 65 Mo. 74 791 
 Stall c. Wilbur, 77 N. Y. 158 199, 200,202 
 
 Stanberry v. Smy the, 13 ( )hi<) St. 495 935 
 
 Stanbrough v. Daniels, 77 Iowa, 561 333 
 Standard Oil Co. v. Hoese (1899), 57 
 
 Neb. 665, 78 N. W. 292 709 
 Standard Sewing Mach. Co. v. Henry 
 
 (1894), 43 S. C. 17, 20 S. E. 790 785, 
 
 788 
 
 Standish v. Dow, 21 Iowa, 363 325, 334 
 
 Stanford v. Davis, 54 Ind. 45 661 
 
 V. Stanford, 42 Ind. 485 309 
 
 Stanley v. Foote et a/. (1900), 9 Wyo. 
 
 335, 63 Pac. 940 418 
 
 V. Mather, 31 Fed. Rep. 860 329 
 
 Stansfield v. Hobson, 16 Beav. 189 244 
 Stanton v. Kenrick (1893), 135 Ind. 
 
 382, 35 N. E. 19 684 
 Stapleton v. Ewell (1900), Ky., 55 
 
 S. W. 917 702 
 Starbird v. Cranston (1897), 24 Colo. 
 
 20, 48 Pac. 650 108 
 
 Starbuck v. Dunklee, 10 Minn. 173 728 
 
 Stariha v. Greenwood, 28 Minn. 521 112 
 Stark V. Publishers, etc. Co. (1901), 
 
 160 Mo. 529, 61 S. W. 669 806 
 
 V. Wellman, 96 Cal. 400 522 
 
 Starr v. Cragin, 24 Hun, 177 753 
 Starr Cash Car Co. v. Reinhardt, 20 
 
 N. Y. Suppl. 872 649, 936 
 
 State V. Bailey, 7 Iowa, 390 118 
 I'. Bank of Commerce (1900), 61 
 
 Neb 22, 85 N. W. 43 655 
 
 V. Bartlett, 68 Mo. 581 609 
 
 V. Beckner, 26 N. E. Rep. 553 806 
 
 V. Boone, 108 N. C. 78 667 
 
 V. Cason, 11 S. C. 392 609 
 V. Casper (1903), — Ind. — , 67 
 
 N. E. 185 378 
 
 V. Cent. Pac. R. Co , 9 Nev. 79 792 
 
 V. Chamberlin, 54 Mo. 338 787 
 V. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. (1893), 
 
 4 S. D. 261, 56 N. W. 894 G74 
 
 V. Cy. Judge, 7 Iowa, 186 118 
 V. Jacksonville P. & M. R. Co , 
 
 15 Fla. 201 279, 321 
 
 V. .Johnson, 52 Ind. 197 88, 104 
 V. Krause (1897), 58 Kan. 651, 
 
 50 Pac. 882 444, 498, 639 
 
 V. Kruttschnitt, 4 Nev. 178 502 
 V. Lorenz (1900), 22 Wash. 289, 
 
 60 Pac. 644 639 
 V. McDonald (1805), 4 Idaho, 
 
 343, 40 Pac. 312 298, 670 
 
 V. Mclntire, 58 Iowa, 572 820 
 V. Marshall Cy. Judge, 7 Iowa, 
 
 186 118
 
 clii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [IHE REFERENCES ARE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 State V. Meagher, 44 Mo. 356 55 
 
 V. Milwaukee L. S. & W. Ry. 
 
 Co., 44 Wis. 579 659 
 
 V. Moore, 10 Mo. 369 151 
 
 I'. Moores ( 1897), 52 Neb. 770, 73 
 
 N. W. 299 709 
 
 V. Newlin, 69 Ind. 108 713 
 
 V. Nortli. Belle Min. Co., 15 Neb. 
 
 385 597 
 
 V. Ohio Oil Co. (1897), 150 Ind. 
 
 21, 49 N. E. 809 180 
 
 V. Orwig, 34 Iowa, 112 283, 285 
 
 r. Owslev (1895), 17 Mont. 94, 
 
 42 Pac. 105 686 
 
 V. Pac. Brewing Co. (1899), 21 
 
 Wasli. 451, 58 Pac. 584 217 
 
 V. Porter (lOOy), — Neb. — , 95 
 
 N. W. 769 709 
 
 V. Ramsey (1897), 50 Neb. 166, 
 
 69 N. W. 758 565 
 
 V. Red River, etc. Co. (1897), 69 
 
 Minn. 121, 72 N. W. 60 354 
 
 i>. Russell, 5 Neb. 211 736 
 
 V. Satiingtun, 68 Mo. 454 178 
 
 V. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. (1894), 
 
 125 Mo. 596, 28 S. W. 
 
 1074 107 
 
 V. Stratton, 19 S. W. Rep. 803 203 
 V. Tittmann, li>3 Mo. 553 455 
 
 V. True, 25 Mo. App. 451 202 
 
 V. Williams, 48 Mo. 210 813 
 
 V. Y. J. S. M. Co., 14 Nev. 220 658 
 State ex inf. v. Firemen's Fund 
 Ins. Co. (1899), 152 Mo. 1, 52 
 S. W. 595 832 
 
 State ex rd. v. Adams (1901), 161 
 
 Mo. 349, 61 S. W. 894 730 
 
 V. Aloe (1899), 152 Mo. 466, 54 
 
 S. W. 494 709 
 
 i;. Archibald (1894), 52 0. St. 1, 
 
 38 N. E. 314 709 
 
 r. Bradlev (1901), 10 N. D. 157, 
 
 86 N." W. 354 217 
 
 V. Butte Water Co. (1896), 18 
 
 Mont. 199, 44 Pac. 966 730 
 
 V. City of Pierre (1902), 15 S. D. 
 
 559, 90 N. W. 1047 751 
 
 f. Coolev (1894), 58 Minn. 514, 
 
 60 N. W. 338 602 
 
 V. Cornell (1897), 52 Neb. 25, 71 
 
 N. W. 961 710 
 
 V. Dickerman (1895), 16 Mont. 
 
 278, 40 Pac. 698 013 
 
 V. Fleming (1898), 147 Mo. 1, 44 
 
 S. W. 758 612 
 
 V. Fraker (1901), 106 Mo. 130, 
 
 05 S. W. 720 217 
 
 V. Halter (1897), 149 Ind. 292, 47 
 
 N. E. 605 710 
 
 V. Helms (1898), 101 Wis. 280, 
 
 77 N. W. 194 8, 72 
 
 V. Hickman (18tt9), 150 Mo. 626, 
 
 51 S. W. 680 343 
 
 V. Holmes (1900), 60 Neb. .39,82 
 
 N. W. 109 421 
 
 State ex rel. v. Ilorton Land and 
 Lumber Co. (1001), 161 Mo. 
 664, 61 S. W. 869 477, 665 
 
 r. Indemnity Ass'n (1898), 18 
 
 Wash. 514, 52 Pac. 234 606 
 
 V. Jackson (1895), 142 Ind. 259, 
 
 41 N. E. 534 645 
 V. Jeter (1901), 59 S. C. 483, 38 
 
 S. E. 124 599 
 
 V. King (1894), 6 S. D. 297, 60 
 
 N. W. 75 788 
 
 V. Mack (1902), 20 Nev. 85, 69 
 
 Pac. 862 421 
 
 V. Merchants' Bank (1901), 160 
 
 Mo. 640, 61 S. W. 676 602 
 
 V. Metschan (1896), 32 Ore. 372, 
 
 46 Pac. 791 271, 320 
 V. Moores (1899), 58 Neb. 285, 78 
 
 N. W. 529 181, 605 
 
 r. Mount (1808), 151 Ind. 679, 
 
 51N. E. 417 217 
 
 V. Osborn (1895), 143 Ind. 071, 
 
 42 N. E. 921 744 
 1-. Osborn (1900), 60 Neb. 415, 
 
 83 N. W. 357 565 
 
 V. Parsons (1896), 147 Ind. 579, 
 
 47 N. E. 17 822 
 V. Peckham (1893), 136 Ind. 198, 
 
 36 N. E. 28 521 
 
 V. Peterson (1897), 142 Mo. 526, 
 
 89 S. W. 453 801, 802 
 
 V. Renshaw (1902), 166 Mo. 682, 
 
 66 S. W. 953 593 
 
 V. Sandford (1894), 127 Mo. 368, 
 
 30 S. W. 112 117 
 
 V. Stuht (1808), 52 Neb. 209, 71 
 
 N. W. 941 709 
 
 V. Superior Court (1894), 9 
 
 Wash. 366, 37 Pac. 454 638 
 
 V. Thompson (1899), 149 Mo. 
 
 441, 51 S. W. 98 605 
 
 V. Thum (1898), Idaho, 55 Pac. 
 
 V. Tittmann (1896), 134 Mo. 162, 
 
 35 S. W. 579 
 V. Tooker (1806), 18 Mont. 540, 
 
 46 Pac. 530 
 V. Withrow (1000), 154 Mo. 397, 
 
 55 S. W. 400 
 V. Wood (1900), 155 Mo. 425, 56 
 S. W. 474 
 State Bank v. Felt (1896), 99 la. 532, 
 68 N. W. 818 
 V. Kellv (1890), 109 la. 544, 80 
 
 N.'W. 520 
 V. Showers (1902), — Kan. — , 
 70 Pac. 332 
 State Nat. Bank v. Smith (1898), 55 
 
 Neb. 54, 75 N. W. 51 
 Staten Island, etc. Rv. Co. r. Hinch- 
 liffe (1902), 170 N.'Y. 473,63 N. E. 
 545 
 Stauback v. Rexford, 2 Mont. Ty. 505 
 Steadman v. Guthrie, 4 Met. (Ky.) 
 147 
 
 663 
 670 
 665 
 709 
 566 
 675 
 804 
 613 
 312 
 
 793 
 
 784 
 
 212
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED, 
 
 cliii 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Stearns r. Martin, 4 Cal. 227 881 
 
 Stebbins v. Goldtlnvaite, 31 Ind. 159 786 
 V. Lardner, 48 N. W. Rep. 847 831 
 Stack V. a. F. & I. Co. (1894), 142 
 
 N. Y. 236, ;]7 X. E. 1 840, 845 
 
 Stedinan v. City of Berlin (1897), 97 
 
 Wis. 505, 73 N. W. 57 708 
 
 Steed V. Savage (1902), 115 Ga. 97, 
 
 41 S. E. 272 39, 666, 667 
 
 Steele v. Etlieridge, 15 Minn. 501 852 
 
 Steele Lumber Co. i'. Laurens Lum- 
 ber Co. (1896), 98 Ga. 329, 24 S. E. 
 755 356 
 
 Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry. 
 Co. (1890), 64 Minn. 216, 66 
 N. W. 723 712 
 
 V. Waterbury (1893), 52 Minn. 
 
 211, 53 N. W. 1146 832, 833 
 
 Steeple v. Downing, 60 Ind. 478 119, 784 
 Steffes V. Lemke, 40 Minn. 27 402 
 
 Stehman v. Crull, 26 Ind. 436 63 
 
 Steidl V. State (1902), 63 Neb. 695, 
 
 88 N. VV. 853 669 
 
 Steinbach v. Prudential Ins. Co. 
 (1902), 172 N. Y. 471, 65 N. E. 
 281 271, 274, 318, 375, 413, 417, 473 
 Steinhart v. Pitcher, 20 Minn. 102 915 
 Steinmann v. Strimple, 29 Mo. App. 
 
 478 375 
 
 Stelling V. Grabowski, 19 N. Y. 
 
 Suppl. 280 178 
 
 Stembridge v. Southern Ry. Co. 
 
 (1903), — S.C. — , 43 S. E. 968 689 
 Stenberg v. State (1896), 48 Neb. 
 
 299, 67 N. W. 190 888 
 
 Stendal v. Boyd (1897), 67 Minn. 
 
 279, 69 N. W. 899 682 
 
 Stengel v. Boyce, 143 Ind. 642 690 
 
 Stepank v. Kula, 36 Iowa, 563 216, 227 
 Stephens v. Am. Fire Ins. Co. (1896), 
 
 14 Utah, 265, 47 Pac. 83 543 
 
 V. Harding (1896), 48 Neb. 659, 
 
 C7 N. W. 746 20, 179 
 
 V. Magor, 25 Wis. 533 475 
 
 V. Spokane (1895), 11 Wash. 41, 
 
 39 Pac. 266 567, 568 
 
 V. Union Assurance Co. (1897), 
 
 16 Utah, 22, 50 Pac. 626 689 
 
 Stephenson v. Ballard, 50 Ind. 176 576, 
 
 578, 581 
 V. Bankers' Life Ass'n (1899), 
 
 108 la. 637, 79 N. W. 459 816 
 V. Southern Pac. Co. (1894), 102 
 
 Cal. 143, 36 Pac. 407 681, 682 
 Sterling v. Smith (1893), 97 Cal. 
 
 343, 32 Pac. 320 702 
 
 V. Sterling (1903), 43 Ore. 200, 
 
 72 Pac. 741 685 
 
 Stern v. City of St. Louis (1901), 161 
 
 Mo. 146, 61 S. W. 594 625 
 
 V. Katz, 38 Wis. 136 576 
 
 Stern Auction, etc. Co. v. Mason, 16 
 
 Mo. App. 473 780, 805 
 
 Sternberger v.' McGovern, 56 N. Y. 
 12 35, 36, 475 
 
 Sterrett ;•. Barker (1897), 119 Cal. 
 
 492, 51 Pac. 695 353 
 
 Stetler v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 
 
 49 Wis. 609 609 
 
 Stetson V. Briggs (1896), 114 Cal. 
 
 511,46 I'ac. 603 730 
 
 Stevens v. Baker, 1 Wash. 315 66 
 
 V. Bosch, 54 N. J. Eq. 59, 33 
 
 Atl. 293 509 
 
 V. Brooks, 23 Wis. 196 389, 391, 393, 
 
 633 
 V. Campbell. 21 Ind. 471 326, 327 
 V. Chance, 47 Iowa, 602 520, 526 
 
 r. Cumin (1903), 28 Mont. 366, 
 
 72 Pac. 753 674 
 
 V. Flannagan, 30 N. E. Rep. 898 110 
 V. Home Savings Ass'n (1897), 
 
 Idaho, 51 Pac. 779 940 
 
 V. Mayor, etc., 84 N. Y. 296 15, 29, 
 
 og 
 
 V. South Ogden Land Co. (1896), 
 
 14 Utah, 232, 47 Pac. 81 302 
 
 r. Thompson, 5 Kan. 305 801, 803 
 Stevenson v. Flournov, 89 Ky. 561 756 
 I'. Matteson (1893), 13 Mont. 
 
 108, 32 Pac. 291 341 
 
 V. Polk, 71 Iowa. 278 364 
 
 Stewart v. Am. Ex. Bank (1898), 54 
 
 Neb. 461, 74 N. W. 865 735 
 
 V. Anderson (1900), 111 la. 329, 
 
 82 N. W. 770 568 
 
 V. Beale, 7 Hun, 405 260 
 
 V. Beck, 90 Ind. 458 815 
 
 V. Bole (1901), 61 Neb. 193, 85 
 
 N. W. 33 599 
 
 V. Brown, 37 N. Y. 350 202 
 
 V. Carter, 4 Neb. 564 29, 470 
 
 V. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 17 
 
 Minn. 372 386, 388 
 
 I'. Gregory, Carter & Co. (1900), 
 
 9 N. D. 618, 84 N. W. 553 152 
 V. Hoag, 12 ( )hio St. 623 782, 807 
 V. Price (1902), 64 Kan. 191, 67 
 
 Pac. 553 91, 98 
 
 V. Rusengren (1902), — Neb. — , 
 
 92 N. W. 586 444, 498 
 
 V. Spaulding, 72 Cal. 264 103 
 
 V. Walterboro Ry. Co. (1902), 
 
 64 S. C. 92, 41 S. E. 827 642 
 
 Stich V. Dickinson, 38 Cal. 608 425 
 
 Stiles V. City of Guthrie (1895), 3 
 Okla. 2G, 41 Pac. 383 191, 263, 388, 
 
 662 
 Still V. Hall, 20 Wend. 51 842 
 
 Stillings V. Van AUstine (1902), 
 
 Neb., 89 N. W. 756 569 
 
 Stillwcll !K Duncan (1898), 103 Ky. 
 
 59, 44 S. W. 357 924 
 
 Stillwell's Adm'r ;;. Land Co. (1900), 
 
 Ky., 58 S. W. 696 673 
 
 Stilwell u. Chappell, 30 Ind. 72 935 
 
 V. Hurlbert, 18 N. Y. 374 152 
 
 V. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 461 475 
 
 V. McNeely, 1 Green Ch. 305 251 
 
 Stitt V. Little, 63 N. Y. 427 627, 629
 
 :liv 
 
 TABLE -OF CASCS CITED. 
 
 hitix c. Matthews, 63 Mo. 371 
 Stock-ii rowers' Bank r. Newton 
 
 (1889), 13 Colo. 245. 22 Pac. 444 
 Stocker i: Green, 04 Mo. 280 
 Stockett 1-. Watkins, 2 Gill & J. 
 
 o2t5 
 Stockton j\ Anderson, 40 N. J. Eq. 
 426 
 V. Stockton, 73 Ind. 510 
 Stockton, Bk. of, v. Howland, 42 Cal. 
 
 129 
 Stockton Sav. & L. Soc. r. Giddings, 
 
 yG Cal. 84 
 Stockton, etc. Works r. Glens Falls 
 Ins. Co. (1898), 121 Cal. 167, 53 
 I'ac. 565 
 Stoddard r. Aiken (1890), 57 S. C. 
 134, 35 iS. E. 501 
 r. Treadwell, 26 Cal. 294 910, 913 
 Stoddard County r. Malone (1803), 
 
 115 Mo. 508, 22 S. W. 469 
 Stoddard MtV- Co. v. Mattice (1897), 
 
 10 S. D. 253, 72 N. W. 891 
 Stoddert 1-. Ward, 31 Md. 562 
 Stokes r. Geddes, 46 Cal. 17 
 r. Scott Cy., 10 Iowa, 166 
 v. Sprague (1899), 110 la. 89, 
 81 N. W. 195 
 Stoll r. Sheldon, 13 Neb. 207 
 Stolze V. Bank of Minnesota (1807), 
 67 Minn. 172, 69 N. W. 172 
 
 [the refeeexces are to the pages.] 
 5 
 
 30 
 781 
 
 649 
 
 352 
 852 
 
 293 
 
 869 
 
 659 
 
 785 
 
 821 
 
 758 
 118 
 563 
 118 
 
 713 
 150 
 
 131, 
 134 
 V. Torrison (1903), 118 Wis. 315, 
 
 95 N. W. 114 856, 887, 897, 903, 
 
 906, 921, 924 
 
 Stone v. Buckner, 12 Sm. & M. 73 359 
 
 r. Fouse, 3 Cal. 292 38, 66 
 
 r. Hunt, 94 Mo. 475 778 
 
 r. Lewman, 28 Ind. 97 
 
 v. Mattinjrly, 19 S. W. Rep. 402 
 
 Stone's Adm'r t". Towell, 13 B. Mon. 
 
 342 
 Stoner v. Keith Countv (1896), 48 
 
 Neb. 279, 67 N. W. 311 
 Storer i-. Austin (1902), 136 Cal. 588, 
 
 69 Pac. 277 
 Store V i: Kerr (1902), Neb., 89 
 
 N. \V. 601 
 Stork r. Supreme Lodge (1900), 113 
 
 la. 724, 84 N. W. 721 
 Storm V. Davenport, 1 Sandf. Ch. 
 
 135 
 Storts V. George (1899), 150 Mo. 1, 
 
 51 S. W. 489 
 Storv & Isliam C. Co. v. Story 
 (1893), 100 Cal. 30, 34 Pac. 671 
 
 903, 918 
 Stotscnburg v. Fordice (1895), 142 
 
 Ind. 4!«). 41 N. E. 313 840, 864 
 
 Stout v. Notiman, 30 Iowa, 414 300 
 
 V. St. Louis Tribune Co 
 
 Mo. 342 
 
 Stowell V. Eldred, 30 Wis. 614 
 
 727 
 65 
 
 800 
 
 403 
 
 640 
 
 40 
 
 34 
 
 48 
 
 130 
 
 491, 
 
 ■. Otis. 71 N. V. .36 
 
 52 
 ' 584,687 
 620, 865, 
 886 
 
 784, 791 
 
 Strahle v. First Nat. Bank (1896), 
 
 47 Neb. 319, 66 N. W. 415 688 
 
 Stratton v. Wood (1895), 45 Neb. 
 
 629, 63 N. W. 917 640 
 
 Strause i-. Ins. Co. (1001), 128 N. C. 
 
 64, 38 S. E. 256 703 
 
 Strauss v. Bendheim (1000), 162 
 
 N. Y. 469, 56 N. E. 1007 158 
 
 Straut's Est., lie, 126 N. Y. 201 253 
 
 Stra whacker v. Ives (1901), 114 la. 
 
 661, 87 N. W. 669 712 
 
 Street v. Beal, 16 Iowa, 68 326. 333, 338, 
 
 370 
 r. Bryan, 65 N. C. 610 915 
 
 V. Morgan (1902), 64 Kan. 85, 
 
 67 Pac. 448 780 
 
 V. Town of Alden (1895), 62 
 
 Minn. 160, 64 N. W. 157 263 
 
 Street Ry. Co. i-. Stone (1894), 54 
 
 Kan. 83, 37 Pac. 1012 303, 599, 600 
 
 Streeter v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 40 
 
 Wis. 294 609 
 
 r. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 44 Wis. 
 
 383 620 
 
 Strickland v. Strickland, 12 Sim. 463 347 
 Striker r. Mott, 2 Paige, 387 243 
 
 Stringer v. Stringer ( 1894), 93 Ga. 
 
 320, 20 S. E. 242 822 
 
 Stringfellow v. Alderson, 12 Kan. 
 
 112 718 
 
 Striiigfield v. Graff, 22 Iowa, 4-38 246 
 
 Strobel f. Kerr Salt Co. (I'JOO), 164 
 
 N. Y. 303, 58 N. E. 142 196, 262 
 
 Stroebe v. Fehl, 22 Wis. 347 633 
 
 Strohn v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 37 
 
 Wis. 625 150 
 
 Stronach v. Stronacli, 20 Wis. 129 241 
 Strong V. Downing, 34 Ind. 300 271, 
 
 311 
 r. Hoos, 41 Wis. 659 502 
 
 V. Weir (1896), 47 S. C. 307, 25 
 
 S. E. 157 592 
 
 Stroup r. State, 70 Ind. 405 614, 618 
 
 1-. Stroup (1894), 140 Ind. 179, 30 
 
 N. E. 864 678 
 
 Strucknieyer i: Lamb (1896), 64 
 
 Minn. 57, 65 N. AV. 930 94, 154 
 
 Strunian v. Robb, 37 Iowa, 311 53 
 
 Strunk v. Smith, 36 Wis. 631 442 
 
 Stuart r. Bank of Staplehurst (1899), 
 
 57 Neb. 569, 78 N. W. 298 304 
 
 Stubblefifld v. Gadd (1901), 112 la. 
 
 6Sl, 81 N. W. 917 665 
 
 Stubbs V. Motz (1893), 113 N. C. 458, 
 
 18 S. E. 387 702 
 
 Stuber 1-. Gannon (1896), 98 la. 228, 
 
 67 N. W. 105 673 
 
 r. McKntce (1894), 142 N. Y. 
 
 200, 36 N. E. 878 740 
 
 Stucker v. Stucker, 3 J. J. Marsh. 301 244 
 Stuckey v. Eritsche, 77 Wis. 329 89 
 
 Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co. i'. Lang- 
 son (1895), 89 Wis. 200, 61 
 N. W. 773 638 
 
 V. McCargur, 20 Neb. 500 332
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 clv 
 
 [the references are to tue pages.] 
 
 Stuht V. Sweesy (1896), 48 Neb. 767, 
 
 67 N. W. 748 
 Sturges ('. Burton, 8 Ohio St. 215 
 Sturgis V. Baker (1903), 43 Ore. 236, 
 
 72 Pac. 744 
 Sturm r. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 63 
 
 N. Y. 77 
 Sturman v. Stone, 31 Iowa, 115 
 Sturtevant v. Brewer, 9 Abb. Pr. 414 
 
 Styer v. Sprague (1896), 63 Minn. 
 
 414. 65 N. W. 659 
 Styers r. Alspaiigli (1896), 118 N.C. 
 
 631, 24 S. E. 4-i2 
 Styles (,'. Fuller, 101 N. Y. 622 
 Suber r. Allen, 13 S. C. 317 
 
 V. Richards (1901), 61 S. C. 393, 
 
 89 S. E. 540 
 
 Suckstorf V. Butterfield (1898), 54 
 
 Neb. 757, 74 N. W. 1076 
 Suiter v. Turner, 10 Iowa, 517 325, 
 Sukforth V. Lord, 87 Cal. 399 
 Sullivan r. Byrne, 10 S. C. 122 
 
 V. Collins (1900), 107 Wis. 291, 
 
 83 N. W. 310 639, 
 
 V. Davis, 4 Cal. 291 
 V. Field (1896), 118 N. C. 358, 24 
 
 N. E. 735 
 V. N. Y., N. Haven, & H. K. Co., 
 
 19 Blatchf. 388 
 V. Nicoulin (1901), 113 la. 76, 84 
 
 N. W. 978 868, 
 
 V. Sherrv (1901), 111 Wis. 476, 
 
 87 N. W. 471 
 r. Sullivan, 4 Hun, 198 
 V. Sullivan Co., 14 S. C. 494 
 V. Traders' Ins. Co. (1901), 169 
 N. Y. 21.S, 62 N E. 146 
 Sully V. Goldsmith, 49 Iowa, 690 
 Summers v. Farish, 10 Cal. 347 
 
 V. Heard (1899), 66 Ark. 550, 50 
 
 S. W. 78 
 V. Hoover, 42 Ind. 153 
 V. Hutson, 48 Ind. 228 419, 
 
 V. Vaughan, 35 Ind. 323 
 Sumner v. Coleman, 20 Ind. 486 325, 
 Sundback v. (iilbert (1896), 8 S. D. 
 
 359, 66 N. W. 941 
 Sunman v. Brewin, 52 Ind. 140 
 Supervisors of Douglas County, etc. 
 See Douglas County, Franklin, 
 Kewaunee, La Pointe, Mercer, 
 Oconto, Saratoga, etc. 
 Surginer v. Paddock, 31 Ark. 528 
 
 562, 
 Susong V. Vaiden, 10 Rich. L. 247 
 Sussdorf V. Schmidt, 55 N. Y. 319 
 
 Sutherland v. Carr, 85 N. Y. 105 
 V. HoUiday (1902), — Neb. — , 
 
 90 N. W. 937 
 
 Sutton ". Casseleggi, 77 Mo. 397 
 V. Clark (1901), 59 S. C. 440, .38 
 
 S. E. 150 
 V. Stone, 2 Atk. 101 
 
 612 
 660 
 
 91 
 
 150 
 575 
 412, 
 413 
 
 362 
 
 331 
 816 
 526 
 
 686 
 
 332 
 
 598 
 865 
 
 643 
 516 
 
 191 
 
 457 
 
 870 
 
 200 
 242 
 515 
 
 702 
 787 
 114 
 
 202 
 784 
 425 
 727 
 327 
 
 686 
 314 
 
 439, 
 
 597 
 295 
 587, 
 617 
 155 
 
 278 
 
 283 
 
 822 
 365 
 
 Sutton V. Sutton (1900), 60 Neb. 
 
 400, 83 N. W. 200 49 
 
 Suydam r. Moore, 8 Barb. 358 .396 
 
 Svanburg r. Fosseen (1899), 75 Minn. 
 
 350, 78 N. W. 4 180, 191 
 
 Swales V. Grubbs, 33 N. p]. Kep. 
 
 1124 216 
 
 Swan L. & Cat. Co. v. Frank, 39 Fed. 
 
 Kep. 456 356 
 
 Swank v. Barnum (1896), 63 Minn. 
 
 447, 05 X. W. 722 641 
 
 v. St. Paul City My. Co. (1895), 
 61 Minn. 423, 63 N. W. 
 1088 816 
 
 V. Swank (1900), 37 Ore. 489, 61 
 
 Pac. 846 624 
 
 Swanson v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 
 (1898), 73 Minn. 103, 75 N. W. 
 1033 710 
 
 Swarthout v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 
 
 49 Wis. 625 202 
 
 Swasev ;•. Adair, 88 Cal. 179 52 
 
 S watts V. Bowen (1894), 141 Ind. 322, 
 
 40 N. E. 1057 676, 821 
 
 Swearingen v. Lahner (1894), 93 la. 
 
 147, 61 N. W. 431 819 
 
 Swedish Am. Nat. Bank v. Dickin- 
 son Co. (1896), 6 N. D. 222, 69 
 N. W. 455 432 
 
 Sweeney v Bailey (1895),7 S.D.404, 
 
 64 N. W. 188 877, 881, 934 
 
 V. Schlessinger (1896), 18 Mont. 
 
 326, 45 Pac. 213 787 
 
 Sweet r. Davis (1895), 90 Wis. 409, 
 
 m N. W. 1047 757 
 
 V. Desha Lumber, etc. Co., 20 
 
 S. W. Rep. 514 598 
 
 V. Ervin, 54 la. 101 714 
 
 V. Ingerson, 12 How. Pr. 331 481, 
 483, 497, 521 
 V. Mitchell, 15 Wis. 641 633 
 
 V. Tuttle, 14 N. Y. 465 800, 829 
 
 Sweetman v. llamsev (1899), 22 
 
 Mont. 323, 56 Pac. 361 787 
 
 Sweetser v. People's Bank (1897), 
 
 69 Minn. 196, 71 N. W. 934 930 
 Sweezey v. Collins, 36 Iowa, 589 617 
 Swenney v. Hill (1902), 65 Kan. 826, 
 
 70 Pac. 868 .338 
 Swenson v. Cresop, 28 Ohio St. 668 793, 
 
 939 
 
 V. Moline Plow Co., 14 Kan. 387 244 
 
 Swift V. Ellsworth, 10 Ind. 205 95, 113, 
 
 156, 814 
 V. Fletcher, 6 Minn. 550 872 
 
 V. Kingsley, 24 Barb. 541 663 
 
 V. Pacific Mail S. 8. Co. 106 
 
 N. Y. 20() 149 
 
 V. State Lumber Co., 71 Wis. 
 
 476 378 
 
 V. Swift, 46 Cal. 266 153 
 
 Swihart r. Harless (1896), 93 Wis. 
 
 211,67 N. W. 413 443 
 
 Swinsr V. White River Lumber Co. 
 (1895), 91 Wis. 517, 65 N. W. 174 180
 
 clvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the beferences are to the pages.] 
 
 428 
 
 642 
 
 852 
 
 Switz V. Black, 45 Iowa. 507 
 
 Swon r. Stevens (1897), 143 Mo. 
 
 384, 45 S. W. 270 
 Swope r. Burnham, etc. Co. (1898), 
 
 C Ukla. 736. 52 Pac. 924 
 Svdner I'ump Co. v. Kocky Mount 
 'ice Co. (1899), 125 N. C. 80, 34 
 
 S. E. 198 
 Sykes r. First Nat. Bk., 49 N. W. 
 
 Kep. 1058 15, 310 
 
 T. 
 
 Tabler i-. Wiseman, 2 Ohio St. 207 369 
 Tabor v. Mackee, 58 Ind. 290 887, 940 
 
 286 
 
 15 
 
 Tabue i-. McAdams, 8 Bush, 74 
 Tacoma v. Tower Co. (1896), 
 
 Wash. 515, 46 Pac. 1043 
 Taggart v. Risley, 3 Ore. 306 
 Taintor i'. Prendergast, 3 Hill, 72 
 Tait r. Culbertson, 57 Barb. 9 
 Talbert v. Singleton, 42 Cal. 390 
 Talbot V. Garretson (1897), 31 Ore. 
 256, 49 Pac. 978 
 V. Roe (1903), 171 Mo. 421, 71 
 
 S. W. 682 
 V. Wilkins, 31 Ark. 411 
 Talbott V. Padgett, 30 S. C. 107 
 Taliaferro i-. Smiley (1900), 112 Ga. 
 
 62, 37 S. E. 106 
 Tallnian v. Barnes, 54 Wis. 181 
 f. HoUister, 9 How. Pr. 508 
 Talmage v. Bierhause, 102 Ind. 
 
 270 
 Talty V. Torling (1900), 79 Minn. 
 
 386, 82 \. W. 632 
 Tanderup ;•. Hansen (1894), 5 S. D. 
 
 104, 58 N. W. 578 651, 655 
 
 Tanguav r. Feltliouser, 44 Wis. 30 637 
 Tannebaum v. Marsellus, 22 N. Y. 
 
 .suppl. 928 
 Tanner v. Niles, 1 Barb. 560 
 Tarbox v. Adams Cy. Sup., 34 Wis. 
 
 558 
 Tarpey v. Deseret Salt Co., 5 Utah, 
 
 205 
 Tarwater *•. Han. & St. Jos. R. Co., 
 
 42 Mo. 193 
 Tasker i-. Small, 3 My. & Cr. 632 55, 256, 
 
 358 
 Tassell r. Smith, 2 DeG. & J. 713 
 Tate V. Douglas (1893), ;il3 N. C 
 190, 18 S. E. 202 
 i: Ohio &. Miss. R. Co., 10 Ind. 
 
 174 113,173,262 
 
 Tatum t'. Roberts (1894), 59 Minn. 
 
 52, 60 N. W. 848 
 Taylor v. Adair, 22 Iowa, 279 
 V. Collins. 51 Wis. 123 
 V. Fickas, 64 Ind. 167 
 1-. Matteson (1893), 86 Wis. 113, 
 
 56 N. W. 829 710, 868, 871 
 
 r. Mayor, 20 Hun, 292 131 
 
 V. Mayor, 8li N. Y. 10 930 
 
 815 
 723 
 116 
 313 
 52 
 
 636 
 
 327 
 112 
 891 
 
 686 
 924 
 418 
 
 866 
 
 368 
 
 821 
 
 63 
 920 
 
 246 
 
 191 
 
 341 
 424 
 
 178 
 219 
 
 Taylor v. Metrop. El. Ry. Co., 52 
 
 N. Y. Super. Ct. 299 
 V. Patton (li)03), — Ind. — , 66 
 
 N. E. 91 
 V. Pullen (1899), 152 Mo. 434, 53 
 
 S. W. 1086 
 V. Purcell ( 18941, 60 Ark. 606, 31 
 
 S. W. 567 754, 812, 
 
 V. Root, 4 Keyes, 335 876, 
 
 V. Stowell, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 175 
 
 V. Tavlor (1900), 110 la. 207, 81 
 
 N. W. 472 
 V. Thompson, 42 111. 9 
 r. Webb, 54 Miss. 36 
 Teachout v. Des Moines B. G. S. Ry. 
 
 Co., 75 Iowa, 722 
 Teague v. Fowler, 56 Ind. 569 887, 
 Teal V. Woodworth, 3 Paige, 470 
 Teall V. Syracuse, 32 Hun, 332 
 Teasley v. Bradley (1900), 110 Ga. 
 
 497, 35 S. E. 782 
 Tecuniseh Nat. Bank v. McGee 
 (1901), 61 Neb. 709, 85 N. W. 949 
 Tecumseh State Bank v. Maddox 
 
 (1896), 4 Okla. 583, 46 Pac. 563 
 Tell V. Beyer, 38 N. Y. 161 663, 
 
 V. Gibson, 66 Cal. 247 228, 
 
 Telle V. Rapid Transit Ry. Co. 
 (1893), 50 Kan. 455, 31 Pac. 1076 
 Templeton v. Sharp, 9 S. W. Rep. 
 
 507 
 Ten Broeck v. Orchard, 74 N. C. 409 
 
 Tendesen v. Marshall, 3 Cal. 440 
 Ten Eyck v. Casad, 15 Iowa, 524 326, 
 
 I). Mayor, 15 Iowa, 486 
 Tennant v. Pfister, 51 Cal. 511 178, 
 Tenney v. State Bank, 20 Wis. 152 
 
 Terhune v. Terhune, 40 How. Pr. 258 
 Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Pierce, 95 
 
 Ind. 496 
 
 Terre Haute, etc. R. R. Co. v. Mc- 
 Corkle (1894), 140 Ind. 613, 
 40 N. E. 62 
 I'. Sheeks (1900), 155 Ind. 74, 56 
 N. E. 434 
 Terre Haute & L. R. Co. v. Sher- 
 wood, 132 Ind. 129 
 Terrell v. Walker, 66 N. C. 244 
 Terrett v. Sharon, 34 Conn. 105 
 Territory v. Cox, 3 Mont. 197 
 
 V. Hildehrand, 2 Mont. 426 
 Terry i-. .Munger, 121 N. Y. 161 
 
 V. Musser, 68 Mo. 477 
 Terwilliger r. Wheeler, 35 Barb. 620 
 Tew V. Wolfsohn (1903), 174 N. Y. 
 
 272, 66 N. E. 934 
 Tewsbury v. Bronson, 48 Wis. 581 
 
 V. Schulenbcrg, 41 Wis. 584 
 Texas, etc. Ry. Co. v. Humble (1899), 
 
 97 Fed. (C. C. A. Ark.) 837 
 Texier v. Gouin, 5 Duer, 389 769 
 
 495 
 
 816 
 
 312 
 
 824 
 934 
 933, 
 936 
 
 642 
 118 
 340 
 
 428 
 895 
 368 
 522 
 
 715 
 
 158 
 
 638 
 805 
 503 
 
 682 
 
 823 
 47, 
 49 
 517 
 333 
 118 
 193 
 37, 
 633 
 890 
 
 920 
 
 656 
 
 625 
 
 661 
 843 
 118 
 117 
 277 
 649, 
 804 
 568 
 114 
 
 501 
 637 
 667 
 
 230 
 ,801
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 clvii 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Thalheimer v. Crow, 13 Colo. 397 G18, 
 
 8t)9 
 Thames v. Jones, 97 N. C. 121 196, 471 
 Thatcher v. Candee, 33 How. Fr. 
 
 145 242, 251 
 
 V. Cannon, 6 Bush, 541 <»36 
 
 I'. Haun, 12 Iowa, 303 377 
 
 V. Heisey, 21 Ohio St. 608 022 
 
 TheUn v. Stewart (1803), 100 Cal. 
 
 372, 34 Pac. 861 444,517,711,712 
 
 Tlieusen i-.Eryan (1901), 113 la. 496, 
 
 85 N. W. 802 
 Thigpen v. Staton, 104 X. C. 40 
 Thomas v. Bennett, 56 Barb. 197 
 V. Carson (1896), 46 Neb. 765, 65 
 
 N. W. 899 
 V. Chamberlain, 39 Ohio St. 
 
 112 
 V. Churchill (1896), 48 Neb. 266, 
 
 67 N. W. 182 
 V. Cooksey (1902), 130 N. C. 148, 
 
 41 S. E. 2 
 V. Dunning, 5 De G. & S. 618 
 V. Exchange Bank (1896), 99 la. 
 
 202, 68 N. W. 780 
 V. Franklin (1894), 42 Neb. 310, 
 
 60 N. W. 568 
 V. Glendinning (1896), 13 Utah, 
 
 47, 44 Pac. 652 
 V. Goodwine, 88 Ind. 458 
 V. Irwin, 90 Ind. 557 
 V. Kennedy, 24 Iowa, 397 
 V. Markmann ( 1895),43Neb. 823, 
 
 62 N. W. 206 
 V. Nelson, 69 N. Y. 118 
 V. Utica & B. li. Co., 97 N. Y. 
 
 245 
 V. Walker (1902), 115 Ga. 11, 41 
 
 S. E. 269 
 V. Werremeyer, 34 Mo. App. 665 
 V. Wood, 61 Ind. 132 
 Thomas's Adm'r v. Maysville Gas Co. 
 (1900), 108 Ky. 224, 50 S. W. 153 
 Thompkins v. White, 8 How. Pr. 520 576 
 Thompson v. Brazile (1898), 65 Ark. 
 495, 47 S. W. 299 
 V. Brown (1898), 106 la. 367, 76 
 
 N. W. 819 
 V. Caledonian Fire Ins. Co. 
 (1896), 92 Wis. 664, 6G 
 N. W. 801 
 V. Citizens' St. Ry. Co. (1898), 
 152 Ind. 461, 53 N. E. 462 
 
 655 
 618 
 166 
 
 681 
 
 823 
 
 818 
 
 314 
 245 
 
 930 
 
 607 
 
 822 
 714 
 206 
 364 
 
 566 
 618 
 
 522 
 
 41 
 
 806 
 178 
 
 656 
 
 606 
 640 
 
 639 
 
 614, 
 623 
 V. Cohen (1894), 127 Mo. 215, 28 
 
 S. W. 984 816 
 
 V. Ellenz (1894), 58 Minn. 301, 
 
 59 N. W. 1023 608 
 
 V. Erie R. R., 45 N. Y. 468 788 
 
 V. Fall, 64 Wis. 384 47, 49 
 
 V. Fargo, 63 N. Y. 479 149 
 
 V. Fenn (1896), 100 Ga. 234, 28 
 
 S. E. 39 625 
 
 V. Frakes (1900), 112 la. 585, 84 
 
 N. W. 703 783 
 
 Thompson v. Graham, 1 Paige, 384 
 V. Great Northern Ky. Co. 
 
 (1897), 70 Minn. 219, 72 
 
 N. W. 962 
 V. Greenwood, 28 Ind. 327 801, 
 V. Halbert, 109 N. Y. 329 
 V. Harris (1902), 64 Kan. 124, 67 
 
 Pac. 456 
 V. Iluffaker, 19 Nev. 291 
 V. Huron Lumber Co., 4 Wash. 
 
 600 
 V. Kessel, 30 N. Y. 383 900, 
 
 V. Killian, 25 Minn. Ill 592, 
 
 V. Lake, 19 Nev. 103 
 
 i'. Mallorv Bros. (1898), 104 Ga. 
 
 684, 30 S. E. 887 
 V. Perkins (1896), 97 la. 607, 66 
 
 N. W. 874 
 r. Recht (1902), 158 Ind. 302, 63 
 
 N. E. 569 
 V. Rush (1902), — Neb. — , 92 
 
 N. W. 1060 
 V. Sanders (1901), 113 Ga. 1024, 
 
 39 S. E. 419 
 V. Sickles, 46 Barb. 49 
 V. Skeen (1896), 14 Utah, 209, 46 
 
 Pac. 1103 
 V. Sweetser, 43 Ind. 312 779, 
 
 V. Thompson, 52 Cal. 154 
 V. Toland, 48 Cal. 99 
 V. Tookey, 71 Ind. 296 
 V. Town of Elton (1901), 109 
 
 Wis. 589, 85 N. W. 425 
 V. Wertz (1894), 41 Neb. 31, 50 
 
 N. W. 518 614, 
 
 r. Whitney (1899), 20 Utah, 1, 
 
 57 Pac. 429 
 V. Wolfe, 6 Oreg. 308 
 V. Young, 51 Ind. 599 
 Thompson & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Nich- 
 olls (1897), 52 Neb. 312, 72 N. W. 
 217 
 Thompson-Houston Elec. Co. v. 
 Palmer (1893), 52 Minn. 174, 53 
 N. W. 1137 677, 
 
 Thomson I'. Baskerville, 3 Ch. Rep. 
 215 
 V. Sanders, 118 N. Y. 252 
 V. Smith, 63 N. Y. 301 244, 360, 
 V. Town of Eton (1901), 109 
 Wis. 589, 85 N. W. 425 
 Thorn j;. Sweeney, 12 Nev. 251 
 Thornton v. Crowther, 24 Mo. 164 
 V. Knox's Ex., 6 B. Mon. 74 
 V. Pigg, 24 Mo. 249 325, 
 
 Thorp V. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N. Y. 
 253 
 I'. Philbin, 15 Dalv, 155 
 Thorpe v. Dickey, 51 Iowa, 676 499, 
 i: Union Pacific Coal Co. 
 (1902), 24 Utah, 475, 68 
 Pac. 145 
 Thorson v. Baker (1898), 107 la. 49, 
 77 N. W. 510 
 
 253 
 
 673 
 
 829 
 727 
 
 466 
 392 
 
 428 
 922, 
 927 
 609 
 355 
 
 641 
 
 625 
 
 543 
 
 179 
 
 197 
 
 872 
 
 757 
 780 
 736 
 154 
 
 852 
 
 584 
 
 625 
 
 672 
 576 
 221 
 
 804 
 
 247 
 911 
 376 
 
 586 
 576 
 99 
 245 
 336 
 
 110 
 916 
 520 
 
 221 
 830
 
 clviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the beferemces ake to tbe pages.] 
 
 Threadgill i\ Commissioners (1895), 
 
 11(5 N. C. 010, 21 S. E. 425 643, 831 
 Threait v. Mining Co. (1896), 49 
 
 S. C. 95, -lO S. E. 970 402, 466, 468 
 
 Throckmorton i-. Pence (1893), 121 
 
 Mo. 50, 25 S. W. 843 366, 816 
 
 TliurnionJ i-. Cedur Spring Baptist 
 
 Church (1900), 110 Ga. 810, 36 
 
 S. E. 221 
 Thurston r. Thurston (1894), 
 
 Minn. 279, 59 N. \V. 1017 
 Tibbetis f. Blood. 21 Barb. 650 
 Turnginst, 85 N. 
 
 58 
 
 291 
 
 271 
 157 
 
 Tieineyer 
 
 516 
 Tiernev i- 
 
 816 
 
 329 
 
 503 
 118 
 
 818 
 
 Spiva, 97 Mo. 98 
 Tiffin Glass Co. v. Stoelir (1896), 54 
 
 (). St. 157,43 N. E. 279 
 Tift V. Buffalo, 1 X. Y. Sup. Ct. 150 
 I'. Wight & Wesloskv Co. 
 (1901),113Ga. 681,39S.E. 
 503 
 
 Tillamook Dairy Ass'n i;. Schermer- 
 horn (1897), 31 Ore. 308, 51 Pac. 
 438 639, 642 
 
 Tillerv v. Candler (1896), 118 N. C. 
 
 888,' 24 S. E. 709 642 
 
 Times Publishing Co. v. Everett 
 
 (1894), 9 AYash. 518, 37 Pac. 695 459 
 Tinkler r. Swaynie, 71 Ind. 562 113, 205 
 Tinkuni v. O'Xeale, 5 Nev. 93 269, 289 
 Tinsley v. Tinslev, 15 B. Mon. 454 881, 
 899,911,916,927 
 Tippecanoe Cy. Cora'rs v. Lafay- 
 ette, etc. R. Co., 50 Ind. 85 265 
 Tipton Light, etc. Co. v. Newcomer 
 (1900), 156 Ind. 348, 58 N. E. 842 
 Tisdale v. Moore, 8 Hun, 19 
 Titus r. Lewis, 33 Ohio St. 304 
 Tobias v. Tobias (1894). 51 O. St. 
 
 519, 38 N. E. 317 
 Tobin V. Galvin, 49 Cal. 34 234, 316 
 
 V. Portland Mills Co. (1902), 41 
 
 Ore. 269, 68 Pac. 743 235, 379, 
 381, 383, 385. 386, 390 
 Tobv V. Oregon Pac. Ry. Co. (1893), 
 
 98 Cal. 490, 33 I'ac. 550 94, 97 
 
 Todd c. Cromer (1893), 30 Neb. 430, • 
 54 N. W. 674 
 V. Crutsinger, 30 Mo. App. 145 
 
 942 
 
 602 
 470 
 702 
 
 354 
 
 332 
 103, 
 930 
 254 
 112 
 
 V. Sterrett, 6 J. J. Marsh. 432 
 '•. \Veber, 95 N. Y. 181 111 
 
 Tolbert r. Caledonian Ins. Co. 
 
 (1897). 101 (ia. 741, 28 8. E. 991 
 Toledo \V. & \V. Ky. Co. v. Harris, 
 
 49 Ind. 119 
 'I'olman c .Johnson, 43 Iowa, 127 
 Tomlinson i-. .Monroe, 41 Cal. 94 
 Tompkins r. Wadley, 3 N. Y. S. C. 
 
 424 798, 810 
 
 V. White. 8 How. Pr. 520 516 
 
 Toner v. Wagner (1901), 158 Ind. 
 
 447. r,:j N. K. H,yj 
 TonrK-Uc- r. Hiill. 3 Abb. Pr. 205 
 Toombs c. Ilornbuckle, 1 Mont. 286 
 
 678 
 
 575 
 930 
 605 
 
 071 
 309 
 739 
 
 Tootle 1-. Berkley (1896), 57 Kan. 
 
 Ill, 45 Pac. 77 713 
 
 Tojicka Capital Co. ;•. Remington 
 (1900), 01 Kan. 6, 59 Pac. 1062 668, 
 
 734 
 Topping 1-. Clay (1895), 62 Minn. 3, 
 
 63 N. W. 1038 688 
 
 v. Clay (1896), 65 Minn. 346. 
 
 68 N. W. 34 676 
 
 V. Parish (1897), 98 Wis. 378, 
 
 71 N. W. 367 20,665 
 
 Tormev r. Pierce, 49 Cal. 306 637 
 
 Touchard v. Crow, 20 Cal. 150 196 
 
 V. Keyes, 21 Cal. 202 199 
 
 To well V. Pence, 47 Ind. 304 725 
 
 Towle V. Pierce, 12 Mete. 329 248 
 
 Town i: Bringolf, 47 Iowa, 133 852, 930 
 Town of. See name of town. 
 Towne i: Sparks, 23 Neb. 142 780, 815 
 Towner v. Tooley, 38 Barb. 598 309, 
 
 384, 387 
 Towns !-. Matliews (1893), 91 Ga. 
 
 546, 17 S. E. 955 198 
 
 To%vnsend v. Bissell, 5 N. Y. Sup. 
 
 Ct. 583 218 
 
 V. Rackham (1894), 143 N. Y. 
 
 516, 38 N. E. 731 107 
 
 Townsend v. Champernowne, 9 
 
 Price, 130 360 
 
 Township of. See name of township. 
 Tov V. McHugh (1901), 62 Neb. 820, 
 
 87 N. W. 1059 615, 665 
 
 Trabue v. Bogert, 126 N. Y. 370 455 
 
 V. McAdams, 8 Bush, 74 298 
 
 Tracy v. Ames, 4 Lans. 500 622 
 
 V. Craig, 55 Cal. 01 662 
 
 r. Grezaud (1903), — Neb.— , 93 
 
 N. W. 214 605 
 
 V. Harmon (1895), 17 Mont. 465, 
 
 43 Pac. 500 676 
 
 V. Kelly, 52 Ind. 535 784 
 
 v. Tracy, 59 Hun, 1 576 
 
 Traders' Deposit Bank v. Day 
 
 (1899), 105 Ky. 219, 48 S. W. 983 641 
 Tradesman's Bk. r. McFeely, 61 
 
 Barb. 522 505, 524 
 
 Trapnali v. Hill, 31 Ark. 345 662, 734, 
 
 942 
 Traster v. Snelson's Adm., 29 Ind. 
 
 96 727 
 
 Travelers' Ins. Co. r. Cal. Ins. Co., 
 
 1 N. Dak. 151 207 
 
 V. Walker (1899), 77 Minn. 438, 
 
 80 N. W. 018 782 
 
 Traver v. Spokane St. Ry. Co. (1901), 
 
 25 Wash. 225, 65 Pac. 284 681, 682 
 
 Travis f. Barger, 24 Barb. 614 798 
 
 Trayser Piano Co. v. Kerschner, 73 
 
 N. Y. 183 598 
 
 Treadway v. Wilder, 8 Nev. 91 604 
 
 Trccothick v. Austin. 4 Mason, 41 357 
 Trenor v. Cent. Pac. R. Co., 50 Cal. 
 
 222 179 
 
 Tre.scott v. Sniytii, 1 ^McCord Ch. 
 301 377
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 clix 
 
 Tresterr. Oitv of Sheboygan (18'J4), 
 
 87 Wis. 49(3, 58 N. W. 747 853, 887, 
 
 941 
 Trevaskis v. Peard (1896), 111 Cal. 
 
 599, 44 Pac. 24(3 
 Treweek r. Howard (1895), 105 Cal. 
 
 434, 39 Pao. 20 
 Trezona r. Cliicago, etc. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1898 J, 107 la. 22, 77 N. W. 486 
 Tribune Printing Co. v. Barnes 
 
 (1898), 7 N. D. 591, 75 N. W. 904 
 Trigg V. Ray (1897), G4 Ark. 150, 41 
 
 S. VV. 55 
 Trimmer v. Thomson, 10 Rich. L. 
 
 1(54 
 Tripp V. Riley, 15 Barb. 333 
 Trogden r. Deckard, 45 Ind 
 
 709 
 
 830 
 
 295 
 199, 204 
 572 748, 
 783 
 Trompen v. Yates (1902), — Neb. 
 
 — , 92 N. W. 647 173, 202 
 
 Tron V. Yohn (1896), 145 Ind. 272, 
 
 43 N. E. 437 849, 864 
 
 Tronson v. Union Lumber Co., 38 
 
 Wis. 202 562 
 
 Troost V. Davis, 31 Ind. 34 LJ, 17 
 
 Trotter c. Mutual Reserve Life Ass'n 
 
 (1897), 9 S. D. 596, 70 N. W. 843 669 
 Trowbridge v. Forepaugli, 14 Minn. 
 
 133 303, 305 
 
 V. Spinning (1000), 23 Wash. 48. 
 
 62 Pac. 125 680 
 
 V. True, 52 Conn. 190 470 
 
 Troxel v. Thomas (1900), 155 Ind. 
 
 519, 58 N. E. 725 258, 712 
 
 Troy & Rut. R. Co. v. Kerr, 17 Barb. 
 
 581 663 
 
 u. Tibbits, 11 How. Pr. 168 635 
 
 Truesdell v. Bourke (1895), 145 N. Y. 
 
 612, 40 N. E. 83 656 
 
 V. Rhodes, 26 Wis. 215 270, 276, 278, 
 
 457 
 
 Truitt V. Baird, 12 Kan. 420 824 
 
 Trull V. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115 650 
 
 Trustees v. Forrest, 15 B. Mon. 168 42 
 
 V. Gleason, 15 Fla. 384 350 
 
 V. Kellogg, 16 N. Y. 83 344 
 
 V. Nesbitt (1896), 65 Minn. 17, 
 
 67 N. W. 652 756 
 
 V. Odlin, 8 Oliio St. 293 541, 596 
 
 Tryon v. Baker, 7 Lans. 511 648, 649, 
 
 650 
 V. Lovejoy, 73 Wis. 66 820 
 
 Tucker v McCoy, 3 Colo. 284 55, 942 
 
 V. Northern Terminal Co. 
 (1902), 41 Ore. 82, 68 Pac. 
 426 673 
 
 V. Shiner, 24 Iowa, 334 300, 403 
 
 V. Silver, 9 Iowa, 261 348 
 
 Tuells V. Torras (1901), 113 Ga. 691, 
 
 39 S. E. 455 816 
 
 Tuers v. Tuers, 100 N. Y. 190 470 
 
 Tuffree v. Stearns Ranchos Co. 
 
 (1899), 124 Cal. 306, 57 Pac. 69 102 
 
 Tupper V. Thompson, 26 INIinn. 385 805 
 Turk r. Ridge, 41 N. Y. 201 111 
 
 [tUE REFEKENCES are to the P.'kGES.] 
 
 Turner v. Althaus, 6 Neb. 54 
 
 V. Butler (1894), 126 Mo. 131, 
 
 28 S. W. 77 
 7.-. Campbell, 59 Ind. 279 
 V. Duehman, 23 Wis. 500 520, 
 V. First Nat. Bk. of Keokuk, 26 
 
 Iowa, 262 261,271, 
 
 V. Gregory (1899), 151 Mo. 100, 
 
 52 S. W. 234 680, 
 
 V. Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 310 301 
 
 734 
 658 
 703 
 
 V. Interstate Ass'n (1897), 51 
 
 S. C. 33, 27 S. E. 947 
 V. Pierce, 34 Wis. 658 29, 37, 
 V. Shuffler, 108 N. C 642 
 r. Simpson, 12 Ind. 413 866, 
 
 Turpi n v. Eagle Creek, etc. Co., 48 
 
 Ind. 45 
 Tustin Fruit Ass'n v. Earl Fruit Co. 
 
 (1898), Cal, 53 Pac. 693 
 Tutwiler v. Dunlap, 71 Ala. 126 
 Tweeddale v. Tweeddale (1903),— 
 
 Wis. — , 93 N. W. 440 
 Twine V. Kilgore (1895), 3 Okla. 640, 
 
 39 Pac. 3«» 
 Tyler r. Freeman, 3 Cush. 261 
 i". Granger, 48 Cal. 259 
 V. Kent, 52 Ind. 583 
 ('. Tualatin Acad., 14 Oreg. 485 
 V. Willis, 33 Barb. 327 
 Tvnon v. Despain (1896), 22 Colo. 
 
 "240, 43 Pac. 1039 714, 
 
 Tyson v. Applegate, 40 N. J. Eq. 
 305 
 V. Blake, 22 N. Y. 558 
 
 29 
 
 704 
 131 
 527 
 
 520 
 
 681 
 307, 
 313 
 
 710 
 
 475 
 823 
 935 
 
 119 
 
 152 
 327 
 
 108 
 
 680 
 116 
 154 
 439 
 402 
 872 
 
 818 
 
 239 
 219 
 
 u. 
 
 Ueland v. Haugan (1897), 70 Minn. 
 
 349, 73 N. W. 169 354 
 
 Uhl V. Uhl, 52 Cal. 250 525 
 
 Ullrich V. Cleveland, etc. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1898), 151 Ind. 3-58, 51 N. E. 95 689 
 Ulrich V. McConaughev (1901), 63 
 
 Neb. 10, 88 N. W. 150" 781 
 
 Umsted v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio St. 113 179, 
 180, 266, 355 
 Undeland i-. Stanfield (1897), 53 Neb. 
 
 120, 73 N. W. 459 640 
 
 Underwood v. Tew (1893), 7 Wash. 
 
 297, 34 Pac. 1100 687 
 
 Unglish ('. Marvin, 128 N. Y. 380 816 
 
 Union Bank v. Bell, 14 Ohio St. 200 270, 
 
 325 
 V. Hutton (1903), —Neb. — , 95 
 
 N. W. 1061 816 
 
 V. Mott, 27 N. Y. 633 301, 651 
 
 Union Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bragg 
 
 ( 1901 ), 63 Kan. 291, 65 Pac. 272 703 
 
 Union Coll. v. Wheeler, 61 N. Y. 88 123 
 Union Guaranty Co. v. Craddock 
 
 (1894), 59 Ark. 693, 28 S. W. 424 830 
 Union India Rub. Co. v. Tomlinson, 
 
 1 E. 1). Smith, 364 142
 
 clx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Union Lumber Co. v. Chippewa Cy. 
 
 8up., 47 Wis. 245 
 Union rklercantile Co. i-. Jacobs 
 
 (IbltT), -20 Mont. 270, 50 Pac. 793 
 
 Union Nat. Bk. v. Carr, 49 Iowa, 259 
 V. Roberts, 44 Wis. 373 
 V. Cross (1898), 100 Wis. 174, 75 
 
 N. W. 992 
 V. Hill (1899), 148 Mo. 380, 49 
 S. W. 1012 
 Union Pac. Kv. Co. r. Davidson 
 (1895)," 21 Colo. 93, 39 Pac. 
 1095 
 V. Roeser (1903), — Neb. — , 95 
 
 N. W. 68 
 V. Smith (1898), 59 Kan. 80, 52 
 
 Pac. 102 
 r. Vincent (1899), 58 Neb. 171, 
 78 N W. 457 162, 
 
 Union Sewer Pipe Co. v. Olson ( 1901), 
 
 82 Minn. 187, 81 N. W. 756 
 Union Stock Yards Co. v. Conoyer 
 (1893), 38 Neb. 488,56 N. W. 1081 
 Union Stockyards Nat. Bank v. Has- 
 kell (1902), Neb., 90 N. W. 233 
 Union Storage Co. v. McDermott 
 (1893), 53 Minn. 407, 55 N. W. 606 
 Union St. Ry. Co. v. First Nat. Bank 
 
 (1903), 42 Ore. 606, 72 Pac. 586 
 United Coal Co. v. Canon City Coal 
 Co. (1897), 24 Colo. 116, 48 Pac. 
 1045 20, 40, 243, 
 
 United States v. Union Pac. R. R. 
 
 Co., 98 U. S. 509, 604 
 Unitod States ex rel. v. Railroad Co. 
 
 (1895), 3 Okla. 404, 41 Pac. 729 
 U. S. Express Co. v. Keefer, 59 Ind. 
 
 263 
 U. S. L. Ins. Co. V. Jordan, 21 Abb. 
 
 N. Cas. 330 
 United States Mortgage Co. v. Mc- 
 Clure (1902), 42 Ore. 190, 70 Pac. 
 543 
 United States Saving Co. v. Harris 
 (1895), 142 Ind. 220, 40 N. E. 1072 
 
 U. S. Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Roche, 
 
 116 N. Y. 120 333, 
 
 U. S. T. Co. /'. Stanton (1893), 139 
 
 N. Y. 631, 34 N. E. 1098 
 Universalists, N. W. Conf. of, v. 
 
 Myers, 36 Ind. 375 
 University Notre Dame du Lac v. 
 
 Shanks, 40 Wis. 352 
 Upchurch /•. Robertson (1900), 127 
 
 N. C. 127, 37 S. E. 157 
 Upington v. Oviatt, 24 Ohio St. 232 
 
 Uppfalt '•. Woermann, 30 Neb. 189 
 
 Upton I'. Kennedy (1803), 36 Neb. 66, 
 ry.i N. W. 1042 787, 
 
 V. Railroad Co. (1901), 128 N. C. 
 173, 38 S. E. 736 
 
 758 
 
 849, 
 864 
 865 
 618 
 
 604 
 
 117 
 
 375 
 683 
 177 
 214 
 543 
 817 
 802 
 107 
 703 
 
 320 
 509 
 117 
 598 
 471 
 
 819 
 
 592, 
 726 
 
 373 
 
 853 
 
 147 
 
 609 
 
 806 
 263, 
 
 265 
 932, 
 
 939 
 
 788 
 831 
 
 Ure V. Bunu (1902), Neb., 90 N. W. 
 
 904 643 
 Urlan v. Weeth (1902), — Neb. — , 
 
 89 N. W. 427 418 
 
 Urton r. State, 37 Ind. 339 748 
 
 Usher v. Heatt, 18 Kan. 195 576 
 
 Usparicha r. Noble, 13 East, 232 116 
 Utassy v. Giedinghagen (1895), 132 
 
 -Mo. 53, 33 S. W. 444 687 
 Utlev r. Foy, 70 N. C. 303 89, 881 
 Utterback v. Meeker (1896), 16 
 
 Wash. 185, 47 Pac. 428 ' 263 
 
 V. 
 
 Vail V. Jones, 31 Ind. 467 831, 886, 917, 
 
 923 
 Valentine's Will (1696), 93 Wis. 45, 
 
 67 N. W. 12 308 
 
 Vallev Bank v. Wolf (1897), 101 
 
 Iowa, 51, 69 N. W^ 1131 423 
 
 Valz V. First Nat. Bank (1895), 96 
 
 Kv. 543, 29 S. W. 329 823 
 
 Van Aken v. Clarke, 82 Iowa, 256 358 
 Vanalstine v. Whelan (1901), 135 
 
 Cal. 232, 67 Pac. 125 664 
 
 Van Alstvne v. Van Slyck, 10 
 
 Barb. 383 
 Van Arsdale v. Drake, 2 Barb. 599 368 
 Vanarsdall v. State, 65 Ind. 176 155 
 
 Van Bibher v. Fields (1894), 25 Ore. 
 
 527, 36 Pac. o26 703 
 
 V. Hilton, 84 Cal. 585 942 
 
 Van Brunt v. Day. 81 N. Y. 251 930 
 
 V. Mather. 48 Iowa, 503 660 
 
 Van Brunt & Co. v. Harrigan (1895), 
 
 8 S. D. 96, 65 N. W. 421 684 
 
 Vance v. Anderson (1896), 113 Cal. 
 
 532, 45 Pac. 816 664, 665 
 
 Vancleave v. Beam, 2 Dana, 155 257 
 
 Vanderbcek v. Francis (1903), 75 
 
 Conn. 467, 53 Atl. 1015 584, 587 
 
 Vandermulen v. Vandermulen, 108 
 
 N. Y. 195 206,211 
 
 Vander})oel r. Van Valkenburgh, 
 
 N. Y. 190 257, 340, 343 
 
 Van de Sande v. Hall, 13 How. 
 
 Pr. 458 872 
 
 Van Deusen r. Young, 29 Barb. 9 196 
 
 Vandcvoort v. Gould, 36 N. Y. 639 516 
 
 Van Doren i-. Relfe, 20 Mo. 455 89, 104 
 
 I).. Robinson, 16 N. J. Eq. 256 
 
 251, 351 
 Vanduyn i-. Hepner, 45 Ind. 589 781 
 
 Van Dyke v. Doherty (1896), 6 
 
 N. D. 263, 69 N. W. 200 712, 
 
 735, 757 
 
 V. Maguire, 57 N. Y. 429 734, 777 
 
 Van Epps v. Harrison, 5 Hill, 03 842 
 
 Van Etten v. Kosters (1896), 48 
 
 Neb. 152, 66 N. W. 1106 
 
 V. Medland (1898), 53 Neb. 569, 
 74 N. W. 33 
 
 735, 
 876 
 
 G03
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 clxi 
 
 [the references are to tub paqes.] 
 
 Van Gicson r. Van Gieson, 10 
 
 N. Y. 316 769 
 
 Van Gorden v. Ormsby. 65 Iowa, 657 428 
 Van Home v. Everson, 13 Barb. 526 175 
 Van Housen v. Broehl (18'J'J), 59 
 
 Neb. 48, 80 N. W. 260 96, 816 
 
 Van Lehn r. Morse (1897), 16 Wash. 
 
 672, 48 Pac. 404 639 
 
 Van Lien v. Byrnes, 1 Hilt. 133 152 
 
 Van Liew v. Johnson, 6 N. Y. S. C. 
 
 648 504 
 
 Van Loben Sels r. Bunnell (1901), 
 
 131 Cal. 489, 63 Pac. 773 334 
 
 Vanmeter v. Fidelity Trust Co. 
 
 (1899), 107 Kv. 108, 53 S. W. 10 409 
 Van Metre v. Wolf, 27 Iowa, 34 814 
 
 Vanneman u. Powers, 56 N. Y. 39 314 
 Van Nest v. Latson, 19 Barb. 604 326 
 Vanover v. Justices, 27 Ga. 354 118 
 
 Van Pelt v. Gardner (1898), 54 Neb. 
 
 701, 75 N. W. 874 259, 355, 356 
 
 Van Schaack v. Saunders, 32 Hun, 
 
 515 329 
 
 Van Schaick v. Farrow, 25 Ind. 
 
 310 544, 568 
 
 V. Third Av. R. Co., 38 X. Y. 
 
 346 105, 110 
 
 Van Sickle v. Keith (1893), 88 la. 9, 
 
 55 N. W. 42 607 
 
 Van Skike v. Potter (1897), 53 Neb. 
 
 28, 73 N. W. 295 773 
 
 Vanstream v. Liljengren, 37 Minn. 
 
 191 94 
 
 Vansyoc v. Freewater Cemetery 
 
 Ass'n (1901), 63 Neb. 143, 88 
 
 N. W. 162 681 
 
 Van Trott v. Wiesse, 36 Wis. 439 791 
 Van Valen v. Lapham, 5 Duer, 689 931 
 V. Russell, 13 Barb. 590 877 
 
 Van Wagenen v. Kemp, 7 Hun, 328 301, 
 303, 305, 478 
 Van Wart v. Price, 14 Abb. Pr. 4 190 
 
 Van Werden v. Equitable Assur- 
 ance Society (1896), 99 la. 621, 
 
 68 N. W. 892 710 
 
 Van Wy v. Clark, 50 Ind. 259 791 
 
 Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige, 160 345 
 
 Vary v. B. C. R. & M. R. Co., 42 Iowa, 
 246 301 
 
 Vass V. Brewer (1898), 122 N. C. 
 
 226, 29 S. E. 352 787 
 
 Vassar v. Thompson, 46 Wis. 345 609 
 Vassear v. Livingston, 13 N. Y. 
 
 248 663, 856, 872 
 
 Vaughn v. Gushing, 23 Ind. 184 376 
 
 V. Georgia Land Co. (1896). 98 
 
 Ga. 288, 25 S. E. 441 29 
 
 Vaule V. Miller (1897), 69 Minn. 
 
 440, 72 N. W. 452 887, 925 
 
 V. Steenerson (1895), 63 Minn. 
 
 110, 65 N. W. 257 656, 709 
 
 Veach v. Schaup, 3 Iowa, 194 326, 333 
 Veasey c. Humphreys (1895), 27 
 
 Ore. 515, 41 Pac. 8 832 
 
 Veeder v. Lima, 19 Wis. 280 118 
 
 Venable v. Dutch, 37 Kan. 515 850, 873 
 
 Venice v. Breed, 65 Barb. 597 374, 788, 
 
 834, 882, 924 
 
 Venlin v. Slocum, 9 Hun, 150 325, .•!50 
 
 Vernieule v. Beck, 15 How. Pr. 333 499 
 
 Vermont Loan & Trust Co v. Cardin 
 
 (1898), 19 Wash. 304, 53 
 
 Pac. 164 
 
 V. McGregor (1897), 5 Idaho, 
 
 320, 51 Pac. 102 465, 
 
 Vernon y. Union Life Ins. C'o. (1899), 
 
 58 Neb. 494. 78 N. W. 929 
 Vetterk'in ?;. Barnes, 124 U. S. 169 
 Via 11 V. Mott, 37 Barb. 208 
 Viburt V. Frost, 3 Abb. Pr. 120 
 Victorian Number Two (1894), 26 
 
 Ore. 194,41 Pac. 1103 
 Vidger v. Nolin (1901), 10 N. I J. 
 
 353, 87 N. W. 593 
 Vieley v. Thompson, 44 111. 9 
 Vierling v. Binder (1901), 113 la. 
 
 337, 85 N. W. 621 796, 
 
 Vilas V. Mason, 25 Wis. 310 633, 
 
 V. Page, 106 N. Y. 439 
 Viles V. Bangs, 36 Wis. 131 188, 
 
 V. Green (1895), 91 Wis. 217, 64 
 N. W. 856 
 Village of. See name of village. 
 Vilmar v. Schall, 61 N. Y. 564 
 Vimont v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 
 
 64 Iowa, 513 97, 
 
 Vincent v. Starks, 45 Wis. 458 
 Vine V. Casmey (1902), 86 Minn. 74, 
 
 90 N. W. 158 
 Vint V. Pad get, 2 DeG. & J. 611 
 Virden v. Ellsworth, 15 Ind. 144 .300, 
 Virgin v. Brubaker, 4 Nev. 31 
 Virginia Chemical Co. i'. Moore 
 
 (1901), 61 S. C. 166, 39 S. E, 346 
 Vliet V. Sherwood, 38 Wis. 159 611, 
 
 Voechting v. Grau, 55 Wis. 312 
 Vogelgesang v. City of St. Louis 
 
 (1897), 139 Mo. 127, 40 S. W. 653 
 Voight V. Brooks (1897), 19 Mont. 
 
 374,-48 Pac. 549 
 Von Fragstein v. Windier, 2 Mo. 
 
 App. 598 
 Von Schmidt v. Huntington, 1 Cal. 
 
 55 
 Voorhcos V. Fisher (1893), 9 Utah, 
 
 303, 34 Pac. 64 666, 
 
 Voorhis v. Baxter, 1 Abb. Pr. 43 
 
 202 
 
 472 
 
 833 
 350 
 497 
 181 
 
 498 
 
 606 
 118 
 
 810 
 897, 
 927 
 111 
 204 
 
 711 
 
 627 
 
 102 
 160 
 
 675 
 246 
 402 
 103 
 
 933 
 635, 
 637 
 866 
 
 592 
 
 579 
 
 V. Child's Ex., 17 N. Y. 354 
 
 175 
 
 V. Kelly, 31 Hun, 293 
 Voris V. State, 47 Ind. 345 
 Vose V. Galpen, 18 Abb. Pr. 96 
 
 V. Philbrook, 3 Story, 335 248, 
 Voss V. Lewis, 126 Ind. 155 
 Vrooman v. Jackson, 6 Hun, 326 614 
 
 V. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280 
 
 790 
 177. 
 293 
 i, 86, 
 293 
 120 
 295 
 927 
 251 
 213 
 ,620 
 111
 
 clxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 w. 
 
 Wabasli, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Cen- 
 tral Trust Co. of N. Y., 22 Fed. 
 Kcp. 138 334 
 
 Wabaska Electric Co. v. City of 
 Wvniore (1900), 60 Neb. 199, 82 
 N."\V. 62G 378, 56.5, 680 
 
 Wa Ching v. Constantine, 1 Idaho 
 
 Ter. 2m 29, 45 
 
 Wachter i: Queiizer, 20 N. Y. 547 797 
 
 Waddell V. Darlinp, 51 N. Y. 327 859, 934 
 
 r. Waddell, 99 Mo. 338 490 
 
 "Wade r. City Railway Co. (1900), 
 
 36 Ore. 311, 59 Pac. 875 639 
 
 V. Gould (1899), 8 Okla. 690, 59 
 
 Pac. 11 433 
 
 V. Rusher, 4 Bosw. 537 372 
 
 V. State, 37 Ind. 180 814 
 
 V. Strever (1901), 166 X. Y. 251, 
 
 59 N. E. 825 702 
 
 "Wadley v. Davis, 63 Barb. 500 900, 916, 
 
 927 
 "Wadsworth v. Wadsworth, 81 Cal. 
 
 182 942 
 
 Wagener v. Boyce (1898), Ariz., 52 
 
 Pac. 1122 711, 819 
 
 V. Kirven (1899), 56 S. C. 126, 
 
 34 S. E. 18 668 
 
 Wager i: Link (1896), 150 N. Y. 
 
 549, 44 N. E. 1103 624 
 
 AVaggoner v. Liston, 37 Ind. 357 745 
 
 Waggv V. Scott (1896), 29 Ore. 386, 
 
 45 Pac. 774 592 
 
 "Wagner v. Ewing, 44 Ind. 441 814 
 
 V. Sanders (1901), 62 S. C. 73, 
 
 39 S. E. 950 818 
 
 "Wait V. "Whecder & Wilson Man. Co., 
 
 31 Pac. Kcp. 661 895 
 
 "Waite c. Willis (1902), 42 Ore. 288, 
 
 70 Pac. 1034 580 
 
 "Wakeman v. Everett, 41 Hun, 278 874 
 V. Grover, 4 Paige, 23 334 
 
 V. Norton (1897), 24 Colo. 192, 
 
 49 I'ac. 283, 814 
 
 Walburn i'. Chenault, 43 Kan. 352 97 
 
 "Walcott V. Hand (1894), 122 Mo. 
 
 621, 27 S. W. 331 198 
 
 "Waldo r. Thweatt (1897), 64 Ark. 
 
 126, 40 S. W. 782 717 
 
 Waldron v. Home Mutual Ins. Co. 
 (1894), 9 Wash. 534, 38 Pac. 
 136 624 
 
 Walker r. Bamberger (1898), 17 
 
 Utah, 2;59, 54 Pac. 108 410 
 
 V. Chester County (1893), 40 
 
 S. C. 342, 18 S. E. 9.36 677 
 
 V. Edraundson (1900), 111 Ga. 
 
 454, .36 S. E. 800 686 
 
 V. Ins. Co. (1894), 143 N. Y. 167, 
 
 38 N. E. 106 850, 803 
 V. Irwin (1895), 94 la. 448, 62 
 
 N. W. 785 588 
 
 V. Johnson (1881), 28 Minn. 147, 
 
 'J N. W. 632 866, 878 
 
 Walker r. Kynett, 32 Iowa, 524 63 
 
 V. Lanev, 27 S. C. 150 828 
 
 V. Mauro, 18 Mo. 564 90 
 r. McCaull (1900), 13 S. D. 512, 
 
 83 X. W. 578 682 
 
 V. McKay, 2 Mete. 294 131, 134, 
 
 135 
 t'. McNeill (1897), 17 Wash. 582, 
 
 50 Pac. 518 673 
 
 V. Mitchell. 18 B. Mon. 541 516 
 V. O'Connell (1898), 59 Kan. 306, 
 
 52 Pac. 894 643 
 V. Paul, Stanton's Code (Ky.), 
 
 37 • 251 
 
 r. Sedgwick. 8 Cal. 398 29, 30, 475 
 
 V. Steele, 9 Colo. 388 89 
 
 i'. Symonds, 3 Swanst. 75 352 
 V. Walker (1895), 93 la. 643, 61 
 
 N. W. 960 864 
 r. Walker (1897), 150 Ind. 317, 
 
 50 N. E. 68 824 
 
 V. Wilson, 13 Wis. 522 937 
 Walker's Adm. v. Walker, 25 Mo. 
 
 367 20, 31, 69 
 
 Walkup V. Zehring, 13 Iowa, 306 472 
 Wall V. Buffalo Water Co., 18 N. Y. 
 
 119 742 
 
 V. Fairley, 77 N. C. 105 343 
 'v. McMillan (1895), 44 S. C. 402, 
 
 22 S. E. 424 330 
 I'. Mines (1900), 1.30 Cal. 27, 62 
 
 Pac. 386 427 
 r. Muster's Ex'rs (1901), Ky., 63 
 
 S. W. 432 817 
 
 V. Whisler, 14 Ind. 228 415 
 
 Wallace i\ Eaton, 5 How. Pr. 99 340 
 V. E.xch. Bk. of Spencer, 126 
 
 Ind. 265 748 
 
 V. Lark, 12 S. C. 576 791 
 
 t'. Morss, 5 Hill, 391 660 
 
 V. Robb, 37 Iowa, 192 780 
 V. Ryan (1894), 93 la. 115, 61 
 
 N. W. 395 672 
 Wallber v. Williams (1003), — Wis. 
 
 — , 93 N. W. 47 822 
 Wallenstein v. Selizman, 7 Bush, 
 
 175 878 
 
 Waller v. Bowling, 108 N. C. 289 200 
 V. Deranlciui (1003), — Neb. — , 
 
 94 N. W. 1038 849, 863, 982 
 
 v. Hamer (1902), 65 Kan. 168, 69 
 
 Pac. 185 855 
 
 Walley v. Walley, 1 Vern. 487 248 
 
 Walrod r. Bennett, 6 M;irb. 144 806 
 Walser v. Wear (1897), 141 Mo. 443, 
 
 42 S. W. 928 718, 906, 928 
 
 Walsh V. Hall, 66 N. C. 233 891. 920, 
 
 922, 927 
 
 V. Mehrback, 5 Iliin, 448 751 
 V. Wash. Mar. Ins. Co., 3 Robt. 
 
 202 150 
 
 Walsworth >: Johnson, 41 Cal. 61 815 
 
 Walter v. Bennett, 16 N. Y. 250 626, 630, 
 
 631, 633 
 
 V. Fowler, 85 N. Y. 621 598
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references ABE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Walters c. Cont. Ins. Co., 5 Hun, 343 470 
 V. Eaves (1898), 105 Ga. 584, 32 
 
 S. E. 609 543, 930 
 
 V. Walters, 132 III. 467 360 
 
 Walton ;;. Washburn (1901), Ky., 64 
 
 S. W. 634 180 
 
 Walton Plow Co. v. Campbell, 52 
 
 N. W. Hep. 883 
 Waltz ('. Waltz, 84 Ind. 403 
 Wandell v. Edwards, 25 Hun, 498 
 
 779 
 112 
 
 784, 
 799 
 495 
 662 
 
 Wandle v. Turney, 5 Duer, 661 
 Wands v. School Dist., 19 Kan. 204 
 Wanser v. Lucas (1895), 44 Neb. 759, 
 
 62 N. W. 1108 
 Wapello Cy. v. Bigham, 10 Iowa, 39 
 Warburton v. Ralph (1894), 9 Wash. 
 
 537, 38 Pac. 140 
 Ward V. HUckwood, 48 Ark. 396 
 i: Cowdrey, 5 N. Y. Suppl. 282 
 V. Edge (1897), 100 Ky. 757, 39 
 
 S. W.440 
 V. Guyer, 3 N. Y. S. C. 58 
 V. Petrie (1898), 157 N. Y. 301, 51 
 
 N. E. 1002 
 V. Rvba (1897), 58 Kan. 741, 51 
 
 Pac; 223 116, 149 
 
 V. Waterman, 85 Cal. 488 350 
 
 i'. Waters, 63 Wis. 39 821 
 
 Warden v. Fond du Lac Sup., 14 
 
 Wis. 618 
 Warder v. Cuthbert (1896), 99 la. 
 681. 68 N. W. 917 
 V. Seitz (1900), 157 Mo. 140, 57 
 
 S. W. 537 579, 584 
 
 Ware v. Long (1902), Kv., 69 S. W. 
 
 797 
 Waring v. Gaskill (1895), 95 Ga. 731, 
 22 S. E. 659 ■ 
 V. Indem. Fire Ins. Co., 45 N. Y. 
 
 606 
 
 V. Waring, 3 Abb. Pr. 246 
 
 Warner v. Hess (1899), 66 Ark. 11-3, 
 
 49 S. W. 489 
 
 V. Myrick, 16 Minn. 91 779, 810 
 
 V. Stp. Uncle Sam, 9 Cal. 697 230 
 
 V. Turner, 18 B. Mon. 758 103 
 
 V. Warren, 46 N. Y. 228 314, 315 
 
 Warren v. Boyd (1897), 120 N. C. 56, 
 
 26 S. E. 700 818 
 
 V. Burton, 9 S. C. 196 334 
 
 V. Chandler ( 1896), 98 la. 237, 67 
 
 N. W. 242 866 
 
 V. Hall (1895), 20 Col. 508, 38 
 
 Pac. 767 854, 919 
 
 V. Howard, 99 N. C. 190 254 
 
 V. Van Pelt. 4 E. D. Smith, 202 910 
 
 Warrenton v. Arrington, 101 N. C. 
 
 109 
 Warshawkv i\ Anchor Ins. Co. 
 (18'.)0), 98 la. 221, 67 N. W. 237 ^ 
 Wiu-th V. Kadile, 18 Abb. Pr. 396 
 
 49 
 293 
 
 757 
 920 
 113 
 
 756 
 661 
 
 180 
 
 118 
 
 816 
 
 664 
 
 914 
 
 150 
 419 
 
 605 
 
 190 
 
 Warthen v. Himstreet (1900), 112 la. 
 605, 84 N. W. 702 
 
 830 
 388, 
 525 
 
 603 
 
 Washburn & M. Man. Co. v. Chicago 
 
 G. W. F. Co., 109 111. 71 358 
 
 Washington ;;. Love, 34 Ark. 93 286 
 
 i: Spokane St. Ky. Co. (1895), 13 
 
 Wash. 9, 42 Pac. 628 083 
 
 Washington Nat. Bank ?■. Saunders 
 (1901), 24 Wash. 321, 61 
 Pac. 546 ' 867 
 
 v. Woodrum (1898), 60 Kan. 34, 
 
 55 Pac 330 466 
 
 Washington Sav. Bank y. Butchers', 
 etc. Bank (1895), 130 Mo. 155, 31 
 S. W. 761 , ■ 872 
 
 Washington Tp. v. Bonney, 45 Ind. 
 
 77 147, 725 
 
 Water Supply, etc. Co. v. Larimer, 
 etc. Co. (1898), 25 Col. 87, 53 Col. 
 386 665 
 
 Water Supply Co. v. Hoot (1895), 50 
 
 Kan. 187, 42 ]\ac. 715 359 
 
 Waterbury v. Westervelt, 9 N. Y. 
 
 5!)8 302 
 
 Waterhouse v. Schlitz Brewing Co. 
 (1900), 12 S. D. 397, 81 M. W. 
 725 305 
 
 Waterman r. C, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 
 
 61 Wis. 464 149 
 
 V. Frank, 21 Mo. 108 89 
 
 V. Waterman, 81 Wis. 17 515 
 
 Waterville Man. Co. v. Bryan, 14 
 
 Barb. 182 785 
 
 Watkinds v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., 38 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 711 778 
 
 Watkins v. Brvant, 91 Cal. 492 350 
 
 V. Jones, 28 Ind. 12 769, 808 
 
 V. Milwaukee, 52 Wis. 98 878 
 
 V. Wilco.x, 4 Hun, 220 354, 373 
 
 Watson V. Conwell, 30 N. E. Rep. 5 310 
 V. Gabby, 18 B. Mon. 658 101 
 
 V. Glover (1899), 21 Wash. 677, 
 
 59 Pac. 516 17 
 
 V. Hazzard, 3 Code R. 218 519 
 
 V. Lemen, 9 Colo. 200 753 
 
 V. Railway Co. (1894), 8 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 144, 27 S. W. 924 469 
 V. Richardson (1900), 110 la. 
 
 698, 80 N. W. 416 815 
 
 V. Rushmore, 15 Abb. Pr. 51 635 
 
 V. San Francisco & H. B. R. Co., 
 
 50 Cal. 523 455, 456 
 
 V. St. Paul Citv Ry. Co. (1899), 
 
 76 Minn. 358, 79 N. W. 308 710 
 Watt V. Alvord, 25 Ind. 533 325, 336 
 
 ;.'. Mayor. 1 Sandf. 23 131, 133 
 
 Wattels r. Minchen (1895), 93 la. 
 
 517, 61 N. W. 915 002,710 
 
 Watts r. Co.ven, 52 Ind. 155 748 
 
 V. Creighton, 52 N. W. Rep. 12 327 
 
 V. Gallagher, 31 Pac. Rep. 626 316 
 
 V. Gantt (1899), 42 Neb. 869, 61 
 
 N. W. 104 896, 903, 906, 928 
 
 V. Julian, 122 Ind. 124 327 
 
 V. McAllister, 33 Ind. 204 626, 631 
 
 v: Svmes, 1 DeG. M. & G. 240 246 
 
 Waugh V. Blumenthal, 28 Mo. 462 369
 
 clxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references 
 
 Waughenheim r. Graham, 39 Cal. 
 
 IG'J Oil, 927 
 
 Waukon & Miss. R. Co. r. Dwyer, 49 
 
 Iowa, I'Jl 576 
 
 Wausau Boom Co. v. Plumer, 49 "Wis. 
 
 11- 195 
 
 Way V. Bragaw, 1 C. E. Green, 213 260 
 1-. Colyer ( 1893), 54 Minn. 14, 55 
 
 N. \V. 744 132 
 
 Wavland v. Tysen, 45 N. Y. 281 787 
 
 Waviiure -•. Wavmirc (1895), 144 
 
 Iml. 329, 43 X.E. :i67 822 
 
 Weaver r. Apple' (1896), 147 Ind. 
 
 304, 46 N. E. 642 645 
 
 V. Braden, 49 N. Y. 286 765, 779, 
 
 812 
 V. Cressman, 21 Neb. 675 340 
 
 V. Wabasli, L-tc. Can. Trs., 28 Ind. 
 
 112 145, 149 
 
 Webb v. Bidwell, 15 Minn. 479 563, 
 
 665 
 V. Hayden (1901), 166 Mo. 39, 65 
 
 S. W. 760 160 
 
 r. Ilelion, 3 Kobt. 625 372 
 
 Webber r. Ward (1896), 94 Wis. 
 
 605, 69 N. W. 349 815 
 
 Weber i-. Dillon (1898), 7 Okla. 568, 
 
 54 Pac 894 177 
 
 V. Marshall, 19 Cal. 447 52 
 
 Webster i-. Bebintier, 70 Ind. 9 784 
 
 1-. Bond, 9 Hun, 437 45, 47, 411 
 
 i: Drinkwater, 5 Greenl. 322 652 
 
 V. Ilarwinton, 32 Conn. 131 118 
 
 V. Long (1901), 63 Kan. 876, 66 
 
 Pac. 1032 780 
 
 V. Tibbits, 19 Wis. 438 256, 278, 662. 
 
 725 
 Wedgewood r. Parr (1900). 112 la. 
 
 514, 84 N. W. 528 453 
 
 Weed V. Case, 55 Barb. 534 629 
 
 Weeks v. Love, 50 N. Y. 568 213 
 
 i-.McPhail (1901), 128 N. C. 134, 
 
 38 S. E. 292 452 
 
 V. O'Brien (1891), 141 N. Y. 199, 
 
 36 N E. 185 671, 672 
 
 V. Pryor, 27 Barb. 70 872 
 
 r. Smith. 18 Kan. 508 784 
 
 Weese v. Barker, 7 Colo. 178 197 
 
 Weetjen v. Vibbard, 5 Hun, 266 238 
 
 Wehle V. Butler, 01 X. Y. 245 301 
 
 Wi-limhoff r. Rutherford (1895), 98 
 
 Ky. 91, .32 S. W. 288 600, 659 
 
 Welch 1-. Milliken (1898), 57 Neb. 86, 
 
 77 N. W. 363 639 
 
 Weil >: Howard, 4 Nev. 384 474 
 
 r. Jones, 70 Mo. 560 870, 880 
 
 r. Lankins, 3 Neb. 384 260 
 
 Wciidand v. ('(jchran. 9 Neb. 480 29 
 
 Weir r. Groat, N. Y. S. C. 444 315 
 
 V. Itathbun (1895), 12 Wash. 84, 
 
 40 Pac. 625 327 
 
 Weirich v. Dodge (1899), 101 Wis. 
 
 621, 77 N. W. 906 181 
 
 Wei«e r. fieriu-r. 42 Mo. 527 104 
 
 Welborn v. Eckcy, 25 Neb. 193 428 
 
 ARE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Welch V. City of Astoria (1894), 26 
 
 Ore. 89, 37 Pac. G6 687 
 
 r. Hazelton, 14 I low. Pr. 97 939 
 
 V. Piatt, 32 Hun, 194 471 
 
 ?•. Sackett, 12 Wis. 243 202 
 
 Weld f. The Jolinson Mfg. Co. 
 
 ( 1893), 86 Wis. 549, 57 N. W. 378 47 
 Welier v. Goble, 66 Iowa, 113 112 
 
 Welles r. Yaies, 44 N. Y. 525 29, 30 
 
 Wells V. Cone, 55 Barb. 585 178, 202 
 
 V. Green Bay, etc. Canal Co. 
 (1895), 90 Wis. 442, 64 
 N. W. 99 355 
 
 V. Henshaw, 3 Bosw. 625 934 
 
 V. Jewett, 11 How. Pr. 242 502 
 
 r. McPike, 21 Cal 215 753 
 
 V. Monihan. 129 N. Y. 161 815 
 
 V. Mutual Benefit Ass'n (1894), 
 
 126 Mo. 630, 29 S. W. 607 605 
 V. Pacific R. Co., 35 Mo. 164 578 
 
 V. Sinmionds, 8 Hun, 189 310 
 
 V. Stewart, 3 Barb. 40 131, 133 
 
 V. Strange, 5 Ga. 22 248 
 
 V. Wells (1898), 144 Mo. 198, 45 
 
 S. W. 1095 308 
 
 V. Western Paving & Supply Co. 
 (1897), 96 Wis. 116, 70 N.W. 
 1071 606 
 
 Well«, Fargo, & Co. v. Coleman, 53 
 
 Cal. 416 576 
 
 Welsh i: Burr (1898), 56 Neb. 361, 
 
 76 N. W. 905 604 
 
 V. Darragh, 52 N. Y. 590 627 
 
 Welsher v. Libby, McNeil & Libbv 
 (1900), 107 Wis. 47, 82 N. W. 
 693 934 
 
 Wendover v. Baker (1893), 121 Mo. 
 
 273, 25 S. W. 918 47 
 
 Wenk V. City of New York (1902), 
 
 171 N. Y. 607, 64 N. E. 509 592 
 
 Wenning v. Teeple (1895), 144 Ind. 
 
 189, 41 N. E. 600 678 
 
 Werner r. Ascher (1893), 86 Wis. 
 
 349, 56 N. W. 869 593 
 
 Wernli r. Collins, 54 N. W. 365 620 
 
 Wertf. Crawfordsville& A. Tump. 
 
 Co., 19 Ind. 242 785 
 
 West V. Bisho]) (1900), 110 la. 410, 
 
 81 N. W. 696 818 
 
 V. Eley (1901), 39 Ore. 461, 65 
 
 Pac. 798 587 
 
 V. Miller, 125 Ind. 70 327 
 
 v. Moody, 33 Iowa, 137 931, 935 
 
 I'. Norwich Union Fire Ins. 
 Co. (1894), 10 Utah, 442, 37 
 Pac. 685 689 
 
 V. Randall, 2 Mason, 181 249, 251 
 V. West (lh98), 114 Mo. 119, 46 
 
 S. W. 13!» 704 
 
 West Midland Rv. Co. v. Nixon, 1 
 
 Hem. & M. 176' 256 
 
 West Point Irrigation Co. v. Ditch 
 
 Co. (1900), 21 Utah, 229,61 Pac. 16 320 
 West Point Water, etc. Co. v. State 
 (1896), 49 Neb. 223, 68 N. W. 607 709
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 clxv 
 
 [the references 
 
 West Seattle Land Co. v. Ilerren 
 
 (1897), 16 Wash. G65, 48 Pac. 341 639 
 Wostcott V. Ainsworth, ;) Ilun, 53 627, 
 
 ()2'J 
 r. Brown, 13 Ind. 83 748, 784 
 
 r. Fargo, 61 N. Y. 542 354 
 
 Western Assurance Co. v. Dry 
 Goods Co. (1808), 54 Nob. 241, 
 74 N. W. 592 639 
 
 Western Assurance Co. v. Towie, 65 
 
 Wis. 247 651 
 
 Western Bank v. Sherwood, 29 Barb. 
 
 383 122 
 
 Western Carolina Bank v. Atkinson 
 
 (1893), 113 N. C. 478, 18 S. E. 703 787 
 Western Compound Co. See Great 
 
 Western, etc. 
 Western Cornice, etc. AVorks i\ 
 Mever (1898), 55 Neb. 440, 76 
 N. W. 23 640 
 
 Western Dev. Co.f.Emery, 61 Cal.611 112 
 Western Mattress Co. v. Potter 
 
 (1903), — Neb. -, 95 N. W. 841 752 
 
 Western 11. Co. r. Nolan, 48 N. Y. 
 
 513 104, 238, 251, 253 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Fenton, 
 
 52 Ind 1 713 
 
 V. Henley (1901), 157 Ind. 90,60 
 
 N. E. 682 669 
 
 V. Meek, 49 Ind. 53 748 
 
 V. Mullins (1895), 44 Neb. 732, 
 
 62 N. W. 880 714 
 
 V. Parsons (1903), Ky., 72 S. W. 
 
 800 665 
 
 V. State (18^6), 146 Ind. 54, 44 
 
 N. E. 793 643 
 
 Westervelt v. Acklev, 62 N. Y. 505 930, 
 
 940 
 Westfall i: Dungan, 14 Iowa St. 276 874 
 Westfelt 0. Adams (1902), 131 N. C. 
 
 379, 42 S. E. 823 64 
 
 WestiPixliouse Co. v. Tilden (1898), 
 
 56 Neb. 129, 76 N. W. 416 626 
 
 Westlake v. Farrow, 34 S. C. 270 470 
 
 Weston V. Brown (1899), 158 N. Y. 
 
 360, 53 N. E. 36 26 
 
 V. Estey (1896), 22 Colo. 334, 
 
 45 Pac. 367 825 
 
 V. Keighlev, Finch, 82 242 
 
 V. Lumley,'33 Ind. 486 831 
 
 V. McMuUin, 42 Wis. 567 637 
 
 V. Meyers (1895), 45 Neb. 95, 63 
 
 N. W. 117 566 
 
 V. Turver, 17 N. Y. St. Hep. 
 
 502 915 
 
 Wetherell v. Collins, 3 Mad. 255 378 
 
 Wetmore v. Crouch (1899), 150 Mo. 
 
 671, 51 S. W. 738 565, 579 
 
 Wetzstein v. Boston & M. Min. Co. 
 (1903), 28 Mont. 451, 583, 
 72 Pac. 865 714 
 
 V. Hegeman, 88 N. Y. 69 147 
 
 Wetmore v. San Francisco, 44 Cal 
 
 294 91, 97, 766, 778, 779, 803 
 
 Wi-y mouth V. Boyer, 1 V€s. 416 250 
 
 ARE TO THE PAOES.] 
 
 Whalen v. Citizens' Gas Light Co. 
 (1896), 151 N. Y. 70, 45 N. E. 
 363 673 
 
 Whaley v. Dawson, 2 Sch. & Lef. 370 
 
 506 
 V. Lawton (1898), 53 S. C. 580, 
 
 31 8. E. 660 604 
 
 V. Lawton (1900), 57 S. C. 256, 
 
 35 S. ¥.. 558 644 
 
 Whalon i-. Aldricli, 8 Minn. 346 852, 
 
 911, 913 
 Whatling v. Nash, 41 Hun, 579 471 
 
 Wiieat r. Kice, 97 N. Y. 296 ] 1 1 
 
 Wheatley r. Strobe, 12 Cal. 92 'JO 
 
 Wlieaton v. Briggs, 35 Minn. 470 758 
 Whedbee r. Leggett, 92 N. C. 469 940 
 V. Keddick, 79 N. C. 521, 887, 895, 
 Wheeler v. Barker (1897), 51 Neb. 
 
 846, 71 N. W. 750 711 
 
 V. Billings, 38 N. Y. 263 751, 762, 764 
 V. Floral Mill Co., 9 Nev. 254 563 
 
 V. Lack (1900), 37 Ore. 238, 
 
 61 Pac. 849 413 
 
 Wheeler, etc. Co. v. Worrall, 80 Ind 
 
 297 684 
 
 Wheeler, etc. MfL^ Co. r. Bjelland 
 
 (1896), 97 la. 637, 66 N. W. 885 942 
 Wheeler Savings Bank r. Trace}' 
 (1897), 141 Mo. 252, 42 S. W. 946 466, 
 
 470 
 Wheelock v. Lee, 64 N. Y. 242 29, 42 
 
 V. Pacific Pn. Gas Co., 51 Cal. 
 
 223 1)30, 933 
 
 Whcreatt >: Worth (1900), 108 Wis. 
 
 291, 84 N. W. 441 639, 643, 820 
 
 Whetstone v. Beloit S. B. Co., 45 
 
 N. W. Kep. 535 471 
 
 In re, Whetton, Estate of (1893), 98 
 
 Cal. 203, 32 Pac. 970 308 
 
 Whippernian r. Dunn, 124 Ind. 349 180 
 Whipple V. Fowler (18:!4), 41' Neb. 
 
 675, 60 N. W. 15 645 
 
 Whitaki'i' r. Whitaker, 52 N. Y. 368 316 
 Whitbeck v. Sees (1898), 10 S. D. 
 
 417, 73 N. W. 915 593 
 
 r. Skir.iier, 7 Hill, 53 843 
 
 Whitcomb ;.• Hardy (1897), 68 Minn. 
 
 265, 71 N. W. 263 725, 804 
 
 White V. Allatt, 87 Cal. 245 147 
 
 r. Allen, 3 Ore. 103 792 
 
 r. Blitch (1900), 112 Ga. 775, 38 
 
 S. E. 80 849 
 
 V. Costisjan (1903), 138 Cal. 564, 
 
 72 Pac. 178 735 
 
 r. Cox, 46 Cal. 169 456 
 
 f. Johnson (1895), 27 Ore. 282, 
 
 40 Pac. 511 413 
 
 V. Joy, 13 N. Y. 83 541 
 
 V. Lvons, 42 Cal. 279 15, 37, 544, 559 
 V. M'iller, 7 Hun, 427 310, 801 
 
 V. Moses, 11 Cal. 69 814 
 
 V. Parker, 8 Barb. 48 160 
 
 r. Phelps, 14 Minn. 27 99 
 
 V. San Rafael, etc. R. Co., 54 
 
 Cal. 176 713
 
 clxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the befere-nces are to the pages.] 
 
 !■; 
 
 769, 803 
 
 570 
 
 719, 791 
 
 Wliite V. Scott, 26 Kan. 476 
 V. Smith. 46 X. Y. 418 
 i: Soto, 82 Cal. 654 
 i: Spencer, 14 N. Y. 247 
 c. Wliite's Bk. of Buffalo r. Far- 
 thing. 101 N. Y. 344 260, 414 
 Whitehead r. Sweet (1899), 126 Cal. 
 
 67. 58 Pac. 376 15, 466, 511, 606 
 
 WJiiteiiill V. Shickle, 43 Mo. 537 66 
 
 Whitelegee v. De Witt, 12 Daly, 
 
 319 ' 911 
 
 Whitelev i: Southern Rv. Co. (1896), 
 
 119N:C. 724. 25 S. E. 1018 664 
 
 White C)ak Dist. Tp. r. Oskaloosa 
 Dist. Tp., 44 Iowa, 512 181, 190, 277, 
 
 279 
 Wliite Sulphur Springs Co. v. Holly, 
 
 4 \V. Va. 597 
 Whiting i: Doob (1898), 152 Ind. 157, 
 52 N. E. 759 
 V. Koepke (1898), 71 Conn. 77, 
 
 40 Atl. 1053 
 
 V. Root, 52 Iowa, 292 18, 34, 37 
 
 Whitlock r. Redford. 82 Ky. 390 922 
 
 v. Uhle (1903), 75 Conn. 423, 53 
 
 Atl. 891 
 
 Whitman r. Keith, 18 Ohio St. 134 
 
 118 
 
 643 
 
 615 
 
 603 
 100, 
 120 
 592 
 
 ( . Wairy. 44 W^is. 491 
 Whitman McXaniara Tobacco Co. v. 
 
 Wurm (1902), Kv-, 66 S. W. 609 302 
 Wiiiimire r. Boyd (1898), 53 S C. 
 
 315. 31 S. E. .306 040 
 
 Whitner v. Perhacs, 25 Abb. N. Casi 
 
 130 471 
 
 Whitney v. Allaire. 1 X. Y. 305 843 
 
 i: Chicago & X. W. Ry. Co., 27 
 
 Wis. 327 060 
 
 c. McKinney, 7 Johns. Ch. 144 357, 
 
 378 
 V. Priest (1901), 26 Wash. 48, 66 
 
 Pac. 108 703 
 
 r. Whitnev (1902), 171 N. Y. 176, 
 
 03 X.'E. 834 762 
 
 Whitsett V. Keishow, 4 Colo. 419 343 
 
 Whittfd V. Xasli, 60 X. C. 590 413 
 
 Wiiittenhall v. Korber, 12 Kan. 618 290 
 Whitty v. City of Oshkosh (1900), 
 
 106 Wis. 87, 81 N. W. 992 673 
 
 Whitworth V. Davis, 1 Ves. & B. 550 612 
 Wickersham v. Comerford (1894), 
 
 104 Cal. 494, 38 Pac. 101 757 
 
 V. Crittenden. 93 Cal. 17 356, 471 
 
 Wickhatn v. Weil, 17 X. Y. Suppl. 
 
 518 933 
 
 Wickwire v. Angola, 30 X. E. Rep. 
 
 917 748 
 
 Widener .;. State, 45 Ind. 244 748 
 
 Wict)hold V. Hermann, 2 Mont. 609 676 
 Wiedenian r. Hedges (1901), 03 Neb. 
 
 103. 88 X. W. 170 768 
 
 Wieiienfeid r. Byrd, 17 S. C. 106 295 
 
 Wiesner v. Young, 52 X. W. Rep. 
 
 390 190 
 
 Wigand i;. Sickel, 3 Keyes, 120 651 
 
 Wiggins I'. McDonald, 18 Cal. 126 
 
 104, 105, 
 Wigmore r. Buell (1897), 116 Cal. 
 
 94, 47 Pac. 927 835, 
 
 Wigton r. Smith (1895), 46 Xeb. 461, 
 
 04 X. W. 1080 
 Wilbour r. Hill. 72 X. Y. .36 
 Wilcke V. Wilcke (1897), 102 la. 173, 
 71N. W. 201 703, 
 
 Wilco.x r. Hausch, 57 Cal. 139 
 r. McCoy, 21 Ohio St. 655 
 Wilcox Lumlier Co. v. Rittenian 
 (1902), 88 Minn. 18, 92 X. W. 472 
 Wild V. Columbia Cy. Sup., 9 How. 
 
 I'r. 315 
 Wildbahn r. Robidoux, 11 Mo. 659 
 Wilde r. Ilaycraft, 2 Duval, 309 
 Wilder v. Bovnton, 63 Barb. 547 
 
 911, 
 Wildman v. Wildman (1898), 70 
 
 Conn. 700, 41 Atl. 1 400. 46U, 462, 
 Wiles i: Lambert, 66 Ind. 492 598, 
 V. Suydam, 6 X. Y. Sup. Ct. 292 
 455, 458, 482, 505. 
 Wilev V. Starbnck. 44 Ind. 177 
 Wilhelm r. Byles, 60 Mich. 561 
 Wilhoit V. (i)unnin<,'liam, 87 Cal. 
 
 453 
 Wilken V. Exterkamp (1897), 102 
 
 Ky. 143, 42 S. W. 1140 
 Wilkerson v. Farnliam, 82 Mo. 672 
 
 r. Hast, 57 Ind. 172 
 Wilkes V. Morehead, Stanton's Code, 
 
 31 n. 
 Wiikeson, etc. Co. r. Driver (1894), 
 
 9 Wash. 177, 37 Pac. 307 
 Wilkins r. Batterman, 4 Barb. 47 
 
 r. Erv, 1 Meriv. 262 236, 254, 
 r. Lee (1894), 42 S. C. 31, 19 
 
 S. E. 1016 
 r. Moore, 20 Kan. 538 
 V. Stidger, 22 Cal. 231 
 r. Suttles (1894), 114 X. C. 650, 
 19 S. E. 606 
 Wilkinson r. Bertock (1900), HI Ga. 
 187, 36 S. E. 623 870, 
 
 r. Fowkes, 9 Hare, 193 
 V. Henderson, 1 My. & K. 682 
 r. Parish, 3 Paige, 053 
 V. Pritchard (1895), 93 la. 308, 
 61 X. W. 965 
 Willard v. Carrigan (1902), Ariz., 68 
 Pac. 538 584, 
 
 V. Giles, 24 Wis. 319 
 V. Reas, 26 Wis. 540 177, 180, 
 270, 278, 
 Wilier r. Bergenthal, 50 Wis. 474 
 
 ;•. Mai)hy,51 Ind. 169 
 Willett '•. I'oVter. 42 Ind. 250 
 
 V. Willett, 3 Watts, 277 
 Willey I'. Xichols (1898), 18 Wash. 
 
 528, 52 Pac. 237 450, 
 
 Williams >: Allen, 29 Beav. 292 
 V. Bankhead. 19 Wall. 563 
 V. Boyd, 75 Ind. 286 
 
 15, 
 109 
 
 023 
 
 703 
 797 
 
 924 
 592 
 476 
 
 616 
 
 165 
 
 783 
 399 
 865, 
 913 
 
 467 
 665 
 
 621 
 147 
 261 
 
 181 
 
 806 
 982 
 661 
 
 104 
 
 137 
 611 
 
 413 
 
 692 
 684 
 
 923 
 
 872 
 .321 
 294 
 368 
 
 659 
 780 
 193, 
 457 
 618 
 784 
 273 
 649 
 
 478 
 352 
 321 
 942
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 clxv: 
 
 433 
 702 
 343 
 
 785 
 
 680 
 
 641 
 
 25 
 
 891 
 
 334 
 526 
 725 
 
 [the refebences 
 
 Williams v. Brown, 2 Keyes, 486 91, 
 
 131, 135, 935 
 
 V. Browulee, 101 Mo. 309 333 
 
 V. Casebcer (1899). 126 Cal. 77, 
 
 58 Pac. 380 228, 231 
 
 f. Eikenbarv (189.!), 36 Neb. 
 
 478, 54 N. \V. 852 
 V. Evans, 6 Neb. 216 
 V. Ewing, 31 Ark. 229 
 V. Franklin Pp. Acad. Ass., 26 
 
 Ind. 310 
 u. Fuller (1903), — Neb. —, 94 
 
 N. \V. 118 
 V. Hall (1898), 103 Ga. 796, 30 
 
 S. E. 660 
 V. Hayes, 5 How. Pr. 470 
 V. Irby, 15 S. C. 458 
 V. Kerr (1893), 113 N. C. 306, 18 
 
 S. E. 501 
 17. Lowe, 4 Neb. 382 
 I'. McGrade, 13 Minn. 46 
 V. Meeker, 29 Iowa, 292 326, 327 
 
 V. Meloy (1897), 97 Wis. 561, 73 
 
 N. W. 40 387 
 
 i;. Ninemire (1901), 23 Wash. 
 
 393. 63 Pac. 534 703 
 
 V. Norton, 3 Kan. 295 89, 97 
 
 V. Oresfon Short Line K. TJ. Co. 
 
 (1898), 18 Utah, 210, 54 
 
 Pac. 991 
 V. Peabody, 8 Hun, 271 
 V. Peinny, 25 Iowa, 436 
 V. Rogers, 14 Bush, 776 
 V. Scott's Adm., 11 Iowa, 475 293 
 ^•. Slote, 70 N. Y. 601 15, 34, 37, 38 
 V. Smitli, 49 Me. 564 378, 379 
 
 V. Smith, 22 Wis. 594 262 
 
 V. Southern Pac. R. R. Co. 
 
 (1895), 110 Cal. 457,42 Pac. 
 
 974 
 V. Thorn, 11 Paige, 459 
 V. Van Tuvl, 2 Ohio St. 336 
 V. Weiting, 3 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 
 439 
 r. Williams (1902), 115 la. 520, 
 
 88 N. W. 1057 639, 640 
 
 I'. Williains (1894), 20 Colo. 51, 
 
 37 Pac. 614 
 V. Williams ( 1899), 102 Wis. 246, 
 
 78 N. W. 419 
 I'. Williams (1903), 117 Wis. 125, 
 
 94 N. W. 24 
 Williams - Havward Shoe Co. v. 
 Brooks (1900), 9 Wyo. 424, 64 
 Pac. 342 
 Williams Mower, etc. Co. v. Smith, 33 
 
 Wis. 530 
 Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354 
 V. Dodge, 5 Hun, 497 
 V. Michigan Fire & Marine Ins. 
 
 Co. (1893), 86 Wis. 393, 57 
 
 N. W. 46 
 V. Selden (1898), 53 Minn. 73, 54 
 
 N. W. 1055 
 Willie c. Lugg, 2 Edm. 78 
 
 679 
 
 470, 519 
 
 118 
 
 290 
 
 207 
 123 
 369 
 
 932 
 
 230 
 
 618 
 
 675 
 
 783 
 
 785 
 137 
 316 
 
 110 
 
 340 
 
 247 
 
 ARE TO THK PAGES.] 
 
 Willis u. Barron (1898), 143 Mo. 450, 
 
 45 S. VV. 289 210, 887 
 
 i: City of Perry (1894), 92 la. 
 
 297, 60 N. VV. 727 817 
 
 V. DeWiti, 52 N. W. Rep. 1090 286 
 V. Tozer (1894), 44 S. C. 1, 21 
 
 S. K. 617 671 
 
 Willitsr. Walter (1898), 32 Ore. 411, 
 
 52 Pac. 24 680 
 
 Wills V. Simmon.ls, 8 Hun, 189 217 
 
 V. Siade, 6 Ves. 498 242 
 
 V. Wills, 84 Ind. 106 544, 546, 579 
 
 Willson V. Cieaveland, 30 Cal. 192 831, 
 
 833 
 V. Manhattan liy. Co., 20 N. Y. 
 
 Suppl. 852 806 
 
 Wilson V. Aberdeen (1901), 25 Wash. 
 
 614, 66 Pac. 95 716 
 
 V. Atlanta, etc. Kv. Co. (1902), 
 
 115 Ga. 171,41 S. E. 699 815 
 V. Bell, 17 Minn. 61 338 
 
 V. Burhans (1897), 96 Wis. 550, 
 
 71 N. W. 879 787 
 
 V. Castro, 31 Cal. 420 269, 505, 508 
 i: City Nat. Bank (1897), 51 
 
 Neb. 87, 70 N. W. 501 688 
 
 V. Clark, 20 Minn. 367 97, 564 
 
 V. Commercial Union Ins. Co. 
 
 (1902), 15 S. D. 322, 89 
 
 N. W. 649 756 
 
 f. Fuller (1894), 58 Minn. 149, 
 
 59 N. W. 988 626 
 
 V. Garagtv, 70 Mo. 617 284 
 
 V. Henrv,'40 Wis. 594 283 
 
 V. Houston, 76 N. C. 375 160, 205 
 V. Hughes, 94 N. C. 182 891, 922 
 
 V. Kiesel (1894), 9 Utah, 397, 
 
 35 Pac. 488 96, 102, 646 
 
 v. Lowry (1898), Ariz., 52 Pac. 
 
 777 710 
 
 V. Madison, 55 Cal. 5 942 
 
 V. Mineral Point, 39 Wis. 160 378 
 r. .Moore, 1 My. & K. 126 241 
 
 V. Neu (1901)", — Neb. — , 95 
 
 N. W. 502 756 
 
 V. Noonan, 35 Wis. 321 799 
 
 V. Railwav Co. (1897), 51 S. C. 
 
 79, 28 S. E. 91 773, 778, 818 
 
 V. Root, 48 Ind. 486 748 
 
 V. Runkel. 38 Wis. 526 870, 930 
 
 V. Smith, 61 Cal. 209 515 
 
 V. Sullivan (1898), 17 Utah, 341, 
 
 53 Pac. 994 790 
 
 V. Thompson, Stanton's Code 
 
 (Kv.), 60 467, 523 
 
 V. Wilson (1894), 26 Ore. 251, 38 
 
 Pac. 185 159 
 
 V. Wilson (1902), 41 Ore. 459, 
 
 69 Pac. 923 714 
 
 V. AVilson (1895), 117 N. C 351, 
 
 23 S. E. 272 809 
 
 V. Wilson's Guardianship (1902), 
 
 40 .Ore. 353, 68 Pac. 393 353 
 
 Wilt I'. Buchtel, 2 Wash. Ter. 417 820 
 Wiltman ;•. Watrv, 37 AVis. 238 756
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references are to the pages.] 
 
 Wiltsic c. Nortliam, 3 Bosw. 1G2 872 
 
 Winimcr v. Simon (1894), 9 Utah, 378, 
 
 35 Pac. 507 018 
 
 Wiliborne c. Lumber Co. (1902), 
 
 130 N C. 32, 40 S. E. 825 197 
 
 WiiiLiirn r. Fidelity, etc. Ass'n 
 
 ( litOO), 110 la. 374.'81 X. W. 682 069 
 Wimliester r. Joslyn (1903), — Colo. 
 
 — , 72 Pac. 1079 624, 790 
 
 "Wiliclicster, Bp. of, v. Mid Hants 
 
 Ky. Co.. L. K. 5 Kq. 17 255 
 
 AVinchester Turnpike Co. v. Wick- 
 
 liffe's Adm'r (1897), 100 Ky. 531, 
 
 38 S. W. 866 823 
 
 Windsor v. Miner (1899), 124 Cal. 
 
 492. 57 Pac. 386 664 
 
 Winemiller v. Laughlin (1894), 51 
 
 (), Si. 421, 38 X. E. Ill 677 
 
 AViner v. Mast (1896), 146 Ind. 177, 
 
 45 X. E. 66 814 
 
 Wines r. Rio Grande Ry. Co. (1893), 
 
 9 Utah. 228, 33 Pac. 1042 96 
 
 Wing r. Davis, 7 Greenl. 31 244 
 
 V. Dusjan, 8 Bush, 583 758 
 
 AVingard c. Banning, .39 Cal. 543 376 
 
 A\inkler v. Racine AVagon, etc. Co. 
 
 (1898), 99 Wis. 184, 74 N. W. 973 593 
 Winne v. Xiagara F. Ins. Co., 91 
 
 X. Y. 185 207, 217 
 
 AVinninaham v. Trueblood (1899), 
 
 149 .Aio 572, 51 S. AA^ 399 819 
 
 AA'inona & St. Peter R. Co. v. St. 
 
 Paul & S. C. R. Co., 23 Minn. 
 
 359 117 
 
 AVinslow r. Clark, 47 X. Y. 261 338, 379 
 V. Dousman, 18 \A''is. 456 342, 473 
 i: Minn. & Pac. R. Co., 4 Minn. 
 
 313 3.50 
 
 V. Urquhart, .39 Wis. 260 376 
 
 V. Winsiow, 52 Ind. 8 47, 886, 942 
 AVinston's Adm'r v. 111. Cent. R. R. 
 
 Co. ( 1901 ), Kv., 65 S. AV. 13 302 
 
 AVinter ,: McMillan, 87 Cal. 256 942 
 
 t: Winter, 8 Xev. 129 596 
 
 Winterburg v. AVinterburg (1893), 
 
 52 Kan. 406, 34 Pac. 971 623 
 
 AVinterfield v. Cream City Brewing 
 
 Co. (1897), 96 AVis. 239, 71 N. AV. 
 
 101 758 
 
 Wintermute >: Cooke, 73 X. Y. 107 38 
 AA'inters r. Means (1897), 50 Neb. 
 
 209, 69 X. AV. 753 684, 822 
 
 /■. Rush, 34 Cal. 1.36 149 
 
 Wintringham v. Hayes (1894), 144 
 
 X. Y. 1, 38 N. E. 999 913 
 
 AVintrode r. Uenbarger (1898), 150 
 
 Ind. .056, 50 X. E. 570 716 
 
 AVirt r. Dinan, 44 .Mo. App. 583 314 
 
 AVisconsin Cent. Bk. r. Knowlton, 
 
 12 Wis. 024 785 
 
 AVisconsin Lakes Ice Co. r. Ice Co. 
 
 (1902), 115 AVis. 377, 91 X. AV. 
 
 988 604 
 
 AVise V. Rose (1895), 110 Cal. 159, 42 
 
 Cal. 669 740 
 
 Wiseman v. Thompson (1895), 94 la. 
 
 607,63 N. W. 346 714,818 
 
 AViser r. Blachly, 1 Johns. Ch. 437 321, 
 
 347, 412 
 AVisner v. Ocumpaugh, 71 X". Y. 113 
 
 42,45 
 Wiswell v. Tefft, 5 Kan. 263 783 
 
 AVitherington r. Huntsman (1897), 
 
 64 Ark. 551, 44 S. AV. 74 877 
 
 AVitkowski V. Hern, 82 Cal. 604 637 
 
 Witte r. Eoote (1895), 90 AVis. 235, 
 
 62 N. AV. 1044 815 
 
 . V. Wolfe, 16 S. C. 256 515 
 
 AVittenbrock v. I'arker (1894), 102 
 
 Cal. 93, 36 Pac. 374 946 
 
 Witter r. Little, 66 Iowa, 431 153 
 
 AAMttraan i: AVatry, 37 AVis. 228 787 
 
 AA''ohhvend r. Case Threshing Mach. 
 
 Co., 42 Minn. 500 
 AA'olcott i\ Ensign, 53 Ind. 70 
 AVolf V. Banning, 3 Minn. 202 317 
 
 428 
 804 
 325, 
 335 
 
 V. H., 13 How. Pr. 84 855, 872 
 
 V. Hemrich Bros. Co. (1902), 28 
 AA'ash. 187, 68 Pac. 440 
 
 V. Schofield, 38 Ind. 175 
 
 626 
 576, 584, 
 748 
 
 V. Shelton (1902), 159 Ind. 531, 
 65 X. E. 582 
 Wolfe V. Mo. Pac. Rv. Co., 97 Mo. 
 
 473 
 Wolff r. Lamann (1900), 108 Kv., 
 .343, 50 S. AV. 408 
 V. Stoddard, 25 AVis. 503 
 r. Ward, 104 Mo. 127 
 Womble v. Fraps, 77 X. C. 198 
 
 V. Leach, 83 X. C. 84 
 Women's Christian Ass'n r. Kansas 
 City (1898), 147 Mo. 103. 48 S. AV. 
 960 
 Wood V. Anthony, 9 How. Pr. 78 
 V. Bangs, 1 Dakota, 179 
 V. Bewick Lumber Co. (1897), 
 
 103 Ga. 235, 29 S. E. 820 
 V. Brown (1897), 104 la. 124, 73 
 
 X. AV. 608 
 V. Brown, 34 X. Y. 337 
 r. Brush, 72 Cal. 224 
 V. Carter (1903), — Xeb. — , 93 
 
 X. AV. 15S 
 V. Cullen, 13 Minn. 394 
 r. Denver City Water Co. (1894), 
 
 20 Colo. 253, 38 Pac. 739 
 V. Dummer, 3 Mason, 315 
 
 V. Fisk, 63 X. Y. 245 
 
 V. Holland (1893), 57 Ark. 198, 
 
 21 S. AV. 223 
 
 V. Luscomb, 23 AVis. 287 
 
 1-. Mayor, etc. 73 X. Y. 656 
 
 V. Oakland, etc. Transit Co. 
 
 (1895), 107 Cal. 500, 40 Pac. 
 
 806 
 V. Olney, 7 Xev. 109 278 
 V. Orford, 52 Cal. 412 
 
 132 
 
 149 
 
 677 
 573 
 239 
 713 
 576 
 
 350 
 455 
 118 
 
 641 
 
 645 
 344 
 878 
 
 89 
 66 
 
 421 
 385 
 293 
 
 378 
 301 
 119 
 
 375 
 662 
 316 
 
 V. Ostram, 29 Ind. 177 
 
 764, 815
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 clxi.K 
 
 [toe eeferences are to the pages.] 
 "Wood V. Perry, 1 Barb. 114 122 | Wotten v. Copeland, 
 
 Steina (1896), 9 8. D. 110, 08 
 N. W. 160 200 
 
 V. White, 4 My. & Cr. 470 255, 256, I 
 
 358; 
 V. Williams, 4 Mad. 186 239 | 
 
 V. Wood, 83 N. Y. 575 225 i 
 
 Woodbridge v. De AVitt (1897), 51 
 
 Neb. 98, 70 N. W. 506 685 
 
 v. Sellwood (1896), 65 Minn. 
 
 135, 67 N. W. 799 811 
 
 Woodbury c. Delap, 1 N. Y. Sup. 
 
 20 496, 497 
 
 Woodbury Sav. Bk. v. Charter Oak 
 
 Ins. Co., 29 Conn. 374 111 
 
 Woodcock V. Bostic (1901), 128 
 
 N. C. 243, 38 S. E. 881 756 
 
 Wooden v. Waffle, 6 How. Pr. 145 23, 
 
 541, 559 
 Woodford v. Leavenworth, 14 Ind. 
 
 311 
 Woodhouse i-. Duncan, 106 N. Y. 527 
 Wooding V. Blanton (1900), 112 Ga. 
 
 509, 37 S. E. 720 
 Woodrick v. Woodrick (1894), 141 
 
 N. Y. 457, 36 N. E. 395 
 Woodruff V. Garner, 27 Ind. 4 862, 886, 
 
 898, 923 
 V. No. Bloomfield Gr. Min. Co., 
 8 Sawy. 628 
 Woods V. Colony Bank (1901), 114 
 Ga. G83, 40 S. E. 720 
 V. Sheldon(1896), 9 S. D. 392, 69 
 N. W. 602 
 Woodward v. Conder,33 Mo. App. 147 
 v. Lavertv, 14 Iowa, 381 
 V. State ("1899), 58 Neb. 598, 79 
 
 N. W. 164 565 
 
 V. Wood, 19 Ala. 213 244, 251 
 
 Woodwortli V. Campbell, 5 Paige, 
 
 518 243 
 
 V. Knowlton, 22 Cal. 164 739, 780 
 
 V. Sweet, 44 Barb. 268 315 
 
 Woody V. Jordan, 69 N. C. 189 728, 932 
 
 Wool V. Edenton (1893), 113 N. C. 
 
 33, 18 S. E. 76 191 
 
 Woolsey v. Brown, 74 N. Y. 82 316 
 
 V. EUenviUe V. Trs., 23 N. Y. 
 
 Suppl. 411 620 
 
 V. Williams, 34 Iowa, 413 564, 621 
 Wooster c. Chamberlin, 28 Barb. 
 
 602 273, 289 
 
 Work V. Tibbits, 133 N. Y. 574 637 
 
 Woronicki v. Pariskiego (1901), 74 
 
 Conn. 224, 50 Atl. 562 732 
 
 Worrall v. Munn, 38 N. Y. 137 517 
 
 Worth V. Fayetteville, 1 Wins. 70 118 
 V. Stewart (1898), 122 N. C. 
 
 263, 29 S. E. 413 678 
 
 V. Wliartou (1898), 122 N. C. 
 
 376, 29 S. E. 370 676 
 
 Wortliam v. Sinclair (1896), 98 Ga. 
 
 173, 25 S. E. 414 600, 802 
 
 Worthlev's Adm. v. Hammond, 13 
 Bush, 510 665 
 
 Johns. Ch. 
 140 " 243, 368 
 
 Wrigglesworth v. Wriggleswortli, 45 
 
 Wis. 255 37 
 
 Wright V. Bacheller, 16 Kan. 259 831, 
 
 942 
 V. Bundy, 11 Ind. 398 
 V. Cormer, 34 Iowa, 240 
 V. Delafield, 25 N. Y. 266 
 V. Hooker, 10 N. Y. 51 
 V. Howcdl, 35 Iowa, 288 
 V. Johnson, 50 Ind. 454 
 V, McCorniick, 67 N. C. 27 
 V. Schmidt, 47 Iowa, 233 
 V. Storrs, 32 N. Y. 691 
 V. Tinsley, 30 Mo. G89 
 V. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343 
 V. Wright, 54 N. Y. 437 
 
 11 
 
 292 
 
 196 
 
 800 
 
 242 
 
 715 
 
 714 
 
 895 
 936 
 
 247, 334 
 456 
 
 865, 889 
 633 
 333 
 618 
 594 
 748 
 178 
 149 
 306 
 15, 225, 316, 
 814 
 
 Wright, Barrett, etc Co. v. Robin- 
 son (1900), 79 Minn. 272,82 N. W. 
 632 655 
 
 Wright's Adm. v. Wright, 72 Ind. 
 
 149 159 
 
 Wunderlich v. Chicago & N. W. 
 R. R. Co. (1896), 93 Wis. 132, 66 
 N. W. 1144 191, 215 
 
 Wurlitzer v. Suppe, 38 Kan. 31 
 Wyandotte v. Agan, 37 Kan. 528 
 
 515 
 225, 
 231 
 
 Wyandotte, etc. Bridge Co. v. Wy- 
 andotte, 10 Kan. .326 
 Wyatt V. Wvatt (1897), 31 Ore. 531, 
 
 49 Pac. 855 
 Wygand v. Sichel, 3 Keyes, 120 
 Wvland r. Griffith (1895), 96 la. 24, 
 
 64 N. W. 678 
 Wylly c. Grigsbv (1899), 11 S. D. 
 
 491, 78 N. W. 957 
 Wyman v. Herard (1899), 9 Okla. 35, 
 
 59 Pac. 1009 179, 271 
 
 V. Remond, 18 How. Pr. 272 636 
 
 V. Robbins (1894), 51 0. St. 98, 
 
 37 N. E. 264 132 
 
 Wynn v. Cory, 43 Mo. 301 20, 30, 477 
 Wynne v. Heck, 92 N. C. 414 153 
 
 265 
 
 593 
 562 
 
 608 
 
 606 
 
 X. 
 
 Xenia Branch Bk. 
 372 
 
 Lee, 7 Abb. Pr. 
 
 902, 927 
 
 Yale r. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265 315 
 
 Yancey v. Greenlee, 90 N. C 317 196, 424 
 
 Yaucy v. Teter, 39 Ind. 305 727 
 
 Yardfcy v. Clothier, 51 Fed. Rep. 508 132 
 Yarwood v. Johnson (1902), 29 Wash. 
 
 643, 70 Pac. 123 665 
 
 Yates V. Compton, 2 P. Wms. 308 253 
 
 V. Hoffman, 5 Hun, 113 293 
 
 V. State, 58 Ind. 299 189
 
 clxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [the references 4RE TO THE PAGES.] 
 
 Yeatcs v. Walker, 1 Duv. 84 189, 453 
 
 Yotzer c. Young, 52 N. \V. Kep. 1054 426, 
 
 428 
 York r. Chicago. B. & Q. U. R. Co. 
 {ie9H), 5G Neb. 572, 76 
 N. \V. 1005 679 
 
 V. Rockwood, 132 Ind. 358 576 
 
 I', fciteward (1898), 21 Mont. 515, 
 
 55 Pac. 29 639 
 
 !•. Wallace, 48 Iowa, 305 620 
 
 York Park Bldg. Ass'n v. Barnes 
 
 ( 1894 1, 39 Neb. 8:34, 58 N. W. 440 686 
 Yorn '•. Bracken (1899), 153 Ind. 
 
 492, 55 N. H. 257 656 
 
 Yost V. Coin'l Bk. of Santa Ana. 94 
 
 Cai. 494 658 
 
 Young V. Borzone (1901), 26 Wash. 4, 
 
 66 Pac. 135 913 
 
 V. Catlett, 6 Duer, 437 738 
 
 V. Coleman, 43 Mo. 179 458 
 
 V. Drake, » Hun, (51 265, 470 
 
 V. Franklin Cy. Com'rs, 25 Ind. 
 
 295 209 
 
 V. Garlington, 31 S. C. 290 413 
 
 V. Gaut (1901), 69 Ark. 114, 61 
 
 S. W. 372 8!;6 
 
 V. Glascock, 79 Mo. 574 780, 805 
 
 r. Gormlev (1903), 119 la. 540, 
 
 93N.'W.565 625 
 
 J,-. Gormley (1903), 120 la. 372, 
 
 94 N. W. 922 675 
 
 V. Greenlee, 82 N. C. 346 283 
 
 V. Hudson, 99 Mo. 102 94, 97 
 
 1-. Marshall, 8 P>ing. 43 652 
 
 V. N. Y.& Liv. Stp. Co., 10 Abb. 
 
 Pr. 229 278, 355 
 
 V. Pickens. 49 Ind. 23 791 
 
 V. Schofield (1895), 132 Mo. 650, 
 
 34 S. W. 497 679, 752 
 
 V. Severy (1897), 5 Okla. 630, 49 
 
 Pac. 1024 603 
 
 V. Shickle H. & H. Iron Co., 103 
 
 Mo. 324 575 
 
 r. Young, 81 N. C. 91 29, 470, 496 
 Youngblood v. Railroad Co. (1901), 
 
 60 S. C. 9, 38 S. E. 232 679 
 
 Young Men's Chr. Ass. v. Dubach, 
 
 82 Mo. 475 830 
 
 Youngs I'. Kent, 46 N. Y. 672 751 
 
 Youngson v. Bond (1902), 64 Neb. 
 615, 90 N. \V. 556 254 
 
 Youngstown v. Moore, 30 Ohio St. 
 
 133 609 
 
 Younkin v. Milwaukee, etc. Co. 
 
 (1901), 112 Wis. 15, 87 N.W. 861 196, 
 
 263 
 Yuba V. Adams, 7 Cal. 35 428 
 
 Zabriskie r. Smith, 13 N. Y. 322 178, 
 
 215 
 Zalesky i-. Home Ins. Co. (1897), 102 
 
 la. 613, 71 N. W. 566 432 
 
 Zander f. Valentine Blatz Brewing 
 
 Co. (1897), 95 Wis. 162, 70 N. W. 
 
 164 651 
 
 Zarrs i\ Keck (1894), 40 Neb. 456, 
 
 58 N. W. 933 947 
 
 Zeidler v. Johnson, 35 Wis. 335 791 
 
 Zeller v. Martin, 54 N. W. Rep. 
 
 330 306 
 
 Ziglcr V. McClellan, 15 Ore. 499 911 
 
 Zimmerman v. Erhard, 58 How. Pr. 
 
 11 226 
 
 V. Makepeace (1899), 152 Ind. 
 
 199. 52 N. E. 992 239 
 
 V. Schoenfeldt, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 
 142 373 
 
 Zinc Carbonate Co. v. The First Na- 
 tional Bank of Shull.'sburg (1899), 
 
 103 Wis. 125, 79 N. W. 229 468, 493 
 Zinn V. Baxter (1901), 65 Ohio St. 
 
 341. 62 N. E. 327 181 
 
 Zion Church v. Parker (1901), 114 
 
 la. 1, 8G N. W. 60 603, 864 
 
 Zion Co-operative Ass'n v. Mayo 
 
 (1898), 22 Mont. 100. 55 Pac. 915 672 
 Zitske V. Goldberg, 38 Wis. 216 576 
 
 Zoller V. Kellogg, 66 Hun, 194 637 
 
 Zorger i-. Rapids Tp., 36 Iowa, 175 119 
 r. Ruster, 51 Wis. 32 329 
 
 Zorn r. Zorn, 38 Hun, 67 525 
 
 Zuelly 1-. Casper (1903), — Ind. — , 
 
 67 N. E. 103 118 
 
 Zug V. Forgan (1902), Neb., 90 N. W. 
 
 1129 593 
 
 Zundelowitz v. Webster (1896), 96 
 
 la. 587, 65 N. W. 835 606 
 
 Zurrtuh 1-. Smith (1902), 135 Cal. 
 
 644, 67 Pac. 1089 16
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES, 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 § 1. * 1. Necessity of Remedial Law. By far the greater 
 portion of any actual system of jurisprudence consists of com- 
 mands tlmt create and define those rights and corresponding 
 duties which control the normal relations of individuals with each 
 other and with the body politic of which they are members.^ 
 Some of these rights and their corresponding duties govern the 
 relations alone of the state with individuals, and are properly 
 termed public; the others are confined to the relations of in- 
 dividuals with each other, and are called private. As these 
 rights and duties form the very substratum of the whole law, as 
 the law and all the machinery of administration exist solely to 
 declare and enforce them, as they are in fact the very end and 
 object of legislation and government, they may be and are by 
 most juridical writers appropriately styled primary rights and 
 duties. If mankind were absolutely perfect so that disobedience 
 would be impossible, if it were certain that every command 
 uttered by the Supreme Power would be voluntarily obeyed by 
 those to whom it was addressed, the law would contain nothing 
 else than an enumeration of these primary rights and duties. 
 Since, however, disobedience is possible, and these primary rights 
 may be broken and duties unperformed, a supplemental branch 
 of the law becomes a matter of necessity, by which obedience 
 may be enforced. This secondary and supplementary department 
 is by some writers called the " sanctioning," because it deals with 
 
 1 [|For a discussion of the question, "What is Law? " see vol. 25, Reports Am. 
 Bar Ass'u, 1902, p. 445 et s"-/.] 
 
 1
 
 2 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 the sanctions which give their compulsive efficacy to the com- 
 mands of the supreme power. I shall, however, use the term 
 remedial as descriptive of this department, since it more nearly 
 accords with the nomenclature customary among lawyers in 
 England and in America. 
 
 § 2. * 2. Remedies and Remedial Rights and Duties. Definitions 
 and Illustrations. This secondary and supplementary or remedial 
 department of jm"isprudence has to do with remedies and with 
 remedial rights and duties. Remedies^ in their widest sense, are 
 either the final means by which to maintain and defend primaiy 
 rights and enforce primary duties, or they are the final equiva- 
 lents given to an injured person in the place of his original pri- 
 mary rights which have been broken, and of the original primary 
 duties towards him which have been unperformed. Remedial 
 rights, or rights of reined?/, are rights which an injured person 
 has to avail himself of some one or more of these final means, or 
 to obtain some one or more of these final equivalents. Remedial 
 duties are secondary duties, devolving upon the party who has 
 infringed upon the primary rights of another, and failed to per- 
 form his own primary duties towards that other, to make the 
 reparation provided by some one or more of these final means, or 
 furnished in some one or more of these equivalents. One or two 
 familiar and simple examples will illustrate and explain these 
 abstract definitions. A. and B. have entered into a contract by 
 which the latter has agreed to sell and deliver to the former a 
 quantity of merchandise : analyze the results of this relation. 
 A. has the right that B. should transfer and deliver to him the 
 goods referred to, and a corresponding duty rests upon B. to 
 make the transfer and delivery. This right and this duty are 
 primary. B. fails to perform, and thereupon a new secondary 
 right in A. arises, and a new secondary duty of B. A.'s new 
 right is to have the remedy which tlie law permits in such a case, 
 and B.'s new duty is to grant this remedy ; this new right and 
 this new duty are remedial. The remedy given under such cir- 
 cumsttinces is a pecuniary compensation, a sum of money in the 
 place of the goods, which in our legal nomenclature is termed 
 damages. In this instance the remedy is plainly an equivalent. 
 A.'s primary riglit was to acquire the ownership and the posses- 
 sion of the corpus of the goods; B.'s primary duty was to trans- 
 fer the ownership and possession of that corpus. The remedy,
 
 INTllODUCTION. 
 
 however, is not the ownership and possession of the merchan- 
 dise, but the ownership and possession of a sum of money instead 
 thereof. It is a moral and indirect means of enforcing the pri- 
 mary right, because it may induce B. to perform his primary duty 
 and deliver the goods ; but, if it does not produce that effect, it 
 is an equivalent for the ownership and possession of the articles 
 themselves. In this instance we have a given primary right and 
 duty, a breacli thereof b}^ non- performance, a new remedial right 
 and duty in the place of the primary ones, and a remedy differ- 
 ent from, but equivalent to, those originals. This familiar ex- 
 ample illustrates every case of remedy by a pecuniary compensation 
 in the place of the primary right and duty which have been 
 broken. Another example will be sufificient. A. and B. have 
 entered into a contract by which the latter has -agreed to convey 
 a certain farm, and to execute and deliver a deed thereof to the 
 former. Here A.'s primarj'- right is to have B. convey the farm, 
 which is done by executing and delivering the deed and by sur- 
 rendering possession of the land. B.'s corresponding primary 
 duty is to perform these acts. Upon B.'s refusal, A. is at once 
 clothed with a new and remedial right, and B. is subjected to a 
 new and remedial duty. Under these circumstances the law gives 
 a remedy which is the same as the end which was to be attained 
 by the primary right and duty themselves ; that is, the convey- 
 ance of the land. In other words, the law will compel B. to do 
 just what he in terms contracted to do, — execute and deliver 
 the deed and surrender the possession. Here the secondary 
 remedial right and duty are the same as the original primary 
 right and duty ; and the remedy itself is not an equivalent to, 
 but is identical with, the result to be reached by such primary 
 right and duty. The remedy, however, is plainly a means by 
 which A. maintains his primary right, and enforces the primary 
 duty which B. owes to him, for by it the self-same right is 
 upheld, and the self-same duty is performed. 
 
 § 3. * 3. Distinction bet'ween Public and Private Remedies. 
 When the primary rights and duties are public, that is, Avhen 
 they govern the relations alone of the State with individuals, 
 the remedies for the violation thereof are public, and the larger 
 portion of them are criminal. Wlien tlie primary rights and 
 duties are private, that is, when they are confined to relations 
 of individuals with each other, the remedies are also private, or,
 
 4 CIVIL REMKDIES. 
 
 as they are frequently termed, civil. This treatise will deal 
 with the latter class alone. The vast majority of public remedies 
 are designed to preserve the good order of society, and to enforce 
 those duties of individuals towards the State whose violations are 
 called crimes, and the remedies themselves are criminal: but 
 there are other public remedies which are not in any respect 
 criminal. The remedies to which I now refer may, at first 
 blush, appear to be private, and to be used to enforce some 
 rights that belong to an individual rather than to the body 
 politic ; yet, on closer examination of their elements and objects, 
 it Avill be plainly seen that they are strictly public, and serve to 
 uphold rights which inhere in the Commonwealth. The sub- 
 division which I am thus describing includes those judicial pro- 
 ceedings by which the regular organization and structure of the 
 government are preserved by determining the conflicting claims 
 of litigant parties to occupy and hold the powers and functions 
 of some particular public office. The individual who is, or who 
 claims to be, a portion of the governmental organism, by virtue 
 of an official position which he seeks to estaljlish, may be an 
 actor in the judicial proceeding ; but the proceeding is not insti- 
 tuted, nor is the determination made, on his own personal ac- 
 count, nor for his own private benefit; the State is in theory and 
 in practice the party primarily interested, and the rights of the 
 State are maintained and established by the judicial decision. 
 On the other hand, certain remedies which have the outward 
 appearance of being public, which are required by some ancient 
 and arbitrary rule of form to be brought in the name of the 
 Commonwealth or of the people, are actuall}- private and civil. 
 The interj)osition of the State as a nominal actor is merel}' 
 formal, and the rights to l)e upheld belong to individuals in their 
 private cliaracters and ca[)acities. Remedies and remedial rights 
 of this last class, being strictly private and civil, fall within the 
 scope of the present work, while those of the preceding class are 
 not embraced within its design.
 
 CHAPTER FIRST. 
 
 ABOLITION OF THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ACTIONS AT 
 LAW AND SUITS IN EQUITY, AND OF ALL THE COMMON- 
 LAW FORMS OF ACTION. 
 
 § 4. * 44. statutory Provision. The following is the form of 
 the simple but most comprehensive provision found in the codes 
 of procedure and practice acts, embodying the fundamental prin- 
 ciple which is the subject-matter of the present chapter, and 
 which is the single source from which all the other portions of 
 the system flow as necessary consequences : " The distinction 
 between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all 
 such actions and suits heretofore existing, are abolished; and 
 there shall be in this State hereafter but one form of action for 
 the enforcement or protection of private rights and the redress 
 of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action."^ 
 In a very few of the States the change from the former modes is 
 
 1 N. Y. § 69 (3.339) ; Cal. § 307 ; S. C. 
 § 92; Nev. § 1 ; Nebr. § 2; Kans. § 10; 
 Ohio, § 3 ; Ind. § 1 ; N. C. § 12 ; [Con- 
 necticut, Gen. St., 1902, § 607 ; Minnesota, 
 Gen. St., 1894, § 5131 ; Mi.ssouri, Kev. St., 
 1899, § 539; Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2600; 
 Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901. § 3112; 
 Montana, § 460 ; North Dakota, Rev. 
 Codes, 1899, § 5181 ; Wyoming, Kev. St., 
 1899, §3443; Colorado, § 1; Utah, Rev. 
 St., 1898, §2852; South Dakota, Ann. 
 St., 1901, § 6030; Oklahoma, St., 1893, 
 § 3882 ; ^Vashing•ton. Bal. Code, § 4793. 
 
 In the citations of New York statutes, 
 the section numbers first given refer to 
 tlie old Code of Procedure, while the 
 numbers a])pearing in parentheses refer 
 to the new code of Civil Procedure.] The 
 provision in the California Code is as 
 follows: "§307 (§ 1). There is in this 
 State but one form of civil action for the 
 enforcement or protection of ])rivate 
 rights, and the redress or prevention of 
 private wrongs." 
 
 £The provision of the New York code. 
 
 quoted in the text, has been changed to 
 read as follows : " There is only one form 
 of civil action. The distinction between 
 actions at law and suits in equity, and the 
 forms of those actions and suits, have been 
 abolished." Code Civ. Pro., § 3339. The 
 various codes differ somewhat among 
 themselves in the wording of this pro- 
 vision, but in a general way they follow 
 either the New York or California form. 
 The New York form is found in Indiana, 
 Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, Wisconsin, 
 Nortli Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado. South 
 Dakota, and Oklahoma, while the Califor- 
 nia form is found in Missouri, Ohio, Con- 
 necticut, South Carolina, Nevada, Idaho, 
 Montana, Utah, and Washington. 
 
 Georgia, wliich in many respects has 
 followed the Code procedure, has adopted 
 statutes as follows : " Bills in equity and 
 all distinctions of actions into real, per- 
 sonal, and mixed, are abolished." " A 
 civil action is one founded on private 
 rights, arising eitlier from contract or 
 tort." Code, 1895, §§4931, 4932.]
 
 6 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 not SO complete, and a slight distinction is preserved between 
 suits brought to obtain legal and those brought to obtain equi- 
 table relief. All the common-law forms of action are abolished, 
 and one civil action is established for all remedial purposes: the 
 proceedings in this civil action, however, may be either (1) 
 ordinary or (2) equitable. The plaintiff may prosecute his 
 action by equitable proceedings in all cases where courts of 
 chancery, before the adoption of the code, had jurisdiction, and 
 must so proceed in all cases where such jurisdiction was exclu- 
 sive. In all other cases the plaintiff must prosecute his action by 
 ordinary proceedings. The plaintiff indicates by the formula, 
 "In ordinary proceedings," or "In equitable proceedings," at 
 the commencement of his petition or complaint, to which class 
 the action belongs. The provisions of the code regulating the 
 prosecution of actions apply to both kinds of proceedings unless 
 the contrary expressly appears. In fact, the only real distinction 
 between them is that they are to be placed upon different dockets 
 of the court, so that the suits of the one class will be tried by a 
 jury, while those of the other class will be tried by the judge 
 without a jury, and the evidence in equitable proceedings may 
 be taken by deposition instead of b}^ oral examination in open 
 court. ^ It is evident that in these States the difference kept up 
 between legal and equitable actions is more nominal than real, 
 and that the principle of absolute unity prevails as truly in their 
 codes as in those of the other commonwealths. ^ 
 
 1 Ky. §§ 1-1.3 ; Iowa, §§ 2507, 2508, 
 251.3, 2514, 2520; Oregon, §§ 1, 376; 
 [[Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., §§ 5607- 
 5610, 5616-5622.] 
 
 '^ [[The question cannot be raised by 
 demurrer, but by motion to transfer from 
 one docket to the other. McClure v. Dee 
 (1902), 115 la. 546, 88 N. W. 1093; Mc- 
 Cormick, etc. Co. v. Markert (1899), 107 
 la. .340, 78 N. W. 33. See also the follow- 
 ing cases in whicii tliis distinction is di.s- 
 cu88ed: Hodowal v. Yearous (1897), 103 
 la. 32, 72 N. VV. 294 ; Kassiug i,-. Ordway 
 
 (1897), 100 la. 611, 69 N. W. 1013; Gatch 
 V. Garretson (1896), 100 la. 252, 69 N. W. 
 550; Evans v. McConnell (1896), 99 la. 
 326, 68 N. W. 790 ; Leach v. Kundsou 
 (1896), 97 la. 643, 66 N. W. 913 ; Hawley 
 V. Exchange Bank (189F), 97 la. 187. 6C. 
 N. W. 152; Reed v. Lane (1895), 96 la. 
 4.54, 65 N. \V. 380 ; Wilkinson v. Pritciiard 
 (1895). 93 la. 308. 61 N. W. 965 ; Rabb r. 
 Albright (1894), 93 la. 50, 61 N. W. 402; 
 Mechan v. Watson (1898), 65 Ark. 216,47 
 S. W. 109-3
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF Till': CIVIL ACTION. 
 
 SECTION FIKST. 
 
 THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES AS TO A UNION OF LEGAL AND EQUI- 
 TABLE METHODS WHICH HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY THE COURTS. 
 
 § 5. * 65. Purpose of Section One, Chapter One. General Prin- 
 ciples of Construction. It is not my purpose in the present sec- 
 tion to discuss in order the particuhir practical questions that 
 have arisen in the construction of those provisions of the State 
 codes of procedure and practice acts wliich abolish the distinction 
 between legal and equitable actions; namely, the combining of 
 legal and equitable causes of action and defence in the same suit, 
 the interposing of equitable defences to legal causes of action, 
 the granting of legal remedies where the pleadings had con- 
 templated equitable ones, or of equitable remedies where the 
 pleadings had contemplated legal ones, and the like. I intend 
 rather to ascertain, if possible, and state the general principles 
 of construction which the courts have finally adopted and applied 
 in the settlement of these and all other similar questions which 
 have arisen from this most distinctive and important feature 
 of the reformed procedure. These principles are fundamental; 
 they underlie the whole process of judicial interpretation ; they 
 shape the entire action of the courts in building up a system of 
 practical rules out of the broad and somewhat vague enactments 
 of the statute. A knowledge of these controlling motives and 
 opinions which have guided the judges in their work of con- 
 struction is of the highest importance; with it we may attain a 
 systematic and harmonious result; without it we shall certainly 
 be left in a chaos of conflicting decisions. 
 
 § 6. * Q6. Narro-wr Interpretation by Some Judges. This Inter- 
 pretation Overruled. The adoption of the Code of Procedure by 
 the Legislature of New York in 1848 was undoubtedly a shock 
 to the opinions and prejudices of lawyers who had been accus- 
 tomed to regard the former system as perfect in principle, and 
 while it met with a strenuous opposition from many members of 
 the bar, it is not surprising that some of the judges also for a 
 time found it difficult, if not impossible, to yield obedience to the 
 letter even of the statutory requirement, much less to accept its 
 spirit with zealous approval. Opinions are to be found, deliv-
 
 8 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 ered at an early day by very eminent and able judges, sometimes 
 sitting in the court of last resort, which, if taken as correct 
 expositions of the statute, would have reduced the great reform 
 to the empty change in a few words; the ancient names would 
 have been abolished, but all the substance, all that Avas repre- 
 sented by those names, would have remained in full force and 
 effect. According to this view there had been no union of 
 methods into one common mode of proceeding, no abolition of 
 any real distinctions between legal and equitable actions, because 
 such a result is simply impossible of attainment.^ Since the 
 New York Constitution provides that the Supreme Court of that 
 State shall have general jurisdiction in law and equity, and 
 speaks in one or two other places of "equity," it has been said 
 from the bench that a statute abolishing the distinctive features 
 of equity would be unconstitutional, and that the New York 
 code, so far as it purports to produce that effect, is void.^ The 
 system which this school of judges has constructed out of the 
 reformatory legislation is the following. ^ The distinctions be- 
 tween law and equity inhere in tlie very nature of the subject, 
 and cannot be abolished. The legislature may, unless restrained 
 by the constitution, abrogate the law or equity, but cannot 
 destroy the distinctions between them. The language of the 
 statute, however, is not broad enough to effect such a change; 
 
 ^ See Reubens r. .Joel, 13 N. Y. 488, in which it is held error to permit the jury 
 
 493, and Voorhis 7-. Child's Ex., 17 N. Y. to find a cause of action ex contractu under 
 
 354, 357-362, per S. L. Seldeu J. pleadin^js showing that the cause of action 
 
 2 Selden J., in Reubens v. Joel, 13 was founded in tort. See also to the same 
 
 N. Y. 494, 495. effect State ex rel. v. Helms (1898), 101 
 
 8 Selden J., in Reul)ens v. Joel and Wis. 280, 77 N. W. 194. See further 
 
 Voorhis v. Child's Ex., uhi supra. Joseph Dessert Lumber Co. v. Wadleigh 
 
 QSee Anderson i-.Chilson (1895), 8 S.D. (1899), 103 Wis. 318, 79 N. W. 237, affirm- 
 
 64, where it is stated in the syllabus that ing Kewaunee Cy. Sup. r. Decker, 30 Wis. 
 
 " AltiioHKli the common law forms have 624, and in which it is said : " It is just as 
 
 been abolished, an e(|uitable action under necessary to-day as it ever was that a 
 
 the code system is clearly distingui.shable suitor should so state his cause of action 
 
 from one at law," quoting from Dalton v. that the court may determine whether it 
 
 Vanderveer (Sup.), 29 N. Y. Su])p. .342, be ex contractu or ex delicto." In Fran- 
 
 that a " distinction between equitable and Cisco v. Hatch (1903), 117 Wis. 242, 93 
 
 legal actions still exists, tliough tiic forms N. W. 1118, the court said: "Having 
 
 have been abolished." In Ca.sgrain v. brought this action in tort, neither the 
 
 Hamilton (1890), 92 Wis. 179, 60 N. W. plaintiff nor the court could change it 
 
 1 18, it is shown that whether the action is into an action upon contract upon the 
 
 one in tort or in contract is still a practical trial against the defendants' objections. 
 
 question under the code. See also Rood This principle is well settled in this. 
 
 V. Taft (1890), 94 Wis. 380, 09 N. W. 183, State."J
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF THE CIVIL ACTION. 9 
 
 it is confined to external acts and forms, to tlie metliods of ob- 
 taining remedies, to the incidents of actions, and not to their 
 substance. Even when thus restrained, tliere are necessary 
 elements in tlie subject-matter which cannot be affected l)y 
 legislation, and which limit, therefore, the general phrases of 
 the code. Assuming that primary legal and equitable rights 
 and duties remain unaltered, essential differences must exist in 
 the actions brought to enforce the legal and the equitable classes 
 of rights, and also the various species of legal rights. For this 
 reason the substantial features and characteristics of the various 
 actions at law must and do subsist, and the rules which are 
 based upon these facts must and do continue in operation. The 
 names "covenant," "debt," "trespass," "assumpsit," "bill in 
 equity," and the like, have been abandoned, but all the things 
 which these names represented are left in their essentials exactly 
 as before the attempted reforms. This theory of interpretation 
 reduces the Code of Procedure from its position as the embodi- 
 ment of a new system for the administration of justice to the 
 level of a mere amendatory act regulating the minor details of 
 practice. The explanation here made of it is now useful only as 
 a matter of history;^ it never became controlling; the opinions 
 
 ^ ^See, however, the case of Draper r. between actions at law and in equity, to 
 Brown, decided in 1902 by the Supreme abolish which is beyond the power of 
 Court of Wisconsin, 115 Wis. 361, 91 legislative enactment. The legislature 
 N. W. 1001, from which we quote as fol- may abolish the old forms of action and 
 lows : " It iH.ay seem somewhat anomalous has done so ; but the essential principle* 
 that, under a Code, any distinction should of equitable actions and equitable relief, 
 exist between legal and equitable actions, as distinguished from legal actions and 
 That such distinction does exist is recog- remedies, are as vital now, and as clearly 
 nized in almost every Code State. It is a marked and defined, as before the en- 
 distinction inherent in the very nature of actment of the Code. They are inde- 
 things, and must be recognized .so long as structible elements in our system of 
 both legal and equitable remedies are jurisprudence, and the courts are con- 
 permitted. A ra.nn has both legal and stantly required to recognize and apply 
 equitalde rights. In the vindication of them.' The courts of New York an- 
 his legal rights he can call upon the in- nounced the same doctrine early in the 
 dividual or individuals who have invaded history of the Code. Reubens v. Joel, 13 
 such rights for reparation In the en- N. Y. 488 ; Goulet f. As.seler, 22 N. Y. 225 ; 
 forcement of his equitable rights he has the Gould ?'. Rank, 86 N. Y. 75-83. So pro- 
 power, and it is Ids duty, to call in every nounced and well preserved is this distiuc- 
 person necessary to a complete determina- tion that this court sustained a demurrer 
 tion or settlement of the question involved, to a complaint in an equitable action, 
 Such is the statute. Section 2603, Ilev. St. notwithstanding it contained allegations 
 1898. In treating this question, Mr. Jus- which, if standing by themselves, would 
 tice Lvon, in Bonesteel r. Bonesteel, 28 constitute an action at law. Denner v. 
 Wis. 245. wrote as follows: 'There are Railroad Co., 57 Wis. 218, 15 N. W. 
 certain essential and inherent distinctions 158."]
 
 10 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 which it represents were tliosc of individual judges rather than 
 of courts, and they have been repeatedly and completely over- 
 ruled by tribunals of the highest authority. ^ 
 
 ^ 7. * Cn . How^ Interpreted in Most of the States. Criticism of 
 Interpretation in these States. This protest against the changes 
 in the time-honored modes of judicial procedure, this antagonism 
 to the principle of the new system, which was at the outset con- 
 fined to a small though very able portion of the bench, was long 
 since abandoned;^ and the courts have in most of the States not 
 only conformed to the letter of the reformatory legislation, but 
 have to a considerable extent, but not, as I think, to the full 
 extent, accepted and carried out its evident spirit and meaning. 
 I speak advisedly in this statement. While the courts on the 
 whole, and in all the States, do not show a disposition to defeat 
 the reform by a hostile construction, but rather seem desirous of 
 promoting it, and establishing it upon a secure basis, there are 
 yet marked differences in this respect among the States, and also 
 strange inconsistencies in the application of general principles to 
 particular instances. The acceptance of the reformed procedure 
 is much more constrained and reluctant in certain of the States 
 than in the remaining and by far the larger portion of them. 
 Again, a lack of uniformity will be discovered in applying the 
 most general and comprehensive principles of interpretation to 
 the various elements and features of judicial procedure. All 
 these inconsistencies, when they exist, have arisen from the 
 incapacity of the judicial mind to apprehend the fact that legal 
 actions and equitable actions have been abolished, and a "civil 
 action " has been substituted in their place. Conceding this 
 truth in general, courts have sometimes failed to act upon it in 
 reference to some subordinate particulars; the result has been, 
 not a perfect harmonious structure built up by judicial labor, but 
 a structure, although following on the whole a comprehensive and 
 symmetrical plan, yet marred by many breaks and unfinished 
 parts and misshapen additions. In short, the true fundamental 
 principles of construction have been generally adopted as guides, 
 the true spirit and design of the reform system have been gener- 
 
 ' Sec the comments upon Mr. Justice ^ See, however, cases cited in note 1, 
 
 Selden'H o[)inion in I{euben.s v. Joel, made p. 9. 
 by Com.stock J., in N. Y. Ice Co. v. N. W. 
 Ins. Co., 2.3 N. Y. 330, 360.
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF THE CIVIL ACTION. 11 
 
 ally apprehended; but in descending to the details, and in pre- 
 scribing the practical rules of procedure, this principle and this 
 spirit have been sometimes forgotten or intentionally disregarded. 
 §8. * 68. No Change in Rights, Duties, or Liabilities. It has 
 been abundantly settled, in perfect accordance with the theory 
 developed in the preceding section, and in strict conformity with 
 the language and design of all the State codes and practice acts, 
 that the new system has not produced, and was not intended to 
 produce, any alteration of, nor direct effect upon, the primary 
 rights, duties, and liabilities of persons created by either depart- 
 ment of the municipal law.^ Whatever may have been the 
 nature or extent of these primary rights and duties, from what- 
 ever causes, facts, acts, or omissions they took their rise, whether 
 they were denominated legal or equitable, they remain exactly 
 the same as before. The codes do not assume to abolish the 
 distinctions between " law " and " equity, " regarded as two com- 
 plementary departments of the municipal law ; not a clause is to 
 be found which suggests such a revolution in the essential nature 
 of the jurisprudence which we have inherited from England. 
 The principles by which the courts determine the primary rights 
 and duties of litigant parties remain unaltered; upon the acts or 
 
 1 Peck V. Newton, 46 Barb. 173, 174, 104, 73 N. W. 776, where the court says: 
 per Parker J. ; Cole v. Reynolds, 18 N. Y. " The framers of the code clearly intende<l 
 74, 76, per Harris J. ; Lattin v. McCarty, to abolish all distinctions between actions 
 41 N. Y. 107, 110, per Hunt C.J. ; Meyers at law and suits in equity, to abolish the 
 V. Field, 37 Mo. 434, 441, per Holmes J. ; forms of all .such actions, and to provide 
 Richardson v. Means, 22 Mo. 495, 498, per that in this State there .shall be but one 
 Leonard J. ; Maguire i'. Vice, 20 Mo. 429 ; form of action for the enforcement or pro- 
 Matlock V. Todd, 2.5 Ind. 128, 130, per tection of private rights and the redress or 
 Elliot J. ; Woodford v. Leavenworth, 14 prevention of private wrongs, which is de- 
 Ind. 311, 314, per Worden J.; Emmons nominated a civil action." See especially 
 V. Kiger, 23 Ind. 483, 487; De Witt r- Draper r. Brown (1902), 11.5 Wis. 361, 91 
 Hays, 2 Cal. 463, 468, per Murray C. J. ; N. W. 1001, citing and quoting from Hone- 
 Grain t'. Aldrich, 38 Cal. 514; Cropsey r. steel v. Bouesteel, supra. Hopkins v. 
 Sweeney, 27 Barb. 310; Klonne v. Brad- Washington County (1898), 56 Neb. 596, 
 street, 7 Ohio St. 322, 325, per Bowen, J. ; 77 N. W. 53 : " The distinction between 
 Garret v. Gault, 13 B. Mon. 378, 380, per law and equity is not abolished in this 
 Hise J. ; Bonesteel v. Bonesteel, 28 Wis. State. Section 2 of the Code of Civil 
 245, 250, per Lyon J. ; Dickson r. Cole, Procedure, however, provides that there 
 .34 Wis. 621, 625 ; Martin v. Mobile & O. shall be but one form of action, called a 
 R. R., 7 Bush, 116, 124; Richmond & L. ' civil action,' in which rules of law or doc- 
 Turnp. Co. v. Rogers, 7 Bush, .532, 535 ; trines of equity may, under proper plead- 
 Lanison i\ Pfaff, 1 Handy, 449, 452 ; ing and proper states of facts, either or 
 Clau.ssen v. La Frenz, 4 Greene (la.), 224; both be enforced.''] See Mowry t'. Hill, 
 Smith -•. Rowe, 4 Cal. 6. 11 Wis. 146, 149. 
 
 [^See Kollock v. Scribuer (1897), 98 Wis.
 
 12 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 omissions which were fhe occasion of a right called equitable the 
 same right is still based, and is still properly termed equitable; 
 from the acts or omissions which were the occasions of a right 
 called legal the same right still arises, and is still with propriety 
 termed legal. ^ I remark, in passing, that much of the confusion 
 and uncertainty which now exists would at once disappear, if the 
 bar and the bench should adopt a nomenclature in conformity 
 with the settled principle of interpretation, and should speak of 
 legal and equitable rights, legal and equitable remedies, but not 
 of legal and equitable actions. To term an action "legal" or 
 " equitable " is a misnomer, and one which involves a wrong 
 conception and a false doctrine, since the statute has removed 
 all distinction between legal and equitable actions, and has su"b- 
 stituted in place of both a single " civil action ; " and the courts 
 have decided that the legislature intended exactly what it has 
 said. 2 But as the legislature did not say, nor mean to say, that 
 the distinctions between legal and equitable rights or remedies 
 are abolished, those terms may be used with propriety and cor- 
 rectness.^ The reformed American system, in short, has given 
 no new causes of action. Primary rights and duties are un- 
 changed ; the delicts or wrongs which are the violations of these 
 rights and duties are still committed in the same manner as 
 before ; and as these primary rights and duties, and the wrongs 
 which violate them, constitute the causes of action over which 
 the courts exercise their remedial jurisdiction, it is plain that no 
 statute relating solely to procedure can increase, diminish, or 
 modify the causes of action which exist independently of pro- 
 cedure. In some instances particular parties are permitted to 
 maintain an action who could not have maintained it under the 
 old practice; but in no instance can this now be done where 
 upon the same facts and circumstances a similar action could not 
 have been maintained by some person. A familiar illustration of 
 this statement is found in the change made in the common-law 
 
 ' QAnderson v. War Eagle Min. Co. reference to the form of action. Skinner 
 
 (1903), Idaho, 72 I'ac. 671, quoting the i-. Sliinner (1894), 38 Neb. 756, 57 N. W. 
 
 text.] 534. But see Draper r. Brown (1902), 
 
 '^ Qlt is not material by what name, or 115 Wis. 361, 91 N. W. 1001. 3 
 whetlier by any, an action under the code ^ [^Anderson v. War Eagle Min. Co. 
 
 JH designated. The pleader .sliould state (1903), Idaho, 72 Pac. 671, quoting the 
 
 the facts, and if they constitute a cause of text.] 
 action, the law affords the remedy without
 
 GENEUAL NATURE OF THE CIVIL ACTION. 13 
 
 rule prohibiting an action by the assignee of a non-negotiable 
 thing in action, and requiring the suit to be prosecuted in the 
 name of the assignor, although for the benefit, and, as it was 
 finally settled, under the complete control, of the assignee. The 
 codes have abrogated this technical dogma, and thus permit an 
 action to be brought by a party who formerly had no such power; 
 but this does not create nor constitute any new cause of action. 
 The assignee now sues where the assignor sued ; the same facts 
 must be proved, the same rights asserted, and the same relief 
 given ; the only change is in permitting the assignee to accom- 
 plish directl}^ and in his own name, what he before accomplished 
 indirectly and by the use of another's name. 
 
 § 9. *69. No Change in Remedies or Remedial Rights. The 
 doctrine thus uniformly established in reference to the effect of 
 the reform legislation upon primary rights and duties, and causes 
 of action, is also as clearly settled in reference to its effect upon 
 remedies and remedial rights, when the term is used — as it 
 properly should be — to denote the reliefs which are conferred 
 upon parties, and not tlie means of procuring these reliefs. The 
 word "remedies" is sometimes used in two different technical 
 senses, and from this dual meaning there arises — as in all such 
 cases — doubt and confusion. The secondary and in strictness 
 improper signification renders the word equivalent to the mere 
 judicial instruments and their incidents, the actions at law, suits 
 in equity, special proceedings, and the like, — the various steps 
 in a forensic controversy which fall within the proper domain of 
 practice. The primary and strictly accurate signification makes 
 it synonymous with the judgments which are pronounced by the 
 court, and which established the remedial rights and prescribe 
 the manner in which and the means by which they are to be 
 satisfied. Or "remedies " may denote those judgments executed 
 and performed by which the party has received the very benefit 
 to which he was entitled, — the sum of money, the possession of 
 the land or of the chattels, the execution and delivery of the 
 deed, the cancellation of the agreement, the removal of the ob- 
 struction, or whatever else was ordered to be done by the opposite 
 party. In either of these two latter senses, the remedies which 
 were in use under the former system, and which were awarded 
 by the courts upon proper occasions, are absolutely unaffected 
 in any of their essential features by the reformatory legislu-
 
 14 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 tion.^ The general and sweeping language so often quoted abol- 
 ishes the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity ; and 
 other provisions and clauses recognize all the forms of judgment 
 known to the common-law courts, namely, for payment of money, 
 for the possession of land and of chattels, and also the specific 
 kinds of relief which courts of equity embodied in their decrees. 
 Strictly speaking, the remedy given is no part of the action, but 
 is the result thereof; it is the object for which the action is 
 prosecuted, the end at wdiich all the litigation is directed. A 
 modification of the action, a change in its forms, incidents, 
 names, modes of procedure, including the process, the pleadings, 
 the parties, the manner of trial, and all other steps preparatory 
 to the judgment, does not involve any alteration in this result; 
 the general language of the codes does not, therefore, include 
 and apply to the substance of the judgments, that is, of the 
 remedies. Without, however, relying exclusively upon an 
 interpretation which may seem to be too refined and verbal, the 
 practical construction given by the courts, and as illustrated by 
 the citations contained in the preceding foot-note, fully sustains 
 the conclusions which are reached by an analysis of the language. 
 Abolition of the distinction between legal and equitable actions, 
 and of the forms of legal actions, does not abolish the distinc- 
 tions between remedies. If from the nature of the primary right, 
 and of the wrong by which it is invaded, the injured party would 
 under the old system have been entitled to an equitable remedy, 
 he is still entitled to the same relief, and it may well be teimed 
 equitable; if from the like causes he would have been entitled to 
 a legal remedy, he is still entitled to the same relief, and it may 
 properly be described as legal. 
 
 § 10. * 70. The Differences that have been Abolished. What is 
 Established? It having been thus determined that no effect has 
 been wrought upon the primary lights and duties which consti- 
 
 ' See ca.<es last citeil under § 8 ; also, actions at law and suits in equity, yet the 
 
 Carrico I'. Toinlinson, 17 Mo. 499 ; Butler legislature has not intended tliereby to 
 
 r. Lee, .33 How. I'r. K. 251 (Ct. of App.). change the nature of the remedies wliieh 
 
 [[See Uord c. Bradbury (1900), 156 Ind. generally obtain in those jurisdictions 
 
 30, S;* N. IC. 31, where the court says: where courts of law and chancery are 
 
 " .Judgments at law and decrees inequity separate, nor could they do so if they 
 
 are all 'judgments' under the code." wished, as it would be in most instances 
 
 Olson c. Thompson (1897), 6 Okla. 74, 48 impos.sible to obtain relief in an action at 
 
 Pac. 184: " Notwitlistanding the legisla- law wiiere such relief must come through 
 
 turc hat abolisiied the distinction between the equitable powers of the court. "J
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF THE CIVIL ACTION. 
 
 15 
 
 tute the great body of the municipal hiw, nor upon tlie final 
 remedies granted to the litigant parties, the courts have, with 
 general though not with absolute unanimity, agreed upon the 
 interpretation to be given to the pi'ovision under consideration. 
 The broad principle of construction may be regarded as estab- 
 lished in most if not all the States, that the clauses of the stat- 
 utes abolishing the distinction between actions at law and suits 
 in equity were intended to mean exactly what they say, without 
 reservation or equivocation. All the differences which belonged 
 to the external machinery by which a judicial controversy was 
 conducted up to the judgment itself, all the rules respecting 
 forms of action, all the peculiar characteristics of a legal or of an 
 equitable action, or of the various kinds of legal actions, except 
 the constitutional requirement as to the jury trial, have been 
 swept away. One action, governed in all instances by the same 
 principles as to form and methods, suffices for the maintaining 
 of all classes of primary riglits, and for the pursuit of all kinds 
 of civil remedies.^ 1 say, governed by the same pynnciples us to 
 form and method; but this does not assume that exactly the 
 
 1 Dobson u. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 156, 165; 
 Crary v. Goodman, 12 N. Y. 266, 268; 
 N. Y. Ceut. Ins. Co. v. Nat. Protection 
 Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. 85, 90; Cole v. Reynolds, 
 18 N. Y. 74, 76 ; Bidwell r. Astor In.s. Co., 
 
 16 N. Y. 263, 267 ; Phillips r. Gorham, 17 
 N. Y. 270, 273, 275 ; Laub v. Buckniiller, 
 
 17 N. Y. 620, 626 ; N. Y. Ice Co. v. N. W. 
 Ins. Co., 23 N. Y. 357, 359 ; Brown v. 
 1-irown, 4 Robt. 688, 701 ; Grinnell v. 
 Buchanan, 1 Daly, 538 ; Crosier v. Mc- 
 r>aughlin, 1 Nevada, 348 ; Rogers v. Pen- 
 niston, 16 Mo. 432; Troost v. Davis, 31 
 Ind. 34, 39; Scott v. Crawford, 12 Lid. 
 411 ; Kramer v. Rebman, 9 Iowa, 114; 
 De Witt V. Hays, 2 Cal. 463 ; Wiggins r. 
 McDonald, 18 Cal. 126 ; Bowen v. Aubrey. 
 22 Cal. 566, 569 ; Ireland v. Nichols, 1 
 Sweeney, 208; Garret v. Gault, 13 B. 
 Mon. 378, 380 ; Wright v. Wright, 54 
 N. Y. 437, 442 ; White v. Lyons, 42 Cal. 
 279 ; Giles v. Lyon, 4 N. Y. 600 ; Getty 
 V. Hudson River R. R., 6 How. Pr. 269 ; 
 Mowry v. Hill, 11 Wis. 146, 149; Chiiin 
 V. Trustees, 32 Ohio St. 236 ; Gress v. 
 Evans, 1 Dak. 387 ; Williams v. Slote, 70 
 N. Y. 601 ; Stevens v. The Mayor, etc, 84 
 N. Y. 296, 304, 305; Anderson v. Hunn, 
 
 5 Hun, 79 ; McPlierson i-. Weston, 64 
 Cal. 275 ; Sykes v. First Nat. Bk. (S. D.), 
 49 N. W. 1058. 
 
 [South Bend Chilled Plow Co. v. Geo. 
 C. Cribb Co (1900), 105 Wis. 443, 81 
 N. W. 675 ; Dickerson v. Spokane (1901), 
 26 Wash. 292, 66 Pac. 381 : " Under the 
 system of code procedure whereby the 
 distinction between actions at law and 
 suits in equity is abolislied, an action at 
 law is maintainable upon an ecjuitable as- 
 signment." Morehouse v. Throckmorton 
 (1899), 72 Conn. 449, 44 Atl. 747 ; Hahl v. 
 Sugu (1901), 169 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135. 
 In Rogers v. Duhart (1893), 97 Cal. 500, 
 32 Pac. 570, it is said : " With us, mere 
 forms of action are cast aside. Every 
 action is now, in effect, a special action on 
 the case." Merriman i\ Walton (1895), 
 105 Cal. 403, 38 Pac. 1108; Whitehead v. 
 Sweet (1899), 126 Cal. 67, 58 Pac. 376 : 
 " Under our code there is but one form 
 of action, and if the complaint states facts 
 .wljic'h entitle the plaintiff to relief either 
 legal or equitable, it is not demurrable 
 upon the ground that it does not state 
 facts sufficient to constitute a cause of 
 action."J
 
 16 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 same form or method is to be or can be used in all actions for 
 whatever purposes brought. The common principle as to form 
 and method is not that all actions shall assume absolutely the 
 same form, nor is it that they shall be governed by any technical 
 rules which separate them into arbitrary classes ; it is that they 
 shall all conform to and follow the facts and circumstances which 
 constitute the cause of action, and entitle the parties to relief. 
 It is established, therefore, that a single judicial action, based 
 upon and conforming to the facts and circumstances of each par- 
 ticular case, whatever be the nature of the primary right which 
 they create, must be used for the pursuit of all remedies, legal 
 or equitable.^ The authorities referred to in the notes show that 
 this doctrine is now adopted in all the States where the reformed 
 procedure prevails, and that there is little variation in the lan- 
 guage by which it is expressed. When, however, we shall 
 pass from this statement of the doctrine in the abstract to the 
 application of it in particular instances, — as, for example, in 
 questions as to parties, pleading, judgments, — the perfect uni- 
 formity of jq,dicial opinion and action disappears ; but still in 
 the great majority of the States the courts have fairly followed 
 the true intent of the legislation and the correct principle of 
 interpretation. 
 
 §11. *71. Rule Settled herein. Familiar Rule in Old System. 
 Thus it may be regarded as a settled rule, resulting from the 
 
 ' []See cases cited in last preceding note, ferred to, clearly evince the legislative 
 
 Zurfluh V. Smith (1902), 135 Cal. 644, 67 intent to strip our modern procedure of 
 
 Pac. 1089. This was an action for ac- the cumbrous forms and distinctions which 
 
 counting against the administrator of a made tlie jiractice under the common law 
 
 deceased guardian and for judgment fur and tiie earlier statutes so burdensome iu 
 
 the amount found due against the sureties its details and so uncertain in its results. 
 
 on the guardian's bond. Appellants, tlie I'pon exaniiiiiiig that portion of the Code 
 
 sureties, claimed that an equitaljlc action which deals with actions to recover real 
 
 must first be brought to ascertain the property (Ch. 14, tit. 1, art. 1) we find that 
 
 amount due and then a second action to the old term 'ejectment' has been dis- 
 
 obtiiin a judgment against tlie sureties for carded in the title and it is now eutitled 
 
 that amount. But the court held it proper ' Actions to recover real property.' This 
 
 to bring one action to decide the entire change of name was obviously a part of 
 
 controversy, saying that it mattered not the plan of the codifiers to reduce our 
 
 that part of the relief was eiiuitable and practice to a simple and composite scheme 
 
 part legal.] under which all of the rights of litigants, 
 
 Qln Hahl u. Sugo (1901), 169 X. Y. 109, both legal and e()uitable, so far as they 
 
 62 .N. E. 135, the court, referring to sec- are consistent with each otlier and affect 
 
 tions 3339,481, and others of the code, the same ])arties, can he tried in one actioa 
 
 said: "These sections of the Code, and and be merged iu one juiiguieut."] 
 others, which ueed not Ije sjiecifically re-
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF THE CIVIL ACTION. 
 
 17 
 
 statutory provision in question, that if a plaintiff lias set forth 
 facts constituting a cause of action, and entitling him to some 
 relief, either legal or equitable, his action shall not be dismissed 
 because he has misconceived the nature of his remedial right, and 
 has asked for a legal remedy when it should have been equitable, 
 or for an equitable remedy when it should have been legal. ^ 
 
 1 [[Damou v. Leque (1896), 14 Wash. 
 253, 44 Pac. 261, quotiug the text; Wat- 
 son !'. Glover (1899), 21 Wash. 677, 59 
 Pac. 516; Dreyer v. Hart (1896), 147 lud. 
 €04, 47 N. E. 174; Gartuer v. Corwine 
 (1897), 57 O. St. 246, 48 N. E. 945 ; Auder- 
 son V. War Eas^le Miu. Co. (1903), Idaho, 
 72 Pac. 671, quoting the te.xt] ; Crary 
 V. Goodraau, 12 N. Y. 266, 268; N. Y. 
 Cent. Ins. Co. v. National Protec. Ins. Co., 
 14 N. Y. 85, 90 ; Emery v. Pease, 20 N. Y. 
 €2, 64 ; Bidwell v. Astor Ins. Co., 16 N. Y. 
 263, 267; Phillips i'. Gorham, 17 N. Y. 
 270, 273, 275; Laub v. Buckniiller, 17 
 N. Y. 620, 626 ; N. Y. Ice Co. v. N. W. 
 Ins. Co., 23 N. Y. 357, 359 ; Farlow v. 
 Scott, 24 N. Y. 40, 45 ; Marquat v. Mar- 
 quat, 12 N. Y. 336 ; Troost v. Davis, 31 
 lud. .34, 39 ; Grain v. Aldrich, 38 Cal. 514, 
 520 ; Leonard v. Rogau, 20 Wis. 540, 542. 
 In Emery v. Pease, 20 N. Y. 62, the com- 
 plaint set out facts entitling the plaintiff 
 to an accounting, but did not ask one ; it 
 did not aver any settlement, nor ascer- 
 tained balauce due, and demanded judg- 
 ment for a sum certain. On the trial the 
 complaint was dismissed, on the ground 
 that it did not set forth facts sufficient to 
 constitute a cause of action. Comstock J., 
 after stating the old rule by which the 
 action would liave been properly dis- 
 missed, proceeds (p. 64): "In determin- 
 ing whether an action will lie, the courts 
 are to liave no regard to the old distinc- 
 tions between legal and equitable reme- 
 dies. Those distinctions are c.\])ressly 
 abolished. A suit does not, as formerly, 
 fail because the plaintiff has made a mis- 
 take as to the form of the remedy. If the 
 case which he states entitles him to any 
 remedy, either legal or equitable, his com- 
 plaint is not to be dismissed because he 
 has prayed for a judgment to which he is 
 not entitled." Bidwell v. Astor Ins. Co., 
 16 N. Y. 263, was an action on a policy of 
 insurance. The complaint asked thiit tlie 
 policy be reformed, and that the defendant 
 
 pay $7,000 as the sum insured by the re- 
 formed policy. Without a reformation 
 the plaintiif was not entitled to a judg- 
 ment for any amount. On the trial a 
 mistake in the instrument was prqved, 
 and the court directed a judgment for 
 $7,000. The defendant insisted that a 
 judgment for damages, instead of one for 
 a reformation, was imj)roper. The court 
 say : " There was nothing in the objection 
 that the court should have stopped with 
 reforming tlie policy, and turned the plain- 
 tiff over to a new action to recover dam- 
 ages." The N. Y. Ice Co. v. N. W. Ins. 
 Co., 23 N. Y. 357, is an important and 
 suggestive case. The action was on an 
 insurance policy. The plaintiff claimed a 
 money judgment for a loss, and also a 
 reformation of the policy which, if made, 
 would entitle him to a furtlier recovery of 
 money. He failed to make out a case for 
 a reformation ; whereupon the trial court 
 dismissed the action, holding that tlie other 
 issue could not be tried. Comstock J. said 
 (p. 359) : " I am of opinion that it was 
 erroneous to turn the plaintiff out of court 
 on the mere ground that he had not en- 
 titled himself to the equitable relief 
 granted, if there was enough left of his 
 case to entitle him to recover the sum in 
 which he was insured. No suggestion was 
 made that the complaint did not show a 
 good cause of action for this money, even 
 after striking out all tlie allegations and 
 the prayer on the subject of the equitable 
 relief." The same doctrine is again ap- 
 plied in Barlow v. Scott, 24 N. Y. 40, 45, 
 Lott J. saying : " Under our present 
 arrangement, the same court lias botli legal 
 and equitable jurisdiction ; and if tiie facts 
 stated by a party in his complaint are 
 sufficient to entitle liim to any of the 
 relief asked, and an answer is put in 
 putting these facts in issue, it would be 
 erroneous to dismiss the complaint on the 
 ti-ial merely because improper relief is 
 primarily demanded." The true principle
 
 18 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 Nothing was a more familiar rule in the old system than the one 
 which turned a plaintiff out of court if he had misconceived tlie 
 nature or form of his action. If he brought an action at law, 
 and on the trial proved a case for equitable relief, or if he filed a 
 bill in equity, and at the hearing showed himself entitled to a 
 judgment at law, he must absolutely fail in that proceeding. It 
 is very plain that this arbitrary and most unjust rule rested 
 wholly upon the ancient notions as to distinctions between legal 
 and equitiible actions, and did not rest upon any notions as to the 
 jirimary rights which the litigant parties sought to maintain. 
 Wherever, therefore, the letter and spirit of the reformed system 
 are followed by the courts, this harsh rule is swept away. A 
 suit does not now fail because the plaintiff has erred as to the 
 form or kind or extent of the remedy he demands.^ A party 
 cannot be sent out of court merely because the facts alleged do 
 not entitle him to relief at law, or merely because they do not 
 entitle him to relief in equity. If the case which he states shows 
 him entitled to any relief, either legal or equitable, his complaint 
 is not to be dismissed because he has prayed for a judgment that is 
 not embraced by the facts. The only inconvenience which a 
 plaintiff can suffer from such an error is, that the trial may, per- 
 haps, be suspended, and the cause sent to another brancli of tlie 
 court, or, as in Kentucky, Iowa, and Oregon, to another docket.^ 
 If a plaintiff had brought his action on the theory that it M'as 
 based upon an equitable right, and sought an equitable relief, 
 and it turns out to be in effect legal, so that the defendant is 
 entitled to a jury trial, the trial must be had before a jury, and 
 
 was tersely and most accurately stated by ^ McCrory v. Parks, 18 Ohio St. 1; 
 
 Sanderson J. in Grain r. Aldrich, 38 Cal. Ellithorpe r. Buck, 17 Ohio St. 72. See 
 
 .014, 520 : " Legal and equitable relief are Dickson v. Cole, 34 Wis. 621, 62.5. 
 
 adnninistered in the same forum and ac- ^See p. 6, note 1. Ming Yue i'. Coos 
 
 cording to the same general plan. A party Bay U. R. Co (1893), 24 Ore. 392, 33 Pac. 
 
 cannot be sent out of court merely because 641: "The distinction between actions 
 
 liis facts do not entitle him to relief at and suits is not al)olished by our code, 
 
 law, or merely because he is not entitled . . . When, therefore, the }ilaintiffs, being 
 
 to relief in equity, as the case may be. in equity, failed to statu in their complaint 
 
 He can be sent out of court only when a cause of suit, notwithstanding they may 
 
 upon his facts he is entitled to no relief have stated a cause of action, the court 
 
 either at law or in eciuity." Hamill v bad no jurisdiction to retain and try such 
 
 Thompson, 3 Colo. 518, 523 ; Schilling v. action, but was bound to dismi.'^s the suit, 
 
 Kominger, 4 Colo. 100; Whiting i' Hoot, and leave the ])laintiffs to prosecute their 
 
 52 Iowa, 292 ; Herring r. Neely, 43 Iowa, action, if they have one .at law." See 
 
 157. also Small v. Lutz (1899), 34 Ore. 131, 55 
 
 » See notes 2 and 3, p. 005. Pac. 529.]
 
 GENERAL MATUKE OF THE CIVIL ACTION. 19 
 
 not before a single judge sitting us a chancellor ; and, when the 
 trial had taken place before the wrong tribunal, the judgment 
 would be reversed, and the cause sent for a new trial in the 
 ■proper place.^ 
 
 § 12. * 72. Struggle in Establishing Rule. Missouri Doctrine. 
 The rule discussed in the foregoing paragraph as to the relation 
 between the facts alleged and the relief asketl and granted was 
 not established without a struggle, and has not at all times, 
 and in all the States, prevailed without exception, and perhaps is 
 not even now universally accepted. Many early cases in New 
 York were decided under the influence of the former practice 
 and the ancient notions ; and although the Court of Appeals 
 has completely repudiated the doctrine of those adjudications, 
 yet the principles announced by it have not always been fol- 
 lowed by the inferior tribunals of the same State.^ In one or 
 two of the States, and especially in Missouri, the ancient rules 
 and doctrines in reference to this subject-matter have been re- 
 peatedly asserted, and, until a very recent period, prevailed in 
 the courts, notwithstanding the adoption of the reformed proce- 
 dure. In Missouri, the judiciary, standing alone in this respect, 
 preserved for a long time the real distinctions between legal and 
 equitable actions as strongly marked as under the former system, 
 and, in fact, insisted upon a rule more strict than that enforced 
 by the English Court of Chancery.^ The following examples 
 will illustrate this peculiar interpretation of their code by the 
 Missouri courts. In those cases where the plaintiff holds the 
 equitable title to land, while the legal title is in the defendant by 
 
 1 Davis V. Morris, 36 N. Y. 569, 571, jury cause. Parker v. Laney, 58 N. Y. 
 
 5"2, per Grover J. In this case the New 469 ; Richmoud v. Dubuque, etc. R. Co., 
 
 York Court of Appeals laid down, in a 33 Iowa, 422, 489-491. 
 formal manner, the rule as to the trial of 2 gee Peck v. Newton, 46 Barb. 173, 
 
 legal and e(|uitable issues. If the plead- 174. 
 
 iugs present both legal and equitable '* fSoe also Draper v. Brown (1902), 
 
 issues, the parties are entitled to a jury, 115 Wis. 361, 91 N. W. 1001, in which the 
 
 and all the issues must be tried together ; court, in speaking of the distinction be- 
 
 tliat is, there should not be a partial tween legal and eqnital)le actions, said : 
 
 trial before a jury and the residue before " So pronounced and well preserved is 
 
 another tribunal. If, however, the plain- this distinction that this court sustained 
 
 tiff insists upon a trial before the court, and a demurrer to a complaint in an equitable 
 
 his claim is acceded to, upon the discov- action, notwithstanding it contained alle- 
 
 ery that the action presents issues which gations which, if standing by themselves, 
 
 must be decided by a jury, the complaint would constitute an action at law. Deuuer 
 
 should not be dismissed, but the cause v. Railroad Co., 57 Wis. 218, 15 N. W. 
 
 should be seut to the circuit for trial ai a 158. "3
 
 20 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 mciius of a fraudulent conveyance, it has been frequently held 
 tluit the former must first obtain a decree in equity, cancelling 
 the outstanding deed, and must then resort to a separate action 
 of ejectment to recover possession of the land. A vendee of 
 land has also been required to proceed in two distinct actions, — 
 the first equitable, to compel a specific performance, and the 
 second legal, to obtain possession. The plaintiff was turned 
 over to a second legal action in order to complete his remedy, 
 because, as the court repeatedly insisted, possession of land can 
 never be awarded by a decree in equity.^ The Missouri court ha.s 
 recently receded, in part at least, from tliis extreme position, and 
 is plainly tending towards a complete harmony with the doctrines 
 which are accepted in other Stfites.^ A simple criterion has been 
 suggested by which to determine the nature of the action. If 
 the facts alleged in the complaint or petition would entitle the 
 plaintiff to both legal and equitable relief, the prayer for judg- 
 ment — that is, the nature of the remedy demanded — might 
 be a certain test by which the character of the suit should be 
 known.'^ This suggestion has not, however, been followed in 
 other cases. 
 
 1 Meyers v. Field, 37 Mo. 434, 441 ; 
 Maguire c. Vice, 20 Mo. 429; Curd v 
 Lackland, 43 Mo. 199; Wyuu i-. Cory, 
 43 Mo. 301 ; Gray i: Payne, 43 Mo. 203 ; 
 Bobb 1-. Woodward, 42 Mo. 482, 487 ; 
 Peyton i: Rose, 41 Mo. 257, 262 ; Gott v. 
 Powell, 41 Mo. 416 ; Moreau v. Detche- 
 mendy, 41 Mo. 431; Walker's Adm. /•. 
 Walker, 2.') Mo. 367 ; Reed v. Robert.son, 
 4.T Mo. 580 ; Rutherford v. Williams, 42 
 Mo. 18, 23; Fithiau v. Monks, 43 Mo. 
 502, 517 ; Magwire v. Tyler, 47 Mo. 115, 
 127. 
 
 2 Henderson f. Dickey, .50 Mo. 161, 
 165, per Wagner J. Followed in numer- 
 ous recent ca-ses; see Paddock v. Somes, 
 102 Mo. 226. 
 
 QSee Holli.ster t-. Bell (1900), 107 Wis. 
 198, 83 N. W. 297, in which it is said: 
 "The idea that a plain action at law, as 
 to whicii there is an entire failure of proof, 
 can be turned into an action in equity and 
 a recovery be had such as that jurisdiction 
 in any event can aff(jrd on the facts, does 
 not find supjjort in the decisions of this 
 court. If an nction be brought an<l tried 
 *n an action at law, such relief only is ob- 
 
 tainable as is afforded on the facts in that 
 form of action." Seals v. Augusta Ry. Co. 
 (1898), 102 Ga. 817,29 S. E. 116; Ham- 
 ilton V. Mandle (1898), 103 Ga. 788, 30 
 S. E. 658 ; Field v. Brown (1896), 146 
 Ind. 293, 45 N. E. 464 : " There may prop- 
 erly be joined causes or defences, one of 
 which is triable by the court and the other 
 by a jury. "J 
 
 3 Giliett V. Treganza, 13 Wis. 472, 475, 
 per Dixon C. J. Followed in Lowber v. 
 Connil, 36 Wis. 176; liarrall i'. Gray, 10 
 Neb. 186. 
 
 [[Topping t'. Parish (1897), 96 Wis. 378, 
 71 N. W. 367. But in Stephens v. Hard- 
 ing (1896), 48 Neb. 6.^)9, 67 N. W. 746, 
 the court said : " Under our system of 
 pleading the nature of an action is deter- 
 mined not alone by the j>rayer for relief, 
 but also from the character of the facts 
 alleged." So, also, Lett v. Hammond 
 (1899), 59 Neb. 339, 80 N. W. 1042 ; Irwin 
 V. Richard.son (1894), 88 Wis. 429, 60 
 N. W. 786 ; United Coal Co. i-. Canon 
 City Coal Co. (1897), 24 Colo 116, 48 Vnv. 
 1045; Imperial Siiale Brick Co. >• .Tewett 
 (1901), 169 N. Y. 143, 62 N. E. 167.3
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF THE CIVIL ACTION. 21 
 
 § 13. * 73. Summary of Foregoing Discussion. Fundamental 
 Principle Stated. To recapitulate the results ol' the foregoing 
 (Uscussion: The courts have, with few exceptions, accepted the 
 language of the code in its simplicity, and have given to it a 
 reasonable meaning; they have acknowledged that the legislature 
 intended to abolish, and has abolished, all the features which 
 distinguish legal and equitable actions from each other, and has 
 established a single action for the pursuit of all remedies; they 
 have settled the doctrine that by the use of this single action 
 neither the primary rights nor the remedial rights of litigant 
 parties are affected or in any manner modified, since they do 
 not depend upon matters connected with the form or external 
 features of the action, and that among the matters which are 
 thus connected with the form are the setting forth or statement 
 of the cause of action or defence in the pleadings, and the 
 demand of relief or prayer for judgment. A mistake or mis- 
 conception in respect to the action being called legal or equitable 
 does not defeat the plaintiff, but at most may require a trial 
 before a properly constituted court. One fundamental principle 
 controls the administration of justice by means of this common 
 civil action, and this principle may be formulated in the follow- 
 ing manner: The object of every action is to obtain a judgment 
 of the court sustaining or protecting some primary right or 
 enforcing some primary duty; every such primary right and 
 duty results from the operation of the law upon certain facts, 
 in the experience of the person holding the right or subjected to 
 the duty ; every wrong or violation of this primary right or duty 
 consists in certain facts, either acts or omissions of the person 
 committing the wrong. A statement, therefore, of the facts 
 from which the primary right or duty arises, and also of the 
 facts which constitute the wrong or violation of such primary 
 right or duty, shows, and must of necessity show, at once a 
 complete cause of action; that is, the court before which this 
 statement is made can perceive from it the entire cause of action, 
 the remedial right flowing therefrom, and the remedy or reme- 
 dies which should be awarded to the injured party. All actions 
 can be and should be constructed in the manner thus described ; 
 and, if so, they would conform to the single and common prin- 
 ciple announced by the reformed method of procedure. Whether 
 the rights and duties are legal or equitable, whether the remedies
 
 22 CIVIL remp:dies. 
 
 appropriate are legal or equitable, whether the facts are simple 
 and few or complex and numerous, does not in the sliglitest 
 degree affect the application and universality of this principle; 
 it is the central conception of the new system, the corner-stone 
 upon which the whole structure is erected. 
 
 § 14. * 74. Pleading at Common Law and in Equity. It is not 
 my purpose in the present section to follow this general principle 
 in its application to the various features and phases of an action; 
 to do so would be to anticipate the matter contained in several 
 subsequent chapters. A brief allusion must be made, however, 
 to one of these topics, or else the theory of construction finally 
 accepted by the courts will be but partially explained, — I refer 
 to the subject of pleading. No single element of difference 
 more sharply marked the contrast between the action at law and 
 the suit in equity under the former system than the manner in 
 which the litigant parties in each stated their causes of action 
 and their defences. Although it was said that in each kind of 
 judicial proceeding the /ac^s constituting the cause of action or 
 defence should alone be alleged, this rule was not followed in 
 actual practice. In a common-law action the "issuable facts" 
 only were spread upon the record. The plaintiff never narrated 
 the exact transaction between himself and the defendant from 
 which the rights and duties of the parties arose ; he stated what 
 he coiiceivid to he the legal effect of these facts. Thus, if the trans- 
 action was a simple arrangement respecting the sale and purchase 
 of goods, instead of disclosing exactly what the parties had 
 actually done, the pleader used certain formulas expressing the 
 supposed legal effect of what had been done, as that he had "sold 
 and delivered " or had " bargained and sold " tlie chattels ; and, 
 if a mistake was made in properly conceiving of this legal effect, 
 — that is, if the real facts of the transaction, as disclosed by the 
 evidence, did not correspond with this conception of their legal 
 effect taken by the pleader, — the plaintiff might be, and, unless 
 permitted to amend, would be, turned out of court. On the 
 equity side the facts as they occurred, rather than the legal 
 aspect of or conclusions from these facts, were set forth, accord- 
 ing to the original theory of equitable pleading. In practice this 
 narrative was always accompanied b}^ a detail of mere evidentiary 
 matter, which was inserted, not because it was necessary to the 
 statement of the cause of action, but because it was a means of
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF THE CIVIL ACTION. 23 
 
 obtaining admissions from the defendant, and of thus making 
 him a witness in the cause against himself. A l)ill in equity 
 had, therefore, two entirely distinct uses and olTices; it was a 
 narrative of the facts from which the plaintiff's rights to relief 
 arose, and it was an instrument for obtaining evidence from the 
 opposite party. This latter purpose, which was known as "dis- 
 covery," the codes have expressly abolished, and have substituted 
 in its stead the more direct method of an oral examination of one 
 party by the other, if desired, either on the trial or preliminary 
 thereto. 
 
 § 15. * 75. Tw^o Schools of Interpretation respecting Modes of 
 Pleading under the Code. Upon the adoption of the reformed 
 system in New York there arose at once in that State, and sub- 
 sequently in other commonwealths, two schools of interpretation 
 in reference to the modes of pleading prescribed by the new 
 procedure. One school maintained that all the distinctive fea- 
 tures and elements of the common law and of the equity modes 
 of pleading remained in full force, and that the legislature had 
 simply abolished certain names and certain technical rules of 
 mere form. This particular theory was a necessary and evident 
 corollary of the broader principle advocated by the same school, 
 and already explained in the present section, that the division of 
 actions into legal and equitable still existed, in all that pertained 
 to their substantial nature ; if actions were now, as before, legal 
 or equitable, the most characteristic features of the two classes, 
 that which marked their difference in the most emphatic manner, 
 — the peculiar modes of pleading appropriate to each, — were of 
 course preserved. In a common-law cause the pleader was to 
 follow the common-law rules of pleading, and in an equity suit 
 the equity rules. This doctrine was asserted and was sustained 
 with great ability and earnestness by several judges in the in- 
 fancy of the system. It would be useless to cite all the reported 
 decisions in which it was advocated ; and I shall only refer to a 
 few which have always been regarded as leading.^ The other 
 
 1 Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, "Tlie rules of pleading at common law 
 
 5 How. Pr. 216; Wooden r. Waffle, have not heen abrogated. The essential 
 
 6 How. Pr. 145. principles still remain, and have only been 
 I^But see the following cases: Lassiter inoiiified as to technicalities and matters 
 
 V. Roper (1894), 114 N. C. 17, 18 S. E. of form." Kilpatrick-Kocli Dry-Goods Co. 
 946; quoting with approval Parsley v. r. Box (1896), 13 Utah, 494, 4.5 Pac. 629 : 
 Nicholson, 65 N. C. 210, the court said: " Section 3219, Comp. Laws of Utah, 1'<SS,
 
 24 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 school asserted that all the distinctions between the common-law 
 and the equity modes of pleading had been embraced within the 
 sweeping language of the statute, and had been discarded ; that 
 one general principle of pleading was applicable to the civil 
 action in all cases, whatever might be the nature of tlie primary 
 right it sought to maintain, or of the remedy it sought to pro- 
 cure. This principle, which was stated in a preceding para- 
 graph, is simple, universal, and natural. It is merely that the 
 pleader must narrate in a plain and concise manner the actual 
 facts from which the right and duties of the parties arise, and 
 not his conception of their legal effect, nor, on the other hand, 
 the mere detail of evidence which substantiates the existence of 
 those facts. This comprehensive principle applies to all kinds of 
 actions, to one founded upon a legal right and seeking a legal 
 remedy, and to one founded on an equitable right and seeking 
 an equitable remedy; and it avoids all questions and difficulties 
 as to the " issuableness " of the matters alleged. Undoubtedly, 
 from the very nature of the primary rights invaded and of the 
 remedies demanded, the narrative of facts will generally be much 
 more minute, detailed, and circumstantial in actions brought to 
 
 declares the rule for stating the cause of and must remain the same, whether under 
 
 action as follows: 'The complaint must code or at common law; that is to say, a 
 
 contain ... a statement of the facts con- pleading must be so drawn as to tender a 
 
 stituting the cause of action, in ordinary definite issue or issues, and not leave the 
 
 and concise language.' The al)Ove is, in adversary to grope in the dark as to what 
 
 substance, the common-law rule. ' Plead- the meaning of the pleading is ; ' this is 
 
 ing is the statement in a logical and legal no more allowable now than formerly.' " 
 
 form of the facts which constitute the Citizens' Bank v. Tiger Tail Mill Co. 
 
 plaintiff's cause of action, or the defend- (1899), 152 Mo. 14.5, 53 S. W. 902 : " While 
 
 ant's ground of defence. . . . Facts only the use of formal aud technical averments, 
 
 are to be stated, and not arguments or which were necessary at common law to 
 
 inferences, or matters of law.' 1 Chitty the statement of a cause of action, have 
 
 PI. pp. 21.3, 214." Casey i'. Mason (1899), been dispensed with by our code aud are 
 
 8 Okla. 665, 59 Pac. 252 : " The statute no longer necessary, the same material 
 
 did not abolish common-law causes of ac- allegations are necessary under it that 
 
 tion — it only abolished their forms and were necessary at common law; and it is 
 
 grouped them under one head — aud there clear, we think, that at common law, in 
 
 is no difference between trespass at com- order to state a cause of action in trover, 
 
 mon law and under the .statutes. A plain- the petition should .«tate that the plaintiff 
 
 tiff, under the statute, must allege and liad possession, or the right to the po.sses- 
 
 prove every fact that he was required to sion, of the property sued for at the time 
 
 allege and prove at common law " Phelps, of the conversion." Merriman i\ McCor- 
 
 etc. Co. V. Halsell (1901), 11 Okla. 1, 65 mick Harve.sting M. Co. (1893), 86 Wi.s. 
 
 Pac.340; Huston y. Tyler (1897), 140 Mo. 142, 56 N. AV. 743 ; Sell i-. Missi.ssippi 
 
 252, 36 S. W. 654: "The above cases River Logging Co. (1894), 88 Wis. 581, 
 
 recognize the doctrine that the 'funda- 60 N. W. 1065.3 
 mental requirements ' of good pleading are
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF TIIH CIVIL ACTION 
 
 25 
 
 maintain equitable rights and to recover equitable relief than in 
 those based upon legal rights and pursuing legal relief, but this 
 incident does not alter or affect the j)rinciple which governs all 
 cases; the pleader in both cases sets out the facts which entitle 
 him to the remedy asked, and no niore;^ it simply liappens that 
 legal remedies usually depend upon a few positive facts, while 
 equitable remedies often arise from a multitude of circumstances, 
 events, and acts, neitlier of which, taken by itself, would have 
 created any right or imposed any duty. It would be useless to 
 incumber the page by a reference to all the reported cases in 
 which this doctrine has been approved; and I shall merely cite 
 one or two which are leading in point of time, and which may be 
 regarded as examples of the class, ^ Without entering upon any 
 discussion of these two theories, it is enough to say that the 
 latter one has been accepted as expressing the true intent and 
 
 [^^ " The spirit of our civil code is that 
 a party shall state in his pleadings the 
 real facts of iiis case and not falsehoods 
 or fictions ; and when each party states 
 what he believes to be true and the real 
 facts of his case, the court may know pre- 
 cisely where the parties differ : " Ken- 
 nett I'. Peters (1894), 54 Ken. 123, 37 Pac. 
 999. " Under the reformed procedure it 
 is unnecessary, in a pleading, to state legal 
 fictions. The pleader should state the 
 facts which constitute his cause of action 
 in ordinary and concise hmguage " : Ball 
 V. Beaumont (1900), 59 Neb. 631, 81 N. W. 
 858.] 
 
 2 Millikin V. Gary, 5 How. Pr. 272; 
 Williams v. Hayes, 5 How. Pr. 470; 
 People !;. Ryder, 12 N. Y. 433, 437. The 
 doctrine of the text was very clearly and 
 accurately stated by Crocker J. in Bowen 
 V. Aubrey, 22 Cal. 566, 569. 
 
 [See also Botsford v. Wallace (1899), 
 72 Conn. 195, 44 Atl. 10, where the court 
 says: "Aiming at simplicity, the Practice 
 Act has discarded the technical formali- 
 ties of common-law pleading, and has fol- 
 lowed in the main the practice in equity." 
 Also Dun nett v. Thornton (1900), 73 Conn. 
 1, 46 Atl. 158; Cone v. Ivinson (1893), 4 
 Wyo. 226, 33 Pac. 31 ; Skinner (•. Skinner 
 (1894), 38 Neb. 756, 57 N. W. 534; Moore 
 V. Spurrier (1899), 55 S. C. 292, 33 S. E. 
 352; Hawkins v. Overstreet (1898), 7 Okla. 
 277, 54 Pac. 472: "We have no action 
 of trover. . . . The distinction between 
 
 actions at law and suits in equity, and the 
 forms of all such actions and suits hereto- 
 fore existing, are abolished. ... It is not 
 necessary that the facts should be stated 
 in such manner as would iiave entitled 
 the plaintiff to a recovery under any par- 
 ticular form of action. It is sufficient if 
 facts are alleged which show a right to 
 recovery by the plaintiff against the de- 
 fendant under the general principles of 
 law determining the rights of parties, and 
 without regartl to what may or may not 
 liave been the rules of pleading or stating 
 a cause of action before the adoption of 
 our code."] 
 
 See contra, the remarks of Holmes J. in 
 Meyers r. Field, 37 Mo. 434, 441. It will 
 be seen in the sequel that the Supreme 
 Court of Missouri stands quite alone — or 
 at least did so until a very recent day — 
 in its theory of interpretation, and retains 
 the distinctions between legal and equita- 
 ble forms, in as marked a manner as 
 thou<;h no change had been made by the 
 statutes. 
 
 [See Faulkner v. First Nat. Bank (1900), 
 130 Cal. 258, 62 Pac. 463, in which it is 
 said : " While we have no forms of action 
 here, yet when the averments of facts in a 
 complaint show the case to be one for 
 which a particular action would have been 
 a proper one at common law, then the 
 general principles of pleading and practice 
 apply to it which apply to the special form 
 of common-law action."]
 
 26 CIVIL KEMEDIKS. 
 
 spirit of the new procedure, and the former has left scarcely any 
 traces in the practical administration of justice in the great 
 majority of the States. The forms contained in the most popular 
 and approved text-books upon practice and pleading furnish a 
 sure test; and, without exception, these are all based upon the 
 method of interpreting the codes last described. And yet with 
 great inconsistency, as it seems to me, the courts have generally 
 held that the ancient forms of common-law pleading in assumpsit 
 viay be used in actions upon contract, especially where the con- 
 tract is implied ; that they sufficiently meet the requirements of 
 the codes, although they do not set out the actual facts of the 
 transaction from which the legal right arises. Thus, it has been 
 decided that the count in indebitatus assumpsit for goods sold 
 and delivered is a sufficient complaint or petition in an action 
 to recover the price. ^ The difference between this ruling of the 
 courts and the theory first above stated is, that according to the 
 latter theory the common-law mode of stating a legal cause of 
 action or defence must be followed in substance, while by the 
 decisions referred to it may be followed in the particular classes 
 of actions described. But even this ruling, although, as I think, 
 a plain departure from the essential spirit of the new system, is 
 of little practical importance ; the bar have, with almost absolute 
 unanimity, adopted the method of stating the facts as they 
 occurred, and do not attempt to aver in their stead the legal 
 fictions of promises which are never made, or conclusions of law 
 which are in no sense of the term actual facts. There are other 
 important features of an action — the parties, the union of dif- 
 ferent causes of action or defence, affirmative relief to the de- 
 fendant, the form of the judgments, and the like — which have 
 been greatly affected by the general provision of the statute 
 abolishing the distinctions between legal and equitable methods, 
 and the judicial interpretation given thereto; but it is impossible 
 to discuss them in any general manner, and their particular treat- 
 ment is reserved for subsequent chapters. 
 
 1 Allen V. Patterson, 7 N. Y. 476, 478. or ])etitions being sanctioned which are 
 
 Some of the State legislatures have by a identical with the ancient common counts, 
 
 statutory enactment set forth forms of and therefore allege fiction instead of facts, 
 
 pleading under the code, and tlius made See, for example, statutes of Indiana, 
 
 them regular and valid. It is strange that ^Weston v. Brown (1899), 158 N. Y. 360, 
 
 in some of these the spirit of the code 53 N. E. 36.3 
 is dii'ectly violated, forms of complaints
 
 UNION OF LEGAL AND KQL'ITABLE REMEDIES. 27 
 
 SECTION SECOND. 
 
 THE COMBINATION BY THE PLAINTIFF OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE 
 PRIMARY RIGHTS AND OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE RKMEDIES 
 IN ONE ACTION. 
 
 § 16. * 76. Principles of Unity Applied to Particular Cases. The 
 general principles of unity developed in the preceding section 
 will now be applied to the several cases which are constantly 
 arising in the practical administration of justice, for the purpose 
 of ascertaining how far the abolition of all distinctions between 
 actions at law and suits in equity has affected the process of 
 stating causes of action, and praying for and obtaining remedies 
 by the plaintiff. It was in this very feature of the judicial process 
 — the stating of causes of action, and the obtaining of relief 
 thereon — that the distinction spoken of was exhibited in the 
 most marked manner ; and it is in this feature, therefore, that the 
 change must be the most sweeping and radical, if the distinction 
 has in truth been abolished. Under the former system a legal 
 primary right, when invaded, could only be redressed by an 
 action at law, and a legal judgment alone was possible ; while 
 an equitable primary right must be redressed or protected in an 
 equity suit and by an equitable remedy. A union or combina- 
 tion of the two classes, either wholly or partially, in one action 
 was unknown, unless permitted by some express statute, and was 
 utterly opposed to the theory whicli separated the two depart- 
 ments of the municipal law. The new system not only permits 
 but encourages — and in its spirit, I believe, requires — such a 
 union and combination; for one of its elementary notions is that 
 all the possible disputes or controversies arising out of, or con- 
 nected with, the same subject-matter or transaction should be 
 settled in a single judicial action.^ 
 
 1 The code does not require legal and a jireviou.s recovery of legal relief bars 
 equitable causes of action and reliefs to tlie subsequent recovery of equitable relief 
 be united in the same action, even when based on the same cause of action. In 
 growing out of the same transaction or tiiis case the facts were as follows : Plain- 
 subject-matter ; a previous decree award- tiffs and defendant were the respective 
 ing equitable relief does not, it is held, bar owners of adjoining lots in the city of 
 the subsequent recovery of legal relief. Buffalo. Defendant in erecting a brick 
 Bruce v. Kelly, 5 Hun, 229, 232. house on her lot encroached on plaintiff.-;' 
 
 [See Hahl r. Sugo (1901), 169 N. Y. lot. In 1896 plaintiffs brouglit an action 
 
 109, 62 N. E. 135, in which it is held that to recover the land thus encroached upon.
 
 28 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 17. *78. Both Equitable and Legal Relief Awarded. Illustra- 
 tious. When the plaintiff is ch)thed with primary rights, both 
 legal and equitable, growing out of the same cause of action or 
 the same transaction, and is entitled to an equitable remedy, and 
 also to a further legal remedy, based upon the supposition that 
 the equitable relief is granted, and he sets forth in his complaint 
 or petition the facts which support each class of rights, and which 
 show that he is entitled to each kind of remedy, and demands a 
 judgment awarding both species of relief, the action will be sus- 
 
 Plaintiffs recovered in this action and 
 upon a second trial recovered again, and 
 in 1898 judgment was entered in their 
 favor establishing their title in fee to the 
 land in dispute. The execution issued on 
 the judgment was returned " by the sheriff 
 with an endorsement thereon .stating in 
 substance that the strip of land described 
 therein was occupied by a portion of the 
 stone foundation and brick wall of defend- 
 ant's house, and that it was impracticable 
 for him to remove the same." A motion 
 by plaintiffs at "a Special Term for an 
 order directing the defendant to remove 
 that portion of the wall of her house 
 which encroaches upon the plaintiffs' 
 land " having been denied, plaintiffs there- 
 upon brought an " action in equity to 
 compel the defendant to remove said en- 
 croaching wall from their land." The 
 judgment recovered by plaintiffs in the 
 former action was pleaded in bar. The 
 Supreme Court sustained the action and 
 granted the relief prayed for, and this 
 judgment " was unanimously affirmed by 
 the Appellate Division." The Court of 
 Appeals, in its opinion reversing the judg- 
 ment, among other things, said : " Let us 
 now see whether the plaintiffs have more 
 than one cause of action arising out of 
 the wrong of the defendant, and if not, 
 what that cause of action is. The plain- 
 tiffs are the owners of a strip of land 
 upon which the defendant has wrongfully 
 entered and erected a wall which is a 
 portion of her house. The facts alleged 
 show one y)rimary right of the plaintiffs 
 and one wrong done by the defendant 
 which involves that right. Therefore the 
 plaintiffs have stated but a single cause of 
 action, no matter how many forms and 
 kinds of relief they may be entitled to. . . . 
 The plaintiffs' right is to recover pousession 
 
 of their land. The defendant's wrong 
 consists in the entry upon and use of the 
 land without the plaintiffs' consent. The 
 particular nature of that wrong may re- 
 quire the application of different remedies 
 for the enforcement of the right. But 
 that does not change the nature of the 
 cause of action, nor entitle the plaintiffs 
 to split it into several causes of action. 
 The complaint in the first action stated 
 tlie facts upon which the plaintiffs based 
 their claim of title and right to possession. 
 Under its allegations tlie title as well as 
 the right to possession could be tested. 
 (Cagger v. Lansing, 64 N. Y. 417.) The 
 right to possession involved the removal 
 of the encroaching wall, for without such 
 removal there could be no real transfer of 
 possession. This in turn required equi- 
 table relief, which, under proper pleadings 
 and an appropriate method of trial, could 
 have been granted in the same action in 
 which the title and right to po.ssession 
 were adjudicated. (Corning v. Troy Iron 
 & N'ail Factory, 40 N. Y. 191 ; Broie.stedt 
 V. S. S. R. R. Co., 55 id. 220.) The fact 
 that jjhiintifts' com))laint lacked the aver- 
 ments wiiich wouhl have apprised the 
 court of their right to equitable relief, and 
 that the course of the trial furnisiied no 
 indication that they intended to claim 
 such relief, is no excuse for the com- 
 •mencement of a separate and independent 
 action upon the siuirle cause involved in 
 the prior action. It would be novel prac- 
 tice, indeed, to permit the correction of 
 errors in that summary and extra-judicial 
 manner." I'ringle v. Hall (1899), Ariz , 
 56 Pac. 740: An action for the refor- 
 mation of a contract may be joined with 
 an action on the contract. Text, § *76, 
 quoted at length.]
 
 UNION OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES. 
 
 29 
 
 tained to its full extent in the form thus adopted. He may, on 
 the trial, prove all the facts averred, and the court will in its 
 judgment formally grant both the equitable and the legal relief.^ 
 It will be noticed that this proposition embraces only those cases 
 in which the legal relief demanded rests upon and flows as a 
 consequence from the prior equitable relief, but the principle of 
 the rule is not confined to such cases ; it extends also to those in 
 which the two remedies, although connected witli the same trans- 
 action or subject-matter, are not connected as cause and effect.^ 
 This is the most complete union of legal and equitable primary 
 rights and remedies in one action which can be made ; but it is 
 limited and restricted to those cases in which these rights and 
 remedies arise from the same transaction or subject.-matter. It is 
 not generally possible to join one legal cause of action with 
 another entirely independent equitable cause of action, there 
 being no antecedent connection between the two. In the cases 
 described above, where the union is permitted, there is, in fact, 
 no joinder of different causes of action ; ^ there is only the union 
 
 1 Laub V. Buckmiller, 17 N. Y. 620, 
 €26 ; Lattin v. McCartv, 41 N. Y. 107, 109, 
 110; Davis v. Lamberton, 56 Barb. 480, 
 483 ; Brown v. Brown, 4 Robt. 688, 700, 
 701 ; Walker v. Sedgwick, 8 Cal. 398 ; 
 Welles r. Yates, 44 N. Y. 52.5 ; Henderson 
 r. Dickey, 50 Mo. 161,165; Guernsey u. 
 Am. Ins. Co., 17 Minn. 104, 108; Mont- 
 gomery V. McEwen, 7 Minn. 351. See, 
 however, Hudson i\ Caryl, 44 N. Y. 553, 
 which holds that, in an action brought to 
 remove a nuisance, damages can only be 
 awarded by the verdict of a jury, sed qn. 
 See also Kewaunee Cy. Sup. v. Decker, 
 30 Wis. 624, 626-630, per Dixon C. J., for 
 a very elaborate opinion in opposition to 
 the doctrine of the text and of the cases 
 cited above in this note. Further illustra- 
 tions of the text are Stewart v. Carter, 
 4 Neb. 564 ; Turner v. Althaus, 6 Nel>. 
 .54; Weinland v. Cochran, 9 Neb. 480; 
 Wa Ching ?•. Constantine, 1 Idaho, 266 ; 
 Young r. Young, 81 N. C. 91 ; Kahn v. 
 Kahn, 15 Fla. 400; Leidersdorf v. Flint, 
 50 Wis. 401 ; Anderson r. Hunn, 5 Hun, 
 79 ; Stevens v. The Mayor, etc., 84 N. Y. 
 296, 305 ; Wheelock v. Lee, 74 N. Y. 495, 
 500 ; Margraf v. Muir, 57 N. Y. 159 ; Hale 
 V. Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y. 626 ; Madi- 
 
 son Av. Bap. Ch. V. Oliver St. Bap. Ch. 
 73 N. Y. 83 ; Cone v. Niagara Fire Ins. 
 Co., 60 N. Y. 619. 
 
 [;Hahl V. Sugo (1901), 169 N. Y. 109, 62 
 N. E. 135; Vaughn v. Georgia Land Co. 
 (1896), 98 Ga. 288, 25 S. E. 441 ; Harp i-. 
 Abbeville Investment Co. (1899), 108 Ga. 
 168, 33 S. E. 998; Brown v. Latham 
 (1893), 92 Ga. 280, 18 S. E. 421.] Butler 
 1-. Barnes, 61 Conn. 399 ; Bowen v. State, 
 121 Ind. 235; Jaseph v. People's Sav. Bk. 
 (Ind. Sup. 1889), 22 N. E. 980; Jennings 
 V. Reeves, 101 N. C. 447 ; Paddock v. 
 Somes, 102 Mo. 226. But see La we v. 
 Hvde, 39 Wis. 345. 
 
 ' 2 See N. Y. Ice Co. v. N. W. Ins. Co., 
 23 N. Y. 357, 359; Cahoon v. Bank of 
 Utica, 7 N. Y. 486 ; Broiestedt i-. South 
 Side R. Co., 55 N. Y. 220, 222 ; Turner v. 
 Pierce, 34 Wis. 658, 665, ])er Dixon C. J. ; 
 Linden v. Hepburn, 3 Sandf. 668, 671 ; 
 Gray v. Dougherty, 25 Cal. 266. The 
 legal and equitable causes of action should 
 be separately stated. Gates v. Kieff, 7 
 Cal. 124; Magwire i-. Tyler, 47 Mo. 115, 
 127. 
 
 3 [^The following cases support the doc- 
 trine of the text, but they all assume that 
 there are two distinct causes of action,
 
 30 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 of remedial rights flowing from one cause of action, as -wall be 
 seen from the judgments of the court in several of the cases cited 
 in the note, and as will be more fully shown in a subsequent 
 /-€hapter. This rule, which has been lirraly established by the ^ 
 / court of last resort in New York, and which is adopted in all the 
 States with one or two exceptions, has been applied in the follow- 
 ing cases among others : ^ in an action by the holder of the legal 
 title to correct his title deed, to recover possession of the land 
 according to the correction thus made, and to recover damages 
 for withholding such possession ; - in an action by one holding the 
 equitable title to procure defendant's deed to be cancelled, and a 
 conveyance by defendant to himself, to recover possession and 
 damages, and to restrain defendant from conveying away the 
 land ; 3 in an action by the grantor of land to correct his deed by 
 the insertion of an exception of the growing timber, and to recover 
 damages for trees embraced in* the exception, wrongfully cut by 
 the grantee ; * in an action to abate a nuisance, to restrain its 
 further commission, and to recover damages therefor ; ^ in an 
 action by a widow to establish her right of dower, to procure it 
 to be assigned, to recover possession and damages ; ^ and in an 
 action by the vendor of land to recover a money judgment on 
 notes given him for the price, and to foreclose his lien on the 
 land itself." 
 
 § 18. * 79. Doctrine in Missouri and "Wisconsin. In Missouri, 
 however, the judiciary for a long time denied the correctness of 
 this rule, and rejected it under all circumstances in which it 
 could possibly be applied. The doctrine was asserted and main- 
 tained in a long series of adjudications that the holder of an 
 equitable title, or the possessor of an equitable primary right, 
 can obtain none but an equitable remedy prosecuted in an equi- 
 table form of action. The Supreme Court of that State even 
 
 one legal and the other equitable. Brown recover thereon, as reformed, against joint 
 
 V.Wilson (1895), 21 Colo. 309, 40 Pac. iusurersj 
 
 fi88; Mulock r. Wilson (1893), 19 Colo. " Lattin v. McCarty, 41 N. Y. 107; 
 
 296. 3.T Pac. 532; Stock-Growers' Bank Henderson r. Dickey, 50 Mo. 161. 
 
 !•. Newton (1889), 13 Colo. 245, 22 Pac. * Welles i-. Yates, 44 N. Y. 525. 
 
 444.] ^ Davis c. Laniberton, 5'6 Barb. 4S0. 
 
 ' For additional instances, see jiost, But see Hudson r. Caryl, 44 N. Y. 553, 
 
 §§ *452-*462. that a jury trial is necessary to the re- 
 
 ^ Laub V. Buckmiller, 17 N. Y. 620. covery of daniage>. Parker r. Laney, 58 
 
 (^Imperial Shale Brick Co. r. Jewett (1901), N. Y. 469. 
 
 169 N. v. 143, 62 N. E. 167, in an aition o Brown v. Brown, 4 Kobt. 688. 
 
 to reform a contract of insurance and to '' Walker v. Sedgwick, 8 Cal. 398.
 
 UNION OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES. 31 
 
 went SO far as to reject the familiar principle of equity jurispru- 
 dence, which permitted the Court of Cliancery, liaviiiy ac(iuired 
 jurisdiction by means of some equitable rig] it, to go on and 
 administer full legal relief in order that the party should not be 
 put to the trouble and expense of a second action at law. In 
 accordance with this narrow view of equity and this narrow 
 construction of the reformed legislation, it was settled that ths 
 holder of an equitable title who seeks to enforce his right and to 
 acquire a legal title by means of a specific performance, a can- 
 cellation, or a reformation of deeds, must, after obtaining that 
 relief, bring a second action at law to recover the possession. If 
 he unite his equitable cltiim for cancellation and the like with 
 the legal claim for possession, he was actually to be turned out 
 of court. This remarkable interpretation pvit upon the language 
 of the statute, and so completely defeating its plain intent, was 
 resorted to in the following, among other instances, which are 
 selected as illustrations merely: in actions brought to set aside 
 and cancel deeds of conveyance made to the defendant, alleged 
 to be fraudulent, and to vest the legal title in the plaintiff, and 
 to recover possession of the premises in question; ^ in an acticm 
 of partition, where defendant was in possession of the whole 
 land, claiming title therein, it being held that the plaintiff must 
 first establish his legal right by ejectment, and then bring an 
 equity action of partition.^ The Supreme Court of Missouri 
 has, however, in a very recent decision, receded from this very 
 extreme position, and has partly, at least, overruled the authorit}' 
 of the cases referred to in this and the subsequent paragraph. 
 Although the single judgment does not in its reasoning and 
 conclusions accept the liberal views of the New York Court of 
 Appeals in their full scope and extent, yet it plainly tends in 
 that direction, conferring the reliefs of reformation or correction 
 of a deed of conveyance and recovery of possession of the land 
 included in such deed as corj^ected.^ The judiciary of Wiscon- 
 
 1 Curd i'. Lackland, 43 Mo. 139 ; Wynn ^ Gott r. Powell, 41 Mo. 416 ; Moreau 
 
 V. Cory, 43 Mo. 301 ; Gray v. Payne, 43 v. Detchemendy, 41 Mo. 431. 
 
 Mo. 203; Bobb v. Woodward, 42 Mo. * Henderson v. Dickey, 50 Mo. 161, 
 
 482 ; Peyton !,\ Hose, 41 Mo. 257 ; Walker's 16.5, per Wagner J. The judgment in 
 
 Adm'r v. Walker, 2.5 Mo. 367 ; Magwire this case comments on and condemns the 
 
 ?'. Tvler, 47 Mo. 115, 127; Rutherford v. leading decisions referred to in the two 
 
 Williams, 42 Mo. 18, 23; Fithian v. preceding notes; and, although it deals 
 
 Monks, 43 Mo. 502, 517. too leniently with the gross mistakes int»
 
 32 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 sin seem now alone, among the tribunals of the several States, 
 to reject this liberal theory of interpretation, and to require 
 separate actions for the assertion of legal and equitable rights, 
 and the procurement of legal and equitable remedies. The 
 principle of unity approved and adopted b}- the highest tribunal 
 of New York has been deliberately rejected after a most thor- 
 ough examination, and the opposite principle, which distin- 
 guishes between the two classes of action, and retains their 
 separate use, and prohibits the recovery of legal and equitable 
 remedies in one suit, is avowedly accepted as being the correct 
 construction of the legislative provisions.^ 
 
 which Holmes J. had fallen in announcing 
 the doctrine of those prior cases, yet it 
 squarely overrules their central principle, 
 and destroys their authority. Henderson 
 V. Dickey has been followed in numerous 
 cases in Missouri. See Paddock v. Somes, 
 102 Mo. 226. 
 
 [^The view now entertained by the Su- 
 preme Court of Missouri respecting some 
 of the matters referred to in the te.xt is 
 shown by the following recent cases : Nalle 
 V. Thompson (1903), 173 Mo. 595, 73 S. W. 
 599; Nalle i;. Parks (1903), 173- Mo. GI6, 
 73 S. W. 596 ; Martin v. Turnbaugh 
 (1899), 153 Mo. 172, 54 S. W. 515 ; Lewis 
 V. Rhodes (1899), 150 Mo. 498, 52 S. W. 
 11 ; Dunn v. McCoy (1899), 150 Mo. 548, 
 52 S. W. 21 ; Springfield, etc. Co. v. 
 Donovan (1899), 147 Mo. G22, 49 S. W. 
 500; Kingman i'. Sievers (1898), 143 Mo. 
 519, 45 S. W. 266; O'Day v. Conn (1895), 
 131 Mo. 321, 32 S. W. 1109; Kerstner v. 
 Vorweg (1895), 130 Mo. 196, 32 S. W. 
 298; Sampson v. Mitchell (1894), 125 Mo. 
 217, 28 S. \V. 768 ; Crawford v. Whitmore 
 (1803), 120 Mo. 144, 25 S. W. 365 ; Morri- 
 son V. Ilerrington (1894), 120 Mo. 665, 25 
 S. W. 568. In these cases a greater de- 
 gree of liberality is shown than the author 
 ascribes to the court. In Martin c Turn- 
 baugh it is said that " every one admits 
 that it is elementary law that when a court 
 of efjuity obtains jurisdiction of a cause it 
 has power to retain jurisdiction until it 
 does complete justice between the parties," 
 and further that "the petition may now 
 have a count at law and a count iu ecpiity, 
 . . . the answer may contain a legal 
 defence, an eijuitable defence, and an 
 
 equital)le cross bill or counterclaim, . . . 
 and the reply may set up legal or equitable 
 defences to the new matter set up in the 
 answer. . . . The object of all of which is 
 to simplify proceedings, and to settle the 
 whole controversy between the parties in 
 one action.] 
 
 [|In Morrison v. Herrington, an action 
 of ejectment, the court said : " Here the 
 causes of action, one legal and the other 
 equitable, arose out of transactions con- 
 nected with the same subject of action. 
 The parties being the same also, there was 
 no misjoinder. Though the court could 
 have granted full and complete relief on 
 the equity cause of action, euen to awarding 
 a ivrit of possession, still it is quite common 
 practice to join an ejectment count with 
 an eciuity cause of action in sucli cases. "3 
 
 Qlt is held in Lewis i; Rhodes, Dunn v. 
 McCoy, Martin i\ Turnbaugh, and O'Day 
 r. Conn, that " where the answer admits 
 the facts constituting the plaintiff's legal 
 cause of action and sets up other facts of 
 an equitable cliaracter in avoidance, the 
 whole case is converted into a suit in 
 equity triable by the court." Likewise if 
 the answer .seeks affirmative equitable 
 relief. See, however, Kersten i\ Vorweg, 
 in which it is said : " This is an action at 
 law. The fact that the answer contained 
 an equitable dofence did not change the 
 character of the action and convert it into 
 a case in equity."] 
 
 1 Noonan r. Orton, 21 Wis. 283 ; Ke- 
 waunee Cy. Sup. r. Decker, 30 Wis. 624, 
 626, per Di.xon C. .J. ; Horn v. Luddington, 
 32 Wis. 73. The first of these cases was 
 an action brought to compel the specific
 
 UNION OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLK KK.MKDIES. 33 
 
 § 19. * 80. Legal Relief only actually Awarded. lUustratioas. 
 The next case to be considered is tlie same in principle, and 
 nearly so in all its features, with the one just discussed. Tiie 
 plaintiff, as in the last instance, possesses primary rights, both 
 legal and equitable, arising from the same subject-matter or 
 transaction, and is entitled to some equitable relief, reformation, 
 cancellation, specific performance, and the like, and to legal relief 
 based upon the assumption that the former relief is awarded ; he 
 avers all the necessary facts in his pleading, and demands both 
 the remedies to which he is entitled. The court, instead of 
 formally conferring the special equitable remedy and then pro- 
 ceeding to grant the ultimate legal remedy, may treat the former 
 as though accomplished, and render a simple common-law judg- 
 ment embracing the final legal relief which was the real object 
 of the action.^ This proceeding is plainly the same in princi[)le 
 with the one stated in the foregoing paragraph; but it is a more 
 complete amalgamation of remedies, a more decided departure 
 from the notions which prevailed under the former system. By 
 the omission of the intermediate step, the actual result is reached 
 of a legal remedy based upon an equitable primary right or title. 
 No doubt this omission of the intermediate step is often as 
 advantageous to the plaintiff as though it had been taken in the 
 most formal manner; but, on the contrary, it will sometimes 
 happen that the formal change of his equitable title into a legal 
 one by a decree of cancellation, or of specific performance or 
 reformation, will be necessary to secure and protect his rights in 
 the future. As a matter of safety and prudence, the particular 
 form of judgment just described should only be used in actions 
 
 performauce of an agreement to give a tions wliicli are in direct conflict with tlio 
 
 lease. The complaint also alleged a breach letter as well as the spirit of tiic codes, 
 
 of a covenant which was to liave been See also Lawe v. Hyde, 39 Wis. 345 ; 
 
 contained in the lease, and demanded a Williams v. Lowe, 4 Neb. 382 ; Paxton r. 
 
 judgment for the damages arising tliere- Wood, 77 N. C. 11 ; Mattair v. Payne, 15 
 
 from as well as for the specific perform- Fla. 682. 
 
 ance. Held, that the two could not be [[But see Draper r. Brown (1902), 115 
 
 combined; that the plaintiff must first Wis. 361, 91 N. W. 1001, in which the 
 
 obtain the lease, and then bring his action Wisconsin court cites the New York cases 
 
 for a breach of tlie covenant in it. The of Keubens c Joel, (ioulet v. A.sseler, and 
 
 judgment of Dixon C. .J. in Supervisors?-. Gould v. Bank, to sustain it in the distinc- 
 
 Becker is an exhaustive discussion of this tion whicli it makes between legal and 
 
 subject, with a review of the leading equitable actions.] 
 
 authorities. Although there is much in i Bidwell v. Astor In.s. Co., 16 N. Y. 
 
 his opinion that is correct and admirable, 263, 2G7 ; riiillijjs v. Gorham, 17 N. Y. 
 
 he reaches, as his main conclusions, posi- 270 ; Caswell v. West, 3 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 3S3. 
 
 3
 
 34 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 upon executory contracts where a pecuniary payment exhausts 
 their efficiency; in actions involving titles to land, the full judg- 
 ment — embracing the equitable relief as well as the legal remedy 
 of possession — would generally be far preferable. The rule 
 permitting such a single legal remedy has been applied in the 
 following among other instances: in an action upon an insurance 
 policy which by mistake was so drawn that the plaintiff — the 
 assured — had no claim for damages, he demanded judgment (1) 
 reforming the instrument, (2) recovering $7,000 for a loss em- 
 braced within its terms as thus reformed, and the court ordered 
 a judgment merely for the amount of the loss as claimed;^ in an 
 action to recover lands of which the plaintiff had the equitable 
 title only, the legal title being in the defendant by means of a 
 deed of conveyance from the plaintiff"'s ancestor, the former 
 owner, regular on its face, but alleged to have been obtained by 
 fraudulent representations, instead of directing a cancellation of 
 this deed and a reconveyance to the plaintiff, the court granted 
 a judgment for the recovery of possession directly ; ^ in an action 
 upon a contract for the building of a house according to certain 
 specifications, the complaint alleging a mistake in the specifica- 
 tions as set out in the written instrument, and averring a per- 
 formance according to the specifications actually agreed on by the 
 parties, and demanding judgment for the amount due for such 
 services without praying for any reformation of the contract, the 
 action in this form was sustained, and it was expressly held that 
 no prayer for a correction was necessary.^ The rule here stated, 
 and the decisions which sustain it, are plainly in direct opposition 
 to the doctrine which originally prevailed in the Missouri courts, 
 and which still receives the approval of the Wisconsin judges. 
 
 § 20. * 81. Legal Relief A'warded, but Equitable Relief Denied. 
 Illustrations. Another case, varying in souh^ of its cii'cumstanees 
 from the two which have been described, and yet depending 
 upon the same principle, remains to be considered. If the 
 plaintiff possesses, or supposes liimself to possess, primary rights, 
 Ijoth legal and equitable, arising from the same subject-matter or 
 transaction, and avers the necessary facts in his pleading, and 
 
 1 Bidwell V. Astor Ins. Co., 16 N. Y. Williams v. Slote, 70 N. Y. 681 ; Whiting 
 
 263. See also Cone v. Niagara Fire Ins. v. Root, .52 Iowa, 292. 
 Co., 60 N. Y. 619, 3 T. & C. 33; Maher 2 phJUips v. (iorham, 17 N.Y. 270. 
 
 t'. Ilibeniia Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 283, 291; « Caswell u. West, 3 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 383.
 
 UNION OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES. 
 
 35 
 
 prays for both the remedies corresponding to the two different 
 rights, but on the trial fails to establisli his e(|uitable cause of 
 action and his consequent right to the equitable remedy, his 
 action should not be therefore dismissed ; he should recover the 
 legal judgment which the legal cause of action demands. ^ 
 Thus, in an action on a policy of insurance, all the necessary 
 facts being alleged, the complaint demanded a money judgment 
 on account of a loss, and also that the instrument should be 
 reformed by reason of an alleged mistake, which reformation, if 
 made, would increase the sum insured, and enable the plaintiff 
 to recover a larger amount. On the trial he failed to prove the 
 averments respecting the mistake, and was not, therefore, en- 
 titled to any equitable relief. The New York Court of Appeals 
 held that judgment should have been recovered on the legal 
 cause of action for the sum which was actually insured, and 
 
 1 McNeady v. Hyde, 47 Cal. 481, 483,— 
 action to recover possession of laud, and 
 for an injunction; Sternberger v. Mc- 
 Govern, 56 N. Y. 12, 21, 15 Abb. Pr. 
 N. s. 257, 271, — specific performance and 
 damages. 
 
 [^Micliener y. Springfield, etc. Co. (1895), 
 142 lud. 130, 40 N. E. 679: "Not only 
 does the same judge under [our reformed] 
 system exercise both law and ecjuity pow- 
 ers, but he exercises botli legal and equita- 
 ble jurisdiction aud administers both legal 
 and equitable relief in each case, when 
 the facts pleaded and proved warrant it. 
 How, then, can the cause be dismissed 
 for want of jurisdiction merely because the 
 plaintiff asks for equitable relief wliile 
 the facts show that he is entitled to legal 
 relief? Tiie court being clothed by the 
 code with power and jurisdiction to ad- 
 minister botli, or either legal or equitable 
 relief in the same case, its jurisdiction is 
 not and cannot be defeated by it appearing 
 from the facts stated that tlie eijuitable 
 relief sought cannot be awarded because 
 such facts show that the only relief the 
 plaintiff is entitled to is purely legal re- 
 lief, or vice versa ; nor is the jurisdiction 
 defeated because the facts stated in the 
 complaint are not sufficient to entitle the 
 plaintiff to either legal or equitable relief. 
 The remedy in such a case is a demurrer 
 for want of sufficient facts." Latham v. 
 
 Harby (1897), 50 S. C. 428, 27 R. E. 862: 
 Where a complaint filed as a bill in equity 
 does not entitle plaintiff to equitable re- 
 lief, but does show a legal cause of action, 
 it is error to dismiss it. Tlie cause should 
 be transferred to the law calendar. Mor- 
 decai i: Seignious (1898), 53 S. C. 95, 30 
 S. E. 717: When a complaint states a 
 good cause of action, either at law or in 
 equity, it should not be dismissed. Simon 
 V. Sabb (1899), 56 S. C. 38, 33 S. E. 799: 
 A complaint entitling plaintiff to relief 
 either on the law or equity side of the court 
 is not subject to demurrer on the ground 
 that it does not state facts sufficient to con- 
 stitute a cause of action. Ferst's Sons v. 
 Powers (1902), 64 S. C. 221, 41 S. E. 974; 
 Gillis I'. Hilton & Dodge Co. (1901), 113 
 Ga 622, 38 S. E. 940 : Where a legal and 
 an equitable cause of action is alleged, aud 
 evidence establishes only the legal cause 
 of action, judgment sliould be given on 
 tliat. Alter r. P.ank of Stockham (1897), 
 53 Neb. 223, 73 N. W. 667 : " To maintain 
 a civil action under our code, it is not 
 essential that the action be denominated 
 either an action at law or in equity, nor 
 that it be given any particular name. If 
 the litigant pleads the facts, and they con- 
 stitute a cause of action or defence, the 
 courts are bound to award the relief due." 
 Meyers n. Smith (1899), 59 Neb. 30, 80 
 N. W. 273.]
 
 36 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 reversed the ruling below which had dismissed the action.^ As 
 another illustration: in an action by the grantor of land against 
 the grantee to set aside the deed of conveyance on the ground 
 that it was procured by false and fraudulent representations, 
 after setting out all the facts which constituted the transaction, 
 the complaint prayed for two remedies in the alternative, — (1) 
 damages for the deceit, (2) cancellation and a reconveyance. A 
 reconveyance was found to be impossible on the trial, because 
 the defendant had conveyed the premises to hona fide purchasers. 
 A simple legal judgment for the damages caused by the deceit 
 was granted, and was held to be proper by the general term of 
 the New York Supreme Court. ^ This rule is now established, 
 except in the one or two States which retain the distinctions 
 between legal and equitable actions ; but there are some earlier 
 dicta, and even decisions opposed to it,^ which, however, must 
 be considered as overruled.* 
 
 § 21. * 82. Where Equitable Remedy only is demanded and 
 Legal Remedy only is granted. Doctrine in Missouri and "Wiscon- 
 sin. In each of the foregoing instances the complaint has suited 
 all the necessary facts constituting both grounds for relief, and 
 has actually demanded both remedies in the prayer for judgment. 
 Another case presents itself with a change of features. The 
 averments of fact are the same, but the plaintiff demands only 
 the special equitable remedy to which he deems himself entitled. 
 On tlie trial he fails to prove the alleged grounds for equitable 
 relief, bat does establish a case for the legal relief which was not 
 demanded in the prayer for judgment, although all the necessary 
 facts, from which the remedial right arose, were averred. It is 
 now, after some hesitation, settled that even in this case the 
 plaintiff is not to be dismissed from court, but should be per- 
 mitted to recover the legal remedy supported by the allegations 
 of fact contained in the complaint or petition.^ There are dicta 
 
 1 N. V. Ice Co. V. N. W. Ins. Co., 23 even this dirium is not so broad as the 
 N. Y. 357, 359. head-note. 
 
 2 Graves v. Spier, 58 Barb. 349, 383, * See Davis v. Morris, 36 N. Y. 569. 
 384; and sec Sternberger r. McGovern, 15 ^ QSouth Carolina, etc. R. R. Co. v. 
 Abb. Pr. N. 8. 257, 271, .56 N. Y. 12. Aujrusta R. R. Co. (1900). Ill Ga. 420,36 
 
 * See Penn. Coal Co. v. Del. & Hudson S. E. 593 : A petition mainly in the form 
 
 Canal Co., 1 Keyes, 72. The reporter's of an equitable petition is maintainable as 
 
 head-note is not sustained by the decision an action at law if it sets forth a letral 
 
 of this case. A dictum of Mr. J. Emott, cause of action. 3 Marquat i-. Marquat, 12 
 
 at p. 76, is the sole ground for it ; and N. Y. 336 ; Barlow i-. Scott, 24 N. Y. 40,
 
 UNION OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES. 37 
 
 in opposition to this rule,^ but they are all overruled oy the 
 subsequent and more authoritative decisions in the same States. 
 In Missouri this liberal doctrine lias not been adopted, since, as 
 has been already seen, the principle of uniting legal and equitable 
 causes of action and remedies in one suit has been rejected in all 
 its phases. The moditication of its earlier notions, which the 
 Supreme Court of that State has made in its latest decisions, 
 does not necessarily extend to the case under consideration. ^ 
 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin seems, also, to have aban- 
 doned the position which it originally occupied in reference to 
 the particular subject in question, and now refuses to award a 
 legal remedy to a plaintiff who has only demanded equitable 
 relief.^ 
 
 § 22. * 83. Where Allegations and Proof entitle to Equitable 
 Relief only, but only Legal Relief is prayed for, Equitable Relief ■will 
 be awarded. Rule in Missouri. The phases and combinations 
 to which the liberal principle has thus far been applied have 
 resembled each other in this, that in all of them the plaintiff 
 was clothed with a double remedial right and both a legal and 
 an equitable cause of action; in those which are now to be 
 examined, the plaintiff claims but one remedial right, and sets 
 up but one cause of action. When the complaint or petition 
 
 45; Cuff y. Dorlaucl,55 Barb. 481 ; Graves Henderson v. Dickey, .50 Mo. 161; (fol- 
 
 i'. Spier, 58 Barb. .349; Tenney v. State lowed in numerous subsequent cases; 
 
 Bank, 20 Wis. 152 ; Foster v. \Vatson, 16 Paildock v. Somes, 102 Mo. 226.) 
 B. Mon. 377, 387 ; Leonard ;;. Rojian, 20 ^ Horn v. Luddington, 32 Wis. 73. The 
 
 Wis. 540 ; White v. Lyons, 42 Cal. 279. complaint alleged moneys advanced and 
 
 In Leonard v. Rogan, Dixon C J. said services rendered by plaintiff to defendant 
 
 (p. .542): "If the plaintiff demands relief under an oral agreement that the latter 
 
 in equity when upon the facts stated he is would convey certain lauds, and demanded 
 
 only entitled to a judgment at law, or vice judgment for a specific performance. De- 
 
 versa, liis action does not as formerly fail ciding that no case was made out for a 
 
 because of the mistake. He may still specific performance, the court also held 
 
 have the judgment appropriate to the case that tlic jdaintiff could not recover for the 
 
 made by the complaint." See also Hamill moneys advanced and the services ren- 
 
 V. Thompson, 3 Colo. 518, 523; Harrall r. dered ; and that in such an equitable ac- 
 
 Gray, 10 Neb. 186 ; Herrington v. Robert- tion a legal remedy could not be obtained, 
 
 son, 71 N. Y. 280; 7 Hun, 368; Williams relying upon the authority of Kewaunee 
 
 r. Slote, 70 N. Y. 601 ; Lewis -v. Soule, Cy. Sup. )'. Decker, 30 Wis. 624, 626. The 
 
 52 Iowa, 11; Whiting v. Root, 52 Iowa, conflict between this ruling and that of the 
 
 292. same court in Leonard v. Rogan, 20 Wis. 
 
 1 See, for example, Mann v. Fairchild, .540, 542, is direct. T make no attempt to 
 2 Keyes, 106, 111; Heywood i-. Buffalo, reconcile them. See Dickson r. Cole, 34 id. 
 14 N." Y. 534, .540. 621 , 625 ; Turner r. Pierce. 34 id. 658. 665 ; 
 
 2 Myers v. Field, 37 Mo. 434. As to Deery r. McPlintock. 31 id. 195; Wrig- 
 the extent of the recent modification, see glcsworth r. Wii^rglesworth, 45 id. 255.
 
 38 CIVIL REMEDIES." 
 
 alleges a case which entitles the plaintiff to equitable relief, but 
 no basis for legal relief is stated, and prays a common-law judg- 
 ment, but no equitable remedy of any kind, if the case as alleged 
 is proved upon the trial the equitable remedy which is appro- 
 priate to it should be awarded. Disregarding tlie prayer or 
 demand of judgment, the court will rely upon the facts alleged 
 and proved as the basis of its remedial action. This application 
 of the general principle has been made in a case wliere the 
 complaint or petition stated facts entitling the plaintiff to an 
 accounting as against the defendant in respect of a joint under- 
 taking, but not to a judgment for a sum certain. The prayer, 
 however, was for the ordinary money judgment. The New York 
 Court of Appeals held that this action should not have been dis- 
 missed, but that a judgment for an accounting should have been 
 granted.^ The rule in Missouri seems to have been settled in an 
 entirely different sense." 
 
 § 23. * 84. 'Where Allegations entitle to Equitable Relief and 
 not to Legal Relief, and Equitable Relief alone is asked, and Proof 
 fails to establish Case Alleged, but does establish Legal Cause of 
 Action, Suit must be dismissed. Converse of this Rule. Principle 
 herein. If, however, the complaint or petition contains a case 
 entirely for equitable relief, stating no facts upon which a legal 
 remedial right arises, and prays a judgment awarding the equi- 
 table relief alone, but on the trial the plaintiff fails to prove the 
 case as thus alleged, but does establish a legal cause of action 
 not averred in his pleading, his suit must be dismissed; he 
 cannot recover the legal remedy appropriate to the facts which 
 he succeeds in proving.^ There is no conflict between this and 
 
 1 Emery y. Pease, 20 N.Y. 62, 64. See, Aucr, 8 Ilun, 180; Hurlbutt i: N. W. 
 
 however, Russell i;. Ford, 2 Cal. 86 ; Biuk- Spaiildiiig Saw Co., 93 Cal. 55, rule stated 
 
 ley V. Carlisle, 2 Cal. 420 ; Stone i-. Fouse, in the text followed. 
 
 3 Cal. 292; Barnstead y. Empire Miu. Co., - Maguire r. Vice, 20 Mo. 429; Rich- 
 
 5 Cal. 299. In all these cases, the court, ardson r. Means, 22 Mo. 495 ; Mevers r. 
 
 while lioldini; tl'at the plaintiff could not Field, 37 Mo. 434. 
 
 recover a judgment for a certain sum, did ' Bradley '-•. Aldrich,40 X. Y. 504. This 
 
 no/ give judgment for au accounting. The case is Important, as it lays down the 
 
 question, however, was not raised. Blood proper limitations upon tlie doctrine of 
 
 V. Fairbanks, 48 id. 171, 174. See also some prior decisions which I liave cited. 
 
 Schilling I'. Rominger, 4 Colo. 100; Ilamill See al.^o Stevens v. The Mayor, etc., 84 
 
 f. Thomp.son, 3 id. 518, 523; Harrall v. N. V. 296, 305; Arnold r. Angdl, 62 id. 
 
 Gray, 10 Neb. 186; Parker v. Jacobs, 14 .508; People's Bank i-. Mitchell, 73 iil 406, 
 
 S. C. 112 ; Smith i;. Bodine. 74 N. Y. 30; 415 ; Bokes /'. Lansing, 74 id. 437 ; Win- 
 
 WiUiams i;. Slote, 70 id. 601 ; Mackey v. termute v. Cooke, 73 id. 107; Smith v.
 
 UNION OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES. 
 
 39 
 
 any of the preceding propositions; in fact, the one principle 
 governs them all. This principle is that the court looks to the 
 faicts alleged and proved, and not to the prayer for relief.' If 
 the facts •entitling a party to a remedy, legal or equitable, are 
 averred and proved, he shall o])tain that remedy, notwithstanding 
 his omission to ask for it in his demand of judgment; and, if the 
 facts were not averred, he shall not obtain the remedy, although 
 he demanded it in the most formal manner. The reform legisla- 
 tion has not dispensed with the allegations of fact constituting a 
 cause of action; on the contrary, it has made them, if possible, 
 more necessary than under the old system. The converse of the 
 rule above stated is also true. If the plaintiff sets forth a case 
 entirely for legal relief, and prays a legal judgment alone, and 
 at the trial fails to prove the averments actually made, he cannot 
 establish an equitable cause of action not pleaded, and recover 
 an equitable remedy thereon. ^ 
 
 § 24. * 85. May invoke Equitable Right in Aid of Legal Action. 
 The principle may be applied in still another form or combination 
 of circumstances. In a purely legal action, or, to speak more 
 
 Bodiiie, 74 id. 30 ; Lawe v. Hyde, 39 Wis. 
 34.5 ; Meyer v. Dubuque County, 43 Iowa, 
 592; Schilling v. Rominger, 4 Colo. 100; 
 Hamill v. Thompson, 3 id. 518, 523. [[See 
 to the same effect Ander.son v. Chilson 
 (1895), 8 S. D. 64, 65 N. W. 435, where 
 the court said : '' When a complaint is 
 framed for equitable relief, and it appears 
 upon the trial that the pleader is not en- 
 titled thereto, judgment at law inconsis- 
 tent with the allegations of the complaint, 
 for damages upon a breach of contract to 
 pay a stipulated amount of money, cannot 
 be entered, and the complaint must be 
 dismissed."] 
 
 1 [[Metropolis Mfg. Co. v. Lynch (1896), 
 €8 Conn. 459, 36 Atl. 832. But see Steed 
 V. Savage (1902), 115 Ga. 97, 41 S. E. 
 272, where it seems to be held that 
 " whether a petition is based upon an 
 equitable or a legal cause of action de- 
 pends upon the character of the relief 
 sought, as shown by the prayers, which 
 indicate whether the alleged cause of ac- 
 tion is intended by the pleader as founded 
 upon legal or equitable principles ; and 
 upon general demurrer it will be deter- 
 mined whether the averments of the peti- 
 tion are such as to authorize the relief 
 
 called for by the prayers. When a peti- 
 tion contains some averments which are 
 appropriate to a legal cause of action and 
 the prayers of the same call for equitable 
 relief only, the court upon general de- 
 murrer will decide whether the j)etition as 
 a whole authorizes the equitable relief 
 prayed for ; and if it does not, the de- 
 murrer will be sustained, notwithstanding 
 there may be averments in the petition 
 which as against a general demurrer 
 might constitute a legal cause of action."] 
 2 Drew V. Person, 22 Wis. 651. This 
 case resembles Emery v. Pease, 20 N. Y. 62, 
 and might be confounded with it. The 
 distinction, however, is plain upon exami- 
 nation, and at once removes any appear- 
 ance of conflict. In Emmery v. Pease, the 
 complaint stated facts showing that the 
 plaintiff was entitled to an accounting, 
 although it prayed for a money judgment. 
 In Drew v. Ferson, the pleading set out 
 simi>ly a case to recover money laid out 
 and expended ; it did not contain any alle- 
 gation upon which to base a judgment for 
 accounting. In the former case, there- 
 fore, it was proper to grant the equitable 
 remedy, and in the latter it was proper 
 to dismiss the suit : there is no conflict.
 
 40 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 correctly, in an action where the plaintiif sets forth and mainly 
 relies upon a legal primary right or title, and asks a remedy 
 which is purely legal, he may still invoke the aid of an equitable 
 right or title which he holds, or of which he may avail himself, in 
 order to maintain his contention, and obtain the legal relief which 
 he seeks. This is a more indirect union of legal and equitable 
 rights and causes of action tlian exists in any of the instances 
 heretofore discussed; but it is none the less such a union, ^ 
 
 § 25. *86. Mode of Trial when both Legal and Equitable Causes 
 of Action are alleged, Ho-wr w^aive Right to Jury Trial. As tO 
 the mode of trial when the complaint or petition sets forth an 
 equitable and a legal cause of action, there is some diversity in 
 the practice of the several States.''^ The constitutions protecting 
 
 ' Sheehan v. Ilamiltou, 2 Keyes, 304 ; 
 3 Abb. Pr. n. s. 197. This was an action 
 to recover possession of laud. Living- 
 ston, the original owner, had demi.sed tlie 
 land to one Tavlor by a perpetual lease, 
 reserving a rent-charge with a clause of 
 re-entry. L. assi^rned this rent-charge and 
 all his rights to Dr. Clarke, who died 
 in 18-16, and the plaintiff is his heir-at- 
 law. The action is brought to recover 
 the land on account of failure to pay the 
 rent. The defence was as follows : Tay- 
 lor had given a mortgage on the land 
 whicli had been foreclosed, and the land 
 was bought by Dr. Clarke in 1831, and 
 was by him conveyed to one Risley and 
 from him by mesne conve3"ances to the 
 defendant. The defendant's contention 
 was that Dr. Clarke in 1831 being owner 
 both of the land and of the rent-charge, 
 the latter merged and was extinguished. 
 In reply, the plaintiff ])roved that Dr. 
 Clarke did not intend that the rent-charge 
 should merge, but that it should be kept 
 alive. The General Term of the Supreme 
 Court held that this doctrine of non- 
 merger was purely equitable, and could 
 not be invoked by the plaintiff in this 
 legal action, and that the plaintiff should 
 have first established the rent-charge in 
 an e(|uitabh' action, and then brought this 
 action of ejectment. The Court of Ap- 
 peals reversed this decision, and laid 
 down the doctrine of the text. See, al.'JO, 
 Arthur r. Homestead Ins. Co., 78 N. Y. 
 462, 467. [Home Ins. Co. v. Railroad 
 Co. (1893), I'J Colo. 4G, 34 Pac. 281.] 
 
 2 ^United Coal Co. t". Canon City Coal 
 Co. (1897), 24 Colo. 116, 48 Pac.'lO-l5: 
 " The question whether an issue of fact 
 can be tried by a jury or by the court is 
 not to be determined from the nature of 
 the issue, but from the character of the 
 action in which such issue is joined." 
 Kuhl r. Pierce County (1895), 44 Neb. 
 584, 62 N. W. 1066;" Angus v. Craven 
 (1901), 132 Cal. 691, 64 Pac. 1091: Per 
 Henshaw J. (concurring). " Under onr 
 system, equitable and legal rights are 
 determined in the same forum. It is 
 within the discretion of the court to con- 
 trol the order of proof upon the issues 
 joined. In the natural order, before de- 
 fendant was entitled to a hearing upon the 
 legal issues tendered, she nmst defeat 
 plaintiffs upon the equitable issues pre- 
 sented by them. This was the view of the 
 trial court, and in pursuance of it, it took 
 to itself, as was proper, the determination 
 of tlie.se e(juital)le matters. The result 
 was that it found defendant's deeds to 
 have been forgeries. Had it reached the 
 opposite conclusion, then defendant might 
 with right have insisted that the remain- 
 ing issues of law be tried before a jury. 
 But that time never arrived, and I do not 
 concede the riglit of a litigant to oust a 
 court of e(|uitable jurisdiction in an action 
 of purely etjuitable cognizance, merely by 
 tendering additional issues whicli are tria- 
 ble at law before a jury. It is sufficient if 
 a jury be lia<l when those issues come to 
 trial." 'I'his was an action to quiet title 
 brought by a plaintiff in possession, and
 
 UNION OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE KKMEDIES. 41 
 
 the jury trial in common-law cases in which it had been custom- 
 arily used, the defendant may, of course, insist that the legal 
 issues shall be passed upon by a jury. He may waive this right 
 by a stipulation in writing, by an oral stipulation made in open 
 court, by failing to appear on the trial, and perhaps by permitting 
 the trial to be actually entered upon without objection. If tlie 
 litigant parties, or either of them, assert their rights as thus 
 stated, it is settled in New York that the legal issues must be 
 tried at a circuit court, or at a trial term of the court in which 
 the action is pending; ^ and it seems that all the issues, legal and 
 equitable, must thereupon be tried together in the same manner, 
 for it is said that "no provision is made for two trials of the 
 issues joined in the same action." If a cause is brought on to 
 trial before the court sitting without a jury — in New York, the 
 special term — as an equity cause, and the trial is commenced 
 under that supposition, the defendant not waiving his right by 
 acquiescence, and the court, in the course of the investigation, 
 discovers that it involves separate legal issues, the complaint 
 should not be dismissed on that account; the trial should be 
 suspended, and the case sent to the Circuit or other court pos- 
 sessing a jury. 2 The same rule prevails generally in other 
 
 defendant answered by a cross complaint out recourse to a court of equity. But 
 
 in the nature of ejectment. See also where defendant lias performed liis part 
 
 Hidgeway y. Herbert (1899), 150 Mo. 606, of the contract of release pleaded, and 
 
 51 S. W. 1040, quoted at length in note interposed it as a bar to the action, and 
 
 2, p. 47, and other cases cited in the plaintiffs admit its execution, knowing 
 
 same note. Thomas i\ Wallver (1902), at the time thereof its legal effect, they 
 
 115 Ga. 11,41 S. E. 269: "It has always cannot escape the legal bar created tliereby. 
 
 been the practice, especially since the To get rid of such an instrument resort 
 
 passage of tlie procedure act of 1887, must be had to a court of equity. Han- 
 
 when both legal and equitable rights are cock v. Blackwell (1897). 1.'39 Mo. 440,41 
 
 united in one petition, for tlie court to S. W. 205 : Defendant was charged with 
 
 apply legal principles to the legal rights having uttered slanderous words res])ect- 
 
 and equitable principles to the equitable iiig plaintiff. For a valuable considera- 
 
 rights." Ford v. Holloway (1900), 112 tion plaintiff executed to defendant her 
 
 Ga. 851, 38 S. E. 373.] release in full satisfaction of all claims 
 
 1 Davis w. Morris, 36 N. Y. 569; Peojjle against defendant. Subsequently the con- 
 V. Albany, etc. R. Co., 57 N. Y. 161, 174. sideration was tendered back and the 
 
 2 [^Hahl ('. Sugo (1901), 169 N. Y. 109, jire.<cnt action was brought for the same 
 62 N. E. 135. Homuth v. Metropolitan slander, and defendant pleaded the release 
 St. Ry. Co (1895), 129 Mo. 629, 31 S. W. in bar. Plaintiff replied alleging fraud in 
 903 : It is the general rule in this State procuring the release. Held that the re- 
 and elsewhere that the issues raised by a lease must first lie set aside by an action 
 reply impeaching the integrity of a re- in e(]uity or jtlaintiff must a:ld a count to 
 lease pleaded by way of answer in an her petition to have the release set aside, 
 action at law, may be tried at law with- Parker v. Beasley (1895), 116 N. C. 1, 21
 
 42 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 States. A mistake in bringing on the cause for trial is to be 
 corrected by simply sending it to the proper court or placing it 
 upon tlie proper docket.^ In some of the States provision is 
 made for the trial of the issues separately and at different times. 
 The equitable issues may be tried first and the legal issues after- 
 wards, or the order may be reversed as the nature of the case and 
 the relations of the issues seem to require.^ 
 
 SECTION THIRD. 
 
 EQUITABLE DEFENCES TO ACTIONS BROUGHT TO ENFORCE LEGAL 
 RIGHTS AND TO OBTAIN LEGAL REMEDIES. 
 
 S 26. * 87. Former System. Illustration. Criticism. Subject 
 Matter of Section Third. Another practical effect of removing the 
 distinction between actions at law and suits in equity is shown in 
 the emplo\inent of equitable defences to actions bi-ought to en- 
 force legal rights and to obtain legal remedies. The ancient 
 system knew of no such union, and a thorough-paced lawyer 
 of the old school would have deemed it incestuous. Legal 
 rights set up by the plaintiff must be met in the same action 
 by legal rights set up by the defendant. If the defendant, 
 when prosecuted in an action at law, had an equity which, if 
 
 S. E. 9.5.5 : " The moment either party by ^ Massie v. Stradford, 17 Ohio St. .596 ; 
 his pleadings sets out and asks equitable Petty v. Malier, 15 B. Mon. 591, 604; 
 relief, the court of equity acquires juris- Smith i'. Moberly, 15 B. Mon. 70, 7-3 ; Ben- 
 diction, cleaM the deck, and adjusts all nett v. Titherington, 6 Bush, 192. Sec 
 equities between the parties."] Guernsey v. Am. Ins. Co., 17 Minn. 104, 
 ^ I^banon Trs. r. t'orrest, 15 B. Mon. 108; Harrison i\ Juneau Bank, 17 Wis. 
 168; Foster >: Watson, 16 B. Mon. .377, 340; Du Pont r. Davis, .35 Wis. 631, 639 ; 
 387 ; Sale v. Crutchfield, 8 Bush, 636, 644. and see Richmond r. Dubuque, etc. R. 
 If an action is wrongly transferred to the Co., 33 Iowa, 422, 489-491. [|See p. 6, 
 equity docket when no valid equitable note 1.] On the mode of trial, .see also 
 issues are presented by the pleadings, McPherson v. Featherstoiie, 37 Wis. 632 
 this is error which requires a new trial, (equitalde issue may be tried by the court 
 Creager i'. Walker, 7 Bush, 1, 3. QCarder "J^i'r the legal i.ssue is determined in favor 
 V. Weisenburgh (1893), 95 Ky. 135, 23 of the plaintiff by the jury) ; Lewis r. 
 S. W. 964: "If the equitalde right de- Sonic, 52 Iowa, 11; Davison r. Associates 
 pends upon the decision of legal issues, of the Jersey Co., 71 N. Y. 333 ; Wheelock 
 concerning which the party is entitled to a r. Lee, 74 id. 495, 500, and cases cited ; 
 jury trial, the case, on motion, should be Hughes v. Dunlap. 91 Cal 385 ; Donahue 
 tran.sferred as matter of right to the com- v. Meister, 88 Cal. 121; Downing i: Le 
 mon law docket to be tried by jury." Du, 82 C,a.l. 471. An equitalde defence 
 Where an equitable defence is interposed, set up does not change the nature of the 
 the cau.se is transferreil to the ecpiity action. Wisner v. Ocumpaugh, 71 N. Y. 
 docket: Peel v. January, 35 Ark. 331; 113,117. 
 Sandel & Hill Dig. § 5804.3
 
 NATURE OF EQUITABLE DEFENCES. 43 
 
 worked out, would defeat the recovery, his only mode ot redress 
 was to commence an independent suit in chancery by which he 
 might enforce his equitable right, and in the mean time en- 
 join his adversary from the furtlier prosecution of the action 
 at law. A single familiar example Avill illustrate the situation. 
 
 A. has entered into a contract with B. to convey to the latter a 
 farm on payment of the price, and lets him into possession. The 
 price is paid in full, 'so that the vendee is fully entitled to liis 
 deed. A., in this position of affairs, commences an action of 
 ejectment to recover possession of the land. By tiie common-law 
 system B. would have no defence whatever to that action ; tiie 
 legal title is in the plaintiff, and his own title and right to a deed, 
 being equitable, were not recognized by courts of law as any 
 defence. Of course a municipal law which did not furnish some 
 means of enforcing B.'s right and defeating A.'s action would be 
 incomplete, and unfitted for a civilized people. The common law 
 provided a means, but it was cumbrous, dilatory, and expensive. 
 
 B. commences a suit in the Court of Chancery, sets forth the 
 agreement to convey and all the other facts from which his 
 equitable title arises, alleges the pending ejectment brought by 
 the vendor, and prays for the proper relief. It is important to 
 notice the extent and nature of this relief, because it throws 
 light upon questions which now arise concerning the doctrine 
 of equitable defences. The vendee might content liimself witli 
 asking and obtaining an injunction which would stay the pend- 
 ing ejectment, and leave him in possession undisturbed by 
 that action, but would plainly not be a perfect and lasting pro- 
 tection in the future. To end the matter and to secure himself 
 absolutely, he must ask and obtain the affirmative remed}' of a 
 specific performance and a conveyance from A. to himself. This 
 being done, he is armed with the legal title, and can defend any 
 legal action brought against him by the vendor or his heirs or 
 grantees. Nothing could be devised more cumbrous than this 
 double litigation to enforce one right and to end one controversy.' 
 
 1 [[South Portland Land Co. i'. Munger equity. Each action, that at law and that 
 
 (1900), 36 Ore. 457, 60 Pac. 5 : In an in ecjuity, was a distinct proceeding l)c- 
 
 actiou of ejectment defendant filed a cross- longing to a different . forum, and th(> 
 
 bill in equity, and it was held that plain- jirupcr practice w.as to try out the action 
 
 tiff was entitled to have the bill stricken at law and tlien institute a se])arate suit 
 
 out on motion, since the action at law in wjuity to obtain the relief sought in the 
 
 should be tried out before the cross suit in cross-bill.]
 
 44 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 NothinfT could be more simple, natural, and necessarj' than the 
 reforni which permits the equitable right to be pleaded and 
 proved in the action at law ; and yet, when the change was made 
 by the legislature, experienced and learned lawyers and judges 
 denounced it, and strove to render it merely nominal. Even at 
 the present day, and in States Avhere the liberal doctrine has been 
 accepted and has received the sanction of the highest tribunals, 
 individual members of the bench wdll occasionally raise their 
 voices in strenuous opposition ; and in one or two of the States 
 an interpretation has been placed upon the statute which confines 
 its beneficial operation within the narrowest limits. The subject- 
 matter of the present section naturally separates itself into three 
 divisions, and the discussion will follow that order : (1) What is 
 an equitable defence? (2) When may an equitable defence be 
 interposed in an action purely legal, which will include the 
 joinder of equitable and legal defences in the same suit? and 
 (3) When can affirmative relief against the plaintiff be granted 
 to the defendant upon the equitable defence which he sets up ? 
 
 § 27. * 88, Meaning of the Terms " Equitable " and '' Defence." 
 Restriction Imposed by some Courts herein. What is an equitable 
 defence? It is to be observed that this term contains two distinct 
 words, and that the separate meaning of each is essential to the 
 complete and accurate conception of the whole, — " equitable " 
 and " defence." Equitable is used in its technical sense as con- 
 trasted with legal ; that is, the right which gives it its efficacy is 
 an equitable right, — a right formerly recognized and enforced 
 only in courts of equity, and not in courts of law. The notion 
 involved in the word " defence " is, however, the most important 
 to observe. In its judicial signification, a defence is sometliing 
 which simply prevents or defeats the recovery of a remedy in an 
 action or suit, and not something by means of which the party 
 who interposes it can obtain relief for himself. If the codes had 
 merely in express language authorized the defendant to set up 
 equitable defences, but had not enacted any further provisions in 
 reference to the subject-matter, the granting of affirmative equi- 
 table remedies to the defendant could not have been inferred 
 from such permission. A "defence" is essentially negative, and 
 not afllirmative. The facts from which the defensive right arises, 
 may [)erhaps, in a proper occasion and when employed for that 
 pur{)Ose, be made the basis of aifinnative relief; but, when so
 
 NATURE OF EQUITABLE DEFENCES. 45 
 
 employed, they would not be a defence. In sliort, a defence is 
 not to be conceived of as the means of acquiring positive relief 
 or any remedy, legal or equitable. When, therefore, the statute 
 permits an equitable defence to be interposed in a legal action, it 
 merely contemplates the fact that the equitable right averred 
 shall prevent the plaintiff from recovering the legal remedy he is 
 pursuing by his action. If to this negative effect is added the 
 privilege of obtaining an affirmative judgment against the 
 plaintiff, based upon the same equitable right, the latter so far 
 ceases to be a "defence," and becomes in turn a cause of action. 
 The action itself thus assumes a double aspect; each litigant 
 party in this respect becomes an actor, and each a defendant. 
 This analysis may appear to be, and certainly is, elementary and 
 familiar ; but it is needed to clear up some confusion and dif- 
 ficulties into which certain courts have fallen in reference to the 
 subject under consideration. Tliese courts, as will be seen in the 
 sequel, would restrict the operation of the reform to those cases 
 in which the defendant asks and obtains some specific aifirmative 
 equitable relief against the plaintiff ; in other words, to those 
 cases in which the equitable right relied upon by the defendant 
 is not used as a defence at all^ but is averred as a true cause of 
 action. This construction is, as it seems to me, a palpable error, 
 and it deprives the legislative provision of half its efficacy. 
 
 § 28. * 90. Meaning of Equitable Defence. Definition by Ne-vr 
 York Court of Appeals. A defence is a right possessed by the 
 defendant, arising from the facts alleged in his pleadings A\hich 
 defeats the plaintiff's claim for the remedy which he demands by 
 his action. An equitable defence is such a right wliich was 
 originally recognized by courts of equity alone. A concise and 
 accurate definition was given by one of the members of the New 
 York Court of Appeals in an early case. " Under the head of 
 equitable defences are included all matters which would before 
 have authorized an application to the Court of Chancery for 
 relief against a legal liability, but which at law could not be 
 pleaded at bar. The facts alleged by way of defence in this action 
 would have been good cause for relief against the judgment in a 
 court of chancery, and under our present system are, therefore, 
 proper matters of defence.'* ^ Another judge said in the same 
 
 1 Dobson V. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 15('), 166, IIuii, 437 ; Wisiier r. Ocuinpaugh, 71 N. Y. 
 per Allen J. See Webster v. Bond, 9 113, 117; Wa Cliuug v. Constautiue, I
 
 46 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 case : " An equitable defence to a civil action is now as available 
 as a legal defence. The question now is, Ought the plaintiff 
 to recover? and anything which shows that he ought not is 
 available to the defendant, whether it was formerly of equitable 
 or of legal cognizance."' ^ I nee^ not pursue this analysis fur- 
 ther ; the instances in which equitable defences have been sus- 
 tained, as given in the cases hereafter cited, will explain and 
 illustrate their nature more clearly than any abstract definition or 
 description. 
 
 § 29. * 91. Cases holding that Facts entitling to Equitable Re- 
 lief against Legal Cause of Action can be interposed only upon the 
 Condition that AfiBrmative Relief is demanded. Criticism. Express 
 as is the language of the statutes, and well established as is the 
 juridical nature of " defence '' in general, the doctrine has been 
 strenuously maintained, and is supported by the decisions of 
 respectable courts, that a defendant cannot avail himself, as a 
 defence, of facts entitling him to equitable relief against the 
 plaintiff's legal cause of action, unless he does it by demanding 
 and obtaining that specific remedy which, when granted, destroys 
 the cause of action ; in other words, he cannot invoke the right 
 as long as he treats it and relies upon it as a defence. If he does 
 not institute a separate action based upon his equitable right, and 
 recover the specific relief therein, and restrain the pending action 
 at law, he must, at least, in the answer pleaded to that action at 
 law, affirmatively demand the equitable remedy, and this remedy 
 must be conferred upon him. If he simply avers the facts as a 
 negative defence, he will not be j)ermitted to rely upon them and 
 to defeat the plaintiff's recovery by that means. Certain of the 
 cases which announce this doctrine, will be found in the foot- 
 note.^ The error of this doctrine has already been demonstrated. 
 
 Idaho, 266; rennover c. Allen, 51 Wis. - Follett !•. Heath, 15 Wis. GOl ; Conger 
 360; 50 Wis. 308;" Holland v. Johnson, r. Parker, 29 Ind. 380; Hicks v. Shep- 
 51 Ind. 346. As to whether an equitable pard, 4 Lans. 335, 337 ; Cramer r. Ben- 
 defence must or only mm/ he .set up, see ton, 60 Barb. 216. See also Keuyou i'. 
 Erie II. Co. r. Uamsay, 45 N. Y. 637, per Quinn.41 Cal. 325 ; Lombard/;. Cowham, 
 FolgerJ. ; Giles i>. Austin, 62 id. 486 (such 34 Wis. 486, 492; Dewey ;-. Hoag, 15 
 defence need not be set up when tiie de- Barb. 365; Cadiz r. Majors, 33 Cal. 288; 
 fondant's ripht is not absolute, and when Clark >: Lockwood, 21 Cal. 220; Bruck y. 
 it rests in the discretion of the court to Tucker, 42 Cal. 352 ; Miller v. Fulton, 47 
 grant the relief or not) ; Ricker v. Pratt, Cal. 146. Kent v. Agard, 24 Wis. 378, 
 48 Ind. 73. does not conflict with this doctrine. See 
 ' Dubson ?'. Pcarce, 12 N. Y. 150, 168, Du Pont v. Davis, 35 Wis. 634, 639; Hills 
 per Johnson J. v. Sherwood, 48 Cal. 386, 392 ; McClane v.
 
 NATURE OF EQUITABLE DEFENCES. 47 
 
 A defence is a negative resistance, an obstacle, a something which 
 prevents a recovery, whether it be equitable or legal. If every 
 equitable defence, in order to be available, must consist in an 
 affirmative recovery of specific relief against the plaintiff, or at' 
 least in the right to recover such relief if the defendant choose 
 to enforce it, for exactly the same reasons, and with exactly the 
 same force, it might be said that every legal defence, in order 
 to be available, must consist of an off-set or counter-claim. In 
 fact, the codes, without exception recognize the correctness of 
 the rule stated in the text. The sections which prescribe the 
 form and contents of the answer enumerate " defences," legal and 
 equitable, and counter-claims. A recovery of equitable relief by 
 defendant is as truly a counter-claim as the recovery of pecuniary 
 damages ; ^ and the statute thus expressly distinguishes between 
 equitable defences as such and the recoveries of affirmative equi- 
 table relief. The cases which will be referred to in subsequent 
 paragraphs show that the overwhelming weight of authority sus- 
 tains the doctrine which I have stated as the correct construction 
 of the codes. 
 
 § 30. * 92. Correct Construction. Limitation upon the Interposi- 
 tion of Equitable Defences to Legal Causes of Action. 1 now pasS 
 to the consideration of the cases in which equitable defences have 
 been admitted. ^ It will be impossible to state any exhaustive 
 
 White, 5 Minn. 178, 190. See Webster in the same forum, a party who is brought 
 V. Eoud, 9 Hun, 437 ; Ten Broeck v. into court to respond to a promise con- 
 Orchard, 74 N. C. 409 ; Quebec Bank v. tained in a note may defend successfully 
 Weyand, 30 Ohio St. 126 ; Hatcher v. by showing that its consideration has 
 Briggs, 6 Ore. 31; Fennoyer v. Allen, failed because of facts creating the equita- 
 51 Wis. 360; 50 id. 308; Lawe i'. Hyde, ble barrier to its enforcement just stated." 
 39 id. 345 ; Henkle v. Margerum, 50 Ind. The liarrier stated was misrepresentation. 
 240; Winslow v. Winslow, 52 id. 8; Wendover n. Baker (1893), 121 Mo. 273, 
 Thompson I'. Fall, 64 id. 382; Kentfield 25 S. W. 918: An answer setting up e(|ui- 
 V. Hayes, 57 Cal. 409 ; Scott v. Norris table defences and praying for affirmative 
 (Ind. App. 1892), 32 N. E. 332; Mason v. ecjuitable relief, converts the case into a 
 Mason, 102 Ind. 38. [|Weld v. Tlie John- proceeding in ecjuity to be governed by 
 son Mfg. Co. (1893), 86 Wis. 549, 57 N. W. prmciples and rules of procedure applicar 
 378.3 ble to such cases. Swon y. Stevens (1897), 
 
 1 Affirmative relief will of course be 143 .Mo. 384, 45 S. W. 270; Kostuba i-. 
 
 given in proper cases. As an illustration. Miller (1896), 137 Mo. 161, 38 S. W. 946 : 
 
 see Blake v. Buffalo Creek R. B., 56 N. Y. An equitable defence will not convert an 
 
 485, 493, 494 ; Bailey v. Bergen, 4 N. Y. action at law into one in eciuity where no 
 
 Sup. Ct. 642. afhrmative relief is asked. Kidgeway v. 
 
 ' [^Sachleben v. Heintze (1893), 117 Herbert (1899), 150 Mo. 606, 51 S. W. 
 
 Mo. 520, 24 S. W. 54 : " Under our i^ystem 1040: "When an answer in a law suit 
 
 of law, in which legal and equitable rights admits the j)laintiffs cause of action, and 
 
 and remedies are recognized an ! ai)plied sets up purely an e(iuitable defence, it con-
 
 48 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 rule derived from the decisions thus far made by the courts ; for 
 it cannot be supposed that they have exhausted the instances in 
 Avliich this species of defence is proper. There does not seem 
 to be any limit to the use of such defences other than is found 
 in the very nature of equity jurisprudence itself. Whenever 
 equity confei-s a right, and the right avails to defeat a legal cause 
 of action, — that is, shows that the pkintiff ought not to recover 
 in his legal action, — then the facts from which such right arises 
 may be set up as an equitable defence in bar. There can be no 
 other limitation, unless we would defeat the plain intent of the 
 statute, and return to the old method of granting to the defendant 
 a decree in equity from which a le(jal defence may arise. The 
 following cases are intended as illustrations and examples rather 
 than as a full enumeration of the possible instances in which the 
 defence may be interposed. 
 
 § 31. * 93. Illustrations and Examples. In an action brought 
 to recover damages for the breach of covenants contained in a 
 deed of conveyance, the defendant may set up, as an equitable 
 defence, a mistake in the instrument which should be corrected ; 
 as, for example, in such an action on a covenant against incum- 
 brances, the alleged breach being an outstanding mortgage, the 
 defendant may show the original agreement to except such mort- 
 gage from the operation of the covenant, and that by mistake the 
 exception was omitted.^ In an action upon a judgment recovered 
 against the defendant, the latter pleaded that the judgment was 
 
 verts the whole case into a suit in equity tory substitute for the relief formerly 
 triable by the chancellor. A plaintiff is afforded l)y courts of law and courts of 
 not thereby deprived of his rigiit of trial equity collectively." Hainill v. Bank of 
 by jury, because the defendant by his Clear Creek County (1896), 22 Colo. 384, 
 answer concedes the plaintiff'.s right to re- 45 Pac. 411: In an action of forcible 
 cover unless the equity defence prevails." detainer, equitable defences may be inter- 
 But where in such an action defendant posed which show that, while the title to 
 presents two defences, one legal ami the the property is in the plaintiff, the de- 
 other equitable, the legal issues are triable fendant has a better right to possessiou. 
 by a jury and the equitable issues are for Neal r. Widcman (1894), 59 Ark. 5, 26 
 the chancellor. Martin v. Turnbaugii S. W. 16: Defendant in an action to recover 
 (1899), 153 Mo. 172, 54 S. W. 515: "If possession of land was allowed to take 
 the action is one at law, and the answer advantage of fraud by answer and cross- 
 seeks atlirmative e(|uitable relief or pleads complaint.] 
 
 a legal defence and the reply rai.scs an ^ llaire v. Baker, 5 N. Y. 357. The 
 
 equitable defence to the affirmative legal New York Court of Appeals held in this 
 
 defence set up in the answer, the equitable case that the defendant could set up this 
 
 claim or defence must be tried by the matter as a de/lnce, but could not hare any 
 
 court, sitting in equity, before the actiou atfirmative relief. This latter po.sition has 
 
 at law can be tried ; and this is the statu- been since abandoned by the court.
 
 NATURE OF EQUITABLE DEFENCES. 49 
 
 originally obtained by fraud, and that he had instituted a suit in 
 equity against the judgment creditor in the State of Connecticut, 
 in which the judgment had been decreed to be void, and its en- 
 forcement had been enjoined. These facts constituted a perfect 
 equitable defence and complete bar to the action.^ In an action 
 to recover damages for the non-performance of an executory con- 
 tract to run a steamboat on a certain route for the plaintiff, the 
 answer alleged a mistake in drawing the contract by which a 
 proviso was omitted that would have excused the defendant's 
 failure to perform, and prayed a reformation. The New York 
 Court of Appeals sustained the defence, saying: "The court 
 below clearly erred in holding that the equitable defence could 
 not be tried in this action. That it could be is too thoroughly 
 settled to admit of further dispute." ^ The defence may arise 
 from facts occurring subsequent to tlie joinder of issue, and 
 require to be interposed in a supplemental answer. On the day 
 of trial of an action for work and labor, the parties met, had a 
 negotiation, and settled the controversy, by the terms of which 
 settlement the suit was to be abandoned. The plaintiff after- 
 wards repudiating the compromise and proceeding with the trial 
 ■of the cause, the defendant, after tendering performance, was 
 permitted to set up the facts in a supplemental answer ; and it 
 "was held that they constituted a perfect equitable bar.^ 
 
 § 32. * 94. In Actions to recover Land. Three Classes of Cases. 
 Illustrations. The action to recover possession of land — analogous 
 to ejectment — is the one in which the equitable defence is the 
 most frequent; and here, of course, it assumes a great variety of 
 shapes.* Those, however, which are the most common are the 
 
 1 Dobson V. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 156, 165 ; 60 N. Y. 430 ; Rpect v. Spect, 88 Cal. 
 Pennoyer v. Allen, 51 Wis. 360; 50 id. 437. 
 
 308. ^The following cases hold that an equi- 
 
 2 Pitcher v. Hennessey, 48 N. Y. 415, table defence may be interposed in an 
 422. In this case the defendant asked action of ejectment : Wanser v. Lucas 
 and obtained the reformation. (1895), 44 Neb. 759, 62 N. W. 1108; Sut- 
 
 3 Kelly V. Dee, 2 N. Y. vSup. Ct. 286. ton v. Sutton (1900), 60 Neb. 400, 83 
 
 4 Harrin<rtoni'.Fortner,58Mo.468,474; N. W. 200; Davis v. Holbrook (1898), 25 
 Hubble V. Vaughau, 42 Mo. 138; Max- Colo. 493, 55 Pac. 730; Cheney f. Crandell 
 -well V. Campbell, 45 Ind. 360, 363 ; Ham- (1901), 28 Colo. 383, 65 Pac. 56 ; Power v. 
 mond V. Perry, 38 Iowa, 217. See also Sla (1900), 24 Mont. 243, 61 Pac. 468; 
 Collins V. Rogers, 63 Mo. 515; Ten Goldberg w. Kidd (1894), 5 S. 1). 169, 58 
 Broeck v. Orchard, 74 N. C. 409 ; Heer- N. W. 574; Freeman r. Brewster (1897), 70 
 mans v. Robertson, 64 N. Y. .332; Mc- Minn. 203, 72 N. W. 1068. In Freeman f. 
 Manus v. Smith, 53 Ind. 211 ; Thomp.son Brewster the court holds that in such ca.se 
 V. Fall, 64 id. 382 ; Hoppough v. Struble, the defendant must set up and allege his 
 
 4
 
 50 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 right to a connection of either the plaintiff's or the defendant's 
 muniments of title because of mistakes therein ; the riglit to a 
 specific performance by the plaintiff of his contract to convey the 
 land; and tlie right to a cancellation of a conveyance on the 
 ground of fmud. These three classes of defences are found in 
 numerous forms according to the different circumstances wliich 
 may arise in the transactions of life and the affairs of business ; 
 but they may all be reduced to the same general principle. In 
 i some instances the equitable rights have been admitted in a 
 purely defensive character, and in others the judgment has 
 awarded affirmative relief to the defendant. In one case, the 
 plaintiff having proved title in himself by means of a deed from 
 the conceded original owner, the defendant, by way of an equi- 
 table bar, alleged that, prior to the plaintiff's conveyance, he had 
 purchased of the said owner several parcels of land, including 
 the one in question, that the deed from such original owner 
 should have contained a description of the premises claimed by 
 the plaintiff, but by mistake it was omitted. This defence was 
 sustained as an equitable bar without an actual reformation of 
 defendant's deed ; ^ and in the same manner a mistake in a deed 
 from the plaintiff to the defendant, by which the land in suit was 
 omitted, may be made the basis of an equitable defence without 
 any actual reformation asked or granted.^ The title of the plain- 
 tiff in another similar action being claimed under a sheriff's deed 
 given in pursuance of a sale on execution against the original 
 owner, the defence was that at the sale the sheriff expressly ex- 
 cepted the parcel of hmd in question therefrom, that his certificate 
 and deed omitted such exception and included a description of 
 the premises by mistake, and that the owner subsequently con- 
 veyed to the defendant. The court, on the defendant's demand, 
 reformed the plaintiff's deed, and admitted the defence.^ In a 
 
 equities in his answer so fully and com- Griffith (1894), 9 Utah, 469, 35 Pac. 512, 
 
 j)letely that a court of equity would, under it is held that the defendant in ejectment 
 
 the old yiractice, have granted him ade- may set up iu his answer and prove any 
 
 quale relief and have confirmed his right facts constituting an equitable estoppel.] 
 of possessiou aa against the holder of the ^ Crary v. Goodman, 12 N. Y. 266,268. 
 
 adverse title, citing Williams v. Murphy, See also Guedici v. Boots, 42 Cal. 452, 
 
 21 Minn. .5.34. In the Montana case it 456. 
 
 is said : " In such cases, however, the - Iloppough v. Struble, 2 N. Y. Sup. 
 
 answer is in the nature of an original hill Ct. 604, 60 N. Y. 430 ; Glacken t\ Brown, 
 
 in equity, and must contain all the allcga- 39 Hun, 294; Rogers v. Castle (Minu. 
 
 tions necessary to constitute the defence or 1892), 53 N. W. 651. 
 warrant the relief sought. In Duke v. •' Bartlett v. Judd, 21 N. Y. 200, 203.
 
 NATURE OF EQUITABLE DEFENCES. 51 
 
 similar action, where the plaintiff's title was through a sheriff's 
 deed, executed to him as purchaser at an execution sale against 
 the person who was the admitted source of title, the defendant 
 pleaded, as an equitable defence, an equitable mortgage arising 
 prior to the inception of tlie judgment lien, and liis own posses- 
 sion under the same. These facts were held to constitute a jrood 
 defence without affirmative relief asked or ffranted.^ 
 
 § 33. * 95. In Actions by Vendors against Vendees to recover 
 Possession of Lands. Illustrations, Equitable defences are very 
 frequent in actions brought to recover possession of lands by the 
 vendors against the vendees, when an agreement to convey 
 the land in question has been entered into.^ As illustrations, 
 the following have been upheld : when the complaint alleged the 
 non-payment of the purchase price at the stipulated time, and a 
 consequent forfeiture, the defence that the time of payment had 
 been extended by an oral agreement, and that a tender had been 
 duly made in compliance with such agreement;^ in an action in 
 all respects the same on the part of the plaintiff, the defence that 
 a tender had been made and kept good, the court expressly refus- 
 ing to grant the affirmative relief of specific performance to the 
 defendant.^ The vendee's right to possession under a contract to 
 convey is a very familiar species of equitable defence to actions 
 brought to recover the land by the vendor.^ In an action by the 
 
 1 Chase v. Peck, 21 N. Y. 581. The may set up, as an equitable defence, the 
 court having first decided that the facts same equitable rights which he could have 
 alleged constituted the defendant an equi- enforced had he brought an action for a 
 table mortgagee, so that his possession specific performance. Duffy i'. O'Donovan, 
 under it would be a good e(iuitable defence, 46 N. Y. 227 ; Leaird r. Smith, 44 id. 619 ; 
 stated the rule in a very accurate and con- Hubbell v. Von Schoening, 49 id. 330, 331 ; 
 densed manner, per Denio J. (p. 586) : Giles v. Austin, 62 id. 486; Ingles v. I'at- 
 " But, since the blending of legal and terson, 36 Wis. 373 ; Morton v. Dickson, 
 equitable remedies, a different rule must (Ky. 1890), 14 S. W. 905 ; Hyde r. Man- 
 be applied. The defendant can defeat the gan, 88 Cal. 319 ; Southern Pac. R. Co. r. 
 action upon equitable principles ; and if, Terry, 70 Cal. 484. 
 
 upon the application of these principles, ^ Cythe t-. La Fontain, 51 Barb. 186, 
 
 the plaintiff ought not to be put into posfies- 188. 
 
 sion of the premises, he cannot recover in the * Harris v. Vinyard, 42 Mo. 568. 
 
 action." The principle so concisely and » Petty v. Malier, 15 B. Mon. 604; 
 
 clearly enunciated is a complete answer Onson v. Cown, 22 Wis. 329 ; Creager v. 
 
 to the reasoning of Mr. Justice Talcott, Walker, 7 Bn.sh, 1,3. Possession of de- 
 
 in Cramer r. Benton, cited supra, note 2, fendant under an oral contract to convey 
 
 p. 46. See McClane v. White. 5 Minn, by plaintiff or his vendor: Chandler v. 
 
 178; Ptichardson r. Bates, 8 Ohio St. 257, Neil. 46 Kan. 67 ; Newkirk c. Marshall. 
 
 264. 35 Kan. 77 ; Ingles v. Patterson, 36 Wis. 
 
 - In Cavalli ?;. Allen, 57 N. Y. 508, 514, 373; Kenyon v. Youlen, 53 Hun. 591; 
 
 it was held that the vendee in possession Ford v. Steele, 31 Neb. 521 (parol gift).
 
 52 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 grantee of the vendor, who took with constructive notice of the 
 defendant's interest, the right of the vendee's assignee to pos- 
 session and to a deed of conveyance is a good equitable defence 
 in bar.^ To an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage executed 
 by the defendant to the plaintiff's assignor, the answer alleged a 
 mistake in the instrument in relation to the terms and times of 
 payment, claiming that, when corrected, nothing would be due, 
 and demanded the affirmative relief of a reformation. This 
 remedy was granted by the court, although the mortgagee was 
 not a party to the action. ^ In pleading an equitable defence, all 
 the facts should be averred which are necessary to the existence 
 of the equitable right. In many instances this right is, from the 
 nature of the case, a right to affirmative remedy; and, whether 
 this remedy is demanded or not, the answer should contain all 
 the substantial facts that would be found in a cross-bill in 
 chancery. 3 
 
 §34. *96. Other Actions to -which such Defences are Appli- 
 cable. Tliese defences are not, however, confined to actions 
 involving the title to lands, or those brought upon contracts 
 relating to land; they are proper in actions based upon mercan- 
 tile agreements, and in all others where an equity may arise and 
 affect the rights of the parties. The complaint in an action 
 upon a promissory note demanded judgment for a certain balance 
 unpaid. A defence that the note was given upon a settlement, 
 and that by mistake the amount was made too large by a certain 
 sum which was more than the unpaid balance claimed by the 
 plaintiff, was held a good equitable bar to the action, without 
 any specific relief demanded or awarded ; ^ and in an action upon 
 a policy of reinsurance the recovery was defeated by the fact, set 
 up in defence, that the same person acted as agent for both the 
 parties in procuring the policy to be issued, and that his agency 
 
 1 Talbcrt I-. Singleton, 42 Cal. 390,395, Arguello r. E(linp:pr, 10 Cal. 150; Clark 
 396 ; Cavalli v. Allen, 57 N. Y. 508. ?\ Huher, 25 Cal. 593, 597. See also Hiii- 
 
 2 Andrews (•. Gillespie, 47 N. Y. 487, ton r. Pritchanl, 102 N. C. 94; Dorris v. 
 490; Cox V. Ratcliffe, 105 Ind. 374; Sullivan, 90 Cal. 279 ; Swasey r. Adair, 88 
 Dobbs v. Kellogg. 53 Wis. 448. Cal. 179; Dale r. Hunnenian, 12 Neb. 221. 
 
 8 See Hruck c. Tucker, 42 Cal. 346, * Seeley i-. Engell, 13 N. Y. 542, re- 
 
 352; Kstrada v. Murphy, 19 Cal. 272; versing s. c. 17 Barb. 530. See Becker 
 
 Leatrado v. iJarth, 19 Cal. 660; Weber v. r. Sandusky City Bk., 1 Minn. 311. Also 
 
 Marshall, 19 Cal. 447 ; Ilium v. Kobinson, in actions on notes, see Holland tv John- 
 
 24 Cal. 127; Downer v. Smith, 24 Cal. son, 51 lud. 346; Ueukle v. Margerum, 
 
 114. See Hughes r. Davis. 40 Cal. 117; 50 id. 240.
 
 NATURE OF EQUITABLE DEFENCES. 53 
 
 for the plaintiff was unknown to the defendant at tiie tinio.^ 
 Here, also, no affirmative relief was granted; nor could any have 
 been given except cancellation of the policy, which would cer- 
 tainly have been entirely useless. The assignee of a leiise 
 bringing an action for the rent, the defendant averred that ihe 
 assignment to the plaintiff, although absolute in form, was in 
 fact given as collateral security for the payment of a note, that 
 the note had been paid, and that the interest of the plaintiff had 
 thereby ended. This defence was sustained, and here, also, no 
 affirmative relief could have been essential to the defendant's 
 security or protection under any circumstances; the judgment 
 in his favor was a bar to all possible further action on the lease 
 by the plaintiff or his assigns. ^ In all the foregoing instances 
 the single equitable defence has been spoken of as though it 
 stood alone, unconnected with any others. An equitable de- 
 fence, however, may be joined with any other defences, legal or 
 equitable, which may possibly arise in the action. In many of 
 the cases referred to in the text and cited in the notes, other 
 defences were spread upon the record. Thus, in the action upon 
 a policy of insurance, any of the customary legal defences of 
 misrepresentations, breach of warranties, non-compliance with 
 provisions of the policy in regard to proofs, and the like, might 
 have been pleaded and proved in connection with the equitable 
 defence which was interposed.^ 
 
 § 35. * 97. Affirmative Relief upon Facts Alleged in Answer. 
 C^-oss-Complaints. Different Positions Contrasted. Tlie remain- 
 ing question to be considered is. When will affirmative equitable 
 relief be granted to the defendant upon the facts which he 
 alleges in his answer as constituting an equitable bar to the 
 plaintiff's recovery? The New York Court of Appeals, in an 
 early case, expressly held that in an action upon a covenant 
 against incumbrances in a deed of lands, brought to recover 
 damages for a breach thereof by means of an outstanding mort- 
 gage, the defendant may show, by way of equitable defence in 
 bar, a mistake in the deed by which an exception of that very 
 
 ^ N. Y. Central Ins. Co. v. Nat. Pro- to an equitable cause of action : Ilanna r. 
 
 tection Ins. Co., UN. Y. 85 ; 20 Barb. 468. Keeves (1900), 22 Wash. 6, 60 Pac. 62] 
 
 '^ Despard v. Walbridge, 15 N. Y. .374, See Bennett r. Titherington, 6 Bush, 
 
 378; Struman 17. Robb, 37 Iowa, 311,313; 192; Dorsey v. Reese, 14 B. Mon. 157; 
 
 Hablitzel i'. Latham, 35 id. 550. Smith v. Moberly, 15 B. Mon. 70, 73 ; 
 
 ^ C^ legal defence may be interposed Bosley v. Mattingly, 14 B. Mon. 89, 91.
 
 54 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 mortofasfe was omitted from the covenant,, but that he could not 
 have, in that action and upon an answer setting up all these 
 facts, the affirmative relief of reformation. The case was de- 
 cided, and the judgment sustained, expressly upon this distinc- 
 tion.^ This decision, however, cannot be regarded as correct in 
 the light of other subsequent adjudications made b}' the same 
 court and referred to in the foregoing paragraphs. Affirmative 
 relief may certainly be given to the defendant upon his answer 
 in all cases where, from the nature of the subject-matter and 
 from the relations of the parties, a specific remedy in his favor is 
 possible according to the doctrines of equity jurisprudence, cer- 
 tainly iu all cases where the answer can be considered as setting 
 up a counter-claim. There are undoubtedly instances in which 
 no such relief is possible.^ Where, however, the nature of the 
 subject-matter and of the relations between himself and the 
 plaintiff are such that he could have maintained an independent 
 suit in equity against the plaintiff and procured specific relief 
 thereby, or could have filed a cross-bill under the old practice, 
 he may now obtain the same remedy upon his answer, at all 
 events, as was before remarked, if the demand alleged in the 
 answer constitutes a valid counter-claim. This is undoubtedly 
 the general rule. In a very few States, however, cross-com- 
 plaints or petitions are expressly recognized by the codes in 
 addition to counter-claims;^ and the rule in those States may be 
 that, if the demand for equitable relief do not constitute a proper 
 counter-claim, it must be made in a cross-complaint or cross- 
 petition, and not in an answer. Subsequently to the decision of 
 Haire v. Baker,* in New York, the Court of Appeals held, by 
 way of dictum in Dobson v. Pearce,^ that the defendant miiij 
 obtain affirmative relief upon the answer which he pleads to the 
 
 J Haire v. Baker, 5 N. Y. 357 (1851). 3 [^Crosby v. Clark (1001), 132 Cal. 1, 
 
 2 The case of Despard v. Walbridge, 63 Tac. 1022: In an action of ejectment 
 
 cited supra, seems to be such a one. for land purchased by plaintiff, the defen- 
 
 The defendant had a rigiit to prevent a dant in po-ssession may by cross-complaint 
 
 recovery against himself by one whri had enforce a trn.st ajjain.^t the plaintiff, fur 
 
 DO interest in the lease; but he certainly fraud in j)rocurinp; the title. Board of 
 
 could not have enforced a rea.s.signment of School Commissioners t\ Center Town- 
 
 the lea.se from the plaintiff to his a.ssignor, ship (1895), 143 Iiid. 391, 42 N. E. 808 ; 
 
 nor a cancellation of that a.«signment, be- Cocke v. Clausen (1900), 67 Ark. 455, 55 
 
 cause he had no interest in or povk-er over S. W. 846. See also §682 et seq.] 
 the instrument in question ; much less * Haire v. Baker, 5 N. Y. 357. 
 
 could he have obtained any relief against ^ Dobson i;. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 156, 105. 
 
 the lease. Ilia right was purely defensive, per Allen J.
 
 THE ACTION OF EJECTMENT. 0.> 
 
 plaintiff's cause of action. Finally, the doctrine was expressly 
 established as the basis of the decision. In an action to recover 
 possession of land, where the plaintiff held his title by a sheriff's 
 deed given upon a sale under execution against the original 
 owner, the defendant not only defeated the recovery by proving 
 a mistake in the sheriff's deed, but obtained a judgment reform- 
 ing that deed by correcting the mistake.^ While in some States 
 the answer may be turned into a cross-petition, and affirmative 
 relief obtained,^ yet this proceeding does not seem to be neces- 
 sary, even in those States where the practice provides for such 
 cross-petition or cross-complaint; the defendant may have the 
 proper affirmative relief to which he is entitled upon his answer.-^ 
 In Missouri, however, it would seem that affirmative equitable 
 relief can never be granted to the defendant upon his mere 
 answer.* In extreme contrast with this position is the doctrine, 
 already discussed, which refuses to the defendant the benefit of 
 an equitable defence as a bar to a legal cause of action, unless 
 the facts relied upon are such that he would be awarded an 
 affirmative remedy if he elected to demand a judgment confer- 
 ring it.^ The general subject of affirmative relief to defendants 
 will be treated more at large in the subsequent sections upon 
 "Counter-claim " and "Union of Defences in One Answer." 
 
 SECTION FOURTH. 
 
 A LEGAL REMEDY OBTAINED UPON AN EQUITABLE OWNERSHIP 
 OR EQUITABLE PRIMARY RIGHT. 
 
 § 36. * 98. Statement of Question Discussed herein. Ejectment 
 at Common Law. A special case, arising from the general union 
 of legal and equitable forms produced by the new system, 
 
 1 Bartlett v. Judd, 21 N. Y. 200, 203. Nippel v. Hammond, 4 id. 211 ; Reed r. 
 
 2 Massie v. Stradford, 17 Ohio .St. .596; Newton, 22 Minn. 541 ; Quebec Bank v. 
 Hablitzel L'. Latham, 35 Iowa, 550 ; Ham- Weyand, 30 Ohio St. 126; I)o.ugIas v. 
 mond r. Perry, 38 id. 217. Haberstro, 25 Hun, 262. Relief on a cro.=9- 
 
 3 Klonne v. Bradstreet, 7 Ohio St. .322. complaint or cross petition. Marre Lewi.s, 
 Defendant can have no alBrmative relief 31 Ark. 203 ; Abbott r. Monti, 3 Colo. 561 : 
 upon an answer by way of defence merely; Hatcher ;■. Briggs, 1 Ore. 31 ; Kellogg v. 
 it must be demanded by a cross-complaint, Aherin, 48 Iowa, 299. QSee discussion of 
 or by a counter-claim'. Earle's Adni. v. cross-complaints, §§ *806-*808.] 
 
 Hale, 31 Ark. 473; Tucker v. McCoy, 3 * Harris v. Vinyard, 42 Mo. 568. See 
 
 Colo. 284 ; Abbott v. Monti, 3 id. 561 ; State v. Meagher, 44 Mo. 356. 
 Monti V. Bishop, 3 id. 605 ; Sisty v. Bebee, ^ See supra, § 29. 
 
 4 id. 52; Mills v. Buttrick, 4 id. 53, 123 ;
 
 56 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 requires a particular examination. It may be properly presented 
 under the form of the question whether the holder or possessor 
 of a purely equitable primary right, or the owner of a purely 
 equitable estate or interest, can maintain an action to recover a 
 remedy which, before the change in procedure, was purely legal; 
 or, to express the same thought in terms not entirely accurate, 
 but which are, nevertheless, in constant use, whether STich 
 holder of a purely equitable primary right, or owner of a purely 
 equitable estate or interest, can maintain upon it an action at 
 law to recover an ordinary legal judgment, either for possession 
 or for damages ; to put the same question in a concrete form by 
 limiting it to a particular class of rights and remedies, whether 
 the owner of an equitable estate in land can maintain an action 
 analogous to ejectment ? The action of ejectment was originally 
 invented to enable a tenant for years to recover possession of the 
 demised premises during the term, the ancient real action being 
 confined to freehold estates. It was, during its existence and 
 use as a strict common-law instrument, a possessory action ; and 
 a judgment rendered in it never determined the question of title. 
 Its use in trying titles was wholly a matter of convenience : no 
 rule of the common law made it a means of settling a disputed 
 controversy as to title. Nothing but the voluntary acquiescence 
 of the defeated party enabled it to produce even the semblance 
 of such a result. Action after action might be brought, and the 
 common law placed no obstacle in the way of such a succession of 
 attacks. Equity alone devised the cumbrous method of an injunc- 
 tion suit to restrain the further prosecution, and to quiet the title 
 of the party who had succeeded in several trials at law. Since 
 the common law paid the most rigid adherence to external forms, 
 it is true that the action of ejectment, until changed by statute, 
 was never used except for the recovery of demised premises; and 
 this form was preserved in the absurd fiction of making John 
 Doe, as tenant of the real claimant, the plaintiff on the record. 
 As the estate for years, to protect which the action was origi- 
 nally invented, was a legal estate, the rule grew up, and was 
 followed witliout exception, and from the very necessities of 
 its form, that the action of ejectment could only be employed 
 as a means of recovering possession of a legal estate. The 
 common law undoubtedly knew no such thing as ejectment 
 by the owner of an equitable estat(.', or tlie holder of an equi-
 
 THE ACTION OF EJPXTMENT. 57 
 
 table title; such estate or title could only be protected by a court 
 of equity. 
 
 § 37. * 99. Arbitrary and Technical Character of Old Rule. Dis- 
 tinction Abolished by Code. View still Entertained by some Courts. 
 Criticism. This rule, however, was always a matter of mere 
 external form; it was one of the formal incidents of the action, 
 as arbitrary and technical as the fiction of the plaintiff being a 
 lessee. When the statute abolished all the distinctions between 
 actions at law and suits in equity and between the forms of such 
 actions, one might naturally have supposed that the formal rule 
 thus described would have been at once abandoned. On the 
 contrary, the courts of certain States, in which the new pro- 
 cedure has been adopted, continue to speak of actions of eject- 
 ment as though they were existing and fully recognized judicial 
 instruments, with all their ancient and arbitrary incidents and 
 requirements ; as though, in fact, there had been no great change 
 sweeping away the very foundations of the ancient system. It 
 is true, this reform legislation has not altered any primary rights 
 nor final remedies; an equitable right or estate is not turned into 
 a legal right or estate ; and the remedies of pecuniary compensa- 
 tion and of possession of lands or chattels whicli were called 
 legal because they could only be obtained by actions at law, and the 
 other specific kinds of relief which were called equitable because 
 they could only be obtained by suits in equity, are left unaffected. 
 One great change, however, has taken place which some courts 
 seem at times to have forgotten; all these remedies are now to be 
 obtained by a single civil action, which it is neither appropriate 
 to call legal nor equitable, because the distinctions between legal 
 and equitable actions have been destroyed. It may be well 
 enough, in order to avoid circumlocution, to describe one class 
 of remedies as legal and another as equitable, if it be constantly 
 remembered that this nomenclature no longer depends upon the 
 kind of action used in the pursuit of these remedies, and that 
 they are all pursued and obtained by means of one action which 
 has no distinctive and peculiar features depending upon the 
 species of remedy granted through its instrumentality. 
 
 §38. *100. Question Stated in Paragraph Thirty-six Answered 
 upon Principle. Argument. Assuming these elementary doctrines 
 of the new systerri of procedure, I am enabled, by applying them, 
 to answer tha proposed question upon principle ; I shall then com-
 
 58 CIVIL REMKDIES. 
 
 pare the results thus obtained with the rules laid down by judicial 
 decision. It must be conceded at the outset that every primary 
 right, whether legal or equitable, when invaded, should have a 
 remedy or remedies appropriate to its nature and extent. When 
 the right is possessory, there should be a remedy which restores 
 possession ; when the right involves the ownership or title, there 
 should be a remedy which establishes the ownership or title, or 
 which restores the owner to his full dominion by removing 
 obstructions to or clouds upon his title. The law gives these 
 classes of remedies; and the confusion into which some of the 
 courts have fallen in reference to this subject results from a 
 failure to distinguish between these two kinds of primary rights, 
 and the two corresponding kinds of remedies; from an utter 
 confounding of possessory rights with rights of ownership, and 
 possessory remedies with remedies going to the ownership. 
 Now, it cannot be doubted that where the question is concerning 
 ownership, where the primary right invaded is one of ownership 
 or title, and the remedy sought is correlative thereto, the equi- 
 table right must have an equitable remedy. If a person is clothed 
 with an equitable title or ownership, from the very nature of the 
 case his remedy must be equitable, because the positive relief 
 which he needs in almost all cases is the conversion of this 
 equitable ownership or title into a legal one, which can only be 
 done by a remedy within the competency of equity tribunals, — 
 by a specific performance, a reformation, a re-execution, a can- 
 cellation, and the like. The only exception to the kind of relief 
 described — the turning the equitable title into a legal one — is 
 the remedy of injunction, which is often necessary, and which 
 does not change the nature of the title, but leaves it as it was. 
 When, therefore, the object of the action and of the remedy 
 demanded relates to ownership or title, unquestionably the equi- 
 table title must be judiciall}' protected and aided by a remedy 
 that is purely equitable, and cannot be thus protected and aided 
 by a remedy which is in form legal. 
 
 §39. *101. Conclusion. This, liowever, is not true when 
 the right is possessory, and the remedy demanded is a mere 
 transfer or restoration of possession. There are equitable pri- 
 mary rights, titles, and ownerships which entitle the holder 
 thereof to the undisturbed possession of the land which is the 
 subject-matter of the right or title. This proposition cannot be
 
 THE ACTION OF EJKCTMKNT. 50 
 
 denied. A large part of the remedies once given by the Court 
 of Chancery alone, and the whole range of equitable defences 
 now allowed in legal actions, are based upon the conception that 
 the equitable owner is entitled to possession as a part of his 
 right. To deny this is to turn many of the familiar rules of the 
 law into absurdity, and to render much of the relief given by 
 the courts self-contradictory. When the vendor under a land 
 contract sues the vendee in possession to recover the premises, 
 and the latter interposes his equitable right as a defence, and 
 succeeds in defeating the action brought against him, that suc- 
 cess is entirely due to the fact that he is entitled to the possession 
 by virtue of his equitable title. Now, what the law permits to 
 be done defensively^ for the same reason, and by the application 
 of the same principle, it should permit to be done affi.rmatively . 
 There is no distinction in principle between the two cases. It 
 is simply absurd to say that a person in possession under an 
 equitable title may defend and be kept in his possession by 
 exhibiting that title in a legal action, but that, if he is out of 
 possession, he shall not be allowed to recover his rightful pos- 
 session by exhibiting his title in the same kind of action. In 
 fact, when the courts, with almost perfect unanimity, decided 
 that the equitable owner may rely on his title as an absolute l)ar 
 — a merely negative defence — to the so-called action of eject- 
 ment brought against him, they decided in principle that he may 
 obtain possession in the like action. Whenever, therefore, a 
 person clothed with an equitable title or ownership Avhich by its 
 nature entitles him to the immediate possession of the land as 
 against the party actually in possession, and he desires simply 
 to obtain the possession, there is nothing in principle which can 
 forbid him to maintain an action for that purpose, and recover 
 the possession. To call such an action "legal " is no answer; for 
 the rule which forbade an equitable right or title to be enforced 
 or even recognized in a court of law was a mere arbitrary matter 
 of form, and has been expressly abolished. To call the action 
 "ejectment" is no answer, because there is no such action, and 
 all the technical rules which prevailed in respect to it at the 
 common law have been swept away by the legislative command. 
 The courts which now speak of "ejectment" as an existing 
 species of action, and which apply its rules to an action now 
 brought to recover possession of land, are so far disregarding the
 
 60 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 express terms of the statute and thwarting its plainest design. 
 It is true that all equitable ownerships and titles do not carry 
 with them the right of immediate possession of the land, and 
 this argument is carefully limited to those which do involve this 
 element in their proper nature. It might seldom happen that 
 the equitable owner would be satisfied with a mere possessory 
 remedy, but there are circumstances and situations in which, and 
 parties .against whom, such remedy may be very important, and 
 may perhaps be the only one practicable. To illustrate by the 
 most familiar and plain example, that of a vendee under a con- 
 tract to convey land. Assume such an agreement completely 
 fulfilled by the vendee. He is the equitable owner, and entitled 
 to possession as against the vendor, and therefore as against all 
 the world. Beyond a doubt as against the vendor, this equi- 
 table owner would prefer to bring an action to obtain a specific 
 performance, and thus at one blow to consummate his title and 
 remove all obstacles to the full enjoyment of his ownership; but 
 if he chooses to ask for a part iiistead of the whole, upon what 
 grounds of principle, upon what reasons of policy, shall the 
 courts refuse to award him the possession by compelling the 
 vendor, who wrongfully withholds, to surrender it up? To say 
 that the vendor has the legal title is no answer, and is a mere 
 arguing in a circle, because the action and the remedy do not 
 concern the title, and by the conceded rules of the law his legal 
 title does not enable the vendor to retain possession from the 
 vendee. If, however, a third person without color of right, and 
 not the vendor, withholds the possession, the reasons in favor 
 of the vendee's maintaining the action are still stronger. Is it 
 answered that in ejectment the defendant may succeed by prov- 
 ing legal title out of the plaintiff, because the plaintiff must 
 recover upon the strength of his own title, and not upon the 
 weakness of the defendant's ? This, again, is a mere formula of 
 words without any real meaning. There is no action of eject- 
 ment. The action supposed to have been brought is simply one 
 to recover the possession to which the plaintiff is entitled from a 
 defendant who has no right or color thereof; and at best the rule 
 invoked is the arbitrary result of external and technical forms 
 clustered about the common-law action, all of which have been 
 swept out of existence with the action itself. Unless, therefore, 
 it is established that the common-law form of action called
 
 ACTION FOR POSSESSION ]?Y AN EQUITARLI'; OWNER. 01 
 
 "ejectment," with all of its incidents, still remains in full force 
 and effect, notwithstanding the peremptoiy provisions of the 
 statute which have in terms abrogated them, I have demonstrated 
 that there is no reason or ground in principle for refusing to 
 permit the owner of an equitable estate, which entitles him 
 to immediate possession, to maintain an action for the purpose 
 of recovering that possession. We maj' call the action legal or 
 equitable, and it makes no difference. The sum of the whole 
 matter is, a person is clothed with a right over land which by 
 its essential nature confers upon him the right of immediate 
 possession; he should be, and 6n principle is, permitted to en- 
 force that right and obtain possession, if that remedy is all he 
 demands, even though he might, if he chose, avail himself of a 
 higher and more efficient remedy. The same course of argument 
 applies with equal force to rights over chattels as well as over 
 lands, wherever there can be an equitable ownership of chattels. 
 
 § 40. * 102. Result of Discussion upon Principle Compared •writh 
 Doctrine of Decisions. Concession by Author. Rule in Missouri, 
 "Wisconsin, Indiana, California, and Iowa. I have now to compare 
 the result of a discussion of the question upon principle with the 
 doctrine which is established upon the authority of decisions thus 
 far made ; and I concede at the outset that in numbers the judi- 
 cial decisions are decidedly opposed to my conclusions. In ac- 
 cordance with its general theory, that a distinction between legal 
 and equitable actions is still preserved, the Supreme Court of 
 Missouri has held, in a long series of cases, that the owner of an 
 equitable title can under no circumstances obtain legal relief, but 
 shall be driven to two actions, — the first to turn the equitable 
 into a legal estate, and the second to obtain possession.^ The 
 
 1 Reed v. Robertson, 45 Mo. 580, and [[See Martin v. Turnbaugh (1899), l.").-} 
 
 cases cited in the notes to § *79. See, how- Mo. 172, 54 S. W. 515. This was an 
 
 ever, Henderson v. Dickey, 50 Mo 161. action of ejectment, the petition being 
 
 In Reed v. Robertson the defendant was in the u.sual form. The answer was a 
 
 a trnstee, and held the legal title in trust general denial, and an equitable defence 
 
 to convey the same to the plaintiff. It and cross action. The reply raised equi- 
 
 was adjudged that the plaintiff could not table defences to the claim for equitable 
 
 maintain a simple action for possession, — relief asked by defendant in his answer, 
 
 called by the court ejectment, — but must The court below heard defendant's equi- 
 
 resort to a suit in equity to compel a per- table defence, but held that the equi- 
 
 formance of his trust by the defendant, table reply thereto of the plaintiff could 
 
 The other case cited shows that the court of not be heard in this action, and that 
 
 Mis.souri has modified its views in relation plaintiffs "must he reverted to a separate 
 
 to relief of possession accompanying other bill in equity." In reversing the case the 
 
 specific equitable relief , but goes no farther. Supreme Court said: "This case is a
 
 62 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 same doctrine lias been estoblished in Wisconsin, and has been 
 extended to waste, on the ground that the actions of ejectment 
 
 strong illustration of the difference be- 
 tween ptoceedings at common la\\' and 
 under our code. It is a plain suit in 
 ejectment. When it was begun, the title 
 was in the plaintiffs and the defendant 
 was in possession, without any right of 
 record. But by his answer the defendant 
 asks the court, on its chancery side, to 
 raise up or restore an equitable right to 
 the possession, by cancelling the entry of 
 satisfaction of the deeds of trust, and re- 
 instating them. Unless and until the 
 court does so, which it can only do after a 
 trial, the defendant has shown no defence 
 to the plaintiffs' right to the possession of 
 the lanil. At common law the defendant 
 could not have interposed such a defence 
 or asked such relief in the ejectment 
 suit. The defendant would have been 
 compelled to ask the aid of a court of 
 equity, and the proceedings in the eject- 
 ment suit would have been stayed until 
 the determination of the equity suit. 
 When the defendant went into a court 
 of equity and asked to have the entry of 
 satisfaction annulled and tlie deeds of 
 trust reinstated, tlie plaintiff could have 
 defended on the grounds stated in his 
 reply ; that is, that the defendant had 
 lost his right to have the relief asked be- 
 cause of his fraud, by virtue of the merger 
 or by reason of the payment of the debt 
 secured by the deeds of trust. If the 
 plaintiffs herein (who would, of course, be 
 the defendants in such a suit in equity) 
 establislied any of these defences, the de- 
 fendant herein (the plaintiff in such an 
 equity suit) would be denied the relief 
 sought, the equity suit would be ended, 
 and the defendant W(juld have no further 
 defence in the ejectment suit, and lience 
 the judgment would be for tlie plaintiffs. 
 
 " No one denies that in such a suit in 
 equity the plaintiffs could interi)use the 
 defences named. No one will contend 
 that if this defendant had commenced a 
 suit in eijuity to have liis entry of satis- 
 faction annulled and his deeds of trust 
 reinstated, as soon as the warranty deed 
 from Wells to him was set aside, that the 
 plaintiffs herein (wlio would be tlie neces- 
 sary defendants in such an action) could 
 plead the defences here set up or could 
 
 ask for an accounting and for leave to re- 
 deem. Every one admits that it is ele- 
 mentary law tliat wlien a court of equity- 
 obtains jurisdiction of a cause it has the 
 power to retain jurisdiction until it does 
 complete justice between the parties. 
 
 " It was the very purpose of the code, 
 when the common law and ecjuity powers 
 were centred in the same court, to abolish 
 this circumlocution, and hence the petition 
 may now have a count at law and a count 
 in equity { R. S. 1889, sec. 2040), the answer 
 may contain a legal defence, an equitable 
 defence, and an equitable cross bill or 
 counter-claim (R. S. 1889, sec. 2050), and 
 the reply may set up legal or equitable 
 defences to the new matter set up in the 
 answer (R. S. 1889, sec. 2052). The ob- 
 ject of all which is to simplify proceed- 
 ings, and to settle the whole controversy 
 between the parties in the one action. If 
 the action is one at law, and the answer 
 seeks affirmative equitable relief or pleads 
 a legal defence, and the reply raises an 
 equitable defence to the afrirmative legal 
 defence set up in the answer, tlie equitable 
 claim or defence must be tried by the 
 court, sitting in equity, before the action 
 at law can be tried ; and this is the statu- 
 tory substitute for the relief formerly 
 afforded by courts of law and courts 
 of equity collectively. In this case the 
 court has stayed the plaintiffs' suit at law 
 while it heard defendant's cross action in 
 equity ; but it has refused to hear the 
 plaintiffs' defence to the defendant's (?ross 
 action in equity, and thus it has granted 
 defendant the c(|uitable relief he asked, 
 and denied the plaintiffs the right to de- 
 fend in equity against the defendant's 
 equitable claim, and also denied the plain- 
 tiffs the relief at law they asked. 
 
 "Tlie conditions thus presented in this 
 case are that when tliis ejectment suit was 
 begun the defendant had no defence at 
 law and the plaintiffs were entitled to a 
 judgment. But by his answer the defend- 
 ant stayed tlie suit at law until bis claims 
 for eijuitable relief were heard. The 
 court, silting in ecjuity, heard defendant's 
 claim and refused to hear the plaintiffs' 
 equitable defences thereto; awarded the 
 defendant the equitable relief he asked.
 
 ACTION FOR POSSESSION BY AN KQUITABLE OWNER. 
 
 G3 
 
 and waste must be brought by one having the legal ownership, 
 and that he must recover on the strength of his own title. ^ It 
 would seem th;it the same rule has been adopted in Indiana, 
 although tliis is by no means certain. A series of cases have held 
 that a plaintiff, alleijing a legal ownership and right of possession, 
 cannot recover upon proof of an equitable ownership ; that an 
 action to recover possession of lands, where the pleading contiuns 
 such averments, is analogous to the connnon-law ejectment, and 
 the plaintiff " must recover on a legal title, and not on an equita- 
 ble title." ^ In California, the doctrine is established in the most 
 general form, that the holder of an equitable title cannot maintain 
 an action to recover the possession, because, in the language of 
 the courts, " in ejectment the legal title must prevail ; " ^ and a 
 like rule seems to prevail in Iowa."* 
 
 § 41. * 103. Conflict in New York. Phillips v. Gorham. Rule 
 in Kansas. In New York there is a conflict of opinion, as slunvn 
 by the reported cases. The Supreme Court has held, in accord- 
 ance with the doctrine laid down in Missouri, Wisconsin, and 
 
 and denied the plaintiff any kind of relief 
 either legal or equitable. Thus a suit at 
 law is converted into a suit in equity so 
 far as the defendant is concerned, but the 
 plaintiffs are reverted to another proceed- 
 ing in equity to undo what the court sit- 
 ting in equity has done in this case; and 
 if they succeed, then they must come 
 again into a court of law. 
 
 " The error of the trial court was in 
 not dealing with the whole controversy 
 when it tried the case as one in equity. 
 If it was a case in equity so far as the de- 
 fendant was concerned, it was the duty of 
 the court, in trying defendant's claim in 
 equity, to hear and determine all the 
 equitable defences which a court of equity 
 would or could hear if it had been an 
 original proceeding by Estes to have his 
 entry of satisfaction annulled and his 
 deeds of trust reinstated. In other words, 
 the court did equity for Estes, but refused 
 to do it for Martin, and told iiini to go 
 into a court of equity to get relief, not- 
 withstanding he was already in a court of 
 equity. This is more circumlocution than 
 existed before the code. For this error 
 the judgment cannot stand." 
 
 It is stiU the rule in Missouri that 
 "to support an action of ejectment the 
 
 plaintiff must be vested with the legal 
 title to the land in question at the time 
 of the commencement of the action, and 
 that he cannot recover uptm a merely 
 equitable title." See Nalle v. Thompson 
 (1902), 173 Mo. 595, 73 S. W. 599 ; Xalle r. 
 Parks (1902), 173 Mo. 616, 73 S. W. 596; 
 Kingman v. Sievers (1898), 143 Mo. 519, 
 45 S. W. 266; Clay i'. Mayr (1898), 144 
 Mo. 376, 46 S. W. 157 ; Crawford i-. Whit- 
 more (1893), 120 Mo. 144, 25 S. W. 365. 
 A similar rule prevails in Kentucky. See 
 Howard v. Singleton (1893), 94 Ky. 336, 
 22 S. W. 337.] 
 
 1 Eaton V. Smith, 19 Wis. 537; Gillett 
 v. Treganza, 13 Wis. 472,475; Hammer 
 V. Hammer, 39 Wis. 182. 
 
 2 Groves v. Maiks, 32 Ind. 319; Kowe 
 V. Beckett, 30 Ind. 154; Stehman i-. Crull, 
 26 Ind. 436. 
 
 3 Emeric ?;. Pennima-i, 26 Cal. 119, 124 : 
 Clark V. Lockwood, 21 Cal. 222. See Hart- 
 ley r. Brown, 46 Cal. 201 ; Buhne v. Chism, 
 48 Cal. 467, 472 ; also Morton v. Green, 2 
 Neb. 441 ; Percifull v. Piatt, 36 Ark. 456; 
 Tarpey v. Deseret Salt Co., 5 Utah. 20.t. 
 
 * Walker v. Kynett, 32 Iowa, 524, 526. 
 But see Brown v. Freed, 43 Ind. 253', 254- 
 257.
 
 64 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 California, that the holder of an equitable title cannot recover 
 possession, even against a mere intruder, but that he must first 
 procure liis equitable to be changed into a legal ownership by the 
 judgment rendered in an equity action, and thus put himself in a 
 condition to maintain ejectment.^ The Court of Appeals in New- 
 York has reached a conclusion directly the contrary in a case 
 where the facts and the form of the proceeding made the decision 
 necessary and final. The ruling was, therefore, not a dictum^ but 
 was the very ratio decidendi, and involved a principle which fully 
 sustains the reasoning and doctrine of the text, although the case 
 did not in form present the naked question under discussion. A 
 plaintiff who had only an equitable title was permitted to recover 
 a judgment for possession, based upon a verdict, where no other 
 relief was granted, against a defendant who held the legal title 
 under a deed regular on its face. This decision goes to the full 
 length of the doctrine which I have advocated ; for, although the 
 complaint demanded the specific equitable reUef of cancellation 
 and reconveyance as well as possession, yet on the trial, which 
 was had before a jury, and was conducted in all respects like the 
 trial of a legal action, these demands for relief were entii-ely 
 ignored ; the single question of the plaintiff's right to possession 
 was submitted to the jury, and upon their verdict a judgment for 
 possession was rendered, which was affirmed by the tribunal of 
 last resort.2 In Kansas, under an express provision of the code, 
 the holder of an equitable title may maintain an action to recover 
 possession of the land.^ 
 
 § 42. * 104. Another Class of Actions herein. Partner ageiinst 
 Copartner. Familiar Rule herein. Holding in Indiana. In Missouri. 
 In Most of the States. Case herein Referred to Contrasted with one 
 previously Discussed. Argument. Conclusion Reached. There is 
 another class of actions which have been admitted by some courts 
 as a consequence of the reform legislation, which could not have 
 
 1 Peck (;. Newton, 46 Barb. 173. table title was .sufficient to maintain eject- 
 
 2 Phillips V. Gorham, 17 N. Y. 270. nient. In WestfeJt v. Adams (1902), 131 
 Also, Murray v. Blackledge, 71 N. C. 492. N. C. 379, 42 S. E. 823, it is said: "It 
 
 * Kanssis Pac. K. v. McBratuey, 12 seems to be settled by the decisions of 
 
 Kan. 9. our court that a jilaintiff may recover in 
 
 p'<jpe I'. Nichols (1899), 61 Kan. 230, ejectment upon an »'i|uitalile title." Citing 
 
 59 I'ac. 2.")7. The Kansas statute was Taylor v. Katman, 92 N. C. 601 ; Condry 
 
 adopted in Oklahoma, and under it the v. Cheshire, 88 N. C. 375; Geer v. Geer, 
 
 court held, In Laughlin v. Fariss (1897), 109 N. C. 679.] 
 7 Okla. 1, 50 Pac. 254, that an equi-
 
 ACTION BETWEEN rAltTNEUS. 65 
 
 been maintained prior to the change. It was a faniihar doc- 
 trine that one partner could not maintain an action at law 
 against a copartner to recover any sum which was a portion of 
 the firm assets, or to recover any sum claimed to be due by virtue 
 of their common partnership dealing or joint undertakings, unless 
 there had been prior to the suit an account stated and a balance 
 agreed upon between them, or unless the defendant had expressly 
 promised to pay the sum sought to be recovered. In other words, 
 the plaintiff in his declaration was obliged to aver either the 
 accounting together and the balance struck, or the express 
 promise. If he did not, he would be either nonsuited at the 
 trial or his pleading would be held insuificient on demurrer. If 
 there had been no such account stated or express promise, his 
 only remedy was by an action in equity for an accounting ; and, 
 having obtained jurisdiction of the matter, the Court of Chancery 
 would decree pajanent of the amount due. This doctrine is too 
 familiar to require the citation of authorities in its support. The 
 Supreme Court of Indiana has held that this rule is abrogated by 
 the code of procedure, and that a partner may maintain an action 
 to recover a sum due from his copartner, by reason of their joint 
 business, without averring or proving any settlement or express 
 promise.^ The same doctrine has been applied in Missouri to 
 owners in common generally who are not partners.^ The old rule 
 is retained, however, in most of the States ; and an action by a part- 
 ner to recover a sum of money from his copartner, alleged to have 
 become due by reason of their joint undertakings, is not permitted, 
 unless based upon a mutual settlement or an express promise.^ 
 
 1 Heavilon v. Heavilon, 29 Ind. 509; ^ QFor a thorough discussion of this 
 Shalter f. Caldwell, 27 Iiid. 376 ; Duck r. principle, see Miller v. Freeman (1900), 
 Abbott, 24 Ind. 349. See also Jamison y. Ill Ga. 6.')4, 36 S. E. 961: It is a well 
 Walsh, 30 Ind. 167. But, per contra, "recognized rule that one partner cannot, 
 Briggs V. Daughertv, 48 Ind. 247, 249, before a final winding up of the partner- 
 seems to abandon this position. See also ship, maintain against his copartner an 
 Crossley v. Taylor, 83 Ind. 337 ; Lang v. action at law based upon partnership 
 Oppenheimer, 96 Ind. 47; both cases con- transactions." To this rule there is the 
 forming to the general rule. exception thus stated by Judge Story : 
 
 ■^ Rogers I'. Pennistou, 16 Mo. 432, 43."). " V/hencver there is an express stipula- 
 
 QBut see Bambrick v. Simms (1895), 132 tion in the partnership articles which is 
 
 Mo. 48, 33 S. W. 445, where the court violated i)y any partner, an action at law, 
 
 said: "It is well settled that one partner either assumpsit or covenant as the case 
 
 may sue another in an action at law where may require, will ordinarily lie to recover 
 
 the transaction relates to but one single damages for the breach thereof. ... A 
 
 unadju.sted matter growing out of the careful consideration of the statement and 
 
 partnership transactions."] of the authorities cited to sustain it will 
 
 5
 
 66 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 It is SO held in California, ^ and in New York,^ and in other 
 States ; ^ and this is beyond doubt the correct interpretation of 
 the codes. The contrast between this case and the one previ- 
 ously discussed is plain ; and an analysis of these contrasting 
 features will do much toward elucidating the general principles 
 which regulate the union of legal and equitable actions and 
 remedies. When a person has an equitable ownership of land of 
 a kind which entitles him to immediate possession, his remedial 
 right to possession is in exact conformity with his primary right 
 of ownership. The denial of this remedy of simple possession 
 under the former system was based solely upon technical and 
 arbitrary notions incidental to the mere external forms of actions 
 and modes of adjudication which prevailed in the two classes of 
 courts ; and when these external forms, with their incidents, were 
 removed, a way was opened for redressing the primary equitable 
 right in a manner exactly conforming with its own nature and 
 extent; that is, a primary equitable right or interest calling for 
 
 sell V. Grimes, 46Mo. 410; Buckner v. Ries, 
 34 Mo. 357 ; Jepsen v. Beck, 78 Cal 540. 
 
 I^The rule iu Ohio is stated in Kuiineke 
 V. Mapel (1899), 60 O. St. 1, 53 N. E. 259. 
 It was here held that it was a " well estab- 
 lishe<l rule that one partner cannot, in the 
 absence of a showing that, by some special 
 agreement, the particular matter has been 
 withdrawn from the partnership account, 
 maintain an action at law against another 
 to recover an amount claimed by him by 
 reason of partnership transactions, until 
 there has been a final settlement of the 
 business of the partnership." 
 
 Nebraska, also, follows the general rule. 
 Lord V. Peaks (1894). 41 Neb. 891, 60 
 N. W. 353. But a partner may sue his 
 copartner where the cause of action is not 
 connected with the partnership accounts : 
 Ilalleck V. Streeter (1897). 52 Neb. 827, 
 73 N. W. 219. And in Glade v. White 
 (1894), 42 Neb. 336, 60 N. W. 556, it was 
 said that " where a partnership has been 
 dissolved and in tlie settlement of the 
 ])artnprship affairs one partner lias become 
 owner of the accounts and debts payable 
 to the partnership, such partner may 
 maintain an action at law against the 
 other for money collected on such ac- 
 count by such other partner and with- 
 held by him without the knowledge of 
 the plaintiff."] 
 
 show that the cases falling within this 
 exception are of three classes: (1) those 
 in which the partnership is inchoate and 
 has never been launched ; (2) those in 
 which the partnership is at an end , and 
 (3) tho.se in which the stipulation whicli 
 is violated, and for the breach of which 
 the action is brought, i.s one between the' 
 partners individually and ' the damages 
 from which belong exclusively to the 
 other partner and can be assessed without 
 an accounting.' "J 
 
 1 Russell V. Byron, 2 Cal. 86 ; Buckley 
 V. Carlisle, 2 Cal. 420 ; Stone v. Fouse, 3 
 Cal. 292 ; Barnstead v. Empire Mining 
 Co., 5 Cal. 299 ; Ross v. Cornell, 45 Cal. 
 133; Pico V. Cuyas, 47 Cal. 174, 179; 
 Fisher v. Sweet, 67 Cal. 228. 
 
 2 Emery v. Pease, 20 N. Y. 62. 
 
 3 Wood i\ CuUen. 13 Minn. 394, 397 ; 
 Lower v. Denton, 9 Wis. 268 ; Shields f. 
 Fuller, 4 Wis. 102 ; Smith r. SmiHi, 33 
 Mo. 557 ; M'Knight v. M'Cutchen, 27 M<i. 
 436 ; Springer v. Cat)ell, 1 Mo. 640 ; Bean 
 r. Gregg. 7 Colo. 490 ; Bishop c. Bisliop. 
 54 Conn. 232 ; O'Brien r. Smith. 42 Kan. 
 49, Stone v. Mattinjrlv (Kv. 1892), 19 
 S. W. 402 ; McDonald v Holmes, 22 Or. 
 212; Stevens »■ Baker, 1 Wash. 315. But 
 xee. for examples where an action may be 
 inaintained. Wliitehill v. Shickle, 43 Mo. 
 637 ; Seaman -• Johnson, 46 Mo. Ill ; Ru.s-
 
 ACTION BETWEEN PARTNERS. 07 
 
 possession can be redressed by granting possession. In other 
 words, the ancient rule denying to an ecpii table owner tlie remedy 
 of bare possession in the cases described was one of the "distinc- 
 tions " and " forms " in express terras abolished by the legislature 
 in enacting tlie new procedure. Courts which continue the denial 
 because "ejectment could not be brought by a holder of an equi- 
 tiible title," or because " the legal title must prevail," overlook the 
 real nature botli of the right to be redressed and of the remedy to 
 be conferred, and pay a regard only to the technical notions of 
 form which hampered the common-law courts in all their move- 
 ments, and which became at last so grievous a restraint upon the 
 administration of justice that the legislature was compelled to 
 intervene. In the other case, however, the reasons of the rule 
 were very different, and were founded upon the nature of the 
 primary right itself, and not upon any formal incidents of 
 the judicial proceeding by which it was redressed. A partner 
 is not suffered to maintain the action in question because his 
 primary right, flowing from the fact of partnership, is not of such 
 a nature as to call for a remedy of that kind ; that is, a judgment 
 for the payment of a certain sum. The right to the recovery of 
 a certain sura of money, unless arising from tort, must, according 
 to the common-law, be based upon a promise express or implied. 
 It does not affect this principle to say that the common-law doc- 
 trine of implied promises was itself largely founded upon a fiction. 
 Granting this to be true, as it undoubtedly was, still the theory 
 was firmly established that the liability spoken of arose either 
 from an express promise or from acts, events, or relations which 
 created a duty to pay, and which duty the law conceived of as 
 springing from an implied promise. If we discard the notion of 
 an implied promise, therefore, as fictitious, there must still be a 
 relation existing between the parties, from which the duty takes 
 its origin ; and without tlie existence of such a relation there was 
 no duty on the one side, and no primary right on the other. Now, 
 it was an elementary doctrine of tlie law pertaining to partnership 
 that, resulting from their mutual dealings with their joint assets, 
 no promise is ever implied that one partner shall pay to the other 
 any definite sum as the amount due from the proceeds of the 
 undertaking, or as his share of the joint assets. No promise is 
 ever implied from the existence of this relation, from the mere 
 fact of there being a joint business, joint profits, or joint property.
 
 68 CIVIL KKMEDIES. 
 
 Or, to express the same doctrine -without the use of fictitious 
 terms, from the relation of partnership and the joint undertakings 
 and assets thereof, the law imposed no duty upon one partner to 
 pay to tlie other any definite sum in respect of his share therein, 
 and gave no corresponding primary right to that other to demand 
 such payment. If, however, there has been an accounting, so 
 that a balance in favor of one is ascertained, a promise is implied 
 on the part of the other — or a duty arises on his part — to pay 
 that sum. The right to maintain the action by one partner 
 against another, and to recover a definite sum, depended therefore, 
 and still depends, not upon anything connected with the form of 
 the action, or upon the distinctions between legal and equitable 
 actions, but upon the very nature of the primary right. Those 
 courts which have held that, under the new procedure, a partner 
 may recover a definite sum from a copartner without an account- 
 ing and without an express promise, have in effect decided that 
 the new procedure has materially changerl the primary rights of 
 parties, has, in this instance, created a primary right which did 
 not before exist at all, which is a conclusion in direct antagonism 
 with the plainest and best-settled principles of interpretation. In 
 fact, this primary right of a partner against his fellow has not been 
 modified by the reform in the modes of procedure ; and under the 
 new system, as under the old, there should be no recovery of a 
 definite sum in any action, unless the facts which create the 
 primary right have occurred, — unless there has been or is an ac- 
 counting and balance ascertaine 1, or an express promise to pay the 
 sum. It is not the case of an equitable })rimary right being sup- 
 ported by a legal remedy, because the equitable primary right of 
 the partner does not involve the payment of a certain sum ; its 
 only remedy is an accounting, and this is preserved in full force 
 and effect. The analysis above given may not be very important 
 in itself ; but it will aid in distinguishing primary from remedial 
 rights, and the substances of rights which have not been changed 
 from the foniial incidents which have been abolished ; it will 
 enable us to determine the exact limits of the modifications made 
 by the reform legislation. 
 
 §43. *105. Additional Instances. A few instances of other 
 actions will bring this inquiry to an end.^ It has been held in 
 
 * Tli.1t an action brought to recover a and ha.seil upon purely equitable rights, 
 money judgment alone may be equitable see Hindge c. Baker, .57 N. Y. 209, 219.
 
 ACTION BETWEEN PARTNERS. 69 
 
 Nevada that a person claiming to be tenant in common with others 
 of land may maintain an action for partition, whether his title be 
 legal or equitable.^ On the other hand, the Supreme Court of 
 Missouri has decided tliat the owner of chattels by an equitable 
 title cannot recover damages for their conversion in an action 
 analogous to trover.^ 
 
 § 44. * lOG. Importance of Subject-Matter Dwelt upon in Sec- 
 tion Fifth. Final Object of Reformed System. Author's Predic- 
 tion. I have thus dwelt at length upon the particular case of 
 combining legal and equitable rights and remedies which forms 
 the subject of the present section, because more than any other 
 it involves and expresses the true intent and design of the new 
 system ; it is the crucial test of the manner in which the spirit of 
 the reform' is accepted by the courts. Probably nothing con- 
 nected with the practical administration of justice could be more 
 startling to the lawyer of the old school than the suggestion that 
 the owner of a purely equitable estate in lands should be able to 
 bring an action of ejectment to recover possession of the premises ; 
 it would be opposed to all his conceptions of law and of equity 
 and of the uses of actions and courts. And yet these conceptions 
 were plainly artificial and arbitrary, and the familiar rules as to 
 the employment of actions as plainly had no foundation in the 
 nature of things, but rested upon words alone. The final object 
 of the reformed American system was to sweep away all of these 
 technicalities, and to allow every primary right to be maintained 
 and every remedial right enforced in the same manner and by a 
 single judicial instrument, untrammelled by the restrictions and 
 limitations which made the practical administration of justice in 
 England and in the United States seem so absurd to the culti- 
 vated jurists of Europe. That the numerical weight of authority 
 is at present opposed to my views in relation to the particular 
 matter in question, I fully concede. 1 believe, however, that in 
 time the influence of an education in the technicalities of the 
 common-law system will cease to be felt on the bench and among 
 the members of the bar, and that the practical rules of procedure 
 in all the States will be brought into a perfect harmony with the 
 letter and the spirit of the reformatory legislation. 
 
 1 Crosier i'. McLauc^hlin, 1 Nev. .348. .367; S. P. .Jolianuesson v. Borschenius, 
 
 2 Walker's Adm. v. Walker, 25 Mo. 35 Wis. 131, 134.
 
 70 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 SECTION FIFTH. 
 
 THE NATURE OF CIVIL ACTIONS AND THE ESSENTIAL 
 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM. 
 
 § 45. * 107. Features of Civil Actions that are really Different 
 and which the New System does not change. iSotwithstanding 
 the sweeping language of the codes and practice acts, which 
 abolishes all distinctions between the forms of actions heretofore 
 existing, many judges, in construing the provisions, have declared 
 in most emphatic terms that the change is confined to the external 
 forms alone of actions at law, and that in their essential features 
 certain distinctions and peculiar elements remain which cannot 
 be removed by legislation. This statement is to a certain extent 
 true, if It be con lined to what is really the substance of each 
 action, and is not extended so as to include many incidents which, 
 although appearing to be substantial, are really the results of 
 arbitrary conceptions relating to the form ; for example, the old 
 rule discussed in the preceding section, which confined the action 
 of ejectment to the recovery of possession of lands in which the 
 plaintiff had a legal estate. If this doctrine, however, is carefully 
 examined, and the examples and authorities in its support are 
 closely analyzed, it will be found that all the unchangeable feat- 
 ures and elements which are said to inhere in different actions, 
 and which cannot be reduced to an identity, pertain to the primary 
 rights sought to be maintained by their means, to the delicts or 
 wrongs by wiiich these rights are invaded, to the remedial rights 
 which thereupon accrue to the injured party, and to the remedies 
 themselves which are the final objects of the judicial proceeding. 
 These features and elements in actions are indeed different, and 
 the difference between them the new system does not propose t(. 
 abolish nor change. The doctrine itself is, therefore, no more 
 than the statement in another form of the conceded fact that the 
 reformed procedure has not affected the primary rights or the 
 remedies which the municipal law creates and confers. 
 
 § 46. * 108. Actions still differ in Substance. Statement of this 
 Doctrine by the Courts. As all actions are l)iought to maintain 
 some primary right invaded by a wrong, and as they result in 
 some one of the many kinds of remedies prescribed by the law, and
 
 ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ACTIONS. 71 
 
 as in each action the facts from wliich the primary riglit arises, 
 and the facts which constitute the wrong, must be stated, and as 
 the plaintiff must demand and seek to obtain some remedy appro- 
 priate to the right and the delict, it follows, as a necessary conse- 
 quence, that the actions, although constructed and carried on 
 according to the one uniform principle of alleging the facts as 
 they actually are and praying for the relief legally proper, must 
 differ in their substance, because the rights, the delicts, and the 
 remedies differ. This necessary feature of civil actions under the 
 codes has been dwelt upon and explained in numerous cases, 
 some of which are cited in the note.^ This doctrine was very 
 clearly stated in a recent case as follows : " Although all forms 
 of action were abolished by the code, the principles by which the 
 different forms of action were governed still remain, and now, as 
 much as formerly, control in determining the rights of the parties. 
 In pleading, a party is now to state the facts on w^liich he relies 
 to sustain a recovery ; and, if issue l)e tak^^n thereon, lie will be 
 entitled to just such a judgment as the facts established will by, 
 the rules of the law warrant, without regard to the name or the 
 form of his action." ^ This judge would, however, have ex- 
 pressed his meaning more accurately if he had said, " The princi- 
 ples by which the different actions were governed still control," 
 instead of " The principles by whi(;h the different forms of action 
 were governed still control." The true effect of the reform w^as 
 well stated by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in the follow- 
 ing extract : " The code makes no change in the law w^iich deter- 
 mines what facts constitute a cause of action, except that, by 
 reducing all forms of action to the single one by petition, it 
 changes the question whether the plaintiff's statement of his 
 cause shows facts constituting a cause of action in ' trespass,' or 
 * assumpsit,' or other particular form, into the more general 
 question whether it shows facts which constitute a cause of action 
 at all ; that is, whether the facts stated are sufficient to show a 
 
 1 Goulet V. Asseler, 22 N. Y. 225, 227, Cortes, 17 Cal. 487, 497, per Cope J. ; 
 
 228, per Selden J., Eldridge v. Adams, Sampson ?'. Shaeffer, 3 Cal. 196, 205, per 
 
 54 Barb. 417, 419, per James J.; Herd v. Wells J.; Miller v. Van Tassel, 24 Cal. 
 
 Chandler, 13 B. Mon. 403 ; Hill v. Barrett, 458, 4f>3, per Rhodes .J. ; Richnioud & L. 
 
 14 B. Men. 83, 85, per Marshall J.; Payne Turnp. Co. v. Rogers, 7 Bush, 532. 535; 
 
 V. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220, 243, per Field Ilowland v. Needham, 10 Wis. 495. 
 C. J.; Liibert v. Chauviteau, 3 Cal. 458, - Eldridge v. Adams, 54 Barb. 417, 419, 
 
 462, per Wells J. ; Jones v. Steamship per James J.
 
 72 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 right in the plaintiff, an injury to that right by the defendant, 
 and consequent damage. What facts do in this sense estabhsh a 
 cause of action is determined by the general rules or principles 
 of law respecting rights and wrongs, and by a long course of 
 adjudication and practice applying these rules to particular actions 
 under the long-established rule of pleading, that the declaration 
 must state the facts which constitute the plaintiff's cause of 
 action. . . . The code does not authorize a recovery upon a 
 statement of facts which did not constitute a cause of action in 
 some form before the code was adopted. And therefore the 
 former precedents and rules and adjudications may now be re- 
 sorted to as authoritative, except so far as they relate to the dis- 
 tinctions between the different forms of action, or to merely 
 formal or technical allegations." ^ To this clear and accurate 
 exposition I can add nothing which will increase its efficacy as 
 the enunciation of the general principle. The final effect pro- 
 duced by the reform legislation in abolishing all distinctions 
 between actions may be expressed in the following manner: No 
 inquiry is now to be made whether the action is " trespass," or 
 " trover," or " assumpsit," or any other of the ancient common- 
 law forms, nor, except for the single purpose of determining the 
 proper tribunal for its trial, whether it is legal or equitable ; all 
 these forms and classes are utterly abrogated.^ For this reason, 
 the various rules which pertain to each of these common-law 
 forms of action, which distinguished one from the other, which 
 determined the peculiar nature and object of each, and which 
 regulated the proceedings in each, are no longer to be invoked. 
 
 1 Hill (-•. Barrett, U B. Mon. 83, 85. tained. See also Bates v. Drake (1902), 
 See Johaniiessuii v. Borschenius, 35 Wis. 28 Wash. 447, 68 Pac. 961. in which tlie 
 131, 135 ; Haughton v. Newberry, 69 N. C. court refers to tlie " form " of the action 
 456, 459-461. in a different sense than that suggesteil in 
 
 2 QIntheca.se of Draper r. Brown (1902), the text. Seals r. Augusta By. Co. (1897), 
 115 Wis. 361,91 N. W. 1001, whether a 102 Ga. 817, 29 S. E. 116; Hamilton r. 
 demurrer should he sustained was held to Handle (1898), 103 Ga. 788, 30 S. E. 658. 
 depenil up(Jii the answer to the inr|uiry But see Casgrain r. Hamilton (1896), 92 
 whether the action was legal or equitable. Wis. 179,66 N. W. 118; Hood v. Taft 
 The ground urged for sustaining the de- (1896), 94 Wis. 380, 69 N. W. 183; State, 
 murrer in this case was that "two or more e.r rel. v. Helms (1898), 101 Wis. 280, 77 
 causes of action have been improperly N. W. 194; .Joseith Dessert Lumber Co. 
 united in the complaint." It was overruled v. Wadleigh (1899), 103 Wis. 318, 79 N. W. 
 by the court l)elov/, and this was affirmed 237; Francisco v. Hatch (1903), 117 Wis. 
 by the Supreme Court; but the r)pini()n 242, 93 N. W. 1118. See also note 1, 
 showH thai if the action had been a legal ji. 9, sn/ira.'J 
 
 one, the demurrer would have been sus-
 
 ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ACTIONS. 73 
 
 It is simply an abuse of language to say that the ancient forms 
 of action liave been abolished, and tliat any of the rules which 
 were based upon the existence of these forms, and had no rele- 
 vancy except in connection therewith, are retained. The only 
 question is, Would the facts stated have enabled the plaintiff to 
 maintahi any of the common-law actions or a suit in equity? 
 This is, however, identical with the rule already given, that the 
 primary rights created by the law, and the wrongs committed 
 against them, and the remedial rights resulting from such wi-ongs, 
 are unaffected by the legislation which only aims at a reform in 
 the procedure. 
 
 § 47. *109. Illustrative Examples of Doctrine Reached. Differ- 
 ence in Form of Discussion under the Old System and the New. 
 Danger herein. The general doctrine thus reached may be prop- 
 erly illustrated by one or two examples which will serve to fix its 
 exact meaning and application. Under the former system, the 
 person who had the actual possession, or the immediate right to 
 the possession, of a chattel which had been taken and carried 
 away or destroyed by the wrong-doer, might recover his compen- 
 satory damages in the action of " trespass." To maintain it, the 
 possession or immediate right thereof was an essential element, 
 and the plaintiff recovered the value of the article as the measure 
 of his damages. If, however, the plaintiff had merely a contin- 
 gent or prospective interest, without right of immediate posses- 
 sion, in a chattel which was at the time the general property of 
 another. Ids appropriate action for the taking, destruction, or con- 
 version of the chattel by a wrong-doer, was " case," and his dam- 
 ages were a compensation for the pecuniary loss actually sustained. 
 The distinctions between these two actions have been abolished ; 
 but the distinctions between the primary rights and the wrongs 
 which constitute the two causes of action cannot be removed. 
 Now, as before, if the owner in possession sues for the taking 
 or destruction of his chattel, he will recover its value as his 
 damages, while if the holder of a contingent future interest, 
 unaccompanied "by possession, sues for the taking or destruction, 
 he will recover the value of his interest. In the one case the 
 plaintiff must establish his possessory right if he seeks to obtain 
 the value of the chattel as his compensation ; in the other case 
 the value of liis contingent interest will be proved and fixed 
 by the jury. These elements and features, however, do not belong
 
 74 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 to the action as a judicial instrument for establishing a right; they 
 belong to the primary and remedial rights themselves, which are 
 unchanged by the codes. In the former system of procedure, in 
 the works of text-writers, and in the judgments of courts, the 
 discussion and determination of these unchangeable primar5' and 
 remedial rights was always intimately connected with, and made 
 an essential part of, the discussion and determination of the rules 
 as to external form in the action itself, so that it was difficult, if 
 not impossible, to distinguish them. From the very nature of the 
 common-law system of procedure, as well as from tlie judicial 
 habit of mind wliich it produced, the courts seldom, if ever, p;ussed 
 upon the existence of the primary or the remedial right in the 
 abstract ; they decided rather whether tlie action was of the 
 proper form, or the averments of tlie pleadings were of the proper 
 nature, to maintain the primary riglit asserted, and to enforce the 
 remedial right claimed to have arisen. The result was that, in the 
 standard treatises and digests, primary and remedial rights were 
 classified and arranged under the various forms of action known 
 to the common-law procedure. These forms, with all their inci- 
 dents, have been swept away ; but there is danger lest the tecli- 
 nical rules which have been abrogated should be confounded 
 with the principles relating to rights and remedies which remain 
 unaffected b}' the reform. • 
 
 § 48. *110. Distinction between Actions ex contractu and those 
 ex delicto Preserved. Election. This Distinction relates to Cause 
 of Action. A particular feature of distinction between actions — 
 or rather between the rights upon which actions are based — which 
 existed under the common-law s^'stem has been preserved under 
 the new procedure. The general classification being made of 
 actions ex contractu and those ex delicto, there were many cases in 
 wliicli a party who had suffered a wrong by the conversion or the 
 taking and carrying away of his chattels might waive the tort, 
 and bring an action of assumpsit upon the wrong-doer's implied 
 promise to pay the price of the articles taken. The same elec- 
 tion still exists. Wherever the plaintiff who could sue in "tres- 
 pass" or "trover" might, if he chose, bring "assumpsit," he may 
 now waive the tort, and nraintain an action upon an implied prom- 
 ise and recover the price of the goods as though there had been 
 a sale. This choice, however, does not relate to the external form 
 
 ' See Clark v Bates, 1 Dak. 42; Frout i-. Hardin, 56 lud. 165.
 
 ESSENTIAL DIFFEllENCES BETWEEN ACTIONS. 75 
 
 of an action ; it relates to the very cause of action itself, — to the 
 unchangeable rights which are to be protected and enforced by 
 the judicial proceeding. In one instance, the plaintiff is permitted 
 to view the transaction as an injury to his property by which he 
 has sustained damages which amount to the entire value of that 
 property. In the other, he views the transaction as a sale, by 
 which the title to the property has passed to the defendant, and a 
 duty to pay the price rests upon him. For reasons of public 
 policy, the law allows the injured party to make his choice be- 
 tween these two quite different versions of the same transaction ; 
 and, although one of them may be a fictitious view, substantial 
 justice is done thereby. It is plain, however, that this rule has 
 no connection with the external forms of action ; it has reference 
 only to the rights and delicts which lie back of all actions.^ 
 
 § 49. *111. Conclusion. Criticism of the Author. Difference 
 in the Two Systems of Procedure. In conclusion, as the distinc- 
 tions between the common-law forms of action are abolished, the 
 practice since the codes, sometimes indulged in even by courts in 
 their solemn judgments, of retaining the ancient nomenclature, 
 and of describing a given cause as "trespass," " trover," "assump- 
 sit," and the like, is productive of confusion, and of confusion 
 alone. No practical rules or doctrines in the administration of 
 justice according to the reformed system of procedure result from 
 these old forms ; no practical aid in the decision of a cause is 
 to be obtained from regarding it as "trespass," or "trover," or 
 " assumpsit," or from the giving it any other name ; no difficul- 
 ties are removed nor doubts cleared up by a resort to this method 
 of description. On the other hand, there is a constant tendency 
 to associate with these names the rules and doctrines which were 
 once inseparable from them, but which have been in the most 
 positive manner abrogated by the legislature ; in fact, much of 
 the doubt and confusion which even yet accompany the adminis- 
 tration of justice in those States which iiave adopted the reformed 
 
 1 As to actions ex contractu aud ax de- Sparman v Keim, 83 id. 245, 249 ; Lock- 
 
 Ucto, see Goss v. Board of Commissioners, wood i\ Quackenbush, 83 id. 607 ; Co- 
 
 4 Colo. 468, Pierce v. Carey, 37 Wis. 232 ; naughty c Nichols, 42 id. 83 ; Ledwich v. 
 
 Front V. Hardin, 56 Ind. 165: Greeutree c McKini, 53 id. 307. 316; Ross v. Mather, 
 
 Kosenstock, 61 N. Y. 583, 588-590, Fields 51 id 108; Matthews v. Gady, 61 id. G51 ; 
 
 I'. Bland, 81 id. 239 ; Neudecker v. Kohl- Graves v. Waite, 59 id. 156; Lataillade '•. 
 
 berg, 81 id. 296; Neftel v. Lightstone, 77 Oreua, 91 Cal. 565; and post, §§ *554- 
 
 id. 96; Harrington i-. Bruce, 84 id. 103; *564, *567-*573.
 
 76 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 system of procedure, is due to a retention of these names by the 
 bench and the bar ; and 1 beheve that the reform itself will never 
 produce its full results in simplicity and scientific accuracy until 
 the ancient nomenclature is utterly forgotten or banished from 
 the courts. The two systems of procedure are so entirely differ- 
 ent, they are based upon notions so absolutely unlike, that any 
 intermingling of their elements is impossible ; the one which has 
 been introduced by the legislative will must be left to be de- 
 veloped according to its own distinctive principles, without any 
 interference from that which has been abandoned and discarded.
 
 STATUTORY PROVISIONS IN RELATION TO PARTIES. 77 
 
 CHAPTER SECOND. 
 THE PARTIES TO THE CIVIL ACTION. 
 
 SECTION FIRST. 
 THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND THEIR GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 § 50. * 112. Introductory. Fundamental Difference between Legal 
 and Equitable Actions in respect to Parties. Intention Shown in 
 the Codes to adopt Equitable Theory. The second of the distinc- 
 tive features which belong to and characterize the single civil 
 action of the American system consists of the principles and rules 
 adopted in respect of the parties thereto. Under the old procedure 
 the rules which governed the parties to actions at law, and those 
 which regulated the parties to suits in equity, stood in marked 
 contrast with each other ; in fact, the fundamental conception of 
 these two judicial instruments w^as radically unlike. It will be 
 sufficient to mention one of these essential differences. In an 
 action at law the plaintiff must be a person in whom is vested 
 the whole legal right or title ; and, if there were more than 
 one, they must all be equally entitled to the recovery. So far as 
 the mere recovery is concerned, the right must dwell in them all 
 as a unit, and the judgment must be in their favor equall3\ The 
 defendants, on the other hand, must be equally subject to the 
 common liability, so that, even if it were possible for the jury to 
 find a separate verdict against each, the same and single judgment 
 must be rendered against them all in a body. In other words, 
 whatever might be the nature of the antecedent right or liability, 
 whatever antecedent power there might be of electing to sue by 
 one or all and against one or all, after the election is made to 
 sue by or against all, the recovery is necessarily joint, and the 
 burden of the remedy is necessarily joint. The suit in equity 
 was hampered by no such arbitrary requirements. Two general 
 and natural principles controlled its form : first, that it should be 
 prosecuted by the party really in interest, although with him 
 might be joined all others who had an interest in the subject-
 
 78 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 matter and in obtaining the relief demanded ; and, secondly, that 
 all persons \vhose presence is necessary to a complete determi- 
 nation and settlement of the questions involved shall be made 
 parties, so that in one decree their various rights, claims, interests, 
 and liabilities, however varying in importance and extent, may be 
 detei-mined and adjudicated upon by the court. As the methods 
 adopted by the chancellor did not require him to pronounce a 
 judgment in favor of all the plaintiffs, nor indeed in favor of 
 plaintiffs alone, and against all the defendants, nor indeed against 
 defendants alone, it was not a matter of vital importance whether 
 a particular person wlio was made a party should be a plaintiff 
 or a defendant. It was possible to give relief to defendants as 
 against each other or against plaintiffs. It must not be under- 
 stood that no order or method was observed in the disposition of 
 parties ; but, without discussing the various rules in detail, it is 
 sufficient for my present purpose to point out this fundamental 
 difference in conception between legal and equitable actions. The 
 intention plainly shown in the various State codes of procedure 
 is to adopt the general equity theory of parties, rather than the 
 legal theory, and to apply it to the single civil action in all cases, 
 whatever be the nature of the primary riglit to be protected or 
 of the remedy to be obtained. How far this intention has been 
 expressed, how comj^letely it has been carried out in the legisla- 
 tion of the several States, will be seen from the provisions them- 
 selves to be immediately quoted. After making these extracts 
 and grouping them properly, I shall very briefly point out their 
 general similarity and their special divergencies from the common 
 type, and shall then proceed in the succeeding sections of the 
 present chapter ^vith a careful discussion of each separate provi- 
 sion. It will be seen that there is an almost complete identity 
 in many of these statutory rules as they are expressed in the va- 
 rious codes, although in some of them the equitable theory has 
 been more fully carried out in detail. 
 
 §51. *113. General Code Provisions. " Every action must be 
 prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest except as 
 otherwise provided . . . ., but this section shall not be deemed to 
 autliori/.e the assignment of a thing in action not arising out of 
 contract." ^ The same appears slightly varied in a few States, 
 
 ' [Iii.liana, Burns' St., 1901, §251.] §4; [Kentucky, § 18 ; Washington, Bal. 
 Kansas, § 20 ; (Jregou, §§ 27, 37'J ; Nevada, Code, § 4824 ; Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 3898 ;
 
 STATUTORY PKOVJSIONS IN RELATION TO PARTIES. 79 
 
 as follows: " Every action must be prosecuted in the name of 
 the real party in interest, except as is otherwise provided by 
 law."' In some codes the form is that first given above, but 
 to it is added the following clause : " But an action may 
 be maintained by the grantee of land in the name of the 
 grantor, or his or her heirs or legal representatives, when the 
 grant or grants are void by reason of the actual possession of a 
 person claiming under a title adverse to that of the grantor at the 
 time of the delivery of the grant, and the plaintiff shall be allowed 
 to prove the facts to bring the case within this provision." ^ In 
 Nebraska the following provision is added : " The assignee of a 
 thing in action may maintain an action thereon in his own name 
 and behalf without the name of the assisfnor." ^ 
 
 § 52. *114. Same Subject. "In the case of an assignment of 
 a thing in action, the action by the assignee is without preju- 
 dice to any set-off or other defence existing at the time of or 
 before notice of the assignment ; but this section does not apply 
 to a negotiable promissory note or bill of exchange transferred 
 in good faith and upon good consideration before maturity." * 
 " When the action is brought by the assignee of a claim arising 
 out of contract not assigned by indorsement in writing, the 
 assignor shall be made a defendant to answer as to the assign- 
 Wisconsin, St., 1898, §2605; Minnesota, but he sliall, in his complaint, allege that 
 •St., 1894, § 5156 ; Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, lie is the actual, bo»a Jide owner thereof, 
 § 540.] and set forth when and how he acquired 
 
 1 Ohio, § 25 ; Cal. § 367 ; Iowa, § 2543 ; title thereto."] 
 I^Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2902; North * New York, § 112 (502, 1909, 1910); 
 Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, §5221; Mon- Ohio, § 26; Kansas, § 27; California, 
 tana, § 570; Washington, Bal. Code, § 368; South Carolina, § 135; Oregon, 
 §4824; Idaho, Code Civ. Fro., 1901, §3155; §§ 28,382; Nevada, § 5; Iowa, § 2546, 
 Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3467; Col- somewhat different in form from the text ; 
 orado, § 3 ; Arkansas, Sand. & Hill 's Dig., N. C. § 55 ; [^Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2903 ; 
 § 5623; Nebraska, § 29; New York, Code North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5222; 
 Civ. Tro., § 449, but see provisions cited South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6071; 
 in following note. Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, § 1301 ; Okla- 
 § 1299. homa, St., 1893, § 3899 ; Washington, Bal. 
 
 •■^ New York, § 111 (1501, 449, 1909, Code, § 4835; Montana, § 571; Idaho, 
 1910) ; South Carolina, § 134; N. C. § 55. Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3156; Wyoming, 
 [South Dakota, Ann. St, 1901, §6070.] Rev. St., 1899, § 3467; Colorado, § 4; 
 
 3 [Nebraska, §30; Connecticut, Gen. St., Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, § 650. in a 
 1902, § 631, where the following is the form somewhat different from that given 
 entire statute on the subject, without tiie in the te.\t; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, 
 jirovision as to the real party in interest ; § 277; Nebraska, § 31; Wisconsin, St., 
 " Tlie assignee and equitable and bona Jide 1 898, § 2606 ; Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5157 ; 
 owner of any chose in action, not nego- Kentucky, § 19.] 
 tiable, may sue thereon in his own name ;
 
 80 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 raent or his interest in the subject of the action ; " and this is 
 followed by the provision in reference to set-off or other defences 
 contained in the last citation.^ 
 
 § 53. * 115. Same Subject. " An executor, an administrator, 
 a trustee of an express trust, or a person expressly authorized by 
 statute, may sue without joining with him the person for whose 
 benefit the action is prosecuted. A trustee of an express trust 
 within the meaning of this section shall be construed to include a 
 person with whom, or in whose name, a contract is made for the 
 benefit of another." '^ The same as slightly varied : " An ex- 
 ecutor, administrator, trustee of an express trust, a person with 
 whom or in whose name a contract is made for the benefit of 
 another, or a person expressly authorized by statute, may bring 
 an action without joining with him the person for whose benefit 
 it is prosecuted. Officers may sue and be sued in such name as 
 is authorized by law, and official bonds may be sued upon in the 
 same way.'" ^ 
 
 §54. *116. Same Subject. "All persons having an interest 
 in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, 
 may be joined as plaintiffs, except as otherwise provided in this 
 title." ^ "Any person may be made a defendant who has or 
 claims an interest in the controversy, adverse to the plaintiff, or 
 who is a necessary party to a complete determination or settle- 
 ment of the questions involved therein."^ In a few codes the 
 
 1 [Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 277.] * New York. § 117 (446) ; Ohio, § 34 
 
 2 New York, § 113 (449); California, Kansas, § 35; California, §§ 378, 381 
 §369; South Carolina, § 136, Oregon, Iowa, § 2545; South Carolina, § 140 
 § 29 ; Nevada, § 6 ; North Carolina, § 57 ; Oregon, § 380, but limited to equitable 
 CUtah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2902 , North Da actions; Nevada, § 12; N. C. § 60; [[Utah, 
 kota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5223; South Rev. St., 1898, § 2913; North Dakota, 
 Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6072; Arizona. Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5229 ; South Dakota. 
 Rev. St., 1901, §§ 1299, 1300; Washing- Ann. St., 1901. § 6077; Oklahoma. St., 
 ton. Bal. Code, § 4825; Montana, § 570 . 1893. § 3907; Washington, Bal. Code, 
 Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3157 ; Colo- § 4833, in somewhat different form ; Mon- 
 rado, § 5; Arkansas, Sand. & Mill's Dig., tana, § 580 ; Idaho, Code Civ Pro., 1901, 
 § 5626 ; Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, § 620, § 3166 , Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3479 ; 
 where only the first sentence quoted in Colorado, § 10; Arkau.sas. Sand. & Hill's 
 the text appears; Wisconsin, St., 1898, Dig .§ 5629 ; Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, 
 § 2607; Missouri. Rev. St., 1899, §541; § 617; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, §263; 
 Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5158, Indiana, Nebraska. § 40; Wisconsin, St., 1898, 
 Burns' St., 1901, § 252.] § 2602; Mis,souri, Rev. St., 1899, § 542; 
 
 * Ohio, § 27; Kansas, § 28; Iowa, Kentucky, § 22 ] 
 
 § 2544, [Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 3900; * Ohio, § 35; Kansas, § 3fi ; Iowa. 
 
 Wyoming, Rev. .St., 1899, § 3469; Ken- § 2547; Nebraska, § 3S ; Nevada, § 13; 
 
 turky. § 21, in a somewhat different form ; Oregon, § .iSO. limited to equitable ac- 
 
 ^'ebraska, § 32 ] tions ; QOklahunia, St., 1893, § 3908; 
 
 J
 
 STATUTOllY PROVISIONS IN RKLATION TO PARTIES. 
 
 81 
 
 same provision appears, but added to it is the following clause: 
 " And in an action to recover possession of real estate the land- 
 lord and tenant thereof may be joined as defendants ; and any 
 person claiming title or a right of possession to real estate may 
 be made a party plaintiff or defendant as the case may require to 
 any such action." ^ 
 
 §55. *117. Same Subject. "Of the parties to the action 
 those who are united in interest must be joined as plaintiffs or 
 ■defendants; but, if the consent of any one who should have l^een 
 joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be made a defend- 
 a,nt, the reason thereof being stated in the complaint. 
 
 " When the question is one of a common or general in- 
 terest of many persons, or when the parties are very numerous, 
 and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, 
 one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole. "^ 
 
 § 56. *118. Same Subject. "Persons severally liable upon 
 the same obligation or instrument, including the parties to bills 
 of exchange and promissory notes, may all or any of them be 
 included in the same action at the option of the plaintiff. "^ The 
 
 Washington, Bal. Code, § 4833, in some- 
 ■what different form ; Wyoming, Rev. St., 
 1899, § 3480; Colorado, § 11 ; Arkansas, 
 Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5630 ; Connecticut, 
 Gen. St., 1902, § 618 ; Wisconsin, St., 1898, 
 § 2603 ; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 269 ; 
 Kentucky, § 23.] 
 
 1 New York, § 118 (447, 1503, 1598); 
 California, §§ 379, 380; South Carolina, 
 § 141 ; N. C. § 61 ; QUtah, Rev. St., 1898, 
 § 2914; North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, 
 § 5230; South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, 
 § 6078 ; Moutana, § 581 ; Idaho, Code Civ. 
 Pro., 1901, § 3167; Missouri, Rev. St., 
 1899, § .543.] 
 
 '•i This provision is thus given in one 
 section in New York, § 119 (448); Cali- 
 fornia, § 382; S. C. § 142; N. C. § 62 ; 
 Oregon, §381, limited to ecjuitahle actions; 
 Nevada, § 14, adding, however, to the 
 section as given in the text the following 
 clause : " Tenants iu common, joint ten- 
 ants, and copartners, or any number less 
 than all, may jointly or severally bring, or 
 defend, or continue, the prosecution or 
 defence of any action for the enforcement 
 of the rights of such person or per- 
 sons." The same provision is found in the 
 
 California code, § 384, except that " copar- 
 ceners " is substituted in place of " co- 
 partners." QUtah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2917 ; 
 North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, §5232; 
 South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6079; 
 Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, § 1313 ; Moutana, 
 §584, Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §3170; 
 Colorado, § 12; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, 
 § 270, Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2604.] In 
 the following States it is separated into 
 two sections corresponding to the two para- 
 graphs of the text : Ohio, §§ 36, 37 ; Kan- 
 sas, §§ 37, 38; Iowa, §S 2548, 2549; 
 ([Kentucky, §§ 24, 25; Oklahoma, St., 1893, 
 §§ 3909, 3910; Washington, Bal. Code, 
 §§ 4833, 4834, Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, 
 §§3481. 3482, Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's 
 Dig., §§ .'■)631, 56.32 ; Connecticut, Gen. St., 
 1902, §§ 617, 619, with a .separate pro- 
 vision, § 589, allowing several actions by 
 joint tenants and tenants in common ; 
 Nebraska, §§ 42, 43. In Missouri, the first 
 paragraph only is enacted, anil is Rev. St., 
 1899, § 544 3 
 
 » New York, § 120 (454) ; Kansas, §39; 
 Ohio, § 38; California, § 383, adding, 
 "and sureties on the same or separate in- 
 strument," after the words " promissory
 
 82 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 corresponding provision in some of the States is much more full, 
 and more explicitly alters the common law rules in respect to 
 joint debtors. " Persons severally liable on the same contract, 
 including the parties to bills of exchange and promissory notes, 
 common orders and checks, and sureties on the same or separate 
 instruments, may all or any of them, or the representatives of 
 such as may have died, be sued in the same action at the plain- 
 tiff's option.''^ "Every person who shall have a cause of action 
 against several parties, including parties to bills of exchange and 
 promissory notes, and be entitled by law to a satisfaction there- 
 for, may bring suit thereon jointly against all, or as many of the 
 persons liable as he may think proper; [and he may, at his 
 option, join any executor or administrator or other person liable 
 in a representative character, with others originally liable. "J^ 
 "When two or more persons are bound by contract or by judg- 
 ment, decree, or statute, whether jointly only, or jointly and 
 severally, or severally only, including the parties to negotiable 
 paper, common orders or checks, and sureties on the same or 
 separate instruments, or by any liability growing out of the 
 same, the action thereon may at the plaintiff's option be brought 
 against all or any of them. When any of those so bound are 
 dead, the action may be brought against any or all of the sur- 
 vivors, with any or all of the representatives of the decedents 
 or against any or all of such representatives. An action or judg- 
 ment against any one or more of several persons jointly bound 
 shall not be a bar to proceedings against the others."^ 
 
 notes;" S. C. § 143; N. C. § 63; Oregon, » Qlowa, Code, 1897, § 3465; Ken- 
 
 § 36, 382 ; Nevada, § 15; [^Minnesota, St., tucky, § 27, in slightly different form ; Ar- 
 
 1894, § 5166, "and sureties on the same kausas. Sand. & Ilill's Dig., § 5034, same 
 
 instrument ;" Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2918 ; as Kentucky.] In Kansas all ioiut cou- 
 
 North Dakota, Kev. Codes, 1899, § 5223, in tracts are declared to he joint and several ; 
 
 somewhat different form; South Dakota, on the death of one or more of the joint 
 
 Ann. St., 1901, § 6080, same form as in promisors or obligors, the right of action 
 
 North Dakota; Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, exists against the representatives of the 
 
 § 1306, in somewhat different form ; deceased and against the survivors ; when 
 
 Oklalioma, St., 1893, § 3911 ; Washington, all die the right of action e.xists against 
 
 IJal. Code, § 4836 ; .Montana, § 585; Idaho, the representatives of nil the decea.sed 
 
 Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3171 ; Wyoming, debtors in all cases of joint obligations 
 
 Rev. St., 1899, § 3483; Colorado, §13; or joint " ;i.«sumptions " of partners or 
 
 Indiana. Hums' St . 1901, § 271 ; Nebraska, others, the action may be prosecuted 
 
 §44; Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2609.3 against any one or more of those who 
 
 1 [Kentucky, § 26; Arkansa-s Sand. & are so liable. [Gen. St., 1901, §§ 1190- 
 Ilill's Dig , 5; .0633.] 11 94 J 
 
 2 [.Miss>,uri, Rev. St., 1899, §515]
 
 STATUTOKY ri;OVISIf)NS IX RELATION TO I-AUTIES. 83 
 
 §57. *119. Same Subject. "(1) The court nmy determine 
 any controversy between the parties before it, when it can be 
 done without prejudice to the rights of others, or by saving their 
 rights; but when a complete determination of the controversy 
 cannot be liad without the presence of other parties, the court 
 must cause them to be brougiit in. 
 
 " (2) Wlien, in an action for tlie recovery of real or personal 
 property, a person not a party to the action, but having an inter- 
 est in the subject thereof, makes application to the court to be 
 made a party, it may order him to be brought in by the proper 
 amendment. 
 
 " (3) A defendant against whom an action is pending upon a 
 contract, or for specific real or personal property, may at any 
 time before answer upon affidavit that a person not a party to 
 the action, and without collusion with him, makes against him a 
 demand for the same debt or property, upon due notice to such 
 person and the adverse party, apply to the court for an order to 
 .substitute such person in his place and discharge him from lia- 
 bility to either party, on his depositing in court the amount of 
 the debt, or delivering the property or its value to such person 
 as the court may direct, and the court may in its discretion make 
 the order."! 
 
 §58. *120. Special Code Provisions. The following special 
 provisions, found in several of the States, are quoted, not because 
 they are necessarily involved in the general theory of the re- 
 
 ' In the followinjr States these provi- first and third subdivisions of tlie text, 
 sions form a single section, as in the text : QSo in North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, 
 South Carolina, § 145, N. C, §65; Ne- §§ 5238, 5240; South Dakota, Ann. St., 
 vada, § 17 ; [Wisconsin, St., 1898, §2610.3 '^01, §§ 6085, 6087; Washington. Bal. 
 In these others they are separated into Code, §§ 4840, 4842.^ In the others there 
 three sections, corresponding to the three is but one section identical with the first 
 subdivisions of the text : (^hio, §§ 40, 41, subdivision of the text: Oregon, §§ 40, 
 42: Kansas, §§41, 42, 4.S ; ^Oklahoma, .382; Iowa, § 2551. [^Missouri, Kev. St., 
 St., 189.3, §§391.3-3915; Wyoming, Hev. 1899, § 0^19 In Arizona, Rev. St., 1901. 
 St., 1899, §§ 3487, 3488, 3490; Arkansas, § 1308, the provision is : " Additional par- 
 Sand. & Hill's Dig., §§ 5635-5637 , Ne- ties may be brought in l>y proper process 
 liraska, §§ 46-48.] In others still they either by plaintiff or ilefendant upon such 
 form two sections, embracing respectively terms as the court may prescribe; Con- 
 tbe first and second subdivisions and the necticut. Gen. St., 1902, § 621 ; Minnesota, 
 third (^Kentucky, §§ 28, 29; Utah. Rev. Gen. St.. 1894, § 5178, in different form.] 
 St., 1898, §§ 2921, 2926 ; Montana, §§ 588, The provisions of the Iowa and California 
 591 ; Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §§3175, codes in relation to " intervening," which 
 3178; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, §§ 273, are very special and unlike that in the 
 274, New York, §§452, 820.] In Cali- text, are quoted in a subsequent section of 
 fornia, §§ 389, 386, correspond to the this chajiter.
 
 84 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 formed system, but because they will serve to explain a number 
 of cases which will be cited hereafter, and because they show 
 the tendency of the modern legislation away from the arbitrary 
 notions of the common law in respect of parties. " A father, or, 
 in case of his death or desertion of his family, the mother, may 
 prosecute as plaintiff for tlie seduction of the daughter, and the 
 guardian for the seduction of the ward, though the daughter or 
 ward is not living wnth or in the service of the plaintiff at the 
 time of the seduction or afterwards, and there is no loss of ser- 
 vice.''^ "When a husband has deserted his family the wife may 
 prosecute or defend in his name any action that he might have 
 prosecuted or defended, and shall have the same powers and 
 rights therein as he might have had."^ "A father, or, in case 
 of his death or desertion of his family, the mother, may main- 
 tain an action for the injury of the child and the guardian for 
 the injury, of the ward." ^ "An unmarried female may prose- 
 cute as plaintiff an action for her own seduction, and recover 
 such damages as may be found in her favor."* 
 
 § 59. * 121. Same Subject. In several of the States a part- 
 nership may sue or be sued by its firm-name alone, the judgment 
 being enforceable against the property of the firm and of such 
 members as are personally served, provision being made for 
 extending its effect to the other members by some subsequent 
 proceeding. The following is the type of these provisions, and 
 they are all substantially the same:' "An action may be brought 
 by or against a partnership, as such, or against all or either of 
 the individual members thereof; and a judgment against the 
 firm, as such, may be enforced against the partnership property, 
 or that of such members as have appeared or been served with 
 notice. And a new action may be brought against the other 
 
 ' ^Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5163] ; Call- clause, as to tlie guarfiian and ward, is not 
 
 fornia, § 375 ; Orep^on, § 34 ; Qldaho, Code found in the Iowa code: Oregon, § 33; 
 
 Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3163; Montana, § 577; [Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3164; 
 
 Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2910; Washington, Montana, § 578; Colorado, § 9; Utah, 
 
 Bal. Code. § 4830; Indiana, Burns' St., Hev. St., 1898, § 2911 ; Arizona, Kev. St., 
 
 1901, §265.] 1901, § 1305; Wa.shington, Bal. Code, 
 
 •■' [Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5165] ; Iowa, § 4829 ; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 267]. 
 
 § 2564 ; QArkansaB, Sand. & Hill's Dig., ♦ Iowa, § 2555 ; California, § 374; Ore- 
 
 § .5643; I'tah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2906; gon, § 35 ; [Idaho. Code Civ. Pro.. 1901, 
 
 Indiana. Burns' St. 1901. § 266.] § 3162; Montana. § 576 ; Utah. liev. St., 
 
 ' [Minne.sota, St.. 1894. § 5164] ; Cali- 1898. §2909; Wasliington. Bal. Code, 
 
 fornia. § 376 ; I.«wa, § 2.')56 But the last § 4S31 : Indiana, Biirn.s' St., 1901, § 264.]
 
 STATUTORY TROVISIONS IN RELATION TO PARTIES. 85 
 
 members on tlie original cause of action." ^ Certain other special 
 provisions in relation to parties will be quoted in substMjuent 
 sections, and especially the legislation of the various States con- 
 cerning suits by and against married women. This legislation in 
 several instances does not form a part of the codes of procedure, 
 but is contained in separate statutes having particular reference 
 to the status of marriage. 
 
 §60. *122. Statutory Provisions. Interpretation. Two Vie'ws. 
 The foregoing are all the provisions relative to parties in general. 
 It is plain, upon the most cursory reading, that the language of 
 these sections is so comprehensive, and without exception or 
 limitation, that it appears to include all actions, legal and equi- 
 table, and to apply the equitable doctrines alike to both classes. 
 It should be observed, however, in this connection, that in a vast 
 number of actions strictly legal the equitable theory of parties, 
 as stated in these clauses, would determine the proper parties 
 thereto in exactly the same manner as the common-law theorj% 
 and there could arise, then, no conflict. The possible conflict 
 which could arise in other cases would result either (1) from the 
 old notion that in a common-law action all the plaintiffs must be 
 equally interested in the recovery, and all the defendants equally 
 liable to the judgment, so that no person could be a plaintiff who 
 did not allege for himself this community of interest, or be made 
 a defendant against whom this community of liability was not 
 charged, or (2) from the com.mon-law doctrine of joint, joint 
 and several, or several rights and liabilities which control to 
 a very great extent the rules as to parties in legal actions. 
 One school of judges, applying to this particular topic the 
 theory of interpretation described in the preceding chapter, have 
 been unable to concede that the general statutory provisions 
 quoted above did repeal and abrogate these long and firmly 
 established rules and doctrines of the common law, and have 
 therefore wished to confine their operation and effect to equitable 
 
 1 Iowa, § 2553 ; ^Minnesota, St., 1894, known ; and in such case it shall not be 
 § 51772; California, § 388; Nebraska, necessary to allege or prove the uames 
 §§ 24, 27. Qn Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, of the individual members thereof " The 
 § 3485, the provision is as follows; "A Colorado statute, § 14, is similar in sub- 
 partnership formed for the purpose of stance, but differs in form. So in Utah, 
 carrying on trade or business in this state. Rev St.. 1898, § 2927 ; Connecticut, Geu. 
 or holding property therein, may .sue or St., 1902, § 588; Ohio, R. S., 1900, 
 be sued by the usual or ordinary name § 5011/] 
 which it has assumed, or by which it ie
 
 86 CIVIL RKMEDIES. 
 
 actions.' Another school of judges, regarding the codes as 
 highl}' remedial statutes, have been inclined to follow out their 
 spirit, and to give their language the fullest meaning of wliich 
 it is capable, even to the extent of liolding that its general 
 expressions abolished and swept away the legal distinctions 
 between joint, joint and several, and several rights and liabili- 
 ties. The influence and effect of these different systems of 
 interpretation will be shown in the succeeding sections of this 
 chapter. 
 
 § 61. *128. More Radical Statutes in a Few States. Outline 
 of Treatment of Parties. In a few of the States the legislation has 
 left no room for any such conflict of opinion, and has pushed the 
 equitable theory to its final results by express enactments which 
 leave nothing to implication. The codes of these States provide 
 for bringing in parties to certain legal actions under some cir- 
 cumstances merely because they have an interest in the event of 
 the suit, although they have no share in the relief, and bear no 
 part of the liability; and they utterly abrogate the common-law 
 rules relative to joint, joint and several, or several liabilities. 
 In these States, therefore, there can be no doubt as to the con- 
 struction which should be put upon the general statutory provi- 
 sions quoted; and they are treated as establishing the equity 
 doctrine and applying it to actions of all kinds. In the suc- 
 ceeding sections of this chapter I shall pursue the order of the 
 legislation whicli is the same in all the States, and shall sepa- 
 rately discuss the following subjects: The Real Party in In- 
 terest to be made Plaintiff; The Effect of an Assignment of 
 a Thing in Action upon the Defences to it; A Trustee of 
 an Express Trust, etc., to sue alone; Who maybe joined as 
 Plaintiffs ; Who may be joined as Defendants ; When One or 
 More may sue or be sued for All; Parties severally liable on 
 the same Instrument; Bringing in New Parties; Intervening; 
 and Interpleader. 
 
 > As an illustration of these views, see the opinion of S. L. Selden J. in Voorhis 
 V. Child's Ex., 17 N. Y. 354.
 
 THE UKAL TAKTY IX INTEREST TO BE THE I'L.VlNTII I'. 87 
 
 SECTION SECOND. 
 
 THE REAL TARTY IN INTEREST TD BE MADE PLAINTIFF. 
 
 § 62. *124. Statutory Provision as to Real Party in Interest. 
 *' Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party 
 in interest/ except when otherwise provided . . .," is the sen- 
 sible and comprehensive form used in Ohio, California, Iowa, 
 Nebraska, Wyoming, Idaho. ^ To this is added: "But this sec- 
 tion shall not be deemed to authorize the assignment of a thing 
 in action not arising out of contract," in Indiana, Kansas, Mis- 
 souri, Wisconsin, South Carolina, Kentucky, Oregon, Nevada, 
 North Carolina, Washington. ^ It was sometimes said that at 
 the common law a thing in action, not negotiable, could not be 
 assigned; but the true meaning of the rule was merely this, that 
 the assignee could not bring an action upon it in his own name. 
 Courts of law had long recognized the essential validity of such 
 assignment in a large class of cases, by permitting the assignee, 
 who sued in the name of his assignor, to have entire control of 
 the action, and by treating him as the only person immediately 
 interested in the recovery. Indeed, the assignment gave to the 
 assignee every element and right of property in the demand trans- 
 ferred, except the single one of suing upon it in his own name ; 
 it was regarded as assets in his hands and in those of his personal 
 representatives ; his rights were completely protected against the 
 interference of the assignor with an action brought in the latter's 
 name. It is true, the property derived from the assignment was 
 said to be equitable, and not legal ; but this distinction did not 
 lessen the intrinsic, essential nature of the ownership. It would 
 seem that the property of the assignee is now strictly legale 
 although the question does not require any solution in this work. 
 
 1 [^Sheridan v. Nation (1900), 159 Mo. under section 29 of tlie code of Civil Tro- 
 
 27, 59 S. W. 972 : The code requirement cedure, is the person entitled to the avails 
 
 that the suit be brought in the name of of the suit : " Kinsella v. Sharp (1896i. 
 
 the real party in interest does not mean 47 Neb. 664, 66 N. W. 634.] 
 that it must be brouglit in the real name ^ QAlso in New York, Utali, Nortli 
 
 of the party in interest. A party may do Dakota, Montana, Washington, Colorado, 
 
 business in any name he wishes, and suit and Arkansas.] 
 may be brought in that name. ^ [|Also in Soutli Dakota and Arizona.] 
 
 Definition : " The real party in interest
 
 88 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 63. * 125. Principal Effect of Statutory Provision. One effect 
 — and perhaps the principal effect of this statutory provision — 
 is, that all assignees of things iti action which are assignable may 
 sue upon them in their own names, and are no longer obliged to 
 sue in the names of the original assignors.^ It is not strictly 
 correct to say that the provision itself renders any thing in action 
 assignable, that it creates any attribute of assignability ; but, for 
 the purpose of defeating such possible interpretation, the second 
 clause was added in many of the codes. This limiting clause, 
 however, is only negative in its form and meaning. It merely 
 forbids a certain construction to be placed upon the preceding 
 language. It does not say that no thing in action is assignable 
 unless it arises out of contract. The rules governing this quality 
 of things in action are found in other provisions of the law, and 
 not in this section. 
 
 § 64. *126. Legal Assignment. Action in Name of Assignee, 
 niustratious. The immediate and in some respects the most 
 important consequence of the rule that "every action must be 
 prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest," is this: 
 wherever a thing in action is assignable, the assignee thereof 
 must sue upon it in his own name.^ I shall therefore, in the 
 first place, discuss this result, and ascertain the extent to which 
 it has been carried, and the cases to which it has been applied. 
 It is abundantly settled that when a thing in action, transferable 
 by the law, is absolutely assigned, so that the entire ow^nership 
 
 1 This provision only applies to " ac- 542; Carpenter r. Tatro, 3C id. 297; Har- 
 tious " as defined in the code, and not to din v. Hilton, .50 Ind. 319 ; State v. John- 
 special proceedings. The proceeding to son, ,52 Ind. 197; Mitchell v. Dickson, 53 
 enforce a mechanic's lien, in pursuance of Ind. 110; Shane v. Francis, 30 Ind. 92; 
 certain special statutes in New York, is Gallagher v. Nichols, GO N. Y. 438, 448. 
 not an action ; and the original liulder of - [^I'hcEiiix Ins. Co. w. Carualian (1900), 
 the lien who had assigned it is the proper 63 0. St. 258, 58 N. E. 805 : Where the 
 party to institute the proceeding for tlie owners of a chose in action assign the 
 henefit of his assignee. Hallahan v. Her- same ahsolutely to a third party, the as- 
 hert, 57 N. Y. 409. As to actions by the signee muM sue on it, even though the 
 assignee, see Devlin »;. The Mayor, etc., contract of assignment contains the further 
 63 N. Y. 8, 14-20; Sheridan i'. The provision that the assignors are to pro- 
 Mayor, etc., 68 id. 30 ; Fitch v. Rathhun, ceed to collect the moneys due on said 
 61 id. 579 ; Morris c. Tuthill, 72 id. 575 ; chose in action in their own names and 
 Merchants' Bank v. Union II. & T. Co., 69 pay over the same to the assignee. The 
 id. 373, 380; Green v. Niagara Ins. Co., 6 code is imperative that the action must he 
 Hun, 128; Jackson v. Daggett, 24 Hun, brought in the name of the real party in 
 204; lirowning i^ Marvin, 22 Hun, 547; interest.] 
 Archibald i;. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 38 Wis.
 
 THE REAL PARTY IN" INTEREST TO BE THE I'LAIXTIFF 
 
 89 
 
 passes to the assignee witliout condition or reservation, and the 
 legal title is fully vested in him, he is the real party in interest, 
 and may sue upon it in his own name, and is, in fact, the onl}-- 
 proper party to bring the action,' — as in the case of a claim for 
 the use and occupation of land thus assigned ;2 a partnership 
 demand transferred by the other partners to one member of the 
 firm;^ a delivery bond taken by a constable for the delivering up 
 of property which he had seized on execution and transferred to 
 the plaintiff:' in the action ; * the right of action to recover dam- 
 ages for a' breach of a covenant of seisin in a deed of conveyance 
 assigned by the grantee;^ a claim for borrowed money. ^ It was 
 held in Missouri that the assignee of a thing in action arising 
 out of contract must sue in his own name, although there was 
 DO specific statutory provision in that State permitting such a 
 demand to be assigned, and the statutory provision to that effect 
 formerly existing had been omitted from the revision of the laws 
 then in force. The clause of the Practice Act was enough to 
 authorize the action because he was the real jjart}- in interest.' 
 
 §65. *127. Equitable Assignment. Same Rule. Illustrations. 
 Not only does the rule prevail when the assignment is absolute 
 and complete, and the assignee is the legal owner of the demand ; 
 
 1 CCrum i\ Stanley (1898), 55 Neb. 351, 
 75 N. W. 851 : The assignee of a chose in 
 action is the proper and only party who 
 can maintain an action thereon. Wood 
 V. Carter (1903), — Neb. — , 93 N. W. 
 158 ; Gunderson v. Thomas (1894), 87 Wis. 
 406, 58 N. W. 750 : The assignor of a 
 chose in action is not a necessary party. 
 But, as was held in Philip v. Durkce 
 (1895), 108 Cal. 300, 41 Pac. 407, the 
 averment that the plaintiff, who is an 
 assignee of a contract, was damaged in a 
 certain sum by its breach, is immaterial 
 and cainiot aid a failure to aver how much 
 the assignors were damaged thereby.] 
 
 2 Mills V. Murry, 1 Neb. 327, and a 
 claim of damages for waste against a 
 tenant or subtenant in favor of the rever- 
 sioner, and by him assigned to the plain- 
 tiff. Rutherford v. Aiken, 3 N. Y. Sup. 
 Ct. 60. 
 
 3 Canefox v. Anderson, 22 Mo. 347 ; 
 Stuckey v. Fritsche, 77 Wis. 329 ; Walker 
 V. Steele, 9 Colo. 388. A non-negotiable 
 note payable in work, Schnier v. Fay, 12 
 
 Kan. 184; Williams v. Norton, 3 Kan. 
 295. [jBaxter v. Hart (1894). 104 Cal. 
 344, 37 Pac. 941 : Where two partners 
 jointly entered into a contract with defend- 
 ant, and then, by an agreement between 
 themselves, .stipulated that plaintiff should 
 be the recijiieut of the entire benefit 
 thereof, this constitutes plaintiff the real 
 party in interest and he is the proper and 
 only party plaintiff. All the facts show- 
 ing it, however, should be alleged. ] 
 
 * Waterman v. Frank, 21 Mo. 108; 
 and see Moorman v. Collier, 32 Iowa, 138. 
 Where a bond is taken in an action by an 
 officer for the security of any particular 
 person, that person is the real party in 
 interest. 
 
 5 Van Doren v. Relfe, 20 Mo. 455 ; 
 Utley r. Foy, 70 N. C. 303 (a land 
 contract). See also Bartholomew Cy. 
 Comni'rs r. Jameson, 86 Ind. 154. 
 
 « Smith V. Schibel, 19 Mo. 140; Knad- 
 ler V. Sharp, 36 Iowa, 232, 235 (an open 
 account). 
 
 ■7 Lbng !-. Heinrich, 46 Mo. 603.
 
 90 
 
 CIVIL KEMHDIKS. 
 
 it prevails with equal force in cases where the assignment is 
 simply equitable in its character, and the assignee's title would 
 not have been recognized in any form by a court of law under 
 the old system, but would have been purely equitable. Such 
 assignee, being the real party in interest, must bring an action 
 in his own name; for, in respect to this provision of the statute, 
 the equit}^ doctrine which it embodies is, beyond a question, to 
 be applied to all actions.^ As illustrations: the person to whom 
 an order is given by a creditor upon his debtor for the whole 
 amount of the demand, although the debtor has not accepted nor 
 promised to pay, is an equitable assignee, and nnist sue in his 
 own name ; ^ also, where a creditor assigns part of his claim to 
 the plaintiff, of which the debtor has notice ; ^ and when a bond 
 was verbally assigned, and was delivered by the obligee to the 
 plaintiff;* and when the assignment, though absolute on the 
 face, was, in fact, partial, the assignee agreeing to account for 
 the remaining portion to the assignor. In this case the assignor 
 might be brought in to protect his own interests, and, in some 
 States, would be an indispensable party. ^ The rule deduced 
 
 1 See Cottle v. Cole, 20 Iowa, 481, 485 ; 
 Lytle V. Lytle, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 127. In the 
 fi-f-st of these cases Mr. Justice Dillon 
 said : " The course of decision in this 
 State establishes this rule ; viz., that the 
 party hoMing tlie le()a/ title of a note or 
 instrument may sue upon it, though he be 
 a-i agent or trustee, and be liable to ac- 
 count to another for the proceeds of the 
 recovery ; but he is open in such case 
 to any defence which exists again-st the 
 party beneficially interested. Or the 
 party beneficially interested, though he 
 may not have the legal title, may sue in 
 his own name. This may not j)rccisely 
 accord with the line of decisions under 
 other codes, but we think it liberal and 
 right, and conducive to the practical at- 
 tainment of justice." [^Hartzell v. Mc- 
 Chirg (1898), .54 Neb. .316, 74 N. W. r,2fi : 
 " The equitable owner of a negotiable 
 promissory note in his po.ssession may 
 maintain an action there(jn in liis own 
 name. "3 
 
 - VVheatley v. Strobe, 12 Cal. 92. 98; 
 Walker v. Mauro, 18 Mo. 564. Upon 
 facts as stated in the text. Gamble J. says 
 in the last case : " The effect of our new 
 
 code of practice, in abolishing the distinc- 
 tions between law and ecjnity, is to allow 
 the assignee of a chose in action to bring 
 a suit in his own name in ca.scs where, by 
 the common law, no assignment would be 
 recognized. In this respect, the rules of 
 equity are to prevail, and the assignee 
 may sue in his own name." He goes on 
 to show that this is an equitable though 
 not a legal assignment. 
 
 3 Grain v. Ahlrich,,38 Cal. 514 ; Childs 
 V. Alexander, 22 S. C. 169. vSee Shaver 
 V. West. Un. Tel. Co., 57 N. Y. 459, 464. 
 
 * Conyngham v. Smith, 16 Iowa, 471, 
 475 ; Barthol v. Blakin, 34 Iowa, 452, 
 and Moore v. Lowry, 25 Iowa, 336. Same 
 decision in case of mortgages vcrl)ally 
 a.ssigned. S. P. Green v. Marble, 37 Iowa, 
 95; Andrews r. Mc Daniel, 68 N. C. 385 
 (an unindorsed note). 
 
 5 Gradwohl v. Harris, 29 Cal. 150. 
 The action was brought by ydaintiff as 
 assignee of W. & B. of a contract for the 
 payment of money. W. & R. iiilervenexi, 
 alleging that, though the assignment was 
 absolute on its face, it was actually for one- 
 fourth only of the demand, and they 
 (W. & B.) were entitled to three-fourtha
 
 THE KK.VL I'AUTY IN IXTERKST TO I5K TIIK PLAINTITF. 
 
 01 
 
 from these iiutliorities is plain and imperative: The assigntH; 
 need not he the legal owner of the tiling in action; if the legal 
 owner, he must of course bring the action; hut, if the assignee's 
 right or ownership is for any reason or in any manner equitaVile, 
 he is still the proper plaintiff, in most of tlie States the only 
 plaintiff, although, in a few, the assignor should be joined as a 
 plaintiff or as a defendant.^ The plain intent of the statute is to 
 extend the equity doctrine and rule to all cases. '-^ 
 
 § 66. * 128. Effect of Statute in Case of Negotiable Instruments. 
 Conflict in Opinion. As the Statutory provision declares that 
 "every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party 
 in interest," the defence that the plaintiff is not such real party 
 in interest is, in general, a bar to the suit.^ This is certainly so 
 when the plaintiff is the assignee of anything in action not 
 negotiable, and the issue raised by an answer setting up such 
 defence would be simply whether the plaintiff was, upon the 
 proof, the real party in interest. If, however, the thing in action 
 
 of the recovery. The court held that the 
 action was properly brought, but also that 
 the interveutiou was proper, and gave a 
 judgnieut that the plaintiff recover one- 
 fourth and W. & B. three-fourths of the 
 demand. Such au intervention and judg- 
 ment would doubtless shock a lawyer bred 
 iu the old school ; but it is convenient, 
 sensible, and every way worthy of univer- 
 sal adoption. The common-law objection 
 that a divided judgment is impossible is 
 simply absurd; the thing is done, and is 
 therefore possible. See also Allen v. 
 Brown, 44 N. Y. 228, 2.31 ; Uurgin v. Ire- 
 land, 14 N. Y. 322; Williams v. Brown, 
 2 Keyes, 486 ; Paddon v. Williams, 1 
 Robt. 340 ; Meeker v. Claghorn, 44 N. Y. 
 349, 353 ; Wetmore r. San Francisco, 44 
 Cal. 294, 300 ; Lapping i-. Duffy, 47 Ind. 
 51; Boyle v. Bobbins, 71 N. C. 130; 
 Bartholomew Cy. Comm'rs i'. Jameson, 
 8<) Ind. 154 (where A receives money of 
 B, and in consideration tliereof agrees to 
 assign to B any judgment lie, A, may re- 
 cover on a claim held by him against C, 
 there is an equitable a.ssignment of the 
 claim, and C alone can sue thereon); 
 Childs V. Alexander, 22 S. C. 169. 
 
 1 ^Reynolds v. Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. 
 (1895), 143 Ind. 579, 40 N. E. 410, quoting 
 the text.] 
 
 2 McDonald v. Knecland, 5 Minn. 352, 
 365. 
 
 * [^lowa and Cal. Land Co. v. Iloag 
 (1901), 132 Cal. 627,64 Pac. 1073: "As 
 was said by this court in Philbrook v. 
 Superior Court, 111 Cal. 31, a defendant's 
 right is to have a cause of action prose- 
 cuted against him by the real party in in- 
 terest, but, as has been elsewhere pointed 
 out (Giselmau v. Starr, 106 Cal. 651), liis 
 concern ends when a judgment for or 
 again.st the nominal plaintiff would protect 
 him from any action upon the same de- 
 mand by another, and when, as against the 
 nominal plaintiff, he may assert all de- 
 fences and counterclaims available to 
 him, were the claim prosecuted by the real 
 owner." 
 
 So in Sturgis v. Baker (1903), — Ore. 
 — , 72 Piiiv 744, and Lodge v. Lewis 
 (1903), 32 Wash. 191, 72 Pac. 1009, it 
 was held that a defendant could not raise 
 the question whether or not the plaintiff 
 was the real party in interest, unless 
 some right of setoff or counterclaim was 
 affected. 
 
 But see also Stewart v. Price (1902), 
 64 Kan. 191, 67 Pac. 553, and Brown 
 V. Ginu (1902), 66 Ohio St. 316, 64 N. E. 
 123, set out at some length in note 1, 
 p. 98.J
 
 92 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 is an instrument negotiable in its nature, the subject is compli- 
 cated by the special doctrines and rules of the law which relate 
 to the quality of negotiability. It is elementary that possession 
 of negotiable paper, payable to bearer, is at least prima facie 
 evidence of ownership; and it is also settled that when such 
 paper, payable to order, is indorsed and delivered to the in- 
 dorsee, the legal title passes to him, and he may maintain an 
 action thereon; while the maker, acceptor, or indorsers cannot 
 question his title, at least in any manner short of impeaching its 
 good faith. This legal title carried with it the right to sue, no 
 matter what arrangements might be made between him and his 
 immediate indorser concerning the use of the proceeds. The 
 question then arises. Has the rule introduced by the code changed 
 these established doctrines ? Does the apparent and formal legal 
 ownership resulting from the possession of a negotiable instru- 
 ment payable to bearer, or from the indorsement and possession 
 of similar paper payable to order, constitute the plaintiff the real 
 party in interest within the meaning of the code ? Or ma}^ the 
 defendant go behind this formal title, and show that some other 
 person is the real party in interest, and thus defeat the action? 
 If the latter query must be answered affirmatively, it is evident 
 that the statutory provision under consideration has made an 
 important change in the law of negotiable paper. The question 
 thus proposed has given rise to some conflict in opinion, and is 
 not entirely free from doubt. On the one side it has been urged 
 that the language of the section in all the State codes is most 
 general and comprehensive, containing no exception in terms nor 
 by implication, and that it is, in its highest degree imperative, 
 ''''must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest," 
 except in the single case of "the trustee of an express trust," 
 and that the real party in interest is the person for whose immedi- 
 ate benefit the action is prosecuted, who controls the recovery, 
 and not the person in whom the mere naked apparent legal title 
 is vested. On the other side it is urged that the rule permitting 
 such a holder or indorsee to prosecute the action is one of the 
 elementary doctrines of the law relating to negotiable paper, — a 
 rule not of practice or procedure, but of the mercantile and com- 
 mercial law, — and that the legislature cannot liave intended, by 
 such a general clause of a statute concerning procedure, to abro- 
 gate well-settled principles of the law merchant. I will examine
 
 THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO BE THE PLAINTIFF. 93 
 
 and compare some of the cases in which the question has been 
 discussed. 
 
 § 67. *129. New York Decisions. In Edwards V. Camp- 
 bell,^ which WHS an action upon a note payable to bearer, the 
 plaintiff had the note in his passession ; but a judgment in his 
 favor was reversed on the ground tliat he was not the real party 
 in interest. Killmore v. Culver ^ was an action upon a promis- 
 sory note payable to Tanner or bearer. The answer denied the 
 plaintiff's ownership, and alleged that Tanner was the real 
 owner. It was sufficiently established by the evidence that the 
 plaintiff was acting simply as agent for Tanner, and would be 
 immediately accountable to the latter for all the money recov- 
 ered. These facts were held to constitute a complete defence on 
 the ground that Tanner was the real party in interest, and should 
 have been the plaintiff. In James v. Chalmers,-'^ it was said by 
 one of the judges of the New York Court of Appeals, in refer- 
 ence to actions upon negotiable paper: "Under the code of 
 procedure, if it appears that the plaintiff is not the real party 
 in interest, it is a bar to the action, and no further defence is 
 necessary." The question was very elaborately discussed by the 
 courts of New York in Eaton v. Alger,'* which was an action by 
 the indorsee of a note. The Supreme Court held that the de- 
 fendants! might prove that the plaintiff had no interest in the 
 note, but was a mere agent of the payee, and was bound to 
 account to him, on demand, for the proceeds, and that these facts 
 would constitute a complete defence to the action. 
 
 § 68. * 130. The Rule in New York. Cases of higher au- 
 thority, because decided by the New York Court of Appeals, 
 have established the other rule for that State. In City Bank of 
 New Haven v. Perkins,^ the rule which prevailed prior to the 
 code was reaffirmed and applied to the facts before the court, 
 
 ^ Edwards v. Campbell, 23 Barb. 423. bills in question, or their proceeds, from 
 
 "^ Killmore v. Culver, 24 Barb. 6.50, 6.57. tlie plaintiff." The doctrine of City Bank 
 
 ' James v. Chalmers, 6 N. Y. 209,215, v. Perivius is declared to be the settled 
 
 per Welles J. general rule, but its operation explained 
 
 • * Eaton V. Alger, 57 Barb. 179, 189. and limited in Hays v. Hathorne, 74 N. Y. 
 
 * City Bank of New Haven v. Perkins, 486. As sustaining the general rule, see 
 
 29 N. Y. 554, 568, per Johnson J. The also Devol v. Barnes, 7 Hun, 342 ; Green 
 
 learned judge also said: " It will be time v. Niagara Ins. Co., 6 Hun, 128; Davis i'. 
 
 enough to determine whether any other Rowlands, 5 Hun, 651. But see Iselin v. 
 
 person has a better title when such person Reynolds, 30 Hun, 488. 
 
 shall come before the court to claim the
 
 94 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 although no allusion was made in its opinion to the provisions 
 of § 111 (1501, -149, 1909, 1910). The doctrine was stated as 
 follows : " Nothing short of inahi fides or notice thereof will 
 enable a maker or indorser of such paper to defeat an action 
 brought upon it by one who is apparently a regular indorsee or 
 holder, especially when there is no defence to the indebtedness. 
 As to anything beyond the bona fides of the holder, the defend- 
 ant, who owes the debt, has no interest." The same rule was 
 repeated in Brown v. Penfield;^ but in this case also there was 
 no reference made to the provision of the code relating to the real 
 party in interest. It might be considered doubtful whether the 
 question had been put to rest by these two decisions, but all 
 doubt has been removed. The case of Eaton v. Alger was 
 carried to the Court of Appeals; the opinion of the Supreme 
 Court was overruled ; and the original rule of the law in refer- 
 ence to suits upon negotiable paper was expressly held not to 
 have been changed by the code.'-^ In this conflict among the. 
 decisions, the judgment of the court of last resort of course pre- 
 vails; and the question is thus settled in New York by the force 
 of authority, whatever may be thought of the comparative weight 
 of the argument in support of either rule. 
 
 §69. *131. Rule in Other states. The doctrine which prevails 
 in Iowa seems to be the same as that now established in New 
 York.'^ The same doctrine appears to be established in Min- 
 nesota ; * in Missouri ; ^ in Nebraska ; ^ in Washington ; " in 
 California.^ The construction given to the statutory provision 
 
 1 Brown r. Peiifiel(l,36 N. Y. 473. The Ileipler (Minn.), 52 N. AV. 33; Elraquist 
 remarks of Davies C. J., in which this doc- r. Markoe, 4,5 Minn. 305; Van.streani v. 
 trine was reasserted, were, however, mere Liljengren, 37 Minn. 191 ; QStruckmeyer 
 vbiter dicta. c. Lam)) (1896), 64 Minn. 57, 65 N.W. 930.3 
 
 2 Eaton (•. Alger, 47 N. Y. 345; s. c. '^ Young v. Iluilson, 99 Mo. 102. 
 
 2 Keyes, 41. '• Ilerron r. Cole,25 Neb. 692; [^Meeker 
 
 8 Cottle r. Cole, 20 Iowa, 481, 485, per v. Waldron (1901), 62 Neh. 689, 87 N. W. 
 
 Dillon J. followed in Abell Note, etc. Co. 539 : Commercial State Bank r. Rowley 
 
 r. Hurd (Iowa, 1892), 52 N. W. 488 : (1902), Neh., 89 N. W. 765.] 
 
 " The course of decision in tliis State ^ McDaniel v. Pressler, 3 Wasli. 636 ; 
 
 establishes this rule; viz., that the party Davis r. Erickson, 3 Wash. 654; QKidilell 
 
 holding the legal title of a note or instru- ;•. Trichard (1895), 12 Wash. 601,41 Pac. 
 
 ment may sue on it, though he he an 905.] 
 
 agent or trustee, and liable to account to * McPherson v. We.ston, 64 (^al. 275 ; 
 
 another for the proceeds of the recovery; Curtis ?•. Sprague, 51 Cal. 239; ^Oortel- 
 
 but he is oj)en in sucli case to any defence you r. .lones (1901), 132 Cal. 131, 64 I'ac. 
 
 wliich may exist ajjainst the person bene- 119; Toby v. r)regon Pac. Ry. Co. (1893), 
 
 ficially interested." 98 Cal. 490, 33 Pac. 550. 
 
 * Minnesota Thresher Manuf. Co. p. Tlie same doctrine prevails in North
 
 THE REAL rA^rrY Ix\ INrEHL;8T TO BE THE PLAINTIFF. 95 
 
 by the court of Indiana is entirely different, as it is held to 
 include the indorsee and holder of negotiable paper as well as 
 the assignee of any other thing in action. Such indorsee or 
 holder, although possessed of the naked legal title, is not the real 
 party in interest, and is not authorized to sue, if the beneficial 
 interest and the whole right to the proceeds of the recovery are 
 in another party. ^ It is, however, a settled rule of pleading in 
 Indiana, that an answer merely averring that the plaintiff is not 
 the real party in interest, but that some other person named is 
 the real party, without alleging any facts from which these con- 
 clusions would arise, presents no issue. ^ In Kentucky, also, the 
 defence that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest may be 
 set up in an action upon a promissory note or other negotiable 
 instrument, brought by the person who is the apparent holder, or 
 who has the naked legal title, although in that State, by virtue 
 of an express provision of the code, the person having the legal 
 title must also be made a party, either plaintiff or defendant.^ 
 In an action by the assignee of a note against the maker thereof, 
 it is no defence to show that the assignment was made with 
 intent to defraud certain creditors of the assignor. This does 
 not make the plaintiff any the less the real party in interest. As 
 the assignor participates in the fraud, he could not repudiate his 
 transfer, and has parted with all possible interest in the note.* 
 Whenever the defence that the plaintiff is not the real party in 
 interest is allowable, it must be pleaded in the answer; if not, it 
 will be regarded as waived.^ 
 
 Dakota. Seybokl v. Bank (1896), 5 N. D. Bank (Ky. 1892), 18 S. W. 234. [^See 
 
 460, 67 N. W. 682; Commercial Bank v. Power i\ Hambrick (1903), Ky., 74 S. W. 
 
 Red River Bank (1899), 8 N. D. 382, 79 660, where it was held that the assignee of 
 
 N. W. 859. Also in Montana. Meadow- a note may sue upon it in his own name, 
 
 craft V. Walsh (189.5), 15 Mont. 544, 39 whether the assignment was absolute or 
 
 Pac. 914.] merely as collateral security.] 
 
 1 Swift V. Ellsworth, 10 Ind. 205. See * Rohrer v. Turrill, 4 Minn. 407. 
 
 also Gillispie y. Fort Wayne & So. R. Co., ^ Savage v. Corn Exch. Ins. Co., 4 
 
 12 Ind. 398 ; Deuel v. Newlin (Ind. Sup. Bosw. 2; Giraldin i\ Howard, 103 Mo. 40 ; 
 
 1892), 30 N. E. 795; Bartholomew Cy. see also ;ws^ § *711, and cases cited in note. 
 
 Comm'rs f. Jameson, 86 Ind. 154. [^Lesh r. Meyer (1901), 63 Kan. 524, 66 
 
 '■' Lamson v. Enlls, 6 Ind. 309 ; Me- Pac. 245 ; Bank of Stockhara v. Alter 
 
 wherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 199 ; Garrison v. (1901), 61 Neb. 359, 85 N. W. 300. An 
 
 Clark, 11 Ind. 369; Swift v. Ellsworth, averment in an answer that the plaintiff 
 
 10 Ind. 205 ; Hereth v. Smith, 33 Ind. 514, is not the real party in intere.st i.s a mere 
 
 and cases cited; Hardin v. Helt(jn, 50 conclusion of law, and insufficient: Esch 
 
 Ind. 319. V. White (1901), 82 Minn. 462, 85 N. W. 
 
 ^ Carpenter v. Miles, 17 B. Mon. 598, 238, 718. But an allegation that prior to 
 
 602. See Palmer v. Mt. Sterling Nat. tlie commencement of tlie suit the plaintiff
 
 96 CIVIL REMEDIES. ; 
 
 jj 70. *lo2. Absolute Assignment made Conditional or Partiad 
 by Contemporaneous and Collateral Agreement. Analogous to 
 the subject discussed in the preceding paragraph is the question 
 whether an assignee, to whom a thing in action has been trans- 
 ferred by an assignment which is absolute in its terms, so as to 
 vest in him the entire legal title, but which, by means of a 
 contemporaneous and collateral agreement, is, in fact, rendered 
 conditional or partial, is the real party in interest. It is now 
 settled by a great preponderance of authorit}', although there is 
 some conflict, that if the assignment, whether written or verbal, 
 of an3-thing in action is absolute in its terms, so that by virtue 
 thereof the entire apparent legal title vests in the assignee, any 
 contemporaneous collateral agreement by virtue of which he is 
 to receive a part onh' of the proceeds, " and is to account to the 
 assignor or other person for the residue, or even is to thus account 
 for the whole proceeds, or by virtue of which the absolute trans- 
 fer is made conditional upon the fact of recovery, or by which his 
 title is in any other similar manner partial or conditional," does 
 not render him any the less the real party in interest:^ he is 
 entitled to sue in his own name, whatever collateral arrangements 
 have been made between him and the assignor respecting the pro- 
 ceeds. ^ The debtor is completely protected by the assignment, 
 and cannot be exposed to a second action brought by any of the 
 
 sold the note sued on, is a good defence : owner, has no interest in the property 
 
 Van Hoasen v. Broehl (1899), 59 Neb. 48, injured, may be allowed: Kansas City f. 
 
 80 N. W. 260. See also National Distil- Kin<,' (1902). 6,5 Kan. 64,68 Pac. 1093. 
 
 ling Co. L". Cream City Importing Co. I5ut see Service v. Baniv (1900), 62 Kan. 
 
 (1893), 86 Wis. 3.i2, .56 N. W. 864.] 857, 62 Pac. 670, and Hudson v. Barratt 
 
 QThe defence that the plaintiff is not (1901), 62 Kan. 137, 61 Pac. 737, where 
 
 the real party in interest may be raised sucli amendments were allowed, 
 by answer or demurrer: Meyer r. Barth Bowser c. Mattler (1893), 137 Ind. 649, 
 
 (1897), 97 Wis. .•?52, 72 N. W. 748; J. I. 35 N. E. 701 : A question as to the real 
 
 Case Threshing Co. r. Pedersou (1894), 6 party in interest, and as to the consecpient 
 
 S- 1) 140, 60 N. W. 747. right to sue, cannot be r.aised for the first 
 
 Where the defect appears on tlie face time in the Supreme Court, but such a 
 
 of the complaint, a general demurrer defence must be specially pleaded in bar.] 
 properly raises the objection: Smith r. ^ QBohart >'. Buckingham (1901), 62 
 
 Security Co. (1899), 8 N. D.451, 79 N. W. Kan. 658, 64 Pac. 627, quoting the text.] 
 981. See also note, p. 714, on Issues -^ [[Wines c. Hio (Jrande Ily. Co. (1893), 
 
 Raised by Demurrers. 9 Utah, 228, .33 P.ac. 1042, (juoting the 
 
 An amcnilment substituting the real text; Anderfson r. Yoscmite Mining Co. 
 
 j>arty in interest is not iillowal)le: Wilson (189+), 9 Utah, 420.35 Pac. 502 ; Guerney 
 
 «•. Kiesel (1894). 9 Utah. 397. 35 Pac. 488. r. Moore (1895), 131 Mo. 650, 32 S. W. 
 
 Hut an amendniont alleging that one of 1 132, (luoting the text.] 
 the plaintifTs, originally alleged to be an
 
 THE UKAL VXliTY IN INTEUEST TO UK THE PLAINTIF!' 
 
 97 
 
 parties, either the assignor or other, to whom the assignee is 
 bound to account. This is the settled doctrine in most of the 
 States.^ Notwithstanding the general unanimity of the court« 
 in sustaining this doctrine, there are still some indications of a 
 different opinion, although it can hardly be said that this differ- 
 ence has been embodied in an adjudication as the ratio decidendi. 
 The opinion to which I refer will be found at large in the note. 
 
 1 Allen 1-. Brown, 44 N. Y. 228, 231 
 •(assignmeut without consideration, and 
 assignee to be accountable to the assignor 
 for all the proceeds) ; Meeker y. Claghorn, 
 44 N. Y. 349, 353 (facts similar to the 
 last) ; Wetmore v. San Francisco, 44 Cal. 
 294 (assignment made as collateral secu- 
 rity) ; Durgin v. Ireland, 14 N. Y. 322 
 {assignment in writing absolute, but by a 
 contemporaneous agreement the assignors 
 were to have one half the proceeds) ; 
 Castner i". Sumner, 2 Minn. 44; Williams 
 V. Norton, 3 Kans. 295 ; Cottle v. Cole, 20 
 Iowa, 481 ; Curtis v. Mohr, 18 Wis. 615; 
 Hilton V. Waring, 7 Wis. 492 (assignment 
 as collateral security) ; Wilson ),-. Clark, 
 11 Ind. 385; Gradwohl v. Harris, 29 Cal. 
 150 ; Saulsbury v. Corwiu, 40 Mo. App. 
 373 (assignment of note for collection) ; 
 Jackson i'. Hamm, 14 Colo. 58 ; Brumbaek 
 V. Oldliain, 1 Idaiio, 709 (assignment of 
 account for collection) ; Young v. Hudson, 
 99 Mo. 102 (assignment of account for 
 collection) ; Haysler v. Dawson, 28 Mo. 
 App. 5.31 (same); Sheridan r. The Mayor, 
 etc., 68 N. Y. 30 ; Gates v. No. Pac. R. Co., 
 64 Wis. 64 (assignee to pay certain debts 
 of the assignor from the proceeds of the 
 suit, and account to the assignor for the 
 remainder) ; Vimont i'. Chicago & N. W. 
 R. Co., 64 Iowa, 513; Ginocchio v. Ama- 
 dor Canal & Min. Co., 67 Cal. 493; Ervin 
 V. Oregon Ry. & N. Co., 35 Hun, 544; 
 Walburn v. Chenault, 43 Kan. 352. In 
 Castner v. Sumner the notes m suit, wliicli 
 were for $3,100, were assigned as security 
 for $1,500, owing by the payee to the 
 plaintiff, the latter giving ])ack a bond to 
 pay over the balance after satisfying his 
 own demand. Upon these facts the court, 
 per Atwater J., said : " There may be a 
 question as to whether the assignment of 
 the notes was absolute, or whether a con- 
 tingent interest remained in tlie assignor. 
 But in either case tlie action is properly 
 
 brought in the name of the plaintiff." . . . 
 In Williams v. Norton a note payable to 
 the order of the payee had been verbally 
 transferred and delivered to the jjlaintiff 
 without endorsement. The action by such 
 assignee was held to be properly brought, 
 even though he may not be entitled to 
 apply to his own use the whole proceeds. 
 " A delivery bj- the payee to his surety or 
 indemnitor, with authority to receive the 
 money and pay the principal debt, will 
 enable the surety to sue in his own name. 
 He will, within the meaning of the code, 
 be the real party in interest." 
 
 []In Laurence v. Congregational Church 
 (1900), 164 N. Y. 115, 58 N. E. 24, it was 
 held that " the assignee of a claim under a 
 written assignment which vests the legal 
 title in him, though as security for a debt, 
 is not bound, in an action against the 
 debtor, to prove the existence of a debt 
 from the assignor to himself, as the state 
 of the accounts between the assignor and 
 assignee does not concern the defendant, 
 or, if it does, the burden is upon \\\m to 
 prove such a state of facts as would render 
 the assignment inoperative or reinvest the 
 assignor in equity with the beneficial 
 ownersliip of the claim " (Syllabus). lu 
 Falconio v. Larsen (1897), 31 Ore. 137, 48 
 Pac. 703, it was held that the assignee of 
 a claim for wages, assigned for collection 
 only, could sue in his own name. In 
 Toby V. Oregon etc. R. R. Co. (1893), 98 
 Cal. 490, 33 Pac. 550, the court said : " A 
 trustee to whom a chose in action has 
 been transferred for collection is, in con- 
 templation of law, so far the owner that 
 he may sue on it in his own name." Re- 
 affirmed in Cortelyou v. Jones (1901), 132 
 Cal. 131, 64 Pac. il9. See also Pratchett 
 V. Marsh (1895), 52 Ohio St. 494, 40 N. E. 
 200; McBrayer v. Dean (1897), 100 Ky. 
 398, 38 S. W. 508.3
 
 98 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 as it is an able argument upon that side of the question. ^ Em- 
 braced within the same principle, and governed by the same rule, 
 
 1 Robbins v. Deverill, 20 Wis. 142. 
 The plaintiff sues an assignee of Peet 
 & Williams. Dixon C. J. gave the fol- 
 lowing opinion (p. 148) : " The statute is 
 imperative that every action must be 
 prosecuted in the name of the real party 
 in interest, except as therein otherwise 
 provided. The proof is that the plaintiff 
 is not the owner of the demand sued upon. 
 It belongs to the firm of R. & L., com- 
 posed of the plaintiff, his brother, and one 
 Lewis. The demand was transferred to 
 the plaintiff alone by words of absolute 
 assignment, no trust being expressed, but, 
 as the plaintiff himself testifies, he holds 
 it nevertheless in trust for his firm. It 
 was received on account of a debt due the 
 firm of R. & L. from P. &, W. Upon these 
 facts it seems to me the plaintiff cannot 
 maintain the action. He is not the real 
 party in interest, nor the trustee of an 
 express trust within the meaning of the 
 statute. His brotlier and Lewis should 
 have been joined as plaintiffs." 
 
 pn Crowns !■. Forest Land Co. (1898), 
 99 Wis. 10.3, 74 N. W. 546, the court 
 seems to have departed somewhat from 
 the doctrine of Robbins v. Deverill. This 
 was a suit to foreclose a mortgage, and 
 the defendant attempted to defend on the 
 ground that the plaintiff was not the real 
 party in interest. The court said : " That 
 portion of tlie answer which alleges that 
 respondent gave no consideration for the 
 note and mortgage presents no issuable 
 fact. It tends in no way to defeat the 
 action. It is a matter of no moment to 
 appellant whether any consideration was 
 paid for the note and mortgage or not. 
 Under subsequent allegations in the an- 
 swer it appears that respondent became 
 vested with and held the legal owncrsliip 
 of the demand sued upon. The appellant 
 had no legal interest to inquire whether 
 the respondent's interest was actual or 
 colorable, or whether consideration was 
 paid therefor or not." And in Chase v. 
 Dodge (1901), 111 Wis. 70, 86 N. W. 548, 
 which was an action by the assignees of a 
 bill of merchandise, the court said : " The 
 assignee of a claim, holding the legal title 
 by a transfer valirl as against his assignor, 
 
 is the ' real party in interest,' and th* 
 proper party to sue thereon . . . ; and the 
 fact that such transfer is colorable only is 
 immaterial unless the rights of creditors 
 are involved or the right to interpose some 
 defence or counterclaim supposed to be 
 cut off by the assignment." See also An- 
 derson V. Johnson (1900), 106 Wis. 218,82 
 N. W. 177; Brossard v. Williams (1902), 
 114 Wis. 89, 89 N. W. 832-3 
 
 See also cases cited ante, under § *130; 
 and Bostwick v. Bryant, 113 Ind. 448 
 (assignee for collection merely of a note 
 cannot sue thereon in his own name) ; 
 Hoagland v. Van Etten, 22 Neb. 681 ; 
 s. c. 23 Neb. 462 (where the proceeds of 
 the suit are to be paid to the assignor, 
 and the assignee has no beneficial interest 
 in them, the latter cannot sue on the 
 assigned claim). 
 
 Qln Kansas the sujireme court has 
 wavered in its decisions. In the case of 
 Stewart c. Price (1902), 64 Kan. 191, 67 
 Pac. 553, in a carefully rea.soued opinion, 
 a divided court expressly overruled the 
 case of Knapp v. Eldridge, 33 Kan. 106, 
 and held that " one holding by written 
 assignment a verified itemized account is 
 not the real party in interest, and cannot 
 maintain an action thereon in his own 
 name where it is showu tliat, by a con- 
 temporaneous oral agreement, he has 
 agreed to pay the full amount thereof, 
 when collected, to his assignor ; and this 
 is true notwithstanding the iis.^ignor testi- 
 fies that the defendant in the action does 
 not owe her anything, that the whole 
 amount is due her from the plaintiff, and 
 that he is to pay her provided he re- 
 covers in the action." But only two years 
 later, Stewart v. Price was itself expressly 
 overruled by the case of Manley i'. 
 Park (1904), — Kan. — , 75 Pac. 557, 
 the court unanimously approving the doc- 
 trine of the minority opinion in Stewart 
 V. Price. 
 
 The same rule obtains in Ohio. Brown v. 
 Ginn (1902), 66 Ohio St. 316, 64 N. E. 123. 
 In this case the court said : " We are aware 
 that the tendency of some courts ha.s been 
 to uphold actions brought upon negotiable 
 instruments, transferred for collection
 
 THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO BE THE PLAINTIFF. 99 
 
 is the case of an assignee of a thing in action, who, by the terms 
 of the transfer, is not bound to pay the consideration thereof 
 until the debt has been collected ; he is the real party in interest, 
 and is fully authorized to sue in his own name.^ 
 
 § 71. * 133. Instances of Action by Assignee as Real Party in 
 Interest. The following are particular cases in which the as- 
 signee was held by the courts to be the real party in interest 
 within the meaning of the codes, and entitled as such to sue in 
 his own name: Where a bond or a mortgage was assigned 
 verbally;^ the assignment of a receipt and delivery order, which 
 was in the following words: "1,000 bushels of com. Received 
 in store, on account of S. F. A., 1,000 bushels of corn, to be 
 delivered to his order at, etc., etc. (signed) W. H. H.;"^ 
 assignment of a promissory note payable to order without any 
 indorsement;* the assignment of a debt evidenced by a lost 
 note ; ^ where the assignment of a bond or note was by means of 
 a separate instrument in writing;*^ the assignment of a claim 
 arising from an agreement to pay the defendant in a certain 
 pending suit a stipulated sum of money if he would withdraw 
 his defence;' the assignment of a claim for damages resulting 
 from the wrongful conversions of chattels ; ^ the assignment by a 
 widow of her right of dower after the death of her husband, but 
 before the dower had been set apart to her.^ The mere parting 
 
 only, on the ground that the plaintiff is 3 Merchants & Mech. Bank v. Hewitt, 
 
 the real party in interest, and that there 3 Iowa, 93. 
 
 are some authorities which point to that 4 Carpenter v. Miles, 17 B. Mon. 598 ; 
 
 conclusion. Indeed it may lie admitted White v. Phelps, 14 Minu. 27; Pease v. 
 
 that the trend in some of the Code States Rush, 2 Minn. 107 ; Pearson v. Cummings, 
 
 is in that direction. But we have found no 28 Iowa, 344 ; Hancock v. Ritchie, 11 Ind. 
 
 case which goes to the extent of holding 48 ; Rogge v. Cassidy (Ky. 1890), 1.3 S. W. 
 
 that an assignment of an open account 716; Caldwell v. Meshew, 44 Ark. 564; 
 
 for the mere purpose of collection, one Heartman v. Franks, 36 Ark. 501 ; Kiff v. 
 
 which gives the assignee a contingent Weaver, 94 N. C. 274. 
 
 interest only, constitutes him the real 6 Long r Constant, 19 Mo. 320. 
 
 party in interest within the meaning of 6 Thornton v. Crowther, 24 Mo. 164; 
 
 the statute." Peters v. St. Louis, &c. R. R., 24 Mo. 586. 
 
 See cases cited in note 3, p. 91, and " Gray v. Garrison, 9 Cal. 325. 
 
 note 1, p. 87. 8 Smith v. Kennett, 18 Mo. 154; Laz- 
 
 1 Cummings v. Morris, 25 N. Y. 625 ; ard v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 139. lu this la.«t 
 s. c. 3 Bosw. 560. case an action by the assignee to recover 
 
 2 Conyngham v. Smith, 16 Iowa, 471 ; possession of tlie chattels was sustained. 
 Barthol v. Blakin, 34 Iowa, 452; Green 9 Strong c. Clem, 12 Ind. 37 ; ([Dobber- 
 V. Marble, 37 Iowa, 95; Andrews v. stein v. Murphy (1896), 64 Minn. 127, 66 
 McDaniel, 68 X. C. 385; Kiff v. Weaver, N. W. 204-3 
 
 94 N. C. 274.
 
 100 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 with the possession of a note does not, however, constitute an 
 assignment thereof, and the owner is the proper party to sue, 
 although the instrument is in the hands of another person with 
 whom it has been deposited.^ The assignee of a foreign executor 
 or administrator may maintain an action in his own name to 
 recover a debt due to the estate from a person residing within 
 the State in which the suit is brought.^ Upon the same prin- 
 ciple, when a demand not arising within the State, in favor of 
 one foreign corporation against another foreign corporation, is 
 assigned to a resident of the State, such assignee may maintain 
 an action upon it against the debtor corporation, although the 
 original creditor is expressly forbidden by statute to sue under 
 such circumstances. The prohibition of an action between the 
 foreign corporations does not affect the assignability of the 
 claim. ^ 
 
 § 72. * 134. Same Subject. The assignee of a judgment re- 
 covered by the defendant in an action brought to recover the 
 possession of chattels may sue in his own name upon a bond 
 given by the plaintiff upon the requisition made for a delivery 
 of tlie goods to him. The assignment of the judgment carries 
 with it all demands arising upon this bond or undertaking, and 
 the assignee is the real party in interest.* In like manner, the 
 assignee of a judgment recovered against a sheriff for official 
 misconduct in seizing the plaintiff's property may bring an action 
 in his own name upon the sherift''s bond." The principle may be 
 stated more broadly. The assignee of any claim or demand may, 
 in general, sue in his own name upon any incidental or collateral 
 security connected with the demand, and l)y means of which its 
 payment or satisfaction can be enforced. Thus, the assignee of 
 a judgment obtained in a garnishee process may maintain an 
 action in his own name against the garnishees;^ the assignee of 
 the cause of action in a pending litigation may sue on an appeal 
 bond given to the j)laintiff, the assignor, in the course of the 
 
 ' Seidell r. Prin;^le, 17 Barb. 4')8 : revive a judfrinent hy the assignee thereof ; 
 
 [^Bohart >■. Buckingham (1901), 62 Kan Gerner v. Cliurch (1895), 43 Nel>. 690, G 2 
 
 658, 64 Pac. 627, f)u<jliiig the text.] N. W. 51 (assignee of subscription).] 
 
 2 Petersen r. Cliemical Bank, 32 N. Y. * Bowdoin v. Coleman, 3 Al.b. Pr. 431. 
 
 21. 6 Charles r. Haakins, 11 Iowa, 329. 
 
 => .McBridf; /• FiirintTs' Bank, 26 N. Y. « Whitman r. Keith, 18 Ohio St. 134. 
 
 450. 457. In tliis case, Mr. .Justice Scott give.s a very 
 
 (^Further instances: Haupt r Biirtun full ami clear exposition of the statutory 
 
 (1898), 21 Mont. 572, 55 I'ac. 110 (suit to provision under consideration.
 
 THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO BE THE PLAINTIFF, 101 
 
 proceedings.^ The assignee of a reversion and also of the cove- 
 nants contained in the lease is the proper party to bring an action 
 to recover damages arising from a breach of such covenants. ^ 
 When a surviving partner assigns things in action which belonged 
 to the firm, the assignee succeeds to his rights, and must sue in 
 his own name to collect the same."* 
 
 § 73. * 185. Joinder of Assignor in Some States. In Ken- 
 tucky, if the assignment is equitable, which is defined to be 
 an assignment not expressly authorized by statute to be made, 
 although the assignee must sue in his own name, the assignor 
 must also be joined as a party plaintiff or defendant;* as, for 
 example, when an execution is assigned,^ or a lease. ^ In certain 
 States, where the thing in action is not negotiable, or assignable 
 by indorsement, the assignor may be joined as a defendant to 
 answer to his interest and to the assignment." In other States, 
 however, where similar provisions are not found in the codes or 
 practice acts, the rule is entirely different, and the assignor is 
 not a proper party either plaintiff or defendant. Thus, in Ohio, 
 an assignor having been made a defendant under the general 
 provisions of the code relating to the joinder of parties plaintiff 
 and defendant, it was held that he neither had an interest in the 
 controversy adverse to the plaintiff, nor was he a necessary party 
 to a complete determination or settlement of the questions in- 
 volved therein, and therefore he had been improperly made a 
 defendant.^ This is undoubtedly the rule in all the States 
 whose codes do not contain the special provision permitting or 
 requiring the joinder of assignors in order to answer to the as- 
 signment. And even though he may retain some residuary, 
 contingent, or equitable interest, the assignor is not the proper 
 party to sue; the legal title is not only in the assignee, but he is 
 
 1 Bennett v. McGrade, 15 Minn. 1.32. R. S. ch. 22, § C, "all bonds, Itills, or notes 
 
 Same as to assignment of a conti-act, for money or property shall he assignable 
 
 Gallagher v. Nichols, 60 N. Y. 438, 448, so as to vest the right of action in the 
 
 449; liolen r. Crosby, 49 id. 183. assignee." 
 
 •^ Masury v. Southworth, 9 Ohio St. "^ ^Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 277.] 
 
 340. s Allen v. Miller, 11 Ohio St. 374. 
 
 3 Roys V. Vilas, 18 Wis 169. [^Held in Shambaugh v. Current (1900), 
 
 * Dean v. English, 18 B. Men. 132; 111 Iowa, 121,82 N. W. 497, that the de- 
 Gill V. Johnson's Adni., 1 Mete. (Ky.) fendant cannot require the assignor to be 
 649; Lytle v. Lytle, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 127. made a party, since any defence as against 
 
 ^ Watson r. Gabby, 18 B. Mon. 658, the assignor could be made against the 
 
 665. assignee.] 
 
 ** Hicks V. Dotv, 4 Bush, 420. Bv 1
 
 102 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 entitled to receive all the proceeds of the recovery, and whatever 
 possibilities the assignor may have, he is not the real party in 
 interest.^ 
 
 ^ 74. * IfSG. Assignment Pendente Lite. Substitution of As- 
 signee. The thing in action may even be assigned while a 
 snit upon it is pending, and, by the express provisions of the 
 statute, the assignee may either be substituted as plaintiff, or 
 the suit may be carried on to its termination in the name of the 
 original party. ^ Such substitution, when made, is not the bring- 
 ing of a new action, and does not require a supplemental coni- 
 
 1 Smith V. Cliicago & N. W. R. Co., 2.3 
 Wis. 267, where it apjjeared that in pro- 
 ceedings supplementary to execution, be- 
 fore instituted against the plaintiff in 
 another State, the demand in suit had 
 heen assigned to a receiver ; tiiis was held 
 a complete defence. See also Gates i'. 
 No. Pac. R. Co., 64 Wis. 64 ; Vimont v. 
 Chicago N. W. Ry. Co., 64 Iowa, 513 ; 
 Smith r. Felton, 85 Ind. 223 (note assigned 
 as collateral security); Michael v St. Louis 
 Mut. F. Ins. Co., 17 Mo. App. 23 (the 
 assignor of an insurance policy should not 
 be joined as plaintiff with the assignee, to 
 wiiom the whole policy has been trans- 
 ferred as collateral security) ; Cable v. St. 
 Louis Marine Ry. Co., 21 Mo. 133; and 
 see insurance cases, post, § *226, note. 
 
 2 QMcCuUough V. Dovey (1901), 61 
 Neb. 675, 85 N. W. 893 ; Parker v. Taylor 
 (1902), Neb., 91 N W. 537; City' of 
 Springfield v. Weaver (1896), 137 Mo. 
 650, 37 S. W. 509 ; TufPree v. Stearns 
 Ranches Co. (1899), 124 Cal. 306, 57 Pac. 
 69. 
 
 Whethci the assignee siiall be sub.sti- 
 tuted or the action shall proceed in the 
 name of the original party, is a matter 
 within the discretion of the court : Brown 
 V. Kohout (1895). 61 Minn 113, 63 N W. 
 248; Fay " Steubenrauch (1903), 138 
 Cal. 656, 72 Pac. 156 , Sears ». Ackerman 
 (1903). 138 Cal. 583, 72 Pac. 171. 
 
 But in Wilson v. Kiesel (1894), 9 Utah 
 397, 35 Pac. 488, it was held that where 
 an action is prosecuterj to judgment in the 
 name of the assignor, after an assignment 
 pmdpulf lite, no action can thereaftor be 
 brought on such judgment in the name of 
 tlie assignor ; and where an action is Desun 
 Ml hw name it must be dismissed, an 
 
 amendment substituting the real party in 
 interest not being allowable. See, how- 
 ever, Service ;;. Bank (1900), 62 Kan. 857, 
 62 Pac. 670, and Hudson v. Barratt (1901), 
 62 Kan. 137, 61 Pac. 737, where such 
 amendments were allowed. 
 
 The statute furnishes no authority for 
 the continuation of the action by the 
 plaintiff where his assignee has settled 
 the claim and demands that the action 
 be discontinued. Hirsheld v. Fitzgerald 
 (1898), 157 N.Y. 166, 51 N. E. 997, 
 
 In McKiiiglit V. Bertram Heating, etc. 
 Co. (1902), 65 Kan. 859, 70 Pac. 345, a 
 part of the claim was assigned pending 
 the action, and it was held that the plain- 
 tiff, who sued on a quantum meruit, could 
 recover in his own name the amount 
 assigned 
 
 In Matthews v. Cantey (1896), 48 S. C. 
 588, 26 S. E 894, defendant executed 
 three promissory notes to A. A assigned 
 them to B, and B pledged them to plain- 
 tiffs as collateral security for a debt which 
 B owed plaintiffs. Said debt not being 
 paid when due, plaintiffs brought this 
 action on the notes, and it was conceded 
 by all parties that plaintiffs had a good 
 cause of actioii at that time. But after 
 the commencement of this suit, B paid 
 plaintiffs the debt in full, and assigned 
 the notes to C, such assignment by B. 
 divesting plaintiffs of all interest in the 
 notes, and ])utting the legal and beneficial 
 title in C. C did not move to be made a 
 party, and the circuit court dismissed the 
 action on the ground that the suit was not 
 being prosecuted in tlic name of the real 
 party in interest. This order was afllrmed. 
 Section 142 of the code jjrovides that "no 
 action shall ai)ate by the death, marriage
 
 THE KEAL PARTY IX INTEREST TO BK THE PLAINTIFF. 
 
 103 
 
 pliiint.^ If an assignee carries on a suit in, the name of tlie 
 assignor, he must show affirmatively that the transfer was made 
 ■pendente lite.'^ 
 
 ^ 75. * 137. Assignment of Part of Demand. Action by Grantee 
 on Covenants. It has been decided in some cases that the 
 assignment of part of an entire claim does not enable the as- 
 signee to sue in his own name, but that the assignor must still 
 sue for the whole demand.^ This rule is based upon the old 
 doctrine of the indivisibility in law of an entire thing in action. 
 Other cases hold that such an assignment conveys an equitable 
 interest, and makes the assignee an equitable owner, so that he 
 may sustain an action brought in his own name, although the 
 
 or other disability of a party, or by the 
 transfer of any interest therein, if the 
 cause of action survive or continue. In 
 case of death, marriage or other disability 
 of a party, the court, on motion, at any 
 time within one year tliereafter, or after- 
 wards on a supplemental complaint, may 
 allow the action to be continued by or 
 against his representative or successor in 
 interest. In case of any other transfer of 
 interest, the action sliall be continued in 
 the name of the original party, or the 
 Court may allow the person to whom 
 the transfer is made to be substituted in 
 the action." The court held that the words 
 " any other transfer of interest," under 
 which it was sought to defeat the abate- 
 ment of the action, meant " such a transfer 
 of interest in the action as would enable 
 the transferee to claim under the original 
 parly." And .since in the case at bar the 
 transferee claimed not under the original 
 party, the plaintiffs, but under B., this 
 statute did not save the action, and it 
 must abate under the provision of sec- 
 tion 1.32, requiring all actions to be 
 prosecuted in tlie name of the real party 
 in interest.] 
 
 ' [Fish V. Smith (1900), 7.3 Conn. .377, 
 47 Atl. 711 : "An assignment of a claim 
 pending suit thereon calls for no altera- 
 tion or amendment in the complaint, but 
 only for an application for a change of 
 parties." And in Campbell r. Irvine 
 (1895), 17 Mont. 476, 43 Pac. 626, it was 
 held that the substituted plaintiff might 
 prove the assignment by which he became 
 entitled to the subject of the suit, although 
 
 the assignment was not pleaded in the 
 complaint. 
 
 The Supreme Court of Washington, 
 however, has held, in Powell v. Nolan 
 (1902), 27 Wash. 318, 67 Pac. 712, that a 
 supplemental complaint must be filed, and 
 that a judgment obtained witiiout the 
 filing of such supplemental complaint is 
 invalid, where the defendant was not 
 present or represented in court at the 
 time the substitution was made.] 
 
 2 St. Anthony Mill Co. v. Vandall, 
 1 Minn. 246 ; Virgin v. Brubaker, 4 Nev. 
 31; Warner I'. Turner, 18 B. Mon. 758. 
 See also McGean v. Metrop. Elev. Ky. 
 Co., 133 N. Y. 9 ; Asher v. St. Louis, &c. 
 K. Co., 89 Mo. 116; Lowell v. Parkinson, 
 4 Utah, 64 ; Todd v. Crutsinger, 30 Mo. 
 App. 145 ; Hamilton v. Lamphear, 54 
 Conn. 237 ; Stewart v. Spaulding, 72 Cal. 
 264 ; Nichols v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 36 
 Minn. 452 ; Snyder v. Phillips, 66 la. 481 ; 
 Perkins v. Marrs, 1 5 Colo. 262. 
 
 3 Cable V. St. Louis Marine Railway 
 Co., 21 Mo. 133; Leese v. Sherwood, 21 
 Cal. 151 ; Burnett v. Crandall, 63 Mo. 
 410; Beardslee v. Morgner, 73 Mo. 22; 
 Loomis V. Robin.son, 76 Mo. 488. But 
 this rule does not prevent one of two 
 joint payees from transferring the whole 
 of his interest, so that his assignee (in this 
 case the other payee) may sue in his own 
 name; McLeod y. Snyder (Mo. 1892), 19 
 S. W. 494. See Lapping v. Duffy, 47 Ind. 
 51; Boyle v. Robbins, 71 N. " C. 130; 
 [^Smith r. Atkin.son (1893), 18 Colo. 255, 
 32 Pac. 425, holding that the common-law 
 rule has not been changed.]
 
 104 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 assignors may, upon their own application, be allowed to inter- 
 vene, in order to protect their interests.^ The grantee of land 
 cannot sue in his own name to recover damages for the breach of 
 covenants in the deed to liis grantor which do not run with the 
 land, unless the covenants themselves have also been assigned, 
 but the grantor is the proper party ; as, for example, the grantee 
 cannot sue upon a covenant of seisin in the deed to his grantor, 
 in those States where that covenant is regarded as broken immedi- 
 ately, if at all, upon the execution of the deed, and as not running 
 with the land. 2 
 
 § 76. * 138. Suing " to the Use of"' Another. Beneficiaries 
 under Express Trusts. It is no longer, consistently with the 
 provisions of the codes, possible for one person to sue "to the 
 use of " another, as was common in some States. The parties 
 beneficially interested must themselves bring the action.^ There 
 are cases which hold that when there is a trustee of an express, 
 trust, he must bring the action, and that the beneficiary can in 
 no such case sue in his own name, at least alone.* The correct- 
 ness of this ruling may well be doubted. The section relative 
 to the real party in interest is, in all the codes, imperative; 
 
 1 Grain r. Aldrich, 38 Cal. 514; Wig- Relfe, 20 Mo. 45.5; Wilkes v. Morehead, 
 gins V. McDonald, 18 Cal. 126. See, also, Stanton's Code (Ky.), p. 31 (n ) ; Lytle v. 
 Childs (,■. Alexander, 22 S. C. 169; Sin- Lytic, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 127, 128. ' Also, 
 gleton y. O'Blenis, 125 Ind. 151 (partial State v. Johnson, 52 Ind. 197; Shane c. 
 assignee and a.<siguor may join). Qlt was Francis, 30 id. 92. j^HoUister v. Hubbard 
 held in Schilling r. Mullen (1893), 55 (1899), 11 S. D. 461, 78 N. W. 949. An 
 Minn. 122, 56 N. W. .')86, and in Dean v. action for breach of a sheriff's bond, pay- 
 St. Paul, etc. Ry. Co. (1893), .53 Minn. 504, able to the county, must be brought in the 
 55 N. W. 628, that an action to recover a name of the party in interest, and not in 
 duly assigned portion of a demand cannot the name of the county for the use of such 
 be maintained by the assignee where the ))arty. To the same effect is Guernsey v. 
 a.<signor is not made a party, the debtor Tuthill (1900), 12 S. D. 584, 82 N. W. 
 refusing to recognize the assignment. 190. See. however. City of Bethany v. 
 And in Cook v. City of Menasha (1899). Howard (1899), 149 Mo. 504, 51 S. W. 94, 
 103 Wis. 6, 79 N. W. 26, it was held that where the contrary is held in respect to a 
 the plaintiff was not aggrieved by an contractor's bond.j 
 
 order of the court making the a.ssignor a * Reed v. Harris, 7 Robt. 151. A Spe- 
 party. The same court held, in Skobis r. cial Term deci.«ion, and not entitled to much 
 Ferge (1899). 102 Wis. 122, 78 N. W. 426, weight. See Western R. Co. v. Nolan, 48 
 that the assignment by a creditor of a N. Y. 513; Davis v. Erickson, 3 Wash, 
 portion of a claim is not binding on the 654 ; Kelley v. Thuey. 102 Mo. 522 ; Hen- 
 debtor uidcss he consents thereto.] ricus ;•. Englert (N. Y. App. 1893), 33 
 
 2 Elall V. Plaine, 14 Ohio St. 417; N. E. 5.50 (obligees on a bond, who signed 
 Sinker r. Floy.l, 104 Ind. 291. as "agents " of others, are the onlv proper 
 
 3 Weise v. (ierner, 42 Mo. 527 : Hutch- plaintiffs to a suit on the bond, though a 
 ingB V. Weems. 35 Mo. 285; Brady v. different rnle would applv had the instru- 
 Ciiandler, 31 Mo. 28; Van Doren i'. ment not been under seal).
 
 THE UEAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO BE THE PLAINTIFF. 105 
 
 while that in rehition to the trustee of an express trust is 
 permissive. 
 
 § 77. * 139. Actions by Third Persons for whose Benefit Con- 
 tracts have been made. The cases thus far considered in this 
 section are all connected with the assignment of a thing in action 
 by the original creditor, and they involve the question, When 
 may the assignee, under such circumstances, be the party plain- 
 tiff in an action to enforce the assigned demand? The rule of 
 the statute, that every action must be brought in the name of the 
 real party in interest, applies also to numerous cases which have 
 no connection whatever with assignments and assignees; and I 
 propose, in the remainder of this section, to review and examine 
 these other illustrations of the principle. It is now the settled 
 doctrine in so many of the States, that it may be called the 
 American doctrine,^ — although the contrary rule has been estab- 
 lished in England and in some States, and notably in Massachu- 
 setts,^ where it has been very recently reaffirmed with emphasis, 
 — that, where an express promise was made by A. to B., upon a 
 consideration moving from B., whereby the promisor engages to 
 do something for the benefit of C, as, for example, to pay him 
 a sum of money, although C. is both a stranger to the considera- 
 tion and not an immediate party to the contract, yet he may 
 maintain an action upon the promise in his own name against 
 the promisor, without in any manner joining as a party the one 
 to whom the promise was directly made.^ This rule was origi- 
 nally adopted prior to the reformed procedure, and was based 
 partly upon considerations of convenience, and partly upon a 
 liberal construction of the nature of the contract. [The provision 
 
 1 Ileiulrick v. Lindsay, 93 U. S. 143. Iowa, 187; Allen r. Thomas, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 
 For an interesting discussion of the ra- 198; Wiggins i\ McDonald, 18 Cal. 126; 
 tionale. of the doctrine, see an article by Miller v. Florer, 15 Ohio St. 148, 1.51, per 
 Henry O. Taylor, 15 Amer. Law Rev. White J. ; Rogers i'. Gosnell, 58 Mo. 589, 
 231. ' ■ 590 ; 51 Mo. 466 ; Coster v. Mayor of 
 
 2 l^The same doctrine prevails in Con- Albany, 43 N. Y. 399, 411 ; Van Schaick 
 necticut. See Baxter v. Camp (1898), 71 v. Tiiird Avenue R. Co., 38 N. Y. 346^ 
 Conn. 245, 41 Atl. 803, and Morgan v. Ricard i;. Sanderson, 41 N. Y. 179 ; Barker 
 Randolph, etc. Co. (1900), 73 Conn. 396, ,-. Bradley, 42 N. Y. 316,319; Secor v. 
 47 Atl. 658.] Lord, 3 Keyes, 525; Claflin v. O-strom, 54 
 
 3 Kimball V. Noyes, 17 Wis. 695; San- N. Y. 581, 584; Cooley v. Howe Machine 
 ders V. Clason, 13 "Minn. 379; Meyer v. Co., 53 N. Y. 620 ; Glen y. Hope Mnt. Life 
 Lowell, 44 Mo. 328: Cross r. Truesdale, Ins. Co., 56 N. Y. 379, 381; Barlow v. 
 28 Ind. 44; Devol v. McInto.sh, 23 Ind. Meyers, 6 X. Y. Sup. Ct. 183; Johnson 
 529; Day r. Patterson, 18 Ind. 114 : Rice v. Knapp, 36 Iowa, 616; Jordan v. White, 
 V. Savery, 22 Iowa, 470; Scott v. Gill, 19 20 Minn. 91.
 
 106 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 of the codes under review does not place the matter beyond all 
 doubt ; although the person for whose benetit the promise is thus 
 made is certainly the real party in interest.]^ The following are 
 
 1 po late :i.s 1903, tlie Supreme Court 
 of Wisconsin, in the case of Tweeddale v. 
 Tweeildale, inj'ni, declared that '" there is 
 as raucii confusion, prohahly, in the judi- 
 cial holdings in respect to the matter, as 
 on any question of law that can be men- 
 tioned." 
 
 The conflict centres about tlie two req- 
 uisites laid down in tiie leading case of 
 Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. V. 280. These 
 are as follows : there must be, in order to 
 allow suit by a third person on such a 
 contract, ( 1 ) an intention on the part of 
 the promisee to secure some benefit to the. 
 third party, (2) some privity l)etweeu the 
 promisee and the party to be benefited, 
 and some duty or obligation owing from 
 the promisee to the third person which 
 would give the latter a legal or equita'.)le 
 claim to the benefit of the promise. Most 
 of the cases turn on one or the other of 
 these points, and they may l)e grouped 
 accordingly. 
 
 In Morgan u. Randolph, etc. Co. (1900), 
 73 Conn. 396, 47 Atl. 6.58, the defendant 
 purchased the property of a ])artnership, 
 and in part consideration agreed to pay 
 the partnersiiip deltts. Held tiiat the 
 intention was primarily to secure a benefit 
 to the partnersiiip and not to the creditors, 
 hence the latter could not recover on the 
 agreement. This is an extreme case, and 
 the court itself admits that it is out of 
 accord with the current of American 
 authority. 
 
 There are numerous cases of actions 
 by materialmen and laborers upon con- 
 tractors' bonds, which have usually turned 
 upon the question of intention. Such a 
 case was Parker v. Jeffery (1894), 26 Ore. 
 186, 37 Pac. 712, where the court held 
 that to entitle a third person to recover 
 upon a contract made Initween other 
 persona, tiiere must not only be an intent 
 to secure some benefit to such third person, 
 but the contract must have been made and 
 entered into directly and primarily for 
 his l>enefit. The same rule was adopted 
 in Montgomery v. Uief (1897), 15 Utali 
 495, 50 I'ac. 623; Brower Lumber Co. i-. 
 Mill.;r (1896), 28 Ore. 565, 43 Pac. 659; 
 
 Howsmon i-. Trenton Water Co. (1893), 
 119 Mo. 304, 24 S. W. 784, Jefferson v. 
 Asch (1893), 53 Minn. 446, 55 N. VV. 604. 
 
 The construction of tliese contractors' 
 bonds, as indicative of intention, has niveii 
 rise to some ditticulty. In Pickle Marble 
 & Granite Co. v. McClay (1898), 54 Neb. 
 661, 74 N. W. 1062, the bond provided 
 that the contractor should provide ail the 
 labor and materials necessary for the con- 
 struction of the building, and that tiiere 
 should not be any lawful claims against 
 him for labor and materials. Tliis w;is 
 held to be a bond for tiie benefit of the 
 materialmen and lal)orers. The same 
 l)ond was similarly construed in Korsmeyer 
 etc. Co. V. McClay (1895), 43 Neb. 649, 62 
 N. W. 50, and in Pioneer, etc. Co. v. McClay 
 (1898), 54 Neb. 663, 74 N. W. 1063. 
 Similar bonds were construed in Doll v. 
 Crume (1894), 41 Neb. 655. 59 N. W. 806; 
 Kaufmann c. Cooper (1896), 46 Neb. 644. 
 65 N. W. 796; Hohman i\ Gniser (1898), 
 53 Neb. 474, 73 N. W. 923 ; and Spokane 
 & Idaho Lumber Co. v. Boyd (1902), 28 
 Wash. 90, 68 Pac. 337, and in each case 
 held to have been executed for the bene- 
 fit of materialmen and laborers. In 
 McDonald ;;. Davey (1900), 22 Wash. 366, 
 60 Pac. 1116, a bond conditioned that the 
 lessee of a mine should pay all debts con- 
 tracted for labor and materials used in 
 and about the mine, was hehl to be a 
 bond for the benefit of the laborers, over- 
 ruling the case of Sears)'. Williams (1894), 
 9 Wash. 428, 37 Pac. 665, in which the 
 court had criticised the Nebraska cases. 
 Even a covenant that the contractor would 
 file with the board of public works receipts 
 of claims from all parties furnishing ma- 
 terials and labor, was held to be a cove- 
 nant for the benefit of materialmen, in 
 Lyman !•. City of Lincoln (1894), 38 Neb. 
 794, 57 N. W". 531. 
 
 On the other hand, in Greenfield Lum- 
 ber Co. V. Parker (1902), 1.59 Ind. 571, 
 65 N. E. 747, where one contracted with 
 a township to build a school house and 
 gave a bond conditioned that he woiihi 
 provide the labor and material at his own 
 cost, and that the township should not be
 
 THE KEAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO BE THE I'LAINTIFF. 
 
 107 
 
 some examples and illustrations of this rule: Where a part- 
 nership assigns its assets, and, in consideration thereof, the 
 
 answerable therefor, it was held that this 
 was not a covenant for tlie benefit of the 
 luaterialmeu. See also Reynolds v. Louis- 
 ville, etc. R. H. Co. (1895), 143 Ind. 579, 
 40 N. E. 410. So in Parker v. Jeffery 
 (supra) a coveaaut by the contractor to 
 pay all sums of money due for material 
 and labor, was held not to be a covenant 
 for the benefit of the laborers and material- 
 men. Same holding in Brcjwer Lumber 
 Co. V. Miller {sujun), and in Jefferson v. 
 Asch {snpra). See also Fidelity & Deposit 
 Co. V. Parkinson (1903), — Neb. — , 94 
 N. W. 120. 
 
 In State v. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. (1894), 
 125 Mo. 596, 28 S. W. 1074, it was held 
 that where a railroad company covenants 
 to pay the debts of another company, the 
 creditors of the latter may sue on the 
 covenant, but where the agreement is 
 merely to " save harmless " another against 
 the claims of third persons, the latter can- 
 not sue on the agreement, as it is not 
 made for their benefit. 
 
 The Iowa cases on this point are based 
 upon a statute, and hence are not of gen- 
 eral authority. See (jreeu Bay Lumber 
 Co. V. School Dist. (1902), — la. — ,; 
 90 N W. 504, citing the earlier Iowa 
 decisions. 
 
 Upon the question whether privity be- 
 tween the promisee and a third person, or 
 some duty or obligation owing from the 
 former to the latter, is necessary to support 
 an action by such third person, there is 
 wide divergence of judicial opinion. The 
 New York cases have continued to adhere 
 to Vrooman r. Turner. See Townsend v. 
 Rackham (1894), 143 N. Y. 516, 38 N. E. 
 731. In the more recent case of Bu- 
 chanan V. Tilden (1899), 158 N. Y. 109, 52 
 N. E. 724, the duty owing from the prom- 
 isee to the third person was largely a 
 moral one, but was held sufficient. The 
 promise was made to a husband by another 
 for the benefit of his wife, and this rela- 
 tion, taken in connection with the peculiar 
 equities of the case, was held to he a suf- 
 ficient consideration to support a promise 
 in favor of his wife. The court is careful 
 to state that the case is decided upon its 
 peculiar facts. i 
 
 The New York doctrine is followed in 
 Jefferson v. Asch (1893), 53 Minn. 446,55 
 N. VV. 604; Union Storage Co. v. Mc- 
 Dermott (1893), .53 Minn. 407, 55 N. W. 
 606 ; School District ex rel. v. Livers 
 (1899), 147 Mo. 580,49 S. W. 507; Mc- 
 Donald V. American Nat. Bank (1901), 25 
 Mont. 456, 65 Pac. 896. In Howsmon v. 
 Trenton Water Co. (1893), 119 Mo. 304, 
 
 24 S. W. 784, and Kansas City Sewer 
 Pipe Co. y.Thomp.son (1893), 120 Mo. 218, 
 
 25 S. W. 522, the court held that inasmuch 
 as there was no liability of the promisee 
 to the third person, no recovery could be 
 had against the promisor. 
 
 In the following cases the promisee 
 was under contractual obligation to the 
 third party, and the promisor, for a con- 
 sideration, assumed the debt. In each 
 case a recovery was allowed. Barnett v. 
 Pratt (1893), 37 Neb. 349, 55 N. W. 1050 ; 
 Lovejoy v. Howe (1893), 55 Minn. 353, 57 
 N. W. 57; Meyer v. Shamp (1897), 51 
 Neb. 424, 71 N. W. 57 ; Porter v. Woods 
 (1896), 138 Mo. .539, 39 S. W. 794 ; Maxcy 
 V. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. (1893), 
 
 54 Minn. 272, 55 N. W. 1130; Barnes v. 
 Hekla Fire Ins. Co. (1893), 56 Minn 38, 
 57 N. W. 314; Dickinson Co. v. Fitter- 
 ling (1898), 72 Minn. 483, 75 N. W. 731 ; 
 Feidman v. McGuire (1899), 34 Ore. 309, 
 
 55 Pac. 872; Hawley v. Bank (1896), 97 
 la. 187. 66 N. W: 152. 
 
 In a number of States, however, the 
 limitations of the New York doctrine have 
 been abandoned, and neither privity nor 
 duty, as between the promisee and the 
 third person is required to support a suit 
 by the latter. Thus in Ferris v. Am. 
 Brewing Co. (1900), 155 Ind. 539, 58 
 N. E. 701, a lease was executed by a lessee 
 whereby he covenanted to sell no beer 
 upon the leased premises except that 
 manufactured by the plaintiff, and the 
 plaintiff was allowed to enforce this cove- 
 nant by injunction against the lessee. 
 
 As stated in the text, one of the most 
 striking instances of the application of 
 this liberal view appears in the case of the 
 assumption, on the part of a grantee of 
 land, of a mortgage debt. It is held in a 
 number of States that an action will lie
 
 108 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 purchaser agrees with the members to pay all the firm debts, 
 any creditor of the partnership may sue him upon this under- 
 
 under such circumstances liy the mort- 
 gagee against the grautee, even though 
 the in)niediate grantor is not personally 
 liable therefor. Hare v. Murphy (1895), 
 45 Neb. 809, 64 N. W. 211 ; McKay i\ 
 Ward (1899), 20 Utah, 149, 57 Pac. 1024; 
 Euos V. Sanger (1897), 96 Wis. 150, 70 
 N. W. 1069. In Hicks v. Hamilton (1898), 
 144 Mo. 495, 46 S. W. 432, the Supreme 
 Court of Missouri held that such an action 
 could not be maintained by the mortgagee, 
 in the absence of a liability on the part of 
 the immediate grantor. But two years 
 later, in Crone v. Stinde (1900), 156 Mo. 
 262, 55 S. W. 863, the Hicks case was ex- 
 pressly overruled, and it was held that the 
 liability of the grantor for the debt was 
 not a condition precedent to the right of 
 the mortgagee to sue the grantee. In 
 Starbird v. Cranston (1897), 24 Colo. 20, 
 48 Pac. 650, the mortgagee was allowed 
 to sue the grantee, but it does not appear 
 whether or not the grantor was liable for 
 the debt. i)u the contrary, the Supreme 
 Court of Minnesota, in Brown v. Stillman, 
 43 .Minn. 126, 45 N. W. 2, has refused to 
 allow such an action except where tlie 
 grantor was liable. 
 
 An action by the mortgagee against 
 the grantee, at least under the rule of 
 Brown v. Stillmau {supra), is expressly 
 provided for by statute in Connecticut. 
 Gen. St. 1902, § 587. 
 
 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
 seems to have gone to the extreme limit 
 of liberality in permitting third parties to 
 sue, as appears in two very recent cases. 
 In Ktsclieid v. liaker (1901), 112 Wis. 129, 
 83 N. W. 52, the parents of defendant's 
 wife conveyed a farm to iiim for a recited 
 consideration of -$5,000, and lie gave back 
 a mortgage securing a bond running to 
 them in tliat amount, conditioned on his 
 paying to them .§4,000, in designateil in- 
 stalments, and the remaining Si, 000 to 
 their daughter fdefendant's sister-in-law) 
 within on«* year after the decease of both 
 of the obligees. Tiie daughter's adminis- 
 tratijf brougiit an action on the b(jnd more 
 than a year after the decea.se of both the 
 parents, and was allowed to recover, al- 
 tbougii the last surviving obligee had 
 
 executed a receipt in full satisfaction of 
 the mortgage and l>ond, and had dis- 
 charged the mortgage of record, the 
 court calling attention to the fact that 
 the daughter had known of the provision 
 of the bond and liad assented thereto. lu 
 Tweeddale v. Tweeddale (1903), — Wi.s. 
 — , 93 N. W. 440, the court went still 
 farther. The facts in this case, so far as 
 they concern tliis question, were almost 
 identical with those in Etscheid r. Baker, 
 except that the beneficiary, who was the 
 brother of the defendant, knew nothing 
 about the provision for his benefit until 
 after the discharge of the mortgage by 
 his mother, who was the mortgagee and 
 obligee of the bond. But the court held 
 that this made no difference, and said : 
 " Without further discussion of the matter 
 we adhere to the doctrine that where one 
 person, for a consideration moving to him 
 from another, promises to pay to a third 
 person a sum of money, the law immedi- 
 ately operates upon the acts of the parties, 
 establishing the essential of privity be- 
 tween the promisor and the third person 
 requisite to binding contractual relations 
 between them, resulting in the immediate 
 establishment of a new relation of debtor 
 and creditor, regardless of the relations of 
 the third person to the immediate prom- 
 isee in the transaction ; that the liability 
 is as binding between the promisor and the 
 third person as it would be if the considera- 
 tion for the promise moved from the latter 
 to the former, and such promisor made 
 the promise directly to the third person, 
 regardless of whether the latter has any 
 knowledge of the transaction at tiie time 
 of its occurrence ; that the liability being 
 once created by the acts of the immediate 
 parties to the transaction and the opera- 
 tion of the law thereon, neither one nor 
 both of sucli parties can thereafter change 
 the situation as reg.ards tiie third person 
 without his consent." 
 
 It is true that three months prior to 
 the decision in the Tweeddale case, the 
 same court, in Rowe v. Moon (1902), 115 
 Wis. 566, 92 N. W. 263, in refusing to 
 accept the rule laid down in the New York 
 case of V'rooman r. Turner, stated that, to
 
 THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO BE THE PLAINTIFF. 
 
 109 
 
 taking, and recover the amount of the indebtedness due to the 
 phiintiff thus suing, ^ and may even sue him and the sureties wlio 
 united with him in his undertaking to the assigning parties ;2 
 and where man}' subscribers contributed different sums of money 
 to the defendant for a specified purpose, and he entered into 
 a written contract with three persons, whereby, among other 
 things, he promised to repay the sums so loaned, it was held 
 that any subscriber might sue on the agreement to recover the 
 amount which he advanced,^ and where B. placed a sum of 
 money in the hands of A., which the latter promised to pay over 
 to C, C. may prosecute an action against A. on his promise.^ 
 Where the defendant was indebted to B., who was in turn 
 indebted to C. in a less amount, and the two former parties 
 agreed that defendant should pay to C. the amount of the latter's 
 demand, which should be 2Jro tanto a payment on his own debt to 
 B., C was permitted to recover on this promise.^ If in a policy 
 of insurance it is stipulated that the loss, if any, shall be paid to 
 
 «nable a third person to enforce a con- 
 tract, there must be both "an intent on 
 the part of the promisor [should read 
 promisee] to benefit him, and some duty 
 or obligation to carry out such promise." 
 If tliis means an obligation other than 
 that arising from the promise itself, it is 
 inconsistent with the later case of Tweed- 
 dale V. Tweeddale, and must be deemed 
 overruled by the latter. 
 
 Utah, also, seems committed to this 
 liberal doctrine. In Brown v. Markland 
 (1898), 16 Utah, 360, 52 Pac. 597, the 
 ■court said ; " Where a promise or con- 
 tract has been made between two parties 
 for the benefit of a third, an action will 
 lie thereon at the instance and in the 
 name of the party to be benefited, although 
 the promise or contract was made without 
 his knowledge, and without any considera- 
 tion moving from him." 
 
 Kentucky, also, has approved a liberal 
 interpretation of the statute. In Blakeley 
 V. Adams (1902), — Ky. — , 68 S. W. 39.3, 
 it was held that a deed conveying land, 
 which provides that a certain surety of the 
 grantee shall have a lien on the land to 
 indemnify him, creates a lien in favor of 
 the surety, which may be enforced by 
 him, though he is a stranger to the deed. 
 This is a curious case, and it does not 
 
 clearly appear how the doctrine of an 
 action by a third party applies. But tlie 
 court considered it and decided it on that 
 basis, and in the course of the opinion 
 said: "The generally recognized doctrine 
 in American courts is that a tliird party, 
 for whose benefit a contract was made 
 between others, may maintain an action 
 on the contract against the promisor. 
 And in no State has this doctrine been 
 carried farther than in Kentucky." 
 
 The rule stated in the Tweeddale ca.se 
 {supra), is provided against by statute in 
 some States. See McArthur v. Drydea 
 (1897), 6 N. D. 438, 71 N. W. 125, w'hich 
 construes the statute of that State, Kev. 
 Codes, § 3840, declaring that " a contract 
 made expressly for the l)enefit of a third 
 person may be enforced liy him at any time 
 before the parties thereto rescind it.''] 
 
 ' Sanders v. Clason, 13 Minn. 379 ; 
 Meyer v. Lowell, 44 Mo. 328, and cases 
 cited; Barlow i;. Myers, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 183; 64 N Y. 41. 
 
 - Kimball v. Noyes, 17 Wis. 695 ; Devol 
 V. Mcintosh, 23 Ind. 525 ; Claflin v. Os- 
 trom, 54 N. Y. 581, 584. 
 
 ■^ Kice V. Savery, 22 Iowa, 470, 477. 
 Dillon J. speaks of the rule as well settled. 
 
 ^ Allen r. Thomas, 3 Mete. (Ky ) 198. 
 
 s Wiggins V. McDonald, 18 Cal. 126.
 
 110 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 a person named, not the assured, such person may sue in his own 
 name on the policy.^ B. sold and delivered goods to A., and in 
 consideration thereof A. promised to pay a certain sum to C, 
 which was, in fact, the amount of a debt due from B. to C. ; it 
 was lield that C. could recover upon the promise so made by A. 
 in his behalf. 2 Perhaps the most striking illustration of this 
 doctrine, and of the extent to which it has been carried, is found 
 in a class of cases where, upon a conveyance of land, the grantee 
 assumes and promises to pay a debt which is secured by mortgage 
 on the land so conveyed. If the grantee of land encumbered by 
 a mortgage assumes the mortgage debt by a clause in his deed, 
 and promises to pay the same, the creditor-mortgagee may main- 
 tain an action against this grantee upon the bond or other evi- 
 dence of the indebtedness, and recover the amount thereof, and 
 is not restricted to the remedy by foreclosure of the mortgage ; ^ 
 and the creditor may thus sue the grantee upon the bond, even 
 though that instrument had expressly provided that the mort- 
 gagee should first have recourse on the land, and the obligor 
 should only be liable for the deficiency which might arise after 
 the foreclosure; this stipulation, it was held, protected the 
 obligor personally, and could not })e taken advantage of by the 
 grantee who had promised to pay the debt.* The result of these 
 and other decisions is, that the third person, for whose benefit an 
 undertaking is entered into between other parties, may sue upon 
 it, although such undertaking is an instrument in writing and 
 under seal.^ This doctrine is plainly a departure from the tech- 
 
 1 Cone V. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 3 N. Y. see Sacramento Lumber Co. v. Wagner, 
 Sup. Ct. 33, 39, 60 N. Y. G19 (lo.s.s made 67 Cal. 293. 
 
 payable to an encumbrancer of the jirop- ^ Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 ; Burr 
 
 erty in.sured ; encumbrancer can sue alone, v. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178; Brewer v. Maurer, 
 
 even thougli his debt lias been fully paid, 38 Ohio St. 550; Pope r. Porter, 33 Fed. 
 
 so tliat he will hold the amouut recovered Rep. 7 ; Stevens r. F]anna_u;an (Ind. 1892), 
 
 as a tru.-<tee for the owner ; to the same 30 N. E. 898 ; and see the subject fully 
 
 effect, Bartlett v. Iowa State Ins. Co., 77 discussed in 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 1206- 
 
 lowa, 80; Newman v. Sjtringfield Ins. 1208, and notes. [See also note 1, p. 106, 
 
 Co., 17 Minn. 123, 126; (^Phccnix Ins. su/irn.] 
 
 Co. V. Omaha Loan & Trust Co. (1894), * Thorp v. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N. Y. 
 
 41 Neb. 834, 60 N. W. 1.33. On the con- 2.53. 
 
 trary, in Williamson v. Michiiran Fire & '' Coster v. Mayor of Albany, 43 N. Y. 
 
 Marine Ins. Co. (1893), 86 Wis. 393, 57 399,411; Van Schaick r. Third Avenue 
 
 N. W. 46, it was held that the action must R. R., 38 N. Y. 346 ; Ricard v. Sanderson, 
 
 be broujjht in the name of the assured, 41 N. Y. 179; Lawrence i'. Fox, 20 N. Y. 
 
 though the mortgagee, to whom the loss 268; Burr r. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178; Thorp 
 
 was payable, might be joined.] v. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N. Y. 253 ; Kim- 
 
 2 Hall (•. Roberts, 61 Barb. 33; and ball v. Noyes, 17 Wis. 695; Devol v.
 
 THE KEAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO BE THE PLAINTIFF. 
 
 Ill 
 
 nical notions of the common law, which did not permit a person 
 to sue upon a contract unless he was a party to it, or unless the 
 consideration moved from him, and wliicli especially forbade an 
 action upon a sealed undertaking by a stranger. The courts of 
 some States adhere strictly to this old notion, and utterly repu- 
 diate the innovation.^ The new rule, however, is as convenient 
 as it is just. The objections to it are every way technical and 
 arbitrary, — a repetition of verbal formulas without any convinc- 
 ing reasons. It certainly avoids a circuity of actions, and it 
 enables the only person beneficially interested in the promise — 
 the real party in interest — to come into court in the first instance 
 and establish his rights, without being driven to enforce them in 
 a roundabout manner through the intervention of a third person, 
 who, if successful, must account to him for the proceeds of the 
 litigation. The true extent and application of the doctrine, and 
 the proper limitations upon it, have been discussed and fixed by 
 the New York Court of Appeals in very recent cases. ^ 
 
 Mclntoph, 23 Ind. 529 ; Barker v. Brad- 
 ley, 42 N. Y. 316, 319; Secor v. Lord, 3 
 Keyes, 525; Claflin v. Ostrom, 54 N. Y. 
 581, 584; Glen v. Hope Mut. L. Ins. Co., 
 56 N. Y. 379, 381 ; McDowell v. Law, 35 
 Wis. 171. The principle applies to con- 
 tracts nnder seal : Em mitt u. Brophy, 42 
 Ohio St. 82 ; co)itra, Woodbury Sav. Bk. 
 V. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 29 Conn. 374. 
 
 1 Exchange Bank v. Rice, 107 Mass. 
 37, per Gray J. 
 
 2 Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233, 240, 
 per Kapallo J. ; Merrill v. Green, 55 N. Y. 
 270, 273; Turk v. Ridge, 41 N. Y. 201, 
 206. See also Hinman v. Bowen, 5 N. Y. 
 Sup. Ct. 234, which holds that a defence, 
 good as against the immediate promisee, 
 is also available against the beneficiary, 
 (s. c. 3 Hun, 192.) Phillips v. Van Schaick, 
 37 Iowa, 229. See also Green v. Richard- 
 son, 4 Colo. 584 ; McKinnon v. McKinnon, 
 81 N. C. 201 ; Cone v. Niagara Ins. Co., 
 60 N. Y. 619; Barlow v. Meyers, 64 id. 
 41 ; Arnold v. Nichols, 64 id. 117 ; Simson 
 V. Brown, 68 id. 355 ; Lake Ontario Shore 
 R. Co. V. Curtiss, 80 id. 219; Dunning v. 
 Leavitt, 85 id. 301 ; Root v. Wright, 84 
 id. 72, 74, 75 ; Pardee r. Treat, 82 id. 385 ; 
 Vroomau r. Turner, 69 id. 280; Rowe v. 
 Parsons, 6 Hun, 338; Bean v. Edge, 84 
 N. Y. 514; Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181, 
 
 194; Wheat v. Rice, 97 N. Y. 296; Sew- 
 ard V. Huntington, 94 N. Y. 116; Litch- 
 field V. Flint, 104 N. Y. 543 ; Vilas v. Page, 
 106 N. Y. 439; Berry v. Brown, 107 N. Y. 
 659; St. Mark's Church v. Teed, 120 
 N. Y. 583; Lorillard v. Clyde, 122 N. Y. 
 498. The principal limitations upon the 
 doctrine, as determined by the New York 
 cases, may be stated as follows. In order 
 that the third person may sue upon the 
 promise, it must be designed to be pri- 
 marily for his benefit, and not primarily 
 for the exoneration of the promisee. Ar- 
 nold V. Nichols, 64 N. Y. 117. There must 
 have been some obligation or duty owing 
 from the promisee to the third person 
 which would give the third per.son a legal 
 or equitable claim to the benefit of the 
 promise, or an equivalent from him per- 
 sonally ; a mere stranger to the contract 
 cannot sue. Simpson v. Brown, 68 N. Y. 
 355 ; Vroomau v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280 ; 
 Litchfield v. Flint, 104 N. Y. 543; Loril- 
 lard V. Clyde, 122 N. Y. 498; Pulver i: 
 Skinner, 42 Hun, 322 ; Duruherr v. Rau 
 (N. Y.), 32 N. E. 491. While it is im- 
 material whether or not the third person 
 is designated by name (Simson i'. Brown, 
 68 N. Y. 355), it is necessary that he be 
 so indicated tliat he may be ascertained. 
 Wlieat ;-. Rice, 97 N. Y. 296 (creditors
 
 112 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 78. *140. Commercial Paper. Action by Legal Promisee. 
 Upon the same principle, the equitoble owner of a promissory 
 note is the real party in interest within the statute, and is the 
 proper person to sue upon it, although there may be no indorse- 
 ment, and possession of tlie instrument is prima facie evidence of 
 
 of a firm have no legal interest in a con- 
 tract with the firm hv which the promisor 
 agrees to pay a specified portion of the 
 firm's debts, as it rests entirely with the 
 promisor to designate what creditors shall 
 have the benefit of the promise) ; see also 
 Edick V. Green, 38 Hun, 202; Weller v- 
 Goble, 66 Iowa, 113. Some acceptance of 
 the promise by the creditor, by word or 
 act, must be shown. Wlieat v. Kice, 97 
 N. Y. 296. On the other liand, the rule 
 as stated in more general terms seems 
 to be recognized in Todd u: Weber, 95 
 N. Y. 181 (the j)romise of the father of 
 a bastard child, made to certain persons, 
 ou consideration that these persons pro- 
 vide for tlie child's education and support, 
 to " make it up to them " in his will, may 
 be sued upon by the child, as being the 
 party beneficially interested). See also 
 vSt. Mark's Church v. Teed, 120 N. Y. 583. 
 Tlie question of the acceptance of the 
 promise by C, the third person, has been 
 much discussed iu Indiana. Until accepted 
 by C, the contract may, of course, be re- 
 scinded by A. and B. Davis ?;. Calloway, 
 30 Ind. 112. But where the obligation or 
 sum is specific, and is due at a known or 
 certain time, a demand by C. is not neces- 
 sary before suit. Rodenbarger r. Bram- 
 blett, 78 Ind. 213; distinguishing Durham 
 V. Bischof, 47 Ind. 211 (wliere A. had made 
 no absolute and specific promise, being 
 assignee of a stock of goods under an 
 agreement "to compromise or otherwise 
 to settle all debts owing by the assignors," 
 it is manifestly just and proper tliat a ile- 
 niand by C., a creditor, should be required 
 before suit). Bringing the action by C. 
 is usually sufficient evidence of his ac- 
 ceptance of the contract ; no averment 
 of acceptance is necessary. Carnahau i'. 
 Tousey, 93 Ind. 561, Elliott J. dis.senting; 
 Kisk V. Hoffman, 69 Ind. 137. Many ca.ses, 
 in addition to those cite<l from New York, 
 bold tiiat the promise must have been in- 
 tended to be primarily for C.'s benefit, in 
 enter that he may sue ui)on it. See Dun- 
 
 dee Mortgage, etc. ('o. i\ Hughes, 20 Fed. 
 Hep. 39; Burton v. Larkin, 36 Ivans. 246; 
 Johnson r. Bamberger (Ark. 1892), 19 
 S. W. 920 (agreement among creditors 
 not to sue debtor without concurrence of 
 a majority of the creditors is not intended 
 for his benefit) ; Civil Code of California, 
 § 1559; Chung Kee v. Davidson, 73 Cal. 
 522 : " It must appear from the direct 
 terms of the contract that it was made 
 for the benefit of third parties. It can- 
 not be implied from the fact that the 
 contract would, if carried out between 
 the parties to it, operate incidentally to 
 their benefit." P'or further ilhistratious, 
 see Waltz v. Waltz, 84 Ind. 403 (contract 
 for benefit of promisee's heirs) ; Western 
 Development Co. v. Emery, 61 Cal. 611 
 (contract of subscrijjtion) ; Baker v. 
 Bryan, 64 Iowa, 561 ; Jordan v. Kava- 
 naugh, 63 Iowa, 152. Promisor assumes 
 promisee's debts, and creditors of the lat- 
 ter sue. Stariha v. Greenwood, 28 Minn. 
 521 ; Ellis v. Harrison, 104 Mo. 270; 
 Knott V. Dubuque & S. C. R. Co. (Iowa, 
 1892), 51 N. W. 57; compare Anderson 
 V. P'itzgerald, 21 Fed. Rep. 294. Persons 
 whose property iu a city was destroyed 
 by fire were allowed to sue a water com- 
 j)any for breach of its contract to supply 
 the city with water, in Paducah Lumber 
 Co. V. Paducah Water Supply Co., 89 Ky. 
 340 ; contra, Davis v. Clinton Water Works, 
 54 Iowa, 59 ; Ferris v. Carson Water Co , 
 16 Nev. 44 ; s. c. 40 Am. Rep. 485. The 
 principle under discussion was stated 
 without any limitation in Hecht i\ Caugh- 
 ron, 46 Ark. 132 ; Chamblee v. McKenzie, 
 31 Ark. 155; Talbot v. Wilkins, 31 Ark. 
 411; Green r. Morrison, 5 Colo. 1 8 ; Lehow 
 r. Simonton, 3 Colo. 346; Dodge's Adm. 
 r. Muss, 82 Ky. 441 ; Kaufman v. U. S. 
 Nat. Bk., 31 Neb. 661 ; Shainp v. Meyer, 
 20 Neb. 223; Miliani v. Tognini, 19 Nev. 
 133; Schneider r. White, 12 Or. 503; B.as- 
 .sett i: Hughe.s, 43 Wis. 319. [See note 1, 
 J). 106, supra.]
 
 THE EEAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO BE THE PLAINTIFF. 113 
 
 such ownership.^ In fact, wherever the spirit of the reformed 
 system is carried out, — and tliis is now very generally, if not 
 universally, the case, — the equity rule as to parties is freely 
 applied to all legal actions, and this one principle will easily 
 solve aU particular cases of difficulty or doubt.^ But, as has 
 been shown in preceding paragraphs, the law as to commercial 
 paper has not been changed in several of the States by this pro- 
 vision of the statute in reference to the parties plaintiff ; and in 
 those States, therefore, the indorsee, and, a fortiori, the payee of 
 a negotiable note or bill may maintain an action upon it, even 
 though there may be relations between himself and third persons 
 which give them a right of action over against him for the pro- 
 ceeds. As, for example, if A., having in his hands money be- 
 longing to B., should loan it, and take a note from the borrower 
 payable to himself, he could sue upon it ; however much B. might 
 have been interested in the original money, and however valid a 
 demand he may have against A., he is not a party to the note nor 
 the holder of it.^ In the class of cases already mentioned, where 
 an express contract is made with one for the benefit of another, 
 and the person thus beneficially interested is permitted to sue in 
 his own name, the one to whom the promise was expressly given 
 may, in general, also maintain an action.^ The promise being 
 actually made to him, and the consideration moving from him, he 
 is legally/ the contracting party, and is clothed with the legal 
 right; indeed, he falls under the definition of trustee of an ex- 
 press trust given in another section of the codes.^ 
 
 1 Garner ?■. Cook, 30 Ind. 331 ; Comp- against the purcliaser for the value of the 
 
 ton r. Davidson, 31 Ind. 62. In the latter property.] 
 
 case, the answer denied that the plaintiff ^ See Kice v. Savery, 22 lovt^a, 470, 
 
 was "the legal owner of the note in 477; Cottle i'. Cole, 20 Iowa, 481,485. In 
 
 suit." This was held no defence, as it the former of these cases Dillon J. said : 
 
 was sufficient if he was the equitable " If the promise is made for the benefit of 
 
 owner. another, who is the real jiarty in interest, 
 
 '^ Conyngham v. Smith, IG Iowa, 471 ; the latter may sue, though the contract 
 
 Tate y. Ohio & Miss. K. Co., 10 Ind. 174; was made to an agent or trustee; or 
 
 Swift V. Ellsworth, 10 Ind. 20.5. the agent or trustee, or person in whose 
 
 8 Robbins v. Cheek, 32 Ind. 328 ; Rob- name a contract is made for the beue- 
 
 bins V. Dishon, 19 Ind. 20.5. fit of another, may sue without joining the 
 
 * fHeld in Dorr Cattle Co. v. Jewett party for wliose benefit the suit is prose- 
 <1902), 116 la. 93, 89 N. W. 109, that one cuted." This subject is treated at large 
 who sells property to another under an in a subsequent section. See also Tinkler 
 ngreement that its value shall be credited v. Swaynie, 71 Ind. .562 ; Ward v. Cow- 
 on the note of a third person, may, drey, 5 N. Y. S. 282, affirmed 119 N. Y. 
 on failure of the purcliaser to make 614; and Albere r. Kingsland, 13 N. Y. S. 
 the credit as agreed, maintain an action 794; Lev v. Miller, 28 Neb. 822.
 
 114 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 ^ 79. * 141. Instances of Real Party in Interest. Actions on 
 Bonds. Actions by Principals and Agents, etc. The following are 
 additional examples of actions maintained by the real party in 
 interest, and in which the equity doctrine on this subject has 
 been freely applied, although the rights to be protected and the 
 remedies to be obtained ■were legal. After a judgment had been 
 obtiiined in an action of ejectment prosecuted according to the 
 old form b}- John Doe as the fictitious plaintiff, the succeeding 
 action to recover the mesne profits of the land should be brought 
 in the name of the actual owner of the fee, — the lessors of the 
 plaintiff in the ejectment, — they being the real parties in interest.^ 
 An undertaking given to the sheriff by the defendant in an action 
 for the recovery of chattels, in order to procure a return of the 
 goods, should be prosecuted by the plaintiff in that action, since 
 he is the real party in interest ;2 and it is said to be a general 
 rule in Iowa that when a bond or undertaking is- given to an 
 ofl&cer, in the course of some judicial proceeding, for the security 
 of any particular person, such person may sue upon it in his own 
 name without the formality of an assignment.^ If a levy by virtue 
 of an execution is made upon chattels by a deputy sheriff, and the 
 goods are wrongfully taken from his possession, an action against 
 the wrong-doer should be brought by the sheriff ; he is the real 
 party in interest, since the deputy sheriff acted simply as his 
 agent.'* An injunction bond having been given to two obligees, 
 defendants in the action, one of thera only w^as injuriously affected 
 by the injunction and suffered any damage therefrom ; he alone, 
 it was held, could maintain an action on the undertaking, as he 
 was the only party in interest, and a suit in the names of both 
 united as plaintiffs was declared to be improperly brought under 
 the code.^ A plaintiff in a pending suit having moved for the 
 
 1 Mastertoii v. Hagan, 17 B. Mon. 325. 3 Moormiui r. Collier, 32 Iowa, 138. 
 
 It must be understood that tlie new sys- * Terwilliger *•. Wheeler, 35 Barb. 620. 
 
 tern had gone into effect after the com- ^ Siunniers c. Parish, 10 Cal. 347. 
 
 mencement of the ejectment, and before QA contrary conclusion was readied by 
 
 that of tlie second action for mesne profits, the Supreme Conrt of Montana in Mon- 
 
 - McBetii V. Van Sickle, 6 Nev. 134. tana Mining Co. r. St. Louis Co. (1897), 19 
 
 See also, a.s to actions on ntlfichment honds, Mont. 313, 48 I'ac. 305, where it was hfld 
 
 National Park Bank y. Goddard, 131 N. V. that in an action on an injunction bond. 
 
 494 (the person at whose instance an all of the obligees are nece.ssary parties to 
 
 oflRcfT levies an attachment is the proper the action, and the fact that .some of tlie 
 
 plaintiff) ; Munzesheimer i'. BjTue (Ark., obligees have no interest in tlie subject of 
 
 1892), 19 .'<. W. 320 (action on attachment the suit, does not change thf rule. The 
 
 bond for witness fees). court said, " But, sav counsel, the code
 
 THE REAL I'AKTY IN INTEREST TO BE THE I'LAINTIFF. 
 
 n, 
 
 appointment of a receiver, the application was denied on condition 
 that the defendant give a bond or undertaking to account liiniself 
 as though he \A^ere a receiver for all assets which might come into 
 his hands, and in pursuance of tins order he gave a bond in form 
 running to the State ; the plaintiff having recovered judgment, 
 and the defendant failing to account, the action on tlie under- 
 taking was propeily brought at once by the plaintiff in his own 
 name, without any assignment to him by the State. ^ A person, 
 in whose name a business was secretly carried on by the defend- 
 ant and others in order to conceal their property and interest from 
 their creditors, was permitted to recover the value of assets re- 
 ceived in the course of the business, which had been taken by the 
 defendant and converted to his own use.^ Where several persons 
 were owners of a chattel, but for purposes of convenience the title 
 stood in the name of one of them alone, and he executed a bill of 
 sale of it in his own name to a purchaser who supposed that his 
 immediate vendor was solely interested, it was held that all the 
 owners might join as plaintiffs to recover the price ; they were 
 the real parties in interest under the provision of the code.^ 
 This case is a particular instance of a general rule. It is now 
 
 provision that the suit shall be brought 
 in the name of the real party in interest 
 has changed the common-law rule, and 
 any party shown to have no interest in 
 a recovery sought would be improperly 
 joined. This is true ; but, considering 
 what we have said, is the argument cor- 
 rectly invoked in this instance ? The ac- 
 tion sho\ild be brought in the name of the 
 real party in interest, but as the bond, on 
 its face, declared them to be the real 
 ])arties in interest, in order to ascertain 
 the truth of the matter alleged, that one 
 obligee alone was damaged, it was neces- 
 sary to join all the obligees as plaintiffs, 
 or make them defendants " Iti support 
 of the text: Pilger r. Harder (1898), 55 
 Xeb. 113, 75 N. W. 559, where the action 
 was on a replevin bond. 
 
 In Gyger v. Tourtnev (1900), 59 Neb. 
 555. 81 N. W. 437, it was held that " a 
 trustee of an express trust, who was re- 
 strained with respect to matters concern- 
 ing the trust estate, may maintain an 
 action on the bond given in the injunction 
 suit in which he is named as obligee."] 
 
 1 Baker v. Bartol, 7 Cal. 551. Qn 
 Curry v. Gila County (1898), Ariz., 53 
 Pac 4, it was held that a county for whose 
 use and benefit a bond is executed, may 
 sue upon it, although the bond is executed 
 to the Territory of Arizona. But in Myers 
 V. Baughman (1901), 61 Neb. 818, 86 
 N. W. 507, it was held that the prosecu- 
 trix in a bastardy proceeding could not 
 sue on the bastardy bond in her own name, 
 but the action could be brought only in 
 the name of the State, which was named 
 as obligee, for the use of the pro.secutrix 
 as her interest might appear, the State 
 being in fact a beneficiary under the bond 
 as well as the prosecutrix.] 
 
 2 Paddon r. W^illiams, 2 Abb. Pr. n. S. 
 88. 
 
 ^ Silliman ?•. Tuttle, 45 Barb. 171. 
 nin Chamberlain v. Woolsey (1903), — 
 Xeb. — , 95 N. W. 38, it was held that 
 "one having legal title and the right of 
 possession to personal pro])erty may main- 
 tain an action for its wrongful conversion 
 bv a stranger, without joining a party wl>o 
 mav have a beneficial interest therein."]
 
 116 CIVIL REMEDIKS. 
 
 settk'd that wlieu a simple contract, whether verbal or written, 
 is entered into by an agent in his own name, but really acting 
 on behalf of an undisclosed principal, and tiie fact of the agency 
 is unknown at the time, but the parties suppose that they are 
 dealing with lum on his own individual account, the principal 
 may bring an action and recover upon it as tliough he had been 
 the party expressly contracting.^ In these cases, however, the 
 agent may also bring the action ; he being one of the contracting 
 parties, the agreement being in express terms made with him, he 
 is a proper party to enforce its observance ; ^ the agent may also 
 sue, even where tlie principal was disclosed, and it was shown 
 that he was acting in behalf of such principal, if the contract is 
 of such a form that the promise is in express terms made to the 
 agent himself.^ Where the promise in favor of a principal is 
 implied, the agent cannot in general sue upon it in his own name, 
 but the action must be brought by the principal himself. Thus, 
 where a person making a bet in his own name deposited S3,000, 
 the amount thereof, ^^ith the stakeholder, but of this sum only 
 S600 was his own money, and the rest had been furnished by 
 other parties — not as a loan — who united with him in the wager, 
 and he brought an action under the statute against the stakeholder 
 to recover back the wliole amount of the money so deposited by 
 him, it was held by the New York Court of Appeals that he could 
 only recover the $600 which he had actually furnished of his own 
 funds ; that he was simply an agent for the owners of the remain- 
 ing portion of the moneys advanced, and the implied promise to 
 refund arose in their favor alone; and they must therefore sue in 
 their own names to recover their respective shares.* 
 
 1 St. .John V. Griffith. 2 Abb. Pr. 198 ; .Toneis, 6 Iowa, 169; Usparicha v. Noble, 
 
 Hall V. Plaine, 14 Ohio St. 417 ; Hisg'm.s 13 I':a.<!t,3.32 ; Buffiim r. Cliadwick, 8 Mass. 
 
 V. Senior, 8 Mees. & W. 834 ; Sims r. 103; Fairfield r. Adams, 16 Pick. 381. 
 Bond, .5 B. & Ad. 389, 393, per Ld. ])eu- Qln Ward r. Rylia (1897), .58 Kan. 741. 
 
 man ; Bastalde v. Poole, 1 Cromp. M. &, R. 51 Pac. 223, an agent took a hill of .sale of 
 
 410, fier Parke B. ; Hicks r. Whitmore, personal property in liis own name, in pay- 
 
 12 Wend. 548; Taintor v. I'reudergast, 3 mcnt of a debt due to his principal, and 
 
 Hill, 72. See /Jos<, § * 177. u])on taking j)os.session of the property 
 
 ^ See cases cited in last note. Tyler r. was dispo.^isessed of it by a third person. 
 
 Freeman, 3 Cush. 261 ; QHernian v. City It w:us held that the agent could not main- 
 
 of Oconto (1898), 100 Wis. 391, 76 N. W. tain replevin for it under a general alle- 
 
 364 I Barhani (• Bell (1893), 112 N. C. 131, gation of ownership in himself, without 
 
 16S. K. 903; Brown i\ Siiarkey (1894), 93 stating facts in respect to his special 
 
 la. 157, 61 X. W. 364 ; Brannon v. White interest and rigiit of possession.] 
 Lake Tp. (1903),— la. —,95 N. W. 284.] * Huckman r. Pitcher, 20 N. Y. 9. 
 
 * Ca.ses citeil in last notes. Fear v. For furtiier examples of the real party in
 
 ACTIONS BY TAX-PAYERS. 
 
 117 
 
 § 80. * 142. Particular Injury to Plaintiff Essential in Certain 
 Cases. People cannot maintain Action to redress Private Wrong. 
 It is the established doctiiiie in sevenil States, and l)y many 
 cases, that an action cannot be maintained by a private person, 
 citizen, freeholder, or tax-payer, either suing alone or on behalf 
 of all others similarly situated, to restrain or remove or redress 
 any public wrong, or nuisance, or unlawful act done under color 
 of legal authority by the officers of a county, town, city, or other 
 municii)ality, unless the plaintiff has suffered some special wrong, 
 unless some particular injury is done to him which is not sus- 
 tained by all others in the community alike. As a result of this 
 rule, no citizen or tax-payer or freeholder can prosecute an action 
 
 interest, see Winona & St. Peter R. Co. 
 r. St. Paul & S. C. R. Co., 23 Minn. 359 ; 
 Lafayette Cy. v. Hixon, 69 Mo. 581 : 
 Quilien r. Arnold, 12 Nev. 234 ; Kahn- 
 weiler v. Anderson, 78 N. C. 133; Maun 
 I'. ^<;tua Fire Ins. Co., 38 Wis. 114; Kel- 
 loj^g V. Adams, 51 id. 138; Sigel Sch. 
 Dir. r. Coe, 40 id. 103, action on the official 
 bond of a school district treasurer by the 
 official successors of the obligee ; Terri- 
 tory r. Co.x, 3 Mont. 197; Dunning v. 
 Ocean Nat. Bk., 61 N. Y. 497 ; Olrastead 
 V. Keys, 85 id. 593 ; Greene r. Republic 
 F. Ins. Co., 84 id. 572; Conn. F. Ins. Co. 
 V. Erie R. Co., 73 id. 399, 405 ; Rowe v. 
 Parsons, 6 Hun, 338, action on adminis- 
 trator's bond running to the people, by 
 j)cr.<ons interested in the estate ; Dodson 
 V. Lomax (Mo., 1893), 21 S. W. 25. 
 
 QFor other instances of actions main- 
 tained by tiie real party in interest, see 
 Rogers v. Galloway (1898), 64 Ark. 627, 
 44 S. W. 454 (college suing on subscrip- 
 tions made to secure its estahli-shuient) ; 
 State ex rel y. S.andford (1894), 127 .Mo. 
 368,30 S. W. 112 (State on relation of 
 county tax-collector) ; Hodges r. 2salty 
 (1899), 104 Wis. 464, 80 N. W. 726 (per- 
 sons who paid for building a church su- 
 ing on unpaid .subscriptions) ; Railway 
 Co. I'. Taylor (1893), 57 Ark. 136, 20 S. W. 
 1083 (one who lias a special jjroperty in 
 an animal killed by a railway train); 
 Ettlinger i-. P. R. & C. Co. (1894), 142 
 N. Y. 189, 36 N. E. 1055 (holder of bonds 
 secured by trust mortgage, suing for fore- 
 closure) ; Kiusella v. Sharp (1896), 47 Neb. 
 664, 66 N. W. 634 (suit for conversion, 
 
 by donee or nominal vendee) ; German 
 Savings Bank i\ Citizens Nat. Bank 
 (1897), 101 Iowa, .530, 70 N. W. 769 (in- 
 tervention by bank wliich paid a check on 
 a forged indorsement, in suit between 
 drawer of check and tlie drawee bank, 
 not allowed) ; City of Des Moines v. Polk 
 County (1899), 107 Iowa, 525, 78 N. W. 
 249 (suit by city for fees earned by city 
 officers); Cabe v. Vanhook (1900), 127 
 N. C. 424, 37 S. E. 464 (suit ])y trustees 
 of a cemetery to compel an executor to 
 erect a fence according to the terms of a 
 will); Alexander v. Overton (1893), 36 
 Neb. 503, 54 N. W. 825 (suit for wrongful 
 sale of land brought by nominal vendee) ; 
 Union Nat. Bank v. llill (1899), 148 Mo. 
 380,49 S. W. 1012 (suit by stockholders 
 of an insolvent bank ag.ainst directors for 
 negligent management, where assignee 
 refuses to sue). 
 
 It was held in United States ex rel. v. 
 Railroad Co. (1895), 3 Okla. 404, 41 Pac. 
 729, that where private parties, as rela- 
 tors, are authorized to u.se the name and 
 authority of the United States for the 
 protection of their interests, the exemption 
 from payment of or security for costs, 
 enjoyed by the United States, does not in 
 any way attach to them. They are the 
 real parties in interest and are subject to 
 the same liabilities for costs as other liti- 
 gants. Illinois Cent. li.R. Co. ;•. Matthews 
 (1903), — Ky. — , 72 S. W. 302 : One not 
 the owner of baggage which he checks, 
 but who is liable to the owner, may sue 
 the carrier for damage to it.^
 
 118 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 to restrain official acts which would create a municipal indebted 
 ness ; or to set aside and annul such public acts when done, 
 although the indebtedness must sometime be paid b}- means of 
 increased taxation, and the plaintiff's property would be liable 
 for his proportionate share of the tax when levied.^ On the 
 other hand, actions of the nature and for the purposes described, 
 brought by a citizen, tax-payer, or freeholder, are permitted in 
 many and perhaps in a majority of the States, and are common 
 forms of judicial proceeding to restrain the abuse of local legisla- 
 tive and administrative power by municipal officials. Among 
 these remedial processes are actions l)y a citizen, tax-payer, or 
 freeholder to restrain or set aside tax proceedings, the levying of 
 assessments for local improvements, the issue of bonds by muni- 
 cipal corporations in aid of railways, and similar acts of a public 
 or quasi public nature.^ On the other hand, the people cannot 
 
 1 Doolittle V. Broome Cy. Supervisors, 
 18 N.Y. 15 j ; Roosevelt v. Draper, 23 
 N. Y. 318; People r. Mayor, 32 Barb. 102 ; 
 Sargeut v. Ohio & Miss. R. Co., 1 Hamly, 
 52; Carpenter v. Maiiu, 17 Wis. 155; 
 Kittle V. Fremont, 1 Keb. 329 ; Craft v. 
 Jackson Cy. Com'rs, 5 Kau. 518; Kirk- 
 jiatrick v. State, 5 Kan. 673 ; Tift r. Buf- 
 falo, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 150; Comins r. 
 Jefferson Cy. Sup., 3 id. 296; Ayres 
 V. Lawrence, 63 Barb. 454 ; Dcmarest v. 
 Wickiiani, 63 N. Y. 320 ; Kilbourn c. St. 
 John, 50 ill. 21 ; Lutes v. Briggs, 64 id. 
 404; Wood v. Bangs, 1 Dak. 179. 
 
 -' [Kirchery. Pederson (1903), 117 Wis. 
 68, 93 N. W. 813 ; Zuelly v. Casper (1903), 
 — Ind. — , 67 N. E. 103. j Rice i-. Smith, 
 9 Iowa, 570; State v. Bailoy, 7 id. 390; 
 State (.■. Marshall Cy. Judge, 7 id. 186; 
 Litchfield v. Polk Cy., 18 id. 70; 01m- 
 stead c. Henry Cy. Sup., 24 id. 33 ; Wil- 
 liams V. Peinny, 25 id. 436; Stokes v. 
 Scott Cy., 10 id. 166; McMillan v. Boyles, 
 14 id. 107; Rock v. Wallace, 14 id. 593; 
 Ten Kyck v. The Mayor, 15 id. 486; 
 Chamberlain v. Burlington, 19 id. 395; 
 IlanHon v. Vernon, 27 id. 28 ; Hubbard 
 V. John.son Cy. Sup, 23 id. 130; Harney 
 V. Cliarles, 45 Mo. 157; Scrihner ti. Allen, 
 12 Minn. 148; Howes i\ Racine. 21 Wis. 
 514 ; Mitchell r. Milwaukee, 18 id. 92. 97; 
 Bond >-. Kenosha, 17 id. 2^4,287 ; Veeder 
 V. Lima, 19 id. 2«0, 295-299; Rochester 
 «•. .Mfrc 1 r,:uik, 13 id. 432, 439; Sauer- 
 
 hering v. Iron Ridge & M. R. Co., 25 id. 
 447 ; Warden v. Fond du Lac Cy. Sup., 
 14 id. 618; Kellogg v. Oshkosh, 14 id. 
 623; Nill v. Jenkinson, 15 Ind. 425; 
 Lewis I'. Henley, 2 iil. 332 ; La Fayette r. 
 Fowler, 34 id. 140; Harney v. Indianapo- 
 lis, C. & D. R. Co., 32 id. 244 ; Coffman r. 
 Keightley, 24 id. 509 ; Oliver r. Keiglitley, 
 24 id. 514; Nave v. King, 27 id. 356 ; Har- 
 rison Cy. Com'rs v. McCarty, 27 id. 475 ; 
 Madison Cy. Com'rs v. Brown, 28 id. 161 ; 
 Andrews v. Pratt, 44 Cal. 309 ; Bncknall 
 V. Story, 36 Cal. 67 ; Douglass v. Placer- 
 ville, 18 Cal. 643 ; Vanover v. Justices, 
 etc., 27 Ga. 354 ; Brodnax v. Groom, 64 
 N. C. 244; Galloway r. Jenkins, 63 N. C. 
 147; Worth v. Fayettevilie, 1 Wins. (No. 
 2 Eq. N. C.) 70; Mobile v. Waring, 41 
 Ala. 139 ; Gilmer r. Hill, 22 La. An. 465 ; 
 White Sulphur Springs Co. v. Holly, 4 
 W. Va. 597; Bull r. Read, 13 Gratt.'78; 
 Baltimore v. CM, 31 Md. 375, 395 ; Stod- 
 dert V. Ward, 31 Md. 562; Lane v. Schomp, 
 20 N. J. E(i. 82; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 
 N. H. 126 ; Barr r. Deniston, 19 X. H. 170, 
 180; New Loudon v. Brainard. 22 Conn. 
 552; Scofield r. Eighth Scliool Dist., 27 
 id. 499, 504 ; Webster v. Harwinton, 32 
 id. 131; Terrett v. Sharon, 34 id. 105; 
 Mercer Cy. Sup. v. Hubbard, 45 111. 139: 
 Vieley v. Thompson, 44 111. 9; Cleghorn 
 V. Postlewaite, 43 id. 428; Taylor r. 
 Thomp.son, 42 id. 9 ; Clarke v. Hancock 
 Cy. Sup., 27 i !. ;:05, 311 ; Butler v Dun
 
 ACTIONS BY GRANTORS OF LAND. 119 
 
 maintiiin a civil action for the redress of mere private wrongs. 
 An action can be brought in their name only to iiphohl and en- 
 force a distinct right on their part in respect to the subject- 
 matter of the controversy.^ 
 
 § 81. * 143. Special Provision iu New York respecting Action 
 by Grantee of Land held by Disseisor at Time of Conveyance. 
 Partnerships. The last clause of § 111 (1501, 449, 1909, 1910) in 
 the New York Code was added as an amendment merely for 
 purposes of certainty, and to remove all possible doubts as to the 
 true meaning of the section. As it was originally enacted with- 
 out this clause, a doubt had sometimes been suggested whether 
 any action at all could be brought under the circumstances men- 
 tioned in the amendment, that is, when land had been conveyed 
 by an owner which at the time was held by a disseisor adversely 
 to such true owner. If brought by the grantee, he could show 
 no title, because the conveyance to him would, by virtue of other 
 rules of the law, be deemed a nullity. If brought in the name of 
 the grantor, it might be said that he was not the real party in 
 interest, and, under the requirements of this section, was for- 
 bidden to sue. The code was therefore amended so as to exclude 
 the latter construction, by adding the final provision as it now 
 stands. The purpose of this amendment is really to limit and 
 restrict the operation and effect of the section as originally 
 enacted, and not to create any new authority or right as between 
 the grantor and the grantee for the use of the former's name by 
 the latter, nor to create any new title to the land in the grantee 
 liimself.^ An express provision exists in the codes of certain 
 
 ham, 27 id. 474 ; Perkius v. Lewis, 24 id. v. Port Washington, 37 Wis. 168 ; Benton 
 
 208; Robertson v. Rockford, 21 id. 4.51; Cy. Com'rs v. Templeton, 51 Ind. 266; 
 
 J'rettyman v. Tazewell Cy. Sup., 19 id. Delaware Cy. Com'rs v. McClintock, bl 
 
 406 ; Drake v. Phillips, 40 id. 388 ; Colton Ind. 325 ; Turpin v. Eagle Creek, etc. Co., 
 
 V. Hanchett, 13 id. 615 ; Dews i'. Chicago, 48 Ind. 45; Ayers v. Lawrence, 59 N. Y. 
 
 ] 1 Wall. 108. See Dillon on Munic. Corp. 192 ; Metzger v. Attica & A- Arc R. Co., 
 
 §§906, 914-924 (4th ed.) ; Allison f. Louis- 79 id. 171 ; Kewton v. Keech, 9 Hun, 355. 
 
 ville, etc. R. Co., 9 Bush, 247. See also See also, on this subject, 1 Pomeroy's 
 
 later ca.ses, Longley v. City of Hudson. 4 Equity, §§ 258, 259, 260, 265, 266. 
 
 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 353 ; Marsh r. City of i People v. Albany & Su.'iq. R. R., 57 
 
 Brooklyn, id. 413; Clay Cy. Com'r.s v. N. Y. 161; People v. Ingersoll, 58 N. Y. 
 
 Markle, 46 Ind. 96, 103-105; Zorger r. 1; People v. Fields, 58 N. Y. 491. See 
 
 Rapids Tp., 36 Iowa, 175; Minnesota Oil People v. Sherwin, 2 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 59R ; 
 
 Co. y. Palmer, 20 Minn. 468; Hodgman and Wood v. The Mayor, etc., 7.1 N. Y. 
 
 V. Chicago & St. P. R. Co., 28 Minn. 48; 556. 
 
 Moses V. Kearney, 31 Ark. 261 ; Normand - Hamilton v. Wright, 37 N. Y. 505, 
 
 V. Otoe Cy. Com'rs, 8 Neb. 18; Noesen 507, per Woodruff J.; Steeple y. Down-
 
 120 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 States, authorizing partnerships to sue and to be sued by and in 
 their firm names, without making the individual members by 
 name parties to the action.^ This provision is merely permissive, 
 and not at all compulsory ; it is not a substitute for, but an 
 addition to, the former existing methods of conducting suits.^ 
 
 SECTION THIRD. 
 
 THE EFFECT OF AN ASSIGNMENT OF A THING IN ACTION UPON 
 
 THE DEFENCES THERETO. 
 
 5 82. * 154. statutory Provisions respecting the Effect of As- 
 signment upon Defences. The statutory provision found in the 
 various State codes which relates to the subject-matter of this 
 section is the following: "In the case of an assignment of a thing 
 in action, the action by the assignee is without prejudice to any 
 set-off or other defence existing at the time of or before notice 
 of the assignment; but this section does not apply to a negoti- 
 able promissory note or bill of exchange, transferred in good 
 faith and upon good consideration, before maturity."^ In Ohio, 
 Kansas, and Nebraska, the phraseology is slightly different. It 
 reads: "The action of the assignee shall be without prejudice to 
 any set-off or other defence now allowed."* The consideration 
 of the topics embraced in this provision should, in a strictly 
 scientific method, form a part of the general subject of Defences, 
 and might properly be postponed until this portion of the work 
 is reached ; but I have chosen to pursue the order of the codes 
 themselves, which is the same in all the States, rather than to 
 
 ing, 60 Ind. 478; Voorhis v. Kelly, 31 §6071; Arizoua, Rev. St., 1901, § 1301; 
 
 Hun, 293; Smith v. Loug, 12 Abb. N. Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 3899; Montana, 
 
 Cas. 113. §571; Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3156 ; 
 
 ' See statutory provisions cited in note Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3467; Colo- 
 
 to ^ *\2\, ante. rado. § 4; Connecticut, (Jen. St., 1902, 
 
 ^ Whitman v. Keith, 18 Ohio St. 134. § 650, in a somewhat different form from 
 
 » New York, § 112 (502, 1909, 1910); that given in the text; Indiaua, Burns' 
 
 (^Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5157;;] Califor- St., 1901, § 277; Wisconsin, St., 1898, 
 
 nia, § 368; Kentucky, § 31 ; South Caro- § 2606.] 
 
 lina, § 135; Oregon, §§ 28. 382; Nevada, ^ QOhio, Bates' Ann. St., § 4993;] 
 § 5 ; Iowa, § 2546 (slightly altered) ; North Kansas, § 27 ; [^Nebraska, § 31 ; Washing- 
 Carolina, § 55; [;Utah, Rev. St., 1898, ton, Bal. Code, § 4835, in a quite different 
 § 2903; North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1«99, form.] 
 § 5222; South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901,
 
 THE ASSIGNMENT SUBJECT TO DEFENCES. 121 
 
 adopt one more theoretically correct, yet perhaps not more prac- 
 tically advantageous. 
 
 § 83. * 155. Defences and Counter-Claims Distinguished. It is 
 important that the defences which this clause admits should be 
 carefully distinguished from the counter-claim subsequently pro- 
 vided for by the statute. This section, speaks of defences which, 
 as they ask no affirmative relief, and simply prevent the plaintiff 
 from succeeding, may be made available against an assignee as 
 well as against the original creditor. The counter-claim is more 
 than a defence: it assumes a right of action against and demands 
 a recovery of affirmative relief from the plaintiff in the suit, and 
 is, therefore, impossible as against an assignee suing, if it existed 
 against the assignor. The proposition here stated is very simple 
 and plain, and yet the defences permitted against the assignee 
 by this section have been sometimes confounded with counter- 
 claims, and that even by judges and courts.^ 
 
 § 84. * 156. Interpretation of the Statute. The section quoted 
 above, and which is substantially the same in all the States, does 
 not change the then existing law as to defences under the cir- 
 cumstances mentioned in it. It was not intended to alter the 
 substantial rights of the parties, but only to introduce such 
 modifications into the modes of protecting them as were rendered 
 necessary by the provisions of the preceding section requiring 
 the real party in interest in most cases to be the plaintiff. Tak- 
 ing the two sections together, the plain interpretation of them is r 
 The assignee of a thing in action must sue upon it in his own 
 name, but this change in the practice shall not work any altera- 
 tion of the actual rights of the parties ; the defendants are still 
 entitled to the same defences against the assignee who sues which 
 they would have had if the former rule had continued to prevail, 
 and the action had been brought in the name of the assignor, but 
 to no other or different defences. In other words, the section 
 must be interpreted as though it read as follows : " In the case 
 of the assignment of a thing in action, the action of the assignee 
 shall be without prejudice to any set-off or other defence existing 
 at the time of or before notice of the assignment, which would 
 
 1 Qu Iowa, Washington, and Wyoming ton, Bal. Code, §483.5; Wyoming, Rev. 
 
 the statute expres,sly names both counter- St., 1899, § 34G7 ; Iowa, Code, 1897, 
 
 claim and set-off as being unprejudiced § 34C1.3 
 by the action of the assignee. Wasliiug-
 
 122 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 have been available to the defendant had the action been brought 
 in the name of the assignor." This construction is now firmly 
 and universally established.^ 
 
 J^ 85. * 157. The Rule, as Existing Prior to the Codes, Stated. 
 Assignee takes Subject to Equities and Legal Defences. As the 
 
 pre-existing rule is thus reaffirmed, a full discussion of the stat- 
 utory provision requires an examination and statement of that 
 rule itself. In the first place, the general doctrine is elementar}' 
 that the purchaser of any thing in action, not negotiable, takes 
 the* interest purchased subject to all the defences legal and 
 equitable of the debtor v:ho issued the ohliyation or security. That 
 is, when the original debtor, the obligor on the bond, or the 
 promisor, in whatever form his promise is made, if it is not 
 negotiable, is sued by the assignee, the defences legal and equi- 
 table which he had at the time of the assignment, or at the time 
 when notice of it was given, against the original creditor, avail 
 to him asrainst the substituted creditor.^ This doctrine has been 
 applied to all kinds of defences as well as to set-off, and to all 
 forms of contract not negotiable: as, for example, in an action 
 on a bond and mortgage by the assignee, the defence that the 
 bond and the mortgage collateral thereto were given on con- 
 sideration that the obligee should perform certain covenants 
 contained in an agreement between the parties, which was set 
 out, and that he had wholly failed to perform the same, was held 
 good; 3 in an action brought on a warehouseman's receipt, the 
 same being held not negotiable;^ in an action by an assignee for 
 the benefit of creditors ; ^ and in an action to compel a specific 
 performance, brought by the assignee of the vendee, under a con- 
 tract for the sale of lands, although the vendee was in possession.^ 
 
 1 Beckwith »•. Union Bank, 9 X. Y. given of it, when there is an interval be- 
 
 211, 212, per Johnson J. ; Myers v. Davis, tween the execution of the transfer and 
 
 22 N. Y. 489, 490, per Denio .1. the notice." Commercial Hauk v. Colt, 
 
 - Ingrahamr. Dishrough, 47 N. Y.42I : 15 Barh. .506; Ainslie v. Bovnton, 2 Barb. 
 
 Anlrcw.s v. Gilk-spie, 47 N. Y. 487; Biisli 058; Wood c. Perry, 1 Barb. 114 ; We.st- 
 
 r. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. ."j.l.i, .538, per Denio em Bank /•. Sherwood, 29 Barb. 383 ; 
 
 •T. ; Blydenburgh f. Thayer, 3 Keyes, 293 ; Reeve.<» >•. Kimball, 40 X. Y. 299. 
 
 ("allanan c Kdwanls, 32 X. Y. 483, 486, » Western Bank i-. Sherwood, 29 Barb, 
 
 per Wriglit J., who thus states the rule : 383. 
 
 " An jwsif^nee of a ^/lox*' iti anion not ne- * Commercial Bank r. Colt, 15 Barb. 506. 
 gotiable takes the thing assigned subject 6 Maas v. Goodman, 2 Hilt. 275 ; Ma- 
 te all the rights which the debtor had rine & F. Ins. Bk. of Ga. v. Jauncey, 1 
 acquired in respect thereto prior to the Barb. 4S6. 
 assignment, or to the time notice was « Reeves v. Kimball, 40 N. Y. 299.
 
 EQUITIKS BETWEEN ASSIGNOR AND ASSIGNEE. 123 
 
 § 86. * 158. Doctrine applies also to Second and Subsequent 
 Assignees. The doctrine is not coiilined, however, in its operation 
 to the case of the debtor — the promisor in the thing in action — 
 setting up a defence to an action brought by an assignee upon the 
 demand itself to enforce the collection or performance thereof ; it 
 applies also to the second and subsequent assignees of a non- 
 negotiable thing in action, although transferred to the purchaser 
 and holder for full value, and without notice, if there were 
 equities subsisting between the original assignor and his imme- 
 diate assignee in favor of the former. If the owner and holder 
 of a thing in action not negotiable transfers it to an assignee 
 upon condition, or subject to any reservations or claims in favor 
 of the transferrer, although the instrument of assignment be 
 absolute on its face, this immediate assignee, holding in it a 
 qualified and limited property and interest, cannot convey a 
 greater property and interest than he himself holds; and if he 
 assumes to convey it to a second assignee by a transfer absolute 
 in form, and for a full consideration, and without any notice on 
 the part of such purchaser of a defect in the title, this second 
 assignee nevertheless takes it subject to all the equities, claims, 
 and rights of the original owner and first assignor. The doctrine 
 of so-called ^'' latent equities," which has received some judicial 
 support, — that is, the doctrine that the equities of the original 
 assignor, under the circumstances thus stated, are latent and 
 cannot prevail against the title of the second assignee, — is 
 unsound; it is an attempt to extend the peculiar qualities of 
 negotiable paper to things in action not negotiable, and destroys 
 the fundamental distinction between the two classes of negotiable 
 and non -negotiable demands.^ 
 
 § 87. * 159. Illustrations. A few illustrations of this rule 
 will serve to show its true meaning, and the extent of its 
 
 1 Bushy. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 53.5; Au- v. Equitable Life Ins. Soc, 59 id. 587; 
 
 derson v. Nicholas, 28 N. Y. 600, approved Greene v. Warwick, 64 id. 220 ; Loomis w 
 
 by Woodruff J. iu Reeves v. Kimball, 40 Ruck, 56 id. 620; Davis v. Bechstein, 69 
 
 N. Y. 311 ; Mason r. Lord, 40 N. Y. 476, id. 440, 442; Matthews v. Sheehan, 69 id. 
 
 487, per Daniels J. ; Williams r. Thorn, 585 ; Cutts v. Guild, 57 id. 229, 232, 233 ; 
 
 1 1 Paige, 459 ; McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bank, Reid v. Sprague, 72 id. 457, 462 ; Crane r. 
 
 55 Barb. 59, 68; s. c. 46 N. Y. 325; Turner, 67 id. 437, 440 ; Combes y. Chand- 
 
 Schafer v. Reilly, 50 N. Y. 67; Mangles let, 33 Ohio St., 178, 181-185; Farmers' 
 
 I'. Di.Kon. 3 H. of L. Cas. 702. See also, Nat. Bk. v. Fletcher, 44 Iowa, 252 ; and 
 
 on the subject discussed in this and the see in Pomeroy's Equity, §§ 707-715, 
 
 succeeding paragraphs, Union Coll. v. where this subject is fully discussed. 
 Wheeler, 61 N. Y. 88, 104, 112; Barry
 
 124 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 application. The holder of a bond and mortgage for $1,400 
 assigned and delivered them to secure an indebtedness of !?-T(\ 
 the assignee giving back a written undertaking to return the same 
 upon being paid that amount. This assignee afterwards trans- 
 ferred the securities to a second, and he to a third assignee, the 
 latter paying full value, and having no notice of any outstanding 
 claims or defects in the title. The original owner tendered to 
 this assignee the $270 and interest thereon, and demanded a 
 return of the bond and mortgage. Upon refusal he brought an 
 action to compel such return ; and it was held by the New York 
 Court of Appeals, after a most exhaustive discussion, that he 
 should recover.^ Certificates of stock being wrongfully taken 
 from the owner and sold to the defendant, it was held that the 
 latter acquired no better or higher title than that held by his 
 immediate transferrer, — the one who wrongfully converted the 
 stock, — and that the original owner could recover the value of 
 the securities with interest; but the decision was partly placed 
 upon the special circumstances of the transfer, which deprived 
 the defendant of the character and position of a bona fide pur- 
 chaser.2 The lessee of premises assigned the lease by an instru- 
 ment valid on the face, but the transfer was in fact given as 
 security for a usurious loan made to him by the assignee. This 
 lease was afterwards transferred by the assignee, passed through 
 divers hands, and was finally purchased by the defendant, who 
 knew that the first transfer was intended as a security for a loan, 
 but who had no knowledge nor notice of the usurious taint which 
 affected the loan, and who paid full value as the consideration 
 of the transfer to himself. Su])sequent to the original assign- 
 ment by the lessee, but before the tiansfer to the defendant, the 
 plaintiffs recovered a judgment against such lessee, which was 
 regularly entered and docketed, and the lessee's interest in the 
 premises leased and in the lease itself was sold on execution, 
 
 > IJush c. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. The doctrine. See Ballard r. Burgett, 40 N. Y. 
 opinion of Deuio J. is a mo.st able review 314, and the cases cited. 
 of all the autlioritie.s which seem to su.s- '■^ Anderson v. Nicholas, 28 N. \' . 600. 
 tain the doctrine that certain so-called On account of the peculiar facts referred 
 " latent e(/uities " a.TG uot protected afjainst to in the text, which prevented the de- 
 an assignment. He shows that all the fendant from relying upon the defence of 
 expressions of judicial opinion to that ^/ona/ic/e.s, this case cannot he regarded a.s 
 effect are oliltf-r dicta, while a large iium- a direct autiiority for the doctrine of the 
 l>er of direct decisions necessarily involv- text, 
 ing the (juestiou are opposed to the
 
 ASSIGNMENT OF STOCK CERTIFICATES. 125 
 
 bought in by the phiintiffs, and a .sheriff's deed of such interest 
 was delivered to them, which deed, however, was executed after 
 the assignment to the defendant. The plaintiff's thereupon com- 
 menced an action to recover possession of the leased premises, 
 and to avoid the transfer of the lease to the defendant on account 
 of the usury which affected and nullified the first assignment 
 made by the lessee to his immediate assignee. The New York 
 Court of Appeals, following the doctrine of the decisions quoted 
 above, held that the action could be maintained ; that the lessee 
 might have set aside the transfer from himself on account of the 
 usury which tainted it; that the subsequent assignees, including 
 the defendant, succeeded to all the rights, and were subjected to 
 all the disabilities, possessed by and imposed upon the person 
 who transferred the security to them, — the first assignee; and, 
 finally, that the judgment creditors of the lessee were clothed 
 with his rights and powers in the matter.^ 
 
 v^ 88. * 160. Doctrine of Estoppel Applied against the Assignor 
 in Case of Quasi-Negotiable Demands. The principle thus settled, 
 and the cases which support it, are entirely consistent with 
 another doctrine that has lately been approved and established 
 by the same distinguished court, namely, the doctrine of estoppel 
 as applied to the transfer of certain species of things in action 
 which, in the customary practice of business men, have acquired 
 a qiiasi-negotiahle character. The doctrine as thus invoked by 
 the court may be stated as follows : The owner of certain kinds 
 of things in action not technically negotiable, but which, in the 
 course of business customs, have acquired a semi-negotiable 
 character as a matter of fact, may assign or part with them for 
 a special purpose, and at the same time may clothe the assignee 
 or person to whom they have been delivered with such apparent 
 indiciu of title, and instruments of complete ownership over 
 them, and power to dispose of them, as to estop himself from 
 setting up against a second assignee, to whom the securities have 
 been transferred in good faith and for value, the fact that the 
 
 ^ Mason v. Lord, 40 N. Y. 476, 487. v. Lathrop is reaffirmed, and its ])rinciple 
 
 The doctrine is directly sustained in the pronounced to be " well settled." The 
 
 following more recent cases : Schafer v. result of these authorities is to limit the 
 
 Reilly, .50 N. Y. 61, 67 ; Reeves v. Kim- decision in Moore v. Metrop. Nat. Bank, 
 
 ball, 40 N. Y. 399 ; Ingraham v. l)is- infra, and to confine it to the doctrine as 
 
 borough, 47 N. Y. 421 ; Cutts v. Guild, 57 laid down in McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bank, 
 
 N. Y. 229, 232, 233. In the last case Bush inft-a.
 
 126 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 title of the first assignee or holder was not absolute and perfect. 
 After some conflict of opinion in the lower courts, the New York 
 Court of Appeals has recently applied the foregoing doctrine to 
 the customary mode of dealing with certificates of stock. It 
 holds that if the owner of such stock certificates assigns them as 
 collateral security, or pledges them, or puts them into the hands 
 of another for any purpose, and accompaiiies the deliver}^ by a 
 blank assignment and power of attorney to transfer the same in 
 the usual form, signed by himself, and this assignee or pledgee 
 wrongfully sells them to an innocent purchaser for value in the 
 regular course of business, such original owner is estopped from 
 asserting, as against this purchaser in good faith, his own higher 
 title and the want of actual title and authority in his own imme- 
 diate assignee or pledgee. This principle, thus applied to the 
 peculiar state of facts described, and to the particular kind of 
 securities, is in no respect necessarily antagonistic to the general 
 doctrine in relation to things in action before stated in the text. 
 The court rested its decision exclusively upon the form of the 
 blank assignment and power of attorney executed by the assignor 
 and delivered to the assignee, which clothed him with all the 
 apparent rights of ownership which are recognized by business 
 men in their usual course of dealing with like securities, as suffi- 
 cient to confer a complete title and power of disposition upon the 
 assignee. The decision was nothing more than the application 
 of the doctrine of estoppel in circumstances to which it had not 
 before been applied.^ 
 
 1 McNeil V. Tenth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y. particular species of securit}' then before 
 
 325, reversing s. c. 55 Barb. 59. The the court, — certificates of stock in stock 
 
 Supreme Court held (1) that certificates corporations; and, while he does not claim 
 
 of stock were in no respect negotiable, for them absolute negotiability, he does 
 
 and (2) the rule as laid down by Denio J. in fact render them indirectly negotiable 
 
 in Bush v. Lathrop. The law of estoppel by means of the estoppel which arises 
 
 w;ts not invoked nor alluded to. In the upon ilealing with them in the manner 
 
 Court (jf Appeals the doctrine of latent described, which is the mode universally 
 
 eijuities was discussed ; the dcci.sion of the j)revalent among business men. Ballard 
 
 court in Bush c. Lathrop, and the reason- ;•. Burgett, 40 N. Y. ."{14. In Ilolbrook 
 
 ing of Mr. Justice Denio, were expressly r. N. .1. Zinc Co., 57 N. Y. 616, 622, 623, 
 
 recognized as correct, and as applicable to the doctrine of estoppel was applied to 
 
 all cases in which the facts do not warrant the corporation itself, whose stock had 
 
 the application of the princijde of e.s- been transferred in good faith, and in the 
 
 toppfl. Mr. Justice Kapallo, in his al)le usual manner, to the jdaintiff. McNeil 
 
 judgment, does not discuss the rule in c Tenth Nat. Bank, snpta, and Leitch r. 
 
 relation to things in action of all kinds; Wells, 48 N. Y. 5S5, were held to be 
 
 he confines himself exclusively to the controlling; and Leilwicb v. McKim, 53
 
 EQUITIES BF.TWEEN ASSIGNOR AND ASSIGNEE. 127 
 
 ^ 89. *161. Extension of Doctrine of Estoppel to all Things in 
 Action, making them all practically Negotiable. This clecisioil, 
 and the rule which it establishes in reference to certificates of 
 stock, are doubtless in the interests of modern business methods. 
 For several years these certificates of stock, with an assignment 
 in blank and a blank power of attorney to effect their surrender 
 and transfer, have been practically regarded by business men as 
 negotiable instruments; they have been used, transferred from 
 hand to hand, and assigned by delivery, in exactly the same 
 manner as bills and notes payable to bearer, and millions of 
 property are constantly ventured upon their use. It was a 
 matter of absolute necessity that the courts should pronounce 
 these securities practically negotiable ; a contrary ruling would 
 have interrupted and jeoparded the whole financial system of 
 the country. It would have been well if the court had boldly 
 met the question face to face, and liad expressly held these 
 securities to be negotiable to all intents and purposes. This 
 course of decision would have produced no unexpected interfer- 
 ence with other general doctrines, and it has a precedent in the 
 acts of the American courts holding that municipal and corpora- 
 tion coupon bonds of the ordinary form are negotiable. As the 
 court did not pursue this course, it accomplished the same pur- 
 pose by resorting to the doctrine of estoppel ; and I repeat, that. 
 when confined to these peculiar forms of securities wdiich had 
 been made practically negotiable by the course of business, the 
 judgment and its ratio decidendi do not affect the general prin- 
 ciple in relation to the transfer of things in action which has 
 been stated and illustrated in preceding paragraphs. But the 
 same court has, in a still later case, gone far beyond both the 
 conclusions and the reasoning of its judgment in McNeil v. Tenth 
 National Bank, and has virtually obliterated the distinction 
 between negotiable and non-negotiable things in action, at least 
 so far as the relations between assignors and assignees of them 
 are concerned. The doctrine of estoppel, which had been used 
 to protect the customary modes of transacting business with 
 certificates of stock, is now extended to all species of things in 
 
 N. Y. 307, was said not to conflict in stolen and transferred in the customary 
 
 any manner. It is decided in Nevada manner to a /^ona^c/e purchaser for value, 
 
 that certificates of stock in the ordinary the latter acquired no title as against the 
 
 form are not negotiable instruments, so owner. Bercich v. Marye, 9 Nev. 312. 
 that when such certificates had been
 
 128 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 action, and the effect of an estoppel is declared to be produced 
 from (( mere assignment of the securiti/, absolute on its face, executed 
 bi/ the original owner, (ind delivered to his assignee. In short, 
 whenever the owner of a non-negotiable thing in action delivers 
 the same to another person, and accompanies the delivery by an 
 assignment thereof, absolute on its face, and this person transfers 
 the same to a purchaser for value who relies upon the apparent 
 ownerehip created by the written assignment, and has no notice 
 of anything limiting that apparent title, the original owner is 
 estopped from asserting as against such purchaser any equities 
 existing between himself and his immediate assignee, and any 
 interest or property in the security which he may have, notwith- 
 standing the written transfer. The Court of Appeals, in reach- 
 ing this conclusion, expressly overrules the decision made upon 
 the facts involved in Bush v. Lathrop, but at the same time 
 declares that ic does not intend to shake the general doctrine 
 controlling the transfer of non-negotiable things in action upon 
 whiuh that decision is based. It is plain, however, that the 
 ancient and, as it was supposed, well-settled doctrine is sub- 
 stantially abrogated by this last application of the principle of 
 estoppel. The estoppel is made to arise from a mere naked 
 transfer in writing, absolute in form; the rationale of the deci- 
 sion is the apparent ownership thus bestowed upon the assignee ; 
 and these elements of the judgment will clearly apply to so many 
 cases that things in action are practically rendered negotiable in 
 their nature as between the series of successive holders, — the 
 assignors and assignees. This point being attained, it will be a 
 short and easy step to apply the doctrine of estoppel to the debtor 
 himself, — the obligor or promisor who utters the security. If 
 negotiability is produced by means of estoppel between the 
 assignor and assignee, arising from the fact and form of a trans- 
 fer from one to another, by parity of reasoning the debtor may 
 be regarded as estopped l)y the fact and form of his issuing the 
 undertaking and delivering it to the tirst holder, and thus creat- 
 ing an apparent liability against himself. In short, there is 
 exactly the same reason for holding the debtor estopped from 
 denying his liability upon a written instrument which ai)parently 
 creates an absolute liability, when that instrument lias passed 
 into the hands of a purchaser wlio has no notice of tlie actual 
 relations Ijctween the original parties, as for holding an assign )r
 
 EQUITIES BETWEEN ASSIGNOU AND ASSIGNKK. 129 
 
 estopped from denying the completeness of a transfer made by 
 liim absolute on the face. This result, if reached, would render 
 all things in action practically negotiable.^ 
 
 § 90. * 162. Recapitulation of Rules Established independently 
 of the Codes. As the result of adjudications of which the fore- 
 going are examples, the rules of the law as established independ- 
 ently of the codes may be summed up in the following manner: 
 (1) All defences, either legal or equitable, which existed in favor 
 of the debtor himself against the original creditor at the time of 
 the assignment, or of notice to him of the assignment, of a non- 
 negotiable thing in action, avail to him against the assignee who 
 seeks to enforce the demand against such debtor; (2) When the 
 owner and holder of a non-negotiable thing in action transfers it 
 to an assignee for a special purpose — such as security for a loan, 
 and the like — by an assignment absolute on its face, but as 
 between himself and his assignee retains an interest in or claim 
 upon the demand, and this assignee assumes to transfer the same 
 absolutely to a second assignee who purchases in good faith 
 without notice and for value, the first assignee in fact transfers 
 no higher title than he possesses, and the second assignee takes 
 the thing in action subject to the equities and claims of the 
 original assignor; but (3) in the State of New York a modification 
 of this second rule has been introduced in very recent decisions, 
 and in pursuance thereof, if the original owner accompanies the 
 delivery of the thing in action with a written assignment thereof 
 absolute in form, and therefore apparently vesting the complete 
 ownership in his immediate assignee, an innocent purchaser for 
 value from the latter is protected against any claims, demands, 
 or equities existing in favor of the first assignor; the latter is 
 estopped from asserting his true right and property in the secur- 
 ity. This modification, which was at first confined to certificates 
 of stock transferred by means of the customary blank assignment 
 and power of attorney, has been extended to all things in action. 
 
 § 91. * 163. Effect of Code Provision upon Defence of Set-off. 
 No Substantial Change. What construction has been put by the 
 courts upon the provision of the codes embodying and reaffirming 
 these general rules ? I shall consider in the first place the effect 
 of this provision upon the defence of set-off. No substantial 
 change has been made in the rights of the several parties. The 
 
 1 Moore v. Metropolitan Nat. Bank, 55 N. Y. 41. 
 
 9
 
 130 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 assignee takes the demand assigned subject to all the rights 
 which the debtor had acquired prior to the assignment, or prior 
 to the time when notice was given, if there was an interval 
 between the execution of the transfer and the notice; but he 
 cannot be prejudiced by any new dealings between the original 
 parties after notice of the assignment has been given to the 
 debtor. When two opposing debts exist in a perfect condition 
 at the same time, either party may insist upon a set-off. If, 
 therefore, the holder of sucli a claim already due and payable 
 assign the same, and the debtor at the time of tliis transfer holds 
 a similar claim against the assignor, which is also then due and 
 payable, he may set off his debt against the demand in the hands 
 of the assigrnee. If, however, the assignment is made before the 
 opposing demand becomes mature, and the latter does not thus 
 become actually due and payable until after the transfer, the 
 debtor's right of set-off is destroyed by the mere fact of the 
 assignment, and no notice thereof to him is necessary to produce 
 that effect.^ The following special rule also exists under the 
 peculiar circumstances mentioned. If an insolvent holder of a 
 claim not yet matured assigns the same before maturity, and the 
 debtor at the time of this transfer holds a similar claim against 
 the assignor, which is then due and payable, his right of set-off 
 against the assignee, when the latter's cause of action arises, is 
 preserved and protected. ^ This latter doctrine is based upon 
 
 1 [[ This is not the rule in California, against D. as a valid set-off. The statute 
 
 In St. Louis Nat. Bank v. Gay (1894), provided that " In the case of an assign- 
 
 101 Cal. 286, 35 I'ac. 876, the facts were meiit of a thing in action, the action hy 
 
 as follows: On Feb. 4, 1891, defendant the a.ssignee is without prejudice to any 
 
 made and delivered to D. two non-nego- set-off or other defence existing at the 
 
 tiahle notes payable one year from date, time of or before notice of tiie assigu- 
 
 which 1). assigned on Feb. 24, 1891, to nient," Code of Civ. Pro, § .'?68 ; and it 
 
 plaintiff. On Feb. 12, 1891, D. made and was contended by plaintiff that at the 
 
 delivered his negotiable note, payable one time of the notice of jussignment defend- 
 
 year from date, to C, which was regularly ant's demand against 1). was not an exist- 
 
 assigned to defendant on Oct. 21, 1891. ing set-off, becau.se it was not then due. 
 
 Wlien defendant purchased D.'s note he But the court held that the thing itself — 
 
 liad no notice that his note to 1). had been the note, the chose in action — was then 
 
 assigned, and was not notified thereof until existing, which satisfied tiie statute.] 
 Feb. 1, 1892. Thus, neither at the time {jrac § * 797, infra, and notes.] 
 
 of the assignment by D. of defendant's '- {_h\ the case of Storts v. George 
 
 notes nor at the time when notice of such (1899), 1.50 Mo. 1, ."jl S. \V. 489, the court 
 
 assignment was given to defendant, were said : " It has been often ruled in the 
 
 any of the demands due and payable. State of New York, and is now the law 
 
 But it was held that in a suit by plaintiff in this State, that, if tlie claim against the 
 
 on defendant's notes, commenced Aug. 1, assignee was due at the date of the as- 
 
 1892, defendant might plead his demand eigunicnt, then there is an equity because
 
 EQUITIES r.ETWEEN ASSIGNOR AND ASSIGNEE. 
 
 131 
 
 considerations of equity, and is intended to prevent one party 
 from losing his own demand on account of the insolvency of Ins 
 immediate debtor, an.d from being at the same time compelled 
 to pay the debt originally due from himself to that insolvent. 
 These three rules existed prior to the codes, and have not been 
 changed by the provisions of the statute under consideration.^ 
 
 of the insolvency of the assignor, and the 
 debt so due may he set off against the 
 claim in favor of the assignee, though 
 the claim held by the assignee was not 
 due at the date of the assignment. . . . 
 But the claim against the assignee must 
 be due at tlie date of the assignment, and 
 if it is not then due, there is no equitable 
 set-off." See also Homer v. Bank of 
 Commerce (1897), 140 Mo. 225, 41 S. W. 
 790. 
 
 But in St. Paul, etc. Trust Co. v. Leek 
 (1894), 57 Minn. 87, 58 N. W. 826, the 
 court held that this equitable right of set- 
 off was available against an assignee wlien 
 the opposing claim held by the defendant 
 was not only unmatured at the time of 
 the assignment, but was not due at the 
 time the set-off was pleaded. Same rule 
 affirmed in Stolze i'. Bank of Minnesota 
 (1897), 67 Minn. 172, G9 N. W. 172. In 
 Lay bourn v. Seymour (189.3), 53 Minn. 
 105, 54 N. W. 941, defendants were in- 
 debted to a corporation on account. They 
 also held the express contract oliligation 
 of the corporation to deliver a certain 
 amount, in value, of manufactured goods. 
 In an action on the account brought by 
 the general assignee of the corporation, 
 the defendants properly set off their claim 
 again.st the corporation, though no demand 
 had been made for the goods, the insol- 
 vency and assignment making the demand 
 unnecessarv. 
 
 The einiitable riglit of set-off cannot be 
 used to obtain an unjust preference by a 
 creditor of an insolvent debtor. Thus, in 
 Northern Trust Co. v. Healy (1895), 61 
 Minn. 230, 6.3 N. W. 625, where the 
 debtor of an insolvent purchased a claim 
 held by a third person against tlie insol- 
 vent, for the purpose of using tlie same 
 as a set-off, having reasonable cause to 
 believe, when he purcliased it, that his 
 creditor was insolvent it was held that he 
 could not use the claim as a set-off.] 
 
 i [Stadler v. First Nat. Bank (1899), 
 22 Mont. 190, 56 I'ac. Ill, quoting § *163 
 of the text with approval.] Beckwith v. 
 Union Bank, 9 N. Y. 211; Myers v. 
 Davis, 22 N. Y. 489 ; .Martin ?'. Kunzmul- 
 ler,37 N. Y. 396 ; Blydenburgh v. Thayer, 
 3 Keyes, 293; 34 How. Pr. 88; Watt v. 
 Mayor, etc., 1 Sandf. 23; Wells r. 
 Stewart, 3 Barb. 40 ; Ogden v. Prentice, 
 33 Barb. 160; Adams r. Rodarmel, 19 
 lud. 339; Morrow's Assignees c. Bright, 
 20 Mo. 298'; Walker v. McKay, 2 Mete. 
 (Ky.) 294; Roberts v. Carter,' 38 N. Y. 
 1U7; Williams ?:. Brown, 2 Keyes, 486; 
 Piobinson o. Howes, 20 N. Y. 84 ; ]\Iaas v. 
 Goodman, 2 Hilt, 275 ; Merrill v. Green, 
 55 N. Y. 270, 274 ; Lathrop v. Godfrey, 6 
 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 96; Frick v. White, 57 
 N. Y. 103; Gildersleeve v. Burrows, 24 
 Ohio St. 204. When negotiable paper is 
 transferred after maturity, tlie maker has 
 the same right to avail himself of a claim 
 against the assignor as a set-off that he 
 would have if the demand assigned was 
 not negotiable. Norton v. Foster, 12 Kan. 
 44, 47, 48 ; Leavenson v. Lafontane, 3 
 Kan. 523, 526. As further illustrations of 
 the text, see Martin v. Pilsbnry, 23 Minn. 
 175; Davis v. Sutton, 23 id. 307 ; Davis v. 
 Neligh, 7 Neb. 84 ; Downing v. Gibson, 
 53 Iowa, 517; Chapman v. Plumer, 36 
 Wis. 2G2 ; Harte v. Houchin, 50 Ind. 327 ; 
 Heavenridge v. Mondy, 49 Ind. 434 ; Tur- 
 ner V. Campbell, 59 Ind. 279 ; Barlow v. 
 Mvers, 64 N. Y. 41, reversing 3 Hun, 720; 
 6 T. & C. 183 ; Shipman v. Lansing, 25 
 Hun, 290; Seymour v. Dunham, 24 id. 
 93 ; Taylor v. The Mayor, etc., 20 id. 292 ; 
 Huse V. Ames, 104 Mo. 91 ; IJayburn v. 
 Hurd. 20 Or. 229 ; Fuller v. Sciglitz, 27 
 Ohio St. 355. The defendant, it has been 
 held, in pleading his set-off or counter- 
 claim must allege tli.at it matured before 
 the assignment of the claim on which he 
 is sued. Francis v. Leak (Ind. App., 1893), 
 33 N. E. 807. In .support of the tliird
 
 132 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 92. * 164. Illustrations. The true extent and limitiitions 
 of the doctrine will best he seen in its application to the facts 
 of decided cases. On the 24th of August, 1850, the firm of 
 W. C. & A. A. Hunter, having on deposit in the Union Bank 
 the sum of S3, 000, made a general assignment to one Beck with. 
 At the time the bank was holder of a bill of exchange, which 
 was indorsed by the firm and had been discounted by the bank 
 for them. This bill fell due on the 27th of August, and, not 
 being paid, the amount of it was charged against the firm in their 
 account by the bank. On the next day, the 28th, the assignee 
 for the first time notified the bank of the assignment, and de- 
 manded payment of the sum on deposit to the firm's credit, 
 which was refused. The assignee brought a suit to recover the 
 debt, and the bank set up the amount due on the bill of exchange 
 as an offset. It was held by the Superior Court of New York 
 City, and by the Court of Appeals, that the demand in favor of 
 the bank could not be set off, as it was not an existing demand 
 payable when the assignment was made ; and that no notice was 
 necessary by the assignee to protect himself against such a 
 defence. Notice is only necessary against subsequent acts and 
 dealings of the debtor with an assignor, which might prejudice 
 the rights of the assignee, such as payment.^ In March, 1855, 
 
 (special) rule stated in the text, see Smith .indebtedness to him of the assignor, wlio 
 
 V. Sj)ingler, 83 Mo. 408; Green v. Conrad was the orii^inal judgment creditor, ex- 
 
 (Mo. Suj), 1893), 21 S. \V. 839 ; Armstrong isting at the time of the assignment of 
 
 V. Warner (Mhio, 1892), 31 N. E. 877; tlie judgment. 
 
 Fera v. Wickham, 61 Mun, 343 ; Layhourn Wolf r. Slielton (1902), 1.59 lud. 531, G.") 
 
 *•. Seymour (Minn., 1893), 54 N. \V. 941, N. E. 582: A purchaser of real estate 
 
 and cases cited; Vardley r. Clothier, .51 under a warranty deed has the right to set 
 
 Fed. Kep. 508, and cases cited ; Louis off against his warrantor's assignee of a 
 
 Snyder's Sons Co. i'. Armstrong, 37 Fed. nnn-negotiable note, given for the unpaid 
 
 Rep. 18; Balbach »». Frelinghuysen, 15 purchase money, a sum that the purchaser 
 
 Fed. Kep. 685; Jones v. Pieuing (Wis., has been coni])elled to pay to relieve Ins 
 
 18;t3), 55 N. \V. 413. jmrcha.'ie from a ])re-existing debt.] 
 
 Qln Wyman v. Hobbins (1894), 51 O. i Beckwith f. Union Hank, 9 N. Y. 211. 
 
 St. 98, 37 N. E. 264, it was held that wiiere 212. QSce, as to necessity of notice, Stadler 
 
 an indorsee of a promijjsory note brings r. Fir.-^t Nat. Bank (1899), 22 Mont. 190, 56 
 
 an action on it against the maker, the latter Pac. 111.] See, however. Smith v. Fox, 
 
 may set off an indebtedness due him from 48 N. Y. 674, which was an action by an 
 
 a previ(jus ind<jrsee, wlien sucli indebted- assignee for the benefit of the creditors of 
 
 ness existed wliile sucli indor.see held the one R., a private banker, brought on a note 
 
 note and botli note and indebtedness were given by defendant to R., and transferred 
 
 then past due. to the plaintiff. At the time of the assigu- 
 
 Way V. Colyer (1893), 54 Minn. 14, 55 ment <lefendant had an amount of money 
 
 N. W. 744: In an action by aa assignee on deposit with R., — more tlian sufficient 
 
 of a judgment, the defendant may plead to pay the note ; and this demand was hcM 
 
 aa a set-off against tiie judgment an to be a good setoff against the note, on
 
 SET-OFF AGAINST THE ASSIGNEE. 133 
 
 the firm of Watrous & Lawrence made a general assignment to 
 one Meyers, having before that time sold goods to the defendants 
 on credit, the price of which did not become due and payable 
 until September, 1855. In February of the same year, W. & L. 
 had ordered from the defendants a (piantity of articles — patent 
 churns — to be manufactured and delivered at a certain agreed 
 price. There had been such mutual dealings between the parties 
 before. In May, 1855, the defendants completed the churns, 
 and tendered them to the assignee, who declined to receive them. 
 The assignee brought an action foi- the price of the goods when 
 it became due in September, and the defendants insisted upon 
 the value of the churns as an offset. The defence of offset was 
 rejected. The court held that the situation of the parties at the 
 date of the assignment must determine the question, and unless 
 a right of offset existed then, it could not arise afterwards. It 
 did not exist then, because neither of the demands had matured; 
 but it was enough that the defendant's claim was not yet pay- 
 able, even if the one assigned was presently due.^ If the 
 defendant's demand had become mature at the time of the assign- 
 ment, it could undoubtedly have been set off under the equitable 
 rule before stated, on account of the insolvency of W. & L. A 
 tirm made a general assignment, having at the time a claim due 
 and payable against the defendants. The assignee brings an 
 action upon the demand, and the defendants set up a note of the 
 assignors which they held at the time of the assignment, but 
 which did not fall due until after that date. The attempted set- 
 off was rejected. "An allowance to a party by way of set-off is 
 always founded on an existing demand in priesenti, and not on 
 one that may be claimed in futuro.^'"^ In an action bv an as- 
 
 the authority of Smith v. Felton, 43 N. Y. See also Fera r. Wiciihani, 135 N. Y. 223, 
 419. The claim made against the defend- reversing s. c. 61 Hnn, 343, and over- 
 ant, and the demand set up by him, ruling llothschild v. Mack, 42 Hun, 73. 
 must both affect him iu the same capac- In Kentucky, however, the assignor's insol- 
 ity ; thus, when the defendant is sued for vcncy is a sufficient ground for allowing the 
 a personal debt, he cannot interpose as a set-off of a claim not due at the time of 
 set-off a demand due him as au executor, the assignment. Kentucky Flour Co.'s 
 Barlow v. Myers, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 183. As.signee r. Merchants' Bank (Ky., 1890), 
 5 Myers v. Davis, 22 N. Y. 489, 490, 13 S. W. 910. |[Samc rule in Minnesota: 
 citing Chance v. Isaacs, 5 Paige, 592; St. Paul, etc. Trust Co. c Leek (1894), 57 
 Bradley v. Angell, 3 N. Y. 475, 493. Minn. 87, 58 N. W. 826.] 
 [|This case, Myers v. Davis, was quoted '^ Martin v. Kunzmuller, 37 N. Y. 396 ; 
 and approved in Stadler v. First Nat. Watt v. The Mayor, etc., 1 Sandf. 23 ; 
 Bank (1899), 22 Mont. 190, 56 Pac. 111] Wells r. Stewart, 3 Barb. 40.
 
 134 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 signee for the benefit of creditors, the defendant relied upon a 
 judgment for costs recovered by himself against the assignor 
 after the making of the transfer. This set-off was not admitted, 
 and it was decided that no notice of the assignment was neces- 
 sary to cut off such a defence.^ And when the defendants, in 
 an action brought upon an assigned demand, alleged payments 
 which they had made, subsequent to the assignment, as sureties 
 for the assignor upon a liability existing prior to and at the time 
 thereof, this set-off was overruled on the same principle ; for, 
 although there was a liability which might result in a debt, there 
 was no existing debt until the payment had actually been made.^ 
 In another action by an assignee the defendant insisted that a 
 similar set-off arising from his payment as surety for the assignor, 
 made under the same circumstances as the last, should be allowed 
 as within the equitable rule on account of the assignor's insol- 
 vency. The set-off was rejected, however, because there was no 
 existing indebtedness in favor of the defendant against the as- 
 signor at the date of the assignment. Such a present indebted- 
 ness is indispensable, whether the case is to be governed by the 
 ordinary rule, or whether the equitable doctrine based upon the 
 assignor's insolvency ^ is relied upon.* When a negotiable proni- 
 
 1 Ogden y. Prentice, 33 Barb. 160. See tomers ; and that it does not become so 
 
 also Lucas v. East Stroudsburg Glass Co., until, at the least, it commits an act of in- 
 
 38 Hun, 581. solvency, and probably not until it sus^pends 
 
 - Adams v. Rrjdarmel, 19 Ind. 339. payment or is closed by the governme'nt."] 
 3 QThe meaning of the word " insol- '« Walker y. McKay, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 294. 
 
 vency, " as used in this connection, was [^And in Merchants' Nat. Bank y. Robinson 
 
 con.sidered by the supreme court of Mon- (1895), 97 Ky. 552, 31 S. W. 136, the 
 
 tana in Stadler v. First Nat. Bank (1899), court said : "An unmatured debt cannot 
 
 22 Mont. 190, 56 Pac. 111. The court, be set off against a /wHayj(/e assignee for 
 
 after quoting the above portion of tbe value of a demand due from the defend- 
 
 text, said : " Insolvency has two mean- ant to the assignor." See also Stadler v. 
 
 ings. In its popular sense, it signifies First Nat. Bank (1899), 22 Mont. 190,56 
 
 the condition of a person whose entire Pac. Ill, quoting the te.xt. See, to the 
 
 assets are insufficient to pay his debts contrary, Stolze v. Bank of Minnesota 
 
 in full. The terra is, however, used (1897), 67 Minn. 172,69 N. W. 172; St. 
 
 in a restricted sense to express the Paul, etc., Trust Co. v. Leek (1894), 57 
 
 present ability of a trader to pay his Minn. 87, 58 N. W. 826 ; St. Louis Nat. 
 
 current obligations as they mature, in tbe Bank v. Gay (1894), 101 Cal. 286, 35 Pac. 
 
 usual course of business. . . . Tlie Na- 870.] See," however, Morrow's Assignees 
 
 tional Bank Act seems strongly to imply r. Hriglit, 20 Mo. 298, in whidi the set-off 
 
 that, so long as an jissociation is carrying was allowed, the court plainly mistaking 
 
 on Its business and meeting its obligations or misconceiving the extent and limita- 
 
 as they mature, whatever its actual condi- tions of the equitable doctrine flowing 
 
 tion as to future ability may be, it is, in from the insolvency of the assignor. See 
 
 the absence of fraud, not to be deemed in- also the decision iii Chenault v. Bush, 84 
 
 solvent, as betweeu itself and its cu.s- Kv. 528, which is similar to that iu
 
 SET-OFF AGAINST THE ASSIGNEE. 135 
 
 issory note is assigned before it becomes due, the maker thereof 
 cannot offset against the assignee a claim existing against the 
 original payee and assignor of the note, although the assignee 
 liave notice of such claim at and before the time of the transfer 
 to him ; there is no case for the set-off between the original 
 parties at the date of the assignment, because the demands are 
 not then matured, and the notice given to the assignee is not of 
 any existing legal defence.^ There being no possibility of setting 
 off a claim of damages arising from a tort or fraud against a 
 demand growing out of contract, if two such opposing claims 
 exist and are in suit, and the creditor in the contract assigns his 
 cause of action, which is afterwards merged in a judgment in 
 favor of the assignee, and subsequently to that assignment the 
 opposing party — the debtor in the contract — obtains a judgment 
 for the damages in his action on the tort, the latter is not entitled 
 to set off this judgment against the one recovered against himself 
 by the assignee. No rights of set-off existed at the date of the 
 transfer, and none could spring up after that time.^ 
 
 § 93. * 165. Right of Set-off may be Available although once 
 Suspended. Illustration. It is possible that a right of set-otf 
 may be available at the time an action is brought, although at 
 some prior period it was suspended, as is well illustrated by the 
 following case: On the 29th of August the Hollister Bank dis- 
 counted for one Monteath a sight draft on New York drawn by 
 him, and passed the proceeds to his credit as a deposit. He did 
 not draw them out. This draft was dishonored on presentment. 
 
 Morrow's Assignees r. Bright. The latter same riglits of set-off also when the note 
 
 case has recently been overruled by Huse is assigned before maturity, but not iu 
 
 V. Ames, 104 Mo. 91, and the rule in good faith and for a valuable consid- 
 
 Walker v. McKay, stated in the text, now eration. Bone v. Tharp, 63 Iowa, 223. 
 
 prevails in Missouri. See also, in support In Richards v. Union Village, 48 Hun, 263, 
 
 of the text, Kinsey v. Ring (Wis., 1892), and in Richards v. La Tourette, .53 Ilun, 
 
 53 N. W. 842. 623, claims iu the hands of the defendants 
 
 1 Williamsr. Brown, 2 Keyes,486. See were not allowed to be offset against de- 
 
 also Barlow v. Myers, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 183 ; mauds sued upon by assignees not due at 
 
 s. c. reversed on appeal, 64 N. Y. 41. But, the time of the assignment; in the first 
 
 where negotiable paper is assigned after case, against an order for the payment of 
 
 maturity, the maker's rights of set-off money; in the second case, against a bond 
 
 are the same as though the demand and mortgage. It is fair to say, however, 
 
 assigned was not negotiable. Norton v. that in neither of these cases was Barlow 
 
 Foster, 12 Kan. 44, 47, 48; Leavenson r. v. Myers mentioned. 
 
 Lafontane, 3 Kan. 523 ; Harris v. Burwell, 2 Roberts v. Carter, 38 N. Y. 107. See 
 
 65 N. C. 584 ; contra, Richards r. Darly, Martin v. Richardson, 68 N. C. 255. 
 34 Iowa, 427, 429. The maker has the
 
 136 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 On the 31st the bank failed, and in the course of time Robinson 
 was appointed its receiver. On the 21st of September ISIonteath 
 assigned to the Howes liis chiim against the bank for the sum on 
 deposit, the same being partly or wholly the proceeds of the said 
 draft. At the time of the assignment the draft in question was. 
 held by parties in New York, to whom the bank had transferred 
 it as collateral security; and, of course, during the interval in 
 which the draft was thus held, the bank could have had no pos- 
 sible set-off by means of it against the demand of Monteath for 
 his deposit, either made by him or by his assignee. But before 
 any action was brought, the bank again became owner of the 
 draft. An action was afterwards commenced by the receiver ta 
 recover an indebtedness due to the bank from the Howes; they 
 set up the claim of Monteath for his deposit assigned to them, 
 as above stated ; and the receiver in fact opposed the demand of 
 the bank against Monteath upon the dishonored draft as a set-off 
 to the defendants' set-off.^ Although the New York Court of 
 Appeals held that the debt against the bank assigned to the 
 defendants by ^Monteath should be disallowed, yet their entire 
 reasoning shows that it was disallowed, not because it w^ould not 
 in itself have been a valid set-off, but because its effect was 
 entirely destroyed by the counter set-off of the draft in the 
 hands of the bank. If the bank had retained the continuous 
 ownership of the draft, as soon as it was dishonored it would 
 have been a good claim against Monteath, and w^ould have ex- 
 tinguished, in whole or in part, his claim for the money due on 
 deposit; this set-off existing at the date of the assignment to the 
 defendants would have been equally available against them ; and 
 as the bank became owner of the draft before the action was 
 brought, its original right revived with the same force and to 
 the same extent as though the draft had never been out of its 
 control. 2 
 
 § 94. * 166. California Rule. Set-off of Demand Accruing after 
 Assignment but before Notice. It is held, ill California, that a 
 demand against an assignor, which was obtained by the debtor 
 or accrued in his favor before notice of the assignment, although 
 in fact subsequent to tlie assignment itself, may be set off against 
 
 3 Qln Ilaminer v. Downing (1901 ), 39 stitutes a departure in pleading. See, 
 Ore. 504, G4 I'ac. 051, it was 1ip1<1 that a however, oases cited in note to § *748.] 
 B€t-off to a plea of set-off is had, anil con- ^ Kohiusuu r. Howes, 20 X. Y. 84.
 
 SET-OFF AGAINST THE ASSIGNEF^ 137 
 
 the cause of action in the hands of the assignee. ^ This ruling, 
 however, is clearly opposed to the doctrine of the New York 
 cases already quoted, and to the theory of set-off generally 
 adopted. Notice may be required in order to cut off other 
 defences ; but a set-off, according to the accepted rule, must exist 
 in the form of a debt then due and payable to the debtor at the 
 date of the transfer. A note, payable on demand, with or with- 
 out interest, transferred at a considerable interval of time after 
 its date, is taken and held by the assignee, subject to all defences- 
 existing in favor of the maker against the payee at the time of 
 the transfer; in other words, such a note is transferred after 
 maturity.^ 
 
 § 95. * 167. Nature of Notice Necessary to protect Assignee. 
 Defendant's Rights as against Assignee purely Defensive. When 
 notice to the debtor is necessary to a complete protection of the 
 assignee against subsequent transactions between the assignor 
 and the debtor, such as payment, release, and the like, an actual 
 notice is not indispensable. Such information or knowledge as 
 would be sufficient to put any reasonable man upon the inquiry, 
 when an inquiry reasonably followed up would have led to an 
 ascertaining of the truth, is equally effective to protect the 
 assignee; in short, the equitable rule in reference to purchasers 
 of land applies to the assignees of things in action.^ In Ohio, a 
 set-off against the person beneficially interested, for whose benefit 
 the suit is prosecuted, may be interposed when the action is 
 brought by one who is, within the meaning of the code, a trustee 
 of an express trust, and there has been no assignment at all. 
 Thus, where a promise is made to A. for the benefit of B., and 
 
 1 xMcCabe v. Grey, 20 Cal. 509. [|The after the as.sipiiment, when the certificate 
 
 case of McCabe c Grey was atiirmed in of deposit became due before he had notice 
 
 St. Louis Nat. Bank '.-. Gay (1894), 101 Cal. of the assignment.]] See also Martin v. 
 
 286, 3.5 I'ac. 876, the court saying: " Ap- Well.*, Fargo, & Co.'s Exp. (Ariz., 1892), 
 
 pellant refers to the fact that in Pomeroy 28 Pac. 958. 
 
 on Remedies and Remedial Rights, § *166, " Herrick v. Woolverton, 41 N. Y. 581, 
 
 McC'abe y. Grey, 20 Cal. 510, was hostilely reversing s. c. 42 Barb. 50. This case 
 
 criticised; but in tliis instance, at least, <U'cides notliing new in the law of set-off ; 
 
 the opinion of the text-writer has not it simply ends a long controversy in the 
 
 overruled the decision of the court." New York courts upon the question 
 
 The same rule seems to obtain in Ken- whether notes on demand with intnest 
 
 tucky. In Huber i\ Egner (1901), Ky., are continuing securities, or whether, like 
 
 61 S. W. 353, it was held that the maker such notes without interest, they become 
 
 of a note is entitled, in an action by the due at once. 
 
 assignee, to plead as a set-off the amount '' Wilkius v Batterman, 4 Barb. 47 ; 
 
 of a time deposit he made with the payee Williamson r. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354.
 
 138 CIVIL llEMEDIES. 
 
 the former, in pursuance of the express permission of the code, 
 brings the action in his own name, a set-off existing against B., 
 who is the real party in interest, the beneficiary for whose behalf 
 the contract Avas made and the suit is maintained, may be pleaded, 
 and, if proved, will be allowed in total or partial "bar of the 
 recovery.^ While in actions prosecuted by assignees the defend- 
 ant can always avail himself of any existing valid set-off, and 
 sometimes counter-claim, as a defence, he cannot recover a judg- 
 ment against the assignee for the excess of any of his claim over 
 the amount of debt established by the plaintiff; as against the 
 assignee, a set-off and a counter-claim of the same nature — that 
 is, a right of action which would be a counter-claim if prosecuted 
 against the original assignor — can only be used defensively', and 
 can do no more than defeat the action entirely.^ 
 
 § 96. * 168. Actions to -wind up Insolvent Corporations. Doc- 
 trine of Set-off Complicated by other Considerations. Many diffi- 
 culties have arisen, and many cases have been decided, growing 
 out of proceedings to wind up insolvent corporations, and espe- 
 cially insolvent insurance companies ; but, as the questions 
 generally turned upon particular provisions of charters, or of 
 statutes regulating such proceedings, little or no aid can be 
 obtained from these decisions in construing the section of the 
 code under consideration. A portion of these companies were 
 mutual, in which every person assured became at once a corpo- 
 rator, so that in any business transaction between himself and 
 the company he would necessarily occupy both the position of 
 creditor and of debtor. This double relation is destructive to 
 any power on his part of invoking the doctrine of set-off. Other 
 companies were stock corporations, and, in addition to the rules 
 as to set-off common to all creditors and debtors, there are special 
 statutory provisions in many States regulating the winding up of 
 these bodies, which greatly enlarge the scope of set-off. The 
 adjudications made in the settlement of such corporations, and 
 the particular rules applicable to them adopted by the courts, 
 have, therefore, little or no connection with the subject-matter 
 of the present discussion. In the case of a mutual company there 
 is no room for any set-off, as has been expressly determined. 
 
 > Miller & Co. v. Florcr, 1.") Ohio St. 525; Looinis v. Eagle Bank, 10 Ohio St. 
 148, 151. .327 ; Casad v. Hughes, 27 lud. 141. 
 
 2 Leavenson v. Lafontaue, 3 Kaiis. 523,
 
 SET-OFF AGAINST THE ASSIGNEE. 139 
 
 A marine insurance company having become insolvent, and a 
 receiver of its affairs appointed, he brought an action on certain 
 notes given by tlie maker thereof for the premium of several 
 policies of insurance. A loss had occurred on one of these 
 policies which became due and payable before any of the notes 
 fell due, and before the appointment of the receiver and the 
 assignment to him. There was an interval of time, tlien, both 
 before the appointment of the receiver and afterwards, during 
 which the company first and the receiver subsequently were 
 holders of a claim against the defendant not yet matured, while 
 the defendant was holder of a claim against the company which 
 was due and payable. Upon the general doctrine as heretofore 
 stated in the text, the maker of these premium notes could not 
 have had an available set-off against the assignee, because at the 
 date of the transfer both demands had not matured ; but, as his 
 own claim was then due and payable, the equitable rule founded 
 upon the insolvency of the assignor would have relieved him. 
 The set-off was entirely rejected, however, on the ground that 
 the compan}' was mutual, the defendant being a corporator, and 
 both a debtoi- and a creditor. ^ In other cases brought by the 
 receiver of an insolvent insurance company, not mutual, upon 
 premium notes, claims by the makers of the notes on account of 
 losses which occurred previous to the appointment of the re- 
 ceiver, but not adjusted so as to become actually payable until 
 after the transfer to him, have been allowed as offsets, not, how- 
 ever, by virtue of the general law as to offsets, — it being held 
 that they did not fall within the settled rules, — but by virtue of 
 certain provisions contained in the statute relating to insolvent 
 corporations which describe such claims as "mutual credits," and 
 direct them to be set off.^ 
 
 § 97. * 169. Right of Set-off in Actions by Personal Representa- 
 tives. Rule in New York. When an executor or administrator sues 
 individually on a note given, or a promise made to him as such 
 personal representative for a debt owing to the deceased at the 
 time of his death, it is the rule in New York that the defendant 
 cannot set off claims due to himself from such decedent, although 
 
 1 Lawrence v. Nelson, 21 N. Y. 158. - Osgood v. De Groot, 36 N. Y. 348. 
 
 It was conceded, liy way of a dictum, that See, however, Osgood v. Ogden, 4 Keyes, 
 if the corporation had not been mutual, 70. 
 the set-off would have been allowed as 
 stated in the text.
 
 140 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 accruing prior to the death, " on the ground that the plaintiff's 
 demand arose after the death of the testator ; and in such a case, 
 no set-off can be received, notwithstanding it existed at the time 
 of the death of the deceased." ^ 
 
 S 98. * 170. Rules as to Set-off apply to other Defences, except 
 that it is Notice, not Assignment, -which cuts off Availability. The 
 foregoing cases and statements relate to the special defence of 
 set-off as against the assignee. Exactly the same rules apply 
 to every other species of defence, with the single modification that, 
 in respect of many such defences, the point of time which limits 
 the effect or cuts off the availability of the defence is not the 
 date of the assignment, but the date of the notice thereof, actual 
 or implied, which is given to the debtor. If the debtor is not 
 notified actually or impliedly of the assignment, it is possible 
 that many transactions between himself and the assignor, done 
 in good faith on his part, may have the same effect in discharg- 
 ing his indebtedness as if the demand had not been assigned, — 
 such as payment to or release by the original creditor, the as- 
 signor.^ But no transaction can have tliis effect if entered into 
 subsequently to a notice of the assignment given to the debtor, 
 or to such information received by him as in law amounts to 
 the same thing as actual notice. Thus, if after a notice to the 
 debtor that the demand against him is assigned, he make a pay- 
 ment to the assignor, he cannot rely upon it as a defence par- 
 tial or total to an action brought by the assignee to enforce the 
 claim.^ 
 
 The scope of this work does not require nor even permit that 
 
 1 should discuss the defence of set-off, or any other particular 
 defence, in an exhaustive manner. The sole purpose of this sec- 
 tion is to construe and interpret the provision, found in almost 
 the same language in all the State codes of j)rocedure, and to 
 ascertain what change, if any, that provision had wrought in tlie 
 pre-existing rules of the law in relation primarily to parties, and 
 incidentally to the availability of defences where the party plain- 
 tiff is an assignee of a thing in action. 
 
 1 Mf-rrittr. Seaman, G N. Y. 168. citing • Hogan v. Black, 6G Cal. 41 ; Randall 
 
 Root V. Taylor, 20 .lolins. 137 ; Fry v. v. Roynold.s, 20 J. & S. 145. 
 
 Evans, 8 Wend. 5.J0 ; Mercein v. Smith, ' Field v. The Mayor, etc. of N. Y.. 6 
 
 2 Mill, 210; 2 U. S. 279. N. Y. 179; McClo,skey v. San Franciaco, 
 
 66 Cal. 104.
 
 ACTION BY OTHER THAN REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. 141 
 
 SECTION FOUKTH. 
 
 WHEN A PERSON OTHER THAN THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST 
 
 MAY SUE. 
 
 § 99. *1T1. Statutory Provisions. There are two forms of the 
 statutory provision, which differ, however, very slightly. The 
 first is : " An executor, an administrator, a trustee of an express 
 trust, or a person expressly authorized by statute, may sue with- 
 out joining with him the person for whose benefit the action is 
 prosecuted.^ A trustee of an express trust, within the meaning 
 of this section, shall be construed to include a person with whom 
 or in whose name a contract is made for the benefit of another." ^ 
 The second form is a little more special : " An executor, adminis- 
 trator, trustee of an express trust, a person with whom or in 
 whose name a contract is made for the benefit of another, or a 
 person expressly authorized by statute, may bring an action with- 
 out joining with him the person for whose benefit it is prosecuted. 
 Officers may sue and be sued in such name as is authorized by 
 law, and official bonds may be sued upon in the same way." ^ 
 The only difficulties of interpretation presented by this section 
 are the determining with exactness what persons are embraced 
 within the three classes, described as " trustees of an express 
 
 1 [[The use of the word " may " in- cieut ground for the abatement of the 
 
 stead of " must " allows the action to he action.] 
 
 brought either by the trustee or the bene- '^ N. Y. § 1 1.3 (449) ; Cal. § 369 ; South 
 ficiary. In Hutchison v. Myers (1893), Carolina, § 136; Oregon, § •!% ; Nevada, 
 5-i Kan. 290, 34 Pac. 742, the court said : § 6; North Carolina, § .57 ; [^Utah, Rev, 
 "But granting that Holmes, who is St., 1898, ij 2902; North Dalcota, Rev. 
 named as trustee in the instrument, is Codes, 1899, 4} 5223 ; South Dakota, Ann. 
 the trustee of an express trust, we see St., 1901, § 6072 ; Arizona, Uev. St., 1901, 
 no reason wiiy the beneficiary may not §§ 1299, 1300; Wasliington, Bal. Code, 
 properly bring the action. ... As will § 482.5; Montana, § .570; Idalio, Code 
 be observed, the provision authorizing Civ. Pro. 1901, § 3157; Colorado, § 5; 
 the trustee to bring an action is per- Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig. § 5626; 
 missive rather than mandatory in its Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, § 620; Wis- 
 terms, and hence will not preclude the cousin, St., 1898, § 2607; Indiana, Burns' 
 maintenance of an action in the name St., 1901, § 252; Minnesota, St., 1894, 
 of the real party in interest." And in § 5158; Mi.ssouri, Rev. St., 1899, § 541.] 
 Snell V. Harrison (1895), 131 Mo. 495, 3 Ohio, § 27; Kansas, § 28; Iowa, 
 32 S. W. 37, it was held that where a § 2544; ^Oklahoma, St.. 1893, § 3900; 
 trustee of an express trust holding the Wyoming, Rev. St , 1899, § 3469, Ken- 
 legal title to land institutes a partition tucky, § 21, in a somewhat different form; 
 proceeding 3i,nA.\omsthQ cestaisipietrnfitent, Nebraska, § 32.] 
 who are minors, such joinder is not suffi-
 
 142 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 « 
 
 trust," *' persons with whom or in whose name a contract is made 
 for the benefit of another,"" and " persons expressly authorized by 
 statute to sue." It is phiin that there are substantially three 
 classes. The second and better form of the provision actually 
 separates them, and does not represent one as a subdivision of tlie 
 other. The first form in terms speaks of "the person with whom 
 or in whose name a contract is made for the benefit of another," 
 as an instance or individual of the wider and more inclusive 
 group, " trustees of an express trust."' It should be carefully 
 noticed, however, that these two expressions are not stated to be 
 synonymous ; the former is not given as a definition of the latter. 
 The section does not read, "a trustee of an express trust shall be 
 construed to mean a person with M'hum or in whose name a con- 
 tract is made for the benefit of another ; " but simply that the 
 latter shall be regarded as one species of the genus. There is 
 liere no limitation, but rather an extension, of the meaning, and 
 the clause of course recognizes other kinds of trustees besides the 
 party to the special fonn of contract, who is not very happily 
 termed a " trustee. "' The section of the New York code, when 
 originally passed, contained but the first sentence as it now 
 stands. Some doubt arose as to its meaning, and a judicial 
 decision having held that the pln-ase embraced, among others, 
 a person with whom or in \\hose name a contract is made for 
 the benefit of another, the legislature, to remove all possibility 
 of doubt, added this judicial language as an explanatory clause. 
 The two forms of the provision, although their phraseology differs 
 somewhat, mean exactly the same thing, and establish exactly 
 the same rule. As these two phrases, whether they be regarded 
 as separated, or one as partially explanatory of the other, are the 
 most comprehensive ones in the section, and present the main 
 difficulties of construction, I shall discuss them first in order, and 
 shall endeavor to ascertain what particular classes of persons 
 were intended to be described by them. This discussion will 
 consist in discovering, if possible, some general principle of 
 interpretation by which to test each particular case, and in stating 
 the instances which have been definitely passed upon by the 
 coui'ts. 
 
 § 100. *172. Meaning of Term, "Trustee of an Expreaa Trust." 
 Theoretical View. What is a "trustee of an express trust"? 
 The section uses the term in its most general sense without limi-
 
 ACTION BY OTHER THAN REAL TARTY IN INTKKEST. 143 
 
 tation, so that when its full legal signification is ascertained, tliat 
 must be its meaning in this connection. If the legislature has 
 said, as in New York and other States, that, in addition to its 
 generally accepted technical import, it shall also include certain 
 persons who are not usually, nor perhaps with strict accuracy, 
 denominated "trustees," this exercise of the legislative power 
 within the domain of definition does not change, certainly does 
 not lessen, its signification, as it stands without the explanatory 
 comment. In Ohio, and in several of the States, the phrase is 
 used alone, but accompanied by the clause which is descriptive 
 of another class, and is not a mere partial explanation. We must 
 find the true legal definition of "trustees of an express trust," 
 and add to this the "persons with whom or in whose name con- 
 tracts are made for the benefit of others ; " the combined result 
 will be the entire class intended by the legislature. ^ It is obvi- 
 ous that the trust must be "express," in contradistinction to 
 implied. In the large number of instances where a trust is 
 raised by implication of law from the acts, circumstances, or 
 relations of the parties, the trustee is certainly not embraced 
 within the language of the provision. An express trust assumes 
 an intention of the parties to create that relation or position, and 
 a direct act of the parties by which it is created in accordance 
 with such intention, outside of the mere operation of the law. 
 In the case of an implied trust, the law, for the purpose of doing 
 justice, and usually for the purpose of working out some equi- 
 table remedy, lays hold of the prior situation, acts, or circum- 
 stances of the parties, declares that a trust arises therefrom, and 
 imposes the quality of trustee upon one, and of beneficiary upon 
 another, in a manner and with a result that are often the furthest 
 possible from their actual design. In an express trust the parties 
 intend such a relation between themselves, carry out their inten- 
 tion by suitable words, and the law confirms and accomplishes 
 the object which they had in view. An express trust primarily 
 assumes three parties : the one who by proper language, creates, 
 grants, confers, or declares the trust; the second who is the 
 recipient of the authority thus conferred; and the third for 
 
 ^ QThe statute authorizing the trustee the suit is to give the trustee powers not 
 
 of an express trust to sue in his own name conferred upon him by the instrument 
 
 without joining the beneficiary, has no creating the trust: Sampson v. Mitchell 
 
 application to a case where the object of (1894), 125 Mo. 217, 28 S. W. 768j
 
 144 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 whose benefit the authority is received and held. It is true that 
 in many instances the first-named parties are actually but one 
 person ; that is, the same individual declares, confers, receives, 
 and holds the authority for the benefit of another; but the theory 
 of the transaction is preserved unaltered, for the single person 
 who creates and holds the authority acts in a double capacity, 
 and thus takes tlie place of two persons. It is impossible, how- 
 ever, to conceive of an express trust as a legal transaction or 
 condition, without assuming the prior intention, and the express 
 language by which this intention is effected, and the trust created 
 resting upon one as the trustee for the benefit of a second as the 
 beneficiary; and, except as every grant, transfer, or delegation 
 of authority and power is in a certain broad sense a contract, the 
 notion of a contract is not essential to our conception of an 
 express trust. The authority may be conferred by the public 
 acting through governmental machinery, as in the case of officers, 
 or by the intervention of courts, as in the cases of administrators, 
 executors, receivers, and the like ; or by private persons, as in 
 innumerable instances of trusts relating to real or personal prop- 
 erty ; but there must be the intent to accomplish that very result, 
 and this intent must be expressed by language or by some process 
 of delegation which the law regards as an equivalent. Further- 
 more, in its accurate legal signification, a trust implies something 
 which is the subject thereof. Although the word may have a 
 more extensive meaning in its popular use, so that a trust may 
 be spoken of where the trustee is simply clothed with a power to 
 do some personal act unconnected with any property in which he 
 has an interest or over which he has a control, yet this is not its 
 legal import. An illustration of this legal notion of a trustee 
 may be seen in the case of a guardian over the j)erson alone of 
 his ward, without any interest in or power over his estate, or 
 the committee of the person of a lunatic. Such a guardian or 
 committee, althougli [)(>.ssessing a power to be exercised for the 
 benefit of another, is not a trustee; and the term, when applied 
 to him, could be used only in a popular and not a legal sense. 
 Su(.h a guardian or connuittee would not therefore, by virtue 
 merely of the permission granted in the provision of the statute 
 under examination, be entitled to sue in his own name as a 
 trustee of an express trust. In the light of this analysis of the 
 expression as a term of legal import, it is plain that "a person
 
 ACTION BY OTHER THAN UKAL PARTY IN INTEREST. 145 
 
 with whom or in whose name a contract is made for the benefit 
 of another," is not necessarily a trustee. He may be; and 
 whether he is or is not must depend entirely upon the nature and 
 subject-matter of the contract itself. The contract may be of 
 such a kind, stipulating concerning property in such a manner, 
 that the contracting party will be made a trustee. On the other 
 hand, it may be of such a kind, having no reference perhaps to 
 property, or stipulating for personal acts alone, that the con- 
 tracting party will not be a trustee in any proper sense of the 
 word, but will be at most an agent of the person beneficially 
 interested. There are numerous instances, therefore, in which 
 an agent, w4io enters into an agreement for either a known or 
 for an unknown principal, is permitted, in accordance with the 
 particular clause under consideration, to sue in his own name. 
 
 §101. *173. Judicial View. I shall proceed to show, in 
 the first place, how far the foregoing description is sustained 
 by judicial authority. Few cases have attempted to define the 
 phrase, "trustee of an express trust," in any comprehensive 
 manner, for the courts have in most cases been content with 
 determining whether the particular instance before them fell 
 within the term. The following definitions or descriptions, 
 however, have been given : " An express trust is simply a trust 
 created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some 
 writing, or deed, or will. And it is to be observed, in reference 
 to § 4 of the code [of Indiana], that it does not assume to define 
 the meaning of the term ' trustee of an express trust ' in its 
 general sense; it simply declares that these words, within the 
 meaning of the section, ' shall be construed to include a person 
 with whom, or in whose name, a contract is made for the benefit 
 of another. ' Evidently this provision was not intended to limit 
 the meaning of the general term, 'express trust,' or to confine 
 the operation of the statute to the particular class of cases re- 
 ferred to, but rather to enlarge its sense b}- including also that 
 class within it."^ In another case it was said: "In order to 
 constitute a trustee of an express trust, as I understand the 
 statute, there must be some express agreement to that effect, or 
 something which in law is equivalent to such an agreement. 
 The case of factors and mercantile agents may or may not con- 
 stitute an exception under the custom and usage of merchants. 
 
 1 Weaver v. Wabash, etc. Canal Co. Trs., 28 Ind. 112, 119, 
 10
 
 14G CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 Bat in every other case the trust must, I think, be expressed by 
 some agreement of the parties, not necessarily, perhaps, in writ- 
 ing, but either written or verbal, according to the nature of tlie 
 transaction. In this case no agreement is shown that the plaintiff 
 was to take or hold as trustee, and that he is a trustee results 
 merely from other circumstances. It is implied from the fact 
 of partnership, and from the fact that the plaintiff received the 
 assignment on account of a debt due the firm. If it is not a case 
 purely of implied trust, as distinguished from an express trust, 
 then I am at loss to conceive of one ; and to hold the plaintiff to 
 be a trustee of an express trust would, in my judgment, be a 
 palpable disregard of the statute, and a violation of the intent of 
 the legislature."^ In a case where a contract in the nature of a 
 lease was effected by a person describing himself in the instru- 
 ment as agent of the owners, but who had no interest whatever 
 in the premises leased, and did not execute the instrument, and 
 to whom no promise was made as the lessor, it was held that he 
 could not maintain an action for the rent or for possession of the 
 land forfeited by non-payment of the rent. He could not sue as 
 the "person with whom, or in whose name, a contract is made 
 for the benefit of another,"' because no promise at all was made 
 to him, and he was not a "trustee of an express trust."' The 
 court said: "One who contracts merely as the agent of another, 
 and has no personal interest in the contract, is not the trustee of 
 an express trust within the meaning of the statute, and cannot, 
 under the code, sue upon such contract in his own name." Of 
 course this last expression must be taken in connection with the 
 facts of the case; namely, that no promise was made to the 
 plaintiff individually.^ 
 
 1 Robbins r. Deverill, 20 Wis. 142, per nor the trustee of an express trust, witliiu 
 
 Dixon C.J. This was an action by the the moanin<r of the statute. He is not a 
 
 pi lintiff as assignee of V. & W. The trustee of an express trust, because no 
 
 a-isigninent was in writing, but was taken such trust appears from the assignment, 
 
 on account of a debt due from P. & and none is shown to exist between him- 
 
 W. to the firm of K. &, L., which con- self and his copartners by virtue of any 
 
 sisted of the plaintiff and the two others, other instrument." lie then adds the 
 
 with an understanding that P. & W. were remark quoted in the text. 
 
 nut to be credited on their debt to R. & L. 2 Kawlings r. Fuller, 31 Ind. 255. Qln 
 
 imtil the money was collected. Dixon Mitchell i. St. Mary (1897), 148 Ind. Ill, 
 
 C. J. sai 1 : "The demand was transferred 47 N. E. 224, the court said: "There 
 
 to the plaintiff alone by words of absolute must be .something in the nature of the 
 
 a.««ignment, no trust beincr erprfssed. . . . contract, appearing upon its face or from 
 
 ITp'in these facts the plaintiff cannot re- alUgations in the pleadings, disclosing 
 
 cover. He is not the real party in interest, that a trust relation exists and is sought
 
 ACTION BY OTHER THAN KEAL PARTY IN INTEKEST. 147 
 
 § 102. *174. Same Subject. New York Cases. The nature uf 
 an express trust, and tlie elasses of persons embraced within the 
 statutory phrases in question, were determined, upon great con- 
 sideration, by the New York Court of Appeals, in the leading 
 case of Considerant v. Brisbane.^ ''The term 'trustee of an 
 express trust ' had acquired a technical and statutory meaning. 
 Express trusts, at least after the time of the adoption of the 
 [New York] Revised Statutes, were defined to be trusts created 
 Ijy the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or 
 deed, or will; and the Revised Statutes had abolished all express 
 trusts except those therein enumerated which related to land. 
 If this section (§ 113 [449j) of the code was to be restricted and 
 limited to those enumerated express trusts, the practical incon- 
 venience arising from making the beneficial interest the sole test 
 of tlie right to sue, and Avhich that section (§ 113) was intended 
 to obviate, would continue to exist in a large class of formal and 
 informal trusts. Accordingly, in 1851, the section was amended 
 by adding the provision that ' a trustee of an express trust, 
 within the meaning of this section, shall be construed to include 
 a person with whom, or in whose name, a contract is made for 
 the benefit of another.' It is to be observed that there is no 
 attempt to define the meaning of the term ' trustee of an express 
 trust' in its general sense; but the statutory declaration is that 
 these words ' shall be construed to include a person,' etc. The 
 counsel for the respondent insists that the sole intention of the 
 legislature in amending the section was to remove a doubt that 
 had been expressed, whether a factor or other agent, wdio had at 
 common law a right of action on a contract made for the benefit 
 
 to be enforced for the benefit of the cestui Hun^ 644 ; Heavenridge v. Mondv, 49 
 
 ijue trust. It is not enough that an agent Ind. 434 ; 34 id. 28 : when a jndgnient 
 
 who exceeds his authority in suing in his lias been obtained by a trustee of an 
 
 own name upon a demand due his j)rinci- express trust, defendant may set off a 
 
 pal is an agent and may intend to account judguient in his favor against the bene- 
 
 for the recovery. He cannot bind his ficiary, and plaintiff is estopped from 
 
 j)rincipal without authority expressed or setting up that he is the real party in 
 
 implied, and it is only when the ]irincipal interest; North W. Conf. of Univ. r. 
 
 may be deemed to be in court and bound Myers, 36 id. 375 ; Brooks v. Harris, 42 
 
 by tlie proceeding that sec. 251 [allowing id. 177; Wiley v. Starbuck, 44 id. 298 ; 
 
 .suit by a trustee of an express trust] is Washington Tp. v. Bonney, 45 id. 77. 
 
 intended to apply."] For further examples, see Wetmore r. 
 
 1 Considerant v. Brisbane, 22 N. Y. Hegeman, 88 N. Y. 69 ; White v. Allatt, 
 
 389, 395, per Wright J. As to action by 87 Cal. 245 ; Cassidy v. Woodward, 77 
 
 trustees of an express trust, see also Iowa, 354 ; and i«/}-a, § * 178. 
 I'resb. Soc. of Kuoxboro v. Beach, 8
 
 148 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 of his principal b}' reason of liis legal interest in the contract, 
 was by the code deprived of that right. But no such limited 
 intention can be inferred from the words of the statute. Indeed, 
 it is only by a liberal construction of the section that the case of 
 u contract by a factor (an individual contract) can be brought 
 within it at all. It is intended manifestly to embrace, not only 
 formal trusts declared by deed inter pra^tes, but all cases in which 
 a person acting in behalf of a third party enters into a written 
 express contract with another, either in his individual name, 
 without description, or in his own name expressly, in trust for, 
 or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, another, by whatever form 
 of expression such trust may be declared. It includes not only 
 a person with whom, but one in whose name, a contract is made 
 for the benefit of another." These definitions and descriptions 
 of the term fully sustain the conclusions reached in the preceding 
 paragraph as to the legal meaning of the phrase " trustee of an 
 express trust." It is abundantly settled that an agent cannot sue 
 in his own name to enforce an implied liability to his principal; 
 if by any possibility he should be a trustee under such circum- 
 stances, he would not be the trustee of an express trust. ^ 
 
 § 103. * 175. Statute includes an Agent ■with ■whom an Express 
 Contract is made. Illustrations. Having thus attempted to arrive 
 at a general definition of the term, I shall proceed to consider the 
 cases which are embraced within it, and shall take at first those 
 in which a "person with whom, or in whose name, a contract is 
 made for the benefit of another" has sued in his own name. It 
 is fully established by numerous decisions that when a contract 
 is entered into expressly with an agent in his own name, the 
 [)romise being made directly to him, although it is known that 
 he is acting for a principal, and even although the principal and 
 liis beneficial interest in the agreement are fully disclosed and 
 stipulated for in the very instrument itself, the agent in such 
 
 ' Palmer r. Fort Plain, etn. I'lk. K. Co., name of, the town." Ruckman v. Pitcher. 
 
 11 N. Y. 37(), 390, i)er SeMeii .1. : "There 20 N. Y. 9: "The aj^ent may, in many 
 
 is no covenant or agreement miming to ca.ses, sue upon express contracts, made 
 
 these officers in terms. Tiiey, as agents with him.self by name. . . . Hnt this im- 
 
 of the town, convey the riglit to use the plied duty or assiun/isit arises only in 
 
 highway upon a certain condition. It is favor of those to whom the money in fact 
 
 virtually the act of the town through belonged, and therefore caimot be en- 
 
 thein. If an implied covenant arises upon forced in the name of another person to 
 
 the instrument, it is a covenant with the whom the obligation is not due." 
 town, and must ho cnfiirced liv, and in the
 
 ACTION BY OTHER THAN REAL PARTY IN INTKRKST. 
 
 149 
 
 case is described by the language of the statute, and may main- 
 tain an action upon the contract in his own name without join- 
 ing the person thus beneficially interested.^ The following are 
 
 1 [Leach v. Hill (1898), 100 Iowa, 171, 76 
 N. W. 667 : A bank fashier, who cashes a 
 check upon the uiidcrtaking of a third 
 person that the check will he honored by 
 tlie drawee, may sue, as trustee of an ex- 
 press trust, u])ou the check and the third 
 person's agreement, without joining the 
 bank for which he was acting. In 
 Mitchell V. St. Mary (1897), 148 Ind. Ill, 
 47 N. E. 224, on the other hand, where a 
 note was endorsed in blank and given to 
 the treasurer of a corporation as a mere 
 custodian of the corporation, with no 
 intention to make him a trustee, such 
 treasurer, it was held, could not sue upon 
 it in his own name as the trustee of an 
 express trust. See also Hudson c. Archer 
 (1893), 4 S. D. 128, .55 N. W. 1099, quot- 
 ing the text. See also Herman v. City of 
 Oconto (1898), 100 Wis. 391, 76 N. W. 
 364; Ward r. Tlyba (1897), 58 Kan. 741, 
 51 Pac. 223; Brown /•. Sharkey (1894), 93 
 low. I, 157,61 N. W.3G4.] Considerant v. 
 Hrisbanc, 22 N. Y. 389, reversing s. c. 2 
 Mosw. 471. The plaintiff was agent for a 
 foreign corporation wliich did business 
 under the name of " Bureau, Guillon, 
 Goden, & Co." The defendant applied to 
 the plaintiff for stock in said corporation, 
 and authorized the plaintiff to subscribe 
 in his name for such stock to the amount 
 of $10,000, and, in payment of the sub- 
 scription, gave plaintiff two notes, each in 
 the following form : " New York, March 1, 
 1855. On the first day of July, 1855, I 
 promise to pay V. Considerant, executive 
 agent of the company Bureau, Guillon, 
 Goiien, &Co., the sum of $5,000, for which 
 I am to receive st(3ck of said companv 
 known as premium stock, to the amount 
 of .^5,000, value received. A. Brisbane." 
 The plaintiff alleged that he had entered 
 defendant's name as a subscriber; averred 
 a tender of the stock and a refusal to 
 accept the same ; and sued in his own 
 name on the notes. The Court of Ap- 
 l)eals held that he could maintain the 
 action. The judgment of Wright J. is an 
 exhaustive discussion of the whole sub- 
 ject. Denio J. dissented, but not from the 
 general reasoning as to the true interpre- 
 
 tation of the code. His dissent was basO(l 
 entirely upon a construction of the notes 
 sued upon. He insisted that the promise 
 in these notes was, in fact, made to the 
 company, and not to the agent; and so 
 the case did not fall within the terms of 
 the statutory provision. Rowland v. 
 Phalen, 1 Bosw. 43 ; Cheltenham Fire- 
 brick Co. V. Cook, 44 Mo. 29 ; Wright v. 
 Tinsley, 30 Mo. 389 ; Weaver r. Wabash, 
 etc. Canal Co. Trs., 28 Ind. 112; Hice r. 
 Savery, 22 Iowa, 470, in which it was held 
 that either the agent or the beneficiary 
 might sue. See supra, § *140. Winters 
 V. Rush, 34 Cal. 136 ; Ord v. McKee, 5 CaL 
 515; Scantliu i;. Allison, 12 Kan. 85,88; 
 Noe r. Christie, 51 N. Y. 270, 274. In 
 Hubbell V. Medbury, 53 N. Y. 98, the 
 provision of the code was held to be per- 
 missive only, and not to prohibit an action 
 by the beneficiary, even without the 
 trustee. (Compareanie, § *I38.) And see 
 Presb. Soc. of Knoxboro v. Beach, 8 Hun, 
 644 ; People v. Slocum, 1 Idaho, 62. It 
 is held in New York that an action against 
 a common carrier for a breach of his 
 contract, or of his duty to carry, must be 
 brought in the name of the owner of the 
 goods, although the contract may have 
 been made or the goods shipped by 
 another. Green v. Clarke, 12 N. Y. 343; 
 Krulder v. Ellison, 47 N. Y. 36 ; Thomp- 
 son V. Fargo, 63 N. Y. 479 ; 49 N. Y. 1 88. 
 But when the consignor, although not the 
 general owner, has a lien upon or a special 
 interest in the goods, and makes the con- 
 tract and pays tiie consideration for their 
 carriage, he may bring an action for the 
 breach of the contract iu Jiis own name, in 
 order that he may protect his rights. 
 Swift V. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 106 N. Y. 
 206. The usual rule, however, seems to 
 b(! that the person with whom the common 
 carrier contracts, although for another's 
 benefit, may sue, whether or not he has a 
 special interest in the goods. Snider v. 
 Adams Exp. Co., 77 Mo. 533 ; Wolfe v. 
 Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 97 Mo. 473 ; Hooper v. 
 Chicago &'n. W. Ry. Co., 27 Wis. 91 ; 
 Waterman v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 
 61 Wis. 464. For further instances of
 
 150 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 particular instances, or examples of particular classes of cases, in 
 Avliieh an agent has been permitted to sue, or may always sue, in 
 liis own name, because the contract is made with him directly, 
 although on behalf of a known principal: on. a sealed lease 
 between the plaintiff, as agent for the owner, of the first part, 
 and the defendant as the lessee;^ on a sealed contract between 
 ])laintiff and defendant, the plaintiff describing himself as agent 
 for his sisters, and stipulating that they should act in defendant's 
 theatre at specified wages, wdiich the latter covenanted to pay, 
 the action being brought for such wages ;2 where the plaintiff, 
 being the holder of the legal title to certain land, which he held, 
 however, merely for the benefit of a married woman, was in- 
 duced, by false representations, to execute a mortgage thereon, 
 supposing it to be for her benefit and at her request, but in fact 
 without any consideration paid to himself or to her, brought an 
 action in his own name to restrain a foreclosure of the mortgage ; ^ 
 in an action on a policy of marine insurance "for the account of 
 whom it may concern," and in case of loss the amount insured to 
 be paid to the plaintiff or order ; ^ where a promise was made to 
 the administrator of an estate, and he afterwards resigned, and 
 another was appointed in his place, it being held that he was the 
 proper party to sue;^ where a grantee in a deed of land was 
 simply acting as agent for another, and the purchase price was 
 paid with that other's money, the grantee is the proper party to 
 sue for the breach of a covenant which was broken immediately 
 
 suits by agents on contracts made witli Rockwell r. Holconib (Colo. 1892), 31 I'ac. 
 
 tliein expressly iu their own names, see 944; Beck v. Haas, 31 Mo. App. 180. 
 McLaughlin i-. Deadwood First Nat. Bk., ^ Morgan r. Reid, 7 Abb. Pr. 21.5. 
 
 6 Dak. 406 ; Consol. Barb- Wire Co. v. " Nelson i: Ni.xon, 13 Abb. Pr. 104. 
 
 Purcell, 48 Kan. 267 ; Cremer v. Winmier, ■' Brown c. Cherry, 38 How. Pr. 3.")2. 
 
 40 Minn. 511 (contract by agent for sale * Walsh v. Wash. Mar. Ins. Co., 3 
 
 of land); Close v. Hodges, 44 Minn. 204 Robt. 202; Greenfield v. Mass. Mut. L. 
 
 (njortgage to agent) ; Lake v. Albert, 37 Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 430. See also Sturm v. 
 
 Minn. 453; Stoll r. Sheldon, 13 Neb. 207 ; Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 63 N. Y. 77; 
 
 Seymour ". Smith, 114 N. Y. 481 ; Coffin Waring v. ludem. F. Ins. Co., 45 id. 606; 
 
 ?•. Grand Rapids Hydr. Co. (1892), 18 N. Y. Strolm r. Hartford F. lus. Co., 37 Wis. 
 
 Suppl. 782 ; HoUingswortb r. Moulton, .53 625 ; Protection Ins. Co. v. WiLson, 6 Ohio 
 
 Hun, 91 ; Albatiy & R. Iron, etc. Co. v. St. 553. [^Insurance taken out by an em- 
 
 Lundberg, 121 U. S. 451; Merchaiits' plover for the benefit of his employees 
 
 Bank i-. .McClelland, 9 Colo. 608 (cashier may be .lued for by tiie employer without 
 
 of bank) ; Holmes r. Boyd, 90 Ind. 332 joining the beneficiaries, becau.^e he is a 
 
 (same). Further illustrations of the text : trustee of an expre.><s trust: Fidelity & 
 
 Coffin r. Grand Rapids Hydraulic Co. Casualty Co. ;•. Ballard (1899), 105 Ky. 
 
 (N. Y. App. 1893), 32 N. E.1076; Lewis 253, 48 "s. W. 1074.] 
 r. Whittcri (.Mo. Sup. 1892), 20 S. W. 617 ; ^ Harney v. Dutcher, 15 Mo. 89.
 
 ACTION BY OTHER THAN REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. 151 
 
 upon the execution of the deed, c. ^., a covenant iigainst incum- 
 brances;^ a guest at an inn who had property of another in liis 
 possession, which was lost, was held to he the projjcr party to 
 sue for its value ; ^ an auctioneer may sue for the price of goods 
 sold by him, whether lie have any interest in the price or not,^ 
 iind a sheriff, for the price of property sold by him on execution ; * 
 the master of a ship or other vessel may maintain an action iov 
 freight, or on any contract concerning the ship, entered into on 
 behalf of tlie owners," or for the taking and carrying away, con- 
 version of, or injury to, the cargo. ^ 
 
 § 104. * 176. Actions on Bonds given to protect other Persons. 
 Obligee may sue. Various kinds of bonds and undertakings 
 generally required by statute, and given to some designated 
 obligee, although showing on the face that they are designed to 
 protect, secure, or indemnify other persons, are also contracts 
 made "with, or in the name of, one person for the benefit of 
 another; " and although the party immediately interested may in 
 general sue in his own name,'' yet the obligee or person to whom 
 the promise is made may always, unless forbidden by statute, 
 maintain the action, and in some States is the only one who is 
 permitted to do so.^ Among these are bonds in great variety 
 given to the "people" or to the "State," conditioned upon the 
 faithful discharge of their duties by public, local, or municipal 
 officers, actions on which, except when otherwise directed bv 
 statute, may be brought by the people or the State ; ^ bonds 
 running to the people or to the State, conditioned upon the 
 faithful discharge of duties by various private or semi-private 
 trustees, or by persons appointed in judicial proceedings and the 
 
 1 Hall V. Plaine, 14 Ohio St. 417, 423. contractor with labor ami materials, is a 
 
 2 Kellogg V. Sweeney, 1 Lans. 397. trustee of au express trust. The same 
 8 Minturn v. Main, 7 N. Y. 220, 224 ; question was raised in United States r. 
 
 Bogart V. O'Regan, 1 E. I). Smith, 590. Kundle (1901), 27 Wash. 7, 67 Pac. 395; 
 
 * Armstrong I'. Vroman, 11 Minn. 220; and the United States, as obligee of tbo 
 McKee v. Lineberger, 69 N. C. 217, 239. bond, was held a proper plaintiff, as trustee 
 
 5 Kennedy v. Eilau, 17 Abb. Pr. 73; of an express trust, j 
 Braithwaite i\ Power, 1 N. Dak. 455. ^ Hunter v. Mercer Cy. Com'rs of, etc., 
 
 •* Houghton v. Lynch, 13 Minn. 85. 10 Ohio St. 515 (countv treasurer's bond 
 
 * See supra, §§ *139, *141. running to the State) ; State r. Moore, 19 
 
 * [^United States >\ McCann (1901), 40 Mo. 369 (sheriff's bond) ; Meier r. Lester, 
 Ore. 13, 66 Pac. 274, quoting the text, 21 Mo. 112 (constable's bond); Shelby 
 where it was hehl that a person to whom Cy. v. Simmonds, 33 Iowa, 345 (county 
 a contractor's bond is executed condi- treasurer's bond running to the county), 
 tioned to pay all persons supplying the
 
 152 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 like, such as those given by administrators, executors, or re- 
 ceivers ; ^ those given by the trustees of an estate, although 
 entirely for the benefit of the persons having an interest in the 
 estate; 2 bastardy bonds ^ and the like; bonds given directly to a 
 sheriff or other superior officer to indemnify a deputy sheriff or 
 other subordinate officer against the consequences of acts done in 
 the discharge of the latter's official duties ; * a bond given by a 
 town superintendent of common schools to the supervisor of the 
 town, an action on which must be brought by the supervisor or 
 his successor in office.^ 
 
 § 105. * 177. Actions on Contracts Made for Undisclosed Prin- 
 cipals. Agent may sue. In all the instances heretofore men- 
 tioned, the contract has been made with an agent in his own 
 name, and the promise given to him, although the principal or 
 beneficiary was known, and even expressly designated and pro- 
 vided for by the terms of the agreement. The rule is the same,, 
 and even more emphatically so, if the principal or beneficiary is, 
 at the time of the contract, unknown or undisclosed, or not men- 
 tioned in the instrument. When a contract, even in writing, 
 is made with and by an agent, and no mention is made of any 
 principal or beneficiary, but the other contracting party supposes 
 he is dealing with the former on his own private account, but in 
 fact such person is an agent for an undisclosed principal and 
 enters into the agreement in the course of his agency, actually 
 effecting the contract on behalf of that superior behind him, the 
 rule is Avell settled that the one who was thus a direct party to 
 the agreement — the actual agent — may bring an action upon it 
 in his own name, or the principal may sue in his name.^ 
 
 1 People V. Laws, 3 Abb. Pr. 450 ; prosecutrix as her interest might appear, 
 
 Annett v. Kerr, 28 How. Pr. 324 ; People the State being in fact a beneficiary under 
 
 V. Townsend, 37 Barb. 520. Tiie re- the bond as well a.'* the jirosecutri.x.] 
 porter's head-note reads .should be sued by •• Stiiwell i-. llurlbert, 18 X. Y. 374, 
 
 the people ; this is more than was decided. 375. 
 
 Haggott V. Boulger, 2 Duer, 160. The ^ Fuller v. Fullerton, 14 Barb. 59. 
 
 bond may also be pro.secuted by the per- '^ QStewart v. Gregory, Carter & Co. 
 
 son interested and benefited. See, how- (1900), 9 N. D. 618,84 N. W. 553; Carter 
 
 ever, Carmichael i;. Moore, 88 X. C. 29. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1900), 111 Ga. 38, 
 
 ^ People V. Norton, 9 N. Y. 176, 179. 36 S. E. 308; Tustin Fruit Assn. f. Earl 
 
 3 People V. Clark, 21 Barb. 214. QSee Fruit Co. (1898), Cal., 53 Pac. 693.] 
 
 Myers i;. Baughman (1901), 61 Neb. 818, Erickson v. Compton, 6 How. Pr. 471; 
 
 80 N. W. 507, where it was held that an Grinnell v. Schmidt, 2 Sandf. 706 ; Union 
 
 action on a bastardy bond could be lirought India Rubber Co. f. Tomlin.son, 1 E. D. 
 
 only in the name of the State, which was Smith, 364; Van Lien v. Byrnes, 1 Hilt, 
 
 named as obligee, for the use of the 13!; Iliggius v. Senior, 8 Mees. & W.
 
 ACTION BY OTHER THAN KKAL I'ARTY IN INTEREST. 153 
 
 § 106. * 178. other Classes of Trustees. I liave tliUS far con- 
 sidered oiily the particular class of trustees of an express trust 
 specially described in some of the codes as "persons with whom 
 or in whose name a contract is made for the benefit of others." 
 There are numerous other and more properly designated classes 
 of such trustees ; and whatever be their nature, or the object of 
 the trust, they may, by virtue of this section of the statute, 
 maintain an action in their own names. They are generally 
 created or appointed by some instrument in the nature of a grant 
 or conveyance, or they may be appointed in judicial proceedings 
 by a court. Although the rule is simple and peremptory that 
 these trustees may sue without joining the beneficiaries, the 
 following instances in which the rule has been applied may be 
 enumerated: assignees, general or special, in trust, to pay 
 creditors ; ^ the assignees of a contract in trust to reimburse out 
 of the proceeds thereof third persons for advances made;^ 
 trustees appointed to take and collect subscriptions for colleges 
 and other similar purposes;^ a receiver appointed in another 
 State ; * the grantee of lands in trust for the use and benefit of 
 another is the proper party to sue for possession or for damages 
 by trespass or other injury ; ^ a person who agreed to hold notes 
 
 834; Sims r. Bond, 5 B. & Ad. 389, 161; Simonton i'. First Nat. Bk. of Min- 
 
 393. per Lord Deunian. Ludwig v. neapolis, 24 Minu. 216 ; Witter i". Little, 
 
 Gille.spie, 10.5 N. Y. 653; McLaughlin v. 66 Iowa, 431. Compare Wynne v. Heck, 
 
 Great Western In.s. Co., 20 N. Y. Suppl. 92 N. C. 414. 
 
 (Com. PI. 1892), 536 ; ' Manette ?7. Simp- ^ Cummiii.s t-. Barkalow, 4 Keyes, 514. 
 
 son, 15 N. Y. Suppl. (Supreme Ct. 1891), [^Aud in Bates v. Richards Lumber Co. 
 
 448 ; Snider v. Adams Exp. Co., 77 Mo. (1893), 56 Minn. 14, 57 N. W. 218, it was 
 
 523 ; Keown ?-. Voirel, 25 Mo. App. 35. As held that a beneficial interest in a con- 
 
 against right of undisclosed princi})al to tract for work and labor may be a.ssigned 
 
 sue, see Kelley c. Thuey, 102 Mo. 522. In by a party who engages therein to per- 
 
 ordiuary contracts made by agents for form the same, so as to entitle the assignee 
 
 tiieir principals, the latter are the real to recover the contract jjrice upon tlie ful- 
 
 parties in interest, and inn.st sue. Swift filmeut of the contract by tlie assignor, 
 
 V. Swift, 46 Cal. 266, 269 ; Chin Kem and that the assignee in such a case is a 
 
 You ?;. Ah Joan, 75 Cal. 124; Ferguson trustee of an express trust, as he is obliged 
 
 I'. McMahon, 52 Ark. 433. See, also, to account for the jiroceeds.] 
 ante, § *141. ^ Slocum v. Barry, 34 How. Pr. 320; 
 
 » Lewis r. Graham, 4 Abb. Tr. 106; Dix v. Akers, 30 Ind. 431 ; Musselman v. 
 
 St. Anthony's Mill Co. v. Vandall, 1 Minn. Cravens, 47 Ind. 4. See Lathrop v. Knapp, 
 
 246. See Foster v. Brown, 65 Ind. 234. 37 Wis. 307. 
 
 Assignee to pay creditors distinguished * Runk v. St. John, 29 Barb. 585 ; per 
 
 from a mere agent to collect claims and contra, Hope Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 2 
 
 pay <iebts: Sandmeyer v. Dak. F. & M. Robt. 278. See Lathrop v. Knapp, 37 
 
 Ins. Co. (S. Dak. 1891), 50 N. W. 353; Wis. 307 ; Garver r. Kent, 70 Ind. 428. 
 citing Brockmeyer v. Wash. Nat. Bk., 40 •■> Goodrich v. Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 422; 
 
 Kan. 376; Cornley u. Dazian, 114 N. Y. Boardmau r. Beckwith, 18 Iowa, 292,
 
 lo-i cmL hemedil;s. 
 
 aud a mortgage for the benefit of another, and to apply the pro- 
 ceeds thereof when collected in payment of a debt owned by 
 himself to that other, may sue to enforce the securities ; ^ the 
 assignee of a stock subscription, who holds it for the benefit of 
 a bank, is the proper party to bring an action upon it;^ a person 
 to whom chattels had been transferred for the benefit of a married 
 woman in trust, to permit her to have exclusive use and posses- 
 sion, and to dispose of them by her direction, is the proper party 
 to briuff an action to restrain interference with or disturbance of 
 her possession. 3 It has been held in Kentucky that where a 
 railroad company issued bonds which were held by many dif- 
 ferent persons, and executed a mortgage to a trustee for the 
 purpose of securing such bonds, this trustee, who was the sole 
 mortgagee named in the instrument, could not maintain an action 
 in his own name alone to foreclose the mortgage on account of the 
 non-payment of the money due on the bonds, but he must join 
 the bond-holders as parties plaintiff with himself.* The correct- 
 ness of this decision may well be doubted in the light of the other 
 cases above cited, which uniformly proceed upon a different 
 doctrine. 
 
 § 107. *179. Actions Brought by Public Officers. Many public 
 officers are authorized by law to bring actions in their own names, 
 and by virtue of their official character, in respect of matters 
 falling within the scope of their official functions. As this 
 subject is entirely regulated by special statutes, which greatly 
 vary in different States, and as it is not in fact a portion of the 
 general civil procedure, but rather a matter exceptional and 
 collateral thereto, I shall not attempt any discussion of the cases 
 in which such officers may sue, but shall simply mention a few 
 
 295. See Holden r. N. Y. & Erie Bank, lected anything, was held to be a trustee 
 
 72 N. Y. 280, 297 ; Tyler v. Gran<;eT, 48 of an express trust, aud could therefore 
 
 Cal. 259 ; McKiunon v. McKinnon, 81 N. C. maintain the action in his own name/] 
 201; [^Lewis v. ,St. Paul, etc. IJy. Co. - Kimball'!;. Spicer, 12 Wis. 668. 
 
 (189+), 5 S. D. 148, 53 X. W. 580.] ^ j^egj j._ Harris, 7 Robt. 151. A 
 
 1 Gardinier r. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 605. trustee under separation articles, by the 
 
 See Davidson v. Kims, 67 N. C. 228 ; terms of which lie was to receive au- 
 
 Thompson v. Toland, 48 Cal. 99, 114; uual payments from the husband and 
 
 Moorehead v. Hyde, 38 Iowa, 382. Qln for the support of the wife, may sue 
 
 Strucicmeyer v. Lamb (1896), 64 Minn, for the recovery of such sums without 
 
 57, 65 N. W. 930, the assignee of certain joining the wife. Clark v. Fosdick, 118 
 
 notes and chattel mortgages, who was to N. Y. 7. 
 
 bring suit against the maker and account * Bardstown & L. R. Co. v. Metcalfe, 
 
 to hi.s as.-ignor fur the proceeds if he col- 4 Mete. (Ky.) 199.
 
 ACTION BY UTHEK THAN KEAL PARTY IN INTEREST. 155 
 
 decisions which may have some general interest.^ Actions by 
 pubhc officers suing as such shoukl be brought in their individual 
 names, but with their official titles added ;2 but the mere use of 
 the official title will not be enough, without the proper averments 
 of the official character in the pleadings ; in the absence of such 
 averments, the title will be regarded as only a description of the 
 person.' In New York, counties cannot sue nor be sued. All 
 actions and judicial proceedings in favor of or against counties, 
 except those which some county officer is expressly authorized to 
 maintain in his own name for the benefit of the county, must be 
 brought by or against the "Board of Supervisors" of the county 
 named, as an organized unit, and by that designation, and not 
 against the supervisors individually ; * but when the action is by 
 or against the supervisors, not as the immediate representatives 
 and in the place of the county, it must be brought by or against 
 them individually, with their title of office added. ^ The rule in 
 respect to towns in New York is different. They are municipal 
 corporations, and inust sue and be sued by their corporate name,' 
 except in the few cases where town officers are expressly author- 
 ized by statute to sue in their name of office for the benefit of the 
 town.^ In accordance with this rule, where the supervisor and 
 commissioner of highwaj'S had entered into a contract on behalf 
 of the town, which contained no promise to or undertaking with 
 themselves, as such officers, it was held that they could not 
 maintain an action upon it in their joint names, but the action 
 should have been by the town, as the real party in interest." 
 
 ^ QA county judge, suing on a trustee's fayette Cy. i\ Ilixon, 69 Mo. 581 ; Vanars- 
 
 bond under R. S. § 4015, is the trustee of dall v. The State, 65 lud. 176; Garver v. 
 
 an express trust : Ilichter i;. Leiby (1898), Kent, 70 id. 428; Jefferson Cy. Com'rs 
 
 99 Wis. 512, 75 N. \V. 82.3 v. Lineberger, 3 Mont. 31 ; San Benito 
 
 2 Paige V. Fazackerly, 36 Barb. 392. Cy. v. Whitesides, 51 Cal. 416. 
 As to actions by towns, counties, super- ^ Gould v. Glass, 19 Barb. 179. [It 
 
 visors, and similar officers, see Hathaway was held in Atkinson v. Cawley (1900), 
 
 V. Cincinnatus, 62 N. Y. 434; Lewis i-. 112 Ga. 485,37 S. E. 715, that where an 
 
 Marshall, 56 N. Y. 663 ; Guilford v. Cooley, action is instituted by " W. Y. Atkinson, 
 
 58 id. 116 ; Chautauqua t'. Gifford, 8 Ilun, Governor, etc.," the words "Governor, 
 
 152; Sutherland v Carr, 85 N. Y. 104; etc.," pltb merely descriptio persoiue, and do 
 
 Hagadorn v. Raux, 72 id. 583 ; Cairns v. not designate the capacity in which the 
 
 O'Bleness, 40 Wis. 469 : Beaver Dam suit is brought.] 
 
 t'. FriuL's, 17 id. 398 ; Franklin T. Sup. v. * Hill r. Livingston Cy. Sup , 12 N. Y. 
 
 Kirby, 25 id. 498 ; Dutcher v. Butcher, 52 ; Magee v. Cutler, 43 Barb. 239. 
 39 id. 651 ; Pine Valley v. Unity, 40 id. » Wild v. Columbia Cy. Sup., 9 How. 
 
 682: La Cro.sse v. Melrose. 22 id. 459; Pr. 315, per Harris J. 
 School Dir. of Sigel !?. Coe, 40 id. 103; ^ Duanesburgh i-. Jenkins, 46 Barb. 294. 
 
 Oconto Cy. Sup. v. Hall, 42 id. 59 ; La- ^ Palmer v. Fort Plain & C. Plk. R.
 
 156 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 The Secretary of State for the War Department of Great Britain 
 was permitted to sue in his individual name to recover pubUc 
 moneys which had been embezzled by a subordinate official, it 
 beincr shown tliat by the British statute the property was vested 
 in him as such secretary.^ The "Metropolitan Fire Depart- 
 ment," a commission created by statute for the city of New 
 York, is declared to be a qiLasi corporation, capable of suing and 
 being sued, and not a mere official agency of the municipality. "-^ 
 
 § 108. * 180. Meaning of Phrase, "Persons expressly Author- 
 ized by Statute " to sue. Classes of Persons Included. Hardly 
 any attempt lias been made by the courts to determine in a 
 general manner the classes of persons who fall within the desig- 
 nation of "expressly authorized by statute" to sue. The Su- 
 preme Court of Indiana in one case made an approach towards 
 such an interpretation. In an action upon a promissory note by 
 the assignee thereof, his right to sue was denied by the defend- 
 ant. The evidence tended to show that he was not the real 
 party in interest. To meet this objection, he invoked a prior 
 general statute, which expressly provides that indorsees and 
 assignees of bills and notes may sue in their own names, and 
 urged that he was thus brought directly within the class of 
 "persons expressly authorized by statute" mentioned in the 
 section of the code under consideration. The court, however, 
 refused to adopt this construction of the code. It said: "Is the 
 assignee of a note who holds it as such, without any real interest, 
 one of that class of persons here referred to as being ' expressly 
 authorized by statute to sue ' ? or does the provision have refer- 
 ence to another class of persons, such as the guardians of an 
 idiot, etc. ? We are of the opinion that the clause of the section 
 above quoted does not have reference to the rights of an assignee 
 of a promissory note, but to such persons as may be authorized 
 to sue in their own names because of holding some official posi- 
 tion, as the president of a bank, the trustees of a civil township, 
 and the like."^ There have been held embraced within the same 
 class, not only the presidents and other managing officers of 
 joint-stock associations for business purposes, but also similar 
 
 Co., II N. Y. 376, 390, per Selden J. "A - Clarissy v. Metropolitan Fire Dep., 
 
 town is a political corporation, and suits 7 Abb. Pr. n. s. 352. 
 
 in Its behalf must be prosecuted in the ^ Swift v. Ellsworth, 10 Ind 205, per 
 
 name of the town." See su/<ra, § • 174. Hanoa J. 
 » reel V. Elliott, 7 Abb. Pr. 433.
 
 ACTION BY OTUEll THAN KEAL PAKTV IN INTEREST. 157 
 
 officers of some voluntary societies organized for purposes not 
 connected with business, when the action is brought on behalf 
 of, or in relation to matters belonging to, the society, and among 
 other instances the following; ^ a suit brought by the president of 
 a voluntary unincorporated religious and missionary association 
 to recover a legacy bequeathed to it;^ by the treasurer of a divi- 
 sion of 'the Sons of Temperance, a voluntary social organization ; ^ 
 by the president of a bank of which he was the nominal pro- 
 prietor, all the contracts and transactions being in his name as 
 such proprietor ; ^ by the trustee of the " Pittsburg Trust Com- 
 pany," an unincorporated business association, in an action 
 brought to recover damages for negligence in not protesting a 
 bill of exchange belonging to such association, by which the 
 amount thereof was lost.^ An officer of the Bank of England 
 was permitted to sue in New York upon a bill of exchange 
 belonging to the bank, by showing that the statutes of England 
 authorized him to bring an action. ^^ On the other hand, it has 
 been held in the same State that an action brought by a person 
 as foreman of a certain named fire company — unincorporated — 
 could not be maintained ; that the provisions of the code and of 
 other statutes authorizing suits in the name of officers of unin- 
 corporated bodies do not apply to such societies as fire com- 
 panies.' If the doctrine stated by the Indiana court cited above 
 be taken as the correct interpretation of the clause, it follows 
 that the whole section provides for three classes of persons who 
 may sue in their own name, although not the real parties in 
 interest; namely, fird, those with whom, or in whose name, a 
 contract is made for the benefit of another, to whom the promise 
 is directly given, and who sue because they are the actual 
 promisees; secondly, trustees proper of an express trust, who, 
 by virtue of being trustees, have an interest in or title to some 
 
 1 QThe president of an unincorporated ^ Tibbetts v. Blood, 21 Barb. 650; ex- 
 ussociatiou was allowed, under § 1919 of pressly hokliug that these statutes are not 
 the Code of Civil Procedure, to bring an confined to business associations. 
 
 iiction to recover the property belonging ■» Burbank v. Beach, l.'j Barb. 326. 
 
 to all the members of the same : Ostrom ^ Lau<;hlin v. Greene, 14 Iowa, 92, 94. 
 
 V. Greene (1900), 161 N. Y. 353, 55 N. E. The plaintiff was said to be a trustee of 
 
 ■919.3 ^" express trust. 
 
 2 De Witt V. Chandler, 11 Abb. Pr. « Myers v. Machado, 6 Abb. Pr. 198. 
 459 (General Term). It was held that ' Mastersou v. Botts, 4 Abb. Pr. 130 
 the action might be maintained under (Sp. T.), 
 
 statutes of 1848, 1849, citing Tibbetts v. 
 Blood, 21 Barb. 650.
 
 158 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 property which is the subject-matter of the trust; and, thirdly^ 
 certain persons clothed with authority to do various acts for, or 
 in behalf of, others, but who are not vested with any interest in 
 or title to property, so as to render them trustees in the strict 
 meaning of that term, and who are authorized by various statutes 
 to maintain actions in the exercise of their personal authority, 
 such as officers of voluntary societies, guardians, or committees 
 of the person, and the like. 
 
 ^ 109. * 181. Actions by Executors and Administrators. That 
 executors and administrators can maintain actions relating to the 
 estate in their own names alone, is a proposition too familiar and 
 elementary to require discussion or the citation of authority. ^ 
 Although in general a foreign executor or administrator cannot 
 sue as such in the courts of another State or country than that in 
 wiiich he was appointed, yet, if the objection is not raised by 
 
 1 [In Bern v. Shoemaker (1898), 10 
 S. D. 453, 74 N. W. 239, it was held 
 that on the refusal of the administrator to 
 hriug an action for the recovery of lands 
 alle<!;ed to belong to the estate, the heirs 
 may bring such action, on the broad 
 ground that when one whose duty it is to 
 protect the estate refuses to do so, the 
 ))arties beneficially interested may take 
 steps to do so. See also Tecumseh Nat. 
 Bank r. McGee (1901), 61 Neb. 709,85 
 N. W. 949, where the court said that 
 "while the general rule is that an admin- 
 istrator or personal representative of a 
 decedent's estate must prosecute actions 
 for recovery of debts due the estate, tliere 
 are exceptions to the rule ; and in the 
 present case held that the order of the 
 trial court, substituting an heir at law and 
 jtermitting her to prosecute the action for 
 her interest in the claim in controversy 
 in her own name, the other heir.s having 
 .•■■ettled and compromised theirs, was not 
 erroneous." 
 
 Ives V. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1901), 129 
 N. C. 28, 39 S. E. 631 : Only the personal 
 representative, and not the heirs, of a 
 deceased beneficiary can bring an action 
 on a life insurance policy. Burrell v. 
 Kern (1899), 34 Ore. 501, 56 Pac. 809: 
 " When the cause of suit or action, 
 whether in contract or in tort, accrues 
 after the death of the testator or intestate, 
 the money, if recovered, will bo assets of 
 
 the estate, and the executor or adminis- 
 trator may sue, at his option, in either his 
 representative or individual capacity." 
 
 Hook r. Garfield Coal Co. (1900), 112 
 la. 210, 83 N. W. 963: An administrator 
 cannot maintain trespass for injuries to 
 the real estate of his intestate. In this 
 case the court held that where adminis- 
 trators sue for trespass to real estate of 
 their intestate under an assignment from 
 the heirs, and request that the heirs, who 
 assigned simply to avoid a multiplicity 
 of suits, be substituted as parties plaintiff, 
 sucli request, while discretionary with the 
 court, should ordinarily be granted. 
 
 Bunker v. Taylor (1900), 13 S. D. 433, 
 83 N. W. 555 : Where an executrix of au 
 estate dies pending a suit, and adminis- 
 trators are appointed to continue the 
 ailministration of tlie estate, they are 
 " successors in interest " to the executri.x 
 within the statute providing that on the 
 death of a party, if the cause of action 
 survive, the action may be continued by 
 his successor in interest. Strauss v. Rend- 
 heim (1900), 162 N. Y. 469, .56 N. K. 1007 : 
 A contract of sale may be made by ex- 
 ecutors and enforced by them in an action 
 for specific performance, witliout making 
 the beneficiaries parties, where such ex- 
 ecutors have an unqualified and imperative 
 power to sell real estate and convert it 
 into cash in order to divide it among 
 legatees.]
 
 ACTION BY OTHER THAN KEAL PARTY IN INTEREST. 159 
 
 answer or deniurrer, it is waived under the codes of procedure ; 
 that is, the objection goes simply to the parties' capacity to sue, 
 and not to the cause of action set up in the complaint or petition.^ 
 In California, lands owned in fee by the deceased do not descend 
 at once to his heirs or pass to his devisees, but go with the 
 personalty into the estate in the hands of his administrator or 
 executor as a part of the assets to be administered upon. Any 
 action, therefore, relating to such land, — to recover its posses- 
 sion, or damages for injuries done to it, or rents, or the like, — 
 brought at any time before a final settlement of the estate and 
 distribution thereof, must be prosecuted by the administrator or 
 executor alone. ^ In an action by the administrator of a mort- 
 gagee, brought to foreclose the mortgage, the heir of the mort- 
 gagee is not a proper party to be joined as a co-plaintiff. In 
 California, as in New York, the mortgage is a mere security, 
 incident and collateral to the debt, and belongs wholly to the 
 j)ersonalty.^ 
 
 § 110. * 182. Actions by General Guardians. How far general 
 guardians of infants, testamentary or appointed by the probate 
 courts, are authorized to maintain actions in their own names, 
 relating to the personal property of their wards, depends rather 
 upon the provisions of the statutes which define their powers and 
 duties than upon those of the codes.* The codes in general can 
 
 1 l\obbius V. Wells, 18 Abb. Pr. 191. from the complaint that the plaintiff had 
 ^Held in Gregory v. McCorniick (1893), capacity to sue as admiuistratrix, but it 
 120 Mo. 6.57, 25 S. W. 565, that the ob- must appear from the complaint that she 
 jection that plaintiff is a foreign executor did not have capacity. The former objec- 
 or administrator, if it appears on the face tion can be taken only by answer.] 
 of the petition, if not raised by special As to foreign administrator, see Con- 
 demurrer on the ground that plaintiff has nor's Adm. v. Paul, 12 Bush, 144; as 
 not le^^al capacity to sue, is waived. To to executors and administrators generally, 
 the same effect see Wilson v. Wilson see Duncan v. Whedbee, 4 Colo. 1 43 ; 
 (1894), 26 Ore. 251, 38 Pac. 185, citing the MuUin's Appeal, 40 Wis. 154; Harte v. 
 text. Houchin, 50 Ind. 327 ; Wright's Adm. v. 
 
 But see Louisville & Nashville R. R. Wriglit, 72 Ind. 149 (A. as administrator 
 
 Co. V. Brantley's Adm'r (1894), 96 Ky. of B.'s e.state can sue A. as administrator 
 
 297, 28 S. W. 477, where it was held that of C.'s estate) ; Ham v. Henderson, 50 
 
 where a foreign administrator attemjits to Cal. 367 ; Cashman v. Wood, 6 Hun, 520. 
 
 bring suit, defendant may demur gener- - Curtis i". Herrick, 14 Cal. 117; Meeks 
 
 ally on the ground that the petition does v. Ilahn, 20 Cal. 620; Grattan v. Wiggins, 
 
 not state a cause of action. It is not a 23 Cal. 16; Emeric v. Peuuiman, 26 Cal. 
 
 case of want of legal capacity to sue. 119. 
 
 And it was held iu Locke v. Klunker ^ Grattan r. Wiggins, 23 Cal. 16. 
 
 (1898), 123 Cal. 231, 55 Pac. 993, that a * [In an action brought in behalf of 
 
 demurrer for want of 'facts will not be minors by a guardian, it is necessary for 
 
 Bustained where it merely does not appear the guardian to allege issuable facts show-
 
 160 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 luirdly be deemed to have enlarged their powers in this respect. 
 In a few States, the guardian is specitically mentioned and 
 coupled with the executor and administrator in the section of 
 the statute under consideration ; and this language may be inter- 
 preted as authorizing him to sue in respect of all property which 
 is under his control by virtue of his office.^ In New York, it 
 has been determined by the Supreme Court in a very carefully 
 considered case, the decision, however, being rested upon a con- 
 struction of the Revised Statutes, and not of the code, that the 
 general guardian may ])ring all actions in his own name respect- 
 ing the personal property of the ward and the rents and profits 
 of his real estate.^ This same power is expressly conferred upon 
 him by the statutes of certain States.'^ On the^ other hand, it is 
 held in Kentucky that, while the guardian, who has taken a note 
 expressly made to himself as payee for moneys belonging to the 
 ward, may prosecute an action thereon, because the promise is 
 given directly to him, he cannot sue in respect of his ward's 
 property in general, since he has no estate or interest therein ; 
 such actions must be brought in the name of the infant.^ The 
 
 int^ his representative capacity, and if he 
 does not do so the complaint is demurrable 
 upon the ground of want of capacitv to 
 *ue, but unless so made the ol)jection is 
 waived : Dalrymple v. Security Loau Co. 
 (11)00), 9 X. b. 306, 83 N. w". 245. The 
 objection that the parties to an action are 
 minors who appear without guardians ad 
 lllpiii is waiveil by pleading to the merits : 
 Blumauer v. Clock (1901), 24 Wash. 590, 
 €4 Pac. 844. A father may su(! as guar- 
 dian (til litem for services of his minor 
 child rendered to a third party : Grosov- 
 sky (.'. Goldenberg (1902), 86 Minn. 378, 
 90 N. W. 282.3 
 
 1 This interpretation is given to the 
 language of the code by the Supreme 
 Court of Indiana in Shepherd v. Evans, 
 9 Ind. 200, which holds that, by virtue of 
 the provision, the guardian is empowered 
 to bring such actions in his own name. 
 See Wilson v. Houston, 70 X. C. 37.5 (when 
 wards arc necessary plaintiffs) ; Crawford 
 I'. Xeal. 50 Cal. 321 (necessary al-iegationa 
 in suit by infant by a guardian nd litem). 
 A ceneral guardian may sue, Hanonstein 
 V. Knll. 59 Flow. Vr. 24: Fox '•, Kcrpor, 
 61 Ind. 14-<; and see Carrillo ,• Mcl'hil- 
 
 lips, 55 Cal. 130 ; per contra he cannot sue 
 in his own name, Vincent v. Starks, 45 
 Wis. 458. 
 
 ^ Thomas v. Bennett, 56 Barb. 197; 
 Seaton i'. Davis, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 91 ; and 
 see White r Parker, 8 Barb. 48, 52; 
 Mebane v. Mebane, 66 N. C. 334 ; Biggs 
 r. Williams, 66 N. C. 427. 
 
 ■^ See [[Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 3982.] 
 
 * Anderson v. Watson, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 
 509. [[So, also, in Missouri, in Webb v. 
 lI.^ydon (1901), 166 Mo. 39, 65 S. W. 760, 
 it was held tliat a suit to recover property 
 belonging to a ward .slioiild be brought in 
 the name of tlie ward by tlie curator, and 
 not in the name of the curator, since the 
 title is in the ward. McLean '■. Dean 
 (1890). 60 Minn. 369, 69 N. W. 140: 
 Where a note is purchased by a guardian, 
 payable to himself, but witli the funds of 
 his ward and for the ward's benefit, the 
 guardian may sue upon it in his own 
 name. 
 
 Dixon V. Cardozo (1895), 106 Cal. 
 506, 39 Pac. 857 : After the commence- 
 ment of the action plaintiff liecame insane, 
 and a guardian was appointed and substi- 
 tuted, upon motion, as ])laintifT. Held
 
 JOINDKR OF I'LAINTIIFS. 161 
 
 statutes which provide for the appointment of guardians or com- 
 mittees over the property of lunatics, confirmed drunkards, and 
 other such persons not sui juris, generally confer uj)on them the 
 same powers that are given to the general guardians of infants, 
 and a similar rule should therefore prevail in reference to their 
 prosecution of actions. Although there is some conflict in the 
 decided cases, yet, as these guardians or committees do not 
 acquire any estate or interest in the property subjected to their 
 control, but only a power of possession and management, the 
 correct doctrine upon principle would seem to be that they can- 
 not maintain actions concerning it in their own names, unless 
 expressly authorized to do so by statute ; other actions may be 
 brought by them.^ 
 
 SECTION FIFTH. 
 WHO MAY BE JOINED AS PLAINTIFFS. 
 
 §111. *183. Statutory Provisions. The following are the 
 provisions relating to the joinder of parties plaintiff in one action 
 found in the various State codes, and it will be seen that there 
 is an absolute identity of language in all the legislation upon 
 this subject. " All persons having an interest in the subject of 
 the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, may be joined 
 
 error, as the suit should have been prose- with another, the ward is not a necessary 
 
 cuted in the name of the original plaintiff, party.] 
 
 by J. D.. his guardian. Dennison v. Will- i Kingr. Cutts, 24 Wis. 625; McKillip 
 
 cut (1894), Idaho, 35 Pac. 698: "The r. McKillip, 8 Barb. 552. Bnt, per contra, 
 
 guardian of a minor is not permitted to see Person v. Warren, 1 4 Barl). 488, which 
 
 bring suit in his own name for money or expressly holds that the cominittoe is a 
 
 property belonging to the ward, and wliich "trustee of an express tru.-<t" within the 
 
 he has a right to the possession of as meaning of tiie code. The whole subject 
 
 such guardian, but mu.st bring suit as was discussed and determined in the very 
 
 guardian." late case of Fields v. Fowler, 4 N. Y. Sup. 
 
 Plympton v. Hall (1893), 55 Minn. 22, Ct. 598. The action was brought by the 
 
 56 N. W. 351 : The suit instituted in be- committee of the person and estate of a 
 
 half of a lunatic should be in the name of lunatic to set aside the sale of a farm 
 
 the lunatic, but brought by his guardian made by defendant to tlie lunatic, to 
 
 or next friend. Row v. Kow (1895), 53 cancel tlie satisfaction of a mortgage 
 
 O.St. 249, 41 N. E. 239: An action to which had been executed by him, and 
 
 recover property belonging to an imbe- also a check which he had given on such 
 
 •cile must be brought by guardian and sale. The action was held to be properly 
 
 not by next friend. R. S. § 4998. How- brought by the committee. E. Darwin 
 
 ard V. Singleton (1893), 94 Ky. 336, 22 Smith J., in giving the opinion of the 
 
 S. W. 337 : In an action by a guardian to court, says : "'J'he rule undoubtedly wa-;, 
 
 sell his ward's real estate owned j(;intly and still is, at law, where the action is
 
 162 
 
 CIVIL KEMKDIES. 
 
 as plaintiffs, except as otherwise provided in this title." ^ This 
 is the important section; but the following one somewhat en- 
 larges its scope and effect in certain cases: "Of the parties to 
 the action, those who are united in interest must be joined as 
 plaintiffs or defendants; but, if the consent of any one who 
 should have been joined as plaintiff' cannot be obtained, he may- 
 be made a defendant, tlie reason thereof being stated in the com- 
 plaint."- The particular statutory rules relating to married 
 women as parties, and prescribing Avhen wives may sue alone 
 or when husbands must be joined, will be stated in a subsequent 
 portion of this section. Many of these special enactments are 
 not found in the codes of procedure, but in separate and inde- 
 pendent legislation. 
 
 § 112. * 195. Scope of Statutory Provisions. The Provisions 
 respecting Plaintiffs Compared -with those respecting Defendants. 
 Apply to Legal as well as Equitable Actions. It must be con- 
 ceded at once that there is no repeal or modification of the 
 
 brouf>;ht to assert the title of the lunatic 
 to real and personal property, it must be 
 brought in his name, as held in Mclvillip 
 V. Mclvillip, 8 Barb. 552." He cites the 
 laws of 1845, ch. 112, which authorize the 
 committee to sue for any debt, claim, or 
 demand transferred to them, or to the 
 possession and control of which they are 
 entitled ; also Gorliam v. Gorham, 3 Barb. 
 Ch. 32; Ortley v. Messere, 7 Johns. Ch. 
 139, and § 111 of the code, and reaches 
 the conclusion that the equity rule as to 
 parties is controlling in actions of this 
 kind. The decision in Person c. Warren, 
 U Barb. 488, is expressly approved and 
 followed. S. P. Bearss c. Montgomery, 
 40 Ind. 544. 
 
 1 New York, § 117 (446) ; Ohio, § 34 ; 
 Kansas, § 35 ; California. §§ 378, 381 ; 
 Iowa, § 2545; South Carolina, § 140; Ne- 
 vada, § 12; Oregon, § 380, but limited to. 
 e()iiitable actions; North Carolina, § 60; 
 QVVi.scoiisin, St., 1898, § 2602 ; Utah. Uev. 
 St., 1898, § 2913; North Dakota, Rev. 
 Codes, 1899, § 5229; South Dakota, Ann. 
 St., 1901, § 6077; Oklahoma, St., 1893, 
 § 3907 ; WjLshingion, Bal. Code, § 48.33, 
 in somewhat different form ; Montana, 
 § 580 ; Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1 901 , § 3 1 66 ; 
 Wyominj;, Ilev. St., 1899, § 3479; Colo- 
 rado, § 10; Arkansa.s, Sand. & Hill's Dig., 
 
 § 5G29 ; Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, §617; 
 Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 263; Ken- 
 tucky, § 22; Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, 
 § 542; Nebraska, § 40.] 
 
 2 New York, § 119 (448); California, 
 § 382; South Carolina, § 142; Oregon, 
 § 381, but limited to equity actions; Ne- 
 vada, § 14; Ohio, § 36; Kansas, § 37; 
 Iowa, § 2548; North Carolina, § 62; 
 QUtah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2917; North 
 Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5232; South 
 Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6079; Arizona, 
 Rev. St., 1901, § 1313; Montana, § 584; 
 Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3170; 
 Colorado, § 12; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, 
 270; Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2G04 ; Okla- 
 homa, St., 1893, § 3909; Wa.shington, 
 Bal. Code, § 4833; Wyoniin-i, Kcv. St, 
 1899. §3481 : Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, 
 § 617; Nebraska, § 42; Arkansas, Sand. 
 & Hill's Di^'., § 5631 ; Kentucky, § 24; 
 Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, § 544.] 
 
 QThe code provision requiring the rea- 
 son to be given for making a person de- 
 fendant w'ho should ])roperly be a plaintiff, 
 requires the reason for not joining him, 
 that is, his refusal, to be stated, and not 
 his reason for such refusal : Union Pac. 
 Rv. Co. V. Vincent (1899), 58 Neb. 171, 
 78 N. W. 457.]
 
 GENERAL THEORY AND INTENT OF THE CODES. iG.'j 
 
 common-law rules in detail; the requirements of the old law as 
 to joint and several rights, and the union or severance of the 
 parties holding such rights, are not in any express manner 
 referred to. It should also be carefully observed — and the fact 
 is one of great practical importance — that the provisions in the 
 various codes relating to parties plaintiff are not so full, minute, 
 and express as those relating to parties defendant. Even in 
 those State codes where the common-law distinctions between 
 joint, joint and several, and several liabilities are utterly abol- 
 ished, and the practical requirements as to the union or severance 
 of parties defendant based upon them are wholly swept away, 
 there is no corresponding express legislation as to the distinctions 
 between joint and several rights and the union or severance of 
 plaintiffs. This difference in the mode of treatment may be 
 made the ground — and has been by many judges — of inferring 
 that the legislature intended to leave the ancient legal doctrines 
 as to plaintiffs untouched, and to confine its work of reform to 
 the case of defendants. The legislative intent, therefore, what- 
 ever it may be, must be found in the few general provisions 
 quoted at the commencement of the present section, and in the 
 subsequent provisions which regulate the rendition of judgments, 
 so far as the same depends upon or is connected with the parties 
 to an action. Referring to these provisions, it is plain that their 
 language is general, inclusive, without exception, and applying 
 alike to all kinds and classes of actions. Whatever doctrines in 
 reference to parties plaintiff the legislature has adopted, what- 
 ever regulations it has established, its intention, as shown by the 
 language of all the codes but one or two, is to apply them equally 
 to legal and to equitable actions. No exception being made nor 
 even suggested, the courts cannot, unless by an act of positive 
 legislation, by an act of direct usurpation, create an exception, 
 and say that these general terms were intended to apply to 
 equitable suits alone, while legal actions were intended to be 
 left outside of their scope and effect. 
 
 § 113. * 196. The Statute in Effect an Enactment of the Equity 
 Doctrine. Practical Question herein. These statutory provisions 
 themselves are confessedly an enactment, with hardly a verbal 
 change, of the general principles long ago established by courts 
 of equity for the regulation of the parties plaintiff in suits pend- 
 ing before them. The legislature has, therefore, in a very brief
 
 164 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 but comprehensive form, adopted the equitable doctrine, and has 
 applied it to tiie civil action rec^uired to be used in the enforce- 
 ment of all rights and the pursuit of all remedies, whether legal 
 or equitable. This proposition cannot be denied, without deny- 
 ing to the language of the statute its plain meaning and ordinary 
 significance and force. The practical question, then, arises at 
 once. How far is this equitable doctrine inconsistent with the 
 positive rules as to parties plaintiff in legal actions, long estab- 
 lished as a part of the common-law procedure? To what extent 
 does it, as thus generally stated, necessarily abrogate or modify 
 these special rules? That some change is wrought, if we adhere 
 to the simple language, is very manifest. For example, the 
 common law required that all partners, or other joint contractors, 
 should unite as plaintiffs, and admitted no ordinary exception or 
 excuse for the non-joinder. The new procedure, after requiring, 
 as did the common law, that all those parties " united in interest 
 must be joined as plaintiffs," adds, "but if the consent of any 
 one who should have been joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, 
 he may be made a defendant, the reasons being stated in the 
 complaint or petition." The practice permitted by this clause 
 was familiar to courts of equity, but was utterly unknown in 
 courts of law. Here, however, it is applied to all actions; no 
 exception is suggested; and if we follow the plain language of 
 the codes, this important alteration is made in the ancient legal 
 rules regulating the parties plaintiff. 
 
 § 114. * l'.>7. Statutory Provisions confirm Common-Law^ Rules 
 to a Certain Extent. Assuming that the provisions in relation 
 to plaint! ifs are an enactment in a statutory form of the general 
 equitable doctrine in regard to the same subject, and that, as 
 they stand in the codes, they equally embrace within their scope 
 actions of all kinds, legal and equitable, and giving full force to 
 their language, they do not abrogate but rather confirm a large 
 portion of the common-law rules, those, I mean, which require 
 all persons jointly interested to l^e united as plaintiffs. The 
 general requirements, "all persons having an interest in the 
 subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, may 
 be joined as plaintiffs," and "those who are united in interest 
 must be joined as plaintiffs," plainly include the case of persons 
 "having an interest in the subject-matter," or "united in in- 
 terest " by virtue of their being joint obligees, covenantees, or
 
 GENERAL THEORY AND INTENT OF THK CODES. 165 
 
 promisees at law, as well as the case of persons having some 
 connnon equitable interest. The two sections of the codes from 
 which I have quoted do not contemplate nor permit a severance 
 among parties plaintiff when the old law requires a joinder;^ the 
 changes introduced by them rather tend in the opposite direction, 
 and, talking their language simply as it stands, they would seem 
 to allow the uniting of parties plaintiff in many cases where such 
 union was forbidden in legal actions; as, for example, the unit- 
 ing of survivors of joint promisees and the personal representa- 
 tives of those deceased. In fact, the practical rule of equity in 
 regard to suits by persons jointly interested, or having a joint 
 right, was the same as that which prevailed at law, with the 
 single exception or addition which provided for the case of a 
 refusal by one or more of the joint holders of the right to unite 
 with their fellows as plaintiffs. In equity, as well as in law, the 
 joint owners of property, and the joint obligees, or covenantees, 
 were in general required to be all made co-plaintiffs, but if one 
 or more refused to join, he or they could be made defendants. ^ 
 This equitable doctrine is now, if we accept the express language 
 of the codes, and not the glosses put upon it by some of the 
 courts, extended to all actions alike. 
 
 § 115. * 198. Code allows a Freer Union of Parties Plaintiff 
 than under the Common Law. As already Stated, these sections 
 of the codes, if full force be given to their plain and simple term?, 
 look to a more free union of parties as plaintiffs in the same 
 action than was allowed by the courts of law under the former 
 system. In order to be a proper plaintiff, according to the 
 ancient theory, the person must be interested in the whole of 
 the recovery, so that one judgment could be rendered for all the 
 plaintiffs in solido ; that a judgment should be given to one 
 plaintiff for a certain sum of money, or for certain lands or 
 
 ^ Qln Burkett v. Lehmen-Higginson shouW have been joined as plaintiff can- 
 Co. (1899), 8 Okla. 81, 56 Pac. 856, the not be obtained, he may be made a defend- 
 oourt said : '■ The provisions of our Code ant, and the respective rights of the several 
 do not contemplate or permit a severance parties, plaintiffs or defendants, whether 
 among parties plaintiff when the old law equitable or legal, may be determined and 
 reijuired a joinder. . . . Our Code, by adjudicated in the one action, although in 
 abolishing distinctions in forms of action, the case of joint plaintiffs or joint defend- 
 )ias preserveil all the rights of litigants ants their rights and liabilities may not in 
 that are equitable or legal, without cliaug- all particulars be the .>jame." ] ' 
 ing the common-law rules relating to the ^ ^ee 1 Daniel's Chan. PI. (4th Am. 
 joinder of parties to actions, except in the ed.), pp. 192, 206, 207, 208, 21 1, 216. 
 particular that, if tiie consent of one who
 
 166 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 chattels, and a judgment for a different sum, or other lands or 
 chattels, be awarded to another plaintiff, was regarded as the 
 sheerest impossibility. The legal notion of survivorship forbade 
 the union of the personal representatives of a deceased joint 
 contractor with the others who were living, and even the union 
 of the representatives of all, if all were dead. The text of the 
 codes is broad enough, and explicit enough, if it is taken 
 literally, to abolish these legal restrictions upon the freedom of 
 joining parties as plaintiffs. The clauses, "All persons having 
 an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the 
 relief demanded," and "those who are united in interest," do 
 not necessarily require that the interest of all those who are to 
 be united as plaintiffs should be equal or the same, and they do 
 require the union of all those having such an interest without 
 any restriction as to its nature, whether it be legal or equitable. 
 The interest of the survivors of joint obligees, covenantees, or 
 promisees, was, under the ancient system, strictly legal. The 
 interest of the executors or administrators of the deceased joint 
 obligee or promisee was equitable, but was none the less a full 
 interest, for it enabled the estate to obtain its entire portion of 
 the benefit flowing from the contract. The unequivocal language 
 of the codes declares that persons holding this common interest 
 in the subject-matter of the action, or in obtaining the relief 
 demanded, may be united as plaintiffs. 
 
 § 116. * 199. Joinder of Holders of Interests •wrhich are Several. 
 In one otlier class of cases these provisions of the reform legis- 
 lation would seem to have modified the former practice in legal 
 actions, if their meaning is to be found in their exact terms. 
 At the common law, the different holders of several rights 
 must sue separately, although tlie rights were created by a 
 single instrument, and although there might be some kind of a 
 common interest; no election was given to bring a joint action 
 by all, or a separate action by each. This rule is directly within 
 the modifying effect of the sections under consideration. "All 
 persons having an interest in the subject of the action, and in 
 obtaining the relief demanded, may be joined as plaintiffs." The 
 extent of the interest is not the criterion, nor its source nor 
 origin. If the persons have anij interest, whether complete or 
 partial, whether absolute or contingent, whether resulting from 
 a common share in the proceeds of the suit, or arising from the
 
 GENERAL THEORY AND INTENT OF THE CODES. 1G7 
 
 stipulations of the agreement, the language applies without any 
 limitation or exception, and without any distinction suggested 
 between actions which are equitable and those which are legal. ^ 
 This was the established equity doctrine which in many cases 
 permitted parties to be united as plaintiffs whose rights were, 
 in a legal aspect, not joint, but several. It is possible, indeed it 
 frequently happens, that several rights may be held by two or 
 more persons, who nevertheless have ''an interest in the subject 
 of the action and in the relief demanded;" audit would seem 
 that these persons, according to the interpretation given above, 
 may now, if they so elect, join as plaintiffs in bringing a legal 
 action as well as in maintaining an equitable suit. 
 
 § 117. * 200. Recapitulation of Foregoing Theoretical Analysis. 
 I have thus far intentionally examined the sections of the various 
 State codes which relate to the joinder of ])arties plaintiff in the 
 civil action, without any reference to judicial authority and con- 
 struction ; I have endeavored to ascertain and to state the object 
 and design of the legislature as the same could be gathered with 
 reasonable certainty from the very words which it has employed. 
 This legislative intent, when the field of investigation is thus 
 limited, depends upon the prior rules controlling the choice of 
 parties plaintiff both in legal and in equitable actions and upon 
 the exact text of the statute itself. I recapitulate the results 
 reached by this analysis : (1) The common-law doctrines defining 
 joint and several rights, and the special rules relating to joint 
 and several actions, are not specifically abrogated or modified; 
 whatever changes have been made are the result of very general 
 and comprehensive language used by the legislature. (2) There 
 is a striking difference between the general character of the pro- 
 visions having reference to plaintiffs and that of the provisions 
 referring to defendants ; the latter are more special in their 
 nature, and in many of the States much more reformatory. (3) 
 The new system has, in a very comprehensive form, established 
 the doctrine of equity in regard to the choice and joinder of 
 plaintiffs, and, by making no exceptions or limitations, has 
 applied this doctrine to all actions, whether legal or equitable. 
 (4) The effect of extending this doctrine of equity to legal actions 
 is not to prevent the union of parties as co-plaintiffs in cases 
 where, on account of the joint right, the common law required 
 
 1 First Nat. Bk. of Central City v. Hummel, 14 Colo. 250.
 
 168 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 such union; the common-law rule making the joinder of all such 
 persons necessary is left unaffected, with the single exception 
 that if one who should regularly be made a plaintiff, in pursuance 
 of such rules, refuses to permit his name to be thus used, he may 
 be made a defendant instead; and this exceptional provision 
 being without limitation or restriction in the text, applies as 
 well to legal as to equitable actions. (5) Persons having an 
 interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief 
 demanded, may be joined as plaintiffs in all actions, whatever 
 be their nature, although the rights of such persons are legally 
 several, and although at the common law they would be required, 
 to institute separate actions ; or, in other words, the plain import 
 of the legislation — its language not being confined to any class 
 of suits — is to enlarge the number of cases in which persons may 
 be joined as co-plaintiffs, and to place legal actions in this respect 
 upon exactly the same footing as those which are equitable in 
 their nature. (6) The special rules of the common law as to- 
 husband and wife have been entirely abolished in some States by 
 provisions contained in their codes of procedure, and in other 
 States by separate statutes relating exclusively to the status of 
 marriage. 
 
 § 118. *201. General Theory of Judicial Interpretation. Intro- 
 ductory. The foregoing results were obtained from an examina- 
 tion of the language alone which the legislatures have used ; I 
 shall now proceed to compare them with the general conclusions 
 which have been reached by the courts in their interpretation of 
 the same provisions, and shall thus test their correctness and 
 their value as practical guides in the administration of justice. 
 In pursuing this investigation, the inquiry will at present be 
 confined to those judicial decisions which have dealt with the 
 subject of parties plaintiff, those which discuss the analogous 
 topic of parties defendant being reserved to the succeeding sec- 
 tion of this chapter. This course will necessarily produce some 
 repetition of general principles ; but as the questions relating ta 
 plaintiffs and those relating to defendants arise from provisions- 
 of the codes quite different in their scope and import, a separate 
 consideration of them will prevent confusion and uncertainty. I 
 shall /r.s< ascertain, if possible, and formulate the general theory 
 of construction upon which the courts have proceeded in their 
 decision of special cases ; and, secondhj^ shall classify :ind arrange
 
 JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE CODES. 169 
 
 these cases, and deduce therefrom the particular rules as to the 
 joinder of plaintiffs in the civil action which have been judicially 
 settled as a part of the reformed system of procedure. The 
 number of instances in which the courts have laid down a broad 
 and comprehensive principle of interpretation, v/hich might be 
 the guide in whole classes of adjudications, is very few, and 
 such a principle must rather be gathered by a process of induc- 
 tion from an analysis and comparison of particular cases. The 
 few attempts at the statement of a general theory which have 
 been made, I shall quote somewhat at length. 
 
 § 119. * 202. Interpretation Given by the Courts of New York 
 and Ohio. Liberal Construction. In an early case, — an action 
 brought by the three obligees in an injunction bond, — the objec- 
 tion was raised that the rights of the plaintiffs were not joint, 
 and that they had been improperly united. Their interests, 
 which had been interfered with by the injunction, were in fact 
 distinct and separate, and it was assumed throughout the judg- 
 ment that, under the former system, each should have brought 
 a several action on the undertaking. The court, after stating 
 the old rule applicable to the circumstances, proceeded as fol- 
 lows: "We are now to determine this question as it arises under 
 the code of procedure. With the view of embracing all cases, 
 whether of law or equit3% and of making them conform to one 
 general rule, the code provides, in § 117, that ' all persons hav- 
 ing an interest in the subject of the action and in relief demanded 
 maybe joined as plaintiffs.' This is now the rule in all cases, 
 whether such as were formerly the subjects of suits in equity or 
 of actions at law, and we are to administer it according to its 
 spirit and true intent, however the practice may differ from the 
 rule that has heretofore prevailed in actions at law. ... It will 
 be perceived that this case falls within the precise words of the 
 section before cited. All have an interest in the subject of the 
 action and in the relief demanded — that is, in the damages 
 arising out of the operations of the injunction. It is not said to 
 be a joint or an equal or even a common interest, but simply an 
 interest in the subject of the action with the view of doing full 
 justice and settling the rights of all the parties in interest in one 
 suit." 1 The Supreme Court of Ohio has adopted the same prin- 
 
 1 Loomis V. Brov/n, 16 Barb. 325, 330, Telly v. Bowyer, 7 Bush, 513, the Court 
 332, per Gridley .1. lu tlie recent case of of Appeals of Kentucky gave a very dif-
 
 170 CIVIL IIE.MEDIES. 
 
 ciple of interpretation, and has given a construction to important 
 terms of the statutory provision. An action was brought upon 
 an undertaking called a forthcoming bond, executed by the 
 defendant and sureties in attachment proceedings. Certain 
 creditors had commenced suit, and had attached the property of 
 their common debtor. The latter gave the bond in question to 
 the sheriff running to all these plaintiffs, the condition of which 
 was that the property attached, or its equivalent in money, 
 should be forthcoming to answer the judgments which might 
 be obtained. Subsequently other creditors issued attachments 
 against the same debtor, which were delivered to the same 
 sheriff, and he returned on each that he had levied upon the 
 same goods before mentioned. All these creditors united in an 
 action upon the bond, and the objection was taken that there 
 was a misjoinder of parties plaintiff. The court, after examining 
 the clauses of the code relative to attachments, and showing that 
 the bond enured to the benefit of all the creditors, disposed of 
 the objection as to parties in the following manner: "The first 
 question presented for our consideration is the right of joinder of 
 the plaintiffs in the action. The provisions of the code are as 
 follows [citing the sections]. In order to correctly determine 
 this question, it is only necessar}^ to ascertain what was the 
 subject of the action, and how the parties stood related to it. 
 The subject of the action is the attachment undertaking." The 
 court proceeds to hold that all the plaintiffs had a beneficial 
 interest in this undertaking, although not named as parties in 
 it, and concludes: "It follows, therefore, that the subsequent 
 attaching creditors had an interest in the subject of the action 
 and in obtaining the relief deman<le(l by the action upon the 
 undertaking, and might properly ])C joined as plaintiffs."^ It 
 should be observed that the court here gave a very broad inter- 
 pretation to the phrase " the subject of the action " and to the 
 
 fereut construction to the statutory pro- the settlement of estates several distribu- 
 vision. The action was brought by tees may unite as jtlaintiffs. But, except 
 several distributees to recover from the iu a j)articular class of ciises, not embrac- 
 ailniiuistrator the shares found to be due ing this, we know of no authority for unit- 
 each on a settlement of the estate, and it ing as co-plaintiiTs several parties having 
 resulted in a joint judgment for the aggre- separate and independent rights of action 
 gate amount of such shares. The action, against the same defendant, or for a joint 
 it was held, was entirely irregular. Quot- recovery thereon." 
 
 ing § 'Ml of the code, in relation to the ^ Ilutledge i: Corliin, 10 Ohio St. 478, 
 
 joinder of i)liiintiffs, the court said : ''There 484, per Sutliff J. 
 can be no doubt that in eijuity actions for
 
 JUDICIAL INTEUPKETATION OF THE CODES. 171 
 
 term "interest." The "subject of the action" was said to be 
 the contract upon which the suit was brought, and not the mere 
 individual rights arising from that contract, nor the breach of 
 those rights by the defendant. The "interest" required is 
 equally general, and the huiguage of the clause is satisfied by a 
 beneticial interest created by operation of law, even though the 
 person in whom it resides is not named in the contract, and could 
 not possibly have had any interest at the time the instrument 
 was executed. Again, the rights of the plaintiffs were clearly 
 several; the undertaking of the defendants was for different 
 amounts due to separate individuals, and payable upon the hap- 
 pening of different events having no legal connection and no 
 common element. It was, in its legal effect, a collection of 
 independent promises to pay distinct sums of money to separate 
 persons contained in one written instrument. 
 
 § 120. ' 203. Same Liberal View Adopted in Indiana. The 
 Supreme Court of Indiana has stated the same general principles 
 of interpretation in a clear manner, and with the evident desire 
 to comply with the spirit of the new system which characterizes 
 all the decisions of that able tribunal. An action was brought 
 by three plaintiffs upon a peculiar contract, entered into between 
 themselves and the two defendants, in which each of the five 
 stipulated for indemnity against a certain contingent liability to 
 be given by the four others, and in which the rights and liabili- 
 ties were clearly several according to the common-law conception. 
 The court say : " The code itself is not exactly definite as to who 
 may be joined as plaintiffs. It provides, however, that judgment 
 may be given for or against one or more of several plaintiff's, 
 which was the practice in equity, though it was otherwise at law. 
 It also provides that all persons having an interest in the subject 
 of the action, and in the relief demanded may be joined as plain- 
 tiffs. Indeed, the code seems to have re-enacted the rules which 
 had prevailed in courts of equity as to who iiuist join as plaintiffs, 
 and may be joined as defendants. But as to those cases in which 
 in equity plaintiffs might or might not have joined at their 
 option, the code does not expressly speak, for the reason, prob- 
 ably that the general rule in equity was not founded upon any 
 uniform principle, and could not be expounded by any universal 
 theorem as a test.^ And it may have been thought safe, there- 
 
 1 Story Ivi- PI. § 539.
 
 172 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 fore, to leave each case to be decided by the courts upon authority 
 and analogy. That it was intended the rules of pleading in 
 courts of equity should govern the subject, is quite evident from 
 tliose provisions of the code which prescribe the relief that may 
 be granted, and to whom; in this respect conforming entirely to 
 the established practice of those courts, — a mode of administra- 
 tion quite imj^racticable in a great many cases, unless the parties 
 might be as in chancery. The present inquiry is, then, in view 
 of the considerations above stated, reduced to this: Could these 
 plaintiffs have formerly been joined in chancery?" The opinion 
 proceeds to examine the provisions of the contract, and, holding 
 that the rights as well as the liabilities of all the parties were 
 entirely several, and would have been so regarded in equity, 
 concludes as follows: "In the case before us there is in the 
 plaintiffs no community of interest in any matter involved in the 
 suit; no right common to all is claimed; everj'thing is separate, 
 save only that the right asserted by each is founded in a contract 
 which, for convenience, happens to be on the same sheet of paper. 
 We have failed to find any warrant in the adjudged cases for a 
 joinder of plaintiffs under such circumstances."^ The equitable 
 interpretation of the sections relating to the union of parties 
 plaintiff is here fully admitted, and it is declared that the estab- 
 lished rule of the equity courts is to be taken as the criterion by 
 which to determine all questions as to the proper joinder of 
 plaintiffs now arising, even in legal actions. The attempt to 
 maintain this particular suit by the three co-plaintiffs was con- 
 demned, not because their rights were several according to the 
 legal notion, but because they were so unconnected that they 
 could not have Ijeen enforced by a single action in equity. The 
 same court reiterated this principle of interpretation in another 
 well-considered case, and it may be regarded as the settled doc- 
 trine of that State. " The code requires all persons having an 
 interest in the subject of the action, and in the relief demanded, 
 except as otherwise provided, to be joined as plaintiffs. It also 
 requires those who are united in interest to be joined as plaintiffs 
 or defendants. And it then declares that, when the question is 
 one of common or general interest to many persons, or when the 
 parties are numerous and it is impracticable to bring them all 
 
 ' Goodnifrht »•. Goar, .'iO Ind. 418, 419, Iiid. .51, 59; Hume lus. Co. v. Oilman, 
 jKir Frazer J. See Maple c Beacli, 4.'3 112 Ind. 7.
 
 JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE CODES. 173 
 
 before tlie court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit 
 of the whole. ^ These provisions substantially re-enact the old 
 equity rules on the subject of parties. All who are united in 
 interest must join in tlie suit, unless they are so numerous us to 
 render it impracticable to bring them all before the court; while 
 tliose who have only a common or general interest in the contro- 
 versy may one or more of them institute an action. This, how- 
 ever, must not be understood as allowing, in all cases, two or 
 more persons having separate causes of action against the same 
 defendant, though arising out of the same transaction, to unite 
 and pursue their remedies in one action. Several plaintiffs, by 
 one complaint, cannot demand several matters of relief which are 
 plainly distinct and unconnected. But where one general right 
 is claimed, where there is one common interest among all the 
 plaintiffs centering in the point in issue in the cause, the objec- 
 tion of improper parties cannot be maintained. "^ 
 
 § 121. * 204. In Missouri and California. Statute Held to 
 apply only to Equitable Actions. Notwithstanding the common 
 principle which lies at the bottom of the foregoing opinions, and 
 which has undoubtedly been adopted by a great majority of, the 
 various State courts in their construction of these statutory pro- 
 visions, there has not been an absolute unanimity of decision. 
 By som.e individual judges, and even by some courts, the opera- 
 tion of the sections under consideration has been confined exclu- 
 sively to equitable actions, while the ancient common-law rules 
 as to parties have been declared controlling in all legal actions. 
 A reference to two or three cases in which this ancient distinc- 
 tion has been still preserved will be sufficient for my purpose. 
 
 1 pndiana, Burns' St., 1901 , §§ 263, 270.]] [[In the recent case of Trompen v. Yates 
 
 -Tate ?;. Ohio & Mi.ss. R. Co., 10 Ind. (1902), — Neb. — , 92 N. W. 647, the 
 
 174; citing McKeuzie v. L'Amoureux, 11 court said, affirming the liberal interjire- 
 
 Barb. 516; Bouton v. Brooklyn, 15 Barb, tation indir-ated in the text: "We think, 
 
 375; Murray v. Hay, 1 Barb. Ch. 59. The under the holding of this court in Karle r. 
 
 following cases, among others, assert the Burch, 21 Neb. 710, and in the earlier 
 
 general doctrine that the provisions of case of Kaufman r. Wessel, 14 Neb. 162, 
 
 the code apply to legal and equitable and the approval that has been often 
 
 actions alike. Cummings v. Morris, 25 given to both those cases, that this court 
 
 N. Y. 625 ; Grinnell v. Schmidt, 2 Sandf. is committed to the applying in law ac- 
 
 706 ; Cole v. Reynolds, 18 N. Y. 74. tions of tlu; equity doctrine that interest' 
 
 Earle r. Burch, 21 Neb. 702 ; Schiffer in the subject of the action gives a right 
 
 V. Eau Claire, 51 Wis. 385; Home Ins. to join as plaintiff."] 
 Co. V. Oilman, 112 Ind. 7; Hughes v. 
 Boone, 81 N. C. 204. '
 
 174 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 Two persons, A. and B., entered into a written contract with a 
 third. C, for the performance of certain work and labor at a 
 stij)uhited price. The work having been completed, and C. 
 refusing to pay the price agreed upon, A. brought an action 
 upon the contract; demanding judgment for one half of said 
 sum, and making B., his co-contractor, a defendant, allegiog 
 that he had refused to be a party plaintiff, and had confederated 
 with C. to hinder and delay the plaintiff from obtaining his 
 demand. The Supreme Court of ^Missouri, in affirming a nonsuit 
 which had been ordered at the trial, said : " If C. has violated his 
 contract, he is liable to an action; but that action could only l)e 
 brought in the joint names of A. and B., the contractors. That 
 provision of the Practice Act which allows a party to be made a 
 defendant when he will not join as a plaintiff, has nothing to do 
 with this question. That was a rule of equity practice which 
 was necessarily incorporated into a system which abolished all 
 distinction of actions. In adopting it, it was not designed that it 
 should have any operation but in cases where it was applicable 
 under the former system of practice. It was never intended that 
 it should affect the rights of parties arising out of written con- 
 tracts. Nothing is better settled than the rule tliat, on an 
 undertaking to two, both must join in an action on it, otherwise 
 there is no cause of action. It is a part of the contract that both 
 sliall sue, otherwise no action shall be brought. If one will say 
 that he had no right of action, and will not sue, why should he 
 not have as much right as the other who says there is a cause of 
 action?"^ The same general doctrine was accepted as the basis 
 of interpretation, and the same restriction of the statutory provi- 
 sions to suits in equity was announced by the Supreme Court of 
 California in an early case arising upon similar facts. '' The 
 simple question presented for our consideration is, whether there 
 was a non-joinder of parties plaintiff or not; it being contended 
 that § 14 of the Practice Act has introduced a new rule, and that 
 one of several parties may maintain an action on a joint contract, 
 in his own name, by simpl}^ suggesting the impossibility of ob- 
 taining the consent of the others to join in the action. Upon 
 examination of this section, we are satisfied that it was intended 
 
 1 Kainey v. Smizer, 28 Mo. 310, per Scott J. Sec, per contra, Ilill i'. Marsh, 
 46 Ind. 216.
 
 JUDICIAL INTERI'RETATION OF THE CODES. 175 
 
 to apply to suits in equity, and not to actions at law." ^ I have 
 placed in a foot-note a number of cases which contain expressions 
 of opinion by individual judges, that the sections and clauses of 
 the codes and practice acts regulating the choice and joinder of 
 parties are confined in their scope and operation to equitable 
 actions alone, and were not intended by the legislature to inter- 
 fere with the former rules applicable to legal actions. ^ 
 
 § 122. * 205. Recapitulation of Judicial Views. Cases in ■which 
 there is an Election. The citations given in the foregoing para- 
 graplis confirm the conclusions which were reached by a mere 
 analysis of the language. That these provisions as to the parties 
 plaintiff do enact the general doctrines which had prevailed in 
 courts of equity, is admitted by both schools of interpretation ; 
 and that these equitable rules, thus embodied in a statutory 
 form, do apply to all actions, and are not by any implied limita- 
 tion restricted to equitable actions, is now, I think, declared 
 by the courts in most of the States which have adopted the re- 
 formed procedure. Assuming these facts as premises, all the 
 other propositions stated in my preliminar}^ analysis follow as a 
 necessary consequence. In this immediate connection it should 
 be remarked that individual judges will give greater or less scope 
 to the liberty granted by the legislative rule, according to their 
 personal notions of expediency. There was a numerous class of 
 cases, under the former system, in which courts of equity recog- 
 nized an election on the part of claimants either to join in one 
 proceeding or to sue separately. This power of choice, then 
 confined of course to suits in equity, still remains in similar 
 instances, and may even be extended to certain controversies in 
 which the cause of action is legal. Thus, where the right is 
 strictly several, and would be regarded as such by the common 
 law, equity might have allowed them an election to sue sepa- 
 rately or jointly. This power of choice, contained in the equity 
 doctrine, is introduced into the new procedure, and is of course 
 not confined to suits equitable in their nature. We must there- 
 fore expect to find, within certain narrow bounds, some conflict 
 
 1 Andrews v. Mokelumne Hill Co., 7 to preserve a distinction between actions 
 
 Cal. 330, 333. The same court lias, in at law and suits in equity, 
 
 later cases, pursued a course of decision - Voorhis v. Child's Ex., 17 N. Y. 3.54, 
 
 more in accordance with the spirit of the per Seldcn J.; Habicht v. Pembertou, 
 
 code, and has, as completely perhaps as 4 Sandf. 6.57; Van Home v. Everson, 13 
 
 any other tribunal, abandoned all attempt Barb. 526.
 
 176 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 of decision from judges who accept and heartily approve the 
 general principles of interpretation vehich have been developed 
 in the foregoing discussion. 
 
 § 123. * 206. Manner of Raising Question as to Proper Parties 
 PlaintiflF. Defect of Parties means too Few. Before proceeding to 
 the discussion of particular cases and special rules, a preliminary 
 question may he here properly answered : How can the objection 
 that an action has not been brought by the proper plaintiff or 
 plaintiffs be raised and regularly presented to the court for its 
 decision? The codes of procedure all agree in prescribing, 
 among other grounds of demurrer to the complaint or petition, 
 the following: "When it shall appear on the face of the com- 
 plaint or petition ; 2, that the plaintiff has not legal capacity to 
 sue; or, -4, that there is a defect of parties plaintiff or defendant; 
 or, 6, that the complaint or petition does not state facts sufficient 
 to constitute a cause of action ; " ^ and also that, " when any of 
 the matters enumerated in section [the foregoing] do not appear 
 on the face of the complaint or petition, the objection may be 
 taken by answer; "' ^ and, finally, "if no objection be taken, either 
 by demurrer or answer, the defendant shall be deemed to have 
 waived the same, excepting only the objection to the jurisdiction 
 
 1 New York, § 144(488) ; Kansas, § 89 ; In the following codes it is made a 
 
 Nebraska, § 94 ; Ohio, § 87 ; Oregon, § G6 ; special cause of demurrer that there is a 
 
 California, § 430; N. C. § 95 ; S. C. § 167. misjoinder of ])laintiffs or defendants. 
 
 [^Arizona, Uev. St., 1901, § 13.51 ; Arkan- Cal. § 430; Nevada, § 40; Colorado, § ."JO. 
 
 sas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5717; Idaho, Misjoinder of plaintiffs is now a ground 
 
 Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §3206 (including of demurrer in New York, § 488. 
 misjoinder as a ground); Iowa, Code, - New York, § 147 (498) ; Kansas, § 91 ; 
 
 1897, § 3561 ; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, Nebraska, § 96 ; Ohio, § 89 ; Oregon, §69; 
 §342; Kentucky, Codes, 1895, §§ 92,93; Cal. § 433; N. C. § 98; S. C. § 170. 
 Montana, § 680 (including misjoinder as [^Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, § 1353, in re- 
 a ground); Missouri, Kev. St., 1899, §598 spect only to the ground numbered 4 in 
 (including misjoinder as a ground) ; Min- the text; Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., 
 nesota, (ien. St., 1894, §5232; North § 5720 ; Colorado, § 54 ; Idaho, Code Civ. 
 Dakota, Kev. Codes, 1899, §5268; Okla- Pro, 1901, § 3209; Iowa, Code, 1897, 
 homa, St., 1893, § 3967 ; Utah, Rev. St., § 3563; Indiana, Burns' St.. 1901, § 346; 
 
 1898, §2962 (including misjoinder as a Montana. § 684 ; Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, 
 ground); South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, §602: Minnesota, Gen. St., 1894, § 5234; 
 §0115; Washington, Bal. Code. § 4907 ; Nevada. § 44 ; North Dakota, Rev. CodeB, 
 Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3535 (includ- 1899. § .5271 ; Oklahoma, St., 1893. § 3969 ; 
 mg misjoinder as a ground); Wisconsin. Utah, Rev. St.. 1898. §2966: South Da- 
 St., 1898, § 2649.] kota. Ann. St., 1901, §6118; Washington, 
 
 Cln Connecticut the statute provides B.al. Code, §4909; Wyoming, Rev. St., 
 merely that" all demurrers shall distinctly 1899. § 3537; Wisconsin, St., 1898, 
 specify the reasons why the pleading <le- § 2653.] 
 mnrred to is insufficient " Gen. St., 1902, 
 § 60S.]
 
 DEFECT OF TAKTIES PLAINTIFF. 
 
 177 
 
 of the court, and the objection that the complaint or petition 
 does not state facts sulhcient to constitute a cause of action." ^ 
 The construction to be placed upon these clauses, and the result- 
 ing rules prescribing the methods by which an objection as to 
 proper parties must be interposed, in order to present a question 
 for judicial decision, have been settled in the various States 
 with almost complete uniformity. In regard to defect of parties 
 -plaintiffs the interpretation is now established, that "defect of 
 parties," given as one ground of demurrer, means too few, and 
 not too many. A demurrer alleging this particular objection 
 €an only be interposed, therefore, in case of a ?io?i-joinder of 
 necessary plaintiffs or defendants, and never in case of a mi&- 
 joinder. The word "defect" is taken in its literal sense of 
 "deficiency," and not in a broader sense as meaning any error in 
 the selection of parties. Upon this point the courts are nearly 
 unanimous. 2 It has been held, however, in Wisconsin, that 
 this is the proper form of demurrer where the objection is to a 
 misjoinder.^ 
 
 1 New York, § 148 (499) ; Kansas, § 91 ; 
 Nebraska, § 96 ; Ohio, § 89 ; Oregon, § 70 ; 
 €al. §434;N. C. § 99; S. C. § 171. QAri- 
 zona. Rev. St., 1901, § 1353; Arkansas, 
 Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5720; Colorado, 
 § 55 ; Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3210 ; 
 Iowa, Code, 1897, §§ 3563, 3564 (substan- 
 tially different from the provision given 
 in the text); Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, 
 § 346; Kentucky, Codes, 1895, §§ 92, 93; 
 Montana, § 685 ; xVIissouri, Rev. St., 1899, 
 § 602; Minnesota, Gen. St., 1894, § 5235; 
 Nevada, § 45 ; North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 
 1 899, § 5272 ; ( /klahoma, St., 1 893, § 3969 ; 
 Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2967 ; South Da- 
 Tcota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6119; Washing- 
 ton, Bal. Code, § 4911; Wyoming, Rev. 
 St, 1899, § 3537; Wiscon.sin, St., 1898, 
 § 26.54.] 
 
 - [Union Pac. Ry Co. v. Smitli (1898), 
 ■59 Kan. 80. 52 Pac. 102; Weber r. Dillon 
 (1898), 7 Okla. 568, .54 Pac. 894; Allen v. 
 Cooley (1898), 53 S. C. 414, 31 S. E. 6.34 ; 
 Dolan 1-. Hubinger (1899), 109 Iowa, 408, 
 ^0 N. W. 514 ; Cedar Rapids Nat. Bank v. 
 Lavery (1900), 110 Iowa, 575, 81 N. W. 
 775.] " Palmer v. Davis, 28 N. Y. 242 ; Ca.so 
 r Carroll, 35 N. Y. 385; Richtmyer r. 
 Richtmver, 50 Barb. 55 ; Powers r. Bum- 
 
 cratz, 12 O. St. 273 ; Berkshire v. Shultz, 
 
 25 Ind. 523; Bennett v. Preston, 17 Ind. 
 291 ; Mornan v. Carroll, 35 Iowa, 22 ; 
 Hill V. Marsh, 46 Ind. 218. As the .same 
 is true of defendants, — the section in- 
 cluding both parties in a single formula, 
 — the decisions in reference to them are 
 in point. See Peabody v. Washington, 
 iSbc. Ins. Co., 20 Barb. 339; Voorhis v. 
 Baxter, 18 Barb. 592 ; s. c. 17 N. Y. 354 ; 
 Bank of Havana v. Magee, 20 N. Y. 355. 
 See al.so We.stern, etc. Co. v. ^"tna Ins. 
 Co., 40 Wis. 373 ; Marsh v. Board of 
 Supervisors, 38 id. 250; Willard v. Reas, 
 
 26 id. 540 (settling the rule as given in the 
 text, and limiting Read v. Sang, 21 id. 
 678) ; Schiffer v. Iviu Claire, 51 Wis. 385; 
 Lowry V. .Tackson, 27 S. C. 318 ; McKee 
 V. Eaton, 26 Kan. 226; White v. Scott, 
 26 Kan. 476 ; Boldt r. Budwig, 19 Neb. 
 739 ; Clark v. Crawfordsville Coffin Co , 
 125 Ind. 277; Evans v. Schafer, 119 Ind. 
 49 ; Murray v. McGarigle, 69 Wis. 483. 
 
 3 Head ' i: Sang, 21 Wi.s. 678. The 
 demurrer was held proper upon the au- 
 thoritv of an early New York decision, — 
 Dunderdale v. Grymes, 16 How. Pr. 195, 
 which has since been many times overruled 
 in tliat State. 
 
 12
 
 178 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 124. ^ 207. Question of Defect of Parties must be raised by 
 Demurrer or Answer. When u defect of piU'ties plaintiff — that 
 is, a non-joinder — appears on the face of tlie coni[)laint or peti- 
 tion, the defendant must raise the question by denuirrer, and 
 not by answer.^ If he neglects to interpose a denuirrer upon 
 this specific ground, he waives the objection entirely, even 
 though he sets up the defence in his answer. The reason given 
 for this somewhat technical rule is the following: The mere 
 defence of a defect of parties, not going to the real merits of the 
 controversy, and not denying the cause of action existing in 
 some persons, is not favored by the courts ; it is regarded as a 
 "dilatory defence," because it does nothing more than postpone 
 the decision of the substantial issues ; and, although the defend- 
 ant is permitted to avail himself of it, he must follow exactly the 
 modes prescribed by the rules of practice, or by the statute for 
 its interposition.^ If the defect does not appear upon the face of 
 the complaint or petition, the defendant must set up the defence 
 specially in his answer, or, failing this, he waives the objection.* 
 
 1 [^Foster v. Lyon County (1901), 63 
 Kau. 43, 64 Pac. 1037 ; Masoii i-. St. Paul 
 Fire Ins. Co. (1901 ), 8-2 Minn. 336, 8b N. W. 
 13; Cooper v. Thomason (1896), 30 Ore. 
 161, 45 Pac. 295; Carskaddon v. Pine 
 (1899), 154 Ind. 410, 56 N. E. 844 ; Castile 
 r. Ford (1897), 53 Neb. 507, 73 N W.945; 
 .lolmsou I'. Gooch (1894), 114 N. C. 62, 19 
 S. E. 62 ; Radant v. Werheim Mfg. Co. 
 (1900), 106 Wis. 600, 82 N. W. 562; Os- 
 horn V. Logus (1895), 28 Ore. 300, 42 Pac. 
 997. But a demurrer will not lie where 
 tiie complaint does not sh(jw that the party 
 for whose non-joiyder tlie demurrer is 
 interposed was living when the suit was 
 <-ommenced : Deegau v. Deegan (1894), 
 22 Xev. 185, 37 Pac. 360] 
 
 •^ Zabriskie v. Smith, 13 N. Y. 322; 
 l)e Puy V. Strong, 37 N. Y. 372, 3 Keyes, 
 003 ; Patchip r. Peck, 38 N. Y. 39 ; Fi.shor 
 r. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416; Wells v. Cone, .55 
 Barh. 585 ; Hees v. Ncllis, 1 N. Y. Sup. 
 Ct. 118; Alexander v. Gaar, 15 Ind. 89; 
 Ju.stice u. Phillips, 3 Bush, 200 ; Andrews 
 r. .Mokelumne Hill Co., 7 Cal. 330 ; 'len- 
 nant v. Pfister, 45 Cal. 270; Dailey v. 
 Houston, 58 Mo. 361, 366; Mcliobcrts v. 
 So. Minn. R. R., 18 Minn. 108, 110; Me- 
 clianics' Bank v. Gilpin, 105 Mo. 17. As 
 the same rule ajiplies in case of defect in 
 
 parties defendant, see Dillaye v. Parks, 
 31 Barb. 132; Wright v. Storrs, 32 N. Y. 
 691 ; s. c. 6 Bos. 600 ; Abbe v. Clarke, 31 
 Barl). 238. See also Biakeley r. Le Due, 
 22 Minn. 476 ; Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 id. 
 43; Gimbel v. Pignero, 62 Mo. 240; Kel- 
 logg V. Maliu, id. 429 ; McConuell v. 
 Braynor, 63 id. 461 ; Dunn r. Hannibal & 
 St. J. R. Co., 68 id. 268 ; State v. Saffiug- 
 ton, id. 454 ; Donnan r. Intelligencer Co., 
 70 id. 168 ; Parchin c. Peck, 2 Mont. 567 ; 
 Ross V. Linder, 12 S. C. 592; Lillie v. 
 Case, 54 Iowa, 177 ; Bouton v. Orr, 51 id. 
 473 ; Ryan r. MuUin, 45 id. 631 ; Taylor 
 r. Collins, 51 Wis. 123 ; Thomas v. Wood, 
 61 Ind. 132 ; Cox v. Bird, 65 id. 277 ; Bar- 
 nett V. Leonard, 66 id. 422 ; Davis i'. 
 Beciistein, 69 N. Y. 440 ; Risley v. Wight- 
 man, 13 Hun, 163 ; Porter r. Fletcher, 25 
 Minn. 493 ; Mackenzie v. Edinburg Sch. 
 Trs., 72 Ind. 191 (an unincorporated asiso- 
 ciation cannot sue by its name ; all the 
 members must join as jtlaintiffs) ; Beeler 
 V. First Xat. Bk. of Earned (Neb., 1892), 
 51 N. W. 857; Steiling v. Grabowsky, 19 
 N. Y. Suppl. 280 ; McCallister's Adm. v. 
 Sav. Bk. of Louisville, 80 Ky. 684; Tal- 
 mage v. Bierhause, 103 Ind. 270. 
 
 a [Johnson c. Gooch (1894), 114 N. C. 
 62, 19 S. E. 02; Moore v. Harmoiv(1895),
 
 DEFECT OF I'AUTIES PLAINTIFF. 
 
 179 
 
 To sum up: if a defect of parties plaintiff appears in the plead- 
 ing, the mode of raising the defence is by demurrer alone; if it 
 does not appear in the pleading, by answer alone; and, unless 
 the defendant complies with these requirements as to method, he 
 waives all objection.^ It has been expressly decided in Ohio, 
 
 142 Ind. 555, 41 N. E. 599. Held in 
 Mason v. St. Paul Fire Ins. Co. (1901), 82 
 Minn. .'536, 85 N. W. 13, that a defect 
 of parties plaintiff, when the question is 
 raised bv answer, does not entitle the de- 
 fendant to a verdict on the merits, but 
 only to a dismissal ; but if, in such a case, a 
 motion to dismiss is not made uyion proof of 
 the defect of parties plaintiff, the objection 
 is waived. And in Atcheson, Topeka, etc. 
 |}y. Co. V. Hucklebridge (1901), 62 Kan. 
 506, 64 Pac. 58, it was held that the Code 
 provision requiring defects in petitions 
 other than those appearing on face of 
 same to be set up by answer, does not 
 apply to a petition by a partner who con- 
 ceals the fact of partnership and wrong- 
 fully brings suit in his own name for an 
 injury to partnership property. In such 
 case defendant, if ignorant of partnership 
 until disclosed upon the trial, may then 
 raise the question without amending 
 answer. See dissenting opinions herein. 
 
 A demurrer to a petition, stating in 
 general terms that " there are no proper 
 parties," i.s too vague and general. It 
 should point out who would be proper 
 parties : Dawson !•. Equitable Mortgage 
 Co. (1899), 109 Ga. 389, 34 S. E. 668; 
 Parker r. Cochran (1895), 97 Ga. 249, 22 
 S. E. 961-3 Also Merritt v. Walsh, 32 
 N. Y. 685 ; Donnell v. Walsh, 33 N. Y. 
 43; s. c 6 Bosw. 621 ; Gock r. Keneda, 
 29 Barb. 120; Umsted v. Buskirk, 17 
 Ohio St. 113; Dickinson v. Vauderpoel, 
 5 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 168. See also Trenor 
 V. Cent. Pac. R. R., 50 Cal. 222 ; Maxwell 
 r. I'ratt, 24 Hun, 448 (an answer setting 
 up a defect of parties must give the names 
 of tlic plaintiffs to be joined). 
 
 1 [Kngel V. Dado (1902), — Neb. 
 — , 92 N. W. 629; Hannegan v. Roth 
 (1896), 12 Wash. 695,44 Pac. 256; Stephens 
 V. Harding (1896), 48 Neb. 659, 67 N. W. 
 746 ; Bridge Co. v. Fowler (1895), 55 Kan. 
 17, 39 Pac. 727 ; Gilland v. Union Pac. Ry. 
 Co. (1895), 6 Wyo. 185, 43 Pac. 508; 
 Moore v. Bevier (1895), 60 Minn. 240, 62 
 
 N. W. 281 ; Bell v. Mendcnhall (1898). 71 
 Minn. 331, 71 N. W. 1086; Allen v. 
 Cooley (1898), 53 S. C. 77, 30 S. E. 721 ; 
 Howe" I'. Harper (1900), 127 N. C. 356, 37 
 S. E. 505 ; Medano Ditch Co. v. Adams 
 (1902), 29 Colo. 317, 68 Pac. 431 ; Prich- 
 ard's Executrix v. Peace (1895), 98 Ky. 
 99, 32 S. W. 296; Rittenhouse v. Clark 
 (1901), 110 Ky. 149, 61 S. W. 33; Radant 
 V. Werheim Mfg. Co. (1900), 106 Wis. 
 600, 82 N. *W. 562 ; Osborn r. Logus 
 (1895), 28 Ore. 306, 42 Pac. 997; Ross 
 V. Page (1902), 11 N. D. 458, 92 N. W. 
 822; Bates-Smith Inv. Co. v. Scott (1898), 
 56 Neb. 475, 76 N. W. 1063 ; Coe v. An- 
 derson (1894), 92 Iowa, 51.5, 61 N. W. 
 177; Hellams y. Prior (1902), 64 S. C. 
 296, 43 S. E. 25; Wyman v. Herard 
 (1899), 9 Okla. 35, 59 Pac 1009. 
 
 A plea in abatement for defect of 
 parties must show affirmatively the names 
 of tlie parties omitted, that they are alive, 
 and that they are within the jurisdiction 
 of the court : Cone v. Cone (1901), 61 S. C. 
 512, 39 S. E. 748. A demurrer or plea on 
 the ground of defect of parties should 
 show in what the defect consists and 
 should name the party not joined: Emer- 
 son V. Schwindt (1900), 108 Wis. 167, 84 
 N. W. 186; Johnson v. Gooch (1894), 
 114 N. C. 62, 19 S. E. 62; Boseker v. 
 Chamberlain (1903), — Ind. — , 66 N. E. 
 448. 
 
 The objection of defect of parties can- 
 not be raised for the first time on ap- 
 peal : Thompsou v. Rush (1902), — Neb. 
 — , 92 N. W. 1060; nor by an in- 
 struction: Loomis V. Hollister (1902), 75 
 Conn. 275, 53 Atl. 579 ; Osborn v. Logus 
 (1895), 28 Ore. 306, 42 P; '^.. 995; nor 
 by oral demurrer at the trial : Shull v. 
 Caughman (1898), 54 S. C. 203, 32 S. E. 
 301 ; nor is it ground for dismissing the 
 complaint on the trial upon the merits : 
 liadant r. Werheim Mfg. Co. (1900), 106 
 Wis. 600, 82 N. W. 562 ; nor can it be 
 raised by motion for a new trial : Mather 
 V. Dunn" (1898), 11 S. D. 196, 76 N. W.
 
 180 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 and this is plainly the correct rule, that a demurrer for want of 
 sufficient facts does not raise the question of a defect — non- 
 joinder — of plaintiffs or defendants.^ 
 
 § 125. * 208. Meaning of "Want of Legal Capacity to Sue. A 
 demurrer or defence for this cause must relate exclusively to 
 some legal disabilit}^ of the plaintiff, — such as infancy, cover- 
 ture, idiocy, and the like, — and not to the absence of facts 
 sufficient to constitute a cause of action. ^ The facts constituting 
 a cause of action may be sufficiently averred, and yet the plaintiff 
 may not have a legal capacity to sue. The objection that the 
 plaintiff has not legal capacity cannot, therefore, be raised and 
 
 922-2 See, however, post, § * 287, to the 
 effect that the objection of *the defect of 
 indispensable parties is not so waived in 
 equitable suits. 
 
 1 Umsted v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio St. 113. 
 Nevil V. Clifford, 55 Wis. 161 ; Whipper- 
 man v. Dunn, 124 lud. 349. QTo the 
 same effect are Walton v. Washburn 
 (1901). Ky, 64 S. W. 634; Bell v. Men- 
 denhall (1898), 71 Minn. 331, 73 N. W. 
 1086; Carskaddon t;. Pine (1899), 154 
 lud. 410. 56 N. E. 844i Boseker r. Cham- 
 berlain (1903), — Ind. — , 66 N. E. 448; 
 Beyer r. Town ui Crandon (1898), 98 
 Wis. 306, 73 N. W. 771 ; Ross v. Page 
 (1902), 11 N. D. 458, 92 X. W. 822 ; Svan- 
 burg V. Fosseen (1899), 75 Minn. 350, 78 
 N. W. 4.3 
 
 - [ Wlien the plaintiff's incapacity to sue 
 appears on tlie face of the complaint tlie 
 objection must be taken by denmrrer or it 
 is waived : Blackwell v. Britisii-American 
 Co. (1902), 65 S. C. 105, 43 S. E. 395; 
 Cooper c. The People (1900), 28 Colo. 87, 
 63 Pac. 314; Meyer v. Barth (1897), 97 
 Wis. 352, 72 N. W. 748 ; Swing r. White 
 Kiver Lumber Co. (1895), 91 Wis. 517, 
 65 N. W. 174. When it does not appear 
 on the face of the pleading, the remedy is 
 by answer : Clark v. Carey ( 1 894), 41 Ncl). 
 780. 60 N. W. 78 ; Blackwell >: British- 
 American Co. (1902), 65 S. C. 105, 43 S. E. 
 395; Hankinson i-. Charlotte, etc. R. R. Co. 
 (1893), 41 S. C. 1, 19 S. E. 206. In either 
 case the grounds of the objection must be 
 specified : Blackwell c. British-American 
 Co. (1902), 65 S. C. 105, 43 S. E. 305, and 
 they cannrjt be shown under a goneral 
 denial: llicks v. Beam (I89.5), 112 N. C. 
 
 642, 17 S. E. 490; Hankinson r. Charlotte, 
 etc. R. R. Co. (1893), 41 S. C. 1, 19 S. K. 
 206. Held in State v. Ohio Oil Co. (1897). 
 150 Ind. 21,49 N. E.809, that the capacity 
 of the State to sue should be questioned 
 by demurrer under the second statutory 
 ground, — want of legal capacity to sue. 
 Gager v. Marsden (1899), 101 Wis. 598, 
 77 N. W. 922 : Mere error of the trial 
 court in making substitution of plaintiffs 
 does not go to the legal capacity of the 
 substituted plaintiffs to sue, and on a 
 demurrer for want of such capacity the 
 complaint stands as if the action were 
 originally commenced by tJie substituted 
 plaintiffs. Rogers r. Levy (1893), 36 Nei>. 
 601, 54 N. W. 1080: A judgment of di.s- 
 missal on the ground of want of legal 
 capacity to sue is not a bar to a future 
 action on the same cause of action. Ward 
 V. Petrie (1898), 157 N. Y. 301, 51 N. E. 
 1002: The ground of demurrer that lite 
 plaintiff has not lesral capacity to sue dues 
 not ap]ily to a receiver duly appointed in 
 8ui)plementary proceedings, where the 
 defendant claims that he cannot maintain 
 the action by reason of the nature of the 
 relief .sought. Such objection is not 
 waived by failure to plead or demur. 
 
 In order that this question may 1 *'■ 
 raised by demurrer, the want of capacity 
 to sue must affirmatively appear on the 
 face of the complaint, and hence it is not 
 enough that the complaint fails to show 
 that the plaintiff has capacity to sue: 
 Locke V. Kluiikcr (1898), 123 c'al. 231, 55 
 Pac. 99.'5 ; Xortlirup v. A. G. Wills Liitii- 
 ber Co. (1902), 65 Kan. 769, 70 J'ac. 879.]
 
 MISJOINDER OF PLAINTIFFS. 
 
 181 
 
 relied upon under a demurrer for want of sufficient facts, nor the 
 ohjcetion of a want of facts under a demurrer alleging an absence 
 of legal capacity. 1 
 
 § 126. * 201*. Efifect of Misjoinder of Parties Plaintiff. Common 
 Law and Equity Rules. .\ misjoinder of parties plaintiff is not 
 made a specific ground of demurrer, or mentioned as a defence, 
 except [in a few of the codes]. ^ At the common law two or 
 more persons could not be joined as plaintiffs in an action upon 
 contract, unless they possessed a joint right; and if, on the trial. 
 
 1 [|State ex rel. v. Moores (1899), ."JS 
 Neb. 28.5, 78 N. W. 529 ; Berkin o. Marsh 
 (1896), 18 Mont. 152, 44 Pac. 528, where 
 it was held that legal di.sability to sue 
 pertains to the person desiring to sue, and 
 not to the cause of action, and the fact 
 tiiat the cause of action has not accrued 
 does not give rise to the objection of dis- 
 ability to sue. To the same effect .«ee 
 Weirich v. Dodge (1899), 101 Wis. 621, 
 77 N. \V. 906. See also Zinn v. Baxter 
 (1901), 65 Ohio St, 341, 62 N. E. 327, 
 where it was lield that the fact of an as- 
 signment of the cause of .action, upon 
 which plaintiff sues, before the commenee- 
 ment of the action, goes not to plain- 
 tiff's capacity to sue but to the right of 
 action. 
 
 The following cases support the rule 
 stated in the text : ^tua Life Ins. Co. 
 V. Sellers (1899), 154 Ind. 370, 56 N. E. 
 97; Bern v. Shoemaker (1895), 7 S. D. 
 510, 64 N. W. 544 ; Coddington v. Canaday 
 (1901), 1.57 Ind. 243, 61 K E. 567; Rada- 
 baugh V. Silvers (1893), 135 Ind. 605,35 
 N. E. 694; Knight v. Le Bea (1897), 19 
 Mont. 223, 47 Pac. 952 ; Birmingham v. 
 Cheetham (1898), 19 Wash. 657, 54 Pac. 
 37. 
 
 But the question of the right of plain- 
 tiff to maintain the action may be raised 
 by general demurrer : Kinsley v. Kinslcv 
 (1897), 150 Ind. 67, 49 N. E. 819 ; Ameri- 
 can Trust, etc. Bank y. McGettigan (1899), 
 152 Ind. 532, 52 N. E. 793.] 
 
 De Bolt V. Carter, 31 Ind. 355; Berk- 
 shire V. Shultz, 25 Ind. 523; People v. 
 Crooks, 53 N. Y. 648 ; Haire r. Baker, 5 
 N. Y.357 ; Fulton F. Ins. Co. r. Baldwin, 
 37 N. Y. 648; Allen v. Buffalo, 38 N. Y. 
 280 ; Palmer v Davis, 28 N. Y. 242 ; Bank 
 of Lowville V. Edwards, 11 How. Pr. 216 ; 
 
 Viburt V. Frost, 3 Abb. Pr. 120; Myers v. 
 Machado, 6 Abb. Pr. 198, 14 How. Pr. 149 ; 
 Hobart v. Frost, 5 Duer, 672; Saxton v. 
 Seiberling, 48 Ohio St. 5.54. In New 
 York, a corporation is not required to 
 aver tlie acts creating its corjjorate char- 
 acter; and, in an action by a bank where 
 the complaint omitted any such allega- 
 tion, a demurrer on the ground of a want 
 of legal capacity was overruled. Phoenix 
 Bk. of N. Y. V. Donnell, 40 N. Y. 410, 
 41 Barb. 571. As to legal capacity to 
 sue, see Excelsior Petroleum Co. v. Lacey, 
 63 N. Y. 422 ; Beers v. Shannon, 73 iii. 
 292, 297 ; Minneapolis Harvester Works 
 )-. Libby, 24 Minn. 327 ; White ( )ak Dist. 
 Tp. V. Oskaloosa Dist. Tp., 44 Iowa, 512; 
 Smith V. Peckham, 39 Wis. 414; Rogers 
 V. Lafayette Agr. Works, 52 Ind. 296 ; 
 De Bolt V. Carter, 31 id. 355; Langsdale 
 V. Girton, 51 id. 99; Perkins v. Stimmel, 
 114 N. Y. 3.59; Bray v. Black, 57 Ind. 
 417 ; Wilhoit i'. Cunningham, 87 Cal. 
 453 ; Beville v. Cox, 109 N. C. 265 ; 
 Brookmire v. Rosa (Neb. 1892), 51 N. W. 
 840; Farrell v. Cook, 16 Nebr. 483 ; Pence 
 V. Aughe, 101 Ind. 317 ; Campbell v. Camp- 
 bell, 121" id. 178 ; Murray v. McGarigle, 69 
 Wis. 483. The demurrer must be overruled 
 if any one of several plaintiffs has capacity 
 to sue. O'Callaghan v. Bode, 84 Cal. 689. 
 []The question of plaintiff's capacity to 
 sue cannot be raised by an interveuor : 
 Pitts Agricultural Works v. Baker (1898), 
 1 1 S. D. 342, 77 N. W. 586.] 
 
 - ^This is made a specific ground of 
 demurrer in the following codes : Colo- 
 rado, § 50 ; Nevada, § 40 ; New York, 
 §488; Idaho, Code Civ. Pro. (1901), §3206; 
 Montana, §680; Utah, Rev. St. (1898), 
 § 2962; Wyoming, Rev. St. (1899), 
 § 3535 ; Mi-s-xouri, Rev. St., 1899, § 598.]
 
 182 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 they failed to establish such right as alleged residing in all, a 
 nonsuit was inevitable. If two or more persons were united as 
 plaintiffs in a legal action based upon their right of property in 
 lands or chattels, they must necessarily have been either joint 
 owners or owners in common, and a failure to prove the joint 
 right of action was followed ])y the same consequence, — a defeat 
 of all the plaintiffs. In equity, no such doctrine prevailed? 
 because when two or more persons were made plaintiffs in the 
 same action it by no means followed that they held and alleged 
 a joint light residing in themselves. When, therefore, there was 
 an improper or unnecessary union of co-plaintiffs in an equity 
 action, the suit did not necessarily fail as to all; the bill might 
 be dismissed at the hearing as to certain of the plaintiffs, and a 
 decree rendered for the others; or some might be struck off, 
 upon motion, at any stage of the proceedings, and the cause go 
 on in the name of the residue. 
 
 § 127. '' 210. Same Subject. Under the Codes. Preliminary 
 Analysis. Has any change in these conceptions, and in the prac- 
 tical rules derived from them, been wrought by the codes of pro- 
 cedure? If the old distinction between joint legal rights and 
 several legal rights is maintained; if the ancient notion of the 
 common law," that two or more parties plaintiff in a legal action, 
 brought upon a contract or upon the ownership of land or chattels, 
 must hold a joint cause of action, is still preserved, with all of 
 its teL;hnical incidents; if it be considered that the reform 
 legislation has confined its equitable doctrine as to parties to 
 equitable actions alone, while it has left the doctrines regulat- 
 ing legal actions untouched, — then no change has been wrouglit 
 in the practical rules which determine the effect of a misjoinder 
 of plaintiffs, as stated in the foregoing paragraph. Under this 
 assumption, a misjoinder of plaintiffs in a legal action, brought 
 upon a contract or upon property in lands or chattels, must 
 now, a.s formerly, entail the consequence of a complete failure; 
 while now, as formerly, a misjoinder of plaintiffs in an equity 
 suit does not entail such a consofjuence; a judgment can be 
 recovered by a portion of the plaintiffs, and the action be 
 dismissed as to the residue. If, on the other hand, the system 
 is to l)e accepted and acted upon in the spirit which (lesigii('(l 
 it, — if its requirements as to parties, which, as is nnivcu'sally 
 conceded, enact the established doctrines of tlie ec^uity courts,
 
 MISJOINDER OF TLAINTIFFS. 183 
 
 extend the one principle to all actions, legal as well as equi- 
 table, — then there is a single rule governing all actions, and, 
 so far as the dogmas of the common law are inconsistent there- 
 with, they are necessarily abrogated, and form no part of the 
 reformed American procedure. The most conspicuous and char- 
 acteristic of these dogmas are the notions as to joint rights, 
 and as to the impossibility of severing in the judgment when 
 such rights have been averred as the causes of action; and 
 these notions must be abandoned, if full force and effect are 
 to be given to the language used by the legislature. The 
 whole discussion is thus reduced to a single question: Are 
 these provisions of the code to be accepted in their entirety, 
 with all their legitimate and necessary consequences, or are 
 they to be limited and restricted by some exception grafted 
 upon them by the courts, and are their consequences to be 
 abridged and their operation to be confined to those actions 
 which, under the former system, would have been called equi- 
 table? I have already, in the former portion of this section, 
 stated, as the guiding principle of interpretation adopted b}' 
 most of the courts, the doctrine that the equitable rules of the 
 codes were to be applied in all actions, whatever be their nature. 
 This is certainly the inference to be drawn from the judicial 
 decisions when a general theory of interpretation vjas the subject of 
 discussion; and one theory, when accepted, ought, beyond a 
 doubt, to be carried out in all the minor details, in the work of 
 creating all the practical rules for administering justice, if any 
 consistent and symmetrical result is desired.^ But unfortunately, 
 in comparing the decided cases, and in endeavoring to deduce 
 from them a body of pi-actical rules, we shall find so much in- 
 consistency and vacillation in the judgments of even the same 
 tribunals, that we are sometimes forced to doubt whether any 
 general principle of construction was ever intended to be adopted 
 by the courts, whether they ever accepted any theory of intei'- 
 pretation, and proceeded to work from it as a foundation in 
 constructing a system of procedure. In regard to the particular 
 matter now under consideration, if we collect and compare the 
 
 ^ ^The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in dealing with the subject is set out in full 
 
 the very recent case of Castle >•. Madison as follows : " Under the technical rules of 
 
 (1902), 113 Wis. 346, 89 N. W. 156, so the common law it was not considered 
 
 fully and clearly supports the author's possible for two or more persons to be 
 
 views, that the portion of the opinion united as plaintiffs in the same action
 
 ]84 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 decisions which have been made in the different States, it ^^'ill be 
 difficult, if not impossible, to say, upon their authority, that any 
 definite rule has been established determining the effect of a 
 misjoinder of plaintiffs. 
 
 § 128. *211. Misjoinder of Plaintiffs no Defence in an Equi- 
 table Action. It is certainly settled beyond a doubt that, in 
 all equitable actions, and in all actions where, upon equitable 
 principles, a co-plaintiff may sometimes be added, not because he 
 is jointly interested with the other, but because his presence as a 
 party is considered necessary to a complete determination of the 
 issues, — as where a husband is sometimes added in an action 
 brought by a wife touching her separate property, — the equitable 
 rule applies in its full force, and a misjoinder of plaintiffs is not 
 a defence to the suit; it is neither a ground of demurrer, nor can 
 it be set up in the answer as a bar to the relief demanded in the 
 
 upon a contract unless they were, for all 
 the purposes of that action, equally united 
 in interest, unless the benefit of the con- 
 tract belonged to them as a unit, and un- 
 less the right in them was created at the 
 same time and by the same act. And the 
 same rule was applied to the joinder of 
 defendants. The common law knew noth- 
 ing of defendants against whom a judg- 
 ment for the entire amount of debt and 
 damages was not to be rendered, nor of 
 defendants who become liable at different 
 times, and u|)on separate instruments. . . . 
 The revolution contemplated by the code 
 has been, in a measure, defeated by at- 
 tempting to interpret it according to com- 
 mon-law principles. It was deemed that 
 it had not abolished the ancient legal con- 
 ceptions as to parties and joint rights and 
 liabilities, and hence the code was fenced 
 around by a series of decisions on this sub- 
 ject renderinj; it much less revolutionary 
 than its framers evidently designed. It 
 has been said — and the statement appeals 
 to us with considerable force — that these 
 ancient rules of the common law ouglit to 
 have but meagre weight as against the 
 plain and obvious purpose of the code to 
 simplify and remove the difficulties of the 
 former practice. The rules of practice 
 under the regime of etjuity were in every 
 way different from these legal doctrines. 
 The legal notion of a necessary unity in 
 
 the rights of the plaintiffs or in the liabili- 
 ties of defendants was not known or rec- 
 ognized in equity. The great range of 
 precedents on this subject may be found 
 in any text-book on equity jurisprudence. 
 It is plain from a cursory reading of the 
 sections of our statute mentioned that they 
 are broad and comprehensive enough to 
 cover the entire field of ancient equity 
 rules. They are without exception or 
 limitation, and usually have been con- 
 strued as being of equal breadth and scope 
 with the rules of equity as administered in 
 England when applied to suits in equity. 
 It is, perhnps, to be regretted that the 
 early expositors of the code should have 
 found it necessary to apply its language 
 in one way as to legal actions, and the 
 same language in another way as to suits 
 in equity. The natural and fundamental 
 ideas which seemed to control in suits in 
 equity were that the suit should be prose- 
 cuted by the party really in interest, al- 
 though there might be joined with him 
 others who bad an interest in the subject- 
 matter an<l in the relief sought, and that 
 all persons whose presence was necessary 
 to a complete determination of the (jues- 
 tions involved should be made ])arties, so 
 that in one decree their rights, claims, 
 interests, and liabilities, however varying 
 in importance or extent, might be adjudi- 
 cated and enforced by the court."]
 
 MISJOINDER OF PLAINTIFFS. 
 
 185 
 
 complaint or jjetition.^ The name of the unnecessary plaintiff 
 may be struck out b}' the court, upon motion ; or, if the cause 
 proceeds to trial, a judgment may be rendered in favor of the 
 plaintiff entitled thereto, and the action dismissed as against the 
 others. 2 The changes made b}^ the codes themselves, and also 
 by special statutes relating to the property rights of married 
 women, have certainly extended this rule to many cases not 
 
 1 [^Misjoinder was held by the Supreme 
 Court of Indiana to constitute a defence in 
 an action which, while not strictly equita- 
 ble, involved an equitable cause of action. 
 This was the case of Mcintosh v. Zaring 
 (1897), 150 lud. 301,49 N. E. 164. Three 
 firms of attorneys had executed a contract 
 with defendants, by the terms of which an 
 action was to be brought by the said at- 
 torneys to set aside the will of the father 
 of one of the defendants. Each firm was to 
 receive one-third of the total fee, said total 
 to amount to a certain per cent of the sum 
 defendant should realize out of the estate 
 of her father, whether by suit or com- 
 promise. The attorneys fully performed 
 the contract on their part, but defendant 
 falsely and fraudulently represented to 
 them that she had received, as the result 
 of the compromise entered into, $50,000 
 from her father's estate, whereas in fact 
 she had received the sum of $250,000. 
 Relying on her representations plaintiffs 
 settled with her on the basis of §50,000. 
 When the fraud was di.scovered this action 
 was brought, the members of the three 
 firms joining as plaintiffs, demanding 
 judgment for tlie amount still due and 
 unpaid on the contract, and other proper 
 relief. One of the members of one of the 
 firms had previously died, and his admin- 
 istratrix juined as plaintiff. The com- 
 plaint alleged the contract, the settlement, 
 and the facts constituting the fraud. De- 
 fendants filed a general demurrer for want 
 of facts. 
 
 The court held that tlie contract was 
 several as to each firm of attorneys, and 
 hence did not create a joint right of action 
 in said attorneys. " But," said the court, 
 " there is an element in the complaint be- 
 yond the .scope of the mere written con- 
 tract that exerts an influence upon the 
 right of the several obligees or payees 
 therein to maintain a joint action thereon. 
 
 That element is the allegation of fraud 
 and misrepresentation of the defendants" 
 as to the amount Mrs. Mcintosh had re- 
 ceived from the estate of her father on 
 the compromise. . . . While neither one 
 of the firms of attorneys in the contract 
 mentioned were interested in either of the 
 other firms recovering thereon, so as to 
 enable them to join in a suit thereon, yet 
 they were all interested in the other 
 element which was essential to be estab- 
 lished, without which neither of them 
 could recover, namely, the fraud by which 
 they had been induced to .accept a smaller 
 sum in full settlement and discharge of 
 the contract than was really due them 
 In other words, they were all alike inter- 
 ested in avoiding the settlement." There 
 was no specific prayer to have the settle- 
 ment set aside, but the facts showed plain- 
 tiffs entitled to it, and the court held it 
 proper to grant such relief under the gen- 
 eral prayer. Accordingly the court held 
 that in respect of this joinder the com- 
 plaint was not bad for want of sufficient 
 facts. 
 
 But the administratrix of one of the 
 attorneys had joined as plaintiff, although 
 under the law the partnership assets went 
 to the survivor. Hence she had no inter- 
 est in the action. And on this account 
 the court held the complaint bad as again.st 
 the demurrer, as to all the plaintiffs, not- 
 withstanding that the equitable cause of 
 action for setting aside the settlement 
 had been deemed sufficient to warrant the 
 joinder of the firms of .attorneys. 
 
 See also People, ex rel. v. District Court 
 (189.3), 18 Colo. 29.3, 32 Pac. 819, which 
 is controlled l)y the statute making mi.s- 
 joinder of plaintiffs aground of demurrer.] 
 
 ^ Ackley r. Tarbox, 31 N. Y. 564 ; 
 Allen V. Buffalo, 38 N. Y. 280 ; QKucera ;•. 
 Kucera (1893), 86 Wis. 416, 57 N. W. 47. ]
 
 1S(1 CIVIL KH.MEDIES. 
 
 Strictly equitable, even to cases which could not have been 
 maintained at all Avliile the common law was in its integrity. 
 
 § 129. * 212. Doctrine that Demurrer -will lie or Dismissal as to 
 Party improperly Joined. There is another class of decisions, 
 made in actions of a similar nature to those last mentioned, — 
 that is, actions strictly equitable, and those in which a plaintiff 
 is added in pursuance of a supposed positive rule of practice, 
 although no joint legal right is alleged, — in which it has been 
 held that, if the misjoinder of a plaintiff appears upon the face 
 of the complaint or petition, the defendant may demur as against 
 the party, thus improperly joined, on the ground that the plead- 
 ing does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action 
 in his favor; or, if no demurrer is interposed, the same objection 
 may be raised at the trial, and the action dismissed as to him-. 
 If the misjoinder does not appear upon the face of the pleading, 
 the defence must be set up in the answer.^ The principle of this 
 class of decisions is the same as that involved in the cases 
 described in the preceding paragraph. The actions in which 
 this method of raising the objection of a misjoinder is permitted, 
 may be equitable or may be legal; but, if the latter, they are 
 not based upon a joint legal right alleged to be held by all the 
 plaintiffs. In all of them the right of action is assumed to be 
 possessed by one or more of the plaintiffs, who are the real parties 
 in interest, and the other parties are added through some sup- 
 posed requirement of form or of policy. 
 
 § 130. "^ 213. Misjoinder Fatal as to all the Plaintiffs in a Legal 
 Action. View of some Courts. We are finally brought to the 
 case of an action strictly legal in its nature, brought by two or 
 more plaintiffs in whose favor a joint riglit is averred as the 
 ground of recovery. The cotirts of some States have distinctly 
 asserted and applied the ancient common-law rule under these 
 circumstances, notwithstanding the provisions of the codes, and 
 notwithstanding even the liberal scheme of interpretation which 
 
 1 Palmer v. Davis, 28 N. Y. 242. hini, Imt uot as to both. No joint cause of 
 
 I'almer and wife sued on an award made action was liere alie^'cd, although, nomi- 
 
 in her favor. The Court of Apjx-als ]i<ld tuilli/, the action was joint. See also 
 
 that the husband was not a proper plain- Willard v. Keas, 26 Wis. 540, 544, which 
 
 tiff ; that, as this appeared on the face of holds that, in an action by two or more 
 
 tiie complaint, the defendant might have plaintiffs, a general demurrer Mgainst all 
 
 demurred generally as to him; and that these plaintiffs, on the ground of a want 
 
 the same objection could l)e raiser! on the of sufficient facts, is bad if a good cause 
 
 trial, and the complaint dismissed as to of action i» alleged in favor of one of them.
 
 MISJOINDER OF PLAINTIFFS. 187 
 
 had, as a general thcorij, been adopted by the same tribunals. 
 When, in such an action, a joint right is averred as arising from 
 contract or from tlie ownership of hind or chattels, while in fact 
 no joint right in all exists, but only a several right held by one 
 or a joint one held by some, this error, according to the con- 
 struction now stated, goes to the entire proceeding and defeats 
 the suit as against all the plaintiffs. If the error appears upon 
 the face of the complaint or petition, the objection may be raised 
 by a general demurrer interposed against all the plaintiffs, on 
 the ground that facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action are 
 not stated in the pleading; and, in the absence of a demurrer, 
 the same objection may be taken at the trial by a motion for a 
 nonsuit or for a dismissal of the action. Finally, if the error is 
 not apparent on the face of the pleading, the defence may be set 
 up in the answer, and is, perhaps, admissible under the general 
 denial. This is plainly the original common-law doctrine, un- 
 affected by the reform legislation, and it proceeds upon the 
 assumption that the cause of action is a joint one, that this 
 attribute of jointness is as essential to the maintenance of the 
 alleged right as any other material fact, and that the inability to 
 establish the particular averment is not a mere variance, but is a 
 complete failure of proof. ^ As an illustration: if the complaint 
 
 1 Bartges v. O'Neil, 13 Ohio St. 72 ; jointly, as was averred, and that this de- 
 Masters V. Freemau, 17 Ohio St. 323; feet could be taken advantage of by a 
 ])e Bolt v. Carter, 31 Ind. 355; Goodnight general demurrer for a want of sufficient 
 I'. Goar, 30 Ind. 418 ; Berkshire y. Schujtz, facts; and that the action should have 
 25 Ind. 523 ; Lipperd v. Edwards, 39 Ind. been dismissed on the trial for the same 
 165; Estabrook v. Messersmith, 18 Wis. reason. Compare this decision with that 
 545; Frans v. Young, 24 Iowa, 375; Gi- made by the New York Court of Appeals 
 raud V. Beach, 3 E. D. Smith, 337. Cer- in Simar v. Canaday, .53 N. Y. 298, which, 
 tain of these cases inferentiallij support to a certain extent, presented the same 
 the propositions contained in the text, by peculiar features. The Ohio court re- 
 holdiug that a misjoinder of plaintiffs in affirmed the doctrine in the subsequent 
 .sucli actions may be taken advantage of case of Masters v. Freemau, 17 Ohio St. 
 by a general demurrer, upon the ground 323. Estabrook v. Messersmith, 18 Wis. 
 tiiat sufficient facts are not alleged ; the 545, was an action by two partners, 
 others, however, sustain these propositions alleging their partnership, their joint 
 to their full extent. As the subject is one ownership of certain goods, and a wrong- 
 of great practical importance, I shall quote ful conversion thereof by the defendants, 
 from the.se decisions at .some length. Bart- It appeared on the trial that one of the 
 ges V. O'Neil, 13 Ohio St. 72, was an action plaintiffs had been guilty of a fraud upon 
 by a husband and wife to recover daniiiges his creditors in respect of the property in 
 for deceit in the .sale of lands purchased question, which, as the court hell, pre- 
 froin the defendant. The Supreme Court eluded him from recovery; and it was 
 of Ohio held that the petition <iisclo.sed no thereupon claimed by the defendants that, 
 cause of action belonging to the phiintiffs although the other plaintiff was innocent
 
 188 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 should allege that the plaintiffs A. and B. were partners, and as 
 such had sold and delivered to the defendant certain goods, for a 
 
 of the fniutl, there could be uo recovery 
 ill any form, — not by the plaintiffs jointly, 
 because one of them was unable to main- 
 tain the action ; and not by the innocent 
 partner, because the right averred in the 
 complaint was a joint one. The plaintiffs 
 were permitted, however, to recover the 
 value of the innocent partner's interest. 
 This judgment was reversed by the Su- 
 jireme Court, and the grounds of the 
 decision were thus stated by Dixon 0. J. 
 (p. .549): "The plaintiffs were partners, 
 and sued for the alleged wrongful conver- 
 sion of their partnership' property ; and 
 such is the nature of their legal right — 
 they are so iudissolubly blended — that 
 they must not only join in an action at law, 
 but a right of action must be established 
 in both, or no recovery can be had. It is 
 a general principle, applicable to suits of 
 this nature, that all must be entitled to 
 judgment, or none ; and in cases where 
 either party is precluded on the ground of 
 fraud, the fraud binds not only the guilty 
 partner, but the innocent partner in that 
 suit. ... It would seem that, if the de- 
 frauded party [meaning the innocent jiart- 
 ner] lias any remedy, it is only by a suit 
 in ecjuity, in which the objection of joining 
 his guilty copartner as a party plaintiff is 
 e.xsily obviated." I must remark, in pass- 
 ing, that the last observation is certainly 
 a strange one, in the face of the statutory 
 provision contained in the Wisconsin code, 
 which purports to abolish all distinctions 
 between legal and ecjuitable actions. That 
 a plaintiff should be turned out of court in 
 one action called Ifg'il, and should be told 
 that he must bring another action called 
 equitable, for exactly the same demand, 
 and upon exactly the s.ame allegations of 
 fact, and that, in the latter suit, the par- 
 ticular and technical ground of his defeat 
 in the former one could not be objected 
 to his recovery, seems, to say the least, to 
 be a recognition of the "distinction "which 
 the law-making power had so expressly 
 abrogated. 
 
 I^.Xn interesting illustration of the evo- 
 lution of judicial opinion is afforded by 
 a comparison of this case of Estabrook 
 V. Messersmith with the recent case of 
 
 Castle V. Madison (1902), 113 Wis. 346, 
 89 N. W. 156, in which the court fully 
 supports the author in his view of the 
 unity of procedure. This case is quoted 
 at length in note to § *210.] 
 
 The Supreme Court of Indiana has ap- 
 proved the doctrine Qof Estabrook v. 
 Messersmith] in substance, although in a 
 form somewhat modified. Berkshire v. 
 Shultz, 25 Ind. 523. QSee the case of 
 Mcintosh V. Zaring (1897), 150 Ind. 301, 
 49 N. E. 164, in which the court said: 
 "It is tirmly settled in this State that 
 a complaint which does not state a good 
 cause of action as to all, though it does 
 as to some of the plaintiffs, is bad as 
 to all, for want of suthcient facts to con- 
 stitute a cause of action." The court in 
 this case quoted from the case of Nico- 
 deinus v. Simons (1889), 121 Ind. 564, z& 
 follows : " If, therefore, two or more 
 persons bring a joint action, alleging a 
 joint cause of action, and it turns out upon 
 the trial that upon the facts alleged in the 
 complaint some, but not all, of the plain- 
 tiffs are entitled to recover, the court or 
 jury, as the case may be, will so find, and 
 judgment will be rendered accordingly. 
 . . . But, as we have already held, the 
 complaint is good, and the question before 
 us is one of evidence, and not of pleading; 
 upon the evidence before them, the jury 
 found for the female appellee and the 
 court rendered judgment in her favor. 
 This, we think, was proper." And the 
 court, in Mcintosh v. Zaring, goes on to- 
 say : " It is very clear that the section 
 quoted is in no way inconsistent with the 
 long line of cases cited hohliiig that a 
 comijlaint by plaintiffs will be bad for 
 want of sufhcient facts if it does not state 
 a cause of action in favor of all the plain- 
 tiffs." See also Brunson v. Henry (1894), 
 140 Ind. 455, 39 N. E. 256 ; Medlock i;. 
 Merritt (1897), 102 Ga. 212, 29 S. E. 
 185.] Goodnight r. Goar, 30 Ind. 418; 
 I)e Holt V. Carter, 31 Ind. 355; Lipperd 
 I'. Edwards, 39 Ind. 165, 170. In Viles 
 V. Bangs, 36 Wi.s. 131, 1.39, 140, the 
 ca.se of Estabrook v. Messersmith, 18 
 id. 545, quoted supra in this note, was 
 severely criticised and its correctness
 
 MISJOINDER OF I'LAINTIFFS. .1 SIJ 
 
 stipulated price, and slioiild demand a judgment therefor, and on 
 the trial it should appear that A. and B. were not partners as 
 averred, and did not jointly sell and deliver the chattels to the 
 defendant, but that in fact the same were sold and delivered by 
 A. alone, B. having no interest in or connection with the trans- 
 action, in pursuance of the rule adopted in these decisions no 
 judgment could be rendered for A. separately; the action would 
 entirely fail as respects both the plaintiffs. It thus appears that, 
 in at least three States, the courts have, in the most explicit 
 manner, and in well considered opinions, reaffirmed the ancient 
 common-law doctrine in respect to legal actions brought by two 
 or more plaintiffs jointly; and have held that the joint right 
 must be proved as alleged, or the action must fail as to all the 
 plaintiffs. In other States, it is merely said that a misjoinder is 
 ground for a demurrer interposed to all the plaintiffs for the 
 cause that the complaint or petition does not state facts sufficient 
 to constitute a cause of action. 
 
 § 131. * 214. New York Cases. Criticism. The question 
 has been presented to the New York Court of Appeals, but 
 has not been passed upon in such an explicit manner as neces- 
 sarily to establish the rule for that State. In an action brought 
 by two plaintiffs, G. and C, to recover damages for an alleged 
 fraud, the action being in form joint, and the demand of judg- 
 ment being for damages due to the plaintiffs jointly, the com- 
 plaint was dismissed at the trial, because it appeared that the 
 right of action was held by one of the plaintiffs alone. In respect 
 to this ruling, the Commission of Appeal said: "Probably the 
 court had the power in this action, if the claim had been made, 
 to have awarded to C. his damages, giving judgment against the 
 other plaintiff. But the court was not bound to do this, and 
 committed no error in defeating the plaintiffs, because they did 
 
 doubted. Cole J. made, in fact, tlie same lyn, 5 Ilun, 149 ; Marie v. Garrison, 
 
 criticism which I have made in the fore- 83 N. Y. 14, 29 ; Loomis i-. Brown, 16 
 
 going note. See also Graham Tp. Indep. Barb. 331 ; Great W. Compound Co. v. 
 
 Sch. Dist. V. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2, .50 ^.tna Ins. Co , 40 Wis. 373. See also 
 
 Iowa, 322 (in an action to recover money, Ilellams v. Switzer, 24 S. C. 39; Sira v. 
 
 the objection to a misjoinder of plaintiffs Hurst, 44 Ind. 579 ; Yates v. State, 58 
 
 should be made by motion, not by de- Ind. 299 ; Hyatt v. Cochran, 85 Ind. 231 ; 
 
 murrer). As to proper or improper Dill v. Voss, 94 Ind. 590; Pixley v. Van 
 
 joinder of plaintiffs, see Bort v. Yaw, Nostern, 100 Ind. 34; Morningstar v. 
 
 46 Iowa, 323; Fuller v. Fuller, 5 Hun, Cunningham, 110 Ind. 328. 
 593 ; Brett v. First Univ. Soc. of Brook-
 
 190 CIVIL ki:medies. 
 
 not establish a cause of action in which they were hoth inter- 
 ested."'' Tlii:i conchision is certainly very unsatisfactory. It 
 can hardly be possible that it is a matter of discretion with the 
 court, at the trial, whether it will permit a severance in the 
 judgment or will dismiss the action entirely. The rights of 
 litigant parties cannot depend upon so A^arying a criterion as the 
 opinion or whim of an individual judge. In a subsequent case, 
 where the action was brought by a husband, and wife to recover 
 damages for a fraud alleged to have been done to them jointly, 
 and in which a joint right of action was distinctly averred, the 
 same court announced the rule in the following manner, but, as 
 it was entirely unnecessary to the decision of the case, the ex- 
 pression of opinion cannot be regarded as anything mo e than a 
 dictum : " The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint upon 
 several grounds, and, 1st, that the plaintiffs could not maintain 
 a joint action, and that there was thereby a misjoinder of parties 
 plaintiff. This point is not rested upon the marital relation of 
 the plaintiffs, and the existence of that relation may, in con- 
 sidering it, be put out of view. It is an objection which may 
 be taken on the trial. ' But it is not an objection which affords 
 good grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint of both 
 plaintiffs, if either of them has shown that he or she has a good 
 cause of action. In such case the motion must be for a dis- 
 missal of the complaint of the plaintiff in whom no right of action 
 appears. 2 Whether either of the plaintiffs had shown a good 
 cause of action will be considered under the next two heads. "^ 
 
 § 132. * 215. True Interpretation of the Codes as to Conse- 
 quences of Misjoinder. Although not entitled to the weight of 
 authority as a decision^ the doctrine last-quoted from the opinion 
 of the New York Court of Appeals is in complete accordance 
 with the true spirit and evident intent of the reform legislation. 
 The conclusions reached by the courts of Ohio, Wisconsin, and 
 Indiana, in the cases heretofore cited, plainly result from a failure 
 
 ' Calkins v. Smith, 48 N. Y. 61 1, G19, 191 ; Fry v. Street, 37 Ark. 39; Lancaster 
 
 per Karl J. Cy. v. Kush (Neb. 1892), 52 N. W. 837; 
 
 2 Citing rode, § 144 (6),§ 148; I'alnicr Wiesner v. Young (Minn. 1892), 52 N. W. 
 
 r. Davis, 28 N. Y. 242. 390 ; Hurd c. Simpson, 47 Kan. 372 ; Arts 
 
 •'* Simar v. Canady, 53 N. Y. 298, 301, r. Guthrie, 75 Iowa, 674; White Oak 
 
 per Folger J. S. 1'. Green v. Green, C9 Dist. Tp. v. Oskaloosa Di.st. Tp. 44 Iowa. 
 
 N. C. 294, 298; Burns v. Ashworth, 72 512. A preponderance of recent authority 
 
 N. C. 496; Warrcnton v. Arrington, 101 supports the opinion of the author and the 
 
 N. C. 109 ; Oliphint v. Mansfield, 3G Ark. dictum of Folgcr J.
 
 MISJOINDKU UF PLAINTIFFS. 
 
 101 
 
 to grasp tlie central principle of interpretation which should be 
 applied in construing the codes of procedure, and to push it to 
 its legitimate consequences. That principle, which had been 
 fully recognized by the same tribunals under other circumstances, 
 is the purely equitable nature of the statutory provisions regulat- 
 ing the subject of parties, and the application of the equitable 
 theory to the civil action in all its phases, and under all its uses, 
 without exception or limitation. This is now conceded, almost 
 universally, to be the true interpretation of the clauses of the 
 codes under consideration, whenever the mode of interpretation 
 is to be stated in a general and comprehensive manner.* The 
 confusion and conflict of decision shown in the preceding para- 
 
 1 [_" A misjoinder or uniting of parties 
 who should not he joined cannot he taken 
 advantage of hy demurrer:" Dolan v. 
 Hubiuger (1899), 109 la. 408, 80 N. W. 
 514. To the same effect, Cedar Kapids 
 Nat. Bank v. Lavery (1900J, 110 la. 
 57.5, 81 N. W. 775. A motion is the proper 
 remedy : Lull v. Auamosa Nat. Bank 
 (1900), 110 la. 537, 81 N. W. 784; 
 Martin v. Clay (1899), 8 Okla. 46, 50 Pac. 
 715; Hornish v. Ringen Stove Co. (1902), 
 116 la. 1, 89 N. W. 95; Stiles v. City of 
 •Guthrie (1895), 3 Okla. 26, 41 Pac. 383 ; 
 Powell V. Banks (1898), 146 Mo. 620, 48 
 S. VV. 664 (even after judgment). The 
 question cannot be raised hy demurrer on 
 the ground of defect of parties or mis- 
 joinder of causes of action : Wunderlich 
 V. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co. (1896), 93 
 Wis. 1.32, 66 N. W. 1144. Nor can it be 
 raised by a demurrer for want of juris- 
 diction or want of facts: Svanburg t-. 
 Fosseeii (1899), 75 Minn. 350, 78 N. W. 4. 
 
 " A misjoinder apparent upon the face 
 of the petition is waived if not objected to 
 before trial :" Goble v. Swobe (1902), 64 
 Neb. 838, 90 N. W. 919. The objection of 
 misjoinder cannot be made for tiie first 
 time on appeal: Brook i-. Rayless (1898), 
 6 Okla. 568. 52 Pac. 738; Breault v. 
 Merrill & Ring Lumber Co (1898), 72 
 Minn. 143, 75 N. W. 122. The objection 
 comes too late at the trial : Harrell v. 
 Davis (1899), 108 Ga. 789, 33 S. E. 8.52. 
 " There is no such reason for demurrer as 
 misjoinder of parties : " Cargar >•. Fee 
 (1894), 140 Ind. 572, 39 N. E. 93. In 
 North Carolina, on the other hand, mis- 
 joinder of parties must he taken advantage 
 
 of by demurrer and not by motion, but the 
 defect is considered a mere matter of sur- 
 plu.sage and not fatal : McMiHan v. Baxley 
 (1893), 112 N. C. 578, 16 S. E. 845; Tate 
 V. Douglas (1893), 113 N. C. 190, 18 S. E. 
 202; Sullivan v. Field (1896), 118 N. C. 
 358, 24 N. E. 735 ; Hocutt v. Wilmington 
 etc. R. R. Co. (1899), 124 N. C. 214, 32 
 S. E. 681. See contra, Wool v. Edeuton 
 (1893), 113 N. C. 33, 18 S. E. 76. 
 
 See in this connection the case of Hurd 
 V. Hotciikiss (1900), 72 Conn. 472, 45 Atl. 
 11, where the court said : " Plaintiffs may 
 ordinarily bring actions jointly or sev- 
 erally, as they consider their rights re- 
 (]uire; just as plaintiffs may claim the 
 relief to which they conceive themselves 
 to be entitled. If it turn out in the 
 progress of the trial that the plaintiffs 
 are not properly named, then the court 
 makes such order as the circumstances 
 require, or renders judgment against them 
 all, or for only such of tliem as may have 
 established a right to recover. This is 
 autliorized to be done by §§ 888 and 1108 
 of the General Statutes. These sections 
 furnish the only authority of which we 
 are aware, for a court to make an order 
 that one or more of the persons joined as 
 plaintiffs in a complaint shall be forbidden 
 to prosecute." Citing tlie text. 
 
 In Colorado, where misjoinder is a 
 statutory ground of demurrer, it is held 
 tliat the objection cannot be raised by 
 answer, where the defect appears upon 
 the face of the complaint : Sams Car 
 Cou{.ler Co. v. League (1898), 25 Colo. 
 1 29, 54 Pac. 642.]
 
 192 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 graphs arise from the fact that courts, in determining the special 
 rules applicable to particular classes of cases, have been unwilling 
 to carry out the principle which they have accepted in its most 
 general form, and to adopt the results which necessarily flow 
 from it; they have shrunk from the changes in the old and familiar 
 methods which sucli a course would produce. It is very plain, 
 however, that, if we are ever to have a uniform, consistent, 
 simple, and symmetrical system of procedure as the outcome of 
 the reform legislation, the courts must be willing to follow the 
 general principles of interpretation to their legitimate conclu- 
 sions. A system in which the equital)le doctrine as to parties 
 and judgments is permitted to work its effect upon legal actions 
 to a partial extent, while the ancient legal doctrine is applied 
 in other instances, would be more objectionable even than the 
 former complete division between equitable and legal proceed- 
 ings. As the codes do not indicate any line where the equitable 
 doctrine is to stop and the legal to commence, in determining the 
 practical rules, the position of this line must depend upon the 
 views of individual judges and courts, and thus an element of 
 uncertainty and confusion is introduced into tlie procedure, 
 which can never be removed; there being no 2^?T?iCijy/(? by which 
 to settle the respective limits of the two theories or doctrines as 
 to parties, no fixed system of practical rules would ever be estab- 
 lished. If, on the other hand, the equitable doctrine should l)e 
 not only stated as the correct general theory of interpretation, 
 but should be honestly followed out in its application to all cases, 
 the same practical rules would be deduced alike for legal and for 
 equitable actions, and the resulting system would l)e definite, 
 certain, and consistent, — the system beyond a doubt contem- 
 plated by the legislatures when they enacted the codes in the 
 several States. If this were done, tlie ancient rules of the 
 conniion law respectiiig the nature of joint rights when set up 
 as the basis of recovery, and the effect of alleging such a right 
 in favor of two or more plaintiffs, would disappear, and a sever- 
 ance in the judgment would be a? much a matter of course in 
 legal actions as in equitable suits. 
 
 § 133. * 216. When Objection may be made by Demurrer or 
 Answ^er against Party improperly Joined. There is still another 
 case in respect of wliicli tliere seems to be a unanimity of deci- 
 sion. When an action is Ijrought by two or more plaintiffs, and
 
 RULKS AS TO PLAINTIFFS. 193 
 
 the averments of the complaint or petition show that one or more 
 of them have been improperly joined as co-plaintitfs with the 
 rest, the defendant may interpose a demurrer as to such plaintiff 
 or plaintiffs, not because of a defect of parties, nor because of a 
 misjoinder, but because tlie complaint or petition does not state 
 facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in respect to these 
 plaintiffs. The distinction between this case and the one last 
 considered is evident. In the latter, the demurrer is to all the 
 plaintiffs, and the objection extends to the entire action upon 
 the alleged ground that no joint claim or cause of action is 
 shown to exist in all the plaintiffs. In the present case, it is 
 conceded that a cause of action is shown in favor of one or more 
 of the plaintiffs, and the objection goes only to the others in 
 whose favor no cause of action appears. This mode of objecting 
 to a misjoinder of plaintiffs may be used in legal as well as in 
 equitable actions. Of course, if the objection does not appear 
 upon the face of the pleading, but exists as a matter of fact, it 
 may and should be set up as a defence in the answer.^ 
 
 Rules as to Plaintiffs in Particular Classes of Cases. 
 
 § 134. * 217. Order of Proposed Treatment. I now pass from 
 this examination of the doctrine in its general scope to its appli- 
 cation in the various classes of cases which can arise in the ad- 
 ministration of justice. The further discussion will be pursued 
 in the following order: First., Parties plaintiff in legal actions; 
 Second., Actions by or between husband and wife ; Thirds Parties 
 plaintiff in equitable actions. The first of these divisions will 
 be separated into: 1. Actions by owners in common and by joint 
 owners of land; 2. Actions by joint owners of chattels; 3. 
 Actions by persons having a joint right arising from contract; 4. 
 Actions by persons having several rights arising from contract; 
 5. Actions by persons having a joint right arising from tort; 
 
 ^ The rule as stated iu the text is complaint must siiow a cause of action 
 
 either expressly approved, or is impliedly against all the defendants, or it is bad on 
 
 acknowlediied, in several of the cases cited a general demurrer for want of sufficient 
 
 under the preceding paragraph. See also facts, as against the plaintiff improperly 
 
 Willard r. Heas, 26 Wis. 540, 544; Peo- joined); People?-. Ilaggin, 57 Cal. 579 (if 
 
 pie V. Crooks, 53 N. Y. 648. In Missouri an action is brought by entirely wrong 
 
 and California the codes expressly stato, jtlaintiff or jilaintiffs, the objection can be 
 
 as one ground of demurrer, the misjoinder raised by such a general demurrer). See 
 
 of the parties, plaintiff or defendant, also Teunant v. Pfester, 51 Cal. 511; 
 
 See Parker v. Small, 58 lud. 349 (a Harris r. Harris, 61 Ind. 117. 
 
 13
 
 194 CIVIL liKMEDIES. 
 
 6. Actions by persons having several rights arising from torts.' 
 The second and third of the general divisions do not admit of a 
 similar subdivision. 
 
 First : Legal Actions. 
 
 § 135. *218. I. Legal Actions by Joint Owners and Owners in 
 Common of Land. Modern Statutes. Common-Law^ Rules. The 
 change in the common law produced by statute throughout the 
 United States has practically abolished joint ownership in land, 
 except in the case of those holding alicni juris, as trustees. The 
 statutory rule is, I believe, quite universal among the States, that 
 when two or more persons succeed by inheritance to the same 
 land, their ownership is common and not joint, and when land 
 is conveyed to several persons in tlieir own right, without any 
 express direction to the contrary, their ownership also is com- 
 mon.^ The exceptions to this rule are trustees who are generally 
 omitted from the operations of the statutes, so that a grant or 
 devise to several as trustees creates a joint ownership; and in 
 certain States, as in New York, the peculiar modification of joint 
 estates created by a conveyance to a husband and wife, is held to 
 be unaffected by the statutes, and to exist as at the common law. 
 On the other hand, the legislation of some States has abolished 
 joint ownership, in an absolute manner, so that it cannot be 
 created even by the act of the parties. As a conclusion it is 
 enough to say that the common-law joint tenancy of land by per- 
 sons holding sui juris does not practically exist in this countr}-.'' 
 At the common law all the joint owners were required to unite 
 in any action, whether real or personal, based upon their pro- 
 prietiiry riglit. With owners in common, the rule was not so 
 uniform. In personal actions for injuries done to the land, it 
 was proper for all the owners to unite; in actions to recover 
 possession, however, each sued for his individual interest, al- 
 though this particular doctrine was doubtless modified in many 
 States, as it was in New York. Finally, in actions for rent, if 
 the letting was joint, or if the reservation was of an entire rent 
 to all, all would unite as plaintiffs; but if the rent was reserved 
 to them separately in distinct parts, each must sue for his own 
 
 1 Wash, on Real Prop., vol. 1, p. 40'J - Wash, on Real Prop., vol. 1, p. 409 
 
 (uote). (note).
 
 ACTIONS BY OWNERS OF LAND. 195 
 
 share. ^ It should be remembered that, in the action of ejectment 
 at the common law, the plaintiff was the fictitious person called 
 John Doe, and the real claimant was his lessor. It was only in 
 the United States, where the fictions of the action had generally 
 been abolished by statute, that it was possible for joint owners or 
 owners in common to appear as the actual plaintiffs in ejectment. 
 I now pass to cases decided since the enactment of the codes in 
 the several States. ^ 
 
 § 136. * 219. Decisions under the Codes. Where the rent 
 is entire, owners in common of the demised land may unite 
 in an action to recover it from the lessee; and upon the same 
 principle they may join in an action to recover the rent from a 
 person to Avliom it had been paid for their use; for example, 
 devisees in fee in remainder, after a life estate, may join in a 
 suit against the executor of the deceased life-tenant to recover 
 the rent which he had collected from the lessee subsequent to 
 the death. 2 A joinder of all does not, however, seem to be abso- 
 lutely necessary. It seems that each may sue for his own share 
 of the rent, even though it accrue as an entire sum to all the 
 owners in common.* The only possible alternative, however, is 
 a suit by all or a suit by each for his own portion separately; an 
 action cannot be maintained by a portion more than one and less 
 than all.^ When the lessor of land dies intestate, the term being 
 unexpired, his administrator is the only proper party to sue for 
 the unpaid rent which accrued prior to the death, while the heirs, 
 either jointly or separately, must sue for that accruing subse- 
 quently thereto.^ In actions brought to recover damages for 
 torts done to the land, such as trespasses, nuisances, and the 
 like, the common-law rule remains unchanged, and all the 
 owners in common must unite as plaintiffs;'^ even when they 
 
 1 See 1 Ch. I'l. (Springfield eil., 1840), i Jones v. Felch, 3 Bosw. 63; Porter 
 
 pp. 13, (;.-). " V. Hleiler, 17 Barb. 149. 
 
 - UMiuher v. Dunn (1898), 11 S. D. ^ Kiug r. Andersou, 20 Intl. 385. 
 196, 76 N. W. 922: Teuant.s in common "^ King y. Anderson, 20 Ind. 385 ; Craw- 
 are not " united in interest" within Comp. ford r. Gunn, 35 Iowa, 543. 
 Laws, § 4879, requiring all such persons '< De Puy v. Stronj,', 37 N. Y. 372 ; 3 
 to join in an action.] Keyes, 603; Hill r. Gibbs, 5 Hill, 56; 
 
 3 Marshall v. Moseley, 21 N. Y. 280, Parke v. Kilham, 8 Cal. 77 (diversion of 
 
 287. See Cruger r. McLaury, 41 N. Y. water) ; Sliepard v. Manhattan Hy. Co., 
 
 219, which holds that one of the owners 117 N. Y. 442; Wausau Boom Co. r. 
 
 in common may sue for his share of an Plumer, 49 Wis. 112 (the persons in ac- 
 
 entire rent. See infra, § *220, n. tual possession may maintain trespass).
 
 196 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 hold under different titles, they must still join, as, for example, 
 the heirs-at-la\v and devisees of the same land, in an action for 
 injuries done to the inheritance,^ or the owners in common of a 
 mill, who derive their rights under different conveyances, in a 
 suit for the diversion of water from their mill.^ The owners in 
 common must also join in an action to recover damages for fraud 
 practised in the sale of the land to them ; a separate suit cannot 
 be maintained.^ Administrators or executors cannot sue for 
 trespasses or other injuries done to the land after the death of 
 the owner whom they represent ; the heirs or the devisees, as the 
 case may be, are the only proper plaintiffs.* 
 
 § 137. * 220. Same Subject. Owners in common need not 
 not unite in an action to recover possession ; ^ each may bring a 
 separate suit for his \individed share. ^ This is a very familiar 
 
 The remainder-man and life tenants may 
 join as co-plaintiffs in suit for a nuisance, 
 e. q. a dam. Schiffer v. Eau Claire, 51 
 Wis. 385; Seymour v. Carpenter, 51 id. 
 413. 
 
 The separate owners of separate lands 
 each injured by the same nuisance, e. g. 
 a dam, or diversion of water, cannot 
 join as co-plaintiffs in an action for dam- 
 ages ; but they can join in an equitable 
 action to enjoin and remove the nuisance. 
 Palmer v. Waddell, 22 Kan. 352 ; QYouu- 
 kin V. Milwaukee, etc. Co. (1901), 112 Wis. 
 15, 87 N. W. 861 ; Linden Land Co. v. 
 Milwaukee, etc. Co. (1900), 107 Wis. 493, 
 83 N. W. 851 ; Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co. 
 (1900), 164 N. Y. 303. 58 N. E. 142; 
 Beacii V. Spokane Ranch Co. (1901), 25 
 Mont. 379, 65 Pac. Ill ; Brown v. Canal 
 and Reservoir Co. (1899), 26 Colo. 66, 56 
 Pac. 183; Rounow v. Delmue (1895), 23 
 Nev. 29, 41 Pac. 1074; McDonough ;•. 
 Carter (1896), 98 Ga 703, 25 S. E. 938 ;] 
 Foreman v. Boyle, 88 Cal. 290; Hellams 
 V. Switzer, 24 S. C. 39 ; Spanish Fork City 
 V. Hopper (Utah, 1891). 26 Pac. Rep. 293 
 (tenants in common of water). [^Rut 
 where a domestic animal breaks into a 
 pasture Held and injures live stock belong- 
 
 1 Van Deusen i-. Young, 29 Barb. 9. 
 
 2 Samuels v. Blanchard, 25 Wis. 329. 
 
 ' Lawrence r. Montgomery, 37 Cal. 
 183, 188, per Crockett J. See Foster v. 
 Elliott. 33 Iowa, 216, 224. 
 
 < Aubuchon r. Lory, 33 Mo. 99 ; Hart 
 V. Metrop. Elev. Ry. Co., 15 Daly, 391. In 
 a suit by tenants in common, the personal 
 representative of a deceased co-tenant is 
 projx'rly joined to recover damages up to 
 the time of the death of the decedent ; 
 and the heirs to recover damages subse- 
 quent to that date : Shepard v. Manhattan 
 Ry. Co., 117 N. Y'. 442. 
 
 [^Indianapolis, etc. R. R. Co.. v. Price 
 (1899), 153 Ind. 31, 53 N. E. 1018: Where 
 a piece of real estate is appropriated by 
 defendant, while plaintiffs and |)laintiffs' 
 ancestor are tenants in common therein, 
 and plaintiffs' ancestor dies before suit is 
 brought, and suit is brought by plaintiffs 
 both for the damages to their own intere.st 
 .and .13 heirs of the deceased tenant, the 
 fact that they have no right to sue as 
 heirs for the injury sustained by decedent 
 does not render their coniidaiut bad on 
 demurrer.] 
 
 " QBut where an action is joint, if it 
 appears that the defendants have a good 
 
 ing to one of the tenants in common of defence against one of the plaintiffs, the 
 
 the field, such tenant m.ay maintain an 
 action against the owner of the animal 
 without joining the other co-tenants ; Mor- 
 gan V. Hndnell (1895), 52 O. St. 552, 40 
 N. E. 710.] See ahio § *269, post, and 
 cases cited. 
 
 action must fail : Wooding v. Blanton 
 (1900), 112 Ga. 509, 37 S. E. 720.] 
 
 « Brown v. Warren, 16 Nev. 228; Hart 
 V. Robertson, 21 Cal. 346; Toucliard v. 
 Crow, 20 C-il. 1.50; Thames o. .Jones, 97 
 N. C. 121; Yancey v. Greenlee, 90 N. C.
 
 ACTIONS BY OWNERS OF LANDS. 
 
 197 
 
 rule, and such actions are constantly brought by widows to 
 recover their dower before it has been set out to them or ad- 
 measured, and by individual heirs. Of course all the owners 
 viay join, and must join if the design is to recover possession of 
 the entire tract over which the common ownership extends, as a 
 separate parcel of land ; ^ when one sues, he can only demand and 
 obtain a judgment for his own undivided portion of the common 
 premises. 2 The election between modes of instituting the action 
 goes no further, however; it cannot be prosecuted by a portion 
 of the co-owners less than all ; it must be by all or by one.^ In 
 
 317; Weese v. Barker, 7 Colo. 178. 
 Cruger i'. McLaury, 41 N. Y. 219. Oue 
 Iv. had a given lease in fee of lands, re- 
 serving rent, with a clause of re-entry on 
 non-payment. Oue of his six children 
 and heirs-at-law sues to recover an un- 
 divided sixth part of the ])remises, on 
 .iccount of the condition broken. The 
 Court of Appeals held the action properly 
 brought ; that all the heirs need not be 
 joined ; and, also, that each of the heirs 
 might have maintained an action for tlie 
 rent. This last proposition settles the 
 doubt ex})ressed by Conistock J. in Mar- 
 shall II. Moseley, cited in note to § *219, 
 80 far as the law of New Y'ork is con- 
 cerned ; and in that State, although the 
 rent is entire, and accruing to all the 
 owners iu common, each may sue. See 
 Fisher v. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416, in which it 
 may seem to be intimated that all must 
 join in a suit to recover possession of the 
 land ; but there is actually no discrepancy 
 in the two decisions. In the case last 
 cited all the owners but one united in a 
 suit to recover possession of tlie entire 
 jinrcel of land ; and in such an action a 
 joinder of all the owners is, of course, 
 neces.sary. The court did not intimate 
 that one co-owner may not sue for his 
 undivided share. See also Hasbronck r. 
 Bunce,3 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 309, 311 ; 62 N. Y. 
 475. The above conclusions are sup- 
 ported bv Mattis v. Boggs, 19 Neb. 698; 
 (jray v. Givens, 26 Mo. 291. 
 
 [^It is held in North Carolina that a 
 tenant in common may maintain eject- 
 ment against his co-tenant : Kicks v. Pope 
 (1901 ), 129 N. C. 52, 39 S. E. 638. Same 
 doctrine obtains in Georgia: Thompson 
 V. Sanders (1901), 113 Ga. 1024, 39 S. E. 
 
 419. Under the North Carolina code, 
 § 627, a tenant in common may bring an 
 action for waste against his co-tenant, and, 
 by analogy, he may bring an action to re- 
 strain waste: Morrison v. Morrison (1898), 
 122 N. C. 598, 29 S. E. 901.3 
 
 1 QBut see Winborne v. Lumber Co. 
 (1902), 130 N. C. 32, 40 S. E. 825, where 
 the court said : " One tenant in common 
 can recover the entire tract against a third 
 party, for each tenant is entitled to pos- 
 session of the whole, except against a co- 
 tenant." So in Shelton r. Wilson (1902), 
 131 N. C. 499, 42 S. E. 937.] 
 
 2 [[In Winborne v. Lumber Co. {supra), 
 it was held that the court erred in direct- 
 ing the jury to respond to the first issue 
 " Yes, one-fifth of the land," if they be- 
 lieved the evidence ; whereas the defend- 
 ant had no right to have the amount of 
 the plaintiff's right to possession deter- 
 mined, for, as against defendant, the 
 plaintiff was entitled to recover poBsession 
 of tlie whole.] 
 
 3 Fisher v. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416. See 
 Hubbell V. Lerch, 58 N. Y. 237, 241 ; Ha.s- 
 brouck V. Buuce, 62 N. Y. 475. [^The 
 doctrine announced in Hasbrouck r. Bunce 
 (snpra) has been rendered obsolete in 
 New York Ijy statute, Code Civ. Pro. § 1500, 
 which reads as follows : " Where two or 
 more jiersons are entitled to the possession 
 of real property, as joint tenants or ten- 
 ants in common, oue or more of them may 
 maintain such an action, to recover his or' 
 their undivided shares in the property, in 
 any case where such an action might be 
 maintained by all." See Deering i\ 
 Reilly (1901), 167 N. Y. 184, 60 N. E. 
 447, where this statute is construed.] One 
 co-tenant may, in general, sue alone for
 
 198 
 
 CIVIL rp:mediks. 
 
 piii-suance of this general principle, the same rule has been ex- 
 tended to actions brought to recover a fund, or a portion thereof, 
 when l)y reason of some judicial proceedings this fund stands in 
 the place of the land itself. Thus, where the land of two co-^ 
 owners had been taken for public purposes, and the amoimt 
 awarded as compensation had not been paid over, because the 
 owners were at the time unknown, one of them was permitted to 
 recover his portion of the whole sum in a separate action, the 
 money representing the land, and the action itself being analo- 
 gous to one brought to recover an undivided share of that land.^ 
 In certain States, the subject now under consideration is regu- 
 lated by express statute. ^ Thus, in California, joint owners and 
 owners in common may sue jointly or severally, or any number 
 
 his share, ilorenhaut v. Wilson, 52 Cal. 
 262. But in an action to recover land for 
 a breach of a condition subsequent, all the 
 grantors or their heirs must join ; ap 
 action cannot be maintained by one of the 
 co-tenants for his share. Cook v. St. Paul's 
 Church, 5 Ilun, 293. It seems that in 
 South Carolina a joint action for recovery 
 of possession may be brought by a j)ortion 
 of the co-owners less than all to recover 
 their shares. See Bannister r. Bull, 16 
 S. C. 220. Two tenants in common joined 
 in an action to recover possession of land, 
 making the remaining tenants in common, 
 who refused to jom, defendants. It was 
 held that a verdict for the whole land was 
 improper, and should have been for the 
 undivided shares of the plaintiffs only. 
 The joinder as defendants of the uon- 
 con.senting co-tenants was unnecessary for 
 the recovery of the partial interest, and 
 ineffectual for the recovery of the whole. 
 
 QA joint grantee in a deed is not a nec- 
 essary party in a suit in ejectment by the 
 other: McNear v. Williamson (1902), 166 
 Mo. 358, 66 S. W. 160. Where tlie land 
 of a deceased person is sold for taxes and 
 one of his heirs is not made a party to tlie 
 suit, such heir may maintain an action for 
 the whole tract and recover his ali(]Uot 
 part: Walcott v. Hand (1894), 122 Mo 
 621, 27 S. W. .3.31. 
 
 Where an action for tlie recovery of 
 land is brought by three plaintiffs jointly, 
 and the evidence does not show title in all 
 of tlioni, none of tlicin are entitled to re- 
 
 cover: Towns V. Mathews (1893), 91 Ga. 
 546, 17 S. E. 955 ; McGlamory v. McCor- 
 mick (1896), 99 Ga. 148. 24 S. E. 941.] 
 
 1 Van Wart v. Price, 14 Abb. Pr. 4 
 (note). 
 
 ^ [[California and Idaho have the fol- 
 lowing statute : " All persons holding as 
 tenants in common,' joint tenants, or co- 
 parceners, or any number less than all, 
 may jointly or severally commence or 
 defenci any civil action or proceeding for 
 the enforcement or protection of the rights 
 of such party." California, Code, § 384 ; 
 Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3173. 
 
 Utah and Montana have the following 
 statute: "All persons holding as tenants 
 in common or as joint tenants, or any 
 number less than all, may jointly or 
 severally commence or defend any civil 
 action or proceeding for the enforcement 
 or protection of the rights of such party. 
 In all cases one tenant in common or joint 
 tenant can sue his co-tenant." Utah, Rev. 
 St., 1898, § 2919; Montana, Code, § 586. 
 
 The Connecticut statute reads as fol- 
 lows : " Any joint tenant or tenant in 
 common of land may maintain an action 
 in his own name for any injury thereto ; 
 but the non-joinder of the other tenants 
 may be shown by tlie defendant in reduc 
 tion of damages, and the plaintiff shall 
 only recover for the damage to his in- 
 terest." Gen. St., 1902, § 589. 
 
 The Georgia Code, § 4941,proviiles that 
 "a tenant in common need not join hiu 
 co-teuant, but may sue separately for his
 
 ACTIONS BY OWNEHS OF CHATTELS. 199 
 
 of them may sue, and in like manner they may be sued.^ Under 
 this statute a portion of the co-owners of a mine were suffered 
 to unite in an action, and recover possession of their shares 
 from intruding wrong-doers. ^ 
 
 ^ 138. * 2-1. II. Legal Actions by Joint Owners of Chattels. 
 At Common Law. Under the Codes. The ownership of chattels 
 by two or more persons is quite dilt'erent in its incidents from 
 the similar ownership of lands, and it must be described rather 
 than defined. It is not a joint ownership in the pure common- 
 law signification of that term, since it does not involve the right 
 of survivorship; there is no survivorship among the co-owners 
 of chattels, whether partners or not, and at the death of one his 
 interest passes to his personal representatives. On the other 
 hand, this united interest of the co-proprietors is so close that it 
 cannot be separated except by mutual consent. The conmion 
 law provides no mode of partition. The right of either co-owner 
 may be transferred by any valid act 'biler vivos, and it may be 
 devolved at his death ; but it is impossible by any legal compul- 
 sory means for one to enforce a partition against his fellow- 
 owners, even when such a division would be physically possible, 
 unless it be true, as said in one case, that such owner may manu- 
 ally separate, and afterwards hold for his own exclusive use, 
 when the chattels themselves are capable of being weighed or 
 measured, so that an accurate division can be easily made, — as 
 in the case of grain. ^ Even in the settlement of a partnership, 
 the only judicial mode of a final division is a sale of all the 
 assets, and their consequent conversion into money, which is 
 distributed among the partners. In this respect, the ownership 
 
 interest, and the jiulgineut in such case an action brought to recover damages, 
 affects only himself." being the value of the land which had 
 In Nevada the statute, which is the last been sold on a judgment obtained by the 
 part of § 3109, Coinp. Laws, 1900, reads as defendant, which judgment had been sub- 
 follows : " Tenants in common, joint ten- sennently reversed on appeal. If one of 
 ants, or copartners, or any number less the co-owners dies, his executor or ad- 
 than all, may jointly or severally bring or ministrator may be joined with the other 
 defend or continue the prosecution or co-owners in California, 
 defence of any action for the enforcement ^ Tri])p v. Kiley, 15 Barb. 333. See 
 of the rights of such person or persons "2 also Channon i;. Lusk, 2 Lans. 213 ; Stall 
 
 1 See last preceding note. v. "Wilbur, 77 N. Y. 158, 164 (a crop of 
 
 2 Goller V. Fett, 30 Cal. 481. See grain), Lobdell v. Stowell, 37 How. Tr. 
 Touchard v. Keyes, 21 Cal. 202. See 88 (grain); and see Potter v. Xeal, 62 
 also Reynolds v. Hosmer, 45 Cal. 616, How. Tr. 158 (cattle). 
 
 631. The statute* was held to apply to
 
 200 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 of chattels by two or more persons is more joint in its nature than 
 the joint ownership of lands. From this notion of the oneness of 
 the interest residing in the owners of things personal, it follows 
 that a joinder of all in any actions founded upon the property in 
 the chattels is even more necessary, and is less open to exception, 
 than in the case of an ownership of land, since one co-owner of 
 a chattel has no right to its exclusive possession as against the 
 others, and cannot recover its possession from them by action 
 analogous to replevin,^ or its value in actions like trover or tres- 
 pass;^ and since a direct judicial partition of the interests is 
 unknown, it follows by the clearest logic that such exclusive 
 possession, or such partition, cannot be permitted indirectly by 
 means of an action against a third person in the name of one co- 
 owner, the result of which, if successful, would be to give him 
 an exclusive, or an apparently exclusive, right. When the 
 object of the property is land, the interest of each co-owner is 
 regarded as separate fur all furjioses except possession ; and, in 
 strict accordance with this notion, he is permitted to sue alone, 
 to recover his undivided part of the land, or his part of the rent 
 payable for the use of it; but when the object of the property is 
 
 ^ Q" One tenant in common cannot 
 maintain replevin for the possession of 
 any of the common property against his 
 cotenant, nor against one in possession of 
 the property as the joint agent of the 
 tenants in common : " Smith-McCord Dry- 
 Goods Co. r. Burke (1901), 63 Kan. "40, 
 06 Pac. 10-36/] Cross u. Hulett, 53 Mo. 
 397; Mills v. Malott, 43 Ind. 248, 251; 
 Davis V. Lottich, 46 N. Y. 393 ; Balch c. 
 .Jones, 61 Cal. 234; Bowen v. Roach, 78 
 Ind 361 ; Spooner v. Ross, 24 Mo. App. 
 599; Carle v. W^all (Ark. 1891). 16 S. W. 
 293. As to suits by one co-owner of chat- 
 tels against the other for a conversion, 
 see Hewlett v. Owens, 51 Cal 570; Stall 
 V. Wilbur, 77 N. Y. 158 in last note. 
 
 2 (^But see Sullivan v. Sherry (1901), 
 111 Wis. 476, 87 N. W. 471. where the 
 court said : " The general rule is that one 
 tenant in common cannot maintain tres- 
 pass or trover against his cotenant or the 
 lalter's licensee of the joint proj)erty in 
 respect thereto. The trial court, supposing 
 that such rule was controlling in this ca.se, 
 sustained the demurrer. It is not infre- 
 «jueut that courts are misled into giving a 
 
 general the effect of a universal rule. 
 There are but few of the former that are 
 not subject to exceptions as well estab- 
 lished and important as the general prin- 
 ciple ; and the rule in question does not 
 belong to that few. It is subject to sev- 
 eral exceptions, one being that if a co- 
 tenant or his licensee destroys the common 
 property or converts it to his own use, he 
 may be sued in trespass or trover to re- 
 dress the wrong wherever such a remedy 
 would exist in the absence of the relation- 
 ship between cotenants . . . The author- 
 ities clearly indicate that the exception 
 we have stated to the general rule is not a 
 modern creation. It has been recognized, 
 by courts and law writers at least from 
 the time of the Year Books." So in Wood 
 V. Steina (1896), 9 S. I). 110, 68 N. W. 
 160, it was held that a tenant in common 
 of chattels may maintain trover against 
 his co-tenant who appropriates them to 
 his own use so as to render any future 
 enjoyment on the part of the complaining 
 tenant impossible] See Schouler Pera. 
 Prop. 200; compare Waller v. Bowling, 
 108 N. C. 289, and cases cited.
 
 ACTIONS BY OWNERS OF CHATTELS, 201 
 
 a chattel or chattels, the interest of all the owners is conceived 
 of as a unit, both in respect to the right of proprietorship and to 
 the possession, and a single one cannot sue for his part of the 
 thing itself, nor for his share of the profits payable for its use, or 
 of its value if it be taken, converted, or sold, or of the damages 
 if it be injured; all must join so as to represent this unity of 
 interest.^ These general doctrines, which were fully settled in 
 the common law, are unchanged by the new procedure, as will 
 appear from the rules established by the following cases. 
 
 § 139. * 222. Code Decisions. Part-Owners of Ships. The 
 part-owners of ships and other vessels are jointly interested, 
 80 far as concerns the maintaining of actions touching the prop- 
 erty in them or their use, and must all unite in such actions; 
 as, for example, in a suit to recover freight, whether from the 
 shipper or from a person to whom it has been paid by the shipper.^ 
 It would seem, however, that a portion, one or more, of such 
 owners may sue when the residue refuse to join as plaintiffs, by 
 making such dissentients defendants, and inserting appropriate 
 averments in the complaint or petition ; this course is certainly 
 proper if full effect is to be given to the provisions of the codes 
 regulating this particular subject, and they are not to be re- 
 stricted in their application to equitable actions.^ Under peculiar 
 circumstances, a portion of the part-owners have been suffered 
 to maintain an action of a similar general nature without even 
 making the others defendants, as stated in the foot-note.* 
 
 § 140. * 223. Joint Owners of Chattels. It is clearly the rule, 
 established under the new system as well as under the old, that, 
 properly, all the owners of a chattel, whether partners or not, 
 must join in an action to recover damages for injuries done to 
 
 ^ QCinfel r. Malena (1903), — Neb. — , the action without joining the other co- 
 
 93 N. W. 165.] owner. This reason given for the de- 
 
 ^ Merritt v. Walsh, 32 N. Y. 685 ; Don- cisiou was clearly wrong. The decision 
 
 nell V. Walsh, 33 N. Y. 43, 6 Bosw. 621. would have been in exact conformity with 
 
 3 Coster V. New York & Erie 11. Co., the letter and the spirit of the code if 
 
 5 Duer, 677, 3 Abb. Pr. 332. McL. had been made a defendant, and the 
 
 * Bishop r. Kdmiston, 16 Abb. Pr. 466 facts in regard to him had been alleged. 
 
 (G. T.). The two plaintiffs and one McL. In Peck v. McLean, 36 Minn. 228, one of 
 
 owned a ship. It was insured and lost, the part-owners of a certain vessel was 
 
 and defendant collected the insurance allowed to sue alone, without joining her 
 
 money. He had settled with McL. for co-owners either as plaintiffs or defend- 
 
 the latter's share, and the plaintiffs sue ants; since they could not be joined as 
 
 for their shares. The court held that they defendants, being out of the jurisdiction, 
 
 were tenants in common, and could bring and refused to join as plaintiffs.
 
 202 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 it,^ or for a wrongful taking or conversion of it,^ or to recover 
 its possession.^ This rule is so firmly settled that nothing less 
 than an express contract in reference to the chattel with one of 
 the co-owners in his own name, by which promises are made 
 directly to him, will suffice to permit a severance. In such a 
 case, while he may sue alone, in virtue of the express under- 
 taking to and with him,* 3'et all the others may, if they so elect, 
 join with him in an action on the contract: for example, a sale 
 of the chattel and a promise to pay the price. ^ 
 
 1 Wells V. Cone, 55 Barb. 585 ; Hays v. 
 Crist, 4 Kan. 350. See also Swarthout 
 v. Chicago, &c. R. Co., 49 Wis. 625 ; Pratt 
 i;. Radford, 52 id. 114. [[vSuininers v. 
 Heard (1899), 66 Ark. 5.50, .50 S. W. 78 : 
 Where partnership property is seized on 
 execution ajjaiust one of tlie partners, an 
 action for damages suffered by reason of 
 the loss of the equity to have the assets 
 of the firm applied to tlie payment of the 
 joint debts contracted on account of the 
 partnership, should be brought by both 
 partners, but tliis" defect of parties is 
 waived by failure to take advantage of it 
 by demurrer or answer.] 
 
 2 Gock V. Keneda, 29 Barb. 120. See 
 also Fullerr. Fuller, 5 Hun, 595; Keeder 
 V. bayre, 70 N. Y. ISO, 181, 190; Spalding 
 i". Black, 22 Kan. 55 ; State v. True, 25 
 Mo. A pp. 451 ; Welch v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 
 24.3 ; but see Soule v. Mogg, 35 Ilun, 79 ; 
 as to action by one co-owner against an- 
 other for conversion, see Stall c. Wilbur, 
 77 N. Y. 158; Hewlett v. Owens, 51 Cal. 
 570; see ante, § *221, and cases cited. 
 In accordance with the principle of these 
 cases, it was held in Soule i\ Mogg, 
 35 Hun, 79, that an ownerin-commou of 
 property separable by weight or measure 
 — in that case, money — might maintain 
 a separate action for its conversion by a 
 third party, as well as for its conversion 
 by a co-owner. 
 
 ^But see Balletine i-. Joplin (1898), 105 
 Ky. 70, 48 S. W. 417, where it was held 
 that where one mortgaged as his own a 
 marc which another owned jointly with 
 him, the mortgagee and the purchaser at 
 a sale whiili he procured to be made under 
 attachment are liable to tlie other joint 
 owner as for a conversion of his interest. 
 Aii'l Holey c. Allred (1903), 25 Utali, 402, 
 
 71 Pac. 869, where it was held that under 
 Rev. St., 1898, § 2919, the owner of an 
 undivided half interest in personal prop- 
 erty may maintain an actiun for con- 
 version without joining his co-owner as 
 either plaintiff or defendant, and the 
 complaint need not state who owns the 
 other lialf. 
 
 Holders of mortgage liens upon chattels, 
 created by different mortgages filed at 
 different times, have such a joint interest 
 in such chattels as to properly join in an 
 action against a sheriff for conversion, 
 such property being in their joint posses- 
 sion : Trompen v. Yates (1902), — Xeb. 
 — , 92 N. W. 647.] 
 
 ' [[Vermont Loan & Trust Co v. Car- 
 din (1898), 19 Wash. 304, 53 Pac. 164; 
 Miller v. Crigler (1899), 83 Mo. App. 
 395. See also Trompen v. Yates (1902), 
 — Neb. — , 92 N. W. 647, where it was 
 held that " Mortgagees holding mortgages 
 of various priority on the same goods who 
 are jointly in possession of them, may 
 join in an action against the sheriff for 
 depriving tliem of possession and con- 
 verting the goods to his own use." (Syl- 
 labus iiy the court.)] Bush v. Groom, 
 9 Bush, 675, 678 ; Luke v. Marshall, 5 ,1. J. 
 Marsh. 356. See also Russell v. Lermon, 
 39 Wis. 570. Contni, Stewart v. Brown, 
 37 N. Y. 350; Seip i-. Tilghman, 23 Kan. 
 289 ; contra, joint owners sliould unite in 
 action to recover property exempt from 
 execution: here, however, the nonjoinder 
 had been waived. 
 
 * .Justice I'. Pliillips, 3 Bush, 200. 
 
 * Silliman v. Tuttle, 45 Barb, 171. Ac- 
 tion by all the co-owners where a sale 
 had been made, as in tlie last preceding 
 case, by one of them alone.
 
 ACTIONS BY OWNKKS OF CllATTKLS. 203 
 
 § 141. * 224. Surviving Partners. The new procedure has 
 not, in general, changed the former rules as to the rights and 
 powers of surviving partners when one or more of the firm 
 Jiave died. Now, as before, the surviving partner or partners 
 have the exclusive possession of the firm assets, for the purpose 
 of paying its debts and settling its affairs. They alone can 
 prosecute all actions of a legal nature, to recover debts, or 
 the possession of property, or its value, or damages for its wrong- 
 ful conversion or misuse. The remedy on all rights of action 
 held by or due to the firm is to be pursued in their names, and 
 the personal representatives of the deceased member or members 
 cannot be joined in such actions by virtue of any interest which 
 they may have in the proceeds, and in the final winding up of 
 the partnership accounts. ^ This doctrine, however, does not 
 mean that every thing in action, belonging to the firm at the 
 time of the death of a member, must invariably be enforced by 
 the survivor, or not at all; he is simply the proper and only 
 person to sue, as long as the thing in action or other personal 
 property remains a part of the firm assets. ^ The survivor may 
 assign such a firm asset, and the assignee would thereupon be 
 entitled to sue in his own name, as in the case of any other 
 assignment. When, therefore, a surviving partner had trans- 
 ferred a firm demand to the administrator of the deceased partner, 
 such administrator would be alone able to enforce the collection 
 by suit in his own name, not, however, by virtue of his original 
 representative capacity, but only in his character as assignee.'' 
 
 § 142. ' 225. Extreme Limits to which some Courts have 
 carried Doctrine as to Joint Rights. The rule that all the CO- 
 owners of a chattel must unite in any action founded upon the 
 property in it has been pushed by some of the courts to its 
 
 ^ QSee Mcintosh i'. Zaring (1897), 150 only be maintained by the personal repre- 
 
 Ind. 301, 49 N. E. 164, set out at length iu sentative of the deceased partner.] 
 note to § *211, a»;e. But see, also, Hard- » Roys r. Vilas, 18 Wis. 169; Brown 
 
 wood Log Co. V. Coffin (1902), 130 N. C. v. Allen, 3.5 Iowa, 306, 311. See, also, 
 
 432, 41 S. E. 931, where it is said that the especially, Robinson i'. Hintrager (Iowa), 
 
 personal representative should be made a 36 Fed. Rep. 752, per Shiras J., p. 756 
 
 party. 3 Hargadine v. Gibbons, 45 Mo. App. 460, 
 
 ■•^ [jK'obertson r. Burrell (1895), 110 Cal. per Thompson J., and numerous cases 
 
 568, 42 Pac. 1086: The heirs of a deceased cited; 8 C. (Mo. Sup. 1893), 21 S. W. 
 
 partner are not proper parties to bring an 726; Crook v. TuU (Mo. Sup. 1892), 20 
 
 action for an accounting iu respect to the S. W. 8 ; State v. Stratton (Mo. Sup. 
 
 partnership property, but such action can 1892), 19 S. W. 803.
 
 204 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 extreme limits, — to the extent, as it seems to me, in fact, of 
 nullifying an express and very salutary provision of the reform 
 legislation. I have already discussed the general principle of 
 interpretation referred to with sufficient fulness,^ and shall 
 simply state the additional decisions, without further comment. 
 When, in the case of partners or other joint owners of personal 
 property, one of them is legally disabled, V)y means of some act 
 of his own, from asserting or maintaining any right in himself, 
 or, in other words, when he has put himself in such a condition 
 that, if he were the sole owner, he would not have a right of 
 action in reference to the property, it has been held that all the 
 partners or co-owners cannot prosecute an action in their joint 
 names, even in respect of the interest of those who have done no 
 acts impairing their individual rights. It is said that, as the 
 right of action is essentially and completely joint, and as there- 
 fore all the co-owners must be able to sue, this unity of interest 
 cannot be severed and a recovery permitted for that share of the 
 interest which, as between themselves, belongs to the innocent 
 rather than to the guilty owners. Upon the same principle, and 
 applying in the like manner the rigid doctrine of an absolute 
 unity of right among the co-owners of chattels, the one who had 
 done no act affecting his individual interest cannot sue, in 
 respect of that interest, to recover the portion of the entire 
 demand due to himself by making the others defendants.^ It is 
 plain from the propositions contained in this subdivision, and 
 from the cases cited in their support, that the courts have made 
 no substantial changes, as results of the reformatory legislation, 
 in the rules concerning the parties plaintiff in actions by the co- 
 owners of personal property. 
 
 § 143. * 226. m. Legal Actions by Persons having Joint Rights 
 arising from Contract. Tlie general effect of the provisions con- 
 tained in the codes upon the common-law doctrines respecting 
 joint rights of action has already been discussed with sufficient 
 
 1 See supra, §§ *221-»223, and cases Allen, 13 N. Y. 173; Tripp v. Riley. 15 
 
 cited. Barb. 333. See Hill v. Marsh, 46"lud. 
 
 ^ Estabrook t;. Messersmith, 18 Wis. 218. The case of P^stabrook r. Messer- 
 
 545 ; Frans v. Young, 24 Iowa, 375 ; smith, cited above in ihi.s note, has been 
 
 Nightingale u. Scannell, 6 Cal. 506; and severely criticised, and its correctness 
 
 see Kainey v. Smizer, 28 Mo. 310; Clark que.'»tioned, in Viles v. Bangs, 36 Wis 131, 
 
 r. Cable, 21 Mo. 223 ; Andrews v. Moke- 139, 140, per Cole J. 
 lumiie Hill Co., 7 Cal. 330; Kussell v.
 
 JOINT ACTIONS ON CONTRACT. 205 
 
 fulness, and I shall simply add to that discussion some examples 
 and illustrations furnished by the decided cases. It was shown 
 that the ancient rule, requiring all the joint obligees, covenantees, 
 and promisees to unite in actions brought upon their contracts, 
 had not been abrogated, and only modified perhaps in the single 
 particular of permitting parties to be made defendants who refuse 
 to join as plaintiffs. The doctrine of equity in this respect was 
 substantially the same as that of the law, and demanded a union 
 of all joint claimants to prosecute their joint right by a suit in 
 chancery. When the doctrine of equity was made statutory, and 
 was applied to all classes of actions, it therefore wrought no 
 change in the practical rules. Of course these provisions of the 
 codes as to parties have not of themselves altered in any manner 
 the principles which the common law had established for deter- 
 mining whether a right created by any contract is joint or 
 several. In actions ex contractu^ all the persons having a joint 
 interest must be made plaintiffs, and, when one of them dies, 
 the action must be brought or must proceed in the names of the 
 survivors, the personal representatives of the deceased obligee 
 or promisee cannot be joined as co-plaintiffs; and in the same 
 manner, in actions ex delicto for injuries to personal property, all 
 the joint owners must unite, and, if one of them dies, the action 
 is to be prosecuted by the survivors alone. These common-law 
 rules remain in full force. ^ It has been held that two or more 
 
 ' QMcIntosh V. Zaring (1897), 150 Ind. cannot maintain an action thereon in his 
 501, 49 N. E. 164, quoting the text.] In- own name witiiont joining the other 
 diana, B. & W. Ry. Co. v. Adam.son, 114 owner, though the note is payable to 
 Ind. 282 ; Bucknam v. Brett, 35 Barb, bearer and is in his possession). All per- 
 596; 13 Abb. Pr. 119; Daby r. Ericsson, sons entitled to shares in the same debt 
 45 N. Y. 786. The survivor was held to may join in an action to recover it, e. g. 
 be the proper party to sue, although, by assignees of different portions. Brett v. 
 an arrangement between him.self and the First Univ. Soc. of Brooiilyn, 5 Hun, 149. 
 representatives of the estate of the de- Where the wards should be joined as co- 
 ceased, the proceeds were to belong e.\- plaintiffs in a suit by a new guardian on 
 clusively to them, and he disclaimed all tlie former guardian's bond, see Wilson 
 interest therein. See also Carrere v. v. Houston, 76 N. C. 375. 
 Spofford, 15 Abb. Pr. n. s. 47, 48, 49. |[See, however, Hardwood Log Co. v. 
 That all joint creditors or promi.sees must Coffin (1902), 130 N. C. 432, 41 S. E. 931, 
 join as plaintiffs, see Porter v. Fletcher, in which it is held that where a firm is a 
 25 Minn. 493; McConnell v. Brayner, 63 party jdaintiff, and a member of the firm 
 Mo. 461 ; Marie v. Garrison, 83 X. Y. 14, dies, his personal representative should be 
 29; Tinkler v. Swaynie, 71 Ind. 562; made a. party. Jameson y. Bartlett (1902), 
 Henry c. Mt. Pleasant Tp., 70 Mo. 500; 63 Neb. 638, 88 N. W. 860: "Where 
 Lyford r. No. Pac. C. R Co., 92 Cal. 93 ; one of .several plaintiffs or defendants 
 McNamee v. Carpenter, 56 Iowa, 276 (one dies, in an action pending in this court on 
 of two joiut owners of a promis.-^ory note error, the right of arlion, if it survives ta
 
 206 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 obligees in an injunction undertaking, although their interests 
 were entirely separate, and no joint claim for damages existed, 
 may unite in an action upon it;^ but in another similar case, 
 where the action was joint in form, the recovery was limited to 
 the damages suffered by the plaintiffs jointly, and they were not 
 permitted to show what each had separately sustained. ^ In an 
 action on a penal bond running to several persons jointly, the 
 common-law rule required all the obligees to be made plaintiffs, 
 although the condition avus to perform distinct acts for the 
 benefit of the obligees severally.^ When a deed of conveyance 
 
 or against the remaining parties, may be 
 enforced without bringing tlie representa- 
 tive or successor of the deceased party into 
 the case."] 
 
 1 Loomis V. Brown, 16 Barb. 325. See 
 opinion of Gridley J. The decision 
 was not placed upon the ground that 
 the plaintiffs' rights were joint. It was 
 considered that the code permitted a union 
 of plaintiffs in legal actions, which was 
 not possible at the common law. Q" A 
 contract entered into and performed jointly 
 by two or more persons, the c'>mpen- 
 sation for the performance of wliich is 
 separate and distinct as to each of such 
 person.-?, may be sued upon separately by 
 each of them, to recover tlie amount due 
 to him or the damages sustained by 
 him:" Curry v. Railway Co. (1897), 58 
 Kan. 6, 48 Pac. 579. See, to the same 
 effect, Mcintosh v. Zaring (1897), 150 lud. 
 .301, 49 N. K. 164. In the enforcement of 
 a joint contract all mu.st jo<n : Slaughter 
 V. Davenport (1891)), 151 Mo 26, 51 S. W. 
 471, 
 
 Where a contract ig made by a carrier 
 with a funeral party juiuMy to hold a train 
 for them, each member of tlie party has a 
 separate cause of action for the breach of 
 the contract : Southern Ry. Co. v. Mar- 
 shall (1901), 1 1 1 Ky. 560, 64 S. W. 418, fol- 
 lowing Baughman v. Hailroad Co., 94 Ky. 
 150. 
 
 In a joint action by several plaintiffs, 
 if the evidence shows that at least part of 
 them cannot recover, a verdict for tlie 
 defendant must result: Medlock r. Merritt 
 (1897), 102 Ga. 212, 29 S. E. 185.] 
 
 ^ Fowler v. Frisbie, 37 Cal. 34. A 
 number of persons were in possession of 
 laud, not jointly, nor in common, but each 
 
 possessing and cultivating a separate par- 
 cel of the whole. An action was brought 
 to recover the entire tract, and, by the 
 provisions of the California statute re- 
 ferred to in a preceding paragraph, all 
 these occupants were made defendants. 
 An injunction was granted restraining 
 them all from interfering, etc. with the 
 crops, and the ordinary undertaking was 
 given to them. The persons thus enjoined 
 bring this action on the undertaking ; and 
 the rule stated in the text was expressly 
 lai<l down by the court. It would be 
 difficult to reconcile these two cases. 
 
 3 Pearce v. Hitchcock, 2 N. Y. 388, per 
 Jewett C. J. See also Koeniger v. Creed, 
 58 lud. 554; Thomas v. Irwin, 90 Ind. 
 557 ; McLeod v. Scott, 38 Ark. 72. See, 
 however, Sprague v. Wells, 47 Minn. 504; 
 Alexander v. Jacoby, 23 Ohio St. 358, 383. 
 Vandermulen i'. Vandermulen, 108 N. Y. 
 195, 204, was an action on a covenant run- 
 ning to several persons jointly, conditioned 
 to pay distinct amounts for the benefit of 
 tlie covenantees severally. It was held that 
 a. separate action was maintainable by each 
 of the covenantees ; and, strangely enough, 
 Pearce r. Hitchcock was cited as authority 
 for this ruling. The learned judge ap- 
 jioars to have overlooked the fact tiiat the 
 actual decision in Pearce r. Hitchcock, 
 which, contrary lo the common-law rule 
 tliere stated, allowed separate actions by 
 the obligees, was based entirely on the 
 statute relating to attachment bonds. 
 [[Where an attachment bond is made to 
 two jointly, both are necessary parties to 
 an action for the full amount of the bond: 
 King V. Kehoe (1894), 91 la. 91, 58 N. W. 
 1071.]
 
 JOINT ACTIONS ON CONTRACT, 
 
 207 
 
 of land is given to two or more grantees, the implied covenants 
 of title, if there be any, are joint, and give only a joint right of 
 action, so that one of the grantees cannot sue alone for a breach.^ 
 This is a reaffirmance of the rule applicable to the same circum- 
 stances under the common law.^ 
 
 § 144. * 227. Same Subject. Illustrations. It has been said, 
 in a decision made since the code, that in an action, whether 
 legal or equitable, by a firm, all the partners, even those (hat are 
 dormant, must unite as plaintiffs ; ^ but this case can hardly be 
 
 1 Lawrence v. Montgomery, 37 Cal. 
 183. 
 
 2 [[Proctor V. Georgia Ins. Co. (1899), 
 124 N. C. 265, 32 S. E. 716 : A mortgagor 
 of realty took out a fire insurance policy, 
 expressed to be paid to the plaintiff (the 
 mortgagee) and assured, " as their inter- 
 ests may appear." Held that the mort- 
 gagor is a necessary party. 
 
 Ermeutrout v. American Fire Ins. Co. 
 (1895), 60 Minn. 418, 62 N. W. 543 : The 
 owner of certain property took out a 
 policy of insurance upon the same, the 
 loss to be paid to the assignee of the 
 mortgagee " as interest may appear," said 
 assignee being named in the policy. After 
 the loss the said assignee assigned all his 
 interest under the policy to a third party, 
 and it was held that the third party and 
 the owner might properly be joined in an 
 action upon the policy.] The defendant, 
 C, entered into a contract with the plain- 
 tiff, D., for the construction of a building 
 upon a lot belonging to them, upon which 
 the other plaintiff, S., held a mortgage ; 
 and for the faithful performance of the 
 contract C. gave his bond to S. for the 
 benefit of all the plaintiffs; in an action 
 for a breach of the bond it was held that 
 both mortgagor and mortgagee were 
 properly joined as plaintiffs. Daley ;'. 
 Cunningham, 60 Cal. 530. Where an in- 
 surance policy is made payable to the 
 mortgagee of the property " to the extent 
 of his interest," or '' as his interest may 
 appear," the mortgagor and mortgagee 
 may join in suing on the policy, as they 
 have a common interest in enforcing the 
 contract : Winne r. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 
 91 N. Y. 185 ; Home Ins. Co. v. Oilman, 
 112 Ind. 7. When, in such a case, the 
 mortgage debt, after the loss becomes pay- 
 
 able, is greater than the sum insured the 
 mortgagee may sue alone. Hammel v. 
 Queen Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 240; Travelers' 
 Ins. Co. V. Cal. Ins. Co., 1 N. D. 151. 
 Where, bowever, the interest of the mort- 
 gagee in the premises insured has ended, 
 be is no longer a proper party, either 
 plaintiff or defendant. So held in Great 
 W. Compound Co. v. JEtna Ins. Co., 40 
 Wis. 373. See, however, ante, § *139, 
 and cases cited. A policy having been 
 assigned by the assured to his mortgagees 
 as collateral security, the assured, it has 
 been held, was pro])erly joined as co- 
 plaintiff with the assignees, although 
 he had, by alienation of the property, 
 rendered the policy void except as to the 
 interest of his assignees; to this extent 
 he was interested, as payment of the loss 
 to them would inure to his benefit: Boyn- 
 ton V. Clinton, etc. Ins. Co., 16 Barb. 254 
 (these plaintiffs, it was said, could not 
 have been joined at common law). Contra, 
 Michael v. St. Louis Mut. F. Ins. Co., 17 
 Mo. App. 23. 
 
 3 Secor V. Keller, 4 Duer, 416. See 
 Beudel v. Hettrick, 45 How. Pr. 198; 
 Lewis V. Greider, 51 N. Y. 231 ; 49 Barb. 
 606. That dormant partners need not 
 be joined, see Piatt v. Iron Exch. Bk. 
 (Wis. 1892), 53 N. W. 737. 
 
 Qln Williams i\ Southern Pac. R. R. Co. 
 (1895), 110 Cal. 457, 42 Pac. 974, plaintiff 
 brought an action to recover compensation 
 for certain work which he alleged was 
 done by him at defendant's request. The 
 answer consisted of denials. It was dis- 
 closed by the evidence that the contract 
 was made by the plaintiff in behalf of a 
 partnership of which he was a member 
 and was executed at joint expense. 
 Thereupon defeudiut moved for a non-
 
 208 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 regarded as correct, for it was well settled at the common law 
 that dormant partners need not be joined, and it does not seem 
 that anything in the code has changed the rule in this particular. 
 When eleven officers, harbor masters, all engaged in the same 
 duties, and each entitled to an equal share, one-eleventh of the 
 total fees, made an agreement by which one of them undertook 
 to collect all the fees, and to account for and pay over to the 
 other ten their portions of the same, it was held that all of the 
 ten must unite in an action brought against the eleventh to 
 recover from him the amounts due to them which he had re- 
 ceived; one could not sue alone. ^ Persons may sometimes be 
 united as plaintiffs in an action upon a written contract, even 
 though they are not parties thereto, and the terms of the agree- 
 ment make no direct reference to them, if they, notwithstanding, 
 have an actual interest jointly with the ostensible parties in the 
 subject-matter of the contract, and in the cause of action arising 
 upon it.'* The authorities of a county appropriated $117,600 to 
 procure volunteers to fill the quota of the county, and ordered 
 $300 to be paid as bounty to each volunteer out of this fund. 
 Eighty-six persons, who had already enlisted in the military 
 service, agreed with the county officials that, in consideration 
 of being paid said bounty, they would form a part of its quota, 
 and they were thereupon actually enrolled in and credited to the 
 
 suit, on the ground that one partner could ship name, under § 5011, R. S., and one 
 
 not maintain an action to enforce a part- of the partners dies while it is pending, 
 
 nership demand, which motion was over- the action cannot go on in the name of 
 
 ruled. On appeal the ruling was ap- the partnership, even under order of the 
 
 proved. The court said : " We are of court, for it has ceased to exist, and the 
 
 opinion, following the incontestable trend action must be revived and proceed in 
 
 of authority, that the absence sus parties the name of the representative or successor 
 
 of some of the partners from a complaint of the firm, and the court held further, in 
 
 by one or more of them on a partnership the same case, that where a suit is brought 
 
 <lemaud does not, speaking strictly, affect in the partnership name, an averment as to 
 
 the merits, and in order to he considered who the partners are is mere surplusage, 
 
 must be pleaded by the defendant. The Citing Winters v. Means, 50 Neb. 209, and 
 
 motion for nonsuit was therefore properly D.imond v. Bank, 70 Minn. 298.] 
 denied." Cases are cited from New York, i Deau ;;. Cliamberlin, 6 Duer, 691. 
 
 Minnesota and Missouri. The complaint, stating these facts, and 
 
 As to actions between partners, see alleging tliat defendant had refused to 
 
 § '104, ante. account for and pay over to the single 
 
 In some states the statute permits part- plaintiff his sliare, was held bad ou 
 
 nerships to sue in the firm name. See demurrer ; all should have joined as 
 
 § •121, ntite. The Supreme Court of Ohio, plaintiffs. 
 
 in Ph(i-nix Ins. Co. v. Carnahan (1900), '■^ Kutledge v. Curhiii, 10 Ohio St. 478. 
 
 6.3 O. St. 25S, 58 N. E. 80"), lield that See the facts and opinion, su/>ia, § *202. 
 
 where a suit is cummeuced in the partner- Moore v. Jackson, 35 Ind. SCO.
 
 JOINT ACTIONS ON CONTRACT. 209 
 
 number of volunteers required from the county. The bounty 
 not being paid, the entire eighty-six united in an action demand- 
 ing judgment for the total amount of their bounties, $25,800, 
 and the action was held to be properly brought.^ 
 
 § 145. * 228. Criticism of Cases holding that a Joint Promisee 
 cannot be made a Defendant. The COmmon-law theory of joint 
 right, growing out of contract, equally with the joint right aris- 
 ing from the ownership of chattels, has been carried by certain 
 cases so far that manifest injustice has been done, and the en- 
 forcement of conceded rights has been defeated, in order that the 
 courts should not depart from an arbitrary and technical rule. 
 These cases have held that, where a contract is made by or with 
 two or more on the one part, so that a joint right of action is 
 held by them, the only possible action is one brought by all, if 
 living; that one -of them cannot sue on the contract making his 
 co-contractor a defendant, with proper averments in the pleading, 
 whether he seeks to recover the whole amount due, or only his 
 own individual interest therein, and though the co-contractor 
 refuses to join in the suit for any reason, even if the latter has 
 been paid his share. ^ I have already discussed this topic at large, 
 and fully expressed my opinion upon it.^ The decisions last 
 mentioned, and the rule which they approve, are directly opposed 
 to the letter of the codes, which makes no restriction to equitable 
 
 1 Young V. Franklin Cy. Com'rs, 25 join in an action on the policy. Kausal v. 
 Ind. 295, 299. Each plaintiff was only Minn. Farm. Mat. F. Jus. Ass'n,31 Minn, 
 interested to the extent of $.300. There 17. Sureties who have paid money for 
 was no joint right in the whole fund, their principal may have a joint action 
 This case therefore illustrates, in a clear for the whole amount ; or each may, as 
 manner, the proposition heretofore made, before the code, bring a separate action 
 — that the code admits of a joinder of for the amount he has paid : Skiff v. 
 plairitiffs in instances where such join- Cross, 21 Iowa, 459. Two persons were 
 der was not permitted at the common allowed to join in suing a common carrier 
 law. for the value of a chest, their joint prop- 
 For a single premium a joint policy erty, and of its contents, part of which 
 of insurance was issued to the owner of was the property of one plaintiff, part of 
 a building and to the owner of a stock of the other; a check having been issued 
 goods therein, neither having any interest to them jointly for the transportation of 
 in the property of the other, except as it the chest and its contents: Anderson i". 
 arose from their relation as husband and Wabash, etc. Ky. Co., 65 Iowa, 131. 
 wife, and his occupancy of her store build- '^ Kainey r. Smizer, 28 Mo. 310; Clark 
 ing. It was held, that they properly v. Cable, 21 Mo. 223 ; Andrews v. Moke- 
 joined as plaintiffs in an action on the lumiie Hill Co., 7 Cal. 330 ; Kyan v. 
 policy ; Graves v. Merchants' & B. Ins. Co., Kiddle, 78 Mo. 521 ; Hogendobler v. Lyon, 
 82 Iowa, 637. Property of a married man 12 Kans. 276. 
 
 on the land of his wife was insured in their ^ See supra, § *204, and notes, and Hill 
 
 joint names; it was held that they might v. Marsh, 46 Ind. 218. 
 
 14
 
 210 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 suits, and are in violent antagonism with the evident intent of 
 the reformed procedure. It was said hy the court, in one case, 
 that if an action by one of the creditors was permitted, under the 
 circumstances stated, the debtor would be exposed to subsequent 
 suits and recoveries from the other creditors. This remark shows 
 an entire misapprehension of the meaning and purpose of the 
 statutory provision. It requires the dissenting creditor or co- 
 contractor, who refuses to be a plaintiff, to be made a defendant, 
 for the very purpose of concluding liim, by the judgment, from 
 any subsequent prosecution on his own behalf. He is added as 
 a party, and "has his day in court," and tliis will be a complete 
 bar to a future attempt on his own part, if he sliould change his 
 mind. No possible injustice could therefore be done to the 
 defendant, and great injustice would necessarily be done to the 
 creditor who desires to enforce his lawful demand, if the utterly 
 arbitrary rule sustained by these and similar cases should be 
 generally approved as the correct interpretation of the codes. 
 The New York Court of Appeals has determined that an action 
 may be maintained by one firm against another firm to recover a 
 sum ascertained to be due, although the two partnerships have a 
 common member who is made a defendant, with proper aver- 
 ments, in the complaint; and the action need not be brought for 
 the equitable relief of an accounting, but for the legal relief of 
 an ordinary money judgment.^ 
 
 § 146. * 229. IV. Legal Actions by Persons having Several 
 Rights Arising from Contract. As the principles have been already 
 stated in the preliminary discussions of this section, it is only 
 
 ^ Cole y. Reyiioliis, 18 N. Y. 74. [^Willis it was deemed absurd to permit a party 
 
 V. Barron (1898), 143 Mo. 450, 4.') S. W. to be both a plaintiff and a defendant in 
 
 289. The court said : " At common law the same action, and for the further rea- 
 
 partnership contracts were construed to he son that until the jiartiier.'ship affair.s were 
 
 joint only, not joint and several. As a adjudged and tlic balance struck it could 
 
 consequence of this rule in actions by or not be said one partner was indebted to 
 
 afjainst partners it was nece-ssary that all another. . . . l^ut since the statute now 
 
 the p:\rtners should join as plaintiffs or makes the note the several contract of each 
 
 Lc joined as defendants. A further con- member of the firm, and makes each 
 
 sequence of this doctrine was tliat a part- partner liable in soliJo, the payee is no 
 
 ner could not sue a firm of which he was Ion<rer under the necessity of suing him- 
 
 a member on a note executed by the firm self, and hence so far as the question of 
 
 to himself. . . . All the law writers and j)arties to pleadings is concerned, be can 
 
 all tlk- adjudged cases place the disability sue either or all of the other partners 
 
 of one partner to sue his firm upon its without infringing the common-law rule 
 
 note to him u[)on the ground that a man of pleading."] 
 cannot contract with himself, and because
 
 SEVERAL ACTIONS ON CONTRACT. 211 
 
 necessary to add some further illustrations furnished by the 
 decided cases. The common-law doctrine in respect to several 
 rights and actions does not seem to have been changed, unless, 
 possibly, under the operation of the equitable rule embodied in 
 the codes, plaintiffs having stricth^ several rights may be allowed 
 to unite in legal actions, under circumstances which establish a 
 certain community of interest among them, although under the 
 same circumstances they would have had no such election at the 
 common law. There is at least a tendency shown by some of 
 the decisions towards such a m.odification of the rule which 
 formerly prevailed in reference to several rights and causes of 
 action.' The following examples will serve to illustrate the 
 nature of several rights, and the doctrine as to parties plaintiff 
 in suits brought to enforce them. Tenants in common of a tract 
 of land, who hold their titles by different conveyances from the 
 same grantor, each of which contains covenants relating to the 
 land and its use, cannot unite in an action brought against 
 the grantor to recover damages for the breach of such covenants; 
 their interests under the covenants and their rights of action are 
 in every sense several.^ The obligees in an injunction bond, 
 M'here the interests interfered with by the injunction are separate, 
 and the injury done to each is distinct, cannot join in a suit to 
 recover damages for these several causes of action ; their recovery 
 in such proceeding must be limited to the damages that are 
 strictly joint. ^' Certain persons executed the following written 
 /agreement: "We, the undersigned, agree to guarantee the de- 
 positors of W. E. C. [a banker] in the payment in full of their 
 demands against said W. E. C. on account of money deposited 
 with him." Each depositor, it was held, must sue separately 
 upon this guaranty to recover the amount of his individual 
 claim; all the depositors could not join in a single action, 
 because their interests were entirely several, neither one having 
 
 1 See ante, § * 227 and note. whose firm property had been wrongfully 
 ^ Samuels v. Blanchard, 25 Wis. 329. .seized under the attachment, was sus- 
 ' Fowler v. Frisbie, 37 C'al. 34 ; but, tained. Alexander r. Jaeoby, 23 Ohio 
 per conira, see Loomis v. Brown, 16 Barb. St. 358, 383. See ante, § *2G6, and notes, 
 325. It is held in Ohio that the interests and Vandermulen v. VandermnleTi, 108 
 of the obligees in an attachment bond N. Y. 195, 204, there cited. For further 
 are several, although the undertaking is , ilhistrations see Great West. Compound 
 in terms joint. Where such a bond was Co. v. vEtna Ins. Co., 40 AVis. 373 ; Hub- 
 given to three persons, an action on it by bard v. Burrell, 41 id. 365 ; Eldridge v. 
 two of them, who were partners, and Putnam, 46 id. 205 ; Brett v. First Univ.
 
 212 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 any interest in the demand of another.^ A nnmLer of persons 
 having each subscribed different sums of money for a loan to a 
 certain party in aid of a proposed enterprise, and a committee of 
 three having been appointed to act as agents for the subscribers, 
 which committee entered into a written contract with him con- 
 taining various stipulations concerning the use of the money, and 
 also an undertaking on his part to repay the amounts advanced, 
 each of the subscribers was held entitled to maintain a separate 
 action against the borrower to recover the sum loaned by himself.^ 
 Five persons entered into a written agreement stipulating that, 
 if either or any of them should be drafted during the late war, 
 the others would contrilnite equal sums to enable him or them 
 to hire substitutes. Three of the parties having been drafted 
 and procured substitutes, one at a cost of SI, 500, and the others 
 for SI, 100, each, it was held by the Supreme Court of Indiana 
 that each must sue the others in a separate action for the stipu- 
 lated indemnity, and a joint action by the three was dismissed.-' 
 A number of persons, being interested in opposing a certain 
 claim and in defending suits thereon, appointed a committee to 
 employ counsel and to conduct the defence, and agreed to pay 
 the expenses incurred by such committee. The cost of the 
 defence not having been contributed, the committee paid the 
 same, and thereby became entitled to reimbursement. This 
 right, it was held, was a several one in each member thereof, and 
 a separate suit by each to recover the sum paid out by himself 
 was proper, rather than a joint action by all to recover the whole 
 amount which had been disbursed.* Under the general statutes 
 of New York, providing for the formation of corporations for 
 various purposes, and making the stockholders personally liable 
 under certain circumstances to the creditors of the corporation 
 for the debts thereof, this right of action in the creditors is a 
 several one, and a separate action may therefore be maintained 
 by each creditor. It is admitted, however, that a proper action 
 
 Soc. of Brooklyn, 5 Ilun, 149; Small c. - Rice v. Savery, 22 Iowa, 470. The 
 
 Kobinson, 9 id. 418; Koeiiip;er r. Creed, court held that the committee might al.'WJ 
 
 58 Ind. .'J54 ; Durham v. Hall, 67 iil 123; sue as trustees of an express trust, the 
 
 Graham Tp. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Indep, promise having been made directly to 
 
 Sch. Dist. No. 2, 50 Iowa, .T22 ; Goldsmith them, and also that each creditor could 
 
 »•. Sachs, 8 Sawy. 110, 17 P'ed. IJep. 726. sue. 
 
 1 Stoadn)an r. Guthrie, 4 Met. (Ky.), » Goodnight r. Goar, 30 Ind. 418. 
 
 147, 1.'>1. ' * Fiunev v. Hrant, 19 Mo. 42.
 
 SEVERAL ACTIONS ON CONTRACT. 
 
 213 
 
 may he brought against all the stockholders for the benefit of all 
 the creditors.^ A bond having been given for the j)aynient of a 
 certain sum to the heirs of A., eight in number, upon the death 
 of their mother, it was held by the Supreme Court in New York 
 that an action might be maintained by one heir against the 
 obligor, or, he being dead, against his administrator, to recover 
 one-eighth of the entire sum ; that the right of the obligees was 
 several and not joint.^ Where three towns were each liable for 
 a share of the cost of erecting a bridge, and the proper officers 
 of each — the highway commissioners — procured the same to be 
 erected, but the entire expense thereof was actually advanced 
 and paid out by two of these commissioners, their right of action 
 asrainst the third commissioner to recover the amount thus dis- 
 bursed for his use was declared to be several, and a joint action 
 against him, it was held, could not be maintained.^ 
 
 1 Weeks v. Love, 50 N. Y. 568. It was 
 said that all the cases impliedly huld the 
 doctrine above stated ; and the following 
 were cited : Briggs r. Penniman, 8 Cow. 
 387 ; Manu v. Pentz,3 N. Y. 415 ; Osgood 
 V. Laytin, 5 Abb. Pr. n. s. 1 ; Garrison v. 
 Howe, 17 N. Y. 458. 
 
 2 Hees I'. Nellis, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 118. 
 
 ' Corey v. Rice, 4 Lans. 141. There 
 ■was no joint or common interest held by 
 the towns which the plaintiffs represented 
 in tlie sum which was thus advanced ; it 
 was not like an advance made by a part- 
 ncrshi]), or made out of a fund owned liy 
 the plaintiffs together. The implied prom- 
 ise of the defendant was, therefore, not to 
 the plaintiffs jointly. 
 
 Where a policy of insurance provided 
 for the ])ayment of different sums to 
 different parties, it was held improper 
 for the beneficiaries to join in one action 
 to recover the several sums due : Keary 
 V. Mutual Reserve Fuud L. A.ss'n, 30 
 Fed. Rep. 359. Two of three contracting 
 parties agree to perform certain services 
 for the third, and eacli of the two is to 
 receive t'lerefor a separate and distinct 
 compensation ; each may bring a separate 
 action, it being quite immaterial that in 
 the rendition of the services for which 
 they were to receive their several com- 
 pensation tlieir joint action may have 
 been necessary : Richey v. Branson, 33 
 AIo. A pp. 418; Bowman r. Branson (Mo. 
 
 1892), 19 S. W. 634. The plaintiff and 
 two others, H. and B., acting on behalf 
 of the S. Company, covenanted that the 
 plaintiff should perform certain work for 
 the defendants, in consideration of which 
 the defendants promised to pay the plain- 
 tiffs a stipulated sum. It was held that 
 tlie plaintiff could maintain an action to 
 recover a balance alleged to be due on the 
 contract price, without joining H., B., or 
 the S. Company : Craig i'. Fry, 68 Cal. 
 363. One of the sureties in an official 
 bond covenanted to indemnify his co- 
 sureties against liability on the bond, and 
 one of the latter was compelled to pay 
 part of a defalcation of the princip.al ; it 
 was held that he could sue alone upon the 
 covenant. Cross r. Williams, 72 Mo. 577 : 
 " If the consideration for the promise of 
 indemnification made by the defendant 
 was that the sureties should go on H.'s 
 bond, though it moved from many per- 
 sons, yet it moved from each one sever- 
 ally," citing Parsons on Contracts, p. 18. 
 See also Bush v. Ilaeussler, 26 Mo. App. 
 263. In general, one surety can sue alone 
 at law to enforce contribution from a 
 co-surety, without joining his otlier co- 
 sureties: Voss V. Lewis, 126 Ind. 155. 
 
 QDuucan v. Willis (1894), 51 O. St. 433, 
 38 N. E. 13; Defendant, having knowl- 
 edge that the plaintiff and his brother 
 were desirous of purchasing, each for his 
 own separate use, a number of head of
 
 ?14 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 147. * 230. V. Legal Actions by Persona having Joint Rights 
 Arising from Personal Torts. The COmmoil-law rule governing the 
 selection of parties plaintiff in such actions is entirely unchanged. 
 When the personal tort produces a common injury to all, and 
 thus creates a common damage, all the persons affected by the 
 wrong must join in an action to recover the damages. In pur- 
 suance of this principle, all the members of a partnership may 
 and must unite in an action for a libel or slander on the firm, by 
 which its business is injured. Undoubtedly, the instances in 
 which a common, as distinguished from a several injury, can be 
 done to a number of individuals by personal torts, must neces- 
 
 light feeding hogs, represented to them 
 that he had one hundred hogs to sell of 
 the kind and quality desired, which were 
 sound, healthy and free from disease, and 
 for which he had paid $5.00 per hundred 
 pounds, but declined to sell in separate 
 lots; he would sell the Duncans the entire 
 lot and they could divide them to suit 
 themselves. Relying upon these repre- 
 sentations the brothers purchased the one 
 liuudred hogs, jiaying $5.12^ per hundred 
 pounds, the plaintiff and his brother each 
 to have fifty head of the hogs as his sepa- 
 rate and individual j)roperty, and to feed 
 separately on their respective farms. On 
 the same day the hogs were divided in 
 accordance with the agreement, and plain- 
 tiff took his fifty at once to his own farm, 
 where some of them died on the same day 
 by reason of hog cholera. They had been 
 exposed to this disease and were infected 
 with it at the, time of the sale, all of which 
 was known to the defendant, who had in 
 fact purchased them as diseased hogs, and 
 for a much less sum than S^.OO i)er hun- 
 dred pounds. Not only did plaintiff lose 
 the diseased hogs which died, but the 
 diseAse was communicated to bis other 
 hogs, and he was greatly injnreil thereby. 
 Held, that this contract of purchase, 
 though joint in form, and based upon a 
 consideration moving jointly from the 
 two, wxs in spirit and essence, a separate 
 contract as to each, and that the rights 
 acquired under it by the purchasers were 
 separate and distinct. Citing many cases, 
 P^nKlish and American. 
 
 Union P. K. Co. u. Vincent (1899), 58 
 Neb. 171, 78 N. W. 457: "A railroad 
 
 company made with two persons a con- 
 tract, in form joint, for the transportation 
 of horses, a portion of which belonged to 
 one of the shippers and the remainder to 
 the other. None was owned in common. 
 The horses of one were injured, and he 
 sued, naming the other as a defendant 
 because he refused to join as plaintiff. 
 No objection was made for defect of 
 parties until the trial began. Held, with- 
 out deciding how an action in such case 
 should be brought, that the railroad com- 
 pany could not complain because one of 
 throe situations must exist. The suit was 
 sufficriently brought by the person whose 
 stock was injured, as the real party in 
 interest ; or else it was sufficient to make 
 the other a defendant alleging that he 
 would not join as plaintiff; or if ho must 
 necessarily have joined as plaintiff, the 
 defect appeared on the face of the petition 
 and was waived by not demurring on that 
 ground." 
 
 Baughman v. Louisville, etc. K. R. Co. 
 (I89;5), 94 Ky. 150, 21 S. W. 757 : Where 
 a contract for the shipment of horses 
 owned by different persons was made 
 with the carrier by one person acting as 
 agent for them all, each owner had a 
 separate action for damages suffered by 
 him for breach of the contract of ship- 
 ment, and all could not unite in one 
 action. 
 
 Brown v. Farnham (189.3), 55 Minn. 27, 
 56 N. W. 352 ; In an action upon a com- 
 position agreement, any creditor being a 
 party thereto may bring a several action 
 for his damages for the breach thereol.J
 
 ACTIONS ARISING FROM PERSONAL TORJS. 
 
 21, 
 
 saiily be rare; but wlien they do occur, tlie rule as stated must 
 be applied.^ A single illustration will sufiice. False and fraudu- 
 lent representations concerning the pecuniary responsibility of a 
 certain person having been made to a partnership, by which it 
 was induced to sell goods to him on credit, and the price of the 
 goods not being paid or recoverable by reason of the purchaser's 
 insolvency, it was decided by the New York Court of Appeals 
 that an action to recover damages for the deceit should be brought 
 by all the partners jointly. ^ 
 
 § 148. *231. VI. Legal Actions by Persons having Several 
 Rights Arising from Personal Torts. The Converse of the proposi- 
 tion stated in the preceding paragraph is also as true now as it 
 was prior to the new system of procedure. Where a personal 
 tort has been done to a number of individuals, but no joint injury 
 has been suffered and no joint damages sustained in consequence 
 thereof, the interest and right are necessarily several, and each 
 of the injured parties must maintain a separate action for his own 
 
 1 [^Mclutosh V. Zaring (1897), 150 Ind. 
 301, 49 N. E. 164: Where several con- 
 tracts are made between defendant and 
 three firms of attorneys for legal services, 
 tlie fees to depend upon the amount of 
 recovery or the sum obtained through 
 compromise, and defendant fraudulently 
 represents that as a result of compromise 
 a smaller sum was obtained than was in 
 fact the case, upon the basis of wjiich 
 representations the firms of attorneys 
 settle with defendant, a joint right of 
 action arises iu the firms of attorneys by 
 reason of such fraud, since all are alike 
 interested in avoiding the settlement. 
 
 Beetle v. Anderson (1897), 98 Wis. 5, 
 73 N. W. 560: "Where several persons 
 induced by false representations, purchased 
 a mortgage, each contributing one-fourth 
 of the money, held, that their interests in 
 the securities were joint ; and they might 
 properly sue jointly for the fraud." 
 
 Cohen v. Wolff (1893), 92 Gsi. 199, 17 
 S. E. 1029: Where different persons have 
 been induceil by fraud to sell goods to a 
 firm, and the firm executes mortgages 
 upon the goods so purchased, all the per- 
 sons so defrauded may ji)in in an action to 
 have the mortgages declared void. 
 
 Wunderlich v. Chicago & Northwestern 
 11. Co. (189G),93 Wis. 132,66 N. W. 1144: 
 
 An insurer who has paid the loss on 
 insured property to the assured, becomes 
 subrogated pro tanto to the latter's right 
 of action against the third person through 
 whose negligence the loss occurred, and 
 the insurer and assured should properly 
 join in an action for the negligent burning. 
 
 Elliott V. Pontius (1893), 136 Ind. 641, 
 35 N. E. 562 : Several plaintiffs who have 
 independent demands as creditors against 
 a defendant debtor, may sue jointly for 
 relief against a fraudulent scheme to 
 remove the debtor's property, but when the 
 fraud alleged is shown not to exist, the 
 joint right ceases and each must revert to 
 his several right against the debtor.] 
 
 ^ Zabriskie v. Smith, 13 N. Y. 322. 
 See also Cochrane v. Quackenhush, 29 
 Minn. 376 (joint action by partners for a 
 malicious prosecution, to recover for in- 
 juries theicby caused to their joint credit, 
 business, and jiroperty) ; Peakes i». Graves, 
 25 Neb. 235 (joint action by partners for 
 deceit). An action brought liy members 
 of a firm to recover damages for an alleged 
 slander relating to the credit of the firm 
 does not abate by the death of a mem- 
 ber; the entire cause of action vests 
 in the survivors. Shale v. Schautz, 35 
 Hun, 622.
 
 216 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 personal redress.^ It follows, therefore, that when a tort of a 
 personal nature, an assault and battery, a false imprisonment, a 
 libel, a slander, a malicious prosecution, or the like, is committed 
 upon two or more, the right of action must, except in a very few 
 special cases, be several. In order that a joint action may be 
 possible, there must be some prior bond of legal union between 
 the persons injured — such as a partnership relation — of such a 
 nature that the tort interferes with it, and hy virtue of that very 
 interference produces a wrong and consequent damage common to 
 all. It is not every prior existing legal relation between the 
 parties that will impress a joint character upon the injury and 
 damage. Thus, if a husband and wife be libelled or slandered, 
 or beaten, although there is a close legal relation between the 
 parties, it is not one which can be affected by such a wrong, and 
 no joint cause of action will arise. The doctrine above stated 
 has been fully recognized and asserted by the courts since the 
 codes were enacted. ^ Afire company — a voluntary association 
 — having been libelled, a joint action by its members to recover 
 damages against the libeller was held improper; not being part- 
 ners, and not having any community of legal interest whereby 
 they could suffer a common w^rong, the right of action was sev- 
 eral, and each must sue alone. ^ The same rule has been applied 
 in the case of two or more persons, not partners, suing jointly to 
 recover damages for a malicious prosecution ; the action cannot 
 be maintained.* 
 
 § 149. * 232. Vn, Actions iu Specisd Cases. Some special 
 cases which do not fall within the foregoing classification will 
 conclude this branch -of the discussion.^ A policy of fire insur- 
 
 1 ^See, however, Shall v. Barton (1899), not join in a suit against a telegraph com- 
 .•iS Neb. 741, 79 N. W. 732, where the court pany for mental anguish; each has a 
 8aid : " This court is committed to the separate cause of action, if any : Morton 
 doctrine that two parties having separate i;. Western Union Tel. Co. (1902), 130 
 and distinct claims to the possession of the N. C. 299, 41 S. E. 484. 
 
 same property may join in an action of 3 Qiraud v. Beach, 3 E. D. Smith, 337 ; 
 
 replevin therefor. "3 Hinkle v. Davenport, 38 Iowa, 355, 358; 
 
 2 Rhull V. Barton (1898), 56 Neb. 718, Stepank i-. Kula, 36 id. 563. 
 
 77 N. W. 132: "Two creditors who lost * Riioads v. Booth, 14 Iowa, 575. 
 
 their several claims and attachment liens, See Swales v. Grubbs (Ind. App. 1893), 
 
 because a coroner negligently approved a 33 N. E. 1 124, and see al.so, on the general 
 
 worthless replevin bond in a suit in which subject of tiiis paragraph, Ilellanis r. 
 
 the attached property was taken from tlie Switzor, 24 S. C. 39. 
 
 sheriff, cannot join as ])laintiffs in an * QA proceeding in mandamus is proji- 
 
 ac.tion for damages against the coroner for erly brongiit in tiie name of the State, 
 
 approving such bond." Two persons can- evLii though the application is made in
 
 ACTIONS IN SPECIAL CASES. 
 
 217 
 
 ance, containing the clause, "loss, if any, payable to E. B. G., 
 mortgagee," the assured, it was held, could not maintain an 
 action without making E. B. G. a co-plaintiff, unless it was 
 alleged and proved that the mortgage to him had been paid off 
 so that his interest had ended. ^ In several of the States, by 
 virtue of special provisions contained in their codes, partnerships 
 may sue and be sued by the use of the firm name as the parties 
 plaintiff or defendant, in the same manner as though they were 
 corporations. The judgments recovered in such actions against 
 the partnership can only be enforced, in the first instance, against 
 the firm property, and can only be extended so as to bind the 
 individual property of the several partners by a subsequent direct 
 proceeding against them, or some of them, in the nature of a scire 
 facias."^ The Kentucky code contains a peculiar provision in 
 
 the interest of a private person : State v. 
 I'ac. Brewing Co. (1899), 21 Wash. 451, 
 58 Pac. 584. 
 
 lu a suit for a penalty the person suing 
 and not the State is the proper party 
 plaintiff, unless the statute otherwise 
 directs: Burrell v. Huglies (1895), 116 
 N. C. 430, 21 S. E. 971. In such a suit 
 several may sue jointly for their joint 
 use : Carter v. Wilmington, etc. R. R. Co. 
 (1900), 126 N. C. 437, 36 S. E. 14. 
 
 State ex rel. v. Bradley (1901 ), 10 N. D. 
 157, 86 N. W. 354: Under § 7605, Rev. 
 Codes, a citizen of a county in which a 
 liquor nuisance exists may maintain an 
 action in the name of the State without 
 authority from the State's attorney or the 
 attorney general. 
 
 Persons whose interests are separate 
 and independent cannot be joined as re- 
 lators iu mandamus : State ex rel. v. 
 Fraker (1901), 166 Mo. 130, 65 S. W. 720. 
 But where a board of election com- 
 missioners refuses to place the names of 
 a number of nominees for the office of 
 appellate judge upon the official ballot, 
 such nominees have sufficient common 
 interest in obtaining a unit of mandate 
 agair'st tlia board, to unite in an action 
 therefor: State ex rel. v. Mount (1898), 
 151 Ind. 679, 51 N. E. 417.;] 
 
 1 Ennis v. Harmony F. Ins. Co., 3 
 Bosw. 516. ^ Where an insurance policy is 
 ptiyable absolutely to a mortgagee, the 
 mortgagee is a necessary party plaintiff, 
 tliougli the assured may proj)erly Ijc made 
 
 a party also to protect his interest in the 
 policy : Burlington Ins. Co. r. Lowery 
 (1895), 61 Ark. 108, .32 S. W. 383. See 
 also § *226, infra, and notes.] And see 
 Hammell v. Queen Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 240 ; 
 Winne r. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 91 N. Y. 
 185; Connecticut F. Ins. Co. v. Erie Ry. 
 Co., 73 N. Y. 399. Where insured prop- 
 erty is destroyed by fire, caused by the 
 wrongful act or negligence of a third 
 party, if the value of the property ex- 
 ceeds the amount of insurance paid, the 
 insurer paying the loss acquires thereby 
 to the extent of the payment a joint in- 
 terest with the owner in the cause of 
 action against the wrongdoer, hence, in 
 prosecuting such cause of action the in- 
 surer must join the owner as co-plaintiff. 
 Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Oregon Ry. & 
 Nav. Co., 20 Oreg. 569. That such joinder 
 is, at any rate, permissible, see Crandall 
 V. Goodrich Transp. Co., 16 Fed. Rep. 75. 
 But where the insurance company has 
 paid the insured the full value of tiie 
 property destroyed, it may maintain tlie 
 action in its own name. Marine Ins. Co. 
 V. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 
 643 ; Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Oregon Ry. & 
 Nav. Co., 20 Oreg. 569. 
 
 2 See supra, § *121. Ryerson v. Ilen- 
 drie, 22 Iowa, 480. See Wills v. Sim- 
 mond.s, 8 Hun, 189, 200 (legal action by 
 one of several partners against another 
 one without joining the remaining co- 
 partners).
 
 213 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 reference to actions brought by an assignee of a tiling in action 
 where the assignment is equitable, merely, — that is, where it is 
 not expressly authorized by statute ; in such a case the assignor 
 must be joined as a party either plaintiff or defendant, at the 
 option of the assignee who brings the suit.^ The code of the 
 same State expressly authorizes the owner of land to maintain 
 approriate actions to recover damages for any trespasses or other 
 injuries committed thereon, although he may not be in the actual 
 possession, or have the right to the immediate possession, at the 
 time when the trespass or other injury complained of was com- 
 mitted. ^ This is undoubtedly the true interpretation of the 
 codes of all the States without any express provision to that 
 effect. The common-law distinction between " trespass " and 
 "case" being abolished, the owner is entitled to maintain an 
 action and recover damages, by alleging the actual facts which 
 constitute the cause of action, although under the former proce- 
 dure he would, under certain circumstances, sue in "trespass," 
 and under other circumstances in "case." The nature of the 
 rii/Jit of action has not been changed, nor has the amount of 
 damages recoverable been affected, but the special and technical 
 rules which governed the use of the two common-law actions 
 mentioned have certainly been abrogated.^ A legatee or dis- 
 
 1 Dean v. English. 18 B. Mon. 135. tainly entitled to recover such damages 
 This provision is somewhat different from as he would have obtained if the action 
 that found in the code of Indiaua, which was the common-law " case," — that is, 
 requires the assignor, in all ca.«es, where damages for the injury to the inheritance, 
 the thing in action is not assigned by To nonsuit the plaintiff is to restore the 
 indorsement, — that is where it is not a old distinctions between these technical 
 negotiable instrument, — to be joined as actions. This doctrine is expressly sus- 
 a defendant, in order to answer to the tained by the Supreme Court of Mis- 
 assignment. [^Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, souri : Fitch i;. Gosser, 54 Mo. 267; and 
 § 277.] by a very recent decision in New York: 
 
 2 Bebee v. Hutchinson, 17 B. Mon. Adams i;. Farr, 5 N. Y. Sup. Ct., 59, 
 496. citing Robinson v. Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 252. 
 
 8 Brown V. Bridges, 31 Iowa, 138, 145. S. P. Foster v. Elliott, 33 Iowa, 216, 224 ; 
 
 A plaintiff suing, as owner of land, for Rogers i'. Duhart (Cal. 1893), 32 Pac. 570 
 
 injuries done by a wrongdoer, cannot, (an allegation, not sustained by the evi- 
 
 consisteutly with the plain import of the deuce, tiiat the plaintiff was in posses.sion 
 
 codes, be nonsuited, because lie was out may be treated as surplusage). But see 
 
 of possession, and not entitled to posses- Townscnd v. Bissell, 5 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 583, 
 
 Bion. Undoubtedly, he may not be able per Gilbert J., a contrary dictum, which, 
 
 to recover such damages a.s he would in the face of these authorities, and of the 
 
 have recovered if the action was the com- code itself, is clearly a mistake. The char- 
 
 mon-law "trespass," — that is, damages acter of the possession required to maintain 
 
 for the wrong done to his possession as " trespass " is illustrated in Alexander '•. 
 
 well as to the inheritance; but he is cer- Ilurd, 64 N. Y. 228. The plaintiff's wife
 
 ACTIONS BY ]>AUENTS OR GUARDIANS. 
 
 219 
 
 tributee of an estate in the liands of an executor or administrator 
 may, under certain circumstances, maintain an action to recover 
 a debt or demand due to the deceased, if for any reason the 
 personal representative is legally disabled from suing. Thus, 
 for example, where B. in his lifetime was indebted to A., both 
 die, and the same person is made administrator or executor of 
 each estate, a legatee or distributee of A.'s estate may bring an 
 action in his own name against the one who is thus the adminis- 
 trator of B.'s estate, as well as executor or administrator of A.'s 
 estate. This person, as the representative of one estate, cannot 
 sue himself as representative of the other, and therefore the 
 beneficiaries of the creditor estate are permitted to prosecute the 
 action. It seems, also, that such action can be brought either by 
 one of the legatees or distributees, or by all of them jointly.^ 
 
 § 150. " 233. Actions by Parents or Guardians for the Seduction 
 of, or Injury to, their Children or "Wards. It is held in New York 
 
 owned the farm ; the plaintiff built tlie 
 house on it, in which he and his family had 
 lived for years, and were still living ; he 
 worked the farm, owned the stock and 
 tools, and provided for his family. It was 
 held that he had such a possession of the 
 farm that he could maintain an action for 
 trespass upon it in breaking into and in- 
 juring it. 
 
 1 Fisher v. Hubbell, 65 Barb. 74 ; s. c. 
 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 97. It was also held that 
 Hubbell — the common trustee — should 
 be made a defendant, both as adminis- 
 trator of A.'s estate, and as executor of 
 B.'s estate ; of the latter, because he thus 
 represented the debtor; and of the for- 
 mer, because he was the regular plaintiff, 
 and should be made a party in order to 
 conclude the estate by the judgment. It 
 was said that, in order to bind the estate 
 of a deceased person, his administrator 
 or executor must be made a party /?; his 
 representative capacity; it is not sufficient 
 that he be made a party. See Haynes v. 
 Harris, 33 Iowa, 516. In Missouri, the 
 distributees of an estate in the hands of 
 an administrator may, before an order for 
 distribution is made, all unite in a joint 
 action on the administrator's bond against 
 him and his sureties. Whether such joint 
 action would be proper after the order for 
 a (listri!)ntion,7/((:E7-e. Kelley v. Thornton, 
 
 56 Mo. 325. In Kentucky it has been ex- 
 pressly decided that several distributees 
 cannot unite in a legal action against the 
 administrator to recover the shares found 
 due to each upon a settlement of the 
 estate. Felly v. Bowyer, 7 Bush, 5)3. 
 For various actions by administrators, 
 executors, legatees, and heirs, see Smith 
 V. Van Ostraud, 64 N. Y. 278; Tyson 
 )•. Blake, 22 N. Y. 558; Dunning r. 
 Ocean Nat. Bank, 61 id. 497 ; Cashman 
 V. Wood, 6 Hun, 520; Pendleton v. Dal- 
 ton, 77 N. C. 67 ; Filbey v. Carrier, 45 Wis. 
 4G9 ; Catlin v. Wheeler, 49 id. 507 ; Harris 
 f. Harris, 61 Ind. 117; Taylor v. Fickas, 
 64 id. 167 ; McDowell v. Hendrix, 67 id. 
 513 ; Colton v. Uuderdouk, 69 Cal. 155 (a 
 sole devisee in possession of the estate may 
 sue for trespass) ; Segelken v. Meyer, 94 
 N. Y. 473 (special circumstances under 
 which plaintiff may recover personal prop- 
 erty of a deceased person as next of kin, 
 without the intervention of an adminis- 
 trator) ; Grubb r. Lookabill. 100 N. C. 267 
 (in an action by an administrator against 
 his decedent's vendee to recover the pur- 
 chase-money due on a bond for title by 
 selling the land, the vendor's heirs-at-law 
 are necessary parties). As to co-plaintiffs 
 in action for contribution, see Hughes 
 V. Boone, 81 N. C. 204.
 
 220 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 that a mother may maintain an action for the seduction of her 
 infant daughter where the father is dead, and the daughter is 
 dependent upon the mother, although the latter has remarried.^ 
 This rule has also been extended to the case where the father is 
 not dead, but has abandoned his wife, who lives separate and 
 apart from him, and maintains herself and family by carrying on 
 a business in which the daughter is actually employed as an 
 assistant, rendering substantial services. The action being 
 founded upon the relation of master and servant, and not upon 
 that of parent and child, and the mother carrying on a business 
 in which the daughter is employed as a servant, all the requisites 
 of the general doctrine relating to the action of seduction are 
 fully complied with.^ These decisions are based upon common- 
 law principles independently of any changes made by statute.'^ 
 The codes of several States, however, contain special provisions 
 authorizing actions to be brought by fathers, or, in case of their 
 death or desertion of tlieir families, by mothers, and by guard- 
 ians, to recover damages for the seduction of, or for the death 
 of, or injuries to, their children or wards.* A woman is per- 
 
 1 Lampman v. Hammond, 3 N. Y. Sap. 
 Ct. 293: Gray v. Durland, 50 Barb 100, 
 51 N. Y. 424 ; Furman v. Van Sise, 56 
 N. Y. 435; Badgley r. Decker, 44 Barb. 
 577. 
 
 ■^ Badgley v. Decker, 44 Barb. 577. See 
 Certwell v Hoyt, 6 Hun. 575 (by a grand- 
 father). Action.s to recover earnings of an 
 infant child ; see Hollingsworth r. Sweden- 
 burg, 49 Ind. 378 ; Monaghaii v. Randall 
 Sch. Dist., 38 Wis. 100; Matthew.s ;•. Mo. 
 Pac. Ry. Co., 26 Mo. App. 75 (action by 
 widow to recover for loss of services of her 
 minor child, su.stained, independently of 
 statute). QSenn v. Southern Ry. Co. (1894), 
 124 Mo. 621, 28 S. W. 66: Where the 
 mother dies pending an action brought by 
 both parents for the death of an unmarried 
 minor son, the father may continue the 
 action in his own name. Keller r. City of 
 St Louis (1899), 152 Mo. 596, 54 S.'w. 
 4-38: Where a wife secures a divorce from 
 her hu.^band, and the " care and custody " 
 of the cliild is awarded to the wife, but no 
 order is made respecting the " mainte- 
 nance " of the child, the duty of supporting 
 the cliild still devolves upon the husband, 
 and the wife caimot, during the husband's 
 
 life, maintain an action alone for damages 
 due to injuries to the minor child. Pierce 
 V. Conners (1894), 20 Colo. 178, 37 Pac. 
 721 : By statute the father and mother 
 have an equal interest in the judgment re- 
 covered for wrongfully causing the death 
 of a minor child. But suit may be brought 
 either by the father alone or by both to- 
 gether. Buechner v. Columbia Shoe Co. 
 (1895), 60 Minn. 477, 62 N. W. 817 : Under 
 G. S. 1894, § 5164, a father may maintain 
 an action in his own name to recover 
 damages for an injury to his minor child. 
 Same holding in Lathrop v. Schutte (1895), 
 61 Minn. 196, 63 N. W. 493.] 
 
 3 [^Mut .see Anthony v. Norton (1899), 60 
 Kan. 341,56 Pac. 529 and Snider v. Newell 
 (1903), 132 N. C. 614, 44 S. E. 3.54, where 
 it was held that, under the general code 
 provisions, without any special statute, a 
 parent might recover for the seduction of 
 a daughter without showing any loss of 
 services.] 
 
 ■• Sec supra, § *120, where the States 
 are enumerated. A statute which dis- 
 penses " with any allegation or proof of 
 loss of service " does not change the rules 
 of the law as to the parties; the seduced
 
 ACTIONS BY HUSBAND AND WIFE. 221 
 
 raitted, in a few States, to maintain an action and recover 
 damages for her own seduction. ^ 
 
 Second: Actions by and between Husband and Wife. 
 
 § 151. * 234. Common Law and Equity Rules. The COmmon- 
 law rules as to the power of a wife to bring actions in her own 
 name, and as to the necessity of making husband and wife co- 
 plaintiffs in all actions where she could be party at all, relating 
 to her property or to wrongs suffered by her, have been either 
 swept away or greatly modified in all the States which have 
 adopted the reformed system of procedure. These common-law 
 requisites were concisely stated in a former paragraph of this 
 section. 2 In equity, while as a general rule the husband was 
 joined as a co-plaintiff even in suits touching her equitable sepa- 
 rate estate, yet when their interests were at all antagonistic, and 
 especially Avhen the proceeding was in any manner adverse to 
 him, she was permitted to sue without uniting him with her, 
 and even to make him a defendant. Her action, however, was 
 prosecuted in her name by a next friend.^ 
 
 [§ 152. statutory Provisions. There are two general types of 
 the statutory provision as found in most of the codes. The 
 statutes of the first type abolish the necessity of joining the hus- 
 band and wife where such joinder would not be necessary aside 
 from the marriage relation. The Kansas statute is illustrative 
 of this type, and reads as follows : " A married woman may sue 
 and be sued in the same manner as if she were unmarried,"* 
 The statutes of Oklahoma and Utah are identically the same, and 
 those of Colorado, Montana, and Nebraska differ only slightly.^ 
 
 woman cannot bring the action. Wood- action the complaint must allege that the 
 
 ward V. Anderson, 9 Bush, 624. plaintiff is unmarried. 
 
 [_ConJIict of lines. In Thorpe v. Union ^ ggg supra, § *19l. 
 
 Pacific Coal Co. (1902), 24 Utah, 475, 68 ^ Story, Eq. PI. §§ 61. 631 ; Daniell 
 
 Pac. 145, it was held that where the statute Chan. PI. (4th Am. ed.), pp. 109, 110. 
 
 of Wyoming requires an action for the * QGen. St., 1901, § 4457.] 
 
 negli'^ent death of a person to be brought * \_Oklahnma : St., 1893, § 3901. Utah : 
 
 by and in the name of the personal rcpre- Rev. St., 1898, § 2S04. 
 
 sentative of the deceased, and the statute Colorado: "A married woman may 
 
 of Utah allows such action to be brought sue, and be sued in all matters, the same as 
 
 by the heirs, the statutes of Wyoming must if she were sole." Code, § 6. 
 
 control where such an action is brought in ^fontana : '' A married woman mav 
 
 the courts of Utah for the death of a person sue and be sued in the same manner as i f 
 
 negligently killed in Wyoming] she were sole." Code, § 572. 
 
 1 See .^i(/)ra, § *1 20. And see Thotnp- Nehrashi : "A woman may, while 
 
 son V. Young, 51 Ind. £99; in such an married, sue and be sued, in the same
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 Substantially the same provision, but expressed in different form, 
 is found in Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota^ 
 and Wyoming. 1 The Missouri statute allows a married woman 
 to sue " with or without joining her husband " in the same 
 manner as though she were sole.^ The New York statute also 
 falls in this group, but in addition to the general provision 
 allowing a married woman to sue or defend "alone or joined 
 with other parties as if she were single," it specifies certain 
 classes of cases where the husband should not be joined.^ The 
 second type requires that the husband and wife be joined except 
 in certain enumerated cases. The Indiana statute is a good 
 example of this form. It reads as follows: "A married woman 
 may sue alone : First. When the action concerns her separate 
 property. Second. When the action is between herself and her 
 husband ; but in no case shall she be required to sue or defend by 
 guardian or next friend, except she be under the age of twenty- 
 
 manner as if she were unmarried." Comp. 
 St., 1901, § 3661.] 
 
 ^ [_Ioira: "A married woman may in 
 all cases sue and be sued without joining 
 her husband with her, and an attachment 
 or judgment in such action shall be en- 
 forced by or against her as if she were 
 single." Code, 1897, § 3477. 
 
 Minnesota : " A married woman may 
 sue or be sued as if unmarried, and with- 
 out joining her husband, in all cases where 
 the husband would not be a necessary 
 party aside from the marriage relation." 
 St., 1894, § 5159. 
 
 North Dakota : " When a married 
 woman is a party, her appearance, the 
 prosecution or defence of the action, and 
 the joinder with her of any other person or 
 party, must be governed by the same rules 
 as if she were single." Rev. Codes, 1899, 
 § 5224. 
 
 Ohio : " A marrieil woman shall sue 
 and be sued as if she were unmarried, and 
 her husband shall lie joined with her only 
 when the cause of action is in favor of or 
 against both her and her husband." Bates' 
 St., § 4996. 
 
 South Dakota : Identical witli North 
 Dakota statute, supra. Ann. St., 1901, 
 § 6073. 
 
 Wtjomin') : "In any civil action, suit 
 or proceeding, whenever any married 
 woman is a party, it shall not be necessary 
 
 to join her husband with her as a party 
 except in such cases where it would be 
 necessary to join such husband without 
 reference to the fact of his marriage to 
 such woman." Rev. St., 1899, § 3470.J 
 
 2 ][_Mis>iouri : " A married woman may, 
 in her own name, with or without joining 
 her husband as a party, sue and be sued 
 in any of the courts of this State having 
 jurisdiction, with the same force and effect 
 as if she was a feme sole, and any judg- 
 ment in the cause shall have the same 
 force and effect." Rev. St., 1899, § 546.] 
 
 8 Q.Ve?(; York : " In an action or special 
 proceeding a married woman appears, 
 prosecutes or defends alone or joined with 
 other parties as if she was single. It is 
 not necessary or proper to join her hus- 
 band with her as a party in any action or 
 special proceeding affecting her separate 
 property. The husband is not a necessary 
 or proper party to an action or special 
 proceeding to recover damages to the per- 
 son, estate or character of his wife, and all 
 sums that may be recovered in such actions 
 or special proceedings shall be the separate 
 property of the wife. The liusband is not 
 a necessary or proper party to an action or 
 special proceeding to recover damages to 
 the person, e.<tate or character of another 
 on account of the wrongful acts of his 
 wife committed without his instigation." 
 Code Civ. Pro. § 450.]
 
 ACTIONS BY HUSBAND AND WIFE. 
 
 223 
 
 one years." ^ This statute is found in substantially the same form 
 in Arizona, Arkansas, Nevada, Xorth Carolina, Oregon, South 
 Carolina, and Wisconsin. ^ In California a third class of excep- 
 tions is added, namely, where the husband has deserted the wife 
 or where there is an agreement in writing between them.^ Idaho 
 has adopted the California statute, and Washington has a statute 
 very similar to it.'* The statutes of Connecticut, Georgia, and 
 
 1 QBurns' St., 1901. § 2.55.] 
 
 2 ^Arizona : " When a married woman 
 is a party, her husband shall be joined 
 with her, except that : First, When the 
 action concerns her separate property, she 
 may sue alone. Second, When tlie action 
 is between herself and her husband, she 
 may sue or be sued alone." Rev. St., 1901, 
 § 1302. 
 
 Arkansas : " Where a married woman 
 is a party, her husband must be joined 
 with her, except in the following ca.ses: 
 First, She may be sued alone upon con- 
 tracts made by her in respect to her sole 
 and separate property, or in respect to 
 any trade or business carried on by her 
 under any statute of this state. Second, 
 She may maintain an action in her own 
 name for or on account of her sole or 
 separate estate or property, or for dam- 
 ages against any person or body corporate 
 for any injury to her person, character or 
 property. Third, Where the action is be- 
 tween herself and her husband, she may 
 sue and be sued alone." Sand. & Hill's 
 Dig., § .5641. 
 
 Nevada: Identical with the statute of 
 Arizona, s«/)ra. Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3102. 
 
 North Carolina : Identical with the 
 statute of Arizona, supra, adding " and in 
 no case need she prosecute or defend by a 
 guardian or next friend." Code Civ. Pro., 
 1883, § .56. 
 
 Oregon : " Where a married woman is 
 a party, her husband shall be joined with 
 her, except that, — 1. Where the action 
 affects her separate property, or where the 
 cause of action is for a wrong committed 
 against her person or character, or is for 
 wages due for her personal services, she 
 may sue or be sued alone ; 2. Where the 
 action is between herself and her husband, 
 .she may sue or be sued alone ; and in no 
 case need she prosecute or defend by a 
 guardian or next friend." Hill's Code, § 30. 
 
 South Carolina: "Where a married 
 woman is a party her husband must be 
 joined with her, except that (1) Wlier© 
 the action concerns her separate property, 
 she may sue or be sued alone : Provided, 
 That neither her husband nor liis property 
 shall be liable for any recovery against 
 her in any such suit; but judgment mav 
 be enforced by execution against her sole 
 and separate estate in the same manner 
 as if she were sole. (2) Where the ac- 
 tion is between herself and her husband 
 she may sue or be sued alone ; and in no 
 case need she prosecute or defend by a 
 guardian or next friend." Rev. St., 1893, 
 Code Civ. Pro., § 135. 
 
 Wisconsin : " Where a married woman 
 is a party her husband must be joined 
 with her, except that where the action con- 
 cerns her separate property or business or 
 alleged antenuptial debts, or is between 
 herself and her husband, she may sue or 
 be sued alone." St., 1898, § 2608.] 
 
 8 ^California: "Where a married 
 woman is a party, her husband must be 
 joined with her, except : (1 ) Where the ac- 
 tion concerns her separate property, or her 
 right or claim to the homestead property, 
 she may sue alone ; (2) Where tlie action 
 is between herself and her husband, siie 
 may sue or be sued alone ; (3) Where she 
 is living separate and apart from her hus- 
 band, by reason of his desertion of her, or 
 by agreement in writing entered into be- 
 tween them, she may sue or be sued 
 alone." Code, § 370.] 
 
 * [_ldaho: Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3158. 
 Washington : " Where a married wo- 
 man is a party, her husband must be 
 joined with her, except — 1. Where the 
 action concerns lier separate property, or 
 her right or claim to the homestead proji- 
 erty, she may sue alone; 2. AYhere the 
 action is between herself and her lius- 
 band, she may sue or be sued alone;
 
 224 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 Kentucky are peculiar and do not fall within either of these 
 groups. ] ^ 
 
 § 153. * 239. "Wife xnuBt sue Alone in Some States. The fol- 
 lowing are instances in which it has been held, under the special 
 provisions of the New York statutes, that the wife must sue 
 alone, although the joinder of the husband does not, as decided 
 by the Court of Appeals, defeat the action entirely. The doc- 
 trine which lies at the foundation of these decisions is also em- 
 bodied in the statutes of the other States which have followed 
 the example of New York by abrogating the common-law rules 
 concerning suits by husband and wife. The cases themselves 
 are therefore authoritative precedents in interpreting the corre- 
 sponding statutory provisions of those States. The wife should 
 sue alone on an award made in her favor ; ^ to recover damages 
 for the taking or the conversion of her personal property;^ in an 
 action on a lease executed in her name ; * to recover possession of 
 
 3. Where she is living separate and apart 
 from her hushand, she may sue or be sued 
 alone." Bal. Code, § 4826-3 
 
 1 ^Connecticut : "Where a married 
 woman shall carry on any business, and 
 any riglit of action shall accrue to her 
 therefrom, she may sue upon the same as 
 if she were unmarried. 
 
 " In any civil action by or against a 
 married woman, her husband may be 
 joined with her, as a co-plaintiff or co- 
 defendant, as the case may be ; and when 
 ao joined, if a cause of action is found to 
 exist in favor of or against one of them 
 only, a judgment or decree shall be ren- 
 dered accordingly ; and in such cases no 
 costs shall be taxed for such husband or 
 wife in favor of whom no cause of action 
 is found, nor against such husband or 
 wife against whom no cause of action is 
 found." Gen. St., 1902, §§ SQ."?, 594. 
 
 (jporqin : " If a tort be committed upon 
 the person or reputation of tlie wife, the 
 husband or wife may recover therefor ; if 
 the wife is living separate from her hus- 
 band, she may sue for such torts, and also 
 torts to her children, and recover the 
 flame to lier use. She may enforce con- 
 tracts made in reference to her own ac- 
 quisition." Code, 189.^), § 247.5. 
 
 Kentiirki/ : 1. "In actions between hus- 
 band and wife; in actions concerning her 
 separate property; and in actions con- 
 
 cerning her general property, and in ac- 
 tions for the personal suffering of or injury 
 to her person or character, in which he 
 refuses to unite, she may sue or be sued 
 alone. 2. In all other actions by or 
 against a wife, she and her husband may 
 join or be joined as plaintiffs or defend- 
 ants. 3. She may defend an action against 
 her and her husband for herself, and for 
 him also if he fails to defend. 4. If a 
 husband desert his wife she. may bring 
 or defend for him any action which he 
 might bring or defend, and shall have the 
 powers and riglits with reference thereto 
 which he would have had but for such 
 desertion. 5. If a female party to an 
 action marry, her husband may be made 
 a party by a motion, causing the fact to be 
 stated upon the record ; and the action 
 shall not be delayed by rea.son of the 
 marriage. 6. But if a wife be of unsound 
 mind, or imprisoned, the actions mentioned 
 in subsections one, three, and four of this 
 section must be prosecuted or defended 
 by her committee or curator, if she have 
 one ; and if she have none, must be prose- 
 cuted by iier next friend, or defended by 
 her guardian ad litem." Codes, 1895, 
 §34.3 
 
 2 Palmer v. Davis, 28 N.Y. 242. 
 
 » Ackley v. Tarbox. 31 N. Y. 564. 
 
 * Draper v. Stouvenel, 33 N. Y. 507.
 
 ACTIONS BY HUSBAND AND WIFE. 225 
 
 her lands ; ^ to recover damages for trespasses upon her lands ; ^ 
 to recover damages for an assault and battery upon herself ; ^ to 
 recover damages for the seduction of her own female servant, 
 when she carries on a business in which the servant is employed;* 
 to recover damages for tlie alienation of her husband's affection 
 and deprivation of his society ; ^ to recover damages for false and 
 fraudulent representations by which she was induced to convey 
 her lands ;'^ in an action against a common carrier to recover 
 the value of articles lost or destroyed, although gifts from her 
 husband;" to recover the price agreed to be paid for personal 
 services rendered to the defendant.^ 
 
 § 154. * 240. Result of New York Statutes. As the result of 
 the New York statutes modifying the legal relations between 
 the husband and wife, either may, under certain circumstances, 
 maintain actions of a legal nature ; that is, upon a legal cause of 
 action, and seeking to obtain legal relief, against the other. It 
 would seem, however, that such actions must be based upon 
 rights of property or of contract. When the husband, prior to 
 the marriage and in consideration thereof, gave his intended wife 
 a promissory note, it is a valid demand in her hands, and she 
 may, subsequent to the marriage, maintain an action against him 
 upon it.^ The wife may bring an action in her own name against 
 her husband to recover the possession of land which is her sepa- 
 rate property. ^° She may also sue him to recover her personal 
 
 1 Darby v. Callaghan, 16 N. Y. 71; further, to the same effect, Wyandotte f. 
 
 Hillman v. Hillinan, U How. Pr. 456. Agan, 37 Kan. 528 ; Porter v. Dunn, 131 
 
 ■■2 Fox I'. Duff, 1 Daly, 196. N. Y. 314. For further illustrations in 
 
 ^ Maan v. Marsh, 35 Barb. 68. And suits on contracts, or concerning Iier own 
 
 also in Iowa for torts to her. Mewhirter property, see Bitter v. Rath man, 61 N. Y. 
 
 V. Hatteu, 42 Iowa, 288. 512 ; Curtis v. Del., L. & W. K. Co., 74 N. Y. 
 
 * Badgley i-. Decker, 44 Barb. 577. 116; Fitch y. Rathbun, 61 id. 579 ; Kava- 
 
 In this case, the wife, living separate nagh v. Barber, 131 N. Y. 211 (nuisance); 
 
 from her husband, kept a boarding-house, Hufnagel v. Mt. Vernon, 49 Huii, 286. 
 and her daughter aided her by personal ^ Wright v. Wright, 54 N. Y. 437, 59 
 
 services. Barb. 505. 
 
 5 Bennett y. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584. lo Wood v. Wood, 83 N. Y. 575; 
 
 ^ Newberry v. Garland, 31 Barb. 121. Minier v. Minier, 4 Lans. 421. The court 
 
 ' Rawsou I'. Pennsylvania Railroad, 2 in the latter case draw a distinction be- 
 
 Abb. Pr. N. s. 220. tweeu a suit like this, affecting her sepa- 
 
 ' Adams v. Honness, 62 Barb. 326 ; rate property, and one brought to recover 
 
 but see, per contra. Beau v. Kiah, 6 N. Y. damages for a tort, such as slander, or 
 
 Sup. Ct. 464. Brooksv. Schwerin, 54 X. Y'. assault and batterv. See, liowever, per 
 
 543; Sloan v. New York Central R. Co., contra, Gould v. Gould, 29 How. Pr. 441. 
 
 4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 135. See also Reynolds Tliis decision is in plain opposition to tlio 
 
 V. Robiuson, 64 N. Y. 580, 593. See spirit and letter of the remedial statutes. 
 
 1.')
 
 226 CIVIL REMEDIES, 
 
 property ; or for money loaned to him ; qr to recover the value of 
 services rendered in his business under an express contract, or 
 under such circumstances that a promise to pay therefor would 
 be implied.^ When the husband and wife are owners in common 
 of land, she may maintain a suit against him for a partition. ^ 
 The foregoing cases all involve and are based upon rights of 
 action growing oat of her ownership of property, or out of con- 
 tract in reference to such property, or to her services. No rights 
 of action arise from personal torts committed by the husband, 
 and she is not permitted to maintain actions against him to 
 recover damages for such torts, as an assault and battery, ^ or a 
 slander.^ A husband cannot recover in an action against his wife 
 for his services rendered to her in the oversight and management 
 of her separate property, there having been no express agreem.ent 
 for the payment of a compensation, and the circumstances being 
 such that no promise could be implied.^ 
 
 § 155. * 241. Actions for Personal Torts and for Fraud and 
 Deceit. At the common law the husband and wife were required 
 to join as plaintiffs in all actions for damages from the wife's 
 personal suffering, either bodily or mental, while he sued alone 
 in all actions for damages suffered by himself exclusively, from 
 the loss of her society, and from expenses and the like occasioned 
 by her injuries. Except in New York, and the other States 
 
 1 Adams v. Curtis, 4 Lans. 164. The in Kaufman v. Schoeffel, 37 Hun, 140, thai 
 
 action was against a firm of which the husband and wife cannot legally enter 
 
 husband was a member. She may be into a business copartnership : to the con- 
 
 his creditor. Re Alexander, 37 Iowa, trary, Graflf v. Kinney, 1 How. Pr. N. 8. 
 
 4.54. He maj' sue her for conversion of 59 ; Zimmerman i-. Erhard, 58 How. Pr. 
 
 his property; Berdell f. Parkhurst, 19 11. See also, on the general subject of 
 
 Hun, 358. She may sue him for conver- the wife's mental disabilities, Bertles r. 
 
 sion ; Ryerson v. Ryerson, 55 Hun, 191, Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152; Coleman r. Burr, 
 
 38 N. Y. St. Rep. 375; to recover her 93 N. Y. 17. 
 
 personal property ; Howland r. Howland, 2 Moore v. Moore, 47 N. Y. 467. The 
 
 20 Hun, 472. She may sue her husband, husband and wife may .sue jointly for the 
 
 or be sued by him, on a contract made conversion of chattels which they own 
 
 for the benefit of her .separate estate; jointly. Chambovet i-. Cagney, 35 N. \- 
 
 Granger f. Granger (1886), 2 N. Y.St. Superior Ct. 474. 
 
 Rep. 211 (suit by husband on promissory * Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb, 
 
 note of wife) ; Benedict v. Driggs, 34 366 ; Schultz v. Schultz, 27 Hun, 26, 63 
 
 Hun, 94, and cases cited. Whether a How. Pr. 181, contra, was reversed with- 
 
 partnersliip agreement is such a contract out opinion by the Court of Appeals, 89 
 
 is a question on which the decisions are N. Y. 644. 
 
 at variance. It is held in Fairlee v. * Freethy r. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641. 
 
 Bloomingdale, 67 How. Pr. 292. in Noel ^ Perkins v. Perkins, 62 Barb. 531. 
 
 V. Kinney (1885), 31 Alb. Law J. 328, and Alward v. Ahvard (1888), 2 N. Y. Suppl.42.
 
 ACTIONS BY HUSBAND AND WIFE. 227 
 
 which have made the wife in all respects like the single woman 
 in regard to the capacity of instituting and prosecuting judicial 
 controversies, these ancient doctrines of the common law have 
 been preserved.^ The wife should certainly not be joined as a 
 plaintiff with her husband in any action for tort to his property, 
 or for fraud in relation thereto, unless she has some interest in 
 or ownership of the subject-matter which has also been affected 
 by the wrong.- Thus, where a husband is induced by the false 
 and fraudulent representations of the grantor to purchase land, 
 and the title is taken in his wife's name, but the consideration 
 is wholly paid by him, she having in fact no prior legal interest 
 in the land or in the price, an action for the deceit cannot prop- 
 erly be brought in their joint names ; he is the only person 
 interested, and should be the sole plaintiff.^ The same has been 
 decided in respect to an action for fraud practised upon a hus- 
 band and wife, by which a convej'ance of land was obtained from 
 them. The land thus conveyed was alleged to have been their 
 homestead, but in fact the wife had no legal interest in it, the 
 title having been exclusively in the husband. A joint action to 
 recover damages for the deceit under these circumstances was 
 held to be improper.^ If, however, the wife has a legal interest 
 or ownership in the subject-matter which has been injured or lost 
 by the wrongful act or fraud of the defendant, a joint action in 
 the names of both husband and wife to recover damages is 
 proper. This doctrine has very recently been approved by the 
 New York Court of Appeals, and applied to the following state 
 of facts. The owner in fee of land in which his wife had no 
 interest except her inchoate right of dower, was induced by false 
 and fraudulent representations to sell and convey the premises 
 to the defendant by a deed in which the wife joined, and to 
 receive in consideration thereof certain mortgages which were 
 in fact worthless. A joint action by the husband and wife to 
 recover damages for the deceit was sustained, the husband, it 
 
 1 [|See notes, pp. 221, 222, an?e.] '^ Bartges v. O'Neil, 13 Ohio St. 72; 
 
 2 [|Edmisonw. Zborowski (1896),9S. D. Barrett y. Tewksbnry, 18 Cal. 334. See 
 40, 68 N. W. 288 : The court said : Stepank v. Kula, 36 Iowa, 563. 
 
 " A wife who joins in an acceptance of * Read v. Sang, 21 Wis. 678; and 
 
 an offer for her husband's property, and see Davies i'. Cole, 28 Kau. 259. But 
 in a deed tendered to the person making see Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298. 
 the offer, is not a necessary party plaintiff 
 iu an action for specific performance."]
 
 228 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 was said, being entitled to sue on account of his ownersliip of the 
 fee, and the wife on account of her inclioate (h)\vei' right. ^ 
 
 § 156. * 242. Actions for Personal Torts to Wife. When a 
 wife has suffered bodily injury, either by violence or by negli- 
 gent or unskilful acts of the wrong-doer, and the injury is of 
 such a nature as to disable her for a while and make medical or 
 other attendance necessary, a joint action is not the proper one 
 in which to recover the husband's damages for his loss of her 
 society and for the expenses caused by the wrong done to her; 
 such damages can only be recovered in an action brought by the 
 husband as the sole plaintiff.^ If, on the other hand, the com- 
 pensation sought is for the personal wrong done to her, both must 
 unite as plaintiffs [in all those States which follow the second 
 
 1 Simar v. Canadav, 53 N. Y. 298, 305. 
 This is certainly au extraordinary decision, 
 and introduces a rule before, I think, un- 
 thought of, — namely, that whenever the 
 owner in fee is induced liy fraud to con- 
 vey his laud, and the wife joins in the 
 deed, the two may maintain a joint action 
 and recover a single judgment in solido 
 for tiieir joint damages. The decision 
 cannot be supported either on principle 
 or on authority ; the essential difference 
 between the husband's fixed, certain in- 
 terest, capable cf being ascertained, and 
 the wife's uncertain, contingent interest, 
 under all possible circumstances much 
 less than her husband's, seems to have 
 utterly escaped the attention of the court. 
 ByR. S. Ind., 1881, § 2506, a wife's 
 common-law right of dower Wius enlarged 
 into a contingent fee, which may become 
 vested, not only by the death of her 
 husband, but l)y a judicial sale where 
 her inchoate interest is not directed by 
 the judgment to be barred or sold. It 
 was held that by virtue of this statute 
 the wife was a proper party plaintiff 
 witli the husband in an action to com- 
 pel a railroad coin[)any to maintain a 
 crossing over its right of way, in accord- 
 ance with a condition in a deed by tiie 
 husband and wife of the land for the 
 right of way. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. 
 Priest (Ind. Sup. 1892), 31 N. E. Rep. 77. 
 For a nuisance to premises owned by 
 husband ami wife <as tenants by the en- 
 tirety, he may sue alone. Demby v. City 
 of Kingston, GO Ilun, 294. 
 
 2 Kavanaugh v. Janesville, 24 Wis. 
 618, action for injuries to wife from a 
 defective sidewalk ; Barnes v. iMartin, 15 
 Wis. 240, assault and battery on wife ; 
 Smith V. St. Joseph, 55 Mo. 456, 458; 
 Dailey v. Houston, 58 Mo. 361, 366 ; Tell 
 V. Gibson. 66 Cal. 247. The joint action 
 mentioned in the text was allowed by 
 Laws of Wisconsin, 1873, ch. 96 ; II. S. 
 Wis. § 2680 ; Holmes v. Fond du Lac. 42 
 Wis. 282. But in construing ch. 91, Laws 
 of 1881, wliich allows the wife to sue 
 alone for a personal tort, it is lield that 
 the husband's cause of action for damages 
 special to himself cannot be so joined 
 with the wife's. Siiauahan v. Madison, 
 57 Wis. 276. 
 
 QMcKune r. Santa Clara, etc. Co. (1 895), 
 110 Cal. 480, 42 Pac. 980: In an action 
 for injuries to a wife's person, husband 
 and wife must join ; but in an action for 
 the consequential injury to the husi)and, 
 in loss of service and expenses incurred, 
 he must sue alone ; and these two actions 
 cannot be joined in one suit. Williams v. 
 Casebeer (1899), 126 Cal. 77, 58 Pac. 38": 
 Whore a single .act against both imsl)aml 
 and wife has given each a cause of action 
 for malicious prosecution, they cannot 
 unite their separate causes of action iu 
 one complaint and sue jointly, but each 
 must bring a separate action. The wife, 
 however, in bringing her suit must join 
 her husband as party plaintiff. McDevitt 
 V. City of St. Paul (1896), 66 Minn. 14, 
 68 N. W. 178: a husband may recover 
 damages against a city for injuries suffered
 
 ACTIONS BY HUSBAND AND WIFE. 
 
 229 
 
 type;i] as, for example, in suing for a slander or libel upon the 
 wife, the husband and wife must sue jointly, unless he has suf- 
 fered some special damage, and the object of the proceeding is 
 to obtain compensation therefor.''^ The same rule applies to all 
 torts to the person of the wife; for the injuries to her, both 
 husband and wife must join ; for the injuries special to him, such 
 as loss of her society, expenses incurred, and the like, he must 
 sue alone. ^ It has even been held, in a State where the cause 
 of action for a personal tort survives, that, when a claim for 
 damages against a physician for malpractice existed in favor of a 
 wife, and she died, her husband must be joined as a co-plaintiff 
 with her administrator in prosecuting an action to enforce such 
 demand.* If the gravamen of the action is a tort to the wife's 
 {)erson, the general rule above stated applies, and the husband 
 
 by his wife by reasou of a defective side- 
 walk, and for expenses for medical attend- 
 ance. In City of Eskridge v. Lewis (1893), 
 .■jl Kan. 376, 32 Pac. 1104, " An action 
 was brought by a married woman against 
 a city to recover for personal injuries re- 
 sulting from a defective sidewalk, and her 
 husband was joined with her as plaintiff, 
 who sought to recover for the loss of ser- 
 vices of tlie wife. Held, that the wife 
 suffered a loss from the injuries sustained 
 which was personal to herself, and th.at a 
 demurrer to the petition because of mis- 
 joinder wiis well taken ; but dismissing 
 ttie husband from the case before its sub- 
 mission cured the error committed in 
 overruling the demurrer."] 
 
 1 QGiffen v City of Lewiston (1898), 
 Idaho, .5.5 Pac. .545 : Where a husband and 
 wife sue for personal injuries received by 
 the wife, the judgment should run to both. 
 But the right of action for injuries re- 
 ceived by a single woman who, before 
 action commenced, married, is in the wo- 
 man alone, and her husband is not prop- 
 erly to be joined with her : Kippen v. Ollas- 
 .son (1902), 136 Cal. 640, 69 Pac. 293.] 
 
 •^ Johnson v. Dickcn, 25 Mo. 580; En- 
 ders V. Beck, 28 Iowa. 86. Tliis latter 
 decision was made under a .statute differ- 
 ent from that which is now in force in 
 Iowa. See also McFadden ;) Santa Ana, 
 etc. Ry. Co., 87 Cal. 464 ; Gibson v. Gib- 
 son, 43 Wis. 23 ; Barnett v. Leonard, 66 
 lud. 422. The wife mav now sue alone, 
 
 in Indiana, -for a personal tort. Ante, 
 p. 222. QSee also Lamb d. Harbaugh 
 (1895), 105 Cal. 680, 39 Pac. 56; Harper 
 V. Pinkstou (1893), 112 N. C. 293, 17 S. E. 
 161 : An action by a husband for slander 
 of his wife, the wife not being a party and 
 the complaint alleging no special damages 
 to the husband, states no cause of action.] 
 
 3 Long V. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595, 597 ; 
 McKinney i-. Western Stage Co., 4 Iowa, 
 420. See remark in last preceding note. 
 Dailey v. Houston, 58 Mo. 361, 366; 
 Smith V. St. Joseph, 55 Mo. 456, 458; 
 Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323 ; Ohio & M. 
 R. Co. V. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366; Boyd v. 
 Blaisdell, 15 Ind. 73. See also Hammond 
 V. Town of Muskwa, 40 Wis. 3.54 ; Beau- 
 dette V. Fond du Lac, 40 id. 44; Hunt v. 
 Town of Winfield. 36 id. 154; Oliver 
 V. Town of La Valle. 36 id. 592 ; Gibson v. 
 Gibson, 43 id 23; Meese v. Fond du Lac. 
 48 id. 323 ; Barnett r. Leonard, 66 Ind. 
 422 ; Matthew v. Cent. Pac. R. Co., 63 
 Cal. 450; Mann v. Rich Hill, 28 Mo. 
 App. 497 (joint action for injuries to the 
 wife not a bar to action for injuries special 
 to the liushand). 
 
 ^Baltimore, etc. R. R. Co. v. Glenn 
 (1902), 66 O. St. 672, 64 N. E. 438 : while 
 a wife has a rigiit of action for injuries 
 negligently inflicted, a husband also has a 
 right of action for loss of lier services and 
 necessary expenses in iiealing her injuries, 
 and her recovery is no bar to his.] 
 
 * Long r. .Morrison, 14 Ind. 595.
 
 230 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 must be joined, although the action might be brought in form ex 
 contractu. As an example, if the wife has been injured by the 
 negligence or other wrongful act of a carrier, who was trans- 
 porting her as a passenger, although the action might be in form 
 based upon the contract of passage made with her, the injury 
 being proved in enhancement of damages, or might be in form 
 directly based upon the tort, yet in either case the very gist of 
 the claim would be the negligent or tortious act of the defendant, 
 and the husband and wife must therefore unite as co-plaintiffs 
 in order to recover the damages resulting from her personal 
 injuries.-' 
 
 § 157. * 243. Actions for Tort3 to Wife's Person in New^ York 
 and States having Similar Statutes. In those States whose Stat- 
 utes have abrogated the ancient principles respecting the marriage 
 relation, the wife must sue alone in her own name in actions 
 based upon torts to her own person, as well as in actions concern- 
 ing her own property, or in those founded upon her contracts. 
 Cases illustrating this rule as it prevails in New York have 
 already been given. ^ Similar conclusions have been reached 
 by the courts of the other States whose legislation is substantially 
 the same as that of New York.^ Thus it is held in Iowa, under 
 the existing statutory provisions, that a wife must be the sole 
 plaintiff in an action instituted to recover damages for a malicious 
 
 1 Sheldon v. Steamship " Uncle Sam," the courts of the State. Texas, etc. \\j. 
 18 Cal. 526; Warner v. The Same, 9 Cal. Co. v. Humble (1899), 97 Fed. (C. C. A. 
 697. 'Ark.), 837. In Brockett v. Fair Haven, 
 
 2 See supra, § *239. etc. K. K. Co. (1900), 73 Conn. 428, 47 Atl. 
 
 3 QWilliams I'. Williams (1894), 20 Colo. 763, it was held that the joinder of the 
 51, 37 Pac. 614: The common law doc- husband in an action for personal injury 
 trine that the wife, as an inferior, could to the wife, was permissive. 
 
 not briiif^ an action for damages against Bains v. Bullock (1895). 129 Mo. 117, 
 
 one who wrongfully induces her Imsband 31 S. W. 342 : A deed of land to a hui*- 
 
 to abandon iier, does not exist in Colorado, band and wife in fee creates an estate by 
 
 The wife has rights equal to her husband entirety and each is entitled to the posses- 
 
 in this respect. Citing Foot r. Card, 58 siou of the entire premises as against 
 
 Conn. 1 ; Westlake v. Westlake, .34 0. St. third persons. The married women's att 
 
 621. Mayor /;. Smith (1900), 111 Ga. 870, has destroyed the legal unity between 
 
 36 S. E. 953 : " A married woman living husband and wife which gave rise to the 
 
 with her husband may bring an action in estate by entirety, but the estate has not 
 
 her own name for physical injuries sua- been abolished. And under this act al- 
 
 tained by her. Civil Code, § 2475." lowing a married woman to sue for the 
 
 A State statute giving a married wo- possession of her separate property in her 
 
 man a right to maintain an action for own name, she may bring ejectment for 
 
 personal injuries in her own name, is her estate by entirety without joining lier 
 
 applif-able to suits commenced in the fed- husband.] 
 eral courts as well as to suits brought in
 
 ACTIONS BY HUSBAND AND WIFE. 
 
 231 
 
 prosecution of herself; the joinder of her husband is iniprojKT, 
 since the damages when recovered are her own separate property-, 
 in which he has no interest or share ; ^ and, on the same prin- 
 ciple, a suit for a libel upon herself must be brought by the wife 
 alone. 2 
 
 § 158. * 244. Actions for Torts to "Wife's Property. [In those 
 states where statutes of the second type exist, a married woman] 
 may sue alone to recover damages arising from torts and negli- 
 gences and other wrongs to her own property ; these actions fall 
 within the language of the codes, and plainly " concern her sepa- 
 rate property."^ Thus it has been held that the wife may main- 
 tain a suit in her own name to recover damages for a trespass 
 to land owned by her, "although her husband occupied the land 
 in the usual manner with her and their family, and cultivated it, 
 but had no legal or other rights in it."^ If she can prosecute 
 a suit for trespass, she can certainly do the same when the injury 
 is negligent instead of violent and intentional. On -the other 
 hand, there are circumstances under which an action should be 
 maintained by the husband alone, although the wife may have or 
 seem to have some interest in the subject-matter of the contro- 
 versy. Thus, in California he must sue alone in actions relating 
 to the " common property " of the husband and wife, and in those 
 relating to "homesteads" as the same are defined and regulated 
 by the statutes of the State. ^ These subjects, however, depend 
 
 ^ Musselman ;•. Gallif^her, 32 Iowa, 
 383. [See Williams v. Casebeer (1899), 
 126 Cal. 77, 58 Par.. 380.^ 
 
 2 Pancoast v. Burnell, 32 Iowa, 394. 
 See Shuler v. Millsap's Ex'or, 71 N. C. 297. 
 In a suit by a married woman for per- 
 sonal injuries, .she cannot recover for the 
 loss of her services in the household ; the 
 husband alone can sue for these. Wyan- 
 dotte V. Agan, 37 Kan. 528. 
 
 3 [Hand v. Scodeletti (1900) 128 Cal. 
 674, 61 Pac. 373 ; where a married woman 
 sues for conversion of her separate 
 property, it is not necessary for her to al- 
 lege that it is her separate property where 
 she does not allege in the same count that 
 she is a married woman.] 
 
 * Boos V. Gomber, 24 Wis. 499. [T'rey 
 V. Stanley (1895) 110 Cal. 423, 42 Pac. 
 908 : A wife may bring an action to 
 quiet title in respect of her separate 
 
 property even though a homestead has 
 been declared upon the premises for the 
 joint benefit of herself and husband, with- 
 out joining her husband. A wife may sue 
 alone for the protection of any right she 
 may have in her separate property, even if 
 that right be merely that of a joint tenant. 
 But see Friburk v. Standard Oil Co. (1896), 
 66 Minn. 277, 68 N. W. 1090, where the 
 court said : " The fact that a wife is fur- 
 nishing the dwelling in which tlie family 
 resides does not change the common-law 
 rule that the husband is the head of the 
 family, nor will it give to the wife the 
 right to recover for damages resulting 
 from the maintenance of a nuisance."] 
 5 Barrett i;. Tewksbury, 18 Cal. 334 ; 
 Guiod V. Guiod, 14 Cal. 506 ; Cook v. 
 Klink, 8 Cal. 347 ; Poole v. Gerrard, 6 Cal. 
 71. [But see Anderson t-. Davis (1898), 18 
 Utah, 200, 55 Pac. 363 : when the legal
 
 232 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 entirely upon the special provisions of the statutes in the several 
 commonwealths, and have no proper connection with the general 
 system of procedure established by the various codes. It seems 
 that the husband alone can sue for a conversion or loss of or 
 injury to those articles of personal use belonging to the wife, — 
 her clothing and ornaments, — which at the common law consti- 
 tute her par apher7ialia.^ 
 
 § 159. * 245. Tort Actions between Husband and Wife. Whether, 
 under the legislation of the various States, actions for tort can be 
 maintained by the wife against the husband, or by the husband 
 against the wife, does not seem to have been definitively settled 
 by judicial decision. The departure from the ancient theory of 
 the marriage relation has been as great in New York as in any 
 other commonwealth, and yet, as has been shown, the courts of 
 that State have declared against the possibility of actions between 
 the spouses for any personal torts committed by one upon the 
 other, such as libels, assault and battery, and the like.^ The 
 same result would seem to be inevitable under the more restricted 
 legislation of other States, for their statutes which modify the 
 common-law doctrines of marriage are confined in their terms 
 to her power over her separate property and over contracts. 
 Actions between husband and wife, based upon torts done to 
 property, have arisen, but their propriety has not been finally 
 determined.^ There does not, however, seem to be any real 
 
 title to a homestead is in a wife, but the her separate property, be held account- 
 larger portion of the purchase price was able, in a suitable case, for the violation 
 paid by the husband, their joint interest in of his trust, but that the mere possession 
 the preservation of the homestead gives of the property by the husband, uuex- 
 them the right to join as plaintiffs in an plained, was not such a breach of trust; 
 action to enjoin its sale.] and remarks : " It is hardly necessary to 
 ^ McCormick »■. Penn. Cent. R. Co., 49 add that, if she had a riglit of action at 
 N. Y. 302, 317. See also Curtis v. Del., all against her husband, it could only 
 L. & W. R. Co., 74 N. Y. 116. have been asserted in equity ;" and that 
 2 See § *240, and notes. the only practical effect of § 49 of the 
 8 Owen V. Owen, 22 Iowa, 270; David- Kentucky code was to dispense with the 
 son V. Smith, 20 Iowa, 466. In Matson r. intervention of the next friend ; that it 
 Matson, 4 .Met. (Ky.) 262, the wife sued conferred no new right of action. See 
 the husl)and in an ordinary action to also Kalfus r. Kalfus (Ky. 1892), 18 S. W. 
 recover possession of slaves devised to Rep. 366 : and compare Manning i'. Man- 
 her as her separate property, which he ning, 79 N. C. 293. 
 
 refused to deliver to her, no other ground [^I5ut see Gillespie v. Gillespie (1896), 
 
 of relief, legal or eriuitable, being alleged. 64 Minn. 381, 67 N. W. 20, where it i» 
 
 In reversing a judgment rendered for the held that a wife may sue her husband in 
 
 ydaintiff, Duvall C. J. points out that the her own name, in any form of action, to 
 
 husband might, as trustee for the wife of enforce any right affecting her property.
 
 ACTIONS BY HUSBAND AND WIFE. 233 
 
 difficulty in principle. If a wife is clothed with full authority 
 over her own property as though she was unmarried, and if, in 
 pursuance thereof, she is permitted to invoke the aid of judicial 
 proceedings in enforcing contracts against her husband, and in 
 recovering from him the possession of lands and chattels, there 
 can be no valid ground for refusing to her the power of main- 
 taining actions against hira for the wrongful taking, detention, 
 or conversion of her chattels, or for injuries done to her property 
 by violence or by negligence.^ Both classes of actions depend 
 upon the same fundamental rights, — the rights of property which 
 the statute fully confers upon her. If the owner may recover 
 from her husband the very thing itself — the land or chattel — in 
 a real action, it is not an enlargement of her power to suffer her 
 to recover the value of such things wholly or partially in a per- 
 sonal action. The notion that the proceeding must be equitable is 
 a remnant of the ancient system which has been abrogated, and 
 is conceived in forgetfulness of the radical changes made by the 
 statutes in the common-law theory of the marriage relation. If 
 the facts constituting the cause of action are stated in the plead- 
 ing, it is both unnecessary and improper to call the action equi- 
 table, since the relief, if granted, is the ordinary pecuniary 
 judgment against the defendant personally, and not a judgment 
 in rem against his property. 
 
 § 160. * 246. Desertion by Husband as Affecting "Wife's Capacity 
 to sue. The desertion of his wife and familj^ by the husband 
 does not increase her powers and capacities in reference to the 
 bringing and maintaining of judicial proceedings, unless provi- 
 sion is made for such an emergency by express statute. Thus, 
 
 the same as if she were a stranger. Also 21 S. W. 354 ; although contracts between 
 
 Grubbe v. Grubbe (1894), 26 Ore. 363, 38 husband and wife are void at law, thej 
 
 Pac. 182. Under Hill'.s Code, § 2870, pro- may be held valid in equity where they 
 
 vidiug that either husband or wife, as are fair and just. Snedager v. Kincaid 
 
 owner, may sue to recover ])roperty of (1901), Ky., 60 S. W. 522; under Civ. 
 
 which the other has secured possession or Code Prac. § 35, the action of an infant 
 
 control, either may sue the other at law married woman for divorce and alimony 
 
 not only f(-r property wroni^fullv obtained, need not be brought by guardian or next 
 
 but on contracts as well. I3ut under friend, but may be brought in her own 
 
 identically the same statute the Supreme name.] 
 
 Court of Iowa held, in Heacock y. Heacock ' In Wisconsin a husband may main- 
 
 (1899), 108 la 540, 79 N. W. 353, that tain " replevin " against his wife for cliat- 
 
 a wife cannot sue her husband on his per- tels claimed by her to be her separate 
 
 sonal contract Iowa code, § 2904. property ; Carney v. Gleissner, 62 Wis. 
 
 Bohannon v. Travis (1893), 94 Ky. 59, 493.
 
 234 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 after such desertion, the wife cannot maintain an action in her 
 own name to set aside a conveyance of land alleged to have 
 been obtained from him by fraud. ^ In several States, however, 
 the codes contain express provisions, which, in case of desertion 
 by the husband, permit the wife to prosecute and defend such 
 actions as he might have done.^ 
 
 Third : Eqititahle Actions. 
 
 § 161. * 247. Grand Prfticiple Underlying Equity Doctrine. 
 Scope of Inquiry. The grand principle which underlies the 
 doctrine of equity in relation to parties is, that every judicial 
 controversy should, if possible, be ended in one litigation; that 
 the decree pronounced in the single suit should determine all 
 rights, interests, and claims, should ascertain and define all 
 conflicting relations, and should forever settle all questions 
 pertaining to the subject-matter. Since the chancery judges 
 were not hampered by the legal dogma that one judgment must 
 be rendered alike for all the plaintiffs and against all the defend- 
 ants on the record, they were enabled to adopt and enforce such 
 practical rules as would render this principle operative and 
 efficient. In disclosing these rules, and in explaining their 
 application, I am not confined to decisions made by courts pro- 
 fessedly' governed by the reformed procedure. The codes, as 
 has already been shown, have taken the most general doctrines 
 of equity in relation to parties, have put them into a statutory 
 form, and have made them applicable without exception to all 
 actions.^ Whether these doctrines have been entirely incorpo- 
 
 1 Green v. Lyndes, 12 Wis. 404. See Wis. 598, 77 N. W. 922, the court .said: 
 
 also Barnett i'. Leonard, 66 lud. 422. " It ^ttie Code] was designed to preserve 
 
 - See supra, § 152; Andrews v. Run- and make more perfect l)y new forms the 
 
 yon,65 Cal. 629 ; Baldwin r. Second Street method for the settlement in one action, 
 
 Cable Ry. Co , 77 Cal. 3'JO ; Tobin i'. denominated the civil action, of all the 
 
 Galvin, 49 Cal. 34 (the statute does not rights of a party plaintiff, or parties 
 
 apply where the wife is merely tenipora- plaintiff united in interest in the subject 
 
 rily absent from the husband). ^Browne, thereof, and the rights of adverse parties 
 
 Brown (1897), 121 N. C. 8, 27 S. K. 998: both as between them, and between them- 
 
 Under the constitution and section 1832 selves, not only as to the subject of the 
 
 of the Code, which declares that every action, but the subjects germane thereto, 
 
 woman whose husband shall abandon her . . . The system is complete, as said in 
 
 shall 1)6 deemed a free trader, a wife KoUoch i\ Scribner, 98 Wis. 104, enabling 
 
 abandoned by her husband may maintain the court in a single action, by the presen- 
 
 an action in tort, in her own name, against tation of i.ssues made up by the complaint. 
 
 a third party. ] answer, and reply, to take within its jiiris- 
 
 * Qln Gager v. Marsden (1899), 101 diction a single subject or controver.sy,
 
 PLAINTIFFS IN LqUITABLE ACTIONS. 235 
 
 rated into the legal actions under the codes has sometimes been 
 doubted; it is universally admitted, however, that they are 
 operative with their full force and ejffect in all equitable actions 
 which may be brought in accordance with the new procedure. 
 For the purpose of ascertaining the existing rules which control 
 the selection of parties in equitable actions, we are not, there- 
 fore, restricted to those States which have accepted the reform ; 
 we nlay and must extend our inquiry to England and to other 
 States of this country wherever equity exists as a separate divi- 
 sion of the municipal law. 1 shall endeavor, in a very condensed 
 and summary manner, to give the doctrine of parties plaintiff, 
 which has been established by courts of equity and in equitable 
 actions, whether prior or subsequent to the great reform intro- 
 duced into so many of the States, and the result will express the 
 law as it now exists in those States.^ 
 
 § 162. * 248. Equity Rules more Explicit respecting Defendants 
 than Plaintiffs. Two Classes of Co-Plaintiffs in Equity. It is im- 
 possible to lay down with precision many rules in reference to 
 plaintiffs, because equity does not particularly concern itself 
 with determining that such a person shall be a plaintiff, and 
 such another a defendant, but rather requires in a more general 
 form that the persons shall be parties, so as to be bound by the 
 
 and all parties interested tlierein adverse ested may be before the court, so that the 
 to the plaintiffs, and all necessary to be relief may be properly adjusted amonj^ 
 before the court for their due protection those entitled, the liabilities properly ap- 
 and for the determination of the entire portioned, and the incidental or conse- 
 controversy, includin<^ such matters as quential claims or interests of all may be 
 may be germane to the primary subject of bound in respect thereto by the sinf^le 
 the action." decree." See also Castle v. Madison 
 And in Siever v. Union Pac. Ey. Co. (1902), 11.3 Wis. 346, 89 N. W. 15C,, 
 (1903), — Neb. — , 93 N. W. 943, the quoted at length in note to p. 183, anip. 
 court said: "Equitable doctrines with In Tobin v. Portland Mills Co. (!00'2), 
 respect to parties and judgments are 41 Ore. 209, 68 Pac. 743, the court said : 
 •wholly unlike those which prevail at " Courts of law require no more parties t« 
 common law — different in their funda- an action than those immediately inter- 
 mental conception, in their practical op- ested in the subject-matter, but in equity 
 eration, in their adaptability to circum- all persons, including those remotely inter- 
 stances, and in their results upon the ested therein, may be joined, and are often 
 rights and duties of litigants. The gov- necessary parties."] 
 
 erning motive of equity in the admini.stra- ^ In this subdivision I have drawn very 
 
 tion of its remedial system is to grant full largely upon the fourth American edition 
 
 relief, and to adjust in one suit the rights of Dauiell's Chancery Pleadings, and the 
 
 and duties of all the parties which really learned notes of Mr. Perkins, the Ameri- 
 grow out of, or are connected with, the can editor, and have closely followed that 
 subject-matter of that suit. The primary most admirable work, 
 object is that all persons sufficiently inter-
 
 236 CIVIL KEMEblES. 
 
 decree, and is in general satisfied if they are thus brought before 
 the court either as plaintiffs or as defendants. In other words, 
 the rules of equity seldom declare that a given person or class of 
 persons must be plaintiffs, but simply declare that such person 
 or class must he made parties, if not as plaintiffs, then as de- 
 fendants.^ The result is that the positive rules as announced by 
 courts and as gathered from a comparison of decisions, are much 
 more full and explicit in reference to defendants than they are in 
 reference to plaintiffs. In actual practice, all persons having an 
 interest in the subject-matter, and therefore either necessary or 
 proper parties, except the actual plaintiff who institutes and 
 prosecutes the suit, are generally made defendants, even though 
 their interests may be concurrent with those of this plaintiff. 
 Still, different individuals holding different rights may be united 
 as plaintiffs in equitable actions ; such a joinder is often provided 
 for by well-settled doctrines, and, although their requirement is 
 not peremptory, these doctrines must be discussed and fully 
 stated. The persons that can be made co-plaintiffs in an equity 
 suit may be roughly separated into two general classes: (1) 
 Those whose rights, claims, and interests, as against the defend- 
 ant, are joint, — not necessarily joint in the strict, technical sense 
 of the common law, but in a broader and popular sense, — that 
 is, those whose interests, claims, and rights, whether legal or 
 equitable, are concurrent, arising out of the same events, having 
 the same general nature, and entitled to the same sort of relief. 
 All such persons must be brought before the court as parties, and 
 naturally they should be plaintiffs, and so the rules primarily 
 require ; but the requirement is by no means peremptory, and in 
 many and in even the great majority of instances, the equity 
 principle is satisfied if all but the one who actually sets the cause 
 in motion are placed among the defendants. (2) In the second 
 class are found all those persons who are collaterally interested 
 in the subject-matter of the controversy ; whose interests and 
 claims, although antagonistic to the defendant, and to that 
 extent, therefore, in harmony with those of the real plaintiff, are 
 still several and distinct in tlu-ir nature, arising from different 
 
 ' See WilkiijB v. Frv, 1 M<-riv. 244, 262. fprnlants : but in equity the arrangement 
 
 f Keys ft al. v. McDermott (1903), — Wis. of parlies is of little importance, and can 
 
 — , 9^ N. W. 553, the rnnrt saying : "To \,e regulated by the court at any time, ia 
 
 tlii» <iid. they, as well — perhaps more its discretion. "j 
 properly — miglit h;ivc been made de-
 
 PLAINTIFFS IN EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 237 
 
 facts and circumstances, and demanding perhaps a different re- 
 lief. Although the individuals or the class which have been 
 thus vaguely described may be joined as co-plaintiffs with the 
 one who is the chief actor in the suit, and although the rules 
 speak of such a joinder as possible, yet in actual practice they 
 are almost invariably placed among the defendants. With this 
 preliminary explanation, which modifies the entire doctrine of 
 equity in relation to plaintiffs, I shall proceed to state the gen- 
 eral principles which underlie the whole equitable system of 
 parties, and to illustrate the working of these principles in the 
 more important species and varieties of actions by which equitable 
 remedies are conferred. 
 
 § 163. * 249. Statement of Fundamental Principle and •wrhat it 
 assumes. Special Subject of Inquiry Stated. The fundamental 
 principle maybe stated as follows : The plaintiff who institutes 
 an equitable action must bring before the court all those persons 
 who have such relations to the subject-matter of the controversy 
 that, in order to prevent further litigation by them, they must be 
 included in and bound by the present decree; in other words, 
 all those persons who are so related to the controversy and its 
 subject-matter, that, unless thus concluded by the decree, they 
 might s"et up some future claim, and commence some future 
 litigation growing out of or connected with the same subject- 
 matter, against the defendant who is prosecuted in the present 
 suit, and from whom the relief therein is actually obtained. The 
 principle as thus expressed assumes, what is always true in prac- 
 tice, that in every equitable action there is some person, or group 
 of persons, like a firm or joint tenants, who primarily institutes 
 the proceeding, and demands the relief for his own benefit; and 
 him, or them, we may designate " the plaintiff ; " and there is 
 also some person or group of persons against whom all the real 
 demands are made, and from whom the substantial remedy sought 
 b}' the action is asked, — and him we denominate " the defend- 
 ant." In addition to these two contestants, there are the other 
 individuals described in the foregoing proposition, who must also 
 be brought before the court and made parties to the controversy 
 either as co-plaintiffs or as co-defendants. Equity is satisfied 
 in most instances by making them co-defendants, and they are 
 generally so treated in actual practice, unless their interests are 
 so identical with those of the plaintiff that they must participate
 
 238 CIVIL KEMKDIES. 
 
 • 
 
 in the substantial relief awarded by the decree. The special 
 subject of our present inquiry- may therefore be stated thus: In 
 what cases and under what circumstances are such persons 
 primarily and naturally to be associated as co-plaintitfs rather 
 than as co-defendants ? The answer to this question embodies 
 the principle in its most general form which equity courts have 
 applied in all species of actions to determine the proper joinder 
 of plaintiffs. All those persons whose rights and interests in the 
 subject-matter, and in the relief demanded, are concurrent with 
 the plaintiffs, must be made parties, and naturally wall be made 
 co-plaintiffs, although it is sufficient in most instances if they 
 are brought into the cause as co-defendants. The principle in 
 this very general form is too vague to be of any value as a prac- 
 tical rule, and I shall therefore take up in order the most impor- 
 tant classes of cases in which it is applied.^ 
 
 § 164. * 250. Subordinate General Principles herein. Where 
 Actual Plaintiff holds only Equitable Right or Title, Holder of Legal 
 Right or Title should be made Co-Plaintiff. The lirst of the sub- 
 ordinate general principles into which the foregoing vague 
 doctrine may be subdivided, is the following: When the actual 
 plaintiff, as above described, has only an equitable estate, 
 interest, or primary right in the subject-matter of the suit, the 
 person who holds the legal estate, interest, or right therein, 
 should be made a party, and primarily a co-plaintiff; for without 
 such joinder the defendant might be subjected to another litiga- 
 tion from this legal owner or holder of the legal title, a result 
 wliich equity strives in every way to prevent.^ One of the most 
 familiar as well as important illustrations of this general prin- 
 ciple is the rule which prevails in suits relating to trust property. 
 When property is held in trust, and an action concerning it is 
 brought by the beneficiary or person claiming under the trust, 
 the trustee, or one in whom the legal title is vested, must be 
 made a co-i)laintiff.^ As, for example, when a mortgage has 
 
 ' See Jones v. Williams, 31 Ark. 175; Heirs, 9 Rush, 408. See also Weetjin i\ 
 
 Pfohl v. Simpson, 74 N. Y. 137. Vihbard, 5 Hun, 205 ; Sandford i: Jodrell, 
 
 2 1 Dani.ll's, p. 192. 2 Sm. & G. 176; O'Brien v. O'Connell, 
 
 •■' 1 Danieirs, p. 193. See Western R. 7 Hun, 228; Holden v. N. Y. & Erie Bk , 
 
 Co. r. Nolan. 48 N. Y. 513 ; Malin v Malin. 72 N. Y. 286, 297 ; Eldridge v. Putnam, 46 
 
 2. Johns. Ch. 238; Fish I'. Howand, 1 Paige, Wi.s. 205 ; Dewey c. Mover, 9 Hun, 473 ; 
 
 20; f'aasiday I. Mcl)aniel,8 B. Mon. 519; Fort Stan wix Hk. r. Leggctt, 51 N. Y. 
 
 Covington &. Lex. R. Co. v. Bowler's 552; Fox i. Mover, 54 id. 125; Bowdoin
 
 PLAINTIFFS IN EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 239 
 
 been given to a trustee in trust for certain beneficiaries, the 
 trustee and the beneficiaries must unite in a suit to foreclose.^ 
 The principle applies to all cases where the legal title to sue 
 stands in one, and the beneficial interest in the subject and in 
 the result is held by another; both must unite as plaintiffs.^ 
 Thus, if a covenant is made with a trustee for the benefit of a 
 cestui que trusty both must join in an action to compel a specific 
 performance.^ The case of a simple contract, made by an agent, 
 when the agency appears on the face of the agreement, or can be 
 easily established by extrinsic evidence, does not fall Avithin the 
 operation of this rule, for the principal can sue alone and prove 
 the agency if it is disputed. If, however, the agency does not 
 appear in the contract itself, and the principal or person for 
 whom the agreement is made cannot prove it with ease and cer- 
 tainty, then the agent may be made a party so as to bind his 
 interest.* When an agent acts in any transaction on his own 
 account as well as on account of his principal, so that he has a 
 beneficial interest in the subject-matter, he must be made a co- 
 plaintiff with his principal.^ 
 
 § 165. * 251. Case of Suits by Assignees. Change Effected by- 
 Codes. The case of suits brought by the assignees of things in 
 action is another special example of this general principle. 
 
 College V. Merritt, 54 Fed. Rep. 55 (suit the terms of a trust, the party or parties 
 
 to remove cloud from title to trust prop- beneficially interested may maintain an 
 
 erty ; cestuis que trustent may bring suit action in their own right to enforce the 
 
 if the trustees neglect to sue, making the trust, and to obtain the benefit thereof." 
 
 latter defendants) ; Sawtelle v. Ripley Same rule announced in Zimmerman v. 
 
 (Wis. 1893), 55 N. W. 156 (action to con- Makepeace (1899), 152 Ind. 199, 52 N. E. 
 
 strue trust in a will ; the trustee named 992.] 
 
 therein is a necessary party). ^ story Eq. PI. § 209 ; Cope r. Parry, 
 
 1 Story Eq. PI. §§ 201, 209 ; Wood v. 2 Jac. & Walk. 53S. See McCotter v. 
 
 Williams, 4 Mad. 86 ; Ilichens v. Kelly, Lawrence, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 392, 395. 
 
 2 Sm. & G. 264 ; Boyd v. Jones, 44 Ark. * 1 Daniell's, p. 196 ; Botsford v. Burr, 
 
 314 ; Tyson v. Applegate, 40 N. J. Eq. 305 ; 2 Johns. Ch. 409 ; Bartlett v. Pickersgill, 
 
 Applegate v. Tyson, 39 N. J. Ei] 365; 1 Cox, 15. It should be remembered that 
 
 Harlow v. Mister, 64 Miss. 23; Wolff u. when a contract- is made by an agent in 
 
 Ward, 104 Mo. 127. his own name expressly for the benefit of 
 
 2 [^But see Cape v. Plymouth Congre- another, he i.s, according to the codes, a 
 
 gational Church (1903), 117 Wis. 150, 93 trustee of an express trust, and may sue 
 
 N. W. 449, where it was held that a cestui upon it in his own name, without joining 
 
 que trust, entitled to pos.session of real the beneficiary as a party. To this extent 
 
 estate, may, witliout the trustees, maintain tlie new procedure has modified the rule 
 
 an action to enjoin interference witli its which prevailed in equity, and which 
 
 rights. And in Goble v. Swobe (1902), required tliat both persons should join 
 
 — Neb. — , 90 N. W. 919, the coui;t said : in bringing the action. 
 
 " Where a trustee refuses to carry out ^ Small v. Attwood, 1 Younge, 407.
 
 240 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 Where a legal thing in action had been assigned, the assignee 
 was permitted to sue in equity for its enforcement in his own 
 name, but the assignor, or his personal representative if he was 
 dead, was an indispensable party, if not as a co-plaintiff, then as 
 a defendant; otherwise the debtor might be subjected to a second 
 action at law in the name of the assignor.^ This particular rule, 
 however, as has been shown in the preceding sections of the 
 present chapter, has been entirely abrogated in most of the States 
 that have adopted the new procedure, since their codes expressly 
 permit the assignee to sue alone without joining the assignor 
 either as a co-plaintiff or as a defendant; but it is substantially 
 retained by the codes of Kentucky and of Indiana. 
 
 § 166. * 252. Case of Suita for Administration of Decedents' 
 Estates. In ordinary suits for the administration of the estates of 
 deceased persons brought by creditors, legatees, or distributees, 
 a general personal representative of the estate — an administrator 
 or executor — is indispensable, and is a necessary party, and 
 should properly be made a co-plaintiff, although he may be 
 put with the defendants. ^ These ordinary administration suits, 
 which are the common means in England of winding up and 
 settling the estates of decedents, are practically unknown in this 
 country. It is only under some exceptional circumstances that 
 the equity jurisdiction is with us invoked, not to supersede the 
 action of the probate courts, but to aid it, when if left to itself it 
 would fail to afford complete relief and to do complete justice. 
 Whenever such exceptional circumstances exist, and by reason 
 of fraud, collusion, or other similar cause on the part of the 
 executor or administrator, a creditor, or legatee, or distributee 
 of an estate, may and does bring an action on behalf of the estate, 
 even in such a case the personal representative — the adminis- 
 
 1 1 Daniell's, pp. 197-200, and cases 2 i Darnell's, p. 201; Penny v. Watts, 
 there citeil. Where an equitable thing in 2 Phil. 149, 153; Donald v. Bather, 16 
 action, or an equitable interest, was as- Beav. 26; Croft v. Waterton, 13 Sim. 
 signed, the nssignee could sue alone, since 653. For illustrations of suits -by ad- 
 there was no possible danger of an action raiui.strators, heirs, etc., see Marsh v. 
 at Uw by the assignor. Fad wick y. Piatt, Waupaca Cy. Sup., 38 Wis. 250 ; Jones 
 11 Beav. 503; Bagshaw r. Ertstern Union ,-. Billstein, 28 id. 221 ; Chipman v Mont- 
 R. Co, 7 Hare, lU; Blake r. Jones, 3 gomery, 63 N. Y. 221; Allison i-. Robin- 
 Anst. 651. There is no difference, under son, 78 N. C. 222 ; Harris v. Bryant, 83 id. 
 the codes generally, between the assign- 568. 
 ment of a legal and of an equitable thing 
 in action in re»[)ect to the parties.
 
 PLAINTIFFS IN EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 241 
 
 trator or executor — is a necessary part}- ; if he is not united as a 
 co-plaintiff, he must be added as a defendant. ^ 
 
 § 167. * 253. Rule Applicable to Persons Having Legal Demands 
 Arising out of Same Subject-Matter. In all the foregoing in- 
 stances the rule has been applied to the holders of a legal and of 
 an equitable estate or interest in the subject-matter; it extends 
 also to all persons having legal demands against the defendant 
 arising out of the same subject-matter or event. Thus, where a 
 lease has been assigned by the lessee, both the lessor and the 
 lessee may each sue the assignee at law for a breach by him of 
 the covenants. In equity, however, neither is permitted to sue 
 the assignee without joining the other also, so that the defendant 
 cannot be subjected to a double action and recovery.^ 
 
 § 168. * 254. All Holders of Concurrent Equitable Rights against 
 the Defendant should be made Co-Plaintiffs. Ill the class of caseS 
 thus far examined, either an equitable right existed in one person 
 and a legal right in another, or a legal right was held by all. 
 The same principle extends to the very numerous class of cases 
 in which the rights against the defendant arising from the same 
 subject-matter or event are all equitable. Whenever, therefore, 
 in addition to the plaintiff who actually institutes the action, 
 there are other persons having concurrent equitable rights against 
 the defendant growing out of the same subject-matter, they should 
 in general be made parties to the action, primarily no doubt as 
 co-plaintiffs, but, if not, then as defendants.^ The doctrine thus 
 stated in general terms has a very wide application, and upon it 
 
 ^ Attorney General v. Wynne, Mos. Hardy v. Miles, 91 N. C. 131. For a full 
 126; Wilson v. Moore, 1 My. & K. 126, discussion of the circumstances under 
 142; Saunders y. Druce, 3 Drew. 140. As which the equity jurisdiction maybe in- 
 «xamples of such actions, see Fisher v. voked in this country in aid of the probate 
 Hubbell, 7 Lans. 481, 65 Barb. 74, 1 N. Y. courts, see 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 1152-1154, 
 Sup. Ct. 97 ; in which the same person and extended note to § 1154. 
 was executor of the estates of A. and of ^ I Daniell's, pp. 206, 207 ; Sainstry v. 
 B., and the plaintiffs, legatees of A., had Grammer, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 165 ; London v. 
 claims which placed them in the position Richmond, 2 Vern 421 ; 1 Bro. P. C. 516. 
 of creditors to the estate of B. ; and Lan- ^ QSanborn v. People's Ice Co. (1900), 
 caster v. Gould, 46 Ind. 397, which was 82 Minn. 43, 84 N. W. 641 : In a suit to 
 .an action by legatees and next of kin, restrain defendant from cutting and carry- 
 ■against a creditor of the estate and the ing away ice from a lake on which plain- 
 executor, to set aside a fraudulent allow- tiff is a riparian owner, there is no defect 
 ance and payment of a claim made by the of parties plaintiff where the plaintiff 
 executor to the creditor; and Stronach shows himself specially affected by de- 
 V. Stronach, 20 Wis. 129, 133. See also fendant's acts, on account of his peculiar 
 Hills V. Sherwood. 48 Cal. 386, 392 ; relations to the water, not shared in com- 
 Haynes v. Harris, 33 Iowa, 516, 518-520 ; mon by other shore owners.] 
 
 IG
 
 242 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 is based a very large portion of the special rules as to parties 
 which prevail in equity. It includes not only those who have 
 concurrent rights in the whole subject-matter of the suit, but 
 those also who have similar rights in a part of it, such as joint 
 tenants, who must all be parties in an action concerning the 
 property.^ In a suit by joint tenants or tenants in common for 
 a partition, all must be before the court; but it is not necessary 
 of course that all should be plaintiffs.^ There have been relaxa- 
 tions of this general rule. An action by three out of forty-seven 
 tenants in common, brought to restrain the defendants from 
 quarrying stone upon the land which was owned in common by 
 the whole number, has been sustained, notwithstanding an objec- 
 tion on the ground of the non- joinder was interposed. ^ And 
 where one tenant in common had leased his share for a long 
 period of years, the lessee was permitted to maintain a partition 
 against the other tenants in common, without making the rever- 
 sioner of his own share — the lessor— a party.* And generally 
 a tenant for life may institute a partition without bringing in the 
 remainder-men.^ When land is held by tenants in common for 
 
 1 1 Daniell's, pp. 207, 208; Haycock 
 I'. Haycock, 2 Ch. Cas. 124; Weston (.-. 
 Keighley, Finch, 82 ; Stafford v. London, 
 1 P. Wms. 428 ; 1 Stra. 95. Where there 
 are two or more trustees, they must all 
 unite, since their interest is strictly joint, 
 riiatcher u. Candee, 33 How. Pr. 145 
 (N. Y. Ct. of App.). In a suit by tenants 
 in common to restrain a nuisance, the 
 widow of a deceased co-tenant is properly 
 joined as plaintiff, for the protection of 
 her dower interest. Shepard v. Man- 
 hattan Ky. Co., 117 N. Y. 442, 446, 447. 
 In Woodruff v. No. Bloonifield Gravel 
 Min. Co., 8 Sawy. 62S, s. c. 15 Fed. 
 Rep. 25, it was held that one tenant 
 in common mif^ht bring suit to enjoin 
 a nuisance affecting the property with- 
 out joining his co-tenants. And one heir 
 may bring an action to restrain the dese- 
 cration of his ancestor's grave, and for 
 damages, without joining the other heirs. 
 Mitchell r. Thorne, 57 Hun, 40.'). Where 
 tenants in cr)mmon of a tract have by 
 separate clccds and at separate times and 
 places conveyed their interests to a com- 
 mon vendee, they cannot join in a .suit to 
 i:iiiccl the deeds, as neither vendor has 
 
 an interest in the relief demanded by the 
 other. Jeffers v. Forbes, 28 Kan. 174, 
 179, per Brewer J. See ante, § *219, and 
 notes. 
 
 2 Anon., 3 Swanst. 139; Brashear v. 
 Macey, 3 J. J. Marsh. 93 ; B raker v. Dev- 
 ereaux, 8 Paige, 513; Borah v. Archers, 
 7 Dana, 176; Cornish v. Gest, 2 Cox, 27. 
 In j)artition by a tenant in common, his 
 wife is not a necessary co-jilaintiff ; she 
 should be made a party to the action, but 
 rather as a defendant than as a j)laintiff. 
 Rosekrans v. White, 7 Lans. 486. The ad- 
 ministrator of a deceased tenant in com- 
 mon may, under certain circumstances, 
 be a proper party, together with liis heirs, 
 in a partition. Scott v. Guernsey, 60 Barb. 
 163, 181. See Sullivan v. Sullivan. 4 Hun, 
 198 (partition). 
 
 =' Ackroyd v. Briggs, 14 W. R. 25. 
 [Hannegan v. Roth (1896), 12 Wash. 695, 
 44 Pac. 256 : Any or all of the tenants in 
 common may maintain an action to quiet 
 title, under Code § 529.] 
 
 ^ Baring i-. Nash, 1 Vcs. & B. 551 ; 
 Heaton v. Dearden, 16 Be:iv. 147. 
 
 ' Wills I'. Slade, 6 Ves. 498 ; Brassey 
 1-. Chalmers, 4 De G., M. & G. 5l>.S.
 
 PLAINTIFFS IN EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 243 
 
 life, or when there are future contingent interests which may 
 finally vest in persons not yet in being, a partition may l)e had 
 between those who possess the present estates; but it will only 
 be binding upon the parties who are before the court and those 
 who are virtually represented by such parties. ^ In an action 
 brought to determine boundaries, all persons interested, whether 
 their estates are present or future, remainder-men and rever- 
 sioners, must be parties, although of course all need not be 
 plaintiffs. 2 It is not necessary, as a general rule, to make the 
 actual occupying tenants or lessees parties in suits relating to 
 real property. They must, however, be parties in special cases 
 where they are directly interested and their concurrence is 
 necessary; 2 as, for example, in a partition suit where a tenant 
 in common has leased his share, and in a suit brought to restrain 
 an ejectment which was instituted against the tenants themselves 
 instead of against their lessor.* If, on the other hand, lessees, 
 or any persons holding limited interests, sue to establish some 
 general right, that is, some right belonging to or affecting the 
 whole estate and not merely their own temporary possession and 
 user, the ultimate owners of the inheritance must also be made 
 parties, so that they may be bound by the decree, but the require- 
 ment will be satisfied by making them defendants.^ Thus, where 
 a lessee brought an action to establish a right of way against a 
 person who had erected an obstruction, it was held that his lessor 
 should have been joined as a party to the suit.^ 
 
 1 Wotten V. Copeland, 7 Johns. Ch. fully extracting coal from the leased 
 140; Striker v. Mott, 2 Paige, 387,389; premises.] 
 
 Woodworth v. Campbell, 5 Paige, 518; ■♦ 1 Daniell's, p. 209; Story Eq. PL 
 
 Gaskell v. Gaskell, 6 Sim. 643; Gayle v. § 1.51 ; Lawley v. Walden, 3 Swanst. 142; 
 
 Johnston, 80 Ala. 395. Poole v. Marsh, 8 Sim. 528. See Saloy 
 
 2 1 Daniell's, p. 209; Story Eq. PL i;. Bloch, 136 U. S. 338. 
 
 § 165; Bayley v. Best, 1 Uuss. & My. » 1 Daniell's, pp. 209, 210. 
 659; Miller v. Warmington, 1 Jac. & ^ Poore v. Clarke, 2 Atk. 515. [^Co- 
 Walk. 484; Speer v. Crawter, 2 Meriv. lumhia Water Power Co. v. Electric Co. 
 410; Attorney General v. Stephens, 1 K. (1894), 43 S. C. 154, 20 S. E. 1002: The 
 & J. 724; 6 De G., M. & G. Ill; Pope plaintiff was the purchaser of a canal from 
 V. Melone, 2 A. K. Marsh. 239. the State. Tiie defendant was lessee from 
 
 3 [[United Coal Co. v. Canon City Coal the State of 500 horse power of water 
 Co. (1397), 24 Calo. 116, 48 Pac. 1045: power in said canal, reserved by the State 
 Where a lessee coal company is under in the sale to plaintiff, the lease providing 
 contract to pay the lessor company a cer- that defendant should supply the State 
 tain royalty on every ton of coal mined, as penitentiary with 100 horse power, and 
 rental for the property, both the companies should have the remainder for its own 
 may join as plaintiffs in an injunction profit. Defendant erected a steam plant 
 suit against other parties who are wrong- on the banks of the canal as supplemental
 
 244 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 ^ 169. * 255. Doctrine extends to Actions relating to Personad 
 Property. lUuatrations. The doctrine that persons having or 
 chiiinin>'- a joint interest or estate must unite, extends to actions 
 which relate to personal property as well as to those which relate 
 to real property. ^ The following particular instances will illus- 
 trate this application. If a legacy is given to two jointly, both 
 must sue for it; but if legacies are given separately, there being 
 no common interest in any particular one, each legatee may sue 
 for his own.- Where two or more persons are jointly interested 
 in the money secured by a mortgage, that is, according to the 
 law prevailing in this country, when they are joint mortgagees 
 or joint assignees of a mortgage, they must all unite in a fore- 
 closure. ^ And it is not even necessary that they should be joint 
 holders of the debt secured by the mortgage. All persons who 
 are entitled to share in the proceeds, whether their interest is 
 joint or in common, or several, must be made co-plaintiffs, or at 
 least must be brought into the action as defendants.* When, 
 
 to its use of the leased water power. 
 Plaintiff brought a suit ia equity to en- 
 join defendant from using the water 
 power, and also asked for damages for 
 the erection of the steam plant on plain- 
 tiff's land. Held, that inasmuch as the 
 State, being owner of the penitentiary, is 
 interested in the use of the water power, 
 the State is an indispensable party to the 
 injunction proceedings, but that in the law 
 action the State is not a necessary party.^ 
 
 1 1 Daniell's. p 211. 
 
 2 Haycock i-. Haycock, 2 Ch. Cas. 124; 
 Haghsen v. Cookson, 3 Y. & C. 578. 
 
 « Story Eq. PI. § 201 : Stucker v. 
 Stucker, .3 J. J. Mursh. 301 ; Wing v. 
 Davis, 7 Greenl. 31 ; Noyes v. Sawyer, 3 
 Vt. 100 ; WiKxlward v. Wood, 19 Ala. 213 ; 
 Palmer v. Karl of Carlisle, 1 S. & S. 423 ; 
 Lort-e V. Morgan, 1 Bro. C. C. 368 ; Stans- 
 field f. Hobson, 16 Beav. 189. For an e.\- 
 ample of misjoinder, because there was 
 no community of interest, see Ferris v. 
 Dickerson, 47 Ind. 382. See also Thomp- 
 son V. Smith, 63 N. Y. 301 (a vendor's 
 lien); Simpson v. Satterlee, 64 id. 6.57, 
 6 Hun, 30.') (where the holder of a mort- 
 (^age lia.s a'<8iirned it as collateral security, 
 he may foreclose, but the assignee must 
 alw> be joined as a necessary party): see 
 also Cerf v. Ashley, 68 Cal. 419 ; Church 
 
 V. Smith, 39 Wis. 492 (in an action by 
 a grantor to enforce the grantor's lien, 
 when a portion of the notes given for 
 instalments of tlie fund have been as- 
 signed, the assignees are necessary par- 
 ties). Mesechaert v. Kennedy, 4 McCrary 
 C. Ct. 133 (joint owners of bonds must 
 join in a suit to declare them a lieu on 
 property). Contra, Swenson v. Moliiie 
 Plow Co., 14 Kan. 387 (wliere a mortgage 
 was given to secure two notes, and one of 
 the notes was assigned, the mortgagee, 
 and the assignee of the note cannot 
 maintain a joint action on the notes and 
 mortgage). 
 
 « Story Eq. PI. § 201 ; Goodall r. 
 Mopley, 45 Ind. 355, 358. In this case a 
 mortgage had been executed to several 
 different mortgagees. All but one joined 
 in a foreclosure, and he was afterwards 
 permitted to foreclose for his own behalf, 
 making the other mortgagees, as well a.s 
 all other persons interested, defendants. 
 See, per contra, Montgomerie v. Marquis 
 of Bath, 3 Ves. 560. — a case whicli has 
 been severely criticised. Two mortga- 
 gees of land, holding several mortgages 
 given at the same time to secure several 
 obligations, are tenants in common, and 
 may join in a suit to foreclose their mort- 
 gages. Cochran v. Goodell, 131 Mass. 464.
 
 PLAINTIFFS IN EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 245 
 
 however, the mortgage has been assigned to trustees in trust for 
 the benefit of creditors, the trustees are the only necessary parties 
 plaintiff in a foreclosure suit, and the creditors, being represented 
 b}^ them, need not be joined.^ Actions to foreclose mortgages 
 upon land, and those to enforce and foreclose the vendor's lien 
 upon land for the purchase-price thereof, are in all respects 
 based upon the same principles. The equitable doctrine prevail- 
 ing in by far the greater part of the States, and which has entirel}^ 
 displaced the legal notion, regards the debt as the essential fact, 
 and the mortgage as a mere incident thereto. The holder of the 
 mortgage has therefore no estate in the mortgaged premises.^ 
 Whoever is interested in the debt as one of the creditors is 
 therefore interested in the mortgage or in the vendor's lien, and, 
 upon the well-settled rules of equity procedure, all must be made 
 parties in order to avoid a division of the claim and a multiplicity 
 of actions.^ In the Western States it is very common, on the 
 sale of land, for the vendor to take the vendee's notes payable at 
 successive dates for the price, and either to receive back a mort- 
 gage given to secure such notes, or to rely upon the equitable 
 lien arising from the sale as the security. All the holders of 
 such notes must join as plaintiffs in an action to foreclose, 
 whether the security be a mortgage or the mere vendor's lien.* 
 A note and mortgage having been given to a husband and wife 
 as security for money of the wife loaned to the mortgagor, and 
 the husband dying, the wife was held to be the proper party to 
 sue in her own name, either as the surviving promisee and mort- 
 gagee, or because the contract concerned her separate estate.^ 
 
 1 Morley v. Morley, 25 Beav. 253 ; ^ Pettibone v. Edwards, 15 Wis. 95 ; 
 
 Thomas v. Dunning, 5 De G. & S. 618; Jenkins v. Smith, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 380; 
 
 Knight V. Pocock, 24 Beav. 436. Merritt r. Wells, 18 Ind. 171; Goodall v. 
 
 - ^It was held in Sidney Stevens Imple- Mople\', 45 Ind. 355, 358. See, however, 
 
 ment Co. i\ South Ogden Laud Co. (1899), Rankin r. Major, 9 Iowa, 297. Upon the 
 
 20 Utah, 267, 58 Pac. 843, that since by death of a vendor, it is held, in Kentucky, 
 
 the law of Utah trustees in a deed of trust that his heirs must be joined as plaintiffs 
 
 are not vested with any title to the prop- in a suit to enforce the lien for purchase- 
 
 erty, legal or equitable, they are not money, that the administrator cannot 
 
 necessary parties in an action to foreclose maintain the action alone. Anderson v. 
 
 the deed of trust.] Sutton, 2 Duv. 480, 486 ; Smith (•. West's 
 
 s [[Held iu Casey V. Gibbons (1902), 136 Ex., 5 Litt. 48; Edwards v. Bohannon, 
 
 Cal. 368, 68 Pac. 1032, that the plaintiff, 2 Dana, 98; Thornton v. Knox's Execu- 
 
 in her individual capacity as distributee of tors, 6 B. Mon. 74 ; Etheridge v. Vernoy, 
 
 one half the mortgage, might join with 71 N. C. 184, 185, 187. [[See, however, 
 
 herself as executrix representing the other § *340, and cases cited in the note.] 
 
 half of the mortgage.] 5 Shockley v. Shockley, 20 Ind. 108.
 
 246 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 170. * 256. Suits to Redeem. The rule which regulates 
 actions to foreclose prevails also in those brought to redeem. 
 As all the persons entitled to share in the mortgage debt must 
 unite in the foreclosure suit, so in a suit to redeem, the mort- 
 o-atror, and all others who have a common right with him to 
 redeem, must be made parties; in strict theory they should be 
 co-plaintififs, but it is sufficient if the one who for his own pur- 
 poses institutes the action adds the others as defendants.^ Where 
 a judgment of foreclosure had been obtained on a mortgage, and, 
 with the authority or knowledge of the mortgagee, the sheriff 
 .sold the premises in the usual manner, but at a merely nominal 
 price, it was held, in Indiana, that the mortgagor and the niort- 
 jrasree micjht unite in an action to set the sale aside, and to 
 redeem the land from the purchaser, — the mortgagor by virtue 
 of his ownership, and the mortgagee by virtue of his interest in 
 having a price produced at the sale large enough to pay his 
 entire claim. ^ The general doctrine above stated is strictly 
 enforced in redemption suits of all varieties, the underlying 
 principle being that a redemption must be complete and total, 
 that the creditor shall not be compelled to accept a partial pay- 
 ment of his claim, or to make a partial surrender of liis securities. 
 When two tracts of land are mortgaged to the same 'person to 
 secure the same debt, and they afterwards come into the hands 
 of different proprietors, one of them cannot be redeemed without 
 the other; the owners of both the parcels, and all persons in- 
 terested in them, must be parties to the action, if not all as 
 plaintiffs, then at least as defendants.^ This joinder of the 
 persons interested in the two estates is only necessary, however, 
 while the mortgages are held by the same mortgagee or other 
 holder. If one of them is assigned, or if by any other means 
 they come into the hands of different holders, they being on dis- 
 
 1 1 Daniell's, pp. 212, 2i;i; Story Kq. liii.[,'sworth, 27 lud. 115; Stringfield v. 
 
 V\. § 201 ; Chapman v. Hunt, 1 McCarter, Graff, 22 Iowa, 438. 
 
 149; Large v. Van Doren, 1 Mc-Carter. » Story Eq. PI., §§ 182, 287; Palk ?•. 
 
 208. See also Haggerson v. Phillii).<, 37 Lord Clinton, 12 Ves. 48; Lord Cliol- 
 
 \Vi«. 3C4 (widow of a decea-sed inort- raondeley v. Lord Clinton, 2 Jac. & W. 1, 
 
 gagor i.-i not a necessary party) ; Parker 134; Ireson v. Denn, 2 Cox, 42.'); Jones 
 
 r. Small, ."iS Ind. 349 (in a suit to redeem v. Smith, 2 Ves. 372. 6 Ves. 229 (n.); 
 
 by a griintee, the grantor is not a neces- Watts v. Symes, 1 De G., M. & G. 
 
 Bary party) ; Southard v. Sutton, 68 Me. 240; Tassell v. Smith, 2 De G. & J. 713; 
 
 57.V ' Vint IV P.adget, 2 De G. & .L 611 ; Sell.y 
 
 - Berkshire c.Shullz, 2.5 Ind.523. See i'. Poinfrf.t. 1 .1. & II. 336. 3 De G, F. & 
 
 also MeCuUoch's Administrator r. IIol- J. 59 J ; Bailey v. Myrick, 36 Me. 50.
 
 PLAINTIFFS IN EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 247 
 
 tinct parcels of land, all connection between them is severed, 
 and the actions to redeem must be separate.^ If the action to 
 redeem is brought by an incumbrancer, the same rule applies. 
 In a suit by an incumbrancer, who seeks to redeem from a prior 
 incumbrance, the mortgagor or owner of the land subject to the 
 incumbrances, whatever they may be, is an indispensable party, 
 although not necessarily a plaintiff. ^ While a second mortgagee, 
 in an action to redeem, must thus bring in the mortgagor or his 
 heir or other owner of the land, he may foreclose the mortgagor 
 and a third mortgagee without joining the first mortgagee as a 
 party, since his proceeding does not in the least affect the rights 
 of such first mortgagee, but its effect is merely to put himself in 
 the place of the mortgagor and of the third mortgagee.^ This 
 rule may be stated in a more general form. In suits brought to 
 enforce subsequent claims, intei-ests, or incumbrances, on prop- 
 erty subject to prior charges which are to be left unaffected, the 
 holders of such prior liens or interests need not be made parties.* 
 § 171. * 257. Suits for Accounting. All Persons interested in 
 Jbaving an Account Taken, or in its Result, should be made Co- 
 Plaintiffs. The general principle that all persons concurrently 
 interested in the subject-matter of the suit or in its result, 
 whether that relate to real or to personal property, must be 
 parties, is invoked and strictly enforced in all species of actions 
 which are brought to obtain an accounting against the defendant. 
 The remedy of accounting is multiform, and it is often made the 
 basis of some further and ulterior relief, such as rescission and 
 cancellation, redemption, and the like ; but wherever an account- 
 ing is sought, either for its own sake or as the preliminary step 
 to further judicial action, the rules as to parties are controlling. 
 When several persons are interested in having an account taken, 
 or in its result, one of them cannot be permitted to institute a 
 
 1 Willie V. Lugg, 2 Eden, 78. 371 ; Arnold v. Bainbrigge, 2 De G., 
 
 2 1 Daniell's, p. 214; Story Eq. PI. F. & J. 92; Audsley v. Horn, 26 Beav. 
 §§84, 186, 195; Thomson v. BaskerviU, 195, I De G., F. & J. 226; Person v. 
 3 Ch. Rep. 215; Farmer v. Curtis, 2 Sim. Merrick, 5 Wis. 231 ; Wright v. Bundy, 
 466; Hunter r. Macklew, 5 Hare, 238; 11 Ind. 398. In England, if the plain- 
 Fell V. Brown, 2 Bro. C. C. 276 ; Palk v. tiff in such an action brings in the prior 
 Lord Clinton, 12 Ves. 48; Hallock i: mortgagee, he must offer to redeem liis 
 Smith, 4 Johns. Ch. 649. mortgage. Gordon v. Horsfall, 5 Moore, 
 
 s 1 Daniell's, p. 214; Story Eq. PI. 393. 
 § 193; Rose v. Page, 2 Sim. 471; Bris- * 1 Daniell's, p. 214; Rose v. Page, 2 
 
 foe V. Kenrick, 1 Coop. temp. Cott. Sim. 471 ; Parker f. Fuller, 1 R. & M. C.'jG.
 
 248 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 proceeding for that purpose by himself alone and without joining- 
 the othei-s in some manner, so that they shall be bound by the 
 decree, for otherwise the defendant would be exposed to as many 
 actions as theie are persons interested, each brought and main- 
 tained for the same purpose and upon substantially the same 
 proofs.^ The actions in which an accounting is necessary are 
 very numerous, and arise out of external circumstances very 
 unlike, but, in all of them, the rule as thus stated must be fol- 
 lowed in the selection of the parties. Thus in a partnership, or 
 any other like adventure where there is a sharing of profits or 
 losses, all the persons having shares must be made parties to a 
 suit brought for an accounting. ^ Under the proper circum- 
 stances one may sometimes sue on behalf of himself and all the 
 others interested, and it is not indispensable that the individuals 
 having concurrent rights should all be joined as plaintiffs in the 
 action. 2 If, however, one or more of the parties are non-resi- 
 dents, and beyond the jurisdiction of the court, the rule, under 
 such circumstances, is sometimes relaxed, and the action is 
 allowed to proceed with those parties who are within the reach 
 of the court and its process. The admission of this exception, 
 or of similar ones, is not, however, a matter of absolute right; it 
 depends rather upon the sound discretion of the court regulated 
 by considerations of equity and justice.* The heirs of a deceased 
 partner must be parties in an action brought to sell real estate of 
 the firm in winding up the partnership and paying the firm debts ; 
 although the land is, for the purpose of paying firm debts, treated 
 in equity as a personal asset, yet the legal title of the heir must 
 be divested, and to that end he must be brought in as a party. ^ 
 
 1 1 Daniell's, p. 216; Petrie r. Petrie, 7 Phila. 594; Wells r. Strange, 5 Ga. 22 ; 
 Laus. 90. See also Getty c Develin, 70, Mudgett c. Gager, 52 Me. 541. 
 
 N. Y. 504 (accounting) ; I'fohl /■. Simpson, * The following cases will show to 
 
 74 i<l. 1.37 (action against a fund or a class what extetit, and under what circum- 
 
 of persons) ; Eldridge i-. Putnam, 4G Wis. stances, the rule has been relaxed : Story 
 
 205 (all the cestuis que trustent must join Eq. PI. § 78; Darwent i\ Walton, 2 Atk. 
 
 in an action against the trustee for an ac- 510; Walley v. Walley, 1 Vern.487; Towle 
 
 counting) ; Hughes i-. Boone, 81 N. C. 204 v. Pierce, 12 Mete. 329 ; Vo.'se v. Philbrook, 
 
 (action for contribution); Hammond t-. 3 Story, 3.35 ; Lawrence r. Rokes, 53 Me. 
 
 Pennock, 61 N. Y. 145 (rescission on ac- 110, 116; Fuller y. Benjamin, 23 Me. 255 ; 
 
 count of fraud). Drage v. ILirtupp, 28 Ch. D. 414 ; Palmer 
 
 2 IreUiu V. Lewes, Finch, 96; MofTat v. Stevens, 100 Mass. 461. See Bowdoiu 
 V. Farquharson, 2 liro. C. C. 338. College v. Merritt, 54 Fed. Rep. 55. 
 
 » Story Eq. PI. § 16C; Good f. Blewitt, '' Piigh v. Currie, 5 Ala. 446; Lnng r. 
 
 M Vm. 397 ; Cullen r. Duke of Queens- Waring. 25 Ala. 625; Andrews w. Brown, 
 bury, 1 Bro. C. C. 101 ; Hills v. Nash, 1 21 Ala. 437.
 
 PLAINTIFFS IN EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 249 
 
 On the death of a partner, his personal representative may at 
 once maintain an action against the survivors for an accounting; 
 and when there was no real estate held by the firm as a part of 
 its assets, so that no question can arise as to the title of any 
 lands, the heirs of. the deceased are neither necessary nor proper 
 parties to such action.^ 
 
 § 172. "' 258. Residuary Legatees, Distributees, and Next of Kin. 
 Statement of General Rule herein. Another example is found in 
 the action by a residuary legatee, brought to obtain an account 
 of his share of the residue ; he must make all persons interested 
 in the residue parties, even though their interest may be quite 
 remote and contingent.^ One residuary legatee may sometimes 
 sue on behalf of all others interested.^ Also in a suit by next of 
 kin or distributees against the administrator for an account, all 
 of the next of kin or distributees must be parties, naturally as 
 plaintiffs, but if not, then as defendants. This is the established 
 equity rule prior to or independent of any changes made by stat- 
 utes.* These instances of distributees and residuary legatees 
 thus given are in fact particular cases of a more general rule in 
 reference to actions which have for their object, in whole or in 
 part, an accounting by the defendant, which may be stated as 
 follows: When the persons assert the claim to an account as a 
 portion of a class entitled under a general description, all the 
 members of that class, or all the individuals included under that 
 general description, must be before the court ; if not among the 
 original parties to the suit, they must be brought in before the 
 final hearing, so that the rights of the entire body can be deter- 
 
 1 Cheeseman v. Wiggins, 1 N. Y. Sup. ghan v. Smith, 2 Phil. 301 ; Smith v. Snow, 
 Ct. 595 3 Mad. 10; Hares v. Stringer, 15 Beav. 
 
 2 1 Daniell's, pp. 216, 217; Story Eq. 206; Grace v. Terrington, 1 Coll. 3. 
 
 PI. §§ 89, 203, 204; Parsons v. Neville, 3 » Kettle v. Crary, 1 Paige, 417, 419, 
 Bro. C.C. 365; Cockburn i\ Thompson, 16 420; Ross v. Crary, 1 Paige, 416; Hal- 
 Ves. 328; Brown v. Hicketts,3 Johns. Ch. lett v. Ilallett, 2 Paige, 15, 19 ; Egberts v. 
 553; Davoue i-. Fanning, 4 Johns Ch. Woods, 3 Paige, 517. 
 199; Pritchard v. Hicks, 1 Paige, 270; * 1 Daniell's, pp. 217,218; Story Eq. 
 Sheppard v. Starke, 3 Munf. 29 ; West v. PI. § 89 ; Hawkins r. Hawkins, 1 Hare, 543, 
 Randall, 2 Mason, 181, 190-199; Huson 546; Noland y. Turner. 5 J. J. Marsh. 179 ; 
 V. McKenzie, Dev. Eq. 463 ; Arendell v. West v. Randall, 2 Mason, 181, 190; Kel- 
 Blackwell, Dev. Eq. 354 ; Bethel v. Wil- lar v. Beelor, 5 Monr. 573 ; Oldham v. Col- 
 son, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 610. See Mc- lius. 4 J. J. Mar^h, 50. See Petrie v. Pe- 
 Arthnr v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340, 395. As trie, 7 Lans. 90; McArthur v. Scott, 113 
 illustrations of such remote and contin- U.S. 340, 395; Bland y.Fleeman, 29 Fed. 
 gent interests, see Sherrit u. Birch, 3 Bro. Rep. 669; Richtmyer v. Richtmyer, 50 
 C C. 229 (Perkins's ed. note) ; Davies i: Barb. 55. 
 Davies, 11 Eng. L. &. Eq. R. 199; Lena-
 
 250 CIVIL KEMEUIES. 
 
 mined in one decree, and the defendant relieved from the possi- 
 bility of a multiplicity of actions. Primarily, all these persons 
 being interested in the account adversely to the defendant, they 
 should all be made co-plaintiffs; but, as has often been observed, 
 the rules of equity do not demand this strict distinction between 
 plaintiffs and defendants, and they are satisfied if all the indi- 
 viduals, besides the one actually instituting the suit, are placed 
 among the defendants. It is also often possible, when the class 
 is numerous, that one should sue on behalf of all the others. 
 This general rule is most comprehensive in its practical applica- 
 tion, and must be invoked in a very large number of cases which 
 have little external resemblance; it was well established both in 
 England and in this country as a doctrine of equity procedure, 
 l)ut has of late years been much modified and relaxed in England 
 by statutes.^ 
 
 § 173. * 259. Same Subject. Exceptions. Statement of Dis- 
 tinction herein referred to. There are some exceptions, however, 
 to the foregoing rule which requires all persons interested in the 
 result of an accounting to be made parties. When some of the 
 individuals who were originally interested have been abeady 
 separately accounted with and paid, they need not be made 
 parties to the suit.^ And when the accounts and shares of the 
 different persons have been kept entirely separate and distinct 
 from each other, so that neither one is interested in that of the 
 others, although all relate to the same adventure or undertaking, 
 there need be no joinder of all.^ And where persons are each 
 entitled to a certain fixed portion of an ascertained sum in the 
 hands of a trustee, each may sue for his own share without 
 joining his co-beneficiaries.^ The distinction here referred to is 
 important, and should be stated more fully, as follows: If a 
 trustee holds a fund which he is bound to distribute to different 
 beneficiaries in unequal proportions, and the proportionate share 
 of each has not yet been ascertained, all the persons who are 
 
 1 See 1 Daiiiell's, p. 217; Story Eq. PI. De Taatet, Jac. 28-4; Bray v: Fromont, 
 § 90. See Lancaster Baptist Cliurch v. 6 Mad. 5. 
 
 Presb. Church, 18 B. Mon. 635; Ilutchin- ♦ 1 Daniell's, p. 219; Story Eq. PI. 
 
 8on r. Roberts, 67 N. C. 22.3. §§ 207 n, 212; Perry v. Knott, 5 Beav. 
 
 2 D'Wolf f. D'Wolf, 4 U. L4.'J0;Branch 2'J3 ; Smith v. Snow, 3 Mad. 10; Hares 
 V. Booker, 3 Munf. 43; Moore v. Beau- r. Stringor, 15 Beav. 206; Lenaghan v. 
 champ, 5 Dana, 70. Smith, 2 Phil. 301 ; Hunt v. Peacock, 
 
 * Weymouth v. Boyer, 1 Ves. 416; 6 Hare, 301. 
 Hills V. Na«li, 1 Phil. 5'J4, 597 ; Brown c.
 
 PLAINTIFFS IN EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 251 
 
 interested in the distribution are necessary parties to an action 
 brought to enforce the trust; but where the proportionate share 
 of each beneficiary has been definitively ascertained by a proceed- 
 ing binding oh the trustee, each is entitled to demand payment 
 of the share belonging to himself, and when the payment is with- 
 held he may maintain a separate action for its recovery. The 
 liability of the trustee to each is then exactly the same as though 
 the sum ascertained to belong to him was the only sum which 
 the trustee had received and had been directed to pay.^ When 
 a person jointly interested in the account is out of the jurisdic- 
 tion, the cause has sometimes been allowed to go on without him 
 as a party. ^ 
 
 § 174. * 260. Special Applications of General Principles above 
 Stated. General Rule. Important Exceptions, I shall now briefly 
 describe some of the most important special applications of the 
 foregoing general principles in relation to community and con- 
 currence of interests. As a result of these principles, it is a 
 general rule, with but few well-defined exceptions, that trustees 
 cannot alone maintain actions relating to the trust property, but 
 the beneficiaries must also be made parties to the suit in some 
 form, either as co-plaintiffs with the trustees or as defendants.^ 
 
 1 Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Benson, 5 Duer, Malin, 2 Johns. Ch. 238 ; Fish v. Howland, 
 168,176, per Duer J.; Walker v. Paul, 1 Paige, 20; Schenck v. Elliugwood, 
 Stanton's (Ky.). code, p. 37 ; Hubbard i\ 3 Edw. Ch. 175; Helm v. Hardin, 2 B. 
 Burrell, 41 Wis. 365. A fund had been Men. 232; Barney v. Spear, 17 Ga. 223; 
 devised to a trustee for the benefit of the Woodward v. Wood, 19 Ala. 213 ; Kirk v. 
 superannuated preachers of a certain Clark, Prec. Cha. 275 ; Phillipson v. Gatty, 
 " conference." It was held that the 6 Hare, 26 ; Brokaw v. Brokaw's Ex., 41 
 superannuated preachers of that body N. J. Eq. 215 ; Northampton First Nat. 
 might unite in an action to enforce the Bk. v. Crafts, 145 Mass.. 444 ; Boyd r. 
 trust for their own benefit and that of Jones, 44 Ark. 314. Where two or more 
 future persons entitled under it. Lan- trustees have been appointed, they must 
 caster Bapt. Church v. Presb. Church, 18 all unite in actions brought by them, as 
 B. Mon. 635. their right is strictly joint ; and this rule 
 
 2 Story Eq. PI. §§ 78, 89 ; West ?•. Ran- applies, although some one of them may 
 dall, 2 Mason, 196 ; Vose r. Philbrook, have attempted, by assignment or other- 
 3 Story, 335 ; Lawrence v. Kokes, 53 Me. wise, to divest himself of tlie trust. 
 110; Mudgett r. Gager, 52 Me. 541; Thatcher v. Candee, 33 How. Pr. 145 
 Drage v. Hartopp, 28 Ch. D. 414 ; Palmer (N. Y. Ct. of App.). And see cases cited 
 V. Stevens, 100 Mass. 461. supra under § * 250. 
 
 3 1 Daniell's, pp. 220-224 ; Story Eq. \J.t was held in Bennett v. Bennett 
 PL §§ 207, 209; Covington & Lex. R. Co. (1902), — Neb. — , 91 N. W. 409, that in 
 V. Bowler's Heirs, 9 Bush, 468 ; Western an action by a guardian the ward need not 
 R. Co. V. Nolan, 48 N. Y. 513; Large u. be joined as plaintiff, under § 32 of the 
 Van Doren, l' McCarter. 208 ; Stilwell V. code. Becker r. Strooher (1902), 167 
 McNeely, 1 Green, Ch. 305; Van Doren Mo. 306, 66 S. W. 1083: The court said, 
 V. Robinson, 1 C. E. Green, 256 ; Malin v. " It is well settled in tliis state that the
 
 252 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 The following are simple illustrations of this general doctrine. 
 Where trustees in trust to sell lands brought an action against 
 the purchaser at their sale to compel a specific performance of 
 their contract of purchase, it was held that the cestuis q^ce trustcnt 
 of the purchase-money must be made parties. ^ Again, where the 
 trustees of a numerous unincorporated society brought an action 
 to compel the specific performance of an agreement entered into 
 by themselves for the benefit of the association, it was held that 
 the members of the society should be joined, or, if they were too 
 numerous, then some of them ought to be made co-plaintiffs, 
 suing as representatives on behalf of the others. ^ There are, 
 however, as already stated, certain well-defined exceptions to 
 this general rule requiring trustees and cestuis que trustent to be 
 joined in suits concerning the trust property, of which the fol- 
 lowing are the most important: (1) When trustees appointed to 
 sell lands are expressly authorized by the deed of trust to sell in 
 their own names, and it is further expressly provided in such 
 deed that their own receipt of the price shall be a complete dis- 
 charge to the purchaser, it is settled that they may maintain a 
 suit to compel a specific performance against the purchaser with- 
 out joining the cestuis que trustent with themselves as parties.^ 
 
 (2) In some special instances, where the interest of the bene- 
 ficiaries was simply collateral to the rights of the trustee against 
 the defendant, the trustee has been permitted to sue alone.* 
 
 (3) And in suits between the trustees themselves, brought by 
 one to compel the other to account for and restore trust property 
 misappropriated by him, the beneficiaries need not be made 
 parties.^ But if the cestuis que trustent have concurred in the 
 
 beneficiary and trostee in a deed of trust selves and all other members of said 
 
 executed upon land the subject of parti- church."] 
 
 lion, prior to the institution of a suit for '^ See 1 Daniell's, pp. 221, 222, and 
 
 that purpose, are proper parties to such cases cited. 
 
 suit, but no such rule prevails with re- * As, for example, in Saville v. Tan- 
 spect to a beneficiary or trustee, in a crcd, I Ves. Sen. 101, 3 Swanst. 141, 
 mortgage or deed of trust executed after Story Eq. PI. § 221. 
 a partition suit has been instituted. "J ** Story Eq. I'l. § 21.3; Franco r. 
 > Calverley v. I'help, 6 Mad. 229. Franco, 3 Ves. 77 ; Bridget v. liames, 
 2 Douglas V. Ilorsfall, 2 S. & S. 184. 1 Col. 72; May ?•. Selby, 1 Y. & C. 235; 
 QHeld in Lilly v. Menke (1894). 126 Mo. Horsley v. Fawcett, 11 Beav. .565; Peake 
 190. 28 S. W.' 643, that where plaintiffs, v. Ledger, 8 Mare, 313, 4 De G. & S. 137 ; 
 iu behalf of an unincorporated church Baynard r. Woollcy. 20 Beav. 583 ; Allen 
 a.ssoriation, bring a suit in partition, the v. Knight, 5 Hare, 272, 277 ; Cunningham 
 petition should allege th-it plaintiffs as v. Pell. 5 I'aige, C07. But see Chancel- 
 trustees of the church "sue for theni- lor r. Morecrafl, 1 1 Beav. 262. Whcu the
 
 PLAINTIFFS IN EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 253 
 
 breach of trust, they must be joined in the suit brought by one 
 trustee against his co-trustee to repair the fault. ^ 
 
 § 175. * 261. Case of Suits by Executors and Administrators, 
 and Suits by Assignees in Insolvency. Important Exceptions Con- 
 tinued. (4) The most important exception by far, as well as the 
 most familiar one, is the case of executors and administrators; 
 they can always sue alone, without joining the legatees, dis- 
 tributees, creditors, or other persons interested in the estate, as 
 parties either plaintiff or defendant. The legal title to the 
 personalty is so completely vested in the executors and adminis- 
 trators, that, both in law and in equity, they are considered as 
 fully representing the rights and interests of all the other persons 
 who have ultimate claims upon such estate as legatees, distribu- 
 tees, or creditors. In all actions, therefore, relating to the 
 «state, they sue alone. This rule is fully established in equity 
 as well as at law.^ All the acting executors or administrators 
 must join ; ^ but if a portion only have proved, the others need 
 not be made parties, although they may not have formally 
 renounced.* It is not indispensable, however, that all the ex- 
 ecutors or administrators should be plaintiffs ; for it is enough in 
 equity if all the parties are before the court, so that one executor 
 or administrator may sue as plaintiff, if he make his co-executor 
 
 suit by the trustee is merely to recover or though not at all necessary, is not im- 
 
 reduce to possession the trust property, proper. Richardson's Administrator v. 
 
 and is in no way intended to control the Spencer, 18 B. Mon. 450. An adminis- 
 
 administration or disposition of it, or to trator may maintain an action to set aside 
 
 affect the right or relation of the cestui que transfers of his intestate in fraud of cred- 
 
 trust, the latter is not a necessary party, itors, since he represents the creditors as 
 
 Horsley f . Fawcett, 11 Beav. .565; Carey well as the deceased. Cooley v. Brown, 
 
 V. Brown, 92 U. S. 172, and cases cited; 30 Iowa, 470, 47.3, 474. And see cases 
 
 Hickox V. Elliott, 10 Sawy. 415, s. c. 22 cited supra under § *252. 
 Ted. Rep. 13, 19, 20; Smith v. Portland. ^ 1 Daniell's, p. 226; Offley v. Jenney, 
 
 30 Fed. Rep. 734 (suit to protect the trust 3 Ch. Rep. 92 ; Cramer v. Morton, 2 Mol- 
 
 pnjperty by injunction) ; Re Straut's loy, 108. 
 
 Estate, 126 N. Y. 201 ; Western R. Co. * Davies ». Williams, I Sim. 5; Dyson 
 
 V. Nolan, 48 N. Y. 513. See also ante, v. Morris, I Hare, 413; Rinehart ?;. Rine- 
 
 §*178. hart, 2 McCarter, 44; Marsh v. Oliver, 
 
 1 Jesse V. Bennett, 6 De G., M. & G. 1 McCarter, 262. But an executor who 
 €09. has not proved the will n)ay, nevertheless, 
 
 2 1 Daniell's, p. 224 ; Jones v. Good- be a necessary defendant in a suit brought 
 child, 3 P. Wms. 33 ; Peake v. Ledger, to carry its trusts into effect. Ferguson 
 8 Hare, 313; Smith v. Bolden, 33 Beav. v. Ferguson, 1 Hayes & J. 300; Yates v. 
 262. It has been held that an adminis- Compton, 2 P. Wms. 308 ; Cramer v. 
 trator. suing in equity to recover assets of Morton, 2 Moll. 108; Thompson v. Gra- 
 the estate, may join the distributees as ham, 1 Paige, 384. 
 
 co-plaintiffs ; that such uniting of parties.
 
 254 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 or co-administrator a defendant. ^ When a residuary legatee 
 sues for his share of the residue, all the other residuary legatees 
 must be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. ^ And in a 
 suit for distribution, all the distributees must be brought in as 
 parties, primarily as plaintiffs, but at all events as defendants.^ 
 Where legacies are charged upon real estate, the executors alone 
 are not sufficient parties; but all the other legatees must be 
 brought in, so that the assets may be marshalled, and the re- 
 spective rights of all may be determined.* (5) Another impor- 
 tant exception to the rule requiring the union of beneficiaries 
 and trustees in suits' relating to the trust property is the case of 
 assignees in trust for creditors, and the assignees in bankruptcy 
 or insolvency. These particular trustees, as well as executors 
 and administrators, may always sue and defend alone in such 
 actions, without joining with themselves the creditors whom they 
 represent as cestuis que trustent.^ Nor need the assigning debtor, 
 bankrupt, or insolvent be made a party. ^ 
 
 § 176. * 262. General Principle Applicable to those Having 
 Future and Expectant Interests. Equity Doctrine. Illustrations. 
 The principle which requires all persons claiming interests in the 
 subject-matter concurrent with the plaintiff who instituted the 
 suit to be made parties, is applicable in general to those having 
 future and expectant interests, as well as to those whose inter- 
 ests are present, and whether they are in possession, remainder, 
 or reversion. It is the established doctrine of equity that when 
 a person claims an estate, either under a will or a deed by which 
 successive estates or interests have been created, all the other 
 persons claiming under the same will or deed, down to the one 
 who is entitled to the first vested estate of inheritance, must be 
 
 > Wilkins v. Fry, 1 Meriv. 244, 262 ; v. llallett, 2 Paige, 15; Rowland v. Fish, 
 
 Blonnt i\ Burrow, 3 Bro. C. C. 90; Dare 1 Paige, 20; Toild v. Sterrett, 6 J. J. 
 
 i: Allen, 1 Green, Ch. 288. Marsh. 432. QIu Youngson i-. Bond 
 
 2 1 Daniell's. p. 22.'> ; Harvey v. Harvey, (1902), 64 Neb. 615, 90 N. W. 556, it was 
 
 4 Beav. 215, 220; Smart f. Bradstotk, held that an administrator could not bring 
 
 7 Beav. 500 ; Bateman v. Margerisou, an action to quiet title, since his right to 
 
 6 Hare, 496, 499 ; Doody v. Iliggins, the real estate was ))ossess(>ry only.] 
 
 9 Hare, Ap. 32, 38; Gould v. Hayes, 19 ^ 1 Daniell's, p. 224; Spragg r. Binkes, 
 
 Ala. 438. .'-, Vf.s. 587. See also .Jewett v. Tucker. 
 
 " HiiwkinB V. Craig, 1 B. Mon. 27; 139 Ma.ss. 566 ; Smith v. Jones, 18 Neb. 
 
 Osborne i: Taylor. 12 Gratt. 117. But .see 481 ; Warren v. Howard, 99 N. C. 190. 
 
 Kcfler 1-. Keeler, 3 Stockn. 458 ; Moore f. « I)e (iolls r. Ward, 3 P. Wms. 311 
 
 Gleaton, 23 Ga. 142. (n.) ; Kayc r. Fosbrooke, 8 Sim. 28; Dy- 
 
 * Morse '■. Sadler, 1 Co.\, 352 ; Hallett son c. Hornby, 7 l)e G., M. & G. 1.
 
 PLAINTIFFS IN EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 255 
 
 joined in the .action as parties, either as co-plaintiffs or as de- 
 fendants. To illustrate by a simple example: If, by a deed, 
 land has been given to A. for years, with remainder to B. for 
 life, and remainder to C. in fee, and A. is in possession as the 
 tenant for years, B. cannot alone maintain an action against A. 
 to restrain tlie commission of waste; but C, the remainder-man 
 in fee, must also be brought in as a party, naturally as a co- 
 plaintiff, but if not, then as a defendant, so that he may be 
 before the court representing the ultimate ownership. All those 
 entitled to intermediate estates prior to the first vested inherit- 
 ance must also be joined, so that the entire ownership may be 
 brought before the court, and may be bound by its decree.^ 
 
 § 177. * 263. General Rule in Suits for Specific Performance. 
 Illustrations. In actions to compel the specific performance of 
 contracts, the immediate parties to the agreement are, as a 
 general rule, the only necessary parties to the suit; but this 
 Includes, of course, those who by substitution become clothed 
 with the rights or duties of the original contractors, as heirs, 
 devisees, or sometimes the personal representatives. ^ If a tract 
 of land is sold in separate parcels to different purchasers, the 
 latter cannot unite in an action for a specific performance against 
 the vendor, since each sale is distinct, and depends upon its own 
 circumstances. But if there is only one contract of sale to several 
 persons covering the land in question, although it may have 
 stipulated for different shares, the purchasers may unite ; it is 
 not necessary that the vendees should be jointly interested in the 
 purchase, in the legal import of that term, it is enough if they 
 have common or concurrent interests in the subject-matter. ^ If 
 the vendee in a land contract dies, his heirs are the parties to 
 
 1 1 Daniell's, pp. 227-330; Story Eq. 5 Eq. 17; Aberaman Iron Works c. Wick- 
 Pl. § 144; Finch v. Finch, 2 Ves. Sen. ens, L. II. 4 Ch. App. 101; Feuwick v. 
 492; Molineux I'. Powell, 3 P. Wms. 268 Bulman, L. R. 9 Eq. 165; Daking v. 
 (n.) ; Herring v. Yoe, 1 Atk. 290; Pyn- Whimper, 26 Beav. 568; Morgan y. Mor- 
 cent V. Pyucent, 3 Atk. 571; Sohier v. gan, 2 Wheat. 290; Lord v. Underdunck, 
 Williams, 1 Curtis, 479. 1 Saudf. Ch. 46 ; Hoover v. Donally. 
 
 2 1 Daniell's, p. 230 ; Tasker y. Small, 3 Hen. & Man. 316. See McCotter v. 
 
 3 My. & Cr. 63, 69 ; Wood v. White, Lawrence, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 392. 395, 
 
 4 My. & Cr. 460; Robertson v. Gr. West, and Maire v. Garrison, 83 N. Y. 14, 29. 
 Ry. Co., 10 Sim 314; Humphreys c. Hoi- \^¥or an interesting case concerning the 
 lis, Jac. 73 ; Patersoi^ v. Long, 5 Beav. 186 ; que.stiou of parties plaintiff in an actiou of 
 Peacock v. Peuson, 11 Beav. 355; Petre specific performance, see Daly v. Ruddell 
 V. Duucomhc, 7 Hare, 24; De Hoghton v. (1902), 137 Cal. 671, 20 Pac. 784.3 
 Money, L. 11. 2 Ch. App. 164, 170; Bishop " Owen v. Frink, 24 CaL 171, 177. 
 
 of Winchester v. Mid. Hants Ry. Co., L. R.
 
 256 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 bring an action for a specific performance; but his. administrator, 
 when the suit is simply to recover damages.^ It follows, from 
 the general rule given above, that a mere stranger claiming an 
 interest or estate under an adverse title is neither a necessary nor 
 a proper party to the suit for a specific performance ; his rights 
 cannot be affected by the decree made therein, and must, in fact, 
 be determined in another and distinct proceeding. ^ But a person 
 claiming under a prior agreement is not such a mere stranger, 
 and he is a proper party in an action brought by the vendee to 
 compel a specific performance, and to determine the right to the 
 purchase-money.^ Another person than the vendor may also be 
 so interested in the subject-matter of the contract, that his pres- 
 ence or aid will be needed in order to make out a complete title ; 
 and, when this is the case, such person may also be joined as a 
 party to the suit for a specific performance, although not an 
 actual party to the contract sought to be enforced.* Also, when 
 a third person has, after the making of the contract, acquired some 
 interest in the subject-matter under the vendor, but with notice 
 of the vendee's rights, he may be brought in as a co-defendant 
 ■with the vendor in the suit for a specific performance.^ 
 
 § 178. * 264. Co-PIaintiffs in Suits to enforce the Trusts of a 
 "Will. It was a well-established doctrine of equitable procedure, 
 that, in suits to carry into effect and enforce the trusts of a will, 
 the heirs-at-law must be made parties. This rule has, however, 
 been greatly modified, if not actually abrogated, in England by 
 recent statutory legislation; and in the United States it is not 
 often invoked because such suits are comparatively infrequent.^ 
 
 1 Webster v. Tibbitts. 19 Wis. 438; Lawrence, 6 N. Y. Sap. Ct. 392, 395; 
 
 Peters v. Jones, 35 Iowa, 512, 518. See Story Eq. PI. § 209. 
 
 Gardner v. Kelso, 80 Ala. 497 ; Hill v. ^ Spence v. Hogg, 1 Coll. 225 ; CoUett 
 
 Smith, 32 N. J. Eq. 473. The adminis- v. Hover, 1 Coll. 227 ; Cutts v. Thodey, 13 
 
 trator is not a proper plaintiff in a suit Sim. 206 ; Leuty v. Hilla.s, 2 De G. & .1. 
 
 for .specific performance when the pur- HO. See Carter v. Mills, 30 Mo. 432. 
 
 cha,se-money has been wholly paid: McKay This rule, given in the text, must be 
 
 f. Broad, 70 Ala. 377. applied under a great variety of external 
 
 - Ta.sker v. Small, 3 My. & Cr. 63, 69 ; circumstances, and is exceedingly com- 
 
 De Hoghtoa v. Money, L. R. 2 Ch. App. prehensive in its operation. 
 164, 170. 8 See, on the subject of the heirs being 
 
 * West Midland Ry. Co. i;. Nixon, 1 parties, and of the statutory changes in 
 Hem. & M. 176; Chadwick v. Maden, England,! Daniell's, pp. 231, 232 ; Story 
 <> Hare. 188. Eq. PI. § 163. As to actions for the con- 
 
 ♦ Wood V. White, 4 M. & C. 460, 483; struction of wills, see Chipman v. Mont- 
 Chadwick v. Maden, 9 Hare, 18S; Cope gomery, 63 N. Y. 221, and 1 Pomeroy's 
 V. Parry, 2 Jac. & W. 538; McCotter v. Equity, § 352, n. (1).
 
 PLAINTIFFS IN EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 257 
 
 Where, on the other hand, an action is brought to set aside a 
 will, then all the devisees are necessary parties, and the executor, 
 unless he has renounced ; ' and all the legatees residuary and 
 other. 2 
 
 § 179. * 265. Principle Underlying Special Rules. Connecting 
 Link. General Principle. The broad principle which underlies 
 most of the foregoing special rules is, that when an action is 
 instituted by some determinate individual for his own benefit, 
 whom we call the plaintiff, all persons having interests or claims 
 against the defendant, in relation to the subject-matter, concur- 
 rent with his, must be brought in as parties ; if they do not wish 
 to unite as co-plaintiffs, they must be added as defendants. The 
 connecting link is the concurrence of the interests. If this element 
 is wanting, the principle itself is not operative.^ It follows, 
 therefore, as a general principle, — the converse of that already 
 discussed, — that when a suit is instituted by some determinate 
 individual, whom we call the plaintiff', and there are other per- 
 sons asserting claims against the defendant, even in respect to 
 the same subject-matter, but such claims are set up under titles 
 antagonistic to, or inconsistent with, that of the plaintiff, these 
 persons should not be made parties to the action either as plain- 
 tiffs or as defendants, since the indispensable element of concur- 
 rence in their interests is wanting, so that if they were joined as 
 parties, two distinct controversies at least would be carried on in 
 the single litigation.* Among the examples of such improper 
 
 1 Vancleave v. Beam, 2 Dana, 155; joined in an action to rescind the sale. 
 
 Hunt V. Acre. 28 Ala. 580; Vanderpoel The court said: "The complaint shows 
 
 w. Van Valkenburgh, 6 N. Y. 190. that, although these plaintiffs severally 
 
 '■2 McMaken v. McMaken. 18 Ala. 576. owned their quota of shares, they never- 
 
 ' Qln an action to enjoin the threatened theless acted in concert respecting them 
 
 breach of a contract, there is a misjoinder and the interests represented by them, 
 
 of parties plaintiff when between some of and were by the same fraud of the de- 
 
 the plaintiffs and the defendant there is fendaut induced to act in concert in selling 
 
 no privity of contract and hence no in- their stock to him. The defendant baited 
 
 terest, on the part of such plaintiffs, in and set one trap for both and caught both 
 
 the outcome of the litigation : Atlantic, in it. The wrong of the defendant de- 
 
 -etc. R. R. Co. V. Southern Pine Co. (1902), stroyed their unity of action as owners of 
 
 116 Ga. 224, 42 S. E. 500. the stock, and it is agreeable to equity 
 
 In Bradley V. Bradley (1900), 165 N.Y. that the plaintiffs should be extricated 
 
 183, 58 N. Vj. 887, the two plaintiffs, by together, and under the facts tliey allege 
 
 reason of false representations respecting be permitted to act together in rescinding 
 
 the value and condition of the property of the sale and in reinstating themselves iu 
 
 a corporation in which they were stock- their former position. "J 
 holders, sold their shares of .stock at a * See 1 Daniell's, pp. 229, 230-233. 
 
 price much below its actual value. They 
 
 17
 
 258 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 union of persons whose interests are antagonistic is the case of an 
 action to redeem brought by an heir-at-law and a devisee under 
 a will ; the joinder is improper, since one or the other of these 
 parties has, of course, no right to redeem in the case supposed. ^ 
 And a person liable to account to the other plaintiffs cannot be 
 joined as a co-plaintiff.''^ This objection, based upon the incon- 
 sistency of rights and interests, does not appl}', however, to 
 causes in which a single plaintiff unites in himself two or more 
 conflictinor claims or interests.^ 
 
 ^ 180. * 2G0. Distinct Claims not necessarily Inconsistent. 
 Conflicting Decisions. Because claims, titles, and interests are 
 distinct, and, in a certain sense, independent of each other, they 
 are not therefore necessarily antagonistic or inconsistent; and 
 persons having such distinct claims and interests, which are not 
 antagonistic or inconsistent, may often be united in an action of 
 which the object is their common benefit.'* In applying this 
 principle, there is some diversity of opinion, and even conflict 
 among the decided cases. In certain classes of actions the doc- 
 trine is well settled, and the joinder of such persons is a matter 
 of common practice. In other classes of suits the courts have 
 not been so unanimous; sometimes they have yielded to the 
 general tendency of equity, which seeks to determine all disputes 
 concerning the same subject-matter in one litigation, and have 
 
 1 Lord Cholmondeley r. Lord Clinton, certain property. Thomas purchased the 
 
 2 Jac. & W. 1, 135, 4 Bligh, 1, s. c. T. property and jrave Troxel his note for 
 
 & R. 107, 11.5; Fiilham v. McCarthy, 1 §400, payable when Troxel should pay off 
 
 H. L. Cases, 703 ; Saumarez v. Saumarez, the •?400 due Freeze. Freeze foreclosed 
 
 4 M. & C. 336 ; Robertson v. Southgate, and took judgment against Miller and 
 
 6 Hare, 536 ; Bill i'. Cureton, 2 M. & K. Troxel for $560. Thomas, to protect his 
 
 503 ; Jopp V. Wood, 2 I)e G., J. & S. 323 ; interest in the property, purchased the 
 
 Griggs V. Staplee, 2 I)e G. & S. 572 ; New- judjrment. Miller was thus liable to 
 
 comb I'. Horton, 18 Wis. 566; Gates v. Thomas on the judgment, and hence 
 
 Boomer, 17 Wis. 455; Crocker i;. Craig, was interested in having the amount of 
 
 46 Me. 327 ; Fletcher v. Holmes, 40 Me. Thomas's note to Troxel applied on the 
 
 364. judL'ment ; and Thomas, having himself 
 
 ■^ .Jacob r. Lucas, 1 Beav. 436, 443 ; paid the judgment which Troxel was 
 
 Griffith r. Vanheythuysen. 9 Hare, 85. liable for. was interested to have the 
 
 ' Miles r. Durnford, 2 De G., M. & G. amount of his note to Troxel applied on 
 
 641; Carter ;;. Sanders, 2 Drew, 248; the judgment and the note cancelled. 
 
 Foulkc* V. Davies. L R. 7 Eq, 42. /fold, that Miller and Thomas had suflB- 
 
 * QTroxel i: Thomjis (1900). 155 Ind. cient common interest to join in a suit to 
 
 519, 58 X. F 725: Miller and Troxel have the amount of the note held by 
 
 made a note to Freeze for S»00, which Troxel applied on the judgment and the 
 
 Troxel for a consideration agreed to pay, note cancelled.] 
 said note being secured by mortgage on
 
 PLAINTIFFS IN EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 259 
 
 therefore permitted the union; at other times they have been 
 controlled by the fact that there was no real legal community of 
 interest among the parties, and have refused to allow the at- 
 tempted joinder. As it will be impossible to deduce any general 
 rule covering all such instances, I shall first mention and illus- 
 trate those classes of causes in which the doctrine has been 
 established, and shall in the second place collect some examples 
 of other classes in which there is no such unanimity of judicial 
 decision. The most familiar and important case of persons 
 having distinct but not conflicting interests, and in respect of 
 whom the rule concerning their joinder as parties is well settled, 
 is that of creditors. There are several species of actions brought 
 by creditors, in which the various creditors of a single debtor 
 may all unite as co-plaintiffs. Thus, the creditors of a deceased 
 debtor m.ay all join in the same administration suit brought to 
 settle his estate, and to administer its assets ; but this species of 
 action is quite uncommon in the United States.^ Such union, 
 however, is not necessary; one may sue alone if he choose ;2 and 
 when the number is great, one may sue on behalf of all the 
 others. ^ 
 
 § 181. * 267. Case of Creditors' Suits. The most common and 
 important action by creditors, to which the rule may be applied, 
 is the creditor's suit, or an action in the nature of a creditor's 
 suit.^ A single judgment creditor may alone maintain an action 
 to enforce the payment of his judgment, to reach equitable assets, 
 to set aside fraudulent transfers by his debtor and thus let in the 
 lien of his judgment, and for other similar relief; and the other 
 
 1 1 Dauiell's, p. 235; Cosby t-. Wick- v. Dickinson (1898), 100 Wis. 574, 76 
 
 liffe, 7 B. Mon. 120; Conro v. Port Henry N. W. 766.] 
 
 Iron Co., 12 Barb. 27; Cheshire Iron * [^Doherty v. Holliday (1893), 137 
 
 Works r. Gay, 3 Gray, 531, 534, 535. Ind. 282, 32 N. E. 315: While it is a 
 
 - Anon., 3 Atk. 572 ; Peacock v. Monk, general rule that if a complaint assumes 
 
 1 Ves. 127, 131. See Hills v. Sherwood, to state a cause of action in favor of two 
 
 48 Cal. 386, 392. or more parties, and states a cau.se of 
 
 ^ [^Gianella v. Bigelow (1897), 96 Wis. action in favor of a part only of the par- 
 
 185, 71 N. W. Ill : In an action by credi- ties thus joined, it is bad on demurrer, 
 
 tors to enforce the liability of stockholders, this rule does not apply to a comjJaiut in 
 
 which must be a proceeding in equity, all the nature of a creditors' bill where tliere 
 
 the creditors should join or one or more is a statement of the respective claims 
 
 should sue for the benefit of all, such lia- of creditors showing that each claim is 
 
 bilitv being, under the statute, a liability several and distinct and there is no at- 
 
 of all the stockholders to all the creditors, tempt to state a joint cause of action in 
 
 See to same effect. Van Pelt v. Gardner favor of those who are named iu the 
 
 (1898), 54 Neb. 701, 75 N. W. 874 ; Smith title.]
 
 260 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 judgment creditors need not necessarily be joined, either as co- 
 plaintiffs or as defendants,^ On the other hand, two or more 
 of the judgment creditors, or all of them together, may unite in 
 bringing such an action,^ or finally, one may sue on behalf of 
 himself, and all others who are in the same position. ^ Since all 
 the creditors have the same kind of interest in the common fund, 
 the assets of the debtor, and since a receiver is frequently ap- 
 pointed over that fund, the utmost latitude is permitted in 
 respect to the union of different creditors as co-plaintiffs. One 
 may maintain the action alone, or may sue on behalf of himself 
 and of all the others similarly situated, or all may join, or any 
 number less than all may at their election institute the action. 
 Such an action may also be brought by a receiver of the debtor's 
 property, appointed in proceedings supplementary to execution, 
 and he may either sue alone, or the judgment creditors, or some 
 of them, may join with him.'* 
 
 § 182. * 268. All Beneficiaries under a Trust should join in a 
 Suit to enforce it. Different Rule in Suits to overthrow a Trust. 
 Where an assignment has been made in trust for creditors, one 
 of the creditor beneficiaries cannot maintain an action to enforce 
 
 1 White's Bank of Buffalo i'. Farthing, citation of authorities. When the debtor 
 101 N. Y. 344, 348. i.s dead, a judgment creditor may bring 
 
 2 Gorrell v. Gates, 79 Iowa, 632 ; an action to set aside a fraudulent traus- 
 [^Ganiet i-. Simmons (1897), 103 la. 163, fer made by him. Hills v. Sherwood, 
 72 N. W. 444 : Several judgment credi- 48 Cal. 386, 392. An attaching creditor 
 tors may join in an action to set aside a merely cannot maintain the action. Weil 
 fraudulent conveyance. Ferst's Sons v. r. Lankins, 3 Nel). 384, 386 ; but see, for 
 Powers (1902), 64 S. 0. 221, 41 S. E. 974 : numerous conflicting decisions on this last 
 Two or more creditors may join in an ac- point, 3 Pom. Kq .lur. § 1415. 
 
 tion to set aside a sale of a stock of goods * See cases cited in last preceding 
 
 as a fraud upon creditors note; also Hamlin v. Wright, 23 Wis. 
 
 Ellis V. Pullman (1894), 95 Ga. 445, 22 491 ; Gates v. Boomer, 17 Wis. 455, 458; 
 
 S. E. 568: The creditors of a mercantile Uuffing r. Tilton, 12 Ind. 259; Burton v. 
 
 corporation may unite in an equitable peti- Anderson, Stanton's (Ky.) code, p. 34; 
 
 tion against the corporators wIkj have Baker v. Bartol, 6 Cal. 483. For further 
 
 misap[)r<)priated the assets.] illustrations see Ilann v. Van Voorhis, 5 
 
 « Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y. 587, 588, Ilun, 425; Stewart v. Beale, 7 id. 405; 
 
 589 ; Clarkson i;. I)e Peyster, 3 Paige, Dewey v. Moyer, 9 id. 473 ; Fox v. Moyer, 
 
 320; Parmelee v. Egan, 7 Paige, 610; 54N. Y. 125; Fort Stanwix Bank ^'. Lcg- 
 
 Grosvenor v. Allen, 9 Paige, 74; Farn- gett, 51 id. 552; Haines v. HoUistcr, 64 
 
 ham V. Camyjbcll, 10 I'aige, 598 ; Way v. id. 1 ; Pierce v. Milwaukee Constr. Co., 38 
 
 Bra-raw, 1 C. E. Green, 213, 216; Egdell Wis. 2.53 ; Hardy v. Mitcliell, 67 Ind. 485 ; 
 
 r. Haywood, 5 Atk. 357 See, especially, Smith >•. Schulting, 14 Hun, .')2; Green r. 
 
 Conro c. Port Flenry Iron Co., 12 Barb. Walkill Nat. Bank, 7 id. 63; Enright -■. 
 
 27, 57-60, per Willard .1., for a full di.scus- Grant, 5 Utah, 334, 400. 
 sion of the subject, and an exhaustive
 
 PLAINTIFFS LNf EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 261 
 
 the trust, to compel an accounting by the assignee, and to pro- 
 cure a settlement and distribution of the trust estate. All the 
 creditors must unite in bringing such an action, either actually 
 or by representation; for where the number of such creditors is 
 great, one or more have been permitted to sue on behalf of them- 
 selves and all the others. ^ The rule thus stated in respect of 
 creditors is simply a special case of the general doctrine appli- 
 cable to every species of trust. In actions based upon the trust, 
 recognizing its existence and validity, and seeking to carry out 
 its terms and provisions, all the persons interested must be 
 parties; all the beneficiaries must therefore unite in an action 
 against the trustee brought to obtain an accounting, and a wind- 
 ing up and settlement of the estate, or, in technical phraseology, 
 an action brought to administer the trust. ^ While the bene- 
 ficiaries as a class must all unite, either actually or through a 
 representative plaintiff, in actions based upon the trust as exist- 
 ing, and brought to administer it, one person who would be a 
 beneficiary may, without joining any others, maintain a suit 
 which is based upon a denial of the trust and seeks to overthrow 
 it, and to set aside the instruments which created it, and the acts 
 of the trustee done under it. Thus, for example, any judgment 
 creditor may bring an action in his own name to set aside an 
 assignment in trust for himself and the other creditors.^ 
 
 ' Story Eq. PI. §§ 150, 207; Bainbridge v. Garrard, 25 Ga. 557 ; High v. Worley, 
 
 V. Burton, 2 Beav. 539. In Harrison v. 32 Ala. 709 ; Gould r. Hayes, 19 Ala. 438; 
 
 Stewardson, 2 Hare, 530, twenty creditors Keeler v. Keeler, 3 Stockt. 458 ; Case v. 
 
 was held to be too small a number to Carroll, 35 N. Y. 385 ; Sortore v. Scott, 
 
 allow a suit by representation. After a 6 Lans. 271, 275; Munch v. Cockerell, 
 
 receiver of a national bank has been 8 Sim. 219, 231. See French v. Gifford, 
 
 appointed, a creditor may maintain an 30 Iowa, 148, 158, 159; O'Connor v. 
 
 action to establish liis demand, and the Irvine, 74 Cal. 435 ; Barrett v. Brown, 
 
 bank and the receiver may both be joined 86 N. E. 556. 
 
 as co-defendants ; the appointment of the ^ In Hubbell v. Medbury, 53 N. Y. 98, 
 
 receiver does not absolutely dissolve the where an assignment had been made for 
 
 corporation. Green u. Walkill Nat. Bank, the benefit of creditors, a cestui que trust 
 
 7 Hun, 63 ; Nat. Pahquioque Bk. c. First under it and the assignor brought an ac- 
 
 Nat. Bk. of Bethel, 36 Conn. 325, 14 Wall, tion to set aside a wrongful purchase of 
 
 283; Kennedy ?'. Gibson, 8 Wall. 506; Tur- the trust property by the assignee; the 
 
 ner y. Bank of Keokuk. 26 Iowa, 262. In action was sustained, and it was held that 
 
 Wilhelm c. Byles, 60 Mich. 561, however, a .substituted trustee as the plaintiff was 
 
 it was held tliat all the creditors are not unnecessary. When a trustee is guilty of 
 
 necessary parties to a bill brought by a misconduct in his tru.st, by misapplying 
 
 creditor to enforce the trust. the assets, or converting the same to his 
 
 '•2 De la Vergne v. Evertsoti, 1 Paige, own use, a single cestui que trust is per- 
 
 181; Greene v. Sisson, 2 Curtis, 171; milted by a special statute, in Minnesota. 
 
 Hawkins ;v Craig, 1 B. Mon. 27 ; Flam to maintain an action for an account, and
 
 262 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 183. * 269. Joinder of Persons Owning Distinct Parcels of 
 Land. From the cases of creditors and cestuis que ti'ustciU, in 
 respect of whom the rule is well settled, I now pass to other 
 classes of persons having distinct, though not conflicting, inter- 
 ests and claims, and I collect a number of decisions which show 
 the tendency of the courts in dealing with them. Owners of 
 entirely distinct and separate parcels of land, although no com- 
 munity of right or interest existed among them, have been per- 
 mitted to unite in equitable actions based upon their individual 
 separate property, simply because the wrong to be remedied or 
 prevented was a single act, and affected all of them and all of 
 their lands in the same manner. ^ Thus, owners of separate 
 tenements have been allowed to join in an action brought to 
 restrain and remove a nuisance which was common to all.^ Two 
 or more owners of separate lots assessed for a local street im- 
 provement, when the assessment is claimed for the same reason 
 to be invalid as to all, may unite in an action to restrain tiie 
 
 to enforce the trust, and to remove tlie 
 trustee. This statute is general in its 
 terms, and applies to all trustees and 
 trusts. " Upon petition or bill of any 
 person interested in the execution of an 
 express trust, the Court of Chancery may 
 remove any trustee who shall have vio- 
 lated, or threatened to violate, his tru'^t." 
 Compiled Stat, of Minn., p. 38-t, § 26; 
 Goncelier v. Foret, 4 Minn. 13. See 
 French t: Gifford, 30 Iowa, 148, 1.58, 1.59. 
 In the case of a charitable trust, any 
 beneficiary having an interest in the use 
 or in the subject of the gift, has an un- 
 questionable right to institute a proceed- 
 ing in equity for the purpose of securing 
 a faithful execution of the beneficent ob- 
 ject of the founder of the charity. Bapt. 
 Church at Lancaster v. I'resb. Church, 
 18 B. Mon. 635, 641. 
 
 ^ QDilTerent riparian owners of distinct 
 parcels of riparian land, who have a com- 
 mon grievance for an injury of the same 
 kind, inflicted at the .same time and by the 
 same act.s, though the injury differs in 
 (iegree as to each owner, may unite in a 
 common action to enjoin a higlier riparian 
 owner from diverting or ywlluting the 
 stream: Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co. (1900), 
 164 N. Y. .303, 58 N. E. 142. See, to the 
 Bame effect, Beach i\ Spokane Ranch Co. 
 
 (1901), 25 Mont. 379, 65 Pac. Ill ; Brown 
 I'. Canal and Reservoir Co. (1899), 26 
 Colo. 66, 56 Pac. 183 ; Ronnow v. Delmue 
 (1895), 23 Nev. 29, 41 Pac. 1074.] 
 
 ■^ Peck V. Elder, 3 Sandf. 126. But 
 six owners of distinct tracts of laud 
 through which a stream ran were not 
 permitted to join in an action to restrain 
 another riparian owner from diverting 
 the water. Schultz v. Winter, 7 Nev. 130. 
 See, per contra, Foot v. Bronson, 4 Lans. 
 47, 52, in wliich such a union of different 
 owners wjis held proper; citing Reid r. 
 Gifford, Hopk. 416; Murray v. Hay, I 
 Barb. Ch. 59 ; Brady v. Weeks, 3 Barb. 
 157 ; and see Keyes v. Little York Gold, 
 &c. Co., 53 Cal. 724; Churchill r. Lauer, 
 84 Cal. 233. Such suit may be main- 
 tained by separate owners of distinct 
 parcels of land to restrain or remove a 
 nuisance. Pettebone v. Hamilton, 40 Wis. 
 402 ; Williams i\ Smith, 22 id. 594; Barnes 
 V. Racine, 4 id. 454 ; First Nat. Bk. of 
 Mt. Vernon v. Sarlls, 129 Ind. 201. Such 
 separate owners cannot, however, join iu 
 an action to recover damages for the nui- 
 sance : ante, § *219, and note. See also 
 Lutes V. Britrgs, 5 Hun, 67 (illegal assess- 
 ments). For a more full discussion of this 
 subject, see 1 Pomeroy's Ei|uity, §§ 245, 
 257, 258, 259, 260, 273, and c:iscs cited.
 
 PLAINTIFFS IX EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 263 
 
 collection; and when the number of such owners is great, one 
 may sue as a representative for all the others.^ Also a number 
 of proprietors of adjacent and separate lots fronting on a street 
 through which a railroad was laid out, were permitted to join in 
 a suit for the purpose of preventing the company from construct- 
 ing its track in such a manner as to interfere with access to all 
 of their several lots alike. ^ The question as to the joinder of 
 plaintiffs who own distinct parcels of land, or who are clothed 
 with distinct primary rights of the same kind, which are all 
 interfered with and affected in the same manner by a common 
 wrong, has frequently arisen in actions brought by taxpayers and 
 freeholders to prevent or set aside some proceeding done under 
 the forms of public authority, and which is designed to create 
 and impose a public burden, such as a tax for special objects, an 
 assessment for some local improvement, a municipal bonding in 
 aid of some quasi public enterprise, and numerous other like 
 proceedings which create a public or municipal debt. Such 
 actions are permitted, and are freely used in most of the States, 
 although not allowed in New York and a few others. Where 
 suits of this character are sustained by the courts, the question 
 has arisen, whether two or more taxpayers having distinct free- 
 holds, or distinct pieces of property subject to the burden, and 
 who have no connection except in the common wrong and in the 
 like relief demanded by all, may unite in the action, or whether 
 one may sue on behalf of all, or finally, whether each must bring 
 a separate suit to free his own property from the wrongful incum- 
 brance.^ It would seem, upon the principle of the decision last 
 
 1 Upingtoa v. Oviatt, 24 Ohio St. 232, owners of separate parcels of land were not 
 
 247 ; Glenn v. Waddell, 23 Ohio St. 605. allowed to join in a suit to quiet title.] 
 
 - Tate V. Ohio & Miss. R. Co., 10 Ind. 3 [^Street v. Town of Alden (1895), 62 
 174. [[Abutting land or lot owners may Minn. 160, 64 N. W. 157 : An action to set 
 unite as ])laintiffs to restrain the improper aside a judgment fraudulently obtained, 
 use of a street by a railroad company, and reversing an order of the town supervisors 
 to abate the nuisance, but cannot join in a vacating a road running through plain- 
 suit to recover damages : Youukin v. Mil- tiff's farm, is properly brought by plaintiff 
 waukee, etc. Co. (1901), 112 Wis. 15, 87 who is one of the legal voters who 
 N. W. 861. The same doctrine was stated petitioned for such vacating. See also 
 in Linden Land Co. v. Milwaukee Elec- McCaun v. City of Louisville (1901), — 
 trie, etc. Co. (1900), 107 Wis. 493, 83 Ky. — , 63 S. W. 446; Commonwealth 
 N. W. 851, where it was held, further, that v. Scott (1901), — Ky. — , 65 S. W. 596 ; 
 one could not sue for all, and an allega- Stiles v. City of Guthrie (1895), 3 OkLi. 
 tion in the complaint that plaintiff does 26, 41 Pac. 383. And see, generally, the 
 so is mere surplusage. In Utterback v. subject of one plaintiff suing on behalf of 
 Meeker (1896), 16 Wash. 185, 47 Pac. 423, others, *388 et ser/.]
 
 264 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 quoted, that such a joinder was not only proper, but was in every- 
 way expedient ; but the cases have not been unanimous upon the 
 point, and some of them have distinctly pronounced against a 
 joint proceeding. In Wisconsin, where a number of freeholders, 
 owning distinct lots of land, and having no connection except 
 that they were all residents of the municipality, and whose per- 
 sonal property had been levied upon for the tax, and advertised 
 for sale, united in an action to set aside the entire proceedings 
 of the local authorities, and to procure the tax and all steps taken 
 in relation to it to be declared void, and to restrain the sale of 
 their property, it was held that these plaintiffs could not join in 
 a suit merely to prevent the sale of their property because their 
 interests were entirely several ; but that they could unite in an 
 action to avoid and set aside the proceedings of the municipal 
 authorities, and that the court, having thus acquired jurisdiction,. 
 could go on and administer complete relief.^ In another case, 
 two plaintiffs owning distinct lots in severalty, and suing on 
 behalf of all other taxpayers of the city, brought an action to set 
 aside a local assessment and tax made and levied by the city 
 authorities, and to restrain the sale of their lots. It was held 
 that they could not maintain the joint action. The court said» 
 if the tax was illegal there was an apparent cloud upon each lot, 
 and each plaintiff was interested only in removing this cloud 
 from his own land; each and all might be interested in the legal 
 question involved in the suit; for if one had a right to remove 
 the cloud and to enjoin the assessment as illegal, for the same 
 reasons and upon the same evidence, each of the others might 
 obtain relief: but there was no such common pecuniar}' interest 
 as authorized them to unite in one suit and obtain the relief 
 demanded ; each could sue alone, and the others were not neces- 
 sary parties; this was not an action respecting a common fund, 
 nor to assert a common right, nor to restrain acts injurious to 
 property in which all the plaintiffs had a common interest.^ In 
 Ohio, two or more owners of separate lots assessed for a local 
 improvement may unite in an action to restrain the enforcement 
 
 ' Peck I'. Beloit Sch. Dist. No. 4, 21 couclusions wliich they reach. See also 
 
 Wifl. 516. N>wtomb v. Horton, 18 Wis. 566, which 
 
 ^ Harnes r. Beloit, 19 Wis. 93. 94, per maintains the same doctrine as Barnes v. 
 
 Downer J. It is impossilile to reconcile Beloit. 
 the reasoning in tliese two cases, or the
 
 PLAINTIFFS IN EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 265 
 
 and collection, when the tax is claimed for the same reason to be 
 invalid as to all.^ In Kansas a distinction is made depending- 
 upon the nature of the tax itself. If the tax is wholly illegal, 
 that is, illegal as applied to all persons and property, — as, for 
 example, a tax to pay the interest on illegal bonds, — any number 
 of taxpayers may unite in the action. ^ If, however, the tax is 
 valid as a tax, — as, for example, the ordinary county or State 
 tax, — and becomes illegal for some cause only as it applies to 
 certain persons or property, then each person severally interested 
 as the owner of distinct and separate lots of land must sue alone ^ 
 there can be no joinder by taxpayers who have no common prop- 
 erty.^ In Iowa it has been recently held that taxpayers owning 
 separate property cannot unite, nor can one sue on behalf of all 
 others similarly situated, in an action to restrain the enforcement 
 and collection of an illegal tax, but each must bring an action for 
 himself.* 
 
 § 184. * 270. Miscellaneous Cases. Joinder of Holders of 
 Separate Liens, Creditors of Corporations. A few other miscel- 
 laneous cases of distinct interests may be mentioned. When 
 several persons have simultaneous but entirely separate me- 
 chanic's liens upon the premises of the same person for work 
 done and materials furnished by them, they cannot all, nor can 
 any two or more of them, unite in an action brought to enforce 
 and foreclose such liens under the statute.^ Under the con- 
 struction given to statutes of Ohio, making the shareholders in 
 corporations liable in certain contingencies to the creditors of the 
 companies, it is held that a suit should be brought by or for all 
 the creditors who come within the conditions; that is, all these 
 
 1 Upiugton V. Oviatt, 24 Ohio St. 232, ^ Harsh v. Morgan, 1 Kan. 293, 298. 
 247 ; Glen v. VVaddell, 23 Ohio St. 60.5. The following are further illustrations of 
 
 2 Wyandotte, etc. Bridge Co. i\ Wyaii- the same general doctrine : actions by a 
 dotte, 10 Kan. 326 ; Gilmore y. Norton, 10 stockholder or the stockliolders against 
 Kan. 491 ; Gilinore v. Fox, 10 Kan. hOd. the corporation or its managing officers ; 
 
 •* Hudson V. Atchison Cy. Com'rs, 12 Osgood r. Maguire, 61 N. Y. 524; Youug 
 
 Kan. 140, 146, 147. v. Drake, 8 Huu, 61 ; Dousman v. Wis., etc. 
 
 * Fleming v. Mershon, 36 Iowa, 413, Miu. Co., 40 Wi.s. 418; Rogers r. Lafay- 
 
 416-420. The question was carefully ex- ette Agric. Works, 52 Ind. 296, and numer- 
 
 amined with a reference to numerous de- ous cases cited ; Tippecanoe Cy. Com'rs 
 
 cisions of equity courts. Cole .1. dissented r. Lafayette, etc. Tl. K., 50 Ind. 85 ; action 
 
 in a very able opinion containing a review to remove a cloud, Pier v. Fond du Lac, 
 
 of all the authorities, pp 421-427. For 38 Wis. 470 ; action by one firm against 
 
 an extended discussion of tin's subject, another firm where there is a coinmoni 
 
 see 1 Pom. Kq. Jur. §§ 259, 260, 265, 266, partner, Ford v. Stuart Indep. Sch. Dist., 
 
 270, and notes. 4u Iowa. 294.
 
 266 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 creditors should actually be made plaintiffs, or the action should 
 be in the name of one for the benefit of all.^ 
 
 SECTION SIXTH. 
 
 WHO MAT BE JOINKD AS DEFENDANTS. 
 
 § 185. * 271. Statutory Provisions. The Sections of the various 
 State codes and practice acts which prescribe rules for the proper 
 selection of defendants are as follows ; one of them is found in 
 all the statutes, and expresses the doctrine in its general form : 
 *' Any person may be made a defendant who has or claims an 
 interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or who is a 
 necessary party to a complete determination, or settlement of the 
 questions involved therein." ^ To this general declaration there 
 is added in a few States the following particular clause : " And 
 in an action to recover the possession of real estate, the landlord 
 and tenant thereof may be joined as defendants, and any person 
 claiming title or a right of possession to real estate may be made a 
 party plaintiff or defendant, as the case may require, to any such 
 ■action." ^ The codes also all contain the following provisions, 
 either embraced in a single section or separated into two, namely : 
 " Of the parties to the action, those who are united in interest 
 must be joined as plaintiffs or defendants ; but if the consent of 
 any one who should have been joined as plaintiff cannot* be 
 obtained, he may be made a defendant, the reason thereof being 
 stated in the complaint.* When the question is one of common 
 or general interest of many persons, or when the parties are very 
 
 1 Umsted v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio St. 113. » New York, § 118 (447, 1503, 1598) ; 
 One creditor may sue on behalf of all to South Carolina, § 141 ; North Carolina, 
 enforce .stockholders' liability for unpaid § 61 ; California, § 379; QUtah, Kev. St., 
 8ub.scriptions in California : Baines v. Bab- 1898, §2914; North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 
 cock (Cal., Sept. 2.J, 1891), 27 Pac. 674. 1899, § 5230; South Dakota, Ann. St., 
 
 2 (Jhio. § 35; Kansas, § 36; Iowa, 1901, § 6078; Montana, § 581; Idaho, 
 § 2547; Nebraska, § 41; Nevada, § 13; Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §3167; Missouri, 
 iJregon, § 380; hut applied only to e(iuita- Rev. St. 1899, § 543.J 
 
 bleactioiiH; ^Oklahoma, St. 1893, § 3908; ■• Q" If such a defendant answers and 
 
 Wa-shington, Bal. Code, § 4833, in some- admits the aliej^ations of the complaint, 
 
 what different form ; Wyoinin;^, Rev. St., .ind asks the same relief as the jjhiintiff, 
 
 1899, §3480; Colorado, § 11; Arkansas*, he will be regarded as a plaintiff and given 
 
 Sand. & llilKs DIl'., § 5630; Connecticut, relief as such: Cole v. Getziuger (1897). 
 
 Gen. St., 1902, § 618 ; Wisconsin, St., 1898, 96 Wis. 559, 71 N. W. 75.] 
 § 2G03; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 269; 
 Kentucky, § :i3.]
 
 WHO MAY BE JOINED AS DEFENDANTS. 
 
 267 
 
 numerous, and it may be impracticable to bring them all before 
 the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the 
 ■whole." ^ Finally, a section is found in every code particularly 
 referring to the case of persons severally liable on the same in- 
 strument, of which the ordinary form is as follows : " Persons 
 severally liable upon the same obligation or instrument, includ- 
 ing the parties to bills of exchange and promissory notes, may 
 all or any of them be included in the same action at the option 
 of the plaintiff." ^ 
 
 § 186. * 272. Subject-Matter and Plan of Treatment herein. 
 The subject-matter of the present section is the interpretation of 
 the general clauses of the statute quoted above, — the doctrine of 
 parties defendant in its general scope and import, — the general 
 rules which prescribe the choice and direct the joinder of defend- 
 ants in civil actions of all kinds, whether legal or equitable. The 
 special cases described in the other clauses of the statute, — 
 namely, that of one person suing or being sued as the repre- 
 
 ^ These provisions are thus found as a 
 single section in New York, § 119 (448) ; 
 California, § 382 ; South Carulina, § 142 ; 
 North Carolina, § 62 ; Nevada, § 14 (see 
 page 81, supra, note 2) ; Oregon. § 381 ; 
 £Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2917; North 
 Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5232 ; South 
 Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6079; Arizona, 
 Rev. St., 1901, § 1313; Montana, § 584; 
 Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3170; Colo- 
 rado, § 12; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, 
 §270; Wisconsin, St., 1898, §2604.] In 
 the following States they are separated 
 into two sections, corresponding to the tv/o 
 paragraphs of the text : Ohio, §§ 36, 37 
 Kansas, §§ 37, 38 ; Iowa, §§ 2548, 2549 
 ^Nebraska, §§ 42, 43; Kentucky, §§ 24 
 25; Oklahoma, St., 1893, §§ 3909, 3910 
 Washington, Bal. Code, §§ 4833, 4834 
 Wyomiug, Rev. St., 1899, §§ 3481, 3482 
 Arkansas Sand. & Hills Dig., §§ 5631 
 5632; Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, §§ 617 
 619.] The Missouri code contains only 
 the first pjiragraph. Rev. St., 1899, § 544 
 
 2 New York, § 120 (454) ; Kansas, § 39 
 Nebraska, § 44 ; Ohio, § 38 ; Oregon, § 36 
 South Carolina, § 143; North Carolina 
 § 63 ; Nevada, § 15 ; [^Minnesota, St., 1894 
 § 5166, "and sureties on the same instru 
 meut;" Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2918 
 North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5223, 
 
 in somewhat different form ; South Da- 
 kota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6080, same form as 
 in North Dakota ; Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, 
 § 1306, in somewhat different form ; Okla- 
 homa, St., 1893, § 3911 ; Washington, Bal. 
 Code, § 4836 ; Montana, § 585 ; Idaho, 
 Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §3171; Wyoming, 
 Rev. St., 1899, § 3483 ; Colorado, § 13 ; In- 
 diana, Burns' St., 1901, § 271 ; Wisconsin, 
 St., 1898, § 2609.] In California, § 383, 
 i.s the same, adding, " and sureties on the 
 same or separate instruments," after the 
 words " promissory notes." For tlie corre- 
 sponding sections in the codes of Kentucky, 
 Iowa, and Missouri, see infi-a, § * 403. In 
 these codes the change in the common- 
 law doctrine is carried to a much greater 
 length ; tlie distinctions between joint, 
 joint and several, and several liabilities 
 are utterly abrogated. The same radi- 
 cal change is made in North Carolina. 
 " § 63 a. In all cases of joint contract of 
 co-partners in trade or others, suits may 
 be brought and prosecuted on the same 
 against all or any number of the persons 
 making such contract." Placing "copart- 
 ners " in the same position as " joint ten- 
 ants " and " tenants in common," is a very 
 strange provision, and was doubtless an 
 oversight.
 
 268 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 sentative of others, and that of persons severally liable upon the 
 same instrument — will be separately discussed in the two 
 sections which follow the present one. 
 
 § 187. * 286. Intent and Object of Legislation. Principle of Con- 
 struction. Conclusions Reached in Preceding Section Adopted and 
 Repeated here. Changes Made should apply to all Actions. Posi- 
 tion of Courts. What is the general intent and object of the 
 legislation in reference to parties defendant, taken as a whole ? 
 What principle of construction should be adopted in arriving at 
 the practical meaning and effect of the various provisions of the 
 State codes already quoted? These questions, which are cer- 
 tainly fundamental, were thoroughly discussed in the last section, 
 and a reiteration of the reasoning there presented would be en- 
 tirely useless. It cannot be doubted that the legislature proposed 
 to itself the same object, and was actuated by the same intent, 
 in the rules which it has prescribed for defendants as in those 
 which it has adopted for plaintiffs. I dwell upon the fact, which 
 is apparent upon the most cursory reading, that the clauses con- 
 cerning defendants are more full and detailed, and more clearly 
 set forth the equitable doctrines, than those concerning plaintiffs. 
 This fact is very obvious when we refer to the subsequent sec- 
 tions of the codes defining the forms of judgments, and authoriz- 
 ing a severance among the parties in rendering judgment, and 
 also when we refer to the special provisions in many codes which 
 utterly abolish the ancient legal distinctions between joint, joint 
 and several, and several liabilities. The conclusions reached in 
 the preceding section, and repeated here, are the following : The 
 legislature does not seem to have intended to abandon the ancient 
 doctrine in respect to joint and several rights ; and, in fact, the 
 complete adoption of the equitable principles which regulate 
 the union of parties would not require such a change, for in 
 equity, as well as in law, all persons having a joint right must 
 in general unite in a suit to enforce that right. The legislature, 
 on the other hand, does seem to have intended to effect a change 
 more or less thorough in the common-law rules which determine 
 the differences between joint, joint and several, and several lia- 
 bilities, and which regulate the selection and union of defendants 
 in the case of one or the other of these habilities. This intent, 
 suflficiently indicated in all the codes, is placed beyond a doubt 
 by the express provisions of others. The general conclusions
 
 GENERAL DOCTRINES AS TO DEFENDANTS. 26:) 
 
 of the discussion concerning plaintiffs, found in the last preced- 
 ing section, are equally true of parties defendant. Believing 
 them to be a correct interpretation of the codes, I adopt them 
 here without any unnecessary repetition of the reasoning by 
 which they were established.^ The rules which the legislatures 
 have put into a statutory form are confessedly the general doc- 
 trines of equity concerning defendants.^ They apply in terms 
 to the civil action appropriate for the pursuit of all remedies ; 
 no exceptions are made or suggested. The design of the legis- 
 lature is therefore plain, that these equitable doctrines and rules 
 should be controlling in all cases, and should not be confined 
 to actions which are equitable in their nature. It must be con- 
 fessed at once, however, that this conclusion has not been ac- 
 cepted by all the courts, nor in its full extent, perhaps, by any. 
 The general expressions of the codes, although their main design 
 is e^^ident enough, have not been regarded as sufficiently explicit, 
 detailed, and peremptory to abrogate and sweep away all of the 
 long-settled particular rules of the former system. In other 
 words, the change, as it has been wrought out by judicial de- 
 cision, has been made partial and incomplete, and has been far 
 more radical and perfect in certain of the States than in others. 
 It is impossible to lay down in an explicit manner any more defi- 
 nite principle of interpretation than that here given. The actual 
 position of the courts must be learned from their decision of par- 
 ticular cases, and from the special rules concerning defendants in 
 various classes of actions which have been established by them, 
 and which will be detailed in the following portions of this 
 section.^ 
 
 1 See supra, §§*196-*200. termine who is liable, and who is not, 
 
 2 Qn Demarest v. Holdeman (1901), except upon a full hearing in which all 
 157 Ind. 467, 62 N. E. 17, it was said that the persons in any way affected or inter- 
 the section of the code providing that any ested are before the court, equity permits 
 person may be made a defendant wlio has the joinder of all those so related to tiie 
 ■or claims an interest in the controversy controversy, and who have a common 
 adverse to the plaintiff, or who is a neces- interest in some one or more branches 
 sary party to a complete determination or of it. "J 
 
 settlement of the questions involved, is ^ The general theory of the codes, ami 
 
 substantially a re-enactment of the rules the principles of the new procedure in 
 
 governing pleadings in chancery, and they respect of parties defendant, are discussed 
 
 apply to all suits at law as well as in with more or less fulness in the following 
 
 equity. And "where the subject of the cases: Wilson v. Castro, 31 Cal. 420; 
 
 action has become so complicated and en- Bowers v. Keesecher, 9 Iowa, 422; Nelson 
 
 tangled that the rights of the parties are v. Hart, 8 Ind. 293 ; Braxton v. State, 25 
 
 involved in doubt, and it is difficult to de- Ind. 82 ; Tinkum i'. O'Neale, 5 Nev. 93;
 
 270 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 Particular Rules and Doctrines. 
 
 S 188. * 287. How take Advantage of Nonjoinder of Defendants. 
 "Waiver. Power of Cdurt herein. Before proceeding to the ex- 
 uniiiKition in detail of the particular rules and doctrines as to 
 defendants, which have been established by judicial decision, 1 
 sluill inquire how the questions may be raised in the progress of 
 an action; when the objection of a misjoinder or a nonjoinder is 
 waived; and what is the effect of such an error in the proceed- 
 ings, if properly brought before the court for adjudication. I 
 have already quoted and discussed the statutory provisions which 
 prescribe the modes of raising the questions in reference to 
 plaintiffs ; ^ and the same rules exist in the case of defendants, 
 for the language of the codes in defining these methods applies 
 alike to both parties.^ It was shown, in the paragraphs referred 
 to, that "defect" of parties refers solely to the now- joinder of the 
 proper plaintiffs or defendants, — to the fact of too feiv parties. 
 This construction is universal.^' It is settled by an overwhelm- 
 ing and unanimous array of authorities, (1) that if the defect of 
 parties defendant — as thus defined — appears on the face of the 
 complaint or petition, the defendant who desires to raise the 
 question must demur upon that specific ground, an allegation of 
 the defect in the answer as a defence being nugatory; (2) when 
 the defect does not thus appear on the face of the plaintiff's 
 pleading, the defendant must raise the objection in his answer as 
 a defence; and, (3) if both of these methods are omitted, or if 
 one of them is employed when the other is proper, the defendant 
 waives all objection to the defect or nonjoinder.* In no case can 
 
 Smetters v. Rainey, 14 Ohio St. 287, 291 ; Dist. Tp. v. Pratt, 17 Iowa, 16; Byers v. 
 
 Union Banic v. Bell, U Ohio St. 200, 211. Kodabaugh, 17 Iowa, 53. 
 
 Where a demand exist.s in favor of a firm, ^ Ibid.; Truesdale v. Rhodes, 26 Wis. 
 
 and one partner refuses to join as a jjlain- 215, 219, 220. Read i'. Sang, 21 Wis 678, 
 
 liff, he may he m.ade a defendant in an laid down a different rule, but the Wis- 
 
 ordinary legal action brought by his co- consin court is now in harmony with those 
 
 partM<rs to recover the debt. Hill r. of all the other States. See also Marsh r. 
 
 Mar.xh. 40 Iiid. 218. This ruling, in my WaupacnCy. Sup.. 38 Wis. 250; Great W. 
 
 opinion, exhibits the true intent of the Compound Co. r. yEtna Ins. Co., 40 id. 373. 
 
 codes in the clearest possible manner. ♦ Bevier c. Dillingham. 18 Wis. 529; 
 
 1 See supra, §§ •200, «207. Burhop v. Milwaukee^ 18 Wis. 431 ; Cord 
 
 ^ .See tlie citations from the codes, and i-. Hirsch, 17 Wis. 403 ; Carney v. LaCros.-^, 
 
 the cases collected supra, §§ * 200, *207 ; etc. R. Co., 15 Wis. 503 ; Lowry v. Harris, 
 
 Hill I'. Marsh, 40 Ind. 218; .Moruan v. 12 Minn. 255; Mitchell v. Bank of St. 
 
 Carroll, 35 Iowa, 22, 24, 25 ; Beckwith v. Paul, 7 Minn. 252 ; Carr v. Waldron, 44 
 
 Darg-rl.s, 13 lowa, 303; Sioux City Sch. Mo. 393; Makepeace v. Davis, 27 Ind.
 
 NONJOINDER OF DEFENDANTS. 
 
 271 
 
 this objection be raised by a demurrer on the ground that the 
 pleading does not state facts sul'ficient to constitute a cause of 
 action. 1 Although this rule is so firmly settled, yet if, on the 
 trial, or even on appeal, the court sees that other parties are 
 indispensable to a full determination of the questions at issue, 
 it may, on its own motion, even though the defect has not been 
 pointed out by answer or demurrer, order the additional parties 
 to be brought in.^ This power is expressly given by all the 
 
 352 ; Little v. Johnson, 26 Ind. 170 ; John- 
 son V. Britton, 23 Ind. 105 ; Shane v. 
 Lowry, 48 Ind. 205, 206 ; Strong v. Down- 
 ing, 34 Ind. 300 ; Turner v. First National 
 Bank, 26 Iowa, 5G2 ; Hosley v. lilack, 28 
 N. Y. 438 ; Kingsland v. Braisted, 2 Laus. 
 17 : Sager v. Nichols, 1 Daly, 1 ; Bridge v. 
 Payson, 5 Sandf. 210; Lewis v. Williams, 
 3 Minn. 151 ; Hier t: Staples, 51 N. Y. 
 136; Fort Stanwix Bank v. Leggett, 51 
 N. Y. 552; Potter v. Ellice, 48 N. Y. 321 ; 
 Pavisich v. Bean, 48 Cal. 364 ; Kuteuberg 
 V. JMain, 47 Cal. 213; Gillam i'. Sigmau, 
 29 Cal. 637. See, however, Muir v. Gib- 
 son, 8 Ind. 187 ; Shaver v. Brainard, 29 
 Barb. 25. Also, Hardy v. Miller, 11 Neb. 
 395 ; Black v. Duncan, 60 Ind. 522 ; Gil- 
 bert V. Allen, 57 Ind. 524 ; Hardee v. Hall, 
 12 Bush, 327 ; Rossi'. Linder, 12 S. C. 592 ; 
 [^Beach v. Spokane Ranch Co. (1901), 25 
 Mont 379, 65 Pac. Ill; Coddington v. 
 Canaday (1901), 157 Ind. 243, 61 N. E. 
 567; Wyman v. Herard (1899), 9 Okla. 
 35, 59 Pac. 1009. 
 
 Unless the objection of defect of parties 
 defendant is made before trial, it is waived : 
 Thurston v. Thurston (1894), 58 Minn. 
 279, 59 N. W. 1017 ; Bignold v. Carr 
 (1901), 24 Wash.413,64 Pac. 519. Where 
 the case was tried without the objection 
 being made, it was waived : Lawrence v. 
 Congregational Church (1900), 164 N. Y. 
 115, 58 N". E. 24 ; Bowery. Cassels (1900), 
 59 Neb. 620, 81 N. W. 622. The objection 
 of defect of parties defendant must be 
 made by answer or demurrer or it is 
 waived : Henderson v. Turngren (1894), 9 
 Utah, 432, 35 Pac. 495 ; Ayres v. Duggan 
 (1899), 57 Neb. 750, 78 n' W. 296; Fitz- 
 gerald V. Fitzgerald, etc. Co. (1895), 44 
 Neb. 463, 62 N. W. 899. The question 
 cannot be raised by a motion for a non- 
 suit : Fourth Nat. Bank v. Mayer (1896), 
 100 Ga. 87, 26 S. E. 83 ; Shull'r. Caugh- 
 
 man (1898), 54 S. C. 203, 32 S. E. 301 ; 
 nor by objection to testimony at the trial : 
 Dickerson v. Spokane (1901), 26 Wash. 
 292, 66 Pac. 381 ; Greene v. Finnell (1900). 
 22 Wash. 186, 60 Pac. 144; nor by an af- 
 firmative defence setting up a novation : 
 Scott V. Hallock (1897), 16 Wash. 439, 47 
 Pac. 968. 
 
 In State ex rel. v. Metschan (1896), 32 
 Ore. 372, 46 Pac. 791, the court said : "At 
 common law a demurrer for want of neces- 
 sary parties defendant was required to 
 point out, either by name or in some other 
 definite way, from tlie facts stated in the 
 bill, those who should have been, and 
 were not, made parties to the suit, so as 
 to enable the plaintiff to obviate the objec- 
 tion by bringing them in ; and this rule 
 has not been abrogated by the provisions 
 of the code." And in Jaeger v. Suude 
 (1897), 70 Minn. 356, 73 N. W. 171, the 
 court said : " Under the code, as under 
 the old chancery practice, a demurrer for 
 defect of parties defendant is bad if it 
 does not in some suitable manner point 
 out the persons who ought to be made 
 defendants. "3 
 
 1 Leedy v. Nash, 67 Ind. 311. 
 
 2 []An important case dealing with the 
 question of waiving defects of parties de- 
 fendant, has very recently been decided 
 by the New York Court of Appeals. Stein- 
 bach V. Prudential Ins. Co. (1902), 172 
 N. Y. 471, 65 N. E. 281. One Fehrman 
 was indebted to the plaintiff, and to secure 
 the debt a policy of insurance was taken 
 out in the defendant company upon the 
 life of said Fehrman, the plaintiff agree- 
 ing to pay the premiums in considera- 
 tion of the policy being made payable to 
 her. Plaintiff paid the premiums under 
 the alleged representations by defendant 
 tl at she was tlie beneficiary of the policy, 
 anil she did not know until after tlie deatli
 
 272 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 codes, and was a familiar doctrine of the equity procedure. The 
 language of the statutes is certainly broad enough to permit 
 the exercise of this power in legal as well as in equitable actions ; 
 
 of Fehrmau that said policy was not pay- 
 able to her by its terms. She therefore 
 brought action ajrainst the company to 
 have the policy reformed so as to substitute 
 iier in place of the estate of the lieceased 
 as beneficiary of the policy, and for judg- 
 ment on the policy as reformed. The 
 personal representatives of Fehrmau were 
 not joined as defendants. The company 
 did not raise the question of nonjoinder 
 by answer or demurrer, but at the close of 
 the evidence, on the trial, moved the court 
 to dismiss the complaint by reason of the 
 defect of parties defendant. The motion 
 was deuied and defendant excepted. After 
 affirmance by the Appellate Division, two 
 of the justices dissenting, the defendant 
 came to the Court of Appeals. 
 
 The court, by Vaun, J., said : " By the 
 judgments below the names of the bene- 
 ficiaries in a policy of life insurance were 
 stricken out and the name of a stranger 
 substituted as sole beneficiary without 
 making the former parties to the action or 
 giving tliem an opportunity to be heard. 
 This has been done upon the ground that 
 the insurance company, whicli is tlie sole 
 defendant, waived the objection that there 
 was a defect of parties tiefendaiit by not 
 taking it either l)y demurrer or answer as 
 provided by section 499 of the Code of 
 Civil Procedure. That .section, however, 
 must be read in connection witli section 
 452, which provides that 'The court may 
 determine the controversy, as between the 
 parties before it, where it can do so with- 
 out prejudice to the rights of others, orhy 
 saving their rights ; imt where a comjdete 
 determination of the controversy cannot 
 be had without the presence of other par- 
 ties, the court must direct them to be 
 brought in.' The a])parent inconsistency 
 between these sections was tlie subject of 
 controversy before tlie courts for a long 
 time, but we think it w.ia dispelled by the 
 judgment in < tstcrlioudt r. Board of Super- 
 visors of the County of T'lster (98 N. Y. 
 239.24.3). . . . In reversing the judgment 
 in favor of tlie taxpayers we said : ' Con 
 struinK sections 4.'i2 and 499 together, their 
 m<;ining is that a defendant, by omitting 
 
 to take the objection tiiat there is a defect 
 of parties by demurrer or answer, waives 
 on his part any objection to the granting 
 of relief on that ground, but when the 
 granting of relief against him would preju- 
 dice the rights of others, and their rights 
 cannot be saved by the judgment and the 
 controversy cannot be completely deter- 
 mined without their presence, the court 
 must direct them to be made parties before 
 proceeding to judgment.' ... A com- 
 plete determination of a controversy can- 
 not 1)6 had where there are persons, not 
 parties, whose rights must be determined, 
 in form at least, at the same time that tlie 
 rights of tlie parties to the action are 
 determined according to the policy uniler 
 consideration, as it was written, the per- 
 sonal representatives of Mr. Fehrman are 
 entitled to the proceeds, yet the judgment 
 below, rendered without notice to them, 
 take,s the policy away from tliem and 
 gives it to the plaintiff. They had a ma- 
 terial interest in the subject-matter of the 
 action, yet they were deprived of it without 
 an opportunity to he heard and were ciist 
 in jud<;meiit without being sued. While 
 they are not bound by the judgment which 
 does all this in form, still tlie determination 
 of the controversy is necessarily incom- 
 plete because they are not bound. . . . 
 The personal representatives of Fehrman 
 were necessary parties and the court should 
 have dismissed the complaint unless within 
 a reasonable time they were brought in, 
 not necessarily for the protection of the 
 defendant, as it had neglected its rights, 
 but for their own protection, as well as 
 the seemly and orderly administration of 
 justice." 
 
 A dissenting opinion was written by 
 Ilaight, J., in which two justices con- 
 curred, holding that the opinion of the 
 court })ractically annulled section 499 of 
 the Code of Civil Procedure. 
 
 See Ilannecan v. Koth (1896), 12 Wash. 
 69.'), 44 Pac. 256, where it was held that 
 the complaint wonld not be dismissed, hut 
 would be retained until the necessary 
 parties should be brought in.~|
 
 MISJOINDER OF DEFENDANTS. 273 
 
 but, practically, the courts confine its operation to the latter 
 class. 1 When the defendant sets up in his answer the defence 
 of nonjoinder, he must state the names and places of residence 
 of the other persons whom he alleges to be necessary defendants. 
 This old rule of the common-law pleading has not been altered 
 by the new legislation. ^ 
 
 § 189. * 288. Consequences of Nonjoinder of Defendants. The 
 foregoing being the methods of raising the questions as to a 
 •defect of parties defendant, the inquiry arises, What is the effect 
 •of such defect when established in either of these methods ? If, 
 upon demurrer, it is held that the plaintiff has failed to unite all 
 the necessary defendants, he will be permitted to amend, as a 
 matter of course, upon the terms as to costs prescribed by the 
 practice. When the defence is set up in the answer, the same 
 opportunity is given to the plaintiff to amend, and to reconstruct 
 his action. If the defect is not removed in this manner, it will 
 certainly defeat any legal action, although not necessarily, per- 
 haps, an equitable one. Undoubtedly, the codes, adopting the 
 doctrine of equity tribunals, and extending it to all cases, permit 
 the court in its discretion to retain the cause, under such cir- 
 cumstances, until the other necessary parties are brought in, 
 instead of dismissing it altogether. It is plain that the language 
 of the statutes is general, and embraces all species of actions, 
 no exception being expressed or intimated ; and there can be no 
 pretence that it is not as practicable and as easy to deal with 
 legal actions in this manner as with equitable suits. Practically, 
 however, the authority thus given to the courts is restricted to 
 equitable actions, while legal actions are disposed of in the same 
 manner and by the same rules as before the reformed system was 
 
 1 As illustrations, see Mnir v. Gibson. N. Y. S. 861. Where such an answer was 
 S Ind. 187 ; Shaver v. Brainard, 29 Barb, defective in certain particulars, although 
 2.5; O'Connor v. Irvine, 74 Cal. 43.5, 443, it conveyed the information needed, and 
 where it was held that the failure of the all the requisites of the defence were 
 court on its own motion to order necessary proved on the trial, the defect was held 
 parties brought in, although the defend- cured. Wooster v. Chamberlin, 28 Barb, 
 antsomitted to raise an objection of defect 602. It has been held in Indiana that a 
 ■of parties by demurrer or answer, was demurrer to the complaint, on the ground 
 fatal to the judgment. See also Osterhoudt of a nonjoinder of defendants, must also 
 V. Ulster Cy. Sup., 98 N. Y. 239 ; Pirsson show who ought to have been added as 
 »'. Gillespie (Supreme, 1889), 4 N.Y.Suppl. defendants, and that, failing to do so, it 
 «91 ; O'Fallon v. Clopton, 89 Mo. 284. will be overruled. Willett v. Porter, 42 
 
 2 Kingsland v. Braisted, 2 Lans. 17; Ind. 2.50, 2.54 ; Nicholson i;. Louisville, etc 
 Schwartz v. Weehler (Com. PI. 1892), 20 Ry. Co., 55 Ind. 504. 
 
 18
 
 274 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 adopted. — that is, the nonjoinder of a necessary defendant, 
 when not cured hy amendment, defeats that action, althongh it 
 does not destroy the cause of action. It may be instructiye to 
 compare these results with the provisions of the new English 
 procedure, whicli declare that under no circumstances shall a 
 cause be defeated or dismissed on account either of a nonjoinder 
 or of a misjoinder of parties.^ 
 
 § 190. * 289. Misjoinder of Defendants. T'wo Cases herein. 
 Two Aspects of True Case of Technical Misjoinder. I paSS now to 
 the misjoinder or imj^roper uniting of defendants. ^ Two cases 
 present themselyes which might perhaps be regarded as falling 
 under this head: naniel}', (1) Where all of the defendants are 
 improperl}' sued ; and, (2) AVhere one or more are properly sued, 
 and the others are improperly joined with them. The latter only 
 is a true case of technical "misjoinder." The first is the ordi- 
 nar}' case of an action entirely misconceived, and the complaint 
 or petition failing to disclose any ground for relief, so that all 
 the defendants jointly or each of them separately, according to 
 the circumstances, might either demur for want of sufficient 
 facts, or move to dismiss the action on the trial. Such a case 
 does not fall within the special rules of procedure which relate 
 to 2^arties^ but is to be determined by the general doctrines of 
 the law defining rights and liabilities. The second of the two 
 cases just described does come within the subject-matter of 
 parties defendant, and is to be considered under two aspects, 
 which give rise to two very different classes of questions. These 
 two aspects are the following: It being supposed that one or more 
 defendants, whom I will call A., are properly sued, and that one 
 or more others, whom I will call B., are improperly joined in the 
 action, the matters for consideration Mdiich can possibly arise from 
 these facts are: (1) How shall the proper defendants. A., take 
 advantage of the error, and what effect (if any) will it have 
 
 1 The "Supreme Court of Judicature improperly united, tlic defendant sliall 
 
 Act'' of 1873; Sclie<luk', Mule 9. QSce have judgment against them for cu!<ts; 
 
 also Sreinhach v. I'rudcntial Ins. Co. if defendants, they may disclaim and have 
 
 (1902), 172 N. Y. 471, 65 N. E. 281 ; Ilan- their costs against the plaintiff. Tiiis is 
 
 ucgan V. Hoth (1896), 12 Wash. C9.j, 4i carrying out the true sjiirit of the reform ; 
 
 I'ac. 25G."] it fully su.staius the theoretical position 
 
 * The admirable rule is adopted in taken in the text, and might well he fol- 
 
 North Carolina that a wi/s-joinder of par- lowed in all the States. Green v. Green, 
 
 ties, either plaintiffs or defendants, shall 69 N. C. 294, 298. 
 never defeat any a<!tion. If plaintilfs are
 
 MISJOINDER OF DEFENDANTS. 275 
 
 ■upon their rights? and, (2) How shall the improper defendants, 
 B., raise the objection, and what effect (if any) will the error 
 have upon their rights? It is plain that these two sets of de- 
 fendants occupy very dissimilar positions in the action; that their 
 rights are very different, and that while the latter are entitled to 
 full relief, the former may not be in the least injured or affected 
 by the misjoinder. Much confusion in practice has resulted from 
 the neglect to distinguish between these two cases. 
 
 § 191. * 290. Situation of Defendants properly Sued. Change 
 in Common-Law Rule herein. Doctrine Established by the Cases. 
 Proceeding to the discussion of these two cases separately, I 
 shall state the rules established in respect to the first of them, 
 and shall illustrate by a stiiking example the extent to which 
 the common-law doctrines have been changed b}' the reformed 
 procedure. When a legal action is brought against two or more 
 defendants upon an alleged joint liability, even though based 
 upon a. joint contract, and one or more of them are, so far as they 
 are individually concerned, properly sued, but the others are 
 improperly united, the defendants properly sued have no cause 
 of complaint whatsoever, in any form, on account of the misjoin- 
 der; they cannot demur or answer for defect of parties, because 
 there is no " defect ; " they cannot demur generally for want of 
 sufficient facts, because sufficient facts are averred as against 
 them; they cannot demur or answer on account of this 7nis- 
 joinder, because that particular ground of objection is not jn-o- 
 vided for by the codes. ^ If on the trial the cause of action is 
 
 ^ An exception mnst, of course, be him as co-defendant. The provision au- 
 made of those codes which expressly thorizing a demurrer for the misjoinder 
 provide, as a distinct cause of demurrer of parties defendant is taken from the 
 or defence, the misjoinder of parties, — system of equity pleading wliich formerly 
 namely, Missouri, California, Qalso New prevailed. Under that system such de- 
 York, Nevada, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, murrer could be interposed only hy the 
 Utah, and Wyoming. Sec § *206, ante, party who was improperly made a de- 
 note. See O'Brien v. Fitzgerald (1894), fendant. The defendant against whom 
 143 N. Y. 143, 38 N. E. 371. there was a sufficient complaint could not 
 
 See, however, Gardner v. Samuels object that others who had no interest in 
 
 (1897), 116 Cal. 84, 47 Pac. 935, a case the subject-matter of this suit were made 
 
 decided under a code making misjoinder defendants, unless it also appeared that 
 
 of parties a cause for deumrrer. The his interests were affected therebv. This 
 
 court said: "The complaint sufRciently ground of demurrer is authorized by the 
 
 states a cause of action against the de- code of Missouri, and it is held in that 
 
 fendant Samuels. It is urged by the State that the former rule in equity is to 
 
 respondent, however, that the demurrer be followed. (Ashby v. Winston, 26 Mo. 
 
 of Samuels was properly sustained by 210.)" See also Euffatti v. Lexington 
 
 reason of the mi.sjoinder of Morris with Mining Co. (1894), 10 Utah, 386, 37 I'ac.
 
 276 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 proved against them.^ but none against them and the others^ still 
 the phiintiff will not be absolutely nonsuited; he will recover his 
 judgment against them according to the right of action estab- 
 lished by the proof; while as against the other defendants he will 
 fail, and will be nonsuited, or his complaint be dismissed. This 
 result of the reform legislation is a very great departure from the 
 former practice. At the common hnv, if a plaintiff alleged a 
 joint cause of action against two or more defendants, and failed 
 to prove the case as set out in his pleading, he was defeated as to 
 all ; he could not recover against a part and fail as to the others. 
 The interpretation of the codes, as thus stated, is based partly 
 upon the sections already quoted in relation to defendants, and 
 partly upon other sections — to be fully discussed hereafter — in 
 relation to the form and manner of recovery and entry of judg- 
 ments. By combining these various provisions, and by a con- 
 struction of them in accordance with their plain spirit and 
 meaning, the courts have deduced the rules here given. To 
 those defendants who are sued in a legal action, even though 
 upon an alleged joint liability, and who are actually liable upon 
 the contract or other cause of action averred, the fact that other 
 persons are also added as co-defendants, however improperly, is 
 no defence, is no answer to the action in any manner or form. 
 This doctrine is fully established by the cases collected in the 
 foot-note, and in many others which it is unnecessary to cite.^ 
 
 591, holding that one defendant cannot has run in favor of one of them, the 
 
 complain that another is joined who is action against the other two is not 
 
 not bound.] affected tliereby.] Mcintosh v. Ensign, 
 
 1 Qlacksonu. McAuley (1895), 13 Wash. 28 N. Y. 169, 172, — see also, per Km- 
 
 298, 43 Pac. 41; Lull r. Auamosa Nat. mott J., pp. 174, 175 ; Rrumskill y. James, 
 
 Bank (1900), 110 la. 537, 81 N. W. 784; 11 N. Y. 294; Marquat >•. Marquat, 12 
 
 Curran v. Stein (1901), — Ky. — , 60 N.Y. 336; Harrington y. Higham, 15 Barli. 
 
 S. \V. 8.39: Hassler r. Hefele (1898), 151 524; Parker v. Jackson, 16 Barb. 33; 
 
 Ind. 391, 50 N. K. 361 ; Huffatti v. Lex- N Y. & N. H. K. Co. v. Schuyler, 17 
 
 ington Mining Co. (1894), 10 Utah, 386, N. Y. 592 ; Coakley r. Chamberlain, 8 Abl). 
 
 37 Pac. 591 ; Bunnell r. Berlin Iron Bridge Pr. N. s. 37; Fort Staiuvix Bank v. T>eg- 
 
 Co. (1S95), 66 Conn. 24, 33 All. 533; gett, 51 N.Y. 552; Truesdell c. Rhodes, 
 
 Knatz V. Wise (1895), IG Mont. 555, 41 26 Wis. 215,219,220; McGonigal v. Col- 
 
 Pac. 710; North Hudson Bldg. & Loan ter, 32 Wis. 614 ; Willard i-. lieas, 26 Wis. 
 
 Assn. f. Childs (1893), 86 Wis. 292, 56 540, 544; Alnutt v. Leper, 48 Mo. 319 ; 
 
 N. W. 870; Empire Canal Co. v. Itio Brown c. Woods, 48 Mo. 330; Rutenberg 
 
 Grande County (1895), 21 Colo. 244, 40 v. Main, 47 Cal. 213, 221; Aucker i;. 
 
 Pac. 449; Harrison v. McCormick (1898), Adams, 23 Ohio St. 543, 548-550; Lamp- 
 
 122 Cal. 651, 55 Pac. 592: Where an kin i'. Chisom, 10 Ohio St. 450. See also 
 
 action is brought jointly against three cases cited, i'«/ra, under §* 291 of the text 
 
 partnr-rs, and tlio statute of limitations in reference to the remedy by those who
 
 MISJOINDER OF DEFENDANTS. 277 
 
 The rule being thus established in the extreme case of legal 
 actions alleging a joint liability upon contract, it is of course 
 equally true in all other legal actions based upon a liability which 
 at the common law was several, and in which the misjoinder of 
 some defendants would have been no defence as to those properly 
 sued, — as, for example, in actions for torts. A fortiori does the 
 same doctrine apply in all equitable actions. Under the former 
 system, the improper uniting of co-defendants was never a suffi- 
 cient ground for preventing a decree against those who were 
 properly made parties if the suit was in equity.^ 
 
 § 192. * 291. How Question of Misjoinder may be raised by 
 Defendants improperly joined. Demurrer Interposed by "Whom. 
 "Waiver herein. The situation of those parties improperly joined 
 as co-defendants is, of course, very different from that just 
 described. The very statement of the case assumes that the 
 action is wrongly brought as against them; that, either as dis- 
 closed by the allegations of the plaintiff's pleading, or as dis- 
 covered by the evidence on the trial, no cause of action exists 
 against them, notwithstanding the one which exists against their 
 co-defendants. If, therefore, in such a case, it appears on the 
 face of tlie complaint or petition that one or more persons have 
 been improperly made defendants, such persons may present the 
 objection by a demurrer, not on the ground of a "defect" of 
 parties, but on the ground that the plaintiff's pleading does not 
 state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against them.^ 
 This demurrer must be interposed only by those defendants who 
 are wrongly sued, and not hy all the defetidants jointly^ since, if 
 two or more demur jointly, and as to a portion of them there is 
 
 are. improperly joined. See also Territory ^ See N. Y. & N. H. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 
 
 V. Hildebrand, 2 Mout. 426; White Oalc 17 N. Y. 592. 
 
 Dist. Tp. V. Oskaloosa Dist. Tp., 44 Iowa, 2 [^See Gardner v. Samuels (1897), 116 
 
 512 ; Littell v. Sayre, 7 Hun, 485 ; Stafford Cal. 84, 47 Pac. 9.35, where a demurrer for 
 
 w. Nutt, 51 Ind. 535; Murray w. Ebright, misjoinder was held proper, under the 
 
 50 id. 362 ; Erwin v. Scotten, 40 id. 389 ; statute. But it was said that a demurrer 
 
 Carmien v. Whitaker, 36 id. 509 ; Graham couched in the words of the statute wouhl 
 
 V. Henderson, 35 id, 195; Crews v. Lack- not be sufficient; "but a demurring party 
 
 land, 67 Mo. 619 ; Ryan v. State Bank, 10 by designating the defendants who were 
 
 Neb. 524 ; Hubbard v. Guriiey, 64 N. Y. improperly joined with him, sufficiently 
 
 457 ; Blackburn v. Sweet, 38 Wis. 578 ; calls the plaintiffs' attention to his objec- 
 
 Pierson v. Fuhrmann (Colo. App 1891), tion to the complaint." But see also 
 
 27 Pac. 1015; Emry v. Parker. Ill N. C. Plankinton v. Hildebrand (1895), 89 Wis. 
 
 261. But see Curry v. Roundtree, 51 Cal. 209, 61 N. W. 839.] 
 181.
 
 278 CIVIL RKMKDIES. 
 
 no cause for the demurrer, it must fail as to all.^ The safer 
 practice is, therefore, for each defendant who claims that he is 
 improperly joined, to demur separately and individually from 
 the others. This particular ground of objection is not waived by 
 a neglect to demur, as it is expressly provided in all the codes 
 that the defendant may at the trial interpose the same objection 
 to the plaintiff's recover3% even though he has failed to allege it 
 on the record. 2 If the absence of a cause of action does not 
 appear on the face of the plaintiff's pleading, the defence may 
 be set up in the separate answer or answers of the parties who 
 rely upon it. Finally, whatever be the completeness or defect of 
 the allegations made by the plaintiff and of the issues raised in 
 the answers of the defendants, if on the trial the evidence fails to 
 establish a cause of action against some portion of the defendants, 
 and it thus appears that they had been wrongfully proceeded 
 against in the action, the plaintiff will be nonsuited, or his com- 
 plaint or petition dismissed as to them, and his recovery will be 
 limited to the others against whom a cause of action is made out. 
 The foregoing rules are sustained by the cases with almost abso- 
 lute unanimity.^ These are the more regular and formal modes 
 
 1 Lowry i-. Jackson, 27 S. C. 318. Co. v. Hall (1895), 110 Cal. 490, 42 Pac. 
 
 - QBut see Boland v. Ross (1893), 120 962] ; Youug v. N. Y., etc. Steamship Co., 
 Mo. 20S, 2.") S. W. 524, where it was held 10 Abb. Pr. 229; Mitchell v. Bank of St. 
 that although the petition for an account- Paul, 7 Minn. 252, 256; Nichols v. Kan- 
 ing stated no grounds for equitable relief dall, 5 Minn. 304; Seagerr. Burns, 4 Minn, 
 against the defendant M, yet inasmuch as 141; Lewis v. Williams, 3 Minn. 151; 
 he failed to avail himself of that fact and Makepeace v. Davis, 27 Ind. 352, 355 ; 
 did not demur on the ground of misjoinder, McGonigal v. Colter, 32 Wis. 614; Web- 
 but answered to the merits after other ster v. Tibbitts, 19 Wis. 438; Truesdell 
 defendants had answered and filed tlieir v. Rhodes, 26 Wis. 215, 219, 220; Willard 
 cro.ss-bills against him, the court did not v. Reas, 26 Wis. 540, 544; Rntenberg i'. 
 lose jurisdiction over him under the cro.ss- Main, 47 Cal. 213, 221. See also Grulin 
 bills by dismissing tiie complaint as to v. Stanley, 92 Cal. 83. See, however, per 
 him. He was deemed to have waiveil by contra, Wood r. Olney, 7 Nev. 109, which 
 his pleadings all questions as to jurisdic- holds that, when a joint demurrer by de- 
 tiou and to have voluntarily submitted his fendants is good as to some and bad as to 
 rights to the court] tlie others, it will not be overruled as to 
 
 ** QDobbs V. Purington (1902), 136 Cal. all; it will be su.stained as to tiiose who 
 
 70, 68 Pac. 3j3; Bunce v. Pratt (1893), 56 had a good cause of demurrer, and over- 
 
 Jlinn. 8, 57 N. W. IGO; Sutherland v. ruled only as to the other.-;. In Missouri, 
 
 IloUiday ( 1902), — Neb. — , 90 N. W. 937 ; where a misjoinder is made a cause of de- 
 
 Kuffatti V. Lexington Mining Co (1894), niurrer, it is held the objection must be 
 
 10 Utah, 386, ."57 Pac. 591 ; Ilassler r. set up by those u-ho are thus improjurly 
 
 llefele (1898). 151 lii.i. 391, 50 N. E. 361 ; joined, and not by the others. If the 
 
 Currau c. Stein ( 1901), — Ky. — , 60 S. W. otlicrs unite in the demurrer, it will ba 
 
 839; Lull V. Ai.aniosa Nat. Bank (1900), overruleil as to them. Brown v. Woods. 
 
 J 10 la 537, 81 N. W. 784; Bailey Loan 48 Mo. a.JO ; Aluutt r. Leper, 43 .Mo. .H.i.
 
 MISJOINUEU OF DEFENDANTS. 279 
 
 of raising the questions as to misjoinder by those defendants wlio 
 are thus wrongfully made parties to a suit; but there undoubtedly 
 may be cases in which the court w^ill proceed in a more summary 
 manner, and will strike off the name of a party on his mere 
 motion. Such cases must of necessity be somewhat exceptional, 
 for, as a general rule, the rights and liabilities of the parties to 
 the record will not be determined on motion or by any other 
 means except a formal trial of the issues. 
 
 § 193. * 292. Recapitulation of Code Reforms respecting Mis- 
 joinder of Defendants. Criticism. If we SUm up the results 
 of the preceding discussion, the following conclusion may 
 be regarded as established beyond any doubt. In ascertaining 
 the effects of a misjoinder of parties, the courts, with great 
 unanimity, have accepted and carried out in practice the spirit 
 and true intent of the reform legislation: namely, that the 
 familiar doctrines of equity should be made controlling in all 
 kinds of actions legal and equitable. They have in this instance 
 entirely abandoned the technical common-law rules, and have 
 assimilated all actions in this respect to a suit in equity. Even 
 in the case where the common-law doctrine of joint liability was 
 the most rigid, they have with perfect ease abandoned it, have 
 treated it as though abrogated by the general expressions of the 
 reform legislation, and have thus demonstrated that the judicial 
 reasoning by which that ancient dogma had been supported was 
 in fact nothing but a formula of words wdthout any real force 
 and meaning. They have shown that in a legal action upon 
 contract, no matter what may be the allegations as to the joint 
 nature of the liability, it is possible to sever the judgment and 
 to permit a recovery against some defendants and for the others, 
 and thus to bring all cases legal and equitable within the opera- 
 tion of the familiar principles of equity. I dwell upon this 
 special instance of liberal construction because it well illustrates 
 the position which I have theoretically maintained as to the 
 general mode of interpreting the codes. The courts of the dif- 
 
 See also, as to the effect of misjoinder, Ass'n, 74 N. C. 117; State v. J. P. & M. R. 
 
 Nave V. Hadley, 74 lud. 155; Meudenhall Co, 15 Fla. 201 ; Mahouey v. McLeau, 26 
 
 i\ Wilson, 54 Iowa. 589 ; Cogswell v. Minn. 415. In Barnes v. Blake, 59 Hun, 
 
 Miirpiiy, 46 id. 44; White Oak Dist. Tp. 371, it was held that a mi.'ijoinder of de- 
 
 V. Oskaloosa Dist. Tp., 44 id. 512. On feudants was not a cause for a demurrer 
 
 tl;e general doctrine as to the proper for want of sufficient facts In- tlic party 
 
 j linder of defendants, see Buie v. Mech. imjiroperly joined.
 
 280 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 ferent States have found no difficulty in adopting and applying- 
 the complete doctrine of equity in this case ; there is no greater 
 difficulty in adopting and applying the same to all the provisions- 
 of the codes relative to parties, and to the amalgamation of equi- 
 table and legal principles in the one civil action created by the 
 new procedure. If the rules which control equitable tribunals- 
 can be and ought to be introduced into the civil action in respect 
 to the single feature of a misjoinder of defendants, for the same 
 reason they can and ought to be introduced in respect to all the 
 parties and in respect to every other external feature of the judi- 
 cial proceeding. If the courts had been consistent in this matter, 
 and had not halted in their work of liberal construction, a com- 
 plete, harmonious, and symmetrical system would long since have 
 been constructed, and the confusion and conflict in principle 
 which now exists would have been avoided. Until this course 
 is freely and systematically adopted, until the courts shall follow 
 out to its legitimate results in all parts and elements of the action 
 the equitable notion which is made everywhere so prominent in 
 the statute, we can never expect to obtain all the simplicity and 
 clearness, and subordination of external form to substantial facts, 
 promised by the new system of procedure. 
 
 § 194. * 293. Same respecting Nonjoinder. Less Liberal Inter- 
 pretation here. Case of Nonjoinder and Misjoinder Compared. 
 Criticism and Recommendation. Even in determining the eifects 
 of a nonjoinder of proper defendants, the courts have failed 
 to interpret the provisions of the codes with the same free- 
 dom which they used in that of misjoinder ; they have hesi- 
 tated and stopped, when it would have been easy to have gone 
 forward, and to have given the clauses their full force and effect. 
 Undoubtedly the two cases stand upon a somewhat different 
 footing. When a person is himself properly sued, it does not 
 substantially affect his rights or liabilities that another person is 
 also improperly sued with him ; that fact does not essentially 
 make his own liability greater or less. But when a person is 
 sued, he has, in many instances, — certainly in all those legal 
 actions where the lialnlity is joint, and in some equitable suits 
 where the rights and liabilities are complex, — a right that all 
 the others who are also liable with him, or against whom the 
 cause of action exists, or who are necessary parties to a complete 
 determination of the controversy, should be united with him as
 
 ACTIONS AGAINST OCCUPANTS OF LAND. 281 
 
 co-defendants, and a neglect to join them is an error against 
 which he should be permitted to object, and from which he 
 should be suffered to obtain a relief. The former equitable 
 procedure, as well as the common-law practice, recognized this 
 right of the defendant. But it is a very different thing to say- 
 that such an error, when established, should in any class of cases 
 absolutely defeat the action. The error is not essentially fatal. 
 This is shown by the practice itself of the courts, which treats 
 the objection as dilatory, and requires it to be presented in a 
 certain technical manner, or else regards it as waived. There 
 is then no reason in the nature of the proceeding why the equity 
 doctrine should not have been applied under these circumstances 
 to all legal actions, so that, when an improper noyijoinder is 
 finally established by the decision of the court, the action should 
 never be defeated thereby, but should be retained by the court in 
 order that the plaintiff might add the necessary defendants, and 
 then the cause proceed to judgment on the merits. It is cer- 
 tainly as practicable and as easy to pursue this course with all 
 legal actions, as it is with those that are equitable; and the 
 codes expressly permit, if not require it, in language which in 
 terms embraces every species of suit. 
 
 I shall now proceed to consider the particular cases which have 
 arisen, and the various specific rules as to parties defendant which 
 have been established by judicial decision. This examination 
 will show how the general principles of interpretation have been 
 applied by the courts, and will exhibit the system as a whole 
 which has been constructed in respect to the selection and 
 joinder of defendants. The discussion will be separated into 
 three general divisions : namely, legal actions generally ; actions 
 against husband and wife, or either of them, as affected by the 
 marriage relation; equitable actions generally. 
 
 FIRST: LEGAL ACTIONS. 
 
 § 195. * 294. I. Actions against Owners or Occupants of Land. 
 Limitation herein. Distinguished from Common-Law Action of 
 Ejectment. This division does not include actions for trespass or 
 other torts to the land or its possession, which will be considered 
 under a subsequent subdivision relating to torts. The actions 
 here intended must be brought against joint owners, owners in 
 common, or occupants. The action to recover possession of
 
 282 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 land, and to try the title thereto, is generally called by lawj-ers 
 and judges tlie action of ejectment. Yet wherever the new 
 procedure is adopted, it far more nearly resembles in all of its 
 essential features the ancient real actions which were displaced 
 in use by "ejectment," — in its essential features, 1 say, for of 
 course it has none of the technical peculiarities which marked 
 those old common-law forms of proceeding. One fact is certainly 
 true, namely, that it does not bear the slightest resemblance to 
 the action of " ejectment " as that was contrived by the old 
 judges and lawyers, and only confusion and misconception result 
 from applj'ing to it that name. Undoubtedly the courts have 
 continued to connect with it some of the special rules and doc- 
 trines which belong to the action of ejectment; but many of 
 them, I am sure, could never have been retained if the courts 
 had fully appreciated the completeness of the change wrought 
 by the reformed system of procedure in abolishing all the forms 
 of le<Tal actions, and had reflected that the technical rules result- 
 ing^ alone from the absurd fictions which characterized ejectment 
 have no legitimate connection with the simple action to recover 
 possession of and try the title to land which has been introduced 
 by the codes in the place of the former modes. As in the "real 
 actions," the real party in interest, and that is the owner of the 
 estate entitling him to possession, — Avhatever be its nature, — 
 must be the plaintiff, and if the object be to establish a title, the 
 holder or claimant of the adverse title must be made the defend- 
 ant, while in respect of the claim to possession the occupant 
 must be made a defendant. These are the simple essentials of 
 the action, and they clearly have nothing in them akin to "eject- 
 ment." The codes of some States contain express provisions in 
 relation to parties defendant, and especially in relation to the 
 union of the landlord and tenant as co-defendants,^ but these are 
 rather inserted fi-om an excess of caution, and do not add any- 
 thing to the force of the more general clauses. 
 
 § 196. * 295. Who should be joined. Illustrations. In an 
 action to recover possession of an entire tract or i)arccl of land, 
 when the claim of the plainLilT lo the whole rests upon and is 
 
 1 Cofle of New York, § 118 (447, l.')0.3, Dakota, Kcv. Codes, 1899, § .5230; Smitli 
 
 1.598); California, §§ 379, 380; SoiUli Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6078 ; Montana, 
 
 Carolina, § 141; Xott!i Carolina, § 61; § .'iSl ; I.iaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3107 ; 
 
 l^L'tali, Kc-v. St, 1898, §2914; North Missouri, Kev. St., 1899, § 543.]
 
 ACTIONS AGAINST OCCUPANTS OF LAND. 
 
 283 
 
 derived through a single title, he may, and unless their occupa- 
 tion is distinct, should join all the actual occupants or tenants of 
 the tract, even though they may be in jjossession of separate and 
 distinct portions thereof, and may hold, possess, and claim under 
 separate and distinct titles.^ In addition to these he may join 
 the landlord or person holding the fee, or any person claiming 
 the ownership and right of possession, and ynuat join such person 
 if he desires to establish in that action his own ultimate owner- 
 ship against that claimant. ^ If the entire tract is in the posses- 
 sion of two or more persons who possess the same, not in separate 
 portions, but jointly or in common in undivided shares, they 
 should all be made defendants. If the plaintiff, however, claims 
 separate portions of an entire tract under distinct titles, and each 
 of these portions is possessed or occupied by a different person 
 holding under a separate right or title from the others, he cannot 
 join all these occupants in a single action ; a suit must be brought 
 
 1 [Lewis V. Hiuson ( 1 902), 64 S. C. 57 1 , 
 43 S. E. 15, quoting tiie text. Andrews 
 V. Carlile (1894), L'O Colo. 370, 38 Pac. 
 465: Wiiere several defendants are sued 
 jointly in ejectment, and each files a sepa- 
 rate answer, a joint judgment may be 
 rendered against them unless they de- 
 mand separate trials and judgments 
 within a proper time. 
 
 In Kliuker v. Schmidt (1898), 106 la. 
 70, 75 N. W. 672, plaintiff alleged that 
 defendant was in wrongful possession of a 
 strip of land fourteen feet wide along the 
 westerly side of his lot. This, if true, 
 indicated tliat each lot owner in that tier 
 of lots was fourteen feet on his neighbor's 
 land to the east. Held, that this did not 
 show an interest in the suit which would 
 warrant the other lot owners being made 
 parties defendant, on defendant's motion. 
 There was merely a possibility of contro- 
 versies arising between the other lot 
 owners, and, besides, their defences might 
 not be the same.] See, however, Sutton 
 V. Casseleggi, 77 Mo. 397. 
 
 2 State V. Orwig, 34 Iowa, 112, 115. 
 As to proper defendants in actions to re- 
 cover possession of land, and to try the 
 title thereto, see also Jackson v. Allen, 30 
 Ark. 110; Rollins v. Rollins, 76 N. C. 
 264 ; Colgrove v. Koonce, 76 id. 363 ; 
 Lytle r. Burgin, 83 id. 301 ; Young v. 
 Greenlee, 82 id. 346 ; Cagger r. Lansing, 
 
 64N. y. 417; in Wisconsin, see Gray v. 
 Tyler, 40 Wis. 579 ; Pier v. Fond du Lac, 
 38 id. 470 (tlie Wisconsin statute provides 
 for an action of ejectment against a person 
 not in possession ; this person must be 
 one exercising some acts of ownersliip 
 over the land, "or claiming title tliereto 
 or some interest therein ; " and the com- 
 plaint must allege that the defendant 
 " unlawfully withholds the posses.sion from 
 the plaintiff ; " Iicid, that in such an ac- 
 tion the title claimed by the defendant 
 must be one which, if valid, would give 
 him a possessory right to the jiremises ; 
 and ejectment will not lie against one 
 not in possession who only claims a lien) ; 
 Wilson V. Henry, 40 id. 594; Piatt v. 
 Jante, 35 id. 629 ; Barclay v. Yeomans, 
 27 id. 682 ; Burchard v. Roberts, 70 Wis. 
 111. Under the Missouri statute, requir- 
 ing the action to be brought against the 
 person in possession, Shaw v. Tracy, 95 
 Mo. 531 (possession of the tenant is not 
 such possession of the landlord as to en- 
 able the plaintiff to recover against the 
 landlord as sole defendant) ; Phillips v. 
 Phillips, 107 Mo. 360 (occupancy of or 
 residence upon the property is not a neces- 
 sary element of po.ssession) ; Bensicck v. 
 Cook (Mo. 1892), 19 S. W. 642; Callahan 
 V. Davis, 90 Mo. 78; Charter Oak L. Ins. 
 Co. V. Cummings, 90 Mo. 267.
 
 284 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 to recover each portion against the occupant thereof ; the mere 
 fact of propinquity would not produce any community of interest. 
 The foregoing propositions are sustained and illustrated in the 
 following instances. In an action brought by a widow to recover 
 dower (which had not been assigned) in a city lot of land and 
 block of stores, the occupant, holding under a lease for one year, 
 of a single floor of one store standing on a small portion of the 
 entire tract was held to be properly joined as a co-defendant.^ 
 A similar action being brought to recover dower in a tract which 
 the husband had conveyed during his marriage to a single grantee 
 by one deed in which his wife did not join, and which land had 
 by subsequent deeds been conveyed, one-half to one separate 
 owner, and one-half to another, it w^as held that the widow, 
 being entitled to dower in the whole tract, might join both these 
 owners of the fee, who were also the occupants, as defendants in 
 the same action. ^ The rule is not confined to proceedings for 
 the recovery of dower. Where it was alleged that one defendant 
 claimed to be owner in fee of the whole premises, and that 
 the three other defendants were his tenants, and that they all 
 "unjustly withheld from the plaintiff the possession of the said 
 premises," and it appeared on the trial that each of these four 
 defendants actually occupied a separate portion, it was held that 
 all these persons were properly united as co-defendants in the 
 action.^ When the land is in the actual possession of a tenant, 
 the landlord may be joined with him as a co-defendant, inde- 
 pendently of any express provision of the code authorizing such 
 a course, if the landlord has in any manner interfered to resist 
 the plaintiff's claim, or has aided and abetted the tenant in Mb 
 resistance, or has asserted the right of ownership to be in himself 
 as against the plaintiff.* 
 
 1 Ellicott I'. Hosier, 7 N. Y. 201. This since he is entitled to the possession, 
 
 was so lield under the 2 R. S. of New Bledsoe v. Simms, 53 Mo. 305. See also 
 
 York, p. 303, §§ 2 and 4, and p. 304, §§ 10 AVilson v. Garaghty, 70 Mo. 517 ; Rust v. 
 
 and 13, which provide that ejectment must Goff, 94 Mo. 511. 
 
 he brought against the person actually - Galbreath v. Gray, 20 Ind. 290. It 
 
 in occupation ; citing Sherwood v. Van- was lield that the respective liabilities of 
 
 denburgh, 2 Hill, 303. The defendant the two defendants could be arranged and 
 
 harl contended that the action, being for determined in the judgment. 
 dower, must be against the owner of the '^ Fosgate i\ Herkimer Man. Co., 12 
 
 freehold, as in the common law action of N. Y. 580. See Fisher v. Hepburn, 48 
 
 dower. In .Missouri, wiien an action is N. Y. 41, 55, per Earl J. 
 brouglit to recover lands claimed to be * Abeel v. Van Gelder, 36 N. Y. 513 
 
 owtK'd in fee by a wife, her husband is the Fosgate v. Herkimer Man. Co., supra 
 
 only proper j)arty to be made defendant, Fearce v. Ferriss K.\., 10 N. Y. 280
 
 ACTIONS AGAINST OCCUPANTS OF LAND. 285 
 
 § 197. * 29G. Who should not be joined. Illustrations. Per- 
 sons, however, whose rights tuiiiiot he at all affected by a re- 
 covery against the party in actual possession, whose interest is 
 entirely distinct from his, and under or from whom he does not 
 derive any title, are neither necessary nor proper co-defendants 
 with him in an action brought to recover the possession as against 
 his special title; as, for example, the remainder-man in fee after 
 a life estate, when the action is merely for the purpose of re- 
 covering possession during the continuance of such life interest. 
 Thus, in an action against a husband, tenant by the curtesy in 
 actual possession, brought, not to establish an absolute title in 
 fee, but to recover the possession during the husband's life, the 
 heirs of the deceased wife — who are the reversioners in fee — 
 are neither necessary nor proper parties defendant.^ On the 
 same principle, an action by the grantee in a sheriff's deed of 
 lands given on an execution sale, the judgment debtor having 
 died, should be against the latter's heirs alone, and not against 
 them and his widow ; her dower right could not be affected by 
 the recover}', and being as yet unassigned, it did not entitle her 
 to possession as against the j^laintiff.^ Lands having been given 
 to a tenant for life, with remainder in fee to another, the former 
 leased the premises for a term of years, with a covenant of quiet 
 enjoyment. The life tenant died before the expiration of the 
 term, and the remainder-man thereupon entered and took posses- 
 sion. The lessee brought an action upon the broken covenant 
 against both the executors of the life tenant and the remainder- 
 
 Fosgate v. Herkimer Man. Co., 12 Barb, railroad company which had acquired it 
 
 •352. See also Fiuuegan i'. Carraher, 47 by condemnation proceediug.s, the lessee 
 
 N. Y. 493, which was very similar to Abeel of such land is a neces.sary party: Roby 
 
 r. Van Gelder, SM/j/a, in all the facts. The v. N. Y. C. & H. K. R. R. Co. (1894), 142 
 
 landlord alone was sued. Court held the N. Y. 176, 36 N. E. 1053. 
 tenant was also a proper and perhaps a The tenant in possession is the only 
 
 necessary party, but objection to his non- necessary party to an action of ejectment, 
 
 joinder had been waived by not demurring even though he may set up that tliere are 
 
 or answering. See, further, Clason r. tenants in common with him : Raymond 
 
 Baldwin, 129 N. Y. 183; City of Napa c. v. Morrison (1894), 9 Wash. 156, 37 Pac. 
 
 Howland, 87 Cal. 84. In Iowa, it is held 318. See also Danihee v. Hyatt (1897), 
 
 that, when the defendant is only a tenant, 151 N. Y. 493; 45 N. E. 939. 
 the landlord mai/ be substituted; but this All the occupants of land need not be 
 
 is not necessary. If substituted or noti- joined ; one is sufficient : Hennessey v. 
 
 fied, he is bound by the judgment ; other- Paulsen (1895), 147 N. Y. 255, 41 N. E. 
 
 wise he is not. State v. Orwig, 34 Iowa, 516.] 
 112, 115. 1 Allen i-. Ranson, 44 Mo. 263. 
 
 [^Where an owner of land brings an ^ Cavender v. Smith, 8 Iowa, 360. 
 
 action to recover possession against a
 
 286 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 man. The action in this form was plainl}' without any founda- 
 tion; the remainder-man was improperly joined, as he was in no 
 manner liahle on the covenant.^ 
 
 ^ 198. * 207. II. Actions against Ov^ners or Possessors of 
 Chattels. In Actions to recover Possession of Chattels. Common- 
 Law Rule not Changed. The actions whlch fall under this sub- 
 division, and which have any distinctive features, are very few 
 in number. Those brought to recover damages for a tortious 
 act, trespass, or negligence, committed by means of a chattel, 
 and those brought to recover damages for the conversion of a 
 chattel, properly belong to the subdivision which treats of actions 
 for torts in general. The common-law rules as to parties de- 
 fendant in an action to recover possession of chattels have not 
 been in an}^ manner affected by the new procedure. Such action 
 must be brought against the party or parties in actual possession 
 of the chattel demanded by the plaintiff.^ If this actual posses- 
 sion is in one, he must be the sole defendant; if in two or more 
 jointly, — as, for example, in a partnership, — they must all be 
 made defendants.^ There is a particular case in which the action 
 may be maintained against one in eoyutriictive possession, as well 
 as against the party in actual possession.* If the original taking 
 of the goods was wrongful, and the wrong-doer has subsequently 
 parted with the possession by assignment, the action will still lie 
 against him, or it may be prosecuted against both himself and the 
 assignee whose possession is actual.^ Possession by the party, 
 however, and not the claim of ultimate ownership, is in general 
 
 1 Coakley v. Chamberlain, 8 Abb. Pr. 8 i Ch. PI. pp. 122, 12.3 (SpringfieM 
 
 N. K. .37. The complaiut wa.s dismissed as ed. 1840) ; Gassner v. Marquardt, 76 Wis. 
 
 to the remainder-mau, and judgment was 579 ; Washington v. Love, 34 Ark. 93 ; 
 
 rendered .igainst the executors. The Harkey v. Tillman, 40 Ark. 551 ; and 
 
 action was in every respect remarkable. Helman v. Withers (Ind. App. 1892), 30 
 
 Where a lessor assigns his term, the lessor N. K. 5, citing numerous cases ; Scott v. 
 
 may join the lessee and the assignee in a McGraw, 3 Wash. 675; Willis v. De Witt 
 
 suit for the rent. Tabue v. McAdams, (S. Dak. 1892), 52 N. W. 1090, and cases 
 
 8 Hush, 74. cited. 
 
 - []" One having custody of property ■• Nichols v. Michaels, 23 N. Y. 264, 
 
 in dispute is a proper defendant in re- 270,271. See liaughton r. Newberry, 69 
 
 plevin": Kngel >•. Dado (1902), — Neb. N. C. 456. 
 
 — , 92 \. W. 629. Replevin sliould be ^ Nichols v. Michaels, 23 N. Y. 264, 
 
 brought against the party in pos.scssion, 268, 270, 271, per .James and Seldcn ,IJ. 
 
 and wliore such .iction is brouglit against See, liowever, Davis v. Van de Mark. 45 
 
 an oflicor acting under an execution, he Kan. 130; Feder v. Abrahams, 28 Mo. 
 
 may be .>ined either as an individual or Ajip. 454. 
 as an ofTicer: Irwin v. Walling (1896), 
 4 Okla. 128, 44 Pac. 219.]
 
 SHir-owxKRS. 287 
 
 tlie ground for making him a defendant. If the possessor is 
 sued, and a third person also sets up a claim of title, the con- 
 llicting demands may be determined by means of an interpleader 
 between the plaintiff and this claimant, ordered by the court at 
 the instance of the defendant, if he in fact admits that he himself 
 has no right in and to the goods. ^ 
 
 § 199. * 298. Ship-Owners. The liability of ship-owners for 
 supplies furnished or repairs made, or npon other contracts, 
 express or implied, in respect to the vessel itself, gives rise to 
 rules which properly fall under this subdivision. I do not now 
 stop to inquire when, how, or by whom the owners may be bound, 
 nor what are the powers of the master or other agent in managing 
 the vessel. It is assumed that the power exists and has been 
 properly exercised, and that a liability has arisen for the supplies, 
 repairs, or other aid to the ship; and the single question is. What 
 is the extent of the liability, upon whom does it rest, and against 
 whom should it be enforced? When a liability has been created 
 by the master or other agent for supplies furnished to the vessel, 
 the part-owners are responsible in soUdo, and should all be joined 
 as defendants ; the noyijoinder of some is a defence by those sued ; ^ 
 and the same is true in the case of repairs and of all other ex- 
 penses properly incurred in sailing her.^ An action to recover 
 compensation in the nature of salvage for services rendered in 
 saving and securing a disabled steamboat under circumstances 
 entitling the plaintiff to such compensation, was held to be prop- 
 erly brought against all the persons and corporations who owned 
 interests in the boat, even though their interests were distinct 
 and unequal, and even though some of them were separate 
 
 1 See code of New York, § 122 (452, 1901, § 6085 ; Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2924; 
 820) ; California, § 380 ; Nebraska, § 48 ; Washington, Bal. Code, § 4S42 ; Wiscou- 
 North Carolina, § 65; Nevada, § 17; sin, St., 1898, § 2610 ; Wyoming, Rev. St., 
 [[Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, § 1.S08; Arkan- 1899, § 3490.J 
 sas, Sand. & Hill's St., §§ 5635-5637; '^ Sager i-. Nichols, 1 Daly, 1. 
 Colorado. § 18; Connecticut, Gen. St., ^ gaggg^t v. Crowell, 3 Robt. 72. Lia- 
 1902, § 1019; Georgia, Code, 1895, §4896; bility in solido means a joint liability, 
 Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3176; In- where all must be proceeded against, and 
 diana, Burns' St., § 274 ; Iowa, Code, the judgment is recovered against all, but 
 1897. § 3487 ; Kansas, Gen. St., 1901, may be fully enforced against either, and 
 § 4474 ; Kentucky, § 30 ; Missouri, Rev. , he left to his right of contribution, if anv, 
 St., 1899, §417: Montana, § 588; North against his fellows. In reference to the 
 Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5240; Ohio, general doctrine stated iu the te.xt, con- 
 Bates' St., § 5016; Oklahoma. St., 1893, suit Smith's Mercantile Law, pp. 237, 2.3S 
 § 3915 ; Oregon, Hills' Laws, § 40; South (Am. ed), and Abbott on Shipping, 
 Carolina, § 143 ; South Dakota, Ann. St., pp. 116-118 (marg. pag.).
 
 288 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 insurers of her by different policies, to whom an abandonment 
 had been made on account of a total loss. Altliough their inter- 
 ests and their liabilities were unequal, they might all be sued in 
 a single action, and a separate judgment could be rendered against 
 each in proportion to his or its liability.^ 
 
 § 200. * 299. III. Actions upon Contract ; Joint Liability. 
 Common-Law Bules Unchanged in Legal Actions. Exceptions. 
 Notwithstanding the general intent of the codes — ■ which, I 
 think, is very plain — to substitute the equitable in place of the 
 legal doctrines upon the subject of joint liability and of the 
 necessary defendants in actions brought thereon, this intent has 
 not guided the courts in the decision oi the particular cases as 
 they have arisen. The overwhelming weight of authority, in 
 passing upon the subordinate and practical questions, has deter- 
 mined that no such change has actually been made, and that the 
 common-law rules are left controlling in all legal actions. ^ The 
 only modification — and it is rather formal than real — seems to 
 be in the manner of raising the questions. In an action against 
 joint debtors, or to enforce a joint liability arising out of contract, 
 all of the joint debtors or joint contractors that are living must 
 be united as co-defendants ; ^ and a neglect to make such union 
 of parties, if properly taken advantage of, will be fatal to the 
 action.'* In other words, the codes, in the absence of such ex- 
 
 1 Cloon !-. City Jus. Co., 1 Handy, 32, partnership described as the firm of A. & 
 per Gholson J., Superior Court of Cin- B., and alleged to be composed of the in- 
 cinuati. dividuals A. & B. is not amendable so as 
 
 2 This general statement does not, of to make the action one against a partner- 
 course, apply in those States whose codes ship described as the firm of C. & B., and 
 expressly cliange the common-law rules in composed of the individuals C. & B." 
 respect to joint debtors and joint liability All partners Tnust be joined : Jones v. 
 upon contract, and expressly permit any Langhorne (189.'5), 19 Colo. 206, 34 Pac. 
 number to be sued, and also the personal 99"; Cox u. Gille Hardware Co. (1899), 
 represi-ntatives of deceased joint debtors 8 Okla. 483, 58 I'ac. 045. Where a joint 
 to be united with the .survivors, etc. See liability l)ut not a partnership is alleged, 
 supra, § * 118. proof of the partnership is admissible to 
 
 3 QHut where all have not been served sliow the joint liability : First Nat. Bank 
 witli proce.ss, the action may proceed v. Hattenbach (1900), 13 S. D. 365, 83 
 against tliose served : Gyger v. Courtney N. W. 421.] 
 
 (1900), 59 Neb. 555, 81 N. W. 437; Per- * [^Montana, by statute, allows suit 
 
 kins County v. Miller (1898), 55 Neb. 141, against two or more persons transacting 
 
 75 N. W. 577 ; Clark v. Commercial Nat. business under a common name, to be 
 
 Bank (1903), — Neb. — , 94 N. VV. 958. brought against tiiem in such common 
 
 In Greer v. Waxeibaum (1902), 115 name, the summons to i)e served on one or 
 
 Oa. 866, 42 S. E. 206, the court said : " A more of the a.ssociates, § 590. Similar 
 
 petition in an action brought against a statute in Colorado, § 14; California,
 
 DEFENDANTS JOINTLY LIABLE ON CONTRACT. 
 
 289 
 
 press provisions as are found in those of some States, Mia ve not 
 changed the nature of joint liability on contract, nor assimilated 
 it to a several or joint and several one.^ While this doctrine is 
 
 ^ 388; Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5177; 
 Wyoming, Kev. St., 1899, §3485; Utah, 
 Rev. St., 1898, § 2927 ; Connecticut, Gen. 
 St., 1902, §588; Ohio, K. S., 1900, §5011.] 
 
 1 QIu Arkansas and Kentucky the 
 statute is as follows : " Where two or more 
 persons are jointly bound by contract, the 
 action thereon may be brought against all 
 or any of them, at the plaintiff's option." 
 Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig. § 5634 ; 
 Kentucky, Code, 1895, § 27. 
 
 In Kansas and Missouri the statute is 
 as follows : " In all cases of joint obliga- 
 tions and joint assumptions of co-partners 
 or others, suits may be brought and pros- 
 ecuted against any one or more of those 
 who are so liable." Kansas, Gen. St., 
 1901, § 1193; Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, 
 §892. 
 
 The Iowa statute is somewhat more 
 comprehensive : " Where two or more 
 persons are bound by contract or by judg- 
 ment, decree or statute, whetlier jointly 
 only, or jointly and severally, or severally 
 only, including the parties to negotiable 
 paper, common orders and checks, and 
 sureties on the same or separate instru- 
 ments, or by any liability growing out of 
 the same, the action thereon may, at the 
 plaintiff's option, be brought against any 
 or all of them." Code 1897, § 3465. 
 
 The North Carolina statute is as fol- 
 lows : " In all cases of joint contracts of 
 •co-partners in trade or others, suit may be 
 brought and prosecuted on the same 
 against all, or any number of the persons 
 making such contracts." Code, 1883, § 187. 
 
 In 1897 Minnesota adopted a similar 
 statute. Laws 1897, chap. 303, reading as 
 follows : " A joint or separate or several 
 action may be brouglit against any one or 
 more or all of the ])arties liable upon such 
 joint obligation, and a joint or several 
 judgment niuy be entered against any one 
 or more or all of tiie parties liable upon 
 such joint obligation ; provided, however, 
 tlie court may, upon application by any 
 interested party, or upon its own motion, 
 require the ])Iaintiff to bring in as parties 
 defendant all of the parties jointly liable 
 on any such obligation. ""] 
 
 2 Bridge v. Payson, 5 Sandf. 210; 
 Wooster v. Chamberlain, 28 Barb. 602 ; 
 Tinkum v. O'Neale, 5 Nev. 93 ; Keller r. 
 Blasdel, 1 Nev. 491; Jenks v. Opp, 43 
 Ind. 108, 110; Kamm i'. Harker, 3 Ore. 
 208; Aylesworth v. Brown, 31 Ind. 270; 
 Bledsoe v. Irvin, 35 Ind. 293; Hardy v. 
 Blazer, 29 Ind. 226 ; 92 Am. Dec. 347 ; 
 Braxton v. State, 25 Ind. 82 ; Shafer v. 
 Moriarty, 46 Ind. 9, 13. See Lane v. 
 Salter, 51 N. Y. 1. In Bledsoe v. Irvin, 
 the court said that the decision there 
 made did not conflict with the doctrine 
 of Goodnight v. Goar, 30 Ind. 418, which 
 was that " the code seems to have re- 
 enacted the rules which prevailed in 
 equity as to who must join as plaintiffs 
 and may be joined as defendants," becau.se, 
 even in equity, such parties (joint delitors) 
 must all be made defendants, and thus 
 brought before the court; citing, in sup- 
 port of this equity rule, 1 Dan. Ch. Frac. 
 329 ; Perry v. Turner, 55 Mo. 418. If one 
 of two or more joint debtors has been 
 discharged in bankruptcy, he is still a 
 necessary defendant, since his defence is 
 personal, and must be specially pleaded. 
 Jenks V. Opp, 43 Ind. 108, 110, HI. See 
 also, retaining the common-law rule, 
 People V. Sloper, 1 Idaho, 158; Ryan v. 
 State Bk., 10 Neb. 524; Rider Life Raft 
 Co. V. Roach, 97 N. Y. 378. 
 
 [^Kansas and Missouri have the follow- 
 ing statute : " All contracts which, by the 
 common law, are joint only, shall be con- 
 strued to be joint and several." Kansas, 
 Gen. St,, 1901, § 1190; Missouri, Rev. St., 
 1899, § 889. Colorado has a statute 
 almo.st identical, Mills' St., § 2528, quoted 
 in note to § * 303. And a recent Minnesota 
 statute, Laws 1897, chap. 303, provides 
 that " Parties to a joint obligation sliall 
 be jointly and severally liable tliereon for 
 the full amount thereof." 
 
 In Outcalt V. Collier (1899), 8 Okla. 
 473, 58 Pac. 642, the court held tliat under 
 the various sections of the Oklahoma 
 statutes, contracts wliich appear to be 
 joint must be construed to be joint and 
 several. See § *276, note. 
 
 Held, in Davison v. Harmon (189G), 
 
 19
 
 290 
 
 CIVIL EEMEDIES. 
 
 generally accepted in the States which have adopted the reform 
 system of procedure, in a few of them, as has been said, the 
 language of the statute is much more specific, and this language, 
 it is held by the courts, substantially abolishes all joint debts and 
 contract liabilities, and reduces them to joint and several liabili- 
 ties; or, rather, it produces a still greater effect, for, as judicially 
 interpreted, it permits the creditor to sue one, all, or any number 
 ho pleases, of the debtors or persons liable on the contract.^ 
 
 v^ 201. * 300. One of two or more Joint Contractors Incapacitated. 
 Retired Partners. If one of two or more joint contractors is in- 
 capable of entering into a valid agreement, but all are sued 
 jointly in one action, judgment may be recovered against those 
 alone who are capable of contracting and of binding themselves 
 thereby ; as, for example, where a note had been given in a firm 
 name, and the jDartners, who were husband and wife, were both 
 
 65 Minn. 402, 67 N. W. 101.5, that where 
 a plaintiff brings an action upua a joint 
 contract, and, upon default of one of the 
 joint del>tor.s, takes a judgment bv default 
 against him, such judgment is a bar to a 
 subsequent action against the others. But 
 it was held in Pfefferkorn v. Haywood 
 (1896), 65 Minn. 429, 68 N. W. 68, that if 
 the debt is in fact joint and several, 
 though alleged to be joint, and judgment 
 by default is so entered, tlie court may 
 thereafter allow an amendment of the 
 complaint to conform it to the facts.] 
 
 ' This is the nece.'isary effect of the 
 provision in the code of each State re- 
 ferred to in the text, and named in note 
 last preceding; namely, Kansas, Kose v. 
 Williams, 5 Kan. 483 ; .Jefferson County 
 Com'rs 1-. Swain, 5 Kan. 376 ; Crane v. 
 Ring, 48 Kan. 58 ; Whittcnhall v. Korber, 
 12 Kan. 618; Alvey v. Wilson, 9 Kan. 
 401. 405 ; Silver v. Foster, 9 Kan. 56, 59. 
 Iowa, llyerson v. Hendrie, 22 Iowa, 480, 
 an action sustained against one of the 
 ])artners upon a firm note ; the opinion of 
 Cole J. is a very full discussion of tiie 
 doctrine and of the changes ninde by tiie 
 new system, — an exceedingly instructive 
 opinion, but too long for (|uotation. Ken 
 lucky, Gos.sora v. Badgett, 6 Bush, 97 ; 
 Nichols ir. Burton, 5 Bush, 320. This last 
 case holds thai a judgment against one 
 jiartner uii a firm debt extinguishes the 
 demand, and is a bar to any subsequent 
 
 action thereon against the other partners. 
 This result is expressly guarded against 
 by the codes of certain other States. 
 Bradford v. Toney, 30 Ark. 763 ; Williams 
 V. Rogers, 14 Bush, 776 (a judgment in 
 the suit against one or more is riot a bar 
 to an action against the others, overruling 
 Nichols r. Burton) ; Lingenfelser r. Simon, 
 49 Ind. 82 (fier contra, it is a bar ; but the 
 execution of a note by one joint debtor is 
 not a satisfaction of the joint liability, 
 unless taken under an express agreement 
 that it siiould be so). It is held in Mis- 
 souri that a judgment is not a contract 
 within the meaning of the statute, and 
 that therefore in a suit upon a joint judg- 
 ment all the judgment debtors must be 
 made defendants ; Sheehan & L. Transp. 
 Co. V. Sims, 28 Mo. App. 64; coH^ra, in- 
 terpreting the same statute, Belleville 
 Sav. Bk. V. Winslow, 30 Fed. Rep. 488. 
 It is held in Colorado that the language 
 of the statute in tiiat State (Gen. Stat. 
 § 1834), "All joint oidigations and cove- 
 nants shall hereafter be taken and held to 
 be joint and several obligations and cove- 
 nants," does not embrace or apply to oral 
 contracts. Kxchange Bank v. Ford, 
 7 Colo. 314; I^Kellogg v. Window (1897), 
 100 la. 552, 69 N. W. 875 ; Council Bluffs 
 Bank v. Griswold (1897), .50 Neb. 753, 70 
 N. W. 376, construing: the Iowa statute ; 
 IHnstein c. .Johnson (1893),.112 N. C 253, 
 17 S. E. 155.3
 
 DEFENDANTS JOINTLY LIABLE ON CONTRACT. 291 
 
 sued, judgment would be given against the husband alone. ^ 
 ^\'hen a contract is made by a iirm, all the persons who were then 
 members of the partnership continue liable upon it, even though 
 some of them may have retired fi'om the firm before the contract 
 was broken. No arrangement among the partners tliemselve.s 
 can change their liability to their common creditor, unless he is a 
 party thereto, and in some manner discharges an outgoing mem- 
 ber from his responsibility. A suit, therefore, where there has 
 been no such discharge, should be brought against all the persons 
 who were partners at the time when the agreement was entered 
 into or the indebtedness was incurred.^ 
 
 § 202. * 301. Case of Implied Contracts. Illustrations. The 
 rule which requires that all joint debtors must be made defend- 
 ants applies to the cases wliere the contract is implied, as well as 
 to those in which it is express. Thus, when two or more ad- 
 ministrators, or an administrator and an administratrix, have been 
 appointed over an estate, and upon their retainer services are 
 rendered by a person for their benefit, — • as, for example, by a 
 lawyer retained to conduct legal proceedings affecting the estate, 
 — they are jointly liable to him for his compensation, and should 
 be sued jointly in an action to recover it; their different and 
 even hostile interests in the final distribution do not alter the 
 nature of their liability upon the contract, express or implied, 
 made with the person thus employed.^ The case of persons 
 liable to repay money which had been paid by mistake, is 
 another familiar example of liability arising from implied con- 
 tract ; all the parties upon whom such duty rests should be 
 joined in the suit to recover the .money.* The members of a 
 joint-stock association, not being a corporation, are jointly liable 
 as partners for the debts and contracts of such association.^ 
 
 1 Bramskill v. James, 11 N. Y. 294. Kentucky, by statute, a surety who has 
 
 See Groat v. I'hillips, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 42, paid the debt or a part thereof may sue 
 
 where a wife who had joined in a contract the principal debtor and the co-surety in 
 
 was omitted in the action. one action, and recover from the former 
 
 " Briggs V. Briggs & A^ose, 15 N. Y. the whole amount, and from the latter his 
 
 471. See also Bowen r. Crow, 16 Neb. contributory share. llobiusou v. Jen- 
 
 5.56 (an action to recover taxes levied nings, 7 Bush, 6.30 ; 2 R. S. 398, ch. 97, § 7. 
 
 upon property OM'ned by a partnership, ^ j^So, in Thurmond v. Cedar Spring 
 
 which had been dissolved at the time the Baptist Church (1900), 110 Ga. 816, .36 
 
 action was brought: all the members of S. E. 221, it was held tliat tlie members 
 
 the late firm must be joined). of an unincorporated religious society are 
 
 •* Mygatt V. Wilcox, 1 Lans. 55. liable as joint promisors on its contracts. 
 
 * Duncan v. Berlin, 5 Robt. 457. In If such society luis duly appointed trustees
 
 292 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 Although the statute permits a creditor to sue the president 
 or otlier managing officer, tlie judgment thus obtained can onl}' 
 be enforced out of the common property. If he desires to enforce 
 his chiim against the members individually, he must unite all of 
 them as defendants, no matter how numerous, as in an action 
 a'T-ainst an ordinary tirm.^ The apparent exception, which existed 
 at the common law, to the general rule requiring all joint debtors 
 to be sued, remains in full force under the new system, so that a 
 dormant partner need not necessarily be included as a defendant 
 in an action against tiie firm, although of course he may be so 
 joined, if the plaintiff elect.^ 
 
 S 203. *302. Survivorship. In States containing no Special Stat- 
 utory Provisions respecting Joint Liability, Common-Law Rule Un- 
 changed. Practical Result herein. I am finally brought to the 
 case where one or more of several joint debtors dies. The com- 
 mon-law rule had been settled from the earliest period that only the 
 survivors could be sued. Equity had modified this legal doctrine, 
 and permitted an action against the personal representatives of 
 the deceased debtor or contractor. Has an}^ change in this 
 respect been introduced by the new procedure ? It is now es- 
 tablished by a great preponderance of authority, in those States 
 whose codes do not contain the special provisions concerning 
 joint liability already referred to,^ that these rules, as they existed 
 immediately prior to the reform legislation, have not been in any 
 manner modified, but remain in active o[)eration as a part of the 
 present system. The practical result is, upon the death of one 
 or moi-e joint debtors, obligors, or promisors, a legal action, can 
 be maintained against the survivors alone, and in such action 
 the personal representatives of the deceased cannot be made 
 defendants for any purpose. An equitable action, however, can 
 be maintained ajjainst the administrators or executors of the 
 
 to huld and manage its property, the 498 ; Farwell r. Davis, 66 Barb. 7,3 ; Leslie 
 
 trustees are the. only necessary parties in v. Wiley, 47 N. Y. 648. Compare Marvin 
 
 an action for money furnisheil to the use v. Wilber, 52 N. Y. 270. Even when the 
 
 of the ehnrcli : .losey v. Union Loan & dormant partner is the husband of the 
 
 Trust Co. (1898), 106 (ia. 608, .32 S. E. ostensible one. Scott c Conway, .58 N. Y. 
 
 028.] 619; Woodbouse v. Duncan, 106 N. Y. 
 
 ' King.sland /•. Hraisteil, 2 Lans. 17. r)27. 
 
 2 North f. Hlo.'is, .30 N. Y. .374 : Cuok- ■* See these j)rovisions in the codes of 
 
 ingham v. [.lu^her, 2 K<>ves, 4.")4 ; liiirllint Missouri. Kentucky, Iowa. Kaiis;is, Nortii 
 
 '•. I'ost, 1 Hosw 28; Brown r. Birdsall, ( 'arolina. QMiniiesota and Arkansas, a«^e, 
 
 29 Bar!). .')4') ; Arnold *. .Morris, 7 Daly, p. 289, note 1.]
 
 DEFENDANTS JOINTLY LIABLE ON CONTRACT. 
 
 293 
 
 deceased when, and only when, either the legal remedy against' 
 the survivors has been exhausted, or such remedy would be 
 absolutely useless. In such equitable action, therefore, the plain- 
 tiff must either aver and prove the recovery of a judgment and 
 the issue and the return of an execution thereon unsatisfied, 
 against the survivors, or else that the survivors are utterly 
 insolvent.^ This rule differs from that prevailing in England 
 in a single particular. ^ The English Court of Chancery permits 
 
 1 [^Dishneau y. Newton (1895), 91 Wis. 
 199, 64 N. W. 879.J Voorhis v. Child's 
 Ex., 17 N. Y. 3.54; Richter v. Poppen- 
 liauseii, 42 N. Y. 373 ; Pope v. Cole, 55 
 N. Y. 124; Lane v. Doty, 4 Barb. 534; 
 Voorhis v. Baxter, I Ahb. Pr. 43 ; Moore- 
 liouse V. Ballon, 16 Barb. 289; Bentz v. 
 Thurber, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 645 ; Maples 
 r. Geller, 1 Nev. 233, 237, 239 ; Fowler v. 
 Houston, 1 Nev. 469, 472 ; Kimball v. Whit- 
 ney, 15 Ind. 280, 283; Barlow (•. Scott's 
 Adni., 12 Iowa, 63 ; Pecker v. Cannon, 1 1 
 Iowa, 20; Marsh v. Goodrell, 11 luwa, 
 474; Williams y. Scott's Adm., 11 Iowa, 
 475. The last four cases were all on joint 
 and several notes, and it was lield that tlie 
 rule applied to them as well as to ohliffa- 
 tions purely joint. It should be observed 
 that all these Iowa cases were decided 
 jirior to the "revision " of the statutes 
 made in 1860. County of Wapello r. 
 Bigham, 10 Iowa, 39 ; Childs r. Hyde, 10 
 Iowa, 294; People v. Jenkins, 17 Cal. 500; 
 Humphreys v. Crane, 5 Cal. 173; May 
 V. Han.son, 6 Cal. 642. But in Bank of 
 Stockton r. Howland, 42 Cal. 129, an ac- 
 tion against the survivors and the admin- 
 istrator of a deceased joint debtor was 
 held to be properly brought ; the judg- 
 ment, however, should be severed, and 
 against the survivors should be de bonis 
 jiropriis, and against the administrator de 
 honis testatoris. See also Bostwick v. Mc- 
 Evoy, 62 Cal. 496 ; Lawrence v. Doolan, 
 68 Cal. 309. It was decided in Parker r 
 Jack.son, 16 Barb. 33, per Gridley J., that 
 ail action could be maintained against 
 llie survivor and the personal represent- 
 ative of a deceased maker of a Joinf aiid 
 s'-iy nd note, without alleging or proving 
 til", in.solvency of the survivor. For the 
 ]iroceedings when the cause of action is 
 for a tort, and survives upon the death of 
 one of the wrongdoers, see Bond v. Smith, 
 
 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 239 ; and when the prom- 
 ise is joint and several, see Speyers v. 
 Fisk, 6 N. Y. Sup.Ct. 197, and cases cited. 
 When an execution against the survivors 
 of joint debtors has been returned unsat- 
 isfied, the action against the personal rep- 
 resentatives of the deceased debtor will 
 lie, although it may turn out that the 
 survivors were not insolvent. Pope r. 
 Cole, 55 N. Y. 124, and .see Yates v. Hoff- 
 man, 5 Hun, 113. See also Livermore 
 V. Bushnell, 5 Hun, 285 (in an action 
 against defendants jointly liable on a 
 contract, if one or more die the action 
 does not abate ; the death should be sug- 
 gested on the record, and the action pro- 
 ceed against the survivors; the personal 
 representatives of the deceased cannot be 
 joined) ; Cairnes v. O'Bleness, 40 Wis. 
 469 (same); Jones v. Keep, 23 Wis. 45; 
 Masten v. Blackwell, 8 Hun, 313; Lanier 
 V. Irvine, 24 Minn. 116, pending an action 
 on a joint and several bond, if one of the 
 defendants dies it ma}' be continued against 
 the survivors, without joining the rep- 
 resentatives of the deceased defendant; 
 . Scholey v. Halsey, 72 N. Y. 578 ; Mat- 
 tison V. Childs, 5 Colo. 78 (following the 
 common-law rule) : Seaman v. Slater, 18 
 Fed. R. 485. When the joint debtor who 
 dies is a mTe surety, his estate is abso- 
 lutely discharged from all liability at law 
 or in equity, — that is, liability to the 
 creditor. Wood v. Fiske, 63 N. Y. 245 ; 
 Getty r. Binsse, 49 id. 385, and cases 
 cited ; Davis v. Van Buren, 72 id. 587, 
 588, 589, and cases cited ; Pickersgill v. 
 Lahens, 15 Wall. 140. 
 
 - ^The very recent case of Potts v. 
 Dounce (1903), 173 N. Y. 335, 66 N. E. 
 4, affirming Potts r. Baldwin, 67 App. 
 Div. 434, states a different rule in that 
 State from the rule given in the text. It 
 was an action upon a promissory note.
 
 294 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 a suit ao-ainst the personal representatives of tlie deceased at 
 once, without attempting, much less exhausting, any remedy 
 at law against the survivor. In other woixis, the creditor lias his 
 option at all times to sue the survivors at law, or the representa- 
 tives of the deceased in equity, whether the survivors are solvent 
 or not ; and this doctrine has been adopted in several American 
 States.^ 
 
 ^ 204. * 303. States whose Codes contain Provisions Changing 
 Common-Law Rule. Result. These doctrines and modes of pro- 
 cedure in reference to the enforcing a joint demand when one 
 debtor dies, have not, however, been accepted in all the States 
 which have adopted the new system. In Indiana it is declared 
 to be the true meaning and intent of the provisions of the code 
 abolishing the distinctions between legal and equitable actions, 
 and introducing the equitable principles concerning parties, and 
 proN'iding for a severance in the judgment, that upon the death 
 of one or more joint, or joint and several debtors or obligors, an 
 action will lie at once against the survivors and the administra- 
 tors or executors of the deceased.^ In certiiin States, special pro- 
 brought against three surviving joint 
 promisors and tiie executor of the fourth. 
 The question presented to the court was 
 whether tiie executor of the deceased 
 maker was properly joined. Section 758 
 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended 
 in 1877, provides that in case of the death 
 of one of two or more plaintiffs, or defend- 
 ants, if the entire cause of action survives 
 to, or against, the others, the ac-tion may 
 proceed in favor of, or against, the sur- 
 vivors ; " but the estate of a person or 
 ])arty, jointly liable upon contract with 
 others, shall not be discharged by his 
 death, and tlie court may make an order 
 to bring in the proper representative of 
 the decedent, when it is necessary so 
 to do for the proper disposition of the 
 matter." The court, by (Jray J., says : 
 " While this section, by its place in the 
 code, is applical)le to the case of the 
 death of a party pending tlie action, it 
 must, nevertliejess, be reganled as making 
 a material alteration in the law and as 
 imjiosing a liability wiicre none existed 
 before. ... At common law, her death 
 would have terminated her liability; but, 
 while no action at law could have been 
 brouglit against her estate, as she was a 
 
 joint debtor, equity, if an inability to 
 collect from the survivors were sliowii, 
 would have allowed a recovery against the 
 estate. Section 758 of the code, now, by 
 continuing the liability of the estate of 
 the deceased, enables that liability to be 
 enforced iu an actiou at law. It effects, 
 directly, what, formerly, equity intervened 
 to accomidisli. But, while tlie legal rule 
 of liability has beeu changed, the rule of 
 procedure is not, and when the personal 
 representatives of the deceased joint debtor 
 are directly ])roceeded against at law, the 
 plaintiff should, still, allege the in.solvency, 
 or inat)ility to ])ay, of the survivors. "^ 
 
 1 Wilkinson r. Henderson, 1 My. & K. 
 582; Braithwaite r. Britain, 1 Keen, 219; 
 Brown r. Weatherby, 12 Sim. 6, 11. The 
 survivors, however, should be made co- 
 defendants. 
 
 - Braxton v. The State, 25 Ind. 82; 
 Katon u. Burns, 31 Ind. .T.H). The former 
 of tliese cases is an aide and instructixo 
 decision; the opinion presents the equi- 
 table theory of interpreting the code in 
 a clear and convincing manner. Voorliisr. 
 Child's Ex., sujuui, was expressly dis- 
 approved. In Klu.ssman v. Copeland, 18 
 lud. 30G, the uniting the adiiiinislrator
 
 DEFENDANTS JOINTLY LIABLE ON CONTKACT. 
 
 295 
 
 visions of the codes, or of other statutes, expressly authorize an 
 action to be brought in the first instance against the survivors 
 and the personal representatives of the deceased joint debtor, 
 or even against some, any, or one of them, at the option of the 
 plaintiff.^ 
 
 of a deceased joint debtor as a co-defendant 
 with the survivor was declared not to 
 be necessary. When a bond had been 
 executed by a guardian and his surety, 
 and the surety had died, tlie action on tiie 
 bond may be brouglit iu Indiana against 
 the surviving principal and the heirs nf 
 the deceased obligor, the latter being 
 liable of course to the extent of the lands 
 descended to them. Voris v. State, ex 
 re/. Davis, 47 Ind. 345, 349, 350 ; and nn 
 action may be maintained on an ad- 
 ministrator's bond against the surviving 
 principal — the administrator — and tb.e 
 executor of a deceased surety. Tlie bond 
 was assumed to be joint, and the judg- 
 ment was against both defendants in solido 
 for the full amount. Myers v. State, ex 
 rel. McCray, 47 Ind. 293, 297 ; citing and 
 following Braxton l-. State, supra, and 
 Owen V. State, 25 Ind. 107. See also 
 Hays V. Crutcher, 54 Ind. 260. The 
 courts of South Carolina have put the 
 same interpretation upon the code pro- 
 visions. See Trinimier v. Thomson, 10 
 Rich. L. 164; Susoug r. Vaiden, 10 Rich. 
 L. 247 ; Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, 17 S. C. 106. 
 [^The Indiana doctrine was approved by 
 the Supreme Court of Wyoming in the 
 case of Chadwick v. Hopkins (1893), 4 
 Wyo. 379, 34 Pac. 899. In the course of 
 the opinion the court says : " The one 
 sufficient reason for the rule of the com- 
 mon law, that the surviving joint obligor 
 and the representatives of the estate of 
 the deceased could not be joined as defend- 
 ants in an action at law, was the inal)ility 
 of a court of law to render separate and 
 different judgments in a single action — 
 against the survivor to be satisfied de bonis 
 propriis, and against the administrators of 
 the estate of the deceased to l)e satisfied 
 from such estate in due course of adminis- 
 tration. From the same reason it followed 
 that the survivor alone was liable in an 
 action at law, and that if he were solvent 
 and the action tlius available for the col- 
 lection of the debt the plaintiff need go 
 
 no further, and he was not permitted to 
 do so. In the code States this, the only 
 reason for the rules of the common law 
 upon the subject, has entirely disappeared. 
 . . . With all due respect for the o])inions 
 of some eminent courts wliich seem to 
 liold differently, we are of the opinion 
 that codes such as ours, doing away with 
 the reason of the common-law rule under 
 consideration as to joinder of parties de- 
 fendant, also furnish, iu terms sufficiently 
 clear, a new rule to be followed in its 
 stead." Citing the text, and cases from 
 Ohio, v'>outh Carolina, and Indiana. J 
 
 1 QThe statutes upon this subject are 
 as follows : 
 
 Ohio: "Where two or more persons 
 shall be indebted in any joint contract, or 
 upon a judgment founded upon any such 
 contract, and either of tliem shall die, his 
 estate shall be liable therefor, as if the 
 contract had been joint and several, or as 
 if tlie judgment had been against himself 
 alone." Bates St., § 6102. 
 
 Iowa: " When any of those so bound 
 [jointly] are dead, the action may be 
 brought against any or all of the sur- 
 vivors, with any or all of the representa- 
 tives of the decedents, or against any or 
 all such representatives." Code, 1897, 
 § 3465. 
 
 Kentucky : " If any of the persons so 
 bound [jointly] be dead, the action may 
 be brought against any or all of the sur- 
 vivors with the representatives of all or 
 any of the decedents, or against the latter 
 or any of them." Code, 1895, § 27. 
 
 ilissouri : " In case of the death of one 
 or more of the joint obligors or promisors, 
 the joint debt or contract sliall and may 
 survive against the heirs, executors, and 
 administrators of the deceased obligor or 
 promisor, as well as against the sur- 
 vivors." Rev. St., 1899, § 890. 
 
 Kansas : Same as Missouri. Gen. St., 
 1901, § 1191. 
 
 Indiana: "When two or more persons 
 shall be jointly liable on a contract or
 
 296 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 205, * 304. Criticism of General Rule, Although the inter- 
 pretation put upon the cotles in reference to tliis particular sub- 
 
 judgment, and either of them shall die, 
 his estate, executors, and administrators 
 shall be liable for the failure to perform 
 the contract ami for the payment of the 
 judgment, to the same extent and in the 
 same maimer as if such contract or judg- 
 ment were joint and several." Burns St., 
 1901, § 6.36. 
 
 Arlcansas : " Where any of the persons 
 so bound [jointly] are dead, the action 
 may be brought against any or all of the 
 survivors, with the representatives of all 
 or anv of the decedents." Sand. & Hills' 
 Dig.,"§ 5634. 
 
 Minnesota : " When two or more persons 
 are indebted on any joint contract, or upon 
 a judgment founded on a joint contract, 
 and either of them die, his estate is liable 
 therefor, and the amount thereof may be 
 allowed by the probate court, as if the 
 contract had been joint and several, or 
 as if the judgment had been against him 
 alone." St., 1894, § 4521. 
 
 iVisconsin : " When two or more per- 
 sons shall be indebted ou any joint con- 
 tract or upon a judgment founded upon 
 a contract, and either of them shall die, 
 his estate shall be liable tlierefor, and the 
 claim may be allowed by the court as if 
 the contract had been joint and several 
 or as if the judgment had been against 
 him alone, and the other parties to such 
 joint contract may be compelled to con- 
 tribute or to pay the same if they would 
 liave been liable to do so upon payment 
 thereof by the deceased." St., 1 898, § 3848. 
 
 Colorado : " All joint obligations and 
 covenants shall hereafter be taken and 
 held to be joint and several obligations 
 and covenants." Mills St., § 2528. 
 
 New York : " The estate of a person or 
 party, jointly liable upon contract with 
 otliers, shall not i)e discharged by his 
 death, and the court may make an order 
 to bring in the proper representative of 
 the decedent, when it is necessary so to do 
 for the proper disposition of the matter." 
 Code ('iv. Pro. § 758. See Potts v. Dounce 
 (1903), 173 N. Y. 335, O X. E. 4. quoted 
 at length in nuto to § ».3()2, for a judicial 
 interpretation of this statute. 
 
 South Dakota: " Where one of two or 
 
 more plaintiffs, or one of two or more 
 defendaats, in an action, dies, and only 
 part of the cause of action, or of several 
 distinct causes of action, survives to or 
 against the others, the action may proceed 
 without bringing in the person who haa 
 succeeded to the rights of the deceased 
 party ; and the judgment shall not affect 
 him, or his interest in the subject of the 
 action. But the court may order such 
 successor of a deceased party, or any 
 person who claims to be such successor, 
 to be brought in as a party, either plaintiff 
 or defendant, whenever it appears proper 
 to do so, upon his own application or 
 upon the application of any party to the- 
 actiim, and, if necessary, that supple- 
 mental pleadings be put in." Ann. St., 
 1901, § 6084.] 
 
 Burgoyne v. Ohio L. Ins. & T. Co., 
 .■> Ohio St. 586, 587. This was an action 
 against the surviving makers and the- 
 administrator of a deceased maker of a 
 promissory note. Ranney C. J., after 
 stating the original common-law rule, and 
 quoting a statute of Ohio (Swann's R. S. 
 p. 378) as f(jllows, — " When two or more 
 persons shall be indebted on a joint con- 
 tract or upon a judgment founded upon 
 any such contract, and either of them 
 shall die, his estate shall be liable there- 
 for as if the contract had been joint and 
 several, or as if the judgment had beea 
 against him alone," — proceeds (p. 587): 
 " This statute effected an entire abroga- 
 tion of the common-law principle to which 
 allusion has been made, and left the estate 
 of the joint debtor liable to every legal 
 remedy as fully as though the contract 
 had been joint and several. Until the 
 passage of the act to establish a code of 
 civil procedure, it is true his personal 
 representatives and the survivors could 
 not be sued in the same action. But by 
 the 38th section of that act it is provided 
 that ' ])ersons severally liable on the same 
 obligation or instrument may all or any 
 of them be included in the same action 
 at the oj)tion of the plaintiff.' And the 
 371st section allows a several judgment 
 to be given against any one of the defend- 
 ants as tlie nature of the case mav re-
 
 DEFENDANTS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE. 297 
 
 ject by the courts of New York and of many other States is 
 clearly established by an overwhelming weight of authority, I 
 do not hesitate to say that it is as plainly opposed to the obvious 
 intent, and even to the very letter, of the reform legislation. 
 When the statute has in express terms abolished all distinctions 
 between actions at law and suits in equity, has declared that in 
 all cases any person may be made a defendant, who has or claims 
 an interest in the controvers}^ adverse to the plaintiff, or who is a 
 necessary party to a complete determination and settlement of the 
 questions involved, and has finally authorized a several judgment 
 to be rendered in any action, it is simpl}" a palpable violation of 
 these positive provisions to say that a creditor shall not maintain 
 a legal action against the personal representatives of a deceased 
 joint debtor, but shall be driven to an equitable suit, and that 
 only in a certain contingency ; it is a useless sacrifice to the merest 
 form. I would not be understood by this criticism as denying 
 the existence of the rule, for it is too well settled to be doubted. 
 If, however, the courts shall at any time accept the intent of the 
 legislatures, as it is plainly shown in their statutory work, and 
 shall adopt a general equitable theory of interpretation, which 
 shall be applied in all cases to all actions without reservation or 
 exception, so that there shall result one single and uniform system 
 of procedure, then without doubt the rule that I am criticising 
 will be abandoned, and the conclusions reached by the Indiana 
 courts will be accepted in all the States. 
 
 § 206. * 305. IV. Actions upon Contract; Joint and Several Lia- 
 bility. No Change by General Language in most Codes. Illustrations. 
 The former doctrine of the common law concerning joint and sev- 
 eral contracts and suits thereon has not been affected by the new 
 procedure, except in those few States, already referred to,^ whose 
 codes or statutes permit the creditor in all cases to sue all, or any, 
 or one of the debtors or co-contractors. The general language 
 found in most of the codes has wrought no change in the practical 
 
 quire. In the opinion of the court, tliese against each according to the nature of 
 
 sections permit the joinder of tlie sur- their respective liabihties." The con- 
 
 vivor or survivors and the personal rep- struction here put upon the Ohio statute 
 
 resentatives of the deceased obligor in is certainly far more equitable, and in ac- 
 
 the same action, whether the contract is cordaiice with their intent, than that put 
 
 in terms j((int and several, or is made so ujion the code of New York. See also 
 
 by the 90th section of the administration Sellon r. Braden, 13 Iowa, 365. 
 Statute upon the death of the joint oldi- ^ Ante, p. 289, note, 
 
 gor, and authorize a separate jiidgnieiit
 
 298 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 rules.^ This proposiuon is sustained b}' many of the cases in 
 reference to joint liability, cited under the foregoing paragraphs ; 
 it is also recognized or distinctly affirmed in many particular in- 
 stances, among wliich I mention a few.^ Two insurance com- 
 panies had insured a building by separate policies, each of which 
 contained the usual rebuilding clause. Upon the occurrence of a 
 fire, they united in a joint notice of their election to rebuild, and 
 partly completed the work under such notice. Default being- 
 made by them, the owner brought an action against one of them 
 to recover damages for the non-performance of the contract to 
 rebuild. It was held that by the election the companies had 
 turned their policies into building contracts, and weie liable ac- 
 cording to the terms thereof, and that the owner might sue both- 
 in a joint action, or either in a separate action ; in other word.;, 
 that their liability was joint and several.^ Premises were leased 
 with covenants against under-letting, and against using the build- 
 ing for certain purposes. The lessee sub-let portions to different 
 under-tenants, Avho violated the covenants by using them in the 
 prohibited manner. An action against all, — the lessee and the 
 sul>tenants, — to recover damages for the breach of the covenants, 
 was held proper, although it was said the plaintiff must have a 
 separate judgment against each defendant for the special injury 
 and wrong done by him. A separate action might also have been 
 brought agaiiLSt the original lessee and each of the under-tenants.* 
 When an ex[»ress joint and several note is made by a firm, and is 
 signed by the firm mime, it retains its joint and several charac- 
 ter ; an action may be brought either against all the })artners, or 
 against each or one of them.^ In certain States, as has already been 
 mentioned,^ the express language of the codes permits an action 
 
 1 [^Certain statutory presumptions exist 1206, 821, 822) of the New York odle. 
 
 in some States. See notes to §§ * 27.t, The entire ileci.sion is in closer hannuny 
 
 *276, where the statutes of California, with tlie plain intent of the coile than 
 
 Montana, Oklahoma, ami North ami South many others whicli have been cited. See 
 
 Dakota are set out.^ Trai)ae r. McAdams, 8 Hush, 74. 
 
 - QStatc V. McD.inalil (189.5), Idaho. 40 -^ Snow v. Howard, 35 Barb. 5.'). See 
 
 Pac. .-Jl'i; Council Bluffs Savings Hank r. D'Gonnaii r. Lindeke, 20 Minn. 9.3 (a joint 
 
 Griswold (1897), 50 Xeb. 7.W, TO X. W. and several bond). A covenant to in- 
 
 S'C] deninify persons against liability on a 
 
 •'' .Morrell r. Irving F. Ins. Co., 3.3 N Y. bond wherein they arc jointly and sev- 
 
 429. erally bound,' is also joint and several. 
 
 ♦ Gillilan r. Norton, Kobt. 546. The Hughes v. Oreg. Hy. & Nav. Co., 11 Ore. 
 
 ruling of tlie court in respect toasepar.ate 437. 
 
 judgment was ba.sed u]>ou § 274 (1205, « J/j/e, p. 280, note.
 
 DEFENDANTS JOINTLY AND SEVEItALLY LIABLE. 299 
 
 against any number of joint and several debtors at the plaintiff's 
 option, as well as against any number of joint debtors.^ ' If 
 several defendants are sued jointly upon an alleged joint and 
 several contract, the plaintiff may sever in the recovery, and take 
 judgment against a portion only, if the evidence shows sucli a 
 liability ; ^ and when one of two or more persons jointly and sever- 
 ally liable dies, the creditor may at once sue the personal repre- 
 sentatives of the deceased in a separate action, or may sue the 
 survivors.^ 
 
 § 207. * 306. V. Actions upon Contract; Several Liability. No 
 Change in Common-Law Doctrines — Except. No change has been 
 made in the common-law doctrines and rules concerning several 
 liability arising from contract, except that produced by the pro- 
 vision found in all the codes in substance as follows. Persons 
 severally liable on the same obligation or instrument, including 
 the parties to bills of exchange, promissory notes, and negotiable 
 bonds, — and in some States sureties, — may all, or any of tliem, 
 be included in the same action at the option of the plaintiff. 
 This clause certainly effects a very important change in the 
 ancient rule, in all cases where the liability flows from an instru- 
 ment or contract in writing, in that it permits a creditor to sue 
 all the several promisors, or any number of them, instead of re- 
 stricting him to a separate action against each.'* The effect of 
 this clause, and the extent of the change wrought by it will be 
 discussed at large in Section VIII. of the present chapter. With 
 this exception, the common-law doctrine is unaltered. In many 
 States it is settled by a decided preponderance of authority, that 
 a principal debtor and a guarantor thereof cannot be joined as 
 co-defendants in the same action. Even wlien the principal debt 
 is evidenced by a written instrument, and the guaranty is in- 
 
 1 Rose V. Williams, 5 Kau. 483 ; Jeffer- 2 [^Black Hills Bank v. Kellogg (1893), 
 
 son County Com'rs v. Swain, 5 Kau. 376; 4 S. D. 312, 56 N. W. 107 L] 
 
 Kupfer V. Sponhorst, 1 Kau. 75 ; Rose i-. ^ gpeyers v. Fisk, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 
 Madden,] Kan. 445 ; Sellou r. Bradeu, 13 197; Parker r. Jackson, 16 Barb. 33; 
 
 Iowa, 365; Ryerson v. Hendrie, 22 Iowa, Mcintosh v. En.^ign, 28 N. Y. 169; Har- 
 
 480 ; Clapp v. Preston, 15 Wis. 543. This rington v. Higham, 15 Barb. 524. 
 
 last case arose under a provision identical * See Powell v. Powell, 48 Cal. 234. 
 
 with § 120 (454) of the New York code as Persons severally liable for different items 
 
 to parties severally liable on the same in- of a general demand cannot be joiued as 
 
 fitrument ; and see Powell v. Powell, 48 Cal. defendants iu one action. Miller v. Curry, 
 
 234. In Kansas a personal money judgment 53 Cal. 665. 
 against two or more is a joint and several 
 obligation. Read v. Jeffries, 16 Kan. 534.
 
 300 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 dorsed upon the same paper, the parties are not " severally liable 
 on the same obligation or instrument," and do not fall within the 
 provision last above quoted. A separate action must be brought 
 against the principal debtor and against the individual guarantor.^ 
 This doctrine does not prevail in all the States. It is held in 
 some, by very able courts, that where the payee or owner of a 
 promissory note transfers the same, and writes a guaranty upon 
 it, he may be sued as a guarantor, together with the maker there- 
 of, in one action ; and the same doctrine has b'cn applied to a 
 similar transfer and guaranty of a contract to pay money not 
 negotiable in form.^ In an ordinary action to recover upon a 
 debt due by an insolvent corpomtion, over which a receiver has 
 been appointed, he is not a necessary, nor even proper co-defend- 
 ant when no cause of action is stated, and no relief is praj^ed 
 against him.^ 
 
 § 208. * 307. VI. Liability in Actions for Tort. Common-Law 
 Doctrines Unchanged. General Rule as to Parties Defendant herein. 
 Illustrations. The common-law doctrines concerning the liability 
 of tort-feasors, and as to the joinder or separation of them in ac- 
 tions brought to recover damages for the wrong, are entirely un- 
 changed by the new SN'stem of procedure. It is unnecessary to 
 repeat these ancient rules ; that they are still in operation with 
 their full force and effect is sufficiently shown b}' the following 
 particular instances. In general, those who have united in the 
 commission of a tort to the person or to property, whether the 
 injury be done by force or be the result of negligence or want of 
 skill, or of fraud and deceit, are liable to the injured party with- 
 out any restriction or limit upon his choice of defendants against 
 whom he may proceed. He may, at his option, sue all the wrong- 
 
 ' QSims i". Clark (1892), 91 Ga. 302, that in each one of these cases the guar- 
 
 18 S. E. 158 ] Le Roy r. Shaw, 2 Dner, aiitor was the original ]jayee or promisee, 
 
 626; De Hidder r. Schcrmerhorn. 10 Barh. and also the assignor; but it must be said 
 
 6.38; Alien v. Fosgate, II How. Pr. 218; that the court does not lay any stress upon 
 
 I'halen i'. Dingee, 4 K. D. Smitli, .379 ; tliis fact as a ground for its decision. 
 Honduront v. Bladen, 19 Ind. 100; Virden » Arnold v. Suff()ll< Bank, 27 Bar!). 424. 
 
 V. KlJsworth, 1.5 Ind. 144. See Stout In an action against two or more as for 
 
 V. Noteman, 30 Iowa, 414, 415 ; Tucker c. money had and received, a comjjlriint is 
 
 Shiner. 24 Iowa, .334. Also Graham v. domurraldo which sliows that the money 
 
 Hingo, 67 Mo. .324; Barton r. Speis, 5 was received otlicrwise than jointly; .al- 
 
 llun, 60 tliough the joinder miglit have lioen 
 
 - Marvin /•. Adamson, 11 Iowa, 371 ; pr()|)er if the action had sounded in tort: 
 
 Mix /'. Kairchild, 12 Iowa, ^r>\ ; Tucker Simmons r. Spencer, 9 Fed. H. 5*^1; 3 
 
 V. Shiner. 24 Iowa, .334: I'eddicord r. McCrary. 48. [|[.<)nstal<>t i: Calkins 
 
 Whiltam, 9 Iowa,471. It is to lie noticed (180S), 120 Cal. (,SS, 53 I'ac. 25!ii.3
 
 DEFENDANTS IN ACTIONS FOR TOR'I 
 
 301 
 
 doers in a single action, or may sue any one, or may sue each 
 in a separate action, or may sue any number he pleases less than 
 all ; the fullest liberty is given him in this respect.^ The only 
 exceptions are those few instances in which the tort from its 
 very nature must be a separate act impossible to be committed 
 by two or more jointly .^ A sheriff and his de[)uty may be sued 
 jointly for the trespasses and other wrongful acts done by the 
 
 '- QBut where a joint issue is presented 
 on the pleadings against a number of 
 tort-feasors, plaintiff has no right to any 
 other than a joint recovery, unless the 
 action has failed as to all but one of 
 the defendants, or unless the joint issue 
 has been modified by a severance in 
 the answers: Ashkraft v. Knoblock (1896), 
 146 Ind. 169, 45 N. E. 69. But see Ilass- 
 ler V. Ilefele (1898), 151 Ind. 391, 50 N. E. 
 361, where the court says, quoting from au 
 earlier case : " It was held in terms that 
 this provision of the code (Burns' R. S., § 
 579) applies to all actions indiscriminately, 
 ■whether founded upon contract or upon 
 tort ; that it is immaterial whether the 
 complaint alleges a joint or a joint and 
 -several liability ; that the right of recovery 
 is, in this respect, to be regulated by the 
 proof and not by the allegations of the 
 complaint ; that, in other words, every 
 complaint is, in the respect stated, to be 
 treated as both joint and several where 
 there are two or more defendants. "J 
 
 2 Creed v. Hartman, 29 N. Y. 591, 592, 
 597 ; Roberts v. Johnson, 58 N. Y. 613, 
 616, an action against one partner only 
 where the entire firm had been guilty 
 of negligence ; Chester v. Dickerson, 52 
 Barb. 349, 358 ; Phelps v. Wait, 30 N. Y. 
 78, an action against principal and agent 
 for negligence of the agent; Kasson v. 
 People, 44 Parb, 347 ; Wood v. Luscomb, 
 23 Wis. 287, an action against one part- 
 ner for negligence by the firm ; Fay v. 
 Davidson, 13 Minn. 523; Mandlebaum v. 
 Russell, 4 Nev. 551 ; McReady v. Rogers, 
 1 Neb. 124; Murphy v. Wilson, 44 Mo. 
 313; Allred y. Bray, 41 Mo. 484; Brady 
 V. Hall, 14 Ind. 317, action for injury done 
 by trespassing animals which belonged to 
 several persons jointly ; Turner c. Hitcli- 
 cock, 20 Iowa, 310, a very elaborate and 
 instructive judgment ; Buckles v. Lam- 
 bert, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 330; Ilubbell v. Meigs, 
 
 50 N. Y. 480, 489; Mcintosh v. Ensign. 
 28 N. Y. 169; Buliis v. Montgomery, 50 
 N. Y. 352. Where a right of action for 
 tort exists against several, and is of sucli 
 a character tliat it survives upon the death 
 of the wrong-doer, if one of the persons 
 liable dies, the action may be brought or 
 continued against his personal representa- 
 tives ; but it is the settled rule in New 
 York that the action in such case must 
 be divided, and one suit be broutj;ht or 
 continued against the survivors, and one 
 against the representatives of the deceased. 
 Bond V. Smith, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 239; 
 4 Hun, 48; HeinmuUer v. Gray, 13 Abl). 
 Pr. N.s. 299 ; Union Bank v. Mott, 27 N. Y. 
 633 ; Gardner v. Walker, 22 How. Pr. 405; 
 McVean v. Scott, 46 Barb. 379. As fur- 
 ther illustrations; — negligence: Vary v. 
 B. C. R. & M. R. Co., 42 Iowa, 246 (joint 
 employers) ; Van Wagenen v. Kemp, 7 
 Hun, 328, a joint action allowed against 
 the owner of a lot for a negligent excava- 
 tion of the sidewalk, and tiie city for 
 negligently suffering the same ; cf . infra, 
 § *308 note; Mitchell r. Allen, 25 id. 
 543 (a release of one of the persons 
 jointly negligent releases all) ; Gudger v. 
 Western N. C. R. Co., 21 Fed. R^ 81; 
 trespass : Wehle r. Butler, 61 N. Y. 245 ; 
 Fleming v. McDonald, 50 Ind. 278; fraud : 
 Bond V. Smith, 4 Hun, 48 (one of the de- 
 fendants dies) ; Hun v. Gary, 82 N. Y. 65 
 (trustees guilty of a tortious breach of 
 trust, a portion of them may be sued — 
 all need not be joined) ; nuisance : Cobb 
 V. Smith, 38 Wis. 21, a mill-dam caused 
 plaintiff's lands to be overflowed ; held, 
 tlie persons who had acquired title to the 
 land on which the dam stands, and by 
 whose authority it has been maintained, 
 are proper co-defendants ; Greene r. Nnn- 
 nemacher, 36 Wis. 50 ; Lohmiller v. Indian 
 Water Co., 51 id. 683; Hillmau v. New- 
 intrton, 57 Cal. 56.
 
 302 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 latter in his official capacity; the deputy, because he actually 
 commits tlie tort, and tlie sheriff because he is the princi- 
 pal.^ A passenger in the cars of one company was injured by a 
 collision with a train of another compajiy which used the same 
 track. The servants of both companies were in fault, and as the 
 wrong was caused by the negligence of each corporation, an action 
 brought against them jointly was sustained.- 
 
 1 Waterbury v. Westcrvelt, 9 N. Y. 
 598; King v. Urser, 4 Diier, 431 ; contra, 
 Moultou r. Norton, 5 Barb. 286, 296, per 
 Pratt J. This dictum is clearly errone- 
 ous. So, too, an executiou or an at- 
 tachment creditor, under whose direction 
 property is tortiously taiien by the sheriff, 
 is properly joined with the slieriff in an 
 a('tion for the trespass : Elder i-. Frevert, 
 18 Nev. 446; Marsh c. Backus, 16 Barb. 
 483. 
 
 •i Colegrove v. X. Y. & N. H. R. Co., 
 20 N. Y. 492; Moouey v. Hudson River 
 R. Co , 5 Robt. 548. 
 
 QA railroad company and its receiver 
 may be joined in an action for tort to 
 recover damages caused by flooding plain- 
 tiff's land : St. Louis, etc. U. II. Co. v. 
 Trigg (1897), 63 Ark. .5 $6, 40 S. W. 579. 
 An engineer and fireman tiirough whose 
 negligence plaintiff's intestate was killed, 
 may be sued jointly with tlie master, the 
 railroad corporati<>n : Winston's Adm'r 
 V. 111. Cent. R. li. Co. |190l), Ky.. 05 
 S. W. 13. A master and servant, gen- 
 erally, may be jointly sued for tiie ser- 
 vant's negligence : Central of Georgia Ky. 
 Co. V. Brown (1901), 113 Ga. 414, .38 S E. 
 989; Greenberg iv VVhitcomI) Lumber Co. 
 (1895), 90 Wis. 225. 63 N. W. 93. A fire- 
 man injured in a collision properly joined 
 as defendants the railroad company, the 
 division superintendent, and the train de- 
 spatcher ; Howe v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. 
 (1902), .30 Wash. 569, 70 Pac. 1100. 
 
 Where a tort is committeil by the .soj)- 
 arate liut concurrent negligence of a town 
 marshal and a board of town trustees, 
 suit may be lirought against them jointly, 
 together with the bondsmen on the mar- 
 hhal'rt bond: Doeg r. Cook (1899), 126 
 Cal. 213, 58 Pac. 707. All who participate 
 in a fraud are jointly liable therefor : 
 Spaulding i>. North Milwaukee Town Site 
 Co. (1900), 106 Wis. 481, 81 N. W. 1064 ; 
 
 Austin r. Murdock (1900), 127 N. C. 454, 
 37 S. E. 478 ; — including those whose 
 gains or losses are attriliutable to the 
 fraud : Stevens v. South ( )gdeu Land Co. 
 (1896), 14 Utah, 2.32, 47 Pac. 81. 
 
 It was held in Page v. Citizens Bank- 
 ing Co. (1900), 111 Ga. 73, 36 S. E. 418, 
 that an action for malicious prosecution 
 may he brouglit jointly against a partuer- 
 sliip, the individual meml)ers tiiereol". and 
 a person not a member, if such prosecu- 
 tion was begun and carrietl on as a result 
 of a conspiracy among tliem. 
 
 The plaintiff may sue any one or more 
 of joint tort-feasors as he may elect : 
 Coddingtou v. Canaday (1901), 157 Ind. 
 243, 61 N. E. 567 ; Pugh v. Chesapeake 
 & Ohio Ry. Co. (1897), 101 Ky. 77, 39 
 S. W. 695 ; Dougla.ss i: Itailway Co. 
 (1894), 91 la. 94, 58 N. W. 1070; lirowu 
 c. City of Webster City (1902), 115 la. 
 511, 88 N. W. 1070; Cumberland Tel. 
 Co. 1-. Ware's Adm'r (1903),— Ky. — , 
 74 S. W. 289; Chapiu i: Bal)Cock (1396), 
 67 Conn. 255, .34 Atl. 1039. 
 
 One joint wrong doer cannot complain 
 that others equally guilty are not joined 
 with him : Berksou v. Kansas City Ry. 
 Co. (1898), 144 Mo. 211, 45 S. W."lll9; 
 Whitman McNamara Tobacco Co. i-. 
 Wurm (1902), Ky., 66 S. W. 609 ; Scott v. 
 Flowers (1900). 60 Neb. 675, 84 N. W. 81. 
 
 The plaintiff may dismiss as to some 
 at any stage of the proceedings, without 
 affecting the merits as to the others : 
 Berksou r. Kansas City Ry. Co. (1898), 
 H4 Mo. 211, 45 S. W. 1119; Melsou v. 
 Thornton (1901), 113 Ga. 99, 38 S. E..342. 
 
 It is held in Coniiecticut, Nichols v. 
 I'eck (1898), 70 Conn. 439, 39 Atl. 803, 
 that the persons jointly guilty of a tres- 
 pass ijnare clitiisnm frer/it shouM be sued 
 jointly, and if several actions are institnted 
 witlmnt due cause such actions should be 
 cousoiidaied.]
 
 DEFENDANTS IN ACTIONS FOR TORT. 
 
 303 
 
 § 209. * 308. Joint Liability must rest upon Community in Wrong- 
 doing. In order, liowever, that the geneial rule thus stated 
 should apply, and a union of wrong-doers in one action should 
 be possible, there must be some commmiity in the wrong-doing 
 among the parties who are to be united as co-defendants ; the in- 
 jury must in some sense be their ^om^ work.^ It is not enougli 
 that the injured party has on certain grounds a cause of action 
 against one, for the physical tort done to himself or liis property, 
 and has, on entirely different grounds, a cause of action against 
 another for the same physical tort ; there must be something 
 more than the existence of two separate causes of action for the 
 same act or default, to enable him to join the two parties liable 
 in the single action. This principle is of universal application.^ 
 
 1 ^But in the case of a joint assault, 
 malice ou the part of one will be attributed 
 to all, and each will be held liable for all 
 tlie damages, both actual and exemplary: 
 Reizeustein v. Clark (1897), 104 la. 287, 
 73 N. W. ,588. So a master and servant are 
 l)oth liable for the servant's wilful tort, 
 if within the scope of his employment : 
 Gardner v. Southern Ry. Co. (1903), 6.5 
 S. C. 341,43 S. E. 816. 
 
 ■^ Trowbridge v. Forepaugh, 14 Minn. 
 133. F., owning a lot in St. Paul abut- 
 ting on a street, dug and left open a dan- 
 gerous hole in the street, into which the 
 plaintiff fell. He sues the city and F. 
 jointly, basing his claim upon the above 
 acts of F., and upon the general duty of 
 the city in respect of its streets. The 
 court held that such a joint action could 
 not be maintained. " The liability of the 
 city depends on a state of facts not affect- 
 ing its co-defendant, and tlie converse is 
 equally true. Neither is, in fact nor in 
 law, chargeable with, nor liable for, the 
 matter set up as a cause of action against 
 the other. They did not jointly conduce 
 to the uijnry." Contra, in Van Wage- 
 nen v. Kemp, 7 Hun, 328, a similar case, 
 the joinder was alloAved. See also Long 
 r. Swindell, 77 N. C. 176; Cogswell v. 
 Murphy, 46 Iowa, 44 ; Keyes ?•. Little 
 York Gold, etc. Co., 53 Cal. 724 ; Mitchell 
 r. Allen, 25 Hun, 543 (a release of one 
 of several joint tort-feasors releases all ; 
 Cooper V. Blair, 14 Oreg. 255 ; Dahms v. 
 Sears, 13 Oreg. 47 ; \yi. K. & T. Ry. Co. 
 I'. Haber (1896), 56 Kan. 694, 44 Pac. 632.] 
 
 ^Where parents wrongfully cause hus- 
 band and wife to separate, they are jointly 
 liable, though each does not participate 
 in all the acts of the other : Price r. 
 Price (1894), 91 la. 693, 60 N. W. 202. 
 And in an action by a wife for damages 
 resulting from a particular intoxication of 
 her husband, all the parties who con- 
 tributed to the particular intoxication may 
 be joined, although they were conducting 
 separate places of business when the liquor 
 was sold to the husband and did not act 
 in concert : Faivre v. Mandirschied (1902), 
 117 la. 724. 90 N. W. 76. 
 
 It was held in City of Kansas City v. 
 File (1899), 60 Kan. 157, 55 Pac. 877, that 
 a city and an electric light company are 
 jointly liable for injuries sustained by 
 plaintiff by reason of a broken wire which 
 remained in the street for three Aveeks, 
 constituting a dangerous obstruction to 
 travel. A dissenting opinion was ren- 
 dered citing the te.xt, and the case of 
 Trowbridge v. Forepaugh (infra). See, 
 also, Street Ry. Co. y. Stone (1894), 54 
 Kan. 83, 37 Pac. 1012, where a city and 
 a street railway were held jointly liable 
 for a dangerously constructed track. 
 
 In Smith v. Day (1901), 39 Ore. 531, 
 65 Pac. 1055, the court said: "Two or 
 more tort-feasors may be sued jointly 
 when they have all concurred by joint 
 design or common act or negligence to 
 produce the injury complained of ; but 
 where the parties have acted separately 
 and independently of each other, witliout 
 concert, or hy common purpose, although
 
 304 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 § 210. * 309, Case of Joint Conversion of Chattels. The general 
 doctrine under examination embraces as well the case of a joint 
 conversion of chattels, as any other instance of joint tort to 
 property or person. When two or more have united in the act 
 which amounts to a conversion, or have so interfered with the 
 chattel as to constitute a conversion within the legal , meaning of 
 the term, the owner or person having the special property may 
 sue all, or one, or any, as in the case of any other tort.^ But 
 there must be a community in the wrong-doing ; the wrongful 
 act must constitute a conversion on the part of all, and in that 
 act all must have engaged. When such is the case, the law 
 does not apportion the responsibility, but holds each liable for 
 the whole amount.' If there is no such community, a joint action 
 for the conversion will not lie, and a fortiori, it will not lie when 
 the defendants have not each been guilty of an act which 18 a 
 ■wrongful conversion. '^ 
 
 § 211. * 310. Case of Replevin and Detinue. The same general 
 doctrine, under the same limitations, controls the action of 
 replevin, or detinue, — or to recover possession of chattels, which 
 at the common law was regarded as a personal action based upon 
 the tortious act of the defendant, in his wrongful detention or 
 taking of the goods. If, therefore, there is a joint wrongful 
 taking or detention of the goods, the action will lie against the 
 wrong-doers jointly, although one of them may have parted with 
 his actual possession. Thus, where goods had been sold and 
 delivered to a fraudulent vendee, so that the vendor might 
 rescind and retake the chattels, and this vendee had afterwards 
 assigned them to an assignee in trust for creditors, and the 
 
 the injury may be a common result to them joint tort-feasors and jointly liable 
 
 which the acts of each contributed, their for the wrongful attachments.] 
 liability i.s not joint, and a joint recovery ^ See Simmons c. Spencer, 9 Fed. 11. 
 
 cannot be had." 581 ; 3 McCrary, 48. 
 
 Stuart V. Bank of Staplehurst (1899), - ([E.s9 1; (iriffith (1894), 128 Mo. ."JO, 30 
 
 :>: Neb. 569, 78 N. VV. 298: " The jietition S. W. 343: "The purcluiser, with knowl- 
 
 cliarged joint actions of the defendants, edj^e of the conversion, is jointly liable 
 
 and the acts were such as might be done with the wrongful seller. ... It does not 
 
 in combination; hence it w;u* not open matter that the parties acted in good faith 
 
 to .ittack by demurrer for an iniproper and believed they had a right to take and 
 
 joinder of |)artics." dispose of the property."] 
 
 Miller >: Ik-ck (1899), 108 la. 575, 79 ■' Manning c. Monaghan, 23 N. Y. 539. 
 
 N. W. :J44 : Whore two creditors with See s. c. 28 N. Y. 585. Further instances of 
 
 Hf;|)aratc danns put them in the hands of joint conversion : Hearty f. Klinkiianimcr, 
 
 the same attorney, and attachments were 39 Minn. 438. All the wrongdoers n(tcd not 
 
 sued out on eacii, this does not make be joined : Carroll v. Fcthers, 82 Wis. G7.
 
 DEFENDANTS IN ACTIONS FOR TORT. 305 
 
 possession had actually been transferred to such tmstee, an 
 action by the vendor to recover the possession of the goods was 
 held to be properly brought against both jointly, the assignee 
 not being a purchaser for value.^ 
 
 § 212. * 311. Common Carriers. The common-law doctrines re- 
 lating to suits against common carriers are unaltered. Although 
 an action may be brought upon their contract express or implied 
 to cany the goods safely, yet the ultimate ground of their liability 
 is their general duty, the violation of which is a tort. The usual 
 form of the action under the old system was Case, and not 
 Assumpsit. The owner of goods that have been lost or damaged 
 in the carriage may therefore treat the default as a tort, and sue 
 all or any of the parties at his election.^ 
 
 I 213. * 312. Lessor and Lessee. Principal and Agent. A joint 
 liability for an injury may arise from the ownership and occupancy 
 of real property.^ As an example, where the owner of a house 
 had constructed a coal-hole in the sidewalk in such a manner and 
 position as to be dangerous to passers, and had leased the premises 
 to a tenant who used the coal-hole, and a person passing on the 
 -sidewalk had fallen into it and been injured, both the owner and 
 the tenant were held liable, and a joint action against them was 
 sustained.* In general, the principal and his agent may be sued 
 
 1 Nichols V. Michaels, 2.3 N. Y. 264. illustrations : nuisance : Cobb v. Smith, 
 See, especially, the opinions of James J., 38 Wis. 21 ; supra, § * .307 (n.) ; Greene 
 p. 268 et seq., and of Selden J., pp. 270, v. Nunuemacher, 36 Wis. 50 ; Lohmiller 
 271, where the nature of the action before i\ Indian Water Co., 51 id. 683. 
 
 •and since the code is discussed at length. [^Waterhouse v. Schlitz Brewing Co. 
 
 See also OH^e, §* 297. (1900), 12 S. D. 397, 81 N. W. 725: 
 
 2 Mcintosh V. Ensign, 28 N. Y. 169. A tenant is not a necessary party in an 
 
 3 [^Where the sole ground of liability action against the owner of a building for 
 for a negligent injury is the ownership of injuries caused by its collapse, where the 
 •certain laud, the persons who are joint complaint alleges that tlie collapse oc- 
 vowners should be joined : Printup v. curred because of negligent construction, 
 Patton (1893). 91 Ga. 422, 18 S. E. 311. but did not allege decay or want of repairs. 
 But in an action by mandamus against a It was hell in Atcheson, Topeka, etc. 
 lessee of a railroad to compel the restora- Ry. Co. v. Anderson (1902), 65 Kan. 
 tion of a highway, the lessor is not a 202, 69 Pac. 158, that the lessee could 
 necessary party : People ex reJ. v. Rail- not be sued without the lessor. The court 
 way Co. (1900), 164 N. Y. 289, 58 N. E. said, in the syllabus: "In an action 
 138.] against a railroad company for damages 
 
 * Irvin V. Wood, 4 Robt. 138, 5 Robt. in laying a track in a public street and 
 
 482; s. c. on appeal, 51 N. Y. 224, 230; obstructing the ingress and egress of a 
 
 10 Am. Rep. 603. But see Trowbridge lot owner to and from his property, it 
 
 V. Forepaugh, 14 Minn. 133, supra, §*308 appeared that the company sued was not 
 
 {n ) ; and compare Van Wagener r. the owner of the track when it was built, 
 
 Kemp, 7 Hun, 328, there cited. Farther nor at the time the action was commenced, 
 
 20
 
 306 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 jointly for an}' trespass or other wrongful act done by the agent 
 while acting within the scope of his employment. The agent is 
 personally responsible, because his employment will not shield 
 him from the consequences of his torts, and the principal is liable 
 upon the familiar doctrine of agency. The injured party may of 
 course sue either separately.^ 
 
 § 214. *313. Cases ■where Joint Liability is Impossible. It has 
 already been said that the general doctrine of the joint and several 
 nature of the liability springing from torts does not obtain in 
 those cases where the injury is essentially a several one, or where, 
 in other words, from its intrinsic character, it can only be com- 
 mitted by one person. The most imijortant of this class of torts 
 is slander. No joint action for slander is possible ; but such an 
 action can be maintained for the publication of a libel, as in the 
 very familiar and frequent instance of a newspaper, which con- 
 tains defamatory matter, being owned and published by a partner- 
 ship.2 In the same manner a joint action to recover damages for 
 a malicious prosecution, which is an injury to character, may be- 
 yond doubt be brought against two or more persons who united 
 in promoting the judicial proceeding complained of. 
 
 § 215. *314. Joint Tort may give Rise to many Actions, but only 
 one Satisfaction. ^Vltliongli in eases of joint torts t!ie law gives 
 the injured party a wide choice to sue all the \\Tong-doers, or any 
 num])er, in a single action, or to sue each of them separately, thus 
 bringing as many actions as there are persons, yet it does not per- 
 mit him thereby to multiply his damages. He can have but one 
 
 Imt was a lessee only. Held, that the erly joined. Zeller r. Martin (Wis. 1893), 
 
 le.«sur compauy, which laid the track, and 54 N. W. 3.30. When damage is caused 
 
 caused the obstructi(jn, was a necessary by the negligence of a servant of a firm, 
 
 party. "3 all or any number of the partners may 
 
 1 Plielps I'. Wait, 30 N. Y. 78; Wright be sued. Roberts r. Johu.son, 58 N. Y. 
 
 r. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343; 32 Am. Dec- 613,016. 
 
 .')07 ; Montfort v. Hughes, 3 E. I). Smith, -^ Forsyth c Kdmiston, 2 Abb. Pr. 430. 
 
 591, 594 ; Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb. 358 ; A quiere is suggesteil, whether au action 
 
 Hewett V. Swift, 3 Allen, 420; Shearer for slander may not be maintained against 
 
 r. Kvans, 89 Ind. 400. An e.xecution or several persons it' the defamatory words 
 
 attachment creditor under whose direc- are uttered in jiursuance and as the result 
 
 tion a levy is unlawfully made, held to I)e of a conspiracy among them. This, per- 
 
 properly joined witii tlie sheriff in an ac- haps, may be possible, 
 lion for the trespa.ss ; Elder r. Frevert, 18 QMouson v. Lathrop (1897), 96 Wis. 
 
 Nev. 446; Marsh r. Backus, 16 Barb. 483; 380, 71 N. W. 590: Where a libellous 
 
 and in an action of false imprisonment ttdegram is sent, the sender and the tele- 
 
 the sheriff who made the arrest and the grapli company may be jointly liable.] 
 judge who issued the process were proji-
 
 DEFKXDAXTS IN ACTION^S FOR TORT. 
 
 307 
 
 satisfaction.^ In short, he can collect but one amount of damages 
 out of the many that may have been awarded him in separate 
 actions, although he is entitled to the costs in each suit.^ If he 
 has prosecuted two or more jointly, and the jury has assessed a 
 different sum as damages against each defendant, the plaintiff 
 nuiy enter the judgment against all for either of these amounts 
 which he elects, and of course he would naturally choose the 
 largest. This rule is based upon the notion that the injury is a 
 unit, that one award of damages is a compensation for that in- 
 jury, and that the defendants are equally responsible as among 
 themselves. A satisfaction of one is therefore operative as to all. 
 Imprisonment under a body execution is regarded by the law as 
 pro tanto a satisfaction ; ^ and if one such judgment debtor, being 
 in imprisonment, is voluntarily discharged therefrom by the 
 creditor, the judgment or judgments against all the others are 
 ipso facto satisfied, even though rendered in separate actions, as 
 fully as though the discharge had been by payment.* 
 
 1 [^Butler V. Ashworth (1895), 110 Cal. 
 614, 43 Pac. 386; Holliiigsworth v. How- 
 ard (1901), 113 Ga. 1099, 39 S. E. 465; 
 Ashcraft c Knoljlock (1896), 146 Iiul. 169, 
 45 N. E. 69. Satisfaction as to one joint 
 tort-feasor is a bar to au action as to the 
 others: Dnlauey v. Buffum (1903), 173 
 Mo. 1, 73 S. W. 125] 
 
 2 This doctrine is not confined to cases 
 of tort ; it applies in all instances where 
 there have been .separate suits or recov- 
 eries against persons who are jointly and 
 severally liable on the same obligation ; 
 satisfaction of one is satisfaction of all, 
 except as to costs ; and if some of the 
 actions are pending, payment of one may 
 be pleaded in bar of such pending suits. 
 First Nat. Bk. of Indianapolis v. Indi- 
 anapolis Piano Man. Co., 45 Ind. 5. See 
 also Lord v. Tiffany, 98 N. Y. 412. In au 
 action for assault and battery committed 
 by the defendant and one P. G., the an- 
 swer set up that plaintiff had recovered 
 judgment against P. G. for the same tort, 
 and issued execution thereon, whicli had 
 been levied on the property of P. G. 
 Held, a good defence. The injured party 
 may sue each or any of several joint tres- 
 pas.sers separately, and prosecute each 
 action to final judgment, but must then 
 elect against which one he will have exe- 
 
 cution. A final judgment and execution 
 or an order for execution, against one is 
 a discharge of all the others. Fleming 
 V. McDonald, 50 Ind. 278. The English 
 rule is that final judgment alone without 
 any execution is a discharge of all the 
 others. Brinsmead v. Harrison, L. R. 7 
 C. P. 547. 
 
 3 Koenig v. Steckel, 58 N. Y. 475. 
 
 4 Kasson v. The People, 44 Barb. 347. 
 The plaintiff had obtained a judgment 
 against G. and one against R, in a sepa- 
 rate action against each for a joint tres- 
 pass. G. was taken on body execution, 
 and, while in custody, was voluntarily set 
 at liberty by the judgment creditor. The 
 plaintiff afterwards took the other de- 
 fendant, R., on a body execution in his 
 action. R. applied to a judge by Itabeas 
 corpus, and was discharged. The General 
 Term, on appeal, held this discharge regu- 
 lar, and laid down the doctrines stated in 
 the text. See also McReady v. Rogers, 
 1 Neb. 124 ; Turner v. Hitchcock, 20 
 Iowa, 310. The latter case was very ex- 
 traordinary. The action was for a tres- 
 pass, and was against si.x women and 
 their husbands ; and one Johnson was a 
 defendant. The petition alleged that a 
 party of women, of whom the female de- 
 fendants were a portion, made a raid upon
 
 308 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 ^216. * 315. VII. Statutory Actions in the Settlement of Dece- 
 dents' Estates. In many, if not all States, actions are autliorized 
 by statute, in the matter of settling the estates of deceased per- 
 sons, which were unknown at the common law, as, for example, 
 an action by a legatee to recover his legacy. It is not within my 
 purpose to inquire when such actions may be brought, but simply 
 to ascertain what special rules, if any, have been laid doAvn in 
 reference to the proper parties therein.^ A statute of New York 
 requires the heirs of an intestate who have inherited lands under 
 certain specified circumstances, to be sued jointly and not sepa- 
 rately for a debt due from the deceased, the land in their hands 
 being regarded as a fund upon which the debt is chargeable and 
 out of which it is to be paid. It has been held that this statute 
 does not make the heirs jointly liable as joint debtors, but that it 
 merel}' prescribes a mode of enforcing the demand out of assets 
 which have descended to them.^ In an action by a residuary 
 legatee against the executor to recover the amount claimed to 
 have been given by the will, all persons interested in the residue 
 
 the plaintiffs saloon, destroying property 
 therein. The defendants, except Johnson, 
 answered, among other defences, that 
 since the action was l)rought tlie plaintiff 
 Jiad released tiie defendant Johnson ;. also 
 that one Almira C. was one of the joint 
 trespassers ; and, hefore the action was 
 brought, the plaintiff and she had inter- 
 married, and were then husband and wife. 
 On the trial, it was proved that plaintiff 
 had released Johnson, but that she had 
 taken no part in the tres])asses, and was 
 not liable tiierefor. The other defence 
 »vas proved exactly as alleged. Upon 
 these facts, the court held that the re- 
 lease of Johnson did not discharge the 
 other defendants, because she was not 
 in fact a joint trespa.sser. On the second 
 defence, Dillon J., after stating tlie coin- 
 inou-law rules concerning joint tresp;isscrs, 
 reached the follow! nir conclusions : That 
 the code had not changed these former 
 rules ; that separate actions may be 
 <)njught, separate verdicts given, and 
 judgments rendered, liut only one satis- 
 faction, that the release of one joint 
 wrong-doer discharges all ; and, finally, 
 that the marriuge of one with the plain- 
 tiff operated as a release and discliarge. 
 On this laHt point the court were equally 
 
 divided ; but they were agreed upon all 
 the other propositions of Judge Dillon's 
 opinion. The case, as a whole, is very 
 instructive, and contains a full discussion 
 of the doctrines concerning joint torts, 
 and a review of all the leading authori- 
 ties. See also Mitchell r. Allen, 25 Hun, 
 543 (a discharge by the plaintiff of one 
 of the persons jointly liable releases all 
 the others). 
 
 1 |[In a proceeding to establish a lost 
 will, the legatees, devisees and heirs at 
 law are all necessary parties : In re Valen- 
 tine's Will (1896), 93 Wis. 45, 67 N. W. 
 12. In a contest of a will it is not neces- 
 sary to bring in all persons interested in 
 the estate, if all the devisees are properly 
 brought in: Kischman ('. Scott (1901), 
 166 Mo. 214, 65 S. W. 1031. In a suit to 
 set aside a will, a judgment will be re- 
 versed if devisees are named wliich are 
 not made parties: Wells r. Wells (1898), 
 144 Mo. 198, 45 S. W. 1095; — and the 
 executor is a necessary party, and as such 
 lias a right to defend the will : In re 
 Estate of Whetton (1893), 98 Cal. 203, 32 
 Pac. 970.3 
 
 2 New York Laws of 1837, p. 537, § 73 ; 
 Kellogg 1:. Olmsted. 6 How. Pr. 487. Also 
 Selover v. Coe, 63 N. Y. 438.
 
 ACTIONS CONCERNING DECEDENTS' ESTATES. 309 
 
 must be joined as co-defendants with the executor, and if a 
 legacy is charged upon lands, the devisees must also be made 
 parties.^ When a creditor seeks to recover his demand against 
 the estate, his suit should be prosecuted against the executor or 
 administrator alone; the widow, heirs, legatees, next of kin, and 
 creditors, are neither necessary nor proper parties defendant. 
 This was the universal rule under the former system; and al- 
 though the code has enacted the equitable doctrines concerning 
 parties, and has made no exception in their application to differ- 
 ent actions, it has not changed the procedure in this particular. 
 The administrator or executor represents the estate; is a trustee 
 for all the parties who are interested in its distribution ; and his 
 defence is their defence. He is bound to interpose all necessary 
 and available answers to demands made upon the estate, and the 
 law presumes that he will faithfully perform this duty. The 
 general language of the codes certainly does not require a greater 
 latitude in the admission of parties defendant who are interested 
 in the event of the suit than was demanded by the practice of 
 the equity courts. It has not therefore been so construed as to 
 make the widow, heirs, legatees, and others necessary or proper 
 defendants, although they may seem to be interested in the result 
 of the controversy. 2 The same is true even when the testator 
 has bequeathed all his property, real and personal, to a single 
 legatee; the creditor must pursue his claim against the executor, 
 and not against the legatee.^ Although, in general, an action to 
 recover a debt or demand due to the estate must be brought by 
 the administrator or executor alone, yet in some exceptional 
 
 1 Tonnelle v. Hall, 3 Abb. Pr. 205. tee would be a proper, but is not an 
 
 Such an action, although it may be au- essential, party."] 
 
 thorized by statute, is in all its features ^ kelson v. Hart, 8 Ind. 293, 295. See 
 
 equitable ; and the equity rules as to also Stanford v. Stanford, 42 Ind. 485, 488, 
 
 parties must control it. See Towner v. 489. In an action against the sureties on 
 
 Tooley, 38 Barb. 598, as to the neces.sary an administrator's bond, he himself being 
 
 defendants in an action upon an adminis- dead, his administrator is not a necessary 
 
 tration bond by lef;atees whose legacies are defendant, and the next of kin of tlie ' 
 
 charged upon the lands of the deceased, original decedent are not proper defeud- 
 
 nilarrell v. Warren (1898), 105 Ga. 476, ants. Flack v. Dawson, 69 N. C. 42. If 
 
 •30 S. E. 426, tlie court said : " When a one of two executors dies, and an action 
 
 legatee under a will cites au administra- is brought against his personal represent- 
 
 tor de bonis non cum testxinicnio unnexo to a ative to recover a demand against the 
 
 settlement, the defendant is not, as a mat- original estate, the surviving executor 
 
 ter of right, entitled to have another, who must be made a co-defendant. McDowell 
 
 is the sole remaining legal ee, made a c. Clark, 68 N. C 118, 120. 
 party to the proceeding. Such other lega- ^ Perry v. Seitz, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 122.
 
 310 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 instancps sncli suit may be instituted and prosecuted by a legatee 
 or distributee, when the administrator or executor is incapaci- 
 tated from suing. ^ 
 
 ^ 217. * 310. VIII. Some Special Actions. In New York, an 
 action against a county sliould be brought against "The Board 
 of Supervisoi-s " of the specified count)', and not against the 
 f^upervisors individually or by name.^ A suit may be maintained 
 between two firms having a common partner, he being made a 
 defendant, and suitable averments being inserted in the com- 
 jjlaint or petition. ^ Where a particular religious society or 
 individual church is incorporated, an action to recover a debt or 
 damages for the breach of a contract due from it must be brought 
 against this corporation, and not against the bisliop or priest, 
 whatever may be the ecclesiastical powers and authority of such 
 clerical officers.* In certain States the assignor of a non-nego- 
 tiable thing in action, or where the a.ssignment is not expressly 
 authorized by statute, is a necessary defendant in an action 
 brought by the assignee.^ 
 
 1 See Fisher v. Ilubbell, 1 N. Y. Sup. 
 Ct. 97; s. 0. 65 Barb. 74; 7 Lans. 481; 
 Lancaster v. Gould, 46 Ind. 397 ; Shove v. 
 Shove, 69 Wis. 425. QBut see Sheppard 
 f. Green (1896), 48 S. 0. 165, 26 S. E. 
 224, where it was held that the persoual 
 representatives of the deceased, the volun- 
 tary grantees and persons holding liens 
 executed by them are all necessary par- 
 ties in au action to establish creditors' 
 claims on the a.ssets of a decedent's estate, 
 aud to set aside certain conveyances as 
 fraudulent ]] 
 
 2 Hill V. Livingston Cy. Sup., 12 N. Y. 
 52. See al.so Sims v. McClure, 52 Ind. 267 
 (against common-school trustees) ; Ilawley 
 I'. Fayetteville, 82 N. 0. 22 (against towns); 
 Hamilton v. Fond du Lac, 40 Wis. 47 
 (against municipal corporations for inten- 
 tional trespa.sses) ; Wliite '■. Miller, 7 Hun, 
 427 (again.st the "Shakers") ; La France 
 V. Krayer, 42 Iowa, 14.3 (in actions under 
 the "civil damage act"). 
 
 ' Cole I'. IJeynolds, 18 N. Y. 74; En- 
 gliM t\ Furni.-is, 4 E. I). Smith, 587. See 
 al.xo Ford v. Ind. Dist. of Stuart, 46 Iowa, 
 294; Crosby i-. 'i'imolat (Minn. 1892), 
 52 N. W. 526. The balance of account 
 between the two firms may be struck, and 
 asHigned to a third jierson to sue upon 
 
 the same ; Beacannon v. Liebe, 1 1 Ore. 
 44.3. As to actions between two of sev- 
 eral partners without joining the others, 
 see Wells v. Simmonds, 8 Hun, 189, 209; 
 A'eudecker c. Kohlberg, 81 N. Y. 296. 
 
 ■* Charboneau v. Henni, 24 Wis. 250. 
 A peculiar case. The action was against 
 a Roman Catholic bishop, to recover the 
 cost of building a church edifice belong- 
 ing to a religious society. 
 
 5 Harvey v. Wilson, 44 Ind. 231, 234; 
 Allen V. Jerauld, 31 Ind. 372; Indiana 
 & Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. McKernan, 24 
 Ind. 62; Iloldridge v. Sweet, 23 Ind. 118; 
 French r. Turner, 15 Ind. 59; Gowcr v. 
 Howe, 20 Ind. 396 ; Breeding v. Tobin 
 (Ky. 1892), 18 S. W. 773; Hood v. Cal. 
 Wine Co., 4 Wash. 88 : St. Louis, I. M. 
 & S. Ry. r. Camden Bk., 47 Ark. 541 ; 
 Sykes v. First Nat. Bk. of Canton (S Dak. 
 1S91), 49 N. W. 1058; Keller i-. Williams, 
 49 Ind. 504; Clough i'. Thomas, 53 Ind. 
 24 ; Heed i\ Garr, 59 Ind. 299 ; Reed r. 
 Finton, 63 Ind. 288; Leedy v. N.ash, 67 
 Ind 311 ; Gordon v. Carter, 79 Ind. 386; 
 compare Riley v. Schawacker, 50 Ind. 592 : 
 Watson V. Conwell (Ind. App., 18.12). 30 
 N. E. 5; Boudurant v. Bladen, 10 Ind. 
 100 ; Nelson v. Johus<m, IS Ind. 329; 
 Ilubbell V. Skiles, 16 Ind. 138; Hopkins
 
 ACTIONS AGAINST HUSBAND AND WIFE. 311 
 
 § 218. * 317. Joinder in Case of Substituted Debtor. Ill tlie 
 case of a substitution of one party for another as a debtor, — 
 that is, when, a debt being due from one person, another for a 
 valuable consideration assumes such indebtedness and promises 
 to pay the same, — it has been decided in Indiana that the cred- 
 itor may maintain an action against the substituted debtor, Imt 
 must join with him the original debtor as a co-defendant, under 
 the general provision of the code requiring or permitting all 
 persons to be made defendants who are necessary parties to a 
 complete, determination and settlement of the questions involved. ^ 
 In this decision the court has accepted to its full extent the 
 equitable theory of parties, and has applied it unreservedly to a 
 purely legal action ; for since the creditor had surrendered all 
 claim upon the original debtor, he could recover no judgment in 
 the action against such debtor, and the latter's presence could 
 only be necessary for his own protection and that of the other 
 defendant. It is probable that this ruling would not be followed 
 by those courts which have partially or wholly confined the 
 operation of the statutory provisions in question to equitable 
 actions. When the stockholders of a corporation are by statute 
 made personally responsible for an amount equal to the amount 
 of stock held by them, the liability is not joint, and each must 
 be sued separately.^ 
 
 SECOND. ACTIONS AGAINST HUSBAND AND WIFE OR EITHER OF 
 THEM: PARTIES DEFENDANT AS AFFECTED BY THE MARRIAGE 
 RELATION. 
 
 § 219. * 318. General Extent of Statutory Modification of Com- 
 mon-Law Rules. No Change in Suits against Wife for her Torts, 
 Frauds, and other Wrongful Acts. Tlie provisions of the Codes, 
 and of other statutes, in relation to actions in which married 
 women are parties, were quoted in full in the last preceding- 
 section, and need not be repeated here.^ There is a marked 
 
 r. Org.-in, 15 lud. 188; Perry v. Seitz, 2 v. PLanly, 76 Ind. 272; McGill v. Gunn, 
 
 Duv. (Ky.) 122; Lytle v. Lytle, 2 Mete. 43 lud. 315. 
 
 (Ky.) 127; Gill v. Johnson's Adni., 1 2 Perry ?■. Turner, 55 Mo. 418. But 
 
 Mete. (Ky.) 649. See Shane v. Lowry, see ante, %* 299, note; /ws^ § *417. 
 
 48 Ind. 205, 206 ; Strong v. Downing, 34 ^ gg© supra, § 152, where the statutory 
 
 Ind 300 ; Durham !'. Bischof, 47 lud. 21 1 ; provisions embracing the cases of ])lain- 
 
 S. P. Hardy v. Blazer, 29 Ind. 226. tiffs and of defendants will be found iu 
 
 1 Hardy i\ Blazer, 29 Ind. 226 ; Davis full.
 
 312 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 difference in the extent of the alterations made in the former law 
 by the legislation of the various Stiites. The changes in New 
 York are complete and radical, the wife being in almost eveiy 
 respect assimilated to the unmarried woman. The example of 
 New York is followed by many States. In many otliers, how- 
 ever, the modifications do not go to any such extent, and are 
 confined to the cases in which married women are sued or sue in 
 respect of their separate property, and those in wliich the action 
 is directly between the husband and wife, leaving all others to 
 be controlled by the prior law. We saw in the preceding section 
 that in this group of States where a right of action exists on 
 account of a tort committed to the person of a married woman, 
 the common-law rules are unchanged, and the action must be 
 either in the name of the husband alone, or of the husband and 
 wife jointly; while in New York, and in the States which have 
 copied its legislation, the wife is permitted to sue in her own 
 name in respect of any cause of action accruing to herself. 
 There is even less modification of the ancient doctrines which 
 regulate the form of suits against the wife for her torts, frauds, 
 and other wrongful acts.^ 
 
 § 220. * 319. Result. The result is that, in actions whicli 
 concern her separate property, the wife may or must be sued 
 alone. In those States which permit her to enter into contracts 
 having reference to her separate property, or connected with a 
 business or trade which she may carry on, suits upon such con- 
 tracts may or must be brought against her individually ; ^ while 
 
 1 Qln Taylor v. PuUeu (1899), 152 Mo. 2 Qln HoUister v. Bell (1900), 107 Wis. 
 
 434, 53 S. W. 1086, the court said: 198, 83 N. W. 297, the court said: "A 
 
 " While it is true tliat one of the sup- married woman ha.s not capacity to bind 
 
 posed rea.sons for the rule which required herself at law by contract, except as regards 
 
 a husband to be joined with his wife in an her separate property or business. It fol- 
 
 action for her torts has ceased because he lows, as has often been decided by this 
 
 no longer acc^uires her property by virtue court, that a married woman's note, given 
 
 of the marriage in tiiis state, all lawyers solely for the purpose of securing or pa\-- 
 
 must admit that so far no writer or court iug the debt of a third person, is void at 
 
 has as yet furnished satisfactorily all the law and not enforceable in equity against 
 
 reasons which may have influenced the her separate property in the absence of 
 
 adoption of the rule at common law, and some ecjuitable considerations rendering 
 
 until they are produced, certainly the such enforcement under the circumstances 
 
 courts cannot declare that all tlie ren.sons just." The signing of a promissory note 
 
 have ceaseil and thus abolish the rule by by a married woman raises no presump- 
 
 judicial decision." See also Nichols v. tion that slie intended to charge her sepa- 
 
 Nicluds (1898), 147 Mo. 407, 48 S. W. rate estate: State Nat. Bank v. Smith 
 
 947.2 (1898), 53 Neb. 54, 75 N. W. 51. See al.-<o
 
 ACTIONS AGAINST HUSBAND AND WIFE. 313 
 
 actions to recover damages for personal torts committed Lv her 
 must be instituted against her and her husband jointly, or, in 
 certain exceptional cases, solely against the husband. These 
 propositions, which are the general summing up of the statutory 
 2)rovisions, and of the judicial interpretation thereof, I shall now 
 illustrate by particular instances which will embrace all the 
 important questions that arise. 
 
 § 221. * 320. The Settled Rule. Tort Committed in Presence or 
 by Compulsion of Husband. It is the settled rule in the States 
 which have adopted the second form of statute,^ that, in actions 
 to recover damages for all torts whether with or without vio- 
 lence, negligences, frauds, deceits, and other such wrongs done 
 by the wife personally, and not done merely by, or by the use of, 
 her separate property, the common-law principle is unaltered, 
 and the husband and wife must be joined as co-defendants.^ 
 The principle thus stated assumes that the wife acted voluntarily. 
 If, however, the tort is committed by the wife in the presence 
 and under the compulsion or direction of lier husband, he alone 
 is liable, and should be sued without making her a co-defendant. 
 In applying the latter rule, it is settled that if the tort is done by 
 the wife in the presence of her husband, 3, prima facie j^resumption 
 is raised that it was done by his direction and under his compul- 
 sion. This presumption may be overcome, and if it be shown 
 that she acted voluntarily, although in his presence, she must be 
 
 Gallagher I'. Mjelde (1898), 98 Wis. 509, the wife; Turner v. Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 
 
 74 N. W. 340, holding that a married 310, trespass on plaintiffs premises and 
 
 woman without property and not in busi- destroying personal property thereon ; 
 
 ness cannot make a binding contract to Musselman v. Galligher, 32 Iowa, 383 ; 
 
 repay money loaned to enable herself and McEIfresh v. Kirkendall, 36 Iowa, 224 ; 
 
 husband to go into business ] Luse v. Oaks, 36 Iowa, 562, slander by the 
 
 ^ [^That form which requires a joinder wife ; Curd v. Dodds, 6 Bush, 66l, action 
 
 except in actions concerning tlie wife's for fraud of wife in selling certain property 
 
 separate property and in actions between of hers. Held, that she was not liable for 
 
 husband and wife. See § 152, «rt/e.] a fraud in entering into a contract, the 
 
 ^ QHenley v. Wilson (1902), 137 Cal. law of Kentucky not permitting her to 
 
 273,70 Pac. 21, citing the text ;] Andei- make a binding contract; the doctrine of 
 
 son (.'. Hill, 53 Barb. 238, assault and battery the text is fully recognized in the opin- 
 
 by the wife; Peak v. Lemon, 1 Lans. 295, ion. Coolidge v. Parris, 8 Ohio St. 594, 
 
 conversion ; Tait v. Culbertson, 57 Barb. as,sault and battery by the wife. In 
 
 9, lil)el by the wife; Rowing v. Manly, Rowing v. Manly, 49 N. Y., Rapiillo J. 
 
 57 Barb. 479, 483 ; s. C. 49 N. Y. 192, 198, discusses the subject [^of the joinder of 
 
 fraud and forgery by the wife; Brazil v. the husband and wife under the coinmon- 
 
 Moran, 8 Minn 236, assault and battery law rule, as it existed in New Y'ork prior 
 
 by tlie wife ; Ball r. Bennett, 21 Ind. 427, to the recent legislation. The opinion is 
 
 action for setting fire to ])laintiff's mill b}^ a learned and exhaustive one.] See also
 
 314 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 made a defendant. These common-hnv rules liave not been in 
 any respect changed by the codes. ^ 
 
 J§ 222. * 321. 'Where Tort is committed by "Wife in the Use or 
 by Means of her Separate Property. If, however, the tort is not 
 committed by the wife personally, but is done by means of her 
 separate property, or in the use thereof, or under color or claim 
 of ownership of her separate property, the action should be 
 brought against her individually, without joining the husband as 
 co-defendant, in all those States whose statutes permit a married 
 Avoman to be sued alone in respect of all matters which concern 
 her se^mrate estate.^ In other woi'ds, actions whicli concern or 
 liave relation to her separate property are not contined to those 
 upon contract or those involving the ownership of the property, 
 but extend to suits based upon torts and wrongs done by means 
 or in the use of or claim to the propert}'. 
 
 Clark 1-. Boyer, 32 Ohio St. 299 ; Suuman 
 V. Brewin, 52 Ind. 140 (if the husiiaud 
 dies afier verdict, the wife is liable to 
 have judgment entered against lierself 
 aloue). Fitzgerald i'. Quann, 109 N. Y. 
 441 ; 33 Hun, Go2 (slander by wife) ; 
 Austin f. Bacon, 49 Huu, 386 (same); 
 Quilty r. Battie, 61 Hun, 164 (harboring 
 a vicious dog); Wirt i-. Dinan, 44 Mo. 
 App. 583 (for deceit of wife). [|But see, 
 also, Thomas r. Cooksey (1002), 130 N. C. 
 148, 41 S. E. 2, where a suit for po.<sessiou 
 of personal property was held properly 
 brought against the wife alone. Tiie court 
 said that if tlie fact tiuit she had ahu.shand 
 living would protect her, "all tliat a mar- 
 ried woman would liave to do would be to 
 get ])0!<session of some one else's property, 
 and tiie owner would be witliout remedy 
 and helpless. Heath i'. Morgan, 117 N. C. 
 504." Also, Pender v. Mallett (1898), 123 
 N. C. 57, 31 S. E. 331, where suit was 
 brougiit by a receiver again.st a wife to 
 wliom her husband liad conveyed pro])erty 
 i;i fraud of creditor.s, the husband being 
 joined as a defendant ] 
 
 ' Brazil v. Moran, 8 Minn. 236 ; Ball c. 
 Bennett, 21 Ind. 427 ; Curd v. Dodd.s G 
 Busli, 081, 685; Cassiu r. Delaney, 38 
 N. Y. 178, per Hunt C. .J. : " An offence 
 by lii.-j direction, but not in liis presence, 
 does not exeinj»t her from lialnlity ; nor 
 «bjes liic presence, if unaccomjianied by liis 
 direction. Tlie presence furnishes evidence 
 and affords a {jresumption of liis direction. 
 
 but it is not conclusive, and the truth may 
 be established by comjjetent evidence." 
 Flanagan v. Tiuen, 53 Barb. 587. The 
 rule is settled in Missouri, that if husband 
 and wife both unite in committing a tort, 
 as, for examide, an assault and battery, a 
 joint action against them will not lie, but 
 the husband alone must be sued. Dailey 
 V. Ilou.ston, 58 Mo. 361, 366, 367 ; Meegan 
 V. Gunsollis, 19 Mo. 417; see, however. 
 Flesh V. Lindsay (Mo Sup. 1893), 21 S. W. 
 907. But in an action against husband 
 and wife for tltcir joint fraud, it was held 
 in New York that she would not be liable 
 unless she actively participated in the 
 wrong. Vanneman v. Powers, 56 N. Y. 
 39, 41. 
 
 2 Peak V. Lemon, 1 Lans. 295; Eagle 
 V. Swayze, 2 Daly, 140 ; Howe v. Smith, 
 38 How. Pr. 37, s. c. on appeal, 45 N. Y. 
 230 ; Baum v. Mullen, 47 N. Y. 577. 
 Action against a married woman alone to 
 recover damages for fraud in the sale of 
 land which she owned, the husband acting 
 as her agent in the sale and making the 
 fraudulent re])rcseutations. The fact that 
 her liusband acted as her agent in the sale 
 did not affect her liability, for he may be 
 her agent the same as any other ])ers<)n. 
 She is liable for frauds committed by her 
 husband as her agent in carrying on a 
 business for her. Warner v. Warren, 46 
 N. Y. 228. See also (,)uiUy v. Battie, 135 
 N. Y. 201. QSee Pender ?•. Mallett (1898), 
 123 N. C. 57, 31 S. E. 351. J
 
 ACTIONS AGAINST HUSBAND AND WIFE. 315 
 
 § 223. * 322. Under New York Statutes. Under the Statutes 
 of New York, a married .woman may be sued alone upon any 
 contract which she has made in a trade or business carried on by 
 herself, or in her name by her agent, and the complaint should 
 be in the ordinary form as though the action was brought against 
 an unmarried woman. ^ She must also be sued in the same 
 manner upon any contract made in relation to, or uj)on any lia- 
 bility growing out of her separate property. Finally, if she 
 enters into any contract and therein charges the paj'^ment thereof 
 upon her separate property, she is in like manner personally- 
 liable, and must be sued witliout making her husband a co- 
 defendant. The charge thus made does not create an equitable 
 lien upon any particular property, nor even a general lien to be 
 enforced by an equitable action. It simply creates a personal 
 liability upon herself, to be enforced in an ordinary legal action, 
 and by the recovery of any ordinary judgment for debt or dam- 
 ages. Such charge may even be verbal, and when made creates 
 a personal liability which may be enforced against anj^ property 
 which she may have at the time, or any which she may after- 
 wards acquire. In all these cases it is not necessary to allege in 
 the complaint the special facts from which such liability arises ; 
 the complaint should be in the ordinary form, and all the special 
 facts relating to her coverture should be averred in the answer. ^ 
 
 1 Hier i-. Staples, 51 N. Y. 136. She 116; Perkius (;. Perkins, 62 Barb. 531; 
 has not the full power to contract ; the Baken v. Harder, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 440 ; 
 contract must either he made in some Weir r. Groat, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 444 ; 
 trade or business which she carries on, or Blauke v. Bryant, 55 N. Y. 649; Loomis 
 be for her personal services, or have a v. Ruck, 56 N. Y. 462 ; Corn Exch. Ins. 
 connection with her separate property. Co. v. Babcock, 42 N. Y. 613; Yale v. 
 See the following cases: Manchester v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265, 22 N. Y. 450, which 
 Sahler, 47 Barb. 155; Smith v. Allen, 1 is superseded by subsequent decisions; 
 Lans. 101 ; Hart v. Young, 1 Lans. 417; Owen i'. Cawley, 36 N. Y. 600; Carpenter 
 Lennox v. Eldred, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 140; v. O'Dougherty, 50 N. Y. 660; Garret.son 
 Shorter v. Nelson, 4 Lans. 114; Hallock v. Seaman, 54 N. Y. 652; Newell v. Rob- 
 V. De Munu, 2 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 350 ; Bodiue arts, 54 N. Y. 677 ; Fowler v. Seaman, 40 
 V. Killeen, 53 N. Y. 93 ; Adams v. Honness, N. Y. 592 ; Quassaic Nat. Bk. v. Waddell, 
 62 Barb. 326. 3 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 680 ; Miller v. Hunt, 3 
 
 2 These ])ropositions are the final results N. Y. Sup. Ct. 762 ; Kelty v. Long, 4 N. Y. 
 at which the New York courts have ar- Sup. Ct. 183; Bogert v. Gulick, 65 Barb, 
 rived through a long and progressive 322 ; Warner v. Warren, 46 N. Y. 228 : 
 series of decisions. Maxou v. Scott, 55 Manhattan Brass & M. Co. v. Thomp.son, 
 N. Y. 247 ; Hier v. Staples, 51 N. Y. 136 ; 58 N. Y. 80. — Contracts between tlie wife 
 Hinckley v. Smith, 51 N. Y. 21 ; Frecking and husband ; see also anie, § *240, and 
 V. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422, 426 ; Smith v. notes. Slie may become his credit.ir, and 
 Dunning, 61 N. Y. 249 ; Fo.ster v. Conger, maintain an action to recover tlie debt: 
 61 Barb. 145, 147; Ainsley r. Mead,3Lans. Woodworth v. Sweet, 44 Barb. 268, 51
 
 316 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 ^ 224. * 325. Wife as Party in Actions concerning the Home- 
 stead. Under the stiitutes of many States respecting liomesteads, 
 it is the established rule that the wife has such a vested interest 
 in the homestead that she is always a proper, and generally a 
 necessar}', party defendant with her husband in all actions which 
 may affect the title thereto, or the right to the possession thereof. 
 At all events, her interest will not be cut off unless she is made 
 a party. Even when the husband himself brings an action in 
 order to enjoin a sale of the homestead, or seeking in any other 
 way to protect his right, the defendants, for their own security^ 
 may, and perhaps should, require the wife to be brought in as a 
 co-plaintiff.^ 
 
 § 225. * 328. Defence by Wife when both are sued together. 
 The codes of several States contain a provision that, " if the hus- 
 band and wife be sued together, she may defend for her own 
 right, and if the husband neglect to defend, she may defend for 
 
 N. Y. 8 ; McCartney v. Welch, 44 Barb. 
 27 1 ; Savage v. O'Neil, 44 N. Y. 298 ; Jay- 
 cox r. Caldwell, 51 N. Y. 395. If the hus- 
 bami ffires a note to his wife during the 
 marriage, no action can be maintained on 
 it by her against him or his representa- 
 tives after his death, simply because there 
 is no consideration : Whitaker i\ Whita- 
 ker, 52 X. Y. 368 ; but if there is a con- 
 sideration for the note, or if it is given by 
 him in contemplation of marriage, she can 
 enforce it by suit : Wright i\ Wright, 
 54 N. Y. 437 ;' Banfield i-. Rumsey, 4 N. Y. 
 Sup. Ct. 322. The following are the most 
 important among the recent N. Y. decis- 
 ions : William.son ;•. Dodge, 5 Hun, 479 ; 
 Covert V. Hughes, 8 id. 305 (a married 
 woman is liable for the price of goods 
 bought by her as agent of her husband 
 which were necessary for and were used 
 for the support of herself and her chil- 
 dren. Laws of 1860, ch. 90, § 1); Goss- 
 man v. Cruger, 7 id. 60; Hill v. Rosselle, 
 G id. 631 ; McVey v. Cantrell, 6 id. 528 ; 
 70 N. Y. 295; Conlin v. Cantrell, 64 N. Y. 
 217 (tiie liability of a married woman who 
 ha.s a separate estate, and iier intention to 
 charge such estate, may be inferred from 
 the circumstances of the contract; it is 
 not necessary that there should be a 
 t<jj<;ci(ic agreement to charge her separate 
 cHtate) ; Smith v. Dunning, Gl i<l. 249; 
 
 Cushman v. Henry, 75 id. 103; Tiemeyer 
 V. Turnginst, 85 id. 516 (very important 
 case ; she is liable on any contract of 
 purchase although she had no separate 
 property at the time she entered into the 
 contract) ; Woolsey v. Brown, 74 id. 82 
 (liable as a surety) ; Nash v. Mitchell, 71 
 id. 199. In California, under the Civil 
 Code, the liability of a married woman on 
 her contracts is substantially the same as 
 in New York and Iowa, except that her 
 husband must be joined as a co-defendant 
 in suits upon them. See Wood v. Orford, 
 52 Cal. 412; Varry v. Kelly, 52 id. 334; 
 Marlow v. Barlew, 53 id. 456 ; Tobin v. 
 Galvin, 49 id. 34. 
 
 QThe present New York statute reads 
 as follows : " A husband who acquires 
 property of his wife by ante-nuptial con- 
 tract or otherwise, is liable for her debts 
 contracted before marriage, but only to 
 the extent of the property so acquired." 
 Gen. Laws, Ch. 48, § 24.] 
 
 1 Chase V. Abbott, 20 Iowa, 154, 160. 
 See also Burnap ;•. Cook, 16 Iowa, 149, 
 1.53, 158, per Dillon J.; Larson i-. Rey- 
 nolds, 13 Iowa, 579 ; Revalk v. Kraemer, 
 8 Cal. 66, 72 ; Marks v. Mar.sh, 9 Cal. 96 ; 
 Moss V. Warner, 10 Cal. 296; Sargent v. 
 Wilson, 5 Cal. 504 ; De Uprey v. De 
 Uprey, 27 Cal. 329, 332 ; Watts v. Gal- 
 lagher (Cal., Dec. 13, 1892), 31 Pac. 626.
 
 DEFENDANTS IN EQUITABLK ACTIONS. 317 
 
 his right also. " The former clause of this section at least applies 
 only to equitable suits in which separate rights of the wife are 
 involved, as, for example, those relating to her separate property ; 
 it has no application to ordinary legal actions in which both are 
 sued jointly, and over which the husband has still, as under the 
 former practice, the entire control.^ It was a settled rule of the 
 equity procedure that, in an action against husband and wife, 
 not affecting her separate estate and seeking no relief against her 
 property, service of process upon the husband was a good and 
 sufficient service upon the wife, and he could appear on her 
 behalf, so that she would be bound by the decree made upon 
 such service and appearance. This rule, it is said in some cases, 
 still subsists under like circumstances. Of course, if the wife's 
 separate property is involved, or if any relief is demanded against 
 her directly, she must be personally served, and has a right to 
 appear independently of her husband. This right, although 
 expressly secured by statute in some States, exists independently 
 of any such statutory permission. ^ 
 
 THIRD: EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 
 
 § 226. * 329. I. General Principles. Distinction between Neces- 
 sary and Proper Parties. In all equitable actions, a broad and 
 most important distinction must be made between two classes of 
 parties defendant; namely, (1) those who are " necessary, " and 
 {2) those who are "proper." Necessary parties, when the term 
 is accurately used, are those without whom no decree at all can 
 be effectively made determining the principal issues in the cause. 
 
 1 Coolidge V. Parris, 8 Ohio St. ,594; Franklin, 15 Ohio St. 485; s. c. 16 Ohio 
 Wolf V. Banning, 3 Minn. 202. See also St. 193. This case was similar in all its 
 Holliday v. Brown, 33 Neb. 657 (rehearing features to Foote v. Lathrop, supra. Both 
 denied, March 16, 1892, 51 N. W. 839). were parties, but service was made on the 
 Such legal actions as those for torts done husband alone. Held, that the wife was 
 by the wife, or debts due by her dum uot concluded, and her dower right was 
 sola, and others, in which the law still not cut off. The cases are diametrically 
 requires both spouses to be made de- opposed to each otiier. 
 
 fendants, are not affected by the statutory ^As to Communit// Properti/ : The wife 
 
 provision. is a proper party defendant in an action 
 
 2 Foote V. Lathrop, 53 Barb. 183; La- against the husband on a note executed 
 throp V. Heacock, 4 Laus. 1. This was a by himself alone, in order to determine 
 foreclosure suit, the mortgage being upon whether the judgment can be executed a-s 
 lands of the husband, so that the wife's one for a community debt : Clark v. El- 
 only possible interest was to protect her tinge (1902), 29 Wash. 215, 69 Pac. 736; 
 inchoate right of dower. Wolf r. Banning, McDonough v. Craig (1894), 10 Wash. 
 3 Minn. 202, 204. Contra. McArthur i'. 239, 38 Pac. 1034.]
 
 318 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 Proper parties are those Avithout whom a substantial decree may 
 he made, but not a decree which sliall completely settle all the 
 questions which may be involved in the controversy, and con- 
 clude the rights of all the persons who have any interest in the 
 subject-matter of the litigation. ^ Confusion has frequently arisen 
 from a neglect by text-writers, and even judges, to observe this 
 plain distinction. Parties are sometimes spoken of as necessary 
 when they are merely proper. Thus, because a decree cannot be 
 rendered which shall determine the rights of certain classes of 
 individuals without making tliem defendants in the action, they 
 are not unfrequently called necessary parties ; or, in other words, 
 because they must be joined as defendants in a particular suit, 
 in order that the judgment therein may bind tlieni^ they are 
 denominated "necessary" parties absolutely. Such persons are 
 "necessary" sub modo — that is, they must be brought in if it 
 is expected to conclude them by the decree; but to call them 
 " necessary " absolutely is to ignore the familiar and fundamental 
 distinction between the two classes of parties which has just been 
 mentioned. This inaccurate use of language would make every 
 person a necessary party who should actually be joined as a co- 
 defendant in an equitable action. 
 
 § 227. * 330. Distinction betw^een Necessary and Proper Parties 
 Illustrated. Practical Test. I will illustrate these positions by 
 a familiar example. In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the 
 owner of the land covered by it is a necessary defendant, because 
 without his presence no decree can be made for the sale of the 
 land; in other words, no effective decree at all, and the suit 
 would be an empty show of litigation. The holders of subse- 
 quent mortgages, judgments, and other liens upon the same land 
 are not necessary parties in order to the rendition of an effective 
 judgment, because the land can be sold without their presence 
 and without cutting off their liens. If, however, the plaintiff 
 desires to settle all the questions involved in one controversy, 
 and to determine the rights of all the persons who have any 
 interest in the land, he must bring in all these holders of subse- 
 quent liens, so that a judgment may be given which shall fore- 
 
 1 [Reiser v. Gigricli (1S94), 59 Minn. — , 93 N. W. 813, quoting California v. 
 
 .•568,01 N. W. 30, <|uotinp: the text; Uudil Sontliern Tae. Ry. Co., 157 IT. S. 229; 
 
 V. Fosseen (1900), S2 Minn. 41, 84 N. W. Steinliacii (•. Prudential Ins. Co. (1902), 
 
 496; Kircher c. I'eder.son (1903), 117 Wi.s. 172 N. Y. 471, 05 N. E. 281. J
 
 DEFENDANTS IN EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 319 
 
 close their rights. To accomplish this end, these persons must 
 be made defendants; and in that respect they are necessary 
 parties — that is, necessary in order to attain the particular result 
 desired. They are not, however, necessary to the decision of the 
 main issues involved in the suit and to the granting of a decree. 
 If we use language accurately, we shall call them 2)roper parties, 
 and shall thus distinguish them from the other class, without 
 whom the judicial machinery cannot be put in motion. Every 
 person who' is rightly joined as a defendant in an equitable 
 action, is, in a certain broad sense, a necessary party, because his 
 presence is necessary, to accomplish some particular end, and to 
 make the judgment more complete than it otherwise would have 
 been ; but to use the term in this broad sense is to lose all the 
 benefits of an accurate classification and of practical rules de- 
 pending on such classification. To sum up: Necessar}?^ parties 
 defendant are those without whom no decree at all can be ren- 
 dered ; proper parties defendant are those whose presence renders 
 the decree more effectual; and all the proper parties are those by 
 whose presence the decree becomes a complete determination of 
 all the questions which can arise, and of all the rights which are 
 connected with the subject-matter of the controversy. A prac- 
 tical test will at once fix the class into which any given persons 
 interested in an equitable litigation must fall. If the person is a 
 necessary defendant, a demurrer for defect of parties on account 
 of his nonjoinder will be sustained; and conversely, if the de- 
 murrer will be sustained, the person is a necessary party. If the 
 given person is merely a proper party, such a demurrer will not 
 be sustained on account of his nonjoinder, although the court 
 may undoubtedly, in the exercise of its discretion, order him to 
 be brought in. 
 
 § 228. * 331. Equity Doctrine herein. Statutory Provision. 
 The principal provision quoted at the commencement of the 
 present section, and which is the same in all the codes of pro- 
 cedure, is a general and concise statement of the doctrine which 
 had long prevailed in courts of equity in relation to the joinder 
 of defendants. As the language of this provision is permissive 
 — any person may be made a defendant, not must be — it was 
 evidently intended to embrace "proper" as well as "necessary" 
 parties within its requirement. The doctrine of equity, ex- 
 pressed in its most general form, is, that all persons materially
 
 320 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 interested, either legally or beneficially, in the subject-matter of 
 the suit, should be made parties to it, either as plaintiffs or as 
 defendants, so that there may be a complete decree which shall 
 bind them all.^ Those whose interests are adverse to the claims 
 set up by the plaintiff, and who would therefore naturally resist 
 such claims, should be brought into the action as defendants. 
 On the other hand, those whose interests are concurrent with 
 the interests of the principal plaintiff" who actually institutes and 
 prosecutes the suit, should primarily be joined with him as 
 co-plaintiffs. But, as has already been shown in the preceding 
 section, equity procedure is not strenuous in respect to this ac- 
 curate division, and often permits individuals of the latter class 
 to be made defendants, being satisfied if they are before the 
 court so as to be bound by the decree. The persons who are 
 interested in resisting the demands of the actual plaintiff, and 
 who must therefore be defendants in the action, are separated, 
 according to the nature of their interests and of their relations 
 with each other, into two classes, — those immediately inter- 
 ested, and those consequentially interested. When an individ- 
 ual is in the enjoyment of the subject-matter, or has a right, 
 interest, or estate in it, either in possession or in expectancy, 
 
 1 See Story, Eq. PI. §§ 72, 76 a. It The following are illustrations of de- 
 has been suggested that this general doc- fendanti* properly joined : Miles i'. Du Bey 
 trine should be stated as follows: All (1894), 15 Mont. 340, 39 Pac. 313 (all per- 
 persons materially interested in the object sons diverting water from a water course) ; 
 of the suit should be made parties. See Brown v. Canal & Reservoir Co. (1899), 
 Calvert on Parties, pp. 1-11; Story, Eq. 26 Colo. 66, 56 Pac. 183 (ditch company 
 Pi. §§ 76 6, 76 c. and persons claiming right to prorate 
 
 ^Paine v. Foster (1900), 9 Okla. 213, 53 water, in an action to restrain pro-rating) ; 
 Pac. 109: The syllabus by the court reads, West Point Irrigation Co. v. Ditch Co. 
 "Courts of equity ' delight to do justice, (1900), 21 Utah, 229, 61 Pac. 16 (all per- 
 and nut by halves;' and it is a general sons obstructing flow of water in ditch); 
 rule in equity that all persons materially United Coal Co. v. Canon City Coal Co. 
 interested, either legally or beneficially, in (1897), 24 Colo. 116, 48 Pac. 1045 (a min- 
 the subject-matter of a suit, are required to ing company and its agent where one or 
 be made parties, either plaintiff or defend- the other or both were taking coal from 
 ant, however numerous they may be, so plaintiff's mines) ; Siever v. Union Pac. 
 that there may be a complete decree, whicli R. R. Co. (1903), — Neb. — , 93 N. W. 
 should bind them all." 743 (employer and creditor of employee in 
 In Abbott V. Caches (1899), 20 Wash, suit by employee to restrain vexatious 
 517, 50 I'ac. 28, the court quoted as fol- attempts to garni.shee exempt wages) ; 
 lows fruui High on Injunctions: "The State ex rel. v. Mctschan (1896), 32 Ore. 
 true test, however, in all cases would .seem 372, 46 Pac. 791 (the holder of a county 
 to be to make such parties defendant as warrant in a suit to enjoin its pay- 
 are necessary to a proper solution of the ment).] 
 <|uestion« at issue."
 
 . DEFENDANTS IN FORECLOSURE SUITS. 321 
 
 which is lial)le to be defeated or diminished by the plaintiff's 
 success, he has an immediate and direct interest in resisting the 
 phiintiff's demand, and is, in general, a necessary defendant. 
 The interest here spoken of need not be personal and beneficial ; 
 it includes any estate or right in the subject-matter, legal or 
 equitable, whether beneficial to the holder thereof or not.^ 
 Numerous illustrations of this fundamental doctrine are given in 
 the succeeding portions of this section. 
 
 § 229. * 332. Persons consequentially Interested. If a person 
 not thus immediately interested is, nevertheless, so related to 
 the subject-matter and to the principal defendant that, upon the 
 plaintiff's success, he will be liable to be proceeded against by 
 such defendant, and to be compelled to make compensation, in 
 whole or in part, for the loss, he is consequentially interested in 
 the subject of the action, and is also, in general, a necessary, 
 or at least a proper, co-defendant. Equity requires this class of 
 persons to be joined as defendants, not because they will be 
 directly affected by the decree when rendered, but because, if 
 the plaintiff succeeds against the principal defendant, the latter 
 will then have the right to call upon them to reimburse him, 
 wholly or partially, or to do some other act which shall, accord- 
 ing to the nature of the case, restore or tend to restore him to 
 his former position before the recovery against him. To avoid 
 a multiplicity of actions, such persons should, in general, be 
 brought into the suit in the first instance, so that their secondary 
 or consequential liabilities may be determined and adjusted 
 together with the main issues in the one decree. ^ I shall now 
 apply these very general statements of doctrine to the classes of 
 cases which most frequently arise in actual practice. 
 
 § 230. * 333. II. Actions to foreclose Mortgages. Introductory. 
 Statutory Distribution of Parties. The first claSS or group of equi- 
 table actions which I shall take up, both because it is the most 
 
 1 1 Dan. Ch. PI. (4th Am. ed.) p. 246. 2 j paQ. ch. PI. (4th Am. ed.) p. 282. 
 
 On the general doctrine concerning de- See also Story Eq. PI. §§ 159, 162, 169, 
 
 fendauts in equity, and necessary and 169 o, 172, 173, 176 ; Greenwood i\ Atkiu- 
 
 proper parties, see Douglas Cy. Sup. v. sou, 5 Sim. 419; Wilkinson v. Fowkes, 
 
 Walbridge, .38 Wis. 179, citing Williams 9 Hare, 19.3; Knight i'. Knight, .3 P. Wms. 
 
 V. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 563 ; Janes v. Wil- 333 ; Crosljy's Heir.s I'.Wickliffe, 7 li. Mou. 
 
 liams, 31 Ark. 175; Hamill r. Thomp.sou, 120; Wiser v. Bhichly, 1 Johns. Ch. 437; 
 
 3 Col. 518, 523 ; State v. Jacksonville, P. New Eng. Com'l Bk. v. Newport Steam 
 
 & M. R. Co., 15 Fla. 201 ; Satterthwaite Factory, 6 11. I. 154. 
 V. Beaufort Cy. Com'rs, 76 N. C. 153. 
 
 21
 
 322 CIVIL REMEDJES. 
 
 familiar and because it illustrates very clearly the general doc- 
 trine, is that of suits to foreclose mortgages. The statute dis- 
 tributes the persons who may be proper or necessary parties 
 defendant into two divisions, those "who have or claim an 
 interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff," and those 
 " who are necessary parties to a complete determination or settle- 
 ment of the questions involved therein." It is plain that the 
 latter division is the more comprehensive, and in fact includes 
 the former. Every person " who has or claims an interest in the 
 controversy adverse to the plaintiff" is evidently "a necessary 
 party to a complete determination of the questions involved 
 therein;" but, on the other hand, it is equall}' evident that 
 there may be persons " who are necessary parties to a complete 
 determination of the questions involved, but who do not have 
 nor claim any interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff." 
 A single example will illustrate this position. The codes of 
 several States require the assignor of a thing in action to be 
 made a co-defendant "to answer to the assignment" in a suit 
 brought by the assignee. Of the two defendants, when this is 
 done, the debtor alone has an interest in the controversy adverse 
 to the plaintiff. The assignor has no such interest; he is not 
 liable for the debt; his interest in the result is rather in accord 
 with than in opposition to the plaintiff. He is, however, a 
 necessary party to a complete determination and settlement of 
 the questions involved in the suit. One of these questions is, 
 whether the cause of action was in fact assigned to the plaintiff ; 
 and it is important to the rights of the debtor that this question 
 be for ever settled in the single action. In the absence of any 
 positive requirement of the statute, the assignor would not be a 
 necessary defendant, because a judgment could be rendered 
 against the debtor without the presence of the assignor. This 
 example well illustrates my statement above, that one may be a 
 party necessary to the settlement of all the questions involved in 
 tlie suit, and at the same time neither have nor claim any interest 
 adverse to the plaintiff. This evident distinction will aid us 
 in discriminating between the necessary and the proper parties 
 defendant in any given equital)le action, for, as a general propo- 
 sition, all those persons who have or claim an interest in the 
 controversy adverse to the plaintiff are '"''necessary''' defendants, 
 if by "interest adverse" is intended an interest opposeij to a
 
 DEFENDANTS IX FORECLOSURE SUITS. 323 
 
 recovery of judgment hy the, ijlaintiff ; while those who, in con- 
 tradistinction to the former, are merely "necessary parties to a 
 complete determination of the questions involved," are, in the 
 main, "jsro^gr" defendants. 
 
 § 231. * 834. Object of the Judgment in Foreclosure. Necessary 
 and Proper Parties herein. These principles Jiiay now be applied 
 to the class of actions under immediate discussion, — those 
 brought to foreclose mortgages. Those persons who own or 
 have an estate in the land to be sold under the decree, and those 
 who, in the original creation of the debt, or by any subsequent 
 assumption of it, are debtors to the mortgagee, and therefore 
 liable to a personal judgment for a deficiency, have an interest in 
 the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, and are beyond doubt 
 necessary parties, if the plaintiff desires to obtain all the relief 
 which the law affords him, namely, of sale and personal judgment 
 for deficienc}^ If, however, the plaintiff will be satisfied with 
 a partial relief, and simply asks a decree for a sale without any 
 personal judgment for a deficiency, the debtor, unless he is also 
 owner of the land in whole or in part, is not a necessary defend- 
 ant. The decree and sale must of course divest all ownership 
 and titles to the land or any part thereof, or else there would be 
 no sale but simply the show of one. But in order that the land 
 may produce its full value, the decree and sale must go further 
 than this, and must cut off all subsequent liens and incumbrances, 
 and inchoate interests which are not titles but merely the seeds 
 of titles. There is thus a threefold object of the judgment: (1} 
 To divest the title of the present owner, and transfer the owner- 
 ship to the purchaser. This is essential, and all persons who 
 have any such title are necessary parties, for without them the 
 whole action would be a nullity.^ (2) To cut off all liens and 
 inchoate interests, so that the land can be sold at a greater ad- 
 vantage. This is of course not absolutely essential, for a sale can 
 be effected without it. The holders of such liens and inchoate 
 interests are proper parties. (3) To obtain a decree for any defi- 
 ciency which may arise after the sale, against those jjersons who 
 are liable for the mortgage debt. All such debtors are necessary 
 parties if the plaintiff seeks to obtain this particular relief; biit 
 
 1 [3" Any one who has the right to pay v. Hotel Ass'n of Omaha (1901), 63 Neb. 
 
 the debt and redeem is a necessary party 181, 88 N. W. 17.5, citing Denney i-. Cole, 
 
 to the foreclosure proceedings, and a dc- 22 Wash. .372, 61 Pac. SS.] 
 cree in his absence is nugatory : " Brown
 
 324 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 he may waive this relief and content himself with the sale and 
 the proceeds thereof, in which case these mere debtors would not 
 be necessary defendants. The foregoing principles have been 
 adopted by all the courts. The doctrine is universally estab- 
 lished that in the equitable action to foreclose a mortgage by a 
 sale of the mortgaged premises, all persons who own the land 
 or anv part thereof, all who have any interest therein vested or 
 contingent, perfected or inchoate, subsequent to the giving of 
 the mortgage, all who are owners or holders of an}^ subsequent 
 liens or incumbrances thereon, and finally all who are personally 
 liable for the debt secured by the mortgage, may generally be 
 united as defendants; and must be made defendants if the 
 plaintiff seeks to obtain a decree affording him all the relief 
 which the court can grant. As titles, interests, and liens prior 
 and paramount to the mortgage are in no way affected by it 
 or by the decree of foreclosure and the sale thereunder, the 
 owners and holders thereof are neither necessary nor proper 
 parties.^ 
 
 § 232. * 335. Variations in Practical Rules Due to Differences in 
 Local Law as to Nature of Interests in Land. While this general 
 statement of the doctrine is universally accepted, there are some 
 points of difference in its practical application. These differences 
 will be found, upon careful examination, to arise, not from any 
 doubt as to tl>e general principle itself, but from a certain want 
 of uniformity in the local law of the various States in respect to 
 the nature of liens and incumbrances upon the land, and in 
 respect to the nature of inchoate or contingent interests in the 
 land. Thus, if in one State a judgment, when docketed, be- 
 comes a lien upon the lands of the debtor, and in another such a 
 judgment is not a lien, a judgment creditor of the owner of the 
 mortgaged premises would plainly be a proper part}'- defendant 
 in the tirst-named State, and as plainly not a proper party in the 
 second. The most important difference in the local law defining 
 and regulating the nature of interests in the land, relates to the 
 inchoate dower of the wives of mortgfaofors and of other subse- 
 (juent owners, and especially where the mortgage is given for 
 purchase-money so as to take precedence of the dower right of 
 the mortgagor's wife. In some States where dower is carefully 
 protected, the wives of the mortgagors and of other subsequent 
 
 1 QBut see note to § *.342/]
 
 DEFENDANTS IN FORECLOSURE SUITS. 325 
 
 owners of the land are in all cases regarded as liaving a positive 
 interest in the equity of redemption, even though they joined in 
 the execution of the mortgage, or even though the lien of the 
 mortgage be prior to their dower right; and they are therefore, 
 under all possible circumstances, necessary defendants if the 
 plaintiff wishes to cut off their rights of redemption. In other 
 States, the wives, under some circumstances at least, are not 
 regarded as having any real interest in the land, nor any right of 
 redemption, and they need not therefore be made defendants for 
 any purpose. This example is a sufficient illustration, and shows 
 that any difference in the practical rules laid down by various 
 courts arises from a variation in the law defining the nature of 
 interests in the land ; what constitutes an interest in one State 
 may not do so in another. 
 
 ^ 233. * 336. Mortgagor and his Grantee as Parties. I paSS 
 from this broad statement of the general principle to a more 
 careful discussion of the rules, with an analysis of some leading 
 cases. The doctrine which I have thus stated is approved and 
 applied under various circumstances, and to different classes of 
 persons having different interests and liens in the cases cited in 
 the foot-note. 1 When the mortgagor remains owner of the 
 
 1 [[The author's original note has heen wife join in mortgage on wife's property : 
 classitied and condensed as follows : Owner Wolf r. Banning, 3 Minn. 133. Trustee 
 of laud: Lenox v. Heed, 12 Kan. 223; and beneficiary ; Mavrich y. Grier, 3 Nev. 
 Green i\ Dixon, 9 Wis. 532 (containing a 52. Wife of grantee of mortgaged prera- 
 full discussion of subject of parties) ; Sum- ises : Watt v. Alvord, 25 Ind. 533 ; Kay v. 
 uer y. Coleman, 20 Ind. 486 (holding that Wliittaker, 44 N. Y. 565. Third party 
 owner of land subject to mortgage is interested in mortgage debt : Johnson v. 
 proper but not necessary party) ; Semple Britton, 23 Ind. 105. Assignor of instru- 
 r. Lee, 13 la. 304 (same doctrine) ; Daven- meut secured by mortgage: Holdridge u. 
 port y. Turpin, 43 Cal. 597. Grantee of Sweet, 23 Ind. 118; Gower v. Howe, 20 
 jiart of mortgaged premises: Douglass y. Ind. 396. These cases fell within a special 
 Bishop, 27 la. 214. Judgment creditor of provision of the Indiana code. Rankin v. 
 mortgagor : Union Bank of Masillon v. Major, 9 la. 297 ; Sands v. Wood, 1 la. 
 Bell, 14 O. St. 200; Gaines v. Walker, 16 263. Prior mortgagee: Standish v. Dow, 
 Ind. 361; Morris v. Wheeler, 45 N. Y. 21 la. 363. Occupant of mortgaged prem- 
 708 : "This is certainly a most extraordi- ises: Suiter v. Turner, 10 la. 517. Heirs 
 nary decision; it is in direct conflict with of deceased mortgagor : Muir v. Gibson, 8 
 other decisions made by the same court, Ind. 187; Leggett c Mutual Life Ins. Co., 
 and is an utter confounding of all distinc- 64 Barb. 23. Person claiming title ad- 
 tious between necessary and proper par- verse to mortgagor : Brundage v. Domes- 
 ties. The decision is so clearly erroneous tic, etc. Soc, 60 Barb. 204. Wife, where 
 that it can only be regarded as an ina'd- husband and wife join in mortgage (not 
 vertence." Verdin v. Slocum, 71 N. Y. necessary) : Thornton v. Pigg, 24 Mo. 
 345. Obligor on mortgage debt other 249 ; Powell v. Ross, 4 Cal. 197 (neces- 
 than mortgagor: Nichols v. Randall, 5 sary) : Chombersw. Nicholson, 30 Ind. 349; 
 Minn. 240, Husband, where husband and McArthur v. Franklin, 15 0. St. 485, s. c.
 
 326 
 
 CIVIL IlEMKDIKS. 
 
 premises, he is of course, on every account, a necessary defend- 
 ant. ^ If, liovt'ever, he has conveyed away the entire hind hy an 
 absolute deed of conveyance, the grantee, who is the owner at 
 the time of commencing tlie suit, is a necessary party defendant, 
 even though his deed has not been put upon record, because 
 without his presence the decree for a sale, which is the essential 
 primary remedy granted by the action, cannot be made.^ In a 
 few cases, however, such parties have been spoken of as projyer 
 
 16 id. 19.3. Wife, where she did not join 
 with her liushand in mortgage : Fletcher 
 V. Holmes, 32 Ind. 497 ; Moouey v. Maas, 
 22 la. 380; Merchants' Bank v. Thomp- 
 son, .55 N. Y. 7. Personal representative 
 of deceased mortgaj^or : Miles r. Smith, 
 22 Mo. .502 ; Darlington v. Effey, 13 la. 
 177; Belloc r. Rogers, 9 Cal. 123 ; Schadt 
 V. Hep])e, 45 Cal. 433 ; Huston v. String- 
 ham, 21 la. 36. Mortgagor after convey- 
 ance of equity of redemption : Burkham 
 V. Beaver, 17 Ind. 367 ; Johnson r. Monell, 
 
 13 la. 300; Mnrray v. Catlett, 4 Greene 
 (la.) 108; Stevens v. Campbell, 21 Ind. 
 471 ; Daly v. Burchell, 13 Abb. Pr. n. s. 
 264; Williams v. Meeker, 29 la. 292. 
 Junior mortgagee: Procter v. Baker, 15 
 Ind. 178; Newcomb v. Dewey, 27 la. 381 ; 
 Ansoi} V. Anson, 20 la. 55 ; Knowles v. 
 Rabliu, 20 la. 101 ; Chase v. Abbott, 20 
 la. 1.54 ; Street v. Beal, 16 la. C83 ; Hein- 
 street v. Winnie, 10 la. 430; Crow v. 
 Vance, 4 la. 434 ; Veach i'. Schaup, 3 la. 
 194; Hayward r. Stearns, 39 Cal. 58. 
 As.signee of mortgage as collateral secu- 
 rity : Sinison v. Satterlee, 64 N. Y. 657. 
 Joint obli'zors with mortgagor : Fond du 
 Lac Harrow Co. v. Haskins, 51 Wis. 135. 
 Citing also, Hall v. Nelson, 23 Barb. 88, 
 
 14 How. Pr. 32; Peto i;. Hammond, 29 
 Beav. 91 ; Maule v. Duko of Beaufort, 1 
 Russ. 349; Drury v. Clark, 16 How. Pr. 
 424 ; Denton v. Nanny, 8 Barb. 624 ; Mills 
 V. Van Voorhie.s, 20 N. Y. 415 ; Delaplaine 
 V. Lewis, 19 Wis. 476; Bigelow i-. Bush, 
 6 Paige, 343 ; Shaw v. Iloadley, 8 Blackf. 
 165; Van Nest v. Latson, 19 Barb. 604; 
 Cord V. Hirsch, 17 Wis. 403; Riddick u. 
 Walsh, 15 Mo. 538; Martin /;. Noble, 29 
 Ind. 216; French v. Turner, 15 Ind. 59 ; 
 Ten Eyck v. Casad, 15 la. 524; Parrott v. 
 Hughw, 10 la. 459; Bates v. Ruddick, 2 
 la 42'): Harworxi r .Marye, 8 Cal. 580; 
 
 Carpenter v. Williamson, 25 Cal. 161 ; 
 Patou V. Murray, 6 Paige, 474 ; Church v. 
 Smith, 39 Wis. 492 ; De Forest v. Holum, 
 38 Wis. 516.] 
 
 1 Q Where mortgaged premises are sub- 
 sequently subjected to an easement ijy the 
 public, and damages therefor are awarded 
 to the owners of such premises, the owner.s 
 are pro])er if not necessary parties to an 
 action by the mortgagees to have the liens 
 of their mortgages adjudged to be liens 
 upon the money awarded as damages : 
 Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v. Cit_v of St. Paul 
 (1899), 77 Minn. 410, 80 N. W. 357. 
 
 Carey-Lombard Lumber Co. v. Bier- 
 bauer (1899), 76 Minn. 434, 79 N. W. 541 : 
 Where a person has an equitable interest 
 in a building subject to lien, such in- 
 terest may be proceeded against and the 
 lien enforced without joining the legal 
 owner of the land on whicii tlie building 
 stands.] 
 
 '^ Hall V. Nelson, 23 Barb. 88 ; 14 How. 
 Pr. 32 ; Cord v. Hirsch, 17 Wis. 403 ; John- 
 ston V. Donvan, 106 N. Y. 269. See, how- 
 ever, Shippcn r. Kimball, 47 Kan. 173, to 
 the effect that a grantee wliose deed has 
 not been put on record is not a necessary 
 party to tiie foreclosure, so as to render 
 tlie proceedings ineffectual to convey a 
 title. 
 
 QGoodwin r. Tyrrell (1903), Ariz., 71 
 Pac. 906 ; Armstrong v. Hufty (1901), 156 
 Ind. 606, 55 N. E. 443 ; Hopkins r. Warner 
 (1895), 109 Cal. 133, 41 Pac. 868; Osborn 
 V. Logus (1895), 28 Ore. 306, 42 Pac. 997 ; 
 Brown v. Hotel Ass'n of Omaha (1901), 
 63 Neb. 181, 88 N. W. 175. 
 
 But it is not necessary to join the trus- 
 tees in a deed of trust, in a suit to fore- 
 close the same : Sidney Steven.s Implement 
 Co. V. Improvement Co. (1899), 20 Utah, 
 267, 58 Pac. 843.]
 
 DEFENDANTS IN FORECLOSURE SUITS. 327 
 
 defendants merely.^ This latter view is, in my opinion, clearly 
 incorrect, since it leads to the inevitable conclusion that there 
 may be an action without any necessary defendant. If, how- 
 ever, the mortgagor has conveyed away only a portion of the 
 premises and remains owner of the residue, the grantee of the 
 part so conveyed is not a necessary defendant. The suit against 
 the mortgagor alone is not a nullity; there is a title in him for 
 the decree of sale to act upon; but the rights of the grantee 
 would be unaffected.^ It follows as an evident corollary from 
 the proposition just stated, that the mortgagor who has conveyed 
 away the whole of the mortgaged premises is no longer a neces- 
 sary party defendant in a foreclosure action, that is, he is not 
 indispensable to the rendition of a simple judgment of sale, if no 
 decree for a deficiency is asked. ^ He is, however, an eminently 
 proper party; and if the plaintiff wishes a personal judgment for 
 any deficiency which may arise upon the sale, he, or his personal 
 representative if he is dead, is a necessary party, and may defend 
 the action, and defeat the same by any competent defence which 
 he may establish.* The decisions do not make any distinction 
 between the case in which the mortgagor has simply conveyed 
 the land incumbered by the mortgage, and that in which the 
 grantee has assumed to pay the mortgage debt, and in fact there 
 is and can be no such distinction. Whatever arrangement the 
 mortgagor may make with his grantee, he cannot by his own act 
 free himself from his liability to the holder of the mortgage ; he 
 
 1 Sumner v. Coleman, 20 Ind. 486; 471; Biirkliam v. Beaver, 17 Ind. 367; 
 
 Semple v. Lee, 13 Iowa, 304. In the last Huston v. Stringham, 21 Iowa, 36 ; Johu- 
 
 ■case, the mortgagor and the owner to son v. Monell, 13 Iowa, 300; Semple v. 
 
 whom the land had been conveyed were Lee, 13 Iowa, 304 ; Murray v. Catlett, 
 
 both joined, and the court said the owner 4 Greene (la.), 108 ; Belloc v. Rogers, 
 
 was a ;»-o/>«' party, and the mortgagor was 9 Cal. 123; Williams v. Meeker, 29 Iowa, 
 
 not a necessa/vy one. [^The same doctrine 292, 294; Story, Eq. PI. § 197. See also 
 
 was announced iu Talbot v. Roe (1903), Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 U. S. 187; Daugh- 
 
 171 Mo. 421, 71 S. W. 682, the court say- erty v. Deardorf, 107 Ind. 527; Bennett 
 
 ing that the only result of not joining the v. Mattingly (Ind. 1887), 10 N. E. 299; 
 
 grantee was to leave her right to redeem Keister v. Myers, 115 Ind. 312; West v. 
 
 still open.] Miller, 125 Ind. 70 ; Jolinson v. Foster, 68 
 
 - Douglass V. Bishop, 27 Iowa, 214, Iowa, 140; Watts v. Creighton (Iowa, 
 
 216. There is certainly a plain distinc- 1892), 52 N. W. 12; Miner v. Smith, 53 
 
 tion between this case and the one where Vt. 551 ; Tutwiler v. Dunlap, 71 Ala. 126; 
 
 the entire premises are conveyed by tlie Butler v. Williams, 27 S. C. 221 ; QHop- 
 
 mortgagor. Watts )a Julian, 122 Ind. 124. kins v. Warner (1895), 109 Cal. 133, 41 
 
 3 Drury v. Clark, 16 How. Pr. 424; Pac. 868; Weir v. Rathbun (1895), 12 
 
 Delaplaine v. Lewis, 19 Wis 476, and Wash. 84, 40 Pac. 625] 
 
 cases cited ; Stevens v. Camnbell, 21 Ind. * See cases cited in last note.
 
 328 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 Avill therefore remain liable, either as principal debtor or as surety 
 for the grantee who has assumed the payment, and will continue 
 subject to a judgment for a deficiency.^ 
 
 vj 234. * 337. Successive Grantees of Mortgaged Premises as 
 Parties. Administrator and Heirs of Mortgagor. The same prin- 
 ciple is of universal application, and embraces all successive 
 grantees of the premises who have made themselves personally 
 liable for the mortgage debt. Thus, if the mortgagor conveys 
 the premises to A., who takes them simply burdened by the lien, 
 but does not assume and agree to pay the debt, and A. after- 
 wards conveys in the same manner to B., who again conveys to 
 C. who is the owner when the foreclosure is commenced, A. and 
 B. are plainly neither necessary nor proper parties; they have 
 retained no interest in the land, and were never personally re- 
 sponsible for the debt. If, on the other hand, in this series of 
 conveyances. A., B., and C. had each in turn assumed and 
 agreed to pay the mortgage debt, C. would be the necessary de- 
 fendant in any action to foreclose, because he is the owner of the 
 land. The mortgagor. A., and B. would be proper defendants, 
 because tiiey are personally liable for the debt. The mortgagor's 
 liability was created by the original instrument, bond, note, or 
 otherwise, and he did not become freed, therefrom because others 
 also assumed it. A.'s and B.'s liability was created by their 
 voluntary assumption, and having been once incurred, it could 
 not be thrown off without the consent of the creditor. If the 
 plaintiff therefore demands a judgment for deficiency, and desires 
 to make his security as complete as possible, he may join the 
 mortgagor and A. and B. as co-defendants in the suit to fore- 
 close.^ If the mortgagor has conveyed his entire interest and 
 
 ' See same cases last citeil. QIii Plan- in several cases, after the repeal of the 
 
 kinton v. Hildebraiid (1895), 89 Wis. 20'>, statute, that the legal cause of action on 
 
 CI N. \V. 8.')9, the court said : " In the the note or bond could not properly be 
 
 aiisence of some statute extendinj^ tlicir joined with the equitable one to fore- 
 
 p jwer, courts of equity, in foreclosure close the mortgage, unless both causes 
 
 cases, have invariably left the complainant of action affected all the p.arties to the 
 
 to his remerly at law for tlie jiart of the action"] 
 
 mortirage ilebt not satisfied by the fore- - See same causes last cited. See also 
 
 closure and .s;ile. Statutory provisions of Logan v. Smith, 70 Ind 597 ; Scarry v. 
 
 the character referred to were adopted in Eldridge, 63 id. 44. QJohns c. Wilson 
 
 Wisconsin during its territorial existence, (IS'JS), Ariz. 53 Pac. 583; Hopkins v. 
 
 and continued in force until, by the ado))- Warner (1895), 109 Cal. 133, 41 Pac. 868. 
 
 tion of tlie code, they were repealed. The One who becomes liable by endorsement 
 
 result wxs tiiat it was held by this court, on note of mortg.\gor may also be joined
 
 DEFENDANTS IN FOKECLOSUKE SUITS. 
 
 ::2a 
 
 afterwards dies, 1 is administrator or executor must be joined as 
 a defendant if a judgment for deficiency is prayed, and may be 
 admitted to contest the validity of the mortgage and of the debt 
 it is given to secure.^ It is even said by some courts that the 
 personal representative of the deceased mortgagor is a necessary 
 party defendant with the heirs and widow. ^ When the mort- 
 gagor dies intestate owning the land, or when any subsequent 
 owner thus dies, his heirs are indispensable parties ; and if the 
 objection to their nonjoinder has not been taken, the court will 
 of its own motion order them to be brought in as defendants. 
 No effectual decree of sale can be made without them.^ 
 
 in foreclosure suit : Meehan r. Bank 
 (1895), 44 Neb. 213, 62 N. W. 490. A.s 
 to the grantee being subject to an action 
 at law while a separate suit in etjuity is 
 ijrosecuted to foreclose the mortgage, see 
 (iarneau v. Kendall (1901), 61 Neb. 396, 
 8o N. W. 291 ; Meehan v. Bank (1895), 
 44 Neb. 213, 62 N. W. 490.] 
 
 1 Huston V. Stringham, 21 Iowa, 36 ; 
 Darlington v. Effey, 13 Iowa, 177. 
 
 ^ [ivelsey v. Welch (189C), 8 S. D. 255, 
 66 N. W. 390; Simon v. Sabb (1899), 56 
 S. C. 38, 33 S. E. 799, where it is held that 
 under the act of 1894, making it necessary 
 to recover judgment for a specific sum 
 against tlie mortgagor's estate before the 
 mortgaged property can be sold, the per- 
 sonal representative of a deceased mort- 
 gagor is a necessary party.]] Miles r. 
 Smitli, 22 Mo. 502. If the plaintiff seeks 
 a ])ersoiial judgment for a deficiency, the 
 personal representative of a deceased mort- 
 gagor is of course a necessary defendant ; 
 but if tiie plaintiff demands no such judg- 
 ment, and is contented with the security 
 of the land alone, it seems, the personal 
 representative is not a necessary party. 
 Story's Eq. PI. §§ 196, 200; Buncombe 
 V. Haiisley, 3 P. Wms. 3.33 in.) ; Fell v. 
 Brown, 2 Bro. C. C. 276; Bradshaw i'- 
 Outram, 13 Ves. 234. See also Stanley 
 V. Mather, 31 Fed. Rep. 860 ; Van Schaack 
 V. Saunders, 32 Hun, 515 ; Munn v. Mar.'^h, 
 38 N. J. Eq. 410; Eraser r. Bean, 96 N. C. 
 327 ; Levering v. King, 97 Ind. 130; Hodg- 
 don V. Heidman, 66 Iowa, 645 ; Hill v. 
 Townley, 45 Minn. 167 ; Renshaw v. Tay- 
 lor, 7 Ore. 315. But even if the c(mi- 
 plaint prays for judgment for a deficiency, 
 the personal representatives are not neces- 
 
 sary iu the sense that their omission will 
 render tlie complaint demurrable ; for the 
 prayer is not part of the complaint : so 
 held in Butler v. Williams, 27 S. C. 221. 
 []A devisee and those claiming under him 
 are necessary parties, as well as the heirs : 
 Chadbourn i\ Johnston (1896), 119 N. C. 
 282, 25 S. E. 705.J 
 
 3 Muir 1-. Gibson, 8 Ind. 187 ; Story's 
 Eq. PI. § 196. In North Carolina, when 
 the mortgagee dies, his heirs are, in gen- 
 eral, necessary parties plaintiff or defend- 
 ant ; but there are exceptions, as where 
 the mortiragee had assigned, and died in- 
 solvent, leaving non-resident heirs. Ethe- 
 ridge v. Veruoy, 71 N. C. 184, 186, 187. 
 See also Retishaw v. Taylor, 7 Ore. 315 
 (heirs necessary with the administrator) ; 
 Zoger V. Ruster, 51 Wis. 32 (heirs neces- 
 sary) ; Hill V. Townley, 45 Minn. 167 
 (same) ; Pillow v. Sentelle, 39 Ark. 61 
 (same) ; De Forest v. Holum, 38 AVis. 516 
 (devisee of deceased vendee in foreclosure 
 of tlie vendor's lien) ; llibernia Sav. & 
 Loan Soc. v. Herbert, 53 Cal. 375 (mort- 
 gagor conveyed to a grantee and died, i:o 
 judgment for a deficiency being asked, 
 his administrator is not a necessary de- 
 fendant). In Harsh v. Griffin, 72 Iowa, 
 608, it was held that tlie failure to join 
 the heirs does not render the foreclosure 
 sale wholly void ; their only right is to 
 redeem. Under the statutes of Missouri 
 and of California the personal represent- 
 ative is the only necessary defendant ; 
 Tierney v. Spiva, 97 Mo. 98 ; Hall v. Klep- 
 zig, 99"Mo. 83; Bayly v. Muehe, 65 Cal. 
 345. [^It is not necessary to join the heirs 
 of a deceased mortgagor : Dickey v. Gib- 
 sou (1898), 121 Cal.' 276, .53 I'ac. 704.
 
 330 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 235. * 338. Personal Representative of Owner of Mortgaged 
 Premises Necessary Party in California. Judgment Creditors of Mort- 
 gagor. Assignor of Secured Debt. Ill California, the personal repre- 
 sentative of a deceased person sncceeds at once to all lands as 
 well as personal property ; the title vests in him for purposes of 
 administration ; and if an owner of mortgaged land dies, his ex- 
 ecutor or administrator is therefore an indispensable party defend- 
 ant.^ A mortgagor having conveyed the land to assignees in 
 trust for the benefit of creditors, judgment creditors whose judg- 
 ments were recovered subsequent to such assignment, and which 
 were therefore not direct liens on tlie land, were held to be proper 
 parties defendant in an action brought to foreclose the mortgage 
 against the mortgagor and the trustees. These trustees having 
 suffered a default, the judgment creditors were permitted to in- 
 tervene and to contest the validity of the mortgage and of the 
 debt which it secured by setting up usury .2 The general proposi- 
 tion was announced by the court, that the cestuis que trustent are 
 proper defendants as well as the trustees. When a mortgage was 
 given to secure a note payable to the order of the mortgagee, and 
 the latter indorsed and transferred the note and assigned the 
 mortgage, the assignee cannot maintain an action against the 
 mo)'tgagor and maker of the note, and the indorser of the note 
 (the mortgagee), to foreclose the mortgage and to ol)tain judg- 
 ment asrainst both for either the whole amount of the note or for 
 the deficiency. A legal action may be brought against both on 
 the note, but a foreclosure must be against the mortgagor alone.^ 
 This last rule is exactly otherwise in Minnesota by virtue of an 
 express statute. If the mortgage debt is secured by the obliga- 
 tion of any person other than the mortgagor, he may be joined as 
 a defendant in the foreclosure suit, and a judgment for deficiency 
 may be rendered against him alone, or jointly with the mortgagor, 
 as the case may be.* 
 
 The heirs and devisees of a deceased ment will result prejudicially to the estate, 
 
 mortn;a<?or are necessary parties : Wall v. a necessary party.] 
 
 McMillan (189.'j), 44 S. C. 402, 22 S. E. - Union Hank of Masillon v. Bell, 14 
 
 424.] Ohio St. 200. |[But see Sidney Stevens 
 
 ' Harwood v. Marve, 8 Cal. 580. It is Implement Co. c. Improvement Co. (1899), 
 
 held that the heirs of the deceased mort- 20 Utaii 267, 58 Pac. 843, where it was 
 
 gagor ar<? not necessary parties. Bayly held tiiat the trustees of a deed of trust 
 
 V. Mueliu, G5 Cal. .'545. [|Sec Kelsey c. were not ueces.sary ])arties in an action to 
 
 Welch (1890), 8 S. I). 255, 66 N. W. 390, foreclose the same.] 
 where tlie heirs were lield proper parties, ■'' Sand.* v. Wood, 1 luwa, 26.1. 
 
 and the aiministrator, wliere the judg- ■* Nichols v. Kandall, 5 Minn. 304, 308.
 
 DEFENDANTS IN FOKECLOSURE SUITS. 331 
 
 § 236. * 339. Special Statutes Making Assignor of a Thing in 
 Action a Necessary Party- The special provisions ill the codcs of 
 some States requiring the assignor of a thing in action to be made 
 a defendant under certain circumstances in a suit by the assignee, 
 affects the general doctrine as to parties in forech)Sure actions in 
 those States. These provisions, it will be remembered, require 
 the assignor to be made a party " when the thing in action is not 
 assignable by indorsement," or when it is not a negotiable instru- 
 ment, or when the assignment is not expressly authorized by 
 statute so as to transfer the legal title to the assignee. It has 
 been held in States where these provisions are in force, that if a 
 mortgage is given to secure a negotiable note, and this note is 
 transferred in the usual manner by indorsement, although there 
 is no written assignment of the mortgage, the assignor need not 
 be made a defendant. The transfer of the note by indorsement 
 carries v^ath it the title to the mortgage, and the assignee thus 
 becomes legal owner of both by a form and mode of transfer 
 which permits the action to be brought mthout the assignor as 
 a party defendant.^ On the otlier hand, if the mortgage alone is 
 assigned by a written transfer, while the evidence of the debt, for 
 example a bond, is merely transferred by delivery, the assignor, 
 who might be the mortgagee, is a necessary defendant under the 
 provision above referred to.^ This decision would undoubtedly 
 embrace all cases where the instrument which is the principal evi- 
 dence of debt, whether bond or negotiable note, unless the latter 
 be payable to bearer, is transferred by delivery merely. If a note, 
 secured by mortgage is payable to bearer, so that the legal title 
 will pass by mere delivery, it would seem the assignor need not be 
 made a defendant. Such a note being negotiable, the case falls 
 directly within the language of the provision as it is found in 
 several codes. 
 
 § 237. * 840. "Where Holder of less than all of a Series of Notes 
 Secured by same Mortgage brings Foreclosure Suit. When a mort- 
 gage is given to secure a series of notes made by the mortgagor, 
 
 '■ Gower (,". Howe, 20 lud. 396. Mort- closed by the assignee without making the 
 
 gagees who have assigned their entire assignor a party, the latter may redeem 
 
 interest are not necessary parties. Pullen upon payment of his debt. Re Gilbert's 
 
 V. Heron Min. Co., 71 N. C. 567 ; Smythe Est., 104 N. Y. 200. QSee Styers v. Als- 
 
 V Brown, 25 S. C. 89. It is held in New paugh (1896), 118 N. C. 631, 24 S. E.422.] 
 York that where the mortgage has been - Holdridge v. Sweet, 23 Ind. 118; 
 
 assigned by the mortgagee as collateral French v. Turner, 15 Ind. 59. See Kittle 
 
 security for his own debt, and is fore- v. Van Dyck, 1 Saudf. Ch. 76.
 
 332 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 having different periods of time to run, as, for example, one, two 
 and three years, the proceeds of the Land when sold upon fore- 
 closure are to be applied to the payment of these notes in the 
 order in which they fall due ; that is, the one which first falls due 
 is to be paid in full, and the surplus, if any, goes to the payment 
 of the second, and so on. If the mortgagee assigns one or more 
 of such notes, and retains the others, or if the notes are separately 
 assigned to different persons, the holders cannot unite as co- 
 plaintiffs in an action to foreclose, because the debt has been 
 severed and their interests are separate and distinct. Either 
 holder, however, may bring an action to foreclose, and may make 
 the other holder (or holders) defendant, and such defendant can 
 set up his rights in his answer. The facts being thus presented, 
 the decree can adjust the various interests and equities of the 
 different holders, and apportion the proceeds according to the 
 priorities. The foregoing rules are established in lowa.^ 
 
 § 238. * 341. Occupant of Premises as Party. Averments of Peti- 
 tion as to each Person Made Defendant. An occupant of the land, 
 that is, a person in possession without alleging the title to be in 
 Idmself, is not a necessary party; his rights, however, whatever 
 they may be, will not be affected by the decree in a suit to which 
 he was not made a defendant.^ The complaint or petition must 
 allege, in respect of every person made a defendant, that he has 
 or claims some interest adverse to the plaintiff, or that he is a 
 
 1 Kankin v. Major, 9 Iowa, 297. It was uot raised. In the recent case, how- 
 must he confessed this is a sacrifice of ever, of Guthrie v. Treat (190:i), — Neb. 
 suhstance to form. If the assignee may — , 92 N. W. 595, iu au ehil)orate and well 
 have affirmative relief as a defendant, it rea-soned opinion in which the rule in Ran- 
 is difficult to see any substantial reason kin v. Major (siijira), aud the similar ca.^e 
 why he should not l)e permitted to join of Swenson i,-. Plow Co., 14 Kau. 387, is 
 as plaintiff in the first instance. For a thoroughly discussed, the court holds that 
 statement of the varying rules on the sub- under the facts of this case a joinder is 
 ject of mortgages to secure several notes, proper. The Iowa and Kansas rule is 
 see .'{ I'om. Eq. Jur. §§ 1200-120.3. See explained on tjie iiasis of the different 
 also Johnston v. McDuffee, 83 Cal. 30; methods of procedure in foreclosure in 
 Studcbaker Bros. Man. Co. c. McCargur, those States. But in Bacon v. O'Keefe 
 20 Neb. 500. (1896), 13 Wash. 6.55, 43 Pac. 886, that 
 \_h was held in the following Ne- court held that a joinder was not only 
 bra-ska cases that the holders of the proper but necessary, ami refused to Ssanc- 
 different notes .secured by the mortgage tion the rnle in Burnett v. Hoffman 
 might maintain separate actions of fore- {.supra). "2 
 
 closure: Todd r. Cremer (1893), 36 Neb. - Suiter v. Turner, 10 Iowa, 517. See 
 
 430, 54 N. W. 674; Burnett v. Hoffman liichardson v. Iladsall, 106 111. 476. That 
 
 (1894), 40 Neb. 569, 58 N. W. 1134; Sloan he is a proper party, see Buyter r. Keid, 
 
 V. Thoma« (1899), 58 Neb. 713, 79 N. W. 121 N. Y. 498 (motion for rehearing de- 
 
 728, but the question of the right to join nied, Oct. 14, 1890, 25 N. K. 377).
 
 DEFENDANTS IN FORECLOSURE SUITS. 333 
 
 necessary party to a complete settlement of the questions involved 
 in the controversy. A clofendant concerning whom no sueli aver- 
 ment is made may demur for want of sufficient facts. ^ Parties 
 remotely and contingently interested in the result, although lia\'- 
 ing no estate in or lien on the land, may be proper defendants in 
 order to protect their rights and to effect the settlement of the 
 questions.^ 
 
 ^ 239. *3-12. Subsequent and Prior Incumbrancers as Parties. 
 Husband in Case of Mortgage on Wife's Land. It is a rule univer- 
 sally established that all subsequent incumbrancers, who are 
 holders of general or specific liens on the land, whether mort- 
 gagees, judgment creditors, or whatever be the nature of the lien 
 if it can be enforced against the land, are not necessary parties in 
 the sense that their presence is indispensable to the rendition of a 
 decree of sale ; but they are necessary parties defendant to the 
 recovery of a judgment which shall give to the purchaser there- 
 under a title free from their liens and incumbrances. If they are 
 not joined as defendants, their rights are unaffected ; their liens 
 remain undisturbed and continue upon the land while in the 
 hands of the purchaser ; and they retain the right of redemption 
 from the holder of the mortgage before the sale, and from the 
 purchaser after the sale.^ It is not, in general, considered that 
 
 1 Martin v. Noble, 29 lud. 216. It is 288, 293; Newcomb v. Dewey, 27 Iowa, 
 
 not necessaiy to allege auy particular in- 381 ; Auson v. Anson, 20 Iowa, 55 ; Ten 
 
 terest. A general averment, as stated in Eyck ;■. Casad, 15 Iowa, 524 ; Knowles v. 
 
 tlie text, is sufficient in respect to all the Kahlin, 20 Iowa, 101 ; Chase c. Abbott, 
 
 defendants, except those against whom a 20 Iowa, 154; Street v. Beal, 16 Iowa, 68; 
 
 personal judgment is asked, and those who Ileimstreet v. Winnie, 10 Iowa, 430; 
 
 are owners of the land. See Anthony v. Veacli v. Schaup, 3 Iowa, 194 ; Bates v. 
 
 Nye, 30 Cal. 401 ; Sichler y. Look, 93 Cal. Ruddick, 2 Iowa, 423; Hayward v. 
 
 600 r Carpenter v. Ingalls (S. Dak. 1892), Stearns, 39 Cal. 58, 60; Green v. Dixon, 
 
 51 N. W. 948. [McKibben v. Worthing- 9 Wis. 532 ; Story's Eq. PI. § 193 ; Haines 
 
 ton's Ex'r (1898), 103 Ky. 356, 45 S. W. v. Beach, 3 Johns. Ch. 459; Draper v. 
 
 233; Commonwealth v. Robinson (1895), Lord Clarendon, 2 Veru. 518; Lomax v. 
 
 96 Ky. 5.53, 29 S. W. 306.] Hide, 2 ^'ern. 186; Godfrey v. Chadwell, 
 
 '^ See, as illustrations, Johnson v. Brit- 2 Vern. 601 ; Morret v. Westerne, 2 A^ern. 
 
 ton, 23 Ind. 105; Parrott v. Hughes, 10 663; Rolleston i;. Morton, 1 Dr. & W. 171 ; 
 
 Iowa, 459. Such persons are not, how- Besser v. Hawthorne, 3 Ore. 129; Par- 
 
 ever, necessary parties : United States dee v. Steward, 37 Hun, 259 ; Douthit r. 
 
 Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Roche, 116 N. Y- Hipp, 23 S. C. 205; Hensley v. Whiffin, 
 
 120, 130. 54 Iowa, 555 ; Stanbrough v. Daniels, 77 
 
 3 Kay r. Whittaker, 44 N. Y. 565. 572 ; Iowa, 561; Williams v. Brownlee, 101 
 
 Bloomer v. Sturges, 58 N. Y. 168; Rath- Mo. 309; De Lashmutt v. Sellwood, 10 
 
 bone V. Hooney, 58 N. Y. 463 ; Gaines r. Ore. 319; Johnson v. Hosford (lud., 1887), 
 
 Walker, 16 Ind. 361 ; Proctor r. Baker, 10 N. E. 407. See, however, per contra, 
 
 15 lud. 178; Wright v. Howell, 35 Iowa, Morris v. Wheeler, 45 N. Y. 708, — a
 
 334 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 prior incumbrancers are even proper defendants, for as their liens 
 are paramount to the mortgage, they cannot be in any manner 
 affected by the action or the decree therein. ^ It is said in Iowa, 
 however, tliat they are proper parties.^ If a mortgage is given 
 by a liusband and wife on hinds whicli are her separate estate, he 
 is a necessary co-defendant with his wife, except in the very few 
 States whose statutes expressly exclude him in actions having 
 reference to the wife's separate propert}'. If he united with the 
 wife in the note, bond, or other obligation secured by the mort- 
 
 clearly erroneous decision. The holder 
 of an interest in the laud not adverse or 
 paramount to the mortgage, but also not 
 subject to it, may be made a party de- 
 fendant. Brown v. Volkenning, 64 X. Y. 
 76, 84. As to the proper relief against 
 persons holding subsequent interests, see 
 Heath v. Silverthoru Lead Miu. Co, 39 
 Wis. 146. Q)sborn v. Logus (1895), 28 
 Ore. 306, 42 Pac. 997 ; Gammon v. John- 
 son (1900), 126 N. C. 64, 3.5 S. E. 18.5; 
 Williams v. Kerr (1893), 113 N. C. 306, 
 18 S. E. 501. In Gaines v. Childers (1901), 
 38 Ore. 200, 63 Pac. 487, the court said : 
 " If encumbrancers are not made parties 
 to a suit to foreclose a lien, they are, of 
 course, in no respect bound by the decree 
 or proceeding thereunder; but the decree 
 itself is valid, and vests in the purcliaser 
 the legal title to tiie premises, and the 
 right, in a proper proceeding, to compel 
 such lien creditors to redeem." 
 
 A purcha.'ser at a sheriff's sale, where 
 land is sold under the execution of a judg- 
 ment junior in lieu to a mortgage thereon, 
 and who seeks to refer for the security of 
 his title to a judgment senior to such 
 mortgage, is a proper party to the fore- 
 closure of the mortgage : Baura f. Tran- 
 tham (1895). 45 S. C. 291, 23 S. C. 54.] 
 
 1 Story's Eq. PI. § 193; Rose v. Page, 
 2 Sim. 471 ; Delabere i'. Norwood, 3 
 Swanst. 144 (n.) ; Wakeman i;. Grover, 
 
 4 Paige, 23 ; Parker v. Fuller, 1 Russ. & 
 My. 656 ; Hagan v. Walker, 14 How. 
 U. S. 37 ; Ricliards v. Cooper, 5 Beav. 
 304 ; Arnold v. Bainbrigge, 2 De G., F. & 
 J. 92; Aud.^ley v. Horn, 26 Beav. 195; 
 1 De G., F. & J. 226; Person f. Merrick, 
 
 5 Wis. 231 ; Wright ?>. Bandy. 11 Ind.398; 
 Rathbone r. H«.oney, 58 N. Y. 463; Je- 
 rome V. .McCarier, 94 U. S. 734 ; Wabafh, 
 
 St. L. & P. Ry. Co. V. Central Trust Co. of 
 N. Y., 22 Fed. Rep. 138. As to whether 
 they are proper though not necessary 
 defendants, see Warren v. Burtou, 9 S. C. 
 197 ; Baas v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 39 
 Wis. 296 ; Emigrant L Sav. Bk". v. Gold- 
 man, 75 X. Y. 127 ; Lockman v. Reilly, 95 
 N. Y. 64 ; Hinsou v. Adrian, 86 X. C". 61 ; 
 Harwell v. Lehman, 72 Ala. 344 ; Foster 
 V. Johnson & Trowbridge, 44 Minn. 290; 
 First Xat. Bk. of Salem r. Salem Capital 
 Flour Mills Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 580. 
 
 £iiee, on the contrary, Van Loben Sels 
 V. Bunnell (1901), 131 Cal. 489, 63 Pac. 
 773, where the court said : " There is no 
 doubt of the jurisdiction of the court to 
 adjudicate the claims of a prior encum- 
 brancer if made a party. Such encum- 
 brancers are not necessary parties, but 
 they are always proper parties, and it is 
 good practice to join them for the purpose 
 of li(iuidating their claims. Whenever a 
 prior encumbrancer is made a party, it is 
 his right to file a cross-complaint to fore- 
 close his lien." To the same effect see also 
 Gammon i'. Johnson (1900), 126 X. C. 64, 
 35 S. E. 185; Jacobi v. Mickle (1894), 
 144 X. Y. 237, 39 X. E. 66, where a prior 
 encumbrancer was made a party and 
 suffered default, and was held to be barred 
 thereby from foreclosing his mortgage. 
 Prior encumbrancers may be made parties 
 for the purpose of determining the amount 
 and rank of their liens : Missouri, etc. 
 Trust Co. V. Richardson (1899), 57 Neb. 
 617, 78 X. W. 273. Held proper but not 
 necessary parties : Globe Loan & Trust 
 Co. i". Eiler (1901), 61 Xeb. 226, 85 X. W. 
 48.] 
 
 - Standish r. Dow, 21 Iowa, 363 ; H&im- 
 street v. Wiuuie, 10 Iowa, 430.
 
 DEFENDANTS IN FORECLOSURE SUITS. 335 
 
 gage, he is a proper defendant in Minnesota, for the further 
 reason that a judgment for deficiency may be rendered against 
 him in the action.^ 
 
 § 240. *343. Joinder of Wife of Mortgagor. In regard tO the 
 necessity or propriety of joining the wife of the mortgagor, or of 
 any subsequent owner of the mortgaged premises, there is some 
 conflict among the decisions. The solution of this question 
 depends mainly upon the law of the State regulating the wife's 
 right of dower.2 In most of the States the common-law doctrines 
 as to dower prevail without substantial alteration. In some, 
 however, they have been entirely abrogated, or at least radically 
 changed. As at the common law, the wife's inchoate dower right 
 attached to all lands owned in fee by the husband during the 
 marriage, any mortgage, except for purchase-money, given by the 
 luisband, in which the wife does not join, is subject to her dower 
 right. When such a mortgage — not for purchase-money — is 
 executed by the husband alone, a foreclosure thereof by an action 
 in which she is even made a party defendant does not affect her 
 rights ; she can assert her claim to dower in the land after her 
 husband's death without redemption; the decree as to her is a 
 mere nullity.^ If the wife unites with her husband in executing 
 the mortgage, her dower right becomes subject to the mortgage 
 lien ; in other words, she is entitled to dower in the equity of re- 
 demption. This entitles her to redeem upon the same principle 
 that any other junior incumbrancer is thus entitled. In all those 
 States where the common-law doctrines as to dower have not 
 been abrogated, the wife of the mortgagor, who has united in 
 executing the mortgage, though not an absolutely necessary 
 party, must be made a defendant in order to cut off her right 
 of redemption. If not a party to the foreclosure suit, she may 
 come in and redeem f]-om the purchaser.^ The same is, of course, 
 
 1 Wolf V. Banning, 3 Miun. 202, 204. * McArthur v. Franklin, 15 Ohio St. 
 
 Qn Padley v. Neill (1896), 134 Mo. 364, 485; 16 id. 193; Chambers v. Nicholson, 
 
 3.5 S. W. 997, a wife commenced an 30 Ind. 349 ; Chase v. Abbott, 20 Iowa, 
 
 action to cancel a mortgage on her prop- 154 ; Anthony ),-. Nye, 30 Cal. 401 ; Mills 
 
 erty, and a foreclosure was allowed on a r. Van Voorhies, 20 N. Y. 412. For the 
 
 cross bill without joining her husband.] peculiar law of North Carolina, see Creecy 
 
 ^ []But where a wife renounces her i-. Pearce, 69 X. C. 67 ; Etheridge v. Ver- 
 
 dower right, she is not a necessary party : noy, 71 N. C. 184, 185-187 ; Nimrock v. 
 
 Miller v. Bank (1897), 49 S. C.'427, 27 Scanlin, 87 N. C. 119. Wife is a neces- 
 
 S. C. 514.] sary defendant in Wisconsin : Foster v. 
 
 ® Moomey v. Maas, 22 Iowa, 380 ; Mer- Hickox, 38 Wis. 408, overruling Cary v. 
 
 chants' Bank v. Thomson, 55 N. Y. 7, 11. Wheeler, 14 id. 281. In Alabama, she is
 
 336 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 true of any owner to whom the land or a part thereof has been 
 conveyed, subject to the mortgage, and who remains owner at the 
 time of commencing the action to foreclose.^ It is not necessary 
 to set out the wife's interest in detail in the plaintiff's pleading ; 
 it is sufficient to aver in the usual general formula that she has or 
 claims an interest in the land adverse to the plaintiff.^ A con- 
 trary rule prevails in a few States, in which it is held that the 
 wife, under the circumstances mentioned, need not be made a 
 defendant.^ This ruling must be based upon the local law of 
 dower radically different from the common law. 
 
 § 241. * 344. Joinder of Wife of Mortgagor in Foreclosure of Pur- 
 chase-Money Mortgage. There is a marked conflict in the deci- 
 sions defining the wife's right under a purchase-money mortgage. 
 One theory holds that the legal position of a wife whose husband 
 has executed a purchase-money mortgage in which she did not 
 unite is exactly the same as that of a wife who has united with 
 her husband in executing a mortgage not given for purchase- 
 money. The lien of the mortgage is, of course, paramount to 
 the dower interest, but she still has a right of redemption, and, 
 in order to cut this off, she must be made a defendant in the 
 foreclosure action.* The same rule also applies to the wife of 
 the person to whom the land or a part of it has been conveyed, 
 subject to a purchase-money mortgage, and who is owner at the 
 time of the foreclosure.* The other theory denies that the wife 
 whose husband executes a purchase-money mortgage in which she 
 does not join has any interest in the land, or any right of re- 
 demption. According to this view, she need not be made a 
 defendant in the action to foreclose, and is cut off by decree and 
 sale, although omitted as a party. ^ When a trustee of a married 
 
 not a necessary party, though she claims Ross, 4 Cal. 197. This last case cannot be 
 
 an equity in the land on tlie ground that reconciled with Anthony r. Nye, supra. 
 
 her funds were used in paying the pur- Qln Morgan v. Wicklifle (1903), — Ky. 
 
 chase-money: Flowers r. Barker, 79 Ala. — , 72 S. W. 1122, under Ky. St., § 2i;J5, 
 
 445. [^Wife is a proper, if not a neces- restricting the wife's dower right, it was 
 
 sary, party : Ilausmann Bro.s. MTg Co. v. held that the wife was not a nece.s.sary 
 
 Kempfert (1896), 9.3 Wis. 587,67 N. W. party to a suit to foreclose a mortgage in 
 
 1136. So is the widow, who joined in the which siie liad joined. J 
 
 mortgage: Chadbourn v. Johnston (1890), * Mills v. Van Voorhies, 20 N. Y. 412. 
 
 119 N. C. 282, 25 S. E. 705.] Also in Fo.ster v. Ilickox, 38 Wis. 408. 
 
 1 Watt V. Alvord, 25 lud. 533, and ^ Fletcher v. Holmes, 32 lud. 497, per 
 
 caaes last cited. Elliott J. ; Etheridge j\ Vernoy, 71 N. C. 
 
 '•^ Anthony I'. Nye, 30 Cal. 401. 184-186. QSce also, Schaefer v. I'urvi- 
 
 » Thornton v. Pigg. 24 Mo. 249 ; Rid- ance (1903), — - lud. — , 66 N. E. 154.] • 
 dick 1-. Walsh, 15 Mo. 538; Powell i-.
 
 DEFENDANTS IN FOKECLOSUKE SUITS. 337 
 
 woman purchased lands in trust for her, and gave a purchase- 
 money mortgage therefor, it was held, in Nevada, that the wife 
 and her husband were both necessary defendants in an action 
 brought to foreclose the mortgage.^ 
 
 § 242. * 345. Parties in Foreclosure of Mortgage upon Homestead. 
 Adverse Claimant as Party. Other Cases. Under the law of Cali- 
 fornia in respect to homesteads, it is held that the husband and 
 wife must both join in a mortgage of the homestead in order that 
 it should have any validity as against either; and of course the 
 wife is a necessary defendant in an action to foreclose such a 
 mortgage in which she has joined. ^ In an action to foreclose a 
 mortgage, a person who sets up a claim to the land adverse and 
 paramount to the title of the mortgagor, and who therefore denies 
 the efficacy of the mortgage lien, cannot properly be joined as a 
 co-defendant by the plaintiff. ^ Such an adverse claim to the 
 land in opposition to the mortgage cannot be tried in the equi- 
 table action to foreclose. So far as mere legal rights are 
 concerned in such an action, the only proper parties are the 
 mortgagor and the mortgagee, and those who have acquired 
 rights under them subsequent to the mortgage. The mortgagee 
 or holder of the mortgage cannot make one who claims prior and 
 adversely to the title of the mortgagor a defendant for the pur- 
 pose of trying the validity of his adverse claim. ^ In Iowa, a 
 
 1 Ma^Tich V. Grier, 3 Nev. 52. And whose homestead rights are not subject to 
 ■when mortgaged land is conveyed in trust, a mortgage, are not proper parties to its 
 or vested in trustees, the cestuis que trustent foreclosure : Hoppe v. Fountain (1894), 104 
 are necessary defendants in a suit to fore- Cal. 94, .37 Pac. 894.] 
 
 close. Clark v. Keyburu, 8 Wall. 318; '^ QSo held in Joslin y. Williams (1901), 
 
 Faithful V. Hunt, 3 Anst. 751 ; Calverley 61 Neb. 859, 86 N. W\ 473.] 
 V. rhelp, 6 Mad. 229 ; Osbourn v. Fallows, * Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Lent, 6 Paige, 
 
 1 Rus. & M. 741 ; Newton w. Earl Egmont, 637, per Walwortli Chan.; Corning v. 
 
 A Sim. 574, 584, 5 Sim. 130, 135; Coles Smith, 6 N. Y. 82; Palmer v. Yager, 20 
 
 V Forrest, 10 Beav. 552, 557 ; Goldsmid v. Wis. 91, 103, per Dixon C. J. ; Pelton v. 
 
 Stonehewer, 9 Hare A pp. 38; Story's Eq. Farmin, 18 Wis. 222. See also Roberts u. 
 
 PI. §§ 206, 207 ; United States Trust Co. Wood, 38 Wis. 60 ; Crogan r. Spence, 53 
 
 of N. Y. V. Roche, 116 N. Y. 120, 1.30; Cal. 15; Houghton v. Allen, 75 Cal. 102; 
 
 Kirkpatrick V. Corning, 38 N. J. Eq. 234. McComb v. Spangler, 71 Cal. 418, 423; 
 
 2 Revalk v. Kraemer, 8 Cal. 66 ; Marks Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. San Diego 
 V. Marsh, 9 Cal. 96 ; Moss v. Warner, 10 vStreet-Car Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 105; but 
 Cal. 296 ; Sargent v. Wilson, 5 Cal. 504. may try the validity of a claim which is 
 See also Mabury v. Ruiz, 58 Cal. 11; not thus adverse and paramount, and maj 
 Hefner v. Urton, 71 Cal. 479. [^Held in make the holder thereof a defendant : 
 Spalti y. Blumer (1894), 56 Minn. 523, 58 Brown v. Volkenning, 64 N. Y. 76, 84; 
 N. W. 1 56, that a decree of foreclosure. Baas v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. 39 Wis. 
 where the wife is not a party, will not 296 ; Lyon v. Powell, 78 Ala. 351. 
 affect her homestead interest. Children
 
 338 CIVIL KKMEDIES. 
 
 trust deed of land or of chattels intended as security for a debt 
 is by statute regarded as a mortgage, and may be foreclosed by 
 action in the same manner as a mortgage.^ A subsequent in- 
 cumbrancer, as, for example, a mortgagee, who has not been 
 made a party to the foreclosure of a prior mortgage, may redeem 
 the land from the sale, and, in his action to compel the redemp- 
 tion, he should make the mortgagor and his prior mortgagee, and 
 the purchaser at the sale and his grantees, if any, tlie parties 
 defendant. 2 The grantee of the purchaser is an indispensable 
 defendant in such an action ; and if his omission is properly 
 objected to by the actual defendant, the action must fail.^ 
 
 § 243. * 340. III. Parties in Creditors' Actions : and Actions by 
 or on Behalf of Creditors to set aside Fraudulent Transfers by their 
 Debtors. General Remarks. It is not within the SCOpe of this 
 work to inquire into the nature of creditors' suits, nor to discuss 
 the question when and under what circumstances they may be 
 maintained. My only present concern is with respect to the 
 proper selection of parties defendant, whenever the actions them- 
 selves may be properl}^ brought. The general purpose of a 
 creditor's suit proper is to reach, at the instance of a judgment 
 creditor whose legal remedies of judgment and executifm thereon 
 have been exhausted, the assets of the judgment debtor, which, 
 either by reason of their intrinsic nature, or by reason of their 
 transfer alleged to have been fraudulent as agiiinst tlie creditor, 
 are or have been placed beyond the reach of an execiition at law, 
 
 1 Darlington v. Effey, 1.3 Iowa, 177. It was held in Swenney v. Hill (1902), 
 Trust deeds appear to be used in place of 6,5 Kan. 826, 70 Pac. 868, that " if promis- 
 murtgages in several other of the AVestern sory notes be given to one f)ei\son, and a 
 States. mortgage securing them is given to an- 
 
 2 Anson v. Anson, 20 Iowa, 55 ; Knowles other, who by tlie terms of the latter instru- 
 V. Rablin, 20 Iowa, 101 ; Street j;. Keal, 16 ment is given active powers and authority 
 Iowa, 68 ; Rurnap !•. Cook, 16 Iowa, 149. over the subjects of the mortgage relation. 
 So, too, where the prior mortgagee seeks the mortgagee is a necessary party to a 
 a second time to foreclose his mortgage suit bruuglit by the payee of the notes to 
 against a subsequent mortgagee who was foreclose the mortgage." (Syllabus by 
 not made a party to the first foreclosure the court.) 
 
 suit, all tlie jjurchasers at the first fore- ]Vht'?-(' the Mortfjagee Dies.. An action 
 
 closure sale are neces.sary parties : Moulton for possession and foreclosure brought by 
 
 r. Cornish, 61 Hun, 4.38. a mortgagee against a mortgagor and 
 
 * Winslow I'. Clark, 47 X. Y. 221, 263; others, cannot be continued by the mort- 
 
 citing Dias i-. Merle, 4 Paige, 259. And gagee's executfir when tlie mortgagee dies 
 
 in an action to set aside a foreclosure sale pending the suit, without joining the mort- 
 
 for fraud, the purchaser is a necessary de- gagee's heirs as parties: Hughes v. Gay 
 
 fendant : Wibson r. Bell, 17 Minn. 61^ 64. (1903), 132 N. C. 50, 43 S. E. 539.] 
 
 ^ Where }f(jrlg<i<jpe is not Payee of Debt.
 
 DEFENDANTS IN CREDITORS' SUITS. 339 
 
 and which are therefore denominated equitable assets. Certain 
 species of property, as, for example, things in action, although 
 in the ownership of the debtor, cannot be seized on execution. 
 The distinctive feature of the action, however, is to reach land, 
 and sometimes chattels, which the debtor, having owned by a 
 legal title, has transferred to some grantee or assignee in fraud 
 of his creditors ; or to reach such land, and sometimes personal 
 property, the legal title to which stands, and always has stood, 
 in other parties, while by reason of alleged facts the equitable 
 ownership, at least so far as the creditors are concerned, is held 
 by the debtor himself, and the property is thus, as is alleged, 
 liable to be taken and applied to the discharge of the creditor's 
 demands. Under what circumstances a transfer of property is 
 fraudulent as against the creditors, or the equitable ownership is 
 held by the debtor while the legal title is vested in another, 
 it is not now the place to inquire. Assuming that such cir- 
 cumstances exist, and that when they exist an action may be 
 maintained by the judgment creditor whose legal remedies are 
 exhausted, to reach the property an^ have it applied in some 
 manner to the payment of his demands, it may be asked. Who 
 should be made parties defendant in such an action? The 
 answer to this question is plain, and the rule has been well 
 established, depending as it does upon the most evident prin- 
 ciples of equity jurisprudence. The creditor's suit, properly 
 so called, and which has been thus described in general terms, 
 should not be confounded with actions that creditors may some- 
 times bring, based upon the law of trusts and the right of a cestui 
 que trust to compel the performance of his duty by a trustee. 
 
 § 244. * 347. Parties Defendant in Action by Judgment Creditor 
 to reach Equitable Assets ; and to reach Property fraudulently Trans- 
 ferred. In an action by a judgment creditor to reach the equi- 
 table assets of the debtor in his own hands, or to reach property 
 which has been transferred to other persons, or property which is 
 held by other persons under such a state of facts that the equi- 
 table ownership is vested in the debtor, the judgment debtor is 
 himself an indispensable party defendant, and the suit cannot be 
 carried to final judgment without him. In some cases, as when 
 the property has been assigned at different times to different 
 assignees, or is held by different legal owners, who are all made 
 co-defendants, he is the very link which unites them all together.
 
 340 
 
 CIVIL KKMEDIES. 
 
 the common centre to which they are all connected, and it is 
 because he is a party defendant that they can all be joined in one 
 action as co-defendants. ^ Even if the objection to his nonjoinder 
 be not taken by the actual defendants, the court will on its own 
 motion order him to be brought in.^ If the judgment debtor 
 himself is dead, his administrator or executor is an indispensable 
 
 1 [^Sheppard v. Green (1896), 48 S. C. 
 165, 26 S. E. 224; First Nat. Bank v. 
 Slmler (1897), 15-3 N. Y. 16.3, 47 N. E. 262, 
 in which the court said : " The authorities 
 are decisive in affirming the general rule 
 that, in a creditor's action brought to im- 
 peach and set aside a general assignment 
 by a debtor of his property for the benefit 
 of creditors, the court will not proceed to 
 judgment in the absence of the debtor as 
 a party defendant, unless by death or other 
 circumstance his joinder, as a defendant, 
 is wholly impracticable. It has been held 
 in some cases that in a suit hronght by a 
 creditor against a fraudulent alienee of tlie 
 debtor, to set aside a specific transfer for 
 fraud, where the conveyance was absolute 
 and transferred as between the parties an 
 indefeasil)le title or interest, the fraudulent 
 vendor is not a nece.s.sar3' party. (Butling- 
 ton V. Harvey, 95 U. S. 103 ; Campbell v. 
 Jones, 25 Minn. 155; Potter v. Phillips, 
 44 la. .357 ; .«ee, also. Fox v. Moyer, 54 
 N. Y. 130). But the relaxation of the rule 
 has never, so far as we can discover, been 
 extended to the ca.sc of an assignment in 
 trust for the benefit of creditors." See 
 also Williamson v. Selden (1893), 53 Minn. 
 73, 54 N. W. 1055 ; Beviiis v. Eisman 
 (1900), Ky., 56 W. W. 410; First Nat. 
 Bank v. Gibson ( 1 903), — Neb., — 94 N. W. 
 965.] Lawrence t>. Bank of the Rei)ublic, 
 N. Y. 320 ; vShaver v. Braiuard, 29 Barb. 
 25; Wallace v. Eaton, 5 How. Pr. 99; 
 Logan V. Hale, 42 Cal. 645 ; Allison v. 
 Weller, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 291 ; Vanderpoel 
 u. Van Valkenburgii, 6 N. Y. 190; Gay- 
 lords V. Kelshaw, 1 Wall. 81 ; Miller v. 
 Hall, 70 N. Y. 250; llubbell r. Mercliants' 
 Bk. of Syracuse, 42 Hun, 200 ; Hickox >: 
 Elliott, 10 Sawy. 415; 8. C. 22 Fe<l. Bep. 
 13, 20; Coffey v. Norwood, 81 Ala. 512; 
 Pottery. Phillips, 44 Iowa, 353; Blanc i'. 
 Paymiister Min. Co., 95 Cal. 524; Wil- 
 liam.son i-. Selden (.Minn. 1893), 54 N. W. 
 1055; Dunn i-. Wolf, 81 Iowa, 688; Wea- 
 ver f. Cressman, 21 Neb. 075; Taylor r. 
 
 Webl), 54 Miss. 36. Where the creditor 
 seeks to establish his debt, as well as to 
 subject the property fraudulently conveyed 
 to the payment thereof, the debtor must, 
 of course, be made a party : Chadbourne 
 V. Coe (C. C. A). 51 Fed. Kep. 479. As 
 illustrations of various actions by credi- 
 tors, see Boone Co. v. Keck, 31 Ark. 387 ; 
 Holland v. Drake, 29 Ohio St. 441 ; Eraser 
 V. Charleston, 13 S. C. 533 ; Potter v. Phil- 
 lips, 44 Iowa, 353; Green v. Walkill Nat. 
 Bank, 7 Hun; 63; Dewey v. Moyer, 9 id. 
 473 ; Haines r. Hollister, 64 N. Y. 1 ; Scott 
 r. Indiauap. Wagon Works, 48 Ind. 75. 
 
 [^See Glover v. Hargadiue-McKittrick 
 Dry Goods Co. (1901), 62 Neb.483,87 N. W. 
 170, where the court said : " The vendor in 
 a conveyance alleged and proved to have 
 been fraudulently made and to be for tliat 
 re.ason void as against creditors is always 
 a ])roper but not in all cases a necessary 
 party to an action by the latter to set the 
 instrument or transaction aside. If he has 
 reserved or retained no title or interest in 
 or lien upon the property, but has parted 
 with it both absolutely and comjiletely, he 
 has no rights to be affected by the result 
 of the litigation and his presence m.ay be 
 dispensed with." (Syllabus by the court.) 
 
 In Gores v. Field "(1901), 109 Wis. 40S, 
 84 N. W. 867, creditors brought an action 
 against the directors and officers of an in- 
 solvent bank, which had made a general 
 assignment, to recover losses sustained by 
 their mismanagement, and it was held that 
 the corj)oration, being in fact defunct, was 
 not a necessary party. But in Keady v. 
 Smith (1902). i70 Mo. 163. 70 S. W. 434, 
 in a somewhat similar action, in which, 
 however, the corporation was still a going 
 concern, the corporation was ludd a neces- 
 sary ]jarty.] 
 
 2 Shaver v. Braiuard, 29 Barb. 25. It 
 was said that .a decree without his pres- 
 ence is im])ossible. ^First Nat. Bank >•. 
 Shuler (1897), 153 N. Y. 163, 47 N. E. 
 262.2
 
 DEFENDANTS IN CREDITORS' SUITS. 341 
 
 defendant; ^ ;ind if the objection be taken for the first time in the 
 appellate court, the cause will be remanded in order that he may 
 be added as a defendant.^ When, however, the debtor convej'ed 
 his land to A. for the purpose of a second conveyance to his own 
 wife in fraud of his creditors, which second conveyance was 
 made, and the debtor afterwards died, it was held that his heirs 
 were neither necessary nor proper parties to the creditor's action 
 brought to set aside these conveyances. "The conveyance of 
 their ancestor, though fraudulent, concludes them, and effectually 
 cuts off all their interest in the pro2:)erty."^ 
 
 § 245. * 348. Assignee of Judgment Debtor a Necessary Party. 
 "Where Legal Title is in Third Person and Equitable Ovsmership in Debtor. 
 If the object of the action be to reach property which has been 
 assigned by the debtor, the assignee is a necessary party defend- 
 ant, even if he be a non-resident of the State ; * and on the same 
 principle, if the plaintiff seek to reach property of which the 
 legal title is in a third person, but the equitable ownership of 
 which is alleged to be in the debtor, such holder of the legal title 
 must be a defendant.^ When the debtor conveyed land to a 
 third person with the purpose that such person should at once 
 convey the same to the debtor's wife, which second conveyance 
 was forthwith made, it was held, in an action against the debtor 
 and his wife to reach the land in her hands, that the first grantee 
 was a necessary party defendant.^ A debtor fraudulently con- 
 
 1 Alexander i». Quigley, 2 Duvall, 300; real property, the wife is not a proper 
 Postlewaite v. Howes, 3 Iowa, 365 ; Coates party in an action by creditors to set aside 
 V. Day, 9 Mo. 315; [jPrentiss v. Bowden the conveyance, but the wife of a fraud- 
 (1895), 145 N. Y. 342, 40 N. E. 13 ; Shep- ulent grantee isa proper party : Tatum v. 
 pard V. Green (1896), 48 S. C. 165, 26 S. E. Roberts (1894), 59 Minn. 52, 60 N. W. 848. 
 224; First Nat. Bank v. Shuler (1897), See also Stevenson y. Matteson (1893), 13 
 153 N. Y. 163, 47 N. E. 262. In the last Mont. 108, 32 Pac. 291. 
 
 case the wife of the debtor was one of the Where an action is brought by a 
 alleged fraudulent vendees, and she be- creditor to set aside a fraudulent confes- 
 came his executrix upon his death pend- sion of judgment by the debtor in favor 
 ing the suit. She was already a party in of H., and a conveyance of land to H. 
 her individual capacity, and was not made under execution sale, the administrator 
 a party in her representative capacity, and heir at law of H. are necessary par- 
 Held that she was not bound as executrix ties : Sloan v. Hunter (1899), 56 S. C.385, 
 and the judgment could not be sustained.] 34 S. E. 658. If the grantee be dead, his 
 
 2 Postlewaite v. Howes, 3 Iowa, 365. heirs are necessary parties : Bevins v. 
 
 3 Harlin v. Stevenson, 30 Iowa, 371, Eisman (1900), Ky., 56 S. W. 410.3 
 375. * Ogle V. Clough, 2 Duv. 145. 
 
 * Gray v. Schenck, 4 N. Y. 460. [[Where « Bennett v. McGuire, 5 Lans. 183, 188. 
 
 a husband and wife jointly execute a The necessity of making this grantee a 
 fraudulent conveyance of the husband's defendant is not apparent. It is true, his
 
 342 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 veyed hind to A., and took back a purchase-money mortgage 
 whicli he assigned to B. In an action to set aside the convey- 
 ance, or to reach the mortgage, it was held that the debtor and 
 both A. and B. were proper and necessary parties defendant.^ 
 
 ^5 246. * 849. Assignees of Separate Parcels of Property should be 
 joined. Reason herein. When the action is brought for either of 
 these objects, if the debtor has at different times assigned, in 
 alleged fraud of his creditors, different parcels of his property to 
 different assignees, or if different parcels of property are held by 
 dift'erent persons in alleged fraud of the debtor's creditors, so 
 that the equitable ownership is claimed to be vested in him, all 
 of these assignees, or all of these holders of tlie legal title, may 
 be joined with the debtor as co-defendants in one action. ^ The 
 reason given for this rule permitting separate assignees or holders 
 of the legal title to be joined, although they take by different 
 conveyances and at different times, is, "that the}' ail have a 
 common interest centering in the point at issue in the cause ; so 
 that, while the title to one piece of property is in one defendant, 
 and the title to some other distinct piece is in another defendant, 
 yet these various titles Avere taken and are now held for a com- 
 mon purpose, and to accomplish the same fraudulent end. All 
 are privy to have been concerned in acts tending to the same 
 illegal result. The matters are not distinct, but are in truth all 
 connected with the same fraudulent transaction in which all the 
 defendants have })articipated.^ 
 
 § 247. * 350. Other Cases. Trustees of an Express Trust. Inno- 
 cent Third Parties. In an action brought by or on behalf of a 
 judgment creditor, to reach a fund in the hands of an express 
 trustee for the debtor, such debtor is a necessary defendant, and 
 
 deed is sought to l)e set aside, but lie has Reed (•. Stryker, 12 Abb. Pr. 47 ; Jacot 
 
 no iiitere.st wliatever in the result; all v. Boyle, 18 How. Pr. 106; Hamliu v. 
 
 title luw passed out of him, and he cannot Wright, 23 Wis. 491 ; Winslow v. Dous- 
 
 be affected by the judgment. See Spicer man, 18 Wis. 456; North v. Brad way, 9 
 
 V. Hunter, 14 Abb. Pr. 4. Minn. 18.'i. 
 
 1 Foster v. Townshend, 12 Abb. Pr. ■' Winslow v. Dousman, 18 Wi.s. 4,i6, 
 
 N. 8. 469. When a debtor had conveyed 462, per Cole J.; Hamlin v. Wright, 2.'? 
 
 laud in fraud of his creditors, and the Wis. 491, 494; Briiikcrhoff v. Brown, 6 
 
 grantee had executed a mortgage thereon, Johns. Ch. R. 139, l.")? ; Fellows c. Fellows, 
 
 llie mortgagee was held a necessary de- 4 Cow. 682; Boyd v. Hoyt, 5 Paige, 65; 
 
 fendant in a creditor's suit to set a.'iide the N. Y. & N. H. R. Co. r. Schuyler, 1 7 N. Y. 
 
 conveyance. Copis i-. Middleton, 2 Mad 592 ; Story's Eq. PI. §§ 285, 2S6 : Di\ v. 
 
 410 Briggs, 9 Paige, 595; Sizer v. Miller, 9 
 
 ^ Morton r. Weil, 11 Abb. Pr. 421; Paige, 605.
 
 DEFENDANTS IN ADMINISTRATION SUITS. 343 
 
 should be joined with the trustee; he is the person directly 
 iuterested in the fund, and the one to be directly affected by the 
 judgment. 1 When a creditor's suit was brought to reach prop- 
 erty fraudulently transferred by the debtor, and the alleged 
 fraudulent transfer was consummated through the means of a 
 third person, who in good faith received a conveyance of the 
 property in trust for the alleged fraudulent grantee, and who 
 subsequently conveyed the same to such grantee in accordance 
 with the trust, such third person was held not to be a proper 
 defendant; there was simply no cause of action against him, 
 because he was free from any fraudulent intent. ^ 
 
 § 248. * 351. IV. Actions Relating to the Estates of Deceased Per- 
 sons. The "administration suit " in chancery, by means of which 
 the estates of deceased persons are usually settled in England, is 
 uncommon, if not entirely unknown, in the United States. The 
 actions which will fall under the above heading are almost en- 
 tirely special cases, depending upon special circumstances: suits- 
 by judgment creditors to reach the property of deceased debtors, 
 or of beneficiaries to reach trust property lield by deceased 
 trustees, or of heirs or next of kin, or legatees, to set aside the 
 fraudulent transactions of administrators and executors, and the 
 like. It is almost impossible, therefore, to collect these various 
 cases into any well-defined groups; each must stand upon its own 
 facts, and will illustrate as far as possible the broad generalities 
 of the equitable doctrine as to parties.^ 
 
 1 Vanderpoel v. Van Valkenburgh, 6 son of creating preferences, the ci-editors 
 N. Y. 190. alleged to have been preferred are not 
 
 2 Spicer v. Hunter, 14 Alib. Pr. 4; necessary parties: Bradley y. Bailey (189.5), 
 Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y. 587, 589. 95 la. 745, 64 N. W. 758. But wliere one 
 For a peculiar case of misjoinder of de- creditor seeks to be placed aliead of prior 
 fendants in a creditor's action, see Gale v. creditors such prior creditors must be 
 Battin, 16 Minn. 148, 150. made parties: State ex rel. v. Hickman 
 
 Q Receiver as Party. Held in Daisy (1899), 150 Mo. 626, 51 S. W. 680.] 
 Roller Mills v. Ward (1897), 6 N. D. 317, ^ For various examples of such actions 
 70 N. W. 271, that where judgment credi- see Littell v. Sayre, 7 Hun, 485; Skid- 
 tors brought suit merely to set aside con- more v. Collier, 8 id. 50 ; Selover v. Coe, 
 veyauces of real estate as fraudulent, and 63 N. Y. 438 ; Janes i'. Williams, 31 Ark. 
 asked for no accounting for rents and 175 ; Williams v. Ewing, 31 id. 229 ; 
 profits, a receiver of the rent.s and profits Whitsett r. Kershaw, 4 Col. 419 ; Wall v. 
 appointed after the conveyances were made Fairley, 77 N. C. 105 ; Harris v. Bryant, 
 is not a necessary party. 83 id. 568 ; Conolly v. Wells, 33 Fed. Kep. 
 
 Other Creditors as Parties. In an 205 (in an action against executors for an 
 
 action between certain creiiitors and the accounting, all must be joined, including 
 
 general assignee, raising the issue as to one who was outside tlie jurisdiction of 
 
 the general assignment being void by rea- the court) ; Howth i\ Owens, 29 Fed. Hop.
 
 344 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 249. *352. Illustrations. A testator left real and personal 
 property in fee to A., but if she should die without issue, $10,000 
 of it were given over to B. The original executor of this will 
 died leaving the trust fund mingled with his own property, and 
 the whole passed to his executor, C. A. died without issue, and 
 B. brought an action to recover the legacy of $10,000, making C, 
 the then executor of the original executor, the defendant. It 
 was held by the Court of Appeals in New York, that C. was a 
 necessary party, but that the administrator of A. was also a 
 necessary defendant without whom the issues in the cause could 
 not be decided.^ " He [this administrator] is a trustee of the next 
 of kin of A., and they are interested in the fund after satisfying 
 all charges upon it, and have a right to be heard upon any claim 
 which tends to take it away for the benefit of another or to 
 reduce it."^ In an action brought by one executor against his 
 co-executor for an account, — the ground of the proceeding being 
 the breach of his trust by the latter, and the misuse of funds 
 belonging to the estate, — the legatees, next of kin, and creditors 
 of the deceased are not necessary defendants unless the account- 
 ing is to be final ; if it is made the final accounting and settle- 
 ment of the trust, then all these persons must be brought in as 
 defendants.^ The administrator, in violation of his trust, fraudu- 
 lently conveyed lands of the estate to a person who was a partici- 
 pant in the fraud. This grantee died intestate. The children 
 — the only heirs and next of kin — of the deceased original owner 
 brought an action against the administrator and the heirs of the 
 grantee, to set aside the fraudulent transfer, to compel a re-con- 
 veyance of the land, and for an accounting by the administrator. 
 This action was held proper; the heirs of the grantee were held 
 to be necessary defendants, and properly united with the 
 
 722 (representative of deceased executor this [wliere creditors of tlie testator are 
 
 rnuBt be joined). For a full discussion claiming contract liens upon ))roperty 
 
 of the jurisdiction of erjuity over admin- which is charf,'ed by the will with tlie pay- 
 
 istration suits in tliis country, see 3 Pom. ment of debts generally], with no one 
 
 Eq. Jur. §§ 1152-1154, and extended note representing them and their debts a charge 
 
 to § 1154. upon the realty, they, or some of them, 
 
 QIu Payne v. .Johnson's Ex'ors (ISO.T), were necessary ])arties to the action en- 
 
 95 Ky. 17.5, 24 S. W. 238, the court .said forcing this lien. "3 
 
 that " while all creditors are not necessary ^ Auburn Tlieol. Sem. Trs. i-. Kellogg, 
 
 parties to an action by an administrator IG N. Y. 83. ' 
 for the settlement of an e-^tate, still thoy - Iliid., p. 00, per Dcnio J. 
 
 are entitled to be iieard ; and inaca-selike ^ Wuud v. Brown. .'54 X. V. 337.
 
 DEFENDANTS IN ADMINISTRATION SUITS. 345 
 
 administrator.^ And when in a similar case the fraudulent 
 administrator had at different times conveyed portions of the 
 land to different grantees, an action by tlie heirs of the deceased 
 owner against the administrator and all of these grantees, was 
 sustained. "If there is a common point of litigation, the 
 decision of which affects the whole number of defendants, and 
 will settle the rights of all, they may ail be joined in the same 
 proceeding. "2 
 
 § 250. * 353. When Administrator ia not a Necessary Party. 
 Illustration. An administrator is not a necessary party defend- 
 ant unless some claim is made against the estate which he would 
 have the right to resist, or unless the judgment would be in some 
 manner prejudicial to the estate;^ a fortiori^ he is not a necessary 
 defendant when the immediate object of the action is to increase 
 the amount of assets available to the payment of the debts of the 
 deceased, even though the ultimate purpose of the proceeding 
 may be the benefit of the creditor who prosecutes it. Thus, 
 where the deceased in his lifetime had received an absolute deed 
 of lands, which he did not put upon record, and had subsequently 
 with a fraudulent intent destroyed this deed, and procured the 
 grantor therein to execute another conveyance of the same land 
 without consideration to a third person who took the same with 
 full knowledge and collusively and put the same upon record, a 
 judgment creditor of the deceased, whose judgment was recov- 
 ered while the deceased held the deed to himself, brought an 
 action against the second grantee and the heirs and widow of the 
 deceased, seeking to set aside the second deed, and to establish 
 
 1 Bassett v. Warner, 2.3 Wis. 673. 474, 70 Pac. 455, where the court says : " It 
 This case is plainly the same in principle is, in effect, a suit to determine a contro- 
 as the suit by a judgment creditor against versy between the different heirs as to 
 a fraudulent debtor and his grantee. their respective riglits of inheritance, and 
 
 2 Bowers v. Keesecher, 9 Iowa, 422, in such a controversy it is well settled 
 424 ; citing Story's Eq. PI. §§ 284, 534 ; that the administrator has no interest, but 
 Bugbee v. Sargent, 23 Me. 271 ; Kayner is a mere officer of the court, holding the 
 I'. Julian, Dickens, 677 ; Brinkerhoff v. estate as a stake holder." See also Hall 
 Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. R. 152; Varick v. v. Bank (1898), 145 Mo. 418, 46 S. W. 
 Smith, 5 Paige, 160. 1000, where it was held that an adminis- 
 
 ^ QSee McCabe v. Healy (1902), 138 trator cannot bring a suit in equity to set 
 
 Cal. 81, 70 Pac. 1008, where it was held aside a fraudulent conveyance of land 
 
 that the administrator had no concern or made by the deceased unless an order i* 
 
 interest in a suit between the plaintiff first obtained from the probate court 
 
 who claims under a contract to make a directing him to take possession of the 
 
 will and tlie heirs of the decedent. And land for the payment of debts.]] 
 also //( re Healv's Estate (1902), 1-37 Cal.
 
 "4(1 CIVIL RKMEDIES. 
 
 the original title of the judgment debtor, and to enforce the 
 lien of his own judgment upon the land; this action was held 
 to have been properly brought against the defendants named. 
 The administrator of the deceased was held not to be a neces- 
 sary party defendant, because the proceeding was really for the 
 benefit of the estate, and he could make no opposition if he were 
 present.^ 
 
 § 251. * 354. "When Legatees and Next of Kin are neither Neces- 
 sary nor Proper Parties. In actions by creditors against executors 
 or administrators to recover debts alleged to be due from the 
 deceased, or by the owners of the property to recover assets 
 which had been in the possession of the deceased and apparently 
 belong to his estate in the hands of his personal representatives, 
 the legatees or next of kin are not necessary nor even proper 
 parties defendant. ^ The executors or administrators represent 
 the estate. They can bring all suits to recover property in 
 the hands of third persons alleged to belong to the estate, with- 
 out joining the legatees or distributees as co-plaintiffs, ^ and on 
 the same principle they can defend all actions brought against 
 themselves, involving the ownership of property in their own 
 hands, or the indebtedness of the estate, without the presence of 
 legatees and next of kin as co-defendants. Thus in an action 
 against executors to reach certain moneys and securities in their 
 possession as apparent assets, but which it Avas claimed had 
 been held by the testator in trust for the plaintiff and actually 
 belonged to him, the legatees were held not to be necessary de- 
 fendants.* And in an ordinary suit to recover a debt due from 
 the deceased, brought against the administrator, the widow, and 
 the next of kin, it was held that all these defendants, except the 
 administrator, were improperly joined; he represents them, and 
 his defence is their defence.^ 
 
 1 Cornell v. Radway, 22 Wis. 260, 2 [^Byrcl v. Byrd (1895), 117 N. C. .523, 
 
 26.5, per liixon C. J. It was said that 2.3 S. E. 324.] 
 
 the administrator or executor might ^ QlJnt where a. «uit was brought by the 
 
 bring the suit; but this authority did heirs of a devi.see under a will to recover 
 
 not ^ take away the right of the cred- property mi.sdirected by the life tenant, 
 
 itor. Wis. R. S., ch. 100, §§ 16-18. the administrator was held a necessary 
 
 But see per contra, as to the necei»sity party: Burford v. Aldridge (1901), 165 
 
 of the personal representative being Mo. 419, 63 S. W. 109.] 
 
 made a party in such actions, 1 Dan. * King c. Lawrence. 14 Wis. 238. 
 
 Ch. I'l. (4th Am. ed.), p. 200, and cases ' Nelson r. Hart, 8 Ind. 293. That the 
 
 cited. personal representatives are the only
 
 DEFENDANTS IX ADMINISTRATION SUITS. 
 
 347 
 
 § 252. * 355. When a Dififerent Rule applies. A different rule, 
 however, prevails in an action by u distributee against the ad- 
 ministrator, legatee against the executor, or beneficiary against 
 the trustee, when the right asserted, if it exists at all, is also 
 held by all the other parties similarly situated with the one who 
 sues, and the decision would in fact determine all their rights. 
 In such a case, in order that the trustee may not be subjected to 
 a multiplicity of suits, when the whole controversy could be de- 
 cided in one, the equitable doctrine primarily requires that all the 
 distributees, legatees, or beneficiaries should unite as plaintiffs ; 
 but if any refuse to join, they should be made defendants.^ The 
 statutes of several States permit an equitable action to be brought 
 by the heirs of the testator to set aside a will of lands for any 
 cause which can invalidate it. In such a suit the devisees under 
 the will are indispensable defendants. ^ In fact, the executor can 
 hardly be called a necessary party, for he takes no interest in the 
 land. Conversely, in an action to reach the land of a deceased 
 intestate, his heirs are indispensable defendants, without whom 
 
 proper defendants in such actions, see 
 Story's Eq, PI. §§ 10+, 140 ; Anon., 1 Vern. 
 261 ; Lawsou v. Barker, 1 Bro. C. C. 303 ; 
 Brown v. Dowthwaite, 1 Mad. 446 ; Jones 
 V. How, 7 Hare, 267 ; Haycock v. Hay- 
 cock, 2 Ch. Cas. 124 ; Jennings v. Paterson, 
 15 Beav. 28; Micklethwait v. Winstanley, 
 13 W. R. 210; Pritchard v. Hicks, 1 
 Paige, 270; Wiser v. Blachly, 1 Johns. 
 Ch. 437 ; Davison v. Rake, 45 N. J. Eq. 
 767. In general, all the personal rep- 
 resentatives must be joined. Offey ?'. 
 Jenney, 3 Ch. Rep. 92 ; Hanip v. Robin- 
 son, 3 De G., J. & S. 97 ; CouoIIy v. 
 Wells, 33 Fed. Rep. 205 ; Howth v. Owens, 
 29 Fed. Rep. 722. But if an executor has 
 not proved, he need not be joined. Strick- 
 land r. Strickland, 12 Sim. 463; Dyson v. 
 Morris, 1 Hare, 413 ; Farrell v. Smith, 2 
 B. & B. 337 ; Clegg v. Rowland, L. R. 3 
 Eq. 368. And, in an action by a creditor 
 against the heirs and devisees of his de- 
 ceased debtor, to make his claim out of 
 the land of the decea.sed in their hands, 
 tiie joinder of such heirs and devi.sees was 
 held proper, since the judgment could 
 provide for the order of their liabilities. 
 Rockwell V. Geery, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 687 ; 
 Schermerhorn v. Barhydt, 9 Paige, 28; 
 
 Houston V. Levy's Ex., 44 N. J. Eq. 6 , 
 Read v. Patterson, 44 N. J. Eq. 211; 
 Dandridge v. Washington's Ex., 2 Pet. 
 370 ; Deegau v. Capner, 44 N. J. Eq. 
 339. 
 
 1 Dillon V. Bates, 39 Mo. 292. [^Hill v. 
 Dade (1900), 68 Ark. 409, .59 S. W. 39: 
 Where a suit is brought by heirs to deter- 
 mine whether an executrix iiad power 
 under a will to sell the fee of tlie ancestor's 
 land, all persons holding portions of said 
 land through conveyances from the ex- 
 ecutrix are ])roper parties. See also Reiser 
 V. Gigrich (1894), 59 Minn. 368, 61 N. W. 
 30, where the action was brought by the 
 administrator against parties connected 
 with a fund belonging to the estate.] 
 
 2 Eddie v. Parke's Ex., 31 Mo. 513. 
 The action was brought against the ex- 
 ecutors alone. See Morse v. Morse, 42 
 Ind. 365 ; infra, § *379, note. [^In Fogle 
 V. St. Michael Church (1896), 48 S. C. 86, 
 26 S. E. 99, it was held that neither the 
 executor nor heir at law was a necessary 
 party in an action to enforce a contract to 
 dispose of property by will, when the 
 executor has turned over the entire assets 
 to the devisee.]
 
 348 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 no decree can be made, and it is difficult to see how the admia- 
 istrator could be a necessary party. ^ 
 
 i^ 253. * 35G. V. Trusts. Actions to enforce Performance of Ex- 
 press Trusts. Trustees and Survivors Necessary Parties. It is a 
 universal and elementary rule that, in an action to enforce the 
 performance of an express trust, the trustee is an indispensable 
 defendant. This doctrine was applied in a case where a debtor 
 had transferred personal property to a trustee upon trust to sell 
 the same, and out of the proceeds to pay the demands of the 
 creditor. The directions of the trust not having been complied 
 with, the creditor brought an action against the debtor alone to 
 foreclose the trust deed and for a sale of the goods. The trustee 
 was held to be a necessary defendant. ^ Where there were origi- 
 nally two or more trustees, and one or more have died, in an 
 action by the beneficiary to enforce the trust, and especially if a 
 violation thereof is alleged against all the trustees, the survivors 
 and the personal representatives of the deceased not only may 
 
 1 Muir V. Gibson, 8 Ind. 187, 190. 
 That the adniinistrator is a proper party 
 in Buch au action, see Lowry v. Jackson, 
 27 S. C. 318. See Silsbee v. Smith, 60 
 Barb. 372. In an action for an account 
 of personal estate which came into the 
 hands of a deceased administrator or ex- 
 ecutor, his personal representatives are 
 necessary defendants. As to the neces- 
 sary parties in an action to construe a 
 will, see McKethan o. Ray, 71 N. C. 165, 
 1 70. ' 
 
 2 Tucker v. Silver, 9 Iowa, 261, per 
 Wright C. J. After stating the rule as 
 laid down in the text, the court declares 
 that it has not been changed by tlie new 
 procedure. See also McKinley v. Irvine, 
 13 Ala. 681 ; Cassiday v. McDaniel, 8 
 B. Mon. 519; Morrow v. Lawrence, 7 
 Wis. 574; Jones v. Jones, 3 Atk. 110. 
 And, in general, all the trustees must he 
 joined. Coppard v. Allen, 2 De G., J. & 
 S. 173; Howth v. Owens, 29 Fed. Rep. 
 722. But a trustee who has never acted, 
 and has relea.sed all his interest to his 
 co-trustee, need not be made a party. 
 Richanlson v. Hulbert, 1 Aust. 65. When 
 a trustee has assigned his interest in the 
 trust estate, in general both lie and the 
 assignee should be defendants. Story's 
 Efj. I'l § 209 ; Bailey i-. luglce, 2 Paige, 
 
 278. But if he has assigned his entire 
 interest absolutely, the assignee alone 
 should be sued, unless the assignment 
 was a breach of trust. Story's Eq. PI. 
 §§211, 213. 214; Munch v. Cockerell, 8 
 Sim. 219. As examples of this general 
 rule, when a demand is to be enforced 
 against idiots or lunatics, their commit- 
 tees or guardians must be sued, the luna- 
 tics or idiots themselves being proper 
 but not necessary parties. Beach v. 
 Bradley, 8 Paige, 146. And in suits re- 
 lating to the property of insolvents or 
 bankrupts, their assignees are nece.ssary 
 defendants. Storm r. Davenport, 1 Sandf. 
 Ch. 135 ; Movan v. Hays, 1 Johns. 
 Ch. 339; Sells i'. IIubbell,"2 Johns. Ch. 
 394; Botts V. Patton, 10 B. Mon. 452. 
 And the assignees are the only necessary 
 defendants ; neither the insolvents or 
 bankrupts, nor the creditors, need be 
 joined with them. Collett v. Wollaston, 
 3 Bro. C. C. 228 ; Lloyd v. Lander, 5 
 Mad. 282, 288; Sells v. Ilubbell, 2 Johns. 
 Cli. 394 ; Sj)ringer v. Vanderpool, 4 Edw. 
 Ch. 362 ; Wakcman r. Grover, 4 Paige, 
 23; Dias i;. Bouchaud, 10 Paige, 445 
 I^Rumsey v. People's Ry. Co. (1900), l.")4 
 Mo. 215, 55 S. W. 615. And when a 
 trustee wrongfully conveyed trust pro]icrty, 
 the grantee was held a necessary ]p:iity to
 
 DEFENDANTS IN SUITS INVOLVING TRUSTS. 
 
 349 
 
 be united as co-defendants,^ but they must be so joined, or else 
 no decree enforcing the trust can be made.^ 
 
 § 254. * 357. Joining Beneficiaries. Distinction bet'ween Actions 
 in Opposition to, and in Furtherance of, the Trust. There is a broad 
 distinction between the case of an action brought in opposition 
 to the trust, to set aside the deed or other instrument by which 
 it was created, and to procure it to be dechired a nullity, and 
 that of an action brought in furtherance of the trust, to enforce 
 its provisions, to establish it as valid, or to procure it to be 
 wound up and settled. In the first case, the suit may be main- 
 tained without the presence of the beneficiaries, since the trustees 
 represent them all and defend for them. In the second, all the 
 beneficiaries must be joined, if not as plaintiffs, then as defend- 
 ants, so that the whole matter may be adjusted in one proceed- 
 ing, and a multiplicity of suits avoided.^ The reason of this 
 distinction is obvious. It is, that any one person interested in 
 opposition to the trust has a right to test the validity thereof, 
 and his voluntary action cannot be controlled by the will of 
 
 a suit to enforce the trust against the 
 property: Bridge Co. v. Fowler (1895), 
 55 Kau' 17, 39 Pac. 727.] 
 
 1 Sortore v. Scott, 6 Lans. 271, 276. 
 It was held that the rule forbidding such 
 union of parties in a legal action against 
 joint debtors had no application to such 
 an equitable suit. See also Petrie v. 
 Petrie, 7 Lans. 90; King v. Talbot, 40 
 N. Y. 76. See also Hazard v. Duraut, 19 
 Fed. Rep. 471. 
 
 ^ Sherman v. Parish, 53 N. Y. 483, 490. 
 Action by a sole beneficiary against a 
 trustee for an alleged breach of the trust. 
 There had been other trustees who were 
 dead, and their personal representatives 
 were not made defendants. Folger J. 
 said : " It is the principle of courts of 
 equity, in cases of breach of trust, when 
 no general rule or order of the court in- 
 terferes, and when the facts of the case 
 call for a contribution or recovery over, 
 that all persons who should be before 
 tlie court to enable it to make complete 
 and final judgment are necessary ])arties 
 to the action. Nor has our mode of pro- 
 cedure abrogated the rule." Ho cites Hill 
 on Trustees, 520, 521 ; Perry on Trusts, 
 §§ 875, 876, 877 ; Lewin on Trusts, 845 ; 
 Munch V. Cockerell, 8 Sim. 219; Perry v. 
 
 Knott, 4 Beav. 179; Shipton r. Rawlins, 
 4 Hare, 619 ; Cunningham v. Pell, 5 Paige, 
 607; New York code, § 118. The court 
 add the following very important rule : 
 That, on timely objection to the want of 
 necessary parties, if the plaintiff does not 
 bring them in, the complaint must be 
 dismissed, hut not absolutelij ; the dismissal 
 should be without prejudice. The com- 
 plaint, however, should not even be thus dis- 
 missed if the cause can be made to stand over 
 on terms, in order to enable the plaintiff Xo 
 brinq in the 7iecessnri:/ parties. This ruling is 
 in e.xact conformity with the plain intent 
 of the codes, and with the views expressed 
 by me iu the text in a former paragraph. 
 See also Haines v. Hollister, 64 N. Y. 1 ; 
 Howth V. Owens, 29 Fed. Rep. 722. Au 
 heir at law is a proper, though not a 
 necessary, ])arty to a suit against the 
 legal representative of his ancestor to re- 
 cover loss sustained by a breach of trust 
 of the ancestor as executor. McCartin v. 
 Traphagen's Adm., 43 N. J. Eq. 323. 
 
 8 [^But in an action by trustees, brought 
 in furtherance of their duty as such, in 
 respect to the trust property, the bene- 
 ficiaries are not nece.ssary parties : Roberts 
 I'. New York Elevated R. R. Co. (1898), 
 155 N. Y. 31, 4y N. E. 262. J
 
 350 CIVIL REMEDIES 
 
 others, while the trustees themselves are sufficient to represent 
 and defend all the interests of those who claim under the trust. ^ 
 But when the trust is assented to, and the purpose is simply to 
 carry out its provisions, all the beneficiaries are alike interested 
 in tiiat object and in reaching that same result, and it is just to 
 the trustee that the controversy should be ended in one proceed- 
 ing. As illustrations of this principle: In an action brought to 
 set aside a trust deed made by a railroad company to a trustee 
 for the benefit of bondholders, and to restrain a sale of the road 
 thereunder, the beneficiaries under the trust were declared not to 
 be necessary or even proper parties, and the application of one of 
 them — a bondholder — to be admitted as a defendant was denied, 
 although he alleged that the trustee intended to make no defence, 
 and was actually colluding with tlie plaintiff and the company.^ 
 On the same principle, wliere a testator had devised all his lands 
 to his executors with power to sell and distribute the proceeds 
 among his heirs, an action by a third person claiming to own part 
 of these lands, denying that they belonged to the testator, and 
 seeking to reach them or their j)roceeds in the hands of the ex- 
 ecutors, was held to ba properly brought against the executors 
 alone without joining the heirs of the deceased as defendants. 
 The suit in effect sought to set aside the trust pro tanto between 
 the executors and the heirs. ^ In like manner, an action by one 
 
 1 QThe trustee is a necessary party in 150; Dewey v. Mover, 9 id. 473; Moore 
 
 a suit to set aside the deed of trust : Mark- v'. Hegemar, 6 id. 290 ; Benjamin v. 
 
 well V. Markwell (1900), l.")7 Mo. .326, 57 Loughborough, 31 Ark. 210; The Trus- 
 
 8. W. 1078. But it wa-s held in Ilohin.son tees v. Gleason, 15 Fla. 38-t; Hill v. 
 
 V. Kind (1896), 23 Nev. 330, 47 Pac. 1, Duraud, 50 Wis. 354. For further in- 
 
 that the beneficiaries were also neces.sary stances of actions brouglit in opposition 
 
 parties in a suit by one of them to revoke to the trust, to which the beneficiaries are 
 
 the trust.] not necessary parties, see Vetterlein v. 
 
 '^ QF. G. Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler Barnes, 124 U. S. 169; Uedin v. Bran- 
 County (1804), 121 Mo. 614,26 8. W. 367 : han,43 Minn. 283 ; Watkins v. Bryant, 91 
 " If the trustees were made parties and Cal. 492 ; Ward v. Waterman, 85 Cal. 
 notified, tliat was sufficient. This is un- 488. The trustee is a necessary party : 
 doubtedly the rule in trusts of this cliar- McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340. 
 acter. Whatever binds the trustee in ^ Paul i-. Fulton, 25 Mo. 156. See also 
 proceedings to enforce tlie trust, liinds llidenour ?'. Wherritt, 30 Ind. 4S5. QWo- 
 tiie bondholders, and whatever forecloses men's Cliristian Ass'n v. Kausiis City 
 the trustee, in the absence of fraud or bad (1898), 147 Mo. 103, 48 S. W. 960: In an 
 faith, forecloses them " See alsoBuinsey action to have effectuated and carried out 
 V. Peoples' Ry. Co. (1900), 154 Mo. 215, a charitable trust cstabli.slied by a will, the 
 55 S. W. 615.] Winslow y. Minn. & Pac. heirs of the testatrix are not necessary 
 K. Co., 4 Minn. 313, 316. As to when the parties. See al.so Lacklami v. Walker 
 cp.s^/(x f/i(f f;«,s7e«; are or are not necessary (1899). 151 Mo. 210, 52 S. W. 414. In 
 defendants, see Vcrdin c. Slocuni, 9 Ilun, Newman r. Newman (1899), 152 Mo. 398,
 
 DEFENDANTS TN SUITS INVOLVING Ti;UST,-<. '6ol 
 
 or more creditors against tlie debtor and liis assignee in trnst for 
 all the "creditors, to set aside the assignment on the ground of 
 fraud, or for any other reason, is properly brought without 
 joining all or any of the other creditors, who are the beneficiaries, 
 either as defendants or as jjlaintiffs.^ 
 
 § 255. * 358. Same Subject. On the other hand, if an action 
 is brought based upon the assignment or other deed as a valid 
 transaction, seeking to enforce the trust, to obtain an account- 
 ing, to procure a final settlement, or for any other similar relief 
 which recognizes and adopts the trust, and which, when obtained, 
 would alike beneficially affect all the persons similarly situated, 
 all the creditors or other cestuis que trustent must either unite as 
 plaintiffs, or, if the suit is instituted by one or by some, the 
 others must be joined as defendants. The court will not permit 
 the same question to be litigated in separate suits at the instance 
 of each person who has a demand identical in its nature with 
 that held by all the others. ^ An action by distributees against 
 their administrator, or by any beneficiaries against their trustee, 
 to open an account once settled, on the ground of an alleged 
 fraud, and for a new accounting and distribution of the shares 
 
 54 S. W. 19, real estate was conveyed to a ants in the action to recover it. Einmert 
 
 trustee, his heirs and as.signs. After his v. De Long, 12 Kan. 67, 83. Except in 
 
 death the cestui que trust brought suit to the cases of administrators and executors, 
 
 vest the title in a new trustee, on the and of assignees for the benefit of cred- 
 
 ground that the trustee in his lifetime itors, the general rule is tliat in all actions 
 
 had illegally conveyed the same. It was against trustees based upon tlie existence 
 
 held that the heirs of the trustee were of the trust, the benejliciaries also must 
 
 necessary parties, although the trustee by be made parties. Story's Eq. PI. §§ 192, 
 
 will had conveyed all his property to 193, 207 ; Helm ii. Hardin, 2 B. Mou. 232 ; 
 
 another as trustee, since the title on the Clemens v. Elder, 9 Iowa, 272 ; Van Doreu 
 
 trustee's death descends to his heirs.] d. Robinson, 1*6 N. J. Eq. 2.56. See al.so 
 
 1 Bank of Briti.sh North America v. Brokaw i;. Brokaw's Ex., 41 N. J. Eq. 215 ; 
 
 Suydam, 6 How. Pr. 379 ; Hancock v. Biron v. Scott, 80 Wis. 206. If, however, 
 
 Wooten, 107 N. C. 9. See, however, Hud- the cestuis que trustent are very numerous, 
 
 son V. Eisenmayer Milling, &c. Co., 79 the rule is sometimes relaxed, or a por- 
 
 Tex. 401 . See also Mitchell v. Bank tion of them only are brought in as repre- 
 
 of St. Paul, 7 Minn. 252, which was an sentatives for the whole number. Story's 
 
 action by a stockholder to set aside pro- Ec]. PI. §§ 118, 150 ; Holland v. Baker, 3 
 
 ceedings of the officers, and particularly Hare, 68 ; Harrison v. Stewardson, 2 Hare, 
 
 an assignment in t^-ust for creditors ; also, 530. In Fitzgibbon v. Barry, 78 Va. 755, 
 
 French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 148, 159. a cestui que trust, whose interest was future 
 
 ~ Bank of British North America v. and very uncertain and contingent, was 
 Suydam, 6 How. Pr. 379; Garner v. held an unnecessary party to a suit to sub- 
 Wright, 24 How. Pr. 144, 28 id. 92. stitute a new trustee. [^See, also, Howe 
 Generally, when a demand is payable i;. Gregg (1897), 52 S. C. 88, 29 S. E. 394 ; 
 out of a trust fund, the trustees and the Cook v. Basom (1901), 164 Mo. 594, 65 
 beneficiaries must be joined as defend- S. VV. 227.]]
 
 352 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 claimed to be due, is plainly controlled by the same rule. It is 
 entirely analogous to the suit above mentioned by creditors to 
 procure an accounting from their assignee; it adopts and seeks 
 to carry out the trust. All the distributees or beneficiaries must 
 therefore be made parties, if not as plaintiffs, then as defendants.^ 
 § 256. * 359. Implied Trustee Necessary Party in Actions to 
 reach Property Impressed with Implied Trust or to enforce a Lien 
 thereon. Examples. In actions to reach property impressed with 
 an implied trust, or to enforce a lien thereon, the person in whom 
 the legal title is vested, and who is an implied trustee, is, of 
 course, a necessary defendant. Some examples will illustrate 
 this rule. A husband purchased land with his own funds, but 
 procured the deed to be made to his wife; he afterwards em- 
 ployed a person to erect a dwelling-house upon the land, who 
 obtained a mechanic's lien on the premises for the price of his 
 labor and materials. An action to enforce the lien was held to 
 be properly Ijrought against the wife and the husband; the legal 
 title was held by her in trust for her husband, as this title was 
 to be divested by the judgment which was based upon a demand 
 against the cestui que trust, both were necessary parties. ^ Land 
 was purchased by a husband, but by arrangement was conveyed 
 to his wife, the sale and conveyance being procured, as was 
 alleged, by the fraudulent representations of both. The grantor, 
 alleging the fraud and the non-payment of the price, brought an 
 action against the husband and wife to establish his debt and to 
 
 1 Dillon V. Bates, .39 Mo. 292. Thi.s Knott, 4 Beav. 179, 181 ; Shiptoii i'. Raw- 
 rule is general. Whenever au action is lins, 4 Hare, 619. And in an action by 
 brous^ht for an accounting and settlement one trustee against a co-trustee for a 
 of a trust estate, all persons interested in breach of the trust, all the beneficiaries 
 the estate must be parties. Devaynes v. who have concurred in such breacii are 
 Robinson, 24 Beav. 86 ; Coppard v. Alien, necessary defendants. Jesse v. Bennett, 
 2 I)e G., J. & S. 1";} ; Hall c. Au.stin, 2 6 De G., M. & G. 609 ; Williams v. Allen, 
 Coll. 570 ; Biggs v. Penn, 4 Hare, 469 ; 29 Beav. 292 ; Roberts v. Tunstall, 4 
 Chancellor v. Morecraft, 11 Beav. 262; Hare, 2.57, 261. 
 
 Penny v. Penny, 9 Hare, 39. If several - Lindley v. Cross, 31 Ind. 106. [^Xa- 
 trustees have been guilty of a breach of tional German-American Bank >•. I.aw- 
 trust, all must [may] be joined in a suit rcnce (1899), 77 Minn. 282, 79 N. W. 1016 : 
 by the cestui que trust brought to obtain In an action by a judgment creditor of 
 relief against such broach. The liability the husband to enforce a resulting trust 
 of the ilefaulting trustees in such a case is against the land of the wife for the pay- 
 joint and several. See 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. nient of the judgment, on the ground that 
 § 1081, ami numerous cases cited ; Stock- the consideration for the grant to the wife 
 ton ('. Anderson, 40 N. J. Eq. 486 ; Walker was paid by the husband, the husband is a 
 V. Symonds, 3 Swanst. 7.") ; Munch r. proper though not a necessary party.] 
 Cockerell, 8 Sim. 219, 231 ; Perry v.
 
 DEFENDANTS IN SUITS INVOLVING TRUSTS. 353 
 
 enforce a lien for the same upon the land. Pending the suit the 
 wife died, and her heirs were substituted as defendants in her 
 place. The Supreme Court of Iowa, conceding that the heirs 
 were necessary parties, held that the wife's administrator was a 
 proper and, under certain aspects of the case, a necessary defend- 
 ant, and ordered him to be brought in. If the action was simply 
 to recover a pecuniary demand from the defendant, he was clearly 
 a necessary party ; but if it was only to establish a specific lien, 
 he was only a proper party. ^ A railroad company having placed 
 certain of its bonds in the hands of a trustee upon trust to pay 
 therefrom a debt due to a certain creditor of the company, and 
 the trustee having, in violation of his duty, surrendered up the 
 bonds to the company, and permitted them to be cancelled, 
 whereby the security was utterly lost, it was held, in an action 
 by the creditor against the trustee for a breach of his trust, that 
 the railroad company was not a necessary defendant.^ The 
 owner of bonds and other securities deposited them with his 
 agent for a specific purpose. The agent, in violation of his 
 fiduciary capacity, disposed of them to divers persons at different 
 times and in different amounts. The owner brought an action 
 against the agent and all the transferees for the purpose of set- 
 ting aside the sales and reaching his property or its proceeds. It 
 was held that this common action was improperly brought ; that 
 there was no community" of interest among the defendants ; and 
 that a separate suit should have been instituted against the agent 
 and each assignee.^ 
 
 1 Parshall v. Moody, 2-t Iowa, 314 Pac. 393. In an action against an incom- 
 
 2 Ridenour r. Wherritt, 30 Ind. 485. petent person, the guardian is neither a 
 ■^ Le.xington & B. S. R. Co. v. Good- necessary nor proper party : Redmond v. 
 
 man, 5 Abb. Pr. 493, per Peabody J. Peterson (1894), 102 Cal. 59.5, 36 Pac. 923. 
 
 This decision, as it seems to me, is in See also Leavitt y. Bell (1898), 55 Neb. 57, 
 
 direct conflict with the well-settled priu- 75 N. W. 524. 
 
 ciple which has been stated in the text, Administrators and Executors : An ad- 
 and which is fully sustained by the au- miuistrator cannot be sued in the same 
 thorities. action in his individual and in his repre- 
 [^Guardians : " The administrator of a sentative capacity, nor can a complaint 
 guardian is a necessary party to a suit in- against him as a representative be amended 
 volviug an account of the guardiauship " : so as to constitute an action against him 
 Brassell v. Silva (1897), 50 S. C. 181, 27 as an individual : Sterrett w. Barker (1897), 
 S. E. 622. In a proceeding to .determine 119 Cal. 492, 51 Pac. 695. In an action 
 whether certain additional credits should against executors o?fi .so>( fo?-^, the complaint 
 be allowed to a removed guardian, the sliould be against them as executors gen- 
 guardian is not a necessary party: Wil- erally : First Nat Bank )-. Lewis (1895), 12 
 son's Guardianship (1902), 40 Ore. 353, 68 Utah, 84, 41 Pac. 712.]
 
 354 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 257. * 3(50. VI. Actions against Corporations and Stockholders 
 and between Partners. Introductory. Actions to wind Up the 
 affiiir.s of corporations, and tlio.se permitted by creditors against 
 stockholders to enforce a personal liability of the latter, depend 
 so entirely upon special statutory provisions, and these are so 
 different in different States, that no general rule can be laid down 
 concerning them which shall be a part of the common procedure. 
 In fact, the subject does not strictly belong to a treatise upon the 
 principles of the codes. I have collected some cases, however, 
 which indicate the tendencies of the courts in the various States. ^ 
 
 § 258. * 361. Receivers." Creditors. Directors. An insurance 
 company became insolvent, and a receiver was appointed to wind 
 up its affairs. While it was in an insolvent condition, the direc- 
 tors had declared dividends which had been paid to stockholders. 
 Certain creditors brought separate actions against individual 
 stockholders to recover back the dividends so paid and received, 
 which actions were pending. In this condition of affairs the 
 receiver instituted a suit against all the stockholders to compel a 
 repayment of all the illegal dividends, and made the above-men- 
 
 1 As examples, see Chase v. Vauder- 
 bilt, 62 N. Y. 307 ; Osgood v. Maguire, 61 
 id. 524; Westcott v. Fargo, 61 id. 542; 
 Hackley v. Draper, 60 id. 88; Hun v. 
 Gary, 82 id. 65 ; People v. Albany & Vt. 
 R. Co., 77 id. 2.32 ; Watkins v. Wilcox, 4 
 Hun, 220; Pierce v. Milwaukee Constr. 
 Co., 38 Wis. 233 
 
 2 [l_Actions hy and aguhixt Receivers: 
 A corporation which has passed into a re- 
 ceiver's hands is no longer capable of suing 
 or being sued, and should not be joined 
 with the receiver : Idaho Gold Reduction 
 Co. V. Croghan (1899), 6 Idaho, 471, 56 
 Pac. 164; Ueland v. Haugan (1897), 70 
 Minn. 349, 73 X. W. 169. A receiver ap- 
 pointed in another State has a right to 
 maintain an action in tiie courts of Ken- 
 tucky : Hallam i-. Ashfonl (1902), Ky., 70 
 S. W. 197. A receiver is a stranger to all 
 proceedings instituted before his appoint- 
 ment, and remains a stranger until made 
 a party by the court, and the action may 
 legally proceed to judgment without his 
 being made a party : St. Louis, etc. Ry. 
 Co. r. IloUaday (1895), 131 Mo. 440, .33 
 S. W. 49. A receiver, being an officer of 
 the court appointing him, cannot be sued 
 
 in any other court without the consent of 
 the appointing court : Smith v. St. Louis, 
 etc. Ry. Co. (1899), 151 Mo. 391, 52 S. W. 
 378. A personal tax assessed against the 
 corporation cannot be collected in an action 
 against the receiver personally, instituted 
 under G. S. 1894, § 1569: State v. Red 
 River, etc. Co. (1897), 69 Minn. 131, 72 
 N. W. 60. A receiver, in onler to main- 
 tain an action, must allege facts showiiii,' 
 his appointment, by what jurisdiction he 
 was appointed, and enough of the proceed- 
 ings to show that his appointment was 
 legal, and tlie allegations must be made 
 with suflicient certainty to admit of being 
 traversed : Rhorer v. Middlesboro Co. 
 (1898), 103 Ky. 146, 44 S. W. 448. 
 
 " The failure of a party to obtain leave 
 of the court to sue a receiver appointed by 
 it, does not affect the jurisdiction of the 
 court in which the suit is brought, ^o hear 
 and determine the matter. The require- 
 ment is for the protection of the receiver, 
 and if be makes no objection to the suit 
 being brought without leave, it is difficult 
 to perceive why anyone else should be 
 jicrmitted to do so " : Tobias v. Tobias 
 (1894), 51 O. St. 519, 38 N. IC. 317.]
 
 DEFENDANTS IN SUITS AGAINST CORPORATIONS. 355 
 
 tioned creditors defendants, asking- against them an injunction 
 to restrain the further prosecution of their actions. It was held 
 by the New York Court of Appeals that the receiver could main- 
 tain such an action; that the creditors could not; that all tlie 
 stockholders were properly sued together ; - and tliat the creditors 
 were properly joined so as to restrain their proceedings and avoid 
 a circuity of action, and settle the whole in one controversy. ^ A 
 stockholder, suing on behalf of all the others, instituted an action 
 against a railroad company to compel the declaration of a divi- 
 dend, alleging that funds were in its hands sufficient and appro- 
 priate for that purpose. The action was dismissed because, if 
 sustainable at all, it should have been against the directors, who 
 were the managing trustees, and whose duty it was to declare a 
 dividend, if any such duty existed. ^ 
 
 § 259. * 362. Judgment Creditors. Stockholders. In a Suit by 
 judgment creditors of a corporation (on behalf of all others who 
 should come in) against the stockholders, who were made liable 
 by statute for the debts of the company in specified contingencies, 
 certain other judgment creditors were united as defendants. 
 Upon a general demurrer interposed by them, they were deter- 
 mined to be neither necessary nor proper defendants. They 
 should have been joined as plaintiffs, if at all ; but this was not 
 necessary, and the comj^laint contained no allegation that they 
 had refused to unite in that manner.* In Ohio, under statutes 
 making stockholders liable to judgment creditors when the ordi- 
 nary legal remedies against the corporation have been exhausted, 
 it has been held that all the stockholders must be united as 
 defendants, and proceeded against in a single action.^ 
 
 1 [[All properly sued together in action ^ Karnes r. Rochester & G. Val. R. 
 to enforce -stock liability, even when resi- Co., 4 Abb. Pr. n. s. 107. per T. A. John- 
 dent in different counties : Gainey v. Gil- son J. [[In an action to compel a cor- 
 son (1897), 149 Ind. 58, 48 N. E. 6.33. poration to deliver shares of stock, the 
 Co«i/a, in Kell V. Lund (1896), 99 la. 153, directors are proper but not necessary 
 68 N. W. 593. Held in Waller v. Hamer parties : Wells v. Green Bay, etc. Canal 
 (1902), 65 Kan. 168, 69 Pac. 185, that all Co. (1895), 90 Wis. 442, 64 N. W. 69.] 
 who were within the jurisdiction of the ■* Young v. N. Y. & Liv. S. S. Co., 10 
 court must be brought in. See also Ryan v. Abb. Pr. 229, per Hogeboom J. 
 Jacques (1894), 10-3 Cal. 280, 37 Pac. 186.] ° Umsted v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio St. 113. 
 
 2 Osgood V. Laytin, 5 Abb. Pr. n. s. 1 ; Contra, Thompson v. Lake, 19 Nev. 103, 
 [[Van Pelt v. Gardner (1898), 54 Neb. 115 ; Hatch r. Dana, 101 U. S. 210; Baines 
 701, 75 N. W. 874; Gianella v. Bigelow y. Babcock (Cal., Sept. 1891), 27 Pac. R. 
 (1897), 96 Wis. 185, 71 N. W. Ill ; Smith 674. That the corporation is not a neces- 
 V. Dickinson (1898), 100 Wis. 574, 76 sary party to such an action, see J^lour 
 N. W. 766.] City Nat." Bk. v. Wechselberg, 45 Ped.
 
 356 CIVIL EEMKDIES. 
 
 ^ 260. * 363. Corporation, Officers, and Assignee. All action by 
 Stockholders of a bank against the president and other officers, 
 the corporation itself, and an assignee, alleging fraud and viola- 
 tion of duty by the officei-s, misajDplication of funds terminating 
 in a fraudulent assignment, and praying that the assignment 
 might be set aside, the officers removed, a receiver appointed, 
 and the bank wound up, was sustained in Minnesota as being 
 within the jurisdiction of an equity court, and was declared to be 
 brought against the proper parties.^ In a similar action, based 
 upon the same facts, and asking for a removal of the officers, the 
 appointment of a receiver to take charge of the assets, and for an 
 election under the direction of the court, the corporation was 
 held to be a necessary party defendant as well as the officers 
 implicated. 2 
 
 ^ 261. * 364. Assignor of Stock. Rule in Indiana. In New^ York. 
 The holder of stock in a corporation assigned it to a creditor as 
 collateral security for the debt, and this creditor in turn assigned 
 or pledged the security to a third person. The latter having 
 commenced an action to enforce his right of property against the 
 
 ){ep. 547 ; Sleeper v. •Goodwin, 67 Wis. necessary party, when insolvent, in an 
 
 577, 586; Nolan v. Hazen, 44 Min. 478. action by a receiver to recover money 
 
 In a bill by creditors of a corporation to belonging to tlie corporation from a 
 
 enforce the liability of a stockholder for third party : Nealis v. Am. Tube & Iron 
 
 his unpaid subscription, the corporation, Co. (1896), 150 N. Y. 42, 44 N. E. 944. 
 
 if it still exists, is a necessary party : Pat- The corporation is an indispensable party 
 
 terson v. Lynde, 112 111. 196. [|A11 the defendant in a suit to marshal its assets: 
 
 stockholders and all the creditors must be Steele Lumber Co. i'. Laurens Lumber 
 
 made parties: Van Pelt i-. Gardner (1898), Co. (1896), 98 Ga. 329, 24 8. E. 755. 
 54 Neb. 701, 75 N. W. 874 ; Gianella v. In an action by stockholders against the 
 
 Bigelow (1897), 96 Wis. 185, 71 N. W. directorsof a corporation for an accounting 
 
 111; Gainey i-'. Gilson (1897), 149 Ind. for moneys received from an improper sale 
 
 58, 48 N. E. 633 (even wliere they reside of stock, where one of the defendants dies 
 
 in different counties), but see contrary * pending the suit, his administrator may 
 
 rule in Kell v. Lund (1896), 99 la. 153, 68 be substituted without giving rise to a 
 
 N. W. 593, where it is held that each misjoinder: Morgan v. King (1900), 27 
 
 stockholder is entitled to a sejiarate action Colo. 539, 63 Pac. 41 6. J 
 in the county of his residence.] - French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 148, 159. 
 
 1 Mitchell V. Bank of St. Paul, 7 Min. See also Wickersham v. Crittenden, 93 
 
 252. [jThe corporation is not a necessary Cal. 17,33; Swan Land & Cattle Co. v. 
 
 party in a suit by the receiver of a corpora- Frank, 39 Fed. liep. 456. Qln J. K. Orr 
 
 tion against the stockholders to recover Co. v. Kimbrough (1896), 99 Ga. 143, 25 
 
 the amouut of their liability for the debts S. E. 204, the court said : " Although an 
 
 of the corporation : Moore i*. Hipley (1898), equitable petition may mention the name 
 
 106 Ga. 556, 32 S. E. 647. Corporation of a corporation and contain a prayer for 
 
 not a necessary party in a suit by corpo- certain relief against it, such corporation 
 
 ration creditors to enforce unpaid stock is not a party to the petition wherp there 
 
 cub<criptions: Van Pelt i\ Gardner (1898), is no prayer for process as to it. "3 
 5t Neb. 701, 75 N. W. 874. Nor is it a
 
 DEFENDANTS IN SUITS AGAINST CORrOKATIONS. 357 
 
 corporation alone, it was decided, in Indiana, that both of the 
 assignors were necessary defendants under the special provisions 
 of the code of that State, which require the assignors of things in 
 action not negotiable to be made parties in a suit by the assignee.^ 
 But in New York, where the debtor, defendant in an action by 
 an assignee of the demand, was entitled to an accounting with 
 the assignor in respect of the claim sued upon, in order to ascer- 
 tain in fact whether any such claim existed, and applied for an 
 order bringing him in as a defendant for that purpose, it was 
 held that such assignor was neither a necessary nor a proper 
 party, and could not be brought in.^ The courts of New York 
 seem to have established the rule under the code for that State, 
 that an assignor of a thing in action is never a proper, much less 
 a necessar}^ defendant in an action by the assignee, even when 
 the plaintiff's contention depends upon the legal relations and 
 liabilities existing between the defendant — ^the debtor — and the 
 assignor. This doctrine is entirely contrary to that which pre- 
 vails in many of the States, and which is sanctioned by their 
 codes and approved by their courts ; and it seems to be equally 
 opposed to the former doctrine of. equity, which permitted, if it 
 did not require, the presence of the assignor in all cases where 
 the assignment did not convey a legal title, and especially where 
 an accounting or other settlement of matters in dispute between 
 the assignor and the defendant was necessary in order to ascertain 
 the amount of the plaintiff's demand.^ 
 
 § 262. * 365. Accounting by one Partner against another* and 
 by Surviving Partner. In an action virtually of accounting by one 
 partner against another to recover the plaintiff's share of the 
 assets or profits, and, a fortiori, when the action is confessedly 
 one for accounting, all the partners must be defendants.^ This 
 special rule assumes that there has been no settlement, no bal- 
 ance ascertained and agreed upon, so that a simple action at law 
 
 1 Ind. & lU. Cent. R. Co. r. McKernan, 3 Story's Eq. PI. § 153, and notes; 
 
 24 Ind. 62. I Dan. Ch. PI. (4th Am. ed.), pp. 197- 
 
 ^ AUenr. Smith, 16 N.Y. 415. See also 199, and notes; Miller v. Bear, 3 Paige, 
 
 Andrews v. Gillespie, 47 N. Y. 487, which 467, 468; Whitney v. McKinney, 7 Johns, 
 
 holds that the mortgagee who assigned Ch. 144; Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 
 
 the mortgage is not a proper defendant 41-44. 
 
 in an action to foreclose, even though the * ^See § * 104, and cases cited in the 
 
 defence pleaded by the mortgagor is that notes to that section.] 
 of mistake in drawing the mortgage, and ^ Duck v. Abbott, 24 Ind. 349 ; Set- 
 
 pr.ays the relief of reformation. tembre v. Putnam, 30 Cal. 490.
 
 358 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 could be maintained therefor by one partner against another, but 
 the situation is such that an action for an accounting is the only- 
 relief given by the law. In such equitable action all the part- 
 ner are necessary parties. A partnership, being engaged in the 
 business of buying and selling lands, for i)urposes of convenience 
 had all the titles taken in the name of one member of the firm. 
 He died, ])eing at the time thus the apparent owner of lands 
 which Avere actually firm property. An action by the survivor 
 for an account and settlement was properly brought against the 
 heirs, widow, and administrator of the deceased; these persons 
 were all held to be necessary parties.^ 
 
 § 263. * 3(36. VII. Actions for Specific Performance. Conflict of 
 Opinion herein. It is the established rule of equity procedure 
 that, in the ordinary and direct action to compel the specific 
 performance of a contract for the sale of lands, the parties to the 
 contract themselves, or the persons who have become substituted 
 in their place, as the heirs, ^ and under certain circumstances the 
 executors or administrators, are the only proper parties plaintiff 
 or defendant. A suit for the purpose of obtaining this special 
 relief cannot be combined with a cause of action for relief against 
 other persons claiming an interest in the same land; in other 
 words, this action cannot be made to determine the titles of 
 other claimants, nor to foreclose the liens of subsequent incum- 
 brancers.^ This well-settled rule has, however, been departed 
 
 1 Gray v. Palmer, 9 Cal. 616. But the 8 Taskcl r. Small, 3 My. & Cr. 63, 68, 
 
 heirs of a devisee of the deceased, it has per Lord Cotteuham, Cliau. ; Mole v. 
 
 been held, are not nece.ssary parties: Smith, Jacob, 490, 494, per Lord Eldon, 
 
 Van Aken v. Clarke, 82 Iowa, 2.56. j^Iii Chan. ; Wood v. White, 4 My. & Cr. 470; 
 
 an action against a rreceiver. of a part- Kobertson v. Gr. Western Ry. Co., 10 
 
 ner-ship on a contract made by him as Sim. 314; Fagan v. Barnes, 14 Fla. .53, 
 
 receiver, the surviving partner is not a .57 ; Knott v. Stephens, 3 Oreg. 269 ; 
 
 necessary party : Painter v. Painter (1902), Monlton i". Chafee, 22 Fed. Kep. 26; 
 
 138 Cal. 231, 71 Pac. 90. And where one Ashley v. Little Kock (Ark. 1892), 19 
 
 partner institutes proceedings for a re- S. W. 1058; Washburn & M. Man. Co. r. 
 
 ceiver of partnership assets to prevent Chicago G. W. F. Co., 109 111. 71. In 
 
 another jiartner from wasting them, firm Ta.sker i-. Small, mortgagees of the land 
 
 creditors are not necessary parties: Allen were held to be ini])roper defendants. In 
 
 " Couley (1898), 53 S. C. 414, 31 S. K. another case, a tenant of the vendor in pos- 
 
 034.] session was declared an improper party. 
 
 - [[It was held in Salinger v. Gunn All persons interested iu the subject- 
 
 (1895), 61 Ark. 414, 33 S. W. 959, that matter of the action as holders of the 
 
 in a suit by the vendee of land for specific legal or equitable titles to the premises in 
 
 performance of the contract of sale, the question were declared to be necessary 
 
 heirs of the deceased vendor are necessary ])arties, plaintiff or defendant, in McCotter 
 
 partie.<.3 r. Lawrence, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 392, 395.
 
 IN SUITS FOR A SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 359 
 
 from by some State courts. Thus, in a case decided by the 
 Supreme Court of Minnesota, a contract to convey land had 
 been given, and the vendee had gone into possession. Subse- 
 quently to the execution of the agreement and the change of 
 possession, certain persons had recovered judgments against the 
 vendor, which they claimed to be liens upon the land. These 
 judgment creditors were held to be proper defendants in the suit 
 for a specific performance brought by the vendee for the purpose 
 of cutting off their rights of redemption, it being assumed that 
 their liens were subordinate to the vendee's rights.^ And it was 
 held in a recent case in California that, in an action to compel 
 the specific performance of such a contract, — the land being an 
 undivided share of a specific tract, — all persons subject to the 
 vendee's equities, and holding adversely to him, must be made 
 defendants. 2 
 
 § 264. * 367. Holder of Adverse Claim. Personal Representative 
 of Deceased Vendor. Heirs. New York and lo-wa Cases. In a 
 somewhat peculiar case recentl}' decided by the Supreme Court of 
 New York, a person holding a subsequent and adverse claim to 
 the plaintiff was declared to be a necessary defendant to a com- 
 plete determination of the issues. The action being brought to 
 procure the specific performance of a land contract made between 
 the plaintiff and the defendant, the complaint alleged that the de- 
 fendant had made a subsequent contract to convey the same land 
 to F., and prayed an injunction restraining defendant from making 
 a conveyance to F. Upon this allegation and prayer for relief, 
 it was held that such subsequent vendee was a necessary party. ^ 
 
 1 Seager v. Burns, 4 Minn. 141, 14.5, ^ Fullerton v. McCurdy, 4 Lans. 1-32. 
 
 per Emmet J. The judge made no sug- "When A. agrees to convey to B., and 
 
 gestion of a doubt wliether these creditors afterwards conveys to C, who has notice 
 
 were proper parties. The whole discus- of tlie prior contract, C. is a necessary 
 
 sion turned upon the question whetlier defendant in an action by the original 
 
 the general allegation of the plaintiff, that vendee to compel a specific performance, 
 
 they "claimed an interest,'' etc., was Stone i'. Buckner, 12 Sm. & M. 73 ; Dailv 
 
 enough. They were likened by the court ?>. Litchfield, 10 Mich. 29; Spence v. Hogg, 
 
 to junior incumbrancers in a mortgage I Coll. 225; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. 
 
 foreclosure. None of the authorities last v. Benton, 42 Kan. 698. One to whom 
 
 cited were mentioned. the vendor had assigned the contract as 
 
 ■^ Agard v. Valencia, 39 Cal. 292. This collateral security was held to be a proper 
 
 case is somewhat peculiar, and the facts defendant in Butler v. Gage (Colo. Sup. 
 
 are exceedingly complicated. The deci- 1889), 23 Tac. R. 462. [^See also Water 
 
 sion certainly seems to conflict with the Supply Co. v. Root (1895), 56 Kan. 187, 
 
 general rule as established by equity 42 Pac. 715, where the court in the svlhv- 
 
 courts, and as stated in the text. bus said : " Where A. makes a written
 
 360 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 Where the vendor has died, and the vendee brought his action 
 acainst the sole heir at hiw of the deceased, but conceded in 
 his complaint that the entire purchase-money had not been 
 paid, and averred a tender and a readiness to pay, the adminis- 
 trators of the vendor were held to be necessary defendants in 
 New York.^ It would appear from the reasoning of this case 
 that its decision is confined to the single case in which the vendor 
 has died before the purchase-money has been entirely paid, and 
 in which the same remains unpaid up to the time of commencing 
 the action. If the purchase price has been paid in full, either to 
 the vendor during his lifetime, or to his administrators after his 
 death, then his heire would seem to be, in general, the only 
 necessary parties defendant, his personal representatives not then 
 having any interest in the controversy. ^ In the face of a statute 
 providing that an action for a specific performance of a land 
 contract may be brought against the executor or administrator of 
 a deceased vendor, and that other parties are not necessary, but 
 may at the discretion of the court be brought in, the Supreme 
 Court of Iowa has held that such personal representatives are not 
 necessary, but only proper parties; that in the absence of the 
 statute the heirs of the vendor are the only proper or possible 
 parties ; and that, the language of the statute being permissive, 
 it will not be construed to make the administrators or executors 
 necessary defendants. ^ 
 
 contract for a sale of real property to B., Champeinownc, 9 Price, 130. See also 
 
 wliicli is forthwith placed on record, and Lowry v. Jackson, 27 S. C. .318; Sawyer 
 
 afterwards conveys tlie property to C, v. Baker, 66 Ala. 292 ; Houston v. Black- 
 
 who buvs with constructive notice of the man, 66 Ala 5.59 ; Coffey r. Norwood, 81 
 
 rights of B., under his contract, AcW, that Ala. 512; Walters r. Walters, 132 111. 
 
 an action to compel a conveyance of the 467. If the vendor sues the heirs alone 
 
 lei^al title, after full perf<jrmance of his of the deceased vendee, the latter can in- 
 
 part of the contract hy B., may be main- sist upon the administrators being brought 
 
 taiued against C, and that A. is not an in. Story's Eq", PI. § 177; Cock i'. Evans, 
 
 iudispensable party to the action. "J 9 Yerg. 287. The vendor and the vendee 
 
 1 Potter V. Ellice, 48 N. Y. 321, 323. having botii died, the heirs and widow 
 See also Tiiompson v. Smith, 63 N. Y. of the latter brought a suit against the 
 301 ; Rain v. Koper, 15 Fla. 121 ; Butler devisees of the vendor to wliom tiie laud 
 j;. Gage (Colo. Sup. 1889), 23 Pac. R. 462. had been devised, and the parties were 
 
 2 All tiie lieirs of a deceased vendor are all held to l)e proper, in Peters u. Jones, 
 necessary defendants in the action. House 35 Iowa, 512, 518; see ca.ses cited by 
 i: Dexter, 9 Midi. 246; Duncan n. Wick- Miller J. at page 518. When the oldigor 
 liffe, 4 Scam. 452. See also Rogers v. in a title bond has died, his heirs at law 
 Wolfe, 104 Mo. 1. are necessary parties to a suit by iiis per- 
 
 •* Judil V. Moseley, 30 Iowa, 423, 427; sonal rei)resentatives to subject the laud 
 Story's E(|. PI. §§ 160, 177; Champion r. to tiie ])ayment of the purchase-money: 
 Bruwn, 6 Joims. Ch. 402; Townsend v. Gruljb r. L.okabill, 100 N. C. 267-
 
 DEFKNDANTS IN SUITS TO QUIKT TITLE. 361 
 
 § 265. * 368. Prior Mortgagee. Agent of Vendor. Person Mak- 
 ing Redemption. Ill an action against the vendor to compel the 
 specific performance of his contract, the pLaintiff united with him 
 as co-defendants the holders of two prior mortgages embracing 
 the land agreed to be conveyed, which had been given by the 
 vendor, alleging in his complaint that the vendor had agreed to 
 pay off and remove these mortgages, and that they included other 
 lands in addition to that claimed by the plaintiff, which were 
 sufficient to satisfy the demand secured thereby, and praying 
 that the mortgagees might be compelled to sell such otlier lands 
 first. The New York Court of Appeals, however, held that these 
 mortgagees could not be joined as co-defendants in the action. ^ 
 When in the contract for the sale and conveyance of land the 
 vendor appointed a certain person as his agent to make and 
 deliver a deed in his name to the vendee, and directed the agent 
 to execute and deliver the same, and neither the vendor nor the 
 agent complied with the terms of the agreement, an action 
 brought against the vendor and the agent as co-defendants was 
 held to be improper, and the agent was declared not to be a 
 proper party in any aspect of the case, since he had no interest 
 in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff. ^ Land had been sold 
 at execution sale, and afterwards redeemed in alleged compliance 
 with the statute which prescribes the manner of redemption. 
 The purchaser, denying the validity of the redemption, brought 
 an action against the sheriff alone to compel an execution and 
 delivery of the deed, and this action was held insufficient; it 
 should have embraced the person who made the redemption, and 
 who claimed to hold the land by virtue thereof, as a co-defendant 
 with the sheriff.'^ 
 
 § 266. * 369. VIII. Actions to quiet Title. Scope of Statute 
 herein in "Western States. Multiform Use of. The nature of the 
 action to quiet title is such that it is impossible to lay down any 
 but the most general rule in relation to its parties defendant. 
 
 1 Chapman >•. West, 17 N. Y. 125. joined witli B. in tlie action, primarily as 
 
 2 Dahoney v. Hall, 20 Ind. 264. a plaintiff; but if not, then as a defendant ; 
 
 3 Crosby r. Davis, 9 Iowa, 98. Wiiero but if the agreement between B. and C. is 
 the vendee sub-contracts, there is a dis- that B. will convey the land to C, then 
 tinction depending upon the nature of the B. is the onlv necessary partv in the ac- 
 sub-contract. If A. agrees to convey to tion against A. Alexander v. Cana. 1 
 B., and the latter in turn agrees with C. De G. & Sm. 415; Chadwick r. Maden, 
 
 that the conveyance shall he made by A. 9 Hare, 188; B v. Walford, 4 Russ. 
 
 directly to him, — C, — then C. must be 372.
 
 362 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 The very object of the proceeding assumes that there are other 
 claimants adverse to the plaintiff, setting up titles and interests 
 in the land or otlier subject-matter hostile to his. Of course all 
 these adverse claimants are proper parties defendant, and if the 
 decree is to accomplish its full effect of putting all litigation to 
 rest, they are necessary defendants. ^ Originally, and independ\ 
 ent of statute, this particular jurisdiction of equity was onhi 
 invoked when either many persons asserted titles adverse to that 
 of the plaintiff, or when one person repeatedly asserted his single) 
 title by a succession of legal actions, all of which had failed, anq 
 in either case the object of the suit was to settle the whole ootJ- 
 troversy in one proceeding. The action has, however, been A 
 greatly extended by statute, especially in the Western States, 
 and is there an ordinary means of trying a disputed title between y 
 two opposite claimants. The general scope of these statutes i^ 
 as follows : The_plajjitiff must be in possesion claimin g an ^tate 
 in the lands. ^ The adverse claimant or claimants must be ouFbf 
 po^essiSri",' and must assert a hostile title or interest. In this 
 conditiou the possessor of the land, without waiting for any pro- 
 ceeding, legal or equitable, to be instituted against him, may take 
 the initiative, and, by commencing an equitable action, may 
 compel his adversaries to come into court, assert their titles, and 
 have the controversy put to rest in a single judgment. It is 
 plain, therefore, that this statutory suit is the converse of the 
 legal action of ejectment. The action to quiet title is not, how- 
 ever, confined to the ownership of lands; its use is multiform; it 
 may be invoked to determine conflicting rights over personal 
 property, and even rights growing out of contract where a multi- 
 plicity of actions depending upon the same questions will thereby 
 be avoided. I shall now give some il'lustrations of the action and 
 of its different forms. It will be seen that each case must stand 
 
 1 ^Browning v. Smith (1894), 139 Ind. liad delivered possessiou to tlie grantee, 
 
 280, 37 X. E. 540: In a suit for quieting under an agreement that a portion of the 
 
 title t<j land, the omission of the holder purcjiase price should he de))osited with a 
 
 of an erpiity of re(leni))tion as party de- third jiarty to he ])aid over^after a cloud 
 
 fendant does not prevent the decree from on the title should he removed, has suffi- 
 
 ojicrating to bar and foreclose those who cient interest tq maintain an action to 
 
 were made parties.] quiet title. See, also, ]\ruczinski ?\ Neuen- 
 
 - ^Sco, however. Slyer v. Sprague dorf (1898), 99 Wii^: 264, 74 N. W. 974, 
 
 (1896), GJ Minn. 414, 6.5 N. W. 6,')9, where where one not in possession was allowerl 
 
 a grantor who had conveyed land hy to maintain an action to remove a cloud 
 
 warranty deed with full covenants, and from his title.]
 
 DEFENDANTS IN SUITS TO QUIET TITLE. 363 
 
 mainly upon its own circumstances under the guidance of tlie 
 general principle which requires all persons whose rights and 
 interests could be affected by the decree to be made parties. 
 
 § 267. * 370. Illustrations of Action and its Forms. The officers 
 of a railroad company, in violation of their duty and of the 
 charter, and with a fraudulent intent, issued large amounts of 
 spurious stock of the corporation, which had all the appearance 
 on the face of being genuine. These issues had been made at 
 different times, and to various persons, and the stock was actu- 
 ally held by three hundred and twenty-six separate owners, who 
 had bought it in the course of business supposing it to be genuine. 
 Most of these holders had commenced suits against the company 
 to compel it to recognize the stock as valid in their hands. 
 Under these circumstances the corporation began an action 
 against all these three hundred and twenty-six persons as de- 
 fendants, to procure the stock to be declared spurious, to enjoin 
 the suits then pending, and to determine the controversy at one 
 blow. The suit was sustained as a bill of peace and to quiet 
 title, and the defendants were held to have been properly united 
 in the one proceeding ; their stock was tainted (if at all) by a 
 common vice, and the same fundamental question disposed of 
 all their claims. ^ On the same principle, the receiver of an 
 insolvent insurance company was permitted to unite all the judg- 
 ment creditors of the corporation who were separately suing the 
 stockholders on their personal liability, and to enjoin their actions 
 in order that the liability of all the stockholders might be enforced 
 by himself in the same action. - 
 
 § 268. * 371. Same Subject. In an action to quiet title to 
 lands by correcting mistakes in deeds thereof, all persons having 
 any interest in the land, or having an}^ interests which could be 
 affected by the relief demanded, must be brought before the 
 
 1 N. Y. & N. H. R. Co. V. Schuyler, 17 Story's Eq. PI. §§ 120, 130 e( seq. ; London 
 
 N. Y. 592. The final result was, that the v. Perkins, 4 Bro. P. C. 158 ; Hardcastle v. 
 
 court pronounced the stock valid as against Smithsou, -3 Atk. 2-45 ; Adair v. New River 
 
 the company, and each defendant obtained Co., 1 1 Ves. 429 ; Newton v. Earl of Eg- 
 
 a separate judgment against the plaintiff, mont, 5 Sim. 130; Harrison ;;. Steward- 
 
 s. <;. 34 N. Y. 30. Bills of peace are some- son, 2 Hare, 530; Holland v. Baker, 3 
 
 times permitted to be bronght against a Hare, 68. See also Supervisors v. Deyoe, 
 
 part only of those claiming adversely to 77 N. Y. 219. ' 
 
 the plaintiff when their number is very - Osgood v. Laytiu, 5 Abb. Pr. n. s. I 
 
 large ; but in all such cases the right must (Ct. of App.). 
 be s:eneral anions: all these claimants.
 
 364 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 court as defendants.^ When the land has passed through several 
 owners by a succession of conveyances, all the series of grantors, 
 or their heirs if they themselves are dead, are necessary defend- 
 ants. ^ In another case involving the same principle, a sale had 
 been made under a power of sale contained in a mortgage of land, 
 and a deed of the land executed by or on behalf of the mortgagee 
 to the purchaser. In the description of the premises contained 
 in this mortgage there was an important mistake, which was 
 repeated in the deed to the purchaser who took the conveyance 
 in ignorance thereof. On discovery of this error he brought an 
 action to reform the mortgage and his deed by correcting the 
 mistake, and made the mortgagor the only defendant. The 
 Supreme Court of Missouri held upon these facts the mortgagee 
 was a necessary defendant, and must be brought in before any 
 judgment could be rendered.^ 
 
 § 269. * 372. Case in New York. The general rule governing 
 actions to quiet and determine title to lands brought b}^ the one 
 in possession against the persons who set up adverse claims was 
 clearly and accurately stated by the New York Court of Appeals 
 in a recent case. The proceeding was instituted under a statute 
 which corresponds in its important features with the description 
 of that class of enactments given in a preceding paragraph 
 (§ * 369). The party in possession had united all the adverse 
 claimants as defendants in his suit, and this was objected to as a 
 misjoinder. The court stated the doctrine in the following man- 
 ner: " It is claimed on the part of the respondents that the jilain- 
 tiff could not unite all the claimants as defendants in the action. 
 I cannot doubt that this claim is entirely unfounded. Here are 
 twenty-four persons claiming title to this real estate. They all 
 
 ^ [^Iii IIiiiiiiilia],etc. K. R. Co. w. Nortoiii Jle. 507. As to necessary or proper de- 
 
 (1900), 154 Mo. 142, 55 S. W. 220, it was fendants in actions to correct mistakes in 
 
 sou<^ht to quiet title Ijy liaving a deed set instriunents, see Newman v. Home Ins. 
 
 aside wliich wa.s executed by a third party. Co., 20 Minn. 422, 424 ; Durliam r. Hisdioff, 
 
 Held that tlie grantor and grantee of 47 Ind. 211. Also Bush r. Hicks, GO N. Y. 
 
 fraudulent deed were necessary parties.] 298; Mills i*. IJuttrick, 4 Col. 123; Steven- 
 
 ^ Flanders v. McClanahan, 24 Iowa, son v. I'olk, 71 Iowa, 278; Coggswell v. 
 
 486. See this case for a very elaborate Griffith (Neb. 1888), .30 N. W. Hc]). 538; 
 
 discussion of the doctrine stated in the Roberts v. Chanilierlaiu, .30 Kan. 677. 
 text; but see Thomas v. Kennedy, 24 '■' Haley v. Bairley, 37 Mo. 363. The 
 
 Iowa, 397; and see Beckwith v. Darges, court finally lield that the purchaser could 
 
 18 Iowa, 303. In an action to refurm a not maintain such an action at all; that 
 
 deed, both the grantor and the grantee are he was not in such ])rivity with the mort- 
 
 nece?sary parties. Pierce v. Faunce, 47 gagnr as to ontiile him to the relief.
 
 DEFENDANTS IN SUITS FOR PAKTITION. 365 
 
 denied the plaintiff's right upon the same ground, and chiimed 
 title from the same source, and therefore had the same defence 
 to the action. It cannot be that under the Revised Statutes it 
 would have been necessary for the plaintiff to have instituted in 
 such a case tv/enty-four special proceedings. Under the Revised 
 Statutes these defendants, if they had all been in possession of 
 this real estate, claiming the same title which they set up as de- 
 fendants in this action, could all have been united as defendants 
 in an action of ejectment ; and they could, if they had chosen to 
 do so, all have united in an action of ejectment against the plaintiff. 
 Hence there was no error in the joinder of these defendants." ^ 
 
 § 270. * 373. IX. Actions for Partition. Their General Purpose. 
 General Creditors. Holders of Liens on Entire Tract. The action of 
 partition has been made the object of so many special and vary- 
 ing statutory regulations in the different States, that it cannot 
 properly be said to fall within the domain of the general procedure 
 as the same is established by the codes. I shall only attempt, 
 therefore, to point out its general features relating to parties de- 
 fendant, and such as are common to all or several of the States in 
 which the reformed system prevails. The primary object of the 
 action is to divide the land according to their respective interests 
 among the co-owners. The proceeding may be instituted by any 
 co-owner, and all the other co-owners are of course necessary de- 
 fendants, and they are in such case the only necessary or even 
 proper defendants, for the rights of no otlier classes of persons 
 could be affected by the decree making the division.^ General 
 
 1 Fisher v. Hepburn, 48 N. Y. 41, 55, the defendants claimed and exercised their 
 per Earl J. Goldsmith v. Gilliland, 24 Tights and interests severally and sepa- 
 Fed. Rep. 154; Kiucaid v. McGowan, 88 rately, each to a distinct part of the shore. 
 Ky. 91 ; Ellis v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 77 The question of misjoinder of parties de- 
 Wis. 114; Keens v. Gaslin, 24 Neb. 310; fendant was presented by demurrer and 
 Johnson v. Robinson, 20 Minn. 170; answer. The joinder of the several de- 
 Story's Eq. PI. §§ 144, 198; Sutton v. fendants was proper. They severally 
 Stone, 2 Atk. 101 ; Reynoldson w. Perkins, claimed riglits affecting plaintiff's right 
 Arnb. 564; Mead v. Mitchell, 17 N. Y. appurtenant to liis land, and their claim, 
 210, 214, 215; Clemens o. Clemens, 37 thougli under different patents, was from 
 N. Y. 59. I^Heckman v. Swett (1893), 99 the same source, and tlie injury to the 
 Cal. 303, 33 Pac. 1099, was an action to plaintiff, as well as their defence to the 
 quiet title to a fishing privilege. The action, depended as to each upon the same 
 plaintiff was tlie owner of certain lands facts. Pom. Rem. & Rem. Rights, §* 372 ; 
 on the north side of the Eel river, and Fisher v. Hepburn, 48 N. Y. 41-55.''] 
 the defendants each severally owned cer- '-^ C^nly a joint tenant or a tenant in 
 tain lauds on tlie south side of the same common can maintain an action for tlie 
 river, opposite the plaintiff's lands. The partition of real estate : Phillips v. Dorris 
 courtsavs: " The court further found that (1898), 56 Neb. 293, 76 N. W. 555. An
 
 366 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 creditors of any co-owner, or of any prior owner of the whole 
 tract of land, — as, for example, the deceased ancestor of the 
 present co-owners, — or of any prior owner of part of the land, 
 not liaving obtained judgment, and not therefore holding any 
 lien upon the premises or a part of them, would not be proper 
 defendants for any purpose, any more than the general creditors 
 of a jiiortgagor in the case of a foreclosure. The holders of liens 
 upon the entire tract to be divi.ded, such as judgment creditors of 
 tlie former owner, or the holders of mortgages given by a former 
 owner, would not be necessary defendants, nor would they be 
 even proper paities to the action. Their liens would be utterly 
 unaffected by the decree and subsequent division in pursuance 
 ^'hereof. As their judgments or mortgages were incumbrances 
 upon ti.o whole land prior to the titles of the present co-owners, 
 tlie division u£ the real estate among these co-owners would leave 
 the same liens undisicirbed and effectual upon the same premises 
 in their full force and effect. The transaction would be the same 
 in substance as the conveyance .by a mortgagor of the mortgaged 
 premises to a grantee who takes tlicMi subject to the existing lien. 
 Such incumbrancers are therefore, acco.i-tlin<T to the doctrines of 
 equity, not even proper parties defendai.-t, when the action is 
 simply for a division of the soil. 
 
 § 271. * 374. Holders of Liens on Undivided Shares. The caSG 
 of those who hold liens upon the undivided shares of individual 
 co-owners, may appear at first view to be somewhat d\ifferent from 
 the one last described, but it really falls within the same^ principle. 
 As long as the co-owner's share remains undivided, thc^ incum- 
 brance upon it is equally vague ; that is, it is not a lien upion any 
 specific and determined part of the whole common tract, but "upon 
 an undivided and undistino^uished fraction of it. As the sincrle 
 co-owner himself cannot say of any particular spot of the territory 
 ill ([uestion, " This is mine, I am entitled to the exclusive poss€>ts- 
 sion of this," so his judgment creditor or mortgagee cannot sa\y 
 of any particvdar lot, " I liave a lien upon this, and can enforco 
 that lien by selling this specific portion." The sole effect of the 
 decree and the decision in execution- tliereof is to allot a certain 
 specified and determined piece of land to the eo-OAvner in place 
 of his former undefined share, and to transfer the lien-holder's 
 
 aiimiiii.strator of a deceased joint tenant Thruckmorton r. I'ence (189.3), 121 Mo. 
 is nut a jmjjfcr party to a piiLliion suit: oO, 2.'> S. W. 843.]
 
 DEFENDANTS IN SUITS FOR PARTITION. 367 
 
 incumbrance to this specified and determined portion of tlie 
 soil. The incumbrance itself is neither increased nor diminished 
 in amount; it is merely changed from its floating to a fixed 
 character. It is plain, therefore, that the incumbrancer thus 
 described has no real legal or equitable interest in the parti- 
 tion suit when the same is instituted and carried on to its end for 
 the mere purpose of dividuig the land among the co-owners. His 
 rights are unaffected; his lien undisturbed. The only apparent 
 interest which he has, or can possibly have, is not in the action 
 itself, nor even in the judgment ordering a partition, but in the 
 execution of that judgment. It may be said that he has an in- 
 terest to see that the division is properly made, so that the co- 
 owner on whose share he has the lien will receive a fair allotment, 
 and that thus the value of his own security will be preserved. He 
 has such an interest undoubtedly, but it is not a legal one ; nor 
 does it commence until the cause is decided and the judgment 
 rendered. Moreover, the actual division is 'made by officers of the 
 court, — the sheriff, or commissioners appointed in the case, — and 
 they act under the direction and control of the court itself. As 
 in the case of all other administrative official acts the law presumes 
 that they will be rightly done, it does not require a person to be 
 made a party to the action in order that he may be in a position 
 to protect himself against the wrongful acts of the officers who 
 are appointed to carry a judgment of the court into effect. Per- 
 sons are made parties in order that they may have an opportunity 
 of presenting their rights and claims to the judge before he makes 
 his decree, to the end that they may be considered and passed 
 upon and established by the judgment itself. When that judg- 
 ment can in no possible manner affect his rights, he is not even 
 a proper party to the suit. I have thus stated the principles of 
 equity unmodified by statute which govern the action of partition 
 when the same is brought for an actual division of the land. The 
 statutory provisions in relation to the action may have altered 
 these rules in some particulars; but I have only designed to 
 present the equity doctrine pure and simple with the reasons 
 therefor; so that local changes, wherever tliey have been made, 
 will be the more readily understood and their effect appreciated.^ 
 
 1 Prior \o any contrary statute, tlie tract, are not proper parties. Harwood 
 rule was well settled that incumbrancers v. Kirby, 1 Paige, 469, 471 ; Sebring v. 
 on the undivided shares, or on the whole Mersereau, Hopli. 501, 503; s. c. on app.
 
 3ti8 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 272. * 375. Different Rule where Object of Suit is to sell Land 
 and divide Proceeds. Tliere is another aspect, however, of the 
 partition suit which places it in very different relations to the 
 holders of liens and incumbrancers either upon the whole land 
 paramount to the titles of the co-owners, or upon the undivided 
 shares of the co-owners themselves. Its object is sometimes to 
 sell the whole land, and to divide the proceeds, and not to divide 
 the land itself. When this is the nature of the judgment, it is 
 plain that the riglits and interests of the lien-holders must be 
 adjusted and determined in tlie one action, and especially so when 
 the land is to be sold free from all incumbrance, so that the lien 
 of all the mortgages and judgments will be transferred from the 
 real estate to the fund which is the proceeds thereof, and they 
 will be paid off and satisfied therefrom. There is then a neces- 
 sary antagonism between the co-owners and all classes and species 
 of incumbrancers upon their undivided shares. Their rights are 
 clashing ; they are opposing claimants of the same fund ; the in- 
 terests of all are to be finally established and satisfied at the 
 one judicial proceeding. It is evident, therefore, upon the most 
 familiar principles of equity jurisprudence in its relation to par- 
 ties, that in the a:>pect of the action now described, all the holders 
 of liens and incumbrances upon the undivided shares of individual 
 co-owners, created subsequent to the inception of their titles, are 
 not only proper but necessary defendants in order that a decree 
 should be made determining all these conflicting rights and 
 claims, while the holders of prior liens, if not necessary, are at 
 
 9 Cow. .344, 34.') ; Wotten v. Copoland, 7 sary defendant unless a sale of the land is 
 
 Johns. Ch. 140, 141; Agar r. Fairfax, 17 to be made. Tanner t;. Niles, 1 Barb. 
 
 Ves. 542, 544 ; Baring v. Nash, 1 Ves. & 560. It is held in New York that, iude- 
 
 B. 551. All the tenants in common, or pendent of statute, subsequent contingent 
 
 owners of undivided shares, niu.^t be remainder-men, or persons holding under 
 
 ]iarties either plaintiffs or defendants, executory devises, who may hereafter 
 
 Buriians v. Burhans, 2 Barb. Cli. 398 ; come into being, are bound by a decree in 
 
 Teal V. Woodworth, 3 Paige. 470. When partition made by a court of equity, when 
 
 a tenant in common has assigned his the, ])resent owners of a vested estate of 
 
 share for the benefit of Iiis creditors, such inlieritance in the land have been made 
 
 creditors are not proper parties. Van parties. Mead v. Mitchell, 17 N. Y. 210, 
 
 Arsdale v. Drake, 2 Barb. 599. A widow 214, 215 ; Clemens v. Clemens, 37 N. Y. 59. 
 
 entitled to dower in an undivided share is [Hidd in Chalmers v. Trent (1894), 11 Utah 
 
 a necessary party. Wilkinson v. Parish, 8S, 39 Pac. 488, that the holder of a lien 
 
 3 Paige, 653 ; Green v. Putnam, 1 Barb. n|)on a joint tenant's share was a necessary 
 
 500; Gregory v. Gregory, 69 N. C 522, ])arty to a suit for partition, and that such 
 
 526. But a widow who is entitled to necessary party might be brought in by 
 
 dower in the whole tract is not a neces- cross-hill.]
 
 DEFENDANTS IN SUITS FOIi PARTITION. 
 
 369 
 
 least proper parties for a complete adjudication.^ It may some- 
 times be impossible at the commencement of the action to deter- 
 mine whether the judgment will be given for a simple partition 
 of the land itself, or for a sale of the land and a division of the 
 proceeds after satisfying the incumbrances, and therefore tlie 
 classes of persons described may be joinfid as defendants from 
 motives of precaution. The results thus reached from an analysis 
 of the action itself with its peculiar relief, and the application 
 thereto of familiar equity doctrines, have, however, been largely 
 modified in many States by statutory reo-ulations.- 
 
 1 It is held in Indiana, that all persons 
 interested should be made parties, and 
 that lien-holders ou undivided shares may 
 be joined. Milligan v. Poole, 3.5 Ind. 64, 
 68. In Missouri, all the co-owners, in- 
 cluding infants hy their curator, may unite 
 in the proceeding as plaintiffs, so that it 
 will be entirely ex parte. Larned v. Ren- 
 shaw, 37 Mo. 458 ; Waugh v. Blumeu- 
 thal, 28 Mo. 462. Where a deed of trust 
 covered a portion of the land, the trustee 
 and cestui que trust were held to have been 
 properly made defendants in order to bind 
 their interest, altliough no relief was asked 
 against them. Reiuhardt ;;. Weudeck, 40 
 Mo. 577 ; Harbison v. Sauford, 90 Mo. 477. 
 Such a deed of trust is equivalent to a 
 mortgage, so that these defendants were, 
 in fact, incumbrancers. As to the parties 
 in Ohio, see Tabler v. Wiseman, 2 Ohio St. 
 207 ; Williams r. Van Tuyl, 2 Ohio St. 
 336. In New York, it is said that all in- 
 cumbrancers should be brought in as par- 
 ties in order that the land may be sold free. 
 Bogardus v. Parker, 7 How. Pr. 305. 
 
 - [|Most of the States have special stat- 
 utes respecting parties to suits for parti- 
 tion. The following brief synopsis of 
 these statutes will indicate tiieir general 
 scope and effect. 
 
 A7-izona : Any owner or claimant of real 
 estate or any interest therein, or a part 
 owner of personalty, may compel a parti- 
 tion. Rev. St., 1901, §§"3492-3515. 
 
 Arkansas: Every person having an in- 
 terest in the premises, including tenants 
 for years, for life, by curtesy, or in dower, 
 those entitled to the reversion, remainder, 
 or inheritance, and all who, upon any con- 
 tingency, may become entitled to any bene- 
 ficial interest in the premises, vrhether in 
 
 possession or otherwi.se, shall be made 
 parties. Sand. & Hill's Dig. §§ 5415-5417. 
 
 California : " The summons must be di- 
 rected to all the joint tenants and tenants 
 in common, and all persons having any 
 interest in, or any liens of record by mort- 
 gage, judgment, or otherwise upon the 
 property, or upon any particular j)ortion 
 thereof ; and generally to all persons un- 
 known who have or claim any interest in 
 the property." Code Civ. Pro., § 756. 
 
 Colorado : Same as in Arkansas. Code 
 1883, Chap. XXIV. §§ 2, 3. 
 
 Idaho : Same as in California. Code 
 Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3398. 
 
 Indiana : Any person holding lands as 
 joint tenant or tenant in common, whether 
 in his own right or as executor or trustee, 
 may compel partition, and trustees, ad- 
 ministrators, and executors, may be made 
 parties to answer as to any interest they 
 may have in the property. Burns' St., 
 1901, § 1200. 
 
 loiva : Persons having apparent or con- 
 tingent interests in the property may be 
 made parties. Creditors having general 
 specific liens upon the entire property, 
 may be made parties, and those holding 
 liens upon one or more of the undivided 
 interests shall be made parties. Code, 
 1897, §§ 4243, 4244, 4250. 
 
 Kansas : " Creditors having a specific 
 or general lien upon all or any portion of 
 the property may be made parties." Gen. 
 St., 1901, § 510.3. 
 
 Kentucki/ : " All persons interested iu 
 tlie property who have not united in the 
 petition shall be summoned." Code, § 499. 
 
 Minnesota : " The summons shall be 
 •iddressed by name to all the owners and 
 lien-holders who are known, and generally 
 
 24
 
 370 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIF.S. 
 
 5 273. * 37''. Joinder of Wife of Tenant in Common. Administra- 
 tor of Deceased Tenant in Common In New York. Jii New York, 
 when the action for a partition i.^ brought bv one tenant in com- 
 mon in fee, his wife is a necessary party, but ratlier a.'j a defendant 
 than as a plaintiff. Her inchoate right of dower is entitled to 
 protection.^ If one tenant in common dies, so that his estate 
 
 to all persons unknown, havinf^ or claim- 
 ing an interest in the property." St., 
 1894, § 5771. 
 
 Missouri: " Every person having any 
 interest in snch premises, wliether in pos- 
 session or otherwise, shall be made a ])arty 
 to such petition." Rev. St., 1899, § 4376. 
 
 Montana : " Every person having an 
 undivided share, in possession or otherwise 
 in tlie property, as tenant in fee, for life, 
 or for years ; every person entitled to the 
 reversion, remainder or inheritance of an 
 undivided share, after the determination 
 of the particular estate therein ; every per- 
 son who, by any contingency, contained in 
 a devise, or grant, or otherwise, is or may 
 become entitled to a beneficial interest in 
 an undivided share tliereof ; every person 
 having an inchoate riglit of dower in the 
 property or any part thereof, whicii has 
 not been admeasured, must be a party to 
 an action for partition. But no person 
 other than a joint tenant or a tenant in 
 common of tlie property, shall be a plaintiff 
 in the action." " The plaintiff may, at his 
 election, make a tenant in dower, for life, 
 or for years, of the entire property, or a 
 creditor or other person, having a lien or 
 ■ interest, which attaches to the entire prop- 
 erty, a defendant in the action." Also a 
 section identical with tlie California stat- 
 ute given above. Code Civ. Pro., §§ 1.342, 
 1.34.3, 1.347. 
 
 Nebraska: "All tenants in common, 
 or joint tenants of any estate in land may 
 be comj)elled to make or suffer partition 
 of such estate or estates." " Creditors 
 having a specific or general lien upon all 
 or any portion of the property may or 
 may not be made parties, at the option of 
 tiie' plaintiff." Comp. St. 1901, §§6.323, 
 6325. 
 
 Xi ratio : .'^ameas in California. Comp. 
 Laws, 1900. § .3365. 
 
 New y^ork : Has the same jirovisiuns 
 quoted above from Montana, with others 
 
 too long to be set out here. Code Civ. 
 Pro., §§ 1538, 1539. 
 
 North Dakota : Same as California. 
 Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5799. 
 
 0/iio : Eacli tenant in common, copar- 
 cener, or otlier interested person, shall be 
 named as defendant in the petition. Bates' 
 St., § 5756. 
 
 Oklahoma : " Creditors having a specific 
 or general lien upon all or any j>ortion of 
 the property, may be made parties." St , 
 1893, § 4513. 
 
 Oregon : " The plaintiff may, at his 
 election, make a tenant in dower by the 
 curtesy for life or for years of the entire 
 ))roperty or auy part thereof, or creditors 
 having a lien upon the property or any 
 portion thereof, other than by judgment 
 or decree, defendants in the suit." Hill's 
 Laws, § 425. 
 
 South Dakota : Same as California. 
 Ann. St., 1901, § 6597. 
 
 Utah : Same as California. Rev. St , 
 1898, § 3.')26. 
 
 Washinf/ton : " The plaintiff may, at 
 his option, make creditors having a lien 
 upon the property, or any portion thereof, 
 otiier than by a judgment or decree, de- 
 fendants in the suit." Bal. Codes. § 5559. 
 
 Wisconsin: " Every person having au 
 interest, as aforesaid [enumerating sub- 
 stantially the same parties as in the Mon- 
 tana statute], whether in possession or 
 otherwise, and every person entitled to 
 dower in such premi.ses, if the same has 
 not been ail measured, may be made a 
 party to such action " " The plaintiff 
 need not, in the first instance, but may, at 
 his election, make any creditor having a 
 lien upon ttic premises or any part thereof, 
 or any undivided interest or estate therein 
 a defendant." St. 1898, §§ 3102, 3103. 
 
 W liominq : Same as Ohio. Hev. St., 
 1S99, § 40S.3.] 
 
 1 Rosekrans v. Wliite, 7 Ia\\\<. 4H6. 
 [^But it was lield in Haggerty »•. Wagner,
 
 DEFENDANTS IN SUITS FOR I'AIiTITION. 
 
 '1. 
 
 descends to his heirs, if other of the co-owners were indebted to 
 him for rents and profits of the hind, his administrator should ])r 
 joined as a party defendant with his heirs, since the sum due for 
 these rents and profits, and which would be ascertained by an 
 accounting and determined by the decree, would go to his per- 
 sonal estate in the hands of the administrator, and not to hisheirs.^ 
 § 274. * 377. In Indiana and California. In Indiana, the widow 
 takes an undivided portion of the husband's land in fee, as his 
 statutory heir. In an action of partition, brought by the widow 
 against the other heirs of her deceased husband in that State, his 
 creditors, it is held, cannot be made defendants for any purpose.^ 
 Under, the California homestead laws, the wife is a necessary co- 
 defendant with her husband in the partition of lands which they 
 claim or she claims to be a homestead.^ The general rule is laid 
 down in that State that " all persons having or claiming any 
 interest in the land are not only proper but necessary parties to ;i 
 suit for partition." * 
 
 (1897), 148 Ind. 625, 48 N. E. 366, that 
 the wife of a tenant in common is not a 
 necessary party. And in Cochran v. 
 Thomas (1895)' 131 Mo. 258, 33 S. W. 
 6, the husband of a co-tenant was held 
 not to be a necessary party, under G. S., 
 1865, chap. 152. Same- rule stated in 
 Estes V. Nell (1897), 140 Mo. 6.39, 41 S. W. 
 940. In Chalmers v. Trent (1894), 11 
 L'tah, 88, 39 Pac. 488, the wife of a co- 
 tenant was held a necessary party ] 
 
 1 Scott V. Guernsey, 60 Barb. 163, 
 181; s. c. on app. 48 N. Y. 106. \J.n 
 Budde V. Rebenack (1896), 137 Mo. 179, 
 38 S. W. 910, it was held that in an action 
 for partition of lauds devi.sed to minors, 
 brought before the settlement of the 
 estate, the executor is a proper party de- 
 fendant. In such a proceeding against 
 infants, it was held in Bogart v. Bogart 
 (1896), 138 Mo. 419, 40 S. W. 91, they 
 must be represented by a legal guardian 
 and curator, otherwise tlie purchaser at 
 the sale under the decree obtains no title 
 as to them.] 
 
 ■^ Gregory v. Iligli, 29 Ind. 527. The 
 court said : " Any decree of partition be- 
 tween the widow and heirs could not con- 
 clude the rights of the creditors against 
 the estate of the deceased ; nor could 
 creditors prove their claims in such a 
 
 proceeding to which the administrator 
 was not a party." 
 
 8 De Uprey v. De Uprey, 27 Cal. 329. 
 
 * Ibid. p. 332, per Sanderson J. See 
 Gates V. Salmon, 35 Cal. 576. 
 
 pn Hiles v. Rule (1893), 121 Mo. 248, 
 25 S. W. 959, the court said: "No judg- 
 ment in partition should be made when it 
 appears that the parties, wlio are not be- 
 fore the court, have an existing vested in- 
 terest in the subject-matter of the suit. 
 In such case the parties interested sliould 
 be brought iu, or partition should be 
 denied." And it was held that the general 
 rule that defect of parties, appearing on 
 the face of the petition and not objected 
 to by demurrer, is waived, does not apply 
 to partition suits. So, iu Lilly v. Menke 
 (1894), 126 Mo. 190, 28 S. W."643, it was 
 held that a petition in partition which dis- 
 closes the interests of persons not made 
 parties does not state a cause of action. 
 
 In Campbell v. Stokes (1894), 142 N. Y. 
 23, 36 N. E. 811, it was held that in an 
 action of partition among a testator's 
 children, they taking as life tenants, 
 grandchildren living at the time of the 
 suit were necessary parties, since they 
 were presumptively entitled to possession 
 on the death of the life tenant. Becker v. 
 Stroeher (1902), 167 Mo. 306, 66 S. W.
 
 372 CIVIL KKMEDIES. 
 
 5 275. * 378. X. Actions for Various Miscellaneous Objects. Part- 
 nership Matters and Accounting. .Vu action by one partner against 
 another for a dissolution and a winding up of the concern, partly 
 based on the ground of a fraudulent transfer of firm property 
 by the defendant partner to a third person, may properly include 
 this assignee as a co-defendant, since the sale may be declared 
 void, and he may be ordered to account.^ When two of three 
 partners — or any part of tlie entire firm — entered into a con- 
 tract with a third person, by which they transferred, or agreed to 
 transfer, to him a certain share of their interest in the concern — 
 a mine — and a like share of the profits made by their interest, an 
 action by such assignee to determine his rights, and to obtain his 
 share in the profits, would be properly brought against the two 
 contracting parties alone ; the other members would not be 
 necessary defendants. But if the action is to wind up the con- 
 cern, to dissolve the firm, and to sever the interests of the re- 
 spective members, all the partners are indispensable parties ; if 
 the action is instituted by one, or by his assignee, all the others 
 must be joined as defendants.^ And, as a general proposition, in 
 an action to compel an accounting growing out of any transac- 
 tions or relations, all persons interested in obtaining the account, 
 or in the result thereof, are necessary parties, and should be made 
 defendants, if not plaintiffs.^ 
 
 108.3: "Where a deed of trust is executed to contribute towards satisfying the plain- 
 after a partition suit has been instituted, tiff's claim, should be joined. Story's 
 the beneficiary and trustee, while they Eq. PI. § 169; Madox v. Jackson, 3 Atk. 
 may be made parties to the partition if 406 ; Bland v. Winter, 1 Sim. & S. 246 ; 
 they so desire, are not necessary parties.] Jackson v. Rawlins, 2 Vern. 195 ; Ferrer v. 
 
 1 Webb V. Helion, .3 Uobt. 025; Wade Barrett, 4 Jones Eq. 455; Hart v. Coffee, 
 V. Rusher, 4 Bosw. 537. 4 Jones Eq. 321 ; Dunham v. Ramsey, 37 
 
 2 Settembre v. Putnam, -30 Cal. 490. N. J. Eq. 388. When a debt is joint, all 
 See Blood v. Fairbanks, 48 Cal. 171, 174, the joint debtors must be made defeud- 
 175; and Skidmore i-. Collin.s, 8 Hun, .50. ants; a.s, for example, if the suit is to 
 Where a bill is filed against one partner enforce a demand against a firm, all tlie 
 to set aside partnership transactions, and partners must be joined; and if the action 
 vacate a conveyance of real estate, assets is brought against the personal roprescnt- 
 of the partnershij), but lield in the name ativcs of a deceased partner, tlie survivors 
 of one of the partners for the benefit of must also be co-defendants. Story's Eq. 
 the firm, and for an account, all the part- PI. §§ 166-168; Pienson v. Robinson, 3 
 uers are necessary parties. Bell r. Dono- Swanst. 139 (n.) ; Sdiolefield v. Heafield, 
 hoe, 8 Sawyer, 435 ; s. c. 17 Fed. Rep. 710. 7 Sim. 067 ; Hills ;•. McRae, 9 Hare, 297 ; 
 
 3 Petrie v. Pctrie, 7 Lans. 90,95. The Butts r. Genung, 5 Paige, 254. Re Mc- 
 gcneral doctrine is. that all persons inter- R.ae, 25 Ch. I) 16 ; 7?^ IIo.lg.s<n),31 Ch. D. 
 ented in re.si.sting the jdaintiff's demands 177; AV Barnard, 32 Ch. D. 447. Seenl.xo 
 must be made dofenilants. As an exam- Eirtell >•. Savrc. 7 Hun, 485; Sonthal r. 
 pie, all yaiit debtor.!, a;id all persons liable Shields, 81 N. C. 28 ; Getty c. Develin, 70
 
 DEFENDANTS IN SUITS FOR A RESCISSION. 373 
 
 § 276. * 370. Rescission and Cancellation. In actions to obtain 
 this remedy, each case must to a great extent stand upon its own 
 circumstances. Tliere is one general principle which is generally 
 applicable, and whicli regulates the selection of parties in all 
 causes of this nature, whatever be the particular facts upon which 
 each depends. It is the simple but comprehensive rule that all 
 persons whose rights, interests, or relations with or through the 
 subject-matter of the suit, would be affected by the cancellation 
 or rescission, should be brought before the court as defendajits, so 
 that they can be heard in their own behalf. This general principle 
 is assumed or expressly announced by all the decided cases, and 
 those which are quoted are intended simply as illustrations.^ 
 
 § 277. * 380. Same Subject. — In an action to set aside an 
 award, even for the misconduct of the arbitrators, the arbitrators 
 themselves cannot properly be made defendants, as they have no 
 interest in the subject-matter, nor are they legally affected by the 
 relief if granted.^ For the same reason, a sheriff is neither a 
 necessary nor a proper defendant in an action to set aside a deed 
 of land given by him upon a sale under an execution against the 
 plaintiff.^ The owner of land who had been induced to sell by 
 the fraud and collusion of his own agent, and of the purchaser, 
 conveyed the entire tract to such purchaser, who took the ap- 
 parent ownership in fee of the whole ; but, in fact, by a secret 
 arrangement between himself and the vendor's agent, the latter 
 was entitled to one half of the land so sold and conveyed, and 
 actually advanced to that end one half of the purchase price. 
 An action by the grantor to set aside this conveyance was held 
 to be properly brought against the ostensible purchaser of the 
 whole, who took the deed in his own name, and the agent 
 jointly, because the latter was in reality one of the purchasers, 
 and his equitable interest would be affected by the decree of 
 cancellation.'^ 
 
 N. Y. 509 ; Fnlkerson ;•. Davenport, 70 '^ Knowlton v. Mickles, 29 Barb. 465. 
 
 Mo. 541 (equitable set-off). 3 Draper v. Van Horn, 15 In J. 155. 
 
 1 Morse v. IMorse, 42 Ind. 365; Ziin- See, however, Colorado Man. Co. v. Mc- 
 
 merman r. Schoeufeldt, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Donald, 15 Colo. 516, to the effect that it 
 
 142. See also Sanders v. Yonkers Vill., is a matter for the discretion of the trial 
 
 63 N. Y. 489, 493 ; Hammond r. Peunock, court whether the sheriff in such a case 
 
 61 id. 145 ; Potter v. Phillips, 44 Iowa, should be made a party. See also Gilbert 
 
 353 ; Watkins v. Wilcox, 4 Hun, 220 ; v. James, 86 N. C. 244*. 
 Hill V. Lewis, 45 Kan. 162; Dailey v. * Roy I). Ilaviland, 12 Ind. 364 
 
 Kinsler (Neb.), 47 N. W. 1045.
 
 374 CIVIL llEMEDIES. 
 
 § 278. * 381. Same Subject. — In an action against a trustee to 
 cancel a' mortgage given to him as such, or to set aside a deed 
 to liim absolute on the face, which it was alleged was in fact a 
 mortgage, all tlie persons interested in the mortgage debt and 
 the security thereof, and particularly the beneficiaries for whose 
 benefit the trustee held the security, are necessary parties defend- 
 ant, and their absence would be fatal to the recovery of the relief 
 demanded.^ When the lands of a deceased testator or intestate 
 have been sold in pursuance of an order of the surrogate, on the 
 application of the administrator or executor, for the alleged pur- 
 pose of paying the debts of the deceased, an action to set aside 
 such sale must be brought not only against the persons to wliom 
 the land was sold, and the present owners thereof, but also against 
 the personal representatives of the deceased, so that the question 
 whether there were debts of such a nature and extent as to ren- 
 der the sale necessary may be determined.^ Bonds having been 
 issued in tlie name of a town in aid of a railroad under color of 
 legal authority, and the town subsequently bringing an action 
 to set aside the entire proceedings on the ground of illegality and 
 to procure the bonds to be delivered up and cancelled, all the 
 holders of such bonds, it was held, could be united as defendants 
 therein, so that their rights could be determined in one proceed- 
 ing ; it was not considered requisite to such joinder that any 
 common interest in respect to their ownership of the securities 
 should exist among the defendants ; it was enough that their 
 rights as hoklers all depended upon the one question involved 
 in the suit.^ If a judgment has been recovered against two or 
 more joinths and one of them afterwards institutes an action 
 to set aside such judgment or to restrain its enforcement on the 
 ground of want of jurisdiction in the court which rendered it, or 
 on the ground of fraud, his co-judgment-debtors must be made 
 parties to the proceeding, either as plaintiffs, or, upon their 
 refusal to join, as defendants ; their presence before the court 
 is necessary to any adjudication upon the merits.* 
 
 1 Clemon.s v. Elder, 9 Iowa, 272, 275. ^ Venice v. Breed, fi.'j Bail). .597. 
 
 2 SiLsbee v. Smith, GO Barb. 372. In * Gates v. Lane, 44 Cal. .•}92. (^AIl the 
 sach an action all persons who participated partie.<i to a judgment should he made 
 ia the fraudulent transaction, and who parties to the proceeding to annul it : Day 
 claim a present interest in the property v. Goodwin (1898), 104 la. .374, 7.3 N. W. 
 affected hy it, should he made defendants. 804. 
 
 Howse V. Moody, 14 Fla. 59, 03, 64. Land was conveyed to two sons of the
 
 DEFENDANTS IN SUITS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS. 
 
 37; 
 
 §279. * 382. Enforcement of Liens. — In an action by a sub-con- 
 tractor or materialman to enforce the mechanic's lien given 
 by statute, it is proper to make the contractor a party defendant 
 as well as the owner of the building, so that all the claims may be 
 adjusted in one suit.^ It is decided, in California, that when the 
 building or other premises upon which the labor was performed 
 is owned l)y a partnership, all the members of the firm are neces- 
 sary defendants in an action to enforce a mechanic's lien, even 
 though the plaintiff was employed by one of the partners alone 
 
 grautor in cousideration of their agreement 
 to support their mother during her natural 
 life, boon afterwards the grautor died, 
 tlie sous failed to Iceep tiieir contract, and 
 the mother, together with the children 
 of tiie grautor other thau the grantees, 
 brought suit for rescission of the contract. 
 Held that the heirs of the grantor were 
 proper parties : Lane v. Lane (1899), 106 
 Ky. 530, 50 S. W. 857. 
 
 Reformation. Grigshy r. Barton County 
 <1962), 169 Mo. 221, 69 S. W. 296: All 
 persons who will be affected by the refor- 
 mation of an instrument should be made 
 parties. See also Horner v. Bramwell 
 (1896), 2.3 Colo. 238, 47 Pac. 462. If a 
 party necessary to tlie suit is not brought 
 in, the case will be dismissed on motion at 
 the close of the evidence : Steinbach v. 
 Prudential Ins. Co. (1902), 172 N. Y. 471, 
 65 N. E. 281.] 
 
 1 Carney v. La Crosse & M. R. Co., 15 
 Wis. 503 : Lewis v. William.s, 3 Minn. 151 ; 
 Lookout Lumber Co. ;;. Mansion Hotel & 
 B. Ry. Co., 109 N. C. 568 ; Davis v. John 
 Mouat Lumber Co. (Colo. App. 1892), 31 
 Pac. R. 187 ; Northwestern Cement, etc. 
 Co. V. Norwegian-Dan. Ev. L. A. Sem., 43 
 Miun. 449. Compare Hubbard v. Moore, 
 132 Ind. 178 ; Green v. Clifford, 94 Cal. 
 49. But it is held in Missouri tliat the 
 sub-contractor need not bring in all of 
 several joint contractors ; the statute re- 
 quiring the " original contractor " to be 
 made a defendant is satisfied if one of 
 them is joined. Putnam v. Ross, 55 Mo. 
 116; Steinmann v. Strimple, 29 Mo. App. 
 478 ; Horstkotte v. Menier, 50 Mo. 158, 
 does not conflict with this decision, since 
 it merely holds that the original contractor 
 must be a defendant. 
 
 [^Contractor is proper but not necessary 
 
 party in suit by materialman : Wood v. 
 Uakiand, etc. Transit Co. (1895), 107 Cal. 
 500, 40 Pac. 806. Contractor is necessary 
 party in suit by sub-contractor : Union 
 Pac. Ry. Co. ;•. Davidson (1895), 21 Colo. 
 93, 39 Pac. 1095 ; cfharles v. Mallack Lum- 
 ber Co. (1896), 22 Colo. 283, 43 Pac. 548 ; 
 H. B. C. Co. V. N. Y. C, etc. R. R. Co. 
 (1895), 145 N. Y. 390, 40 N. E. 86. Con- 
 tractor is not necessary party in suit by 
 materialman : Bethune v. Cleveland, etc. 
 Ry. Co. (1899), 149 Mo. 587, 51 S. W. 
 465. (contractor is a necessary party in 
 suit by materialman : Castleberry v. John- 
 stem (1893), 92 Ga. 499, 17 s" E. 772. 
 The person with whom the plaintiff con- 
 tracted is a necessary party : Gilliam v. 
 Black (1895), 16 Mont. 217, 40 Pac. 303. 
 The persou to whom the premises are sold 
 during tlie life of the lien is a necessary 
 party: Pickens v. Polk (1894), 42 Neb. 
 267, 60 N. W. 566. 
 
 In Blanshard v. Schwartz (1898), 7 
 Okla. 23, 54 Pac. 303, the court, quoting 
 with approval the case of Johnson v. 
 Keeler, 46 Kan. 304, said : " In an action 
 to foreclose a mechanic's lien, all lien 
 holders and encumbrancers should be made 
 parties, and a lien liolder who is not made 
 a party in the first instance is entitled, 
 upon application, to come in at any time 
 before final judgment, and, by answer in 
 the nature of a cross petition, set forth his 
 claim of lien, and ask to have the same 
 foreclosed." 
 
 An attorney who has a lien on the judg- 
 ment recovered for liis client, wlio secures 
 an affirmation of the judgment on appeal, 
 may ])roperly make the sureties on the 
 appeal bond parties to a suit to enforce 
 the lien : Coombe v. Knox (1903), 28 
 Mont. 202, 72 Pac. 64 1.]
 
 376 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 was ignorant of the other co-owners, and had filed his notice of 
 lien only against the one employing him.^ It may be stated as a 
 general rule, that in all actions to enforce a lien, the person in 
 whose adveree possession the property subject thereto is held, is 
 a necessary defendant, or otherwise the decree would virtually 
 be a nullity .2 
 
 § 280. * 383. Same Subject. — A contract for the sale of lands 
 being pledged or assigned by the vendee as collateral security for 
 the payment of a debt, and the creditor — the pledgee, or assignee 
 — bringing an action to foreclose the right of redem^Jtion, and to 
 sell the security, and to apply the proceeds in payment of his own 
 demand, the vendor in the contract is held not to be a necessary 
 party defendant in such suit.^ The same rule must apply to all 
 kinds and forms of securities and things in action which are 
 pledged or assigned for the purpose of collateral security, such 
 as bonds, notes, certificates of stock, and the like. The obligor 
 on the bond, the maker of the note, the corporation which issued 
 the stock certificate, cannot be a necessary defendant in an action 
 to foreclose and sell. 
 
 § 281. * 384. Same Subject. A mortgage was foreclosed in a 
 summary manner prescribed by statute in Iowa, and the premises 
 were conveyed to A., the mortgagee. He afterward assigned the 
 mortgage and the note secured by it to B., and entered into a 
 written agreement to convey to him the land. B. subsequently 
 brought an action to foreclose the same mortgage against the 
 mortgagor, and the subsequent incumbrancers, and also made A. 
 a defendant, setting up the former summary proceedings and A.'s 
 
 1 McDonald v. Backus, 45 Cal. 262. Carolina, in order to cut off her inchoate 
 
 2 Wingard v. Banning, 39 Cal. 543. A dower right. Bunting v. Foy, G6 N. C. 
 junior incuinhraucer shoukl Ije made a de- 193. See also Win.'ilow i-. Urqnliart, 39 
 fendant, or his right of redemption will Wis. 260; Church r. Smitii, 39 id. 492; 
 not be cut off. Evan.s v. Tripp, 35 Iowa, DeForest v. ilolnm, 38 id. 408; Boorman 
 371. When tlie original owner of tlie i\ Wisconsin, etc. Co., 36 id. 207 ; Rice v. 
 premises on wliich the lien exists has con- Hall, 41 id. 453 ; Crawfordsville r. Barr, 
 veyed all his interest hy deed, he is no 65 lud. 367 : Chapman r. Callalian, 66 
 longer a necessary defendant if no personal Mo. 299; Th<j7n])son ;•. Smith, 63 N. V. 
 judgment is asked ; the suit must be against .301. ^It was lield in National Bank of 
 the grantee. McCormick v. Lawton, 3 Deposit v. Rogers (1901), 166 N. V. 380, 
 Xeb. 449, 451. In an action by the vendor 59 N. E. 922, that where a bank brought 
 in a land contract against the vendee to an action to enforce a lien ujion property 
 foreclose the latter's rights, and to sell his assigned by the pledgor to an assignee for 
 interf-it in the land for tlie balance of the the benefit of creditors, the assignor, while 
 jmrcliase- price unpaid, the vendee's wife a proper, i.'i not a neces.sary party.] 
 must lie made a co-defendant, in North •* \'auglin t>. Cusliing, 23 Ind. 184.
 
 DEFENDANTS IN SUITS FOR A CONTRIBUTION. 377 
 
 agreement to convey, averring that such proceedings were invalid 
 and worked no change in the rights of the parties, and also 
 alleging that there was a mistake in the description of the land 
 contained in the contract made by A., and praying that such mis- 
 take might be corrected, that A. might be ordered to convey the 
 proper premises, and that the title might be quieted, or, if the 
 former proceedings should be held invalid, that the usual decree 
 of foreclosure of the mortgage might be rendered and the land 
 sold thereunder. This action was held by tlie Supreme Court of 
 Iowa to be properly brought ; there was no improper joinder of 
 defendants or of causes of action.^ 
 
 § 282. * 385. Contribution. It is a general rule of the equitable 
 procedure that, in an action to enforce an obligation to contribute 
 and to recover the amounts due from contributors, all the persons 
 liable to make contribution should be joined as defendants, in 
 order that their respective amounts may all be adjusted in a 
 single suit. On the other hand, when several parties are en- 
 titled to a share from a common source, and the claims have not 
 been adjusted and made specific and personal, but they all de- 
 pend upon the same facts and involve the same questions, all the 
 claimants should unite in the action, or at least should be brought 
 before the court as defendants, if they are not joined as plaintiffs.^ 
 
 § 283. *386. Actions by Taxpayers. In many States taxpayers 
 and freeholders are permitted to maintain actions to set aside pro- 
 ceedings by local authorities, and to restrain the enforcement and 
 collection of the tax which is the result of such proceedings, on 
 the ground of their illegality. In such actions not only the 
 officials themselves whose proceedings are sought to be set aside, 
 and the administrative officers whose function it is to enforce the 
 tax, must be made defendants, but also all other persons whose 
 
 1 Thatcher v. Ilaun, 12 Iowa, 303. rule is that all the co-sureties must be 
 This was, in fact, a suit to reform a cou- made defendants, and the personal repre- 
 tract for the conveyance of land, and to sentatives of any that are dead, and also 
 com])el a specific; performance as reformed, the principal debtor. Story's Eq. PI. 
 or, in the alternative, for the foreclosure § 169 a; Ferrer f. Barrett, 4 Jones Eq. 
 of a mortgage. If the relief was ])roper, 455; Haywood v. Ovey, 6 Mad. 113; 
 the parties defendant were clearly so. Moore v. Moberly, 7 B. Mon. 299 ; Tres- 
 
 2 Carr 1-. Waldron, 44 Mo. 393 ; Story's cott v. Smyth, 1 McCord Ch. 301. See 
 Eq. ri. § 169 ; Madox r. Jackson, 3 Atk. also McDearman v. McClure, 31 Ark. 
 406 ; Bland v. Winter, 1 S. & S. 246 ; 559 (between co-tenants) ; Rosenthal v. 
 Jackson I'. Rawlins, 2 Vera. 195 ; Hart r. Sutton, 31 Ohio St. 406 (between co- 
 Coffee, 4 Jones Eq. 321. In an action by sureties). 
 
 a .surety for contribution, the general
 
 378 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 rights or interests may be adversely affected by a decree granting 
 the relief demanded by the plaintiifs. For example, in such a suit 
 brought to set aside the proceedings of certain municipal au- 
 thorities, and to restrain the levy and collection of a special tax 
 im^Hised l)v them for the purpose of paying certain illegal judg- 
 ments held by different judgment creditors, all these judgment 
 creditors were declared to be necessarily joined as defendants ; 
 the}' had a common interest among them all, centring in the point 
 at issue in the cause. ^ 
 
 § 284. * 387. Actions to Redeem In an action by a mortgagor 
 or person holding under him to redeem, all those, in general, 
 should be made defendants whose interest will be affected by the 
 decree. If the mortgagee is living, he is, of course, an indis- 
 pensable defendant ; and if he is dead, his personal representatives, 
 according to the theory of mortgages which prevails in this 
 country .2 As a general rule, all persons who are interested in 
 the mortgage-money or debt secured by the mortgage must be 
 joined.^ Thus, if the mortgage is held by a trustee, the cestui 
 que t?-ust should be a co-defendant.'^ If the mortgagee has ab- 
 solutely assigned all his interest in the mortgage, he is no longer 
 a necessary party in the suit to redeem, but the assignee takes his 
 place : and if there are several successive assignments of such a 
 character, the last assignee is the only necessary defendant.^ But 
 
 1 ([Ander.soa v. Orient Fire Ins. Co. ^ [Wood v. Holland (189.3), 57 Ark. 
 
 (1893), 88 la. 579, 55 N. W. 348 ; Wabaska 198, 21 S. W. 223.] 
 
 Electric Co. v. City of Wymore (1900), 60 ^ Story's Eq. PI. § 188 ; Palmer v. Earl 
 
 Xeb. 199, 82 N. W. 626; McCaim v. City of Carlisle, 1 Sim. & S. 423; Osbourn v. 
 
 of Louisville (1901), — Ky. — , 63 S. W. Fallows, 1 Kus. & M. 741 ; McCall v. Yard, 
 
 446; Comiiiunweakli v. Scott (1901), 112 1 Stockt. 358; Large v. Van Doreu, 14 
 
 Ky. 252, 65 S. W. 596. Tbe St;ite, liuw- N. J. Eq. 208. 
 
 ever, is not a proper party plaintiff in an * Story's Eq. PI. §§ 192, 208 ; Drew v. 
 
 action a<2;ainst a county auditor to recover Harman, 5 Price, 319 ; but .';ec Swift i*. 
 
 money belonging to the county wrongfully State Lumi)er Co., 71 Wis. 476. Where 
 
 received by him, where the county com- tiie mortgagee had assigned the mortgage 
 
 missioners refuse to sue ; nor can it be in trust for his family, it was held that, in 
 
 made sufh by joining ta.xpayers as re- an action to redeem, the mortgagee, the 
 
 lators : State y. Casper (1903), — Ind. — , trustee, and the beneficiaries were all 
 
 67 N. K. 185.] Newcomb v. Hortou, 18 necessary defendants. Wetherell v. Col- 
 
 Wi«. 566, 570, per Cole J., citing Hrinker- lins, 3 Mad. 255. 
 
 hoff V. Brown, 6 Johns. Cii. 139; Fellows ^ Story's Eq. PI. § 189 ; Chaml)ers r. 
 
 V. Fellows, 4 Cow. 682; Story's Eq. PI. Goldwin, 9 \'es. 269; Hill i;. Adams, 2 
 
 §§ 285 el seq. See also Wilson v. Mineral Atk. 39 ; Whitney r. McKinney, 7 Johns. 
 
 Point, 39 Wis. 160; Watkins v. Mihvau- Ch. 144; Williams v. Smith, 49 Me. 564; 
 
 kee, 52 id. 98 ; Bettinger r. Bell, 65 Ind. Beals v Col)b, 51 Me. 348; Bryant r. 
 
 445 ; Hayes v. Hill, 1 7 Kans. 360 ; (Jraliam Erskine, 55 Me. 153, 158. See also Swift 
 
 r. Minneapolis, 40 Minn. 436. c. State Lumber Co., 71 Wis. 476.
 
 ONE SUING ON BEHALF OF OTHERS. 6 id 
 
 wliere the mortgagee has made only a partial assignment, and 
 retains any interest in the mortgage or in the debt secured by it, 
 he must be joined with the assignee as a co-defendant.' When 
 the suit is brought, not by the mortgagor, but by a subsequent 
 mortgagee or other incumbrancer, to redeem from a prior mort- 
 gage, all the owners of the equity of redemption are necessary 
 co-defendants with the holder of such prior mortgage.^ If the 
 mortgagor conveys his entire estate in the land, he need not be 
 made a party in an action to redeem by his grantee."* Persons 
 having partial interests in the equity of redemption, or subsequent 
 liens or incumbrances upon it or upon a portion of it, may 
 redeem ; but in such case they must bring in all other parties 
 who are interested in the land ; such other persons are necessary 
 parties to the action either as plaintiffs or defendants, in order 
 that all the rights and claims may be determined in one decree.* 
 
 SECTION SEVENTH. 
 
 WHEN ONE PERSON MAY SUE OR BE SUED ON BEHALF OF ALL 
 THE PERSONS INTERESTED. 
 
 § 285. * 388. Statutory Provision. In immediate connection 
 with the general topics treated in the preceding two sections, 
 there are certain special subjects which, though subordinate, are 
 sufficiently important to require a separate notice, and they will 
 therefore be considered in the present and the following two 
 sections.^ The first of these involves an answer to the questions, 
 
 1 Story's Eq. PI. § 191; Hobart v. ton v. Lothrop, 46 Me. 297; Bailey v. 
 Abbott, 2 P. Wms. 643. Myrick, 36 Me. 50; [Crais; v. Miller 
 
 2 Story's Eq. PI. §§ 186, 191 ; Palk v. (1893), 41 S. C. 37, 19 S. e'. 192, citiug 
 Cliuton, 12 Ves. 48; Lord Cholmondeley the text.] 
 
 V. Lord Clinton, 2 Jac. & W. 134; Smith ■* Story's Eq. PI. §§ IB."), 186; Henley 
 
 V. Moore, 49 Ark. 100 (chattel mortgage) ; v. Stone, 3 Beav. 3.5.5 ; Chappell ;;. Pee.-*, 
 
 Hunt V. Rooney, 77 Wis. 258. As to the 1 De G., M. & G. 393; Fell v. Brown, 2 
 
 necessary defendants in an action for re- Bro. C. C. 278 ; Palk v. Lord Clinton, 12 
 
 demption by a subsequent incumbrancer Ves. 58, 59 ; Farmer v. Curtis, 2 Sim. 
 
 when the prior mortgage has been fore- 466 ; |^Dunn r. Dewey (1898), 75 Minn. 
 
 closed without making him a party, see 153, 77 N. W. 793.] 
 
 Anson v. Anson, 20 Iowa, 55 ; Knowles r. ^ Qrhe close connection of the statu- 
 
 Rablin, 20 Iowa, 101 ; Street v. Beal, 16 tory provision under discussion with the 
 
 Iowa, 68; Burnap i'. Cook, 16 Iowa, 149; provision requiring the joinder of parties 
 
 Winslow V. Clark, 47 N. Y. 261, 263; when united in interest, wlien the New 
 
 Dias v. Merle, 4 Paige, 259 ; Bloomer v. York Code was adopted, is shown by tlu- 
 
 Sturges, 58 N. Y. 168. frfllowing quotation from Tobin v. Port- 
 
 3 Williams v. Smith, 49 Me. 564 ; Hil- land Mills Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 269, 68 Pac.
 
 380 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 When may one person sue as the representative of others who, 
 although not named, are regarded as virtual co-plaintiffs in the 
 action? and, When may one person in like manner be sued as 
 tlie representative of others who are regarded as co-defendants? 
 The statutory provision permitting this method of bringing the 
 parties before the court is as follows: "When the question is 
 one of a common or general interest of many persons, or when 
 the parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to 
 bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend 
 for the benefit of the whole." ^ 
 
 §286. 
 
 589. 
 
 Author's Analysis of Language of Statute. Two 
 Distinct Cases. Essential Elements of each Case. Following the 
 course which has generally been adopted thus far, I shall first 
 examine this provision of the codes by an independent analysis 
 of its language, and shall then state the interpretation which 
 has been put upon it by the courts. It is very evident that it 
 describes two distinct and separate cases in which a plaintiff or 
 defendant may be clothed with the representative character de- 
 
 743 : " In McKenzie v. L'Amoureux, 1 1 
 Barb, 516, Mr. Justice Harris, comment- 
 iug upon the exceptions spoken of by 
 Judge Story, and explaining the adoption 
 of the section of tlie code adverted to, 
 says : ' So far was the legislature from in- 
 tending any change in the rule on this 
 subject, that, in making the great changes 
 contemplated by the adoption of the code, 
 it was careful to preserve this convenient 
 practice of the Court of Chancery. The 
 code commissioners had reported a section, 
 copied substantially from one of the rules 
 of tiie Supreme Conrt of the United States, 
 providing that those wiio are united in 
 iiit<;rest must be joined as plaintiffs or de- 
 fendants, except that, if the consent of 
 any one wlio should have been joined as 
 jilaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be 
 made a defendant, the reason thereof 
 being stated in the complaint. This, too, 
 was the jiractice in tiie Court of Chancery. 
 The legislature adopted the provision 
 tlms reported, but added to tlie section as 
 follows : And when the question is one of 
 common or general^interest of many per- 
 sons ; or wlien tiie parties are very numer- 
 ous and it may be impracticable to bring 
 tliem all before the court, one or more 
 mav sue or defend for the benefit of tlie 
 
 whole: Code, § 119. This was also in 
 acordance with the tiien existing practice 
 of tiie courts of equity. The legislature 
 seems to have apprehended that by adopt- 
 ing the rule reported by the commissioners 
 it might be understood to have rejected 
 the kindred rules embraced in the latter 
 clause of the section. To prevent this 
 misapprehension the latter clause was 
 added, thus retaining in the new practice 
 the same rules by which to determine 
 whether the proper parties were before 
 the court which then prevailed in the 
 Court of Chancery.' "J 
 
 1 New York, § 119 (448); California, 
 § .382 ; Kansas, § .38 ; Iowa, § 2.549 ; Ken- 
 tucky, §37 ; South Carolina, § 142 ; Ore- 
 gon, §381 ; Nevada, § 14 ; Nebraska, § 43 ; 
 North Carolina. § 62 ; j^Ftah, Kev. St., 
 
 1898, § 2917 ; North Dakota, Kev. Codes, 
 
 1899, §5232; South Dakota, Ann. St., 
 1901, §6079; Arizona, Kev. St., 1901, 
 §1313; Montana, §584; Idaho, Code 
 Civ. Pro., 1901, §3170; Colorado, §12; 
 Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 270 ; Wiscon- 
 sin. St., 1898, § 2604 ; < »klahoma, St., 189.3, 
 §3910; Washington, Bal. Code, § 4834; 
 Wyoming, Hev. St., 1899. §3482 ; Arkan- 
 sas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5632 ; Connecti- 
 cut, Gen. St., 1902, § 619 ; Nebraska, § 43.3
 
 ONE SUING OX BEHALF OF OTHERS. 381 
 
 scribed, and may thus stand in the pkice of others whose rights 
 and interests are determined together with his own.^ These two 
 cases depend upon distinct and separate facts and circumstances, 
 and are as follows : (1) Tliere must be a " question of common or 
 general interest" to wiavi^ persons involved in the action. The 
 two essential elements of this case are, the question of common 
 or general interest to be determined, and the many persons who 
 have this common or general interest in the matter at issue. 
 The " many persons " in this case is opposed to the very numerous 
 parties in the other, and is doubtless satisfied by a number actu- 
 ally less. It is certainly not necessary, in order to fulfil its 
 requirements, that there should be any impractleahility of bring- 
 ing all the persons having the common or general interest before 
 the court. (2) The second case depends entirely ujDon the 
 number of the persons who should, according to the ordinary 
 rule, be made plaintiffs or defendants. The single essential 
 element is the impracticability of bringing all the parties before 
 the court on account of their great number. The language does 
 not in terms require an}^ question of common or general interest 
 to this great number, but it is difficult to conceive of an action 
 in Avhich a very large number of persons should be capable of 
 joining as plaintiffs — so large that it would be impracticable to 
 bring them all actually before the court — unless the question to 
 be determined was one of common or general interest to them 
 all.^ It inevitably follows, therefore, from the customary nature 
 
 1 [^See Hawardeni'. The Youghiogheuy sons." See also Tobiu v. Portland Mills 
 
 & Lehigh Coal Co. (1901), 111 Wis. 545, Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 2G9, 68 Pac. 743, quot- 
 
 87 N. VV. 474, in which the court said : " It ing the text. J 
 
 is to be noted that there are two cases - [^The language of tlie courts, respec- 
 
 named in the statutes referred to in which tively, in the cases of Tobin v. Portland 
 
 one may sue for all, viz. : (1) When the Mills Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 2G9, 68 Pac. 743, 
 
 question is one of common or general in- and George v. Benjamin (1898), 100 Wis. 
 
 terest of many persons, and (2) when the 622, 76 N. W. 619, suggests, but does not 
 
 parties are very numerous, and it is im- settle, the question, whether the statutory 
 
 practicable to bring them all before the provision can be invoked when the interest 
 
 court. The latter class was under consid- is joint. In tlie former case the court, iu 
 
 eration in the cases of George v. Benjamin, referring to the latter clause of the section, 
 
 100 "Wis. 622, and Hodges v. Nalty. 104 said: It " in effect enacts tlie third excep- 
 
 Wis. 464; hence what is said in those tion to th« rule in equity, in respect to the 
 
 ca.ses as to the number of persons which necessity of making all persons immedi- 
 
 will be deemed ' very numerous,' is inap- ately interested in the subject-matter 
 
 plicable here, because this ca.se comes parties, omitting therefrom, however, the 
 
 under the first sul)division, wliich onlv words, ' and although they have, or may 
 
 requires the presence of a question of have, separate, distinct interests.' This 
 
 common or general interest of many per- omission cannot mean tliat tlie legislative
 
 3S2 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 of litigations, that these two cases described by the statute are in 
 practice constantly united ; they constantly run into each other. 
 In fact, it seldom if ever happens that a suit arises which falls 
 strictly within the terms of the second case, and not within those 
 of the first.^ 
 
 § 287. * 390. Necessary Allegations herein. Wlienever these 
 provisions are invoked, in order that a plaintiff may he entitled 
 to sue or a defendant to be sued in the representative character 
 described, the facts showing that the requirements of either case 
 have been complied with must not only exist, but must be alleged 
 bv the plaintiff as the very ground and reason for adopting the 
 peculiar form of action permitted by the statute. The complaint 
 or petition must show either that many persons have a common 
 or general interest in the questions involved in the action, or else 
 that the number of persons who would be joined as plaintiffs or 
 defendants, if the ordinary rule was applied, is so very great 
 that it is impracticable to make them all victual parties. Unless 
 the pleading contains these averments, the action must be re- 
 garded as though brought by the single plaintiff or against the 
 single defendant named. '-^ It should be carefullv observed that 
 
 .nssemlily intended thereby to limit the own name if he was before the court." 
 tliiril exception to cases in vvliicli the very The court tiieu proceeds to show that, iu 
 numerous parties mentioned had a joint accordance with the common law rules 
 and indivisible interest in the subject- as stated by Dicey and Chitty, " the fact 
 matter of the suit, for to give the statute that all the parties to the contract are 
 such construction would render tlie statute united in interest affords a suflScieut rea- 
 superfluous, as the preceding clause of the son for holding that they are necessary 
 section extends the second exception to parties to the action." And finally con- 
 that very class of parties, but limits it to a eludes the discussion of tiiis question by 
 less number." It seems to be assumed by saying : " So in whatever view we consider 
 tiie court, in this language, that tlie statute the c:ise we are unable to see how the 
 applies to the case of a joint and indivis- plaintiff can maintain the action alone." 
 ible interest in the subject-matter <>f the Bearing in mind the facts of tlie two cases, 
 suit. Turning to the language of the it is difficult to reconcile tlie language of 
 court in George v. Benjamin, we find it the courts. J 
 
 reads as follows : " It requires but a mere i QSee Ilawarden r. The Youghiogheny 
 
 inspection of the complaint to show that & Lehigh Coal Co., .fMyjcfl, for a case where 
 
 the claim that tlie question involved in this the two do not "run into each other." 
 
 action is ' one of a common or general in- Hodges v. Nalty (1899), 104 Wis. 464, 80 
 
 tcrest to many jiersous ' is not justified by N. \V. 726.] 
 
 the L'lcts alleged. It shows positively and ■^ j^Castle c Madi.son (1902), 113 Wis. 
 
 definitely that <tll are united in interest. 346, 89 N. W. 156. In this ca.se the 
 
 ... It seems too ])lain for argument that court said : " It is argued that it is im- 
 
 the complaint fails to state any fact which practicaide to bring iu all the riparian 
 
 shows that the parties to this contract have owners, au<l that all interests are repre- 
 
 a common or general interest which would seuted in the suit as it is This contention 
 
 enable each to maintain an action in his cannot be sustained. It is not shown that
 
 ONE SUING ON BEHALF OF OTHERS. 383 
 
 this provision does not create any new rights of action, nor 
 enhirge any of those now existing. The suit cannot be sustained 
 by one as the representative of the many others who really sue 
 in his name, unless it could have been maintained if all these 
 many others had been regularly joined as co-plaintiffs, or unless 
 it could liave been maintained by each of them suing separately 
 and for himself. The statutory provision is simply a matter of 
 convenience, a rule of form, a means of enabling many persons 
 to have their rights determined without their actual appearance 
 in court as litigant parties. 
 
 § 288. * 391. Judicial Interpretation of Statute. Order Pursued 
 in Examination of Decided Cases. Passing to the judicial interpre- 
 tation of the clause, I shall ascertain, from an examination of 
 the decided cases, (1) when one person may sue or be sued in a 
 representative capacity ; and (2) the purpose and object of such 
 form of action, and especially its effects upon the rights and 
 duties of the other persons who are represented in and by the 
 actual party. ^ The conclusions reached in the preceding para- 
 graphs as to the meaning of the provision, and the two distinct 
 cases mentioned in it, are fully sustained by the authorities. 
 The construction of this section of the codes has been established 
 by the courts, and the rule is settled as already stated, that, 
 where the question to be decided is one of " common or general 
 interest " to a number of persons, the action may be brought by 
 or against one or all the others, even though the parties are not 
 so numerous that it would be impracticable to join them all as 
 actual plaintiffs or defendants ; but, on the other hand, when the 
 parties are so very numerous that it is impracticable to bring 
 them all into court, one may sue or be sued for all the others, 
 
 it is impracticable to bring all the owners those thus represented, the court may so 
 
 into the suit. We shall not assume that determine when the merits of the answer 
 
 it is because they are numerous. Furtlier, in abatement are considered." The num- 
 
 the owners who have been let in are not ber of owners referred to was 2.56. See 
 
 here in a representative capacity. The Tobiu i-. Portland Mills Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 
 
 order making them parties allows them in 269, 68 Pac. 74.3. ] 
 
 on their own behalf alone, and not on be- ^ [^In McCann r. City of Louisville 
 
 half of any other riparian owner. If it be (1901), — Ky. — , 63 S. W. 446, the court 
 
 shown that there is difficulty in making .«aid : " The purpose of the section is to 
 
 the numerous owners defendants, " and avoid a multiplicity of suits, and settle the 
 
 the court believes that some may be pro- rights of all parties having a common or 
 
 ceeded against as representatives of a class general interest in one suit." See, how- 
 
 under the statute, so that the litigation as ever. Northwestern Loan Co. v. Muggli 
 
 carried on will end the controversy as to (1895), 8 S. D. 160, 65 N. W. 442.]
 
 384 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 even though they have no common or general interest in the 
 questions at issue ; ^ and the necessary facts to bring the case 
 within one or the other of these conditions must be averred. ^ 
 
 ^ 289. * 392. Statute re-enacts Equity Rule. Must be some 
 Connection between Parties Represented in both Cases. Test. This 
 .section of the codes is a re-enactment of a rule ^vllich had pre- 
 vailed in equity, and is to receive a construction which will make 
 it identical with the pre-existing doctrine.^ Although the case 
 
 1 ^IcKenzie v. L'Amourcux, 11 Barb. 
 516. See also Towner v. Tooley, 38 Barb. 
 598, 607. 
 
 2 Bardstown & L. R. Co. i: IMetcalf, 
 4 Mete. (Ky.) 199, 204. 
 
 3 [[George v. Beujainin (1898), 100 
 Wis. 622, 76 N. W. 619. In thi.s case 
 thirty-one persons by -written agreement 
 formed a syndicate to purchase, manage, 
 and sell a tract of land, and each agreed 
 to contribnte a certain sum at once, and 
 to ]jay from time to time such sums as 
 should be needed for payments. One of 
 the number was made trustee, and a trust 
 in favor of each was declared to the extent 
 of a oue-thirty-first interest in the land. 
 The suit was brouglit by the trustee in 
 belialf of liimself and associates against 
 one of the parties to said agreement to 
 recover S4,900, claimed to be due on the 
 agreement. Plaiutiif, to su})port his right 
 to bring the action in his own name alone, 
 relied upon the jjrovisions of tlie statute 
 under discussion in the text. The court 
 said : " He seeks to sustain his riglit to 
 maintain this action on the two grounds 
 mentioned in the statute, — that the ()ue.s- 
 tion involved is one of common and gen- 
 eral interest of many persons, and that 
 the parties are very nnmerons, and it is 
 impracticable to bi'ing them all before the 
 court. As stated in Day v. Buckingham, 
 87 Wis. 215, and repeated in Frederick r. 
 Douglas Co., 96 Wis. 411, this statute has 
 been construed as merely re-enacting the 
 rules which j)revailed in equity, and which 
 otherwi.se might have been held to be 
 abolished by the code. So, also, it has 
 been lield that when the question is one 
 of common or general interest, the action 
 may be brought by one or more for the 
 benefit of all who have such common or 
 general interest, without siiowing that the 
 parties are even numerous, or that it 
 
 would be im])racti cable to bring them all 
 before the court. ... It re(iuires hut a 
 mere inspection of the complaint to show 
 that tiie claim that the question involved 
 in this action is ' one of common or gen- 
 eral interest to many persons ' is not justi- 
 fied by the facts alleged. On the contrary, 
 the complaint shows that the <|uestion in- 
 volved firises out of contract, personal to 
 each one of the subscribers to it. It 
 shows positively and definitely that all 
 are united in interest. Each subscriber 
 to the contract agrees with every other 
 subscriber that he will ' pay such sum or 
 sums as shall be needed for future pay- 
 ments on said i)roperty, as the same are 
 demanded and required by the parties in 
 interest herein.' ... It would seem too 
 plain for argument that the complaint 
 fails to state any fact wliich shows tliat 
 the parties to this contract have a common 
 or general interest which would enable 
 eacli to maintain an action in his own 
 name if he was before the court." In 
 Ilodgcs V. Kalty 104 Wis. 464, 80 N. W. 
 726, the court, after fjuoting statutory 
 provisions under di.scussion, made refer- 
 ence to George i\ Benjamin as follows : 
 " Tin's sectio7i was recently considered in 
 the case of an action to enforce payment 
 of a subscription to a business enterprise 
 (George r. Benjamin, 100 Wis. 622), and 
 it was held tliat the com])laint did not 
 show a common or general interest in all 
 the subscribers, and that the number of 
 sub.scribers, wiiich was thirty-one in that 
 case, was not so large as to be called very 
 numerous and render it impracticable to 
 bring them all before the court; hence it 
 was held that all must join in that case. 
 That case rules the present case upon the 
 first branch of the section, . . ." I'latt v. 
 Colvin (1893), .50 O. St. 703, 36 N. E 73.'}. 
 For a very interesting arid recent case,
 
 ONE SUING ON BEHALF OF OTHERS. o85 
 
 secondly mentioned omits the element of a " common or general 
 interest," and speaks only of the very great number as the sole 
 ground for permitting one to sue or to be sued for all the others, 
 yet even in this case there must be some connection between the 
 parties who are to be represented, according to the familiar prin- 
 ciples of equity procedure. The right which the suit is brought 
 to assert must in some manner or degree belong to all who are 
 represented by the actual plaintiff; and all the persons who are 
 represented by the actual defendant must have some interest 
 adverse to the demand for relief set up by the action. The par- 
 ties thus represented by the plaintiff or defendant may not be in 
 privity with each other, but there must be some bond of connec- 
 tion which unites them all with the questions at issue in the 
 action. The test would be to suppose an action in which all the 
 numerous persons were actually made plaintiffs or defendants, 
 and if it could be maintained in that form, then one might sue 
 or be sued on behalf of the others ; but if such an actual joinder 
 would be improper, then the suit by or against one as a represen- 
 tative would be improper, notwithstanding the permission con- 
 tained in this section of the statute.^ 
 
 § 290. * 398. Applicable both to Legal and Equitable Actions. 
 Number of Parties in Second Case. The provision applies both to 
 legal and to equitable actions, since no restriction or limitation 
 is contained in its language ; but when the second case is relied 
 upon, the parties must be so numerous that it is really impracti- 
 cable to make them all actual plaintiffs or defendants ; and it has 
 
 see Commonwealth v. Scott (1901), 112 Ky. Vesey, 444 ; 1 Turner & Euss. 297 ; 2 Sim. 
 
 252, 6.5 S. W. 596, where the court, after 369 ; 1 Dan. Ch. PI. pp. 2-35, 237 ; Story'.s 
 
 a review of the eiuiry practice, says: Eq. PI. §§ 99-103 ; and legatees or next of 
 
 "Section 25 of Civil Code of Practice of kin, 1 Dan. Ch. PI. p. 238; Story's Eq. 
 
 this State, which is substantially a re- PI. §§ 104-106; Brown r. Ricketts, 3 Johns, 
 
 enactment of section 37 of the former Ch. 553 ; Fish r. Howland, 1 Paige, 20, 
 
 Code, recognizes and codifies this equita- 23 ; Hallett v. Ilallett, 2 Paige, 18-20, 21. 
 
 hie practice. It is this: 'If the question For further illustrations in ca.'^es of volun- 
 
 involve a common or general interest of tary associations and the like, see Story's 
 
 many persons, or if the parties be numer- Eq. PI. §§ 107-115 6; 1 Dan. Ch. PI. 
 
 ous and it is impracticable to bring all of pp. 238, 239. The same principle applies, 
 
 them before the court within a reasonable under similar circum.^tances, to defend- 
 
 time, one or more may sue or defend for ants. 1 Dan. CIi. PI. pp. 272, 273 ; Story's 
 
 the benefit of all.'" Tobin v. Portland Eq. PI. §§ 116 etseq.; Wood y. Dummer, 
 
 Mills Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 269, 68 Pac. 743.] 3 Mason, 315-319, 321, 322; Gorman v. 
 
 1 Reid I'. The Evergreens, 21 How. Pr. Russell, 14 Cal. 531 ; Cullen v. Duke of 
 
 319. 321, per Emmott J. citing Story's Queensberry, 1 Bro. C. C. 101; 1 Bro. 
 
 Eq. PL § 123 ; Adair v. New River Co.,"ll P. C. 396.
 
 386 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 been held that the number thirty-five was not sufficiently great.* 
 When one sued on behalf of an association by its name, upon a 
 promissory note, and alleged in his complaint that it was unin- 
 corporated, and that its members were very numerous, the mere 
 facts thus alleged were held to be insufficient.^ Undoubtedly in 
 such a case the plaintiff: should sue on behalf of the persons who 
 compose the society, and not on behalf of the society itself. 
 Indeed, this point has been directly decided. It is held that, in 
 case of such a society whose members are too numerous to bring 
 them all before the court, the plaintiff must make one of them a 
 defendant as a representative of the others, and not make the 
 association a defendant.^ 
 
 § 291. * 394. Particular Instances. The following are some 
 particular instances in which these principles have been applied, 
 and in which it has been held that the action might be maintained 
 by one or more for the benefit of the others. One creditor may 
 sue on behalf of all the other creditors in an action to enforce the 
 terms of an assignment in trust for the benefit of creditors, to 
 obtain an accounting and settlement from the assignee and other 
 like relief; also, in an action to set aside such an assignment on 
 the ground that it is illegal and void; and also one judgment 
 creditor may sue on behalf of all other similar creditors in an 
 action to reach the equitable assets, and to set aside the fraudu- 
 lent transfers of the debtor. In all these classes of cases the 
 creditors have a common interest in the questions to be deter- 
 mined by the controversy.^ When a mortgage had been given 
 
 1 Kirk V. Young, 2 Abb. Pr. 453, per in allowing one or more to sue for all." 
 Gierke J. at S. T. Undoubtedly, a num- This was a case in which ten subscribers 
 ber much less than thirty-five would be brought an action for the benefit of all 
 sufficient when a " common interest " is subscribers who had paid their subscrip- 
 set up. In an action by creditors it was tions against a subscriber who had refused 
 held, by a very able English judge, that to pay his subscri|)ti(Hi. See also George 
 twenty was too small anumber Harrison v. Benjamin (1898), 100 Wis. 622, 76 N. W. 
 V. Stewardson,2 Hare, 5.S0. QSee Hodges 619, holding that thirty-one "was not so 
 T. Nalty (1899), 104 Wis. 464, 80 N. W. large as to be called very numerous and 
 726, from which we quote as follows : render it impracticable to bring them all 
 "Seventy-five persons is surely a very before the court." Tobin <;. Portland Mills 
 large and unwieldy number of persons to Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 269, 68 Pac. 743.] 
 j<jiii in an action where it is practicable for 2 Habicht v. Pemberton, 4 Sandf. 657. 
 a few to settle the controversy for the ^ Keller i'. Tracy, 11 Iowa, 530; Stew- 
 benefit of all. A line mu.st be drawn art v. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 17 Minn, 
 somewhere, and, while it may be difficult 372, 398. 
 
 to draw it at any precise number, we hold ^ Greene v. Breck, 10 Abb. Pr. 42; 
 
 that seventy-five is a sufficient number, in Hrooks v. Peck, 38 Barb. 519. See Story's 
 
 a case like the present, to justify the court Eq. PI. §§ 99-103; 1 Dan. Cli. PI. (4th
 
 ONE SUING ON BKHALF OF OTHERS. 387 
 
 by a railroad company to a trustee in order to secure bondholders, 
 and he desired to obtain directions of the court in respect to the 
 payment of coupons, and brought an action for that purpose, and 
 alleged in his complaint that the holders of the coupons were 
 very numerous, so that it was impracticable to bring them all 
 before the court, it was held proper, and within the provision of 
 the code, to make a few of these persons defendants as the repre- 
 sentatives of all the others, with suitable averments showing the 
 reasons for such a form of action.^ Conversely, a suit can be 
 maintained by one on behalf of all to foreclose a mortgage when 
 the number of mortgagees, or of bondholders, is large. It would 
 be hardly necessary in such a case that the number of persons 
 should be so great as to make it impracticable to bring them all 
 in; they have a common interest in the questions at issue. ^ The 
 provision also applies to actions by distributees for their shares, 
 and by legatees brought to settle the estate and to recover their 
 legacies;^ and to actions by heirs to set aside a deed or will of 
 their ancestors.* In both these cases there is a common interest 
 among the claimants. 
 
 § 292. * 395. Same Subject. An action by members or share- 
 holders of an unincorporated association for a dissolution, wind- 
 ing up, and division, or for other like relief, plainly falls within 
 
 Am. ed.), pp. 235, 237. See also Libby v. - Blair v. Shelby Cy. Agr. Soc, 28 Ind. 
 Norris, 142 Mass. 246; Sears v. Hardy, 175. Action on behalf of one hundred 
 120 Mass. 524; Mason v. Pomeroy, 151 and thirty-eight mortgagees. Bardstown 
 Mass. 164. Twenty creditors were held & L. R. Co. v. Metcalf, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 199. 
 to be too small a number in Harrison v. See also Carpenter v. Cincinnati, etc. Ky. 
 Stewardson, 2 Hare, 530. [^Williams v. Co., 35 Ohio St. 307 ; Chicago, etc. Land 
 Meloy (1897), 97 Wis. 561, 73 N. VV. 40; Co. v. Peck, 112 111. 408. 
 Harper v. Carroll (1895), 62 Minn. 152, ^ McKenzie v. L'Amoureux, 11 Barb. 
 64 N. W. 145; Corey v. Sherman (1895), 516; Towner v. Tooley, 38 Barb. 598. In 
 96 la. 114, 64 N. W. 828; Herrick v. the first of these cases the number of 
 Wardwell (1898), 58 O. St. 294, 50 N. E. persons represented by the plaintiff was 
 903.] three. Story's Eq. PI. §§ 104. 105 ; 1 Dan. 
 1 Coe V. Beckwith, 10 Abb. Pr. 296. Ch. PI. (4th Am. ed.), p 238; Hallett r. 
 See P.eid v. The Evergreens, 21 How. Pr. Hallett, 2 Paige, 18-20. 21 ; Fish i\ How- 
 319. I^In Gorley v. City of Louisville land, 1 Paige, 20, 23 ; Brown r. Ricketts, 
 (1901), — Ky.—, 65 S. W. 844, it was 3 Johns. Ch. 5.53. See also Hills r. Put- 
 held that where a large number of police- nam, 152 Mass. 123 (bill for iu.structions 
 men have claims against the city for com- as to the disposition of an estate not dc- 
 pensation during the time they were fective for want of parties, if the numer- 
 illegally suspended, several may sue for ous claimants are fully represented by 
 the benefit of all, and that the aggregate those having similar interests) ; Hills v. 
 amount would determine the jurisdiction, Barnard, 152 Mass. 67. 
 and not the amount claimed by each one '' Hcndrix v. Money, 1 Bush (Ky.), 
 of the parties.] 306.
 
 388 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 the statutory provision, and may be brought by one of tlie 
 associates in a representative capacity. In some instances the 
 proceeding would plainly fall within the first subdivision, since 
 there would be a common interest among all the members or 
 shareholders; in other instances, it might, perhaps, fall within 
 the second, and be based upon numbers alone. ^ The question, 
 whether one taxpayer or freeholder can sue for the benefit of 
 others similarly situated, to restrain or set aside the acts of local 
 officials done under color of authority, can only be properly con- 
 sidered and determined by those courts which hold that such 
 actions are proper in their general form. Wherever this par- 
 ticular kind of action is condemned in toto, the decision of tlie 
 particular point now referred to must, of coarse, be entirely 
 extra-judicial. In the States which permit such suits by a tax- 
 payer or freeholder generally, there is some conflict of opinion in 
 respect to the question whether one can sue on behalf of others 
 similarly situated with himself. It has been held in Wisconsin 
 that an action cannot be maintained by one taxpayer as a repre- 
 sentative of all others in a local district, to prevent the enforce- 
 ment of an alleged illegal tax which would be a lien upon real 
 estate, on the ground that the lands owned by the individual 
 taxpayers, and affected by the tax, are distinct and separate par- 
 cels, and there is no common interest among the owners thereof. 
 The conclusion was that each taxpayer must sue separately.^ 
 
 § 293. * -30(3. Nature of such Action. What Essential on Part of 
 those not Named in order to become Parties. I pass now to con- 
 sider the nature of an action brought by one on behalf of others, 
 and its effects upon the riglits and duties of those who are repre- 
 sented by the actual plaintiffs. The persons not named in such 
 cases are not parties to the suit unless they afterwards elect to 
 come in and claim as sucli, and bear their proportion of the 
 
 1 Warth V. Radde, 18 Ahb. Pr. 396; Perry y. Whitaker, 71 N.C.477; [McCaiui 
 
 Gorman v. Russell, 14 Cal. 531; Von v. cfty of Louisville (1901), — Ky. —, 63 
 
 Schmidt v. Iluutinj^tou, I Cal. 55; Stew- S. W. 446 ; Commonwealth r. Scott (1901), 
 
 art f. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 17 Minn. 112 Ky. 252, 65 S. W. 596. In thiscase one 
 
 .■{72,398 ; Cockhurn r. Thomjison, 16 Ves. of many taxp'iyers of an iJlef^al tax sued 
 
 321 ; Story's Eq. PI. §§ 107-115 b ; 1 Dan. to recover, for the benefit of all, the taxes 
 
 Ch. V\. (4th Am. ed.), pp. 238, 239; At- .so paid. The action was sn.stained not- 
 
 lanta Real Estate Co. v. Atlanta Nat. with.^tanding the i)arty in whose name 
 
 Bank, 75 Ga. 40 ; Dousman v. Wisconsin, .suit was l)ron;;lit was anon-resident of the 
 
 etc. Co., 40 Wis. 418 ; Chester f. Halliard, county. See, however. Stiles v. City of 
 
 36 N. J. Ecj. 313. Guthrie (1895), 3 Okla. 26, 41 Pac. 383.] 
 
 ■^ Newcomb v. Ilorton, 18 Wis. 566;
 
 ONE SUING ON BEHALF OF OTHERS. 389 
 
 expenses. It is optional with them whether they will become 
 parties or not, and until they so elect they are, in the language 
 of tlie books, "in a sense deemed to be before the court." ^ They 
 are so far before the court, that if they neglect, after a reasonable 
 notice to them for that purpose, to come in under the judgment 
 and establish their claims, the court will protect the defendants 
 and parties named from any furtlier litigation in respect of the 
 same fund or other subject-matter, especially so far as such liti- 
 gation may tend to disturb the rights of the parties as fixed by 
 the judgment. A person who elects to come in and make him- 
 self a party must apply for an order making him such, and upon 
 the granting the order he is to all intents and purposes a party. ^ 
 
 § 294. * 397. Equity Rule. Rule in Kentucky. This rule, 
 which is merely the doctrine and practice of equity applied to 
 cases arising under the statutory provision, has not been ac- 
 quiesced in by all the courts. In Kentucky, where the chancery 
 has always existed as a separate tribunal, and where even under 
 the code there is a nominal distinction kept up between legal 
 and equitable actions, it is held that the assent of those who are 
 not actual parties, but who have a common interest with their 
 representative, will be presumed unless they show their dis- 
 approval by some act indicating the dissent.^ This is in direct 
 conflict with the rule first stated. According to the one, the 
 persons who are represented must do some affirmative act of 
 approval and adoption, and regularly this act should be an 
 application to the court, and the obtaining an order declaring 
 them to be in all respects j)arties ; according to the other, these 
 persons must do some act of disaffirmance and rejection, but 
 what particular act is not disclosed. 
 
 § 295. * 398. Question whether One has made himself a Party 
 may present itself in Two Aspects. The question whether any 
 spocitied person among the number of those represented had 
 made himself or was a party to the suit, may present itself in 
 
 1 Story's Eq. PI. § 99 ; Adair v. New Iron & Steel Co., 46 Fed. Rep. 33G. Cred- 
 
 River Co., 11 Ves. 444. itors who refuse to join are postponed to 
 
 - Stevens v. Brooks, 22 Wis. 695, 703, thu.se creditors who do come in under the 
 
 704, per Dixon C. .J.; Hallett v. Hallett, 2 general creditors' bill. Bank of Rome v. 
 
 Paige, 18, per Walworth Ch. ; Good v. liaselton, 15 Lea (Tenu.), 216. See also 
 
 Blewit, 19 Ves. 336, 339, per Lord Kldon ; Bilmyer v. Sherman, 23 W. Va. 656. 
 Story's Eq. PI. § 99 ; Barker v. Walters, ^ Flint v. Spurr, 17 B. Mon. 499, 513. 
 
 8 Beav. 92 ; Belmont Xail Co. v. Columbia
 
 390 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 two very different aspects, and its answer may be necessary for 
 two very different purposes. ^ In the first place, tlie question 
 may be, wlietber this individual, as against the defendants in 
 the action, and perhaps as against those who were the original 
 plaintiffs, or who had made themselves such, is entitled to the 
 immediate benefits of the recovery, to a share in the relief 
 granted by the court in its decree. It is evident that, under 
 this aspect of the matter, a slight affirmative act of assent and 
 adoption may be sufficient if the person is then willing and does 
 contribute his share to the expenses of the litigation. The 
 nature of the cause of action may be such that, if the relief is 
 granted at all, it will necessarily enure to the benefit of all who 
 may be situated in the same position as the actual plaintiff. 
 On the other hand, the cause of action may be such that a sepa- 
 rate application will be necessary to bring each person within the 
 operation of the judgment, although the decision made in one 
 case may control that in all others : as, for example, in a cred- 
 itors' suit to set aside fraudulent transfers of the debtor's land, 
 and let in the liens of the plaintiffs' judgments, a separate action 
 of the court is necessary in the case of each judgment creditor, 
 in order that he may reap the benefit of the general decision 
 pronouncing the debtor's transfer to be void. 
 
 1 [[To the point tliat one cannot be wheat deposited at Black's warehouse at 
 made a party plaintiff against his consent, Halsey, could, if they so desired, have ex- 
 see Tobin V. Portland Mills Co. (1902), 41 pressed their assent to be joined as plain- 
 Ore. 269, 68 Pac. 74."J, the court saying : tiffs, thereby demonstrating the practica- 
 "A person materially interested in the l)ility of bringing them all before the court, 
 subject-matter of a suit may, against his If tlie depositors had not been interrogated 
 will, be made a party defendant, but we in respect to their willingness to pay their 
 know of no rule whereby he can, witliout part of the expenses, the law would prob- 
 his consent, be joined as plaintiff. The ably have presumed that, as they were 
 desire of a person to be joined as a j)arty anxious to secure their share of the grain 
 plaintiff is indicated ijy a willingness to alleged to have l)een shipped to the de- 
 bear his siiare of the expenses of tiie trial fendants they were also willing to contrib- 
 and while 3.5 of tlie depositors were ute tlieir part of the expenses incurred 
 anxious to participate in tlie profits of the in recovering it, or its value ; but their 
 suit if any were realized, .'i^ of them, testimony dispels such ])rcsumptioii, if it 
 tacitly, at least, expressed their unwilling- could ever have been invoked." But see 
 ncss so to contribute, therein- manifesting Mct.'anni'. City of Louisville (1901), — Ky. 
 their dissent to being joined as plaintiffs, — , G3 S. W. 446, in wliicii it is held that, 
 notwithstanding which a decree is given under the facts therein stated, parties 
 in their favor, thus in effect making them may be made plaintiff against their con- 
 parties against their will. Besides this, tlie sent. In tliis case the statutory provision 
 101 depositors, liaving made voluntary under dicussion was invoked.] 
 affidavits of their respective claims for
 
 ONE SUING ON BEHALF OF OTHKKS. 391 
 
 §296. * 309. Same Subject. Ill tlie second place, the ques- 
 tion may be whether tlie specified individual who is one of those 
 represented by the actual plaintiff, is concluded and bound by 
 the judgment rendered in tlie action. This question will gener- 
 ally arise at a subsequent time, and in another action brought by 
 or against the individual, and involving the same issues as those 
 embraced in the former controversy.^ Is this person bound by 
 the former judgment ? Of course he is not bound unless he was 
 practically a party to the proceeding; the plainest principles of 
 common justice refuse to hold a man concluded if he has not had 
 "a day in court." When the matter is presented in this aspect, 
 the strict rule of the equity courts first above stated must be 
 controlling. If the subsequent proceeding is a hostile one 
 against the person, the former adjudication cannot be relied 
 upon as an estoppel or as conclusive, unless he had affirmatively 
 taken the steps which made him an actual party by adopting the 
 suit with all its burdens and benefits, or unless, after having had 
 notice, and an opportunity of coming in and making himself 
 such a party, he had refused or neglected to do so. If, however, 
 this subsequent proceeding is on behalf of the person, set in 
 motion by him, the same doctrine must apply; he cannot under 
 exactly the same circumstances claim and receive the benefits of 
 the former litigation, but disclaim and be freed from its burdens 
 and disabilities. 
 
 § 297. * 400. Conclusion of Author from Discussion. The con- 
 clusion to which I arrive from the foregoing discussion may be 
 summed up as follows: There may be a marked difference in 
 the manner of enforcing the rule, or even in the rule itself, 
 depending upon the position of the litigation, and the situation 
 of the person who invokes its aid or against whom it is invoked. 
 If the prior suit is still pending, and the purpose of the claimant 
 who belongs to the class of persons represented by the actual 
 plaintiff or defendant, be to take a practical part in the contro- 
 vers}', or to share the benefit of the judgment which has been or 
 may be rendered, his mere act of making the claim, coupled with 
 a willingness to bear his share of the expenses, will be of itself a 
 sufficiently positive and affirmative act to make him a party to 
 the proceeding and entitle him to his personal relief. Even in 
 this case, however, the action may be of such a nature and the 
 
 1 Stevens v. Brooks, 22 Wis. 695.
 
 392 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 juclo-ment of such a character, that a separate order or adjudi- 
 cation of the court will be necessary in order to determine the 
 particular rights under the general decree of each party, and to 
 award to him his special portion of the general relief. The case 
 already mentioned of the different judgment creditors interested 
 in the result of an ordinary creditors' suit, is a sufficiently illus- 
 trative example. If, however, the prior suit has been termi- 
 nated, and the question arises in a subsequent controversy, and 
 involves the conclusive effect of the former adjudication upon 
 the class of persons represented by the actual parties, in order 
 that such judgment should be conclusive upon any particular 
 person of the class either in his favor or against him, there must 
 have been the previous formal act on his part of applying to the 
 court, and an order thereon making him a party to the action, so 
 that his name should have appeared in some manner upon the 
 record ; or it must be shown that he had notice of the proceed- 
 ings, and an opportunity to unite in them of which he neglected 
 or refused to avail himself. These views and conclusions recon- 
 cile the decisions which at first sight appear to be conflicting, 
 and they present a practical and harmonious rule of procedure.^ 
 
 S 293. * 401. Necessary Averments of Complaint or Petition. It 
 has already been stated that the complaint or petition should 
 contain averments which bring the action within one or the other 
 of the cases mentioned in the section of the codes. The allega- 
 tions showing the existence of a common or general interest in 
 the questions at issue in the one case, or the impracticability, on 
 account of numbers, of bringing all the persons before the court 
 in the other, should be positive and specific, so that, if denied, 
 an issue may be raised upon thera.^ It is not necessary, hoAv- 
 ever, that the persons who, it is alleged, have the common or 
 general interest, or who, it is said, are so numerous that they 
 cannot all be brought before the court, should be named, nor be 
 described with particularity ; nor is it necessary that they should 
 be an association or special class, or be described as such.'^ The 
 
 1 See on this subject, Story's Eq. PI. 2 Paige, 18, 19; Bilmvcr v. Sherman, 23 
 
 §§ 99, 196 ; David v. Frowd, 1 Myl. & K. W. Va. 050 ; Glide v. i)\v_vcr, 83 Cal. 477, 
 
 200; Gillespie v. Alexander, 3 Kuss. 130 ; 487. See David v. Frowd, 1 .M. & K. 200; 
 
 Farrell v. Smith, 2 Ball & B. 337; Cock- Thompson r. Huftakcr, 19 Nev. 291. 
 
 burn y. 'i'hoTnp.son, 10 Yes. 327; Good v. - [Castle v. Madison (1902), 113 Wis. 
 
 Ble wit, 19 Yes. 330, 339; Leigh v.Tliomas, 340, 89 N. AY. 1.50; Hodges v. Nalty 
 
 2 Ye.s. 312, 313; Hendricks v. Pohiiisun, (1899), 104 Wis. 404, 80 N. W. 726.] 
 
 2 Johns. Gil. 283, 290; Ilallctt v. Ilallctt, ^ Sourse v. Marshall, 23 Iiul. 194.
 
 PERSONS SEVKKALLY LIABLE OX THE SAME INSTIIUMENT. 393 
 
 general averment descriptive of the persons as a wliole is enough ; 
 and the question whether any particular individual is included 
 within it will arise, and must be decided upon his application to 
 be admitted as a participant in the suit while in progress, or in 
 the relief after judgment. If any opposition is made to his a])- 
 plication, the matter will be sent to a master or referee to hear 
 and report, and upon his report the court will make the proper 
 order admitting or rejecting the applicant.^ 
 
 SECTION EIGHTH. 
 PERSONS SEVERALLY LIABLE UrON THE SAME INSTRUMENT. 
 
 § 299. * 402. Reasons for Separate Treatment. Two Classes of 
 Statutory Provisions. The subject-niatter of this section has al- 
 ready been treated in a general manner in the discussions relating 
 to joint, joint and several, and several liabilities, and to actions 
 thereon, and to the changes wrought in the common-law rules regu- 
 lating the same, which are contained in the sixth section of this 
 chapter. It is of so great importance, however, and the statutory 
 provisions have made so sweeping an alteration in the ancient 
 law, and withal there is so marked a difference in the special 
 legislation of the State codes upon this particular topic, that the 
 subject demands an independent and thorough examination. 
 The statutory provisions themselves must be separated into two 
 classes. The first class, which is found in most of the codes, 
 embraces special rules relating only to persons severally liable 
 upon the same instrument, and the language which embodies the 
 enactment is substantially alike in all the statutes which contain 
 the provision at all. The second class, which is found in a por- 
 tion only of the codes, is much more sweeping and radical in its 
 changes ; it embraces rules relating to joint, joint and several, 
 and several liabilities arising upon all contracts ; while the lan- 
 guage used by the legislatures is not the same in an}'- two of the 
 codes. 
 
 § 300. * 403. Quotation of Statutory Provisions. I quote these 
 two classes of provisions separately. — First class. " Persons 
 severally liable upon the same obligation or instrument, including 
 
 1 Steveus v. Brooks, 22 Wis. 695.
 
 394 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 the parties to bills of exchange and promissory notes, may all or 
 any of them be included in the same action at the option of the 
 plaintiff." ^ In Kentucky the section is somewhat varied, and 
 reads as follows : " Persons severally liable upon the same con- 
 tract, and parties to bills of exchange, to promissory notes placed 
 upon the footing of bills of exchange, or to common orders and 
 checks, and sureties on the same or separate instruments, may all 
 or any of them, or the representatives of such as may have died, 
 be included in the same action at the plaintiff"s option." ^ — Sec- 
 ond class. The Missouri code contains the following: "Every 
 person who shall have a cause of action against several persons, 
 including parties to bills of exchange and promissory notes, and 
 who shall be entitled by law to one satisfaction therefor, may 
 bring suit thereon jointly against all or as many of the persons 
 liable as he may think proper, and he may, at his option, join any 
 executor or administrator or other person liable in a representa- 
 tive character, with others originally liable." ^ According to the 
 last revision of the California code, " All persons holding as tenants 
 in common, joint tenants, or coparceners, or any number less than 
 all, may jointly or severally commence or defend any civil action or 
 proceeding for the enforcement or protection of the rights of such 
 party." * A section is found in the Nevada code nearly the same 
 as the foregoing in most respects, but with one very marked dif- 
 ference: " Tenants in common, joint tenants, or copartners, or any 
 number less than all, may jointly or severally bring or defend, or 
 continue the prosecution or defence of any action for the enforce- 
 ment of the rights of such person or persons." * The changes 
 
 1 New York, § 120 (454) ; Kansas, § 39 ; 2 [^Kentucky, § 26 ; Arkansas, Sand. & 
 Oregon, § 36 ; Nevada, § 15 ; South Caru- Hill's Dig., § 5633.] 
 liua, § 143; California, § 383; Minnesota, 3 (^Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, § 545.] 
 § 35 ; Nebraska, § 44 ; Oiiio, § 38 ; North ♦ California, code of 1872, § 384 ; ori- 
 Caroliua, § 63; QUtah, Hev. St., 1898, ginally statute of 1857, p. 62. 
 § 2918; North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, » Nevada, § 14. This section is plainly 
 § 5233, in somewiiat different form; copied from the California statute of 1857. 
 South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6080, The change from " coparceners " to "co- 
 same form as in North Dakota; Arizona, partners" is remarkable. The use of the 
 Rev. St., 1901, § 1306, in somewhat differ- word "coparceners" was natural, per- 
 ent form; Oklahoma, St., 1893, ij 3911 ; haps, though doubtless entirely unneces- 
 Washington, Bal. Code, § 4836 ; Montana, sary in the earlier enactments, for certainly 
 § 585; Llalio, Code Civ. Proc, 1901, no estate in " coparcenary " e.xi.sts in C.ali- 
 §3171; Wyr.ming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3483, furnia. The word used in the Nevatla 
 in somewhat different form ; Cohjrado, code, unless treated as a mistake, pro- 
 § 13; Indiana, Buhls' St., 1901, §271; duces a most violent and exceptional 
 WLscousin, St.. 1898, § 2609.] change in the prior law. The language
 
 PEKSOXS SEVERALLY LIABLK ON THE SAME INSTRUMENT. 
 
 595 
 
 in the common law made by the Iowa and Kentucky codes are 
 radical and complete. In the former : " When two or more per- 
 sons are bound by contract or by judgment, decree, or statute, 
 whether jointly only, or jointly and severally, or severally only, 
 including the parties to negotiable paper, common orders, and 
 checks, and sureties on the same or separate instruments, or by 
 any liability growing out of the same, the action thereon may, at 
 the plaintiff's option, be brought against aiiy, or all of them. 
 When any of those so bound are dead, the action may be brought 
 against any or all of the survivors, with any or all of the repre- 
 sentatives of the decedents, or against any or all of such repre- 
 sentatives. An action or judgment against any one or more of 
 several persons jointly bound shall not be a bar to proceedings 
 against the others." ^ The corresponding section of the Kentucky 
 code differs from this verbally rather than substantially : " If two 
 or more persons be jointly bound by contract, the action thereon 
 may be brought against all or any of them at the plaintiff's option. 
 If any of the persons so bound be dead, the action may be brought 
 
 is not broad enough to cover all joint lia- 
 bilities arising from contract ; the single 
 case of partnership liability is excepted. 
 QSee ante, p. 198, note 2, for other statutes 
 of the same character.^ 
 
 1 Qlowa, Code. 1897 § 3465. Lull v. 
 Anamosa Nat. Bank (1900), 110 la. 5.37, 81 
 N. W. 784 : " If plaiutitf maintains his ac- 
 tion against one of several defendants, he 
 may have judgment against that one, and 
 the other defendants may have judgment 
 against plaintiff for costs. The rule is 
 alike applicable to actions ex contractu and 
 ex delicto." Kellogg v. Window (1897), 
 100 la. 552, 69 N. W. 875. In Curran v. 
 Steiu (1901), — Ky. — , 60 S. W. 839, the 
 court say : " In Gasson v. Badgett, 
 6 Bush, 97, it was held that in an action 
 against two upon an alleged joint con- 
 tract no judgment could be rendered 
 against one upon proof that the contract 
 was made with him alone. But after this 
 decision was rendered by the act of 1888 
 the following amendment was made to 
 section 131 of the Code of Practice: 'In 
 an action on a contract alleged to have 
 been made by several defendants, in the 
 event the evidence shall show the contract 
 to have been made witli less than all those 
 defendants bv whom it is alleged to have 
 
 been made, this shall not be deemed 
 either a variance or failure of proof, but 
 judgment may be rendered against the 
 party or parties shown to be bound and in 
 favor of those shown not to be bound.' " 
 See also Council Bluffs Savings Bank v. 
 Griswold (1897), 50 Neb. 753, 70 N. W. 
 376, in wliich the court construing the 
 Iowa statute quoted in the text said : 
 " The evident purpose of tlie statute above 
 quoted is to abolish tlie joint liability of 
 persons bound by contract, judgment, or 
 statute, and to authorize the prosecution 
 of actions against any or all of the parties 
 so liable, at the election of the plaintiff," 
 and see further Schowalter v. Beard 
 (1900), lOOkla. 454, 63 Pac. 687, as fol- 
 lows ; " Another defence urged is that the 
 obligation is joint, and that all the ob- 
 ligors should be made parties defendant. 
 We think sec. 851, page 219 Oklahoma 
 Statutes of 1893, settles this proposition, 
 as all the obligors on tliis agreement were 
 parties who received some benefit, and the 
 statute above cited makes all such con- 
 tracts, presumably, joint and several, and 
 the proof 8hov.-s that all these defendants 
 were owners of, or parties interested in 
 lot 18, on which the wall was partly 
 erected. "J
 
 396 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 against any or all of the survivors, A\ith tlie representatives of all 
 or any of the decedents, or against the latter or any of them. If 
 all the persons so bound be dead, the action may be brought 
 against the representatives of all or of any of them. An action 
 or judgment against any one or more of several persons jointly 
 bound shall not be a bar to proceedings against the others." ^ 
 Substantially, the same change in the common law is made b)' 
 the North Carolina code.^ 
 
 § 301. * 404. Two Classes of Statutory Provisions Compared and 
 Distinguished. These two classes of legislative enactments must 
 be examined separately. The provisions of the first class relate 
 solely to persons severally, as opposed to those jointly or jointly 
 and severally liable. The term " severally liable " has long had 
 a well-known technical meaning in the law, and is plainly used 
 with that meaning in this connection. The modification of the 
 former rules made by tliis section is therefore quite restricted. 
 Again, this several liability must arise from the fact that the 
 persons are all parties to one single instrument, except that, in a 
 few States, sureties upon separate instruments are also included. 
 This latter clause is probably intended to cover the case, which 
 is not infrequent, of two or more official or other bonds given on 
 behalf of the same principal and to the same obligee, and in- 
 tended to secure the same object, the rights and obligations of 
 the sureties thence arising being the same as if they had all 
 executed a single undertaking.^ In the third place, there is no 
 limit upon the kind of contract from which this several liability 
 may arise, provided it is in writing. The broad language of the 
 clause includes any and every species of written contract."* The 
 instances given of bills, notes, checks, orders, etc., are illustra- 
 tions merely, and do not restrict the operation of the section to 
 themselves. The result is, that the provision as a whole has the 
 same force and effect in all the States of whose codes it forms a 
 part, with the single exception, already noticed, in reference to 
 sureties upon separate instruments. Fourthly, no change is made 
 
 1 QKentuckj, Codes, 1895, § 27.] QSee ante, p. 289, note 1, for similar 
 
 - Code of North Carolina, § 63 a. " In statutes in Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, 
 
 all cases of joint contract of co-partners in and Minnesota ] 
 
 trade, or others, suits may he brouf^ht and -^ See Towcll v. Powell, 48 Cnl. 234. 
 
 prosecuted on the same against all or any * Tlie clause does not enihrace qr 
 
 number of the persons making sucli con- apply to oral contracts : Excliange Bauk 
 
 tract." See Merwin v. liallard, 65 N. C. i-. Ford, 7 Colo. .'iU. 
 
 168.
 
 PERSONS SEVERALLY LL\BLE ON THE SAME INSTRUMENT. 397 
 
 in the prior rules of law which define the nature of " several 
 liability." The contracts from which such a liability arises, and 
 the cases in which it exists, are left as the codes found them. 
 Finally the only change made by the section is, that while the 
 common law required a separate action by the creditor against 
 each one of the persons thus severally liable, he is now per- 
 mitted at his option to sue all, one, or any of them.^ How far 
 the provision permits the joinder of the personal representatives 
 of deceased parties with any or all of the survivors as co-defend- 
 ants must be a matter for judicial construction ; that found in 
 the Kentucky code removes all possible doubt by expressly 
 authorizing such a proceeding. The second class of provisions 
 goes to the root of the matter, and practically destroys all dis- 
 tinction between joint, joint and several, and several liabilities, 
 in respect of actions against the original parties, and of those 
 against the survivors and the representatives of such as have 
 died. These enactments are so express, so full, and so plain in 
 their language, that they leave very little room for forensic 
 exposition or judicial interpretation. 
 
 § 302. * 405. Turning-Point of Decisions herein. Illustrations. 
 From this analysis of the language I proceed to the judicial in- 
 terpretation which has been put upon it. Most of the conclusions 
 contained in the foregoing paragraph result so plainly from the 
 express terms of the statute, that no doubt can be entertained of 
 their correctness, and no necessity can arise for judicial construc- 
 tion. It will be found, therefore, that the decisions based upon 
 this section have generally turned, not upon any question as to 
 its meaning, but upon points of the former law. Nearly all of 
 these cases will be seen, when we get at the ratio decidendi, to 
 have determined either that the parties were or were not severally 
 liable, or that they were or were not liable upon the same instru- 
 ment. These points, I say, are preliminary only, and do not 
 belong to any exposition of the statutory provision itself ; they 
 simply settle the question whether or not the particular case falls 
 
 1 QRuffatti V. Lexiugton Mining Co. is no ground of complaint on the part of 
 
 (1894), 10 Utah, 386, 37 Pac. 591. "In tlie mining company, if it, in fact, was 
 
 suit upon a contract, where the evidence bound by the contract, that the plaintiff 
 
 warrants it, we think it is universally saw fit to sue some one else who was not 
 
 held that a recovery may be had against bound, in connection with it, to recover 
 
 one or the other, or both, of the defend- damages for a breach."] 
 auts, who are sued upon the contract. It
 
 398 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 ■within its terms. The decisions to be cited will illustrate this 
 statement, and show its correctness. In a leading case, giving a 
 construction to the section, the New York Court of Appeals said : 
 " It relates to several, and not to joint liabilities. The latter did 
 not require the aid of a special provision. It relates in terms to 
 cases where a plurality of persons contract several obligations 
 on the same instrument." ^ The Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
 has expressed itself to the same effect. " The language of this 
 statute is very clear and positive, and no doubt can exist as to its 
 meaning. It has changed the rule of the common law with 
 respect to the actions which it mentions. No demurrer can now 
 be sustained for the nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties defendant 
 where a part only of the persons severally liable are included in 
 the action, and the rest omitted, and that fc>ct appears on the face 
 of the complaint." '^ 
 
 § 303. * 406. Forms of Contract included in Statute. Illustrations. 
 Form of Judgment. The terms of the statute are so broad and 
 unrestricted, that they include every kind and form of written 
 contract upon which the parties thereto are made severally liable.^ 
 It is not necessary that they .should be bound for the same identical 
 demand or debt, nor that each should be responsible for the aggre- 
 gate amount of all their several liabilities. In other words, it is 
 not neces.sary that the judgment sliould be a joint one for the 
 same single debt, nor even a separate judgment against each for 
 that one sum, nor, as it would seem, a separate judgment against 
 each for the same sum. If a contract should be made by a num- 
 ber of promisors, by which each bound himself in an amount 
 different from that of all the others, the liability Avould plainl}'' 
 be several, and the agreement itself would be embraced within 
 the terms of the section. The Supreme Court of Kentucky has 
 used the following language in reference to such a contract. 
 " In this case there is but one contract, and it is the same con- 
 tract between the same parties, but several as to its obligation. 
 
 1 Carman v. I'la-ss, 2.3 X. Y. 280, 287, .several liability, and not a joint liability 
 
 j)er Denio .1. with the otiicr subscril)ers, and hence isio 
 
 - Decker v. Trilling. 24 Wis. 610, 612, be enforced in an action .at law against 
 
 ])er Dixon C. J. (^Hut see Hodges v. him alone. "] 
 
 Xalty (1899), 104 Wis. 464, 80 N. W. 726, " [[.Main r. Johnson (189.3), 7 Wash, 
 
 in which the court, speaking of the liabil- .321, .35 I'ac. 07 ; Kodini v. Lytle (1896), 
 
 ity incurred by the subscribers to a fund 17 Mont. 448, 43 I'ac. 501 ; Loustalot v. 
 
 for the construction of a church, said: Calkins (1898), 120 Cal.- 688, 53 Pac. 
 
 " Tlie liability of each subscriber is a 258. 3
 
 PERSONS SEVERALLY LIABLE ON THE SAME INSTRUMENT. 399 
 
 And neither the hmguage nor the presumed objeet of the section 
 can be constructively restricted to a several contract binding 
 each separate obligor for the whole amount of their aggregate 
 liabilities. The letter of the section certainly authorizes no such 
 restriction; and the policy of avoiding a vexatious multiplicity of 
 actions for the breach of the same contract, would apply equally 
 to every contract made at one and the same time by the same 
 parties severally liable upon it." ^ Upon this doctrine a joint 
 action was sustained against twenty-seven persons who had exe- 
 cuted the following undertaking : " We the undersigned agree 
 to become bound to A. as sureties for B., each for the sum of 
 8100, for any goods he may buy of said A., each of us to be 
 bound for $100 and no more, it being the true intent and mean- 
 ing that each incurs for himself a separate liability for $100." ^ 
 Although such an action 'is brought against all the debtors, and 
 thus appears to be joint, the judgment of course is not joint but 
 separate, that is, against each for the amount of his own liability. 
 It could certainly make no difference in -the principle if the par- 
 ties to such an agreement each undertook a different amount of 
 liability instead of all incurring the same. These views have 
 been approved, and it has been expressly held that when persons 
 are bound for separate sums by the same instrument, and are 
 sued jointly, a separate judgment should be entered against each 
 for the amount of his individual indebtedness.^ The case thus 
 resembles the ordinary contract of subscription, which in accord- 
 ance with the principle of the decisions above quoted would 
 clearly be embraced within this section.* 
 
 § 304. * 407. Form of Judgment Continued. Discussion by Wis- 
 consin Supreme Court. The question has been raised whether in 
 an action, under this provision of the codes, against all or some 
 of the persons thus severally liable upon the same instrument, a 
 joint judgment against the defendants can ever be proper, and 
 whether the final determination of the court should not be in the 
 form of a separate judgment against each for his individual liabil- 
 ity.^ It has been said that the statute permitting debtors sever- 
 
 1 Wilder. Haycraft, 2 Duvall, 309, 311, " The case of an action against the 
 
 per Robertson J. makers and indorsers of a note or bill is 
 
 ^ Ibid. special. A suit against them resulting in 
 
 3 People V. Edwards, 9 CaL 286. a joint judgment for the amount due, is 
 
 * [^But see Hodges v. Nalty (1899), 104 ])ermitted by express statutes passed long 
 
 Wis. 464, 80 X W. 726.]] jjrior to tiie new procCkiure.
 
 400 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 ally liable to be sued jointly, and the joint action brought in 
 accordance therewith, do not make them jointly liable ; and it can 
 make no possible difference in the apphcation of this principle, 
 whether each person is severally bound on the contract for the 
 same or for a different sum.^ An action against the maker, and 
 the personal representatives of a deceased indorser of a promissory 
 note has been sustained under this section, but it was held that a 
 joint judgment against them could not be rendered. This ruling 
 was placed upon the ground that the judgment agiiinst one must be 
 de bonis propriis, and against the other de bonis testatoris.^ The 
 whole subject has been ably and exliaustively treated by the 
 Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and I shall quote their discussion 
 and conclusions. The action was upon a joint and several prom- 
 issory note, the plaintiff electing to treat it as several, and pro- 
 ceeding to sue two only of the five makers. He had obtained a 
 joint judgment for the amount of the note against both, and each 
 was of course liable for that entire amount. The court say: 
 " Another objection is to the form of the judgment. The judg- 
 ment is a joint one against both of the defendants, instead of 
 being several against each. It is urged that this is erroneous. 
 It is contended that the option given to the plaintiff to include in 
 the action all or any of the persons thus severally liable, is to 
 enable him to accomplish in one action what by the former prac- 
 tice required several actions, — that is, to enforce in the action 
 the several liability of each defendant in the same manner as if 
 a separate suit had been brought against him. But for its being 
 obviated by a provision of the statute to which I shall presently 
 refer, this objection would be fatal to the judgment. The form 
 of the judgment is not directed by the statute authorizing per- 
 sons thus severally liable to be included in the action. The 
 second subdivision of § 11 of chapter 124 of the Revised Statutes 
 of Wisconsin ^ has no relation to the question, because, as held by 
 the Court of Appeals in Pruyn v. Black,"* the words there used, 
 '• defendants severally liable," mean defendants liable separately 
 from the defendants not served, though joi)itly as respects each 
 
 1 Kelsey v. Bradljury, 21 Barb. 531 ; ^ Tliis section provides for taking 
 Parker v. Jackson, 16 Barb. 3.3. judgment against some of tlie defendants 
 
 2 Eaton i;. Alger, 47 N. Y. 345; 2 " .severally liable " in an action, when the 
 Keyes, 41 ; Churchill r. Trapp, 3 Al)b. otliers liave not been servc'l. It i.-< the 
 Pr. 306. See also Burgoyne v. U. L. Ins. same as [^§ 2884, St., 1898.] 
 
 & Tr. Co., 5 Ohio St. 586. •• I'ruvii c. Black, 21 N. V. .300.
 
 PERSONS SEVERALLY LIABLE ON THE SAME INSTRUMENT. 401 
 
 other. And the provisions of § 20 of chap. 132 of the Revised 
 Statutes of Wisconsin ^ do not affect it, for the reason that the 
 judgment tliere authorized against one or more of several defend- 
 ants is only when a several judgment may be proper. It seems 
 to me to be left therefore for the courts to determine according 
 to the general principles of the law governing the subject what 
 the form of the judgment shall be ; and, acting upon these prin- 
 ciples, it seems very clear to me that the judgment should follow 
 the nature oi the claim establislied ; and if that is separate and 
 several as against each defendant, then the judgment should be 
 so." ^ The judgment in this case was not, however, reversed, 
 since another section of the Wisconsin code requires the court to 
 disregard any error which does not affect the substantial rights of 
 the parties. 
 
 § 305. * 408. Joint and Several Liability may be treated by Prom- 
 isee or Obligee as Several under Statute herein. — Although persons 
 jointly and severally liable on a contract are not mentioned in 
 this section of .the codes, it is within the option of the promisee 
 or obligee in such an agreement to treat it as several, and by his 
 act to render it so to all intents and purposes. A joint and sev- 
 eral contract has been held, therefore, to fall within the scope and 
 operation of the provision ; and the creditor, in pursuance of its 
 permission, has the election to sue each of the debtors singly, or 
 
 1 This section is the general provision force in this State, for the reason that the 
 
 rel.atiug to judgments, permitting judg- question is regulated by our code of civil 
 
 ment to be rendered for some of the de- procedure.' " And it is said tlie statute 
 
 fendants, and against the others, under provides : " Though all the defendants 
 
 certain circumstances; it corresponds to have been summoned, the judgment may 
 
 [^§ 2883, St., 1898.3 be rendered against any of them severally, 
 
 - Decker v. Trilling, 24 Wis. 610, 613, when the plaintiff would be entitled to 
 
 per Dixon C. J. [|In Haasler v. Hefele judgment against such defendants if the 
 
 (1898), 151 Ind. 391, 50 N. E. 361, it was action had been against them severally." 
 
 objected that since the cause of action See Bunnell v. Berlin Iron Bridge Co. 
 
 alleged was joint a separate judgment (1895), 66 Conn. 24, 33 Atl. 533, in which 
 
 against each of the two defendants for the court say : " Independently however 
 
 one-half the amount of plaintiff's claim of such autliority, we think the provisions 
 
 was erroneous. In answer to this objec- of the Practice Act for including in one 
 
 tion the court said : " If any one should action parties defendant liaving separate 
 
 complain of this it would seem to be the and even antagonistic interests, and for 
 
 appellee,' who was not given the joint authorizing tlie court by orders for sepa- 
 
 judgment for which she had asked in her rate trials and otherwise to protect their 
 
 complaint. In answer to a similar objec- differing interests, clearly implies the pos- 
 
 tion, it was said by this court in Loui.sville, sibility of a 'final judgment' as to one 
 
 etc. 11. W. Co. V. Treadway, 143 Ind. 689 : party, altliough the action continues in 
 
 ' The authorities cited by appellant in court for the disposition of the rights of 
 
 support of the rule asserted can have no other parties. "J 
 
 26
 
 402 
 
 CIVIL rf:mediks. 
 
 to sue all, or to sue an}^ number of them.^ The question might 
 arise, whether, if he elected to sue all, the contract would be 
 reo-arded as joint in accordance with the former practice, or 
 whether by virtue of this statutory enactment it would be taken 
 as several. I am not aware that this question, which perhaps has 
 little practical importance, has been passed upon by the courts. 
 
 ^ 306. * 409. Case of Guarantor and Principal Debtor. Weight of 
 Authority. Rule in Iowa. — It has been decided in many cases, and 
 undoubtedly the weight of authority sustains this ruling, that a 
 guarantor and the principal debtor cannot be sued together in 
 one action ; even though the guaranty be written upon the same 
 paper with the agreement which it undertakes to secure. It is 
 said that the principal debt and the collateral undertaking do not 
 constitute one instrument, and the parties therefore do not come 
 within the language of the statute.^ A diiferent rule, however, 
 
 1 Decker v. Trilliug, 24 AVis. 610, 612; 
 Clapp V. Preston, 15 Wis. .543 ; Burgoyiie 
 V. O. L. Ins. & Tr. Co., 5 Ohio St. 586 ; 
 People V. Edwards, 9 Cal. 286; People v. 
 Love, 25 Cal. 520, 526. Action on a joint 
 and several bond. The court held it gov- 
 erned by the statute as though several. 
 It lias been said, therefore, that this pro- 
 vi.<ion has in effect destroyed joint and 
 several liability arising on single express 
 written contract. Hepj)e v. .Johnson, 73 
 Cal. 265; Steffes v. Lemke, 40 Minn. 27. 
 
 2 Le Roy v. Shaw, 2 Duer, 626; l)e 
 Ridder v. Schermerhorn, 10 Barb. 638; 
 Allen V. Fosgate, 11 How. Pr. 218; Phalen 
 V. Dingee, 4 E. D. Smith, 379; Carman 
 r. Plass, 23 N. Y. 286, 287, per Denio .J. ; 
 H-mdurant v. Bladen, 19 Ind. 160; Virden 
 r. Ellsworth, 15 Ind. 144. See also Burton 
 V. Speis, 5 Hun, 60; Graham v. Ringo, 67 
 Mo. 324; Tyler v. Tualatin Academy, 14 
 Ore. 485. For a lonn of contract under 
 which the guarantor man be sued jointly 
 with the principal debtor, see Decker v. 
 Gaylord, 8 Hun, 110, a case analogous to 
 Carman v. Plass, <:ited in the following 
 note. ([Loustalot v. Calkins (1898), 120 
 Cal. 688. .53 Pac. 258. In this case Calkins 
 had indorsed note sued upon before de- 
 livery and under .section 3117 of the Civil 
 Code of that State thereby became liable 
 as an indorser. One Libcn and A. C. 
 Calkins, the makers, and .J. W. Calkins 
 •were joined us defendants .J. W. Calkins 
 
 demurred because of a " misjoinder of 
 parties defendant in that .1. W. Calkins, 
 an alleged and supposed guarantor, is 
 joined with the principal jiromisors." A 
 joint and several judgment was rendered 
 against the defendants. For reversal upon 
 appeal one of the two grounds relied upon 
 was "the demurrer of J. W. Calkins to 
 the complaint should have been sus- 
 tained." The court said: " In speaking as 
 to parties who may be joined as defend- 
 ants, the Code of Civil Procedure, section 
 383, declares : ' Persons severally liable 
 upon tlie same obligation or instrument, 
 including the parties to bills of exchange 
 and j)romissory notes and sureties on the 
 same or separate instruments, may all 
 or any of them be included in the same 
 action, at the option of the plaintiff.' By 
 a liberal construction of tliis provision it 
 may be fairly said that an indorser, such 
 as the defendant Calkins, is a party to tlie 
 promissory note. . . . 
 
 " The object of this section of the Law is 
 directed solely to the avoidance of a multi- 
 plicity of actions. And we see no sub- 
 stantial objection to the ajiplicatiou of the 
 rule to a case like the one at bar. Upon 
 an examination of the authorities from 
 other States having statutcjry pr(jvi.sions 
 substantially similar to the one found in 
 our code, we find those authorities pre- 
 ponderating to the effect that a guarantor 
 and the maker of a promissory note may
 
 PERSONS SEVERALLY LIABLE ON THE SAME INSTRUMENT. 403 
 
 prevails in Iowa, and it is there held in a series of cases, that the 
 guarantoi- and the principal debtor may be sued in one action, 
 since they are liable for the same debt, and are, within the mean- 
 ing of the section, bound upon the same instrument.^ 
 
 §307. * 410. When Liability arises from same Instrument. — A 
 surety or guarantor may be joined as a co-defendant with his 
 principal if the contract be in such a form and of such a nature 
 that his liability ar'ises from the same instriniient. A lease made 
 between the lessor of the first part, and the lessee A. of the 
 second part, and B. of the third part, contained the usual clauses 
 of demise to A. and covenants on his part to pay rent, etc., and 
 also a covenant, on the part of B., whereby " he did, in con- 
 sideration of the premises and of the sum of one dollar, guar- 
 antee unto the lessor the payment of the aforesaid rent, and the 
 faithful performance of the covenants in said lease contained." 
 The instrument was signed and sealed by all the parties. The 
 New York Court of Appeals held that the lessor might, by vir- 
 tue of the section under consideration, maintain an action against 
 A. and B. to recover a sum due for rent. The case was distin- 
 guished from the others cited above, in reference to ordinary 
 guaranties, since the parties to this lease were made liable by the 
 same instrument.'"^ I cannot refrain from expressing the opinion 
 
 not be joined as parties defendant; but ground of improperly uniting two causes 
 
 that question is not directly before us, of action. 3 
 
 and we pass it by for tliat reason. In this ^ Tucker ;'. Shiner, 24 Iowa, 334 ; Mix 
 
 State from its earliest judicial history the v. Fairchild, 12 Iowa, 331 ; Marvin v. 
 
 makers and indorsers of negotiable prom- Adamson, 11 Iowa, 371;' Peddicord ?•. 
 
 issory notes have been joined as parties Whittam, 9 Iowa, 471. 
 defendant, and no question as to the cor- ^ Carman v. Plass, 23 N. Y. 286, 287. 
 
 rectness of the practice has ever been Where an administrator in the course of 
 
 suggested. For this reason alone we feel his administration gave two bonds with 
 
 constrained to give the statute a construe- different sureties, but the umlertaking and 
 
 tion it has tacitly borne for so many the liabilities of the sureties being the 
 
 years. . . . Tlie demurrer was properly same in each, it was held, in California, 
 
 overruled." that all the sureties on both bonds coulil 
 
 See also Gilmore v. Skookum Box be sued in one action under the special 
 
 Factory (1899), 20 Wash. 703, 56 Pac. provision of the code in that State. Pow- 
 
 934. where it was held that under Bal. ell v. Powell, 48 Cal. 234; QStoner v. 
 
 Code, § 4836, providing that persons sev- Keith County (1896), 48 Neb. 279, 67 
 
 erally liable upon the same promi.ssory N. W. 311. "It is further claimed that 
 
 note may all, or any of them, be included there was a misjoinder of parties ; that 
 
 in the same action, a complaint declaring the sureties on the first bond should not 
 
 against the maker of a note on his written have joined in an action with those 
 
 undertaking, and also against another who signed the second. Under the view 
 
 party on a verbal promise to pay the that the default of the treasurer occurred 
 
 same note, is not demurrable on the after the execution of tiie second bond,
 
 404 CIVIL KEMEDIKS. 
 
 that this is a distinction without a difference. Believing that 
 the decision of the court was right, it is impossible to discrim- 
 inate the cases of ordinary guaranties from it by any valid and 
 substantial reasons. By permitting parties to a contract resem- 
 bling this lease to be joined in a single action, and refusing to 
 admit the same form of suit against a principal debtor and his 
 guarantor, whose undertaking is perhaps indorsed upon the same 
 writing, the courts in fact make the nature of their obligation to 
 depend upon the position of the written matter on the paper, and 
 not upon the terms and nature of their agreements. The rules 
 of procedure, as established by the reformed system, were never 
 designed to be controlled by such considerations. The judicial 
 decisions which illustrate the second class of provisions quoted 
 at the commencement of this section have already been cited and 
 discussed in section sixth, and need not be repeated here. 
 
 SECTION NINTH. 
 BRINGING IN NEW PARTIES: INTERVENING. 
 
 § 308. * 411. Two Types of Code Provisions herein. As the 
 equitable theory of parties was adopted in the new procedure, we 
 should naturally expect some provision for changing them, either 
 by addition or diminution. In accordance with this expectation, 
 the codes all contain sections prescribing rules more or less elab- 
 orate and explicit for tlie guidance of the courts in this respect. 
 They follow two different types. The one is the mere statement 
 in a statutory form of the doctrine as to bringing in new parties 
 which had long prevailed in courts of equity, and to it is atlded a 
 provision which permits a summary interpleader to be ordered by 
 the court, upon motion, in certain specified cases, thus avoiding 
 the delay and trouble of a fonnal interpleader suit. The New 
 York code adopted this type, and it has been followed, sometimes 
 with slight variations, but often with literal exactpess, by most of 
 the State codes and practice acts. The other type is entirely dif- 
 ferent. It discards entirely all the ancient notions; it goes far 
 beyond the concessions made by the equity courts; it creates, 
 
 the sureties on both bonds were properly prin(i]);il to faitlifuUy jicrfonn the duties 
 joined as parties defendants. They were of liis oflke."3 
 each and all liable for the failure of the
 
 BUINGING IN NEW PAUTIES. 405 
 
 under the title "Intervention," or ''Intervening," a new division 
 of the procedure. The fundamental notion is, that the person 
 ultimately and really interested in the result of a litigation — the 
 person who will be entitled to the linal benefit of the recovery — 
 may at any time, at any stage, intervene and be made a party, so 
 that the whole possible controversy shall be ended in one action 
 and by a single judgment. The States v/hicli have adopted this 
 type to its fullest extent are Iowa and California, and their ex- 
 ample has been followed in a number of others. 
 
 §309. *412. Statutory Provisions of First Form. The provisions 
 which follow the first form, as thus described, are all represented 
 by the sections contained in the New York code : " The court 
 may determine any controversy between the parties before it, 
 where it can be done without prejudice to the rights of others, 
 or by saving their rights ; but where a complete determination 
 of the controversy cannot be had without the presence of other 
 parties, the court must cause them to be brought in. 
 
 " And when in an action for the recovery of real or personal 
 property a person not a party to the action, but having an interest 
 in the subject thereof, makes application to the court to be made a 
 party, it may order him to be brought in by the proper amendment. 
 
 "A defendant against whom an action is pending upon a con- 
 tract, or for specific real or personal property, may, at any time 
 before answer, upon affidavit that a person not a party to the 
 action, and without collusion with him, makes against him a de- 
 mand for the same debt or property, upon due notice to such 
 person and the adverse party, apply to the court for an order to 
 substitute such person in his place, and discharge him from 
 liability to either party, on his depositing in the court the amount 
 of the debt, or delivering the property or its value to such person 
 as the court may direct; and the court may, in its discretion, 
 make the order." ^ 
 
 1 [^The present New York statute reads a person, not a party to the action, has au 
 
 as follows : Code Civ. Pro., § 4.52 : " The interest in the subject thereof, or in real 
 
 court may determine the controversy, as property, tlie title to which may in any 
 
 between the parties before it, where it niauuer be affected by the judgment, or 
 
 can do so without prejudice to the rights in real property for injury to which the 
 
 of others, or by saving their rights ; but complaint demands relief, and makes ap- 
 
 where a complete determination of tiie plication to tlie court to be made a party, 
 
 controversy cannot be had without the it must direct him to be brought in by tlie 
 
 presence of other parties, the court must proper amendment." Code Civ. Pro., 
 
 direct them to be brouglit in. And where §820: "A defendant against whom an
 
 406 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 310. * 41 o. Statutory Provision of Second Form. The Second 
 form of the statutory provisiou creating and regulating the subject 
 of "Intervention" is as follows: "Any person who has an in- 
 terest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of the 
 parties to the action, or against both, may become a party to an 
 action between other persons, either by joining the plaintiff in 
 claiming what is sought by the petition, or by uniting with the 
 defendant in resisting the claim of the plaintiff, or by demanding 
 anything adversely to both the plaintiff and the defendant, either 
 before or after issue has been joined in the cause, and before the 
 trial commences. The court shall determine upon the inter- 
 vention at the same time that the action is decided, and the 
 iutervenor has no right to delay ; and if the claim of the inter- 
 venor is not sustained, he shall pay all costs of the intervention. 
 The intervention shall be by petition, which must set forth the 
 facts on which it rests ; and all the pleadings therein shall 
 
 action to recover upou a contract, or an 
 action of ejectment, or an action to recover 
 a chattel, is pending, may, at any time be- 
 fore answer, npon proof, by affidavit, that a 
 person, not a party to the action, makes a 
 demand against bim for the same debt or 
 property, without collusion with him, ap- 
 ply to the court, upon notice to that person 
 and the adverse party, for an order to 
 substitute t!iat person in his place, and to 
 discharge him from liability to either, on 
 his paying ijito court tlie amount of the 
 debt, or delivering the possession of the 
 property, or its value, to such person as 
 the court directs ; or upon it appearing 
 that the defendant disputes, in whole or in 
 ]iart. the liability as asserted against him 
 by different claimants, or that he has 
 some interest in the suljject-matter of the 
 co.itroversy which he desires to assert, his 
 applii-atioa may be for an order joining 
 the other claimant or claimants as co-de- 
 fendants with him in the action. The 
 court may, in its discretion, make such 
 order, upon such terms as to costs and 
 payments into court of the amount of 
 the debt, or part thereof, or delivery 
 of the po.ssossioii of tlie property, or its 
 value or part thereof, as may be just, 
 and tlierenpon the entire controversy may 
 1)6 determiiK'd in tlie action."] Ohio. 
 §§ 40-4.T; California, §§ 386, 389; Ne- 
 
 bra.ska, §§ 46-48; North Carolina, § 65; 
 Nevada, § 17; ^Arizona, ,Kev. St., 1901, 
 § 1308; Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., 
 §§ ."jCSj-.^es: ; Colorado, §§ 16-18; Con- 
 necticut, Gen. St., 1902, §§ 621, 1019: 
 Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §§ 317.5, 
 3176, 3178; Indiana, Burns' St, §§ 273, 
 274; Iowa, Code, 1897, §§ 3466, 3487; 
 Kan.sas, Gen. St., 1901, §§4469-4471 ; Ken- 
 tucky, Code, 1895, §§ 28, 29; Missouri, 
 Rev. St., 1899, § 543 ; Montana, §§ 588, 
 591; North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, 
 §§ 5238, 5240 ; Ohio, Bates' St., §§ 501.-5, 
 5014, 5016; Oklahoma, St., 1893, §§391.3- 
 3915; Oregon, Hill's Laws, §§ 40, 41; 
 South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 143; South 
 Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, §§ 6085, 6087; 
 Utah, Rev. St., 1898, §§ 2924, 2926; 
 Washington, Bal. Code, §§ 4840, 4842; 
 Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2610; Wyoming, 
 Rev. St., 1899, §§ 3487, .3488, 3490.] 
 Several of these sections differ somewhat 
 from the language of the New York code 
 quoted in the text, but the differences are 
 not material ; they relate entirely to details 
 of ))ractice, and do not enlarge nor restrict 
 the power conferred upon the courts. 
 See People v. Albany & Vt. R. Co., 77 N. V. 
 232; Chapman r. Forbes, 123 N. Y. 532, 
 .539; Ladd r. Stevenson, 112 N. Y. 325; 
 Johnston v. Donvan, 106 N. Y. 267.
 
 BRINGING IN NEW I'AUTIES. 
 
 407 
 
 be governed by the same principles and rules as obtain in other 
 pleadings." ^ 
 
 § 311. * 414. Three Transactions herein. First of said Transac- 
 tions. Moving Party. Tlxe several clauses thus quoted at large 
 relate to and establish three entirely different transactions in the 
 conduct of an action. Not a little confusion has arisen from a 
 neglect to keep these three subjects separate ; the requisites of 
 the one have been confounded with those of another, and thus 
 mistakes have followed which a little care in examining the statute 
 would have obviated. The three transactions referred to are the 
 following: The first is provided for in all the codes, and is the 
 brief enactment of a familiar rule in equity. It is the bringing 
 in additional parties by the court when a complete determination 
 of the controversy cannot be had without their presence. This 
 act plainly contemplates the fiict that there are already parties 
 before the court, defendants against whom the plaintiff has a 
 cause of action, and is entitled to some relief. The enlarmnsf 
 the number of parties, under such circumstances, is clearly not 
 the same thing as the commencing a new action because the 
 plaintiff has failed to make out any cause of action against those 
 
 1 Code of Iowa [;i897, §§ 3594-3596], 
 slightly changed in phraseology from the 
 former revisions of the statutes ; Califor- 
 nia, Code of 1872, § 387 : " Any person 
 may, before the trial, intervene in an action 
 or proceeding, who has an interest in the 
 matter in litigation, in the success of either 
 of the parties, or an interest a;^ainst botli. 
 An intervention takes place when a third 
 person is permitted to become a party to 
 an actiou or proceeding between other 
 persons, either by joining the plaintiff in 
 claiming what is sought by tlie complaint, 
 or by uniting with the defendant in resist- 
 ing the claims of the plaintiff, or by de- 
 manding anything adversely to both the 
 plaintiff and the defendant, and is made 
 by complaint setting fortli the grounds 
 upon which the intervention rests, filed 
 by leave of the court, and served upon 
 the parties to the action or proceeding 
 who have not appeared, and upon the at- 
 torneys of the parties who have appeared, 
 who may answer or demur to it as if it 
 were an original complaint." Tliis provi- 
 sion is somewhat changed from the origi- 
 nal f<irin in the statutes of 18.54, ch. 84, 
 
 §§ 71-74. It is substantially the same as 
 that in Iowa, except that tlie intervenor 
 must obtain leave of the court to file his 
 complaint, while in Iowa lie files his pe- 
 tition as a matter of course at his own 
 election. 
 
 QThe provisions of the Calforuia statute 
 respecting intervention are found in sub- 
 stantially similar form in Idaho, Code Civ. 
 Pro., 1901, 4) 3177 ; Montana, §589 ; North 
 Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5239; South 
 Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6086; Utali, 
 Rev. St., 1898, § 2925; Washington, 
 Bal. Code, § 4846; Colorado, §§ 22-24. 
 The provisions of the Iowa statute are 
 found in substantially similar iorm in Min- 
 nesota, Gen. St., 1894, § 5273; Nebraska, 
 Comp. St., 1901, §§ 5638-5640; Nevada, 
 Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3694. The Arizona 
 statute reads as follows : " Any person who 
 has an interest in the sul)ject-matter of tlie 
 suit which can be affected by the judg- 
 ment, may, on leave of the court or judge, 
 intervene in such suit or proceeding at anv 
 time before the trial." Rev. St., 1901 
 § 1278.3
 
 408 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 whom he has already sued. By whose desire or on whose motion 
 the additional parties shall be brought in, the section does not 
 specify, but the terms are broad enough to include every case. 
 In the majority of instances the plaintiff doubtless applies for the 
 additional parties. Cases may and do arise in which the defend- 
 ant, deeming it necessary to protect his own interests, makes the 
 application. Finally, the court may, on its own motion, order in 
 the persons whose presence it regards proper to a complete de- 
 termination of the issues. 
 
 §312. * 415. Second of said Transactions. Scope of Statutory Pro- 
 vision herein. Moving Party. Tlie second of these transactions, in 
 the progress of an action, is the bringing in and making a party 
 to the suit a third person upon his own application, — or, in the 
 very aj)propriate language of certain codes, the Intervening of a 
 third person. In respect to this proceeding there is the marked 
 difference between the two types of statutory provisions abeady 
 spoken of. Most of the codes, following that of New York, have 
 legislated upon the subject with great caution, and have merely 
 given a certain extension to the familiar common-law practice of 
 permitting a landlord to come in and defend an action of eject- 
 ment in the place of his tenant. The provision itself is Very 
 brief, and by its terms is confined to actions for the recovery of 
 real or personal property. Beyond a doubt it embraces all equita- 
 ble actions in which the remedy is the recovery of real or personal 
 property, and is not restricted to the legal actions which cor- 
 respond to the ancient ejectment and replevin. This short and 
 simple clause is the only one which authorizes a third person to 
 be made a party upon his own motion. 
 
 § 313. * 416. Intervention in Iowa and California. Origin of. 
 Passing to the codes of Iowa and California, we see that Inter- 
 vening rises at once into a proceeding of great importance. It 
 may be resorted to in any and all actions, and at every stage in 
 the action prior to the commencement of the trial. Tlie inter- 
 venor may have an interest witli tlie j^laintiff, or with the defend- 
 ant, or one special to himself and adver.se to both of the original 
 parties. He does not ask the privilege of intervening, and obtain 
 that privilege by an order; he intervenes as a matter of right, by 
 filing and serving his petition in the same manner as though he 
 was commencing an ordinary action, and his rights are passed 
 upon and disposed of, together wilh those of the plaintiff and
 
 BKINGING IN NEW PARTIES. 409 
 
 defendant, at the trial. ^ It is plain that this is a judicial pro- 
 ceeding utterly unknown before in our ordinary courts, entirely 
 unlike anything which had been customary in the common law or 
 equity tribunals of England or the United States. Indeed, it was 
 confessedly borrowed from the procedure established by the code 
 of Louisiana. 
 
 § 314. *417. Third of said Transactions. Interpleader. How- 
 Distinguished from other of said Transactions. The third judicial 
 transaction is the act of a defendant in procuring anotiier person, 
 not a party to the suit, to be substituted in place of himself as 
 the party defendant, and himself to be thereby discharged from 
 all liability in respect of the cause of action, — a special remedy 
 long known in another form as an Interpleader. It should be 
 carefully distinguished from each of the two former proceedings. 
 Unlike the second, the stranger does not come in on his own 
 motion ; unlike the first, the application can only be made by a 
 defendant. It is confined in its operation to three kinds of 
 actions: those brought to recover money on a contract, either 
 debt or damages, those brought to recover specific real property, 
 and those brought to recover specific personal property. It is a 
 substitute, by means of the summary mode of a motion and an 
 order made thereon, for the ancient equitable action called the 
 Bill of Interpleader. The consideration of this subject does not 
 legitimately fall within the purposes of the present work; it 
 does not involve the question who are and who are not proper 
 
 ^ [|But see East Riverside Irrigation those whom he desires to make defend- 
 
 District v. Holcorab (1899), 126 Cal. 315, ants, and that new parties brought in 
 
 58 Pac. 817. In this case third parties against his will cannot be allowed to set 
 
 had been brought in and made defendants up against him defences and affirmative 
 
 at the request of the original defendant causes of action which the original defeud- 
 
 and against the objection of the plaintiff, ant could not have set up ; and this is 
 
 These third parties " set up new matters especially so where the granting of the 
 
 and causes of action not involved in the relief sought by the original complaint 
 
 original suit — not defences to the action, would not have prejudiced the other 
 
 and not available at all to the original causes of action wliich the new parties 
 
 defendant," and their right so to do was seek to liave adjudicated. Peculiar cir- 
 
 one of the questions passed upon by the cumstances may make exceptions to the 
 
 Supreme Court. Among other things the rule, but tlie general principle is as above 
 
 Court said : " The principles which govern stated." See also Clay County Laud Co. 
 
 are, however, to a great extent those v. Alcox (1902), P8 Minn. 4, 92 N. W. 
 
 wliich a])ply to interventions and counter- 464. See Yaiuiieter v. Fidelity Trust Co. 
 
 claims and the bringing in of new parties (1899), 107 Ky. lOS, 53 S. W. 10, in which 
 
 and those which would apply to cros.s-bills Horn v. Volcano Water Co., 13 Cal. 62, is 
 
 under the old equity practice. The gen- quoted and approved.] 
 eral rule is, that a plaintiff may select
 
 410 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 parties, and there is no possible reason for its being discussed in 
 this connection except that the statutory provision which regu- 
 lates it is immediately associated with other clauses which do 
 relate to parties.^ The two other judicial proceedings will now 
 be examined with the aid of such judicial decisions as have 
 explained their scope and effect. 
 
 ^ 315. *418. I. Bringing in Additional Parties. When the Court 
 must act. The issues between the original parties are to be 
 determined, if that can be done without prejudice to the rights 
 of others, or by saving the rights of others; if this be possible, 
 the cause should be adjudicated as it was presented for decision. ^ 
 
 1 QSee the folluwing receut cases re- 
 specting Interpleader : Hirsch v. ISIayer 
 (1901), 165 N. Y. 236, .59 N. E. 89; E. G. 
 L. Co. V. McKeige (1893), 139 N. Y. 237, 
 34 X. E. 898; First Nat. Bank v. Beebe 
 (1900), 62 0. St. 41, 56 N. E. 485; John- 
 ston v. Oliver (1894), 51 O. St. 6, 36 N. E. 
 458 ; Brownwell & Wright Car Co. i-. 
 Barnard (1897), 139 Mo. 142, 40 S. W. 
 762 ; Scott-Force Hat Co. v. Hombs (1894), 
 127 Mo. 392, 30 S. W. 183; Roselle v. 
 Farmers' Bank (1893), 119 Mo. 84, 24 
 S. W. 744 ; McFadden v. Swinerton 
 (1900), 36 Ore. 336, 59 Pac. 816; North 
 Pacific Lumber Co. v. Lang (1895), 28 
 Ore. 246, 42 Pac. 799 ; Austin v. March 
 (1902), 86 Minn. 232, 90 N. W. 384 ; John 
 R Davis Lumber Co. r. The First National 
 Bank of Milwaukee (1894), 87 Wis. 435, 
 58 N. W. 743; Jaques v. Dawes (1902), 
 _ ^Qh. — , 92 N. W. 570 ; Hartford Life 
 & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Cumming.s (1897), 
 50 Neb. 236, 69 N. W. 782 ; Daulton r. 
 Stuart (1902), 30 Wash. 562, 70 Pac. 
 1096; Walker r. Bamberger (1898), 17 
 Utah, 239, 54 Pac. 108; Hockaday v. 
 Drye (1898), 7 Okla. 288, 54 Pac. 495J 
 
 ■^ Qln Clay County Land Co. i-. Alcox 
 (1902), 88 Minn. 4, 92 N. W. 464, plain- 
 tiff commenced an action against Alcox 
 for the restitution of its offices and to 
 restrain him from using them. " The an- 
 swer denied the allegations of the com- 
 plaint and alleged that the appellant 
 commenced the action in the name of the 
 land company without authority for hi.s 
 own benefit. It then alleged that the re- 
 spondent and appellant were copartners 
 under the firm name of the Clay County 
 Land Company, fur the purpose of buying 
 
 and selling real estate ; that the prosecu- 
 tion of the business resulted in a profit of 
 $7,500, one half of which belonged to the 
 respondent, but that the appellant had re- 
 tained the whole thereof, and refused to 
 account for ancr pay over the same. The 
 answer prayeti that the appellant be made 
 a party to the action, that a receiver be 
 appointed for the co-partnership business, 
 and that an accounting be had b_v the 
 court, or under its direction." Alcox pro- 
 cured an order from the court " on appel- 
 lant to show cause why he should not be 
 made a party plaintiff to the action and 
 reply to the respondent's answer therein." 
 Appellant moved to dismiss the order on 
 the ground that he was a resident of an- 
 other county and that the court was with- 
 out jurisdiction to make him a party 
 plaintiff. The trial court denied this mo- 
 tion of dismissal and made an order re- 
 quiring appellant to reply to the " answer 
 of the respondent within twenty days, and 
 in default of such reply, that judgment 
 for the relief demanded iu the answer be 
 rendered against him as if he had l)een 
 made a party to the action in the first in- 
 stance." The only question considered by 
 the Supreme Court in reversing the case 
 was " wiiether the trial court erred in 
 making its order comjielliug the appellant 
 to appear as a plaintiff in the action and 
 reply to the respondent's answer under 
 penalty of having judgment entered 
 against him for the relief demanded iu 
 the answer." In disposing of the ques- 
 tion the court said : " It is not a question 
 of jurisdiction of the court to make the 
 order, as counsel seem to treat it, but 
 whether it was error to make it in view of
 
 BIUNLIING IN NEW PARTIES. 
 
 411 
 
 If a complete determination of the controversy cannot be had 
 without the presence of other parties, the court must cause them 
 to be brought in. The force and effect of the whole provision 
 depend upon the interpretation given to the clause, " when a 
 complete determination of the controvers}- cannot be had without 
 the presence of other parties." To use the language of an emi- 
 nent judge which has been repeatedly approved by other courts 
 in different States, this clearly means, " When there are other 
 persons, not parties, whose rights must be ascertained and settled 
 before the rights of the parties to the suit can be determined. 
 Doubtless there are many other cases in which a defendant may 
 require other parties to be brought in, so that the judgment of 
 the court in the action may protect him against the claims of 
 such other parties; but this is his own privilege and he may 
 
 the facts of tliis particular case. We are of 
 the opiniou that it was, aud that the error 
 was one which deprived the appellant 
 of his legal right to have any transitory 
 action which the respondent might bring 
 against him tried in the district court 
 of the county in which he resided, unless 
 the place of trial was changed by tlie court 
 for cause. . . . The statute now provides 
 that whenever the plaintiff or defendant, 
 or in case of counterclaim, or a demand 
 for affirmative relief, in any action shall 
 discover that any party ought, in order to 
 a full determination of such action, to 
 have been made a party plaintiff or de- 
 fendant therein, the court, if satisfied that 
 such is the case, shall make its order 
 bringing in such new party, and require 
 liim to answer the complaint, or reply to 
 the answer, as the case may be. That is, 
 it is only when the bringing in of other 
 parties is necessary to a full determi- 
 nation of the controversy between the 
 original parties tendered by the complaint, 
 answer, or counterclaim that the court 
 can compel them to come into the action 
 as parties plaintiffs or defendants. Now, 
 the defendant's so-called counterclaim in 
 this action tenders no issue between the 
 original parties to the action for a full 
 determination of which it is necessary that 
 appellant should be made a party plaintiff. 
 It is simply an allegation of a cause of 
 action wholly distinct from the cause of 
 action alleged in the complaint, aud with 
 which the plaintiff has no connection. 
 
 We have here a case where the defendant 
 denied all of the allegations of the com- 
 plaint, aud alleged that the appellant 
 commenced the action in the name of the 
 land company without authority. This 
 did not make it necessary to bring in the 
 appellant as a party in order to secure a 
 full determination of the controversy be- 
 tween the plaintiff and the defendant, for, 
 if his answer was true, he was entitled to 
 a judgment against the plaintiff on the 
 merits. But the respondent, conceiving 
 that he had an independent cause of action 
 against the appellant, alleges it in his 
 answer, and makes it the basis of tlie 
 order compelling the appellant to reply to 
 the answer and litigate the action with 
 him in the county of Clay In this way 
 the original action is converted into one 
 by the respondent against tlie a|i])ellant, 
 the former being in fact tlie plaintiff and 
 the latter defendant, whereby the appel- 
 lant is deprived of his legal right to a trial 
 thereof in the county where he resides. 
 It needs no argument to support the con- 
 clusion that the statute authorizes nothing 
 of the kind, and that there has been a 
 miscarriage of justice in this ciise. We 
 therefore hold tliat the order of the district 
 court making the appellant a party and 
 requiring him to reply to the answer was 
 reversible error, and that the action should 
 have lieen dismissed as to him." See to 
 the same effect East Riverside Irrigation 
 District v. Holcomb (1899), 126 Cal. 315, 
 58 Pac. 817.]
 
 412 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 waive it."^ The distinction between the two conditions here 
 spoken of is plain. In the first, the rights of the parties to the 
 record are so bound up with those of others, that they cannot be 
 ascertained and fixed without at the same time ascertaining and 
 fixing the rights of the others also, and to do this, these others 
 must of course be before the court. In the second, the issues 
 between the parties to the record can be decided, but the rela- 
 tions of the defendant towards third persons are of such a nature 
 that they will be affected by the decision, and it would be better 
 and safer for him if these persons should be brought in so that 
 his relations might be defined and protected in the single judg- 
 ment. Such a proceeding is not, however, absolutely necessary 
 to the determination of the controversy, and the defendant may 
 waive his claim to the additional parties ; it is, in fact, a privi- 
 lege, not an absolute necessity. The circumstances and relations 
 to which I allude were aptly described and the rule concerning 
 them accurately stated by another judge: "There are cases in 
 which it is proper and necessary to make a jierson defendant 
 upon the ground of avoiding a multiplicity of suits. His rights 
 may not be directly affected by the decree, but it may occur that 
 if the plaintiff succeeds, the defendant will thereby acquire the 
 right to call upon the party omitted or not joined, either to re- 
 imburse him or reinstate him in the position lost by the plaintiff's 
 success. And if so, the person consequently liable to be thus 
 affected should be before the court that his liability may be 
 adjudicated by one proceeding. "^ 
 
 § 316. * 419. Same Subject. If the case comes within the 
 first described condition, that is, if there are other persons, not 
 parties, whose rights must be ascertained and settled before the 
 rights of the parties to the suit can be determined, then the 
 
 1 McMahon r. Allen, 12 How. Pr. 39, 358; Judy v. Farmers' & Traders' Bank, 
 45, jjer Woodruff J. ; affirmed, 3 Abb. Pr. 70 Mo. 407 ; Southal v. Shields, 81 N. C. 
 89; approved, Chapman v. Forbes, 123 28; Isler r. Koonce, 83 id. 55 ; Hodges r. 
 N. Y. 532, 538. Jvimball, 49 Iowa, 577 ; Prouty r. Lake 
 
 2 Camp (•. McGillicuddy, 10 Iowa, 201, Shore & M. S. U. Co., 85 N. Y. 272; 
 per Wright C J., citing 1 Dan. Ch. I'r. Dows r. Kidder, 84 id. 121; New York 
 329; Story's Eq. PI. § 173; Wiser v. Milk Pan Co. v. Remington Works, 25 
 IJlachly, 1 Johns. Ch. 4^7. See akso Hun, 475 ; Abbott v. .lewett, 25 id. 603 ; 
 Forepaugh v. Appold, 17 B. IMon. 632; Delancy v. Murphy, 24 id. 503; Dubber.-? 
 Baas r. Chicago & N. W. Ky. Co.. 39 r. Goux, 51 Cal. 153; Rol)in.son i-. Glea- 
 Wis. 296 ; Oro Fino, &c. Min. Co. v. Cul- son, 53 id. 38; Pfister /•. Wade, 56 id. 43 ; 
 len, 1 Idaho, 113 ; Clark v. Stanton, 24 Derham v. Lee, 87 N. Y. 599. 
 
 Minn. 232; Penfield v. Wheeler, 27 id.
 
 BRINGING IN NEW I'AUTIES. 
 
 4i: 
 
 statute is peremptory; the court must cause such persons to be 
 brought in; it is not a matter of discretion, but of absolute judi- 
 cial duty.-^ The enforcement of this duty does not rest entirely 
 upon the j^a-rties to the record. If they should neglect to raise 
 the question, and to apply for the proper order, the court, upon 
 its own motion, will supply the omission, and will either directly 
 bring in the new i)arties or remand the cause in order that the 
 plaintiff may bring them in.^ The fact that the necessary party 
 is a non-resident of the State does not change the rule ; he must 
 still be brought in.^ The addition of the necessary party may be 
 made at any stage of the cause.* The action of the court may 
 consist in requiring necessary defendants to be served with pro- 
 cess, who had been named on the record, but not brought in by 
 actual service or appearance. ° 
 
 § 317. * 420. Same Subject. Limitations herein. This per- 
 emptory duty does not arise unless the conditions of the statute 
 are fully met, and the court will not order in new parties de- 
 fendant, against the will of the plaintiff, unless they are actu- 
 ally necessary in the sense already defined.^ Thus, in an action 
 
 1 Davis V. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 2 Duer, 
 663 ; 3 Duer, 119 ; Shaver v. Brainard, 29 
 Barb. 2.t ; Sturtevaut v. Brewer, 9 Abb. 
 Pr. 414; Mitchell v. O'Neale, 4 Nev. 504; 
 Jones c. Vautress, 23 Ind. 533; Johnson 
 t'. Chandler, 15 B. Mon. 584, 589 ; John- 
 ston 1-. Neville, 68 N. C. 177 ; Whitted v. 
 Nash, 66 N. C. 590 ; [^Eureka v. Gates, 
 '(1898), 120 Cal. 54, 52 Pac. 125. In this 
 case the court said : " The rule is not 
 questioned that, under our practice, when 
 new parties are necessary for the deter- 
 mination of the issues raised by a cross 
 complaint they may and should be brought 
 in." See also Chalmers v. Trent (1894), 
 11 Utah, 88, 39 Pac. 488. For valuable 
 and interesting case in this connection 
 see Steinbach v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1902), 
 172 N. Y. 471, 65 N. E. 281. See also 
 dissenting opinion in this case. Hannegan 
 V. Roth (1896), 12 Wash. 695, 44 Pac. 256. 
 In Emerson v. Schwindt (1900), 108 Wis. 
 167, 84 N. W. 186, the court said: " But 
 the statute also provides that, ' when a 
 complete determination of the controversy 
 cannot be had without the presence of 
 other parties . . . the court shall order 
 them to be brought in,' sec. 2610. This 
 
 language seems to be mandatory." See 
 also Wheeler v. Lack (1900), 37 Ore. 238, 
 61 Pac. 849, in which the text is freely 
 quoted. For an interesting case quoting 
 the text see Robinson v. Kind (1896), 23 
 Nev. 330, 47 Pac. 1 ; Wilkius v. Lee 
 (1894), 42 S. C. 31, 19 S. E. 1016.] 
 
 2 Jones V. Vantress, 23 Ind. 533 ; 
 Mitchell V. O'Nenle, 4 Nev. 504 ; Young 
 V. Garlington, 31 S. C. 290. 
 
 ^ Sturtevaut v. Brewer, 9 Abb. 414; 
 s. c. on app., 4 Bosw. 628. 
 
 * Attorney-General r. Mayor, etc. of 
 N. Y., 3 Duer, 119; [^National Savings 
 Bank i: Cable (1900), 73 Conn. 568, 48 
 Atl. 428.] 
 
 5 Powell I-. Fincli, 5 Duer, 666. [|For 
 valuable discussion respecting the proper 
 practice when an order has been made al- 
 lowing additional persons to be made 
 parties to a cause, see White '.-. Johnson 
 (1895), 27 Ore. 282, 40 Pac. 511.] 
 
 '^ [^Nortliwestern Telephone Co. r. Rail- 
 way Co. (1900), 9 N. D. 339, 83 N. W. 215. 
 See Bauer v. Dewey (1901), 166 N. Y. 
 402, 60 N. E. 30, in which it is said the 
 court has no authority under section 452 
 of the Code of Civil Procedure to compel
 
 414 CIVIL eemedip:s. 
 
 ao^ainst the indorsers of a note, the pLaintiff will not l)e compelled 
 to bring in the maker as a co-defendant.^ Xor is a new party to 
 be ordered in merely for the purpose of settling matters between 
 him and the defendant in which the plaintiff has no interest. ^ 
 The statute Avill not permit the plaintiff to add a new defendant 
 without whose presence he could have no recover// sinca he would 
 have no cause of action. Such a proceeding would in effect be 
 the commencing a new action, and the statutory provision as- 
 sumes that in the pending action a right to obtain a recovery is 
 set up as against the original defendants. ^ The plaintiff cannot 
 be allowed, under the color of bringing in additional parties, to 
 commence a tiew action when he would have failed entirely in the 
 former one because he had not set up a good cause of action. 
 
 8 318. * 421. Examples and Illustrations. Pleadings. Rule in 
 Indiana in Reference to Assignors. I aeld a few examples of cases 
 wliere parties have been brought in ; they are designed merely as 
 illustrations. Additional parties have been ordered in, in an 
 action for the specific performance of a contract executed by 
 three when two only Avere at first made defendants;* in an action 
 for an accounting between two of a larger number of tenants in 
 common of a mine, the complete adjustment of the account re- 
 (piiring that all the others should be added ;^ in a similar action 
 for an accounting between partners in a mining venture, and for 
 a winding up of the concern;^ in an action upon a promissory 
 note given for the purchase price of land in which the vendor 
 and holder of the note sought to enforce his lien, the heirs of the 
 deceased vendee, to wliom the land had descended, were made 
 
 the plaintiff in an action in which a money holding that the section of the code (§ 452, 
 judgment only is sought and in which the C. C. P.) referred to parties in what, un- 
 title to no real, specific or tangible per- der the oki practice, would have been 
 sonal property is involved, to bring in suits in equity, aud that it was never 
 as a defendant a third party on his own intended to make it incumbent upon a 
 application] plaintiff in an action at law to sue any 
 
 ^ Sawyer r. Chambers, 11 Abb. Pr. 110. otlier than the parties he .should choose; 
 
 2 Frear ;•. Bryan, 12 Ind. .34.3, 345. citing Webster v. Bond. 9 Hun, 437; 
 
 See Carr r. Collins, 27 Ind. 306; Fagan Peoples. Albany & Vt. R. Co., 15 Hun, 
 
 r. Barnes, 14 Fla. 53, 56, 58; Pecic r. 126. 
 
 Ward, 3 Duer, 647 : Fischer r. Holmes, ^ McMahon v. Allen, 18 How. Pr. 39; 
 
 123 Ind. 525 ; Pollard r. Lathrop, 12 Colo, affirmed, 3 Abb. Pr. 89. 
 171; White's Bk of Buffalo r. Farthing, * Powell v. Finch, 5 Duer, 666. See 
 
 101 N. Y. 344, 348; Chapman v. Forbes, Johnston »•. Neville, 68 N. C. 177. 
 123 N. Y. 532. It is said in this last case » Mitchell r. O'Xealo, 4 Xev. 504. 
 
 (p. .538) that the decisions of tlie New ^ Settembre v. Putnam, -30 Cal. 490. 
 
 York courts have been fpiite uniform in
 
 BRINGING I.\ NEW PARTIES. 415 
 
 defendants;^ in proceedings in aid of an execntion the judgment 
 debtor is a necessary party, and will be brouglit in.^ Under the 
 requirements of the Indiana code in reference to assignors of 
 tilings in action when transferred without indorsement, if the 
 assignor dies, the assignee must make liis personal representative 
 a defendant in the action, or must show that there is none.^ 
 After new parties have been brought in, the pleadings must be 
 made to show that they are proper. When new defendants have 
 been added on the application of the plaintiff, but the complaint, 
 which stated no cause of action against them originally, had not 
 been amended so as to supply this defect, it must be dismissed 
 as against such defendants at the trial, and judgment thereon 
 rendered in their favor.^ 
 
 § 319. * 422. Author's Suggestions herein. I cannot paSS from 
 this subject without adding certain remarks which are suggested 
 by it, and which concern the practical administration of justice. 
 The clause of the codes under examination is expressed in the 
 most general terms, containing no exception nor limitation. 
 Whenever a necessary party has been omitted by the pleader, the 
 court has the power in any stage of the cause to remedy the 
 defect by ordering him to be brought in, and the case to stand 
 over until that is done.^ It is almost universally the fact that 
 an objection for the nonjoinder of parties is really technical, that 
 is, it does not go to the entire merits of the controversy. A 
 cause of action is generally set forth against those, or in favor of 
 those, who are actually made parties ; and the only error consists, 
 not in stating the cause of action incorrectly, but in omitting 
 some of the persons who are or rather may he beneficially or 
 injuriously affected by it. If it be the true purpose and design 
 of courts to administer justice between litigants, and to ascertain 
 and enforce their rights and obligations, then it would seem to 
 be the primary duty of the judges to decide every cause as far 
 
 1 Jones I'. Vantress. 23 Ind. 53,3. defendant to make liis answer more defi- 
 
 2 Wall V. Whisler, 14 Ind. 228. nite and certain by alleging the name of 
 
 3 St. John r. Hardwick, 11 Ind. 2.51. such third party was sustained.] 
 
 See Darty. McQuilty, 6 Ind. 391 ; Bray !•. •* Smith v. \Veage, 21 Wis. 440. See 
 
 Black, 57 Ind. 417. \\\\ Kyes r. Wilcox also Blakely v. Frazier, 20 S. C. 144. 
 (1900), 13 S. D. 228, 83 N. W. 93, the al- & QMiUs y Callahan (1900), 126 N. C. 
 
 legations of the answer disclosed that the 750, 36 S. E. 164: l^obson i-. Southern 
 
 presence of a third party was necessary to IJy. Co. ( 1901 ), 129 X. C. 289, 40 S. E. 42 ; 
 
 a complete determination of the contro- Finch v. Gregg (1900), 126 N. C. 176, 35 
 
 ver.'^y. The plaintiff's motion to require S. E. 251.]
 
 416 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 as possible upon the merits, and not upon some technical point 
 which puts no question at rest, but simply renders it necessary 
 to commence a new suit. Most emphatically does this seem to 
 be their duty when the statute has provided a mode for accom- 
 plishing this result, and has even required in peremptory terms 
 that this mode shall be pursued. AVhenever the objection that 
 there is a defect of necessary or proper parties is raised, it is 
 always possible for the court in a summary manner to order them 
 in, and to retain the cause for tliat purpose, and to decide the 
 issues upon the merits, when the required addition has Ijeen 
 effected. Not only is this course possil)le, but it is actually 
 enjoined upon the courts by the. codes. And yet this most bene- 
 ficial provision of the statutes is to a great extent a dead letter. 
 I believe there is hardly another section of the codes so well 
 calculated, if it were observed in its spirit and letter, to prevent 
 the success of mere technicalities and to promote justice among 
 suitors by procuring the decision of causes upon their merits. 
 In marked contrast with the judicial practice which prevails to 
 so great an extent in the States which have adopted the reformed 
 American procedure, is a provision of the new system of practice 
 recently approved by the British Parliament, which declares that 
 under no circumstances sliall an action be dismissed, and the 
 plaintiff turned out of court, because he has committed an error 
 in the selection of parties, either by uniting too many or too 
 few, but that in every instance the court shall make the proper 
 amendment, and by striking out or bringing in, shall shape the 
 action into a proper form and condition for a decision of its 
 issues upon the merits.^ Although our codes do not contain 
 such a provision in express terms, they do contain all that is 
 necessary for the adoption and enforcement of the same general 
 rule of procedure by the courts. The New York Court of 
 Appeals has recently made a decision which is in close agreement 
 with the foregoing views. It holds that if the plaintiff does not. 
 bring in tlie necessary parties after an objection properly made, 
 the complaint may, in the discretion of the court, be dismissed, 
 but without prejudice to a new action. An unqualified judg- 
 ment of dismissal in such a case is erroneous. But the com- 
 plaint should not be dismissed even without prejudice, and the 
 plaintiff thus put to a new action, when the same end can be 
 
 1 Supreme Court of JiKiitature Act ; Schedule, § 9.
 
 INTERVENTION. 417 
 
 reached by allowing the cause to stand over in order that the 
 plaintiff may add the necessar}' j)artie.s.i 
 
 ^320. * 423. II. Intervention. Need not be Necessary Party. 
 Discretion of Court. Time of Application. I proceed first to 
 examine tlie force and effect of that provision which is found in 
 most of the codes. In order that a iierson may avail himself of 
 the permission given by it, and may make himself a party to an 
 action, he need not be a necessary party.^ The granting of such 
 an application lies in the discretion of the court, and it should 
 not be permitted if the applicant is already a plaintiff in another 
 suit in. which he may obtain all the relief he asks.^ The appli- 
 cation must be made before judgment, if made at all.^ 
 
 § 321. * 424. statutory Provision Limited. Illustrations. The 
 occasions on which a third person may intervene in a pending 
 action are very few. The scope of the provision is exceedingly 
 limited; it has been said that its operation is confined to those 
 cases in which a bill of interpleader would have been permitted, 
 under the former practice, to accomplish the same end.^ It is 
 certain that the right to intervene can only be exercised in 
 actions for the recovery of real or personal property. ^ It does 
 
 1 Sherman r. Parish, 53 N. Y. 48.3,490, 3 gcheidt v. Sturgis, 10 Bosw. 606. 
 
 491. QSee the importaut case of Steiubach That tlie grautiug of the application is 
 
 V. Prudential Ins. Co. (1902), 172 N. Y. di.scretionary, see Colgrove i\ Koonce, 76 
 
 471, 65 N. E. 281, the facts of which are N. C.363. QMcNamara r. Crystal Mining 
 
 set out in note to § *287. In this case the Co. (1900), 23 Wash. 26, 62 Pac. 81.] 
 court said : " The personal representatives * Carswell v. Neville, 12 How. Pr. 445 ; 
 
 of Fehrman were necessary parties, and Meadows v. Goff (Ky. 1890), 14 S. W. 
 
 tlie court should have dismissed the com- IJep. 535 ; Chapman v. Forbes, 123 N. Y. 
 
 plaint unless within a reasonable time they 532, 540. [^Safely i\ Caldwell (1895), 17 
 
 were brought in, not necessarily for the Mont. 184, 42 Pac. 766; Dupont v. Amos 
 
 protection of the defendant as it had neg- (1896), 97 la. 484, 66 N. W. 774 ; Keehn v. 
 
 lected its rights, but for their own protec- Keehn (1902), 115 la. 467, 88 N. W. 957 ; 
 
 tion, as well as the seemly and orderly Owens v. Colgan (1893), 97 Cal. 454, 32 
 
 administration of justice." See, however, Pac. 519; Clarke r. Baird (1893), 98 Cal. 
 
 the vigorous dissenting opinion in this 642, 33 Pac. 756 ; Hibernia Savings and 
 
 case by Haight J. concurred in by O'Brien Loan Society i'. Churchill (1900), 128 Cal. 
 
 and Martin JJ. In Hannegan v. Roth 633, 61 Pac. 278; McConniff v. Van 
 
 (1896), 12 Wash. 695, 44 Pac. 256, the Dusen (1898), 57 Neb. 49, 77 N. W. 348; 
 
 court said : " While a court will not pro- Deere v. Eagle Mfg. Co. (1896), 49 Neb. 
 
 ceed to final judgment in the absence of 385, 68 N. W. 504.] 
 
 a necessary party, it will not dismiss the ^ Hornby !>. Gordon, 9 Bosw. 656. The 
 
 action on account of the nonjoinder of following cases are illustrations of such 
 
 such party, but will retain it until all ne- intervention : Sims v. Goethe, 82 N. C. 
 
 cessary parties are brought in, after which 268 ; Peck v. Parchin, 52 Iowa, 46 ; Peo- 
 
 it will proceed to judgment on the merits." pie i'. Albany & Vt. Tl. Co., 77 N. Y. 232 ; 
 
 Citing § *292 and * 293 of the text.] Conant v. Frary, 49 Ind. 530. 
 
 '■2 Carter v. Mills, 30 Mo. 432. 6 Kelsey v. Murray, 28 How. Pr. 24:;; 
 
 27
 
 418 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 not exist, therefore, in an action to recover money; as, for 
 example, in a suit for wharfage, persons claiming to be owners 
 of the wharf were not permitted to intervene;^ nor in an action 
 in the nature of a creditor's suit, to reach a surplus of money in 
 a certain person's hands ;2 nor in an action to dissolve a partner- 
 ship, and for an accounting;^ nor in any action on contract for 
 the recovery of debt or damages.'* In an action to recover pos- 
 session of goods, on account of the vendee's fraud, third persons, 
 claiming to have purchased them from him, cannot intervene.^ 
 
 18 Abb. Pr. 294; Tallman i: Ildllister, 
 9 How. Pr. 508 ; Judd v. Young, 7 How. 
 Pr. 79. 
 
 1 Kelsey v. Murrny, 18 Abb. Pr. 294. 
 
 - Tallman ;•. Hollister, 9 How. Pr. 508. 
 
 3 Daytou v. Wilkes, 5 liosw. 655. 
 
 •* .Judd V. Young, 7 How. Pr. 79. 
 
 5 Hornby i". Gordon, 9 Bosw. 656. 
 QFor additional cas6s in which interven- 
 tion was not permitted, see the following: 
 Murray v. Polglase (1899), 23 Mont. 401, 
 59 Pac. 4.39 (by one who had not filed 
 adverse claim under the statute to mining 
 claim, though he claimed an interest in 
 tlie premises adverse to both plaintiff and 
 (iefendant) ; Dietrich v. Steam Dredge 
 (1894), 14 Mont. 261, 36 Pac. 81 (by a 
 stranger to a suit commenced, and who 
 had not obtained leave of court or made 
 any showing by complaint, but who upon 
 his own motion appeared and demurred to 
 the complaint) ; Denver Power & Irriga- 
 tion Co. V. Denver, etc. Co. (1902), — 
 Col. — , 69 Pac. 568 (by a party who had 
 no interest in the subject-matter of dis- 
 ])ute between litigants) ; Ball v. Cedar 
 Valley Creamery Co. (1896), 98 la. 184, 
 67 N. W. 232 (by one claiming an interest 
 in property about to be sold under an 
 execution issued upon a judgment) ; Bank 
 of Commerce v. Timbrell (1900), 113 Iowa, 
 713, 84 N. W. 519 (by one to whom an 
 ab.solute a.ssigninent liad been made; he 
 must be .substituted a.s plaintiff) : Hoppe 
 /•. Fountain (1894), 104 Cal. 94,37 Pac. 894 
 (by parties holding title not subject to a 
 mortgage in an action brouglit to foreclose 
 the mortgage) ; Goodrich v. Williamson 
 (1901), 10 Okla. 588, 63 Pac. 974 (by a 
 general creditor of a husband claiming 
 that the promissory note sued upon was 
 executed by the wife in fraud of the 
 
 creditors of the husband of whom the 
 intervenor was one, the latter asking that 
 the proceeds of the note be awarded to 
 it); Bray v. Booker (1897), 6 N. D. 526, 
 72 N. \V. 933 (by a bank, who was the 
 creditor of the vendor, in a suit by the 
 vendor against the vendee to enforce a 
 vendor's lien for the unpaid jjurchase 
 price, the vendee having agreed to ])ay a 
 portion of the purcliase price to the bank) ; 
 McXaniara v. Crystal .Mining Co. (1900), 
 23 Wash. 26, 62 Pac. 81; Dickson v. 
 Dows (1902), 11 N. D. 404, 92 N. W. 798 ; 
 Churchill v. Stephenson (1896), 14 Wash. 
 620, 45 Pac. 28 (by a mere general or 
 contract creditor in an action against an 
 administrator for the recovery of real 
 e.state) ; Haines i'. Stewart (1902), — Neb. 
 — , 91 N. W. 539 (by one who merely 
 claims to be the owner of attached prop- 
 erty for the purpose of liaving his owner- 
 ship determined in the attachment suit) ; 
 Omaha S. R. Co. v. Beeson (1893), 36 
 Xeb. 361, .54 N. W. 557 (must have some 
 interest in the subject of controversy. A 
 mere contingent liability to answer over 
 to tlie defendant, without any privity with 
 the plaintiff, is not sufficient) ; Staidey v. 
 Foote et al. (1900), 9 Wyo. 335, 63 Pac. 
 940 (by a claimant to money garnished, 
 or property attached in an action between 
 other parties, for the purpose of having 
 his rights thereto determined); Urlan ?•. 
 Weeth (1902). — Neb. — , 89 N. W. 427 
 (by one alleging that he was the son of 
 the mortgagor, in a mortgage foreclosure 
 suit, that the premises mortgaged consti- 
 tuted a homestead, that tlie mortgagor 
 was dead and the intervenor was si-izfd in 
 his own right of the real estate described 
 in his petition, and asking tliat his interest 
 in the homestead be determined. The
 
 IXTERVENTIOX. 419 
 
 Tliis ruling, however, is not based upon the nature of the 
 suit itself, but upon the absence of any rights in the proposed 
 iiitervenors. 
 
 § 322. * 425. Additional Illustrations. The following are some 
 instances in which an intervention has been permitted. In an 
 action for the partition of lands, any person having an interest 
 in the land may intervene; but when the partition is among the 
 heirs and devisees of a deceased owner, a judgment creditor of 
 such decedent has no such interest nor right. ^ In an action to 
 recover land, a landlord may intervene when his tenant only has 
 been made a defendant;^ and in an action to recover the posses- 
 sion of goods taken on execution, the execution creditor may 
 intervene.^ In a suit to compel the specific performance of a 
 contract to convey land against the vendor alone, a third person 
 alleging title in himself to the same land from the same vendor, 
 prior and paragiount to that of the plaintiff, was allowed to 
 intervene and to defend. It was said that the intervenor need 
 not be a necessary party, but should be permitted to come in if 
 the judgment as between the original parties would cast a cloud 
 upon liis own title. ^ Under the former practice, no intervention 
 was ever permitted in actions at law, except that in ejectment the 
 landlord might make himself a defendant in place of his tenant. ^ 
 
 court said : " The matters set up in tlie - Godfrey v. Townseiid, 8 How. Pr. 398. 
 petition for intervention of Herman Riihl 3 Conlclin v. Bishop, 3 Duer, 646. In- 
 are not determined or in any way affected tervention in attachment proceedings bv a 
 liy the decree in this case. They were person claiming an interest in the prop- 
 not nece.ssary to a proper determination of erty : Blair v. Puryear, 87 N. C. 101. 
 the matters presented in the issues herein, ^ Carter v. Mills, 30 Mo. 432. In Sum- 
 aiid the motion to strike the petition of mers r. Hutson,48 Ind. 228, a third person 
 intervention from the files was correctly was permitted to intervene in an action 
 sustained ; " Moline, Milburn & Stoddard upon a promissory note, to make himself 
 Co. V. Hamilton (1898), 56 Neb. 132,76 a defendant, to set up in his answer facts 
 N. VV. 455 (by atliird person who filed a showing that he was the real party in 
 l)etition of intervention in a replevin case, interest, and the equitable owner of tiie 
 in effect nothing but a general denial, the note, and the one solely entitled to its pro- 
 court said : " The first requisite of an in- ceeds, and to recover thereon as against 
 tervention is tliat the intervenor show tliat the maker, who was the original defend- 
 he claims an interest in the subject-matter ant. This is certainly identical with the 
 of the litigation ") ; Bohart r. Buckingham .system which prevails in Iowa and Cali- 
 (1901), 62 Kan. 658, 64 Pac. 627; Gam- fornia. This intervention was permitted 
 mage v. Powell (1897), 101 Ga, 540, 28 under the general provision of § 18, that 
 S. E. 969.] " any person may be made a defendant 
 1 Waring v. Waring, 3 Abb. Pr. 246. who has an interest in the controversy 
 See Baker v. Riley, 16 Ind. 479, which adverse to the plaintiff." 
 holds that a person claiming title to the ^ Hornby v. Gordon, 9 Eosw. 656 ; 
 whole land should not be permitted to Godfrey ;;. Townseud, 8 How. Pr. 398. 
 intervene in a partition suit. QMooney v. N. Y. EI. R. Co. (1900)
 
 420 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 323. *426. The Iowa and California System of Intervening. 
 Illustrative Examples. The peculiarities of this proceeding, the 
 
 163 N. Y. 242, 57 N. E. 496, was an action ways in which it is conipeteiit for the 
 by a property owner against a railroad to court of original jurisdiction to bring in 
 restrain its operation, by injunction, and new ])artics, and the particular course that 
 for damages. Pending the action j)lain- it may decide to adopt generally presents 
 tiff conveyed the premises to one Cohen, a question of choice or discretion not open 
 Avho in turn conveyed to one Scalliou. In to discussion in this court. The facts 
 plaintiff's deed to Cohen the former " re- which rendered the presence of the new 
 served the easements of light, air, and ac- parties necessary in order to permit a 
 cess as taken and used by the defendants, final adjudication of the controversy were 
 and all the claims for damages for such patent and undisputed. They were evi- 
 taking and use, both as to tlie fee and deuced by the two conveyances made sub- 
 rental value, past, present and future;" setjuont to the commencement of the 
 and in Cohen's deetl to Scallion the same action, and the defendants were permit- 
 reservations were made. At the trial dc- ted by the court to raise any question 
 feudants moved to dismiss the complaint growing out of tiiese new facts that they 
 
 on the ground that phiintiff was not then 
 the owner of the fee or of any part thereof, 
 or entitled to any relief by injunction. 
 The court reserving its decision upon this 
 motion, an adjournment was moved on be- 
 half of the defendants until all tlie parties 
 in interest were properly ])efore the court 
 " by an application on the part of the 
 jilaiutiff for leave to serve a supiilemeiital 
 
 could rai.-^e in any form or in any manner. 
 The original plaintiff, by his counsel, sug- 
 gested one method of bringing in the new 
 parties, wliile the defendants' counsel sug- 
 gested another method. The defendants' 
 metliod was to put the plaintiff to his 
 application at a Special Term to amend the 
 process and the pleadings and to serve a 
 supplemental complaint with the right to 
 
 summons and com])laint, bringing in his the defendants to serve a snpplenivntal 
 
 grantees as parties plaintiff, with leave to 
 the defendants to answer the su})plemental 
 complaint." The court not passing upon 
 this motion at the time, tiiereupon Cohen 
 and Scallion requested to be made parties 
 plaintiffs and consented to submit their 
 rights to the court. This request was 
 granted, and an order made that the 
 pleadings and proceedings be amended 
 accordingly. The defendants were " al- 
 lowed on the trial to make any defence 
 that they may be advised, with the same 
 force and effect as if a supplemental com- 
 plaint and answer had been made and 
 served," and for that purpose " tiie cause 
 was postponed for two weeks." The trial 
 court awarded a money judgment to 
 Mooney, and also to Cohen and Scallion, 
 each in a different amount; and also 
 awarded an injunction to be operative 
 upon certain conditions nameil. The Ap- 
 pellate Division reversed the judgment. 
 The ()uestion presented by the record in 
 
 answer. The learned trial judge doubt- 
 less had the power to compel the plaintiff 
 to resort to that method, dilatory as it 
 was, but he decided to make them parties 
 on their own application and to let the 
 cause proceed as if everything had been 
 done that the defendants' counsel askeil. 
 The contention of the learned counsel for 
 the defendants is that the judge bad no 
 power to do that. In this we think he is mis- 
 taken. By the provisions of the Code ex- 
 tensive powers in this respect are conferred 
 upon the court of original jurisdiction." 
 The court after quoting the provisions 
 of the statute continued as follows : " lu 
 view of these broad provisions of the 
 statute, it cannot be said that the trial 
 court was without power to bring iu, as 
 parties plaintiff, tho.se persons who had 
 become interested in the realty during the 
 pendency of the suit. The manner iu 
 which the i)Owor was exercised is a ques- 
 tion of discretion and not of law. The 
 
 the Court of Appeals was the power of court had the power to order and direct 
 
 the trial ju<ige, at the trial, to bring in that the grantees of the jiremises, ])cnding 
 
 Cohen and Scallion as parties. In rcvers- tlie action, should be made parties by 
 
 ing the case the Court of Appeals, among amendment of the pleading or oilier xisi' as 
 
 other things, iaid : " There are various the case requires. . . . The only ([uestiou
 
 INTERVENTION. 
 
 421 
 
 extent of its innovations upon all prior methods, antl its useful- 
 ness in procuring controversies to be decided on their merits in a 
 
 is whether a court of equity may, upon the 
 trial, admit new parties to the record when 
 thi^y ask to be heard and when their 
 presence is necessary for a complete de- 
 termination of the controversy. When 
 all the parties are before tlte court, as in 
 this case, we entertain no doubt with 
 respect to the power to order the amend- 
 ment in the manner and upon the con- 
 ditions that it did. It was an exercise of 
 discretion by the trial judge in furtiier- 
 ance of justice, and no rule of practice or 
 ]irinciple of law was violated. We think 
 tliere was power in the court to order the 
 amendment as it did, and hence the order 
 appealed from sliould be reversed and the 
 judgment of the Special Term affirmed 
 with costs." 
 
 See also the following cases in which 
 intervention was allowed: Majors v. 
 Taussig (1894), 20 Colo. 44, 36 Pac. 816 
 (by stockholders to defend an action upon 
 a note fraudulently executed by the offi- 
 cers, the company refusing to defend) ; 
 Wood y. Denver City Water Co. (1894), 
 20 Colo. 253, 38 Pac. 739 (by residents 
 supplied by one water company, in action 
 brought by another company to enjoin the 
 furmer and claiming an exclusive privilege 
 to supply wnter to the inhabitants of the 
 town); Maddox v. Teague (1896), 18 
 :\Iont. 593, 47 Pac. 209 (by joint mort- 
 gagee in an action against a sheriff on his 
 official bond by the other mortgagee for 
 failure to pay over the proceeds of a sale 
 of the mortgaged property in satisfaction 
 (jf his claim, which was alone sufficient to 
 exhaust the ])enalty of the bond) ; Dunn 
 '.-. Nat. Bank (1898), 11 S. D. 305, 77 
 N. W. Ill (by payee named in a certifi- 
 cate of deposit and claiming owuei-shij) 
 thereof in an action thereon by the holder, 
 who was alleged to have obtained it 
 through fraud) ; Cooper v. Mohler (1898), 
 104 Iowa, 301, 73 N. W. 828 (by a third 
 parly, the owner of one of the notes 
 secured by a mortgage- which plaintiff is 
 seeking to foreclose, he having an interest 
 in determining the priorities of the various 
 claims secured by the mortgage) ; A. E. 
 Johnson Co. i: White (1899), 78 Minn. 48, 
 80 N. W. 838 (by one partner where the 
 otiier partner was sued upon notes exe- 
 
 cuted by him alone and the two partners 
 joined in intervention coinjjlaint alleging 
 the partnership, that the notes were given 
 for partnership debt and setting up coun- 
 ter-claims against plaintiff to them as 
 partners) ; Ex parte Kenmore Shoe Co. 
 (1897), 50 S. C. 140, 27 S. E. 682 (by a 
 party seeking to establish an eifuitalde 
 lien over the fund sought to be distributed 
 in the principal case) ; McKldowncy v. 
 Madden (1899), 124 Cal. 108, h<o Pac.783 
 (by a subsequent attaching creditor who 
 has levied upon property levied upon in a 
 prior action to defeat the lien of the prior 
 levy); Hice v. Dorriau (1893), 57 Ark. 
 541, 22 S.W. 213 (by an attaching cred- 
 itor, in a prior attachment, to show that 
 the prior order of attachment was wrong- 
 fully issued) ; State ex rel. v. Mack 
 (1902), 26 Nev. 85, 69 Pac. 862 (where a. 
 corporation, of which the district judge 
 was a stockholder, brought mandamus to 
 compel him to ])ass upon a claim against 
 an insolvent estate, another claimant has 
 sufficient interest to intervene by asking 
 that he be compelled to call another 
 judge); Muhlenberg ?•. Tacoma (1901), 
 25 Wash. 36, 64 Pac. 925 (by the re- 
 ceiver of an insolvent bank in an action 
 by the trustee of a pledgee of such bank, 
 instituted for the purpose of establishing 
 the validity of certain city warrants, etc.) ; 
 Gund V. Parke (1896), 1*5 Wash. 393, 46 
 Pac. 408 (by a wife for the purpose of 
 having any judgment that may be ren- 
 dered against her husband adjudged not 
 a community debt and that it should 
 not be satisfied out of the community 
 property, in an action on the husband's 
 promissory note) ; Pitman r. Ireland 
 (1902), 64" Neb. 675, 90 N. W. 540 (by a 
 mortgagor who has conveyed lands by 
 an unconditional deed of general war- 
 ranty for the purpose of pleading usury 
 in an action to foreclose the mortgage) ; 
 State ex rel. v. Holmes (1900), 60 Neb. 39, 
 82 N. W. 109 (by tlie shareholders of a 
 corporation for the purpose of protecting 
 their own interests, where the officers of 
 the corporation fail and refuse to pro- 
 tect and conserve the corporate property ) ; 
 to the same effect is Fitzwater v. Bank 
 (1901), 62 Kan. 163,61 Pac. 684 ; McCou-
 
 422 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 single action, will be best shown by detailing the facts of one or 
 
 niff 1-. Van Dusen (1898), 57 Neb. 49, 77 
 N. W. 348 (by a person claiming owner- 
 ship of i)roperty in litigation). " That any 
 person who can by proper averments show 
 that he Ikis an interest in the matter in 
 litigation may, without leve of court, be- 
 come a party to the suit and obtain an 
 adjudication of his claim," see the two 
 following cases : Spalding v. Murphy 
 (1901), 63 Neb. 401, 88 N. W. 489; 
 Greenwood r. Ingersoll (1901), 61 Neb. 
 785, 86 N. W. 476 (by a chattel mort- 
 gagee in proceedings in garnishment 
 instituted by judgment creditors of mort- 
 gagor to appropriate the proceeds of the 
 mortgaged property to the payment of the 
 judgments) ; Deere v. Eagle Mfg. Co. 
 (1896), 49 Neb. 385, 68 N. W. 504 (by a 
 second attaching creditor to have his lieu 
 adjudged superior to that of plaintiff) ; 
 Joshua Hendy, etc. Works v. Dillon 
 (1901), 135 Cal. 9, 66 Pac. 960 (by a third 
 party claiming ownership of the property 
 sought to be recovered in an action of re- 
 plevin, said tliird party's title being 
 pleaded in the answer of the defendant, 
 who averred his willingness to surrender 
 the property to the owner, and the third 
 party himself alleging " tliat he was the 
 owner of the said property and entitled to 
 the exclusive possession thereof," and 
 asking judgment awarding him the posses- 
 sion of the same) ; German Savings Bank 
 I'. Citizens Nat. Bank (1897), 101 Iowa, 
 530, 70 N. W. 769 ; Smith v. City of St. 
 Paul (1896), 65 Minn. 295, 68 N. \V. 32. 
 
 We quote from the opinion of the court 
 in the case last above cited as follows : 
 " The city of St. Paul had taken by con- 
 demnation proceedings a tract of land for 
 the purpose of opening a street, the com- 
 pensation or damages awarded being one 
 gross sum for the entire tract. Tlie plain- 
 tiff brought tliis action against the city to 
 recover the amount of the award, alleging 
 that she was tlie owner of tiie entire tract. 
 The St. Paul Trust Co. and Mrs. Sache 
 interposed 'com])laints in intervention,' 
 alleging that they respectively owned cer- 
 tain portions of tlie tract, and hence were 
 severally entitled to a part of the awani. 
 To these complaints the plaintiff demurred 
 on the ground that the facts stated did not 
 constitute a ground of intervention. Tliis 
 
 appeal is from an order overruling the 
 demurrers. 
 
 " The contention of the plaintiff is that 
 these parties had no right to intervene, 
 under G. S. 1894. § 5273, for the reason 
 that they ' wouhl neitlier gain nor lose by 
 the direct legal operation and effect of the 
 judgment;' that any interest they might 
 have in tlie property, or any claim they 
 might have against the city, would be 
 wholly unaffected by the result of a suit 
 between tlie city and the plaintiff. Lewis 
 V. llarwood, 28* Minn. 428, 10 N. W. 586. 
 If the action had been brought by plaintiff 
 to recover an ordinary debt alleged to be 
 due her from the city, or if the intervenors 
 had to rely exclusively upon the statute 
 for their right to come into the action, 
 the plaintiff's contention migiit be diffi- 
 cult to answer. But compulsory inter- 
 pleading and voluntary intervention in an 
 action originally between other parties 
 were always known and recognized as 
 ancillary remedies by means of whicli 
 courts were enabled more conveniently 
 and perfectly to adjudicate upon the ulti- 
 mate rights of the parties in the subject- 
 matter involved in the litigation, and thus 
 award full and final relief in the further 
 judicial proceedings to which these reme- 
 dies were auxiliary. It is not to be sup- 
 posed that the statute in relation to 
 interpleader and intervention was intended 
 to abolish those ancillary remedies in cases 
 where they were previously authorized, 
 and to limit them exclusively to cases 
 falling strictly within the terras of the 
 statute. 
 
 " Condemnation proceedings under the 
 city charter are in rem against the land. 
 The award becomes a fund standing in 
 the place of the land, and whoever (jwns 
 the land is entitled to the award. If the 
 award is ])aid over to one as owner who 
 is not the true owner, he will be liable to 
 the true owner in an action for money had 
 and received. Hence, if the whole of the 
 award should be paid over to the plaintiff, 
 and the fact should be that she was not 
 entitled to the whole of it, but that the 
 intervenors were severally entitled to a 
 part of it, they could maintain actions 
 against her to recover their shares. The 
 fact that tliev iniglit, at their election,
 
 INTEKVENTION. 
 
 42: 
 
 two cases in which it has been resorted to.' An action in tlie 
 usual form was brouglit by A., the payee of two promissory notes 
 
 have a remedy agaiust the city would uot 
 deprive them of this right of action. If 
 this is so, why may they not intervene in 
 this action, in order to have the award 
 apportioned, and to recover their share 1 
 Why shoukl they have to wait until tlie 
 money was paid over to the plaintiff, and 
 then sue her 1 Where the duty is de- 
 volved on the court or other tribunal 
 before which the condemnation proceed- 
 ings were had, to distribute or apportion 
 the award among those entitled to it, there 
 is no question of the right of any claimant 
 to appear and assert his right to it, or of 
 the court or other tribunal to require any 
 such claimant to appear and establish his 
 claim. . . . Doubtless the city might, in 
 a proper case, require the plaintiff and 
 other claimants to interplead ; but if it 
 appeared that a third party claimed a 
 portion of the award, the court would, in 
 our opinion, have the power to require 
 such person to be brought in as a party 
 to the action, in order that there might 
 be a full and final adjudication of the 
 rights of all parties in the fund ; and, if 
 such a person can be thus brought in, 
 there is no reason why he may not be 
 allowed to come in voluntarily." 
 
 Citizens' Nat Bank v. City Nat. Bank 
 (1900), 111 Iowa, 211, 82 N. W. 464; 
 Valley Bank r. Wolf (1897), 101 Iowa, 
 51, 69 N. W. 11.31; Enger v. Lofland 
 (1896), 100 Iowa, 303, 69 N. W. 526; 
 Palmer v. Bank of Zunibrota (1896), 65 
 Minn. 90, 67 X. W. 893.] 
 
 1 [;Dennis v. Kolm (1901), 131 Cal. 91, 
 63 Pac. 141. We quote from this case as 
 follows : " This action was brought to 
 recover for goods, wares, and merchan- 
 dise, alleged to have been sold to the 
 defendants as copartners under the firm 
 name of ' Kolm Bros.' One Perkins had 
 in his hands about eight hundred and 
 seventy dollars, which plaintiff claimed 
 to be the money of H. Kolm, who was 
 alleged to be one of the partners. Plain- 
 tiff had the eight hundred and seventy 
 dollars attached in this action as the 
 property of H. Kolm. Bertha Kolm, a 
 sister, filed a complaint in intervention in 
 which she denied that the money so at- 
 tached was the property of H. Kolm or of 
 
 ' Kolm Bros.,' and alleged that the same 
 was her property, and asked that she bo 
 adjudged to l)e the owner thereof. A 
 demurrer was interposed by plaintiff to 
 the complaint in intervention, overruled, 
 and plaintiff filed an answer to said com- 
 plaint. The respondent II. Kolm filed an 
 answer to the complaint of plaintiff, in 
 which, among other things, he denied that 
 he ever was, at any time, a meml)er of the 
 firm of ' Kolm Bros.,' or that he was in 
 any way indebted to the plaintiff. The 
 case was tried before a jury, and verdicts 
 rendered for the respondent H. Kolm and 
 tlie interveuor Bertha Kolm. Upon these 
 verdicts judgment was entered. The ap- 
 peal is from the judgment and an order 
 denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial. 
 It is claimed that the court erred in over- 
 ruling the demurrer to the complaint in 
 intervention, for the reason that the said 
 complaint does uot state facts showing 
 that the interveuor has any interest in 
 the matter in controversy, or that the 
 decision would in any way affect her 
 rights. It is provided in the Code of 
 Civil Procedure, section 387 ; ' Any person 
 may, before the trial, intervene in an 
 action or proceeding, who has an interest 
 in the matter in litigation, in the success 
 of either of the parties, or an interest 
 against both.' In this case the interveuor 
 claimed the money in the hands of Perkins, 
 as the proceeds of a note and mortgage 
 that had been assigned to her by respond- 
 ent H. Kolm. She alleged that ' Kolm 
 Bros.' were at no time the owners of said 
 note or mortgage or of the money in the 
 hands of Perkins, but that she was the 
 owner of the same. If she could show 
 that H. Kolm was not one of the copart- 
 ners of the firm of ' Kolm Bros.,' then he 
 was uot indebted to plaintiff. If plaintiff 
 was not a creditor of II. Kolm at any 
 time, then he could not attack the transfer 
 of the note and mortgage made by Kolm 
 to the interveuor. We think the inter- 
 veuor had such interest as would entitle 
 her to intervene under the statute. It 
 was said by this court in Coffey v. Green- 
 field, 55 Cal. 382, in speaking of the inter- 
 est which entitles a party to intervene : 
 ' And the Code does not at tcnnpt to specify
 
 424 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 made by B., in which B. made no defence. At this stage of the 
 cause C. filed a petition of intervention, alleging the following 
 facts: Before the giving of these notes, B. was indebted in the 
 amount thereof to one D., and was not indebted at all to the 
 plaintiff ; that the plaintiff A. caused B. to execute and deliver 
 to him these notes, and the consideration thereof was B.'s said in- 
 debtedness to D. ; that A. had no authority to take tliese notes in 
 his own name, but they should have been given in the name of 
 D. ; that D. is dead, and the intervenor C. is bis administrator; 
 that the notes belong really to the estate of D., and the plaintiff 
 has no interest in them, except that the legal title is in him. The 
 petition prayed that the intervenor might become a party plain- 
 tiff, and that judgment might be rendered in his favor as admin- 
 istrator for the amount of the notes against B., the niidcer thereof. 
 To this petition the original plaintiff A. demurred, and the 
 Supreme Court of Iowa held that the case was a proper one, 
 within the system established in that State, for an intervention, 
 and that upon the facts alleged in the petition the intervenor 
 was entitled to judgment. ^ In another case. A., claiming to be 
 
 wlmt or how great this interest shall be, in 
 order to give a right to intervene. Any 
 interest is sufficient. The fact tiiat the 
 intervenor may or may not protect liis 
 interest in some other way is not material. 
 If lie " has an interest iu the matter in 
 litigation or in the success of either of the 
 parties" he has a right to intervene.' 
 The provisions of our statute are taken 
 from tiie Code Procedure of Louisiana, 
 and the practice iu that State is to allow 
 a party to intervene whose property has 
 been seized or att.acked in the suit. 
 (Pomeroy in Keniedies and Remedial 
 Rights, sec. 427 ; Field v. Harrison, 20 
 La. Ann. 411 ; Yale i: Hoopes, 16 La. 
 Ann. 31 1 ; Letchford v. Jacobs, 17 La. Ann. 
 79)." Tiie section cited from Remedies 
 and Remedial Rights appears in Code 
 Remedies as § *429.] 
 
 1 Taylor v. Adair, 22 Iowa, 279. [The 
 following quotation from Taylor r. Adair 
 appeared as § 427 ia the text of the last 
 edition : " To tlie lawyer not thoroughly 
 conversant with the sweeping and radical 
 changes in procedure and practice made by 
 the Revision, the y>r<)position that such an 
 intervention as that sought in tlie present 
 
 instance is allowaV)le, would be not a little 
 startling. ... A design to avoid needless 
 multiplicity of actions is everywhere ap- 
 parent iu the present system of procedure. 
 Consonant with the other provisions of 
 this system are those governing and regu- 
 lating the rights of tliird parties to inter- 
 vene in a pending action. Applying the 
 section of the code (§ 2683) to the case iu 
 hand, we first inquire wliether C, as the 
 administrator of I)., has 'an interest in 
 the matter in litigation.' What was tlie 
 matter in litigation ? Clearly tlie debt 
 wiiich B. owed. We say the debt rather 
 than the note, for the debt is the substance 
 of whicli the note is simply a memorandum 
 or visildc evidence. Now this debt is al- 
 leged, and on tlie record admitted, to be 
 OAving by B. to 1) .and not to the plaintiff. 
 If 1). or his administratcu- had possession 
 of the notes, though they are made pay- 
 able to the plaintiff A., he might, on show- 
 ing Iiis ownership, sue tliercon in his own 
 name. So, altiiough the i)laintiff A. might 
 sue in his own name on the notes, they 
 being made payable to him, yet if they 
 were in reality tlie propert}' of T>., tlio 
 maker niitrht avail himself of anv defence
 
 INTERVENTION. 
 
 425 
 
 assignee of a note and mortgage executed to 1j. as the payee 
 and mortgagee, commenced an ordinary action for a foreclosure. 
 Thereupon C. filed a petition of intervention as administrator of 
 B., the mortgagee, in which he denied that the note and mortgage 
 had ever been assigned to A., denied that the latter had any 
 interest or right therein, and averred that they were assets of tlie 
 estate of his intestate B., and prayed for judgment in his own 
 favor of foreclosure and sale against the mortgagor and other 
 defendants. Upon a demurrer to this petition, the Supreme 
 Court of California held that the intervention was entirely within 
 the intent and the letter of the statute, and that the intcrvenor 
 should have judgment.^ Again, in an action commenced to fore- 
 
 he mi^ht have against D. These consid- 
 erations are advanced to ilhistrate how 
 thoiougiily the laW penetrates beyond 
 names and forms and externals into the 
 very substance and kernel. Now, if the 
 plaintiff succeeds, he recovers that which, 
 on the assumption of tlie truth of the pe- 
 tition of intervention, belonged to another ; 
 that wliich D. or his representative may 
 sue him for and compel him to pay. He 
 m.ay be insolvent. He may, if he re- 
 cover the judgment, assign it. Why 
 should the real owner of the del)t not 
 have the privilege of coming into court, 
 and, on establishing as against the plain- 
 tiff the right to the debt, directly re- 
 cover it in his own name 1 This avoids 
 niuliiplicity of actions, consequent delay, 
 and augmented costs. It may, as above 
 suggested, be the , only protection against 
 the insolvency or fraud of the plaintiff. 
 We are not prepared to admit the truth 
 of the proposition advanced in support of 
 the demurrer, that the interest of D. is of 
 such a nature that it could be asserted 
 only in a court of equity. Nor are we 
 prepared to admit the further proposition 
 that in a legal action an intervenor's in- 
 terest in the matter in litigation must be 
 a legal interest, to entitle him to the benefit 
 of the statute. We conclude by announc- 
 ing it as the opinion of the court that this 
 is a case in which the applicant has shown 
 that he has ' an interest in the matter in 
 litigation against both parties,' — a case 
 in which he demands something adversely 
 to both plaintiff and defendant. This 
 interest is adverse to the plaintiff, as he 
 
 claims against him tlie amoimt of the note 
 and debt. His interest is adverse to the de- 
 fendant, since he claims to recover against 
 him a judgment for the amount of the 
 note."3 See Summers v. Ilutson, 48 Ind. 
 228. 
 
 1 Stich V. Dickinson, .38 Cal. 60S. {The 
 following quotation from Stich v. Dickin- 
 son appeared as § 428 in the text of the 
 last edition: "The intervention in this 
 case comes within the last category of 
 either [that is, where his interest is ad- 
 verse to both of the original parties]. 
 The intervenor certainly lias no inter- 
 est in common either with the plaintiff 
 or the defendant ; but we think he has 
 an interest in the matter in litigation 
 adverse to both within the meaning of the 
 section referred to. He has an interest 
 against the pretension of the plaintiff 
 to be owner of the note and mortgage, 
 and to have a decree of foreclosure for 
 his benefit, and against the defenilant., for 
 the collection of the debt. The sul)jpct- 
 matter of the litigation is the note and 
 mortgage, and the right of the plaintiff 
 to have a decree of foreclosure and sale. 
 The intervenor claims as against the plain- 
 tiff that he and not the plaintiff is entitled 
 to the decree of foreclosure ; and as against 
 the defendant, that the mortgage debt is 
 due and unpaid, and that he is entitled to 
 a foreclosure. In this case the intervenor 
 claims tlie demand in suit, viz. the note 
 and mortgage, and we can perceive no 
 reason founded on the policy of the law 
 which should preclude the settlement of 
 the whole controversy in one action."]
 
 426 
 
 CIVIL KF.MEDIE3. 
 
 close a mortgage given (together with a note) by a corporation 
 which had become insolvent, certain judgment creditors of the 
 company intervened, alleging fraud in the execution of the note 
 and mortgage by the defendant, and that they were void as 
 against its creditors; and praying that they might be adjudged 
 void, and the action to foreclose be dismissed. The intervention 
 of these judgment creditors was sustained, but it was hold, at the 
 same time, that simple contract creditors had no foundation for 
 an intervention, since they could not dispute the mortgage.^ 
 
 1 Horn r. Volcano Water Co., 13 Cal. 
 62. []Tlie following quotation from Horn 
 V. Volcano Water Co. appeared as § 429 
 in the text of the last edition: "The 
 petition of the creditor K. docs not disclose 
 any right on his i)art to intervene ; it shows 
 that he was a sim])le contract creditor, 
 holding obligations against the company, 
 but it does not show that any portion of 
 them are secured by any lien on the mort- 
 gaged premises. His intervention is only 
 an attempt of one credit(jr to prevent an- 
 other creditor from obtaining judgment 
 against the common debtor, — a proceed- 
 ing which can find no support either in 
 principle or authority. The interest men- 
 tioned in the statute which entitles a per- 
 son to intervene in a suit between other 
 parties, 7nust be in the matter in litigation, 
 and of such a direct and immediate charac- 
 ter that the intervener will either r/nin or lose 
 by the direct legal operation and effect of the 
 judgment. The provisions of our statute 
 are taken substantially from the Code of 
 Procedure of Louisiana, which declares 
 that ' in order to be entitled to intervene, 
 it is enough to have an interest in the 
 .success of either of the parties to the 
 suit ; ' and the Supreme Court of that 
 State, in passing upon the term ' interest,' 
 thus used, held this language: 'This we 
 8U|)pose must be a direct interest by which 
 tlie intervening ])arty is to obtain imme- 
 diate gain or suffer loss by the judgment 
 which may be rendered between the origi- 
 nal parties; otherwi.^ie the strange anomaly 
 would be introduced into our jurisiiruileiicc 
 of suffering an accumulation of suits in 
 all instances where doubts might be cnter- 
 tainc<l or enter into the imagination of 
 subsequfnt jdaintiffs, that a defendant 
 against whom a previous action was under 
 
 prosecution might not have property suffi- 
 cient to discharge all his debts. For as 
 tlie first judgment ol)tained might give 
 a preference to the person who siiould ob- 
 tain it, all subsequent suitors down to t he 
 last would have an indirect interest in de- 
 feating the action of the first.' To author- 
 ize au intervention, therefore, the interest 
 must be that created by a claim to the 
 demand or some part thereof in suit, or a 
 claim to or lien upon the jiropcrty or some 
 part thereof which is the subject of litiga- 
 tion. No such claim or lien is asserted in 
 the petition of R., and his right to inter- 
 vene in consequence thereof fails. The 
 petition of S. and others stands u|)on a 
 different footing. It shows that they were 
 judgment creditors having liens by their 
 several judgments upon the mortgaged 
 premises at the time of the institution of 
 the suit. As sucii, they were sul)scquent 
 incumbrancers and necessary parties to a 
 complete adjustment of all tlie interests in 
 the mortgaged premises, though not indis- 
 pensable parties to a decree determining 
 the rights of the other parties as between 
 themselves. For such adju.stinent the 
 court would have been justified in ordering 
 tiiem to be broujrht in, either upon their 
 own ])etition, as in the present ca.se, or by 
 au amendment to the com])laint."[] 
 
 See also Lewis i\ Harwood, 28 Minn. 
 428; Yetzer v. Young (S. 1). 1892), 52 
 N. VV. Rep. 1054; McClurgr. State lliiid- 
 ery Co. (S. 1). 1892), 53 N. W. Rep. 428 ; 
 Gale V. Shillock (Dak., Oct. 1886). 30 
 N. \V. Rep. 138; Smith r. Gale, 12 Supr. 
 Ct. Rep. G74 ; Limberg v. Higginbotham, 
 11 Colo. 316; Curtis r. Latiirop, 12 Colo. 
 169 ; Daniels c. Clark, 38 Iowa, 556 ; Cot- 
 tle V. Cole, 20 Iowa, 481.
 
 INTEllVENTION. 427 
 
 § 324. *430. Author's Statement of the Doctrine. The doc- 
 trine stated by Mr. Justice Field [in Home v. Volcano Water 
 Co.] is clearly the correct interpretation of the provisions con- 
 tained in the California and the Iowa codes, and the opinion of Mr. 
 Justice Dillon [in Taylor v. Adair] is in complete harmony with 
 it. The cases cited above all fall within this doctrine. In each 
 the intervenors had a direct interest, either in prosecuting the 
 action and obtaining the benefit of the recovery, or in defending 
 the action and entirely defeating the i-ecovery. If the intervenor 
 claims to be the only one entitled to the relief, if he asserts that 
 the ultimate cause of action is vested in him and not in the 
 original plaintiff, then his interest is adverse to both of the 
 parties. The doctrine may be expressed in the following man- 
 ner : The intervenor's interest must be such, that if the original 
 action had never been commenced, and he had first brought it as 
 the sole plaintiff, he would have been entitled to recover in his 
 own name to the extent at least of a part of the relief sought; or 
 if the action had first been brought against him as the defendant, 
 he would have been able to defeat the recovery in part at least. 
 His interest may be either legal or equitable. If equitable, it 
 must be of such a character as would be the foundation for a 
 recovery or for a defence, as the case might be, in an independent 
 action in which he was an original party. As the new system 
 permits legal and equitable causes of action or defences to be 
 united by those who are made the parties to an ordinary suit, for 
 the same reason either or both may be relied upon by an inter- 
 venor. In short, the same rules govern his rights which govern 
 those who originally sue or defend.^ The proceeding by inter- 
 vention is not an anomalous one, differing from other judicial 
 controversies, after it has been once commenced. It is, in fact, 
 the grafting of one action upon another, and the tr34ng of the 
 combined issues at one trial, and the determining them by one 
 judgment. In this aspect of the proceeding it is both plain and 
 reasonable that the intervenor should not be required to appl}' 
 for permission to come in. He brings himself into court, and 
 
 1 I^See Wall v. Mines (1900), 130 Cal. the iutervention, and snch defendant then 
 
 '27, 62 Pac. 386, in which the court say : has all the rights to plead given tlie dc- 
 
 " The intervention may be adverse to fendants in an ordinary action, and may 
 
 botli plaintiff and defendant. Where it file a cross complaint to the intervention 
 
 is adverse to either, such party becomes under sec. 442."] 
 defendant, and the intervenor plaintiff in
 
 428 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 becomes a litigant party by filing and serving his petition, which 
 is answered by the adversary parties — plaintiff or defendant, or 
 both — in the same manner as though it was the pleading of a 
 plaintiff : the issues are thus framed, — issues upon the plaintiff's 
 petition and the intervenor's petition, — and tlie trial of the 
 whole is had at one hearing. If the intervenor fails on this 
 trial, a judgment for costs is of course rendered against him ; if 
 he succeeds, a judgment is given in his favor according to the 
 facts and circumstances of the case.-^ 
 
 § 325. *431. Concluding Remarks. This is certainly a great 
 innovation upon the procedure which has liitherto prevailed in 
 courts of law and of equity. It is, however, a method based 
 upon the very principles which lie at the foundation of the en- 
 tire reformed American system. The onlj- possible objection is 
 the multiplication of issues to be decided in the one cause, and 
 the confusion alleged to result therefrom. This objection is not 
 real: it is the stock argument which was constantly urged in 
 favor of retaining the common-law system of special pleading, 
 and was repudiated when the codes were adopted by the Ameri- 
 can States, and has been at last utterly repudiated in England. 
 Complicated issues of fact are daily tried by juries, and compli- 
 cated equities are easily adjusted by courts. The description 
 
 1 Poehlmann r. Kennedy, 48 Cal. 201 ; Cal. 3 ; Loughborough v. McNevin, 74 
 
 Brooks 1-. Hager, 5 Cal. 281, 282; Sargent Cal. 250; Kobinson t--. Crescent City Mill, 
 
 V. Wilson, .5 Cal. 504, 507; Moss v. War- &c. Co., 9.3 Cal. 316 ; Kansas & C. P. Ry. 
 
 uer, 10 Cal. 296, 297 ; People v. Talmage, Co. v. Fitzgerald, .33 Neb. 137 ; Welborn 
 
 6 Cal. 256, 258; County of Yuba (•. f. Eskey, 25 Xeb. 193; McClurg ;;. State 
 
 Adams & Co., 7 Cal. 35;" Davis v. Ep- Bindery Co. (S. D. 1892), 53 N. W. 428; 
 
 pinger, 18 Cal. 378, 380; Dixey v. Pol- Gale ?\ Shillock (Dak., Oct. 1886), 30 N. 
 
 lock, 8 Cal. 570; Speyer v. Ihmels, 21 W. 138; Smith v. Gale, 12 Supr. Ct. Kep. 
 
 Cal. 280, 287 ; Coghill v. Marks, 29 Cal. 674; Yetzer v. Young (S. D. 1892), 52 N. 
 
 673. Contra to the.se case.s, see the well- W. 10.54 ; Dunham f. Greenbauni, 50 Iowa, 
 
 considered opinion of Clark .1. in Lewis 303 ; Lewis v. Harwood, 28 Minn. 428 ; 
 
 V. Harwood, 28 Minn. 428. Dutil r. Teachout v. Des Moines B. G. S. Uy. Co., 
 
 Pacheco, 21 Cal. 438, 442; Coster v. 75 Iowa, 722 ; Van Gorden r. Orinsby, 55 
 
 Brown, 23 Cal. 142, 143; Gradwohl Iowa, 657; Goctzman v. Whitaker, 81 
 
 V. Harris, 29 Cal. 150, 154; People ?;. Iowa, 527. Further illustrations: Des 
 
 Se-xton, 37 Cal. 532, 534 ; Joliet Iron, Moines Ins. Co. v. Lent, 75 Iowa, 522 ; 
 
 &c. Co. i;. Chicago C. & W. K. Co., 51 Wohlwend v. Case Threshing-Mach. Co., 
 
 Iowa, 300; Switz t'. Bl.ick, 45 Iowa, 597 ; 42 Minn. 500; Dennis r. Spencer, 45 
 
 Ingle r. Jones, 43 Iowa, 286 ; Harwood y. Minn. 250; Pence v. Sweeney (Idaho, 
 
 QuiMl)y, 44 Iowa, 385 ; Henry v. Cass Cy. 1891), 28 Pac. Rep. 413 ; Curtis r. Lathmp, 
 
 Mill, &c. Co., 42 id. 33 ; (^olmrn r. Smart, 12 Colo. 109; Liml)erg i-. Higginbothani, 
 
 53 Cal. 742; Rosecrans i;. Ellsworth, 52 11 Colo. 316; Bennett v. Wliitcomb, 25 
 
 Cal. 509; Porter v. Garrissino, 51 Cal. Minn. 148; Thompsou d. Huron Lumber 
 
 559. See also Martin v. Thompson, 63 Co., 4 Wa.sh. 600.
 
 INTERVENTION. 429 
 
 wliich I have here given of the enlarged power of intervention 
 admitted by the codes of California and of Iowa may, by intro- 
 ducing its methods to the profession of other States, procure its 
 general adoption wherever the new procedure is established. 
 Courts and legislatures of the several States may well borrow 
 the improvements which have been made in other common- 
 wealths ; and thus, by a comparison of methods, the common 
 system may become perfected and unified.^ 
 
 1 See ante, § *413, and note.
 
 •ioO CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 CHAPTER THIRD. 
 
 THE AFFIRMATIVE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE ACTION: THE 
 FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE CAl'SE OF ACTION BY THE 
 PLAINTIFF. 
 
 SECTION FIRST. 
 
 THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS. 
 
 § 326. * 432. Introduction. I here collect all the provisions of 
 the various codes which relate in a general manner to the plain- 
 tiff's complaint or petition, and wliich contain the rules applicable 
 to the theory of plciuling as a whole : those which prescribe the 
 mode of alleging certiiiu particular classes of facts, or regulate 
 the joinder of causes of action, or define the nature and uses of 
 the reply, will be quoted in subsequent portions of the chapter, 
 in immediate connection with the several subjects to A\hich they 
 refer. The important clauses which announce the fundamental 
 and essential principles and doctrines of the reformed system in 
 regard to all pleadings, and whicli determine the form and sub- 
 stance of the one by which the plaintiff sets forth the grounds of 
 liis claim for judicial relief, are nearly the same in the different 
 State codes. With the few variations in the language, which will 
 be pointed out, there is no substantial difference ; and the system 
 of pleading, as found in the statute, is absolutely the same wher- 
 ever the reform prevails. The following are all the provisions 
 which it is necessary to quote in order to exliibit the simple and 
 natural metliods introduced b}'- the new procedure. 
 
 § 327. * 433. statutory Provisions as to Complaint. *' All the 
 forms of pleading heretofore existing are abolished; and hereafter 
 the forms of pleading in civil actions in courts of record, and the 
 rules by which the sufhciency of the pleadings is to be deter- 
 mined, are those prescribed l)y this act." ^ " Tlie first pleading 
 
 ' Kansas, § 8o ; Nebraska, § 90; North and pleadin;;. all common counts, general 
 
 Carolina, § 91. The corresponding pro- issues, and all fiction.s, arc abolished ; and 
 
 vision of the Iowa code is more detailed : hereafter the forms of ))leading in civil 
 
 " § 2644. All technical forms of action actions, and the rules by which their suffi-
 
 PROVISIONS IN RELATION TO PLEADING. 
 
 431 
 
 on the part of the phxintiff is the complaint." ^ " The only plead- 
 
 ciency is to be determined, are those pre- 
 scribed in this code." 
 
 {^Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5710. 
 
 California, § 42, reading as follows • 
 " The forms of pleadings in civil actions, 
 and the rules by which the sufficiency of 
 the pleadings is to be determined, are 
 those prescribed in this code." 
 
 Colorado, § 47, reading as follows : 
 " The mode of pleading in civil actions, and 
 the rules by which tlie sufficiency of the 
 pleadings shall be determined, shall be as 
 prescribed in this act, and not otherwise." 
 
 Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, § 607, read- 
 ing as follows : " There shall be but one 
 form of civil action, and the pleadings 
 therein shall be as follows." 
 
 Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3201, 
 same as California, supra. 
 
 Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 3.39, read- 
 ing as follows : " All the distinct forms of 
 pleading heretofore existing, inconsistent 
 with the provisions of this act, are hereby 
 abolished ; and hereafter the forms of 
 pleadings in civil actions in courts of rec- 
 ord, and the rules by which the sufficiency 
 of the pleadings is to be determined, are 
 modified as prescribed by this act." 
 
 Kentuckij, Code, 189.5, § 88, reading as 
 follows: "The forms of pleadings, and 
 the rules by which their sufficiency is to 
 be determined, are those prescribed by 
 this code." 
 
 Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5228. reading as 
 follows: "The forms of proceedings in 
 civil actions, and the rules by which the 
 sufficiency of pleadings is to be deter- 
 mined, shall be regulated by statute." 
 
 Missouri, Eev. St., 1899, § 591, reading 
 as follows: "The forms of pleading in 
 civil actions in courts of record, anil the 
 rules by which the sufficieuc}' of the plead- 
 ings are [.s(V] to be determined, are, except 
 as otherwise specially provided by law, 
 prescribed by this article." 
 
 Montana, Code, 1895, § 661, reading as 
 follows : " The forms of pleading in civil 
 actions, and the rules by which the suffi- 
 ciency of the pleadings are \si<-\ to be de- 
 termined, are those prescribed in this code." 
 
 Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3132, 
 reading as follows : " All the forms of 
 pleadings in civil actions, and the rules by 
 which the sufficiency of the pleadings 
 
 shall be determined, shall be those pre- 
 scribed in this act." 
 
 New York, Code Civ. Pro., § 518, read- 
 ing as follows : " This chapter prescribes 
 the form of pleadings in an action, and 
 the rules by which the sufficiency thereof 
 is determined, except where special pro- 
 vision is otherwise made by law." 
 
 North Carolina, § 91, same as California, 
 supra. 
 
 North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5265. 
 
 Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, § 5054, reading as 
 follows : " The forms of pleading in civil 
 actions in courts of record, and the rules 
 by which their sufficiency shall be de- 
 termined, are those prescribed in this 
 chapter." 
 
 Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 3963, reading as 
 follows: "The rules of pleading hereto- 
 fore existing in civil actions are abolished ; 
 and hereafter, the forms of pleadings in 
 civil actions in courts of record, and the 
 rules by which their sufficiency may be 
 determined, are those prescribed by this 
 code." 
 
 Oregon, Plill's Laws, § 63, containing 
 the words " in actions at law " after the 
 word existing in the form given in the 
 text. 
 
 South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 161, 
 reading as follows : " There siiall be no 
 other forms of pleading in civil actions in 
 courts of record in this State, and no other 
 rules by which the sufficiency of the 
 pleadings is to be determined, than those 
 prescribed hy this code of procedure." 
 
 South Dakota, Ann. ^t., 1901, § 6111. 
 
 Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2957, same as 
 California, supra. 
 
 Washington, Bal. code, § 4903, substan- 
 tially same as Indiana, su/ira. 
 
 Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2644, reading 
 as follows :* " The forms of pleading in 
 civil actions in courts of record, and the 
 rules by which the sufficiency of the plead- 
 ings are [sic] determined are those pre- 
 scribed by this chapter." 
 
 Wr/oming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3530, same 
 as Ohio, siipira. 
 
 1 New York, § 141 (478) ; California, 
 § 425 ; Oregon. § 64; North Carolina, § 92. 
 
 [[Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5715 ; 
 Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, § 607 ; Idaho, 
 Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3203; Indiana,
 
 432 
 
 CIVIL IIE.MEDIES. 
 
 ings allowed are, 1, the petition by the plaintiff; 2, the answer or 
 demurrer by the defendant; 3, tlie demurrer or reply by the 
 plaintiff ; 4, the demurrer to the reply by the defendant." ^ " The 
 
 I'iurns' St., 1901, § 341 ; Minnesota, St., 
 1894, § 5230; Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, 
 § 592 ; Montana, Code, 1895, § 670; North 
 i)akota, Rev. Codes, 1899, §5266; Ohio, 
 Bates' St., 1903, § 5057 ; South Carolina, 
 Code, 1893, § 162; South Dakota, Ann. 
 St., 1901, § 6112 ; Washington, Bal. Code, 
 § 4905 ; Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2645 : 
 Wvoming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3533.] 
 
 1 Kausa.s, § 86 ; Nebraska, § 91. 
 
 \;^Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, § 1275, reading 
 as follows : " The pleadings in all civil 
 suits in courts of record shall be by corn- 
 plaint and answer." 
 
 Ar/cansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5711, 
 allowing (1) complaint, (2) demurrer or 
 answer by defendant, (3) demurrer or re- 
 ply by plaintiff. 
 
 California, § 422, allowing, on part of 
 plaintiff, (1) complaint, (2) demurrer to 
 answer, and on part of defendant, (1) 
 demurrer to compbiint, (2) answer, to 
 which were added by the conimi.ssiouers' 
 amendment of 1901, on the part of plain- 
 tiff, (3) demurrer to cro.ss-coniplaint, (4) 
 answer to cross-com])laint, and on part of 
 defendant, (3) cro.ss-complaint, (4) demur- 
 rer to answer to cross-complaint. But see 
 Lewis V. Dunn (1901), 134 Cal. 291, as to 
 unconstitutionality of this amendment. 
 
 Colorado, Code, 1890, § 48. 
 
 Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3202, 
 allowing, on part of plaintiff, (1) com- 
 plaint, (2) demurrer to answer, and on 
 part of defendant, (1) demurrer to com- 
 plaint, (2) answer. 
 
 /Hc/fflHa, Burns' St., 1901, § 340, allow- 
 ing (I) complaint by plaintiff, (2) demurrer 
 and answer by defendant, (3) demurrer and 
 reply by plaintiff. 
 
 Iowa, Code, 1897, § 3557, allowing 
 (1) petition of plaintiff, (2) motion, de- 
 murrer or answer of defendant, (3) mo- 
 tion, demurrer or reply of plaintiff, (4) 
 motion or demurrer of defendant. 
 
 Kentucky, Code, 1895, § 89, allowing 
 "(1) petitions, answers and replies, and 
 such additional pleadings, by way of re- 
 joinder and rebutter, .as may be necessary 
 to form a material issue of fact, (2) de- 
 murrers." 
 
 Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5229, substan- 
 tially the same as Indiana, supra. 
 
 Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, §§ 592, 596, 
 607. 
 
 Montana, Code, 1895, § 662. 
 
 Nevada, Comp. Law.s. 1900, § 3133, 
 allowing, on part of plaintiff, complaint 
 and demurrer to answer, and on part of 
 defendant, demurrer and answer. 
 
 Neu! York, Code Civ. Pro., §§ 478,487, 
 493, 514, supra. 
 
 North Carolina, §§ 92, 94, 105, 107, 
 allowing complaint, demurrer and reply 
 on part of plaintiff, and answer and de- 
 murrer on ])art of defendant. 
 
 North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, 
 §§ 5266, 5267, 5277. 5279. 
 
 Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, § 5055, providing 
 that the answer may be styled a cros.s-peti- 
 tion when affirmative relief is demanded. 
 
 Oklahoma. St., 1893, § 3964. 
 
 Oregon, Hill's Laws, § 64, allowing on 
 the j)art of the plaintiff, (1) complaint, 
 (2) demurrer, or (3) reply; and on part 
 of the defendant, (I) demurrer, or (2) 
 answer. 
 
 South Carolina, Code, 1893, §§ 162, 164, 
 174, 176. 
 
 South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, §§ 6112, 
 6114, 6124, 6126. 
 
 Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2958. 
 
 Washington, Bal. Code, § 4904. 
 
 Wisronsin, St., 1898, §§ 2645, 2648, 
 2661, 2663. 
 
 Wyomint), Rev. St., 1899, § 3532, allow- 
 ing (1) petition, (2) demurrer, (3) answer, 
 wliich, when affirmative relief is demanded 
 therein, may be styled cross-petition, 
 (4) reply. 
 
 Supplemental Plrodings. 
 
 But supplemental ])leadings may be 
 filed alleging facts occurring after the fil- 
 ing of the original pleadings, in aid of the 
 original pleadings : Ellis v. City of Indian- 
 apolis (1897), 148 Ind. 70, 47N. E. 218; 
 Swedish Am. Nat. Bank v. Dickinson Co. 
 (1896). 6 N. D. 222, 69 N. W. 455; B.irker 
 V. Pri/.er (1897), 150 Ind. 4, 48 N. E. 4; 
 Kirhy .■. Muench (1900), 12 S. D. 616,82 
 N. W. 93 ; Zalesky v. Home Ins. Co. 
 (1897), 102 la. 613, 71 N. W. .566: Foote
 
 rKOVISIOXS IN RELATION TO PLEADING. 
 
 433 
 
 complaint shall contain, 1, the title of the cause specifying the 
 name of the court in which the action is brought, the name of the 
 county in which tlie plaintiff desires the trial to be had, and 
 the names of the parties to the action, — plaintiff and defendant ; 
 2, a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause 
 of action without unnecessary repetition; 3, a demand of the 
 relief to which the plaintiff supposes himself entitled. If a re- 
 covery of money be demanded, tlie amount thereof shall be 
 stated." 1 " The defendant may demur to tlie complaint when it 
 
 V. Burlington Gaslight Co. (1897), 103 la. 
 576, 72 N. W. 755; Christie v. Iowa Life 
 Ins. Co, (1900), 111 la. 177, 82 N. W. 499 ; 
 Lathrop v. Deariug (1894), 59 Minn. 234, 
 61 N. W. 24; Malmsteu v. Berryhill 
 (1895), 63 Minu. 1, 65 N. W. 88; Guptill 
 V. City of Red Wing (1899), 76 Minn. 129, 
 78 N." W. 970; Bomar ;.•. Means (1896), 
 47 S. C. 190, 25 S. E. 60; Wade v. Gould 
 (1899), 8 Okla. 690, 59 Pac. 11 ; Childs v. 
 Kansas City, etc. R. R. Co. (1893), 117 Mo. 
 414, 23 S. W. 373; Barnard v. Gantz 
 (1893), 140 N. Y. 249,35 N.E. 430; Bank 
 of Chadron v. Anderson (1895), 6 Wyo. 
 518, 48 Pac. 197; Williams i\ Eikenbary 
 (1893), 36 Neb. 478, 54 N. W. 852 ; Chap- 
 man V. Jones (1897), 149 Ind. 434, 47 N. E. 
 1065. 
 
 But if a party has no cause of action at 
 the time of the commencement of the 
 action, he cannot maintain it by means of 
 a supplemental complaint : Hill v. Den 
 (1898), 121 Cal. 42, 53 Pac. 642; Gordon 
 V. City of San Diego (1895), 108 Cal. 264, 
 41 Pac. 301 . 
 
 Permission to file supplemental plead- 
 ings is within the discretion of the court : 
 Jacob V. Lorenz (1893), 98 Cal. 332, 33 
 Pac. 119; Allen v. City of Davenport 
 (1901), 115 la. 20, 87 N.'W. 743 ; Schou- 
 weiler v. Hough (1895), 7 S. D. 163, 63 
 N. W. 776 ; Fitzgerald's Estate v. Union 
 Bank (1902), — Neb. — , 90 N. W. 994. 
 
 A supplemental complaint, without an 
 original complaint upon which to stand, 
 cannot be the foundation of an action : 
 Ellis V. City of Indianapolis (1897), 148 
 Ind. 70, 47 N. E. 218. 
 
 " It seems to us that ' a plea since the 
 last continuance' is not what would 
 strictly be termed an amendment, but 
 more in the nature of a supplemental 
 pleading — something more than was 
 
 pleaded before. Such pleas nmst be made 
 by leave of court, that is, they must have 
 the sanction of the court, and the oppos- 
 ing j)arty must have an opportunity to be 
 heard. This is and should be so whether 
 it is a matter of discretion with tlic court 
 or a right the party has to insist on its 
 being filed as a matter of law. ... To 
 entitle the defendant as a matter of law 
 to file such a plea, it must ap])ear from 
 the petition that the facts stated, if true, 
 would be a good defence and a bar to the 
 plaintiff's action. . . . But if the petition 
 does not set forth facts which, if true, 
 would be a bar to ])laintiff's recovery, then 
 the court is not bound to allow the plea 
 to be filed:" Balk v. Harris (1902), 130 
 N. C. 381, 41 S. E. 940.] 
 
 1 Kauisas, § 87 (petition) ; Nebraska, 
 § 92 (petition) ; Oregon, § 65 (complaint) ; 
 North Carolina, § 93 (complaint). In Ohio, 
 Kansas, and Nebraska, the second subdi- 
 vision reads, " A statement of the facts 
 constituting, etc., in ordinary and conci.se 
 language." 
 
 {^Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, § 1289, read- 
 ing as follows : " The complaint shall set 
 forth clearly the names of the parties, a 
 concise statement of the cause of action, 
 without any distinction between suits at 
 law and in equity, and shall also state the 
 nature of the relief which he demands." 
 
 Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5715, 
 reading as follows : " The complaint must 
 contain: (1) The style of the court in 
 wliich the action is brought ; (2) The 
 style of the action, consisting of the names 
 of all the parties thereto, distinguishing 
 them as plaintiffs and defendants, followed 
 by the words 'complaint at law,' if the 
 proceedings are at law, and by the words 
 ' complaint in equity,' if the proceedings 
 are ecjuitable; (3) A statement in ordi- 
 
 28
 
 434 
 
 CIVIL llEMKDIES. 
 
 shall appear on the face thereof, either, 1, that the court has no 
 jurisdiction of the person of the defendant or the subject of the 
 action ; or, 2, that the plaintiff lias not legal capacity to sue ; 
 or, 3, tliat there is another action pending between the same 
 parties for the same cause ; or, 4, that there is a defect of parties 
 plaintiff or defendant; or, 5, that several causes of action have 
 been improperly united; or, 6, that the complaint does not 
 state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." ^ " When 
 
 n.iry and concise laii^juage, witlioiit repeti- 
 tion, of the facts cunstitutinj^ the phiiutiff's 
 cause of action; (4) A demand of tlie 
 relief to which the phiiniitf considers him- 
 self entitled." 
 
 California, § 426 (complaint), substan- 
 tially as set out in tiie text. 
 
 Colorado, Code, 1890, § 49 (complaint). 
 
 Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, § 614 (com- 
 plaint), reading aS follows : " All pleadings 
 shall contain a plain and concise statement 
 of the material facts on which the pleader 
 relies, but not of the evidence by which 
 they are proved, such statement being 
 divided into paragraphs numbered cou- 
 secuiively, each containing, as nearly as 
 may be, a separate allegation." 
 
 '/c/«^o. Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §3204 (com- 
 ])laint), substantially as set out in the text. 
 
 Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, §341 (com- 
 plaint), the second subdivision reading, 
 "A statement of tiie facts constituting the 
 cause of action, in plain and concise lan- 
 guage, without repetition, and in such 
 manner as to enable a person of common 
 understanding to know what is intended." 
 
 Iowa, Code, 1897, § 3.i59 (petition), 
 sulistantially identical with the jirovisions 
 in Arkansas. 
 
 Kentucky, Code, 189.5, § 90, reading as 
 follows : " The petition must state facts 
 which constitute a cause of action in favor 
 of the plaintiff against the defendant, and 
 must demand the specific relief to whicli 
 tl>e plaintiff considers himself entitled ; 
 and may contain a general prayer for any 
 other relief to which the plaintiff may 
 apj)ear to be entitled." 
 
 Minnesola, St , 1894, § 5231 (complaint). 
 
 Missouri, Hev. St., 1899, § .592 (petition). 
 
 Montana, Code, 1895, S 671 (complaint). 
 
 Nerndn, Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3134 
 (complaint). 
 
 Ntw York, Code Civ. I'ro., § 481 (com- 
 
 plaint), the second clause quoted under (3) 
 in the te.Kt being absent. 
 
 North Carolina, § 93 (complaint), add- 
 ing to subdivision 2 the words, "and each 
 material allegation shall be distinctly 
 numbered."] 
 
 North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5266 
 (complaint). 
 
 0/i''o, Bates' St., 1903 (petition), § 5056, 
 5057, reading as follows : § 5056 : " Every 
 pleading mu.st contain the name of the 
 court and the county in which the action 
 is brought, and t!ie names of the parties, 
 followed liy the name of t!ie plcailing." 
 § 5 57 : " 'ihe first pleading shall be the 
 petition by the plaiutilf", which must con- 
 tain : (1) A statement of the facts consti- 
 tuting the cause of action in ordinary and 
 concise language. (2) A demand for the 
 relief to which the plaintiff supposes him- 
 self entitled. If the recovery of money is 
 demanded, the amount shall be stated ; 
 and if interest is claimed, the time for 
 which interest is to be computed shall also 
 be stated." 
 
 Oklahoma, St , 1893, § 3965, adding to 
 the first subdivision as given in the text, 
 the words, " followed by the word ' jieti- 
 tion.' " 
 
 South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 163 (com- 
 plaint), omitting the second clause quoted 
 under (3) in the text. 
 
 Utali, Rev. St., 1 898, § 2960 (complaint). 
 
 Washinyton, Bal. Code, § 4906 (com- 
 plaint). 
 
 HV.scohs/h, St., 1898, § 2646 (complaint). 
 
 W'yominy, Kev. St., 1899, § 3533, add- 
 ing tiie same words as in the Oklahoma 
 statute, supra. 
 
 1 Kansas, § 89 ; Nebraska, § 94 ; Cali- 
 fornia, § 430 (adding, " 7, that the 
 complaint is ambiguous, unintelligible, 
 or uncertain ") ; North Carolina, § 95. In 
 Iowa, the first four sn1)divisions of § 2048
 
 PROVI-^IONS IN liKL.VTKlN TO PLEADING. 
 
 435 
 
 an}^ of the matters eniinierated do not appear upon the face of 
 the complaint, the objection may be taken by answer. If no sucli 
 objection be taken either by demurrer or answer, the defendant 
 shall be deemed to have waived the same, excepting only the 
 objection to the jurisdiction of the court, and the objection that 
 the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause 
 of action." ^ 
 
 are the same as those given in the text, 
 and the section then proceeds : " or, 5, that 
 the facts stated in the petition do not en- 
 title the plaintiff to the relief demanded; 
 or, 6, that the petition on the face tliereof 
 shows that the claim is harred by the stat- 
 ute of limitations ; or fails to show it to be 
 in writing when it should be so evidenced ; 
 or, if founded on an account or writing as 
 evidence of indebtedness, and neither such 
 account or writing, or a copy thereof, is 
 incorporated with, or attached to, such 
 ])leading, or a sufficient reason stated for 
 nut doing so." 
 
 \^Arizo)ia, Rev. St., 1901, § 1351, adding 
 '• (7). 'J'hat the caitse of action is barred 
 Ijy limitation." 
 
 Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5717, 
 
 omitting the fifth gi-ound given in the text. 
 
 California, § 430, the commissioners' 
 
 amendment of 1901 adding to subdivision 
 
 5 the words, " or not separately stated." 
 
 Colorado, Code, 1890, § 50, adding the 
 words " or misjoinder " after the word 
 " defect " in subdivision 4, and adding " 7, 
 that the complaint is ambiguous, unintel- 
 ligible and uncertain." 
 
 Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 320G, 
 identical with the provisions of the Colo- 
 rado Code. 
 
 Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 342. 
 Kenturkij, Coile, 1895, § 92, adding the 
 words " in this State " after the word 
 " pending " in subdivision 3, and omitting 
 subdivision 5. 
 
 Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5232. 
 Missouri, Rev. St. 1899, § 598, adding 
 the words " in this state " at the end of 
 sul)division 3, and adding " 7, that a party 
 plaintiff or defendant is not a necessary 
 party to a com])lete determination of the 
 action." 
 
 Montana, Code, 1895, § G80, identical 
 with the provisions in Colorado. 
 
 Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3135, 
 identical with the provisions in Colorado. 
 
 New York, Code Civ. Pro., § 488, omit- 
 ting from subdivision 1 the words " or the 
 sui)ject of the action," and making that a 
 separate ground in subdivision 2, adding 
 two subdivisions in place of subdivision 4, 
 as follows : " 5. That there is a misjoinder 
 of parties plaintiti". 6. That there is a 
 defect of jjarties, plaintiff or defendant." 
 North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5268. 
 Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, § .5061, substan- 
 tially the same as New York, except that 
 ground 5 reads " That there is a mi.s- 
 joinder of parties plaintiff or defendant," 
 and adding "8. Tliat separate causes of 
 action against several defendants are im- 
 properly joined. 9. That the action was 
 not brought within the time limited. for 
 the commencement of such actious." 
 Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 3967. 
 Oregon, Hill's Laws, § 67, adding, " 7. 
 That the action has not been commenced 
 within the time limited by this Code." 
 South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 165. 
 South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6115. 
 Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2962, identical 
 with the Colorado statute. 
 
 Washington, BaI. Code, § 4907, adding, 
 " 7. That the .action has not been com- 
 menced within the time limited by law." 
 
 \Visco7isin, St., 1898, § 2649, identical 
 with the statute of Washington. 
 
 W Homing, Rev. St., 1899, § 3.535, 
 a<lding two subdivisions in place of sub- 
 division 4, as follows : "4. That there is a 
 misjoinder of parties plaintiff. 5. That 
 there is a defect of parties, plaintiff or 
 defendant," and adding another subdi- 
 vision, as follows : " 7. Tliat separate 
 causes of action agaiii.st several defend- 
 ants are improperly joined." 
 
 1 New York, §§ 147 (498), 148 (499); 
 Kansas, § 91 ; Nebraska, § 96 ; California, 
 §§ 433, 434; Oregon, §§69, 70; North 
 Carolina, §§ 98, 99. The Iowa Code, 
 § 2650, after the same pi-ovisioii as that in 
 the text, adds, "If the facts stated by the
 
 436 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 ^ 328. * 434. Statutory Provisions Applicable to all Pleadings. 
 The foregoing provisions describe the complaint or petition : tlie 
 following clauses — some of which, however, are not found in all 
 the codes — comprise the general rules applicable to all pleadings, 
 which regulate their form and contents, and determine their suf- 
 ficiency, — the general principles, in short, which characterize the 
 system of pleading provided for by the reformed procedure : " In 
 the construction of a pleading for the purpose of determining its 
 effect, its allegations shall be liberally construed with a view to 
 substantial justice between the parties." ^ " If irrelevant or re- 
 dundant matter be inserted in a pleading, it may be struck out an 
 
 petitiou do not entitle the plaintiff to any 
 relief wiiatever, advantage may be taken 
 of it by motion in arrest of judgment 
 before judgment is entered." 
 
 [^Arizona, Kev. St., 1901, § 135.3. 
 Arlcansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5720, 
 adding the words " over the subject of the 
 action " after the word "court." 
 
 Colorado, Code, 1890, §§ 54, 55. 
 Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §§ 3209, 
 3210. 
 
 Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 346, adding 
 the words " over the subject of the action " 
 after the word " court," and adding the 
 following clause: "Provided, however, 
 That the objection that the action was 
 brought in the wrong county, if not taken 
 by answer or demurrer, shall be deemed 
 to have been waived." 
 
 Kentucky, Code, 1895, §§ 92, 93, add- 
 ing the words " of the subject of the 
 action " after the word '' court," and pro- 
 viding that a neglect to raise the questions 
 seasonably subjects the party to the pay- 
 ment of costs. 
 
 Minnesota, St. 1894, §§ 5234, 5235. 
 
 Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, § 602, adding 
 the words " over the subject-matter of the 
 action " after the word " court." 
 
 Montana, Code, 1895, §§ 684, 685. 
 
 Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, §§ 3139, 
 3140. 
 
 A^ortA Z>afco<a, Rev. Codes, 1899, §§ 5271, 
 5272. 
 
 Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, § 5063. 
 
 Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 3969. 
 
 South Carolina, Code, 1893, §§ 168, 
 169. 
 
 South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, §§ 6118, 
 6119. 
 
 Utah, Kev. St., 1898, §§ 2966, 2967. 
 
 Washiwiton, Bal. Code, §§ 4909, 4911, 
 in slightly different form. 
 
 Wisconsin, St., 1898, §§ 2653, 2654. 
 
 Wyoming, Kev. St., 1899, § 3537.] 
 
 1 New York, § 159 (519) ; Kansas, 
 § 115 ; Nebraska, § 121 ; California, § 452 ; 
 Oregon, § 83; North Can^lina, § 119. 
 
 ^Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5754. 
 
 Colorado, Code, 1890, § 77. 
 
 Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3223. 
 
 Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 379, adding 
 the following: "but when the allegations 
 of a pleading are so indefinite or uncertain 
 that the precise nature of the charge or 
 defence is not apparent, the court may 
 require the pleading to be made definite 
 and certain by amendment." 
 
 loiva. Code, 1897, § 3446, reading as 
 follows : " The rule of the common law, 
 that statutes in derogation thereof are to 
 be strictly construed, has no application 
 to this code. Its provisions and all pro- 
 ceedings under it shall Ije liberally con- 
 strued with a view to promote its objects 
 and assist the parties in obtaining ju.stice." 
 
 Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5247. 
 
 Missouri, Kev. St., 1899, § 629. 
 
 Montana, Code, 1895, § 740. 
 
 Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3165. 
 
 N^orth Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5283. 
 
 Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, § 5096. 
 
 Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 3993, 
 
 South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 180. 
 
 South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6130. 
 
 Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2986. 
 Washini/ton, Bal. Code, § 4931. 
 Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2668. 
 Wi/ominy, Kev. St., 1899, § 3670.]
 
 PROVISIONS IN RELATION TO PLEADING. 
 
 437 
 
 motion of any person aggiieved thereby ; and when the allega- 
 tions of a pleading are so indefinite and uncertain that the precise 
 nature of the charge or defence is not apparent, the court may 
 require the plea'ding to be made definite and certain by amend- 
 ment." ^ " All fictions in pleading are abolished." '-^ " A material 
 allegation in a pleading is one essential to the claim or defence, 
 
 1 Kansas, § 110; Kebraska, § 125; 
 California, § 453 (altered verbally) ; Ore- 
 gon, § 84 ; North Carolina, § 120. 
 
 [^Arkcinsas, Sand. & Hill's Dig'., § 5755, 
 containing first clause only. 
 
 Colorado, Code, 1890, § 60, containing 
 the provisions quoted in the text, together 
 with considerable other matter. 
 
 Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3224, 
 reading as follows : " Sham and irrelevant 
 answers .and irrelevant and redundant 
 matter inserted in a pleading, may be 
 stricken out, upon such terms as the court 
 may, in its discretion, impose." 
 
 Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 385, read- 
 ing in part as follows : " All surplusage, 
 tautology, and irrelevant matter shall be 
 set aside and struck out of any pleading, 
 when pointed out by tlie party aggrieved," 
 and also § 379, quoted on page 436, supra. 
 
 Iowa, Code, 1897, § 3618, almost iden- 
 tical with the Idaho statute, quoted supra, 
 and also § 3630, very similar to the second 
 clause quoted in the te.xt. 
 
 Keniuckfj, Code, 1895, § 121, reading 
 as follows : " Irrelevant or redundant 
 matter in a pleading shall be stricken 
 out, upon or without motion, at the cost 
 of the party whose pleading contains it." 
 
 Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5248, slightly 
 varied from the form given in the text. 
 
 Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, § 612, slightly 
 varied from the form given in the text. 
 
 Montana, Code, 1895, § 742, almost 
 identical with tlie Idaho statute. 
 
 Nebrcisha, Code, 1901, § 125, slightly 
 varied from the form given in the text. 
 
 Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3152, 
 reading as follows : " If irrelevant or 
 redundant matter be inserted in a pleading, 
 it may be stricken out by the court, on 
 motion of any person aggrieved thereby." 
 
 Neiv York, Code Civ. Pro., §§ 545, 546, 
 substantially similar to the statute quoted 
 in the text, but somewhat more specific. 
 
 North Dakota, Rev. Codes,.1899, § 5284. 
 
 Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, §§ 5087, 5088, 
 
 sub.stantially similar to the statute quoted 
 ill the text, l)ut somewhat more specific. 
 
 Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 3997. 
 
 South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 181. 
 
 South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6131. 
 
 Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2987, very 
 similar to the Idaho statute. 
 
 Washington, Bal. Code, § 4932, adding 
 to the statute given in the text " or may 
 dismiss the same." 
 
 Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2683, substan- 
 tially similar to the statute given in the 
 text, but somewhat more specific. 
 
 Wijominf;, Rev. St., 1899, §§ 3561, 3562, 
 identical with the Ohio statute.] 
 
 - Kansas, § 116. 
 
 \^Idalio, Con.st., Art. 5, sec. 1, providing 
 that " Feigned issues are prohibited." 
 
 Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 381. 
 
 Iowa, Code, 1897, § 3557. 
 
 Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, § 610, provid- 
 ing that " No allegation shall be made iu 
 a pleading which the law does not re- 
 quire to be proved, and only the substan- 
 tial facts necessary to constitute the cause 
 of action or defence shall be stated." 
 
 Nebraska, Code, 1901, § 4, identical 
 with Ohio statute. 
 
 North Carolina, § 15, providing that 
 " Feigned issues are abolished."] 
 
 North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5183, 
 ]iroviding that " Feigned issues are abol- 
 ished." 
 
 Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, §4973, providing 
 that " There can be no feigned issue." 
 
 Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 3884, identical 
 with Ohio statute. 
 
 South Carolina, Code, 1893. § 92, pro- 
 viding that " Feigned issues shall not be 
 allowed." 
 
 South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6032, 
 identical with the North Dakota statute. 
 
 Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2841, stating 
 that " Feigned issues have been abolished." 
 
 Wi/omin;/, Rev. St., 1899, § 3445, iden- 
 tical with Ohio statute.
 
 43 S 
 
 CIVIL REMKDIE3. 
 
 which, could not be struck from the pleading without leaving it 
 insufficient. Neither presumptions of law nor matters of which 
 judicial notice is taken need be stated in the pleading,'" ^ The fol- 
 lowing special provision, which is found only in a portion of the 
 codes, and is not impliedly contained in the general principles 
 common to them all, is quoted because of its practical impor- 
 tance as a rule of procedure in those States whose legislation has 
 adopted it : " If the action, counter-claim, or set-off be founded 
 on an account, or on a note, bill, or other written instrument, as 
 evidence of indebtedness, a copy thereof must be attached to and 
 filed with the pleading. If not so attached and filed, the reason 
 thereof must be shown in the pleading." ^ 
 
 1 Kansas, §§ 129, 130; Nebraska, 
 §§ 135, 136 ; California, § 463 (first clause 
 only) ; Oregon, § 93 (tlie first clause 
 oulv). 
 
 '[^Arkansfis, Sand. & Hill's Dig., 
 §§ 5762, 5751. 
 
 Colorado, Code, 1890, § 72, first clause 
 only. 
 
 'Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3234, 
 first clause only. 
 
 Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 377, last 
 clause only. 
 
 Kentucky, Code, 1895, § 127, providing 
 that " A material allegation is one which 
 is necessary for the statement or support 
 of a cause of action or defence," and 
 § 119, providing that "neither the evi- 
 dence I'elied on by a party, nor presump- 
 tions of law, nor facts of which jurlicial 
 notice is taken, excepting private statutes, 
 shall be stated in a pleading." 
 
 Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, § 631, second 
 clause only. 
 
 Montana, Code, 1895, § 756, first 
 clause only. 
 
 Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3161, 
 first clause only. 
 
 Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, §§ 5082, 5083. 
 
 Oklahoma, St., 1893, §§ 4007, 4008. 
 
 Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2997, first 
 clause only. 
 
 Washington, Bal. Code, § 4944. 
 
 Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, §§ .•»56, 
 3557.J 
 
 •^ Kan8a.s, § 118 ; Nebraska, § 124. 
 
 [^Arkansas, Sand. & Ilin's Dig., §5752, 
 with slightly different wording. 
 
 Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 365, read- 
 
 ing in part as follows : " When any 
 pleading is fountled upon a written instru- 
 ment or on account, the original, or a 
 cop3' thereof, must be filed with the jjlead- 
 ing. . . . Such copy of a written iu.'^tru- 
 ment, when not copied in the pleadings, 
 shall be taken as part of the record." 
 
 Iowa, Code, 1897, § 3561, giving as one 
 ground for demurrer, " if founded on an 
 account or writing as evidence of indebted- 
 ness, that neither such writing or account 
 or copy thereof is incorporated into or 
 attached to the pleailing, or a sufficient 
 reason stated for not doing so." 
 
 Kansas, Code, 1901, § 118, adding the 
 following clause, " But if the action, coun- 
 ter-claim or set-off be founded upon a 
 series of written instruments executed by 
 the same person, it shall be sufficient to 
 attacli and file a copy of one only, and in 
 succeeding causes of action or defences 
 to set forth in general terms descriptions 
 of the several instruments respectively." 
 
 Kentucki/, Code, 1895, § 120, identical 
 with the Arkansas statute. 
 
 Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, § 630, allowing 
 a copy of an account to be attached, at 
 jileailer's oj)tion, in lieu of setting forth 
 the items in the pleading. 
 
 Montana, Code, 1895, § 747, reading as 
 follows: "Where a cause of action, de- 
 fence or counter-claim is founded upon 
 an instrument for the payment of money 
 only, the party may set forth a copy of 
 the instrument, and state that tiicre is 
 due him thereon, from the adverse party, 
 a specified sum, which he clain\s. Such 
 an allegation is ecjuivalcut to setting fortli
 
 PROVISIONS IN RELATION TO l'Li;AI»ING, 
 
 439 
 
 § 329. * 435. Statutory Provisions Respecting Ameudmeut. 
 Ample provision is made for the amendment of pleadings, either 
 at the trial itself, or at any other time in the progress of the 
 cause. The following sections are contained in all the codes, 
 with some unimportant verbal variations in a few of them : " No 
 variance between the allegation in a pleading and the proof shall 
 be deemed material, unless it have actually misled the adverse 
 party to his prejudice in maintaining his action or defence upo-n 
 the merits. Wlienever it sliall be alleged that a party has been 
 so misled, that fact shall be proved to the satisfaction of the 
 court, and in what respect he has been misled ; and thereupon 
 the court may order the pleading to be amended upon such terms 
 
 the instrument according to its legal 
 effect." 
 
 New York, Code Civ. Pro., § 534, iden- 
 tical with Montana statute. 
 
 Ohio, Bate.s' St., 1903, § 5085, substan- 
 tially the same as the provision quoted iu 
 the text, and § 5086, reading as follows : 
 ■" In an action, countei-claim, or set-off, 
 founded upon an account, or upon an in- 
 strument for the unconditional payment 
 of money only, it shall be sufficient for a 
 party to set forth a copy of the account or 
 instrument, with all credits and the in- 
 dorsements thereon, and to state that there 
 is due to him, on such account or instru- 
 ment, from the adverse party, a specified 
 sum, wliicli he claims, with interest ; and 
 when others than the makers of a promis- 
 sory note, or the acceptors of a bill of 
 exchange, are parties, it shall be necessary 
 to state the facts which fix their liability." 
 
 Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 4001, reading in 
 part as follows : " In an action, counter- 
 claim or set-off, founded upon an account, 
 promissory note, bill of exchange or other 
 instrument, for the unconditional pay- 
 ment of money only, it shall be sufficient 
 for a party to give a copy of the account 
 or instrument, with all credits, and the 
 indorsements thereon, and to state that 
 tliere is due him, on such account or in- 
 strument, from the adverse party, a speci- 
 fied sum, which he claims, with interest." 
 
 Oregon, Hill's Laws, § 83, allowing the 
 pleader to set out tlie items of an account 
 in the pleading, or to file a copy thereof, 
 at his option. 
 
 Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2G75, reading as 
 
 follows : " In an action, defence or coun- 
 ter-claim founded upon an instrument for 
 the payment of money only, it shall be 
 sufficient for the party to give a copy of 
 the instrument, and to state that there is 
 due to him tiiereou, from the adverse 
 party, a specified sum which he claims." 
 
 [Vi/ominr/, Ttev. St., 1899, § 3559. 
 
 In the following States the pleader may 
 deliver a copy of an account to the adverse 
 party within a designated period, in lieu 
 of setting out the items in his pleading : 
 Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3225; 
 Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3151 ; 
 North Dakota, Kev. Codes, 1899, § 5282 ; 
 South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 179; South 
 Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6129; Utah, 
 Rev. St., 1898, § 2988; Arizona, Rev. St., 
 1901, § 1287.] 
 
 For illustrations, see Evans v. Cler- 
 mont, etc. Co., 51 Ind. 160; Excelsior Dr. 
 Co. V. Brown, 38 id. 384 ; Etchison Ditch- 
 ing Ass'n V. Busenback, 39 id. 362 ; Dob- 
 son V. Duckpond D. Ass'n, 42 id. 312; 
 Alspaugh V. Ben Franklin Dr. Ass'n, 51 
 id. 271 ; Montgomery v. Gorrell, 51 id. 
 309 ; Brown v. State,' 44 id. 222 ; Mitchell 
 r. Am. Ins. Co., 51 id. 396; Ilinkle (;. Mar- 
 gerum, 50 id. 240; Sanford v. Wood, 49 
 id. 165 ; Jagers v. Jagers, 49 id. 428 ; Hays 
 V. Miller, 12 id. 187; Tyler v. Kent, 52 
 id. 583 ; Calvin v. Woolen, 66 id. 464 
 (neglect to file is cured by verdict) ; Ohio 
 & Miss. Ry. Co. v. Nickles.s, 71 id. 271 ; 
 Surginer v. Paddock, 31 Ark. 528 ; Han- 
 nibal & St. Jos. R. Co. V. Kuudsou, 62 
 Mo. 569. ,
 
 440 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 as shall be just." ^ " When the variance is not material, as pro- 
 vided in the last section, the court may direct tlie fact to be found 
 according to the evidence, or may order an immediate amend- 
 ment without costs." 2 " Where, however, the allegation of the 
 cause of action or defence to which tlie proof is directed is un- 
 proved, not in some particular, or particulars, but in its entire 
 scope and meaning, it shall not be deemed a case of variance 
 within the last two sections, but a failure of proof.*' ^ An}^ plead- 
 ing may be amended once by the party filing or serving it, as a 
 matter of course, and without costs, and without prejudice to 
 proceedings already had: such amendment must be made within 
 specified times, which differ in the various codes ; but will not be 
 permitted if it appear to be merely for purposes of delay.* In 
 
 1 New York, § 169 (539) ; Kansas, 
 § 133 ; Nebraska, § 138 ; California, § 469 ; 
 Oregon, § 94; Nortli Carolina, § 128. 
 
 [Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5764; 
 Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §3237; In- 
 diana, Burns' St., 1901, § 394; Iowa, Code, 
 1897, § 3597; Kentucky, Code, 1895, 
 §129; Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5262; Mis- 
 souri, Kev. St., 1899, § 655; Montana, 
 Code, 1895, § 770; North Dakota, Rev. 
 Codes, 1899, § 5293; Ohio, Bates' St., 
 § 5294; Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 4011; 
 South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 190; South 
 Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6140; Utah, 
 Rev. St., 1898, § 3001; Washington, Bal. 
 Code, § 4949 ; Wisconsin, St., 1898, 
 § 2669; Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3736; 
 Colorado, Code, 1890, § 78, in a different 
 form.] 
 
 2 New York, § 170 (540); Kansas, 
 § 134 ; Nehnvska, § 139 ; California, § 470 ; 
 Oregon, § 95; North Carolina, § 129. 
 
 [Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5765; 
 Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3238 ; In- 
 diana, Burns' St., 1901 , § 395 ; Iowa, Code, 
 1897, § 3598 ; Kentucky, Code, 1895, 
 § 130; Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5263 ; Mis- 
 souri, Rev. St., 1899, § 656 ; Montana, 
 Code, 1895, § 771 ; North Dakota, Rev. 
 Codes, 1899, § 5294; Ohio, Bates' St., 
 §.5295; Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 4012; 
 South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 191 ; South 
 Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, §6141 ; Utah, Rev. 
 St., 1898, § .3002 ; Washington, Bal. Code, 
 § 49.50; Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2670; 
 Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3737. j 
 
 2 New York, § 171 (541); Kansas, 
 
 § 135 ; Nebraska, § 140 ; California, § 471 ; 
 Oregon, § 96 ; North Carolina, § 130. 
 
 [Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5766 ; 
 Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §3239; In- 
 diana, Burns' St., 1901, § 396; Iowa, 
 Code, 1897, § 3599 ; Kentucky, Code, 1895, 
 § 131 ; Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5264 ; Mon- 
 tana, Code, 1895, § 772; North Dakota, 
 Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5295; Ohio, Bates' 
 St., § 5296 ; Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 4013 ; 
 South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 192; South 
 Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6142; Utah, 
 Rev. St., 1898, § 3003; Washington, Bal. 
 Code, § 4951 ; Wiscon.-in. St., 1898, § 2671 ; 
 Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3738.] 
 
 "* New York, § 172 (542, 543, 497); 
 Kansas, § 136; Nebra.ska, § 141 ; Califor- 
 nia, § 472 ; Oregon, § 97 ; North Carolina, 
 § 131. 
 
 [Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, § 1288 ; Ar- 
 kansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5767 ; Colo- 
 rado, Code, 1890, § 73; Connecticut, Gen. 
 St., 1902, § 639; Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 
 1901, § 3240; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, 
 §397; Iowa, Code, 1897, § 3560; Ken- 
 tucky, Code, 1895, § 132; Minnesota, St., 
 1894, § 5265; Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, 
 §661; Montana,Code, 1895, §773; Nevada, 
 Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3162 ; North Dakota, 
 Rev. Code.s, 1899, § 5296; Ohio, Bates' 
 St., § 5111 ; Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 4014; 
 South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 193; South 
 Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6143; Utah, 
 Rev. St., 1898, § 3004; Wisconsin, St., 
 1898, § 2685; Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, 
 § 3585.] 
 
 These provisions are substantially the
 
 PROVISIONS IN RELATION TO PLEADING. 
 
 441 
 
 addition to this privilege of voluntary amendment accorded to the 
 parties, the court itself may, on motion, amend a pleading, or per- 
 mit it -to be amended, at any stage of the cause, before and in 
 most of the States, after the judgment, on such terms as may be 
 proper. This authority is conferred in very broad terms, with the 
 limitation, however, that the cause of action or defence shall not 
 be substantially changed. ^ Finally, all the codes contain the fol- 
 lowing most righteous provision, which, as appears by their re- 
 ported decisions, is treated by the courts of some States as though 
 it were a legislative command binding upon them : " The court 
 shall, in every stage of an action, disregard any error or defect in 
 the pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect the substantial 
 rights of the adverse party, and no judgment shall be reversed or 
 affected by reason of such error or defect." '^ 
 
 same, except in respect to the time within 
 which the amendment can be made; they 
 all permit one such amendment by the 
 party of his own pleading, as a matter of 
 course. 
 
 1 New York, § 173 (723); California, 
 §473; North Carolina, § 132. 
 
 [^Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, § 1288, at 
 any stage of the action ; Arkansas, Sand. 
 & Hill's Dig., § 5769, at any time ; Colo- 
 rado, Code, 1890, § 7.5, without limitation 
 as to time; Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, 
 § 639, — at any time, § 645, —after de- 
 fault before final judgment, § 646, — from 
 contract to tort, and vice versa, § 647, — 
 from equitable to legal cause, and vice 
 versa; Idaho,' Code Civ. Pro., 1901, 
 § 3241, without limitation as to time ; In- 
 diana, Burns' St., 1901, § 399, at any 
 time; Iowa, Code, 1897, § 3600, at any 
 time; Kansas, Code, 1901, § 139, before or 
 after judgment; Kentucky, Code, 1895, 
 § 134, at any time; Minnesota, St., 1894, 
 § 5266, before or after judgment ; Mis- 
 souri, Rev. St., 1899, § 657, at any time 
 before final judgment, § 660, — after final 
 judgment; Montana, Code, 1895, § 774, 
 without limitation as to time ; Nebraska, 
 Code, 1901, § 144, either before or after 
 judgment ; Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, 
 § 3163, without limitation as to time ; 
 North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5297, 
 before or after judgment ; Ohio, Bates' 
 St., § 5114, before or after judgment; 
 Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 4017, before or af- 
 
 ter judgment ; Oregon, Hill's Laws, § 101, 
 at any time before trial, § 102, — allowing 
 court to enlarge time limited by code ; 
 South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 194, before 
 or after judgment ; SoutJi Dakota, Ann. 
 St., 1901, § 6144, before or after judg- 
 ment; Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 3005. 
 without limitation as to time; Washing- 
 ton, Bal. Code, § 4953, without limitation 
 as to time; Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, 
 §3588, before or after judgment; Wis- 
 consin, St., 1 898, § 2830, at any stage of 
 the action, before or after judgment.] 
 
 The following is the clause as found in 
 all the codes substantially, and exactly in 
 most of thera. The court ma}' at any 
 time "amend any pleading or proceeding 
 by adding or striking out the name of any 
 party ; or by correcting a mistake in the 
 name of any party, or a mistake in any 
 other re.spect ; or by inserting allegations 
 material to the case ; or, when the amend- 
 ment does not substantially change the 
 claim or defence, by conforming tlie plead- 
 ing or proceeding to the facts proved." 
 
 ■2 Nebraska, § 145 ; Kansas, § 140 ; Ore- 
 gon, § 104 ; North Carolina, § 135. 
 
 [^Arizona, Rev. St., lOOl, § 1293; Ar- 
 kansas, Sand. & Hill's St., § 5772 ; Cali- 
 fornia, § 475, somewhat more specific ; 
 Colorado, Code, 1890, § 78; Idaho, Code 
 Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3243; Indiana, Burns' 
 St., 1901 , § 401 ; Iowa, Code, 1897, § 3601 ; 
 Kentucky, Code, 1895, § 134; Minnesota, 
 St., 1894, § 52G9; jNIissouri, Rev. St.,
 
 442 CIVIL kemedils. 
 
 N^ 330. * 43G. Order of Proposed Treatment. Ill the important 
 discussions based upon tlie foregoing statutory provisions, which 
 will form the substance of the present chapter, the natural and 
 scientific order of treatment would undoubtedly lead me lirst to 
 develop the general and essential principles upon which the whole 
 reformed theory of pleading is Ijased, and afterwards to apply 
 these principles in determining the rules that regulate the matter" 
 and form of the plaintiff's complaint or petition. Scientific method 
 must, however, be sometimes abandoned from considerations of 
 convenience and expediency ; and such a course seems to be 
 proper in this instance. In attempting to obtain a correct notion 
 of the essential principles and doctrines of the new system, it will 
 be necessary to fix the meaning of certain terms and phrases used 
 in all the codes; and it so happens, from tlie course of judicial 
 decisions involving the question, that tliese veiy terms and phrases 
 can be most advantageously examined, and most easil}^ interpreted, 
 in connection with the particular subject of " The Joinder of 
 Causes of Action." The entire discussion wdll, tlierefore, be ren- 
 dered simpler, and useless repetition will lie avoided, by adopting 
 the arrangement thus suggested. In pursuing this plan, the 
 subject-matter of the chapter will be separated into the following 
 general di%dsions : (1) The joinder of different causes of action in 
 one proceeding ; (2) the essential principles w^iich lie at the 
 foundation of the reformed system of pleading ; (3) the general 
 doctrines and practical rules deduced from these principles, wliich 
 determine and regulate both the external form and the substance 
 of the plaintiff's complaint or petition. 
 
 1899, § 659 ; Montana, Code, 189."), § 778; to the reply, and to the joinder of causes 
 
 Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3166 ; New of action, are given hereafter. In a few of 
 
 York, Code Civ. Pro., § 721, enumerating the codes, especially in tho.se of Iowa, lu- 
 
 twelve classes of defects whicli shall not diana, and Missouri, there are certain 
 
 effect tlic judgment ; Nortli Dakota, Rev. special clauses prescribing wliat may be 
 
 Codes, 1899, § 5'iOO; Ohio, Bates' St., jiroved under the answer of denial, and 
 
 § 5115; Oklahoma, St., 189.3, § 4018; what must !>e pleaded as new matter, or 
 
 South Carolina, Code, 1893, §197; South referring to some mere points of detail: 
 
 Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6147 ; Utah, as these clauses are all embraced by im- 
 
 Itev. St., 1898, § 3008; Washington, Kal. j)licatiou in the more general provisions 
 
 Code, § 4957 ; Wisconsin, St., 1898, §2829; common to all the codes, and thus make 
 
 Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899. § 3589.] no change in the law of the States where 
 
 The foregoing are all the general provi- they are found, they are surplusage, and 1 
 
 Bions relating to the plaintiff's pleading, have not quoted them. Strunk v. Smith, 
 
 or to the theory of pleading as a whole: 36 Wis. 631. 
 those relating to the defendant's pleading,
 
 JOINDElt OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 443 
 
 SECTION SECOND. 
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 
 
 § 331. * 437. Subdivisions for Discussion herein. The discus- 
 sion of tliis important subject will be sepai'ated into the following 
 subdivisions : I. The statutory provisions found in the various 
 State codes. II. The forms and modes in which a misjoinder 
 may occur, and the manner in which it must be objected to and 
 corrected. III. The legal import of the term " cause of action," 
 and the case discussed in which only a single cause of action is 
 stated, although several different remedies, or kinds of relief, are 
 demanded. IV. The legal import of the term " transaction ; " 
 discussion of the case of "causes of action arising out of the 
 same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject 
 of action." V. Instances in which the proper joinder of causes of 
 action is connected with the proper joinder of defendants ; discus- 
 sion of the provision that all the causes of action must affect all 
 of the parties. VI. Instances in which all the causes of action 
 are against the single defendant, or against all the defendants 
 alike ; and the only question is, whether the case falls within any 
 one of the several specified classes, except the first which em- 
 braces those arising out of the same transaction, etc. These sub- 
 divisions, I think, entirely exhaust the particular subject-matter 
 to which this section is devoted. 
 
 I. Tlie Statutory Provisions. 
 
 § 332. * 438. Language of the Codes herein. The provision, 
 which is found substantially the same — with very sliglit modifi- 
 cations, if any — in most of the codes, is as follows : " The plain- 
 tiff may unite in the same complaint several causes of action, 
 whether they be such as have heretofore been denominated legal 
 or equitable, or both,^ when they all arise out of, 1. The same 
 transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of 
 
 1 [^Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. Stone 175, 87 N. W. 1067; Swihart v. Harles.s 
 
 (1899), 61 Kan. 48, .58 Pac. 986 ; Haskell (1896), 93 Wi.s. 211,67 N. W. 413 ; Blakely 
 
 Co. Bank v. Bank of Santa Fe (1893), 51 v. Smock (1897), 96 Wi.s. 611, 71 N. W. 
 
 Kan. 39, 32 Pac. 624. But see Pietsch 1052; Lane v. Dowfl (1903), 172 Mo. 167, 
 
 V. Krause (1903), 116 Wis. 344, 93 N. W. 72 S. W. 632; Plankiuton v. Ilildcbraud 
 
 9; Reeg v. Adams (1902), 113 Wis. (1895), 89 Wis. 209, 61 N. W. 839.3
 
 444 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES, 
 
 action ; 2. Contract, express or implied ; or, 3. Injurie.-;, Avith or 
 AWthout force, to person and property, or either ; or, 4. Injuries 
 to character ; or, 5. Claims to recover real property, with or with- 
 out damages for the withholding thereof, and the rents and profits 
 of the same; or, 6. Claims to recover personal property, with 
 or without damages for the withliolding thereof; or, 7. Claims 
 against a trustee, by virtue of a contract, or by operation of law.i 
 " But the causes of action so united must all belong to one of 
 these classes, and, except in actions for the foreclosure of mort- 
 gages, must affect all the parties to tlie action, and not require 
 different places of trial, and must be separately stated.^ 
 
 1 QBosworth V. Allen (1901), 168 N. Y. 
 157, 61 N. E. l&'i. "The cause of action 
 to set asitle the contract may properly be 
 united with the cause of action to coin])el 
 an accountiug for the injurious results of 
 the arrangement of which it is a part, 
 since both causes of action were founded 
 upon claims against trustees, arising by 
 operation of law. "J 
 
 - QState V. Krause (1897), 58 Kan. 651, 
 50 Pac. 882 (cause of action on one bond 
 of county treasurer cannot be joined with 
 cause of action on another bond where 
 .sureties are different) ; Barry v. Wach- 
 osky (1899), 57 Neb. 5.34, 77 N. W. 1080. 
 Tlie facts in this case were as follows: 
 James M. Barry, J. M. Brannan, and 
 C. D. Ryan made their non-negotiable 
 promissory note, and delivered the same 
 to D. F. Clarke, who was payee of the 
 same. The latter, before maturity of the 
 note, seems to have sold and delivered it 
 to the plaintiff, and before doing so 
 " wrote his name across the back of the 
 note, and over that he recited in writing 
 that lie guaranteed the payment of the 
 note." Wachosky brouglit suit on the 
 note making Barry, Brannan, Ryan, and 
 Clarke defendants. In the opinion the 
 court, among other things, said : " In tlie 
 case at bar Clarke did write over his 
 signature on this note a guaranty of pay- 
 ment, and by so doing he became liable to 
 Wachosky a.s a guarantor of this note. 
 But thi; makers of the note were not 
 parties to this contract of guaranty. . . . 
 Wachosky has, perhaps, two causes of 
 action. One cause of action is on the 
 note and against the makers thereof. 
 
 The other cause of action is against Clarke 
 on his guaranty of payment. These 
 two causes of action cannot be united, for 
 the obvious reason tliat each one does 
 not s^ffect all the parties to the action." 
 Plankinton r. Hildebrand (1895), 89 Wis. 
 209, 61 N. W. 839; Gunder.son v. Thomas 
 (1894), 87 Wis. 406, 58 N. W. 7.50; 
 A. T. & S. F. Rid. Co. V. Commr's of 
 Sumner Co. (1893), 51 Kan. 617, 33 Pac. 
 31 2 ; Draper r. Brown (1902), 115 Wis. 361, 
 91 N. W. 1001 ; Stewart v. Rusengren 
 ( 1902), — Xeb. — , 92 N. W. 586 ; Hughes 
 v. Ilunner (1895), 91 Wis. 116, 64 N. W. 
 887; Blakely v. Smock (1897), 96 Wis. 
 611, 71 N. W. 1052; Egaard v. Dahlke 
 (1901), 109 Wis. 366, 85 N. W. 369; 
 Hilton V. Hilton's Adm'r (1901), — Ky. 
 — , 62 S. W. 6 ; Clayton v. City of Hen- 
 derson (1898), 103 Ky. 228, 44 S. W. 667; 
 Thelin v. Stewart (1893), 100 Cal. 372, 34 
 Pac. 861 ; Jamison v. CuUigan (1899), 151 
 Mo. 410, 52 S. W. 224 ; Kruczinski i-. Neu- 
 endorf, 99 Wis. 264, 74 N. W. 974 ; Ander- 
 son r. Scandia Bank (1893), 53 Minn. 191, 
 54 N. W. 10G2; Carrier v. Bern.stein 
 (1898), 104 la. 572, 73 N. W. 1076; Mc- 
 Donald V. Second Nat. Bank (1898), 106 
 la. 517, 76 N. W. 1011 (where the mis- 
 joinder resulted from tlie causes of action 
 i)eing triable in different counties) ; Mor- 
 ton V. Western Union Tel. Co. (1902), 1-30 
 N. C. 299, 41 S. E. 484; I'lankinton ?•. 
 Hildebrand (189.5), 89 Wis. 209, 61 N. W. 
 839; Budde v. Rcbcnack (1896). 137 Mo. 
 179, 38 S. W. 910; Kstep r. Hamnions 
 (1898), 104 Ky. 144,46 S. W. 715; Ilawar- 
 deu V. The Yonghioglieny & Leliigh Coal 
 Co. (1901), 111 Wis. 545^ 87 N. W. 472.^
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSi:s OF ACTION. 
 
 445 
 
 " In actions to foreclose mortgages, the court shall have power 
 to adjudge and direct payment by the mortgagor of any residue 
 of the mortgage debt that may remain unsatisfied after a sale of 
 the mortgaged premises, in cases in which the mortgagor shall be 
 personally liable for the debt secured by such niortgage ; and if 
 the mortgage debt be secured by the covenant, or obligation, 
 of any person other than tlie mortgagor, the plaintiff may make 
 such person a party to the action, and the court may adjudge 
 paj-ment of the residue of such debt remaining unsatisfied after a 
 sale of the mortgaged premises, against such other person, and 
 may enforce such judgment as in other cases." ^ 
 
 1 ^Arizona. " Only such causes of action 
 may he joiued as are capable of the same 
 character of relief. Actions ex contractu 
 shall not be joiued with actions ex delicto. 
 In actions ex delicto there shall not be 
 joined actions to recover for injuries to 
 the ])erson, to property, or to character ; 
 but they shall be sued for separately." 
 Kev. St.", 1901, § 1291. 
 
 Arkansas. " Several causes of action 
 may be united in the same complaint, 
 where each affects all the parties to the 
 action, may be brought iu the same 
 county, be prosecuted by the same kind of 
 proceedings, and all belong to one of the 
 following classes: (1) Claims arising out 
 of contract, express or implied ; (2) Claims 
 for the recovery of specific real property, 
 and the rents, profits, and damages for 
 ■withholding the same ; (3) Claims for the 
 recovery of specific per.sonal property, and 
 damages for the taking or withholding 
 the same; (4) Claimsfor partition of real or 
 personal property, or both; (5) Claims aris- 
 ing from injuries to character; (6) Claims 
 arising from injuries to person and prop- 
 erty ; (7) Claims against a trustee by 
 virtue of a contract or by operation of 
 law." Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5703. 
 
 California. " The plaintiff may unite 
 several causes of actiou in the same com- 
 plamt, where they all arise out of: [( 1 ) A 
 single act committed by the defendant, or 
 several such acts constituting but a single 
 transaction]. (I) [2] Contracts, express 
 or implied; (2) [3] Claims to recover spe- 
 cific real property, with or without dam- 
 ages for the withholding thereof, or for 
 waste committed thereon, and the rents 
 and profits of the same; (3) [4] Claims 
 
 to recover specific personal property, with 
 or without damages for the witliliolding 
 thereof; (4) [.ij Claims against a trustee 
 by virtue of a contract or by operation of 
 law; (5) [6] Injuries to character ; (6) [7] 
 Injuries to person; (7) [8] Injuries to 
 property. Tlie causes of action so united 
 must all [, e.xcept in the cases mentioned 
 in subdivision one,] belong to one only of 
 these classes, and must affect all the par- 
 ties to the actiou, and not require different 
 places of trial, and must be separately 
 stated ; but an action for malicious arrest 
 and prosecution, or either of them, may 
 be united with an action for either an 
 injury to character or to the person." 
 The portions inclosed in brackets are 
 the portions added by the Commissioners' 
 Amendment of 1901. See Lewis v. Dunne 
 (1901), 134 Cal. 291, sustaining technical 
 objections to the constitutionality of the 
 amended code. Code Civ. Pro., § 427. 
 The paragraph of the text relative to 
 foreclosure suits is found in different form 
 in § 726. 
 
 Colorado. " The plaintiff may unite 
 several causes of actiou in the same com- 
 plaint, when they all arise out of any one 
 of the following named classes : Provided, 
 They affect all of the same parties, both 
 plaintiff and defendant, and affect them 
 iu the same character and capacity ; and 
 provided, they do not recpiire different 
 places of trial, to wit : Class First — Ac- 
 tions to recover specific real property, 
 whether the same be claimed by virtue of 
 superiority of title or by superiority of 
 possessory right, or on account of unlaw- 
 ful detainer or forciljle entry ; and with 
 such claims may be united any and all
 
 446 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 § 333. * 439. Features Common to many Codes. States in 
 which these Features are wanting. The scheme contained in all 
 these codes is marked by certain common features, which should 
 
 claim.s for damages, for rents in arrear, 
 for profits during any unlawful occupa- 
 tion thereof, and for any waste committed 
 thereon. Provided, That all such claims 
 arise from the same property for the re- 
 covery of which the suit is brought. 
 Class Second — Action to recover specific 
 l)ersonal property with which may be joined 
 any and all claims for damages for the 
 uulawfiJ detention of the same, or for the 
 forcible taking of the same, including, in 
 proper cases, claims for exemplary dam- 
 ages, and in case the property cannot be 
 recovered in specie, damages for the un- 
 lawful conversion thereof. Class Third 
 — All actions sounding only iu damages, 
 whether the same be for breach of con- 
 trace, sealed or parol, express or implied, 
 or for injuries to property, person or char- 
 acter, or for any two or more of these 
 causes, and in all cases it shall be neces- 
 sarv to state separately in the complaint 
 the different causes for which the action is 
 brought, and in all cases equitable relief 
 may be granted." § 70. For provisions 
 relative to foreclosure suits, see § 252. 
 
 Connecticut. " In every civil action not 
 brought before a justice of the peace, the 
 plaintiff may include in his complaint 
 botii legal and equitable rights and causes 
 of action, and demand both legal and 
 e(iuitable remedies ; but wiiere several 
 causes of action are united in the same 
 complaint tiiey must all be brought to re- 
 cover either (1) upon contract, express or 
 implied ; or (2) for injuries, with or without 
 force, to person and property, or either, 
 including a conversion of property to de- 
 fendant's use; or (3) for injuries to char- 
 acter ; or (4) upon claims to recover real 
 property, with or without damages for the 
 withholding thereof, and the rents and 
 profits of tiie same; or (5) upon claims to 
 recover personal property specifically, with 
 or without damages for the withholding 
 thereof; or (6) claims arising by virtue of 
 a contract or by operation of law, in favor 
 of or against a party, in some representa- 
 tive or fiduciary capacity; or (7) upon 
 claims, whether in contract, or tort, or 
 both, arising out of the same transaction 
 
 or transactions connected with the same 
 subject of action. The several causes of 
 action so united must all belong to one of 
 these classes, and, e.\cept in actions for 
 the Ibreclosure of mortgages or liens, must 
 affect all the parties to tiie action, and not 
 require different places of trial, and must 
 be separately stated ; and in all cases 
 where several causes of action are joined 
 in tlie same complaint, or as matter of 
 counter-claim or set-off, in the answer, if 
 it appear to the court that they cannot all 
 be conveniently heard together, the court 
 may order separate trials of any such 
 causes of action, or may direct that any 
 one or more of them be expunged from 
 the complaint or answer." Gcu. St., 1902, 
 § 613. 
 
 Georcjia. " All claims arising ex con- 
 tractu between the same parties may be 
 joined in the same action, and all claims 
 arising ex delicto may in like manner be 
 joined. The defendant may akso set up, 
 as a defence, all claims against the jilain- 
 tiff uf a similar nature with the plaintiff's 
 demand." Code, 1895, § 4944. 
 
 Idalto. Identical with the provisions 
 of the California Code without the por- 
 tions added by the Commissioners' Amend- 
 ment of 1901.' Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §3205. 
 For provisions relative to foreclosure suits 
 see §3.'33l. 
 
 Indiana. " The plaintiff m.ay unite 
 several causes of action in the same com- 
 plaint, when they are included in either of 
 the f(jllowing classes : First. Money de- 
 mands on contract. Second. Injuries to 
 property. Third. Injuries to person or 
 character. Fourth. Claims to recover the 
 possession of personal property, with or 
 without damages for the withholding 
 thereof, and for injuries to the property 
 withheld. Fifth. Claims to recover the 
 posae.^sion of real property, with or with- 
 out damages, rents and profits for the 
 withholding thereof, and for wa-ste or 
 damage done to the land ; to make parti- 
 tion of and to determine and quiet the 
 title to real ])roperty. Sirth. Claims to 
 enforce the specific performance of con- 
 tracts, and to avoid contracts for fraud
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 
 
 447 
 
 be noticed ; namely, the express provision for the uniting of legal 
 and equituble causes of action, and the exceedingly general and 
 
 or mistakes. Seventh. Claims to fore- 
 close mortgages ; to enforce or discharge 
 specific lieus ; to recover persoual juiig- 
 ment upon the debt secured by such mort- 
 gage or lien ; to subject to sale real 
 property upon demauds agaiust decedents' 
 estates, when such property has passed to 
 heirs, devisees, or their assigns ; to mar- 
 siial assets ; and to substitute one person 
 to the rights of another ; and all otlier 
 causes of action arising out of a contract 
 or a duty, and not falling within either of 
 the foregoing classes. But causes of ac- 
 tion so joined must affect all tlie parties to 
 the action, and not require different places 
 of trial, and must be separately stated and 
 numbered." Burns' St., 1901, § 279. 
 
 loira. " Causes of action of whatever 
 kind, where eacii may be prosecuted by 
 the same kind of proceedings, if held by 
 the same party, and against the same 
 party, in the same rights, and if action 
 on all may be brought and tried in that 
 county, may be joined in the same peti- 
 tion ; but the court may direct all or any 
 portion of the issues joined to be tried 
 separately, and may determine the order 
 thereof," Code, 1897, § 35-15. 
 
 Kansas. The enumeration of classes 
 is identical with that given in the text, 
 followed by this clause : " But the causes 
 of action so uniteii must all belong to one 
 of these classes, and must affect all the 
 parties to the action, except in actions to 
 enforce mortgages or otlier liens." Code, 
 § 8.3, Gen. St., 1901, §4517. 
 
 Kentucky. Identical, with very slight 
 verbal changes, with the Arkansas statute, 
 exclusive of subdivision 7. Code, 1895, 
 §83. 
 
 Minnesota. Identical with the provi- 
 sions of the text, except that, in the second 
 paragraph, the words " except in actions 
 for the foreclosure of mortgages " are 
 omitted. St., 1894, § 5260. Third para- 
 graph wanting. 
 
 Missouri. The enumeration of classes 
 is identical with that given in the text 
 except the seventh class, which is as fol- 
 lows : " Claims bj' or against a party in 
 some representative or fiduciary capacity, 
 by virtue of a contract or by operation of 
 
 law," followed by this clau.se: "But the 
 causes of action so united must all belong 
 to one of these cla.sses, and must affect all 
 the parties to the action, and not require 
 different places of trial, and must be sepa- 
 rately stated, with the relief sought for 
 each cause of action, in such manner that 
 they may be intelligibly distinguished.' 
 Kev. St., 1899, § 593. 
 
 Montana. Identical with the provi- 
 sions of the California Code without the 
 portions added by the Commissioners' 
 Amendment of 1901, except that the .sec- 
 ond paragraph reads as follows : " The 
 causes of action so united must all appear 
 on the face of the complaint to belong," 
 etc., the remainder being identical with 
 the California provision. Code, 1895, 
 §672. 
 
 Nebraska. The enumeration of classes 
 is identical with tliat given in the text, 
 except that the order of classes 5 and 6 
 is reversed, the enumeration being fol- 
 lowed by this clause : " The causes of at;- 
 tion so united, must affect all the parties 
 to the action, and not require different 
 places of trial." Code, 1901, §§ 87, 88. 
 
 Nerada. Identical with the provisions 
 of the California Code, without the por- 
 tions added by the Commissioners' Amend- 
 ment of 1901, with very slight verbal 
 changes. Comp. Laws, 1900, §3159. 
 
 New York. " The plaintiff may unite, 
 in the same complaint, two or more causes 
 of action, whether they are such as were 
 furmerly denominated legal or etjuitable, 
 or both, where they are brought to recover 
 as follows : ( 1 ) Upon contract, express or 
 implied ; (2) For personal injuries, ex- 
 cept libel, slander, criminal conversation, 
 or seduction; (3) For libel or slander; 
 (4) For injuries to real property; (5) 
 Keal property, in ejectment, with or with- 
 out damages for the withholding thereof ; 
 
 (6) For injuries to personal property; 
 
 (7) Chattels, with or without damages 
 for the taking or detention thereof ; (8) 
 Upon claims against a trustee, by virtue 
 of a contract, or by operation of law ; (9) 
 Upon claims arising out of the same trans- 
 action, or transactions connected with the 
 same subject of action, and not included
 
 448 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 vague clause permitting the union of causes of action arising out 
 of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same 
 
 witliiu oue of the foregoiug subdivisions 
 of tills section; (10) For penalties in- 
 curred under the fisheries, game and forest 
 laws. But it must appear, upon the face 
 of tlie complaint, that all the causes of ac- 
 tion, so united, belong to one of the fore- 
 going subdivisions of this section ; tliat 
 they are consistent with each other; and, 
 except as otlierwise ])rpscril)ed by lavr, 
 that they affect all the parties to the ac- 
 tion ; and it must appear upon the face of 
 the complaint, that they do not require 
 different places of trial." Code Civ. Pro., 
 § 484, as amended Laws, 1877, c. 416, and 
 Laws, 1900, c. 590. 
 
 North Carolina. Identical with tlie 
 provisions given in the text. § 126. 
 
 North Dakota. Identical with the pro- 
 visions given in the text, except that tlie 
 words "or waste committed tliereon" are 
 added to the fifth subdivision. Rev. Codes, 
 1899, §5291. 
 
 Ohio. " The plaintiff may unite several 
 causes of action in the same ))etition, 
 whether they are such as have heretofore 
 been denominated legal or eiiuitable, or 
 both, when they are included in either of 
 the following cla.^ses : ( 1 ) The same trans- 
 action ; (2) Transactions connected with 
 the same subject of action ; (3) Contracts, 
 e.xpress or implied; (4) Injuries to person 
 and property, or to either ; (5) Injuries to 
 character; (6) Claims to recover tlie pos- 
 session of personal property, with or with- 
 out damages for the withholding tliereof ; 
 (7) Claims to recover real property, with 
 or without damages for the withholding 
 thereof, tlie rents and jn-ofits of the same, 
 and the partition thereof; (&) Claims to 
 foreclose a mortgage given to secure the 
 payment of money or to enforce a specific 
 lien for money, and to recover a personal 
 judgment for the debt secured by such 
 mortgage or lien ; (9) Claims against a 
 trustee, by virtue of a contract, or by 
 operation of law." Bates' St., 1 90.3, § 5058. 
 
 Oklahoma. The enumeration of classes 
 is identical with that of the text, except 
 that the order of classes 5 and 6 is 
 reversed, and the enumeration is followed 
 by this clause : " But the causes of action 
 80 united must all l)elong to one of these 
 cl.isses, and mu.st affect all tlie jiartics to 
 
 tlie action, except in actions to enforce 
 mortgages or other liens." St., 1893, 
 §3961. 
 
 Oregon. "The i)laiutiff may unite sev- 
 eral cau.ses of action in the same complaint 
 wlien they all arise out of — ( 1 ) Contract, 
 express or implied ; (2) Injuries, with or 
 without force, to the person; (3) Injuries, 
 with or witiiout force, to property ; (4) 
 Injuries to character; (5) Claims to 
 recover real property, with or witiiout 
 damages for tiie witliholdiiig thereof; (6) 
 Claims to recover personal property, with 
 or without damages for the withholding 
 thereof; (7) Claims against a trustee, by 
 virtue of a contract or by operation of 
 law. But the causes of action so united 
 must all belong to one only of the.se 
 classes, and must affect all the parties to 
 the action, and not require different places 
 of trial, and must be separately stated." 
 Hill's Laws, § 93. 
 
 South Carolina. Identical in all re- 
 spects with all three paragraphs given in 
 the text. Code, 1893, § 188. 
 
 South Dakota. Identical in all re- 
 spects with the three paragraphs given 
 in the text, except that to class 5 are 
 added the words " or for waste committed 
 thereon." Ann. St., 1901, § 6138. 
 
 Utah. Identical with the first two 
 paragraphs of the text, except that to 
 class 5 are added the words "or waste 
 committed tliereon." Paragraph three of 
 text, respecting mortgage foreclosures, is 
 wanting. Rev. St., 1898, §2961. 
 
 Washington. The enumeration of 
 classes is identical with the statute of 
 Oregon, and is followed by this clause, 
 " But the causes of action so united must 
 affect all the parties to the action, and not 
 require different places of trial, and must 
 be separately stated." Bal. Code, § 4942. 
 
 Wisconsin. Identical with the first 
 two paragraj)lis of the te.xt, except that 
 the words, " except in actions for the 
 foreclosure of mortgages," are omitteil 
 from the second paragraph. St., 1898, 
 § 2647. 
 
 Wyoming. The enumeration of classes 
 is identical with that of the text, except 
 that the order of classes 5 and 6 is 
 reversed, the enumeration being followed
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 449 
 
 subject of action. In a few States these peculiar features are 
 wanting ; while the other classes of causes of action which may- 
 be joined are substantially the same as provided in the arrange- 
 ment already given. This is the case in Kentucky, in Oregon, 
 and in California.^ It should be remembered that in Kentucky 
 and in Oregon [also in Iowa and Arkansas] a slight distinction 
 between legal and equitable proceedings is preserved ; and this 
 fact, doubtless, accounts for the form of the pi'o vision in the codes 
 of those States. No such distinction remains in California, and, 
 as has been seen in a former chapter, legal and equitable causes 
 of action may be united, according to the established procedure in 
 that State, notwithstanding the omission in the clause expressly 
 regulating such joinder. 
 
 § 334. * 440. Departures from Original Type. In other States, 
 the original type set forth in the New York code has been widely 
 departed from. Thus, in Indiana, an attempt is made to enumer- 
 ate and arrange the particular classes of equitable as well as legal 
 causes of action which may be joined. In Iowa the departure 
 from the common type and the changes of the common law are 
 much wider, and more radical. The code of that State, as do the 
 codes of Kentucky and of Oregon, retains some slight separation 
 between legal and equitable actions, but permits all possible 
 actions that are legal, or all that are equitable, to be united in one 
 petition. The only requirement in reference to their nature is, 
 that all causes of action so united must be in the same kind of 
 proceedings ; that is, all legal, or all equitable. 
 
 § 335. *441. Scope and Meaning of Statutory Provisions. 
 Difficulties of Interpretation. These various statutory provisions 
 will be examined, and the judicial interpretation put upon them 
 will be ascertained, in a subsequent portion of the present section. 
 Their general scope and meaning, however, are very plain. Ex- 
 cepting in Iowa, a plaintiff may unite different causes of action in 
 the one complaint or petition, under the following restrictions : 
 They must affect all the parties ; they must all be triable in the 
 same county ; and they must all belong to one of the various 
 specified classes. The result is, that all the causes of action so 
 
 l)y this section, " The causes of action so mortgage foreclosures in some respects 
 united must not require different places of similar to tliat given ia the text. llev. 
 trial, and, except as otherwise provided, St., 1899, §§ 3493, 3494, 3495. ;] 
 must affect all the parties to the action." ^ [^Lanib u. Harbaugh (1895), 105 Cal. 
 
 Following this is a section relative to 680, 39 Pac. 56. J 
 
 29
 
 450 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 united must be either upon contract, or for injuries to person or 
 property, and tlie like, unless they all arise out of the same trans- 
 action, or transactions connected with the same subject of action. 
 This latter exception does not, as has been seen, prevail in a few 
 of the States ; but, where it does prevail, the most incongruous 
 and dissimilar causes of action may be joined, if they arise out 
 of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same 
 subject of the action, within the meaning of that phrase.^ It is 
 evident that very little difficulty can arise in interpreting and 
 applying most of the classes. The real doubts and uncertainties 
 grow out of (1) the confounding the reliefs demanded by the 
 plaintiff with the cause of action upon which such demand is 
 based ; and thi.s confusion is more apt to exist in equity causes, 
 and especially in those where legal relief is prayed for as well as 
 equitable ; (2) the clause permitting the joinder of causes of 
 action arising out of the same transaction, etc. " Transaction " 
 has had no technical legal meaning, and is a word of very vague 
 import at best; but this vagueness is largely increased b}^ the 
 additional clause which permits causes of action arising out of 
 transactions connected with the same subject of action to be 
 united. These are the two chief, and almost only, sources of 
 doubt in the practical construction of the passage in question. 
 The first one — the liability of confounding the reliefs demanded 
 with the causes of action — may, of course, be avoided by the 
 exercise of care and discrimination: the second is much more 
 embarrassing, and it is hardly possible that all doubt should ever 
 be removed from the legal meaning of the language. 
 
 II. The Forms and Modes in ivJdch a Misjoinder may occur, and 
 the Manner in lohich it must he objected to and corrected. 
 
 § 336. * 442. Separate Statement of Different Causes of Action. 
 All of the codes require that the different causes of action 
 should be separately stated. In other words, each must be set 
 forth in a separate and distinct division of the complaint or 
 
 1 ^Pollock r. Association (1896), 48 further sum for maliciously instituting^ 
 
 S. C 6.'), 2.5 S. E. 977, (jnoting the text, the injunction proceeding for the purpose 
 
 Willey t). Nichols (1898), 18 Wash. 528, .52 of hara.ssing and injuring plaintiffs is 
 
 Pac. 237, to the effect that "an action demurrable on the ground of misjoinder 
 
 against the principal and sureties upon an of actions, one being based on contract, 
 
 injunction bond for the penalty therein the other on tort."] 
 named and against the princij)al in a
 
 JOIXDEK OF CAUSES OF ACTIOX. 45 L 
 
 potiiion, in sncli a manner that each of these divisions might, 
 if taken alone, be the substance of an independent action. In 
 fact, the whole proceeding is the combining of several actions into 
 one. At the common law, these separate divisions of the declara- 
 tion were termed " counts ; " and that word is still used by t€xt- 
 writers and judges, although, with one or two exceptions, it is 
 not authorized by the codes ; and it tends to produce confusion 
 and misapprehension, since the common-law "count" was sub- 
 stantially a very different thing from the " cause of action " of 
 the new procedure. In one or two States, the term " paragraph " 
 is used to designate these primary divisions. The difificulty in the 
 use of this term is that it is now very generally used in England, 
 and in most of the States where the reformed system prevails, to 
 designate the short sub-divisions, or allegp.tions, of facts into which 
 each cause of action is separated, according to a mode of plead- 
 ing which has become very common. Tlie term " cause of action" 
 is perhaps as proper as any which can be used for the purpose. 
 That such a separation should be made, and that each distinct 
 cause of action should be stated in a single and independent divi- 
 sion, so that the defendant may answer or demur to it without 
 any confusion with otliers, is plainly indispensable to an orderly 
 system of pleading, and is expressly required by all the codes ; ^ 
 and in some of the States the courts have strictly enforced the 
 requirement, and liave thereby done much to prevent the formal 
 presentations of the issues to be tried from falling into that con- 
 fused and bungling condition which exists to so great an extent 
 in certain of the States. 
 
 § 337. * 443. How Question of Misjoinder of Causes of Action 
 is raised. Effect of Sustaining Demurrer upon this Ground. 
 The special provisions respecting the manner of raising an 
 objection to a misjoinder of causes of action, and the effect there- 
 of, are as follows : In all the codes but two, it is prescribed 
 that the defendant may demur to the complaint, or petition, if it 
 shall appear on the face thereof that several causes of action have 
 been improperly united ; that, if the error does not so appear, the 
 objection may be taken by the answer; and that, if not taken 
 in either of these modes, it is waived.^ The sustaining of a de- 
 
 1 I^Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia are identical with those which regulate 
 (1899), 71 Conn. 369, 42 Atl. 67.3 t'le method of objecting to a defect of 
 
 2 See these provisions, collected in the parties ; and tlic decisions already cited 
 text or notes, sicpra, § *43.3. These rules (§§ *206, *207, *287), of course, apply to
 
 •452 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 raurrer upon this ground is not fatal to the action in all the 
 States. Several codes contain the very just provision, that, 
 when such a demurrer is sustained, the court may simply order 
 the action to be divided into as many as may be necessary for the 
 proper hearing and determination of the causes of action set forth 
 in the original pleading.^ The plaintiff is thus not thrown out 
 of court in respect of any of the causes of action alleged by liim ; 
 he is merely required to separate the single cause into the number 
 of independent suits which he should have originally brought.^ 
 
 § 338. * 444. ESect of Misjoinder iu soma States. In one or 
 two States a misjoinder is attended with even less serious con- 
 sequences than this, the sole object of the statutorj^ provision on 
 the subject being to secure a trial of each cause of action before 
 the proper tribunal. In Iowa there can be no misjoinder, prop- 
 erly so called, except by uniting a legal and an equitable cause of 
 action. Still, if two legal causes are so utterly incongruous as to 
 prevent a trial of them together, the court may order them to be 
 tried separately. The clauses of the Iowa code are found in the 
 foot-note.^ The provisions of the Kentucky code, in reference to 
 
 the present subject-matter. If the, objec- 
 tion appears on the face of the pleading, it 
 must be raised by demurrer, and not by an- 
 swer ; and this is substantially the same 
 as saying that it must always be raised 
 by demurrer, because the misjoinder will 
 ahvai/s appear on tiie face of the jjleading. 
 See James v. Wilder, 25 Minn. .305 ; Mead 
 V. Brown, 65 Mo. 552 ; Finley v. Ha\'es, 
 81 N. C. 363; Boon v. Carter, 19 Kans. 
 135; Keller v. Boatman, 49 Ind. 104; 
 Rankin v. Collins, 50 id. 153; Hardy v. 
 Miller, 11 Neb. 395. 
 
 (^Gardner v. Gardner (1896), 23 Nev. 
 207, 45 Pac. 139 ; Smith v. Putnam (1900), 
 107 Wis. 155, 82 N. W. 1077; Porter r. 
 Sherman County Banking Co (1893), 36 
 Neb. 271, 54 N. W. 424 ; Beale /•. Baniett's 
 Ad'm (1901), Ky.. 64 S. W. 833 ; Murray 
 >'. Booker (1900). Ky., .58 S. W. 788; Sick- 
 man V. WoUett (190.3), — Colo. — , 71 Pac. 
 1107; Koss r. Wait (1894). 4 S. 1). 584, 
 57 N. W. 497 ; Corbett v. Wreun (1894), 
 25 Ore. 305, 35 Pac. 658.] 
 
 1 QOhio, Bates' St., 1900, § 5065; Wis- 
 consin. St.. Ift98, § 2686; North Carolina, 
 Code. § 272;] New York, § 172 (497); 
 Nebraska, § 97 ; Kansas, § 92 ; South Car- 
 
 olina, § 195. See Alexander r. Thacker, 
 30 Neb. 614. 
 
 - I^Solomon v. Bates (1896), 118 N. C. 
 311, 24 S. E. 746: Where a demurrer 
 for rai.sjoinder of causes is well founded, 
 the action should not be dismissed but 
 simply divided (Code, § 272). But where 
 there is a misjoinder botii of cau.ses and 
 parties, tlie action cannot be divided under 
 this section of the code : Cromartie i*. 
 Parker (1897), 121 N. C. 198, 28 S. E. 
 297 ; Mortou r. Western Union Tel. Co. 
 (1902), 1.30 N. C. 299, 41 S. E. 484. See 
 also .Matthews v. Bank (1901), 60 S. C. 
 183, 38 S. E. 437; Weeks v. McPhail 
 (1901), 128 N. C. 134, 38 S. E. 292. 
 
 Gattis V. Kilgo (1S99), 125 N. C. 13.3, 
 34 S. E. 246 : Where a demurrer is sus- 
 tained on the ground of misjoinder of 
 causes of action, it i.s within the discretion 
 of the judge to allow an amendment, and 
 if such amendment is not made it becomes 
 the rJiily of tlie judge to divide the action 
 on the docket for separate trials.] 
 
 3 Qlowa, Code of 1897, §3546: "The 
 plaintiff may at any time before the final 
 jiubmission of the case to ti>e jury or to 
 the court when the trial is liy the court,
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 
 
 453 
 
 the remedy for a misjoinder, are similar to those of lowa.^ The 
 practice in Indiana differs from that which prevails in the States 
 generally, and also from that established in Iowa. A demurrer 
 for misjoinder is permitted ; but its effect can never be fatal to 
 the action. In fact, the matter seems to be practically left in the 
 discretion of the lower or trial court, and any disposition of the 
 objection to a misjoinder made by it cannot be assigned as error 
 so as to reverse a judgment on review. The sections of the 
 Indiana code are quoted in the note.^ 
 
 strike from his petition any cause of ac- 
 tion or part thereof." § 3547 : " The 
 court, at any time before the answer is 
 filed, upon motion of the defendant, shall 
 strike out of the petition any cause or 
 causes of action improperly joined with 
 others." § 3548 : " All objectious to the 
 misjoinder of causes of action shall be 
 waived, unless made as provided in the 
 last preceding section." § 3549 : " When 
 a motion is sustained on the ground of 
 misjoinder of causes of action, the court, 
 on motion of the plaintiff, sliall allow him, 
 with or without costs, in his discretion, to 
 file several petitions, each including such 
 of said causes of action as may be joined, 
 and an action shall be docketed for each 
 of said petitions, and the causes shall he 
 proceeded in without further service, the 
 court fixing by order the time of pleading 
 therein."]] 
 
 Tliis mode of procedure is simple, and 
 eminently just, and sweeps away a mass 
 of technical defences which .still disfigure 
 the pure ideal of the American system in 
 many States. For a construction of these 
 provisions, see Hinkle v. Davenport, 38 
 Iowa, 355, 358 ; Cobb t: 111. Cent. R. Co., 
 33 Iowa, 60!, 016; Grant v. McCarty, 38 
 Iowa, 468. 
 
 £Bai see McDonald v. Second Nat. 
 Bank (1898), 106 la. 517, 76 N. W. 1011, 
 where it was held that under Code, § 3545, 
 providing that " Causes of action of what- 
 ever kind, ... if action on all may be 
 brought and tried in that county, may be 
 joined in the same petition," there is a 
 misjoinder of causes of action when fore- 
 closure is sought in one petition of mort- 
 gages on two different pieces of land, 
 securing the same debt, one piece of land 
 being in the county of venue and the 
 other in another county. See also Wedge- 
 
 wood V. Parr (1900), 112 la. 514, 84 X. W. 
 528, where it was held that where a peti- 
 tion claimed judgment on a note with in- 
 terest and possession of wlieat, tliere was 
 a misjoinder of causes under the Code, 
 § 4164, providing that, in actions of re- 
 plevin, there could be no joinder of any 
 cause of action not of tlie .same kind] 
 
 1 [^Kentucky, Code, §§ 84, 85, 86 ;] 
 Sale V. Critchfield, 8 Bu.sh, 636, 646. The 
 defendant must move before answer that 
 plaintiff elect between the causes of ac- 
 tion, and strike out the others ; if no .such 
 motion is made, tlie objection is waived. 
 Tiie same rule prevails as to tiie misjoin- 
 der of parties, which is never ground of 
 demurrer; defendant must move to strike 
 out the improper parties, or else waive aU 
 objection. Dean v. English, 18 B. Mon. 
 132; Yeates v. Walker, 1 Duv. 84. 
 
 2 I^Burns' Indiana St., 1901, § 342.] 
 " The defendant may demur to the com- 
 plaint when it appears upon the face 
 thereof, . . . 6th, that several causes of 
 action have been improperly joined. 
 § 343. When a demurrer is sustained on 
 the ground of several causes of action 
 being improperly joined in the same com- 
 plaint, the court shall order the misjoinder 
 to be noted on the order-book, and cause 
 as many separate actions to be docketed 
 between the parties as there are causes 
 decided by tlie court to be improperly 
 joined, and each shall stand as a separate 
 action, and the plaintiff shall thereupon 
 file a separate complaint in each of the 
 above cases, to which the defendant shall 
 enter his appearance and plead and go to 
 trial, or suffer a default, in the same man- 
 ner as in the original action. § 344. No 
 judgment shall ever be reversed for any 
 error committed in su.staining or overrul- 
 ing a demurrer for misjoinder of causes
 
 454 CIVIL EEMKDIES. 
 
 § 339. * 445. Motion by Adverse Party Requiring Correction of 
 Pleading. There is another section found in all the codes, 
 which has an important bearing upon the suljject under con- 
 sideration in some of its aspects, — that which permits the cor- 
 rection of pleadings at the instance of the adverse party on his 
 motion by striking out irrelevant and redundant matter, and by 
 requiring the pleading to be made more definite and certain by 
 amendment where its allegations are so indefinite and uncertain 
 that the precise nature of the charge or defence is not apparent.^ 
 
 § 340. *446. Possible Forms of Misjoinder. Three forms or 
 modes of alleged misjoinder are possible, and tliey must be ex- 
 amined separately in respect to the manner in which the objection 
 thereto should be taken. They are, (1) When different causes 
 of action which may properly be united are alleged in the one 
 complaint or petition not distinctly and separately as required by 
 the statute, but combined and mingled together in a single state- 
 ment. (2) When different causes of action which cannot prop- 
 erly be united are alleged in the one complaint or petition, and 
 are separately and distinctly stated. (3) When different causes 
 of action which cannot properly be united are alleged in the one 
 complaint or petition not distinctly and separately, but combined 
 and mingled together in a single statement.^ These three cases 
 will be examined in order. 
 
 § 341. * 447. First Form of Misjoinder not Ground of Demurrer. 
 Remedy is by Motion. Although the sections of the codes, de- 
 fining what causes of action may be united, all require in posi- 
 tive terms that when so joined each must be separately stilted,^ it 
 is settled by the weight of authority, and seems to be the gen- 
 eral rule, that a violation of this particular requirement is not a 
 ground of demurrer. This conclusion is based upon the language 
 
 of action." "§ 346. Where any of the 44 Ind. 22.3, 227, that no objection can be 
 
 matters enumerated in § [342] do not rai.sed on appeal, 
 appear on the face of the complaint, the ' See supra, § *434. 
 
 objection (except for misjoinder of causes) - QLewis v. Hinson (1902), 64 S. C. .571, 
 
 may be taken by answer." It is plain 43 S. E. 15 (quoting the tcxt).^ 
 from the foregoing tliat the practical " [^Xot so in Connecticut. See Knap[) 
 
 effect of a siicce.ssful demurrer is trivial, r. Walker (1900), 7-3 Conn. 459,47 Atl. 6.5.'>. 
 It compels the separation of the action, And in Ronth Carolina, by the act of 
 
 and the trial of two or more suits instead 1898, it is not necessary, in an action er 
 
 of one. No discretion is left to the court, delicto, to make use of separate allegations 
 
 as in New York, Iowa, and other States ; setting up actual and punitive damages : 
 
 the court .s/,nll cau.se tlie separate actions Machen v. Tol. Co. (1902), 63 S. C. 363, 
 
 to be docketed. See Clark c. Liueberger, 41 S. E. 448-3
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 
 
 455 
 
 of the codes autliorizing a demurrer for the reason that causes of 
 action " are improperly united in the complaint or petition." ^ It 
 is said that this expression only points to the case in which 
 causes of action have been embraced in one pleading which could 
 not properly be joined ; while in the special case under considera- 
 tion it is assumed that all the causes of action may be united, and 
 the only error consists in the external form or manner of their 
 joinder. The remedy is, therefore, not by a demurrer, but by a 
 motion to make the pleading more definite and certain by sepa- 
 rating and distinctly stating the different causes of action.^ The 
 
 1 QThis ground for demurrer applies to 
 the whole complaint, aud not to one of 
 several paragraphs: (iilleuwaters y. Camp- 
 bell (1895), 142 Ind. 529, 41 N. E. 1041.] 
 
 ■^ Bass V. Conistock, 38 N. Y. 21 ; 36 
 How. Pr. 382, and cases cited ; Wood v. 
 Anthony, 9 How. Pr. 78 ; Hendry v. 
 Hendry, 32 Ind. 349 ; MulhuUand v. Rapp, 
 50 Mo. 42 ; Pickering r. Miss. Valley Nat. 
 Tel. Co., 47 Mo. 457, 460 ; House v. Lowell, 
 45 Mo. 381. See Wiles i-. Suydam, 6 N. Y. 
 Sup. Ct. 292. A different rule formerly 
 prevailed in Missouri, and it was held that 
 the error was not only ground for a de- 
 murrer, but even for a motion in arrest of 
 judgment after verdict ! McCoy v. Yager, 
 34 Mo. 134; Clark's Adm. t;. Han. & St. 
 Jos. R. Co., 36 Mo. 202 ; Hoagland v. Han. 
 & St. Jos. R. Co., 39 Mo. 451 ; Farmers' 
 Bank v. Bayliss, 41 Mo. 274, 284, per 
 Holmes .1. These prior cases, however, 
 are expressly overruled by the more re- 
 cent decisions of the same court cited 
 above. See also Freer v. Denton, 61 
 N. Y. 492 : Sentinel Co. v. Thomson, 38 
 Wis. 489 ; Riemer v. Johnke, 37 id. 258 ; 
 Hardy v. Miller, 11 Neb. 395; but see 
 Watsou V. San Francisco & H. B. R. Co., 
 50 Cal. 523. See, further, Townsend v. 
 Bogert, 126 N. Y. 370; Ellsworth v. 
 Rossiter, 46 Kan. 237 ; State v. Tittmann. 
 103 Mo. 553. The mi.sjoinder is waived 
 by going to trial without objection : Beers 
 V. Kuehn (Wis., Jan. 10. 1893), 54 N. W. 
 Rep. 109. If the plaintiff refuse to sepa- 
 rate and distinctly state the different 
 causes of action, it is pi'oper to dismiss 
 the suit, but without prejudice ; so held 
 in Eisenhouer v. Stein, 37 Kan. 281. 
 
 [^City of St. Louis r. Weitzel (1815), 
 130 Mo. 600, 31 S. W. 1045; IMarviu ?.-. 
 
 Yates (1901), 26 Wash. 50, 66 Pac. 131; 
 Childs V. Kansas City, etc. R. R. Co. (1893), 
 117 Mo. 414, 23 S" W. 373; City Carpet 
 Beating Works v. Jones (1894), 102 
 Cal. 506, 36 Pac. 841 (citing the te.xt) ; 
 Cargar v. Fee (1894), 140 Ind. 572,39 N. E. 
 93; Kearney Stone Works v. McPherson 
 (1894), 5 Wyo. 178, 38 Pac. 920; Richard.sou 
 r. Carbon Hill Coal Co. (1895), 10 Wash. 
 648, 39 Pac. 95 (citing the text) ; A. T. & S. 
 F. R. R. Co. V. Comm'rs of Sumner Co. 
 (1893), 51 Kan. 617, 33 Pac. 312 ; Shrigley 
 V. Black (1898), 59 Kan. 487, 53 P.ac. 477 ; 
 Fox V. Rogers (1899), 8 Idaho, 710, 59 
 Pac. 538. 
 
 See late case of Lane v. Dowd (1903), 172 
 Mo. 167, 72 S. W. 632, in which the court 
 said : " There is a long and unbroken line 
 of decisions drawing the distinction as to 
 the method of taking advantage of a de- 
 fective petition. If there are two causes of 
 action that can be united in one petition, 
 but are improperly joined in one count, 
 this defect is reached by a motion, before 
 tlie trial is begun, to elect upon which 
 cause of action the plaintiff will proceed. 
 If the petition contains two causes of 
 action that are of such character that they 
 cannot legally be joined in one action, 
 then demurrer is the proper pleading to 
 reach the irregularity. This is what the 
 cases cited by appellant hold. Hence, as 
 there is no dispute on that proposition, it is 
 unnecessary to further refcrto those cases." 
 
 But see Austin, Tomlinson, & Webster 
 M. Co. r. Hei.ser (1894), 6 S. D. 429, 01 
 N. W. 445. citing the text ; Brewer v. V.c- 
 Cain (1895), 21 Colo. 382, 41 Pac. 822; 
 Jackins v. Dickinson (1893), 39 S. C. 436. 
 17 S. E. 996; Ponca Mill Co. r. Mikesell 
 (1898), 55 Neb. 98, 75 N. W. 46, the court
 
 456 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 plaintiff can thus be compelled to amend his complaint or peti- 
 tion, and to state each cause of action by itself, so that the 
 defendant may deal with it by answer or demurrer as the nature 
 of the case demands. It seems to be the settled rule in Califor- 
 nia, however, that the defect may properly be taken advantage of 
 by demurrer.^ 
 
 § 342. * 448. Remedy when Second Form of Misjoinder occurs. 
 When causes of action separately state 1 are improperly united in 
 the same com[)laint or petition, the rule which prevails in all the 
 States, except in the few whose special legislation has already 
 been described, is the same as that which applies to the case of a 
 defect of parties. ^ If the error appears on the face of the plead- 
 ing, the defendant must demur, and cannot raise the objection by 
 answer.^ The statute adds, that, if the error do not thus appear 
 on the face of the pleading, the defence may be pi-esented by the 
 answer. If the defendant omits to use either of these methods 
 
 saying : " Moreover, only one cause of 
 action is in form stated. If two were in 
 fact included in the averments, the remedy 
 was by motion to strike out surplusage or 
 to require the two causes to be separately 
 stated. A demurrer does not reach tlie 
 commingling of two causes of action in a 
 single count, if they be, under the code, 
 of such character tliat they may be joined." 
 See also Chicago, 11. I & Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
 O'Neill (1899), 58 Neb. 2.39, 78 N.'w. .521 ; 
 Building & Loan Assn. v. Cameron (1896), 
 48 Neb. 124, 66 N. W. 1109; Ponca Mill 
 Co (;. Mikesell (1898), 5.t Nel). 98, 75 N. W. 
 46 ; Glover v. Remley (1898), 52 S. C. 492, 
 30 S. E. 405. 
 
 A motion to strike out surplusage 
 would also be projjer : Ponca Mill Co. r. 
 Mikesell (1898), 55 Neb. 98, 75 N. W. 46. 
 But a motion to compel plaintiff to elect 
 on which to stand will not lie : Austin, etc. 
 Co. V. Heiser (1894), 6 S. D. 429, 61 N. W. 
 445. Nor is it ground for dismissing the 
 complaint that with one good cause of 
 action others are mingled: Mattliews v. 
 Bank (1900), 60 S. C. 183, 38 S. E. 437. 
 
 Hayden v. Pearce (1898), 33 Ore. 89, 52 
 Pac. 1049. Where a misjoinder of causes 
 of action ai)])ears on tlie face of the com- 
 plaint, the plaintiff .should be re<|uired to 
 elect on whidi cause lie will proceed ; but 
 when the def<!ct is not apparent until the 
 judgment is entered a writ of review will 
 
 lie to correct the error. (Compare with 
 Lane v. Dowd, sit/ira.) See also Smith 
 v. Day (1901), 39 Ore. 531, 65 Pac. 1055, 
 where the court said tliat a non-suit should 
 be granted fur misjoinder of causes. Un- 
 less the proper objection is taken by mo- 
 tion, the defect of intermingled counts 
 is waived : Smith v. Jones (1902), — S. D. 
 —,92 N. W. 1084] 
 
 ^ Nevada Cy., etc. Canal Co. v. Kidd, 
 43 Cal. 180, 37 Cal. 282; Watson v. San 
 Francisco & H. B. R. Co., 41 Cal. 17, 19 ; 
 Buckingham v. Waters, 14 Cal. 146; 
 White V. Cox, 46 Cal. 169. In Wright 
 V. Conner, 34 Iowa, 240, 242, it was said : 
 "If through bad pleading two or more 
 distinct causes of action or defences are 
 contained in one division of a j)etition or 
 answer, which is called a count, a de- 
 murrer may be directed at one of them 
 if insufficient at law." In strictness, the 
 objecting party ought first to reiiuire, by 
 motion, that tiie petition or answer be 
 properly divided, or an election made be- 
 tween tlie causes of action or tlie defences ; 
 but, omitting this, he may demur. 
 
 •- ^Dudley v. Duval (1902), 29 Wash. 
 528, 70 Pac. 68 ; Lane v. Dowd (1903), 172 
 ]Mo. 167,72 S. W. 632; see Bandmaun v. 
 Davis (1899), 23 Mont. 382,59 Pac. 856.] 
 
 ' QA demurrer for want of sufficient 
 facts will not reach this objection. Marvin 
 y. Yates (1901), 26 Wash. 50, 66 Pac. 131-3
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OV ACTION. 457 
 
 properly, he is deemed to have waived the objection. The prac- 
 tical result is, that a demurrer must always hj resorted to, or all 
 objection to such misjoinder will be waived.^ The demurrer 
 may be by any of the defendants ; '^ and it must be to the entire 
 complaint or petition, and not to any cause or causes of action 
 supposed to have boen improperly joined.^ To sustain a demur- 
 rer for this reason, however, the complaint must contain two or 
 more good grounds of suit which cannot properly be joined in 
 the same action. .When a complaint, therefore, consists of two or 
 more counts, and one sets forth a good cause of action, and an- 
 other doos not, although it attempts to do so, the pleading is not 
 demurrable on the ground of a misjoinder, even though the causes 
 of action could not have been united had they been sufficiently 
 and properly alleged.^ 
 
 § 343. * 449. Rule in Few States. In a very few States, how- 
 ever, the practice is different, and a demurrer is not permitted as 
 the remedy for a misjoinder. It is so in Kentucky. The defend- 
 ant must move to strike out, or to compel the plaintiff to elect 
 which cause of action he will proceed upon, and to dismiss the 
 others ; and a failure to make such motion is a complete waiver 
 of the objection. The plaintiff may also at any time before trial 
 withdraw any cause of action.^ The sections of the Iowa code 
 
 1 Blossom I'. Barrett, 37 N. Y. 434, 436 ; 219 ; Bassett v. Warner, 23 Wis. 673, 689, 
 Smith r. Orser, 43 Barb, 187, 193; Mead 690; Willard v. Reas, 26 Wis. .540, 544; 
 V. Bagnall, 1.5 Wis. 156 ; Jamison v. Copher, Lee v. Simpson, 29 Wis. 333 ; Cox v. West. 
 35 Mo. 483, 4S7 ; Ashby >\ Winston, 26 Pac. R. Co., 47 Cal. 87, 89, 90; Sullivan 
 Mo. 210: Flibernia Sav. Soc. v. Ordwav, v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 19 Blatchf. 
 38 Cal. 679; Lawrence v. Montgomery, 388; Jenkins r. Thomason, 32 S. C. 254. 
 37 Cnl. 183. See also Field v. Hurst, 9 ^ Forkuer u. Hart, Stanton's Code, p. 
 S. C. 277 ; Eversdon v. Mayhew, 85 Cal. 1 ; 60 ; Wilson r. Thompson, id. j). GO ; Hart 
 QRoss V. Jones (1896), 47 S. C. 211, 25 v. Cundiff, id. p. 61 ; Hord r. Chandler, 
 S. E. 59.] 13 B. Mon. 403; McKoe v. Pope, IS id. 
 
 2 Ashby V. Winston, 26 Mo. 210. If 548,555; Bonney y. Reardin, 6 Bu.'ih, 34 ; 
 A. and B. are sued together on several Dragoo v. Levi, 2 Duv. 520 ; Chiles r. 
 causes of action, the joinder of which Drake, 2 Mete. (Ky-) l+G ; Hancock 
 would have been proper had the suit v. Johnson, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 242 ; Sale v. 
 been against A. alone, A. may demur to Crntchfield, 8 Bush, 636, 646; Hinkle v. 
 the misjoinder of causes of action. Hoff- Dave.nport, 38 Iowa, 355, 358 ; Cobb v. 111. 
 man v. Wheelock, 62 Wis. 434. Cent. R. Co., 38 Iowa, 601, 616 ; Grant v. 
 
 3 Boughcr y. Scobey, 16 Ind. 151, 154; McCarty, 38 Iowa, 468. If the plaintiff 
 and must be on the specific ground of refuse to elect, the court cannot therefore 
 the misjoinder, — a demurrer for want of dismiss the action, but must make the 
 sufficient facts does not raise the objec- election for him. Sheppard v. Stephens 
 tion : Cox V. West. Pac. R. Co., 47 Cal. (Ky. 1887), 2 S. W. Rep. 548. 
 
 87, 89, 90 ; Remy v. Olds, 88 Cal. 537. "[^Arkansas also follows this practice. 
 
 * Truesdell v. Rhodes, 26 Wis. -215, Eiley v. Norman, 39 Ark. 158. In For-
 
 458 CIVIL KEMEDIES, 
 
 quoted in § 338 show that a similar practice exists in that 
 State. 
 
 S 344. * 450. Remedy wheu Third Case of Misjoinder occurs. 
 The third case presents some difficulties. When the complaint 
 or petition contains causes of action which cannot properly be 
 united, and they are mingled and combined in the same allega- 
 tions, — in other words, the pleading in form sets forth but one 
 cause of action, while in reality it embraces two or more which 
 cannot be joined in any form, — is the defendant's remedy by 
 demurrer, or by motion in the first instance that the pleading be 
 made more definite and certain by separating the causes of action, 
 and by demurrer when such separation has been accomplished? 
 In Missouri it is definitely settled that the remedy is by demur- 
 rer.^ That this is a proper practice is implied with more or less 
 distinctness by decisions in several other States.^ 
 
 § 345. *451. Author's Criticism and Suggestion herein. There 
 are grave difficulties attendant upon the adoption of such a rule, 
 although it seems to be generally supported by the decided cases. 
 When, upon sustaining a demurrer interposed upon the ground of 
 a misjoinder of causes of action, the action itself is not defeated, 
 but the causes of action improperl}' united are merely separated, 
 and new actions corresponding with such division are proceeded 
 with, it would seem to be a necessary prerequisite that the causes 
 
 dyce I'. Nix (1893), 58 Ark. 1.36, 23 S. W. distinctly held by these later cases : Gold- 
 
 967, the defendant demurred for mis- berg v. Utley, 60 N. Y. 427, 429 ; Wiles v. 
 
 joinder, but the court considered the de- Suydam, 64 id. 173 ; Liedersdorf v. Second 
 
 nuirrer as a motion to strike and as such Ward Bk., 50 Wis. 406 ; Anderson v. 
 
 p;issed upon its merits. See also Rev- Scandia Bk. (Minn., May, 1893), 54 N. W. 
 
 nolds r. Roth (1895), 61 Ark. 317, 33 Rep. 1062; Lamming v. Galusha (N. Y. 
 
 S. \V. 105.] App. 1892), 31 N. E. Rep. 1024. 
 
 1 Mulhulland v. Rajjp, 50 Mo. 42 ; [^Haskell County Bank v. Bank of 
 
 Ederlin v. Judge, 36 Mo. 350; Young v. Santa Fe (1893), 51 Kan. 39, 32 Pac. 624. 
 
 Coleman, 43 Mo. 179, 184; Cheely's Adm. See Lane v. Dowd (1903), 172 Mo. 167, 72 
 
 V. Wells, .33 Mo. 106, 109. And see Pick- S. W. 632 ; Baudmanu v. Davis (1899), 23 
 
 ering v. Miss. Val. N. Tel. Co., 47 Mo. 457 ; Mont. 382, 59 Pac 856, in which the court 
 
 House I'. Lowell, 45 Mo. 381. said : " A motion to exclude evidence or 
 
 '^ Gary v. Wheeler, 14 Wis. 281 ; Bur- an objection to receiving it, is not the rem- 
 
 rows V. Holderman, 31 Ind. 412 ; Lane r. edy for the intermingling in one count of 
 
 State, 27 id. 108, 112; Fritz ?■. Fritz, 23 several causes of action ; nor is there rem- 
 
 iil. .383, 390 ; Hibernia Sav. Soc. i-. Ord- edy other than demurrer, by which the 
 
 way, 38 Cal. 679 ; Ander.son v. Hill, 53 complaint may be attacked upon the 
 
 Barb. 238. See, however, Rogers v. Smith, ground that causes of action are improp- 
 
 17 Ind. 323, per Perkins .J., which seems to erly united." Plaukinton v. Ilildebrand 
 
 hold that tlie remedy should be by motion. (1895), 89 Wis. 209, 61 N. W. 839.] 
 That a demurrer is the proper remedy is
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. ' 459 
 
 of action should have been separately and distinctly stated in the 
 original pleading. To allow the demurrer to a complaint or peti- 
 tion in which several causes of action are mingled up, and to 
 divide this mass of confused allegations into as many complaints 
 as there are causes of action, would seem to be a work of great 
 difficulty, if not of absolute impossibility. Again : it is always 
 difficult if not impossible to determine with exactness whether a 
 complaint or petition does contain two or more different causes of 
 action when the allegations are thus combined into one state- 
 ment. If the averments are found sufficient to express one cause 
 of action, it may generally be said that the other averments are 
 mere surplusage, which should be rejected on a motion made for 
 that purpose, and not the material allegations which set forth a 
 second cause of action. For these reasons, which are based 
 chiefly upon notions of convenience, a demurrer does not seem to 
 be an appropriate remedy until the causes of action have been 
 separated, and it is known with certainty what and how many 
 they are. In this case, therefore, the more convenient practice 
 would seem to be a motion in the first instance to make the plead- 
 ing more certain and definite by arranging it into distinct causes 
 of action, or a motion to strike out the redundant matter and sur- 
 plusage and thus reduce it to a single definite cause of action. 
 The latter order would take the place of a demurrer ; the former 
 would be followed by a demurrer after the causes of action had 
 been separated.^ 
 
 III. Meaning of the Term " Cause of Action ; ''^ Where one Cause 
 of Action only is stated^ although several Different Kinds of 
 Relief are demanded. 
 
 § 346. * 452. Confounding " Cause of Action " ■with " Remedy." 
 Decisions herein. Definition Obtained by Analysis. Tlie cause 
 of action is very often confounded with the remedy. This mis- 
 take or misconception is peculiarly apt to occur in cases where, 
 under the code, the plaintiff seeks to obtain legal and equitable 
 relief combined, the right to such relief springing from the same 
 state of facts. To avoid this tendency to confusion, it is abso- 
 lutely necessary to ascertain and fix with certainty the true mean- 
 
 . 1 [[Lewis r. Hinson (1902), 64 S. C. 571, Times Publishiug Co. v. Everett (1894), 
 43 S. E. 15 (quoting the text) ; Cargar v. 9 Wash. 518, 37 Pac. 695.] 
 Fee (1894), 140 Ind. 572, 39 N. E. 93;
 
 460 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 iner of the term " cause of action."' The American courts of the 
 present clay seem to avoid the announcement of any general 
 principle, or the giving of any general definitions. While, there- 
 fore, they have repeatedly held that but one cause of action was 
 stated in a case before them, and have carefully distinguished it 
 in that instance from the reliefs demanded, they have not at- 
 tempted to define the term " cause of action " in any general and 
 abstract manner, so that this definition might be used as a test in 
 all other cases. We shall obtain no direct help, therefore, from 
 their decisions ; but they will furnish examples and tests to de- 
 termine whether any definition which may be framed is accurate. 
 1 shall, however, attempt a definition or description, basing it 
 upon an analysis of the essential elements wliich enter into every 
 judicial proceeding for the^jixutection of a private right on the 
 O MC side, and the enforceiu ent o t aT^jnyat'e Hiity^h "_ffie othe r. 
 There are such elements or ieatures which necessarily combine in 
 every action ; they are independent of any judicial recognition ; 
 they exist in tha very nature of things; and, if we can by an 
 accurate analysis discover these elements, we shall at once have 
 obtained a correct notion of the term " cause of action." 
 
 § 347. * 453. Remedy. Elements of every Judicial Action. 
 Elements Constituting Cause of Action. Every action is brought 
 in order to obtain some particular result which we term the 
 remedij^ whicli the code calls the " relief," and which, when 
 granted, is summed up or embodied in the judgment of the court. 
 This result is not the "cause of action " as that term is used in 
 the codes. It is true this final result, or rather the desire of ob- 
 taining it, is the primary motive which acts upon the will of the 
 plaintiff and impels him to commence the proceeding, and in the 
 metaphysical sense it can properly be called the cause of this ac- 
 tion, but it is certainly not so in the legal sense of the phrase. 
 This final result is the " object of the action " as that term is 
 frequently used in the codes and in modern legal terminology.^ 
 It was shown in the introduction that every remedial riglit arises 
 out of an antecedent primary riglit and corresponding duty and a 
 delict or breach of such primary- right and duty by the person on 
 whom tlie duty rests. Every judicial action must therefore involve 
 
 ^ Q" Every actiou is brought in orflcr not ' the cau'^e of action ; ' it is rather 
 to obtain some particular result whicli is tlie ' object of the action.' " Wildinau'T. 
 termeii the remedy. This final result is WiMnian (ISOS,', 70 Conn. 700, 41 Atl. 1.]
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 461 
 
 the following elements : a 2£HB2LiXLisbi B9§^6^si^^ 
 and a corresponding primary duty. devolving iip()n the defendant; 
 a delict or wrong done by the defendant which consistei|.. in _a 
 bfeacK of sucli"^i5"rrmarY rifflit and duty ; a remedial xiirht in iayor 
 of the plaintiff, and a remedial duty resting on the defendant 
 springing from this delict, and finally the remedy or relief itself. 
 Every action, however complicated or however simple, must con- 
 tain these essential elements. Of these elements, the primary- 
 right and duty and the delict or wrong combined constitute thej 
 cause of action in the legal sense of the term, and as it is usedJ 
 in the codes of the several States. They are the legal cause oij 
 foundation whence the right of action springs, this right of action 
 being identical with the " remedial right " as designated in my 
 analysis.^ In accordance with the principles of pleading adopted 
 in the new American system, the existence of a legal right in an 
 abstract form is never alleged by the plaintiff ; but, instead thereof, 
 the facts from which that right arises are set forth, and the right 
 itself is inferred therefrom. The cause of action, as it appears in \ 
 the complaint when properly pleaded, will therefore always be the 1 
 facts from which the plaintiff's primary right and the defendant's j 
 corresponding primary duty have arisen, together with the facts! 
 whicli constitute the defendant's delict or act of wrong.^ 
 
 1 [^Jameson v. Bartlett (1902), 63 Neb. out of tlie wrong of the defendant, and if 
 638, 88 N. W. 860.] not, what that cause of action is. The 
 
 plaintiffs are the owners of a strip of land 
 ^ IXeariina of "Cause of Action." ^^^^^ ^j^j^j^ jl^^ defendant has wrongfully 
 
 "The question is not determined by entered and erected a wall which is a por- 
 
 the Code of Civil Procedure, for though tion of her house. The facts alleged show 
 
 in section 484 it prescribes what separate one primary right of the plaintiffs and one 
 
 causes of action may be joined in the same wrong done by the defendant which in- 
 
 complaint, it nowhere assumes to define vol ves that right. Therefore, the plaintiffs 
 
 what is a single cause of actiou : " Reilly have stated but a single cause of action, 
 
 I.'. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co. (1902), 170 no matter how many forms and kinds 
 
 N. Y. 40, 62 N. E. 772. of relief they may be entitled to. The 
 
 " We are of the opinion that the cause relief prayed for, or to which they may be 
 
 of the action con.^ists of the negligent act entitled, is no part of their cause of action 
 
 which produced the effect, rather than in (Pomeroy's Code Kemcdios, § *455):" 
 
 the effect of the act in its application to llahl v. vSugo (1901), 169 N. Y. 109, 62 
 
 different primary rights, and that the in- N. E. 135. "In every cause of action 
 
 jury to the person and property as a result tiiere must exist a primary right, a corre- 
 
 of the original cau.se gives rise to different sponding primary duty, and a failure to 
 
 items of damage:" King v. Chicago, M. perform that duty : " South Bend Cliilled 
 
 & St. Paul Ry. Co. (1900), 80 Minn. 83, 82 Plow Co. v. George C. Cribb Co. (1900), 
 
 N. W. 1113. 105 Wis. 443, 81 N. W. 675. 
 
 " Let us nov7 see whether the plaintiffs " In applying the rule, some confusion 
 
 have more than one cause of action arising has resulted from the neglect to define the
 
 462 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 348. * 454. Cause of Action 
 Examples. The cause of action 
 
 terms ' cause of action ' and ' action ; ' to 
 whidi, tlicrefore, our attention must be 
 first directed. The latter term is very 
 comniouly confounded with the suit (litis) 
 ill which the action is enforced. But this 
 is not the technical meaning of the term, 
 according to which an action is simply the 
 right or power to enforce an obligation. 
 ' An action is nothing else than the right 
 or power of prosecuting in a judicial pro- 
 ceeding wliut is owed to one,' — which is to 
 say, an obligation, . . . The action there- 
 fore springs from the obligation, and 
 hence the ' cause of action ' is simply the 
 obligation. . . . The ' cause of action ' is 
 therefore to be distinguished, also, from 
 the ' remedy,' — which is simply the means 
 by which the obligation or the correspond- 
 ing action is effectuated, — and also from 
 the ' relief ' sought : " Frost v. Witter 
 (1901), 132 Cal. 421, G4 Pac. 703. "It 
 does not appear from the petition that the 
 trustees have been in any way extravagant 
 or negligent or dilatory in the perform- 
 ance of the duties of their office, or that 
 they have violated any law or contract, or 
 caused any injury, or done any wrong, or 
 witiiheld any right, or that they have 
 threatened or are about to do any such 
 thing. At least, some one of these ele- 
 ments is essential to a cause of action : " 
 Sands v. Gund (1903), — Neb. — , 93 
 N. W. 990. " As was said iu Bruil v. 
 Northwestern M. K. Ass'n, 72 Wis. 430, 
 the words ' cause of action ' . . . include 
 the act or omission without which there 
 would be no cause of action or right of 
 recovery : " Hosley i'. Wisconsin Odd 
 Fellows Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1893), 86 
 Wis. 463, 57 N. W. 48. Threatt v. Mining 
 Co. (1896), 49 S. C. 95, 26 S. E. 970. 
 
 " To borrow the phraseology of Mr. 
 Pomeroy, the primary right, which the 
 plaintiffs are seeking to enforce, is the 
 right to have the assets of the estate of 
 their alleged debtor applied to the pay- 
 ment of their cbiirn, and the breach of this 
 primary right in the modes stated in the 
 complaint is the delict complained of. 
 These two things, says Mr. Pomeroy, in 
 his work on Remedies, according to the 
 Code Pleailing, at page 487, sec. 4.')3 
 [*45.3], con.«titute the cause of action:*' 
 
 and Remedial Right Differentiated, 
 thus defined is plainly different 
 
 Sheppard v. Green (1896), 48 S. C. 165, 26 
 S. E. 224. Smith -■. Smith (1897), .50 S. C. 
 54, 27 S. E. 545, quotes the author's Analy- 
 sis of a cause of action with apparent 
 approval. Broughel v. So. New Eug. Tel. 
 Co. (1900), 72 Conn. 617, 45 Atl. 435. " A 
 cause of action consists of a right belong- 
 ing to the plaintiff, which has been violated 
 by some wrongful act or omi.ssion of the 
 defendant : " Goodrich v. Alfred (1899), 72 
 Conn. 257, 43 Atl. 1041. Wildman v. 
 Wildmau (1898), 70 Conn. 700, 41 Atl. 
 1, quotes from § * 453 of the text and adds : 
 " Stated in brief, a cause of action may be 
 said to cousist of a right belonging to the 
 plaintiff and some wrongful act or omis- 
 sion done by the defendant, by which that 
 right has been violated." 
 
 "It is said, though, that even if the 
 amendment set forth a cause of action, it 
 should have been stricken for the reason 
 that it set forth a new and distinct cause 
 of action. To determine this question it 
 is necessary to ascertain what was the 
 cause of action set forth in the original 
 petition. If the right to recover the 
 property in controversy upon the legal 
 title was the cause of action originally set 
 forth, then it would seem that the amend- 
 ment did contain a new cause of action, 
 for it was based upon an alleged right to 
 recover the projierty upon an equitable 
 title. It needs no argument to show that 
 an equitalile title is entirely separate and 
 distinct from a legal title. To say, how- 
 ever, that the cause of action set forth in 
 the original petition was the right to 
 recover upon a legal title is giving the 
 term ' cause of action ' too restricted a 
 meaning. The cause of action in such a 
 case consists, not only of the right of the 
 plaintiff but of the wrong of the defend- 
 ant. The right of the plaintiff consists in 
 being entitled to the possession of the 
 property which i.s owned by him, and the 
 wrong of the defendant consists in his 
 withhuMing from the plaintiff that which 
 is rightfully his. Under this view of the 
 matter the cause of action set forth in 
 the original petititm was based upon two 
 facts : ownership of the ])roj)erty l)y the 
 plaintiff, and the wrongful withholding of 
 po.ssc.ssiou by the defendants : " McCaud-
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 
 
 463 
 
 from the remedial riglit, and from the remedy or relief itself. 
 The remedial right is the consequence, the secondary right which 
 springs into being from the breach of the plaintiff's primary right 
 
 less V. Inland Acid Co. (1902), 115 Ga. 
 968, 42 S. E. 449. 
 
 "A 'cause of action,' as the term is 
 used in pleading, is not the name under 
 which a state of facts may he classed, hut 
 it consists of the facts giving rise to the 
 action. An action is a proceeding in 
 court. Code, section 3424. The cause of 
 action is the fact or tlie facts that 'justify 
 it or show the right to maintain it.' 
 Hence, when a material fact, necessary to 
 a recovery, is omitted from a petition, we 
 say it does not state a cause of action. 
 In 5 Am. & Eng. Euc. Law, 776, it is 
 said : ' The cause of action is the entire 
 state of facts that gives rise to an ehforce- 
 ahle claim. The phrase comprises every 
 fact which, if traversed, the plaintiff must 
 prove in order to obtain judgment.' This 
 definition is taken, substantially, from 
 the case of Read v. Brown, 22 Q. B. Div. 
 128. In that case it is said that a cause 
 of action is ' every fact which it would 
 be necessary for plaintiff" to prove, if 
 traversed, in order to support his right to 
 the judgment of the court.' It is tlien 
 said : ' It does not comprise every piece of 
 evidence which is necessary to prove each 
 fact, but every fact which is necessary to 
 be proved.' In Hutchinson v. Ains- 
 worth, 73 Cal. 452 (15 Pac. Eep. 82), 
 speaking of a cause of action with ref- 
 erence to the statute of limitations, it 
 is said : ' The facts upon which the 
 plaintiff's right to sue is based, and upon 
 which the defendant's duty has arisen, 
 coupled with the facts which constitute 
 tlie latter 's wrong, make up tlie cause of 
 action.' See Bruil v. Association, 72 
 Wis. 430 (39 N. W. 529), and Rapalje 
 & Lawrence, Law Dictionary, 180. Care 
 siiould be taken not to confuse the term 
 ' cause of action ' as used abstractly and 
 as used in pleading. In a general sense, 
 the term means ' a claim which may be 
 enforced.' Bucklin i-. Ford, 5 Barb. 393. 
 ' It is a right which a party has to insti- 
 tute and carry through an action.' Myer 
 V. Van Collem, 28 Barb. 230. ' The right 
 to prosecute an action with effect.' 
 Douglas V. Forrest, 4 Bing. 704. Look- 
 
 ing to these cases, it will be seen that the 
 term ' cause of action ' is used with no 
 purpose to indicate a rule by which one 
 cause of action may be distinguished from 
 a^iother, but merely with reference to the 
 existence of a cause of action. We use 
 expressions like these: ' A cause of action 
 for negligence ; ' ' A cause of action for 
 malicious prosecution ; ' ' A cause of action 
 for desertion.' They indicate the subject 
 or subject-matter of the action, but are 
 meaningless as showing a particular cause 
 of action. In Rodgers c. Association, 17 
 S. C. 406, are the following (juery and 
 answer : ' What is a cause of action 1 We 
 must keep in view the difference between 
 the subject of the action and the cause of 
 the action. The subject of the action was 
 what was formerly understood as the sub- 
 ject matter of the action. . . . The cause of 
 the action is the right claimed or wrong 
 suffered by the plaintiff, on the one hand, 
 and the duty or delict of the defendant, 
 on the other ; and these appear by the facts 
 of each separate case. We have empha- 
 sized closing words to call especial 
 attention to the rule when applied to a 
 particular case : " Box v. Chicago, R. I. & 
 P. liy. Co. (1899), 107 la. 660, 78 N. W. 
 694. 
 
 " But neither the conception of the 
 plaintiffs or defendant, nor the kind of 
 relief prayed, while they may be con- 
 sidered, is conclusive upon the court as to 
 what the cause of action is which the 
 pleading sets up. That fact must be 
 determined from the pleading itself. 
 Upon a careful analysis of this complaint, 
 we think it quite clear that the real cause 
 of action stated is the violation by the 
 trustee of his duty to the cestuis que trust- 
 erit in indirectly buying for himself the 
 trust property at tlie executor's sale : " 
 French y. Woodruff (1898), 25 Colo. 339, 
 45 Pac. 416. "The foundation of the 
 cause of action in bot'a complaints is 
 the transaction constituting the trust; the 
 cause of action in both is the violation of 
 that trust ; and both are equitable in char- 
 acter : " Mullen V. McKim (1896), 22 
 Colo. 463, 45 Pac. 416.]
 
 \ 
 
 464 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 by the defendant's wrong, wliile tlie remedy is the consummation 
 or satisfaction of this remedial right. From one cause of action, 
 that is, from one primary right and one delict being a breach 
 thereof, it is possible, and not at all uncommon, that two or 
 more remedial rights may arise, and therefore two or more differ- 
 ent kinds of relief answering to these separate remedial rights. 
 This is especially so when one remedial right and corresponding 
 relief are legal, and the other equitable ; but it is not confined to 
 such cases. One or tw^o very familiar examples will sufficiently 
 illustrate this statement, and will show the necessity as well as 
 the ease of discriminating between the "• cause of action " and the 
 remedy. Let the facts which constitute the plaintiff's primary 
 right be a contract duly entered into by which the defendant 
 agreed to convey to the plaintiff' a parcel of land, and full pay- 
 ment by the plaintiff of the stipulated price and performance of 
 all other stipulations on his part. Let the debet be a refusal by 
 the defendant to perform on his part. This is the cause of ac- 
 tion, and it is plainly single. From it there arise two remedial 
 rights and two corresponding kinds of relief ; namely, the reme- 
 dial right to a compensation in damages, with the relief of actual 
 pecuniary damages ; and the remedial right to an actual perform- 
 ance of the agreement, and the relief of an execution and deliv- 
 ery of the deed of conveyance. If the plaintiff in one action 
 should state the foregoing facts constituting his cause of action, 
 and should demand judgment in the alternative either for dam- 
 ages or for a specific performance, he would, as the analysis above 
 given conclusively shows, have alleged but one cause of action, 
 although the reliefs prayed for would be distinct, and would have 
 belonged under the old system to different forums, — the common 
 law and the equity courts. Again : let the plaintiff's primary 
 right be the ownership and right to possession of a certain tract 
 of land, and let the facts from which it arises be properly alleged ; 
 let the delict consist in the defendant's wrongful taking and re- 
 taining possession and user of sucli land for a specified period of 
 time, and let the facts showing this wrong be properly averred in 
 the same pleading. Evidently the plaintiff will have stated one 
 single and very simple cause of action. The remedial rights aris- 
 ing therefrom, and the remedies tliemselves corresponding thereto, 
 will be threefold, and all of them legal : namely, (1) the right to 
 be restored to possession, with the actual relief of restored pos-
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 465 
 
 session ; (2) the right to obtain compensation in damages for the 
 wrongful withholding of the land, with the relief of actual pecu- 
 niary damages ; and (3) the right to recover the rents and profits 
 received by the defendant during the period of his possession, 
 with the relief of an actual pecuniary sum in satisfaction therefor. 
 Here, also, the single nature of the one cause of action plainly 
 appears, and its .evident distinction from the various remedial 
 rights and actual remedies which do or may arise from it.^ 
 
 § 349. * 455. Test in Determining whether Different Causes of 
 Action have been stated. Caution in Applying Test. The result of 
 this analysis of tlie necessary elements which enter into every 
 action is simple, easily to be understood, and yet exceedingly im- 
 portant ; and the principle I have thus deduced will serve as an 
 unerring test in determining whether different causes of action 
 have been joined in a pleading, or whether one alone has been 
 stated. If the facts alleged show one primary right of the plain- 
 tiff, and one wrong done by the defendant which involves that 
 right, the plaintiff has stated but a single cause of action, no 
 {A matter how many forms and kinds of relief he may claim that he 
 ^,/is entitled to, and may ask to recover ; the relief is no part of the 
 cause of action. In applying this test, however, it must be ob- 
 served that the single primary riglit, and the single wrong, which, 
 taken togetlier, constitute the one cause of action, may eacli be 
 very comj^licated. For example, the primary right of ownership 
 includes not only the particular subordinate rights to use th^ 
 thing owned in any manner permitted by the law, but also similar! 
 rights to the forbearance on the part of all mankind to molest the/ 
 proprietor in such use. The facts which constitute the delicti 
 complained of may, embrace not only the wrongful obtaining, ana 
 keeping possession, in such a case as the one last supposed, but 
 also the procuring and holding deeds of conveyance, or other 
 muniiheats^pf title^jDy which such possession is made possible^ 
 and to appear rightful. These suggestions are necessary to guard 
 against the mistake of supposing that a distinct cause of action 
 
 1 The fact that the codes generally See Larned r. Hudson, 57 N. Y. 151, which 
 
 seem to treat these different claims for is based entirely upon the language of the 
 
 relief as distinct causes of action does not statute. 
 
 affect the correctness of my analysis; they [^Christensen v. Hollingsworth (1898), 
 
 are plainly no more than separate reliefs 6 Idaho, 87, 53 Pac. 211 ; Vermont Loan & 
 
 or remedies based upon the same facts Trust Co. v. McGregor (1897), 5 Idaho, 
 
 which constitute a single cause of action. 320, 51 Pac. 102.J 
 
 30
 
 466 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 will arise from each special subordinate right included in the 
 general primary right held by the plaintiff, or from each particular 
 act of wrong, which, in connection with others, may make up the 
 composite but single delict complained of.^ 
 
 1 r Different Kinds of Itclief frotn one 
 Cause of Action, 
 
 " The first common tirouml of demurrer 
 is that several causes of action are improp- 
 erly united. A general rule governing 
 such objections as this is that a complaint 
 in equity is not multifarious which presents 
 but one primary right for enforcement, or 
 one subject of action for adjudication, 
 though it may pray for many and various 
 forms of relief, all germane to that single 
 subject of the action, or to the vindication 
 of that primary right : " Level Land Co. 
 V. Sivyer (190l"), 1^2 Wis. 442, 88 N. W. 
 317; Imperial Shale Brick Co. v. Jewett 
 (1901), 169 N. Y. 143, 62N. E.167; White- 
 head V. Sweet (1899), 126 Cal. 67, 58 Pac. 
 376. See also Washington National Bank 
 V. Woodrum (1898), 60 Kan. 34, 55 Pac. 
 330; Sherrin v. Flinn (1900), 155 Ind. 
 422, 58 N. E. 549 ; Gunder v. Tibbits 
 (1899), 153 Ind. 591, 55 N. E. 7G2 ; Darby 
 V. M. K. & T. Ky. Co. (1900), 156 Mo. 391, 
 57 S. W. 550; Pryor v. Kansas City (1899), 
 153 Mo. 135, 54 S. W. 499 ; Rissler v. Ins. 
 Co. (1899), 150 Mo. 366, 51 S. W. 755; 
 Wheeler Savings Bank v. Tracey (1897), 
 141 Mo. 252, 42 S. W. 946; Mcintosh v. 
 Kaukin (189G), 134 Mo. 340, 35 S. W- 
 995; Thompson f. Harris (1902), 64 Kan. 
 124, 67 Pac. 456; Sheppard v. Green 
 (1896), 48 S. C. 165, 26 S. E. 224, quoting 
 the te.xt; Adkins v. Loucks (1900), 107 
 Wis. 587, 83 N. W. 934; Jordan v. Estate 
 of Warner (1900), 107 Wis. 539 ; 83 N. W. 
 94G; Fo.ster v. Posson (1899), 105 Wis. 99, 
 81 N. W. 123 ; Perry v. Jefferies (1901 ), 61 
 S. C. 292, 39 S. E. 315 ; Matthews v. Bauk 
 (1901), 60 S. C. 183, 38 S. E. 437; Day v. 
 Schneider (1896), 28 Ore. 457, 43 Pac. 
 6.'.0; Hough V. Hough (1894), 25 Ore. 218, 
 35 Pac. 249; Bostick v. Barnes (1900), 59 
 S. C. 22, 37 S. E. 24; Mew v. Railway 
 Co. (1899), 55 S. C. 90, 32 S. E. 828; 
 Sloan V. Railway Co. (1902), 64 S. C. 
 389, 42 S. E. 197; Farley v. Basket and 
 Veneer Co. (1897), 51 S. C. 222, 28 S. E. 
 193 ; Jackins v. Dickin.son (1893), 39 S. C. 
 436. 17 S. E. 996; I)aw.«on v. Marsh 
 (1902), 74 Conn. 498, 51 At). 529; Brock- 
 
 ett 1-. Fair Haven & W. R. Co. (1900), 73 
 Conn. 428, 47 Atl. 763 ; Angliu c. Couloy 
 (1903),— Ky.—, 71 S. W. 926; :\Iitchc]l 
 V. New Farmers' Bank's Trustee (1901), 
 — Ky.— , 60 S. W. 375; Hueston v. Mis- 
 sissippi & Rum River Boom Co. (1899), 
 76 Minn. 251, 79 N. W. 92; Chicago. Rock 
 Island, & P. Ry. Co. v. Haywood & Sou 
 (1897), 102 la. 392, 71 N. W. 358; Eagle 
 Iron Works v. Railway Co. (1897), 101 la. 
 289, 70 N. W. 193; Glover I'.Narcy (1894), 
 92 la. 286, 60 N. W. 531 ; Baxter i;. Camp 
 (1898), 71 Conn. 243,41 Atl. 803. But see 
 Ramsdell v. Clark (1897), 20 Mont. 103, 
 49 Pac. 591 ; Craft Refrigerating Machine 
 Co. V. Quinnipiac Brewing Co. (1893), 63 
 Conn. 551, 29 Atl. 76, in wliich the courc 
 said : " Separate counts are required for 
 separate and distinct causes of action, but 
 not for the presentation of se])arnte and 
 distinct claims for relief founded on the 
 same cause of action or transaction." 
 
 See also Threatt v. Mining Co. (1896), 
 49 S. C. 95, 26 S. E. 970, from whirli the 
 following is quoted : "The first and second 
 grounds of appeal are intended to allege 
 error in the refusal of the Circuit Judge 
 to grant defendant's motion to recinire the 
 plaintiff to elect which one of the several 
 causes of action set out in the complaint he 
 would go to trial upon. No doubt exists 
 that the Circuit .Judge met this issue 
 squarely; he decided that the complaint 
 stated but one cause of action. Was this 
 error ? . . . Alter all it resolves itself into 
 a question of what the complaint actually 
 alleges, wliether it was one or several 
 causes of action. Great care must always 
 be observed to grasp the question, Wliat 
 right of the plaintiff has the dcfcnd.iut in- 
 vaded ? . . . What the plaintiff in tiie case 
 at bar really seeks is to prevent the de- 
 fendant, tiirough its milling operations, 
 from invading his riglit of property. The 
 injury to his bottom land is one element 
 m this invasion of his right of property ; 
 the injury to his right to water his stock 
 in tlie stream is another element; the in- 
 jury to pure air at his home is another 
 clement ; the injury to his fishing privilege
 
 JOINDER OF CAL'.si:s uK AUlioN. 467 
 
 § 350. * 456. Two or more Distinct Rights each Invaded by Dis- 
 tinct Wrongs, and t"wo Rights Invaded by one and the same Wrong, 
 or one Right Broken by two Separate Wrongs. Oil the other 
 hand, if the facts alleged in the pleading show that the plaintiff 
 is possessed of two or more distinct and separate primary rights, 
 each of which has been invaded, or that the defendant has coiii- 
 niitted two or more distinct and separate wrongs, it follows inevi- 
 tably, from the foregoing principle, that the plaintiff has united 
 two or more causes of action, although the remedial rights aris- 
 ing from each, and the corresponding reliefs, may be exactly of 
 the same kind and nature. If two separate and distinct primary 
 rights could be invaded by one and the same wrong, or if the 
 single primary right should be invaded by two distinct and sepa- 
 rate legal wrongs, in either case two causes of action would re- 
 sult ; a fortiori must this be so when the two primary rights are 
 each broken by a separate and distinct wrong. 
 
 § 351. * 457. General Principle Drawn from Analysis of Essen- 
 tial Elements of a Judicial Action. The general principle which I 
 have thus drawn from an analysis of the essential elements which 
 make up a judicial action can be applied to all possible cases, and 
 v.'ill furnish a sure and simple test by which to determine whether 
 one or more causes of action have been embodied in any complaint 
 or petition.^ The demand for relief must be entirely disregarded ; 
 
 in sucH stream is another element; tlie in- ing at the wliole pleading, there is more 
 jury to the two neighborhood roads is an- than one primary right presented thereby 
 other element; tlie injury to his ditches for vindication. There may be many 
 another element ; and the injury to the air minor subjects, and facts may be stated 
 he breathes while in his bottom lands is constituting independent grounds for re- 
 another element. All these elements enter lief, either as between the plaintiff and all 
 in to complete the alleged wrong to plain- the defendants, or the former and one of 
 tiff by this defendant tlirough his milling the latter, or between defendants, and 
 operations. The Circuit Judge evidently there be still but a single primary purpose 
 took this view of the complaint when he of the suit, with which all the other mat- 
 overruled this objection to it. We take the ters are so connected as to be reasonably 
 same view of tliis matter, and, therefore, considered germane thereto, — parts of one 
 overrule these two exceptions." Wildinan entire subject, presenting to the court but 
 V Wildman (1898), 70 Conn. 700, 41 Atl. one ])rimary ground i'or invoking its juris- 
 1 ; South Bend Chilled I*low Co. u. George diction. That was the rule before the 
 C. Cribb Co. (1900), 105 Wis. 443, 81 code, and it was preserved thereby iu un- 
 N. W. 839.] mistakable language, as this court has said 
 
 1 \_Test to determiue tvhHher Plnad- On many occasions:" Herman v. Felthou- 
 
 inff states one, or more than one, sen (1902), 114 Wis. 423, 90 N. W. 432. 
 
 Cause of Action. Sec also Level Laud Co. v. Sivyer (1901), 
 
 " The test to be applied in order to de- 112 Wis. 442, 88 N. W. 317. " The infal- 
 
 termine whether a complaint states more lible test, by which to determine whether 
 
 than one cause of action, is whether, look- a complaint states more than one cause of
 
 468 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 whether single or complex, it 
 effect upon, the " cause of action, 
 
 action, is, Does it present more than one 
 subject of action or primary right for ad- 
 judication 1 ... If it stand that test, no 
 matter how many incidental matters may 
 be connected with the primary right, ren- 
 dering other parties than the main defend- 
 ant i)roper or necessary to the litigation 
 for a complete settlement of the contro- 
 versy as to plaintiff, or for the due protec- 
 tion of their rights as against him or 
 between tliemselves, there is yet but one 
 cause of action, and a demurrer upon the 
 ground of tlie improper joinder of causes 
 of action will not lie : " Adkius r. Loucks 
 (I'JOO). 107 Wis. 587, 83 N. W. 934. 
 
 '■ As has often been said by this court, 
 the test of wliether there is more than one 
 cause of action stated in a complaint is not 
 whether there are different kinds of relief 
 prayed for or objects sought, but wlietlier 
 there is more than one primary right 
 sought to be enforced or one sul)ji'ct of 
 controversy presented for adjudication ; " 
 South Bend Chilled Plow Co. v. Geori^e C. 
 Cribb Co. (1900), 105 Wis. 443, 81 N. W. 
 675. See also Zinc Carbonate Co. v. The 
 rirst National Hank of Shullsburg (1899), 
 103 Wis. 125, 79 N. W. 229; Gager 
 r. Marsden (1899), 101 Wis. 598, 77 N. W. 
 922. In Threatt v. Mining Co. (1896), 49 
 S. C. 95, 26 S. E. 970, it is said: "Great 
 care must always l)e observed to grasp the 
 question, What right of the plaintiif has 
 the defendant invaded ■? " 
 
 The test prescribed in the text was 
 adopted in the case of lleilly v. Sicilian 
 Asphalt Paving Co. (1902), 170 N. Y. 40, 
 62 X. E. 772. In this case it was claimed 
 by appellant "that while driving in Cen- 
 tral Park in the city of New York both 
 his person and his vehicle were injured in 
 conse(|uence of collision with a gravel 
 heap jjlaced on the road throuirh tb.e neg- 
 ligence of the defendant. Thereupon he 
 brought an action against the defendant 
 in the Court of Common Pleas to recover 
 damages for the injury to his person. Sub- 
 sequently he brougiit another action in one 
 of tiie District C<jurts in tiie city of New 
 York to recover for the injury to his vehi- 
 cle. In this la.st action he obtained jmig- 
 ment, which was paid by the defendant. 
 Thereafter the defendant set up by sup- 
 
 forms no part of, and has no 
 ,"" Rejecting, therefore, all those 
 
 plemental answer the judgment in the 
 District Court suit, and its satisfaction as 
 a bar to the further maintenance of the 
 action in the Common Pleas." On the 
 trial in the Supreme Court " it was held 
 that the plaintiff's right of action was 
 merged in the judgment recovered in the 
 District Court and his complaint was dis- 
 missed. The judgment entered upon this 
 direction was affirmed by the Appellate 
 Division." The Court of Appeals, revers- 
 ing the judgment appealed from, said : 
 " The question now before us has been the 
 subject of conflicting decisions in different 
 jurisdictions. In Englaud it has been 
 held by the Court of Aj)peal, Lord Cole- 
 ridge, Chief Justice, dissenting, that dam- 
 ages to person and to ])r(jperty, though 
 occasioned l)y the same wrongful act. gi\e 
 rise to different causes of action (Bruns- 
 den V. Humphrey, L. R. [14 Q. B. D.] 
 141) ; while in Massachusetts, Miimesota, 
 and Missouri the contrary doctrine lias 
 been declared (Doran r. Cohen, 147 
 Mass. 342 ; King v. Chicago, M. & St. P. 
 liy. Co., 82 N. W. Rep. 1113; Von Frag- 
 stein V. Windier, 2 Mo. App. 598). The 
 argument of those courts which maintain 
 that an injury to person and property 
 creates but a single cause of action is that 
 as the defendant's wrongful act was single, 
 the cause of action must be .single, and 
 that the different injuries occasioned by it 
 are merely items of damage proceeding 
 from the same wrong, while that of tlie 
 English court is that the negligent act of 
 the defendant in itself constitutes no cause 
 of action and becomes an actionable wrong 
 only out of the damage which it causes. 
 'One wrong was done as soon as the 
 ])laiiitiff's enjoyment of his proj)erty was 
 substantially interfered with. A further 
 wrong arose as soon as the driving also 
 caused injury to the plaintiff's ])erso:i' 
 (Brunsden r. Humphrey, .s-K/)m). I doubt 
 whether either argument is conclusive. 
 If, when one person was driving the vehi- 
 cle of another, both the driver and the 
 vehicle were injured, there could be no 
 doubt that two causes of action would 
 ari.se. one in f.ivor of the person injured 
 and the other in favor of the owner of the 
 injured property. On the other hand, if
 
 JOINJiEli OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 
 
 469 
 
 portions of the pleading which describe the remedy or relief de- 
 manded, the inquiry should be directed exclusively to the allega- 
 
 botli tlie horse and the vehicle, being the faction. Ujjon the trial below, judgment 
 
 jToperty of the same person, were injured, was rendered for the ftiil amount, and de- 
 
 tliere would be but a single cause of action fendant appeals." In the course of the 
 
 for the damage to both. If, wiiile in- opinion it is said : " 'I'he learned trial 
 
 jury to the horse and vehicle of a person judge, in a carefully written memoran 
 
 gives rise to but a single cause of action, dum, based his decision upon the proposi- 
 
 injury to the vehicle and its owner gives tion that at the common law every person 
 
 rise to two causes of action, it must be was possessed of two distinct primary 
 
 because there is an e.ssential difference 
 between an injury to the person and an 
 injury to property that makes it imprac- 
 ticable or, at least, very inconveinent in 
 the administration of justice to Ideud the 
 two. We think tliere is such a distinc- 
 tion. . . . While some of the difiiculties 
 in the joinder of a claim for injury to the 
 person and one for injury to the property 
 in one cause of action are created by our 
 statutory enactments, tbe history of the 
 common law shows that the distinction 
 between torts to the person and torts to 
 property has always obtained. . . . Tliere- 
 )re, for reason of the great difference 
 
 riyhts, — the right of personal security 
 and the right of private property, — and 
 that a di.stinct cause of action arose from 
 an infringement of either. And, it is 
 argued, these rights have been carried 
 into our system of jurisprudence, and 
 remedies provided for their preservation ; 
 that the constitution guarantees a certain 
 remedy by tlie law for injuries thereto; 
 that statutes have been enacted with the 
 special purpose of keeping these rights 
 separate and distinct, in order that the 
 remedy for an infringement of each may 
 he enforced without reference to the other, 
 as the statute of limitations . . . ; also, 
 
 lietween the rules of law a])plicable to the statute providing what causes of ac- 
 
 injuries of the person and those relating tions survive. Counsel for respondent, 
 
 to injuries to property, we conclude that taking this distribution of primary rights 
 
 an injury to person and one to property, as a basis, have argued ably that it ueces- 
 
 though resulting from the same tortious sarily follows that the cause of action in 
 
 act, constitute different causes of action." this case did not consist of the act of neg- 
 
 To the^sarae effect, see Watson v. Kail- 
 way Co* (1894), 8 Tex. Civ. App. 144, 27 
 S. W. 924. 
 
 The author's test, however, was rejected 
 in King v. Chicago, M. & St P. Ky. Co. 
 (1900), 80 Minn. 83, 82 N. W. 111.3. In 
 this case the facts were as follows : '' Plain- 
 tiff, while riding in and driving his wagon 
 across defendant's tracks, was run into by 
 defendant's train. As a result, he was 
 ])ersonally injured, and the wagon and 
 horses and harness were damaged. There- 
 
 ligence on the part of the defendant in 
 injuring the plaintiff and his property, but 
 the cause of action arose from the results 
 of the act; that instantly upon the strik- 
 ing and throwing of plaintiff by the engine 
 the cause of action arose for injury to his 
 person, and another cause arose as soon as 
 plaintiff's enjoyment of his pro])erty was in- 
 terfered with. . . . We are of the opinion 
 that the cause of the action consists of the 
 negligent act which produced the effect, 
 rather than in the effect of the act in its 
 
 after plaintiff brought an action against application to different primary rights, 
 
 defendant to recover for the injuries suf- and that the injury to the person and 
 
 fered in his person, and secured a judg- property as a result of the original cause 
 
 ment for $1,000. While that action was gives rise to different items of damage. 
 
 still pending on appeal in tiiis court The views we have adopted seem to 
 
 plaintiff commenced the present proceed- us more in harmony with the tendency 
 
 ing to recover the damage sustained by towards simplicity and directness in the 
 
 the injury to the horses, wagon, and har- determination of controversial rights, 
 
 ncss, alleged to be $225. As a defence to That rule of construction should be 
 
 this action, defendant pleaded the former ado])ted which will most speedily and 
 
 judgment as a bar, and, by an amendment economically bring litigation to an end, 
 
 later, pleaded its full payment and satis- if at the same time it conserves the ends
 
 470 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 tions of fact which set forth the primaiy right of the plaintiff and 
 the wrong done by the defendant. If one such right alone, how- 
 ever comprehensive, is asserted, and if one such wrong alone, 
 however complex, is complained of, but one cause of action is 
 alleged.^ If the examination discloses more than one distinct and 
 independent primary right held by the plaintiff, and all of them 
 invaded by the defendant, or more than one distinct and inde- 
 pendent wrong done by the defendant to the plaintiff's primary 
 right or rights, then the complaint or petition has united different 
 causes of action, and the rules which control their joinder are 
 brought into opei'ation.^ 
 
 of justice. There is nothing to be gained 
 in splitting up the rights of au injured 
 party as iu this case, and much may be 
 saved if one action is made to cover the 
 subject." Judgment reversed. See also 
 Foerst v. Kelso (1901), 131 Cal. 376, 63 
 Pac 681 ; and Hanson c. Anderson (1895), 
 90 Wis. 195, 62 N. W. 1055. 
 
 ^ ^Splitting a "Cause of Action." 
 
 "The rule is that a single or entire 
 cause of action cannot be subdivided into 
 several claims and separate actions main- 
 tained thereon. Secor v. Sturgis, 16 N. Y. 
 548 ; Nathans v. Hope, 77 N. Y. 420. As 
 to this principle there is no dispute : " 
 lleilly r. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co. 
 (1902), 170 N. Y. 40, 62 N. E. 772. See 
 to same effect, Brunsden v. Humphrey 
 (1884), L. R. [14 Q. B. D.] 141 ; King v. 
 Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry. Co. (1900), 80 
 Minn. 83, 82 N. W. 1113; Norvell v. 
 Mecke (1900), 127 N. C. 401, 37 S. E. 452; 
 Huffman v. Knight (1900), 36 Ore. 581, 
 60 Pac. 207; Achey v. Creech (1899), 
 21 Wash. 319, 58 Pac. 208 ; Haiil i-. Sugo 
 (1901), 163 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135 ; Pat- 
 node V. Westenhaver (1902), 114 Wis. 
 460, 90 N. W. 467 ; Smelker v. Chicago & 
 Northwestern R. Co. (1900), 106 Wis. 
 135, 81 N. W. 994 ; Richardson v. Opelt 
 (1900), 60 Neb. 180, 82 N. W. 377 ; Don- 
 nell V. Wright (1899), 147 Mo. 639, 49 
 S. W. 874; Fort v. Penny (1898), 122 
 N. C. 230. 29 S. E. 362 ; Day v. Brenton 
 (1897), 102 la. 482, 71 N. W. 538 ; Atlanta 
 Elevator Co v. Cotton Mills (1898), 106 
 Ga. 427. 32 .S. E. 541 ; Little v. City of 
 Portland (1894), 26 Ore. 235, 37 Pac. 911 ; 
 Insurance Co. v. Bulleue (1893), 51 Kau. 
 
 764, 33 Pac. 467 ; Hoffman v. Hoffman's 
 Executor (1894), 126 Mo. 486, 29 S. W. 
 603 ; Wheeler Savings Bank v. Tracey 
 (1897), 141 Mo. 252, 42 S. W. 946 ; Wild- 
 man V. Wildniaii (1898), 70 Conn. 700, 41 
 Atl. 1.3 
 
 - See Davenport r. Murray, 08 Mo. 
 198; Donovan v. Dunning, 69 id. 436; 
 Young V. Young, 81 N. C. 91. As exam- 
 ples of only one cause of action, altliough 
 several distinct reliefs are asked and ob- 
 tained, see the following cases : Pet>]ilc v. 
 Tweed, 63 N. Y. 194, 5 Hun, 3.53 ; ILiines 
 V. Hollister, 64 N. Y. 1 ; Boardman v. Lake 
 Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 84 N. Y. 157 ; Tis- 
 dale V. Moore, 8 Hun, 19 ; Skidmore v. Col- 
 lier, 8 id. 50 ; Walters v. Continental Ins. 
 Co., 5 id. 343 ; Young v. Drake, 8 id. 61 ; 
 Prentice v. Jausen, 7 id. 86 ; Van Wagenen 
 i\ Kemp, 7 id. 328 ; Williams v. Peabody. 
 8 id. 271 ; Board of Supervisors v. Wal- 
 bridge, 38 Wis. 179 ; Liedersdorf v. Flint, 
 50 id. 401 ; Collins r. Cowen, 52 id. 634 ; 
 Kahn v. Kahu, 15 Fla. 400; Donovan v. 
 Dunning, 69 Mo. 436 ; Stewart v. Carter, 4 
 Neb. 564; Young v. Young, 81 N. C. 91 ; 
 Barrett v. Watts, 13 S. C. 441. See also 
 Westlake v. Farrow, 34 S. C. 270; John- 
 son !'. Golder, 132 N. Y. 116; Tuers v, 
 Tuers, 100 N. Y. 196; Trow])ridge v. 
 True, 52 Conn. 190; Louvall v. Gridley, 
 70 Cal. '507; Smiley v. Deweese, 1 lud. 
 App. 211 ; Loui.sville, St. L. & T. Ry. Co. 
 V. Neafus (Ky. 1892), 18 S. W. Rep. 1030 
 (different elements of damage arising 
 from single breach of contract) ; Gran- 
 dona I'. Lovdal, 70 Cal. 101 (prayer for 
 abatement of nuisance and damages). In 
 the following cases, also, it was held that 
 but one cause of action was stated : Sayles
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 471 
 
 § 352. * 458. Cause of Action not to be confounded with 
 Relief. Illustrative Cases. Although the decisions do not at- 
 tempt to furnish any general test by which one may determine 
 the nature of a " cause of action," and whether a pleading con- 
 tains one or more, they fully recognize the fact that the cause 
 of action is not to be confounded with the relief, and that the 
 demand for or the granting of many forms of remedy may be 
 based upon a single cause of action. The following cases not 
 only exhibit the proneness to confound the remedy with the cause 
 of action, and the necessity of understanding the essential dis- 
 tinction between them, but they also illustrate, and fully sustain, 
 the foregoing principles, which I have proposed as the test by 
 which such distinction may be at once recognized : a complaint 
 alleged that the plaintiff, being indebted to the defendant upon 
 several promissory notes held by the latter, had assigned to it a 
 bond and mortgage as collateral security ; that the defendant had 
 collected the amount due on the bond and mortgage, which was 
 more than sufficient to pay all the notes in full ; that a surplus 
 was left remaining in its hands, and upon these facts demanded 
 payment by the defendant of such balance, and surrender and can- 
 cellation of the notes so given by the plaintiff. To this complaint 
 the defendant demurred, on the ground that causes of action had 
 been improperly joined. The New York Court of Appeals held 
 that there was no uniting at all of different causes of action, and 
 that only a single one was stated, although two distinct reliefs 
 were demanded.^ 
 
 V. Bemis, 57 Wis. 31.5 (trespass ou land, cellation of a release of the defendant foi 
 
 aggravated by injury to personal prop- liability for the injuries) ; also Damon v. 
 
 erty) ; Whatling v. Nash, 41 Hun, 579 Damon, 28 Wis. 510; Moon ?;. McKnight, 
 
 (same) ; Gilbert v. Pritchard, 41 Hun, 46 54 Wis. 551. Several of these cases ap- 
 
 (trespass on land, aggravated by assault) ; pear to consider the invasion of distinct 
 
 Butler V. Kirby, 53 Wis. 188; Loveland rights of the plaintiff by one tortious act, 
 
 ■V. Garner, 71 Cal. 541 ; Thames r. Jones, or series of connected tortious acts, as 
 
 97 N. C. 121 ; Welch v. Piatt, 32 Hun, 194 ; constituting but one cause of action; thus 
 
 Lehnen i\ Purvis, 55 Hun, 535 ; United making the latter consist in the delict 
 
 States L. Ins. Co. I'. Jordan, 21 Abb. N. alone. Comjiare ^josi, p. 476, note 5. For 
 
 Cas. 330; Whitner v. Perhacs, 25 Abb. an instance of two causes of action itn- 
 
 N. Cas. 130; Newcombe i\ Chicago & properly mingled, see American Button- 
 
 N. W. Ry. Co. (N. Y. Supreme, Jan. 1890), Hole, etc. Sew. Mach. Co. v. Thornton, 28 
 
 8 N. y. Suppl. 3C6 ; Leary v. Melcher IMinn. 418. 
 
 (N. Y. Supreme, May, 1891), 14 N. Y. i Cahoon v. Bank of Utica, 7 N. Y. 
 
 Suppl. 689 ; Wickersham v. Crittenden, 486. The defendant insisted that a cause 
 
 93 Cal. 17 ; Whetstone v. Beloit Straw of action for the recovery of money was 
 
 Board Co. (Wis. 1890), 45 N. W. 535 united with one equitable in its nature, 
 
 (damages for personal injuries, and can- The court said, per Johnson J. (p. 43S);
 
 472 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 § 353. * 459. Same Subject. Actions brought to reform instru- 
 ments in writing, such as pohcies of insurance and other con- i 
 tracts, mortgages, deeds of conveyance, and the like, and to 
 enforce the same as reformed by judgments for the recovery of 
 the money due on tlie contracts, or for the foreclosure of the 
 mortgages, or for the recovery of possession of tlie laud conveyed 
 by the deeds, fall within the same general principle. One cause 
 of action only is stated in sucli cases, however various may be the 
 reliefs demanded and granted.^ Tlie principle also applies to 
 
 " The ground ou which this case ought to 
 be put is, that the complaint does not cou- 
 tain two causes of action. The claim is 
 single. . . . The plaintiff now seeks an 
 account of the proceeds of the mortgage 
 and of their disposition, and to have the 
 balance paid over, and the notes which 
 are satisfied delivered up. It is no an- 
 swer to say that the balance of moneys 
 could have been recovered in an action for 
 money had and received. It would none 
 the less have been the proper foundation 
 for a bill in equity. ... It is only be- 
 cause there is no dispute about the amount 
 due that there seems to be any room for 
 mistake as to the character of the claim. 
 If that remained to be ascertained, it 
 would be the clearest possible case for an 
 account ; and yet this case is not clearer 
 than the one before us. ... It is, in short, 
 a complaint by a debtor to have his obli- 
 gation delivered up and cancelled, and an 
 account of the securities pledged, and 
 payment of the surplus. That a claim so 
 simple in its character, so well recognized, 
 and even familiar, under the old practice 
 in chancery, should be seriously regarded 
 as two distinct causes of action, requiring 
 distinct modes of trial, and incapable of 
 being joined in a single suit, is quite as 
 surprising as the doctrine itself, if held to 
 be well founded, wouM be inconvenient." 
 See also Connor v. St. Anthony Bd. of 
 Ed., 10 .Minn. 4.39, 444; Sortore V Scott, 
 6 Lans. 271, 275, 276; Reedy v. Smith, 42 
 Cai. 245, 250. 
 
 1 Bidwell V. Astor Mut. Ins. Co., 10 
 N. y. 263 ; N. Y. Ice Co. v. N. VV. Ins. 
 Co., 23 N. Y. 357 ; Guernsey v. Am. Ins. 
 Co., 17 Minn. 104, 108 (actions to reform 
 a policy of insurance, and to recover the 
 amount dne on it as reformed); Gooding 
 I'. McAllister, 9 How. Pr. 123 (action to re- 
 
 form a written contract, and to recover a 
 money judgment upon it for the sum due 
 when corrected) ; McCown v. Sims, 69 
 N. C. 159; Rigsbee v. Trees, 21 Ind. 227 
 (actions to reform a promissory note, and 
 to recover the amount thus shown to be 
 due. The decision in the latter case is re- 
 ferred, however, to the special provision of 
 the Indiana code, § 72) ; Hunter v. McC^oy, 
 14 Ind. 528 ; McClurg v. Phillips, 49 Mo. 
 315, 316 (actions to reform a mortgage, to 
 foreclose as thus corrected, or to reform a 
 deed and quiet the title thereunder). Walk- 
 up i". Zehring, 13 Iowa, 306 (action to cor- 
 rect mistakes in a series of title-deeds, to set 
 aside anotlier deed of the same land, and 
 to quiet the plaintiff's title and possession). 
 See, however, per contra, Harri.son v. Ju- 
 neau Bank, 17 Wis. 340, which was^ suit 
 to reform a contract, and to recover the 
 money due upon it when corrected. 
 Di.xon C. J. said (p. 350) : " The com- 
 plaint contains two distinct causes of ac- 
 tion, — the one equitable, the other legal, 
 — which in strictness should liave been 
 separately stated. That for the reforma- 
 tion was equitable, and was for the court ; 
 the other, for the recovery of monev, was 
 lepal, and was for the jury." The learned 
 court has hero fallen into the evident error 
 of confounding the cause of action with 
 the relief; and its decision is in direct 
 conflict with the doctrine established by 
 the nnmerous authorities quoted above 
 and below, which involve similar facts 
 and the same principle. The doctrine of 
 tliis case has become established in Wis- 
 consin ; a union of equitable and legal 
 causes of action is hardly permitted in 
 that State. 
 
 [jChristensen v. Ilollingsworth (1898), 
 6 Idaho, 87. 53 Pac. 211 ; Vermont Loan 
 & Trust Co. V. McGregor (1897), 5 Idaho,
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 
 
 473 
 
 actions brought against a fraudulent grantor or assignor and his 
 grantees or assignees to set aside the transfers, although made 
 at different times and to different persons, and to subject the 
 property to the plaintiff's liens, as in creditors' suits ; or to com- 
 pel a reconveyance and restoration of possession of the propert}', 
 as in the case of suits by defrauded lieirs or cestuis que trustent, 
 and the like. There is but one cause of action against the 
 various defendants in these and similar suits. ^ In like manner, 
 the principle applies to actions brought by persons holding the 
 I equitable title to lands against those in wliom the legal title is 
 I vested, for the purpose of setting aside the deeds under which 
 the latter claim, on the ground of fraud or other illegality, and of 
 I recovering or confirming possession and quieting title. The dif- 
 1 ferent reliefs which the plaintiff seeks to obtain do not constitute 
 fdifferent causes of action.^ It also applies to actions for the fore- 
 
 /t: 
 
 320, 51 Pac. 102 ; Jenkins v. Taylor (1900), 
 Ky., 59 S. W. 853 ; Steinbach i\ Prudential 
 Ins. Co. (1902), 172 N. Y. 471, 65 N. E. 
 281 (action to reform policy and judgment 
 thereon as reformed). Imperial Shale 
 Brick Co. v. Jewett (1901), 169 N. Y. 143, 
 62 N. E. 167 (also an action to reform pol- 
 icy and recover thereon as reformed). 
 Hahl V. Sugo (1901), 169 N. Y. 109, 62 
 N. E. 135, see note ( 1 ) to p. 27, ante, for the 
 facts of this case. Robinson v. Brown 
 (1901); 166 N. Y. 59, 159 N. E. 775; Keys 
 V. McDermott (1903), — Wis. —,93 
 N. W. 553.] 
 
 1 Bassett v. Warner, 23 Wis. 673, 685 ; 
 Blake v. Van Tilborg, 21 Wis. 672 ; Bow- 
 ers V. Keesecher, 9 Iowa, 422 ; Howse v. 
 Moody, 14 Fla. 59, 63, 64. These were 
 actions by heirs, or otlier persons in the 
 position of benefiriaries, against adminis- 
 trators, or other individuals holding a fidu- 
 ciary relation to them, and their grantees 
 or assignees, to set aside fraudulent trans- 
 fers, to compel an accounting and a re.'^to- 
 ration, and other like reliefs. Tlie doctrine 
 of the text was freely applied in them all ; 
 Winslow V. Dousman, 18 Wis. 456; Gates 
 V. Boomer, 17 Wis. 455; North v. Brad- 
 way, 9 Minn. 183; Chautauqua Cy. Bk. v. 
 White, 6 N. Y. 236. These actions were 
 all ordinary creditors' suits. 
 
 2 Phillips V. Gorham, 17 N. Y. 270; 
 Laub V. Buckmiller, 17 N. Y. 620; Lattin 
 V. McCarty, 41 N. Y. 107. See, further, 
 
 Johnson v. Colder, 132 N. Y. 116 (com- 
 plaint alleging that tlie plaintiff is the 
 owner of laud subject to a mortgage which 
 was fraudulently foreclosed, and praying 
 for redemption, accounting, and that a 
 pretended mortgage given by the pur- 
 chaser at a foreclosure sale be cancelled, 
 states but one cause of action) ; Louvall 
 V. Gridley, 70 Cal. 507 (prayer that a deed 
 be declared a mortgage, and the title to 
 the land involved be quieted). 
 
 [[Beronio v. ^'entura Lumber Co. (1900), 
 129 Cal. 23-2, 61 Pac. 958, was an action to 
 have a sheriff's deed adjudged void and to 
 quiet title to certain premises tlierein de- 
 scribed. Defendant demurred upon the 
 / ground that two causes of action had been 
 / improperly united in the complaint, "viz., 
 an action to quiet the plaintiff's title, and an 
 i action to have the slieriff 's deed declared 
 ; void." The court below sustained tlie de- 
 murrer. The Supreme Court in reversing 
 J the case said : " The complaint presents 
 \ only a single cause of action, viz., the en- 
 forcement of the plaintiffs right to the , 
 premises in question atfainst tlie unlawful / 
 claim of the defendant tliereto. As a i 
 ^portion of the remedy for the enforce- ( 
 ment of that right it .seeks the annulment • 
 of the sheriff's deed, but a plaintiff may I 
 'frequently be entitled to several species I 
 ! of remedy for the enforcement of a sin- I 
 '\ gle riglit (Pomeroy's Code Remedies, sec. / 
 V*459) ; " San Pedro Lumber Co. v. Rey- j
 
 474 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 closure of mortgages, where the phiintiff seeks to obtain not only 
 a sale of the mortgaged premises, but also a judgment for a 
 detioiency against the mortgagor and other persons who are per- 
 sonally liable for the debt.^ In several States the codes expressly 
 authorize such actions.^ The weight of authority, however, in 
 those States whose codes do not contain isuch expiess provisions, 
 seems to be the other way ; and the rule therein seems to be gen- 
 erally established, that, in an action of foreclosure, a judgment 
 for a deficiency cannot be obtained against any persons liable for 
 the debt other than the mortgagor himself ; it is said that the 
 
 noMs (1896), HI Cal. 5S8, 44 Pac. 309; 
 Bremuer i". Leavitt (1895), 109 Cal. 130, 
 41 Pac. 859; Richardson v. Opelt (1900), 
 m Neb. 180, 82 N. W. 377.] 
 
 1 QReichert i;. Stilwell (1902), 172 
 N. Y. 83, 64 N. E. 790: Uuder the statute 
 iu this State in an action to foreclose a 
 mortgage there is but one cause of action 
 alleged, even if the bond is set forth iu 
 the complaint and judgment for deficiency 
 is demanded as a part of tlie relief. The 
 statutory authority to render a personal 
 judgment for the deficiency does not 
 create a distinct and independent cause of 
 action, but is an incidental remedy, de- 
 pendent wholly upon the statute and sub- 
 sidiary to the main object of the action. 
 See Plaukinton v. Hildebrand (1895), 89 
 Wis. 209, 61 N. W. 839. In Security Loan 
 and Trust Co. v. Mattern (1901), 131 Cal. 
 326, 63 Pac. 482, the defendant Lena 1). 
 Mattern executed and delivered to plain- 
 tiff her promissory note for $3,500, and 
 secured the payment of the same by her 
 mortgage upon certain land. Subse- 
 quently, Mrs. Mattern desiring to ex- 
 change a portion of the land mortgaged, 
 the plaintiff released tliis portion of the 
 land from the lien of tlie mortgage in 
 consideration of defendant Bechtel exe- 
 cuting and delivering to iiim his mortgage 
 on land owned by the latter as security 
 for the payment of .said note in lieu of 
 said release. The action was brought to 
 recover upon the note and to foreclose tlie 
 Mattern and Bechtel mortgages. Mrs. 
 Mattern and Bechtel were made defend- 
 ant.s. Defendants demurred to tlie ctmi- 
 plaint, among other grounils, because of a 
 misjoinder of causos of action. It was 
 claimed that two distinct causes of action 
 
 were set fortli in the complaint — one 
 against defendant Mattern and one against 
 Bechtel. It seems that plaintiff had sep- 
 arated his complaint into two " Counts." 
 In sustaining the ruling of the court be- 
 low in overruling the demurrer the Su- 
 preme Court said: " Altliougti one portion 
 of the complaint is entitled therein ' First 
 Count ' and another portion ' Second 
 Couut, ' the portions so entitled do not 
 purport to set forth separate causes of ac- 
 tion, but to state tlie facts by which the 
 defendants Mattern and Bechtel are re- 
 spectively relateil to the plaintiff's cause 
 of action. A complaint, while setting 
 forth a single cause of action, may at the 
 same time ask for different relief from 
 different defendants, according as they are 
 connected with this cause of action, and 
 its character is to be determined from its 
 contents rather than from a misnomer on 
 the part of the pleader." In American 
 Savings and Loan Association v. Burg- 
 hardc (1897), 19 Mont. 323,48 Pac. 391, 
 it was held that a complaint in such a case 
 as that stated in tlie text did not state two 
 causes of action, aiul that the money judg- 
 ment and the decree were different modes 
 of relief for the same wrong. See also 
 First Nat. Bank v. Lambert (1895), 63 
 Minn. 263, 65 N. W. 451.] 
 
 2 Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. i'. Cross, 18 
 Wis. 109; Saner v. Steinbauer, 14 Wis. 
 70 ; Weil v. Howard, 4 Nev. 384 ; Greither 
 V. Alexander, 15 Iowa, 470, 473, per 
 Wright C. J. ; Eastman v. Turnian, 24 
 Cal. 379, 382, per Sawyer J. ; Rollins v. 
 Forbes, 10 Cal. 299; Farwell v. Jackson, 
 28 Cal. 105; [^Endress v. Shove (1901), 
 110 Wis. 133, 85 N. W. 653.]
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 4(.j 
 
 making such third person a party, and the praying a decree for 
 deticiency against him, is a misjoinder of causes of action.^ A 
 suit by the vendor of land to recover the purchase price, and to 
 enforce his hen therefor upon the premises sold or conveyed, in- 
 cludes but one cause of action, the double relief plainly arising 
 from the single state of facts.^ 
 
 § 354. * 460. Same Subject. The following are some ad- 
 ditional instances in which the doctrine has been approved and 
 enforced by the courts, and the cause of action lield to be a single 
 one. An action against a husband and wife, brouglit upon an 
 alleged indebtedness of both, and an agreement of Ijotli to secure 
 the same by a mortgage upon the wife's lands, although at the 
 trial the debt was shown to be against the husband alone, and no 
 such agreement as the one alleged was proven ; ^ an action by the 
 vendee in a land contract for a specific performance and for dam- 
 ages, where judgment was given for damages alone ; * an action 
 by the heirs and administrator of a deceased cestui que trust 
 against the trustee, who held both real and personal estate in 
 trust, for an accounting, a conveyance of the land, and a transfer 
 of the personal property ; ^ an action to remove a nuisance, for 
 damages, and for an injunction ; ^ for admeasurement of dower, 
 possession, and recovery of rents and profits ; " by one tenant in 
 common against the other, to compel a specific performance of 
 the latter's agreement to convey his share, or for a partition ; ^ an 
 action by a stockholder against a bank, its officers, and their 
 assignee, to set aside an assignment, to remove the officers, for an 
 accounting, and for a winding-up of the corporation, — all based 
 
 1 Faesi v. Goetz, 15 Wis. 231 ; Gary v. v. Sedgwick, 8 Cal. 398. In the latter 
 Wheeler, 14 Wis. 281 ; Jesup v. City Bk. case, the action was on notes given for the 
 of Raciue, 14 Wis. 331 ; Stilwell v. Kel- price. 
 
 logg, 14 Wis. 461 ; Borden v. Gilbert, 13 ^ Marquat v. Marquat, 12 N. Y. 336. 
 Wis. 670; Doan v. Holly, 26 Mo. 186, 2.5 * Barlow v. Scott, 24 N. Y. 40; Stern- 
 Mo. 357. In Ladd v. James, 10 Ohio St. berger v. McGovern, 56 N. Y. 12,21. And 
 437, it was said that when a mortgage is see Duvall v. Tiusley, 54 Mo. 93, 95. 
 given to secure a note, and an action is ^ Bichtmyer v. Richtmyer, 50 Barb. 55. 
 l)rought setting out both, and demanding "* Davis v. Lambertson, 56 Barb. 480. 
 judgment for money on the note, and for ' Brown v. Brown, 4 Robt. 688. 
 a foreclosure and sale on the mortgage, ^ Hall v. Hall, 38 How. Pr. 97. This 
 any issue of fact affecting the former de- decision is certainly opposed to the prin- 
 mand for relief must be tried by a jury ciple stated in the text, and to the weight 
 if either party require it. See also Mc- of authority. Two different primary rights 
 Carthy i'. Garraghty, 10 Ohio St. 438. are clearly stated ; one based upon the con- 
 
 2 Stephens v. Magor, 25 Wis. 533 ; tract, and the other upon the ownership in 
 Turner v. Pierce, 34 Wis. 658 ; Walker common.
 
 476 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 upon the fraudulent practices of the officers ; ^ where a debtor who 
 had executed a deed to A. in trust for his creditor B. alleged that 
 the two had fraudulently sold the land which had been bought in 
 by B., and sought to set aside the sale and to redeem ; ^ an ac- 
 countino- against the executor of a father and the administrator 
 of his son, where the estates were so mingled and confused that 
 a separate accounting was impossible ; ^ an action against the 
 executor of a lessee who had continued to occupy the premises, 
 to recover the rent accruing before the death, as well as that ac- 
 cruing after ; ^ an action to recover damages for negligently driv- 
 ing against and injuring the plaintiff and his horse and carriage ; ^ 
 an action to recover damages for fraudulent representations in the 
 sale of some sheep, the plaintiff claiming special damages for the 
 destruction of his entire flock, caused by the communication of 
 disease from those which he had purchased ; ^ an action for ma- 
 licious prosecution, in which special acts of wrong and damage 
 were alleged ; "' and, it has been said, an action to recover damages 
 for several distinct and separate breaches of one contract.^ 
 
 § 355. * 461. Cases in Missouri. To the principle which I have 
 thus stated, and the doctrine approved by such an overwhelm- 
 ing weight of judicial authority, there w^as opposed a series of 
 decisions in Missouri, which, w^hile they remained unquestioned, 
 rendered the law of tlie State widely different in this respect 
 fi-om that \\iiich was established in other commonwealths. The 
 Supreme Court held in numerous cases, and a great variety of 
 circumstances, that where upon the facts the plaintiff would ulti- 
 mately be entitled to different kinds of relief, — such as, for 
 example, the setting aside deeds of conveyance to the defendant, 
 and the recovery of the possession of the land, — if, after alleging 
 
 1 Mitchell V. Bank of St. Paul, 7 Minn. tlie. injury to lliem created two causes of 
 
 2.J2, 255. action. 
 
 ■•2 McGlothlin v. Hemery, 44 Mo. 350. « Wilcox r. McCoy, 21 Oliio St. 655, 
 
 The opinion in this case is an elaborate citing Packard v. Slack, ."32 Vt. 9. 
 discussion of the entire doctrine. '^ Scheuck v. Biitsch, 32 Ind. 338. 
 
 8 McLachlan v. Staples, 13 Wis. 448, » Fisk v. Tank, 12 Wis. 276, 298, per 
 
 451. Dixou C. J. Tlie acts and defaults com- 
 
 * Pugsley V. Aikiu, 11 N. Y. 494. jdained of in this ca.se can liardly be called 
 
 ° Howe V. Peckhani, 10 Barb. 056 distinct and separate Itreaches. See also 
 
 (S. T.). The correctness of this de- Smiley v. Dawcese (Ind. App. 1891), 27 
 
 ci.sion is. more than doubtful. Ma.son J. N. E. Rep. 505. See Roehiing r. Huebsch- 
 
 inakes the cause of action to con.sist mann, 34 Wis. 185; Kansas City Hotel 
 
 of the delict alone. Certainly the plain- Co. v. Sigement, 53 Mo. 170, that different 
 
 tiff's rigiit to his own person and to items of an account or claim constitute 
 
 his property were different rigiits, and but one cause of action.
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 477 
 
 all the facts, he should demand the separate reliefs, liis complaint 
 would contain different causes of action, and would be held bad 
 on demurrer, or even judgment arrested after verdict, or reversed 
 on appeal because of tlie error. In other words, the court .com- 
 pletely identified tlie relief, and even the prayer for it, with the 
 cause of action. ^ The court has, however, recently receded from 
 this most untenable position, and seems to have overruled this 
 long series of decisions.^ Tlie Missouri court seems to have finally 
 brought the law of that State in reference to the subject-matter 
 under consideration into harmony witli the plain intent of the 
 code and the well-settled doctrines of equity jurisj)rudence, as 
 well as into a conformity with the rule settled by the unanimous 
 consent of other courts.-^ 
 
 §356. *462. Summary. — I have thus described the cases in 
 which but one cause of action is alleged, although the many and 
 sometimes conflicting demands for relief may make it appear that 
 several causes of action have been united and mingled together in 
 the pleading. I have stated a general principle whicli will furnish 
 a certain test for determining all such cases, by ascertaining what 
 allegations contain the " cause of action," and what contain the 
 demands for relief, and by showing the essential nature of each, 
 and the necessary distinctions between them. I shall now pro- 
 ceed to consider the classes of cases in which different causes of 
 action are united either properly or improperly. 
 
 IV. The Joinder of Causes of Action Arising out of the same Trans- 
 action or Transactions Connected with the same Subject of 
 Action; Legal Meaimig of the Terms '■'- Transaction^^ and ^ 
 " /Subject of Action.^^ 
 
 § 357. * 463. Most Frequent Applications of this Class. In- 
 cludes Legal Controversies. The class which is described by the 
 language of the codes quoted in the above heading is broad, 
 comprehensive, vague, and uncertain. The principal design was 
 
 1 Curd V. Lackland, 43 Mo. 139 ; Wynn 3 {In State ex rel. v. Horton Land and 
 
 V. Cory, 43 Mo. 301 ; Gray v. Payne, 43 Lumber Co. (1901), 161 Mo. 664, 61 S. W. 
 Mo. 203; Peyton v. Rose, 41 Mo. 2.57; 869, it is said: "The character of the 
 Gott r. Powell, 41 Mo. 416; Moreau v. action is determined by the facts stated in 
 Detchemendy, 41 Mo. 431. the petition and not by the prayer for re- 
 
 2 Henderson v. Dickey, 50 Mo. 161, lief." See also Liese 2'. Meyer (1898), 143 
 165, per Wagner J.; Duvall v. Tinsley, Mo. 547, 45 S. W. 282.] 
 
 54 Mo. 93.
 
 478 CIVIL RKMKDIES. 
 
 undonbtedl}' to embrace tlie vast mass of equitable actions and 
 causes of action which could not be classified and arranged in any 
 more definite manner; and the language was properly left vague, 
 so that it might not in any manner interfere with the settled doc- 
 trines of equitable procedure and pleading, parties and remedies. 
 Although tiiis general design is very apparent, 3'et it is no less 
 evident that the author of the clause failed to distinguish between 
 the " cause of action " and the remedy or relief Avliich is sought 
 to be obtained by means of the action. The most fre([uent appli- 
 cation of this class in the actual administration of justice has been 
 and will be to equitable actions : but the language is not confined 
 to them ; it includes legal controversies as well. If all the other 
 requisites of the statute are complied with, legal causes of action 
 of the most dissimilar character — for example, contract and tort 
 — may be united in one proceeding, provided they all arise out of 
 the same transaction, or out of transactions connected with the 
 same subject of action.^ With respect to equitable cases, there 
 cannot be much difficulty ; it is always easy to say, and perliaps 
 to see, that the facts constituting the causes of action arise at 
 least in some vague manner from the same transaction, or from 
 transactions connected witli the same subject of action. With 
 respect to legal cases the difficulty is much greater, and is some- 
 times impossible to be overcome by any logical reasoning. The 
 question will be sometimes presented, not only whether the facts 
 constituting two or more causes of action have arisen from the 
 same transaction, but whether it is possible, in the nature of 
 things, that they could arise in such a manner. 
 
 § 358. * 464. Controlling "Words herein. Necessity of Judicial 
 Definition of. A full interpretation of the language used in the 
 
 * QPollock V. Association (1896), 48 and each of them, sounded in tort, and 
 
 R. C. 65, 25 S. E. 977, citing the text. See tliey all grew out of and were connected 
 
 also Dinges u. Kiggs (1895), 43 Neb. 710, with the same transaction, and were tliere- 
 
 62 N. W. 74, a suit where the "petition fore properly joined. (Code of Civil I'ro- 
 
 set up three causes of action: First, nia- ccdure, sec. 87; Freeman v. Webb, 21 
 
 licious prosecution; second, damage to Neb. 160.)" See Commercial Union As- 
 
 jilaintiff's business by arresting occujiants surance Co. i: Shoemaker (1901), 63 Neb. 
 
 of her place of business; third, slander." 173, 88 N. VT. 156, for c;ise suggesting 
 
 'I'he court in sustaining the ruling of the that "contract and tort" may not be 
 
 District Court in overruling the motion of united. See also Bank ?'. Grain Co. (1898), 
 
 the defemlant to compel jilaintiff to elect 60 Kan. 30, 55 Tac. 277, where this ques- 
 
 upon which one of the three causes of tion was raised but not decided ; and see 
 
 action stated in her petition she would further Willey c. Nichols (1898), 18 Wash, 
 
 rely, said: "There was no error in this 528, 52 Pac. 237.] 
 ruling of the court. The causes of action,
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 479 
 
 codes would result in a general rule applicable to all actions ; a 
 rule which should determine when causes of action may and do 
 arise out of the same transaction, or out of transactions connected 
 with tlie same subject of action. This rule would be obtained, not 
 from an analysis of all possible causes of action, but from a con- 
 struction of the language used by the legislature ; and it would 
 require a legal definition, in an accurate but universal manner, of 
 the terras " titans action," " connected Avitli," and " subject of ac- 
 tion." These three terms are the controlling words upon which 
 the whole clause turns ; and until the courts shall have defined 
 them in a general and positive manner, all attempts at interpret- 
 ing the language and deducing any comprehensive and practical 
 rule from it must be futile. Until such a definition is made, each 
 case must be decided upon its own circumstances, in a mere em- 
 pirical method, so that the confusion and uncertainty will con- 
 tinue, and even increase, in the place of the uniformity and 
 certainty in the practice which the profession and suitors have 
 the right to demand. In short, the courts must break away from 
 the judicial habit which has of late years grown upon them, and 
 must be willing to attempt the discussion and settlement of defi- 
 nitions, principles, and doctrines connected with the reformed pro- 
 cedure, in a general and comprehensive form. Although little 
 aid can be derived from judicial decisions I shall attempt the 
 extremely difficult task of defining these terms, or, to be more 
 accurate, shall attempt to describe their legal significance and 
 effect, and thus to aid in reaching a general rule or principle by 
 which to determine whether any given cases are embraced within 
 the class designated by the legislature. 
 
 § 359. * 465. Language of Comstock J. and Author's Criticism. 
 In corroboration of the statement made above in regard to the 
 general purport and object of the class in question, I quote the 
 language used by an eminent judge of the New York Court of 
 Appeals, which, while it contains some unjust remarks upon the 
 authors of the New York code, is a very pointed and accurate 
 description of the clause and of its immediate design : " In respect 
 to the joinder of causes of action, the provision of the law, so far 
 as is material to the question, now is, that ' the plaintiff may unite 
 in the same complaint several causes of action, whether they be 
 such as have heretofore been denominated legal or equitable, or 
 both, where they all arise out of the same transaction or transac-
 
 480 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 tions connected with the same subject of action.' The authors of 
 the code, in framing this and most of its other provisions, appear 
 to have had some remote knowledge of what the previous law 
 had been. This provision as it now stands was introduced in the 
 amendment of 1852, because the successive codes of 1848, 1849, 
 and 1851, with characteristic perspicacity, had in effect abrogated 
 equity jurisdiction in many important cases by failing to provide 
 for a union of subjects and parties in one suit indispensable to its 
 exercise. This amendment, tlierefore, was not designed to intro- 
 duce any novelty in pleading and practice. Its language is, I 
 think, well chosen for the purpose intended, because it is so 
 obscure and so general as to justify the interpretation which shall 
 be found most convenient and best calculated to promote the ends 
 of justice. It is certainly impossible to extract from a provision so 
 loose, and yet so comprehensive, any rules less liberal than those 
 which have long prevailed in courts of equity." ^ 'Sir. Justice 
 Comstock plainly regards it unnecessary, if not impossible, to 
 attempt a definition of the terms employed in the passage which 
 he quotes, and would leave each case to be decided upon its own 
 circumstances. This is undoubtedly the easier method for the 
 courts to pursue ; but suitors, as well as the profession, have a 
 right to ask from them some rules by which a reasonable degree 
 of certainty as to the correct manner of bringing and conducting 
 causes shall be secured. Regarded as a statutory enactment of 
 the equity doctrine touching the joinder of causes of action in one 
 suit, the clause perhaps requires no special interpretation, since it 
 may be assumed to permit tlie previous equitable principles and 
 rules of procedure to exist unchanged. In this light alone it is 
 treated by Mr. Justice Gomstock in the extract taken from his 
 opinion. But as it applies also to legal actions, and as there were 
 no prior doctrines and rules of practice in courts of law which 
 it reproduces or suffers to remain operative, it does as to them 
 " introduce a novelty in pleading and practice." In order to fix 
 its application in such cases, the meaning of its controlling terms 
 must be determined. There was no prior rule of the common-law 
 procedure which permitted the union of a claim upon contract 
 with another arising from violence to property or person under 
 any circumstances, and yet it is possible that such a combination 
 may be made by virtue of this particular provision. 
 
 1 N. Y. k N. II. R. Co. V. Schuyler, 17 N. Y. 592, 604, per Comstock J.
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 481 
 
 ^ 360. * 466. Observations Made by Courts Respecting Meaning 
 of these Terms. I shall lirst collect some general observations 
 which have been made by the courts upon tlie legal import of 
 these terms, and shall, with whatever aid is derived from the 
 judicial interpretation, attempt an mdependent analysis. A com- 
 plaint united a cause of action for an assault and battery with one 
 for slander, alleging that the defamatory words were uttered while 
 tlie beating was in actual progress. To a demurrer for a mis- 
 joinder, it was answered that both causes of action arose out of 
 the same transaction. The court disposed of this position in the 
 following manner : " It by no means follows that, because the 
 two causes of action originated or happened at the same time, 
 each cause arose out of the same transaction. It is certainly 
 neither physically nor morally impossible that there should be 
 two transactions occurring simultaneously, each differing from the 
 other in essential attitudes and qualities. As here, the transac- 
 tion out of which the cause of action for the assault springs is 
 the beating, the physical force used ; while the transaction out of 
 which the cause of action for the slander springs is not the beat- 
 ing or the force used, but the defamatory words uttered. The 
 maker of a promissory note might, at the very instant of its de- 
 livery and inception, falsely call the payee a thief ; and yet who 
 would say that the two causes of action arose out of the same 
 transaction ? It has been held that a contract of warranty and a 
 fraud practised in tlie sale of a horse at the same trade did not 
 arise out of the same transaction, so as to be connected each with 
 the same subject of action, and that a complaint containing both 
 causes of action was demurrable.^ Assault and battery and slan- 
 der are as separate and distinct causes of action as any two actions 
 whatever that can be named. The subjects of the two actions are 
 not connected with each other. Each subject is as distinct and 
 different from the other as the character of an individual is from 
 his bodily structure. The question is not whether both causes of 
 action sprang into existence at the- same moment of time. Time 
 has very little to do with solving the real question. The questionV 
 f is, Did each cause of action accrue or arise out of the same trans- 
 [V action, the same tiling done f It is apparent that each cause of''^ 
 I action arose, and indeed must necessarily have arisen, out of the ; 
 1 doing of quite different things by the defendant, — diiferent in 
 
 1 Sweet ;•. Lif^crscni, 12 How. ]''r. .3"!. 
 
 ."1
 
 482 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 ytheir nature, in all their qualities and characteristics, and inflicting- 
 .injuries altogetlier different and dissimilar. The same evidence 
 'would not sustain each cause of action, and they may require 
 different answers." ^ It has been held, however, that the twd 
 causes of action under exactly the same circumstances do arise! 
 inut of the same transaction, and may be united in the samaf 
 complaint.^ -^ 
 
 § 361. * 467. Author's Criticism. A complaint contained one 
 cause of action for the breach of a warranty given on the sale of 
 a horse, and a second cause of action for fraudulent representa- 
 
 1 Anderson v. Hill, 53 Barb. 2.38, 245, 
 per T. A. Johnson J. ; and see Dragoo i". 
 Levi, 2 Duv. 520, which reaches the same 
 conclusion. It should be noticed that 
 Judge Johnson offers no affirmative defi- 
 nition of " transaction," except in making 
 "the same transaction" equivalent to 
 " the same thing done " See also Wiles 
 V. Suvdam, 64 N. Y. 173, per Church C. J. : 
 Held, that the two causes of action cannot 
 be joined ; one is on contract, and the 
 other is for a penalty given by statute; 
 they do not " arise out of the same trans- 
 action, "^nor are they " connected with the 
 same su!)ject of action." Hay v. Haj^ 13 
 Hun, 315; French v. Salter, 17 id. 546; 
 Douglas Cy. Sup., 38 Wis. 179; Ogdens- 
 burgh & L."C. R. Co. v. Vt. & Can. R. Co., 
 63 N. Y. 176 (meaning of " subject-matter 
 of the action "). 
 
 - Brewer v. Temple, 15 How. Pr. 286 ; 
 Harris v. Avery, 5 Ivans. 146 The first 
 of these was a special term decision, and 
 is expressly overruled in Anderson v. Hill. 
 I quote from the opinion in the other as 
 an example of the argument on the other 
 side of the question. The defendant had 
 wrongfully arrested the plaintiff, and at 
 the same time called him a thief. The 
 court say : " We think that these facts 
 constitute only one transaction. . . . Our 
 code has abolished all cummon-law forms 
 of action, and has established a system 
 for the joinder of actions more philo- 
 sophical and complete in itself. It fol- 
 lows the rules of equity more closely than 
 it does those of the common law, one 
 object seeming to be to avcjid the multi- 
 plicity of actions, and to settle in one suit 
 as eijuity did, as far as practicable, the 
 whole subject-matter of a controversy. It 
 
 is probably true that the two causes of 
 action for assault and battery and for 
 slander cannot, under our code, be united, 
 unless both arise out of the same trans- 
 action ; but we do not know any reason 
 why they should not be united when both 
 do arise out of the same transaction." 
 The court here simply assumes that both 
 causes of action did arise out of the same 
 transaction, but does not venture upon 
 any reasons for that opinion. The deci- 
 sion is a mere begiring of the question. 
 
 [Benton v. Collins (1896), 118 X. C. 
 196, 24 S E. 122. In this case a cause of 
 action for assault and batterv and an 
 equitable cause of action to set aside a 
 deed alleged to have been fraudulently 
 executed to defeat plaintiff in the collec- 
 tion of his claim for damages for the 
 assault, were held to be properly joined 
 in the same complaint See also Ferst's 
 Sons V. Powers (1900), 58 S C 398. 36 
 S E. 744. in which it is held that a legal 
 cause of action for goods sold and de- 
 livered may be joined with an equitable 
 cause of action to set aside a sale of a 
 .stock of goods as a fraud upon creditors. 
 See also Eudress i\ Shove (1901 ), 110 Wis. 
 1.33, 85 N. W. 653, to the effect that "a 
 cause of action to enforce a mortgage, and 
 one to recover on the personal liability 
 of the mortgagor, grow out of the same 
 transaction and are connected with the 
 same subject tliereof, hente may be joined 
 under the statute on that subject regard- 
 less of the statutory provision for defi- 
 ciency judgments in foreclosure cases, 
 provided no one other than the debtor is 
 made a defendant and the two causes of 
 action are separately stated. "J
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 4S3 
 
 tions respecting the quality and condition of the horse made at 
 the same sale, the plaintiff claiming that both causes of action 
 arose out of the same transaction. The court said : " It is some- 
 w liat dil'licult to determine the precise extent and boundaries of 
 tlie first subdivision of § 167 of the code, which provides for the 
 joinder of causes of action where they arise out of the same trans- 
 action or transactions connected with the same subject of action. 
 In this case the plaintiff first counts in assumpsit on an alleged 
 warranty of the horse, and in the second count for fraud and de- 
 ceit in wrongfully concealing the defects of the same horse. It 
 may be true that these causes of action arise out of the same 
 transaction, to wit, the bargain for the purchase of the horse ; but 
 are they connected with the same subject of action ? The subject 
 of the action is either the contract of warranty, or it is the fraud- 
 ulent concealment of the defects complained of. These causes of 
 action cannot consist with each other. I am inclined to think 
 that the object of the section was to allow the plaintiff to include 
 in his complaint two or more causes of action actually existing, 
 arising out of the same transaction, and when a recovery might 
 be had for both in the same action ; and that the joinder must be 
 of those - causes of action which are consistent with, not those 
 which are contradictory to, each other." ^ The judge here fell 
 into at least one palpable error and misreading of the statute. If 
 the causes of action arise out of the same transaction, it is not 
 necessary that they should also be connected with the same sub- 
 ject of action. There are two alternatives: first, the causes of 
 action must arise out of the same transaction, that is, one trans- 
 action , or, secondly^ they must arise out of transactions which are 
 themselves connected with the same subject of action. When it 
 was conceded by the learned judge that the two causes of action 
 in this case arose out of the same transaction, namely, the bargain 
 for the sale of the horse, he had no room for further argument; 
 the case was practically decided. The real question was, whether 
 they did in fact arise out of the same transaction ; whether the 
 negotiation preceding the sale ivas the "transaction " within the 
 legal meaning of the provision. The rule laid down at the end of 
 
 ^ Sweet V. Ingerson, 12 How. Pr. 331, stood that a vendor cannot enter into a 
 
 per Bacon J. What inconsistency exists contract of warranty, and also make false 
 
 between these two causes of action ? representations at the same sale and in 
 
 Does the learned judge mean to be under- llic Kdine langiuvje?
 
 484 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 the citation affords no help in solving the difficulty, if indeed it 
 has any meaning whatever. 
 
 § 362. *4:68. Same Subject. In a case where the defendants — 
 common carriers — had carried a quantity of wheat of the plain- 
 tiffs on their boats from Buffalo to New York, the complaint 
 separately stated two causes of action. The first alleged a 
 wrongful conversion of 340 bushels of wheat, and demanded 
 judgment for their value, as damages ; the second alleged an 
 overpayment of freight on the shipment to the amount of il70, 
 and demanded judgment for that sum. In passing upon the 
 question raised by the defendants' demurrer, the court said : " It 
 must be admitted that the first cause of action is for a tort, and 
 that the second is on an implied contract to recover back money 
 paid by plaintiffs under a mistake of facts. But the counsel for 
 the plaintiffs insists that both causes of action arise out of the 
 same subject of action, viz. the transportation of wheat from Buf- 
 falo to New York, or arise out of transactions connected %vith that 
 subject of the action, and are therefore joined under the first sub- 
 division of § 167 of the code. Cases throw but little light on 
 the unmeaning generality of the first subdivision of this section. 
 Now, I do not think the transportation of the wheat to New York 
 is the subject of the plaintiffs' action. The plaintiffs have two 
 causes of action. The subject of the first would be the loss, 
 waste, or wrongful conversion of the 340 bushels of wheat by the 
 defendants, and their wrongful neglect or act by which the plain- 
 tiffs lost their property. The subject of the second cause of action 
 would appear to be the 8170 of the plaintiffs' money, which the 
 plaintiffs overpaid to the defendants on account of freight, and 
 which the defendants ought to have paid back to the plaintiff's. 
 But have both these causes of action, or subjects of action, arisen 
 out of the same transaction, within the meaning of this provision 
 of the code ? I do not want to nullify the code, and I have no 
 right to nullify it ; and this provision has, or was intended to 
 have, some meaning. Why, then, should I not saj^ that the trans- 
 action in this case, out of which have arisen the plaintiffs' two 
 cau.ses of action, and subjects of action, commenced witli the ship- 
 ment of wheat at Buffalo, and has not ended yet, even by the 
 commencement of this action ; the plaintiffs' two causes of action 
 being links in tiie chain of facts containing tlie transaction, and 
 thus arising out of, or connected with, the same transaction ? By
 
 JOIXDKR OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 485 
 
 the ' subject of action' in this section of the code must be intended, 
 not the subjects of the different counts, or of the several causes of 
 action, but of the action as a unit. To say that by the ' subject 
 of action ' is meant the several causes of action nullifies this pro- 
 vision of the code. To give force and effect to it, it appears to 
 me you must say that it means that the plaintiffs can unite several 
 causes of action against the same party, arising out of the same 
 transaction, and nothing more ; and you must treat the concluding 
 words, ' or transactions connected with the same subject of action,' 
 as useless and unmeaning surplusage. Upon the Avhole, I have 
 come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs had a right to unite the 
 two causes of action in this complaint ; but I have done so, know- 
 ing that no reasoning on this point can have much logical pre- 
 cision, or lead to a satisfactory result." ^ 
 
 § 363. * 469. Same Subject. This opinion, which I have quoted 
 in full, is one of the most elaborate attempts to be found in the 
 repo)'ts at an analysis and definition of these terms. Some obser- 
 vations upon it are appropriate here, before passing to the other 
 citations. It is plain that the learned judge labored under a hope- 
 less confusion, both in respect to his notions of the meaning of 
 the important terms, ancl in respect to his reading of the clause 
 itself. He is completely afloat as to the legal import of "subject 
 of action," constantly treating it interchangeably with "transac- 
 tion," and, notwithstanding his disclaimer, confounding it with 
 "cause of action." Why, in the one case, is the "subject of 
 action " declared to be the conversion of the wheat, the wrongful 
 act or neglect by which tlie wheat was lost to the plaintiffs, — 
 that is, the very delict committed by the defendant, and in the 
 other case declared to be the ononey^ — the very physical thing 
 which the plaintiffs had mistakenly paid to the defendants, and 
 which the defendants were under an implied contract to repay ? 
 It is self-evident that, if by the term " subject of action " is meant 
 the delict or wrong by which the plaintiffs' primary right of prop- 
 erty in their wheat was invaded, it must also mean the wrrong in 
 the other case, — - that is, the breach of the implied contract to 
 repay the money; ancl if it denotes, in the one instance, the 
 money which is the subject of the plaintiffs' claim, it must denote 
 the same in the other. But the great error of the learned judge 
 consists in his mistaken reading of the statute. The view of the 
 
 1 Adams v. Bissell, 28 Barb. 382, 385, per Sutherland J.
 
 486 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 plaintiffs' counsel, which he repudiates, was certainly simple and 
 intelligible. That view regarded both causes of action as arising 
 out of one and the same transaction, — the transport of the grain, 
 with all of its incidents. After rejecting it, the judge, in fact, 
 returns to this theory at last, and rests his decision u[)on it. In 
 his discussion, however, he reverses the order of the statute ; he 
 treats it as though it required the " subjects of action " to be con- 
 nected with one "transaction," instead of prescribing that the 
 " transactions "' should be connected with the same " subject of 
 action ; " and, finding that this construction leads him into diffi- 
 culties from which there is no escape, he finally pronounces the 
 important clause of the section useless surplusage, to be entirely 
 rejected. I need hardly say that courts have no authority to 
 reject any portion of a statute, unless it be absolutely meaning- 
 less. This clause is certainly not thus without meaning. Causes 
 of action may arise from the same transaction, and they may arise 
 from transactions which are connected with the same subject of 
 action, — that is, which have a common point of connection witli 
 which they are all united, and whicli common point is the subject 
 of the action. This, I say, is far from meaningless ; on the con- 
 trary, it is a simple and plain expression, as far as the language 
 is concerned, when that language is used in its oixiinaiy and pop- 
 ular signification. The difficulty, and the only difficulty, springs 
 from the question, whether the words are thus used in their proper 
 sense, or whether they must receive a special and technical legal 
 inteipretation in order to amve at the legislative intent, and to 
 frame from them a definite rule which shall be applicable to all 
 possible cases. It is an abuse of judicial power to reject an 
 express provision of a statute on the sole ground of a difficulty 
 in understanding and enforcing it. 
 
 § 364. * 470. Same Subject. In an action by a judgment cred- 
 itor against his debtor and an assignee of such debtor to set aside 
 transfers, to recover propert}', and for other relief, it was said b}* 
 the court: " What is the subject of the action in this case? It is 
 the restitution of the propert}-- of the judgment debtor, whom the 
 plaintiff represents. To entitle himself to this rehef, the plaintiff 
 avers in liis complaint different transactions out of which his riglit 
 to a restitution flows." ^ There is here a plain cfmfusion of ideas. 
 The restitution of the debtor's property, which is the relief de- 
 
 1 Paleii V. Buslincll, 40 B.irlj. 24.
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 487 
 
 manded, is the object of the action. If there is anything con- 
 nected with this matter clear,, it is that the authors of the code 
 used the terms "subject of action" and "object of the action" to 
 describe different and distinct facts. 
 
 § 365. *4T1. Jones v. Steamship Cortes. The general theory 
 of pleading and of actions embodied in the new system was stated 
 with some fulness by the Supreme Court of California, in an 
 action brought against a steamboat company by a passenger to 
 recover damages. The plaintiff had purchased a ticket from San 
 Francisco to San Juan, being led to believe, by public advertise- 
 ments of the defendants, that the vessel landed at the latter place. 
 She was carried on to Panama, the boat not stopping at San Juan, 
 and was subjected to many personal discomforts and injuries, and 
 also suffered consequential pecuniary losses and damage. The 
 complaint was in the form of an action for deceit, rather than 
 on the contract, and contained allegations of false and fraudulent 
 representations. In respect to this complaint, the court pronounced 
 the following opinion : " Our system of pleadiiig is foi'med upoJi 
 the model of the civil law, and one of its principal objects is to 
 discourage protracted and vexatious litigation. It is the duty of 
 the courts to assist as far as possible in the accomplishment of this 
 object, and it should not be frittered away by the application of 
 rules Avhieh have no legitimate connection with the system. The 
 provisions for avoiding a multiplicity of suits are to be liberall}' 
 and beneficially construed ; and we see no reason why all matters 
 arising from, and constituting part of, the same transaction, should 
 not be litigated and determined in the same action. Causes of 
 complaint differing in their nature, and having no connection with 
 each other, cannot be united ; but the object of this rule is to 
 prevent the confusien and emljarrassment which would necessarily 
 result from the union of diverse and incongruous matters, and it 
 has no application to a case embracing a variety of circumstances, 
 so connected as to constitute but one transaction. . . . Every 
 action under our practice may be properly termed an action on 
 the case ; and it would seem that every ground of relief which 
 can be regarded as a part of the case may with propriety be in- 
 cluded in the action. . . . The plaintiffs have brought their suit 
 upon the whole case to recover damages, not only for the breach 
 of the contract, but for the wrongs and injuries committed by the 
 owners and agents of the defendants in that connection. The
 
 488 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 defendants are liable for all the damages resulting from these 
 causes ; and there is certainly no impropriety in adjusting the 
 whole matter in one controversy." ^ The section found in all the 
 codes defining a " counter-claim " contains the expressions " trans- 
 action " and " connected with the subject of action," used in the 
 same sense as in the passage now under consideration. In a few 
 of the decisions which have been based upon that section, there is 
 some approach towards a general interpretation of these phrases. 
 The cases are collected in the succeeding chapter, in the section 
 which treats of the counter-claim, and may be consulted for what- 
 ever light they throw upon tlic present discussion. 
 
 § 366. * 472. Observations of the Author. Two Alternatives. 
 It is plain that little real help can be obtained from the foregoing 
 judicial explanations, and we must return to the very language of 
 the statute itself. This language must be caiefuUy studied, and 
 the proper force and effect given to all its words. In order that 
 different causes of action may be united, they must arise out of a 
 transaction, or out of transactions. Nothing is said about their 
 being connected with or arising out of the same "subject of 
 action." There are two alternatives only : First, these different 
 causes of action may arise out of the same transaction, — that is, 
 out of one ; or, secondly, they may arise out of different transac- 
 tions ; but in that case these transactions must be connected with 
 the same '• subject of action." The words " arise out of " are 
 important and em]^hatic. They indicate a sequence of cause and 
 effect, so that the causes of action must result as consequences 
 from, or be produced by, the transactions. It is plain that there 
 must be a close connection between the transaction, as the origin, 
 and the causes of action, as the products. 
 
 § 367. * 473. Meaning of " Transaction." " Transaction " is de- 
 fined by Worcester as " the act of transacting or conducting any 
 business; negotiation; management; a proceeding." We must 
 recur to the definition of cause of action already given. It in- 
 cludes the plaintiff's primary right which has been invaded, and 
 the wrongful act or defaidt — the delict — of the defendant by 
 wliich the right is broken. In oider that causes of action may 
 arise out of a transaction, tliere must therefore be a negotiation, 
 or a proceeding, or a conduct of business, between the parties, of 
 such a nature that it produces, as necessary results, two or more 
 
 1 .Joiie.s V. Stcain.sliip Cortes, 17 Cal. 487, 497, por Cope -J.
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 489 
 
 different primary rights in favor of the plaintiff, and wrongs done 
 by the defendant wliich are violations of sneh rights. The pro- 
 ceeding, or negotiation, or conduct of business, must, of course, 
 be a unit, one affair, or else it would not be a single transaction ; 
 and yet it must be in its nature complex, for it must be the origin 
 of two or more separate primary rights, and of the wrongs which 
 violate them. In order that tliis may be so, the facts from 
 which the different primary rights flow must he parts of^ or stejjs 
 in, the transaction ; and, for the same reason, the wrongful acts 
 or omissions of the defendant must be parts of the same transac- 
 tion. If a single transaction — that is, a single, continuous, and 
 complex proceeding, or negotiation, between the parties — is 
 analyzed and reduced into its series of acts and defaults, and some 
 of these acts are the facts from which spring one primary right 
 in favor of the plaintiff, and other acts are the facts from which 
 spring a different primary right in his favor, and others still are 
 the violations or breaches of these rights, these two causes of 
 action do truly arise out of the same transaction. 
 
 § 368. * 474. Same Subject. It is clear that every event affect- 
 ing two persons is not necessarily a " transaction " within the 
 meaning of the statute ; indeed, the word as used in common 
 speech has no such signification. " Transaction " implies mutu- 
 ality, something done by both in concert, in which each takes 
 some part. Much less can it be said that, because two events 
 occur to the same persons at the same time, they are necessarily so 
 connected as to become one transaction. The case cited above, 
 in which a cause of action for an assault and battery and one for 
 a slander were united, illustrates this statement. Two events 
 happened simultaneously, the beating and the defamation, but 
 neither was a "transaction" in any proper sense of the word. 
 The wrong which formed a part of one cause of action was the 
 beating ; that which formed a part of the other was the malicious 
 speaking. The plaintiff's primary rights which previously existed 
 were broken by two independent and different wrongs. The only 
 common point between the causes of action was one of time ; but 
 this unity of time Avas certainly not a " transaction." ^ Much of 
 
 1 [^See De Wolfe v. Abraham (189G), the presence and hearing of a large nuni- 
 
 151 N. Y. 186, 45 N.E. 455, in which "the her of people, the defendants, through 
 
 plaintiff sued the defendants, merchants their lawful agents, charged plaintiff 
 
 in the city of Brooklyn, for slander, alleg- with theft, in that she had stolen from 
 
 ing that at their place of business, and in them a certain ring. The ])laintiff's
 
 490 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIKS. 
 
 the difficulty in construing this Language has resulted, I think, 
 from a failure to apprehend the true nature of a " cause of action," 
 from a forgetfulness that it includes two factors, — the primary 
 
 counsel, in opening the case to the jury, 
 stated that the alleged slander was not 
 uttered by the defendants, or either of 
 them, but by a clerk or salesman in their 
 employ ; that plaintiff, at the time of tlie 
 slander, was falsely imjjrisoned by a de- 
 tective of defendants, and that slie sought 
 to recover damages for false impris- 
 onment and the slander. Thereupon 
 the counsel for the defendants moved 
 upon the complaint and the opening 
 for a dismissal upon the ground that 
 the defendants were not liable for the 
 slander of their clerk, and that the com- 
 plaint was solely for slander. This 
 motion was denied and the plaintiff was 
 allowed to withdraw a juror for the pur- 
 pose of applying to the Special Term for 
 leave to amend her complaint, so as to 
 allege a cause of at'tion for false imprison- 
 ment against the defendants. A motion 
 ■was accordingly made at Special Term, 
 and the justice ])residing held that the 
 proposed amended complaint contained a 
 union of the causes of action for slan- 
 der and false imprisonment, and denied 
 the motion. On aj)])eal the Appellate 
 Division reversed the order of the 
 Special Term and allowed the amend- 
 ment, hohling that ' injury at the same 
 time to the jiersou by physical violence 
 and to the character by language may 
 well be regarded as parts of a single 
 tort.'" The question presented to the 
 Court of Appeals was " whether under all 
 the circumstances of tlie case the plaintiff 
 should have been allowed to amend her 
 complaint for slander by adding thereto 
 the statement of a cau.se of action for 
 false imprisonment." lu reversing the 
 order appealed from the Court of Appeals, 
 among other tilings, said : " We are 
 unable to agree with the conclusion 
 reached by the learned Appellate Division 
 that injury at the same time to the jjer- 
 son by physical violence and to the 
 character by language may well be 
 regarded as parts of a single tort. We 
 think to so hold is to ignore a distinction 
 that exists in all jurisdictions where the 
 
 common law is administered. It is not 
 necessary, however, to examine pre- 
 cedents, as the Code of Civil Procedure 
 (§ 484) is decisive of this appeal." After 
 stating the provisions of this section of 
 the code ttie court proceeds: "It thus 
 apjjears that the legislature has indicated 
 with great clearness and j)articularity the 
 causes of action that may i)e united in the 
 same complaint. The test is very simple, 
 as all causes of action united must belong 
 to the same subdivision of the section we 
 are considering. False imprisonment is 
 an injury to the person and is embraced 
 within subdivision 2, while slander is in 
 express tern)s excluded therefrom and 
 ])laced in subdivision 3. The plaintiff's 
 case is not aided by subdivision 9 of the 
 section, which provides for uniting causes 
 of action upon claims arising out of the 
 same transaction. It does not follow that 
 two causes of action, originating at the 
 same time, arose as matter of law out of 
 the same transaction, or are proved l)y 
 the same evidence (Anderson i". Hill, 5-3 
 Barb. 24.5, 246). In tlie case cited the 
 General Term of the Supreme Court held 
 that causes of action for assault and bat- 
 tery and slander could not be united in 
 the same complaint." Here the court 
 quotes the text commenting upon the case 
 of Anderson i'. Hill cited in the opinion 
 and concludes as follows : " The separate 
 and distinct nature of the causes of action 
 of false imprisonment and slander are 
 apparent when we apply the test under 
 the circumstances of the case at bar, 
 whether the same evidence would prove 
 the plaintiff's case. It is obvious that it 
 would not ; in the action for false impris- 
 onment plaintiff must show an unlawful 
 arrest and detention ; in the action for 
 slander the proof would be the uttering of 
 the slander in the ])resence of others, its 
 falsity, if justified, and extrinsic evi- 
 dence of malice if any existed. Tlie 
 measure and proof of damages in the two 
 causes of actiou would be entirely dif- 
 ferent."]
 
 joindp:r of causes of action. 
 
 491 
 
 right and the wrong which invades it. A " cause of action " can- 
 not be said to " arise out of " an event, when the event produces 
 or contains but one of these factors, — the deUct or wrongful 
 act.^ 
 
 1 rjUeaning of the Term "Transac- 
 tion." 
 
 Gutzman v. Clancy (1902), lU Wis- 
 589, 90 N. W. 1081, holds that the word 
 " transaction," in the statute, is broad 
 enough to include an entire, continuous 
 physical encounter ; Gilbert r. Loberg 
 (1894), 8.6 Wis. 661, 57 N. W. 982; Story 
 & Isham'c. Co. v. Story (1893), 100 Cal. 
 30. -M Pac. 671, quoting the author. In 
 Kuapp v. Walker (1900), 73 Conn. 459, 47 
 Atl. es."), the court said : " The complaint 
 before us, containing but one count, 
 describes a cause of action for fraud. It 
 alleges that the defendant by certain 
 false and fraudulent representations, 
 which are set forth, induced the plaintiff 
 to ])art with his horse of the value of 
 $100. It also describes a cause of action 
 for breach of contract. It alleges that 
 the defendant failed to perform his agree- 
 ment to deliver a certain gray mare in 
 exchange for the horse vi^hich he had 
 received from the plaintiff. Tiie dealings 
 between the plaintiff and defendant with 
 reference to an exchange of horses was the 
 transaction out of which both the alleged 
 causes of action arose, and a st:iteuient of 
 all the claimed facts of the entire trans- 
 action therefore involved a statement of 
 both of said causes of action." 
 
 In Craft Refrigerating Machine Co. 
 v. Quinni])iac Brewing Co. (1893), 63 
 Conn. 551, 29 Atl. 76, the court said : 
 " As the word is employed in American 
 codes of pleading and in our own Prac- 
 tice Act, a transaction is something wliich 
 has taken place whereby a cause of action 
 has arisen. It miist therefore consist of 
 an act or agreement, or several acts or 
 agreements having some connection with 
 each other, in which more than one per- 
 son is concerned, and by which the legal 
 relations of such persons between them- 
 selves are altered. The transaction be- 
 tween the parties to the present action 
 began when they made the contract for 
 the manufacture and sale of the two 
 machines. Then followed the delivery of 
 the machines, the refusal to accept them. 
 
 the attempt of the plaintiff to retake 
 them, the forcible prevention of their 
 removal, and the subsequent continuance 
 of their use in the defendant's business. 
 Without taking each aiul all of these 
 events into consideration, the legal rela- 
 tions of the parties could not be fully 
 determined. From the delivery of tlie 
 machines to the commencement of the 
 action, they had remained continuously in 
 the defendant's possession. It had simply 
 dealt with them in a different way at dif- 
 ferent times. The l^ractice Act is to be 
 ' favorably and liberally construed as a 
 remedial statute.' ... It has taken the 
 word transaction, not out of any legal 
 vocabulary of technical terms, but from 
 the common speech of men. So far as we 
 are aware it has never been the subject 
 of any exact judicial definition. It is 
 therefore to he construed as men com 
 monly understand it, when applied, as in 
 our Practice Act it certainly is applied, 
 ... to any dealings between the 
 parties, resulting in wrongs, without 
 regard to whetlier tiie wrong be done by 
 violence, neglect, or breach of contract. 
 It seems to us hardly to be doubted that 
 any ordinary man would consider every- 
 thing stated in the complaint as ])roperly 
 belonging to a narrative of the whole 
 transaction between the parties, and 
 necessary for the information of one who 
 was to form a judgment as to their 
 respective rights. That a broader mean- 
 ing should be given to the term ' trans- 
 action' than it has received in some of the 
 courts of our sister States, is plain from 
 the provision in the Practice BooJ;, . . . 
 that 'where several torts are connnit- 
 tcd simultaneously against the j)laiiitiff 
 (as a battery accompanied by slanderous, 
 words) they may be joined as causes of 
 action arising out of the same transaction, 
 notwithstanding they may belong to dif- 
 ferent classes of action.' This was the 
 deliberate adoption of a view of the mean- 
 ing of the word in question which had 
 been previously disapproved in New York, 
 as well as by Judge Bliss in his treatise on
 
 492 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 369. * 475. Meaning of "Subject of Action." The same analysis 
 applies also to the remaining portion of the clause, the sole cliff er- 
 ence being that the causes of action arise out of different trans- 
 actions instead of one. The common tie between the causes 
 of action in that case is, that the transactions themselves are 
 connected v/ith the same " subject of action." What is meant 
 bv this term? It cannot be synonymous with "cause of action." 
 This appears from making the substitution, since the result would 
 be, " causes of action may be united when they arise out of trans- 
 actions connected with the same cause of action ; " which is an 
 absurdity, a mere statement in a circle. " Subject of action " 
 must, therefore, be something different from "cause of action." 
 It is also different from " object of the action," The object of 
 the action is the thing sought to be attained by the action, the 
 remedy demanded and finally awarded to the plaintiff. Causes 
 of action cannot arise out of transactions connected with the 
 " object of the action," because that object is something in the 
 future, and could have had no being when the transactions took 
 place out of which the causes of action arose. As the causes of 
 action arise out of certain transactions, and as these transactions 
 are connected with a " subject of action," it is plain that this sub- 
 ject must be in existence simultaneously with the transactions 
 themselves, and prior to the time when the causes of action com- 
 mence. This fact also shows that the " subject " must be some- 
 thing other than the cause of action. The phrase was not used 
 in legal terminology prior to the code, but another one very 
 similar to it was in constant use, and had acquired a well-defined 
 meaning ; namely, " subject-matter of the action.'''' Thus the rule 
 is familiar, that courts must have jurisdiction of " the subject- 
 matter of the action," as well as over the parties. Courts might 
 have the power in a proper case to grant any kind of relief, legal 
 or equitable, and to entertain any form of proceeding, and yet 
 not have jurisdiction over some particular " subject-matter." The 
 term "subject of action," found in the code in this and one or 
 two other sections, was doubtless employed by its authors and the 
 legislature as synonymous with, or rather in the place of, " subject- 
 matter of the action." I can conceive of no other interpretation 
 
 Code Pleading (§125), though accepted See also McHard v. Williams (1S96), 8 
 in Kansai?. Anderson v. Hill, .5.3 Barb. S. D. 381, 66 N. W. 930.3 
 23S, 245; Harris f. Avery, 5 Kans. 146."
 
 JOIXDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 
 
 493 
 
 which will apply to the phrase and meet all the requirements of 
 the context. " Subject-matter of the action " is not the " cause 
 of action," nor the " object of the action." It rather describes the 
 physical facts, the things real or personal, the money, lands, chat- 
 tels, and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted. It 
 is possible, therefore, that several different " transactions " should 
 have a connection with this " subject-matter," or, what seems to me 
 to be the same thing, with this " subject of action. " The whole 
 passage is, at best, a difficult one to construe in such a manner 
 that any explicit and definite rule can be extracted from it.^ I 
 remark, in bringing this analysis of the language to a close, that 
 the latter clause of the subdivision — "or transactions connected 
 with the same subject of action " — can probably have no applica- 
 
 1 [^Meaning of the Term " Subject 
 of Action.^'' 
 
 Ill Box V. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. 
 
 (1899), 107 la. 660, 78 N. W. 964, the 
 court quotes as follows from Rodgers v. 
 Association, 17 S. C. 406: "What is a 
 cause of action 1 We must keep in view 
 the difference between the subject of the 
 action and the cause of the action. The 
 subject of the action was what was for- 
 merly understood as the subject-matter 
 of the action." See Adkins v. Loucks 
 (1900), 107 Wis. .587, 83 N. W. 9.34; Jor- 
 dan V. Estate of Warner (1900), 107 Wis. 
 5.39, 8.3 N. W. 946 ; Foster v. Posson 
 (1899), 105 Wis. 99, 81 N. W. 123. In 
 Zinc Carbonate Co. v. First National Bank 
 of Shullsburg (1899), 103 Wis. 125, 79 
 N. W. 229, the court said : " There is 
 but one subject of action, — the conspir- 
 acy to defraud and its consummation to 
 the damage of plaintiff. All the allega- 
 tions of fact are parts of the presentation 
 of that one subject." Dinau v. Coneys 
 (1894), 143 N. Y. 544, 38 N. E. 715: 
 " The subject-matter of the plaintiff's ac- 
 tion w<as the alleged right of possession of 
 the land sought to be recovered. The 
 subject-matter of the counter-claim was the 
 right to recover against the plaintiff 
 the amount of the legacy, and also . . . 
 the right to relief by sale of the land for 
 its payment." Ponca Mill Co. v. Mikesell 
 (1898), 55 Neb. 98, 75 N. W. 46: "An- 
 other ground of demurrer was that two 
 causes of action are improperly joined. 
 
 This is because the plaintiff alleged the 
 proceedings to set aside the conveyance to 
 Jordan and the lien re.sulting to himself, 
 and prayed a foreclosure. The Code of Civil 
 Procedure provides (sec. 87) that the plain- 
 tiff may u«ite several causes of action relat- 
 ing to ' the same transaction or transactions 
 connected with the same subject of action.' 
 The vagueness of tliat language has 
 caused the profession much difficulty ; but 
 the facts out of which the lieu arose em- 
 brace a part of the fraudulent conduct 
 justifying interposition through a receiver- 
 ship; they resulted in giving plaintiff a 
 special interest aside from that of a stock- 
 holder, and it would certainly seem that 
 the language quoted is I)road enough to 
 cover such a state of facts." McHard v. 
 Williams (1896), 8 S. D. 381. 66 N. W. 
 930. In Craft Refrigerating Machine 
 Co. V. Quinuipiac Brewing Co. (1893), 63 
 Conn. 551, 29 Atl. 76, it is said : "It fol- 
 lows that both the causes of action were 
 properly united in the same complaint. 
 The same result would also be reached 
 if what we have viewed as one transaction 
 could be regarded as consisting of several 
 transactions, since such would all be con- 
 nected with the same subject of action, 
 that is, the two machines and the title to 
 them;" Daniels ;•. Fowler (1897), 120 
 N. C. 14, 26 S. E. 635 ; Solomon v. Bates 
 (1896), 118 N. C. 311, 24 S. E. 746: 
 " There is the same ' subject of action ' 
 throughout, i. e. the plaintiff's lo.ss of his 
 deposit. "3
 
 494 
 
 CIVIL EEMEDIES. 
 
 tion to legal causes of action, and can only be resorted to in prac- 
 tice as describing some equitable suits which involve extremely 
 complicated matters. In fact, Mr. Justice Comstock's position is 
 doubtless correct, that the entire subdivision finds its primary and 
 by far most important application to equitable rather than to legal 
 proceedings.^ 
 
 § 370. * 476. Examples of Causes of Action Held to have arisen 
 out of the same Transaction. Althougli the courts have generally 
 refrained from any discussion of this clause, they have had 
 frequent occasion to invoke its aid ; and the following cases will 
 furnish some examples of judicial decisions based upon it.'- The 
 causes of action united in the same complaint or petition were 
 held to have arisen out of , the same transaction, where one was 
 for the recovery of the possession of land, and the other was for 
 the value of its occupation by the defendant ; ^ for an accounting 
 and payment of the bahance found due, and for the surrender up 
 of securities ; * for injuries to the person and for those to the 
 
 ^ In support of the interpretation of 
 the phrase " suhject of the action," sug- 
 gested by the text, namely, that it " de- 
 scribes the physical facts, the tilings real 
 or personal, the money,- lauds, chattels, 
 and the like, in relation to which the suit 
 is prosecuted," see Holmes v. Abbott, 
 53 Hun, 617, 6 N. Y. Suppl. 943. A 
 cause of action entitling to injunction 
 and damages for continuous interference 
 with rights of pn^perty by the mainte- 
 nance and operation of a steam railn^ad 
 in a highway may be united with a tdaim 
 for damages for personal injuries suffered 
 by the plaintiff while driving along the 
 highway in conseiiuence of his horses be- 
 ing frightened l)y the noise of a passing 
 engine and train ; since both claims are 
 " connected with the same subject of ac- 
 tion," wliicli in this case is the unlawful 
 obstruction of the highway by the de- 
 fendant : Lamming o. Galusha, 135 N. Y. 
 239. 
 
 2 [^Bush V. Froelick (1896), 8 S. D.353, 
 66 N. W. 939. " Under Comp. Laws, sec. 
 4932, authorizing the joinder of causes of 
 action arising out of ' the same transac- 
 tion, or transactions connected with the 
 same subject of action,' the holder of a 
 note secured by a trust deed may in one 
 action seek to f<jrecloso the trust deed, to 
 »et aside a prior foreclosure made by the 
 
 trustee without plaintiff's knowledge or 
 consent, to enjoin the county treasurer 
 from issuing to the trustee a tax deed for 
 the mortgaged premises, ami to adjust the 
 equities of the various parties." Dinges 
 V. Riggs (1895), 43 Neb. 710, 62 N. W. 74; 
 for malicious prosecution, for damage to 
 plaintiff's business by arresting occupants 
 of iier place of business, and for slander. 
 Maldaner v. Beurhaus (1900), 108 Wis. 
 25, 84 N. W. 25 ; Alliance Elevator Co. v. 
 Wells (1896), 93 Wis. 5, 66 X. W. 796: 
 one count alleged the withholding of 
 premises wrongfully after expiration of 
 lease therefor; the other count, that cer- 
 tain ]iersonal property, that by the terms 
 of' the lease defendant was entitled to the 
 use of, had been converted. Held, upon 
 demurrer for improper joinder of causes, 
 that both causes arose out of the same 
 transaction or transactions connected with 
 the same subject of action. Porter v. In- 
 ternational Bridge Co. (1900), 163 N. Y. 
 79, 57 N. K. 174; Scott v. Flowers (1900), 
 60 Neb. 675, 84 N. W. 81, a cause of ac- 
 tion for false imprisonment joined with a 
 count for malicious jtrosecution.] 
 
 3 Armstrong ;;. Hinds, 8 Minn. 254. 
 See Larned v. Hudson, 57 N. Y. 151 ; 
 also fiost, § * 494, and note. 
 
 * Montgomery v. McEwen, 7 Minn. 
 351.
 
 JOINDEE OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 495 
 
 property of a passenger, coinmitted by tlie wrongful acts and 
 frauds of a steamboat company on the same voyage ; ^ where the 
 owner of stereotype plates of a book alleged a breach of defend- 
 ant's contract to furnish paper and print a book therefrom, and 
 also injuries negligently done to the plates themselves while in 
 the defendant's possession ; ^ detaining the plaintiff's chattels, and 
 wrongfully and negligently injuring tliem wliile thus detained ; ^ an 
 action by a judgment creditor against his debtor and another to 
 recover back money wrongfully paid as usury to such person by 
 the debtor, to compel this assignee to account for actual securities 
 placed in his hands by the debtor, and to set aside certain trans- 
 fers of personal property made by the debtor ; * an action in 
 which the plaintiff sought to recover the agreed price in a con- 
 tract for building a house, damages caused by the defendant's 
 delay to have the premises read}- in time for the work to go on, 
 and the price of extra work and materials, and finally to set aside, 
 on the ground of fraud, an award made in reference to certain of 
 the matters in dispute ; ^ an action to recover damages for the 
 conversion of goods by the defendant, a common carrier, and to 
 recover back money mistakenly paid as freight for the same 
 goods ; ^ where lands incumbered by an outstanding mortgage 
 had been conveyed by a warranty deed, and the grantee therein 
 brought an action against the grantor and the holder of the 
 mortgage, and prayed a judgment fixing the amount cUie upon 
 the mortgage, if anj, and directing the same to be delivered up 
 and cancelled upon payment hy the plaintiff of tlie amount so 
 ascertained, and ordering the grantor thereupon to repay that sum 
 to the plaintiff ; "* action against a constable and the sureties upon 
 his official bond, alleging the issue of an execution to such officer 
 and a levy by him upon propei'ty of the judgment debtor sufficient 
 to have made the amount due, a neglect to return the execution, 
 
 1 Jones V. Steamboat Cortes, 17 Cal. ^ Paleu r. Bushnell, 46 Barb. 24. It 
 487, 497. See, however, Graut ;■. Mc- raiglit, perhaps, have beeu better to say 
 Carty, 38 Iowa, 468. Injury to tlie per- that there was but one cause of action, 
 son and injury to tlie property of the ^ Lee v. Partridge, 2 Duer, 463. 
 ])laintiff by one negligent act of the de- •'.Adams v. Bissell, 28 Barb. 382, SS."). 
 fendant : Rosenberg i'. Staten Island Ky. " Wandle v. Turney, 5 Duer, 661. 
 Co. (Com. n. 1891), 14 N. Y. Suppl. 476. Although Bosworth J. says the causes 
 But ste Taylor v. Metropolitan El. Ry. of action all arose out of the same trans- 
 Co., .52 N. Y. Super. Ct. 299. action, yet, upon the principles already 
 
 2 Badger v. Benedict, 4 Abb. Pr. 176. stated in the text, there was actually but 
 ^ Smith r. Orser, 43 Barb. 187. one cause of action.
 
 496 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 the receipt and collection of the money, and refusal or neglect to 
 pay over the same to the plaintiff,^ ^liere the plaintiff alleged that 
 he had placed SlOO in the defendant's hands for the purpose of 
 entering an eighty-acre lot in the plaintiff's name, at the expected 
 price of SI. 25 per acre ; that the defendant thereupon entered the 
 lot in his own name, but paid therefor only SIO, and converted 
 the residue of the money to his own use ; and demanded judgment 
 for the S90 and interest, and also for a conveyance of the land to 
 himself ; ^ an action to recover a specified sum due upon a written 
 contract, and damages for the breach of certain covenants in the 
 same instrument, and also to compel the specific performance of 
 a covenant to convey land contained therein ; ^ where one cause 
 of action was for the defendant's deceit practised in the sale of 
 oil leases to the plaintiff, and the other was for money had and 
 received, being the price paid by the plaintiff in the same sales.* 
 The owner in fee of land having been induced by the defendant's 
 fraud to convey the same by a deed in which the wife joined, the 
 grantor and his wife brought a joint action to recover damages 
 for the deceit. The New York Court of Appeals held that the 
 husband had a cause of action for the loss of the land which he 
 owned in fee ; that the wife had a cause of action for the loss of 
 her inchoate dower right ; that they could recover one joint judg- 
 ment as a satisfaction for both claims ; and, finall}', that the two 
 causes of action were properly united, since they arose out of 
 the same transaction, — namely, the bargaining and sale of the 
 premises and the fraudulent representations made therein by the 
 defendant.^ Several of the cases cited in the last preceding sub- 
 
 ^ Moore v. Smith, 10 How. Pr. 361. they may be joined) ; Barr v. Shaw, 10 
 
 '■' Callaghan r. McMahan, 33 Mo. 111. Hun, 580 (causes of action for different 
 
 3 Gray v. Dougherty, 25 Cal. 266. torts may arise out of the same trans- 
 
 4 Woodbury v. Delap, 1 N. Y. S. C. action, and be joined); Young y. Young, 
 20; s. c. 65 Barb. 501. The first count 81 N. C. 91. 
 
 set out the sale and tlie deceit and the ^ Simar i;. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298, 305, 
 damages ; the others, for money had and per Folger J. The coinphiint was not 
 received, alleged that the money had been framed at all ufwn the theory which the 
 had and received by the defendant "a.s court adopted in making this decision, 
 above stated." This, it wa.s held, iucor- It did not purport to set forth two sepa- 
 porated into the latter counts the aver- rate causes of action ; it was a joint com- 
 ments of the former, and showed that all plaint, and alleged a joint cause of action 
 arose out of the same transaction. See in favor of the jjlaintiffs, and demanded 
 also Gertler v. Linscott, 26 Minn. 82 (if a a single joint judgment. The peculiar 
 cause of action on contract and one for a feature of the decision is that which sus- 
 tort arise out of the same tran.saction, or tain,-* a single judgment for one sum as 
 out of a series of connected transactions, damages in satisfaction of both demands.
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 497 
 
 division of this section might perhaps be regarded as instances 
 of causes of action arising out of the same transaction ; they cer- 
 tainly would be so if they were to be considered as embracing 
 more than one cause of action.^ 
 
 § 371. * 477. Examples of Causes of Action Held not to have 
 arisen out of the same Transaction, The following are examples 
 of causes of action contained in the same complaint or petition 
 which have been held not to arise out of the same transaction : 
 for an assault and battery and for a slander, although committed 
 simultaneously ; ^ for a breach of a warranty of soundness given 
 on the sale of a horse, and for fraudulent representations as to the 
 soundness made at the same sale ; ^ a claim by the plaintiffs as 
 next of kin and legatees of A., two of tlie defendants being A.'s 
 executors, and a claim by them as legatees of B., one of the 
 defendants being B.'s executor, the action being for an account 
 and settlement of both estates.^ 
 
 § 372. * 478. What Facts must be averred herein. When 
 the plaintiff unites two causes of action which can only be joined 
 because they arise out of the same transaction, or out of transac- 
 tions connected with the same subject of action, the facts show- 
 ing such common origin or connection must be averred, so tliat 
 the court may see whether the joinder is proper. A mere general 
 allegation that the causes of action all arose out of the same 
 transaction is of no avail, and would be surplusage.^ 
 
 although tlie case is expressly based upon tion in this case clearly arose out of the 
 
 tlie doctrine that there were separate aud same transaction ; indeed, a more illus- 
 
 distinct causes of action. Assuming that trative example could hardly be found 
 
 the court was correct in this position, among purely legal actions, 
 they plainly both arose out of the same * Viall v. Mott, 37 Barb. 208. The 
 
 transaction. Supreme Court of North Carolina, in a 
 
 1 ^ee supra, §§*459,*460,andespecially very recent case, seems to deny any opera- 
 
 Bidwell V. Astor Mat. Ins. Co., 16 N. Y. tive force whatsoever to the first clause 
 
 263; Phillips v. Gorham, 17 N. Y. 270; of the section under consideration, which, 
 
 Laub V. Buckmiller, 17 N. Y. 620; N. Y. as it occurs in the code of that State, is 
 
 Ice Co. V. N. W. Ins. Co., 23 N. Y. 3.57 ; identical with the one given in the text. 
 
 Lattin v. McCarty, 41 N. Y. 107 ; Howe Although the language used by the court 
 
 V. Peckham, 10 Barb. 6.56; Blake v. Van is only a dictum, it is a strong expression 
 
 Tilborg, 21 Wis. 672; Fish v. Berkey, 10 of opinion that no causes of action can 
 
 Minn. 199. be united by reason of that particuhir 
 
 - Anderson v. Hill, 53 Barb. 238, 24.'); provision unless they are embraced witliin 
 
 Dragoo r. Levi, 2 Duv. 520. But, per some of the other classes mentioned by 
 
 contra, see Harris v. Avery, 5 Kan. 146; tlie section. See N. C. Land Co. y. Beatty, 
 
 Brewer v. Temple, 15 How. Pr. 286. 69 N. C. 329, 334. 
 
 3 Sweet V. Ingerson, 12 Ilow. Pr. 331. ^ piynn v. Bailey, 50 Barb. 73. See 
 
 In accordance with the principles main- Woodbury i'. Delap, 1 N. Y. S. C. 20, 65 
 
 tained in the text, the two causes of ac- Barb. 501. 
 
 32
 
 498 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 V. Instances i)i which the Proper Joinder of Causes of Action is 
 connected with the Proper Joinder of Defendants ; Discussion 
 of the Provision that all the Causes of Action must affect all 
 of the Parties. 
 
 § 373. * 479. Statement of Question Examined in this Sub- 
 division. Questions relating to the uniting of causes of action 
 may be presented in two forms. In whatever one of the enumer- 
 ated classes they fall they may (1) be against the single defend- 
 ant, or the several defendants all equally liable, — perhaps jointly 
 liable. — in which case the inquiry has to do solely with the 
 joinder of the causes of action themselves, and is not concerned 
 with the joinder of the defendants ; or (2) they may be against 
 several defendants unequally and differently liable, one cause of 
 action affecting a portion of the defendants more directly and 
 substantially than it does others. In such case the inquiry has 
 to do with the joinder of the defendants as well as with the union 
 of the causes of action. I shall, in the present subdivision, ex- 
 amine the latter of these cases. It is required by all the codes 
 as a prerequisite to the uniting of different causes of action, that, 
 notwithstanding they may all belong to the same class, they must 
 affect all the parties to the action.^ The only exception men- 
 tioned in any statute is the action to foreclose a mortgage.^ 
 
 1 QHayden v. Pearce (1898), 33 Ore. (1901), 109 Wis. 366, 85 N. W. 369; 
 
 89, 52 Pac. 1049 ; The Victorian Number Hilton v. Hilton's Adm'r (1901), 110 Ky. 
 
 Two (1894), 26 Ore. 194, 41 Pac. 1103; 522, 62 S. W. 6 ; Clay ton ?■. City of HendeV- 
 
 Pretzfelder v. Merchants' Ins. Co. (1895), son (1898), 103 Ky". 228, 44 S. W. 667; 
 
 116 N. C.491, 21 S. E. 302 ; Cook i'. Smith Jamison v. Culligan (1899), 151 Mo. 410, 
 
 (1896), 119 N. C. 350, 25 S. E. 958 ; Bur- 52 S. W. 224; Kruczinski v. Neuendorf, 
 
 roll f. Hughes (1895), 116 N. C. 430, 21 99 Wi.s. 264, 74 N. W. 974 ; Anderson v. 
 
 S. E. 97i ; Barry v. VVachosky (1899), 57 Scandia Bank (1893), 53 Minn. 191, 54 
 
 Neb. 534, 77 N.' W. 1080; A. T. & S. F. N. W. 1062; Carrier v. Bernstein (1898), 
 
 md. Co. V. Comm'rsof Sumner Co. (1893), 104 la. 572, 73 N. W. 1076 ; Smith v. Day 
 
 51 Kan. 617,33 Pac. 312 ; Drapers. Brown (1901), 39 Ore. 531, 65 Pac. 1055 ; Beane 
 
 (1902), 115 Wis. 361, 91 N. W. 1001; i'. Givens (1898), 5 Idaho, 774, 51 Pac. 987 ; 
 
 Stewart v. Iloseugren (1902), — Neb. —, Insley v. Shire (189.5), 54 Kan. 793, 39 
 
 92 N. W. 586 ; State v. Krause (1897), 58 Pac. 713.^ 
 
 Kan. 651, 50 Pac. 882; Hughes r. Ilunner ^ This exception, in fact, confounds 
 
 (1895), 91 Wis. 116, 64 N. W. 887; John "relief" with "cause of action." It sim- 
 
 )i. Davis Lumber Co. v. Home Insurance jdy permits dcfen<iants to be joined against 
 
 Co. of New York (1897), 95 Wis. 542, 70 whom some .'special relief is demanded, 
 
 N. W. 84, tlie olijection tliat the causes and is therefore entirely unnecessary. In 
 
 joined do not affect all the parties to the every such suit there is only one cause 
 
 action must be raised by demurrer on that of action, unless a common-law action 
 
 ground : Blakely v. Smock (1897), 96 Wis. on the note or bond is combined with the 
 
 611,71 N. W. 1052; Egaard v. Dahlke foreclosure.
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 
 
 499 
 
 § 374. * 480. Effect of Code Provision Requiring that Causes of 
 Action Joined in one Complaint must affect all the Parties. While 
 the causes of action thus united must affect all of the parties, 
 it is not necessary that they should affect them all equally or in 
 the same manner.^ If equality and uniformity were required, a 
 large part of the equity jurisdiction would be swept away at one 
 blow ; for it is the distinguishing feature of that system that all 
 persons having any interest in the subject-matter of the contro- 
 versy or in the relief granted should be made parties, however 
 various and unequal their interests may be. Indeed, equality 
 of right or of liability was not essential in all common-law 
 actions. It was only when the proceeding was in form joint that 
 this equality was indispensable according to legal conceptions. 
 The provision of the codes has not changed any of these former 
 doctrines ; it simplj^ enacts in one statutory and comprehensive 
 
 1 Vermeule v. Beck, 1 5 How. Pr. 333. 
 Tlie fullowiug cases furnish illustrations 
 of the questions discu.ssed in this and 
 the succeeding paragraphs. Schnitzer r. 
 Cohen, 7 Hun, 665 ; Barton v. Speis, 5 
 id. 60; Nichols r. Drew, 19 id. 490; 
 <"ook V. Horwitz, 10 id. .586; Brown v. 
 Coble, 76 N. C. 391 ; Mendenhall v. V7il- 
 son, 54 Iowa, 589 ; Thorpe v. Dickey, 51 
 iJ. 676 ; Cogswell v. Murphy, 46 id. 44 ; 
 Addicken v. Schrubbe, 45 id. 315 ; Hack- 
 ett V. Carter, 38 Wis. 394 ; Heath v. 
 Silverthorn Min. Co., 39 id. 146; Greene 
 V. Nnnnemacher, 36 id. 50 ; Lull v. Fox 
 & Wis. Imp. Co., 19 id. 101 ; Arimond v. 
 Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 31 id. 316. 
 See also Kelly r. Newman, 62 How. Br. 
 156 (defendants); Higgius v. Crichton, 
 11 Daly, 114; Hynes v. Farmers' Loan 
 & Tr. Co. (Supreme, 1890), 9 N. Y. Suppl. 
 2G0 (plaintiffs) ; Mitchell v. Mitchell (N. 
 C. 1887); 1 S. E. Rep. 648 (defendants); 
 Himes v. Jarrett (S. C. 1887), 2 S. E. Rep. 
 393 ; Hoffinan r. Wheelock, 62 Wis. 434 ; 
 Waddell v. Waddell, 99 Mo. 338 ; Lever- 
 ing V. Schnell, 78 Mo. 167 (per.sons injured 
 by fraud, whose interests are distinct, can- 
 not join as plaintiffs unless the fi-aud was 
 accomplished through a joint transac- 
 tion) ; Mullen v. Hewitt, 103 Mo. 639 
 (fraudulent conveyances to .separate gran- 
 tees, no common design shown) ; Faivre 
 V. Gillan (Iowa, 1892), 51 N. W. Rep. 
 46; Berg v. Stanwood, 43 Minn. 176 (im- 
 
 proper joinder, where complaint alleges 
 separate promises by two defendants to 
 I)ay for the same work, and does not allege 
 a joint promise) ; Langevin v. St. I'anl 
 (Minn. 1892), 51 N. W. Rep. 817; Bren- 
 ner V. Egly, 23 Kan. 123 ; Lindh v. Crov^r- 
 ley, 26 Kan. 47 (a cause of action against 
 all the parties to a promissory note cannot 
 be united with a cause of action on a judg- 
 ment rendered on the note against one of 
 the parties thereto) ; Heutig v. S. W. 
 Mut. Benev. Ass., 45 Kan. 462 ; Rizer v. 
 Davis Cy. Comm'rs, 48 Kan. 389 ; Has- 
 kell Cy. Bank v. Bank of Santa Fc (Kan. 
 1893), 32 Fac. Rep. 624; Hoye r. Ray- 
 mond, 25 Kan. 665 ; Johnson r. Kirby, 65 
 Cal. 482 ; Powell v. Dayton, etc. R. Co., 
 13 Ore. 446. It is not a misjoinder to 
 sue tlie sureties on a guardian's original 
 bond and those on his additional bond in 
 a single action; as "the rights and lia- 
 bilities of each set of sureties depend for 
 their extent on a correct ascertainment 
 and adjustment of those of the other set, 
 each is interested in the result of the liti- 
 gation with the other ; hence all the 
 parties are affected as required by the 
 code;" 26 Weekly Law Bulletin (Cin- 
 cinnati Com. Pleas), 147, 148, citing Allen 
 V. State, 61 Ind. 268; Matthews i-. Cope- 
 land, 79 N. C. 493 ; Holerau v. School 
 Dist., 10 Neb. 406; and other cases. 
 [[Grady r. Maloso '1896), 92 Wis. 666, 66 
 N. \V. 8O8.3
 
 500 CIVIL ItEMEDIES. 
 
 form the principle which controlled the courts, both of law and 
 equity, under the former practice. It leaves an equitable action 
 to be governed by the same rules as to parties which controlled 
 it when equity was a distinct department, and it extends the 
 theory at least to legal actions as well. The practical effect 
 of tliis clause in the statute will be best learned from an ex- 
 amination of the cases in which it has been applied, and from 
 the judicial construction which has been thereby put upon it. 
 Those which are quoted first in order pronounce against the pro- 
 priety of the union made by the plaintiff, because the causes of 
 action did not affect all the parties. 
 
 § 375. *481. Illustration. The owner of a tract of land had 
 made O. his agent for the purpose of selling it, and O. had sold 
 the land to S., who also stood in a fiduciary relation to the owner, 
 and S. had conveyed portions of the land to different purchasers. 
 The original owner thereupon brought an action against O. and 
 S., charging fraud and a violation of their fiduciary duty against 
 both. The complaint demanded a judgment of damages against 
 O. for his deceit, and against S. an account and payment of all 
 the proceeds and profits that he had or might have made from his 
 own sales, and a reconveyance of the portion yet remaining unsold. 
 The Xew York Court of Appeals held that the causes of action 
 were improperly united ; and, as its opinion is instructive, I quote 
 from it at some length. " The plaintiff has elected to regaixi S. 
 as his trustee, and the complaint as to him and the decree proceed 
 on this basis. The plaintiff therefore elects to aflirm the sale as 
 to S. He cannot uno Jiatu afiirm it as to him, and disaffirm it as 
 to the defendant O. It is difficult to see how under the provision 
 of § 167 of the code these causes of action may be united in the 
 same complaint. Although it may be said that both causes of 
 action arise out of tlie same ti-ansaction, namely, the sale of the 
 plaintiff's land to the defendant S., yet the cause of action against 
 O. is for an injury to the plaintiff's property, while that against 
 S. is a claim against him as a trustee by operation of law. The 
 causes of action joined in tlie complaint do not affect both of the 
 i^arties defendant. O. is not affected by nor in any way responsi- 
 ble for S.'s acts as plaintiff's trustee, and the complaint does not 
 profess to make him liable therefor. So S. is not sought to be 
 made responsible for the fraudulent acts of*0. On the plain- 
 tiff's own showing, he has separate and distinct causes of action
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 501 
 
 against each of the defendants which cannot be joined under 
 the code." ^ 
 
 § 376. * 482. Illustrations. The same doctrine was asserted and 
 ruHng made in the following cases, the causes of action being held 
 improperly united in each because they did not affect all of the 
 parties : where one cause of action was on a judgment against the 
 defendant and two others, a second on a judgment against the de- 
 fendant and one other, while a third was on a judgment against 
 the defendant alone ; ^ where the first cause of action was against 
 a husband and wife for a slander by the wife, and the second 
 against the husband for his own slander ; ^ an action against a 
 husband and wife on a contract made by both in the wife's busi- 
 ness, where a personal judgment was demanded against him, and 
 a judgment to enforce the demand against the wife's separate 
 estate ; * where the plaintiff's agent, with whom certain securities 
 had been deposited, had transferred them, in violation of his duty, 
 to various assignees, and a single action was brought against him 
 and all these transferees to set aside the assignments and to re- 
 cover the bonds or their proceeds ; ^ an action by a reversioner 
 against the tenant for life and the occupant to recover damages 
 for injuries done b}^ them to the land, the complaint containing 
 
 1 Gardner i'. Ogilen, 22 N. Y. 327, 340, fendantsalone, even though such certificate- 
 
 per Davies J. was obtaiued as one of the fruits of the con- 
 
 [| Tew y. Wolfsohn (1903), 174 N. Y. 272, spiracy." Hawarden r. Youghiogheny & 
 66 N. E. 934. In this case the complaint Lehigh Coal Co. (1901), 111 Wis. ,54.5," 87 
 alleged that one defendant conducted a N. W. 472 : k?ld, that a cause of action at 
 certain business as agent for the other law for damages to the plaintiff growing 
 defendant, liis wife, who owned it ; that he out of an unlawful combination cann(^t be 
 ])retended to be conducting the business united with a cause of action in equity in 
 as his own, and entered into a contract favor of the plaintiff and others similarly 
 with plaintiff as agent for his wife, his situated to restrain further operations by 
 undisclosed principal ; that the defendants the combination, since both causes of ac- 
 refused to perform the terms of the con- tions do not affect all the parties. Plank- 
 tract, and induced plaintiff to pay money, inton v. Hildebraud (1895), 89 Wis. 209, 
 for which they refused to account. Held, 61 N. W. 839.] 
 
 not demurrable on the ground of mi.sjoin- ^ Barnes v. Smith, 16 Abb. Pr. 420. 
 
 der of causes of action, as, if it does not ^ Malone r. Stilwell, 15 Abb. Pr. 421. 
 
 state a single cause of action against the And see Dailey v. Houston, 58 Mo. 361, 
 
 wife only, it states a single cause of action 366. 
 
 against both defendants. Haskell County * Palen v. Lent, 5 Bosw. 713. 
 
 Bank v. Bank of Santa Fe' (1893), 51 Kan. ^ Lexington & B. S. R. Co. v. Goodman, 
 
 39, 32 Pac. 624. In this case it was held 15 How. Pr. 85. This was a special term 
 
 that "an action to recover damages against decision, and is therefore not entitled to 
 
 a number of defendants for a fraudulent much authority. The case is clearly in 
 
 conspiracy cannot be joined with an action principle identical with the ordinary cred- 
 
 to obtain a cancellation of a certificate of iter's suit, 
 deposit owued and held by one of said de-
 
 502 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 a cause of action asfainst 07ie defendant for cuttinsj and removingr 
 timber, a second against both for the same acts, and a third against 
 both for removing fire-wood already cut; ^ an action for deceit, in 
 which one count of the comphiint alleged fraudulent acts against 
 a part of the defendants, and other counts charged similar acts 
 against all ; ^ ^vhere damages were claimed from the owner of a 
 city lot for making an excavation in a street, into which the 
 plaintiff fell, and from the city for permitting the street to be 
 broken up ; ^ an action against two defendants to recover damages 
 for the flowing of plaintiff's lands, the complaint alleging in the 
 fii'st count that one defendant erected a dam in the north branch 
 of a certain river, and in the second count that the other defend- 
 ant constructed a dam in the south branch of the same stream, 
 by the combined effects of which obstructions the injury was 
 done ; ^ an action against two defendants, in which the claim 
 against one was for goods sold and delivered, and that against 
 the other was on his promise to pay the price thereof; ^ an action 
 against a public officer and the sureties on his official bond for a 
 breach thereof, the complaint containing also a cause of action 
 against the officer alone for damages caused by a distinct and 
 different negligent act ; ^ a cause of action against A., B., and 
 C. for money loaned to them, and one against A., D., and E. on 
 a note given by them as collateral security for the same loan." 
 
 § 377. * 483. Causes of Action so Joined must also affect all the 
 Plaintiffs. Illustrations. The causes of action must not only affect 
 all the defendants, but all the plaintiffs as well, the provision of 
 the codes applying equally to both parties.^ Thus an action by 
 
 1 Rodgers i\ Rodgers, II Barb. 59.5. [;Davis r. Novotney (1901), 15 S. D. 
 
 2 Wells i;. Jewett, 11 How. Pr. 242. 118, 87 N. W. 582: A trustee iu baiik- 
 " Trowbridge v. Forepaugh, 14 Minu. ruptcy cannot join in one complaint causes 
 
 133. See also Kelly v. Newman, 62 IIow. of action against several defendants, each 
 
 Pr. 156. of whonijin a separate suit, obtained prop- 
 
 * Lull c. Fo.\ & Wis. Imp. Co., 19 Wis. erty of the bankrupt by replevin or levied 
 100, 102. upon it in attachment, within the prohibi- 
 
 ^ Sanders I.'. Cla.son, 13 Minn. 379. tiou of the bankruptcy act, since such 
 
 * State '•. Kruttschnitt, 4 Nev. 178; causes of action do not arise out of the 
 Ghirardelli v. IJourland, 32 Cal. 585. And same transaction nor are they connected 
 against the sureties on an administrator's with the same subject of action. There is 
 bond for a breach thereof, and against the also a misjoin<ler of parties defendant] 
 administrator himself for a viidation of iiis ^ Where a husband and wife sued for 
 trust. Howse v. Moody, 14 Fla. 59, C4,65. an assault and battery upon the wife, asxl 
 
 ' Farmers' Bank of Mo. r. Bayliss, 41 the petition set forth a claim for the iiijn- 
 Mo. 274. And see Lane v. State, 27 Ind. ries su-stained by the wife, fur wliicii 1k)1]i 
 108. must sue, and also a claim for the loss of
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION'. 
 
 :.o;j 
 
 three persons having entirely distinct and separate claims against 
 the defendant for work and materials, brought to foreclose their 
 individual mechanics' liens on their debtor's house, was held 
 improper ; ^ and where six persons, owners of distinct and sepa- 
 rate parcels of land through which a stream ran, each being 
 entitled to the use of the water as it passed through his land, 
 joined in a suit to restrain the defendant from diverting the 
 entire stream at a point above all their premises, the Supreme 
 Court of Nevada condemned the complaint as improperly uniting 
 the causes of action and the plaintiffs.^ In an action to recover 
 possession of land brought by two plaintiffs, the complaint con- 
 
 her services, for which he alone must sue, 
 two causes of action were held to be im- 
 properly united. Dailey r. Houston, 58 
 Mo. 361, 366 ; Tell v. Gibsou, 66 Cal. 247 ; 
 Reynolds v. Robinson, 64 X. Y. 589 ; Filer 
 v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 49 X. Y. 47 ; Mo- 
 sier V. Beale, 43 Fed. Rep. 358 ; and see 
 mite, § * 242. 
 
 ^Anderson v. Scandia Bank (1893), 53 
 Minn. 191, 54 N. W. 1062: A cause of 
 action by a husband and wife to avoid 
 usurious securities given by them upon a 
 loan made to the wife, cannot be joined 
 with another by the wife alone to recover 
 back money paid by her upon the usurious 
 contract. See also Morton r. Western 
 Union Tel. Co. (1902), 130 N. C. 299, 41 
 S. E. 484. 
 
 The several causes, in order that they 
 may be united, must not only affect all the 
 plaintiffs but must be brought in the same 
 right. In the case of Carrier v. Bernstein 
 (1898), 104 la. 572, 73 N. W. 1076, plaintiff 
 filed a petition in two counts, the first 
 being a suit by her as wife under § 1557 
 of the code to recover actual and exem- 
 plary damages for injury to her person, 
 property, etc., caused by sales of intoxicat- 
 ing licjuors to her husband, the second 
 being a suit by her as a citizen of the 
 county, under Code, § 1539, for one-half 
 the forfeit imposed by law for the selling 
 of liquor to an intoxicated person or ha- 
 bitual drunkard. Held, that there was a 
 misjoinder because the causes of caction, 
 while prosecuted by the same kind of 
 proceedings, are not by the same party as 
 plaintiff or in the same right, as required 
 by Code, § 2630. As to the parties plain- 
 
 tiff, in one the plaintiff sues in her own 
 name. In the second count the plaintiff 
 does not sue as wife but as a citizen of the 
 county and as informer. But even though 
 the actions be considered brought by the 
 same party, " surely it cannot be said that 
 they are in the same right. The first is in 
 the right as wife (or damages to her per- 
 son, property, and means of support, aud is 
 a right existing solely and exclusively in 
 favor of the plaintiff, for injuries actually 
 suffered by her. The second is in the 
 right of the county, not to damages, but 
 to the forfeiture to its school fund. The 
 citizen prosecuting such au action as in- 
 former has no personal right of recovery. 
 He cannot recover anything in his own 
 right, and it is only when recovery is had 
 in favor of the school fund that the in- 
 former is compensated by receiving one- 
 half the amount recovered." 'J 
 
 i Harsh ;;. Morgan, 1 Kan. 293, 299. 
 Tenants in common who have been im- 
 posed on by the fraud of a common vendee 
 to whom they have at different times exe- 
 cuted separate deeds, each of his interest, 
 cannot join in a suit to set these aside: 
 Jeffers v. Forbes, 28 Kan. 174. 
 
 ^ Schultz r. Winter, 7 Nev. 130. For 
 contrary cases, see supra, § * 269 (note). 
 Though the separate owners may, by 
 the weight of authority, join in claiming 
 an injunction, the uniting of their several 
 claims for damages in one complaint is 
 improper, as the plaintiffs have a common 
 interest in ol)taiuing the equitable, but not 
 the legal relief. See Barham v. Ilostetter, 
 67 Cal. 272 ; Foreman i-. Boyle, 88 Cat 
 290.
 
 504 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 tained two counts : the first averred a title to the premises in one 
 of the pLaintiffs, while the second alleged a different and even 
 hostile title in the other. A demurrer to this complaint was sus- 
 tained, on the ground that the two causes of action did not affect 
 both of the plaintiffs. The former practice of naming different 
 lessors of the plaintiff in ejectment, and afterwards of uniting 
 different plaintiffs who claim under distinct and hostile titles, has 
 been abolished by the code. " The action to recover possession 
 of land now stands on the same footing precisely in respect to 
 parties and the union of causes of action with all other actions." ^ 
 § 378. * 484. The Doctrine, as Stated by the New York Court 
 of Appeals, respecting a Cause of Action against an Executor, Ad- 
 ministrator, or Trustee United with one against him in his Individual 
 
 Capacity. Causes of action to recover possession of different 
 chattels from different defendants cannot be joined in the same 
 suit.-^ Nor can a cause of action against a trustee to compel the 
 conveyance of the trust property be united with a cause of action 
 against an administrator on a demand growing out of the same 
 property.^ A cause of action against an executor, administrator, 
 or trustee, in his representative character, cannot be united with 
 one against the same individual personally. The doctrine was 
 recently stated by the New York Court of Appeals, as the result 
 of an elaborate examination of the authorities : " The following 
 principles are settled by these authorities : 1. That, for all causes 
 of action arising upon contract made by deceased in his lifetime, 
 an action can be maintained against the executor or administrator 
 as such, and the judgment would be de bonis testatoris, or intesta- 
 toris. 2. That in all causes of action, where the same arise upon 
 a contract made after the death of the testator or intestate, the 
 
 1 Hubbell V. Lerch, 62 Barb. 295, 297, damages for withlioldin'^ the same, it 
 per T. A. Johnson, J. ; St. John v. Pierce, has been held, cannot he joined with a 
 22 Barb. 362 ; Hubbell v. Lerch, 58 N. Y. similar cause of action in respect to an- 
 2.37, 241. QSee Behlow v. Fischer (1894), other parcel, sed qu., Holmes v. Williams, 
 102 Cal. 208, 36 Pac. 509.] 16 Minn. 164, 169 ; nor can a claim for a 
 
 2 Robinson v. Rice, 20 Mo. 229. specific performance against A. be joined 
 
 3 McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 16 Mo. with a claim to recover possession of land 
 242. Tiie following cases are additional against B., Fagan v. Barnes, 14 Fla. 53, 
 illustrations of the rule that the causes of 56 ; nor can a cause of action for fraud 
 action must affect all the parties. Cheely's agai«st one defendant be united with a 
 Adm. r. Wells, 33 Mo. 106 ; Liney v. cause of action upon contract against an- 
 Martin, 29 Mo. 28 ; Stalcup v. Garner, 26 other. Van Liew v. John.son, 6 N. Y. S. C. 
 Mo. 72. A cause of action to recover f.48 ; N. C. Land Co. v. Beatty, 69 N. C. 
 possession of one parcel of land with •'3^9.
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 505 
 
 claim is against the executor or administrator personally, and not 
 against the estate, and the judgment must be de honh propriis. 
 3. That these different causes of action cannot be united in the 
 same complaint." ^ 
 
 § 379. *485. Illustrations. Under the provisions of the In- 
 diana code an action wi\s sustained against a husband and wife, 
 brought by a creditor of the husband to recover a judgment for 
 the amount of the demand against him, and to charge certain 
 land held by the wife under an implied trust for her husband 
 with a mechanic's lien which accompanied the demand ;2 and also 
 an action ao-ainst a husband and wife, which was brought to 
 obtain a judgment against him for the price of goods sold and 
 delivered, and also to set aside his deed of land fraudulently con- 
 veyed to her, so as to let in the hen of the judgment when 
 recovered.^ 
 
 § 380. * 486. Discussion of Questions under Consideration in 
 Wilson V. Castro. The questions under consideration, in their 
 application to equitable actions, were thoroughly and ably dis- 
 cussed by the Supreme Court of California in the case of Wilson 
 V. Castro,* and I shall close this subdivision with an extract from 
 the opinion. After a statement of the general rules and doctrines 
 of equity in relation to parties, the learned judge proceeds to 
 discuss the question as to the joinder of causes of action in 
 connection with the union of the defendants, or, to adopt the 
 nomenclature used by equity courts, the subject of " multifarious- 
 ness.''^ " A bill in equity is said to be ' multifarious ' when dis- 
 tinct and independent matters are joined therein, — as, for 
 example, the uniting of several matters, perfectly distinct and, 
 unconnected, against one defendant, or the demand of several 
 matters of a distinct and independent nature, against severa 
 
 1 Ferrin i'. Myrick, 41 N. Y. 315, 319- be joined with a claim against him as a 
 
 322, per Hunt C. J. ; Austin v. Munro, 47 trustee of the company for the same de- 
 
 N. Y. 360, 364, 365, per Allen J. ; Austin mand, both being based upon a statute. 
 
 V. Munro, 4 Lans. 67. See, per contra. Wiles y. Suydam, 6 N. Y. S. C. 292, citing 
 
 Tradesman's Bank v. McFeely, 61 Barb. Durant v. Gardner, 10 Abb. Pr. 445; 19 
 
 522, decided in the face of Ferrin v. My- How. Pr. 94 ; Sipperly v. Troy & B. R. 
 
 rick. Joinder of causes of action against Co., 9 How. Pr. 83 ; Dickens v. N. Y. Cent, 
 
 executors and administrators in their in- R. Co., 13 How. Pr. 228. See /jos^, §* 502. 
 
 dividual and representative capacities is ^Schlicker v. Hemeuway (1895), 110 Cal. 
 
 permitted in New York in certain ca.ses 579,42 Pac. 1063.] 
 
 by C. C. P., § 1815. Bat a claim against 2 Lindley v. Cross, 31 Ind. 106. 
 
 the defendant as a stockholder, to recover ^ Frank v. Kessler, 30 Ind. 8. 
 
 a demand due from the corporation, may * W'ilsou v. Castro, 31 Cal. 420.
 
 506 CIVIL REMEDIED. 
 
 defendants. But the case of each particuLar defendant must be 
 entirely distinct and independent from that of the other defend- 
 ants, or the objection cannot prevail : for, as said by Judge 
 Story, 'The case of one may be so entire as to be incapable of 
 being prosecuted in several suits, and yet some other defendant 
 may be a necessary party to some portion only of the case stated. 
 In the latter case the objection of multifariousness could not be 
 allowed to prevail. So it is not indispensable that all the parties 
 should have an interest in all the matters contained in the suit ; 
 it will be sufficient if each party has an interest in some matter 
 in the suit, and they are connected with the others.' ^ The same 
 autlior lays it down that, ' To support the objection of multifari- 
 ousness because the bill contains different causes of suit against 
 the same person, two things must concur: firsts the different 
 grounds of suit must be wholly distinct ; secoyidly, each ground 
 must be sufficient as stated to sustain a bill; if the grounds be 
 not entirely distinct and unconnected, if they" arise out of one and 
 the same transaction, or series of transactions forming one course 
 of dealing, and all tending to one end, if one connected story can 
 be told of the whole, the objection does not apply.' ^ When the 
 2)oint in issue is a matter of common interest among all the 
 parties to the suit, though the interests of the several defendants 
 are otherwise unconnected, still they may be joined. In Salvidge 
 V. Hyde,^ Sir John Leach V. C. said, ' If the objects of the suit 
 are single, but it happens that different persons have separate 
 interests in distinct questions which arise out of the single object, 
 it necessarily happens that such different persons must be brought 
 before the court in order that the suit may conclude the whole 
 subject.' In Boyd v. Hoyt,* Mr. Chancellor Walworth laid 
 down the same doctrine in substantially the language used by 
 Sir John Leach in Salvidge v. Hyde ; and Mr. Daniell, in his 
 excellent work,^ says, in reference to the doctrine held in Sal- 
 vidge V. Hyde, there is no doubt that the learned judge stated 
 the principle correctly, though in the application of it he went, 
 in the opinion of Lord Eldon, too far.^ In Whaley v. DaAvson," 
 Lord Kedesdale observed that in the English cases, when de- 
 murrers, because the plaintiff demanded in his bill matters of 
 
 1 Story's Eq. PI. §§ 271, 271 a. ^ 1 Daniell's Ch. PI. p. 386. 
 
 2 Ibid. § 271 6. 6 1 .Jac. R. 151. 
 
 8 Salvi(igei-. Ilyde.SMadd. Ch. K. 138. ' Whaley i-. Dawson, 2 Sch. & Lef. 
 
 ♦ Boyd i;. Hoyt, 5 Paige, 78. 370.
 
 JOINDEU OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 507 
 
 distinct natures against several defendants not connected in 
 interest, have been overrnled, there has been a general right 
 in the plaintiff covering the whole case, although the rights of 
 the defendants may have been distinct. In such cases tlie court 
 proceeds on the ground of preventing multiplicity of suits, when 
 one general right is claimed by the plaintiff against all the 
 defendants ; and so in Dimmock v. Bixby,^ the court held that 
 wlien one general right is claimed by the plaintiff, although the 
 defendants may have separate and distinct rights, the bill of 
 complaint is not multifarious. In the elaborate case of Campbell 
 V. Mackay,^ Lord Cottenham held that when the plaintiffs have 
 a common interest against all the defendants in a suit, as to one 
 or more of the questions raised by it, so as to make them all 
 necessary parties for the purpose of enforcing that common 
 interest, the circumstance of the defendants being subject to 
 distinct liabilities in respect to different branches of the subject- 
 matter will not render the bill multifarious. In the same case 
 his lordship observed that it was utterly impossible upon the 
 authorities to lay down any rule or abstract proposition as 
 to what constitutes multifariousness which can be made uni- 
 versally applicable. The only way, he said, of reconciling the 
 authorities upon the subject, is by adverting to the fact, that 
 although the books speak generally of demurrers for multifarious- 
 ness, yet in truth such demurrers may be divided into two kinds, 
 one of which, properly speaking, is on account of a misjoinder 
 of causes of action ; that is to say, uniting claims of so different 
 a character that the court will not permit them to be litigated 
 in one record, even though the plaintiff and defendants may 
 be parties to the whole transactions which form the subject of 
 the suit. The other of which, as applied to a bill, is that a party 
 is brought as a defendant upon a record, with a large portion of 
 which, and with the case made by it. he has no connection wluit- 
 ever. A demurrer for such a cause is an objection that the com- 
 plaint sets forth matters which are multifarious ; and the real 
 cause of objection is, as illustrated by the old form of demurrer, 
 that it puts the parties to great and useless expense, — an objec- 
 tion which has no application in a case of mere misjoinder of 
 parties. Upon this subject Judge Story says: 'In the former 
 class of cases, where there is a joinder of distinct claims between 
 
 1 Dimmock v. Bixby, 20 Pick. 368. ^ Campbell v. Mackay, 1 Myl. & Cr. 60.1.
 
 508 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 the same parties, it has never been held as a distinct proposition 
 that they cannot be united, and that the bill is of course demur- 
 rable for that cause alone, notmthstanding the claims are of 
 a similar nature, involving similar principles and results, and 
 may therefore without inconvenience be heard and adjudged 
 together. If that proposition were to be established and carried 
 to its full extent, it would go to prevent the uniting of several 
 demands in one bill, although the parties were liable in respect to 
 each, and the same parties were interested in the property which 
 may be the subject of each. Such a rule, if established in equity, 
 would be very miscliievous and oppressive in practice, and no 
 possible advantage could be gained by it.' ^ He states in conclu- 
 sion the result of the principles of the cases to be,- ' Tliat where 
 there is a common liability in the defendants, and a common 
 interest in the plaintiffs, different claims to property, at least 
 if the subjects are such as may without inconvenience be joined, 
 may be united in one and the same suit ; and further, that where 
 the interests of the plaintiffs are the same, although the defend- 
 ants may not have a co-extensive common interest, but their 
 interests may be derived under different instruments, if the 
 general objects of the bill will be promoted by their being united 
 in a sincfle suit, the court will not hesitate to sustain the bill 
 against all of them.' " ^ 
 
 1 Story's Eq. PI. §§ 531, 532. cases or claims united in the bill are of 
 
 '^ Ibid. §§ 533, 534. so different a character that the court 
 
 3 Wilson V. Castro, 31 Cal. 420, 42G- will not permit them to be litigated in one 
 
 431, per Currev J. record. It may be that the plaintiffs and 
 
 ^ defendant.* are parties to the whole of the- 
 
 \ Multifariousness, , ,. i- i <• ^i i • .. r 
 
 I- transactions which form tlie subject of 
 
 We quote at length from the case of the suit, and nevertheless those transac- 
 
 Benson v. Keller (1900), 37 Ore. 120, 60 tions may be so dis.'^imilar that the court 
 
 Pac. 918, as follows: "Objections on ac- will not allow them to be joined together, 
 
 count of multifariousness seem to be di- but will rc{|uire distinct records. But 
 
 vided primarily into two classes: (1 ) Tiiose what is more familiarly understood by the 
 
 which go to a misjoinder of two or more term "multifariousness " as applied to a 
 
 independent and incompatible causes of bill, is where a party is alile to say he is 
 
 suit ; and (2) where several matters of a brought as a defendant u])ou a record, 
 
 distinct nature are .stated and demanded with a large portion of whicli, and of the 
 
 against different parties. The two kinds case made by whicii, he has no connection 
 
 of objections are well illustrated by Lord whatever.' See also G.irtland v. Dunn, 
 
 Chancellor Cottenham in Campbell r. 11 Ark. 720. It is said in Alexander r. 
 
 Mackay, 1 Mylne & C. 603, wherein the Alexander, 85 Va.353, 363 (7 S. E. 335, .339, 
 
 distinction is clearly stated. He says: 1 L. R. A. 125. 127). 'that a bill will al- 
 
 ' Frequently the objection raised, though ways he deemed multifarious where several 
 
 termed " inultifariousnesiJ," is in fact more matters joined in the bill against one de- 
 
 properly misjoinder; that is to say, the feudant are so entirely distinct and iude-
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSKS OF ACTION. 
 
 509 
 
 § 381. *487. Calvert's Observations upon the Distinction be- 
 tween " Subject " and " Object " of the Action. The observations of 
 ]\Ir. Calvert upon the distinction between " subject " and " ob- 
 
 pendent of each other that the defendant 
 will be compelled to unite in his answer 
 and defence different matters wholly un- 
 connected with each other, and as a con- 
 sequence the proof applicable to each 
 woultl be apt to be confounded with each 
 other, and great delays might be occa- 
 sioned respecting matters ripe for hearing 
 by waiting for proofs as to some other 
 matter not ready for hearing ; or, again, 
 where there is a demand of several mat- 
 ters of a distinct and independent nature 
 in the same bill, rendering the proceeding 
 oppressive because it would tend to load 
 each defendant with an unnecessary bur- 
 den of costs, by swelling the pleadings 
 with the statement of the several claims 
 of the other defendants, with which he 
 has no connection.' In Attorney-General 
 V. Craddoc-k, 3 Mylne & C. 85, it was 
 said : ' The object of the rule against 
 multifariousness is to protect a defendant 
 from unnecessary expense, but it would 
 be a great perversion of that rule if it 
 were to impt)se upon the plaintiffs and 
 all the other defendants the expenses of 
 two suits instead of one.' . . . The diffi- 
 culty of laying down any rule of universal 
 application, as it respects the subject of 
 nmltifariousness, is suggested by many of 
 the authorities. The cases upon the sub- 
 ject are extremely various, and the courts, 
 in deciding them, seem to have considered 
 ' what was convenient in particular cir- 
 cumstances, rather than to have attempted 
 to lay down any absolute rule.' Gartland 
 V. Dunn, 11 Ark. 720. The objection does 
 not go to the merits of the cause, but re- 
 lates more nearly to a question of con- 
 venience in conducting the suit ; and, in a 
 large measure, it simply calls for an exer- 
 cise of discretion in deciding whether 
 both or all the causes of suit set forth in 
 the bill shall be tried in a single suit, or 
 be split up, and the parties relegated to 
 the bringing of two or more suits for 
 the accomplishment of their purposes, or 
 whether a defendant who is a necessary 
 party in respect of one or more matters 
 suggested by the complaint has a sufficient 
 interest in or connection with the other 
 
 matters involved to make him a proper 
 party in respect to such other matters ; 
 Bolles >: Bolles, 44 N. J. Eq. 38.5 (14 Atl. 
 593). Mr. Justice Depew, in Lehigh Val. 
 R. R. Co. V. McFarlan.Sl N. J. Eq. 706, 758, 
 says : ' The rule with regard to multifa- 
 riousness, whether arising from the mis- 
 joinder of causes of action or of defendants 
 therein, is not an inflexible rule of practice 
 or procedure, but is a rule founded in gen- 
 eral convenience, which rests upon a con- 
 sideration of what will best promote the 
 administration of justice without nmltiplv- 
 ing unnecessary litigation, on the one 
 hand, or drawing suitors into ueedle.ss 
 and unnecessary expenses on the other.' 
 See also Stevens v. Bosch, 54 N. J. Eq. 
 59 (3.S Atl. 293). Upon the whole, it 
 would seem that each case must be ex- 
 amined with reference to its own partic- 
 ular and peculiar features ; and, ' much,' 
 as Mr. Justice Story remarks in Oliver v. 
 Piatt, 44 U. S. (3 How.) 333, 412, 'musT 
 necessarily be left — where the authorities 
 leave it — to the sound discretion of the 
 court.' See also Gaines v. Chew, 43 
 U. S. (2 How.) 619; Barney v. Latham, 
 103 U. S. 205, 215; United States v. 
 Union Pac. R. R. Co., 98 U. S. 569, 604." 
 In Conley v. Buck (1896), 100 Ga. 187, 
 28 S. E. 97, the court said : " This court 
 has repeatedly decided that multifarious- 
 ness is an objection not favored by courts 
 of equity. A leading case in this countrv, 
 on these two sulijects, whicli has been 
 cited, approved, and followed in numerous 
 decisions by courts of last resort in Am- 
 erica, is that of Briukerhoff v. Brown, 
 6 Johns. Ch. 139, where it was urged bv 
 way of demurrer that the bill was multi- 
 farious, first, as to parties ; second, as to 
 the objects of the bill. In that case the 
 court decided that ' a bill may be filed 
 against several persons, relative to matters 
 of the same nature, forming a connected 
 series of acts, all intended to defraud and 
 injure the plaintiffs, and in which all the 
 defendants were more or less concerned, 
 though not jointly in each act.' And 
 Chancellor Kent, after an able and elabo- 
 rate review of the leading English author-
 
 510 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 ject " of the action, and upon the sense in which the former term 
 is used in the common method of statins the g-eneral rules of 
 
 ities, said : ' The principle to be deduced 
 from these cases is, tliat a bill against 
 several persons must relate to matters of 
 tlie same nature and having a connection 
 with each other, and in which all of the 
 defendants are more or less concerned, 
 though their rights in respect to the gen- 
 eral subject of the case may be distinct.' 
 In Fellows v. Fellows, 4 Coweu, 682, de- 
 cided by the Court of Errors of New 
 York, in 1825, one of the defendants de- 
 murred to the bill ' because it w^ for 
 several distinct matters and causes in 
 many of which the defendant was not 
 concerned ; ' but the court, following the 
 ruling in Brinkerhoff v. Brown, supra, held 
 ' that the defendants were properly joined, 
 and that the demurrer should be over- 
 ruled.' And the court said, ' This was 
 held as well because there was one con- 
 nected interest, centering in the point in 
 issue, or one common point of litigation, 
 as that the joinder tended to prevent mul- 
 tiplicity of suits.' The court stated that 
 ' the general rule is, that where a bill is 
 filed concerning things of distinct natures 
 against several persons, it is demurrable ; 
 but unconnected parties may join in a 
 .'iuit, when there is one connected interest 
 among them all, centering in the point in 
 issue in the cause.' " 
 
 Montserrat Coal Co. v. Coal Mining 
 Co. (1897), 141 Mo. 149, 42 S. W. 822 : 
 " The sole question presented by this rec- 
 ord is the propriety of the judgment of 
 the circuit court liolding the petition mul- 
 tifarious and sustaining the demurrer. In 
 the leading case of Campbell v. Mackay, 
 1 Myl. & C. 603, 13 Condensed Eng. 
 Chcy. Repts. 543, Lord Cottenham, after 
 reviewing the English cases, remarked 
 that ' to lay down any rule applicat)le 
 universally, or to say what constitutes 
 multifariousness as an abstract proposi- 
 tion, is, upon the autliorities, impossible.' 
 The decided cases since his lordship's day 
 do not render the solution of the question 
 any tlie less difficult. Indeed, no rule 
 of equity pleading has less of certainty 
 and uniformity in its application ; a result, 
 doubtless, owing to the variety of degrees 
 of right and interest which enter into the 
 affairs of life. The general definition 
 
 given by this court in Clark et al. v. Ins. 
 Co., 52 Mo. 272, is as accurate as any to 
 be found in the books: 'A bill is said to 
 be multifarious when distinct and inde- 
 j)eudent matters are improperly joined 
 whereby they are confounded, as the 
 writing in one bill of several matters 
 perfectly distinct and unconnected against 
 one defendant, or tlie demand of several 
 matters of a distinct and independent 
 nature against several defendants in the 
 same bill.' In Gaines v. Chew, 2 How. 
 (U. S.) 619, the court say: 'In general 
 terms a bill is said to be multifarious 
 wliich seeks to enforce against different 
 individuals demands which are wholly dis- 
 connected.' The rule is best illustrated 
 by the cases themselves." See also Budde 
 V. Rebeuack (1896), 137 :\Io. 179, 38 S. W. 
 910; Boggess v. Boggess (1894), 127 Mo. 
 305, 29 S. W. 1018. 
 
 In Fry r. Rush (1901), 63 Kan. 429, C5 
 Pac. 701, the court said : " As before inti- 
 mated, the petition in this case is also 
 objectionable because it presents two dis- 
 tinct forms of the vice of multifariousness, 
 — that of uniting in the same count dis- 
 tinct and disconnected subjects, matters, 
 and causes, and that of joining in the 
 same suit, both as plaintiffs and defend- 
 ants, ])arties who are without a common 
 interest in the subject of the litigation and 
 have no connection with one another." 
 
 In Demarest v. Holdeman (1901), 157 
 Ind. 467, 62 N. E. 17, it is said : " It has 
 been held sufficient to sustain a bill against 
 the charge of multifariousness, that each 
 defendant has an interest in some one 
 matter common to all the parties. And 
 where the subject of the action has become 
 so complicated and entangled that the 
 rights of the parties are involved in doubt, 
 and it is difficult to determine who is 
 liable, and who is not, except upon a full 
 hearing in which all the persons in any 
 way affected or interested are before the 
 court, equity permits the joinder of all 
 those so related to the controversy, and 
 who have a common interest in some one 
 or more branches of it." 
 
 In Daniels r. Fowler (1897), 120 N. C. 
 14, 26 >S. E. 635, the court said : " If the 
 grounds of the complaint ' arise out of the
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 
 
 511 
 
 equity procedure, are so valuable and instructive, that I shall 
 quote thera, with some condensation. They apply as well to the 
 doctrine of parties heretofore discussed as to the particular lan- 
 guage of the codes under consideration in the present section. 
 After layiilg down the equity rule as to parties in the customary 
 form adopted by several eminent judges, in which the necessity 
 or propriety of their being joined is made to depend upon their 
 interest in the " subject " of the suit,i he proceeds : ^ " The ex- 
 pression 'subject of suit' may mean one of two things, — either 
 the fund or estate respecting which the question at issue has 
 arisen, or else that question itself. For instance, in a foreclosure 
 
 same transaction, or series of transactions, 
 forming one course of dealing, and all tend- 
 ing to one end; if one connected story can 
 be told of the wliole,' it is not multifarious." 
 
 In Foster v. Landon (1898), 71 Minn. 
 494, 74 N. W. 281, the rule was said to 
 be well settled that "the case against one 
 defendant may be so entire, as to be inca- 
 pable of being prosecuted in several suits ; 
 and yet some other defendant may be a 
 necessary party to some portion only of 
 the case stated. In the latter case the 
 objection of multifariousness could not be 
 allowed to prevail," quoted from Story, 
 Eq. PI. § 271 a. The court also cited 
 Pomeroy, Code Rem. § * 486. See also 
 Allred v. Tate (1901), 113 Ga. 441, .39 
 S. E. 101 ; Level Land Co. v. Sivyer 
 ( 1 901 ), 1 1 2 Wis. 442, 88 N. W. 37 ; South 
 Bend Chilled Plow Co. v. George C. Cribb 
 Co. (1900), 105 Wis. 443. 81 N. W. 675; 
 Plankinton v. Hildebrand (1895), 89 Wis. 
 209, 61 N. W. 839. 
 
 In Whitehead v. Sweet (1899), 126 Cal. 
 67, 58 Pac. 376, the court said: "On well 
 understood principles of equity pleading, a 
 bill is not multifarious because the plain- 
 tiffs are not entitled to a decree in their 
 favor jointly or in solido. It is sufficient 
 if they are injured in a similar way, that 
 they have common grievances to redress, 
 and that they are entitled to relief of the 
 same kind. (4 Thompson on Corporations, 
 sec. 4602.) Applying the principles above 
 laid down to this case, the complaint does 
 not contain actions improperly joined. It 
 tells one continued story, and alleges 
 wrongs wilfully perpetrated by the defend- 
 ants, and the way in which they were 
 
 ])crpetrated. No third parties appear in 
 any way to be involved. If defendant 
 Sweet agreed for the benefit of the corpo- 
 ration to transfer his stock with proxy 
 irrevocable, and has violated his contract, 
 why should he not now and in this action 
 be compelled to perform it ? A bill iii 
 equity is said to be multifarious when dis- 
 tinct and independent matters are joined 
 therein. If the subject-matter in the main 
 relates to one transaction around which 
 the others cluster, and each ]jarty has an 
 interest in some matters in the suit, and 
 they are connected, even tliough all the 
 parties do not have an interest in all 
 the matters in the suit, the bill is not 
 multifarious." 
 
 "It is not, however, the mere fact that 
 several causes of action are united in the 
 same suit which the plaintiffs may bring- 
 in different rights that will make a com- 
 plaint bad by reason of multifariousness. 
 There must be such an inconsistency or 
 repugnancy in the various rights declared 
 on as to cause confusion and embarrass- 
 ment on the part of the court in adminis- 
 tering the relief which the facts might 
 warrant were separate suits brought for 
 the enforcement of the .several rights : " 
 Henshaw v. Salt River Canal Co. (1898), 
 Ariz., 54 Pac. 577."] 
 
 1 See Lord Redesdale, Plead. 164,170; 
 Lord Hardwicke in Poore v. Clarke, 2 Atk. 
 515; Lord Thurlow in Anon, 1 Ves. 29 ; 
 Sir William Grant in Palk v. Clinton, 12 
 Ves. 58 ; Wilkins v. Fry, 1 Meriv. 262 ; 
 Lord Eldon in Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 
 Ves. 325 ; Calvert on Parties, pp. 3, 4. 
 
 ^ Calvert on Parties, p. 5.
 
 512 CIVIL PwEMEDIES. 
 
 suit it may mean either, in the first sense, the mortgage debt or 
 mortgaged premises, or, in the second sense, the question whether 
 a foreclosure ought or ought not to take place." He goes on to 
 show by citations from their judgments that in the cases quoted 
 below, Lord Eldon and Sir William Grant used the phrase in tlie 
 first sense, and adds : " If the words ' subject of suit ' were taken 
 in that very extensive meaning in which Lord Eldon and Sir 
 William Grant used them, the general rule as laid down by 
 them would be inconsistent with several distinctions which are 
 firmly established." This statement he illustrates by a refer- 
 ence to many instances in which it is well settled tliat per- 
 sons who are direct!)- interested in the property, fund, or estate 
 affected by the action, need not be made parties, — as for ex- 
 ample in an action by or against trustees, the cestuis que trust- 
 ent are under some circumstances neither necessary nor proper 
 parties.^ 
 
 § 382. *488. Same Subject. Upon these premises Mr. Calvert 
 proceeds to develop his own views as follows : " The rule, then, 
 which has been stated in these cases in reference to the ' subject 
 of the suit,' meaning thereby the estate or fund on which tlie 
 question at issue has arisen, does not appear to be adapted to 
 general application. It must be taken in connection with other 
 authorities wliich will now be quoted." The authorities then 
 cited by him, while using the same phrase, "subject of the suit," 
 make the necessity of a person's being joined as a party to depend 
 upon his interest in the questions involved in the litigation^ and the 
 effect which the decree tuill have upon that interest. This doctrine 
 was tersely expressed by Lord Lyndhurst : " The general rule is, 
 that all persons who are interested in the question must be parties 
 to a suit instituted in a court of equity." ^ He thus sums up the 
 matter: "Not all concerned in the subject-matter respecting 
 which a thing is demanded, but all concerned in the very thing 
 which is demanded, the matter petitioned for in the prayer of the 
 bill, in other words, the object of suit, should be made parties in 
 equity. Upon a combination of all tliese authorities, it is pro- 
 
 ^ Calvert on Parties, pp. 6, 7, 8. Davis, 1 Ves. & B. 550 ; Sir John Leach 
 
 2 Small V. Atwood, Younge, 458. The in Smith v. Snow, 3 Madd. R. 10; Lloyd 
 
 other dicta cited by Mr. Calvert are Lord v. Lander, 5 Madd. R. 289 ; I<ord Hard- 
 
 Loupjhboroupjh in King r. Martin, 2 Ves. wicke in Poore u. Clarke, 2 Atk. 515; 
 
 643; Lord Eldon in Fenton i'. Hughes, 7 Com. Dig. Tit. Chan, E. 2. 
 
 Ves. 288 ; Sir T. Plumer iu Whitworth v.
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 513 
 
 posed to state the general rule in the following words : All per- 
 sons having an interest in the object of the suit ought to be made 
 parties." ^ 
 
 § 383. *489. Author's Criticism of Calvert's Theory. This 
 theory is open to a very plain criticism. Assuming that " subject 
 of the suit " may be used in the two senses mentioned by Mr. 
 Calvert, and conceding that the rule requiring all persons in- 
 terested in the "subject," taken in the first of these senses, to be 
 made parties, would not be universally correct, the natural con- 
 clusion would be that the phrase " subject of the suit," as found 
 in the sreneral rule, should be taken in its second sense. The 
 author seems in his argument to reach this position ; but in the 
 very act of arriving at this result he confounds this second sense 
 of the expression with a very different thing, — the object of the 
 suit. The " object of the suit " is, as he states it to be, the very 
 relief prayed for by the bill, the remedy asked and granted ; but 
 this relief or remedy is certainly not identical with the " subject 
 of the suit " used in its secondary meaning. Taking his illustra- 
 tion of the foreclosure suit, the " subject" may be the mortgaged 
 debt or the mortgaged premises on the one hand, or the question 
 whether a foreclosure ought or ought not to take place on the 
 other. The latter is clearly not the same as the sale of the land 
 and the payment of the debt out of the proceeds, which is the 
 only object of the action. It would seem very clear then, by 
 the author's own argument, that tlie final conclusion which he 
 reaches is not derived from his premises nor established by his 
 reasoning. The authorities agree, in one form of expression or 
 another, that all persons materially interested in the " subject of 
 the suit " should regularly be made parties. The " subject of the 
 suit " may be the fund, estate, or property, in respect of which 
 the action is maintained ; and it is true that, in a very large num- 
 ber of instances, — in fact, in a very large majority of instances, 
 — all the persons interested in this fund or estate should be par- 
 ties in an equity suit. But the " subject of the suit " may be 
 regarded as describing the questions respecting this fund or estate 
 which are involved in the litigation ; and if the rule as just stated 
 is too broad to be of absolutely universal application, it is cer- 
 tainly true that all persons materially interested in these questions 
 ought to be joined as parties. 
 
 1 Calvert, pp. 10, 11. 
 .33
 
 514 CIVIL i;i:medies. 
 
 ^ 384. *490. Application of Calvert's Analysis to the Language 
 of the Codes. Let us apply Mr. Calvert's analysis of the term to 
 the language found in the codes. In equitable actions there is 
 generally, if not quite always, a fund, or estate, or property, 
 which is the subject of the suit, as well as questions concerning 
 the same to whicli the terra raay also be applied. The provisions 
 of the codes, however, embrace legal actions ; and in them it can- 
 not generally be said that there is any fund, property, or estate, 
 in relation to which the questions at issue have arisen, and which 
 can be regarded as the " subject." In a very large proportion of 
 legal actions, therefore, the term " subject of the action " can onl}' 
 be conceived of in the second sense which has been attributed to 
 it, and denotes the totality of questions at issue between the par- 
 ties, embracing, in short, both the primary rights and duties of 
 the litigants, and the remedial rights and duties which have 
 sprung from the injuries complained of. The term does not seem 
 capable of any clear and complete analysis, and the result is that 
 it may denote the " thing/' if any, — land, chattel, person, fund, 
 estate, and the like, — in respect of which rights are sought to be 
 maintained and duties enforced, or it may denote the sum of the 
 questions between the parties to be determined by the judgment 
 of the court. The latter meaning is distinguishable and is to be 
 distinguished from the " object of the action," which is always 
 the relief to be obtained by the determination of the questions 
 which constitute the " subject of the action." 
 
 VI. Instances in which all the Causes of Action are against a Single 
 Defendant, or against all the Defendants alike. 
 
 § 385. *401. Questions Discussed in this Subdivision pertain 
 ■wholly to Joinder of Causes and not to Parties. In the cases in- 
 cluded in tliis subdivision, no question can arise respecting the 
 proper joinder of defendants. The only matter of inquiry is, 
 whether all the causes of action fall within some one of the 
 classes enumerated in the statute, so that they may be united in 
 one judicial proceeding. As the fn"st and most general of these 
 classes has already been fully considered in another subdivision, 
 it will not be again referred to. No general principle is involved 
 which needs illustration and explanation ; and I shall simply 
 state, first, a number of cases as examples of a proper joinder,
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 515 
 
 and, secondly, a number of instances in which the joinder has 
 been held to be improper. 
 
 § 386. * 492. Joinder of Causes Arising out of Contract. Illus- 
 trations. All causes of action arising out of contract may be 
 united, and this includes, of course, implied as well as express 
 contracts. A complaint contained four causes of action. The 
 first alleged that the father of the defendant, being indebted to 
 the plaintiff, devised and bequeathed all of his property, real and 
 personal, to the defendant, and in his will declared that " the 
 said [defendant] is to pay all the debts that I may owe at my 
 decease," "and also $35 annually during her lifetime to" the 
 plaintiff : that the defendant accepted such gifts and took pos- 
 session of the property, and thus became liable to pay such debts 
 and said annuity. The second count was for money had and 
 received, the third on an express promise to pay money, and the 
 fourth for rent due. Upon demurrer to this complaint, the de- 
 fendant's liability in respect to the matters alleged in the first 
 count was held to be, in contemplation of law, on an implied 
 promise, and all the causes of action thus arising out of contract 
 were properly united.^ 
 
 § 387. * 493. When Tort is ■waived and Suit is brought upon 
 Implied Promise. Illustrations. In certain cases the plaintiff is 
 allowed an election to treat the wrong done as a tort, or to waive 
 the tort, and sue as upoji an implied promise of the defendant. 
 
 1 Gridley v. Giidle}-, 24 N. Y. 130. (1894), .5 Wyo. 178,38 Pac. 920 (cause 
 
 See also Quellen i-. Arnold, 12 Nev. 234; of action for work and labor joined witli 
 
 Sullivan 1-. The Sullivan Co., 14 S. C. 494; one for money loaned); McCorkle v. 
 
 South Side Ass'u v. Cutler, etc. Co., 64 Mallory (1903), 30 Wash. 632, 71 Pac. 186 
 
 Ind. SCO; Witte v. Wolfe, 16 S. C. 256 (a cause of action to recover damages for 
 
 (on an unsecured money demand, and to breach of contract united with one alleg- 
 
 foreclose a mortgage) ; Childs c. Harris ing the same contract and that defendant 
 
 Manuf. Co., 68 Wis. 231 (a judgment is a had wrongfully taken possession of certain 
 
 contract within the meaning of the code buildings erected by plaintiff in order to 
 
 provision). Joinder of causes of action fulfil the contract). Dudley v. Duval 
 
 upon a (/iiaiitum meruit and for the breach (1902), 29 Wash. 528, 70 Pac. 68 (a cause 
 
 of an express contract : Waterman r. of action on a contract for services united 
 
 Waterman, 81 Wis. 17; Wilson v. Smith, with one upon a guaranty). Reindl v. 
 
 61 Cal. 209; Cowan v. Abbott, 92 Cal. Heath (1901), 109 Wis. 570, 85 N. W. 495 
 
 100. A statute allowing an attachment (a cause of action to recover for work 
 
 to issue, under certain circumstances, on done by plaintiff under a contract, united 
 
 a claim before it is due, does not make it with a cau.se of action for breach of a 
 
 a cause of action, so that it may be joined provision in the same contract by which 
 
 in the same action with causes of action defendant agreed to furnish a certain quan- 
 
 on claims that are due: Wurlitzer v. tity of logs to be sawed). Gundersou u. 
 
 Suppe, 38 Kan. 31. Thomas (1894), 87 Wis. 406, 58 N. W. 
 
 QKearuey Stone Works v. McPherson 7bO~]
 
 516 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 When this is permitted, a cause of action of such a nature in 
 which the tort has been waived and the claim placed upon the 
 footing of an implied promise may be joined with causes of action 
 arising out of any other form of contract, express or implied ; as, 
 for example, where the first cause of action was for goods sold 
 and delivered, and the second averred that the defendant had 
 wrongfully taken the goods of the plaintiff, had sold them and 
 received their price, and demanded judgment for this sum so re- 
 tained by him.^ It has been recently held by the Supreme Court 
 in New York, that where the plaintiff seeks to unite a cause of 
 action merely upon contract with another cause of action origi- 
 nally for a tort, but in which the tort may be waived and the 
 liability treated as springing from an implied promise, the plead- 
 ing must show in some direct manner that the tort is waived, 
 and that the claim is upon a promise ; and to this end tlie plain- 
 tiff must not only allege the facts as they occurred, but must 
 aver a promise to have been made by the defendant, in the same 
 manner as an action of assumpsit was distinguished under the 
 former system.^ A complaint contained three counts. The first 
 alleged a sale by the defendants of certain county warrants dra^vn 
 in their favor as payees, and facts constituting an implied prom- 
 ise or guaranty that these instruments were legal and genuine, 
 but that they were not genuine, and hatl been adjudged invalid 
 as against the county in an action brought upon them ; tlie sec- 
 ond sought to charge the defendants as indorsers, treating- the 
 instruments as negotiable notes ; the third was for money had and 
 received. These causes of action were held to be properly united, 
 since they all arose out of contract.^ 
 
 § 388. * 494. Additional Illustrations. A claim to recover pos- 
 session of land, a claim to recover damages for its detention or 
 wrongful taking, and a claim for the rents and profits thereof 
 during the defendant's occupanc}', may all or any of them be 
 united in one action : * but the plaintiff is not compelled to do so ; 
 
 1 Hawk f. Thome, 54 Barb. 164; Leach * Vandevoort v. Gould, 36 N. Y. 639, 
 ?•. Leach, 2 N. Y. S. C. 657. See also 045; Livingston v. Tanuer, 12 Barb. 481 ; 
 Freer v. Dentou, 61 N. Y. 492; Logan i-. Holmes r. Davis, 21 Barb. 265; 19 N. Y. 
 Wallis, 76 N. C. 416. Fifield v. Sweeney, 488; Tompkins v. White, 8 How. Pr. 520; 
 62 WiH. 204. Arm.strong ;-. Hinds, 8 Minn. 254, 256; 
 
 2 Bootli r. Farmers' & Mech. Bk. of Walker >•. Mitchell, 18 B Mon. 541 ; Burr 
 Rochester. 1 N. Y. S. C. 45. v. VVoodrow, 1 Bush, 602; Sullivnii r. 
 
 •■' Keller /■. Hicks, 22 Cal. 457. Davis, 4 Cal. 291; Laiig.sdiile r. W.xil-
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 517 
 
 he may sue separately on each.^ An action to compel the spe- 
 cific performance of a contract to convey land is, within the 
 meaning of the statute, an action to recover possession of lands, 
 and may be united with a cause of action for damages on account 
 of defendant's delay in performing the contract.^ In like manner, 
 a claim to recover possession of chattels may be united with a 
 claim for damages for their taking or detention.'^ 
 
 § 389. * 495. Causes for Injuries to Property. Illustrations. 
 Causes of action for injuries to property form a distinct class, 
 and the generality of this language permits the union of claims 
 arising from injuries of all kinds, whether with or without force, 
 whether direct or consequential, and whether to real or to per- 
 sonal property. Singulai'ly enough, injuries to the person are 
 })laced in the same group in most of the States, rather than in a 
 class by themselves, or with injuries to character.* The following 
 are examples of causes of action arising from injuries to property 
 which have been held properly united in a single suit : in an ac- 
 tion against a railroad company, (1) for damages resulting from 
 the unlawful throwing down the fences on plaintiff's farm, whereby 
 cattle entered and destroyed the growing crops, (2) for damages 
 caused by water thrown on to the farm by means of an embank- 
 ment, (3) for damages from earth piled upon the farm, obstructing 
 the passage of teams and the free use of the land, (4) for damages 
 occasioned by the killing of cattle by means of passing engines ; ^ 
 
 leu. 120 Ind. 16; Hiles v. .Johnson, 67 Carter, .38 Wis. 394; Spahr v. Nicklaus, 
 
 Wis. 517; Black v. Drake, 28 Kau. 482; 51 Ind. 221 ; Bottorf u. Wise, 53 id. 32. 
 Fletcher v. Brown (Neb. 1892), 53 N. W. i Ibid. 
 
 577. A claim to recover land, with dam- - Worrall v. Munn, 38 N. Y. 137. A 
 
 ages for withholding the same, and a demand for a specific performance against 
 
 claim of the rents and profits for its use, A. cannot be, united with a demand to 
 
 are distinct causes of action, and evidence recover possession against B. Fagan v. 
 
 to prove the latter is inadmissible under a Barnes, 14 Fla. 53, 56. 
 complaint which does not contain such '^ Pharis v. Carver, 13 B. Men. 236. 
 
 cause of action, but simply alleges the '^ []Thelin v. Stewart (1893), 100 Cal. 
 
 former. Larned v. Hudson, 57 N. Y. 151 ; 372, 34 Pac. 861, holding that a .cause of 
 
 Pengrai'. Munz, 29 Fed. Rep. 830. But action for an injury to the person cannot 
 
 cninpare § *454, an/e. It has been held be united with a separate cause of action 
 
 tliat a claim to recover possession of one for a subsequent injury to property, aud 
 
 p-xrcel of land cannot be joined with a that a demurrer to a complaint on this 
 
 similar claim in respect to another and ground, where such causes of action are 
 
 distinct parcel. Holmes v. Williams, 16 so set out, will be sustained. Code Civ. 
 
 Minn. 164, 169. See, however, Beronio Proc, § 427.] 
 
 V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 86 Cal. 415. See ' Clark's Adm. v. Han. & St. Jos. R. 
 
 also Merrill v. Deering, 22 Minn. 376 ; Co., 30 ]Mo. 202 ; and see Teudesen v. 
 
 Lord y Deering, 24 id. 110; Ilackett v. Marshall, 3 Cal. 440.
 
 518 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 an action by a mine-owner, alleging (1) injuries caused by the 
 bursting of defendant's dam, negligently constructed, whereby 
 gold-bearing earth was washed away and (2) damages resulting 
 from the delay and hindrance in working the mine ; ^ where the 
 complaint contained two counts, the first being for trespasses 
 done to the land prior to its conveyance to the plaintiff, the claim 
 having been assigned to him, and the second alleged that the 
 plaintiff was owner and in possession of the land, that the defend- 
 ants were about to enter upon the same and quarry and carry 
 away minerals therefrom, and prayed an injunction restraining 
 the trespassers, the two causes of action were held to be properly 
 joined, although one was legal and the other equitable.^ On the 
 same principle, in a suit to recover possession of land, a separate 
 cause of action may be added to restrain a threatened trespass 
 and commission of waste.^ A cause of action for deceit practised 
 in the sale of chattels may be joined with one for the unlawful 
 taking and conversion of other goods ; the claim of damages for 
 the fraud in such a case arises from an " injury to property " 
 within the meaning of the codes.^ 
 
 § 390. * 496. Malicious Prosecution and Slander or Libel. 
 Within the class of "injuries to character" fall not only actions 
 for libel and for slander, but those for malicious prosecution ; the 
 gist of the latter, according to the old authorities, being the wrong 
 done to the plaintiff's reputation.^ A cause of action for malicious 
 
 1 Fraler v. Sears Union Water Co., 12 expressly authorizes a party to 'unite in 
 Cal. .'J55. the same complaint several causes of ac- 
 
 2 More V. Massini, 32 Cal. 590, 595, tion . . . where they arise out of ' and 
 per Shafter J. The opinion in this case is ' belong to one ' of the several classes 
 instructive. tlierein mentioned and affect all the ' pur- 
 
 ■* Natoma Water Co. v. Clarkin, 14 ties to the action ' and do ' not require 
 
 Cal. 544. different places of trial ' and are 'stated 
 
 * Cleveland r. Barrows, 59 Rarb. 364, separately.' R. S. 1878, sec. 2647. One of 
 
 374, 375, ])er T. A. Johnson J. See also the classes so named therein is 'injuries 
 
 De Silver v. Holden, 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. to character.' Id. Under this statute this 
 
 236. Joinder of a cause of action for tres- court has held that a plaintiff may unite 
 
 pass to real property with one fur assault, in the same comjilaint a cause of action 
 
 Craig V. Cook, 28 Minn. 232; waste, and for lil)el and another cause of action for 
 
 deceit in the .sale of personalty, Gilbert r. .slander. Noonan i-. Orion, 32 Wis. lOO. 
 
 Loberg (Wis. 1892), .53 N. W. 500. It li><rically follows that two or more sepa- 
 
 ^ ^Fred v. Traylor (1903), — Ky. — , rate causes of action for slander may bo 
 72 S. \V.7G8, Ilellsiern r. Katzer (1899), united in the same complaint. In the case 
 103 Wis. 391, 79 N. W. 429, in which the at bar we arc clearly of the opinion that 
 court said : " One ground of demurrer aa- only one cause of action is alleged, or 
 signed is that several causes of action attempted to be alleged. True, the coin- 
 have been improperly united. The statute plaint sets forth three several c.\cerpts
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 519 
 
 prosecution may therefore be joined with one for libel or slander, 
 or both.^ 
 
 § 391. * 497. Special Cases. The following are some special 
 cases. In Wisconsin a complaint was sustained in an action by 
 a creditor, one count of which set up a cause of action against a 
 bank to recover certain property or its value, and another count 
 alleged a cause of action against delinquent stockholders of the 
 corporation.^ Where a complaint contained two causes of action, 
 the first to enforce an implied trust alleged to have arisen in favor 
 of the plaintiff on the conveyance of lands from himself to the 
 defendant, and the second to enforce a vendor's lien on the same 
 lands, they were held to be properly united, since both arose out 
 of trusts, the one by virtue of a contract, and the other by opera- 
 tion of law.3 In another equitable suit the joinder of four causes 
 of action was sustained, where the first was to reform a certain 
 trust deed by inserting the name of a trustee, and to foreclose it 
 when reformed, the second was to foreclose a mortgage upon the 
 same land, while the third and fourth were to enforce certain 
 charges which were liens on the land, and which the plaintiff had 
 been compelled to pay in order to protect his security.* 
 
 § 392. * 498. Rule in Iowa. All of the foregoing cases were 
 decided under State codes which contain substantially the same 
 provisions and the same division into classes. In Indiana and 
 Iowa, it will be remembered, the corresponding sections of the 
 
 from the discourse complained of ; but it prosecution, both causes of action arising 
 alleges that they were each and all made out of the same trausaction.] 
 at the same time and place, in the same ^ Martin v. JMattison, 8 Abb. Pr. 3 ; 
 connection, and that the language em- Hull v. Vreeland, 18 Abb. Pr. 182; Wat- 
 ployed in each of such excerpts was un- son v. Hazzard, 3 Code Rep. 218 ; Shore 
 derstood by the persons then and there v. Smith, 15 Ohio St. 173 ; Hargau v. 
 present in the congregation, or by the Purdy (Ky. 1892), 20 S. W. 432 (slander 
 most of them. It is true that in discuss- joined with libel). 
 
 ing the subject of damages it has been ^ Seaman v. Goodnow, 20 Wis. 27, 
 
 said that where the article complained of sed qu. 
 
 contains several expressions, each of which ^ Burt v. Wilson, 28 Cal. 632. See 
 
 is libellous per se, each such e.xpiession also Price v. Brown, 10 Abb. N. Cas. 67 
 
 is, in legal effect, a separate cause of ac- (causes of action arising out of breach of 
 
 tion. Caudrian v. Miller, 98 Wis. 168. trust may be united in a suit against the 
 
 But that does not mean that each such trustee's executors). 
 
 expression must necessarily be pleaded as * Eurnside v. Wayman, 49 Mo. 356. 
 
 a separate cause of action." Scott v. The " trust deed " mentioned was, in fact. 
 
 Flowers (1900), 60 Neb. 675, 84 N. W. 81, a form of security used in several of the 
 
 in which it was said a cause of action for States instead of a mortgage. See also 
 
 false imprisonment may be joined in the Williams v. Peabody, 8 Hun, 271 ; Hay v. 
 
 same petition with a count for malicious Hay, 13 id. 315.
 
 520 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 statute are peculiar, and more latitude is permitted, especially in 
 the latter State, in the joinder of unlike causes of action. As 
 in Iowa all legal or equitable causes of action may be united, 
 a claim arising upon contract may be included in the same petition 
 with one for damages resulting from any kind of tort.^ And 
 where twent3^-two different parcels of land belonging to the same 
 owners had been conveyed to the plaintiff by as many separate 
 tax deeds, he was permitted to foreclose all these deeds, and thus 
 cut off the owner s right of redemption in one action. ^ In con- 
 struing the sections of the Iowa code which give the trial court a 
 discretion in reference to the joinder of unlike causes of action, 
 and which authorize it to compel ,an election, or to strike out 
 on the defendant's motion, it is held that the provision for 
 compelling the plaintiff to elect applies only to a case where 
 the various causes of action set forth in the petition are merely 
 different modes of stating one and tlie same demand, and the 
 defendant must file an affidavit showing this fact as the basis 
 of his motion ; but the court may, on defendant's motion, strike 
 out a cause of action which it deems impossible or inconven- 
 ient to try ^vith the others, but in no case is a demurrer the 
 proper remedy.^ 
 
 § 393. * 499. Illustrations from Indiana and California. In 
 Indiana, a cause of action by a wife for an absolute divorce was 
 held properly joined with a cause of action to compel the specific 
 performance of an agreement to convey certain lands to her made 
 
 ^ Turner r. First Nat. Bk. of Keokuk, tiffs for the destruction of chattels owned 
 
 20 luwa, 562. See also Memienhall i-. by them jointly, and also for au assault 
 
 Wilson, 54 Iowa, 589 (trespass and con- and battery committed upon each ; but, 
 
 tract); Thorpe v. Dickey, 51 id. 676; no motion havinj^ been made to strike 
 
 Stevens v. Chance, 47 id. 602. out, the irregularity was thereby waived : 
 
 2 Byington r. Woods, 13 Iowa, 17, 19. Grant i\ McCarthy, 38 Iowa. 468; an ac- 
 
 See, per contra, Turner v. Duchman, 23 tion l)y two persons not partners for a 
 
 Wis. 500. slander of each, but on the trial the case 
 
 [^Campbell v. Equitable Loan & Trust was severed, and the trial proceeded on be- 
 
 Co. (1901), 14 S. I). 483, 85 N. W. 1015. half of one alone, and this was held proper : 
 
 Under the statute allowing joinder of Hinkle v. Davenport, 38 Iowa, 335. For 
 
 causes of action to recover real j)roperty, it furtlier illustration, see Faivre i'. Gillan 
 
 is proper to joiu five causes of action to (Iowa, 1S92), 51 N. W. 46. 
 set aside five tax deeds on five separate ^See the following recent Iowa cases : 
 
 tracts of land.] Devin r. Walsh (1899), 108 la. 428, 79 
 
 8 Keed i-. Howe, 28 Iowa, 250, 252 ; N. W. 133 ; Prader r. Nat. Acc't. Ass'n. 
 
 Iowa & Minn. II. Co. v. Perkins, 28 Iowa, (1899), 107 la. 431, 78 N. W. 60 ; Clayton 
 
 281. In the following cases, the causes County j-. Ilerwig (1897), 100 la. 03], 69 
 
 of action were held to have been im- N. W. 1035; Jenks v. Lansing Lumber 
 
 properly joined: an action by two plain- Co. (1896), 97 la. 342, 66 N. W. 231.]
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 521 
 
 by the husband at the time of their separation.^ In California, by- 
 virtue of the provisions of a special statute, a cause of action 
 against a sheriff to recover damages for his neglect to execute and 
 return process may be joined with a claim to recover a statutory 
 penalty for the failure in his official duty.'-^ 
 
 § 394. * 500. Cause of Action upon Contract cannot be joined 
 w^ith one to recover Damages for a Tort. Illustrations. Author's 
 Criticism. I shall conclude this section with a classified series of 
 decisions which will illustrate the improper union of different 
 causes of action. Except in Iowa, the rule is universal that a 
 cause of action upon contract cannot be joined with one to recover 
 damages for a tort, unless both should arise out of the same trans- 
 action, and thus fall within the inclusive terms of the first class. 
 The following are examples merely of this elementary rule.^ A 
 count against the defendant for his wrongful acts as president of 
 a bank, and one against him as a stockholder in such bank to re- 
 cover on its notes, were improperly embraced in the same com- 
 plaint,* also a claim against certain part owners of a vessel to 
 recover her hire, which they had received, and one to restrain 
 them from a threatened wrongful sale of the ship.^ It has been 
 held that a demand arising from the breach of a warranty given 
 upon the sale of chattels cannot be joined with one based upon the 
 vendor's deceit practised in the same sale.^ Notwithstanding 
 
 1 Fritz r. Fritz ; 23 Iiid. 388. 25 Ore. 305, 35 Pac. 658 : Where a com- 
 
 QSee late cases ill Indiana as follows: plaint contains allegations of a covenant 
 
 Coddington v. Canaday (1901), 157 Ind. against incumbrances and its breach, and 
 
 243, 61 N. E. 567 ; State px rel. v. Peck- also allegations of the representations of 
 
 ham (1893), 136 Ind. 198, 36 N. E. 28; the defendant as to the freedom of the 
 
 Kichwiue v. Presbyterian Church (1893), property from incumlirances, their falsity, 
 
 135 Ind. 80, .34 N. E. 737/] defendant's knowledge that they were 
 
 - Pearkes ?•. Freer, 9 Cal. 642. false, and plaintiif 's reliance on them, 
 
 ^ [^Clough V. Rocky Mountain Oil Co. there is a misjoinder of causes, one being 
 
 (1898), 25 Colo. 520, 5.5 Pac. 809 : A cause in contract, the other in tort, but unless 
 
 of action in contract against a corporation the objection is taken by demurrer it is 
 
 cannot be joined with a cause of action waived. See also Conant v. Storthz 
 
 against the directors of the same corpora- (1901 ), 69 Ark. 209, 62 S. W. 415.] 
 
 tion brought under a statute making the ■* Butt v. Cameron, 53 Barb. 642 ; Imt 
 
 directors liable for the deljts of the com- see Wiles v. Suydam, 6 N. Y. S. C. 292. 
 
 pany in case they failed to make certain ^ Coster v. N. Y. & E. R. Co., 3 Abb. 
 
 reports as to the condition of the com- Pr. 332. 
 
 pany, the latter being the cause of action ^ Springsteed i\ Lawson, 14 Abb. Pr. 
 
 in tort. Allen v. Macon, etc. R. R. Co. 328; Sweet f. Ingerson, 12 How. Pr. 331. 
 
 (1899), 107 Ga. 838, 33 S. E. 696 : A cause See Gertler v. Linscott, 26 Minn. 82 ; 
 
 of action on contract cannot be joined in a Logan i\ Wallis, 76 N. C. 416 ; Doughty 
 
 .single suit with a cause of action arising i\ Atlantic & N. C. R. Co., 78 id. 22; 
 
 from a tort. Corbett v. Wrenn (1894), Keller v. Boatman, 49 Ind. 104.
 
 522 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 these decisions, it is impossible to conceive of two legal causes of 
 action which more completely and accurately correspond to the 
 lansruaofe of the codes, as '"arising out of the same transaction," 
 The bargain between the parties is certainly a transaction ; certain 
 language used by the seller may amount to a contract of w^arranty ; 
 certain other language may be the false representations ; indeed, 
 it is possible, and not at all unlikely, that the selfsame words 
 spoken by the vendor might be at once the fraudulent representa- 
 tions and the promise, for language otherwise sulhcient is none 
 the less a promise because tlie person using it knowingly lied 
 when he uttered it. To say that these two demands do not arise 
 out of the same transaction is virtually to say that no two different 
 legal claims ever can so arise. I cannot regard these decisions, 
 therefore, otherwise than as mistaken. 
 
 § 395. * 501. Illustrations. In an action against a railroad 
 company, the complaint contained three counts: the first for 
 wrongfully carrying away and converting cattle ; the second for 
 the same injury done to hogs ; and the third set up an agreement 
 to transport cattle from a specified place to another, and averred 
 a breach thereof by means of a negligent omission whereby the 
 plaintiff lost his cattle. On demurrer, it was said tliat the first 
 two causes of action, being for torts, could be joined; but the 
 third was upon contract, and its union with the others was error.^ 
 The joinder of a count for the conversion of chattels with one for 
 money had and received would be clearly wrong : ^ and the same 
 is true of any tort and implied contract.^ It is doubtful whether 
 a cause of action on contract and one for a tort to the person can 
 be conceived of as arising out of the same transaction, so that they 
 may be embraced in the same pleading. The attempt, however, 
 has been made to unite a claim for the breach of a written con- 
 tract to convey land \\\i\\ a cause of action for assault and battery 
 
 1 Cohvell V. N. Y. & E. R. Co., 9 How. construct and maintain a farm crcssiiig, 
 Pr. .311; Hoagland v. Han. &. St. .los. R. as required by statute, aii.^cs upon the 
 Co., .39 Mo. 451. See also Stark v. Well- breach of an iiii])lied contract to perform 
 man, 96 Cal. 400. a statutory duty, and tlierefore cannot 
 
 - Cobb I'. Dows, 9 Barb. 2.30, and cases be united witli a cause of action for dam- 
 in last note. See also Teall c Syracuse, ages for injuries to real jiroperty caused 
 32 Hun, .332. by the diversion of a stream. Followed 
 
 2 Hunter v. Powell, 15 IIow. Pr. 221. in Hodges v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 
 It was held in Thomas r. Utica & B. R. R. 10.=) N. C. 170, a case preseuting similar 
 Co., 97 N. V. 245, that a cau.se of action facts. 
 
 for the omis.sion by a railroad com]>any to
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 523 
 
 committed by the defendant in forcibly taking the instrument 
 from the plaintiff's possession, but it was unsuccessful.^ In like 
 manner, a cause of action against a lessee arising upon the 
 lease cannot be joined with a claim for damages on account of 
 injuries done to the property, unless, of course, the latter is 
 embraced within some stipulation or covenant of the lease, so 
 that it would in fact be a demand on the contract.^ It can make 
 no difference with the rule that the tort is a fraud consisting in 
 false statements or concealments. Thus, a complaint by an in- 
 dorsee against liis immediate indorser was held bad on demurrer, 
 one count of which alleged the ordinary liability of defendant as 
 indorser, and the other set up certain false representations as to 
 the solvency of the maker, by which the plaintiff was induced 
 to purchase the paper.^ The rule, in short, applies to all cases 
 of demands based upon a promise, express or implied, and claims 
 based upon fraud, unless the tort may be waived, and the com- 
 plaint be framed so as to present both causes of action as arising 
 from contract.* 
 
 § 396. * 502. Cause of Action against one in Personal Char- 
 acter cannot be united -with one against him in Representative 
 Character. Reason. Author's Criticism. Illustrations. Another 
 particular rule, which is but an application of the same doc- 
 trine, requires that the several causes of action against or for 
 a given person should all affect him in the same capacity. 
 In other words a demand for or against a party in his per- 
 sonal character cannot be united with another demand for or 
 against him in a representative character as trustee, executor, 
 administrator, receiver, and the like.^ The reason usually given 
 
 1 Ehle t'. Haller, 6 Bosw. 661. liigh Coal Co. (1901), 111 Wis. 545, 87 
 - Ederliu v. Judge, 36 Mo. 350. Con- N. W. 472. Plaintiff was a retail coal- 
 versely, a claim of damages for the breach dealer in the city of Superior, and filed his 
 of the lessor'.s covenant of quiet enjoy- compiaiutin two counts against the defend- 
 ment, and a claim of damages for a tres- ants, who are wholesale and retail coal- 
 pass in his wrongful entering upon the dealers. His first count stated a cause of 
 demised premises and injuring the lessee's action in favor of himself alone, for dam- 
 property thereon, cannot be joined. Keep ages caused by an alleged malicious con- 
 V. Kaufman, 56 N. Y. 332. spiracy on the part of the defendants to 
 ^ Jamison v. Copher, 33 Mo. 483. destroy hisbusiness, said defendants having 
 ■* Forkner v. Hart, Stanton's Code combined for the purjiose of establishing 
 (Ky.), 60; Wilson v. Thompson, Id. 60; a monopoly and preventing plaintiff from 
 Hubbell r. Meigs, 50 N. Y. 480, 487; purchasing coal. His second count stated 
 Booth V. Farmers' & Mecli. Bk. of Roch- an equitable cause of action in favor of 
 ester, 1 N. Y. S. C. 45. himself and a number of other retail coal- 
 ^ QHawardeu v. Youghiogheny & Le- dealers similarly situated, in whose behalf
 
 524 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 for tliis rule when applied to defendants is, that the judgment 
 upon one cause of action would be against the defendant per- 
 sonall)', to be made de bonis proprils, while the judgment upon 
 the other cause of action would be against him in his representa- 
 tive or official capacity, and not perhaps to be made out of his own 
 property; as, for example, it might be made de bonis testatoris. 
 This reasoning, borrowed from the old law, is a mere formula of 
 w^ords, for there is nothing in the nature of things w^hich prevents 
 such a double judgment. It is just as easy for such a judgment 
 to be rendered in one action as it is for two distinct judgments 
 to be granted in separate suits. The argument, however, Hke so 
 much of so-called legal reasoning, still has convincing force with 
 most of the courts, even while administering the reformed system. 
 Tlie following cases are given as illustrations of this doctrine, and 
 in all of them the joinder was pronounced improper : a com- 
 plaint on a partnership debt against the defendant as surviving 
 partner, and against him in a separate count as executor of his 
 deceased partner ; ^ against the defendant personally, and also as 
 an executor or administrator ; ^ in a suit against an executor or 
 administrator, a demand w^hieh existed against the deceased in 
 his lifetime, and a different demand which arose from a promise 
 made by the executor or administrator after the death, for as 
 to the latter claim the defendant is personally liable.^ On the 
 
 he sued to restrain the defendants from a affects but one party phiintiff, whereas 
 
 further enforcement of said conspiracy, tlie second cause of action affects numer- 
 
 A general demurrer was filed to the whole ous ])arties plaintiff. The doctrine is fre- 
 
 coniplaint on the ground that two causes quently stated that the several causes of 
 
 of action were improperly joined. The action for or against a person must affect 
 
 court said : " The statute provides that him in the same cajtacity in order to make 
 
 causes of action, in order to be united in them capable of being joined. Pomeroy, 
 
 one complaint, ' must affect all the parties Code Kemedics, § * .502. These conclu- 
 
 to the action.' Stats. 1898, sec. 2647. sions are conclusive to tlie effect tliat the 
 
 It is clear that this limitation would be general demurrer to the whole coiuplaint 
 
 violated if the two causes of action in liiis on riie ground of improper joinder .should 
 
 comjdaint were allowed to be united in have been sustained. "3 
 one complaint. The fir.«t cause of action ^ Landau v. Levy, I Abb. ]'r. 376. 
 
 is a straight action at law for damages to - McMahon v. Allen, 3 Abb. Pr. 89. 
 
 tlie plaintiff alone. No one el.se has any By C. C. P. of New York, § 1815, such 
 
 interc,>it in the judgment in that action, joinder is allowed in certain specified 
 
 whatever it lie. But the second cause of cases. ^Crowley v. Hicks (1898), 93 Wis. 
 
 action is a cause of action in favor of a 5G6, 79 N. \V. 348.] 
 
 large numlper of persons constituting a ^ Ferrin r. Myrick, 41 N. Y. 315, 322; 
 
 class represented by the plaintiff. Poten- Austin r. Munro, 47 N. Y. 360, 364; s. c. 
 
 tially all of the class are parties. They 4 Lans. 67. See, however, Trailesman's 
 
 are invited to become formal parties plain- Bank ?;. McFeely, 61 Barb. 522, which 
 
 tiff, and presumably will accept the invi- cannot be regarded as correct in tlie liglit 
 
 tation. Tims the first cause of action of tlic.se otiier decisions.
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 525 
 
 same principle, a demand upon a contract between the plaintiff 
 and the defendant, and a claim by the plaintiff as a shareholder 
 in an unincorporated company against the defendant as president 
 thereof, in respect of matters connected with the management 
 of its affairs, were held to be improperly joined, since the de- 
 fendant's liability, if any, in the latter cause of action existed 
 against him as a trustee.^ The plaintiff must also sue in the 
 same capacity in respect of all the causes of action. lie cannot 
 in one count sue as an executor or administrator, and in another 
 sue in his personal character.^ In an action for malicious prose- 
 cution the complaint contained three counts: the first for the 
 malicious prosecution of the plaintiff himself ; the second for 
 the same wrong done to his wife, she having been imprisoned ; 
 and the third for a like tort to his minor children. The only 
 legal ground for recovery on the second and third of these counts 
 was declared to be the loss of the wife's society in the one 
 case, and of the children's services in the other; as these inju- 
 ries were personal to the plaintiff, they could be joined with the 
 cause of action alleged in the first count for the tort directly to 
 himself.^ 
 
 § 397. * 503. Some Unclassified Cases. Author's Criticism. The 
 cases which follow do not admit of any classification, and several 
 of them are of doubtful authority, even if not palpably erro- 
 neous. A cause of action for a limited divorce on the ground 
 of cruelty, desertion, and the like, cannot be united with one for 
 an absolute divorce on account of adultery, or of any other 
 matter prescribed by statute. The two demands are simply in- 
 compatible.* It was decided by one judge in New York that a 
 
 1 Warth V. Radde, 18 Abb. Pr. 396. Co. v. Will's Adm'r (1002), — Ky. — , 66 
 
 See, however, Logau o. Wallis, 76 N. C. S. W. 628 ; Lewis Adm'r v. Taylor Coal 
 
 416. Co. (1902), 112 Ky. 84.5, 66 S. W. 1044; 
 
 - Lucas V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 21 Barb. Page v. Citizens Banking Co. (1900), 111 
 
 245. But see Armstrong v. Hall, 17 How. Ga. 73, 36 S. E. 418. " Cau.ses of action for 
 
 I'r. 76. ])er C. L. Allen J., at Special malicious prosecution, malicious arrest, and 
 
 Term, — a decision in direct opposition false imprisonment, all sounding in tort, 
 
 to the rule stated in the text ; also, Hart may be joined in the same action when 
 
 V. Metrop. El. Ry. Co , 15 Daly, 391. the plaintiff and defendants in each cause 
 
 See also Quellen v. Arnold. 12 Nev. 234; of action thus joined are identical. Civil 
 
 Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. Chester, 57 Ind. Code, § 4944." See also Sams v. Derrick 
 
 299. (1898), 103 Ga. 678, 30 S. E. 668.] 
 
 ^ Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323. QA * Henry v. Henry, 17 Abb. Pr. 411 ; 
 
 cause of action for pain and suffering Mcintosh y. Mcintosh, 12 How. Pr. 289; 
 
 cannot he joined with the statutory cause Zorn v. Zorn, 38 Hun, 67; but see contra. 
 
 ;if nciiiin for death. See Louisville Ry. Grant v. Grant (Minn. 1893), 54 X W.
 
 526 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 demand to recover possession of a chattel cannot be united with 
 a claim of damages for the taking, detaining, and converting the 
 same. But as the codes expressly authorize the joinder of claims 
 for the possession of chattels, and of damages for the withholding 
 the same, this decision can hardly be sustained. " Withholding " 
 clearly includes " detaining,'' and, as it is not a technical term, it 
 was doubtless intended to embrace " taking " aud " conversion " 
 as well.^ A cause of action to recover the possession of a certain 
 parcel of land cannot, it has been said, be united with a demand 
 of damages caused by the defendant's trespasses upon other lands 
 of the plaintiff.2 It has also been held that a claim to recover 
 possession of land, and a demand of damages for the defendant's 
 tortious entry upon the same land, cannot be joined, because they 
 are entirely inconsistent.^ 
 
 § 398. * 504:. Grouping of Actions for Injuries to the Person 
 in some States. Illustrations. In one or two of the States, 
 actions for injuries to the person constitute a separate class, 
 and are not grouped together with those for injuries to property. 
 Thus in California, an "action to recover damages for alleged 
 injuries to the person and property of the plaintiff, and for his 
 false imprisonment, and for forcibly ejecting him from a house 
 
 1059. It would be difficult to determine 
 in what class the action for either kind of 
 divorce fall.s. One judge in Mcintosh v. 
 Mcintosh suggested that limited divorce 
 was a claim for injury to the person. It 
 seems to be casus omissus. See also Has- 
 kell V. Haskell, .54 Cal. 262 (in an action 
 for divorce, adultery and habitual intem- 
 perance are distinct causes) ; Uhl i'. Uhl, 
 .52 id. 250 (a cause of action to annul a 
 marriage by reason of a former marriage 
 of the plaintiff to one still alive cannot be 
 joined with a cause of action to (juiet 
 plaintiff's title to her separate property, in 
 which defendant falsely claims an inter- 
 est. Hut in Prouty i: Prouty, 4 Wash. 174, 
 a complaint in an action for divorce and 
 alimony, which asked tliat alleged fraud- 
 ulent conveyances by the husband of all 
 his property be set aside, was held to pre- 
 sent no misjoinder. The same complaint 
 cannot unite causes of action for divorce, 
 and to obtain the annulment of a separa- 
 tion deed : fJalusha v. Galusha (N. Y. 
 Apj), May, 1893), 33 N. E. 1062). 
 
 1 Maxwell v. Farnam, 7 How. Pr. 236, 
 per Harris J., at Special Term. 
 
 - Hulce V. Thompson, 9 How. Pr. 113. 
 But cannot both causes of action be re- 
 ferred to the single class of " injuries to 
 property " ? The recovery of possession 
 is merely the relief, and not the cause of 
 action. 
 
 3 Budd V. Bingham, 18 Barb. 494, per 
 Brown J. It is difficult to perceive this 
 inconsistency. This and some similar de- 
 cisions are cited, not because they have 
 any authority or any value, but to com- 
 plete the statement of the judicial iuter- 
 ])retation put upon this provision of the 
 statute. For further illustrations, see 
 Buckmaster r. Kelley, 15 Fla. 180; Mat- 
 tair V. Payne, 15 id. 682: Williams r. 
 Lowe, 4 Neb. 382; Paxton >: Wood, 77 
 N. C. 11; Suber 1-. Allen, 13 S. C. 317 ; 
 Stevens v. Chance, 47 Iowa, 602 ; Schnit- 
 zer V. Cohen, 7 Hun, 665 ; French v. 
 Salter, 17 id. 546; Dyer v. Barstow, 5 
 Cal. 652; Brown v. Rice, 51 id. 89.
 
 GENERAL PKIXCIPLKS OP PLEADING. 527 
 
 and lot in his possession, and detaining the possession thereof 
 from liini," was held to be an improper union, as it embraced 
 causes belonging to two if not three of the classes specified in 
 the code ; ^ and in another case, the joining of a claim to recover 
 possession of land, damages for its detention, damages for the 
 forcible expulsion of the plaintiff from the premises, and the 
 value of the im})roveraents made by him, was pronounced equally 
 an error for the same reason. ^ 
 
 § 399. * 505. Holding of Wisconsin Court in Action to quiet 
 Title. An action to quiet the title to three different tracts of 
 land which had belonged originally to different owners, and 
 which the plaintiff held under three distinct tax deeds executed 
 at separate times, was held in Wisconsin to violate the require- 
 ments of the code. The proceeding was likened by the court to 
 the foreclosure in one action of three different mortgages given 
 by three different owners upon three separate parcels of land.^ 
 
 SECTION THIRD. 
 
 THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING. 
 
 § 400. *506. The Three Types of Pleading Prior to the Re- 
 formed System. Pleading by Allegation. In order that the sys- 
 tem of pleading introduced by the reformed procedure may be 
 accurately understood, I shall briefly describe the essential 
 principles and doctrines of those which prevailed in different 
 courts at the time of its adoption, and the comparison which can 
 thus be made will be of great assistance in arriving at correct 
 results. The three types of pleading then known either in 
 England or in this country were the common law, the equity, 
 and that which in the absence of a distinctive name I shall call 
 "pleading by allegation." The last-mentioned method was used 
 in the courts of admiralty, of probate and divorce, the ecclesi- 
 astical courts, and wherever the law as administered was based 
 directly upon the doctrines and modes of the Roman Civil Law. 
 Its peculiar features consisted (1) in breaking up an entire 
 pleading into a number of separate paragraphs, — technically 
 
 1 McCarty l. Premont, 23 Cal. 196, Bowles v. Sacramento Turnp. Co., 5 Cal. 
 197. [See late case of Lamb v. Harbaugh 224 ; Bigelow v. Gove, 7 Cal. 133. 
 (1895), 105 Cal. 680, 39 Pac. 56.] 3 Turner i'. Duchman, 23 Wis. 500. 
 
 2 Mayo V. Madden, 4 Cal. 27. And see
 
 523 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 "allegations," — each of which should properly contain a single 
 important circumstance or principal fact going to make out the 
 cause of action ; and (2) the statement in each allegation of all 
 the minute and subordinate facts which taken together compose, 
 and are evidence of, the main circumstance or fact relied upon 
 by the litigant party to sustain his contention. The pleading as 
 a w^hole, therefore, comprised not only averments of the sub- 
 stantial facts, the important conclusions of fact which must be 
 established by the proofs, — those facts which in the common- 
 law system are called "issuable" or "material," — but also a 
 narrative of all the probative facts, of all the evidence from 
 which the existence of the "issuable" facts must be inferred. 
 A libel constructed upon this theory disclosed the whole case of 
 the complaining party; if properly framed, it set forth in a con- 
 tinuous and narrative form a complete account of the transaction, 
 describing the situation of the parties at its commencement, all 
 the various incidents which happened in its progress, its final 
 conclusion, and the results produced upon each, and prayed for 
 such relief as the law affords in the given case. The codes of 
 several States have plainly intended to borrow one feature of 
 this system ; that is, the separation of the pleading into a number 
 of distinct paragraphs continuously numbered, and each com- 
 prising the statement of a single material or issuable fact. The 
 second feature, namel}', the narrative of probative facts and cir- 
 cumstances in the manner above described, violates the funda- 
 mental and essential principle of the reformed procedure. 
 
 § 401. * 507. The Equity System of Pleading. The equity 
 method of pleading, when freed from all the superfluous addi- 
 tions which had become incorporated with it in practice, and 
 when thus reduced to its mere essential elements, consisted in 
 a statement of all tlie facts indicating the relief to which the 
 complainant is entitled, and in this original aspect it did not 
 differ in principle from that prescribed by the codes. I pur- 
 posely make use of the expression "facts indicating the relief to 
 which the complainant is entitled," rather than the ordinary 
 phrase "facts constituting the complainant's cause of action," 
 for a reason which will be fully explained in the sequel. ' I now 
 call attention to the form of expression, for it is important, and 
 will assist in removing certain difficulties which have been sug- 
 gested by some of the judges in their exposition of the codes.
 
 PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY PLEADING. 529 
 
 Practically, a bill in equity, prior to any modern reforms, had 
 been changed from the original simplicity as above described, 
 and had come to consist of three distinct parts or divisions, the 
 narrative, the charging, and the interrogative. The first of 
 these contained a statement of the complainant's case for relief; 
 the second anticipated and rebutted the defendant's supposed 
 positions; while the last was used to probe the defendant's con- 
 science, and to extract from him admissions under oath in his 
 answer concerning matters within his own knowledge which the 
 existing rules of evidence did not permit to be proved by the 
 j)arties themselves as ordinary witnesses. The result of these 
 modifications was an almost entire departure from the simple 
 conception of equity pleading. The bill and answer were gen- 
 erally made to include the evidence by which either party main- 
 tained his own contention, or defeated that of his adversary, and 
 also legal conclusions and arguments which more appropriately 
 belonged to the briefs of counsel and the discussions at the 
 hearing. All this, I say, although very common and perhaps 
 universal in the actual practice before any reforms through 
 legislation or rules of court, was really unnecessary, and formed 
 no essential part of the theory of equity pleading. The onlj^ 
 indispensable portion of a bill was the narrative. Except for the 
 purpose of eliciting evidence from the defendant, there was no 
 more reason why this should contain mere evidence of the facts 
 that were the foundation of the complainant's demand for relief, 
 as contradistinguished from those facts themselves, than there 
 was for the same kind of probative matter to be inserted in a 
 declaration at law. The bill in equity, as has been already said, 
 should comprise a statement of all the facts which show the 
 relief to which the complainant is entitled, which indicate the 
 nature and extent of that relief whether total or partial, and 
 the modifications or exceptions to be made in it; wliile the 
 answer should perform the same office for the defendant. By 
 the application of this doctrine, a bill in equity was generally 
 quite different in its contents from a declaration at law; it was 
 ordinarily more minute in its averments, and contained state- 
 ments of matter which in a legal action would more naturally 
 and properly belong to the evidence rather than to the alle- 
 gations of issuable facts. The reason for this distinction lay 
 entirely in the difference between equitable and legal primary 
 
 34
 
 530 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 rights and between equitable and legal remedies, especially in 
 the latter. A judgment at law was always a single award of 
 relief; the recovery either of a specific tract of land, or of a 
 specific chattel, or of a definite sum of money, and such judg- 
 ment, whatever might be its amount, was either wholly rendered 
 for the plaintiff, or wholly denied. Furthermore, the right to 
 recover a legal judgment always depended uj)on the existence of 
 a comparatively few important facts, — " issuable " or " material " 
 facts, — and the very definition of an issuable fact is, one which, 
 if denied and not proved, would prevent the plaintiff from re- 
 covering. In equit}^ the primary rights and remedies of the 
 complainant were often very different from those which existed 
 at law. His remedy was not necessarily a single recovery of 
 some specific form of relief; it might vary in its nature and 
 extent through a wide range; it might be total or partial, it 
 might be absolute or conditional. The defence, on the other 
 hand, might be total or partial; and it might even consist of 
 modifications made in the form of relief demanded by the com- 
 plainant, or in supplemental provisions added thereto in order 
 to meet some future contingency. In short, it was impossible 
 to say that the complainant's right to recover always depended 
 upon the existence of certain " issuable " facts, the failure to 
 establish either one or even all of which would necessarily defeat 
 his contention. It is true that in some cases the equitable 
 remedy sought by the complainant might be of such a nature 
 that it would follow from the proof of such issuable facts as 
 completely and directly as the plaintiff's right to a common-law 
 judgment does in a legal action. While this was possible in 
 some instances, in the great majority of equitable actions the 
 relief was more complicated ; the primary rights were more com- 
 prehensive ; and the decree as a whole was shaped, modified, and 
 adapted to various circumstances and minor facts upon which 
 individually the cause of action or the defence did not entirely 
 rest, but all of which in combination entered into the resulting 
 remedial right belonging to the litigant parties. Now, on the 
 theory of equity pleading, all these facts should be averred by 
 the complainant or tlie defendant as the case might be; and 
 while it can be properly said that they all indicate and affect 
 the relief to be awarded by the court, they cannot all be said " to 
 constitute the cause of action " or tlie defence in the same sense
 
 PRINCIPLES OF COMMOX-LAW PLEADING. 531 
 
 in which the "issuable "' or "material "' facts constitute the cause 
 of action or the defence in a suit at law. I repeat the statement 
 already made, for it is an important one, that this descri[)tion 
 does not necessarily apply to every case of equitable relief. 
 Under certain circumstances, and in some particular instances, 
 the remedy and the right to its recovery are single and depend 
 upon the existence of a few well-defined and controlling facts; 
 such facts are then " material " or " issuable " in the strictest 
 sense of those terms, and they are all that it is requisite to allege 
 in the pleading. In most instances, however, an equity pleading 
 necessarily contained allegations of facts which were not " issu- 
 able " in the technical meaning of that word, but which m ere 
 nevertheless the basis of the relief demanded and obtained. I 
 have dwelt thus carefully upon the foregoing analysis, because it 
 is the element which enters into and decides a most important 
 question to be considered in the sequel; namely, whether the 
 proper modes of pleading in legal and in equitable actions under 
 the reformed procedure can be referred to and derived from the 
 single fundamental principle announced by all the codes. An- 
 other essential feature belonged to the equity method of pleading, 
 and distinguished it from that which prevailed in courts of law. 
 The facts upon which the contentions of the litigant parties 
 wholly or partially depended were averred as they actually hap- 
 pened or existed, and not the legal effect or aspect of those facts. 
 This distinction was a vital one, as will be fully pointed out in 
 the succeeding paragraphs, and its relations with the reformed 
 theory of pleading are direct and intimate. 
 
 § 402. * 508. The Common-La-w System of Pleading. Intro- 
 ductory. I come finally to the common-law system of j^leading. 
 It has frequently been said, even by able judges, that under this 
 method the material, issuable facts constituting the cause of 
 action, and they alone, were to be alleged ; and that, as exactly 
 the same principle lies at the basis of the new system, the latter 
 has made no substantial change, but has only removed the un- 
 necessary and troublesome incidents which had been gathered 
 around the original simple common-law conception. In support 
 of this view, the general language of Chitty and other text- 
 writers is quoted as conclusive. There is just enough truth in 
 this description of the common-law pleading to make it plausible ; 
 but enough of error to render it, wlien adopted as a means of
 
 532 CIVIL KEMKWES. 
 
 interpreting the codes, extremel}' misleading. In fact, it is im- 
 possible to describe the common-law pleading as a unit: it was 
 o-overned by no universal principles ; the modes which prevailed 
 in certain actions were radically unlike those that were employed 
 in othei-s. I shall attempt in a very brief manner to point out all 
 its essential features, and to explain its general character. 
 
 § 403. * 509. Technicality of the System. In the lirst place, 
 certain elements were firmly incorporated into the system which 
 were not really fandamental and essential, although often re- 
 garded and spoken of as its peculiarly characteristic requisites. 
 1 refer to the extreme nicety, precision, and accuracy which were 
 demanded by the courts in the framing of allegations, in averring 
 either the facts from which the primary rights of the parties 
 arose, or those which constituted the breach of such rights, in 
 the use of technical phrases and formulas, in the certainty of 
 statement produced by negativing almost all possible conclusions 
 different from that affirmed by the pleader, in the numerous 
 repetitions of the same averment, and finally in the invention 
 and employment of a language and mode of expression utterly 
 unlike the ordinary spoken or written English, and meaningless 
 to any person but a trained expert. This requirement of accu- 
 racy and precision was in former times pushed to an absurd and 
 most unjust extreme ; as for example, the use of the past tense 
 "had," instead of the present "have," in a material allegation, 
 would be fatal to the plaintiff's recovery. If it be said that 
 these extreme niceties and absurd technicalities were things of 
 the past, abandoned by the law courts in modern times, a perusal 
 of some standard reports — for instance, those of Meeson and 
 "Welsln' — will show on what grounds of the merest form the 
 rights of litigant parties have been determined, even within the 
 present generation. Still, I do not regard this precision, accu- 
 racy, and general technicalit}-, which actually distinguished the 
 common-law system of pleading, as something essential to its 
 existence, as its absolutely necessary elements. It might have 
 retained all its fundamental principles in respect to the nature of 
 the allegations used and the kinds of facts averred, and at the 
 same time have employed the familiar language of common nar- 
 rative in making all these averments. The essential elements 
 of the system would then be presented in their naked sini[)licity. 
 The actual technicalities which have been thus mentioned, and
 
 PKINGU'LKS OF COMMON- LAW PLEADING. 533 
 
 which were the boast of the skilful special pleader, were only a 
 disgrace to the administration of justice. However pleasant 
 they might have been as exercises in logic, they were productive 
 of untold injustice to suitors. It is simpl}^ amazing that they 
 could have been retained so long and adhered to so tenaciously, 
 and even lauded with extravagant eulogium, among peoples like 
 tiie English and the American. Tliat they were entirely abro- 
 gated by all the codes of procedure is plain ; and after a series of 
 improvements, commencing in 1834, when the celebrated " Rules 
 of Hilary Term " were adopted, the British Parliament has swept 
 them out of the English law, and has introduced the substance 
 of the American system. 
 
 § 404. * 510. Essential Principles and Elements of Common-La-w 
 Pleading. Passing from these technical incidents, I proceed to 
 inquire what were the real and essential principles and elements 
 of the common-law pleading. How far was it true that the 
 material facts constituting the cause of action, and these alone, 
 were to be alleged ? This statement was partly correct, — that 
 is, correct under most important limitations and reservations, in 
 certain of the forms of action ; while in the other of these forms 
 of action it was not true in, the slightest extent; in fact, it was 
 diametrically opposed to the truth. 1 will recapitulate the 
 important actions, and refer them to their proper classes. In 
 ejectment there can be no pretence that any attempt was made 
 to allege the actual facts constituting the cause of action; the 
 declaration and accompanying proceedings were a mass of fictions 
 which had become ridiculous, whatever may have been their 
 original usefulness, and the answer was the general issue; the 
 record thus threw no light upon the real issues to be tried by the 
 jury. In trover, the averments of the declaration were that 
 the plaintiff was possessed, as his own property, of certain speci- 
 fied chattels.; that he lost them; and that tlie defendant found 
 them, and converted them to his own use. Throwing out of 
 view the abused fictions of a loss and a finding, there was here 
 the statement of two facts, namel}', the description of the chattels 
 so as to identify them, and the plaintiff's property in them ; but 
 the most important allegation of all, the one upon which in the 
 vast majority of cases the whole controversy would turn, was 
 a pure conclusion of law. The statement that defendant had 
 converted the same to his own use did not indicate anv fact to
 
 534 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 be considered and decided by the jury in reaching their verdict. 
 In the action of debt, also, the important allegation was a mere 
 conclusion of law, namely, that the defendant was indebted to 
 the plaintiff in a certain sum whereupon an action had accrued ; 
 and although the declaration contained a further statement of 
 the consideration or cause of the indebtedness, yet as a whole it 
 did not pretend to set forth the material facts constituting the 
 cause of action. In assumpsit, the pleadings were of two very 
 different species, in all cases of implied promises, and especially 
 when the common counts were resorted to, the averments were 
 purely fictitious, as much so as in ejectment; there was not the 
 slightest approach towards a statement of the facts constituting 
 a cause of action as they actually existed. When the suit was 
 brought upon an express contract, and the declaration was in the 
 form of a special assumpsit, there was a greater appearance of 
 alleging facts ; but even here the facts were stated in their sup- 
 posed legal aspect and effect, as legal conclusions, and not simply 
 as they occurred. There are left to be considered the actions 
 of covenant, detinue, trespass, and case. In each one of these, 
 according to the nature of the action, the facts constituting the 
 grounds for a recovery were more nearly stated, although in some 
 of them the averments were required to be made in an exceed- 
 ingly precise and technical manner. The declaration in a special 
 action on the case necessarily comprised a narrative of the actual 
 facts constituting the cause of action ; but as has been said, this 
 narrative was thrown into a very arbitrary, technical, and un- 
 natural shape. It therefore bore some resemblance in substance 
 to a complaint or a petition, when properly framed according to 
 the reformed theory ; and some judges have even said that every 
 such complaint or petition is a declaration in a special action on 
 the case. The assertion so often made by the older text-writei-s, 
 and repeated by modern judges, that the common-law system of 
 pleading demanded allegations of the facts constituting the cause 
 of action or the defence, is thus, as a general proposition, mani- 
 festly incorrect, for in many forms of action there was no pretence 
 of any such averments. 
 
 § 405. *511. Same Subject. Hut we must go a Step farther 
 in order to oV)tain an accurate notion of the common-law theory. 
 In all the instances where fictions were discarded, and where the 
 important allegations were not mere naked conclusions of law,
 
 PRINCIPLES OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING. 535 
 
 but where, on the contrary, the pUiintiff assumed to state the 
 "issuable " facts constituting his cause of action, lie did not nar- 
 rate the exact transaction between himself and the defendant 
 from which the rights and duties of the respective parties arose ; 
 he stated only 2v7tat he conceived to he the leyal effect of these facts. 
 The " issuable " facts, in the contemplation of the common-law 
 system, were not the actual controlling facts as they really 
 occurred, and as they would be proved by the evidence, from 
 which the law derived the right of recovery: they were the legal 
 aspect of those facts, — not strictly the bare conclusions of law 
 themselves derived from the circumstances of the case, but rather 
 combinations of fact and law, or the facts with a legal coloring, 
 and clothed with a legal character. The result was, that the 
 "issuable" facts as averred in the pleading were often purely 
 fictitious; that is, no such events or occurrences as alleged ever 
 took place, but they were represented as having taken place in 
 the manner conceived of by the law. The pleader of course set 
 forth his ovai view of this legal effect under the peril of a pos- 
 sible error in his application of the law to his case ; if a mistake 
 was made in properly conceiving of this legal effect, — or, in 
 other words, if the facts established by the evidence did not 
 correspond with his opinion as to their legal aspect stated in the 
 declaration, — the plaintiff's suit would entirely fail.^ 
 
 1 la corroboration of these conclusions, put his case as wisely as he might have 
 I quote a paragraph from a series of ex- done. In practice, dangers of this l^iud 
 ceedingly able articles upon the English are mitigated, though by no means in- 
 Judicature Bill, which appeared in the variably escaped, by inserting a multi- 
 " Saturday Review" during the year tude of counts, all giving slightly different 
 1873, and were correctly attributed to one versions of the same transaction, in order 
 of the foremost English barristers as their that on one or other of them the plaintiff 
 author. While discussing the pleading may be found to have stated correctly tlie 
 which ought to be introduced, he describes legal effect of the facts. The jjerinission 
 the common-law methods by way of con- to do this was in fact a recognition of tlic 
 trast, and, among others, the following plaintiff's inherent right to ask alterna- 
 as one of its features: "The first .striking tive relief; but it was clogged by the ab- 
 difference is this, that, on the common- surd condition that he could only do so 
 law plan, a plaintiff is required to state, by resorting to the clumsy fiction of pre- 
 not the facts, but what he considers to be tending to have a number of independent 
 the legal effect of the facts. If his ad- grounds of action, when he knew that he 
 visers take a wrong view of a doubtful had only one, but did not know exactly 
 point, and make him declare, say, for what the court might consider the legal 
 goods sold and delivered when the real effect of his facts to be. This was not 
 facts, as proved, only make a case of only unscientific and irrational, but, in 
 goods bargained and sold, the unlucky some cases, it has led to enormou.s ex- 
 plaintiff is cast, not because he is not en- pense by compelling a plaintiff to declare 
 titled to recover, but because he has not on, and a defendant to plead to, scores ■ f
 
 536 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 406. * 512. History of the Action of Assumpsit. The extent 
 of these fictitious allegations in pleading, and their influence 
 upon the form and growth of legal doctrines at large, are ex- 
 hibited in a remarkable manner by the history of the action of 
 assumpsit, and its effect in originating and developing the doc- 
 trine of implied promises and contracts. At an early day, the 
 action of debt was the only one by which to recover for the 
 breach of an unsealed contract; but the defendant was permitted 
 to "wage his law," and by that means to greatly embarrass, if 
 not to defeat, the plaintiff's recovery. To obviate this difficulty, 
 the action of assumpsit was at length invented. The gist of this 
 action was the defendant's promise; the distinctive averment of 
 the declaration was the promise, of course express in form, and 
 so indispensable was it, that, if the allegation was omitted, judg- 
 ment would be arrested, or reversed on error, even after verdict 
 in the plaintiff's favor. The promise was stated to have been 
 
 fictitiou.sly differing counts, when there 
 was only one matter in di.spute between 
 tliem. We do not suppose that the 
 greatest zealot among special pleaders 
 would say that sucli a queer sclieme as 
 this is ])referable to one under wliich the 
 plaintiff states the facts on which he 
 founds his claim, and asks for such relief 
 as their legal effect may entitle him to." 
 "Saturday Review," April 12, 1873, vol. 
 35, p. 472. In the face of this most ac- 
 curate description of common-law plead- 
 ing in its essence, the assertion that it 
 requires a statement of the actual facts 
 constituting the cause of action is seen to 
 be as fictitious as many of its ordinary 
 allegations, — one of the fictions which 
 make up so large a part of the system 
 itself. 
 
 ^Some recent utterances of the Su- 
 preme Court of Missouri are interesting 
 in this connection. In Estes v. Dcsnovers 
 Shoe Co. (1900), 155 Mo. 577, 56 S.' \W. 
 3 1 G, the court said: "The petition, how- 
 ever, was obnoxious to a salutary rule of 
 pleading which would have rendered it 
 lial)le to demurrer if tlie demurrer lia.l 
 covered that feature. The defect in tlic 
 petition is tliat it sets out the contract 
 sued on in hcEc verba instead of pleading 
 it by its legal effect. That form of 
 pleading is to be considered none the loss 
 bad because it is not of uncommon jirac- 
 
 tice even among learned lawyers. The 
 rules of good pleading require that the 
 instrument relied on should be pleaded by 
 its legal effect, which requirement is not 
 for mere form, but rests on substantial 
 reason. The pleading is addressed to 
 the court and should state the pleader's 
 theory of his case, not leaving it to the 
 court to construct a theory as best it may 
 from the evidence set out, and not leav- 
 ing his adversary in the dark as to what 
 the theory advanced is, or what construc- 
 tion the pleader puts upon his contract. 
 It is not a contest in which the comba- 
 tants may catch as they can. If the con- 
 tract is inartificially drawn so that its 
 meaning or effect is obscure, it is all the 
 more important that tlie pleader advanc- 
 ing it should take the responsibility of 
 stating its legal effect, leaving tlie instru- 
 :uent itself to be used as evidence, which 
 is its only office." And in tlie still later 
 ca-e of Keilly v. CuUen (1900), 159 Mo. 
 322,60 8. \V. 126, the Court said that a peti- 
 tion which alleged a contract in hcec verba 
 instead of by its legal effect left the issue 
 uncertain, tliat the code system of plead- 
 ing furnished no authority for such uncer- 
 tainty, and that such a petition would be 
 held -bad on demurrer on the ground that 
 it did not state facts constituting a cause 
 of action.]
 
 PRINCIPLES OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING. 537 
 
 express, and in fact no form of common-law action provided for 
 a recovery upon an implied promise ; in every case of assumpsit, 
 either general or special, on the common counts or otherwise, the 
 defendant was represented as having expressly promised. For a 
 considerable period of time after the invention of assumpsit, 
 undoubtedly the contracts enforced by its means were all express, 
 so that the averment of the declaration accorded with the actual 
 transaction between the parties, as shown by the evidence. In 
 the course of time, however, cases were brought before the courts, 
 in which the right of action on the one hand, and the liability to 
 pay on the other, depended upon a moral and equitable duty of 
 the defendant, arising, not from any promise made by him, but 
 from the acts, circumstances, and relations existing between him 
 and the plaintiff. The courts were thus placed in a dilemma. 
 The obligation of the defendant and the right of the plaintiff 
 were founded upon the plainest principles of equity and justice, 
 and to deny their existence was impossible. Still, there was no 
 action directly appropriate for their enforcement. None of the 
 actions ex delicto could be used, since there was no tort; debt 
 was also out of the question, because the amount claimed was 
 unliquidated damages ; even assumpsit was not applicable, for 
 there was no promise. In this emergency the English judges 
 were true to their traditions, and to all their modes of thought. 
 Instead of inventing a new action, and applying it to the new 
 class of facts and circumstances, they reversed the order, and 
 applied the facts and circumstances to the already existing 
 actions. They fell back upon their invariable resource, the use 
 of fictions; but went farther than ever before or since; and, 
 instead of inventing a fictitious element in the action, they 
 actually added a fictitious feature to the facts and circumstances 
 from which the legal right and duty arose. They selected the 
 existing action of assumpsit as the one to be employed in such 
 classes of cases ; and since that action is based upon a promise, 
 and since the declaration must invariably allege a promise to 
 have been made, the early judges, instead of relaxing this re- 
 quirement of pleading, actually added the fictitious feature of 
 a promise which had never been made to the facts which con- 
 stituted the defendant's liability. In other words, the courts 
 invented the notion of an implied promise, in order that the 
 cases of liability and duty resulting from certain acts, omissions.
 
 53S 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIKS. 
 
 or relations wliere there had been no promise, might be brought 
 within the action of assumpsit, and be tried and determined by 
 its means. There is no more singuhir and instructive incident 
 than this in the whole history of the English law, and it has a 
 most direct and important connection with the practical rules of 
 pleading under the reformed procedure of the codes. We see 
 that the notion of an implied promise as the ground of recovery 
 in these cases of moral and equitable duty did not exist prior to 
 and independent of the action which was selected as the proper 
 instrument for its enforcement; on the contrar}', the action 
 already existed the distinguishing feature of which Avas the 
 allegation of a promise made by the defendant, and a fictitious 
 or " implied " promise was invented and superadded to the actual 
 facts constituting the defendant's liability, for the simple pur- 
 pose of bringing his case within the operation of that action and 
 its formal averment.^ 
 
 1 It would be both interesting and in- 
 structive to trace this doctrine of implied 
 promises tlirouu;h the whole series of 
 cases, from its first suggestion as a fiction 
 of pleading until it became firmly incor- 
 porated into the general theory of con- 
 tracts; l)Ut my limits will not permit such 
 an excursion. I quote, however, the con- 
 clusions reached by Judge Metcalf in his 
 exceedingly able work upon Contracts, as 
 an authority for the position taken in the 
 text. After an analysis of numerous early 
 cases, he says : " As there will be no occa- 
 sion to advert hereafter to the fictions 
 adopted in setting forth the plaintiff's 
 claim in declarations in the action of as- 
 sumpsit, it may not be amiss to present a 
 succinct view of those fictions, and of the 
 reasons on which they are founded. The 
 usual action on a simple contract in old 
 times was debt. The declaration in that 
 action averred in substance that the de- 
 fendant owed the plaintiff, and thereupon 
 an action had accrued, etc. No promise 
 was alleged, for no promise was necessary. 
 But the defendant was allowed to wage 
 hifl law. To avoid this wager of law, a 
 new form of action was devised, to wit, 
 the action of assumpsit, in which a prom- 
 ise of the defendant was alleged, and was 
 indispensable. A dedaraticjn which did 
 not aver sucli prornise was insuflficient 
 
 even after verdict ; and the law is the 
 same at this day. The promise declared 
 on is always taken to be express. In 
 pleading, there is no such thing as an im- 
 plied promise. But as no new rule of evi- 
 dence was required in order to support 
 the new action of assumpsit, it being 
 necessary only to prove a debt, as was 
 necessary when the action was debt, the 
 fictitious doctrine of an implied promise 
 was introduced ; and for the sake of legal 
 conformity it was held, when the defend- 
 ant's legal liability was proved, that the 
 law presumed that he had ])romised to do 
 what the law made him liable to do. . . . 
 A single example will illustrate these 
 two fictions Qhe author had described the 
 kindred fiction of an (implied) request 
 alleged to have been made.] A husband 
 is bound by law to support his wife ; and 
 if he wrongfully discard her, any person 
 may furnisii support to her, and recover 
 pay therefor of the husband. In the ac- 
 tion of debt, there would be no necessity 
 to allege a promise in such a case. But 
 the husband might wage his law, and de- 
 fraud the plaintiff. In the action of as- 
 sumpsit, the furnisliing of the supplies 
 must be allet;ed to have been by the 
 plaintiff at the husband's request, and a 
 promise of the husband to i)ay miLst a"is(i 
 be alleged. But proof of the actual fac>b
 
 PRINCIPLES OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING. 539 
 
 § 407. * 513. Outline of Proposed Discussion o'f Reformed Pro- 
 cedure. Having thus described the thiee types of pleading in 
 existence when the reformed procedure was inaugurated, I now 
 proceed to examine the system introduced by that procedure 
 itself. In pursuing this investigation, 1 shall endeavor, firsts to 
 ascertain the essential and general principles upon which it is 
 founded; secondly^ to determine the manner in which the plain- 
 tiff should set forth the affirmative subject-matter of the action 
 in his complaint or petition; and thirdly, to apply the results 
 thus reached to the most important and common instances of 
 action and remedy. Although I shall aim at a close conformity 
 with the true spirit and intent of the statutory legislation, yet 
 this intent will be sought for in the decided cases which have 
 given a judicial interpretation to the codes. It must be conceded 
 at the outset that there is an irreconcilable conflict between two 
 classes of decisions, not only in mere matters of detail, but in 
 their whole course of reasoning, in the premises which they 
 assume, and in the conclusions which they draw therefrom. 
 But this conflict was, in by far the greater part of the States, 
 confined to the earlier periods of the reform, and has virtually 
 disappeared. There is a substantial agreement among the courts 
 in respect to the general principles which they have finally 
 adopted: whatever differences now exist arise in the process of 
 applying these fundamental doctrines to particular cases. The 
 confusion which actually prevails to a very great extent in sev- 
 eral of the States results not from any uncertainty either in the 
 general principles or in the more subordinate rules, but from an 
 entire ignorance or disregard of them by pleaders, and from a 
 neglect to enforce them by the judges. 
 
 § 408. * 514. Two Theories as to the Relation between the New 
 and Old Systems. Before entering upon the matter thus outlined 
 a preliminary question suggests itself, upon the answer to which 
 much of the succeeding discussion must turn. This question 
 
 supports both these allegations. The in an action to enforce such a liability 
 
 husband, being in law liable to pay, is under the codes, the plaintiff should, in 
 
 held to have (impliedly) made both the addition to the actual facts from which 
 
 request and the promise." Metcalf on the defendant's liabilitj- arises, also allege 
 
 Contracts, pp. 203, 204. This origin of a promise to have been made by him. 
 
 the implied promise, of its invention as a The promise was simply a formal inci- 
 
 liction in order to bring the case within dent of the particular action in the old 
 
 the operation of " assumpsit " throws a system, and is certainly no more than auch 
 
 strong light upon the question, whether, an incident in the new.
 
 540 ' CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 involves the true relations between the doctrines and rules of 
 pleading enacted by the codes and those which existed previously 
 as parts of the common law and the equity jurisprudence, and 
 may be stated as follows: Are the doctrines and rules contained 
 in the statute to be regarded as the sole guides in pleading under 
 the reformed procedure? or are the ancient methods still con- 
 trolling, except when inconsistent with some express provisions 
 of the later legislation? In answering this inquiry, the two 
 schools of interpretation so often mentioned again appear, and 
 the difference between them is the same as that already described 
 under a somewhat altered shape. It is plain that the position 
 taken by the courts, in answering the question here suggested, 
 must to a very great extent influence the wliole body of practical 
 rules which they adopt in reference to pleading as well as to all 
 the other features of the civil action. According to one theory, 
 these doctrines and rules of the common law and of equity still 
 remain, although changed in many particulars by the reform 
 legislation : the pleader must first recur to them, and must then 
 examine how far their requirements have been abrogated or 
 altered by the statute; in a word, the legislation is purely 
 amendatory, and is not reconstructive. According to the other 
 theory, these doctrines and rules of the common law and of 
 equity do not exist at all as authoritative and controlling, — that 
 is, as controlling because rules of the common law or of equity. 
 The general principles and fundamental requirements of the 
 codes have been substituted in their place, completely abrogating 
 them, and constituted by the legislature as the only sources of 
 authority to the bench and the bar in shaping the details of the 
 reformed procedure. If any particular doctrine or rule which 
 formerly prevailed is also found existing to-day, it so exists not 
 because it is a part of the common law or of the equity system, 
 but because it is either expressly or impliedly contained in and 
 enacted by the reformator}' statute. When, therefore, in dis- 
 cussing and interpreting such a doctrine, a resort is had to the 
 former methods for aid, the reference is, not to obtain authority, 
 but to liiid an analogy or explanation. In other words, the 
 system introduced by the codes is regarded as complete in itself, 
 entirely displacing the ancient modes. In several particulars, 
 however, its doctrines and rules are either identical with or 
 closely reseiuljle those which existed before; and, in tlioir judi-
 
 GENERAL PKINCII'LES OF PLEADING. 541 
 
 cial construction, recourse must })C had by way of explanation 
 and analogy merely to these original forms, but no such recourse 
 is to be had for the purpose of obtaining the authority for any 
 proposed measure or practical regulation connected with the 
 pleading under the new procedure. 
 
 § 409. * 515. The Theory generally Adopted. During the ear- 
 lier periods of the present system, there was an evident disposi- 
 tion on the part of some judges and courts to adopt the former 
 of these two views, and to hold that the old methods, rules, and 
 requisites of the common law and of equity, are still applicable 
 in substance when not inconsistent wdth the provisions cf the 
 statute; or, in other words, that they had been supplanted only 
 so far as such inconsistency extends. ^ The second theory has, 
 however, been generally if not universally adopted as the true 
 interpretation to be put upon the language of the codes, and as 
 the starting-point in the work of constructing a system of prac- 
 tical rules for pleading. The proposition, as stated in the fore- 
 going paragraph, has been expressly announced in well-considered 
 judgments ; in the vast majority of instances, however, it has 
 rather been assumed and impliedly contained in the decision of 
 the court, yet none the less passed upon and affirmed. It may 
 now, I think, be regarded as the established doctrine, that the 
 code in each of the States is the only source of authority from 
 which rules of pleading may be drawn, that its methods have 
 completelj' supplanted those which preceded it, so that the latter 
 can no longer be appealed to as possessing of themselves any 
 force and authority. ^ 
 
 § 410. *516. Essential Principles of Reformed System of Plead- 
 ing. Introductory. I shall now proceed to gather from the text 
 of the codes, as interpreted by the most authoritative decisions, 
 and to state in order, the comparatively few general and essen- 
 tial principles of pleading introduced by the reformed procedure, 
 
 1 See Howard v. Tiffany, 3 Sandf. 695 ; 2 School Sec. Trs. v. Odlin, 8 Ohio St. 
 
 Fry V. Bennett, 5 Sandf. 54 ; McMaster v. 293 ; Jolly v. Terre Haute Drawbr. Co., 9 
 
 Booth, 4 How. Pr. 427 ; Rochester City lud. 421 ; White i-. Joy, 13 N. Y. 83, 90; 
 
 Bank v. Suydara, 5 How. Pr. 216 ; Woodeii People v. Ryder, 12 N. Y. 433, 438, 439 ; 
 
 V. Waffle, 6 How. Pr. 145 ; Buddiugtou Ahern v. Collins, 39 Mo. 145, 150. See 
 
 V. Davis, 6 How. Pr. 401 ; Houghton v. also Clark v. Bates, 1 Dak. 42 ; Clay Cy. 
 
 Townsend, 8 How. Pr. 447 ; Boyce v. v. Simonsen, 1 id. 403, 430 ; Scott v. 
 
 'Brown, 7 Barb. 80 ; Knowles v. Gee, Robards, 67 Mo. 289 ; Dunn v. Remington, 
 
 8 Barb. 300 ; Bank of Genesee v. Patchin 9 Neb. 82 ; lugle v. Jones, 43 Iowa, 286. 
 Bank, 13 N. Y. 309, 313.
 
 542 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 which constitute the foundation of its simple, natural, and scien- 
 tific as well as practical system. These essential principles apply 
 to certain classes of answers in addition to all complaints or 
 petitions, although from the nature of the two pleadings the}^ 
 find their fullest and highest expression in the latter. Whenever 
 the answer is simply in the form of denial, whether general or 
 specific, it is of course governed by rules applicable to it alone. 
 But so far as the answer contains defences of new matter, and 
 a fortiori so far as it contains a counter-claim, or set-off, or the 
 l)a8is of any affirmative relief, its allegations and those of the 
 complaint or petition must conform to the same requirements, 
 must follow the same method. The general and essential prin- 
 ciples of the reformed pleading now to be discussed, illustrated, 
 and arranged in an orderly manner, apply therefore alike to the 
 plaintiffs statement of his case for relief, and to the defendant's 
 statement of affirmative matter, either by way of defences in con- 
 fession and avoidance, or by way of cross-demands against any 
 parties to the action. 
 
 § 411. *ol7. Manner of Averring Material Pacts. The funda- 
 mental and most important principle of the reformed pleading, 
 the one from which all the others are deduced as necessary 
 corollaries, is the following: The material facts which constitute 
 the ground of relief, or the defence of new matter (confession 
 and avoidance), should be averred as they actually existed or 
 took place, and not the legal effect or aspect of those facts, ^ and 
 
 1 \_Ph(uUnq according to Legal Efftct. according to their legal effect or as thev 
 
 The rule that facts should be averred as actually existed, at the option of the 
 
 they actually existed or took place, and pleader, and when the former mode is 
 
 not the legal effect or aspect of those adopted the oppo.site party may, if lie is 
 
 facts, is not universally sustained by the ignorant of the exact facts, demand a bill 
 
 cases. Thus the Supreme Court of Mi.s- of particulars or move to make more 
 
 Houri, in several recent cases, has taken definite and certain. New York News Pub- 
 
 the other view, holding that a contract lishing Co. v. Steamship Co. (1893), 148 
 
 should be alleged, not in hcEC verba, but N. Y. .39, 42 N. E. 514. So, in Kentucky, 
 
 according to its legal effect. Estes v. in Brady v. Peck (1896), 91» Ky. 42, 34 
 
 Desnoyers Shoe Co. (1900), 15.t Mo. 577, S. W. 906, it was held to be immaterial 
 
 56 S. \V. .316; Heilly v. Cullen (1900), whether an averment of a covenant be iu 
 
 159 Mo. 322, 60 S. W. 126; Anderson v. the words used in the deed or according to 
 
 Gaines (1900), 156 Mo. 604, 57 S. W. 726. the force and effect which the statute gives 
 
 See note to § * 511, where the fir.st two to the words. See also, to the .same effect, 
 
 cases are quoted from at length. An older More i;. Elmore County Irr. Co. ( 1 893), 3 
 
 case, Nichols v. Nichols (1896), 134 Mo. Idaho, 729, 35 Pac. 171 ; Porter i'. Allen 
 
 187, 35 S. W. 577, on the contrary, quoted (1902), — Idaho, — , 69 Pac. 105 ; Matthie- 
 
 the text with approval. In New York, sen v. Arata (1897), 32 Ore. 342, 50 Pac. 
 
 also, it is held that facts may be alleged 1015; Blaine v. Knapp & Co (1897), 140
 
 GENEKAL rRINCIPLES OF PLEADING. 
 
 543 
 
 not the mere evidence or probative matter by which their exist- 
 
 Mo. 241, 41 S. W. 787; Nelson v. Great 
 Northern Ky. Co. (1903), 28 Mont.297, 72 
 Pac. 642. See also §§ * 74 et seq. See alio 
 South Milwaukee Co. v. Murphy (1902), 
 112 Wis. 614, 88 N. W. 583, where it was 
 held that the performance of conditions 
 precedent might he alleged according to 
 their legal effect, but solely by reason of 
 the statute. 
 
 Exhibits. Another method of pleading 
 a written instrument is to attach the same 
 to the pleading as an exhibit, but diffc^r- 
 ent rules prevail in different jurisdictions 
 as to the precise function of such exhibits. 
 In some States the exhibit is considered a 
 part of the pleading for all purposes, and 
 may be looked to in considering the suffi- 
 ciency of the pleading : Elliot v. Roche 
 (1896), 64 Minn. 482, 67 N. W. 539; 
 Realty Revenue, etc. Co. v. Farm, etc. 
 Co. (1900), 79 Minn. 465, 82 N. W. 857 ; 
 Union Sewer Pipe Co. v. Olson (1901), 82 
 Minn. 187, 84 N. W. 756 ; Cox v. Henry 
 (1901), 113 Ga. 259, 38 S. K. 856; South- 
 ern Mut. Ins. Co. V. Turnley (1896), 
 100 Ga. 296, 27 S. E. 975 ; Walters v. 
 Eaves (1898), 105 Ga. 584,32 S. E. 609; 
 Reed v. Equitable Trust Co. (1902), 
 115 Ga. 780, 42 S. E. 102; Savan- 
 nah Ry. Co. V. Hardin (1900), 110 Ga. 
 433, 35 S. E. 681); Fitch j;. Applegate 
 (1901), 24 Wash. 25, 64 Pac. 147 ; Haj's v. 
 Dennis (1895), 11 Wash. 360, 39 Pac. 658 
 (recommending that the better practice is 
 to state a cause of action in the body of 
 the complaint without reference to ex- 
 hibits) : New Idea Pattern Co. v. Whelan 
 (1903), 75 Conn. 455, 53 Atl. 953; Cran- 
 mer v. Kohn (1898). 11 S. D. 245, 76 
 N. W. 937; First Nat. Bank ;•. Dakota 
 Fire Ins. Co. { 1894), 6 S. D. 424, 61 N. W. 
 439 ; Davison v. Gregory (1903), 132 N. C. 
 389, 43 S. E. 910; Stephens v. Am. Fire 
 Ins. Co. (1896), 14 Utah, 265, 47 Pac. 83 ; 
 Hudson !•. Scottish Union Ins. Co. (1901), 
 110 Ky. 722, 62 S. W. 513; Porter v. 
 Allen (1902), — Idaho —, 69 Pac. 105. 
 See also Am. Freehold Co. v. McManus 
 (1900), 68 Ark. 263, 58 S. W, 250. 
 
 In Nebraska an exhibit is considered a 
 part of the pleading only when it consists 
 of an instrument for the unconditional 
 payment of money only : First Nat. Bank 
 V. Engelbercht (1899), 58 Neb. 639, 79 
 
 N. W. 556 ; Lincoln Mortgage & Trust Co. 
 V. Ilutchins (1898), 55 Neb. 158, 75 N. W. 
 538 ; Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Arthur (1896), 
 48 Neb. 461, 67 N. W. 440 ; Holt County 
 Rank v. Holt Co. ('1898), 53 Neb. 827, 74 
 N. W. 259. 
 
 In Indiana an exhibit is deemed a part 
 of the pleading only when the iu.strument 
 is one upon whicli the action is founded: 
 Thompson v. Recht (1902), 158 Ind. 302, 
 63 N. E. 569 ; First Nat. Bank v. Greger 
 (1901), 157 Ind. 479, 62 N. E. 21 ; Bird v. 
 St Johns Episcopal Church (1899), 154 
 Ind, 138, 56 N. E. 129; Murphy v. Brana- 
 inan (1900), 156 Ind. 77,59 N. E. 274; 
 Indiana, etc. Ass'n v. Plank (1898), 1.^2 
 Ind. 197, 52 N. E. 991 ; Frankel v. Michi- 
 gan Mutual Ins. Co. (1902), 158 Ind. 304, 
 62 N. E. 703 ; Miller v. Bottenberg 
 (1895), 144 Inil. 312, 41 N. E. 804; Fitcli 
 V. Byall (1897), 149 Ind. 554, 49 N. E. 
 455 ; Forbes i\ Union Central Life Ins. 
 Co. (1898), 151 Ind. 89, 51 N. E. 84; 
 Fuller V. Cox (1893), 135 Ind. 46, 34 N. E. 
 822. 
 
 The Indiana rule lias been followed in 
 Oklahoma : First Nat. Bank v. Jones 
 (1894), 2 Okla. 353, 37 Pac. 824 ; Dunham 
 r. Holloway (1895), 3 Okla. 244, 41 S. W. 
 140; Grimes v. Cullison (1895), 3 Okla. 
 268, 41 S. W. 355. 
 
 On the other hand, some courts have 
 held tliat the exhibit cannot avail to aid 
 the averments of the pleading: Hickory 
 County t;. Fugate (1898), 143 Mo. 71, 44 
 S. W. 789 (see also Cooms Commission 
 Co. V. Block (1895), 130 Mo. 668, 32 S. W. 
 1139); Estate of Cook (1902), 137 Cal. 
 184, 69 Pac. 1124 (may aid formal but 
 not substantial defects) ; Palmer r. La- 
 vignc (1894), 104 Cal. 30, 37 Pac. 775 ; 
 Savings Bank v. Burns (1894), 104 Cal. 
 473, 38 Pac. 102) ; Cave v. Gill (1900), 5» 
 S. C. 256, 37 S. E. 817 (may aid formal 
 defects) ; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Kahn 
 (1893), 4 Wyo. 364, 34 Pac. 895 ; Altemus 
 V. Asher (1903), Ky., 74 S. W. 245 
 (where merely filed with and referred to 
 in a pleading). But see Gardner v. Con- 
 tinental Ins. Co. (1903), Ky., 75 S. W. 
 283, where the court said : "The rule is 
 tliat an exhibit will not cure a defective 
 j)leading or supply averments omitted in 
 the pleading:. But it is also the rule that
 
 :,u 
 
 CIVIL IIE.MEDIES. 
 
 ence is established.^ I have purposely refrained from using the 
 
 iu a suit on a written contract, if the con- 
 tract sliows that no cau^e of action exists, 
 the court on demurrer will consider the 
 exhibit. In other words, wliile an exhibit 
 cannot niaiie a pleading good, it ma\' make 
 it bad."3 
 
 1 I'eople V. Ryder, 1 2 N. Y. 433, 487 ; 
 HiU V. Barrett, 14 B. Mon. 83 ; Green v. 
 Palmer, 15 Cal. 411, 414; Rogers r. Mil- 
 waukee, 13 Wis. CIO, GU ; Bird v. Mayer, 
 8 Wis. 362, 367 ; Horn v. Ludingtou, 28 
 Wis. 81, 83; Groves v. Tallman, 8 Xev. 
 178; Pier c. Ileinrichoffen, 52 Mo. 333, 
 335; Wills V. Wills, 34 Ind. 106, 107; 
 De Graw v. Elmore, 50 X. Y. 1 ; Cowin v. 
 Toole, 31 Iowa, 513, 516; Singleton v. 
 Scott, 11 Iowa, 589; Bowcn r. Aubrey, 22 
 Cal. 566, 569 ; Pfiffner f. Krapfel, 28 Iowa, 
 27, 34 ; White v. Lyons, 42 Cal. 279, 282; 
 Louisville & P. Canal Co. v. Murphy, 9 
 Bush, 522, 527 ; Gates v. Salmon, 46 Cal. 
 361, 379; King r. Enterprise Ins. Co., 45 
 Ind. 43, 55; Lytle v. Lytle, 37 Ind. 281 ; 
 Van Schaick v. Farrow, 25 Ind. 310; Chi- 
 cago & S. W. R. Co. V. N. W. U. Packet 
 Co , 38 Iowa, 377, 382 ; Boweu v. Emmer- 
 son, 3 Ore. 452; Cline v. Cline, 3 Ore. 
 355, 358 ; Gates v. Gray, 66 N. C. 442, 
 443; Farron v. Sherwood, 17 N. Y. 227 ; 
 Coryell v. Cain, 16 Cal. 567, 571. The 
 opinion of Marvin J. in People r. Ryder is 
 exceedingly instructive, and covers most 
 of the subordinate questions that arise in 
 connection with the general topic. He 
 said (p. 437): "This rule (§ 142 of the 
 New York Code) is substantially as it ex- 
 isted, prior to its enactment, in actions at 
 law. Chitty says : ' In general, whatever 
 circumstances are necessary to constitute 
 the cause of complaint or ground of de- 
 fence must be stated in the pleadings, and 
 all beyond is surplusage ; facts only are 
 to be stated, and not arguments or infer- 
 ences or matter of law, in which respect 
 pleadings at law appear to differ materi- 
 ally from those in equity.' (1 Ch. PI. 245.) 
 At page 266 he says: 'It is a most im- 
 portant principle of the law of pleading, 
 that in alleging the fact it is unnecessary 
 to state such circumstances as tend to 
 prove the tnith of it. The dry allegation 
 of the fact, without detailing a variety of 
 minute circumstances whicli constitute the 
 evidence of it, will suffice. The object 
 
 of the pleadings is to arrive at a specific 
 issue upon a given and material fact ; and 
 that is attained although the evidence of 
 such fact to be laid before a jury be not 
 specifically developed in the pleadings.' 
 I have supposed it safe, and a compliance 
 with the code, to state the facts consti- 
 tuting the cause of action substantially in 
 the same manner iu which they were 
 stated in the old system in a special count. 
 By that system the legal issuable facts 
 were to be stated, and the evidence by 
 which those facts were to be established 
 was to be brought forward u])on the trial. 
 This position will not embrace what were 
 known as the common counts. ... It has 
 been supposed that a wider latitmle should 
 be allowed in equity pleading, and tiiat 
 evidence may to some extent be incor- 
 porated in the statement. The rule of 
 the code is broad enough for all cases ; 
 and it permits a statement of facts and 
 circumstances as contradistinguished from 
 the evidence whtch is to establish those 
 facts. But in all equitj' cases the facts 
 may be more numerous, more compli- 
 cated, more involved ; and the pleader 
 may state all these facts in a legal and 
 concise form wliich constitute the cau.se 
 of action, and entitle him to relief. The 
 rule touching the statement of facts con- 
 stituting the cause of action is tlie same 
 in all cases ; and the rules by whicii the 
 sufficiency of ])leadings is to be deter- 
 mined are prescribed by the code." How 
 far the positions quoted from Mr. Chitty 
 are correct is shown in the preceding 
 paragraphs of this section. No more ac- 
 curate exposition of the fundamental doc- 
 trine announced by the codes is to lie found 
 in the books than the foregoing opii.ion 
 of Mr. Justice Marvin. In several of the 
 cases to be cited the di.«cussion has l)een 
 confined to legal actions, and general 
 statements have been made in reference 
 to the " material " or " issuable " facts 
 which are plainly erroneous when applied 
 to suits brought for ei|uitable relief. The 
 principle as formulated by Mr. Justice 
 Marvin embraces both species of actions, 
 and brings them both within the purview 
 of the statutory provision. In Green r. 
 Palmer, the Supreme Court of Cnlifomia 
 laid down the rules iu respect to tlie kinds
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING. 
 
 545 
 
 common formula, "facts which constitute the cause of action^''' in 
 
 of facts wliic-h sliould be averred, and de- 
 fined the nature of "material" or "issu- 
 able " facts in a most exhaustive manner. 
 From the elaborate opinion of Field C. J. 
 the following extracts are taken (p. 414) : 
 " First rule. Facts only must be stated. 
 This means the facts as contradistin- 
 guislied from the law, from argument, 
 from hypothesis, and from evidence of 
 the facts. The facts must be carefully 
 distinguished from the evidence of the 
 facts. The criterion to distinguish the 
 facts from the evidence is, — Second rule. 
 Those facts, and those alone, must be 
 stated which constitute the cause of ac- 
 tion, the defence, or the reply. There- 
 fore (1) each party must allege every 
 fact which he is required to prove, and 
 •will be precluded from proving any fact 
 iiot alleged. The plaintiff, on his part, 
 must allege all that he will have to prove 
 to maintain his action ; the defendant, 
 on his part, all that he must prove to 
 defeat the plaintiff's title after the com- 
 plaint is admitted or proved. (2) He 
 must allege nothing affirmatively which 
 he is not required to prove. This is some- 
 times put in the following form : viz., 
 ' that those facts, and those only, should 
 be stated which the party would be re- 
 quired to prove.' But this is inaccurate, 
 since negative allegations are frequently 
 necessary, and they are not to be proved. 
 The rule applies, however, to all affirma- 
 tive allegations, and, thus applied, is uni- 
 versal. Every fact essential to the claim 
 or defence should be stated. If this part 
 of the rule is violated, the adverse party 
 may deumr. In the second place, nothing 
 should be stated which is not essential to 
 the claim or defence ; or, in other words, 
 none but ' issuable ' facts should be 
 stated. If this part of the rule be vio- 
 lated, the adverse party may move to 
 strike out the unessential parts. An un- 
 essential, or what is the same thing, an 
 immaterial allegation, is one which can be 
 stricken from the pleading without leav- 
 ing it insufficient, and, of course, need not 
 be proved or disproved. The following 
 question will determine in every case 
 whether an allegation be material : Can it 
 be made the subject of a material issue ? 
 In other words, If denied, will the failure 
 
 to prove it decide the case in wiiole or in 
 part ? If it will not, then the fact alleged 
 is not material (issuable) ; it is not one 
 of those which constitute the cause of ac- 
 tion, defence, or reply." This opinion was 
 ado])tcd, and tlie mode of distinguishing 
 " material " or " issuable " allegations was 
 approved by tlie Supreme Court of Ore- 
 gon in Cline v. Cliue, .'3 Ore. 35.5, 358, 
 359. The criterion thus proposed by Mr. 
 Chief Justice Field is- perfect in its appli- 
 cation to legal actions, l)ut is hardly broad 
 enough to include all cases wheje equi- 
 table relief is demanded, unless it was 
 intended to embrace such cases in the 
 language " decide the case in whole or 
 in part." If such was the intention, the 
 manner of stating the rule is somewhat 
 obscure, and it clearly needs amplification 
 and explanation. I return to this question 
 in a subsequent paragraph of the text. 
 In Pier v. Heinrichoffen, 52 Mo. 333, whicli 
 was an action against the indorsers of a 
 note, the petition alleged a demand of 
 payment at maturity, and notice of non- 
 payment given to the defendants. At the 
 trial the plaintiff proposed to prove facts 
 excusing such demand and notice ; and, the 
 evidence being rejected, a verdict was ren- 
 dered against him. This ruling was sus- 
 tained by the Suj^reme Court, Ewing J., 
 after saying tliat the plaintiff's mode 
 of pleading would have been proper 
 under the common-law system, proceeds 
 (p. 335) : " As the vice of the old system 
 of pleading was its ])roKxity, its general 
 averments and general issues, and the 
 del.ay and expense inseparable from it 
 the new system which we have adopted 
 has little claim to be considered a reform, 
 unless it avoids such defects, and fur- 
 nishes rules by which the great object of 
 all pleadings is attained ; viz., to arrive 
 at a material, certain, and single issue. 
 Hence the great improvement of our code 
 consists in requiring the pleadings to con- 
 tain a plain and concise statement of the 
 facts constituting the cause of action, or 
 matter of defence. Facts and not evi- 
 dence nor conclusions of law, must be 
 stated. Every fact which the plaintiff 
 must prove to maintain his suit is consti- 
 tutive in the sense of the code." The 
 petition in this case, it was held, sliould
 
 546 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 order tliut the principle niiglit be expressed in its most compre- 
 hensive manner, and might include equitable as well as legal 
 actions. As will be shown in tlie sequel, it is only in legal 
 actions that the material or issuable facts which are to be 
 averred "constitute the cause of action" in the strict sense of 
 the term; while in equitable actions facts may be material, and 
 must be alleged, which, while they form the basis of or modify 
 the remedy demanded, do not properly constitute the cause of 
 action. This distinction will be fully developed in subsequent 
 paragraphs which discuss the mode of pleading in equitable 
 actions. This single and simple principle lies at the foundation 
 of the entire reformed method introduced by the codes. When 
 fully comprehended, it will be found to involve all the other 
 requisites of the system. It distinguishes the new pleading from 
 each of the three types which formerly prevailed, and which 
 have already been described; from the modes used in the equit}^ 
 and the civil-law courts, by wholly dispensing with any state- 
 ments of probative matter, and by limiting the averments to the 
 fundamental facts which constitute the cause of action or the 
 grounds of relief; and from the mode used in the common-law 
 courts, by discarding all fictions, all technicalities, all prescribed 
 formulas, and by requiring the material facts to be alleged as 
 
 have averred the matters of excuse sought Murphy, 9 Bush, 522, 527, the Kentucky 
 to be proved. The description here given Court of Appeals stated the general doc- 
 of issuable or " constitutive " facts is ap- trine in the following manner : " While 
 propriate to legal actions only, and must the ancient forms of pleading are abol- 
 be modified in its terms in order to meet ished, still every fact necessary to enable 
 the characteristic features of many equi- tlie plaintiff in the action to recover must 
 table suits. Wills v. Wills, 34 Ind. 106, be alleged, and every essential averment 
 is also very instructive, and contains a required to make a declaration good at the 
 princi])le of wide application which dis- common law upon general demurrer must 
 tinguislies the present from the former be made in the petition. Tlie facts must 
 theory of pleading. In Pfiffner r. Krapfel, be alleged so as to enable the opposite 
 28 Iowa, 27, 34, Cole J. very truly said : party to know what is meant to be proved, 
 " Our system of pleading is essentially and also tiiat an issue may be framed in 
 a fact system, intended to require the regard to the subject-matter of dispute, 
 parties in judicial proceedings to state and to enalile the court to pronounce the 
 the facts of their claims, and advise the law upon the facts stated. The dry alle- 
 opposite party of the true nature and gation of the facts in the petition, without 
 object of the suit. It is against the spirit setting forth the evidence of the truth 
 and plain intent of our code to alhiw par- of the statements made, is all that is re- 
 ties to claim as fruits of their litigation quired." See, as further examjdcs, Clark 
 that whicli was not by the fair and obvious v. Bates, 1 Dak. 42 ; Clay Cy. v. Simon.sen, 
 import of the pleadings put in issue and 1 id. 403, 430 ; Scott i\ Kobards, 67 Mo. 
 litigated between them." In the very re- 289; Dunn v. Remington, 9 Neb. 82; 
 cent case of Louisville & P. Canal Co. v. Ingle i-. Jones, 43 Iowa, 286.
 
 GENERAL rillNCIPLES OF PLEADING. . 547 
 
 they actually existed, and not tlieir legal effect, and still less 
 the legal conclusions inferred from them. In discussing this 
 fundamental principle, and developing from it the subordinate 
 doctrines and practical rules which are involved in its general 
 terms, its component elements must be separately examined, 
 and the full import of each must be carefully ascertained. This 
 analysis will lead me (1) to define the legal meaning of the term 
 "cause of action" as used in the codes, and to point out the 
 somewhat different senses which must be given to the phrase 
 when it is applied to legal and to equitable actions; (2) to 
 determine the nature of the facts which "constitute the cause 
 of action " in each of its two significations, and in this connec- 
 tion to point out the difference between the " issuable facts " 
 averred in legal actions and the facts material to the remedy but 
 not strictly " issuable " sometimes necessary to be alleged in 
 equitable actions, and to explain the distinction in this respect 
 which inheres in the modes of pleading employed in these two 
 classes of suits; and (3) to discuss the requirement that these, 
 material facts should be stated as they actually occurred or 
 existed, and not their legal effect and meaning, and to display 
 its full force and significance. The result of this analysis will 
 then be applied in developing the various general rules which 
 make up the reformed system of pleading. 
 
 § 412. * 518. The Term " Cause of Action." The term " cause 
 of action " is employed by the framers of the codes in several 
 different connections; but it must be assumed that in each of 
 them it was intended to have the same signification, that, wher- 
 ever used, it was designed to describe the same elements or 
 features of the judicial proceeding called an action. The courts 
 have never, so far as I have been able to discover, attempted any 
 thorough and exhaustive discussion of the phrase, and determined 
 its meaning by any general formula or definition ; and little or no 
 aid will therefore be obtained in this inquiry from judicial inter- 
 pretation. The few decided cases which venture upon a partial 
 description were quoted in the last preceding section. In another 
 instance, not there referred to, in which the plaintiff alleged that 
 the legal title to certain lands was vested in the defendant, but 
 that these lands were held by him in trust for the plaintiff, and 
 demanded an execution of the trust by conveyance, etc., the 
 cause of action was decided to be "the trust;" the court declar-
 
 548 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 ing that in every money demand on contract " the debt " is the 
 cause of action, and holding that, in the case before them, the 
 cause of action itself — the trust — was stated in the complaint, 
 but that the facts constituting it were not averred.^ 
 
 § 413. *519, True Signification of the Term. The true signifi- 
 cation of the term "cause of action " was carefully examined and 
 determined in the second section of the present chapter; and I 
 shall not repeat the course of discussion there pursued, but shall 
 simply recapitulate the conclusions which were reached. Every 
 action is based upon some primary right held by the plaintiff, 
 and upon a duty resting upon the defendant corresponding to 
 such right. By means of a wrongful act or omission of the 
 defendant, this primary right and this duty are invaded and 
 broken; and there immediately arises from the breach a new 
 remedial right of the plaintiff, and a new remedial duty of the 
 defendant. Finally, such remedial right and dut}' are consum- 
 mated and satisfied tby the remedy which is obtained through 
 means of the action, and which is its object. Now, it is very 
 plain, that, using the words according to their natural import 
 and according to their technical legal import, the "cause of 
 action " is what gives rise to the remedial right, or the right of 
 remedy, which is evidently the same as the term " right of ac- 
 tion " frequently used by judges and text-writers. This remedial 
 right, or right of action, does not arise from the wrongful act or 
 omission of the defendant — the delict — alone, nor from the 
 plaintiff's primary right, and the defendant's corresponding pri- 
 mary duty alone, but from these two elements taken together. 
 The "cause of action," therefore, must always consist of two 
 factors, (1) the plaintiff's primary right and the defendant's 
 corresponding primary duty, whatever be the subject to which 
 they relate, person, character, property, or contract ; and (2) the 
 delict, or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which 
 the primary right and duty have been violated. Every action 
 when analyzed will be found to contain these two separate and 
 distinct elements, and in combination they constitute the "cause 
 of action." The primary right and duty by themselves are not 
 the cause of action, because when existing by themselves, un- 
 })roken by the defendant's wrong, they do not give rise to any 
 action. For this reason, that definition is clearly erroneous 
 
 1 Iloru V. Ladington, 28 Wis. 81, 83.
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING. 549 
 
 which pronounced the "debt" in an action on contract, or the 
 "trust" in a suit to enforce a trust, to be the "cause of action." 
 Much less can the delict or wrong by itself be the cause of 
 action, because, without the primary right and duty of the 
 parties to act upon, it does not create any right of action or 
 remedial right as I have used the phrase. It is very clear from 
 this analysis that the "cause of action " mentioned in the codes in- 
 cludes and consists of these two branches or elements in combina- 
 tion, — the primary right and duty of the respective parties, and 
 the wrongful act or omission by which they are violated or broken. 
 § 414. * 520. Complete Statement of Entire Cause of Action 
 ■TO-onld include Legal Rules and Rights and Duties. The first of 
 these branches must always, from the nature of the case, be a 
 conclusion of law. The law by its commands creates a rule 
 applicable to certain facts and circumstances, by the operation of 
 which, when these facts and circumstances exist, a right arises, 
 and is held by the plaintiff, and a corresponding duty arises and 
 devolves upon the defendant. While this first factor of the 
 "cause of action" is therefore always a conclusion or proposition 
 of law, and results from the command of the supreme power in 
 the State as its cause^ it necessarily presupposes the existence of 
 certain facts and events as the occasion of its coming into opera- 
 tion. A complete and exhaustive exhibition of it would thus 
 require a statement of the legal rule itself applicable to the 
 given condition of facts and circumstances, and of the primary 
 right and duty arising therefrom ; and also an allegation that the 
 facts and circumstances themselves to which the rule applies, and 
 on the occasion of which the right and duty arise, do actually 
 exist or have existed. If this principle were adopted in plead- 
 ing, every cause of action would demand a mingled averment of 
 legal rules, of the facts and events to which they apply, and of 
 the rights and duties resulting from the operation of the given 
 rule upon the existing facts. In the second branch of the cause 
 of action, there is, on the other hand, no element whatever of 
 the law: it is simply and wholly matter of fact. It consists 
 entirely of affirmative acts wrongfully done, or of negative omis- 
 sions wrongfully suffered by the defendant; and its statement in 
 a pleading can be nothing more than a narrative of such acts or 
 omissions. A primary right existed in favor of the plaintiff, and 
 a corresponding duty devolved upon the defendant, of which an
 
 550 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 integral element is a legal rule: this right and this duty, if 
 positive, called upon the defendant to do some act towards the 
 plaintiif, the nature of which depended upon the nature of the 
 right and duty; if negative, they called upon the defendant to 
 forbear from doing some act towards the plaintiff, tlie nature of 
 which was determined in like manner. In the one case, the 
 defendant's delict consists in his not doing the act winch his 
 duty obliged him to do; and in the other case, in doing the act 
 which his duty forbade him to do. In both instances, therefore, 
 the wrong which constitutes the second factor or branch of the 
 cause of action is a fact more or less complex, and not either 
 wholly or partially a legal conclusion or rule. 
 
 § 415. *521. Term as Applied to Legal Actions. Such being 
 the general nature and signification of the term "cause of action," 
 its different phases- of meaning, when applied either to legal or 
 to equitable actions, will next be pointed out and described. 
 These differences do not extend to its essential elements ; they 
 are wholly formal, and they result entirely from the external 
 differences sometimes subsisting between legal and equitable 
 primar}^ rights and between legal and equitable remedies. In a 
 legal cause of action, the primary right of the jjlaintiff and duty 
 of the defendant are generally si7nple in their nature as contra- 
 distinguished from complex; that is, they call for some single, 
 simple, and complete act or forbearance on the part of the de- 
 fendant; and when broken by the defendant's delict, the remedial 
 right and duty which arise always demand a single, simple, and 
 complete act to be done by the defendant; namel}', either the 
 payment of a sum of money as debt or damages, or the delivery 
 of possession of a specific chattel, or the delivery of possession 
 of a specific tract of land, which constitute the only remedies 
 that can be oljtaincd b}' a legal action. It follows, therefore, 
 from the nature of a legal primary right and duty and of a legal 
 remedy, that the cause of action in a legal suit is always simple, 
 and can be stated, and must necessarily be stated, in such a 
 manner, that the remedial right, if it exists at all, will be shown 
 at once in its completeness and certainty. Furthermore, the 
 legal primary right must necessarily depend upon a few facts; 
 and these being all indispensable to its existence, the absence of 
 even a single one will entirely invalidate the whole cause of action, 
 and will sliow that no remedial riirht whatsoever has arisen.
 
 GENERAL I'KINCII'LES OF PLEADING. 551 
 
 § 416. * 522. Term as Applied to Equitable Actions. The 
 foregoing description does not apply to e(iuitable actions gener- 
 ally, although it undoubtedly does to some. In very many, and 
 indeed in most, equitable causes of action, not merely the facts 
 which are the occasion of the right, but the primary rights and 
 duties themselves of the parties, arc complex : it cannot be said 
 of them that they must either wholly exist, or must be entirely 
 denied; they do not, in other words, demand a single specific act 
 or omission on the part of the defendant, but a series, and often 
 a very complicated series, of acts and omissions. In determining 
 these primaiy rights and duties of the respective parties to an 
 equitable suit, there must frequently be a settlement and adjust- 
 ment of opposing claims; one must be modified by another; and, 
 as the result, a collection of rights and duties is established 
 inhering in each of the litigants, and embracing a great variety 
 of particulars. In certain classes of equitable actions it cannot 
 be properly said that any wrong or delict has been committed by 
 the defendant, or any violation of the plaintiff's primary rights, 
 unless an ignorance of those rights by all the parties, and a 
 consequent hesitation on the part of all to act, can be deemed a 
 technical wrong. These classes of suits are prosecuted, not 
 hecause there has been any denial of right or duty, but because 
 in the absence of an accurate knowledge of their rights, or of 
 power to arrange and adjust them by voluntary proceedings, an 
 appeal to the courts becomes necessary in order to solve the 
 problem or to accomplish the adjustment. An action brought to 
 construe a will may be mentioned as an illustration of the first 
 class, and the ordinary suit for partition as an example of the 
 second. Again: the remedies furnished by equity are seldom 
 the single, simple, and complete awards of pecuniary sums, or 
 of possession of lands or of chattels, as is the case with all legal 
 judgments. They are complex and involved ; they often consist 
 in an adjustment and award of partial reliefs to each of the 
 parties; they may provide for future and contingent emergen- 
 cies; and they are sometimes nothing more than an: authoritative 
 determination by the court of the primary rights themselves 
 belonging to the plaintiffs and the defendants. This sketch 
 shows very plainly that an equitable cause of action is often very 
 different, in its external form at least, from any legal cause of 
 action; and although the same general principle of pleading
 
 552 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 applies to each, yet it must undergo some modification in that 
 application. The facts constituting the cause of action are to 
 be stated in an equitable as well as in a legal action; but facts 
 do not constitute the equitable cause of action in the same sense 
 nor in the same manner that they constitute the legal cause of 
 action. 
 
 § 417. * 523. Nature of the Facts Constituting a Cause of Action 
 ■when Term is applied to both Legal and Equitable Suits. The 
 result thus reached leads to the second subdivision of tlie present 
 inquiry; namely, the nature of the facts which constitute the 
 cause of action when that term is applied both to legal and to 
 equitable suits. As has already been remarked, the first branch 
 or division of the cause of action contains three distinct elements, 
 two of them legal, and the other of fact; the second branch con- 
 sists wholly of facts ; while the remedial right which flows from 
 the two is of course a conclusion of law. If the theory of plead- 
 ing required that all these elements should be expressed, then 
 the plaintiff's complaint or petition would always comprise the 
 following averments: (1) The rule of law applicable to certain 
 facts from which his primary right and the defendant's primary 
 duty arise; (2) the existence of the facts to which such rule 
 applies, and which are the occasion of the right and duty; (3) 
 the primary right and duty themselves wliich spring from the 
 operation of such rule upon the given facts, — these three sub- 
 divisions forming the first branch of the "cause of action;" (4) 
 the facts constituting the violation of the primary right and duty; 
 that is, the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant, — this 
 statement being the second branch of the "cause of action; " (5) 
 the remedial right held by the plaintiff, and the remedial duty 
 devolving upon the defendant, which result from the " cause of 
 action," and are wholly conclusions of law. In this manner 
 everything which enters into the plaintiff's case, fact and law, 
 would be spread upon the record. A bill of complaint in chan- 
 cery, prior to any statutory modification, was substantially con- 
 structed upon this plan, although the various subdivisions were 
 not so logically separated and arranged. The mode of pleading 
 which prevailed in the sui)erior courts of Scotland seems to have 
 been in complete conformity with this theory.-^ 
 
 1 [^Tlie Supreme Court of Coiinectirut ford (1902), 75 Conn. TG, 52 Atl. 4S7. oom- 
 iii New York, etc. 11. K. Co. v. Hunger- pared au action at law to a svllogism.
 
 GENEKAL PEINCIPLES OF PLEADING. 553 
 
 § 418. * 524. Elements Omitted and Retained vsrhen Cause of 
 Action is set forth in the Complaint. Tlie reformed system, fol- 
 lowing in this respect the common-law method, dispenses with 
 several of these elements which make up the plaintiff's entire 
 ground for relief: it wholly rejects all the subdivisions which 
 are mere legal rules or conclusions, and admits only those that 
 consist of the facts to which the legal rules apply, and which are 
 the occasion whence the conclusions arise. It assumes that the 
 courts and the parties are familiar with all the doctrines and 
 requirements of the law applicable to every conceivable condition 
 of facts and circumstances, so that, when a certain condition of 
 facts and circumstances is presented to them, they will at once 
 perceive and know what are the primary and the remedial rights 
 and duties of both the litigants ; and this knowledge being com- 
 plete and perfect, it is a useless incumbrance of the record to 
 spread out upon it the legal propositions and inferences with 
 which every one is assumed to be acquainted. A complaint or 
 petition, therefore, drawn in accordance with this theory, must 
 omit (1) the legal rule which is the direct cause of the primary 
 right and duty, (2) the primary right and duty themselves which 
 are the results of this rule acting upon the given facts, and (3) 
 the remedial right and duty which accrue to the plaintiff; and 
 it must only state (1) the facts which enter into the first branch 
 of the cause of action and are the occasion of the primary right 
 and duty, and (2) the facts which constitute the defendant's 
 wrongful act or omission, — that is, the delict which is the 
 second branch of the cause of action. As will be seen in the 
 sequel, a statement of the legal rule, or of the primary legal right 
 and duty without the facts to which they apply, and which are 
 the occasion for their existence, is insufficient: it alleges no cause 
 of action, and cannot be made the basis of an issue ; while such 
 a statement in addition to those facts is surplusage, and, if the 
 rules of pleading are strictly enforced, will be struck out on 
 
 using the following language : " The for instance, the defendant has done cer- 
 
 major premise is a proposition of law, as, tain acts (being the acts referred to in the 
 
 for instance, whoever does certain speci- proposition of law) to the damage of 
 
 fied acts to the injury of another is bound the plaintiff. These facts are alleged in 
 
 to pay that other the damages thus in- the complaint. The conclusion is the 
 
 flicted. This proposition is not pleaded, judgment or sentence of the law, which 
 
 but is necessarily involved in stating necessarily follows the establishment of 
 
 the facts alleged in the complaint. The the truth of the two premises."^ 
 minor premise is a statement of facts, as,
 
 55-4 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 motion, and will, at all events, be wholly disregarded. We 
 thus arrived at the first general doctrine in relation to the facts 
 constituting tlie cause of action ; namely, the facts which are 
 among the elements of the cause of action, that is, those which 
 are the occasion for the primary right and duty to arise, and 
 those which form the breach of such right and duty must be 
 alleged, to the entire exclusion of the other elements that enter 
 into the cause of action, — - the legal rules, and the legal rights 
 and duties of the parties. 
 
 § 419. * 525. Cases -wrhere Facts Show^ing Primary Right are 
 omitted because presumed. Before proceeding to the second 
 general doctrine, I shall notice an apparent modification of or 
 departure from the one just announced, which occurs in a cer- 
 tain class of actions. In a very great majority of instances, the 
 complaint or petition must narrate in an express manner those 
 facts, which, as I have shown, form an element of the first 
 branch or division of the cause of action, — those facts to which 
 the general rule of law applies in order to create the primary 
 right and duty of the parties. In these cases, therefore, the 
 pleading does actually contain, in direct and positive terms, the 
 allegations of two distinct groups of facts: first, those which are 
 the occasion of the primary right and duty; and secondly, those 
 which are the breach of such right and duty, — the wrong or 
 delict. There is nothing of fact left to be understood or as- 
 sumed. In another class of cases, however, the first group of 
 facts is not expressly averred ; it is omitted ; it is assumed to 
 exist in the same manner that the legal rules are assumed; and 
 the complaint or petition actually contains only those facts which 
 constitute the breach, — the Avrongf ul act or omission of the de- 
 fendant. The peculiar class of actions thus mentioned do not, 
 however, depart from or violate the theory of pleading before 
 described, but are constructed in exact conformity with it. The 
 facts upon which the primary right and duty of the parties 
 depend are omitted, because they are in accordance with the 
 universal experience of mankind, and must therefore be presumed 
 to exist, so that their averment, like the averment of legal rules, 
 is unnecessary. A simple and familiar illustration is the action 
 to recover damages for an assault and battery. The primary 
 right of the plaintiff is the right to liis own pcn'son, free from 
 molestation or interference by any one. This right, Ijcing a
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING. 555 
 
 legal conclusion, is of course not averred. The fact upon which 
 it depends is simply that the plaintiff is a human being, existing 
 iind possessing the common faculties and attributes of humanity. 
 Since this fact conforms to the universal experience, its averment 
 in the complaint or petition is needless; it is tacitly assumed; 
 and the pleading consists wholly in statements of the wrongful 
 trespass committed by the defendant. Another illustration is 
 the action for slander or libel. The facts upon which the pri- 
 mary right and duty of the parties depend is the existence of the 
 plaintiff as a member of society, and as possessing a character 
 among his fellow-men. Although the common-law declaration 
 contained averments of the plaintiff's reputation, they are un- 
 necessary, and the complaint or petition may contain merely an 
 account of the defamatory words spoken or published by the 
 defendant and the other elements of the wrong. It may be 
 stated as a general proposition, that, in actions brought for 
 injuries to the plaintiff's own person or character, the facts 
 which enter into the first branch of the cause of action, and are 
 the occasion whence the primary right and duty of the parties 
 arise, need not be expressly averred; they are assumed to exist, 
 and nothing but the delict need be alleged. Notwithstanding 
 this abridgment, the pleading in such cases is based upon the 
 same theory and governed by the same rules as the pleading in 
 all other classes of actions. 
 
 § 420. *526. Only Ultimate Facts are to be alleged. The 
 second of the general doctrines included within the principle 
 under consideration is, that, in stating the two required groups 
 of facts, those important and substantial facts alone should be 
 alleged which either immediately form the basis of the primary 
 right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts or 
 omissions of the defendant, and not the details of probative mat- 
 ter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements 
 are to be established. This doctrine applies to all classes of 
 actions, and if strictly enforced it would render the pleadings 
 simple, and the legal issues at least clear, cei'tain, and single. 
 The courts have been unanimous in their announcement of the 
 rule, and the decisions already quoted, as well as those to be 
 cited in subsequent paragraphs, will show the variety of circum- 
 stances, allegations, and issues to which it has been applied. 
 There can be no real difficulty, if the action is legal, in distiu-
 
 55G CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 guishing between the facts which are material and issnable and 
 shoukl therefore be averred, and those which are merely pro- 
 bative or evidentiary and shonld be omitted. Since the legal 
 priniary right and duty are always simple, and demand from the 
 defendant the performance or the omission of some single and 
 well-defined act, they will always depend, for their occasion, upon 
 a few positive, determined, and certain facts, all of which are 
 necessary to their existence, so that neither of these facts could 
 be modified, and much less could be omitted, without entirely 
 defeating the right and duty, and with them the cause of action 
 itself. The same is true of the facts which make uj) the defend- 
 ant's delict or wrong. In order, therefore, tliat any given legal 
 cause of action should exist, in order that au}^ given remedial 
 ris'ht or risfht of action should arise, these determinate, un- 
 changed, and positive elements of fact must all conspire to pro- 
 duce that result, and must be alleged; they literally "constitute '* 
 the cause of action, and form the "'material" or "issnable " aver- 
 ments spoken of by the courts. The subordinate facts, on the 
 other hand, which make up the probative matter and the details 
 of evidence, may vary indefinitely in their nature ; and so long 
 as they perform their function of establishing the " issuable " 
 averments, the cause of action will not be affected. To illustrate 
 by a very familiar example: In an action to recover damages for 
 the breach of a written contract, the allegation that the defend- 
 ant executed the agreement is material and issuable ; it cannot 
 be modified, and much less abandoned, without destroying the 
 whole cause of action. Its denial raises a direct issue, to main- 
 tain or disprove which evidence can be offered. The subordinate 
 probative matter l)y which this averment is established may vary- 
 according to the exigencies of the case, and a resort to or failure 
 with one method will not prevent the use of another. The plain- 
 tiff might rely upon the defendant's admissions that he executed 
 the paper, or upon the testimony of a witness who saw him sign 
 it, or upon the opinions of persons who are acquainted with his 
 handwriting, and who testify that the signature is liis. One or 
 the other, or even all, *of these means might be resorted to, and 
 the material fact to be proved would remain tlie same. If, how- 
 ever, instead of directly averring that the defendant executed the 
 written contract, the plaintiff should allege tliat the defendant 
 had a'lniiltcd liis signature to be genuine, or that a specified indi-
 
 GENERAL PlilNCU'LES OF PLEADING. . 557 
 
 vidual asserts that he saw the instrument signed, or that persons 
 familiar with his handwriting declare the signature to be his, it 
 is plain that neither of these statements would present a material 
 issue ; that is, an issue upon which the cause of action would de- 
 pend. This familiar illustration covers the whole field of legal 
 actions. The allegations must be of those principal, determinate, 
 constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, as stated, the en- 
 tire cause of action rests, so that, when denied, the issue thus 
 formed with each would involve the whole remedial right. ^ Every 
 legal cause of action will include two or more distinct and sepa- 
 rate facts; and in order that these facts may be issuable, the 
 failure to prove any one of them when denied must defeat a 
 recovery. If this fundamental doctrine of the reformed pleading 
 is fairly and consistently enforced in actual practice, the issues 
 presented for trial must necessarily be simple and single. Single- 
 ness and simplicity of issues do not require that the cause should 
 contain but one issue for the jury fo decide, one affirmation and 
 denial the determination of which disposes of the whole contro- 
 versy. This result of the common-law special pleading is often 
 described by enthusiastic admirers of the ancient system, but it 
 was seldom if ever met with in the actual administration of jus- 
 tice. The issues are single when each consists of one and only 
 one material fact asserted by the plaintiff and controverted by 
 the defendant, of such a nature that its affirmative decision is 
 essential to the cause of action, while its negative answer defeats 
 a recovery. The reformed theory of pleading contemplates and 
 makes provision for such issues; and if its provisions are faith- 
 fully carried out, the disputed questions of fact would be as 
 sharply defined, and as clearly presented for decision to juries, as 
 can be done by any other possible method. 
 
 § 421. *527. The Doctrine as Applied to Equitable Suits. The 
 discussion thus far of this particular doctrine has been confined 
 to legal actions ; are any modifications necessary to be made in its 
 statement when applied to equitable suits? The differences in 
 form between legal causes of action and remedies on the one side 
 and equitable causes of action and reliefs on the other have been 
 described, and need not be repeated. By virtue of these inherent 
 differences, the material facts which must be alleged in an equi- 
 table suit are often, in their nature and effects, quite unlike the 
 
 1 ^Nichols i\ Nichols (1896), 134 Mo. 187, 35 S. W. 577, quoting the text.]
 
 558 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 "issuable" facts which constitute a legal cause of action. In 
 the legal action the issuable facts are few; in the equitable suit 
 the material facts upon which the relief depends, or which influ- 
 ence and modify it, are generally numerous, and often exceed- 
 ingly so: in the former they are simple, clearly defined, and 
 certain; in the latter they may be and frequently are compli- 
 cated, involved, contingent, and uncertain. These are mere 
 differences of external form, but there is another much more 
 important, and wliich more nearly affects their essential nature. 
 The legal cause of action so completel}' rests for its existence 
 upon the issuable facts, that if any one of them when denied 
 fails to be established by proof, the plaintiff's entire recovery is 
 defeated thereby, a result which is recognized by all the judicial 
 decisions as involved in the very definition of a legal issuable 
 fact. An equitable cause of action may undoubtedly rest in like 
 manner upon a given number of determinate facts. In general, 
 however, as has already been fully explained, facts may exist 
 material to the recovery in a certain aspect, or in a certain con- 
 tingency, or to a certain extent, and which therefore enter into 
 the cause of action, but which are not indispensable to some kind 
 or measure of relief being granted to the plaintiff. These facts 
 if established will determine the character, extent, and com- 
 |)]eteness of the remedy conferred by the court; but if they are 
 not established, the remedy is not thereby wholly defeated; it is 
 only in some particulars modified, limited, or abridged. Since 
 tliese classes of facts assist in determining the nature, amount, 
 and details of the relief to be awarded, they in part at least 
 "constitute the cause of action" within the true meaning of the 
 term, and must l)e alleged. While the material facts of an equi- 
 table cause of action differ in the manner thus described from 
 the issuable facts of a legal cause of action, the single and com- 
 prehensive principle of the reformed procedure embraces and 
 controls both classes of suits. Mere evidence, probative matter 
 as contradistinguished from the principal facts upon which the 
 remedial right is based, are no more to be spread upon the record 
 in an equitable than in a legal action. A distinction iniieres in 
 the nature of the causes of action, and from this distinction the 
 facts material to the recovery in an equitable suit may be numer- 
 ous, complicated, affecting the right of recovery partially instead 
 of wholly, modifying rather than defeating the remedy if not
 
 GENERAL PRINCirLES OF PLEADING. 559 
 
 established ; but still they are the material facts constituting the 
 cause of action, and not mere details of evidentiary or probative 
 matter.^ 
 
 § 422. * 528. This Distinction between Material Facts in Legal 
 and Equitable Actions Sustained by the Courts. The existence 
 and necessity of this distinction between the material facts to be 
 alleged in legal and equitable actions are fully recognized and 
 admitted by judicial opinions of the highest authority.^ It also 
 prevails, I believe, universally in practice. By no judge has it 
 been more accurately and exhaustively discussed than by Mr. 
 Justice S. L. Selden in two early cases which, although without 
 the binding authority of precedents, have the force of cogent and 
 unanswerable reasoning.*^ With the practical conclusions in 
 reference to the nature of the material facts that should be 
 averred in an equitable complaint or petition at which Mr. Jus- 
 tice Selden arrives, I entirely concur; his course of argument 
 upon which those conclusions are based is the same in substance 
 which has been pursued in the foregoing paragraphs. I wholly 
 dissent, however, from his inference that these results are not 
 contemplated by and embraced within the single and comprehen- 
 sive principle announced by the codes, that the facts constituting 
 the cause of action, and they alone, must be stated. This infer- 
 ence does not follow from his argument, nor from the final posi- 
 tions which he reaches; it is wholly unnecessary; and it has 
 been rejected by judges who have accepted and maintained the 
 very doctrines concerning the nature of equitable pleading under 
 the code which he so ably supports. It is only by giving to the 
 phrase "facts constituting the cause of action" a narrow inter- 
 pretation, which it was plainly not intended to receive, that the 
 material facts of an equitable cause of action can be thus widely 
 separated from the issuable facts of a legal one. Both are aptly 
 described by the phrase which is found in all the codes. The 
 averment of issuable facts in one class of cases, and of the mate- 
 rial facts affecting the remedy in the other class, without the 
 details of evidence or probative matter relied upon to establish 
 
 1 [See Smith v. Smith (1897), 50 S. C. 2 gge People v. Ryder, 12 N. Y. 433, 
 
 54, 27 S. E. 545, where the court quotes 437 ; Horn v. Ludingcon, 28 Wis. 81, 83 ; 
 
 with approval almost the entire section of White v. Lyons, 42 CaL 279, 282. 
 
 the text relative to the difference between ^ Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, 
 
 material facts in equity and issuable facts 5 How. Pr. 216; Wooden v. Waffle, 6 
 
 at law.]] How. Pr. 145.
 
 560 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 either, is a necessary coDsequence of the single comprehensive 
 principle which underlies the whole reformed system. 
 
 § 423. * 529. Facts should be alleged as they actually existed 
 or occurred, not their Legal Effect. The third and last point 
 remains to be considered in this general discussion. The issu- 
 able facts in a legal action, and the facts material to the relief 
 in an equitable suit, should not only be stated to the complete 
 exclusion of the law and the evidence, but they should be alleged 
 as they actually existed or occurred, and not their legal effect, 
 force, or operation. This conclusion follows as an evident 
 corollary from the doctrine that the rules of law and the legal 
 rights and duties of the parties are to be assumed, while the 
 facts only which call these rules into operation, and are the occa- 
 sion of the rights and duties, are to be spread u})on the record. 
 Every attempt to combine fact and law, to give the facts a legal 
 coloring and aspect, to present them in their legal bearing upon 
 the issues rather than in their actual naked simplicity, is so far 
 forth an averment of law instead of fact, and is a direct violation 
 of the principle upon which the codes have constructed their 
 system of pleading. The peculiar method which prevailed at 
 the common law has been fully described ; it was undoubtedly 
 followed more strictly and completely in certain forms of action 
 than in others ; in a few instances — as in a special action on the 
 case — the declaration was framed in substantial conformity with 
 the reformed theory. But in very many actions, and those in 
 constant use, the averments were almost entirely of legal con- 
 clusions rather than of actual facts. The familiar allegations 
 that the plaintiff had "bargained and sold," or "sold and deliv- 
 ered," that the defendant "was indebted to the plaintiff," or 
 "had and received money to the plaintiff's use," and very fre- 
 quently even the averment of a promise made by the defendant, 
 may be taken as familiar illustrations from among a great num- 
 ber of other similar phrases which were found in the ordinary 
 declarations. Rejecting as it does the technicalities, the fictions, 
 the prescribed formulas, and the absurd repetitions and redun- 
 dancies, of the ancient common-law system, the new pleading 
 radically differs from the old in no feature more important and 
 essential than this, that the allegations must be of dry, naked, 
 actual facts, while the rules of law applicable thereto, and the 
 legal rights and duties arising therefrom, must be left entirely
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING. 561 
 
 to the courts. While this doctrine has been uniformly recog- 
 nized as correct wlien thus stated in an abstract and general 
 manner, it has sometimes been overlooked or disregarded in 
 passing upon the sufficiency and regularity of particular plead- 
 ings. Whether those decisions which have permitted the com- 
 mon counts to be used as good complaints or petitions, and those 
 which have required the promise implied by law to be expressly 
 averred as though actually made, are in conformity with this 
 doctrine, will be considered in subsequent paragraphs, and the 
 various cases bearing upon the question will be cited and dis- 
 cussed. It is sufficient for my present purpose to state the 
 doctrine in its general form, and to reserve its application for 
 another portion of the chapter. 
 
 § 424. * 530. Cases Supporting Doctrine that Facts, not Legal 
 Conclusions, are to be stated. As the foregoing analysis has been 
 exclusively based upon the text of the codes, I shall now test 
 the correctness of its conclusions, and illustrate the extent and 
 application of its general doctrines, by a reference to the decided 
 cases, following in the arrangement of the subject-matter the 
 order already adopted. The rule that facts alone are to be 
 stated, to the exclusion of law and of the legal rights and duties 
 of the parties, has been uniformly accepted by the courts, and 
 has been enforced in every variety of issues and of special cir- 
 cumstances. In a very recent decision, this general doctrine was 
 expressed in the following language : " Matter of law is never 
 matter to be alleged in pleading. No issue can be framed upon 
 an allegation as to the law. Facts only are pleadable, and uj)on 
 them without allegation the courts pronounce and apply the law. 
 This is true alike in respect to statutes and to the common law." ^ 
 
 1 People V. Marlboro H. Com'rs, 54 of the law," and then adds the language 
 
 N. Y. 276, 279. The question was as to quoted in the text. See also Comnion- 
 
 the validity of a certain statute. The wealth v. Cook, 8 Bush, 220, 224 ; Clark 
 
 defendants, in their pleading, had ad- v. Lineberger, 44 Ind. 223, 228, 229. The 
 
 mitted its validity, and that they were material, issuable facts, not mere legal or 
 
 required by it to do the acts sought to be other conclusions, — as illustrations see 
 
 enforced by the action, and had nowhere Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ey. Co. v. Keller, 
 
 raised any objection on the record. The 49 Ind. 211 (in a complaint in an action 
 
 adverse party claimed that this admission against a railroad for killing plaintiff's 
 
 precluded the defendants from raising the cattle which got on the track, it is not 
 
 question at the argument. Johnson J. sufficient to allege, in reference to the 
 
 said: "The objection to its [this ques- fencing of the track, "that the said rail- 
 
 tion] being raised is that the defendants road was not at the time and place said 
 
 have, in pleading, admitted the obligation animals were killed fenced in by said de- 
 
 3G
 
 562 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 Among tlie allegations which have been condemned as legal con- 
 clusions, and for that reason as forming no material issue, and 
 which have been rejected as failing to state any element of a 
 cause of action, the following are given as illustrations: in an 
 action to dissolve a partnership, for an accounting, etc., the 
 averment that on a day named, and for a long time previous 
 thereto, the defendant and the plaintiffs "were partners doing 
 business under the firm name of T. & C.;"^ in an action to 
 restrain the removal of a county seat under a statute which was 
 claimed to be special and therefore void, the allegation that "said 
 act is a special law in a case where a general law of uniform 
 operation throughout the State exists, and can be made appli- 
 cable ;"2 in an action apparently to recover damages for the 
 wrongful interference with the plaintiff's possession of certain 
 
 fendant in manner and form as in the 
 statute provided ") ; Tronson v. Union 
 Lu;iib. Co., 38 Wis. 202 (in an action of 
 replevin the averments that " the taking 
 [hy defendant] wa.s wrongful, and tlie de- 
 tention unjust," are mei-e jiropositions of 
 law) ; Page ?•. Kennan, 38 Wis. ."20 (in 
 an action to quiut title to land tlie com- 
 plaint alleged that defendant claimed un- 
 der certain deeds, and that her " claim 
 is without foundation in law," and "that 
 she has no legal claim or lien u])on or 
 title or interest in or to the laud ; " A< W, 
 a mere legal conclusion, and insufficient 
 to show the invalidity of defendant's 
 title): Surginer v. Paddock, 31 Ark. 528; 
 Schilling v. Rominger, 4 Col. 100 ; Clay 
 Co f. Simonsen, 1 Dak. 403, 430; Scott v. 
 liohards, 67 Mo. 289 ; Botey v. Griswold, 
 2 Mont. 447 ; Peter.'^on r. Koach, 32 Ohio 
 St. 374 ; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. 
 Moore, 33 id. 384 ; Scott v. B. & S. W. R. 
 Co., 52 Iowa, 18; Cooper v. French, 52 
 id. 531 ; Ockendeu v. Barnes, 43 id. 615; 
 Northern Kan. T. Co. v. Oswald, 18 Kan. 
 336; Sheridan v. Jackson, 72 N. Y. 170, 
 173; Stack v. Beach, 74 Ind. 571 ; Leach 
 V. Rhoiles, 49 Ind. 291 (in action on a 
 contract a general averment that there 
 was a full and valuable consideration, is a 
 mere conc-lusion of law, and not suflicient ; 
 tied fjH. is not this the issuable allegation of 
 fact?); Moore v. Ilobbs, 79 N. C. 535 ; 
 Estate of David Gharky, 57 Cal. 274 ; 
 Pavne v. McKinlev, 54 id. 532; Fite v. 
 
 Orr's Ass'n (Ky. 1886), 1 S. W. Rep. 5?2 ; 
 McEntee v. Cook, 76 Cal. 187 ; Bowers v. 
 Smith (Mo. 1892), 20 S. W. Rep. 101 ; 
 Johnson r. Vance, 86 Cal. 128 (alle;rntion 
 that yjlaintiff is " owner in fee simple " of 
 property in dispute is statement of an ulti- 
 mate fact, not of a conclusion of law) ; Go- 
 ing V. Dinwiddle, 86 Cal. 633 ; Mitchell v. 
 Clinton, 99 Mo. 153. The complaint need 
 never anticijjate any defences which may 
 be set up in the answer, nor contain alle- 
 gations to meet them. Caflin v. Taussig. 
 7 Hun, 223 ; Metrop. L. Ins. Co. r. Meeker, 
 85 N. Y. 614; Cohen v. Continental L. 
 Ins. Co., 69 id. 300, 304 ; Roth v. Palmer, 
 27 Barb. 652 ; Kayser v. Sichel, 34 id. 89 ; 
 Bliss r. Cottle, 32 id. 322 ; Wygand v. 
 Sichel, 3 Keyes, 120. 
 
 1 Groves r. Tallman, 8 Nev. 178. A 
 general demurrer to the complaint was 
 sustained, the court holding that this alle- 
 gation was a mere condu.sion of law, and 
 that the executed agreement of partner- 
 ship should have been set forth. The 
 decision, a.s it seems to me, is entirely 
 wrong : the plaintiff had stated the issu- 
 able fact, while the court demanded the 
 evidence : there may have been no written 
 contract of partnership. See Kelsey v. 
 Henry, 48 Ind. 37, which fully sustains 
 the views expressed in this note. 
 
 2 Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322, the court 
 further holding that, when the complaint 
 alleges a mere conclusion of law, no an- 
 swer to such allegation is necessary.
 
 GENKRAL rillXCIPLES OF PLEADING. 563 
 
 land, the averment that the plaintiff "was entitled to the ex- 
 clusive possession of" the premises in question;^ in an action 
 against a subscriber to the stock of a corporation to be organ- 
 ized, brought to recover the amount of his subscription, an 
 averment that the "company was legally organized, into which 
 organization the defendant entered." ^ 
 
 § 425. * 531. Same Subject. Also, in an action to recover on 
 a policy of fire insurance, by the terms of which the sum assured 
 did not become payable until certain acts had been done by the 
 plaintiff as conditions precedent, an averment merely "that the 
 whole of said sum is now due; "^ in an action to restrain the col- 
 lection of a tax on the plaintiff's land, an allegation that the 
 land "is by the laws of the State exempt from taxation;"* in a 
 suit to recover a stock subscription to a corporation, an allega- 
 tion that the party became a subscriber to the capital stock "by 
 signing and delivering" a specified agreement;^ an allegation 
 " that the title of the plaintiff to said lots by virtue of said, tax 
 sale is invalid, from an irregularity in the notice of such tax 
 sale ; " ^ in an action to set aside a judgment for a tax, an allega- 
 tion " that no notice was given of the said proceedings, or any 
 of them," which resulted in the tax;" in an action brought to 
 recover land claimed by inheritance from a former owner, the 
 allegation that the plaintiff was "one of the heirs of" such 
 
 1 Garner v. McCullough, 48 Mo. 318. * Quinney w. Stockbridge, 33 Wis. 505. 
 The petition did not state that the plain- There was no other statement showing 
 tiff was or had ever been in possession, that the land was exempt; and, in order 
 and failed to disclose the nature of his that it should be so, certain special cir- 
 claim or the source of his right, the cumstances must have existed. Tlie 
 allegation (juoted being the sole asser- averment was held to be of no force what- 
 tion of a right in the land. It was held ever, unless accompanied by allegations 
 that no cause of action was stated, and all of the proper facts; and a preliminary 
 evidence should be exchuled at the trial, injunction was therefore dissolved upon 
 although the defendant had answered. the complaint alone. 
 
 2 Hain ;;. N. W. Gravel R. Co., 41 Ind. & Wheeler v. Floral Mill Co., 9 Nev. 
 196. This averment was held to have 254, 258. In an action against the corn- 
 raised no issue, citing Indianapolis, C. & pany, it set up the demand mentioned in 
 L. R. Co. V. Robinson, 35 Ind. 380. the text as a set-off or counter-claim, al- 
 
 3 Doyle V. Phoenix Ins. Co., 44 Cal. leging the plaintiff's liability in the man- 
 264, 268. The court having decided that ner described. A judgment in favor of 
 the comjilaint did not sufficiently aver a the defendant was reversed, because there 
 performance of the conditions precedent was no averment in the answer which 
 by the plaintiff, and so failed to state a made out a cause of action, citing Barron 
 cau.se of action, added: " The allegation r. Frink, 30 Cal. 486; Burnett v. Stearns, 
 that 'the sum is now due' may be laid 33 Cal. 473. 
 
 out of the case, inasmuch as that is a ^ Wel)b v. Bidwell, 15 Minn. 479, 485. 
 
 coiiclusion of law merelv." '^ Stokes i\ Geddcs, 46 Cal. 17.
 
 564 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 former owner ;^ in an action on a contract where the defendant's 
 liability depended upon the performance of certain conditions 
 precedent by a third person, the mere allegation, without stating 
 any performance by such person, that " the defendant neglected 
 and refused " to perform the stipulated act on his part " accord- 
 ino- to the terms of said acjreement."^ The law of another State 
 or countr}^ however, is regarded, for purposes of pleading, as 
 matter of fact, and must be averred with so much distinctness 
 and particularity that the court may, from the statement alone, 
 judge of its operation and effect upon the issues presented in 
 the cause. Thus, in an action upon a note executed and made 
 payable in Illinois, the allegation, "that by the law of Illinois 
 the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in tlie amount of such 
 note," was held insuihcient to admit evidence of what the Illinois 
 law is in reference to the subject-matter.^ In Indiana the aver- 
 ment, that the defendant "is indebted" to the plaintiff in a 
 specified amount, is held to be sufficient. This ruling, however, 
 is not based upon the general principles of pleading announced by 
 the codes, Ijut upon certain short forms authorized by the legis- 
 lature, which were copied from the ancient common counts in 
 assumpsit.* Examples similar to the foregoing might be indefi- 
 nitely multiplied ; })ut these are sufficient to illustrate the action 
 of the courts, and to show how firmly they have adhered to the 
 doctrine that facts, and not law, must be alleged, and that the 
 averments of legal conclusions without the facts from which they 
 have arisen form no issues, state no causes of action, admit no 
 evidence, and do not even support a verdict or judgment, — in 
 short, that they are mere nullities.'^ 
 
 1 Larue c. Hays, 7 Bush, 50, 53. Tliis doctrine or rule relied upou must be fully 
 allegation was held not to be admitted and accurately stated in the pleading. See 
 by a faihire to deny it, citing Bani<s v. Woolsey v. Williams, 34 Iowa, 413, 415. 
 •lohnson, 4 J. J. Marsh. 649; Currie v. * .lolinson v. Kilgore, 39 Ind. 147. 
 Fowler, 5 .1. J. Marsh. 145. Tiiese statutory forms, in my opinion, 
 
 2 Wilson V. Clarlv, 20 Minn. 367, 309. violate the fundamental princijdes of 
 This was declared to be a mere conclu- plcailing adopted by tlie reformed pro- 
 sion of liiw ; and as no facts were stated cedure, more so even than the ancient 
 from which it could be inferred, it wa.s a common counts. Tiiis question will be 
 nullity. particularly examined in a subsequent 
 
 ^ Hoots ('. Merriwether, 8 Rush, 397, paragraph. 
 401. As a foreign law is a matter of fact, 
 
 the court does not take judicial notice of ^ £Facts, not Leyal Conclusions, 
 
 it. and if different from that of the forum, «''«"'<^ ''^ pleaded. 
 
 and if it must be invoked in order to make Upou this general proposition, and in 
 
 out the cause of action, the particular support thereof, .sec the following ca.se.s :
 
 GENERAL PKINCIPLES OF PLEADING. 
 
 565 
 
 §426. 
 
 *.532. Cases Supporting Doctrine that Material, not Pro 
 bative, Facts are to be stated. 
 
 Wabaska P^lectric Co. v. City of Wymore 
 (1900), 60 Neb. 199, 82 N. W. G26 ; Wood- 
 ward V. State (1899), .58 Neb. 598, 79 
 N. W. 164; State ex rel. v. Osborn (1900), 
 
 60 Neb. 415, 83 N. W. 357; Blakeslec v. 
 Missouri Pac. lly. Co. (1894), 43 Neb. 61, 
 
 61 N. W. 118; Ilobinsoiir. Berkey (1896), 
 100 la. 136, 69 N. W. 433 ; Deiini.s v. Nelson 
 (1893), 55 Miun. 144, 56 N. W. 589; Folaud 
 V. Town of Frankton (1895), 142 Ind. 546, 
 41 N. E. 1031 ; Davis v. Clements (1897), 
 148 Ind. 605, 47 N. E. 105G; Lanier v. 
 Union Mortgage Co. (1897), 64 Ark. 39, 
 40 S. W. 466; Malliiickrodt Chemical 
 Works V. Nemnich (1902), 169 Mo. 388, 
 69 S.. W. 355 ; Livingstone v. Buff (1903), 
 65 S. C. 284, 43 S. E. 678 ; First Nat. Bank 
 V. Myers (1895), 44 Neb. 306, 62 N. W. 
 459. " 
 
 But a pleading is not rendered insuffi- 
 cient because in addition to averments of 
 fact there are also conclusions of law : 
 Nourse v. Weitz ( 1903), — La. — , 95 N. W. 
 25 L 
 
 An averment of a legal conclusion is 
 not admitted by demurrer nor by failure 
 to deny it : Lanier v. Union Mortgage 
 Co. (1897), 64 Ark. 39, 40 S. W. 466; 
 Greer v. Latimer (1896), 47 S. C. 176, 25 
 S. E. 136; State v. Kanisey (1897), 50 
 Neb. 166, 69 N. W. 758 ; Markey v. School 
 District (1899), 58 Neb. 479, 78 N. W. 932 ; 
 Hoyer v. Ludiugtou (1898), 100 Wis. 441, 
 76 N. W. 348; knapp w. St. Louis (1900), 
 156 Mo. 343, 56 S. W. 1102 ; Bogaard v. 
 Ind. Dist. of Plainview (1895), 93 la. 269, 
 61 N. W. 859 ; Peake v. Buell (1895), 90 
 Wis. 508, 63 N. W. 1053; Edwards v. 
 Smith (1897), 102 Ga. 19, 29 S. E. 129. 
 
 The objection tliat some of the allega- 
 tions of the complaint are mere legal 
 conclusions is one of form rather than sub- 
 stance, and does not render the pleading 
 subject to a demurrer for want of facts : 
 Harris v. Halverson (1901), 23 Wash. 
 779, 63 Pac. 549. But in Mallinckrodt 
 Chem.- Works v. Nemnich (1902), 169 Mo. 
 388, 69 S. W. 355, it was held that a legal 
 conclusion rendered a pleading obnoxious 
 to attack by general demurrer. Same 
 rule stated in Ryan v. Holliday (1895), 
 110 Cal. 335, 42 Pac. 891, but this case 
 was expressly overruled by Penrose c. 
 
 Pursuing the order before indi- 
 
 Winter (1901), 135 Cal. 289, 67 Pac. 772. 
 See also Smith u. Kaufman (1895), 3 Okla. 
 568,41 Pac. 722. A legal conclusion ren- 
 ders the pleading liable to attacli by 
 motion to make more definite and certain : 
 Griffith v. Wright (1899), 21 Wash. 494, 
 58 Pac. 582. A pleading containing only 
 conclusions of law is to be regarded as 
 irrelevant, interposed for delay only, and 
 may be stricken out on motion : Dennis v. 
 Nelson (1893), 55 Minn. 144, 56 N. W. 589. 
 
 A mixed statement of fact and legal 
 conclusion may properly be pleaded : Liv- 
 ingstone V. Ruff (1903), 65 S. C. 284, 43 
 S. E. 678, quoting witli approval Clarke v. 
 Railroad Co., 28 Minn. 71. So, also, 
 facts, together with the conclusion which 
 tlie law implies from them, may both 
 properly be pleaded : Wetmore v. Crouch 
 (1899), 150 Mo. 671, 51 S. W. 738. But 
 it was held in Manry v. WaxelVjaum Co. 
 (1899), 108 Ga. 14, 33 S. E. 701, that where 
 a written instrument is sued upon, allega- 
 tions in the petition which merely sought 
 to construe it were properly stricken out. 
 
 Facts or conclusions which are pre- 
 sumed or necessarily implied from facts 
 pleaded, need not be alleged : City of 
 Brookfield v. Tooey (1897), 141 Mo. 619, 
 43 S. W. 387 ; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
 Kahn (1893), 4 Wyo. 364, 34 Pac. 895; 
 Bishop (;. Middleton (1894), 43 Neb. 10, 61 
 N. W. 129; Henke y. Eureka Endowment 
 A,ss'n (1893), 100 Cal. 429, 34 Pac. 1089; 
 McMurray-Judge, etc. Co. v. City of St. 
 Louis (1896), 138 Mo. 608, 39 S. W. 467 ; 
 Lord I'. Russell (1894), 64 Conn. 86,29 
 AtL 242 ; Pyle v. Peyton (1896), 146 Ind. 
 90, 44 N. E. 925. 
 
 Conclusions of Fact. Allegations of con- 
 clusions of fact cannot avail unless they 
 are accompanied by statements of the 
 facts tliemselves from wliich the court 
 may draw the conclusions: Longshore 
 Printing Co. v. Howell (1894), 26 Ore. 527, 
 38 Pac. 547; Bordeaux i'. Greene (1899), 
 22 Mont. 254, 56 Pac. 218. When so ac- 
 companied they are useful as indicating 
 the pleader's theory of his case : Robinson 
 V. Berkey (1896), 100 la. 136, 69 N. W. 433. 
 Conclusions do not limit the evidence 
 which is admissible : Allend v. Spokane 
 Falls, etc Ry. Co. (1899), 21 Wash. 324,
 
 566 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 catecl, the following cases will explain and illustrate the second 
 doctrine that the principal, material, and issuable facts must be 
 
 58 Pac. 24-1. Specific facts control general 
 stateiiieuts of fact : Frain v. Burgett (1898), 
 152 Ind. 55, 50 N. K. 873. 
 
 Instances of Allegations Held to be Con- 
 clusions of [mw. 
 
 Tliat money is due : Creecy v. Joy 
 (1901), 40 Ore. 28, 66 Pac. 295 ; Penrose v. 
 Winter (1901), 133 Cal. 289, 67 Pac. 772 ; 
 Kyan v. Holliday (1895), 110 Cal. 335, 42 
 Pac. 891 ; Ricliards v. Lake View Land 
 Co. (1897), 115 Cal. 642, 47 Pac. 683; 
 Baldwin r. Burt (1895), 43 Neb. 245, 01 
 N. W. 601. 'That a note is a wife's 
 separate estate : " Leahy v. Leahy (1895), 
 97 Ky. 59, 29 S. W. 852. That a wife, as 
 sole lieir of her husband, owns a cause of 
 action: Butties i-. De Baun (1903), 116 
 Wis. 323, 93 N. W. 5. Tlie allegations in 
 the petition that the ordinance in question 
 was passed, " without any legal warrant or 
 authority therefor ; " that " the passage of 
 said ordinance was a violation by the city 
 of its duties as trustee ; " that " the use 
 hv the chemical company of the vacated 
 portions of tlie street is wholly illegal ; " 
 that " plaintiff has no adequate remedy at 
 law ; " that the " damages of plaintiff are 
 irreparable," are merely conclusions of 
 law and not averments of facts : Knapp 
 V. St. Louis (1900), 156 Mo. 343, 56 S. W. 
 1102. See also State ex rel. v. Wood 
 (1900), 155 Mo. 425, 56 S. W. 474, where 
 same rule is stated respecting allegation 
 of irreparable injury. That there was no 
 legal and sufficient levy of taxes : Weston 
 V. Meyers (1895), 45 Neb. 95. 63 N. W. 
 117. That the tax deed under which de- 
 fendant claims is void, because the officers 
 who made the a.ssessment and executed 
 tiie deed were legally disciualified, and 
 failed to publish jiroper notice : O'Hara v. 
 Parker (1893), 27 Ore. 156, 39 Pac. 1004; 
 ^ha!lnon i>. Portland (1900), 38 Ore. 382, 
 62 Pac. 30. An allegation, in an action to 
 enjoin tiie collection of a certain tax, that 
 " the said board of directors has no juris- 
 diction or |)(jwer to appropriate said 
 money for said propo.sed highway : " 
 Bog.iard V. Jud. Dist. of Plainview (1895), 
 93 la 269, 61 N. W. 859. That a sale 
 wa.s made fraudulently for the purpose of 
 iiindcriag, delaying and defrauding credit- 
 ors : Coue V. Ivinsou (1893), 4 Wyo. 203, 
 
 33 Pac. 31. That a judgment was pro- 
 cured by fraud and is contrary to law : 
 Thomas v. Markmann (1895), 43 Neb. 
 823, 02 N. W. 20G. That the execution of 
 a deed was procured by fraud : First Nat. 
 Bank of Sutton v. Grosshans (1901), 61 
 Neb. 575, 85 N. W. 592. In an action by 
 a mortgagor to recover a surplus left in 
 tlie hands of the sheriff, an allegation that 
 " the remaining S51 arising from said sale, 
 as aforesaid, is surplus payable to plaintiff, 
 who is entitled to the same as mort- 
 gagor, and by virtue of a deed of convey- 
 ance of said property so sold, to her made 
 and delivered by said Arthur W. Clyde : " 
 Clyde V. Johnson (1894), 4 N. I). 92, 58 
 N. W. 512. That it was defendant's duty 
 to erect and maintain guards over a certain 
 window: Peake v. Buell (1895), 90 Wis. 
 508, 63 N. W. 1053. That a pole, wiiich 
 caused personal injuries, was " too near 
 the track : " Blackstone v. Central of 
 Georgia Ry. Co. (1898), 105 Ga. 380, 31 
 S. E. 90. Tliat tlie plaintiff had " used 
 all the diligence he could : " Edwards v. 
 Smith (1897), 102 Ga. 19,29 S. E. 129. 
 That a certain fence is liable to be blown 
 over on plaintiff's buildings : Bordeaux v. 
 Greene (1899), 22 Mont. 254, 56 Pac. 218. 
 That a corporation is the successor of 
 another, assumed all its liabilities, and is 
 liable for tiie payment of the obligations 
 sued on : Khorer v. Middlesboro Co. ( 1S98), 
 103 Ky. 146,44 8. W.448. That the " said 
 1'. W. Smith is not now or never ha.s been 
 legally appointed assignee for J. A. New- 
 kirk : " Smith r. Kaufman (1895), 3 Okla. 
 508, 41 Pac. 722. That defendant's re- 
 fusal to transmit the message tendered 
 was " witliout reasonable grounds : " 
 Kirbyu. Western Union Tel. Co. (1893), 
 4 S. D. 463, 57 N. W. 202. That defend- 
 ant put it ab.solutely out of his power to 
 l)erform his contract : Garberius v. Koberts 
 (1895), 109 Cal. 12.5, 41 Pac. 857. That 
 " plaintiff is not an innocent holder for 
 value of said note : " Voorhees v. Fisher 
 (1893), 9 Utah, 303. 34 Pac. 64. That 
 plaintiff has a lien on certain cattle : Hill 
 i: Campbell Commission Co. (1898), 54 
 Neb. 59, 74 N. W. 38)^. That jdaiiitiff 
 has a special ownership in certain ])r(ip- 
 erty: Griffing v. Curtis (1897). 50 Neb.
 
 GENERAL PRINCirLES OF PLEADING. 
 
 567 
 
 pleaded, and not the details of evidentiary or probative matter 
 from which the existence of the final facts is inferred. The 
 language employed by the court in an action brought to restrain 
 the execution of tax deeds of the plaintiff's land, on account of 
 illegality in the proceedings, furnishes a very instructive example 
 of such averments : " The plaintiff relied upon the absence of 
 preliminary proceedings essential to the validity of the tax sales. 
 But instead of averring, either of his own knowledge or upon 
 information and belief, that such proceedings were not had, he 
 only averred that he had searched in the proper offices for the 
 evidence that they were had, and failed to find it. The only 
 issue that could be made upon such an allegation would be 
 whether he had searched and found the evidence or not, which 
 would be entirely immaterial." ^ In pleading certain classes of 
 
 334, 69 N. W. 964. That certain acts of 
 au agent were within the apparent scope 
 of his employment : Hoyer v. Ludington 
 (1898), 100 Wis. 441, "76 N. W. 348. 
 That a contract was not one for the sale 
 of goods, but merely an agreement as to 
 prices which should be paid for goods 
 ordered from time to time: Gipps Brew- 
 ing Co. V. De France (1894), 91 la. 108, 
 58 N. W. 1087. That plaintiff is lessee of 
 premises and entitled to possession and to 
 the rents payable from tenants : Harris v. 
 Halverson (1901), 23 Wash. 779, 63 Pac. 
 549. That certain assessments were duly 
 levied : Harlow v. Supreme Lodge (1901), 
 Ky., 62 S. W. 1030. That a plat did not 
 contain a dedication to the public use of 
 certain streets, etc. ; Bellevue Imp. Co. v. 
 Ivayser (1903), — Neb. —, 95 N. W. 499. 
 That the Constitution requires every bill 
 to be read by sections on three several 
 days, unless the sevei'al readings are dis- 
 pensed with by two-thirds vote : Laudes v. 
 State (1903), — lud. — , 67 N. E. 189. 
 
 Instances of Allegations Held not to be 
 Conclusions of Law. 
 
 That defendant waived the non-pay- 
 ment of the entire stock : MacFarland >•. 
 West Side Improvement Ass'n (1898), 56 
 Neb. 277, 76 N. W. 584. In a suit to en- 
 force payment of city warrants, an allega- 
 tion that the warrants " were registered 
 for payment according to law by the " 
 city treasurer " at the dates of their re- 
 s)iective presentations : " Freeman v. City 
 of Huron (1897), 10 S. D. 368, 73 N. W. 
 
 260. " That the plaintiff is the owner 
 and that the property is her sole and 
 separate property : " Kemp v. Folsom 
 (1896), 14 Wash. 16,43 Pac. 1100. That 
 " he waived demand and notice : " Bay 
 View Brewing Co. v. Grubb (1901), 24 
 Wash. 163, 63 Pac. 1091. That title to 
 land is in the United States and is not 
 subject to taxation : Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. r. 
 Ilenrie (1901), 63 Kan. 330, 65 Pac. 665 ; 
 Security Co. v. Harper County (1901), 63 
 Kan. 351, 65 Pac. G60. That defendant 
 unlawfully procured the arrest of plaintiff : 
 Reynolds!;. Price (1900), Ky., 56 S. W. 
 502. That an assessment was duly made 
 and that notice thereof was duly given to 
 the assured : Miles v. Mutual Reserve 
 Fund Life Ass'n (1901), 108 Wis. 421, 84 
 N. W. 159, criticising Am. M. A. Soc. v. 
 Helburn, 85 Ky. 1, where the contrary 
 was held. That a warrant was duly and 
 legally signed : Stephens (-. Spokane ( 1 895), 
 11 Wash. 41, 39 Pac. 266. That the debt 
 sued on is the .same debt evidenced by a 
 certain note : Shirley v. Stephenson (1898), 
 104 Ky. 518, 47 S. W. 581.] 
 
 1 Rogers r. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 610, 
 61 1. If the plaintiff had alleged that the 
 proceedings iu question had been omitted, 
 the facts stated by him would have been 
 proper evidence in support of the aver- 
 ment. This case exhibits very clearly the 
 distinction between the ultimate issuable 
 fact which cannot be changed in order 
 to make out a given cause of action, and 
 the probative matter by wiiich such fact
 
 568 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 issues, it is undoubtedly difficult sometimes to discriminate 
 between the final facts and the probative matter. This is espe- 
 cially true in charging fraud, which must almost invariably 
 consist of many different circumstances, some affirmative and 
 some negative ; but the rule should nevertheless be applied. " It 
 is not necessary nor proper for the pleader to set out all the 
 minute facts tending to establish the fraud ; the ultimate facts, 
 and not the evidence, should be pleaded."^ An allegation of 
 mere evidentiary matter, and not an ultimate or issuable fact, is 
 surplusage ; it need not be controverted, and is not admitted by 
 a failure to deny. As was said in a recent decision, " the matter 
 averred is not an ultimate fact; that is to say, a fact which is 
 required to be stated in a complaint, and which, if not denied by 
 the answer, would stand as admitted; but it is merely matter of 
 evidence which might be stricken out of the complaint. "^ If in 
 addition to the issuable or material facts the pleading also con- 
 tains the details of evidence tending to establish them, these 
 latter averments should be stricken out on motion as surplusage.^ 
 
 is established, and which may vary ac- 
 cording to the exigencies of the case. Of 
 course the omission of the preliminary 
 proceedings must be proved, but it could 
 be proved by many different kinds of 
 evidence. This distinction is a certain 
 test by which to determine whether any 
 given fact is issuable and material, or is 
 only probative. 
 
 1 Cowin V. Toole, 31 Iowa, 513, 516; 
 Singleton i-. Scott, 1 1 Iowa, 589. 
 
 2 Gates V. Salmon, 46 Cal. 361, 379. 
 See also, as further illustrations. Clay 
 Cy. V. Siraonsen, 1 Dak. 403, 430; Scott 
 V. Robards, 67 Mo. 289 ; Terry v. Musser, 
 68 id. 477; Cook v. Putnam Co., 70 id. 
 668 ; Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. McCormick, 
 20 Kan. 107 ; Harris v. Hillegass, 54 Cal. 
 463 ; Elder v. Spinks, 53 id. 293 ; Damb- 
 raan v. White, 48 id. 439; Schilling v. 
 Rominger, 4 Colo. 100 (mode of allegation 
 in equitable actions). The complaint 
 need not anticijiate and meet expected 
 defences. Claflin v. Taussig, 7 Hun, 223, 
 and cases cited ; Metrop. Life Ins. Co. v. 
 Meeker. 85 N. Y. 614; Cohen v. Conti- 
 nental Life Ins. Co., 69 id. 300, 304. 
 
 2 King V. Enterprise Ins. Co., 45 Ind. 
 43 ; Van Schaiik v. Farrow, 25 Ind. 310; 
 Lytle V. Lytle, 37 Ind. 281. 
 
 ^Ultimate, not Probative Facta, to be 
 alleged. 
 
 In support of this general proposition, 
 see the following cases : Stewart v. An- 
 derson (1900), 111 la. 329, 82 N. W. 770; 
 Durell V. Abbott (1895), 6 Wyo. 265, 44 
 Pac. 647 ; Markey v. School District (1899), 
 
 58 Neb. 479, 78 N. W. 932; Bee Publish- 
 ing Co. V. World Publishing Co. (1900), 
 
 59 Neb. 713, 82 N. W. 28 ; McCarville v. 
 Boyle (1895), 89 Wis. 651, 62 N. W. 517 ; 
 Stephens v. Spokane (1895), 11 Wash. 41, 
 39 Pac. 266. 
 
 What are Ultimate Facts ? 
 
 Meyer v. School Di.«trict (1893), 4 
 S. D. 420, 57 N. W. 68: " Ar ultimate or 
 issuable fact in a pleading is one essential 
 to the claim or defence, and wliich cannot 
 be stricken from the pleading without 
 leaving it insufficient. Such issuable facts 
 quite frequently involve a legal proposi- 
 tion also." Atkinson v. Wal)ash R. R. 
 Co. (1895), 143 Ind. 501, 41 N. E. 947: 
 The test of the materiality of averments 
 is whether they tend to constitute a cause 
 of action or defence. Culbertson Irrigat- 
 ing, etc. Co. V. Cox (1897), 52 Neb. 684, 
 73 N. W. 9 : "A material allegation is 
 one essential to a claim or defence wiiicli
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING. 
 
 569 
 
 There is a class of allegations which are necessar}', Lut which 
 are not issuable in the ordinary meaning of this term as already- 
 defined, — that is, the cause of action is not defeated by a failure 
 to prove them as averred, and an omission to deny them does not 
 admit their truth, but still they must be stated, and a complaint 
 or petition w^ould be insufficient, or at least incomplete, without 
 them. This class includes in general the statements of time,^ 
 
 cannot be stricken from the pleading with- 
 out leaving it insufticient." McLean v. 
 City of Levviston (1902), Idaho, 69 Pac. 
 478 : In actions for negligence, " the 
 pleader must state all facts necessary to 
 inform the defendant of all acts or omis- 
 sions that are charged against the defend- 
 ant, so as to enable him to make a full 
 and complete defence thereto." 
 
 " A material fact not alleged is pre- 
 sumed not to exist : " Stillings v. Van 
 Allstine (1902), Neb., 89 N. W. 756. 
 
 Consequences of Pleading Evidence. 
 
 McCaughey v. Schuette (1897), 117 Cal. 
 223, 46 Pac. 666, 48 Pac. 1088. Where 
 ultimate facts are not pleaded but the 
 complaint contains averments of such 
 evidentiary facts as would, if proved, au- 
 thorize the court in finding the ultimate 
 facts, the complaint is bad on general 
 demurrer for want of sufficient facts. 
 The court say, " To uphold such a plead- 
 ing is to encourage prolixity and a wide 
 departure from that defiuiteness, certainty, 
 and perspicuity which is one of the para- 
 mount objects sought to be enforced by 
 the code system of pleading.'' This 
 decision seems opposed to the current of 
 authority and is not warranted by the 
 previous decisions in California. The 
 cases cited by the court do not go as 
 far as this case. 
 
 But, for the contrary view, see Dilla- 
 hunty r. Railway Co. (1894), 59 Ark. 629, 
 28 S. W. 657. In this case, where a fact 
 material to the cause of action was not 
 alleged as such in the complaint, but only 
 evidence of such fact was alleged, a demur- 
 rer on the ground that it did not state 
 facts sufficient to constitute a cause of 
 action was overruled. It was held that 
 the proper practice was to interpose a 
 motion to make more definite and certain. 
 So in Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hemingway 
 
 (1902), 63 Neb. 610, 88 N. W. 673, it was 
 held that the remedy for argumentative 
 pleading was by motion, not demurrer. 
 
 Facts within Knowledge of Opposite Parti/. 
 
 In Brashear v. City of Madison (1895), 
 142 Ind. 685, 36 N. E. 252, the court said : 
 " The true rule, as we understand it, is 
 that facts peculiarly within the knowledge 
 of the party against whom they should be 
 pleaded, and not accessible to the pleader, 
 may be dispensed with, but this may not 
 be done without showing that such facts 
 are so peculiarly within the knowledge of 
 the opposite party, and not accessible to 
 the pleader. . . . Under our code, the bur- 
 den rests upon the pleader to state in a 
 plain and concise manner the facts re- 
 quiring the relief demanded, and to be 
 excused from this duty he must allege 
 that such facts are beyond hfs reach and 
 not w^ithin his knowledge."] 
 
 1 [[Railway Co. v. State (1894), 59 
 Ark. 165, 26 "s. W. 824. Where plaintiff 
 alleged, in suing for a penalty, that on 
 the 24M of February, 1889, at about 11 
 o'clock A.M., the defendant on a certain 
 engine of a passenger train ffoing south 
 failed to ring bell or sound whistle, and 
 proved on the trial that in the spring of 
 1889, on a certain engine of a. freight train 
 going north the failure occurred, held that 
 there was a total variance. The court 
 discusses the allegation and proof of time, 
 and holds that the plaintiff must make 
 such allegation specific and establish it by 
 proof, in order to advise the defendant 
 what it is to meet on the trial. In the 
 following cases it was held that the time 
 was immaterial, and need not be proved as 
 laid: Bancroft Co. v. Haslett (1895), 106 
 Cal. 151, 39 Pac. 602 (date of conversion) ; 
 Carrier v. Bernstein (1898), 104 la. 572, 73 
 N. W. 107G (date of illegal .sale of intoxi- 
 cating liquors in action for penalty) ;
 
 570 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 place, ^ value,- quantity, amounts,^ and the like; although, under 
 peculiar circumstances, the allegation of any one of these 
 matters may become in ever}' sense of the term issuable and 
 material. Ordinarily, however, this is not so. The rule thus 
 given prevailed in the common-law pleading, and has not been 
 changed by the new procedure. Thus, for example, in an action 
 for the conversion of chattels, the statement of their value is not 
 issuable; failure to deny does not admit its truth, nor exclude 
 evidence as to the real value.* 
 
 § 427. * 533. Instances of Allegations Approved or Condemned 
 by the Courts. The decisions which follow in this and one or 
 two subsequent paragraphs are cited in order to furnish some 
 examples of allegations which have been judicially tested and 
 pronounced sufficient or insufficient, as the case may be. A few 
 such particular instances will better illustrate the general doc- 
 trine of the codes, and will more clearly explain the requisite 
 form and nature of issuable and material averments than can be 
 done by any other method, either of description or of argument. 
 In an action upon a guaranty of a note, the objection was raised 
 by the defendant that the complaint failed to state any cause of 
 action. It set out a note payable to the defendant which fell 
 due October 1, 1867, and alleged "that on the 9th of October, 
 1867 [after it was due], the defendant, for value received, trans- 
 ferred said note to the plaintiff, and then and there guaranteed 
 the payment thereof by his written guaranty, indorsed thereon as 
 follows: 'For value received, I hereby guarantee the payment of 
 the within note when due, October 9, 1867 ; ' and although said 
 note became due and payable before the commencement of this 
 action, yet the said makers of said note, nor the said defendant, 
 
 Delsman v. Friedlander (1901), 40 Ore. .3.3, Cincinnati, etc. Ry. Co. v. McLain (1897), 
 
 66 Pac. 297 (date of execution and in- 148 lud. 188, 44 N. E. 306; Au.sic v. KuW- 
 
 dorsement of note ."sued on). See subject way Co. (1901), 10 N. I). 215, 86 N. W . 
 
 Time, ill note on Necessity and Form of 719; Coulter c. Great Nortliern Ry. Co. 
 
 Particular Allegations, p. 687.] (1896), 5 N. 1). 568, 67 N. \V. 1046.] 
 
 1 QFor ca,ses holding that there is no ^ [^Plumb v. Griffin (1901). 74 Conn, 
 
 material variance where there is a differ- 132, 50 Atl. 1 ; Derrick r. Cole (1894), 60 
 
 ence between the place allegeil and that Ark. 394, .30 S. W. 760; Campbell v. 
 
 proved, see Barrett r. Village of Ham- Brosius (1893), 36 Neb. 792, 55 N. W. 
 
 mond (18'J4), 87 Wis. 654, 58 N. W. 1053 ; 215.] 
 
 J'rewittj'. Mi.ssouri,oto. Hy. Co. (1896), 134 » QDenn v. Peters (1900), 36 Ore. 486, 
 
 Mo. 615, .36 S. W. 667. 59 Pac. 1109.] 
 
 For cases holding that such difference ■• Cliicago & .S. VV. U. Co. v. N. W. U. 
 
 does constitute a material variance, see Packet Co., 38 Iowa, 377, 382.
 
 GENERAL riilNClPLES OF I'LKADING. 571 
 
 have paid the same, nor any part thereof; that the plaintiff is 
 the owner and holder," etc., stating the amount due, and making 
 the usual demand of judgment. The defendant claimed that the 
 complaint did not state a cause of action because it failed to 
 allege that the amount due is due on the note and guaranty or 
 on the guaranty, or from the defendant to the plaintiff, and 
 failed to allege that the maker had not paid the note ; also 
 because the guaranty being executed after the note became due, 
 and stipulating payment ivhen due, is impossible and void. 
 After disposing of the last objection by holding that the guaranty 
 was payable at once, the court, by applying the rule of favorable 
 construction prescribed by the code, pronounced the complaint 
 sufficient.^ In an action against a railroad company for killing 
 the plaintiff's horses, which had strayed upon the track and been 
 run over, the only negligence charged upon the defendant at the 
 trial was in reference to its construction and maintaining of its 
 fences through which the animals escaped and reached the track. 
 The sole allegation of the complaint was that the defendant "so 
 carelessly and negligently ran and managed the said locomotive 
 and cars, 'and the said railroad track, grounds, and fences, that 
 its said locomotive and cars ran against and over the said 
 horses." It was not even stated that the animals escaped 
 through the fences. In pronouncing upon the sufficiency of 
 this averment, it was said by the court that the best possible 
 construction for the plaintiff which could be put upon the lan- 
 guage was " that the defendant so negligently managed the fences 
 that its train ran over the horses," and that, even under the 
 liberal rule prescribed by the codes, this could not be taken as 
 alleging a cause of action for negligently constructing the fences, 
 
 1 Gunn V. Madigan, 28 Wis. loS, 163, the aid of that rule to enable us to hold 
 
 164. The opiniou of the court, after that it is a good pleading. It sets out the 
 
 stating the positions of the defendant's contract and the alleged breach thereof, 
 
 counsel, proceeded : " The rule practically the interest of the plaintiff and the lia- 
 
 applied by him is, that a pleading must l)ility of the defendant, and demands the 
 
 be construed most strictly against the proper judgment. Ought we to demand 
 
 pleader. He seems to have forgotten more ? " The only real defect of the 
 
 that this stern rule of the common law is pleading is, that, from the grammatical 
 
 repealed by the code, and in its place a construction of a single clause, it does not 
 
 more beneficent one has been enacted, allege that the note was not paid. " Yet 
 
 Looking at the complaint in the light of the said makers of said note, nor the saiil 
 
 this new rule, it seems to us that it states defendant, have paid the same." It is 
 
 a cause of action. Indeed, we are not thus made to aver that the makers have 
 
 quite sure that it is necessary to invoke paid it.
 
 572 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 or suffering them to be out of repair, so that the animals escaped 
 through them on to the track. ^ 
 
 § 428. * 534. Same Subject. In an action for trespass to hind, 
 the petition stated that "plaintiff by virtue of a contract -with 
 one E. was entitled to the exclusive possession of " the premises, 
 " that subsequently to this contract the premises were purchased 
 by the defendant with knowledge of the plaintiff's rights, tliat 
 the defendant forcibly took possession and excluded the plain- 
 tiff," but did not allege tliat the plaintiff' was ever in possession, 
 nor the relation which E. bore to the land, nor the terms of the 
 contract with him, nor that defendant's acts Avere Avrongful. 
 This petition, it Avas held, stated no cause of action, and was 
 properly dismissed at the trial. ^ In an action to foreclose a 
 mortgage of land, the plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction 
 to restrain the removal of machinery which had been so affixed' 
 to the land as to become part of the freehold. A motion was 
 made on the pleadings to dissolve the injunction on the ground 
 that the complaint contained no allegations which could be made 
 the basis of that relief. The clause relied upon by the plaintiff 
 was the following: That the defendants had erected on the 
 premises a manufacturing establishment, "and put therein ma- 
 chinery which had become part and parcel thereof," and that 
 "among other machinery which they put therein was a steam- 
 engine," etc., enumerating other articles. This was held to be a 
 sufficient averment that the engine, etc., had become part of the 
 realty. If the defendants desired a more explicit allegation they 
 should have moved for that purpose, the manner of raising the 
 objection which they had adopted being tantamount to a de- 
 murrer for want of sufficient facts.^ The complaint, in an action 
 on a note against the maker and indorsers, alleged several suc- 
 cessive indorsements until it was thus indorsed and transferred 
 to one M., but omitted to state an indorsement and transfer from 
 him to the plaintiff. It contained, however, the following aver- 
 ment, " that the plaintiff is now the lawful owner and liolder of 
 
 1 Autisdel v. Chicago & X. W. Ry. Co., suits and issuable facts in legal actions. 
 26 Wis. 145, 147. A failure to prove this special averment 
 
 2 (uirner v. McCuUough, 48 Mo. .318. would not defeat the cau.se of action ; it 
 
 3 Kimball c. Darling, .32 Wis. 675, 084. would simply modify and limit the amount 
 The allegation in question is an admira- of relief to be obtained by the plaintiff; 
 hie illu.'Jtration of the di.stinctiou between but it was certainly a necessary allegation 
 facts material to the remedy in ecpiity fur tliat jjurpo.se.
 
 GENERAL rRINCIPLES OF PLEADING. 573 
 
 the said note, and the defendants are justly indebted to him 
 tliereon," etc. This was held to be a sufficient statement of the 
 plaintiff's title ; the defect, if any, was one which should be cured 
 by motion to make the pleading more definite and certain.^ The 
 material portion of the complaint in an action for work and labor 
 simply stated that the plaintiff performed w^ork " for the defend- 
 ant at an agreed price of $26 per month." It was objected on 
 demurrer that no request on the part of the defendant was 
 alleged, but the pleading was held to be sufficient under the rule 
 of construction adopted by the codes. ^ In an action on a town 
 treasurer's official bond, the complaint, after setting out the 
 bond, averred the breach thereof in the following manner, simply 
 negativing the conditions: "He has not duly and faithfully per- 
 formed the duties of his office, and has not faithfully and truly 
 accounted for and paid over according to law all the state and 
 county taxes which came into his hands ; " but it did not allege 
 that any such taxes had ever come into his hands. This com- 
 plaint was pronounced fatally defective on demurrer, as the facts 
 constituting the breach should have been pleaded."^ 
 
 § 429. * 535. Same Subject. The petition in an action against 
 H. as maker and C. as indorser of a note set out the note made 
 by H. payable to bearer and a guaranty thereon, "I guarantee 
 the payment of the within note to C. E. [the plaintiff'] or order," 
 signed by C, and added: "The defendant H. is liable on said 
 note as maker, and the defendant C. as indorser and guarantor. 
 The plaintiff C. E. is the holder and owner of said note. There 
 is due from the defendants to the plaintiff on said note the sum 
 of," etc. On demurrer by the defendant C, he Avas held to be 
 absolutely liable as a guarantor, and that under the liberal rule 
 of construction the allegations of the complaint imported a cause 
 of action, and w^ere sufficient.* In an action by the vendee for 
 
 1 Reeve v. Fruker, 32 Wis. 243. * Clay v. Edgerton, 19 Ohio St. 549. 
 
 - Joubert v. Carli, 26 AYis. 594, per The court, after stating that the defendant 
 
 Paiue J.: "The allegation that one has C. was absolutely liable as a guarantor, 
 
 performed work for another at an agreed added that the allegations above stated 
 
 price per mouth or per day, must be held implied a transfer of the note from him 
 
 to fairly import that the agreement was to the plaiutiff, and a consideration by 
 
 prior to the performance of the work, and means of such transfer. C. is thus shown 
 
 that the work was done in pursuance to be au indorser, and is, as it appears, 
 
 of it." therefore held liable as a guarantor. This 
 
 3 Wolff r. Stoddard, 25 Wis 503, 505; decision, in my opinion, cannot be sup- 
 Franklin Tp. Sup. V. Kirby, 25 Wis. 498. ported on principle. It is such ruling as 
 Dixon C. J. dissented in both cases. this that destroys the scientific character
 
 574 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 fraudulent representations miide on a sale, the complaint must 
 allege that the plaintiff relied upon them; and the absence of 
 sucli an averment will not be supplied by a statement of mere 
 evidentiary matter tending to show the existence of that material 
 fact, unless the evidence so stated is conclusive.^ In an action 
 brought to recover damages for the conversion of chattels, the 
 complaint was substantially as follows: That the plaintiff was 
 on, etc., the owner of certain chattels; that he leased them to 
 one S. by a written lease, in which he reserved the right to take 
 l^ossession of them, and to terminate the letting, whenever he 
 should deem himself unsafe, or that the chattels were not well 
 taken care of; that S. took possession under the lease; that the 
 defendant, who is a United States marshal, seized them while 
 thus in the possession of S. under a process in bankruptcy 
 against S. ; that plaintiff demanded them from the defendant, 
 who refused, etc. ; that the plaintiff demanded the possession 
 from the defendant "on the ground that the plaintiff deemed 
 himself unsafe, and did not think that the property was well 
 taken care of;" and that the defendant had converted the same 
 to his own use. The complaint did not contain any further or 
 more express statement that the plaintiff did as a matter of fact 
 deem himself unsafe. A demurrer for want of facts was sus- 
 tained, and the pleading was held insufficient because it did not 
 show a right of possession in the plaintiff when the action was 
 brought, in that it failed to allege any fact entitling him to ter- 
 minate the letting, and to resume possession of his property. ^ 
 The petition in an action for conversion alleged that the de- 
 fendant "had in his possession, and under his control, $5,000 in 
 money, and $10,000 in hardware, stoves, etc., of the money and 
 
 and usefulness of the reformed system, amonilmcnt on a motion to make it more 
 
 and tends to bring it into discredit. dotinitc and certain. 
 
 1 Goings V. White, 33 Ind. 125. This - Hatliaway v. Quinby, 1 N. Y. S. C. 
 
 decision assumes that, although in ac- 386. The construction given to the oom- 
 
 cordance with the general doctrine, the plaint in this case was certainly severe 
 
 principal fact and not the evidence of it and technical, and hardly in accordance 
 
 should be pleaded, yet a statement of the with the rule laid down in the code. The 
 
 evidence mni/ untier certain circumstances objection is for incomjilotcness and in- 
 
 be suflicient to raise a substantial issue, definiteness of the allegation. The j)lain- 
 
 If the principal fact be not alleged, but tiff certainly does state, although perhaps 
 
 the details of evidence are given, and in a jiartial manner, that lie deemed hiin- 
 
 thcse are positive and conclusive in their self unsafe. A motion was certainly more 
 
 nature, the pleailing will not be bail ou appropriate than a demurrer. 
 demurrer, although it will be subject to
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING. 575 
 
 property owned by the plaintiff," and converted tlie same. This 
 was declared, on a motion to make the petition more definite and 
 certain, to be a sufficient averment that the money and goods 
 were the property of the plaintiff. ^ If an action is brouglit on a 
 bail bond given in a criminal proceeding, the complaint should 
 allege that the person was released from custody upon the execu- 
 tion and delivery of the undertaking, and a pleading omitting 
 this statement was held bad.^ Where a tender is essential to 
 the plaintiff's cause of action, the complaint must either aver it 
 in express terms, or must state a sufficient excuse for omitting 
 it. In such a case the plaintiff alleged "that he has been ready 
 and willing during all the time aforesaid, and has offered, to 
 accept and take said conveyance, and to pay the balance of said 
 purchase-money." This averment was pronounced to be insuffi- 
 cient, and the complaint was held bad on demurrer, as it neither 
 stated a tender, nor an excuse for not making a tender.^ In 
 actions brought to recover damages, an allegation that damages 
 have been sustained is indispensable. As was said by the Su- 
 preme Court of California in a late decision, "it is not alleged 
 in the complaint that the plaintiff has sustained damages, and 
 therefore he is not entitled to judgment for damages."* 
 
 1 Sturman v. Stone, 31 Iowa, 1 15. Mo. 400 ; Le May v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 105 
 
 2 Los Angeles Cy. v. Babcock, 45 Cal. Mo. 361 ; plaintiff'.s, Higgins v. Jeff'erson- 
 252. ville, etc. R. Co., 52 id. 110; Toledo, W. 
 
 8 Englander v. Rogers, 41 Cal. 420, & W. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 49 id. 119 ; Hath- 
 
 422. away v. Toledo, etc. Ry. Co., 46 id. 25 ; 
 
 ■» Bohall w. Diller, 41 Cal. .532. See also Jefferson ville, M. & R. Co. v. Eowen, 40 
 Bradley w. Aldrich, 40 N. Y. 504, and si(p?a, id. 545; Durgin v. Neal, 82 Cal. 595; 
 § * 84, note 3 ; and comp. Graves v. Spier, Young v. Shickle, H. & H. Iron Co., 103 
 58 Barb. Si9, supra, §* 81, note 2. The Mo. 324; Lafayette & I. R. Co. v. Huff- 
 following cases furnish illustrations of man, 28 id. 287 ; Higley ?-. Gilmer, 3 Mont, 
 allegations held to be sufficient or insuffi- 90 ; in slander and lihel, Roberts v. Lovell, 
 cient in a variety of ordinary actions : of 38 Wis. 211 ; Hanuing v. Bassett, 12 Bush. ' 
 fraud, Smith v. Nelson, 62 N. Y. 286 ; 361 ; Harris v. Zanone, 93 Cal. 59 ; of 
 Jones V. Frost, 51 Ind. 69; Arnold r. daynages, Argotaingev y. Vines, 82 N. Y. 
 Baker, 6 Neb. 134; Nicolai v. Lyon, 8 308; Ferguson v. Hogan, 25 Minn. 135; 
 Oreg. 56 ; Lafever v. Stone, 55 Iowa, 49 ; Johnson v. C, R. I. & P. R. Co., 50 Iowa, 
 Ockenden v. Barnes, 43 id. 615; Pence r. 25; Comer v. Knowles, 17 Kan. 436; 
 Croar, 51 Ind. 329 ; Hess v. Young, 59 Ind. Indianapolis, B. & W. R. Co. v. Milligan, 
 379 ; Sacramento Sav. Bank v. Hynes, 50 50 Ind. 393 ; Prescott v. Grady, 91 Cal. 
 Cal. 105; Hoester v. Sammelmann, 101 518; Brown v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 
 Mo. 619; of vegiigpnce, defendant's, Pitts- 99 Mo. 310; actions on express contracts, 
 burgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Nelson, 51 Ind. performance of conditions, Preston v. 
 150; St. Louis & S. E. Ry. Co. v. Mathias, Roberts, 12 Bush, 570 ; Averbeck v. Hall, 
 50 id. 65; Smith v. Buttner, 90 Cal. 95; 14 id. 505; Andreas u. Holcombe, 22 Minn. 
 Pope V. Kansas City Cable Ry. Co., 99 339 ; Livesey v. Omaha Hotel Co., 5 Neb.
 
 576 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 ^ 430. * 536. Attitude of Courts in Instances Cited largely Due 
 to Liberal Rule of Construction. The cases contained in the last 
 three paragraphs, and from which quotations have been made, 
 were not selected as examples of proper pleading according to 
 the principles established by the reformed procedure; on the 
 contrary, most of those which were sustained by the courts 
 escaped condemnation only by applying the liberal rule of con- 
 struction prescribed in the codes. These decisions are given 
 rather to show how far a pleading may disregard the require- 
 
 50 ; Estabrook v. Omaha Hotel Co., 5 id. 
 76 ; Lowry v. Magee, 52 Ind. 107 ; Rhodes 
 V. Alameda Co., 52 Cal. 350; Smith r. 
 Moha, 87 Cal. 489 ; Ehrlich v. JFAna. L. 
 Ins. Co., 103 Mo. 231 ; work and ma- 
 terials, Steplienson v. Ballard, 50 Ind. 
 176; Wolf V. Scofield, 38 id. 175; the 
 consideration, Leach v. Rhodes, 49 id. 
 291 ; a written instrument, Waukon &, 
 :Miss. R. Co. 1-. Dwyer, 49 Iowa, 121 ; 
 Brown i-. Champlin, 66 N. Y. 214, 218 ; 
 Pettit ('. Hamh-u, 43 Wis. 314 ; White v. 
 Soto, 82 Cal. 654 (modification of written 
 contract must be pleaded) ; McMenomy 
 V. Talbot, 84 Cal. 279 ; non-payment, 
 Roberts i-. Treadwell, 50 Cal. 520 ; Grant 
 V. Sheerin, 84 Cal. 197 ; Eliot v. Eliot, 77 
 Wis. 634 ; Tracy v. Tracy, 59 Hun, 1 ; 20 
 Civ. Pro. R. 98 ; Humphrey v. Fair, 79 
 Ind. 410; Singleton i-. O'Blenis, 125 Ind. 
 151 ; indebtedness. Pine Valley v. Unity, 
 40 Wis. 632 ; of a partnership, Stixr. Mat- 
 thews, 63 Mo. 371; Kilsey v. Henry, 48 
 Ind. 47 ; Jor obtaininrj an injunction, Wells, 
 Eargo, & Co. v. Coleman, 53 Cal. 416; 
 Boehme v. Sume, 5 Neb. 80 ; Thorn i-. 
 Sweeney, 12 Nev. 251 ; Portland v. Baker, 
 
 8 Ore. 356 ; of time, Balch v. Wilson, 25 
 Minn. 299 ; Leihy v. Ashland, etc. Co., 49 
 Wis. 165; Cohn v. Wright, 89 Cal. 86; 
 of compliance with statutory requirements, 
 Biroa v. St. Paul Water Com'rs, 41 Minn. 
 519 ; in miscellanf-ons rases, Calvin v. llun- 
 can, 12 Bush, 101 (action on vendor's 
 lien); Mitchell r. Mitchell, 61 N. Y. 398 
 (of adultery) ; Rhodes v. Alameda Co., 52 
 Cal. 350 (against a county) ; Wiebbold i-. 
 Hermann, 2 .Mont. 609 (name of party) ; 
 Orr W. Ditch Co. r. Larcombe, 14 Nev. 
 .53 (in intcrjdeader) ; Broome v. Taylor, 
 
 9 Hun, 155 (against a married woman); 
 Horn V. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 38 Wis. 
 
 463 (a private statute) ; Pittsburgh, C. & 
 St. L. R. Co. r. Theobald, 51 Ind. 246 
 (against a railroad for injury to a passen- 
 ger) ; Crawford v. Neale, 56 Cal. 32 (a 
 guardian ad liteni) ; Darrah v. Gow, 77 
 Mich. 16 (defects in workmanship must 
 be specified) ; York v. Rockwood, 132 
 Ind. 358 (action to set aside fraudulent 
 conveyances) ; Nordholt v. Nordholt, 87 
 Cal. 552 (duress) ; Chicago & O. Coal, 
 etc. Co. V. Norman (Oiiio, 1892), 32 N. E. 
 Rep. 857 (injury to employee by defective 
 appliances); Brown r. Brown (Ind. 1893), 
 32 N. E. Rep. 1128 (partition). The fol- 
 lowing cases furnish examples of com- 
 plaints or petitions in some commiMi 
 species of actions which have been sus- 
 tained ; in ejectment, Sears v. Taylor, 
 4 Col. 38 ; Johnston v. Pate, 83 N. C. 1 10 ; 
 Thompson v. Wolfe, 6 Ore. 308; Bent- 
 ley V. Jones, 7 id. 108; Austin v. Schluy- 
 stcr, 7 Hun, 275 ; for a conversion, Wombie 
 V. Leach, 83 N. C. 84 ; Johnson v. Oreg. 
 Nav. Co., 8 id. 35; Pease v. Smith, 61 
 N. Y. 477 ; Johnson v. Ashland Co., 44 
 Wis. 119 ; for breach of contract ,Va.rtT'u\ge 
 V. Blanchard, 23 Minn. 69 ; Usher i-. Ileatt, 
 18 Kan. 195; ou ]>romissory Ho^es, Adams 
 J-. Adams, 25 Minn. 72 ; Harris Man. Co. 
 r. Mar.*h, 49 Iowa, 11 ; Abiel i\ Harring- 
 ton, 18 Kan. 2.53; Durland i.-. Pitcairn, 51 
 Ind. 426; Green v. Southain, 49 id. 139; 
 Friddle r. Crane, 68 id. 583 ; in libel or 
 slander, Cary r. Allen. 39 Wis. 481 ; Stern 
 V. Katz, 38 id. 136; Frank ;•. Dunning, 
 38 id. 270; Lipprant i-. Lipprant, 52 Ind. 
 273; Shiglcy v. Snyder, 45 id. 541; 
 Downey r. Dillon, 52 id. 442 ; Dor.sett r. 
 Adams, 50 id. 129 ; Schnrick v. Kollm.an, 
 50 id. 336 ; in replevin, Crawford v. Fur- 
 long, 21 Kan. 698; Zitske v. Goldberg, 38 
 Wis. 216.
 
 ALLEGATIONS OF IMPLIED TROMISKS. 577 
 
 ments as to form and method, and may violate all the principles 
 of logical order and precision of statement, and may yet be held 
 sufficient on general demurrer, because the material facts consti- 
 tuting a cause of action can be discovered among the mass of 
 confused or imperfect allegations. The principles and doctrines 
 of pleading adopted and enforced by the courts are illustrated 
 and explained by such examples as these, but the cases them- 
 selves are to be carefully avoided as precedents. The mode of 
 correcting imperfect and insufficient averments as distinguished 
 from those which state no cause of action, and the liberal rule of 
 construction introduced by the code, will form the subject of a 
 separate and careful discussion in a subsequent portion of this 
 chapter. 
 
 § 431. * 537. Doctrine that Facts Pleaded should be stated as 
 they occurred or existed. Tvyo Questions Presented. In con- 
 sidering the third general doctrine developed in the preceding 
 analysis, — namely, that the facts pleaded should be stated as 
 they actually occurred or existed, and not their mere legal 
 aspect, effect, or operation, — two practical questions are pre- 
 sented, and the discussion will be mainly confined to them. 
 These questions are, (1) whether in actions based upon the 
 common-law notion of an implied contract the pleader should 
 simply allege the facts as they really occurred from which the 
 legal duty arises, without averring a promise which was never 
 made, or whether he must or may, as in the common-law as- 
 sumpsit, state a promise to have been expressly made which is 
 the legal effect or operation of those facts ; and (2) whether the 
 ancient common counts, or allegations substantially identical 
 therewith, fulfil the requirements of the new procedure, and can 
 be used, in conformity with its fundamental principles, as com- 
 plaints or petitions in the classes of actions to which they would 
 have been appropriate under the former sj'stem. I shall take 
 up these questions separately, first collecting and comparing the 
 decisions bearing upon each ; and, secondly, discussing them 
 upon principle. 
 
 § 432. '^ 538. (l) Necessity or Propriety of Alleging a Promise 
 in Actions upon Implied Promises. There is a marked unanimity 
 of opinion among the decisions which directly involve this ques- 
 tion, since most of them accept the language of the codes, and 
 fully recognize the radical change in principle effected by the 
 
 37
 
 578 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 reformed procedure. In Farron v. Sherwood, ^ after sustaining 
 a complaint substantially a general count in assumpsit for work 
 and labor without any averment of a promise by the defendant, 
 the New York Court of Appeals said: "It is not necessary to 
 set out in terms a promise to pay; it is sufficient to state facts 
 showing the duty from which the law implies the promise. That 
 complies with the requirement that facts must be stated constitut- 
 ing the cause of action." This language was not a mere dictmn ; 
 it was absolutely essential to the judgment, since the complaint 
 contained no averment of a promise, and was nevertheless held 
 sufficient. The decision must therefore be regarded as settling 
 the doctrine for that State. In another action to recover com- 
 pensation for work and labor, where the complaint stated various 
 services performed by the plaintiff from which it was claimed a 
 duty on the part of the defendant arose, but alleged no promise 
 by him, the Supreme Court of New York adopted the same rule 
 of pleading. 2 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Wis- 
 consin said by way of a dictum in an early case : " Good pleading 
 requires that a promise which the law implies should be stated."^ 
 And in an action for services alleged in the petition to have been 
 performed at the request of an agent of the defendant, the 
 Supreme Court of Missouri held that either the promise must be 
 averred, or the facts from which a promise will be inferred, as a 
 matter of law.* In Montana, the rule is distinctly established 
 
 1 Farrou v. Sherwood, 17 N. Y. 227, necessary, and perhaps not even proper, in 
 230. See also Mackey v. Auer, 8 Hun, such a case, for the plaintiff to allege in his 
 180; De la Guerra v. Newhall, 55 Cal. complaint any promise on the part of the 
 21 ; Moore v. Hobbs, 79 N. C. 535 ; Jones defendant, but he must state facts which, 
 V. Mial, 79 id. 164; Emslie v. City of if true, according to well-settled principles 
 Leavenworth, 20 Kan. 562; Stephenson of law, would have autliorized him to al- 
 V. Ballard, 50 Ind. 176. J^ge, and tlie court to infer, a promise on 
 
 2 Cropsey v. Sweeney, 27 Barb. 310, the part of the defendant before the code. 
 312, jjer Sutherland J., who delivered the TIic form of assumpsit is no longer neces- 
 following opinion : " Although the form sary, nor perliaps even proper, in such a 
 of the action of assumpsit, and of tiie case; but facts sufiicieut to raise it, and 
 pleadings therein, has been abolished, to put it on paper were it lawful to do so, 
 yet the obligation of contracts and the are still necessary." He goes on to hold 
 distinction between an express and an that the special facts alleged in the corn- 
 implied assumpsit remain; and notwith- j)]aint raise no implied promise, 
 standing the code, in a large class of " Bird c. Mayer, 8 Wis. 362, 367. This 
 cases now as before the code, it is only remark was entirely obiter. The question 
 on tlie theory of an implied assumpsit, before the court was, whether a warranty 
 inferred from the conduct, situation, or sued on was express or implied. 
 
 mutual relations of the parties, that jus- * Wells r. Pacific K. R. Co., 35 Mo. 164. 
 
 tice can l^e enforced, and tlie performaiico The allegation of a performance at the 
 of a legal duty compelled. It is no longer request of an agent of the defendant
 
 ALLKGATIONS OF IMPLIED I'lvOMISES. 
 
 79 
 
 that tlie facts from wliic-h the promise is inferred sliould be 
 pleaded, and not the promise itself; but that in an action on an 
 express promise it must be alleged. ^ The Supreme Court of 
 Indiana has held with evident reluctance that in such a case it 
 is not necessary for the party to aver a promise, and that it is 
 enough for him to state the facts from vi^hich the law implies it. 
 The court added, however, after this concession, that it is better 
 in all cases to allege a promise, saying: " It is always good plead- 
 ing to state the legal effect of the contract whether it is written 
 or oral. "^ And in another case, where the action was brought 
 
 was insufficient, being matter of evidence 
 only. 
 
 tin Wetmore v. Crouch (1899), 150 Mo. 
 671, 51 S. W. 7.38, the court said : " If the 
 contract relied on is express, it must be so 
 pleaded, but if it is implied, the facts out 
 of which it is claimed to arise must be 
 pleaded." See also Warder v. Seitz (1900), 
 157 Mo. 140, 57 S. W. 537. In this case 
 the petition stated that plaintiff told de- 
 fendant at the time he was employed by 
 her that "the customary fee for such ser- 
 vices was five per cent if settled out of 
 court and ten per cent if settled after suit, 
 upon whatever amount she received, that 
 defendant made no objection to said fee, 
 but instructed plaintiff to take charge of 
 her interests and proceed in the premises 
 to secure a settlement by compromise, or 
 failing in that, to bring a suit to break 
 and set aside said will." The petition 
 further alleged that the services were ren- 
 dered at the special instance and request 
 of the defendant and were reasonably 
 worth five thousand dollars. " These are 
 apt and appropriate averments in a suit 
 upon a quantum meruit, and have no place 
 in a petition based upon an express con- 
 tract, and they clearly and unmistakably 
 show the pleader's intention to rely upon 
 a guantnm meruit and not upon a con- 
 tract."] 
 
 ^ Higgins V. Germaine, 1 Mont. 230. 
 
 (^In Conrad Nat. Bank v. Great North- 
 ern Ry. Co. (1 900), 24 Mont. 1 78, 61 Pac. I, 
 the court said : " It is not necessary to 
 allege a promise to pay where the facts 
 as alleged imply a promise, as where the 
 board, food, lodgings, etc., are furnished 
 to defendant upon request ; but where the 
 furnishing or delivery is to a third person, 
 
 upon defendant's request, then, nothing 
 further appearing, no promise on the part 
 of the defendant to pay is implied ; for a 
 furnishing or delivery to a tliird party, 
 though upon defendant's request, does not, 
 as a matter of law, imply an undertaking 
 by defendant to pay. . . . Either the ex- 
 press promise should be alleged, or the 
 facts from which it may be implied, as 
 that the credit was extended to the em- 
 ployer and not to the employee (Chitty 
 on Pleading, pp. 308, 356) ; or the allega- 
 tion should have been made generally that 
 the food, board, lodging, and merchandise 
 were furnished to the employer at its re- 
 quest." See also Voight v. Brooks (1897), 
 19 Mont. 374, 48 Pac. 549.2] 
 2 Wills V. Wills, 34 Ind. 106, 107, 108. 
 Qn Cox D.Peltier (1902), 159 Ind. 355, 
 65 N. E. 6, it was held that a complaint 
 on an undertaker's bill, which alleges that 
 a coffin was furnished and services ren- 
 dered " at the special instance and re- 
 quest " of the defendant, sufficiently 
 charges an implied promise on defend- 
 ant's part to pay the reasonable value 
 thereof. 
 
 The Supreme Court of Minne.sota, in 
 Oevermann v. Loebertmann (1897), 68 
 Minn. 162, 70 N. W. 1084, said: " It is 
 not necessary to plead implied promises." 
 See also Hurlhut v. Leper (1900), 12 S. D. 
 321, 81 N. W. 631. Here it was held that 
 a complaint alleging that " prior to the 
 22d day of March, 1896, the plaintiff per- 
 formed work and labor as a teamster and 
 laborer for the defendant, four and one- 
 third months, at .$40 per month," and 
 claiming a balance of $92.65, with interest 
 at seven per cent per annum, does not 
 purport to allege an express contract but
 
 580 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 for the value of goods sold, etc., the same court, while passing 
 upon the sufficiency of a complaint which was substantially in 
 the form of an old common count without a request or a promise 
 averred, used the following language : " In all these instances 
 the law implies the promise from the facts stated, and our statute 
 simply requires the statement of facts ; and if upon these facts 
 the law implies a promise, the complaint would be good." ^ 
 
 § 433. * 539. Case of Booth v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank 
 (n. y.). The question was discussed by the Supreme Court of 
 New York in a very recent decision; and the importance of the 
 case, and the positions taken in the opinion, make it necessary to 
 quote from the judgment at some length. The complaint con- 
 tained two counts. The second was for money had and received 
 to the plaintiff's use. The first set out the facts in detail, stat- 
 ing a liability which migliL be considered as resulting from the 
 tortious acts of the defendant, or might be regarded as arising 
 from an implied contract, but omitting to aver any promise. The 
 defendant demurred on the ground that two causes of action 
 had been improperly joined, one on contract, and the other for 
 a tort, — an injury to property. The plaintiff, in answer to this 
 position, claimed that he could elect under the circumstances 
 to sue either for tort or on contract, and that the first cause of 
 action should be treated as of the latter kind, so that there was 
 no misjoinder. The court, however, entirely rejected this claim; 
 and after stating that the ancient assumpsit and case were in 
 many instances concurrent remedies for injuries to personal 
 propert}' ; that in assumpsit the pleader must always have alleged 
 that the defendant ''undertook and promised," etc., and a breach 
 of that promise, while in case the declaration was substantially 
 the same except that the allegation of an undertaking and 
 promise was omitted; that in the first count this averment is 
 wanting, and "it is therefore a count in case,'^ — proceeded as 
 follows: "If the plaintiff is right in supposing that the law 
 implied a promise by the bank not to satisfy the judgment after 
 
 ouly an imjjlied contract. A receut 1 75, tliat where one has received money 
 
 Oregon case — Waite v. Willis (1902), which equitably i)elongs to another, an 
 
 42 Ore. 288, 70 Pac. 1034 — holds that action lies in assumpsit, but sucli action is 
 
 it is not necessary to allege a fictitious noi founded upon the idea of a ro?i^iar/, but 
 
 promise. upon the idea of an ohiifntinn to refund, 
 
 It was held in Bates-Farley Bank i*. and no privity need be shown.] 
 Dismukes (1899), 107 Ga. 212, 33 S. E. i Gwaltuey i-. Cannon, 31 Ind. 227.
 
 ALLEGATIONS OF IMPLIED PROMISES. 581 
 
 it was assigned to him, he was bound to allege that the Lank 
 undertook and promised not to satisfy, etc., in order to make it 
 a count on contract. . . . The codifiers, while i)roposing to 
 abolish the distinction between forms of action, found it impos- 
 sible or impracticable in many cases to effect that object; and 
 this case illustrates their failure in at least one class of cases. 
 When case and assumpsit were at the common law concurrent 
 remedies, the form of action that the pleader selected was deter- 
 mined, as I have shown, by the insertion or omission from the 
 declaration of the allegation that the defendant 'undertook and 
 promised.' This right of selection remains; and whether the 
 action is tort or assumpsit must be determined by the same cri- 
 terion. If this is not so, then the right of election is taken 
 away. If taken away, which of the two is left? An action 
 on contract cannot be joined with one in tort. How are we to 
 determine whether the action is one on contract or in tort, 
 unless the pleader by averment alleges the making of the con- 
 tract, and demands damages for a breach in the one case, or by 
 the omission of such an averment makes it an action in tort? I 
 know of no more certain or convenient criterion by which to 
 determine the class to which a cause of action belongs than the 
 one suggested. If some such rule is not established, the ques- 
 tion of misjoinder will arise in every case in which at the common 
 law assumpsit and case were concurrent remedies." ^ 
 
 § 434. * 540. Conclusions. It is very evident from the fore- 
 going collection of decisions that the courts have, by an over- 
 whelming preponderance of authority, accepted the simple 
 requirement of the codes, and have not destroyed its plain 
 import by borrowing the notion of a fictitious promise from the 
 common-law theory of pleading. The practical rule ma}' be 
 considered as settled, that, in all instances where the right of 
 
 1 Booth V. Farmers' & Mech. Bk. of promise, arises. De la Guerra v. New- 
 
 Roche.ster, 1 N. Y. S. C. 45, 49, 50, per hall, 56 Cal. 21 ; Mackey v. Auer, 8 Hun, 
 
 Mulliu J. it is very remarkable that the 180; a mere allegation of indebtedness, 
 
 judge makes no reference whatever to however, is not sufficient : Moore v. 
 
 the prior cases of Farron v. Sherwood and Hobbs, 79 N. C. 535. When a party to 
 
 Cropsey v. Sweeney, which are decisive of an express contract may sue upon an im- 
 
 the question involved. A promise need plied contract, and the proper allegations 
 
 not be alleged, and if alleged a denial of it in such case, see Emslie v. Leavenworth, 
 
 would raise no material issue, where the 20 Kan. 562 ; action for labor and mate- 
 
 fiicts have been averred from which the rials, see Stephenson v. Ballard, 50 Ind. 
 
 liability, represented by the fiction of a 176; Jones v. Mial, 79 N. C. 164.
 
 582 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 action is based upon a duty or obligation of the adverse party 
 which the common law denominates an implied contract, it is no 
 longer necessary to aver a promise, but it is enough to set out 
 the ultimate facts from which the promise would have been 
 inferred. This being so, we must go a step farther. If it is not 
 necessary to make such an allegation, then it is not proper to do 
 so; although some of the judicial opinions, from a failure to 
 apprehend the true grounds of the rule, would seem to permit, 
 while they do not require, the averment. A promise need not 
 be allesfed because none was ever made: the facts constitutino: 
 the cause of action are alone to be stated, and this promise is 
 not one of those facts ; it is simply a legal inference, contrived 
 for a very technical purpose to meet the requirements of form in 
 the ancient legal actions. The same reason which shows that 
 the averment is unnecessary demonstrates that it is improper, 
 that it violates a fundamental doctrine of the new theory; and 
 if an harmonious system is ever to be consti-ucted upon the basis 
 of the reform legislation, this doctrine should be strictly enforced. 
 § 435. * 541. Criticism of Booth v. Farmers' and Mechanics' 
 Bank. The only recent case which is in direct conflict with these 
 views is the one last quoted, Booth v. Farmers' and ^Mechanics' 
 Bank; and it seems to demand some comment. Perhajis there 
 cannot be found in the current reports a more striking example 
 of exalting form above substance, and of repealing an express 
 statutory provision by judicial construction, than is shown in 
 this decision. The learned judge virtually admits that the text 
 of the code is opposed to his conclusions, when he assumes that 
 the codifiers failed to accomplish the results which they intended. 
 It may be remarked that he speaks of the statute as though it 
 were entirely the work of the "codifiers," and he seems to ignore 
 the authority of the legislature which made it a law. But are 
 the common-law notion of an implied undertaking and the arbi- 
 trary requisite of alleging this fictitious promise such necessary- 
 conceptions, are they so involved in the essential nature of juris- 
 prudence, that it is impossil)le or impracticable for the legislature 
 to change or to abolish them? The very suggestion is its own 
 answer. Nothing in our ancient law was more thoroughly tech- 
 nical and arljitrary, more completely a mere matter of form, 
 without even the shadow of substantial and necessary existence, 
 tlian this very notion of a certain kind of legal liabilit}^ being
 
 ALLEGATIONS OF IMTLIED PROMISES. 583 
 
 represented as arising from an implied promise, and the accom- 
 panying rule that the promise thus imagined must be averred as 
 though it were actually made. It was shown in a former part of 
 this section that the action of assumpsit was not even invented 
 as an instrument by which to enforce the liability thus conceived 
 of; but the fiction of an implied promise was itself contrived in 
 order that the liability might be enforced by the already existing 
 action of assumpsit, in which the allegation of a promise was the 
 distinctive feature. The error of the opinion under review is, 
 that it treats these matters of arbitrary form, these fictitious 
 contrivances of the old pleaders, as though they subsisted in 
 the nature of things, and were beyond the reach of legislative 
 action. The difficulty, suggested by the learned judge, of being 
 unable to distinguish between an action of tort and one of con- 
 tract, in order that an election might be made between them, 
 exists only in imagination. If we will look at the matter as it 
 really is, throwing aside the old technicalities and fictions, there 
 is plainly no necessity for any such distinction. If the pleader 
 unites a cause of action upon express contract with a cause of 
 action consisting of facts, from which under the former system a 
 promise might have been implied, he has already made his elec- 
 tion, — all the election that is needed, — and there would be no 
 possibility of any subsequent change in or departure from this 
 original theory of his complaint. The only practical difference 
 which could ever arise from treating his second cause of action 
 as though founded upon tort would be the power sometimes 
 given of arresting the defendant either on mesne or final process, 
 and this power would plainly have been surrendered. To sum 
 up the foregoing criticism, the whole course of reasoning pursued 
 by the learned judge assumes that the most technical, arbitrary, 
 and fictitious distinctions between the ancient forms of action 
 are still subsisting; it does not merely ignore the legislation 
 which has abrogated those distinctions, but it expressly denies 
 the ability of the legislature to accomplish such a result. This 
 is not interpreting, it is repealing, a statute. 1 have dwelt upon 
 this case longer perhaps than it intrinsically merits ; but I have 
 done so because the principles announced in it, if generally fol- 
 lowed, would sap the very foundations of the reformed procedure, 
 and prevent the erection of any harmonious and symmetrical 
 system upon the basis of its fundamental doctrines.
 
 584 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 436. * 542. (2) Common Comits under the Codes. Is a com- 
 plaint or petition, substantially the same in its form and its alle- 
 gations with the old common or general count in assumpsit, in 
 accordance with the fundamental principles of the new pro- 
 cedure, and can it now be regarded as a good pleading? The 
 courts have almost unanimously answered this question in the 
 affirmative, and have held that such complaints or petitions 
 sufficiently set forth a cause of action in the cases where the 
 declarations which they imitate would have been proper under 
 the former practice.^ Notwithstanding the imposing array of 
 
 1 I have collected in this uote the lead- 
 ing cases which sustain the position in the 
 text. Allen v. Patterson, 7 N. Y. 476 ; 
 Meagher v. Morgan, .3 Kan. .372 ; Clark 
 V. Fensky, 3 Kan. 389 ; Carroll v. Paul's 
 Ex., 16 Mo. 226; Brown v. Perry, 14 
 Iiid. 32 ; Kerstetter v. Raymond, 10 Ind. 
 199; Farron v. Sherwood, 17 N. Y. 227, 
 229; Hosley v. Black, 28 N. Y. 438; 
 Hurst V. Litchfield, 39 N. Y. 377 ; Green 
 V. Gilbert, 21 Wis. 39.5 ; Evans v. Harris, 
 19 Barb. 416; Grannis v. Hooker, 29 
 Wis. 65, 66, 67 ; Cudlipp v. Whipple, 4 
 Duer, 610; Bates v. Cobb, 5 Bosw. 29; 
 Adams v. Holley, 1 2 How. Pr. 326 ; Betts 
 V. Baciie, 14 Abb. Pr. 279; Sloman r. 
 Schmidt, 8 Abb. Pr. .5 ; Goelth u. "White, 35 
 Barb. 76 ; Stout v. St. Louis Tribune Co., 
 52 Mo. 342 ; Curran v. Curran, 40 Ind. 
 473 ; Johnson v. Kilgore, 39 Ind. 147 ; 
 Bon-slog V. Garrett, 39 Ind. 3-38 ; Wolf v. 
 Schofield, 38 Ind. 175, 181 ; Noble v. Bur- 
 ton, 38 Ind. 206 ; Higgins v. Germaine, 1 
 Mont. 230; Gwaltney y. Cannon, 31 Ind. 
 227 ; Fort Wayne, J. & S. R. Co. v. Uc- 
 Dotiald, 48 Ind. 241, 243; Raymond v. 
 Ilanford, 6 N. Y. S. C. 312 ; Fells v. Vest- 
 vali, 2 Keycs, 152; Pavisich v. Bean, 48 
 Cal. 364; Wilkins v. Stidger, 22 Cal. 231 ; 
 Abadie v. Carrillo, 32 Cal. 172; Merritt 
 V. Gliddon, 39 Cal. 559, 564. That the 
 common counts may still be used, see' also 
 Magee v. Kast, 49 Cal. 141 ; Ball v. Fullon, 
 31 Ark. 379 ; Jones v. :Mial, 82 X. C. 252 ; 
 79 id. 164 ; Emslie v. Leavenworth, 20 Kan. 
 562 ; Jennings Cy. Com'rs v. Verbarg, 63 
 Ind. 107; Dashaway A.ss'n v. Rogers, 79 
 Cal. 211 ; Castagnino v. Balletta, 82 Cal. 
 250 ; Leeke c. Hancock, 76 Cal. 127. 
 
 ^The nse of the common counts has been 
 approvf^d ill tlir^ following cases: Johnson- 
 
 Brinkman Co. i-. Bank (1893), 116 Mo. 
 558,22 S. W. 813; Fox v. Easter (1900), 10 
 Okla. 527, 62 Pac. 283 ; Willard v. Carrigan 
 (1902), Ariz., 68 Pac. 538; Livingstone v. 
 School District (1898), 11 S. D. 150, 76 
 N. W. 301 ; Brown v. Board of Education 
 (1894), 103 Cal. 531, 37 Pac. 503 ; Snapp 
 r. Stanwood (1898), 65 Ark. 222, 45 S. W. 
 546; Goodman v. Alexander (1901), 165 
 N. Y. 289, 59 N. E. 145 ; Hatch v. Leonard 
 (1901), 165 N. Y. 435, 59 N. E. 270; Van- 
 derbeek v. Francis (1903), 75 Conn. 467, 53 
 Atl. 1015; Messmer v. Block (1898), 100 
 Wis. 664, 76 N. W. 598 ; Burton v. Rose- 
 mary Co (1903), 132 N.C. 17,43S. E. 480; 
 Kilpatrick-Koch Dry-Goods Co. v. Box 
 (1896), 13 Utah, 494, 45 Pac. 629 ; Pleasant 
 V. Samuels (1896), 114 Cal. .34, 45 Pac. 998; 
 Jenney Electric Co. v. Branham (1896), 
 145 Ind. 314, 41 N. E. 448; Minor v. Bal- 
 dridge (1898), 123 Cal. 187, 55 Cal. 783; 
 Nichols V. Randall (1902), 136 Cal. 426, 69 
 Pac. 26; School Dist. No. 9 v. School 
 Dist. No. 5 (1903), 118 Wi.s. 233, 95 N. W. 
 148. 
 
 See the following cases in respect to the 
 proper method of pleading the common 
 counts and im])lied contracts: Glover v. 
 Henderson (1893), 120 Mo. 367, 25 S. W. 
 175; Fox V. Easter (1900), 10 Okla. 527, 
 62 Pac. 283 ; Hatch v. Leonard (1901), 165 
 N. Y. 435, 59 N. E. 270; Goodman v. 
 Alexander (1901), 165 NY. 289, .59 N. E. 
 145; Warder v. Seitz (1900), 157 Mo. 140, 
 57 .S. W. ;}37 ; Ilurlbut v. Leper (1900). 12 
 S. D. 321, 81 N. W. 631 ; Conrad Nat. 
 Bank r. Great Northern Ry. Co. (1900), 
 24 Mont. 178, 61 Pac. 1 ; Pioneer Fuel Co. 
 r. Hager (1894), 57 Minn. 76, 58 N. W. 
 828; Thompson v. Town of Elton (1901), 
 109 Wis. 589, 85 N. W. 425 ; Farwell v.
 
 THE COMMON COUNTS. 
 
 585 
 
 judicial authority shown by the citations in the foot-note, the 
 courts of one or two States have refused to foUow this course of 
 decision, and have pronounced such forms of conij)laint or peti- 
 tion to be in direct conflict with the correct principles of pleading 
 established by the codes. Although these few cases cannot be 
 regarded as shaking, or as throwing any doubt upon, the rule so 
 firmly established in most of the States, they may be properly 
 cited in order that all the light possible may be thrown upon this 
 particular question of interpretation.^ 
 
 Murray (1894), 104 Cal. 464, 38 Pac. 
 199. 
 
 The use of the conimou couuts is pecu- 
 liar in Connecticut. See the following 
 cases in which the subject is discussed : 
 Cuminings v. Gleason (1900), 72 Conn. 
 .587, 45 Atl. 353 ; McNamaia v. McDonald 
 (1897), 69 Conn. 484, 38 Atl. 54 ; New York 
 Breweries Corporation v. Baker (1896), 68 
 Conn. 337, 36 Atl. 785. 
 
 The common counts are available in 
 cases where they would have been so at 
 common law: Barrere v. Somps (1896), 
 113 Cal. 97, 45 Pac. 177. They are avail- 
 able against a municipal corporation as 
 well as against a private party : Brown v. 
 Board of Education (1894), 10.3 Cal. 531, 37 
 Pac. 503. An action for money had and re- 
 ceived may be maintained not only in case 
 of the actual receipt by defendant of money 
 belonging to the plaintiff, but where any- 
 thing is received as, or in lieu of, money : 
 Snapp V. Stanwood (1898), 65 Ark. 222, 45 
 S. W. 546.;] 
 
 1 Poerster v. Kirkpatrick, 2 Minn. 210, 
 212; Bowen v. Emmerson, 3 Ore. 452. 
 The complaint in the first of these cases 
 was, " that the above-named defendants 
 are justly indebted to the plaintiff in the 
 sum of, etc., on account for goods, M'ares, 
 and merchandise sold and delivered by 
 the plaintiff to the defendants at the spe- 
 cial instance and request of the defend- 
 ants, wherefore," etc. ; and it will be 
 noticed that this is fuller than several of 
 the forms before quoted, since it alleges a 
 request. In sustaining a demurrer to this 
 complaint, the court held it defective, be- 
 cause it contained ( 1 ) no statement of the 
 time of sale, and (2) no averment that 
 the goods were of the price or value of the 
 sum mentioned, or that the defendants 
 
 promised to pay that sum, and laid down 
 the general doctrine in the following man- 
 ner : '• In actions for goods sold and de- 
 livered, it is essential that one or the 
 otlier of these allegations should be made. 
 Without it the allegation of indebtedness 
 is a mere conclusion of law unsupported 
 by any fact. The defendant's liability 
 grows out of the fact that the goods were 
 either worth the amount of the claim, 
 or else tliat they promised to pay that 
 amount. If they were worth the amount, 
 the law implies a promise. Without one 
 or the other of these allegations, there 
 appears no consideration to support the 
 pretended indebtedness." In Bowen v. 
 Emmerson the Supreme Court of Oregon 
 pronounced the use of the general Cdunt 
 in assumpsit to be entirely inconsistent 
 witli the reformed theory of pleading, and 
 expressly refused to follow ihe decision 
 made in Allen v. Patterson. I'he opiiiion 
 is a clear and very strong arjruinent in 
 favor of the simple and natural modes of 
 pleading provided by the codes. 
 
 [;in the recent case of Hammer v. 
 Downing (1901), 39 Ore. 504, 65 Pac. 17, 
 tiie court said : " Under tlie code, as cim- 
 strued by this court, the mode of statement 
 employed by the ' common counts ' known 
 to the common law is inappropriate and 
 insufficient ; it being deemed essential to 
 set out the facts from which the cause of 
 action arises, and the proofs must extend 
 to and comprehend all the items goin^ to 
 the establishment of such accumulation." 
 
 In Minnesota, however, the court does 
 not take so radical a position. In Pioneer 
 Fuel Co. V. Hager (1894), 57 Minn. 76, 58 
 N. W. 828, the court said : " We are of 
 opinion that the courts in the code States 
 have sacrificed the principles of code
 
 586 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 437. * 543. Use Sanctioned also where Obligation is Express. 
 Not only have the courts in this manner sanctioned the use of 
 the coumion counts as appropriate modes of setting forth the 
 pkintiffs cause of action; they have also held that another rule 
 of the old practice is still retained by the codes. The rule thus 
 declared to be in force is the following: When the plaintiff has 
 entered into an express contract with the defendant, and has 
 fully performed on his part, so that nothing remains unexecuted 
 but the defendant's obligation to pay, he may if he please sue 
 upon the defendant's implied promise to make such payment, 
 rather than upon the express undertaking of the original con- 
 tract; and to that end he may resort to a complaint or petition 
 identical with the ancient common counts; except, as has already 
 been shown, the averment of a promise may, and according to 
 
 pleading more than they ought to have 
 done iu adopting this common-law formula 
 at all, and that we should not outdo the 
 common law itself hy reducing the formula 
 still more and making it still more in con- 
 flict with code ])riuciples. The complaint 
 must at least be sufficient at common law, 
 ■which it is not." 
 
 But iu Nebraska the practice of using 
 the common counts has been condemned. 
 The court of that State said iu Penn 
 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Conoughy (1898), 
 54 \eh. 123, 74 N. W. 422, "The Code of 
 Civil Procedure (sec. 92) requires a 
 pleader to state the facts which consti- 
 tute the cause of action or defence iu or- 
 dinary and concise language ; and the 
 practice of adding a common count in a 
 pleading is one not contemplated by the 
 code." 
 
 Other courts have criticised the use of 
 tliis form of pleading, but have neverthe- 
 less adhered to it. Thus the Supreme 
 Court of California said, in Minor v. 
 Baldridge (1898), 123 Cal. 187, 55 Cal. 
 783 : "The mode of pleading is inconsist- 
 ent with our code, and it may be a matter 
 of regret that it was ever tolerated, but 
 the innovation is not so great if sucii 
 complaint must fall before a special 
 demurrer, which is like a motion to re- 
 quire a pleader to make his pleadings 
 more definite, which practice prevails in 
 some States." 
 
 A similar view was expressed by the 
 
 Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Thom- 
 son V. Town of Elton (1901), 109 Wis- 
 589, 85 N. W. 425: "At most the com- 
 plaint was open to a motion to make more 
 definite and certain. In a complaint for 
 money had and received under the old 
 sy!*tem of pleading, the facts were pleaded 
 according to their legal effect, and it has 
 been repeatedly held that a statement of 
 facts good at the common law in actions 
 like this is sufficient under the code. . . . 
 It is possible that the framers of the code 
 did not contemj)late such a result of their 
 work when tliey said, ' The complaint 
 shall contain a plain and concise statement 
 of the facts constituting each cause of 
 action, without unnecessary repetition ; ' 
 but such construction was adopted by the 
 courts in the State from which we took the 
 code, before its adoption liere, though at 
 a time when there was a strong inclina- 
 tion to hold on to old forms and ingraft 
 tJiem on to the new system as far as possi- 
 ble. That was done, and it is believed 
 the courts went beyond reason in some 
 cases." 
 
 And in Colorado tlie court held in 
 Kimball i: Lyon (1893), 19 Colo. 266, 
 35 Pac. 44, that while pleading in the 
 form of the common counts is not favored 
 by the code, yet objection can be made 
 thereto only by special demurrer, by 
 motion for a copy of the account sued on 
 or for a bill of particulars.]
 
 THE COMMON COUNTS. 
 
 587 
 
 the better opinion sJiould, be omitted. ^ This doctrine is sup- 
 
 J Farrou v. Slierwood, 17 N. Y. 227, 
 229 ; Hosley v. Black, 28 N. Y. 438 ; Hurst 
 I). Litchfield, 39 N. Y. 377 ; Atkinson v. 
 Collins, 9 Abb. Pr. 353 ; Evans v. Harris, 
 19 Barb. 416; Green r. Gilbert, 21 Wis. 
 395, an action to recover for the part pei-- 
 formance of an express contract, the plain- 
 tiff having been prevented by sickness 
 from completing; Carroll v. Paul's E.x., 
 16 Mo. 226 ; Brown v. Perry, 14 Ind. .3^2 ; 
 Ker.stetter i'. Raymond, 10 Ind. 199; Stout 
 V. St. Louis Tribune Co., 52 Mo. 342 ; Fri- 
 ermuth v. Friennuth, 46 Cal. 42 ; Ray- 
 mond V. Hanford, 6 N. Y. S. C. 312; Fells 
 V. Vestvali, 2 Keyes, 152; Ashton v. Shep- 
 herd, 120 Ind. 69. In Sussdorf v. Schmidt, 
 55 N. Y. 319, 324, the complaint alleged 
 an agreed compensation for services ; but, 
 at the trial, the plaintiff was permitted to 
 prove their value as upon a quantum me- 
 ruit, and this was held no error, or at most 
 an immaterial variance ; but, pei- contra, in 
 Davis V. Mason, 3 Ore. 154, it was held 
 that in an action for services, the complaint 
 stating an express contract to pay a stipu- 
 lated sum, the plaintiff cannot prove and 
 recover their value i\Y>ona.(/ua7ttum vieruit. 
 In Farron v. Sherwood, which is, perhaps, 
 the leading case, the doctrine was thus an- 
 nounced by Strong J. (p. 229) : " The case 
 is therefore within the well-settled rule, 
 that when there is a special agreement, 
 and the plaintiff has performed on his 
 part, the law raises a duty on the part 
 of the defendant to pay the price agreed 
 upon, and the plaintiff may count either 
 upon this implied assumpsit, or on the ex- 
 press agreement. A new cause of action, 
 upon such performance, arises from this 
 legal duty in like manner as if the act done 
 had been done upon a general request, 
 without an express agreement. This rule 
 is not affected by the code. The plain- 
 tiff might, as he has done, rest his action 
 on the legal duty, and his complaint is 
 adapted to and contains every necessary 
 element of that cause of action." In Ker- 
 stetter v. Raymond, the Supreme Court 
 enumerated the instances in which the 
 general or common count was a proper 
 means of suing upon an express contract 
 between the parties, and declared that they 
 were all retained by the codes. These in- 
 stances are, (1) when the plaintiff has 
 
 fully executed, and the time of payment is 
 passed, the measure of damages being the 
 stipulated price; (2) when the sjjecial con- 
 tract lias been altered or deviated from by 
 common con.sent; (3) when the plaintiff 
 has performed a part, and has been pre- 
 vented from performing the whole by 
 the act of the defendant, or by tlie act of 
 the law; (4) when the plaintiff has not 
 fully complied witli the terms of the con- 
 tract, but, professing to act under it, has 
 done for or delivered to the other party 
 something of value to him which he haa 
 accepted. This last doctrine is not uni- 
 versally accepted in the broad terms here 
 stated ; but it is the settled rule in Indiana. 
 See Loraax v. Bailey, 7 Blackf 599. 
 
 QHeld, in Jenney Electric Co. v. Bran- 
 ham (1896), 145 Ind. 314, 41 N. E. 448, 
 that a recovery may be had upon the com- 
 mon counts notwithstanding the evidence 
 shows a special contract. But in Duncan 
 V. Gray (1899), 108 la. 599, 79 N. W. 362, 
 no recovery was allowed where an implied 
 promise was alleged and an express prom- 
 ise proved. So in Roche r. Baldwin (1902), 
 135 Cal. 522, 65 Pac. 459, where a com- 
 plaint was drawn upon a quantum meruit, 
 and evidence produced upon the trial es- 
 tablished a contract whereby certain per- 
 sons named were to fix the amount to be 
 paid for the services rendered, it was held 
 a fatal variance. The probata and allegata 
 do not at all correspond. See also, to the 
 same effect, McCormick v. Interstate, etc. 
 Ry. Co. (1900), 154 Mo. 191, 55 S. W. 
 252; Burton v. Rosemary Co. (1903), 132 
 N. C. 17, 43 S. E. 480. 
 
 In accord with Jenney Electric Co. v. 
 Branham (supra), it was held in West v. 
 Eley (1901), 39 Ore. 461,65 Pac. 798, that 
 where a complaint is founded upon a quan- 
 tum meruit, the only effect of proving an 
 express contract fixing the price is tliat 
 the stipulated price becomes the quantum 
 meruit in the case. It is not a question of 
 variance, but only of the mode of proof of 
 the allegations of the pleadings. The 
 same rule was applied in Vanderbeek r. 
 Francis (1903). 75 Conn. 467, 53 Atl. 1015 ; 
 Hecla Gold Mining Co. v. Gisborn (1899), 
 21 Utah, 68,59 Pac. 518 ; Roberts v. Leak 
 (1899), 108 Ga. 806, 33 S. E. 995. 
 
 Where an express contract is alleged in
 
 588 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 ported by numerous decisions in various States, and it seems to 
 be regarded as still operative in all the circumstances to which it 
 was applicable under the former S3-stera. 
 
 § 438. * 54-4. Criticism of Doctrine. In the face of this over- 
 whelming array of authority, it may seem almost presumptuous 
 even to suggest a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusions 
 that have been reached with so much unanimity. I cannot, 
 however, consistently with my very strong convictions, refrain 
 from' expressing the opinion that, in all these rulings concerning 
 the use of the common counts, the couits have overlooked the 
 fundamental conception of the reformed pleading, and have 
 abandoned its essential principles. This position of inevitable 
 opposition was clearly, although unintentionally, described by 
 one of the judges in language already quoted, when he says, 
 " We are inclined to sanction the latter view, and to hold that 
 ihe facts which, in the judgment of the law, create the indebted- 
 ness or liability, need 7iot be set forth in the complaint." Now, 
 the "facts which create the liability" are the "facts constituting 
 the cause of action " which the codes expressly require to be 
 alleged; tlie two expressions are synonymous; and the direct 
 antagonism between what the court says need not be done, and 
 what the statute says must be done, is patent. But the objection 
 to the doctrine of these decisions does not chiefly rest upon such 
 verbal criticism; it is involved in the very nature of the new 
 theory when contrasted with the old methods. In every species 
 of the common count, the averments, by means of certain pre- 
 scribed formulas, presented what the pleader conceived to be 
 the legal effect and operation of the facts instead of the facts 
 themselves, and the most important of them was always a pure 
 conclusion of law. The count for money had and received well 
 illustrates the truth of this proposition. In the allegation that 
 " the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff for money had and 
 received by him to the plaintiff's use," the distinctive element 
 
 the pleading, and the proof shows only an (1895), 98 Ky. 186, 32 S. AV. 623 ; Price i-. 
 implied contract, no recovery can he had : Price's Executor (1897), 101 Ky. 28, 39 
 I'ear.sou v. Switzer (1898), 98 Wis. 397, S. W. 429; Ilu.'ston v. Tyler (1897), 140 
 74 N. \V. 214 ; Walker v. Irwin (189.5), 94 Mo. 252, 36 S. W. 654 ; Maddox v. Wag- 
 la. 448, 62 N. W. 785; Harrison v. Puste- iier (1900), 111 Ga. 146, 36 S. E. 609, 
 oska (1896), 97 la. 166, 66 N. W. 93; Bir- Coiiira, Burge.ss v. Helm (1898), 24 Nev. 
 lant V. Cleckley (1896), 48 S. C. 298, 26 242, 51 Pac. 1025; Livingstone v. Wagner, 
 S. E. 600; Newton's Executor v. Field 23 Nev. 53, 42 Pac. 290.J
 
 THE COMMON COUNTS. 589 
 
 was the phrase "money had and received to the plaintiff's use." 
 This technical expression was not the statement of a/aci, in the 
 sense in which that word is used by the codes; if not strictly a 
 pure conclusion of law, it was at most a symbol to which a cer- 
 tain peculiar meaning had been given. The circumstances under 
 which one person could be liable to another for money had and 
 received were very numerous, embracing contracts express or 
 implied, and even torts and frauds. The mere averment that 
 the defendant was indebted for money had and received admitted 
 any of these circumstances in its support, but it did not disclose 
 nor even suggest the real nature of the liability, the actual cause 
 of action upon which the plaintiff relied. The reformed theory 
 of pleading was expressly designed to abrogate forever this general 
 mode of averment, which concealed rather than displayed the 
 true cause of action ; it requires the facts to be stated, the facts 
 as they exist or occurred, leaving the law to be determined and 
 applied by the court. The same is true of the common count in 
 every one of its phases. A careful analysis would show that the 
 important and distinctive averments were either naked conclu- 
 sions of law, or the legal effect and operation of the facts 
 expressed in technical formulas to which a particular meaning 
 had been attached, and which were equally applicable to innu- 
 merable different causes of action. The rule which permitted the 
 general count in assumpsit to be sometimes used in an action 
 upon an express contract was even more arbitrary and technical, 
 and was wholly based upon fictitious notions. The conception 
 of a second implied promise resulting from the duty to perform 
 the original express promise has no foundation whatever in the 
 law of contract, but was invented, with great subtlety, in order 
 to furnish the ground for a resort to general assumpsit instead 
 of special assumpsit in a certain class of cases. All the reasons 
 in its support were swept away by the legislation which abolished 
 the distinctions between the forms of action, since it was in such 
 distinctions alone that those reasons had even the semblance of 
 an existence. My space will not permit this discussion to be 
 pursued any farther, although much more might be added to the 
 foregoing suggestions. If the principles of pleading heretofore 
 developed in the text are true expressions of the reformed theory, 
 the legislature certainly intended that the facts constituting each 
 cause of action should be alleged as they actually happened, not
 
 590 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 by means of any technical formulas, but in the ordinary language 
 of narrative; and it is, as it appears to me, equally certain that 
 the use of the common counts as complaints or petitions is a 
 violation of these fundamental principles. 
 
 i$ 439. * 545. Further Rules of Pleading to be considered. Out- 
 line of Discussion. From the few general principles which thus 
 constitute the simple foundation of the reformed pleading, there 
 result as corollaries certain subordinate doctrines and practical 
 rules, to the development and illustration of which the remaining 
 portion of the present section will be devoted. The immediate 
 object of these special rules is to enforce in complaints or peti- 
 tions and answers a conformity with the essential principles upon 
 which the system is based, and at the same time to procure a 
 decision of judicial controversies upon their merits, and not upon 
 any mere technical requirements as to form and mode. They 
 relate to the practical methods which must be pursued in setting 
 forth the causes of action and the defences; and the particular 
 subjects with which they deal are (1) insufficient, incomplete, 
 or imperfect allegations, (2) immaterial and redundant allega- 
 tions, (3) the doctrine that the cause of action or the defence 
 proved must correspond with the one alleged. Connected with 
 and subsidiary to these topics are the remedies j^rovided for each, 
 and particularly that of amendment, which the codes expressly 
 authorize with the utmost freedom, and also the power of elect- 
 ing between the two modes of setting forth the same cause of 
 action under certain circumstances either as ex contractu or as ex 
 delicto. Preliminary, however, to the discussion thus outlined, 
 I shall state and very briefly explain a principle which will 
 necessarily affect its whole course, and largely determine its 
 results, — the principle of construction as applied to the pleadings 
 themselves. 
 
 § 440. *546. Strict Construction of Pleadings Superseded by- 
 Liberal Construction. It was a rule of the common law firmly 
 established and constantly acted upon, — that, in examining and 
 deciding all objections involving either form or substance, every 
 pleading was to be construed strongly against the pleader; noth- 
 ing could be presumed in its favor; nothing could be added, or 
 inferred, or supplied by implication, in order to sustain its suffi- 
 ciency. This harsh doctrine, unnecessary and illogical in its 
 original conception, and often pushed to extremes that were
 
 LIBEKAL CONSTRUCTION OF PLEADINGS. 591 
 
 simply absurd, was the origin of the technicality and excessive 
 precision, which, more than any other features, characterized the 
 ancient system in its condition of highest development. All 
 the codes contain the following provision, or one substantially 
 the same : " In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of 
 determining its effect, its allegations shall be liberally construed 
 with a view to substantial justice between the parties."^ The 
 evident intent of the legislature in this clause was to abrogate 
 at one blow the ancient dogma, and to introduce in its place the 
 contrary principle of a liberal and equitable construction; that 
 is, a construction in accordance with the general nature and 
 design of the pleading as a whole. This mode of interpretation 
 does not require a leaning in favor of the pleader in place of the 
 former tendency against him; it demands a natural spirit of fair- 
 ness and equity in ascertaining the meaning of any particular 
 averment or group of averments from their relation and connec- 
 tion with the entire pleading and from its general purpose and 
 object. The courts have uniformly adopted this view of the 
 provision ; and although in particular instances they may some- 
 times have departed from it, yet, in their announcement of the 
 theory^ they have unanimously conceded that the stern doctrine 
 of the common law has been abolished, and that, instead thereof, 
 an equitable mode of construction has been substituted. From 
 the multitudes of decisions which maintain this position with 
 more or less emphasis I select a few examples, and other illus- 
 trations will be subsequently given. 
 
 § 441. * 547. Judicial Approval of Liberal Construction. The 
 New York Court of Appeals, while construing a complaint, said: 
 " The language is clearly susceptible of this interpretation ; and 
 if so, that interpretation should be given in preference to [another 
 which was stated]. If the language admits of the latter inter- 
 pretation, it may be said to be ambiguous, and that is all. It is 
 not true that under the code, if there be uncertainty in respect to 
 the nature of the charge, it is to l)e construed strictly against the 
 pleader. By § 159, in the construction of a pleading, its allega- 
 tions must be liberally construed with a view to substantial jus- 
 tice."^ The language used by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
 in a similar case is still stronger: "Contrary to the common-law 
 rule, every reasonable intendment and presumption is to be made 
 
 1 [^See § * 434, note 1 r\ - Oleott v. Carroll, 39 N. Y. 430, 438.
 
 592 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 in favor of the pleading."^ The same interpietr.tion is g'ven 
 to the provision in Iowa; the old dogma of leaning against the 
 pleader is abandoned, and a liberal and equitable construction is 
 now the rule.^ The practical force and operation of this prin- 
 ciple, and liow much effect it actually' produces in the judicial 
 process of construing pleadings, can best be seen by an examina- 
 tion of the decisions in which it has been invoked. A few of 
 them have therefore been selected, and placed in the foot-note." 
 
 1 Morse v. Oilman, 16 Wis. 504, 507. 
 See also Hazletou v. Union Bk. of Colum- 
 bus, 32 Wis. 34, 42, 43, wliicli holds that 
 greater latitude of presumption is ad- 
 mitted to sustain a complaint, when objec- 
 tion to it is not made until the trial, after 
 issues have beeu formed by an answer. 
 
 •2 Shank v. Teeple, 33 Iowa, 189, 191 ; 
 Foster v. Elliott, 33 Iowa, 216, 223 ; Gray 
 ?•. Coan, 23 Iowa, 344 ; Doolittle v. Green, 
 32 Iowa, 123, 124. 
 
 " McGlasson v. Bradford, 7 Bush, 250, 
 252 ; .joubert v. Carli, 26 Wis. 594 ; Clay v. 
 Edgerton, 19 Ohio St. 549 ; supra, § * 535 , 
 Gunn V. Madigan, 28 Wis. 158, 164; Rob- 
 son V. Comstock, 8 Wis. 372, 374, 375 ; 
 Morse v. Gilraau, 16 Wis. 504. As further 
 examples, see Bushey v. Reynolds, 31 Ark. 
 657 ; Thompson v. Killian, 25 Minn. Ill ; 
 Ferguson v. Va. & T. R. Co., 13 Nev. 184 ; 
 Chiiders v. Veruer, 12 S. C. 1 ; Wilkins v. 
 Moore, 20 Kan. .538 ; Strong v. Hoos, 41 
 Wis. 659 ; Whitman v. Watry, 44 id. 491 ; 
 Evans i\ Neale, 69 Ind. 148 ; ]\Ioore v. 
 Moore, 56 Cal. 89; Wilcox v. Hausch, 57 
 id. 139; McAllister i'. Welker, 39 Minn. 
 535 ; Isaacs v. Holland, 1 Wash. 54. 
 
 [^Construction of Pleadittf/s. 
 
 Pleadings are to be construed libei-ally 
 with a view to substantial justice between 
 the parties: Guy v. McDaniel (1897), 51 
 S. C. 4.36, 29 S. E. 196; Cone v. Ivinson 
 (1893), 4 Wyo. 203,31 Vac. 31 ; McArthur 
 V. Clarke Drug Co. (1896), 48 Neb. 899, 67 
 N. W. 861; ilart7xll r. McClurg (1898). 
 54 Xeb. 313, 74 N. W. 625 ; Miller v. 
 Bayer (1896), 94 Wis. 123, 68 N. W. 869; 
 South Bend Chilled Plow Co. v. Geo. C. 
 Cribb Co. (1897), 97 Wis. 2.30, 72 N. W. 
 749 ; Benolkin i\ Guthrie (1901), 111 Wis. 
 554, 87 N. W. 466 ; S.age v. Culver (1895), 
 147 N. Y. 241, 41 N. E. 513; Dailey r. 
 Burlington, etc. Ry. Co. (1899), 58 Neb. 
 
 396, 78 N. W. 722; Roberts v. Samson 
 (1897), 50 Neb. 745, 70 N. W. 384 ; Wenk 
 V. City of New York (1902), 171 N. Y. 607, 
 64 N. E. 509 ; Coatsworth v. Lehigh Valley 
 Ry. Co. (1898), 156 N. Y. 451, 51 N. E. 
 301 ; Kain v. Larkin (1894), 141 N. Y. 144, 
 39 N. E. 9 ; United States Saving Co. v. 
 Harris (1895), 142 Ind. 226, 40 N. E. 1072 ; 
 Strong V. Weir (1896), 47 S. C. 307, 25 
 S. E. 157; Waggy v. Scott (1896), 29 
 Ore. 336, 45 Pac. 774 ; Hood v. Nicholson 
 (1896), 137 Mo. 400, 38 S. W. 1095 ; Vogel- 
 gesaug V. City of St. Louis (1897), 139 Mo. 
 127, 40 S W. 653 ; Baird v. Citizens' Ry. 
 Co. (1898), 146 Mo. 265, 48 S. W. 78; 
 Ingraham v. Lyon (1894), 105 Cal. 254, 
 38 Pac. 892 (but see California cases cited 
 infra, holding that pleadings are to be con- 
 strued most strongly against the pleader) ; 
 Hall V. Woolcry (1898), 20 Wash. 440, 55 
 Pac. 562, holding that in the absence of a 
 demurrer, a complaint is entitled to a 
 liberal construction ; Blumenthal v. Pacific 
 Meat Co. (1895), 12 Wa.sh. 331, 41 Pac. 47, 
 to same effect. 
 
 The case of Cone v. Ivinson (su/jra), 4 
 "Wyo. 203, has a very elaborate discussion 
 of the question of construction. Pomeroy, 
 Bliss, Swan, and Maxwell are all copiously 
 quoted, and the authorities are thoroughly 
 reviewed, a strong dissenting opinion being 
 filed. Upon a rehearing being granted, 
 the case was tlioroughly reargued, the 
 court adhering to its original position. 
 
 A pleading must be held to allege all 
 the facts that can be imjjlieil by fair and 
 reasonable intendment from the facts ex- 
 pressly stated: Sage v. Culver (1895), 147 
 N. Y. 241, 41 N. E. 513; Kain v. Larkin 
 (1894), 141 N. Y. 144, 39 N. E. 9 ; Coats- 
 worth V. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co. (1898), 
 156 N. Y. 451, 51 N. E. 301; Wenk v. 
 City of New York (1902), 171 N. Y. 607, 
 64 N. E. 509 ; Roberts v. Samson (1897),
 
 LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF PLEADINGS. 
 
 193 
 
 111 a very small number of cases, however, the courts seem to 
 have overlooked this change made by the statute, and have 
 
 50 Neb. 745, 70 N. W. 384 ; Dailey v. Bur- 
 lington, etc. R.R. Co. (1899), 58 Neb. 396, 
 78 N. W. 722 ; Miller v. Bayer (1896), 94 
 Wis. 123, 68 N. W. 869. 
 
 Where a pleading i.s assailed for the 
 first time by a demurrer ore tenus, it will 
 be construed liberally : National Fire Ins. 
 Co. r. P'astern Building & Loan Ass'n 
 (1902), 63 Neb. 698, 88 N. W. 863 ; First 
 Nat. Bank v. Pennington (1899), 57 Neb. 
 404, 77 N. W. 1084; Holtz v. Hanson 
 (1902), 115 Wis. 236, 91 N. W. 663 ; Werner 
 V. Ascher (1893), 86 Wis. 349, 56 N. W. 
 869; Phillips v. Carver (1898), 99 Wis. 
 561, 75 N. W. 432; Winkler v. Kacine 
 Wagon, etc. Co. (1898), 99 Wis. 184, 74 
 N. W. 973. 
 
 A pleading attacked for tlie first time 
 in the Supreme Court on the ground that 
 it does not state a cause of action, will be 
 liberally construed : Omalia Nat. Bank v. 
 Iviper (1900), 60 Neb. 33, 82 N. W. 102; 
 F'owler v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (1899), 35 Ore. 
 559, 57 Pac. 421 ; Roseburg Ry. Co. v. 
 Nosier (1900), 37 Ore. 299, 60 Pac. 904. 
 See also First Nat. Bank v. Tompkins 
 (1903), — Neb. — , 94 N. W. 717. 
 
 When a complaint is attacked after 
 judgment for want of facts to state a cause 
 of action, it must be liberally construed : 
 Mosher v. Bruhu (1896); 15 Wash. 332, 
 46 Pac. 397; Cobb v. Lindell Ry. Co. 
 (1899), 149 Mo. 135, 50 S. W. 310; Mer- 
 rill V. Equitable Farm & Stock, etc. Co. 
 (1896), 49 Neb. 198,68 N. W. 365; Ameri- 
 can Fire Ins. Co. v. Landfare (1898), 56 
 Neb. 482, 76 N. W. 1068. A decree lor 
 plaintiff will cure tlie inadvertent omission 
 of the won! " not " in a complaint : Wyatt 
 V. Wyatt (1897), 31 Ore. 531, 49 Pac. 855. 
 See also Montesano v. Blair (1895), 12 
 Wash. 188, 40 Pac. 731 ; State ex rel. v. 
 Renshaw (1902), 166 Mo. 682, 66 S. W. 
 953; Milner v. Harris (1903), — Neb. —, 
 95 N. W. 682. 
 
 Imperfect allegations have frequently 
 been held to be aided by verdict or judg- 
 ment. See Hall v. Southern Pac. Co. 
 (1899), Ariz., 57 Pac. 617; Ades y. Levi 
 (189.3), 137 Ihd. 506, 37 N. E. 388 ; Philo- 
 math V. Ingle (1902), 41 Ore. 289, 68 Pac. 
 803 ; Clian Sing v. City of Portland (1900), 
 
 37 Ore. 68, 60 Pac. 718; Mass. Benefit 
 Ass'n V. Richart (1896), 99 Ky. 302, 35 
 S. W. 541 ; Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. 
 Lawes (1900), Ky., 56 S. W. 426 ; Hill v. 
 Ragland (1902), — Ky. — , 70 S W. 634 ; 
 Salmon Falls Bank v. Leyser (1893), 116 
 Mo. 51, 22 S. W. .504; People's Bank?;. 
 Scalzo (1894), 127 Mo. 164, 29 S. W. 1032 ; 
 Nicolai v. Krimbel (1896), 29 Ore. 76, 43 
 Pac. 865; Miller v. Ilirschberg (1895), 
 27 Ore 522, 40 Pac. 506. But it has been 
 held that such aider does not take place 
 where the complaint is radically defective : 
 Nye V. Bill Nye Min. Co. (1903), 42 Ore. 
 560, 71 Pac. 1043. Compare Gu.stin v. 
 Concordia Ins. Co. (1901), 164 Mo. 172, 
 64 S. W. 128. 
 
 When olijection is made for the first 
 time on the trial that the complaint does 
 not state facts constituting a cause of 
 action, the pleading will be sustained if 
 .possible: Johnston v. Spencer (1897), 51 
 Neb. 198, 70 N. W. 982 ; Chicago, Burling- 
 ton, etc. R. R.Co. V. Spirk (1897), 51 Neb. 
 167, 70 N. W. 926; Peterson v. Hopewell 
 (1898), 55 Neb. 670, 76 N. W. 451 ; Butts 
 1-. Kingman & Co. (1900), 60 Neb. 224, 82 
 N. W. 854; Anderson v. Alsetli (1895), 6 
 S. D. 566, 62 N. W. 435 ; Whitbeck v. 
 Sees (1898), 10 S. D. 417, 73 N. W. 915 ; 
 Broyhill v. Norton (1903), 175 Mo. 190, 74 
 S. W. 1024 ; Seibert v. Minneapolis, etc. 
 Ry. Co, (1894), 58 Minn. 39, 59 N. W. 822 ; 
 Commonwealth Title Ins. Co. v. Dokko 
 (1898), 71 Minn. .533, 71 N. W. 891. 
 
 When objections are made to the intro- 
 duction of evidence on the ground that the 
 petition fails to state a cause of action, 
 the pleading will be liberally construed : 
 Zug V. Forgan (1902), Neb., 90 N. W. 
 1129; Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Ruby 
 (1900), 60 Neb. 216, 82 N. W. 629; Norfolk 
 Beet Sugar Co. v. Hight (1898), 56 Neb. 
 162, 76 N. W. 566. 
 
 Under the liberal rule of construction 
 the word " wages " was construed as 
 tliough it read " damages " when the latter 
 should have been used : Tiffin Glass Co. v. 
 Stoehr (1896), 54 0. St. 157, 43 N. E. 
 279 ; the word " pain " was construed to 
 mean "paid:" Connor r. Becker (1901), 
 62 Neb. 856, 87 N. W. 1065 ; the complaint 
 
 38
 
 )94 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 expressly declared that the construction must be adverse to the 
 pleader, thus recognizing the ancient rule as still in force ;^ 
 
 and reply were read togetlier to determiue 
 the intent of tlie pleader : Lavery v. Arnold 
 (18J9), 36 Ore. 84, 58 Pac. 524 ; " where a 
 complaint contains words which, if properly 
 arrangcMl, might state two causes of action, 
 it will be construed as stating only the one 
 principally intended : " Santa Fe, etc. Ky. 
 Co. r. Hurley (1894), Ariz., 36 Pac. 216; 
 where a complaint may be treated as set- 
 ting out a cause of action either ex con- 
 tractu or ex delicto, anil the action would 
 be barred if treated as ex delicto, it will be 
 treated as ex contractu : St. Louis, etc. R. R. 
 Co. V. Sweet (1897), 63 Ark. 563, 40 S. W. 
 463 ; the words " entered into " were con- 
 strued to equal " executed," and the alle- 
 gation of the execution of a bond was 
 held to include the performance of every 
 act essential to the making and approval 
 of the bond : Fire Ass'n of Pliiladelphia v. 
 Ruby (1900), 60 Neb. 216, 82 N. \V. 629; 
 an allegation that a child was six years of 
 age, held to include an allegation tliat said 
 child was unmarried, in an action for the 
 death of an unmarried minor diild : Baird 
 V. Citizens' Ry. Co. (1898), 146 Mo. 265, 
 48 S. W. 78; facts not conclusions control 
 in construction of pleading: Spargur v. 
 Komine (1893), 38 Neb. 736, 57 N. W. .523 ; 
 where it is not clear whether the action is 
 legal or equitable, it should be so con- 
 stru<^d as to maintain the jurisdiction of 
 tlie court: Adams v. Hayes (1897), 120 
 N. C. 383, 27 S. Iv 47 ; a pleading in the 
 form of an indictment will be considered 
 as a complaint if the necessary facts are 
 alleged : St. Louis, etc. K. R. Co. v. State 
 (1901), 68 Ark. 561, 60 S. W. 654. 
 
 The Supreme Court of Missouri, in the 
 case of Hood v. Nicholson (1896), 137 Mo. 
 400, 38 S. W. 1095, used the following 
 language resrecting the limits applicable 
 to the liberal construction of pleadings ; 
 " Courts, to prevent delays and avoid hard- 
 ships, will disregard all defects in plead- 
 ings whicl) do not affect the substantial 
 rights of the adverse party, and will dis- 
 regard form and look to the substance and 
 at all times give .such interpretation to 
 language used iis fairly appears to have 
 been intended by its author; yet it is not 
 authorized to rob, by construction, lan- 
 
 guage of its plain and obvious moaning, or 
 of the fair, reasonable, and obvious conclu- 
 sion to be deduced therefrom, to enable its 
 author to relieve himself from a position of 
 embarrassment wliere by its use he has 
 voluntarily placed himself." 
 
 In Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. r. Haywood 
 (1897), 102 la. 392, 71 N. W. 358, the court 
 said : " Where the right of recovery is based 
 upon a written contract, as in tliis case, and 
 the averment of facts constituting another 
 cause of action is necessary to bring the 
 remedy sought within the terms of the con- 
 tract, then it will be assumed that only 
 one cause of action was intended. In other 
 words, parties are presumed to follow the 
 requirements of statute in preparing their 
 pleadings, and a single count or division 
 of a petition will not be construed to state 
 two causes of action unless the purpose of 
 the pleader so to do clearly appears.""] 
 
 1 Commonwealth v. Cook, 8 Bush, 220, 
 224 ; Wrigiit v. McCormick, 67 N. C. 27. 
 And see Rogers v. Shannon, 52 Cal. 99 ; 
 Henley v. Wilson, 77 N. C. 216 (common- 
 law rule applied; ambiguous language 
 .strictly construed against the pleader ; 
 no intendments in his favor) ; Jaffe v. Lili- 
 enthal, 86 Cal. 91 ; Loehr v. Murphy, 45 
 Mo. A pp. 519. 
 
 ^Im the following cases it is held that 
 the pleadings are to be construed most 
 strongly against the pleader : May.s v. 
 Carman (1902), Ky., 66 S. W. 1019; 
 Friend v. Allen (1900), Ky., 56 S. W. 418; 
 Goff V. Marsden Co. (1900), Ky., 56 S. W. 
 667; Fox v. Mackey (1899), 125 Cal. 54, 
 57 Pac. 672 ; California Navigation Co. i\ 
 Union Transp. Co. (1898), 122 Cal. 641, 
 55 Pac. 591 ; Siskiyou Lumber Co. r. 
 Rostel (1898), 121 Cal. 511, 53 Pac. 1118; 
 Heller v. Dyerville Mfg. Co. (1897), 116 
 Cal. 127. 47 Pac. 1016; Callahan v. Lough- 
 ran (1894), 102 Cal. 476, 36 Pac. 835 (but 
 see Ingraham v. Lyon (1894), 105 Cal. 
 2.54, 38 Pac. 892, where the liberal view is 
 announced); Ilolt v. Pearson (1895), 12 
 Utah, 63,41 Pac. 560 (expressly overruled 
 in Mangum v. Bullion, etc. Co. (1897), 
 15 Utah, 534, 50 Pac. 834); Johnston i-. 
 Meaghr (1897), 14 Utah, 426, 47 Pac. 861, 
 holding that, on demurrer, pleadings are
 
 IMPERFECT OK INFOKMAL ALLEGATIONS. 595 
 
 while in some others the judicial action was clearly based upon 
 that old doctrine, although it was not formally announced in the 
 opinions. 1 Under the light of this beneficent but new principle, 
 that pleadings are to be construed fairly, equitably, and liberally, 
 with a view to promote the ends of justice, and not enforce any 
 arbitrary and technical dogmas, I shall proceed to consider, in 
 the order already indicated, the several practical rules mentioned 
 above, which regulate the manner of setting forth the cause of 
 action or the defence. 
 
 § 442. * 548. I. InsufiBcient, Imperfect, Incomplete, or Informal 
 Allegations, and the Mode of Objecting to and Correcting them. 
 Distinction between Imperfect and wholly Deficient Allegations. 
 The codes clearly intend to draw a broad line of distinction 
 between an entire failure to state any cause of action or defence, 
 on the one side, which is to be taken advantage of either by the 
 general demurrer for want of sufficient facts, or by the exclusion 
 of all evidence at the trial, and the statement of a cause of action 
 or a defence in an insufficient, imperfect, incomplete, or informal 
 manner, which is to be corrected by a motion to render the 
 pleading more definite and certain by amendment. The courts 
 have, in the main, endeavored to preserve this distinction, but 
 not always with success ; since averments have sometimes been 
 treated as merely incomplete, and the pleadings containing them 
 have been sustained on demurrer, which appeared to state no 
 cause of action or defence whatever; while, in other instances, 
 pleadings have been pronounced wholly defective and therefore 
 bad on demurrer, or incajDable of admitting any evidence, the 
 allegations of which appear to have been simply imperfect or 
 incomplete. It is undoubtedly difficult to discriminate between 
 
 to be construed most strongly against the Co. (1900), 24 Mont. 178, 61 Pac. i; 
 
 pleader, but, after trial, in the pleader's Fidelity & Casualty Co. d. Vandyke (1896), 
 
 favor ; Oregon & Cal. R. R. Co. v. Jack- 99 Ga.'542, 27 S. E. 709. 
 sou County (1901), 38 Ore. 589, 64 Pac. In Blumenthal v. Pacific Meat Co. 
 
 .307, holding that, when tested by demur- (1895), 12 Wash. 331, 41 Pac. 47, the 
 
 rer, the allegations of a pleadiug are to court seems to favor a somewhat strict 
 
 be construed most .strongly against tlie construction when the pleading is attacked 
 
 ]ilea(ler, but after pleading over all in- by motion or demurrer.^ 
 tendments must be indulged in favor of i For examples, see Hathaway v. 
 
 its sufficiency ; Mellott y. Downing (1901), Quinby, 1 N. Y. S. C. 386; Doyle v. 
 
 39 Ore. 218, 64 Pac. 393 (to the same Phcenix Ins. Co., 44 Cal. 264; Scofield 
 
 effect); Patterson v. Patterson (1902), 40 v. Whitelegge, 49 N. Y. 259, 261 ; Holmes 
 
 Ore. 560, 67 Pac. 664 (to same effect); y. Williams," 1 6 .Minn. 164, 168. 
 Conrad Nat. Bank i\ Great Northern Ry.
 
 596 CIVIL LEMEDIE.S. 
 
 these two conditions of partial and of total failure; and it is 
 utterly impossible to frame any accurate general formula which 
 shall define or describe the insufficiency, incompleteness, or ini- 
 perfectness of averment intended by the codes, and shall embrace 
 all the possible instances within its terms. B}- a comparison of 
 the decided cases, some notion, however, may be obtained of the 
 distinction, recognized if not definitely established by the courts, 
 between the absolute deficiency which renders a pleading bad on 
 demurrer or at the trial, and the incompleteness or imperfection 
 of allegation which exposes it to amendment by motion; and in 
 this manner alone can any light be thrown upon the nature of 
 the insufficiency which is the subject of the present inquiry. 
 
 § 443. * 549. Motion the Proper Method of Attackins Pleadings 
 which are merely Imperfect. The true doctrine to be gathered 
 from all the cases is, that if the substantial facts which constitute 
 a cause of action are stated in a complaint or petition, or can be 
 inferred by reasonable intendment from the matters M'hich are 
 set forth, although the allegations of these facts are imperfect, 
 incomplete, and defective, such insufficiency pertaining, how- 
 ever, to the form rather than to the substance, the proper mode 
 of correction is not by demurrer, nor by excluding evidence at 
 the trial, but by a motion before the trial to make the averments 
 more definite and certain by amendment.^ From the citations in 
 
 1 People V. Ryder, 12 X. Y. 43.3 ; Prin- v. Hall, 43 Cal. 191 (objection that a coni- 
 
 dle V. Caruthers, 15 N. Y. 425; Flauders plaint is ambiguous cannot be rai.scd 
 
 V. McVickar, 7 Wis. 372, 377 ; Kobson v. under a general demurrer) ; Blasdel v. 
 
 Comstocli, 8 Wis. 372, 374, 375; Kuehn Williams, 9 Nev. 161; Smith v. Dennett, 
 
 V. Wilson, 13 Wis. 104, 107, 108; Morse c. 15 Minn. 81; Lewis c. Edwards, 44 Ind. 
 
 Oilman, 16 Wis. 504, 507 ; Kimball iv Dar- 33;5, 336; Snowden i'. Wiias, 19 Ind. 10; 
 
 ling, 32 Wis. 675, 684 ; Keeve v. Fraker, Lane v. Miller, 27 Ind. 534 ; Johnson 
 
 32 Wis. 243; Hazleton v. Union Bk. of v. Kol)insoD, 20 Minn. 189, 192; Mills 
 
 Columbus, 32 Wis. 34, 42, 43; Horn i-. v. Rice, 3 Neb. 76, 86, 87; School Trs. r. 
 
 Ludin<j;ton, 23 Wis. 81, 83 (a motion made Odlin, 8 Ohio St. 293, 296. A (juotation 
 
 and granted, — a good illustration of de- from a few of these cases will show the 
 
 fective allegations added to); Clay v. exact position taken by the courts in refer- 
 
 Edgerton, 19 Ohio St. 549 ; Winter v. ence to the extent of defect which can 
 
 Winter, 8 Nev. 129 (statement of a ma- and must be cured by motion ; and I select 
 
 terial fact by way of recital); Saulslniry from among tho.se which have discussed 
 
 /•. Alexamler, .50 Mo. 142, 144 ; Corpenny the sul)ject in the most general manner. 
 
 V. Sedalia, 57 Mo. 88 (a motion in arrest In Prindle v. Caruthers, 15 N. Y. 425, the 
 
 of judgment not proper when a cause complaint set out a copy of a written 
 
 of action is stated however defectively); contract made by defendant, and reciting 
 
 Pomeroy v. Benton, 57 Mo. 531, 550; that, "for value received," he " promised 
 
 Hale c.Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y. 626, to i)ay II. C. or E. C," etc.; but it did 
 
 6.30; 15artiiol v. Blakin, 34 Iowa, 452; not, in any other manner, allege a con- 
 
 liussell c. Mixer, 42 Cal. 47.'); Mattery sideration. It also stated that "the cou-
 
 IMPERFECT Oli INFORMAL ALLEGATIONS. 
 
 597 
 
 the foot-note, it is clear that the courts have, with a considerable 
 degree of unanimity, agreed upon this rule, and have in most 
 
 tract is, and was prior to, etc., the property 
 'of the plaintiff by purchase," but did not 
 disclose from whom the transfer was 
 made, nor the consideration. The de- 
 fendant demurrin<r for want of sufficient 
 facts, the court held that the copy of the 
 contract as set fortli contained a sufficient 
 allegation of a consideration, and added : 
 " The remedy for all defects of this 
 nature is by motion to make the faulty 
 pleading more definite and certain ; that 
 ])roceeding has taken the place of demur- 
 rers for want of form." liobson v. Com- 
 stock, 8 Wis. 372, waa an action for 
 malicious prosecution. The complaint 
 merely alleged that the defendant, mali- 
 ciously and without probal)le cause, pro- 
 cured the plaintiff to be arrested and to 
 be imprisoned, to his damage, etc., but did 
 not state the nature of the indictment, 
 nor in what the charge consisted, nor 
 even that it was false, nor that there had 
 been a trial, nor that the plaintiff had 
 been discharged or acquitted. The de- 
 fendant answered by a general denial; 
 and, at the trial, the plaintiff had a ver- 
 dict. On appeal from the judgment, the 
 court, by Cole J., held (pp. 374, S?.")) that 
 the complaint was exceedingly defective 
 and informal in its manner of setting out 
 the cause of action ; but it was cured 
 by the verdict. The plaintiff must have 
 jnoved a discharge or acquittal, or else 
 he could not have obtained a verdict. 
 The code requires a liberal construction ; 
 and the defendant should have moved 
 that the pleading be made definite and 
 certain by supplying the omitted aver- 
 ments. In Morse v. Gilmau, 16 Wis. 1)04, 
 tlie complaint alleged that defendant 
 entered into a written contract with one 
 Merrick for grading at a specified price 
 per cubic yard ; that the work had 
 been completed by M. according to the 
 agreement ; that there was due thereon 
 a certain named, sum ; and that the de- 
 mand had been assigned by M. to the 
 plaintiff ; but it did not to any further 
 extent state the provisions of the contract. 
 At the trial, all evidence on the part of 
 the plaintiff was excluded, and the com- 
 plaint was dismissed. In reversing this 
 
 ruling, the court, by Dixon C. J., said 
 (p. .')07): "That the contract between M. 
 and the defendant is not set out, as it 
 undoubtedly sliould have been, is not an 
 objection which can be taken in this way. 
 'I'he remedy of the defendant for this de- 
 fect is by motion to require the complaint 
 to be made more definite and certain 
 by amendment. A complaint to be over- 
 thrown by demurrer, or by objection to 
 evidence, must be wholly insufficient. If 
 any portion of it, or to any extent it pre- 
 sents facts sufl[icient to constitute a cause 
 of action, or if a good cause of action caii 
 be gathered from it, it will stand, how- 
 ever inartificially the.se facts may be pre- 
 sented, or however defective, uncertain, 
 or redundant may be the mode of their 
 treatment. Contrary to the common-law 
 rule, every reasonalile intendment and 
 presumption is to be made in favor of the 
 pleading; and it will not be set aside on 
 demurrer unless it be so fatally defective, 
 that, taking all the facts to be admitted, 
 tlie court can say they furnish no cause 
 of action whatever ; " citing and approv- 
 ing Cudlipp v. Whipple, 4 Duer, 610; 
 Graham v. Camman, 5 Duer, 697 ; Broder- 
 ick v. Poillon, 2 E. D.Smith, .554 ; Elfrauk 
 r. Seller, 54 Mo. 134; Russell v. State Ins. 
 Co., 55 Mo. 585 ; Biddle v. Ramsey, 52 
 Mo. 153. The court, in Mills v. Kice, 
 3 Neb. 76, 86, 87, said that when a 
 petition is uncertain or indefinite in its 
 allegations, when it attempts to set up 
 a good cause of action, but the defect 
 does not go to the length of omitting to 
 state any cause of action, tlie defendant 
 must move to correct ; he cannot take 
 advantage of it by demurrer. The fol- 
 lowing cases are additional examples, and 
 they generally sustain the distinction 
 stated in tlie text and the rule there laid 
 down. Ball v. Fulton Cy., 31 Ark. 379 (the 
 rule of the text, § * 549, ([uoted, approved, 
 and followed) ; Kalckhoff r. Zoehrlaut, 40 
 Wis. 427 ; Lash v. Christie, 4 Neb. 262 ; 
 Surginer i\ Paddock, 31 Ark. 528; AuU 
 V. Jones, 5 Neb. 500 ; Farrar v. Triplet, 
 7 id. 237 ; Dorsey v. Hall, 7 id. 460 ; State 
 r. North. Belle Min. Co., 15 Nev. 385; 
 Coon Dist. Tp. v. Providence Dist. Tp.
 
 598 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 instances applied it to defects and mistakes having the same 
 general features, and have sometimes severely strained the doc- 
 trine of liberal construction in order to enforce it. Thus, if 
 instead of alleging the issuable facts the pleader should state the 
 evidence of such facts, or even a portion onlj- thereof, unless 
 the omission was so extensive that no cause of action at all was 
 indicated, or if he should aver conclusions of law, in place of 
 fact, the resulting insutficiency and imperfection would pertain 
 to the form rather than to the substance, and the mode of cor- 
 rection would be by a motion, and not by a demurrer. It is 
 virtually impossible, however, to lay down a dividing-line, so 
 that on the one side shall fall all the errors which are venial, and 
 on the other all those which are fatal. While in most instances 
 the courts have held that a motion is the only means of removing 
 the defect, and therefore that a neglect to make a motion waives 
 all objection without any reference to the stage of the cause, yet 
 in some cases a considerable stress has been laid upon the effect 
 of a verdict in curing the error. ^ And in certain decisions the 
 language of the judges tends to create an unnecessary confusion, 
 and to incorporate an additional element of doubt into the rule, 
 
 Dir , 52 Iowa, 287 ; XlcCormick v. Basal, called for trial) ; Sukforth /;. Lord, 87 Cal. 
 
 46 id. 235 ; Bradley c. I'arkhurst, 20 Kan. 399 ; Bush v. Cella, 52 Ark. 378 ; Sweet v. 
 
 462; Walter v. Fowler, 85 N. Y. 621; Desha Lumber, etc. Co. (Arl:. 1892), 20 
 
 Marie c Garrison, 83 id. 14, 23; Calvo r. S. W. Rep. 514; Newport Light Co. v. 
 
 Davies, 73 id. 211 ; Raster v. Raster, 52 Newport (Ry. 1892), 19 S. W. Kep. 188; 
 
 Ind. 531 ; BrookviUe & C, Turnp. Co. v. Sheeks v. Krwin, 130 lud. 31 ; De Hart i-. 
 
 Pumphrey, 59 id. 78 ; U. S. Expre.ss Co. v. Etuire, 121 Ind. 242 ; Cockerill v. i?tafford, 
 
 Reefer. 59 id. 263; Evansville v. Thayer, 102 Mo. 571. 
 
 59 id. 324; Pennsylvania Co. v. Sedwick, i See Robson v. Comstock, 8 Wis. 372, 
 
 59 id. 336 ; Rees v. Cupp, 59 id. 566 ; Shaw 374, 375 ; Hazleton v. Union Bk. of Colum- 
 
 V. Merchants' Nat. Bk., 60 id. 83 ; Boyce bus, 32 Wis. 34, 42, 43 ; Clay v. Edgerton, 
 
 r. Brady, 61 id. 432; Sebbitt v. Stryker, 19 Ohio St. 549 ; Saulsbury r. Alexander, 
 
 62 id. 41 ; Barrett v. Leonard, 66 id. 422; 50 Mo. 142, 144; Corpenny v. Sedalia, 57 
 
 Wiles V. Lambert, 66 id. 494; Proctor r. Mo. 88; Pomeroy r. Benton, 57 Mo. 531, 
 
 Cole, 66 id. 576; Dale v. Thomas, 67 5.50; Blasdel c' Williams, 9 Nev. 161; 
 
 id. 570; Earle v. Patterson, 67 id. 503; Smith v. Dennett, 15 Minn. 81. In Mis- 
 
 Milroy v. Quinn, 69 id. 406 ; Lee r. Davis, souri, and in a few other States, a motion 
 
 70 id. 464; Smith v. Freeman, 71 id. 229; in arrest of judgment is permitted by the 
 
 Trayser Piano Co. v. Kerschner, 73 id. practice under some circumstances, and 
 
 183; Ohio & Miss. R. Co. v. CoUarn, the above cases, cited from that State, hold 
 
 73 id. 261; Snyder t-. Baber, 74 id. 47; that such a motion is not proper when the 
 
 Gentz V. Martin, 75 id. 228; Drais r. petition is simply defective and imperfect 
 
 Hogan, 50 Cal. 121 ; Jameson v. Ring, 50 in its statement of the cause of action, and 
 
 id. 132; Lo.s Angeles v. Signoret, 50 id. should only be made when it wholly fails 
 
 298; St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Snave- to set forth any cause of action ; the mere 
 
 ley, 47 Kan. 637 (motion generally too imperfection is cured by the verdict, 
 late wlien not made until after the case is
 
 IMPERFECT OR INFORMAL ALLEGATIONS. 
 
 599 
 
 which is not at best, from its very nature, capiible of absolute 
 certainty. In the cases referred to, the courts have declared 
 that if the defendant omits to move to make the pleading more 
 definite and certain, or to deviur, but answers and goes to trial, 
 the objection is waived.^ This form of expression is a plain 
 departure from the rule as given above, and is self-contradictory. 
 The very distinctive feature of the class of defects under consid- 
 eration is, that they do not render a pleading demurrable, but 
 only expose it to amendment by motion. A failure to demur is 
 therefore entirely immaterial ; it does not waive anything, because 
 the demurrer if resorted to would have accomplished nothing. 
 Doubt and obscuritj^ alone as to the true meaning and the exact 
 force of the rule can arise from this careless use of language. ^ 
 
 1 Pomeroyr. Benton, 57 Mo. 531, 550; 
 Blasdel v. Williams, 9 Nev. 161 ; Smith v. 
 Dennett, 15 Minn. 81 ; Johnson r. Robin- 
 son. 20 Minn. 189, 192. 
 
 2 ^Imperfect , Incomplete, and Infor- 
 
 mal Allegations. 
 
 Indefiniteness and uncertainti/ in a pe- 
 tition are properly reached by motion and 
 not by demurrer : McAdam v. Scudder 
 (1894), 127 Mo. 345, 30 S. W. 168; Guth- 
 rie v. Shaffer (1898), 7 Okla. 459, 54 Pac. 
 698 ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Main 
 (1903), — N. C. — , 43 S. E. 930; Allen 
 V. Carolina Cent. Ry.Co. (1897), 120 N. C. 
 548, 27 S. E. 76; Rutherford v. Johnson 
 (1897), 49 S. C. 465,27 S. E. 470; Garrett 
 V. Weinberg (1897), 50 S. C. 310, 27 S. E. 
 770 ; State ex rel. v. Jeter (1901), 59 S. C. 
 483, 38 S. E. 124 ; Lockwood v. Bridge Co. 
 (1901), 60 S. C. 492, 38 S. E. 112; Smith 
 r. Bradstreet (1902), 63 S. C. 525, 41 S. E. 
 763 ; Sheeks v. State (1900), 156 Ind. 508, 
 60 N. E. 142; Coddington v. Canaday 
 (1901), 157 Ind. 243, 61 N. E. 567; Frain 
 V. Burgett (1898), 152 Ind. 55, 50 N. E. 
 873 ; Clow v. Brown (1897), 150 Ind. 185, 
 48 N. E. 1034; Garard i'. Garard (1893), 
 135 Ind. 15, 34 N. E. 442 ; Cleveland, etc. 
 Ry. Co. V. Berry (1898), 152 Ind. 607, 53 
 N. E. 415; Olson ?•. Phoenix Mfg. Co. 
 (1899), 103 Wis. 337, 79 X. W. 409; 
 Johnston v. Northwestern Live Stock Ins. 
 Co. (1896), 94 Wis. 117, 68 N. W. 868; 
 Allen V. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. 
 (1896), 94 Wis. 93, 68 N. W. 873 ; Fitch 
 V. Applegate (1901), 24 Wash. 25, G4 Pac. 
 
 147; Fares v. Gleason (1896), 14 Wash. 
 657, 45 Pac. 314; Stewart v. Bole (1901), 
 61 Neb. 193, 85 N. W. 33; Kyd ;;. Cook 
 (1898), 56 Neb. 71, 76 N. W. '524 ; First 
 Nat. Bank y. Smith (1893), 36 Neb. 199, 
 54 N. W. 254 ; Street Ry. Co. v. Stone 
 (1894), 54 Kan. 83, 37 Pac. 1012 ; Sanford 
 V. Lichtenberger il901), 62 Neb. 501, 87 
 N. W. 305; Murrell I'. Henry (1902), 70 
 Ark. 161, 66 S. W. 647 ; City of Santa 
 Barbara v. Eldred (1895), 108 Cal. 294, 
 41 Pac. 410. 
 
 Where a material fact can be only 
 vaguely inferred from the allegations of a 
 complaint, a motion to make more defi- 
 nite and certain will lie: McFadden v. 
 Stark (1893), 58 Ark. 7, 22 S. W. 884 ; 
 City of Santa Barbara v. Eldred (1895), 
 108 Cal. 294, 41 Pac. 410. 
 
 Demurrer Held Proper in some States. 
 By statute in California, Colorado, Idaho, 
 Montana, Nevada, and Utah, it is made a 
 ground of demurrer that the complaint is 
 ambiguous, unintelligible, and uncertain. 
 See note to §*433. where tlie statutes are 
 given. As to the form of the demurrer, it 
 was held in Jacob Sultan Co. v. Union Co. 
 (1895), 17 Mont. 61, 42 Pac. 109, that a 
 demurrer which merely states in the lan- 
 guage of the statute that the complaint is 
 ambiguous, unintelligible, and uncertain, 
 should be disregarded. It ought to specify 
 wherein the ambiguity, etc. consists. See 
 also Herbst Importing Co. v. Hogan (1895), 
 16 Mont. 384, 41 Pac. 135. 
 
 In California, in Greenebaum i>. Taylor 
 (1894), 102 Cal. 624,36 Pac. 957, it waa
 
 600 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES 
 
 S 444. * 550. Demurrer, or Dismissal of Petition at the Trial, 
 Proper when Allegations are wholly Deficient. It has even been 
 
 held that a demurrer to a comphiint on 
 the ground that it is ambiguous, unintel- 
 ligible, and uncertain, for the reasou that 
 it does not contain a sulfioieiit description 
 of the property sued for; should be over- 
 ruled. The complaint was clearly neither 
 unintelligible nor ambiguous, aud if uu- 
 certain merely the demurrer did uot reach 
 it. But see Field v. Andrada (1895), 106 
 Cal. 107, 39 Pac. 323, where a demur- 
 rer was filed on these three grounds con- 
 junctively, but the only specifications were 
 on the ground of uncertainty, and the 
 court sustained the demurrer as one on 
 the latter ground only. See also Henke 
 V. Eureka Endowment Ass'n (1893), 100 
 Cal. 429, 34 Pac. 1089, where it was said 
 that allegations which constitute matters of 
 inducement cannot render a complaint 
 bad on demurrer on the ground that the 
 complaint is ambiguous, uncertain, or 
 unintelligible. 
 
 In Georgia, where no such statute 
 exists, uncertainty is held to be a ground 
 for special demurrer : McClendon i;. Her- 
 nando Co. (1 896), 100 Ga. 219, 28 S. E. 152 ; 
 East Georgia R. li. Co. v. King (1893), 
 91 Ga. 519, 17 S. E. 939; Mayor w. Came- 
 rgn (1900), 111 Ga. 110, 36 S. E. 462. 
 
 Objections going to Formal Defects in a 
 pleading cannot be raised by demurrer, 
 but must be raised by motion : Grant c. 
 Commercial Nat. Bank (1903), — Neb. —, 
 93 N. W. 185 ; Forbes v. Petty (1893), 37 
 Neb. 899, 56 N. W. 730 ; Cone v. Ivinson 
 (1893). 4 Wyo. 203,33 Pac. 31 ; Living- 
 stoue V. Lovgren (1902), 27 Wash. 102, 67 
 Pac. 599 ; Street Ry. Co. v. Stone (1894), 
 54 Kan. 83, 37 Pac. 1012; Johnson v. 
 Douglass (1894), 60 Ark. 39, 28 S. W. 
 515. But in Connecticut a question of 
 formal defects must be raised by de- 
 murrer : Levy v. Metropolis Mfg. Co. 
 (1900), 73 Couu. 559, 48 Atl. 429. 
 
 Alternative Allegations. It is provided 
 by statute in Kentucky that " a party 
 may allege alternatively the existence of 
 one or another fact, if he states that one 
 of them is true and that he does not know 
 which of them is true." But the general 
 rule is that a jileading in the alternative is 
 subject to attack by motion : Daniels v. 
 
 Fowler (1897), 120 N. C. 14,26 S. E. 635; 
 Pender v. Mallett (1898), 123 N. C. 57, 
 31 S. E. 351. In construing the Kentucky 
 statute, in Brown v. 111. Cent. R. R. Co. 
 (1897), 100 Ky. 525, 38 S. W. 862, the 
 court held that it applies solely to alleging 
 facts in the alternative, uot parties, and 
 does not authorize an allegation that the 
 loss and damage occurred " by reason of 
 the negligence of one or the other of de- 
 fendants, or of both defendants, aud as to 
 which plaintiffs are unable to say as to 
 whether one or the other, or both, but one 
 of these alternatives is true." Such aver- 
 ment is insufficient against either of the 
 defendants. To same effect see Louis- 
 ville, etc R. R. Co. V. Ft. Wayne Elec. Co. 
 (1900), 108 Ky. 113, 55 S. W. 918. Each 
 alternative pleaded should be a complete 
 cause of action : Cumberland Valley 
 Bank's Assignee v. Slusher (1897), 102 
 Ky. 415, 43 S. W. 472; Wehmhoff v. Ru- 
 therford (1895), 98 Ky. 91, 32 S. W. 288. 
 Clerical Error. An obvious clerical 
 error in a pleading will be disregarded : 
 Gibbs V. Southern (1893), 116 Mo. 204, 22 
 S. W. 713. 
 
 Form of Motion. It is not error to over- 
 rule a motion to make a pleading more 
 certain when it does not point out wherein 
 the uncertainty consists : Grimes v. Cul- 
 lison (1895), 3 Okla. 268, 41 Pac. 355; 
 Jacol)S Sultan Co. v. Union Co. (1895), 17 
 Mont. 61,42 Pac. 109 (special demurrer) ; 
 Wortham v. Sinclair (1896), 98 Ga. 173» 
 25 S. E. 414 (special demurrer) ; Brown v. 
 Baker (1901), 39 Ore. 66, 65 Pac. 799. 
 
 Limitation on Use of Motion. Amotion 
 to make a pleading more definite aud 
 certain cannot be used to compel the party 
 to plead his evidence : Bowers v. Schuler 
 (1893), 54 Minn. 99, 55 N. W. 817. A mo- 
 tion to strike will not lie where a plead- 
 ing is indefinite and uncertain, but the 
 remedy is by motion to make more de- 
 finite aud certaiu : Computing Scales Co. 
 V. Long (1903),— S. C. — , 44 S. E. 963. 
 Vouseiiuence of Failure to make Motion. 
 In Spires i'. South liound R. R. Co. 
 (1896), 47 S. C. 28, 24 S. E. 992; the 
 conn .said : " When a complaint is general 
 in its allegations of negligence, aud the
 
 IMPERFECT OR INFORMAL ALLEGATIONS. 
 
 601 
 
 held that where a cause of action is so defectively set out that a 
 
 defendant desires to know upon what 
 particular acts of negligence tiie plaintiff 
 relies to sustain his action, it is the duty 
 of the defendant to make a motion to have 
 the conij)laiut made more definite and 
 certain ; and, when this is not done, the 
 plaintiff has the right to introduce any 
 competent evidence tending to sliow neg- 
 ligence on the part of the defendant." 
 
 Hijpothetical Pleading. It was held in 
 Emison v. Owyhee Ditch Co. (1900), 37 
 Ore. 577, 62 Pac. 13, that hypothetical 
 pleading is bad, but whether the objection 
 should be taken by motion to make more 
 definite and certain (6 Ency. PI. & Pr. 
 269) ; or by motion to strike out (Bliss on 
 Code PI. § 317) was not decided. See 
 also Daniells v. Fowler (1897), 120 N. C. 
 14, 26 S. E. 635, and Pender v. Mallett 
 (1898), 123 N. C. 57,31 S. E. 351. where it 
 is held that motion, not demurrer, is the 
 proper remedy. 
 
 Facts should be alleged positively. The 
 material facts of a cause of action or 
 defence should be alleged unequivocally, 
 and will not be considered sufficient where 
 they are stated as contingent or conjec- 
 tural : Atchi.son, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. 
 Atchison Grain Co. (1902), — Kan. — , 70 
 Pac. 933. 
 
 General Pleading. In Chicago, St. 
 Louis, etc. R. R. Co. v. Wolcott (1894), 141 
 Ind. 267, 39 N. E. 451, the court held that 
 in civil cases it is the rule that where a 
 subject comprehends multiplicity of mat- 
 ter, and a great variety of facts, there, in 
 order to avoid pi'olixity, the law allows 
 general pleading. Quoted from 1 Chitty's 
 Pleading 235, and approved. And it was 
 held in Equitable Ins. Co. v. Stout (1893), 
 135 Ind. 444, 33 N. E. 6-23, that a general 
 allegation is ordinarily sufficient when 
 the matters to be pleaded tend to in- 
 definiteness and multiplicity, but the 
 complaint must show by allegation the 
 extended and complicated character of 
 the books, accounts, etc., or other allega- 
 tions from which the rule may be applied. 
 Although a general averment may be 
 sufficient, if the pleader alleges, in addi- 
 tion thereto, specific facts, the latter will 
 control the general averment : Louis- 
 ville, etc. Ry. Co. v. Kemper (1896), 147 
 Ind. 561, 47 N. E. 214; Fitzpatrick 
 
 V. Simonson Bros. (1902), 86 .Minn. 140, 
 90 N. W. 378; Carlson i-. Presbyterian 
 Board (1897), 67 Minn. 436, 70 N.'w. 3; 
 Gowan v. Bensel (1893), .W Minn. 46, 54 
 N. W. 934 ; Chesapeake, etc. Ry. Co. v. 
 lianmcr (1902), Ky., 66 S. W. 375; Sebree 
 Deposit Bank v. Moreland (1894), 96 Ky. 
 150, 28 S. W. 153. 
 
 Necessity of Motion. In Sidway v. Mis- 
 souri Land, etc. Co. (1901), 163 Mo. 342, 
 63 S. \V. 705, the court said : " In order 
 to raise the question of the indefiniteness 
 of a pleading, however, it is by no means 
 necessary to file a motion to make it more 
 definite and certain ; and this is so for two 
 reasons: " 1st. The duty of requiring the 
 pleadings to be definite and certain de- 
 volves on the court ; 2d. The onus of mak- 
 ing the pleading definite and certain is on 
 the party drawing it. 
 
 Pleading by Way of Recital. It is a 
 well-recognized general rule that material 
 facts, essential to the cause of action, 
 should be alleged directly and not by way 
 of recital. In Berry v. Dole (1902), 87 
 Minn. 471, 92 N. W. 334, it was held that a 
 pleading which offended against this rule 
 was bad on general demurrer. The same 
 doctrine was announced by the Supreme 
 Court of Indiana, in Erwin ?». Cent. Union 
 Tel. Co. (1897), 148 Ind. 365, 46 N. E. 
 667. The rule was very instructively ap- 
 plied, in McElwaine-Richards Co. r. Wall 
 (1902), 159 Ind. 557, 65 N.E. 752, to a com- 
 plaint by a servant for an injury suffered 
 from a fall consequent upon his being 
 sent to work in an insecure and unsafe 
 place. Also in Leadville Water Co. v. 
 Leadville (1896), 22 Colo. 297, 45 Pac. 
 362, it was held that allegations by way 
 of recital are insufficient, and objection 
 thereto may be taken by general demur- 
 rer, for the reason that an allegation by 
 way of recital cannot be denied, and no 
 issue concerning it can ever be raised. 
 The court cites the text, §§ * 549, * 550. 
 For the contrary doctrine see City of 
 Santa Barbara r.'Eldred (1895), 108 CaL 
 294, 41 Pac. 410. 
 
 Pleading on Information and Belief. 
 In Missouri allegations upon information 
 and belief are not deemed proper. In 
 Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Hubert (1899), 
 150 Mo. 620, 51 S. W. 1031, the court
 
 602 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 demarrer for want of sufficient facts would have been sustained, 
 
 said : " \Vhile the first four paragraphs of 
 t.'is j)Ctiiio!i state and aver facts, the form 
 of averine!;t is changed iu the fifth, and 
 the pleader tiieii alleges that he is in- 
 formed and l)elie»-es the facts therein re- 
 cited, and ixs these recited facts are 
 essential to plaintiff's cause of action tlie 
 defect is fatal unless this form of aver- 
 ment is permis3il)le under the code. The 
 statute requires in a petition a plain and 
 coucise statement of the facts constituting 
 the cause of action. A statement of iu- 
 fornia'ion and belief as to facts is not 
 within the meaning of this statute." 
 
 In Iowa, however, iu the case of Robin- 
 son i.'. Ferguson (1903), — la. — , 93 N. W. 
 350, t'aey were held sufficient in the ab- 
 sence of a motion attacking the pleading 
 on tliat ground. In Minnesota the court 
 has gone still further. In State ex rcl. 
 V. Co.. ley (1894), 58 Minn. 514, 60 N. W. 
 33S, after referring to the statute requiring 
 that the verification of pleadings shall be 
 to thft effect that the same are true to the 
 knowledge of the person making them, ex- 
 cept as to those matters stated on informa- 
 tion and belief, and, as to those matters, 
 that he believes them to be true, the court 
 said : " This language is not confined 
 merely to the denials in the answer of the 
 controverted allegations in the complaint, 
 but applies to all pleadings, including 
 matters stated in the complaint on infor- 
 mation and belief. Why else should the 
 party be required or allowed to verify the 
 matters stated in the complaint upon in- 
 formation and belief, unless he is allowed 
 to insert such matters in that form ? 
 Evidently, this section of the statute con- 
 templates that such allegations may be 
 inserted in any of the pleadings ; and we 
 believe that such has been the usual pr.ac- 
 tice in this State ever since its admission 
 into the Union in 1858. It would be a great 
 misfortune for us now to declare that prac- 
 tice invalid, and we refuse so to do." 
 
 The objection that the averments in 
 a complaint are made on information and 
 belief is not a ground for demurrer : Car- 
 penter V. Smith (1894), '20 Colo. 39, 36 
 Pac. 7.39 ; Jones v. Pearl Min. Co. (1894), 
 20 Colo. 417, 38 Pac. 700. 
 
 Pifdicating Error as to Formal Defects. 
 Tipton Light, etc. Co. v. Newcomer 
 
 (1900), 156 Ind. 348, 58 N. E. 842: It is 
 the right of a defendant to have the plain- 
 tiff state sjjecifically the facts constituting 
 alleged negligence, and where the motion 
 to make more specific is well taken the 
 court has no discretion. Failure to su.s- 
 tain such a motion when properly made is 
 reversible error. 
 
 But see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. 
 Oy.ster (1899), 58 Neb. 1. 78 N. W. 359 : 
 " One cannot predicate error on the re- 
 fusal to recjuire the pleading of the op- 
 posite party to be made more tiefinite and 
 certain where prejudice has not resulted 
 from the ruling." The same rule seems 
 to obtain in Wisconsin. See Adamson i-. 
 Raymer (1896), 94 Wis. 243, 68 N. W. 
 1000, where it was held that an order 
 directing a pleading to be made more de- 
 finite and certain is discretionary, and is 
 not api)ealable unless there has been an 
 abuse of discretion. To the same effect 
 is Crowley v. Hicks (1898), 98 Wis. 566, 
 74 N. W. 348. And in Washington, in 
 Green v. Tidball (1901), 26 Wash. 338, 67 
 Pac. 84, it was held that in order to cause 
 a reversal there must be not only techni- 
 cal defects in the pleading but also some 
 substantial injury resulting therefrom to 
 the complaining party. Sec also St. Louis 
 & S. F. Ry. Co. V. French (1896), 56 Kan. 
 584, 44 Pac. 12. 
 
 Pleading over after a motion is over- 
 ruled, is a waiver of the right to have the 
 ruling reviewed : Rinard v. Omaha, etc. 
 Ry. Co. (ISOl), 164 Mo. 270, 64 S. W. 
 124; State ex rel. v. Merchants' Bank 
 (1901), 160 Mo. 640, 61 S. W. 676 ; San- 
 guinett V. Webster (1900), 153 Mo. 343, 
 54 S. W. 563 ; Kelly v. Town of West 
 Bend (1897), 101 la. 669, 70 N. W. 726; 
 Wattels I'. Minchen (1895), 93 la. 517, 61 
 N. W. 915; ManwcU ?•. Hurlington, etc. 
 Ry. Co. (1894), 89 la. 708, 57 N. W. 441 ; 
 Banker's Reserve Life A.ss'n v. Finn 
 (1002), 64 Neb. 105, 89 N. W. 672. 
 
 Standi nq on Plead iiuj after Motion Sus- 
 tained. McAdam v. Scuddcr (1894), 127 
 Mo. 3i5, 30 S. W. 168 : Where the court, 
 on motion of defendant, rc'iuires the peti- 
 tion to be made more definite and certain, 
 and plaintiff elects to stand on the jieti- 
 tion, the cause may properly be dismi.s.sed 
 by the court. Same rule stated in Sidway
 
 IMPERFECT OR INFORMAL ALLEGATIONS. 
 
 603 
 
 but the adverse party answers instead, and goes to trial, tlie 
 objection to the pleading is thereby waived, and evidence in its 
 
 V. Missouri Land, etc. Co. (1901), 163 Mo. 
 342, 63 S. W. 705. 
 
 Test of Dejiniteness. In American Book 
 Co. V. Kini^clom Publishing Co. (1898), 
 71 Minn. 363, 73 N. W. 1089, the court 
 said : " If the court can see the meaning 
 of the different allegations, and the cause 
 of action or the defence intended to be set 
 forth by them, the pleading is not indefi- 
 nite." See also City of Logausport v. 
 Kihm (1902), 159 Ind. 68, 64 N. E. 595, 
 where a complaint is instructively ana- 
 lyzed and shown not to set forth the facts 
 constituting tlie cause of action in such a 
 manner as to enable a person of common 
 understanding to know what was intended. 
 
 Waiver of Formal Defects. Larsen v. 
 Utah Loan & Trust Co. "(1901 ), 23 Utah, 
 944, 65 Pac. 208 : Where allegations of 
 fraud are general and no objection is made 
 thereto in the trial court, the defect is 
 waived. Bennett v. Minott (1896), 28 
 Ore. 339, 44 Pac. 283: The objection of 
 uncertainty in a complaint comes too late 
 after judgment. Holman ;;. De Lin (1 897), 
 30 Ore. 428, 47 Pac. 708: A motion to 
 strike out parts of an answer is waived by 
 the subsequent filing, hearing, and deter- 
 mining of a demurrer thereto. Graves v. 
 Barrett (1900), 126 N. C. 267, 35 S. E. 
 539 : A defective statement of a good 
 cause of action is waived when it is ap- 
 parent from tlie answer that the defendants 
 were fully apprised of the subject-matter 
 of the suit. See also Mizzell v. Ruffin 
 (1896), 118 N. C. 69. 23 S. E. 927. Ash- 
 ton V. Stoy (1895), 96 la. 197, 64 N. W. 
 804 : Overruling a motion for more specific 
 statement is not waived where no subse- 
 quent pleading is filed. Zion Church v. 
 Parker (1901), 114 la. 1, 86 N. W. 60: A 
 defect appearing on the face of the plead- 
 ings is waived if no objection is taken in 
 the lower court. 
 
 Warthen v. Himstreet (1900), 112 la. 
 605, 84 N. W. 702 : The court said : " We 
 have held that a defendant may be con- 
 cluded by a default when the facts stated in 
 the petition do not state a good cause of ac- 
 tion at law, or when the petition is so defec- 
 tive as to be vulnerable to a demurrer. 
 Fred Miller Brewing Co. v. Capital Ins. 
 
 Co., Ill la. 590, and ca.ses cited. Doubt- 
 less, if no cause of action is stated, a de- 
 fault has no such effect. Bosch v. Kassiug, 
 64 la. 312. But Himstreet did state a cause 
 of action. The defect in his petition was 
 in matter of form only, and this the de- 
 fendants could waive, and by tlicir non- 
 appearance did waive." Fenuer v. Crips 
 (1899), 109 la. 455, 80 N. W. 526: 
 Where defendant asks an instruction 
 based on a fact not averred with sufficient 
 di.stinctness in plaintiff's petition, he 
 thereby waives the defect. Van Etten 
 I'. Medland (1898), 53 Neb. 569, 74 N. W. 
 33 : "The filing of a demurrer to a peti- 
 tion is a waiver of the right to insist that 
 the allegations of the pleading shall be 
 made more definite and certain." Man- 
 gum V. Bullion, etc. Co. (1897), 15 Utah, 
 534, 58 Pao. 834 : Failure to allege^ specific 
 facts constituting causes of action or spe- 
 cial defences is waived by failure to de- 
 mur or object to evidence, hence cannot 
 be taken advantage of after judgment. 
 Same rule adiiered to in Maynard r. 
 Locomotive, etc. Ass'n (1897), 16 Utah, 
 145, 51 Pac. 259. 
 
 Young V. Severy (1897), 5 Okla. 630, 
 49 Pac. 1024 : An allegation, though in- 
 definite and uncertain and otherwise de- 
 fective, of a material matter, is sufiicient 
 when first questioned by an objection to 
 the introduction of any testimony there- 
 under. So, in Frobisher v. Fifth Ave. 
 Transp. Co. (1897), 151 N. Y. 431, 45 
 N. E. 839, it was held that an objection 
 to the introduction of any evidence be- 
 cause the allegations of the complaint 
 were too general, was not availalile on 
 appeal, when the defendant failed to uKJve 
 to make more specific. Whitlock v. Uhle 
 (1903), 75 Conn. 423, .53 Atl. 891 : Where 
 a complaint asserts necessary facts in an 
 insufficient manner, the defect cannot be 
 taken advantage of, in the absence of de- 
 murrer, after trial and judgment on the 
 merits. 
 
 City of South Bend v. Turner (1900), 
 156 Ind. 418, 60 N. E. 271 : Mere uncer- 
 tainty or inadequacy of averment will be 
 deemed waived by proceeding to trial 
 without objection. Courts do not look
 
 604 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 support must be admitted.^ Other cases are directly opposed 
 to this position, and expressly declare that if the complaint or 
 petition fails to state any cause of action the objection is not 
 waived, and all evidence should be excluded at the trial, even 
 though the defendant has answered; and this ruling is in exact 
 conformity with the provisions of all the codes regulating the 
 use of demurrers. 2 The doctrine first stated is clearly erroneous, 
 and the dicta or decisions which sustain it ought to be wholly 
 disregarded; it violates the section of the codes which enacts 
 that the absence of sufficient facts as a ground of demurrer is not 
 abandoned by an omission to demur; and it utterly ignores the 
 established distinction between a failure to state any cause of 
 action and tlie statement of a cause of action in an imperfect and 
 defective manner. It is only when the answer itself by some of 
 its averments supplies the omission in a complaint or petition 
 otherwise demurrable, that the fault is cured and the objection 
 waived by answering; mere answering instead of demurring 
 
 with favor on the practice of attack- 
 ing pleadings at the trial : Ilaseltiue 
 V. Smith (1900), 154 Mo. 404, 55 S. W. 
 633 
 
 By filing an answer defendant waives 
 all objections of form in the petition : 
 Gelatt V. Ridge (1893), 117 Mo. 553, 23 
 S. W. 882; McCall v. Porter (1903), 42 
 Ore. 49, 71 Pac. 926; Hughes v. McCol- 
 lough (1901), 39 Ore. 372, 65 Pac. 85; 
 Lovejoy v. Isbell (1900), 73 Conn. 368. 47 
 Atl. 682 ; Welsh v. Burr (1898), 56 Neb. 
 361, 76 N. W. 905 (reply). But defendant 
 may, in his answer, expressly reserve the 
 right to insist on a motion to make more 
 definite and certain when duly noticed : 
 Whaley v. Lawton (1898), 53 S. C. 580, 31 
 S. E. 660. 
 
 Cases where Pleadings have been held 
 Uncertain. Dodds v. McCormick Har- 
 vesting Mach. Co. (1901), 62 Neb. 759, 
 87 N. W. 911 : a petition declaring on a 
 promissory note; Kyd v. Cook (1898), 56 
 Neb. 71, 76 N. W. 524 : a petition in an 
 action for wrongful attachment; Olson v. 
 Pluiiuix Mfg. Co. (1899), 103 Wis. 337, 
 79 N. W. 409 : a complaint against three 
 contractors for negligence ; Buist c. Mel- 
 chers (1894), 44 S. C. 46, 21 S. E. 449: a 
 complaint against several successive boards 
 of directors of a corporation for omission 
 
 of duty; Koboliska v. Swehla (1898), 107 
 la. 124, 77 N. W. 576 : petition in action 
 for money paid at request of defendant; 
 Hall V. Law Guarantee, etc. Co. (1900), 22 
 Wash. 305, 60 Pac. 643: complaint in 
 replevin ; Union Nat. Bank v. Cross ( 1 898), 
 100 Wis. 174, 75 N. W. 992: answer in 
 action on promissory note; Koepke v. 
 Milwaukee (1901), 112 Wis. 475, 88 X. W. 
 238 : complaint against city for negligent 
 injury; McFadden v. Stark (1893), 58 Ark. 
 7, 22 S. W. 884 : complaint in action to en- 
 force a mechanic's lien ; Maine ;•. Chicago, 
 etc. H. R. Co. (1899), 109 la. 260, 80 N. W. 
 315: petition in action for negligent in- 
 juries ; Atchison, etc. Ky. Co. v. Potter 
 (1899), 60 Kan. 808, 58 Pac. 471 : petition 
 inaction for personal injuries; Hastings 
 r. Anacortes Packing Co. (1902), 29 
 Wa.sh. 224, 69 Pac. 776: complaint in an 
 action for possession of a fishing -site ; 
 Dishueau v. Newton (1895), 91 Wis. 199, 
 64 N. W. 879: complaint against sure- 
 ties on sheriff's bond (held sufficiently 
 specific).] 
 
 1 Tread way v. Wilder, 8 Nov. 91. 
 
 - Garner r. McCullougli, 48 Mo. 318; 
 Scofield V. Whitelegge, 49 N. Y. 259, 261, 
 262; Saulsbury v. Alexander, 50 Mo. 142,, 
 144.
 
 IMrEKFECT OR INFORMAL ALLEGATIONS. 
 
 605 
 
 cannot produce tliat effect.^ If the averments are so defective, if 
 the omission of material facts is so great, that, even under the 
 rule of a liberal construction, no cause of action is stated, it is 
 not a mere case of insufficiency, but one of complete failure; and 
 the complaint or petition should be dismissed at the trial, or a 
 judgment rendered upon it should be reversed. A few examples 
 are placed in the foot-note. 
 
 While the general doctrine before 
 
 1 Scofield V. Whitelegge, 49 N. Y. 259, 
 261, 262 ; Bate v. Graham, 11 N. Y. 237 ; 
 Louisville & P. Canal Co. v. Murpliy, 9 
 Bush, 522, 529. 
 
 ^ Autisdel v. Chicago & N. W. Ey. Co., 
 26 Wis. 145, 147 ; Toinlinsou v. Mouroe, 
 41 Cal. 94 (an ambiguous and unintelli- 
 gible complaint); Holmes v. Williams, 16 
 Minn. 164, 168. The case described in 
 the text is that of a cause of action, good 
 if properly pleaded, which the plaintiff 
 intended and attempted to set out, but 
 which he failed to set out by reason of 
 omissions and defects in the material alle- 
 gations ; and it is to be distinguished 
 from a cause of action entirely bad in 
 law, no matter how complete and perfect 
 may be tlie averments by which it is 
 •stated. In the first case a pure question 
 of pleading is involved, and the complaint 
 or petition is demurrable because the 
 rules of pleading have been essentially vio- 
 lated ; in the second case a pure question 
 of law is involved, and the complaint or 
 petition is demurrable, although the rules 
 of pleading have been in every respect 
 complied with. 
 
 [Wholly Deficient Pleadhigs. 
 
 Waiver of Defects of Substance. 
 The objection that a pleading does not 
 state facts constituting a cause of action 
 or defence is never waived, but may be 
 raised at anv stage of the proceedings : 
 O'Toole ('. Faulkner (1902), 29 Wash. 544, 
 70 Pac. 58 ; Jones v. St. Paul, etc. Ry. Co. 
 <1896), 16 Wash. 25, 47 Pac. 226; Hoff- 
 man V. McCracken (1902), 168 Mo. 337, 
 €7 8. W. 878; Lilly v. Menke (1894), 126 
 Mo. 190, 28 S. W. 643; McPeak v. Mo. 
 Pac. Ry. Co. (1895), 128 Mo. 617, 30 
 S. W. 170; State ex rel. r. Thompson 
 (1899), 149 Mo. 441, 51 S. W. 98; Epper- 
 .son V. Postal Tel. Co. (1900), 155 Mo. 346, 
 50 S. W. 79.5.; Wells v. Mutual Benefit 
 Ass'n (1894), 126 Mo. 6.30, 29 S. W. 607, 
 
 holding that even a stipulation by the par- 
 ties as to tlie issues in a case does not waive 
 the question of the sufficiency of a petition ; 
 State ex rel. v. Moores (1899), 58 Neb. 
 285, 78 N. W. 529; Lateuser v. Misner 
 (1898), 56 Neb. 340, 76 N. W. 897 ; Tracy 
 V. Grezaud (1903), — Neb. — , 93 N. W. 
 214; Hudelson v. first Nat. Bank (1897), 
 51 Neb. 557, 71 N. W. 304; Sage v. City 
 of Plattsmouth (1896), 48 Neb. 553, 67 
 N. W. 455; Kemper v. Renshaw (1899), 
 58 Neb. 513, 78 N. W. 1071 ; Dufrene v. 
 Ander.son (1903), — Neb.— , 93 N. W. 139; 
 City of South Bend v. Turner (1900), 156 
 Ind. 418, 60 N. E. 271 ; Galvin i: Britton 
 (1898), 151 Ind. 1, 49 N. E. 10G4; Insur- 
 ance Co. V. Bonner (1897), 24 Colo. 220, 
 49 Pac. 366 ; School District v. Flanigan 
 (1901), 28 Colo. 431, 65 Pac. 24; Mizzell 
 V. Ruffin (1896), 118 N. C. 69, 23 S. E. 
 927 ; City of Guthrie v. Nix (1895), 3 Okla. 
 136, 41 Pac. 343 ; De Loach Mill Co. v. 
 Bonner (1897), 64 Ark. 510, 43 S. W. 504 ; 
 Warner v. Hess (1899), 66 Ark. 113, 49 
 S. W. 489; Buckman v. Hatch (1903), 139 
 Cal. 53, 72 Pac. 445 ; Moore v. Halliday 
 (1903), 43 Ore. 243, 72 Pac. ROl. 
 
 But see Queen (,'ity Printing Co. v. 
 McAden (1902), 131 N. C. 178, 42 S. E. 
 575, and O'Donohoe v. Polk (1895), 45 
 Neb. 510, 63 N. W. 829, where it was held 
 that the want of a material allegation is 
 waived by failure to demur. See also 
 Cook V. Am. Ex. Bank (1901), 129 N. C. 
 149, 39 S. E. 746; Duerst v. St. Louis 
 Stamping Co. (1901), 163 Mo. 607, 63 
 S. W. 827. 
 
 Pleading over after demurrer for want 
 of facts has been overruled is not a waiver 
 of the objection : Epperson v. Postal Tel. 
 Co. (1900), 155 Mo. 346, 50 S. W. 795; 
 Hoffman v. McCracken (1902), 168 Mo. 
 337, 67 S. W. 878 ; Jones v. St. Paul, etc. 
 Ry. Co. (1896), 16 Wash. 25, 47 Pac. 226 
 (but see Hardin r. Mullin (1897), 16 Wash. 
 647, 48 Pac. 349, wliere it is held that an
 
 606 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 stated, as to the nature of insufficient and defective averments, 
 has been universally approved in the abstract, it has sometimes 
 
 affirmative waiver of the demurrer waives 
 the ubjcctiou) ; Cox v. Yeazel (1896), 49 
 >'cl.. .'U'?, 68 N. W. 483 ; Hopewell v. Mc- 
 Grew (1897), 50 Neb. 789, 70 X. W. 397 
 (but see Palmer r. Caywood (1902), 64 
 Neb. 372, 89 N. W. 1034, apparently con- 
 tra); Henderson v. Turngren (1894), 9 
 Utah, 432, 35 Pac. 495 ; Seckinger v. 
 Philibert Co. (1895), 129 Mo. 590, 31 
 S. W. 957 ; Thompson v. Brazile (1898), 
 
 65 Ark. 495, 47 S. \V. 299. 
 
 An objection to the sufficiency of a 
 pleading made for the fir.«t time in the 
 Supreme Court is not favored, and the 
 jdeadiug will be liberally construed : 
 Brothers v. Brothers (1901), 29 Colo. 69, 
 
 66 Pac. 901 ; Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. r. 
 Four Mile Ry. Co. (1901), 29 Colo. 90, 6G 
 Pac. 902; Sciiool District v. Fianigan 
 (1901), 28 Colo. 431, 65 Pac. 24; Insur- 
 ance Co. V. Bonner (1897), 24 Colo. 220, 
 49 Pac. 366; Latenser v. Misner (1898), 
 56 Neb. 340, 76 N. W. 897. 
 
 In South Carolina the court has held 
 that tlie statute which provides that the 
 objection that facts are not stated sufficient 
 to constitute a cau.se of action is not waived 
 by failure to demur, applies only to the 
 Circuit Court and not to the Supreme 
 Court. Hence the objection cannot be 
 raised for the first time in the Supreme 
 Court, but is waived if not rai.se<l below : 
 Green r. Green (1897), 50 S. C. 514, 27 
 S. E. 952 ; Garrett v. Weinberg (1897), 50 
 S. C. 310, 27 S. E. 770; Hillhouse v. Jen- 
 nings (1901), 60 S. C. 373, 38 S. E. 599. 
 
 In Iowa it is lield, in a long line of 
 decisions, that tlie question whether a 
 pleading states a cause of action is waived 
 unless it is raised by demurrer or motion 
 in arrest of judgment : Alexander v. Grand 
 Lodge (1903), — la. — , 93 N. \V. 508; 
 Enix V. Iowa Cent. R. R. Co. (1901), 114 
 la. 508, 87 N. W. 417 ; Osborne r. Metcalf 
 (1900), 1 12 la. 540, 84 N. W. 685 ; Dubuque 
 Lumber Co. v. Kimball (1900), 111 la. 48, 
 82 N. \V. 458 ; Pier.son v. School District 
 (1898), 106 la. 695, 77 N. W. 494; Haden 
 V. Sioux City, etc. R. R. Co. (1896), 99 la. 
 735, 68 N. \V. 733 ; Zundeiowitz v. Web- 
 ster (1896), 96 la. 587, 65 N. W. 835; 
 Fulmer v. Mahaska County (1894), 92 la. 
 20, 60 N. W. 207 ; McCorkcU v. Karhoff 
 
 (1S94), 90 la. .545, 58 N. W. 913 ; Manwell 
 V. Burlington, etc. R. R. Co. (1894), 89 la. 
 708, 57 N. W. 441. 
 
 lu Washington it was lield in State ex 
 ri'l. V. Indemnity Ass'n (1898), 18 Wash. 
 514, 52 Pac. 234, tliat a motion for a non- 
 suit on the grouud that the complaint 
 failed to state a cause of action w:is prop- 
 erly- denied, where tliere was no denmrrer 
 and the defect had been cured by the ad- 
 mission of proof without objection. And 
 in Mosher v. Bruhu (1896), 15 Wash. 332, 
 46 Pac. 397, it was held tliat where the 
 objection tliat a complaint did not state a 
 cause of action was raised by demurrer, 
 and then abandoned, it cannot be subse- 
 quently raised. To the same effect is 
 Hardin r. Mullin (1897), 16 Wash. 647,48 
 Pac. 349. 
 
 Wisconsin, also, seems to hold that a 
 failure to seasonably object to a fatally 
 defective complaint is a waiver of the de- 
 fect. See Bigelow v. Town of Washburn 
 (1898), 98 Wis. 553, 74 N. W. 362 ; Wells 
 V. Western Paving & Supply Co. (1897), 
 96 Wis. 116, 70 N. W. 1071. 
 
 Form of Objection. 
 
 An objection to the introduction of any 
 evidence, on the ground that the complaint 
 does not state a cause of action, need not 
 specify wherein the complaint is insuffi- 
 cient : Wylly V. Grigsby (1899), 1 1 S. D. 
 491, 78 N. W. 957. But a motion to direct 
 a verdict for defendant because the evi- 
 dence is not sufficient to show a cause of 
 action, without stating the si)ecific defects 
 in the evidence, is not sufficient : Howie 
 V. Bratrud (1901), 14 S. 1). G48, 86 N. W. 
 747. 
 
 An objection to the introduction of evi- 
 dence upon the grounil that the complaint 
 does not state facts sufficient to constitute 
 a cause of action, is insufficient when it 
 does not point out the particular defect 
 relied upon: Chilson v. Bank (1899), 9 
 N. I). 96, 84 N. W. 354. So in James 
 River Bank ;•. Purchase (1900), 9 N. D. 
 280. 83 N. W. 7. But in Vidger v. Nolin 
 (1901 ), ION. D. 353, 87 N. W. 593, such an 
 objection directed against an answer as a 
 counterclaim or defence was held sufficient. 
 
 It wiis held in Galvin i-. Britton (1898),
 
 IMPERFECT OR INFORMAL ALLEGATIONS. 
 
 607 
 
 been departed from, and pleadings have been wholly condemned, 
 which, according to the criterion established by numerous cases, 
 
 151 IiuL 1, 49 N. E. 1064, that where the 
 sufficiency of a complaint is attacked for 
 the first time on iippeal, it must be on the 
 grountl that it does not state facts suffi- 
 cient to constitute a cause of action, and 
 an attack on the ground that it tloes not 
 state facts sufficient to entitle plaintiff to 
 the relief prayed will not be considered. 
 
 Methods of Raising Question. 
 
 The failure of a complaint to state a 
 cause of action may l)e availed of by de- 
 murrer, by objection to evidence, by mo- 
 tion for judgment on tlie pleadings, by 
 motion in arrest of judgment, or on mo- 
 tion for a new trial : Consolidated Canal 
 Co. V. Peters (1896), Ariz., 46 I'ac. 74. 
 After failure to demur, the method of 
 raising the question of the sufficiency of 
 the pleading to state a cause of action or 
 defence, which is not waived, is by motion, 
 either for judgment on the pleadings or 
 for new trial : James River Bank v. Pur- 
 chase (1900), 9 N. D. 280, 83 N. W. 7. 
 
 Held in the following cases that a judg- 
 ment on the pleadings was properly given 
 where they are fatally defective : Finley 
 V. City of Tucson (1900), Ariz., 60 Pac. 
 872; Goldwater v. Bowen, (1900), Ariz., 
 62 Pac. 691 ; Hutchison v. Myers (1893), 
 .52 Kan. 290, 34 Pac. 742. Nothing out- 
 side the pleadings can be cousidered in 
 passing on such a motion : McCoy t\ 
 Jones (1899), 61 0. St. 119, 55 N. E. 219. 
 A judgment on tlie pleadings is the equiva- 
 lent of the common-law judgment non 
 obstante veiedicto : Crew v. Hutcheson 
 (1902), 115 Ga. 511, 42 S. E. 16. 
 
 In Boyer v. Commercial Building Co. 
 (1900), 110 la. 491,81 N. W. 720, the court 
 said : " When the case came on for trial, 
 defendant objected to the introduction of 
 any evidence, because no cause of action 
 Avas stated in the petition. This objection 
 was entered of record and overruled. 
 The first assignment of error is based 
 upon this action of the court. This sort 
 of oral demurrer has no place in our prac- 
 tice, and we think the trial court was 
 fully justified in so disposing of it." To 
 snme effect, see Van Sickle v. Keith 
 (1893), 88 la. 9, 55 N. W. 42. Held, 
 
 in Sackman r. Sackman (1898), 143 Mo. 
 576, 45 S. \V. 264, that such an objection 
 would bo sustained only where the plead- 
 ing was so defective that a motion in 
 arrest would lie. 
 
 The legal sufficiency of facts alleged in 
 a complaint must be tested either by de- 
 murrer before trial or by motion in arrest 
 of judgment after verdict, but cannot be 
 tested by a motion for nonsuit during the 
 trial: Cook v. Morris (1895), 66 Conn. 
 196, 33 AtL 994. 
 
 In Georgia, it was held, in Fleming v. 
 Roberts (1901), 114 (}a. 634, 40 S. E. 792, 
 that tlie question of the sufficiency of a 
 petition cannot be raised by ol)jection to 
 evidence. " If a petition is not good in 
 substance, tliat is, taking every allegation 
 to be true, it fails to set forth a cause of 
 action, objection must be made either by a 
 general demurrer, or motion to dismiss the 
 case before verdict, or by a motion in arre.st 
 of judgment, or a motion to set aside the 
 judgment after verdict. We know of no 
 other way in which the legal sufficiency 
 of a petition can be properly brought 
 before the court." But this case was 
 overruled in Kelly v. Strouse (1903), 116 
 Ga. 872, 43 S. E. 280. The rule in Crew 
 V. Hutcheson (1902), 115 Ga. 511, 42 S. E. 
 16, in which it was held that it was not 
 error to refuse to allow a defendant to sus- 
 tain by evidence the allegations of a plea 
 which set forth no defence, was extended 
 to cover tlie petition as well as the plea. 
 
 It is not the office of a motion to cure 
 fatal defects. Such objections should be 
 made by demurrer : Chicago, R. I. & Pac. 
 Ry. Co. V. Shepherd (1894), 39 Neb. 523, 
 58 N. W. 189 ; Holgate v. Downer (1899), 
 8 Wyo. 334, 57 Pac. 918. 
 
 In California it is held that pleading 
 evidence is a fatal defect, and hence the 
 objection may be raised by a general de- 
 murrer for want of facts : McCaughey v. 
 Schuette (1897), 117 Cal. 223, 46 Pac. 
 666, 48 Pac. 1088. 
 
 Question Raised hy Court on its own 
 Motion. In Thomas v. Franklin (1894), 42 
 Neb. 310, 60 N. W. 568, the court said: 
 " This court in an action at law or equity 
 will, on its own motion, look into the
 
 60S 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 set forth a cause of action, although in an incomplete and imper- 
 fect manner. Some illustrations of this strict method of decision 
 are given in the note.^ 
 
 record of a case brought on appeal or 
 error, for the purpose of detenniuiug 
 whether tlie petition upou which the ac- 
 tion is founded states a cause of action, 
 and whether the court has jurisdiction of 
 the subject-matter of the action." 
 
 Predicating Error on Ruling on Demurrer. 
 
 A defendant who pleads over after 
 a demurrer is sustained to his answer, 
 waives the right to have such ruling con- 
 sidered on appeal : Frick i\ Kabaker 
 (1902). 1 16 la. 494, 90 N. W. 49S ; Nystuen 
 V. Hanson (1902),— la. —,91 N. W. 1071. 
 A statute in Iowa (Acts 25th Gen. Assem., 
 ch. 96) reads as follows: '"When a de- 
 murrer shall be overruled, and the party 
 demurring shall answer or reply, the rul- 
 ing on the demurrer shall not be consid- 
 ered an adjudication of any question 
 raised by the demurrer ; and in such case 
 the sufficiency of the pleading thus at- 
 tacked shall be determined as if no de- 
 murrer had been filed." Construing this 
 statute, the court, in Frum v Keeney 
 (1899), 109 la. 393, 80 N. W. 507, said': 
 " It was not designed to permit a review 
 of the ruliug on a demurrer wiiich had 
 been overruled, where the party demur- 
 ring had afterwards filed an answer or 
 reply, but to provide that the ruling 
 should not have tlie effect of an adjudi- 
 cation, and to permit the party demurring 
 unsuccessfully to cjuestion the sufficiency 
 of the pleading in other ways during tlie 
 progress of the trial, as by a motion to 
 direct the verdict ur in arrest of judgment. 
 In other words, in such a case the party 
 waived his right to complain of tlie over- 
 ruling of the demurrer by pleading over, 
 but did not waive his right to attack the 
 pleading on the grounds upon which his 
 demurrer was founded at any subsequent 
 time in the progress of the case ; for the 
 statute expressly ])rovi(ied that where a 
 demurrer was overruled tiie sufficiency of 
 the pleading was to ' be determined as if 
 no demurrer had been filed.' " See the 
 following cases in whicli this statute lias 
 been discussed; Adams v. Holden (1900), 
 111 la. 54, 82 X. W. 408; Buchanan v. 
 
 Blackhawk Coal Works (1903), — la. — , 
 9;5 N. \V. 51 ; Krause r. Lloyd (1897), 100 
 la. 660, 69 N. W. 1002; Long ?'. Mellet 
 (1895), 94 la. 548, 63 N. W. 190. See 
 also VVyland v. (iriffitli (1895), 96 la. 24, 
 64 N. W. 673; Cook v. Doty (1894), 91 
 la. 721, 59 N. \V. 35. 
 
 By answering after his demurrer to tiie 
 complaint is overruled a defendant waives 
 an exception to tlie decision on the de- 
 murrer: Cook V. Kittson (1897), 68 Minn. 
 474, 71 N. W. 670; Thompson i-. Ellcnz 
 (1894), 58 Minn. 301, 59 N. W. 1023. 
 
 Filing an amended pleading after a 
 demurrer thereto has been sustained, is a 
 waiver of error in sustaining the demur- 
 rer: Heman v. Glaun (1895), 129 Mo. 
 325, 31 S. W. 589; G.anceart v. Henry 
 (1893), 98 Cal. 281, 33 Pac. 92; Berry v. 
 Barton (1902), 12 Okla.221, 71 Pac. 1074. 
 
 Pleadings Construed on General Demur- 
 rer : Jarrell v. Railroad Co. (1900), 58 
 S. C. 491, 36 S. E. 910 (negligence); 
 Morrison v. City of Eau Claire (1902), 
 115 Wis. 538, 92 N. W. 280 (negligence) ; 
 Andrews u. School District (1896), 49 Neb. 
 420, 68 X. W. 631 (action by a firm in 
 partnership name) ; Aurora Water Co. v. 
 Aurora (1895), 129 Mo. 540, 31 S. W. 946 
 (action against city to recover hydrant 
 rentals); Duryee r. Friars (1897), 18 
 Wash. 55, 50 Pac. 583 (action to enjoin 
 city from issuing bonds) ; De Baker i\ 
 Southern Cal. Ry. Co. (1895), 106 Cal. 
 257,39 Pac. 610.] 
 
 1 Scofield V. Whitelegge, 49 N. Y. 259, 
 261 ; Hathaway v. Quinby, 1 N. Y. S. C. 
 386; Doyle v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 44 Cal. 
 264, 208; Holmes v. Williams, 10 Minn. 
 104,108. Scofield c. Whitelegge was an 
 action to recover possession of a chattel. 
 The complaint alleged that the defendant 
 had become possessed of ami wrongfully 
 detained from the plaintiff a piano of tlio 
 value of, etc., and demanded the usual 
 judgment. The answer denied the pos- 
 se.s.'non of any property belonging to the 
 plaintiff, denied tlic wrongful taking, and 
 denied the plaintiff's ownership. Tlie 
 com])laint was dismissed at the trial, on 
 the ground that it stated no cause of ac-
 
 KEDU.XDANT OR IRRELEVANT ALLEGATIONS. 
 
 60 :) 
 
 § 445. *551. II. Redundant, Immaterial, and Irrelevant Allega- 
 tions, and the Mode of Objecting to and Correcting them. Dis- 
 tinctions. In a lewal action all matter stated in addition to the 
 
 tiou. The opinion of the New York 
 Court of Appeals, by Folger J., after re- 
 citing; the common-law rule in replevin, 
 that the action could only be maintained 
 by one who had the general or a special 
 pro])erty in the chattel, that this property 
 must have been averred in the declara- 
 tion, that the action under the code takes 
 exactly the place of the old replevin, and 
 that the plaintiff in it must have a prop- 
 erty in the chattel, proceeds as follows 
 (p. 261): "Nor is it less nece.ssary now 
 than then for- the plaintiff to aver the facts 
 which constitute his cause of action. He 
 must allege the facts, and not the evi- 
 dence ; he must allege facts, and not con- 
 clusions of law. The plaintiff here alleges 
 that the defendant wrong/ally detains from 
 liiiii tlie chattel. If, indeed, this be true, 
 then it must be that the plaintiff has a 
 general or special property in the chattel 
 and the right of immediate possession. 
 But uidess he has that general or special 
 property and right of immediate posses- 
 sion, it cannot be true that it is wrongfully 
 detained from him. The last — the wrong- 
 ful detention — grows from the first, — 
 the property and right of possession. The 
 last is the conclusion. The first is the 
 fact upon which that conclusion is based ; 
 it is the fact which, in a pleading, must 
 be alleged. Is not the statement of a 
 conclusion of law, without a fact averred 
 to support it, an immaterial statement 1 " 
 This decision is certainly technical to the 
 last degree when tested by the standard 
 established in the codes and in other 
 cases. The complaint was undoubtedly 
 imperfect ; but it set forth a cause of ac- 
 tion, although in an incomplete manner. 
 The learned judge concedes that the aver- 
 ment " the defendant wrongfully detains 
 from the plaintiff " necessarily presupposes 
 and implies a property and right of pos- 
 session in the plaintiff. The only defect, 
 therefore, consisted in an allegation of 
 the evidence, or perhaps of the legal con- 
 clusion, instead of the issuable fact. The 
 defendant was not misled ; his answer 
 shows that he understood the claim, and 
 it raised all the issues upon which he re- 
 
 lieil. The complaint is, indeed, a striking 
 illustration of a defective pleading, which 
 shohld be corrected by motion, and not 
 attacked by demurrer; and the opin- 
 ion is a clear and convincing argument 
 showing why such a motion ought to be 
 granted ; but it violates the liberal ])rin- 
 ciple of construction, and returns to the 
 common-law rule requiring a strict inter- 
 pretation against the pleader. The facts 
 and opinion in Hathaway v. Quinby, 
 which is quite similar in its general 
 character, and in Doyle v. Phoenix Ins. 
 Co., may be found supra, §§ *5.'}1, *5.35. 
 The following cases give further illus- 
 trations of the rule as stated in the text, — 
 that defects of form merely are waived 
 by going to trial without objection and 
 are cured by verdict, while defects which 
 go to the cause of action itself are not 
 thus waived nor cured. There is not, 
 however, an absolute unanimity on this 
 point among the decisions ; some of them 
 cannot be reconciled with the general cur- 
 rent of authority, nor, in my opinion, 
 witli the letter and spirit of the codes. 
 Jefferson v. Hale, 31 Ark. 286 ; People v. 
 Sloper, 1 Idaho, 158; Hawse v. Burg- 
 mere, 4 Colo. 313 ; Revelle's Heirs v. 
 Claxon's Heirs, 12 Bush, .558; Thompson 
 V. Killian, 25 Minn. Ill; Reed v. Pixley, 
 25 id. 482 ; Chesterson v. Munson, 27 id. 
 498 ; International Bk. of St. Louis v. 
 Franklin Cy., 65 Mo. 105 ; State v. Bart- 
 lett, 68 id. 581 ; Richardson i-. Iloole, 13 
 Nev. 492 ; Youngstown v. Moore, 30 Ohio 
 St. 133; State v. Cason, 11 S. C. 392; 
 Edgerly v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 43 Iowa, 587 ; 
 Meyer v. Dubuque Cy., 43 id. 592 ; Polster 
 V. Rucker, 16 Kan. 115 ; Moody v. Arthur, 
 16 id. 419 ; Castle v. Houston, 19 id. 417; 
 Sheridan v. Jackson, 72 N. Y. 170, 172, 
 173 ; Streeter v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 40 
 Wis. 294, 301 ; Univ. of Notre Dame v. 
 Shanks, 40 id. 352 ; Smith v. Barron Cy. 
 Sup., 44 id. 686 ; Vassar v. Thomp.son, 
 46 id. 345; Stetler v. Chicago & N. W. 
 Ry. Co., 49 id. 609 ; Gander v. State, 50 
 Ind. 539, 541 ; Green v. Louthain, 49 
 id. 139 ; Donellan v. Hardy, 57 id. 393 ; 
 Galvin v. Woollen, 66 id. 464 ; Indiau- 
 
 39
 
 CIO CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 allegations of issuable facts, and in an equitable action all such 
 matter in addition to the averments of material facts atfecting the 
 remedy, is unnecessar}', and therefore immaterial and redundant. 
 Whenever, therefore, the issuable facts constituting a legal cause 
 of action, or the material facts upon ^vhich the right to equitable 
 relief is wholly or partially based, are pleaded, all the details of 
 probative matter by which these facts are to be established, and 
 all the conclusions of law inferred therefrom, are plainly embraced 
 within this description. It would not be strictly correct to say 
 that statements of evidence or of legal conclusions are, under all 
 circumstances, redundant. If a complaint or petition should, in 
 violation of the principles established by the reformed procedure, 
 allesre the evidence of some issuable or material fact instead of 
 the fact itself, or should state a conclusion of law in place of the 
 proper fact or facts which support it, these averments would be 
 irregular, imperfect, insufficient, and liable to correction by a 
 motion; but they might not be necessarily redundant. If the 
 pleading was not reformed, and if the defect was not so serious 
 as to render it demurrable, it would be treated on the trial as 
 sufficient; and the statement of probative matter or of legal 
 conclusions would take the place of the issuable or material facts 
 which ought to have been averred, and would thus become mate- 
 rial. It is self-evident, however, that if the essential doctrines 
 of pleading are complied with, and the proper facts constituting 
 the cause of action, or affecting the equitable relief, are all set 
 forth, then any detail of evidence or any conclusion of law is 
 necessarily surplusage, and redundant. An allegation is irrele- 
 vant Avhen the issue formed by its denial can have no connection 
 with nor effect upon the cause of action. ^ Every irrelevant 
 allegation is immaterial and redundant: but the converse of this 
 proposition is not true; every immaterial or redundant allegation 
 is not irrelevant. This general description can only be explained 
 and illustrated by an examination of individual cases, of which a 
 few have been collected in the note as examples. ^ 
 
 apolis & V. Ti. Co. V. McCaffery, 72 id. i CSmith r. Smith (1897), 50 S. C. 54, 
 
 294; Parker v. Clayton, 72 id. 307 ; New- 27 S. E. 545, quoting the text. See also 
 
 man v. Perrell, 73 id. 153; Charlestown Ragsdale v. Railway Co. (1901), 60 S. C. 
 
 Sch. Dist. V. Hay, 74 id. 127; Smock v. 381, 38 S. E 609.] 
 
 Harrison, 74 id. 348; Lewi.s y. Bortsfield, ^ Bowman r. Sheldon, 5 Sandf. 657, 
 
 75 id. 390; King v. Montgomery, 50 Cal. 660; Fasnacht v. Stehn, 53 Barh. 650; 
 
 1 15 ; Hanlin v. Martin, 53 id. 321. Hunter v. Powell, 15 How. Pr. 221 ; Fab-
 
 REDUNDANT OR IRRELEVANT ALLEGATIONS. 611 
 
 § 446. * 552. Motion, not Demurrer, Proper Methocl of Objecting 
 to Superfluous Allegations. The rule is established by the unani- 
 mous decisions of the courts, as well as by the provision found in 
 the codes, that the proper and onl}^ method of objecting to and 
 correcting redundant, immaterial, or irrelevant allegations in a 
 pleading, is a motion to strike out the unnecessary matter, and 
 not a demurrer, nor an exclusion of evidence at the trial. ^ The 
 new procedure thus furnishes, by means of these motions in cases 
 of insufficiency, redundancy, or irrelevancy, a speedy and certain 
 mode of enforcing the fundamental doctrines of pleading which 
 it has established, and of causing the complaints or petitions and 
 answers to present single, clear, and well-defined issues. At the 
 same time it prevents a sacrifice of substance to form, and a 
 decision of controversies upon technical points not involving the 
 merits, by requiring these objections to be taken before the trial, 
 and by regarding them as waived if the j^rescribed mode of 
 remedy is not resorted to. The courts have it in their power, 
 by encouraging these classes of motions, and by treating them 
 as highly remedial and important, to shape the pleading into an 
 harmonious and consistent system, constructed upon the few 
 natural and j)hilosophical principles which were. adopted as its 
 foundation ; or they may, on the other hand, by discouraging a 
 resort to these corrective measures, and by treating them as idle, 
 unnecessary, or vexatious, suffer those principles to become for- 
 gotten, and to be finally abandoned, and may, thereby, lose all 
 
 ricotti V. Launitz, 3 Sandf. 743 ; Lee Bank prise Ins. Co., 45 Ind. 43, 55 ; Hynds v. 
 
 r. Kitching, 7 Bosw. 664; 11 Abb. Pr. Hays, 25 Ind. 31 ; Smith v. Countryman, 
 
 435; Cahill v. Palmer, 17 Abb. Pr. 196; 30 N. Y. 655; Simmons v. Eldridge, 29 
 
 Decker r. Mathews, 12 N. Y. 313 ; Gould How. Pr. 309 ; 19 Abb. Pr. 296; Cahill v. 
 
 V. Williams, 9 How. Pr. 51 ; St. John v. Palmer, 17 Abb. Pr. 196. See also Vliet 
 
 Griffith, 1 Abb. Pr. 39 ; O'Connor w. Koch, v. Sherwood, 38 Wis. 159: allegations 
 
 56 Mo. 253 ; Clague v. Hodgson, 16 Minn, stating a good cause of action should not 
 
 329, 334, 335 ; King v. Enterprise Ins. Co., be struck out on the objection that they 
 
 45 Ind. 43, 55 ; Hynds v. Hays, 25 Ind. 31 ; are irrelevant and redundant ; if they are 
 
 Booher r. Goldsborough, 44 Ind. 490, 498, improperly in the complaint, this is not 
 
 499 (duplicity) ; Loomis v. Youle, 1 Minn, the mode and ground of relief. Magee 
 
 175; Clark v. Harwood, 8 How. Pr. 470; v. Waupaca Cy. Sup , 38 Wis. 247 ; Biggs 
 
 Edgerton v. Smith, 3 Duer, 614 ; Sellar v. v. Biggs, 50 id. 443 ; Hoffmann v. Kop- 
 
 Sage, 12 How. Pr. 531 ; 13 How. Pr. 230; pelkora, 8 Neb. 344; Johns v. Potter, 55 
 
 Lee V. Elias, 3 Sandf. 736 ; Lamoreux v. Iowa, 665 ; Cooper v. Frencdi, 52 id. 531 ; 
 
 Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Duer, 680. See Schoonover v. Hinckley, 46 id. 207 ; Davis 
 
 also the additional cases cited in the next r. C. & W. W. R. li., 46 id. 389 ; Gabe v. 
 
 following notes. McGinnis, 68 Ind. 538; Harris v. Todd, 16 
 
 1 Loomis u. Youle, 1 Minn. 175 ; O'Con- Hun, 248; Smith v. Summerfield, 108 
 
 nor i: Koch, 56 Mo. 253 ; King v. Enter- N. C. 284.
 
 ev2 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 the benefits which were designed, and \\hich could have been 
 obtained from the reform.^ 
 
 ^ r Jiciliindnnt, Itntnntcrial , and Irrel- 
 evant Alleyatious. 
 
 Motion Proper Remedi/. " A demurrer 
 is not a pruuiug hook, and canuot be used 
 to trim out immaterial aud irrelevant 
 matter. This must be done by motion:" 
 In re Estate of McMurray (1899), 107 la. 
 648, 78 N. W. 691. To the same effect 
 see Bolt v. Gray (1898), 54 S. C. 95, 32 
 S. E. 148; Duke f. Brown (1901), 113 
 Ga. 310, 38 S. E. 764; City of Butte v. 
 Peasley (1896). 18 Mont. 303, 45 I'ac. 210; 
 McGiliivray v. McGiilivray (1896), 9 S. D. 
 187, 68 N. W. 316 ; Campbell v. Equitable 
 Loan & Trust Co. (1901). 14 S. U. 483, 
 85 N. W. 1015. 
 
 Form of Motion. A motion to strike 
 out portions of a pleading should desig- 
 nate with particularity tlie averments 
 which it attacks: Stuht v. Sweesy (1896), 
 48 Xeb. 767, 67 N. \V. 748; Keairnes v. 
 Durst (1899), 110 la. 114, 81 N. W. 238; 
 State ex inf. v. Fleming (1898), 147 Mo. 
 1, 44 S. W. 758. If the motion is too 
 broad, so that it cannot be sustained as 
 made, it must be overruled, thougli a 
 narrower motion might have been well 
 taken : Smith v. Meyers (1898), 54 Neb. 1, 
 74 N. W. 277 ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. 
 Co. v. Spirk (1897), 51 Neb. 167, 70 N. W. 
 926; Gilbert v. Loberg (1894), 86 Wis. 
 661, 57 N. W. 982. 
 
 lV/i<it may be stricken out as Surplusage. 
 A paragraph of a complaint which does 
 not allege any fact essential to the plain- 
 tiff's cause of action, should be stricken 
 out upon motion : Pitkin i'. New York & 
 New England K. R. Co. (1894), 64 Conn. 
 482, 30 Atl. 772. The court may, on its 
 own motion, strike out scandalous matter : 
 Morrison v. Snow (1903), 26 Utah 247, 72 
 Pac. 924. Averments of oral conversa- 
 tions between plaintiff and defendant prior 
 to the making of the written contract set 
 out in the pleading, are properly stricken 
 out on motion l)ecause merged in the 
 written instrument : Jordan v. Coulter 
 (1902), 30 Wa.sh. 116, 70 Pac. 257. It is 
 unnecessary to plead facts of which the 
 court will take judicial notice: George v. 
 State (1899), 59 Neb 163,80 N. W.486. 
 
 C'l/useifitencc of Retaining Surplnsaqe. 
 While unnece.ssfiry averments in a plead- 
 
 ing need not be proved (Kerr v. Topping 
 (1899), 109 la. 1.50, 80 N. W. 321), yet 
 they may be supported by evidence if 
 allowed to remain, and such evidence 
 should not be ruled out on objection : 
 Dentr. Hailroad (1901), 61 S. C. 329,39 
 S. E. 527; Hicks c. Southern Ry. (1902), 
 63 S. C. 559.41 S. E. 753; Smith v. Meyers 
 (1898), .54 Neb. 1, 74 N. W. 277. 
 
 In Kelly v. Clark (1898), 21 Mont. 291, 
 53 Pac. 959, the court said : " If a plaintiff 
 aver more than is necessary, and fail to 
 sustain immaterial aud redundant aver- 
 ments, but does prove all the material 
 facts upou whiclia right to relief is based, 
 aud no motion to correct the pleading has 
 been made, it will be treated as sufficient, 
 aud the surplus allegations disregarded." 
 And in Smith v. Meyers (1898), 54 Neb. 
 1, 74 N. W. 277, the court said: "A 
 defendant who by answer pleaded new 
 matter, which the court refused to strike 
 out as immaterial, cannot be heard to 
 complain that the court erred in efusing 
 to strike from the reply allegations trav- 
 ersing those of the answer." 
 
 It was iield in Campbell v. Mo. Pac. 
 Ry. Co. (1893), 121 Mo. 340, 25 S. W. 
 936, that thd- fact that tiie j)etition un- 
 necessarily charged negligence did not 
 prevent a recovery under the statute with- 
 out proof of negligence, the statute mak- 
 ing railroad companies liable without proof 
 of negligence for ])roperty injured or de- 
 stroyed by fire set by their locomotives. 
 And in Oglesby r. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. 
 (1899), 150 Mo. 137, 37 S. W. 829,"it wa.s 
 held that if a petition founded on negli- 
 gence states two acts, each constituting 
 negligence and either sufficient in itself 
 to sustain the cause of action, if there be 
 proof to sustain one and no proof to 
 sustain the other, the action will not fail 
 after verdict. 
 
 Inconsistent Allegations. If a complaint 
 states a good cause of action, additional 
 allegations inconsistent with such state- 
 ment do not render it demurrable : Ross 
 V. Charleston, etc. Co. (1894), 42 S. C. 
 447, 20 S. E. 285. But where a complaint 
 states a good cause of action and also 
 states facts constituting a defence thereto, 
 it is bad on demurrer: Roberts v. Indian-
 
 ALLEGATIONS AND PROOFS MUST COKKESPOND. 
 
 613 
 
 § 447. * 553. III. The Doctrine that the Cause of Action Proved 
 must correspond with the One Alleged. Degrees of Variance 
 between Allegations and Proof. The cocles describe three grades 
 of disagreement between the proofs at the trial and the allega- 
 tions in the pleadings to which such proofs are directed : namely, 
 (1) An immaterial variance, where the difference is so slight and 
 unimportant that the adverse party is not misled thereby, and in 
 which case the court will order an immediate amendment without 
 costs, or will treat the pleading as though amended, permitting 
 the evidence to be received and considered; (2) A material 
 variance, where although the proof has some relation to and con- 
 nection with the allegation, yet the difference is so substantial 
 that the adverse party is misled by the averment, and would be 
 prejudiced on the merits, in which case the court may permit the 
 pleading to be amended upon terms ; ^ (3) A complete failure of 
 proof, where the proofs do not simply fail to conform with the 
 allegation in some particular or particulars, but in its entire 
 scope and meaning, or, in other words, the proof establishes 
 something wholly different from the allegations. In this case 
 
 apolis St. Ry. Co. (1902), 158 lud. 634, 
 C4 N. E. 217. 
 
 Where an answer contains allegations 
 of fraud and other allegations absolutely 
 contradictory of and inconsistent with 
 them, the latter may be stricken out on 
 motion : State ex rel. v. Dickerman (1895), 
 16 Mont. 278, 40 Pac. 698, 
 
 It was held in Raming r. Metropolitan 
 St. Ry. Co. (1900), 157 Mo. 477, 57 S. \\. 
 268, that a petition which states acts as 
 being both negligent and wanton or wilful 
 at the same time is self-contradictory. A 
 claim by a bank of a general lien on a 
 debtor's securities for a balance due by 
 the debtor is not inconsistent with its 
 claim of a lien thereon by special contract : 
 Cockrill V. Joyce (1896), 62 Ark. 216, 35 
 S. W. 221. Nor is an allegation in a 
 complaint on a promissory note that the 
 iiidorser waived notice inconsistent with 
 allegations showing that the holder was 
 excused from giving notice by the subse- 
 <jUGiit action of the iudorser: Loveday i'. 
 Anderson (1897), 18 Wash. 322, 51 Pac. 
 463. 
 
 Predicating Error on Piuling on Motion. 
 Tlie refusal of the court to strike out 
 redundant and irrelevant matter is not 
 
 reversible error unless it affirmatively aj)- 
 pears that the rights of the moving party 
 are thereby prejudiced : Lincoln Mortgage 
 & Trust Co. V. Hutchins (1898), 55 Neb. 
 158, 75 N. W. 538; Hudelson v. First Nat. 
 Bank (1898), 56 Neb. 247, 76 N. W. 570; 
 State Bank v. Showers (1902), — Kan. 
 — , 70 Pac. 332; Pfau v. State ex rel. 
 (1897), 148 Ind. 539, 47 N. E. 927; Cod- 
 dington v. Canaday (1901), 157 Ind. 243, 
 61 N. E. 567 ; Atchison, etc. Ry. Co', v. 
 Marks (1901), 11 Okla. 82, 65 Pac. 996. 
 
 Waiver of Objection. It is too late 
 after verdict to raise the objection that a 
 petition contains redundant and immate- 
 rial matter: Bradley v. Chicago, etc. Ry. 
 Co. (1896), 138 Mo". 293, 39 S. W. 763. 
 And it was held in Bright v. Ecker (1896), 
 9 S. D. 192, 69 N. W. 824, that a com- 
 plaint containing redundant matter and 
 allegations relating to more than one 
 cause of action, will be lield sufficient in 
 the Supreme Court in the absence of an 
 attack by motion, if the facts alleged 
 show any cause of action.] 
 
 1 ^See Olson v. Snake River Valley 
 R. R. Co. (1900), 22 Wash. 139, 60 
 Pac. 156.]
 
 614 CIVIL IIKMEDIES. 
 
 110 amendment is permitted, but the cause of action or defence 
 is dismissed or overruled.^ In these statutory provisions the 
 doctrine that the proofs must correspond with the allegations is, 
 in a somewhat modilied form, united with the subject of amend- 
 ment, by which the minor grades of 'the variance may be obviated. 
 In the present subdivision I shall consider only the former of 
 these two topics, and shall discuss the scope and effect of the 
 general rule, that the cause of action, or the defence as proved, 
 must correspond with that averred in the pleading.'-^ 
 
 § 448. * 554. Consequences of Different Degrees of Variance. 
 The very object and design of all pleading by the plaintiff, and 
 of all pleading of new mattar by the defendant, is that the ad- 
 verse party may be informed of the real cause of action or defence 
 relied upon by the pleader, and may thus have an opportunity of 
 meeting and defeating it if possible at the trial. Unless the 
 petition or complaint on the one hand, and the answer on the 
 other, fully and fairly accomplishes this purpose, the pleading 
 would be a useless ceremony, productive only of delay, and the 
 parties might better be permitted to state their demands orally 
 before the court at the time of the trial. The requirement, 
 therefore, that the cause of action or the affirmative defence 
 must be stated as it actually is, and that the proofs must estab- 
 
 1 See these provisions quoted supra, Ass'n (1894), 42 Neb. 439, 60 N. W. 881 ; 
 § *4.35. Omaha Consolidated Co. r. Burns (1895), 
 
 2 The following cases will illustrate 44 Xeb. 21, 62 N. W. 301; Matthews v. 
 this rule : Bishop r. Griffith, 4 Colo. 68; O'Shea (1895), 45 Neb. 299,63 N. W.820; 
 Burd.'^all v. Waggoner, 4 id. 256; Board- Cannon v. Smith (1896), 47 Neb. 917, 66 
 man u. Griffin, 52 Ind. 101 ; Long i-. Doxey, N.W.999; Carter c.Gibson (1896), 47 Neb. 
 
 50 id. 385 ; Baker v. Dessauer, 49 id. 28; 655, 66 N. "VV. 631 ; Esterly Ilarv. Mac!i. 
 Stroup V. State, 70 id. 495 ; Jeffersonville, Co. v. Berg (1897), 52 Neb. 147, 71 N. W. 
 M. & I. R. Co. I,'. Worland. 50 id. 339; 952; Solt r. Anderson (19U2), 63 Neb. 734, 
 Arnold y. Angell, 62 N. Y. 508 ; Vrooman 89 N. W. 306; Elliott v. Carter White- 
 ;;. Jackson, 6 Ilun,326; Moudran v. Goux, Lead Co ( 1898), 53 Neb. 458, 73 N. \V. 948; 
 
 51 Cal. 151 ; Hopkins v. Orcutt, 51 id. 537 ; Smith v. Building, etc. Ass'u (1895), IIG 
 Bolen V. San Gorgouio Fl. Co., 55 id. 164 ; N. C. 102, 21 S. E. 33 ; McMahan t. Cana- 
 McCord V. Scale, 56 id. 262. dian Ry. Co. (1901), 40 Ore. 148, 66 Pac. 
 
 QA plaintiff must recover according to 70S; Crawford v. Aultmau & Co. (1897), 
 the allegations of his complaint, or not at 139 Mo. 262, 40 S. W. 952; Ilite v. Metro- 
 all: Thompson i-. Citizens' St. Ry. Co. politan St. Ry. Co. (1895), 130 Mo. 132, 31 
 (1898), 152 Ind.46l, 53 N.E. 462; Southern S. W. 262; Chitty v. St. Louis, etc. Ry. 
 Kansas Ry. Co. f. Griffith (1894), 54 Kan. Co. (1899), 148 Mo. 64, 49 S. W. 868; 
 428, 38 Pac. 478; Imlioff >-. House (1893), Rumsey v. People's Ry. Co. (1898), 144 
 36 Neb. 28, 53 N W. 1032; Thomp.sou r. Mo. 175, 46 S. W. 144*; Solt i'. Anderson 
 Wertz (1894), 41 Neb. 31, 59 N. W. 518; (1903), —Neb. — . 93 N. W. 205. 
 Luce r. Foster (1894), 42 Neli. 818, 60 And this is so uotwitli.standing that evi- 
 N. W. 1027 ; Lewis v. Scotia Bldg. & Loan deuce to support a judgment may have been
 
 ALLEGATIONS AND PROOFS MUST CORRESPOND. 
 
 Gi; 
 
 lish it as stated, is involved in the very theory of pleading. ^ It 
 frequently happens, however, and from the very nature 'of the 
 case it must happen, that the facts as proved do not exactly agree 
 with those alleged. To determine the effect of such a disagree- 
 ment we must recur to the reason and object of the rule, and 
 they furnish a certain and equitable test. If the diJBference is so 
 slight that the adverse party has not been misled, but, in prepar- 
 ing to meet and contest the case as alleged, he is fully prepared 
 to meet and oppose the one to be actually proved, then no effect 
 whatever is produced by the variance; to impose any loss or 
 penalty on the pleader would be arbitrary and technical. ^ In 
 
 admitted without objection : New Idea 
 Pattern Co. v. Whelan (1903), 75 Conn. 
 445, 53 Atl. 953; Central R. R. Co. v. 
 Cooper (1894), 95 Ga. 406, 22 S. E. 549; 
 McMahan r. Canadian Ry. Co. (1901), 40 
 Ore. 148, 6G Pac. 708 ; Christian v. Conn. 
 Mut. Ins. Co. (1898), 143 Mo. 460, 45 
 S. VV. 268 ; Greenthal v. Lincoln, Seyms, 
 & Co. (1896), 67 Conn. 372, 35 Atl. 266; 
 Box Butte County r. Noleman (1898), 54 
 Neb. 239, 74 N. W. 582 ; Schmidt v. Ore- 
 gon Gold Min. Co. (1895), 28 Ore. 9, 40 
 Pac. 406, 1014; Coughanoury. Hutchinson 
 <1902),41 Ore. 4 19, 69 Pac. 68; McGavock 
 V. City of Omaha (1894), 40 Neb. 64, 58 
 N. W.'543; Purbush v. Barker (1894), 38 
 Neb. 1, 56 N. W. 996; Brown v. Railway 
 Co. (1898), 59 Kan. 70, 52 Pac. 65 ; Whit- 
 ing V. Koepke (1898), 71 Conn. 77, 40 Atl. 
 1053; Moran v. Bentley (1897), 69 Conn. 
 392, 37 Atl. 1092; Daly v. New Haven 
 (1897), 69 Conn. 644, 38 Atl. 397. See 
 also McLaughlin v. Webster (1894), 141 
 N. Y. 76, 35 N. E. 1081. 
 
 Contra, Morrow v. Board of Education 
 (1895), 7 S. D. 553, 64 N. W. 1126; Brady 
 V. Nally (1896), 151 N. Y. 258, 45 N. E. 547 ; 
 Gillies V. Improvement Co. (1895), 147 
 N. Y. 420, 42 N. E. 196; Schoepflin v. 
 Coffey (1900), 162 N. Y. 12, 56 N. E.502; 
 Bassett v. Haren (1895), 61 Minn. 346, 63 
 N. W. 713 ; Ro.senberger v. Marsh (1899), 
 108 la. 47, 78 N. W. 837 ; Smith v. Phelan 
 (1894). 40 Neb. 765, 59 N. W. .562.] 
 
 1 [[But the issues may, by written stipu- 
 lation, or agreement in open court, be nar- 
 rowed so as to be confined to one point : 
 Grauby Mining Co. v. Davis (1900), 156 
 Mo. 422, 57 S. W. 126. And the issues 
 
 may be broadened by stipulation. In Mc- 
 Elwaine v. Hosey (1893), 135 Ind. 481, 35 
 N. E. 272, it was held that where the 
 parties to an action agree before entering 
 upon a trial " that all facts relating in any 
 way to the case in hand, or affecting the 
 merits of the controversy on either side, 
 may be introduced in evidence under the 
 pleadings now on file," such agreement 
 precludes all insistence that the relief 
 granted is broader than the pleadings 
 authorize.3 
 
 2 [[A party cannot complain of a mere 
 variance between pleading and proof un- 
 less he has been actually misled to his 
 prejudice: Kuhn v. McKay (1897), 7 Wyo. 
 42, 49 Pac. 473 ; and such prejudice must 
 be shown to the court : Meldrum v. Keue- 
 fick (1902), 15 S. D. 370, 89 N. W. 863; 
 Chicago House Wrecking Co. v. Lumber 
 Co. (1902), — Neb. — , 92 N. W. 1009; 
 People's Nat. Bank v. Myers (1902), 65 
 Kan. 122, 69 Pac. 164. 
 
 Variances between allegations and proof 
 which are immaterial or not jjrejudicial, do 
 not call for a reversal of the judgment : 
 Knight V. Finney (1899), 59 Neb. 274, 80 
 N. W. 912; Salazar f. Taylor (1893), 18 
 Colo. 538, 33 Pac. 369 ; Lubker v. Grand 
 Detour Plow Co. (1897), .53 Neb. Ill, 73 
 N. W. 457 ; Kuhn v. McKay (1897), 7 Wyo. 
 42, 49 Pac. 473. A variance will not be 
 deemed material unless it has misled the 
 adverse pai-ty to his prejudice : Toy v. Mc- 
 Hugh (1901), 62 Neb. 820, 87 N. W. 1059 ; 
 Post-Intelligencer Co. v. Harris (1895), 11 
 Wash. 500, 39 Pac. 965 ; Dudley r. Duval 
 (1902), 29 Wash. 528, 70 Pac' 68; Mel- 
 drum V. Kenefick (1902), 15 S. D. 370, 89
 
 616 CIVIL Ki:.MEDIES. 
 
 the second place, the difference, while it does not extend to the 
 entire cause of action or defence, may be so great in respect to 
 some of its particular material facts as to have misled the adverse 
 party, so that his preparation in connection with that particular 
 is not adapted to the proofs which are produced. In such cir- 
 cumstances an amendment is proper because the variance is par- 
 tial, but it is obviously equitable that terms should be imposed. 
 Finally, if the divergence is total, that is, if it extends to such 
 an important fact, or group of facts, that the cause of action or 
 defence as proved would be another than that set up in the 
 pleadings, there is plainly no room for amendment, and a dis- 
 missal of the complaint or rejection of the defence is the only 
 equitable result. It should be noticed that, in order to constitute 
 this total failure of proof, it is not necessary for the discrepancy 
 to include and affect each one of the averments. A cause of 
 action as stated on the pleadings might consist, say, of five dis- 
 tinct issuable or material facts ; on the trial four of these might 
 be proved as laid, while one so entirely different might be sub- 
 stituted in place of the fifth that the cause of action would be 
 wholly changed in its essential nature. 
 
 § 449. * 555. Instances -where Variance has been held Immate- 
 rial. The conclusions reached in the foregoing analysis, and the 
 reasons which support them, are fully sustained by the decided 
 cases which constantly discriminate between the immaterial 
 variance which is disregarded, and the total failure of proof 
 which is fatal to the cause of action or defence.^ It is of course 
 impossible to give any comprehensive formula which shall deter- 
 mine these two conditions; the scope and operation of the doc- 
 trine can only be learned from the decisions which have applied 
 it, of which a few are selected as illustrations. In the following 
 instances the variance was held to be immaterial : In an action 
 upon a written contract which was properly set out in the com- 
 plaint except that one material stipulation was omitted, but a 
 correct copy of it had been served upon the defendant's attorney ;2 
 in an action against a city for injuries done to the plaintiff's 
 house and grounds by the unlawful construction of sewers, side- 
 
 N. W. 8f)3 ; Wilcox Lumber Co. v. Ritte- Wilcox Lumber Co. v. Ritteman (1902), 88 
 
 niiui (1902), 88 Minn. 18, 92 N. W. 472. Minn. 18, 82 N. W. 472.] 
 
 Where a variance i.s immaterial the court ^ QSee Dudley v. Duval (1902), 29 
 
 ■will eitlier disregard it altogether or order Wash. 528, 70 Pac. 68.] 
 
 an immediate amendment without costs: ^ Fisk i-. Tank, 12 Wis. 276, 301.
 
 ALLEGATIONS AND PROOFS MUST CORRESPOND. 617 
 
 walks, etc., it was held that, if the manner of constructing the 
 works was unlawful, the failure to allege negligence in the 
 complaint was not material, and might be either disregarded or 
 amended at any stage of the proceeding ; ^ in an action upon a 
 warranty given in a sale of horses, where the complaint stated in 
 general terms that the defendant warranted them to be sound, 
 while the proof was that he warranted them to be sound as far as 
 he knew; that they were unsound, and that he knew them to be 
 so, the court saying that an amendment if necessary should be 
 made at any time even by the appellate court ;2 in an action 
 upon a warranty of quality, where the complaint set forth an 
 express warranty, and on the trial facts were proved from which 
 a warranty would be implied;^ in an action against two defend- 
 ants to recover damages for injuries done to the plaintiff's sheep 
 by the defendants' dogs, the petition alleging that "a certain 
 pack or lot of dogs owned by the defendants worried, etc., cer- 
 tain sheep of the plaintiff," while the proof showed that one of 
 the defendants owned a portion of the dogs, and the other 
 defendant the remainder, but there was no joint ownership;^ in 
 an action by a husband and wife against a husband and wife for 
 an assault and battery by the female defendant upon the female 
 plaintiff, the petition alleging that the plaintiff Mary D. is the 
 wife of the plaintiff, James D., and the defendant, Martha H., 
 is wife of the defendant, Aaron H., and proof was admitted that 
 the parties were respectively man and wife at the time of the 
 affraj^ ; ^ in an equitable action brought to set aside a conveyance 
 of land made to the defendant, on the ground of his alleged 
 fraud, and the plaintiff failed to make out a case of fraud, but 
 did prove one of mutual mistake;^ in an action for work and 
 labor stated in the complaint to have been done for an agreed 
 compensation, but at the trial the j^laintiff proved the value as 
 upon a quantum meruit.' The Supreme Court of North Carolina 
 
 1 Harper r. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365, * McAdams v. Sutton, 24 Ohio St. 
 377, 378. " The alleged variance did not 333. 
 
 change the gravamen of the action." ^ Dailey v. Houston, 58 Mo. 361, 
 
 2 Chatfield v. Frost, 3 N. Y. S. C. 366. 
 
 357. •> Montgomery v. Shockey, 37 Iowa, 
 
 3 Giffert v. West, 33 Wis. 617, 621; 107, 109; Sweezey v. Collins, 36 Iowa, 
 Leopold V. Vankirk, 27 Wis. 152, 155; 589,592. 
 
 s. c. 29 Wis. 548, 551. At the common " Sussdorff v. Schmidt, 55 N. Y. 319, 
 
 • law, this was the only mode of alleging 324. 
 an implied warranty.
 
 618 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 has gone so far as to hold in one case where the complaint set up 
 a cause of action for the conversion of chattels, and the proof at 
 the trial showed only a liability upon an implied promise for 
 money had and received, that the plaintiff could recover, since 
 all distinction between forms of action had been abolished, and 
 amendments were freely allowed.^ This decision, as will be 
 seen, stands opposed to the whole current of authority in other 
 States. The objection that the proof varies from the allegation 
 must be taken at the trial ; if omitted, then it cannot be after- 
 wards raised on appeal.^ The reason is obvious; when made 
 
 1 Gates V. Kendall, 67 N. C. 241. 
 But see Parsley i'. Nicholson, 65 N. C 
 207, 210, which maintains the general 
 doctrine. 
 
 •- Speer v. Bishop, 24 Ohio St. 598. 
 See, also, as further examples of imma- 
 terial variance, Chamballe v. McKenzie, 
 31 Arli. 155 ; Bruguier r. U. S., 1 Dak. 
 5; McMahan v. Miller, 82 N. C. 317; 
 Gaines v. Union Ins. Co., 28 Ohio St. 
 418 ; Sibila v. Bahney, 34 Ohio St. 399 ; 
 Dodd V. Denney, 6 Ore. 156; Miller v. 
 Hendig, 55 Iowa, 174; Peck i'. N. Y. & 
 N. J. Ry. Co., 85 N. Y. 246 ; Duruford v. 
 Weaver, 84 id. 445 ; Thomas v. Nelson, 
 69 id. 118; Lifler y. Sherwood, 21 Hun, 
 573; Clayes v. Hooker, 4 id. 231 ; Cody 
 V. Berai.s 40 Wis. 666 ; Flanders v. Cot- 
 trell, 36 id. 564 ; Giffert v. West, 37 id. 
 115; Chunot u. Larson, 43 id. 536; Rus- 
 sell V. Loomis, 43 id. 545 ; Aschermann 
 V. Brewing Co., 45 Wis. 262 ; Union Nat. 
 Bk. I'. Roberts, 45 id. 373 ; Dolaplaiue v. 
 Turuley, 44 id. 31 ; Ryan v. Springfield 
 F. & M. Ins. Co., 46 id. 671 ; Wilier v. 
 Bergenthal, 50 id. 474 ; Galloway v. 
 Stewart, 49 Ind. 156; Glasgow v. Hobbs, 
 52 id. 239, 242; Wright i\ Johnson, 50 id. 
 454 ; Stroup v. State, 70 id. 495 ; Hunting- 
 ton I'. Mendenhall, 73 id. 460 ; Tliigpen 
 1-. Staton, 104 N. C. 40 ; Merkle v. Ben- 
 nington, 68 Mich. 133 ; Thalheimer v. 
 Crow, 13 Colo. 397. 
 
 [^Gillies V. Improvement Co. (1895), 
 147 N. Y. 420,42 N. E. 196; Brady v. 
 Naliy (1896), 151 N. Y. 258, 45 N. E. 547 ; 
 Ashe V. Beasley (1896), 6 N. D. 191, 69 
 N. W. 188; yEtiia Iron Works i-. Firmen- 
 ich Mfg. Co. (1894), 90 la. 390, 57 N. W. 
 904; Dean u. Goddard (1893), 55 Minn. 
 290, 56 N. W. lOGO; Adams v. Castle 
 
 (1896), 64 Minn. 505, 67 N. W. 637 ; Lind- 
 say V. Pettigrew (1894), 5 S. D. 500, 59 
 N. W. 726 ; Chouquette v. Southern Elec. 
 R. R. Co. (1899), 152 Mo. 257, 53 S. W. 
 897. The party whose proof varies from 
 his allegations cannot complain : Williams 
 V. Williams (1899), 102 Wis. 246, 78 N . W. 
 419. 
 
 In Schirmer v. Drexler (1901), 134 
 Cal. 134, 66 Pac. 180, the court said: 
 " The findings and decree seem to be en- 
 tirely outside of the case made by the 
 pleadings. The said findings and decree 
 contradict the material allegations of 
 plaintiff's complaint, and there seem to be 
 no allegations at all in the complaint to 
 which the findings and decree can be held 
 to be material or pertinent. The whole 
 theory of the complaint is, that the plain- 
 tiff's rights are those of an owner, ac- 
 quired by adverse use of the ditch and the 
 water. The findings and decree proceed 
 upon an entirely different theory, and ex- 
 pressly state that the use of the water and 
 of the ditch by the plaintiff and his pred- 
 ecessor in interest therein was had with 
 the consent of the owners thereof and 
 under an oral license or agreement there- 
 for. The decree attempts to enforce the 
 specific performance of a contract which 
 is not only nut set up in th? complaint, but 
 to which no reference is made anywhere in 
 the pleadings. We know that there are 
 cases which hold, as contended by re- 
 spondent, that where a question is treated 
 by both parties as an issue in the case, 
 and evidence is taken thereon without ob- 
 jection, the appellant will not thereafter 
 be heard to say that the i|uestion was not 
 in ii<sue. That is a salutary general rule, 
 and we do not wish to overturn it. But
 
 ALLEGATIONS AND PROOFS MUST CORRESPOND. 
 
 619 
 
 at the trial, there is an opportunity for removing it at once by 
 amendment.^ 
 
 iu noue of those cases, tliat we have been 
 ahle to find, were the findings and decree 
 clear outside of the case as made by the 
 pleadings, but in each and all of them the 
 findings, taken altogether, have some re- 
 lation to the issues as framed ; but here 
 the issues as made by the pleadings sus- 
 tain no degree of kinship whatever to the 
 findings and decree, and are, besides, iu 
 direct conflict with the allegations of the 
 complaint. It would be going too far to 
 hold that such a variance as this should 
 be deemed to be waived by failure to ob- 
 ject to evidence at the trial. If the bur- 
 den was on the plaintiff to establish tlie 
 case made by his complaint, why should 
 the defendants object to evidence, as long 
 as it went to show that the case as thus 
 made did not exist ? If this kind of a 
 judgment can be upheld on this kind of a 
 record, theu written pleadings are no 
 louirer neiessary, and may well be dis- 
 pensed with altogether." Cases cited.] 
 
 1 l^lii :lie following cases the variance 
 was held immaterial: In an action against 
 a national bank on its double lial)ility as 
 a stockholder in another corporation, an 
 allegation that it acquired the stock in a 
 particular manner and proof that it ac- 
 quired it in another manner not ultra 
 vires: Bank v. Bank (1902), 64 Kan. 134, 
 67 Pac. 458; error m the description of 
 tlie name of the obligee in a bond : I'ost- 
 Intelligencer Co. v. Harris (1895), II 
 Wash .500, 30 Pac. 965; a mistake iu the 
 description of a house upon which a lien is 
 sought to be foreclosed, when the mistake 
 is so slight that the house is still capable 
 of identification : Griffith v. Maxwell (1 898), 
 20 Wash. 403, 55 Pac. 571 ; error in the de- 
 tails of personal injuries suffered by an 
 insured by reason of a fall : ilercier v. Trav- 
 elers' Ins. Co. (1901), 24 Wash. 147, 64 Pac. 
 158; an allegation that defendant signed 
 a note as principal, and evidence that he 
 signed as surety : Hermiston v. Green 
 (1898), 11 S. D. 81, 75 N. W. 819; an 
 allegation that defendant and another 
 were partners until the other's death in 
 1893, and proof that the partnership was 
 dissolved by consent iu 1885, without the 
 knowledge of the plaintiff ; an allegation 
 
 that defendant executed a separate prom- 
 issory note, and proof that it was a joint 
 and several note of defendant and another : 
 Nichols & Shepard Co. i-. Dedrick (1895), 
 61 Minn. 513, 63 N. W. 1110. 
 
 In the following cases it was held that 
 there was no variance between the plead- 
 ings and proof: an allegation of a money 
 indebtedness for services rendered, and 
 proof of an agreement to pay in specific 
 articles of property: New York News 
 Publishing Co. v. Steamship Co. (1895), 
 148 N. Y. 39, 42 N. E. 514; an allegation 
 that promissory notes were signed by de- 
 fendant as maker, and proof that they 
 were signed by defendant and others 
 under a several liability : Hinchman v. 
 Point Defiance Ky. Co. (1896), 14 Wash. 
 349, 44 Pac. 152; an allegation that the 
 place of injury was a sidewalk, and proof 
 that it was a crosswalk : Piper v. City of 
 Spokane (1900), 22 Wash. 147, 60 Pac. 
 138 ; an allegation, in an action for tres- 
 pass, of ownership of property in fee, and 
 proof of an equitable interest only : Olson 
 V. City of Seattle (1903), 30 Wash. 687, 
 71 Pac. 201 ; an allegation that plaintiff 
 stumbled over the nails projecting from a 
 walk, and proof that she caught her foot 
 between two planks : Bell v. City of 
 Spokane (1902),. 30 Wash. .508, 71 Pac. 31 ; 
 proof of interest upon a balance of an ac- 
 count, where there is no allegation of in- 
 terest due in the complaint : North Star 
 Boot Co. V. Stebbius (1893), 3 S. D. 540, 
 54 N. W. 593 ; an allegation of slanderous 
 words, and proof of the use of words only 
 substantially the same : Emerson c. Miller 
 (1902), 115 "la. 315, 88 N. W. 803; an alle- 
 gation of defendant's liability as a com- 
 mon carrier, and proof of liability as a 
 warehouseman : Cavallaro v. Texas, etc 
 Ey. Co. (1895), 110 Cal. 348, 42 Pac. 918 
 (see contra, Normile v. Oregon, etc. Co. 
 (1902), 41 Ore. 177. 69 Pac. 928) ; an alle- 
 gation that plaintiff, in an action for 
 fraud, was mentally weak and incompe- 
 tent, and proof that she was weak-minded 
 and far below the average in intellect : 
 Haves v. Candee (1902), 75 Conn. 131, 52 
 Ati. 826.]
 
 620 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 450. * OoG. Instances of Complete Failure of Proof. The fol- 
 lowing are examples of a complete failure of proof. In all these 
 cases one cause of action Avas alleged by the plaintiff, and another 
 one was proved or attempted to be proved at the trial, but was 
 rejected by the court. The New York Court of Appeals, while 
 passing upon the admissibility of evidence which made out a 
 liability under implied contract, in order to sustain a complaint 
 that charged a fraudulent transaction and sought to recover the 
 money obtained by means of such fraud, used the following 
 language in a recent case: "It is insisted that, under the code, 
 forms of action are abolished, and that the facts showing the 
 right of action need only be stated. This is correct, but it does 
 not aid the plaintiff. The plaintiff had a cause of action against 
 the defendant upon an account for moneys advanced for him. 
 Instead of stating this cause of action, the allegation is in sub- 
 stance that he paid him money as the price of stocks fraudulently 
 sold by defendant to plaintiff, which contract has been rescinded 
 by the plaintiff, and a return of the money demanded, which has 
 been refused by the defendant. These causes of action differ in 
 substance. The former is upon contract, the latter in tort; and 
 the law will not permit a recovery upon the latter by showing a 
 right to recover upon the former. " ^ It is the settled rule under 
 the codes, contrary to that prevailing in the common-law system, 
 that when a cause of action depends upon the performance of 
 some act, but under certain circumstances the performance may 
 
 1 Degraw v. Elmore, 50 N. Y. 1. The recover on breach of implied contract or 
 following cases give further examples of of common carrier's legal duty to traus- 
 a material or fatal variance, or a failure port in a reasonable time) ; Hinkle v. 
 of proof : Bishop v. Griffeth, 4 Colo. 68 ; San Francisco & N. P. R. Co., 55 Cal. 627 ; 
 Proctor V. Rief, 52 Iowa, 592; Burns v. and cases cited aitte, under § *553. See 
 Iowa Homestead Co., 48 id. 279 ; York v. also Ehrlich v. yEtna L. Ins. Co., 103 Mo. 
 Wallace, 48 id. .305; Fauble r. Davis, 48 231 (allegation of performance does not 
 id. 462 ; McKoon t". Ferguson, 47 id. 636; lay foundation for evidence excusing non- 
 Arnold V. Angell, 62 N. Y. 508 (partner- performance) ; Daley v. Russ, 86 Cal. 114 
 ship) ; Harris c. Kasson, 79 id. 381 ; (same) ; Reed v. AlcConnell, 133 N. Y. 
 Stowell V. Eldred, 39 Wis. 614; Cowles 425; Clark r. Sherman (Wash. 1893). 32 
 r. Warner, 22 Minn. 449; Cumniings v. Pac. 771 (complaint being for money had 
 Long, 25 id. 337 ; Vrooman v. Jackson, 6 and received, plaintiff cannot recover on 
 Hun, 326 (ejectment) ; Southwick r. First an express contract) ; Distler v. Dabney, 
 Nat. Bk. of Memphis, 84 N. Y. 420; Gas- 3 Wash. 200 (same) ; Wcrnli r. Collins 
 ton I'. Owen, 43 Wis. 103; Streeter v. (Iowa, 1893), 54 N. W. 365 (complaint 
 Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 44 id. 383; Jefferson- being on an express contract, plaintiff 
 ville, M. & I. R. Co. v. Worland, 50 Ind. cannot recover on a quantum meruit) ; 
 339 (complaint sets forth special con- Woolsey i\ Ellenville V. Trs. (Supreme, 
 tract for transportation of goods ; cannot 1893), 23 N. Y. Suppl. 411.
 
 ALLEGATIONS AND PROOFS MUST CORRESPOND. 621 
 
 be excused and the cause of action still remain in force, the facts 
 showing the excuse must be alleged if the plaintiff intends to 
 rely upon it, and not upon the performance. The plaintiff is no 
 longer permitted to aver the performance of the required act, 
 and on the trial prove the circumstances which excuse such per- 
 formance, or prove any other alternative than the one specially 
 alleged.^ Thus where, in an action against indorsers, the com- 
 plaint stated a demand at maturity, and notice thereof to the 
 defendants, and on the trial the plaintiff offered to prove facts 
 which would excuse any demand, the evidence was held inad- 
 missible, and the action was dismissed ;2 and in a similar case 
 under a statute which required that, in order to make an indorser 
 liable, due diligence must be used by the institution of a suit 
 against the maker, or else that such a suit would be unavailing, 
 the petition alleged that due diligence had been used by com- 
 mencing a suit against the maker, in which judgment had been 
 recovered, and an execution had been issued and returned un- 
 satisfied ; and it was held that the other alternative, the maker's 
 insolvency, and the consequent unavailing character of a suit 
 against him, could not be shown on the trial ; ^ and in a similar 
 action against the drawer of a bill or the indorser of a bill or 
 note, when the petition avers the demand and notice in order to 
 charge the defendant, a waiver of these steps cannot be proved, 
 — for example, a subsequent promise by the defendant to pay the 
 note when the steps necessary to charge him had been omitted.^ 
 
 § 451. * 557. Examples of Fatal Disagreement between Cause of 
 Action Pleaded and Proved. The following are miscellaneous 
 instances of a fatal disagreement between the cause of action 
 pleaded and that proved on the trial. In an action to recover 
 damages for trespass to lands, the complaint alleging that the 
 plaintiffs were possessed of the premises ; on the trial, however, 
 it appeared that they were remainder-men not yet erititled to the 
 possession, while the defendants were rightfully in possession, 
 but had committed acts of waste for which they would be liable 
 
 ^ I^See subject "Waiver" in note on Pac. 1.56; New England Loan & Trust Co. 
 
 Kecessity and Form of Particular Allega- v. Browne (1900), 157 Mo. 116, 57 S. W. 
 
 tions, p. 689, where cases are cited in 760.3 
 
 support of, and in opposition to, the rule '■' Pierr. Ileinrichoffen, 52 Mo. 333,335. 
 
 stated in the text. See also Omaha Con- ^ Woolseyu.Willian)s,3-4 Iowa,413,415. 
 
 solidated Co. v. Burns (1895), 44 Neb. 21, * Lumbert v. Palmer, 29 Iowa, 104, 
 
 62 N. W. 301 ; Olson r. Snake River 108. See also Hudson i'. McCartney, 33 
 
 Valley R. R. Co. (1900), 22 Wash. 139, 60 Wis. 331, 346, and cases cited.
 
 622 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 in an action properly brought. This cause of action being 
 wholly different from that alleged, the complaint was dismissed.^ 
 The petition in an action of forcible entry and detainer stating 
 that the defendant was holding over af cer the expiration of his 
 lease, the plaintiff was not permitted to show that he obtained 
 possession through fraud ; since this would be the averment of 
 one material fact, and the proof of another, ^ When the com- 
 plaint set forth a contract, and on the trial the plaintiff proved 
 without objection a materially different one, and was thereupon 
 nonsuited, the nonsuit was sustained, the court adding that the 
 admission of the evidence Avithout objection made no difference 
 with the operation of the rule.^ And if a complaijit sets forth 
 a cause of action for a nuisance of a certain specified kind, an 
 essentially different one cannot be proved; as, for example, in 
 an action by a lower riparian owner for increasing the flow of a 
 natural watercourse by draining other streams into it, the plain- 
 tiff was not permitted to prove a nuisance which consisted solely 
 in the fouling of such watercourse by the defendant.^ A written 
 contract having been set out in the petition, the plaintiff cannot 
 in place of it prove facts going to show that the defendant is 
 estopped from denying such contract.^ When a iDetition stated 
 a cause of action for work and labor done by the plaintiff for the 
 defendant, but the proofs showed that defendant had only guar- 
 anteed the payment by other persons for services rendered to 
 them, a recovery was held impossible.^ An allegation that the 
 defendant erected a fence across a highwaj-, and thereby ob- 
 structed it, cannot be sustained by proof that the defendant built 
 a stone fence fifteen rods from the road, and thereby caused Avater 
 to flow upon and obstruct the same, for the causes of action are 
 different;' and upon an allegation that the plaintiff did work 
 and labor for defendant on his milldam, proof that the services 
 were performed in harvesting grain is a fatal variance.^ 
 
 1 Tracv i: Ames, 4 Lans. 500, 506. 6 Packard v. SncU, 35 Iowa. 80, 82. 
 
 2 Goldsmitli V. Boersch, 28 Iowa, 351, 7 Hill r. Supervisor, 10 Ohio St. 621. 
 354. B Thatcher v. Heisey, 21 Ohio St. 668. 
 
 3 John.'ion v. Moss, 45 Cal. 515. 
 
 * O'Brien I'. St. Paul, 18 Minn. 176, 181. QlrtrJawce. 
 
 ^ Phillips V. Van Scliaick, 37 Iowa, In the following eases it was held that 
 
 229,237. It was added that if the plain- there was a variance between pleadings and 
 
 tiff wishes to avail himself of an estoppel proof: — 
 
 it must be specially pleaded, citing Kan- Niglujence. An allegation that the en- 
 
 som f. Stanberry, 22 Iowa, 334. gineer of the train which struck plaiutiff
 
 ALLEGATIONS AND PROOFS MUST CORIIKSPOND. 
 
 623 
 
 § 452. * 558. Variance Fatal where Cause of Action in Tort 
 Alleged and one in Contract Proved. By far the most important 
 distinction directly connected with tliis doctrine is that which 
 
 discovered plaintiff in time to prevent the 
 injury, and proof that it was the tirenian 
 and not the engineer wlio saw plaintiff 
 (not curable by amendment) : Chun v. 
 Jveceivers (1901), Ky., 64 S. W. 649; an 
 allegation of negligence in running de- 
 fendant's cars, and proof tliat defendant 
 did not provide plaintiff with a safe place 
 in which to work : Thompson v. Citizens' 
 St. Ry. Co. (1898), 1.52 Ind. 461, 53 N. E. 
 462; an allegation that plaintitf injured 
 herself by stepping into a hole caused by 
 a missing board in a sidewalk, and proof 
 that she stepped upon a loose hoard, which 
 "rocked," turning her foot and causing 
 it to go into the hole : Gagan v. City of 
 Janes ville (1900), 106 Wis 662, 82 N. W. 
 .5.'<8 ; an allegation of an injury to a pas- 
 senger by reason of defendant's negligence, 
 and ])roof of injury to a trespasser by 
 reason of gross negligence : Fitzgibbon v. 
 Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. (1899), 108 la. 614, 
 79 N. W. 477 ; an allegation that defend- 
 ant was negligent in failing to stop its 
 train at a station while plaintiff was 
 getting off, and proof that defendant was 
 negligent in not showing plaintiff the 
 safe way to go from one train to another : 
 Moss y." North Carolina R. R. Co. (1898), 
 122 N. C. 889, 29 S. E. 410; an allegation 
 that the gripman pushed plaintiff from 
 the car, and proof that plaintiff fell in 
 trying to dodge a hlow aimed at him by 
 the gripman : Raming v. Metropolitan 
 St. Hy. Co. (1900), 157 Mo. 477, 57 S. W. 
 268 ; an allegation that fire was negli- 
 gently taken from defendant's threshing 
 engine and placed in the stubble where it 
 communicated to plaintiff's property, and 
 evidence that defendant was negligent in 
 not properly extinguishing the fire after 
 having properly taken it from the engine : 
 Lieuallen v. Mosgrove (1898), 3.3 Ore. 282 ; 
 54 Pac. 200 ; an allegation of joint negli- 
 gence and proof of negligence of defend- 
 ants severally : Chetwood v. California 
 Kat. Bank ('l896), 113 Cal. 414, 45 Pac. 
 704 ; an allegation of negligence in opera- 
 tion of railroad and proof of negligence in 
 use of defective spark arrester : Missouri, 
 etc Ry. Co. v. Garrison (1903), — Kan. — , 
 
 72 Pac. 225 ; location of accident : Dolau 
 1-. City of Milwaukee (1895), 89 Wis. 497, 
 fil N. W. 564; Kolb v. City of Kond du 
 Lac (1903), 118 Wis. 311, 95 N. W. 149. 
 
 Common Carriers, Actions against. 
 Plaintiff having sued defendant on its 
 common-law liability as a common carrier, 
 cannot recover on proof of a special con- 
 tract limiting the common-law liability : 
 Normile v. Oregon, etc. Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 
 177, 69 Pac. 928; where a complaint is 
 drawn on the theory of defendant's lia- 
 bility as a common carrier, a recovery 
 cannot be had against defendant as a 
 warehouseman : Same case. But see, 
 contra, Cavallaro v. Texas, etc. Ry. Co. 
 (1895), 110 Cal. 348, 42 Pac. 918. 
 
 Fraud. In an action to set aside a 
 sale as fraudulent, allegations of actual 
 fraud are not supported by proof of con- 
 structive fraud. The court said : " If the 
 vice which renders the sale null as to 
 them [defendants] was the existence of 
 actual fraud, the complaint must, as this 
 complaint does, charge its presence. If 
 the vice was constructive fraud, then it is 
 incumbent upon the plaintiffs to state the 
 matters which constitute that cause of 
 action. Of course, both actual and con- 
 structive fraud may be pleaded in the 
 same complaint, but if actual fraud only 
 be set up, then, although proof of con- 
 structive fraud may be evidence, having 
 a tendency to support the allegation of 
 actual fraud, yet the finding of construc- 
 tive fraud is not of itself sufficient to 
 support a judgment, for the allegations 
 and proof must correspond : " Finch v. 
 Kent (1900), 24 Mont. 268, 61 Pac. 653. 
 See also Kley v. Healey (1896), 149 N. Y. 
 346, 44 N. E. 150, where allegations of 
 fraud were held not to be supported by 
 the proof. 
 
 Title. A party cannot plead absolute 
 ownership of property and prove a lien 
 upon it merely, nor vice versa : Randall v. 
 Persons (1894), 42 Neb. 607, 60 N. W. 898. 
 See Title, p. 687. But see Olson v. City 
 of Seattle(1903), 30 Wash. 687,71 Pac. 201, 
 p. 619, note 1. Held, in Smith r. Runnels 
 (189G), 97 la. 55, 65 N. W. 1002, that
 
 624 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 subsists between causes of action ex contractu and those ex delicto. 
 It is settled by an almost unanimous series of decisions in various 
 
 plaintiff ia a suit to partition land, who 
 claims in the petition tu have a life estate 
 therein, is not entitled to relief on the 
 ground that she has an estate in fee 
 simple. See, however, the following cases : 
 Where the complaint alleges title and 
 right of possession in the plaintiff, a re- 
 covery may be had on proof tliat plaintiff 
 owns the equity of redemption : Arritigton 
 V. Arrington "(1894), 114 N. C. 116, 19 
 S. E. •!'%. In an action to recover lami, 
 plaintiff may allege title by inheritance 
 and prove title by possession ; Davis v. 
 Leeper (1900), Ky", 56 S. W. 712. In an 
 action to quiet title there is no variance 
 between an allegation of title in fee and 
 proof of an equitable title : Oliver i'. 
 Dougherty (1902), Ariz., 63 Pac. 553. 
 
 Ex}iiess and Implied Contract. Where 
 the complaint alleges an express contract 
 and proof shows an implied contract, and 
 vt':e versa, no recovery can be had : Buell 
 V. Brown (1900), 131 Cal. 158, 63 Pac. 
 167 ; Morrow v. Board of Education (1895), 
 7 S. D. 553, 64 N. W. 1 126. Contra, Hecht 
 V. Stanton (1895), 6 Wyo. 84, 42 Pac. 749. 
 See also on this general question. Gillies 
 V. Improvement Co. (1895), 147 N. Y. 420, 
 42 N. E. 196 ; Columbus, etc. Ry. Co. v. 
 Gaffney (1901), 65 0. St. 104, 64 N. E. 
 152. 
 
 Rescission. Where a breach of contract 
 is alleged, the pleader cannot on the trial 
 elect to rescind the contract and recover 
 the portion of the price paid : Detroit 
 Heating Co. v. Stevens (1897), 16 Utah, 
 177, 52 Pac. 379. 
 
 Mortgage. Where a complaint is predi- 
 cated on the theory of lack of mental 
 capacity to execute a deed, no recovery 
 can be had on theory that the deed i.s 
 in reality a mortgage : Swank i'. Swank 
 (1900), 37 Ore. 439, 61 Pac. 846. 
 
 Trust. In an action to enforce a trust, 
 an allegation that a husband i.s trustee of 
 property alleged to belong to his deceased 
 wife's estate, is not supported by evidence 
 that he had received money from his 
 wife's separate property : Elmore i-. El- 
 more (1896), 114 Cal. .516, 46 Pac. 458. 
 
 Insurance. A complaint upon a con- 
 tract of insurance for ?500 upon a certain 
 building i.-* not supported by evidence of 
 
 a contract for $600 insurance upon two 
 buildings on the same lot : Waldron r. 
 Home Mutual Ins. Co. (1894), 9 Wash. 
 534, 38 Pac. 136. 
 
 Nuisance. Where, in an action against 
 the city for damages caused by a nuisance, 
 the petition char<res that the city origi- 
 nated the nuisance, proof that it continued 
 it only will not sustain a recovery, since 
 in tiie latter case a request to abate is 
 necessary : Kychlicki i\ City of St. Louis 
 (1893), 115 Mo. 662, 22 S. W. 908. 
 
 Account and Account Stated. Where 
 the petition sets up a cause of action on 
 an open account, plaintiff cannot recover 
 upon proof of an account stated, as the 
 two are distinct and inconsistent : Mc- 
 Cormick v. Interstate, etc. Ry. Co. (1900), 
 1.54 Mo 191, 55 S. W. 252. 
 
 Trespass. Where one act of trespass is 
 alleged to have been committed at a desig- 
 nated time and place, no recovery can be 
 had for a different act .shown to have 
 been committed at a different time : La 
 Rue V. Smith (1897), 153 N. Y. 428, 47 
 N. E. 796. 
 
 Contract. Plaintiff cannot allege one 
 special contract and recover on proof 
 of a different contract : Cremer v. Miller 
 (1893), 56 Minn. 52, 57 N. W. 318; Win- 
 chester V. Joslyn (1903), — Colo. — , 72 
 Pac. 1079. But under an allegation that 
 plaintiff performed services for defendant 
 "at his instance and request," evidence 
 may be introduced showing facts giving 
 rise to an implied contract only : Colum- 
 bus, etc. Ry. Co. v. Gaffney (1901), 65 
 0. St. 104, 61 N. E. 1.52. Under an alle- 
 gation that a grantee orally agreed to 
 assume a mortgage "and thcrelty and 
 otherwise became legally and equitably 
 bound to the grantor and to the mort- 
 gagee to pay the same," evidence that the 
 grantee executed a bond to pay the de- 
 ficiency if any, is admissible : Wager v- 
 Link (1896), 150 N. Y. 549, 44 N. E. 1103. 
 There is a variance between an allegation 
 that a bond sued on was in the penal sum 
 of §2,500 and evidence that it was in the 
 sum of $1,500: Chicago, K. & W. Ry. Co. 
 V. Evans (1896), 57 Kan. 286, 46 Pac. 303. 
 
 Miscflloneous. An allegation that plain- 
 tiff is indebted to defendant is not sup-
 
 ALLEGATIONS AND PROOFS MUST CORRESPOND. 
 
 625 
 
 States, that if a complaint or petition in terms alleges a cause of 
 action ex delicto, for fraud, conversion, or any other kind of tort, 
 
 ported by evidence that plaintiff's assignor 
 is indebted to defendant : Anderson v. 
 Alsetii (1895), 6 S. D. 566, 62 N. W. 435. 
 There is a fatal variance between an alle- 
 gation that a contract was made bv all the 
 heirs of a named intestate and evidence 
 that it was made by a portion only : 
 Thompson v. Fenn (1896), 100 Ga. 2.34, 28 
 S. E. 39. Where suit is brouglit on a 
 sheriff's bond for damages alleged to have 
 been sustained by the failure of the sheriff 
 to properly perform his duties, the plaintiff 
 cannot recover on account of breaches of 
 duty not alleged in the declaration : Hall 
 & IJrowu Co. V. Barnes (1902), 115 Ga. 
 945, 42 S E. 276. If the pleading is of 
 allowed claims and the proof is of claims 
 presented but not adjusted, there is a 
 variance: Hofmanu v. Tucker (1899), 58 
 Neb. 457, 78 Jv. W. 941. A petition alleg- 
 ing that a certain sum had come to the 
 husband by reason of the marriage, is not 
 supported by evidence that the money was 
 voluntarily allowed to the husband by the 
 ■wife after marriage : Dillon v. Stariu 
 (1895), 44 Neb. 881, 63 N. W. 12. 
 
 The fact that acts of negligence are 
 alleged conjunctively does not require that 
 all of them must be proved : Duell v. 
 Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1902), 115 Wis. 
 .516, 92 N. W. 269*; Stern v. City of St. 
 Louis (1901), 161 Mo. 146, 61 S. W. 594; 
 Terre Haute, etc. R. R. Co. v. Sheeks 
 (1900), 155 Ind. 74, 56 N. E. 434; Came- 
 ron V. Bryan (1893), 89 la. 214, 56 N. W. 
 434. 
 
 And in general, if one alleges more 
 than is necessary, such additional alle- 
 gations need not be proved : Young v. 
 Gormley (1903), 119 la. 541, 93 N. W. .565 ; 
 Kaline r. Stover (1893), 88 la. 245, 55 
 N. W. 346; Reizensteiu i\ Clark (1897), 
 410 la. 287, 73 N. W. 588; Harwood v. 
 Davenport (1898), 105 La. 592, 75 N. W. 
 487 ; Anderson v. Union Terminal Ry. Co. 
 (1901), 161 Mo. 411, 61 S. W. 874; Meyer 
 V. Koehring (1895), 129 Mo. 15, 31 S. "w. 
 449; Gannon v. Laclede Gas Co. (1898), 
 145 Mo. 502, 46 S. W. 968. But see, how- 
 ever, Botkin V. Cassody (1898), 106 la. 
 334, 76 N. W. 722, which appears incon- 
 sistent with this rule. 
 
 Evidence Held Admissible under Particular 
 Allegations. 
 
 In general, the proof must be confined 
 to the issues as made by the pleadings: 
 Thompson v. Wertz (1894), 41*Neb. 31, 
 .59 N. W. 518; Callen i'. Rose (1896), 47 
 Neb. 638, 66 N. W. 639 ; Avers i-. Wolcott 
 (1902), — Neb. — , 92 N. "w. 1036. See 
 the following cases for specific illustra- 
 tions of this rule : — 
 
 Acr.ejitance : Thompson v. Perkins 
 (1896), 97 la. 607, 66 N. W. 874. Agree- 
 ment to dtliver : Central R. R. Co. v. Has- 
 selkus (1893), 91 Ga. 382, 17 S. E. 838. 
 Agreement to pai/ for services : Owen v. 
 Meade (1894), 104 "Cal. 179, 37 Pac. 923. 
 Breach of warranty : Snowden v. Water- 
 man (1897), 100 Ga. 588, 28 S. E. 121. 
 Contract: Duval v. Am. T. & T. Co. 
 (1902), 113 Wis. 504, 89 N. W. 482. 
 Description of property : Boyd's Adm'r f . 
 Farmers' Bank (1902), Ky.,69 S. W. 964; 
 Baruhart v. Ehrhart (1898), 33 Ore. 274, 
 54 Pac. 195. Employment : Holton !.•. 
 Waller (1895), 95 la. 545, 64 N. W. 6.33. 
 Extreme cruelty: Winterburg v. Winter- 
 burg (1893), 52 Kan. 406, 34 Pac. 971. 
 Finding purchaser : Clark v. Allen (1899), 
 125 Cal. 276, 57 Pac. 985. Fraud: First 
 Nat. Bank v. McKinney (1896), 47 Neb. 
 149, 66 N. W. 280. Goods sold and de- 
 livered: Gaar, Scott, & Co. v. Brundage 
 (1903), 89 Mian. 412, 94 N. W. 1091. Illegal 
 voting: McLain r. Maracle (1900), 60 Neb. 
 359, 83 N. W. 829. Indebtedness : Klein- 
 schmidt r. Kleinschmidt (1893), 13 Mont. 
 64, 32 Pac. 1. Money loaned: Clarksou 
 V. Kennett (1895), 17 Mont. 563, 44 Pac. 
 88. Negligence : Dickey v. Northern Pac. 
 Ry. Co. (1898), 19 Wash. 350, 53 Pac. 347; 
 McClellan v. Chippewa Valley Elec. Ry. 
 Co. (1901), 110 Wis. 326, 85 N. W. 1018; 
 Brown v. Benson (1897), 101 Ga. 753, 29 
 S. E. 215; Kelly v. Cable Co. (1893), 13 
 Mont. 411, 34 Pac. 611; Spaulding v. C. 
 St. P. & K. C. Ry. Co. (1896), 98 la. 205, 
 67 N. W. 227; Lewis v. Schultz (1896), 
 98 la. 341, 67 N. W. 266; Jenkins v. Mc- 
 Carthy (1895), 45 S. C. 278, 22 S. E. 883 ; 
 Neville v. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. (1900), 
 158 Mo. 293, 59 S. W. 123 ; Schwartzschild, 
 40
 
 626 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDirS. 
 
 and the proof establishes a breach of contract express or implied, 
 no recovery can be had, and the action must be dismissed, even 
 though by disregarding the averments of tort, and treating them 
 as surplusage, there might be left remaining the necessary and 
 sufficient allegations, if they stood alone, to show a liability upon 
 the contract. 1 While this doctrine is firmly established, and 
 Avhile there is no difficulty in its application, when it is once 
 ascertained that the cause of action is for a tort, it is not so easy, 
 in the absence of any specific facts, and in the careless mode of 
 pleading which is too prevalent, to determine whether the cause 
 of action stated by the plaintiff is ex delicto or ex contractu. 
 Under the former system, the presence or absence of certain 
 
 etc. Co. V. Weeks (1903), 66 Kan. 800, 72 
 Pac. 274 ; Nolaiid v. Great Northern Ry. 
 Co. (190.3), 31 Wash. 430, 71 Pac. 109S; 
 Wolf v. Hemrich Bros. Co. (1902), 28 
 Wash. 187, 68 Pac. 440. .Notice and 
 knowledge: De Lay v. Carney (1897), 100 
 la. 687, 69 N. W. 1053 ; Hunt v. City of 
 Dubuque (1895), 96 la. 314, 65 N. W. 
 319; King v. Howell (1895), 94 la. 208, 
 62 N. W. 738. Ownership: Darnall v. 
 Bennett (1896), 98 la. 410, 67 N. VV. 273. 
 t^ereices rendered : Bean v. Fercival Cop- 
 per Mining Co. (1901), 111 Wis. 598, 87 
 N. W. 465. Validity of lev)/: Chapman ;;. 
 James (1895), 96 la. 233, 64 N. W. 795. 
 Votes cast at election : Furguson v. Henry 
 (1895), 95 la. 439, 64 N. W. 292.] 
 
 1 From the great number of cases 
 which maintain this doctrine I have se- 
 lected those which are the most recent 
 and important, and which discuss it with 
 tlie greatest fulness. Walter v. Bennett, 
 16 N. Y. 250; Ro.«s v. Mather, 51 N. Y. 
 108; De Graw r. Elmore, 50 N. Y. 1 ; 
 Sager v. Blain, 44 N. Y. 445, 448 ; Moore 
 V. Noble, 53 Barb. 425 ; Rothe v. Rothe, 
 31 Wis. 570, 572; Anderson r. Case, 28 
 Wis. 505, 508 ; Kewaunee Cy. Sup. v. 
 Decker, 30 Wis. 624; Johannesson w. 
 Borscheniu.s, 35 Wis. 131, 135; Dean 
 r. Yates, 22 Ohio St. 388, 397 ; Watts v. 
 McAllister, 33 Ind. 264. See, per contra. 
 Dates V. Kendall, 67 N. C. 241 ; Gulp v. 
 Steere, 47 Kan. 746. See also Barnes v. 
 Quigley, 59 N. Y. 265 ; Matthews r. CadV, 
 61 id. 561 ; Lane »\ Cameron, 38 Wi.s. 613 ; 
 Pierce v. Carey, 37 id. 232 ; Goss v. Boul- 
 der Cy. Com'is, 4 Culo. 468; Neudeckerv. 
 
 Kohlherg, 81 N. Y. 296, 299,301; People 
 V. Deiiisoii, 84 id. 272 ; 80 id. 656 ; Neftel 
 V. Lightstone, 77 id. 96; Lockwood v. 
 Quackenbush, 83 id. 600 ; Lindsay v. Mul- 
 queen, 26 Hun, 485; Front r. Hardin, 56 
 Ind. 165 ; Hachett v. Bank o^ Cal., 57 Cal. 
 335 ; Freeman r. Grant, 132 N. Y. 22 ; 
 Mea V. Pierce, 63 Hun, 400. These cases, 
 as well as others, show that an action can- 
 not be changed from tort to contract by 
 amendment at the trial. 
 
 [^Sce also, to same effect, Noble v. Atchi- 
 son, etc. R. R. Co. (1896), 4 Okla. 534, 
 46 Pac. 483 ; A, F. Shapleigh Hardware 
 Co. V. Hamilton (1902), 70 Ark. 319, 68 
 S. W. 490; Miller v. Ilirschberg (1895), 
 27 Ore. 522, 40 Pac. 506 ; Brooke v. Cole 
 (1899), 108 Ga. 251, 33 S. E. 849; Holl- 
 mann v. Lange (1898), 143 Mo. 100, 44 
 S. W. 752 ; Westinghouse Co. v. Tilden 
 (1898), 56 Neb. 129, 76 N. W. 416; Pcay 
 V. Salt Lake City (1894), 11 Utah, 331, 40 
 Pac. 206; Ellis r. Flaherty (1902), 65 
 Kan. 621, 70 Pac. 586 (an important case). 
 
 Compare the case of Wilson v. Fuller 
 (1894), 58 Minn. 149, 59 N. W. 988, in 
 which it is held that where a party alleges 
 that certain representations, amounting to 
 a warranty, were fraudulently made, and 
 ])roves the warranty and its breach, but 
 fails to prove the fraud, he may recover 
 for the breach of the warranty. The 
 court observes that the contrary is held in 
 Ross c. Mather, 51 N. Y. 108. Followed 
 in Hrown v. Doyle (1897), 69 Minn. .543, 
 72 N. W. 814. And see, in this connection, 
 Higgins r. Hayden (1897), 53 Neb. 61, 73 
 N. W. 280.]
 
 ALLEGATIONS AND PROOFS MUST COKRESPOND. 627 
 
 technical formulas removed all doubt; but as these arbitrary 
 means of distinction have been abandoned, and as pleadings fre- 
 ([uently, in violation of true principles, combine charges of fraud, 
 of guilty knowledge, of taking, carrying away, and conversion, 
 and the like, with averments of undertakings and promises and 
 their breach, it is sometimes impossible to decide which class of 
 allegations constitute the gravamen of the action, and which is 
 to be regarded as surplusage. The decided cases will not give 
 us much aid, for pleadings with substantially the same averments 
 have received diametrically opposite constructions. There is 
 thus a conflict among the decisions in reference to this subject 
 irreconcilable upon principle, and only to be evaded by pronounc- 
 ing one set of them to be erroneous. Although it is simply 
 impossible to develop any general rule of interpretation from 
 these cases, a few are selected as examples. 
 
 § 453. * 559< How Nature of Cause of Action is determined. 
 Illustrations of Causes ex contractu. It may be considered a 
 settled point, on principle and on authority, that the nature of 
 the cause of action is determined by the allegations of the com- 
 plaint or petition,! so that the inquiry need never extend beyond 
 this first pleading in the suit. I shall first cite illustrations of 
 causes ex contractu. In an action by a vendee to recover damages 
 arising on the sale of a horse to him, the complaint, after setting 
 forth the sale, and that the horse was in fact "wind-broken," 
 stated that the defendant knew of this defect, and " fraudulently 
 concealed the same with intent to deceive " the plaintiff, giving 
 the circumstances in unnecessary detail; and that, "further to 
 mislead and deceive the plaintiff, the defendant falsely repre- 
 sented and warranted to the plaintiff that the horse was sound, 
 etc. ; that by reason of the premises the plaintiff was deceived, 
 and was induced to purchase and pay for the horse ; " concluding 
 with an allegation of damages and a prayer for judgment. The 
 
 1 Welsh V. Darragh, 52 N. Y. 590. 564; Graves ;•. Waite, 59 id. 156; Green- 
 
 Although the immediate question was tree v. Roseustock, 61 id. 58-3; Sheahan 
 
 whetiier the cause was a referable oue, v. Shanahan, 5 Hun, 461 ; Harden v. Cor- 
 
 yet the reasoning and conclusion are gen- bett, 6 id. 522 ; Loomis v. Mowry, 8 id. 
 
 eral. Some of the cases lay some stress 311 ; Harrington v. Bruce, 84 N. Y. 103; 
 
 upon the kind of summons used as in- Sparman v. Keira, 83 id. 245, 249; Harris 
 
 dicative of the pleader's intention. The v. Todd, 16 Hun, 248; Westcott i;. Aius- 
 
 following are further examples of actions worth, 9 id. 53; Stitt v. Little, 63 N. Y. 
 
 held to be on contract: Freer w. Denton, 427, 432; Bishop v. Davis, 9 Hun, 342; 
 
 PI N. Y. 492; Vilmar v. Schall, 61 id. Slutts r. Chafee, 48 Wis. 617.
 
 628 CIVIL REMEDIKS. 
 
 Superior Court of New York City held that this complaint stated 
 a cause of action on contract for the breach of a warrant)-, and 
 that all the averments of fraud must be treated as surplusage.^ 
 A complaint contained the following averments : that the defend- 
 ants, having in their possession certain securities, the property 
 of the plaintiff, entered into an agreement with him, whereby 
 they promised to deliver up said securities to him ; that he had 
 demanded the same, but the defendants wrongfully refused to 
 deliver them, and wrongfully disposed of and converted them to 
 their oivn use. The New York Court of Appeals pronounced 
 this cause of action to be on contract, and not for a tort.^ In 
 another quite similar case the complaint stated that the plaintiffs, 
 at, etc., consigned to the defendants, who were commission- 
 merchants at, etc., certain specified articles, to be sold by them, 
 and the net proceeds thereof remitted; that the defendants re- 
 ceived the goods, and sold them for a sum named; and after 
 deducting all expenses, there was due to the plaintiffs the sum 
 of, etc., which they demanded of the defendants, who omitted 
 and refused to pay the same, and have converted the same to 
 their own use, to the damage of the plaintiffs of, etc. This cause 
 of action was also held by the same court to be on contract, and 
 not for a tort.^ In a more recent action, brought for the price of 
 certain bonds that had been sold to the plaintiff, and which had 
 turned out to be null and void, the claim to recover was put at 
 
 1 Quintard v. Newton, 5 Robt. 72. The See also Sheahan v. Shanahan, 5 Ilun, 
 plaintiff, at the trial, proved the warrauty, 461; Harden v. Corbett, 6 Iliin, 522; 
 but gave do evidence of the scienter, and Greentree v. Rosenstock, 61 N. Y. 583, 
 the complaint was dismissed. The Gen- per Dwight, C. ; Harlow i-. Mills, 58 Hun, 
 eral Term held that he should have re- 391. 
 
 covered, putting their decision upon the ^ Conaughty v. Nichols, 42 N. Y. 83. 
 allegation of a warranty. As this aver- The complaint was dismissed at the trial, 
 ment stood alone, it would seem that it on the ground that the cause of action 
 ought to have been rejected as surplusage- proved was on contract, while the one 
 This decision, in the ligiit of more recent pleaded was for tort. Tliis ruling was 
 ones, must be regarded as erroneous : it is reversed, the appellate court s.niying that 
 not, however, opposed to the leading doc- the single concluding averment of a con- 
 trine stated in the text. version should be treated as surplusage. 
 
 2 Austin V. Rawdon, 44 N. Y. 63, 68, The opinion contains an elaborate discus- 
 69. The statement of a wrongful dis- sion of authorities. This and the preced- 
 position and conversion was said to be ing case are substantially alike. See also 
 merely the averment of a breach. There Byxbie v. Wood, 24 N. Y. 607, 610, 611, 
 can be no doubt as to t!ie correctness of in which certain averments of fraudulent 
 this decision. The central fact of the practices were held to be surplusage, and 
 complaint was made to be the promise, the cause of action to be on contract. 
 
 and the breach was iuartificially cliarged.
 
 ALLEGATIONS AND I'KOOFS MUST COKKESI'OND. 629 
 
 the trial on the ground of implied contract, — a warranty of title. 
 The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, because it was 
 based upon the theory of fraud, that its allegations were of deceit 
 and false representations. The reporter does not think best to 
 disclose the nature of the complaint, although the entire decision 
 turned upon it. The court held that the cause of action was on 
 contract.^ 
 
 § 454. * 560. Illustrations of Causes ex delicto. The following 
 are instances of actions ex delicto. In a suit growing out of the 
 sale of a horse bought by the vendee, the complaint was, " That 
 on, etc., at, etc., the plaintiff purchased a certain horse of the 
 defendant for the agreed price of $120, and paid defendant said 
 sum ; that the defendant, to induce the plaintiff to buy the said 
 horse, falsely and fraudulently represented the said horse worth 
 and of the value of $120, and guaranteed the said horse to be 
 sound in all respects, and wholly free from disease; that said 
 horse was not sound or free from disease, but was unsound and 
 diseased in this (describing), which said disease was well known 
 to defendant at the time of the sale," etc., to the plaintiff's 
 damage, etc. This cause of action was held by the New York 
 Supreme Court to be for deceit, and not on a warranty. ^ The 
 
 1 Ledwich I'. McKim, 53 N. Y. 307, 316. of action on contract by which the tort 
 
 As to the allegations which must be made damages were liquidated. 3 
 
 and proved in order to establish a cause of ^ Moore v. Noble, 53 Barb. 425. The 
 
 action for deceit, see Meyer v. Amidon, 45 following are additional examples of ac- 
 
 N. Y. 169; Oberlander y. Spiess, 45 N. Y. tions held to be ex delicto: Barnes v. 
 
 175 ; Marsh v. Talker, 40 N. Y. 562 ; Mar- Quigley, 59 N. Y. 265 ; Matthews v. Cady, 
 
 shall y. Gray, 57 Barb. 414; Weed r. Case, 61 id. 561; Peck v. Root, 5 Huu, 547; 
 
 55 Barb. 534 ; Gutchess v. Whiting, 46 Lane v. Cameron, 38 Wis. 603 ; Pierce v. 
 
 Barb. 139 ; Stitt v. Little, 63 N. Y. 427, Carey, 37 id. 232 ; Keudecker v. Kohlberg, 
 
 432; Westcott v. Ainsworth, 9 Hun, 53. 31 N. Y. 296, 299, 301 ; People v. Denison, 
 
 ^A complaint averring the delivery 84 id. 272 ; 80 id. 656 ; Lockwood v. 
 
 of merchandise by plaintiff to defend- Quackenbush, 83 id. 600; Stitt r. Little, 
 
 ants, under an agreement that defendants 63 id. 427, 432 ; Bishop v. Davis, 9 Hun, 
 
 should sell the same, and account for the 342 ; Westcott v. Ainsworth, 9 id. 53. 
 
 proceeds, less expenses and a certain com- ^Where negligence is clearly the grava- 
 
 mission, but that defendants "wrongfully men of the complaint, the allegations of 
 
 and unlawfully retained and converted to a promise to repair defective machinery, 
 
 tlieir own use" an excess over the agreed merely to negative any presumption that 
 
 commission, declares upon a contract plaintiff had assumed the risk of the de- 
 
 rather than upon a tort. Hutchcroft v. fective machinery by continuing in the 
 
 Herren (1898), 33 Ore. 1, 52 Pac. 692. employment after the defect became 
 
 See also Mcintosh v. Rankin (1896), known to him, does not warrant defend- 
 
 134 Mo. 340, 35 S. W. 995, for an inter- ant in assuming at the trial that the 
 
 esting case involving allegations indicative action is. for breacli of contract to repair 
 
 both of contract and tort, where the court defects : Manuum v. Bullion, etc. Mining 
 
 held tliat the petition stated a single cause Co. (1897), 15 Utah, 534, 50 Pac. 834.]
 
 630 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 following case is even still stronger ; for although it was conceded 
 that a contract was fully set forth in the pleading, yet the aver- 
 ments of fraud were held to fix the true character of the action. 
 The claim was for damages arising from the sale of a horse, and 
 sustained by the purchaser. The complaint alleged the sale; 
 that at the time thereof the horse was lame in cue leg ; that de- 
 fendant warranted and falsely and fraudulently represented that 
 this lameness resulted from an injury to his foot, and nowhere 
 else ; that when his foot grew out he would be well, and that he 
 had only been lame two weeks ; that plaintiff, relying upon this 
 warranty and representation, and believing them to be true, 
 bought the horse, and paid the price (the representations were 
 then negatived); that the horse was lame in his gambrel joint, 
 and had been so for a long time, all which the defendant, at the 
 time of the sale and the making such warranty and representa- 
 tions, well knew ; that by reason of the premises the defendant 
 falsely and fraudulently deceived him, — to his damage of $500. 
 The cause of action thus stated was held to be for deceit, and 
 not for a breach of warrant}-.^ 
 
 § 455. * 561. Further Examples of Variance where Tort is Al- 
 leged and Contract Proved. The doctrine that a cause of action 
 ex contractu cannot be proved at the trial when the complaint or 
 petition states one ex delicto has been applied to the following 
 classes of cases: where the complaint alleged improper, careless, 
 and negligent conduct, and concealment of material facts by the 
 defendant;^ where the complaint was for the conversion of goods 
 or moneys, and the plaintiff, at the trial, relied upon the breach 
 of an implied contract for money had and received ;3 where the 
 
 1 Ross V. Mather, 51 N. Y. 108; Mar- allegations of fraud were irrelevant and 
 
 shall V. Gray, 57 Barb. 414; McGoveru v. non-issuable; also that the summons cau- 
 
 Pavn, 32 Barb. 8.3, all of which hold the not be used to interpret the jjleadings. 
 
 causes of action therein stated to be fraud, Graves v. Waite, again, was distinguished 
 
 and that the plaintiff must prove a sc/>»/e;-; in Barnes <;. Quigley, 59 N. Y. 265, and 
 
 AValter v. Bennett, 16 N. Y. 2.50 ; Belknap Mattlicws r. Cady, 61 N. Y. 651. See also 
 
 I'. Sealey, 14 N. Y. 143. Conaughty v. I'eck v. Root, 5 Hun, 547 (fraud) ; Pierce 
 
 Xiciiols, 42 N. Y. 83. Ross v. Mather was v. Carey, 37 Wis. 232 (fraud), 
 distinguished in the ca.se of Graves r. - Hothe v. Rothe, 31 Wis. 570, 572. 
 
 Waite, 59 N. Y. 156, and it was held in The court furtlier held that the rule mu.st 
 
 the latter ca.se tliat, the gist of the action be applied, even though the allegations of 
 
 beiuo' upon contract, allegations of fraud- tort failed to state a sufficient ground for a 
 
 ulent representations inducing the plaintiff recovery, if they were enough to determine 
 
 to enter into tlie contract and a demand of the nature of the cause of action, 
 judgment for damages for the same did •* Anderson v. Case, 28 Wis. 505, 508; 
 
 not change the action to tort ; that the Kewaunee Cy. Sup. v. Decker, 30 Wis.
 
 ALLEGATIONS AND PROOFS MUST CORRESPOND. 
 
 631 
 
 suit was brought to recover the possession of personal property, 
 and the cause of action as proved was for money had and re- 
 ceived, or money due upon a general indebtedness ; ^ and finallj^ 
 where a case of deceit and fraudulent representations was stated, 
 and the proof established the breach of a contract. ^ In addition 
 to the general doctrine, that a party should be fully and truly 
 apprised of the nature of the claim set up against him, there is 
 a special reason why the plaintiff cannot recover for a breach of 
 contract when the cause of action stated in the record is for 
 deceit or any other tort. In many actions of tort the defendant 
 maybe taken on a body execution, issued upon the judgment; 
 while a simple breach of contract never exposes him to that 
 liability. If, therefore, a cause of action on contract could be 
 proved and judgment thereon recovered when one for tort was 
 alleged, the record might show a case for arrest on final process, 
 although the issues actually tried involved no such consequence.'' 
 [§§ * 562, *563, * 564. These sections, consisting of quota- 
 tions from the Wisconsin case of Supervisors v. Decker, are given 
 below in the note.*] 
 
 €24 ; Johannesson v. Borschenius, 35 Wis. 
 131, 13.5 ; Walter v. Bcnuett, 16 N. Y. 250. 
 
 1 Sager v. Blain, 44 N. Y. 445, 448, 450. 
 
 ■•2 De Graw v. Elmore, 50 N. Y. 1 ; 
 Ross V. Mather, 51 N. Y. 108; Moore r. 
 Noble, 53 Barb. 425; Watts v. McAllister, 
 33 Ind. 264 ; Dean v. Yates, 22 (Jhio St. 
 388, 397. When a complaint sets out a 
 cause of action upon contract, and not for 
 tort, as, for example, to recover money 
 had and received by the defendant to the 
 plaintiff's use, any averments as to the 
 nature of the defendant's employment 
 showing that it was of a fiduciary char- 
 acter, and the like, are wholly immaterial ; 
 they form no part of the cause of action, 
 and are not issuable. Prouty v. Swift, 51 
 N. Y. .594, 601. 
 
 •^ This special reason for the rule is 
 alluded to in several of the foregoing 
 cases. 
 
 ■* § 562. I shall conclude this sub- 
 division 'by quoting some passages from 
 the most able and practically instructive 
 opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Dixon in the 
 case of [^Kewaunee Sup. v. Decker, 30 
 Wis. 624, 626. The action was brought 
 to recover money of the county alleged 
 
 to have been converted by the defend- 
 ant to his own use, he being Clerk of the 
 Board of Supervisors. The complaint 
 contained averments of fraud, of negli- 
 gence, of conversion, and of contract. A 
 demurrer to it having been overruled, the 
 defendant appealed.] The whole theory 
 of pleading is discussed in this elaborate 
 judgment ; but it is peculiarly api)ropriate 
 in connection with the subjects of insuffi- 
 ciency, redundancy, and immateriality of 
 allegations. " It would certainly," he said, 
 " be a most anomalous and hitherto un- 
 known condition of the law of pleading, 
 were it established that the plaintiff could 
 file a complaint, the particular nature and 
 object of which no (me could tell, but 
 which might and should be held good as 
 a statement of two or three or more dif- 
 ferent and inconsistent causes of action, 
 as one in tort, one upon a money demand 
 upon contract, and one in equity, all com- 
 bined or fused and moulded into one 
 count, so that the defendant must await 
 the events of the trial, and until the plain- 
 tiff's proofs are all in, before being in- 
 formed with any certainty or definitcness 
 what he was called u]>on ti) meet, 'i lie
 
 632 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 456. * 565. Amendments Allowed by the Code. The new 
 procedure, from its dread lest the proper requirements as to form 
 
 proposition tliat a compliiint or any single 
 count of it may be so framed with a double, 
 treble, or any number of aspects, looking 
 to so many distinct and incongruous 
 causes of action, in order to hit the 
 exigencies of the plaintiff's case or any 
 possible demands of his proofs at the trial, 
 we must say strikes us as sometiiing ex- 
 ceedingly novel in the rules of pleading. 
 We do not tliiuk it is tlie law, and, unless 
 the legislature compels us by some new 
 statutory regulation, shall hereafter be 
 very slow to change this conclusion. The 
 defendant supposes the complaint herein 
 to be intended to be one in trover, 
 charging or seeking to charge the de- 
 fendant with the wrongful conversion 
 of certain moneys which came into his 
 hands a.s a public officer, and which be- 
 longed to the plaintiff; and acting upon 
 such supposition, he has demurred to the 
 complaint as not stating facts sufficient 
 to constitute that cause of action. In an- 
 swer to this view, the plaintiffs rather 
 concede than otherwise that the complaint 
 is and was intended to be one in tort for 
 the conversion ; but at the same time they 
 insist, that, if it is not good as a complaint 
 of that kind, it is sufficient as a complaint 
 or count in an action for money had and 
 received ; and, being sufficient for that 
 purpose, they argue that the demurrer 
 was properly overruled. In other words, 
 their position is, that it is a question now 
 open to speculation and inquiry on tliis 
 demurrer, whether upon all or any of the 
 facts stated in the complaint taken col- 
 lectively or separately, or even by severing 
 the allegations themselves so as to elimi- 
 nate or discard certain portions of them 
 as surplusage, a cause of action of any 
 kind is or can be made out ; and if it 
 be found that it can, then the demurrer 
 should be overruled. To show tliat the 
 complaint may be upheld as one for money 
 had and received for the use of the plain- 
 tiff, and the action considered as one of 
 that kind, counsel gravely contend tliat 
 the averments that the defendant made 
 fraudulent representations, and acted 
 falsely, fraudulently, and wrongfully in 
 claiming and withholding the money.s, 
 
 and that he converted the same, etc., may 
 be disregarded, and rejected as surplusage. 
 § .563. "In support of this position, 
 counsel cited several New York decisions, 
 and .some in this court where after trial 
 and judgment, or after issue has been taken 
 on the merits, or after the trial has commenced 
 and the plaintiff's case is closed, it has 
 been held that such allegations may be 
 disregarded. The decisions were in ac- 
 tions like the present, aud others involv- 
 ing a somewhat similar question under 
 the circumstances above stated, and were 
 made in favor of a good cause of action 
 proved or proposed to be, and which by a 
 fair and reasonable interpretation of the 
 pleadings could be said to be within the 
 scope of them, or to he fairly mapped out 
 and delineated by the averments, so that 
 the defendant was apprii^cd of the demand 
 made against him, aud of the facts relied 
 upon to establish it. The great liberality 
 of the code aud the broad powers of 
 amendment conferred and enforced upon 
 the courts under such circumstances are 
 well known [^citing provisions in reference 
 to amendments, variances, and the inter- 
 pretation of pleadings]. These provisions 
 for the most part, if not entirely, relate to 
 the proceedings in an action after issue 
 joined on the merits upon or after trial, or 
 after judgment on the merits, when the 
 facts are made to appear, and the substan- 
 tial rights of the parties are shown. They 
 are enacted in amplification and enlarge- 
 ment of the rules of the common law on 
 the same subject, by which it is well un- 
 derstood that there were many defects, 
 imperfections, and omissions constituting 
 fatal objections on demurrer, which were 
 waived after issue joined, and a trial of 
 verdict and judgment on the merits. The 
 cases cited by counsel are all of them 
 manifestly sucli as fall within these pro- 
 visions and rules, and none of them touch 
 or have any bt'ariug upon the question 
 or case here presented. No case arising 
 U])on demurrer to tlie complaint is cited, 
 and it is believed none can be, hoMing 
 any such doctrine as that contended for." 
 The learned jutlgc cites the following 
 cases as illustrations: Barlow v. Scott, 2i
 
 AMENDMENTS OF PLEADINGS. 
 
 633 
 
 should degenerate into mere technicalities, and from its opposi- 
 tion to the decision of controversies upon points not involving 
 
 N. Y. 40 ; Byxbie v. Wood, 24 N. Y. 607 , 
 Austin V. Kawdou, 44 N. Y. 63 ; Greason 
 V. Keteltas, 17 N. Y. 491 ; Emory v. Pease, 
 20 N. Y. 62 ; Couauglity v. Nicliols, 42 
 N. Y. 83; Wright v. Hooker, 10 N. Y. 
 51; Walter v. Bennett, 16 N. Y. 250; 
 Strocl)e V. Fehl, 22 Wis. 347 ; Hopkins 
 V. Oilman, 22 Wis. 481 ; Tenney v. State 
 Bk. of Wis., 20 Wis. 152; Leonard v. 
 Kogan, 20 Wis. 540; Samuels v. Blau- 
 chard, 25 Wis. 329 ; Vilas v. Ma.son, 25 
 Wis. 310, 328. It is certain that the 
 decision in some of these cases is not 
 based upon the doctrine stated by the 
 judge, — that is, upon any ground of 
 amendment or of waiving the objection 
 by answering, etc. ; but it is put upon the 
 broad and fundamental principle, that, 
 under the codes, equitable and legal re- 
 liefs may be granted in the same action, 
 or one may be granted when the other 
 is demanded : the other cases, however, 
 fully sustain the position taken by the 
 opinion. 
 
 § 564. " It thus appears that the au- 
 thorities relied upon do not sanction the 
 position that a complaint in the first in- 
 stance, and when challenged by demurrer, 
 may be uncertain and ambulatory, pur- 
 posely so made, now presenting one face 
 to the court and now another, at the mere 
 will of the pleader, so that it may be re- 
 garded as one in tort or one on contract or 
 in equity, as he is pleased to name it, and 
 as the necessities of the argument may 
 require, and, if discovered to be good in 
 any of the phases which it may thus be 
 made to assume, that it must be upheld in 
 that aspect as a proper and sufficient plead- 
 ing by the court. As already observed, 
 the opinion of the court is quite to the 
 contrary. We have often held that the 
 inherent and essential differences and 
 peculiar properties of actions have not 
 been destroyed, and from their very na- 
 ture cannot be. Howland v. Needham, 10 
 Wis. 495, 498. These distinctions con- 
 tinuing, they must be regarded by the 
 courts now as formerly ; and now no more 
 than then, except under the peculiar cir- 
 cumstances above noted, can any one com- 
 plaint or count be made to subserve the 
 
 purposes of two or more distinct and dis- 
 similar causes of action, at the option of 
 the party presenting it. If counsel dis- 
 agree as to the nature of the action or 
 purposes of the pleading, it is the province 
 of the courts to settle the dispute. It is a 
 question, when properly raised, which can- 
 not be left in doubt; and the court must 
 determine with precision and certainty 
 upon inspectiim of the pleading to what 
 class of actions it belongs, or was intended 
 to belong, whether of tort, upon contract, 
 or in equity ; and if necessary and mate- 
 rial, even the exact kind of it within the 
 class must also be determined. See Clark 
 v. Langworthy, 12 Wis. 441 ; Gillett v. 
 Treganza, 13 Wis. 472. This is not only 
 in harmony with the decisions above re- 
 ferred to, but with all the decisions of this 
 court bearing upon the question, and we 
 know of none elsewhere in conflict. It is 
 in harmony with these decisions which 
 have been made, that an application to 
 amend should be denied which professes 
 to entirely change the cause of action sued 
 upon, or to introduce a new one of a dif- 
 ferent kind." 
 
 Citing Newton v. Allis, 12 Wis. 378; 
 Sweet V. Mitchell, 15 Wis. 641, 664, 19 
 Wis. 524 ; Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis. 
 82; Stevens v. Brooks, 23 Wis. 196. 
 The opinion proceeds to show that the 
 conclusion thus reached is in harmony 
 with the decisions made in Scheunert v. 
 Kaehler, 23 Wis. 523 ; Anderson i'. Case, 
 28 Wis. 505; Lee v. Simpson, 29 Wis. 
 333 ; Bagan v. Simpson, 27 Wis. 355 ; 
 Samuels v. Blanchard, 25 Wis. 329. It 
 also declares that in determining upon 
 demurrer the true nature of the com- 
 plaint, its object, and what particular 
 kind or cause of action is stated in it, the 
 character of the summons may be taken 
 into consideration in connection with the 
 form of the allegations in the complaint ; 
 and this particular conclusion is also sus- 
 tained by the recent decision made by the 
 New York Court of Appeals, before cited. 
 Having thus laid down the general prin- 
 ciples, the learned judge applies them to 
 the case before him. The summons is for 
 relief, which indicates the pleader's inteu-
 
 634 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 the merits, has made most ample and liberal j)rovision for amend- 
 ments. The sections of the codes are quoted at large in a former 
 paragraph.^ So far as they relate to the pleadings, amendments 
 are separated into two general classes, — those made before the 
 trial, and those made during or after the trial. The first of these 
 classes is again subdivided into (1) the amendments of course, 
 without any application to the court, which each party is allowed 
 to make once in his own pleading within a specified time after it 
 is filed or served; (2) the amendments which are made by per- 
 mission of the court as the result of a special motion or applica- 
 tion for that purpose, iiicluding those which the party is generally 
 suffered to make in his pleading after a demurrer to it has been 
 sustained. The amendments of the second class are for the 
 purpose of conforming the pleadings to the facts which have 
 been proved, or which are proposed to be proved, at the trial. 
 They are all made by permission of the court, frequently upon 
 an oral application during the trial or during the argument on 
 appeal; often by the court itself on its own suggestion. Some- 
 tii\ies, however, the trial is suspended, and the party desiring an 
 amendment is driven to a formal motion in order to obtain it.^ 
 It is not within the scope of this work to -describe the practice in 
 reference to amendments; nor to discuss the particular cases in 
 which they have been or will be allowed. I shall simply state 
 the general principles which have governed the courts in the 
 exercise of the discretion conferred upon them by the statute. 
 
 § 457. * 566. Conflict of Authority on Right to amend by Sub- 
 stituting Different Cause of Action. In giving a practical inter- 
 pretation to the clauses of the codes, a conflict of decision has 
 
 tiou to bring an action of tort, and not one The nature of the reformed pleading 
 on implied contract for money had and and its essential principles are here stated 
 received. The complaint itself is pro- in a most clear and accurate manner, 
 nounced insutficieut in its averments ; while the description of the improper 
 the charges of fraud and conversion are modes wliicli prevail to such an extent 
 in the form of general legal inferences, in actual practice is equally grajjhic and 
 without the necessary statements of facts, correct. The one explains the intent and 
 ■* A general charge that a party acted design of tlie reform ; the otlier shows how 
 fraudulently, faLsely, or wrongfully, or that design has been ignored, and that 
 that he made fraudulent representations intent frustrated, 
 or statements, amounts to nothing; there ^ See supra, § *4.35. 
 must be a specificatiort of facts to justify ^ This particular instance strictly ba- 
 it" (p. 6.34). The foregoing quotations longs to tlie first general class, since it is 
 form a small part of this exceedingly in- virtually an amendment before the trial, 
 structivc opinion.
 
 AMENDMENTS OF PLEADINGS. 635 
 
 arisen among the tribunals of the different States, and sometimes 
 among those of the same State, which it is utterl}^ impossible to 
 reconcile. The rule is established b}- one class of cases, and 
 prevails in certain States, that in all the voluntar}' amendments 
 which a party may make as a matter of course in his own plead- 
 ings, and in all amendments before trial for which the party 
 applies to the court by motion, including those rendered neces- 
 sary by the sustaining of a demurrer to his pleading, he cannot 
 under the form of an amendment change the nature and scope 
 of his action; he cannot substitute a wholly different cause of 
 action in place of the one which he attempted to set up in his 
 original pleading. ^ A very different rule is laid down by another 
 class of cases. It is settled in New York by a carefully consid- 
 ered decision of the Court of Appeals, which overrules a number 
 of contrary decisions made by inferior tribunals of that State, 
 that a complaint may be amended voluntarily and of course, by 
 substituting an entirely different cause of acticm for the one 
 originally alleged, provided the summons continues to be ap- 
 propriate. It is not necessary that the new cause of action 
 should be of the same general nature or class as the first one ; 
 but the plaintiff may, by omitting a cause of action, substitute 
 another iu its stead of an entirely different class and character, 
 if the change does not require an alteration in the summons. A 
 like rule, it was held, also applies to answers and to defences 
 contained therein.^ In some States this liberal interpretation 
 
 1 Kewaunee Sup. v. Decker, 34 Wis. be added to an answer by an amendment 
 378 ; Rutledge v. Vanmeter, 8 Bush, 354, of course. McQueen v. Babcock, 13 Abb. 
 356; McGrath v. Balser, 6 B. Men. 141. Pr. 268; 3 Keyes, 428; Wymau v. Re- 
 See also Vliet v. Sherwood, 38 Wis. 159; mond, 18 How. Pr. 272; although the 
 Spinners v. Brett, 38 Wis. 648 ; North- Court of Appeals, in Brown v. Leigh, 
 western Union Packet Co. v. Shaw, 37 pointed out a difference between the terms 
 Wis. 655 (an amendment may change the of the section which permits amendments 
 action from one on express contract to one of course and of that which allows amend- 
 for money had and received on implied ments upon ap))lication to the court before 
 contract). trial, yet it did not hold tiiat the latter 
 
 ■^ Brown v. Leigh, 12 Abb Pr. x. s. 193 were to be any more restricted in their 
 
 (1872). See also, to the same effect, scope and extent than the former. 
 
 Mason v. Whitely, 1 Abb. Pr. 85 ; 4 Duer, [Deyo v. Morss (1894), 144 N. Y. 216, 
 
 611 ; Prindle v. Aldrich, 13 How. Pr. 466; 39 N. E. 81. 
 
 Troy & B. R. Co. v. Tibbits, 11 How. Pr. In South Carolina, it was held in Jen- 
 
 168; Watson v. Rushmore, 15 Abb. Pr. nings r. Parr (1898), 54 S. C 109,32 8. E. 
 
 51 ; Hall v. Woodward, 30 S. C. 564, 575. 73, that the limitation on the power to allow 
 
 Some of these cases apply the same doc- amendments found in sec. 194 of tlie code, 
 
 trine to amendments made upon motion, viz., that they shall not substantially 
 
 By this rule, an entirely new defence may change the claim or defence, has no appli-
 
 636 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 of the code has been expressly extended to those amendments 
 which require the consent of the court granted upon a motion, 
 and the rule is settled that even in that class the cause of action 
 or defence may be entirely changed.^ In respect to the amend- 
 ments made at the trial, or on appeal, or by the court upon its 
 own motion, great freedom is used, provided the paities are not 
 misled and surprised, and the issues to be decided are not wholly 
 changed. When evidence has been received without objection 
 making out a cause of action, and especially after a favorable 
 verdict upon such evidence, the utmost liberality is shown by 
 the courts iti conforming the averments of the pleading to the 
 case as proved, if the ends of justice will be subserved thereby.^ 
 
 cation to amendments made before the 
 trial. Tiie only limitation in such cases is 
 that the amendment shall be in further- 
 ance of justice. The same rule seems to 
 be followed in Oregon. In Talbot v. Gar- 
 retson (1897), 31 Ore. 256, 49 Pac. 978, 
 the court said : " It is within the power of 
 the trial court to allow, before trial, an 
 amended complaint to be filed containing 
 a new cause of action or suit muterial to 
 the subject-matter of the controversy then 
 before the court. A plaintiff cannot, of 
 course, abandon his original cause of 
 action or suit, and substitute an entirely 
 new and different one, because in such 
 case the new pleading would hot be an 
 amendment, but a substitution for the ori- 
 ginal. But so long as the amendment is 
 germane to the subject-matter of the con- 
 troversy, we can see no objection to the 
 court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, 
 allowing the pleadings to be amended in 
 the furtherance of justice by inserting new 
 and additional allegations material to such 
 controversy, although they may, in effect, 
 constitute a uewcause of action or defence." 
 This decision is opposed to Board of 
 Supervisors i". Decker, 34 Wis. 378, which 
 it cites, and in harmony with Brown 
 V. Leigh, 49 N. Y. 78 ; Hatch v. Central 
 Bank, 78 N. Y. 487 ; Freeman v. Grant, 
 132 N. Y. 22, all of which it cites. See 
 also Lieuallen v. Mosgrove (1900), 37 Ore. 
 44G, 61 Pac. 1022; McMalian i'. Canadian 
 Ky. Co. (1901), 40 Ore. 148, 66 Pac. 708. 
 See, in this coimection, Mulhall v. Mulhall 
 (1895), 3 Okla. .304, 41 Pac. 109. 
 
 In California it was held, in Frost v. 
 
 Witter (1901), 132 Cal. 421, 64 Pac. 705, 
 that a plaintiff may, by amendment, 
 change the nature and scope of his action, 
 but that he may not introduce in that way 
 " a wholly different cause of action." 
 Citing the text, § * 566.] 
 
 1 This is particularly tlie case in North 
 Carolina, where the greatest liberality of 
 amendment prevails. Robinson v. Wil- 
 loughby, 67 N. C. 84 ; Bullard v. Johnson, 
 65 N. C. 436. In the first case the action 
 was brought to recover possession of land 
 under a deed absolute on its face (eject- 
 ment). The court, on appeal, held that 
 this deed was in fact a mortgage, and re- 
 versed a judgment obtained by the plain- 
 tiff, ordering a new trial. Before the 
 second trial, an amendment was per- 
 mitted changing the canse of action from 
 its original form to one for the foreclosure 
 of tiiis mortgage. See also Culp v. Steere, 
 47 Kan. 746 (change from action for false 
 representations in a sale to action for 
 breach of express warranty) ; Hopf v. 
 U. S. Baking Co. (Buf. Super" Ct. 1892), 21 
 N. Y. S. 589 (plaintiff allowed to amend 
 by changing a course of action sounding 
 in tort to one sounding in contract). 
 
 2 Kewaunee Sup. v. Decker, 34 Wis. 
 378; Hodge o. Sawyer, ^34 Wis. 397 ; Bow- 
 man r. Van Kuren, 29 Wis. 209, 215; 
 Smith r. Whitney, 22 Wis. 438; Robinson 
 V. Willoughhy, 67 N. C. 84; Bullard v. 
 Johnson, 65 N. C. 436 ; Oates v. Kendall, 
 67 N. C. 241 ; Flanders v. Cottrell, 36 
 Wis. 564 ; Little v. Va. & G. H. Water 
 Co., 9 Nev. 317. The reporter's head-note 
 ia much broader than the decision actually
 
 AMENDMENTS OF PLEADINGS. 
 
 637 
 
 The plaintiff cannot, however, have his summons and complaint 
 amended during the trial by substituting a different defendant for 
 the single one who was sued, and who had appeared and defended.^ 
 
 made, and is manifestly erroneous. The 
 following cases illustrate the general rules 
 concerning amendments, and the extent 
 to which amendments are permitted. It 
 ^eems to be settled by a very decided pre- 
 ponderance of authority that amendments 
 at the trial caunot change the nature of 
 the cause of action or of the defence ; but 
 that the court may at its discretion per- 
 mit amendments on motion before trial 
 which change the cause of action or de- 
 fence, add a new cause of action or defence, 
 and the like (see additional cases cited 
 under § * .558). Johnson v. Filkington, 39 
 Wis. 62 (cannot amend at trial so as to 
 substitute a new cause of action) ; Vliet 
 V. Sherwood, 38 id. 159; Spinners v. 
 Urett, 38 id. 648; North West. Union 
 P. Co. r. Shaw, 37 id. 655 ; Flanders v. 
 Cottrell, 36 id. 564 ; Tormey v. Pierce, 49 
 Cal. 306 ; Blood v. Fairbanks, 48 id. 171 ; 
 Lottman v. Barnett, 62 Mo. 1 59 ; . Jeffree 
 V. Walsh, 14 Nev. 14.'J; Almance Cy. 
 Comm'rs v. Blair, 76 N. C. 136 ; Scott v- 
 •Chickasaw Cy., 54 Iowa, 47 ; Spink v. 
 McCall, 52 id. 432 ; Newell r. Mahaska 
 Cy. Sav. Bk., 51 id. 178; Peck v. Shick, 
 50 id. 281; Hammond v. S. C. & P. R. 
 Co., 49 id. 450 ; O'Connell v. Cotter, 44 id. 
 48 ; Hobson v. Ogden's Ex., 16 Kan. 388 ; 
 Beyer v. Reed, 18 id. 86 ; Leavenworth, 
 L. & G. R. Co. ;;. Van Riper, 19 id- 317 ; 
 Harris v. Turubridge, 83 N. Y. 92, 97; 
 Reeder v. Sayre, 70 id. 180; Weston v. 
 McMuUin, 42 Wis. 567 ; Tauguay v. Felt- 
 houser, 44 id. 30 ; Tewsbury v. Brouson, 
 48 id. 581 ; Graham v. Chicago, etc. Ry. 
 Co., 49 id. 532; Oro Fino, etc. Min. Co. 
 V. CuUen, 1 Idaho, 113; Read v. Beards- 
 ley, 6 Neb. 493; Page v. Williams, 54 
 Cal. 562 ; Nichols v. Scranton Steel Co., 
 137 N. y. 471 ; Dexter v. Ivins, 133 N. Y. 
 551 ; Miner v. Bacon, 131 N. Y. 677 ; Free- 
 man V. Grant, 132 N. Y. 22 ; Davis v. N. Y., 
 L. E. & W. R. Co., 110 N. Y. 646 (test 
 proposed, whether recovery on the origi- 
 nal complaint would be a bar to recoverv 
 on the amended complaint) ; Bockes r. 
 Lansing, 74 N. Y. 437 ; Lustis v. N. Y., 
 L. E. & W. R. Co., 65 Hun, 547 ; Mea v. 
 Pierce, 63 Hun, 400 ; Bowen v. Sweeney, 
 
 63 Hun, 224; 22 Civ. Pro. R. 79; Ager- 
 singer v. Scorr, 54 Hun, 613 ; Hopf v. 
 U. S. Baking Co. (Buf. Super. Ct. 1892), 
 21 N. Y. Suppl. 589 (plaintiff allowed to 
 amend by changing a cause of action 
 sounding in tort to one sounding in con- 
 tract) ; Zoller r. Kellogg, 66 Ilun, 194 
 (change from legal to equitable cause of 
 action not allowed) ; Sleeman ;;. Ilotch- 
 kiss (Supreme, Jan. 1891), 13 N. Y. S. 98 
 (change from equitable to legal cause of 
 action not allowed) ; Cumber v. Schoen- 
 feld, 16 Daly, 454 (change from malicious 
 prosecution to false imprisonment not 
 allowed) ; Chamberlain v. Mensing (S. C), 
 51 Fed. Kep. 511 ; Esch v. Home Ins. Co. 
 of N. Y., 78 Iowa, 3.34 ; Plumer v. ( larke, 
 59 Wis. 646 ; Continental Ins. Co. v. Phil- 
 lips (Wis., Nov. 1892), 53 N. W. Rep. 774; 
 Carmichael v. Dolan, 25 Neb. 335; Mc- 
 Nider v. Sirrine (Iowa, Oct. 1891), 50 
 N. W. Rep. 200 ; Barnes v. Hekla F. Ins. 
 Co., 75 Iowa. 11; Hughes r. McDivitt, 
 102 Mo. 77 ; Bradley i-. Phoenix Ins. Co., 
 28 Mo. App. 7 (amendment Ijefore an- 
 swer or reply) ; Missouri Lumber, etc. 
 Co. V. Zeitinger, 45 Mo. App. 114 (cannot 
 change from statutory action for treble 
 damages for cutting timber, into action of 
 trover for the timber); Gonrley v. St. L. 
 & S. F. Ry. Co., 35 Mo. App. 87 ; Cald- 
 well V. Meshew, 53 Ark. 263 ; Jackson v. 
 Jackson, 94 Cal. 446; McKeighan v. Hop- 
 kins, 19 Neb. 33. As to amendment en- 
 larging the amount of recovery, see Work 
 V. Tibbits, 133 N. Y. 574; Schuttler v. 
 King (Mont., May, 1892), 30 Pae. Rep. 25 ; 
 Cain V. Cody (Cal., April, 1892), 29 Pac. 
 Rep. 778 ; Guidery v. Green, 95 Cal. 630 
 (amendment by defendant during trial 
 must be allowed, when no new issue pre- 
 sented). That answering the amended 
 complaint is a waiver of the objection 
 that it states a new cause of action, see 
 Witkowski v. Hern, 82 Cal. 604. 
 
 ^ \_ Amendments. 
 
 The question of the right to file amended 
 pleadings during the trial is one within 
 the sound discretion of the trial court, 
 and its rulings will not be disturbed
 
 638 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 458. * 567. Election betw^een Actions ex delicto and Actions 
 ex contractu. Intimately connected with tlie questions last 
 
 nnless the record shows an abuse of 
 discretion . 
 
 Arizona : Brady v. Pinal County (1903), 
 Ariz., 71 Pac. 910. 
 
 California: Bean v. Stoneman (1894), 
 104 Cai. 49, 37 Pac. 777. 
 
 Connecticut : Kenuenberg v. Neff 
 (1901), 74 Conn. 62, 49 Atl. 853; Gulliver 
 V. Fowler (1894), 64 Conn. 556, 30 Atl. 
 852. 
 
 Indiana: Burnett i\ Milnes (1897), 148 
 Ind. 230, 46 N. E. 464. 
 
 Iowa: Aultman v. Shelton (1894), 90 
 la. 288, 57 N. W. 857 ; Guyer v. Minn. 
 Thresher Co. (1896), 97 la. 132, 66 N. W. 
 83; Greenlee v. Home Ins. Co. (1897), 
 103 la. 484, 72 N. W. 676 ; Rosenberger 
 V. Marsh (1899), 108 la. 47, 78 N. W. 837; 
 Smith V. City of Sioux City (1903), 119 
 la. .50, 93 N.'W. 81. 
 
 Kansas: Laird v. Farwell (1899), 60 
 Kan. 512, 57 Pac. 98. 
 
 Minnesota: Reeves & Co. v. Cress 
 (1900), 80 Minn. 466, 83N. W.443; Burke 
 r. Baldwin (1893), 54 Minn. 514, 56 N. W. 
 173 ; Minneapolis.etc.Ry. Co. I'. Firemen's 
 Ins. Co. (1895), 62 Miiiu. 315,64 X. W. 
 902. 
 
 Missouri: Evans ?•. Fulton (1896), 134 
 Mo. 653, 36 S. W. 230. 
 
 Nehrask-a : Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. 
 r. Martelle (1902), — Xeb. — , 91 N. W. 
 364 ; Scherar v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1902), 
 63 Neb. 530, 88 N. W. 687 ; Chicago, R. I. 
 & P. R. R. Co. r. Shaw (1901), 63 Neb. 
 380, 88 N. W. 508 ; Gage v. West (1901), 
 62 Neb. 612, 87 N. W. 344; Dunn v. Bo- 
 zarth (1899), 59 Neb. 244, 80 N. W. 811 ; 
 Harrington r. Connor (1897), 51 Neb. 
 214, 70 N. W. 911 ; Murray v. Loushmau 
 (1896), 47 Neb. 256, 66 N. W. 413 ; Kleck- 
 ner v. Turk (1895), 45 Neb. 176, 63 N. W. 
 469; Central City Bank v. Rice (1895), 
 44 Neb. 594, 63 n' W. 60 ; Barr v. City of 
 Omaha (1894). 42 Neb. 341, 60 N.'w. 
 591 ; Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray 
 ■ (1894), 40 Neb. 601, 59 N. W. 102 ; Man- 
 ning V. Viers (1594), 38 Neb. 32. 56 N. \V. 
 719 ; Omaha & R. V. R. R. Co. v. Mos- 
 cliel (1893), 38 Neb. 281, 56 N. W. 825; 
 Commercial Nat. Bank v. Gibson (1893), 
 37 Neb. 750, 56 N. W. 616; Ledwith v. 
 
 Campbell (1903), — Neb. — , 95 N. W. 
 838. 
 
 North Carolina : Barnes v. Crawford 
 (1894), 115 N. C. 76, 20 S. E. 386. 
 
 North Dakota : Martin v. Luger Fur- 
 niture Co. (1898), 8 N. D. 220, 77 N. W. 
 1003 ; Q. W. Loverin-Browne Co. v. Bank 
 (1898), 7 N. D. 569, 75 N. W. 923. 
 
 Oklahoma : Tecumseh State Bank v. 
 Maddox (1896), 4 Ukla. 583, 46 Pac. 563 ; 
 Consolidated Steel & Wire Co. i'. Burn- 
 ham (1899), 8 Okla. 514, 58 Pac, 654. 
 
 Oregon: Clemens v. Hanley (1895), 27 
 Ore. 326, 41 Pac. 658; Hume v. Kelly 
 (1896), 28 Ore. 398, 43 Pac. 380; Osmun 
 v. Winters (1896), 30 Ore. 177, 46 Pac. 
 780. 
 
 South Dakota: Heegaard r. Dakota 
 Loan & Trust Co. (1893), 3 S. D. 569, 54 
 N. W. 656. 
 
 Washington : Long v. Eisenbeis (1901 ), 
 23 Wash. 556, 63 Pac. 249 ; Hart Lumber 
 Co. V. Rucker (1898), 20 Wash. 383, 55 
 Pac. 320; Bishop v. Averill (1898), 19 
 Wash. 490, 53 Pac. 726 ; Seward v. Der- 
 rickson (1895), 12 Wash. 225, 40 Pac. 
 939 ; Hulbert v. Brackett (1894), 8 Wash. 
 438, 36 Pac. 264 ; State ex rel. v. Superior 
 Court (1894), 9 Wash. 366. 37 Pac. 454. 
 
 Wisconsin : Illinois Steel Co. r. Bud- 
 zisz (1900), 106 Wi.s. 499, 82 N. W. 534; 
 Matthiesou v. Schomberg (1896), 94 Wis. 1, 
 68 N. W. 416 ; Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co. 
 f. Laugson (1895), 89 Wis. 200, 61 N. W. 
 773. 
 
 The question whether, under tlie par- 
 ticular facts, the ruling of the court 
 showed an abuse of discretion, was con- 
 sidered in the following cases : — 
 
 California : Schaake v. Eagle Auto- 
 matic Can Co. (1902), 135 Cal. 472, 63 
 Pac. 1025. 
 
 Idaho : Jones v. Stoddart (1902), Idaho, 
 67 Pac. 650. 
 
 loiva : Clough v. Bennett (1896), 99 
 la. 69, 68 N. AV. 578 ; Ankrum v. City of 
 Marshalltown (1898), 105 la. 493, 75 N. W. 
 360; Burkhardt 1-. Burkhardt (1899), 107 
 la. 369, 77 N. W. 1069. 
 
 Kentucki/: Brady v. Peck (1896), 99 
 Ky. 42, 34 S. W. 906; Felton v. Dunn 
 (1901), Ky., 60 S. W. 298; Metropolitan
 
 ELECTION BETWEEN' ACTIONS. 
 
 G39 
 
 discussed, as to the proper forms of actions and tlic correspond- 
 ence between the allegations and tlie proofs, is the subject indi- 
 
 Life Ins. Co. v. Smith (1900), Ky., 59 
 S. W. 24. 
 
 Minnesota: Smith v. Prior (1894), 58 
 Minn. 247, 59 N. W. lOlG; Minneapolis 
 Stockyards Co. v. Cunningham (1894), 59 
 Minn." .325, 61 N. W. .329. 
 
 Montana: York v. Steward (1898), 21 
 Mont. 515, 55 Pac. 29; Hanpt v. Inde- 
 pendent Tel. Co. (1900), 25 Mont. 122, 63 
 Pac. 1033. 
 
 Nebraska: Donovan v. Kibbler (1902), 
 Neb., 92 N. W. 637; Hubenka v. Vach 
 (1902), 64 Neb. 170, 89 N. W. 789; 
 Dufrene v. Anderson (1902), Neb., 90 
 N. W. 221 ; Chicago, R. I. & Pac. K. R. 
 Co. V. Young (1903), — Neb. — , 93 N. W. 
 922; Missouri, etc. Trust Co. v. Clark 
 (1900), 60 Neb. 406, 83 N. W. 202; 
 Schlageck v. Widhalm (1900), 59 Neb. 
 541, 81 N. W. 448; Welch v. MiUiken 
 (1898), 57 Neb. 86, 77 N. W. 363; Hor- 
 bach V. Marsh (1893), 37 Neb. 22, 55 
 N. W. 286 ; Western Assurance Co. v. Dry 
 Goods Co. (1898), 54 Neb. 241, 74 N. W. 
 592 ; Perkins County v. Miller (1898), 55 
 Neb. 141, 75 N. W. 577. 
 
 North Dakota : Anderson i\ Bank, 
 (1895), 5 N. D. 80, 64 N. W. 114. 
 
 Oregon: Wade i-. City Railway Co. 
 (1900), 36 Ore. 311, 59 Pac. 875 ; Nosier 
 I'. Coos Bay R. R. Co. (1901), 39 Ore. 331, 
 64 Pac. 644 ; Tillamook Dairy Ass'n v. 
 Schermerhorn (1897), 31 Ore. 308, 51 Pac. 
 438. 
 
 South Dakota : Brown v. Edmunds 
 (1896), 9 S. D. 273, 68 N. W. 734. 
 
 Utah: Ruffatti v. Lexington Mining 
 Co. (1894), 10 Utah, 386, 37 Pac. 591. 
 
 Washington : Norris Safe & Lock Co. 
 V. Clark (1902), 28 Wash. 268, 68 Pac. 
 718; Newman v. Buzard (1901), 24 Wash. 
 225, 64 Pac. 139; State v. Lorenz (1900), 
 22 Wash. 289, 60 Pac. 644 ; Price Baking 
 Powder Co. w. Rinear (1897), 17 Wash. 
 95, 49 Pac. 223 ; West Seattle Land Co. v. 
 Herren (1897), 16 Wash. 665, 48 Pac. 341 ; 
 Van Lehn r. Morse (1897), 16 Wash. 672, 
 48 Pac. 404 ; McDonough v. Great North- 
 ern Ry. Co. (1896), 15 Wash. 244, 46 Pac. 
 3.34; Price v. Scott (1896), 13 Wash. 574, 
 43 Pac. 634; Maney v. Hart (1895), 11 
 Wash 67, 39 Pac. 268 ; Barnes v. Pack- 
 
 wood (1894), 10 Wash. 50, 38 P.ac. 857 ; 
 Morgan v. Morgan (1894), 10 Wash. 99, 
 38 Pac. 1054 ; Gould v. Gleason (1895), 10 
 Wash. 476, 39 Pac. 123. 
 
 Wisconsin : Jacobson v. Tallard ( 1 903 ) , 
 116 Wis. 662, 93 N. W. 841 ; Whereatt v. 
 Worth (1900), 103 Wis. 291, 84 N. W. 
 441 ; Sullivan v. Collins (1900), 107 Wis. 
 291, 83 N. W. 310; Carroll v. Fethers 
 (1899), 102 Wis. 436, 78 N. W. 604 J St. 
 Clara Female Academy i-. Northwestern 
 Nat. Ins. Co. (1899), 101 Wis. 464, 77 
 N. W. 893; Rock v. Collins (1898), 99 
 Wis. 630, 75 N. W. 426 ; Schaller v. Chi- 
 cago & Northwestern Ry. Co. (1897), 97 
 Wis. 31, 71 N. W. 1042 ; 'Segelke & Kohl- 
 haus Mfg. Co. V. Hulberg (1896), 94 Wis. 
 106, 68 N. W. 653; O'Connor v. Chicago 
 & Northwestern Ry. Co. (1896), 92 Wis. 
 612, 66 N. W. 795; Geer v. Holcorab 
 (1896), 92 Wis. 661, 66 N. W. 793 ; Thomp- 
 son V. Caledonian Fire Ins. Co. (1896), 92 
 Wis. 664, 66 N. W. 801 ; Kennan v. Smith 
 (1902), 115 Wis. 463, 91 N. W. 986. 
 
 In the following cases it is held that a 
 new and distinct cause of action or defence 
 cannot he introduced by amendment: — 
 
 Arkansas: Freeman v. Lazarus (1895), 
 61 Ark. 247, 32 S. W. 680; Sarber v. 
 McConnell (1897), 64 Ark. 450, 43 S. W. 
 395. 
 
 California: Frost v. Witter (1901), 132 
 Cal. 421, 64 Pac. 705 (an important case). 
 
 Colorado : Anderson v. Groesbeck 
 (1899), 26 Colo. 3, 55 Pac. 1086. 
 
 Connecticut: Pitkin v. New York, etc. 
 R. R. Co. (1894), 64 Conn. 482, 30 AtL 
 772. 
 
 Idaho : Hallettw. Larcom (1897), Idaho, 
 51 Pac. 108. 
 
 Iowa: Boos v. Dulin (1897), 103 la. 
 331, 72 N. W. 533; Denzler v. Rieckhoff 
 (1896), 97 la. 75, 66 N. W. 147; Williams 
 V. Williams (1902), 115 la. 520, 88 N. W. 
 1057. 
 
 Kansas: Ellis v. Flaherty (1902), 65 
 Kan. 621, 70 Pac. 586; State i;. Krause 
 (1897), 58 Kan. 651, 50 Pac. 882. 
 
 Kentucky : Greer v. Louisville, etc. 
 R. R. Co. (1893), 94 Ky. 169,21 S. W\ 
 649; Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. i-. Beau-, 
 champ (1900), 108 Ky. 47, 55 S. W. 716;
 
 640 
 
 CIVIL llEMEDIES. 
 
 cated by this heading: that is, the power held by the plaintiff, 
 under certain circumstances, of choosing whether he will treat 
 
 DuckwaU V. Brooke (1901), Ky., 65 S. W. 
 357 (allowing the addition of another 
 cause of action, when the two might have 
 been originally joined). 
 
 Minnesota: U'Gonuan r. Sabin (1895), 
 62 xMinn. 46, 64 X. W. 84. 
 
 Missouri: Hemau v. Glami (1895), 129 
 Mo. 325, 31 S W. 589 ; Chance v. Jen- 
 nings (1901), 1.59 Mo. .544, 61 S. W. 177. 
 
 Nebraska: Western Cornice, etc. Works 
 «. Mever (1898), 55 Neb. 440, 76 N. W. 
 23; Undeland v. Stanfield (1897), 53 Neb. 
 120, 73 N. W. 459; Stratton v. Wood 
 (1895), 45 Neb. 629, 63 N. W. 917 ; Scrog- 
 gin V. Johnston (1895), 45 Neb. 714, 64 
 N. W. 236; Scott i\ Spencer (1895), 44 
 Neb. 93, 62 N. W. 312 ; Dietz i: City Nat. 
 Bank (1894), 42 Neb. 584, 60 N. W. 896. 
 
 JVorth Carolina : King v. Dudley 
 (1893), 113 N. C. 167, 18 S. E. 110; Miz- 
 zell i: Ruffin (1896), 118 N.C. 69, 23 S. E. 
 927 ; Parker v. Harden (1898), 122 N. C. 
 111,28 S. E. 962; Goodwin v. Fertilizer 
 Works (1898), 123 N. C. 162, 31 S. E. 
 373 ; Board of County Commissioners i\ 
 Candler (1898), 123 N. C. 682, 31 S. E. 
 858 ; Nims Mfg. Co. v. Blythe (1900), 127 
 N. C. 325, 37 S. E. 455 ; Martin v. Bank 
 (1902), 131 N. C. 121, 42 S. E. 558. 
 
 North Dakota: Mares v. Wormington 
 (1899), 8 N. D. 329, 79 N. W. 441. 
 
 South Carolina : Pickett v. Fidelity Co. 
 (1901), 60 S. C. 477, 38 S. E. 160. 
 
 Wisconsin : Gates v. Paul (1903), 117 
 AVis. 170, 94 N. W. 55 (a valuable case); 
 Klipstein v. Ra.schein (1903), 117 Wis. 
 248, 94 N. W. 63. 
 
 Wyominrj': Sowin v. Pease (1895), 6 
 Wyo. 91, 42 Pac. 750. 
 
 That an amended pleading changes 
 the cause of action is ground for motion 
 to strike but not for demurrer : Beattie 
 Mfg. Co. r. Gerardi (1901), 166 Mo. 142, 
 65 S. W. 1035; Williams v. Williams 
 (1902), 115 la. 520, 88 N. W. 1057. 
 
 In the following cases the question is 
 considered whether, under the particular 
 facts, the amendment offered amounted to 
 a change in the cause of action or ground 
 of defence. 
 
 For ca.«es holding that it did not change 
 the cause of action or defence, see : — 
 
 Colorado: Messenger v. Northcutt 
 (1899), 26 Colo. 527, 58 Pac. 1090. 
 
 Connecticut : Mechanics' Bank v. Wood- 
 ward (1902), 74 Conn. ti89, 51 Atl. 1084. 
 
 Georyia: Dinkier v. Baer (1893), 92 
 Ga. 432, 17 S. E. 953 ; Colley v. Gate City 
 Co. (1893), 92 Ga. 604, 18 S. E. 817; Mc- 
 Candless v. Inland Acid Co. (1902), 115 
 Ga. 968, 42 vS. E. 449 ; Craven v. Walker 
 (1897), 101 Ga. 845, 29 S. E. 152; Causey 
 I'. Causey (1898), 106 Ga. 188, 32 S. E 138. 
 
 loa-a : Sachra v. Town of Manilla 
 (1903), 120la. 562, 95 N. W. 198 ; Thoniitson 
 V. Brown (1898), 106 la. 367, 76 N. W. 819. 
 
 Kansas: St. Louis & San Francisco 
 Railway Co. r. Ludlum (1901), 63 Kan. 
 719, 66"Pac. 1045. 
 
 Kentucky : Adams Oil Co. v. Christ- 
 mas (1897)^ 101 Ky. 564, 41 S. W. 545; 
 Ford Lumber Co. \: Clark (1902), Ky., 
 68 S. W. 443 ; Scottish Union Ins. Co. v. 
 Strain (1902), Ky., 70 S. W. 274 
 
 Missouri : Courtney v. Blackwell (1899), 
 150 Mo. 245, 51 S. W. 668. 
 
 Montawi : Murray v. Tingley (1897), 
 20 Mont. 260, 50 Pac. 723. 
 
 Nebraska: Massillon Engine & Thresher 
 Co. V. Prouty (1902), — Neb. — , 91 N. W. 
 384; Ball r" Beaumont (1902), 63 Neb. 
 215, 92 N. W. 170. 
 
 North Carolina : Craven v. Russell 
 (1896), 118 N. C. 564, 24 S. E. 361. 
 
 Oklahoma : Myers v. First Presbyte- 
 rian Church (1901), 11 Okla. 544, 69 Pac. 
 874. 
 
 South Carolina : Booth v. Langley Co. 
 (1897), 51 S. C. 412, 29 S. E. 204; Whit- 
 mire V. Boyd (1898), 53 S. C. 315, 31 
 S. E. 306. 
 
 Utah: Connor v. Raddon (1898), 16 
 Utah, 418, 52 Pac. 764. 
 
 For cases holding that the amendment 
 did introduce a new cause of action or 
 ground of defence, see : — 
 
 Arizona: Motes v. Gila Valley Ry. Co. 
 (1902), Ariz., 68 Pac. 532. 
 
 Arkansas : Robinson v. United Trust 
 (1903), — Ark. — , 72 S. W. 992. 
 
 California : Lambert v. McKenzie 
 (1901), 135 Cal. 100, 67 Pac. 6; Storer v. 
 Austin (1902), 130 Cal. 588, 69 Pac. 277. 
 
 Colorado: Anthony v. Slayden (1900),
 
 ELECTION BETWEEN ACTIONS. 
 
 641 
 
 his cause of action as arising from tort or from conti-act. Tliis 
 right of election sometimes occurs M'hen the contract is express ; 
 
 27 Colo. 144, 60 Pac. 826 (an important 
 case). 
 
 Georgia : Georgia R. II. Co. v. Hough- 
 ton (1899), 109 Ga. 604, 34 S. E. 1026; 
 Charleston, etc. Ry. Co. v. Miller (1901), 
 
 113 Ua. 15, 38 S. E. 338; Cox v. Henry 
 (1901), 113 Ga. 259, 38 S. E. 856 ; Ilorton 
 V. Smitli (1902), 115 Ga. 66, 41 S. E. 253 ; 
 Glaze V. Bogle (1898), 105 Ga. 295, 31 
 S. E. 169; Franklin Bank-Note Co. v. 
 Augusta, etc. Ry. Co. (1897), 102 Ga. 547, 
 30 8. E. 419. 
 
 Indiana: Cohoou v. Fisher (1896), 146 
 Ind. 583, 44 N. E. 664. 
 
 Kansas : Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ilenrie 
 (1901), 63 Kan. 330, 65 Pac. 665; Kan.sa.s 
 City V. Hart (1899), 60 Kan. 684, 57 Pac. 
 938"; Jewett v. Malott (1899), 60 Kan. 509, 
 57 Pac. 100. 
 
 Missouri: Bricken v. Cross (1901), 163 
 Mo. 449, 64 S. W. 99. 
 
 Nevada: Schwartz v. Stock (1901), 
 Nev., 65 Pac. 351. 
 
 North Carolina: Sams v. Price (1897), 
 121 N. C. 392, 28 S. E. 486. 
 
 Oregon : Foste i\ Standard Ins. Co. 
 (1894), 26 Ore. 449, 38 Pac. 617 ; Bailey v. 
 Wilson (1899), 34 Ore. 186, 55 Pac. 973. 
 
 Cases in which particular amendments 
 have been allowed or disallowed are classi- 
 fied and cited as follows : — 
 
 Arkansas : Bank of Malvern v. Burton 
 (1900), 67 Ark. 426, 55 S. W. 483. 
 
 California : Porter v. Fillebrowu (1897), 
 119 Cal. 235, 51 Pac. 322; County of 
 Mono V. Flanigan (1900), 130 Cal. 105, 62 
 Pac. 293. 
 
 Georgia : Baldwin Fertilizer Co. v. 
 Carmichael (1902), 116 Ga. 762, 42 S. E. 
 1002; Allen v. Stephens (1899), 107 Ga. 
 733, 33 S. E. 651 ; Norton v. Scruggs 
 (1899), 108 Ga. 802, 34 S. E. 166; Mad- 
 dux V. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. (1899), 
 
 1 10 Ga. 301,34 S. E. 1036; Mutual Life 
 Ins. Co. V. Presbyterian Church (1900), 
 
 111 Ga. 677, 36 S. E. 880; Equitable 
 Building, etc. Ass'n v. Holloway (1901), 
 
 114 Ga. 780, 40 S. E. 742; Smith v. 
 Columbia Jewelry Co. (1901), 114 Ga. 
 698, 40 S. E. 735 ; Wood (•. Bewick Lum- 
 ber Co. (1897), 103 Ga. 235, 29 S. E. 820 ; 
 Williams V. Hall (1898), 103 Ga. 796, 30 
 
 S. E. 660; Roush v. First Nat. Bank 
 (1897), 102 Ga. 109, 29 S. E. 144 ; Malono 
 V. Kelly (1897), 101 Ga. 194, 28 S. E. 689 ; 
 Atlantic Brewing Co. v. Bluthentlial 
 (1897), 101 Ga. 541, 28 S. E. 1003 ; King 
 V. McGhee (1896), 99 Ga. 621, 25 S. E. 
 849 ; Carey v. Cranston (1896), 99 Ga. 77, 
 24 S. E. 869 ; Ford v. Williams (1896), 98 
 Ga. 238, 25 S. E. 416; Carson v. Feara 
 (1893), 91 Ga. 482, 17 S. E. 342; Purity 
 Ice Works v. Rountree (1898), 104 Ga. 
 676, 30 S. E. 885 ; Thompson v. Mallory 
 Bros. (1898); 104 Ga. 684, 30 S. E. 887. 
 
 Indiana : Chapman v. Jones (1897), 
 149 Ind. 434, 47 N. E. 1065. 
 
 Iowa: Clapp v. Greenlee (1897), 100 
 la. 586, 69 N. W. 1049; Kreuger i-. Syl- 
 vester (1897), 100 la. 647, 69 N. W. 10.59 ; 
 Renner Bros. v. Thornburg (1900), 111 
 la. 515, 82 N. W. 950. 
 
 Kansas : Chandler v. Parker (1902), 65 
 Kan. 860, 70 Pac. 368 ; McManus v. Wal- 
 ters (1901), 62 Kan. 128, 61 Pac. 686; 
 Emporia Nat. Bank v. Layfeth (1901), 63 
 Kan. 17, 64 Pac. 973. 
 
 Kentucki/ : Traders' Deposit Bank v. 
 Day (1899), 105 Ky. 219, 48 S. W. 983; 
 Bright V. First Nat. Bank (1899), 106 Ky. 
 702, 51 S. W. 442; H. Feltman Co. v. 
 Thompson (1900), Ky., 58 S. W. 693 ; 
 Town of Latonia v. Hopkins (1898), 104 
 Ky. 419, 47 8. W. 248; City of Newport 
 V. Commonwealth (1899), 106 Ky. 434, 
 50 S. W. 845; Leonard v. Boyd (1903), 
 Ky., 71 S. W. 508; Jones' Admr. v. 111. 
 Cent. R. R. Co. (1902), Ky., 66 S. W. 
 609 ; Cincinnati Tobacco Warehouse Co. 
 V. Matthews (1903), Ky., 74 S. W. 242. 
 
 Minnesota: Swank v. Barnum (1896), 
 63 Minn. 447, 65 N. W. 722. 
 
 Missouri': Habel r. Union Depot Co. 
 (1897), 140 Mo. 159, 41 S. W. 459 ; Barth 
 V. Kansas City Ry. Co. (1897), 142 Mo. 
 535, 44 S. W. 778; Leavenworth, etc. Co. 
 V. Atchi.son (1896), 137 Mo. 218, 37 S. W. 
 913; Harlan v. Moore (1895), 132 Mo. 
 483, 34 S. W. 70; Clark v. St. Louis 
 Transfer Co. (1894), 127 Mo. 255,-30 S. W. 
 121. 
 
 Montana: Merrill i'. Miller (1903), — 
 Mont. — , 72 Pac. 423. 
 
 Nebraska : Pekin Plow Co. v. Wilson 
 1
 
 G42 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 but, on account of the tortious acts of the defendant, the plaintiff 
 may disregard it, and sue directly for the wrong. In the great 
 
 (1902),— Neb.— ,92 N. W. 176; Norfolk 
 Beet Sugar Co. v. Might (1899), 59 Neb. 
 100, 80 N. W. 276; Security Nat. Bank v. 
 Latimer (1897), 51 Neb. 498, 71 N. W. 38; 
 Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Stoddard (1897), 
 52 Neb. 745, 73 N. W. 291 ; Burlington 
 Voluntary Relief Dept. v. Moore (1897), 
 52 Neb. 719, 73 N. W. 15 ; Real t-. Honey 
 (1894), 39 Neb. 516, 58 N. W. 136 ; Omaha 
 Bottling Co. V. Theiler (1899), 59 Neb. 257, 
 80 N. W. 82; Grotte v. Nagle (1897), 50 
 Neb. 363, 69 N. W. 973; Rosewater v. 
 Horton (1903), — Neb. — , 93 N. W. 681. 
 
 NewYork: Lyman r. Kurtz (1901), 166 
 N. Y. 274, 59 N.E. 903 ; McLaughlin v. 
 Webster (1894), 141 N. Y. 76, 35 N. E. 
 1081 ; Martin v. Home Bank (1899), 160 
 N. Y. 190, 54 N. E. 717. 
 
 North Carolina : Tillery v. Candler 
 (1896), 118 N. C. 888, 24 S. E. 709; Shell 
 V. West (1902), 130 N. C. 171,41 S. E. 65. 
 
 North Dakota : Power v. Bowdle (1 893), 
 3 N. D. 107, 54 N. W. 404. 
 
 Ohio : Raymond v. Railway Co. (1897), 
 57 0. St. 27l', 48 N. E. 1093. 
 
 Oklahoma : Armour Packing Co. v. 
 Orrick (189G), 4 Okla. 661, 46 Pac. 573; 
 Lookabaugh v. La Vance (1897), 6 Okla. 
 358, 49 Pac. 65 ; Swope v. Burnham, etc. 
 Co. (1898), 6 Okla. 736, 52 Pac. 924; 
 Smock V. Carter (1897), 6 Okla. 300, 50 
 Pac. 262. 
 
 Oregon : Tillamook Dairy Ass'n v. 
 Schermerhorn (1897), 31 Ore. 308, 51 Pac. 
 438, Foster v. Henderson (1896), 29 Ore. 
 210, 45 Pac. 898 ; Koshland v. Fire Ass'n 
 (1897), 31 Ore. 362, 49 Pac. 865 ; Farmers' 
 Bank v. Saling (1898), 33 Ore. 394, 54 Pac. 
 190; Christenson v. Nelson (1901), 38 
 Ore. 473, 63 Pac. 648. 
 
 South Carolina : Baker i\ Hornick 
 (1897), 51 S. C. 313. 28 S. E. 941 ; Stewart 
 r. Walterboro Ry. Co. (1902), 64 S. C. 92, 
 41 S. E. 827 ; Glenn i;. Gerald (1902), 64 
 S. C. 236, 42 S. E. 155. 
 
 Utah: Murphy v. Ganey (1901), 23 
 Utah, 633, 66 Pac. 190; Pugmire v. Dia- 
 mond Coal & Coke Co. (1903), 26 Utah, 
 115, 72 I'ac. 385. 
 
 Washington : Morrissey r. Faucett 
 (1902), 28 Wash. 52, 68 Pac 352; Daly c. 
 Kvr-rett Pulp & Paper Co. (1903)," 31 
 
 Wash. 252, 71 Pac. 1014 ; Owen v. St. Paul, 
 etc. Ry. Co. (1895), 12 Wash. 313, 41 Pac. 
 44; Norris Safe & Lock Co. v. Clark 
 (1902), 28 Wash. 268, 70 Pac. 129. 
 
 ]Visconsin : Emerson v. Schwindt 
 (1902), 114 Wis. 124. 89 N. W. 822 ; Jarvis 
 V. Northwestern Mutual Relief Ass'n 
 (1899), 102 Wis. 546, 78 N. W. 1089; 
 Charles Baumback Co. *;. Laube (1898), 99 
 Wis. 171, 74 N. W. 96 ; Hubbard r. Haley 
 (1897), 96 Wi.s. 578, 71 N. W. 1036; Post 
 t'. Campbell (1901), 110 Wis. 378, 85 N. W. 
 1032 ; Robinson v. Eau Claire Stationery 
 Co. (1901), 110 Wis. 369, 85 N. W. 983; 
 John R. Davis Lumber Co. v. First Nat. 
 Bank (1894), 87 Wis. 435, 58 N. W. 743. 
 
 The question of the right to amend as 
 related to the operation of the statute of 
 limitations was considered in the following 
 cases : — 
 
 Arizona: Motes v. Gila Valley, etc. 
 R. R. Co. (1902), 68 Pac. 532. 
 
 Georgia: Knox v. Laird (1893), 92 
 Ga. 123, 17 S. E. 988; Beaty v. Atlantic, 
 etc. R. R. Co. (1896), 100 Ga. 123, 28 
 S. E. 32. 
 
 Indiana : Peerless Stone Co. v. Wray 
 (1S98). 152 Ind. 27, 51 N. E. 326. 
 
 Iowa: Curl v. Foehler (1901), 113 la. 
 597, 85 N. W. 811; Taylor v. Taylor 
 (1900), 110 la. 207, 81 N. W. 472. 
 
 Kansas : Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Moffat 
 (1899), 60 Kan. 113, 55 Pac. 837 ; Huckel- 
 bridge v. Atchison, etc. Ry. Co. (1903), 66 
 Kan. 443, 71 Pac. 814 ; Mis.souri, K. & T. 
 Ry. V. Bageley (1902), 65 Kan. 188, 69 Pac. 
 189. 
 
 Kentucky : Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. 
 Pointer's Admr. (1902), — Ky. — , 69 
 S. W. 1108. 
 
 Missouri: Bricken v. Cross (1901), 163 
 Mo. 449, 64 S. W. 99. 
 
 Nebraska : Norfolk Beet Sugar Co. v. 
 Hight (1899), 59 Neb. 100, 80 N. W. 
 276 ; Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R. Co. v. 
 Young (1903), — Neb. — , 93 N. W. 
 922. 
 
 North Carolina : Gillam v. Life Ins. 
 Co. (1897), 121 N. C. 369, 28 S. E. 470. 
 
 Oklahoma: Butt v. Carson (1896), 5 
 Okla. 160, 48 Pac. 182. 
 
 South Carolina: Mayo i. Spartanburg,
 
 ELECTION BKTWEEN ACTIONS. 
 
 643 
 
 majority of instances, however, the contract invoked, and made 
 tlie basis of the suit, is implied. The theory of the implied 
 
 etc. R. R. Co. (1894), 43 S. C. 225, 21 
 S. E. 10. 
 
 South Dakota: Ilouts v. Bartle (1901), 
 14 S. T). 322, 85 N. W. 591. 
 
 Washington : McClaiue v. FaircliilJ 
 (1901), 23 Wash. 758, 63 Pac. 517 ; Morgan 
 V. Morgan (1894), 10 Wash. 99, 38 Pac. 
 1054. 
 
 Wisconsin : Whereatt v. Worth (1900), 
 108 Wis. 291, 84 N. W. 441 ; Sullivan v. 
 Collins (1900), 107 Wis. 291, 83 N. W. 
 310; Kennan v. Smith (1902), 115 Wis. 
 463, 91 N. W. 986 ; Boyd v. Mutual Fire 
 Ass'n (1903), 116 Wis. 155, 94 N. W. 
 171. 
 
 When an amended pleading is filed, the 
 original ceases to be a part of the record 
 or to perform any function as a pleading : 
 La Societe Frauyaise v. Weidmann (1893), 
 97 Cal. 507, 32 Pac. 583 ; Mowry v. Ware- 
 ham (1897), 101 la. 28, 69 N. W. 1)28; 
 Town of Whiting v. Dooh (1898), 152 Ind. 
 157, 52 N. E. 7.'i9; Western Union Tel. 
 Co. V. State (1896), 146 Ind. 54, 44 N. E. 
 793 ; Aydelott v. Collings (1895), 144 Ind. 
 602, 43 N. E. 867 ; City of Huntington v. 
 Folk (1899), 154 Ind. 91, 44 N. E. 759; 
 Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co. ;;. Center Town- 
 ship (1895), 143 Ind. 63, 40 N. E. 1.34; 
 Boland v. O'Neil (1899), 72 Conn. 217, 44 
 Atl. 15 ; Raymond v. Railway Co. (1897), 
 57 O. St. 271, 48 N. E. 1093; Ralphs v. 
 Hensler (1896), 114 Cal. 196, 45 Pac. 
 1062 (holding that the original cannot 
 even be used as evidence against the 
 pleader.) 
 
 But see, on the other hand, Threadgill 
 V. Commissioners (1895), 116 N. C. 616, 21 
 S. E. 425, where it is held that the rule 
 that where there is an amended pleading 
 filed the case must be tried in the amended 
 pleading, and not in the original, does not 
 obtain in this State. The defendant is not 
 limited to his amended answer, and may 
 have the benefit of the allegations in the 
 original answer. 
 
 And it has been held that abandoned 
 pler.dings are admissible in evidence against 
 the pleader: Spurlock v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. 
 (1894), 125 Mo. 404, 28 S. W. 6.34 ; Lud- 
 wig V. Blackshere (1897), 102 la. 366, 71 
 N. W. 356 ; Leach v. Hill (1896), 97 la. 81, 
 
 66 N. W. 69; Longiey v. McVey (1899), 
 109 la. 666, 81 N. W. 150. 
 
 Where a defendant consents to the filing 
 of an amended complaint, he waives iii.s 
 riglit to a default for plaintiff's failure to 
 reply to tlie answer to the original com- 
 plaint : Radford v. Gaskill (1897), 20 Mont. 
 293, 50 Pac. 854. 
 
 An abandoned pleading cannot form 
 the basis for a judgment on the pleadings: 
 Cummiugs v. Hoffman (1893), 113 N. C. 
 267, 18 S. E. 170. 
 
 As to the time when an amendment 
 may be made, see the following cases: — 
 
 After the evidence is in : Metr(jpolitan 
 Life Ins. Co. v. Smith (1900), Ky., 59 
 S. W. 24 ; Carter 1-. Dilley (1902), 167 Mo. 
 564, 67 S. W. 232 ; Hocks v. Sprangers 
 (1902), 113 Wis. 123, 87 Pac. 1101 ; Ailend 
 V. Spokane Falls, etc. By. Co. (1899), 21 
 Wash. 324, 58 Pac. 244. After verdict: 
 Walker v. O'Connell (1898), 59 Kan. 306, 
 52 Pac. 894 ; Raymond v. Wathen (1895), 
 142 Ind. 367, 41 N. E. 815. After plead- 
 ing to original: Goodwin v. Caraleigh, 
 etc. Co. (1897), 121 N. C. 91, 28 S. E. 192. 
 After motion for change of venue: Kav v. 
 Pruden (1897), 101 la. 60, 69 N. W. 1137. 
 In the Appellate Court: Ure v. Bunn 
 (1902), Neb., 90 N. W. 904; Privett v. 
 Railroad Co. (1899), 54 S. C. 98, 32 S. E. 
 75 ; Martin v. Shannon (1897), 101 la. 620, 
 70 N. W. 720; Evans v. Hughes County 
 (1893), 4 S. D. 33, 54 N. W. 1049; Greely 
 V. McCoy (1893), 3 S. D. 624, 54 N. W. 
 659; Smith v. Wetmore (1901), 167 N. Y. 
 234, 60 N. E. 419. During trial : Moore 
 v. Harrod (1897), 101 Ky. 248, 40 S. W. 
 675. Pending motion for non-suit : Earl 
 Orchard Co. v. Fava (1902), 138 Cal. 76, 
 70 Pac. 1073. Pending motion f)r judgment 
 on pleadings: Bryant v. Davis (1899), 22 
 Mont. 534, 57 Pac. 143. While jury is 
 being empanelled : Jorgenson v. Butte Co. 
 (1893), 13 Mont. 288, 34 Pac. 37. 
 
 As to when the Supreme Court will 
 consider as made amendments whicli 
 might have been made in the court be- 
 low, see Evansville, etc. R. R. Co. v. 
 Maddox (1893), 134 Ind. 571, 33 X. E. 
 345; Helphrey v. Strobach (1895), 13 
 Wash. 128, 42 Pac. 537; Richardson v
 
 644 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 promise, and its invention in order that certain classes of liabili- 
 ties might be enforced by means of the action of assumpsit, have 
 
 Moore (1902), 30 Wash. 406, 71 Pac. 18; 
 Scholey v. Demattos (1898), 18 Wash. 
 504, 52 Pac. 242. 
 
 A complaint which states no cause of 
 action cannot he amended : Whaley v. 
 Lawton (1900), 57 S. C. 2.56, 35 S. E. 558 ; 
 Ruberg v. Brown (1897), 50 S. C. 397, 27 
 S. E. 873; Jacobs v. Gilreath (1893), 41 
 S. C. 143, 19 S. E. 308; Mizzell v. Ruffin 
 (1896), 118 N. C. 69, 23 S. E. 927. 
 
 Tests to determine whether an amend- 
 ment introduces a new cause of action, 
 have been given by some courts. The 
 Supreme Court of Oregon, in Hume v. 
 Kelly (1896), 28 Ore. 398, 43 Pac. 380, 
 has given the following : " A general test 
 as to whether a new cause of action would 
 be introduced by a proposed amendment 
 is to inquire if a recovery had upon the 
 original complaint would bar a recovery 
 under the complaint if the amendment 
 was allowed, or if the same evidence 
 would support both, or the same measure 
 of damages is applicable, or both are sub- 
 ject to the same plea." The rule given 
 by the Supreme Court of Missouri is as 
 follows : " There are two tests by which 
 to determine whether a second petition is 
 an amendment or a sub.stitution of a new 
 cause of action : First, whether the same 
 evidence will support both petitions, and, 
 second, whether the same measure of 
 damages will apply to both. If these 
 questions are answered in the aflBrmative, 
 it is an amendment ; if in the negative, it 
 is a substitution : " Liese v. Meyer (1898), 
 143 Mo. 547, 45 S. W. 282. See also 
 Grigsby v. Barton County (1902), 169 
 Mo. 221, 69 S. W. 296, Avhere the test 
 suggested is whether the same evidence 
 AviU su]>port both and the same judgment 
 can be rendered under both. 
 
 Miscellaneous Rules respecting Amendments. 
 
 "A party cannot answer an amended 
 petition, and, when evidence is offered to 
 maintain its allegations, object for the 
 first time on the ground that tlie amend- 
 ment is a departure from the original : " 
 Bender v. Zimmerman (1896), 135 Mo. 
 53, 36 S. W. 210. Enlarging the issues 
 by amendment, if properly made, does 
 
 not release the surety for costs even for 
 the costs accruing after the amendments. 
 Schawacker v. McLauglilin (1897), 139 
 Mo. 333, 40 S. W. 935. A motion to 
 strike out a third amended petition 
 should not be sustained if the cause of 
 action stated in the original and last peti- 
 tion is the same : Sanguinett v. Web- 
 ster (1900), 153 Mo. 343, 54 S. W. 563. 
 " The rule is well established and is not 
 in conflict with our statute regulating 
 amendments to pleadings, that, where a 
 complaint to which an answer has been 
 filed is amended in substantial manner, 
 the defendant has an alisolute right to 
 plead de noro : " Schwartz v. Stock (1 901 ), 
 Nev., 65 Pac. 351. 
 
 Where an answer denies the allega- 
 tions of the original complaint, and an 
 amended complaint is filed containing a 
 mere repetition of the allegations in the 
 original, it need not be answered: Bros- 
 sard V. Morgan (1900), Idaho, 61 Pac. 
 1031 ; Schmidt r. Mitcliell (1897), 101 Ky. 
 570, 41 S. W. 929. Where an "amended 
 complaint " is identical with the original 
 to which a demurrer has been sustained, 
 no demurrer can be heard to such so-called 
 amended complaint, since it is out of the 
 record. The ruling on the original com- 
 plaint applies equally to the unchanged 
 amended complaint : Ellis v. City of In- 
 dianapolis (1897), 148 Ind. 70, 47 N. E. 
 218. " Prejudicial error cannot be pred- 
 icated on an order allowing a pleading to 
 be amended when the amendment does 
 not change the issues, nor affect the quan-_ 
 tum of proof as to any material fact : " 
 Cate V. Hutchinson (1899), 58 Neb. 232, 78 
 N. W. 500. " It is not reversible error to 
 refuse to permit a petition to be amended 
 on the trial, when such amendment, taken 
 in connection with the other averments 
 of the petition, did not state a cause of 
 action: " Bartlett v. Scott (1898), 55 Neb. 
 477, 75 N. W. 1 102. " Courts very properly 
 refuse afiirmatively to direct wliat lan- 
 guage must be employed in drafting 
 pleadings : " Omaha Fire Ins. Co. v. l»org 
 (1895), 44 Neb. 523,62 N. W.862. " Wlicrc, 
 U])on tlic trial of an action, testimcjny is 
 admitted without objection, it is not error
 
 ELECTION BETWEEN ACTIONS. 
 
 C45 
 
 been already explained. As the fictitious promise was implied 
 or inferred by the law from acts or omissions of the defendant 
 
 for the court to permit the pleadings to 
 be amended to conform to the proof:'" 
 Whipple V. Fowler (1894), 41 Keb. 675, 60 
 N. W. 15. 
 
 After the filing of an amended com- 
 plaint, the defendant has the choice of 
 filing a new answer or letting the old one 
 stand as his answer to the amended com- 
 plaint, but after his election to file a new 
 answer the old one cannot be resorted to 
 to save a default, and judgment may he 
 taken against him if he neglects to file his 
 new answer : Gettings i'. Buchanan ( 189G), 
 17 Mont. 581, 44 Pac. 77 ; Ermentrout v. 
 Am. Fire Ins. Co. (1895), 63 Minn. 194, 
 65 N. W. 270. Where an amendment is 
 allowed, eitiier a copy of the amendment 
 or of the pleading as amended, may be 
 filed and served, though the latter is the 
 better practice : Holter Hardware Co. v. 
 Ontario Mining Co. (1900), 24 Mont. 184, 
 61 Pac. 3. The filing of an amended 
 ]ileading waives any error committed in 
 rulings upon such pleading: State ex rel. 
 V. Jackson (1895), 142 Ind. 259, 41 N. E. 
 534; Gowen v. Gilson (1895), 142 Ind. 
 328, 41 N. E. 594; Weaver v. Apple 
 (1896), 147 Ind. 304, 46 N. E. 642. An 
 amendment made not to show but to con- 
 fer jurisdiction is not allowable : Gillam v. 
 Life Ins. Co. (1897), 121 N. C. 369, 28 
 S. E. 470. But see Boyd r. Roanoke 
 Lumber Co. (1903), 132 N. C. 184, 43 
 b. E. 631, where sucli an amendment was 
 allowed. 
 
 " To strike out a pleading which is sus- 
 ceptible of being amended by a statement 
 of fticts known to exist, and which consti- 
 tute a cause of action or defence to an 
 action, is a harsh proceeding, and should 
 only be resorted to in extreme cases : " 
 Burns r. Scooffy (1893), 98 Cal. 271, 33 
 Pac. 86. A so-called amendment to a pe- 
 tition may be stricken out on motion when 
 the matters alleged are not in support of 
 the cause of action but in reply to matters 
 alleged in appellee's cross-petition : Wood 
 V. Brown (1897), 104 la. 124, 73 N. W. 
 608. A material amendment, itnverified, 
 to a verified complaint, renders it neces- 
 sary to treat the complaint as unverified : 
 Brown r. Rhinehart Bros. (1893), 1 12 N. C. 
 
 772, 16 S. E. 840. The validity of an at- 
 tachment is not affected by the filing of an 
 amended complaint which does not change 
 the cause of action : Meyer r. Brooks 
 (1896), 29 Ore. 203, 44 Pac. 281. " Great 
 liberality, it is true, should be exercised iu 
 allowing amendments to pleadings; but 
 that liberality should only be displaved in 
 furtherance of justice. This is always the 
 controlling consideration before the trial 
 court : " Bank of Woodland v. Heron 
 (1898), 122 Cal. 107, 54 Pac. .537. 
 
 " When a judgment is reversed and 
 cau.se remanded, it stands the same as if 
 no trial had been had, and pleadings may 
 be amended, supplemental pleadings filed, 
 and new issues formed, under proper re- 
 strictions, except that an issue determined 
 upon an agreed statement of facts cannot 
 generally be reopened : " C/'onsoliilated 
 Steel & Wire Co. v. Burnham (1899), 8 
 Okla. 514, 58 Pac. 654. "The trial court 
 may well refuse to permit the amendment 
 of a defective plea in abatement, the only 
 purpose of which is to prevent the court 
 from determining on its merits a cause 
 properly before it:" Mitchell i;. Smith 
 (1901), 74Coun. 125, 49 Atl. 909. "Where 
 the objection that a complaint fails to 
 state a cause of action because of the 
 omission of a material allegation is not 
 taken by demurrer, but b_v a motion to 
 dismiss at the trial, the court mav in its 
 discretion reserve its decision until pos- 
 sessed of the case upon the merits and 
 then permit an amendment when the sub- 
 stantial rights of the defendant will not 
 be injuriously affected thereby ; " National 
 Bank of Deposit r. Rogers (1901), 166 
 N. Y. 380, 59 N. E. 922. An oral deci.sion 
 allowing au amendment of the complaint 
 is sufficient : Findlay i-. Knickerbocker Ice 
 Co. (1899), 104 Wis. 375, 80 N. W. 436. 
 A pleading will not be allowed to be 
 amended to conform to the proof when 
 the facts proved are admissible under the 
 original pleading : Buxton v. Sargent 
 (1898), 7 N. D. 503, 75 N. W. 811. The 
 sufficiency of an amendment to cure the 
 defect in the pleading is not a question to 
 be passed on in determining whetlier or 
 not it should be allowed : Freeman v.
 
 646 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 which created a liability ex cequo et bono, it sometimes happened 
 that these acts or omissions were tortious in their nature. In 
 such a case, tlierefore, the liability could be regarded in a double 
 aspect; namely, as directly springing from the tort committed 
 by the wrong-doer, or as arising from the promise to make com- 
 pensation which the law implied and imputed to him. As the 
 single liability thus resulting from the given acts or omissions 
 was considered under these two different aspects, the common 
 law provided two distinct means or instruments for enforcing 
 it, — one by the form of action appropriate for the recovery of 
 damages from the tort, the other by the form of action appropri- 
 ate for the recovery of damages from the breach of an implied 
 promise. In what instances — that is, in what classes of tortious 
 acts or omissions — the right of action existed had been deter- 
 mined by the courts, although there was not a complete uniform- 
 ity of decision among the tribunals of the several States. 
 
 ^ 459. * 568. New Procedure makes no Change in Doctrine of 
 Election. The doctrine of electing between an action ex delicto 
 and one ex contractu, or, to speak more accurately, between 
 treating the cause of action as arising from tort or from con- 
 tract, has been retained under the new procedure ; and it is ap- 
 plied in the same classes of cases, and is governed by the same 
 general rules, as in the former system.^ The courts, without 
 
 Brown (1902), 115 Ga. 23, 41 S. E. Where a new defence is introduced on 
 
 385. the trial by amendment, the plaintiff is en- 
 
 Where evidence is admitted whicli is titled to a continuance : Dunn v. Bozarth 
 
 not in conformity to the pleadings, the (1899), 59 Neb. 244, 80 N. W. 811. 
 
 latter will be treated as amended to agree " The mode of amending pleadings in 
 
 with the proof : Nicklace v. Dickerson this State is by rewriting the pleading, 
 
 (1898), 65 Ark. 422, 46 S. W. 945 ; Davis leaving out such allegations and inserting 
 
 V. Goodman (1896), 62 Ark. 262, 35 S. W. such other allegations, as may be desired, 
 
 231. so that all parts of the pleading shall be 
 
 The prayer for relief may be amended : in one instrument complete in itself:" 
 
 Hogueland'i-. Arts (1901), 113 la. 634, 85 Satterlund v. Beal (1903), — N. D. — , 95 
 
 N. °VV. 818; Slater v. Estate of Cook N. W. 518.] 
 
 (1893), 93 Wis. 104,67 N. W. 15; Liese v. i [J.n Downs v. Finnegan (1894), 58 
 Meyer (1898), 143 Mo. 547, 45 S. W. 282. Minn. 112, 59 N. W. 981, the court said: 
 In the last case it was held that such an "It being established that an injured party 
 amendment did not change the cause of may elect between the two forms of re- 
 action, medial proceedings, — may sue in tort for 
 
 An amendment substituting the real the wrong done him, or in assumpsit as 
 
 party in interest is not allowaljle : Wilson upon an implied contract, — it follows that 
 
 V. Kiesel (1894), 9 Utah, 397,35 Pac. 488. by waiving the tort the demand may be 
 
 Contra, Service i-. Bank (1900), 62 Kan. counterclaimed against a plaintiff's cause 
 
 857. 62 I'ac. 670; Hud.son i;. Banitt (1901), of action arising on anotlier contract, or, 
 
 62 Kan. 137, 61 Tac. 737. where itself set up l^y a plaintKf as aiiMi.g
 
 ELECTION BETWEKN ACTIONS. 647 
 
 perhaps appreciating the full extent of the changes, and the 
 effect of abolishing all distinctions between forms of actions, 
 decided that the power of choice between the two modes of 
 enforcing demands, of waiving the tort and suing upon an im- 
 plied promise, still exists; and these early decisions have been 
 followed by so many others without an expression of dissent, 
 that the rule is as firmly established in the reformed as it was in 
 the common-law pleading. The single principle upon which the 
 entire doctrine rests is very simple, and should — and would, if 
 the courts were always consistent in acting upon it — afford a 
 ready and plain solution of every question, new or old, which 
 can be suggested. This single principle may be thus formulated: 
 From certain acts or omissions of a party creating a liability to 
 make compensation in damages, the law implies a promise to pay 
 such compensation. Whenever this is so, and the acts or omis- 
 sions are at the same time tortious, the twofold aspect of the 
 single liability at once follows, and the injured party may treat 
 it as arising from the tort, and enforce it by an action setting 
 forth the tortious acts or defaults ; or may treat it as arising 
 from an implied contract, and enforce it by an action setting 
 forth the facts from which the promise is inferred by the law. 
 It should be remembered that different promises may be inferred 
 from different acts or omissions: thus, in one case, the jDromise 
 might be to pay over money had and received to the use of the 
 injured party; and in another, where no money had been actually 
 received, the implied undertaking might be that the Avrong-doer 
 would pay the value or price of goods taken by him. This dis- 
 
 on contract, it may be opposed by a coun- might be maintained. That the doctrine 
 
 terclaim arising out of another contract, has been greatly developed and extended 
 
 . . . The right to waive the tort and to in application is apparent, and that in 
 
 recover on an implied assumpsit is an ex- cases wliere property has been severed 
 
 ception to the principles of code pleading, from real estate by a wrongdoer, carried 
 
 and there must be no extension beyond from tiie freeliold, and converted to his 
 
 what is allowed at common law. . . . Cer- own use, tlie riglitf ul owner may sue and 
 
 tain it is that the rule has been extended recover its value as on implied contract, is 
 
 to cases wliere there has been a wrongful tlioroughly established, although it may 
 
 conversion of property of one person to not be in harmony with the reformed sys- 
 
 the use of another, whether sold or not by teni of pleading. No reason exists why, 
 
 the latter, and also to cases where a tres- if permissible at all, it should not include 
 
 passer has severed trees from land in pos- cases arising out of trespass, to the extent 
 
 session of the owner, or has quarried stone that the property carried away is beneficial 
 
 thereon, and has afterwards taken the to the trespasser, except where it would 
 
 trees or stone away, converting the same involve a trial of title to real estate."] 
 to his own use, so that trover or replevin
 
 648 CIVIL REiMEDIES. 
 
 tinction, so palpable and commonplace, seems to have been 
 overlooked in some classes of decisions. 
 
 § 460. * 569. Classes of Cases -w^here Election is allcwed. 
 Conversion. Conflict of Authority. Having thus formulated the 
 general principle which prevailed in the former procedure, and 
 which has been adopted to its full extent in the present, I shall, 
 in its further illustration, state the various classes of cases to 
 which it has been applied by the courts, and shall thus ascertain 
 the particular instances — the kinds of wrongful acts and omis- 
 sions — in which the right of election exists. To this will be 
 added a few observations upon the mode of indicating the fact 
 that an election has been made by the pleader, that a tort has 
 been waived, and a cause of action upon contract has been 
 chosen. The most common classes of tortious acts, in respect 
 of which the right of election has been invoked, are the wrongful 
 taking or conversion of chattels, or things in action, or money; 
 the wrongful use of land, and appropriation of its rents and 
 profits ; sales of goods on a credit procured by the fraud of the 
 purchaser; frauds and deceits generally by which money or 
 things in action, or chattels, are obtained; and certain cases of 
 express contract, in which, from the policy of the law, the lia- 
 bility is regarded as resulting from a violation of general duty 
 as well as from a breach of the stipulations of the agreement. 
 These classes will be considered separately. It is a firmly estab- 
 lished rule, from which no dissent has been suggested, that when 
 goods or things in action have under any circumstances been 
 wrongfully taken or detained or converted, and have been sold 
 or disposed of by the wrong-doer, the owner may sue in tort to 
 recover damages for the taking and carrying away or the conver- 
 sion, or he may waive the tort and sue on the implied promise 
 to refund the price or value as money had and received to the 
 plaintiff's use.^ When, however, the chattels or things in action 
 have been simply taken or converted, but not sold or disposed of 
 by the wrong-doer, a conflict of opinion exists in respect to the 
 power of the plaintiff to elect between the two forms of action. 
 
 1 McKuight r. Dunlop, 4 Barb. 36, 42 ; Evans, 43 Cal. 380; Gordon v. Bruner, 
 
 Hinds V. Tweddle, 7 How. I'r. 278, 281 ; 49 Mo. 570, 571 ; Putnam v. Wise, I Hill 
 
 Harpendiiig v. Shoemaker, 37 Barb. 270, (N. Y.), 234, 240, and the reporter's note ; 
 
 291 ; Cliainbers v. Lewis, 2 Hilt. 591 ; Berly v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577, 584, and the 
 
 Leach i;. Leach, 2 X. Y. S. C. 657 ; Tryon reporter's note. 
 V. Baker, 7 Lan.s. 511, 514; Roberts v.
 
 ELECTION BETWEEN ACTIONS. 
 
 649 
 
 Certain cases deny this power. This ruling is rested upon the 
 ground that the goods remaining in the hands of the wrong-doer, 
 and no money having in, fact Leen received Ly him, an implied 
 promise to pay over money had and received by the defendant to 
 the plaintiff's use does not and cannot arise. ^ In this country, 
 however, the weight of authority is strongly tlie other way. 
 The cases generally admit an election, under the circumstances 
 described, between an action based upon the tort, and an action 
 based upon the implied promise to pay the price or value of the 
 goods. The tort is waived, and the transaction is treated as a 
 sale, and not as an instance of money had and received. This 
 distinction is certainly supported by the plainest principles, if 
 the doctrine of implied promises and election is to be admitted at 
 all. 2 If money has been converted, the right of election exists 
 
 1 McKnight v. Duiilop, 4 Barb. 3G, 42 ; 
 Henry v. Marvin, 3 E. D. Smith, 71 ; 
 Tryou v. Baker, 7 Lans. 511, 514. [Held, 
 iu Brittain v. Payne (1896), 118 N. C. 989, 
 24 S. E. 711, that when jjroperty is tor- 
 tiously taken and sold, the owner may 
 waive the tort and sue in assumpsit.] 
 
 2 Hinds V. Tweddle, 7 How. Pr. 278, 
 281 ; Chambers v. Lewis, 2 Hilt. 591 ; 
 Putnam v. Wise, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 234, 240 
 (and see note of the reporter) ; Berly i-. 
 Taylor, 5 Hill, 577, 584 (and note of "the 
 reporter) ; Roberts v. Evans, 43 Cal. 380. 
 Gordon v. Bruner, 49 Mo. 570, 571 : " In 
 Massachusetts, in Jones v. Hoar, 5 Pick. 
 285, to which there is a note to a former 
 opinion reviewing the English cases, it 
 was held that no contract could be implied 
 unless the goods were sold and converted 
 into money, and the same doctrine was held 
 in Pennsylvania, in Willett v. Willett, 3 
 Watts, 277, and in Morrison v. Rogers, 2 
 111. 317. But such lias not been the uni- 
 form ruling. In Putnam v. Wise, 1 Hill, 
 240, the court holds that, ' according to 
 the well-known right of election in such 
 cases, the plaintiff might have brought 
 ''assumpsit" as for goods sold and de- 
 livered against those who had tortiously 
 taken their property.' To this the re- 
 porter, Mr. Hill, adds a note, reviewing 
 the cases, and disapproving the doctrine 
 of Jones V. Hoar. (See Hill v. I^avis, 
 3 N. H. 384 ; Stockett v. 'Watkins's Adm., 
 2 Gill & J. 326, and cases cited.) " Quot- 
 
 ing early Missouri decisions to the same 
 effect, — Floyd v. Wiley, 1 Mo. 430, 643 ; 
 Johnson v. Strader, 3 Mo. 359, — the 
 learned judge adds : " It may be treated, 
 then, as the doctrine in this State, that 
 one who has converted to his own use the 
 personal property of another, when sued 
 for the value of that property as sold to 
 him, will not be permitted to say in de- 
 fence that he obtained it wrongfully." 
 See also Small v. Robinson, 9 Hun, 418 ; 
 Cushman v. Jewell, 7 id. 525, 530 (an un- 
 supported dictum) ; Loomis v. Mowry, 
 8 id. 31 1 ; Freer v. Denton, 61 N. Y. 492 ; 
 Fields V. Bland, 81 id. 239 ; Comstock v. 
 Hier, 73 id. 269 ; Kalckhoff v. Zoehrlaut, 
 40 Wi.s. 427; Chamballe v. McKenzie, 31 
 Ark. 155; Huston v. Plato, 3 Colo. 402 ; 
 Brady I'. Brennan, 25 Minn. 210; Logan 
 V. Wallis, 76 N. C. 416 ; Loomis v. O'Neal, 
 73 Mich. 582; Lehmann v. Schmidt, 87 
 Cal. 15; Terry v. Munger, 121 N. Y. 161 ; 
 Abbott V. Blos.som, 66 Barb. 353, 356; 
 Starr Cash Car Co. v. Reinliardt (Com. 
 PI. 1892), 20 N. Y. Suppl. 872. 
 
 QTo the same effect are Galvin v. Mac 
 Mining Co. (1894), 14 Mont. 508, 37 Pac. 
 366; Cragg v. Arendale (1901), 113 Ga. 
 181, 38 S. E. 399; Crown Cycle Co. v. 
 Brown (1901), 39 Ore. 285, 46 Pac. 451 ; 
 Biaithwaite v. Akin (1893), 3 N. D. 365, 
 56 N. W. 133; Anderson v. Bank (1896), 
 5 N. D. 451, 67 N. W. 821. 
 
 In Anderson v. Bank {supro), it was 
 held that wliere an agent, authorized to
 
 650 CIVIL llEMEDIES. 
 
 under the operation of either rule, since the actual receipt of 
 money by the defendant brings the case exactly within the reason 
 and operation of the doctrine as first stated.^ The same choice 
 between the actions may sometimes be possible when the liability 
 is connected with a claim to land, or grows out of its use, al- 
 though the instances are much fewer than those of the preceding 
 class. Thus, when the owner agreed to lease certain premises 
 to the plaintiff for a term of years commencing at a future day 
 named, but before that day actually leased them to another per- 
 son who took possession, and when the time arrived the plaintiff 
 demanded possession, tendered the rent, and on refusal brought 
 an action for damages, it was objected on the trial that his only 
 remedy was ejectment against the tenant in possession. The 
 court held, that, while the plaintiff might have maintained 
 ejectment, he could also bring an action against the lessor, 
 which could be either upon the agreement express or implied, 
 or in tort for the violation of the duty arising from the relation 
 of lessor and lessee between the parties.^ It is settled in Wis- 
 consin, after a careful consideration and an exhaustive analysis 
 and comparison of the conflicting decisions, that when the de- 
 fendant had committed a wilful trespass upon the plaintiff's land 
 by deliberately turning his cattle thereon, in order that they might 
 feed upon the grass, the plaintiff might waive the tort, and sue 
 upon an implied contract for the price and value of the pasturage.^ 
 § 461. * 570. Actions against Common Carriers for Loss or In- 
 jury to Goods. Other Cases. It is a familiar rule, that the action 
 against a common carrier for a loss or injury of goods may either 
 be in tort for the violation of his general duty, or on the contract 
 which he expressly or impliedly enters into. The owner has his 
 election which of these remedies he will pursue ; but his choice 
 cannot alter the extent of the carrier's liability.^ P"'raud in its 
 
 sell at a given price, sells to himself, and ' Norden v. Jones, 33 Wis. 600, 604, 
 
 the principal waives the tort and sues in 605. The opinion of Dixon C. J. is a full 
 
 assumpsit, this does not constitute a ratitt- and most instructive examination of the 
 
 cation of the agent's act so as to limit tiie doctrine. 
 
 recovery to the price at which the agent * Campbell v. Perkins, 8 N. Y. 430, 
 
 had been authorized to sell. The suit is 438; Brown v. Treat, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 225; 
 
 purely one in general a.ssumpsit.] People v. Kendall, 2.5 Wend. 399 ; Wallace 
 
 1 Tryon v. Baker, 7 Lans. 511, 514. t;. Morss, 5 Hill, 391 ; Campbell v. Stakes, 
 
 2 Trull V. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115. See, 2 Wend. 137. 
 
 however, Carpenter v. Stilwell, 3 Abb. QSee Poly r. Williams (1894), 101 Cal. 
 
 Pr. 459. 648, 36 Pac. 102, where a counterclaim
 
 ELECTION BETWEEN ACTIONS. 651 
 
 various phases also furnishes many occasions and opportunities 
 for the exercise of an election between actions. One of the most 
 common is the case of a sale upon a credit procured by the false 
 and fraudulent representations of the vendee as to his pecuniary 
 responsibility. Upon discovering the fraud, even before the 
 expiration of the credit, the vendor may rescind the sale and 
 immediately bring an action in form of tort either to recover the 
 goods themselves, or damages for their taking and conversion; 
 or he may waive the tort, and sue at once on contract for the 
 price. ^ And when money has been obtained by false and fraudu- 
 lent representations, or by fraudulent practices of any kind, the 
 plaintiif has the option to sue either in tort for the deceit, or 
 in contract for money had and received by the defendant to his 
 use. 2 
 
 § 462. * 571. Principle -which determines -when a Promise is 
 Implied. The conflict which has existed to a certain extent 
 among the decisions in reference to the right of election, and the 
 classes of tortious acts and omissions embraced within it, can 
 only be put to rest by determining with certainty the occasions 
 and circumstances in which a promise will be implied by the 
 
 was filed to recover upon an account for son, 77 N. Y. 400 ; Western Assur. Co. r. 
 
 nunsery stock, consisting of fruit-trees and Towle, 65 Wis. 247; Farmers' Nat. Bk. 
 
 £;rape-vines eaten up and destroyed by v. Fonda, 65 Mich. 533 ; Hurt v. Barnes, 
 
 hogs, cattle, and horses of the plaintiff. 24 Neb. 782. 
 
 A demurrer to this counterclaim was over- > - Byxbie v. Wood, 24 N. Y. 607, 610; 
 
 ruled. So in Monroe v. Cannon (1900), Union Bk. of N. Y. v. Mott, 27 N. Y. 633, 
 
 24 Mont. 316, 61 Pac. 863, an action in 636. It will be noticed that these two 
 
 assumpsit for the value of the pa.sturage cases were alike in all their essential 
 
 was allowed in the case of a wrongful facts, and that in one of them the tort 
 
 herding of sheep on plaintiff's land. See Avas held to have been waived, and in tlie 
 
 in this connection Tanderup ik Hansen other not to have been waived ; and this 
 
 (1894), 5 S. D. 164, 58 N. W. 578; Zander distinction was in fact made, not upon 
 
 V. Valentine Blatz Brewing Co. (1897), 95 any difference in the allegations, but be- 
 
 Wis. 162, 70 N. W. 164. cause it subserved the ends of justice, and 
 
 But it was held in Commonwealth defeated an objection of mere form. A 
 
 Title Ins. Co. v, Dokko (1898), 71 Mijm. peculiar instance of fraud was presented 
 
 533, 74 N. W. 891, that "if defendant was in the recent case of Booth v. Farmers' 
 
 a trespasser plaintiff could not waive the & Mech. Bk. of Rochester, 1 N. Y. S. C. 
 
 tort, and sue him on contract as his ten- 45, 49. See the opinion of Mullen J., 
 
 ant." Same holding in McLaue c. Kelly given in full, snpra, § *539. 
 
 (1898), 72 i\Iinn. 395, 75 N. W. 601. ] " l^lt was held in Kansas City, etc. R. K. 
 
 1 Roth V. Palmer, 27 Barb. 652, and Co. v. Becker (1899). 67 Ark. 1, 53 S. W. 
 cases cited ; Kayser v. Sichel, 34 Barb. 406, that a servant of a railroad company 
 84 ; s. c. on app. sub nom. Wigand v. wiio is injured when in the service of liis 
 Sickel, 3 Keyes, 120, approving Roth v. employer, has an election to recover dam- 
 Palmer. See Claffin v. Taussig, 7 Hun, ages either by an action on the express 
 223 ; National Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Gleu- contract or by an action ex delicto ]
 
 652 CIVIL REMEDIES, 
 
 law. It is very clear that whenever the promise will be implied, 
 if the acts or omissions from which it is inferred are at the same 
 time tortious, the election to sue for the tort or for a breach of 
 the contract must necessarily exist, or else it must be denied on 
 some mere arbitrary and insufficient ground. The whole discus- 
 sion is thus reduced to the single question, When is a promise 
 implied by the law? The comprehensive principle which fur- 
 nishes a definite answer to this inquiry, applicable to all circum- 
 stances and relations, has been well stated by the courts in the 
 following terms : " When a promise is implied, it is because the 
 party intended it should be, or because natural justice plainlt/ 
 requires it in consideration, of some benefit received. ^^^ It was also 
 said by a very able English judge, that " no party is bound to 
 sue in tort, when by converting the action into an action on 
 contract he does not prejudice the defendant; and, generally 
 speaking, it is more favorable to the defendant that he should be 
 sued in contract."^ If these quotations are correct statements 
 of the general principle, it is plain that the rule maintained by 
 some decisions, which would restrict the right of election to 
 those cases in which the wrong-doer has actually received money 
 equitably belonging to the plaintiff, is erroneous.^ 
 
 ^ 463.. * 572. Method of Indicating Election. Averment of 
 Promise as a Test. The foregoing examJ3les sufficiently illustrate 
 the scope and extent of the doctrine under consideration, and 
 the class of liabilities to which it is applied. It remains to 
 inquire how, under the new procedure, the plaintiff shall indicate 
 in his pleading the fact that he has actually made his election, 
 and has brought his action in tort or on contract, as the case may 
 be. Under the old system no such question could arise. The 
 election was disclosed by the form of the action itself. If the 
 liability was to be treated as arising from contract, assumpsit 
 was of course the action selected; if from tort, trover or case 
 
 1 Web.ster v. Drinkwater, 5 Greenl. where the plaintiff would have been al- 
 322 ; also per Beardsley J. in Osborn v. lowed to pursue liis remedy in tort." See 
 Bell, 5 Denio, 370. also the following eases : Centre Turiip. 
 
 2 Young V. Marshall, 8 Bing. 43, per Co. v. Smith, 12 Vt. 217; Cummings v. 
 Tindal C. .1. Vorce, 3 Hill, 282 ; Osborn i-. Bell, 5 
 
 '^ It wa.s said V)y Hogeboom J., while Denio, 370; Camp v. Pulver, 5 Barb, 
 
 commenting upon this narrow rule in 91; Butts ?;. Collins, 13 Wend. 139, 154; 
 
 Roth V. Palmer, 27 Barb. 6.52: "Our Lightly u. Clon.ston, 1 T.aunt. 113 ; Hilly, 
 
 courts recognize no such distinction. Perrott, 3 Taunt. 274 ; Young i>. Marshall, 
 
 They allow the election in all cases 8 Bing. 43.
 
 ELECTION BETWEEN ACTIONS. 653 
 
 or replevin, or sometimes trespass, was the proper instrument. 
 Since these forms have been abolished, and all the technical 
 phrases which distinguished one proceeding from another are 
 abandoned, it is only by the substantial nature and contents of 
 the allegations themselves — the facts which they aver — that 
 the election can, if at all, be now indicated. In other words, 
 as the pleader can express his design by means of no arbitrary 
 symbols in the complaint or petition, he must show that he has 
 chosen to sue either in tort or on contract by the very substance 
 of the averments which constitute the cause of action. In a 
 recent case the New York Supreme Court proposed a certain 
 test, and declared that when the plaintiff claims to have waived 
 the tort, and to have sued upon an implied contract, the only 
 possible mode of showing this election is by expressly alleging a 
 promise to have been made by the defendant ; that in no other 
 manner can the design of making the action one ex contractu^ and 
 of distinguishing it fi'om one ex delicto^ be disclosed on the face 
 of the pleading.^ It has already been shown that this conclusion 
 is directly opposed to the fundamental principles of the reformed 
 pleading, and that it is a return to the most technical and purely 
 fictitious dogmas and distinctions of the common-law system. 
 It is also opposed to decisions and judicial dicta in relation to 
 this very question which declare that such a mode of stating the 
 cause of action is inadmissible, and that the facts alone which 
 constitute it must be averred as they actually took place. '^ • 
 
 §464. *573. No Difficulty -where Promise i.s Express. Sum- 
 mons Suggested as Means of Indicating Election in Case of Implied 
 Promise. Whenever the contract relied upon is express, there 
 can be no difficulty in showing the election upon the face of the 
 
 1 Booth V. Farmers' & Mech. Bk. of that a party by its use may shut himself 
 
 Tlochester, 1 N. Y. S. C. 45, 49. See the out from the remedy which his facts 
 
 opinion of Mullen J., supra, § * 539. would give hipi." As the court were 
 
 - Byxbie v. Wood, 24 N. Y. 607, 610; here discussing the doctrine of election, 
 
 Chambers i'. Lewis, 2 Hilt. 591. In and as they held that the complaint 
 
 Byxbie v. Wood, the learned judge pro- stated a cause of action on contract, and 
 
 ceeds as follows : " Under the code, this not one on tort, alt/ionrj/i no promise was al- 
 
 implied promise is treated as a fiction, letjed, this language, and the decision upon 
 
 and the facts out of which the prior law it, are entirely inconsistent with the posi- 
 
 raised the promise are to be stated without tion taken and the test suggested by the 
 
 am/ designation of a form of action ; and Supreme Court in Booth v. Farmers' & 
 
 the law gives such judgnjent as, being Mech. Bank. In Chambers v. Lewis, the 
 
 asked for, is appropriate to the facts. Of courtsimply said that whether a waiver has 
 
 course we cannot now say that a particular been made must now be shown by the fact.s 
 
 phrase makes a particular form of action, so averred in the complaint and by the prayer.
 
 654 CIVIL IIE.MEDIES. 
 
 pleading. If the plaintiff chooses to bring an action ex contractu, 
 his complaint or petition will simply state the terms of the agree- 
 ment, and the facts which constitute the breach thereof. If he 
 chooses to bring an action ex delicto for a violation by the de- 
 fendant of his general duty, his complaint or petition will set out 
 the facts showing his own primary right and the defendant's 
 duty, disregarding the contract, and will then allege the tortious 
 acts or omissions by which that right and duty were violated. ^ 
 Although the same actual transaction between the parties would 
 be stated in either case, the form and manner of the statement 
 would be entirely and plainly different. An ordinary claim 
 against a common carrier for the loss of goods furnishes a familiar 
 example of these two modes. But when the contract relied upon 
 is implied, and is simply the fictitious promise which the law 
 infei-s from the tortious acts themselves, it may be doubted 
 whether it is possible, in accordance with the true principles of 
 the reformed pleading, to frame a complaint or petition in all 
 cases which shall show on its face that the plaintiff has elected 
 to bring his action either in tort or on contract. In one class 
 of liabilities it is certainly possible to do so; namely, in those 
 which result from the defendant's fraudulent representations and 
 deceits. The allegation of a scienter is indispensable in the 
 action ex delicto based upon such a liability, and distinguishes it 
 in a marked manner from the correlative action based upon the 
 implied promise. But when the liability results from the v.rong- 
 ful taking or conversion of chattels, from trespasses, negligences, 
 or other similar kinds of wrongs, the very facts which are alleged 
 in the action of tort are the facts from which the promise is in- 
 ferred ; and, according to the true theory of pleading, these facts 
 must also be stated in the action ex contractu, without any legal 
 inferences or conclusions. It conclusively follows, that, in this 
 general class of liabilities, as the facts which constitute the cause 
 of action are the same in each, the averments of the complaint or 
 petition must be the same in each kind of action, if the essential 
 principles of the reformed S3'stem are complied with, so that it 
 is impossible to indicate upon the face of the pleading alone the 
 election which the phiintiff has made.^ The form of summons 
 
 1 [^See Fordvce r. Nix (1893), 58 Ark. ^ Qin Braithwaite i". Akin (1893), 3 
 
 136, 23 S. W. 967, where a somewhat am- N. 1). 365, 56 N. W. 133. tlie court said : 
 
 l.igiions complaint was held to declare on " To establish a cause of action in as- 
 
 a tort."] sunipsit ilie waiver must be averrfd either
 
 ELECTION BETWEEN ACTIONS. 
 
 G55 
 
 adopted would therefore seem to be the only certain test, in this 
 class of cases, by which the nature of the action can be deter- 
 mined, and the fact of an election can be made known to the 
 adverse party. The only other alternative is, to insert in the 
 complaint certain legal conclusions or descriptive phrases which, 
 in reference to the statement of the cause of action, are purely 
 immaterial and redundant.^ 
 
 express!}' or by t^ie manner of stating the 
 cause of action, for without the waiver no 
 cause of action in assumpsit arises. It is 
 not the wrong which gives the injured 
 party the right to sue on contract ; it is 
 tiie wrong coupled with the waiver of the 
 tort." But see Lenhardt v. French (1900), 
 57 S. C. 493, .35 S. E. 761, where the 
 court said, respecting an election to waive 
 a tort and sue in contract, " the code re- 
 quires no specific words claiming that 
 such an election has been made. It is 
 enough if it appears to be made in effect 
 in the pleadings." 
 
 It was held in Tanderup v. Hansen 
 (1894), 5 S. D. 164, 58 N. W. 578, that 
 where plaintiff sets out facts showing a 
 cause of action in trespass, and then pro- 
 ceeds to allege that he waives the tort 
 aforesaid, and for further cause of action 
 alleges a fictitious promise to pay based 
 on the same facts as set out in the tres- 
 pass, the fictitious averments of promise 
 will be disregarded as surplusage, and the 
 cause of action as appearing in the facts 
 shown will not be considered vitiated by 
 the subsequent averments.^ 
 
 ^ ^Election. 
 
 In regard to the general subject of elec- 
 tion, it is a well recognized rule that in 
 order to apply the doctrine of election of 
 remedies the party must actually have at 
 command inconsistent remedies: Elliott 
 r. Collins (1898), Idaho, 55 Pac. 301; 
 Easton v. Somerville (1900), 111 la. 164, 
 82 N. W. 475 ; Austin Mfg. Co. v. Decker 
 (1899), 109 la. 277, 80 N. W. 312; City of 
 Omaha v. Redick (1901), 61 Neb. 163, 85 
 N. TV. 46 ; State v. Bank of Commerce 
 (1900), 61 Neb. 22, 85 N. W. 43 ; Fuller- 
 Warren Co. V. Harter (1901), 110 Wis. 
 80, 85 N. W. 698; Marshall v. Rugg 
 (1896), 6 Wyo. 270, 44 Pac. 700. 
 
 An election, to be bindinir, must be 
 
 made with full knowledge of the facts : 
 Blaker v. Morse (1898), 60 Kan. 24, 55 
 I'ac. 274 ; City of Earned v. Jordan 
 (1895), 55 Kan. 124, 39 Pac. 1030 ; Deere, 
 Wells, & Co. V. Morgan (1901), 114 la. 
 287, 86 N. W. 271 ; Jones Co. v. Daniel 
 (1899), 67 Ark. 206, 53 S. W. 890. Where 
 the court orders an election the ruling 
 will not be disturbed on appeal except in 
 case of an abuse of discretion : Phillips 
 V. Carver (1898), 99 Wis. 561, 75 N. W. 
 432. 
 
 An election once made is conclusive: 
 Wright, Barrett, etc. Co. v. Robinson 
 (1900), 79 Minn. 272, 82 N. W. 632; 
 Blaker v. Morse (1898), 60 Kan. 24, 55 
 Pac. 274 ; City of Earned v. Jordan 
 (1895), 55 Kan."l24,39Pac. 1030; Carroll 
 V. Fethers (1899), 102 Wis. 436, 78 N. W. 
 604; Theusen v. Bryan (1901), 113 la. 
 496, 85 N. W. 802 ; Remington v. Hudson 
 (1902), 64 Kan. 43, 67 Pac. 636. 
 
 Where a complaint contains inconsist- 
 ent counts, the remedy is a motion to 
 strike: Keller v. Strong (1898), 104 la. 
 585, 73 N. W. 1071 ; Fox v. Graves (1896), 
 46 Neb. 812, 65 N. W. 887. A motion to 
 require plaintiff to elect is also proper : 
 Fox V. Graves (1896), 46 Neb. 812, 65 
 N. W. 887. 
 
 Cases in which remedies were held to 
 be inconsistent : Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
 Henrie (1901), 63 Kan. 330, 65 Pac. 665, 
 damages for refusal to issue railway passes 
 in consideration of right of way, and ac- 
 tion for value of land appropriated; 
 Franey v. Wauwatosa Park Co. (1898), 
 99 Wis. 40, 74 N. W. 548, rescission of 
 contract and damages for fraud in obtain- 
 ing it; Eimited Inv. Co. v. Glendale Inv. 
 Ass'n (1898), 99 Wis. 54, 74 N. W. 633, 
 same; Rildebrand v. Tarbell (1897), 97 
 Wis. 446, 73 N W. 53, insisting on rights 
 under an assignment and bringing act^oT; 
 to have i' ."ot a.-ide ;. Endinirtoij r P;;: •'.;
 
 656 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 SECTION FOURTH. 
 
 THE FORM OF THE COMPLAINT OR PETITION. 
 
 § 465. * 574. Introductory. Having thus discussed and de- 
 termined the fundamental principles and general doctrines of the 
 reformed pleading, which apply to all causes of action, and to 
 
 (1901), 111 Wis. 208, 86 N. W. 571, action 
 on contract for damages and action to 
 rescind ; First Nat. Bank i-. Tootle (1899), 
 59 Neb. 44, 80 N. W. 264, action on con- 
 tract on account for goods sold under 
 fraudulent representations, and rescission 
 of sale ; First Nat. Bank v. McKinney 
 (1896), 47 Neb. 149. 66 N. W. 280, same; 
 Hargadiue-McKittrick Dry Goods Co. r. 
 Warden (1899), 151 Mo. 578, 52 S. W. 59.3, 
 same ; City of Cincinnati ^^ Emerson 
 (1837), 57 0. 8t. 132, 48 N. E. 667, con- 
 testing validity of assessment on a ground 
 common to plaintiff and all other owners 
 of abutting lots, and on a ground pertain- 
 ing to plaintiff's lot alone; MacMurray- 
 Judge, etc. Co. v. City of St. Louis (1896), 
 138 Mo. 608, 39 S. W. 467, damages for 
 injury to property and injunction re- 
 straining such injury ; Davis v. Tubbs 
 (1895), 7 S. D. 488, 64 N. W. 534, action 
 on express contract and on implied con- 
 tract; Hackettr. Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. 
 (1894), 95 Ky. 236, 24 S. W. 871, damages 
 for death and for suffering; Thomas's 
 Adm'r V. Maysville Gas Co. (1900), 108 
 Ky. 224, 56 S. W. 153, same; Owensboro 
 & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Barclay's Adm'r 
 (1897), 102 Ky. 16, 43 S. W. 177, same; 
 Seymore v. Rice (1894), 94 Ga. 183, 21 
 S. E. 293, fraud and breach of warranty ; 
 Vaule V. Steenerson (1895), 63 Minn. 110, 
 65 N. W. 257, damages for refusing to 
 make a levy by virtue of an execution, 
 and damages for levying another execu- 
 tion issued ou the same judgment and 
 appropriating the pnjceeds. 
 
 Cases in which remedies were held 
 uot to be inconsistent : Bent v. Barnes 
 (1895), 90 Wis. 631, 64 N. W. 428, re- 
 ydevin for portion of goods and ecjuitable 
 action to enforce a trust in funds derived 
 fr<jni tlie remainder ; Simons v. Fagan 
 (1901), 62 Neb. 287, 87 N. W. 21, damages 
 
 for maliciously attaching property and 
 action ou the attachment bond ; Eastou 
 V. Somerville (1900), 111 la. 164,82N. W. 
 475, conversion against a guardian for 
 buying a mortgage with funds of the ward 
 and an action against one who received 
 these funds with knowledge of the facts ; 
 Savage v. Savage (1899), 36 Ore. 268, 59 
 Pac. 461, action on a note and on the 
 original indebtedness ; Johnsou-Brink- 
 man Co. »;. Mo. Pac. Ky. Co. (1894), 126 
 Mo. 344, 28 S. W. 870, attachment against 
 a vendee and replevin ; Saunders v. United 
 States Marble Co. (1901), 25 Wash. 475, 
 65 I'ac. 782, action on express contract 
 and on retaining benefits from such con- 
 tract ; Humphrey i;. Kingler (1895), 94 la. 
 182, 62 N. W. 685, prayers in the alterna- 
 tive that a deed be set aside for fraud, or 
 that contract price be recovered. 
 
 Tlieory of Case. 
 
 A complaint must proceed upon some 
 definite theory and must be good upon 
 that theory : Yorn v. Bracken (1899), 153 
 Ind. 492, 55 N. E. 257 ; Terre Haute, etc. 
 R. R. Co. V. McCorkle (1894), 140 Ind. 
 613, 40 N. E. 62 ; Pittsburg, etc. Ry. Co. 
 V. Sullivan (1894), 141 Ind. 83, 40 N. E. 
 138 ; Citizens' Street Ry. Co. v. Willoeby 
 (1893), 134 Ind. 563, 33N. E. 627; Grent- 
 ner v. Fehrenschield (1902), 64 Kan. 764, 
 68 Pac. 619; Codding v. Munson (1897), 
 52 Neb. 580, 72 N. W. 846 ; Truesdell v. 
 Bourke (1895), 145 N. Y. 612, 40 N. E. 
 83. 
 
 A party cannot try his case upon one 
 tlieory and on appeal adopt another : 
 Lebcher v. Lambert (1900), 23 Utah, 1, 
 63 Pac. 628; Gray ;,•. Worst (1895), 129 
 Mo. 122, 31 S. W. 585; Anderson v. 
 Foster (1898), 105 Ga. 563, 32 S. E. 373; 
 Shropshire v. Ryan (1900), 111 la. 677, 
 82 N. W. 1035 ; McHale v. Maloney ( 1903),
 
 FORM OF THE COMPLAINT OR I'ETITION. 057 
 
 all defences by way of confession and avoidance or of affirmative 
 relief, I shall now briefly consider the rules wliich pertain to the 
 form of the complaint or petition, and which regulate the manner 
 of stating and arranging its allegations. These rules are few 
 and simple ; and their object is to render the issues single and 
 certain, and to present the cause of action for a decision upon 
 its merits, and not upon any technical, incidental, or collateral 
 questions. In one important feature the new system stands in 
 marked contrast with the old, — the entire absence of all special 
 phrases or formulas by which the kinds of actions are distin- 
 guished, or by which the pleadings or any parts of them are 
 characterized. 
 
 § 466. * 575. Separate Statement of Different Causes of Action. 
 Inducement and Prayer need not be repeated. When a complaint 
 or petition contains two or more causes of action, all the codes 
 require that they shall be distinctly and separately stated and 
 numbered ; and the method by which a violation of this require- 
 ment is to be corrected has already been explained. ^ It is a 
 settled rule, that if the pleading is of this kind, each separate 
 division or count must be complete by itself, and must contain all 
 the averments necessary to a perfect cause of action. ^ Defects 
 and omissions in one cannot be supplied by the allegations found 
 in another; nor can the pleader, by merely referring to material 
 facts properly set forth in a former count, incorporate them into 
 and make them part of a subsequent one. In other words, all 
 the issuable or material facts constituting the ground for a re- 
 covery must be stated in each cause of action, even though some 
 repetition might thereby become necessary. ^ This requirement, 
 
 — Neb. — , 9.3 N. W. 677; Lansing v. Relief Ass'n (1894), 87 Wi.s. Ill, 58 N. W. 
 Commercial Union Assurance Co. ( 190.3), 76; Moore v. Ilalliday (1903), 43 Ore. 243, 
 
 — Neb. — , 93 N. W. 7.56. 72 Pac. 801. But a failure to allege that 
 Want of a definite theory is not ground they are separate is not ground for de- 
 fer a demurrer, but for a motion to make murrer: Gunderson v. Thomas (1894), 87 
 more definite : Scott v. Cleveland, etc. Ry. Wis. 406, 58 N. W. 750. 
 
 Co. (1895), 144 Ind. 125, 43 N. E. 133. "If any one count of a petition or any 
 
 See also, upon the general subject of separate defence set up in an answer is 
 
 theory of complaint. Mark v. North (1900), adjudged insufficient, such ruling does not 
 
 155 Ind. 575, 57 N. E. 902; Cleveland, affect the other counts of the petition or 
 
 etc. Ry. Co. !.'. Gray (1897), 148 Ind. 266, the other separate defences:" Munford 
 
 46 N. E. 675.] v. Keet (1900), 15-i Mo. 36, 55 S. W. 
 
 1 See supra, §§ *447, *450. 27 1.] 
 
 2 [Clark V. Ross (1895), 96 Ta. 402. 65 3 j^In McKay v. McDougal (1897), 19 
 N. W. 1.340; Johns v. Northwestern Mut. Mont. 488, 48 Pac. 98S, the court said- 
 
 42
 
 658 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 however, applies only to the material and issuable facts which 
 constitute the cause of action. Matter which is simply introduc- 
 tory or by way of inducement, and not part of the gravame'n, 
 after having been once set out at the commencement of the 
 pleading, need not be repeated in each paragraph, but should be 
 referred to merel3^ And this introductory matter includes all 
 descriptions of the character, capacity, or particular right in 
 respect of which the plaintiffs and defendants are made parties 
 to the action, as executors, trustees, public officers, and the like; 
 These and similar statements properly form the commencement 
 or introduction of the complaint, distinct from the several causes 
 of action, and equally applicable to all of them. Whenever, 
 therefore, a cause of action is attacked by a demurrer directed 
 either against it alone or against the entire pleading, it must 
 stand or fall by its own averments, and cannot be helped out by 
 any facts, however sufficient in themselves, alleged in anothei 
 paragraph or count. ^ But the particular sum of damages claimed 
 
 " Each separate division or count of the 
 coniphiint must be complete in itself, and 
 tlie ])lcader, by merely referring to ma- 
 terial facts properly set forth in a former 
 count, cannot incorporate them into and 
 make them part of a subsequent one. 
 This rule should not be extended to the 
 inclusion of a descrij)tion of the property 
 itself, nor to a point requiring exhibits to 
 he repeated, but it should be held to em- 
 Ijrace tliose material and issuable facts of 
 ownership which constitute the plaintiff's 
 action." 
 
 In support of this view, see Cooper 
 V. Portlier Brewing Co. (1900), 112 Ga. 
 894, 38 S. E. 91 ; Aulbach v. Dahler 
 (1896), Idaho, 43 Pac. 322; Corbey v. 
 Kogers (1898), \h2 Ind. 169, 52 N. E. 
 748. 
 
 But in other States it is held that ma- 
 terial facts alleged in one count may be 
 made a part of another count by appropri- 
 ate reference. To this effect see Treweek 
 I'. Howard (1895), 105 Cal. 434, 39 Pac. 
 20; Hopkins j;. Contra Costa Co. (1895), 
 106 Cal. 566, 39 Pac. 933; Uamsey v. 
 Johnson (1897), 7 Wyo. 392, 42 Pac. 1084; 
 Hut.son V. King (1894), 95 Ga. 271, 22 
 S. E. 615; Realty lievenue, etc. Co. v. 
 Farm, etc. Co. (1900), 79 Miun. 465, 82 
 N. W. 857. In this la.st ca.se the court 
 
 held the allegation that " plaintiff realleges 
 and reaffirms all the allegations of para- 
 graphs 1, 2, and 3 of plaintiff's cause of 
 action," a sufficient reference.] 
 
 1 Abeudroth v. Boardley, 27 Wis. 555 ; 
 Durkee i'. City Bk. of Kenosha, 13 Wis. 
 216, 222; Curtis v. Moore, 15 Wis. 134; 
 Sabin v. Austin, 19 Wis. 421, 423; Catlin 
 V. Pedrick, 17 Wis. 88, 91 ; Barlow v. 
 Burns, 40 Cal. 351, 353 ; Potter v. Earnest, 
 45 Ind. 416; Mason v. Weston, 29 Ind. 
 561 ; Day v. Vallette, 25 Ind. 42; Leabo 
 V. Detrick, 18 Ind. 414 ; Nat. Bk. of Mich. 
 V. Green, 33 Iowa, 140 (answer) ; Silvers r. 
 Junction R. Co , 43 Ind. 435, 446 (reply). 
 See also Scott v. Robards, 67 .Mo. 289 ; 
 State V. Yellow Jacket S. Min. Co., 14 
 Nev. 220; Birdsall v. Birdsall, 52 Wis. 
 208; McCarnan v. Cochran, 57 Ind. 106; 
 Killian r. Eigenman, 57 id. 480; Barnes 
 V. Stephens, 62 id. 226 ; Pennsylvania Co. 
 V. Holderman, 69 id. 18; Haskell v. Has- 
 kell, 54 Cal. 262 ; Sharp v. Miller, 54 id. 
 329 ; see also Jasper v. Hazen. 2 N. Dak. 
 401 ; Neier v. Missouri I'ac. Ry. Co., 12 
 Mo. App. 35 ; Anil Sav. Bk. v. Lexington, 
 74 Mo. 104 ; Boeckler v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 
 10 Mo. App. 448; Farri.s v. Jones, 112 
 Ind. 498 ; Bidwell v. Babcock, 87 Cal. 29 ; 
 Yost V. Commercial Bk. of Santa Ana, 
 94 Cal. 494 ; Green v. Clifford, 94 Cal. 49 ;
 
 FORM OF THE COMPLAINT OU PETITION. 
 
 G59 
 
 in each cause of action need not necessarily be given at its close; 
 it is sufficient if the aggregate amount is alleged and demanded 
 at the end of the complaint. ^ 
 
 § 467. * 576. Rule as to Statement of Same Cause of Action in 
 Different Counts. Since the reformed pleading requires the facts 
 to be averred as they actually took place, it does not in general 
 permit a single cause of action to be set forth in two or more 
 different forms or counts, as was the familiar practice at the 
 common law. The rule is undoubtedly settled, that, under all 
 ordinary circumstances, the plaintiff who has but one cause of 
 action will not be suffered to spread it upon the record in differ- 
 ing shapes and modes, as though he possessed two or more dis- 
 tinct demands; and when he does so without special and sufficient 
 reason, he will be compelled, either by a motion before the trial 
 or by an application and direction at the trial, to select one of 
 these counts, and to abandon the others. ^ It is certain that 
 different causes of action in the complaint or petition must, as 
 
 Pennie v. Hiklreth, 81 Cal. 127 ; but see 
 St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. St. Louis, 86 
 Mo. 495. As to what are not separate 
 causes of action, so that they mai/ be 
 stated, in one count, see Rayan v. Day, 
 46 Iowa, 239 (two promissory notes, sed 
 qu.) ; State v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. Ry. 
 Co., 45 Wis. 579 (distinct grounds of for- 
 feiture). 
 
 1 Spears v. "Ward, 48 Ind. 541 ; Blan- 
 chard v. Jefferson, 28 Abb. N. Cas. 
 236. 
 
 []It is held in Connecticut that good 
 pleading requires the claim or claims for 
 relief, no matter how many couuts there 
 may be, to be set out at the end of the 
 entire complaint : Goodrich v. Stanton 
 (1899), 71 Conn. 418, 42 Atl. 74; Baxter 
 V. Camp (1898), 71 Conn. 245, 41 Atl. 803. 
 In support of the rule stated in the text 
 see H. B. Clafliu Co. v. Simon (1898), 18 
 Utah, 153, 55 Pac. 376.] 
 
 ■^ [^In support of this proposition, see 
 Reed v. Poindexter (1895), 16 Mont. 294, 
 40 Pac. 596; Leonard v. Roberts (1894), 
 20 Colo. 88, 36 Pac. 880 ; Bas.sett v. Shares 
 (1893), 63 Conn. 39, 27 Atl. 421 ; Palmer 
 V. Hartford Dredging Co. (1900), 73 Conn. 
 182, 47 Atl. 125 ; Finken v. Elm City Brass 
 Co. (1900), 73 Conn. 423, 47 Atl. 670; 
 Brown v. Wilcox (1900), 73 Conn. 100, 46 
 
 Atl. 827; Goodrich v. Stanton (1899), 71 
 Conn. 418, 42 Atl. 74; Freeman's Appeal 
 (1899), 71 Conn. 708, 43 Atl. 185 ; Oley i'. 
 Miller (1901), 74 Conn. 304, 50 Atl. 744 ; 
 Wehmhoff v. Rutherford (1895), 98 Ky. 
 91, 32 S. W. 288. 
 
 The practice of setting out the facts in 
 different form in the several couuts to 
 meet the exigencies of proof, has been 
 held proper in the following cases: Es- 
 trella Vineyard Co. v. Butler (1899), 125 
 Cal. 232, 57 Pac. 980; Rucker v. Hall 
 (1895), 105 Cal. 425, 38 Pac. 962; Bern- 
 stein V. Downs (1896), 112 Cal. 197, 44 
 Pac. 557 ; Stockton, etc. Works v. Glens 
 Falls Ins. Co. (1898), 121 Cal. 167, 53 
 Pac. 565 ; Rinard v. Omaha, etc. Ry. 
 Co. (1901), 164 Mo. 270, 64 S. AV. 124; 
 Willard i\ Carrigan (1902), Ariz., 68 Pac. 
 538; Armstrong v. Penn (1898), 105 Ga. 
 229, 31 S. E. 158; Cawker City Bank 
 V. Jennings (1893), 89 la. 230, 56 N. W. 
 494. 
 
 Cawker City Bank v. Jennings (1893), 
 89 la. 230, 56 N. W. 494 : The first count 
 of plaintiff's petition declared on a ]>romis- 
 sory note executed by defendant to plain- 
 tiff. The second count expressly purported 
 to set up the same cause of action, and de- 
 clared on money advanced and loaned to 
 the defendant. Held, that the second
 
 660 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 a general rule, imply as many distinct causes of action actually 
 held or claimed to be held by the plaintiff.^ It cannot be said, 
 however, that this rule is absolutely inflexible. As it is one of 
 convenience simply, it must sometimes yield to the demands of 
 justice and equit}-. Under peculiar circumstances, when the 
 exact legal nature of the plaintiff's right and. of the defendant's 
 liability depends upon facts in the sole possession of the defend- 
 ant, and which will not be developed until the trial, tlie pLaintiff 
 may set forth the same single cause of action in varied counts 
 and ^\ ith differing averments, so as to meet the possible proofs 
 which will for the first time fully appear on the trial. This 
 proposition is plainly just and right, and is sustained by the 
 authority of able courts. ^ 
 
 § 468. * 577. Effect of Demurring to Entire Complaint -when 
 Made up of Several Counts. Joint Demurrers by Two or More 
 Defendants. When a complaint or petition contains two or more 
 distinct causes of action, a demurrer to it as a whole, or to all or 
 some of the causes of action jointly, must fail and be overruled if 
 any one of the separate causes of action included in the demurrer 
 is good; and the same rule applies to separate defences in an 
 answer.^ The defendant should never demur to an entire corn- 
 
 count (lid not set up a new cause of in his complaint two distinct causes of 
 
 action. action — (1) aj^ainst the defendant as a 
 
 Where two causes of action are iden- common carrier, and (2) against defeud- 
 
 tical, the remedy is not a motion for an ant as a wajehousemau — for the negli- 
 
 election but a motion to strike out as sur- gent loss of the goods. This manner of 
 
 pi usage : Pollock v. Whijiple (1895), 45 pleading was held proper under the cir- 
 
 Neb. 844, 64 N. W. 210.J cnm.^ances, and the plaintiff could not be 
 
 1 Sturges V. Burton, 8 Ohio St. 215; compelled to elect on the trial. The sub- 
 Muzzy V. Ledlie, 23 Wis. 445 ; Lackey ject is exhaustively discussed by Di.xon 
 r. Vanderbilt, 10 How. Pr. 155; Nash v. C. J., pp. .340-.342. See also Smith t;. 
 McCauley, 9 Abb. Pr. 159; Sippcrly r. Douglass, 15 Abb. Pr. 266; Jones v. 
 Troy & R. Tl. Co., 9 How. Pr. 8.3 ; Hillman Palnier, 1 Abb. Pr. 442. And as further 
 I'. Hillman, 14 How. Pr. 456; Churchill v. examples, Van Brunt r. Mather, 48 Iowa, 
 Churchill, 9 How. Pr. 552; Ford v. Mat- .503; Pearson v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., 
 tice, 14 How. Pr 91 ; Dunning v. Thomas, 45 id. 497 ; La Pofnte T. Sup. v. O'Malley, 
 11 How. Pr. 281; Bishop v. Chicago & 46 Wis. 35; Brinkman r. Hunter, 73 Mo. 
 N. W. Ry. Co., 67 Wis. 610. 172 ; Cramer v. Oppenstein, 16 Colo. .504 : 
 
 2 Whitney r. Chicago &N.W.Ry. Co., Manders v. Craft (Colo. App. 1893), 32 
 27 Wis. 327,340-342. The plaintiff had Pac. Rep. 836 ; Plummer v. Mold, 22 
 shipped wool on defendant's road for Minn. 15; Hawley y. Wilkinson, 18 Minn. 
 Chicago, and it was never delivered. He 525. 
 
 did not know whether it had been lost in * Curtis r. Moore, 15 Wis. 134; Jif- 
 
 the transit, or had been burned at a fire fersonville, M. & L R, ("o. v. Vaiicant, 40 
 
 which had consumed defendnnt's ware- Ind. 233 ; Heavenridge v. Mondy, 34 Lid. 
 
 house in Chicago. He therefore set forth 28 ; Hale i;. Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y.
 
 FORM OF THE pOMPLAINT OR PETITION. 
 
 661 
 
 plaint or petition consisting of several distinct causes of action, 
 nor to two or more causes of action jointly, unless he is certain 
 that they are all insufficient; and, under all circumstances, it is 
 the better and safer practice to demur in express terms to each 
 separately, for each will then stand or fall upon its own merits.^ 
 The same rule also applies to a demurrer for want of sufficient 
 facts by two- or more defendants jointly ; it will be overruled as 
 to all who unite in it if the complaint or petition states a good 
 
 626, 630 ; Ward v. Guyer, 3 N. Y. S. C. 58 ; 
 Alexander ?•. Thacker, 30 Neb. 614 ; Pin- 
 kum V. P]au Claire, 81 Wis. 301 ; Silvers v. 
 JuDCtiou K. Co., 43 lud. 435, 442, 445. In 
 the last case the question arose on a 
 reply which contained several paragraphs 
 or defences. The defendant demurred 
 as follows ; '"Now conies the defendant 
 and demurs to the second, third, and 
 fourth paragraphs of the plaintiff's reply, 
 upon the following grounds: Fiisl, said 
 second paragraph does not ^ state facts 
 sufficient, etc. ; second, said third para- 
 graph does not state facts, etc. ; third, said 
 fourth paragraph does not," etc. This 
 demurrer was held to be joint, and not 
 several ; and the rule of the text was en- 
 forced. The opinion carefully discusses 
 the question, what language makes a de- 
 murrer or an answer joint, and what sev- 
 eral, citing on this topic Lane v. State, 
 7 Ind. 426 ; Earner v. Morehead, 22 Ind. 
 354 ; Jewett !-. Honey Creek Draining 
 Co., 39 Ind. 245; Parlier v. Thomas. 19 
 Ind. 213 ; Fankboner v. Fankbouer, 20 
 Ind. 62 ; Aiken v. Bruen, 21 Ind. 137 ; 
 Hume V. Dessar, 29 Ind. 112. The follow- 
 ing cases are further illustrations of both 
 branches of the rule, — a demurrer to all 
 the causes of action or defences, and a de- 
 murrer by the defendants jointly : Collier 
 V. Erwin, 2 Mont. 335 ; Dann v. Gibson, 
 9 Neb. 513; Hyde r. Kenosha Cy. Sup, 
 43 Wis. 129; American Button-hole, etc. 
 Co. I'. Gurnee, 44 id. 49 ; Lamon >•. Hackett, 
 49 id. 261 ; Schiffer v. Eau Claire, 51 id. 
 385 ; Stanford v. Davis, 54 Ind. 45 ; Wil- 
 kerson 2\ liust, 57 id. 172; Romine v. 
 Romine, 59 id. 346; Price v. Sanders, 
 60 id. 310; Carter v. Zenblin, 68 id. 436 ; 
 Parman u. Chamberlain, 74 id. 82 ; Shafer 
 V. State, 49 id. 460, and cases cited ; Kelsey 
 V. Henrv, 48 id. 37. 
 
 [^Raymond v. Wathen (1895), 142 Ind- 
 367, 41 N. E. 815 ; Palmer v. Breed (1896), 
 Ariz., 43 Pac. 219; Mayors. Smith (1900), 
 111 Ga. 870, 36 S. E. 955 ; Harris County 
 V. Brady (1902), 115 Ga. 767, 42 S. E. 7l"; 
 Pryor v. Brady (1902), 115 Ga. 848, 42 
 S. E. 223 ; Kearney Stone Works r. Mc- 
 Pherson (1894), 5 Wyo. 178, 38 Pac. 920; 
 Florence v. Pattillo (1898), 105 Ga. 577, 
 32 S. E. 642 ; Brake v. Payne (1893), 137 
 Ind. 479,37 N. E. 140; Rownd v. State 
 (1898), 152 Ind. 39. 51 N. E. 914; A. E. 
 Johnson Co. v. White (1899), 78 Minn. 
 48, 80 N. W. 838; Barbre v. Goodale 
 (1896), 28 Ore. 465, 43 Pac. 378 ; Asevado 
 V. Orr (1893), 100 Cal. 293, 34 Pac. 777; 
 Hurst V. Sawyer (1894), 2 Okla. 470, 37 
 Pac. 817; Hanenkratt r. Hamil (1900), 10 
 Okla 219, 61 Pac. 1050; Carter v. Wann 
 (1899), Idaho, 57 Pac. 314; Corns v. 
 Clouser (1893), 137 Ind. 201, 36 N. E. 
 848 ; Lake Erie & W. R. R. Co. v. Char- 
 man (1903), — Ind. — , 67 N. E. 923. 
 
 It was held in Maynard v. Waidlich 
 (1900), 156 Ind. 562, 60 N. E. 348, that a 
 demurrer as follows : " The defendant, 
 Harriet Maynard, demurs to the second, 
 third, and fourth paragraphs of plaintiff's 
 reply to the second paragraph of the an- 
 swer of the said defendant, and says that 
 neither of said paragraphs of said reply 
 states facts sufficient to avoid said answer," 
 is joint and not several.] 
 
 1 Durkee v. City Bk. of Kenosha, 13 
 Wis. 216, 222 ; Ter're Haute & L. R. Co. v. 
 Sherwood, 132 Ind. 129 ; Glassy. Murphy 
 (Ind. App. 1892), 30 N. E. Rep. 1097. 
 
 [^But a demurrer does not lie to a single 
 paragrapli of a complaint unless it purports 
 to present a complete cause of action : 
 Lowman v. West (1894), 8 Wash. 355, 
 36 Pac. 268.3
 
 662 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 cause of action against even one of tliem.^ A different rule, 
 however, prevails in some States. ^ 
 
 § 469. * 578. Admission by Failure to deny. It is expressly 
 provided in all the codes, that material allegations of the com- 
 plaint or petition not controverted by the answer are admitted, 
 and they need not be proved; the same is of course true of aver- 
 ments expressly admitted. A denial of the legal conclusion, 
 such as the indebtedness, while the answer is silent with respect 
 to the i-ssuable facts from which the conclusion follows, is a mere 
 nullity, and raises no issue. ^ What averments are material, and 
 are thus admitted unless controverted, is a question of law to be 
 decided by the court, and not by the jury.* The result just 
 mentioned does not arise from a failure to deny immaterial alle- 
 gations ; such statements are not issuable, and their truth is not 
 conceded for the purposes of the trial l)y the defendant's neglect 
 
 1 McGonigal r. .Colter, .32 Wis. 614; 
 Webster v. Tibbits, 19 Wis. 438; Shore v. 
 Taylor, 46 lud. 34.') ; Owen v. Cooper, 46 
 Ind. 524. See al.so Benedict v. Farlow, 
 lud. App. 160; Couant v. Barnard, 103 
 N. C. 315; Murdock v. Cox, 118 Ind. 266. 
 
 ([Hirsheld i-. Weill (1898), 121 Cal. 13, 
 53 Pac. 402 ; Dalrymple v. Security Loan 
 Co. (1900), 9 N. D. 306, 83 N. W. 245; 
 Mark Paine Lumber Co. v. Improvement 
 Co. (1896), 94 Wis. 322, 68 N. W. 1013 ; 
 Miller V. Rapp (1893), 135 Ind. 614, 34 
 N. E. 981; Frankel v. Garrard (1903), — 
 Ind. — , 66 N. E. 687; Evans v. Fall 
 River County (1896), 9 S. D. 1.30,68 N. W. 
 195 ; Palmer v. Bank of Zumbrota (1896), 
 65 Minn. 90, 67 N. W. 893 ; Burr r. Brant- 
 ley (1893), 40 S. C. 538, 19 S. E. 199; 
 Stahn V. Catawlia Mills (1898), 53 S. C. 
 519, 31 S. E. 498; Asevado v. Orr (1893), 
 100 Cal. 293, 34 Pac. 777 ; Rogers v. 
 Scbulenburg (1896), 111 Cal. 281,43 Pac. 
 899, citing tiie text ; Stiles i'. City of 
 Guthrie (1895), 3 Okla. 26,41 Pac. 383 ; 
 Neal V. Bleckley (1897), 51 S. C. 506, 29 
 S. E. 249. 
 
 And similarly, a joint motion, if not 
 good as to all, should be dismi.ssed : Leon- 
 hardt v. Citizens' Bank (1898), 56 Neb. 38, 
 76 N. W. 472; Cortelyou i-. McCarthy 
 (1898), .53 Neb. 479, 73 K W. 921 ; Car.son 
 V. Fears (1893), 91 Ga. 482, 17 S. E. .342. 
 
 Where several defendants demur 
 " jointly, as well as separately and sever- 
 
 ally, to tlie first, second, and third para- 
 graphs of the complaint, and to each of 
 them separately," licld, that it is a sepa- 
 rate demurrer as to the paragraphs of the 
 complaint but joint as to the parties, cit- 
 ing Carver v. Carver, 97 Ind. 497 : Arm- 
 strong L\ Dunn (1895), 143 Ind. 433, 4L 
 N. E. 540. 
 
 A separate demurrer by one of several 
 joint defendants must be considered as 
 though the demurrant were the sole de- 
 fendant : Frankel ;•. Garrard (1903),— 
 Ind. — , 66 N. E. 687 ; Cummings ;•. Town 
 of Lake Realty Co. (1893), 86 Wis. 382, 
 57 N. W. 43] 
 
 2 Wood V. Olney, 7 Nev. 109. Tlie de- 
 murrer was sustained as to some, and 
 overruled as to the others. 
 
 3 Skinner v. Clute, 9 Nev. 342 ; Jen- 
 kins V. N. C. Ore I)re.«sing Co., 65 N. C. 
 563. Sec also Trapnall v. Hill, 31 Ark. 
 345; Mohr v. Barnes, 4 Col. 350; Dole v. 
 Burceigh, 1 Dak. 227 ; Kansas City Hotel 
 Co. r. Sauer, 65 Mo. 279 ; Bonham v. 
 Craig, 84 N. C. 224 ; Bensley v. McMil- 
 lan, 49 Iowa, 517; Alston v. Wilson,- 44 
 id. 130; Fellows v. Webb, 43 id. 133; 
 Blake v John.son Cy. Com'rs, etc., 18 Kan. 
 266; Wands v. School Dist., 19 id. 204 ; 
 Murray v. N. Y. L. Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 236, 
 239 ; Lange v. Benedict, 73 id. 12 ; Marsh 
 V. Pugh, 43 Wis. 507 ; Tracy v. Craig, 55 
 Cal. 91. 
 
 * Becker v. Crow, 7 Bush, 198.
 
 FORM OF THE COMPLAINT OR PETITION. 663 
 
 # 
 
 to controvert them. In this class are included all species of im- 
 material and non-issuable matter, such as details of evidence, 
 conclusions of law, and averments of time, place, value, amount, 
 and the like, in all ordinary circumstances.^ An important 
 question presents itself in this connection as to the effect of a 
 qualified admission contained in the defendant's answer, and the 
 decisions in respect to it are somewhat conflicting. The rule is 
 settled by one group of cases, that when the answer expressly 
 admits certain material averments of the complaint or petition, 
 but at the same time accompanies this concession with the state- 
 ment of affirmative matter in explanation and qualification by the 
 way of defence, the plaintiff may avail himself of the admissions 
 without the qualifications ; he is not bound to take the defend- 
 ant's entire statement; he is freed from the necessity of proving 
 his own averments that are admitted, while the defendant must 
 prove those which he sets up.^ Other cases seem to lay down 
 a different rule, denying to the plaintiff the full benefit of the 
 admission, and requiring him to accept it, if at all, with the 
 defendant's qualifying matter.^ When different defendants have 
 put in separate answers, an admission by one cannot be used 
 against the others ; * and the same doctrine extends to separate 
 defences of one party in a single answer; the admissions in a 
 defence of confession and avoidance do not overcome the effect 
 of a denial contained in another.^ 
 
 § 470. * 579. Defective Complaint Aided by Averments in 
 Answer. A defective complaint or petition may be supple- 
 mented, and substantial issues may thus be presented by the 
 answer itself.** When the plaintiff has failed to state material 
 
 1 Doyle V. Franklin, 48 Cal. 537, 539 ; 19 Wis. 350 ; Farrell v. Heuuesy, 21 Wis. 
 
 Gates V. Salmon, 46 Cal. 361, 379 (evi- 632. 
 
 dence) ; Chicago & S. W. R. Co. v. N. W. » Troy & R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 17 Barb. 
 
 U. Packet Co., 38 Iowa, 377, 382 (value 581. As to the effect of admissions, see 
 
 of goods) ; People y. Marlboro' H. Com'rs, also Simmons v. Law, 8 Bosw. 213; 3 
 
 54 N. Y. 276, 279 (conclusion of law). Keyes, 217 ; Paige y. Willett, 38 N. Y. 31 ; 
 
 See also Sands v. St. John, 36 Barb. 628 ; Tell v. Beyer, 38 N. Y. 161 ; Robbins v. 
 
 23 How. Pr. 140 ; Fry v. Bennett, 5 Sandf. Codman, 4 E. D. Smith, 325. 
 
 54 : Newman r. Otto, 4 Sandf. 668 ; Oechs * Swift v. Kingsley, 24 Barb. 541; 
 
 r. Cook, 3 Duer, 161 ; Harlow v. Hamil- Troy & R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 17 Barb. 581, 
 
 ton, 6 How. Pr. 473 ; Connoss v. Meir, 2 599. 
 
 E. D. Smith, 314 ; Mayor, etc. of Albany ' ^ Vassear i'. Livingston, 13 N. Y. 256; 
 
 ^. Cunliff, 2 N. Y. 165,171. . 4 Duer, 285 ; Ay res v. Covill, 18 Barb. 
 
 - Dickson v. Cole, 34 Wis. 621, 626, 264; 9 How. Pr. 573. 
 
 €27 ; Sexton v. Rhames, 13 Wis. 99 ; Hart- ^ QState ex rel. v. Thum (1898), Idaho, 
 
 well V. Page, 14 Wis. 49; Orton v. Noonan 55 Pac. 858. But a complaint demurred
 
 664 
 
 CIVIL KKMEDIES. 
 
 facts, so that no cause of action is set forth, but these very facts 
 are supplied by the averments of the answer, the omission is 
 immaterial, and the defect is cured. ^ This rule should properly 
 be confined to the case where the answer affirmatively alleges the 
 very fact that is missing from the complaint ;2 but it has in some 
 instances been enforced, although the answer simply contained a 
 denial of the necessary fact which should have been averred by 
 the plaintiff.3 ^ statement in the reply, however, of a fact which 
 
 to ore tenns at the trial cannot be aided by 
 the answer : Wisconsin Lakes Ice Co. v. 
 Ice Co. (1902), 115 Wis. .377, 91 X. W. 988. 
 In Shute v. Austin (1897), 120 N. C. 
 440, 27 S. E. 90, the conrt said : " The doc- 
 trine of aider can only be invoked in aid 
 of a defective statement of a good cause 
 of action ; but cannot be used to aid the 
 statement of a bad or defective cause of 
 action." See also Harrison v. Garrett 
 (1903), 132 N. C. 172, 43 S. E. 594. 
 
 1 I^Ricketts v. Hart (1899), 150 Mo. 64, 
 51 S. W. 825; Doerner v. Doerner (1901), 
 ICl Mo. 407, 61 S. W. 802 ; Casler v. Chase 
 (1901), 160 Mo. 418, 60 S. W. 1040; Og- 
 den V. Ogden (1894), 60 Ark. 70, 28 S. W. 
 796; Ware v. Long (1902), Ky., 69 S. W. 
 797 ; Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Pittman 
 (1901), Ky., 64 S. W. 460; Daggett v. 
 Gray (1895), 110 Cal. 169, 42 Pac. 568; 
 Shively v. Semi-Tropic Land Co. (1893), 
 99 Cah 259, 33 Pac. 848, quoting the text ; 
 Crowder v. McDonnell (1898), 21 Mont. 
 367, 54 Pac. 43; Beebe v. Latimer (1899), 
 59 Neb. 305, 80 N. W. 904; Hess v. Adler 
 (1900), 67 Ark. 444, 55 S. W. 843; Rail- 
 way Officials, etc. Ass'n. v. Drummond 
 (1898), 56 Neb. 235, 76 N. W. 562. 
 
 Wiiere a material fact is omitted from 
 a complaint, and such fact is found in a 
 special finding, this will not cure the com- 
 plaint: Goodwine f. Cadwallader (1901), 
 158 Ind. 202, 61 N. E. 939; Cleveland, 
 etc. Ry. Co. v. Parker (1899), 154 Ind. 153, 
 56 N. E. 85. 
 
 Where a complaint states facts only 
 infereutially, an admission of such facts 
 in the answer will be considered, for juris- 
 dictional purposes, in aid of tlie complaint : 
 Lockhart v. Hear (1895), 117 N. C. 298, 
 23 S. E. 484. Wiierc defendant, by its 
 answer, shows tliat it understands the 
 nature of a claim set forth defectively in 
 tlie c<jnij)laint, tliere is no reason why it 
 
 should be surpri.«ed or injured by trying 
 the issues raised by tlie pleadings : White- 
 ley V. Southern Ry. Co. (1896), 119 N. C- 
 724, 25 S. E. 1018.] 
 
 2 {In Vanalstine v. Whelan (1901), 135 
 Cal. 232, 67 Pac. 1 25, a material averment 
 was omitted in the complaint, and a denial 
 of the saitl omitted averment was con- 
 tained in the answer. It was claimed l)y 
 the jdaintiff that the defect was cured by 
 the answer. The court said : " The prin- 
 ciple is, that an omission of a material 
 fact is cured by the express averment of 
 that very fact in the defendant's pleadings. 
 But there is nothing of the kind in the 
 case at bar. The contention of respon- 
 dent rests on the fact that defendants, 
 in their answers, say, among other things, 
 that the plaintiff was not the owner or en- 
 titled to the possession of the goods at the 
 time alleged in the complaint, 'or at any 
 other time,' which, it is said, included the 
 time of the commencement of the action. 
 But that is the very converse of the aver- 
 ment which respondent ought to have 
 made in his complaint, — namely, that at 
 the time of the commencement of the ac- 
 tion he was the owner, etc. Tlie judg- 
 ment must therefore be reversed for the 
 insufficiency of the complaint." See also 
 Windsor v." Miner (1899), 124 Cal. 492, 57 
 Pac. 386. Both these cases seem at vari- 
 ance with Vance v. Anderson (1896), 113 
 Cal. 532,45 Pac. 816. In Nye v. Bill Nye 
 Mining Co. (1903), 42 Ore. 560, 71 Pac. 
 1043, it was held that an answer consist- 
 ing of specific denials only cannot aid a 
 complaint.] 
 
 8 Dayton Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 24 Ohio 
 St. 345, 357 ; Miller v. White, 6 N. Y. 
 S. C. 255; Garrett v. Trotter, 65 N. C. 
 430, 432; Bate v. Graham, 11 N. Y. 237; 
 Louisville & P. Canal Co. v. Mnrphy, 9 
 Bush, 522, 529 (a simple denial in the
 
 FORM OF THE COMPLAINT OR PETITION. 
 
 665 
 
 ought to have been alleged in the complaint or petition, is not 
 sufficient, and does not cure the defect.^ 
 
 § 471. * 580. Prayer for Relief.^ The prayer for relief is gen- 
 erally regarded as forming no part of the cause of action, ^ and as 
 having no effect upon it, and as furnishing no test or criterion 
 
 answer) ; but see Scofield v. Whitelegge, 
 49 N. Y. 259, 261, which expres.sly holds 
 that a denial merely in the answer is 
 not sufficient; Shartle v. Minneapolis, 17 
 Minn. 308, 312. See also De la Mar v. 
 Hurd, 4 Col. 442; Herschficld v. Aiken, 
 3 Mont. 442 ; Haggard v. Wallen, 6 Neb. 
 271 ; Worthley's Adm. v. Hammond, 13 
 Bush, 510; Quaid i'. Cornwall, 13 id. 601 ; 
 Howland Coal, etc. Works v. Brown, 13 
 id. 681; Grigsby v. Barr, 14 id. 330; 
 Pearce v. Mason, 78 N. C. 37; Goff v. 
 Outagamie Cy. Sup., 43 Wis. 55 ; Kretser 
 (". Carey, 52 id. 374 ; Wiles v. Lambert, 
 66 Ind. 494; Allen v. Chouteau, 102 Mo. 
 309 ; Donaldson v. Butler Cy., 98 Mo. 163 ; 
 Henry v. Sneed, 99 Mo. 407 ; Cohen v. 
 Knox, 90 Cal. 266 ; Hegard v. Cal. Ins. 
 Co. (Cal., June, 1886), II Pac. Rep. 594 ; 
 Schenk v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 
 28; Cohu v. Husson, 113 N. Y. 662; 
 Sengf elder v. Mut. Ins. Co. of N. Y., 31 
 Pac. Rep. (Wash., 1893) 428. 
 
 [^Vance v. Anderson (1896), 113 Cal. 
 532, 45 Pac. 816; City of Louisville v. 
 Snow's Adm'r (1900), 107 Ky. 536, 54 
 S. W. 860; Main v. Ray (1900), Ky., 57 
 S. W. 7 ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Par- 
 sons (1903), Ky., 72 S. W. 800. An an- 
 swer which assumes that the complaint 
 contains an allegation, supplies tlie omis- 
 sion of it: Lynch v. Beciitel (1897), 19 
 Mont. 548, 48 Pac. 1112. And where a 
 complaint is merely ambiguous, an answer 
 which clears up the ambiguity cures the 
 defect: Hamilton v. Great P'alls Ry. Co. 
 (1895), 17 Mont. 334, 42 Pac. 860] 
 
 1 Webb V. Bidwell, 15 Minn. 479, 
 485. 
 
 ^But where plaintiff omitted certain 
 essential allegations from his petition, and 
 defendant alleged the absence of such 
 omitted f.acts, and plaintiff filed a reply 
 denying the averments of the answer, an 
 issue was thereby raised as to the omitted 
 facts : Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. Co. v. 
 Thieman (189.5), 96 Ky. 507, 29 S. W. 357. 
 So, also, a reply may aid a defective coun- 
 
 ter-claim: Gaskins r. Davis (1894), 115 
 N. C. 85, 20 S. E. 188. 
 
 But in Water Supply, etc. Co. v. Lari- 
 mer, etc. Co. (1898), 25 Colo. 87, 53 Pac. 
 386, the court said : " A defective com- 
 plaint may be aided, and omissions sup- 
 plied, by the answer, or an allegation in 
 the replication, if acquiesced in."] 
 
 - ^Farwell Co. v. Lykins (1898), 59 
 Kan. 9C), 52 Pac. 99 ] 
 
 ^ [[Therelief to be granted depends upon 
 the facts alleged and proved and not upon 
 the prayer for relief : Dennison v. Chap- 
 man (1895), 105 Cal. 447, 39 Pac. 61 ; Ru- 
 tenic V. Hamaker (1902), 40 Ore. 444, 67 
 Pac. 192 ; Hendon v. North Carolina R. R. 
 Co. (1900), 127 N. C. 110, 37 S. E. 155; 
 Adams v. Hayes (1897), 120 N. C. 383, 27 
 S. E. 47 ; Giilam v. Life Ins. Co. (1897), 
 121 N. C. 369, 28 S. E. 470; Stubblefield 
 V. Gadd (1901), 112 la. 681, 84 N. W. 917; 
 McClure v. La Plata County (1896), 23 
 Colo. 130, 46 Pac. 677; Miller v. Rapp 
 (1893), 135 Ind. 614, 34 N. E. 981 ; State 
 ex rel. v. Horton, etc. Co. (1901), 161 Mo. 
 664,61 S. W. 869 ; Sherrin y. Flinn (1900), 
 155 Ind. 422, 58 N. E. 549; French v. 
 Woodruff (1898), 25 Colo. .339, 54 Pac. 
 1015 ; .Johnson v. Polhemus (1893), 99 CaL 
 240, 38 Pac. 908 (in an equity case) ; Klein- 
 schmidt v. Steele (1894), 15 Mont. 181, 38 
 Pac. 827 (in an equity case) ; State ex rel. 
 V. Tooker (1896), 18 Mont. 540, 46 Pac. 
 530 (in an equity case) ; Toy v. McHugh 
 (1901), 62 Neb. 820, 87 N. W. 1059; Top- 
 ping V. Parish (1897), 96 Wis. 378, 71 
 N. W. 367. 
 
 A general prayer for relief is sufficient 
 to warrant the court in granting any relief 
 consistent with the jjleadings and evi- 
 dence: Mackay v. Smith (1902), 27 Wash. 
 442 ; 67 Pac. 982 ; Dormitzer r. German 
 Savings Bank (1900), 23 Wash. 132, 62 
 Pac. 862; Yarwood v. Johnson (1902), 29 
 Wash. 643, 70 Pac. 123; Kelley v. Wehn 
 (1902), 63 Neb. 410, 88 N. W. 682; Rees 
 V. Shepherdson (1895), 95 la. 431, 64 
 N. W. 286 (in an equity case) ; Hession v.
 
 666 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 bv which its nature may be determined. ^ This prevailing view 
 
 Liiiastnitli (1895), 96 la. 483, 65 N. W. 
 399 (ill an equity case) ; McHugli v. Louis- 
 ville Bridge Co. (1901), Ivy., 65 S. W. 456. 
 See, iiowever, Sclimitt c. Schueider (1899), 
 109 Ga. 628, 35 S. E. 145; Ilairalson v. 
 Carsou (1900), 111 Ga. 57,36 S. E. 319; 
 Steed V. Savage (1902), 115 Ga. 97, 41 
 S. E. 272. 
 
 A defective prayer for relief is uot a 
 ground for demurrer : McGillivray v. Mc- 
 Gillivray (1896), 9 S. D. 187,68 N. W. 316 ; 
 Levy V. Noble (1902), 135 Cal. 559, 67 Pac. 
 1033. 
 
 The entire omission of any prayer for 
 relief would not subject the petition to a 
 general demurrer: Fox i-. Graves (1896), 
 46 Neb. 812, 65 N. W. 887. But in 
 Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Martelle 
 (1902), —Neb.—, 91 N. W. 364, the court 
 suggested a qmcre whether such a com- 
 plaint would sustain a verdict and judg- 
 ment. " A prayer for judgment is only a 
 matter of form :" Carson v. Butt (1896), 
 4 Okla. 133. 46 Pac. 596. 
 
 A complaint is not demurrable when 
 its allegations show that the plaintiff is 
 entitled to some relief, thougli not to the 
 relief prayed for : Conner i;. Ashley (1897), 
 49 S. C. 478, 27 S. E. 473 ; Keuaston v. 
 Lorig (1900), 81 Minn. 454, 84 N. W. 
 323; Morey v. City of Duluth (1897), 69 
 Minn. 5, 71 K W. 694 ; Whitehead v. 
 Sweet (1899), 126 Cal. 67, 58 Pac. 376. 
 But not so when only nominal damages 
 could be recovered and a judgment for 
 nominal damages would not carry costs : 
 Kenyon r. West. Union. Tel. Co.'(1893), 
 100 Cal. 4.54, 35 Pac. 75. Contra, Copelaud 
 V. Cheney (1902), 116Ga. 685, 43 S. E. 59, 
 
 The amount in controversy is deter- 
 mined by the allegations of the complaint, 
 not by the prayer for judgment : Town of 
 Central City v. Treat"(1897), 101 la. 109, 
 70 N. W. 110. And, similarly, the alle- 
 gations, not the prayer, determine the 
 question of jurisdiction : Sams Car Coupler 
 Co. V. League (1898), 25 Colo. 129, 54 Pac. 
 642; Lchuhardt v. Jennings (1897), 119 
 Cal. 192, 48 Pac. 56 ; Prince v. Takash 
 (1903), 75 Conn. 616, 54 Atl. 1003. 
 
 A prayer for excessive relief does not 
 remier the coraplaint demurrable: Siegel 
 V. Town of Liberty (1901), 111 Wis. 470, 
 87 N. W. 487 ; Citizens' Loan & Trust Co. 
 
 V. Witte (1901), 110 Wis. 545, 86 N. W. 
 173; Allen v. Frawley (1900), 106 Wis. 
 638, 82 N. W. 593 ; Howard v. Seattle Nat. 
 Bank (1894), 10 Wash. 280, 38 Pac. 1040; 
 Laird-Norton Co. v. lierker (1895), 6 S. 1). 
 509, 62 N. W. 104 ; Level Land Co. i-. 
 Sivyer (1901), 112 Wis. 442, 88 N. W. 317; 
 Hudson V. Archer (1893) 4 S. 1). 128, 55 
 N. W. 1099; Crossen r. Grandy (1902), 42 
 Ore. 282, 70 Pac. 906. Contra, Seals /•. 
 Augusta Ry. Co (1897), 102 Ga. 817, 29 
 S. E. 116. 
 
 In Brown v. Iowa Legion of Honor 
 (1899), 107 la. 439, 78 N. W. 73, it was 
 held that a relief not included in the 
 prayer must be denied. See also Nichols 
 & Shepard Co. r. Wiedemann (1898), 72 
 Minn. 344, 75 N. W. 208, where the same 
 rule substantially was applied, though the 
 court sought to make a distinction. See 
 also Bank of California v. Dyer (1896), 14 
 Wash. 279, 44 Pac. 534; Uverstreet v. 
 Citizens' Bank (1903), 12 Okla. 383, 72 
 Pac. 379. 
 
 Costs need not be asked for in the peti- 
 tion : Reed i'. Corrigan (1901), 114 la. 
 638, 87 N. W. 676. The prayer of the 
 complaint in Johns v. Northwestern Relief 
 A.ss'u (1894), 87 Wis. Ill, 58 N. W. 76, 
 was held so ambiguous as to be subject 
 to a motion to make more definite and 
 certain. Alternative reliefs may be prayed 
 for: Grant v. Grant (1893), 53 Minn. 181, 
 54 N. W. 1059.] 
 
 1 Goodall V. Mopley, 45 Ind. 355, 359 ; 
 Lowry v. Dutton, 28 Ind. 473 ; Bennett v. 
 Preston, 17 id. 291 ; Cincinnati & C. R. 
 Co. V. Washburn, 25 id. 259 ; Hale v. 
 Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y. 626, 631. 
 This doctrine cannot, of course, be true 
 in the one or two States who.se codes 
 provide for a demurrer when the facts 
 alleged show that the plaintiff is not en- 
 titled to the relief demanded in his petition 
 or complaint. For further illustrations of 
 the general rule that the relief actually 
 granted after a trial depends upon the 
 facts properly alleged, and not upon the 
 prayer, see Shilling v. Rominger, 4 Col. 
 100; Radford v. So. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 12 
 Bush, 434 ; First Div. St. Paul & Pac. R. 
 Co. I'. Rice, 25 Minn. 278 ; Saline Co. v. 
 Sappington, 64 Mo. 72; Mo. Valley Land 
 Co. V. Bushuell, 11 Neb. 192; Gilman r.
 
 FORM OF THE GOMFLAINT Oil I'lyriTIOX. ' 667 
 
 was well expressed by a recent decision of the New York Court 
 of Appeals in language which I quote: "The relief demanded by 
 no means characterizes the action, or limits the plaintiff in respect 
 to the remedy which he may have. If there be no answer, the 
 relief granted cannot exceed that which the plaintiff shall have 
 demanded in his complaint. But the fact, that after the allega- 
 tion of the facts relied upon the plaintiff has demanded judgment 
 for a sum of money by way of damages, does not preclude the 
 recovery of the same amount upon the same state of facts by way 
 of equitable relief. The relief in the two cases would be pre- 
 cisely the same; the difference would be formal and tcclinical. 
 If every fact necessary to the action is stated, the plaintiff may 
 even, when no answer is put in, have any relief to which the 
 facts entitle him consistent with that demanded in the com- 
 plaint."^ Although this theory has been accepted by most of 
 the courts, and is approved in numberless cases, at least one 
 tribunal of high character has suggested that the prayer for relief 
 may be properly appealed to as the test by which the nature of 
 the action can be determined in all cases where the pleader has, 
 by his mode of alleging the facts, left his intention in doubt.^ 
 I have thus discussed and stated those fundamental principles 
 
 Pilmore, 7 Ore. 374; Balle v. Mossley, ^ Gillett z;. Treganza, 13 Wis. 472, 475, 
 13 S. C. 439; Dawsoa v. Graham, 48 per Dixon C. J. :" Under our present sys- 
 lowa, 378; Herring v. Hely, 43 id. 157; tem, the test by which we are to deter- 
 Mackey ?;. Auer, 8 Hun, 180; Benedicts, mine the character of actions in those 
 Benedict, 85 N. Y. 625; Tewksbury v. cases where the facts stated indicate two 
 Schulenberg, 41 Wis. 584; Gibson r. Gib- or more actions must be the relief de- 
 son, 46 id. 449 ; Acker v. McCullough, 50 manded. We may, at least, safely adopt 
 Ind. 447 ; Rogers v. Lafayette Co., 52 id. this rule in cases of doubt, and in cases 
 297; Bonnell v. Allen, 53 id. 130; Sohn like the present, where the pleader, cou- 
 V. Marion, etc. Co., 73 id. 78 ; Carpenter ceiviug himself entitled to prosecute sev- 
 V. Brenham, 50 Cal. 549 ; Hall v. Lonkey, eral actions, has so stated his facts as to 
 57 id. 80. See also State v. Boone, 108 leave it uncertain which he intended to 
 N. C. 78; Sannoner i;. Jacobson, 47 Ark. pursue." 
 
 31; Korrady v. L. S. & M. S. liy. Co., []See also O'Brien r. Fitzgerald (1894), 
 
 131 Ind. 261 ; Alworth v. Seymour, 42 143 N. Y. 377, 38 N. E. 371, where the 
 
 Minn. 526; Crosby r. Farmers' Bk., 107 court hold that the prayer for relief may 
 
 Mo. 436 ; Ross v. Purse, 17 Colo. 24. In be looked to in determining whether the 
 
 judgment by default plaintiff can have action is legal or equitable, where the 
 
 no greater relief than is demanded by the facts alleged would support equally an 
 
 prayer: Maxwell i'. Dudley, 13 Bush, 403 ; action at law or in equity. In Georgia it 
 
 Hansford v. Holdam, 14 id. 210; Peck i;. is held that the prayer for relief should 
 
 N. Y. & N. J. Ry. Co., 85 N. Y. 246 ; Bui- generally be considered as indicating the 
 
 lard V. Sherwood, 85 id. 253. ' nature of the action, whether legal or 
 
 1 Bradley v. Aldrich, 40 N. Y. 504; equitable: Steed v. Savage (1902), 115 
 
 Hale V. Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y. 626, Ga. 97, 41 S. E. 272.] 
 631, per Allen J.
 
 668 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 and general doctrines of the reformed pleading which are common 
 to all causes of action. The more special rules which prescribe 
 the nriuner and form of averring particular facts, and which 
 determine the mode of alleging the various causes of action con- 
 sidered separately and individually, must be omitted from the 
 present volume.^ They will find their appropriate place in the 
 
 1 rSecvssiti/ anil Fortn of I'articiiliir 
 Allftfdtious. 
 
 The author did not undertake to dis- 
 cuss this subject, and the editor has not 
 aimed to treat it at all exhaustively in 
 this note. But the cases dealing with it 
 which have appeared during the period 
 covered by this revision have been classi- 
 fied and briefly summarized as follows : — 
 
 Account. 
 
 Statutes in many of the States allow 
 an account to be pleaded by copy thereof. 
 See p. 438, note 2. See McArthur r. 
 Clarke Drug Co. (1896), 48 Neb. 899, 67 
 N. W. 861, construing one of these stat- 
 utes. In Fletcher r. Co-Operative Pub- 
 lishing Co.' (1899), 58 Neb. 511, 78 N. W. 
 1070, it was held that the statute was 
 merely permissive, and it was still proper 
 to plead the facts. 
 
 As to method of pleading an account 
 when payments have been made upon it, 
 see Hammer r. Downing (1901), 39 Ore. 
 504, 65 Pac. 17, where the court said: 
 " If any payment has been made upon the 
 account, good pleading, under our prac- 
 tice, requires that the gross .sum be stated 
 as the amount in which the defendant is 
 indebted, and also the payments, if any, at 
 least in the aggregate, so that tlie amount 
 due becomes a matter of deduction ap- 
 parent upon the face of the complaint. 
 This brings into the investigation the en- 
 tire account, and the balance, when ascer- 
 tained, is the amount subject to recovery." 
 
 Account Stated. 
 It is unnecessary, in an action upon an 
 account stated, to set forth in the com- 
 plaint the subject-matter of the original 
 debt : Schutz v. Murctte (1895), 146 N. Y. 
 l.'J7, 40 N. E. 780. 
 
 An account stated is a new and inde- 
 pendent contract, behind which one cannot 
 go: Conver.se i;. Scott (1902), 137 Cal. 
 2.39, 70 Pac. 13; Haley. Hale (1901), 14 
 
 S. D. 644, 86 N. W. 650; Schutz v. Mo- 
 rette (1895), 146 N. Y. 137, 40 N. E. 780. 
 See Xodine v. First Nat. Bank (1902), 41 
 Ore. 386, 68 Pac. 1109, and Bailey v. 
 Wilson (1899), 34 Ore. 186,55 Pac. 973, 
 for good discussions of tlie subject of ac- 
 count stated. 
 
 Accounting. 
 A complaint does not state a cause of 
 action for an accouuliug whicli does not 
 show the nature of the dealings between 
 the parties and present a coj)v of the ac- 
 count as an exhibit: Gise v. Cook (1898), 
 152 Ind. 75, 52 N. E.454. 
 
 Action for Price. 
 In order to support an action for an 
 agreed price there must have been such a 
 delivery as will pass title to the purchaser ; 
 and if title remains in the seller, and the 
 buyer renounces his contract, the law re- 
 quires the seller to treat the ])roperty as 
 his own and to sue, if at all, for the dam- 
 ages he has sustained : McCorniick Har- 
 vesting Mach. Co. V. Belfany (1899), 78 
 Minn. 370, 81 N. W. 10. 
 
 Ar/e7icy. 
 
 "Where a contract was made or other act 
 done by an authorized agent, it is proper 
 to allege that it was done by the principal : 
 Shull V. Arie (1901), 113 la. 170, 84 N. W. 
 1031 ; Helena Xat. Bank v. Tel. Co. 
 (1898), 20 Mont. 379, 51 Pac. 829; Chesa- 
 peake & Ohio R. R. Co. V. Thicman 
 (1895), 96 Ky. .507, 29 S. W. 357 ; Wage- 
 ner v. Kirven (1899), 56 S. C. 126, 34 S.E. 
 18; Topcka Capital Co. v. KLMuington 
 (1900). 61 Kan. 6, 59 Pac. 1062; Blotcky 
 r. Miller (1902), Neb., 91 N. W. 52.3*; 
 Richmond v. Voorhees (1894), 10 Wa.sh. 
 316, 38 Pac. 1014; Higbee v. Trumbauer 
 (1900), 112 la. 74, 83 N. W. 812. 
 
 But where orticrs were drawn on an 
 agent, and not on his princijjal, and the 
 (inly acceptance was by the agent, no
 
 FORM OF THE COMPLAINT OR PETITION. 
 
 669 
 
 second part of the work, which will treat cf the different remedies 
 themselves that may be obtained by means of the civil action. ^ 
 
 recovery can be had on a petition alleging 
 that they were drawn on and accepted by 
 the principal : Wiuburn i\ Fidelity, etc. 
 Ass'n (1900), no la. 374, 81 N. W. 682. 
 
 In an action brought under § 1816 a, 
 L. & B. Ann. St , for injuries sustained by 
 cue employee through the negligence of 
 another, the complaint must clearly allege 
 the relation between the negligent servant 
 and the company : Albrechc v. Milwaukee, 
 etc. Co. (1894), 87 Wis. 105, 58 N. W. 72. 
 
 Altered Contract. 
 
 "Where a corporation employed the 
 plaintiff under an agreement to pay what 
 his services were worth, and the rate of 
 wages was afterwards fixed by the parties, 
 it was proper to allege in declaring on the 
 contract that the company agreed to pay 
 the wijges fixed in tlie adjustment, and 
 under such allegation proof of the original 
 contract and the subsequent adjustment is 
 admissible : Sandberg v. Victor Mining 
 Co. (1901), 24 Utah, 1, 66 Pac. 360. 
 
 Altered Instrument. 
 A written instrument which has been 
 altered by a stranger may still be used as 
 
 1 [^Verijication : The verification is no 
 part of the pleading : Johnson v. Puritan 
 Miu. Co. (1896), 19 Mont. 30, 47 Pac- 
 337; Bryant v. Davis (1899), 22 Mont. 
 .534, 57 Pac. 143. But where a verifica- 
 tion is required, and is omitted, the plead- 
 ing may be stricken out on motion or 
 judgment may be had on the pleadings : 
 Hearst v. Hart (1900), 128 Cal. 327, 60 
 Pac. 846. In Bryant v. Davis (1899), 22 
 Mont. 534, 57 Pac. 143, it was held that 
 judgment could not be rendered on the 
 pleadings on account of a defective verifi- 
 cation. Verification by one co-plaintiff or 
 co-defendant is suificient : Butterfield v. 
 Graves (1902), 138 Cal. 155, 71 Pac. 510; 
 Claiborne i-. Castle (1893), 98 Cal. 30, 32 
 Pac. 807. 
 
 Want of a verification subjects a plead- 
 ing to attack by motion but not to a de- 
 murrer: Scott-Force Hat Co. v. Ilombs 
 (1894), 127 Mo. 392, 30 8. W. 183; Butter- 
 field ?•. Graves (1902), 138 Cal. 155, 71 Pac. 
 
 a basis for a recovery, but it should be 
 pleaded according to its original terms 
 and not according to its terms as altereil : 
 I'erkius Windmill & Ax Co. v. Tillman 
 (1«98), 55 Neb. 652, 75 :N. W. 1098. 
 
 Anticipating Defences. 
 A pleader is not required to anticipate 
 defences : Larson v. First Nat. Bank 
 (1902), — Neb. — , 92 N. W. 729 ; Sawyer 
 V. Wabash Ry. Co. (1900), 156 Mo. 468, 
 57 N. W. 108; Hamilton v. Love (1898), 
 152 Ind. 641, 53 N. E. 181 ; Eomer v. 
 Conter (1893), 53 Minn. 171, 54 N. W. 
 1052; Trotter v. Mutual Reserve Life 
 Ass'n (1897), 9 S. D. 596, 70 N. W. 843; 
 Indianapolis St. Ry. Co. v. Robinson 
 (1901), 157 Ind. 414, 61 N. E. 936; West- 
 ern Union Tel. Co. v. Henley (1901), 157 
 Ind. 90, 60 N. E. 682 ; Massillon Engine 
 & Thresher Co. r. Prouty (1902),— Neb. 
 — , 91 N. W. 384. 
 
 Articles of Incorporation. 
 
 It is sufficient to plead articles of in- 
 corporation and by-laws by stating their 
 substance and legal effect, without set 
 ting them out in hcec verba : Seal v. 
 
 510. Unless made before trial the objec- 
 tion is waived: Myers v. Douglass (1896), 
 99 Ky. 267, 35 S. W. 917. A verification 
 mav be amended iu the discretion of the 
 trial court: Cantwell v. Herring (1900), 
 127 N. C. 81, 37 S. E. 140; Steidl v. State 
 (1902), 63 Neb. 695, 88 N. W. 853. 
 
 As to when a verification is necessary, 
 see Butte & Boston Co. v. Montana Co. 
 (1900), 24 Mont. 125, 60 Pac. 1039 ; Fisher 
 V. Patton (1895), 134 Mo. 32, 33 S. W. 
 451 ; Cady v. Case (1895), 11 Wa.sh. 124, 
 39 Pac. 375 ; Reichert v. Lonsberg (1894), 
 87 Wis. 543, 58 N. W. 1030. 
 
 And see the following cases for form 
 of verification ; Phifer v. Travelers' Ins. 
 Co. (1898), 123 N. C. 410, 31 S. E. 716; 
 Cole V. Boyd (1899), 125 N. C. 496, 34 
 S. E.557 ; Payne v. Boyd (1899); 125 N. C. 
 499, 34 S. E. 631 ; Martin v. Martin (1902), 
 130 N. C. 27, 40 S. E. 822 ; Roosevelt v. 
 Ulmer (1898), 98 Wis. 356, 74 N- W. 124.]
 
 670 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 Cameron (1901), 24 Wash. 62, 63 Pac. 
 
 110.3. 
 
 Assif^nmenl. 
 
 An allegation that a thing was assigned 
 implies on ilemnrrer that the assignment 
 was valid: (Juuderson v. Thomas (1894), 
 87 Wis. 406, .58 N. W. 750. See also Rol- 
 lins i: Humphrey (1897), 98 Wis. 66, 73 
 N. W. 331. 
 
 Assignment /or Benefit of Creditors. 
 
 An allegation that A. was duly ap- 
 pointed assignee of the firm of B. & Co. 
 and thereafter duly qualified as such as- 
 signee and entered into the discharge of 
 his trust, c;uinot be considered as an alle- 
 gation that B. & Co. made a general as- 
 signment to A. for the benefit of creditors : 
 Sellers v. First Presbyterian Church 
 (1895), 91 Wis. 328, 64 N. W. 1031. 
 
 Attorney, Qualifications of. 
 
 In a suit for services rendered by an 
 attorney, it is not necessary to allege that 
 he is an attorney admitted to practice: 
 Miller v. Ballerino (1902) 135 Cal. 566, 
 67 Pac. 1046, 68 Pac. 600. 
 
 Where an action is brought by a county 
 and the petition is signed by reputable at- 
 torneys in its behalf, there is no necessity 
 tiiat their authority to so act should ap- 
 pear on the face of the petition : Hickory 
 County y. Fugate (1898), 143 Mo. 71, 44 
 S. W. 789. 
 
 An allegation that an attorney of a 
 corporation was appointed and held under 
 said appointment for two years is a suffi- 
 cient allegation that his term was for two 
 years : Germania Spar & Bau Verein v. 
 Flynn (1896), 92 Wis. 201, 66 N. W. 109. 
 
 Bond. 
 
 In an action on an official bond brought 
 against the principal and sureties, an alle- 
 gation that tlie bond was approved is not 
 necessary: Fire Ass'n v. Ruby (1900), 60 
 Neb. 216, 82 N. W. 629. Nor is it neces- 
 sary to separately state the several items 
 of defalcation : State v. McDonald (1895), 
 4 Idalio, .343, 40 Pac. 312. See also State 
 ex rel. v. Tittmann (1896), 134 Mo. 162,35 
 S. W. 579. Compare witli this last case, 
 Pryor v. Kansas City (1899), 153 Mo. 
 135, 54 S. W. 499, which seems inconsis- 
 tent therewith. 
 
 Breach of Covenants. 
 " In assigning breaches of the usual 
 covenants accomjianying tiie transfer of 
 lands, tlie general rule is that the pleader 
 may assign them generally, unless such 
 assignment does not amoufit to a breach. 
 . . . But not so as it respects the covenant 
 against incumbrances, the covenant of 
 warranty, and tliat for (piiet enjoyment, 
 as the grantor does not covenant against 
 all possible incumbrances, or all interrup- 
 tions or claims or ousters, and it therefore 
 becomes necessary to specify the iucum- 
 br.ance or title paramount by reason of 
 which the covenantee or his assigns have 
 been ousted or disturbed in the posses- 
 sion : " Jennings v. Kiernau (1898), 35 
 Ore. 349, 55 Pac. 443. It was held in 
 Evans v. Fulton (1896), 134 Mo. 653, 36 
 S. W. 230, that a breach of a covenant ia 
 well a.ssigned by negativing the words of 
 the covenant. 
 
 Breach of Promise to ^larry. 
 In an action for breach of promise to 
 marry, allegations of seduction by means 
 of such promise may be pleaded merely 
 in aggravation of damages, and do not 
 subject the complaint to the charge of 
 embracing two causes of action : Geiger 
 V. Payne (1897), 102 la. 581, 69 N. W. 
 5,54, 71 X. W. 571. 
 
 Breach of Warranty. 
 The character and extent of the war- 
 ranty and the nature and particulars of the 
 breach must be alleged : Shirk v. Mitch- 
 ell (1893), 137 Ind. 185, 36 N. E. 850. It 
 is necessary to allege that the purchaser 
 relied upon the warranty and was thereby 
 deceived, in an action for its breach : 
 Abilene Nat. Bank v. Nodine (1894), 26 
 Ore. 53, 37 Pac. 47. The petition must 
 allege that the plaintiff was evicted by 
 title paramount : Hampton v. Web.ster 
 (1898), 56 Neb. 628, 77 N. W. .50. 
 
 Capacity. 
 
 The suffi.\ "trustee" in the caption of 
 a complaint will be treated as mere de- 
 scri/itio persona-, where tliere is no aver- 
 ment in the complaint that the ]daiuti£f is 
 trustee of an e.\])re.ss or other trust or is 
 suing for the benefit of another. " When 
 an action is brouL'bt by a trustee, the com- 
 ]daint should disclose the name of the
 
 FORM OF THE COMPLAINT OR PKTITIOX. 
 
 671 
 
 cestui que trust, so that an issue, if neces- 
 sary, may be formed upon that allegation, 
 and also that the cestui (jue trust may be 
 bound hy the judgment or decree :" Marion 
 Bond Co. V. Mexican Coffee Co. (1902), 
 — Ind. — , G.5 N. E. 748. 
 
 An allegation "that the jilaintiff is the 
 duly apjiointed, qualified, and acting ad- 
 ministrator of the estate of Julia Collins, 
 deceased," is good, in the absence of a spe- 
 cial demurrer: Collins v. O'Laverty (1902), 
 136 Cal. 31, 68 Pac. 327; Willis v. Tozer 
 (1894), 44 S. C. 1, 21 S. E. 617, in the ab- 
 sence of any other objection than oral de- 
 murrer at the trial. A general averment 
 of cajjacity is sufficient : Sparks v. Nat. 
 Accident Ass'u (189r)), 100 la. 458, 69 
 N. W. 678. 
 
 A complaint is good against a general 
 demurrer which in its title and body desig- 
 nates plaintiff as administrator of decedent, 
 though tlie complaint contains no allega- 
 tion of decedent's death and the issuing 
 of letters to plaintiff : Toner v. Wagner 
 (1901), 1.58 Ind. 447, 63 N. E. 8.59. 
 
 Where a plaintiff sues as executor or 
 administrator, he should allege that he is 
 such b}^ virtue of letters issued out of 
 a probate court, giving the name thereof, 
 and the term at which such letters were 
 granted : Hamilton v. Mclndoo (1900), 81 
 Minn. 324, 84 N. W. 118. 
 
 An allegation that a cause of action 
 was sold and assigned to plaintiff as ad- 
 ministrator of a decedent's estate for a 
 valuable consideration, sufficiently alleges 
 plaintiff's legal capacity to sue : Brossard 
 V. Williams (1902), lu' Wis. 89, 89 N. W. 
 832. 
 
 tjWhere a guardian sues on behalf of 
 minors it is necessary for him to allege 
 facts showing his representative capacity, 
 and if he does not do so, the complaint is 
 demurrable on the ground of want of 
 capacity to sue : Dalrymple v. Security 
 Loan Co. (1900), 9 N. D. 306, 83 N. W. 
 245. Mere description held sufficient : 
 Bennett i'. Bennett (1902), — Neb. — , 91 
 N. W. 409. Where plaintiffs seek parti- 
 tion in behalf of an unincorporated church 
 association, they should aver that they, as 
 trustees of the church, " sue for themselves 
 and all other members of said church : " 
 Lillv V. Menke (1894), 126 Mo. 190, 28 
 S. W. 643. 
 
 " Where the pleadings disclose a cause 
 
 of action against defendant personally, 
 superadded words, such as ' agent,' ' ex- 
 ecutor,' or ' director,' should be rejected 
 as dc.srrlptio perso/ue : " Andres v. Kridler 
 (1896), 47 Neb. 585, 66 N. W. 649. 
 
 Conditions Precedent. 
 
 Performance of conditions precedent to 
 liability on the part. of defendant must be 
 pleaded by the plaintiff: Albers v. West- 
 ern Union Tel. Co. (1896), 98 la. 51, 66 
 N. W. 1040; Root v. Childs (1897), 68 
 Minn. 142, 70 N. W. 1078; Ary v. Ches- 
 more (1901), 113 la. 63, 84 N. W. 965; 
 Manaudas v. Heilner (1896), 29 Ore. 222, 
 45 Pac. 758; Weeks v. O'Brien (1894), 
 141 N. y. 199, 36 N. E. 185; Boden v. 
 Maher (1897), 95 Wis. 65, 69 N. VV. 980 ; 
 Moody V. Ins. Co. (1894), 52 0. St. 12, 38 
 N. E. 1011; Milburn v. Glynn County 
 (1899), 109 Ga. 473, 34 S. e" 848; Cope 
 V. Type Foundry Co. (1897), 20 Mont. 67, 
 49 Pac. 387 ; Long Creek Bldg. Ass'n r. 
 State Ins. Co. (1896), 29 Ore. 569, 46 Pac. 
 366; Closz v. Miracle (1897), 103 la. 198, 
 72 N. W. 502 ; Charles Baumbach Co. 
 V. Laube (1898), 99 Wis. 171, 74 N. W. 
 96; McGlauflin v. Wormser (1903), — 
 Mont. — , 72 Pac. 428. 
 
 The performance of conditions prece- 
 dent may be alleged generally: Miles v. 
 Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n (1900), 
 108 Wis. 421, 84 N. W. 159; McGannon 
 V. Millers' Nat. Ins. Co. (1902), 171 Mo. 
 143, 71 S. W. 160; Kenney v. Bevilheimer 
 (1902), 158 Ind. 653, 64 N. E. 215; Mc- 
 Cullough V. Colfax County (1903),'— Neb. 
 — , 95 N. W. 29 (only in case of a contract). 
 This rule is prescribed by statute in a num- 
 ber of States, as in Montana, Indiana, 
 Missouri, South Carolina, and others. 
 But these statutes are permi.ssive only, 
 and specific averments are equally proper : 
 Kenney v. Bevilheimer (1902), 158 Ind. 
 653, 64 N. E. 215; Grand Lodge v. Hall 
 (1903), — Ind. App. — , 67 N. E. 272; 
 Brock V. Des Moines Ins. Co. (1895), 96 
 la. 39, 64 N. W. 685 ; Hart v. Accident 
 A.ss'n (1898), 105 la. 717, 75 N. W. .508. 
 
 As a test to determine whether a con- 
 dition is precedent or subsequent, the 
 Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Root r. 
 Childs (1897), 68 Minn. 142, 70 N. W. 
 1078, said: "Where the obligation of a 
 party to a contract is to pay only upon 
 the happening of a contingency, e. g., the
 
 672 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 return of an instrument duly recorded, 
 such contingency is in the nature of a 
 condition precedent, and its occurrence 
 must he alleged in the complaint. But, 
 if payment is not to be made if a con- 
 tingency liapj)ens during its continuance, 
 e. y., if the piirty is enjoined from using 
 the article which is the subject-matter of 
 the contract, he is not to pay tlie purcha.se 
 price until the iujnuctiou is dissolved, tiie 
 contingency is in che nature of a condition 
 subsequent, and it is not necessary to allege 
 in the complaint the non-happening or 
 non-continuance of the contingency." For 
 a further discussion of the same question 
 see Moody v. Ins. Co. (1894), 52 O. St. 12, 
 38 N. E. ion. 
 
 In Montana, in Kent i'. Tuttle (1897), 
 20 Mont. 203. 50 Pac. 559, and Zion Co- 
 operative Ass'n V. Mayo (1898), 22 Mont. 
 100, 55 Pac. 915, it was held that where 
 the statute prescribes certain acts on the 
 part of a foreign corporation a.s conditions 
 precedent to its right to do business in the 
 State, its complaint must allege perform- 
 ance or that the business done, out of 
 which the cause of action arose, was inter- 
 state commerce. But in American Shoe 
 Co. V. O'Rourke (1900), 23 Mont. 530, 59 
 Pac. 910, it was held tliat such allegations 
 ■were unnecessary. 
 
 Where performance of conditions prece- 
 dent is not alleged by the plaintiff, the 
 defendant may raise the objection by de- 
 murrer, or by answer, or he may raise it 
 on the trial: Weeks v. O'Brien (1894), 
 141 N. Y. 199, 36 N. E. 185. See also 
 Duff V. Fire Ass'n (1895), 129 Mo. 460, 30 
 S. W. 1034. 
 
 Where a demand and refusal are con- 
 ditions precedent to plaintiff's case, and 
 defendant in his answer denies all liability 
 so that it is apparent a demand would have 
 been met by a refusal, defendant cannot 
 complain that such demand was not shown : 
 Thompson v. Whitney (1899), 20 Utah, 1, 
 57 Pac. 429. 
 
 Conditions Subsequent, Negativing. 
 " Must the conditions or exceptions, 
 the existence of which may relieve the 
 defendant from liability, be pleaded by 
 plaintiff, <jr are they so far matters of 
 defence that the burden is upon the de- 
 fendant to plead and prove them ? In our 
 judgment tliey were not required to be 
 
 pleaded or proven by plaintiff. . . . They 
 were each and all matters of defence, but, 
 not constituting a part of the plaintiff's 
 case, the burden did not rest upon him 
 either to plead or prove the absence of 
 tliein, in the first instance. And not being 
 required to negative these conditions, if he 
 does so in his pleading such averments are 
 unnecessary and need not be proved : " 
 Jones V. Accident Ass'n (1894), 92 la. 652, 
 61 X. W. 485. See, in support of the rule 
 above indicated. Modern Woodmen v, 
 Noyes (1901), 1.58 Ind. 503, 64 N. E. 21 ; 
 Wallace v. Kyan (1894), 93 la. 115, 61 
 N. W. 395 ; Mtns, Ins. Co. v. Gla.sgow 
 Elec. Co. (1899), 107 Ky. 77, 52 S. W. 
 975; Fletcher r. German-American Ins. 
 Co. (1900), 79 Minn. .337, 82 X. W. 647; 
 Schrepfer v. Kockford Ins. Co. (1899), 77 
 Minn. 291, 79 N. W. 1005; O'Conner v. 
 City of Fond du Lac (1898), 101 Wis. 83, 
 76 X. W. 1116; Little Xestucca Road Co. 
 V. Tillamook County (1897), 31 Ore. 1, 48 
 Pac. 465. 
 
 " Generally, a plaintiff is only required to 
 bring his case within tlie terms appearing 
 on the face of the contract in suit, and 
 need not negative conditions and e.\cep- 
 tions endorsed thereon : " Railway Offi- 
 cials, etc. Ass'n v. Drummond (1898), 56 
 Neb. 235, 76 N. W. 562. 
 
 Where an insurance policy provides 
 that if the insured is killed in certain 
 extra-hazardous occupations, the bene- 
 ficiary should get a reduced sum, the 
 complaint should allege that he was not 
 so killed, else the court cannot render 
 judgment for the sum which is due under 
 the policy: American Accident Co. v. 
 Carson (1896), 99 Ky. 441, 36 S. W. 169. 
 But in Insurance Co. v. McLeod (1896), 
 57 Kan. 95, 45 Pac. 73, it was held that 
 where a policy allowed concurrent insur- 
 ance, and provided for prorating in such 
 cose, such concurrent insurance need not 
 be alleged in the petition. 
 
 Consideration. 
 In an action upon a bond it need not 
 be alleged that it wa,s executed upon a 
 consideration : Northern Assurance Co. v. 
 Hotchkiss (1895), 90 Wis. 415, 63 N. W. 
 1020; Considiue v. Gallagher (1903), 31 
 Wash. 669, 72 Pac. 469. Nor is it neces- 
 sary to allege consideration in an action 
 against a common carrier upon a contract
 
 FORM OF THE COMPLAINT or rKTITION. 
 
 673 
 
 for the carriage of poods : Davis v. Jack- 
 sonville, etc. Line (1894), l:>t; Mo. 69, 28 
 iS. \V. 965. Au assignee of a chose in 
 action need not show that he paid a con- 
 sideration for it because the complaint 
 avers a sale as well as an assignment to 
 him, for the allegation of sale may be 
 treated as surplusage : Gregoire v. Rouriie 
 (18115), 28 Ore. 275, 42 Pac. 996. 
 
 The word " consideration " need not 
 appear in a pleading: Ramsey v. Johnson 
 (1897), 7 Wyo. 392, 42 Pac. 1084. An 
 allegation that a contract was made " upon 
 sufficient consideration " is sufficient : 
 Oslin V. Telford (1899), 108 Ga. 803, 34 
 S. E. 168; Pattillo v. Jones (1901), 113 
 Ga. 330, 38 S. E. 745. 
 
 Contrihutorij Nei^iigence. 
 
 Contributory negligence is a matter of 
 defence and need not be negatived in the 
 complaint : Reading Township v. Telfer 
 (1897), 57 Kan. 798, 48 Pac. 134 ; Whitty 
 V. City of Ushkosh (1900), 106 Wis. 87, 
 81 N. W. 992; Randall v. City of Ho- 
 quiam (1902), 30 Wash. 435, 70 Pac. 1111 ; 
 Walker c. McNeill (1897), 17 Wash. 582, 
 50 Pac. 518; Johnson v. Bellingham Bay 
 Co. (1896), 13 Wash. 455, 43 Pac. 370; 
 Thompson c. Great Northern Ry. Co. 
 (1897), 70 Minn. 219, 72 N. W. 962; 
 House V. Meyer (1893), 100 Cal. 592, 35 
 Pac. 308; Boyd v. Oddous (1893), 97 Cal. 
 510, 32 Pac. 569 ; Tucker v. Northern Ter- 
 minal Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 82, 68 Pac. 426. 
 
 In Indiana, a long line of decisions lield 
 that it was necessary for the plaintiff to 
 negative contributory negligence in his 
 complaint as part of his cause of action : 
 Gartiu v. Meredith (1899), 153 Ind. 16, 53 
 N. E. 836 ; Cleveland, etc. Ry. Co. v. Klee 
 (1899), 154 Ind. 430, 56 N. E.234 ; Sale v. 
 Aurora, etc. Co. (1896), 147 Ind. 324, 46 
 N. E. 669 ; Baltimore, etc. Ry. Co. v. 
 Young (1896), 146 Ind. 374, 45 N. E. 479 ; 
 Evansville, etc. R. R. Co. i-. Krapf (1895), 
 143 Ind. 647, 36 N. E. 901. But the legis- 
 lature, by the act of 1899, Burns' Rev. St., 
 1901, § 359 a, changed this rule, making 
 such allegation unnecessary. See Indian- 
 apolis St. Ry. Co. r. Robinson (1901), 157 
 lud. 232, 61 N. E. 197, holding the act 
 constitutional. Also see Aspy r. Botkins 
 (1903), — Ind. — , 66 N. E. 462, construing 
 the act. 
 
 In Iowa, the rule is firmlv established 
 
 that freedom from contril)ul()ry negligence 
 must be pleaded and ])roved l)y the plain- 
 tiff: Rabe v. Somuierbeck (1895), 94 la. 
 656, 63 N. W. 458 ; Gregory v. Wood- 
 worth (1895), 93 la. 246, 61 N. W. 962 ; 
 Stuber v. Gannon (1896), 98 la. 228,67 
 N. W. 105; Kleiueck v. Reiger (1899), 107 
 la. 325, 78 N. W. 39 ; Elenz v. Conrad 
 (1901), 115 la. 183, 88 N. W. 337; De- 
 catur V. Simp.son (1902), 115 la. 348,88 
 N. W. 839. Same rule held in Idaho: 
 Hauer v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (1900), 
 62 Pac. 1028. 
 
 In New York, also, due care must be 
 affirmatively shown by the plaintiff : 
 Whaleu v. Citizens' Gas Light Co. (1896), 
 151 N. Y. 70, 45 N. E. 363. 
 
 In Connecticut it was held in Brockett 
 17. Fairhaven, etc. R. R. Co. (1900), 73 
 Conn. 428, 47 Atl. 763, that a direct alle- 
 gation that an injury was caused by the 
 negligent act of another necessarily in- 
 volves the allegation that plaintiff's negli- 
 gence did not contribute to it, and a 
 separate averment to that effect is not 
 necessary. 
 
 In Montana it is held that plaintiff's 
 freedom from contributory negligence need 
 be alleged only when the complaint shows 
 that the proximate cause of the injury was 
 plaintiff's own act : Snook v. City of Ana- 
 conda (1901), 26 Mont. 128, 66 Pac. 756; 
 Cummiugs v. Helena, etc. Smelting Co. 
 (1902), 26 Mont. 434, 68 Pac. 852. 
 
 Where a petition shows such contribu- 
 tory negligence as would bar a recovery 
 if pleaded as a defence, the petition is de- 
 nmrrable : Stillwell's Adm'r i\ Land Co. 
 (1900),Ky., 58 S. W. 696. 
 
 In actions for wilful injury, no show- 
 ing of freedom from contributory negli- 
 gence need be made : Cleveland, etc. Ry. 
 Co. U.Miller (1897), 149 Ind. 490,49 N. E. 
 445. 
 
 Freedom from contributory negligence 
 need be pleaded only in general terms : 
 Gregory v. Woodworth (1895), 93 la. 246, 
 61 N. 'W'. 962 ; Stuber v. Gannon (L896), 
 98 la. 228, 67 N. W. 105; Kleineck v. 
 Reiger (1899), 107 la. 32.5, 78 N. W. 39 ; 
 Carter v. Seattle (1898), 19 Wash. 597, 53 
 Pac. 1102. 
 
 Conversiun. 
 
 An averment that defendant converted 
 the property to his own use is a sufficient 
 
 43
 
 674 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 averment of the fact of conversion : Lowe 
 V. (Jznaun (1902), 137 Cal. 257, 70 Pac. 87 ; 
 Sauford V. Janseu (1896), 49 Neb. 766, 69 
 N. W. 108; First Nat. Mank r. Gaddis 
 ( 1903), 31 Wash. .')96, 72 Pac. 460 ; Stevens 
 f. Curran (1903), 28 Mout. 366, 72 Pac. 
 753 (ill the absence of a special demurrer) ; 
 Cordill I'. Minn. Elevator Co. (1903), 89 
 Minn. 442, 95 N. W. 306. 
 
 Corporate Existence. 
 
 " It is not necessary for a plaintiff 
 corporation, in bringing suit, to allege 
 that it is a corporation. Its legal capacity 
 to sue will be presumed in law until tlie 
 contrary is made to appear; and, unless it 
 affirmatively appears from the face of the 
 petition that the plaintiff has no legal 
 capacity to sue, such question cannot be 
 raised by demurrer. The point that 
 plaintiff is not a corporation should be 
 raised by a special plea iu the nature of a 
 plea in abatement. If it is not so raised 
 before pleading to tiie merits, the question 
 is waived. By pleading to the merits, a 
 defendant admits plaintiff's capacity to 
 maintain the action : " Leader Printing 
 Co. V. Lowry (1899), 9 Okla. 89, 59 Pac. 
 242. 
 
 In support of the proposition that 
 corporate existence need not be averred, 
 except where the gist of the action in- 
 volves the corporate existence, see How- 
 land V. Jeuel (1893), 55 Minn. 102, 56 
 N. W. 581 ; Holden v. Great Western 
 Elevator Co. (1897), 69 Minn. 527, 72 
 N. W. 805 ; Brady v. Nat. Supply Co. 
 (1901), 64 O. St." 267, 60 N. E. 218; 
 Fletcher v. Cooperative Pub. Co. (1899), 
 58 Neb. 511, 78 N. W. 1070 ; German Ins. 
 Co. V. Frederick (1899), 57 Neb. .538, 77 
 N. W. 1106; Barber v. Crowell (1898), 
 55 Neb. 571, 75 N. W. 1109. 
 
 A petition by a corporation for the re- 
 moval of a cause to the federal court by 
 reason of diverse citizenship, must spe- 
 cifically aver that it is a corporation 
 created under the laws of another State, 
 and it is not enough to allege that it is a 
 citizen of another State, for corporations 
 are not strictly citizens. Many federal 
 decisions cited : Springs v. Southern Ky. 
 Co. (1902), 1.30 N. C. 186, 41 S. E. 100. 
 
 In some cases, however, it is held 
 necessary to plead coryiorate existence. 
 See Carpenter v. McCord Lumber Co. 
 
 (1900), 107 Wis. fill, 83 N. W. 7G4 ; State 
 I'. Chicago, etc. Ky. Co. (1893), 4 S. D.261, 
 56 N. W. 894. In tlie last case it was held 
 that sec. 2908, Comp. Laws, providing 
 that " in all -civil actions brought by or 
 against a corporation, it shall not be nec- 
 essary to prove on the trial of the cause, 
 tlie existence of such corporation, unless 
 the defendant shall, in the answer, ex- 
 pressly aver that the plaintiff or defendant 
 is not a corporation, " does not avoid the 
 necessity of pleading corporate existence 
 in the complaint. Such defect can be 
 reached only by general demurrer. 
 
 "That the defendant the Pacific Dredg- 
 ing Company is a corporation, organized 
 and existing by virtue of the law, aud 
 doing business in Lemhi county," held a 
 sufficient allegation of incorporation : 
 Jones V. Pacific Dredging Co. (1903), 
 Idaho, 72 Pac. 956. 
 
 Custojn. 
 
 " A custom, special to a particular 
 class of business operations, to be availed 
 of, must be pleaded, and. if put in i.'isue, 
 proved : " First Nat. Bank v. Farmers' 
 & Merchants' Bank (1898), 56 Neb. 149, 
 77 N. W. 50. 
 
 Damages. 
 
 Under a general allegation of damages, 
 evidence was admitted as follows: pro- 
 spective damages for tlie l)reach of an 
 executory contract, in Pathbone, etc. Co. 
 V. Wheelihan (1900), 82 Minn. 30, 84 N. W. 
 638 ; the amount of wages received by 
 plaintiff before and after the injury com- 
 plained of, in Palmer ?>. Winona Hy. & 
 Light Co. (1901), 83 Minn. 85, 85 N.'W. 
 941 ; all damages which n.aturally and 
 proximately result from tlie act com- 
 plained of, in City of Harvard r. Stiles 
 (1898), 54 Neb. 26, 74 N. W. 399, and in 
 North Point Irrigation Co. v. Canal Co. 
 (1900), 23 Utah, 199, 63 Pac. 812. 
 
 Special allegations of damage were 
 held in the following cases to be necessary 
 to let in evidence : in an action for per- 
 sonal injuries, the amount paid for med- 
 ical services: Macon v. Paducah St. Ry. 
 Co. (1901), 110 Ky. 680, 62 S. W. 496; in 
 an action on an open account, the amount 
 claimed: McClendon v. Hernando (1896), 
 100 Ga. 219, 28 S. E. 152; in an action 
 for personal injury, the amount claimed
 
 FORM OF TIIH COMPLAINT OR rETITION. 
 
 675 
 
 for future paiu and surfcring : Schultz v. 
 (iriffitl; (1897), 103 la. 150, 72 N. \V. 445 ; 
 in au action for damages to Ijuildiugs re- 
 moved from laud coudemueil for jjublic 
 use, the cost of raisiug the huildiuLTs after 
 removal: Lamb v. Elizabeth City (1902), 
 131 N. C. 241, 42 S. E. G0.'3 ; iu an action 
 for personal injuries, an allegation that 
 the i)laintiff has been permanently dis- 
 abled from labor, held insulHcient to admit 
 proof of such loss of earnings ; Coontz v. 
 Missouri Pac. Ky. Co. (1893), 115 Mo. 669, 
 22 S. W. 572 ; in an action for breach of 
 a contract of sale, an allegation of what 
 the profits would have been : Singer Mfg. 
 Co. V. Potts (1894), 59 Minn. 240, 61 N. W. 
 23 ; in an action to set aside a conveyance 
 cf real property on account of fraud, an 
 allegation tliat the defrauded party was 
 damaged: Srader v. Srader (1898), 151 
 Ind. 339, 51 N. E. 479; eacli item of 
 damage sought to be recovered : Negley 
 V. Cowell (1894), 91 la. 2,56, 59 N. W. 48 ; 
 in an action for personal injuries, an al- 
 legation that the bi-each of dut}- was the 
 cause of the injury : Bodah v. Town of 
 Deer Creek (1898), 99 Wis. 509, 75 N. W. 
 75; consequential damages : Omaha Coal, 
 Coke & Lime Co. v. Fay (1893), 37 Neb. 
 68, 55 N. W. 211 ; in an action for wrong- 
 ful levy, special damages for loss of pi'ofits : 
 Bradley v. Borin (1894), 53 Kan. 628, 3G 
 Pac. 977 ; in an action for ])ersonal inju- 
 ries, diseases not naturally resulting from 
 the nervous shock alleged : Kleiner v. 
 Third Ave. R. R. Co. (1900), 162 N. Y. 
 193, 56 N. E. 497. 
 
 Special damages, which must be spe- 
 cially pleaded, were defined to be all such 
 damages or elements of damage as do not 
 naturally and necessarily flow from the 
 wrongful acts constituting a trespass, and 
 such as the trespasser and wrongdoer is 
 not bound to know must necessarily and 
 inevitably result from his acts: Rauma v. 
 Bailey (1900), 80 Minn. 336, 83 N. VV. 191. 
 " Special damage " has a technical mean- 
 ing when used in respect to the rules of 
 pleading, and merely distinguishes the 
 damages which must be pleaded from 
 those which need not be pleaded : Piatt r. 
 Town of Milford (1895), 66 Conn. 320, 34 
 Atl. 82. 
 
 In an action for tort, where the alleged 
 wrongful act does not in itself imply mal- 
 ice, the plaintiff must, if he intends to 
 
 claim cxcmj)lary tlamages, allege in his 
 complaint facts entitling him tliereto : Vine 
 V. Casmey (1902), 86 Minn. 74, 90 N. W. 
 158. And when both actual and exem- 
 plary damages are claimed, defendant is 
 entitled to know how mucli is claimed for 
 each: Lamb v. Ilarbaugh (1895), 105 
 Cal. 680, 39 Pac. 56. 
 
 It is not necessary that the petition 
 should allege the measure of damages, as 
 that is a matter to be regulated by the 
 court iu its instructions : St. Louis Trust 
 Co. V. Bambrick (1899), 149 Mo. 560, 51 
 S. W. 706. 
 
 Where it is sought to recover liqui- 
 dated damages, it is necessary to both plead 
 and prove that the case falls within the 
 terms of the exception in Civ. Code, 
 §§ 1670, 1671, declaring all contracts for 
 liquidated damages void except iu certain 
 cases : Long Beach, etc. l^istrict v. Dodge 
 (1902), 135 Cal. 401, 67 Pac. 499. 
 
 Where plaintiff avers, in his petition in 
 an action to recover personal property, 
 that the property is worth at least a cer- 
 tain amount, and this is admitted by the 
 answer, the pleadings fix the amount for 
 the j)urposes of the case : State Bank v. 
 Felt (1896), 99 la. 532, 68 N. W. 818. In 
 an action to recover damages for the 
 wrongful detention of personal property, 
 it is not necessary to allege unusual con- 
 ditions which increased its value, where 
 the gross value is alleged : Hill r. Wilson 
 (1899), 8 N. D. 309, 79 N. W. 150. 
 
 " In a civil action for assault and bat- 
 tery it is unnecessary to specially allege 
 such damages as are the necessary and 
 usual consequence of the act complained 
 of:" Harshman v. Rose (1897), 50 Neb. 
 113, 69 N. W. 755. In au action to fore- 
 close a mortgage, taxes cannot be recov- 
 ered where plaintiff does not allege that 
 he paid them, but merely alleges that de- 
 fendant neglected to pay them and prayed 
 judgment for principal, interest and costs: 
 Williams v. Williams (1903), 117 Wis. 
 125, 94 N. W. 24. Loss of time in an 
 action for illeg'al arrest is sufficiently 
 pleaded by an allegation that plaintiff was 
 deprived of his liberty : Young r. Gormley 
 (1903), 120 la. 372, 94 N. W. 922. 
 
 Debt Due. 
 
 A complaint in an action to foreclose a 
 mortgage should expressly allege that the
 
 676 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 debt is due. But where facts are ])leadcd 
 and sup[>lied in an exiiibit which show 
 that tlie debt was due before the action 
 was instituted, the iutinnity of the plead- 
 ing in this respect is thereby cured : Bald- 
 win r. Boyce (1898), 152 Ind. 46,51 N. E. 
 .•J.34. 
 
 Delivery. 
 
 An allegation that an instrument was 
 executed includes the idea of delivery, 
 aud it is not necessary to allege delivery 
 in terras: Smith v. Wait.- (1894), 103 Ca'l. 
 372, 37 Pac. 232 ; Jacobs v. Hogan 
 (1900), 73 Conn. 740, 49 Atl. 202; Top- 
 ping v. Clay (1896), 65 Minn. 346, 68 
 N. W. 34. 
 
 Demand. 
 
 Where defendant, in his answer, de- 
 nies plaintiff's title, it is not necessary for 
 plaintiff to allege and prove demand pre- 
 vious to bringing an action for conversion : 
 Kosenau v. Syriug (1894), 25 Ore. 386, 35 
 I'ac. 845; Buffkins i'. Eason (1893), 112 
 N. C. 162, 16 S. E. 916; Rich v. Hobson 
 (1S93), 112 N. C. 79, 16 S. E. 931. See 
 also Gross v. Scheel (1903), — Neb. — , 93 
 N. W. 418. 
 
 An allegation of defendant's refusal to 
 pav is equivalent to an allegation of de- 
 mand, for he could not refuse unless he 
 had been asked to pay : Worth v. Whar- 
 ton (1898), 122 N. C. 376, 29 S. E. 370 ; 
 Brossard c Williams (1902), 114 Wis. 89, 
 89 N. W. 832. 
 
 Description.' 
 
 The descri[)tion of land in a complaint 
 should be such that the land can be ascer- 
 tained and located from the allegations 
 alone: Kiernan v. Terry (1894), 26 Ore. 
 494, 38 Pac. 671 ; Scheffer v. Hines (1897), 
 149 Ind. 413, 49 N. 10. 348; Swatts v. 
 Bowen (1894), 141 Ind. 322,40 N. E. 1057 ; 
 Tracy v. Harmon (1895), 17 Mont. 465, 43 
 Pac. 500. 
 
 In Shefferr. Hines (supra), a description 
 employing solely the numbers of the sec- 
 tions, townships and ranges, without ref- 
 erence to any object from which a location 
 in the state could be inferred, was held 
 bad. But see Citizen's Bank v. Stewart 
 (1894), 90 la. 467, 57 N. W. 957, where 
 Buch a description in a decree was held 
 sufficient. A particular description by 
 courses and distances must control the 
 general description when the two are in 
 
 conflict: Ilaggia r. Lorenz (1895), 15 
 Mont. 309, 39 Pac. 285. 
 
 In actions of trover for the conversion 
 of money it is not necessary to describe 
 the money, but it is sufficient to state the 
 aggregate amount taken : Salem Traction 
 Co. V. Anson (1902), 41 Ore. 562, 69 Pac. 
 675. 
 
 Doing Equity. 
 
 In an action for equitable relief, a com- 
 plaint is demurrable which does not allege 
 facts showing that plaintiff has done or is 
 ready to do equity : Buena Vista, etc. Co. 
 r. Tuohy (1895),' 107 Cal. 243, 40 Pac. 
 386. 
 
 Dutii. 
 
 The averment of duty is but a legal 
 conclusion, and is therefore improper aud 
 unavailing: City of Ft. Wayne v. Christie 
 ( 1 900) , 1 56 Ind. 1 72, 59 N. E. 385 ; McPeak 
 V. Mo. Pac. Ky. Co. (1895), 128 Mo. 617, 
 30 S. W. 170; Lang v. Urady (1900), 73 
 Conn. 707, 49 Atl. 199 ; Martin v. Sher- 
 wood (1902), 74 Conn. 475, 50 Atl. 564. 
 
 In some ca.ses, however, an allegation of 
 duty has been considered an allegation of 
 fact: Berry v. Dole (1902), 87 Minn. 471, 
 92 N. W. 334 ; Burnett v. Atlantic Coast 
 Line Ry. Co. (1903), 132 N.C. 261,43 S. E. 
 797. 
 
 In Iowa it is held that in an action for 
 negligence the particular duty neglected 
 must be declared upon : Humpton v. Un- 
 terkircher (1896), 97 la. 509, 66 N. W. 
 776 ; citing Railroad Co. v. Stark, 38 
 Mich. 714. 
 
 This rule seems to obtain also in Wis- 
 consin. See Greenman v. Cliicago North- 
 western R. R. Co. (1898), 100 Wis. 188, 
 75 N. W. 998; Lago v. Walsh (1898), 98 
 Wis. 348, 74 N. W. 212. But see, how- 
 ever, Jones V. Burtis (1894), 88 Wis. 478, 
 60 N. W. 785. 
 
 Election Contest. 
 
 In an action to contest an election the 
 complaint must set forth specifically the 
 particular facts counted upon as invali- 
 dating the election : Borders v. Williams 
 (1900), 155 Ind. 36, 57 N. E. 527. 
 
 Estoppel. 
 
 An estoppel must be pleaded if it is to 
 be available: Cloud r. Malvin (1899), 108 
 la. 52, 75 N. W. G45, 78 N. W . 791 , 
 Nickum r. Uurckhardt (1897), 30 Ore. 464,
 
 FOKM OF THE COMPLAINT OU PETITION. 
 
 677 
 
 47 Pac. 888. See also note 4, p. 815, where 
 many cases are cited to tliis proposition. 
 Hut " a party is not bound to plead au es- 
 toppel where lie is without knowledge that 
 liis demand must ultimately rest upon 
 it:" Donnelly v. San Francisco Bridge 
 Co. (1897), 117 Cal. 417, 49 Pac. .5.59. 
 
 See Plumb v. Curtis (1895), ttG Conn. 
 154, 33 Atl. 998, for interesting discussion 
 of estoppel as a substantial ground of 
 recovery. 
 
 Exception to Rule of Law. 
 Where a party relies upon an exception 
 to the rule that a servant assumes tlie risk 
 of defective machinery, he must first plead 
 the exception : Malm v. Thelin (1896), 47 
 Neb. 086, 66 N. W. 650. 
 
 Exceptions in Statutes. 
 
 In stating a cause of action arising upon 
 an enacting clause of a statute containing 
 an exception, such exception should be 
 negatived ; but where the proviso is con- 
 tained in another clause it need not be 
 negatived: Rowell i'. Janvriu (1896), 151 
 N.Y. 60, 45 N. E. 398 ; Walker v. Chester 
 County (1893), 40 S. C. 342, 18 S. E. 936; 
 Cleveland, etc. Ry. Co. v. Gray (1897), 148 
 Ind. 266, 46 N. E. 675 ; City of Kansas City 
 V. Garnier(1896),57 Kan. 41 2, 46 Pac. 707 ; 
 Larson v. First Nat. Bank (1902), — Neb. 
 — , 92 N. W. 729 ; Hale v. Mo. Pac. Ry. 
 Co. (1893), 36 Neb. 266, 54 N. W. 517 ; 
 Central Kentucky Asylum i\ Penick 
 (1898), 102 Ky. 533, 44 S. W. 92. In 
 Wolff V. Lamann (1900), 108 Ky. 343. 56 
 S. W. 408, it was held that in alleging 
 a statutory cause of action for injuries due 
 to the bite of a dog, it is not necessarv to 
 negative the exceptions of the statute, viz., 
 tliat the injury did not occur upon the 
 premises of the owner after night or that 
 plaintiff was not engaged in some unlaw- 
 ful act in the daytime. These are matters 
 of defence. 
 
 Execution of Instrument. 
 An allegation that a mortgage was made, 
 executed, and delivered includes the sign- 
 ing, sealing, attesting, and acknowledging : 
 Laurent v. Banning (1897), 32 Ore. 11, 51 
 Pac. 80. 
 
 Execution, Issuance and Return of. 
 
 A sufficient showing that a legal execu- 
 tion was issued on a judgment and re- 
 
 turned unsatisfied is made by au allegatlDn 
 that on a day named an execution was, in 
 due form of law, issued upon a certain 
 judgment, to the slieriff, and that such 
 execution was duly returned by saiil slieriff 
 wholly unsatisfied: I'ierstoff )•. Jorges 
 (1893), 86 Wis. 128, 56 N. W. 735. 
 
 Forcible Entrij and Detainer. 
 
 A complaint in the words of tlie statute 
 is sufficient: Locke i;. Skow (1902), Neb., 
 91 N. W. 572. The rule requiring the 
 pleader to state the facts constituting his 
 cause of action or defence should not be 
 applied to this action : Blachford v. Fren- 
 zer (1895), 44 Neb. 829, 62 N. W. 1101. 
 For complaint held sullicient, see Moore v. 
 Parker (1899), 59 Neb. 29, 80 N. W. 43. 
 
 Foreclosure. 
 
 In an action to foreclose a mortgage 
 plaintiff need not set out the nature of, or 
 facts constituting, the claim of another 
 lien holder, but may allege generally that 
 such defendant claims some interest in 
 the mortgaged premises, advising him that 
 his lien will be barred if lie fails to appear 
 and disclose it : Winemiller v. Lauglilin 
 (1894), 51 0. St. 421, 38 N. E. 111. A 
 complaint in a suit to enforce a mortgage 
 on a widow's dower interest must show 
 the facts from which the portion of the 
 mortgage debt properly chargeable to 
 such dower interest can be ascertained : 
 Fowle V. House (1896), 29 Ore. 114, 44 
 Pac. 692. 
 
 For the construction of a complaint in 
 an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien 
 upon several pieces of property, not con- 
 tiguous and not of similar character, see 
 Big Blackfoot Co. r. Bluebird Co. (1897), 
 19 Mont. 454, 48 Pac. 778. 
 
 But one action may be maintained for 
 the recovery of any debt secured iiy mort- 
 gage, under C. L. 1888, § 3460 : Salt Lake 
 Loan & Trust Co. v. Millspaugh (1898), 18 
 Utah, 283, 54 Pac. 893. 
 
 Foreign Laws. 
 A foreign law must be pleaded like any 
 other fact: Lowry v. Moore (1897), 16 
 Wash. 476, 48 Pac. 238 ; Thompson- Hous- 
 ton Elec. Co. V. Palmer (1893), 52 Minn. 
 174, 53 N. W. 1137 ; Dunham v. Holloway 
 (1895), 3 Okla. 244, 41 Pac. 140; Myers r. 
 Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. (1897), 69 Minii. 476,
 
 678 
 
 CIVIL llEMEDIES. 
 
 72 N. W. 694 ; McDonald v. Bankers' Life 
 Ass'u (1900), 154 Mo. 618, 55 S. W. 999; 
 Showaher i\ Uickert (1902), 64 Kau. 82, 
 67 Pac. 454; Smith v. Mason (1895), 44 
 Neb. 610, 63 N. W. 41. A foreign statute 
 should be set out, not pleaded by its legal 
 effect: Lowry n. Moore (1897), 16 Wash. 
 476, 48 Pac. 238. In pleading a foreign 
 statute it is sufficient to allege its sub- 
 stance : Minneapolis Harvester Works r. 
 Smith (1893), 36 Neb. 616, 54 N. W. 973; 
 Showalter v. Rickert (1902), 64 Kan. 82, 
 67 Pac. 454. The law of another State 
 cannot he pleaded by chapter only, but the 
 terms, tenor, and effect of the statute are 
 to be set out: McDonald v. Bankers' Life 
 Ass'n (1900), 154 Mo. 618, 55 S. W. 999. 
 
 In pleading the common law of another 
 State it is sufficient to state as a fact what 
 the law is, without setting out decisions of 
 the courts : Crandall v. Great Northern 
 Ry. Co. (1901), 83 Minn. 190,86 N. W. 10. 
 
 In the absence of allegations to the con- 
 trary, the laws of a foreign state will be 
 presumed the same as those of the State of 
 the forum : Greenville Nat. Bank r. Evans 
 Co. (1900), 9 Okla. 353, 00 Pac. 249 ; Man- 
 .•^ur-Tebbetts Co. i-. Willet (1900), 10 Okla. 
 383, 61 Pac. 1066; Smith v. Mason (1895), 
 44 Neb. 610,63 N. W. 41. 
 
 F}-atid. 
 
 Fraud is never presumed, and must 
 he alleged and proved to be available : 
 Hampton v. Webster (1898), 56 Neb. 628, 
 77 N. W. 50; Nat. State Bank v. Nat. 
 Bank (1895), 141 lud. 3.52, 40 N. E. 799. 
 And in order to be available it must have 
 resulted in injury or damage to the party 
 pleading it : Carrington r. Omaha Life 
 Ass'n (1899), 59 Neb. 116, 80 N. W. 491. 
 
 A general allegation of fraud is not 
 sufficient, but the facts constituting the 
 fraud must be alleged : Murray v. Shoudy 
 (1896), 13 Wash. 33, 42 Pac." 631; Cade 
 V. Head Camp W. 0. W. (1902), 27 
 Wash. 218, 67 Pac 603; Crowley r. 
 Hicks (1898), 98 Wis. 566, 74 N. W. 348; 
 New Bank v. Kleiner (1901), 112 Wis. 
 287, 87 N. W. 1090; James v. Kelley 
 (1899), 107 Ga. 446, 33 S. E. 425 ; Keni- 
 per V. Renshaw (1899), 58 Neb. 513, 78 
 N. W. 1071 ; Johnston v. Spencer (1897), 
 51 Neb. 198, 70 N. W. 982; Crosby v. 
 Ritchey (1896), 47 Neb. 924, 66 N. W. 
 1005; Rockford Watch Co. v. Manifold 
 
 (1893), 36 Neb. 801, 55 N. W. 236; Knox 
 V. Pearson (1902), 64 Kan. 711, 68 Pac. 
 613; Ladd v. Nystol (1901), 63 Kan. 23, 
 64 Pac. 985; Gem Chemical Co. v. Young- 
 blood (1900), 58 S. C. 56, 36 S. E. 437; 
 Beaman v. Ward (1903), 132 N. C. 68, 43 
 S. E. 545; Leasure v. Forquer (1895), 27 
 Ore. 334, 41 Pac. 665; Schiffnian v. 
 Schmidt (1900), 154 Mo. 204, 55 S. W. 
 451 ; Goodson v. Goodson (1897), 140 Mo. 
 206, 41 S. W. 737; Burnham v. Boyd 
 (1902), 167 Mo. 185, 66 S. W. 1088; 
 Clough V. Holden (1893), 115 Mo. 336, 21 
 S. W. 1071 ; County of Cochise i". Copper 
 Queen Min. Co. (1903), Ariz., 71 Pac. 
 946; Guy v. Blue (1896), 146 Ind. 629, 45 
 N. E. 1052; Stroup i-. Stroup (1894), 140 
 Ind. 179, 39 N. E. 864; Tolbert r. Cale- 
 donian Ins. Co. (1897), 101 Ga. 741. 28 
 S. E. 991 ; Peckham v. City of Watson- 
 vi!le(1902),138Cal. 242, 71 Pac. 169; Mor- 
 rill r. Little Falls Co. (1893), 53 Minn. 
 371, 55 N. W. 547. 
 
 But in Pelly v. Naylor (1893), 139 N. Y. 
 598, 35 N. E. 317, it seems to be held that 
 the facts constituting the fraud need not 
 be set out. 
 
 A complaint is good which alleges 
 facts constituting fraud whether fraud is 
 alleged in terms or not : Worth v. Stewart 
 (1898), 122 N. C. 263, 29 S. E. 413; 
 Rathbone v. Frost (1894), 9 Wash. 162, 37 
 Pac. 298. • 
 
 While an intent to deceive is a nec- 
 essary ingredient of fraud, it need not 
 be alleged directly if facts are stated 
 from which it is necessarily implied : 
 Schoellhamer v. Rometsch (1894), 26 Ore. 
 394, 38 Pac. 344. But see McKibbin r. 
 F.llingson (1894), 58 Minn. 205, 59 N. W. 
 1003, where it is held that allegations of 
 facts tending to show a fraudulent intent 
 are not equivalent to an allegation of such 
 intent. As to necessity of alleging fraudu- 
 lent intent, see Nortliwestern Steamship 
 Co. V. Dexter Horton & Co. (1902), 29 
 Wash. 565, 70 Pac. 59, holding that such 
 allegation is necessary, and Cameron v. 
 Mount (1893), 80 VVis. 477, 56 N. W. 
 1094, holding iJuch allegation unnecessary. 
 
 In the following cases the allegations of 
 fraud were passed ujjon by the court, and 
 sustained or condemned, as indicated : Selz 
 V. Tucker (1894), 10 I'tah, 132, 37 Pac. 249 
 (held insufficient) ; Wenning v. Teeple 
 (1895), 144 Ind. 189, 41 N. E. 600 (held
 
 FORM OF THE COMPLAINT Oil PETITION. 
 
 679 
 
 sufficient); Leasure i'. Forquer (1895), 
 27 Ore. 334, 41 I'ac. 663 (held insutii- 
 cient) ; Schiffman v. Schmidt (1900), 154 
 Mo. 204, 55 S. W. 451 (held insufficient) ; 
 Kuh, Njvthan & Fisher Co. v. Glucklick 
 (1903), 120 la. 504, 94 N. W. 1105. 
 
 The general rules as to pleading fraud 
 do not apply to ejectment and replevin : 
 Phoenix Iron Works v. McEvouy (1896), 
 47 Neb. 228, 66 N. W. 290. 
 
 Injur I/. 
 
 A formal allegation of injury is not 
 necessary when facts are stated from 
 which loss or injury is implied: Green 
 Bay, etc. Canal Co. v. Kaukauna, etc. Co. 
 (1901), 112 Wis. 323, 87 N. W. 864. 
 
 The plaintiff is not required to aver 
 all the physical injuries which he has sus- 
 tained or which may have resulted from 
 the wrongful act complained of, if they 
 are such as may be traced to or naturally 
 follow from the act : Williams v. Oregon 
 Short Line 11. K. Co. (1898), 18 Utah 
 210, 34 Pac. 991 ; Croco i-. Oregon Short 
 Line R. R. Co, (1898), 18 Utah, 31 1 , .34 Pac 
 985; Youngblood v. Railroad Co. (1901) 
 •60 S. C. 9, 38 S. E. 232; Curniu v. A. H 
 Stauge Co. (1898), 98 Wis. 598, 74 N. W, 
 ,377 ; Hanson v. Anderson (1895), 90 Wis 
 195, 62 N. W. 1055. 
 
 A claim made in a complaint for a spe 
 -cific injury and "other injuries" is indefi 
 iiite and uncertain, but is sufficient to 
 admit evidence of what the other injuries 
 were : Mauch v. Hartford (1901), 112 Wis. 
 40, 87 N. W. 816. 
 
 Injury to the Person. 
 
 The court held, in Hutcherson v. Bur- 
 den ( 1901 ), 1 13 Ga. 987, 39 S. E. 495, that 
 the expression " injuries to the person," 
 as used in the statute of limitations, was 
 not confined to physical injuries, but em- 
 braced all actionable injuries to the in- 
 dividual himself, as distinguished from 
 injuries to his property. 
 
 Innocent Purchaser. 
 Where a plaintiff is required to allege 
 that he is an innocent purchaser, he must 
 aver the facts, showing all the elements 
 necessary, viz., that he is a purchaser in 
 good faith, without notice, and for a valu- 
 able consideration, and each of these ele- 
 
 ments must be apjjropriately amplified : 
 Young V. Schofield (1895), 132 Mo. G50, 
 34 S. W. 497. 
 
 Interest. 
 
 Where debts or claims bear interest as 
 a matter of law, interest may be recovered 
 upon them under a general prayer for the 
 amount of the debt or claim and interest, 
 without any allegation that it is due: 
 Peterson v. Mannix (1902), Neb., 90 N. W. 
 210. In Ormond v. Sage (1897), 69 Minn. 
 523, 72 N. W. 810, it was held unneces- 
 sary to demand interest where a party is 
 entitled to it by way of damages on money 
 due on contract, and in Brown v. Doyle 
 (1897), 69 Minn. 543, 72 N. W. 814, the 
 court said that it need not be specially 
 pleaded. 
 
 In suing on a promissory note it is not 
 necessary to state how much interest is 
 due, if the rate from a given day is al- 
 leged, yet if a certain sura is named a 
 larger sum cannot be recovered : King v. 
 Westbrooks (1902), 116 Ga. 753, 42 S. E. 
 1002. The exhibit being part of the 
 complaint, a prayer asking for interest 
 according as the same may appear to be 
 due from the items of said exhibit at seven 
 per cent per annum is sufficient to support 
 a verdict for such interest : Dunham v. 
 Holloway (1895), 3 Okla. 244, 41 Pac. 
 140. 
 
 Invalidit)/ of Statute or Ordinance. 
 
 " When it is claimed that a statute or 
 ordinance is invalid because it is in its 
 substance violative of the fundamental 
 law, the inference of invalidity being one 
 following from the fundamental law as 
 compared with the act in question, it is 
 sufficient to generally allege that it is in- 
 valid. When the claim is that such act 
 or ordinance is invalid, not because of 
 jts substance, but because not regularlv 
 passed or adopted, the defect in the pro- 
 ceedings must be specifically pleaded. It 
 is insufficient to allege generally that it 
 was not legally adopted : " City of York 
 V. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. (1898), 56 
 Neb. 572, 76 N. W. 1065. Where it is 
 claimed that a statute is unconstitution- 
 al, a general allegation to that effect is 
 not sufficient, but che specific provision of 
 the constitution infringed ujjon must be 
 pointed out in the pleadings : Ash v. City
 
 680 
 
 CIVIL EEMEDIKS. 
 
 of Indepeiulence (1902), 169 Mo. 
 S. W. 888. 
 
 68 jurisdiction of a justice's court: Willits v. 
 Walter (1898), 32 Ore. 411, 52 Pac. 24. 
 
 Irreparable Ivjury. 
 
 A mere allejrJition, in a complaint, of 
 great or irreparable injury to the j)laintiff 
 and his property, without the facts show- 
 ing,' it, is not sufficient in an action for an 
 injunction: Brass i'. Kathbone (1897), 153 
 N. V. 435, 47 N. E. 905 ; Wabaska Elec- 
 tric Co. r. City of Wyraore (1900), 60 Neb. 
 199, 82 N. "W. 62C; Burrus v. City of 
 Columbus (1898), 105 Ga. 42, 31 S. E.124; 
 Schuster v. Myers (1899), 148 Mo. 422, 
 50 S. W. 103. See al.so Placke v. Union 
 Depot R. R. Co. (1897), 140 Mo. 634, 41 
 S. W. 915. 
 
 A stockholder's allegation that he " has 
 {rood reason to fear and does fear" that 
 the directors will sell the franchise, with- 
 out any averment that they threaten to 
 do so, is not sufficient : Qnin v. Havenor 
 (1903), .53 \Vi.s. 118, 94 X. W. 642. 
 
 Judgment. 
 
 In an action npon a judgment of an- 
 other State rendered by a court of general 
 jurisdiction, it is unnecessary to allege 
 jurisdictional facts. Want of jurisdiction 
 is matter to be set up by answer: Trow- 
 bridge V. Spinning (1900), 23 Wash. 48, 
 62 Pac. 125; Kunze v. Kunze (1890), 94 
 Wis. 54, 68 N. W. 391 ; Bennett v. Bennett 
 (1902), — Neb. — , 91 N. W. 409. In 
 Gude V. Dakota Fire Ins. Co. (1895), 7 
 S. I). 644, 65 N. W. 27, a complaint 
 alleging jurisdictional facts relative to a 
 foreign judgment was considered and lield 
 sufficient. But see Angle i'. Manchester 
 (1902). — Neb. — , 91 N. W. 501. 
 
 In ])leadiug a judgment it is only neces- 
 sary to follow § 456 of the Code of Civil 
 Procedure, and aver that the judgment 
 was "duly given:" Edwards v. Hellings 
 (1893), 99 Cal. 214, 33 Pac. 799; Buck- 
 man V. Hatch (1903), 139 Cal. 53, 72 Pac. 
 445. Same holding in Wisconsin, in Pier- 
 stoff V. Jorges (1893), 86 Wis. 128, 56 
 N. W. 735, as to judgment of a court of 
 limited jurisdiction. Same holding in 
 Oregon, in Fisher v. Kelly (1896), 30 Ore. 
 1, 46 Pac. 146, also as to judgment of 
 court of limited juri.sdiction. 
 
 But ill pleading a judgment of a jus- 
 tice's court it is essential to show that the 
 cause of action was one f;!!!!!!!; under the 
 
 Jurisdiction. 
 
 A court will rever.<e a judgment for 
 want of jurisdiction, not only ui cases 
 where it is shown negatively that jurisdic- 
 tion does not exist, but even wlien it does 
 not appear affirmatively that it does exist : 
 Myers c. Berry (1895), 3 Olda. 612, 41 
 Pac. 580. 
 
 Libel and Slander. 
 
 See the following cases dealing with 
 vari(jus phases of the subject : Sharpe v. 
 Larson (1897), 70 Minn. 209, 72 N. W. 
 961; Richmond v. Post (1897), 69 Minn. 
 457, 72 N. W. 704 ; Fredrick.son v. John- 
 son (1894), 60 Minn. 337, 62 N. W. 388; 
 American Book Co. v. Kingdom Publish- 
 ing Co. (1898), 71 Minn. 363, 73 N. W. 
 1089 ; Heeney v. Kilbaue (1899), 59 0. St. 
 499, 53 N. "e. 262; Grand v. Dreyfus 
 (1898), 122 Cal. 58, 54 Pac. 389; Schubert 
 V. Richter (1896), 92 Wis. 199, 66 N. W. 
 107; Davis v. Hamilton (1902), 85 Minn. 
 209, 88 N. W. 744; Williams v. Fuller 
 (1903), — Neb. — , 94 N. W. 118; Grubb 
 V. Elder (1903), — Kan. — , 72 Pac. 790. 
 
 Names of Parties. 
 
 Parties should sue and be sned in their 
 full Christian names, and not by initial 
 letters: Small v. Sandall (1896), 48 Neb. 
 318, 67 N. W. 156 ; Scarborough v. My rick 
 (1896), 47 Neb. 794, 66 N. W. 867 ; Ene- 
 wold V. OLsen (1894), 39 Neb. 59, 57 N. W. 
 765; Richardson v. Opelt (1900), 60 Neb. 
 180, 82 N. W. 377 ; Nebraska Loan & 
 Tru.st Co. c. Kroener (1901), 63 Neb. 289, 
 88 N. W. 499 ; Gillian r. McDowell (1902), 
 — Neb. — , 92 N. W. 991 ; Twine v. Kil- 
 gore (1895), 3 Okla. 640, 39 Pac. 388; 
 Turner r. Gregory (1899), 151 Mo. 100, 52 
 S. W. 234. But in a suit upon an instru- 
 ment describing the parties by their initials, 
 suit may be brought by or against them 
 in that form: Richardson v. Opelt (1900), 
 60 Neb. 180, 82 N. W. 377. But see the 
 contrary view held in Gillian v. McDowell 
 (1902), — Neb. — , 92 N. W. 991. Where 
 liefendant (the Louisville and Nashville 
 Railroad Company) was sued as the 
 " L. & N. R. R. Co.," its plea in abate- 
 ment ought to have been sust:\ined :
 
 FOIJM OF THE COMPLAINT OR PETITION. 
 
 6S1 
 
 Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Rloyd (1900), 
 — Ky. — , 5.5 K. W. G94. 
 
 The objectiou that the full name is not 
 given may be made at any time before 
 judgment: Small v. Sandall (1896), 48 
 Neb. 318, 67 N. W. l.')6; but not there- 
 after: Shoemaker i\ Goode (1902), Neb., 
 92 N. W. 629 ; Scarborough v. Myrick 
 (1896), 47 Neb. 794, 66 N. W. 867 ; Schrci- 
 ner v. Stanton (1901), 26 Wash. 563, 07 
 Pac. 219 ; Fisk v. GuUiford (1903), — Neb. 
 — , 95 N. W. 494. Demurrer is not the 
 proper remedy : McColgan v. Territory of 
 Oklahoma (1897), 5 Okla. 567, 49 Pac. 
 1018. But where an action was brought 
 by " Heath, Morrow <& Co.," and this is 
 the only description given of the plaintiffs 
 in tlie summons or complaint, a demurrer 
 w^as held proper: Heatli r. Morgan (1895), 
 117 N. C. 504, 23 S. E. 489. Such objec- 
 tion is waived by pleading to the merits: 
 Bell V. Peterson (1900), 105 Wis. 607, 81 
 N. W. 279. 
 
 It is sufficient to correctly state the 
 names of the parties in tlie title, and they 
 may thereafter be referred to merely as 
 plaintiff or defendant : Chicago, etc. R. H. 
 Co. V. Thomas (1896), 147 Ind. 35, 46 
 N. E. 73; Eisely v. Taggart (1897), 52 
 Neb. 658, 72 N. W. 1039; First Nat. Bank 
 V. Hattenbach (1900), 13 S. D. 365, 83 
 N. W. 421. 
 
 " Where the petition or complaint 
 states a cause of action in favor of the 
 plaintiff personally, superadded words, 
 such as 'agent,' 'executor,' or 'trustee,' 
 will be regarded as descriptio persona. 
 merely:" Thomas v. Carson (1896), 46 
 Neb. 765, 65 N. W. 899. Where a peti- 
 tion states facts constituting a cause of 
 action against the defendant individually, 
 a general demurrer should not be 'sus- 
 tained because in the caption of the 
 petition the defendant is designated as 
 guardian: Clift v. Newell (1898), 104 Ky. 
 396, 47 S. W. 270. "A defendant known 
 indiscriminately by either of two names 
 may properly be designated by both in 
 the title of the action, if they are used in 
 such a manner as to indicate clearly that 
 but one person i.s sued : " O. L. Packard 
 Machinery Co. r. Laev (1898), 100 Wis. 
 644, 76 N. W. 596. " Where the caption 
 of the petition gives the individual names 
 of the members of a copartnersliip as de- 
 fendants, and references in the pleadings, 
 
 finding,'*, and judgment to the defendants 
 are generally in tlie plural, the action will 
 be held to be one against the individuals 
 nameil, even tliough the petition charges 
 that the plaintiff contracted with the de- 
 fendants as jiartners : " Burke v. Unique 
 Printing Co. (1901), 63 Neb. 264, 88 N. W. 
 488. 
 
 In Turner v. Gregory (1899), 151 Mo. 
 100, 52 S. W. 2.34, the court said : " In all 
 proceedings the Christian and surname of 
 botli the jilaintiff and defendant should be 
 set forth in the pleadings and process 
 with accuracy. . . . One general rule has 
 been to hold the first ChVistian name a.'j 
 essential, and to hold that the middle 
 name is no part of a man's name, or at 
 least not necessary to his designation." 
 Citing Missouri cases. 
 
 Negative Averments. 
 
 " A negative allegation is to be proved 
 only where it constitutes a part of the 
 original substantive cause of action upon 
 which the plaintiff relies, and this is an 
 exception to the general rule that a party 
 is not called upon to prove his negative 
 averments, although they may be neces- 
 sary in his pleading : " Dirks v. California 
 Safe Deposit Co. (1902), 136 Cal. 84, 68 
 Pac. 487. 
 
 Negligence. 
 
 Negligence cannot be presumed but 
 must be pleaded and proved : Vansyoc r. 
 Freewater Cemetery Ass'n (1901), 63 Neb. 
 143, 88 N. W. 162; First Nat. Bank v. 
 Zeims (1894), 93 la. 140, 61 N. W. 483. 
 
 A general allegation of negligence is 
 sufficient to repel a demurrer for want of 
 facts: House v. Meyer (1893), 100 Cal. 
 592, 35 Pac. 308 ; Stephenson v. Southern 
 Pac. Co. (1894), 102 Cal. 143, 36 Pac. 407 ; 
 Omaha & R. V. Co. v. Wright (1896), 49 
 Neb. 456, 68 N. W. 618 (overruling same 
 case, 47 Neb. 886, 66 N. W. 842) ; Omaha 
 & R. V. Co. V. Crow (1898), .54 Neb. 747, 
 74 N. W. 1066; Collett v. Northern Pac. 
 Ry. Co. (1900), 23 Wash. 600, 63 Pac. 225 ; 
 Traver v. Spokane St. Ry. Co. (1901), 25 
 Wash. 225. 65 Pac. 284; Conrad ;'. De 
 Montcourt (1896), 138 Mo. 311, 39 S. W. 
 805 ; Foster ik Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. 
 (1893), 115 Mo. 165,21 S. W. 916; Connell 
 V. Chesapeake, etc. Ry. Co. (1900), Ky., 58 
 S. W. 374; Baltimore, etc. Ry. Co. v. 
 Young (1896), 146 Ind. 374, 45 N. E. 479 :
 
 682 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 Sale V. Aurora, etc. Co. (1896), 147 Ind. 
 324, 46 N. E. 669 ; Cleveland, etc. Ry. Co. 
 V. Berry (1898), 132 Ind. 607, .53 N. E. 41.5 ; 
 Rodgers v. Baltimore, etc. Ry. Co. (1897), 
 150 Ind. 397, 49 N. E. 453; Citizens' St. 
 R. R. Co. V. Sutton (1897), 148 Ind. 169, 
 46 N. E. 462 ; Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. 
 Bates (1896), 146 Ind. 564, 45 N. E. 108; 
 Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Berkey (1893), 
 136 lud. 181, 35 N. E. 3 ; Rogers v. Trues- 
 dale (1894). 37 Minn. 126, 38 N. W. 688; 
 McGonigle v. Kane (1894), 20 Colo. 292, 38 
 Pac. 367; Walker v. McCauU (1900), 13 
 S. I). 312, 83 N. W. 378; .lones v. City of 
 Portland (1899), 35 Ore. 312, 38 Pac. 637 ; 
 Chaperon c. Portland Electric Co. (1902), 
 41 Ore. 39, 67 Pac. 928; Pittsburgh, etc. 
 Ry. Co. I'. Wilson (1903),— lud. —, 66 
 N. E. 899 ; Cederson v. Oregon Nav. Co. 
 <1900), 38 Ore. 343, 62 Pac. 637 ; Chicago, 
 B. &Q. R. R. Co. r. Oyster (1899), 58 Nel). 
 1, 78 N. W. 359. 
 
 The rule that a general allegation of 
 negligence is sufficient to repel a demurrer 
 for want of facts, '' means, not that the 
 pleadinj; is good by charging that the 
 plaintiff was injured ' by the negligence of 
 the defendant,' but that it is sufficient if 
 the act, .stated us the cause of t!ie injury, 
 is alleged to have been ' negligently ' 
 done : " Cleveland, etc. Ky. Co v. Berry 
 <1898), 152 Ind. 607, .33 N.' E. 415. 
 
 Negligence is an ultimate fact, and not 
 illegal conclusion : House v. Meyer (1893), 
 100 (";al. 592, 33 Pac.SOS; Stephenson v. 
 Southern Pac. Co. (1894), 102 Cal. 143, 36 
 Pac. 407 ; McGonigle v. Kane (1894), 20 
 Colo. 292, 38 Pac. 367 ; Chaperon v. Port- 
 land Elec. Co. (1902). 41 Ore. 39, 67 Pac. 
 923; Rogers v. Truesdale (1894), 37 Minn. 
 126, 58 N. W. 688 ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. 
 Co. !•. Grablin (1893), 38 Neb. 90,56 
 N. W. 796; Hill v. Fairhaven, etc. R. R. 
 Co. (1902), 73 Conn. 177, 32 Atl. 725 (hold- 
 ing it a mi.xed question of law and fact) ; 
 Doolittle V. Laycock (1899), 103 Wis. 334, 
 79 N. W. 408 (mixed question of law and 
 fact). 
 
 Where a petition contains but a general 
 allegation of negligence it is subject to a 
 motion to make more definite and certain : 
 Price V. Water Co. (1897), .38 Kan. 551, .50 
 Pac. 450 ; Jones v. City of Portland (1899), 
 ,35 Ore. 312, 58 Pac. 657 ; Walker v. Mc- 
 Caull (1900) , 13 S. D. 512, 83 N. W. 378 ; 
 Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Berkey (1893), 
 
 136 Ind. 181, 33 N. E. 3; Louisville, etc. 
 R. R. Co. V. Bates (1896), 146 Ind. 364,45 
 N. E. 108; Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. 
 Lynch (1896), 147 Ind. 163, 44 N. E. 997 ; 
 Conrad v. De Montcourt (1896), 138 Mo. 
 311, 39 S. W. 805 ; Omaha & R. V. Co. v. 
 Crow (1898), 54 Neb. 747, 74 N. W. 1066. 
 
 Where a general averment of negli- 
 gence in a petition is followed by an enu- 
 meration of specific facts of negligence, 
 the j)laintiff will l)e restricted to proof o£ 
 the facts so specified : McManamee i'. Mo. 
 Pac. Ry. Co. (1896). 135 Mo. 440, 37 
 S. W. 119; Dlauhi v. St. Louis, etc. Ry. 
 Co. (1897), 139 Mo. 291, 40 S. W. 890; 
 McCarty v. Rood Hotel Co. (1898), 144 
 Mo. 397, 46 S. W. 172; Chitty v. St. 
 Louis, etc. Ry. Co. (1899), 148 Mo. 64, 49 
 S. W. 868; Rogers v. Truesdale (1894), 57 
 Minn. 126, 58 N. W. 688 ; Pierce v. Great 
 Falls, etc. Ry. Co. (1899), 22 Mont. 445, 
 56 Pac. 867 ; Telle v. Rapid Transit Ry. 
 Co. (1893), 50 Kan. 435. 31 Pac. 1076. 
 Contra : Traver v. Spokane St. Ry. Co. 
 (1901), 23 Wash. 225, 63 Pac. 284. Held 
 in Stendal v. Boyd (1897), 67 Minn. 279, 
 69 N. W. 899, that where a general charge 
 of negligence is made as to specific acts 
 which could not be negligent un<lcr any 
 evidence admissible under the allegations 
 of the complaint, the complaint is denmr- 
 rable. 
 
 Negligence need not be charged in 
 terms if the facts alleged show a prima 
 facie case of negligence : Baltimore & Ohio 
 Ry. Co. V. Kreager (1899), 61 O. St. 312, 56 
 N. E. 203 ; City of Geneva v. Burnett 
 (10O2), — Neb.— , 91 N. W. 275. " If the 
 complaint is found to be sufficient in the 
 statement of negligence in one respect, it 
 is good, as against a general demurrer, 
 even if deficient in the statement of another 
 instance of want of care ; " Hough i". 
 Grant's Pass Power Co (1902), 41 Ore. 
 .531. 69 Pac. 653. 
 
 In an action again.'st a common carrier 
 it is sufficient to allege that the goods 
 were delivered to him and were injured by 
 his default while in liis custody and care 
 as a common carrier : Lang v. Brady 
 (1900), 73 Conn. 707, 49 Atl. 199. 
 
 A complaint in an action for negligence 
 is bad which does not allege facts re- 
 quiring the inference that the negligence 
 of the defendant was the proximate cause 
 of the injury. Haltimore, etc. Ry. Co. v.
 
 FORM OF THE COMPLAINT OR PETITION. 
 
 68' 
 
 YouDg (1896), 14G IikI. 374, 45 N. E. 470 ; 
 Chicago, B. & (.1 R. R. Co. v. Kellogg 
 (IS98), 55 Neb. "48, 76 N. W. 462 ; Kelly 
 V. Town of Darlington (1893), 86 Wis. 
 432, 57 N. W. 51. 
 
 lu an action for damages based on Lord 
 Caniphell's Act, the coni])laiut must show 
 that the persons for whose benefit the suit 
 was instituted had a pecuniary interest in 
 the life of the deceased; Chicago, R. I. 
 & Pac. R. R. Co. r. Young (1899), 58 Neb. 
 678, 79 N. W. 556 ; Orgall v. Chicago, B. 
 & Q. R. R. Co. (1895), 46 Neb. 4, 64 N. W. 
 450; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Roeser (1903), 
 — Neb. — , 95 N. W. 68. But in Chicago, 
 etc. R. R. Co. V. Thomas (1900). 155 Ind. 
 634, 58 N. E. 1040, it was held that an 
 averment that decedent left surviving him 
 a wife and infant son carried with it the 
 presumption that both were entitled to his 
 services, and that such seryiceswere valu- 
 able, and a failure to allege that actu.al 
 damages were sustained was not fatal 
 against a demurrer. 
 
 It is not necessary for plaintiff to allege 
 that he has suffered pecuniary loss : Haug 
 v. Railway Co. (1898), 8 N. D. 23, 77 
 N. W. 97." 
 
 " A petition under Lord Campbell's 
 Act should disclose the names of all the 
 beneficiaries, but if the names of the sur- 
 viving minor children of the decedent who 
 were dependent upon him for support are 
 averred, the omissi(^n to allege whether or 
 not he left a widow will not render the 
 pleading bad on demurrer : " Chicago, B. 
 & Q. R. R. Co. V. Oyster (1899), 58 Neb. 1, 
 78 N. W. 359. 
 
 In the following cases the allegations 
 of negligence were passed upon by the 
 court and held sufficient or insufficient, as 
 indicated : Redford v. Spokane St. Ry. Co. 
 (1894), 9 Wash. 55, 36 Pac. 1085 (insuffi- 
 cient) ; Washington v. Spokane St. Ry. 
 Co. (1895), 13 Wash. 9, 42 Pac. 628 (suffi- 
 cient) ; Croft V. Northwestern Steamship 
 Co. (1898), 20 Wash. 175, 55 Pac. 42 
 (sufficient); Hanson i'. Anderson (1895), 90 
 Wis. 195, 62 N. W. 1055 (sufficient) ; Ean 
 V. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1897), 95 
 Wis. 70, 69 N. W. 997 (insufficient) ; 
 Borchsenius v. Chicago, St. P., etc. Ry. Co. 
 <1897), 96 Wis. 448, 71 N. W. 884 (suffi- 
 cient); Anderson v. Haves (1899), 101 Wis. 
 519, 77 N. W. 903 ("sufficient) ; City of 
 Aurora r. Cox (1895), 43 Neb. 727, 62 
 
 N. W. 66 (sufficient) ; Chicago, B. & Q. 
 Ry. Co. V. Grablin (1893), 38 Neb. 90, 56 
 N. W. 796 (insufficient to admit certain evi- 
 dence) ; liunnell v. Berlin Iron Bridge Co. 
 (1895), 66 Conn. 24, .33 Atl. 5.33 (sufficient). 
 
 It was held in Southern Ry. Co. v. 
 O'Bryan (1900), I12(Ja. 127, 37 S. E. 161, 
 that a i)laiuti£E " m.ay bring suit in the 
 county where the failure on the part of tlie 
 railroad company to discharge its duty to 
 the passenger originated, and use tlie trans- 
 actions occurring in the other counties as 
 mere matters of aggravation." And in 
 Senn v. Southern Ry. Co. (1896), 135 Mo. 
 512, 36 S. W. 367, which was an action to 
 recover for the death of a person due to 
 the negligence of a street car driver, re- 
 citals in the petition of a city ordinance 
 regulating the running of street cars and 
 prescribing the duties of those in charge 
 of them, with an allegation that the death 
 of the deceased was caused by a failure to 
 oliserve such ordinance, do not constitute 
 a separate cause of action on the violation 
 of the ordinance, but are to be considered 
 merely as affording evidence of the negli- 
 gence of the driver. 
 
 Where plaintiff predicates t'le action- 
 able negligence on which he relies on a 
 course of conduct in the progress of which 
 are several acts, all closely connected to- 
 gether, and leading up to and culminating 
 in the accident, the allegation as- to each 
 act, that it was improperly and negligently 
 done, does not make each act a separate 
 cause of action, which must be sufficient 
 in itself : Hill v. Fairhaven, etc. R. R. Co. 
 (1902), 75 Conn. 177, 52 Atl. 725. 
 
 New Promise. 
 Where an action is brought upon a new 
 promise to pay a debt barred by the statute 
 of limitations, the petition should allege 
 every fact necessary to a recovery on the 
 original liability and in addition thereto a 
 promise to pay : Meyer v. Zotel's Adm'r 
 (1895), 96 Ky. 362, 29 S. W. 28. 
 
 Non-pai/ment. 
 " Where the plaintiff has proved the 
 existence of a debt sued on — at least 
 within the period of statutory limitation, — 
 the burden of proving payment is on the 
 defendant. . . . The averment of non-pay- 
 ment, while necessary to make the com- 
 plaint perfect upon its face, need not be 
 proved by the plaintiff : " Hurley v. Ryan
 
 684 
 
 CIYIL REMEDIES. 
 
 (1902). 137 Cal. 461, 70 Pac. 292. See 
 also Hurley r. Ryan (1897), 119 Cal. 71, 
 51 Pac. 20, au<i Dodge c. Kimple (1898), 
 121 Cal. 580, 54 Pac. 94, where the want 
 of allegation.? of non-payment in actions 
 on contract for money demands, were held 
 fatal on general demurrer. See, to the 
 same effect, Stanton r. Keurick (1893), 
 135 Ind. 382, 35 N. E. 19, citing Smythe i: 
 Scott, 106 Ind. 245, Higert v. Trustees, 53 
 Ind. 326; Wheeler, etc. Co. v. Worrall, 80 
 Ind. 297; and Brickey v. Irwin, 122 Ind. 
 51. In Baldwin v. Boyce (1898), 152 Ind. 
 46. 51 X. E. 334, facts alleged were held 
 to constitute an inferential showing of 
 non-payment, and were held sufficient. 
 See also Hudelson r. First Nat. Bank 
 (1897), 51 Neb. 557, 71 N. W. 304. for an 
 excellent discussion of the subject, holding 
 tliat non-payment must be alleged, altiiough 
 payment is an affirmative defence. 
 
 Ortlimmces. 
 A municipal ordinance may be pleaded 
 by stating its substance and legal effect, 
 without referring to its title or the date of 
 its passage: Decker v. McSorley (1901), 
 111 Wis. 91, 86 N. W. 554; Moberly v. 
 Hogan (1895), 131 Mo. 19, 32 S. W. 1014; 
 Hirst /•. Kingeu Keal Estate Co. (1902), 
 169 Mo. 194, 69 S. W. 368; Seattle v. 
 Pearson (1896), 15 Wash. 575, 46 Pac. 
 1053. In Village of Fairmont v. Meyer 
 (1901), 83 Minn. 456, 86 N. W. 457, held 
 sufficient to describe the ordinance by its 
 title and date of passage. 
 
 Partneiship. 
 
 Where an action is brought in the name 
 of the partners, and it is alleged that they 
 jointly furnished the goods, it is not neces- 
 sary to allege tlie partnership : Clark r. 
 Wick (1894), 25 Ore. 446, 36 Pac. 165. 
 
 In an action by or against partners, 
 it is not necessary that the title describe 
 the parties as partners, and give the part- 
 nership name, if the facts appear in the 
 complaint : Van Brunt & Co. v. Harri- 
 gan (1895), 8 S. T). 96, 65 N. W. 421. A 
 statement in the bill of particulars that 
 plaintiff is a partnership is sufficient: 
 Biddle V. Spatz (1903), — Neb. — , 95 
 N. W. 357. 
 
 Under G. S. 1894, § 5177, an action will 
 lie against the partners by their common 
 name, though this statute does not author- 
 ize & salt to be brought 6// the partners in 
 
 their common name nor against the part- 
 nership by the common name : Dimond v. 
 Minnesota Sav. Bank (1897), 70 Minn. 298, 
 73 N. W. 182. 
 
 An allegation that a certain firm is a 
 partnership organized and doing business 
 in the State of Nebraska, is sufficient to 
 authorize carrying the action under the 
 firm name, under § 24 of the Code, and it 
 need nut be alleged that it is a Nebraska 
 firm: Chamberlin Banking Mouse v. Noyes 
 (1902), —Neb. — , 92 N. W. 175. See 
 also Winters v. Means (1897), 50 Neb. 209, 
 69 N. W. 753. 
 
 Where suit is brought in the partner- 
 ship name, under H. .S. §5011, an aver- 
 ment as to who the partners are is mere 
 surplusage : Pha-nix Ins. Co. v. Carnahan 
 (1900), 63 O. St. 258, 58 N. E. 805, citing 
 Winters v. Means, 50 Neb. 209; Dimond 
 V. Bank, 70 Minn. 298. 
 
 Passenger, Relation of. 
 An allegation in a petition against a 
 street railway company for injuries, that 
 plaintiff boarded a car witli the intention 
 of becoming a passenger, is not equivalent 
 to an allegation that he was a passenger, 
 since the law does not concern itself with 
 mere intent not evidenced by an outward 
 act: Kaming v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. 
 (1900), 157 Mo. 477, 57 S. W. 268.' See 
 also Southern Ry. Co. v. ])yson (1899), 
 109 Ga. 103, 34 S. E. 997, which holds that 
 the ticket should be set out with sufficient 
 fulness to show that plaintiff was lawfully 
 a passenger. 
 
 Penalties, Actions for. 
 A complaint in an action for a statutory 
 penalty, in the words of the statute, is suf- 
 ficient. The court said : " To test the com- 
 plaint in question in order to determine 
 whether it states a cause of action, we must 
 look to the statute creating the remedy, 
 and not to the rules under the code which 
 control pleadings in actions of common 
 law origin:" Latshaw v. State (1900), 156 
 Ind. 194, 59 N. E. 471. In .sucii an action 
 the complaint should at least contain a 
 reference to tlie statute creating and fix- 
 ing such penalty : Kirby v. Western Union 
 Tel. Co. (1894)", 6 S. D." 1, 60 N. W. 152. 
 
 Performance. 
 In an action on a contract, a complaint 
 which sets out the contract must allege
 
 FORM OF THE COMPLAINT OR PETITION. 
 
 685 
 
 plaintiff's performance of its conditions: 
 Ball r. Doud (1894), 26 Ore. 14, 37 Pac. 
 70. But a general allegation of j)erforra- 
 ance is sufficient : Culbert.son, etc. Power 
 Co. V. Wildman (1895), 45 Neb. 663, 63 
 N. W. 947. 
 
 Possession. 
 
 In an action of forcible entry and de- 
 tainer, au allegation that plaintiff was the 
 owner of the fee of the property is not a 
 sufficient allegation that plaintiff was in 
 actual possession : McGrew v. Lamb (1903), 
 31 \Vash.485, 72 Pac. 100. An allegation 
 that plaintiff and defendant were tenants 
 in common of certain property is not an 
 averment that they were in possession : 
 Sterling v. Sterling (1903), 43 Ore. 200, 72 
 Pac. 741. 
 
 An allegation " that the plaintiff is now, 
 and for more than fifteen years next prior 
 to the date of this complaint has been, the 
 owner in fee simple absolute, and in the 
 actual, notorious and open possession of 
 the following lands " (describing them), is 
 a sufficient allegation of actual possession : 
 Maggs V. Morgan (1903), 30 Wash. 604, 71 
 Pac. 188. 
 
 Quieting Title. 
 
 Plaintiff must allege that he is in actual 
 possession of the laud, the title to which 
 is sought to be quieted : Cornelisou v. 
 Foushee (1897), 101 Ky. 257, 40 S. W. 
 680. A complaint was construed in 
 Deacon v. Central la. Inv. Co. (1895), 
 95 la. 180, 63 N". W. 673, and held to 
 state a cause of action to quiet title. 
 
 Facts must be alleged showing that 
 title is m the plaintiff : Chapman v. Jones 
 (1897), 149 Ind. 4.34, 47 N. E. 1065; 
 Cooper V. Birch (1902), 137 Cal. 472, 70 
 Pac. 291. In the last case it was held 
 that an allegation that plaintiff is the 
 owner of a right to purchase is not equiv- 
 alent to an allegation that plaintiff is 
 owner of the laud. 
 
 Ratification. 
 " We are of the opinion that, when the 
 unauthorized agreement of an agent has 
 been ratified by his principal, an action 
 may be brought thereon, as though origi- 
 nally made by due authority, and that it 
 is not necessary, in the first instance, to 
 allege in the pleading the ratification, but 
 that it may be shown in proof of the 
 agreement :" Long v. Osborn (1894), 91 
 
 la. 160, 59 N. W. 14. See also Smith v. 
 Des Moines Nat. Bank (1899), 107 la. 620 
 78 N. W. 238. 
 
 Receiver, Cajiacitij of. 
 
 An averment " that said Luther Cum- 
 miugs was duly appointed and (jualified as 
 receiver of said association, and, among 
 other things, was then and there, by said 
 court, duly empowered, ordered, and di- 
 rected to collect by suit, if necessary, all 
 the claims due said association," was held 
 a sufficient averment of the authority of 
 tiie receiver to sue: Hatfield v. Cummings 
 (1898), 152 Ind. 280, 50 N. E. 217. See 
 also Hagerman v. Thomas (1901), — Neb. 
 — , 96 N. W. 631. 
 
 Where a receiver brings an action in 
 his own name, he must show by direct and 
 positive averments that leave of court to 
 iustitute and prosecute tiie action was first 
 obtained: Hatfield v. Cummings (supra). 
 See also Rhorer v. Middlesboro, etc. Co. 
 (1898), 103 Ky. 146, 44 S. W. 448. 
 
 Reformation of Written Instrument. 
 
 In a suit to reform a written instru- 
 ment, the plaintiff must set forth the 
 terms of the original agreement, and also 
 the agreement as reduced to writing, and 
 point out clearly wherein there was a mis- 
 take : Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Judy (1896), 
 146 Ind. 322, 43 N. E. 259; Osborn v. 
 Ketchum (1894), 25 Ore. 352, 35 Pac. 972; 
 Sellwood V. Henueman (1900), 36 Ore. 575, 
 60 Pac. 12. 
 
 A general averment of mistake is insuf- 
 ficient: Knox ('. Pearson (1902), 64 Kan. 
 711, 68 Pac. 613. 
 
 Replevin. 
 This action is not controlled by the or- 
 dinary rules of pleading: Woodbridge v. 
 De Witt (1897), 51 Neb. 98, 70 N. W. 
 506. As to allegations of ownership in 
 this action see subject "Title," infra, in 
 this note. Replevin is a local action and 
 the place should be alleged : Byers v. Fer- 
 guson (1902), 41 Ore. 77, 68 Pac. 5. An 
 averment of wrongful possession implies an 
 averment of right to possession : Grever 
 & Sons V. Taylor (1895), 53 0. St, 621, 42 
 N. E. 829. It is not necessary to allege a 
 right to immediate possession : Smith v. 
 Wis, Inv. Co. (1902), 114 Wis. 151, 89 
 N. W. 829. Special damages must be al-
 
 686 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 leged: Kosecrans r. Asay (189G), 49 Neb. 
 512. 68 N. W. 627; Armagost v. Rising 
 (1898), 54 Neb. 763. 75 N. W. 534. lu 
 Bridges c Thomas (1899), 8 Olila. 620, 
 58 Pac. 955. the court said : " While, un- 
 der certain conditions, replevin will lie to 
 recover possession of a building, a peti- 
 tion in replevin for the recovery of a 
 building, in order to state a good cause of 
 action, should specifically aver such a state 
 of facts as will clearly show that sucli 
 building is personal property, and that 
 the plaintiff has a right to maintain the 
 action. It is not suilicient to aver gen- 
 erally that such building is personal prop- 
 erty." Syllabus by the court. 
 
 Seduction. 
 In Anthony v. Norton (1899), 60 Kan. 
 341, 56 Pac. 529, it was lield, that under 
 the general code provisions abolisliing the 
 old system of pleading, \vith its fictions 
 and feigned issues, " a parent may main- 
 tain an action for the seduction of the 
 daughter without averment or proof of 
 loss of services or e.xpenses of sickness." 
 See also Snider i: Newell (1903), 132 N. C. 
 614, 44 S. E. 354. 
 
 Statute of Frauds, Contracts within. 
 
 It is not necessary, in suing on a cou- 
 tract within the statute of frauds, to al- 
 lege that it is in writing, as it will be 
 presumed to be written : Sowards r. Moss, 
 (1899), 58 Neb. 119, 78 N. W. 37.3 ; Dra])cr 
 V. Macon Dry Goods Co. (1898), 103 Ga. 
 661,30 S. E. 566; Bluthenthal r. Moore 
 (1898), 106 Ga. 424, 32 S. E. 344 ; Walker 
 V. Edmundson (1900), 111 Ga. 454, 36 
 S. E. 800 ; Taliaferro v. Smiley (1900), 112 
 Ga. 62, 37 S. E. 106; Sundback v. Gilbert 
 (1896), 8 S. D. 359, 66 N. W. 941 ; Kuth 
 V. Smith (1901), 29 Colo. 154,68 Pac. 278 ; 
 Kilpatrick-Koch Dry Goods Co. v. Box 
 (1896), 13 Utah, 494, 45 Pac. 629 ; Brad- 
 ford luv. Co. (.'. Joo.st (1897), 117 Cal. 
 204, 48 Pac. 1083; Suber v. Eichards 
 (1901), 61 S. C. 393, 39 S. E. .540; Mat- 
 thews V. Matthews (1897), 154 N. Y. 288, 
 48 N. E. 531 ; York Park Bldg. A.ss'n v. 
 Barnes (1894), 39 Neb. 834, 58 N. W. 440. 
 
 But see, for the contrary doctrine, 
 Lowe V. Turpie (1896), 147 Ind. 652, 44 
 N. E. 25; Horner v. McConnell (1902), 
 158 Ind. 280, 63 N. E. 472; Morgan v. 
 Wickliffc (1901), no Ky. 215, 61 S. W. 
 13 ; Graves i-. Clark (1897), 101 la. 738, 69 
 
 N. W. lOJG; Powder River Live Stock 
 Co. V. Lamb (1893), 38 Neb. 339, 56 N. W. 
 1019. 
 
 Statnl(s. 
 
 Public .statutes need not be pleaded, as 
 courts are bouml to take judicial notice of 
 them: Ervin v. State ex rel. (1897), 150 
 Ind. 332, 48 N. E. 249. But private 
 statutes must be pleaded : Nichols v. 
 Bardwell Lodge ^1898), 105 Ky. 168, 48 
 S. W. 426. 
 
 It is not necessary to formally con- 
 clude a complaint with the words, " against 
 the form of the statute in such case made 
 and provided," in case of a general stat- 
 ute : State V. Owsley (1895), 17 Mont. 94, 
 42 Pac. 105. 
 
 In McCullou<^h v. Colfax County 
 (1903), — Neb. — , 95 N. W. 29, tlie court 
 said: " Wjiere the statutes give a new 
 remedy and prescribe prerequisite condi- 
 tions, or if an action of a certain class 
 against certain parties be authori^.ed only 
 after the performance of similar condi- 
 tions, the performance of these conditions, 
 whether the right of action exists at com- 
 mon law or is created by statute, must be 
 alleged in the complaint and proved at 
 the trial. And where the )>laintiff wishes 
 to avail himself of a statutory privilege or 
 right founded upon particular facts, be 
 must state those facts in his complaint. 
 . . . Pleading the statute is .stating the 
 facts which bring the case within it, and 
 counting upon it, in the strict language 
 of pleading, is making express reference 
 to it by apt terms to show the source of 
 right relied on. ... A general averment 
 of the performance of conditions prece-- 
 dent is sufficient in case of contract, but 
 in all otiier cases the facts showing a per- 
 formance must be specially pleaded." 
 
 Stockholders, Action against. 
 
 For essential allegations see Hirshfeld 
 r. Bopp (1895), 145 N. Y. 84, 39 N. E. 
 817. 
 
 Surgeon, Qualifications of. 
 
 A veterinary surgeon, in suing for 
 services, need not allege that he was 
 licensed as a veterinary surgeon : Lyford 
 ?•. Martin (1900), 79 Minn. 243, 82 N. W. 
 479. 
 
 Tender. 
 
 In an action to restrain the colbn-lion 
 of taxes on the ground tliat thov are ex-
 
 FOKM OF TIIK COMn.AIXT OR rETlTIOX. 
 
 687 
 
 ceasive, aii allec;ation that plaintiff ten- 
 dered to the tax collector a certain amount 
 conceded by him to be due, which the col- 
 lector refused to receive, is insuflScieut 
 without a further allepjation that such 
 tender was kept good by depositing the 
 money in court: Welch v. City of Astoria 
 (1894), 26 Ore. 89, 37 Pac. 66. See, to 
 same effect, Jacobs v. Oren (1897), 30 
 Ore. .593, 48 Pac. 431. See also Angier 
 V. Equitable Bldg. Ass'n (1899), 109 Ga. 
 625, 35 S. E. 64 ; Underwood v. Tew 
 (1893), 7 Wash. 297, 34 Pac. 1100. 
 
 Time. 
 
 " Generally, the time at which a ma- 
 terial fact occurred is unimportant, and 
 therefore need not be averred. In sucli 
 cases the fact only is essential, and the 
 date of no importance ; but there are 
 cases where time is vital to the right to 
 recover, and in such exceptional cases the 
 fact is unimportant, unless cou])led with a 
 statement of the date of its occurrence. 
 In such cases it is elementary that an 
 averment of time is essential, and the 
 time must be truthfully stated : " Clyde r. 
 Johnson (1894), 4 N. D. 92, 58 N. W. 512. 
 
 For cases where it was held that the 
 time was immaterial, and need not be 
 proved as laid, see p. 569, note 1. 
 
 Title. 
 
 A general allegation of ownership is 
 sufficient as against a general demurrer : 
 Fisher v. Bouisson (1893), 3 N. D. 493, 57 
 N. W. 505; Shannon v. Grind.staff (1895), 
 11 Wash. 536, 40 Pac. 123; Reedy. 
 McRlll (1894), 41 Neb. 206, 59 N. W. 775 ; 
 Kavanaugh v. Oberfelder (1893), 37 Neb. 
 647, 56 N. W. 316 ; Bennett i: Lathrop 
 (1899). 71 Conn. 613, 42 Atl. 634; Carter 
 V. Wakenmn (1902). 42 Ore. 147, 70 Pac. 
 393 ; Hague v. Niphi Irrigation Co. (1898), 
 16 Utah, 421, 52 Pac. 765; 0.sborne & Co. 
 V. Stevens (1896), 15 Wash. 478, 46 Pac. 
 1027 ; Peoria, etc. Ry. Co. v. Attica, etc. 
 Ry. Co. (1899), 154 Ind.218, 56 N. E. 210; 
 First Nat. Bank v. Ragsdale (1900), 158 
 Mo. 668, 59 S. W. 987 ; Duzan r. Meserve 
 (1893), 24 Ore. 523, 34 Pac. 548 ; Atwater 
 V. Spalding (1902), 86 Minn. 101, 90 N. W. 
 370; McA^-thur v. Clark (1902), 86 Minn. 
 165, 90 N. W. 369. 
 
 While a plaintiff in ejectment need not 
 plead her title, if she chooses to do so she 
 
 is hound by her pleading and cannot prove 
 a title from a different source : Utassy v. 
 Giediughagcn (1895), 132 Mo. 53,33 S. W. 
 444. 
 
 An allegation that at a certain past time 
 plaintiff was the owner of certain prop- 
 erty, is not equivalent to an allegation of 
 present ownership: Ryan v. Spieth (1896), 
 18 Mont. 45, 44 Pac. 403; Irish v. Sunder- 
 haus (1898), 122 Cal. 308, 54 Pac. 1113. 
 In the last case it was held that the pre- 
 sumption of continuance is a rule of evi- 
 dence and not of pleading. 
 
 An allegation that ]daintiff owns the 
 right to purchase certain lauds is not 
 equivalent to an allegation that he is the 
 owner of the lands : Cooper v. Birch 
 (1902), 137 Cal. 472, 70 Pac. 291. In an 
 action by the indorsee of a promissory note 
 payable to order, an allegation that tiie 
 note was "sold, assigned and delivered" 
 to plaintiff w-as held sufficient to admit 
 evidence that it was indorsed to him : Red 
 River Valley Investment Co. v. Cole 
 (1895), 62 Minn. 457, 64 N. W. 1149. An 
 allegation " that the store or place of 
 business of plaintiffs is situated on" a 
 named street, held a sufficient allegation 
 of ownership .is against a general demur- 
 rer : Brunswick &. Western R. R. Co. v. 
 Hardey (1900), 112 Ga. 604, 37 S. E. 888. 
 An allegation that plaintiff " has lawful 
 title " to the described premises, is an alle- 
 gation of fact and not a conclusion : 
 Livingstone v. Ruff ( 1903), — S. C. — , 
 43 S. E. 678. An allegation that county 
 warrants were issued and delivered to a 
 certain person, is sufficient to show that 
 he is the present owner of them : Dorothy 
 V. Pierce (1895), 27 Ore. 373, 41 Pac. 668. 
 An allegation that certain land on a cer- 
 tain date " was the property of 0. D. 
 Parry," is a sufficient averment of owner- 
 ship in fee simple : Grace ;;. Ballou ( 1 893), 
 4 S. D. 333, 56 N. W. 1075. An allega- 
 tion that certain land " is held and claimed 
 by her as her own, and was so held and 
 claimed by her prior to the institution of 
 this action " is not a sufficient allegation 
 of title : DeHaven v. DeHaven's Adm'r 
 (1898), 104 Ky. 41, 46 S. W. 215. 
 
 " Where a note has passed through the 
 hands of several successive transferees, a 
 plaintiff may ignore all intermediate 
 transfers not necessary to show his title, 
 and allege a transfer by the payee directly
 
 688 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 to himself:" Crosby v. Wright (1S97), 70 
 Minn. 251, 73 N. w". 162. 
 
 Defect of title is not sufficiently alleged 
 by the statement that the grantors '' were 
 not seized in fee or possessed of the right 
 to sell and convey " the premises in con- 
 troversy : Decker v. Schulze (1895), 11 
 Wash. 47, 39 Pac. 261. 
 
 In an action on a promissory note pay- 
 able to the order of a third party, a mere 
 allegation that the plaintiff " is now the 
 owner and holder" is not a sufHcient alle- 
 gation of title in the plaintiff. The court 
 said : " We have frequently held that, 
 where a party does not attempt to set up 
 the source of his title to chattel or real 
 proi)erty, a general allegation of owner- 
 ship is sufficient, and will be deemed an 
 allegation of an ultimate fact, and not of 
 a mere conclusion of law. Bnt we have 
 never held that, if he alleged title to have 
 been in a third party, it would be sufficient 
 to then allege that he was now the owner, 
 witliout alleging a transfer from such 
 partv to himself : " Topping i-. Clay (1895), 
 62 Minn. 3, 63 N. W. 1038. 
 
 '• Where a party relies upon his title, as 
 obtained by prescription, he must allege 
 the facts showing the existence of the 
 right, or plead the prescriptive right, aver- 
 ring that the existence of the right was 
 under a claim of right, was peaceable, with- 
 out interruption, and open, notorious and 
 exclusive:" Larsen v. Onesite (1900), 21 
 Utah, 38, 59 Pac. 234 ; Coleman v. llines 
 (1902), 24 Utah, 360, 67 Pac. 1122. 
 
 The word " owner " includes any person 
 who has usufruct, control or occupation of 
 real estate, and such a person may prop- 
 erly allege himself to be the owner of the 
 property in an action of ejectment : Par- 
 ker I'. Minneapolis, etc. R. R. Co. (1900), 
 79 Minn. 372, 82 N. W. 673. 
 
 Where plaintiff in replevin relies upon 
 a special ownership, the facts showing it 
 must be alleged : II ill v. Campbell Coni- 
 mi.ssion Co. (1898), 54 Neb. .59, 74 N. W. 
 388; Raymond v. Miller (1897), 50 Neb. 
 506, 70 N. W. 22 ; Thompson & Sons Mfg. 
 Co. V. NichoUs (1897), .52 Neb. 312, 72 
 N. W. 217; Paxton v. Learn (1898), 55 
 Neb. 459, 75 N. W. 1090; Meyer v. First 
 Nat. Bank (1902), 63 Neb. 679, 88 N. W. 
 867 ; Mus.ser v. King (1894), 40 Neb. 892, 
 59 N. W. 744; Sharp i-. John.son (1895), 
 44 Neb. 105, 02 N. W. 466; Camp v. Pol- 
 
 lock (1895), 45 Neb. 771. 04 N. W. 231 > 
 Strahle r. First Nat. Bank (1896), 47 Neb. 
 319, 66 N. W. 415; Norcross r. Baldwin 
 (1897), 50 Neb. 885, 70 N. W. 511 ; Griffing 
 V. Curtis (1897), 50 Neb. 3.34, 69 N. W. 
 904; Hudelson v. First Nat. Bank (1897), 
 51 Neb. 557, 71 N. W. 304; Elliott i\ 
 First Nat. Bank (1902), 30 Colo. 279, 70 
 Pac. 421 ; Lovell v. Hammond Co. (1895), 
 66 Conn. 500, 34 Atl. 511; Kennett i\ 
 Peters (1894), 54 Kan. 119, 37 Pac. 999 ; 
 Suckstorf V. Butterfield (1898), 54 Neb. 
 757, 74 N. W. 1076; Wilson r. City Nat. 
 Bank (1897), 51 Neb. 87, 70 N. W. 501. 
 
 Under Code Civ. Pro. § 129 (similar to the 
 statutes of several other States, for which 
 see p. 438, note 2), no averment of title is 
 necessary : Pollock r. Stanton County 
 (1899), 57 Neb. 399, 77 N. W. 1081. 
 
 lu an action by a creditor to reach land 
 conveyed by one other than the debtor, on 
 the ground that the debtor owns the equi- 
 table title, the facts showing the debtor's 
 ownershi[) should be alleged : Bevins v. 
 Eisman (1900), Ky., 56 S. W. 410. 
 
 Title by adverse possession may be 
 pleaded by alleging that plaintiff " occu- 
 pied " the land for the necessary time, 
 without alleging " actual possession." Hall 
 V. Roberts (1903), Ky., 74 S. W. 199. 
 
 A petition claiming that j)laintifC is heir 
 of W. and as such entitled to certain land, 
 is insufficient unless facts are stated show- 
 ing the heirship : Craig v. Welch-IIackley 
 Coal & Oil Co. (1903), Ky., 74 S. W. 
 1097. 
 
 Trespass. 
 
 As to who may maintain an action for 
 trespass, see Casey v. Mason (1899), 8 
 Okla. 665, 59 Pac.252; Chicago, R. I. & 
 Pac. Ry. Co. v. Shepherd (1894), 39 Neb. 
 523, 58 N. W. 189. 
 
 In Meyers v. Menter (1902^, 63 Neb. 
 427, 88 N. W. 662, the allegations of the 
 petition were considered and held to state 
 a cause of action for wilful trespass. 
 
 In an action to enjoin the commission 
 of trespasses, it is not sufficient to jilead 
 the tresi)asses in general terms : Wilkeson, 
 etc. Co. 0. Driver (1894), 9 Wash. 177, 37 
 Pac. 307. 
 
 " In an action for trespass tlie plaintiff 
 may charge and prove all the circum- 
 stances accomi)anying tlie act, and which 
 were a jtart of the res (jcsUp,, in order to 
 sliow the temper and purpose with which
 
 FOKM OF THE COMPLAINT OR TETITIOX. 
 
 689 
 
 the trespass was committed, and the ex- 
 tent ol' the injury, under the rule that a 
 series of uuhxwful acts, all aimed at a sin- 
 gle result, and contributing to the injury 
 complained of, may be averred in the 
 complaint without violating the rule 
 against duplicity : " Bingham i: Lipinan 
 (1902), 40 Ore. 363, 67 Pac. 98. 
 
 Value. 
 
 Allegations of value are not considered 
 true by failure of defendant to deny them : 
 Derrick v. Cole (1894), 60 Ark. 394, 30 
 S. W. 760; Campbell v. Brosius (1893), 
 36 Neb. 792, 55 N. W. 215. 
 
 In a petition to recover the value of 
 shares of stock, an allegation that the 
 cori)oration stock "is divided into 100,000 
 shares of the par value of one dollar each," 
 is not an allegation of the value of the 
 stock: Mining Co. v. Huff (1901), 62 
 Kan. 405, 63 Pac. 442. And the allega- 
 tion "that the actual cost of making such 
 wharf was 82,745, said sum being the 
 value thereof as contemplated by the 
 contract," is not a sufficient allegation 
 of value, the words " as contemplated by 
 the contract " rendering it defective : Hart 
 Lumber Co. v. Everett Land Co. (1898), 
 20 Wash. 71, .54 Pac. 767. See also Plumb 
 V. Griffin (1901), 74 Conn. 132, 50 Atl. 1. 
 
 Waiver. 
 
 Waiver of conditions precedent must 
 he specially pleaded iu order to be avail- 
 able : Burlington Ins. Co. v. Campbell 
 (1894), 42 Neb. 208, 60 N. W. 599; An- 
 ders V. Life Ins. Co. (1901), 62 Neb. 585, 
 87 N. W. 331"; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
 Landfare (1902), 63 Neb. 559, 88 N. W. 
 779; Gillett v. Ins. Co. (1894), 53 Kan. 
 108, 36 Pac. 52; Hannan v. Greenfield 
 (1899), 36 Ore. 97, 58 Pac. 888; Long 
 Creek Bldg. Ass'n v. State Ins. Co. (1896), 
 29 Ore. 569, 46 Pac. 366 ; Closz v. Miracle 
 (1897), 103 la. 198, 72 N. W. 502; Hen- 
 sinkveld v. St. Paul, etc. Ins. Co. (1895), 
 96 la. 224, 64 N. W. 769; Heusinkveld 
 V. Capital Ins. Co. (1895), 95 la. 504, 64 
 N. W. 594. 
 
 On the other hand, it is held in some 
 States that waiver need not be pleaded, 
 but may be shown under an allegation of 
 full performance : Foster v. Fidelity, etc. 
 Co. of New York (1898), 99 Wis. 447, 75 
 N. W. 69; Stephens r. Union Assurance 
 
 Co. (1897), 16 Utah, 22, 50 Pac. 626 ; Duff 
 V. Fire As.s'n (1895), 129 Mo. 460, .30 S. W. 
 1034; James v. Mutual Life Ass'n (1899), 
 148 Mo. 1, 49 S. W. 978 ; Nickell v. Plianix 
 Ins. Co. (1898), 144 Mo. 420, 46 S. W. 435 ; 
 McCullough V. Plioenix Ins. Co., 113 Mo. 
 606 ; West v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. 
 Co. (1894), 10 Utah, 442, 37 Pac. 685. 
 
 See also Reisz v. Supreme Council 
 (1899), 103 Wi.s. 427, 79 N. W. 430, hold- 
 ing that the introduction of evidence of 
 waiver where same is not pleaded is not 
 material error. Also Deuster v. Mittag 
 (1900), 105 Wis. 459, 81 N. W. 643. 
 
 It is proper to plead a waiver as such 
 rather tium to set up the matters which 
 give rise to it by way of est()p[)el : Hughes 
 V. Lansing (1898), 34 Ore. 118, 55 Pac. 95. 
 A general allegation is sufficient if not 
 objected to seasonably : Barrett v. Des 
 Moines, etc. Ins. Co. (1903), 120 la. 184, 
 94 N. W. 473. 
 
 Wantonness. 
 
 This, as distinguished from negligence, 
 must be alleged in order to admit proof 
 of it : Holwerson v. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. 
 (1900), 157 Mo. 216, 57 S. W. 77o"; Mc- 
 Clellan v. Chippewa Valley Elec. Ry. Co. 
 (1901), 110 Wis. 326, 85 n!«W. 1018." See 
 Ullrich V. Cleveland, etc. Ry. Co. (1898), 
 151 lud. 358, 51 N. E. 95, for a full discus- 
 sion of the facts necessary to constitute a 
 good complaint on the ground of wilful 
 killing. See also Proctor v. Southern Ry. 
 Co. (1901), 61 S. C. 170, 39 S. E. 351; 
 Schumpert v. Southern Ry. Co. (1903), 
 — S. C. — , 43 S. E. 813; Stembridge r. 
 Southern Ry. Co. (1903), — S. C. — , 43 
 S. E. 968; all of which are based on the 
 act of 1898, which allows the commingling 
 in one count of acts of negligence and 
 wilful wrong. 
 
 In Stembridge v. Southern Ry. Co. 
 (1903), — S. C. — , 43 S. E. 968, the 
 court said : " A cause of action for puni- 
 tive or exemplary damages does not at all 
 consist in claiming such damages eo nomine, 
 but consists in a statement of such acts of 
 wanton or wilful wrongs as would justify 
 the imposition of such damages withiu 
 the sum demanded in the complaint." 
 
 Written Instrument. 
 
 " If the written statement was the basis 
 of the appellant's rights, as contended iu 
 his behalf, we know of no reason for ad- 
 
 44
 
 690 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 mittiug it without pleading it, either in 
 the form in which it was written, or fur 
 enforcenieut iu a reformed condition : " 
 Durrtinger v. Baker (1897), 149 Ind. 375, 
 49 N. E. 276. 
 
 " Where a contract consists of an oral 
 agreement, a part of which only has been 
 reduced to writing, it is proper to allege 
 iu the complaint, as a basis for the re- 
 covery of damages resulting from its 
 breach, the execution of a parol agree- 
 ment : " American Contract Co. f. Bullen 
 
 Bridge Co. (189G), 29 Ore. 549, 46 Pac. 
 138. 
 
 " Where the allegations in a pleading 
 vary from the provisions of the instru- 
 ment upon wiiich it is founded, the pro- 
 visions of such instrument control, and 
 such allegations will be disregarded : " 
 Citing Stengel i-. Boyce, 143 Ind. 642; 
 Harrison Bldg. Co. v. Lackey (1897), 149 
 Ind. 10, 48 N. E. 254. 
 
 See cases cited under Statute of Frauds, 
 supra, in this note.
 
 PKOVISIONS KELATINa TO THE ANSWER. 691 
 
 CHAPTER FOURTH. 
 
 THE DEFENSIVE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE ACTION: THE 
 FORMAL PRESENTATION OF HIS DEFENCE, OR OF HIS 
 CLAIM FOR AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF, BY THE DEFENDANT. 
 
 SECTION FIRST. 
 STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONCERNING MATTERS OF DEFENCE. 
 
 §472. *581. Statutory Provisions Relating to Answers. I CoUect 
 together in one group all the sections of the various codes relating 
 to the nature and contents of the answer, including denials, 
 new matter, counter-claims, set-offs, affirmative relief, and cross- 
 complaints. The clause defining the answer, and describing its 
 contents, is substantially the same, Avith some unimportant varia- 
 tions, in all the codes ; the principal, and indeed only, material 
 differences are found in the provisions relating to counter-claims 
 and cross-demands generally. The following are the sections 
 which determine generally the nature of the answer as a pleading. 
 
 " The answer of the defendant must contain, 1. A general or 
 specific denial of each material allegation of the complaint con- 
 troverted by the defendant, or of any knowledge or information 
 thereof sufficient to form a belief ; 2. A statement of any new 
 matter constituting a defence or counter-claim in ordinary and 
 concise language, without repetition." In a few States the 
 foregoing description is employed, with slight verbal changes, 
 and to it is added another subdivision. The sections, as found 
 in these codes, are given at large in the foot-note.^ 
 
 1 [^Arizona. "The defendant in his sue, (7) Denying the facts constituting 
 
 answer may plead as many defences as he the cause of acti(jn, (8) Set-off and coun- 
 
 may have; but such pleas must be sepa- ter-claiin." Rev. St., 1901, § 13.50. 
 rately stated in one answer, filed at the Arkansas. " The answer shall contain: 
 
 same time and in the following order: (1) The style of the court and the style of 
 
 (1) Denying the jurisdiction of the court, the action, followed by the word ' answer.' 
 
 (2) In abatement of the suit, (3) To But where there are several plaintiffs and 
 strike from the complaint irrelevant, re- defendants, it shall only be necessary to 
 dundant or uncertain matter, (4) To give the one first named of each class, with 
 make the complaint definite and certain, the words ' and others.' (2) A denial of 
 (5) Demurrer, (6) In bar of the right to each allegation of the complaint coutro-
 
 692 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 ^ 473. * 582. Statutory Provisions Respecting Union of Defences. 
 
 The provisions relating to the union of various defences, legal 
 
 verted by the defendant, or of any knowl- 
 edge or information tliereof, sutiicieiit to 
 form a belief. (3) A statement of any 
 new matter constituting a defence, coun- 
 ter-claim or set-off, in ordinary and concise 
 language, without repetition. (4) The de- 
 fendant may set forth in his answer ;is 
 many grounds of defence, counter-claim 
 and set-off, whether legal or equitable, as 
 he siiall have. Each shall be distinctly 
 stated in a separate paragraph, and num- 
 bered. The several defences must refer 
 to the causes of action which tliey are in- 
 tended to answer in a manner by which 
 they may be intelligibly distinguished." 
 Sand. & kill's Dig., § .')7"22. 
 
 CalifoiHin. " The answer of the de- 
 fendant shall contain: (1)A general or 
 specific denial of the material allegations 
 of the complaint controverted by the de- 
 fendant, (i) A statement of any new 
 matter cmistituting a defence or counter- 
 claim. If the complaint be verified, tlie 
 denial of each allegation controverted 
 must he specific, and be made positively, 
 or according to the information and belief 
 of the defendant. If the defendant has no 
 information or belief upon the subject suffi- 
 cient to enable him to answer an allegation 
 of the complaint, he may so state iu his 
 answer, and jilace his denial on that 
 ground. If the complaint be not verified, 
 a general denial is sufficient, but only puts 
 in issue tiie material allegations of the 
 complaint." Code Civ. Pro., § 4.37. 
 
 Colorado. " The answer of the defend- 
 ant shall contain : First, a general or 
 specific denial of each material allegation 
 in the complaint intended to be contro- 
 verted by the defendant; second, a state- 
 ment of any new matter constituting a 
 defence, or counter-claim, in ordinary and 
 concise language, without unnecessary 
 repetition. In denying any allegation in 
 the complaint not presumptively witliin 
 the knowledge of the defendant, it shall 
 be sufficient to put sucli allegations in 
 issue, for the defendant to state, as to such 
 allegation, that he has not and cannot 
 obtain sufficient knowledge or information 
 upon which to base a belief." Code, 1890, 
 § •'•)6. 
 
 Connertiad, " The defendant in his an- 
 swer shall specially deny such allegations 
 of the complaint as he intenils to contro- 
 vert, admitting the truth of the other 
 allegations, unless he intends, in good 
 faith, to ccmtrovert all the allegations, in 
 wliich case he may deny them generally, 
 as follows : ' The defendant denies the 
 truth of the matters contained in the 
 plaintiff's complaint.' He may also, iu 
 his answer, state special matters of de- 
 fence, and shall not give in evidence matter 
 in avoidance, or of defence, consistent with 
 the truth of the material allegations oftiie 
 complaint, unless in his answer he states 
 such matter specially. Under a general 
 denial the jdaiutiff shall be bound to prove 
 the material facts alleged in the complaint. 
 If the defendant intends to controvert the 
 right of the ]daiiitiff to sue as an executor, 
 or as trustee, or in any other representa- 
 tive capacity, or as a corporation, or to con- 
 trovert the execution or delivery of any 
 written instrument or recognizance sued 
 upon, he shall deny the same in his answer 
 specifically." Gen. St., 1902, § 609. 
 
 (leorijiu. "A defendant may either de- 
 mur, plead or answer to the petition, or 
 may file one or more, or all of these de- 
 fences at once, without waiving the benefit 
 of either, or he may file two or more pleas 
 to the same action. In all cases demurrer, 
 pleas and answer shall be disposed of in 
 the order named ; and all demurrers and 
 pleas shall be filed and determined at the 
 first term, unless continued by the court, 
 or by consent of parties." " In all cases 
 when the defendant desires to make a de- 
 fence by plea or otherwise he shall therein 
 distinctly answer each paragraph of plain- 
 tiff's petition, and shall not file a more 
 general denial, commonly known as the 
 plea of ' general issue.' He may in a 
 sin^rle jiaragraph deny any or all of the 
 allegations, or in a single j)aragraph admit 
 any or all of the allegations in any or all of 
 the paragraphs of the })etition." " Under 
 a denial of the allegations of tlie plaintiff's 
 declaration, no other defence is admissiblo 
 except such as disproves the ])laintiff's 
 cause of action ; all otlier matters in satis- 
 faction or avoidance must be specially
 
 rROVlSIONS RELATING TO THE ANSWER. 
 
 693 
 
 or equitable, or botli, and of various counter-claims, in the same 
 answer, are similar in all the codes, with unimportant variations, 
 
 pleaded." Code, 1895, §§ 5047, 5051, 
 5053. 
 
 Idaho. Identical with the California 
 Statute. Code Civ. Pro., I'.lOl, § 3211. 
 
 Indiana. " The an.swer .shall contain — 
 First. A denial of each allegation of the 
 complaint controverted by tlie defendant. 
 Second. A statement of any new matter 
 constituting a defence, counter-claim or 
 set-off, in plain and concise language. 
 Third. The defendant may set forth in 
 his answer as many grounds of defence, 
 counter-claim, and set-off, whether legal 
 or equitable, as he shall have. Each shall 
 be distinctly stated in a separate para- 
 graph, and numbered, and clearly refer 
 to the cause of action intended to be an- 
 swered." Burns' St , 1901, § 350. 
 
 Iowa. " The answer shall contain : 
 (1) The name of the court and county, 
 and of the plaintiffs and defendants, but 
 when there are several plaintiffs and de- 
 fendants it sliall only be necessary to give 
 the first name of each class, with the words 
 ' and others ; ' (2) A general denial of 
 each allegation of the petition, or of any 
 knowledge or information thereof sutH- 
 cient to form a belief ; (3) A special denial 
 of each allegation of the petition contro- 
 verted by the defendant, or of any knowl- 
 edge or information thereof suthcient to 
 form a belief; (4) A statement of any new 
 matter constituting a defence; (5) A .state- 
 ment of any new matter constituting a 
 counter-claim. The defendant may set 
 forth in his answer as many causes of de- 
 fence or counter-claim, whether legal or 
 equitable, as he may have. " Code, 1897, 
 § 3566. 
 
 Kansas. " The answer shall contain : 
 First, A general or specific denial of each 
 material allegation of the petition con- 
 troverted by the defendant. Second, A 
 statement of any new matter constituting 
 a defence, counter-claim or set-off, or a 
 right to relief concerning the subject of 
 the action, in ordinary and concise lan- 
 guage, and without repetition. Third, 
 When relief is sought, the nature of the 
 relief to which the defendant supposes 
 himself entitled. The defendant may set 
 forth in his answer as many grounds of 
 
 defence, counter-claim, set-off, and for re- 
 lief, as he may have, whetiier they be sucli 
 as have been heretofore denominated legal 
 or equitable, or both. Each must be sep- 
 arately stated and numbered, and they 
 must refer in an intelligible manner to the 
 causes of action wliicli they are intended 
 to answer. " Code, 1901, § 94. 
 
 Kentucki/. " The answer may contain 
 — (1) A traverse. (2) A statement of facts 
 which constitute an estoppel against, or 
 avoidance of, a cause of action stated in 
 the petition. (3) A statement of facts 
 which constitute a set-off or counter-claim. 
 (4) A cross-petition. " Code, 1895, §95. 
 
 Minnesota. " The answer of the de- 
 fendant shall contain : First. A denial of 
 each allegation of the complaint contro- 
 verted by the defendant, or of any knowl- 
 edge or information thereof sutiicient to 
 form a belief; Second. A statement of any 
 new matter constituting a defence or 
 counter-claim, in ordinary and concise lan- 
 guage, without repetition. Third. All 
 equities existing at the time of the com- 
 mencement of any action, in favor of a 
 defendant therein, or discovered to exist 
 after such commencement, or intervening 
 before a final decision in such action. 
 And if the same are admitted by the 
 plaintiff, or the issue thereon is determined 
 in favor of the defendant, he shall be en- 
 titled to such relief, equitable or other- 
 wise, as the nature of the case demands, 
 by judgment or otherwise." St., 1894, 
 §5236. 
 
 Missouri. Same as the provisions 
 quoted in the text. Rev. St., 1899, §604. 
 
 Montana. "The answer of the de- 
 fendant must contain: (1) A general or 
 specific denial of each material allegation 
 of the complaint controverted by the de- 
 fendant, or of any knowledge or informa- 
 tion thereof sufficient to form a belief, or 
 a specific admission or denial of some of 
 the allegations of the complaint, and also 
 a general denial of all the allegations of 
 the complaint not specifically admitted or 
 denied in the answer. (2) A statement 
 of any new matter constituting a defence 
 or counter-claim." Code, 1895, §690. 
 
 Nebraska. " The answer shall contain :
 
 694 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 and are as follows : " The defendant may set forth, b}- answer, as 
 many defences and counter-claims as he may have, \Yhethcr they 
 
 First — A general or specific denial of 
 each material allegation of the petition 
 controverted by the defendant. Second — 
 A statement of any new matter constituting 
 a ilefeuce, counter-claim or set-off, in or- 
 dinary and concise language, and without 
 repetition." "The defendant may set 
 forth in his answer as many grounds of 
 defence, counter-claim and set-off as he 
 may have. Each must be separately 
 stated and numbered and they must refer 
 in an intelligil)le manner to the cause of 
 action which they are intended to answer." 
 Code, 1901, §§99, 100. 
 
 Nevadn. " The answer of the defendant 
 shall contain: First — If the complaint 
 be verified, a special denial of each alle- 
 gation of the complaint, controverted by 
 the defendant, or a denial thereof accord- 
 ing tolas information and belief; if the 
 complaint be not verified, then a general 
 denial to each of such allegations ; but a 
 general denial shall only put in issue the 
 material and express allegations of tlie 
 complaint. Second — A statement of any 
 new matter or counter-claim, constituting 
 a defence, in ordinary and concise lan- 
 guage." Comp. Laws, 1900, §3141. 
 
 New York. Identical with the provis- 
 ions quoted in the text. Code Civ. Fro., 
 §500. 
 
 North Carolina. Identical with the 
 provisions quoted in the text. Code, § 100. 
 
 North Dakota. Identical with the pro- 
 visions quoted in the text. Rev. Codes, 
 1899, %:y2-3. 
 
 Ohio. " The answer shall contain — 
 (I) A general or specific denial of each 
 material allegation of the petition contro- 
 verted by the defendant. (2) A statement 
 of any new matter constituting a defence, 
 counterclaim, or set-off, in ordinary and 
 concise language. (3) When a defendant 
 seeks affirmative relief therein, a demand 
 for the relief to which he suppo.ses him.self 
 entitled." "The defendant may set forth 
 in his answer iis many grounds of defence, 
 counter-claim, and set-off as he may have, 
 whether tliey are such as have heretofore 
 ticen denominated legal or equitable, or 
 both ; but tlie several defences nmst be 
 consistent with each other, and each must 
 
 refer in an intelligible manner to the 
 cause of action which it is intended to an- 
 swer." " When tiie answer contains more 
 tlian one defence, counter-claim, or set-off, 
 they must be separately stated and consecu- 
 tively numbered." Bates' St., 1903, §§ 50GG, 
 5067, 5068. 
 
 Oklahoma. Identical with the Kansas 
 statute. St., 1893. §3972. 
 
 Oregon. " The answer of the defendant 
 shall contain, — (I) A specific denial of 
 each material allegation of the complaint 
 controverted by the defendant, or of any 
 knowledge or information thereof suffi- 
 cient to form a belief. (2) A statement of 
 any new matter constituting a defence or 
 counter-claim, in ordinary and concise lan- 
 guage without repetition." Hill's Laws, 
 §72. 
 
 South Carolina. Identical with the pro- 
 vi.sions quoted in the text. Code, 1893, 
 § ITO. 
 
 Soutli Dakota. Identical with the pro- 
 visions quoted in the text. Ann. St., 1901, 
 § 6120. 
 
 Utah. Identical with the Montana 
 statute. Rev. St., 1898, § 2968. 
 
 Washington. Identical with the pro- 
 visions quoted in the text. Bal. Code, 
 § 4912. 
 
 Wisroiixin. Identical with tlie provis- 
 ions quoted in the text. St., 1898, § 2655. 
 
 Wgoming. "The answer shall contain : 
 (1) A general or specific denial of each 
 material allegation of the petition con- 
 troverted by the defendant ^ (2) a state- 
 ment of any new matter constituting a 
 defence, counter-claim or set-off, in ordi- 
 nary and concise language." " The defend- 
 ant may set forth in his answer as many 
 grounds of defence, counter-claim and set- 
 off, as he has, whether they are such as 
 have been heretofore denominated legal or 
 e(mitab]e, or both ; he may claim therein 
 relief toucliing the matters in question in 
 the ])etition against the plaintiff, or against 
 other defendants in the same action ; ami 
 each must be separately stated and num- 
 bered, and they must refer in an intelligibh- 
 manner to the causes of action which tliey 
 are intended to answer." Rev. St., 1899, 
 §§ 3543, 3544.]
 
 PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE ANSWER. 
 
 695 
 
 be such as have been heretofore denominated legal or equitable, 
 or both. They must each be separately stated, and refer to the 
 causes of action which they are intended to answer, in such 
 manner that they may be intelligibly distinguished." Another 
 form found in several codes is, " Tlie defendant may set forth, by 
 answer, as many grounds of defence, counter-claim, or set-off, as 
 he may have, whether legal or equitable, or both." ^ 
 
 1 \^Arizona. See note to § * 581 , supra. 
 
 Arkansas. See note to § * 581, supra. 
 
 California. " The defendant may set 
 forth by answer as many defences and 
 counter-claims as he may have. They 
 must be separately stated, and the several 
 defences must refer to the causes of action 
 which they are intended to answer, in a 
 manner by which they may be intelligibly 
 distinguished. The defendant may also 
 answer one or more of the several cau.ses 
 of action stated in the complaint and de- 
 mur to the residue." Code Civ. Pro., 
 §441. 
 
 Colorado. " The defendant may set 
 forth by answer as many defences and 
 counter-claims as he may have, whether 
 the subject matter of such defences be 
 such as was heretofore denominated legal 
 or equitable, or both, they sliall be sep- 
 arately stated, and the several defences 
 shall refer to the causes of action which 
 they are intended to answer in a manner 
 by which they may be intelligibly distin- 
 guished." Code, 1890, § 59. 
 
 Connecticut. See note to § * b%l, supra. 
 Also Gen. St., 1902, § 612. These pro- 
 visions differ widely from those in most 
 of the code States ; Georgia. See note to 
 § 581, s«/)ra,- Idaho. Identical with the 
 California statute. Code Civ. Pro., 1901, 
 § 3215; Indiana. See note to § *581, 
 supra. 
 
 Iowa. See note to §*581, supra. 
 "Each affirmative defence shall be stated 
 in a distinct division of the answer, and 
 must be sufficient in itself, and must intel- 
 ligibly refer to that part of the petition to 
 which it is intended to apply." Code, 
 1897. § .3568. 
 
 Kansas. See note to § *581, supra. 
 
 Kentnckij. " (2) A pleading may con- 
 tain statements of as many causes of ac- 
 tion, legal or equitable, and of as many 
 matters of estoppel and of avoidance. 
 
 legal or equitable, total or partial ; and 
 may make as many traverses ; and may 
 present as many demurrers, as there may 
 be grounds for in behalf of the pleader. 
 
 (3) If there be more than one, eacli must 
 be distinctly stated in a separate, num- 
 bered paragraph; and either, which is 
 intended to respond to part only of an 
 adverse pleading, must show to what part 
 it is responsive. It is the duty of the 
 court, upon or without motion, to enforce 
 these provisions ; and for that purpose, to 
 dismiss an action without prejudice, or to 
 strike a pleading, or any part thereof, 
 from the case, or to allow a new pleading. 
 
 (4) If, however, a party file a pleading 
 which contains inconsistent statements, or 
 statements inconsistent with those of a 
 pleading previously filed by him in the 
 action, he shall, upon or without motion, 
 be required to elect which of them shall 
 be stricken from his pleading. But a 
 party may allege, alternatively, the ex- 
 istence of one or another fact, if he state 
 that one of them is true, and that he does 
 not know which of them is true. . . . 
 (7) A traverse is a denial, by a party, of 
 facts alleged in an adverse pleading, if 
 they be presumptively within his knowl- 
 edge ; or a denial of them, or a denial 
 that he has sufficient knowledge or infor- 
 mation to form a belief concerning them, 
 if they be not presumptively within his 
 knowledge." Code, 1895, § 113. 
 
 Minnesota. Identical, with very slight 
 verbal changes, with the California stat- 
 ute. St., 1894, § 5239. 
 
 3Iissouri. "The defendant may set 
 forth by answer as many defences and 
 counter-claims as he may have, whether 
 they be such as have been heretofore de- 
 nominated legal or equitable, or both. 
 They must each be separately stated, in 
 such manner that they may be intelligibly 
 distinguished, and refer to the cause of ac
 
 696 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 § 474. * 583. Same Subject. Most of the cocles are in substan- 
 tial agreement as to the nature and object of the counter-claim. 
 In a few, however, there is a departure from this common type ; 
 and in some there are special clauses relating to set-off as a form 
 of defence different from the counter-claim. All these statutory- 
 provisions are collected in the text or in the notes. The following 
 definition has been adopted in a majority of the States : " The 
 counter-claim mentioned in the last section must be one existing 
 in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff between whom a 
 several judgment might be had in the action, and arising out of 
 one of the following causes of action: 1. A cause of action aris- 
 ing out of the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint 
 as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected with the 
 subject of the action; 2. In an action arising on contract, any 
 other cause of action arising also on contract, and existing 
 at the commencement of the action."' The corresponding 
 sections in the codes of Indiana and of Iowa are, however, 
 quite different, and are given at length in the foot-note. It 
 will be seen that they enlarge the scope of the counter-claim, 
 
 tion which they are intended to answer." 
 Part of § 605, Rev. St., 1899. 
 
 Montana. " A defendant may set 
 forth, in his answer, as many defences or 
 counter-claims, or both, as he has, whether 
 they are such as were formerly denomi- 
 nated legal or equitable. Each defence or 
 counter-claim must be separately .stated 
 and numbered. Unless it is interposed as 
 an answer to the entire complaint, it must 
 distinctly refer to the cause of action 
 wbich it is intended to answer." Code, 
 1895, § 699. 
 
 Nebraska. See note to § *581, su/ira. 
 
 Nevada. Identical with the first two 
 sentences of the California statute. Comp. 
 Laws, 1900, § 3144. 
 
 New York. Identical with the Montana 
 statute. Code Civ. Pro., § 507. 
 
 North Carolina. Identical with the pro- 
 vision first quoted in the text. Code, § 102. 
 
 North Dakota. Identical with the pro- 
 vision first quoted in the text. Rev. Codes, 
 1899, § 5274, subdiv. 2. 
 
 Ohio. See note to § *581, supra. 
 
 Oklahoma. See note to § *581, supra. 
 
 Oretjon. Iilentical, except for very slight 
 verbal changes, with the first two sen- 
 
 tences of the California statute. Hill's 
 Laws, § 73, subdiv. 2. 
 
 South Carolina. Identical with the pro- 
 vision first quoted in the text. Code, 1893, 
 §171, subdiv. 2. 
 
 South Dakota. Identical with the pro- 
 vision first quoted in the text. Ann. St., 
 1901, § 6121, subdiv. 2. 
 
 Utah. " The defendant may set forth 
 b}' answer as many defences and counter- 
 claims, legal or equitable, or both, as he 
 may have. They must be separately 
 stated, and the several defences mnst re- 
 fer to the causes of action whicii they are 
 intended to answer in a manner by which 
 they may be intelligibly distinguished. 
 Thedefendant mayalso answer one or more 
 of the several causes of action stated in 
 the complaint and demur to the residue, 
 or may demur and answer at the same 
 time." Rev. St., 1898, § 2972. 
 
 Wnshinfjton. Identical with the pro- 
 vision first quoted in the text. Bal. Code, 
 § 4913a. 
 
 Wisconsin. Identical, except for a very 
 slight verbal change, with the provision first 
 quoted in the text. St., 1898, § 2657. 
 Wijoviing. See note to § * 581, sapra.~\
 
 PEOVISIONS EELATING TO THE ANSWER. 
 
 697 
 
 and that, in Iowa, the restriction as to parties is very much 
 inoditied. ^ 
 
 1 l^Arlzona. See Rev. St., 1901, §§ 1360, 
 13(j3, 1365, 1366, which relate to couuter- 
 claiins, but differ radically fi'oiu tiie pro- 
 visiou.s quotetl iu tlie te.xt. 
 
 Aikimsus. " Tiie counter-claim meh- 
 tioucd iu this chapter must be a cause of 
 actiou iu favor of the defendants, or some 
 of them, against the plaintiffs, or some of 
 tiiem, arising out of the contract or trans- 
 action set forth in the complaint, as the 
 foundation of the plaintiff's claim or con- 
 nected with the .subject of the action." 
 Sand. & Hill's Dig., §' 5723. 
 
 California. Identical with the provis- 
 ions ([uoted in the text. Code Civ. Pro., 
 § 438. 
 
 Colorado. " The counter-claim men- 
 tioned in the last .section .sliall be one ex- 
 isting in favor of the defendant or plaintiff, 
 and against a plaintiff or defendant be- 
 tween whom a several judgment might be 
 had in the action, and arising out of one 
 of the following causes of action : First, a 
 cause of actiou arising out of the transac- 
 tion set forth in the complaint or answer, 
 as the foundation of tlie plaintiff's claim 
 or the defendant's defence, or connected 
 with tlie subject of the action. Second 
 [|same as subdivision 2 of text]" Code, 
 1890, §57. 
 
 Connecticut. " In cases where the de- 
 fendant has either in law or in equity, or 
 in both, a counter-claim, or right of set- 
 off, agaiust the plaintiff's demand, he may 
 have the benefit of any such set-offs or 
 counter-claims by pleading the same, as 
 such, in his answer, and demanding judg- 
 ment accordingly ; and the .same shall be 
 pleaded and replied to, according to tlie 
 rules governing complaints and answers ; 
 provided that no counter-claim, set-off, or 
 defense, merely equitable, shall be available 
 in actions before justices of the peace." 
 Gen. St., 1902, § 612. 
 
 Idaho. Identical with the provisions 
 set out in the text. Code Civ. Pro., 1901, 
 § 3212. 
 
 Indiana. " A counter-claim is any mat- 
 ter ari.sing out of or connected with the 
 cause of action which might be the subject 
 of au action in favor of the defendant, or 
 whicii woulil tend to reduce the plaintiff's 
 
 claim or demand for damages." Burns' 
 St., 1901, § 353. 
 
 Iowa. " Kach counter-claim must be 
 stated in a distinct count or division, and 
 must be : (I) When the action is founded 
 on contract, a cau.se of action also arising 
 on contract, or ascertained by the decision 
 of a court; (2) A cause of action in favor 
 of the defendants, or some of them, against 
 the plaintiff's, or some of them, arising out 
 of the contracts or transactions set forth 
 in the petition or connected with the sub- 
 ject of the actiou ; (3) Any new matter 
 constituting a cause of action in favor of 
 the defendant, or all of the defendants if 
 more than one, against the plaintiff, or all 
 of the plaintiffs if more than one, and 
 which the defendant or defendants might 
 have brought when suit was commenced, 
 or which was then held, either matured or 
 not, if matured when so plead." Code, 
 1897, § 3570. 
 
 Kansas. " The counter-claim mentioned 
 in the last section must be one existing in 
 favor of a defeiuiant and against a plain- 
 tiff between whom a several judgment 
 might be had in the action, and arising 
 out of the contract or transaction set forth 
 in the petition as the foundation of the 
 plaintiff's claim, or connected with the 
 subject of the action. The right to relief 
 concerning the subject of the action men- 
 tioned in the same section must be a right 
 to relief necessarily or properly involved 
 in the action for a complete determination 
 thereof, or settlement of the question in- 
 volved therein." Code, 1901, § 94. 
 
 Kentuckij. " A counter-claim is a cause 
 of action in favor of a defendant against 
 a plaintiff, or against him and another, 
 which arises out of the contract, or trans- 
 action, stated in the petition as the foun- 
 dation of the plaintiff's claim, or which is 
 connected with the subject of the action." 
 Code, 1895, § 96. 
 
 Minnesota. Identical with the provi- 
 sions quoted in the text. St., 1894, § 5237. 
 Missouri. Identical with the provisions 
 quoted in the text. Rev. St., 1899. § 605. 
 
 Montana. " The counterclaim speci- 
 fied in the last section must tend, in some 
 way, to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's
 
 698 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 §475. * 584. Statutes Providing for Set-off. The " Set-off," well 
 known prior to the new system of procedure, and which had been 
 defined and regulated by previous statutes, English and Ameri- 
 can, is clearly embraced within the second subdivision of the sec- 
 tion, as stated in the text, and as found in the codes of New York 
 and of the States which have closely followed that original type. 
 In certain States, however, a special provision is inserted in the 
 codes defining the "set-of¥," of which the following is the common 
 form : " A set-off can only be pleaded in an action founded on 
 contract, and must be a cause of action arising on contract, or 
 
 recovery, and must he one of the following 
 causes of action against the plaintiff, or, 
 in a proper case, against the person whom 
 he represents, and iu favor of the defend- 
 ant, or of one or more defendants, between 
 •whom and the plaintiff a separate judg- 
 ment may lie had in the action. [^The re- 
 mainder practically identical with the two 
 subdivisions quoted iu the text.]" Code, 
 1895, § 691. 
 
 Nebrask-a. " The counter-claim men- 
 tioned in the last section must be one e.x- 
 istiiig in favor of a defendant, and against 
 a plaintiff, between whom a several judg- 
 ment might be had in the action, and 
 arising out of the contract or transaction 
 set forth in the petition as the foundation 
 of the plaintiff's claim, or connected with 
 the subject of the action." Code, 1901^ 
 § 101. 
 
 Nevada. Identical with the statute 
 set out in the text. Comp. Laws, 1900, 
 §3142. 
 
 New York. Identical with the Mon- 
 tana statute. Code Civ. Pro., § .'iOl. 
 
 North Carolina. Identical with the 
 statute set out in the text. § 101. 
 
 North Dakota. Identical with the stat- 
 ute set out in the text. Rev. Codes, 1899, 
 § 5274. 
 
 Ohio. " A counter-claim is a cause of 
 action existing in favor of a defendant, and 
 against a plaintiff or another defendant, or 
 both, between whom a several judgment 
 might be had in the action, and arising out 
 of the contract or transaction set forth in 
 the petition as the foundation of the plain- 
 tiff's claim, or connected with the subject 
 of the action." Bates' St., 1903. § 5069. 
 
 Oklahoma. Identical with the Kansas 
 statute. St., 1893, § 3973. 
 
 Oregon. " The counter-claim mentioned 
 in section 72 must be one existing in favor 
 of a defendant, and against a plaintiff, 
 between whom a several judgment might 
 be had in the action, and arising out of 
 one of the following causes of action : 
 (1) A cause of action arising out of the 
 contract, or transaction set forth in the 
 complaint as the foundation of the plain- 
 tiff's claim; (2) In an action arising on 
 contract, any other cau.se of action arising 
 also on contract, and existing at the com- 
 mencement of the action." Hill's Laws, 
 § 73. 
 
 South Carolina. Identical with the 
 .statute set out in the text. Code, 1893, 
 § 171. 
 
 Sonth Dakota. Identical with the stat- 
 ute set out in the text. Ann. St., 1901' 
 § 6121. 
 
 Utah. Identical with the statute set 
 out in the text. Kev. St., 1898, § 2969. 
 
 Washington. Identical with the statute 
 set out in the text. Bal. Code, § 4913. 
 
 Wisconsin. Identical with the statute 
 set out in the text, with the following 
 clauses added: "3. Where the plaintiff 
 is a non-resident of the State any cause of 
 action whatever, arising within the State 
 and existing at tlie commencement of the 
 action, except that no claim assigned to 
 the defendant shall be jdeaded by virtue 
 alone of this subdivision. But each coun- 
 ter-claim' sliall be pleaded as such and be 
 so denominated, and the answer shall con- 
 tain a demand of the judgment to which 
 the defendant supposes himself to be 
 entitled by reason of the counter-claim 
 therein." St., 1898, § 2656. 
 
 Wjiomiiiij. Identical with the Nebraska 
 statute. Rev. St., 1899, § 3545-3
 
 PKOVISIONS KELATING TO THE ANSWER. 
 
 699 
 
 ascertained by a decision of tlie court." ^ There are additional 
 special clauses in several of these codes regulating the procedure 
 in respect to " set-off " and " counter-claim," particularly in their 
 relations with the parties to the action. These sections provide 
 for the bringing in of new parties found necessary to the deter- 
 mination of the issues raised by the defendant's aflfirmative plead- 
 ing, or for the extending the benefits of a set-off or counter-claim 
 existing in favor of a principal debtor, to his sureties, or existing 
 in favor of one of two or more joint debtors, to the others. These 
 sections are copied in the note.^ 
 
 1 {^Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., 
 § 5725; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 351 : 
 " A set-off .shall be allowed only in actions 
 for money -demands upon contract, and 
 must consist of matter arising out of debt, 
 duty, or contract, liquidated or not, held 
 by the defendant at the time the suit was 
 commenced, and matured at or before the 
 time it is offered as a set-off; " Kentucky, 
 Code, 1895, § 96, subdiv. 2 : "A set-off 
 is a cause of action arising upon a con- 
 tract, judgment or award in favor of a 
 defendant against a plaintiff, or against 
 him and another ; and it cannot be 
 pleaded except iu an action upon a con- 
 tract, judgment or award ; " Kansas, 
 Code, 1901, § 98; Nebraska, Code, 1901. 
 § 104; Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, § 5071 : " A 
 set-off is a cause of action e.xisting in favor 
 of a defendant, and against a plaintiff, be- 
 tween whom a several judgment miglit be 
 had in the action, and arising on contract 
 or ascertained by the decision of a courti 
 and can only be pleaded iu an action 
 founded on contract." Oklahoma, St., 1893, 
 § 3976 ; Wisconsin, St., 1898, §§4258-4264, 
 where the subject of set-off is treated 
 •with considerable detail ; Wyoming, Rev. 
 St., 1899, § 3548.] 
 
 ^ \_Arkansas. " When it appears that 
 a new party is necessary to a final decision 
 upon the counter-claim, the court may 
 either permit the new party to be made 
 by a summons, to reply to the counter- 
 claim in the answer, or may direct that it 
 be stricken out of the answer and made 
 the subject of a separate action." Sand. & 
 Hill's Dig., § 5724. " Where it appears 
 that a new party is necessary to a final 
 decision upon the set off, the court shall 
 
 permit the new party to be made, if it also 
 appears that, owing to the insolvency or 
 non-residence of the plaintiff, or other 
 cause, the defendant will be iu danger of 
 losing his claim, unless permitted to use it 
 as a set-off." § 5729. 
 
 Indiana. " In all actions upon a note 
 or other contract against several defend- 
 ants, any one of whom is principal and 
 the others sureties tlierein, any claim u])on 
 contract in favor of the principal defend- 
 ant, and against the plaintiff or any former 
 holder of the note or other contract, may 
 be pleaded as a set-off by the principal or 
 any other defendant." Burns' St., 1901, 
 § 352. 
 
 Iowa. " When a new party is necessary 
 to a final decision upon a counter-claim, 
 the court may either permit such party to 
 be made, or direct that it be stricken out 
 of the answer and made the subject of a 
 separate action : " Code, 1897, § 3573. " A 
 co-maker or surety, when sued alone, may, 
 with the consent of his co-maker or prin- 
 cipal, avail himself by way of counter- 
 claim of a debt or liquidated demand due 
 from the plaintiff at the commencement 
 of the action to such co-maker or prin- 
 cipal, but the plaintiff may meet such 
 counter-claim in the same way as if made 
 by the co-maker or principal himself : " 
 Code, § 3572. 
 
 Kansa.f. Code, 1901, §§ 97, 99, iden- 
 tical, respectively, to the Arkansas statutes, 
 §§ 5724, 5729. 
 
 Montana. The provisions of this code, 
 
 which were taken from the New York 
 
 Code of Civil Procedure, are very detailed 
 
 respecting counter-claims. See §§ 692-697. 
 
 Nebraska. Code, 1901, §§ 103, 105.
 
 700 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 476. * 585. Statutory Provisions as to Cross-Complaints and 
 Sham Answers. A cross-petitioii or complaint is expressly au- 
 thorized and its purposes defined [in several of the State codes] ;^ 
 as, for example, in that of Iowa. A section found in most of the 
 codes provides that " sham and irrelevant answers and defences 
 may be stricken out on motion, and upon such terms as the court 
 may in their discretion impose." ^ 
 
 identii-al, respectively, to the Arkansas 
 statutes, §§ 5724, 5729. 
 
 Aeic Yurk. See Code Civil Procedure, 
 §§ 502-506, for very detailed statutory 
 provisions relative to counter-claims. 
 
 Ohio. Bates' St., §§ 5070, 5072, iden- 
 tical, respectively, except for sli<^ht verbal 
 ciianges, with the Arkansas statutes, 
 §§ 5724, 5729. 
 
 Oklahoma. St., 1893, §§ 3975, 3977, 
 identical, respectively, except for a slight 
 verbal change in the former, with the 
 Arkansas statutes, §§ 5724, 5729. 
 
 Wisconsin. See St., 1898, §§ 4258- 
 4264, for detailed statutory provisions 
 relative to set-off. J 
 
 1 \_Arkansiis. " When a defendant has 
 a cause of action against a co-det'eudaut or 
 a person not a party to tlie action, and 
 affecting the suhjectinatter of the action, 
 he may make his answer a cross-complaint 
 against the co-defendant or other person." 
 Two other subdivisions provide how the 
 defendant to such cross-coin])laint shall 
 be summoned, how defence shall be made 
 thereto, and that the trial shall not be 
 delaved thereby. Sand. & Hill's Dig., 
 § 5712. 
 
 California. " Whenever the defendant 
 seeks affirmative relief against any party 
 relating to or depending upon the contract 
 or transaction upon which the action is 
 brought, or affecting the property to whicii 
 the action relates, he may, in addition 
 to his answer, file at the same time, or 
 by permission of the court subsequently, 
 a cross-complaint. The cross-complaint 
 must be served upon the parties affected 
 thereby, and such parties may demur or 
 answer thereto as to the original com- 
 plaint." Code Civ. Pro , § 442. 
 
 Idaho. Identical with the California 
 statute. Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3216. 
 
 Iowa. " When a defendant has a cause 
 of action affecting tlie subject-matter of 
 the action against a co-defendant, or a 
 
 person not a party to the action, he may, 
 in the same action, file a cross-petition 
 against the co-defendant or other person." 
 The remainder of the section provides for 
 notifying the defendants, and that the 
 trial shall not be delayed. Code, 1897, 
 § 3574. 
 
 Kentackij. " A cross-petition is the 
 commencement of an action by a defend- 
 ant against a co-defendant, or a person 
 who is not a party to the action, or against 
 both; or by a ])laiutiff against a co-plain- 
 tiff, or a person who is not a party to the 
 action, or against both ; and is not allowed 
 to a defendant, except uj)oii a cause of ac- 
 tion which affects, or is affected by, the 
 original cause of action ; nor to a plaintiff 
 except upon a cause of action which affects, 
 or is affected by, a set-off or counter-claim." 
 Code, 1895, § 96, subdiv. 3. 
 
 Utah. " When a defendant has a cause 
 of action affecting the sulijec^-inatter of 
 the action against a co-defendant, he may, 
 in the same action, file a cross-complaint 
 against the co-defendant." The remainder 
 of the section provides for serving the de- 
 fendant and that the trial shall not be 
 delayed. Kev. St., 1898, § 2974. 
 
 Wiisconsin. " A defendant or a per- 
 son interpleaded or intervening may have 
 affirmative relief ag;uust a co-defendant, 
 or a co-defendant and the plaintiff, or a 
 part of the plaintiffs, or a co-defendant and 
 a person not a party, or against such per- 
 son alone, upon his being brought in ; but 
 in all such cases such relief must involve 
 or in some manner affect the contract, 
 transaction, or property whicli is the sub- 
 ject-matter of the action. Such relief may 
 be demanded in the answer, which must 
 be served upon the ])arty," etc., providing 
 rules of practice in respect thereto. St., 
 1898, § 2656 a.] 
 
 2 New York, § 152 (.538) ; Oregon, § 74 ; 
 California, § 453; North Carolina. § 104; 
 l^.Vrizona, Kev. St., 1901, §1355; Colo-
 
 PKOV-ISIONS RELATING TO THE ANSWER. 701 
 
 § 477. * 586. Statutes Allowing Demurrer to Entire Answer or 
 to Separate Defence or Counter-Claim. All the codes permit the 
 plaintiff to demur to the entire answer, or to any separate defence, 
 therein containing new matter, or to any counter-claim therein, on 
 the ground that the same is insufficient, or that the facts therein 
 stated do not constitute a defence or a counter-claim.^ 
 
 § 478. * 587. Code Provisions Respecting Reply. In respect to 
 the mode of raising an issue of fact upon the allegations of the 
 answer which are not mere denials, the codes are .separated into 
 two classes, — those which require an additional pleading by the 
 plaintiff in order to raise such issues in all instances, and those 
 which require such additional pleading only in response to counter- 
 claims. In the first class, a reply by the plaintiff is needed to all 
 answers or defences that set up new matter, whether as counter- 
 claims or as defences simply, which reply may consist either of 
 denials or of other new matter by way of avoidance. As a conse- 
 quence of this requirement, every allegation of new matter in the 
 answer, whether by way of defence or of counter-claim, not contro- 
 verted by a reply, is, in such States, admitted to be true. The reph^ 
 is the last pleading of fact ; the defendant may demur to it, but not 
 rejoin any defence of fact. ^ 
 
 rado, Code, 1890, § 60 ; Idaho, Code Civ. 1893, § 174 ; South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, 
 
 Pro., 1901, § 3224; Indiana, Burns' St., §6124; Utah, Rev. St., 1898, §§ 2976, 
 
 1901, § 385, in quite different form; Iowa, 2977; Washington. Bal. Code, § 4916; 
 
 Code, 1897, § 3618 ; Kentucky, Code, 189.5, Wisconsin, St., 1898, §§ 2658, 2659; Wy- 
 
 § 113, subdiv. 8; Minnesota, St., 1894, oming. Rev. St., 1899, §§ 3.541, 3542.] 
 
 § 5240; Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, § 611; 2 ["Colorado, Code, 1890, §60; Connecti- 
 
 Montana, Code, 1895, § 742; North Da- cut. Gen. St., 1902, § 610 ; Indiana, Burns' 
 
 kota. Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5276; South St., 1901, § 360 ; Iowa, Code, 1897, § 3576. 
 
 Carolina, Code, 1893, § 173 ; Soutli Da- requires a reply in case of counter-claim, 
 
 kota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6123; Utah, Rev. and also when plaintiff wishes to avail him- 
 
 St., 1898, § 2987 ; Washington, Bal. Code, self of matter in avoidance ; Kansas, Code, 
 
 § 4915 ; Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2682.] 1901, § 4536; Kentucky, Code, 189.5, § 98; 
 
 1 New York, § 153 (494, 514, 516); Minnesota, St., 1894, §5241; Missouri, 
 
 Kansas, §102; Nebraska, § 109 ; Oregon, Rev. St., 1899, §607; Nebraska, Code, 
 
 § 76: California, §§ 443, 444; North 1901, §109; New York, Code Civ. Pro., 
 
 Carolina, §§ 105, 176 ; [^Arkansas, Sand. §§514,516, provides for a reply in case 
 
 & Hill's Dig., § 5730 ; Colorado, Code, of a counter-claim and also, in the discre- 
 
 1890, § 60; Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, tion of the court, on defendant's applica- 
 
 §§ 3217, 3218; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, tion, where new matter in defence is set 
 
 §360; Iowa, Code, 1897, §3575; Minne- up in the answer; North Dakota, Rev. 
 
 sota, St., 1894, § 5241 ; Missouri, Rev. St., Codes, 1899, § 5277, .same as New York ; 
 
 1899, § 607 ; Montana, Code, 1895, § 710 ; North Carolina, § 105, same as New York ; 
 
 Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, §3145; North Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, § 5078; Oklahoma, 
 
 Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5277; Ohio, St., 1893, §3980; Oregon, Hill's Laws, § 76; 
 
 Bates' St., 1903, §§ 5076, 5077 ; Oklahoma, South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 174, same 
 
 St., 1893, § 3980; South Carolina, Code, as New York; South Dakota, Ann. St.,
 
 702 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 § 479. * 588. Same Subject. Ill the secoiicl class of codes, a 
 reply is only necessary to a comiter-claim, ^Vlienever an answer 
 contains new matter by way of defence, and not constituting a 
 counter-claim, an issue of fact is raised by operation of law, and 
 the plaintiff may prove, in response thereto, any facts by way of 
 denial or of confession and avoidance. If a counter-claim is 
 pleaded, the plaintiff must reply thereto either by denials or by 
 confession and avoidance ; and in the absence of such reply, the 
 allegations of the counter-claim are admitted to be true. Xo plead- 
 ing is permitted in response to the reply except a demurrer, which 
 mav be used to raise an issue of law.^ 
 
 1901, §6124, same as New York; "Wash- 
 ingtou, Bal. Code, § 4917 ; Wyoraiug, Rev. 
 St., 1899, §3553. 
 
 Cases Concerning these Provisions. 
 
 See Nat. Lumber Co. v. Ashby (1894), 
 41 Neb. 292, 59 N. W. 913; Burnet v. 
 Cavanagh (1898), 56 Neb. 190, 76 N. W. 
 578; Peaks -•. Lord (1894), 42 Neb. 15, 
 60 N. W. 349; Sullivan v. Traders' Ins. 
 Co. (1901), 169 N. Y. 213, 62 N. E. 146; 
 Solt V. Anderson (1901), 62 Neb. 153, 86 
 N. W. 1076 ; Grant v. Bartholomew (1S99), 
 57 Neb. 673, 78 N. W. 314 ; Beagle v. 
 Smith (1897), 50 Neb. 446, 69 N. W. 956; 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Bachelder (1894), 39 
 Neb. 95, 57 N. W. 996 ; Mollyneaux v. 
 Wittenberg (1894), 39 Neb. 547*, 58 N. W. 
 205; Meeh v. Railway Co. (1900), 61 Kan. 
 630, 60 Pac. 319 ; Davis v. Crookston, etc. 
 Co. (1894), 57 Minn. 402, .59 N. "W. 482; 
 Smith V. L. & N. R. R. Co. (1893), 95 Ky. 
 11, 23 S. W. 652; Stapleton v. Ewell 
 (1900), Ky., 55 S. W. 917 ; Girard v. St. 
 Louis Car Wheel Co. (1894), 123 Mo. 
 358, 27 S. W. 648; Wade v. Strever 
 (1901), 166 N. Y. 251, 59 N. E. 825 ; Kear- 
 ney Stone Works c . McPherson (1894), 
 5 Wyo. 178, 38 Pac. 920 ; Sexton v. Shriver 
 (1903), — Neb. — , 95 N. W. 594; Hib- 
 bard v. Trask (1903), — Ind. — , 67 
 N. E. 179.] See Kimberlin v. Carter, 49 
 Ind. HI; Payne v. Briggs, 8 Neb. 75 ; 
 Scofield V. State Nat. Bk. of Lincoln, 9 
 id. 499; Williams v. Evans, 6 id. 216; 
 Ridenour v. Mayo, 29 Ohio St. 138 ; Titus v. 
 Lewis, 33 id. .304 ; Hixon y. Gurge, 18 Kan. 
 253; Netcott v. Porter, 19 id. 131 ; Kirk 
 V. Woodbury Cy., 55 Iowa, 190; Clapp 
 V. Cunningham, 50 id. 307 ; Cassidy v. 
 
 Caton, 47 id. 22; Davis v. Payne, 45 id. 
 194. 
 
 1 [Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5732 ; 
 California provides for no reply in any 
 case. Code Civ. Pro., § 422 ; Idalio provides 
 for no reply in any case. Code Civ. Pro.. 
 1901, §3202; Iowa, Code, 1897, §3576, 
 requires a reply in case of counter-claim 
 and also when plaintiff wishes to avail 
 himself of matter in avoidance; Montana, 
 Code, 1895, §720; Nevada provides for 
 no reply in any case, Comp. Laws, 1900, 
 § 3133 ; New York, Code Civ. Pro., §§514, 
 516, provides for a reply in case of coun- 
 ter-claim and also, in the discretion of 
 court, on defendant's application, where 
 new matter in defence is set up in the an- 
 swer; North Carolina, § 105, same as New 
 York; North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, 
 § 5277, same as New York ; South Caro- 
 lina, Code, 1893, § 174, same as New York ; 
 South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6124, same 
 as New York; Utah, Rev. St., 1898, 
 § 2980; Wi-scousiu, St., 1898, § 2661. 
 
 Cases Concerning these Provisions. 
 
 See Sterling v. Smith (1893), 97 Cal. 
 343, 32 Pac. 320 ; Alspaugh v. Reid ( 1 898), 
 6 Idaho, 223, 55 Pac. 300; Higley v. Bur- 
 lington, etc. Ry. Co. (1896), 99 la. 503, 68 
 N. W. 829 ; O.skaloosa St. Ry. Co. v. Oska- 
 loosa (1896), 99 la. 496, 68 N. W. 808; 
 Kinkead v. McCormick, etc. Co. (1S98), 
 106 la. 222, 76 N. W. 663; Ashland v. 
 W. C. R. R. Co. (1902), 114 Wi.s. 104, 89 
 N. W. 888; Babcock v. Maxwell (1898), 
 21 Mont. 507, 54 Pac. 943; Cornwall v. 
 McKinney (1896), 9 S. D. 213, 68 N. W. 
 3.33; Levister v. Railway Co. (1899). 56 
 S. C. 508, 35 S. E. 207 ; Stubbs v. Motz
 
 PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE ANSWER. 
 
 7o: 
 
 § 480. * 589. Miscellaneous Statutory Provisions. Tlie fore- 
 going is the genenil scheme of pleading as set forth, with sHght 
 
 (1893), 113N. C. 4.58, 18S. E. 387; Askew 
 V. Koonce (1896), 118 N. C. 526, 24 S. E. 
 218;" James v. Western N. C. R. li. Co. 
 (1897), 121N. C.530, 28S. E. .537; Strause 
 V. Ins. Co. (1901), 128 N. C. 64, 38 S. E. 
 256; Parno v. Iowa, etc. Ins. Co. (1901), 
 114 la. 132, 86 N. W. 210; Parsons v. 
 Grand Lodge, etc. (1899), 108 la. 6, 78 
 N. W. 676 ; Trezona v. Chicago, etc. Ry. 
 Co. (1898), 107 la. 22, 77 N. W. 486; 
 Rowe V. Barnes (1897), 101 la. 302, 70 
 N. W. 197; Runkle v. Hartford Ins. Co. 
 (1896), 99 la. 414, 68 N. W. 712; Smith 
 V. Griswold (1895), 95 la. 684, 64 N. W. 
 624 ; Nichols v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. 
 (1895), 94 la. 202, 62 N. W. 769; Schulte 
 V. Coulthurst (1895), 94 la. 418, 62 N. W. 
 770; McQuade v. Collins (1894), 93 la. 22, 
 61 N. W. 213 ; Brown v. Baker (1901), 39 
 Ore. 66, 65 Pac. 799 ; Sims v. Mutual Fire 
 Ins. Co. (1899), 101 Wis. .586, 77 N. W. 
 908; 'Coleman v. Perry (1903), 28 Mont. 
 — , 72 Pac. 42. 
 
 General Rules as to Reply. '■ 
 It is not the office of a reply to intro- 
 duce a new cause of action: Merrill v. 
 Suing (1902), — Neb. — , 92 N. W. 618; 
 Plummer, Perry & Co. v. Rohman (1900), 
 61 Neb. 61, 84 N. W. 600; Wigton v. 
 Smith (1895), 46 Neb. 461, 64 N. W. 1080; 
 Piper V. Woolman (1895), 43 Neb. 280, 61 
 N. W. 588; Collins v. Gregg (1899), 109 
 la. 506, 80 N. W. 562 ; Ellis v. Soper ( 1 900), 
 110 la. 631, 82 N. W. 1041; Olmstead c. 
 City of Raleigh (1902), 130 N. C. 243, 41 
 S. E. 292; Osten v. Winehill (1894), 10 
 Wash. 333,38 Pac. 1123. 
 
 New matter in a reply constituting a 
 departure will be stricken out on motion : 
 Merrill v. Suing (1902), — Neb. —, 92 
 N. W. 618; Maddox f. Teague (1896), 18 
 Mont. 512, 46 Pac. 535 ; Hunt v. Johnston 
 (1898), 105 la. 311, 75 N. W. 103; Wil- 
 liams V. Ninemire (1901), 23 Wash. 393, 63 
 Pac. 534; Snyder v. Johnson (1903), — 
 Neb.— ,95 N. W. 692. The objection 
 may be raised by demurrer : Brown v. 
 Baker (1901 ), 39 Ore. 66, 65 Pac. 799. 
 
 But a departure may be waived : Farm- 
 ers' & Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Dobney 
 (1901 ), 62 Neb. 213, 86 N. W. 1070 ; Con- 
 
 solidated Kansas City, etc. Co. v. Osborne 
 (1903), — Kan. — , 71 Pac. 838; Asplund v. 
 Mattsou (1896), 15 Wash. 328, 46 Pac. 
 341 ; Gregory c. Kaar (1893), 36 Neb. .533, 
 54 N. W. 859. Or it may be avoided by 
 an amendment of the complaint : Whitney 
 V. Priest (1901), 26 Wasli. 48, 66 Pac. 108. 
 
 As to what constitutes a departure, see 
 Shaw V. Jones (1900), 156 Ind. 60, 59 
 N. E. 166; Wilcke i'. Wilcke (1897), 102 
 la. 173, 71 N. W. 201 ; Hunt v. Johnston 
 (1898), 105 la. 311, 75 N. W. 103 ; Minne- 
 apolis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. (1896), 
 64 Minn. 61, 66 N. W. 132 ; James v. City 
 of St. Paul (1898), 72 Minn. 138, 75 N. W. 
 5; Hoxsie v. Kempton (1899;, 77 Minn. 
 462, 80 N. W. 353 ; Van Bibber f. Fields 
 (1894), 25 Ore. 527, 36 Pac. 526; Mayes v. 
 Stephens (1901), 38 Ore. 512, 63 Pac. 760; 
 Crown Cycle Co. v. Brown (1901), 39 Ore. 
 285, 64 Pac. 451 ; Hammer v. Downing 
 (1901), 39 Ore. 504, 64 Pac. 651 ; Kiernan 
 V. Kratz (1902), 42 Ore. 474, 69 Pac. 1027; 
 Orient Ins. Co. v. Clark (1900), Ky., 59 
 S. W. 863 ; Massillou Engine & Thresher 
 Co. V. Carr (1903), Ky., 71 S. W. 859; 
 Coombs Commission Co. v. Block (1895), 
 130 Mo. 668, .32 S. W. 1139; St. Joseph 
 Union Depot Co. v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. 
 (1895), 131 Mo. 291, 31 S. W. 908; Com. 
 Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Tacoma (1897), 
 17 Wash. 661, 50 Pac. 592 ; Ross v. Howard 
 (1901), 25 Wash. 1, 64 Pac. 794 ; McCorkle 
 V. Mallory (1903), 30 Wash. 632, 71 Pac. 
 186; Dudley v. Duval (1902), 29 Wash. 
 528, 70 Pac. 68; Browu v. Baruch (1901), 
 24 Wash. 572, 64 Pac. 789; Fulton v. 
 Ryan (1900), 60 Neb. 9, 82 N. W. 105; 
 Foley V. Holtry (1894), 43 Neb. 133, 61 
 N. W. ] 20 ; Union Casualty & Surety Co. 
 V. Bragg (1901 ), 63 Kan. 291, 65 Pac. 272 ; 
 Johnson v. Bank (1898), 59 Kan. 250, 52 
 Pac. 860; Rainsford ;>. Massengale (1893), 
 5 Wyo. 1, 35 Pac. 774; Union St. Ry. Co. 
 V. First Nat. Bank (1903), 42 Ore. 606, 72 
 Pac. 586; Childs Lumber Co. v. Page 
 (1902), 28 Wash. 128, 68 Pac.373; Gleckler 
 V. Slavens (1894), 5 S. D. 364, 59 N.W. 323. 
 
 The reply may be waived by proceed- 
 ing to trial as though it had been filed : 
 Killmanr. Gregory (1895), 91 Wis. 478, 65 
 N. W. 53 ; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Palmer
 
 704 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 variations of form, and with no real variations of principle, in 
 all the codes. A few additional provisions are found in some of 
 the codes which do not in any manner affect the common theory, 
 but which were evidently inserted for purposes of exactness, or 
 to put at rest some doubts as to the construction of the statute. 
 These clauses I have collected in the note.^ 
 
 § 481. * 590. Liberality of the Codes in Furtherance of Justice. 
 While the very central principle of the reformed ^jrocedure is, 
 that all causes of action, and all defences, except those of 
 general denial, must be specially pleaded, — that is, pleaded 
 in accordance with the actual facts, — and while, as a neces- 
 sary consequence, there must be . an agreement between the 
 facts proved and the facts alleged, yet the codes are careful to 
 prevent any failure of justice by reason of a mere failure to 
 comply with this rule. Ample means of correcting mistakes are 
 
 (1898), 55 Neb. 559, 76 N. W. 169; Mer- 
 chants' Nat. Bauk v. Barlow (1900), 79 
 Minn. 2.34, 82 N. W. .364 ; Lvford v. Mar- 
 tin (1900), 79 Minn. 243, 82 N. W 479; 
 Minard v. McBee (1896), 29 Ore 225, 44 
 Pac. 491 ; North St. Louis Bl.lo-. Ass'n v. 
 Obert (1902), 169 Mo. 507, 69 S. W. 1044; 
 Ferguson v. Davidson (1899), 147 Mo. 664, 
 49 S. VV. 879 ; Turner r. Burler (1894), 126 
 Mo. 131, 28 S. W. 77 ; Chicago, R. L & 
 Pac. Rv. Co. r. Frazier (1903), — Kan. —, 
 71 Pac. 831; Elder v. Webber (1902), — 
 Neb. — , 92 N. W. 126. 
 
 Complaint and repl_v are to be construed 
 too;ether when not repugnant : Molino v. 
 Blake (1898), Ariz., 52 Pac. 366. A bad 
 reply is good enough for a bad answer : 
 Peden v. Cavins (1892) 134 Ind. 494, 34 
 N. E. 7. It is not error to strike out so 
 much of a reply as has already been al- 
 leged in the petition : West v. West 
 (1898), 144 Mo. 119. 46 S. W. 139. In 
 Connecticut a pleading entitled a " Reply 
 and demurrer " may be filed, raising issues 
 of law as to part of a defence and issues 
 of fact as to the residue : Church r. Pearne 
 (1 903 ), 75 Conn. 350, 53 Atl. 955. See Davis 
 V. Ford (1896), 15 Wa.sh. 107, 45 Pac. 739, 
 for a reply which was held to constitute 
 what at common law was designated a new 
 assignment.] See Johnson v. White, 6 
 Hun,. 587; Dambman v. Schulting, 4 id. 
 50 ; Claflin v. Taussig, 7 id. 223 ; Metrop. 
 L. Ins. Co. V. Meeker, 85 N. Y. 614; 
 
 Colton L. & W. Co. V. Raynor, 57 CaL 
 
 588. 
 
 1 Missouri, R. S., 1899, § 613: '' Dnpli- 
 cili/ is a substantial objection to the peti- 
 tion or other pleading, and shall, on motion, 
 be stricken out." § 624 : " In all actions 
 founded on contract, and instituted 
 against several defendants, the plaintiff 
 shall not be nonsuited by reason of his 
 failure to prove that all the defendants 
 are parties to the contract, but may have 
 judgment against such of tliem as he shall 
 prove to be parties thereto." Kansas, 
 § 104 : " When the answer contains new 
 matter constituting a right to relief against 
 a co-defendant, concerning the subject of 
 the action, such co-defendant may demur 
 or reply to such matter in the same man- 
 ner as if he were plaintiff, and subject to 
 the same rules so far as applicable." 
 Iowa, § 3578 : " Any number of defences, 
 negative or affirmative, an; pleadable to 
 a counter-claim ; and each affirmative mat- 
 ter of defence in the reply shall be suffi- 
 cient in itself, and must intelligibly refer 
 to tlie part oi the answer to which it is 
 intended to apply." Indiaiui. § 359 : " All 
 defences, except the mere denial of the 
 facts alleged by the plaintiff, shall be 
 pleaded specially." §380: " Under a mere 
 denial of any allegation, no evidence shall 
 be introduced which does not tend to 
 negative what the party making the alle- 
 gation is bound to prove."
 
 GENERAL REQUISITES OF THE ANSWER. 705 
 
 provided. Tlie utmost liberality in this respect runs through 
 them all, and the provisions are the same in substance, and 
 almost identical in language. As these clauses apply alike to 
 the pleadings by the plaintiff and by the defendant, they have 
 already been stated in the preceding chapter.' 
 
 § 482. * 591. Outline of Treatment of Code Theory of Defence. 
 Upon the basis of the foregoing citations, I am prepared to pre- 
 sent the theory of the defence as formulated in tlie codes, and as 
 w^rought out by the judicial interpretation thereof. The funda- 
 mental principles of pleading adopted by the reformed American 
 system, and applicable alike to the allegations made by the plain- 
 tiff and by the defendant, have already been discussed in the 
 preceding chapter; and I shall, therefore, confine myself to 
 matters purely defensive. Following an order suggested alike 
 by the mode of arrangement pursued in the statute, and by the 
 logical development of the subject-matter itself, the chapter will 
 be separated into sections, which will treat respectively, I.. Of 
 the general requisites of an answer, and of the general rules 
 applicable to all answers; II. Of answers or defences consist- 
 ing of denials either general or specific; III. Of answers or 
 defences consisting of new matter; IV. Of the union of differ- 
 ent defences, whether legal or equitable, in one answer; V. Of 
 counter-claims, and other affirmative relief. - 
 
 SECTION SECOND. 
 
 THE GENERAL REQUISITES OF AN ANSVfER, AND THE GENERAL 
 RULES APPLICABLE TO ALL ANSWERS. 
 
 § 483. * 592. Introductory. Before examining the different 
 kinds of defence possible under the codes, and the particular 
 rules relating to each, I shall state and explain the few doc- 
 trines and rules which apply to all forms of answer, and which 
 have not been already embraced in the discussion of the general 
 principles of pleading contained in the preceding chapter. There 
 are a few doctrines, practical rather than theoretical, pertaining 
 to the answer considered as an independent pleading, which 
 should be investigated before proceeding with the mass of detail 
 which will make up the bulk of the present chapter. 
 
 1 Supra, § * 435. 
 45
 
 706 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 § 484. * 593. Tw^o Kinds of Ans-wer — Denials and New Matter. 
 Answers are separated by the codes into two classes, — those 
 which consist of denials, and therefore serve the sole purpose 
 of raising a direct issue upon the plaintiff's allegations ; and 
 those which state what the codes call "new matter," — that is, 
 facts different from those averred by the plaintiff, and not em- 
 braced within the judicial inquiry into their truth. The latter 
 class is again subdivided into those in which the " new matter " 
 is simply defensive, and, if true, destroys or bars the plaintiff's 
 right of action; and those in which the "new matter" is the 
 statement of an independent cause of action in favor of the 
 defendant against the plaintiff, which is to be tried at the same 
 time with that set up by the plaintiff, to the end that a re- 
 covery upon it may be used in opposition to the recovery upon 
 the plaintiff's demand, by either diminishing, equalling, or ex- 
 ceeding the same. It is plain, from this brief description, that 
 the answers included in the latter subdivision are not, in any 
 true sense of the word, defences; they do not defeat or bar the 
 plaintiff's right of action. They are, in truth, independent causes 
 of action in favor of the defendant, — cross-demands, — which, 
 for purposes of convenience merely, are tried and determined at 
 one and the same time. There are two suits, to neither of which, 
 perhaps, exists any defence, litigated and decided in the one judi- 
 cial proceeding; and the final balance in favor of one party is 
 awarded to him by the single judgment of the court. This is 
 the true theory of the answers embraced in the last subdivision ; 
 and it is fully approved and adopted by decisions of authority 
 which will be cited in the subsequent section, which treats of the 
 "counter-claim." 
 
 § 485. * 594. Two Kinds of Questions. Those of Form. Two 
 kinds of questions may arise in reference to all answers, — 
 namely, (1) those of substance and (2) those of form. The 
 first class relates to the sufficiency of the pleading, assuming 
 that its allegations are correct in respect to their merely formal 
 character; the second class relates exclusively to the form and 
 external mode of setting forth the facts, assuming that, if prop- 
 erly stated, they would be sufficient to constitute a valjxl answer. 
 It is difhcult to conceive that a question of substance should 
 arise upon an answer consisting only of denials. Such an an- 
 swer might be insufficient: it might raise no complete issue,
 
 DEFECTIVE ANSWERS. 707 
 
 because its denials were too liniitetl, and were interposed to a 
 part only of the plaintiff's allegations, thus admitting by their 
 silence other averments to such an extent that a cause of action 
 in his favor was conceded upon the record; but here the question 
 of substance would not arise from the matter contained in the 
 answer, but from the absence of matter therein. The questions 
 that can arise upon an answer of denials must, therefore, be 
 those of form, — questions whether the denials themiSelves are 
 in such a form that the averments of the complaint, or some of 
 them, are sufiiciently negatived in order to ],)resent an issue or 
 issues for trial and decision. If the answer falls within the 
 second class, — that is, if it sets up new matter, either by way 
 of defence, or by way of counter-claim, set-off, or cross-demand, 
 — the questions arising upon it may be either of substance or 
 of form. 
 
 § 486. * 595. Questions of Substance. What Can be the pos- 
 sible nature of these questions of substance ? The section of the 
 codes enumerating the grounds of demurrer to the complaint or 
 petition contains a complete list of such questions. As found in 
 most of the codes, they are six in number, — namely, (1) want 
 of jurisdiction in the court over the person of the defendant, or 
 the subject-matter of the action; (2) want of legal capacity to 
 sue in the plaintiff; (3) the pendency of another action between 
 the same parties for the same cause ; (4) defect of parties plain- 
 tiff or defendant; (5) a misjoinder of causes of action; (6) failure 
 to state facts constituting a cause of action. To these there is 
 added, in one or two codes, (7) a misjoinder of parties plaintiff 
 or defendant. It is very plain that, except in a special case to 
 be mentioned hereafter, only one of these species of substantial 
 questions can possibly arise in respect to the answer, namely, 
 the sixth, whether the facts stated are sufficient to constitute 
 a defence. Objections as to the jurisdiction of the court, the 
 legal capacity of the plaintiff to sue, the pendency of another 
 action, and the misjoinder of causes of action, must necessarily 
 be confined to and be decided by the complaint or petition. If 
 the plaintiff's pleading is free, the answer can in no manner be 
 exposed to any of them. It may, of course, set up these objec- 
 tions as matters of defence; but the objection would still inhere 
 in tlie plaintiff's cause of action and pleading, and would not 
 be involved in the answer itself. The same is true in respect to
 
 708 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 the nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties in all cases where the 
 answer is simply defensive. It may certainly aver a nonjoinder 
 or a misjoinder as a defence ; but the question thus raised would 
 still depend upon the complaint or petition ; the answer could 
 not by itself, as the initiative, create a nonjoinder or misjoinder 
 of parties. There is one special case, however, in which the 
 answer may, for the first time, involve the question as to the 
 proper joinder of parties. Where it sets up a counter-claim or 
 set-off, and the defendant thus makes himself, in respect to such 
 demand, a plaintiff in fact, though not in name, the answer may 
 be governed by the same rules which govern the complaint or 
 petition. The cause of action thus alleged may be of such a 
 character that the original parties to the record are either too 
 few or too many. An answer of this class may therefore, in 
 itself, and by means of its own averments, independently of 
 the plaintiff's pleading, raise and involve questions of sub- 
 stance relating to the proper joinder of parties to the action. 
 The codes of several States recognize this fact, and expressly 
 provide for the bringing in of additional parties made neces- 
 sary by the allegations of a counter-claim or set-off. With this 
 single exception, it is plain that the only questions of substance 
 which can arise in respect to any answer must relate to the suffi- 
 ciency of the facts alleged to constitute a defence, or counter- 
 claim, or set-off. Upon this assumption, the language employed 
 by the legislature in some of the States permits a demurrer to 
 the answer on the ground of "insufficiency;" in others, "where, 
 upon its face, it does not constitute a counter-claim or defence ; " 
 and, in others still, " where the facts alleged do not constitute 
 a defence or counter-claim." And recognizing the further 
 fact, that these questions of substance cannot arise upon an- 
 swers which consist only of denials, the language of several 
 codes confines the demurrer to "new matter," set up in the 
 answer by way of defence or counter-claim, 
 
 § 487. * 596. Purpose of Demurrer.^ Special Demurrer Abol- 
 ished. Motion Substituted. Under the common-law system of 
 
 1 ^^Oeneral Hales as to Demurrers. Centerville Light Co. (1896), 100 la. 245, 
 
 jrr, , n J v C9 N. W. 541 ; Graham v. Marks (1895), 
 
 Wnat a Demurrer admits. ^ ' v /. 
 
 98 Ga. 67, 25 S. E. 931 ; Smith v. Usher 
 
 A demurrer to a pleading admits all (1899), 108 Ga. 2.31, 3^ S. E. 876; Crew v. 
 
 facts well pleaded therein: Good.son (•. Hutcheson (1902), 115 Ga. 511. 42 S. E. 
 
 Goodson (1897), 140 Mo. 206; Peatman v. 16; Stedman v. City of Berlin (1897), 97
 
 DEFECTIVE ANSWERS. 
 
 709 
 
 procedure, the questions of substance in the defendant's pleas, 
 if the objection a[)peared on their face, were raised by a gen- 
 eral demurrer, while those of form were raised by a "special 
 demurrer." The reformed procedure retains the general de- 
 murrer for the same purpose which it subserved at the common 
 law. Where the answer, as in some States, or the new matter 
 in the answer, as in others, does not state facts constituting 
 a defence, or counter-claim, or set-off, as the case may be, a 
 demurrer, on the ground of insufficiency, is the proper mode 
 of raising and presenting the question for decision to the court. 
 Special demurrers, however, are utterly abolished. If the defect is 
 one merely of form ; if the denials, for example, — although suffi- 
 ciently addressed to the plaintiff's allegations to indicate the in- 
 
 Wis. 505, 73 N. W. 57 ; Allen v. Chicago 
 & N. W. Ry. Co. (1896), 94 Wis. 93, 68 
 N. W. 873; Hand v. City of St. Louis 
 (1900), 158 Mo. 204, 59 S. "w. 92 ; Shields 
 V. John.son County (1898), 144 Mo. 76, 47 
 S. W 107 ; Blaine v. Kuapp & Co. (1897), 
 140 Mo. 241, 41 S. W. 787; McArthnr v. 
 Clarke Drug Co. (1896), 48 Neb. 899, 67 
 N. W. 861 ; State v. Porter (1903), — Neb. 
 — , 95 N. W. 769. 
 
 But the demurrer admits the truth of 
 the allegations of the pleading attacked 
 oul\' for the purpose of determining their 
 legal effeft: Jacobs v. Vaill (1903), — 
 ivan. — , 72 Pac. 530. 
 
 A demurrer does not admit conclusions 
 of law : Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell 
 (1894), 26 Ore. 527, 38 Pac. 547; Kankin 
 r. Railroad Co. (1900), 58 S. C. 532, 36 
 S E. 997 ; American Water Works Co. v. 
 State (1895), 46 Neb. 194, 64 N. W. 711 ; 
 State ex rel. v. Aloe (1899), 152 Mo. 466, 
 54 S. W. 494 ; State ex rel. v. Withrow 
 (1900), 154 Mo. 397, 55 S. W. 460; John 
 D. Park & Sons Co. v. Druggists' Ass'n 
 (1903), 175 N. Y. 1, 67 N. E. 136. 
 
 A demurrer does not admit the con- 
 clusions of the pleader : Southern Hy. Co. y. 
 Covenia (1896), 100 Ga. 46, 29 S. E. 219; 
 Eliot's Appeal (1902), 74 Conn. 586, 51 
 Atl. 558; State ex rel. v. Archibald (1894), 
 52 O. St. 1, 38 N. E. 314. 
 
 But see Standard Oil Co. v. Hoese 
 (1899), 57 Neb. 665, 78 N. W. 292, where 
 a demurrer was held to admit a conclusion 
 reasonably inferable from the facts alleged. 
 
 In passing upon a demurrer for mis- 
 joinder of causes of action, it will be as- 
 sumed that the facts alleged in each count 
 constitute a cause of action : Vaule v. 
 Steenerson (1895), 63 Minn. 110, 65 N. W. 
 257. 
 
 Searching the Record. 
 A demurrer searches the record, and 
 should be carried back to the first pleading 
 which is insufficient: Tribune Printing Co. 
 i: Barnes (1898), 7 N. D. 591, 75 N. W. 
 904; Barr v. Little (1898), 54 Neb. 556, 74 
 N. W. 850; State ex rel. v. Stuht (1898), 
 52 Neb. 209, 71 N. W. 941; State v. 
 Moores (1897), 52 Neb. 770, 73 N. W, 299; 
 West Point Water, etc. Co. v. State (1896), 
 49 Neb. 223, 68 N. W. 507 ; Hawthorne v. 
 State (1895), 45 Neb. 871, 64 N. W. 359; 
 Oakley v. Valley County (1894), 40 Neb. 
 900, 59 N. W. 368 ; Johnson v. Wynne 
 (1902), 64 Kan. 138, 67 Pac. 549; Baxter 
 I'. McDonnell (1897), 154 N. Y. 432, 48 
 N. E. 816; Alkire v. Alkire (1892), 134 
 Lid. 350, 32 N. E. 571 ; Gilreath v. Fur- 
 man (1898), .53 S. C. 463, 31 S. E. 291 ; 
 Chesapeake, etc. Ry. Co. v. Riddle's Adm'x 
 (1903), Ky., 72 S. W. 22; Hoskins v. 
 Southern Nat. Bank (1903), Ky., 73 S. W. 
 786. 
 
 See Goldsmith v. Chipps (1899), 154 
 Ind. 28, 55 N. E. 855, where the court 
 said : " A demurrer to an answer in abate- 
 ' ment does not search the record, and can- 
 not be carried back and sustained to the 
 complaint."
 
 710 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 tended issues, — are so formally defective that it is a question 
 whether the denial or denials attempted to be made do in fact ac- 
 complish the purpose for which they were designed ; or if the aver- 
 ments of new matter in some sort embrace or refer to facts which, 
 if properly pleaded, would amount to a defence or counter-claim, 
 but are stated in such an uncertain, ambiguous, inferential man- 
 ner, that it is a question whether they can avail to the defendant, 
 — in such cases it is settled that the demurrer is not the proper 
 mode of reaching the defect. Instead of the special demurrer, 
 the codes have substituted the motion to make the pleading 
 more definite and certain.^ If no such motion is made, and 
 
 Where au answer purports to auswer 
 only a part of a complaint, a demurrer to 
 such answer cau only be carried back and 
 sustained to so much of the comphiint as 
 it assumes to answer : State ex rel. v. 
 Halter (1897), 149 Ind. 292, 47 N. E. 665. 
 
 Ruling on Demurrer as Res Judicata. 
 
 If a demurrer is sustained on the ground 
 that a complaint fails to state a cause of 
 action, a judgment of dismissal thereon is 
 no bar to a subsequent action in which 
 there is a good complaint : Swausou v. 
 Great Northern Ry. Co. (1898), 73 Minn. 
 103, 7.1 N. W. 1033; Watson v. St. Paul 
 City Ry. Co. (1899), 76 Minn. 358, 79 
 N. W. 308; Potter v. Beuge (1902), Ky., 
 67 S. W. 1005, citing Pepper v. Donnelly, 
 87 Ky. 260; Taylor v. Matteson (1893), 
 86 Wis. 113, 56 N. W. 829; State ex rel. 
 V. Cornell (1897), 52 Neb. 25, 71 N. W. 
 961; O'Hara v. Parker (1895), 27 Ore. 
 156, 39 Pac. 1004. 
 
 If the judgment determined the merits 
 of the case, it is res judicata : Wilson v. 
 Lowry (1898), Ariz., 52 Pac. 777; Klein- 
 schmidt v. Binzel (1893), 14 Mont. 31, 35 
 Pac. 460; Fain v. Hughes (1899), 108 Ga. 
 .537, 33 S. E. 1012; Plant v. Carpenter 
 (1898), 19 Wash. 621,53 Pac. 1107; Day 
 V. Mountin (1903), 89 Minn. 297, 94 N. W. 
 887. 
 
 A judgment on the sole ground tliat 
 the action is premature is not a bar to a 
 
 1 ^Conversely, a motion cannot be used 
 to raise questions of substance : Armstead 
 V. Neptune ( 1 896), 56 Kan. 750, 44 Pac. 998 ; 
 Wattels V. MincJien (1895), 93 la. 517, 61 
 N. W. 915; Gjerstadengen c. Hartzcll 
 
 subsequent suit for the same cause : Peck v. 
 Easton (1902), 74 Conn. 456, 51 Atl. 134. 
 
 A demurrer on the ground that a com- 
 plaint does not state a cause of action, 
 having been once made and overruled, 
 cannot be renewed at any subsequent trial 
 on the same or auy other specifications: 
 Turner v. Interstate Ass'n (1897), 51 S. C. 
 33, 27 S. E. 947; Burrows v. McCalley 
 (1897), 17 Wash. 269, 49 Pac. 508. But 
 see Roche v. Spokane County (1900), 22 
 Wash. 121, 60 Pac. 59. 
 
 The court is not bound by its own rul- 
 ing, and when a demurrer has been sus- 
 tained to a petition, and an amended 
 petition is filed essentially like tlie origi- 
 nal, to which also a demurrer is filed, the 
 court may sustain or overrule it as it sees 
 fit. If the defendant wished to hold the 
 court to its first ruling, he should have 
 moved to have the amended petition 
 stricken from the files : Van Werden ;•. 
 E(juitable Assurance Society (1896), 99 
 la. 621, 68 N. W. 892. See also Noyes v. 
 Longhead (1894), 9 Wash. 325, 37 Pac. 
 452; Hoyty. Beach (1897), 104 la. 257, 73 
 N. W. 492 ; Schoenleber v. Burkhart 
 (1896), 94 Wis. 575, 69 N. W. 343. 
 
 Where a demurrer is filed on several 
 grounds, and it is sustained generally, it 
 will be presumed to have been sustained 
 oil the ground not affecting the merits : 
 Kleinsclimidt v. Binzel (1893), 14 Mont. 
 31, 35 Pac. 460, citing and differing from 
 
 (1899), 8 N. D. 424, 79 N. W. 872. But in 
 McQuade v. Collins (1894), 93 la. 22, 61 
 N. W. 213, it was held that where affirma- 
 tive matter is pleaded which constitutes no 
 defence it may be stricken out on njotion.]
 
 DEFECTIVE ANSWERS. 711 
 
 the plaintiff goes to trial upon the answer as it stands, he will 
 
 People V. Stevens, 51 How. Pr. 235, whicli 
 held the presumption to be that the de- 
 murrer was sustained upoti all the grounds. 
 
 lu Gregory v. Woodwortli {189'J), 107 
 la 151, 77 N. W. 837, it was held that 
 where a plaintiff failed to amend his peti- 
 tion by adding a material averment, and a 
 demurrer thereto had heen sustained by 
 the lower court and by the Supreme Court, 
 the judgment on the demurrer was a final 
 adjudication which bars another action for 
 the same cause, under Code, 1873, § 26,54, 
 ■which provides that on the decision of a 
 •demurrer, if the unsuccessful party fails 
 to amend or plead over, the same conse- 
 quences shall ensue as though a verdict 
 had passed against the plaintiff, or the de- 
 fendant had made default. Given J. dis- 
 sented on the ground that the omission of 
 the averment, being in fact a doubtful 
 question, was not negligence, and hence 
 plaintiff ought to be allowed to commence 
 a second suit under Code § 2537, which 
 provides that " If, after the commence- 
 ment of an action, the plaintiff shall fail 
 therein for any cause, except negligence 
 in its prosecution, and a new suit shall be 
 brought within six moutlis thereafter, the 
 second suit shall, for the purpose herein 
 contemplated, be deemed a continuation of 
 the first." 
 
 Error in overruling a demurrer for mis- 
 joinder of causes of action is harmless : 
 Coddington v. Canaday (1901), 157 Ind. 
 243, 61 N. E. 567. 
 
 The statute providing tliat " but one 
 motion and one demurrer assailing such 
 pleading shall he filed, unless such plead- 
 ing be amended after the filing of a mo- 
 tion thereto," does not prohibit filing a 
 demurrer after a motion to the same plead- 
 ing, even though the pleading has not 
 been amended in the mean time : Gross i'. 
 Miller (1894), 93 la. 72, 61 N. W. 385. 
 
 Demurrer as '' Answer." 
 
 A demurrer is a sufficient "answer" to 
 warrant the granting of relief not prayed 
 for, under R. S , § 2886 : Viles v. Green 
 (1895), 91 Wis. 217, 64 N. W. 856. See 
 also Wagener v. Boyce (1898), Ariz., 52 
 Pac. 1122. But there is no such pleading 
 a,s a " demurrer by way of answer : " 
 
 Smith V. Kibling (1897), 97 Wis. 205, 72 
 N. W. 869. See also Quayle v. Bayfield 
 Co. (1902), 114 Wis. 108, 89 N. W. 892, 
 where an answer contained a demurrer 
 but the defect was held to be waived. 
 
 Predicating Error on Ruling. 
 
 Where a demurrer is sustained generally, 
 the ruling will be sustained if any of the 
 grounds of the demurrer are well taken : 
 Krause v. Lloyd (1897), 100 la. 666,69 
 N. W. 1062 ; Crittenden v. Southern Home 
 Ass'n (1900), 111 Ga. 266, .36 S. E. 643. 
 
 An order su.staininga demurrer, if right, 
 will be sustained, even if the reasons 
 given by the trial court were erroneous : 
 Hughes V. Hunner (1895), 91 Wis. 116, 64 
 N. W. 887. 
 
 Error, if any, in ruling upon a demurrer 
 will not be considered on appeal where 
 the alleged defect has been obviated by an 
 amendment on the trial : Maris v. Cleven- 
 ger (1902), 29 Wa.sli. 395, 69 Pac. 1089; 
 Ivingman v. Pixley (1898), 7 Okla. 351, 
 54 Pac. 494. Contra, Corcoran v. Sonora 
 Min. & Mill. Co. (1902), Idaho, 71 Pac. 127. 
 
 When a demurrer has been sustained to 
 a complaint, and plaintiff fails to apply 
 for an amendment, he must be held to 
 have elected to stand on his pleading : 
 Iowa, etc. Tel. Co. v. Schamber (1902), 15 
 S. D. 588, 91 N. W. 78. 
 
 Pleading over is a waiver of any error 
 in overruling a demurrer: Wheeler v. 
 Barker (1897), 51 Neb. 846, 71 N. W. 750; 
 Citizens' Bank v. Pence (1900), 59 Neb. 
 579, 81 N. W. 623 ; Lederer r. Union Sav. 
 Bank (1897), 52 Neb. 1.33, 71 N. W. 954; 
 Hardin v. Emmons (1898), 24 Nev. 329, 53 
 Pac. 854; Shroeder v. Webster (1893), 88 
 la. 627, 55 N. W. 569 ; Fir.st Nat. Bank 
 V. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank (1903), 
 Neb., 95 N. W. 1062. Contra, Mechan- 
 ics Bank i\ Woodward (1902), 74 Conn. 
 689, 51 Atl. 1084 ; Thelin v. Stewart (1893), 
 100 Cal. 372, 34 Pac. 861 ; Hunter's Ap- 
 peal (1898), 71 Conn. 189, 41 Atl. 557. 
 
 A party cannot complain of a ruling in 
 his own favor : Pritchett v. McGaughev 
 (1898), 151 Ind. 638, 52 N. E. 397. 
 
 A general demurrer to a complaint put 
 in by stipulation after answer and treated 
 by the parties and the trial court as an
 
 ■12 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 not be suffered to raise the objection there for the first time, and 
 
 ordinary demurrer will be so treated on 
 appeal :' McCord v. Hill (1899), 104 Wis. 
 437, 80 N. VV. 735. 
 
 " A judgment will not be reversed on 
 account of the sustaining of an informal 
 <lenmrrer to an answer that does not state 
 facts sufficient to constitute a cause of de- 
 fence:" BoUraan v. Gemmill (1900), 1.53 
 Ind. 33, 57 N. E. 542 ; Hanson v. Cruse 
 (1900), 155 Ind. 176, 57 N. E. 904. 
 
 An order sustaining a demurrer is ap- 
 pealable although no final judgment was 
 entered or rendered by the court : Brad- 
 ley V. Miller (1896), 100 la. 169, 69 N. \V. 
 426. 
 
 An appeal will lie wherever a writ of 
 error could be sustained : O'Donnell v. 
 Sargent & Co. (1897), 69 Conn. 476, 38 
 Atl. 216. 
 
 The overruling of a demurrer to one 
 paragraph of a complaint will not be re- 
 viewed on appeal when the case was tried 
 and judgment rendered for plaintiff on 
 another paragraph : Robinson v. Dickey 
 (1893), 143 Ind. 205, 42 N. E. 679. 
 
 Nor can error be predicated on the 
 court's action in sustaining a demurrer 
 to an answer when the facts averred in 
 the answer were admissible under a gen- 
 eral denial pleaded : Troxel v. Thomas 
 (1900), 155 Ind. 519, 58 N. E. 725; Xow- 
 lin ('. State ex rel. Board of Commission- 
 ers (1903), — Ind. — , 66 N. E. .54; Smith 
 V. Pinnell (1895), 143 Ind. 485, 40 N. E. 
 798. See Clause Printing Co. v. Chicago, 
 etc. Bank (1896), 145 Ind. 682, 44 \. E. 
 256, where same rule was announced in 
 respect to a counter-claim and answer in 
 bar. 
 
 Where two defences are pleaded, one 
 good and the other bad, the error in over- 
 ruling a demurrer to the latter defence is 
 not available, the former constituting a 
 complete bar to the action : Fire Extin- 
 guisher Co. V. City of Perry (1899), 8 
 Okla. 429, 58 Pac. 635. 
 
 Where it clearly appears that no injury 
 resulted to defendant by rea.son of tlie 
 in proper overruling of a demurrer for 
 misjoinder, the judgment sub.sequently 
 rendered npon the complaint will not be 
 reversed; Theliu r. Stewart (1893), 100 
 Cal. 372. 34 Pac. 861 ; A.sevado v. Orr 
 (ISO.)). UK) r-.d liM, 34 Pac. 777. 
 
 " Wliere a demurrer to a petition which 
 states no ground for substantial damages 
 is sustained, this court will not reverse 
 the decision merely because tiie facts 
 stated would entitle plaintiff to nominal 
 damages: " Cook v. Smith (190'5), — Kan. 
 — ,72 Pac. 524. 
 
 Scope of Demurrer. 
 
 A demurrer will not lie to a portion of 
 a statement of a cause of action : McCana 
 V. Penniell893), 100 Cal. 547, 33 Pac. 138; 
 Lewis V. Town of Brandenburg (1898), 
 105 Ky. 14. 47 S. W. 862; Sloan v. Rail- 
 way Co. (1902), 64 S. C. 389, 42 S. E. 197 ; 
 Buist v. Salvo (1894), 44 S. C. 143, 21 
 S. E. 615 ; Steenerson v. Great Northern 
 Ry. Co. (1896), 6+ Minn. 216. 66 N. W. 
 723; Nelson i-. Merced County (1898), 
 122 Cal. 644, 55 Cal. 421. But" see Free- 
 man's Appeal (1899), 71 Conn. 708,43 
 Atl. 185. 
 
 " Where a pleading is tested by de- 
 murrer it must stand or fall by its own 
 averments. It can find neither weakness 
 nor strength from otiier parts of the 
 record : " Pittsburgh, etc. Ry. Co. v. 
 Moore (1898), 152 Ind. .34.5. SSN. E. 290. 
 See also Davidson v. Gregory (1903), 132 
 N. C. 389, 43 S. E. 916; Strawhacker r. 
 Ives (1901), 114 la. 661, 87 N. W. 669 ; 
 Anderson v. Hilton & Dodge Co. (1899), 
 110 Ga. 263, 34 S. E. 365. 
 
 But see Chicago Bldg. Co. v. Cream- 
 ery Co. (1898), 106 Ga. 84, 31 S. E. 809. 
 Held in Douglas v. Coonley (1898 ), 156 
 N. Y. 521, 51 N. E. 283, tbat where an 
 answer is demurred to, all the allegations 
 of the complaint referred to in the answer 
 are to be taken as incorporated in it. 
 
 Where a tlemurrer is specifically di- 
 rected to the second cause of action con- 
 tained in a cross-bill, and the other causes 
 of action therein are substantially the 
 same as the second, the demurrer will be 
 considered as if it went to the entire cross- 
 bill : Hughes V. Pratt (1900), 37 Ore. 45, 60 
 Pac 707. 
 
 Form of Demurrer. 
 
 A demurrer in the words of the statute 
 is sufficient: O'Rourke i'. City of Sioux 
 Falls (1893), 4 S. D. 47, .54 N. W. 1044; 
 Van Dyke v. Doherty (1896), 6 N. D. 263, 
 69 N. W. 200. The section of the code
 
 DEFECTIVE ANSWERS. 
 
 713 
 
 to exclude evidence of the defence or counter-claim on the ground 
 that it is informally pleaded.^ 
 
 requiring that tho demurrer sliall dis- 
 tinctly specify the grounds of the objection 
 to the complaint held to mean only that 
 " when the first ground is relied on the 
 demurrer must specify whether the want 
 of jurisdiction is as to the person or sub- 
 ject-matter ; and when the fourth is relied 
 on the parties must specify whether the 
 defect is in parties plaintiff or defendant, " 
 but in other cases it is sutiicieut to specify 
 which ground is relied ou as the statute 
 names them : Hudson v. Archer (1893), 4 
 S. D. 1 28, 55 N. VV. 1 099. 
 
 A demurrer to au answer generally 
 on the ground that it " does not state 
 facts sufficient to show that the ])laintiff 
 is estopped from maintaining the said 
 action," does not state a ground for de- 
 murrer under the code, and should be dis- 
 regarded : Hill V. Walsh (1894), 6 8. D. 
 421, 61 N. W. 440. See also Tootle v. 
 Berkley (1896), 57 Kan. lll,45Pac. 77, 
 where the demurrer was held iusufficient, 
 not stating a ground for a demurrer under 
 the code. 
 
 But in Iowa a general demurrer in the 
 words of the statute is not sufficient in a 
 law action under Code § 3562, which pro- 
 vides that " A demurrer must specify and 
 number the grounds of objection to the 
 
 1 This general rule is illustrated by the 
 following cases, which also furnish exam- 
 ples of insufficient aud imperfect allega- 
 tions : Becker v. Boon, 61 N. Y. 317; 
 West U. Tel. Co. v. Fenton, 52 Ind. 1 ; 
 Jones V. Frost, 51 id. 69; Langsdale r. 
 Girton, 51 id. 99 ; Ready v. Sommer, 37 
 AVis. 265 ; Bushey v. Keynolds, 31 Ark. 
 657 ; Simpson Cent. Coll. i'. Bryan, 50 
 Iowa, 293 ; Penn. Coal Co. v. Blake, 85 
 N. y. 226, 235; Holcraft v. Mellott, 57 
 Ind. 539; State v. Newlin, 69 id. 108; 
 White V. San Rafael, etc. R. Co., 50 Cal. 
 417 ; Spiers v. Duane, 54 Cal. 176 ; exam- 
 ples of defective answers, Indianapolis, 
 B. & W. R. Co. V. Risley, 50 Ind. 60; 
 Shipman v. State, 43 Wis. 381 ; Nys v. 
 Biemeret, 44 id. 104; Elmore d. Hill, 46 
 id. 618 ; Coltzhauser v. Simon, 47 id. 103 ; 
 nature and effect oisham answeis, Womble 
 
 pleadings, and it shall not be sufficient to 
 state the objection in the terms of the 
 preceding sectiou, except that a demurrer 
 to an equital)le petition for the fifth reason 
 of said section may be stated in the terms 
 thereof." See Stokes r. Sprague (1899), 
 110 la. 89, 81 N. W. 195. Held, in In re 
 Estate of McMurray (1899), 107 la. 648, 
 78 N. W. 691, that a demurrer in a sjiecial 
 proceeding must specify the grounds of 
 objection. And in Miller v. Cross (1900), 
 73 Conn. 538, 48 Atl. 213, a demurrer 
 which did not point out the insufficiency 
 was held radically defective. 
 
 In South Carolina, by Circuit Court 
 Rule 18, the demurrant must state in writ- 
 ing "wherein the pleading objected to is 
 insufficient ; " and it was held a sufiicient 
 compliance with this rule to demur in tiie 
 words of the statute and on the hearing 
 submit the specific grounds of objection 
 in writing: Riggs r. Home Fire Ass'n 
 (1901), 61 S. C. 448, 39 S. E. 614. 
 
 A demurrer to an answer in these 
 words, " It does not state facts sufficient 
 to make a good answer to the con)plaint," 
 is not sufficient to present any question 
 upon the answer. The demurrer should 
 state that the answer does not state facts 
 sufficient to constitute a cause of defence. 
 
 V. Fraps, 77 N. C. 198; Ranson v. Ander- 
 son, 9 S. C. 438 ; Greenbaum v. Turrill, 
 57 Cal. 285 ; oi frivolous answers, Munger 
 V. Shannon, 61 N. Y. 251 ; Cottrell v 
 Cramer, 40 Wis. 555 ; Hemme i-. Hays, 
 55 Cal. 337; Fay v. Cobb, 51 id. 313; 
 Dail V. Harper, 83 N. C. 4 ; Hull v. Carter, 
 83 id. 249 ; Brogden v. Henry, 83 id. 274 ; 
 Larimore v. Wells, 29 Ohio St. 13 ; Sar- 
 gent V. Steubenville, etc. R. Co., 32 id. 
 449 ; Ross V. Ross, 25 Hun, 642 ; Lerdall 
 V. Charter Oak Ins. Co.. 51 Wis. 426. 
 
 [^Where a defence is irrelevant it may 
 be stricken out on motion : Nat. Distilling 
 Co. V. Cream City Co. (1893), 8G Wis. 
 352, 56 N. W. 864. A motion does not 
 reach back, like a demurrer, to the first 
 defective pleading: Smith v. Kibling 
 (1897), 97 Wis. 205, 72 N. W. 869.3
 
 7U 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 488. * 597. Conflict of Decisions. This general rule is well 
 settled; Ijut there has been some conflict of decisions in its 
 
 Citing Tliomas v. Goodwine, 88 Ind. 458 ; 
 Dawson v. Eads (1894). 140 Ind. 208, 39 
 N. E. 919. 
 
 Issues which may be raised by Demurrer. 
 
 Whether the allegations of the com- 
 plaint entitle the plaintiff to equitable re- 
 lief : Devereux i: McCrady (1895), 46 
 S. C. 133, 24 S. E. 77 ; Meyer v. Gar- 
 thwaite (1896), 92 Wis. 571, 66 N. W. 
 704 ; Glover r. Hargadiue-McKittrick Co. 
 (1901), 62 Neb. 48.'J, 87 N. W. 170 (gen- 
 eral demurrer) ; GuUickson v. Madsen 
 <1894), 87 Wis. 19, 57 N. W. 965 (general 
 demurrer). 
 
 But tiiis issue cannot be raised by de- 
 murrer ore tfiius at the trial : Meyer r. 
 Garthwaite (1806), 92 Wi.-;. 571, 66 N. W. 
 704; Picrstoff v. .Jorges (1893), 86 Wis. 
 128, 56 N. W. 735; Bigelow v. Town of 
 Washburn (1898), 98 Wis. 553, 74 N. W. 
 362 ; Lederer v. Union Sav. Bank (1897), 
 52 Neb. 133, 71 N. W. 954. 
 
 Whether a claim is too stale for equity 
 to recognize it: Wilson v. Wilson (1902), 
 41 Ore. 459, 69 Pac. 923. Whether an 
 action is prematurely brought : Dicker- 
 mau V. New York, etc. R. R. Co. (J899), 
 72 Conn. 271, 44 Atl. 228 ; Fiore v. Ladd 
 (1896), 29 Ore. 528, 46 Pac. 144. 
 
 Whether suit is brought in the name 
 of the real party in interest : J. I. Case 
 Threshing Co. ;;."Pederson (1894), 6 S. D. 
 140, 60 N. W. 747 ; Smith v. Security Co. 
 <1899), 8 N. D. 451, 79 N. W. 981 ; Meyer 
 V. Barth (1897), 97 Wis. 352, 72 N. W. 748. 
 
 Jurisdiction. Cannot be raised by 
 general demurrer : Woods v. Sheldon 
 (1896), 9 S. D. 392, 69 N. W. 602. 
 
 Corporate capacity, when plaintiff fails 
 to allege it : Calnan Construction Co. r. 
 Brown (1899), 110 la. 37, 81 N. W. 163, 
 citing Sweet v. Ervin, 54 la. 101, and 
 Andre v. Railway Co., 30 la. 107. But a 
 general demurrer will not raise this issue : 
 Sly V. Palo Alto Mining Co. (1902), 28 
 Wash. 485, 68 Pac. 871. 
 
 Authority to sue. Cannot be raised by 
 denmrrer : Milwaukee v. Zoehrlaut Co. 
 (1902), 1 14 Wis. 276, 90 N. W. 187. 
 
 Whether the facts stated entitle the 
 plaintiff to any relief: George v. Eduey 
 
 (1893), 36 Neb. 604, 54 N. W. 986; West- 
 ern Union Tel. Co. v. MuUins (1895), 44 
 Neb. 732, 62 N. W. 880. 
 
 Statute of frauds : Wiseman v. Thomp- 
 son (1895), 94 la. 607, 63 N. W. 346; 
 Powder River Live Stock Co. v. LamI) 
 (1893), 38 Neb. 339, 56 N. W. 1019; 
 Graves r. Clark (1897), 101 la. 738, 69 
 N. W. 1046; Crane v. Powell (1893), 139 
 N. Y. 379, 34 N. E. 911 ; Tyuou r. Des- 
 pain (1896), 22 Colo. 240, 43 Pac. 1039; 
 Mendelsohn i-. Bauov (1900), 57 S. C 147, 
 35 S. E. 499. Contra, Hemmings v. Doss 
 (1899), 125 N. C. 400, 34 S. E. 511. 
 
 In Wi'tzteiu v. Boston & M. Min. Co. 
 (1903), 28 Mont. 451, 72 Pac. 865, the court 
 said: "Section 680 of the Code of Civil 
 Procedure provides that a demurrer may 
 be interposed to a complaint upon the 
 following ground: '(3) That there is an- 
 other action pending between the same 
 parties for the same cause.' In order to 
 invoke successfully this ground of demur- 
 rer, it must apjtear from the face of tiie 
 complaint (1) that anotlier action is pend- 
 ing, (2) that it is l)etweeu tlie same par- 
 ties, and (3) that it is for the same cause." 
 Each one of these requisites is carefully 
 considered in relation to the pleadings in 
 the case." 
 
 Demurrer Ore Tenus. 
 
 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in 
 discussing this subject, said in Smith v. 
 Kibling (1897), 97 Wis. 205, 72 N. W. 
 869, — " No practice is known whereby it 
 was competent for the defendant to chal- 
 lenge the sufficiency of the complaint by 
 an oral demurrer. Under the present 
 practice all pleadings are re(iuired to be 
 in writing. The time was when all plead- 
 ings were oral. Then it was competent 
 to demur ore tenus, or orally. It is now 
 familiar practice to raise the question of 
 the sufficiency of the complaint at the 
 trial by an objection to the reception of 
 evidence under the complaint. This ob- 
 jection is something like the demurrer 
 ore tenus of the ancient ]>ractice, and some 
 of its con.scquences are the same ; and be- 
 cause of this similarity it is, for conven' 
 ience, called a demurrer ore tenus. But it 
 is not a demurrer at all, witliiu the con-
 
 DEFECTIVE ANSWERS. 
 
 715 
 
 practical application, and judges have occasionally made use of 
 very inaccurate language while invoking it, which has tended to 
 add confusion to a matter which should be kept clear and certain. 
 Thus, judges of great learning and ability, and who are usually 
 guarded in their choice of expressions, in discussing the char- 
 acter of pleadings, both complaints or petitions and answers, 
 when the objection to them was presented for the first time at 
 the trial, and evidence in support of the cause of action or 
 defence was opposed on the ground then first stated, that the 
 allegations were insufficient, have said, that although the plead- 
 ing was in fact defective, and even though it zvas so defective as to 
 be demurrable^ yet, as the adverse party had not demurred, nor 
 moved to make it more certain, but had gone to trial upon it, he 
 had thereby waived all objection to its sufficiency.^ This lan- 
 
 templation of the statute. lu practice, 
 this objectiou is properly made upon tlie 
 trial when evidence under the coin{)laint 
 is first offered. The ruling upon the ob- 
 jection is a mere ruling upon the trial, to 
 be preserved in the bill of exceptions." 
 
 Speaking Demurrer. 
 
 A demurrer which introduces a new 
 averment or assumes that the ])leadiug 
 demurred to contains an allegation which 
 it does not contain, is a speaking demur- 
 rer, and should be overruled : Clarke v. 
 East Atlanta Land Co. (1901), 11-3 Ga. 
 21, 38 S. E. 323; Mathis r. Fordham 
 (1901), 114 Ga. 364, 40 S. E. 324; Woods 
 V. Colony Bank (1901), 114 Ga. 683,40 
 S. E. 720; Teasley v. Bradley (1900), 110 
 Ga. 497, 35 S. E. 782 ; Beckner v. Beckner 
 {1898), 104 Ga. 219, 30 S. E. 622. 
 
 Demurrer Exclusive. 
 
 Defects which appear on the face of 
 the pleading and which are grounds for 
 demurrer, cannot be raised by answer: 
 Bender v. Zimmerman (1896), 135 Mo. 53, 
 36 S. W. 210; Medland v. Walker (1895), 
 96 lia. 175, 64 N. W. 797 ; Clark v. Ross 
 (1895), 96 la. 402, 65 N. W. 340; Griffith 
 V. Cromley (1900), 58 S. C. 448, 36 S. E. 
 738. 
 
 A plaintiff may demur to an answer on 
 the ground that it does not state a de- 
 fence, and also move to have it struck 
 out as frivolous : Badhaiu v. Brabham 
 
 (1899), 54 S. C. 400, 32 S. E. 444. A de- 
 murrer and motion to dismiss are in legal 
 effect the same, and proceed upon sub- 
 stantially the same grounds : Cofer v. 
 Riseling (1900), 153 Mo. 633, 55 S. W. 
 235. A demurrer on the ground of an- 
 other action pending cannot be sustained 
 where there is nothing in the complaint 
 indicating the pendency of such other 
 action: Jackson v. McAuley (1895), 13 
 Wash. 298, 43 Pac. 41. 
 
 Frivolous Demurrer. 
 
 The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in 
 Olsen V. Cloquet Lumber Co. (1895), 6i 
 Minn. 1 7, 63 N. W. 95, said : " A demur- 
 rer should not be struck out as frivolous 
 unless it is manifest, without argument, 
 from a mere inspection of the pleading, 
 that there was no reasonable ground for 
 interposing it. It should not be struck 
 out where there is such room for debate 
 as to the sufficiency of the pleading de- 
 murred to that an attorney of ordinary 
 intelligence might have interposed a de- 
 murrer in entire good faith." See also, 
 Littlefield v. Wm. Bergenthal Co. (1894), 
 87 Wis. 394, 58 N. W. 743 ; Geilfus v. 
 Gales (1894), 87 Wis. 395, 58 N. W. 742.] 
 
 1 QIu First Nat. Bank v. Zeims (1894), 
 93 la. 140, 61 N. W. 483, the court said : 
 " If matter pleaded as a defence is not at- 
 tacked by motion or demurrer, and there 
 is testimony to sustain it, it will defeat the 
 action, although it may not have amounted
 
 716 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 giiage is certainly inaccurate, and unnecessarily confuses a subject 
 wliicli is in itself not free from difficulty. It is, beyond a doubt, 
 true, that if the answer or other pleading is defective in such a 
 manner, and to such an extent only, that the proper method of 
 correction is a motion to make it more definite and certain, and if 
 the adverse party omits to make the motion, but goes to trial, lie 
 therebv waives the objection, and cannot raise it by attempting 
 to shut out evidence of the cause of action or defence. But if 
 the defect is of such a nature that a denuirrer is pro})er, and the 
 pleading would be held insufficient upon a demurrer, it is equally 
 certain that the adverse party does not waive the objection by 
 going to trial without demurring.^ If the pleading was a com- 
 plaint or petition, the ground of demurrer would necessarily be, 
 that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action ; 
 and, by an express provision of all the codes, this ground is not 
 waived by answering and going to trial. If the pleading was 
 an answer, the ground of demurrer would still be that the facts 
 stated did not constitute a defence or counter-claim; and if it did 
 not, in fact, allege a defence or counter-claim none could be 
 proved under it at the trial. ^ The rule, with its proper limita- 
 tions, is a correct one, and operates in the interests of justice 
 and good faith: but if acted upon in the broad manner as above 
 recited, it would tend to destroy all certainty and accuracy in 
 pleading. If the deficiencies are such that a motion is the proper 
 mode of cure, they are necessarily of form, and not of substance ; 
 the adverse party is not in fact misled ; and a neglect on his part 
 to apply the remedy in an early stage of the cause ought to be 
 and is a waiver of all objection, so that the cause of action or 
 defence, as the case may be, can be proved, notwithstanding the 
 ambiguity and indefiniteness of the averments. 
 
 § 489. * 598. Same Subject. Adopting the rule in this re- 
 stricted scope, there are still cases of doubt and of conflict in 
 its application. In some answers a defect of substance is plain ; 
 
 to a legal defence." CitingConger i-. Cral)- 2 [^See Wintrode v. Reiibarger (1898), 
 
 tree, 83 la. 53G, .5.') N. W. 335; Linden r. L50 Ind. 5.50, 50 N. E. 570, where it was 
 
 Green, 81 la. 365, 46 N. W. 1108 ; Benja- held that a demurrer on the ground that 
 
 niin V. Veith, 80 la. 149, 45 N. W. 731.] facts were not stated " sufficient to cousti- 
 
 ' [^See note on Waiver of Defects of tute a good answer to the complaint of the 
 
 Suhstance, p. 605. But see also Wilson c jdaintifF" does not raise the question of 
 
 Abenleen (1901), 25 Wash. 614, 66 I'ac. tlie sufficiency of the answer to state a 
 
 9.-. ; Klcjtz V. James (1896), 97 la. 337, 66 defence.] 
 N. W. 190.]
 
 DEFECTIVE ANSWERS. 717 
 
 the facts alleged clearly constitute no defence: in others the 
 delicicncies are as plainly formal; the necessary facts are all 
 mentioned; no doubt can exist as to the actual intent and mean- 
 ing, hut still some requirements as to form and method have 
 not been complied with. Between tliese two extremes there are 
 cases bordering upon the dividing-line, in which it is difhcult 
 to determine with certainty whether the defect is one of form 
 merely, or whether it passes the limit, and is one of substance. 
 In such instances we shall naturally find a conflict of decision 
 among different judges, and we shall even discover the same 
 court vacillating, in one case applying the liberal doctrine and 
 holding the objection waived, and, in another not essentially 
 different, enforcing the stricter rule, pronouncing the answer 
 entirely bad, and wholly rejecting it. In some of the decisions 
 to which I shall refer, it would seem that able courts have neg- 
 lected their own precedents, and forgotten the rule imposed upon 
 them by the statute, which abrogates the inequitable common- 
 law doctrine of an interpretation adverse to the pleader, and 
 requires a liberal construction with a view to substantial justice 
 between the parties. It is only by a comparison and analysis of 
 these decisions that a practical result can be reached, and a gen- 
 eral principle deduced ; and I shall therefore cite, either in the 
 text or in the notes, the leading cases which have passed upon 
 this important question. 
 
 § 490. * 599. Defects of Form are Curable by Motion. The 
 authorities are uniform that a mere defect of form, as it has 
 been already described, must be cured by a motion, and not by 
 a demurrer.^ In an action to foreclose a purchase-money mort- 
 
 1 ^General Rules as to Motions. appealable. If to the latter, it can only 
 
 The determination of a motion is not be considered on appeal from the final 
 
 res judicata, so as to prevent parties from judgment. " Allen v. Church (1897), 101 
 
 drawing the same matters in question la. 116, 70 N. W. 127. A motion to strike 
 
 again in an action : Heidel v. Benedict out a pleading and the ruling of the court 
 
 (1894), 61 Minn. 170, 63 N. W. 490. The thereon can only be made a part of the 
 
 test as to whether the ruling on a motion record by bill of exce])tions or by order of 
 
 is appealable before judgment is this: court: Allen v. Hollingshead (1900), 15.5 
 
 "Does the part of the pleading assailed Ind. 178, 57 N. E. 917. A pleading which 
 
 show a distinct cause of action, or is sets up the proper facts will be considered 
 
 it a mere incident thereto ? Does the as a motion although not so designated : 
 
 ruling go to the plaintiff's right to re- Waldo v. Thweatt (1897), 64 Ark. 126, 40 
 
 cover, or merely to the amount of his re- S. W. 782. 
 
 covery on a ground otherwise pleaded ^ Pleading over after a motion has been 
 
 If the order relates to the former, it is overruled waives objection to tlie ruling :
 
 718 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 gage of land convej^ed by the plaintiff to the defendant, the an- 
 swer set up covenants in the deed of conveyance, and a breach 
 of them, namely, "that the plaintiff was not seised of the 
 premises, as of a good and indefeasible estate in fee," etc., 
 negativing all the covenants. To this the plaintiff replied, 
 and instead of averring "that he was seised," etc., said, "And 
 the i)laintiff denies that at the time, etc., he was not seised in 
 fee of the said premises," etc., and in this manner met all the 
 allesrations of the answer. The defendant demurred for insuffi- 
 ciency. It was held by the court that " insufficiency " as a ground 
 of demurrer implies that the allegations do not constitute any 
 defence or denial to the adverse pleading. The insufficiency 
 relates to the substance of the averments as a whole, rather 
 than to the form of the expression. The reply in this case 
 was defective in form, but the substiince thereof was good; 
 that is, it stated a denial in an improper manner, and the 
 remedy therefor was not by demurrer, but by motion to render 
 the allegations more definite and certain. ^ Although this de- 
 cision was made in reference to a reply, the principle applies 
 equally to an answer. 
 
 Walser v. Wear (1897), 141 Mo. 443, 42 
 S. W. 928 ; Sprinfrfield, etc. Co. v. Dono- 
 van (1899), 147 Mo. 622, 49 S. W. 500; 
 Buugenstock v. Nishnabotna Drainage 
 Dist. (1901), 163 Mo. 198, 64 S. W. 149. 
 
 A motion which cannot be sustained 
 substantially as made must be overruled : 
 Palmer v. Bank of Ulysses (1899), 59 
 Neb. 412, 81 N. W. 303 ; First Nat. Bank 
 V. Engelbercht (1899), 58 Neb. 639, 79 
 N. W. 556 ; Dobry r. Western Mfg. Co. 
 (1899), 58 Neb. 667^79 N. W. 559 ; Draper 
 V. Taylor (1899), 58 Neb. 787, 79 N. W. 
 709; lludelson v. First Nat. Bank (189S), 
 56 Neb. 247, 76 N. W. 570; Beebe v. Lati- 
 mer (1899), 59 Neb. 305, 80 N. W. 904. 
 
 A motion to strike another motion is 
 not proper practice : German Savings 
 Bank v. Cady (1901), 114 la. 228, 86 
 N. W. 277; Long v. Ruch (1897), 148 
 Ind. 74, 47 N. E. 156; Bonfoy r Goar 
 (1894), 140 Ind. 292, 39 N. E. 56. Nor is 
 it proper to demur to a motion : Bonfoy 
 I'. Goar (1894), 140 Ind. 292, 39 N. E. 56.] 
 
 ' Flanders i^. McVickar, 7 Wis. 372, 
 377. See, to the same effect, Speuce r. 
 Spence, 17 Wis. 448, 454; Hart i;. Craw- 
 
 ford, 41 Ind. 197; Snowden v. Wilas, 19 
 lud. 10 ; Fultz V. Wycoff, 25 Ind. 321 ; 
 l'h(enix v. Lamb, 29 Iowa, 352, 354; First 
 Nat. Bk. of New Berlin v. Church, 3 
 N. Y. S. C. 10. The answer averred that 
 defendant " had no knowledge or infor- 
 mation thereto," which was held to be an 
 improper form of denial : but the plain- 
 tiff '.s remedy was by motion, and the de- 
 fect liad been waived. Seeley v. Engell, 
 13 N. Y. .542, 548, per Denio J.: "The 
 alleged mistake was set up in the answer, 
 and denied by the reply. If the allegation 
 in that respect was too general in its 
 terms, the remedy of the plaintiff was by 
 motion, under § 160, to compel the de- 
 fendant to make it more certain." See 
 also Stringfellow r. Alderson, 12 Kan. 
 112; Lathrop i-. Godfrey, 6 N. Y. S. C. 96 ; 
 Hutchiugs i". Castle, 48 Cal. 152 ; Jackson 
 Sharp Co. v. Holland, 14 Fla. 384, 389 ; a 
 fortiori such an answer cannot be objected 
 to for the first time on appeal. Green i-. 
 Lake Sup. & Pac. Fuse Co., 46 Cal. 408. 
 See also McCown v. McSween, 29 S. C 
 130 ; Hagely v. Hagely, 68 Cal. 348.
 
 DEFECTIVE ANSWKRS. 719 
 
 § 491. * 600. Defects of Form are v/aived by Neglect to move, 
 and Going to Trial. Test of Formal Defects. That all objections of 
 mere form to the answer are waived by a neglect to move, and 
 by going to trial thereon, is sustained by numerous cases ; ^ and 
 some of them apply the rule to answers in which the deficien- 
 cies were very considerable, even so great as to have rendered 
 the pleading demurrable in the opinion of the court pronouncing 
 the decision. In White v. Spencer, ^ which was an action for 
 flowing plaintiff's lands, the answer set up facts showing a 
 user and enjoyment by defendant of the easement for more than 
 twenty years, but did not aver that this user was adverse. The 
 plaintiff replied a general denial, and on his objection all evi- 
 dence in support of the answer was excluded at the trial. On 
 appeal from the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, 
 the New York Court of Appeals held that the user must be 
 adverse, and that the plaintiff might have successfully de- 
 murred to the answer, because an averment of such adverse 
 user was omitted; but that, by replying, and going to trial, he 
 had waived the objection. Denio J. said: "I am of opinion 
 that the plaintiff, having treated the allegation in the answer as 
 a sufficient statement of defence by replying to it, and by going 
 to trial without objection, is precluded from objecting to evi- 
 dence to sustain it." He cited cases showing that the same rule 
 prevailed under the old system,^ and added: "We have decided, 
 it is true, that it is the duty of the judge on the trial to reject 
 evidence offered in support of immaterial issues.^ But an issue 
 is not immaterial, within the meaning of this rule, on account of 
 the omission of some averment in a pleading which is essential to 
 the full legal idea of the claim or defence which is attempted to 
 be set up. If the court can see, as in this case, what the matter 
 really attempted to he pleaded is, the issue is not immaterial, 
 though it may be defectively stated." In this last sentence 
 Mr. Justice Denio has given a very clear and accurate descrip- 
 tion of mere defects in form, which are waived by a neglect to 
 
 1 [^See note on Imperfect, Incomplete, - White v. Spencer, 14 N. Y. 247, 249, 
 
 and Informal Allegations, p. 599. See also 251. 
 
 Barrett v. Baker (1896), 136 Mo. 512,37 3 Meyer v. McLean, 1 Johns. 509; 2 
 
 S. W. 130. " A bad answer is good enough id. 183; Reynolds v. Lounsbury, 6 Hill, 
 
 for a bad complaint : Hiatt c. Town of 534. 
 
 Darlington (1898), 152 Ind. 570, 53 N. E. * Corning v. Corning, 6 N. Y. 97. 
 
 825.3
 
 720 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 correct them by motion. Whether the principle was properly- 
 applied to the case before him, is, as it seems to me, more than 
 questionable. The answer did not attempt to state an adverse 
 user, and simply fail to state it with accuracy; it omitted any 
 such averment entirely; it therefore set up no defence at all. 
 When it is said that, if the court can plainly see what the matter 
 really attempted to be pleaded is, the deficiency is formal, it is 
 not intended that the court may be able, from their knowledge 
 as lawyers and their experience as judges, to guess with reason- 
 able certainty what the pleader designed ; they must be able to 
 gather from the legal import of the facts which are alleged — 
 although improperly alleged — the nature of the defence relied 
 on; in other words, the substantial facts which constitute that 
 defence must, in some manner, appear on the record. A defence 
 of fraud could hardly be considered sufficient at the trial, from 
 which all averments of the scienter had been omitted ; and yet a 
 fact was here wholly left out of the answer which was as essen- 
 tial in making up the defence as the guilty knowledge is to con- 
 stitute the fraud. Although the reasoning of Mr. Justice Denio 
 is admirable in its definition of the general rule, his conclusion 
 cannot be reconciled with some subsequent decisions of the same 
 court. 
 
 § 492. * 601. Case of Simmons v. Sisson. In Simmons v. 
 Sisson, the subject was discussed at large both upon principle 
 and upon authority. ^ The reasoning of the court, and the 
 
 1 Simmons v. Sisson, 26 N. Y. 264, in his own wrong. On the trial, the 
 
 271. The action was brought by the referee held that this answer admitted 
 
 plaintiff, treasurer of a corporation, the allegations of the complaint, that the 
 
 against the defendants, as stockholders, plaintiff had expended the sum mentioned 
 
 The complaint alleged that the plaintiff over and above the earnings, and had 
 
 had. by order of the directors, advanced done this by order of the directors. On 
 
 and e.xpended a certain sura more than :ippeal from the judgment rendered in 
 
 he had received from its funds, and that favor of the plaintiff, Selden J., who de- 
 
 the corporation was indebted to him livered the opinion of the court, declared 
 
 therefor. The answer contained two de- that the fir.st defence was the exact equiv- 
 
 fences, — 1. It denied that the corpora- alent of «// (/e/)ef at the common law, and 
 
 tion was indebted to the plaintiff in said was a good general denial under the 
 
 sum, or in any other sum ; 2. It alleged code, and tlien proceeded as follows : 
 
 that the plaintiff had been directed by " But whether the preceding position ia 
 
 the corporation to expend the earnings correct or not, it was too late to object at 
 
 thereof, and no more ; that with knowl- the clo.se of the trial that this divi.sion of 
 
 edge of such direction, and of the amount the answer did not put the fact of indebt- 
 
 of such earnings, he had expended more edne.ss in issue. Under the former sy.s- 
 
 than said amount, contrary to the wishes tem of pleaiiing, nil (lelmt to an action of 
 
 and instructions of the corporation, and debt on bond or judgment was bad ou
 
 DEFECTIVE ANSWERS. 
 
 721 
 
 decision upon it, are, in the main, in perfect accord with the 
 spirit and letter of the codes, and well express the liberal design 
 of the reformed procedure. The only criticism which must be 
 made upon the opinion — and it is a most important one — is 
 upon that portion which draws analogies from the common-law 
 system. Certainly none of the special common-law rules which 
 distinguished the cases in which a particular form of general 
 issue could be used, and which defined the office of a demurrer 
 either general or special as applied to such pleas, are preserved ; 
 they have all been swept away, and any trace of them only serves 
 to obscure the clear principles which find an expression in the 
 codes. 1 
 
 § 493. * 602. Additional Cases. In an action upon a promis- 
 sory note, the defendant, an accommodation -maker, pleaded the 
 defence of payment by the payee, and on the trial proved, under 
 objection, a delivery of lumber by said payee to the plaintiff, and 
 the receipt thereof by him in full satisfaction of the demand. 
 
 general demurrer ; but if, instead of de- 
 murring, tlie plaintiff went to trial on that 
 issue, it was always held to put him to 
 proof of his cause of actiou. Starkie on 
 Ev. 140; 2 Phil. Ev. Cow. & H.'s ed. 
 168; I Ch. PI. (Springfield ed. 1844) 
 4.33; Meyer v. McLean, 2 Johns. 183; 
 Push V. Cobbett, 2 Johns. Cas. 256, per 
 Radcliff J. ... I think, therefore, that 
 under the strictest rules of special plead- 
 ing, the first defence of the answer, if not 
 objected to as insufficient before trial by 
 demurrer, would always have been held 
 sufficient, ou tlie trial, to put in issue the 
 cause of action ; and that, in view of the 
 provisions of the code in reference to 
 the construction of pleadings, tlie referee 
 erred in holding that the defendants had 
 admitted the indebtedness of tlie corpo- 
 ration, when they expressly denied it. 
 There are, I think, much stronger rea- 
 sons now for holding such an answer suf- 
 ficient, on the trial, to put the question of 
 indebtedness in issue than there were 
 when the decisions were made to which 
 I have referred. Parties are now pro- 
 vided with short and cheap methods by 
 motion to compel defective pleadings to 
 he amended, stricken out, or that judg- 
 ment be pronounced upon them summa- 
 rily ; and they can have no excuse fur 
 
 reserving such objections until the close 
 of the trial. I am of opinion, that, when 
 that course is taken, the party must 
 stand u])on the pleadings and evidence 
 together ; that the judgment must be such 
 as tlie whole case, pleadings and evidence 
 united, demands; and tliat it would be 
 the duty of the court, under § 176, to dis- 
 regard defects in the pleadings not before 
 noticed, or to order the required amend- 
 ments under §§ 170, 173. If, however, 
 the case should be such as to satisfy tlie 
 court tliat neither party had been misled 
 by defects in the pleadings, it should be 
 disposed of under § 169." 
 
 1 Even though the general issue nil 
 debet, when improperly pleaded in debt 
 upon a specialty, might be reached by, a 
 general demurrer, it is very clear that the 
 first defence in the case above mentioned 
 was not demurrable upon any true con- 
 struction of the provisions found in the 
 codes. It was an attempted denial, and it 
 actually contained denials : its real de- 
 fect was that it denied the legal conclu- 
 sion from the facts alleged by the plaintiff, 
 and not the facts themselves. The only 
 proper mode to correct it would have 
 been a motion. All that was said of its 
 resemblance to nil debet wns utterly out- 
 side of the questions before the court. 
 46
 
 722 CIVIL KEMEDIES,. 
 
 The- New York Court of Appeals, after holding that the answer 
 was good, and that under a defence of payment the defendant 
 may prove a payment in cash or in any other manner, added: 
 " If the particulars of the transaction between the payee and the 
 plaintiff were not sufficiently disclosed b}' the answer, the plain- 
 tiff's remedy was a motion under § IGO of the code. He could 
 not accept the plea, and go to trial upon it, and then interpose 
 the objection for the first time that it was not sufficiently de- 
 scriptive of the particulars relied on as constituting payment."^ 
 In Chamberlain c. Painsville, etc. R. R.,- the Supreme Court of 
 Ohio applied the rule sanctioned by Simmons v. Sisson to an 
 answer equally faulty with the one in the latter case in its denial 
 of legal conclusions rather than of issuable facts. The action 
 being upon a promissory note, the answer was, " That the said 
 note in said petition mentioned was and is wholly without con- 
 sideration, and void." No motion was made to compel more 
 specific averments, and the parties went to trial. The court, 
 after saying that the defendant might have been required to 
 make the defence more definite and certain, added : " Under 
 the broad issue thus chosen by the parties, any evidence would 
 have been admissible which tended to impeach or sustain the 
 consideration of the note."' The answers in this case and in 
 Simmons v. Sisson closely resembled each other in their defects 
 and in their violation of the principles of pleading introduced by 
 the codes. In both, the defendants designed to raise an issue of 
 fact which would go to the whole cause of action. The defect 
 was not a misconception of the defence, nor a reliance on matters 
 which constituted no defence ; it was only an imperfect manner 
 of stating a defence which was in itself perfect. Under a true 
 construction of the codes, neither of these answers was demur- 
 rable. If the plain distinction established by the statutes is 
 to be preserved, it is clear that a motion to make the plead- 
 ing more definite and certain is the only mode of curing defects 
 of this kind. I am aware that demurrers have been sustained 
 to such defences, on the ground tliat they were conclusions 
 of law, and not allegations of fact; but the courts have some- 
 times overlooked the distinctions in this respect created by the 
 legislature. 
 
 1 Farmfirs' &, Cit. Bk. v. Sherman, 33 - Chamberlain i.-. Painesville & H. R. 
 
 N. V. 69, 79. Co., 15 Ohio St. 2'->5, 251.
 
 DEFECTIVE ANSWERS. 723 
 
 § 494. * G03. Doctrine that Defects of Substance are Tvaived by- 
 Failure to demur. I repeat, the doctrine would be an anomaly that 
 an answer may be demurrable because it fails to set up any defence 
 or counter-claim, and still become a sufficient pleading so as to 
 admit proof of the defence or counter-claim from the plaintiff's neg- 
 lect to demur or to object in some other manner prior to the trial. 
 This proposition has, nevertheless, been expressly sanctioned b}' 
 the courts in certain cases, although it is not supported by the 
 weight of judicial authority, and is certainly not sustained by 
 principle.^ Roback v. Powell ^ is an example of these decisions. 
 This case goes farther than any of those before cited, and cer- 
 tainly farther than the rule invoked will warrant. A counter- 
 claim is an independent cause of action, in which the defendant 
 becomes the actor, and assumes the character of a plaintiff. The 
 occasions and purposes in and for which it may be set up are 
 carefully prescribed, and it was conceded that this answer did 
 not come within the statutory definition. If the decision be 
 correct, on the same principle it ought to be held that a de- 
 fendant waives all objection to the sufficiency of a complaint or 
 petition which does Jiot state facts constituting a cause of action, 
 when he answers it and goes to trial. 
 
 § 495. * 604. Liberal Rule of Construction not always Follow^ed. 
 Notwithstanding this array of cases in which the liberal rule of 
 construing the pleadings has been sometimes pushed even to an 
 unwarrantable extreme, there are others in which the courts have 
 entirely disregarded the doctrine, have overlooked their own 
 precedents, and have gone to as great a length in the opposite 
 direction. In Manning i\ Tyler, an action was brought upon 
 a promissory note against R. as maker, and T. as indorser.^ 
 
 1 ^See note on Waiver of Defects of ter-claim having been excluded, the Su- 
 Substance, p. 605.J prenie Court of Indiana held, upon the 
 
 2 Roback v. Powell, 36 Ind. 51.5, 516. defendant's appeal, that as the action was 
 The action was upon an injunction bond on a contract, and the counter-claim was 
 given by Mrs. Roback. The injunction for an alleged tort, the latter was in every 
 had restrained the plaintiff from taking way improper, and could not be sustained 
 down a house which stood upon her land, had it been j>roperly objected to ; but 
 She pleaded, 1, a general denial, and, 2, as that all objection to it had been waived 
 a counter-claim, that Powell entered upon by the replying and going to trial, and 
 her land in her possession, and tore down therefore the evidence in its support 
 her house, and carried the same away, to should have been received. 
 
 iier damage $2,000, for which sum she ^ Manning v. Tyler, 21 N. Y. 567. See 
 
 demanded judgment. The plaintiff re- also Gaston v. McLeran, 3 Ore. 389, 391 ; 
 
 plied by a general denial, and went to Taggart r. Risley, 3 Ore. 306; Freitag i'. 
 
 trial. All evidence in support of thecoun- Burke, 43 lud. 38. 40.
 
 724 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 Althougli the answer of the defendants was held to be frivolous, 
 yet the dissenting opinion of ]\Ir. Justice Denio, rather than that 
 of the court, seems to express the rule established by the code. 
 The deficiencies in this answer were certainly no greater than 
 those in other pleadings to which the liberal mode of construc- 
 tion had been applied by the same court. The pleader did 
 allege something more than the broad conclusion that the note 
 was usurious, and the criticism of the court in this respect was 
 without foundation in fact: he detailed the issuable facts with 
 such minuteness and certainty, that no one could be misled as to 
 the exact nature of the defence. The narrative was undoubtedly 
 incomplete, and it should have been perfected upon the plaintiff's 
 motion; but this is all that can be objected to it. Tlie court 
 may have been unconsciously influenced in their decision by a 
 feeling of distaste for the defence of usury, and thus led to 
 apply a stricter rule of coiistruction than they would have 
 enforced in respect to other defences. 
 
 § 496. * 60.5. Case of Lefler v. Field. The case of Lefler V. 
 Field ^ is in yet stronger contrast with the general course of 
 authorities, and with the express requirement of the codes that 
 the pleadings must be construed liberally with a view to substan- 
 tial justice between the parties, and not adversely to the pleader. 
 The action was for the price of barley bargained and sold. The 
 lanswer set up that the barley was contracted for by an agent of 
 the defendants, who agreed to buy it if it was good and mer- 
 chantable; that the plaintiff represented said barley to be a 
 good, first quality, merchantable article; that the agent relied 
 on such representations ; that the barley was not merchantable, 
 which fact was known to the plaintiff, and therefore the defend- 
 ants refused to accept the same. No demurrer was interposed, 
 nor i_iOtion made ; and the parties went to trial on the pleadings 
 as they stood. The Court of Appeals held that no evidence 
 was admissible to establish the defence ; that the answer did 
 not allege a defence of fraud, since it omitted to state two neces- 
 sary elements thereof: (1) that the plaintiff made the representa- 
 tion with the intent to deceive, and (2) that the defendants or 
 their agent were in fact deceived. 
 
 § 497. * 606. Pleadings by Joint Defendants. When two or 
 more defendants are sued and unite in one responsive pleading, 
 
 1 Lefler v. Field, 52 N. Y. 621. Compare Hutching v. Castle, 48 Cal. 152.
 
 PARTIAL DEFENCES. 725 
 
 it must be good as to each and all of these parties, or it will be 
 wholly bad.^ This is the rule which prevails almost universally. 
 Thus, if the defendants join in an answer which on demurrer 
 proves to be insufficient as to one, it will be adjudged bad as to 
 all; but the result will, of course, be otherwise if they plead the 
 same answer separately.^ On the same principle, if two or more 
 defendants unite in a demurrer to the complaint or petition, and 
 a good cause of action is stated against one or some of them, the 
 demurrer will be wholly overruled.^ The rule is extended by 
 analogy to pleadings containing two or more separate defences or 
 causes of action. If a demurrer is interposed to an entire answer 
 containing two or more separate defences, or to an entire com- 
 plaint containing two or more causes of action, it will be over- 
 ruled if there is one good defence or one good cause of action.'* 
 In an action for a joint and several tort against several defend- 
 ants, where the answer of one is a complete justification of the 
 alleged wrong as to all, and the others either suffer a default or 
 plead different defences, if the issues raised by this answer are 
 found against the plaintiff, the verdict will operate for the 
 benefit of all the defendants, and he cannot recover a judg- 
 ment against those even who made default.^ 
 
 § 498. * GOT. Partial Defences. It was an inflexible rule 
 under the common-law system that every plea in bar must go 
 to the whole cause of action, and must be an entire answer 
 thereto on the record: with pleas in abatement the rule was 
 different, for they did not purport to answer the cause of 
 action. The spreading of a partial defence upon the record 
 was unknown. Whenever such defences were to be relied 
 upon, — as, for example, mitigating circumstances, — they were 
 either proved under the general issue, or under a special plea 
 setting up a complete defence which the pleader knew did not 
 
 1 [[Wliitcomb r. Hardy (1897), 68 Washington Tp. v. Bonney, 45 Ind. 77; 
 
 Minu. 2G5, 71 N. W. 26.3.J Silvers v. Junction R. Co., 43 lud. 435, 
 
 '■^ Morton i'. Morton, 10 Iowa, 58. 442-445. See also Bruce v. Benedict, 31 
 
 3 McGonigal v. Colter, 32 Wis. 614 ; Ark. 301 ; Everett v. Waymire, 30 Ohio 
 Webster r. Tib bits, 19 Wis. 438. St. 308; Nichol v. McCallister, 52 Ind. 
 
 4 Jeffersonville, M. & I. R. Co. v. Van- 586; Roberts v. Johauuas, 41 Wis. 616. 
 cant, 40 Ind. 233; McPhail v. Hyatt, 29 See also § * 577, ante. 
 
 Iowa, 137 ; Modlin v. N. W. Turnp. Co., ^ Williams v. McGrade, 13 Minn. 46. 
 
 48 Ind. 492; Excelsior Draining Co. v. See also, to the same effect, Devyr v. 
 
 Brown, 47 Ind. 19; Towell ;•. Pence, 47 Schaefer, 55 N. Y. 446. 
 Ind. 304; Davidson v. King, 47 Ind. 372;
 
 726 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 exist. The code has certainly abolished this doctrine and the 
 practice based upon it. Several features of the new procedure 
 are utterly inconsistent with it. In the first place, the general 
 or special denials of the code are not so broad as the general 
 issues of the common law most in use had become ; and, as will 
 be particularly shown in the following section, they admit of no 
 evidence not in direct answer to the plaintiff's allegations. In 
 the second place, the verification of pleadings introduced by the 
 codes cuts off all averment of tictitious defences. In the third 
 place, the statute expressly authorizes the defendant to set forth 
 "as many defences as he may have;" and this has been very 
 properly construed as a direct permission, and even requirement, 
 to plead partial as well as complete defences.^ Notwithstand- 
 ing this express statutory provision, there has been some conflict 
 of opinion among the courts in respect to the pleading of miti- 
 gating facts and circumstances. Certain judges have found it 
 impossible to forget the technical methods of the old procedure, 
 and have seemed determined to treat them as still existing in 
 full force and effect ; while others have readily adopted the spirit 
 as well as the letter of the reformed system. I shall therefore 
 postpone the discussion of this particular subject — the plead- 
 ing of mitigating circumstances — •until the sections are reached 
 which treat of the "general denial " and of "new matter." 
 
 § 499. * 608. Partial Defences should be pleaded as such. 
 While partial defences are to be pleaded, it is well settled that 
 they must be pleaded as such. If a defence is set up as an an- 
 swer to the whole cause of action, while it is in fact only a partial 
 one, and even though it would be admissible as such if properly 
 stated on the record, it will be bad on demurrer: the facts al- 
 leged will not constitute a " defence ; " which word, when thus 
 used alone, imports a complete defence. ^ The practical result 
 of this doctrine is, simply, that the pleader must be careful to 
 designate the defence as partial ; he must not content himself 
 with simply averring the facts as in an ordinary case, as if 
 they constituted a full answer to the cause of action, but he 
 must expressly state that the defence is partial. In the absence 
 
 1 QCovle V. Ward (1901), 167 N. Y. Saving Co. v. Harris (1895), 142 Ind. 22o, 
 
 240, 60 N. ?:. 596.] 40 N. E. 1072. See al.-io Bowman v. Fur 
 
 •^ HBreyfoglei-. Stotsenburg (1897), 148 Mfg. Co. (1895), 96 la. 188, 64 N. W. 775, 
 
 lud. 552, 47 N. E. 1057 ; United States construing the Code, § 2682.]
 
 PARTIAL DEFENCES. 727 
 
 ■of such statement, it will be assumed that he intended the de- 
 fence to be complete.^ 
 
 § 500. * 609. Criticism of Foregoing Rule. This rule Seems tO 
 be well established, but it is certainly one which may often work 
 injustice. It is a remnant of the old system, and does not har- 
 monize with the central design of the new, which is to elicit the 
 truth and to decide controversies upon all the actual facts. When 
 the defendant has set up a defence as if to the entire cause of 
 action, which is, however, only partial, and when, if described 
 as partial, it would have been perfectly regular, the plaintiff 
 could not be prejudiced by allowing it to stand for what it is 
 worth as a partial defence. He knows that it is, in fact, par- 
 tial, for the very objection assumes that knowledge. If accurately 
 named, he would be obliged to meet and answer it on the trial ; 
 and he would only be compelled to make the same preparation if 
 it were suffered to remain on the record, and to fulfil its intended 
 purpose. In short, the plaintiff could not be misled by such a 
 proceeding; and to strike out the pleading altogether would, if 
 its allegations were true, be depriving the defendant of certain 
 relief to which he was in justice entitled. I repeat, the rule is 
 nothing but a remnant of the ancient technicalit}', the old devo- 
 
 1 Fitzsimmons v. City F. Ins. Co. of the code. If a party has a partial defence 
 New Haven, 18 Wis. 234 ; Tra.ster v. Snel- to an action, he should set it up, and rely 
 son's Adm., 29 Ind. 96 ; Sayres v. Link- on it as .such, and not as a complete and 
 hart, 25 Ind. 14.5; Conger v. Parker, 29 entire defence." See also, to the same 
 Ind. 380; Stone v. Lewman, 28 Ind. 97; effect, Adkins v. Adkins, 48 Ind. 12, 17; 
 Sanders r. Sanders, 39 lud. 207 ; Yancy Allen v. Randolph, 48 Ind. 496 ; Alvord 
 V. Teter, 39 Ind. 305 ; Bouslog v. Garrett, v. Essner, 45 Ind. 156 ; Curran v. Curran, 
 39 Ind. 338 ; Summers i;. Vaughan, 35 Ind. 40 Ind. 473; Jackson v. Fosbender, 45 
 •323, and cases cited. In Fitzsimmons v. Ind. 305 ; Beeson v. Howard, 44 Ind. 413, 
 City F. Ins. Co., supra, it was said by 416; Gulick i;. Conndy, 42 Ind. 134, 136. 
 Cole J., at p. 240: "The appellant con- But this rule does not extend to an an- 
 tends that, if this answer is not good as swer .simply pleading a set-off le.ss than 
 a total defence, it is good as a partial de- the pLiiutiff's demand, since a set-off is 
 fence to the action. The difficulty with not strictly a defence. Mulleudore v. 
 this position is that this answer professes Scott, 45 Ind. 1 13 ; Dodge v. Dunham, 
 and assumes to answer -the entire cause 41 Ind. 186. See also, as examples of the 
 of action. It is not relied on as a partial, rule stated in the text, Jones v. Frost, 51 
 but as a complete defence, and we have Ind. 69 ; McMahan v. Spinning, 51 id. 
 seen that for this purpose it is insufficient. 187 ; Keller v. Boatman, 49 id. 104; Put- 
 Now, under the old system, when a plea nam v. Tennyson, 50 id. 456 ; Peet i\ 
 professed in its commencement to answer O'Brien, 5 Neb. 360; Peck v. Parchin, 52 
 the whole cause of action, and afterwards Iowa, 46; McDaniel v. Pressler, 3 Wash, 
 answered only a part, the whole plea was 636 ; Thompson v. Halbert, 109 N. Y. 329 ; 
 bad. This rule was elementary; and, Shortle v. Terre Haute & I. Ry. Co., 131 
 upon general principles, we do not see Ind. 338 ; Indianapolis, E. R. & S. W. R. 
 why it is not applicable to pleadings under Co. v. Hyde, 122 Ind. 188.
 
 728 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 tion to external forms of logical precision which marked the 
 common-law procedure, and which made it anything but a 
 practical means of eliciting and applying the truth in judicial 
 controversies. 
 
 SECTION THIRD. 
 
 THE DEFENCE OF DENIAL. 
 
 § 501. * 610. Species of Denial. The various species of denial 
 provided for in the codes are "general" or "specific," and posi- 
 tive or a denial of " knowledge or information of the matter suffi- 
 cient to form a belief." In most of the codes, it is expressly 
 permitted that the denials may be either "general" or "specific." 
 In a few, no provision is in terms made for the general denial, 
 and only those that are "specific '' or "special" are mentioned. 
 In one or two, the language simply speaks of "a denial."^ 
 According to a large majority of the codes, the denial, whether 
 general or specific, may be either positive, or a denial of "knowl- 
 edge or information thereof sufficient to form a belief;" but in a 
 very few of them the latter form is omitted. The defendant is 
 universally allowed to deny only such allegations of the com- 
 plaint or petition as he controverts, and this permission is usually 
 given whether he employs the "general" or the "specific" form 
 of denial; but in the latest revision of the Iowa Code [1897], it 
 is said with more accuracy that the general denial must be " of 
 each allegation of the petition," while the specific denial is to be 
 "of each allegation of the petition controverted " by him. 
 
 1 In Minnesota, although the code is the same as that in New York, expressly 
 
 silent respecting the general denial, and authorizes the general denial, the general 
 
 speaks only of "a denial of each allega- denial in the ordinary form, as used in 
 
 tion," it is settled by repeated decisions other States, is held to be a nullity, and 
 
 that the ordinary form of the general an answer containing it will be struck out 
 
 denial is a compliance with the statute, as sham : an altogether different constrnc- 
 
 and is entirely proper: hence the general tion is placed upon the language of the 
 
 denial is in constant use in that State ; statute from that given in any other State, 
 
 and such, I believe, is the practice in most Schelian v. Malone, 71 N. C. 440, 443 ; 
 
 of the States. Leyde v. Martin, 16 Minn. Flack r. Dawson, 69 N. C. 42 ; Woody v. 
 
 38; Becker f. Sweetzer, 15 Minn. 427, 434 ; Jordan, 69 N. C. 189, 195. In California 
 
 Kingsley v. Oilman, 12 Minn. 515, 517; and a few other States, the general denial 
 
 Bond V. Corbet, 2 Minn. 248 ; Caldwell v. is not permitted when the complaint or 
 
 Bruggerman, 4 Minn. 270 ; Starbuck v. petition is verified ; in such a case, there- 
 
 Dunklee, 10 Minn. 173 ; Montour d. Purdy, fore, a general denial raises no issue, and 
 
 11 Minn. 401. On the other hand, in will be struck out on motion. People r. 
 
 North Carolina, notwithstanding that the Ilagar, 52 Cal. 171. 
 language of the code, which is exactly
 
 DIFFEKENT KINDS OF DENIALS. 729 
 
 § 502. * 611. Outline of Proposed Treatment. In actual prac- 
 tice, the "general denial," wherever permitted, is only employed 
 when the defendant desires to put the whole complaint or peti- 
 tion in issue, and " specific " denials when he wishes to take issue 
 merely with certain allegations thereof. It is very plain, that in 
 the former case the "general denial," in its brief and comprehen- 
 sive form, is as efficacious as a particular traverse of each aver- 
 ment separately. Nothing is gained by filling the record with 
 specific denials, when one sweeping denial of the entire pleading 
 will answer the same purpose and admit the same proofs. I 
 shall distribute the subject-matter of this section under the fol- 
 lowing heads, assuming in the first instance, for convenience of 
 the discussion, that the denial is " positive : " I. The form of the 
 "general denial," and of the "specific denials; " II. The nature 
 of "specific denials," and what issues they raise; III. Allega- 
 tions admitted by omitting to deny ; IV. Denials in the form of 
 negatives pregnant; V. Argumentative denials, and specific de- 
 fences equivalent to the general denial; VI. General denial of 
 all allegations not otherwise admitted or explained; VII. What 
 allegations must be denied, — issuable facts, and not conclusions 
 of law; VIII. Denials of information or belief, when proper, 
 and their effect; IX. What can be proved under denials either 
 general or specific ; X. Some special statutory rules in reference 
 to denials. 
 
 § 503. * 612, Same Subject. The discussion which follows, and 
 the practical rules deduced therefrom, are based in the first place 
 upon the assumption that the denials, whether general or specific, 
 are positive in their nature. The conclusions which are reached 
 apply, however, with equal force and effect, to those cases in 
 which the denials are of information or belief. The only object 
 of the latter form is, that the defendant may be enabled to put 
 the plaintiff's allegations in issue when he is obliged to verify his 
 answer, and cannot do so from his own personal knowledge: 
 the effect and efficacy of the traverse are not diminished nor in 
 any manner altered by the use of this method when it is 
 properly employed. 
 
 § 504. * 613. External Form of Denials, General and Specific. 
 Under the common-law system there were several distinct species 
 of the "general issue" and of particular traverses, each appro- 
 priate to and only to be used in some one of the different forms
 
 730 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 of action, or to put in issue certain classes of allegations; but all 
 these have been abolished in the reformed procedure. One form 
 of the general denial is sufficient for all actions and for all issues ; 
 and although it may undergo slight and unimportant variations, 
 it is substantiall}' the same in all the States, and in the hands of 
 all members of the bar. The material averment, modified doubt- 
 less in its phraseology, is that the defendant "denies each and 
 every- allegation of the complaint or petition." The form in 
 common use is, " The defendant, for answer to the complaint 
 herein, denies each and every allegation thereof."^ It is of 
 course impossible to describe the forms of any specific denial. 
 From its very name and nature, it is the special traverse of some 
 particular averment found in the plaintiff's pleading, and must 
 therefore depend to a very great degree upon the matter and 
 shape of the statement which is thus controverted. How far it 
 should merely follow and negative the exact language of the 
 allegation to which it is directed, will be considered under the 
 subsequent head of the section which treats of denials in the form 
 of a negative pregnant. ^ It will there be shown that such an 
 
 1 This form is slightly varied in the 
 standard text-books upon pleading, and 
 in the actual practice of the bar : but this 
 is entirely sufficient ; any additional mat- 
 ter would be superfluous. Examples of 
 irregular forms held to be sufficient, 
 Moen V. Eldred, 22 Minn. 538; Jones 
 I'. Ludlum, 74 N. Y. 61 ; Brothington 
 V. Downey, 21 Hun, 436; Hoffman v. 
 Eppers, 41 Wis. 251 ; but an answer 
 " that no allegation of the complaint is 
 true," is wholly nugatory, — raises no 
 issue. 
 
 ^The following variations have been 
 held sufficient. A denial of " each and 
 every allegation of new matter : " City of 
 Crete v. Hendricks (1902), Neb., 90 N."\V. 
 215; a denial of "all the allegations of 
 each paragraph of both counts of the peti- 
 tion :" Ocean Steamship Co. v. x\nderson 
 (1900), 112 Ga. 835, 38 S. E. 102; an an- 
 swer that defendant "states and alleges 
 that he denies each and every allega- 
 tion of the petition :" lieiss v. Argubright 
 (1902), Neb.. 92 N. W. 988; an answer 
 that defendants "say that they deny each 
 and every allegation:" Town of Denver 
 V. Spokane Falls (1893), 7 Wash. 226, 34 
 Pac. 926. 
 
 In State ex rel. v. Butte Water Co. 
 (1896), 18 Mont. 199, 44 Pac. 966, the 
 court said : " We shall follow the Cali- 
 fornia cases, and hold that the statutory 
 form of denial was the only one to be 
 sustained." To the same effect see Ro.ssi- 
 terv. Loeber (1896), 18 Mont. 372, 45 Pac. 
 560. 
 
 The alleged insufficiency of a general 
 denial cannot be raised for the first time 
 on appeal : King r. Pony Gold Miu. Co. 
 (1903), 28 Mont. 74, 72 Pac. 309. 
 
 A general denial is not rendered bad by 
 immaterial matter alleged in connection 
 therewith: Ralya r. Atkins (1901), 157 Ind. 
 331, 61 N. E. 726.3 
 
 - [_" A denial of the very words of the 
 allegations of the petition, without deny- 
 ing their substance and effect, tenders no 
 issue:" Knight r. Denman (1902), 64 
 Neb. 814, 90 N. W. 863. It is not neces- 
 sary that a traverse should be expressed 
 in negative words : Stetson v. Briggs 
 (1896), 114 Cal. 511, 46 Pac. 603; Glen- 
 cross V. Evans (1894), Ariz., 36 Pac. 212. 
 See also State ex rel. v. Adams (1901), 
 161 Mo. .349, 61 S. W. 894. 
 
 Where suit is brouglit on a note paya- 
 ble conditionally, and the defendant denies
 
 DIFFERENT KINDS OF DENIALS. 731 
 
 exact adherence to the text of the adverse averment may be 
 dangerous, as the result may be an admission of the substantial 
 fact intended to be put in issue. 
 
 § 505. * 614. Issuable Facts as Distinguished from Evidentiary 
 Facts and from Conclusions. The object of all denials is to put 
 in issue the allegations of the complaint or petition. As will be 
 shown hereafter under the head of the proofs which may be ad- 
 mitted in support of a simple denial, it is only the issuable facts 
 which need to be controverted, and which are in fact controverted, 
 by the defendant's traverse. It frequently, and indeed generally, 
 happens that the cause of action depends upon the existence 
 of a succession or group of facts. Each of these must be es- 
 tablished in order to make out the right of action, and all are 
 therefore "issuable facts." In addition thereto, the plaintiff's 
 pleading will often contain other averments which must be 
 stated, but which need not be proved as stated, among which are 
 those of time, place, number, quantity, value, and the like. 
 Finally, it happens too frequently, that besides the statements 
 of these strictly "issuable facts," which are all that the plead- 
 ing should comprise, the plaintiff has unnecessarily, and in 
 a certain sense improperly, introduced averments of matters 
 which are really the details of evidence from which the ex- 
 istence of the "issuable facts" is to be inferred by the jury 
 or the court. It is not always easy to distinguish in a com- 
 plaint or petition between the main conclusions of fact, — 
 the issuable or material facts, — all and each of which are indis- 
 pensable to create the right of action, and the mere details of evi- 
 dence which must be proved at the trial in order to establish the 
 essential "issuable facts; " and the careless mode of pleading 
 which has grown up in some States, contrary to the true intent 
 and spirit of the reformed procedure, results chiefly from a dis- 
 regard of the distinction here mentioned, and is shown in a con- 
 fused admixture of evidentiary matter, allegations of substantial 
 facts, and conclusions of law, in the same complaint or petition. 
 
 § 506. * 615. Function of the Specific Denial. When the Series 
 of issuable facts 'which would make up the plaintiff's cause of 
 
 that the conditions have been performed, S. W. 212. "A denial, though coupled 
 
 and specifies tlie particulars in regard to with an allegation showing a lack of 
 
 ■which there has been non-compliance, the knowledge of the matters denied, is suflB- 
 
 defendant waives all grounds not specified : cient to raise an issue:" Smith v. Allen 
 
 Coffin V. Black (1899), 07 Ark. 219, 54 (1901), 63 Neb. 74, 88 N. W. 155.]
 
 732 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 action are properly stated, it will frequently happen, especially 
 if the pleadings are verified, that the defendant cannot deny them 
 all. Some of them may be true, so that an issue upon them is 
 impossible. But if one or more are not true, and can therefore 
 be controverted, and if tlie existence of all is indispensable to 
 the right of action, a denial of that particular allegation, or of 
 those particular ftllegations, may be as complete a defence as 
 though the entire series was traversed and disproved. The 
 forming such an issue upon some one or more particular aver- 
 ments out of the whole number contained in the complaint or 
 petition is the legitimate and proper office of the "special 
 denial," and by its use in this manner an ample defence may 
 be placed upon the record. A "specific denial *' is therefore a 
 denial of some particular averment in the complaint or petition ; 
 and whether or not it alone raises a material issue, and consti- 
 tutes a sufficient defence, depends upon the question, whether 
 the particular allegation thus traversed is in itself essential to 
 the maintenance of the cause of action.^ There may, of course, be 
 several such specific denials inserted in the same answer, directed 
 to distinct averments of the adverse pleading, and together con- 
 stituting a defence differing from that raised by the "general 
 denial " in the single circumstance, that by the latter all the 
 issuable facts are put in issue, while by the former only a portion 
 of them are controverted. As each specific denial is aimed at a 
 particular averment, it should expressly and unmistakably point 
 out the statement of fact intended to be traversed ; it should 
 deny that allegation fully and explicitly, so that the plaintiff 
 may be forced to establish it by proofs ; and it should leave no 
 doubt as to the matter at which it is aimed, and as to the issue 
 intended to be made.^ 
 
 ^ QWhere the deuial in an answer re- ground, itissaid, thatmere matterof aggra- 
 
 lates solely to an averment which presents ration, not froing to tlie cause of action, or 
 
 no ground for relief, such denial will be niereinducenicntorexplanatory matter, not 
 
 treated as surplusage : Chicago, etc Ry. Co. in itself essential to, or the substance of, the 
 
 r. Phillips (1900), 111 la. 377, 82 N. W. 787. case, should not be traversed. "3 
 
 In Bowman v. Bowman (1899), 153 ~ QTo deny an averment specifically 
 
 Ind. 498, 5.5 N. E. 422, the court .said : "If it must be singled t)Ut and denied apart 
 
 an allegation in the opposite pleading be from others in the same paragraph with 
 
 altogether immaterial, it cannot be trav- which it is connected : Woronieki v. Paris- 
 
 ersed ; otherwise the object of pleading, kiego (1901), 74 Conn. 224, 50 Atl. 562. 
 
 viz., the bringing the parties to an issue See also Boyle i'. McWilliaras (1897), 69 
 
 upon a matter or point decisive of the Conn. 201, 37 Atl. 501. 
 merits, would be defeated. And, upon this Where an answer contains a ilenial of
 
 SPECIFIC DENIALS. 
 
 733 
 
 § 507. * 616. Illustrative Case. The object of this kind of 
 denial, cand the rules which govern its use, were accurately 
 stated in a recent case : " To determine whether an allegation 
 has been properly denied or not, we must examine the answer 
 to the particular allegation which it is designed to controvert. 
 If, taken by itself, an issue is fairly made, and there is no 
 admission inconsistent with the answer, the denial is suffi- 
 cient. . . . Each denial must be regarded as applying to the 
 specific allegation it purports to answer, and not as forming 
 part of an answer to some other specific and entirely independ- 
 ent allegation."^ A single case, an abstract of which is placed in 
 the foot-note, will serve to illustrate the object and effect of the 
 specific denial.^ As the defendant in this action could not con- 
 trovert his signature to the instrument, the pleader evidently 
 supposed that it was impossible for him to deny the execution 
 in the answer since the pleadings were verified; he therefore 
 traversed but one issuable fact, — the delivery. Success in 
 this issue was as complete a defence as though the execution 
 
 any material allegation, a general de- 
 murrer to the entire answer cannot be 
 sustained: Hill v. Walsh (1894), 6 S. D. 
 421, 61 N. W. 440; Lee v. Mehew (1899), 
 8 Okla. 136, 56 Pac. 1046; City of Guthrie 
 V. Lumber Co. (1897), 5 Okla. 774, 50 
 Pac. 84.3 
 
 1 Racouillat v. Rene, 32 Cal. 450, 453, 
 455, per Sawyer J. ; and see AUis v. 
 Leonard, 46 K Y. 688. 
 
 2 Sawyer r. Warner, 15 Barb. 282, 285. 
 The complaint, in an action upon a prom- 
 issory note, alleged the making of the 
 note by the defendant, the delivery thereof 
 by the defendant to the plaintiff, the 
 present ownership of the plaintiff, non- 
 payment, and indebtedness of the de- 
 fendant thereon in the amount specified 
 therein. The answer merely denied that 
 the defendant ever " gave " the said note 
 or any other note to the plaintiff, and 
 denied all indebtedness. On the trial, the 
 plaintiff proved the signature of the note 
 to be in the defendant's handwriting, and 
 his own possession. The body of the in- 
 strument was in the plaintiff's handwrit- 
 ing. The defendant then proved facts 
 tending to show that he never executed 
 the instrument as a note, and never de- 
 
 livered it to the plaintiff, but that he had 
 some time written and left his name on a 
 blank paper, and the plaintiff had fraud- 
 ulently added the body of the note over 
 such signature. The jury rendered a 
 verdict for the defendant ; and, upon the 
 plaintiff's appeal, the court said: "TJie 
 allegation in tlie answer that the defend- 
 ant never gave the note to the plaintiff is 
 a denial of the allegation in the complaint 
 that the defendant made the note, so far 
 as making includes delivery ; and also of 
 the further allegation, that the defendant 
 delivered the note to the plaintiff. The 
 question to be tried on the.se allegations 
 was, whether or not the note was delivered 
 to the plaintiff as alleged by him. . . . 
 The plaintiff made out this fact prima 
 facie. . . . But the defendant was at lib- 
 erty, in support of his side of the issues, 
 independent of other modes, to prove facts 
 inducing a contrary presumption, and, in 
 that way, overcome the presumption from 
 the plaintiff's proof ; and he was entitled 
 to give in evidence any facts calculated to 
 satisfy the jury by fair and direct infer- 
 ence that the note was never delivered by 
 him."
 
 734 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 had also been disproved. It is plain, however, that the "gen- 
 eral denial"' might have been pleaded; for, if the defence was 
 true, there had never been any execution or delivery of the note 
 in the legal sense of these terms. ^ 
 
 ^ 508. * G17. Allegations Admitted by Failure to deny. All 
 the codes provide that material allegations in the complaint or 
 petition, not controverted by a general or specific denial, are 
 admitted to be true for the purposes of the action. ^ It follows 
 
 1 See Higgins v. Germaine, 1 Mont. 
 230 ; also Van Dyke r. Maguire, 57 N. Y. 
 429 (denial of value alone in action for 
 labor and materials) ; Dunning !•. Rum- 
 baugh, 36 Iowa, 566, 568 (denial of exe- 
 cution only in an action on a note). For 
 further illustrations of the text, see Trap- 
 nail v. Hill, 31 Ark. 346 ; Rabbage v. Sec. 
 Bap. Church of Dubuque, 54 Iowa, 172; 
 Koberts v. Johannas, 41 Wis. 616; Miller 
 V. Brigham, 50 Cal. 615 ; Lowell v. Lowell, 
 55 id. 316. 
 
 ^Denials of specific allegations : Juris- 
 dictional facts, Aultman v. Mills (1894), 
 9 Wash. 63, 36 Pac. 1046 ; consideration, 
 Frank v. Jenkins (1895), 11 Wash. 611, 
 40 Pac. 220 ; seizin and po8se.«<sion, Ray- 
 mond V. Morrison (1894), 9 Wash. 156, 
 37 Pac. 318; signification of alleged slan- 
 derous words, Barr v. Birkner (1895), 44 
 Neb 197, 62 N. W. 494; corporate exist- 
 ence, Davis V. Nebraska Nat. Bank (1897), 
 51 Neb. 401, 70 N. W. 963; ownership. 
 Central City Bank v. Rice (1895), 44 
 Neb. 594, 63 N. W. 60 ; execution of 
 promissory note, Topeka Capital Co. r. 
 Remington (1900), 61 Kan. 6, 59 Pac. 
 1062; same, Kimble v. Bunny (1900), 61 
 Kan. 665, 60 Pac. 746; partnership, Craig 
 r. Chipman (1900), Ky., 57 S. W. 244; 
 title, Sprigg v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co. (1897), 
 
 101 Ky. 185, 40 S. W. 575; execution, 
 Marshall Field Co. v. Oren Ruffcorn Co. 
 (1902), 117 la. 157, 90 N. W. 618 ; corpo- 
 rate existence. Law Trust Society v. Hogue 
 (1900), 37 Ore. 544, 62 Pac. 380; that 
 money is due, Parsons r. Wright (1897), 
 
 102 la. 473, 71 N. W. 351; that defend- 
 ants were and still are doing business 
 under the name of the C. agency, Nolan v. 
 Hentig (1903). 138 Cal. 281, 7rPac. 440. 
 
 Evidence admissible under specific 
 denials : A denial that a note had been 
 materially altered dues not raise tlie i.^sue 
 
 that the note was so negligently drawn 
 that the alteration could be made without 
 exciting the suspicions of an ordinarily 
 prudent business man : Bank of Com- 
 merce c. Ilaldeman (1900), 109 Ky. 222, 58 
 S. W. 5S7. In an action to recover for 
 value of services rendered, tlie defendant 
 cannot, under a denial of tlieir value, 
 prove that the services were not rendered, 
 but is confined to proof of value : Buddress 
 V. Sciiafer ^1895), 12 Wash. 310, 41 Pac. 
 43. To .same effect see Galliers v. Chicago, 
 etc. Ry. Co. (1902), 116 la. 319, 89 N. W. 
 1109. Under a denial of title evidence of 
 abandonment may be given : Trevaskis 
 V. Peard (1896), 111 Cal. 599, 44 Pac. 246. 
 
 In Law Trust Society v. Hogue (1900), 
 37 Ore. 544, 62 Pac. 380, the court said : 
 '' A plea of nul iiel corporation imposes 
 upon the plaintiff the burden of proving 
 its corporate existence, but whether it 
 should be considered a pica in abatement 
 or in bar has been the subject of much 
 controversy. . . . Such plea docs not sug- 
 gest a better writ, thereby lacking one of 
 the essential elements of a plea in abate- 
 ment ; and as it tends to defeat, and not 
 postpone, the action, we think the better 
 reason supports the theory that a plea of 
 nul tiel corporation <roes to the merits, and 
 is a plea in bar, and, this beinsj so, Hogue 
 and his wife did not waive such defence by 
 joining it with a j)lea to the merits." 
 
 The execution and delivery of a bond 
 sued on can only be denied by a plea of 
 non est factum : English v. Grant (1897), 
 102 Ga.35, 29 S. E. 157.] 
 
 - [^Stork V. Supreme Lodge (1900), 113 
 la. 724. 84 N. W. 721 ; Kent ;•. Muscatine, 
 etc. Ry. Co. (1902), 115 la. 383, 88 N. W. 
 935; Kellar v. Pagan (1899), 54 8. C. 
 255, 32 S. E. 352 ; McMillan i'. Gambill 
 (1894), 115 N. C. 352, 20 S. E. 474; 
 Peterson';'. Bean (1900), 22 Utah, 43, 61
 
 WHAT IS ADMITTED BY A FAILURE TO DENY. 
 
 73f 
 
 that the plaintiff need not prove any material allegations so con- 
 ceded to be true; evidence in contradiction of them cannot be 
 received; and a finding of fact in opposition to such admission 
 will be disregarded or set aside on appeal. i The important 
 question is, What facts or allegations are "materiar"? The 
 answer has already been indicated. The allegations of the 
 " issuable facts " mentioned in the last preceding subdivision, 
 and described at large in Chapter Third, are the material alle- 
 gations, which are admitted by a neglect to deny them. It 
 follows that the two other classes of averments found in com- 
 plaints and petitions, viz., those of time, place, quantity, value, 
 amount, and the like, and those of unnecessary evidentiary mat- 
 ter, or of legal conclusions, are not thus admitted. They need 
 not be denied, and are not the subject-matter of proper issues 
 upon the pleadings. The allegations of time, place, amount, 
 value, amount of damages, and the like, are not, except in 
 very special cases, matters of substance so as to require a 
 denial; and they may, in general, be contradicted or modified 
 
 Pac. 213; Merguire v. O'Donnell (1894), 
 103 Cal. 50, 36 Pac. 1033 ; Pitzer v. Terri- 
 tory of Oklahoma (1896), 4 Okla. 86, 44 
 Pac. 216; Boles v. Bennington (1896), 
 136 Mo. 522, 38 S. W. 306 ; Parke v. 
 Boulware (1901), Idaho, 63 Pac. 1045; 
 Capitol Lumbering Co. j;. Learned (1899), 
 36 Ore. 544, 59 Pac. 454 ; Harlan County 
 V. Hogsett (1900), 60 Neb. 362, 83 N. W. 
 171 ; Davis v. First Nat. Bank (1899), 57 
 Neb. 373, 77 N. W. 775 ; Baker v. Peter- 
 sou (1899), 57 Neb. 375, 77 N. W. 774; 
 Lonergan v. Lonergan (1898), 55 Neb. 
 641, 76 N. W. 16 ; Equitable Trust Co. v. 
 O'Brien (1898), 55 Neb. 735, 76 N. W. 
 417 ; Hartzell v. McClurg (1898), 54 Neb. 
 313, 74 N. W. 625; Stewart v. Am. Ex. 
 Bank (1898), 54 Neb. 461, 74 N. W. 865; 
 Rohman v. Gaiser (1898), 53 Neb. 474, 73 
 N. W. 923 ; Van Etten v. Kosters (1896), 
 48 Neb. 152, 66 N. W. 1106; Scofield v. 
 Clark (1896), 48 Neb. 711, 67 N. W. 754 ; 
 Maxwell v. Higgins (1893),38 Neb. 671, 
 57 N. W. 388; Smith v. Coe (1902), 170 
 N. Y. 162, 63 N. E. 57; Bouscaren v. 
 Brown (1894), 40 Neb. 722, 59 N. W.385 ; 
 Douglas County v. Bennett (1901), 61 
 Neb. 660, 85 N. W. 833 ; White v. Costi- 
 gan (1903), 138 Cal. 564, 72 Pac. 178 ; Her- 
 ring-IIall-:Marviu Co. y. Smith (1903), 43 
 
 Ore. 315, 72 Pac. 704. But allegations of 
 value and damages are not admitted by 
 failure to deny them : Baker v. Peterson 
 (1899), 57 Neb. 375, 77 N. W. 774 ; Hart- 
 zell V. McClurg (1898), 54 Neb. 313, 74 
 N. W. 625; Grant v. Clarke (1899), 58 
 Neb. 72, 78 N. W. 364. 
 
 Admissions in pleadings are conclu- 
 sive: Nugent V. Powell (1893), 4 Wyo. 
 1 73, 33 Pac. 23 ; Gadsden v. Thrush (1898), 
 56 Neb. 565, 76 N. W. 1060. Facts ad- 
 mitted in the pleadings need not be 
 proved : Johnson v. Reed (1896), 47 Neb. 
 322, 66 N. W. 405; Bradfield v. Sewall 
 (1899), 58 Neb. 637, 79 N. W. 615; Knight 
 t'. Finney (1899), 59 Neb. 274, 80 N. W. 
 912. But a party is not bound by admis- 
 sions in abandoned pleadings: Mahoney v. 
 Hardware Co. (1897), 19 Mont. 377, 48 
 Pac. 545. But they must be proved as 
 against infant defendants, under Code» 
 § 126: Leslie v. Maxey (1902), Ky., 67 
 S. W. 839.] 
 
 1 Morton v. Waring's Heirs, 18 B. 
 Mon. 72, 82 ; Bradbury v. Cronise, 46 
 Cal. 287 ; Howard i'. Throckmorton, 48 
 Cal. 482, 490. 
 
 [^Goldwater v. Burnside (1900), 22 
 Wash. 215, 60 Pac. 409.]
 
 73G 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 without a denial. Thus, in actions of trover, trespass, or 
 replevin, it was not necessary to traverse the averments as to 
 the value of the chattels, and as to the amount of damages; 
 and the same rule prevails in all actions brought for a similar 
 purpose under the new system.^ "The defendant is not bound 
 to answer all matters of evidence which the plaintiff chooses to 
 allege. The office of the complaint is to aver the material, issu- 
 able facts which constitute the cause of action, and not the evi- 
 dence to prove these facts. It is only material allegations that 
 are admitted when not specifically controverted by the answer. "^ 
 " The scope of the general denial is merely to put in issue such 
 averments of the complaint as the plaintiff is bound to prove in 
 order to maintain his action: it does not controvert redundant 
 allesrations."^ 
 
 1 Jenkins v. Steanka, 19 Wis. 126. 
 
 2 Racouillat r. Kene, 32 Cal. 4.50, 4.5.5, 
 per Sawyer J. ; Siter v. Jewett, 33 Cal. 92. 
 
 [[Gattisf. Kilgo (1901), 128 N. C. 402, 
 38 S. E. 931. And only such facts are 
 admitted as are properly pleaded : Doud 
 r. Duluth Milling Co. (1893), 55 Minn. 53, 
 56 N. \V. 463-3 
 
 ^ Adams Exp. Co. v. Darnell, 31 Ind. 
 20, 22, per Prazer J. ; Baker v. Kistler, 13 
 Ind. 63. For an example of immaterial 
 denial, see Newman v. Springfield F. & 
 M. Ins. Co., 17 Minn. 123, 133. Further 
 illustrations of the text, Bounellf. Jacobs, 
 36 Wis. 59 ; Katzhausen v. Koehler, 42 id. 
 232 ; State v. Russell, 5 Neb. 211; Cook v. 
 Smith, 54 Iowa, 636 ; Fargo v. Ames, 45 
 id. 494; Stair v. Cragin, 24 Hun. 177; 
 Thompson v. Thompson, 52 Cal. 154. 
 
 ^^Miscellaneous Rules Respecting 
 Admissicms. 
 
 "Imperfect and defective denials, if 
 acted upon as sufficient at the trial, are in 
 no sense admissions of the allegations of 
 a pleading which are attempted to be 
 denied:" Loftus v. Fischer (1895), 106 
 Cal. 616, 39 Pac. 1064. Where a defend- 
 ant admits a bond pleaded by plaintiff, his 
 denial of certain of its plain and specific 
 provisions is unavailing: Aikens v. Frank 
 (1898), 21 Mont. 192, 53 I'ac. 538. In an 
 action of ejectment by a tenant in com- 
 mon against liis co-tenant, a denial in the 
 answer of the plaintiff's title and right of 
 
 entry is equivalent to an ouster, as of the 
 date of tlie commencement of the action, 
 and the ouster is therefore admitted on 
 the pleadings: Plass v. Plass (1898), 121 
 Cal. 131, 53 Pac. 448. In an action to ob- 
 tain an accounting of a partnership, where 
 plaintiff alleges that no settlement of tiie 
 partnership affairs has been had and tiie 
 defendants specifically deny this allega- 
 tion, an admission in the answer that an 
 error was made in preparing the balance 
 sheet on which the settlement was founded, 
 is pro tanlo a limitation upon tlie denial 
 that there had been no settlement ; Rankin 
 i: Newman (1895), 107 Cal. 602,40 Pac. 
 1024. " Where the answer admits ma- 
 terial allegations of the complaint, but ac- 
 com])anies the concession with a state- 
 ment of affirmative matter in explanation 
 by way of defence, ' the plaintiff may 
 avail himself of the admissions without 
 the qualifications : ' " Cook v. Guirkin 
 (1896), 119 N. C. 13,25 S. E. 715. "If 
 during the trial of an action, new matter 
 pleaded in the answer is treated by the 
 parties as denied or placed in issue, it will 
 be so considered in this court, .although no, 
 or an imperfect, reply was filed : " Minzer 
 V. Will m.an -Mercantile Co. (1899), 59 Neb. 
 410, 81 N. W. 307. While a party may 
 withdraw his pleadings, he cannot by such 
 withdrawal avoid the effect of the ad- 
 missions made: Cooley r. Abbey (1900), 
 111 Ga 439, 36 S. E. 786. 
 
 But where allegations, not denied, are
 
 NEGATIVES PREGNANT. 737 
 
 § 509. * 618. Negatives Pregnant. How they may arise. Such 
 a denial is one pregnant with an admission of the substantial fact 
 which is apparently controverted ; or, in other words, one which, 
 although in the form of a traverse, really admits the important 
 fact contained in the allegation. As an illustration: If the aver- 
 ment was that the defendant on the first day of January made a 
 note, and the answer should deny that the defendant on the first 
 day of January made the note, this might be construed as an 
 admission that he made the note on some other day: or if the 
 complaint stated that " the defendant wrongfully and forcibly 
 entered the plaintiff's close," and the answer should deny "that 
 the defendant wrongfully and forcibly entered the plaintiff's 
 close," the fact of entering the close might be considered as 
 admitted. Of course, a denial to produce this result must of 
 necessity be specific ; for the general denial of "each and every 
 allegation in the complaint " cannot be pregnant with any admis- 
 sion.^ Denials in the form of a negative pregnant arise (1) when 
 the allegation is of a single fact with some qualifying or modify- 
 ing circumstance, and the traverse is in ipsis verbis, using exactly 
 the same language, and no more ; and (2) when the allegation is 
 of several distinct and separate facts or occurrences connected by 
 the copulative conjunction, and the traverse is in ipsis verbis of 
 the same facts and occurrences also connected by the same con- 
 junction. In most of the reported decisions, the courts have held 
 such forms of denial to be insufficient, and have declared that 
 they raised no issues, treating the statements of the complaint or 
 petition as actually admitted. This was the universal rule under 
 the old system ; and as it was not based upon any merely techni- 
 cal reasons, or doctrine of pleading, the same rule is properly 
 followed under the codes. ^ 
 
 treated as in issue on the trial, the omis- 194; Dean v. Leonard, 9 Minn. 190. The 
 
 sion of a denial will be deemed waived : following cases furnish illustrations of 
 
 Albion Milling Co. v. First Nat. Bank the text : Dole v. Burleigh, 1 Dak. 227 ; 
 
 (1902), 64 Neb. 116, 89 N. W. 638; Cross- Hanning v. Bassett, 12 Bush, .361 ; Mor- 
 
 land V. Admire (1899), 149 Mo. 6.50,51 gan v. Booth, 13 id. 480; Harden v. 
 
 S. W. 463; Conant v. Jones (1893), '.Idaho, Atchison, etc. R. Co., 4 Neb. 321 ; Crane 
 
 32 Pac. 2.50 ; Missoula Co. v. O'Donnell v. Morse, 49 Wis. 368 ; Norris v. Glenn, 
 
 (1900), 24 Mont. 65, 60 Pac. 594.] 1 Idaho, 590; Lorney i'. Cronan, 50 Cal. 
 
 1 German Am. Bk. of Hastings v. 610; Prior v. Madigan, 51 id. 178; Le- 
 
 White, 38 Minn. 471, overruling earlier roux v. Murdock, 51 id. 541 ; Argard ?•. 
 
 Minnesota cases. Parker, 81 Wis. 581 ; Pullen v. Wrigiit, 34 
 
 '^ See Pottgieser v. Dorn, 16 Minn. Minn. 314; James w. McPhee, 9 Colo. 486. 
 204, 209; Ljnd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, QCurnow r. Phcenix Ins. Co. (1895), 46 
 
 47
 
 738 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 510. * 619. Illustrations. A few examples will illustrate the 
 nature of these denials, and the decisions of the courts thereon. 
 In an action upon a promissory note against the indorser, the 
 answer, copying the exact language of the complaint, said: "That 
 whether or not, upon the maturity of the said note, the same was 
 duly presented to the makers for payment, and payment thereof 
 demanded and refused, and thereupon said note was duly pro- 
 tested for non-payment and notice of such presentment, refusal, 
 and protest, given to the defendant, the defendant has no knowl- 
 edge or information sufficient to form a belief. " This denial was 
 pronounced bad as a negative pregnant, and was disregarded.^ 
 In an action upon a fire policy against the insurers, the defend- 
 ants moved for leave to file an amended answer. In denying 
 this motion, the court said: "The denials are all liable to the 
 objection that they are negatives pregnant. The complaint avers 
 that on a particular day the property was all destroyed by fire. 
 The answer denies this in the very words of the complaint. Such 
 a denial is a negative pregnant with the admission that it may 
 have been destroyed on some other day, or that a part may have 
 been destroj^ed on the day named. Such denials have always 
 been held insufficient. "^ A complaint alleging that "the proofs 
 of loss were filed with the secretary of the defendant on the 31st 
 of March, 1866," the denial was, that the proofs were filed "as 
 alleged in the comjjlciint." This was declared to be pregnant with 
 the admission that they were filed on another day within the time 
 required.^ 
 
 § 511. * 620. Illustrations. When a verified complaint con- 
 tained many distinct allegations conjunctively stated, and the 
 
 S. C. 79, 24 S. E. 74, quoting the text ; the 'defendant, an answer denying that 
 
 Columbia Nat. Bank v. Western Iron & he performed such work and labor at 
 
 Steel Co. (1896), 14 Wash. 162, 44 Pac. the request of the defendant admitted 
 
 145. But a negative pregnant does not the performance of the services by the 
 
 operate to prevent an expre.is denial of plaintiff. 
 
 the same fact from putting it in issue: ■* Schaetzel v. Germantown, etc. Ins. 
 
 Kennedy v. Dickie (1902), 27 Mont. 70, 69 Co., 22 Wis. 412. See also Robbins v. 
 
 Pac. 672.] Lincoln, 12 Wis. 1. In McMurphy v. 
 
 1 Young V. Catlett, 6 Duer, 4.37, 44.3, Walker, 20 Minn. 382, 384, the complaint 
 per Woodruff J. on a note alleging that it was delivered on 
 
 2 Baker v. Bailey, 16 Barb. 54; Salin- the 10th of September, 1868, an answer 
 ger V. Lusk, 7 How. Pr. 430. See Brad- stating that it "was not delivered until 
 bury V. Cronise, 46 Cal. 287, where, the after Sept. 10, 1868," was held to raise no 
 complaint alleging that the plaintiff did issue. 
 
 certain work and labor at the request of
 
 NEGATIVES PREGNANT. 739 
 
 mswer consisted of denials of these averments m ipsis verbis 
 ilso conjunctively stated, following in this manner the exact 
 anguage of tlie entire complaint, the court ordered a judgment 
 or the plaintiff on the pleadings, saying: "This mode of an- 
 iwering is in violation of the principles of common-law pleading, 
 md not less so of the statute which provides that the defendant's 
 mswer to a verified complaint shall contain a specific denial of 
 ;ach allegation controverted, or a denial thereof according to 
 ;he defendant's information and belief."^ The complaint in 
 m action to recover possession of chattels alleged that "de- 
 'endant unlawfully and wrongfully seized and took said prop- 
 erty into his possession from said plaintiff;" and the answer 
 lenied " that he wrongfully and unlawfully seized and took 
 said property," etc. This answer, it Avas held, admitted the 
 making. 2 It is the settled rule in California that conjunctive 
 lenials, in the very language of conjunctive allegations, raise 
 10 issues.^ 
 
 § 512. * 621. Illustrations. In an action to foreclose a mort- 
 gage given to secure a bond, the complaint alleged the execution 
 )f the bond for SI, 000, with a provision in it, that, if default 
 should be made in the payment of interest for thirty days, the 
 ivhole principal sum should become due at the option of the 
 plaintiff; and set out the mortgage, averring that it contained 
 :he same provision, that interest had been due more than thirty 
 lays, and that plaintiff made his election to regard the whole 
 principal as due. The defendant in his answer admitted the 
 execution of the bond and mortgage, "but he denies that the 
 said bond and mortgage contained any condition or clause 
 whereby, in case of a default in payment of interest for the 
 space of thirty days, the principal sum was to become due and 
 payable immediately, as alleged in said complaint, as by refer- 
 ence to said mortgage will more fully wppear.'''' This defence was 
 
 1 Fish V. Redington, 31 Cla. 185, 194. to pay, the words "assume" and "agree" 
 
 - Woodworth v. Knowlton, 22 Cal. being synonymous, and a denial that they 
 
 164. See also Feeley v. Shirley, 43 Cal. "assumed and agreed" to pay the debt 
 
 369; Harris v. Shoutz, 1 Mont. 212, 216; was sufficient. 
 
 Toombs V. Hornbuckle, 1 Mont. 286. On s Blankman v. Vallejo, 15 Cal. 638 ; 
 the other hand, it was held in Jones v. Kuhland v. Sedgwick, 17 Cal. 123; Caul- 
 Eddy, 90 Cal. 147, that an allegation in field v. Sanders, 17 Cal, 569; Landers v. 
 the complaint that defendants " assumed Bolton, 26 Cal. 393 ; Busenius v. Coffee, 
 and agreed" to pay a debt, amounted 14 Cal. 91. 
 merely to an allegation that they " agreed "
 
 i40 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 struck out as frivolous, the court saying : " This is a denial that 
 both of the instruments contained the clause in question. It is 
 not a denial that one of them contained it. The bond and the 
 raortsrasre tosrether constituted but one instrument. The latter 
 refers to the former as affording particular evidence of the 
 terms of payment. Such reference incorporates into the mort- 
 gage all the terms and conditions of the bond. The only denial 
 was of their joint effect. This was an admission as to the bond." 
 The defence, therefore, did not put in issue the allegation of the 
 complaint, tliat the whole amount was due.^ 
 
 ' Kay v. Whittaker, 44 N. Y. 565, 
 571. 
 
 ^Examples of Negatives Pregnant 
 Held to raise no Issue. 
 
 A denial "that for a great number of 
 years, previous to the time alleged in the 
 plaintiff's complaiut, it had laid out and 
 maintained, and used as a highway, the road 
 described in the plaintiff's complaint:" 
 Grimm v. Town of Washburn (1898), 100 
 Wis. 2-29. 75 N. W. 964. A denial that de- 
 fendant directed decedent " to go down and 
 do certain work in an excavation which the 
 defendant had caused to be made : " Stuber 
 V. McEntee (1894), 142 N. Y. 200, 36 
 N. E. 878. A denial that plaintiff " is a 
 corporation duly organized as a national 
 bank under the Act of Congress of June 3, 
 1864, or any other act: " First Nat. Bank 
 V. Gibsou (1900), 60 Neb. 767, 84 N. W. 
 259. A denial that plaintiff's testatrix on 
 a date named " was the owner in fee 
 simple and entitled to the possession " of 
 the land in controversy : Knight r. Den- 
 man (1902), 64 Neb. 814, 90 N. W. 863. 
 A denial that notes were lost " as alleged 
 in })laintiff's |)etition : " Storey v Kerr 
 (1902), Neb., 89 N. W. 601. An allega- 
 tion " that whether said warrant came 
 into the hands of plaintiff as alleged, this 
 defendant has no knowledge, etc. : " Se- 
 attle Nat. Bank v. Meerwaldt (1894) 8 
 Wa.sh. 630, 36 Pac. 763. The allegation, 
 " further answering said complaiut as to 
 paragraph VIII. thereof, these defendants 
 and neither of them have knowledge or 
 information sufficient to form a belief as 
 to the truth of the allegations therein 
 contained and therefore deny the same 
 and each and every part thereof:" Cole 
 I' Noerdl'iugiir (1900), 22 Wash. 51, 60 
 
 Pac. 57. An allegation of want of knowl- 
 edge or information to form a belief as to 
 whether the road was a legally laid out 
 liighwav, or whether defendant was in 
 duty bound to keep it in repair, and 
 therefore a denial of the same : Carpenter 
 r. Town of Rolling (1900), 107 Wis. 559, 
 83 N. W. 953. A denial that defendant 
 took and carried away the goods : Bach v. 
 Montana Co. (1894), 15 Mont. 345, 39 
 Pac. 291. A denial that "the amount of 
 stock" sold by plaintiff to defendant was 
 ever delivered : EdgerCon v. Power (1896), 
 13 Mont. 3r,0, 45 Pac. 204. A denial 
 tiiat plaintiff's claim "was assigned to 
 defendant for collection as alleged in 
 the answer : " Maliouey v. Hardware Co. 
 (1897). 19 Mont. 377, 48 Pac 545. A 
 denial of a wrongful or unlawful taking 
 or withholding: Proctor i;. Irvin (1899), 
 22 Mont. 547, 57 Pac. 183. A denial of 
 certain allegations "as alleged in the 
 petition : " Board of Education i'. Prior 
 (1898), 11 S. D. 292, 77 N. W. 103. A 
 denial that sucli conveyances were exe- 
 cuted "as operated to convey perpetual or 
 non-assessable water rights : " Grand Val- 
 ley Irrigation Co. v. Lesher (1901), 28 Col. 
 273, 65 Pac. 44. A denial that plaintiff 
 is a corporation organized " under or by 
 virtue of the laws of the State of Illinois ; " 
 McCormick Mach. Co. v. Hovey (1899), 
 36 Ore. 259, 59 Pac. 189. A denial that 
 the defendants "still continue to hold or 
 occupy said premises, or any portion 
 thereof, as tenants of C. P. Lolor : " 
 Knowles v. Murphy (1895), 107. Cal. 107, 
 40 Pac. 111. A copulative denial of four 
 di.stinct matters: Wise ;>. Rose (1895), 110 
 Cal. 159, 42 Cal. 569. An allegaticm 
 " that said defendant did not execute and
 
 NEGATIVES PREGNANT. 741 
 
 § 513. * 622. Conflict of Authority as to whether a Negative 
 Pregnant raises an Issue. There is not, however, an absolute 
 unanimity among the decided cases. In some instances the 
 courts, avowedly rejecting the common-law rule of strict con- 
 struction, and applying the requirement of the codes that plead- 
 ings must be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice, 
 have held that such denials did raise an issue, although their 
 character as negatives pregnant was fully acknowledged. It 
 will be seen from the decisions to be cited, that no line of dis- 
 tinction can be drawn which separates them from those which 
 precede, and reconciles their conflicting results : different courts 
 have simply pronounced in an opposite manner upon substan- 
 tially the same facts or circumstances. A petition stated the 
 cause of action in the following manner: "Plaintiff claims of 
 defendant sixty-four dollars, and for a cause of action states that 
 on the 15th day of October, 1867, the defendant set fire to prairie 
 land, and allowed the fire to escape from his control, whereby 
 said fire spread to and consumed sixteen tons of hay, the prop- 
 erty of the plaintiff, to his damage," etc. The answer denied 
 " that defendant did on the 15th day of October, 1867, set fire 
 to prairie land by which the hay of the plaintiff was consumed." 
 The Supreme Court of Iowa, in pronouncing judgment, said that 
 defendant's denial " was perfectly consistent with his doing the 
 act on the 14th or the 16th, or on any other day than the 15th." 
 Yet, in view of the rule of liberal construction imposed upon the 
 judges by the code, it held that this answer, though conceded to 
 be a negative pregnant, was not a nullity, but raised an issue.-' 
 The Supreme Court of Missouri applied a like lenient method in 
 an action upon a bill of exchange executed by the National 
 Insurance Company. The petition alleged that the company, 
 "by its draft in writing signed by its secretary," made the obli- 
 
 deliver at Fairfield, Iowa, to the plaintiffs, S; W. 405. A denial that an execution 
 
 or either of them, the note, etc. : " Spencer was duly returned : St. Paul Fire Ins. Co. 
 
 r. Turney (1897), 5 Okla. 683, 49 Pac. v. Dakota Land Co. (1897), 10 S. D. 191, 
 
 1012. A denial that defendant " negli- 72 N. W. 460. An allegation " that Helen 
 
 gently and carelessly set fire to the V. W. Knight on and prior to the 25th of 
 
 depot:" Cincinnati, etc. R. R. Co. v. April, 1898, was the owner in fee simple 
 
 Barker (1893), 94 Ky. 71,21 S. W. 347. A and entitled to the possession" of the 
 
 denial " that the killing was done through premises in controversy : Knight v. Den- 
 
 the carelessness or negligence of defend- man (1903), — Neb. — , 94 N. W. 622. ^ 
 ant to the damage of the plaintiff:" i Doolittle v. Greene, 32 Iowa, 123, 
 
 Rogers v. Felton (1895), 98 Ky. 148, 32 124.
 
 742 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 gation; and the answer in turn denied, "that the compan}-, by 
 its draft in writing signed by its secretary," made the obli- 
 gation. This answer, it was held, raised an issue. Construing 
 it freely and favorably to the pleader, it could not be treated 
 as a nullity, although its character as a negative pregnant was 
 undoubted.^ 
 
 § 514. * 623. The Better Doctrine. If the requirements of the 
 codes as to the mode of forming issues by specific denials are not 
 to be a dead letter, the doctrine supported by the series of deci- 
 sions first above cited is clearly correct, and the practical rule 
 drawn from them is in every respect superior to the slipshod 
 method of treatment adopted by the other class of cases. To 
 say the least, a denial in the form of a negative pregnant is 
 such a glaring violation of logical and legal principles, that it 
 exhibits on the part of the pleader either the ignorance which 
 does not comprehend the nature of an issue, or the astute cun- 
 ning which is able to conceal the want of a defence under the 
 appearance of a direct answer. In either instance it should be 
 condemned by the courts. 
 
 § 515. * 62-1. Denials cannot properly contain Ne-w Matter. It 
 has been shown that all defences are either (1) denials of all, 
 some, or one of the plaintiff's allegations ; or (2) afiirmative new 
 matter which assumes that the allegations of the complaint or 
 petition cannot be disproved, but at the same time establishes 
 other facts which defeat the right of action. The general denial, 
 we have seen, is a brief and comprehensive formula, denying 
 '• each and every allegation of the complaint or petition ; " and 
 the special denial is based upon and negatives the single aver- 
 ment against which it is directed. It is utterly impossible, 
 therefore, that a denial, either general or special, if properly 
 framed, should contain any affirmative matter, any allegation 
 of facts in a positive and direct manner as though they consti- 
 tuted new matter and a defence by way of confession and avoid- 
 ance. A defence consisting in the narrative of facts, stated under 
 
 1 First Nat. Bank v. Ilogan, 47 Mr). [In Feldmann ?'. Shea (1899), Idaho, 59 
 
 472. See also EIl.s v. Pacific R. Co., 55 Pac. 5.37, it was lield that the words "sold 
 
 Mo. 278, 286 ; and Wall v. Buffalo Water and delivered" as used in a complaint for 
 
 Co., 18 N. Y. 119, in whicli it wa.s held goods sold and delivered, constitute but 
 
 that the answer should have been cor- one act, and a denial of that act in the 
 
 rected on motion, and that, in the absence conjunctive raises an issue.^ 
 of such motion, an issue was raised.
 
 ARGUMENTATIVE DENIALS. 743 
 
 the form of "new matter," which were not, liowever, new matter, 
 but could all be properly proved under a denial, would be a vio- 
 lation of the true theory of pleading, and of tlie classification and 
 description of defences contained in all the codes. 
 
 § 516. * 625. Pleading New Matter Equivalent to a Denial. It 
 sometimes happens that the pleader, either mistaking the nature 
 of the facts which will be proved by the defendant, and thinking 
 them to be new matter when in truth they are only the evidence 
 which can be offered in support of a denial, or supposing for some 
 reason that his case will be strengthened by spreading all these 
 details upon the record, sets up a defence either alone or joined 
 vrith others which is in form "new matter." It consists of 
 affirmative allegations, stated as though they confessed and 
 avoided the plaintiff's cause of action: and yet the facts thus 
 averred are not new matter; they are simply the evidence which 
 can be offered in support of a denial. The defence altogether is 
 therefore the same as a denial : if it goes to the whole complaint 
 or petition, it is equivalent to the general denial; if it goes to 
 some particular allegation or allegations, it is equivalent to one 
 or more specific denials. It is plain that the defendant has 
 gained nothing by such a mode of pleading; he has not added 
 anything to his case ; he has not stated a fact which he could 
 not have proved under a simple answer of denial. On the 
 contrary, in limiting the scope of his proofs at the trial to the 
 particular matter which he has pleaded, he may have weakened 
 his defence by shutting out the consideration of other facts which 
 he could have given in evidence under a proper denial. At all 
 events, he has unnecessarily disclosed his case to the adverse 
 party. 
 
 § 517. * 626. Same Subject. This is clearly an unpractical as 
 vv^ell as unscientific mode of pleading. Such a defence is an 
 "argumentative denial." The same fault which I have thus 
 indicated, sometimes existed under the old procedure. A plea 
 in the form of a special plea by way of confession and avoid- 
 ance, which contained no matter of that character, but only 
 matter which could be proved under a traverse, and which was 
 therefore equivalent to a traverse, — to the general issue perhaps, 
 — was generally bad on demurrer. The objection was, not that 
 the facts thus set up constituted no defence at all, — for the 
 very assumption was that they did constitute a defence by way
 
 744 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 of traverse, — but the external forms of the system were con- 
 sidered to be of such importance, and this faulty pleading so 
 completely violated them all, that it was held to be worthless for 
 any purpose. 
 
 § 518. * 627. Remedy for such a Denial is by Motion under the 
 Codes. The same rules of order and classification are violated 
 by such defences at the present day ; but as the new procedure 
 looks rather to the substance than to the form, and as a demurrer 
 to the answer is only allowed on the ground of insufficiency, — 
 that is, when the facts stated do not constitute a)iy defence, — the 
 pleading which I have described as an " argumentative denial " 
 is not considered bad on demurrer.^ The plaintiff's remedy is 
 by motion to make the defence more certain and definite, and to 
 strike out redundant and superfluous matter.^ If such motion 
 was more frequently resorted to, and was favored by the courts, 
 it would soon produce the effect of working a marked improve- 
 ment in pleadings. It is not merely a scientific blemish, but a 
 great practical evil, to have the record incumbered by a mass of 
 unnecessary allegations, and matters purely evidentiary, when a 
 short and comprehensive denial would the better subserve the 
 rights of the parties, and more clearly bring out and exhibit the 
 issues designed to be raised by the answer.*^ 
 
 § 519. * 628. Illustrations of Argumentative Denials. An ex- 
 ample or two from among the decided cases will be sufficient 
 to illustrate the kind of defence which is equivalent to the 
 denial and the rulings of the courts thereon. An action was 
 brought by the University of Vincennes against one Judah to 
 recover certain bonds alleged to be the property of the institu- 
 
 1 QOren v. Board of Commissioners denial by defendant is sufficient to give 
 (1901), 157 Ind. 158, 60 N. E. 1019; Hiatt the plaintiff the right to open and close: 
 V. Town of Darlington (1898), 152 Ind. 570, Sorensen v. Sorensen (1903), — Keb. — , 
 53 N. E. 825; Boos i;. Morgan (1896), 146 94 N. W. 540] 
 
 Ind. Ill, 43 N. E. 947; State ex rel. v. » n has been held in New York that 
 
 Osborn (1895), 143 Ind. 671, 42 N. E. 921 ; an affirmative defence inconsistent with 
 
 Childers i;. First Nat. Bank (1896), 147 the allegations of the complaint, but not 
 
 Ind. 430, 46 N. E. 825 ; Nat. Wall Paper coupled with a denial of such allegations, 
 
 Co. V. Mcl'herson (1897), 19 Mont. 355, raises no issue, under the provision of the 
 
 48 Pac. 550.] code that material allegations in the com- 
 
 2 QOren v. Board of Commissioners ))laint not controverted bv the answer, 
 (1901), 157 Ind. 158, 60 N. E. 1019. But must be taken as true. Beard v. Tilgh- 
 see LuiKixshire Ins Co. v. Monroe (1897), man (Supreme, 1892), 20 N. Y. Suppl. 
 101 Ky 12, 39 S. W. 434, where theallega- 736; Fleischman v. Stern, 90 N. Y. 110; 
 tions were held not to amount even to an QSmith v. Coe (1902), 170 N. Y. 162, 63 
 argumentative denial. An argunientative N. K. 57.]
 
 ARGUMENTATIVE DENIALS. 745 
 
 tion, which the defendant had converted to his own use. His 
 answer set up, that the university was indebted to him in a large 
 amount for professional services, and that the board of trustees 
 had passed a resolution allowing him to retain and have these 
 bonds as compensation for his services and in settlement of his 
 claim. The reply, instead of denying this answer, averred that 
 Judah had been secretary of the board of trustees; that he fraud- 
 ulently entered this resolution in the books of record of the uni- 
 versity; that no such resolution was ever passed; and it set out 
 the resolution which was actually passed, and which was very 
 different from that alleged in the answer. To the paragraph of 
 the reply containing this matter the defendant demurred ; the 
 demurrer was overruled, and he appealed. In disposing of the 
 question thus raised, the court said : " Now, this reply is simply 
 a denial of so much of the answer as alleges the adoption of the 
 resolution, or, in other words, the making the contract by the 
 trustees. It is argumentative, and it needlessly explains how a 
 resolution never made by the trustees comes to be found on their 
 records. This is surplusage. But neither argumentativeness 
 nor surplusage justifies a demurrer under our system of plead- 
 ing. There was, therefore, no error in overruling the appellant's 
 demurrer to the second paragraph of the reply." ^ It is plain 
 that a general denial of this answer would have admitted in 
 evidence all the facts specially pleaded in the reply under the 
 form of new matter; and the reply was, in fact, nothing more 
 than a denial. 
 
 § 520. * 629. "Where Answer contains General Denial and also a 
 Special Defence of New Matter Equivalent to General Denial. When 
 the answer contains two or more defences, viz., 1st, a general 
 denial, and, 2d, a special defence in the form of new matter, but 
 in fact equivalent to the general denial, and a demurrer to the 
 latter has been sustained, no material error is thus committed, 
 and the judgment will not be reversed ; for the same facts which 
 were averred in the special defence could be fully proved under 
 the general denial, and the defendant's whole case would thus 
 be available under the issue which remained upon the record.^ 
 In an action for goods sold and delivered, the answer in each of 
 
 1 Judah V. University of Vincennes, 23 ^ Chicago, Cin. & L. R. Co. r. West, 37 
 
 Ind. 272, 277. See also Clink u. Thurston, Ind. 211, 215; Waggoner t'. Liston, 37 
 47 Cal. 21, 29. Ind. 357.
 
 746 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 three separate defences set up the same facts with immaterial 
 variations: viz., that the goods were sold to the defendant's 
 wife without his knowledge or consent; that she had at the 
 time wrongfully abandoned him, and was living apart from 
 him, and for these reasons he was not liable for the price. A 
 demurrer to these defences having been sustained in the court 
 below, the Supreme Court on appeal held that they were all 
 argumentative general denials: " their effect was simply to aver 
 that the goods were not sold to the defendant, and all the matters 
 relied upon could have been proved under a general denial." It 
 was further said, that a motion was the proper remedy to correct 
 such faulty pleading, and the demurrer was irregular; but the 
 irregularity in this instance was merely technical, and the error 
 committed was immaterial, and had not prejudiced any rights of 
 the defendant; for, as he had pleaded the general denial in addi- 
 tion to the special defence mentioned, his entire case was prov- 
 able under that part of the answer. ^ 
 
 § 521. * G30. Combination of General and Argumentative De- 
 nials. This leads me to the second branch of the present 
 subdivision; namely, the combination of the general denial 
 with other defences equivalent thereto in the same answer. 
 The argumentative denial described above is frequently in prac- 
 tice used in connection with the general denial inserted in the 
 same answer. It would seem as though the pleader, after he 
 had written the brief general denial, could not be satisfied with 
 its efficacy, and considered it necessarj^ to add in separate divi- 
 sions of the answer a further statement of the very facts which 
 he knew would constitute the defence, and which could all be 
 proven under the general denial. This mode of pleading is 
 faulty in the extreme ; it has not a single reason in its favor, 
 not an excuse for its existence; it overloads the record with 
 superfluous matter, and produces nothing but confusion and 
 uncertainty. In a few States the courts have struggled to 
 correct this vicious departure from the true theory of pleading, 
 and have enforced the rules and remedies which the codes amply 
 provide. It is unnecessary to argue that this species of answer 
 
 1 Day V. Wamslev, .33 Ind. 145. true, necessarily shows that the allegation 
 
 £ln Burris v. People's Ditch Co. (1894), of the complaint as to the same matter is 
 
 104 Cal. 248, 37 Pac. 922, the court said : untrue, is a good traverse, and sufficient as 
 
 •' It may be said, generally, that any alle- a denial." See also Phillips v. Hagart 
 
 gation in an answer which, if found to be (1896), 1 13 Cal. 552, 45 Pac. 843.]
 
 AKGUMENTATIVE DENIALS. 747 
 
 is in direct conflict with tlie plainest principles and the most 
 express requirements of the codes. Those statutes permit only 
 "denials " and statements of "new matter," that is, matter whicli 
 is truly a coiifeasion and avoidance ; they do not authorize aver- 
 ments of matter which is not new, but which is simply a detail 
 of evidence going in support of a denial. While this reformed 
 system constructed by the codes is perfect in its scientific char- 
 acter, — far surpassing in that respect the loose notions intro- 
 duced by the common-law courts in relation to the function of 
 the ordinary "general issues" of the old procedure, — it is at 
 the same time in the highest degree practical. If the advantages 
 which ought to be derived from the great reform are to be ob- 
 tained, it is clearly the duty of all the courts to insist upon a 
 return to the simple methods which the codes so clearly prescribe, 
 concerning which, indeed, they do not leave the slightest doubt 
 or uncertainty. 
 
 § 522. * 631. Practice in Indiana in Respect to Argumentative 
 Denials. In Indiana, a practice has become settled, which might 
 well be borrowed by the courts of all the other States. I know 
 of no single rule of procedure, which, if uniformly adopted and 
 rigidly enforced, would work out a happier result in bringing the 
 forms and modes of pleading back to the simple and scientific 
 theory embodied in the codes, than the rule which prevails in 
 Indiana, and which I shall now explain and illustrate. I dwell 
 on it at some length, not because it can now be regarded as pan 
 of the universal practice throughout the States in which the new 
 system has been established, but because it ought to become so ; 
 and I hope that, by introducing it to the attention of the bench 
 and bar in other commonwealths, its merits may be at once rec- 
 ognized, and its methods followed. 
 
 § 523. * 632. Same Subject. When the answer contains the 
 general denial, and, in addition thereto, a separate defence or 
 separate defences equivalent to the general denial, — that is, 
 mere argumentative denials as above described, — such addi- 
 tional defences, it is settled, are irregular, and will be over- 
 ruled and expunged from the record. The remedy is not by 
 demurrer, for the reasons already given, but by motion to strike 
 out as redundant and superfluous. If, however, a plaintiff, in- 
 stead of moving to strike out, should demur to the vicious 
 defences, and that demurrer should happen to be sustained by
 
 748 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 the lower court, no material error would have been committed, 
 for the same result would have been reached which would be 
 attained by a motion : the record would be cleansed of its re- 
 dundancy, and the general denial would remain, under which 
 all the facts constituting the defence, and which had been set 
 forth at large in the rejected paragraphs, could be given in evi- 
 dence at the trial. This practice, I say, is thoroughly settled 
 in Indiana ; and the result is a system of pleading in that State 
 which far surpasses, in its brevity and its adherence to the spirit 
 of the codes, that prevailing in any other State. The cases col- 
 lected in the notes illustrate many forms of pleading to which 
 the rule has been applied, and exhibit its practical workings in 
 a very complete manner.^ The same doctrine and practice has 
 been occasionally followed in other States. ^ This subject will 
 be again referred to in the subsequent section which deals with 
 the union of defences. It is very plain that the faulty method 
 described and criticised proceeds in a very great measure from 
 an uncertainty in the mind of the pleader as to the matter which 
 may be given in evidence under the "general denial:" what- 
 ever, then, will remove that uncertainty, will aid in producing 
 a reform in the manner of stating defences in the answer. 
 
 § 524. * 633. General Denials of all Allegations not otherw^iae 
 Admitted or Referred to. A practice has recently grown up of 
 framing an answer in the following manner : To admit such of 
 
 1 Adams Ex. Co. v. Darnell, 31 Ind. ern Union Tel. Co. v. Meek, 49 id. 53; 
 
 20 ; Indianapolis, etc. R. Co. v. Rutherford, Smith r. Denman, 48 id. 65, 70; Milford 
 
 29 Ind. 82; Jeffersonville. etc. R. Co. v. Sch. T. v. Powner, 126 Ind. 528; Wallace 
 
 Dunlap, 29 id. 426; Rhode v. Green, 26 r. Exch. Bk. of Spencer, 126 lud. 265; 
 
 id. 83; Bondurant v. Bladen, 19 id. 160; Craig v. Frazier, 127 Ind. 286; Wickwire 
 
 Butler I'. Edgerton, 15 id. 15; Westcott r. Angola (lud. App., 1892), 30 N. E. Rep. 
 
 r. Brown, 13 id. 83; Garrison v. Clark, 11 917; Hoosier Stone Co. r. McCain (Ind. 
 
 id. 369; Cain v. Hunt, 41 id. 466, 471; Snpr., 1892), 31 N. E. 956. 
 Ferguson i\ Ramsey, 41 id. 511, 513; 2 i^ggt v. Harris, 12 Abb. Pr. 446, per 
 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. r. West, 37 id. 211; Bosworth J.; Radde i-. Ruckgaber, 3 
 
 Urton V. State, 37 id. 339; Port i-. Rus- Duer, 684 ; Simpson r. Mc Arthur, 16 Abb. 
 
 RcU, 36 id. 60; Day v. Wnmsley, 33 id. Pr. 302 (n.), per Brady J.; Bruck v. 
 
 145 ; Allen i-. Randolph, 48 id. 496 ; Trog- Tucker, 42 Cal. 345 ; Page v. Merwin, 54 
 
 den r. Deckard, 45 id. 572 ; Wolf v. Bcho Conn. 426. It is held iu Florida that the 
 
 field, 38 id. 175; Widener f. State, 45 id. court may strike out such a special de- 
 
 244 ; Sparks v. Heritage, 45 Ind. 66 ; fence or not as it pleases, and neither 
 
 Lewis V. Edwards. 44 id. 3.33; Ohio & ruling will be error. Davis i. Shuler, 14 
 
 Miss. R. Co. r. Hemberger.43 id. 462, 464 ; Fla. 438, 445. See also Colorado Cent. 
 
 Wilson v. Root, 43 id. 486, 493. See also R. Co. i-. Mollanden, 4 Colo. 154. A denial 
 
 Lowry i-. Megee, 52 id. 107; Watts r. which is a mere inference from facts al- 
 
 Coxen, 52 id. 155; Bannister i-. Grassy leged is not a good denial. Wright v. 
 
 Fork Ditch A.ss'n, 52 id. 178, 184; Wes^ Schmidt, 47 Iowa, 233.
 
 PARTIAL GENKKAL DENIALS. 749 
 
 the plaintiff's averments, if any, as the facts of the case require ; 
 to deny others wholly or partially ; to explain and modify others 
 if thought necessary ; in short, to unite in one answer or division 
 thereof a mass of special admissions, denials, explanations, and 
 aflirmative statements, and to conclude the whole with a sweeping 
 clause somewhat in this form : " As to each and every other alle- 
 gation in said complaint not herein expressly admitted or denied 
 or mentioned, the defendant hereby denies the same ; " or, " And 
 the defendant denies each and every other allegation in said 
 complaint not hereinbefore expressly admitted or denied or men- 
 tioned." Although a somewhat similar mode of putting in issue 
 the averments of a bill in equity was occasionally resorted to by 
 chancery pleaders under the former system, the codes give no 
 countenance to, nor authority for, such a mongrel form of answer. 
 The true spirit and intent of the theory introduced by the re- 
 formed procedure plainly demand certainty, precision, and defi- 
 niteness in the allegations of both parties, and especially in the 
 denials by which the defendant places on the record the exact 
 issues intended to be tried. In this respect the new method was 
 to be a complete departure from the vagueness and uncertainty 
 resulting from the broad effect given to the general issues in " as- 
 sumpsit," "debt," and "trover" by the common-law courts, and 
 also from the loose and incomplete manner of presenting the 
 issues which necessarily characterized the answer in chancery. 
 This design of the codes would, however, be utterly defeated if 
 the vicious style of defence thus described should become com- 
 mon ; and the courts, it is submitted, ought to have pronounced 
 most emphatically against it when it first made its appearance. 
 
 § 525. * 634. Proper Distinction to be observed between General 
 and Specific Denials. The codes require either a general denial, 
 or specific denials, or defences in confession and avoidance ; and 
 also that each defence must be separately stated, so that the issue 
 raised by it may be perceived at once. The "general denial " is 
 evidently intended to be an answer to the entire complaint or pe- 
 tition, — to negative all its averments. The design of the legis- 
 lature and the understanding of the bar upon this point were 
 shown by the immediate adoption of the form in use through- 
 out all the States. The code of Iowa expressly enacts that the 
 general denial is interposed to the whole petition ; and this 
 provision is plainly a statutory construction of the universally
 
 750 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 prevailing doctrine : a specific denial, on the other hand, must 
 be addressed to some single, particular allegation, and must 
 distinctly indicate the portion intended to be controverted by it. 
 I am of opinion that each specific denial ought to be a single and 
 separate defence by itself, so that, if the issue upon it should be 
 decided in favor of the defendant, the cause of action would be 
 defeated. In this respect, I think, the specific denials of the 
 codes were intended to be analogous to the special traverses pro- 
 vided for by the English judges in their new rules of pleading 
 adopted in 1834. Certain it is that the codes do not, by any 
 stretch of their language, contemplate an answer consisting of 
 a general denial directed to a part only of the complaint or peti- 
 tion, and connected with other admissions, partial denials, and 
 explanations. 
 
 § 526. * 635. DifiBculty Arising from this Form of Answer. 
 Again : this form of answer makes it extremely difficult, and 
 often impossible, to determine what allegations are denied, and 
 what are passed by in silence, and therefore admitted. If the 
 complaint or petition contains numerous averments, and the an- 
 swer is such a mass of express admissions, partial explanations, 
 and statements of matter which is merely evidentiary, and con- 
 cludes with the formula above quoted, we have all the evils 
 which can result from the most vicious system or no-system that 
 can possibly be conceived. The object of pleading is to ascertain 
 and present the issues of fact between the litigants, so that they 
 can be readily perceived and decided by the court and jury. The 
 special boast of the common-law methods was, that they brought 
 out these issues singly and clearly. I am confident that the the- 
 ory of the reformed procedure, when lived up to and accurately 
 followed, will give much better practical results than were ever 
 obtained as a whole from the former system. The kind of an- 
 swer which I have described violates every principle of this 
 theory, and is a contrivance of ignorance or indolence. 
 
 § 527. * 636. This Form Sanctioned by some Courts. Notwith- 
 standing the foregoing considerations, which appear to be such 
 plain and necessary inferences from the language as well as the 
 intent of the codes, the courts of New York and of some other States 
 liave given a seeming approval to this most slovenly manner of 
 stating the defence of denial. So far as their decisions have 
 passed upon tlie sul)ject, they seem either to approve such an-
 
 PARTIAL GENERAL DENIALS. 
 
 751 
 
 swers, or at most to hold that, if improper, the only mode of cor- 
 rection is by a motion to make them more definite and certain; 
 in other Avords, they are sufficient to raise the intended issues. 
 It cannot be said, however, that the question has been settled by 
 authority, or that this species of denial has become an establislied 
 method of pleading wherever the reformed procedure prevails. 
 The few cases which touch upon the matter will now be cited. 
 In an action upon a policy of life insurance, the answer was of 
 the kind mentioned, and concluded as follows : that " the defend- 
 ant denied each and every allegation of the complaint not therein 
 expressly admitted or denied." The Court of Appeals said of 
 this answer: " It is clear, both upon principle and authority, that 
 under a general or sj)ecific denial of any fact which the plaintiff 
 is required to prove to maintain the action, the defendant may 
 give evidence to disprove it.^ If an answer containing denials of 
 the allegations of the complaint, except as thereinafter stated, is 
 rendered indefinite, uncertain, or complicated, the remedy is by 
 motion to make the answer more definite, and not by exclusion 
 of evidence on the trial." ^ A similar answer, endinor with a de- 
 nial of " each and every allegation of the complaint except as 
 herein admitted or stated,'" was held by the same court to be 
 good and to raise an issue.^ 
 
 1 Wheeler v. Billings, 38 N. Y. 263. 
 
 2 Greenfield v. Mass. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 
 47 N. y. 430, 437, per Grover J. An 
 expression in this quotation indicates a 
 certain misconception on the part of the 
 learned judge. A general denial of a fact 
 is something unknown in the system of 
 pleading established by the codes. See 
 also Leyde v. Martin, 16 Minn. 38; Becker 
 V. Sweetzer, 15 Minn. 427, 434 ; Kingsley 
 V. Gilman, 12 Minn. 515, 517, 518, which 
 show that this form of denial is fully 
 approved by the Minnesota court. 
 
 3 youngs V. Kent, 46 N. Y. 672 ; and 
 see AUis v. Leonard, 46 N. Y. 688. That 
 this form of denial is proper, and suffi- 
 ciently raises issues upon the allegations 
 not admitted, seems to be now settled, at 
 least in several of the States. Walsli v. 
 Mehrback, 5 Hun, 448 ; Calhoun v. Hal- 
 len, 25 id. 155; Pen n. Coal Co. v. Blake, 
 85 N. Y. 226, 235 ; St. Anthony Falls Co. 
 V. King Bridge Co., 23 Minn. 186; Ingle 
 V. Jones, 43 Iowa, 286 ; Barley v. Ger- 
 
 man-Am. Bk., Ill U.S. 21 6; Griffin r. L.I. 
 R. Co., 101 N. Y. 348; Crane v. Crane, 43 
 Hun, 309 ; Owens ?•. R. Hudnot's Phar- 
 macy, 20 Civ. Pro. Rep. 145 ; see Clark v. 
 Dillon, 97 N. Y. 370; Davenport v. Ladd, 
 38 Minn. 545. 
 
 [[The following forms of general denial 
 have been held sufficient : " lilach and 
 every material allegation, statement, 
 matter, fact, and thing in said complaint 
 contained, and not hereinafter admitted :" 
 Althouse V. Town of Jamestown (1895), 
 91 Wis. 46, 64 N. W. 423. " Every alle- 
 gation in the complaint not admitted in 
 the answer : " Childers v. First Nat. Bank 
 (1896), 147 lud. 430,46N. E. 825. "Each 
 and every allegation and averment con- 
 tained in ]>laintifrs complaint herein wliich 
 is not hereinafter specifically admitted or 
 qualified : " Mattoou v. Fremont, etc. R. R. 
 Co. (1894), 6 S. D. 301, 60 N. W. 69. 
 " Each and every allegation therein con- 
 tained, and not hereinafter specifically 
 denied, admitted or explained : " State
 
 752 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 528. * 637. Facts, not Conclusions of Law, should be denied. 
 The complaint or petition, in addition to the facts from which the 
 right of action arises, sometimes contains the conclusions of law 
 which result from those facts, such as the indebtedness of the de- 
 fendant, his liability in damages, and the like. It is a fundamen- 
 tal principle of the pleading authorized by the codes, that these 
 averments of fact must be denied, and not merely the legal con- 
 clusion therefrom ; a traverse of the latter without one of the 
 former is a nullity, and creates no issue.^ When the issuable 
 facts are denied, a denial of the conclusions of law is unnecessary, 
 but would certainly be harmless. In this respect, the reformed 
 procedure has introduced a new feature into the science of plead- 
 ing. It is often said, I am aware, by writers of authority even, 
 that, under the common-law methods, the facts were always, and 
 the legal conclusions were never, to be traversed. But this state- 
 
 ex rel. V. City of Pierre (1902), 15 S. I). 
 559, 90 N. W. 1047. " Each and every 
 material allegation : " Nix v. Gilmer 
 (1897), 5 Okla. 740, 50 Pac. 131. 
 
 In Hardy v. Purington (1894), 6 S. D. 
 382, 61 N. W. 158, the court said: "An 
 answer [in maudamu.s], which denies 
 ' each and all the alle<,'ations in the affi- 
 davit contained, except such as are here- 
 inafter admitted or qualified, ' though 
 not a form of pleading to he encouraged, 
 has grown into such frequent use that it 
 would be unwise and unfair to litigants and 
 attorneys for this court to hold, without 
 premonition, that such an answer, unas- 
 .«ailed by motion or otherwise, constitutes 
 no denial. If such an answer leave the 
 plaintiff in doubt as to what allegations of 
 Ills complaint are intended to be denied and 
 what admitted, the answer is subject to a 
 motion to make more definite and certain." 
 
 A reply denying "each and every 
 allegation of new matter " is good after 
 verdict : Western Mattress Co. v. Potter 
 (1903), — Neb. — , 95 N. VV. 841. 
 
 A reply denying " each and every al- 
 legation of new matter set up in defend- 
 ant's answer " and " each and every other 
 part of same, except such allegations 
 of such answer as may be admissions of 
 plaintiff's petition," unless attacked by mo- 
 tion to strike out or to make more definite 
 and certain, is gooil : I'echa v. KastI 
 (1902j, 64 Neb. 380, 89 N. W. 1047. 
 
 " Where a general denial in an answer 
 is qualified by the pleading of special 
 defences in the nature of confession and 
 avoidance, evidence of other defences of a 
 like nature is inadmissible, although, in 
 the absence of such pleading, such evi- 
 dence would have been admissible under 
 the general denial : " Ball c Beaumont 
 (1901), 63 Neb. 215, 88 N. W. 173. 
 
 On the other hand, the following forms 
 have been held insufficient : " Every 
 material allegation of the complaint : " 
 Mead y. Pettigrew (1899), 11 S. U. 529, 
 78 N. W. 945 ; Burke v. Inter-State Sav- 
 ingsAss'n (1901), 25 Mont. 315, 69 Pac. 
 879; Hamilton v. Huson (1898), 21 Mont. 
 9, 53 Pac. 101. " Each and every allega- 
 tion and statement therein which is and 
 are in any way inconsistent with the alle- 
 gations in the petition" and "especially 
 denies all new matter pleaded " in the 
 answer: Young v. Schofield (1895), 132 
 Mo. 650, 34 S. W. 497. " Each and every 
 allegation contained in the answer incon- 
 sistent with the statementie in plaintiff's 
 petition : " Gross i-. Scheel (1903), — Neb. 
 —,93 N. W. 418; Dezell v. Fidelity & 
 Casualty Co. (1903), 176 Mo. 253, 75 S. W. 
 1102: an answer denying "each and 
 every other allegation in said petition not 
 specifically admitted."] 
 
 1 [Hevdenfeldt v. Jacobs (1895), 107 
 Cal. 373, 40 Pac. 492.]
 
 DENIALS OF LEGAL CONCLUSIONS. 753 
 
 ment is clearly inaccurate. In some of the most common forms of 
 declaration in constant use, the leading averment was that " the 
 defendant is indebted,'' a mere inference of law ; and the general 
 issue might be, " he is not indebted," or " he was never indebted," 
 which was certainly nothing but the denial of a legal conclusion. 
 All this has been swept away by the codes, and every trace of it 
 left in the modern practice is in direct opposition both to the 
 spirit and to the letter of the statute. A denial of indebtedness 
 or of liability, without denying the allegations of fact from which 
 the indebtedness or liability is claimed to have arisen, is a nullity ; 
 it raises no issue, and will be held bad on demurrer, as is shown 
 by the subjoined cases : In an action upon a promissory note, the 
 answer admitted the execution of the note, and denied that the 
 defendant owed the debt to the plaintiff. A demurrer to this an- 
 swer was sustained, the court saying : " This answer under the 
 former mode of pleading would have amounted to a plea of nil 
 debet, and would not have been good, as the suit was brought 
 upon a note in wiiting having the dignity of a specialty ; and we 
 are of opinion that the answer was not sufficient under the 
 present practice. It was not sufficient to state that defendant 
 did not owe the debt." ^ All the cases, with hardly an exception, 
 are to the same effect : as in an action on a note, an answer saying 
 that " the defendants do not owe and ought not to pay the note, 
 for they do not admit the regular protest thereof and notice," 
 raised no issue ; ^ also where, in an action for goods sold and de- 
 livered, the answer " denies that the defendant is indebted to the 
 plaintiff as stated in the petition ; " ^ and where, in an action on 
 a note, the answer simply denied indebtedness to the plaintiff as 
 claimed in the petition, or in any other sum or amount whatever.^ 
 
 1 Haggard i;. Hay's Adm., 13 B. Mon. monwealth, 13 Bush, 435 ; Louis v. Brown 
 175. 7 Ore. 326 ; Indianapolis, B. & W. K. Co. 
 
 2 Clark V. Finnell, 16 B. Mon. 329, 335. v. Ilisley, 50 Ind. 60; Hunter i;. Martin, 
 
 3 Francis v. Francis, 18 B. Mon. 57 ; 57 Cal. 365 ; Hintrager I'. Richter (Iowa, 
 and see Nelson v. Murray, 33 Cal. 338; 1892), 52 N. W. Rep. 188; Carpenter v. 
 Curtis v. Richards, 9 Cal. 33 ; Wells v. Ritchie, 2 Wash. 512. Denials of in- 
 McPike, 21 Cal. 215 ; Higgins v. Germain, debteduess: Bullert-. Siddell, 43 Fed. Rep. 
 1 Mont. 230; Skinner v. Clute, 9 Nev. 342, 116; Callanan v. Williams, 71 Iowa, 363 ; 
 
 * Morton v. Coffin, 29 Iowa, 235, 238. Watson v. Lemen, 9 Colo. 200; Gale v. 
 
 For further illustrations of the rule stated James, 11 Colo. 540; Heath y. White, 3 
 
 in the text, see Man. Nat. Bank r. Russell, Utah, 474. See McLaughlin i;. Wheeler 
 
 € Hun, 375 ; Starr v. Cragin, 24 id. 177 ; (S. Dak. 1891), 47 N. W. 816, 818. 
 
 Murray r. N. Y. L. Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 236, [Spencer v. Turney (1897), 5 Okla. 
 
 239; Kentucky River Nav. Co. v. Com- 683, 49 Pac. 1012; Aultman & Taylor Co 
 
 48
 
 754 CIVIL RE.MEWES. 
 
 § 529. * 638. Illustrations. The same is true of any other 
 denials of raere inferences or conclusions of law. Thus, in a suit 
 upon a note given to the plaintiff, a married woman, and made 
 expressly payable to her on its face, a defence that the " note is 
 not her separate property," and a denial that she is the legal 
 owner and holder thereof, were both held nullities, and struck 
 out on motion. 1 The defence, in an action to foreclose a mort- 
 gage, "that D. [the mortgagor] was regularly and duly dis- 
 charged from all his debts, including that to the plaintiff, under 
 proceedings in insolvency," was held not to be new matter re- 
 quiring a reply, " but only a conclusion of law and not of fact," 
 and not to create an issue.^ In an action to recover for injuries 
 caused by the negligence of the defendant, the complaint, after 
 stating the necessary facts showing the negligent omissions, and 
 the consequent destruction of the plaintiff's property, concluded, 
 " to his great damage, to wit, in the sum of $800." The answer 
 simply denied " that the plaintiff had suffered damage in the sum 
 of S800." This denial raised no issue. ^ 
 
 § 530. * 639. Denial of Conclusions of Law is Unnecessary. The 
 converse of the rule illustrated by the foregoing cases is also true. 
 If the answer denies the material facts averred by the plaintiff, or 
 alleges material facts constituting a defence of new matter, it 
 need not deny the plaintiff's conclusions of law, or state any con- 
 clusions of law as the inference from the facts which it has 
 pleaded.* Thus, in an action upon a contract, the answer alleged 
 
 V. Mead (1901 ), 109 Ky. 583, 60 S. W. 294 ; owner and holder of the note and mort- 
 
 'lavlor V. Furcell (1894), 60 Ark. 606, 31 gapes creates no issue: Clemens v. Luce 
 
 S. W. .567.] (1894), 101 Cal. 432, 35 Pac. 1032. A de- 
 
 1 Frost r. Haford, 40 Cal. 165, 166- nial by defendant in an action of eject- 
 Felch V. Beaudry, 40 Cal. 439. ment that his possession is wrongful raises 
 
 2 Christy f. Dana, 42 Cal. 174, 178. noissue: Rhoades v. Higbee (1895), 21 
 
 3 Huston V. Twin & C. C. Turnp. Co., 45 Colo. 88, 39 Pac. 1099. A vali.l denial is 
 Cal. 550; Higgins r. Wortel, 18 Cal. 330. not vitiated by conclusions of law alleged in 
 In an action to enforce a lieu upon defeml- connection therewith : Fitzpatrick v. Si- 
 ant's land, an answer which, without con- nionson Bros. Co. (1902), 86 Minn. 140, 90 
 trovertingany of the facts alleged, simply N. W. 378. 
 
 denied that the plaintiff had any lien, was A denial that the set-off constituted a. 
 
 held to raise no issue. Bradbury v. Cro- defence, raises no issue: Richardson v. 
 
 nise, 46Cal. 287. See, however, Simmons Doty (1895), 44 Neb. 73, 62 N. W. 254. 
 
 V. Si.^son, 26 N. Y. 264, 270, 273. One who in his pleading has stated a le- 
 
 QA mere denial of competency to sue gal conclusion cannot object to a denial 
 
 raises no issue of fact: Chamberlin Bank- thereof in the same terms: Baldwin r. 
 
 ing House v. Noyes (1902), — Neb. — , 92 Burt (1895), 43 Neb. 245, 61 N. W. 601. 3 
 
 N. W. 175. in a foreclosure suit an * (] Abbott v. Caches (1899), 20 Wash, 
 
 answer denying that the plaintiff is the 517, 56 Pac. 28.]
 
 DENIALS OF INFORMATION AND BELIEF. 755 
 
 all the facts necessary to show that the agreement was illegal as 
 being in restraint of trade ; but the illegality was not expressly 
 averred, nor relied upon as a defence by means of any clause 
 drawing such a conclusion from the facts which were stated. 
 The defence, however, was hel^ to be sufficient, both in form and 
 substance : the facts constituting it were all pleaded ; and that was 
 enough, without adding the legal inferences from them.^ 
 
 § 531. * 640. Denials of Kno-wledge or Information. Formula 
 Prescribed by Statute should be followed. All the denials, either 
 general or specific, to which the rules stated in the foregoing sub- 
 divisions apply, may be either positive, or denials of knowledge 
 or information in respect to the matters alleged by the plaintiff. 
 When the latter mode is adopted, the formula prescribed by the 
 statute should be exactly followed, not because there is an}- value 
 in the form simply as such, but because in no other manner can 
 the defendant satisfy the demands of the code, and raise a sub- 
 stantial issue, — an issue which is not a subterfuge and pretence. 
 When the denial is positive, the defendant is required to negative 
 directly each and every allegation of the complaint or petition, or 
 the particular ones controverted by him if less than all. If this 
 cannot be done by reason of the defendant's ignorance, and he is 
 therefore permitted to choose the other alternative, he must deny 
 that he has any knowledge or information concerning the matters 
 alleged sufficient to enable him to form a belief respecting them.^ 
 Any other form must of necessity be evasive. And so the cases 
 all hold ; but a single illustration will suffice. The complaint in 
 an action to recover the price of gas furnished to a city being 
 verified, the answer was as follows : " And this defendant says 
 that the defendant has no knowledge or information in relation to 
 the allegations of the second count of the said complaint, and 
 therefore denies the same." On the trial, the averments of the 
 second count were treated by the court as not denied, and as 
 therefore admitted to be true ; and this ruling was sustained on 
 appeal. The answer was held to be a nullity : the only denials 
 permitted, it was said, are those positive in form, and those which 
 deny any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief; 
 any others raise no issue. ^ The same conclusion was reached in 
 
 1 Frost V. More, 40 CaL 347. ^ San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Fran- 
 
 2 nCoIby V. Spokane (1895) 12 Wash, cisco, 9 CaL 453. 
 690, 42 Pac. 112.]
 
 756 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 respect to an answer which stated that " the defendant has not 
 sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief whether 
 [certain allegations] are true, and therefore denies the same." ^ 
 
 1 Curtis 1-. Richards, 9 Cal. 3.3; Ste- 
 venson V. Flournoy, 89 Ky. 561 ; contra, 
 Cumins v. Lawrence Cy. (S. Dak. 1890), 
 46 N. W. Rep. 182. As to the proper 
 form of such denials, and their effect in 
 raising issues when thus j)roper, see also 
 Kentucky, etc. Co. v. Commonwealth, 13 
 Bush, 436 ; Farmers' & Merch. Bk. of 
 Baltimore v. Charlotte Bd. of Aid., 75 
 N. C. 45 ; Sherman v. Osborn, 8 Ore. 66 ; 
 Ninde v. Oskaloosa, 55 Iowa, 207 ; Claflin 
 I'. Reese, 54 id. 544 ; Ncuberi^er r. Webb, 
 24 Hun, 347 ; Meehan v. Harlem Sav. Bk., 
 5 id. 439 ; Grocers' Bank v. O'Rorke, 6 id. 
 18; Wiltmau v. Watry, 37 Wis. 238 ; Peo- 
 ple i;. Curtis, 1 Idaho, 753. For further 
 examples of such denials improper in 
 form, see Bidwell ',■. Overton, 26 Al)b. N. 
 Cas. 402; Sheldon r. Sabin, 12 Daly, 84; 
 Lay Gas Machine Co. v. Neuse Falls Mfg. 
 Co', 91 N. C. 74 ; Land, etc. Co. of G. U. (•. 
 Williams (S C. 1892), 14 S. E. Rep. 821, 
 15 id. 453; Greer r. Covington, 83 Ky. 
 410; Haney v. People, 12 Colo. 345; 
 Moody V. Belden, 60 Hun, 582. 
 
 QThe following forms have been held 
 sufficient: — "Whether the matters and 
 thiu<js set forth [in said paragraph] are 
 true or false, defendant has no knowledge 
 or information sufficient wliereof to form 
 a belief and he therefore denies the same : " 
 Seattle Nat. Bank v. Mecrwaldt (1894), 8 
 Wash. 630, 36 Pac. 763. A denial of any 
 knowledge or information sufficient " to 
 enable it to form a belief," although the 
 statute uses the words, " sufficient to form 
 a belief : " Wilson i». Commercial Union 
 Ins. Co. (1902), 15 S. D. 322,89 N. W. 
 649. Plaintiff " denies that it has any 
 knowledge or information sufficient to 
 form a belief as to the truth of the alle- 
 gations contained in said answer," held 
 good, as against the objection that it 
 was a negative pregnant, when objec. 
 tion was first made after trial and verdict ; 
 Trnstees v. Nesbitt (1896), 65 Minn. 17, 67 
 N. W. 652. A denial that plaintiff •' has 
 knowledge or information snflicient, etc.," 
 is sufficient without the word "any "before 
 knowledge, as the statute reads : Gilreath 
 I'. Furnian (1900), 57 S. C 289, 35S.E.516. 
 
 The following forms have been held in- 
 sufficient : — " Defendant says that be has 
 not information sufHcient to form a be- 
 lief:" Sigmund r. Rank of Minot (1894), 
 4 N. 1). 164, 59 N. W. 966. An averment 
 that defendant has no knowledge or infor- 
 mation sufficient to form a belief, since 
 there must be a direct denial and not 
 merely an affirmation of a negative : Law 
 Trust Society r. Hogue (1900), 37 Ore. 
 544, 63 Pac. 690. A denial that defend- 
 ant has "any knowledge or information 
 sufficient to form a belief," since under 
 the statute he must deny also that he 
 could obtain sufficient knowledge : Junes ;•. 
 Perot (1893), 19 Colo. 141, 34 Pac. 728. 
 "This defendant has not and cannot ob- 
 tain information sufficient upon which to 
 base a belief," defective in not stating the. 
 same as to both knowledge and informa- 
 tion : Grand Valley Irr. Co. v. Leslicr 
 (1901), 23 Colo. 273, 65 Pac. 44. An alle- 
 gation that defendant " has no knowledge 
 of the facts " alleged in one paragraph of 
 the complaint, and " has no information " 
 respecting the truth of the allegations in 
 another jiaragraph : Woodcock v. Bostic 
 (1901), 128 N. C. 243,38 S. E. 881. An 
 allegation " that defendant has not suffi- 
 cient knowledge or information as to the 
 claim of the plaintiff, and therefore de- 
 mauds and calls for strict legal proof there- 
 of :" National Life Ins. Co. v. Martin(1899), 
 57 Neb. 350, 77 N. W. 769. An allegation 
 that defendant has no knowledge or in- 
 formation concerning the matter alleged 
 in the petition: Wilson v. Neu (1901), 
 — Neb. — , 95 N. W. 502. 
 
 " To authorize the denial of an allega- 
 tion in a petition, a want of belief is suffi- 
 cient ; and it is not improper to accompany 
 the denial with a statement that the party 
 making it has no knowledge or informa- 
 tion on which to form a belief : " Mcintosh 
 V. City of Omaha (1902). Neb., 91 N. W. 
 527. A denial of knowledge or informa- 
 tion sufficient to form a belief as to tlie 
 e.\istence of an alleged fact must be spe- 
 cific as to such fact : Ward v. Edge (1897), 
 100 Ky. 757, 39 S. W. 440. Other cases 
 dealing with the subject : Banks i-. Moshier
 
 THE ISSUES FORMED BY DENIALS. 
 
 757 
 
 § 532. * 641. When a Denial of Knowledge or Information is not 
 allowed. Although the denial of knowledge or information may 
 be used in respect to every form of traverse, whether general or 
 specific, yet it cannot be resorted to under all circumstances. 
 There are occasions in which the defendant will not be permitted 
 to say that he has no knowledge or information of the matter 
 sufficient to form a belief, because such a statement would be a 
 palpable falsehood, a plain impossibility. When the allegation 
 in the complaint or petition is of a fact which must of necessity 
 be within the personal knowledge of the defendant; when it 
 avers an act done or an omission suffered by him personally ; 
 when, for example, it states a contract entered into, or a deliber- 
 ate wrong perpetrated, by himself, — he must know whether the 
 averment is true or false. ^ He will not be suffered to assert a 
 
 (1900), 7.3 Conn. 448, 47 Atl. 6.56 ; Savle.s 
 V. FitzGerald (1899), 72 Conn. 391, 44 Atl. 
 733; Smith v. Allen (1901), 63 Neb. 74, 
 83 N. W. 1.55; Jacobs u. Ilognn (1900), 73 
 Conn. 740, 49 Atl. 202. The Georc^ia 
 statute is somewhat different from that 
 found in most of the code States : Code, 
 §4961 (1895), "Anj averment distinctly 
 and plainly made therein [in the petition], 
 which is not denied by the defendant's 
 answer, shall be taken as prima facie true, 
 unless the defendant -states in his answer 
 that he can neither admit nor deny such 
 averment because of the v/ant of sufficient 
 information." For cases construing it see 
 Lester v. Mcintosh (1897), 161 Ga. 675, 29 
 S. E. 7 ; English v. Grant (1897), 102 Ga. 
 35, 29 S. E. 157 ; Smith v. Champion 
 (1897), 102 Ga. 92, 29 S. E. 160; Angier 
 V. Equitable Bldg. Ass'n (1899), 109 Ga. 
 625, 35 S. E. 64. 
 
 Denials upon Information and Belief: — 
 " The better rule is that a denial made 
 upon 'information and belief is sufficient 
 when made in a certain class of cases. In 
 Btrictne.ss.itistheoiily proper form of denial 
 in a case where, with reference to the fact 
 sought to be denied, defendant has certain 
 information which induces him to believe 
 that such facts are untrue, and yet has not 
 absolute knowledge that such facts are un- 
 true. Having information inducing a 
 belief which falls short of knowledge, 
 defendant cannot truthfully deny that he 
 7ias neither knowledge nor information 
 
 sufficient to form a belief as to the fact." 
 Ku.ssell V. Amundson (1894), 4 N. D. 112, 
 59 N. W. 477. See also Warburton v. 
 Ralph (1894), 9 Wash. 537, 38 Pac. 140; 
 Seattle Nat. Bank v. Meerwaldt (1894), 8 
 Wash. 630, 36 Pac. 763.] 
 
 1 [_Raymond u. Johnson (1897), 17 Wash. 
 232,49 Pac. 492; Sweet v. Davis (1895), 
 90 Wis. 409, 63 N. W. 1047 ; Bartow 
 V. Northern Assurance Co. (1897), 10 
 S. D. 132, 72 N. W. 1135; Nashville, etc. 
 R. R. Co. V. Carrico (1894), 95 Ky. 489, 26 
 S. W. 177; Sioaue t-. Southern" CaL Ry. 
 Co. (1896), 111 Cal. 668, 44 Pac. 320; 
 Gribble v. Columbus Brewing Co (1893), 
 
 100 Cal. 67, 34 Pac. 527 ; Wickersham v. 
 Comerford (1S94), 104 Cal. 494, 38 Pac. 
 
 101 ; Mills' Estate (1902), 40 Ore. 424, 67 
 Pac. 107. 
 
 Matters of public record are presump- 
 tively within the knowledge of the par- 
 ties, and denials of information and be- 
 lief are insufficient : Thompson v. Skeen 
 (1896), 14 Utah, 209, 46 Pac. 1103; Mul- 
 lally V. Townsend (1897), 119 Cal. 47, 50 
 Pac. 1066; First Nat. Bank r. Martin 
 (1898), Idaho, 55 Pac. 302; Simpson v. 
 Remington (1899), Idaho, 59 Pac. 360; 
 First Nat. Bank v. Watt (1901), Idaho, 64 
 Pac. 223; Van Dyke v. Doherty (1896), 6 
 N. D. 263, 69 N. W. 200; Oakes r. Ziemer 
 (1901), 62 Neb. 603, 87 N. W. 350; s. c. 
 (1900), 61 Neb. 6, 84 N. W. 409. 
 
 A denial of knowledge or information 
 that plaintiff is a corporation, is not suffi-
 
 758 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 defective memory, for such a forgetfulness is contrary to the gen- 
 eral experience of mankind. If his recollection is at fault, the 
 law affords him ample opportunity and means of refreshing it 
 during the interval between the service of the adverse pleading 
 and the time for answering. A denial, therefore, of the form 
 described, pleaded in answer to allegations of a nature purely 
 personal to the defendant, will be treated as sham and evasive, 
 and will be struck out on motion. A demurrer would not be the 
 proper remedy ; because the objection is not to the sufficiency as 
 a defence^ but to the bad faith of the party in interposing a plead- 
 ing of such a character. The rule was accurately stated by Mr. 
 Justice Field of the California Supreme Court substantially as 
 follows : " If the facts alleged are presumptively within the 
 knowledge of the defendant, he must deny positively, and a 
 denial of information or behef will be treated as an evasion. 
 Thus, for example, in reference to instruments in writing alleged 
 to have been executed by the defendant, a positive answer will 
 alone satisfy the requirements of the statute. If the defendant 
 has forgotten the execution of the instruments, or doubts the cor- 
 rectness of their description, or of the copies in the complaint, he 
 should, before answering, take the requisite steps to obtain an 
 inspection of the originals. If the facts alleged are not such as 
 must be within the personal knowledge of the defendant, he may 
 answer according to his information and belief." ^ 
 
 cient to pat in issue the question of the D. Bank, 12 id. 333; Barret v. Godshaw 
 
 plaintiff's corporate existence: Stoddard 12 id. 592; Goodell r. Bloomer, 41 Wis 
 
 Mfg. Co. V. Mattice (1897), 10 S. D. 253, 436; Union Lumb. Co. v. Chippewa Cy 
 
 72 N. W. 891; Board of Education v. Sup., 47 id. 24.5; Collart v. Fisk, 38 id 
 Prior (1898), II S. D. 292, 77 N. W. 106 ; 238; Hathaway v. Baldwin, 17 id. 616 
 Iowa Savings, etc. Ass'u v. Selby (1900), see Brotherton v. Downey, 21 Hun, 436 
 111 la. 402, 82 N. W. 968. Nor will such Further instances of such denials disal 
 a denial put in issue the execution of a lowed, as concerning matters presump 
 written instrument : Wiuterfield r. Cream tively within the knowledge of the 
 City Brewing Co. (1897), 96 Wis. 239, defendant: Buller y. Sidell, 43 Fed. Rep. 
 71 N. W. 101; Garland v. Gaines (1900), 116; Sherman v. Boehm, 13 Daly, 42; 
 
 73 Conn. 662, 49 Atl. 19; Moore v. Wheaton r. Briggs. 3.5 Minn. 470; Love- 
 Holmes (1897), 68 Minn. 108, 70 N. W. laud v. Garner, 74 Cal. 298. Instances of 
 872.] such denials which did not come within 
 
 1 Curtis i>. Richards, 9 Cal. 33, 38. See the operation of the rule, and were thero- 
 
 also, to the same effect, Wing v. Dugan, fore allowed : Martin v. Erie Preserving 
 
 8 Bush, 583. 586; Jackson Sharp Co. r. Co., 48 Hun, 81; Harvey v. Walker, 
 
 Holland, 14 Fla. 384,386. The rule stated 59 Hun, 114; Hall v. Woodward, 30 
 
 in the text is also sustained by the follow- S. C. 564 ; Ilagman v. Williams, 88 Cal. 
 
 ing cases : Muffaker v. Nat. Bk. of Monti- 146. 
 cello, 12 Bush, 287 ; Gridler v. Farmers' &
 
 THE ISSUES FORMED T.Y DEXIALS. 759 
 
 § 533. * 642. Outline of Proposed Treatment of Issues Raised 
 by Denials. Ill discussing the topics embraced within this subdi- 
 vision, the same doctrines apply both to general and to specific 
 denials. The only difference is in respect to the extent of their 
 effect and operation.^ The general denial raises an issue witli 
 the entire complaint or petition, and admits evidence in contra- 
 diction to all the plaintiff's material allegations ; while the spe- 
 cific denial raises an issue with the particular allegation alone to 
 which it is directed, and only admits evidence in contradiction 
 thereto. The same rules as to the effect of the general denial 
 upon the issue raised with the whole complaint, and the proofs 
 admissible under it, apply with equal force to the specific denial 
 in respect to the narrower issue which it creates and the evidence 
 which it admits. It will only be necessary, therefore, to discuss 
 the objects and functions of the general denial, since the results 
 ■of this discussion will be true of specific denials within their 
 hmited operation. In pursuing this discussion, I shall inquire 
 into the nature and effect of the general denial and the issues 
 formed by it ; the general nature of the evidence which may be 
 admitted, and the defences which may be set up under it ; and I 
 shall state and classify a number of particular defences, and matters 
 of defence, which have been held admissible or not admissible, 
 or, in other words, a number of particular defences which have 
 been determined to be defences by way of denial, or to be new 
 matter. 
 
 § 534. * 643. Importance of Questions Suggested. No topic 
 connected with the whole subject of pleading is, I think, more 
 important than the questions thus suggested. Undoubtedly, 
 much of the confusion, redundancy, and unscientific character 
 of pleadings under the codes is the result of ignorance or uncer- 
 tainty as to the power of the general denial to admit defences 
 upon which the defendant relies. In very many instances the 
 answer is made a long and rambling mass of purely evidentiary 
 details, when the simple general denial, not exceeding two or 
 three lines in length, would be fully as efficacious, and would 
 present the issue in a sharper and clearer manner. The general 
 denial is in some respects broader in its scope, and in some re- 
 spects narrower, than the general issues as a whole at the com- 
 mon law. But little aid can be obtained from the rules which 
 
 1 See Coles v. Soulsbj, 21 Cal. 47, 50, per Field C. J.
 
 760 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 governed the use of the latter traverses, except by way of 
 contrast. 
 
 § 535. * 657. The General Denial. McKyring v. Bull. In pur- 
 suing this inquiry, I shall rely upon the judicial opinions found 
 in decisions which are universally regarded as authoritative, even 
 using their language instead of my own wherever practicable. 
 The case of McKyring v. Bull ^ is conceded to be the leading one. 
 The opinion of Mr. Justice S. L. Selden is so full, accurate, and 
 able an exposition of the subject, . that other judges have done 
 little more than repeat his conclusions. The action was brought 
 to recover compensation for work and labor. The complaint 
 alleged that the plaintiff entered into the employment of the 
 defendant at a certiiin date, and continued in such employment 
 at defendant's request, doing work and labor until another speci- 
 fied date, and that the services so rendered were worth the sum 
 of $650 ; and concluded as follows : " That there is now due to 
 this plaintiff, over and above all payments and offsets on account 
 of said work, the sum of $134; which said sum defendant refuses 
 to pay : wherefore the plaintiff demands judgment for the last- 
 mentioned sum, and interest from the 4th day of May, 1854." 
 The answer was only a general denial. On the trial, the defend- 
 ant offered to prove payment as a defence to the action ; but the 
 evidence was excluded, on the ground that the defence should 
 have been pleaded. He then offered to prove part payment in 
 mitigation of damages ; but this was also rejected for the same 
 reason. The case thus presented two questions to the Appellate 
 Court for decision : (1) Whether payment could have been proved 
 as a defence under the general denial ; (2) whether it could have 
 l)een proved in mitigation of damages. If the action had been 
 assumpsit or debt, the evidence would have been admissible in 
 either aspect.^ 
 
 [§§ * 658, * 659. These sections of the author's text, con- 
 sisting of quotations from McKyring v. Bull, will be found in 
 the note.^] 
 
 ^ McKyring v. Bull, 16 N. Y. 297, de- in any case be given in evidence as a de- 
 cided in 1857. fence under an answer containing simply 
 
 2 McKyring v. Bull, 16 N. Y. 297, 299. a general denial of the allegations of the 
 
 The opinion concludes as follows: "My complaint." 
 
 conclusion, therefore, is. that neither pay. •'' § 658. The discussion of the second 
 
 ment nor any other defence which con- question presented in this case is so com- 
 
 fesses and avoids the cause of action can plete and instructive, that I adopt it as
 
 ISSUES FORMED BY THE GENERAL DENIAL. 
 
 ■Gl 
 
 Further Illustrations. The Supreme Court of New 
 York, in an early case, described the office of the general denial 
 
 a portiou of the text. " The next ques- 
 tion is, wliether evidence of payment, 
 either iu whole or in part, is adniissihle 
 in mitigation of damages. As the code 
 contain.s no express rule ou the subject 
 of mitigation, except in regard to a single 
 class of actions, this (luestion cannot be 
 properly determined without a recurrence 
 to the jirinciples of the common law. By 
 these principles, defendants in actions 
 sounding in damages were permitted to 
 give in evidence, in mitigation, not only 
 matters having a tendenc^y to reduce the 
 amount of the plaintiff's claim, but, in 
 many cases, facts showing that the plain- 
 tiff had in truth no claim whatever. It 
 was not necessarily an objection to matter 
 offered in mitigation, tliat, if properly 
 pleaded, it would have constituted a com- 
 plete defence. Thus, in Smithies v. Harri- 
 son, 1 Ld. Raym. 727, the truth of the 
 charge was received iii mitigation in an 
 action of slander, although not pleaded. 
 Again : in the case of Abbott v. Chap- 
 man, 2 Lev. 81, which was an action of 
 assumpsit, the defendant having given iu 
 evidence a release. Lord Holt said that ' he 
 should have pleaded exoneravit, but that 
 the evidence was admissible in mitigation 
 of damages.' So too, in the modern case 
 of Nicholl (;. Williams, 2 M. & W. 758, 
 which was assumpsit for use and occu- 
 pation, the defendant, having pleaded 
 payment to a part of the demand, and non- 
 (is^umpsit to the residue, was j)ermitted, 
 upon the trial, to prove payment in full; 
 but it was held that the evidence could 
 only go in mitigation, and that the plain- 
 tiff was entitled to judgment for nominal 
 damages. It is obvious that this practice 
 was open to serious objections. It enabled 
 defendants to avail themselves of their 
 defences for all substantial purposes with- 
 out giving any notice to the j)laintiff. . . . 
 But in regard to payment, release, etc., so 
 long as they were received in evidence 
 under the general issue in bar, no objection 
 could be made to allowing them in mitiga- 
 tion. As soon, however, as this practice 
 was abrogated by the rules of Hilary 
 Term, 4th WiUiam IV., the question as to 
 the admissibility of payment iu mitigation 
 
 at once arose." The learned judge here 
 traces the course of English decisions upon 
 this (juestion, citing and reviewing a num- 
 ber of cases, and referring to certain addi- 
 tional legislation (Lediard v. Boucher, 7 
 C. & P. 1, per Lord Denman ; Shirley v. 
 Jacobs, 7 C. & P. 3, per Tindal C. J. ; 
 Henry v. Earl, 8 M. & W. 228 ; Rule of 
 Trinity Term, 1st Vict. 4 M. & \V. 4), and 
 concludes this discussion as follows : " The 
 matter is now placed, therefore, in the 
 English courts, upon a footing of perfect 
 justice. If the demand for which an action 
 is brought has once existed, and the defend- 
 ant relies upon its having been reduced by 
 payment, he must appear and plead. 
 
 § 6.59. " It is to be determined in this 
 case whether we have kept up with these 
 courts in our measures of reform. The 
 rules of Hilary Term (4 William IV.) and 
 the system of pleading prescribed by the 
 code have, in one respect, a common 
 object; viz., to prevent parties from sur- 
 prising each other by proof of what their 
 ]deadings give no notice. • These rules, 
 according to the construction put upon 
 them by the courts, were found inade- 
 quate, so far as proving payment iu miti- 
 gation is concerned, to accomplish the end 
 in view ; and it became necessary to adopt 
 the rule of Trinity Term (1st Vict.) to 
 remedy the defect. If the provisions of 
 the code are to receive in this respect a 
 construction similar to that given to the 
 rules of Hilary Term, then an additional 
 provision will be required to place our 
 practice upon the same basis of justice 
 and convenience with that in England. 
 But is such a construction necessary ? 
 Section 149 of the code provides that the 
 answer of the defendant must contain, 1. 
 A general or specific denial of the mate- 
 rial allegations of the complaint; and, 2. 
 A statement of any new matter constitut- 
 ing a defence or counter-claim. The lan- 
 guage here used is imi)erative, — 'must 
 contain.' It is not left optional with the 
 defendant whether he will plead new mat- 
 ter or not ; but all such matter, if it con- 
 stitutes 'a defence or counter-claim,' must 
 be pleaded ; and this is in entire accord- 
 ance with the general principles of plead-
 
 762 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 in the following brief but veiy accurate manner : " Under a 
 denial of the allegations of the complaint, the defendant may 
 introduce any evidence which goes to controvert the facts which 
 the plaintiff is bound to establish in order to sustain his action." ^ 
 '• Under the general denial of the code, evidence of a distinct 
 affirmative defence is not admissible. The only evidence which 
 the defendant is entitled to give is limited to a contradiction 
 of the plaintiff's proofs, and to the disproval of the case made 
 by him." ^ 
 
 iu^. The word 'defence,' as here used, 
 must include partial as well as complete 
 defences; otherwise it would be uo longer 
 possible to plead pavineut in part of the 
 plaintiff's demand, except in connection 
 •with a denial of the residue ; since section 
 153 provides that ' the plaintiff may in all 
 cases demur to an answer containing new 
 matter, when, upon its face, it does not 
 constitute a couuter-claiia or defence.'' 
 Such a restriction would be not only con- 
 trary to the general spirit of the code in 
 regard to pleading, but would obviously 
 couriict with § 244, subdivision 5, which 
 provides that ' where the answer expressly, 
 or by not denying, admits part of the 
 plaintiff's claim to be just, the court may, 
 on motion, order such defendant to satisfy 
 that part of the claim,' etc. The question 
 to be determined, then, is, whether these 
 provisions are limited in their operation 
 to cases where the defendant seeks to 
 avail himself of new matter strictly as 
 a defence either in full or pio ianto, or 
 whether they extend to the use of such 
 matter in mitigation. Were there nothing 
 in the code to indicate the intention of the 
 legislature on this subject, we might feel 
 constrained to follow the construction put 
 bv the English courts upon the rules of 
 Hilary Term. But § 246 provides that in 
 all actions founded upon contract brought 
 for the recovery of money only, in which 
 the complaint is sworn to, if the defendant 
 fails to answer, the plaintiff is entitled 
 absolutely to judgment for the amount 
 mentioned in the summons without any 
 assessment of damaires. It is plain, that, 
 in this class of actions, defendants who 
 have paid part only of the plaintiff's de- 
 mand must appear and plead such part 
 paymrmt, or they will lose the benefit of it 
 
 altogether. Tlie provisions of § 385 afford 
 no adecjuate remedy in such cases, because 
 the offer to allow judgment for a part does 
 not relieve the defendant from the ueces- 
 sitv of controverting the residue by an- 
 swer. Section 246 could never iiave been 
 adopted, therefore, without an intention 
 on the part of the legislature that § 149 
 should be so construed as to require de- 
 fendants, at least in this class of cases, to 
 set up part payment by answer ; and it is 
 difficult to suppose that they intended the 
 section to receive one construction in one 
 class of actions, and a different one in 
 another. My conclusion, therefore, is, 
 that § 149 should be so construed as to 
 require defendants in all cases to plead 
 any new matter constituting either an en- 
 tire or partial defence, and to prohil)it 
 them from giving such matter in evidence 
 upon the a.ssessment of damages when not 
 set up in the answer. Not only payment, 
 therefore, in whole or in part, but release, 
 arbitrament, accord and satisfaction, must 
 here be pleaded. In this respect, our new 
 svstem of pleading under the code is more 
 symmetrical than that prescribed by the 
 rules adopted by the English judges." 
 
 1 Andrews v. Bond, 16 Barb. 633, 641. 
 per T. A. Johnson J. 
 
 [;in Milbank v. .Jones (1894), 141 N. Y. 
 340, 36 N. E. 388, it was held that the de- 
 fendant might introduce evidence to con- 
 trovert anything that plaintiff is bound to 
 prove or is permitted to prove. See also 
 Whitney v. Whitney (1902), 171 N. Y. 
 176, 63 N. E. 834, reaffirming the rule 
 quoted in the text.] 
 
 2 Beaty i;. Swarthout, 32 Barb. 293- 
 294, per E. Darwin Smith .1. ; and see 
 Wheeler r. Billings, 38 N. Y. 263, 264. 
 per G rover .1.
 
 ISSUES FORMED BY THE GENERAL DENIAL. 763 
 
 § 537. * 661. Necessity of Reply depends upon Nature of Defence. 
 Whenever a reply is made necessary to all new matter contained 
 in the answer, the question as to tlie nature of a defence has often 
 arisen upon the plaintiff's failure to reply to allegations which 
 the defendant insisted were new matter, and therefore admitted 
 to be true by means of the omission, but which the plaintiff 
 claimed to be mere argumentative denials, or, in other words, un- 
 necessary averments of evidentiary facts which could be proved 
 under a denial. In passing upon such a question, the Supreme 
 Court of Minnesota fully approved and adopted the general doc- 
 trine which has been stated in the text.^ In another case before 
 the same court, the question was examined with great care and 
 marked ability. The action was upon a contract of sale: the 
 answer consisted of specific denials of each allegation in the com- 
 plaint ; and the defendant offered to prove that the contract was 
 entered into on Sunday, and was therefore illegal and void. [The 
 conclusion of the court is given in the note.] ^ 
 
 § 538. * 662. Anything Tending directly to controvert Allega- 
 tions in Complaint Admissible under General Denial. In an action 
 to recover possession of chattels where the complaint alleged 
 property in the plaintiff, and the answer was a general denial, 
 evidence tending to show that the plaintiff was not the owner 
 was excluded on the trial. This ruling was disapproved on 
 appeal, the court saying : " The answer is a denial of each and 
 every allegation of the complaint. The allegation of owner- 
 ship is therefore denied. In Bond v. Corbett,'^ it was held 
 that anything which tends to directly controvert the allega- 
 tions in the complaint may be shown under the general denial. 
 The defendant might, therefore, introduce evidence to show 
 that plaintiff was not the owner, nor entitled to possession."^ 
 
 1 Nash V. St. Paul, 11 Minn. 174, 178 ; upon to be either void or voidable must be 
 Finley v. Quirk, 9 Minn. 194. affirmatively pleaded. " 
 
 2 Finley v. Quirk, 9 Minn. 194, 200, ^ Bond r. Corbett, 2 Minn. 248. 
 
 per Wilson C. J. : " We hold, therefore, * CaldvveU v. Bruggerman, 4 Minn. 
 
 (1) that an answer merely by way of 270, 276, per Atwater J. 
 denial raises an issue only ou the facts [^The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in 
 
 alleged in the complaint; (2) that the Dodge v. McMahan (1895), 61 Minn. 175, 
 
 denial of the sale in this case only raised 63 N. W. 487, stated the rule as follows : 
 
 an issue on the sale in point of fact, and " Authorities may be found, even in some 
 
 not on the question of the legality of such of the code States, to the effect that, under 
 
 sale; (.3) that all matters in confession a mere denial, evidence of any fact may 
 
 and avoidance showing the contract sued be given in evidence that would go to the
 
 764 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES, 
 
 The same doctrine is maintained by the Supreme Court of 
 Indiana.^ 
 
 ^ 539. ' GGo. Same Subject. The doctrine thus stated has also 
 been approved by the Supreme Court of Missouri. ^ "It is clear, 
 both upou principle and authority, that, under a general or spe- 
 cific denial of any fact which the plaintiff is required to prove 
 to maintain the action, the defendant may give evidence to dis- 
 proA'^e it." ^ The true scope of and limitations upon this form of 
 traverse were well illustrated in a very recent case decided by 
 the New York Court of Appeals. The complaint alleged that 
 the plaintiff was owner of certain shares of stock in a corpora- 
 tion; that the stock had been transferred to one W. to hold for 
 the plaintiff; that W., without the plaintiff's knowledge, had 
 transferred the same to the defendant, in payment, as defendant 
 claimed, of a debt due from him to defendant; and prayed that 
 defendant might be compelled to re-transfer and deliver the same 
 to the plaintiff. The answer was a general denial. The nature 
 and extent of the issues thus presented were discussed, and the 
 
 original validity of the contract sued on, 
 — that is, which, altiiough admitting the 
 making of the contract, wouUl show that, 
 wlien made, it was, for some reason in- 
 valid ; as, for example, that it was made 
 on Sunday, or that it was a gambling or 
 wagering contract. But this rule is not 
 in accordance with either the spirit of the 
 reformed ])rocedure or the decisions of 
 this court. The correct rule is that, under 
 a denial, the defendant is at liberty to 
 give only such evidence as tends to dis- 
 prove the e.xistence of facts, as facts, al- 
 leged by the plaintiff, but not of any 
 matter aliunde, which, although admitting 
 such facts, would tend to avoid their legul 
 effect anil operation." See also Iselin r. 
 Simon (1895), 62 Minn. 128, 64 N. W. 
 143; Fort Dearborn Bank i*. Security 
 Bank (1902), 87 Minn. 81, 91 N. W. 257.] 
 
 1 Wood V. Ostram, 29 Ind. 177, 186. 
 
 ^ Northrup i'. Miss. Vail. Ins. Co., 47 
 Mo. 435, 443. 
 
 [^Jones 1-. Rush (1900), 156 Mo. 364, 57 
 S. W. 118 : " Under a general denial any 
 legal evidence is admissible which tends 
 to show that the statements in the petition 
 constituting the plaintiff's cause of action 
 are not true, and to that end he may affirra- 
 ativelv show facts inconsistent with the 
 
 plaintiff's statements tending to prove 
 them to be false." In Cunningham v. 
 I?oush (1900). 157 Mo. 336, 57 S. W . 769, 
 the rule was stated as follows : — " Where 
 a cause of action which once existed has 
 been determined by some matter which 
 subsequently transpired, such new matter 
 must, to comply with the statute, be spe- 
 cially pleaded ; but where the cause of 
 action never existed, the appropriate 
 defence under the law is a denial of the 
 material allegations of the petition ; and 
 such facts as tend to disprove the contro- 
 verted allegations are pertinent to the 
 issue." See also" Pattou j\ Fox (1902), 
 169 Mo. 97, 69 S. W. 287, containing a list 
 of special defences which have been held 
 admissible under the general denial in 
 Missouri. And in Bolton v. Mo. Pac. Ry. 
 Co. (1903), 172 Mo. 92, 72 S. W. .53, the 
 court said : " Any fact the effect of which 
 is to show that an essential statement in 
 the plaintiff's cause of action is untrue may 
 be proven under the general denial, and, 
 therefore, should not be specially pleaded 
 and if so pleaded should be stricken oat 
 as redundant. "] 
 
 8 Greenfield v. Mass. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 
 47 N. Y. 4.30, 437, per Grover J.; Wheeler 
 V. Billinjrs, 38 N. Y. 263.
 
 ISSUES FORMED BY THE GENERAL DENIAL. 765 
 
 principle which controlled thera was stated by Mr. Justice 
 Grover, who pronounced the defence inadmissible.^ 
 
 § 540. * 664. Same Subject. A general denial being pleaded 
 in an action on a non-negotiable note brought against the maker 
 thereof, evidence designed to show a want of consideration was 
 rejected at the trial. The New York Supreme Court, in review- 
 ing this ruling, very properly held that this defence may be proved 
 under an answer of denial in actions upon all contracts which do 
 not import a consideration. ^ While the very point decided, that 
 evidence of a want of consideration could be admitted, is un- 
 doubtedly correct, the opinion as a whole is very careless and 
 inaccurate, and the general criterion which it lays down is 
 clearly erroneous. There are many classes of defences which 
 show that a cause of action never existed, and which cannot 
 be proved under the general denial, but must be pleaded; as, 
 for example, illegality, fraud, duress, and the like. The learned 
 judge was entirely misled by the analogies drawn from the 
 ancient practice. The general denial puts in issue the facts, 
 which, if true, constitute a prima facie cause of action. A 
 consideration is, in general, one of these facts in actions upon 
 contract. When these facts are admitted, but by reason of some 
 extraneous features or elements affecting them they do not pro- 
 duce the otherwise necessary result, that element which consti- 
 tutes the defence, and which destroys the prima facie legal aspect 
 of the facts, is certainly not put in issue by the general denial : 
 it is new matter, and must be specially pleaded. 
 
 1 Weaver v. Barden, 49 N. Y. 286, bona fde purchaser from W. To meet 
 
 297 : " To establish a cause of action, the tiiis case, the defendaut offered to prove 
 
 plaintiff was bound to prove that he was in substance that he was a bona Jide pur- 
 
 the legal owner of the stock, or was chaser from W. The special term held, 
 
 equitably entitled to it as against the against plaintiff's objection, that this 
 
 defendant. Under this answer the de- was admissible under the answer. This 
 
 fendant had a right to give evidence was error. Under the geperal denial, the 
 
 controverting any fact necessary to be defendant could not introduce evidence 
 
 established by the plaintiff to authorize a tending to show a defence founded upon 
 
 reconveyance, but not to prove a defence new matter, but such only as tended to 
 
 founded upon new matter. " Recapitulat- disprove any fact that the plaintiff must 
 
 ing the facts actually proved by the prove to sustain his case. " The court, 
 
 plaintiff, — namely, those alleged in the however, did not pass upon the question 
 
 complaint as above stated, and that W. thus discussed by Grover J. : the decision 
 
 held the stock as a trustee for the plain- was placed upon a different ground ; viz., 
 
 tiff, — he continued : " This established that defendant was not a bona Jide pur- 
 
 the plaintiff's right to the stock as chaser, 
 
 against the defendant, unless he was a 2 Evans i-. Williams, 60 Barb. 346
 
 766 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 541. * 665. Construction Adopted in California. The courts 
 of one State alone dissent from this course of judicial decision, 
 and give to the general denial of the code something of the com- 
 prehensive operation which belonged to the general issues of 7ion- 
 assumpsit and yiil debet at the common law. The construction 
 adopted in California seems to regard the general denial — cer- 
 tainly in actions upon contract — as admitting any defences which 
 show that there is no subsisting cause of action at the time of the 
 commencement of the suit. At least the defence of payment is 
 thus held admissible ; and, if it be so, other similar defences, such 
 as release, accord and satisfaction, and the like, cannot with con- 
 sistency be rejected. This doctrine of the California courts is 
 stated and illustrated in the following cases : In an action upon 
 contract the complaint contained three counts, each in the form of 
 the common-law indebitatus assumpsit. The answer was a general 
 denial. Upon these issues the court said: '"In each count of the 
 complaint there is an averment that on, etc., the defendant was 
 indebted to the plaintiff in a specified sum, and promised to pay 
 it, but therein has made default. The answer contained a gen- 
 eral denial, which made it incumbent on the plaintiff to prove a 
 subsisting indebtedness from the defendant to the plaintiff at the 
 time of the institution of the suit. Under this denial, it would 
 have been competent for the defendant to prove payment. ^ For 
 the same reason, it is competent to show that the plaintiff had 
 transferred the demand, and that the defendant, therefore, was 
 not indebted to him." ^ In another case upon a promissory note 
 the complaint was in the usual form, setting out the note, and 
 alleging that it had not been paid, and that there was due upon 
 it a specified sum, for which judgment was demanded. The 
 answer was the general denial. '"The question is," said the 
 court, " whether the general denial presents any issue of fact. 
 In Frisch v. Caler, this question was fully considered. The 
 statute then in force required a replication to new matter in the 
 answer. The answer averred that the note in suit had been paid 
 by the defendant: and it was contended that that averment was 
 admitted because of the failure on the part of the plaintiff to file 
 
 1 Frisch v. Caler, 21 Cal. 71 ; Brown 294, 299, 300, per Crockett J.: ami see 
 I'. Orr, 29 Cal. 120; Davanay v. Eggen- especially Fairchild v. Anisihaugli, 22 
 hoff, 43 Cal. 395. Cal. 572, 574; Brooks i-. Chilton, 6 Cal. 
 
 2 Wetmore v. San Francisco, 44 Cal. 040.
 
 ISSUES FOEMED BY THE GENERAL DENIAL. 767 
 
 a replication denying it. But the court held that it was not new 
 matter; that the failure to pay the note constituted the breach, 
 and must be alleged ; and that the allegation in the answer — 
 that it had been paid — was only a traverse of the allegation in 
 the complaint that it had not been paid. (See also Brown v. 
 Orr.)i The doctrine then laid down has not since been departed 
 from, so far as we are aware, except in the case of Hook v. 
 White ; ^ and that case, so far as it liolds that the allegation in 
 the complaint that the note remains unpaid is immaterial, and 
 that a denial of the allegation does not put any fact in issue, 
 ought, in our opinion, to be overruled. The general denial in 
 this case puts in issue the averment of the complaint, that the 
 promissory note remained due and unpaid. "^ This decision 
 falls far short of sustaining the sweeping doctrine of Mr. Jus- 
 tice Crockett, in the preceding case of Wetmore v. San Francisco, 
 as to the eiTect of the general denial. When the opinion of Mr. 
 Justice Rhodes is analyzed, it does not in fact lay down any prin- 
 ciple different from that maintained by the cases cited from the 
 courts of other States. It simply asserts that the general denial 
 puts in issue the allegations of the complaint, and that the nega- 
 tive averment of non-payment, when traversed in this manner, 
 produces a complete issue, under which evidence of payment 
 may be offered. This is very far from holding, with Crockett J., 
 that the defence of payment is admissible under the general denial 
 in all cases. 
 
 § 542. * 666. Twofold Office of General Denial. No Exact 
 Statement Possible of Particular Defences Admissible under it. 
 The foregoing extracts from the judgments of so many courts 
 leave little room and little need for any addition by way of com- 
 ments. The unanimity of opinion in respect to the fundamental 
 principles of pleading embodied in the codes is almost absolute ; 
 and this principle has been so clearly formulated by several of 
 the judges, that no difficulty ought to arise in its practical appli- 
 cation. The office of the general denial, like that of the old 
 traverses, is twofold: it forces the plaintiff to prove all the 
 material allegations of fact contained in his complaint or peti- 
 tion, and constituting his cause of action, by sufficient evidence 
 at least to make out a prima facie case ; it also permits the de- 
 
 1 Brown v. Orr, 29 Cal. 120. 3 Davanay v. Eggenboff, 43 Cal. 395, 
 
 2 Hook i;. White, 36 Cal. 299. 397, per Rhodes J.
 
 768 CIVIL IlEMEDIES. 
 
 fenclant to offer any and all legal evidence which controverts 
 those averments, and contradicts the plaintiff's proofs.^ It is 
 clear that no exact statement can be made defining with uni- 
 versal precision what particular issues the general denial raises 
 in all possible cases, and what particular defences it admits ; and 
 in this respect it dil^ers from the general issue. As a result of 
 the common-law methods of pleading, and the uniformity of 
 averment necessarily used in all actions of the same class, the 
 operation of the general issue in every suit was exactly defined ; 
 and this was especially so after the rules made in 4th William 
 IV. (1834). Certain averments, and none others, of the decla- 
 ration, were put in issue by it; certain defences, and none others, 
 were admissible under it. This precise rule cannot be laid down 
 in respect of the general denial, because there is no necessary 
 uniformity in the averments of complaints or petitions in actions 
 of the same kind brought on the same substantial facts, and seek- 
 ing the same relief. As the general denial puts in issue all the 
 material allegations made by the plaintiff, and admits all evi- 
 dence contradicting them, what issues it actually raises, and 
 what defences it actually admits, in a given case, must depend 
 upon the frame of the complaint or petition, and upon the num- 
 ber and nature of the allegations which the plaintiff has inserted 
 therein. It could be said of the general issue in all actions upon 
 contract, — • assumpsit, debt, covenant, — after the rules of Hilary 
 Term, 1834. that the defence of payment was never admissible 
 under it. If we would speak with perfect accuracy, such lan- 
 guage cannot be adopted as the expression of a universal rule in 
 respect of the general denial ; for the plaintiff may so shape his 
 pleading, and introduce into it such a negative averment of non- 
 payment, that the proof of payment would be simply supporting 
 the general denials of the answer. Several cases already cited 
 sufficiently sustain the correctness of this position ; and others, 
 to be hereafter more particularly referred to in a subsequent por- 
 tion of this section, and in the next section under the head of 
 Payment, will furnish various examples of this feature of dis- 
 
 1 ^Graves y. Norfolk Nat. Bank (1890), (1900), 23 Wiisli. 615,63 Pac. 539. "A 
 
 49 Neb. 437, 68 N. W. 612 ; Am. Bldg. superfluous plea does not render irrele- 
 
 & Loan Ass'n v. Rainbolt (1896), 48 vant to a general denial matter wliieh 
 
 Neb. 434, 67 N. W. 493 ; Wiedeman v. would have been relevant in the ali.sorico 
 
 Hedge.s (1901), 63 Neb. 103, 88 N. W. of a special plea:" Horkey v. Kendall 
 
 )"0; Peterson v. Seattle Traction Co. (1898), 53 Neb. 522, 73 N. W. 953.]
 
 ISSUES FORMED BY THE GENERAL DENIAL. 769 
 
 tinction between the general denial and the general issue. ^ Ad- 
 ditional cases, bearing upon the nature and effect of the general 
 denial, are collected in the foot-note. ^ 
 
 § 543. * 667. Only Material Averments Put in Issue by General 
 Denial. As the general denial forms an issue upon the entire 
 cause of action set up by the plaintiff, and forces him to prove 
 the same substantially as alleged, tlie question becomes one of 
 great practical importance : What are the averments in the com- 
 plaint or petition which are thus negatived, and which must be 
 established by sufficient proof on the trial ? The full answer to 
 this question belongs rather to a discussion of the requisites of 
 the plaintiff's than of the defendant's pleading, and will be 
 found in Chapter Third. The universally accepted rule is, 
 that only those averments of the complaint or petition which 
 are material and proper are put in issue by a denial either 
 general or specific in its form. Neither " material " nor " proper " 
 is, however, synonymous with "necessary." A plaintiff may in- 
 sert in his pleading allegations which are unnecessary in that 
 position, and which are not in conformity with the perfect 
 logic of the system, but which, when once introduced, be- 
 come "material," so that an issue is formed upon them by a 
 general or a specific denial.^ The instance just mentioned, of 
 an allegation of non-payment in the complaint met by a denial 
 
 1 See Quin v. Lloyil, 41 N. Y. 349; of Brouklyii, 63 Barb. 610, 616; Catlin 
 
 Marley v. Smith, 4 Kan. 183; Frisch r. v. Guuter, 1 Duer, 253, 26.5; Robinson 
 
 Caler, 21 Cal. 71; White r. Smith, 46 v. Frost, 14 Barb. 536, 541; Texier v. 
 
 N. Y. 418; Van Gieson v. Van Gieson, 10 Gouin, 5 Duer, 389, 391 ; Dyson v. Ream, 
 
 N. Y. 316. 9 Iowa, 51; Scheer v. Keown, 34 Wis. 
 
 - Button V. McCauley, 38 Barb. 413; 349, 35S. The conclusions of the text 
 Schular v. Hudson Riv. R. Co., 38 Barb, as to what allegations in the plaintiff's 
 653 ; Schermerhorn v. Van Allen, 18 Barb, pleading the general denial puts in i.ssue 
 29; Hendricks v. Decker, 35 Barb. 298; and compels him to prove, and wiiat evi- 
 Perkins v. Ermel, 2 Kan. 325 ; Adams dence it admits on the part of the defend- 
 Exp. Co. V. Darnell, 31 Ind. 20; Lafayette ant, are further illustrated by Paris v. 
 & I. R. Co. V. Ehman, 30 id. 83; Watkina Strong, 51 Ind. 339; Stafford v. Nutt, 51 
 V. Jones, 28 id. 12; Frybarger v. Coke- id. 535; Bate v. Sheets, 50 id. 329 ; Mor- 
 fair, 17 id. 404; Bingham u. Kimball, 17 gan v. Wattles, 69 id. 260; Mc Williams 
 id. 396; Norris v. Amos, 15 id. 365; v. Bannister, 40 Wis. 489; Moulton i-. 
 Hawkins V. Borland, 14 Cal. 413; God- Thompson, 26 Minn. 120; School Dist. v. 
 dard f. Fulton, 21 CaL430; Evansville r. Shoemaker, 5 Neb. 36; Jones v. Seward 
 Evans, 37 id. 229, 236; Hier y. Grant, 47 Cy. Com'rs, 10 id. 1.54; Scott v. Mor.se, 
 N. Y. 278 ; Schaus v. Manhattan Gasl. 54 Iowa, 732 ; Amador Cy. v. Butter- 
 Co., 14 Abb. Pr. n. s. 371; Hunter v. field, 51 Cal. 526; Elder r. Spinks, 53 id. 
 Mathis, 40 Ind. 356; Ammerman v. 293. 
 
 Crosby, 26 id. 451 ; Johnson v. Cudding- s [;Dillon v. Lee (1899), 110 la. 156, 81 
 
 ton, 35 id. 43 ; Brett v. First Univ. Soc. N. W. 245.^ 
 
 49
 
 770 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 in the answer, is a familiar example of such averments, material, 
 although not necessary. ^ 
 
 S 544. * 668. Only Issuable Facts are Material. Test to distin- 
 guish them from Evidentiary Facts. It is au elementary doctrine 
 of pleading under the new system, that only the issuable facts — 
 that is, the conclusions of fact which are essential to the exist- 
 ence of the cause of action, or upon which the right to relief 
 wholly or partially depends in equitable suits — are material, 
 and are therefore put in issue by the denial; and the converse 
 of the proposition is true, that the averments of mere eviden- 
 tiary facts, if inserted in the pleading, are not thus controverted. • 
 Although this doctrine is elementary, and appears so simple in 
 the statement, it is nevertheless sometimes exceedingly difficult 
 of application in practice ; and the difficulty is enhanced by the 
 frequent inconsistencies of courts in dealing with it. While the 
 general principle, as just stated, is constantly affirmed, yet there 
 are numerous instances of particular causes of action in which 
 the plaintiffs are required to set out in detail matter which is 
 plainly evidentiary, and which is only of value as leading the 
 mind to a conviction that the final or issuable fact, which is one 
 necessary element of the right of action, exists. In other words, 
 the courts have often, while dealing with particular cases, vio- 
 lated the elementar}' principle which applies, or should apply, to 
 all cases ; and the result is confusion and uncertainty. It is pos- 
 sible, however, to distinguish between issuable, material facts, 
 and evidentiary facts, by an unfailing criterion. In all par- 
 ticular instances of the same cause of action based upon the 
 same circumstances, — that is, arising from the same primary 
 right in the plaintiff, broken by the same delict or wrong on 
 the part of the defendant, — the material or issuable facts which 
 are the essential elements of the right of action must be the same : 
 immaterial circumstances, the time, place, amounts, values, extent 
 of damages, parties, and the like, will be different; but the sub- 
 stantial elements of the cause of action, the facts which constitute 
 it, must in every instance of the same species be the same. On 
 the other hand, the evidentiary matter, the mass of subordinate 
 facts and circumstances which must be actually proved, and from 
 
 1 [^Riner )-. New Hampshire Fire Ins. 62 Pac. 377; Ball u. Putnam (1898), 123 
 Co. (1899), 9 Wyo. 81, CO Pac. 262 ; Rob- Ciil. 134, 55 Pac. 773.] 
 ertson v. Robertson (1900), 37 Ore. 339,
 
 ISSUES FORMED BY THE GENERAL DENIAL. 77 L 
 
 which the above-described essential elements result as inferences 
 more or less direct, may vary with each particular instance of 
 the same species of cause of action. The former class of facts 
 are material, issuable, and, when the theory of pleading in legal 
 actions is strictly observed, they alone should be averred, and 
 they alone should be treated as put in issue by the denials, 
 general or specific : the second class of facts — the proper evi- 
 dentiary matter — should not be pleaded, and, if improperly 
 averred, should not be regarded as put in issue by the denials of 
 the defendant. This is the true theory, and is again and again 
 commended by the courts ; but, at the same time, it is constantly 
 violated by the same courts in their requirements in respect to 
 the pleading in certain species of causes of action. Another 
 source of difficulty in applying the elementary doctrine is found 
 in the circumstance, that not infrequently the material, issu- 
 able fact which must be averred, and which is put in issue, 
 is identical with the fact which must be actually given in evi- 
 dence. In respect of such matters there are no steps and 
 grades, and processes of combination and deduction, by which 
 the issuable fact alleged is inferred from the evidentiary fact 
 proved. The two are one and the same ; and thus matter which 
 is truly evidence must in such case be alleged, and matter 
 which is the proper subject of allegation must be directly given 
 in evidence. 
 
 § 545. * 669. Allegations of Legal Conclusions not Controverted 
 by General Denial. Another and the final element which should 
 belong to the averments in the complaint, in order that an issue 
 may be raised thereon by the denial, is, that they must be of fact, 
 and not of law. This particular topic has already been treated 
 of in a former subdivision of the present section. The reformed 
 system of pleading, unlike that of the common law, authorizes 
 no issues to be raised by allegations of legal conclusions, and 
 denials of the same. Although there are traces to be found in 
 some of the cases of the ancient forms of averment in indebitatus 
 assumpsit and in debt, and of answers resembling the plea of nil 
 debet, yet all the decisions of present authority unite in theoreti- 
 cally condemning such a mode of pleading. I need not, how- 
 ever, dwell upon this particular rule, nor again refer to cases 
 which have been so recently cited. An allegation of law, in the 
 plaintiff's pleading is not controverted by the defendant's denial:
 
 1 1'l CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 no issue is formed thereby under which evidence can be admitted 
 from either party. 
 
 § 546. " 670. General Nature of Evidence Admissible under 
 Denials. The judicial opinions quoted under the preceding 
 head sufficiently establish the principle which controls all the 
 questions embraced under the present, and the cases to be 
 cited in the following one will illustrate the application of that 
 principle. In fact, it is so intimately bound up with the subject 
 last discussed, that it has already been stated and explained. I 
 shall, however, recapitulate and restate this fundamental doc- 
 trine. The material allegations of the complaint or petition, 
 when denied either generally or specifically, determine in each 
 case what evidence and what defences may be given and estab- 
 lished by the defendant. It is impossible to say of any class of 
 cases, that such or such evidence can or cannot be offered as a 
 matter of certain rule, or that such or such a defence can or can- 
 not be set up. As the plaintiff is bound by no inflexible rule 
 as to the form of his pleading, and as to the averments he may 
 choose to introduce into it, so he can widen or contract within 
 distant extremes the extent and nature of the evidence and de- 
 fences which may be interposed by the defendant under a denial.^ 
 As the denial puts in issue all the material allegations of fact 
 made by the plaintiff, whether originally necessary or not, he 
 is at liberty to introduce all and ixnj legal evidence which tends 
 to sustain those allegations. On the other hand, under the same 
 issue, the defendant is entitled to offer any evidence which tends 
 to contradict that of the plaintiff, and to deny, disprove, and over- 
 throw his material averments of fact.^ This is the fundamental 
 and most comprehensive doctrine of pleading embraced in the 
 new procedure, and it of course determines the nature of the 
 defences which may be set up under a general denial. It is 
 to be observed — although the remark is perhaps unnecessary 
 — that the defendant may in this manner attack any material 
 allegation of fact, and thus, if possible, defeat the recovery, 
 while the others are left unanswered or unassailed. ^ 
 
 1 SeeCliicagi), Ciu. &L. R.Co. i-. West, 154; Scott v. Morse, 54 Iowa, 7.32 ; Roe 
 37 Iml 21 1, 215. v. Angevine, 7 Hun, 679; Manning v. 
 
 2 QBay View Brewing Co. v. Gruhb Winter, 7 id. 482; Boomer v. Koon, 6 id. 
 (1901), 24 Wash. 16.3, 63 Pac. lO'JIJ 645; Andrews v. Bond, 16 Barb. r).33 ; 
 
 * As further illustrations of the te.xt, Beaty v. Swarthout, 32 id. 293 ; Scher- 
 Bee Jones i'. Seward Cy. Com'rs, 10 Neb. merhorn i\ Van Allen, 18 id. 29; Siharz
 
 DEFENCES ADMITTED UNDER A DENIAL. 773 
 
 § 547. * G71. Evidence Proper under Denials may be Affirmative 
 or Negative. As the allegations of the complaint or petition 
 controverted by the denials of the answer determine the nature 
 and extent of the evidence admissible under such denials, it 
 follows that this evidence may be sometimes negative and some- 
 times affirmative. Herein lies the source of much confusion and 
 uncertainty as to the character of the defendant's proofs and de- 
 fences, and as to their admissibility under the general denial. 
 Evidence in its nature affirmative is often confounded with 
 defences which are essentially affirmative and in avoidance of 
 the plaintiff's cause of action, and is therefore mistakenly re- 
 garded as new matter requiring to be specially pleaded, although 
 its effect upon the issues is strictly negative, and it is entirely 
 admissible under an answer of denial. In other words, in order 
 that evidence may be proved under a denial, it need not be in its 
 own nature negative : affirmative evidence may often be used to 
 contradict an allegation of the complaint, and may therefore be 
 proved to maintain the negative issue raised by the defendant's 
 denials.^ One or two familiar examples will sufficiently illus- 
 trate this proposition. In certain actions, property in the plain- 
 tiff, in respect of the goods which are the subject-matter of the 
 controversy, is an essential element of his claim. His complaint, 
 therefore, avers property in himself: the allegation is material, 
 and is, of course, put in issue by the general or specific denial. 
 To maintain this issue on his part, the plaintiff may give evidence 
 tending to show that he is the absolute owner, or has the requi- 
 site qualified property. The defendant may controvert this fact 
 in two modes. He may simply contradict and destroy the effect 
 
 r. Oppold, 74 N. Y. 307, 309; Hier r. See also Hess r. Union State Bank (1900). 
 Grant, 47 id. 278 ; Dunham v. Bower, 77 156 Ind. 523, 60 N. E. 305 ; Jones v. Rush 
 id. 76; Brown v. College Cor. Gt. Co., 56 (1900), 156 Mo. 364, 57 S. W. 118; Alpert 
 Ind. 110. V. Bright (1902), 74 Conn. 614, 51 Atl. 
 1 [In Jeffersonville, etc. Co. v. Riter 521 ; Van Skike v. Potter (1897), 53 Neb. 
 (1896), 146 Ind. 521, 45 N. E. 697, the 28, 73 N. W. 295; Phelps v. Skinner 
 court .said: " A defendant, under the (1901), 63 Kan. 364, 65 Pac. 667. 
 general denial, is not confined to negative This rule was approved by the Su- 
 proof in denial of the facts .stated in the preme Court of South Carolina in Wil- 
 comjilaint as a cause of action, hut may, son v. Railway Co. (1897), 51 S. C. 79, 28 
 upon the trial, introduce proof of facts S. E. 91, where it was held that the de- 
 independent of those alleged in the com- fence that an injury was caused by a 
 plaint, but which are inconsistent there- fellow servant w.as admissible under 
 with, and tend to meet and break down the general denial, quoting the text at 
 or defeat the plaintiff's cause of action." length. J
 
 774 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 of the plaintiff's proofs, and in this purely negative manner pro- 
 cure, if possible, a decision in his own favor upon this issue. 
 The result would be a defeat of the plaintiff's recovery by his 
 failure to maintain the averment of his pleading: but the jury 
 or court would not be called upon to find that the property was 
 in any other person; the decision would simply be, that the 
 plaintiff had not shown it to be in himself. On the other hand, 
 the defendant, not attempting directly to deny the testimony of 
 the plaintiff's witnesses, and to overpower its effect by directly 
 contradictory proofs, may introduce evidence tending to show 
 that the property in the goods is, in fact, in a third person. 
 This evidence, if convincing, would defeat the plaintiff's recov- 
 ery. It would be affirmative in its direct nature ; but its ultimate 
 effect, in the trial of the issue raised by the answer, would be 
 to deny the truth of the plaintiff's averment. Such evidence, 
 although immediately affirmative, would still, for the purpose of 
 determining the issue presented by the pleadings, be negative. 
 Again: in an action on a promissory note against the maker or 
 indorser, the complaint might allege title in the plaintiff, and 
 the fact that he was the owner and holder thereof. The answer 
 of denial would put this averment in issue, as it would be mate- 
 rial, and its truth essential to the recovery. Proof by the de- 
 fendant, that, prior to the commencement of the action, the 
 plaintiff had assigned the note to a third person, would be 
 affirmative in its immediate nature, but negative in its effect 
 upon the issue; for it would controvert the truth of the plain- 
 tiff"s allegation. Cases cited under the next subdivision hold 
 that the evidence which I have thus described in both of these 
 examples is admissible under the general denial. 
 
 § 548. * 672. Distinction bet^veen General Issue and Plea of 
 Confession and Avoidance at Common Law not the same as that 
 between General Denial and New Matter under the Code. The 
 theory of the general denial is completed by considering what 
 evidence cannot be given, and what defences cannot be set up, 
 under it. This subject will be discussed at large in the follow- 
 ing section: but some reference to it is appropriate in the present 
 connection. The codes divide defences into denials and new 
 matter. New matter must be speciall}' j)leaded. Defences at 
 the common law were separated into traverses general and 
 special, and j)leas by way of confession and avoidance. The
 
 DEFENCES ADMITTED UNDER A DENIAL. ( t D 
 
 general traverses were the general issues, and special traverses 
 were denials of some particular allegation. The common-law 
 distinction between these classes of defences was generally stated 
 by the text-writers as follows : The general issue, when used in 
 accordance with the original theory in those actions which ad- 
 mitted its full efficacy, put in issue the entire cause of action, 
 and under it the defendant was permitted to offer any evidence 
 and set up any defence which showed that the right of action 
 never, in fact, existed. The plea by way of confession and avoid- 
 ance, on the other hand, did not deny the facts from which the 
 cause of action arose. It admitted or " confessed " that a cause 
 of action once existed as averred, and set up other and subse- 
 quently occurring facts which showed that the right after it had 
 occurred had been in some manner discharged, satisfied, or de- 
 feated. Is it possible to draw the same distinction between the 
 general denial and the new matter of the code? I answer, It is 
 not. Such a distinction, although correct in many instances, is 
 not true absolutely. One reason for this is, that the plaintiff may 
 so frame his complaint or petition, may insert in it allegations of 
 such a sort, that a general denial will admit proof of facts which 
 would be strictly matter by way of confession and avoidance 
 under the former procedure. Certain passages in judicial opin- 
 ions which have identified the "new matter" of the codes with 
 the pleas by way of confession and avoidance of the common law, 
 are, therefore, inaccurate : they were written by their authors in 
 forgetfulness of the inherent difference between the fixed forms 
 of the common-law declarations, and the varying forms of the 
 complaints and petitions which may properly, though not perhaps 
 scientifically, be used under the new system. To illustrate : Pay- 
 ment after breach of a contract, and therefore after a cause of 
 action arose, is certainly matter by way of confession and avoid- 
 ance ; and yet a complaint may be so drawn that payment will 
 not be new matter, but will be provable under a general denial. 
 Other examples might be given ; but this single one suffices. 
 
 § 549. * 673. Same Subject. The result is, that the new 
 matter of the code does not, like the matter in confession and 
 avoidance of the common law, depend upon the essential nature 
 of the cause of action and of the defence, but, like the effect of the 
 general denial, it depends primarily upon the nature of the mate- 
 rial allegations which are embraced in the complaint. Any facts
 
 7/b CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 which tend to disprove some one of these allegations may be 
 given in evidence under the denial : any fact which does not thus 
 directly tend to disprove some one or more of these allegations 
 cannot be given in evidence under the denial. It follows, that if 
 such fact is in itself a defence, or, in combination with others, 
 aids in establishing a defence, this defence must be based upon 
 the assumption, that, so far as it is concerned, all the material 
 allegations made by the plaintiff are either admitted or proven 
 to be true. The facts which constitute or aid in constituting 
 such a defence are "new matter." In this respect the new 
 matter of the codes is analogous to the pleas by way of confes- 
 sion and avoidance of the common law, since it does, in truth, 
 confess and avoid. The two definitions may now be given, and 
 their contrast will be plain. A plea by way of confession and 
 avoidance admitted that the cause of action alleged did once exists 
 and averred subsequent facts which operated to discharge or sat- 
 isfy it. The new matter of the codes admits that all the material 
 allegations of the complaint or petition are true, and consists of 
 facts not alleged therein which destrog the right of action, and 
 defeat a recovery. To sum up these conclusions, the classifica- 
 tion of and distinction between defences at the common law 
 depended upon the intrinsic, essential nature of the causes of 
 action and of the defences. The analogous classification and 
 distinction Ijetween defences admissible under a denial, and 
 those which are new matter, in the new procedure, depend, 
 primarily upon the structure of the complaint or petition, and 
 the material averments of fact which it contains. All facts 
 which directly tend to disprove any one or more of these aver- 
 ments may be offered under the general denial: all facts which 
 do not thus directly tend to disprove some one or more of these 
 averments, but tend to establish a defence independently of 
 them, cannot be offered under the denial; they are new matter, 
 and must be specially pleaded.^ I shall now apply these general 
 principles to some particular instances. 
 
 § 550. * 674. Particular Defences Admissible under the General 
 Denial. In Actions for Compensation for Services. I shall in this 
 subdivision classify and discuss only those cases in which defences 
 have been held admissible : those which have been pronounced 
 inadmissible, for the reason that they fell within the denomina- 
 
 1 [IvffMis '•. Ilohertson (1896), 46 Neb. 837, 65 N. W, 897.]
 
 DEFENCES ADMITTED UNDER A DENIAL. 777 
 
 tion of "new matter," will be given in the next succeeding sec- 
 tion. ^ In an action b}' an attorney and counsellor to recover 
 compensation for professional services, the complaint stating the 
 retainer, the services and their value, and the answer being a 
 general denial, the plaintiff proved the services, and gave evi- 
 dence showing their reasonable value. It was held that the 
 defendant might, under his denial, show that the services were 
 rendered upon a special agreement to the effect that the plaintiff 
 would look to the recover}- of costs from the adverse part}- as his 
 sole mode of compensation, and Avould make no personal claim 
 against the defendant.^ And in a similar action under the same 
 answer the defendant may prove the plaintiff's negligence and 
 want of skill, by which the value of the services was diminished 
 or destroyed."^ In general, in actions to recover compensation 
 for work and labor upon a quantum vuruit the defendants may, 
 under the general denial, prove that the work was negligently or 
 unskilfully done, and thus contest its value; * and may prove that 
 the plaintiff had assigned and transferred the demand before suit 
 brought, for this controverts the defendant's indebtedness to him.^ 
 § 551. * 675. In Actions for Negligent Injuries. In actions for 
 injuries to person or property alleged to have resulted from the 
 
 1 For a summary of recent decisions. The defendant was at lil)erty to prove 
 see the additions to the hxst note under any circumstances tending to show that 
 §*682. he was never indebted at all, or that he 
 
 2 Schermerhorn v. Van Allen, 18 Barb, owed less than was claimed." 
 
 29, per Parker ,1.: "The evidence was s Bridges i'. Paige, 13 Cal. 640, 641. 
 improperly excluded. Under a general * Kaymond v. Hichardson, 4 E. D. 
 allegation of indebtedness, the plaintiff Smith, 171. But under a mere deuial of 
 had proved certain services rendered and the value, the defendant cannot show that 
 their value. It was surely competent for the services were not rendered. Van 
 the defendant, under a denial of such in- Dyke v. Maguire, 57 N. Y. 429. 
 debtedness, to prove that he never in- ^ Wetniore ;;. San Francisco, 44 Cal. 
 curred or owed the debt. He had a right 294, 299. And in an action for goods sold 
 to prove that the services were rendered and delivered, the defendant may show 
 as a gratuity, or that the plaintiff himself that the jdaintiff acted as agent for an- 
 had fixed a less price for their value than other person, whose name was disclosed, 
 he claimed to recover. The services and who wa.s the actual vendor. Merritt 
 being proved, the defendant might show v. Briggs, 57 N. Y. 651. 
 that they were rendered, not fur him, but j^But evidence showing a contract for 
 on the credit of some other jierson, or a smaller sum than that alleged by plain- 
 that the plaintiff himself undertook to run tiff is not admissible : Scholey i\ Demattos 
 the risk of the litigation. It was not an (1898), 18 Wash. .504, 52 Pac. 242. Nor 
 attempt to show an extinguishment of can it be shown that the appropriation foi 
 the indebtedness by payment, release, or the purpose is exhausted : McNnlty r. 
 otherwi.se; but it was an offer to show City of New York (1901), 168 N. Y. 117 
 that such indebtedness never existed. 6lN. E. 111.]
 
 78 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 defendant's negligence, he may prove under a general denial 
 that the wrong was caused by the negligence of third persons 
 not agents of the defendant, and for whom he was not respon- 
 sible;^ or may prove contributory negligence of the plaintiff. ^ 
 In accordance with the principle of these decisions, the defence 
 of non superior is always admissible under a general denial cf 
 complaints which allege the commission of injuries by means of 
 defendant's servants, employees, or agents. ^ 
 
 § 552. * 676. Assignment, Want of Consideration, etc. In an 
 action upon a promissory note or other security, the defendant 
 may under the general denial show an assignment of the thing in 
 action to a third person before the suit was commenced, since 
 this directly controverts the averment of title in the plaintiff;* 
 
 1 Schular v. Hudson Kiver R. Co., 38 
 Barb. 653 ; Schaus v. Manhattan Gasl. 
 Co., 14 Abb. Pr. n. s. 371 ; Jackson v. 
 Feather Riv. & G. W. Co., 14 Cal. 18 ; 
 Adams Exp. Co. v. Darnell, 31 lud. 20. 
 In this case, proof that the goods were 
 stolen was admitted in an action against 
 a common carrier. [^Roemer v. Striker 
 (1894), 142 N. Y. 134, 36 X. E. 808.] 
 
 - Schaus V. Manhattan Gasl. Co., 14 
 Abb. Pr. N. s. 371 ; New Haven & N. Co. 
 V. Quintard, 6 Abb. Pr. x. s. 128; Indian- 
 apolis, etc. R. Co. V. Rutherford, 29 Ind. 82 ; 
 Jeffersonville, M. & I. R. Co. r. Dnnlap, 
 29 Ind. 426 ; Hathawa}' v. Toledo, etc. 
 Ry. Co., 46 Ind. 25, 27. This decision is 
 placed upon the ground that in Indiana 
 the plaintiff must allege and prove the 
 absence of negligence on his part. See 
 also McDoneU v. Buffum, 31 How. Pr. 
 154; Evansville & C. R. Co. v. Hiatt, 17 
 Ind. 102 ; Jonesboro' & F. Turnp. Co. v. 
 Baldwin, 57 Ind. 86 ; Jones v. Sheboygan, 
 etc. R. Co., 42 Wis. 306; McQuade c 
 Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 68 Wis. 616. 
 Contra, Watkins v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., 38 
 Fed. Rep. 711 ; Kentucky Cent. R. Co. v. 
 Thomas, 79 Ky. 164; Stone i-. Hunt, 94 
 Mo. 475 ; Donovan v. Hannibal & St. .1. 
 Ry. Co., 89 Mo. 147 ; Hudson v. Wabash 
 W. Ry. Co., 101 Mo. 13 ; Keitel v. St. Lonis 
 Cable' & W. Ry. Co., 28 Mo. App. 657 ; St. 
 Clair v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 29 Mo. App. 
 76 ; South Omaha v. Cunningham, 31 
 Neb. 316; Grant v. Baker, 12 Ore. .329. 
 
 Qlndiana Natural Gas Co. v. O'Brien 
 (1903), — Ind. — , 66 N. E. 742. It was 
 
 held in Kennedy v. Railway Co. (1901), 
 59 S. C. 535, 38 S. E. 169, that under a 
 general denial defendant may show that the 
 injury was caused solely by plaintiff's negli- 
 gence, since this goes to controvert the 
 allegations of defendant's negligence con- 
 tained in the complaint. Otherwise in 
 case of contributory negligence, since that 
 admits plaintiff's allegations of negli- 
 gence and avoids the effect of the same. 
 Quoting § * 671 of the text.] 
 
 3 [[The defence that the injury was 
 caused by a fellow servant is admissible 
 under a general denial : Wilson v. Rail- 
 way Co. (1897). 51 S. C. 79, 28 S. E. 91 ; 
 Kaminski v. Tudor Iron Works (1902 J, 
 167 Mo. 462, 67 S. W. 221. But see note 
 2, p. 817. And under this issue the de- 
 fendant may show that it exercised due 
 care : Hunter r. Grande Ronde Lumber 
 Co. (1901), 39 Ore. 448, 65 Pac. 598.] 
 
 * Andrews r. Bond, 16 Barb. 633. And 
 see Wetmore v. San Francisco, 44 Cal. 294, 
 299. The exact contrary is held in Brett 
 r. First Univ. Soc, 63 Barb. 610, 618, per 
 Leonard J. The opinion in this case is, 
 however, manifestly incorrect. Under the 
 denial of " execution " in an action on a 
 note or other written contract, the defend- 
 ant may prove that his signature w.as ob- 
 tained by fraud : Corby v. Weddle, 57 Mo. 
 452, 459 ; or that the instrument was not 
 delivered : Fisher v. Hamilton, 48 Ind. 239. 
 But .see Dunning v. Ruml)augh, 36 Iowa, 
 566, 568. In an action upon an account 
 stated for services, the defendant cannot, 
 under the general denial, attack any of the
 
 DEFENCKS ADMITTED UNDKK A DENIAL. 779 
 
 and where the note is non-negotiable, a want of consideration 
 may be shown. ^ The general denial to a complaint in the oidi- 
 nary form, for goods alleged to have been sold and delivered by 
 the plaintiff, admits the defence that a third person who actually 
 made the sale was himself the owner of the goods, and was not 
 acting in the transaction as agent for the plaintiff ; for this proof 
 contradicts the allegation of a sale by the plaintiff ;2 and that 
 the person who actually bought the goods in the name of the 
 defendant was not the latter's agent, but that his prior au- 
 thority had been revoked, and the plaintiff had been notified 
 thereof; for this proof contradicts the allegation of a sale to 
 the defendant.'^ 
 
 § 553. * 677. In Actions for Conversion. In an action for the 
 conversion of chattels, the complaint of course averring propert}' 
 in the plaintiff, the general denial permits the defendant to show 
 that the property is not in the plaintiff;* as, for example, by 
 proving that a third person is owner of the goods either by an 
 absolute or qualified title. "^ This latter proposition is, however, 
 denied by some of the cases, which hold that the defence of 
 property in- a third person, or in the defendant, must be specially 
 
 items in the account: Warner r. Myrick, Day v. Wamsle}-, 3.3 Ind. 14.5, in whicli tlie 
 
 16 Minn. 91. The defence of alteration can defence was admitted that the goods were 
 
 be shown under the general denial in an sold to defendant's wife, who had left him 
 
 action upon a written contract : Boomer without cause, against his consent, and 
 
 V. Koon, 6 Hun, 64.5 ; National Bk. of without his knowledge. 
 
 Paris V. Nickell, 34 Mo. App. 295 ; Walton •* Robinson v. Frost, 14 Barb. 536. 
 
 Plow Co. V. Campbell (Neb. 1892), 52 [;Kervvood v. Avers (1898), 59 Kan. 
 
 N. W. Rep. 883. 343, 53 Pac. 134 ; Hopkins v. Dipert, 
 
 [^The defence of no assignment can also (1901), 11 Okla. 630, 69 Pac. 883. So in 
 
 be set up: Brown v. Curtis (1900), 128 an action for money had and received, it 
 
 Cal. 193, 60 Pac. TTS.^] may be shown under a general denial that 
 
 1 Evans V. Williams, 60 Barb. 346 ; the claim was for money lost by plaintiff 
 Bondurant v. Bladen, 19 Ind. 160; Butler at the game of ])oker: Frank r. I'ennie 
 v. Edgerton, 15 Ind. 15. But not when (1897), 117 Cal. 254, 49 Pac. 208 3 
 
 the consideration is presumed, as in a ^ Davis v. Iloppock, 6 Duer, 254. He 
 
 sealed instrument or negotiable paper: may show title in himself or in a third 
 
 Dubois V. Hermance, 56 N. Y. 673, 674 ; person, Sparks v. Heritage, 45 Ind. 66 ; 
 
 Eldridge v. Mather, 2 N. Y. 157 ; Weaver Kennedy v. Shaw, 38 Ind. 474 ; Farmer r. 
 
 ij. Barden, 49 N. Y. 286. Calvert," 44 Ind. 209, 212; Thomp.son v. 
 
 QBut an illegal consideration for a Sweetser, 43 Ind. 312 ; Davis y. Warfield, 
 
 promissory note cannot be shown under 38 Ind. 461. See also Jones i-. Ilahilly, 16 
 
 this issue : Dillon r. Darst (1896), 48 Neb. Minn. 320, 325 ; Schoenrock v. Farley, 49 
 
 803, 67 N. W. 783.] N. Y. Super. Ct. 302 ; Johnson v. Oswald, 
 
 2 Hawkins !;. Borland, 14 Cal. 413 ; and 38 Minn. 550 (the plaintiff claiming 
 see Ferguson v. Ramsey, 41 Ind. 511, through a sale by the defendant, the latter 
 513. ina,y, under a denial, show fraud to avoid 
 
 3 Hier v. Grant, 47 N. Y. 278 ; and see the sale, and a rescission of it).
 
 78.0 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 pleaded.^ Under a general denial in the same action, or a specific 
 denial of the conversion, any facts may he proved in defence 
 which go to sliow that there was no conversion ; ^ as, for ex- 
 ample, that the goods were lost without fault of the defendant,^ 
 or were taken under an execution against the plaintiff.^ 
 
 § 554. * 078. In Actions to recover Possession of Goods. 
 When the action is brought to recover possession of goods, the 
 complaint alleging title or right of possession in the plaintiff, the 
 defendant may, under the general denial, introduce evidence to 
 show that the plaintiff is not the owner nor entitled to posses- 
 sion of the chattels,^ but cannot show that the plaintiff's title is 
 fraudulent and void as asfainst his creditors.^ Nor can the de- 
 
 1 Dyson c. Ream, 9 Iowa, 51 ; Patter- 
 son V. Clark, 20 Iowa, 429. The doctrine 
 of these cases is clearly o])posed to the 
 true theory of tlie general denial. 
 
 2 [^Nichols & Sliejjard Co. v. Minnesota 
 Thresher Co. (1897), 70 Minn. 528, 73 
 N. W. 415.] 
 
 3 Willard v. Giles, 24 Wis. 319, 324. 
 
 * McGrew v. Armstrong, 5 Kan. 284 ; 
 or that the goods were taken with the 
 plaintiff's consent. Wallace v. Robb, 37 
 Iowa, 192, 195 ; and see Phcenix Mut. L. 
 Ins. Co. V. Walrath, 53 Wis. 669 ; and 
 the defendant in such action may prove 
 any facts in reduction of damages ; as, 
 for instance, that the maker was insolvent 
 in an action for the conversion of a note 
 made by a third person, and owned by the 
 plaintiff, Booth r. Powers, 56 N. Y. 22, 27, 
 31, 33 ; Quin v. Lloyd, 41 N. Y. 349. 
 
 * Caldwell v. Bruggerman, 4 Minn. 
 270; Woodworth c. Knowlton, 22 Cal. 
 164. In this case, defendant proved that 
 the goods were the jiroperty of a third 
 person. See also Sparks i\ Heritage, 45 
 Ind. 66 ; Kennedy v. Shaw, 38 Ind. 474 ; 
 Farmer v. Calvert, 44 Ind. 209, 212; 
 Thompson ». Sweetser, 43 Ind. 312; Sie- 
 denboch v. Riley, 111 N. Y. 560; Griffin r. 
 L. I. R. Co., 101 N. Y. 348; Lane v. Sparks, 
 75 Ind. 278; Pulliam v. Burlingame, 81 Mo. 
 Ill; Oe.ster r. Sitlington (Mo. 1893), 21 
 N. W. Rep. 820 ; Deford v. Hutchin.son, 
 45 Kan. 318, .332; Gandy v. Pool, 14 
 Neb. 98; Aultman v. Stichler, 21 Neb. 
 72 ; Towne v. Sparks, 23 Neb. 142 ; Mer- 
 rill I'. Wedgwood, 25 Neb. 283 ; Staley v. 
 Housel (Neb. 1892), 52 N. W. Roj). 888; 
 
 Chamberlin v. Winn, 1 Wasli. 501. Under 
 a general denial of ])laintiff"s title, the 
 defendant may show that the chattel mort- 
 gage, upon which the plaintiff relies to 
 establish his title, is void for usury : Adam- 
 son V. Wiggins, 45 Minn. 448. 
 
 [^Webster c. Long (1901), 63 Kan. 876, 
 66 Pac. 1032; Street v. Morgan (1902), 
 64 Kan. 85, 67 Pac. 448 ; Payne v. Mc- 
 Cormick Co. (1901), 11 Okla. 318, 66 Pac. 
 287 ; Gila Valley, etc. Ry. Co. v. Gila 
 County (1903), Ariz., 71 Pac. 913; Cum- 
 bey r. Lovett (1899), 76 Minn. 227, 79 
 N. W. 99; Pitts Agricultural Works v. 
 Young (1895), 6 S. D. 557, 62 N. W. 432 ; 
 Piano Mfg. Co. v. Daley (1897), 6 N. I). 
 330, 70 N. W. 277 ; Iowa Sav. Bank r. 
 Frink (1902), Neb., 92 N. W. 916 ; Jenkins 
 V. Mitchell (1894), 40 Neb. 664, 59 N. W. 
 90.] 
 
 ^ Frisbee v. Langworthy, 1 1 Wis. 375. 
 Contra, see Young v. Glascock, 79 Mo. 
 574 ; Stern Auction, etc. Co. v. Mason, 
 16 Mo. App. 473; Sopris v. Truax, 1 
 Col. 89. 
 
 QSeeleman v. Iloagland (1893), 19 Col. 
 231, 34 Pac. 995. Contra, Nat. Bank v. 
 Barkalow (1894), .53 Kan. 68, 35 Pac. 796; 
 Jones V. McQueen (1896), 13 Utah, 178, 
 45 Pac. 202; Munns r. Lovelund (1897), 
 15 Utah, 250, 49 Pac. 743; Gallick r. Ror 
 deanx (1899), 22 Mont. 470, 56 Pac. 961. 
 I'sury m.iy be shown under tlie general 
 denial: Davis r. Culver (1899), 58 Neb. 
 265, 78 N. W. 504. Waiver of conditions 
 of sale may be shown : Oesterf. Sitlingtoii 
 (1893), 115 Mo. 247, 21 S. W. 820.]
 
 DEFENCES ADMITTED UNDEK A DENIAL. 
 
 781 
 
 fendaut in such action, when the record presents the same issue, 
 justify as sheriff under process against A., and assert that the 
 goods in controversy were the property of A. fraudulently trans- 
 ferred to the plaintiff: this defence is new matter, and must be 
 pleaded.^ 
 
 § 555. * 679. In Actions to recover Possession of Laud. In an 
 action to recover possession of land, if the complaint is in the 
 usual form, merely averring that the plaintiff is owner in fee of 
 the premises described and entitled to their possession, and that 
 the defendant unlawfully withholds the same, the general denial 
 admits proofs of anything that tends to defeat the title which the 
 plaintiff attempts to establish on the trial.^ In some States the 
 defence of the Statute of Limitations may even be relied upon 
 in this action under a general denial ; ^ but cannot be in the other 
 
 1 Glazer v. Clift, 10 Cal. 303. Contra, 
 Bailey v. Swain, 45 Ohio St. 657 ; Holm- 
 berg V. Dean, 21 Kaa. 73 ; Merrill v. 
 Wedgwood, 25 Neb. 283. 
 
 [See in this connection Dobson v. Owens 
 <1895), 5 Wyo. 325, 40 Pac. 442; Connor 
 V. Knott (1896), 8 S. D. 304, 66 N. W. 461. 
 The rules respecting replevin in Connec- 
 ticut are different from those in most of 
 the code States. See McNamara v. Lyon 
 (1897), 69 Conn. 447, 37 Atl. 981 ; Smith 
 V. Brockett (1897), 69 Conn. 492, 38 Atl. 57. 
 
 " A defendant in replevin may, under 
 a general denial, prove and recover any 
 items of damage properly allowable to 
 him in such action : " Schrandt r. Young 
 (1901), 62 Neb. 2.54, 86 N. W. 1085; Ul- 
 rich V. McConaughey (1901), 63 Neb. 10, 
 88 N. W. 150.3 
 
 - Lain v. Shepardsou, 23 Wis. 224, 228, 
 per Paine J. : " Under such a complaint, 
 the plaintiff is allowed to show any title 
 he can ; and, from the necessities of the 
 case, the defendant, under a mere denial, 
 must be allowed to prove anything tend- 
 ing to defeat the title which the plaintiff 
 attempts to establish. He cannot be 
 bound to allege specific objections to a 
 title which the complaint does not dis- 
 close, and which he may have no knowl- 
 edge of until it is revealed by the evi- 
 dence at the tri.al." Mather v. Hutchinson, 
 25 Wis. 27 ; Miles v. Lingerman, 24 Ind. 
 385 ; Marshall r. Shafter, 32 Cal. 176 ; the 
 defendant may prove title in himself, and 
 
 an allegation to that effect in the answer 
 is not new matter ; Bruck r. Tucker, 42 
 Cal. 346, 351 ; Bledsoe v. Simms, 53 Mo. 
 305, 307 ; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Mc- 
 Cormick, 55 Fed. Rep. 601. In several 
 States, by virtue of the statute, every de- 
 fence, legal or equitable, may be proved 
 under the general denial, Vaiiduyn v. Hep- 
 ner, 45 Ind. 589, 591 ; Franklin v. Kelley, 
 2 Neb. 79. 113-115 (fraud) ; Hickman 'v. 
 Link, 97 Mo. 482. 
 
 []Iba V. Central Ass'n of Wyoming 
 (1895), 5 Wyo. 355, 40 Pac. 527; Macey 
 1-. Stark (1893), 116 Mo. 481, 21 S. W. 
 1088; Carkeek r. Boston Nat. Bank 
 (1897), 16 Wash. 399, 47 Pac. 884; Com- 
 monwealth Title Ins. Co. i: Dokko (1898), 
 72 Minn. 229, 75 N. W. 106, quoting the 
 text; Cheatham v. Young (1893), 113 
 N. C. 161, 18 S. E. 92; Sbeltou r. Wilson 
 (1902), 131 N. C. 499, 42 S. E. 937 ; Hedges 
 V. Pollard (1899), 149 Mo. 216, 50 S. W. 
 889. But in Kentucky, under Civ. Code, 
 § 125, a defendant cannot assert his title 
 to land under a general denial : Brent v. 
 Long (1896), 99 I^y. 245, 35 S. W. 640.] 
 
 3' Nelson v. Brodhack, 44 Mo. 596; 
 Bledsoe v. Simms, 53 Mo. 305, 307 ; Fulk- 
 erson r. Mitchell. 82 Mo. 13 ; Fairbanks v. 
 Long, 91 Mo. 628 ; Stocker v. Green, 94 
 Mo. 280; Holmes ?^ Kring, 93 Mo. 452. 
 See also post,§ *714, and notes. [^Cole- 
 man V. Drane (1893), 116 Mo. 387, 22 
 S. W. 801.]
 
 732 
 
 CIVIL liEMEDIES. 
 
 States, whose codes expressly require the statute to be pleaded.^ 
 An equitable defence to the action must, however, as it seems^ 
 be specially pleaded;'-^ and the defence that a deed to the plain- 
 tiff absolute on its face, under which he claims title, is only a 
 mortgage.^ 
 
 § 556. " 680. In Actions in which Malice is an Essential Ingre- 
 dient. In an action to recover damages for a malicious prosecu- 
 tion, the complaint alleging malice and the want of a probable 
 cause, the general denial puts these averments in issue, and 
 admits any evidence going to show a want of malice and the 
 existence of a probable cause ; as, for example, when the com- 
 plaint charged that the defendant wrongfully procured the plain- 
 tiff to be indicted, proof on the part of the defendant that he was 
 a grand juror, and that all the acts complained of were done by 
 
 ^ Orton r. Noonaii, 2.5 Wis. 672. A 
 defence arising after the commoncemeut 
 of the action cannot be proved, but must 
 be set up by a supplemental answer. 
 McLane v. Bovee, .3.5 Wis. 27, .34. 
 
 2 Stewart v. Hoag, 12 Ohio St. 623 ; 
 Lombard v. Cowham, 34 Wis. 486, 491. 
 The court, in the last case, held that, 
 when tlie deed under which the plaintiff 
 claims is fraudulent and void, tiiat de- 
 fence may be proved under the general 
 denial, because it controverts the plain- 
 tiff's lej/al title. To this effect is Brown 
 V. Freed, 43 Ind. 253, 254-257, and cases 
 cited. Under a general denial, defendant 
 may show that his deed to the plaintiff, 
 under which the latter claims, was upon 
 an illegal consideration, and therefore 
 void, Sparrow v. Rhoades, 76 Cal. 208, 
 245 ; that an execution sale which was 
 the source of plaintiff's title was void, by 
 reason of the land having been a home- 
 .stead, Kipp v. Bullard, .30 Minn. 84; and 
 see the similar case of Motley v. Griflin, 
 104 N. C. 112; and where the defend.ant 
 is not advised by the complaint as to the 
 source of the plaintiff'.s title, he 7nav in- 
 troduce evidence of an equitable e.stoppel 
 against the plaintiff: Parker v. Dacres, 
 1 Wash. 190. 
 
 [Anderson r. Rasmus.sen (1894), 5 Wyo. 
 44, .36 Pac. 820. But see Travellers' lus. 
 Co. /;. Walker (1899), 77 Minn. 438, 80 
 N. W. 618, where the court said : " Where 
 the complaint in an action of ejectmeut 
 
 merely alleges the plaintiffs title generally, 
 without disclosing the source of liis title 
 or right of possession, if the defendant 
 has an equity wliich, as it exists and 
 without any affirmative relief, defeats 
 plaintiff's claim to the possession, it may 
 be proved under a general denial, being 
 strictly defensive in its nature. But, if 
 the equity is such that it does not give 
 the defendant the right of possession as 
 against the legal title without affirmative 
 relief enforcing the equity, then the de- 
 fendant must plead the facts entitling 
 him to such relief, the matter l)eing in 
 the nature of a counter-claim." See 
 also, to the same effect, Pinkham v 
 Pinkham (1901), 61 Neb. 336, 85 N. W, 
 285.] 
 
 3 Davenport v. Turpin, 43 Cal. 597 
 Hughes i\ Davis, 40 Cal. 117 ; contra, see 
 remarks in Healy u. O'Brien, 66 Cal. 517 
 Smith V. Smith, 80 Cal. 323, 329 ; Hyde 
 r. Mangan, 88 Cal. 319 ; in noue of which 
 cases, however, does it appear to have 
 been necessary to pass upon the point in 
 question. \^Contr(i. Locke i\ Monlton 
 (1895), 108 Cal. 49, 41 Pac. 28. Under 
 this issue it may be shown that a deed in- 
 troduced as evidence of title was executed 
 by a grantor wanting in capacity; Caw- 
 field y. Owens (1902), 130 N. c! 641,41 
 S. E. 891. And it may be shown that the 
 deed was champertous : O'Banion o. Good- 
 rich (1901), Ky., 62 S. \V. 1015.]
 
 DEFENCES ADMITTED UNDER A DENIAL. 
 
 783 
 
 him in that capacity, was held proper.^ The same principle must 
 apply to all cases in which malice is an essential ingredient in 
 the right of action, and is alleged in the complaint or petition : 
 all facts tending to disprove the malice are clearly admissible 
 under the denial. 
 
 § 557, * 681. In Actions for Specific Performance. When the 
 general denial is pleaded in an action to compel the specific 
 performance of a contract to convey land, it is held in some 
 cases that the defence of the Statute of Frauds may be relied 
 upon, for the answer puts the existence of the contract in 
 issue ; ^ other cases, however, hold the contrary, and require 
 the statute to be pleaded. ^ And the Statute of Limitations 
 may be set up under a general denial in the same action, when- 
 ever it is not expressly required by the codes, as in certain 
 States, to be pleaded.* 
 
 1 Animerman v. Crosby, 26 Ind. 451 ; 
 Huuter v. Mathis, 40 lud. 356 ; Kost v. 
 Harris, 12 Abb. Pr. 446; Radde v. Kuck- 
 gaber, .3 Duer, 684 ; Simpson v. McArthur, 
 16 Abb. Pr. 302 (n.) ; Levy v. Brannan, 
 39 Cal. 485 ; Trogdea v. Deckard, 45 Ind. 
 572; but see Scheer v. Keown, 34 Wis. 
 349, an action for false arrest and im- 
 prisonment. In an action for malicious 
 prosecution, under a general denial the 
 plaintiff's guilt may be shown, Bruley v. 
 Rose, 57 Iowa, 651 ; and that the defend- 
 ant acted in good faith, upon the advice 
 of competent counsel, Sparling v. Conway, 
 75 Mo. 510. [^Maynard w Sigman (1902), 
 — Neb. — , 91 N. W. 576 ; Kellogg v. 
 Scheuerman (1897), 18 Wash. 293, 51 Pac. 
 344 ; Bowman v. Fur Mfg. Co. (1895), 96 
 la. 188, 64 N. W. 775 ; McAllister r. 
 Johnson (1899), 108 la. 42, 78 N. W. 790. 
 In actions for libel, privilege is provable 
 under a general denial : Schomberg v. 
 Walker (1901), 132 Cal. 224, 64 Pac. 290; 
 also the truth of the alleged libellous 
 statement : Locke v. Chicago Chronicle 
 Co. (1899), 107 la. 390, 78 N. W. 49; 
 Moffittw. Chicago Chronicle Co. (1899), 
 107 la. 407, 78 N. W. 45.] 
 
 2 Hook V. Turner, 22 Mo. 333 ; Wild- 
 bahn v. Robidoux, 11 Mo. 659; Springer 
 V. Kleinsorge, 83 Mo. 152, 156; Bernhardt 
 V. Walls, 29 Mo. App. 206; Popp v. 
 Swanke, 68 Wis. 364 ; Smith v. Theobald, 
 86 Ky. 141. 
 
 l^Hillhouse v. Jennings (1901), 60 S. C. 
 373, 38 S. E. 599 ; Bean v. Lamprey (1901), 
 82 Minn. 320, 84 N. W. 1016; Williams- 
 Hayward Shoe Co. v. Brooks (1900), 9 
 Wyo. 424, 64 Pac. 342 ; Hackett v. Watts 
 (1896), 138 Mo. 502, 40 S. W. 113; Hill- 
 man V. Allen (1898), 145 Mo. 638, 47 S. W. 
 509; Boyd v. Paul (1894), 125 Mo. 9, 28 
 S. W. 171; Bless v. Jenkins (1895), 129 
 Mo. 647, 31 S. W. 938; Devore u. Devore 
 (1896), 138 Mo. 181, 39 S. W. 68; Kleia 
 V. Liverpool & London Ins. Co. (1900), 
 Ky.,57 S. W. 250 ; Haun v. Burrell (1896), 
 119 N. C. 544, 26 S. E. Ill ; Thompson v. 
 Frakes (1900), 112 la. 585, 84 N. W. 703; 
 Indiana Trust Co. v. Finitzer (1903), — 
 Ind. — , 67 N. E. 520; Riif v. Riibe (1903), 
 — Neb. — , 94 N. W. 517.] 
 
 3 Livesey v. Livesey, 30 Ind. 398 ; Os- 
 borne V. Endicott, 6 Cal. 149 ; Maybee v. 
 Moore, 90 Mo. 340. QSee cases cited in 
 note 2, p. 7 1 8.] 
 
 * Wiswell V. Tefft, 5 Kan. 263; 
 Springer v. Kleinsorge, 83 Mo. 152. 
 
 [;Coleman v. Drane (1893), 11 6 Mo. 387, 
 22 S. W. 801 (ejectment). In Bond v. 
 Bond (1903), 175 Mo. 1 12, 74 S. W. 975, in 
 an action for specific performance, defend- 
 ant, under a general denial, was allowed 
 to introduce a bond for title executed by 
 him to plaintiff's deceased husband, condi- 
 tioned on payment of certain notes, and 
 introduce tlie notes, unpaid, to show a 
 forfeiture.]
 
 784 CIVIL KEMEDIi;S. 
 
 ^ 558. * 682. In Actions on Covenants and Judgments. When 
 the complaint in an action upon a covenant of warranty, con- 
 tained in a deed of land to the plaintiff, alleged the conveyance, 
 the covenant, and a breach thereof by means of an outstanding 
 paramount title and a recovery on the same, the general denial 
 put all these averments in issue, and enabled the defendant to 
 prove any facts going to show that there was no such paramount 
 title. ^ In an action upon a judgment recovered in another State, 
 the complaint set out the recovery of the judgment, and all the 
 other allegations necessary to constitute the cause of action. 
 The defendant pleaded (1) the general denial; (2) that there 
 was no such record ; (3) that the judgment was obtained with- 
 out any notice given to the defendant, without service of process 
 on him or appearance by him, he being all the time a non- 
 resident of the State in which the judgment was recovered. 
 All the matters alleged in these two special defences were, it 
 was held, embraced within the general denial, and could be 
 proved under it: the defences themselves, according to the well- 
 settled practice in Indiana, were struck out on motion, because 
 they were equivalent to the general denial and redundant.^ 
 
 1 Rhode V. Green, 26 Ind. 83. In a Thompson, 8 Ore. 428; Freser r. Charles- 
 creditor's suit to set aside the debtor's ton, 11 S. C. 486; Weeks t". Smith, 18 
 fraudulent transfer of land, the grantee Kan. 508 ; Clayton v. School Di.st., 20 id. 
 may prove, under the general denial, that 206; Emily v. Harding, ^3 Ind. 102; 
 the lari<i was a liomestead, for this rebuts Steeple r. Downing, 60 id. 368; Webster 
 the alleged fraud charged by the plain- v. Bebinger, 70 id. 9; Over v. Shannon, 
 tiff, Hibben i-. Soyer, .33 Wis. 319, 322; 75 id. 352; in actions of rcjilevui, Branch 
 also any facts showing absence of fraud, v. Wi.seman, 51 Ind. 1 ; Wilier v. Manby, 
 Summers v. Hoover. 42 Ind. 153, 156. 51 id. 169; Stowell v. Otis, 71 N. Y. 36; 
 
 2 Westcott I'. Brown, 13 Ind. 83. The Staubadi v. Rexford, 2 Mont. Ty. 565; 
 fullowing recent cases show wliat de- Creighton y. Newton, 5 Neb. 100; Ricii- 
 fences have or have not been admitteil ardson v. Steele, 9 id. 483; Bailey r. 
 under the general denial in various ac- Bayne, 20 Kan. 657 ; in actions on promin- 
 tioQs. Some of tliese decisions can iiardly son/ notes, Casad v. Holdridge, 50 Ind. 
 be reconciled witli the well-settled doc- 529 (illegality of consideration cannot be 
 trine concerning the office of the general shown) ; Schwarz v. Oppold, 74 N. Y. 
 denial, especially some cases dealing 307 (alteration may be shown) ; in con 
 with the actions for the recovery of land, tract for materials, etc.. Read v. Decker, 5 
 and of chattels, ejectment, and replevin. Hun, 646; contract for services, ^Wr.iArA v. 
 In actions for conversion, Ontario Bk. r. Applegate, 61 Ind. 368; /'or roif o;i a /ease, 
 N. J. Steamboat Co., 59 N. Y. 510; Mc- Mack i-. Burt, 5 Hun, 28; on an oral con- 
 Clelland v. Nichols, 24 Minn. 176; Moul- tract. Bush r. Brown, 49 Ind. 573; to re- 
 ton V. Thompson, 26 id. 120; Smith v. scind a contract for fraud, Dalrymple v. 
 Hall, 67 N. Y. 48; in actions Cff ejectment. Hunt, 5 Hun, 111 ; to recover a deficiencif 
 Tracy v. Kelly, 52 Ind. 535; Freeman v. on a wortf/a/je foreclosure, Scofield v. Do.s- 
 Sprague, 82 N. C. .346 ; Powers r. Arm- cher. 72 N. Y. 491, 495, 490 ; for damages, 
 Btroug, 35 Ohio St. 357; I'liillippi v. Wandell v. Edwards, 25 Hun, 498; iu
 
 DEFENCES ADMITTED UNDER A DENIAL. 785 
 
 § 559. * 683. Special Statutory Provisions as to Denying Exist- 
 ence of Corporation and Partnership. This discussion will be 
 ended by a brief reference to some special statutory rules, , pre- 
 scribing the effect and operation of denials in certain cases, which 
 have been adopted in various States. These rules do not belong 
 to the general theory of pleading embodied in the new system ; 
 they rather break the symmetry of that theory ; but as they are 
 practically important, they cannot be passed by without notice. 
 [In New York, a statute, general in its terms, provides that the 
 corporate existence alleged in the complaint need not be proved 
 " unless the answer is verified, and contains an affirmative alle- 
 gation that the plaintiff, or defendant, as the case may be, is not 
 a corporation,"] and the fact is not put in issue by the general 
 denial.^ In Indiana a sworn answer is made necessary to put 
 in issue the legal existence of alleged corporations in actions 
 brought by them ; but a general denial verified complies with this 
 statutory requirement, and compels the plaintiff to prove its cor- 
 porate character.2 In Wisconsin, an answer denying the partner- 
 ship of the plaintiffs in an action by a firm must be verified, or it 
 forms no issue. An unverified denial, therefore, either general 
 or specific, admits the partnership as averred.^ 
 
 action for negligence, Jones v. Sheboygan, 78 N. W. 1070 ; Kelley v. Nebraska Exp. 
 etc. R. Co., 42 Wis. 307; defmce of accord Ass'u (1897), 52 Neb. 355, 72 N. W. 356. 
 and satisfaction, Looby v. West Troy, 24 Contra, Town of Denver v. Spokane Falls 
 Hun, 78 ; in action for a divorce, defences (1893), 7 Wash. 226, 34 Pac. 926.^ Water- 
 in abatement, and the statute of liinita- ville Man. Co. v. Bryan, 14 Barb. 182. 
 tions, Dutcher v. Dntcher, 39 Wis. 651, '^ Chance y. Indianapolis & W. G. Road 
 and numerous cases cited. Co., 32 Ind. 472, disapproving a contrary 
 
 [|A general denial raises the issue of the doctrine in Cicero Hyg. Dr. Co. v. Craig- 
 
 right of a foreign e.xecutor to maintain an head, 28 Ind. 274, and approving Wert v. 
 
 action: Stoddard r. Aiken (1899), 57 S. C. Crawfordsville & A. Turnp. Co., 19 Ind. 
 
 134, 35 S. E. 501. But this form of an- 242 ; Williams v. Franklin Tp. Acad, 
 
 swer does not put in issue the due appoint- Assoc, 26 Ind. 310 ; Adams Exp. Co. v. 
 
 meut of a domestic administrator and his Hill, 43 Ind. 157 ; Indianapolis F. & M. 
 
 right to sue : llaukiuson v. Charlotte, etc. Co. v. Herkimer 46 Ind. 142, 144. A 
 
 R. R. Co. (1893), 41 S. C. 1, 19 S. E. 206. statute in Wisconsin [;requiring a specific 
 
 Nor does it raise the issue of an infant's denial], it is held, applies to both foreign 
 
 disability to sue: Hicks r, Beam (1893), and domestic corporations, St., 1898, 
 
 112 N. C. 642, 17 S. E. 490. Condonation § 4199 ; Williams Mower, etc. Co. v. Smith, 
 
 need not be pleaded: Hill r. Hill (1893), 33 Wis. 530; Central Bk. of Wis. v. 
 
 24 Ore. 416, 33 Pac. 809.] Knowlton, 12 Wis. 624. 
 
 1 [^Code Civ. Pro., § 1776. See also ^ j^St., 1898, § 4197.] Fisk v. Tank, 
 
 Standard Sewing Mach. Co. v. Henry 12 Wis. 276, 301; Martin v. Am. Exp. 
 
 (1894), 43 S. C. 17, 20 S. E. 790; Cham- Co., 19 W^is. 336. 
 
 berlin Banking House y. Kemper, etc. Co. C^^ago v. Walsh (1898), 98 Wis. 348, 
 
 (1902), Neb., 92 N. W. 175; Fletcher v. 74 N. W. 212. Contra, McKasy i-. Huber 
 
 Co-operative Pub. Co. (1899), 58 Neb. 511, (1896), 65 Minn. 9, 67 N. W. G50.] 
 
 50
 
 786 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 ^ 560. * 684. Special Statutory Provisions as to Denials iu Actions 
 on Written Instruments. In Tnduiiia, ill actions Upon written in- 
 struments against the original parties, makers, indorsers, acceptors, 
 obligors, and the like, an unsworn general denial puts in issue 
 only the existence of the writing, and requires its production ; but 
 does not put in issue its execution^ and therefore admits no evi- 
 dence tending to dispute the signature of the defendant or any 
 other facts included within the execution. If veritied, the denial 
 puts in issue both the execution and the existence.^ The rule is 
 different, however, in actions against the executors or admin- 
 istrators of deceased parties to written instruments : tlie unver- 
 ilied general denial pleaded by them raises a complete issue.^ An 
 unverified general denial also admits the plaintiff's legal capacity 
 to sue in Indiana.^ A statute of Iowa enacts that, in actions or 
 defences on written instruments, " the signature or indorsement 
 thereto shall be deemed genuine and admitted, unless the party 
 w^hose signature it purports to be shall deny the same under oath 
 in the pleading." In an action upon a promissory note against 
 the maker, the defendant pleaded an unverified general denial^ 
 and under it insisted as a defence that he did not sign the writing 
 as a note, but executed it with the supposition that it was a simple 
 receipt. This defence being objected to as inadmissible, the court 
 held that the statute referred only to the genuineness of the sig- 
 nature, and did not prohibit the defendant from showing that he 
 did not execute such a contract as the one in suit, but executed an 
 entirely different instrument, for example, a receipt, and that the 
 same had been altered into a note.* In another case upon a note 
 the petition set it out in hcec verba, averring that it was executed 
 by the defendant. The answer was verified, but simply denied 
 knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief whether the 
 allegations of the petition were true. This form of verified denial^ 
 it was held, did not comply with the requirements of the statute 
 in question, and raised no issue in respect of the signature.^ 
 
 i [^Burns' St., 1901, § .367.] Stebbins 8 Downs v. McCombs, 16 Ind. 211; 
 
 V. Goldthwaite, 31 lud. 159; Evans i: Jones v. Cin. Type Foundry, 14 Ind. 89; 
 
 Southern Turnp. Co., 18 Ind. 101 ; Price Ileaston v. Cincinnati & Ft. W. R. Co., 
 
 i>. Grand Hapids & Ind. R. Co., 18 Ind. 16 Ind. 27.5; Harrison v. Martinsville & 
 
 1.37 ; Hicks v Reigle, .32 Ind. .360. F. K. Co., 16 Ind. 50.-5. 
 
 2 Cawood's Adm. r. Lee, .32 Ind. 44 ; ■» Lake r. Cruiksliank, .31 Iowa. .30"). 
 
 Riser v. Snoddy, 7 Ind. 442; Mahon's ^ Hall i\ .Etna Man. Co., .30 Iowa, 21.'), 
 
 Adm. V. Sawyer, 16 Ind. 73. 217, 218. Sec Lyun r. Bunn, 6 Iowa, 48.
 
 DEFENCES ADMITTED UNDER A DENIAL, 
 
 "87 
 
 § 561. * 685. General Denial cannot be struck out as Sham. 
 The general denial, at least when verified, cannot be struck out as 
 sham on motion.^ In accordance with tlie settled rule of tlie 
 former procedure, the general issue could not be struck out for 
 such cause ; and in this respect the general denial is its equivalent. 
 " It gives the defendant tlie same right to require the plaintiff to 
 establish by proof all the material facts necessary to show his 
 right to a recovery as was given by that plea [the general issue]." ^ 
 
 1 [^See Patterson v. Railway Co. (189G), 
 12 Ohio C. C. 274, and Packet Co. i-. 
 Fogarty (1895), 9 Ohio C. C. 418, con- 
 demning the use of a verified general 
 denial when the defendant knows tliat 
 some of the averments denied are true.] 
 State V. Chamberlin, 54 Mo. .338. See also 
 Ewen V. Chicago & N. W. Ky. Co., 38 Wis. 
 G13; Sanford v. McCreedy, 28 id. 103; 
 Wittman v. Watry, 37 id. 2.38 ; Preston »•. 
 Roberts, 1 2 Bush, 570 ; Rauson v. Anderson, 
 9 S.C.438; Sully f.Goldsniith,49 Iowa, 690. 
 
 [^Where the statute requires the denial 
 of the genuineness of the indorsement or 
 assignment of a written instrument to be 
 verified, an unverified plea of denial is an 
 admission of such matters : Daggs v. 
 Phoenix Nat. Bank (1898), Ariz., 53 Pac. 
 201. See also, to same effect, Hardwick 
 V. Atkinson (1899), 8 Okla. 608, 58 Pac. 
 747 ; Lux w. McLeod (1893), 19 Colo. 465, 
 36 Pac. 246. But where the petition al- 
 leges ownership of a note, but not the 
 execution of an indorsement, the owner- 
 ship is put in issue by an unverified general 
 denial : Southern Kan. Farm, etc. Co. v. 
 Barnes (1901), 63 Kan. 548, 66 Pac. 638.3 
 
 2 VVayland v. Tysen, 45 N. Y. 281, 282. 
 See also Grocers' Bank v. O'Rorke, 6 Hun, 
 18; Reynolds v. Craus (Supreme, 1891), 
 16 N. Y. Suppl. 792; Upton v. Kennedy 
 (Neb., 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 1042. 
 
 [^Loranger v. Big Missouri Mining Co. 
 (189'5), 6 S. D. 478, 61 N. W. 686 ; Green 
 V. Hughitt School Tp. (1894), 5 S. D. 452, 
 59 N. W. 224. The same rule applies to 
 any verified denial : King v. Waite (1897), 
 10"S. D. 1, 70 N. W. 10.56 ; Pfister v. Wells 
 (1896), 92 Wis. 171, 65 N. W. 1041 ; Pear- 
 son V. Neeves (1896), 92 Wis. 319, 66 
 N. W. 357. 
 
 In general an answer may be stricken 
 out as sham when its falsity and insuffi- 
 ciency are clearly apparent : Dobson v. Hal- 
 
 lowell (1893), 53 Minn. 98, 54 N. W. 939 ; 
 Randall v. Simmons (1902), 40 Ore. 554, 
 67 Pac. 513; Pfaender v. Winona, etc. 
 R. R. Co. (1901), 84 Minn. 224, 87 N. W. 
 618; Fargo v. Vincent (1894), 6 S. D. 
 209, 60 N. W. 858 ; Sweetman v. Ramsey 
 (1899), 22 Mont. 323, .56 Pac. 361 ; Swee- 
 ney I'. Schlessinger (1896), 18 .Mont. 326, 
 45 Pac. 213 ; McDonald v. Pincus (1893), 
 13 Mont. 83, 32 Pac. 283; Sifton v. Sifton 
 (1895), 5 N. D. 187, 65 N. W. 670; Kidder 
 County V. Foye (1901), 10 N. D. 424, 87 
 N. W. 984; Wilson v. Burhans (1897), 96 
 Wis. 550, 71 N. W. 879; Miser i'. O'Shea 
 (1900), 37 Ore. 231, 62 Pac 491. Under 
 the statute providing that " sham, frivo- 
 lous and irrelevant replies may be stricken 
 out" on motion, the entire reply must 
 be proceeded against: Brown v. Baker 
 (1901), 39 Ore. 66, 65 P^c. 799. Under 
 the express provision of R. S. 1 898, § 2682," 
 matter cannot be stricken from a verified 
 pleading on the ground that it is sham : 
 Moore v. May (1903), 117 Wis. 192. 94 
 N. W. 45. 
 
 For other cases touching sham and. 
 frivolous answers, see Western Carolina 
 Bank v. Atkinson (1893), 113 N. C. 478, 
 18 S. E. 703 ; Campbell v. Patten (1893), 
 113 N. C. 481, 18 S. E. 687; Vass v. 
 Brewer (1898), 122 N. C. 226, 29 S. E. 
 352 ; Bardwell-Robinson Co. v. Brown 
 (1894), 57 Minn. 140, 58 N. W. 872; North- 
 western Cordage Co. v. Galbraith (1897), 
 9 S. D. 634, 70 N. W. 1048; Bank of 
 Commerce v. Humphrey (1894), 6 S. D. 
 415, 61 N. W. 444 ; Pittsburg, etc. Ry. Co. 
 i). Fraze (1898), 150 Ind. 576, 50 N. E. 
 576; Brown v. Porter (1893), 7 AVash. 
 327, .34 Pac. 1105; Oakes v. Ziemer 
 (1900), 61 Neb. 6, 84 N. W. 409; First 
 Nat. Bank v. Stoll (1899), 57 Neb. 758, 78 
 N. W. 254; Upton v. Kennedy (1893), 36 
 Neb. 66, 53 N. W. 1042.]
 
 788 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 The same rule applies to a denial, general in fonn, of certain 
 specified allegations constituting a part of the complaint,^ and is 
 applicable as well to equitable as to legal actions,^ and to all par- 
 tial denials,^ and is not restricted to those which are verified.* 
 
 SECTION FOURTH. 
 THE DEFENCE OF NEW MATTER. 
 
 § 562. * 686. Introductory. Much of what might properly be 
 included in this section has already been necessarily dwelt upon 
 in discussing the defence of denials. The two subjects so cor- 
 relate and support each other, that the one cannot be explained in 
 full without, to some extent, explaining the other also. I shall 
 not repeat the propositions and definitions given in the last sec- 
 tion, but shall content myself with adding examples and illus- 
 trations drawn from decided cases. The subject-matter of this 
 section will be distributed into three subdivisions : I. How de- 
 fences of new matter should be pleaded ; II. What is new matter 
 in general, Avith a particular reference to defences in mitigation 
 and those in abatement ; and, III. Some particular examples of 
 new matter classified and arranged. 
 
 I. How Defences of New Matter should be pleaded. 
 
 § 563. * 687. Statemeut of New Matter in Answer Governed by 
 same Rule as Statement of Cause of Action in Petition. A denial 
 when properly pleaded does not state any facts ; it simply denies 
 facts.^ A defence of new matter, on the other hand, does not 
 deny any facts ; it assumes the averments of the complaint or 
 petition to be true ; and under the ancient system a plea of con- 
 fession and avoidance must give color to these averments, or it 
 would be fatally defective. The "giving color " was simply the 
 absence of any denials, and the express or silent admission that 
 
 1 ^Standard Sewing Mach. Co. ;•. Henry '^ Thompson v. Erie R. Co.. 45 N. Y. 
 
 (1894), 43 S. C. 17, 20 S. E. 790; State 468. 472. 
 
 ex rel. v. King (1894), 6 S. D. 297, 60 3 ciaflin v. Jaroslauski, 64 Barb. 46.3. 
 
 N. W. 75 ; Gjerstaiiengen v. Hartzell * Brooks v. Chilton, 6. Cal. 640. 
 
 (1899), 8 N. D. 424, 79 N. W. 872 ; Larson 6 See Venice v. Breed, 65 Barb. 507, 
 
 V. Winder (1896), 14 Wash. 647, 45 Pac. 603, per Mullin J., for a statement of the 
 
 315. But see Upton r. Kennedy (1893), 36 comjiarative effects of denials and of new 
 
 Neb r.c, 53 N. W. 1012. J matter in raising issues.
 
 DEFENCE OF KEW MATTER. 7t9 
 
 the declaration, as far as it went, told the trutli.^ The defence 
 of new matter consists, therefore, of facts, — positive facts ; and 
 these should be averred as carefully and with as much detail as 
 the facts ^\■hich constitute the cause of action and are allerjed in 
 the complaint. The defence of new matter depends upon the 
 existence of facts from which it results as truly as the cause of 
 action results from other facts.^ The rule for setting forth the 
 facts which constitute the defence is, therefore, the same as that 
 for setting forth the facts which constitute the cause of action.^ 
 In each case, all the material, issuable facts which make up the 
 cause of action or the defence must be averred, while the detail 
 of mere evidentiary matter should properly be left to be used as 
 proofs at the trial. I need not further enlarge upon this proposi- 
 tion, but will illustrate it by a few judicial decisions. Thus it is 
 a settled rule that, when fraud is relied upon as a defence, a gen- 
 eral allegation charging fraud or a fraudulent intent will not 
 suffice: all the facts which the law requires as the elements of 
 fraud, and all wliicli are claimed to be the constituents of the 
 fraud in the particular case, must be averred ; and their absence 
 may destroy the intended effect of the pleading, and shut out all 
 evidence in its support at the trial.* 
 
 1 Under the new procedure, in every in effect a denial of allegations in the com- 
 defence of new matter tliere should be, plaint presumptively within defendant's 
 eitlier expressly or by implication, a con- knowledge: Uisdon r. Davenport (1894), 
 fession that, but for such new matter, tiie 4 S. I) 555, 57 N. W. 482. See note 1, 
 action could be maintained ; the defence p. 757.] 
 
 must contain no denial; such denial * Jenkins t'. Long, 19 Ind. 28, 29, per 
 
 should be pleaded in a separate defence, Frazer J.: "At the common law, fraud 
 
 if at all. Moi'gan z\ Hawkeye Ins. Co., could be given in evidence under the gen- 
 
 37 Iowa, 359 ; Anson v. Dwiglit, 18 Iowa, eral issue, or under a general plea of 
 
 241. This is nothing more than the sim- fraud. But, under the code, fraud must be 
 
 pie rule that two distinct defences should specially pleaded ; and the answer of fraud 
 
 not be mingled together. must contain all the elements necessary 
 
 2 ^Where an answer by way of new to be proved to make out the fraud : and 
 matter alleges conclusions only, it is sub- these are, that the representation must go 
 ject to general demurrer: Van Dyke v. to a material fact; must be made under 
 Doherty (1896), 6 N. D. 263, 69 isf. W. such circumstances that the party had a 
 200.] right to rely on it ; and it mu.st be false 
 
 ^ Qlnan action for conversion, an answer to a material extent." Keller v. Johnson, 
 
 which refers to the " property mentioned 1 1 Ind. 337. In an action on notes, a 
 
 and described in the second paragraph in defence, " that he was induced to execute 
 
 plaintiff's second cause of action," is suffi- the notes mentioned by tlie fraud, covin, 
 
 ciently definite and not demurrable for and deceit of the,'' etc., was held bad on 
 
 want of certainty : Spalding v. Allred demurrer. Capuro v. Builders' Ins. Co., 
 
 (1901), 23 Utah, 354, 64 Pac. 1100. 39 Cal. 123; Oroville & Va. E. Co. v. 
 
 New matter in the answer may heal- Plumas Cy. Sup., 37 Cal. 354; Kent r. 
 
 leged on information and belief where not Snyder, 30 Cal. 666 ; Fankboner v. Fank-
 
 790 
 
 CIVIL UEMEDIES. 
 
 § 564. * 688. Further Illustrations. Akin tO the defence of 
 fraud is that of duress : the facts constituting the duress must be 
 stated, and a mere general averment will not suffice ; as, for ex- 
 ample, in a suit to foreclose a mortgage given by a married 
 woman upon her own land, a defence that "she was induced by 
 the coercion of her said husbtind to execute the said mortgage/' ^ 
 
 bouer, 20 lud. 62 ; Ham t>. Greve, 34 lud. 
 18, 21, a defence " tliat his sij^nature was 
 obtained by the fraud of the plaintiff," 
 without stating any circumstances, was 
 held a nullity. Hale r. Walker. 31 Iowa, 
 344, 355, a defence which simply stated 
 tliat the contract in suit " was either false 
 or fraudulently so written or so done by 
 mistake," admitted no proof of fraud. 
 " In order to admit evidence of fraud, 
 there should, under our .system of plead- 
 ing, be at least a general statement of the 
 facts constituting the fraud." Lefler r. 
 Field, 52 N. Y. 621, action for the price of 
 barley bargained and sold ; answer, that 
 the barley was bargained for by defend- 
 ants' agent ; that he contracted to buy 
 plaintiff's barley, provided it was mer- 
 chantable; that plaintiff represented it 
 good, first quality, and merchantable ; 
 that the agent relied on such representa- 
 tions ; that the barley was not merchant- 
 al)le, which fact was known to the plaintiff. 
 Alth(iugh the plaintiff went to trial on this 
 answer without prior objection, the Court 
 of Appeals held it was worthless, since it 
 omitted two essential elements of the fraud, 
 — (1) the plaintiff's intent to deceive, and 
 (2) that defendants were in fact deceived. 
 See also Cummiugs v. Thompson, 18 Minn. 
 246, 250, in which the rule is given as fol- 
 lows : " A general statement of the matters 
 of fact constituting the fraud is all that is 
 reiiuired : it is not necessary to charge 
 minutely all the circumstances which may 
 conduce to prove the general charge." 
 Dubois r. Ilermance, 56 N. Y. 673, 674 ; 
 Joest u. Williams, 42 Ind. 565, 568 ; Curry 
 V. Keyser, 30 Ind. 214 ; Leighton ;;. Grant, 
 20 Minn. 345, 354. See also Mills r. 
 Collins, 67 Iowa, 164; Specht v. Allen, 
 12 f)re. 117. In Prall v. Peters, 32 Neb. 
 832, an action for false representations in 
 the .sale of a horse, it was held that the 
 defences that the plaintiff.s sustained no 
 damage, and that they had full knowledge 
 
 of the condition of the horse when they 
 purchased the same, constituted new 
 matter. 
 
 [Nichols V. Stevens (1894), 123 Mo. 96, 
 25 S. W. 578 ; Fire Extinguisher Co v. 
 City of Perry (1899), 8 Okla. 429, 58 Pac. 
 635; Greiss )'. State Inv. Co. (1893), 98 
 Cal. 241, 33 Pac. 195; Muldoon ?•. Brown 
 (1899), 21 Utah, 121, 59 Pac. 720; Wilson 
 ;•. Sullivan (1898), 17 Utah, 341, 53 Pac. 
 994; H. B. Clafiin Co. v. Simon (1898), 
 18 Utah, 153, 55 Pac. 376 ; Voorhees /•. 
 Fi-sher (1893), 9 Utah, 303, 34 Pac. 64; 
 Smith r. Estey Organ Co. (1897), 100 Ga. 
 628, 28 S. E. 392 ; I'aving Co. v. Botsford 
 (1896), 56 Kan. 532,44 Pac. 3 ; Guild r. 
 Railroad Co. (1896), 57 Kan. 70, 45 Pac. 
 82; Winchester v. Joslyn (1903), — Col. 
 — , 72 Pac. 1079; Parker v. Jewett (1893), 
 52 Minn. 514, 55 N. W. 56 ; Caplis v. Am. 
 Fire Ins. Co. (1894), 60 Minn. 376, 62 
 N. W. 440 ; JFAusl Ius. Co. v. Simmons 
 (1896), 49 Neb. 811,69 N. W. 125;Ketten- 
 bach ;;. Omaha Life Ass'n (1896), 49 Neb. 
 842, 69 N. W. 135. See also Parker i\ 
 Des Moines Life Ass'n (1899), 108 la. 
 117, 78 N. W. 826, holding that, under 
 the statute, fraud in the application can- 
 not be set up as a defence unless the apjdi- 
 cation was attached to the policy. 
 
 But see Clough ;;. Ilolden (1893), 115 
 Mo. 336, 21 S. W. 1071, where it was 
 held that while a general allegation of 
 fraud is sufficient in an answer ( ICdgell i\ 
 Siger.son, 20 Mo. 494 ; Snialley )•. Halo, 37 
 Mo. 102; Fo.\ v. Webster, 46 Mo. 181), 
 it is not sufficient in a petition, a reason 
 for which distinction the writer, Gantt J., 
 said would be hard to give. To the same 
 effect as to the answer see Ryan v. Mid - 
 dle.sborough Co. (1899), 106 Ky. 181, .50 
 S. W. 13.] 
 
 1 Richardson v. Hittle, 31 Ind. 119; 
 Conn. L. Ins. Co. v. McCormick. 45 ("al. 
 580.
 
 DEFENCE OF NEW MATTER. ^ 791 
 
 A defence of justification in an action for trespasses and other 
 torts must by appropriate averments identify the wrongs com- 
 plained of with the acts described in the answer and justified, or 
 else it will fail of its purpose and be worthless.^ In Indiana, the 
 defence of a former recovery for the same cause of action between 
 the same parties must set out the record of such former suit, or it 
 will be insuflicient and bad on demurrer.''^ The following are 
 some further illustrations of the general rule. A defence of jet- 
 tison by a common carrier on the water should allege all the facts 
 showing the jettison to have been necessary ; ^ a defence of usury 
 must narrate all the particulars of the agreement and transac- 
 tion ; * a defence of long-continued user or prescription should 
 aver that the possession or user by the defendant was adverse : ^ 
 and the defence that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest 
 must state all the facts which show that legal conclusion.^ 
 
 § 565. * 689. Averments of New Matter as Basis for AfiSrmative 
 Helief. When the defendant sets out new matter which he relies 
 upon, not as defensive merely, but as the basis of affirmative re- 
 lief, either in the form of a strictly legal counter-claim or of an 
 -equitable cross-demand, he becomes in truth an actor pro tanto : 
 his answer is to that extent equivalent to a cause of action 
 
 1 Gallimore v. Ammerman, 39 Iiid. 571 (contributory negligence) ; Klais v. 
 323; Isley v. Huber, 45 Ind. 421 ; Boaz v. Pidford, 36 id. 587 (justification by pub- 
 Tate, 43 Ind. 60, 71. lie officers) ; Staley v. Ivory, 65 Mo. 74 
 
 2 Norris v. Amos, 15 Ind. 365; 2 R. S., (failure of consideration) ; Foy v. Haugh- 
 p. 44, § 78. ton, 83 N. C. 467 (fraud) ; Hendrix v. 
 
 3 Bentley v. Bustard, 16 B. Mon. 643. Gore, 8 Ore. 406 (payment) ; Wallace v. 
 * Manning v. Tyler, 21 N. Y. 567, 568, Lark, 12 S. C . 576 (illegality); Kendig 
 
 and cases cited; Gaston v. McLeran, 3 v. Marble, 55 Iowa, 386 (fraud); Clayes 
 
 Ore. 389. v. Hooker, 4 Hun, 231 (usury) ; Lord i-. 
 
 5 White V. Spencer, 14 N. Y. 247. Lindsay, 18 Hun, 489 (duress) ; Jones v. 
 
 6 Raymond v. Pritchard, 24 Ind. 318, Frost, 51 Ind. 69 (fraud) ; Young v. Pick- 
 and cases cited ; Hereth v. Smith, 33 Ind. ens, 49 id. 23 (title) ; Mahoney v. Robins, 
 514, and cases cited ; Shafer v. Bronen- 49 id. 146 (fraud and failure of title) ; Van 
 berg, 42 Ind. 89, 90; Harte v. Houchin, 50 Wy v. Clark, 50 id. 259 (fraud) ; Jones v. 
 Ind. 327. The following recent cases give Shaw, 67 Mo. 667 ; Keim, etc. Co. t. Avery, 
 additional illustrations of the text, and of 7 Neb. 54 ; Sargent v. Steubenville, etc. 11. 
 various defences held to have been prop- Co., 32 Ohio St. 449; Stowell ;;. Otis, 71 
 erlyor improperly pleaded: Becker (-.Boon, N. Y. 36 ; McKissen v. .Sherman, 51 Wis. 
 61 N. Y.317 (tender); Manufac. Nat. Bank 303. When the defendant must or need 
 V. Russell, 6 Hun, 375 (mistake) ; Bush v. not negative the exceptions in a .statute 
 Brown, 49 Ind. 573 (want of consideration on which his defence is based, see Ilarri.s 
 and duress) ; Zeidler v. Johnson, 35 Wis. v. White, 81 N. Y. 532, 546 ; Clark c. 
 335 (statute of limitations, hypothetical) ; Clark, 5 Hun, 340; Fleming v. People, 27 
 Van Trott v. Wiesse, 36 id. 439 (fraud) ; N. Y. 329. 
 
 Freeman v. Engelmann Transp. Co., 36 id.
 
 792 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 asserted in a complaint or petition, and is to be governed by the 
 same rnles. It must aver all the material, issuable facts consti- 
 tutinsr the risrht of action in his favor, and must demand the re- 
 lief legal or equitable which is sought to be obtained from the 
 plaintiff.^ The foregoing cases are given as illustrations and 
 examples of the general doctrine, and not as exhaustive of its 
 scope and application. The rule applies to all defences of new 
 matter. The material, issuable facts which constitute the defence 
 must be averred, so that its sufficiency in law may fully appear 
 on the record : the facts themselves, and not the legal conclusions 
 from assumed facts, are to be stated.^ 
 
 II. The General Nature of New Matter ; Defences in Mitigation 
 of Damayes, and in Abatement. 
 
 § 566. * 690. Introductory. The cases quoted from in the pre- 
 ceding section to show the judicial definition of the general de- 
 nial exhibit also the interpretation put by the courts upon the 
 term " new matter ; " and the decisions which will be cited in the 
 next subdivision of this section will show how that interpretation 
 has been applied in a great variety of particular instances. It 
 would be a needless labor to repeat the extracts referred to, or 
 the general discussion of the nature and properties of new matter. 
 It is elementary that a defence of new matter should be pleaded ; 
 and as new matter must of necessity be a distinct defence from a 
 denial, it follows that it cannot properly be associated or mingled 
 up with denials general or specific in one paragraph or plea. 
 For the same reason, each defence of new matter must necessa- 
 rily be complete and single, as much so as each cause of action, and 
 should be separately stated in a plea by itself. Tliis subject will 
 be treated of at large in a subsequent section. 
 
 § 567. * 691. Denials and New Matter Distinguished. The 
 overwhelming weight of judicial opinion has with almost complete 
 unanimity agreed upon the principle which distinguishes denials 
 
 1 Rose V. Treadway, 4 Nev. 4.'J5 ; Hook fence in action to recover land) ; Heaston 
 
 r. Craighead, 32 Mo. 40.5; White i;. Allen, v. Cincinnati & Ft. W. R. Co., 16 Ind. 
 
 3 Ore. 103. 275. But it was held in Hunter v. Mc- 
 
 - Northrup v. Miss. Vail. Ins. Co., 47 Laughlin, 43 Ind. 38, 45, that the following 
 
 Mo. 435, 443, per Wagner .J. ; State c. wa.s a sufficient averment of a want of 
 
 Cent. Pac. R. Co., 9 Nev. 79, 87 (pay- consideration; that the notes "were given 
 
 xnent) ; Pease v. Hannah, 30 Ore. 301 (de- without any consideration whatever."
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF NEW MATTER. 793 
 
 from new matter, and detei-mines the office and function of each.^ 
 The general denial puts in issue all the material averments of the 
 complaint or petition, and permits the defendant to prove any 
 and all facts wliich tend to negative those averments or some one 
 or more of them. • Whatever fact, if proved, would not thus tend 
 to contradict some allegation of the plaintiff's first pleading, but 
 would tend to establish some circumstance, transaction, or conclu- 
 sion of fact, not inconsistent with the truth of all those allega- 
 tions, is new matter.'^ It is said to be " new,'' because it is not 
 embraced within the statements of fact made by the plaintiff ; it 
 exists outside of the narrative which he has given ; and proving 
 it to be true does 7iot disprove a single averment of fact in the 
 complaint or petition, but merely prevents or destroys the legal 
 conclusion as to the plaintiff's rights and the defendant's duties 
 which would otherwise liave resulted from all those averments 
 admitted or proved to be true. Such is the nature of the new 
 matter wliich cannot be presented by means of a denial, but must 
 be specially pleaded, so that the plaintiff may be informed of its 
 existence and of the use to be made of it by the defendant.^ 
 Whether it is " new " in the sense described must of necessity 
 depend, and depend alone, upon the nature, extent, and variety 
 of the material allegations which the plaintiff inserts in his plead- 
 ing. I shall not repeat the observations upon this point contained 
 in the preceding section, and simply remark that the plaintiff 
 may, by making unnecessary although material averments in his 
 complaint or petition, greatly enlarge the scope of the general 
 denial, and prevent those defensive facts from being in liis case 
 new matter, which in another case, and from the operation of a 
 more scientific and correct mode of pleading, would clearly be 
 
 1 [^Matter specially pleaded, if adniis- Neb. 436 ; Burlingtou & Mo. Riv. R. Co. 
 sible under the general deuial, should be r. Lancaster Cy. Com 'rs, 7 id. 33 ; Swenson 
 stricken out as redundant : Bolton u. Mis- v. Cresop, 28 Ohio St. 668. 
 
 souri Pac. Ry. Co. (1902), 172 Mo. 92, 72 [^See Kingsbury v. Chicago, etc. Ry. 
 
 S. W. 530; Kirtou v. Bull (1902), 168 Mo. Co. (1897), 104 la. 63, 73 N. W. 477,forau 
 
 622, 68 S. W. 927. But it does not render interesting application of this distinction.] 
 
 the pleading demurrable : Staten Island, ° C^ady c. South Omaha Nat. Bank 
 
 etc. Ry. Co. v. Hinchliffe (1902), 170 N. Y. (1896), 46 Neb. 7.56, 65 N. W. 906; Gran 
 
 473, 63 N. E. 545.] v. Houston (1895), 45 Neb. 813, 64 N. W. 
 
 2 The following recent decisions illus- 245; Home Fire Ins. Co. ii. Berg (1896), 
 trate the te.xt : Roe v. Angevine, 7 Hun, 46 Neb. 600, 65 N. W. 780 ; Medland v. 
 679 ; Read v. Decker, 5 id. 646 ; Douglas Conuell (1898), 57 Neb. 10, 77 N. W. 437 ; 
 ;;. Haber.stro, 25 id. 262 ; Saunders ?;. Cham- Denney v. Stout (1900), 59 Neb. 731, 82 
 berlaiu, 13 id. 568; Allen v. Saunders, 6 N. W.18.]
 
 , 'Jl CIVIL REMEDIES, 
 
 new matter. The criterion under the code system is not, there- 
 fore, in evert/ case, the intrinsic, essential nature of the defence 
 itself proposed by the defendant : it is to be found rather in the 
 frame of the complaint or petition, in the material statements of 
 fact made by the plaintiff therein. It cannot then be said, for 
 example, that '• payment " is always new matter ; for tlie plaintiff 
 may so construct his complaint that facts showing payment will 
 be directly contradictory of a material averment embraced within 
 it, and tlierefore plainly admissible under the general denial. It 
 is impossible for tliis reason to collect, arrange, and classify a 
 mass of different defences, and sa}^ of them, as could be said 
 under the old system, that they are all necessarily by way of con- 
 fession and avoidance, and therefore all of necessity " new matter." 
 § 568. * (>92. New Matter as Confession and Avoidance. It fol- 
 lows from the foregoing discussion, tliat considering the office 
 and function of the general denial, and the distinction between it 
 and new matter, the latter confesses and avoids all the material 
 allegations of the comjylaint or petition; that is, it admits all the 
 material facts averred therein, and avoids their legal result by 
 means of the additional facts which are relied upon as constitut- 
 ing the defence.! A particular defence may therefore, w\\ei\ set 
 up in answer to one complaint, be new matter, and require to be 
 pleaded: the same kind of defence, when set up in answer to 
 another complaint, may not be new matter, but may ba proved 
 under the general denial without being specially pleaded. Un- 
 doubtedly the defence of payment in its various phases is the one 
 which most frequently assumes this double aspect; but the prin- 
 ciple plainly applies to other defences, and is general. This de- 
 scription of new matter and the discussion of its nature will be so 
 fully illustrated by the cases to be cited in the following subdivi- 
 sion of the present section, that none need now be quoted in sup- 
 port of the foregoing positions. There are, however, two special 
 classes of defences, which, though embraced under the denomina- 
 tion of new matter, are so peculiar, and so radically different 
 from all others of that name, that they require a separate mention, 
 — defences in mitigation of damages, and defences in abatement. 
 
 1 QJohnson v. Hesser (1901), 61 Neb. North Neb. Fair, etc. Ass'n v. Box (1899), 
 
 631, 85 N. W. 894; Home Fire Ins. Co. v. 57 Neb. 302, 77 N. W. 770; Jack.soii r. 
 
 •lohansen (1899), 59 Neb. 349, 80 N. W. School Dist. (1900), 110 la. 313, 81 N. W . 
 
 1047; Txiwe r Prospect Hill Cemetery 596.] 
 Ass'n (1899), 58 Neb. 94, 78 N. W. 488;
 
 DEFENCES IN MITIGATION. 795 
 
 § 569. * 693. Defences in Mitigation of Damages. Common-Law 
 Theory. The theory of the cominoii hiw in respect of full and 
 partial defences has already been stated. ^ Each defence in bar 
 by way of confession and avoidance must have been a complete 
 answer to the whole cause of action. Facts which fell short of 
 that result, but which constituted a partial answer, were not 
 regarded as true "defences." As they did not defeat a recov- 
 ery, but always allowed a judgment for at least nominal dam- 
 ages, the severe logic of the system did not suffer them to be 
 pleaded separately in the form of a bar. This logic demanded 
 a perfect issue upon the record, — an assertion on the one side, 
 and a complete denial thereof on the other, — or else the record 
 admitted the plaintiff's right to recover. If the defendant 
 should plead facts which constituted a partial defence merely, 
 there would be no issue, and the common-law devotion to logical 
 forms could not admit such a violation of its theory. As the 
 partial defences, if pleaded, would raise no issue, the rule was 
 adopted that they should not be pleaded, but that the general 
 issue should be interposed, and the facts constituting them 
 should be given in evidence under that answer. Matters in 
 mitigation are partial defences, and it became the settled doc- 
 trine of the former procedure that they were to be proved under 
 the general issue. Mitigating circumstances were not confined 
 to actions for torts, to "trespass," "case," or "trover:" they 
 were possible and proper as well in actions upon contract, in 
 "covenant" and "assumpsit." Part payment was of course such 
 a circumstance ; and even full payment might be proved in miti- 
 gation, reducing the plaintiff's recovery to nominal damages. 
 
 § 570. * 694. Theory of the Codes as to Pleading Matter in Miti- 
 gation. The common-law logic does not control the forms of 
 pleading and of the issues under the present system. The notion 
 of a partial defence on the record of an answer which does not 
 go to the whole cause of action, is neither opposed to the spirit 
 nor to the letter of the codes ; on the contrary, it is in full har- 
 mony with the spirit, and seems to be demanded by the letter. 
 The obvious intent of the system — the central conception — is 
 not an observance of logical forms, but that the facts which con- 
 stitute the plaintiff's cause of action, and the defendant's resist- 
 ance thereto, shall be stated in a plain and concise manner, in 
 
 1 See supra, §§ * 607, * 008.
 
 796 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 ordinary language, without reference to any technical require- 
 ments of form or theory. The very primary design of the 
 procedure is that the truth as it is between the parties must 
 be first alleged, and then proved. The letter carries out this 
 spirit, because it requires that the answer must contain (1) the 
 denials, and (2) a statement of ant/ new matter constituting a 
 defence and that tlie defendant may set fortli as many defences 
 as he shall have. No other clauses of the statute limit tlys gen- 
 eral language, or restrict it to entire defences. From the nature 
 of the case, when a complaint or petition is in an ordinary form, 
 containing only the averments necessary to state the cause of 
 action, facts in mitigation of damages must be new matter 
 rather than denials. It follows that the fair and obvious in- 
 terpretation of the codes not only permits but requires that this 
 class of defences, when they are new matter, should be pleaded.^ 
 It is clearly contrary to the entire theory of the system that ani/ 
 new matter, however incomplete may be its effect upon the plain- 
 tiff's recovery, should be proved under a denial: there is not the 
 slightest warrant for such a use to be made of the general denial, 
 whatever may have been the function of the general issue in 
 this respect. In interpreting the language of the codes, all the 
 common -law notions as to the impossibility of pleading partial 
 defences should be wholly rejected; for they were based upon 
 reasons purely technical and arbitrary, — mere formulas of verbal 
 logic without any real meaning. The statute should be construed 
 in its own spirit as an independent creation, and not in the light 
 of ancient dogmas which it was designed to supersede. I need 
 not collate and compare the various provisions of the code bear- 
 ing upon the question in order to establish the textual interpre- 
 tation. Nothing can be added to the demonstration which Mr. 
 Justice Selden has worked out in the opinion already mentioned 
 and quoted at length in the preceding section, and that opinion 
 has not been and cannot be answered.^ 
 
 1 [[This rule is supported by tlie fol- Matter pleaded in mitigation is not 
 
 lowing cases : Reed v. Union Central Life objectionable because it would not justify : 
 
 Ins. Co. (1900), 21 Utah, 295, 61 Pac. 21 ; Conley v. Arnold (1894), 93 Ga. 823, 20 
 
 Vierling I'. Binder (1901), 113 la. 337, 85 S. E. 762. And matter in justification 
 
 N. W. 621, citing the text; Smith v. cannot be available in mitigation unless 
 
 Bowers (1902), Neb., 89 N. W. 596; Lati- so pleaded: Jenks v. Lansing Lumber Co. 
 
 mer v. York Cotton Mills (1903), 66 S. C. (1896). 97 la. 342, 66 N. W. 2.T1.] 
 
 135, 44 S. E. 559. -' McKvring v. Bull, 16 N. Y. 304.
 
 DEFENCES IN MITIGATION. 797 
 
 § 571. * 695. New York Doctrine as to Pleading Matter in 
 Mitigation. On principle, then, all defences in mitigation of 
 damages, when they consist of new matter, should be pleaded, 
 and cannot be proved, under the general denial. How does the 
 question stand upon authority? It is, of course, put at rest in 
 New York by the decision of the tribunal of last resort in 
 McKyring v. Bull.^ The ratio decidendi of that case is uni- 
 versal in its application: it is not confined to the defence of pay- 
 ment; the argument embraces all instances of mitigation, for it 
 is not based upon the particular nature of any defence, but upon 
 an interpretation of the language used by the legislature. This 
 decision has been followed by other courts and in other States, 
 but the cases are not unanimous: in some, the ancient common- 
 law dogmas have been appealed to and accepted as controlling. 
 I will collect the more important of these adjudications. A 
 defence in mitigation having been pleaded to an action for 
 false arrest and imprisonment, the Supreme Court of New 
 York, in denying a motion to strike out the answer, said: "It 
 has been held in several cases that mitigating circumstances in 
 actions of this nature may be proved without being set up, if 
 admissible in evidence at all. Whatever weight may be given 
 to these authorities, I am inclined to think that the case of 
 Foland v. Johnson,'-^ which was decided by the general term of 
 this district, settles the question in favor of the doctrine that 
 mitigating circumstances may be set up by way of answer in a 
 case like the present one. "^ In Foland v. Johnson,* which was 
 an action for assault and battery and false imprisonment, it was 
 held that a separate defence in mitigation was proper. McKyring 
 V. Bull was distinctly recognized as overruling previous cases, 
 and as laying down the universal rule of interpretation for all 
 causes of action and defences. It had been said in several early 
 New York cases that matter in mitigation cannot be pleaded, 
 but must be proved under a general denial : these decisions were 
 all pronounced before that made in McKyring v. Bull, and must 
 
 1 McKyring v. Bull, 16 N. Y. 304. See - Foland v. Johnson, 16 Abb. Pr. 235, 
 
 supra, §§ *6.'i8, *659. See also Wilbour 239. 
 
 V. Hill, 72 N. Y. 36, 38 ; Spooner v. Keeler, ^ Beckett v. Lawrence, 7 Abb. Pr. n. s. 
 
 nl id. 527; Wachter v. Quenzer, 29 id. 403,405. 
 
 547. Compare Wandell r. Edwards, 25 ^ Foland v. Johnson, 16 Abb. Pr. 235, 
 
 Hun, 498; Jauch v. Jauch, 50 Ind. 239. 
 135.
 
 798 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 therefore be considered as overruled.^ There is a dictum in 
 Travis v. Barger,^ to the effect that circumstances in mitigation 
 may be proved under the general denial ; but the facts did not 
 call for any decision. The proposition was stated by the judge 
 arc)uendo. and the opinion itself was prior to the announcement 
 of the contrary doctiine by the Court of Appeals. 
 
 § 572. * 696. Doctrine in Indiana and Kentucky. In Indiana 
 the common-law dogma is still adhered to. The rule as stated 
 by the Supreme Court of that State is, that " matter in mitiga- 
 tion only cannot be specially pleaded or set up by way of answer, 
 but may be given in evidence under the general denial. We 
 know of no authority, either at coiumon law or by statute, allow- 
 ing matters in mitigation only, except in actions for libel and 
 slander, to be specially pleaded or set up in the answer."^ In 
 
 1 Saltus V. Kip, .5 Duer, 646 (Sp. Term) ; 
 Kneedler v. Sternbergh, 10 How. Pr. 67 
 (Sp. Term); Dunlap v. Snyder, 17 Barb. 
 561 ; Anonymous, 8 How. Pr. 434 (Sp. 
 Term) ; Gilbert v. Rounds, 14 How. Pr. 
 46; Lane /•. Gilbert, 9 How. Pr. 1.50. 
 
 - Travis v. Barger, 24 Barb. 614, 623, 
 per Birdseye J. There are New York 
 oases, however, subsequent to McKyring 
 V Bull, which utterly disregard it, and 
 might be considered as overruling it, 
 were it possible for a lower court, an<l a 
 siugle judge quoting himself as authority, 
 to overrule tlie decisions of a higlier tri- 
 bunal. In Harter v. Grill, 33 Barb. 283, 
 per Morgan J., which was an action for 
 criminal conversation, it was held that 
 facts in mitigation could be proved under 
 the general denial. McKyring v. Bull was 
 mentioned, and its authority was denied 
 because the mitigatinu circumstances di<l 
 not constitute a defence. It was said 
 that the section requiring new matter to 
 be pleaxled (§149 of the New York Code) 
 includes only those cases in which the 
 facts to be alleged amount to a complete 
 defence. In short, the entire argument, 
 the whole cour.se of reasoning approved 
 by the court of la.st resort, was disregarded. 
 No analysis or comparison of other sec- 
 tions and pa.s.sages bearing upon the ques- 
 tion was made : the results reached by 
 the Court of Appeals, after a most careful 
 examination of the text of the statute 
 aided by the light of experience, were 
 
 overturned by a bare assertion. Finally, 
 in Tompkins'r. Wadley, 3 N Y. S. C. 424. 
 430, per Morgan J., which was an action 
 for the breach of a promise to marry, evi- 
 dence in mitigation was held admissible 
 under tiie general denial. The same 
 judge again delivered the opinion, and 
 cited Harter v. Crill. Travis i\ Barger, 24 
 Barb. 614, 623, and Kniffen v. McConnell, 
 30 N. Y. 290, in support of his position, 
 McKyring v. Bull not being mentioned. 
 The two former cases have already been 
 commented upon. In the head-note of 
 Kniffen v. McConnell, the reporter states 
 that " /f seems matter in mitigation may 
 be proved under the general denial ; " but 
 there is nothing in the ojjiniou of the court 
 which furuislies the slightest warrant for 
 even that guarded statement. The doc- 
 trine of the text is therefore fully su.s- 
 tained by judicial authority in New York. 
 The two opinions of Mr. Justice Morgan 
 can hardly be regarded as overturning 
 the judgment pronounced by the tri! unal 
 of final resort; and the argument of Mr. 
 Ju.stice Selden is certainly unanswered 
 and unanswerable on principle. See, 
 however, O'Brien v. McCann, 58 N. Y. 
 373, 376. 
 
 8 Smith r. Lisher, 23 Ind. 500, .502, per 
 Elliott J. ; and .see Allis v. Nanson, 41 
 Ind. 154, 157, 158, per Worden J.; Smith 
 r. Rodecap (Ind. App. 1892), 31 N. E. 
 Rep. 479. 
 
 [^See also, in this connection. Hicks v.
 
 DEFENCES IN MITIGATION. 799 
 
 Kentucky it would seem that a partial defence in mitigation 
 should be pleaded.^ The codes expressly authorize mitigating 
 circumstances to be pleaded in actions for libel or slander. 2 
 
 § 573. * 697. Defences iu Abatement. Common-Law Doctrine. 
 At the common law, all pleas were divided into two general 
 classes, — those "in bar '' and those "in abatement." "When- 
 ever the subject-matter of the defence is, that the plaintiff cannot 
 maintain any action at any time, whether present or future, in 
 respect of the supposed cause of action, it may and usually must 
 be pleaded in bar ; but matter which merely defeats the present 
 proceeding, and does not show that the plaintiff is forever con- 
 cluded, should in general be pleaded in abatement.''' ^ The most 
 common defences in the present system analogous to the ancient 
 pleas in abatement are those which set up want of jurisdiction in 
 the court, or a present want of legal capacity in the plaintiff to 
 sue, or a defect of parties, or the pendency of another action. 
 There was a marked difference between these two classes of pleas 
 at the common law, and certain special rules regulating the use 
 of those in abatement. Among these rules, the following were 
 important. A plea in abatement could not be joined with one 
 in bar in answer to the same subject-matter; but the former must 
 be pleaded by way of introduction, and must be disposed of before 
 a plea in bar could be interposed. As a consequence, the plead- 
 ing a defence in bar waived all defences in abatement to the same 
 matter. The judgments rendered upon the two classes of pleas 
 were different: for the one simply dismissed that suit, and did 
 not prevent the plaintiff from commencing another; while the 
 other ended the judicial controversy in respect to the subject- 
 matter involved. 
 
 § 574. * 698. Formal Distinctions bet^ween Pleas in Abatement 
 and in Bar Removed by the Codes. There are in the new pro- 
 Drew (1897), 117 Cal. 305, 49 Pac. 189, erty, 35 Wis. 150, 161, 162; Wilson v. 
 holding that where, hy the same act Noonan, 35 Wis. 321, 348, 349. See 
 which causes damage to the plaintiff, Desmond v. Brown, 33 Iowa, 13. 
 some benefit also results, such incidental - [^See Haynes v. Spokane Chronicle 
 
 benefit need not be pleaded by the Pub. Co. (1895), 11 Wash. 503, 39 Pac. 
 defendant.] " 969 ; Craver v. Norton (1901), 114 la. 46, 
 
 1 Hackett v. Schad, 3 Bush, 353, 355, 86 N. W. 54 ; Fenstermaker v. Tribune 
 per Robertson J. Mitigating facts and Pub. Co. (1895), 12 Utah, 439, 43 Pac. 
 circumstances must be pleaded in actions 112; s. c. (1896) 13 Utah, 532, 45 Pat 
 for libel or slander, and cannot be proved 1097 ] 
 under a general denial. Langtou v. Hag- ^ 1 Ch. PI. 446.
 
 800 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 cedure no such divisions and classes. ^ Defences still exist of 
 the same essential nature as those which were formerly set up 
 l)y means of a plea in abatement, and a judgment thereon in 
 favor of the defendant does not forever bar the plaintiff from the 
 farther prosecution of his demand. They are governed, how- 
 ever, by the same rules of procedure that regulate all the other 
 defences which may be relied upon by a defendant. There is no 
 difference in the methods of pleading them, of trying them, or 
 of adjudicating upon them : ^ the only difference is in respect to 
 the conclusive effects of the judgments rendered upon them.^ 
 In other words, so far as concerns the manner of alleging and 
 of trial, all distinctions between these two classes of defences 
 have been abolished, and both have been placed in the same 
 category.* All defences which are analogous to the ancient pleas 
 
 1 Qlt has been held, however, in the 
 followiug cases that an answer to the 
 merits waives a plea in abatement : (Cham- 
 berlain V. Hibbard (1894), 26 Ore. 428, 38 
 Pac. 437 ; Fort v. Penny (1898), 122 N. C. 
 230, 29 S. E. 362 ; Earle'r. Say re ( 1 896 ) , 99 
 Ga. 617, 25 S. E. 943; Moore r. Ilarmou 
 (1895), 142 Ind. 555, 41 N. E. 599; Smith 
 V. Pedigo (1896), 145 Ind. 361, 33 N. E. 
 777. Contra, La Plant v. Firemen's Ins. 
 Co. (1897), 68 Minn. 82, 70 N. W. 856.] 
 
 - [3 Need ham ;•. Wright (1894), 140 Ind. 
 190, 39 N. E. 510. it was held that a plea 
 in abatement must be certain to a certain 
 intent in every particular, and it re([uires 
 the utmost fulness and particularity of 
 statement, as well as the highest at- 
 tainable accuracy and precision, leaving 
 nothing to be su])plied by intendment or 
 construction. The pleader must not only 
 answer fully what is necessary to be 
 answered, but must also anticipate and 
 exclude all such supposable matter, as 
 would, if alleged on the opposite side, 
 defeat his plea, citing Chitty, Stephen, 
 and Gould, and declaring the doctrine of 
 those text writers to be the rule in 
 Indiana. See also Moore v. Morris (1895), 
 142 Ind. 354, 41 N. E. 796; Miller r. 
 Cross (1900), 73 Conn. 538, 48 Atl. 213; 
 Budd V. Meriden Elec. R. R. Co. (1897), 
 69 Conn. 272, 37 Atl. 683. 
 
 It was held in Coombs Commission Co. 
 r. Block (1895), 1.30 Mo. 668, 32 S. VV. 
 1139, that a jilea in abatement may be 
 
 y)leaded without waiving the right to 
 j)lead to the merits also, and this is true 
 whether the action is one in attachment 
 or an ordinary civil action. Overruling 
 Fordyce i-. Hatliorn (1874), 57 Mo. 120. 
 
 ^\'heu the same matter is pleaded both 
 in abatement and in bar, the latter over- 
 rides the former: Crowns ?•. Forest Land 
 Co. (1898), 99 Wis. 103, 74 N. W. 546. 
 
 A plea treated by the parties as one 
 in abatement is properly so considered : 
 Saylor v. Commonwealth Banking Co 
 (1900), 38 Ore. 204, 62 Pac. 652. 
 
 Combs ('. Union Trust Co. (1896), 146 
 Ind. 688, 46 N. E. 16: "An answer in 
 abatement is not required to state facts 
 sufficient to constitute a defence to the 
 action, but it is sufficient if it states facts 
 sufficient to abate the action." 
 
 Matter in abatement of the action 
 should be determined Ijy proof on the 
 trial, and not upon the pleadings and 
 affidavits on a preliminary hearing: Rick- 
 etson r. City of Milwaukee (1900), 105 
 Wis. 591, Si'n. W. 864.3 
 
 ■' [^Ro.'i.ser V. Georgia Home Ins. Co. 
 (1897), 101 Ga. 716, 29 S. E. 286.] 
 
 ■» Stone's Adm. v. Powell, 13 B. Mon. 
 342 ; Sweet v. Tuttle, 14 N. Y. 465, 468, per 
 Comstock J. (defect of parties) ; Gardner 
 V. Clark, 21 N. Y. 399 (pending of another 
 action) ; Mayhew v. Robinson, 10 How. 
 Pr. 162 (defect of parties) ; Bridge r. 
 Payson, 5 Sandf. 210 (defect of parties): 
 Freeman v. Carpenter, 17 Wis. 126 (pen-
 
 EXAMPLES OF NEW MATTER. 
 
 801 
 
 in abatement — that is, all which are based upon the same facts 
 — are evidently new matter: they cannot be proved under the 
 general denial, but must be specially pleaded. 
 
 III. Some Particular Defences of Netv Matter Classified and 
 
 Arranged. 
 
 § 575. * 699. Introductory. In all the following examples in 
 which it has been held that the defences are new matter, it must 
 be understood that the complaints or petitions were in the proper 
 form, containing the allegations necessary to constitute the causes 
 of action, and no more. Wlien the plaintiff's pleadings deviated 
 from this usual type, and were so framed that the defences could 
 be admitted under the general denial, this fact will be particu- 
 larly mentioned. 
 
 § 576. * 700. Payment. It is the settled rule, except perhaps 
 in California, that when the complaint or petition is in the cus- 
 tomary form, not averring the fact of non-payment in so distinct 
 a manner that an issue would be raised upon it by a denial, the 
 defence of payment is new matter, and must be pleaded as such.^ 
 
 dency of another action) ; Thompson v. 
 Greenwood, 28 Ind. 327 ; Bond v. Wagner, 
 28 Ind. 462. The rule stated in the 
 text, that defences in abatement are new 
 matter and must be pleaded, is further 
 illustrated by the following eases : Alli- 
 son V. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 42 Iowa, 
 274; Plath w. Braunsdorff, 40 Wis. 107; 
 White r. Miller, 7 Huu, 427 ; Dawley v. 
 Brown, 9 id. 461 ; Levi v. Haversteck, .51 
 Ind. 2.36; Stafford v. Nutt, 51 id. .5.35; 
 Smith V. Peckham, 39 Wis. 414; Newhall- 
 House Stock Co (-•. Fliut & F. M. Ry. Co., 
 47 id. 516 ; Dutcher i\ Dutcher, 39 id. 651, 
 and numerous cases cited. 
 
 1 McKyriiig v. Bull, 16 N. Y. 297; 
 Morrell v. Irving Fire Ins. Co., 33 N. Y. 
 429, 443, per Davies J. ; Te.xier v. Gouin, 
 5 Duer, 389, 391, per Oakley C. .T. ; Mar- 
 tin V. Pugh, 23 Wis. 184 ; Phillips v. Jar- 
 vis, 19 Wis. 204 ; Stevens r. Thompson, 
 5 Kan. .305, distinguishing Marley v. 
 Smith, 4 Kan. 183, on the ground that 
 in the latter case the allegations were 
 nnusual ; Baker v. Kistler, 13 Ind. 63 • 
 Hubler r. Pullen, 9 Ind. 273 ; Bassett i\ 
 Lederer, 1 Huu, 274, an action for goods 
 
 sold and delivered. The complaint stated 
 that defendant " had not paid the price, 
 nor any part tliereof :" the answer was a 
 general denial. Held, that proof of pay- 
 ment under the issue was error. This case 
 certainly goes further tlian any other, 
 and is inconsistent with those cited in the 
 next following note. Hall x\ Olney, 65 
 Barb. 27, an instance of payment after 
 suit brought. Held, that defendant should 
 have set up the defence in a supplemental 
 answer. See also Everett v. Lockwood, 
 8 Hun, 356 ; Kuapp v. Kunnells, 37 Wis. 
 135 ; Hegler r. Eddy, 53 Cal. 597 (tender) ; 
 Johnson v. Tyler, 1 Ind. App. 387 ; Hyde 
 V. Hazel. 43 Mo. App. 668; St. Louis, Ft. 
 S. & W. K. Co. V. Grove, 39 Kan. 731 ; 
 Ellison V. Rix, 85 .N. C. 77 ; and see Lent 
 V. N. Y. & Mass. Ry. Co., 130 N. Y. 504. 
 [^Pai/ment : Ferguson v. Dalton (1900), 
 158 Mo. 323, 59 S. W. 88 ; State ex rel. v. 
 Peterson (1897), 142 Mo. 526, 39 S. W. 453 ; 
 Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Hunter (1899) .35 
 Ore. 188, 57 Pac. 424 ; Hi>pper v. Hopper 
 (1901), 61 S. C. 124, 39 S. E. .366; Mar- 
 shall & Ilsley Bank v. Child (1899), 76 
 Minn. 173, 78 N. W. 1048; Mullen v. 
 
 51
 
 802 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 When, however, the complaint or petition contains negative aver- 
 ments of non-payment, so that a traverse of them is in fact equiv- 
 alent to an allegation of payment, an issue is made by the mere 
 denial general or specific, which admits the defence of payment 
 to be proved under it.^ This is not an exception to the fore- 
 going rule ; for an issue upon the very fact of payment is actually 
 formed by such assertions and denials. The decided cases pre- 
 sent some differences in respect to the form of the averment in 
 the complaint or petition, which, by being traversed, permits 
 the defence to be interposed; but the principle upon which they • 
 were decided is the same in all. In an action to recover for 
 work and labor, the complaint stated the agreement, the per- 
 formance of services at a stipulated price, and that on a certain 
 day named the defendant " was indebted to the plaintiff in the 
 sum of $333, being the balance remaining due after sundry pay- 
 ments made by defendant to the plaintiff." The answer was a 
 general denial. Evidence offered by the defendant to prove 
 payments made by him on account, the New York Court of 
 Appeals held, ought to have been admitted under this issue, 
 distinguishing the case from McKyring v. Bull by reason of the 
 peculiar averinents in the complaint. ^ Where a complaint set 
 
 Morris (1895), 43 Neb. 596, 62 N. W. 74; 163, 65 N. W. 909. Contra, Wortham v. 
 
 Cady V. South Omaha Nat. Bank (1896), Sinclair (1896), 98 Ga. 173, 25 S. E. 414. 
 
 46 Neb. 756, 65 N. W. 906 ; Ashlaud A plea of payment cannot be held bad on, 
 
 Land, etc. Co. v. May (1897), 51 Neb. 474, demurrer: Buist v. Fitzsimons (1894), 44 
 
 71 N. W. 67; Hudelson v. First Nat. S. C. 1-30, 21 S. E. 610. 
 Bank (1897), 51 Neb. 557, 71 N. W. 304 ; See the following cases for pleas of 
 
 Morehouse r. Throckmorton (1899), 72 payment which were held sufficient : Har- 
 
 Conn. 449, 44 Atl. 747 ; Culbertson Irrig., din County v. Wells (1899), 108 la. 174, 78 
 
 etc. Co. w. Cox (1897), 52 Neb. 684, 73 N. W. 908; Garrison v. Murphy (1902), 
 
 N. W. 9; Hortzell v. McClurg (1898), 54 Nel)., 89 N. W. 766. An insufficient plea 
 
 Neb. 313, 74 N. \V. 625 ; Barker y. Wheeler of payment, treated as sufficient by the 
 
 (1900), 60 Neb. 470, 83 N. W. 678; s. c. parties, will be deemed amended so as to 
 
 (1901), 62 Neb. 150, 87 N. W. 20; Union properly raise the issue in the supreme 
 
 Stockyards Nat. Bank v. Haskell (1902), court: Mulhall v. Mulhall (1895), 3 Okla. 
 
 Neb., 90 N. W. 2.33 ; Richards v. Jefferson, 252, 41 Pac. 577.] 
 
 (1898), 20 Wash. 166, 54 Pac. 1123 ; Moat- ^ [^Bras.sell v. Silva (1897), 50 S. C. 181, 
 
 ing r. Tigerton Co. (1902), 113 Wis. 379, 27 S. I-:, 622; State e.r rel. v. Peterson 
 
 89 N. W. 152; Clark i-. Wick (1894), 25 (1897), 142 Mo. 526, 39 S. W. 453; Logan 
 
 Ore. 446, 36 Pac. 165 ; Nat. Bank v. Quin- County Nat. Bank v. Barclay (1898), 104 
 
 ton (1897), 57 Kan. 750, 48 Pac. 20. Ky. 97, 46 S. W. 675. Contra, Columbia 
 
 A plea of payment confesses the cause Nat. Bank v. Western Iron Co. (1896), 
 
 of action: Lokken v. Miller (1900), 14 Wash. 162, 44 Pac. 145; Barker v. 
 
 9 N. D. 512, 84 N. W. 368. "A plea of Wheeler (1901), 62 Neb. 150, 87 
 
 payment in full is ordinarily good, without N. W. 20.] 
 
 specifying the time, jjlace or manner - (^uinn v. Lloyd, 41 N. Y. 349, 352, 
 
 thereof : " Fall v. .lolinson (1896), 8 S. D. jicr Lott J. : " The denial involved an issue
 
 EXAMPLES OF NEW MATTER. 803 
 
 out an indebtedness by the defendant, and added " that the same 
 was still due and uni^aid," the general denial was held a suiili- 
 cient answer to allow proof of payment.^ In an action for work 
 and labor, the complaint alleged the services to a specified amount 
 in value, and that there was a balance due the plaintiff, "'' after 
 deducting all payments made by defendant to plaintiff thereon, 
 of $175." The general denial, it was held, entitled the defend- 
 ant to prove all the payments which he had made.''^ This special 
 rule has been repeatedly acted vipon by the courts of California. 
 Indeed, as has been before stated,'"^ they have gone much farther, 
 and have made it a general requisite, in actions upon promissory 
 notes at least, that the complaint must aver the non-payment as a 
 breach in a distinct form, or it will fail to state a cause of action; 
 and that the general denial of such a pleading necessarily admits 
 evidence of payment. In some of the cases the judges have gone 
 to the length of declaring that the general denial, like the gen- 
 eral issue of nil debet or non assumpsit, always admits the defence 
 of payment.^ 
 
 § 577. * 701. What may be shown under the Defence of Pay- 
 ment. When a defence of payment is pleaded, it is competent 
 to show that the payment was actually made in cash, or in some 
 
 upon all the facts above stated and denied, ^ Marley v. Smith, 4 Kan. 18.3, 186. 
 
 not only of the agreement and of the time Explained in Stevens v. Thompson, .5 
 
 which the plaintiff worked, but neces.sarily Kau. 305. 
 
 of the different payments made, so as to ^ White v. Smith, 46 N. Y. 418. See 
 
 determine what in fact was the balance of also Looby v. West Troy, 2t Hun, 78 (a 
 
 the defendant's debt. That balance could special case in which an accord and sati.s- 
 
 not be ascertained without an inquiry as faction was allowed to be proved under a 
 
 to the amount of the payments, as well general denial), 
 as the value of the work performed." ^ g *665. 
 
 Also per Woodruff J. (p. 354) : " It was * Frisch v. Caler, 21 Cal. 71 ; Fairchild 
 
 wholly unnecessary for the plaiutiff to sue v. Amsbaugh, 22 Cal. 572 ; Wetmore 
 
 for a balance as such. He might allege v. San Francisco, 44 Cal. 294, 299, per 
 
 the contract, performance on his part, and Crockett J. ; Davanay v. Eggenhoff, 43 
 
 (daim payment ; and then, if the defendant Cal. 395, 397, per Rhodes J. See also unW, 
 
 desired to prove payment, he must allege § * 665 ; Mickle v. Heinlen, 92 Cal. 596. 
 payment in his an.swer. But where the [[In Bank of Shasta v. Boyd (1893), 99 
 
 plaintiff sues for a balance, he voluntarily Cal. 604, 34 Pac. 337, the court said : " It 
 
 invites examination into the amount of is well settled in this State that tlie allega- 
 
 the indebtedness, and the extent of the tion of non-payment, in a complaint on a 
 
 reduction thereof by payment." Further, promissory note, is material to the cause 
 
 Knapp V. Roche, 94 N. Y. 329 ; but see of action, as without such an allegation 
 
 Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co. v. N. & E. uo breach of the promise would appear, 
 
 R. Ry. Co. (Com. PI. 1893), 22 N. Y. and that when the complaint is not verified 
 
 Suppl. 556. ([Robertson v. Robertson a general denial puts in is.sue every ma- 
 
 (1900), 37 Ore. 339, 62 Pac. 377, citing the terial allegation of the complaint."] 
 text.]
 
 804 CIVIL KEMEDIIuS. 
 
 other manner agreed upon by the parties: as that it was made by 
 the delivery of chattels, which were received by the creditor in 
 satisfaction of his demand; ^ or by the giving and acceptance of 
 anything that is received in the place of money, and in discharge 
 of the debt."^ But under the answer of payment in an action 
 upon a note, the defendant cannot prove a want of consideration 
 for the note, or a mistake in its execution, or an error in the 
 prior accounting and the ascertaining the balance for which it 
 was given, or the execution of a contemporaneous writing which 
 modifies or controls the legal effect of the note; and the same 
 doctrine is plainly applicable to actions upon any species of 
 written agreement.^ 
 
 § 578. * 702. Arbitrament and Award. Former Recovery. The 
 defence of an arbitrament and award covering the same matters 
 in controversy as those stated in the complaint is new matter, 
 and must be pleaded;* and so also is the defence of a former 
 recovery for the same cause of action,^ and of a former partial 
 recovery.® 
 
 § 579. * 703. Actions for the Recovery of Chattels. In an action 
 to recover possession of chattels, the complaint alleging property 
 in the plaintiff, and the answer specifically denying the wrongful 
 taking and detention of the goods, and no more, the facts relied 
 upon by the defendant as constituting his actual defence were, 
 that the plaintiff" and one (>. were partners and the real owners 
 
 1 Farmers' Bank v. Sherman, 33 N. Y. arbitrate is new matter : Merchants' Ins. 
 
 69. Also, receipt by plaintiff of the Co. i-. Stepliens (1900), Ky., 59 S. W. 511. 
 
 proceeds from collaterals in his hands, See also Kahn v. Traders' Ins. Co. (1893), 
 
 Wolcott V. Ensign, 53 Ind. 70. [;Kd- 4 Wyo. 419, 34 Pac. 1059.] 
 
 munds v. Black (1896), 13 Wash. 490, 43 » Hendricks v. Decker, 35 Barb. 298 ; 
 
 Pac. 330.] Piercy v. Sabin, 10 Cal. 22 ; Norris v. 
 
 - Hart ('. Crawford, 41 Ind. 197. Amos, 15 Ind. 365. See also Cave v. 
 
 [^McLaugiilin v. Webster (1894), 141 Crapto, 53 Cal. 135; Fanning v. Hiberuia 
 
 N. Y. 76, 35 N. P:. 1081 ; State Bank v. Ins. Co., 37 Ohio St. .344 ; Muiss y. Gill, 44 
 
 Kelly (1899), 109 la. 544, 80 N. W. 520 Ohio St. 253; Lonisville, N. A. & C. Ry. 
 
 (ratification of agent's act in receiving Co. r. Cauley, 119 Ind. 142. But see Terry 
 
 note) ; Thompson-Houston Elec. Co. r. v. Munger, 49 lluii, 5()0. 
 
 Palmer (1893), 52 Minn. 174, 53 N. W. QMcLean c. Baldwin (1902), 136 Cal. 
 
 1137 (laws of another State as to legal 565, 69 Pac. 259; Whitcomb v. Hardy 
 
 effect of accepting note).] (1897), 68Minn. 265, 71 N. W. 263; Dixon 
 
 3 Lowry V. Shane, .34 lud. 495. r. Caster (1903), — Kan. — , 70 Pac. 871 ; 
 
 * Brazil ". Isiiam, 12 N. Y. 9, 17. McCarty v. Kinsey (1899), 154 Ind. 447, 
 
 I^Kvideiice tending to impeach an award 57 N. E. 108. See the la.st three cases 
 
 actually made is not admi.ssible under a al)ove cited for methods of pleading tliis 
 
 general denial : Conn. Fire Ins. Co. v. defence.] 
 
 O'Fallon (18961,49 Neb. 740, 69 N. W. 6 Mornll c Irving F. Ins. Co., 33 N. Y. 
 
 118. The defence of an agreement to 429,443.
 
 EXAMPLES OF NEW MATTER. 805 
 
 of the goods in question, and that G. had bailed tliem to the de- 
 fendant, who retained them in virtue of such bailment. This 
 defence, however, was held inadmissible under the pleadings, 
 because, first, the unqualified ownership of the plaintiff was 
 admitted on the record by the failure of the answer to deny 
 the allegation of property contained in the complaint; and, 
 secondly, the authority conferred by one owner, G., upon the 
 defendant, to take and retain possession of the chattels, was new 
 matter, and should have been pleaded.^ And, in a similar action, 
 a defence that the defendant had loaned money to the plaintiff's 
 intestate, who was the late owner of the chattels, and had re- 
 ceived from him the possession thereof, and retained them in pos- 
 session as security for such advances, is new matter, and cannot 
 be proved unless specially pleaded ; ^ and the same is true of the 
 defence, that the plaintiff''s title is fraudulent and void as against 
 his creditors.^ 
 
 § 580. * 704. Actions for Tort. In an action to recover dam- 
 ages for the conversion of chattels, a justification by the defend- 
 ant as sheriff, under an attachment, judgment, execution, and 
 levy against a third person, charging that the goods were the 
 property of such judgment debtor, and had been fraudulently 
 assigned and transferred by him to the plaintiff, so that the 
 hitter's title was void, cannot be proved under an answer of 
 denials, but must be pleaded as new matter.* There are cases 
 which go to the extent of holding that, under the general denial, 
 — which traverses the indispensable averment of a sufficient prop- 
 erty in the plaintiff, — the defendant cannot show property in 
 
 1 Tell V. Beyer, 38 N. Y. 161. A lien ■* Jacobs v. Remsen, 12 Abb. Pr. 390; 
 on the chattel or other special property Graham v. Harrower, 18 How. Pt. 144. 
 therein cannot be shown nnder a general In the latter case, T. R. Strong J. seems 
 denial: Guille i\ Wong Fook, 13 Ore. 577. to concede, that, under a denial of the 
 
 2 Gray v. Fretwell, 9 Wis. 186. allegation of property in the plaintiff, the 
 QAnd the defence of right of possession defendant may prove general property in 
 
 by reason of a lien is new matter: Mellott himself, liut not a justification under judi- 
 V. Downing (1901), 39 Ore. 218, 64 Pac. cial process. Frisbee v. Langworthy, 11 
 393.] Wis. 375, an action to recover possession, 
 ^ Frisbee v. Langworthy, 11 Wis. 375. but governed by the same rule as to plead- 
 Contra, see Young v. Glascock, 79 Mo. ing a justification. Isley v. Ilnber, 45 
 574; Stern Auction, etc. Co. i'. Mason, 16 Ind. ^21 ; Boaz v. Tate, 43 lud. 60, 71, 72; 
 Mo. App. 473; Sopris v. Truax, 1 Col. 89 ; Johnson c. Cuddington, 35 Ind. 43 ; Lang- 
 Bailey V. Swain, 45 Ohio St. 657 ; Holm- ton v. IJagerty, 35 Wis. 1,50, 161. Contra, 
 berg 0. Dean, 21 Kan. 73; Merrill v. Wedg- see Mason v. Vestal, 88 Cal. 396 ; Tupper 
 wood, 25 Neb. 283. |[Coos Bay R. R. Co. v. Thompson, 26 Minn. 385. 
 V. Siglin (1894),26 0re. 387, 38Pac. 192.]
 
 806 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 himself: ^ but this ruling seems opposed to the weight of author- 
 ity; and it is certainl}' contrary to the plainest principles of 
 pleading, for sucli facts, when proved, merely contradict the 
 plaintiff's averment of his own title. ^ 
 
 § 581. * 70;). Same Subject. In the action for breaking and 
 entering the plaintiff's premises (trespass qu. cl. fr.^, with the 
 complaint in the proper form, and without any unnecessary aver- 
 ments, the general denial does not raise any issue as to the title 
 to the land, and no evidence attacking such title can be received 
 except under a separate defence ; ^ nor can any defence of justifi- 
 cation be proved unless specially pleaded.'* Where two or more 
 unite as plaintiffs in an action for the taking and carrying away 
 their goods, a defence that " the plaintiffs are not joint owners 
 of the goods and chattels mentioned in the complaint " is new 
 matter.^ To a complaint for an assault and battery committed 
 by a railroad conductor in forcibly ejecting the plaintiff from 
 the cars, the general denial was pleaded: under this issue, the 
 defendant was not permitted to show the regulations of the com- 
 pany, that they were reasonable, and that he was complying with 
 them in doing the act complained of.*^ The defence of recaption, 
 or its equivalent, in an action against a sheriff for an escape, is 
 
 ^ Dyson tf. Ream, 9 Iowa, 51. action for false arrest and imprisonment, 
 
 2 See supra, §§ * 677, * 678. But the proof of tiie plaintiff's bad character in 
 
 defence of title in a third person is new respect to the offence for which he was 
 
 matter. Smith v. Hall, 67 N. Y. 48. arrested cannot be proved under the geu- 
 
 ^ Squires r. Seward, 16 How. Pr. 478 ; eral denial. Scheer v. Keown, 34 Wis. 
 
 Ratlibone v. McCounell, 20 Barb. 311; 349. The following defences are further 
 
 Althouse V. Rice, 4 E. I). Smith, 347. instances of new matter, — in an action 
 
 •• Johnson v. Cuddington,35 Ind. 43. against a sheriff for fal.-;e return, etc., de- 
 
 QHauger i-. Beuua (1899), 153 Ind. 642, fence that the property was exempt, Kis- 
 
 53N. E. 942; Myers r. Longstaff (1900), kaddeu r. Jones, 63 Mo. 190; in action 
 
 14 S. D. 98, 84 N. W. 233 ; Clifton v. against husband and wife for wife's tort, 
 
 Lange (1899), 108 la. 472, 79 N. W. 276 ; lier defence of compulsion by her husband, 
 
 Raynor v. Wilmington Seacoast Ry. Co. Clark v. Boyer, 32 Ohio St. 299; in action 
 
 (1901), 129 N. C. 195, 39 S. E. 821; Fen- for injuries caused by a hole wrongfully 
 
 .'itermaker v. Tribune Pub. Co. (1895), 12 made in a sidewalk, defence of license 
 
 Utah, 4.39, 43 Pac. 112; Wilken v. Exter- from the city government, Clifford »-. Dam, 
 
 kamp(1897), 102 Ky. 143, 42 S. W. 1140; 81 N. Y. !-)2. See, farther, that the de- 
 
 Stark V. Publisiiers, etc. Co. (1901), 160 fence of justification is new matter, Ko- 
 
 Mo. 529, 61 S. W. 669: Upchurch i'. Rob- nigsberger ?•. Harvey, 12 Ore. 286; Thomas 
 
 ertson (1900), 127 N. C. 127, 37 S. E. 157 ; r. Werremeyer, 34 Mo. App. 665 ; Wills.m 
 
 Mangold >:. Oft (1901), 63 Neb. .397,88 ?-. Manhattan Ry. Co. (Com. PL, 1892), 20 
 
 X. W. 507 ; Barr >: Po.st (1898), 56 Neb. N. Y. Suppl. 852 (inaction for false im- 
 
 698, 77 N. W. 123.3 prisoninent) : compare State >•. Reckner 
 
 ^ Walrod v. Bennett, 6 Barb. 144. (Ind., Jan. 1891), 26 N. E. Rep. 553. 
 
 ''' Pier r. Finch, 29 Barb. 170. In an
 
 EXAMPLES OF NEW MATTER. 807 
 
 new matter. An answer setting up this defence having been 
 pleaded, the defendant, at the trial, offered to prove, not the 
 return or the retaking of the prisoner, but that he would have 
 voluntarily returned, and was intending to do so, had he not 
 been prevented from accomplishing his purpose by the fraud of 
 the plaintiff. This defence was held inadmissible under a gen- 
 eral denial, or under the special answer of recaption, because it 
 was new matter, and the allegations and proofs must agree. ^ 
 The defence of recoupment of damages is in all cases new mat- 
 ter, and must therefore be pleaded, although it is often a partial 
 defence analogous to those in mitigation. ^ 
 
 § 582. * 706. Actions Concerning Lands. In the legal action tO 
 recover possession of land, the complaint or petition being in 
 the common form, alleging in general terms that the plaintiff is 
 seised in fee of the premises, and the wrongful taking and with- 
 holding possession thereof by the defendant, and the answer 
 consisting merely of denials general or specific, the defendant 
 cannot, it has been held, prove a prior equitable title in himself 
 derived from the plaintiff or his grantor, although a legal title 
 in himself may be proved, as this would directly contradict the 
 averment in the complaint that the plaintiff was owner of the 
 premises.'^ An action was brought by a wife against her husband 
 
 1 Richtmeyer v. Eemsen, 38 N. Y. 206, 2 Crane v. Hardman, 4 E. D. Smith, 
 
 208, per Grover J.: " The question is 448. 
 
 whether these grounds of defence must be ^ Stewart v. Hoag, 12 Oliio St., 623; 
 
 set up in the answer; that is. whether the Lombard v. Cowham, 34 Wis. 486, 491 ; 
 
 defence offered consists of new matter, Hartley i". Brown, 46 Cal. 201. See SM/)ra, 
 
 or whetlier it merely disproves any of the § * 679, as to what defences may be proved 
 
 material allegations of the complaint, under the general denial in this action. A 
 
 All that the plaintiff must allege and title accruing to the defendant since the 
 
 prove to maintain his action is the re- commencement of the action must be 
 
 covery of the judgment, the issue and pleaded by a supplemental answer. Roper 
 
 delivery of execution to the sheriff, the v. McFaddeu, 48 Cal. 346, 348; McLane 
 
 ■capture of the debtor on the execution, v. Bovee, 35 Wis. 27, 34. The rule as to 
 
 and the escape from custody before suic defences in ejectment is further illustratpd 
 
 brought against the sheriff therefor. We by Powers v, Armstrong, 35 Ohio St. 357 ; 
 
 have seen that the sheriff may defend the Emily v. Harding, 53 Ind. 102; Marks v. 
 
 action by proving a recaption of the debtor Sayward, 50 Cal. 57; Manly v. Howlitt, 
 
 before suit brought, or facts legally ex- 55 id. 94, and see the recent cases added 
 
 cusing him from making such recaption, under § * 682 ; as to other special actions 
 
 Proof of such facts does not controvert concerning laws, .see Morenhaut c. Wilson, 
 
 any allegations of the complaint. It is, 52 Cal. 263 (abandonment of a mining 
 
 therefore, new matter, constituting a de- claim) ; McCreary v. Marstou, 56 id. 403 
 
 fence to the action, and, under the (in action of unlawful detainer by a lessor, 
 
 code, is inadmissible unless set up in defence that the execution of the lease was 
 
 the answer." obtained by fraud or mistake) ; Uigier
 
 808 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 to establish her title to certain lands. The complaint alleged 
 facts showing that she was the equitable owner of tlie lands, 
 which had been purchased by the husband with her money under 
 an understanding that the conveyance was to be made directly to 
 her, but which he had, in fraud of her rights, procured to be 
 made to himself: it prayed that she might be declared the 
 owner, and that a deed to her from her husband might be 
 ordered. W., a judgment creditor of the husband, was per- 
 mitted to intervene, and was made a party defendant. He 
 simply pleaded a general denial. This answer, it was held, 
 put in issue only the averments of the complaint, and did not 
 permit the defendant W. to set up and prove his character or 
 rights as a judgment creditor of the husband. In short, he 
 could obtain no advantage from his intervention, because no al- 
 lusion was made in the complaint to his position and claims as 
 a creditor: that subject-matter was entirely outside of its aver- 
 ments.^ A widow sued to recover her dower in lands which the 
 husband had conveyed to the defendant during the marriage with- 
 out any release from herself, and stated in her complaint the facts 
 necessary to make out the cause of action. The answer set up 
 as a defence that the husband left a last will, in which he devised 
 and bequeathed to the plaintiff certain property to be received 
 by her in lieu of dower; that she had elected to take the gift 
 under the will, and had thus barred her right of dower. This 
 defence was held to be new matter, and to have been iwlmitted 
 by the plaintiff's neglect to reply and controvert its statements.^ 
 In an action brought by the owners of lots abutting upon a cer- 
 tain alley in a city, to restrain the corporation from improving 
 such alley, on the ground that it was a private passage belong- 
 ing to the plaintiffs, the complaint contained the averments of 
 jjroperty in the plaintiffs necessary to show a right of action. 
 The answer stated facts showing that the original owner of the 
 land — the grantor or source of title of the plaintiffs — had dedi- 
 
 V. Edily, 53 id. 597 (tender since suit reply to all new matter was necessary, 
 
 brought). In a creditor's suit to reach a debt due to 
 
 ^IJut see Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. v. the judgment debtor as the vendor of land 
 
 Hertzberg (1894), ^6 Ore. 216, 37 Pac. from the vendee thereof, both being de- 
 
 1019, holding that under Hill's code, fendants, the hitter's an.^wer, that the pur- 
 
 § 319, no estate in defendant or another clui.se-])rice had been fully paid to the 
 
 can be proved unless pleaded.] vendor, was held to be new matter, and 
 
 1 Watkins c. Jone.s, 28 Ind. 12. to require a reply, in Ohio, Edwards v. 
 
 - MtCurty v. Roberts, 8 Ind. 150. A Edwards, 24 Ohio St. 402, 411.
 
 EXAMPLES OF NEW MATTER. 809 
 
 cated this alley to public use, and that it had thus been made a 
 highway. These facts, it was held, could not be proved under 
 a general denial : they were new matter, and must be specially 
 pleaded.^ The defence of long-continued adverse user or pre- 
 scription in actions affecting the title or possession of lands, or 
 involving the existence of easements, is, in general, new mat- 
 ter ; '^ for, in the usual form of such actions, the defence will be 
 in the nature of a justification of the acts complained of. Thus, 
 for example, in an action brought to remove a dam maintained 
 by the defendant, and to restrain his diversion of water from the 
 stream, and for damages, the defence of a long adverse user or 
 prescription, by which his right to the dam and to the water had 
 become perfect, is new matter, and should be pleaded. ^ 
 
 § 583. * 707. Actions upon Contract. The defence of Usury 
 is clearly new matter ; * and the facts showing the usurious agree- 
 ment and the entire transaction must be stated with fulness and 
 circumstantiality.^ The general denial in an action to recover 
 damages for the breach of a promise to marry does not admit 
 the defence of the improper habits and bad character of the 
 plaintiif; as, that she habitually used intoxicating liquors to 
 excess, and was in the habit of becoming intoxicated. Such 
 facts, if they amount to a defence in bar, are new matter, and 
 
 ^ Evansville v. Evans, 37 Ind. 229, 236. ment of the liomestead must be pleaded : 
 
 This decision seems to be opposed to the Bealey y. Blake (1900), 153 Mo. 657, 55 
 
 well-settled doctrines concerning the office S. W. 288.] 
 
 and effect of the general denial. The com- •* Catlin v. Gunter, 1 Duer, 253, 265 ; 
 
 plaint alleged a property in the plaintiffs. Fay v. Grimsteed, 10 Barb. 321. Compare 
 
 which was the very gist of their action ; Adamson v. Wiggins, 45 Minn. 448, ante, 
 
 and a general denial would permit the § * 678 note. 
 
 defendant to contradict such allegation. [^Brundage y. Burke (1895), 11 Wash- 
 Proving a dedication to the public is noth- 679, 40 Pac. 343 ; Bell v. Stowe (1895), 44 
 ing more nor less than showing title in Neb. 210, 62 N. W. 456 ; Kainbolt v. 
 the defendant, the city; and this directly Strang (1894), 39 Neb. 339, 58 N. \V. 96; 
 controverts the material statements of the Campbell v. Linder (1897), 50 S. C. 169, 
 complaint. 27 S. E. 648; Bird v. Kendall (1901), 62 
 
 2[;Newcomb v. Crews (1895), 98 Ky. S. C. 178, 40 S. E. 142; Maize v. Bradley 
 
 339, 32 S. W. 947; Wilson v. Wilson (1901), Ky., 64 8. W. 655.] 
 (1895), 117 N. C. 351, 23 S. E. 272.] & Manning f. Tyler, 21 N. Y. 567, 568; 
 
 3 Mathews v. Ferrea, 45 Cal. 51. Rountree v. Brinson, 98 N. C. 107 ; Anglo- 
 
 [^The defence of homestead must be Am. Land, etc. Co. v. Brohman, 33 Neb. 
 
 pleaded: Marshburn w. Lashlie (1898), 122 409; Lockwood v. Woods, 3 Ind. App. 
 
 N. C. 237, 29 S. E. 371. So also the de- 258. 
 
 fence that plaintiff, after acquiring title, QRainbolt v. Strang (1894), 39 Neb. 
 
 canveyed it to a third party: Kennedy v. 339, 58 N. W. 96; Bell c. Stowe (1895), 
 
 McQuaid (1894), 56 Minn. 450, 58 N. W 44 Neb. 210, 62 N. W. 456.] 
 35. And in a partition suit the abandon-
 
 810 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 must be alleged in the answer. ^ The owner of a building in- 
 cumbered by a mortgage procured it to be insured against fire, 
 the policy being made payable to the mortgagee. In an action 
 on this policy brought by the payee therein, the defence that 
 the mortgage had been foreclosed, the land sold, and the mort- 
 gage debt partly discharged out of the proceeds, was held in- 
 admissible under an answer of mere denials. These facts 
 constituted a partial defence in the nature of payment, and 
 were clearly new matter.^ In a suit against a surety, the de- 
 fence of his discharge from liability by reason of an extension of 
 the time of payment granted to the* principal debtor, in pursu- 
 ance of a private agreement made with the creditor, is new 
 matter, and cannot be proved unless pleaded as such;^ and 
 also his discharge by reason of any other subsequent agreement 
 between the principals to the contract.* 
 
 § 584. * 708. Defence of Illegality. The rule is well settled 
 in strict accordance with the true theory of pleading under the 
 codes, that all defences based upon the asserted illegality of the 
 contract in suit, which admit the fact of a transaction between 
 the parties purporting to be an agreement, and apparently bind- 
 ino-, but which insist that l)y reason of some violation of the law 
 the same is illegal and void, are new matter, and must be set up 
 in the answer in order to be provable.^ A few examples will 
 
 1 Button V. McCauley, 38 Barb. 413. defence of mistake or error in any of its 
 
 Compare Tompkins v. Wadley, 3 N. Y. items is new matter, and cannot be proved 
 
 S. C. 424, 430, which holds that in such an under a general denial, Warner v. Myrick, 
 
 action an act of unchastity committed by l(j Minn. 91 : and the facts which autlior- 
 
 tlie plaintiff can be proved in mitigation i/e tlie application of the ".scaling laws " 
 
 under the "-eneral denial. in North Carolina to contracts of indebted- 
 
 [^Defence by reason of diseased condi- ness, Hank of Charlotte v. Britton, 66 N. C. 
 
 tion of y)laintiff held to be new matter: se."). That the defence of rescission or 
 
 Vierling v. Binder (1901), 113 la. 337, 8.5 abandonment is new matter, see Reynolds 
 
 N. \V. 621.] '• Reynolds, 4.'5 Mo. App. 622; l)ut tliat 
 
 ■- Grosvenor v. Atlantic F. Ins. Co., 1 it may be shown under tlic general denial 
 
 Bosw. 469. tliat the contract sued upon was condi- 
 
 8 Newell V. Salmons, 22 Barb. 647. tional, and, by force of the condition, has 
 
 QBishop ". Hart (1901), 114 la. 96, 86 terminated, see Danenbaum v. Person 
 
 N. W. 218 (action against guarantor); (N. Y. City Ct. 1888), 3 N. Y. Snppl. 129. 
 
 Osborn & Co. v. Evans (1894), 91 la. 13, ^ j^Powell ,-. Flanary (1900), 109 Ky. 342, 
 
 58 N. W. 920. So al.so the renewal of a .'59 S. W. 5 ; CuUi.son v. Downing (1903), 42 
 
 note extending time beyond day when Ore. 377, 71 Pac. 70; Haddock r. Salt Lake 
 
 action was commenced, is new matter: City (1901), 23 Utah, 521, 65 Pac. 491 ; 
 
 Californi:i State Bank v. Webber (1895), All" Doon v. Smitli (1893), 25 Ore. 89, .34 
 
 110 Cal. .5.38, 42 Pac. 1066.] Pac. 1093; Miller v llir.scbberg (1895^27 
 
 « Horton »•. Ruhling, 3 Nev. 498. In Ore. 522, 40 Pac. 506 ; Durham Fertilizer 
 
 an action ujion an account stated, the Co. c. Pagett (1893), 39 S. C. 69, 17 S. E.
 
 EXAMPLES OF NEW MATTER. 
 
 811 
 
 illustrate this rule.^ In an action against a city upon a contract 
 made with the plaintiff by the street commissioners, the answer 
 alleged that these officers did not proceed according to the statute 
 defining their powers, that they did not publish the proper notice 
 of the letting the contract prescribed by the city charter, and 
 that the contract itself was therefore invalid. To this answer 
 there was no reply; and as the code of Minnesota required a 
 reply to all new matter, the defendant claimed that these aver- 
 ments were by reason of the omission admitted to be true. The 
 court so held, pronouncing the defence new matter which could 
 not be proved under a general denial. ^ The defence that the 
 contract in suit was entered into on Sunday, and is for that 
 reason illegal and void under the statute, is new matter ;3 and 
 that the demand was for liquors sold by an innkeeper on credit 
 contrary to statute;"^ and that the plaintiff carried on business 
 by himself under a firm name, there being no partnership, in 
 
 563; Woodbridge v. Sellwood (1896), 65 
 Miim. 135, 67 N. W. 799; Maitlaiid v. Zauga 
 (1896), 14 Wash. 92,44 Pac. 117; McDear- 
 mott V. Sedgwick (1897), 140 Mo. 172, 39 
 S. W. 776, overruliug Sprague v. "Rooney, 
 104 Mo. 360; Horton v. Rolieff (1903), — 
 Neb. — , 95 N. W. 37. lu School i:)istrict. 
 V. Sheidley (1897), 138 Mo. 672, 40 S. W. 
 656, the court said : " Tlie rule is that if 
 a plaintiff, in order to make out his cause 
 of action, is required to show that the con- 
 tract sued upon is, for any reason, illegal, 
 the court sliould not enforce it, whether 
 pleaded as a defence or not. But when 
 the illegality does not appear from the 
 contract itself, or from the evidence neces- 
 sary to prove it, but depends upon extra- 
 neous facts, the defence is new matter and 
 must have been pleaded in order to be 
 available."] 
 
 1 The defence of fraud is new matter, 
 and must be pleq,ded in all actions, whether 
 brought upon contract or to enforce al- 
 leged rights of property in the plaintiff. 
 Jenkins v. Long, 19 Ind. 28; Farmer v. 
 , Calvert, 44 Ind. 209, 212 ; Daly v. Proetz, 
 20 Minn. 411, 417; Jameson v. Coldwell 
 (Ore.), 31 Pac. Rep. 279 (illegal con- 
 tract) ; Buchtel v. Evans, 21 Ore. 315 
 (same) ; contra, Sprague v. Rooney, 104 
 Mo. 349 ; compare last note but one under 
 § * 679, «/(/(.' ; last note under § * 703, ante ; 
 
 and § * 704, with notes. As to defences 
 of fraud and illegality, see I)alryin])lo 
 V. Hillenbrand, 62 N. Y. 5 ; 2 Hun, 488; 
 Leavitt v. Catler, 37 Wis. 46 ; Casad v. Hol- 
 dridge, 50 Ind. 529; Sharon v. Sharon, 
 68 Cal. 29 ; for other special defences, 
 see Dalrymple v. Hunt, 5 Hun, 111 (a for- 
 mer recovery) ; Riggs v. Am. Tract Soc, 
 84 N. Y. 330, 337, 338 (action to set aside 
 a contract made by an insane person ; 
 defence that it was made in good faith 
 and for his benefit) ; Goodwin v. Mass. 
 Mut. L. Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 480, 496 (in ac- 
 tion on a policy of life insurance) ; Hegler 
 V. Eddy, 53 Cal. 597 (tender after the suit 
 was begun). Defence of champerty is 
 new matter : Moore v. Ringo, 82 Mo. 468 ; 
 defence that the contract sued upon is a 
 wagering contract, is new matter: Cum- 
 misky v. Williams, 20 Mo. App. 606 ; 
 contra, Hentz r. Miner, 58 Hun, 428 ; that 
 the contract was an attempt corruptly to 
 influence legislation : Milbank v. Jones, 
 127 N. Y. 370. 
 
 - Nash V. St. Paul, 11 Minn. 174, 178; 
 and see Finley v. Quirk, 9 Minn. 194, 200, 
 203. 
 
 3 Finley v. Quirk, 9 Minn. 194, 200, 203. 
 
 * Denten v. Logan, 3 Met. (Ky.) 434. 
 
 QSee also Shawyer v. Chamberlain 
 (1900), 1131a. 742, 84 N. W. 661; Dillon y. 
 Darst (1896), 48 Neb. 803, 67 N. W. 783.]
 
 812 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 violation of a statute; ^ and that the contract was in restraint of 
 trade. '- 
 
 § 585. * 709. Further Illustrations of New Matter. In actions 
 upon instruments which ^;W?;i.rt facie import a consideration, — 
 that is, upon notes, bills, and other negotiable paper, and writ- 
 ings under seal, — the defence of a want of consideration is new 
 matter; ^ but where there is no such presumption in favor of the 
 contract, the same defence may be proved under the general 
 denial.'* Where suit is brought for goods sold and delivered, or 
 bargained and sold, the defence of a warranty, on the sale, and 
 a breach thereof, is clearly new matter.^ If an action is brought 
 for the possession or for the value of securities claimed to belong 
 to the plaintiff , and alleged to have been in some manner wrong- 
 fully transferred to and detained by the defendant, the defence 
 that the latter purchased the same in good faith, and is a houa 
 fide holder thereof, is, in general, new matter.^ It is plain, 
 however, that the character of this defence will largely depend 
 upon the form of the complaint. The latter might naturally 
 contain averments denying the good faith of the defendant's 
 possession, or stating a want of consideration in the transfer to 
 him, so that a mere denial would raise an issue, and admit evi- 
 dence of the defence. A judgment having been confessed in 
 which the statement of indebtedness was so informal and in- 
 
 1 O'Toole V. Garvin, .3 N. Y. S. C. (1902), 158 Ind. 32.5, 63 N. E. 572, the court 
 
 118. said : " A plea which in general terms al- 
 
 * Prost V. More, 40 Cal. .347. leges no consideration is good, but one 
 
 ^ Frybarger y. Cokefair, 17 Ind. 404; which attempts to set up a whole or partial 
 
 Bingham v. Kimball, 17 Ind. 396; Dubois failure of consideration must state facts 
 
 V. Hermance, 56 N. Y. 673,674; Beeson sufficient to establish .such failure." But see 
 
 ?; Howard, 44 Ind. 413, 415; Brown v. Shirk t'. Neible (1900), 156 Ind 66, 59 N. E. 
 
 Heady (Ky. 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 1036. 281. Under a plea of no consideration it 
 
 ^Huntington v. Lombard (1900), 22 cannot be shown that the consideration waa 
 
 Wash. 202, 60 Pac. 414; Knight c. Finney illegal: Babcock v. Murray (1894), 58 
 
 (1899), 59 Neb. 274, 80 N. W. 912 ; Sharp- Minn. 385, 59 N. W. 1038.] 
 
 less V. Giffeu (1896), 47 Neb. 146, 66 N. W. * See cases cited mpra, § * 676. In the 
 
 285; V. L. & T. Co. r. Siefkc (1894), 144 latter class of actions, a consideration 
 
 N. Y. 354, 39 N. K. 35S ; Sams v. Der- must be averred in the complaint, 
 
 rick (1898), 103 Ga. 678,30 8. E. 668. [^Greer r. Latimer (1896), 47 S. C. 176, 
 
 The facts showing want of consideration 25 S. E.136. But failure of consideration 
 
 sliould he set out : Port Huron, etc. Co. v. is not raised by a general tlenial : Nunn v. 
 
 Clements (1902). 113 Wis. 249, 89 N. W. Jordan (1903)", 31 Wash. 506, 72 Pac. 124 ; 
 
 160; (Jriffith (•. Wright (1899), 21 Wash. Murray ?\ Live Stock Co. (1895), 12 Wash. 
 
 494, 58 I'ac. 582 ; Duckworth ;;. McKinney 259, 40 Pac. 942.] 
 
 (1900), 58 S. C. 418. 36 S. E. 730. But see & Fetherly v. Burke, .54 N. Y. 646. 
 
 Taylor v. Purcell (1894), 60 Ark. 606, 31 "^ Weaver v. Barden, 49 N. Y. 286, 297, 
 
 S. W. 567. In Osborne & Co. v. Ilanlin per Grover J.
 
 EXAMPLES OF NEW MATTER. 813 
 
 complete that the whole was prima facie void as against other 
 creditors, an action was brought to set aside the judgment so 
 confessed. The answer in this action set out in full all the facts 
 of the original indebtedness, which tended to show that an actual 
 debt existed, and that the confession was in good faith and valid. 
 This answer the Supreme Court of California held to be new 
 matter: it was in avoidance, and not in denial of the case made 
 by the complaint.^ 
 
 § 586. * 710. Nevsr Matter Distinguished from Denials by Supreme 
 Court of Missouri. The distinction between new matter and 
 denials was clearly stated in a recent decision by the Supreme 
 Court of Missouri. In an action upon an attachment bond, the 
 petition set out the bond, and alleged as a breach that the plain- 
 tiff in the attachment suit had failed to prosecute the same, and 
 that the attachment had been abated by a judgment of the court 
 in that proceeding. The answer admitted the bond, denied the 
 breach, and asserted that the original suit was still pending by 
 a motion in arrest of judgment and for a new trial. No reply 
 having been pleaded, these averments of the answer were held 
 at the trial to have been admitted. This ruling was reversed on 
 error, and the answer was held to be merely a denial. ^ 
 
 § 587. * 711. Examples of Defences in Abatement. The non- 
 joinder of necessary parties cannot be proved under the general 
 denial; it is new matter, and must be pleaded i^ nor can the mis- 
 joinder of plaintiffs be relied upon under a denial ; the question 
 must be raised by a demurrer or by a special answer.* The de- 
 
 1 Pond V. Daveuport,45 Cal. 225. The Mo. 385 ; Northrup v. Miss. Vail. Ins. Co., 
 correctnessof this decisiou may be doubted. 47 Mo. 435. Tlie allegation in question 
 The answer is rather an argumentative is merely in denial of facts which the 
 denial. The complaint in effect charged plaintiff must prove to make out his prima 
 fraud ; and, if a general denial had been facie cause of action." 
 
 pleaded, the same facts would have been * Abbe c Clarke, 31 Barb. 238. 
 
 evidence in its support to disprove the [^Johnson v. Gooch (1894), 114 N. C. 
 
 fraud. 62, 19 S. E. 62; Cone v. Cone (1901), 61 
 
 2 State V. Williams, 48 Mo. 210, 212: S. C. 512, 39 S. E. 748; North Powder 
 "The general rule is, that any fact which Mill. Co. v. Coughanour (1898), 34 Ore. 
 avoids the action, and which the plaintiff 9, 54 Pac. 223; Deegan v. Deegan (1894), 
 is«uot bound to prove in the first instance 22 Nev. 185, 37 Pac. 360. The above 
 in support of it, is new matter; but a fact cases hold that the plea must specify the 
 which merely uegatives the averments of parties who should have been joined. 3 
 the petition is not new matter, and need * Gillam r. Sigman, 29 Cal. 637; Mills 
 not be replied to. Moreover, an answer v. Carthage, 31 Mo. A pp. 141. See also 
 setting up new matter by way of defence Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651, and the 
 should confess and avoid the plaintiff's other additional cases cited ante, under 
 cause of action. Bauer v. Wagner, 39 § * 698.
 
 814 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 fence that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest is new 
 matter. A general averment, however, to that effect, is not 
 enongh: the facts must be stated which constitute the defence, 
 and which show that he is not the real party in interest.^ The 
 objection that the plaintiff has not the legal capacit}' to sue, 
 unless it appears on the face of the complaint or petition so that 
 it can be raised by demurrer, is new matter. Being in the nature 
 of a dilatory defence, like that of a defect of parties, the facts 
 which constitute it must be stated with certaint}': a mere gen- 
 eral averment would raise no issue.- In application of this rule, 
 the objection that the plaintiff or the defendant is a married 
 woman, when relied on as a defence, cannot be proved under a 
 general denial, but must be pleaded as new matter;^ and in an 
 action by an executor or administrator, the general denial does 
 not put in issue the plaintiff's title to sue.* The defence that 
 the action was commenced before the cause of action had accrued 
 cannot, it has been held, be proved under a general denial, but 
 must be set up in the answer specially.^ Thus in an action for 
 work and labor on an open account, where the answer was a 
 general denial, the defence that the account was not due at the 
 time the action was commenced according to the terms of a 
 
 1 Jackson v. Whedon, 1 E. D. Siiiitli, Joliiison r. Miller, 4" Ind. .376, 377; Lau- 
 
 141 ; Savaj^e v. Corn Exch. F. Ins. Co., 4 ders v. Doui^las, 46 Ind. 522 ; McDaniel 
 
 Bosw. 1 ; Raymond v. Prichard, 24 Ind. r. Carver, 40 Ind. 250 ; Prison i\ O'Dowd, 
 
 .318; Garrison v. Clark, 11 Ind. 369; 40 Ind. 300 ; Van Metre y. Wolf, 27 Iowa, 
 
 Swift y. Ellsworth, 10 Ind. 205; Lamson 341; Wagner v. Ewing, 44 Ind. 441; 
 
 V. Falls, 6 Ind. 309 ; Curtis v. Gooding, 99 Kennard v. Sax, 3 Ore. 263, 265. The de- 
 
 Ind. 45; Hereth v. Smith, 33 Ind. 514; fence of infanry is new matter: Prall v. 
 
 Giraldin v. Howard, 103 Mo. 40. Peters, 32 Xeb. 832. 
 
 QEsch V. White (1901), 82 Minn. 462, [^Fulton v. Ryan (1900), 60 Xeb. 9, 82 
 
 85 N. W. 238, 7)3; Lesh v. Meyer (1901), N. W. 105; Linton v. Jansen (1903), — 
 
 .63 Kan. 524, 66 Pac. 245; Wakeman v. Neb. — , 95 N. W. 675.^ 
 Norton (1897), 24 Colo. 192, 49 Pac. 283 ; * White v. Moses, 11 Cal..69. It is 
 
 Nat. Dist. Co. V. Cream City Imp. Co. the rule in some States that a general 
 
 (1893), 86 Wis. 352, 56 N. W. 864.] denial admits the corporate existence of the 
 
 ■•^ Cal. Steam Nav. Co. v. Wright, 8 Cal. ])hiiiitiff, even if that is alleged in the 
 
 585; Wade v. State, 37 Ind. 180, 182; complaint: Dietriclis r. Lincoln & N. W. 
 
 Wright /;. Wright, 54 N. Y. 437, 441, 59 R. Co., 13 Neb. 43; Nat^ional Life Ins. 
 
 Barb. 505 ; Burnside y. Matthews, 54 N. Y. Co. v. Robinson, 8 Neb. 452; Beatty v. 
 
 78, 82, " mnst be pleaded specially and with Bartholomew Cy. Agr. Soc, 76 Ind. 91, 
 
 certainty to a particular intent;" Barclay and cases cited ; QSparks v. Nat. Accident 
 
 V. Quicksilver Min. Co., 6 Lans. 25,30; Ass'u (1896), 100 la. 458, 69 N. W. 678.] 
 Plia;nix Bk. v. Donnell, 40 N. Y. 410. "" [^Klder v. Rourke (1895), 27 Ore. 363, 
 
 Qlnfancy held in Winer r. Ma.st (1896), 41 Pac. 6, citing the text; Southey v. 
 
 146 Ind. 177, 45 N. E. 66, to be a defence Dowling (1898), 70 Conn. 153, 39 Atl. 1 13 ; 
 
 in bar and not in abatement.] Goodrich r. Bldg. Ass'n (1895), 96 Ga. 803, 
 
 3 Dillaye v. Parks, 31 Barb. 132; 22 S. E. 585.]
 
 EXAMPLES OF NEW MATTEK. 
 
 815 
 
 special contract was excluded on the ground that it should 
 have been pleaded.^ The defence that another action is pend- 
 ing for the same cause must be specially pleaded, unless it is 
 raised by demurrer. ^ 
 
 § 588. * 712. Miscellaneous Defences. The defence of license 
 is new matter, and cannot be proved unless pleaded.^ Accord- 
 ing to the decided weight of authority, an estoppel in ^:)fa'-s cannot 
 be proved under a general denial, but is new matter.* An accord 
 
 1 Hagan v. Burch, 8 Iowa, 309; Smith 
 V. Holmes, 19 N. Y. 271. 
 
 2 Walsworth ii. Jolinson, 41 Cal. (il. 
 QWitte V. Foote (1895), 90 Wis. 2.'3.5, 
 
 62 N. W. 1044 ; Lowinau v. West (1894), 
 8 Wash. 355, 36 Pac. 258; Spencer v. 
 Johnston (1899), 58 Neb. 44, 78 N. W. 
 482; Monroe v. Reid (1895), 46 Neb. 316, 
 64 N. W. 983. 
 
 The defence must be presented sea- 
 sonably to the trial court : Glover v. St. 
 Louis," etc. Co. (1896), 138 Mo. 408, 40 
 S. W. 110. 
 
 Such a plea cannot prevail unless the 
 two causes of action are pending in the 
 same juri.sdiction : Sandwich Mfg. Co. v. 
 Earl (1894), 56 Minn. 390, 57 N. W. 938; 
 Rice V. Ashland County (1902), 114 Wis. 
 130, 89 N. W. 908; Caine v. Seattle & 
 Northern Ry. Co. (1895), 12 Wa.'^h. 596, 
 41 Pac. 904. 
 
 To give occasion for a plea in abate- 
 ment, tlie prior action must be the same 
 cause, between the same parties in the 
 same interest, the same rights must be 
 asserted and the same relief prayed for : 
 Richardson v. Opelt (1900), 60 Neb. 180, 
 82 N. W. 377. See also Dodge v. Corne- 
 lius (1901), 168 N. Y. 242, 61 N. E. 244; 
 Wat.'^on V. Richardson (1900), 110 la. 698, 
 80 N. W. 416; Beardsley v. Morrison 
 (1899), 18 Utah, 478, 56 Pac. 303; Pratt 
 V. Howard (1899), 109 la. 504, 80 N. W. 
 546 ; Wilson v. Atlanta, etc. Ry. Co. (1902), 
 115Ga. 171,41S.E. 699; Calteauxu. Muel- 
 ler (1899), 102 Wis. 525, 78 N. W. 1082; 
 Koch V. Peters (1897), 97 Wis. 492, 73 
 N. W. 25; Tacoma v. Power Co. (1896), 
 15 Wash. 515, 46 Pac. 1043. 
 
 The defence of another action pending 
 
 may be defeated by a dismissal of the 
 
 other action, and a reply to that effect to 
 
 the said defence : Carson-Rand Co. v. Stern 
 
 "(1895), 129 Mo. 381, 31 S. W. 772. 
 
 Matter in abatement is waived if not 
 pleaded: Lombard v. McMillan (1897), 
 95 Wis. 627, 70 N. W. 673 ; Webber v. 
 Ward (1896), 94 Wis. 605, 69 N. W. 
 349.] 
 
 '^ Beaty v. Swarthout, 32 Barb. 293,. 
 294; Haight v. Badgeley, 15 Barb. 499; 
 Snowden v. Wilas, 19 Ind. 10; Gilbert r. 
 Sage, 5 Lans. 287 ; Alford v. Barnum, 45 
 Cal. 482, 485 ; Cliase v. Long, 44 Ind. 
 427,^428; [^Cone v. Ivinson (1893), 4 
 Wyo. 203, 33 Pac. 31.] 
 
 * Wood V. Ostram, 29 Ind. 177, 186 ; 
 Davis !'. Davis, 26 Cal. 23 ; Etcheborne v. 
 Auzerais, 45 Cal. 121 ; Clark v. Huber, 
 25 Cal. 593, 597 ; but see Caldwell v. 
 Auger, 4 Minn. 217; and Parker v. 
 Dacres, 1 Wash. 190; Churchill c. Bau- 
 mann, 95 Cal. 541. An estoppel by judg- 
 ment must be pleaded if there is or has 
 been any opportunity to do so. Clink ;;. 
 Thurston, 47 Cal. 21, 29 ; Meiss v. Gill, 
 44 Ohio St. 253 ; per contra, Larura v. 
 Wilner, 35 Iowa, 244, 247; and see ante, 
 § * 702. See also, as to defence of estoppel, 
 Hanson v. Cheatovich, 13 Nev. 395 ; Pugh 
 V. Ottenheimer, 6 Ore. 231 ; Remillard 
 V. Prescott, 8 id. 37. That estoppel is 
 new matter, see Central Nat. Bk. v. Dorau, 
 109 Mo. 40; Bray v. Marshall, 75 Mo. 
 327; De Votie v. AIcGerr, 15 Colo. 467; 
 Gaynor v. Clements, 16 Colo. 209; and 
 that the facts constituting the estoppel 
 must be shown, see Beck v. Milford, 90 
 Ind. 291; Stewart i-. Beck, 90 Ind. 458 ; 
 Burlington Indep. Dist. v. Merchants' Bk., 
 68 Iowa, 343 ; Miller v. Anderson, 19 Mo. 
 App. 71; Page v. Smith, 13 Ore. 410; 
 McKeen v. Naughton, 88 Cal. 462. Contra, 
 that estoppel may be proved under the 
 general denial, see Towne v. Sparks, 23 
 Neb. 142. Statute of frauds, Sherwood v. 
 Saxton, 63 Mo. 78; Wells v. Monihan, 
 129 N. Y. 161 ; May bee v. Moore, 90 Mo.
 
 816 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 and satisfaction is also new matter; ^ and a discharge in Lank-^ 
 ruptcy or insolvency ;2 and a defence based upon a statutory 
 
 340; but see Unglish v. Marvin, 128 N. Y. 
 380 ; Harris v. Frank, 81 Cal. 280. Tender, 
 liegler v. Eddy, 53 Cal. 597. 
 
 [^Hardy Implement Co. v. South Bend 
 Iron Works (1895), 129 Mo. 222, 31 S. W. 
 599 ; Jasper County Ky. Co. v. Curtis 
 (1900), 15-t .\Io. 10, 55 S. W. 222 ; Thomp- 
 son V. Cohen (1894), 127 Mo. 215, 28 
 S. W. 984; Cockrill v. Hutchin.son (1896), 
 135 Mo. 67, 36 IS. VV. 375; Sanders (•. 
 Cliartraud (1900), 158 Mo. 352, 59 8. W. 
 95; Throckmorton v. Pence (1893), 121 
 Mo. 50, 25 S. W. 843 ; Cadematori v. 
 Gauger (1901), 160 Mo. 352, 61 S. W. 
 195; Seibert v. liloomtield (1901), Ky., 
 63 S. W. 584 ; Excelsior Coal Co. v \'ir- 
 giuia Coal Co. (1902), Ky., 66 S. \V. 373; 
 IJeard-sley y. Clem (1902)", 137 Cal. 328, 70 
 Pac. 175; Newhall v. Hatch (1901), 1.34 
 Cal. 269, 66 Pac. 266 ; Reynolds v. Pascoe 
 (1901), 24 Utah, 219, 66 Pac. 1064; Rio 
 Grande West. R. R. Co. v. Power Co. 
 (1900), 2.3 Utah, 22, 63 Pac. 995; Poynter 
 V Chipman (1893), 8 Utah, 442, 32* Pac. 
 €90; Bruce v. Phcenix Ins. Co. (1893), 24 
 Ore. 486, 34 Pac. 16; Bays v. Trulsou 
 (1893), 25 Ore. 109, 35 Pac." 26; Swank i'. 
 St. I'aul City Ry. Co. (1895), 61 Minn. 423, 
 63 N. W. 1088; Stephen.son v. Bankers' 
 Life A.ss'n (1899), 108 la. 637, 79 N. W. 
 459; Kahler v. Iowa, etc. Ins. Co. (1898), 
 106 la. 380. 76 N. W. 734; Spencer v. 
 Papach (1897), 103 la. 513, 70 N. W. 748, 
 72 N. W. 665; Sherod v. Ewell (1897), 
 104 la. 253, 73 N. W. 493; Warder v. 
 Cuthbert (1896), 99 la. 681, 68 N. W. 
 917; Golden v. Ilardesty (1895), 93 la. 
 622, 61 N. W. 913; Hector Min. Co. v. 
 Valley View Miu. Co. (1901), 28 Colo. 
 315, 64 Pac. 205 ; Adams v. Adams (1903), 
 
 — Ind. — , 66 N. E. 153 ; Taylor v. Patton 
 (1903), — Ind. — , 66 N. E. 91 ; Dudley r. 
 Pigg (1897), 149 Ind. 363, 48 N. E. 642; 
 Frain v. Burgett (1898), 152 Ind. 55, 50 
 N. E. 873 ; Center Scliool Tp. v. State 
 ex rel. (1897), 150 Ind. 168, 49 N. E. 961 ; 
 Kiefer v. Klinsick (1895), 144 lud. 46, 42 
 N. E. 447; Union Bank v. Hntton (1903), 
 
 — Neb. — , 95 N. W. 1061 ; Neb. Mort- 
 gage, etc. Co. y. Van Kloster (1894), 42 
 Neb. 746. 60 N. W. 1016; Cobbey 7-. Bu- 
 chanan (lS9fi), 48 Neb. 39!, 67 X. W. 176 ; 
 
 Blue Valley Lumber Co. v. Couro (1900), 
 61 Neb. 39," 84 N. W. 402 ; Burwell Jrrig. 
 Co. t'. Lashmett (1900), 59 Neb. 605, 81 
 N. W. 617; Holmes v. Lincoln Salt Lake 
 Co. (1899), 58 Neb. 74, 78 N. W. 379; 
 Henderson v. Keutzer (1898), 56 Neb. 460, 
 76 X. W. 881 ; German Nat. Bank v. First 
 Nat. Bank (1898), 55 Neb. 86, 75 N. W. 
 .531 ; Boales v. Ferguson (1898), 55 Neb. 
 565, 76 N. W. 18; Gayiord i.-. Neb. Sav. 
 Bank (1898), 54 Neb, io4,-74 N. W. 415; 
 City Nat. Bank v. Thomas (1896), 46 Neb. 
 861, 65 N. W. 895; Scroggin v. Johnston 
 (1895), 45 Neb. 714, 64 N. W. 236; 
 Palmer Oil Co. v. Blodgett (1899), 60 
 Kan. 712, 57 Pac. 947 ; City of Chippewa 
 P"alls V. Hopkins (1901), 109 AVis. 611, 85 
 N. W. 553; Bank of Antigo ;;. R^au 
 (1899), 105 Wis. 37, 80 N. W.440; Pratt u. 
 Uawcs ( 1903), 118 Wis. 603, 95 N. W. 965 ; 
 Interstate Savings, etc. Ass'n v. Knajip 
 (1898), 20 Wash. 225, 55 Pac. 48 ; Jacobs 
 V. First Nat. Bank (1896), 15 Wash. 358, 
 46 Pac. 396; Moore v. Brownfield (1894), 
 10 Wash. 439, 39 Pac. 113; Schurtz v. 
 Colvin (1896), 55 O. St. 274, 45 N. W. 
 527 ; Village of Chester v. Leonard (1897), 
 68 Conn. 495, 37 Atl. 397 ; Tuells r. Torras 
 (1901), 113 Ga. 691, 39 .S. E. 455.] 
 
 1 Coles V. S()ulsb}% 21 Cal. 47, 50. 
 
 [^In Carpenter v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. 
 (1895), 7 S. r>. 584, 64 N. W. 1120, the 
 court said : " To establish a plea of accord 
 and satisfaction under the statute, it must 
 not only appear that there was an agree- 
 ment to accept, in full settlement of an 
 obligation, something different from or 
 less tlian that to which one of the parties 
 tliereto is entitled, but it mu.st be shown 
 that such agreement has been fully ex- 
 ecuted, and the obligation extinguished 
 liy the creditor's actual acceptance of the 
 consideration specified in the agreement 
 constituting the accord." See also Hale v. 
 Grogan (1896), 99 Ky. 170, 35 S. W. 282; 
 Van Housen v. Broelil (1899), '59 Neb. 48, 
 80 N. W. 260; Long v. Scanlan (1898), 
 105 Ga. 424, 31 S. E. 436; Oil Well Sup- 
 ply Co. V. Wolfe (1894), 127 Mo. 616, 30 
 S."W. 145.] 
 
 •^ C.rnell v. Dakin, 38 N. Y. 253, 256. 
 See also Styles v. Fuller, 101 N. Y. 622.
 
 EXAMPLES OF NEW MATTER. 
 
 817 
 
 provision prohibiting banks from paying ont notes not received 
 by them at par;i and a defence founded upon the plaintiff's 
 failure to perform a contract collateral to the demand set up 
 in the complaint, and upon which the liability of the defendant 
 depended. 2 
 
 1 Codd V. Rathborie, 19 N. Y. 37. 
 
 - Blethen v. Blake, 44 Cal. 117; aud 
 the defence of irregularity on tiie part of 
 the arbitrators iu au action upon an award, 
 Day r. llaiiiniond, 57 N. Y. 479, 484. 
 
 [^Defences of New Matter. 
 
 The following defences have been 
 held to be new matter : 
 
 Act of God : Pengra v. Wheeler (1893), 
 24 Ore. 532, 34 Pac. 354; Chicago, II. I. & 
 Pac. Py. Co. V. Shaw (1901), 63 Neb. 380, 
 88 N. W. 508. 
 
 Alteration of instrument : Mozley v. 
 Reagan (1899),' 109 Ga. 182, 34 8. E. 310 ; 
 JS'inman v. Suhr (1895), 91 Wis. 392, 64 
 N. VV. 1035 ; Maguire v. Eichmeier (1899), 
 109 la. 301, 80 N. W. 395; Wall v. 
 Muster's Ex'rs (1901), Ky., 63 S. W. 
 432. 
 
 Assumption of risk : Nicholaus v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. Hy. Co. (1894), 90 la. 85, 57 
 N. W. 694 ; Faulkner v. Mammoth Min. 
 Co. (1901), 23 Utah, 437, 66 Pac. 799; 
 Dorsett v. Clement-Ross Mfg. Co. (1902), 
 131 N. C. 254,42 S. E. 612. 
 
 Bona fides: Maxwell v. Foster (1902), 
 €4 S. C. 1,41 S. E.776. 
 
 Champerty: Disbrow v. Board of Super- 
 visors (1903), 119 la. 538, 93 N. W. 585 ; 
 Potter V. Ajax Min. Co. (1900), 22 Utah, 
 273, 61 Pac. 990 ; Croco v. Oregon Short 
 Line Co. (1898), 18 Utah, 311, 54 Pac. 
 985. 
 
 Collateral securitij held by plaintiff : 
 Flint >-. Nelson (1894), 10 Utah, 261, 37 
 Pac. 479. 
 
 Compromise : Pullins' Adm'r r. Smith 
 (1899), 106 Ky. 418, .50 S. W. 833. 
 
 Condition or exception in contract : Rail- 
 way Officials, etc. Ass'n v. Drummond 
 (1898), 56 Neb. 235, 76 N. W. 562; Farm- 
 ers', etc. Ins. Co. V. Wiard (1899), 59 Neb. 
 451, 81 N. W. 312; Joliuston v. North- 
 western Live Stock Ins. Co. (1896), 94 
 Wis. 117, 68 N. W.868 ; P'armers', etc. Ins. 
 Co. I'. Peterson (1896), 47 Neb. 747, 66 
 
 N. W. 847 ; Smith v. Continental Ins. Co. 
 (1899), 108 la. 382, 79 N. W. 129 ; Latimer 
 v. Woodmen (1901), 62 S. C. 145, 40 S. E. 
 155. 
 
 Consent and connivance in action for 
 criminal conversation : Morning v. Long 
 (1899), 109 la. 288, 80 N. W. 390. 
 
 Contract limitimj liabilitij : Register 
 Printing Co. v. Willis (1894), 57 Minn. 93, 
 58 N. W.825; Michalitschke Bros. i>. Wells, 
 Fargo & Co. (1897), 118 Cal. 683, 50 Pac. 
 847 ; Kansas City, etc. R. R. Co. v. Pace 
 (1901), 69 Ark. 256, 63 S. W. 62. 
 
 Contributor 1) neyliijence : Hughes v. Chi- 
 cago & Alton R. R. Co. (1894), 127 Mo. 
 447, 30 S. W. 127 ; McFarland v. Mo. Pac. 
 Ry. Co. (1894), 125 Mo. 2.53, 28 S. W. 
 590; Hill v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co. (1897), 
 140 Mo. 4.33, 41 S. W. 909; Louisville & 
 Nashville R. R. Co. v. Copas (1.894), 95 
 Ky. 460, 26 S. W. 179 (even wht-re the 
 petition negatives it) ; Hunter v. Grande 
 Ronde Lumber Co. (1901), 39 Ore. 448, 65 
 Pac. 598; Martin v. Railway Co. (1897), 
 51 S. C. 150. 28 S. E. 303;' Ford v. Chi- 
 cago, etc. R. R. Co. (1898), 106 la. 85, 75 
 N. W. 650 ; Willis v. City of Perry (1894), 
 92 la. 297, 60 N. W. 727 ; Union Stock 
 Yards Co. v. Conoyer (1893), 38 Neb. 488, 
 56 N. W. 1081 ; Ohlweiler r. Lohmann 
 (1894), 88 Wis. 75, 59 N. W. 678; Holland 
 V. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co. (1903), — 
 Utah, — , 72 Pac. 940. 
 
 But where contributory negligence is 
 negatived in the complaint the issue is 
 raised by a general denial : Denver, etc. 
 R. R. Co". V. Smock (1897), 23 Colo. 456, 
 48 Pac. 681 ; Long v. Railway Co. (1897), 
 50 S. C. 49, 27 S. E. 531. Contra, Louis- 
 ville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Copas 
 (1894), 95 Ky. 460, 26 S. W. 179. 
 
 A general averment of contributory 
 negligence is sufficient : Cogdell v. Wil- 
 mington, etc. R. R. Co. (1902), 130 N. C. 
 313, 41 S. E. 541 ; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. 
 Co. V. Smith (1897), 101 Ky. 104, 42 S. W. 
 538. But see Cogdell v. Wilmington &
 
 818 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 § 589. * 713. Statute of Limitations. Different rules prevail 
 in the different States in respect to pleading the Statute of 
 
 W. R.R Co. (190.3), 132 N.C. 852, 44 S.E. 
 618. 
 
 Corporation bi/-Iaw : Angier v. Equitable 
 Bldg. Ass'n (1899), 109 Ga. 625,35 S. E. 64. 
 
 Custom : Eller v. Loomis (1898), 106 
 la. 276, 76 N. W. 686. 
 
 Damages sustained by defendaut : Ilar- 
 riugtou V. Folev (1899), 108 la. 287, 79 
 X. W. 64. 
 
 Defect in registration of official bond : 
 Warren v. Boyd (1897), 120 N. C. 56, 26 
 S. E. 700. 
 
 Double agency : Childs v. Ptomey (1895), 
 17 Mont. 502, 43 Pac. 714. 
 
 Facts Suspending operation of statute: 
 West V. Bishop (1900), 110 la. 410, 81 
 X. W. 696. 
 
 Failure to save insured goods : Davis r. 
 Mutual Fire Ins. Co. (1895), 96 la. 70, 64 
 X. W. 687. 
 
 Fire set by insured : Corkery v. Security 
 In.s. Co. (1896), 99 la. 382, 68 N. W. 792; 
 Heideureich v. Aetna Ins. Co. (1894), 26 
 Ore. 70, 37 Pac. 64. 
 
 Forfeiture: Powerv. Sla( 1900), 24 Mont. 
 243, 61 Pac. 468 ; Pickett v. Fidelity Co. 
 (1901), 60S. C. 477,38 S. E. 160; Bishop 
 r. Baisley (1895), 28 Ore. 119, 41 Pac. 937. 
 
 Injury by fellow servant : Laying v. Mt. 
 Shasta Mineral Spring Co. (1901), 135 
 Cal. 141, 67 Pac. 48, citing numerous 
 cases: Peters v. McKay (1902), 136 Cal. 
 73, 68 Pac. 478; Bowling Green Stone 
 Co. V. Capshaw (1901), Ky., 64 S. W. 507. 
 See also Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. 
 Oyster (1899), 58 Neb. 1, 78 N. W. 3.59. 
 But in Missouri it is lield that this defence 
 may be sliown under a general denial : 
 Kaminski v. Tudor Iron Works (1902), 167 
 Mo. 462, 67 S. W. 221. So in Wilson v. 
 Railway Co. (1897), 51 S.C. 79, 28 S. i:.91- 
 
 Laches: Gay v. Havermale (1902), 27 
 Wash. 390, 67 Pac. 804 ; Town of Fairplay 
 V. Board of Comni'rs (1901 ), 29 Colo. 57, 67 
 Pac. 152; French v. Woodruff (1898), 25 
 Colo. 3.39, .54 Pac. 101.5. It was held in 
 Wagner v. Sanders (1901), 62 S. C. 73,39 
 S. E. 950, that laches might be set up by 
 the court without being pleaded by the 
 defendant. 
 
 Lif/uidnlion : Kirkland v. Dryfus 
 (1897), 103 (ja. 127, 29 S. E. 612. 
 
 Misnomer of defendant: Bird v. St. 
 John's Episcopal Church (1899), 154 Ind. 
 138, 56 X. E. 129. 
 
 Non-incorporation : Brady v. Nat. Supply 
 Co. (1901), 64 O. St. 267, 60 N. E. 218. 
 
 J'rivilege : Gilman v. McCIatchy (1896), 
 111 Cal. 606, 44 Pac. 241. 
 
 Ratification of altered contract: Erick- 
 son V. First Nat. Bank (1895), 44 Xeb. 
 622, 62 N. W. 1078. 
 
 Release: Rivers v. Blom (1901), 16.3 
 Mo. 442, 63 S. W. 812; Frank f. Cobban 
 (1897), 20 Mont. 168, 50 Pac. 423; Hale y, 
 Grogau (1896), 99 Ky. 170, 35 S. W. 282. 
 
 Rescission : Kennedy v. School Dist. 
 (1898), 20 Wash. 399, 55 Pac. 567. 
 
 Security held by plaintiff in an action 
 by creditor's bill : O'Brien v. Stambach 
 (1897), 101 la. 40, 69 N. W. 1133. 
 
 Settlement : Hulbert v. New Nonpareil 
 Co. (1900), 111 la. 490, 82 N. W. 928. 
 
 Statute of frauds : Ilillhouse r. Jen- 
 nings (1901), 60S. C.373, 38 S. E. .599 ; 
 Abba V. Smyth (1899), 21 Utah, 109, 59 
 Pac. 756; Bean v. Lamprey (1901), 82 
 Minn. 320, 84 N. W. 1016; Iverson ?■. 
 Cirkel (1894), 56 Minn. 299, 57 X. W. 800; 
 Tynon r. Despain (1896), 22 Colo. 240, 43 
 Pac. 1039; Crane v. Powell (1893), 139 
 N. Y. 379, 34 N. E. 911; Matthews v. 
 Matthews (1897), 154 N. Y. 288,48 N. E. 
 531 ; Sanger v. French (1898), 157 N. Y. 
 213, 51 N. E. 979 ; St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. 
 V. Hall (1903), — Ark. — , 74 S. w! 293; 
 Thomas v. Churchill (1896), 48 Neb. 266, 
 67 N. W. 182. Unless the defendant 
 raises the defence of the statute of frauds 
 by answer or demurrer, he waives it : 
 Crane v. Powell (1893), 139 X. Y. 379, 34 
 N. E. 911 ; Tift V. Wight & Weslosky Co. 
 (1901), 113 Ga. 681,39 S. E. 503; Wise- 
 man V. Thompson (1895), 94 la. 607, 63 
 N. W. 346. 
 
 Statutory bars: McCann v. Pennie 
 (1893), 100 Cal. 547,35 Pac. 158; Fischer 
 V. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1901), 167 
 N. Y. 178, 60 N. E. 431. 
 
 Subrogation: Hunter v. Hunter (1900), 
 58 S. C. 382, 36 S. E. 743. 
 
 Suicide: Latimer v. Woodmen (1901), 
 62 S. C. 145, 40 S. E. 155. 
 
 Ultra Vires : Lewis v. Clyde S. S. Co.
 
 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
 
 819 
 
 Limitations. In some, by reason of an express provision of 
 their codes, the defence must always be specially set up in the 
 answer, and can never be raised by demurrer, even though the 
 averments of the complaint should show that the cause of action 
 is barred.^ In others it may always be taken advantage of by 
 demurrer whenever the complaint or petition discloses a cause 
 of action which appears to be barred by the statute. ^ The courts 
 
 (1903), — N. C. — , 44 S. E. 666; Ferst's 
 Sons I'. Bank of Waycross (1900), 111 Ga. 
 229, 36 S. E. 773; Hart v. Phenix Ins. Co. 
 (1901), 113 Ga. 859, 39 S E. 304; Citi- 
 zens State Bank v. Pence (1900), 59 Neb. 
 579, 81 N. W. 623 ; Lewis v. Clyde S. S. 
 Co. (1902), 131 N. C. 652, 42 S. E. 969; 
 United States Mortgage Co. v. McClure 
 (1902), 42 Ore. 190, 70 Pac. 543. 
 
 Undue Influence : Kelly v. Perrault 
 (1897), Idaho, 48 Pac. 45. 
 
 Unreasonableness of ordinance .' Blue- 
 dorn V. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1893), 121 Mo. 
 258, 25 S. W. 943. 
 
 Waiver: TJasmussen v. Levin (1901), 
 28 Colo. 448, 65 Pac. 94 ; Swearingen v. 
 Lahner (1894), 93 la. 147, 61 N. W. 431 ; 
 McCoy V. Iowa Ins. Co. (1898), 107 la. 80, 
 77 N. W. 529; Kahler v. Iowa, etc. Ins. 
 Co. (1898), 106 la. 380, 76 N. W. 734. 
 
 Want of funds: Netzer v. Crookston 
 City (1894), 59 Minn. 244, 61 N. W. 21 ; 
 McNulty V. City of New York (1901), 168 
 N. y. 117, 61 N. E. Ill ; Rollings v. 
 Bankers' Union (1902), 63 S. C. 192, 41 
 S. E. 90. 
 
 Want of jurisdiction : Johnson )'. Det- 
 rick (1899), 152 Mo. 243,53 S. W. 891 ; 
 Kahn v. Southern Bldg. Ass'n (1902), 115 
 Ga. 459, 41 S. E. 648 ; Kyd v. Exchange 
 Bank (1898), 56 Neb. 557, 75 N. W. 524 ; 
 Herbert v. Wortendyke (1896), 49 Neb- 
 182, 68 N. W. 350; Burlington Relief 
 Dep't V. Moore (1897), 52 Neb. 719, 73 
 N. W. 15; Hurlburt v. Palmer (1894), 39 
 Neb. 158,57 N. W. 1019; Anheuser-Busch 
 Brewing Ass'n v. Peterson (1894), 41 Neb. 
 897, 60 N. W. 373 ; Eel River R. R. Co. v. 
 State ex rel. (1895), 143 Ind. 231, 42 N. E. 
 617. 
 
 Objection to the jurisdiction may be 
 raised by answer in connection with 
 matters in bar : Herbert i'. Wortendyke 
 (1896), 49 Neb. 182, 68 N. W. 350; Baker 
 r. Union Stock Yards Nat. Bank (1902), 
 
 63 Neb. 801, 89 N. W. 269; Lowe v. Riley 
 (1898), 57 Neb. 252, 77 X. W. 758. 
 
 The sufficiency of the petition is not a 
 test of jurisdiction : Dryden r. Parrotte 
 (1901), 61 Neb. 339, 85 N. W. 287 ; Win- 
 ningham v. Trueblood (1899), 149 Mo. 
 572, 51 S. W. 399.] 
 
 Work done Inj mrmher of familij in an 
 action for work and labor : Schroedor v. 
 Scliroeder (1903), — la. — , 93 N. W. 78. 
 
 1 nSatterlund v. Beal (1903), — N, D. 
 — , 95 N. W. 518.] 
 
 - [Ii:verett v. O'Leary (1903), — Minn. 
 — , 95 N. W. 901 ; Green's Adm'r v. Ir- 
 vine (1902), Ky., 66 S. W. 278; Motes v. 
 Gila Valley, etc. Ry. Co. (1902), Ariz., 
 68 Pac. 532; Wagener v. Boyce (1898), 
 Ariz., 52 Pac. 1122; Smith v. Martin 
 (1901), 135 Cal. 247, 67 Pac. 779; Bliss 
 V. Sneath (1898), 119 Cal. 526, 51 Pac 
 848; Fullertonu. Bailey (1898), 17 Utah, 
 85, 53 Pac. 1020; Smith v. Day (1 901), 39 
 Ore. 531, 65 Pac. 1055; Pass v. Pa.ss 
 (1896), 98 Ga. 791, 25 S. E. 752; Cow- 
 hick i;. Shingle (1894), 5 Wyo. 87, 37 
 Pac. 689; Huckelbridge v. Atchison, etc. 
 Ry. Co. (1903), — Kan. — , 71 Pac. 814 ; 
 Lewis V. Duncan (1903), 66 Kan. 306, 71 
 Pac. 577; Best v. Zutavern (1898), 53 
 Neb. 604, 74 N. W. 64 ; Missouri Pac. Ry. 
 Co. V. Hemingway (1902), 63 Neb. 610, 88 
 N. W. 673 ; Osl)orn v. Portsmouth Nat. 
 Bank (1899), 61 O. St. 427, 56 N. E. 197. 
 
 But a general demurrer on the ground 
 that no cause of action is stated will not 
 raise the issue : Fnllerton v. Bailey (1898), 
 17 Utah, 85, 53 Pac 1020; Bliss v. Sneath 
 (1898), 119 Cal. 526, 51 Pac. 848; Board 
 r. First Presbyterian Church (1898), 19 
 Wash. 455, 53 Pac. 671 ; Joergensou v. 
 Joergenson (1902), 28 Wash. 477, 68 Pac. 
 913. Contra, Cowhick v. Shingle (1894), 
 5 Wyo. 87, 37 Pac. 689 ; Eayrs v. Nason 
 (1898), 54 Neb. 14-3, 74 N. W. 408. 
 
 In ruling upon a demurrer on the
 
 820 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 of still other States occupj^ a middle ground between these ex- 
 tremes. If the provisions of the statute relied on are not abso- 
 lute, but contain exceptions or provisos within which the case 
 could possibly fall, and which might, therefore, prevent the bar 
 of the statute from applying to the cause of action, the demurrer 
 is never proper, because, although not so alleged, the case might 
 come within the exception or proviso : the answer is then the 
 only mode of presenting the defence. But if the particular 
 provisions of the statute are absolute, and contain no such 
 exceptions or provisos within which the case could possibly 
 fall, a demurrer may be interposed when the objection appears 
 upon the face of the plaintiff's pleading; but if it does not so 
 appear, the defence must be set up by answer. 
 
 § 590. * 714. Same Subject. In New York the rule is set- 
 tled, and applied to all actions whether legal or equitable, that 
 the effect of the Statute of Limitations as a defence can only 
 be made available by an answer; that a demurrer can under 
 no circumstances raise the issue ; ^ and finally, that the defence 
 is new matter.^ In Indiana, if the provision of the statute in- 
 voked contains no exceptions or provisos, and it appears on the 
 face of the complaint that the cause of action is barred, the de- 
 fendant can demur; but when there are exceptions or provisos 
 in the operative clause of the statute relied upon, the defence 
 can only be set up by a special answer, and cannot be made 
 
 ground that the actiou is barred by the 41 ; Hyde v. Lamberson, 1 Idaho, 536. 
 
 statute of limitations, the enquiry must be lu the following States, also, the defence 
 
 confined to the face of the complaint and cannot be taken by demurrer : in North 
 
 the indorsement of the sheriff upon the Carolina, Guthrie v. Bacon, 107 N. C. 3.37 ; 
 
 summons cannot be considered: Smith v. in Arkansas, St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. 
 
 Day (1901), 39 Ore. 531, 65 Pac. 1055. v. Brown, 49 Ark. 2.53 ; in Iowa, State v. 
 
 Under the Wisconsin statutes, St., Mclntire, 58 Iowa, 572 ; in Colorado, 
 
 1898, §§ 2649, 2651, a demurrer on this Hunt v. Hayt, 15 Pac. 410; Barnes v. 
 
 ground must specifically point out the Union Pac. Ry. Co. (C. C. A.), 54 Fed. 
 
 particular section of the statute of limita- Rep. 87. It may be taken by demurrer 
 
 tions relied upon : Wlicreatt v. Worth in Ohio, Seymour v. Pittsburg, C. & .St. 
 
 (1900), 108 Wis. 291, 84 N. W. 441; L. Ry. Co.,'44 Ohio St. 12; Douglas v. 
 
 Crowley f. Hicks (1898), 98 Wis. 566,74 Corry, 46 Ohio St. 349; in Missouri, 
 
 N. W. 348.J Ileffernan v. Howell, 90 Mo. 344 ; in Wis- 
 
 1 ^To the same effect see King c. cousin, Tucker v. Lovejoy, 73 Wis. 66 ; 
 Powell (1900), 127 N. C. 10, 37 S. E. 62.] in Minnesota, Humphrey v. Carpenter, 39 
 
 2 .Sands V. St. John, 36 Barb. 628; Minn. 115; in Oregon, Sj)aur v. McBee, 
 Baldwin v. Martin, 14 Abb. Pr. n. s. 9. 19 Ore. 76; Davis r. Davis, 20 Ore. 78; 
 See also Dezengremel v. Dezengremel, 24 in Washington, Wilt v. Buchtel, 2 Wash. 
 Hun, 457; Riley v. Corwin, 17 id. 597; Ter. 417. 
 
 Long V. Bank of Vanceyville, 81 N. C
 
 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
 
 821 
 
 available under a general denial.^ Even in those States wlior 
 the statute may be taken advantage of by demurrer, as well as 
 in all tlie others, it is, when set up by answer, new matter, and 
 can never be proved under a denial, either general or special.''^ 
 
 1 Perkins v. Rogers, 35 lud. 124, 141, 
 and cases cited ; Hanna v. Jeffersouville, 
 etc. R. Co., 32 Ind. 113; but see Matlock 
 V. Todd, 25 lud. 128, which seems to hold 
 that a demurrer is never proper iu lec/ul 
 actions, but may be used in ecpiitable ac- 
 tions, according to the former practice in 
 equity. See McCollister v. Willey, 52 
 Ind. 382; Cass Cy. Com'rs v. Adams, 76 
 Ind. 504 ; Devor v. Rerick, 87 lud. 337 ; 
 Cook V. Chambers, 107 Ind. 67; Shewal- 
 ter V. Bergman, 123 Ind. 155 ; ]\Iedsker v. 
 Rogue, 1 lud. App. 197. All these ca.ses 
 support the rule stated in the text. 
 
 [^Where, however, the complaint shows 
 that the action is not within any of the 
 exceptions, a demurrer will lie : Dorsey 
 Mach. Co. V. McCaffrey (1894), 139 Ind. 
 545, 38 N. E. 208 ; Swatts v. Bowen (1894), 
 141 lud. 322, 40 N. E. 1057. Kentucky 
 follows the same rule : Brandenburg v. 
 McGuire (1898), 105 Ky. 10, 44 S. W. 
 9G ; Spalding v. St. Joseph's School 
 (1899), 107 Ky. 382, 54 S. W. 200.^1 
 
 - McKinuey v. McKiuney, 8 Ohio 
 St. 423 ; Bacivus v. Clark, 1 Kan. 303 ; 
 Howell V. Howell. 15 Wis. 55, 59. Tliis 
 last case holds that the defeudaut may 
 elf mar, although the Wisconsiu code enacts 
 that '■ the objection that the action was 
 not commencetl within the time limited 
 can only be taken by answer." R. S. ch. 
 138, § 1. The court said that "answer" 
 must be taken in its widest sense of any 
 defensive pleading including a demurrer. 
 But see the later case of Tarbox v. Su- 
 pervisors, 34 Wis. 558, which expressly 
 holds that the Statute of Limitations can 
 oiili/ be taken advantage of by answer in 
 Wisconsin. Hartson r. Hardiu, 40 Cal. 
 264. The rule is settled in many States, 
 that when it affirmatively appears on the 
 face of the complaint or petition that the 
 cause of action is barred by the statute, 
 and only then, the defendant may demur; 
 otherwise he must plead the defence 
 specially, since it is never admissible 
 under the general denial, except in the 
 action to recover possession of land in 
 
 certain States by virtue of express pro- 
 visions of their codes. See cnite, § *679; 
 and as to the defence in actions for spe- 
 cific performance, see ante, § * 681. It is 
 so held in Ohio, Huston v. Craighead, 
 23 Ohio St. 198, 209, 210; in Minnesota, 
 Davenport r. Short, 17 Minn. 24, the 
 coui't saying that they would not extend 
 the rule laid down in Kennedy r. Wil- 
 liams, 11 Minn. 314 ; McArdle v. McArdle, 
 12 Minn. 98; Eastman v. St. Anthony's 
 Falls W. P. Co., 12 Minn. 137 ; Hoyt i;. 
 McNeil, 13 Minn. 390; in Kan.^as, Parker 
 1-. Berry, 12 Kan. 351 ; in California, 
 Brennan v. Ford, 46 Cal. 7, 12 ; in Iowa, 
 Robinson v. Allen, 37 Iowa, 27, 29 ; 
 Shearer v. Mills, 35 Iowa, 499 ; Moulton 
 r. Walsh, 30 Iowa, 361 ; Sprin';er c. Clay 
 Cy., 35 Iowa, 241 ; in Nebraska, Mills v. 
 Rice, 3 Neb. 76, 87 ; in Missouri the 
 defence can be proved under a general 
 denial, when the action is for the recov- 
 ery of land, Bledsoe v. Si nuns, 53 Mo. 
 305, 307 ; see ante, § * 679 ; Fairbanks v. 
 Long, 91 Mo. 628 ; Fulkerson v. Mitchell, 
 82 Mo. 13; Bird v. Sellers (Mo. Supr. 
 1893), 21 S W. Rep. 91 ; so also in North 
 Carolina, Falls of Neuse Man. Co. i-. 
 Brooks, 106 N. C. 107; but the defence 
 must be specially pleaded in other cases, 
 Orr V. Rode, 101 Mo. 387 ; Bell v. Clark, 
 30 Mo. App. 224 ; Belleville Sav. Bk. v. 
 Winslow, 30 Fed. Rep. 488. See also 
 Combs V. Watson, 32 Ohio St. 228; 
 Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651 ; Orton 
 V. Noonau, 25 id. 672; Heath r. Heath, 31 
 id. 223 ; Bardeu v. Columbia Cy. Sup., 33 
 id. 445 ; Tarbox v. Adams Cy. Sup., 34 id. 
 558 ; Ward r. Waters, 63 Wis. 39. 
 
 [[Hayes r. Lavagnino (1898), 17 Utah, 
 185, 53 Pac. 1029; Stoddard County v. 
 Maloue (1893), 115 Mo. 508, 22 S. W. 
 469; Hawkins v. Douuerberg (1901), 40 
 Ore. 97, 66 Pac. 691 ; Battery Park Bank 
 V. Loughran (1898), 122 N. C*. 668, 30 S. E. 
 17 ; Oeverraann r. Loebertmauu (1897), 68 
 Minn. 162, 70 N. W. 1084; Easton v. 
 Somerville (1900), 111 la. 164, 82 N. W 
 475; Goring I'. Fitzgerald (1898), 105 la.
 
 822 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 When the Statute of Limitations of another State or country is 
 relietl upon as a defence, the answer must contain all the aver- 
 
 507, 75 N. W. 358; Jenks v. Lansing 
 Lumber Co. (1896), 97 la. 342, 66 N. W. 
 231 ; Small v. Cohen (1897), 102 Ga. 248, 
 29 S. E. 430; Coney v. Home (1894), 93 
 Oa. 723, 20 S. E. 213 ; Stringer v. 
 Stringer (1894), 93 Ga. 320, 20 S. E. 242 ; 
 Hanna v. Emerson (1895), 45 Neb. 708, 
 64 N. W. 229 ; Blair v. Brown (1897), 17 
 Wasli. 570, 50 Pac. 483 ; Malloy v. Chicago 
 & Northwestern K. R. fco. (1901), 109 
 Wis. 29, 85 N. W. 130 ; Waliber r. Wil- 
 liams (1903), — Wis. — , 93 N. W. 47. 
 
 A mere averment in the answer that 
 the action did not accrue within the time 
 limited by the statute of limitations is not 
 suflScient: Dufrene v. Anderson (1903), — 
 Neb. — , 93 N. W. 139 ; Pinkham v. 
 Pinkham (1901), 61 Neb. 336, 85 N. W. 
 285; Scroggin v. Nat. Lumber Co. (1894), 
 41 Neb. 195, 59 N. W. 548 ; Jenks v. Lan- 
 sing Lumber Co. (1896), 97 la. 342, 66 
 N. W. 231 ; Lassiter i-. Roper (1894), 114 
 N. C. 17, 18 S. E. 946; Heyer v. Riven- 
 bark (1901), 128 N. C. 270, 38 S. E. 875 ; 
 Murray v. Harden (1903), 132 N. C. 136, 43 
 S. E. 600. 
 
 But objection to an insufficient plea 
 may be waived ; McDonald i\ Bice (1901), 
 11.3 la. 44, 84 N. W. 985; Kinkead v. 
 Holmes, etc. Co. (1901), 24 Wash. 216, 64 
 Pac. 157. 
 
 On the other hand, it is held in some 
 States that such an averment, although a 
 mere conclusion, is sufficient : Lilly v. 
 Farmers" Nat. Bank (1900), Ky., 56 S. W. 
 722; Snow i;. Rich (1900), 22 Utah, 123,61 
 Pac. 330 ; Thomas v. Glendinning (1896), 
 13 Utaii. 47, 44 Pac. 652 ; McConnell r. 
 Spicker (1901), 15 S. D. 98, 87 N. W. 574 ; 
 Searls r. Knapp (1894), 5 S. D. 325, 58 
 N. W. 807. 
 
 But see, however, Lloyd v. Rawl 
 (1902), 63 S. C. 219,41 S. E. 312, where 
 the court said : " It has been held in this 
 State tliat the statute of limitations may 
 be proved under the general denial or it 
 may be pleaded specifically." The rule 
 was belli to be that wlien the statute is 
 relied upon merely ;ia a defence, to bar 
 plaintiff's recovery, it must be specially 
 j)leaded ; but when it is relied upon to 
 show title to real property in defendant, it 
 
 may be showu under the general denial, 
 as going to controvert plaintiff's allega- 
 tion of title. See also Sutton v. Clark 
 (1901), 59 S. C. 440, 38 S. E. 150. 
 
 The statute of limitations can be 
 pleaded only as a defence, but cannot be 
 used as tlie basis for affirmative relief: 
 Johnson v. Wynne (1902), 64 Kan. 138, 
 67 Pac. 549 ; Corlett v. Ins. Co. (1899), 60 
 Kan. 134, 55 Pac. 844. 
 
 Where an answer pleads a twenty- 
 year statute of limitations and a fifteen- 
 year statute is in fact applicable, the 
 answer will be iield good as a plea of the 
 fifteen-year statute : Waymire v. Waymire 
 (1895)," 144 Ind. 329, 43 N. E. 267. 
 
 " When any statute of limitations is 
 pleaded as a defence, if the facts bring the 
 case within any of the exceptions to the 
 statute, tliey may be set up in the reply. 
 This is the ])roper practice : " State fi.r rcl. 
 V. Parsons (1896), 147 Ind. 579,47 N. E. 17. 
 
 Ordinarily a third party may not in- 
 terpose tlie defence of the statute : Plum- 
 mer. Perry & Co. v. Rohmau (1900), 61 
 Neb. 01, 84 N. W. 600. 
 
 In Corbey v. Rogers (1898), 152 Ind. 
 169, 52 N. E. 748, it was held that in au 
 action to foreclose a mortgage, defendant 
 must aver facts showing that he has such 
 au interest in the real estate as entitles 
 liim to plead the statute. See also Lincoln 
 Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Parker (1902), 65 
 Kan. 81 9, 70 Pac. 892 (in case of demurrer). 
 
 Tiie defence is waiveil if raised neitlier 
 by answer nor demurrer : Scroggin v. Nat. 
 Lumber Co. (1894), 41 Neb. 195, 59 N. W. 
 548 ; Dufrene v. Anderson (1903), — Neb- 
 — , 93 N. W. 139; Hardwick v. Ickler 
 (1897), 71 Minn. 25, 73 N. W. 519; Gil- 
 bert V. llewetson (1900), 79 Minn. 326, 82 
 N. W. 655; Schmitt v. Hager (1903), 88 
 Minn. 413, 93 N. W. 110 ; In re Estate of 
 McMurray (1899), 107 la. 648, 78 N. W. 
 691 ; Belli'. Rice (1897), 50 Neb. 547, 70 
 N. W. 25; Winters v. Means (1897), .50 
 Neb. 209, 69 N. W. 753 ; Hobson r. Cum- 
 mins (1899), 57 Neb. 611, 78 N. W. 295; 
 McCormick Harv. Mach. Co. v. Cum- 
 mins (1899), 59 Neb. 330, 80 N. W. 1049. 
 
 Tiie statute begins to run from the 
 time tliat llie debtor is subject to be sued
 
 UNION OF DEFENCES. 823 
 
 ments of fact necessary to bring the case within tlie provisions of 
 such foreign enactment: nothing will be presumed in favor of 
 the pleader.^ 
 
 SECTION FIFTH. 
 THE UNION OF DEFENCES IN THE SAME ANSWER. 
 
 § 591. * 715. Introductory. All the codes, with some slight 
 difference in the language, but with none in the meaning and effect 
 of the clause, provide that the defendant may set up in his answer 
 as many defences and counter-claims and set-offs as he may liave, 
 whether they be such as have heretofore been denominated legal 
 or equitable, or both.^ When defences are thus united, they must 
 each be separately stated, and refer to the causes of action they 
 are intended to answer. I shall, in the present section, collect 
 the practical rules which have been adopted by the courts in con- 
 struing this provision, touching the mode of pleading different 
 defences in one answer. 
 
 I. How the Separate Defences should be stated. 
 
 § 592. * 716. Each Defence must be Complete in itself. The dis- 
 tinction between partial and full defences has already been pointed 
 out. Assuming that the defences are not intended to be partial, 
 each must of itself be a complete answer to the whole cause of 
 action against which it is directed, as perfectly so as though it 
 
 or from the time that the creditor can, by Minneapolis Harvester Works v. Smith 
 
 his own act or of his own volition, become (Neb. 1893), .53 N. W. 973 (statute of 
 
 entitled to maintain an action : Winches- foreign State) ; Spanish Fork City v. 
 
 ter Turnpike Co. v. Wickliffe's Adm'r Hopper (Utah, 1891), 26 Pac. llep. 293 ; 
 
 (1897), 100 Ky. 531, 38 S. W. 866 ; Os- in California, Code of Civil Procedure, 
 
 borne v. Lindstrom (1899), 9 N. D. 1, 81 § 458. 
 
 N. W. 72.] QValz V. First Nat. Bank (1895), 96 
 
 1 Gillett c. Hill, 32 Iowa, 220. See, Ky. 543, 29 S. W. 329; Richardson v. 
 
 as to the degree of particularity required Mackay (1896), 4 Okla. 328, 46 Pac. 546. 
 
 in pleading the statute. Piper v. Hoard, These cases hold that the foreign statute 
 
 107 N. Y. 67 ; Pemberton v. Simmons, must be pleaded. In the absence of 
 
 100 N. C. 316; Turner v. Shuffler, 108 pleading and proof the foreign statute 
 
 N. C. 642 ; Walker v. Laney, 27 S. C. 150; will be presumed the same as the domes- 
 
 Templeton v. Sharp (Ky., Nov., 1888), tic statute : Mowry r. McQueen (1900), SO 
 
 9 S. W. Rep. 507 ; Thomas v. Chamber- Minn. 385, 83 N. W. 348.] 
 lain, 39 Ohio St. 112 ; Paine y. Comstock, 2 [[Held in Meugert v. Brinkerhuff 
 
 57 Wis. 159; Smith v. Dragert, 60 Wis. (1903), — 0. St. — , 66 N. E. 530, that a 
 
 139 ; Ruggles V. Fond du Lac Cy., 63 defendant must plead all his defences, or 
 
 AVis. 205 ; Meade v. Gilfoyle, 64 Wis. 18 ; they are waived.]
 
 824 CIVIL r.EMEDIES. 
 
 were pleaded alone. It is not necessary that each defence should 
 answer the entire complaint when that contains two or more dis- 
 tinct causes of action, because these causes of action may depend 
 upon separate circumstances, and demand separate answers. If 
 a defence, however, is addressed to the whole complaint, as such, 
 it must completely controvert the whole.^ The rule, as stated in 
 its general form, is, that each defence must be sufficient in itself, 
 in its material allegations or its denials, to constitute an answer 
 to. the cause or causes of action against which it is directed, and 
 thus to defeat a recovery thereon.^ This proposition refers to the 
 substance of the ilefence. In reference to the form and manner 
 of stating this substance, it must, either by actual statement in 
 full, or by a proper reference to and adoption of matter in 
 another defence found in the same answer, contain averments 
 of all the material facts or denials which together make up the 
 defence. Each must in its composition be complete, sufficient, 
 and full ; it must stand upon its own allegations : it cannot 
 be aided, nor its imperfect and partial statements helped out, by 
 matter found in another defence, unless such matter is expressly 
 referred to, and in an express manner adopted or borrowed from 
 that other, and made a part of itself. The reference, however, to 
 the former defence, and the adoption of its matter, if permitted 
 at all, must be express ; for otherwise the allegations of one can- 
 not be treated as incorporated in or helping out those of another. 
 This rule is well settled by the authorities, although often disre- 
 garded in practice.^ If the defence is professedly a partial one, 
 
 1 QWalker v. Walker (1897), IfiO Ind. tains separate defences, each defence must 
 317, 50 N. E. 68.] be sufficient in itself: it cannot be aided 
 
 2 ^The code requirement tliat each de- by matter in another defence. If not 
 fence must be distinctly stated in a sepa- thus complete and sufficient, it is demur- 
 rate paragraph is substantial as well as ruble." Defences should be separately 
 formal: Taylor r. Purcell (1894), 60 Ark. stated and numbered: but a failure to 
 60G, .31 S. \V. h&ir\ comply with tliis rule can only be taken 
 
 3 Baldwin v. U. S. Tel. Co., 54 Barb, advantage of by a motion to correct ; if 
 505, 517: "By the well-.settled rules of such motion is jiot made, the objection is 
 pleading, each answer [defence] must of waived. Truitt v. Baird, 12 Kan. 420, 
 itself be a complete answer to the whole 423. Each defence must be complete in 
 complaint, as perfectly so a.s if it stood itself, and cannot be aided by reference 
 alone. Unless it, in terms, adopts or to the allegations in another. Potter v. 
 raibTS to the matter contained in some Earnest, 45 Ind. 416; Mason v. Weston, 
 other answer, it must be tested as a 29 Ind. 561 ; Day v. Vallette, 25 Ind. 42 ; 
 pleading alone by the matter itself con- Leabo i>. Detrick, 18 Ind. 414; Nat. Bk. 
 tains." Nat. Bk. of Mich. v. Green, .33 of Mich. v. Green, 33 Iowa, 140; Knarr v. 
 Iowa, 140, 144: "When the answer con- Couaway, 42 Ind. 260, 264. See also, as
 
 UNION OF DEFENCES. 
 
 825 
 
 the foregoing rule applies only so far as respects the manner and 
 form of stating the facts. In a partial as well as in a full defence, 
 the averments cannot be aided by matter found in another de- 
 fence, unless the same is expressly referred to and adopted.^ It 
 should be observed also, that in the case of answers containing 
 several defences, as well as of complaints containing several 
 causes of action, certain allegations may be introductory, not 
 forming a portion of either defence in particular, but belong- 
 ing alike to all, so that they should be once made at the com- 
 mencement of the answer before any one of the separate defences 
 is stated.2 
 
 § 593. * 717. Suggested Method of Pleading Specific Denials. 
 Common-Law Theory. In this connection I shall offer a few sug- 
 gestions in reference to the proper mode of pleading specific 
 denials ; a mode which is perhaps not in terms prescribed by the 
 codes, but which is, I think, plainly included within the spirit of 
 the statutory requirements, and which, if universally adopted, 
 would do much to perfect the practical workings of the theor}-" 
 which lies at the foundation of the reformed procedure. The 
 
 to completeness of each defence, Frazer 
 V. Frazer, 70 Ind. 411 ; Lash v. Rendell, 
 72 Ind. 475 ; and additional cases cited, 
 ante, under § * 608 ; as to effect of a de- 
 fence pleaded to one of two separate causes 
 of action, see Musser v. Cruni, 48 Iowa, 52. 
 [^But several breaclies of warranty by 
 the insured do not constitute separate de- 
 fences, and should all be pleaded as a 
 single defence : Hennessy v. Metropolitan 
 Life Ins. Co. (1902), 74 Conn. 699, 52 Atl. 
 490. The same is true where tlie defence 
 consists of a series of acts which together 
 constitute one transaction : Hovland v. 
 Burrows (1893), 38 Neh. 119, 56 N. W. 
 800.] 
 
 1 Qlackson v. Scliool District (1900), 110 
 la. 313, 81 N. W. 596; Douglass v. Ins. 
 Co. (1893), 138 N. Y. 209, 33 N. E. 938; 
 Simonds v. East Windsor Elec. Ky. Co. 
 (1900), 73 Conn. 513, 48 Atl. 210 ; Weston 
 V. Estey (189G), 22 Colo.^334, 45 Pac. 
 367; Harmau v. Harman (1899), 54 S. C. 
 100, 31 S. E. 881, quoting the text; Gil- 
 reath v. Furman (1900), 57 S. C. 289, 35 
 S. E. 516; Hindman V. Edgar (1888), 24 
 Ore. 581, 17 Pac. 862; Pate v. Alhson 
 (1901), 114 Ga. 651, 40 S. E. 715 (holding 
 that words of reference are ineffectual). 
 
 Statements made in one defence in a 
 verified pleading cannot he used as evi- 
 dence against the party upon issues ten- 
 dered by other defences : McDonald v. 
 Southern Cal. R. K. Co. (1894), 101 Cal. 
 206, 35 Pac. 643. But see Hopkins r. Dipert 
 (1902), 11 Okl. 630, 69 Pac. 883, where 
 the court said : " When a general denial 
 is sufficient to entitle a party to make a 
 complete defence to an action, it is not 
 good practice to attempt to set up a state 
 of facts on defence by way of a second 
 count, which can be proved under the gen- 
 eral denial; and unless such second de- 
 fence does contain averments of facts 
 which cannot be proven under the general 
 denial, and which amount to a defence, it 
 does not state facts sufficient to constitute 
 a defence to the action, and a demurrer 
 thereto should be sustained." Where 
 separate defences are not separately stated 
 the remedy is by motion : Seaton v. 
 Grimm (1899), 110 la. 145, 81 N. W. 225. 
 And an insufficient separate defence may 
 be stricken out on motion : Harman v. 
 Harman (1899), 54 S. C. 100, 31 S. E. 
 88I.3 
 
 - [^Gardner r. McWilliams (1902), 42 
 Ore. 14, 69 Pac. 915.]
 
 826 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 advocates of the common-law pleading have never ceased to urge 
 that it served to bring out and present to the jury for their de- 
 cision a single issue, — the affirmation and negation of a single 
 fact, the verdict upon which determined the entire controversy. 
 This theory is certainly very beautiful. We know, however, that 
 in practice the results were far different. Instead of this single 
 issue, in the actions of assumpsit, of debt on simple contract, and 
 of trover, the geneiid issue had come to be almost the only an- 
 swer used, and under it nearly ever}^ possible defence was admis- 
 .sible. This evil produced the reform of 1834 in England. That 
 reform consisted in limiting the effect of the general issue in 
 respect of the defences which could be admitted under it. All 
 matters in confession and avoidance were required to be specially 
 pleaded ; and many of the matters stated in the declaration, which 
 went to make up the cause of action, were required to be spe- 
 cifically denied by a separate traverse to each. To illustrate : In 
 the action of assumpsit, if the contract sued on was express, 
 the general issue of non-assumpsit only denied the making of the 
 contract, the promise ; if it was im[)lied, the same general issue 
 only denied the existence of the facts from which the promise 
 would by law be inferred. If the defendant desired to deny the 
 alleged breach, he was obliged to do so by a separate specific 
 denial, or " special traverse " as it was called. In this manner 
 the issues were made and kept single ; at least, if there were 
 several issues formed by the various traverses and pleas com- 
 prised in the same answer, each was single, — the affirmation and 
 negation of one material, issuable fact. Each " special traverse " 
 was a distinct plea by itself, and denied some averment in the 
 declaration which was necessary to the maintenance of the action, 
 so that, if the defendant was successful on any one traverse, he 
 defeated the entire recovery in respect to that cause of action. 
 This great reform undoubtedly restored the common-law system 
 of pleading somewhat to its original theory. 
 
 § 594. *718. Objections to the Code Answered. While a sim- 
 ilar condition of affairs was existing in this country, tlie Reformed 
 American Procedure was introduced with its radical changes, its 
 complete departure from the ancient notions. Enemies of the 
 system, both on the bench and at the bar, have constantly reiter- 
 ated tlie objection that it made no provision for the development 
 through the means of pleading, and for the presentiition to juries.
 
 UNION OF DEFENCES. 827 
 
 of single and separate issues of fact. No objection could be more 
 grossly unfounded. The common-law methods, as wrought out 
 by the courts, had certainly and notoriously failed to produce 
 that desired result ; and these objectors, when they assailed the 
 code and compared it with the former system, obstinately shut 
 their eyes to what that system actually did in its every -day work- 
 ing, and only repeated what the theorists asserted that it oiigld 
 to do. If the spirit and design of the code, as clearly shown 
 through all of its important clauses and sections, were accepted 
 and carried out by the courts and the profession, and if its plain 
 requirements were obeyed to the full extent of their meaning, the 
 very same beneficial results attained in England by the legislation 
 cind judicial action of 1834 would be accomplished wherever the 
 new procedure has been established. 
 
 § 595. * 719. Same Subject. It seems to me to be the evident 
 purpose of the codes that all issues of fact should be separated 
 and made single ; and that, if such a practice has not yet been 
 generally attained, it is because the rules prescribed by the statute 
 have been violated or ignored; in short, the fault cannot be 
 charged to the system itself. The codes expressly prescribe that 
 each defence must be separate and distinct, and must be so 
 .pleaded. In respect to defences of new matter, this requirement 
 is as precise and exacting as any rule of the common law.^ It is 
 the duty of courts to insist upon a compliance with this statutory 
 regulation, if juries are to be at all aided in their labors by the 
 issues as presented upon the records. To combine a defence of 
 accord and satisfaction, for example, with one of payment, is as 
 marked a violation of the new procedure as of the common-law 
 theory. Is there any different principle or rule in reference to 
 defences of denial? I answer. No. No such difference can be 
 pointed out in the statute itself ; and this fact alone is sufficient 
 to show the correctness of the answer. But the proof of its cor- 
 rectness is positive. The code permits a general denial which 
 controverts all the material allegations of the complaint or peti- 
 tion, and thus presents a broad issue, but still an issue which 
 
 1 See Rose v. Hurley, 39 Ind. 77, 81. been broken, and of fraudulent represen- 
 
 In an action upon a note given for the tations in respect to the article made by 
 
 price of an article sold by the plaintiff the seller. This defence was overruled 
 
 to the defendant, one defence of the an- on demurrer. The opinion of Downey J. 
 
 swer contained mingled allegations of a is valuable and instructive, 
 warranty given on the sale, which had
 
 828 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 is not incumbered with any mcitter by way of confession and 
 avoidance. The code also permits specific denials ; that is, a 
 separate denial of some material allegation of the complaint or 
 petition. These specific denials are identical in design and effect 
 with the special traverses j^rovided for hi/ the English rules of 1834. 
 Each specific denial should be an entire defence by itself, and 
 should be so pleaded, because it should be the denial of some 
 single, materiid, issuable matter averred in the complaint neces- 
 sary to the existence of the cause of action, so that, if sustained, 
 it would entirely defeat a recovery on that cause of action. As 
 the code requires each defence to be separately stated, it follows 
 that a specific denial should always constitute by itself a distinct 
 and complete defence, and should be pleaded in such form, as 
 much, so as any defence of new matter. If the true design and 
 intent of the code in this respect were fully carried out, two or 
 more specific denials could never be combined in one and the 
 same defence. The answer might contain several such denials, 
 but each would be stated as one entire, independent defence, dis- 
 tinct from all the others, and thus presenting one issue of fact, 
 arising from the averment of the complaint or petition and its 
 traverse.^ 
 
 § 596. * 720. Same Subject. If the mode of pleading thus de- 
 scribed should be generally adopted, —and it seems to be in 
 strict accordance with both the design and the requirements 
 of the codes, — the immediate result would be the forming of 
 single issues on the record for the consideration of the jury, de- 
 pending upon one afi&rmation and one negation, far more per- 
 fectly in the actual practice than was accomplished while the 
 ancient procedure remained in existence. The confused method 
 of pleading which h.is undoubtedly become too common, the fail- 
 ure to distinguish and extract the material issues from the over- 
 lying mass of useless details which frequently incumbers the 
 record, is, therefore, no fault of the codes ; it is rather in direct 
 opposition to their intent and their express enactments ; and it 
 has done far more than all other causes to diminish their useful- 
 ness, and to hinder tlie complete reform which they were desio-ned 
 
 1 QSee, however, Greenthal v. Liucolu, Act distinctly abandoned the professed 
 
 Seyms & Co. (1896), 67 Conu. .372, 35 Atl. aim of the common law to bring every 
 
 206, where Baldwin J., delivering the legal controversy to an issue upon some 
 
 opinion of tiie court, says : " The Practice single, certain, and material poiut.''^
 
 UNION OF DEFENCES. 829 
 
 to consummate. To whatever agency this partial failure is to be 
 attributed, one thing is certain, — that the courts have ample 
 power to remedy it, and to accomplish all the beneficial objects of 
 the new procedure which were looked for by its authors. 
 
 II. What Kinds of Defences may he joined in one Answer ; those 
 in Abatement, and those in Bar. 
 
 § 597, * 721. Defences in Abatement and in Bar may be joined 
 in one Answer. It is now settled, in direct opposition to the com- 
 mon-law rule, that defences which seek only to abate the particular 
 axjtion in which they are pleaded may be united with those which 
 seek to bar all recovery upon the cause of action.^ Being joined 
 in the same answer, they are to be tried and determined together 
 at the one trial. The only possible difficulty in the practical 
 operation of this rule arises from the different effects of a judg- 
 ment in favor of the defendant, rendered upon one or the other 
 of these classes of defences. As such a decision upon the former 
 class does not destroy the plaintiff's right of action, nor prevent 
 him from properly commencing and maintaining another suit for 
 the same cause, while a similar decision upon the latter class does 
 produce that final effect upon the right, and as by a general ver- 
 dict given for the defendant upon all the issues contained in the 
 record, and a judgment entered thereon, it might be difficult, and 
 perhaps impossible, to determine which of these results should 
 follow from the judgment thus pronounced, it is plain that, at 
 the trial of an action in which the answer unites the two kinds of 
 defence, the judge should carefully distinguish the issues arising 
 from them, and should submit them separately to the jury, and 
 direct a separate and special verdict upon each. By pursuing 
 this 'course, the record would show exactly the nature of the 
 decision, and of the judgment entered thereon. This mode of 
 procedure has been sanctioned by the highest courts. ^ 
 
 i QWhere facts are i<et up which go to Payson, 5 Sandf. 210; Freeman v. Car- 
 show a misjoinder but which also go to the penter, 17 Wis. 126; Thompson v. Green- 
 merits, the answer will not be held to wood, 28 Ind. 327 ; Bond v. Wagner, 28 
 raise the objection of misjoinder : Leavitt Ind. 462 ; Page v. Mitchell, 37 Minn. 368. 
 V. S. D. Mercer Co. (1902), 64 Neb. 31, 89 But see, per contra, Hopwood v. Pat- 
 N. W. 426.] terson, 2 Ore. 49; Fordyce v. Hathorn, 
 
 2 Sweet f. Tuttle, UN. Y. 465, 468; 57 Mo. 120; Cannon v. McMauu.s, 17 
 
 Gardner !:. Clark, 21 N. Y. 399 ; Mayhew Mo. 345 ; Rippstein v. St. Louis Mut. L. 
 
 V. Robinson, 10 How. Pr. 162; Bridge v. Ins. Co., 57 Mo. 86, wliich retain the
 
 830 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 598. * 722. Inconsistent Defences. Three different questions 
 are presented under this head : (1) Can inconsistent defences be 
 united in the same answer? (2) When are particular defences 
 inconsistent? (3) If a denial and a defence by way of confes- 
 sion and avoidance are joined, do the atlmissions of the latter over- 
 come the denials of the former, so that the plaintiff is relieved 
 from the necessity of proving the allegations denied ? Although 
 these questions are clearly distinct, yet the two former have 
 often if not generally been confounded in the same decisions, so 
 that it will be difficult to keep them entirely separate in the dis- 
 cussion without much repetition. [Assuming that tlie defences 
 are utterly inconsistent, the rule is probably established b}' the 
 weight of judicial authority, that, unless expressly prohibited by 
 the statute, they may still be united in one answer.^] It fol- 
 
 c'ommon-law rule, and liold that a defence 
 in abatement is waived l>y pleading mat- 
 ter in bar. The rule in Missouri is now 
 settled in accordance with the general 
 doctrine stated in the text; Little v. Har- 
 rington, 71 Mo. 390 ; Byler v. Jones, 79 Mo. 
 261 ; Young Men's Chr. Ass'n v. Dubach, 
 82 Mo. 47.5 ; Cohn v. Lehman, 9.3 Mo. .574 ; 
 Christian v. Williams (Mo. Supr. 1892), 20 
 S. VV. Hep. 96; Mclntire v. Calhoun, 27 Mo. 
 App. 513. In Gardner v. Clark, supra, 
 Selden J. said (p. 401 ) : " The only serious 
 inconvenience suggested as likely to result 
 from this construction of the code is, that 
 when an answer embraces both a defence 
 in abatement and one in bar, if the jury 
 find a general verdict, it will be impossible 
 to determine whether the judgment ren- 
 dered upon the verdict should operate as 
 a bar to another suit for the same cause 
 of action or not. It would, however, be 
 the duty of the judge at the circuit, in such 
 a case, to distinguish between the several 
 defences in suljuiitting the cause to tlie 
 jury, and to require them to find sepa- 
 rately upon these. In that way, it is 
 probable that the confusion which might 
 otherwise result may, in most cases, be 
 avoided. At all events, tlie code a<lmits, 
 I think, of no otlier construction." See 
 also Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651 ; 
 Hooker !-•. Green, 50 id. 271. In Indiana, 
 by Rev. -St. 1881, § 365, an answer in 
 abatement must precede, and cannot be 
 pleaded witii, an answer in riar. 
 
 [[Garretson v. Ferrall (1894), 92 la. 
 728, 61 N. W. 251 ; Union Guaranty Co. 
 V. Craddock (1894), 59 Ark. 593, 28 S. W. 
 424; Trigg r. Kay (1897), 64 Ark. 150,41 
 S. W. 55. Contra, Carmien v. Cornell 
 (1897), 148 Ind. 83, 47 N. E. 216. A plea 
 to the jurisdiction may be coupled with a 
 plea to the merits : Johnson v. Detrick 
 (1899), 152 Mo. 243, 53 S. W. 891. 
 
 It is lield in some States that a defend- 
 ant may plead and demur at the same 
 time to the same cause of action : Arizona, 
 l{ev. St. 1901, § 1350; Lamb v. Ward 
 (1894), 114 N. C. 255, 19 S. E. 230; Stahn 
 V. Catawba Mills (1898), 53 S. C. 519, 31 
 S. E. 498. But .see Fidelity & Deposit Co. 
 ('. Parkinson (1903), — Neb. — , 94 N. W. 
 120, holding that a demurrer is not a 
 proper part of an answer, and should be 
 disregarded.] 
 
 1 ^Inconsistent defences were allowed 
 in the following cases : Burns v. Chicago, 
 etc. Ky. Co. (1900), 110 la. 385. 81 N. W. 
 794; Thorson v. Baker (1898), 107 la. 49, 
 77 N. W. 510; Warshawky i'. Anchor Ins. 
 Co. (1896), 98 la. 221, 67 N. W. 237; 
 Kerslakc v. Mclnnis (1902). 113 Wis. 659, 
 89 N. W. 895; South Milwaukee Boule- 
 vard Co. V. Ilarte (1897), 95 Wi.s. 592. 70 
 N. W. 821 ; Societa Italiana r. Sulzer 
 (1893), 138 N. Y. 468, 34 N. E. 193 ; Law- 
 rence V. Peck (1893), 3 S. D. 645, 54 
 N. W. 808 ; Green v. Hughitt School Tp. 
 (1894), 5 S. D. 4.52, 59 N. W. 224; Pike 
 V. Sutton (1895), 21 Colo. 84, 39 I'ac.
 
 INCONSISTENT DEFENCES. 
 
 831 
 
 lows that the defendant cannot be compelled to elect between 
 such defences, nor can evidence in favor of either be excluded at 
 the trial on the ground of the inconsistency.^ [But a different 
 rule prevails in some States.^] 
 
 1084; Carlile v. The People (1899), 27 
 Colo. 116, 59 Pac. 48; Hill v. Groesbeck 
 (1901), 29 Colo. 161, 67 Pac. 167; Millan 
 V. Railway Co. (1899), 54 S. C. 485, 32 
 S. E. .539; Threadgill v. Commission- 
 ers (1895), 116 N. C. 616, 21 S. E. 425; 
 McLamb v. McPhail (1900), 126 N. C. 
 218, 35 S. E. 426; Upton v. Railroad Co. 
 (1901), 128 N. C. 173, 38 S. E. 736 (but 
 see Fayetteville Waterworks Co. v. Til- 
 linghast (1896), 119 N. C. 343, 25 S. E. 
 960); Miles y. Woodward (1896), 115 Cal. 
 308, 46 Pac. 1076; Bauta v. Siller (1898), 
 121 Cal. 414, 53 Pac. 935 (no difference 
 between verified and unverified pleadings 
 in this respect). 
 
 In Montana, in the case of Arnold v. 
 Passavant (1897), 19 Mont. 575, 49 Pac. 
 400, the court seemed to indicate a willing- 
 ness to allow inconsistent defences when 
 no prejudice would result, but it was only 
 by way of dictum. 
 
 In De Lissa v. Coal Co. (1898), 59 Kan. 
 319, 52 Pac. 886, the court said : " We are 
 aware that in actual practice objections 
 are often made and sustained to defences 
 in answers upon the ground that they are 
 inconsistent with each other. The ques- 
 tion of the validity of such objections has 
 seldom been presented to this court, and 
 no attempt has ever been made to declare 
 a general rule upon the subject. Only 
 the special facts of the cases presented 
 have been passed upon. However, con- 
 sidering the numerical weight of the 
 authorities, it would seem that the objec- 
 tion to defences in an answer upon the 
 ground of their inconsistency with each 
 other could never be sustained." The 
 court then quotes the text in support of 
 this proposition, and avoids the necessity 
 of committing itself by holding that in 
 the case at bar the defences pleaded were 
 not inconsistent. But see dictum of John- 
 son J., in Kansas Nat. Bank v. Quinton 
 (1897), 57 Kan. 750, 48 Pac. 20, suggesting 
 the other rule.] 
 
 1 Springer v. Dwyer, 50 N. Y. 19; 
 Buhne v. Corbett, 43 Cal. 264, which 
 
 holds directly that a defendant may plead 
 as many defences as he pleases. Each 
 must be consistent with itself, but need 
 not be consistent with the otliers ; and 
 there is no distinction in this respect 
 between verified and unverified answers. 
 Bell V. Brown, 22 Cal. 671 ; Willson v. 
 Cleaveland, 30 Cal. 192; Mott v. Burnett, 
 2 E. D. Smith, 50, 52; Hollenbeck v. 
 Clow, 9 How. Pr. 289 ; Butler v. Went- 
 worth, 9 How. Pr. 282, 17 Barb. 649; 
 Smith V. Wells, 20 How. Pr. 158, 167; 
 Vail V. .Jones, 31 Ind. 467 ; Crawford v. 
 Adams, Stanton's Code (Ky.), 91 ; Wes- 
 ton V. Lumley, 33 Ind. 486, 488. Sec also 
 People V. Lothrop, 3 Call, 428, 450; Moore 
 V. Willamette Co., 7 Ore. 355 ; Barr v. 
 Hack, 46 Iowa, 308 ; Wright v. Bacheller, 
 16 Kan. 259; Brace v. Burr, 67 N. Y. 
 237,240; Amador Cy. v. Butterfield, 51 
 Cal. 526; Billings v. Drew, 52 id. 565; 
 Citizens' Bank v. Closson, 29 Ohio St. 78 ; 
 Pavey v. Pavey, 30 id. 300 (defendant 
 may be compelled to elect) ; Stebbins v. 
 Lardner (.S. Dak. 1891), 48 N. W. Rep. 
 847; Hummel v. Moore (Colo.), 25 Fed. 
 Rep. 380; Reed v. Reed, 93 N. C. 462. 
 
 ^ Derby V. Gallup, 5 Minn. 119, 120, 
 an action for taking and carrying away 
 goods. The answer contained two de- 
 fences: 1. A general denial. 2. Admitted 
 the taking, and justified it under process. 
 The opinion of Atwater J. is very able, 
 and difficult to be answered on principle. 
 See also Cook v. Finch, 19 Minn. 407, 411 ; 
 Conway V. Wharton, 13 Minn. 158, 160; 
 Adams v. Trigg, 37 Mo. 141: "A party 
 cannot iuterpo.se a denial, and then avail 
 himself of a confession and avoidance ; "" 
 Atteberry v. Powell, 29 Mo. 429, a gen- 
 eral denial and justification in slander 
 held inconsistent; Fugate v. Pierce, 49 
 Mo. 441, 449 ; but compare Nelson v. 
 Brodhack, 44 Mo. 596, which holds that 
 denials and defences of confession and 
 avoidance are not necessarily inconsist- 
 ent; Auld V. Butcher, 2 Kan. 135; and 
 .see Baird v. Morford, 29 Iowa, 531, 534, 
 535. School District v. Holmes, 16 Neb.
 
 832 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 599. * 723. Same Subject. Ill many instances the courts 
 have simply declared that the particular defences united in 
 
 486, a general denial and a defence 
 of part payment, held inconsistent. The 
 following New York ciises, mostly at 
 Special Term, which hold that inconsist- 
 ent defences cannot be permitted, have 
 been expressly overruled by the more 
 recent ones in the same State cited above 
 in the preceding note. Koe v. Rogers, 8 
 How. Pr. 356 ; Schneider v. Schultz, 4 
 Sandf. 664 ; Arnold v. Dimon, 4 Sandf. 
 680. See also Mclntire i'. Wiegand, 24 
 Abb. N. Cas. 312 (denial of the making 
 of the contract sued on, and defence 
 that it was procured by plaintiff's fraud, 
 inconsistent, and the denial .should be 
 stricken out) ; Marx i\ Gro.<s, 58 N. Y. 
 Super. Ct. 221 (same). 
 
 [|The following cases have held that 
 inconsistent defences cannot be united in 
 the same answer : Hatch v. Thompson 
 (1895), 67 Conn. 74, 34 Atl. 770; Fern- 
 side I\ Rood (1900), 73 Conn. 83, 46 Atl. 
 275; Holliugsworth v. Waruuck (1901), 
 112 Ky. 96, 65 S. W. 163 ; Lane v. Bryant 
 (1896)", 100 Ky. 138, 37 S. W. 584; -Mur- 
 phy I'. Russell (1901), Idaho, 67 Pao. 421 
 (when they are mutually contradictory) ; 
 Steenerson v. Waterbury (1893), 52 Minn. 
 211, 53 N. W. 1146 ; " iJlodgett i: Mc- 
 Murty (1894), 39 Neb. 210. 57 N. W. 985; 
 Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Decker (1898), 55 
 Neb. .346, 75 N. W. 841 ; Columbia Nat. 
 Bank v. German Nat. Bank (1898), 56 
 Neb. 803, 77 N. W. 346 ; Oakes v. Zienier 
 (1900), 61 Neb. 6, 84 X. W. 409; Lam- 
 berton v. Shannon (1896), 13 Wash. 404, 
 43 Pac. 336 ; Allen v. Olympia Light & 
 Power Co. (1895), 13 Wash. 307, 43 Pac. 
 55; Seattle Nat. Bank ;•. Carter (1895), 
 13 Wash. 281, 43 Pac. 331 ; Davig v. Ford 
 <1896), 15 Wash. 107,45 Pac. 739; Lord 
 V. Horr (1902), 30 Wash. 477, 71 Pac. 23 ; 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. w. Carnahan (1900), 63 
 O. St. 258, 58 N. E. 805 (the test being 
 whether all can be verified by oath with- 
 out swearing fal.sely) ; Dwelling Hou.se 
 Ins. Co. V. Brewster (1895), 43 Neb. 528, 
 61 N. W. 746 ; State ex inf. v. Firemen's 
 Fund Ins. Co. (1899), 152 Mo. 1, 52 S. W. 
 595. 
 
 Oregon follows the same rule, and holds 
 that where denials and iifhrmative de- 
 
 fences, inconsistent with each other, are 
 united in the same answer, the direct ad- 
 missions contained in the affirmative de- 
 fences will be taken as true : Baines r. 
 Coos Bay Nav. Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 135, 
 68 Pac. 397 ; Randall r. Simmons (1902), 
 40 Ore. 554, 67 Pac. 513 ; Veasey v. Hum- 
 phreys (1895), 27 Ore. 515, 41 Pac. 8; 
 Maxwell v. BoUes (1895), 28 Ore. 1, 41 
 Pac. 661. In Veasey r. Humphreys 
 (supra), the court made the following 
 suggestion as to pleading deni.ils and 
 affirmative defences: "It often happens 
 that new matter directly alleged would be 
 inconsistent with an absolute traverse, so 
 that both could not be verified, and, in 
 such case, if the pleader desires to avail 
 himself of both defences, tliat is, to jiut 
 the opposing party to the proof of his 
 plea, and at the same time save to himself 
 an aflKrmative defence, it is essential that 
 the allegations of new matter should be 
 qualified, or el.se should be preceded by 
 a qualified traverse. These oljservatious 
 apply to such defences as are only appar- 
 ently inconsistent, but when clearly so it 
 is doubtful whether they can be pleaded 
 in the same answer." Tiie qualification 
 of the new matter should be as found in 
 the old precedents. " Thus, as found in 
 Cliitty, the contract to be avoided should 
 be alluded to as ' the said supposed con- 
 tract,' etc." 
 
 The test of inconsistency is whether 
 proof of one defence would tend to dis- 
 prove another: Robinson v. Hill (1902), 
 Ky., 66 S. W. 623 ; Smith v. Doherty 
 (1901 ), 109 Ky. 616, 60 S. W. .380 ; Cate r. 
 Hutchinson (1899), 58 Neb. 232, 78 N. W. 
 500; People's Nat. Bank v. Geisthardt 
 (1898), 55 Neb. 232, 75 N. W. 582; Mur- 
 phy I'. Russell (1901), Idaho, 67 Pac. 421. 
 A motion requiring defendant to elect 
 upon which defence he will go to trial, is 
 the proper method of objecting to incon- 
 sistent defences; Lane v. Bryant (1896), 
 100 Ky. 138, 37 S. W. 584 ; Holliugsworth 
 r. Warnock (1901 ), — Ky. — , 65 S. W. 
 163 ; Dunn r. Bozarth (1899), 59 Neb. 244. 
 80 N. W. 811 ; Davis ?•. Ford (1896), 15 
 Wash. 107, 45 Pac. 739 (motion to strike 
 out) ; De Lissa >: Coal Co. (1898), 59
 
 INCONSISTENT DEFENCES. 
 
 833 
 
 the answers before them were not in fact inconsistent, and have 
 not passed upon the question in its general form. In many of 
 these cases, however, the defences were apparently as inconsistent 
 as those which have been rejected by other courts in the decisions 
 last quoted. I have placed in the foot-note a number of examples, 
 and have indicated the nature of the defences thus suffered to be 
 united.! 
 
 Kan. 319, 52 Pac. 886; McCormick Harv. 
 Mach. Co. V. Hiatt (1903), — Neb. — , 95 
 N. W. 627. 
 
 If no motion is made tlie objection will 
 be deemed waived : Dunn v. Bogarth 
 (1899), 59 Neb. 244, 80 N. W. 811. Such 
 a motion comes too late after filing a re- 
 ply : Vernon v. Union Life Ins. Co. (1899), 
 58 Neb. 494, 78 N. W. 929. " Where in- 
 consistent defences are pleaded, and one 
 is eliminated by an instruction, plain- 
 tiff cannot complain : " Green v. Tierney 
 (1901), 62 Neb. 561. 87 N. W.SSl.] 
 
 1 Nelson v. Brodhack, 44 Mo. 596, ac- 
 tion of ejectment, general denial, and 
 Statute of Limitations ; holds that gen- 
 eral denial and confession and avoidance 
 are not necessarily inconsistent, and over- 
 rules Bauer i'. Wagner, 39 Mo. 385 ; and 
 see McAdow v. Ross, .53 Mo. 199, 202; 
 Cavitt V. Tharp, 30 Mo. App. 131, action 
 on a note, denial of plaintiffs ownership, 
 and payment ; Schuchman v. Heath, 38 
 Mo. App. 280, action on a note, denial 
 of execution, and Statute of Limitations ; 
 Kelly V. Bernheimer, 3 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 140, the court will not compel an election 
 between defences " unless they are so far 
 inconsistent that both cannot properly co- 
 exist in the same transaction ; " Kellogg 
 V. Baker, 15 Abb. Pr. 286, a general de- 
 nial, Statute of Limitations, and release, 
 are not inconsistent ; Lansing v. Parker, 
 9 How. Pr. 288, in assault and battery, a 
 general denial, self-defence, and defence 
 of possession of land, are not inconsistent ; 
 Ostrom V. Bixby, 9 How. Pr. 57, denial 
 and Statute of Limitations ; Ormsby v. 
 Douglas, 5 Duer, 665, slander, denial, and 
 justification ; Hackley v. Ogmun, 10 How. 
 Pr. 44, action to recover possession of 
 chattels, general denial, and a justification 
 of the taking; Booth v. Sherwood, 12 
 Minn. 426, trespass to lands ; answer, 
 (1) denies title, and (2) license; Steener- 
 
 son V. Waterbury (Minn. 1893), 53 N. W. 
 Rep. 1146, action for services rendered; 
 answer, general denial, and payment ; 
 Pike V. King, 16 Iowa, 49, general denial 
 and set-off ; Willson v. Cleaveland, 30 Cal. 
 192, ejectment, denial of title, and Statute 
 of Limitations. 
 
 [Additional instances of defences held 
 not to be inconsistent are found in the 
 following cases : George Fowler, Sons & 
 Co. V. Brooks (1902), 65 Kan. 861, 70 Pac. 
 — : general denial and contributory neg- 
 ligence; Leavenworth Light, etc. Co. v. 
 Waller (1902), 65 Kan. 514, 70 Pac. 365 : 
 same; Pugh v. Oregon Imp. Co. (1896), 
 14 Wash. 331, 44 Pac. 689: same; Lord 
 V. Horr (1902), 30 Wash. 477, 71 Pac. 23 : 
 in a suit for reformation, that the deed 
 expressed the contract and that there was 
 such a mutual mistake as entitled defend- 
 ant to rescind; Gates v. Avery (1901), 
 112 Wis. 271, 87 N. W. 1091: same; 
 Kline v. Hanke (1894), 14 Mont. 361, 36 
 Pac. 454: in an action for rent, eviction 
 by plaintiff and that defendants were only 
 tenants from month to month ; Blodgett 
 V. McMurty (1894), 39 Neb. 210, 57 N. W. 
 985 : general denial and estoppel ; Home 
 Fire Ins. Co. y. Decker (1898), 55 Neb. 
 346, 75 N. W. 841 : failure to furnish 
 proofs of loss and that plaintiff caused 
 premises to be burned ; Gate v. Hutchinson 
 (1899), 58 Neb. 232, 78 N. W. 500: gen- 
 eral denial and unreasonable and unjust 
 account; Corbitt v. Harrington (1896), 14 
 Wash. 197, 44 Pac. 132 : a denial of knowl- 
 edge or information as to the execution 
 of a guaranty and fraud in its execu- 
 tion, if it was executed ; Booco v. Mans- 
 field (1902), 66 O. St. 121, 64 N. E. 115: 
 denial of execution and })lea of no consid- 
 eration ; Smith v. Doherty ( 1901), 109 Ky. 
 616, 60 S. W. 380: same; First Nat. Bank 
 V. Wisdom's Ex'rs (1901) ; 111 Ky. 13.5,63 
 S. W. 461 : same; Spencer r. Society of 
 53
 
 834 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 ^ 600. * 724. Effect of Admissions in One Defence upon Issues 
 Raised in Another. When a denial is pleaded in connection with 
 a defence of new matter, or two defences of new matter are set 
 np, the admissions in the one can never be used to destroy the 
 effect of the other. The concessions of a defence by way of con- 
 fession and avoidance do not obviate the necessity of proving the 
 averments contradicted by the denial.^ This rule is universal. 
 Even in those States where inconsistent defences are not per- 
 mitted to stand, the remedy is by striking out, or by compelling 
 an election, and not by using the admissions of one to destroy the 
 issues raised by the other.^ 
 
 § 601. * 725. Facts Pleaded as both Defence and Counter-Claim. 
 When the facts stated in an answer constitute both a defence and 
 a counter-claim, and are not twice pleaded in separate divisions, 
 but are alleged only once with a proper demand for relief as in a 
 
 Shakers (1901 ),Ky., 64 S. W. 468: same; 
 Hausman v. Mulherau (1897), 68 Minn. 48, 
 70 X. AV. 866: an admission of rent due 
 and a counter-claim for repairs made; 
 Robinson v. Hill (1902), Kv., 66 S. W. 
 623 : breach of warranty and settlement ; 
 Fisher v. Stevens (1898), 143 Mo. 181, 44 
 S. W. 769 : in ejectment, a general denial 
 and an equitable defence that defendant 
 purchased the laud at a trustee's sale ; De 
 Lissa V. Coal Co. : general denial of con- 
 tract and fraud ; Bank of Glencoe v. Cain 
 (1903), 89 Minn. 473, 95 N. W. 308; same. 
 In the following cases the defences were 
 held inconsistent : Omaha Fire Ins. Co. j;. 
 Dierks (1895), 43 Neb. 473, 61 N. W. 
 745 : that the policy was not in force at 
 the time of tiie loss and want of notice of 
 loss; HoUingsworth v. Warnock (1901), 
 112 Ky. 96, 65 S. W. 163 : accidental shoo^ 
 ing and shooting in self-defence ; Lane v. 
 Bryant (1896), 100 Ky. 138,37 S. W. 584 : 
 denial of speaking slanderous words and 
 justification; Baines r. Coos Bay Xav. Co. 
 (1902), 41 Ore. 135,68 Pac. 397: denial 
 of execution of note arid allegations that 
 it was executed in pursuance of a fraudu- 
 lent conspiracy; Davis v. Ford (1896), 15 
 Wash. 107, 45 Pac. 739: an affirmative 
 defence admitting a contract and a de- 
 rial of the same; Dwelling House Ins. 
 Co. i\ Brewster (1895), 43 Neb. 528, 61 
 N. W. 746 : denial and waiver, estoppel or 
 avoidance.] 
 
 1 [^See, however, Hamill v. Ct)peland 
 (1899), 26 Colo. 178, 56 Pac. 901, where a 
 defence of new matter was held to relieve 
 the plaintiff from proving a contract 
 Avhich defendant had denied in another 
 defence. And in several of those States 
 where inconsistent defences are not al- 
 lowed, the force of a denial inconsistent 
 with an admission is destroyed by the 
 latter. 
 
 In Lamberton v. Shannon (1896), 13 
 Wash. 404, 43 Pac. 336, it was held that 
 a general denial, "except as herein ex- 
 pressly admitted, explained or qualified," 
 will, in the absence of anything restricting 
 the application of such qualification, apply 
 to an afiirmative defence pleaded in the 
 same answer, and the force of the denial 
 will be limited by the averments of new 
 matter there contained.] 
 
 - Quigley i-. Merritt, 1 1 Iowa, 147 ; 
 Shannon v. Pearson, 10 Iowa, 588 ; Grash 
 V. Sater, 6 Iowa, 301 ; Siter v. Jewett, 33 
 Cal. 92 ; Nudd v. Thompson, 34 Cal. 39, 
 47 ; Buhne v. Corbett, 43 Cal. 264. See 
 Venice r. Breed, 65 Barb. 597, 603, per 
 Mullin J. See also Amador Cy. v. But- 
 terfield, 51 Cal. 526; Billings v. Drew, 
 52 id. 565; Lawrence v. Peck (S. Dak. 
 1893), 54 N. W. Bep. 808. 
 
 I3i:)ougla.ss V. Ins. Co. (1893). 138 N. Y. 
 209, 33 N. E. 938; Church v. Pearne 
 (1903), 75 Conn. 350, 53 Atl. 955.]
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 835 
 
 counter-claim, the defect, if any, can only be reached by motion. 
 If not so remedied, the defendant may at the trial rely upon the 
 answer in both of its aspects.^ 
 
 SECTION SIXTH. 
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM, SET-OFF, CROSS-COMPLAINT, AND CROSS- 
 DEMAND. 
 
 § 602. * 726. Statutory Provisions. Two Groups. Special Pro- 
 visions of Indiana and low^a Codes. Similarity of Code Provisions. 
 
 A reference to the statutory provisions collected at the com- 
 niencement of section first of this chapter shows that some im- 
 portant differences exist among the various codes in respect to 
 the matters stated in the above title. Most of the codes may 
 be separated into two groups, each following a certain w^ell- 
 defined type. The first group contains those which provide for 
 a " counter-claim," and for no other sort of cross-demand, and 
 which adopt the following formula in defining it : " The counter- 
 claim must be one existing in favor of a defendant and against a 
 plaintiff between whom a several judgment might be had in the 
 action, and arising out of one of the following causes of action: 
 1. A cause of action arising out of tlie contract or transaction 
 set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's 
 claim, or connected with the subject of the action ; 2. In an 
 action arising on contract, any other cause of action arising also 
 on contract, and existing at the commencement of the action." ^ 
 
 1 Lancaster, O., Man. Co. w. Colgate, 12 - [[Northern Trust Co. v. Hiltgen 
 Ohio St. 344; but per contra, see Camp- (1895), 62 Minn. .361, 64 N. W. 909: A 
 bell V. Routt, 42 Ind. 410, 415, which holds counter-claim to be admi.«sible under G. S. 
 that the .same pleading cannot be both a 1894, § 5237, subd. 2, must exist in favor of 
 " defence" and a counter-claim ; if it pur- a defendant and against a plaintiff at the 
 ports to be a counter-claim, and sets up a time the action is commenced. And fur- 
 cause of action, and prays for relief, the ther, such demand is not available as a 
 defendant cannot treat it as a defence in counter-claim when it is acquired by de- 
 bar merely. fendaut long after the insolvency of the 
 
 [^See Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Hunter party against whom it exists. Wigmore 
 (1899), 35 Ore. 188, 57 Pac. 424, where c. Buell (1897), 116 Cal. 94, 47 Pac. 927: 
 the court intimates the opinion that Hill's In an action of ejectment to recover cer- 
 Ann. Laws, § 73, giving defendant the tain lands, defendant cannot plead a coun- 
 right to set forth as many defences as he ter-claim for damages to an adjacent tract 
 may have, applies to matters which are of land owned by him, caused by plain- 
 defensive only, and does not sanction join- tiff's cattle running upon the said tract, 
 ing a counter-claim with other defences.] Said action for damages neither arises out
 
 836 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 The second group embraces those in which the " counter-claim " 
 is substantially identical with the first subdivision of the section 
 just quoted, and in which a "set-off" is also defined in substan- 
 tial agreement with the second subdivision. The following are 
 the formulas adopted in this group : " The counter-claim must 
 be one existing in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff 
 between whom a several judgment might be had in the action, 
 and arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the 
 complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or con- 
 nected with the subject of the action." " A set-off can only be 
 pleaded in actions founded on contract, and must be a cause 
 of action arising upon contract, or ascertained by a decision of 
 the court." The codes of Indiana and of Iowa cannot be re- 
 ferred to either of these two general groups : their provisions 
 are quite different in language from the common type, and much 
 broader in meaning. They will be found quoted at large in sec- 
 tion first of this chapter.^ In several of the States a special pro- 
 vision is made for the introduction of new parties made necessary 
 by the pleading of a " counter-claim " or " set-off." ^ The counter- 
 claim in the ordinary form must be in favor of a defendant and 
 against a plaintiff between whom a several judgment on the ac- 
 tion is possible. This requirement, as will be seen in the sequel, 
 may sometimes fail of working complete justice between the par- 
 ties. Thus, for example, when a surety is sued, and a cross- 
 demand against the plaintiff exists in favor of the principal debtor, 
 the surety cannot interpose this claim because it is not in his own 
 favor. To obviate this and similar difficulties, the codes of In- 
 diana and of Iowa have added special provisions covering the class 
 of cases described, and authorizing one defendant, under certain 
 specified circumstances, to avail himself of a counter-claim or set- 
 
 of the transaction nor is it connected with N. C: 561, 32 S. E. 889. See also Kirby 
 
 the subject of the action. v. Jameson (1896), 9 S. D. 8,67 N. W. 
 
 The counter-claim is the creature of 854; Gurske v. Kelpin (1901), 61 Neb. 
 
 the code, and the code provides for it in 517, 85 N. W. 557 ; Bank of Arkansas City 
 
 two cases, (1) a cause of action arisinpj v. Hasie (1897), 57 Kan. 754, 48 Pac. 22.] 
 out of the transaction set forth by plaintiff ^ See su}>ra, §§ * 583, * 584. 
 
 or connected with the subject of the ac- ^ gee supra, § * 584 (n.), where these 
 
 tioii, (2) in an action on contract, any sections of the statutes are given in full, 
 
 other contract existing at the commence- The New York Code of Civil Procedure 
 
 ment of the action. This limitation as to provides (§501) that "the counter-claim 
 
 existence at the commencement of the mu.st tend, in .some way, to diminish or 
 
 action applie.s only to the second class : defeat the plaintiff's recovery." 
 Piedmout Bank v. Wilson (1899), 124
 
 COUNTEIi-CLAIM. 837 
 
 off existing in favor of a co-defendant, when the liability of both 
 to the plaintiff is joint, or one is a surety for the other.^ From a 
 comparison of the various clauses above quoted or referred to, it 
 is plain that the judicial decisions giving a construction to the 
 sections of the codes embraced in the first and second groups can 
 all be used in constructing the full theory of the " counter-claim " 
 which forms so marked and important an element in the new pro- 
 cedure. In all these States, the " counter-claim " singly, or the 
 " counter-claim " and " set-off " taken together, are not only the 
 same in substance, but are defined in almost exactly the same 
 language, so that the interpretation given by the courts of one 
 State can aid in determining the questions which may arise in 
 another. The decisions made in Indiana and Iowa, however, 
 must to a certain extent stand by themselves; for they are based 
 upon statutes which are in many respects special in their terms, 
 and different in their meaning. 
 
 § 603. * 727. Arrangement of Subject-Matter for Discussion. 
 The subject-matter of this section will be arranged in the fol- 
 lowing order, and distributed into the following subdivisions: 
 I. A general description of the "counter-claim," its nature, 
 objects, and uses. II. The parties in their relations with the 
 counter-claim ; including the requirements that the demand must 
 be, 1. In favor of the defendant who pleads it; and 2. Against 
 the plaintiff; and, 3. When it may be set up in favor of one or 
 some of several defendants or against one or some of several 
 plaintiffs ; that is, when a several judgment may be had in the 
 action between such defendant and plaintiff. III. The subject- 
 matter of the counter-claim, or, in other words, the nature of the 
 causes of action which may be pleaded as counter-claims. This 
 most important subdivision will include several heads: viz., 
 1. Whether a counter-claim must be a legal claim for damages, 
 — like the set-off or the recoupment of the former system, — or 
 whether it may be for equitable or other special relief; 2. When 
 the counter-claim is, or is alleged to be, a cause of action arising 
 out of the contract set forth in the complaint or petition as the 
 foundation of the plaintiff's claim ; 3. When it is, or is alleged 
 to be, a cause of action arising out of the transaction set forth 
 in the complaint or petition as the foundation of the plaintiff's 
 claim ; 4. When it is, or is alleged to be, a cause of action 
 
 1 See supra, § *584 (n.), for these sections in full.
 
 838 CIVIL EEMEDIES. 
 
 connected with the subject of the action. The discussion of these 
 topics will require the special examination and interpretation of 
 certain phrases and clauses of the statute, upon the true meaning 
 of which they all to a great extent depend : namely, («) the in- 
 terpretation of "the foundation of the plaintiff's claim," or when 
 is a contract or transaction "the foundation of the plaintiff's 
 claim "? (6) interpretation of "arising out of," or when does a 
 cause of action "arise out of" a contract or transaction? (c) 
 interpretation of "transaction," (c?) and of "subject of the 
 action;" (e) and of "connected with the subject of the action," 
 or when is a cause of action "connected with the subject of 
 the action"? Resuming the statement of subordinate heads: 
 5. In actions founded on contract, a counter-claim founded on 
 another contract, which embraces in particular (a) the power of 
 electingf between actions in form founded on contract and those 
 in form founded on tort ; and (h} the requirement that the cause 
 of action must exist at the time when the suit was commenced. 
 IV. Set-off as defined in several of the codes. V. Certain mis- 
 cellaneous rules applicable to all counter-claims and set-offs. 
 VI. The special provisions found in the codes of certain States, 
 and especially in those of Indiana and of Iowa. VII. The reply. 
 This arrangement, although perhaps not strictly scientific, is in 
 exact conformity with the order pursued by the statute, and is, 
 therefore, the one best adapted for our present purpose. A full 
 discussion of all the topics mentioned will certainly cover the 
 whole ground, and will develop the complete theory of the 
 "counter-claim" as it appears in the codes. 
 
 § 604. * 728. Couuter-Claim to be compared -with Cross-Demands 
 of Former System. It will materially aid in determining the exact 
 province and scope of the counter-claim if we compare it with 
 the cross-demands in legal actions permitted by the former 
 system of procedure. I shall therefore, by way of preface, 
 and without going into unnecessary details, state the funda- 
 mental principles upon which those cross-demands were based, 
 and the general rules which governed their use. 
 
 § 605. * 729. The Cross-Demands Allowed by the Former Pro- 
 cedure. The cross-demands in legal actions allowed by the former 
 procedure were "set-off " and " recoupment of damages." Origi- 
 nally the common law acknowledged no such defence or pro- 
 ceeding on the part of a defendant: the primitive notion of an
 
 SET-OFF. 839 
 
 action did not admit the possibility of a defendant being an actor 
 and interposing a claim against the plaintiff to be tried in the 
 one suit. The legislature effected the change, and invented the 
 *' set-off."^ Being entirely of statutory origin, the "set-off," 
 when used in actions at law, was necessarily kept within the 
 limits prescribed by the terms of the enactment, and was not 
 extended beyond their fair import. The court of chancery, not 
 acting directly in pursuance of this legislation, but being guided 
 rather by its analogies, was never restricted to its exact provi- 
 sions, and created an "equitable set-off " broader and more com- 
 prehensive than that administered by the courts of law. The 
 original English statute permitted a set-off only in the case of 
 mutual "debts." As this word had a well-known technical 
 meaning in the legal procedure, it served to restrict the use 
 of the set-off to the single class of demands which were at the 
 common law described by the term "debt; " namely, those which 
 arise from contract, and are fixed and certain in their amount. 
 There could not, therefore, be a set-off of general " damages " 
 resulting from the breach of contracts, but only of those claims, 
 the amount of which had been ascertained and settled by the 
 promise itself, so that there could be no discretion in the jury, 
 and no "assessment" by them. Tliis original notion of the set- 
 off was generally perpetuated in the legislation of the various 
 States prior to the Codes of Procedure; although in some its 
 scope had been enlarged, and made to embrace any pecuniary 
 demand arising from contract, whether "debt" or "damages." 
 Where the original notion was preserved, the exact language 
 of the English statute was not always retained; but its force 
 and effect were not materially changed. I have given in the 
 note an abstract of the New York statute as an example of the 
 legislation, since it does not substantially differ from that of 
 other States.^ 
 
 1 (^Gen. Elec. Co. v. Williams (1898), own right, as being the original creditor 
 
 123 N. C. 51, 31 S. E. 288-3 or ^^ being the assignee and owner. 3. It 
 
 - 2 R. S. p. 354, § 18, p. 335, §§ 21, must be for the price of real estate or 
 
 22; 2 Edm. Stat, at Large, p. 3G5, § 18, personal property sold, or for money 
 
 p. 367, §§ 21, 22. The defendant may paid, or for services done; or, if not one 
 
 set off demands which he has against the of these, the amount must be liquidated, 
 
 plaintiff in the following cases : 1. It must or be capable of being ascertained by 
 
 arise upon a judgment or upon a contract, computation. 4. It mu.st have existed 
 
 express or implied, sealed or unsealed, at the time of the commencement of the 
 
 2. It must be due to the defendant in his suit, and must then have belonged to the
 
 840 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 § 606. * 730. Discussion of New York Statute of Set-ofiF. It is 
 not necessary to discuss this statute, nor to cite cases illustrat- 
 ino- its meaning. It has been dispLaced by the more compre- 
 hensive provisions of the code. It is clear that if the plaintiff's 
 action was on a contract and for a "debt," — for the more ex- 
 tended language of the statute describes only a "debt," — and 
 the defendant held another " debt " due from the plaintiff per- 
 sonally, and existing in his own favor, and which did so erist at 
 the commencement of the action, he could plead such demand as 
 a set-off; and if it exceeded the amount of the plaintiff's claim, 
 he could have judgment against the plaintiff for the surplus. 
 Also in an action for the same kind of demand, brought by a 
 plaintiff who had really assigned the claim, and was therefore a 
 nominal party only, or brought by a plaintiff who was a trustee, 
 or sued on behalf of another person, or brought by an assignee of 
 negotiable paper transferred after it became due, the defendant 
 
 defendant. 5. The action itself must be 
 founded upon a similar demand wliicli 
 could itself be a set-off. 6. If there are 
 several defendants, the demand must 
 be due to them jointly. 7. It must be a 
 demand existing against the plaintiff in 
 the action, unless the suit be brought in 
 the name of a plaintiff who has no real 
 interest in the contract upon which the 
 suit is founded ; in which case no set-off 
 of a demand against tlie plaintiff shall be 
 allowed, unless as hereinafter specified. 
 It will be remembered, that, when this 
 statute was passed, things in action were 
 not generally assignable, so that an ac- 
 tion could be maintained by the assignee 
 as plaintiff : if actually transferred, the 
 action was brought in the name of the as- 
 signor as nominal plaintiff; while the 
 real owner — the assignee — was not a 
 party to the record. But full transfers 
 were permitted in the case of negotiable 
 paper : the succeeding subdivisions pro- 
 vide for the special circumstances arising 
 when there has been an assignment. 
 8. In an action on a contract not negoti- 
 able, which has been assigned by the 
 plaintiff (the plaintiff, therefore, being a 
 nominal party, and having no real in- 
 terest), a demand existing against such 
 plaintiff, or against the a.ssignee, at the 
 time of tlie assignment, and belonging to 
 the defendant before notice of tlie a.ssigu- 
 
 ment, may be set off to the amount of the 
 plaintiff's demand (that is, the demand 
 sued upon). 9. If the action is on negoti- 
 able paper, assigned to the plaintiff after 
 it became due, the defendant's demand 
 against tlie assignor thereof may be set 
 off to the amount of the claim in suit. 
 10. If the plaintiff is a trustee, or if he has 
 no real interest in the suit, the defendant's 
 demand against the person beneficially 
 interested may be set off to the amount of 
 the claim in suit. In all of these latter 
 cases, the defendant's demand, in order 
 to be a set-off, must fall within the de- 
 scription given in the former subdivisions. 
 If the amount of the set-off as established 
 equals the plaintiff's demand, the judg- 
 ment shall be rendered that the plaintiff 
 take nothing by his action ; if it be less, 
 the plaintiff shall have judgment for the 
 residue only. K there be found a balance 
 due to the defendant, judgment shall 
 be rendered for the defendant for the 
 amount thereof ; except that no such 
 judgment shall be rendered against the 
 plaintiff when the contract upon which 
 the suit is founded shall have been as- 
 signed before the commencement of the 
 suit, nor when the balance is due from any 
 other person than the plaintiff in the 
 action. QSteck r. C. F. &I. Co. (1894). 142 
 N. Y. 2.36, ^7 N. E. 1 ; Bennett v. Edisou 
 Elec. Co. (1900), 1G4 N. Y. 131, 58 N. E. 7.
 
 RECOUPMENT OF DAMAGES. 841 
 
 might set off a similar kind of demand which he had against 
 either the assignor or the assignee in the first case before notice 
 of the assignment, or against the beneficiary in the second case^ 
 or against the assignor in the third case; but he could not by 
 such set-off do more than defeat the plaintiff's recovery: he 
 could not have a judgment for any balance due to himself. The 
 reason for this latter rule is very plain ; for in neither of these 
 cases was the plaintiff the real ]party in interest and the debtor at 
 the same time. 
 
 § 607. * 731. Origin of Set-off and Recoupment. Resemblances 
 and Dissimilarities. While set-off was entirely of statutory origin, 
 the doctrine and practice of " recoupment of damages " had their 
 inception in the law of judicial decision. From the notion of 
 absolute non-performance as a total defence, the progress w^as 
 easy and natural, through the partial defences of a part per- 
 formance and a reduction of damages by means of unskilful or 
 negligent performance, to the admission of a cross-demand in 
 favor of the defendant for damages resulting from the acts or 
 omissions of the plaintiff that amounted to a breach of the con- 
 tract sued upon. In this manner the doctrine of recoupment 
 took its rise, and it was developed by decision after decision 
 until it became established in the courts of England and of 
 the American States, — a defence as well known and as widely 
 admitted within its scope as the statutory set-off. There were 
 resemblances and dissimilarities between these two defences. 
 Both were confined to actions upon contract, and must them- 
 selves arise from contract; but here the resemblance ends. A 
 set-off must be for a debt, a fixed certain sum, at least capable 
 of being ascertained by computation: recoupment was of dam- 
 ages, often entirely unliquidated, and depending upon an assess- 
 ment by a jury. A set-off was necessarily a demand arising upon 
 a different contract from the one in suit : recoupment was neces- 
 sarily of damages resulting from a breach of the very same contract 
 sued upon. In set-off the defendant might sometimes recover a 
 balance from the plaintiff: in recoupment this could never be 
 done.-' The doctrine may be summarily stated. In an action 
 upon a contract to recover either liquidated or unliquidated 
 damages or a debt, the defendant might set up by way of de- 
 fence and recoup the damages suffered by himself from any 
 
 1 nSt. Louis Nat. Bank v. Gay (1894), 101 Cal. 2SC, 35 Pac 87G.]
 
 842 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 breach by the plaintiff of the same contract. At an early period 
 it was supposed that only damages arising from the plaintiff's 
 fraud in inducing the defendant to enter into the contract, or in 
 executing the same, could be recouped ; but it was subsequently 
 settled that fraud was not a necessary element, and that any 
 breach by the plaintiff of the same contract which he makes the 
 basis of his action would admit the defence of recoupment. The 
 rule was stated in the following manner in a case which arose a 
 short time before the new system of procedure was adopted : " It 
 cannot be denied, consistently with the doctrine now well estab- 
 lished, but that, in an action for a breach of contract, the de- 
 fendant may show that the plaintiff has not performed the same 
 contract on his part, and may recoup his damages for such breach 
 in the same action, whether they were liquidated or not, or may 
 at his election bring a separate action." ^ Recoupment was, how- 
 ever, used solely as a defence : it could do no more than defeat 
 the plaintiff's recovery; even though the defendant's damages 
 should exceed those proved by the plaintiff, he could have no 
 judgment for the surplus. ^ 
 
 § 608. * 732. Illustrations of Recoupment. The nature, scope, 
 and intent of the doctrine may be illustrated by a statement of 
 some familiar instances in which recoupment was used; and it 
 will be readily seen in all of thera that the defendant's demand 
 was based upon a breach of the contract which was the founda- 
 tion of the action, although often of other stipulations or cove- 
 nants in that agreement than the one which it was alleged he 
 himself had broken. Thus, in an action brought to recover the 
 price of land, the defendant could recoup the damages arising 
 from the plaintiff's fraudulent representations concerning the 
 land, by which he had been induced to enter into the con- 
 tract ; ^ and in an action for the price of goods sold, damages 
 resulting from the plaintiff's breach of a warranty on the sale ; "* 
 and in an action for services, damages from the negligent or un- 
 skilful manner of their performance ; ^ and in an action on a lease 
 for rent or use and occupation, damages from the plaintiff's breach 
 
 1 Mayor, etc. of N. Y. v. Mabie, 1-3 * Reab «. McAlister, 8 "Wend. 109. 
 
 N. Y. 151, 153,per Denio J. ; and seeBat- « Rlanchard v. Ely, 21 Wend. 342; 
 
 terman u. Pierce, 3 Hill, 171 ; Murden v. Sickels r. Patti.son, U Wend. 257 ; Still >: 
 
 Priment, 1 Hilt. 75. Hall, 20 Wend. 51 ; Ives i-. Van Epps, 22 
 
 2 Sickels V. Patti.«on, 14 Wend. 257. Wend. 155. 
 * Van Kpi)s v. Harrison, 5 Hill, 63.
 
 KECOUPMEXT OF DAMAGES. 843 
 
 of a covenant to repair, or covenant for quiet enjoyment;^ or 
 damages from the plaintiff's fraud in inducing defendant to enter 
 into the lease. '^^ But recoupment is confined to damages from a 
 breach of the contract sued on.^ The same doctrine, which has 
 thus far been illustrated exclusively from New York cases, pre- 
 vailed in the other States to the same extent, and perhaps, in 
 some of them, had even a' wider application. A very few ex- 
 amples will suffice. In an action upon a promissory note, the 
 answer alleging that the note was given by the defendant for 
 the price of the plaintiff's services in constructing and mounting 
 a water-wheel, and that the work was done and the wheel made 
 and mounted in a very negligent and unskilful manner, to the 
 defendant's damage, was held to state a proper case for a re- 
 coupment of defendant's damages ; * and in an action upon a 
 sealed agreement to recover an amount due for certain sawing 
 done by the plaintiff in pursuance thereof, and also damages 
 from the defendant's failure to furnish the stipulated number of 
 logs to be sawed, damages arising from the plaintiff's breach of 
 other covenants were recouped;^ and damages from the plain- 
 tiff's failure to build according to the specifications were per- 
 mitted to be recouped in an action for the price. ^ In Indiana, 
 where the defendant had given a note for the purchase-price of 
 land sold him by the payee, and the latter had afterwards wrong- 
 fully entered upon the land and taken and converted the growing 
 crops, it was held in an action upon the note that the damages 
 resulting from these wrongful acts of the plaintiff could not 
 be recouped, since they were independent trespasses, and not 
 breaches of the contract." The doctrine was applied in Missouri 
 to the following facts : The action was brought to recover rent 
 of a farm leased to defendant by a verbal agreement: the an- 
 swer set up, that, by further provisions of the same contract, 
 the plaintiff" stipulated to build and maintain a fence between the 
 premises leased and other land occupied by himself; that he neg- 
 lected to build the fence, and, by reason of his neglect, his cattle 
 
 1 Whitbeck v. SkiDner, 7 Hill, 53; Dor- Deming v. Kemp, 4 Saudf. 147; Terrell 
 
 •win I'. Potter, 5 Denio, 306; Mayor o. v. Walker, 66 N. C. 244, 251. 
 Mabie, 13 N. Y. 151. i Butler y. Titus, 13 Wis. 429. 
 
 2 Allaire v. Whitney, 1 Hill, 484; ^ Morrison v. Lovejoy, 6 Minn. 319. 
 
 Whitney v. Allaire, 1 N. Y. 305 ; 4 Denio, ^ Mason v. Hey ward, 3 Minn. 182. 
 
 554. 7 Slayback v. Jones, 9 Ind. 470. 
 
 ^ Seymour v. Davis, 2 Sandf. 239 ;
 
 844 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 came upon defendant's farm, and destroyed crops thereon. The 
 damages thus sustained were held to be the proper subject of 
 recoupment.^ 
 
 § 609. * 733. Mere Defences Distinguished from Set-off or Re- 
 coupment, Counter-claim or Cross-Demand. Another species of 
 
 defence, which existed at the common law and still exists, is 
 sometimes confounded with recoupment or with coiniter-claim, 
 although it bears no real resemblance to either, and should be 
 carefully distinguished from both ; namely, the reduction of the 
 amount claimed to be due in suits for the price of goods sold or 
 of services rendered in most instances when the action is on a 
 quantum meruii or quantum valebant. In set-off and in recoup- 
 ment, the essence of the defence consists in a cause of action 
 against the plaintiff or some other person: whether a judgment 
 is recovered or not is immaterial, but a right of action always 
 lies at the bottom of the legal notion. In the defence referred 
 to, there is no such right: it is simply a process of subtracting 
 from the amount of the adverse claim, and therefore operates 
 directly upon that demand. Set-off and recoupment, on the 
 other hand, do not attack the adverse claim itself; and for that 
 reason it is often said that they are not true defences : they 
 admit the plaintiff's cause of action, and set up an affirmative 
 cross-demand, so that the sums awarded for each may satisfy 
 one another, leaving only a surplus to be received by the party 
 who obtains the larger amount. The distinction is very plain ; 
 but it has sometimes been overlooked. One example will be a 
 sufficient illustration. In an action for the price of goods sold 
 and delivered, and of work and labor done amounting as alleged 
 to $197, the answer set up that the goods furnished and the 
 work done were worth no more than $173, and as to that sum 
 averred payment. On the trial, the defendant offered evidence 
 tending to show that the articles were to be of a certain kind and 
 quality ; that they were, on the contrary, very inferior in quality ; 
 and the consequent diminution in value and price. This evi- 
 dence was rejected on the ground that the reduction sought 
 could only be claimed by way of "recoupment of damages or 
 of set-off." The New York Court of Appeals, reversing this 
 ruling, pronounced the defence admissible, since it was in no 
 
 1 Hay V. Short, 49 .Mo. 139, 142. QFoote & Davis Co. v. Malony (1902), 115 Ga. 
 985,42 S. E. 41.3.]
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 845 
 
 sense a claim for damages against the plaintiff, but simply a 
 diminution of the value of the goods and the labor, as that 
 had been established prima facie by the plaintiff.^ The same 
 principle applies through the whole range of possible defences, 
 under whatever forms they may be set up: if they simply attack 
 the cause of action, and show that by virtue thereof tlie plaintiff 
 ought not to recover at all, or recover all that he demands, they 
 are not, and cannot be, answers in the nature of "set-off" or 
 " recoupment " under the old system, or of " counter-claim " or 
 "cross-demand" under the new. Thus the defence of payment 
 cannot, by any mode of averment, be made a counter-claim ; ^ 
 nor that of usury. ^ And generally, whenever the facts pleaded 
 are merely in bar of the action, and the relief demanded by the 
 defendant is only what would be the legal judgment in his 
 favor upon those facts, the answer is not a counter-claim, nor, 
 a fortiori, a cross-complaint, although it may be in the form of 
 the latter species of pleading.* From this preliminary statement 
 of the former defences which contained some of the elements 
 that are found in the modern counter-claim, and of others which 
 have nothing in common with, but are sometimes mistaken for, 
 the counter-claim, I now proceed to a direct discussion of the 
 latter as it is defined and authorized by the codes, and shall 
 follow the order of treatment already indicated.^ 
 
 I. A General Description of the Counter-Glaim ; its Nature, Objects 
 
 and Uses. 
 
 § 610. * 734. Scope of Inquiry herein. Under this subdivision 
 I shall collect from leading judicial decisions such opinions, and 
 portions of opinions, as have in the clearest and most accurate 
 manner described the general nature, objects, and uses of the 
 counter-claim, and shall add the comments and explanations 
 that seem necessary to a full development of the subject. The 
 discussion is here confined to the general properties of the 
 counter-claim, and does not descend to its various special ele- 
 
 1 Moffet V. Sackett, 18 N. Y. 522. * Bledsoe v. Rader, 30 Ind. 354; Bel- 
 
 2 Burke v. Thome, 44 Barb. 363. leau v. Thompson, 33 Cal. 495. 
 
 2 Prouty V. Eaton, 41 Barb. 409, 412, ^ QFor a history of legislation upon the 
 
 per T. A. Johnson J. subject of set-off, and references, see Steck 
 
 nSmith V. Building Ass'n (1896), 119 v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. (1894), 142 
 
 N. C. 257, 26 S. E. 40; Gen. Elec. Co. v. N. Y. 236, 31 N. E. V.^j 
 Williams (1898), 123 N.C. 51,31 S.E. 288.]
 
 846 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 ments and features, which, depending upon the particular terms 
 of the statutes, demand a more critical examination. 
 
 Sell. * 735. One Class of Cases Included in Term ''Set-off'^ 
 under Former Procedure not Included in Counter-CIaim. Mere De- 
 fence not a Counter-Ciaim. There are certain conclusions which are 
 evident upon the mere reading of the statute. Under the former 
 procedure, the term "set-off" included two quite distinct classes 
 of cases: namely, (1) those in which the defendant might recover 
 an affirmative judgment for a "debt"' against the plaintiff; and 
 (2) those in which the demand in his favor could only be used 
 defensively to diminish, or perhaps defeat, the recovery by the 
 plaintiff. The codes provide for both these classes of eases. 
 Those sections which permit the action to be brought by an 
 assignee of a thing in action, and allow under certain circum- 
 stances the same matters to be interposed as a defence against 
 him which would have been available against the assignor, and 
 those_ sections which permit the action to be brought b}' a trustee 
 of an express trust, and allow the same matters to be set up as a 
 defence against him which would have been available against the 
 party beneficially interested, — these sections plainly embrace the 
 second class of "set-offs" above mentioned; namely, those in 
 which the demand could be used as a defence^ but not as the basis 
 of an affirmative recovery against the plaintiff. On the other 
 hand, these cases are not included within the description given 
 of a counter-claim. 1 A defence, even though it consists of a 
 claim for relief against some person^ but does not permit a recov- 
 ery against the plaintiff, is not a counter-claim. The first class 
 of "set-offs" above mentioned is embraced within the definition 
 of the counter-claim as given by those codes which constitute the 
 first group according to the division made in a former paragraph. ^ 
 In the codes which constitute the second group, the same class 
 of " set-offs " is substantially described under the original name 
 which belonged to that species of answer in the old procedure.^ 
 
 § 612. * 736. Recoupment a Species of Counter-Claim. How- 
 Modified and Enlarged. The " recoupment of damages " has un- 
 dergone a most important modification. It is confessedly covered 
 
 1 ^Piedmont Bank v. Wilson (1899), 2 See§*726. 
 
 124 N. C. ."iGl, .32 S. E. 889; Lindsay, etc. » [ St. Louis Nat. Bank v. Gay (1894), 
 
 Co. V. Carpenter (1894), 90 la. 529, 58 101 Cal. 286, 35 Pac. 87G.] 
 N. W. 900 ]
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 847 
 
 b}' the definition of counter-claim given in all the codes without 
 exception. In those forming the two principal groups according 
 to the classification heretofore made, it is described by the ex- 
 press language, "a cause of action arising out of the contract 
 set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's 
 claim;" in that of Indiana it is described by the language, 
 '' any matter arising out of or connected with the cause of action 
 which might be the subject of an action in favor of the defend- 
 ant, or which would tend to reduce the plaintiff's claim or 
 demand for damages;" and in that of Iowa by the language, "a 
 cause of action in favor of the defendants, or some of them, against 
 the plaintiffs, or some of them, arising out of the contract set 
 forth in the petition." ^ It is beyond dispute, then, that the re- 
 coupment of damages, as the same was authorized by the courts 
 under the old practice, is made a species of counter-claim by all 
 the codes. But its effects have been greatly enlarged. As it 
 has been transferred into a counter-claim, it partakes of all the 
 essential features conferred upon that kind of defence by the 
 statute. For this reason, the defendant, who would formerly 
 have set up the facts in recoupment of damages, and who now 
 pleads the same facts as a species of counter-claim, may upon 
 the basis of those facts obtain a judgment for damages in his 
 favor against the plaintiff, if the proofs upon the trial warrant 
 such a result. 
 
 § 613. * 737. Counter- Claim Broader than Set-off and Recoup- 
 ment. Kinds of Causes of Action that may be interposed as 
 Counter-claims. The two classes of affirmative relief mentioned 
 in the foregoing paragraphs, important as they are, do not ex- 
 haust the scope and efficacy of the counter-claim. The causes 
 of action which were the basis of a " recoupment of damages " 
 or of a " set-off, " as those terms were legally defined, all neces- 
 sarily arose from a breach of contract. The language employed 
 by the codes speaks of causes of action as constituting a counter- 
 claim, which do not arise out of contract. It mentions three 
 alternatives, — causes of action (1) arising out of the contract 
 set forth in the complaint, or (2) arising out of the transaction 
 set forth in the complaint, or (3) conriected with the subject of 
 the action. Unless we would accuse the legislature of tlie most 
 absurd and misleading tautology, tins language was intended to 
 
 ^ See p. G97, ante, where statutes are given in full.
 
 848 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 affirm that there may be counter-claims which do not arise out 
 of contract. Arising out of the "transaction," and "connected 
 •with the subject of the action," are pUiced in opposition to "aris- 
 ing out of contract." As "recoupment of damages" and "set- 
 off " must be based upon the non-performance of a contract, it 
 follows that the counter-claim was designed to include other 
 demands to which neither of these two terms can apply. What 
 are these other demands ? I do not now attempt to answer this 
 question in detail : it is enough to point out the general nature 
 of all such possible cases. If causes of action are for the recov- 
 ery of money only, they must either be upon contract or for a 
 tort. Is there any possible cause of action upon contract, which 
 is neither a "set-off " nor a "recoupment of damages," and which 
 may be embraced within the definition of a counter-claim? There 
 is : a cause of action for the breach of a contract other than the 
 one sued upon, when the demand is for damages merely, to be 
 assessed by the jury, and not for a debt, is neither a "set-off" 
 nor a "recoupment," and yet is plainly described by the second 
 subdivision of the definition found in all the codes which form 
 the first group, and by the definition of " set-off " found in all 
 those which make up the second group. As the word " trans- 
 action " seems to imply causes of action not necessarily upon 
 contract, those arising from tort may perhaps, under proper cir- 
 cumstances, be the subject of counter-claim ; but the discussion of 
 this particular question will be deferred to a subsequent part 
 of this section. I will now sum up the possible cases, or classes 
 of cases, which may be included within the broad definition of 
 the counter-claim as given in the codes of the first group : if we 
 pass to the second group, certain of these classes would fall 
 within the term " set-off " rather than counter-claim. Of the 
 causes of action which terminate in a recovery of money alone, 
 the counter-claim expressly embraces (1) the matters which 
 under the former procedure gave rise to a recoupment of dam- 
 ages; (2) the cases of "set-off" in which a judgment for debt 
 against the plaintiff was possible ; (3) demands to recover un- 
 liquidated damages for the breach of a contract not the founda- 
 tion of the plaintiff's suit, and possibly (-4) demands to recover 
 damages for torts, if the same arose out of the " transaction " set 
 forth in the complaint or petition, or are connected with the sub- 
 ject of the action. These exhaust all the possible instances of a
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 849 
 
 mere pecuniary recovery. Counter-claim may also embrace cases 
 of an equitable nature in which affirmative relief is granted to 
 the defendant.^ Such cases are as plainly described by the gen- 
 eral language of the codes as those of a purely legal character 
 which seek only a pecuniary judgment. In order to shut out 
 these claims for equitable relief, and to limit the counter-claim 
 to causes of action for the recovery of money, the terms of the 
 statute must be read with restrictions interpolated into their 
 midst which were not placed there by the legislature. Were 
 it not that the ancient set-off and recoupment could only be 
 used in legal actions brought to recover money, no judge would 
 have thought that a like limitation must be put upon the lan- 
 guage of the codes. How far the counter-claim includes equi- 
 table relief will be fully discussed in the sequel. Finally, the 
 only other cases which could possibly come within the definition 
 of counter-claim are legal causes of action to recover possession 
 of lands, or to recover possession of chattels. 
 
 § 614. * 738. Essential Elements and Test of Counter-Claim. 
 Must be a Cause of Action. Having thus enumerated the dif- 
 ferent kinds of causes of action and of relief which may be used 
 by the defendant as counter-claims, I shall proceed to point out 
 some essential features and elements which must exist in each of 
 these cases ; that is, some essential elements which enter into the 
 very notion of the counter-claim. (1) It must be a cause of 
 action. 2 In other words, the facts must be such that they would 
 constitute the entire matter proper and necessary to be set forth 
 in the complaint or petition, if the defendant had chosen to insti- 
 
 1 [Kollock V. Scribner (1897), 98 Wis. Helmer v. Yetzer (1894), 92 la. 627, Gl 
 
 104, 73 N. W. 776.3 ^- W. 206; Bardes v. Hutchinson (1901), 
 
 •^ [llichardsy. Am. Desk & Seating Co. 113 la. 610, 85 N. W. 797; Ruinbou^^h v. 
 
 (1894), 87 Wis. 503, 58 N. W. 787; Union Young (1896), 119N. C. 567, 26 S. E. 143; 
 
 Mercantile Co. v. Jacoljs (1897), 20 Mont. Kahrs v. Kahrs (1902), 115 Ga. 288, 41 
 
 270, 50 Pac. 793; Waller v. Deranleau S. E. 649; Gulliver y. Fowler (1894), 64 
 
 (1903), — Neb. —,94 N. W. 1038; Bab- Conn. 556, 30 Atl. 852; Rhea ?•. Bagley 
 
 cock V. Maxwell (1898), 21 Mont. 507, 54 (1899), 66 Ark. 93, 49 S. W. 492; Giirske 
 
 Pac. 943; Askew v. Koonce (1896), 118 r. Kelpin (1901), 61 Neb. 517, 85 N. W. 
 
 N. C. 526, 24 S. E. 218; Stotsenburg v. 557; Lacey v. Lacey (1893), 95 Ky. 110, 
 
 Fordice (1895),142lnd. 490, 41 N. E.313; 23 S. W. 673; Arthurs v. Thompson 
 
 Nicholls V. Hill (1894), 42 8. C. 28, 19 (1895), 97 Ky. 218, 30 S. W. 628; Far- 
 
 S. E. 1017; Tron v. Yohn (1896), 145 rell v. Burbank (1894), 57 Minn. 395, 59 
 
 Ind. 272, 43 N. E. 437: Harris v. Ran- N. W. 485; White v. Blitch (1900), 112 
 
 dolph County Bank (1901), 157 Ind. 120, Ga. 775, 38 S. E. 80; Center Creek Water 
 
 60 N. E. 1025; Lindsixy, etc. Co. v. Car- Co. r. Lindsay (1900), 21 Utah, 192, 60 
 
 penter (1894), 90 la. 529, 58 N. W. 900; Pac. 559.^ 
 
 54
 
 S50 
 
 CIVIL EE.MEDIES. 
 
 tute an independent action between himself as plaintiff and the 
 plaintiff as defendant.^ When a counter-claim is pleaded, the 
 defendant becomes, as far as respects the matters alleged therein, 
 an actor: there are substantially two simultaneous actions pend- 
 ing between the same parties, each of whom is at the same time 
 a plaintiff and a defendant. Since the counter-claim ' states a 
 cause of action, it is to be governed and judged by the rules 
 which apply to the complaint or petition r^ the facts alleged 
 must be sufficient to constitute the cause of action, and the 
 relief to which the defendant is entitled should be properly 
 demanded. In short, the pleader should, for the time being, 
 regard himself as acting for a plaintiff", and as drawing a com- 
 plaint or petition. This rule is so simple and so plain, that it 
 seems almost impossible to mistake it; and yet the books of 
 reports are full of cases in which facts have been set up as 
 counter-claims, which, if admitted to be true, would not have 
 entitled the party pleading them to any relief. The test thus 
 suggested is of universal application. Would the facts averred 
 taken by themselves, if admitted, entitle the defendant to a 
 
 ^ Q" An answer setting up a counter- 
 claim must contain the substantial requi- 
 sites of a complaint, and allege facts which 
 legally entitle the defendant to recover in 
 a suit instituted by him for tliat purpose 
 against the plaintiff ; and, if his pleading 
 omits any allegation tliat would he neces- 
 sary to state a cause of suit, it will he vul- 
 nerable to a demurrer interposeil ou that 
 ground: " Le Clare (■. Thihault (1902), 41 
 Ore. 601, 69 Pac. 552. "A counter-claim 
 must, to be good, contain every allegation 
 which would be needed in a complaint 
 founded on the same cause of action : " 
 Daggs V. Phceni.K Nat. Bank (1898), Ariz., 
 5.3 Pac. 201. 
 
 " To constitute a counter-claim, the 
 facts stated must amount to an independ- 
 ent cause of action ; when they merely 
 serve to defeat plaintiff's cause of action, 
 they amount to a defence, not a counter- 
 claim : " Walker v. Ins. Co. (1894), 143 
 N. Y. 167, 38 N. IC. 106. "A counter- 
 claim, as our decisions affirm, is not a de- 
 fence to a plaintiff's action, but it is a 
 cross-action by the defendant; and it must 
 state facts sufhcient in law to constitute a 
 cause of action ; otherwise it will Ije iield 
 
 bad on demurrer : " Indiana, etc. A.ss'n 
 V. Crawley (1898), 151 Ind. 413, 51 X. E. 
 466. 
 
 " A counter-claim is an action, and to 
 be properly pleaded it must be set forth 
 with all the allegations necessary to up- 
 hold an original petition founded on the 
 same cause of action : " Prichard's Execu- 
 trix V. Peace (1895), 98 Ky. 99, 32 S. W. 
 296. " An answer is a statement of defence. 
 It is not its office to demand affirmative 
 relief, unless upon a counter-claim ; nor 
 can it pro])erly be made to take tlie place 
 of a motion to cite in new parties. So far 
 as used for such purposes it may he dis- 
 regarded by the trial court : " Russell v. 
 Easterbrook (1898), 71 Conn. 50, 40 Atl. 
 905. A counter-claim which cliarges 
 fraud and misconduct in general terms, 
 without specifying particular acts, does 
 not state a cause of action : Alden v. 
 Christianson (1901), 83 Minn. 21, 85 
 N. \V. 824.] 
 
 - It is within the discretion of the 
 court to allow iiim to amend his pleading 
 by adding another count : Veuable r. 
 Dutch, 37 Kan. 515.
 
 COUNTEK-CLALM. 851 
 
 judgment in his favor against the plaintiff? If not, they do 
 not constitute a counter-chiim. 
 
 § 615. * 739. Implies an Opposing Claim. Limitation herein. It 
 has sometimes been said that "counter-claim," ex vi termini^ im- 
 plies a claim, and also an opposing claim; and that, therefore, 
 there cannot be a valid counter-claim unless there is a demand 
 on behalf of the plaintiff. This is no doubt true within certain 
 limits. The counter-claim as well as the defence assumes that 
 the plaintiff sets up a claim in his complaint. There could be 
 no answer of any kind, defensive or affirmative, unless the plain- 
 tiff in the first instance filed or served a pleading containing some 
 demand. But a counter-claim does not necessarily imply that 
 the demand is a valid one. The term, if not invented, was applied 
 by the legislature to thi-; species of answer, which is allowed to 
 be used in cases where the plaintiff sets up certain specified causes 
 of action ; but the code nowhere requires that the cause of action 
 thus alleged sliould be a good one. To interpolate any such limi- 
 tation into the language,of the statute would be giving an unnec- 
 essary meaning to a very simple epithet chosen by the lawmakers 
 to designate a particular kind of pleading. The plaintiff must 
 file a complaint averring facts which are said to constitute a cause 
 of action in his favor. The defendant is expressly permitted to 
 unite in his answer as many defences and counter-claims as he 
 may have. Suppose that he pleads some defence either by way 
 of denial or of new matter, and also a counter-claim. On the trial 
 he establishes his defence, and thus defeats the plaintiff's I'ecov- 
 ery upon the alleged cause of action. Does this success cut off 
 his power to go on and prove the facts constituting his counter- 
 claim, and to obtain the judgment thereon? Such a conclusion 
 would be a monstrous perversion of the statute, and would be a 
 virtual repeal of its express provisions which permit the defend- 
 ant to unite as many defences and counter-claims as he may have. 
 When the legislature authorized him to join defences and counter- 
 claims in this manner, it certainly intended that he should use 
 them all, and did not mean that he should go through the empty 
 form of pleading them, and afterwards abandoning those which 
 are affirmative in their nature because successful in those which 
 are negative.^ This conclusion is self-evident : it necessarily 
 
 1 QLe Chire '?. Thibault (1902). 41 Ore. can be permitted to jilead a couuter-claiiu 
 601, 69 Pac. .552: "Before a defendant as a defence to ]ilaintiff's cause of suit,
 
 852 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDItS. 
 
 results from the positive provisions of the codes, and cannot be 
 avoided without their virtual repeal. I have dwelt upon this 
 subject at some length, not because there can be any legitimate 
 and well-founded doubt concerning it, but because there are cer- 
 tain judicial dicta in a few cases which are supposed to convey a 
 different meaning.^ 
 
 ^ 616. * 7-40. Cause of Action Alleged must exist in Favor of 
 Defendant 'who pleads it. Exception hereto in Codes of Indiana 
 and Iowa. (2) The cause of action thus alleged must exist in 
 favor of the defendant who pleads it. As the counter-claim is de- 
 fined in nearly all the codes, a defendant is not permitted to set up 
 facts which entitle any other person, defendant or otherwise, to 
 relief. He himself must be the party entitled to the judgment de- 
 manded, so that he would be the proper plaintiff, or one of the 
 proper plaintiffs, if the cause of action had been made the basis of 
 an independent suit. It is not, of course, to be understood that a 
 counter-claim must always exist in favor of a single defendant : 
 two or more, when sued jointly, may have a joint cause of action 
 
 he must admit the existence, at least, 
 of a part of his adversary's demands." 
 Syduer Pump Co. v. Rocky Mount Ice Co. 
 (1899), 125 N. C. 80, 34 S.E. 198: When 
 a non-suit has been entered, it is too late 
 to file a supplemental answer containing 
 a counter-claim, since when there is no 
 action pending there can be no counter- 
 claim. Davis V. Seattle National Bank, 
 (1898), 19 Wash. 65, 52 Pac. 526: "A de- 
 fendant may deny liability and at the 
 same time plead a counterclaim or offset, 
 without subjecting himself to the charge 
 of pleading inconsistent defences, if there 
 is no direct contradiction in the special 
 facts pleaded."] 
 
 1 See Mayor, etc. of N. Y. i-. Parker 
 Vein Stp. Co., 12 Abb. Pr. 300; 8 Bosw. 
 300; Bellinger v. Craigue, 31 Barb. 534; 
 Prouty V. Eaton, 41 Barb. 409. See also 
 Schenectady v. Furman, 61 Hun, 171, 
 post, § * 744, note. It is settled, however, 
 in Minnesota, that a counter-claim must 
 of necessity admit the cause of action set 
 up by the plaintiff, and that the defendant 
 cannot deny this cause of action, and at 
 the same time plead a counter-claim. In 
 one case the court said : " The nature of 
 a counter-claim would seem to render 
 necessary the admission by defendant of 
 
 a claim against him in favor of the plain- 
 tiff arising out of the contract or the trans- 
 action, as the case may require, which is 
 the cause of action, or the ground of the 
 plaintiff's claim set forth in the com- 
 j)laint. " All claim of the plaintiff being 
 denied, it was held there could be no 
 counter-claim. Steele v. Etheridge, 15 
 Minn. 501, 509; Mason i'. Hey ward, 3 
 Minn. 182; Whalon v. Aldrich, 8 Minn. 
 346, 348; Koempel v. Shaw, 13 Minn. 
 488; Morrison v. Lovejoy, 6 Minn. 319. 
 I add here the more recent cases which 
 illustrate the general nature and requi- 
 sites of the counter-claim, with respect to 
 all the features described in the para- 
 graphs of the text. Nothing in these 
 decisions requires any modification of the 
 views stated in the text ; in fact, my dis- 
 cussion of the counter-claim in all its 
 bearings is sustained by the current of 
 authority. Davis v. Toulmin, 77 N. Y. 
 280, and cases cited ; Francis v. Edwards, 
 77 N. C. 271 ; Quebec Bk. v. Weygand, 
 30 Ohio St. 126; Schee v. McQuilken, 59 
 Ind. 269; Blakely v. Boruff, 71 id. 93; 
 Thompson v. Tookey, 71 id. 296; Stock- 
 ton r. Stockton, 73 id. 510; liuckcr r. 
 Stcelman, 73 id. 396 ; Exlino v. Lowery, 46 
 Iowa, 556; Town r. Bringolf, 47 id. 133.
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 853 
 
 against the plaintiff; in which case it might be, and properly 
 should be, pleaded as a counter-claim by them all. To the gen- 
 eral lule above stated there is an exception already pointed out in 
 the codes of Indiana and of Iowa, which permits a surety when 
 sued to take advantage of a demand against the plaintiff in favor 
 of his principal, and a joint debtor, when sued, to interpose one in 
 favor of another joint debtor. 
 
 § 617. * 741. Cause of Action must exist against the Plaintiff. 
 (3) The cause of action must exist against the plaintiff in the 
 suit, so that a judgment for the relief demanded can be rendered 
 against him. This feature of the counter-claim is evident upon 
 the most cursory reading of the statutory provision ; and yet the 
 books are full of cases in which matters have been set up as 
 counter-claims that showed no cause of action whatever against 
 the plaintiff, but one (if at all) existing against some other per- 
 son not a party to the suit.^ This error is most likely to arise in 
 actions brought by an assignee of a demand, where the defendant 
 has a claim which would be valid against the assignor. Such 
 claim may, under some circumstances, constitute a perfect defence 
 to the suit, and it may be a set-off according to the provisions of 
 statutes prior to the code ; but it cannot be a counter-claim, for 
 the simple but most cogent reason that it does not entitle the 
 defendant to any possible recovery against the plaintiff.^ 
 
 § 618. * 742. Subject-Matter of Counter-Claini. General Classes, 
 ^atutory Restrictions as to Scope and Character. Analysis of Statu- 
 tory Provisions. (4) In reference to their subject-matter, the codes 
 which form the first group separate counter-claims into two gen- 
 eral classes : namely, firsts those which arise out of a cause of 
 action different from the one alleged by the plaintiff; and sec- 
 ondly^ those which arise out of or are connected with the same 
 cause of action as the one alleged by the plaintiff. In the iirst of 
 
 1 [[U. S. T. Co. V. Stanton (1893), 139 maker, existing at the date of tlie transfer 
 N. Y. 531, 34 N. E. 1098; Dolbeer v. of the note, is not a counter-claim, but a 
 Stout (1893), 139 N. Y. 486, 34 N. E. defence: Lynch y. Free (1896), 64 Minn. 
 1102; Trester v. City of Sheboygan 277, 66 N. W. 277. Where an agent sues 
 (1894), 87 Wis. 496, 58 N. W. 747 • Mom- in his own name, defendant may set up as 
 sen V. Atkins (1900), 105 Wis. 557, 81 a partial defence a demand against the 
 N. W. 647; Smith v. Dawley (1894), 92 principal, but this "is not really a couu- 
 la. 312, 60 N. W. 625.] ter-claiin," since it is not "a demand 
 
 2 [^Walker f. Ins. Co. (1894), 143 N. Y. which may be the basis of a judgment 
 167, 38 N. E. 106. In an action by the against the plaintiff:" Bliss v. Sueath 
 indorsee after maturity of a promissory (1894), 103 Cal. 43, 36 Pac. 1029-3 
 
 note, iin indebtedness of the payee to the
 
 854 CIVIL KE.MEDIES. 
 
 these classes the cause of action stated by the plaintiff must spring 
 from contract, and the counter-claim must arise out of another 
 contract. These counter-claims are identical with tlie "set-off" 
 of the codes which belong to the second group, and they embrace, 
 but are not restricted to, the '' set-offs " used in the former proce- 
 dure. They include that ancient "set-off," and also much more ; 
 for they cover all cases of damages as well as of debt resulting 
 from the non-performance of contracts ; and, according to the 
 construction supported by the overwhelming weight of authoritv, 
 they also extend to cases of equitable relief arising from contract. 
 In the second of these classes the cause of action that may be set 
 forth by the plaintiff is not defined or limited in any manner, and 
 may therefore, unless limitations not contained in the statute are 
 to be interpolated by the courts, be of any kind and nature. The 
 counter-claim, however, is restricted in its scope and character, 
 and must conform to one or the other of three requisites: (a) If 
 a contract is set forth in the complaint or petition as the founda- 
 tion of the plaintiff's demand, the counter-claim must arise out of 
 that same contract ; and this plainly eml)races the ancient recoup- 
 ment of damages, although far broader in its operation than that 
 species of defence, (i) If a " transaction " is set forth as the 
 foundation of the plaintiff's demand, the counter-claim must arise 
 out of that " transaction ; " and, so far as " transaction " is some- 
 thing different from or additional to "contract," this is a provision 
 not identical in its effect with either "set-off" or "recoupment: " 
 it clearly embraces many instances of equitable cross-demand and 
 relief in favor of the defendant; and the only real doubt is, 
 whether it extends also to legal causes of action, (c) Whatever 
 be the nature of the claim asserted by the plaintiff, — for the 
 codes contain no restriction in respect to this matter, — any 
 counter-claim may be pleaded '•' which is connected with the sub- 
 ject of the action." ^ I have thus given a simple analysis of the 
 statutory provision, taking the language as the legislature has 
 used it without modification, neitiier adding to nor subtracting 
 from it. If the courts have at any time placed further limitations 
 upon the scope and operation of the counter-claim, if they have 
 ever refused to admit the broad and comprehensive classification 
 here made, they have done so by narrowing the general language 
 of the statute, and restricting its obvious import. How far judi- 
 
 1 QWarren i-. Hall (1895), 20 Colo. .508, 38 Puc. 707.]
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 855 
 
 €ial decisions have gone in this process of limitation, and how 
 much authority shoukl be conceded to their interpretation, I shall 
 attempt to ascertain and to determine in subsequent portions of 
 this section. My sole object now is to let the statute speak for 
 itself by presenting an analysis and arrangement of its various 
 clauses. It is certain, from this inspection of its very language, 
 that there is no express restriction upon the nature and effect of 
 the relief which may be demanded and obtained by means of a 
 counter-claim, — no express requirement that it must be legal 
 Tather than equitable, nor that it must be confined to a money 
 judgment in the form of debt or damages. Nor is tliere any ex- 
 press provision that the counter-claim must be something essen- 
 tially aijitagonistic to, or tending to defeat or lessen, the cause of 
 action set forth by the plaintiff in his complaint or petition. It 
 will be seen, in the further discussions of this section, that the 
 incident last mentioned is declared by several carefully considered 
 decisions to be a necessary element or feature of the counter- 
 claim, implied in its very nature and in the name given to it by 
 the legislature. I do not question the correctness of this conclu- 
 sion : I merely call attention to the fact, that, in reaching it or any 
 similar result, the courts have added to or taken from the express 
 terms of the codes. 
 
 § 619. * 743. Illustrative Opinions. I shall now collect the 
 opinions of several eminent and able judges, selected from a 
 number of leading cases, in order that the reader may be able to 
 compare their conclusions with the results of the foregoing analy- 
 sis, and to ascertain the general principles upon which the courts 
 have proceeded in constructing the theory of the counter-claim as 
 it is now understood and accepted in the various States. These 
 selections and quotations will be found in the foot-notes.^ The 
 
 1 Leaveuworth v. Packer, .52 Barb, it must be something which resists or 
 
 132, 1.36, per Potter J. : "A counter-claim modifies the plaintiff's claim." See also 
 
 is a kind of equitable defence which is Clinton v. Eddy, 1 Lans. 61, 62 ; Boston 
 
 permitted, under the provisions of the Mills v. EuU, 6 Abb. Pr. n. s. 319, 321 
 
 code, to be set up, when it arises out of Pattison v. Richards, 22 Barb. 143, 146 
 
 the contract set forth in the complaint. Ogden v. Coddington, 2 E. D. Smith, 317 
 
 It is broader and more comprehensive Gleason v. Moen, 2 Duer, 639, 642 ; Schu- 
 
 than recoupment, though it embraces bart v. Harteau, 34 Barb. 447 ; Lignot v. 
 
 both recoupment and .set-off ; and it is Redding, 4 E. D. Smith, 285 ; Carrie c. 
 
 intended to secure to a defendant all the Cowles, 6 Bosw. 453 ; Wolf v. H., 13 How. 
 
 relief which either an action at law, or a Pr. 84 ; Davidson v. Remington, 12 How. 
 
 bill in equity, or a cross-suit, would have Pr. 310. 
 secured on the same state of facts. But
 
 856 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 assignee of a demand liaving brought suit upon it, the defend- 
 ant alleged as a -counter-claim a contract with the assignor, a 
 breach thereof by him, and resulting damages, and prayed judg- 
 ment for the amount of such damages aganist the defendant. 
 No reply being served to this answer, the defendant urged that 
 its averments were admitted, and that he was entitled to judgment 
 on the record. In rejecting his claim, the New York Court of 
 Appeals described the counter-claim at large, and stated prin- 
 ciples of universal application.^ 
 
 § 620. * 744. Doctrine that Counter-Claim must be Antagonistic 
 to, and tend to defeat, lessen, or modify, the Claim of Plaintiff. 
 The doctrine is maintained in several cases, that, as an essential 
 feature or element of every counter-claim, the cause of action 
 which it sets up must be of such a nature that the relief obtained 
 by its means will necessarily interfere with, defeat, lessen, or 
 modify the relief granted to the plaintiff in virtue of the cause of 
 action alleged in his complaint or petition. In other words, the 
 two demands must be, to some extent at least, antagonistic, and 
 tending to destroy or limit each other.^ In an action brought to 
 
 1 [jDolbeer v. Stout (1893), 139 N. Y. 
 486, 34 N. E. 1102.] Vassear v. Living- 
 ston, 13 N. Y. 248, per Deuio J. : "There 
 is nothing in the nature of a counter- 
 claim stated in the answer. There was 
 never any contract between the plaintiff 
 and the defendant ; and although the new 
 matter was, if true, very pertinent to pre- 
 clude the plaintiff from recovering upon 
 the demand assigned to him, it had no 
 tendency to show an independent cause of 
 action in favor of the defendant against 
 the ])laintiff. Section 150 of the code de- 
 fines a counter-claim. It must be a claim 
 existing in favor of the defendant against 
 the plaintiff, arising either out of the con- 
 tract or transaction sued upon, or some 
 other contract. Here tlie defendant had 
 no claim against the plaintiff. If the 
 facts were truly stated, he had grounds 
 for defending himself against the plain- 
 tiff's suit, but none whatever for an 
 independent recovery against him. A 
 counter-claim must contain the substance 
 necessary to sustain an action on behalf 
 of tlie- defendant against the plaintiff, if 
 the plaintiff had not sued the defendant. 
 It is (juite obvKjus that nothing of that 
 
 nature is stated in this answer." In the 
 same case, the court below, after stating 
 the doctrine in a similar manner, added : 
 " A counter-claim which is not also a set- 
 off is not a defence. It is a distinct and 
 independent cause of action, which is not 
 used sinij)ly to repel the claims of the 
 plaintiff, but for which a judgment against 
 him is in all events demanded. Previous 
 to the code, it could not be set up by the 
 defendant at all ; and the permission to 
 set it up in an answer, although with a 
 change of its name, assuredly has not 
 changed its legal character. A recoup- 
 ment or a set-off is a defence ; but a de- 
 fendant who avails himself of such a 
 defence admits, in whole or in part, the 
 demand of the plaintiff as alleged in the 
 complaint : " s. c. 4 Duer, 285, 293, per 
 Duer J. See also Merrick r. Gordon, 20 
 N. Y. 93, 97, per Comstock J. 
 
 2 QStolze V. Torrison (1903), — Wis. 
 — , 95 N. W. 114; Kaukauna Co. r. 
 Kaukauna (1902), 114 Wi.s. 327, 89 N. W. 
 542; Ajjpleton Mfg. Co. v. Fox River 
 Paj)er Co. (1901), 111 Wis. 465, 87 N. W. 
 45'! : " A counter-claim, when established, 
 must in some way qualify or defeat in
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 
 
 857 
 
 foreclose a mortgage upon land, the holder of the legal title, to 
 whom the premises had been conveyed by the mortgagor, was 
 made a defendant ; but no personal judgment for the debt was 
 demanded against him in the complaint, and he was notified to 
 that effect in the usual manner. He pleaded a counter-claim, 
 setting up the following facts : that the plaintiff conveyed the 
 land to the mortgagor by a deed, with full covenants of title ; 
 that the mortgagor conveyed the same premises to the defendant 
 by a similar deed, and also assigned the plaintiff's covenants and 
 all rights of action for their breach ; that said covenants had 
 been broken by the existence of an outstanding paramount title 
 and prior incumbrances, and the defendant had been evicted 
 under the same, to his great damage, for which damages judg- 
 ment was demanded against the plaintiff. Evidence in support 
 of this answer was excluded at the trial, and the defendant ap- 
 pealed. The New York Court of Appeals, sustaining the ruling 
 below, announced the doctrine that the demands of the plaintiff 
 and of the defendant must be reciprocal, in order that there can 
 be any place for a counter-claim.^ In an action to recover the 
 
 whole or in part the phiiii tiff's claim for 
 judgment. ... It must be a claim exist- 
 ing in favor of the defendant and against 
 the ])laintiff between whom a several 
 judgment may be had in the action." 
 Miser v. O'Shea (1900), 37 Ore. 231, 62 
 Pac. 491; Peterson v. Bean (1900), 22 
 Utah, 43, 61 Pac. 213, citing the text.] 
 
 1 National F. Ins. Co. v. McKay, 21 
 N. y. 191, 195, per Com.stock J.: "Upon 
 the defendant's own statement, I do not 
 see tliat anything was in litigation be- 
 tween him and the ])]aiutiff, or that any 
 judgment could be rendered against him 
 except one for costs for interposing a 
 groundless defence to the action. No 
 cause of action existed against him. The 
 complaint claimed nothing against him 
 personally, and stated no facts as the 
 foundation of such a decree. The an- 
 swer showed that he had no title or 
 interest in the mortgaged premises to be 
 affected by the decree. His defence must 
 therefore be deemed to have been put in 
 for the mere purpose of establishing a le- 
 gal cause for an independent suit on the 
 plaintiff's covenants, without any demand 
 against himself being at all involved in 
 
 the controversy. Witliout undertaking at 
 tills time to expound the provisions of the 
 code which relate to the counter-claim, I 
 am satisfied that they do not apply to such 
 a case as this. Of course the claim could 
 only be enforced in this case by a judg- 
 ment in the defendant's favor for the 
 damages sustained in consequence of the 
 eviction. But the plaintiff might, not- 
 witiistanding such a judgment, be entitled 
 to a decree for a foreclosure and sale. The 
 alleged counter-claim does not impair or 
 affect the right to that relief. I appre- 
 hend that a counter-claim, when estab- 
 lished, viust in some way qualify, or must 
 defeat, the judgment to which the plaintiff is 
 otherwise entitled. In a foreclosure suit, a 
 defendant who is personally liable for the 
 debt, or whose land is burdened by the 
 lien, may probably introduce an offset 
 to reduce or e.xtinguisli the claim. But 
 where his personal liability is not in ques- 
 tion, and where he disclaims all interest in 
 the mortgaged premises, I do not see how 
 he can demand a judgment against the 
 plaintiff on a bill, or a note, or a bond, or 
 a covenant. Such is virtually this case. 
 The defendant has, as he insists, a cause
 
 858 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 price of goods sold and delivered, the answer contained a so-called 
 counter-claim which purported to show that the plaintiff held lands 
 under a deed of trust, which he was m equity bound to convey to 
 the defendant, and prayed a judgment directing such conveyance. 
 The Supreme Court in New York decided that these facts, if prop- 
 erly pleaded, would not constitute a counter-claim in opposition 
 to the cause of action stated in the complaint ; and directly held 
 the doctrine that a counter-claim must in some sort defeat the 
 plaintiff's recovery, or interfere with the judgment that would 
 otherwise be rendered in his favor.^ 
 
 of action against the plaintiff upon a bru- 
 ken covenant ; but that cause of action, 
 if it exists, does not enable him to resist 
 or modify the relief to which the plaintiff 
 is entitled." See also Agate v. King, 17 
 Abb. Pr. 159 (Gen. Term,' 1862). An ac- 
 tion to foreclose a mortgage against K. 
 and others. K. owned the land, but was 
 not personally liable for the (lel)t, and uo 
 personal judgment against him was de- 
 • inanded. Hu set np, as a counter-claim, a 
 <lemand for §6,000 damages arising from 
 a breach by the plaintiff of a distinct con- 
 tract to convey land. This was held not 
 to be a counter-claim : it clearly did not 
 fall under the first subdivision : it did 
 not fall under the second subdivision, be- 
 cause, in an action to foreclose a mort- 
 gage as against all the defendants e.xcept 
 tlie one personally liable, the cause of ac- 
 tion does not arise out of contract ; and 
 also because no judgment was asked 
 against K. Some portions of the opijiion 
 do not agree with the reasoning of Com- 
 stocic J. quoted above: while the decision 
 reached is in harmony with that case, tiie 
 dicta of the judge are not entirely so. 
 And see Carpenter i\ Leonard, .5 Minn. 
 1.').5. In an action to foreclose a mort- 
 gage where the plaintiff asked for a jnd<r- 
 ment upon the bond for a deficiency, tiie 
 defendant's counter-claim of damages was 
 allowed: Hunt v. Chapman, 51 N. Y. 555. 
 The doctrine of Nat. V. Ins. Co. v. McKay 
 has been enacted in the New York C. 
 C. P., § 501. "The counter-claim must 
 tend, in some way, to diminish or defeat 
 the plaintiff's rectivery ; " Lipmau r. 
 Jackson Arch. Iron Works, 128 N. Y. 
 58. Under this pnivision it was held, 
 in Schenectady i-. Furinan, 61 Hun, 171, 
 
 that a counter-claim which is entirely in- 
 consistent witli any cause of action on 
 the plaintiff's part and which cannot be 
 j)roved as a claim until it is decided that 
 the plaintiff has no claim, does not 'tend 
 to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's re- 
 covery.' This rule, if established, will 
 evidently limit materially the principle 
 stated in §* 739, «n/f>,- but it is difficult 
 to see why the result necessarily follows 
 from the code provision cited. Tl;e 
 learned judi;e seems to admit that iiis 
 decision is inconsistent with Glen & Hail 
 iManuf. Co. v. Hall, 61 N. Y. 220 ; y -•', 
 § *765 ; but the doctrine now embodied in 
 § 501 of the code was firmly estaldisiu-d 
 wlien the latter case was decided. In 
 Schenectady v. Fiirman, the action was 
 brought to recover for work done, under 
 resolutions of the common council of a 
 city, in .removing certain alleged obstru.- 
 tions in a stream running throngli the 
 defendant's land ; the counter-claim was 
 for the injury done to the land ; the reso- 
 lutions being held invalid, the counter- 
 ilaiiii was disallowed, for the reason given 
 above. 
 
 1 Mattoon v. Raker, 24 How. Pr. 32'.i, 
 331 (Gen. Term), per Bockes J. After 
 reciting the allegations as given above, 
 the opinion proceeds : " Would this con- 
 stitute a defence to the plaintiff's action 
 for goods sold ? Clearly not. Nor would 
 it be such a counter-claim as the defend- 
 ant would have a right to interpose by 
 way of answer to the ])laintiff's alleged 
 grounds of action. Such equitable claim 
 for relief would afford no answer to the 
 plaintiff's claim for judgment. He would 
 still b(! entitled to recover according to 
 tlie allegations of his complaint, without
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 
 
 859 
 
 § 621. * 745. Application of Doctrine. Limitation Established 
 by New York Courts. Purely Judicial. Criticism. These ea.ses 
 must be considered as establishing the doctrine that the defend- 
 ant's cause of action, in order to constitute a valid counter-claim, 
 must to some extent defeat, modify, qualify, or interfere with, the 
 relief which would othei'wise bo obtained by the plaintiff. The 
 sweeping statements and broad generalities of the opinions ought, 
 however, to be limited within their proper bounds, by pointing 
 out the only possible instances in which the principle can apply. 
 
 any deduction even on account of the 
 matters stated in the answer. A coun- 
 ter-claim, to be available to a part}', must 
 afford to him protection in some way 
 against the plaintiff's demand for judg- 
 ment, either in whole or in part. It must 
 therefore consist in a set-off, or claim hy 
 way of recoupment, or be in some way 
 connected with the subject of the action 
 stated in the complaint. It must present 
 an answer to the plaintiff's demand for re- 
 lief; must show that he is not entitled, 
 either at law or under the applications of 
 just principles of equity, to judgment in 
 his favor, as, or to the extent, claimed in 
 the complaint. It must therefore con- 
 tain not only the substance of what is 
 necessary to sustain an action in favor of 
 the defendant against the plaintiff, but it 
 must also operate in some way to defeat, 
 in whole or in part, the plaintiff's right 
 to recover in the action. An answer 
 which does not meet this requirement is 
 insufficient, whether regarded as a de- 
 fence or as a counter-claim. If a person 
 be sued on a promissory note, he cannot 
 set up, by way of defence or counter- 
 claim, a contract with the plaintiff for the 
 purchase of lands, aud allege payment of 
 the purchase-price, aud claim a decree in 
 the action for a specific performance ; 
 nor could he, in such an action on a prom- 
 i.-isury note, have a foreclosure of a mort- 
 gage against the plaintiff, especially if the 
 latter were not personally liable for the 
 mortgage debt." The same principle was 
 again approved by the New York Court 
 of Appeals in a recent decision. " Coun- 
 ter-claim," it was said, "is a new term 
 introduced into the code, and which is 
 limited and defined therein. When the 
 action is upon contract, unless the coun- 
 
 ter-claim arises out of the contract or 
 transaction set forth in t!ie complaint as 
 the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or 
 be connected witii the subject of the ac- 
 tion, it must be a legal or e(juitable cause 
 of action against the plaintiff arising upon 
 contract, and existing at the commence- 
 ment of the action. It is manifest, how- 
 ever, that every cause of action e.xisting 
 in favor of the defendant against the 
 plaintiff, arising upon contract, cannot be 
 the subject of a counter-claim. It must 
 be a cause of action upon which some- 
 thing is due the defendant which can be 
 applied in diminution of the plaintiffs 
 claim. For instance, a cause of action for 
 the specific performance of a contract in 
 reference to real estate arises upou con- 
 tract, and yet cannot be set up as a coun- 
 ter-claim, unless it grew out of, or is 
 connected with, the cause of action alleged 
 in the complaint. . . . The object of in- 
 troducing counter-claims into the prac- 
 tice under the code was to enable parties 
 to settle and adjust all their cro.ss-cbiims 
 in a single action as far as they could." 
 Waddell v. Darling, 51 N. Y. 327, 3.30. 
 See also Pattison v. Richards, 22 Barb. 
 143, 145. This doctrine was fully ap- 
 proved and adopted by the Supreme 
 Court of Wisconsin in the very recent 
 case of Dietrich v. Koch, 35 Wis. 618, 
 626. In the case of Cavalli v. Allen, .57 
 N. Y. 508, which was an action to recover 
 the possession of land, brought by a ven- 
 dor against the vendee in possession, on 
 the ground that a balance of the pur- 
 chase-price remained unpaid, the de- 
 fendant was permitted to set up as a 
 counter-claim a note which he held against 
 the plaintiff, and thus to extinguish the 
 amount due ou the land contract.
 
 860 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 It is said by one of the judges that the counter-claim " must con- 
 sist in a set-off or claim by way of recoupment, or be in some way 
 connected with the subject of the action stated in the complaint." 
 This rule could only be broken by counter-claims belonging to the 
 second subdivision. In respect to all those falling within the 
 fii-st subdivision, they all, by the very terms of the definition, 
 arise out of the same contract or transaction set forth in the com- 
 plaint, or they are connected with the subject of the action. 
 There is, therefore, in this class, no room for a possible violation 
 of the rule laid down by the learned judge. The counter-claim- 
 must, from its very nature, be connected with the subject of the 
 action ; and therefore the relief demanded by it and that prayed 
 for by the plaintiff cannot be entirely independent of each other. 
 It is in counter-claims of the second subdivision alone that the 
 doctrine can be employed and applied with any practical results. 
 And, of these cases, it is plain that all those in which the com- 
 plaint and the counter-claim both demand a money judgment 
 comply with the rule. It is only when one or the other seeks to 
 recover some equitable relief that its violation becomes possible. 
 The limitation thus established by the New York courts may be, 
 and probably is, correct; but at the same time it is a judicial in- 
 terpolation into the statutor}- language, which contains no such 
 restriction. The legislature has said : " When the action arises 
 on a contract, ariy other cause of action also arising on a contract 
 may also be a counter-claim." What grant of authority could be 
 clothed in more general terms than this ? The courts, liowever, 
 say, " It is not true that any other cause of action arising on 
 contract may be a counter-claim : it must be connected with the 
 subject of the action, and must operate in some way to defeat, in 
 whole or in part, the plaintiffs right of recovery." This mode of 
 interpretation, when carried beyond very narrow limits, becomes 
 a usurpation of the law-making function, and an actual repeal of 
 statutory provisions. 
 
 § 622. * 746. Decisions in other States. The decisions matle by 
 the coui'ts of other States present the same general notions in 
 respect to the nature and scope of the counter-claim.^ In Wis- 
 consin the counter-claim is recognized to the fullest extent as in- 
 cluding relief of an equitable nature, and as being available in 
 
 1 See Allen r. Shackelton, 15 Ohio St. U.5, 147, per Wilder J. ; Hill v. Butler, 6 
 Ohio St. 207, 21 C, jier Swan J.
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 861 
 
 actions brought to obtain specific remedies, such as those affecting 
 or establishing the plaintiff's title to land. In a suit to quiet title 
 to land, the plaintiff alleged his possession and claimed his title 
 ■under a certain tax-deed, which, with all the proceedings in rela- 
 tion thereto, was pai'ticularly described. The defendant answered 
 by way of counter-claim that he was in possession and asserted his 
 title under another tax sale and deed, which, with the proceedings, 
 was sufficiently set forth. He prayed judgment tliat the title 
 might be decreed to be in himself. This answer was held to be a 
 good counter-claim, the court declaring that it conformed in every 
 particular with the definition given by the code.^ The Supreme 
 Court of Missouri has also described the counter-claim in entire 
 conformity with the judicial definitions already given.^ The lan- 
 guage of the provision in the Indiana code is somewhat broader 
 than that which is found in most of the other codes. The inter- 
 pretation put upon it, however, will aid in ascertaining the general 
 spirit and object of the entire legislation which introduced this 
 class of defences. In an action to rescind a conveyance of land 
 made by the plaintiff to the defendant on the ground of an alleged 
 fraud, the answer, pleaded as a counter-claim, denied the fraud, 
 insisted upon the validity of the deed, stated the plaintiff's con- 
 tinued and wrongful possession and acts of waste, and demanded 
 judgment for the possession of the land, for the rents and profits 
 thereof, and for damages on account of the waste. This answer 
 
 1 Jarvis v. Peck, 19 Wis. 74, per Dixon to the law ; but it is sufficiently plain and 
 C J. : " It does not deny the plaintiff's de- simple. When the defendant has a cause 
 mand, except so far as it is founded upon of action against the plaintiif, upon wliich 
 his possession, but seeks to extinguish it he might have maintained a suit, sucli 
 by an equitable cross-action. It is a claim cause of action is a counter-claim. The 
 which of itself would constitute a cross- parties, then, have cross-demands ; and, in 
 action in favor of the defendant against fact, there are two causes of action before 
 the plaintiff in a separate suit." See also the court for trial in the same suit. Both 
 Powdery. Bowdle (N. Dak. 1893), 54 N. W. parties are to a certain extent plaintiffs, 
 Rep. 404. and both defendants. The answer, then, 
 
 2 Holzbauer v. Heine, 37 Mo. 443, per does not substantially differ from a peti- 
 Wagner J. : " It must contain the sub- tion ; and the reply performs substantially 
 stance necessary to sustain an action on the same office as the answer to the peti- 
 behalf of the defendant against the plain- tion. Each party claims affirmative relief 
 tiff, if the plaintiff had not sued the de- from the other. If both parties establish 
 fendant. It must have a tendency to their claims, the judgment is rendered for 
 sliow an independent cause of action, — a one or the other, according as his demand 
 claim existing in favor of the defendant may be found to be in excess." See also 
 against the plaintiff, arising either out of Hay v. Short, 49 Mo. 139, 142, which cor- 
 the contract or transaction sued on, or out rects a dictum of Holmes J. in Jones v. 
 of some otlier contract. The term is new Moore, 42 Mo. 419.
 
 862 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 was held to be a good counter-claim so far as it sought to recover 
 the possession and the rents and profits, but not in respect to the 
 demand for damages on account of the waste.' 
 
 § 623. * 747. Cause of Limitation upon Counter-Claims. The 
 foregoing citations fully sustain both the conclusions reached 
 in the preliminary independent analysis of the statute, and the 
 course of reasoning upon which they were based. The feature 
 or limitation which is pointed out by some of the cases, as neces- 
 sarily involved in all counter-claims belonging to the second sub- 
 division, — namely, that the recovery therein must defeat, modify, 
 or interfere with the relief otherwise recoverable by the plaintiff, 
 — results from the fact that the codes make no provisions for two 
 independent and antagonistic judgments rendered in favor of the 
 adverse parties in the same action. One judgment alone is con- 
 templated by the statute, which shall determine the substantial 
 rights of the parties. Even in equitable actions, where relief may 
 be conferred upon defendants as against the plaintiffs or as 
 against each other, such relief must be compatible witli that 
 granted to the plaintiff, so that the whole may be contained in 
 one judgment without opposition or contradiction. If an action 
 upon contract is brought to recover money alone, either debt or 
 damages, and a counter-claim for money, arising upon an entirely 
 distinct contract, is interposed, the resulting judgment would 
 
 1 Woodruff V. Garner, 27 Ind. 4, per ing a definition obviously less comprehen- 
 Frazer J. : " Was this counter-claim good sive than that given by the statute above 
 on demurrer 1 It is not questioned that quoted. The counter-claim comprehends 
 it averred facts sufficient in an independ- recoupment, and much more. It liardly 
 ent suit to entitle the defendant to a admits of a question that it embraces also 
 judgment; but it is urged that these facts what was known as the cross-hill in equity 
 could not be pleaded by way of counter- against the plaintiff. Unless this be so, it 
 claim in this suit. A counter-claim is de- would result that, in many cases, what 
 fined to be 'any matter arising out of, formerly might have been settled in one 
 or connected with, the cause of action litigation, would, under the code, require 
 which might be the subject of an action two or more separate suits to determine it. 
 in favor of the defendant, or which would This is not the .spirit of the code." In ivast- 
 tend to reduce the plaintiff's claim for man i-. Linn, 20 Minn. 433, wliich was also 
 damages.' It may not lie ea.sy to define an action to quiet title, a similar coun- 
 the full meaning and application of this ter-claim for the recovery of tlie land in 
 statute ; and it will therefore be safer, and question by the defendant was sustained- 
 less likely to produce confusion, if the See also Powder v. Bowdle (N. Dak. 
 court sliail at present consider only the 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 404. For an ex- 
 question of its influence upon the case im- haustive discussion of the counter-claim 
 mediately in judgment. To say, as was as defined by the Indiana code, and for 
 inadvertently done in Slayback i'. Jones, a statement of the rules in relation to its 
 9 Ind. 470, that the couuter-daim is the use, .«ee Campbell v. Routt, 42 Ind. 410, 
 same thing as recoupment, would be giv- 413-410.
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 863 
 
 necessarily be single, since it would be rendered merely for the 
 difference between tlie two adverse sums found due by the jury 
 or the court. The implied restriction upon the use of counter- 
 claims, therefore, applies only where one or both of the cross- 
 demands are equitable. It cannot be enforced in an action to 
 recover possession of lands or to recover possession of chattels, 
 since in neither of these instances does the cause of action " arise 
 out of contract," and a counter-claim under the second sub- 
 division is therefore impossible. 
 
 § 624. * 748. How plead Counter-Claim. Characteristic Marks. 
 Reason herein. I shall finish this inquiry into the general nature 
 of the counter-claim by a brief statement of the mode in which it 
 should be formally pleaded. The defendant must, in some express 
 and definite manner, indicate his design of treating and relying 
 upon this particular portion of his answer as a counter-claim. 
 Whether it stands alone, and thus constitutes the entire answer, 
 or whether it is united with other defences or counter-claims, it 
 must be so distinguished by the formal language employed, that 
 the plaintiff and the court may recognize it at once as a counter- 
 claim, and not as a simple defence. It is not enough that the 
 defendant state facts, which, if true, would constitute a cause of 
 action against the plaintiff : he must also state his intention to 
 regard these facts as constituting the affirmative cause of action, 
 and not to regard them as a defence. This intention must be in- 
 dicated either by naming the matter thus pleaded " a counter- 
 claim," — that is, by declaring that it is pleaded as such, — or by 
 concluding it with a prayer for a judgment granting the desired 
 relief. The better practice is — and it should be universal — to 
 use both of these characteristic marks; to commence the par- 
 ticular allegations with the formal statement that they are pleaded 
 as a counter-claim, and to end them with the usual prayer for 
 relief as in a complaint or petition. This practical rule of plead- 
 ing is fully sustained by the decided cases.^ There is one con- 
 
 1 I^Smith V. Coe (1902), 170 N. Y. 162, 41 Ore. 601, 69 Pac. 552; Prichard's Ex- 
 
 63 N. E. 57; Waller y. Deranleau (1903), ecutrix v. Peace (1895), 98 Ky. 99, 32 
 
 — Neb.—, 94 N. W. 1038; Nicholls v. S. W. 296; Indiana, etc. Ass'n ;'. Crawlev 
 
 Hill (1894), 42 S. C. 28, 19 S. E. 1017; (1898), 151 Ind. 413, 51 N. E. 466; Aldeii 
 
 Harris i;. Randolph County Bank (1901), v. Christianson (1901), 83 Minn. 21, 85 
 
 157 Ind. 120, 60 N. E. 1025; Helmer v. N. W. 824; Harrison v. State Banking 
 
 Yetzer (1894), 92 la. 627, 61 N. W. 206 ; & Trust Co. (1902), 15 S. D. 304, 89 N. W. 
 
 Gurske y. Kelpiu (1901), 61 Neb. 517, 85 477; Kylander v. Laursen (1902), 113 
 
 N. W. 557; Le Clare v. Thibault (1902), Wis. 461*^, 89 N. W. 488; Brauchle v. Noth-
 
 864 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 trolling reason why the defendant should designate, in a certain 
 
 heifer (1900), 107 Wis. 457, 83 N. W. 633 ; 
 Barker i;. King (1897), 97 Wis. 53, 72 
 N. W. 222; Morgan v. Hayes (1898), 98 
 Wis. 313, 73 N. W. 786 ; Conway v. 
 Mitchell (1897), 97 Wis. 290, 72 N. W. 
 752; NoUman v. Evensoii (1895), 5 N. D. 
 344, 65 N. W. 686 ; Zion Church v. Parker 
 (1901), 114 la. 1, 86 N. W. 60; Walker 
 t'. Walker (1895), 93 la. 643, 61 N. \V. 
 930. 
 
 Rood I'. Taft (1896), 94 Wis. 380, 69 
 N. W. 183 : " III an action on a pronii.ssory 
 note given in part payment for a stallion, 
 there could he no recovery of damages 
 against the plaintiff for fraud and deceit 
 in the sale, or for a hreach of warranty, 
 unless such matter was pleaded as a 
 counter-claim expressly so denominated, 
 and affirm;itive relief asked." " Where 
 matter is pleaded both as a defence and 
 a.s a counterclaim tlie defensive allega- 
 tions will not be construed as j)art of the 
 counter-claim, in the absence of appropri- 
 ate words of reference." 
 
 New Idea Pattern Co. v. Whelau 
 (1903), 75 Conn. 445, .53 Atl. 9.53: "A 
 counter-claim, when pleaded in an answer, 
 mast be pleaded 'as such,' and after the 
 matters of strict defence. Gen. St. § 612 ; 
 Practice Book, forms 356, 444." 
 
 Stotsenburg y. Fordice (1895), 142 Ind. 
 490, 41 N. E. 313 : " It is now well .settled 
 tliat where the plea is not, strictly speak- 
 ing, a defence to tlie cause of action, but 
 sets up a cross-demand, such as set-off or 
 counter-claim, it is not bad as failing to 
 respond to so much of the claim sued 
 upon as may be in excess of the set-off or 
 counter-claim, though it be directed to the 
 entire cause of action." 
 
 Tron V. Yohn (1896), 145 Ind. 272, 43 
 N. E. 437 : In an action to foreclose a 
 mortgage given for the purchase-money of 
 real estate, evidence of the difference in 
 the quantity of the land as claimed to have 
 been represented by the grantor and that 
 conveyed, is not admissible under a general 
 denial. "The relief sought by the evi- 
 dence was of an affirmative character, as 
 much so as payment, set-off, settlement, 
 accord and satisfaction, or account stated. 
 It was in tiie nature of a counter-claim." 
 Kahrs v. Kalirs (1902), 115 Ga. 28S, 41 
 S. E. 649 : A plea of setoff which fails to 
 
 set out the demand as plainly as if sued 
 on, is insufficient. 
 
 In Habcock v. Maxwell (1898), 21 Mont. 
 507, 54 Pac. 943, the court said : " Defend- 
 ant having characterized his pleading as 
 a defence, is bound by the choice he 
 makes, and may not afterwards be heard 
 to assert that it is a counter-claim. A 
 counter-claim nmst be described as such 
 where the question turns upon the want of 
 a reply. ' Such a rule is essential to pro- 
 tect a plaintiff from being misled by an 
 answer, and to prevent the snare of a 
 counter-claim lurking under the cover of a 
 supposed defence, and unconsciously ad- 
 mitted by a failure to reply.' " 
 
 Union Mercantile Co. v. Jacobs (1897), 
 20 Mont. 270, 50 Pac. 793 : Plaintiff had a 
 judgment against defendants, and defend- 
 ants, who were alleged to be insolvent, had 
 a judgment of less amount against plain- 
 tiff which had been assigned, as plaintiff 
 claimed, to defraud the plaintiff and other 
 creditors. Plaintiff brought an action in 
 equity to have tlie assigned judgment off- 
 set against its judgment. The answer 
 admitted the recovery of the two judg- 
 ments and tlie assignment, but denied 
 that the assignment of the judgment 
 was made fraudulently, and further de- 
 nied each and every alleg.ation in the com- 
 plaint not specifically admitted. On the 
 trial the defendants were allowed to show 
 that the plaintiff had in its possession book 
 accounts of the "defendants sufficient to 
 satisfy its judgment against them, and its 
 action was thereupon dismissed. The 
 action of the trial court in admitting evi- 
 dence of this counter-claim was sustained 
 on appeal, although no counter-claim had 
 beeu pleaded. This case reversed on re- 
 hearing, 20 Mont. 554, the court hold- 
 ing that a counter-claim must be pleaded 
 or it cannot be proved. 
 
 See, however, the following cases: 
 
 Brighton, etc. Irrigation Co. v. Little 
 (1896), 14 Utah, 42, 46 Pac. 268: The 
 general rule is that the court will not 
 grant a decree for affirmative relief to tlie 
 defendant without a counter-claim or cross- 
 complaint, but in this particular case the 
 court was recjuired, under the pleadings, to 
 determine the rights of the jjarties to tlie 
 canal and waters thereof, and a decree for
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 
 
 86{ 
 
 and obvious manner, the special character of the pleading. In all 
 
 affirmative relief was proper without a 
 couuter-claim or cross-complaint. Perego 
 V. Dodge (1893), 9 Utah, 1, 33 Pac. 221 : 
 Where an answer alleges facts which en- 
 title defendant to affirmative relief, it will 
 be granted, even tliough no counter-claim 
 ■or cross-complaint was filed. 
 
 City of Huron i-. Meyers (1900), 13 
 S. I).'420, 83 N. W. 553: Where facts 
 alleged in an answer amount to a couuter- 
 <;laini, they will be so considered although 
 iiot so designated, and hence are admitted 
 by failure of plaintiff to reply to them. 
 Farrell v. Burbank (1894), 57 Minn. 395, 
 59 N. W. 485. Allegations in an answer 
 manifestly set up as a counter-claim, and 
 praying for affirmative relief, -will be 
 treated as a counter-claim, though not 
 designated as such in the answer. 
 
 Arthurs i\ Thompson (1895), 97 Ky. 
 218, 30 S. W. 628: Sub-sec. 4, Sec. 97, 
 Civil Code, provides that " a defendant 
 shall not have judgment upon a set-off or 
 counter-claim, unless the caption of the 
 answer contain the words ' answer and set- 
 off ' or the words ' answer and counter- 
 claim ; ' but a misdescription in the caption 
 of the nature of the defendant's claim shall 
 not prevent him from Iiaving judgment," 
 etc. Held that this only made it neces- 
 sary to apprise the plaintiff that he asked 
 some relief over against him, and that the 
 caption " answer and counter-claim " mis- 
 takenly used instead of the caption " an- 
 swer and set-off " would not deprive the 
 defendant of such relief as he showed him- 
 self entitled to. 
 
 McDougald r. Hulet (1901), 132 Cal. 
 154, 64 Pac. 278 : A. leased a tract of land, 
 and B. and C. for a sufficient consideration 
 guaranteed the payment of the rent by the 
 lessee. The rent was not paid, and B. 
 brought an action, making A. and C. de- 
 fendants, asking to have it adjudged how 
 much was due A. under the lease, and that 
 C was bound to A. for such amount and 
 that plaintiff" was only surety, and further 
 it was sought to have judgment that C. 
 pay A. the amount so found and that plain- 
 tiff recover from C. all money paid and 
 losses sustained by reason of said guar- 
 anty. A. in his answer set out by way of 
 counter-claim and cross-complaint the facts 
 of the transaction, and asked for judgment 
 
 again.st plaintiff for tiie amount which 
 might be found ilue him under the lease. 
 The trial court found that a hvrge sum was 
 due A. under the lease, but refu.sed to give 
 A. judgment against jjlaintiff on the 
 ground tliat the amount due was not the 
 subject of a counter-claim. On appeal it 
 was held that this was error, and look 
 entirely too narrow a view of the matter. 
 The court .said, " Plaintiff could not have 
 prevented the recovery by IJoggs [A.] in 
 an independent suit. Why should he in 
 this ? We do not think it necessary to 
 go into any nice distinctions as to the 
 name given to an answer. "J 
 
 Bates i;. llosekrans, 37 N. Y. 409,411, 
 per Hunc J. ; McConihe v. HoUi.ster, 1 9 Wis. 
 269; Hutchings v. Moore, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 
 110; Wilder v. Boynton, 63 Barb. 547; 
 McAbee v. Randall, 41 Cal. 136. See 
 contra, Brannaman r. Palmer, Stanton's 
 Code (Ky.), p. 90; Sullivan t-. Byrne, 10 
 S. C. 122; Union Nat. Bk. v. Carr, 49 
 Iowa, 359 ; Equitable Life Ass. Soc. r. 
 Cuyler, 75 N. Y. 511, 514, 12 Hun, 247 ; 
 Bates ;;. Rosekrans, 4 Abb. n. s. 276, 37 
 N. Y. 409 ; Wright v. Delafield, 25 N. Y. 
 266 ; Burke v. Thorn, 44 Barb. 383 ; Bur- 
 rail V. De Groot, 5 Duer, 362 ; Beers v. 
 Waterbury, 8 Bosw. 396; Stowell r. 
 Eldred, 39* Wis. 614 ; Selleck v. Griswold, 
 49 id. 39; Gilpin v. Wilson, 53 Ind. 443 ; 
 Holmes v. Richet, 56 Cal. 307 {per contra, 
 need not be so designated). See, further, 
 in support of the conclusions of the text, 
 Brannan v. Paty, 58 Cal. 330; Carpenter 
 V. Hewel, 67 Cal. 589; Fuchs v. Treat, 41 
 Wis. 404 ; Dobbs v. Kellogg, 53 Wis. 448; 
 contra. Mills v. Rosenbaum, 103 Ind. 152; 
 Acer v. Hotchkiss, 97 N. Y. 395, 408. 
 
 The Kentucky code, § 98, subd. 4, pro- 
 vides that "a defendant shall not have 
 judgment upon a set-off or counter-cdaim, 
 unless the caption of the answer contain 
 the words ' answer and set-off,' or the 
 words 'answer and counter-claim.'" It 
 is held, however, that the plaintiff may 
 waive the benefit of this subdivision by 
 replying to the answer and counter-claim. 
 Casou V. Cason, 79 Ky. 558 ; Nutter v. 
 Johnson, 80 Ky. 426. By the Wisconsin 
 code (R. S. § 2656), as amended, the rule 
 of the text is embodied in the provision, 
 " Each counter-claim must be pleaded as
 
 866 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 the States but oue or two, the phiintiff must reply to a counter- 
 claim, or its averments of fact are admitted to be true.^ He ought 
 
 such, and be so denominated, and the 
 answer shall contain a demand of the 
 judgment to which the defendant sup- 
 poses himself to be entitled by reason of 
 the counter-claims therein." The plaintiff 
 waives the defect that the counter-claim 
 is not so designated by demurring or 
 replj'iug to it as a counter-claim, even 
 though the objection is rai.sed on the trial : 
 Voechting v. Grau, 55 Wis. 312. 
 
 [^Township of Noble v. Aasen (1898), 
 8 N. D. 77, 76 N. \Y. 990: Failure to de- 
 mur to an alleged counter-claim on the 
 ground that the facts stated do not consti- 
 tute a counter-claim, waives this objection, 
 and the only point then open to the plain- 
 tiff, which can be raised at any time, is 
 that the fiicts .stated in the answer do not 
 constitute a cause of action in favor of de- 
 fendant that could be enforced against 
 plaintiff under unj/ circumstances. See also 
 First Nat. Bank v. Laughlin (1894), 4 
 N. D. 391, 61 N. W. 473 ; Talty v. Torling 
 (1900), 79 Minn. 386, 82 N. W. 632; 
 Campbell ?;. Jones (1878), 25 Minn. 157; 
 Lace f. Fixen (1888), 39 Minn. 46, 38 
 N. W. 762 ; Walker v. .Johnson (1881), 28 
 Minn. 147, 9 N. W. 632. 
 
 Young V. Gant (1901), 09 Ark. 114, 61 
 S. W. 372 : Where a defendant sets up a 
 counterclaim to which plaintiff makes no 
 reply, if defendant does not move for 
 judgment on the counter-claim the reply 
 will be deemed to have been waived and 
 the issues treated as made. Lacey v. 
 Lacey (1893), 95 Ky. 110,23 S. W. 673 : 
 The objection that the wife's answer, in a 
 suit for divorce, seeking alimony was not 
 styled a " counter-claim " was waived by 
 the plaintiff's replying and joining issue 
 on the matter set up therein. See also 
 Warren v. Chandler (1896), 98 la. 237, 67 
 N. W. 242.] 
 
 1 QSloan i\ Rase (1899), 101 Wis. 523, 
 77 N. W. 895 ; City of Huron v. Meyers 
 0900), 13 S. I). 420', 83 N. W. 553 ; liavicz 
 V. Nickells (1 900), 9 N. 1). 536, 84 N. W. 353. 
 
 Illsly V. Grayson (1898), 105 la. 685, 
 75 N. W. 518. Action to recover rent, 
 aided by attachment. Defendant pleaded 
 a counter-claim for work and labor, etc. 
 To this plaintiff liled a rej)ly consisting of 
 
 a set-off for a balance due him upon a 
 note executed by defendant, etc. The 
 court, after quoting the sections of the 
 code bearing on the matter, said : " It 
 will be observed tiiat while they do not 
 mention either set-off or counter-claim in 
 referring to the reply, yet tliey do recog- 
 nize that defences, either negative or 
 affirmative, may be pleaded, provided the 
 matter pleaded be not inconsistent with 
 the petition. Plaintiff could not join the 
 matters pleaded in reply with his action 
 for rent ; for the statute says the land- 
 lord's lieu may be effected (that is, en- 
 forced) by action for the rent alone within 
 a limited time. Defendant had the un- 
 doubted right to plead his counter-claim; 
 but, if no set-off is allowed by way of 
 reply, he may thus, after litigation ensues, 
 apply any unsettled items of account to 
 his obligation for rent, although he may 
 at the same time be owing his landlord 
 a much larger sum on general account. 
 It may be that such a re|dy would not be 
 proper in a case where the items included 
 therein could have been embraced in the 
 petition. But where the statute expressly 
 inhibits such a course, it certaiuly must 
 be true that plaintiff may interpose in his 
 rejdy, as a matter of defence, any set off 
 he may have to defendant's counter-claim. 
 . . . The cases of Cox v. Jordan, 86 111. 
 560; Galligan v. Fannan, 9 Allen, 192; 
 Mortlaud v. Holton, 44 Mo. 58; Miller v. 
 Losee, 9 How. Pr. 356 ; Turner v. Simp- 
 son, 12 Ind. 413; Blount r. ){ick, 107 Ind. 
 238; and Starke v. Dicks, 2 Ind. App. 125, 
 — seem to su.stain tiie right to plead in 
 reply a set-off to defendant's counter-claim, 
 provided there is no departure from the 
 antecedent ground of complaint." 
 
 Dunham v. Travis (1902), 25 Utah, 65, 
 69 Pac. 468 : In an action on a written 
 contract, the answer, after denying the 
 allegations of the complaint, alleged that 
 a nmtual mistake had been made in the 
 contract, and prayed to have it corrected, 
 to which no reply was filed. Held, that 
 this constituted a counter-claim and not 
 merely matter in defence, and the counter- 
 claim was admitted by failure to reply. 
 
 Ashland Land & Live Stock Co. v.
 
 COUNTER-CI.AIM. 
 
 867 
 
 not to be subjected to this penalty unless he is told in the most 
 express terms that the pleading is a counter-claim. It would have 
 been better if the courts had laid down the most exphcit rule, and 
 liad required the defendant to name his pleading : but the cases 
 do not go to this length ; and a prayer for relief, appended to the 
 proper allegations of fact, will su2)ply the place of a name. It 
 has been held that when the defendant has set up facts wliich 
 really constitute a defence, but has mistakenly called them a 
 counter-claim, formally pleading them as such, he must stand by 
 the designation, and cannot treat them as a defence, and have the 
 benefit of them as a bar to the plaintiff's recovery.^ This ruling, 
 however, is without any cogent reason in its favor, would often 
 work injustice, and seems opposed to some of the cases already 
 quoted.2 
 
 Woodford (1897), 50 Neb. 118, 69 N. W. 
 769 : " Where to a counter-claim well 
 pleaded the plaintiff interposes no reply, 
 a verdict in his favor in excess of the 
 amount claimed in his petition, less the 
 amount of such couuter-cl;iim, should be 
 set aside as unsupported by the pleading : " 
 Medland v. Walker (1895), 96 la. 175, 64 
 N. W. 797 : Failure to plead to a counter- 
 claim does not have the effect of admitting 
 its allegations where every fact pleaded iu 
 the counter-claim is put in issue by the 
 allegations of the petition and the amended 
 and substituted answer. 
 
 Bank of Columbia v. Gadsden (1899), 
 56 S. C. 313, .33 S. E. 575 : Where a plea 
 of set-off is purely defensive, going merely 
 to defeat jdaintiff's recovery, and not 
 authorizing any affirmative relief against 
 the plaintiff, the plaintiff is not bound to 
 reply to it, as required in case of a coun- 
 ter-claim, but may on the trial plead the 
 statute of limitations ore tenus, under sec- 
 tion 189, providing that new matter in 
 the answer not relating to a counterclaim 
 " is to be deemed controverted by the ad- 
 verse party as upon a direct denial or 
 avoidance, as the case may require." 
 
 Replying set-off to set-off: Small v. Ken- 
 nedy (1893), 137 Ind. 299, 33 N. E. 674: 
 "It has often been held by this court 
 that a plaintiff may reply a set-off to a 
 set-off, and upon the same principle there 
 is no reason why he may not reply a 
 counter-claim to a counter-claim." Per 
 contni : Hammer v. Downing (1901), 39 
 
 Ore. 504, 64 Pac. 651 : A reply of a setoff 
 to a plea of setoff is bad, and constitutes 
 a departure iu pleading.] 
 
 1 Ferreira v. l)e Tew, 4 Abb. Pr. 131 
 (Sp. Term), per Brady J.; Campbell v. 
 Koutt, 42 Ind. 410, 415. See also McAbee 
 V. Randall, 41 Cai. 136, where the defend- 
 ant, liaving named his answer a " counter- 
 claiin," was not permitted to treat it as a 
 " cruss-complaint." 
 
 ■^ See De Leyer v. Mich.'\els, 5 Abb. 
 Pr. 203. 
 
 \^Disinhsalof Actionas Affecthnj Couriter- 
 Chiim : Judd v. Gray (1900), 156 Ind. 278, 
 59 N. E. 849; Adams v. Osgood (1898), 
 55 Neb. 766, 76 N. W. 446; Rodgers r. 
 Pari^er (1902), 136 Cal. 313, 68 Pac. 975; 
 Islais, etc. Water Co. r. Allen (1901), 132 
 Cal. 432, 64 Pac. 713; Southern Pac. K. 
 R. Co. V. Pixley (1894), 103 Cal. 118, 37 
 Pac. 194; Maffett v. Thompson (1898), 32 
 Ore. .546, 52 Pac. 565; Bardes r. Hutch- 
 inson (1901), 113 la. 610, 85 N. W. 797; 
 Rumbough v. Young (1896), 119 N. C. 
 567, 26 S. E. 143 ; Axiom Min. Co. r. 
 Little (1894), 6 S. D. 438, 61 N. W. 441 ; 
 Washington Nat. Bank v. Saunders (1901), 
 24 Wash. 321, 61 Pac. 546. 
 
 Atnonnt of CoiaUer-Claini (is Affecting 
 Jurisdiction : Howard Iron Works v. Buf- 
 falo Elevating Co. (1903), 176N.Y. — , 68 
 N. E. 66; Griswold v. Pieratt (1895), 110 
 Cal. 259, 42 Pac. 820; Freeman v. Scitz 
 (1899), 126 Cal. 291, 58 Pac. 690; Martin 
 V. Eastman (1901), 109 Wis. 286, 85 
 N. W. 359 ; General Elec. Co. v. Williams
 
 868 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 II. Tlie Parties in their lielations with th' Counter- Claim. 
 
 ^ 625. * 749. 1. Relations of Defendant to Counter-Claim. Must 
 be a Demand in Favor of Defendant -who pleads it. Test. Ill all 
 the States whose codes do not contain a provision in favor of 
 sureties or joint-debtors, the rnle is established without exception 
 that the counter-claim must be a demand existing in favor of the 
 defendant who pleads it ; in other words, the defendant cannot 
 set up and maintain as a valid counter-claim a right of action sub- 
 sisting in favor of another person, even though there may be close 
 legal relations between himself and such other person. The sure 
 test is very simple. Could the defendant have maintained an in- 
 dependent action upon the demand if he had made it the basis of 
 a separate suit? If he could not, then he cannot use it as a 
 counter-claim. To this proposition there is no judicial dissent 
 nor exception ; and the cases which I shall cite are intended to 
 illustrate the various circumstances in which the rule has been 
 applied.^ 
 
 § 626. * 750. Case of Surety. Relief in Equity. The most 
 common case is that of a surety. When sued alone, or together 
 with the principal debtor, he cannot interpose as a valid counter- 
 
 (1898), 12.3 N. C. .')1, 31 S. E. 288; Hay- 
 good V. Boney (1894), 43 S. C. 63, 20 
 S. E. 803 ; Buiich v. Potts (1893), 57 Ark. 
 257, 21 S. W. 437.] 
 
 1 QNorthera Trust Co. r. Hiltgen(1895), 
 62 Miiiu. 361, 64 N. W. 909; Taylor v. 
 Matte.soii (1893), 86 Wis. 113, 56 N. W. 
 829; Einenson v. Schwindt (1900), 103 
 Wis. 167, 84 N. W. 186; Sullivan v. 
 Nicoulin (1901), 113 la. 76, 84 N. W. 978; 
 Lehaiioii Steam Laundry v. Dyckraau 
 (1900), Ky., 57 S. W. 227." 
 
 Newton v. Lee (1893), 139 N. Y. 332, 
 34 N. E. 90.) : " In an action to recover 
 for good.s alleged to liave been sold 
 and delivered to defendants, the latter, 
 after a general denial, set up in their 
 answer ' for a further and separate auswer 
 and defence ' that the transactions set 
 forth in tlio complaint were between the 
 plaintiffs d.s.siijnor and a corporation, un- 
 der a written contract between vendor 
 and vendee; that the vendor failed to 
 perform its contract, by means whereof 
 the vendee was damaged in a man- 
 ner .set forth ; that defendants ' became 
 I)rivy to the contract' by guaranteeing 
 
 performance on the part of the vendee. 
 Said damages defendants claimed they 
 were ' entitled to recoup and set off as a 
 counter-claim against the jjvetended cause 
 of action set forth in the complaint.' 
 Held, that the second defence, assuming 
 the facts therein stated to 1)0 true, had no 
 relation to the cause of 'action set forth in 
 the complaint ; ' that it set up ' new matter ' 
 within tlie meaning of the provision of 
 the Code of Civil Procedure authorizing 
 a demurrer to a counter-claim ; and so, 
 that an order overruling a demurrer 
 thereto was error. It seems, that if de- 
 fendants had been sued as guarantors or 
 sureties, they could not have availed tlicm- 
 selves, in exoneration of tlicir liability, of 
 a cause of action for (lam.iges for breacli 
 of the contract with their principal." 
 
 Computing Scale Co. v. Churchill 
 (1901), 109 Wis. .303, 85 N. W. .337: 
 " A counter-claim must be one existing in 
 favor of a defendant and against a jilain- 
 tiff between whom a several judgment 
 might be had in the action, and arising 
 out of one of the causes of action men- 
 tioned in the statute."]
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 
 
 869 
 
 claim any cause of action existing in favor of that principal, — 
 not even one arising from a breach by the plaintiff of the very 
 contract in suit.^ There are instances in which eqnity will un- 
 doubtedly relieve the surety when the principal debtor is insol- 
 vent, and holds valid claims against the plaintiff which lie might 
 assert ; but such equitable relief would not be in the form of a 
 counter-cljiim : it would he defensive merely, and would not in- 
 clude any recovery against the plaintiff by the surety. If the 
 principal debtor and the surety are sued together, and the former 
 interposes the counter-claim existing in his own favor and suc- 
 ceeds on it, the result, of course, operates as a defence in aid of 
 the surety : the plaintiff's demand being partly or wholly extin- 
 
 1 Gillespie v. Torrance, 25 N. Y. .306, 
 308, 310, per Selden J. ; s. c. 4 Bosw. 3!) ; 
 7 Abb. Pr. 462 ; La Farge v. Halsey, 1 
 Bosw. 171, 4 Abb. Pr. 397; People v. 
 Brandreth, 3 Abb. Pr. n. s. 224 (Ct. of 
 A pp.), per Hunt and Porter JJ. ; East 
 Iviver Bank v. Kogers, 7 Bosw. 493 ; 
 Lasher v. Williamson, 55 N. Y. 619; 
 O'Ulenis v. Karing, 57 N. Y. 649; Gilles- 
 pie V. Torrance was an action against 
 an indorser of a note. lie alleged, as a 
 counter-claim, that he iudorsed for the ac- 
 commodation of Van P., the maker; that 
 the note was given for the price of timber 
 sold by the plaintiff to Van P. ; that plain- 
 tiff warranted the quality of the timber to 
 the buyer, — a breach of tliis warranty, 
 and conse(pient damages Ui Van P., for 
 which defendant demanded judgment. 
 This attempted counter-claim was re- 
 jected for the reasons stated in tlie text. 
 The opinion of Selden J. is very elaborate 
 and instructive. While holding that the 
 surety has no legal counter-claim nor set- 
 off, Mr. Justice Selden is of opinion that 
 he would be relieved iu equity if the prin- 
 cipal debtor was insolvent. This equita- 
 ble relief, however, would not be in the 
 shape of a recovery against the plaintiff. 
 In La Farge i'. Halsey, the defendants were 
 sureties for the lessee on a lease, and 
 were sued for rent in arrear. They set 
 up, as a counter-claim, damages sustained 
 by the lessee from a breach by the plain- 
 tiff of an agreement made between him- 
 self and the tenant. This was overruled, 
 because the right of action was in the 
 lessee alone. East River Bank i'. Rogers 
 
 was the ordinary case of a guarantor sued 
 for the debt secured. He pleaded, as a 
 counter-claim, a debt due from tlie plain- 
 tiff to his principal, and it was struck out 
 as frivolous. As to counter-claim in favor 
 of a surety, see also Morgan v. Smitii, 7 
 Hun, 244, citing Lewis v. McMillan, 41 
 Bnrb. 420; Smith v. Felton, 43 N. Y. 419, 
 and Gillespie i'. Torrance, supra ; Davis v. 
 Toulmin, 77 N. Y. 280; Scott i,'. Timber- 
 lake, 83 N. C. 382; Coffin v. McLean, 80 
 N. Y. 560; Harris v. Rivers, .53 Ind. 216; 
 Stockton Sav. & L. Soc. v. Giddings, 96 
 Cal. 84; Thalheimer v. Crow, 13 Col. 
 397. 
 
 [Bishop V. Mathews (1899), 109 Ga. 
 790, 35 S. E. 161: A defendant in an 
 action brought against him individually 
 upon a demand for the payment of which 
 he is individually liable, cannot, witliout 
 showing some equitable reason for being 
 allowed so to do, such as the insolvency 
 of the plaintiff, set off .ngain.st the plain- 
 tiffs claim a debt due by the latter to a 
 partnership of which the defendant is or 
 had been a member. 
 
 Crowley v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty 
 Co. (1902), 29 Wash. 268, 69 Pac. 784: 
 "In an action against the surety upon a 
 building contractor's bond to recover the 
 amount of unf)aid bills for material the 
 owner was compelled to pay. tlie defend- 
 ant is entitled to oifset the value of extra 
 work performed by the contractor, and 
 for this purpose may introduce evidence 
 showing that there was a dispute between 
 the owner and contractor as to the reason- 
 able value of such extras, etc."]
 
 870 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 gLiished, the surety would iiecessaiily obtain the benefit of such 
 extinction.^ 
 
 § 627. * 751. Rule not Confined to Sureties. Other Instances. 
 The rule is not confined to sureties. It requires, in general, — 
 the only exception being the case where a separate judgment is 
 possible, — that the counter-claim should exist in favor of all tlie 
 defendants, and that all the persons in whose favor it exists 
 should be defendants in the action, and that it should be pleaded 
 in their common behalf. Thus, where one is sued, a demand in 
 favor of himself and a former partner not a party to the suit is 
 inadmissible as a counter-claim ; '^ and, conversely, in an action 
 against partners upon a firm liability, a counter-claim interposed 
 by one of them, alleging a demand for damages accruing to him 
 individually from the breach of a separate contract between him- 
 self and the plaintiff, must be rejected, because it is not in favor 
 of all the defendants who are thus jointly sued.^ A person sued 
 in a representative capacity — for example, as a receiver — to re- 
 cover trust-funds in his hands, or to enforce the performance of 
 his fiduciary duty, cannot avail himself, by way of counter-claim, 
 of a demand due to himself in his personal and private capacity ; * 
 
 1 O'Blenis v. Karing, 57 N. Y. 649; 
 Springer v. Dwyer, 50 N. Y. 19; Greeu 
 V. Conrad (Mo. Supreme, I89.'l), 21 S. W. 
 Hep. 839 ; Becker v. Northway, 44 Minn. 
 61. Where tiie principal debtor and the 
 plaintiff are insolvent, the surety, who 
 is jointly bound with his principal, may 
 set off his individual claim again.st the 
 plaintiff, notwithstanding tlie statutory 
 j)rovision that the " counter-claim must 
 be one existing in favor of a defendant 
 and against a plaintiff between wliom 
 a several judgment might be had in 
 the action." Clark c. Sullivan, 2 N. Dak. 
 103. 
 
 2 Campbell v. Genet, 2 Hilton, 290. 
 See Bird v. McCoy, 22 Iowa, 549, — a 
 peculiar case in which parties were held 
 included as defendants in the Jirm nmne 
 against which the action wa.s brought. 
 See also, a.s to suits again.st ])artners 
 and other joint debtors, V^^eil v. Jones, 70 
 Mo. 560 ; Great West. Ins. Co. v. Pierce, 
 1 Wyo. Ter. 45; Wilson v. Ruukcl, 38 
 Wis. 526; Harris v. Rivers, .53 Ind. 216; 
 and ra.'es cited /jo.s<, in notes to §§ * 758, 
 ♦ 75'J. 
 
 3 Peabody v. Bloomer, 5 Duer, 678, 6 
 Duer, .53, 3 Abb. Pr. 353, per Woodruff 
 J. : " To an action against several joint 
 debtors for a debt due by them as part- 
 ners, one of them cannot avail himself, 
 either by way of set-off or counter-claim, 
 of such a defence." See this case, and 
 especially the opinion of Hoffman, J. at 
 Special Term on tlie subject of joitit 
 liabi/iti/. See also Wilson v. Kunkel, 38 
 Wis. .526. 
 
 [^Sullivan v. Xicouliu (1901), 113 la. 
 76, 84 N. W. 978 ; Brown v. Fresno Raisin 
 Co. (1894), 101 Cal. 222, 35 Pac. 639; 
 Baxter r. Sherman (1898), 73 Minn. 434, 
 76 N. W. 211 ; McKinnon v. Palen (1895), 
 62 Minn. 188, 64 N. W. 387; Pope Mfg. 
 Co. V. Cycle Co. (1899), 55 S. C. 528, 33 
 S. E. 787; Smith v. Diamond (1893), 86 
 Wis. 359, 56 N. W. 922.;] 
 
 * Johnson v. Gunter, 6 Busii, 534 ; AV 
 Jones (Supreme, 1888), 1 N. Y. Suppl. 
 127. 
 
 QWilkiihson u. Bertock (1900), 111 Ga. 
 187, 36 S. E. 623; Carter v. Tippins 
 (I90I ), 113 Ga. 636, 38 S. E. 946 ; Bisho]) 
 V. Mathews (1899), 109 Ga. 790, 35 S. E.
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 
 
 1 
 
 and the converse of this particular rule is also equally true.^ 
 Under any and all circumstances, a counter-claim consisting of a 
 demand in favor of a third person not a party to the action, and 
 having no relations with the issues involved therein, is entirely 
 inadmissible.^ 
 
 §628. * 752. 2. Relations of Plaintiff to Counter-Claim. Must be 
 a Demand against Plaintiff. Test. Application of Rule most Frequent 
 in what Cases. The very conception of a counter-claim implies 
 that it is a cause of action against the plaintiff. The test is here 
 •equally simple and plain as in the case of the defendant. Would 
 the facts, if alleged in a separate action against the plaintiff, make 
 out a cause of action against him, and show him liable to the ap- 
 propriate relief? If not, they do not and cannot constitute a 
 €ounter-claim. This rule, althougli universal, is most frequently 
 applied in actions brought by assignees of the demands in suit. 
 When the plaintiff is such an assignee, no demand accruing to 
 the defendant against the assignor can possibly be enforced as a 
 counter-claim.^ Such liability of the assignor may, under certain 
 
 161; Davis t'. Haddeii (1902), 115 Ga. 466, 
 41 S. E. 608 ; Edwards v. Williams (1893), 
 39 S. C. 86, 17 S. E. 4.57; Gallagher v. 
 Germania Brewing Co. (1893), 53 Minn. 
 214, 54 N. W. 1115; Gerdtzen v. Cockrell 
 (1893), 52 Minn. 501, 55 N. W. 58; Ore- 
 gon Gold-Mining Co. v. Schmidt (1901), 
 Ky., 60 S. W. 530; Ileadington v. Smith 
 (1901), 113 1a. 107,84 N. W. 982: In a 
 suit brought in a representative capacity, 
 defendant cannot use as a counter-claim 
 a cause of action existing against the 
 plaintiff as an individual.] 
 
 1 Gansner i'. Franks, 75 Mo. 64 ; Lanier 
 V. Branson, 21 S. C. 41. 
 
 [Lewis V. rickering (1899), 58 Neb. 
 63, 78 N. W. 368 ; Le Clare r. Thibault 
 <1902), 41 Ore. 601, 69 Pac. 552 : " Invok- 
 ing the maxim that equity will not suffer 
 a wrong without a remedy, it has been 
 held that a counter-claim ari.sing in a 
 different right will sometimes be allowed 
 in a suit by reason of circumstances tliat 
 render it equitable to do so."'] 
 
 - Bates V. Rosekrans, 37 N. Y. 409, 
 411; Babbett v. Young, 51 Barb. 466; 
 Ernst V. Kuukle, 5 Ohio St. 520 ; Dolph 
 V. Rice, 21 Wis. 590, 593; Briggs v. Sey- 
 mour, 17 Wis. 255; Carpenter v. Leonard, 
 5 Minn. 155; Mealey v. Nickerson, 44 
 
 Minn. 430 (stockholders cannot set off a 
 claim in favor of the corporation). See, 
 however, Mooreliead c. Hyde, 38 Iowa, 
 382, — a case in which the defendants 
 were held to be trustees of an express 
 trust in a contract made with tlie plain- 
 tiff, and a counter-claim by them was 
 sustained. 
 
 3 [;Sniith V. Dawley (1894), 92 la. 312, 
 60 N. W. 625; Hoaglin v. Henderson 
 (1903), 119 la. 720, 94 N. W. 247 ; Newton 
 V. Lee (1893), 139 N. Y. 332, 34 N. E. 905 ; 
 Emerson v. Schwindt (1900). 108 Wis. 167, 
 84 N. W. 186 : "A counterclaim ' must be 
 one existing in favor of the defendant 
 and against a plaintiiS between whom a 
 several judgment might be had in the 
 action.' " In this case tlie defendant in a 
 suit brought by the assignee of a land 
 contract for foreclosure sought to main- 
 tain a counter-claim for legal services 
 rendered the assignor, a receiver. Held, 
 tliat it could not be maintained. See also 
 Computing Scale Co. v. Churchill (1901), 
 109 Wis. 303, 85 N. W. 337; Taylor v. 
 Matteson (1893), 86 Wis. 113, 56 N. W. 
 829; Gibson v. Trow (1900), 105 Wis. 288, 
 81 N. W. 411. 
 
 New Whatcom v. Bellingliam Bay Imp 
 Co. (1896), 16 Wash. 138, 47 Pac." 1102.
 
 872 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 circumstances, be a good defence in bar of the recovery : but, as 
 it is not a liability of the plaintiff, it cannot be a counter-claim ; 
 it is impossible, by means of a valid demand against A. alone, to 
 obtain a judgment against B. The decisions are unanimous, and 
 sustain the doctrine stated above under all possible circumstances.^ 
 The rule is applied by the cases cited in the note to every species 
 
 " In an action by a city to recover benefits 
 for street improvements, the defendant 
 cannot offset a claim for materials fur- 
 nished the contractor who had charge of 
 making the improvements." See also 
 Sheafe v. Hastie (1897), l6 Wash. 563, 48 
 Pac. 246 ; Parker v. Carolina Bank (1898), 
 53 S. C. 58.3, 31 S. E. 673 ; Efird r. Land 
 Co. (1899), 55 S. C. 78, 32 S. E. 758 ; Lau- 
 ragleun Mills i'. Ruff (1900), 57 S. C. 53, 
 35 S. E. 387 ; Rumbough i\ Young (1896), 
 119 N. C. 567, 26 S. E. 143; Wilkinson v. 
 Bertock (1900), 111 Ga. 187, 36 S. E. 623 ; 
 Northern Trust Co. r. Hiltgen (1895), 62 
 Minn. 361, 64 N. W. 909; Harrison v. 
 State Banking & Trust Co. (1902), 15 
 S. D. 304, 89 N. W. 477; Field v. Austin 
 (1901), 131 Cal. 379, 63 Pac. 292; Bloch 
 Queensware Co. v. Metzger (1901 ), 70 
 Ark. 232, 65 S. W. 929; Bernstein v. 
 Coburn (1896), 49 Neb. 7.34, 68 N. W. 
 1021 ; Johnson v. Geneva Pub. Co. (1894), 
 122 Mo. 102, 26 S. W. 676 ; Washington 
 Sav. Bank v. Butchers', etc. Bank (1895), 
 130 Mo. 155, 31 S. W. 761.3 
 
 ' Boyd V. Foot, 5 Bosw. 110; Vassear 
 V. Livingston, 13 N. Y. 248, 252, per Denio 
 J.; s. c. 4 Duer, 285, 293, per Duer J.; 
 Dillaye v. Niles, 4 Abb. Pr. 253 ; Ferreira 
 V. De Pew, 4 Abb. Pr. 131 ; Thompson 
 '•. Sickles, 46 Barb. 49 ; Mcllvaine ;•. 
 Egerton, 2 Robt. 422; Wolf v. H., 13 
 How. Pr. 84, i)er E. Darwin Smith J. ; 
 Davidson v. Remington, 12 How. Pr. 310; 
 Gleason r. .Moen, 2 Duer, 639 ; Cumings 
 V. Morris, 3 Bosw. 560 ; Wiltsie v. Nor- 
 tiiam, 3 Bosw. 162; Duncan v. Stanton, 
 30 Barb. 5.33, 536; Tyler v. Willis, 33 
 Barl). 327 ; Spencer v. Babcock, 22 Barb. 
 326, 33') ; Weeks r. Pryor, 27 Barb. 79 ; 
 Van de .Sande v. Hall, 13 How. Pr. 458, 
 per Paige J. ; Linn v. Rugg, 19 Minn. 181, 
 185; Swift I'. Fletcher, 6 Minn. 550; 
 McConihe v. Holli.ster, 19 Wis. 269. In 
 this case the defendant prayed e<iuitaV)le 
 relief that the mortgage, etc., sued on by 
 an assignee, might be cancelled on account 
 
 of the mortgagee's fraud in obtaining it. 
 Tiic court held tliat this answer was in 
 form a counter-claim, but that it could 
 not be relied on as such by the defendant 
 and the relief granted, because the assignor 
 was a necessary party ; and the opinion 
 implies that, if he had been made a party, 
 the relief could have been granted. Not- 
 withstanding this array of authorities, 
 and the explicit language of the codes, 
 the doctrine has sometimes been over- 
 looked by courts. Thus, in Page v. Ford^ 
 12 Ind. 46, and Slayback i'. Jones, 9 Ind. 
 470, the Supreme Court of Indiana en- 
 tirely failed to notice tiiat the demands 
 existing against an assignor, whicli were 
 set up by the defendants against the as- 
 signee (the plaintiff), could not possibly 
 be counter-claims ; and that the discussion 
 of tlie court upon other points wa.s there- 
 fore wiiolly unnecessary. In the later 
 case of Perry v. Chester, 1 2 Abb. Pr. N. 8. 
 131, Mr. Justice Mouell is chargeable with 
 the same palpable oversight. The action 
 was on an appeal bond given by two 
 defendants to A., and by iiim assigned to 
 the plaintiff. One of the defendants set 
 up a demand in his own favor alone against 
 A., the assignor, as a counterclaim. The 
 learned judge discusses at great length 
 the question, whether one defendant in 
 such an action can rely upon a claim due 
 to himself alone ; and finally reaches the 
 conclusion that, as the undertaking of 
 tiie defendants wa.s joint, tlie demand of 
 the single defendant is not available. He 
 is wholly oblivious to tlie fact that no 
 such claim could be interposed at all in 
 the action against the plaintiff. See also, 
 as further illustrations of the text. Free- 
 man V. Loriilard, 61 N. Y. 612; More v. 
 Rand, 60 id. 208; Manney v. Ingram, 7S 
 N. C. 96; Holliday r. Mi'Mullau, 83 id. 
 270; McCnllocli r." Vibbard, 51 Hun, 227: 
 National Bank of Chamb. v. Grimm, 109 
 N. C. 93. See also cases cited ante, in last 
 note under § * 167.
 
 CUUNTEU-CLAIM. 873 
 
 of assignee, private and official ; and is established with absolute 
 unanimity. 
 
 § 629. * 753. Counter-claim must be a Cause of Action ; merely- 
 Defensive Matter not Sufficient. It is an essential element in the 
 legal notion of a eountev-claim that it must be a cause of action ; 
 must consist of a right to some affirmative relief, and not be 
 matter simply defensive, either in bar of the plaintiff's recovery, 
 or in reduction of its amount. Thus, in an action for the price of 
 work, labor, and material, the defendant in his answer set up pay- 
 ments made by him in excess of tlie plaintiff's demand, but did 
 not in a formal manner call liis pleading a counter-claim, nor 
 demand judgment for the surplus. At the trial he insisted that 
 his allegations were admitted because the plaintiff had not replied. 
 His contention was overruled, not upon tlie defects of form, 
 but upon the absence of any cause of action. The payments as 
 stated to have been made being voluntary, no right to recover 
 back the excess existed ; and the answer was nothing more than 
 the defence of payment.^ And payments or disbursements made 
 by a trustee or holder of a fund, and set up by him in his answer 
 to an action for an account and enforcement of the trust brought 
 by a beneficiary, do not create any right of action, and cannot, 
 therefore, be a counter-claim,^ 
 
 § 630. * 754. In Actions by Married Women ; by Widov^s. Must 
 be against Plaintiff in Capacity in ■which he sues. Against Plaintiff 
 alone and against all the Plaintiffs. Exception. In actions by 
 married women to recover demands due to them personally as a 
 part of their separate property, or their personal earnings, and the 
 like, debts and liabilities of their husbands cannot be successfully 
 
 ^ Holzbauer v. Heine, 37 Mo. 443 ; an action of ejectment, where the de- 
 
 and see McPherson v. Meek, 30 Mo. 34.5; fendant alleges ownership in himself, and 
 
 Lash i\ McCormick, 17 Minn. 403 (partial asks that his title be ciuieted again.st the 
 
 failure of consideration) ; Kent y. Cantrall, plaintiff, such answer is a counter-claim: 
 
 44 hid. 452, 459; McCrary v. Demiug, 38 Venable v. Dutch, 37 Kan. 515; Allen i-. 
 
 Iowa, 527, 531; Lathrop v. Godfrey, 6 Douglass, 29 Kan. 412; Sale v. Bugher, 
 
 N. Y. S. C. 96, —a peculiar case, in which 24 Kan. 432. 
 
 a demand against the plaintiff's assignor, - Duffy r. Duncan, 35 N. Y. 187, 189. 
 who, it was alleged, was the real party It has been held tliat no counter-claim i.s 
 in interest, was sustained ; citing Hunt v. possible against the State beyond the de- 
 Chapman, 51 N. Y. 555; Fir.st Nat. Bk. feating the action brought by it, becau.se 
 of Memphis y. Kidd, 20 Minn. 234, 242, — a judicial proceeding cannot be main- 
 an action to foreclose a mortgage, in tained against it : the counter-claim can 
 which defendant claimed that the debt he used as a de/eure, but no further 
 should be enforced upon other lands be- Commonwealth w. Todd, Q Bush, 708. 
 fore proceeding against those in suit. In
 
 874 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 interposed as counter-claims ; ^ and in a suit by a widow to re- 
 cover dower in land conveyed by her liusband during the mar- 
 riage without ■ her release, the defendant cannot counter-claim 
 damages arising from the breach of a covenant of warranty in the 
 husband's deed; for no right of action exists against her.^ The 
 demand must also be against the plaintiff in the same capacity as 
 that in which he sues. Thus, where the action is by the plaintiff 
 in his private and personal capacity, a claim against him as an 
 executor or an administrator cannot be made a valid counter- 
 claim.^ But, in an action by an executor on a note given to the 
 testator, the defendant can set up by way of counter-claim a de- 
 mand for damages caused by tlie fraud of the deceased in the sale 
 of land for the price of which tlie note was given.* Not only 
 must the counter-claim be a right of action against the plaintiff, 
 but it must, in general, be against the plaintiff alone, and against 
 all the plaintiffs.^ The exception to this rule is expressly pro- 
 
 1 Paiue V. Hunt, 40 Barb. 75. 
 
 2 Hill r. Golden, 16 B. Mon. .5.51, 5.54. 
 
 3 Merritt v. Seaman, 6 Barb. .3-30. The 
 plaintiff .sued on a note given to liini as 
 executor after the death of the te.stator, 
 and the counter-claim was a debt duo 
 from the testator. In support of its de- 
 ci.siou that these demands ilid not affect 
 the plaintiff in the same capacity, the 
 court cited Fry v. Evans, 8 Wend. .530 ; 
 Mercein v. Smith, 2 Hill, 210; but see 
 Westfall V. Duugau, 14 Ohio St. 276. 
 See, also, in support of the rule in 
 Merritt v. Seaman, Patterson r. I'at- 
 ter.son, 59 N. Y. 574; Harte v. Ilouchin, 
 .50 lud. 327 ; McLaui,Wilin v. Winn?r, 
 63 Wis. 120; Harris v. Taylor, 5.3 
 Cunu. 500 ; in an action by an assignee 
 for creditors for the price of goods sold 
 after the assignment, an indebtedness of 
 the assignor cannot be set off : James v. 
 McPhee, 9 Col. 486; Otis v. Shams, 128 
 N. Y. 45. Conversely, where the plaintiff 
 sues i)i a representative capacity, a demand 
 against him in his private capacity is not 
 a j)ri)pcr subject for a counter-claim : 
 Wakeman v. Everett, 41 Hun, 278; Gel- 
 shenen i: Harris, 26 Fed. Rep. 680. 
 When a receiver, trustee, e.xecutor, or ad- 
 ministrator sues to recover a debt due to 
 the estate, a demand by the defendant for 
 services rendered on behalf of the estate 
 on the iilaiiiliff's employiiU'iit is a good 
 
 counter-claim. Davis v. Stover, 58 N. Y. 
 473 I Barbee v. Green, 86 N. C. 158 (set-off 
 of claim for funeral expenses) ; Patterson 
 V. Patterson, 59 N. Y. 574 (same). The 
 New York Code of Civil Procedure, § 502, 
 subd. .3, contains the following provision : 
 " If the plaintiff is a trustee for another, or 
 if the action is in the name of a plaintiff, 
 who has no actual interest in the contract 
 u])on wiiich it is founded, a demand 
 against the plaintiff shall not be allowed 
 as a counter-claim; but so much of a de- 
 mand existing against the person whom 
 he represents, or for whose benefit the 
 action is brought, as will satisfy the 
 plaintiff's demand, must be allowed as a 
 countei--claim, if it might have been so 
 allowed in an action brought by the per- 
 son beneficially interested." See Pender- 
 gast V. Greenfield, 40 Hun, 494. 
 
 * Isliain r. Davidson, 52 N. Y. 237. 
 See McLean r. Leach, 68 N. C. 95; Bran- 
 don r. Allison, 66 N. C. 532, for the pecu- 
 liar rules prevailing in North Carolina. 
 
 ^ Mynderse r. Snook, 1 Lans. 488. 
 The opim'on of T. A. Johnson J. contains 
 an elaborate discussion of the general 
 subject of joint and separate demands and 
 judgments. See also S. P. Belknap r. 
 Mclntyre, 2 Abb. Pr. 306 ; McPherson r. 
 Meek, 30 Mo. 345; Merrick v. Gordon, 
 20 N. Y. 93, 97 ; N. Y. Ice Co. v. Parker, 
 8 Bosw. 683. It mav be intercstiiia; and
 
 COUNTEII-CLAIM. 
 
 87^ 
 
 vided for by the codes, and only exists in those cases where a 
 separate judgment may be rendered for or against the person 
 against whom the counter-claim is [)leaded.^ This exceptional 
 case will be examined in the following subdivision. 
 
 § 631. * 755. 3. "When the Counter-Claim may be in Favor of One 
 or More of Several Defendants, and agaiiast One or More of Several 
 Plaintiffs. "When Possible. Question herein Stated. The provision 
 found in nearly all the codes, that the counter-claim must exist 
 " in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff between whom a 
 several judgment might be had in the action," implies that when- 
 ever the single defendant or all the defendants jointly may recover 
 against one or some of the plaintiffs and not against all, or when- 
 ever one or some of the defendants and not all may recover against 
 the single plaintiff or all the plaintiffs jointly, or whenever both 
 of these possibilities are combined, a counter-claim may be inter- 
 posed against the one or some of the plaintiffs and not against all, 
 and by the one or some of the defendants and not by all. Such a 
 
 instructive to contrast this rule as it lias 
 Leeu inferred from the language found in 
 the coiles generally with the very different 
 rule that results from the freer provisions 
 of the Iowa statute. luan action brought 
 hy a single plaintiff to recover damages 
 for the non-performance of a contract to 
 sell and deliver cattle, tlie defendants 
 alleged the following facts as a counter- 
 claim, and proved the same at the trial ; 
 that subsequently to the agreement sued 
 iipon, they entered into a second and dif- 
 ferent contract with the plaintiff and 
 certain other persons composing a part- 
 nership under the firm name of Gadsden 
 & Co., by which they agreed to deliver, 
 and the firm to receive, the same cattle 
 at the same time and place, but at an en- 
 hanced price; that this second contract 
 was substituted instead of the former 
 one ; that they had fully tendered per- 
 formance, but the purchasers had wholly 
 refused to accept and pay for the cattle, 
 to their damage, for wliicli tliey demanded 
 judgment against the ])laintiff, Gadsden 
 &. Co. of course not being parties to the 
 suit. This counter-claim was sustained, 
 the court sa3nng : " The defendants could 
 hold him [the plaintiff] liable in this ac- 
 tion for the damages sustained for not 
 rc'ceiving tlie cattle: that is to say, though 
 
 others may have been jointly liable with 
 him [the plaintiff], the defendants could 
 recover their damages in this action 
 against him. The defendants could have 
 sued the plaintiff on this contract, and, if 
 so, they could set up their counter-claim, 
 .and hold him for his refusal to receive. 
 And within the rule recognized by this 
 court in Ryerson i\ Hendrie, 22 Iowa, 
 480, this would be so, though the contract 
 was made with the new parties as a part- 
 nership." lledman v. Malvin, 23 Iowa, 
 296, 299. See also Musselman v. Galli- 
 gher, 32 Iowa, 383; Baird v. Morford, 29 
 iowa, 531, 534; Sherman v. Hale, 7f» 
 Iowa, 383; Allen v. Maddox, 40 Iowa, 
 124 (a cause of action may be pleaded as 
 a "set-off," under the first subdivision of 
 the code section, by one defendant, where 
 several are jointly sued ; or, when it ex- 
 ists against several, it may be pleaded 
 against the single plaintiff). 
 
 1 I^Drake v. Avaazini (1894), 20 Col. 
 104, 36 Pac. 846. Where a plaintiff is 
 jointly liable with another to the defend- 
 ant, a counter-claim will not lie against liini 
 alone upon that liability. Holgate i\ 
 Downer (1899), 8 Wyo. 334, 57 Pac. 918: 
 " It is the general rule, both in law and 
 equity, that joiut and separate debts can- 
 not be set off against each other. "]2
 
 876 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 severance in the recovery is possible when the right sought to be 
 maintained on the one side, and the liability to be enforced on the 
 other, are not originally joint. The discussion is therefore re- 
 duced to the question. When may a severance in the judgment be 
 had, so that it may be rendered for a part of the plaintiffs and 
 against the others, and against a part of the defendants and for the 
 others? From the answer to this inquiry we shall ascertain be- 
 tween what parties " a several judgment may be had in tlie action ; " 
 and as a further consequence, when the counter-claim may be 
 against one or more of the plaintiffs, or in favor of one or more of 
 the defendants. In pursuing the discussion, I shall collect and 
 examine some of the leading judicial decisions which have given a 
 construction to the clause, and shall endeavor to ascertain from them 
 the general principles and rules that may determine, in each particu- 
 lar case, when a counter-claim of this form and nature is proper.^ 
 
 § 632. * 75G. (1) Against One or Some of the Plaintiffs. Illustra- 
 tive Case. An action for an accounting and recovery of the 
 amounts found due was brought by three plaintiffs against two 
 defendants under the following circumstances. The five parties 
 had entered into an agreement for the publication of a newspaper : 
 the defendants were to be the actual publisliers, and to have charge 
 of the business ; and, after paying all the expenses, the net pro- 
 ceeds were to be divided into five equal parts, of which the defend- 
 ants were to retain two, and one of the other " three parts shall 
 be paid by [defendants] in cash to each of the other parties to 
 this agreement," — the plaintiffs. The answer, besides other sepa- 
 rate defences, contained a counter-claim consisting of a judgment 
 recovered by the defendant R. against the plaintiff H., and as- 
 signed to both the defendants before the suit was commenced. 
 This counter-claim was set up against the plaintiff II. alone. 
 The New York Court of Appeals held that although the action 
 was inform joint, yet the right of each plaintiff was seveml ; and 
 a several judgment, declaring the simi to which each was entitled, 
 was necessary.2 Nothing can be more firmly settled than the 
 
 ' [^r>el)anon Steam Laundry v. Dyck- fendants had averred and proved payment 
 
 man (1900), Ky., 57 S. W. 2il ; Murphy r. in full of his .-<hare, the defence as to such 
 
 Colton (1896), 4 Okla. 181, 44 Pac. 208; jdaintiff would have been effectual; and 
 
 Van Ktten )•. Kosters (1896), 48 Neb. 152, yet the other two idaintiffs would have 
 
 66 N. W. 1106.] been entitled to judfrment for the several 
 
 2 Taylor I-. Hoot, 4 Keyes.. 335 :" Hence, amounts of their share.*. . . . The same 
 
 a.« to eitlier of the jilaintiffs, if the de- principle is :i])idicable to a defence in the
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. . 877 
 
 general rule, that in the absence of a statutory provision to the 
 contrary, where an action is brought by a partnership on a claim 
 due the firm, no demand in favor of the defendant against one or 
 some of its members can be used as a counter-claim ; ^ but an ap- 
 parent exception to this rule has been admitted. If the business 
 had been carried on by one or more of the firm as ostensible part- 
 ners, a debt owing by him or them may be interposed as a counter- 
 claim, although all the members have united in the action. By 
 their mode of conducting the business, the ostensible partner or 
 partners had been held out to the world as the real firm, and they 
 could sue or be sued without joining the others as parties to the 
 proceeding.^ The case of a demand against the plaintiff or plain- 
 tiffs on the recoixi, and others who are not parties to the suit, being 
 pleaded as a counter-claim, has already been considered. It does 
 not present exactly the question now under consideration, but de- 
 pends for its solution upon the same general principles. It is 
 settled by the decisions, that a joint indebtedness or liability due 
 from the plaintiff and from others not parties to the suit cannot 
 be used as a counter-claim against the plaintiff, because such a 
 cause of action cannot be severed and a judgment rendered against 
 a part only of the persons liable.^ 
 
 nature of a counter-claim. . . . Tlie plain- S. D. 404, 64 N. W. 188 ; Folsom v. Pail- 
 
 tirt"s jiosition is undoubtedly correct, that ing (1899), 58 Neb. 478, 78 N. W. 926.] 
 
 where the cause of action is strictly joint, '^ Van Valen v. Russell, 13 Bar!). 590, 
 
 and the recovery, if had, is for the joint 592, per Edwards J. ; citing 7 Duruf. & 
 
 benefit of the plaintiffs, the defendant E. T. li. .361 (note c) ; Ec p. Enderby, 2 
 
 cannot set off or counter-claim tlie iiidi- Barn. & C.389; Smith ;•. Watson, 2 Barn, 
 
 vidua! debt of either plaintiff to defeat & C. 401. See also Rush v. Tliom[)son, 
 
 or reduce a joint recovery." Such, how- I12lnd. 158. " Where a factor dealing for 
 
 ever, was not the present case, because a principal, but coucealitig that ])riucipal, 
 
 there was no joint demand on the part delivers goods iu his own name, tiie jier- 
 
 of the plaintiffs. The counter-claim was son contracting with him laas a right to 
 
 therefore sustained. See also, as illus- consider him to all intents and purposes 
 
 trating the general conclusions of the text, as the principal; and though the real 
 
 Freeman v. Lorrillard, 61 N. Y. 612, 617; principal may appear and bring an action 
 
 Field (;. Hahn, 65 Mo. 417. upon that contract against the purchaser 
 
 1 Nipper v. Jones, 27 Mo. App. 538 ; of the goods, yet that purchaser may set 
 
 Peclc V. Snow, 47 Minn. 398; Morganthau off any claim he may have against the 
 
 r. King, 15 Col. 413. factor in answer to the demand of the prin- 
 
 I^Owsley r. Bank of Cumberland cipal;" per Lord Mansfield, in Rabone r. 
 
 (1902), Ky., 66 S. W. 33; Gotthauer v. Williams, 7 Durnf. & E. T. It. 360 (n.) ; 
 
 Cunningham (1896), 4 Okla. 551,47 Pac. followed in Hogan v. Shorb, 24 Wend. 
 
 479 ; Witherington v. Huntsman (1897), 64 458 ; Pratt ?•. Collins, 20 Hun, 126 ; Tanne- 
 
 Ark. 551, 44 S. W. 74; McDonald v. Mac- baum v. Marsellus (N. Y. City Ct. 1893), 
 
 kenzie (1887), 24 Ore. 573, 14 P.ac. 868; 22 N. Y. Suppl. 928. 
 
 Adams v. Baker (1898), 24 Nev. 162, 55 3 gee supra, § *754; Schubart ;-. Har- 
 
 Pac. 362; Sweeney v. Bailey (1895), 7 teau, 34 Barb. 447 ; Belknap u. Mclutyre,
 
 878 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 J5 633. * 757. Several Judgment between Some of the Parties. 
 Inquiry Presented herein. Conflict of Opinion. Upon the general 
 question, When can a several judgment be rendered between some 
 of the parties to an action ? there has been much contiict 01 judi- 
 cial opinion, and discrepancy of decision. It resolves itself into 
 the broader inquiry, How far has the common-law doctrine of 
 joint rights and liabilities been changed by the new procedure ? 
 The judges of one school have denied any modilication in these 
 legal notions, and have restricted tlie language of the statute to 
 equitable proceedings. Another school have gone to the opposite 
 extreme, and liave declared the ancient rules as to joint right and 
 liability to be utterly abolished, so that a severance among the 
 plaintiffs or defendants in the recovery may be had in all cases.^ 
 
 2 Abb. Pr. .3G6 ; Myn(ler.se v. Snook, 1 
 Lans. 488; Spofford v. Kowan, 124 N. Y. 
 108 ; McCulloch t: Vibbard, 51 Hun, 227 ; 
 Ingols V. Plimpton, 10 Col. 5-35 ; Wood 
 V. Brush, 72 Cal. 224. Contra in Iowa. 
 Redman v. Malvin, 23 Iowa, 296; and in 
 North Carolina, Sloan v. McDowell, 71 
 N. C. 356-3.58 ; Neal i-. Lea, 64 N. C. 678 ; 
 Harris v. Burwell, 65 N. C. 584. This 
 ruling is not based upon any peculiar 
 stature, but upon the general provision of 
 the code, § 248, that a " judgment may be 
 given for or against one or more of sev- 
 eral plaintiffs, and for or against one or 
 more of several defendants ; " which is 
 the same as found in all the other codes. 
 Where, in Kentucky, an action was com- 
 menced against a resident of the State by 
 a uon-rcsident firm, a demand against one 
 of the plaintiffs \va.s allowed as an equita- 
 ble set-off or counter-claim, because the 
 defendant could not sue upon it in that 
 State. Wallenstein v. Selizman, 7 Bush, 
 175. Where the subject of the counter- 
 claim is a tort for which each and all of 
 the wrongdoers are liable, it is no ob- 
 jection that the tort was committed by a 
 firm composed of the plaintiffs and others 
 not parties to the suit. Walker v. Johnson, 
 28 Minn. 147. 
 
 ^ See Cowles v. Cowles, 9 How. Pr. 
 301. The action was brought by two 
 jjlaintiffs upon a promissory note, made 
 payable to them on demand. The defend- 
 ant alleged facts tending to show that the 
 note was the sole property of the plaintiff, 
 C, and .'Stated a demand in his own favor . 
 
 against C, in every respect proper and 
 sufficient to constitute a counter-claim, if 
 the latter had been the only plaintiff. 
 This answer having been struck out on 
 motion, the General Term, upon apjieal, 
 pronounced it a valid counter-claim, and 
 available to the defendant as pleaded. 
 Two questions, it was said, are raised. 
 " First, in an action upon contract by two 
 or more plaintiffs, can one of them have 
 judgment in his favor, the evidence estab- 
 lishing the cause of action in him alone ? 
 Secondly, if so, can the defendant, upon 
 showing the cause of action to be solely in 
 the one plaintiff, avail himself of a set-off 
 against that plaintiff in a case where he 
 would have had the right to do so had the 
 action been commenced by thai plaintiff 
 alone i " Both of these questions were 
 answered in the affirmative. It was said 
 that the new procedure extended the rules 
 of equity to all legal actions, and so far 
 abrogated the legal notions of joint right 
 and liability : that the sections permitting 
 a judgment "to be given for or against 
 one or more of several plaintiffs, and for 
 or against one or more of several defend- 
 ants," are most general in their terms, and 
 should not be restricted to actions iu which 
 the right sued upon is several, and not 
 joint; and that, a several judgment being 
 thus made possible, the conclusion as to the 
 propriety of the counter-claim against one 
 plaintiff followed inevitably from the ex- 
 jiress language of the statute. In other 
 word.*, no matter what be the form of the 
 action, although the plaintiffs have alleged
 
 COUNTEK-CLAIM. 
 
 879 
 
 This loose or liberal interpretation has, however, been utterly' re- 
 pudiated by other eases, whieli, as it seems to me, establish, by a 
 very decided preponderance of judicial authority, the doc-trine as 
 now generally accepted in those States whose codes compose the 
 two groups mentioned at the commencement of the section.^ The 
 doctrine established by these decisions is, that if the demand in 
 suit was originally joint and several, although the action upon it 
 is joint, and a fortiori if it was several, a several judgment miyhl 
 
 a joint riglit in themselves, the defendant 
 may controvert this Jillegation, show a 
 several right in one of them alone, and 
 interpose a counter-claim against that one. 
 This decision, it will be noticed, does not 
 go to the length of holding that, when two 
 or more plaintiffs sue upon a legal right 
 which is confessedly joint, the deteudaut, 
 while admitting this joint cause of action 
 and the union of all the plaintiffs therein, 
 may assert a coniiter-claim against one, or 
 some of them less tliau all. The reasoning 
 of the learned judge seems logically to lead 
 to that result, for it argues that a several 
 judgment is possible in all cases upon con- 
 tract ; and, if possible, the counter-claim is 
 expressly permited. See also the dicliiin 
 of Folger J. in Simar t'. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 
 298, 301. The same construction is given 
 to the provision in North Carolina. Sloan 
 V. McDowell, 71 N. C. 356, 357; Neal v. 
 Lea, 64 N. C. 678 ; Harris v. Burwell, 65 
 N. C. 584. 
 
 ^ A few cases will illustrate this pre- 
 vailing doctrine. In Mynderse v. Snook, 
 1 Lans. 488, 491-493, the court discusses 
 the general doctrine of joint and several 
 liabilities and judgments ; and from its 
 able opinion I make the following ex- 
 tracts : " The demand which the defend- 
 ants had was against the plaintiff and V. 
 jointly as partners and joint contractors 
 with them. It was for damages arising 
 from an alleged breach of the contract by 
 these two partners. This claim, as is ap- 
 parent, was not against tlie plaintiff, but 
 against the firm of which lie was an indi- 
 vidual member. Properly there could be 
 no several judgment between the parties 
 to this action on account of tl)at claim. 
 It was not upon its face or in law a claim 
 against a plaintiff individually. This is 
 the test (Code, § 150). It was a partner- 
 ship debt if a demand existed. Partners 
 
 are not joint and several debtors, but joint 
 debtors only. Nothing is better settled 
 than the general rule tliat a creditor of a 
 partnersiiip is not entitled, as matter of 
 law, to bring a separate action, and have 
 a separate judgment, against one of the 
 several partners when tiieyare all living " 
 The court then examined and criticised 
 certain cases relied upon by the duli; ad- 
 ants. The language of Ingrahani J. in 
 Schubart v. Harteau, 34 Barb. 447, was 
 declared to be a mere dictum, and its cor- 
 rectness as such was pointedly denied. 
 Briggs V. Briggs, 20 Barb. 477, and Par- 
 sons V. Nash, 8 How. Pr. 454, were dis- 
 tinguished from the case at bar. The 
 point of distinction in both was the fact 
 that the liability of the defendants therein 
 was several as well as joint ; so that a 
 several judgment against each of them 
 would have been possible. " The grounds 
 of these decisions," the court continues, 
 " were undoubtedly correct if the demand 
 on which the action was brought was sev- 
 eral as well as joint, so that the plaintiff 
 might have had a several judgment in the 
 action against either defendant. It ful- 
 filled, in that view of it, precisely the re- 
 (juirements of the code. Neither of these 
 cases supports the dictum in Schubart v. 
 Harteau. According to the rule there 
 laid down, the right to interpose and 
 prove a demand by way of counter-claim 
 depends upon the manner and form of the 
 pleadings in the action, rather than upon 
 the general principles of the law. This, 
 J am sure, is not the true meaning of § 150 
 of the code. By that section, the demand 
 must be of such a nature and character, 
 that, upon the general rules and principles 
 of law, a several judgment may bt had 
 upon it in the action. If it is not such, the 
 party offering it is not entitled to use it 
 in that wav."
 
 880 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 have been recovered, and the counter-claim against part of the 
 jjhiintiffs, or in favor of a part of the defendants, is possible : when 
 the demand in suit is originally joint, a severance is impossible. 
 
 § 634. * 758. (2) In Favor of One or Some of the Defendants. 
 Settled Rule herein. In the following cases the counter-claim 
 was interposed by one or some of the defendants against the single 
 plaintiff, or all tlie plaintiffs if more than one. The same general 
 principles of joint and several right and liability control this class 
 of actions and the one just considered, and the same decisions are 
 authorities in both.^ The rule is settled that, in an action against 
 defendants who are joint contractors and jointly liable, a separate 
 judgment against one or more less than all is not possible except 
 in a few special personal defences ; that in an action, though joint 
 in form, against defendants who are joint and several contractors, 
 and a fortiori against defendants who are severally liable, such a 
 separate recovery may always ba had. The doctrine thus stated 
 has been applied to the case of defendants sued upon a bond in 
 terms joint and several.^ 
 
 ^ Peabody v. Bloomer, 5 Duer, 678, 
 679, per Wouilruff J. ; s. c. sab noin. Pea- 
 body V. Beach, 6 Duer, 53 ; 3 Abb. Pr. 
 353. The same construction was fifiven to 
 the statute by Mr. Justice Marvin, and 
 applied to the admissibility of a counter- 
 claim, in Parsons v. Nash, 8 How. Pr. 
 454 ; and as his reasoning has been fre- 
 quently approved, and his conclusions 
 .adopted by other-courts, I shall ijuote his 
 opinion, not as a binding authority, — fur 
 it was delivered at Si)ecial Term, — but 
 as an argument. The three makers of a 
 joint and .several note, H., N., and P., 
 were sued in a joint action, H. being the 
 principal debtor, and the others his sure- 
 ties. The answer was a counter-claim of 
 a judgment in favor of II. alone against 
 the plaintiffs lor an amount greater than 
 t'le sum secured by the note. It wa.s ad- 
 mitted on the trial; and the plaintiffs 
 moved to set aside the verdict. After 
 referring to § 150, the judge proceeds: 
 *' The counter-claim is to be a claim ex- 
 isting in favor of a defendant and against 
 a plaintiff between whom a several judg- 
 ment might Ite bad in the action. This 
 clearly indicates that there may be cases 
 where the set-off or counter-claim m.ay 
 not be due to or iii favor of all the de- 
 
 fendants ; and to ascertain between whom 
 a several judgment may be had in the 
 action, we must look to other ]>rovisions 
 of the code, particularly §§ 136 and 274. 
 In my opinion, in an answer proper for a 
 set-off or counter-claim against several 
 defendants severaUi/ liable, or jointly and 
 severallji liable, any one of thera may 
 avail himself of his set-off or counter- 
 claim, or any number of the defendants 
 to whom the set-off or counter-claim is 
 jointly due may avail themselves there- 
 of." On the general subject of counter- 
 claims in favor of all or a part of the 
 defendants, see also Batligate v. Haskin, 
 59 N. Y. 533, 539, 540 (in an action to 
 foreclose a mortgage made to secure a 
 joint bond given In' the mortgagor and 
 A. as his surety, a debt due from the 
 plaintiff to the mortgagor is a good 
 counter-claim, althongli the fact that A. 
 signed as surety did not appear on the 
 face of the bond) ; Weil v. Jones, 70 Mo. 
 560; Davis v. Notvvare, 13 Nov. 421; 
 Plyer v. Parker. 10 S. C 464 ; Great West. 
 ,1ns. Co. ;;. Pierce, 1 Wyom. Ter. 45. 
 
 2 People V. Cram, 8 IIow. Pr. 151. 
 The opinion in this ca.se has been fre- 
 (juently cited with approval, and has 
 never been questioned. See also, to the
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 881 
 
 § 635. * 759. Where Partnership may be sued in Firm Name. 
 Illustrative Cases. A peculiar question has arisen in tliose States 
 whose codes permit a partnership to be sued l)y its firm name. 
 ]n such an action, a counter-claim in favor of all the persons 
 actually composing the firm may be pleaded and proved, although 
 it discloses the existence of partners who had not been mentioned 
 as such in the petition or complaint.^ In an action upon an in- 
 junction bond executed by the plaintiff in an equity suit and 
 sureties, the principal defendant was permitted by the Kentucky 
 Court of Appeals to counter-claim damages sustained by himself 
 individually from the wrongful acts of the plaintiff committed 
 while the injunction was in force.^ As one of two or more joint 
 debtors cannot rely upon a demand due to him separately, upon 
 the same principle a defendant cannot interpose a counter-claim 
 in favor of himself and another, or others jointly who are not 
 parties to the suit.^ Bonds having been issued in the name of a 
 town in aid of a railroad under color of statutory proceedings, the 
 town brought an equitable suit against all the holders thereof to 
 have the proceedings declared void, and the bonds themselves can- 
 celled. One of the defendants individually set up as a counter- 
 claim a debt to himself from the town for money loaned. This 
 answer was overruled on the merits, the court holding that it did 
 not fall within the definition of any species of counter-claim. 
 The omission to rest the decision upon the obvious ground, if it 
 
 same effect, Briggs v. Briggs, 20 Barb. ^ Tinsley v. Tinsley, 15 B. Mon. 454. 
 
 477, 479 ; Gordon v. Swift, 46 lud. 208, Altliough the particular question under 
 
 209; Johnson?;. Kent, 9 Ind. 252 ; Blau- discussion was not alluded to hy the 
 
 kenship v. Rogers, 10 Ind. 333; Knour v. court, its very silence must be taken as an 
 
 Dick, 14 Ind. 20; Utley r. Foy, 70 N. C. admission that such a counter-claim in 
 
 303 ; Newell v. Salmons, 22 Barb. 647 ; favor of one defendant was proper. 
 Perry v. Chester, 12 Abb. Pr. n. s. 131, ^ Stearns v. Martin, 4 Cal. 227, 229; 
 
 133. If, however, the defendants are Hopkins v. Lane, 87 N. Y. 501 ; Proctor 
 
 joint debtors, no such counter-claim is v. Cole, 104 Ind. 373 ; but see Seaman v. 
 
 admissible. Pinckney v. Keyler, 4 E. 1). Slater, 49 Fed. Rep. 37 (when one of the 
 
 Smith, 469 ; Slayback v. Jones, 9 Ind. owners of a vessel is sued for the entire 
 
 470; Roberts i'. Donovan, 70 Cal. 108; amount of damages, resulting from the 
 
 Mortimer v. Chambers, 63 Hun, 335 ; breach of a charter-party, and is to be 
 
 Coleman v. Elmore (Ore.), 31 Fed. Rep. compelled to pay the entire sum, he can 
 
 391 (action against partners). setoff the amount due upon the charter- 
 
 [[Murphy i'. Colton (1896), 40kla. 181, party). Where the plaintiff brought suit 
 
 44 Pac. 208; Brodek r. Farnum (1895), 11 against two defendants, and the action 
 
 "Wash. 565,40 Pac. 189 ; Adams v. Baker failed against one, it was held that a joint 
 
 (1898), 24 Nev. 162, 55 Pac. 362 ; Sweeney demand in favor of the defendants could 
 
 r. Bailey (1895), 7 S.D. 404, 64 N. W. 188.^ not be setup as a counter-claim: Cope- 
 
 1 Bird V. McCoy, 22 Iowa, 549. land v. Young, 21 S. C. 275. 
 
 56
 
 882 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 existed, that a counter-claim in favor of one defendant was im- 
 proper, was a plain though silent admission that this objection 
 was untenable. In such an action a teparate judgment is not 
 only possible, but is, in fact, absolutely necessary.^ 
 
 § 636. * 7G0. Construction Given to Language of Iowa Code in 
 Musselman v. Galligher. As the lowa code is unlike that of any 
 other State in this respect, I quote somewhat f reel}' from a 
 case which gives a construction to its language, and ex- 
 plains its peculiar provisions. In an action against a husband 
 and wife jointly, three counter-claims or cross-demands were 
 pleaded as follows : (1) By both defendants jointly to recover 
 damages caused by the plaintiff's malicious prosecution of the 
 wife ; (2) by the husband alone to recover damages caused by 
 the malicious prosecution of his minor children ; (3) by the 
 husband alone to recover damages caused by the malicious 
 prosecution of himself. The judgment of the court, giving a 
 construction to the statute, and passing upon the validity of this 
 counter-claim, will be found in the foot-note.^ 
 
 1 Venice v. Breed, 65 Barb. 597, 605, 
 606. 
 
 ■■^ Musselman i-. Galligher, 32 Iowa, 
 383, 389. There are, Jirst, " set-off," which 
 is an independent cause of action arising 
 on contract or ascertained bv the decision 
 of the court, and can be pleaded only in 
 an action on contract ; secondli/, " counter- 
 claim," which is a cause of action in favor 
 of the defendants, or some of them, against 
 the plaintiffs, or some of them, arising out 
 of the contract or transaction set forth in 
 the plaintiff's petition as the foundation 
 of his claim, or connected with the sub- 
 ject of the action ; thirdli/, " cross-demand," 
 which is a statement of am/ new matter 
 constituting a)ij/ cause of action in favor 
 of the defendant, or all the defendants, if 
 more than one, against tlie plaintiff, or (tU 
 the plaintiffs, if more than one, and which 
 the defendant or defendants might have 
 brought when the suit was commenced, 
 or which was then held, whether matured 
 or not, if matured, when pleaded. "The 
 ' cross-demand ' is more comprehensive 
 than either the set-off or the counter- 
 claim. A set-off is only pleadable in an 
 action on a contract, and must itself arise 
 on contract. A counter-claim must ari.se 
 out of the cause of action, or be connected 
 
 therewith. A ' cross-demand,' however, 
 arises upon any independent cause of 
 action, whether on contract or tort. But 
 a 'cross-demand,' unlike a counter-claim, 
 nuisf exist in favor of all the defendants, 
 if there are more than one, and against all 
 the plaintiffs, if there are more than one. 
 This is the plain reading of the statute ; 
 so that, when there are several defend- 
 ants, a ' cross-demand ' in favor of one 
 only cannot be pleaded." Applying these 
 principles, the answer in question was 
 held to be wholly bad. The demands 
 Avere certainly not set-offs, since they 
 arose out of torts : they were not counter- 
 claims, because they did not arise out of, 
 nor were they connected Avith, the plain- 
 tiff's cause of action. If it is said tliey 
 were " cross-demands," they were inad- 
 missible, because they were in favor of 
 one defendant alone. The claim of dam- 
 ages for the tort to the wife was declared 
 to lie one in her owti favor, if it existed 
 at all ; and the husband could not join 
 with her in enforcing it, whether she 
 brought an action on it as a plaintiff, or 
 pleaded it as a " cross-demand " in an 
 action against her. See also Corbett v. 
 Hughes, 75 Iowa, 281.
 
 COUNTEU-CLAIM. 883 
 
 § 637. * 761. Rules Established in most of the States. By tlu' 
 decisions which have been reviewed in the foregoing paraoiaplis, 
 certain specific rules are clearly established for all the States 
 whose codes may he classed in either of the two general groups 
 mentioned at the commencement of this section. First, when 
 the defendants in an action are joint contractors, and are sued 
 as such, no counter-claim can be made available which consists 
 of a demand in favor of one or some of them. Secondly, when 
 the defendants in an action are jointly and fcverally liable, al- 
 though sued jointly, a counter-claim, consisting of a demand in 
 favor of one or some of them, may, if otherwise without objection, 
 be interposed. Thirdly, since it is possible, pursuant to express 
 provisions of all the codes, for persons severally liable to be sued 
 jointly under certain circumstances in a legal action, — tliat is, in 
 an action brought to recover a common money judgment, — a 
 t ounter-claira in favor of one or more of such defendants may be 
 pleaded and proved. Fourthly, in all equitable suits wherein 
 persons having different interests, and against whom different 
 reliefs are demanded, may be, and constantly are, united as co- 
 defendants, a counter-claim existing in favor of one or more of 
 such defendants may be interposed, free from any objection based 
 entirely upon the situation of the parties. Fifthly, when two or 
 more persons have a /om^ right of action, and unite as plaintiffs 
 to enforce the same, a counter-claim cannot be admitted aoainst 
 one or some of them in favor of any or all the defendants. 
 Sixthly, when two or more persons have separate rights of action, 
 and they are properly united as plaintiff's in one action to enforce 
 these rights, a counter-claim may be set up against one or more 
 of them, as the case may be. Seventhly, if two or more plaintiffs 
 should bring an action joint in form, and should allege and claim 
 to recover upon a joint cause of action, — even a contract, — but 
 in fact the joinder was improper because as to some, or perhaps 
 all but one, there existed no right of action, a recovery could be 
 had in favor of the one or more who established a cause of action, 
 and the complaint be dismissed as to the others ; and it would 
 seem to follow as a necessary corollary that a counter-claim might 
 be interposed against the one or more of the plaintiffs under such 
 circumstances in whose favor a separate judgment could be ren- 
 dered. Lastly, in equitable actions, counter-claim, in favor of 
 one or some of the defendants, and against one or some of the
 
 88-4 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 plaintiffs, must be permissible as a general rule, since in equity 
 the common-law doctrine of joint right and liability does not 
 generally prevail, and separate judgments, or judgments confer- 
 ring separate relief, among the parties, are almost a matter of 
 course. 
 
 § 638. * 762. Counter-claim may fail for "Want of Necessary- 
 Parties, especially those of an Equitable Character. Illustrative Case. 
 Counter-claims otherwise proper may be inadmissible or ineffect- 
 ual for the want of the necessary parties before the court, since 
 the same rules as to parties must apply to them as would be ap- 
 plied if the facts alleged and the relief demanded were stated in a 
 complaint or petition as the basis of a separate action. This 
 objection will more frequently present itself in counter-claims 
 that are equitable in their nature. As the relief must be denied 
 to the plaintiff in an equitable action unless he has brought all 
 the necessary parties before the court, and mat/ be denied unless 
 he has brought in all the proper parties, and as tlie defendant 
 pleading a counter-claim is in the same condition as an ordinary 
 plaintiff, while the plaintiff against whom it is pleaded is in the 
 position of an ordinary defendant, it follows, first, that the relief 
 demanded by the counter-claim must be refused if all the neces- 
 sary parties are not present ; and, secondly, that it may be refused 
 if any proper parties have been omitted. These propositions 
 require no argument or citation in their support. They result 
 inevitably from the fact that the counter-claim is in its nature 
 a cross-action, governed by the same rules which control a suit 
 when proceeding in the ordinary and direct manner. Several 
 examples of legal actions in which the counter-claim has failed 
 for want of the necessary parties have already been quoted ; 
 namely, those decisions in which counter-claims against the plain- 
 tiff in the action, and others jointly liable with him, or in favor 
 of the defendant and others jointly interested with liim liave been 
 overruled.^ A single additional authority will suffice to illustrate 
 a principle which really needs no illustration. In an action to 
 foreclose a mortgage, brought by an assignee thereof, the mort- 
 gagee not being a party to the»record, the defendants alleged, as 
 an equitable counter-claim, facts tending to show that the mort- 
 gage and the note secured by it were procured to be executed by 
 the mortgagee's fraud, and that the plaintiff' took with notice of 
 
 1 See supra, §§ * 754 et seq.
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 885 
 
 the fraud, and prayed that the note and mortgage niiglit be can- 
 celled, and the plaintiff enjoined from enforcing them. The 
 court said: " It is evident that, if the allegations of this answer 
 were in the form of a complaint in a separate action asking that 
 the note and mortgage be surrendered and cancelled, the railroad 
 [the mortgagee] would be a necessary party defendant. The de- 
 fendant then could not set up the facts alleged in his answer as 
 a counter-claim in this action, for the reason that a new party 
 must be brought before the court." ^ In a few States this diffi- 
 culty is very properly met and obviated by express provisions of 
 their codes, which authorize the addition of new parties in order 
 that the relief demanded by the counter-claim or set-oif may be 
 granted.2 
 
 III. TJie Suhjcct- Matter of Counter- Claims, or the Nature of the 
 Causes of Action which may he pleaded as Counter- Claims. 
 
 § 639. * 763. Introductory. This general subdivision is natu- 
 rally separated into three heads, which I shall proceed to examine 
 in the order stated. A. Nature of the subject-matter generally, 
 with special reference to the question whether the counter-claim 
 may be an equitable cause of action and may result in the gi-ant- 
 ing of equitable relief, or whether it must be restricted to legal 
 causes of action and reliefs. B. The particular questions which 
 arise under the first clause or brancli of the statutory definition. 
 C. Those Avhich arise under the second clause or branch of the 
 same provision. 
 
 A. Whether a Counter-Claimmayhe an Equitable Cause of Action, 
 a7id the Means of Ohtaining Equitahle Relief ; or whether it must 
 he restricted to Legal Causes of Action and Reliefs. 
 
 § 640. * 764. An Equitable Counter-Claim may be interposed in 
 an Equitable or Legal Action. From the decisions cited in the 
 foot-note, the following doctrines and rules are clearly and firmly 
 
 1 McConihe v. Hollister, 19 Wis. 2G9. ally interested ; as, for example, tlie 
 
 See also Coursen v. Hamlin, 2 Duer, 51.3 ; grantor in the deed to be reformed. The 
 
 Cummings v. Morris, 2.5 N. Y. 625. But case of Hicks v. Sheppard, 4 Lans. 335, 
 
 see Du Font v. Davis, 35 Wis. 631, 640, which holds the contrary, was expressly 
 
 641, which holds that an equitable coun- di.sapproved. See also Pennoyer ?;. Allen, 
 
 ter-claim of reformation, and the like, 50 Wis. 308. 
 
 may be sustained, and the relief granted, - See these sections quoted at large, 
 
 witliont the presence of parties collater- ,s)/y)?-a, §* 584, note.
 
 8S6 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 established. In an equitable action, a counter-claim consisting of 
 an equitable cause of action, and demanding equitable relief, may 
 be interposed if it possesses all the other elements required by the 
 definition, and may, in many if not most cases, be pleaded by one 
 or more of the defendants less than all against one or more of 
 the plaintiffs. The language of the statute does not confine the 
 use of this afiirmative species of defence to legal actions, nor 
 require that it should necessarily be of a legal nature itself. 
 Adapting itself to the character of the action in which it is intro- 
 duced, in those which are legal it resembles, although much 
 broader and more comprehensive, the former set-off and recou}> 
 ment, wiiile in those which are equitable it often takes the place 
 of a cross-bill or complaint. In a le(jial action, also, an equitable 
 counter-claim may be set up and aftirmative relief may be granted 
 by its means. As the codes in express terms permit equitable 
 defences in such actions, and as in the self-same provision, and 
 by means of the same language, the statute authorizes the joining 
 of as many defences and counter-claims, whether legal or equitable^ 
 or both, as the defendant may have, to deny the possibility of an 
 equitable counter-claim in a legal action, would make it necessary, 
 if any consistency were preserved, to deny also the possibility of 
 an equitable defence. The courts, as may be seen from the cita- 
 tions made below, have, with a few unimportant exceptions, been 
 unu'illing to nullify the language, and defeat the design of the 
 legislature in this manner, and following its plain meaning and 
 import, they have freely admitted and sustained the equitable 
 counter-claim in all actions, whether legal or equitable, where 
 that form of relief was appropriate, and was authorized by the 
 descriptive terms of the statute.^ 
 
 1 HicksviUe & C. S. B. R. Co. v. Long 490; Cavalli v. Allen, 57 N. Y. 508, 514. 
 Island H. Co., 48 Barb. 355, .360 ; Fi.sher See, per contra, that the counter-claim 
 r. Moolick, 13 Wis. 321 ; Sample r. Rowe, must always be a legal cause of a('tion, 
 24 Ind. 208 ; Lombard v. Cowham,' 34 Jones v. Moore, 42 Mo. 413, 419. Tlie 
 Wis. 486, 491,492, and cases cited, which following cases furnish additional exam- 
 show that in Wisconsin every equitable pies of equitable counter-claims. Lawe 
 defence mii.^t be a counter-claim. Vail v. i: Hyde, 39 Wis. 345 (no kf/al counter- 
 .lones, 31 Ind. 407 ; Charlton v. Tardy, 28 claim jjossible in an action of ejectment) ; 
 Lid. 452 ; l)u Pont v. Davis, 35 Wis. 631, Stowell v. Eldred, 39 id. 614 ; Perkins r. 
 639-641; Spalding r. Alexander, 6 Bush, Port Washington, 37 id. 177; Ingles r. 
 160; Jarvis v. Peck, 19 Wis. 74; Grimes Patter.«"^n, 36 id. 373; Glen & Hall Man. 
 V. Duzan, 32 Ind. 361 ; Woodruff v. Gar- Co. r. Hall, 61 X. Y. 226, 236; Cook v. 
 nor, 27 Ind. 4 ; lui.stman v. Linn, 20 Minn. Jenkin.s, 79 id. 575 ; Winslow v. Winslow, 
 4.i3; Andrews v. Gillespie, 47 N. Y. 487, 52 Ind. 8; Ilinkle v. Margeruni, 50 id.
 
 COUNTER-CLADr. 
 
 887 
 
 § 641. 7<35. Limitation upon Equitable Relief Granted to Defend- 
 ant: in Actions of Equitable Character ; in Actions of Legal Character. 
 Doctrine Maintained by Supreme Court of New York. Illustrative 
 Case. Whether all alUnnative ec^uitable leUef granted to a de- 
 fendant must be Hmited to the cases in which a counter-claim is 
 possible, that is, whether a defendant is unable to set up a case 
 for equitable affirmative relief, and obtain a judgnient therefor in 
 his favor against the plaintiff, unless he can bring the facts con- 
 stituting his cause of action within some one of the species of 
 counter-claim defined by the codes, is another question.^ There 
 
 240; McManus r. Smith, 5;J id. 211 ; Gos- 
 sard V. JFerguson, 54 id. 519; Teiigue i'. 
 Fowler, 56 id. 569 ; Morrisou ?'. Kramer, 
 58 id. 38 ; Tabor v. Mackee, 58 id. 290 ; 
 Conaway v. Carpenter, 58 id. 477 ; Jeffcr- 
 sonville," M. & I. II. Co. v. Oyler, 60 id. 
 383; Hamp,sou v. Fall, 64 id. 382 ; Schafer 
 V. Schafer, 68 id. 374 ; Movie v. Porter, 51 
 €al. 639; Whedbee r. Reddick, 79 N. C. 
 521; Moser v. Cochrane, 13 Daly, 159; 
 Dempsey v. Rhodes, 93 N. C. 120; Boyd 
 V. Beaiuiiu, 54 Wis. 1 93. 
 
 Q^c<ilze»). Torrison (1903), 118 Wis. 315, 
 95 N. W. 114; Momsen v. Noyes (1900), 
 105 Wis. 565, 81 N. W. 860; Hotaling i: 
 Tecumseh Nat. Bank (1898), 55 Neb. 5, 
 75 N. W. 242; Maffett v. Thompson 
 (1898), 32 Ore. 546, 52 Pac. 565; Ber- 
 thold V. O'Hara (1893), 121 Mo. 88, 25 
 S. W. 845; Willis v. Barron (1898), 143 
 Mo. 450, 45 S. W. 289 : " It is the settled 
 law of. this court that an unsettled part- 
 nersliip account cannot be pleaded as a 
 counter-claim." Salladin i: Mitchell (1894), 
 42 Neb. 859, 61 N. W. 127 ; Lahiff v. Hen- 
 nepin County, etc. Ass'n (1895), 61 Minn. 
 226, 63 N. W. 493 ; Vaule v. Miller (1897), 
 C9 Minn. 440, 72 N. W. 452; Smith v. 
 Dickinson (1898), 100 Wis. 574, 76 N. W. 
 766 : meaning of equitable counter-claim. 
 
 A debtor of an insolvent bank has an 
 equitable right to set off a claim he holds 
 against the bank against his indel)teduess 
 to the bank, whether or not liis indebted- 
 ness lias matured at tlie time of the bank's 
 insolvency: Mercer v. Dyer (1895), 15 
 Mont. 317, 39 Pac. 314. 
 
 Matthews v. Weiler (1893), 57 Ark. 
 606, 22 8. W. 569 : Defendant, in order to 
 " get even " with plaintiff for alleged dam- 
 ages due to plaintiff furnishing a second 
 
 hand instead of a new soda-water gener- 
 ator, ordered certain other goods from 
 pLiintiff, and then refused to pay for 
 them, //p/f/, that in an action by plain- 
 tiff for tlie i)rice of tho.se goods, defendant 
 could not have an ecjuitable counter-claim 
 for the unliquidated damages connected 
 with the generator, even tiiough tlie 
 plaintiff was a non-resident and had no 
 property in the State. Ecpiity will not aid 
 fraud.] 
 
 1 ([Trester i\ City of Sheboygan (1894). 
 87 Wis. 496, 58 N. W. 747; Harden v. 
 Lang (1900), 110 Ga. 392, 36 S. E. 100 ; 
 Bell w. O her & Sons Co. (1900), 111 Ga. 
 668, 36 S. E. 904; FoUendore v. Follendore 
 (1896), 99 Ga. 71, 24 S. E. 407; Giles r. 
 Bank of Georgia (1897), 102 Ga. 702, 29 
 S.E. 600; Daly*-. Brenuaii (1894), 87 Wis. 
 36, 57 N. W. 963; Richardson v. Doty 
 (1895), 44 Neb. 73, 62 N. W. 254. 
 
 See Armstrong v. Mayer (1903), — 
 Neb. — , 95 N. W. 51, from' which the fol- 
 lowing quotation is made : " A consider- 
 able portion of the plaintiff's argument in 
 this court is devoted to the proposition 
 tliat the claims for damages set up iiy the 
 defendants are not available as counter- 
 claims under sections 100, 101, Code Civ. 
 Proc, and were not maintainable in tiic 
 present cause for that reason. But we 
 think a defendant in an action is not re- 
 stricted to tlie counter-claim provided for 
 in said sections, but, in a jiroper case, 
 may seek affirmative relief either against 
 the plaintiflF or against co-defendants. Tlio 
 code of tliis State contains no provisions 
 with reference to cros.s-petitions. Never- 
 theless, the practice of filing them has 
 long obtained in this jurisdiction, and tlio 
 riffht to bring a cross-suit auxiliary to and
 
 888 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 are decisions which answer tliis question in the afl&rmative, and 
 hold that all such relief must be denied unless the defendant's 
 cause of action is a proper counter-claim. This doctrine was 
 recently maintained by the Supreme Court of New York. An 
 action was brought to restrain the defendant from using a trade- 
 mark alleged to be the sole property of the plaintiff. The answer 
 asserted that the trademark in question belonged in fact exclu- 
 sively to the defendant, that the plaintiff had no right to it, but 
 was unlawfully and wrongfully using it, and thereby interfering 
 with and injuring the defendant's business, and concluded by 
 praying for an injunction, an account, and judgment for damages. 
 At the trial, the defendant's allegations were fully sustained by 
 the proofs, and he obtained the judgment demanded. This judg- 
 ment was reversed on appeal, the court saying : " To entitle the 
 defendant to aifirmative relief, the answer must set up a counter- 
 
 dependent upon the original suit, yet dis- 
 tinct for many purposes, lias been recog- 
 nized, at least, repeatedly." 
 
 Peter v. Farrel. etc. Co. (1895), 53 
 Ohio St. 534, 42 N. E. 690: Sec. 5070, 
 R. S., declaring what an answer shall 
 contain, and sec. 8072, declaring that a 
 counter-claim must be one ..." in favor 
 of a defendant and against a plaintiff be- 
 tween whom a several judgment might 
 be had in an action," do not abridge the 
 former powers of equity. But taking the 
 code as a whole, in view of its spirit and 
 purpose, and in view of sec. 5071, which 
 provides that " The defendant may set 
 forth in his answer as many grounds of 
 defence, counter-claims, and set-offs as he 
 has, whether they are such as have been 
 heretofore denominated legal or equitable, 
 or both," and " he may claim therein re- 
 lief touching the matters in question in 
 the petition against the plaintiff or any 
 other defendants in the same action," the 
 court must be held to have the right to 
 grant relief whenever a party shows even 
 a contingent right to property or a fund 
 which is the subject of an equitable 
 action, even though his claim is not one 
 which could be made the subject of a 
 several jutlgment in liis favor against a 
 fdaintiff. 
 
 Stenberg v. State (1896), 48 Neb. 299, 
 67 X. W. 190: "The fode of Civil Pro- 
 
 cedure relating to set-offs authorizes such 
 defences to be interposed before, but not 
 after judgment. A court of equity, wiiere 
 proper grounds exist therefor, may al- 
 low a set-off in cases not provided for by 
 statute." 
 
 '* The rule is well settled that the in- 
 solvency of a party against whose de- 
 mand a counter-claim is sought to be 
 interposed is a sufficient ground for equit- 
 able interference in cases not provided for 
 by statute : " Le Clare v. Thibault (1902), 
 41 Ore. 601, 69 Pac. 552. 
 
 " The sy-s^tem of pleading, consisting of 
 complaint, demurrer, answer, and reply, 
 meets the necessities of all parties, in all 
 cases, and in all courts. The answer set- 
 ting up new matter constituting a coun- 
 ter-claim, where a defendant seeks 
 affirmative relief against a plaintiff, and 
 the answer setting up facts entitling a de- 
 fendant to such relief against his co-de- 
 fendant as the court has jurisdiction 
 to grant under sec. 2883 R. S., take the 
 place of the cross-bill of the old practice. 
 The answer of a defendant, seeking relief 
 of his co-defendant, is in the nature of a 
 cross-bill, but is an answer and a code 
 pleading nevertheless : " Kollock v. Scrib- 
 ner (1897), 98 Wis. 104. 23 N. W. 776. 
 But see Pendleton r. Beyer (1896), 94 
 Wis. 31, 68 N. W. 415.3
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 889 
 
 claim.^ The claim of defendant for relief is not a counter-claim 
 within the meaning of that term as used in the code. It does not 
 arise out of the ti'ansaction set forth in the plaintiff's complaint, 
 nor does it arise on contract." ^ The general subject of tl.e 
 afhrmative equitable relief which may be obtained by a defendant 
 has been already discussed, and the discussion need not be re- 
 peated. Undoubtedly, in the great majority of instances, any 
 equitable affirmative relief properly conferred upon a defendant 
 would fall within some description of a counter-claim ; in order 
 that it should not be a counter-claim, it must be a cause of action 
 entirely independent of that set forth by the plaintiff, and not 
 arising from a contract. Under the equity practice and system 
 of pleading which prevailed prior to the codes, the matters which 
 could be set up by a defendant in a cross-bill, as the foundation 
 for affirmative relief to him, must have some connection with the 
 matters originally charged against him by the plaintiff's bill, even 
 if his demand did not directly arise out of such original matters; 
 an entirely distinct and independent cause of action could not be 
 alleged by the defendant in a cross-bill ; if he had such a claim, 
 he could only enforce it by a separate suit.^ The codes do not 
 seem to have, in any express manner, enlarged the scope and 
 operation of the defendant's equitable affirmative relief otherwise 
 than by the provisions relating to the counter-claim. In actions 
 of a legal nature it is very clear that no affirmative relief can be 
 obtained by a defendant, unless his cause of action or demand is 
 a proper counter-claim. 
 
 § 642. * 766. Additional Instances. I shall close this branch of 
 the subject by mentioning some special instances, or actions of a 
 particular character, in whicli it has been held that a counter- 
 claim is not possible, or that the affirmative relief demanded by 
 the defendant could not be the subject of a counter-claim.^ In 
 an action for a limited divorce on the ground of cruelty, the de- 
 fendant's answer, charging adultery by the plaintiff and demand- 
 
 i Wright V. Delafiekl, 25 N. Y. 266; * (^Meredith v. Lyon (1902), — Ne|). 
 
 Garvey r. Jarvis, 54 Barb. 179. — , 92 N. W. 122 : "A claim not reduced 
 
 2 Glen & Hall Man. Co. v. Hall, 6 to judgment, for tlie statutory penalties 
 Lans. 158, 161, 162. This decision was for failure to release paid chattel mort- 
 reversed on appeal, and the counter-claim gages, does not furnish such a cross-dc- 
 ■was su.stained as valid. Glen & Hall mand as can be used for the basis of an 
 Manuf. Co. v. Hall, 61 N. Y. 226, 2.36. equitable action to cancel another mort- 
 
 3 Daniell's Chan. PI. and Prac. 1647; gage, between the same parties, which has 
 Storey's Eq. PI. §§ 389, 397. not been paid."J
 
 890 
 
 CIVIL iu;medies. 
 
 ing an absolute divorce, is not a proper counter-claim ; ^ nor, in 
 an action for an absolute divorce because of adulter}', is an answer 
 alleging cruelty and praying for a judicial separation.- In some 
 States a mechanic's lien is enforced, not by any special proceed- 
 ings, but by an ordinary equitable suit. An answer in an action 
 for such a purpose, alleging that the premises described in the 
 complaint formed the defendant's " homestead," and were there- 
 fore, pursuant to statute, free from all lien or charges in favor of 
 creditors, was held not to be a counter-claim, since it stated no 
 cause of action against the plaintiff, and was, in fact, tantamount 
 to a denial.-"' 
 
 § 643. * 7(37. Is Couuter-Claim Possible iu Action to recover Pos- 
 session of Chattels ? It would seem that, in an action to recover 
 llie possession of specilic chattels, no counter-claim is possible, 
 unless, perhaps, equitable relief may be awarded under some very 
 exceptional circumstances.'* A judgment for a return to the de- 
 
 1 Heurv r. Meurv, 3 Kobt. GU ; 17 
 Abb. Pr. 411. 
 
 [^Butsee Woodrick r. Woodrick (1894), 
 141 N. Y. 457, 36 N. E. 395, frutii which 
 we quote : " This is an appeal from a 
 judi^ineut of the general term of the .sec- 
 uud department, affirming a judgment iu 
 favor of defenilant for an absolute divorce, 
 and from au order denying motiou for a 
 new trial. The jdaintiff sued for a limited 
 divorce, alleging that the defendant was 
 guilty of cruel and iulmmau treatment. 
 T!ie defendant denied tlie charges of tlie 
 complaiut, and set up by way of counter- 
 <'laim the adultery of plaintiff, and ])raved 
 for a judgment of absolute divorce. The 
 jury found against the plaintiff on her own 
 cause of action, and also on the defend- 
 .int's couuter-claim. It is now insi.-ted on 
 belialf of plaintiff that she was entitled to 
 judgment of separation on the evidence ; 
 that the finding of the jury that she com- 
 mitted adultery is uusuj»porled liy evi- 
 dence ; and that there were errors of law 
 on the trial that must lead to a reversal 
 of the judgment. In view of the verv 
 .serious con.sequences to tlie jdaiutiff Col- 
 lowing the affirmance of the judgment au<l 
 tlie in.ii.-^tence of her counsel that finding 
 her guilty of adultery was legal error, we 
 have looked into tlie facts of this case 
 with great care, ami are unable to say tliat 
 eitliei- of liie findings of the jury is un- 
 
 supported by evidence. Tliis case was 
 properly submitted to the jury and tlielr 
 verdict is conclusive on the questions of 
 fact." The judgment was affirmed.] 
 
 ^ Diddelli". Diddell, 3 Abb. Pr. 167; 
 Griffin i-. Griffin, 2'5 How. Pr. 183; Tor- 
 hune V. Terhuue, 40 How. Pr. 258; but 
 see Armstrong i'. Armstrong, 27 Ind. 186; 
 McNaniara c. McNamara, 9 Abb. Pr. IS, 
 in which such relief was grautetl to the 
 defendants. 
 
 •^ Knglebrocht r. KickerL, 14 Minn. 
 1 40. 
 
 •* CPhipi)s r. Wilson (1899), 125 N. C. 
 106, 34 S. E. 227 ; Minneapolis Threshing 
 Co. r. Darnall (1900), 13 S. D. 279, 83 
 N. W. 266; Davis v. Culver (1899), 58 
 Neb. 265, 78 N. AV. 504; Palmer r. 
 Palmer (1894), 90 la. 17, 57 N. W. 645; 
 Banning r. Marleau (1894), 101 Citl. 238, 
 35 Pac. 772 ; Kenuebaum r. Atkinson 
 (1S98), 103 Ky. 555,45 S. W. 874; Col- 
 lins V. Morrison (1895), 91 Wis. 324, 64 
 N. W. 1000. See also § «791, and eases 
 cited. 
 
 Aultman Co. v. McDonougii (1901), 
 110 Wis. 263, 85 N. W. 980: "In an ac- 
 tion of repleviu brouglit by a non-resident 
 mortgagee to recover possession of ma- 
 diinery sold to defendunt and mortgaged 
 to secure the purchase price, tiie defend- 
 ant . . . may counter-claim damages fur 
 breucli of warrantv of the sroods sold, ;uul
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 891 
 
 fendimt of the chattels in coutrovorsy is not a counter-claim, for 
 it is expressly provided for by the codes, the very issue in 
 the action being, Which party is entitled to the possession? and 
 the court by its judgment awarding tlie [)OSsession, or the value 
 in money if possession cannot be given, to the one who establishes 
 the right ; if, therefore, the plaintiff had taken the goods into his 
 own custody by the authorized preliminary proceedings, they or 
 their value must be restored when the action fails.^ If a counter- 
 claim can be interposed in this suit, it must be either (1) a de- 
 mand for money, or (2) a demand for the possession of certain 
 other and different chattels, or (3) a demand for some kind of 
 equitable relief. A counter-claim for money could not be ad- 
 mitted under the principle established by the cases, that the 
 relief must have so7ne connection with that asked for by the plain- 
 tiff, and must tend to diminish or modify it in some manner. A 
 judgment for money obtained by the defendant could not inter- 
 fere with or be counter to a judgment awarding possession of 
 chattels to the plaintiff.^ The same difficulties attend the second 
 alternative. It seems impossible that when the plaintiff seeks 
 to recover possession of certain specific chattels, the defendant's 
 right to the possession of other and distinct articles, could arise 
 out of the same transaction which is the foundation of the plain- 
 tiff's claim or could be connected with the subject of the plaintiff's 
 action. The "transactions," wliich are the foundations of their 
 respective causes of action, must, from the very nature of the 
 case, be different. It is not pretended that the action, or the 
 
 also d.amages in tryiug to operate ma- hiought to recover the chattels under such 
 
 chinery returned to the plaintiff, and for circumstances, the defendant might, per- 
 
 which the mortgaged property Avas in liaj).s, set up as a counter-claim au inde- 
 
 part taken iu exchange. "3 pendent demand due to himself from the 
 
 ^ .See De Lever v. Michaels, .'> Abb. Pr. plaintiff on contract, and thus diminish or 
 
 20.3, in which this doctrine was affirmed, extinguish the unpaid balance of the pur- 
 
 although it plainly ueeds uo authority in chase price. Sucli a counter-claim would 
 
 its support. be analogous to the similar one in a suit 
 
 - See Moffat v. Van Doren, 4 Bosw. by a vendor of laud against the veudee, 
 
 609; Williams v. Irby, 15 S. C. 458; Tal- which was sustained in Cavalli v. Allen, 
 
 bott V. Padgett, .30 S. C. 167. It is pos- 57 N. Y. 508. The difficulty suggested iu 
 
 sible, perhaps, that the plaintiff's right to the text, that a money judgment does 
 
 the possession might depend upon the de- not tend to diminish or modify the relief, 
 
 fendant's failure to pay a stipul.ated sum recovery of possession, asked for by the 
 
 of money, as in the case of a conditional plaintiff, was not considered in the cases 
 
 sale and delivery, when the property was of Wilson r. Hughes, 94 N. C. 182 ; Walsh 
 
 to remain in the vendor until tiie price v. Hall, 66 N. C. 233, iu both of which a 
 
 was paid, although possession had been counter-claim of damages was allowed, 
 transferred to the veudee. In an action /■
 
 892 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 cross-demand, is based upon contract. And, finally, the relief 
 granted to the defendant would be entirely independent of that 
 conferred upon the plaintiff ; the two would be complete and 
 entire each by itself, and thus there would be in effect two judg- 
 ments, not modifying or interfering with each other, and not re- 
 lating to the same subject-matter. This reasoning, and the 
 conclusion reached by it, have been sustained by judicial decision, 
 and thus seem to be supported alike by principle and by authority.^ 
 It is possible, perhaps, though hardl}' probable, that equitable re- 
 lief may, under certain exceptional circumstances, be recoverable 
 by the defendant in an action similar in its nature and object to 
 the ancient replevin or detinue. Courts of equity, however, very 
 ^rely interfered in controversies concerning the title to and 
 possession of chattels. 
 
 B. The Particidar Questions which arise under the First Clavse or 
 Branch of the Statutory Definition. 
 
 § 644. * 768. Language of the First Clause. The Three Subjects 
 Embraced -within this Language. Particular Phrases Requiring Con- 
 struction. Method of Interpretation Adopted by the Courts. 
 The language of the first clause or Ijraneh of the definition, 
 which is found in all the codes except those of Indiana and Iowa, 
 and which is now to be interpreted, is: '' xV cause of action aris- 
 ing out of a contract or transaction set forth in the complaint 
 [petition] as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected 
 with the subject of the action." Following the order of this 
 language, it is plain that three different subjects are embraced 
 within it, and the whole discussion must therefore be separated 
 into three corresponding divisions : namely, 1. Cases in which the 
 cause of action alleged as a counter-claim arises out of the con- 
 tract set forth in the complaint ; 2. Those cases in which it arises 
 out of the transaction set forth in the complaint ; 3. Those cases 
 in which it is connected ivith the subject of the action. A com- 
 plete examination of these three subdivisions requires a construc- 
 tion of certain particular phrases which form a part of the 
 statutory definition. These are (a) " foundation of the plaintiff's 
 claim," or when is a contract or transaction the foundation of the 
 
 1 Loven.sohn v. Ward, 45 Cal. 8. This separate chattels cannot be set up as a 
 case expressly holds that a claim to counter-claim. 
 rc<'ovfT the possession of distinct and
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 8y3 
 
 plaintiff's claim? (&) "arising out of," or when does a cause of 
 action arise out of a contract or transaction ? (c) " transaction ;" 
 (fZ) " subject of the action ; " (c) " connected witli," or when is 
 a cause of action connected with the subject of the action? 
 Although the signification of all these phrases and terms must be 
 determined, for upon it depends the interpretation to be given to 
 the entire provision, yet it will be impracticable to take them up 
 and examine them separately. Each is so connected with the 
 others, that, in ascertaining their sense, all must be considered 
 together. The courts have invariably pursued this method ; and 
 their opinions, from which our interpretation will be taken, have 
 always construed the statutory clause as a whole, and have not 
 attempted to distinguish and analyze its constituent parts. I 
 shall therefore pursue the order already mentioned, and shall dis- 
 cuss the three subdivisions into wliich the subject has been sepa- 
 rated, and in so doing shall incidentally define the legal import of 
 the several phrases and terms above enumerated. The decisions 
 which have given, or have attempted to give, a construction to 
 the clause are numerous and conflicting. I shall freely refer to 
 these cases, citing those which represent all theories and schools 
 of interpretation, and shall endeavor to collect from them such 
 doctrines and practical rules as seem to be correct upon principle 
 and to be supported by the weight of authority. As a prelimi- 
 nary step to the discussion of the three subordinate heads, I shall 
 quote and analyze certain judicial opinions which have treated of 
 the clause as a whole, and have proposed general rules by which 
 its meaning may be determined. Having thus ascertained these 
 general rules, I shall inquire what particular cases or classes of 
 cases do or do not fall within one or the other of the three sub- 
 divisions before mentioned. 
 
 § 645. * 769. Illustrative Case. Meaning of Term " Transaction." 
 The cases now to be cited throw more or less light upon the 
 meaning of the statutory clause as a whole, and also, to a certain 
 extent, upon that of the special phrases and terms which it con- 
 tains ; and from them some general principles of interpretation 
 can be inferred. The lower floor of a building having been 
 leased, the landlord brought an action for rent due. The answer 
 was pleaded as a counter-claim. It alleged that the plaintiff 
 occupied the upper floors of the building ; that he wantonly and 
 negligently suffered waterpipes to get out of repair and to leak.
 
 S9-i 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 and by this means caused filthy water to come upon the defendant's 
 premises ; also that plaintiff wantonly and negligently caused 
 hlthv Avater to be thrown from his rooms upon defendant's 
 premises ; that by these acts damages were caused to the defend- 
 ant in an amount specified, for which judgment Avas demanded 
 against the plaintiff. A demurrer to this answer having been 
 sustained, the defendant appealed to the New York Court of 
 Appeals, which affirmed the decision below.^ As already said in a 
 
 1 Edgerton v. Page, 20 N. Y. 281, 285. 
 From the opinion of that court the follow- 
 ing extracts are taken : " The demand of 
 the defendant set out in the answer does 
 not arise out of the contract set forth in 
 the complaint. That contract is for the 
 payment of rent upon a lease of the de- 
 mised premises. The defendant's de- 
 mands arise from the wrongful acts of 
 the plaintiff in permitting water to leak 
 and run into the premises, and in causing 
 it to be thrown upon the premises and 
 property of the defendant. These acts 
 are entirely independent of the contract of 
 hiring, upon which the action is brought. 
 The deniauds are not connected with the 
 subject of the action ; that is, the rent 
 agreed to be paid for the use of the premises. 
 Tlie defendant's demands are for a series 
 of injuries to his property deposited upon 
 the premises, and for impairing the value 
 of the possession. It would be a very 
 liberal construction to hold that, in an 
 action for rent, injuries arising from 
 trespasses committed by the lessor upon 
 the demisr-d premises might be inter{>osed 
 as a counter-claim. The acts of the plain- 
 tiff in this case are of a similar nature. 
 They are either acts of trespass or of 
 negligence from which the injuries to the 
 defendant accrued. Such a construction 
 could only be supported by the idea that 
 tlie subject of the action was the value of 
 the use of the premises. But where there is 
 an agreement as to the amount of the 
 rent, that value is inmiaterial. Unless 
 the acts of the plaintiff' amount to a breach 
 of the contract of iiiring, tliey are not 
 connected with the subject of the action." 
 The opinion procteeds to show that the 
 acts complained of were not a breach of 
 an implied covenant of (|uiet enjoyment, 
 and concludes : " Tliere is nothing in the 
 answer in this case tending to sliow that 
 
 any of the acts of the plaintiff were done 
 under any claim of right whatever. They 
 did not, therefore, amount t» a breach of 
 the contract created by the lease ; and the 
 injuries sustained by the defendant do 
 not, therefore, constitute a counter-claim 
 connected with the subject of the action." 
 To the same effect are the decisions and 
 tlie general interpretation given to the 
 clause in JNIayor, etc. of N. Y. v. Parker 
 Vein Stp. Co.^ 12 Abb. Pr. .300, 301 ; per 
 Woodruff .T. ; Askins v. Hearns, 3 Abb. 
 Pr. 184, 187, per Emott J. ; Sclmaderbeck 
 V. Worth. 8 Abb. Pr. 37, 38, per Ingra- 
 ham .1. ; Drake v. Cockroft, 4 E. D. Smith, 
 34, 39, per Woodruff J. ; Bogardus v. 
 Parker, 7 How. Pr. 303, 305 ; Barhyte v. 
 Hughes, 33 Barb. 320, 321, per Gierke J. 
 These cases all give a very narrow mean- 
 ing to the term " transaction," and incline 
 to the position that a cause of action on 
 contract, and one for tort, or two causes 
 of action for tort, can never be said to 
 arise out of tlie same transaction. The 
 last case cited, Barhyte v. Hughes, goes 
 so far as to hold that " transaction " and 
 " contract " are synonymous ; in other 
 words, that no cause of action can arise 
 out of a " transaction " unless it springs 
 from a contract. The following recent 
 decisions illustrate the questions di.scussed 
 in the paragraphs of the text (§§ * 769- 
 *77C): Brady r. Brennan, 25 Mini:. 210 
 (ill an action on contract, defendant may 
 counter-claim a demand arising out of 
 conversion, by waiving the tort, etc.) ; 
 People V. neunison, 84 N. Y. 272, 279, 
 citing Smith r. Hall, 67 id. 48; Pattison v. 
 Richards, 22 Barb. 143 (in an actiim for 
 a tort — fraud — a counter-claim on con- 
 tract cannot be set up, since it would not 
 arise out of the same transaction, — a very 
 important case) ; Smith v. Hall, G7 N. Y. 
 48 (in an action for a conversion, there
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 895 
 
 former chapter, the difficulty in arriving at the true interpretation 
 of the term " transaction " hes in the fact that it had no strict 
 legal meaning before it was used in the statute. Being placed in 
 immediate connection mth the word " contract," and separated 
 therefrom by the disjunctive " or," one conclusion is certain at all 
 events ; namely, that the legislature intended by it something dif- 
 ferent from and additional to " contract." The most familiar rules 
 of textual interpretation are violated by the assumption that no 
 such signification was intended. The only question at all doubt- 
 ful is, How far did the law-makers design to go, and how broad a 
 sense did they attach to the word? Is it to be used in its 
 widest popular meaning, or must it be narrowed into some 
 limited and technical meaning, and thus be made a term of legal 
 nomenclature? While in common speech a single assault or 
 slander or lie would not be called a " transaction," yet the whole 
 series of events grouped around such a central fact, and connected 
 with it, would, I think, be so designated in popular language, and 
 a fraudulent scheme, or in other words a cheat, is a most familiar 
 example of the class of events to which the term is usually 
 applied. But taking the word " transaction " in the Hmited sense 
 of a " negotiation of business," or some other similar expression, 
 it is certainly a mistake to say that torts cannot arise out of it 
 different from and adverse to the plaintiff's cause of action. In 
 the first place, it is certain that a cause of action based upon the 
 plaintiff 's /rawc? may arise out of such a "transaction," for it may 
 spring from a contract pure and simple. In the second place, as 
 the " negotiation" or " business " or " conduct of affairs " may be 
 concerned with property, with the title to or possession of land or 
 chattels, it is easily conceivable that a distinct cause of action in 
 
 can be no counter-claim, — not the same Wilson Manuf. Co. (Ore. 1892), 31 Pac. 
 transaction); Carpenter w. Manhattan Life Rep. 661; Sheehan v. Pierce (Supreme, 
 Ins. Co., 22 Hun, 49 (in an action for dam- June, 1893), 23 N. Y. Suppl. 1119 (in an 
 ages from a tort, defendant may counter- action of slander, a slander of the defend- 
 claim a demand for tort, if connected with ant uttered by the plaintiff in the course 
 the subject of the action or arising out of of the same conversation cannot be couu- 
 the same transaction) ; on the general sub- ter-claimed). Facts showing that the de- 
 ject of arising out of the same transaction, fendant has been damaged by tlie bringing 
 see Bernheimer v. Wallis, 11 liun, 16; of the action do not constitute a valid 
 Bradhurst I'. Townsend, 11 id. 104 ; Gilpin counter-claim: Kansas Loan & Inv. Co. 
 f. Wilson, .53 Ind. 443 ; Teague i'. Fowler, v. Hutto, 48 Kan. 166. A counter-claim 
 56 id. 569 ; Douthitt v. Smith, 69 id. 463 ; cannot be pleaded in an action for a 
 Whedbee V. Reddick, 79 N. C. 521; James statutory peualty : Woodward v. Conder, 
 V. Cutter, 53 Cal. 31 ; Wait v. Wheeler & 33 Mo. App. 14?".
 
 896 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 favor of the defendant may arise out of a tort to property com- 
 mitted by the plaintiff in the course of the " business " or " nego- 
 tiation" or "conduct of affairs," such as a claim for the taking or 
 conversion of goods, or for a trespass to or wrongful detention of 
 land. Indeed, the difficulty in conceiving of distinct torts arising 
 from one and the same "transaction " is confined almost entirely 
 to the cases of torts to the person. It may be noticed that most 
 of the decisions already cited, in which the possibility of distinct 
 torts having such a common legal origin is denied, directly relate 
 to personal wrongs alone ; and the reasoning of the courts is ex- 
 tended from them to all torts, without any discrimination between 
 their different classes, and the different rules which may govern 
 them.^ 
 
 § 646. * 770. Case of Scheunert v. Kaehler. Criticism. The 
 cases thus far cited have all been decided by courts of New 
 York ; I shall now quote a few which have arisen in other 
 States. A complaint alleged that the plaintiff delivered certain 
 flour to the defendant to be sold on commission, but that the latter 
 had converted the same, or the proceeds thereof, to his own use, 
 and prayed judgment for its value as damages. The answer set 
 up the following facts as a counter-claim : that defendant had 
 leased a flouring-mill to the plaintiff, who covenanted in the lease 
 that he would furnish to defendant constant employment during 
 the continuance of the term for two teams in drawingf flour to 
 Milwaukee at a stipulated sum for each load, and further cove- 
 nanted that all the flour sent from the mill should be delivered 
 to the defendant at Milwaukee, to be sold by him on commis.sion, 
 in pursuance of which agreement the flour mentioned in the com- 
 plaint was in fact delivered ; that the plaintiff had neglected and 
 refused to perform both of liis said covenants, by reason of which 
 the defendant had sustained damages to a specified amount, and 
 judgment was demanded for such sum. A demurrer was inter- 
 posed to this counter-claim, and was sustained by the Supreme 
 Court of Wisconsin.2 This opinion, quoted at large in the note, 
 
 1 [^Blue V. Capital Nat. Bank (1896), ter-claim may be pleaded to an action of 
 145 Inil. .518, 43 N. E. 65.') ; Watts !-. tort, — a question not necessary to be de- 
 Gantt (1899), 42 Neb. 869, 61 N. W. 104 ; cided, — and assuming also th.iV no objec- 
 Sheildey v. Dixon County (1901), 61 Neb. tion exists, because tiie coiitr.act for the 
 409, 85 N. W. 399.] ' breach of which the defendant claims 
 
 2 Scheunert v. Kaehler, 23 Wis. 523, damages is not set forth in the cnnijilaiiit, 
 per Dixon ('. J. : " Assuming that a coun- but tliat the counter-claim would be ad-
 
 COUNTKK-CLAIM. 
 
 897 
 
 necessarily lecads to the conclusion that when the plaintiff luis an 
 election to adopt one or the other of two forms of remedy, one on 
 the contract for the breach thereof, and tJie other in tort for a 
 
 missible, if at all, under the last clause of 
 the subdivision as being counected with 
 the subject of tlie action, tiie question re- 
 solves itself into an inquiry as to the ori- 
 gin of the cause of action stated in the 
 complaint, — whether it arises upon the 
 contract set forth in the answer, or origi- 
 nates ill fixcts outside of and disconnected 
 with that contract. If the former, then 
 the counter-claim would seem to be clearly 
 within the statute; but, if the latter, then 
 it would uot be." The oi)inion states that 
 the plaintiff might have sued upon con- 
 tract for a violation of it, or might have 
 sued in tort for the wrong done him, and 
 tliat he had chosen the latter form of ac- 
 tion, and adds : " The subject of the action 
 is the tort or wrong doue in the conversion 
 of the money; that is the foundation, 
 aud the sole foundation, of the plaintiff's 
 claim in this form of action ; for, unless 
 the money was unlawfully converted, 
 tlie action cannot be maintained." The 
 counter-claim was therefore held to be 
 inadmissible. See also, Akerly v. Vilas, 
 21 Wis. 88, 109, 110, which "holds that 
 the counter-claim must be direct!// con- 
 nected with the subject of the plaintiff's 
 action, or so connected that a cross-bill 
 would have been sustained, or a recoup- 
 ment allowed under the former practice, 
 when it is claimed to fall within the last 
 clause of the first subdivision ; and Vilas 
 ;'. Mason, 25 Wis. 310, 321, where, in 
 an action brought upon a contract, — on 
 a lease against the tenant, — a counter- 
 claim for the conversion of chattels which 
 the defendant had placed upon the de- 
 mised premises, was sustaiued, on the 
 ground that both causes of action arose 
 out of the same transaction ; also Ains- 
 worth r. Bowen, 9 Wis. 348. 
 
 \lln the very recent case of Stolze v. 
 Torrison (1903), — Wis. — , 95 N. W. 114, 
 the court by Cassoday C. J., said: "As 
 indicated, the ' transaction set forth in the 
 <-omj)laint as the foundation of the plain- 
 tiff's claim' was the wrongful breaking 
 .mid entering the close of which the plain- 
 tiff was at the time in the quiet and peace- 
 able possession, and malicious prosecution 
 
 aud conspiracy in support of such conduct. 
 The equitable counter-claim sought tt> bo 
 interposed is to establisii the title of Tor- 
 risou to the locus in quo under a tax (k-cd 
 and asubse(iuent conveyance aud the stat- 
 utes of limitation, mentioned in the fore- 
 going statement, and tcj have the jdaiiitiff'a 
 as.sertion of title adjudged to be unfonnded. 
 It is very obvious that such equitable 
 counter-claim did not arise out of the 
 transaction set forth in the complaint as 
 the foundation of the plaintiff's claim. On 
 the contrary, it arose entirely independent 
 and outside of that transaction, and the 
 trespasses of the defendants alleged are 
 sought to be justified by virtue of it. Nor 
 is it legully ' connected with the subject of 
 the action ' set forth in tlie complaint. It 
 did not arise out of the torts or trespasses 
 alleged in the complaint, nor is it legally 
 counected with such torts or trespasses. 
 ' The subject of the action ' is not the 
 land, nor the title to the land, but the 
 torts alleged. Bazeraore v. Bridgers, 105 
 N. C. 191, 10 S. E. 888. The peaceable 
 possession of the plaintiff was suflScient 
 without actual title to support trespass vi 
 et armis [citing many Wisconsin cases]. 
 Besides, malicious prosecution might be 
 maintained without such pos.session. ' A 
 counter-cliiim must be a claim which, if 
 established, will defeat, or in some wny 
 qualify, the judgment to which plaintiff 
 is otherwise entitled ' [citing Wiscon.--in 
 cases]. This court has held that, where 
 the complaint stated 'a cause of action in 
 trespass quare clausum, with allegations 
 of the injury, destruction, and carrying 
 away of personal property in aggravation 
 of damages,' the defendant could not inter- 
 pose an 'equit.-ible counter-claim, as owner 
 in common with the plaintiff of the personal 
 property injured or taken, to have t!ie 
 plaintiff account for the use of defendant's 
 share of the property, and to have the 
 property sold, and the proceeds divided 
 between the parties, such a claim not 
 arising out of the trespass complained of, 
 nor being counected with the subject of 
 the action.' "] 
 
 57
 
 898 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 conversion, and the like, the ability of the defendant to plead a 
 counter-claim depends upon the kind of action selected ; in other 
 words, the propriety of the counter-claim does not depend upon 
 the actual facts out of which the plaintiff's remedial rights arise, 
 but upon the mere nature of the remedy which he elects to en- 
 force, and of the means which he employs for such enforcement. 
 The result would be, that by changing the kind of action the 
 plaintiff may cut off a counter-claim otherwise admissible. In my 
 opinion, it was not the intention of the legislature, in adopting 
 the reformed procedure, that the essential rights of defendants 
 should be made to rest in this manner upon the form of remedy 
 chosen by the plaintiffs. 
 
 § 647. * 771. Cases in Indiana and Kentucky. Discussion of 
 the Meaning of the Phrases " Arising out of," " Connected w^ith," and 
 " Transaction " in these Cases. In a case already quoted under a 
 former head, an action brought to set aside a deed of lauds on 
 account of the defendant's fraud, to which a counter-claim was 
 pleaded denying the fraud, alleging the validity of the convey- 
 ance, the plaintiff's continued possession of the land and pernancy 
 of the rents and profits, and praying a judgment awarding pos- 
 session, quieting title, and giving damages, the Supreme Ccjurt of 
 Indiana sustained the answer, and granted the relief demanded 
 by the defendant.^ The same court has discussed the legal mean- 
 ing of the phrases "arising out of" and "connected with," and 
 has arrived at one general principle, at least, which may aid in 
 
 1 Woodruff V. Garner, 27 Ind. 4, per the plaintiff directly, and is therefore 
 
 Frazer J.: "The plaintiff's cause of ac- authorized by the statute." 'riie"traus- 
 
 tion is the alleged fraud of the defendant action " set forth in the complaint was 
 
 in procuring the deed .sought to be re- not simply the alleged fraud : it was the 
 
 scinded. The defendant's cause of action entire business or matter i)f agreeing to 
 
 averred in the counter-claim does not sell and ])urchase tlie laud, and of exe- 
 
 arise out of the plaintiff's cause of action, cuting and delivering the deed in pursu- 
 
 for it cannot even exist consistently with ance of such agreement. The jilaintiff 
 
 it. If tlie fraud alleged by the plaintiff averred that the defendant was guilty of 
 
 was perpetrated, then tlie defendant can- fraud ; and such fraud wa.s therefore a 
 
 not have any riglit of action whatever, jjcirt of the transaction, according to the 
 
 So the defendant found it necessary to plaintiff's version. The defendant's cause 
 
 deny the fraud. Hut the deed sought to of action arose out of tlie s.inio transac- 
 
 be set aside constitutes part of the trans- tion, — in fact it »'a.<! the entire tran.saction, 
 
 action upon which the plaintiff and the except the element of fraud, which he as- 
 
 defendant both rely for a recovery. It is serted did not exist. No plainer illustra- 
 
 the link which forms the direct connec- tion of a cause of action arising out of 
 
 tion between the two diverse causes of th<' transaction wliich was also tiie foun- 
 
 actiou. So the counter-claim for possession d.iiion of the plaintiff's claim could be 
 
 is connected with the cause of actiou of imagined.
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 899 
 
 determining their application to all particular cases. The action 
 was to recover money deposited with the defendant who had re- 
 fused to deliver it when demanded. The defendant pleaded by 
 way of counter-claim that the plaintiff liad falsely charged him 
 with stealing the money deposited, and had slandered him by 
 uttering such charge in the presence of others, and prayed judg- 
 ment for damages. In sustaining a demurrer to this answer the 
 court suggested a rule of construction which may be followed in 
 all cases.^ The High Court of ApjDcals in Kentucky has con- 
 strued the phrases " arising out of the transaction " and '- con- 
 nected with the subject of the action " in a very liberal and broad 
 manner. An action was brought on an injunction bond given by 
 T. and sureties. The plaintiff had originally commenced proceed- 
 ings to obtain possession of a farm in the occupancy of T. T. 
 had thereupon brought an equitable suit to restrain these proceed- 
 ings, had obtained a preliminary injunction, and had given the 
 bond in question. The suit being dismissed, this action was 
 brought on the bond, the plaintiff therein claiming damages for 
 being kept out of possession of the farm by means of the injunc- 
 tion during the continuance of the suit. The defendant T. 
 pleaded a counter-claim, alleging that notwithstanding the injunc- 
 tion, and before it was dissolved, the plaintiff — the defendant in 
 the injunction suit — wrongfully took possession of the land and 
 seized the crops thereon, and converted the same to his own use, 
 and demanding judgment for the damages thus caused. At the 
 trial the defendant had a verdict which was sustained on appeal.^ 
 
 1 Conner r. Winton, 7 Ind. 523. " The have had some connection with, the origi- 
 
 question is, What is tlie legal effect of nal transaction in the view of the parties, 
 
 the words 'arising out of or 'connected and which, at the time the contract was 
 
 Avith ' ? Do they refer to those matters made, they could have intended miglit, 
 
 which have an immediate connection with in some event, give one part\' a claim 
 
 the transaction ? or do they include also against the other for compliance or non- 
 
 tliose whicli have a remote relation with compliance witli its provisions. We refer 
 
 it hy a chain of circumstances which were in this connection, of course, to actions 
 
 not had ia view at its inception? Sup- ex contractu only. About actions for tort 
 
 pose C. [the defendant] liad beaten W. it is not necessary to say anything at 
 
 [the plaintiff] for uttering the slander, present." 
 
 could W. have replied the damages oc- ^ Tinsley v. Tinsley, 15 R. Mon. 454, 
 casioned by the battery to those resulting 459, per Marshall J. " It is not required 
 from the slander ? and couli the parties that the counter-claim itself shall be 
 have settled all their quarrels in the ac- founded in contract, or arise out of the 
 tion to recover the money ? We do not contract set forth in the petition ; but it is 
 think that the statute contemplates any sutticient that it arise out of the trans- 
 such practice. A counter-claim is that action set forth in the petition, or be con- 
 which might have arisen out of, or could nected with the subject of the action. As
 
 9U0 CIVIL KE.MEDIES. 
 
 § 648. * 772. Cannot defeat Counter-Claim by Choice of Form of 
 Action. Thompson v. Kessel. The New York Court of Appeals 
 has passed upon the question, How far the form of the action 
 chosen by the plaintiff, when he has an election to sue for a tort 
 or on a contract, can affect the defendant's right to interpose a 
 counter-claim, and has declared that it can produce no effect ; if 
 the defendant would have been able to plead a counter-claim to a 
 cause of action upon an implied promise, growing out of a certain 
 state of facts, the plaintiff cannot, by adopting an action in form 
 for a tort under the same circumstances, cut off" or abridge this 
 substantial privilege ; the chief design of the new procedure was 
 to suboixlinate form to substance and not substance to form. An 
 action was brought to compel the delivery of certain bills of lad- 
 mg, the plaintiffs alleging that the shipment was on their account, 
 and that the goods and the bills of lading thereof belonged to 
 themselves, and were wrongfully detained by the defendants. 
 The answer put these averments in issue, and also set up by way 
 of counter-claim that, since the commencement of the action, the 
 plaintiffs had wrongfully taken possession of the goods, and had 
 converted the same to their own use, and prayed judgment for 
 the value thereof. The court pronounced the defendants' demand 
 to be a cause of action plainly arising out of the transaction set 
 forth in the complaint, or at least connected with the subject of 
 tlie action, being, as it was, for the value of the very goods which 
 the plaintiffs sought to reach, and added the following: " I do 
 not think it lies with the plaintiffs to allege that their taking was 
 a mere tort for the purpose of defeating the counter-claim. And, 
 even if an action sounding in tort might be maintained by the 
 defendants for the taking, I am still of opinion that the cause of 
 action for the value of the goods would constitute a good counter- 
 claim in such a case as this." ^ 
 
 tlie petition states the occupation of tlie constitute the ground of a counter-claim." 
 
 laud by Mrs. T. [tlie present defendant In Wadley v. Davis, 63 Barb. 500, the 
 
 and the plaintiff in the equity suit] during same principle was approved and fol- 
 
 the j)eudeucy of the injunction, and claims lowed ; and a demand arising from tort 
 
 damages therefor, any interference by the to property was held to be a proper coun- 
 
 plaintiff which rendered such occupation terciaini in an action on contract, 
 less profitable or less valuable to the oc- * Tliomjjson i*. Kessel, ."JO N. Y. .383, 
 
 cuj)aut constituted a cause of action aris- 389, per Johnson J. The same doctrine 
 
 ing out of the transaction set forth in the has been recently approved and cnforce<I, 
 
 petition, and is connected with the plain- after an exhaustive examination of tlie 
 
 tiff's cause of action ; and although it authorities, by the Supreme Court of Mi.s- 
 
 amuunt to a tresp-xsa or otiier tort, it ni.iy sonri, in (Jordon r. I>rniier, 49 Mo. ."iTO,
 
 COUNTEK-CLALM. 901 
 
 § 649. * 773. Xenia Branch Bank v. Lee. I sliall end this par- 
 ticular branch of the subject by quoting from a very able and 
 instructive decision made b}^ the Superior Court of New York 
 City, in which the statutory definition was fully analyzed as to all 
 its parts, and an attempt was made to reach the basis of a true 
 interpretation. The action was brought to recover damages for 
 the wrongful conversion of certain bills of exchange. The plain- 
 tiffs had been the owners of the bills, which were drawzi by 
 divers persons on different payees ; they indorsed the same and 
 delivered them to the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, 
 for the purpose of collection only ; this company transferred them 
 to the defendants, who now retain them; it was alleged that the 
 defendants took the bills with notice of all these facts, and were 
 not holders in good faith for value. The complaint stated a de- 
 mand and refusal, an unlawful detention and conversion, and 
 demanded judgment for the value of the securities as damages ; 
 it was strictly for an alleged tort. The answer was pleaded as a 
 counter-claim. It set up the drawing of the bills, their indorsement 
 by the plaintiffs, their delivery to the Ohio Trust Company, their 
 transfer to the defendants for full value and without notice, de- 
 mand of payment, nonpayment and notice thereof to the plaintiffs, 
 and prayed judgment against the plaintiffs as indorsers for the 
 amount due on the drafts. In other words, it was like an ordinary 
 complaint in an action by the indorsees against the indorsers to 
 
 571, per Bliss J., supra, § * 569 ii. And see the petition are, tliat the defendants came 
 Brady v. Brennan, 25 Minn. 210; Kitchie into the possession of certain sacks of the 
 (-. Ilayward, 71 Mo. 560; Kamerick v. plaintiff, and wrongfully converted them 
 Castlenian, 23 Mo. App. 4S1. Kitchie y. to their own use. The details of the traus- 
 Ilayward was an action for the wrongful action, the evidential facts, arc not stated, 
 conversion of certain sacks. The defend- but the ultimate facts only, those which 
 ant answered that the plaintiff had con- will entitle the plaintiff to relief, when 
 tracted with him for the sale and delivery established by other facts at the trial. . . . 
 of a quantity of potatoes of a given quality. It (the transaction) must be held to in- 
 to be delivered in sacks ; that plaintiffs elude all the facts and circumstances out 
 sent him potatoes in the sacks in contro- of which the injury comj)lained of by him 
 versy, but the potatoes were of an inferior arose, and if these facts and circmnstauces 
 quality, and asked damages, by way of also furnished to the defendant a ground 
 counter-claim, for the breach of contract, of action against the jtlaintiff, the defend- 
 The court, through Hough J., said: " If ant will be entitled to jjresent such cause 
 the facts stated by the defendant be true, of action as a counter-claim, showing 
 he certainly has a cause of action against b\' proper averments that it is a part of 
 the plaintiff. It is not, however, a cause the same transaction which is made the 
 of action arising out of any contract set foundation of the plaintiff's claim. In this 
 forth in the petition, for no contract is view of the case, it is immaterial what form 
 therein set forth. The facts set forth in of action is adopted by the plaintiff."
 
 902 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 recover the sum due on a bill or note. A motion to strike out 
 this counter-claim was denied at the special term, and the plain- 
 tiffs appealed to the general term, which, after stating the facts 
 and the questions presented by the record, and reciting the two 
 subdivisions of § 150 of the New York Code, pronounced the 
 opinion found in the note.^ 
 
 1 Xenia Branch Bank v. Lee, 7 Abb. 
 Pr. 372, 389, per Woodruff J.: "This 
 division of tlie section shows that there 
 may be a counter-claim when the action 
 itself does not arise on contract ; for the 
 second clause is expressly confined to 
 actions arising on contract, and allows 
 counter-claims in such cases of any other 
 causes of action also arising on coutracc; 
 and this may embrace, probably, all cases 
 heretofore denominated ' set-off,' legal 
 or eiiuitalde, and any other legal or equi- 
 table demand liquidated or unliquidated, 
 whether within the proper definition of 
 set-off or not, if it arise on contract. Glea- 
 soa V. Moen, 2 Duer, 642. The first sub- 
 division would therefore be unmeaning 
 as a separate definition, if it neither con- 
 templated cases in which the action was 
 not brought on the contract itself in the 
 sense in which these words are ordinarily 
 used, nor counter-claims which did not 
 theni-selves arise on contract. The first 
 subdivision, by its terms, assumes that the 
 plaintiffs' complaint may set forth, as the 
 foundation of the action, a ' contract ' or 
 a ' transaction.' The legi.slature, in using 
 both words, must be assumed to liave 
 designed that each siiould have a mean- 
 ing ; and, in our judgment, their construc- 
 tion should be according to the natural and 
 ordinary signification ofthe terms. In this 
 sease, every contract may be said to be a 
 transaction; but every transaction is not 
 a contract. Again, the second subdivision 
 having provided Jor all counter-claims 
 arising on contract, and all actions arising 
 on contract, no cases can be supposed to 
 which the first subdivision can be applied, 
 unless it be one of three classes ; viz., 
 1st. In actions in which a contract is 
 stated as the foundation of the plaintiffs' 
 claim, couuter-<lairas which arise out of 
 the same contract; or, 2d. In actions in 
 wliich some transaction, not being a con- 
 tract, is set fortli as the foundation of the 
 plaintiffs' claim, counter-claims which 
 
 arise out of the same transaction ; or, 
 3d. In actions in which either a contract, 
 or a transaction which is not a contract, 
 is set forth as the foundation of the plaiu- 
 tiffs' claim, counter-claims which neither 
 arise out of the same contract nor out of 
 tlie same transaction, but which are con- 
 nected with the subject of the action." 
 After some discussion upon the difference 
 between the provision in the first subdi- 
 vision and that in the second subdivision 
 in reference to actions and couuter-claims 
 based upon contract, in whicli he points 
 out tliat, in tlie former, the language is 
 "contract wiiich is XA\g foundation of the 
 plaintiff's claim," and, iu the latter, " ac- 
 tions arising on contract," and that this 
 language appropriately applies, in the 
 first subdivision to certain classes of ac- 
 tions in wliich a contract is the foundation 
 of the plaintiff's claim, although tlie action 
 does not strictly arise on the contract, and, 
 in the second subdivision, to all those 
 actions which are strictly brought on the 
 contract, — the learned judge proceeds 
 witli the main subject : " But, secondly', 
 the subdivision authorizes in actions in 
 which a transaction, not being a contract, 
 is set forth as the foundation of the plain- 
 tiff's claim, counter-claims which arise out 
 ofthe same transaction. This, we think, 
 includes tlie case before u.s:. The ' trans- 
 action ' here in question may either in- 
 clude the history of the bills, so far as the 
 title of the plaintiffs or defendants de- 
 pends upon tiiat history; or tlie 'trans- 
 action ' may, ])erhaps, be confined to the 
 manner and circumstances of the transfer 
 to the defenilants." The opinion recapit- 
 ulates the facts of the case, and shows 
 that, giving to the term " transaction " the 
 first of the.se two meanings, the defend- 
 ants' cause of action arose out of it, and 
 adds a very important suggestion which 
 iiad been overlooked in some of the de- 
 cisions lieretofoie cited : " Some facts 
 enter into the plaintiffs' case which do
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 903 
 
 § 650. * 774. Meaning of Term " Transaction." Differences of 
 Opinion as to the Import of Statutory Terms. While the foregoing 
 decisions do not furnish any general formulas for determining in 
 all cases what is the " transaction " set forth in tlie plaintiff's peti- 
 tion or complaint, or what is the " subject of the action," or when 
 the defendant's cause of action " arises out of the transaction set 
 forth in the complaint," or when it is " connected with the subject 
 of the action," they do throw some light upon the true intent of 
 the legislature in using these phrases, and they settle some prin- 
 ciples which, when properly applied, may assist in constructing 
 the universal rules so much needed by the profession and the 
 bench. It is very evident that there has existed in the minds of 
 judges a radical difference of opinion in respect to the import of 
 the controlling terms of the statutory definition, and especially in 
 respect to the word " transaction." One school would narrow its 
 meaning so as to deprive it of all separate significance in the 
 clause where it is found. They would make it either synony- 
 mous with " contract," or would regard it as being merely the 
 very cause of action which the plaintiff has alleged in his plead- 
 ing as the ground of recovery.^ The other school give to the 
 word a broader and more comprehensive meaning.^ Ex vi termini 
 it imports something different from " contract," and is to be taken 
 in its ordinary and popular sense. It is more extensive than 
 
 not enter into the defendants' case, and ruff reaches the conclusion that, even if 
 
 vice versa. But, from the 'nature of the the defendants' cause of action does not 
 
 sul)ject, this must alivai/s he so. The legis- arise out of the " transaction " set forth 
 
 lature were not so absurd as to mean that in the complaint, it "is directly and im- 
 
 the defendant might counter-claim when mediately cotiuected with the subject of 
 
 the very facts alleged by him, with all the action. The subject of the action is 
 
 tlieir particulars, were identical with those either the right to the possession of the 
 
 alleged by the plaintiff. . . . So, if the bills of exchange, or it is the bills them- 
 
 transaction set fortli as the foundation of selves. The defendants' counter-claim is 
 
 the plaintiffs' claim be regarded as more not only connected with, but is inseparable 
 
 narrow, and as being the transfer of the from, either or both. The object of the ac- 
 
 bills by the Ohio Trust Company to the tion is </a wages; but the S!(/)/ec^ is the lulls of 
 
 defendants, then, as before, the defend- exchange, or the right to their possession." 
 
 ants' counter-claim arises out of the same i See, for example, Mulberger r. 
 
 transaction ; to wit, the transfer. The Koenig, 62 Wis. 558. 
 
 circumstances that the defendants have 2 [^Stolze r. Torrison (1903). 118 Wis. 
 
 to superadd an allegation of demand, pro- 315, 95 N. W. 114; Blue v. Capital Nat. 
 
 test, and notice to the plaintiffs as indor- Bank (1896), 145 Ind. 518, 43 N. E. 655 ; 
 
 sers, does not alter the ca.se. This added Watts v. Ganct (1894), 42 Neb. 869, 61 
 
 fact is only a means of showing ^ow the N. W. 104; Gilbert v. Loberg (1894), 86 
 
 defendants' cause of action arises out of Wis. 661, 57 N. W. 982; Story & Isliam 
 
 the transaction relied upon, and is made Co. i'. Story (189.3), 100 Cal. 30, 34 Pac. 
 
 complete." Finally, Mr. Justice Wood- 671, quoting the text.]
 
 904 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 " cause of action *' or " subject of the action ; " for out of it the 
 defendant's " cause of action " is said to " arise," and it is also to 
 be set forth in the com^jlaint or petition, not as the " cause of 
 action," but as the '' foundation " of the plaintiff's claim. It must, 
 therefore, be something — that comhinatiun of acts and events, cir- 
 cumstances and defaults — ivhich, viewed in one aspect, results in the 
 plaintiff's right of action and, viewed in another aspect, results in the 
 defendant" s right of action. As these two opposing rights cannot 
 be exactly the same, it follows that there may be, and generally 
 must be, acts, facts, events, and defaults in the transaction as a 
 whole, which do not enter into each cause of action, but are con- 
 fined to one of them alone. ^ 
 
 § 651. * 775. Meaning of " Subject of Action." No Agreement 
 in Judicial Opinions. Construction Proposed by Author. In re- 
 gard to what constitutes the " subject of the action," there is 
 no agreement whatever in the judicial opinions. Some of them 
 have treated it as identical with the " cause of action," which is 
 plainly incorrect. As I have already shown, the " cause of action " 
 consists in, 1st, the primary light, and the facts from which it 
 flows ; and, 2d, the breach of that right, and the facts consti- 
 tuting such breach. These taken together create a remedial 
 right, and are the cause of action. The remedy itself is cer- 
 tainly the " object " of the action. The " subject " is certainly 
 not the cause of action ; but when we have reached this conclu- 
 sion we find very little judicial aid in arriving at any other and 
 more affirmative one. Some judges have said that in all posses- 
 sory actions, and all actions to establish property, the " subject of 
 the action " denotes the things to assert a right over which, or to 
 obtain the possession of which, the action is brought, as the land 
 in ejectment and in many equity suits, or the chattels in replevin. 
 Some have said that the " subject " denotes the same in other 
 classes of actions, not brought to recover possession or expressly 
 
 ^ Tlie reader should consult the analy- repeat in the text the former full discus- 
 sis of cases, and the discussion in relation sion ; hut it is plain that the decisions 
 to the same word given iu a former chaj)- there cited, and tiie results there reached, 
 ter (Chap. III., Sec. 2). The language ai>ply \vith equal force to the questions 
 of the clause there under examination is now under consideration. There is an 
 almost identical with that of the present evident connection between the subject 
 pa.'jsage ; and the same meaning must, of of uniting causes of action in one coin- 
 course, be attributed to the words " trans- plaint, and the uniting them in one con- 
 action " and "subject of the action" in troversy, although tlicy are set forth in 
 both sections of the statute. I do not the adverse pleadings.
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 905 
 
 to establish title, but in which, nevertheless, the plaintiff's right 
 to recover is based upon his property in a specific thing, as for 
 the conversion of chattels, or for trespass to lands or chattels ; 
 while some have applied the same principle to actions not based 
 upon any alleged propertij of the plaintiff in a specific thing, and 
 have gone to the extent of holding that, in actions upon contract 
 to recover the debt due or damages for the non-performance 
 thereof, the "subject" is the very contract itself, — the instru- 
 ment in suit, as, for example, in an action upon a bill or note, the 
 " subject," according to this view, would be the bill or note sued 
 upon. Other judges have said that the " subject " is the right 
 which is sought to be enforced in the action ; meaning thereby 
 the 'primary right, which has been infringed upon as distinguished 
 from the remedial right, and from the delict and the remedy. 
 Thus in the case last quoted, which was an action for the con- 
 version of bills, Mr. Justice Woodruff declared that the subject 
 was either the bills themselves, or the plaintiff's original right to 
 their possession. It would, as it seems to me, be correct to say 
 in all cases, legal or equitable, that the " subject of the action " is 
 the plaintiff's main primary right, which has been broken, and by 
 means of whose breach a remedial right arises. Thus, the right 
 of property and possession in ejectment and replevin, the right of 
 possession in trover or trespass, the right to the money in all cases 
 of debt, and the like, would be the " subject " of the respective 
 actions. Although in a certain sense, and in some classes of 
 suits, the things themselves, the land or chattels, may be regarded 
 as the " subject," and are sometimes spoken of as such, yet this 
 cannot be true in all cases ; for in many actions there is no such 
 specific thing in controversy over which a right of property exists. 
 The primary right, however, always exists, and is always the 
 very central element of the controversy around which all the 
 other elements are grouped, and to which they are subordinate. 
 In possessory and proprietary actions, this right, which will then 
 be always one of property or of possession, will be intimately 
 associated with the specific thing itself which is the object of tlie 
 right ; but this relation is not and cannot be universal. It seems, 
 therefore, more in accordance with the nature of actions and more 
 in harmony with the language of the statute to regard the "sub- 
 ject of the action " as denoting the plaintiff's principal primary 
 right to enforce or maintain which the action is brought, than to
 
 906 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 regard it as denoting the specific thing in regard to which the 
 legal controversy is carried on.' In this manner alone can we 
 arrive at a general rule applicable to all possible cases, and the 
 rule thus reached fully satisfies all the requirements of the legis- 
 lative language, and can be invoked in all classes of actions. 
 While I suggest and adopt this meaning of the term " subject,"' 
 I freely concede that no decision, so far as I have discovered, 
 pronounces this interpretation to be the only one admissible; 
 many cases sanction it, none directly reject it ; but none, on the 
 other hand, have gone so far as to declare in its favor to the exclu- 
 sion of all other meanings. The construction proposed, as it has 
 been judicially approved in many instances, would remove all 
 doubt and conflict of opinion, and would furnish a simple and 
 practical rule of universal application.^ 
 
 § 652. * 77(3. The Phrase " Connected with." Connection must 
 be Immediate and Direct. h\ respect to the phrase " connected 
 with" the subject of the action, one rule may be regarded as set- 
 tled by the decisions, and it is recommended by its good sense, 
 and its convenience in practice. The connection must be im- 
 mediate and direct. A remote, uncertain, partial connection is 
 not enough to satisfy the requirements of the statute.^ The crite- 
 rion proposed by the Supreme Court of Indiana in one of the cases 
 cited is as certain and practical as the nature of the subject admits, 
 and only needs to be known to be universally accepted. It is, 
 that the connection must be such that the parties could be sup- 
 posed to have foreseen and contemplated it in their mutual acts ; 
 in other words, that the parties must be assumed to have had this 
 connection and its consequences in view when they dealt with each 
 other. I now pass, according to the order already stated, to the 
 three branches into which the subject-matter is naturally separated. 
 
 I. Cases in which the Cause of Action alleged as a Counter- Claim 
 arises out of the Contract Set forth in the Complaint or Peti- 
 tion as the Foundation of the Plaintiff's Claim. 
 <^ 653. * 777. First and Second Subdivisions of Statute overlap 
 
 to a Certain Extent. Mr. Justice Woodruff, in tlie opinion last 
 
 1 Sharp V. Kin.<iman. 18 S. C. 108. Gl N. \V. 104 ; Ilav.s ,: McLain (1899) 66 
 
 CvStolzc V. TorrLson (190.-}), 118 Wi.s. Ark.400,508. W. 1006; Gurske ?;. Kelpiu 
 
 .31., 9.5 N. W. 114.: (1901),61 Xob.517.85X.\V.557; Walscrr. 
 
 • LWatts «•. Gaiitt (1894), 42 Neb. 869, Wear (1807), 141 .Mo. 443, 42 S. W. 928.]
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 907 
 
 quoted, declares that the second subdivision of the definition was 
 intended to embrace all cases in which the plaintiff's cause of 
 action arises on contract, and the defendant's counter-claim also 
 arises on contract, either the same or another, and that the clause 
 of the first subdivision above mentioned was designed to include 
 only those cases in which the contract is set forth by the plaintiff 
 as \he foundation of his action, although the action itself is not 07i 
 the contract. This is, I think, attributing too much nicety and 
 precision of thought to the legislature, and assumes that it would 
 never enact any duplicate provisions. The first subdivision no 
 doubt covers the cases mentioned by Judge Woodruff, but it also 
 embraces many others. Undoubtedly, the codifiers and the legis- 
 lature in drawing and adopting the first subdivision had in mind 
 the doctrine of recoupment, and so framed the language that it 
 should include cases of recoupment and all others, legal and equi- 
 table, analogous to it, — that is, all cases in which the right of 
 action of the plaintiff and that of the defendant arise from the 
 same contract. It desc^'ibes, therefore, not only the special and 
 infrequent classes of instances in which the plaintiff's claim is 
 not technically on the contract, although a contract is set forth as 
 its foundation, but also air other instances in which the plaintiff's 
 action is strictly brought on the contract, while the defendant's 
 counter-claim in both cases arises from the same contract. The 
 central idea of this subdivision then is, that one and the same 
 contract is the basis of both parties' demand for relief.^ Passing 
 to -the second subdivision, the central thought is equally plain, 
 viz., that the plaintiff's cause of action, and that of the defendant, 
 spring from different contracts ; in other words, the codifiers and 
 the legislature had in mind the familiar case of set-off, both legal 
 and equitable. But, in framing the clause, tlie language was 
 made broader than was necessary, and it actually covers all cases 
 in which the plaintiff's cause of action is on contract, and the 
 defendant's counter-claim is also on contract the same or another. 
 The law-makers have thus in fact given us two provisions author- 
 
 1 QBrosnan v. Kramer (1901), 135 Cal. the lessor against the lessee at the time of 
 
 .36, 66 Pac. 979 : Where a lease is entered the foreclosure sviit is not a claim arising 
 
 into between two parties, and on the same " out of the transaction set forth in the 
 
 date the lessee loans money to the lessor complaint as the foundation of the ))lain- 
 
 secured by a mortgage ou the leased tiff's claim or connected with the subject 
 
 premises, and an action of foreclosure is of the action," whicli is barred by failure 
 
 subsequently brought by the lessee, a de- to set it up. Citing the text. Richardson 
 
 maud for unpaid rent existing in favor of v. Penny (1900), 10 Okla. 32, 61 Pac. 584.3
 
 908 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 izing a counter-claim arising from the same contract as that from 
 which the plaintiff's cause of action results, but only one author- 
 izing a counter-claim springing from another contract than the 
 one upon Avhich the plaintiff's demand is based. The same case 
 mav therefore be often referred to both of these subdivisions ; but 
 I shall, following what seems to be the plain design of the statute, 
 consider under the first all those instances in which the demands 
 of both parties arise from the same contract, and postpone to the 
 second all those in which each demand arises from a separate 
 contract. That this is the correct construction of the whole pro- 
 vision is made certiiin, when we turn to the form which it assumes 
 in all the codes which constitute the second group according to. 
 the classification stated at the commencement of this section.^ 
 
 § 654. * 778. General Proposition Stated. Illustrative Examples. 
 It may be stated as a general proposition that in all actions to 
 recover a money judgment, debt or damages, upon a contract, or 
 where a contract is set forth as the foundation of the plaintiff's 
 claim, a counter-claim of a money judgment against the plaintiff 
 for his breach or non-performance of any stipulations of the same 
 agreement, or for his fraud in procuring the same to be entered 
 into, is admissible. The following examples will illustrate this 
 proposition.- In an action for rent brought by the lessor or by 
 
 1 The following recent decisions give Ohio St. 550; Hade i\ McVay, 31 id. 2.31 ; 
 
 examples and illustrations of counter- Fraker v. Galium, 24 Kan. 679. 
 claims arising out of the contract, etc.: - I^Mack v. Snell (1893), 140 N. Y. 
 
 More I.-. Uand, 60 N. Y. 208, 214 ; Kin;,' v. 193, 35 N. E. 493 ; Rood v. Taft (1896), 
 
 Knapp, 59 id. 460; Boyd v. Schlesinger, 94 Wis. 380, 69 N. W. 183; Smith v. 
 
 59 id. 301, 305 (action to cancel a contract Building Ass'n (1896), 119 N. C. 257, 26 
 
 for the sale of land by plaintiff to de- S. E. 401 ; Kuhn v. Sol. Heaveurich Co. 
 
 fendant, as a cloud upon plaintiff's title, (1902), 115 Wis. 447, 91 N W. 994. 
 counter-claim for the specific performance Where lessees enter into and retain 
 
 of the contract) ; Howard v. Johnston, possession of the rented premises under a 
 
 82 id. 271 ; Nat Bk. of Auburn v. Lewis, covenant in the lea,«e that the landlord 
 
 81 id. 15; Cook v. Jenkins, 79 id. 575; will make improvements, which he fails to 
 
 Levy V. Loeb, 85 id. 365 ; Read v. Decker, do, the le.>i.sees, wiien sued for the rent, 
 
 .^ Hun, 646; Morgan v. Smith, 5 id. 220; may recoup tlie damages resulting from 
 
 Elwell r. Skiddy, 8 id. 73; Nichols v. such breach of the covenant, or set up 
 
 Townscnd, 7 id. 375 ; Griffin v. Moore, the resulting damages as a counter-claim. 
 
 52 Ind. 295; Mc.Mahan v. Spinning, 51 iil. Such counter-claim arises out of the con- 
 
 187; Hinkle v. Margeruni, 50 id. 240; tract sued upon as the foundation of the 
 
 Black V. Elmer, 54 id. 544; Morri.son ;'. landlord's claim, and is connected with 
 
 Kramer, 58 id. 38; Howe Machine Co. r. tiie subject of the action: I'ionecr Press 
 
 Reber, 66 id. 489 ; Merrill v. Niirhtingalc, Co. r. Ilutciiinsou (1896), 63 Minn. 481, 
 
 39 Wis. 247 ; Bonnell v. Jacobs, 30 id. 59 ; 65 N. \V. 938. 
 
 Cr(iUir)ger v. Parze. 48 id. 229; Caleb c. ^Latney c. Ferrill (1897). 100 Ky.3Gl, 
 
 Morgan, 83 N. C. 21 1 ; Craig v. Ileis, 30 38 S. W. '4:14 : Wiiere a wife, tliroiigli her
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 909 
 
 the grantee of the reversion against the lessee or an assignee of 
 the term, where the lease contains a covenant to repair on the 
 part of the landlord, damages sustained by the defendant from a 
 breach of this covenant may be alleged, and recovered as a coun- 
 ter-claim. The damages in one such case, where the demised 
 premises were a hotel, were held to be the sum paid by the defend- 
 ant for making the necessary repairs, together with the amount 
 of loss occasioned by the inability to use certain rooms in the 
 hotel while they were out of repair.^ In an action by the buyer 
 against the seller to recover damages for the non-delivery of 
 goods bargained and sold, the latter may counter-claim the un- 
 paid price of that part of the goods already delivered under the 
 contract.^ When sued for the price of two articles sold under 
 one agreement, the defendant may set up and recover damages 
 resulting from the fraudulent representations of the plaintiff in 
 respect to one of tliem, even though such damages exceed in 
 amount the whole price agreed to be paid for both.^ A person 
 having sold his business and good-will at a certain price, and hav- 
 ing covenanted in the same agreement not to engage therein at 
 the same place, and the damages for a breach of this covenant 
 having been liquidated and fixed at a specified sum, in an action 
 brought by the vendee to recover this amount of liquidated dam- 
 husband as agent, made false and fraud- 51 Pac. 664 : A tenant may set up a coun- 
 ulent representations in the sale of a tract ter-claim for breach of the implied cov- 
 of land with reference to a vein of coal euant for quiet enjoyment, in an action 
 thereon, and its location, thickness and brought by the landlord for rent, where 
 quality, which induced the purchaser to the landlord has disturbed tbe tenant in 
 buy the land, and the wife caused such his possession. See also Hunter r. Hatha- 
 false representations to be made and knew way (1900), 108 Wis. 620, 84 N. W. 996 ; 
 they were untrue, in an action to enforce Illsly y. Grayson (1898), 105 la. 685.75 
 a vendor's lien for deferred payments, the N. W. 518; Frederick i'. Daniels (1902), 
 defendant may set off the damage he has 74 Conn. 710, 52 Atl. 414. J 
 sustained by reason of such false repre- ^ Leavenworth v. Packer, 52 Barb. 
 
 sentations against the purchase price. 132, 136. 
 
 Driver v. Salt Lake Gas Co. (1900), ^ Rawley v. Woodruff, 2 Lans. 419, 
 
 22 Utah, 143, 61 Pac. 733 : The suing out and see Hoffa ?;. Hoffman, 33 Ind. 172, 
 and serving of an injunction prohibiting where damages from fraud were counter- 
 defendant from exercising a right under claimed in a foreclosure suit. When, in 
 the contract sued on by plaintiff, is a an action on a contract, the defendant set 
 breach of the contract by plaintiff suffi- up a counter-claim of damages from the 
 cient to form a basis for a counter-claim plaintiff's fraud, he cannot, at the trial, 
 by defendant, and a counter-claim setting rely upon a mistake in making the agree- 
 up such facts states a cause of action.] raent: fraud and mistake are distinct 
 
 1 Myers v. Burns, 35 N. Y. 269; Cook grounds of recovery or defence ; an<[ proof 
 V. Soule, 56 N. Y. 420; 1 N. Y. S. C. 116 ; of one cannot be given when the otlier 
 Benkard r. Babcock, 2 Robt. 175. alone is pleaded : Dudley v. Scranton, 57 
 
 I^Hanley v. Banks (1897), 6 Okla 79, N. Y. 424, 427.
 
 910 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 ages on the ground that the vendor had violated his agreement, 
 the defendant was permitted to recover the unpaid portion of the 
 purchase price as a counter-claim.^ 
 
 § 655. * 779. Examples Continued. It is settled by numerous 
 decisions, although there were at first some expressions of a con- 
 trary opinion, that in an action to recover the price of goods sold 
 and delivered, or bargained and sold, the purchaser's demand of 
 damages for the plaintiff's breach of his warranty of the quality of 
 the goods may be pleaded as a counter-claim ; in fact, there can be 
 no simpler and plainer illustration of a counter-claim arising out of 
 the very contract set up by the plaintiff as the basis of his recovery.^ 
 When the plaintiff, wlio had been employed as a superintendent 
 of the defendants' manufactory under a written agreement stipu- 
 lating for his services in that capacity at a specified salary for a 
 year, brought an action for his wages, alleging that he had been 
 wrongfully chscharged, a counter-claim of damages sustained by 
 the defendants in their business, through the negligent and unskil- 
 ful conduct of the plaintiff in violation of the provisions of the 
 same contract, was pleaded, and was fully upheld by the court.^ 
 
 1 Baker v. Connell, 1 Daly, 409 ; and 
 see Ains worth r. Bowen, 9 Wis. .348 ; 
 Snow V. Holmes, 71 Cal. 142. 
 
 2 Lemou v. Trull, 13 How. Tr. 248; 
 Warren v. Van Pelt, 4 I-:. D. Smith, 202 ; 
 Dounce v. Dow, 57 N. Y. 16; Love v. 
 Oldham, 22 Ind. .51 ; French v. Saile, 
 
 damages resulting from a breach of war- 
 ranty in recoupment. Haygood r. Boney 
 (1894), 43 S. C. 63, 20 S. E. 803 : Where 
 suit is brought to recover wages for ser- 
 vices rendered as a farm hand, the de- 
 fendant may .set up as a counter-claim the 
 damages he has sustained by reason of 
 
 Stanton's Code (Ky.), 96; Morehead v. plaintiff's careless and negligent use of a 
 
 Haisell, id. 90 ; Earle v. Bull, 15 Cal. 421 ; 
 Hoffa V. Hoffman. 33 Ind. 1 72. See contra, 
 Nichols I'. Bo(;rum, 6 Abb. Pr. 290. This 
 case has been expressly overruled. See 
 also Nichols i: Townsend, 7 Hun, 375, 
 citing Gurney r. Atlantic, etc. 11. Co., 58 
 N. Y. 358; Dounce v. Dow, 57 id. 16 : 
 Day V. Pool, 52 id. 416; and see Merrill 
 V. Nightingale, 39 Wis. 247; Bonnell r. 
 Jacobs, 36 id. 59 ; Giffert r. West, 33 id. 
 617; Schurmeier v. English, 46 Minn. 
 306 ; Rugland c. Thompson, 48 Minn. .539 ; 
 Mass. Loan & T. Co. v. Welch, 47 Minn. 
 183 ; Maders v. Lawrence, 49 Hun, 360. 
 
 (^Heebner i-. Shepard (1895), 5 N. D. 
 56, 63 N. W. 892. 
 
 Laney r. Ing.iUs (1894), 5 S. D. 183, 
 58 N. W. 572: Where an action is brought 
 on a promissory note given for the pur- 
 chase yjrice of a warranted article of nior- 
 chaudise, the defendant may plead the 
 
 horse while working under said contract.] 
 3 Lancaster, etc. Man. Co. ?'. Colgate, 
 12 Ohio St. 344; Stoddard v. Treadwell, 
 20 Cal. 294. But see Barker r. Knicker- 
 bocker Life Ins. Co., 24 Wis. 6.30, in wiiich, 
 under exactly similar circumstances, the 
 defendant's claim that the contract should 
 be cancelled was refused, on the ground 
 that the facts made out a jierfect defence 
 at law; but no counter-claim of damages 
 was pleaded. It is the rule in Wisconsin 
 that, in general, where the invalidity of 
 the plaintiff's claim appears in an action 
 at law, tlie court will not interfere upon 
 a counter-claim to set it aside or enjoin it : 
 S. L. Siieldon Co. r. Mayers, 81 Wis. 627; 
 Commercial Bk. of Milw. v. Fire Ins. Co. 
 of Phil. (Wis 1893), 54 N. W. Hep. 109. 
 
 Counter-claim of damages for negli- 
 gence in carrying out the provisions of 
 the contract sued uj>on : Whitelegge v.
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 
 
 911 
 
 § 656. * 780. Examples Continued. I have collected and placed 
 in the foot-note a number of additional cases in which the an- 
 swers were sustained as valid counter-claims on the ground that 
 they arose out of the contract set forth in the compliant or peti- 
 tion; in some of them, however, the court merely said that they 
 arose either from the " contract or transaction set forth " bv the 
 plaintiff, and did not distinctly determine which of these expres- 
 sions was strictly the proper one to be used.^ 
 
 II. Cases in ivliicli the Cause of Action Alleged as a Counter- Claim 
 arises out of the Transaction Set forth in the Complaint or 
 Petition as the Foundation of the Plaintiff's Claim. 
 
 § 657. * 781. Plan of Discussing this Subdivision. I shall in 
 this subdivision pursue the same plan as in the last, and collect 
 
 De Witt, 12 Daly, .319 (action for services 
 by attorney) ; Schweickhart v. Stuewe, 
 71 Wis. 1 ; Muth v. Frost, 7.5 Wis. 166; 
 Black Riv. Imp. Co. v. Holway (Wis. 
 1893), .53 N. W. Rep. 418; Aultman v. 
 Case, 68 Wis. 612; McGregor v. Auld 
 (Wis. 1892), 53 N. W. Rep. 845; Harlan 
 V. St. Paul, M. &M. R. Co., 31 Minn. 427; 
 Zigler V. McClellan, 1 5 Ore. 499 ; Empire 
 Transp. Co. v. Boggiano, 52 Mo. 294. 
 
 I^Punteuey-Mitcliell Mfg. Co. v. North- 
 wall Co. (1902), — Neb. — , 91 N. W. 863 ; 
 McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Gus- 
 tafson (1898), 54 Neb. 276, 74 N. W. 576; 
 Parry Mfg. Co. v. Tobin (1900), 106 Wis. 
 286, 82 N. W. 154 ; Mallory Commission 
 Co. V. Elwood (1903), 120 la. 632, 95N. W. 
 176; Hobbs v. Bland (1899), 124 N. C. 
 284, 32 S. E. 683.] 
 
 1 Racine Cy. Bk. v. Keep, 13 Wis. 209 ; 
 Butler V. Titus, 13 Wis. 429 ; Koenipel v. 
 Shaw, 13 Minn. 488 ; Gleadell v. Thomson, 
 56 N. Y. 194, 198; Isham v. Davidson, 52 
 N. Y. 237 ; Whaloa v. Aldrich, 8 Minn. 
 346; Mason v. Hey ward, 3 Minn. 182; 
 Dale V. Masters, Stanton's Code (Ky.), 
 97 ; Dennis v. Belt, 30 Cal. 247 ; Wilder 
 I'. Boynton, 63 Barb. 547 ; Burton v. 
 Wilkes, 66 N. C. 604, 610; Hay v. Short, 
 49 Mo. 139; Scott v. Menasha (Wis. 
 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 263 (action on cou- 
 pons, counter-claim for cancellation of the 
 bonds to which they were attached) ; 
 Church V. Spiegelberg, .31 Fed. Rep. 
 601 ; Moser v. Cochrane, 107 N. Y. 35 
 
 (action to recover earnest money paid on 
 a contract for purcliase of land, counter- 
 claim for specific performance) ; King v. 
 Knapp, 59 N. Y. 462 (same) ; Patton v. 
 Royal Baking Powder Co., 114 N. Y. 1 ; 
 Smith V. Wall, 12 Col. 363 ; Seaman v. 
 Slater, 49 Fed. Rep. 37 ; Thomson v. San- 
 ders, 1 18 N. Y. 252 (counter-claim of dam- 
 ages for plaintiff's fraud in procuring the 
 contract) ; More v. Rand, 60 N. Y. 208 
 (same). See McKegney v. Widekind, 6 
 Bush, 107, as to the extent of the relief 
 which may he granted to the defendant 
 in a legal action, and when the contract 
 must be reformed by an equitable pro- 
 ceeding. For examples of vnlid coun- 
 ter-claims where the defendant had an 
 election to sue for a tort or on contract, 
 see Gordon v. Bruner, 49 Mo. 570 ; Tinsley 
 V. Tinsley, 15 B. IMon. 454; Norden v. 
 Jones, 33 Wis. 600, 604 ; but, per contra, 
 see Slayback v. Jones, 9 Ind. 470 Dam- 
 ages resulting to the defendant from a 
 wrongful issue of an attachment in the 
 action may be counter-claimed, if such 
 act of the plaintiff was a breach of the 
 contract sued on, Waugenheim v. Graham, 
 39 Cal. 1 69, 176 ; hut such damages cannot 
 generally be recovered by way of a coun- 
 ter-claim, Hembrock v. Stark, 53 Mo. 588; 
 Nolle V. Thompson, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 121. 
 A counter-claim of damages from a per- 
 sonal tort, ase. g , a slander, is impossible. 
 Conner i'. Winton, 7 Ind. 523 ; Aferritt 
 Milling Co. v. Finlav, 110 N. C. 41 1.
 
 912 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 the various classes of cases in which counter-cLaims, legal or 
 equitable, have been sustained as properly arising out of the 
 transaction set forth in the complaint, and also those in which 
 such attempted counter-claims have been overruled ; and I shall 
 add whatever comments, or extracts from judicial opinions, seem 
 necessary to the clear inference and statement of the general 
 principles and practical rules established by tiie courts. The 
 import of the term " transaction," and of the phrase " arising out 
 of," has been already discussed with some fulness. Without re- 
 peating this discussion, the cases cited will illustrate and com- 
 plete it. 
 
 S 658. * 782. Classification and Arrangement of Cases to be cited. 
 The cases cited will be classified and arranged into groups accord- 
 ing to their nature ; that is, according to the relief demanded by 
 the respective litigants. The first of these classes will contain 
 cases in which the actions are legal, and both parties seek to re- 
 cover a judgment for money alone. This will be subdivided into 
 (1) Those in which the plaintiff's cause of action and the defend- 
 ant's counter-claim are in form for debt or damages upon contract 
 express or implied ; (2) Those in which the plaintiff's cause of 
 action is in form for debt or damages upon contract express or 
 implied, and the defendant's counter-claim is for damages arising 
 from a tort, either (a) for conversion of goods, or (b) for tres- 
 passes or injuries to property or to person, or (c) for fraud ; (3) 
 Those in which the plaintiff's cause of action is in form for dam- 
 ages arising from a tort, and the defendant's counter-claim is for 
 debt or damages upon contract ; and (4) Those in which the de- 
 mands of both parties are for damages arising from a tort. The 
 second will contain legal actions in which the judgment is other 
 than for money; and the third will embrace equital)le actions. 
 
 § 659. * 783. First Class. (1) Where the Plaintiffs Cause of 
 Action and the Defendant's Counter-Claim are in Form Debt or Dam- 
 ages upon Contract Express or Implied. A complaint alleged that 
 the defendant luid in his possession $115, of which two thirds l:>e- 
 longed to the plaintiff, and was received by the defendant to his 
 use, and demanded judgment therefor ; the answer, besides a de- 
 fence of denial, stated by way of counter-claim that the plaintiff 
 had himself in fact received all the money in question (iftll5) ; 
 that one third thereof belonged to the defendant, and was received 
 by the plaintiff to the defendant's use, and prayed judgment for
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 
 
 913 
 
 such sum. This answer was adjudged to be a proper counter- 
 claim arising out of the transaction set forth in the complaint ; and 
 the plaintiff having failed to reply, the allegations thereof were 
 admitted.^ Several of the decisions quoted in the last preceding 
 subdivision may also be regarded as examples of the class de- 
 scribed under the present head; the contract set forth by the 
 plaintiff might be considered a " transaction." Their facts need 
 not be repeated, and their titles will be found in the foot-note.^ 
 
 § 660. * 784. (2) Cases in which the Plaintiffs Cause of Action 
 is upon Contract, and the Defendant's Counter- Claim is for Damages 
 Arising from a Tort. No little conflict will be found among the 
 decisions which are embraced within this group. The judges 
 have been constantly influenced by the established doctrine of 
 the former procedure, which excluded without exception any set- 
 off or recoupment or cross-demand that did not spring from con- 
 tract.^ Some have gone to the length of holding that a cause of 
 
 1 Clinton V. Eddy, 1 Lans. 61. In an 
 action upon a note, the defendant vvas 
 not permitted to recover back t;surious 
 interest paid by him to the -plaintiff on 
 former loans as a counterclaim, because 
 the demand did not arise out of the same 
 transaction ; nor as a set-off, because it 
 did not arise on contract, Smead v. Chris- 
 field, I Disney, 18; but it seems a demand 
 to recover back usurious interest paid for 
 the very loan which is the basis of the 
 action would be a valid counter-claim, 
 Martin v. Pugh, 23 Wis. 184. A claim 
 for the loss, by the negligence of the 
 holder of the note, of certain collateral 
 security for its payment, is a proper 
 counter-claim, First Nat. Bk. of Ft. Dodge 
 V. O'Connell (Iowa, 1892), 51 N. W. Rep. 
 162. 
 
 QPunteney-Mitchell Mfg. Co. v. North- 
 wall Co (190-2), — Neb. — , 91 N. W. 863 ; 
 Dowdcli ',-. Carpy (1902), 137 Cal. 333, 70 
 Pac. 167 ; Adams v. Warren (1900), 27 
 Col. 293, 61 Pac. 609; Wintringhara v. 
 Hayes (1894), 144 N. Y. 1, 38 N. E. 999. 
 In an action by an administrator to re- 
 cover the price of articles purchased by 
 defendant at the administrator's sale, 
 debts due the defendant ffom the intestate 
 could not constitute a counter-claim as 
 thev did not grow out of the same trans- 
 action, nor a set-off because not mutual : 
 Hancock v. Hancock's Adm'r (1902), — 
 
 Ky. — , 69 S. W. 757. See also Griswold v. 
 Pieratt (1895), 110 Cal. 259, 42 Pac. 821.] 
 
 ■^ Racine Cy. Bank v. Keep, 13 Wis. 
 209 ; Butler v. Titus, 13 Wis. 429 ; Koem- 
 pel r. vShaw, 13 Minn. 488; Whalon v. 
 Aldrich, 8 .Minn. 346 , .Mason i'. Heyward, 
 3 Minn. 182; Dale v. Masters, Stanton's 
 Code (Ky.), 97; McKeguey v- Widekind, 
 6 Bush, 107 ; Stoddard v. Treadwell, 26 
 Cal. 294 ; Dennis v. Belt, 30 Cal. 247 , Hay 
 V. Short, 49 Mo. 139; Gordon v. Bruner, 
 49 .Mo. 570; Wilder c. Boynton, 63 Barb. 
 547 ; McKinnon v. Morrison, 104 N. C. 354. 
 
 3 [Rood v. Taft (1896), 94 Wis. 380, 
 69 N. W. 183 ; Hunter v. Hathaway (1900), 
 108 Wis. 620, 84 N. W. 996 ; Loomer v. 
 Thomas (1893), 38 Neb. 277, 56 N. W. 
 973 ; President, etc. of Ins. Co. v. Parker 
 (1902), 64 Neb. 411, 89 N. W. 1040; Young 
 V. Borzone (1901), 26 Wash. 4, 66 Pac. 
 135; McHard v. Williams (1896), 8 S. D. 
 381, 66 N. W. 930. 
 
 In an action for the value of goods, 
 wares, and merchandise sold and delivered, 
 and for services rendered, defendant cannot 
 plead as counter-claim a cause of action 
 for wilfully and maliciously causing a writ 
 of attachment to issue against him, where 
 the facts on which the alleged counter- 
 claim rests arose subsequent to and were 
 wholly independent of those alleged in 
 the complaint; Jones v. Swank (1893), 54 
 Mmn. 259, 55 N. W. 1126.^ 
 
 58
 
 914 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 fiction in favor of the defendant resulting from a tort cannot 
 possibly arise from th0 " transaction " set forth by the plaintiff as 
 the foundation of his claim ; others, however, have given a more 
 liberal and comprehensive interpretation of the term.^ Their dif- 
 fering \dews can best be seen by a comparison of their judicial 
 opinions. In an action for the price of a safe sold and delivered, 
 the defendant pleaded a counter-claim, that the plaintiff had con- 
 verted to his own use a safe, the propert}^ of tlie defendant, for 
 the value of which he demanded judgment.^ The Common Pleas 
 of New York City held that this answer was based upon tort ; 
 
 1 [^Waring v. Gaskill (1895), 95 Ga. 
 731, 22 S. E. 659 : A note was given to 
 plaintiff by the defendant as drawer, with 
 certain shares of stock as collateral, under 
 the agreement that the collateral should 
 not be sold unless ten days' notice was 
 given to the defendant. The stock was 
 sold without the required notice being 
 given, and did not bring the amount of 
 the note. In an action on the note the 
 court held that defendant might plead 
 in recoupment the damages occasioned by 
 the conversion. Yet the Georgia statute 
 defines recoupment as based only upon 
 cross-obligations or iudependent covenants 
 arising under the same contract. But see 
 .Ma.<hburn r. Inman (1895). 97 Ga. 396, 
 where the court said : '' This case falls 
 witliin the general rule, that, to an action 
 sounding in contract, the defendant can- 
 not plead as a set-off a claim arising 
 ex delicto." 
 
 In Hecht «;. Snook (1902), 114 Ga. 921, 
 41 S. E. 74, the court said : " There is 
 notliing in the statutes of this State which 
 authorizes a defendant in a suit at law to 
 set off, as a matter of legal defence to a 
 suit on a contract, damages arising from 
 a tort committed by the plaintiff ; or to 
 set off, in a suit for damages arising from 
 the commission of a tort by the defendant, 
 a claim growing out of a contract between 
 the plaintiff and the defendant." 
 
 Blue 1-. Capital Nat. Bank (1896), 145 
 Ind. 518. 43 N. E. 655:] "Can slander 
 be the subject of a counter-claim in an 
 action upon a promissory note for bor- 
 rowed money ? In our judgment it can- 
 not. . . . ' A counter-claim is that which 
 might have ari.'sen out of, or could have 
 some connection with, the original trans- 
 
 action, in view of the parties, and which, 
 at the time the contract was made, they 
 could have intended might, in some event, 
 give one party a claim against the otiier 
 for compliance or non-compliance with its 
 provisions.' Conner v. \Y'vau>i\, 7 Ind. 523. 
 A tort cannot be regarded as growing 
 out of or connected with contract, within 
 the meaning of the statute, simply because 
 the contract had suggested it, or was 
 remotely an incident to it." 
 
 - QCarson's Executors v. Buckstaff 
 (1898), 57 Neb. 262, 77 N. \V. 670: "A 
 debtor, wheu sued by his creditor, may 
 plead as a counter-claim or set-off, the 
 actual value of any collateral security 
 which the creditor has converted to his 
 own use or the value of any collateral 
 security which he lias released, dissipated, 
 or diverted from the purpose for wliich he 
 held it." 
 
 Braithwaite v. Akin (1893), 3 N. D. 
 365, 56 N. W. 1.33 : Plaintiffs [intervenors] 
 owned certain claims in a steamboat, which 
 was about to be sold under judicial order 
 so as to deprive them of their claims. 
 To ]>rotect themselves they arranged with 
 defendant that they would furnish part of 
 the funds necessary to purchase tlie boat 
 at the judicial sale, that defendant should 
 attend the .sale and hny the b(jat, that the 
 claims of plaintiffs and their advancements 
 should be paid out of the earnings of the 
 boat, the boat being managed by defend- 
 ant. Jleld that a counter-claim based on 
 tlie conversion of the boat by plaintiffs, in 
 an action for an accnimting, was improper 
 and did not arise out <>f the contract or 
 transaction set forth in the intervenors 
 complaint.]
 
 COUNTKR-Cr.AIM. 015 
 
 that the defendant liad not so framed it as to waive the wrong 
 and sue upon an implied promise for the price, and that the 
 pleading was not a proper counter-claim. Having thus fully 
 disposed of the issues, the court went on to declare that if the 
 defendant miglit waive the tort and bring suit in form for the 
 price, the demand would not be a valid counter-claim, because 
 the cause of action would not arise upon contract ; ^ and upon a 
 complaint for the price of goods sold and delivered, the Superior 
 Court of New York City rejected a counter-claim for the Avrong- 
 ful conversion by the plaintiff of other goods belonging to the 
 defendant.^ No allusion was made in the latter decision to the 
 doctrine of election of remedies between an action for the tort, 
 and one in form upon contract ; and in neither of the cases could 
 it be pretended that the defendant's demand, in whatever shape 
 it might be put, arose out of the transaction stated by the plain- 
 tiff. On the other hand, when, in a suit ujDon a promissory note. 
 the defendant pleaded as a counter-claim that he had pledged 
 certain stocks with the plaintiff as security for the debt ; that the 
 latter had wrongfully sold them, and prayed judgment for their 
 value, — the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in reversing a judg- 
 ment for the plaintiff rendered on the trial, assumed that the facts 
 constituted a good counter-claim.^ 
 
 § 661. * 785. Damages from Trespasses, Nuisances, Negligences, 
 and the Like. In an action by the lessor for rent, an answer, 
 which stated that during the continuance of the term the plaintiff 
 erected an oven, furnace, and other apparatus for a bakery under 
 the store demised to and occupied by the defendant, and by the 
 use thereof had filled the premises with smoke, soot, and steam, 
 and had injured the defendant's goods, and demanded judgment 
 for the damages so caused, was treated as a valid counter-claim 
 by the New York Superior Court.* But in a similar action the 
 
 1 Piser r. Stearns, 1 Hilt. 86. * Ayres v. O'Farrell, 4 Kobt. 668; 10 
 
 ■^ Kurtz V. McGuire, 5 Duer, 660. See Bosw. 143. When the cause was first 
 
 also Steinhart v. Pitcher, 20 Minn. 102; before it, the court held that by replying 
 
 Street v. Bryan, 6.5 N. C. 619, actions the plaintiff had waived all objection ; on 
 
 on contracts in which counter-claims of the second appeal, t)ie counter-claim was 
 
 damages arising from unconnected torts more definitely approved, 
 
 were rejected. [^Kiihn )•. Sol Heavenrich Co. (1902), 
 
 » Ainsworth v. Bowen, 9 Wis. 348; 1 I.t Wis. 447, 91 N. W. 994 ; Hawley Bros. 
 
 s. p.. Cass V. Higenbotam, 100 N. Y. 248; Hardware Co. v. Brownstone (1899), 123 
 
 Weston V. Turver (Supr. Ct., Gen. Term, Cal. 643, 56 Pac. 468.] 
 1888), 17 N. Y. St. Rep. 502.
 
 916 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 New York Common Pleas rejected a counter-claim which alleged 
 that at the time of the letting mentioned in the complaint the 
 plaintiff leased other premises to the defendant, and that he had 
 before the commencement of this suit wrongfully broken into said 
 premises and taken therefrom certain chattels of the defendant, 
 which he had injured, destroyed, or lost, and prayed judgment 
 for the value of the goods so taken. The court declared that 
 this cause of action clearly did not arise out of the contract or 
 transaction set forth in the complaint, nor was it connected with 
 the subject of the action : it was a naked and independent act of 
 trespass.^ 
 
 § 662. * 786. Same Subject. Similar decisions have been made 
 in other actions than those for the recovery of rent. In a suit 
 upon a note given for the purchase price of land conveyed to the 
 defendants, they were not permitted to counter-claim damages 
 for the plaintifif's wrongful entry upon the land so conveyed, and 
 cutting and carrying away a growing crop the title to which had 
 passed by the deed.^ It has, however, been recently held by the 
 Supreme Court in New York, that a cause of action for a tort may 
 arise out of the transaction set forth by the plaintiff ; and such a 
 counter-claim was fully sustained in an action on contract.^ 
 
 1 Drake v. Cockroft, 4 E. D. Smith, counter-claims of damages from trespasses 
 34,39. See also Gallup v. Albany R. Co., to land were sustained; but a counter- 
 7 Lans. 471 ; Edgerton v. Page, 20 N. Y. claim of damages arising from a personal 
 281, 285; Mayor, etc. of N. Y. v. Parker tort cannot be sustained, Conner r Win- 
 Vein Stp. Co., 12 Abb. Pr. 300; McKeu- ton, 7 Ind. 523; Merritt Milling Co. v. 
 sie V. Farrell, 4 Bosw 192, 202; Avery Finlay, 1 10 N. C. 41 1 j^Ander.son o. John- 
 ■V. Dougherty, 102 Ind. 443; Thorp v. son (1900), 106 Wis. 218, 82 N. W. 177]. 
 Philbin, 15 Daly, 155; Brugman v. Burr, * Wadley v. Davis, 63 Barb. 500. The 
 30 Neb. 406 ; which were all actions for discussions of tlie text are further illus- 
 rent in which counter-claims for damages trated by tlie following recent ca.ses : 
 from torts of the lessor were rejected. Brady v. Brennan, 25 Minn. 210 (action 
 In Littman v. Coulter, 23 Abb. N. Cas. GO, on contract, counter-claim for conversion 
 however, an action for rent, the defendant by waiving the tort) ; Goebel v. Hough, 
 was allowed to counter-claim damages for 26 id. 252 (action by a lessor for rent, 
 the conversion by the plaintiff of the counter-claim of damages for plaintiff's 
 defendant's goods, under a claim of lieu wrongful trespass on the premi.ses) ; Dev- 
 thereon for the rent. rios '• Warren, 82 N. C. 356 (])laintiff 
 
 ■^ Slayback v. .Jones, 9 Ind. 470; and ami defendants were co-tenants of land; 
 
 see Humbert v. Brisbane, 25 S. C. 506 ; jilaintiff sold his share to defendant and 
 
 per contra, see Gordon v. Bruner, 49 Mo. took defendant's bond fur the price; in 
 
 570, 571 (which w!us decided on the an .action on the i)ond, defendant could 
 
 doctrine of election) ; Tinsley v. Tinsloy, not counter-claim damages done to the 
 
 15 B. Mon. 454, 459; Smith r. Fife, 2 land by the plaintiff before the sale); 
 
 Neb. 10, 13; Aj)persou's Adin. v. Triplett Harris i'. Kivcrs, 53 Ind. 216 (in action 
 
 (Ky. 1890), 13 S. W. 791 ; in all which, on a jironii.s.sory note, no set-off for tort
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM, 917 
 
 § 663. * 787. Damages Arising from Fraud. CroSS-demailds for 
 iLiniages resulting from fraud will naturally occur, and, it would 
 seem, might be easily sustained. But there have been decisions 
 which reject even such counter-claims. In an action on two 
 promissory notes, the defendants — the makers — alleged that 
 they executed a trust deed of land as security for their notes, and 
 proceeded to state acts of fraud committed by the plaintiff in col- 
 lusion with the trustee in the deed, by whic-h the land was sacri- 
 ficed and bought in by the plaintiff at far less than its value, 
 and prayed judgment for the damages resulting from the fraud. 
 The Supreme Court of Missouri overruled this counter-claim in 
 an opinion which contains many palpable errors, and which has 
 been disregarded by subsequent decisions of the same tribunal.^ 
 The Supreme Court of Indiana, however, sustained a counter- 
 claim in every way analogous to the one just described.^ It would 
 seem that little or no difficulty would be met in giving such a 
 construction to the statutory definition as will embrace the cases 
 of damages resulting from the plaintiff's frauds. If the action 
 was on contract, such damages formed a most familiar example 
 of the former " recoupment ; " and it is only necessary to extend 
 that doctrine to analogous cases in which a " transaction " is to 
 be substituted in place of a contract. 
 
 § 664. * 788. (3) Cases in which the Plaintiffs Cause of Action is 
 for a Tort and the Defendant's Counter-Claim is in Form upon Con- 
 tract. The examples of this class of controversies have generally 
 been actions for the wrongful conversion of goods in which the 
 counter-claim of debt or damages upon contract was interposed, 
 and rested either upon the theory that both demands arose out of 
 the one transaction set forth by the plaintiff, or upon the notion 
 that the plaintiff's cause of action might be regarded as founded 
 upon an implied contract, the tort being waived. Such an action 
 having been brought in form for the conversion of goods, the an- 
 swer contained a counter-claim setting up a liability of the plain- 
 possible); Collier v. Ervin, 3 Mont. 142 (1901), 1.57 Ind. 120, 60 N. E. 1025: The 
 (action on contract, no counter-claim for rule is well settled in this State that a 
 a tort unless it arose out of the same claim or demanil arising out of tort cannot 
 transaction, etc.). be pleaded as a set-off against a cause of 
 
 1 Jones V. Moore, 42 Mo. 413, per action arising out of contract. Abraham- 
 Holmes .1. son i\ Laml)er.son (1898), 72 Minn. 308, 7."} 
 
 2 Vail V. Junes, 31 Ind. 467. N. W. 226.]] 
 [[Harris r. Randolph County Bank
 
 918 CIVIL REMEDIKS. 
 
 tiff as a stockholder in a certain manufacturing corporation, 
 averring- all the facts required by the statute to create a personal 
 responsibility iu him for a debt of the company. This attempted 
 counter-claim was of course overruled, as it had not the least con- 
 nection with the transaction stated iu the complaint, nor with the 
 subject of the action.^ I submit the following doctrine as correct 
 ou principle, and as derived from a true interpretation of the 
 statute. Whenever the facts are such that an election is given 
 to the plaintiff to sue in form either for a tort or on contract, and 
 if he sues on contract the defendant may counter-claim damages 
 for the breach of that contract, the same counter-claim may also 
 be interposed when the suit is in form for the tort : the facts being 
 exactly the same in both phases of the action, the counter-claim 
 would clearly arise out of the real transaction which was the 
 foundation of the plaintiff's demand.''^ The term " transaction " 
 refers to the actual facts and circumstances from which the rights 
 result and which are averred, and not to the mere form and manner 
 in which these facts are averred. Although there are decisions 
 which repudiate this interpretation of the codes, and reject the 
 liberal rule drawn from it, I think the doctrine thus stated is now 
 approved and supported by the decided weight of judicial opinion 
 as expressed in the more recent authorities."^ 
 
 1 Chambers v. Lewis, 28 N. Y. 454; McMillan, 83 id. 270; Ring i'. Ogdeu, 44 
 
 11 Al)b. I'r. 210. See also Allen v. Ran- Wis. .'JOS ; Ferris v. Arm.strong Manuf. 
 
 dolph, 48 lud. 496. In Scheunert r. Co. (Supreme, 1890), 10 N. Y. Suppl. 750; 
 
 Kaehler, 2.3 Wis. 52.3, which was an action Loewenherg v. Rosenthal, 18 Ore. 178; 
 
 for the conversion of good.s, a counter- hut Spouseuberger v. Lemert, 23 Kan.s. 55, 
 
 claim of damages from the breach of the held that in an action against a constable 
 
 contract between the parties out of which for his failure or neglect to serve ])ri)cess 
 
 the plaintiff's cause of action arose was properly, the defendant's fees in the same 
 
 rejected, the court adding that it must case were a good set-off or counter-claim, 
 
 also have been rejected even had the [^Harden v. Lang (1900), 110 Ga. 392, 
 
 plaintiff l)rought his suit in form on the 36 S. E. 100; Bell v. Ober & Sons Co. 
 
 contract, which he might have done, be- (1900), 111 Ga. 668,36 S. E. 904; Follen- 
 
 cause the right of action would still in dore v. Follcndore (1896), 99 Ga. 71, 24 
 
 fact be for a tort. The following recent S. E. 407 ; Giles i-. Bank of Georgia (1897), 
 
 cases show that the courts are strongly 102 Ga. 702,29S. E. 600; Britton !-'. Ferrin 
 
 inclined to hold that a counter-claim on (1902), 171 N. Y. 2.35, 63 N. E. 954; 
 
 contract is impossible in an action for tort, Hecht v. Snook (1902), 114 Ga. 921, 41 
 
 since the two could not in the nature of S. E. 74.] 
 
 things arise out of the same transaction : '^ Hitchie i'. Ilayward, 71 Mo. 560; 
 
 People 1-. Deni.son, 84 N. Y. 372, 379 ; Kamcrick v. Castleman, 23 Mo. App. 
 
 Smitli V. Hall, 67 id. 48; Ilumplirey v. 481. 
 
 Merritt, 51 Ind. 197; He.ss ;•. Young, 59 " QStory & Ishani Co. c. Story (1893), 
 
 id. 379; Boil v. Simms, 60 id. 162; Man- 100 Cal. 30, 34 I'ac. 671; Wimmer r. 
 
 ucy v. Ingram, 78 N. C. 96; Ilolliday r. Simon (1894), 9 Utah, 378. 35 I'ac. 507;
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 
 
 919 
 
 § 665. * 789. Same Subject. The tort complained of by the 
 plaintiff may not be a conversion of chattels. The fact that a 
 cause of action upon contract in favor of the defendant may arise 
 out of the transaction set forth in the complaint or j)etition in an 
 action in form for damages resulting from a tort, was distinctly 
 recognized, and the doctrine that a counter-claim setting up such 
 a demand should be jwlmitted, and should not be rejected in defer- 
 ence to notions which the new procedure was designed to sup- 
 plant, was clearly and cogently enforced by the Supreme Court 
 of Indiana in an opinion from which I make a quotation.^ 
 
 Warren v. Hall (1895), 20 Col. 508, 38 
 Pac 767. 
 
 " In replevin by a lessor to obtain pos- 
 session of his lessee's furniture, under a 
 provision of the lease authorizing it to be 
 taken and sold to satisfy unpaid rent, the 
 lessee may counter-claim for damages for 
 breach of the lessor's covenant, in the 
 same lease, to keep the demised premises 
 in repair," citing § * 788 of the text : 
 Collins V. Morrison (1895), 91 Wis. 324, 
 €4 N. W. 1000.3 
 
 1 Judah V. Vincennes Univ. Trs., 16 Ind. 
 56, 60. The plaintiffs — trustees of the 
 Vincennes University — sue to recover 
 the value of certain bonds belonging to 
 the corporation, received by the defendant 
 as its attorney, and converted by him to 
 his own use. He admits the receipt and 
 detention of the securities, and alleges, 
 by way of counter-claim, that the Uuiver- 
 sity was indebted to him for certain pro- 
 fessional services, particularly described, 
 including his services in procuring these 
 very bonds, among others, to be issued to 
 it by the State, and prays judgment for 
 the amount of such indebtedness. In 
 pronouncing upon the validity of this 
 answer as a counter-claim, the court say : 
 " The point is, that the action is in form 
 trover, — an action ex delicto, — and that, 
 under such action, the defendant cannot 
 avail himself of any claim which he may 
 have against the plaintiffs for services 
 rendered, or money expended, on their 
 behalf, even if it was in tiie recovery of 
 the identical property which is the sub- 
 ject of the present action. We are clear 
 that it was the intention of those who 
 initiated and inaugurated tlie present 
 •Code of Procedure that parties litigant 
 
 might, and perhaps should, determine in 
 each suit all matters in controversy be- 
 tween them which could legitimately be 
 included therein, keeping in view their 
 substantial rights. As proceedings so dis- 
 tinct as those were at" law and in equity 
 are no longer required to be separated, 
 but are now blended in one action, we 
 are unable to see any reason for requiring 
 two actions to determine a controversy 
 in which the rights of each party are so 
 dependent upon the rights of the other as 
 in the case at bar. There is most surely 
 an equitable view of this question, as pre- 
 sented iu the case at bar, which renders 
 it distinct and different from an ordinary 
 case iu which one should convert the 
 property of another, and then set up as a 
 defence that the owner was indebted to 
 him for some otlier and distinct transac- 
 tion." See also Birch v. Hall (Supreme, 
 1888), 3 N. Y. Suppl. 747. The Supreme 
 Court of North Carolina has recently ap- 
 proved this doctrine in the most emphatic 
 and general manner, holding that oppos- 
 ing demands on contract and for tort may 
 arise out of the same transaction. Bitting 
 V. Thaxton, 72 N. C. 541, 549. In St. 
 Louis, F. & W. K. Co. V. Chenault, 36 
 Ivans. 51, the treasurer of the plaintiff, a 
 railroad company, who was sued for the 
 conversion of the company's funds, was 
 allowed to counter-claim demands against 
 the plaintiff, in payment of which he had 
 appropriated the money. In Cow Run 
 Co. V. Lehmer, 41 Ohio St. 384, an action 
 for the conversion of oil delivered to the 
 defendant for storage, the allowance for 
 evaporation, and the charges for storage, 
 both provided for by the contract, were 
 held to be proper subjects for counter-
 
 920 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 ^ 666. * 790. (4) Cases in -wrhicli the Demands of both Parties are 
 for Damages Arising from Tort. Countei-elaims of damages from 
 torts, when attempted to be enforced against causes of action for 
 damages also arising from other torts, have, with few exceptions, 
 been rejected.- The courts have been inclined to adopt, or at least 
 to assume, a general principle that such a cross-demand can never 
 arise from the transaction set forth by the plaintiff as the founda- 
 tion of his claim. It will be seen, however, that this doctrine has 
 not been universally accepted.^ In all the cases placed in the 
 foot-note, the proposed counter-claims were over-ruled on the 
 ground that the cross-demands were for unconnected torts.'-^ 
 Opposed to this array of authorities, all announcing the same 
 general doctrine, there are a few cases which sustain a counter- 
 claim of tort against a tort under special circumstances.^ The 
 
 claim. For a case in which such a coun- 
 ter-claim was rejected becau.sc it did not 
 " arise out of the same transaction," etc., 
 see Pattison v. Riciiards, 22 Barb. 143. See 
 the additional cases cited ante under 
 §*788. 
 
 [;Smith V. Building Ass'n (1896), 119 
 N. C. 2.57, 26 S. E. 40; Lovell v. Ham- 
 mond Co. (1895), 66 Conn. .500, 34 Atl. 
 511.] 
 
 1 (^Gilbert v. Loberg (1894), 86 Wis. 
 661, 57 N. W. 982: "In an action by a 
 landlord against tenants for waste the 
 defendants may counter-claim for the 
 value of personal property placed by tliem 
 on the premises durin<^ their tenancy, and 
 which the landlord has converted by pre- 
 venting its removal." 
 
 Keuaker v. Smith (1901), 109 Ky. 643, 
 60 S. W. 407 : In an action to recover 
 damages for trespass and destruction of 
 crops by defendant's cattle, defendant can- 
 not plead as a counter-claim the damages 
 wlii(-h he has suffered from trespasses by 
 plaintiff's cattle, though tliey resulted 
 from plaintiff's breach of his agreement 
 to keep up a portion of the division fence, 
 as the claim of defendant did not arise 
 oat of the same trausacti(jn stated in the 
 petition. 3 
 
 2 Askius V. IIearn.s, 3 Abb. Pr. 184, 
 187; Schnaderbeck i: Worth, 8 Abb. Pr. 
 37; Barhyte v. Hughes, 33 Barb. 320; 
 Henry v. Henry, 3 Hobt. 614, 17 Abb. 
 Pr. 411; Murden i: Prirnent, 1 Hilt. 75; 
 
 Shelly r. Vanarsdoll, 23 Ind. 543 ; Love- 
 joy V. Robin.son, 8 Ind. 399 ; Macdougall 
 V. Maguire, 35 Cal. 274, 280 ; the last case 
 holding that the objection is not removed 
 by replying and going to trial instead of 
 demurring. See, further, Ward v. Black- 
 wood, 48 Ark. 396 ; Kothschild r. Whit- 
 man, 132 N. Y. 472 ; Allen v. Coates, 29 
 Minn. 46 ; Heckman v. Swartz, 55 Wis. 
 173; Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Pierce, 
 95 Ind. 496 ; Keller t: B. F. Goodrich Co., 
 117 Ind. 556 ; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. 
 V. Van Auken, 1 Ind. App. 492; Roths- 
 child V. Whitman, 57 Hun, 135; Sheehan 
 V. Pierce (Supreme, .June, 1893), 23 N. Y. 
 Suppl. 1119 (in an action of slander, a 
 counter-claim for slander not allowed). 
 
 '■^ Tarwater v. Hannibal & St. ,lo. R. R., 
 42 Mo. 193. In Mc Arthur v. Green Bay, 
 etc. Canal Co., 34 Wis. 139, 146, the action 
 was brought for injuries done to the plain- 
 tiff's boat wiiile passing through the canal, 
 cau^d by a break in the canal alleged 
 to have resulted from defendant's negli- 
 gence ; the defendant set up, as a counter- 
 claim, that the break itself was caused by 
 the plaintiff's negligence, and prayed a 
 judgment for the damages. This counter 
 claim was sustained, liie court saying - 
 " If it does not arise out of the tran.sac- 
 tibn set forth in the complaint, it certainly 
 is connected with the subject of the ac- 
 tion." See also Walsh r. IlaU, 66 N. C. 
 23T, 237, in which the ])laintiff sued to re- 
 co\ er possession of a horse which defend-
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 921 
 
 court of last resort in Kentucky has even gone to the extent of 
 liolding that, in an action for an assault and battery, a counter-claim 
 of damages for an assault and battery committed by the plaintiff 
 at the same time, and as a part of the same affray, can be inter- 
 posed, because it arises out of the same transaction, thus giving 
 to that word a very broad and liberal meaning.^ 
 
 § 667. * 791. Second Class. Legal Actions in which the Judg- 
 ment is other than for Money. I pass now to the consideration of 
 legal actions in which the judgment is other than for money ; tliat 
 is, for the recovery of chattels or of lands. In all instances of 
 this class, the question would present itself, and would be the 
 controlling one, whether the counter-claim has such a relation to 
 the plaintiff's cause of action that a recovery upon it would defeat, 
 lessen, or modify the relief which would otherwise be obtained 
 by him.'-^ The practical question therefore is. When, if ever, may 
 there be a counter-claim of money in an action brought to recover 
 possession of chattels ? In some exceptional cases such counter- 
 claims have been allowed, and in my opinion properly allowed. 
 For example, an answer stating the circumstances under which 
 the goods demanded by the action came into the defendant's 
 possession, that the plaintiff was indebted to him in a specified 
 
 ajit had sold him in exchange for a tract course of those events which must, of ne- 
 
 of laud, and the defendant counter-claimed cessity, be fully established and considered 
 
 damages arising from the plaintiff's fraud- in the trial of plaintiff's demand." See 
 
 ulent representations in reference to the also Pelton i\ Powell (1897), 96 Wis. 473, 
 
 land so exchanged. This case certainly 71 N. VV. 887. See Stolze v. Torrisou 
 
 carries the doctrine of counter-claim to (190.3), — Wis. — , 9.5 N. W. 114, distin- 
 
 its extreme limits. guishing these two cases and saying of 
 
 1 Slone V. Slone, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 339. the former that it is " au extreme case." 
 In Heigel v. Willis (Supreme, 1889), 3 Horton y. Pintchunck (1900), 110 Ga. 355, 
 N. Y. Suppl. 497, an action for damages 35 S. E. 663 : In an action for malicious 
 caused by the defendant's driving his prosecution defendant may set off a cause 
 wagon against the wagon of the jjlajntiff, of action for assault and battery, and if 
 a counter-claim for injuries resulting to the damages for the latter exceed in 
 the person and property of the defendant amount those for the former, the defend- 
 from the same collision was held proper, aut may enter up judgment for the ex- 
 Contra to tliese decisions, see several re- cess. Savage v. Davis (1902), 131 N. C. 
 cent cases presenting similar facts, cited 159, 42 S. E. 571 : Defendant had plain- 
 in last note but one. tiff arrested and brought before a justice 
 
 QGutzman v. Clancy (1902), 114 Wis. of the peace on a charge of having ob- 
 
 589, 90 N. W. 1081 : Holding "that the tained five tons of guano from him, the 
 
 word ' transaction ' in the statute is broad defendant, by false pretences. Plaintiff 
 
 enough to include an entire, continuous sued defendant for malicious prosecution, 
 
 phvsical encounter, and that, upon couu- and defendant pleaded the value of the 
 
 ter-claim, defendant may have recovery for guano as a set-off. Held proper.] 
 his damages resulting from any assault '^ See ante, § * 767. 
 
 committed upon him by plaintiff in the
 
 922 
 
 CIVIL remi;dies. 
 
 amount, that the chattels were dehvered to him as a security for 
 such debt, and that he held them by virtue of the lien thus 
 created by the pledge, and demanding judgment for the debt 
 itself, was adjudged a proper counter-claim.^ The New York 
 Court of Appeals has also sustained the counter-claim under 
 circumstances involving the same principle.^ The result of these 
 authorities is, that a cause of action on contract for money may 
 so arise out of the transaction which is the foundation of the 
 plaintiff's claim that it can be interposed as a counter-claim in an 
 action brought to recover the possession of chattels.^ The case 
 
 ^ Brown v. Buckingham, 11 Abb. Pr. 
 387 (Sp. Term). See also Walsh v. Hall, 
 66 N. C. 233, 237 ; Wilson v. Hughes, 94 
 N. C. 182; but see per contra, Gottler v. 
 Babcock, 7 Abb. Pr. 392 (n.). It should 
 be noted that in neither of the North Car- 
 olina cases was the objection considered, 
 that the counter-claim does not tend to 
 defeat or modify the plaintiff's recovery. 
 
 2 Thompson i-. Kessel, 30 N. Y. 383, 
 389 ; per contra, see Moffat v. Van Doren, 
 4 Bosw. 609. If the plaintiff sues for 
 damages, as well as to recover possession, 
 the counter-claim is, of course, proper, 
 although the claim of damages was not 
 allowed by the jury ; see ante, § * 739 ; 
 Lapham v. Osborne, 20 Nev. 168. By ex- 
 press provision of the Iowa Code, § 3226, 
 there can be no counter-claim in an action 
 for the recovery of specific personal prop- 
 erty. With respect to lethal counter- 
 claims in the action of ejectment, see 
 Lawe V. Hyde, 39 Wis. 34.5 ; Reed v. 
 Newton, 22 Minn. 541 ; Haggin v. Clark, 
 51 Cal. 112; Moyle v. Porter, 51 id. 639; 
 Whitlock V. Redford, 82 Ky. 390; Car- 
 penter V. Hewel, 67 Cal. 589. 
 
 " QRennebaum v. Atkinson (1898), 103 
 Ky. 555, 45 S W. 874 ; Banning v. Mar- 
 leau (1894), 101 Cal. 238, 35 Pac. 772. 
 
 Plaintiff sold defendant a tiireshing 
 outfit, and took back a chattel mortgage 
 for a pijrtion of the purchase price. Plain- 
 tiff subsequently also required defendant 
 to insure the property, and agreed that it 
 Would procure the insurance. The prop- 
 erty was subserjuently damaged by fire, but 
 no insurance had been taken out. Plaintiff 
 brought replevin, and defendant pleaded 
 as a counter-claim the loss he had sus- 
 tained by reason of plaintiff's failure to 
 
 procure the insurance. Held proper, as 
 arising out of Uhe contract or transac- 
 tion set forth by plaintiff: Minneapolis 
 Threshing Co. v. Darnall (1900), 13 S. I). 
 279, 83 N. W. 266. 
 
 " In an action of replevin, brought by a 
 non-resident mortgagee, to recover posses- 
 sion of machinery sold to defendant and 
 mortgaged to secure the purcha.se price, 
 the defendant . . . may counter-claim dam- 
 ages for breach of warranty of the goods 
 sold, and also damages in trying to oper- 
 ate machinery returned to the pbiintiff 
 and for which the mortgaged property 
 was in part taken in exchange:" Ault- 
 man Co. v. McDonough (1901), 110 Wis. 
 263, 85 N. W. 980. 
 
 Sections 3226 and 3245 of the Code forbid 
 the allowance of counter-claims in actions 
 to recover personal property : Palmer r. 
 Palmer (1894), 90 la. 17, 57 N. W. 645. 
 
 Plaintiff brought an action for the pos- 
 session of personal property, and defend- 
 ant sought to set up a counter-claim for 
 damages sustained by reason of the un- 
 lawful seizure of said property. Held not 
 a proper counter-claim, as it did not arise 
 out of the same cause of action and did 
 not exist at the commencement of the 
 action. Phipps v. Wilson (1899), 125 N. C. 
 106, 34 S. E. 227. 
 
 " In a replevin action for property 
 covered by a chattel mortgage given to 
 secure the payment of a note owned by 
 plaintiff, the defendant, under a general 
 denial, may show that plaintiff at the 
 commencement of the suit was, and still 
 is, indebted to him for labor in an amount 
 equal to the amount due on the note : " 
 Davia v. Culver (1899), 58 Neb. 265, 78 
 N. W. .504.]
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 
 
 92; 
 
 of a pecuniary counter-claim in an action to recover possession of 
 lands has already been fully discussed.^ 
 
 § 668. * 792. Third Class. Cases in which the Plaintiffs Cause 
 of Action or the Defendant's Counter-Claim, or both, are Equitable in 
 their Nature. The general subject of equitable counter-claims has 
 already been examined, and illustrated by numerous exampl&s. 
 It is thoroughly settled as a fundamental doctrine of the new 
 procedure in relation to pleading, that an equitable counter- 
 claim may be interposed to a legal cause of action, and a fortiori 
 to one which is itself equitable. I shall not repeat the discus- 
 sion to be found in a former part of this section, but shall simply 
 collect in the note a few examples which will illustrate the modes 
 by which such species of cross-demands may arise out of the trans- 
 actions set forth by the plaintiff in his complaint or petition.^ 
 
 1 HDinan y. Coneys (1894), 143 N. Y. 
 544,38 N. E. 715 ; Wigmore v. Buell ( 1897), 
 116 Cal. 94, 47 Pac. 927 ; Wilkins v. Sut- 
 tles (1894), 114 N. C. 550, 19 S. E. 606; 
 Nevvlaad v. Morris (1902), 115 Wis. 207, 
 91 N. W. 664. 
 
 In ejectment a defendant cannot set off 
 a demand for improvements to an amount 
 greater than the claim for mesne profits, 
 and obtain affirmative relief for the dif- 
 ference. The set-off can be u.sed defen- 
 sively only: Dudley v. Johnson (1897), 
 102 Ga. 1, 29 S. E. 50. But see Mills u. 
 Geer(1900), 111 Ga. 275, 36 S. E. 673, 
 where it was held that under the act of 
 December 21, 1897, in a suit to recover 
 land, the defendant who has bond Jide 
 posses.sion of such land under adverse 
 claim of title may plead as a set-off the 
 value of all permanent improvements 
 bona fide placed thereon by himself or 
 other ionayjafe claimants under whom he 
 asserts title. 
 
 Falck V. Marsh (1894), 88 Wis 680, 
 61 N. W. 287 : " In ejectment the grantee 
 of a life tenant by quitclaim deed cannot 
 counter-claim for the value of improve- 
 ments made and taxes paid by him while 
 holding under such deed, as against the 
 owner of the fee. Such a deed cannot be 
 made the basis of an adverse holding of 
 the fee in remainder." 
 
 "Comp. Laws Dak. 1887, § 5455, de- 
 clares that, in an action for the recovery of 
 real property npon which permanent im- 
 
 provements have been made by a defend- 
 ant claiming to hold under color of title 
 in good faith, the value of such improve- 
 ments must be allowed as a counter- 
 claim:" Skelly V. Warren (1903), — S. 1). 
 — , 94 N. W. 408 (Syllabus).^ 
 
 2 Sandford v. Travers, 40 N. Y. 140, 
 143 ; Akerly v. Vilas, 15 Wis. 401 ; Allen 
 V. Shackelton, 15 Ohio St. 145, 147 ; Mo- 
 berly v. Alexander, 19 Iowa, 162; Hill 
 V. Butler, 6 Ohio St. 207, 216; Foss v. 
 Newbury, 20 Ore. 257. The foregoing 
 were foreclosure .suits of purchase-money 
 mortgages, in which the mortgagor coun- 
 ter-claimed damages for the breach of the 
 covenants of title in the plaintiff's deeds, 
 or for the breach of some other collateral 
 agreement, or for the plaintiff's fraud; 
 but in such an action a counter-claim for 
 a slander of title in respect to the land 
 cannot be sustained : Akerly v. Vilas, 21 
 Wis. 88, 109; Briggs v. Seymour, 17 Wis. 
 255. It has been intimated that in a 
 mortgage foreclosure suit a counter-claim 
 of debt or damages on any contract is 
 proper: Briggs v. Seymour, 17 Wis. 255. 
 The following were actions for other kiuds 
 of equitable relief : Grimes ?;. Duzan, 32 
 Ind. 361 ; Woodruff r. Garner, 27 Ind. 4 
 (actions to set aside a deed of land) ; 
 Ea.stman v. Linn, 20 Minn. 433 (to quiet 
 title); Vail y. Jones, 31 Ind. 467; Pow- 
 der V. Bowdle (N. Dak. 1893), 54 N. W. 
 Kep. 404 (to quiet title)"; Grignon v. 
 Black, 76 Wis. 674 (action to enjoin waste.
 
 924 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 III. C>i8f'S in which the Cause of Action Alleged by the Defendant 
 as a Counter-Claim is or is not connected with the Subject of 
 the Action. 
 
 § 669. *793. References to Cases already Cited. Little need 
 be added under this particular head to what has been alread}* said 
 in the foregoing subdivisions. The cases cited in the preliminary 
 general discussion contain all the most important attempts to 
 give a judicial construction to the phrase "connected with the 
 subject of the action : " many of those which have been quoted to 
 explain and illustrate the clause " arising out of the transaction," 
 etc., were also referred by the courts which decided them to the 
 language of the statutory definition now under consideration, — 
 tliat is, the counter-claims were held valid because they were '' con- 
 nected with the subject of the action," as well as because they 
 " arose out of the transaction set forth in the complaint." Finally, 
 it may be said that each one of the cases in which the counter-claim 
 was overruled is an illustration of a demand in favor of the 
 defendant not connected with the subject of the action.^ 
 
 counter-claim to quiet title to the prem- 
 ises) ; but if the cross-demand does not 
 arise out of the transaction which is the 
 foundation of the plaintiff's cause of 
 action, and is not connected with the sub- 
 ject of liis action, it cannot lie a counter- 
 claim, Town of Venice v. Breed, 65 Barb. 
 597, 605; Tallman v. Barnes, 54 Wis. 181. 
 See recent cases cited ante under § *7r)4 ; 
 also in last note under § *824. [^Rens- 
 berger i-. Britton (1903), — Col. — , 71 Pac. 
 379J 
 
 1 {^President, etc. of Ins. Co. v. Parker 
 (1902), 64 Neb 411, 89 N. W. 1040; Mc- 
 Hard c. Williams (1896), 8 S. I). 381, 66 
 N. W. 930; Aultman Co. i\ McDonough 
 (1901), 110 Wis. 263, 85 N. W. 980; Pio- 
 neer Press Co. V. Hutchinson (1896), 63 
 Minn. 481, 65 N. W. 938; Sheiblev v. 
 Dixon County (1901), 61 Neb. 409, 85 
 N. W. 399; Stolze v. Torrison (1903),— 
 Wis — , 95 N. W. 114; Kuhn r. Sol. 
 Ileavenrich Co. (1902), 115 Wis. 447, 91 
 N. W. 994; Duffger v. Dempsey (1895), 
 13 Wash. 396, 43 Pac. 357 ; B.irr v. Post 
 (1898), 56 Neb. 698, 77 N. W. 123 ; Wilcke 
 V. Wilcke (1897), 102 la. 173, 71 N. W. 
 201. 
 
 .Stillwell V. Duncan (189S), 103 Ky. .59, 
 
 44 S. W. 357 : In an action of quare 
 cJausum /regit, based on the bare possession 
 of the plaintiff, defendant may plead title 
 and also maintain a counter-claim for dam- 
 ages to the property during the time that 
 plaintiff was in possession. Such counter- 
 claim is connected with the subject of the 
 action, which is the land in controversy. 
 
 To an action for work and labor in 
 cutting timber trees, defendant filed a 
 counter-claim for damages by reason of 
 plaintiff negligently permitting fire to 
 escape while engaged in the work for 
 which he sues. Held a proper matter for a 
 counter-claim as connected with the sub- 
 ject-matter of the action : Branch v. Chap- 
 pell (ISOiV), 119 N. C. 81,25 S. E. 783. 
 
 Plaintiff sued defendant for a libel 
 published in defendant's paper. Just pre- 
 vious to the libel the plaintiff, a stockholder 
 of defendant company, maliciously and 
 without ])robable cause, as defendant al- 
 leged, commenced a suit for dissolution of 
 the company, to the defendant's damage, 
 and these facts defendant pleaded as a 
 counter-claim. Held that the action for 
 malicious prosecution w.ns connected with 
 the subject of the action and hence a 
 proper matter for counter-claim: Cincin-
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 
 
 92: 
 
 § 670 * 794. Construction of the Phrases " Subject of the Action," 
 " Counected with," and " Arising out of." The language of the 
 phrase is exceedingly general and vague. To construe it requires 
 
 nati Daily Tribune Co. r. Bruck (1900), 
 61 Ohio St. 489, .56 N. E. 198. 
 
 lu au action on a judgment the defend- 
 ant may, by way of counter-claim, set up 
 facts which would justify a court of equity 
 in cancelling the judgment on the ground 
 that no summons was ever served on him, 
 such cause of action being counected with 
 the subject of the plaintiff's action ; that 
 is, the ju(]gment : Vaule w. Miller (1897), 
 69 Minn. 440, 72 N. W. 452. In an action 
 to quiet title to real property, a cross- 
 complaint alleging ownersliip and demand- 
 ing possession and damages pleads matters 
 " connected with the cause of action " in 
 the complaint and constitutes a proper 
 counter-claim : Gill'enwaters v. Campbell 
 <189.5), 142 lud. 529, 41 N. E. 1041. 
 
 I'laintiff brought an action to have a 
 mortgaj^e upon certain land reformed. 
 Defendant, the mortgagee, admitted the 
 mistake in the mortgage, and by way of 
 counter-claim asked to have the mortgage, 
 as reformed, foreclosed. As a second 
 counter-claim defendant asked to have a 
 second mortgage upon the same land, be- 
 tween tlie same parties, reformed and 
 foreclosed. Held, both counter-claims were 
 proper, the first as a cause of action aris- 
 ing out of the contract or transaction set 
 forth in plaintiff's complaint, the sec- 
 ond as connected with the subject of the 
 action : Lahiff v. Hennepin County, etc. 
 Ass'n (1895), 61 Minn. 226, 63 N. W. 
 49.3. 
 
 A tenant in common, who had control 
 of the renting of premises held in com- 
 mon, was sued by his co-tenant for his 
 share of the rents, and the defendant 
 counter-claimed for damages sustained 
 by him because the plaintiff wrongfully 
 induced lessees of such premises to leave 
 before their leases expired, thereby caus- 
 ing him to lose his share of rents which 
 would have accrued but for such inter- 
 ference. The court sustained the counter- 
 claim on the ground that it was a demand 
 connected with the subject of the action, 
 entering into a somewhat full discussion 
 of the phrase " subject of the action," 
 and holding it to be the rent of the lots : 
 
 Dale V. Hall (1897), 64 Ark. 221, 41 S. W. 
 761. 
 
 In a suit to compel specific perform- 
 ance of a contract to convey land, a de- 
 fendant cannot, by way of counter-claim, 
 ask foreclosure of a mortgage on the same 
 land given by plaintiff to defendant. The 
 decision turned upon the question whether 
 the two demands were connected with the 
 subject of the action. The court said, '' Is 
 it [the counter-claim asking for fore- 
 closure] connected with the subject of the 
 action ? It is sometimes difficult to de- 
 termine when a cianse of action set forth 
 in a counter-claim is connected with the 
 subject of the action. We think, however, 
 in this case that the cause of action set up 
 in the counter-claim is a separate and in- 
 dependent cause of action, not connected 
 with the cause of action set forth in the 
 original complaint. The original action 
 was to enforce specific performance of a 
 contract to convey land. The cross com- 
 plaint asked a decree to foreclose a mort- 
 gage upon the land. It seems clear that 
 there was no connection between the causes 
 of action." The opinion proceeds upon 
 the assumption that the terms " cause of 
 action " and " subject of the action " are 
 exactly synonymous, which is clearly 
 erroneous. Wood J., in his dissenting 
 opinion, is more discriminating, and con- 
 sidering the land itself as the subject of 
 the action he finds no reason to reject the 
 counter-claim : Hays v. McLain (1899), 66 
 Ark. 400, 50 S. W. 1006. 
 
 A suit was brought by a grantor to set 
 aside a deed to city lots on the ground of 
 fraud, and defendant pleaded a prior fraud 
 of plaintiff practised upon him in the pur- 
 chase by defendant from a third person of 
 farm lands, for which defendant conveyed 
 these city lots. Held, not a proper coun- 
 ter-claim : Rensberger i\ Britton (1903), 
 — Col. — , 71 Pac. 379. 
 
 Smith V. Building Ass'n (1896), 119 
 N. C. 257, 26 S. E. 40 : In an action to 
 recover twice the amount of usurious in- 
 terest paid, tlie defendant may set up a 
 counter-claim for the debt on which the 
 interest was paid, whether the original
 
 •926 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 a satisfactory interpretation of the terms " subject of the action " 
 and " connected with." It may, I think, be regarded as settled 
 
 action be considered in tort or contract, 
 since such counter-claim arises " out of 
 the contract or transaction set forth in 
 tlie complaint as the foundation of the 
 plaintiff's claim, or is connected with 
 the subject of the action." 
 
 First Nat'l Bank r. Heun (1901), 63 
 Kan. 334, 65 I'ac. 698 : In an action to 
 foreclose a mortgage by one holding it by 
 assignment in trust for certain outstand- 
 injx obligations, said mortgage iiaving 
 been left in the hands of the mortgagee 
 to be cared for and renewed if necessary, 
 the assignee of property {i. e. vendee) 
 may counter-claim loss resulting from 
 failure of mortgagee or trustee to notify 
 insurance company of transfer of property. 
 
 Dowdell i: Carpy (1902), 137 Cal. 333, 
 70 Pac. 167 : Where a decree of fore- 
 closure was reversed only as to certain 
 property included in the mortgage, and 
 was finally affirmed as to all other prop- 
 erly included tiiereiu, the mortgagee, in 
 an action for restitution by tlie mort- 
 f^'igor, mny counter-claim the amount of 
 the deficiency judgment against them. 
 Sncl) judgment arose out of the same 
 transaction and was connected with the 
 subject of the action. 
 
 See First Nat. Bank of Snohomish v. 
 Parker (1902), 28 Wash. 234, C8 Pac. 756 : 
 An action to foreclose a mortgage on real 
 estate, the complaint being in the usual 
 fuirn. The counter-claim was " that plain- 
 tiff, through its cashier Snyder, brought 
 an action in 1896 for the possession of the 
 mortgaged premises against the defend- 
 ant, and in said action had a writ of res- 
 titution issued ; tiiat plaintiff thereupon 
 went into possession of the })remises, and 
 retained such possession until tlie final 
 determination of the action, when defend- 
 ant was restored to the possession of the 
 premises : that by reason of plaintiff's re- 
 tention of the possession of the mortgaged 
 premises defendant was damaged in the 
 sum of SI 970, and the specification of the 
 damages is made. Plaintiff demurred to 
 the affirmative defences and counter- 
 claim Tlie demurrer of the defence was 
 sustained and that to the counter-claim 
 overrulfd. A jury was called to assess 
 
 the damages alleged in the counter-claim. 
 The court, after reducing the assessment 
 of damages to some extent, affirmed the 
 finding of the jury, and allowed $1,000 
 counter-claim, and decreed foreclosure for 
 the remainder due u))ou the mortgage. 
 Both parties appealed. " Plaintiff assigns 
 as error the overruling of the demurrer 
 to the counter-claim, and the reduction of 
 the amount due upon the mortgage in the 
 amount of the counter-claim. It is main- 
 tained by counsel for plaintiff that the de- 
 murrer to the counter-claim should have 
 been sustained, that tlie allowance of any 
 counter-claim in the action was error, and 
 that the damages specified were not the 
 subject of counter-claim within Bal. Code, 
 § 4913." In disposing of the (juestion, the 
 court by Beavis C. J. said : " Subd. I. of 
 the section permits a counter-claim ' m an 
 action arising out of the contract or trans- 
 action set forth in the complaint as the 
 foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or con- 
 nected with the subject of the action.' 
 The construction of this section and 
 similar language in other codes has not 
 been uniform or clear. See Pomeroy, 
 Remedies & Remedial Rights, § 775 
 p775]; Collier r. Krvin, 3 Mont. 142. 
 The general rule is that the statute au- 
 thorizing a counter-claim should be liber- 
 ally construed. It is said in 22 Am. & 
 Eng. Enc. Law, p. 396 : ' In actions in 
 which either a contract or a transaction 
 which is not a contract, is set forth as the 
 foundation of the plaintiff's claim, coun- 
 ter-claims may be interposed which neither 
 arise out of the same contract nor out of 
 the same transaction, if they are connected 
 with the subject of the action. The sub- 
 ject of an action is either the property 
 which is thereby sought to be recovered 
 or alleged to be injured, or a violated 
 right or the right to enforce or maintain 
 which the action is brought.' 
 
 " It would seem in the present action that 
 virtually the same parties are in contro- 
 versy as were in the case of Snyder, who 
 is the cashier of j)laintiff, against Parker 
 and rejiorted in 19 Wash. 276 (.53 Pac. 59, 
 07 Am. St Rep. 720). In that case the 
 plaintiff claimed the prcmisr'S under a deed
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 9_/ 
 
 that the connection here spoken of must be direct and immediate. 
 At the same time it must be considered as sometliing different from 
 " arising out of; " in other words, the defendant's cause of action 
 may be sufficiently " connected witli the subject of the action," 
 although it do not '•'•arise out of the transaction." It can hardly 
 be said, however, that the courts have definitely settled what is 
 a sufficient connection of itself, when not so complete that the 
 defendant's cause of action could also be said to arise out of the 
 transaction set forth by the plaintiff ; unfortunately, in nearly all 
 tlie cases where the judges have held that the counter-claim was 
 connected with the subject of the action according to the true 
 meaning of the statute, they have also said that it arose out of the 
 transaction stated in the complaint. The most that can be as- 
 serted with any degree of assurance is, that the connection must 
 be immediate and direct, and something that the parties can be 
 assumed to have contemplated in. their dealings with each other.^ 
 I shall merely cite in the note a few cases which contain a dis- 
 cussion of the clause, and serve to illustrate and explain its scope 
 and operation.^ 
 
 absolute in form, which, however, was 
 adjudi^ed to be a mortgage and only a lien 
 on the premises. In the case at bar the 
 action is to foreclose a lien upon the same 
 property. It would seem that, by the acts 
 authorized by the plaintiff in taking and 
 holding possession of the premises, and 
 which were found to be injurious, the sub- 
 ject-matter of the lien was damaged, and 
 that the defendant is entitled to such 
 damages, and we think in this case that 
 the realty may properly be held as con- 
 nected with the subject of the action. 
 Metropolitan T. Co. v. Tonawanda, etc. 
 R. R. Co., 43 Hun, 521 ; Tinsley v. Tinsley, 
 15 B. Mon. 454. Upon the record here we 
 are not disposed to disturb tlie finding of 
 the amount of the counter-claim. "3 
 
 1 [Sheibley v. Dixon County (1901). CI 
 Neb. 409, 85 N. W. 399 • " The phrase 
 ' connected with the subject of the action ' 
 should be construed liberally to prevent a 
 multiplicity of actions." Le Clare i'. 
 Thibault (1902), 41 Ore. 601, 69 Pac. 552 : 
 " The connection of the counter-claim 
 with the subject of the suit, to render it 
 available, must be direct and immediate, 
 and such as it is reasonable to assume 
 
 that the parties had in contemplation 
 when dealing with each other." Text 
 § * 794 cited.3 
 
 2 Ashley v. Marshall, 29 N. Y. 494 ; 
 Vose I'. Galpen, 18 Abb. Pr. 96; Xenia 
 Branch Bk. v. Lee, 7 Abb. Pr. 372 ; 2 
 Bosw. 694 ; McAdow v. Ross, 53 Mo 199, 
 207 ; Jones i-. Moore, 42 Mo. 413 ; McAr- 
 thur V. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co , 34 
 Wis. 139, 146; Eastman y. Linn, 20 Minn. 
 4.33 ; Walsh v. Hall, 66 N. C. 233, 237 ; 
 Bitting V. Thaxton, 72 N. C. 541, 549; 
 Thompson v. Kessel, 30 N. Y. 383, 389 ; 
 Vilas V. Mason, 25 Wis. 310, 319; Judali 
 r. Vincennes Univ. Trs., 16 Ind. 56, 60; 
 Wadley v. Davis, 63 Barb. 500 ; Waugen- 
 heim »■ Graham, 39 Cal. 169, 176; Kolle 
 V Thompson, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 121. See 
 Glen & Hall Manuf. Co. v. HalJ, 61 N. Y. 
 226, 236, where it was held that the subject 
 of the action was the device constituting 
 the trade-mark. See also Powder v. Bow- 
 die (N. Dak. 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 404; 
 Grange v. Gilbert, 44 Hun, 9 ; Mulberger 
 I'. Koenig, 62 Wis. 5.58 (the "subject of 
 the action " is identical with the facts 
 constituting the plaintiffs' cause of ac- 
 tion) ; Lehmair v. Griswold, 40 N. Y.
 
 928 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 C CunUr- Claims Embraced u'ithin the Second Subdivision of the 
 Statutory Definition and Set-offs. 
 
 § 671. * 795. Statutory Provision. Limitatiou upon the Discus- 
 sion herein. The form of this provision, as fouud in the codes 
 which make up the first group, as originally classified at the 
 commencement of this section, is, "" 2. In an action arising on 
 contract, any other cause of action also arising on contract, and 
 existing at the commencement of the action." This is substan- 
 tially the definition of "set-off " given in the codes of the second 
 group. The language of this clause plainly includes all cases 
 of counter-claim based on contract when the plaintiff's cause of 
 action is also on contract. Since, however, the first branch of 
 the definition covers all those instances where the counter-claim 
 and the plaintiff's right of action both spring from the same con- 
 tract, the discussion of this second subdivision will be confined 
 to the instances in which, the cause of action being on contract, 
 the counter-claim arises from a different contract.^ For the 
 reasons before given, and which need not therefore be repeated, 
 this construction of the two parts into which the entire definition 
 is divided seems to mo to be in conformity with the plain intent 
 of the legislature and the evident design of the statute. 
 
 §672. * 796. statute enlarges Former Legal "Set-off" and is 
 Broader in its Operation than " Equitable Set-oflF." DiflBcult Ques- 
 tions herein. Order of Treatment. In reference to the most 
 important and controlling requisite of this provision and that 
 defining set-off, no questions of difficulty can arise, since the 
 language itself is so simple and direct that no room is left for 
 
 Super. Ct. 100 (same) ; Carpenter v. Man- r. Kinsman, 18 S. C. 108 (" subject of the 
 
 hattau L. Ins. Co., 93 N. Y. 552 (in con- action " denotes tlie plaintiff's main pri- 
 
 version, the "subject of the action" is mary right, to support or enforce which 
 
 the chattel converted) ; Adams v. Loo- the action is brought). [^Watts v. Gantt 
 
 mis (Supreme, 1889), 8 N. Y. Suppl. 17 (1894), 42 Neb. 8G9, 61 N. \V. 104; Hays 
 
 (same) ; Revere F. Ins. Co. v. Chamber- v. McLain (1899), CO Ark. 400, 50 S. W. 
 
 liu, 56 Iowa, 508 (in an action to cancel 1006; Gurske v. Kelpin (1901), CI Neb. 
 
 an insurance policy, the "subject of the 517, 85 N. W. 557 ; Walserc Wear (1897), 
 
 action " is the policy itself, and a cause 141 Mo. 44.3, 42 S. W. 928/] 
 
 of action thereon for loss of the property i Qllarden v. Lang (1900), 1 10 (Ja. 392, 
 
 insured is a proper counter-claim); Cor- 36 S. K. 100; Rell ;•. Oben & Sons Co. 
 
 nclius V. Kessel, 58 Wis. 237 (in eject- (1900), 111 (la. 668. 36 S. E. 904 ; Jones y. 
 
 ment, tlie " subject of the action " is the Swank (1893), 54 Minn. 259, — N. W. — ; 
 
 land in controversy) ; Lapham v. Osborne, Conner r. Scott (1897), 10 Wash. 371, 47 
 
 20 Nev. 168 (in replevin, the "subject of Pac 76] ; Richard.son r. Penny (1900), 10 
 
 the action " is the ch:>ttf'l in controversy) ; Okla. 32, 61 Pac. 584.] 
 Humbert v. Brisbane, 25 S. C. 506 ; Sharj)
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 929 
 
 doubt as to the construction. If the plaintiff's cause of action 
 arises on contract, any counter-claim, legal or equitable, or set- 
 off, also arising on contract, is admissible, provided the general 
 rule heretofore stated is complied with, that the relief granted 
 to the defendant shall in some manner interfere with, lessen, or 
 modify, if not destroy, that otherwise obtained by the plaintiff. 
 This clause greatly enlarges the scope of the former legal "set- 
 off," for it admits demands for unliquidated damages as well as 
 for debts or amounts ascertained and fixed by the stipulations of 
 the parties.^ It is also much broader in its operation than the 
 "equitable set-oft"," which was permitted by courts of chancery, 
 for affirmative equitable relief may be obtained by the defendant 
 which would come within no description of an "equitable set-off," 
 as the term was formerly understood. So far as relates to the 
 subject-matter, therefore, in all actions to recover money, either 
 debt or damages arising on contract, any counter-claim of debt 
 or damages arising on another contract is valid. When the relief 
 asked for by the plaintiff, or that demanded by the defendant, is 
 equitable, whether the counter-claim is proper must depend upon 
 the nature of these reliefs ; that is, upon the fact of their inter- 
 fering with each other so that one tends to destroy, or at least to 
 modify, the other. While there can be little or no difficulty, 
 therefore, in applying this provision, so far as the subject-matter 
 of the counter-claim is concerned, certain collateral questions are 
 presented, either expressly or impliedly, by the clause, which are 
 not always so easy of solution. One of these is involved in the 
 requirement that the cause ot action constituting the counter- 
 claim must be "existing at the commencement of the action." 
 Another is implied in the phrase "arising on contract." Can 
 a cause of action be said to "arise on contract" when it results 
 from facts which amount to a tort, and would enable the injured 
 party to bring an action in form ex delicto ? In other words, can 
 either party resort to an election between two kinds of proceed- 
 ings, and thus make his suit or counter-claim in form "arising 
 on contract " so as to satisfy the requisites of the statute? In 
 treating of the topics thus suggested, I shall, first, consider 
 the general requirement that the cause of action constituting the 
 
 1 QShelton v. Conant (1894), 10 Wash. (1894), 41 Neb. 149, 59 N. W.359 ; Boyer 
 193, 38 Tac. 1013 ; Niver ;'. Nash (1893), v. Robinson (1901), 26 Wash. 117, 66 I'ac. 
 7 Wash. 558, 35 Pac. 380 ; Burge v. Gandy 119.] 
 
 59
 
 930 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 counter-claim must be existing at the commencement of the 
 action; and shall, secondly^ collect and classify the various cases 
 which have been determined by the courts, and which furnish 
 examples of counter-claims arising from different contracts. In 
 this review the question how far a party may, for the purposes 
 of complying with this statute, elect between an action for a tort 
 and an action on contract, will be answered.^ 
 
 § 673. * TUT. Requisites of Counter-Claim under this Clause of 
 the Statute. The codes do not require that the contract out of 
 which the counter-claim arises should have been originally made 
 with the defendant. The demand may have once been in favor 
 of some third person, and by him assigned to the defendant. 
 When this is the case, the provision under review, as found in 
 most of the codes, makes it necessary that the assignment should 
 be fully completed before the action is commenced, or else the 
 cause of action could not be "existing" in the defendant at the 
 "commencement of the action." ^ In the second place, the right 
 of action, which is the basis of the counter-claim, must have 
 accrued before the commencement of the action; the debt or 
 damages must be both due and payable, or the claim for equi- 
 
 ' The following are recent decisions 826; Sweetser v. People's Bank (1897), 
 
 illustrating this class of counter-claims: 69 Minn. 196,71 N. W. 934. 
 Bathgate r. Haskin, 59 N. Y. 533, 539, Thomas v. Exchange Bank (1896), 99 
 
 540; I'atterson v. Patterson, 59 id. 574, la. 202, 68 N. W. 780: One Pearson was 
 
 1 Hun, 323; Tavlor r. The Mayor, etc., 82 indebted to a bank in the sum of -SlOOQ. 
 
 N. Y. 10; We.stervelt v. Aciiley, 62 id. He had on deposit in said bank $1044.50. 
 
 505 ; 2 Hun, 258 ; 4 T. &, C. 444 ; Van He then drew drafts upon the hank to the 
 
 Brunt V. Day, 81 N. Y 251 ; 17 Hun, 166 ; amount of $1195, and immediately there- 
 
 Clapp V. Wright, 21 Hun, 240; Wilson v. after made a general assignment for the 
 
 Runkel, 38 W^is. 526; Chapman v. Plum- benefit of creditors. Tlie bank learned of 
 
 mer, 36 id. 262; Foulks v. Rhodes, 12 the assignment before the drafts were 
 
 Nev. 225; Carver r. Shelly, 17 Kan. 472; presented, and refused payment for the 
 
 Greer v. Greer, 24 id. 102 ; Quinn c. rea.wn that it wislied to set off its claim 
 
 Smith, 49 Cal. 163; Wheelock v. Pacific against the deposit, altliough its claim was 
 
 Pneumatic Gas Co., 51 id. 223; Humphrey evidenced by a note not due. Held, that 
 
 V. Merritt, 51 Ind. 197; Hart v. Housten, when the debtor is insolvent a bank may 
 
 50 id. 327; Grover & B. Sewing Mach. Co. offset as against a debt not due any sum 
 
 V. Newby, 58 id. 570; Town r. Bringolf, which it may be owing to the debtor, nn- 
 
 47 Iowa, 133; Tolman v. Johnson, 43 id. less the account which it owes has been 
 
 127. pledged to some ^ippcific purpose or im- 
 
 [|First Nat. Bank v. Riggins (1899), pre.s.sed with a trust.] 
 124 N. C. 534, 32 S. E. 801 ; Helms v. 2 Kgyn.dds v. Smith, 28 Kan. 810; 
 
 Harclerode (1902), 65 Kan. 736, 70 Pac. Enter !\ Que.sse, 30 8. C. 126; Skaggs v. 
 
 866; Mercer I'. Dyer (1895), 15 Mont. 317, Given, 29 Mo. App. 612; Todd v. Crut- 
 
 39 Pac. 314; Waiters y. Eaves (1898), 105 singer, 30 Mo. App. 145; Ru.ssell i;. 
 
 Cia. 584, 32 S. E. 609 ; St. Paul, etc. Trust Koouce. 104 N. C. 237. QIack v. Hosmer 
 
 Co. V. Leek (1894), 57 Minn. 87, 58 N. W. (1596), 97 la. 17, 65 N. W. 1009.]
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 
 
 931 
 
 table relief must be perfect, so that a suit to enforce it could be 
 maintained, or else the cause of action would not be " existing " 
 in the defendant at the time specified in the statute. ^ If, then, 
 an existing right of action is assigned to the defendant after the 
 action against him is commenced ; or if a claim on contract is 
 transferred to him before that time, but does not become due 
 and payable or enforceable until after the suit is begun; or, 
 lastly, if a claim is existing in favor of the defendant at the 
 time the action is commenced by virtue of a contract originally 
 made with him, but does not become payable or enforceable until 
 after that time, — in none of these cases can the demand be set 
 up by him as a counter-claim in the action. The answer must 
 also allege that the demand was existing in favor of the defend- 
 ant when the action was commenced. ^ These positions are fully 
 sustained by the decisions.^ 
 
 1 Russell V. Koonce, 104 N. C. 237; 
 Mayo V. Davidge, 44 Hun, 342. In one 
 or two of the codes, however, it is suffi- 
 cient that the demand is due and payable 
 wlien pleaded, if it was held by the de- 
 fendant at the time the action was com- 
 menced. Shannon v. Wilson, 19lnd. 112. 
 I~ee also Chapman v. I'lummer, 36 Wis. 
 262. 
 
 - McGuire v. Lamb (Idaho, 1888), 17 
 Pac. Rep. 749. 
 
 •3 Rice V. O'Connor, 10 Abb. Rr. 362 ; 
 Van Valen v. Lapham, 5 Duer, 689 ; Gan- 
 non V. Dougherty, 41 Cal. 661 ; Rickard 
 V. Kohl, 22 Wis. 506 ; Newkirk v. Neild, 
 19 Ind. 194. If the demand had been 
 actually transferred to the defendant by 
 an absolute verbal assignment before the 
 commencement of the action, although 
 the written assignment of the same was 
 executed after that date, it can be used as 
 a counter-claim. West i\ Moody, 33 Iowa, 
 137, 139; Cottle v. Cole, 20 Iowa, 485; 
 Conyngham v. Smith, 16 Iowa, 471. It is 
 held, in North Carolina, that, if the coun- 
 ter-claim is not barred by the statute of 
 limitations at the time the suit is com- 
 menced, it is good, although the statutory 
 lime may have elapsed when it is actually 
 pleaded. Brumble v. Brown, 71 N. C. 
 513. 516. 
 
 [^Lawrence v. Congregational Church 
 (1900), 164 N. Y. 115, 58 N. E- 24 : "An 
 owner who after the termination of the 
 
 original building contract without the 
 fault of the builder, and after the latter 
 had commenced an action to foreclose his 
 mechanic's lieu and had assigned the lieu 
 and cause of action, but without knowl- 
 edge of the assignment, entered into a 
 new contract with the assignor with refer- 
 ence to the same subject-matter, is not 
 entitled to set off against the assignee any 
 damages arising out of the assignor's 
 failure to perform the new contract, but is 
 entitled to set off whatever he actually 
 paid to the assignor upon the assigned 
 claim, after the assignment, in good faith, 
 and without notice." 
 
 " A judgment which has been super- 
 seded and is pending for review in an 
 appellate court cannot be pleaded as a set- 
 off in another action between tlie same 
 parties." " In the absence of equitable 
 considerations a defendant can only plead 
 as a set-off a claim or judgment upon 
 wliich, at the commencement of the action, 
 he might have maintained an indepen- 
 dent suit against the plaintiff : " Spencer 
 I'. Johnston (1899), 58 Neb. 44, 78 N. W. 
 482. See also Shabata v. Johnston (1897) 
 53 Neb. 12, 73 N. W. 273 ; Jones v. Dris- 
 coll (1895), 46 Neb. 57.5, 65 N. W. 194; 
 Burge V. Gandy (1894), 41 Nebt 149, 59 
 N. W.359 ; Momsen v. Noyes (1900), 105 
 W^is. 565, 81 N. W. 860; Jones v. Swank 
 (1893),.54Miun. 259, 55N. W. 1126; Bank 
 of Arkan.sas City i-. Ilasie (1897), 57 Kan.
 
 932 
 
 CIVIL KEJ.II'DIES. 
 
 § 674. * 798. May, but need not, counter-claim Unliquidated 
 Damages. Claim for Contribution by Surety. Pleading. I now 
 proceed to inquire, What causes of action on contract may be 
 counter-claimed under this second branch of the definition ? It 
 may be stated as the universal rule that, in an action on contract 
 to recover debt or unliquidated damages, the defendant may 
 counter-claim debt or damages arising on another contract, . 
 whether such damages are unliquidated or ascertained. ^ But in 
 the absence of statutory requirement he is not obliged to do so ; 
 he may refrain from urging his demand in this manner, and may 
 enforce it in a separate action. ^ A few early cases lay down a 
 
 751, 48 Pac. 22; St. Louis Nat. Bank v. 
 Gay (1894), 101 Cal. 286, 35 Pac. 876; 
 Rood V. Taft (1896),94 Wis. 380, 69 N. W. 
 183. 
 
 "Under Code Proc. Sec. 195, subd. 2, 
 a cause of action which can be pleaded as 
 a counter-claim, where it does not arise 
 out of the contr.'\ct or tran.saction set 
 forth in the complaint, must exist at the 
 coinmeiicemeut of the action : " Conner i-. 
 Scott (1897), 16 Wash. 371, 47 Pac. 761. 
 
 Kirhy v. Jameson (1896), 9 S. 1). 8, 67 
 N. W. 854 : In an action on a due bill, 
 defendant set up a so-called counter-claim 
 consisting of an account bearing date 
 subse luent to the commencement of the 
 action, and there was no affirmative proof 
 that it existed at the time the suit was 
 brought. Held not a proper counter- 
 claim.] 
 
 1 ^Hancock i». Hancock's Adm'r (1902), 
 Ky., 69 S. W. 757; Niver v. Nash (1893), 
 7 Wash. 558, 35 Pac. 380 ; Shelton v. Co- 
 nant (1894), 10 Wash. 193, 38 Pac. 1013, 
 citing the text; Waller v. Deranleau 
 (1903), —Neb. — , 94 N. W. 1038; Lit- 
 tle's Adm'r w. City Nat. Bank (1903),— 
 Ky. — , 74 S. W. 699.] 
 
 2 Lignot I'. Redding. 4 E. D. Smith, 
 285 ; Schubart v. Harteau, 34 Barb. 447. 
 per Ingraham .1. ; Atwater v. Schenck, 9 
 Wis. 160, 164, per Colo .1., an action on a 
 note, counter-claim of the amount due for 
 tlie price of land sold ; Conway v. Smith, 
 13 Wis. n25, 139, per Paine J., counter- 
 cbiiiii of dainages for non-performance of 
 .'I building contract by the builder; Bid- 
 well I'. Madison. 10 Min. 13, action by a 
 bank on a note, counter-claim of damages 
 
 from the negligence of the bank in not 
 collecting another note left with it for col- 
 lection ; Ijouisville, etc. R. Co. v. Thomp- 
 son, 18 B. Mon. 735, 742, action iiy a 
 railroad to recover stock-subscription, 
 counter-claim of damages from a breach 
 of an agreement to pay for land taken by 
 the railroad ; Williams v Weiting, 3 N. Y. 
 Sup. Ct. 439, 440, action by a veteri- 
 nary surgeon to recover for professional 
 services ; counter-claim, that defendant 
 bought a span of horses, relying upon 
 plaintiff's knowledge and recommenda- 
 tion, and promise to pay for them if they 
 were not good, etc., — breach, and dam- 
 ages. Held, a good counter-claim ; that 
 plaintiff's promise was binding, the de- 
 fendant's prejudice in buying them being 
 a sufficient consideration. The defendant 
 need not set up his cross-demand as a 
 counter-claim : see Douglas v. First Nat. 
 Bk. of Hastings, 17 Minn. 35; Emer- 
 son's Adm. V. Herriford, 8 Bush, 229, and 
 cases cited ; Woody v. Jordan, 69 N. C. 
 189, 197 ; Uppfalt v. Woerraann, 30 Neb. 
 189. For an example of this species of 
 counter-claim or set-off, see Mullendore v. 
 Scott, 45 Iiid. 113; Curtis v. Barnes, 30 
 Barb. 225, action for goods sold, counter- 
 claim of damages from the breach of an 
 arbitration bond ; Wilkcrsou v. Farn- 
 hatn, 82 .Mo. 672, action for rent, counter- 
 claim for improvements under express 
 promi.se of plaintiff to pay for them ; Mid- 
 land Co. V. Broat (Minn.' 1892), 52 N. W. 
 Rep. 972 (counter-claim on a statutory 
 bond given on the issue of a writ of ne 
 ereat). An action on an undertaking to 
 obtain an attachment is an " action on
 
 C0U^"^ER-CLA1M. 
 
 U3: 
 
 different doctrine, and require the damages to Le liquidated so 
 that they would constitute a good set-off under the ancient rules ; 
 but these decisions are palpably erroneous, and are completely 
 overruled.^ The right of action must of course arise out of 
 contract, or be on contract; and it has been doubted whether 
 the claim for contribution by one surety against a co-surety so 
 arises from contract that it may be counter-claimed in an action 
 brought upon another contract.^ This doubt, in my opinion, is 
 altogether too refined. Whatever may have been the equitable 
 origin of the claim of one surety against another, it is very 
 well settled that he could maintain a common law action of 
 assumpsit to recover his contributory share. This shows that the 
 law treated the liability as one arising from an implied promise. 
 In presenting his counter-claim the defendant must conform to 
 all the requirements of pleading by plaintiffs in stating their 
 causes of action. All the facts constituting the cause of action 
 must be averred in the same manner and with the same degree of 
 particularity as would be requisite were the pleading a complaint 
 or petition. 3 
 
 contract;" Wickliani v. Weil (Com. PI. 
 I8'J2),L7 N. Y. Suppl. 518. It was held, 
 liowever, by the New York Supreme 
 (Jourt, General Term, iu Furber i'. Mc- 
 Carthy (Supreme, 1889), 7 N. Y. Suppl. 
 t>13, that an undertaking to obtain an 
 order of arrest is a statutory indemnity 
 in the nature of penalty, and not a con- 
 tract; contra, see Cornell v. Donovan, 14 
 l^aly, 295. An action to collect taxes is 
 not an action on contract; Kansas City 
 V. Kidenour, 84 Mo. 253 ; Catling v. Car- 
 teret Cy. Com'rs, 92 N. C. 536 ; Anderson 
 V. Mayfield (Ky. 1892), 19 S. VV. Rep. 598. 
 That the counter-claim or set-off may be 
 of unliquidated damages, see also Parsons 
 V. Sutton, 66 N. Y. 92 ; Mills v. Carrier, 
 30 S. C. 617; Empire Transp. Co. v. Bog- 
 giaiio, 52 Mo. 294 ; Morrison v. Lovejoy, 
 6 Minn. 319, 352 ; Gardner v. Rishcr, 33 
 Kan. 93 ; Wheelock v. Pacific Pneumatic 
 Gas Co., 51 Cal. 223. 
 
 1 See, e. ^., Evens i'. Hall (Cine. Super. 
 Ct., Sp. T.), 1 Handy, 434. This construc- 
 tion is given to the provision in Nebraska ; 
 it is held that a claim for unliquidated dam- 
 ages even on contract cannot be set off 
 under a clause identical with the second 
 subdivision in the codes of the first group. 
 
 Boyer v. Clark, 3 Neb. 161, 168, 169. 
 The provision is similarly construed in 
 Arkansas ; Mathews v. Weiler (Ark. 1893), 
 22 S. W. Rep. 569 ; and in Kentucky ; 
 Shropshire v. Conrad, 2 Mete. 143; but 
 the unliijuidated claim may be used de- 
 fensively, when the plaintiff is insolvent 
 or a non-resident ; Taylor r. Stowell, 4 
 Mete. (Ky.) 175; Forbes v. Cooper, 88 
 Ky. 285 ; and see Garner v. Jones ( Ky. 
 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 647; but not. when 
 to allow it to be used would be to aid the 
 defendant in tlie execution of a fraudu- 
 lent design ; Mathews v. Weiler (Ark. 
 1893), 22 S. W. Hep 569. See also Frick 
 r. White, 57 N. Y. 103, ante, in note to 
 § *163. 
 
 (^Beaty v. Johnston (18';)9), 66 Ark. 529, 
 52 S. W. 129 ; Garner i;. Jones (1893), 94 
 Ky. 135, 21 S. W. 647; Huber v. Egner 
 (1901 ), Ky., 61 S. W. 3.53 ; Virginia Chem- 
 ical Co. v. Moore (1901), 61 S. C. 166, 
 39 S. E. 346.] 
 
 2 Sciimidt J-. Coulter, 3 Minn. 492. 
 
 \ Holgate r. Broome, 8 Minn. 243, a 
 counter-claim held bad because defendant 
 did not state liis cause of action for goods 
 sold iind delivered with sufficient fulness. 
 [[See §§ *738, * 748]
 
 ^34 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 5 675. * 799. May set up as a Counter-Claim the Following : A 
 Judgment against the Plaintiff ; Rights of Actions Allowed only by 
 Statute and Regarded as Arising on an Implied Promise ; Demand 
 Growing out of Unsettled Partnership Transactions. In ail action 
 on an ordinary contract the defendant may set up as a counter- 
 claim a judgment which he has recovered against the plaintiff, 
 and this without leave first obtained from the court, where such 
 leave is necessary- in order to sue on the judgment. ^ The doc- 
 trine also applies to those rights of action which, although 
 allowed only by statute, are regarded as arising on an implied 
 promise, and under the old system would have been enforced 
 by an action ex contractu. As, for example, where the plaintiff' 
 sued to recover back money lost by a wager and paid to the de- 
 fendant, a counter-claim of a similar demand against the plain- 
 tiff, originally in favor of a third person and duly assigned to the 
 defendant, was sustained by the New York Supreme Court.2 It 
 is now established in opposition to some of the earlier decisions 
 which have been expressly overruled, that a demand growing 
 out of the unsettled partnership transactions between the plain- 
 tiff and defendant may be pleaded as a counter-claim. It is 
 necessary, however, that the defendant should not only aver the 
 existence of such unsettled transactions and ask an accounting, 
 but allege that upon such accounting a balance will be found due 
 him from the plaintiff, and he must demand judgment therefor. 
 Without the averment of such a balance, the counter-claim will 
 be bad on demurrer. ^ 
 
 1 Wells V. Henshaw, 3 Bosw. 625 ; N. D. 455, 75 N. W. 908 ; Long v. Collins 
 Clark V. Story. 29 Barb. 295 ; Cornell v. (1901), 15 S. D. 259, 88 N. W. 571 ; Col- 
 Donovan, 14 Daly, 295; Taylor v. Root, cord y. Conger (1900), 10 Okla. 458, 62 
 4 Keyes, 335 (judgment in an action of Pac. 276; Kcifer i-. Summers (1893). 'l37 
 «'*"^^'")- Ind. 106, 35 N. E. 1103; Lundberg v 
 
 LSweeney v. Bailey (1895), 7 S. 1). David.son (1897), 68 Minn. 328, 71 N. W. 
 
 404, 64 N. W. 188; Adams v. Baker 71, 395 ; Lindliolm y. Ita.sca Lumber Co 
 
 (1898), 24 Nev. 162, 55 Pac. 362; Dunn (1896). 64 Minn. 46, 65 N. W. 931 ; Prav 
 
 ';. Uvalde Asphalt Paving (1903), 175 r. Life Indemnity Co. (1897) 104 La 114 
 
 N. Y. 214, 67 N. E. 439; De Camp v. 73 N, W. 485; llier v. Anheuser-Hu.scli 
 
 Thomson (1899). 159 N. Y. 444, 54 N. E. Brewing A.ss'n (1900), 60 Neb 320 83 
 
 H: Pendleton v. Beyer (1896), 94 Wis. N. W. 77; Welsher v. Libbv, McNeil & 
 
 31. 68 N. W. 415; Spencer i-. Johnston Libby (1900), 107 Wis. 47, 82 N. W. 693 ; 
 
 (1899), 58 Neb. 44. 78 N. W. 482 ; Pity of Richmond v. Bloch (1900),'38 Ore. 317. 60 
 
 S.imerset v. Banking Co. (1900), 109 Ky. Pac. 388 ] 
 
 549, 60 S. W. 5 ; Powell ,'. Nolan (1902), ^ McDougall v. Walling, 48 Barb 364. 
 
 27 Wa.sh. 318, 67 Pac. 712 ; Northwe.stern, » Il.-ndrv r. Il-ndrv. 32 Ind. r..:<}; Wad- 
 
 etc. Bank r. Ranch (1901). Idaho, 66 Pac doH ,-. Darling. 51 N.Y. 327, 330 ; Clift v. 
 
 807; Cleveland i-. McCanna (1898), 7 Northrup, 6 Lans. 330 ; ;)er co;i^ra', Ham-
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 
 
 935 
 
 § 676. * 800. Counter-claim against an Executor de son tort. 
 In an Action by a Pledgor. An executor de son tort becomes 
 liable to those interested in the estate to the extent of the value 
 of the property wliich he appropriated ; this is not the liability 
 of a mere tort-feasor towards the owner of the thing injured: it 
 is the same liability which flows from the ordinary trust relation 
 of executor towards the creditors and legatees, enforceable by 
 actions of accounting, etc. It has been held, therefore, that such 
 responsibility of the plaintiif may be interposed as a counter- 
 claim by a defendant sued on contract, when he is a creditor of 
 the estate with which the plaintiff has wrongfully intermeddled.^ 
 An action by a pledgor of stocks against the pledgee, to recover 
 damages for their wrongful sale at private sale and without notice, 
 has been said to be on contract and not for conversion, and for 
 that assigned reason a counter-claim based upon another contract 
 was held admissible. ^ 
 
 mond V. Terry, 3 Lans. 186 ; Ives v. Miller, 
 19 Barb. 196 ; Iliff v. Brazill, 27 Iowa, 1.31 ; 
 Haskell v. Moore, 29 Cal. 437. 
 
 1 McKenzie v. Pendleton's Adm., 1 
 Bush, 164. The cause of action accruing 
 to a bank against its cashier for wrong- 
 fully permitting an overdraft, is a cause 
 of action on contract, namely, the con- 
 tract of employment as cashier; or may 
 be treated as a cause of action for a 
 breach of his bond given for the faithful 
 performance of his duties as cashier ; and 
 hence is a valid set-off: Board, etc. of St. 
 Louis Pub. Schools v. Broadway Sav. Bk. 
 Est., 12 Mo. App. 104, affirmed 84 Mo. 56. 
 As a general rule, when a receiver, execu- 
 tor, administrator, or trustee sues to re- 
 cover a debt due to the estate in his 
 hands, a demand of the defendant for 
 services rendered on the employment of 
 the plaintiff beneficial to the estate is a 
 good counter-claim, Davis v. Stover, 58 
 N. Y. 473. 
 
 2 Seaman v. Reeve, 15 Barb. 454. The 
 following cases give a construction to the 
 language of the clause defining " set-off" 
 as it is found in the second group of codes : 
 Evens v. Hall, 1 Handy, 434 ; Smead v. 
 Christfield, 1 Disney, 18 ; Anthony v. Stin- 
 soi), 4 Kan. 211 ; Collins v. Groseclose, 40 
 Ind. 414, 416 ; Curran {•. Curran, 40 Ind. 
 473, 480-484, and cases cited; West v. 
 
 Moody, 33 Iowa, 137, 139; Remington r. 
 King, 1 1 Abb. Pr. 278 ; Williams v. Brown, 
 2 Keyes, 486 ; Schieffelin ;;. Hawkins, 
 1 Daly, 289 ; Berry v. Brett, 6 Bosw. 627 ; 
 Roberts v. Carter, 38 N. Y. 107 ; Miller r. 
 Elorer, 15 Ohio St. 149; Stanberry v. 
 Smythe, 13 Ohio St. 495 ; Ross u. Johnson, 
 1 Handy, 388; McCulIough v. Lewis, 1 
 Disney, 564 ; Mortland v. Holton, 44 Mo. 
 58; Jones v. Moore, 42 Mo. 413 ; Lamb v. 
 Brolaski, 38 Mo. 51 ; Kent v. Rogers, 24 
 Mo. 306; Brake v. Corning, 19 Mo. 125 ; 
 Mahan v. Ross, 18 Mo. 121 ; Pratt v. Men- 
 kens, 18 Mo. 158; House v. Marshall, 18 
 Mo. 368; Smith v. Steinkamper, 16 Mo. 
 150; Griffin v. Cox, 30 Ind. 242; Blew r. 
 Hoover, 30 Ind. 450; Stilwell f. Chappell, 
 39 Ind. 72 ; Grossman v. Lauber, 29 Ind. 
 618; Lewis v. Sheaman, 28 Ind. 427; 
 Dayhuff v. Dayhuff's Adm., 27 Ind. 158; 
 Sayres v. Linkart, 25 Ind. 145 ; Kiuir r. 
 Conn, 25 Ind. 425 ; Keightley v. Walls, 24 
 Ind. 205; Durbon v. Kelley's Adm., 22 
 Ind. 183; Indianapolis & Cine. R. Co. v. 
 Ballard, 22 Ind. 448; Fankboner v. Fauk- 
 boner, 20 Ind. 62 ; Shannon v. Wilson, 19 
 Ind. 112; Schoonover v. Quick, 17 Ind. 
 196; Irish v. Snelson, 16 Ind. 365 ; Reilly 
 r. Rucker, 16 Ind. 303; Knouer v. Dick, 
 14 Ind. 20; Fox v. Barker, 14 Ind. 309; 
 Bool I'. Watson, 13 Ind. 387; Turner i-. 
 Simpson, 12 Ind. 413 ; Blankenship v.
 
 936 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 677. * 801. Statement of Established Doctrine. Question of 
 Doubt herein. It may be regarded as a doctrine established by 
 the overwhelming weight of authority, that, whenever by the 
 j^rinciples of the law, independent of the new procedure, a cause 
 of action may be treated as arising either from tort or on con- 
 tract, and the party holding the right may elect between the 
 two kinds of remedial proceeding, and does in fact elect to sue 
 on contract, the demand thus determined to be upon contract 
 may be counter-claimed against a plaintiff's cause of action aris- 
 ing on another contract, or when itself set up by a plaintiff, it 
 may be opposed by a counter-claim arising out of another con- 
 tract. ^ The only question of doubt in the practical application 
 of this doctrine relates to the necessity of indicating the election 
 in the pleading itself; or, in other words, whether the demand 
 ma)' not be thus used as a counter-claim, or against a counter- 
 claim, even though the pleading contains no averments showing 
 the election to have been actually made. While the courts 
 have generally sustained this doctrine, they are not absolutely 
 unanimous. The Supreme Court of Minnesota holds that the 
 code has abolished this rule and the right of electing between the 
 different forms of action ex contractu and ex delicto ; or, rather, 
 has destroyed all possibility of the advantage which could once 
 have been derived under the circumstances above mentioned 
 from such an election. ^ This opinion is based upon a close 
 
 Rogers, 10 Ind. 333; Johnson v. Kent, 11 Cal. 93; Nagleeu. Minturn, 8 Cal. 540; 
 
 9 Ind. 252 ; Lovejoy i-. Robinson, 8 Ind. Marye v. Jones, 9 Cal. 335 ; Howard v. 
 
 399; Woodward c. Laverty, 14 Iowa, 381 ; Shores, 20 Cal. 277; Collins v. Butler, 14 
 
 Cook v. Lovell, 11 Iowa, 81; Campbell v. Cal. 223; Lubert v. Chauviteau, 3 Cal. 
 
 Fox, 11 Iowa, 318 ; Eyre f. Cook, 10 Iowa, 458; Ricketson v. Richardson, 19 Cal. 
 
 586; Stadler v. Parmelee, 10 Iowa, 23; 330; Corwin i. Ward, 35 Cal. 195. 
 Donahue v. Prosser, 10 Iowa, 276 ; Reed v. QCentral Nat. Bank v. Haseltine (1900), 
 
 Chubb, 9 Iowa, 178; Sample i". Griffith, 155 Mo. 58. 55 S. W. 1015; Momsen v. 
 
 5 Iowa, 376; Davi.o i-. Milburn, 3 Iowa, Atkins(1900), 105 Wis. 557,81 N.W. 647.] 
 163; Dorsey r. Reese, 14 B. Mon. 157; i See Norden c. Jones, 33 Wis. 600, 604. 
 
 Lausdale r. Mitchell, 14 B. Mon. 350; See Ogilvie v. Lightstone, 1 Daly, 129; 
 
 Clark V. Finnell, 16 B. Mon. 337 ; Graham Starr Cash Car Co. v. Reinhardt (Com. 
 
 r. Tilford, Stanton's Code, 98 ; Thatcher v. PI. 1892), 20 N. Y. Suppl. 872 ; Barnes v. 
 
 Cannon, 6 Bush, 541; Eversole i'. Moore, McMullins, 78 Mo. 260; Green i;. Conrad 
 
 3 Bu.sh, 49; Haddix u. Wilson, 3 Bu.sh, (Mo. 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 839; Challiss 
 
 523; Miller ;•. Gaither, 3 Bu.sh, 152; i- Wylie, 35 Kan. 506; Smithy. McCar- 
 
 Brown v. Phillips, 3 Bush, 656; Taylor i: thy, 39 Kan. 308; Smith r. Young, 109 
 
 Stowell, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 175; Shropshire f. N. C. 224 (counterclaim not allowed, as 
 
 Conrad, 2 id. 143; Geoghegan r. Ditto^ jdaintiff did not elect to waive the tort). 
 2 id. 433; Finnell r. N'esbitt, 16 \i. Mon.' - Folsom r. Carii, 6 Minn. 420. The 
 
 354; Naglee r. Palmer. 7 Cal. 543 ; Hobbs rule in Indiana is the same : Richey r. 
 
 V. Duff, 23 Cal. 596; Russell v. Conway, Ely, 115 lud. 232.
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 937 
 
 and logical adherence to tlie letter and to the spirit of the 
 code, which require that the facts constituting the cause of 
 action should be averred in a pleading, and abolish all forms 
 of action. 
 
 § 678. * 802. Illustrative Examples in Equitable Actions. In 
 all the foregoing examples the actions were legal. Some illus- 
 trations will now be given of those that are equitable. Many 
 species of equitable actions may arise on contract within the 
 meaning of the statute, and equitable remedies may thus be 
 obtained as counter-claims under the second branch of the defi- 
 nition. A suit was brought to compel the conveyance of land 
 alleged to be held by the defendant in trust for the plaintiff. 
 The defendant was a lawyer, and the plaintiff had been his 
 client. As such attorney, he had agreed, it was said, to bid 
 in the land at a public sale, and to hold it for the plaintiff: he 
 did, in fact, purchase it in his own name, but retained it for 
 himself, and refused to convey. In his answer to these allega- 
 tions, the defendant, besides denials, pleaded, as a counter-claim, 
 a debt due from the plaintiff for professional services in relation 
 to this and other matters. Evidence to sustain this counter- 
 claim was rejected at the trial, for the reason that the defendant 
 had forfeited all claim to compensation on account of his fraudu- 
 lent practices. The Superior Court of New York City, in re- 
 versing this decision, held, that, as the action was on contract, 
 the counter-claim was admissible, and, even if the defendant 
 had been guilty of wrong in one matter, his right to compensa- 
 tion in respect of other matters was not affected ; also, that, on 
 the facts as proved, he had committed no fraud or breach of his 
 fiduciary duty in the instances charged against him.^ In an 
 action to foreclose a purchase-money mortgage, it is well settled 
 that the mortgagor may interpose a counter-claim for the dam- 
 ages sustained by him from the breach of covenants in the 
 plaintiff's deed of conveyance. Both causes of action arise 
 from contract, though from different contracts. ^ 
 
 § 679. * 803. Counter-Claim of Money Demand on Independent 
 Contract Interposed in Action to foreclose Mortgage. The COUnter- 
 
 1 Carrie v. Cowles, 6 Bosw. 452. See Hall v. Gale, 14 Wis. 54; Walker u. Wil- 
 also .Judah v. Vincennes Univ. Tr.s., 16 son, 1.3 Wi.«. 522 ; Lowry r. Hurd, 7 Miun. 
 Ind. .56. .356, 36.3 ; Cov r. Dowuie, 14 Fla. 544. 5fi2. 
 
 2 Eaton V. Talmadge, 22 Wis. 526, See also §* 792, note, ante; Merritt t;. Gou- 
 528; Akerly v. Vilas, 21 Wis. 88, 109; ley, 58 Hun, 372.
 
 938 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 claim of a money demand on an independent and separate con- 
 tract may be interposed in the action to foreclose any mortgage 
 of land, purcliase-mone}', or other, by the mortgagor or defend- 
 ant personally liable for the mortgage-debt, and against whom 
 a decree for a deficiency could be rendered: in respect to such 
 defendants, both causes of action arise on contract, and tho 
 recovery on the counter-claim directly interferes with that on 
 the complaint. In respect to other defendants who are not 
 parties nor privies to the contract of mortgage, but whose 
 liens, or encumbrances, or rights of property in the land are 
 simpl}- cut off by the decree, it may well be doubted whether 
 the cause of action in the foreclosure suit can be said to arise 
 on contract. This question was recently passed upon by the 
 New York Court of Appeals; and the doctrine above stated 
 was fully sustained, and made the basis of decision.^ 
 
 IV. Some Miscellaneous Provisions in Belation to Coiinter- Claims. 
 
 § 680. * 804. Opportunity to interpose Counter-Claim not a Bar 
 to another Suit thereon. Provision of Code herein in few States. 
 As a counter-claim is always a separate and independent cause 
 of action, wliich the defendant may enforce against the plain- 
 tiff, is he obliged to avail himself of it when sued? Or may he 
 omit to set up the demand in his answer, and make it the sub- 
 ject of another action brought by himself? In other words, is 
 the opportunity thus furnished by the codes to try and determine 
 his own claim in the prior suit against himself a bar to his subse- 
 quently maintaining a second suit for the purpose of determining 
 the issues which might have been so disposed of in the former 
 one? In the absence of statutory prohibition, no such effect is 
 produced by the provisions of the codes which authorize the 
 counter-claim. The defendant has an election. ^ He may set 
 
 1 Iluut V. Chapman, 51 N. Y. 5.55,5.57. 80 X. W. 59: J. suod defendant in 1898 on 
 
 See also Charlton f. Tardy, 28 Ind. 452 ; defendant'.s guaranty that a heating appa- 
 
 Bathgate v. Ha.skin, 59 N. Y. 5.33, 5.39, ratus con.structed in J.'.s hou.^io by defend- 
 
 540 ; Kichinoud v. Lattin, 64 Cal. 273. In ant woulii give .sati.sf action, and defendant 
 
 Oregon, a legal counter-claim to a suit in ])leaded in bar that in 1897 lie sued J. in 
 
 equity is not allowed, unless it be con- a jii.stice's court for a balance due on the 
 
 nected with the subject of the suit. See price of the apparatus, and that J. set up 
 
 Ore. Code, § 393 ; Sears v. Martin (Ore. tlie breach of guaranty, and tliat, on ap- 
 
 1892), 29 I'ac. Hej). 890 ; Hurrage i'. Bo- peal to the district court,.!, had judgment. 
 
 nanza fi. ^ <^. Min. Co., 12 Ore. 1G9. Held that since no counter-claim had been 
 
 ■^ QJones V. Witousek (1901) 114 la. 14, pleaded, the judgment of the district court
 
 COUNTER-CLAIM. 
 
 939 
 
 up his cause of actiou as a eountei-elaiin, and have both oppos- 
 ing demands adjudicated ; or he nuiy withhold it, and prosecute 
 it in a separate action brought for that purpose.^ The codes of 
 a few States expressly require the defendant's cross-right to be 
 interposed as a counter-claim, if a proper one for that purpose ; 
 and, if he fails to do so, he cannot enforce it by a direct action.^ 
 
 was no bar to the action for damages for 
 breach of guaranty, since J. was not 
 obliged to plead the couuter-claim in the 
 former action. " It is well settled that a 
 set-off or couuter-claim may or may not be 
 pleaded, as the defendant shall elect ; and 
 unless it is pleaded, the right to sue upou 
 it as an independent cause of action, or to 
 rely upon it in defence of another action 
 by the same plaintiff, is in no wise affected 
 or impaired by a judgment for or against 
 the defendant. In other words, if the 
 matter of set-off or counter-claim is pre- 
 sented and passed upon in a suit, it is 
 barred by the judgment ; if not, the de- 
 fendant may make it the subject of a sep- 
 arate and distinct action : Hunt i\ Brown, 
 146 Mass. 253 ; Roach v. Privett, 90 Ala. 
 391 ; Minnaugh v. Partlin, 67 Mich. 391." 
 Contra, Bellinger r. Craigue, 31 Barb. 
 5.34; Mauney v. Hamilton (1903), 132 
 N. C. 295, 303, 43 S. E. 903 : A defendant 
 is not bound to make use of a counter- 
 claim as such, but may make it the basis 
 of a separate suit. 
 
 Murphy v. Russell (1901), Idaho, 67 
 Pac. 427 : The statute relative to counter- 
 claims was intended to prevent a multi- 
 plicity of suits, and " a cause of action 
 arising out of the transaction set forth in 
 the complaint as the foundation of plain 
 tiff's claim or connected therewith, in 
 favor of the defendant, must be set forth 
 iu the answer as a counter-claim, and 
 could not be made the basis of another 
 suit." Stevens v. Home Savings Ass'n 
 (1897), Idaho, 51 Pac. 779; Beaty v. 
 Johnston (1899), 66 Ark. 529, 52 S. W. 
 129.3 Lowry v. Hurd, 7 Minn. 356, 363 ; 
 Ricker v. Pratt, 48 Ind. 73. 
 
 1 Welch V. Hazelton, 14 How. Pr. 97 ; 
 Lignot V. Redding, 4 E. D. Smith, 285 ; 
 Gillespie v. Torrance, 25 N. Y. 306, 308, 
 310, per Selden J.; Bellinger v. Craigue, 
 31 Barb. 534, 530. See also Giles v. Aus- 
 tin, 62 N. Y. 486 ; Brown v. Gallaudet, 80 
 id. 413; Inslee v. Hampton, 8 Hun, 230; 
 
 Swenson v. Cresop, 28 Ohio St. 668; 
 Uppfalt V. Woermann, 30 Neb. 189. 
 
 - ^CaUfornia : " If the defendant omits 
 to set up a counter-claim in tlie cases men- 
 tioned iu the first subdivision of the last 
 section, neither he nor his assignee can 
 afterwards maintain an action against the 
 plaintiff therefor." Code Civ. Pro., § 439 ; 
 Idaho; Same provision as in California. 
 Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3213; Indiana: 
 "If any defendant ])ersonally served with 
 notice omit to set up a counter-claim aris- 
 ing out of the contract, or transaction set 
 forth iu the complaint as the ground of 
 the plaintiff's claims, or any of them, 
 he cannot afterward maintain an action 
 against the plaintiff therefor, except at 
 his own costs." Burns' St., 1901, §354; 
 Iowa: "Judgment obtained in an actiou 
 by ordinary proceedings shall not be an- 
 nulled or modified by any order in an 
 action by equitable proceedings, except 
 for a defence which has arisen or been dis- 
 covered since the judgment was rendered. 
 But such judgment does not prevent the 
 recovery of any claim, though such ciaifu 
 might have been used by way of counter- 
 claim in the action on which the judgment 
 was recovered." Code, 1897, § 3440; 
 Kansas : " If the defendant omit to set 
 up a counter-claim or set-off, he cannot 
 recover costs, against the plaintiff in any 
 subsequent action thereon ; but this section 
 shall not apply to causes of action which 
 are stricken out of or withdrawn from 
 the answer, as in sections ninetj'-seveu 
 and one hundred and twenty." Code, 
 1901, § 96; Minnesota: "The pleading 
 of a set-off or counter-claim by a defend- 
 ant in any action, in any of the courts of 
 this State, shall not be held or construed 
 to be an admission of any cause of action 
 on the part of plaintiff against such de- 
 fendant." St., 1894, § 5238; Montana: 
 Same as the California statute. Code, 
 1895, § 697; Nebraska: Same as the 
 Kansas statute. Code, 1901, § 102; Ohio:
 
 940 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 § 681. * 805. Form of Verdict, Finding, and Judgment. When 
 the plaintiff's demand is proved and found by the jury or court, 
 and the amount of the eounter-chiim as proved and found equals 
 it, the verdict must be for the defendant, and a judgment ren- 
 dered dismissing the action ; if the counter-claim as found be less 
 than the plaintiff's demand as found, a verdict should be given 
 for the plaintiff for the excess of his recovery over that of the de- 
 fendant; finally, if the counter-claim as found is greater than the 
 plaintiff's demand as found, a verdict should be given for the 
 defendant for the excess.^ If the plaintiff should fail entirely to 
 prove his cause of action as alleged, the defendant would be en- 
 titled to a verdict for the whole amount of his counter-claim as 
 established by his proofs. The foregoing rules presuppose that 
 both demands are for the recovery of money, either debt or 
 damages. If the plaintiff's cause of action, or the counter-claim, 
 is for the recovery of some special relief, legal or equitable, the 
 judgment rendered must be according to the circumstances of 
 the case. As has been shown in the foregoing citations, there 
 may be instances in which it would be impossible for the defend- 
 ant to take anything by his counter-claim, unless the plaintiff's 
 cause of action should be entirely defeated. There is a dictuyji 
 in an Indiana case to the effect that, where the action is for the 
 recovery of money, a pecuniary counter-claim, less in amount 
 than the sum demanded by the plaintiff, is inadmissible, because, 
 as was said, it was not a complete bar or answer to the action.^ 
 This dichim was founded upon an entire misconception of the 
 object and uses of the counter-claim. It is not, in any true 
 sense, a defence in bar of the plaintiff's cause of action. It 
 may be pleaded when the plaintiff's claim and right to recover 
 
 Same as Kansas statute. Bates' St., 1904, 42 Iowa, .526; luslce r. Hampton, 11 Hun, 
 § .5.348; Oklahoma: Same as Kansas 15G. Wlieii a counter-claim is jileaded 
 statute, St., 189.3, § 3974; Utah: Same as the plaintiff cannot dismiss or discontinue 
 California statute. Rev. St., 1898, § 2970; the whole action without defendant's con- 
 iryortuny .■ Same as Kansas statute. Rev. sent, so as to prevent the counter-claim 
 St., 1899, § 3546.] from being tried. Turnell v. Vaughan, 
 1 Moore v. Caruthers, 17 B. Mon. 669, 80 N. C. 46; Amos r. Humboldt Loan 
 681; Hay v. Short, 49 Mo. 139, 142; Ass., 21 Kan. 474; Sale v. Bugher, 24 
 Hogan V. Shnart, 11 Mont. 498; Hitch- id. 432 ; Gwathuey ?'. Cheatham, 21 Hun, 
 cock D. Baughan, 44 Mo. App. 42. With .576; Tabor v. Mackkee. 58 Ind. 290; 
 respect to the recovery and judgment, see Whedhee v. Leggett, 92 N. C. 469 ; Fran- 
 Grove c. Schweitzer, 36 Wis. 554; Wes- cis v. Edwards, 77 N. C. 271. 
 tervelt v. Ackley, 62 N. Y. .505 ; 2 Hun, - McClintic's Adm. v. Cory, 22 Ind. 
 258 ; Heine v. Meyer, 61 N. Y. 171 ; Derr 170, 173, per Worden J. 
 V. Stubbs, 83 N. C. 539; Hall i-. Clayton,
 
 CIlOSS-COxMl'LAINT. U41 
 
 thereon are admitted; but, at the same time, it .is alleged that 
 the defendant has also a right on his side to recover a sum from 
 the plaintiff upon an independent cause of action, which will 
 equal, and so destroy, or exceed, or diminish the amount which 
 would otherwise be the plaintiff's due. Undoubtedly, when the 
 
 plaintiff's complaint shows that he is entitled to a certain sum, 
 
 say $500, — and the defendant, not controverting these allega- 
 tions by any defence in bar, simply interposes a distinct cross- 
 demand for a less amount, — say $300, — the plaintiff's right to 
 a judgment for the difference is at once admitted ; and the plead- 
 ings may be so framed, by the express provisions of some, if not 
 all, of the codes, that he is immediately able to recover the sum 
 so admitted upon the record, while the issues as to the remainder 
 are left to be tried. To say that a defendant shall not avail 
 himself of a smaller demand, and thus lessen the amount of 
 the i^laintiff's recovery, because he cannot allege facts which 
 would defeat that recovery altogether, is palpably unjust, and 
 is warranted by no requirements of the statute. 
 
 § 682. * 806. Cross-Complaints. Provisions of the Codes. Dif- 
 ference in Practice. Illustrative Cases. The practice in a few of 
 the States admits a "cross-complaint" by a defendant, not only 
 against the plaintiff, but against other defendants. ^ Although 
 there is a general similarity, if not substantial identity, in the 
 provisions of the various codes concerning the granting of relief 
 to defendants against the plaintiff's or against each other, yet a 
 very great difference in the actual practice founded upon these 
 
 1 f See § *585 (n.), where the statutory Van Sautvoord, in his work on Pleading 
 
 provisions are set out at length. (p. 574), after discussing generally the 
 
 " It is said that the counter-claim of purpose of the cross-bill under the old 
 
 the code was intended to preserve to a practice, says : ' All these various matters 
 
 defendant all remedies he formerly had, which, under the eijuity practice, were 
 
 either in an action at law or by a bill in proper subjects for a cross-bill, where the 
 
 equity or a cross-bill on similar facts, object was for relief and not for dis- 
 
 2 Wait, Pr. 476, and cases cited. Said covery, are sui)posed to be within the term 
 
 Bosworth J. in Gleason i-. Moen, 2 Duer, "counter-claim," as used in the Code, and 
 
 639: 'The counter-claim secures to the may be set up by the defendant in the 
 
 defendant full relief, which a separate action:'" Kollock ?•. Scrihner (1897), 98 
 
 action at law, or a bill in chancery, or a Wis. 104, 73 N. W. 776. See also Trestor 
 
 cross-bill, could have secured to him on r. City of Sheboygan (1894), 87 Wis. 406, 
 
 an allegation or proof of the same facts, 58 N. W. 747 ; Gillenwaters >,'. Campbell 
 
 but it relates to only such causes of action (1895), 142 Ind. 529, 41 N. K. 1041 ; Peter 
 
 as exist against the plaintiff, and might, v. Farrel, etc. Co. (1895), 53 Ohio St. 534, 
 
 in their nature, be the basis of an action 42 N. E. 690. See also § *765 and 
 
 against him at the suit of the defendant.' notes.]
 
 942 
 
 CIVIL REMEDIES. 
 
 provisions has grown up in the several States. In most of them, 
 the clauses of the statute referred to are practically a dead letter; 
 Wijile in a few they have been accepted and acted upon accord- 
 ing to their evident intent.^ A wide departure has thus been 
 made in the latter commonwealths from the methods which 
 prevailed before the introduction of the reformed procedure. 
 This practice, in respect to cross-complaints against plaintiffs 
 and against other defendants, will be best illustrated by a refer- 
 ence to the facts and decisions of a few prominent cases taken 
 as examples.- In an action brought by Joanna ^Morris against 
 
 1 In some of these States the cross- 
 complaint or petition is used in cases 
 M-Iiere, under the equity practice, the de- 
 fendant would be entitled to file a cross- 
 bill, but which do not fall under the 
 statutory definition of a "counter-claim," 
 or where new parties must be brought in. 
 In a few of these St:ites, however, it would 
 seem tliat the cross-complaint or petition 
 is used in all cases where the defendant 
 seeks to obtain affirmative relief, so that 
 the "counter-claim" is actually enforced 
 by means of such a cross-pleading. The 
 following are some of the most important 
 recent decisions illustrating its use in vari- 
 ous States: Marr v. Lewis, 31 Ark. 203; 
 Trapnall v. Hill, 31 id. 346 ; Earle v. Hale, 
 31 id. 473; Abbott v. Monti, 3 Call, 
 oC ; Monti v. Bishop, 3 id. 605 ; Mills v. 
 Uuttrick, 4 id. 53; Tucker v. McCoy, 3 
 id. 284; Hatcher i'. Briggs, 6 Ore. 31; 
 Scheland v. Erpelding, 6 id. 258 ; Pond r. 
 Waterloo Agric. Works, 50 Iowa, 596 ; 
 Kellogg v. Aherin, 48 id. 299 ; Hervey v. 
 Savery, 48 id. 313; Wright v. Bacheller, 
 16 Kan. 259 ; Hopkins v. Oilman, 47 Wis. 
 581 ; Tippecanoe Cy. Com'rs i-. Lafay- 
 ette, etc. U. Co., 50 Ind. 85, 116, 117; 
 Kwing V. Patterson, 35 id. 326; Winslow 
 )•. Winslow, 52 id. 8; Daly v. Nat. Life Ins. 
 Co., 64 id. 1 ; Joyce v. Whitney, 57 id. 550 : 
 Shoemaker v. Smith, 74 id. 71 ; Williams 
 V. Boyd, 75 id. 286 ; Wilson v. Madison, 55 
 Cal. 5 ; O'Connor v. Frasher, 53 id. 435 ; 
 Kreichbaum v. Melton, 49 id. 50. See also 
 I'illow y. Sentelle, 49 Ark. 430; Marriott 
 V. Clise, 12 Col. 561 ; Mahaska Cy. State 
 Bank v. Christ, 82 Iowa, 56; Grimes ?•. 
 Grimes, 88 Ky. 20; Demartin ;•. Albert, 
 68 Cal 277; jlarrison c. McCormick, 69 
 Cal. 616; Shain v. Belvin, 79 Cal. 262; 
 
 Goldman v. Bashore, 80 Cal. 146; Heil- 
 bron I'. Kings River & F. Canal Co., 76 
 Cal. 11; Wadswonh r. Wadsworth, 81 
 Cal. 182 ; Mott v. Mott, 82 Cal. 413 ; Van 
 Bibbor 1-. Hilton, 84 Cal. 585; Winter v. 
 McMillan, 87 Cal. 256 ; Blakely v. Blakely, 
 89 Cal. 324 ; Clark v. Taylor, 91 Cal. 552^ 
 
 2 I^Powell V. Nolan "{H'02), 27 Wash. 
 318, 67 Pac. 712; Zarrs c. Keck (1894), 
 40 Neb. 456, 58 N. W. 933 ; Patrick Land 
 Co. V. Leavenworth (1894). 42 Neb. 715, 
 60 N. W. 9.54; Smith v. Allen (1901), 63 
 Neb. 74, 88 N. W. 155 ; Berdolt v. Berdolt 
 (1898), 56 Neb. 792, 77 N. W. 399; Putt 
 r. Putt (1897), 149 Ind. 30, 48 N. E. 356; 
 Fleishman r. Woods (1901), 135 Cal. 256, 
 67 Pac. 276 ; Barnacle v. Henderson (1894), 
 42 Neb. 169, 60 N. W. 382; IIa.«lam «. 
 Ha.<lam 11899), 19 Utah, 1, 56 Pac. 243; 
 Am. Exch. Bank v. Davidson (1897), 69 
 Minn. 319, 72 N. W. 129; Maxwell v. 
 Northern Trust Co. (1897), 70 Minn. 334, 
 73 N. W. 173; Wheeler, etc. Mfg. Co. 
 V. Bjelland (1896), 97 la. 637, 66 N. W. 
 885; Nevada Ditch Co. v. Bennett (1896), 
 30 Ore. 59, 45 Pac. 472; Hill v. Friuk 
 (1895), 11 Wa.sh. 562, 40 Pac. 128; 
 Armstrong v. Mayer (1903), — Neb. — , 
 95 N. W. 51 ; Kollock v. Scribner (1897), 
 98 Wis. 104, 73 N. W. 776; Ballin r. 
 Merchants' Exch. Bank (1895), 89 Wis. 
 278, 61 N. W. 1118. 
 
 " While the code makes no express pro- 
 visions for cross-complaints or bills, they 
 are yet recognized by our practice. . . . 
 The answer in such a case must contain 
 all the allegations required in a complaint 
 to justify the granting of a temporary 
 injunction, for the only real difference I'e- 
 tween a comjdaint and a cross-complaint 
 is that the former is maile by the plaintiff
 
 CKOSti-Co:.IPLAINT. 043 
 
 Thompson and Dice, tlie complaint alleged that the plaintiff, as 
 widow of C. Morris, deceased, was owner in fee of certain land, 
 namely, one undivided third of land, of which her husband died 
 seized; that she was induced by the frauds of Thompson, in a 
 manner particularly described, to execute to him a deed of all 
 her said lands : a second paragraph states the same deed to have 
 been made to Thompson by mistake; that the heirs of her hus- 
 band also conveyed all their interest in the same land to T. at 
 the same time, who thus held the title to the entire tract; that 
 therefore T. conveyed five-sevenths of said tract to the defendant 
 Dice, who took with knowledge of the plaintiff's claim; prayer, 
 that her deed to Thompson might be declared void, that T.'s deed 
 to D. might be set aside, so far as it conveyed her land, that her 
 title might be established, etc. Dice answered, first, denials; 
 and, second, that he took from T. in good faith, without notice, 
 and for a full consideration. Thompson, as an answer, inter- 
 posed a cross-complaint against Dice, in which, after denying 
 any fraud, he alleged that he took a conveyance from the heirs 
 of C. Morris, deceased, of all their interest, which was an un- 
 divided two-thirds of the tract; that by mistake his own deed to 
 D. conveyed a greater interest in the land than that which the 
 heirs of C. M. had owned, and which was all that he had in- 
 tended to convey to D. ; prayer, that his deed to D. might be 
 reformed by correcting the mistake. Dice answered this cross- 
 complaint, denying its averments. On the trial, D. moved for 
 a separate trial of the issues between himself and T., which was 
 
 and the latter by the defendant : " Pine " matters in (juestion in tlie petition," the 
 Tree Lumber Co. v. McKinley (1901), 83 summons issued on the petition would be 
 Minn. 419, 86 N. W. 414. sufficient notice to sustain a judgment 
 Joyce V. Growney (1900), 154 Mo. 253, rendered on the cross-petition ; but where 
 55 S. W. 466 : " The statute limits the the cross-petition sets up matters which 
 new matter that may be pleaded in the are not drawn " in question in the peti- 
 answer to that which is a defence to tion," and seeics affirmative relief against 
 the ])laintiff's suit or else a counter-claim a co-defendant, of a nature different from 
 against hivi; it does not authorize a that sought in the petition, a summons to 
 counter-claim or an equitable cross-action the party to be charged, issued on the 
 of one defendant against another, except petition, will not confer jurisdiction to 
 as one defendant may be entitled to such render judgment on the cross-petition, 
 relief against another as will enable him especially wlien the cross-petition is filed 
 to make good his defence to the plaintiff's after the defendant thereto is in default 
 suit." for answer to the petition, and a sum- 
 Southward V. Jamison (1902), 66 Ohio mons on the cross-petition in such case is 
 St. 290, 64 N. E. 135: So long as a cross- necessary.] 
 petition in an action is strictly confined to
 
 944 CIVIL REMKDIES. 
 
 refused. The court found from the evidence that the plaintiff's 
 deed to T. was a mistake; that T. had reconveyed to her by 
 quitclaim; that on the same day T. conveyed to D., and in 
 that deed also there was a mistake, namely, that it conveyed 
 five-sevenths of the whole tract instead of five-sevenths of an 
 undivided two-thirds, which was the amount intended to be 
 conveyed; and a judgment was rendered reforming this deed 
 from T. to D. On an appeal by D. from this judgment, the 
 court held that the matters averred in the cross-complaint, and 
 the relief sought by it, were so intimately connected with the 
 subject of the principal suit by Mrs. Morris, that the whole 
 might be properly litig-ated together; that the cross-complaint 
 stated a good cause of action against D., and that the latter was 
 not entitled to a separate trial of the issues raised hy his answer 
 to it.^ It is plain, from the facts as they were found by the 
 trial court, that the real object of the suit by Mrs. Morris was 
 to get rid of Thompson's deed to Dice. Thompson's deed back 
 to herself had purported to reconvey the title to her, but was 
 partially inoperative by reason of the outstanding deed from 
 Thompson to Dice, which was at least a cloud upon her title. 
 By making both of these persons defendants, she forced Thomp- 
 son to attack his own deed to Dice. As the matters of difference 
 between Thompson and Dice were closely blended with her own 
 claims against both, and as her remedy so directly depended upon 
 the result of the contest between these two parties, it seems emi- 
 nently proper that this triangular legal duel should be fought in 
 one contest, as was done. 
 
 § 683. * 807. Illustrative Cases Continued. Another decision 
 by the same court shows when a cross-complaint by defendants 
 against other defendants will not be sustained. Gasharie and 
 Davis sue one hundred and seven defendants, partners trading 
 under the name of "Farmers' Home Store," and seek to recover 
 the amount of certain notes given by the firm for the price of 
 goods sold on credit, amounting to several thousand dollars. 
 The firm was an association having a president, directors, and 
 memljers. The business was conducted by a managing agent, 
 and overseen by the directors. One of the articles of associa- 
 tion forbade the purchase or sale of goods on credit. The notes 
 in suit were given by the managing agent for goods bought on 
 
 1 Dice V. Morris, 32 Ind. 283.
 
 CROSS-COMPLAINT. 945 
 
 credit. Twenty-eight of the defendants put in an answer by 
 way of a cross -coniphiint against the directors and managing" 
 agent, who were also defendants. Tliis pleading stated the 
 articles of association, alleged a violation of tlieni by the di- 
 rectors and managing agent in the said purchase upon credit, 
 and prayed that the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs might 
 be rendered against said directors and agent in the iirst in- 
 stance, and enforced out of their property. The plaintiffs, and 
 the directors and agent defendants, demurred to this cross- 
 complaint. The court held that it stated no defence to the 
 plaintiff's action, and presented no case for relief against the 
 directors and agent. While the code provides that " judgment 
 ma}"- be rendered for or against one or more of several plaintiffs, 
 or for or against one or more of several defendants, and it may, 
 when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate 
 rights of the parties on each side as between themselves," and 
 while the court has thus the power to settle disputes between the 
 defendants, it will not do so to the detriment of the plaintiff.^ 
 
 § 684. * 808. Code Provision in Indiana. Procedure. Iowa 
 and California. The Code of Indiana expressly authorizes the 
 court to determine the rights of the parties as between them- 
 selves on each side, when the justice of the case demands it. 
 The mode of procedure is not pointed out, and therefore the 
 general methods of chancery must be adopted, modified by the 
 spirit of the code. When a defendant seeks relief against a 
 defendant as to matters not appearing on the face of the original 
 complaint, he must file a cross-complaint setting up the matters 
 on which he relies, making as defendants thereto such of his 
 co-defendants and others as are proper; and process is necessary 
 to bring them in. It is plain that there must be notice and pro- 
 cess to the persons against whom relief is sought on the cross- 
 complaint.2 "The only real difference between a complaint and 
 a cross-complaint is, that the first is filed by the plaintiff, and 
 the second by the defendant. Both contain a statement of the 
 facts, and each demands affirmative relief upon the facts stated. 
 In the making up the issues and the trial of questions of fact, 
 the court is governed b}^ the same principles of law and rules of 
 
 1 Mauning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399. 2 Fletcher v. Holmes, 25 Ind. 458, 465, 
 
 See Indiana Code (2 G & H. 218), per Frazer C. J. ; Meredith i-. Lackey, 16 
 § 368. lud. 1. 
 
 60
 
 946 
 
 CIVIL KEMEDIES. 
 
 practice in the one case as in the other. When a defendant 
 liles a cross-coraphiint, and seeks affirmative relief, he becomes 
 a plaintiff, and the plaintiff in the original action becomes the 
 defendant in the cross-complaint." ^ The same rules as to set- 
 ting out written instruments and copies thereof apply to cross- 
 petitions which are prescribed in reference to original petitions.^ 
 Where, however, the cross-petition is based upon a writing 
 which it does not set out in full, but which is annexed to the 
 petition in the action, this is sufficient; the rule is practically 
 complied with.^ An answer being denominated a counter- 
 claim by the pleader, cannot in California be treated as a 
 cross-complaint.^ 
 
 1 Ewing V. Pattison, 35 Ind. 326, 330. 
 
 - QBallin v. Merchants' Exch. Bank 
 (1895), 89 Wis. 278, 61 N. W. 1118 ; Pine 
 Tree Lumber Co. v. McKinley (1901), 83 
 Minu. 419, 86 N. W. 414; Smith v. Allen 
 (1901), 63 Neb. 74, 88 N. W. 155; Lang- 
 ford V. Langford (1902), 136 Cal. 507, 69 
 Pac. 235 ; Hargreaves v. Tennis (1901), 63 
 Neb. 356, 88 N. W. 486 ; Mills v. Fletcher 
 (1893), 100 Cal. 142,34 Pac. 637 ; VVitten- 
 brock V. Parker (1894), 102 Cal. 93, 36 
 Pac. 374. 
 
 Leach v. Rains (1897), 149 Ind. 152, 48 
 N. E. 858 : " A cross-complaint, like an 
 original complaint, must state facts suffi- 
 cient to entitle the pleader to some affirm- 
 
 ative relief, and it cannot be aided by the 
 allegations of other pleadings in the ac- 
 tion." Schmidt f.Zahrndt (1897), 148 Ind. 
 447, 47 N. E. 335 : " A cross-complaint 
 must be sufficient within itself, without aid 
 from any otiier pleadings in the case. . . . 
 Yet for matters of mere description and 
 identification many of the allegations of 
 the complaint may be referred to." See 
 also Dudenhofer v. Johnson (1895), 144 
 Ind. 631, 43 N. E. 808; Island Coal Co. r. 
 Streitlemier (1894), 139 Ind. 83, 37 N. E. 
 340-3 
 
 3 Coe V. Lindley, 32 Iowa, 437, 444; 
 Ilyder v. Thomas, 32 Iowa, 56. 
 
 * McAbee y.^Randall, 41 Cal. 136.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 [the references are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 
 A. 
 
 ABATEMENT, 
 
 defences in, at common law and under reformed procedure, 573, 574. 
 
 difference between pleas in and those in bar under reformed procedure, 
 574. 
 
 defences in, are new matter, 574, 587. 
 
 joining of pleas in, with those in bar, 597« 
 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION, 
 
 defence of, new matter, 588, 
 ACCOUNT, 
 
 how to plead, page 668, n. 
 ACCOUNTING, 
 
 plaintiffs in actions for, 171-173. 
 defendants, 275. 
 
 parties in actions for, in trust estates, 173, 182, 253, n., 254, n., 255. 
 between partners, 262, 275. 
 
 how to plead, page 668, n. 
 ACCOUNT STATED, 
 
 how to plead, page 668, n. 
 ACT OF GOD, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 817, n, 
 ACTION FOR PRICE, 
 
 how to plead, page 668, n. 
 ACTION ON THE CASE, 
 
 nature of pleading in, 404. 
 
 ACTIONS, 
 
 general nature of the civil, 3. 
 
 distinction between legal and equitable, abolished by reformed pro- 
 cedure, 4, 10-13. 
 
 abrogation of common-law forms of, 4. 
 
 doctrine of parties, 50, 60, 61. 
 
 theory of pleading, 14, 15. 
 proceedings in civil, are ordinary and equitable, 4. 
 principles as to union of legal and equitable, adopted by the courts, 5-15, 
 
 two schools of judges, 6.
 
 948 I^■DEX. 
 
 [the eefeeences arb to th« sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 ACTIONS — continued. 
 
 restrictive construction by one school, 6, 7. 
 
 liberal and correct by the other, S-13. 
 
 distinction between legal and equitable rights or causes of action, 
 
 not abolished, 8. 
 distinction between legal and equitable reliefs, not abolished, 9. 
 distinction between abolished, and one action established for all 
 
 rights and reliefs, 10-13. 
 doctrine of unity in procedure applied to pleading, 14, 15. 
 imion of legal and equitable rights and remedies in civil, 16-25. 
 
 union of both legal and equitable causes of action, and granting of 
 
 both legal and equitable reliefs, 17, 18. 
 union of both causes of action and granting of legal relief only, 
 
 19, 20. 
 legal cause of action stated, and legal relief granted, where equitable 
 
 asked, 11, 21. 
 equitable cause of action stated, and equitable relief granted, where 
 
 legal asked, 11, 22 
 equitable or legal relief prayed for, but not granted, where corre- 
 sponding cause of action not pleaded, 23. 
 use of equitable right in support of a legal cause of action, 24. 
 mode of trial of legal and equitable issues when united, 25. 
 equitable defences to legal, 26-35. See Dkfexces. 
 legal remedy on equitable ownership or right, 36-44. 
 
 action by equitable owner of land for possession, 36-41. 
 by one partner against another for a share of firm property, 42. 
 special ; partition, trover, 43. 
 nature of civil and essential differences between them, 45-49. 
 
 differences are not in forms of, but in the primary rights and reme- 
 dies. 4.5-47. 
 right of election between ex contractu and ex delicto, 48, 387. 
 impropriety of retaining former names of, 49. 
 by or against one as representative for all others interested, 285-298. See 
 
 Parties. 
 against persons severally liable on the same instrument, 299-307. See 
 Liabilities. 
 
 ADMINISTRATORS. See Executors and Administrators. 
 as parties, page 353, n. 
 
 ADMISSIONS IN PLEADINGS, 
 
 general rules respecting, page 736, n. 
 
 AGENCY, 
 
 how to plead, page 608, n. 
 
 AGENTS. See Principal and Agent. 
 AGREED PRICE, ACTION FOR, 
 
 how to plead, page 668, n. 
 ALLEGATIONS, 
 
 in foreclosure suits, 238. 
 
 in suits by or against one on behalf of all interested, 287, 288, 298. 
 
 where causes of action arise out of the same transaction, etc., .372.
 
 INDEX. 949 
 
 [the references are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 AhLEGATIO:SS — CO nthtued. 
 
 sufficiency or insufficiency of, cases illustrating, 427-430. 
 of.piomise, whether proper in actions on implied contracts, 431-435. 
 insufficient, imperfect, incomplete, or informal, how objected to, 442-444. 
 redundant, immaterial, and irrelevant, what are, and how objected to, 
 
 445, 440. 
 proofs must correspond with, 417-455. See Proofs. 
 of one part of pleading aiding those of another, 466, 586. 
 admitted by failure to deny, 469, 508. 
 
 immaterial, nature of, and effect of denial of the same, 469, 508. 
 qualified admission of, effect of, 469. 
 admission of, by one of several defendants, effect of, 409. 
 effect of admission of, in one part of answer on denial in another, 469, 
 
 600. 
 defective, supplied by answer, 470. 
 
 effect of general denial depends upon plaintiff's, 546, 547. 
 what, necessary in counter-claims in different cases, 673-675. 
 See Pleadings; Complaint; Answer. 
 
 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENT, 
 is a defence of new matter, page 817, n. 
 
 ALTERED CONTRACT, 
 
 how to plead, page G69, n. 
 
 ALTERED INSTRUxMENT, 
 how to plead, page 609, n. 
 
 ALTERNATIVE, 
 
 allegations in the, page 600, n. 
 
 AMENDMENTS, 
 
 of parties, 308-325. See Parties. 
 of pleadings, 456, 457. , 
 
 provisions of codes relating to, 329, 481. 
 
 ANSWER, 
 
 affirmative equitable relief in legal action on mere, 35. 
 nonjoinder or defect of plaintiffs, when raised by, 123, 124. 
 
 misjoinder when raised by, 128-133. 
 nonjoinder or defect of defendants, when raised by, 188, 189. 
 
 misjoinder, when raised by, 191, 193. 
 misjoinder of causes of action, when objected to by, 337, 342, 343. 
 principles of reformed pleading apply to, containing affirmative matter, 
 
 410, 563-565. 
 allegations not controverted by, admitted, 469, 508. 
 qualified admissions by, effect of, 469. 
 admissions by one of several defendants, effect of, 469. 
 effect of admissions in one part of, on denial in another, 469, 600. 
 defective complaints aided by, 470. 
 rules and doctrines concerning, 471-684. 
 provisions of codes relating to, 472-482. 
 
 in general, 472. 
 
 union of defences, 473. 
 
 counter-claims and set-offs, 474, 475.
 
 950 INDEX. 
 
 [the references are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 AXSWEll — continued. 
 
 cross-complaints, 476. 
 
 sham and irrelevant, stricken ont on motion, 476. 
 pleadings responsive to; demurrer, reply, 477-479. 
 special [jrovisions in certain codes, 480. 
 amendments, 481. 
 general requisites of, and rules applicable to all, 483-500. 
 cla.s3es of; denials, new matter, 484. 
 questions of form, and those of substance, 485-496. 
 when the different questions arise, 485, 486. 
 how taken advantage of ; general and special demurrer, 487. 
 defective in form distinguished from those demurrable, 488, 489. 
 objections to form, how waived, 488, 491. 
 defective, cured by motion, 487, 490. 
 decisions illustrating, 490-496. 
 joint, by several defendants, 497. 
 partial defences, 498-500. 
 
 to be pleaded, 498, 569-572. 
 how pleaded, 499. .")00. 
 defence of denials, 501-561. See Denials. 
 defence of new matter, 562-590. See New Matter. 
 union of defences in the same, 591-601. See Defences. 
 counter-claims, set-offs, and cross-complaints, 002-684. See Counter- 
 claims, Set-offs, and Cross-Complaints. 
 AXTICIPATING DEFENCES, 
 
 rule as to, page 069, n. 
 ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, 
 
 how to plead, page 669, n. 
 ASSAULT AND BATTERY, 
 joinder of plaintiffs, 148. 
 
 plaintiffs in suits for, to wife, 153, 154, 156, 157» 159. 
 joinder of defendants in actions for, 208. 
 defendants in suits against wife for, 221. 
 
 ASSIGNMENT, 
 
 of things in action at common law, 62. 
 not affected by code provisions, 63. 
 of things in action, effect of, upon defences thereto, 82-98. 
 provisions of codes relating to, 82. 
 defences to, are not counter-claims, 83, 95, 628. 
 former rules re-enacted by the codes, 84. 
 rule as to defences in favor of tlie debtor, 85. 
 equities between successive assignors and assignees, 86-89. 
 cases illustrating, 87-89. 
 doctrine of estoppel against assignor, 88, 89. 
 summary of the discussion, 90. 
 
 demands against assignor, set-off in action by assignee, 91-97. 
 other defences not .set-offs, 98. 
 plaintifts in suits to set aside, for benefit of creditors, 182. 
 how to plead, page 070, n. 
 
 See Assignors and Assignees.
 
 INDEX. 951 
 
 [the references are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 
 ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CllEDlTOliS, 
 how to plead, page 670, n. 
 
 ASSIGNORS AND ASSIGNEES, 
 
 assignees of things in action to sue in their own names, 63-75, 165. 
 when the assignment is absolute, 61. 
 
 when equitable, 05, 73, 149. 
 when of negotiable paper, 66, 69, 78. 
 when conditional or partial, 70, 75. 
 illustrations, 71, 72. 
 assignor to be joined in certain States, 73, 165, 217, 236, 261. 
 when the assignment is made pending action, 74. 
 equities between successive, 86-89. 
 cases illustrating, 87-89. 
 doctrine of estoppel against assignor, 88, 89. 
 demands against assignor set off in action by assignee, 91-97. 
 
 but are not counter-claims, S3, 95, 628. 
 defences other than set-off, when available against assignee, 98. 
 parties in suits by assignees of creditors and in bankruptcy, 175, 253, n. 
 against assignees of creditors, 182, 254, 255, 291. 
 against assignees in bankruptcy, 253, n. 
 assignees of judgment debtors, defendants in creditors' suits, 245, 246. 
 defendants in suits against corporations by assignees of stock, 261. 
 assignors not necessary defendants in suits by asi^ignees to foreclose 
 
 securities, 280. 
 assignees of mortgages defendants in suits to redeem, 284. 
 See Assignments. 
 ASSUMPSIT, 
 
 action of, origin and appropriate use, 406. 
 
 use of forms of pleading in, 15, 436-438. 
 
 right to waive tort and bring, 48, 387, 458-464. See ToRTS. 
 
 impropriety of present use of word, 49. 
 
 nature of pleading in, at common law, 404. 
 
 ASSUMPTION OF RISK, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 817, n. 
 ATTORNEY, QUALIFICATION OF, 
 how to plead, page 670, n. 
 
 AWARD, 
 
 defence of arbitration and, new matter, 578. 
 
 B. 
 
 BANKRUPTCY, 
 
 parties in suits by or against assignees in, 175, 253, n. 
 defence of discharge in, new matter, 588. 
 
 BAR, 
 
 extent of pleas in, at common law, and change made by codes, 498, 569, 
 
 570. 
 difference between pleas in, and those in abatement under the codes, 574. 
 joining of pleas in abatement with those in, 597.
 
 952 INDEX. 
 
 [the references are to the sections except when otherwise INDICATED.3 
 
 BILLS OF EXCHANGE. See Negotiable Paper. 
 
 BONA FIDES, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 817, n. 
 
 BOND, 
 
 how to plead, page 670, n. 
 
 BREACH OF COVENANTS, 
 how to plead, page 670, n. 
 
 BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY, 
 
 how to plead, page 670, n. 
 
 BREACH OF WARRANTY, 
 
 how to plead, page 670, n. 
 
 c. 
 
 CANCELLATION, 
 
 defendants in action for, 276-278. 
 
 CAPACITY, 
 
 how to allege, page 670, n. 
 
 CAPACITY TO SUE, 
 
 meaning of want of, 124 
 
 CAUSES OF ACTION, 
 
 no change made by reformed procedure in, 8. 
 
 union of both legal and equitable, and granting of both legal and equitable 
 reliefs, 17, 18. 
 granting of legal relief only, 19, 20. 
 legal stated, and legal reliefs granted, where equitable asked, 11, 21. 
 equitable stated, and equitable reliefs granted, where legal asked, 11, 22. 
 equitable or legal reliefs prayed for, but not granted where coiTespond, 
 
 not pleaded, 23. 
 use of equitable rights in support of legal, 24. 
 mode of trial when legal and equitable are united, 25. 
 joinder of, 3:51, 309. 
 
 provisions of the codes, 332-334. 
 
 misjoinder of, bow may occur and be objected to, 336-345. 
 to be separately stated, 336. 
 how objected to; demurrer, answer, waiver, 337. 
 effect of sustaining objection, 337-339. 
 forms of misjoinder of, 340. 
 proper, mingled in one count, 341. 
 separately stated, but improperly joined, 342, 343. 
 improper, mingled in one count, 344, 345. 
 meaning of "cause of action,"' 340-348, 412-414, page 461, n. 
 not defined by the courts, 346. 
 elements which form, 347, 348, 412-414. 
 
 distinctions between, and "object of action," and remedial 
 right, 347, 348. 
 test to determine number of, 349-351, page 467, n. 
 splitting, page 470, n.
 
 INDEX. 953 
 
 [the BEFERENCES ABE TO THE SECTIONS EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWIBB INDICATED.] 
 
 CAUSES OF ACnO'S — contiyiued. 
 
 cases where but one, stated, but several reliefs demanded, 352-356, 
 
 page 470, n. 
 ■when arising out of tlie same transaction, or transactions connected 
 with the subject of action, 357-372. 
 nature of cases described by this clause, 357, 358. 
 judicial interpretation of clause, 359-365. 
 meaning of " transaction," 366-368. 
 meaning of " subject of action," 369. 
 examples, 370, 371. 
 necessary allegations by plaintiff, 372. 
 •when joined must affect all parties, 373-384. 
 need not affect all alike, 374. 
 examples of misjoinder, 375-378. 
 must affect all plaintiffs as well as defendants, 377. 
 examples of proper joinder, 379. 
 multifariousness, doctrine of, discussed, 380. 
 Mr. Calvert's positions examined, 381-384. 
 ■when against a single defendant, or against all defendants alike, 
 385-395. 
 in actions on contract, 386, 387. 
 election between tort and contract, 387. 
 in actions relating to lands, 388. 
 for injuries to property, 389. 
 for injuries to character, 390. 
 special cases, 391. 
 
 illustrations of law of Iowa and Indiana, 392. 
 examples of improper joinder, 394, 395. 
 must affect all parties in the same capacity, 396. 
 miscellaneous cases, 397-3.99. 
 distinction between legal and equitable, 415, 416. 
 nature of facts constituting, 417-419. 
 
 facts only, constituting, to be pleaded, 13, 347, 418, 424, 425. 
 material facts only, constituting, to be pleaded, 411, 420-422, 426. 
 ex contractu alleged, and ex delicto proved, 452-455. 
 separate, how stated in complaint, 466. 
 one, in two or more different counts, 467. 
 manner of demurring when several, 468, 497. 
 
 prayer for relief whether forms a part of, and effect on, 11, 21, 22, 471. 
 counter-claims must be, 614. 
 
 CESTUI QUE TRUST. See Trustee. 
 CHAMPERTY, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 817, n. 
 CHATTELS, 
 
 action analogous to trover by equitable owner of, 43. 
 plaintiffs in actions concerning, 138-143. 
 of wife, plaintiffs in actions concerning, 151-154. 
 parties in equitable suits concerning, by holders of joint rights, 169. 
 defendants in actions concerning, 198, 199, 210, 211. 
 in actions concerning wife's, 220, 222, 223.
 
 954 INDEX. 
 
 [thb kepb&bnces are to thb sections except when otebbwue indicated.] 
 CHATTELS — continued. 
 
 joinder of causes of action relating to, 389, 397. 
 
 defences admissible under general denial in actions for goods sold, 552, 
 585. 
 in actions for conversion of, 55;3, 580, 581. 
 in actions to recover possession of, 5;38, 554. 
 defences when new matter in actions to recover possession of, 554, 579. 
 counter-claims in actions to recover possession of, 643, 667. 
 in actions for goods sold, 655. 
 
 COLLATERAL SECURITY, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 817, n. 
 
 COMMITTEES, 
 
 of lunatics, etc., suits by, in their own names, 110. 
 defendants in suits against, 253, n. 
 
 COMMON COUNTS. See Pleadings. 
 
 COMMON LAW, 
 
 pleadings under, 14. 
 
 COMPLAINT OR PETITION, 
 
 provisions of codes relating to, 326-330. 
 
 joinder of causes of action in, 3;Jl-399. See Causes of Action. 
 general principles of pleading, 400-464. See Pleading. 
 form of, 465^71. 
 
 separate causes of action, how stated in, 466. 
 
 one cause of action in two or more counts, 467. 
 
 demurrer, joint or separate, where several causes of action, or several 
 defendants, 468. 
 
 ■what allegations of, admitted by failure to deny, 469. 
 
 qualified admission of, allegations of, 469. 
 
 defective allegations of, supplied by answer, 470. 
 
 prayer for relief, 471. 
 
 COMPROMISE, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 817, n. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. See Law. 
 
 CONDITION IN CONTRACT, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 817, n. 
 
 CONDITIONS PRECEDENT, 
 
 how to plead, page 071, n. 
 
 CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT, 
 
 necessity for negativing, page 672, n. 
 
 CONSENT AND CONNIVANCP; 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 817, n. 
 CONSIDERATION, 
 
 necessity of pleading, page 672, n. 
 CONSTRUCTION OF PLEADINGS, 
 
 rules as to, page 592, n. 
 CONTRACT LIMITING LIABILITY, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 817, n.
 
 INDEX. 955 
 
 [the eeperences are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 
 CONTRACTS, 
 
 equitable defences to action.s on, ol. 
 
 actions by those for whose benefit, are made with others, 77. 
 
 actions by those with whom, or in whose names, are made for otiiers, 78, 
 
 103-105. 
 actions by holders of joint rights arising from, 14;i-145. 
 actions by holders of several rights arising from, 146. 
 actions at common law against persons jointly liable on, 144. 
 
 under the reformed procedure, 146-205. 
 actions against persons jointly and severally liable on, 206. 
 actions against persons severally liable on, 207. 
 wife's, defendants in suits on, 21.9, 220, 223. 
 joinder of causes of action arising from, 385-387. 
 
 ari.sing from torts with those arising from, 392, 394, 395. 
 allegation of promise on implied, improper, 431-435. 
 use of common counts in actions on, 436-438. 
 cause of action arising from, alleged, and tort proved, 452-455. 
 election to waive tort and sue on, 48, 387, 458-464. See Touts. 
 what defences to be specially pleaded in actions on, 583-586. 
 counter-claims where there is an election between tort and, 646, 648, 
 
 656, n„ 664, 677. 
 counter-claims arising from, set forth by plaintiff, 653-656, 659. 
 counter-claims where plaintiff's claim is on, and defendant's for tort, aris- 
 ing from the same, 660-663. 
 where plaintiff's claim is for tort, and defendant's on, 664, 665. 
 counter-claims arising from other, in suits on, 671-679. See Specific 
 
 Performance. 
 
 CONTRIBUTION, 
 
 defendants in actions for, 253, n., 282. 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, 
 
 necessity and manner of negativing, page 673, n. 
 is a defence of new matter, page 817, n. 
 
 CONVERSION, 
 
 how to allege, page 673, n. 
 
 CORPORATE EXISTENCE, 
 
 necessity of alleging, page 674, n. 
 
 CORPORATION BY-LAW, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, n. 
 CORPORATIONS, 
 
 doctrine of set-off in case of insolvent, 96. 
 suits by certain municipal, 107. 
 
 against, 217. 
 demurrer on ground of legal capacity of, to sue, 125, n. 
 parties in actions against stockholders of, 146, 184, 218, 259. 
 
 in actions by stockholders, 258, 260. 
 suits by and against quasi, and certain other, 107, 217. 
 defendants in suits to wind up, 257, 258. 
 
 in suits against, by assignees of stock, 281. 
 denying existence of, 559.
 
 956 INDEX. 
 
 [the references are to the sectioks except when otherwise indicated.] 
 
 COUNTER-CLAIMS, 
 
 amount as affecting jurisdiction, j)age 8G7, n. 
 dismissal of action as affecting, paye 867, n. 
 
 defence to actions by assignees of things in action not, 83, 95, 628. 
 in what States replies are necessary to, 478, 479. 
 classes of, 602, 603. 
 
 provisions of codes relating to, 474, 47"i, 602. 
 cross-demands by the former system, 604-608. 
 set-off, 605, 606. 
 recoupment, 607, 608. 
 
 reduction of damages in quantum meruit and quantum valebant, 609. 
 general description, nature, objects, and uses of, (510-624. 
 embraces set-off and recoupment, 610-612, 619, n. 
 other demands embraced, 613, 619, n., 622. 
 must be a cause of action, G14, 629. 
 whether valid claims by plaintiff are implied by, 615. 
 must be in favor of defendant, 616, 62r>-627. 
 must exist against plaintiff, 617, 628-630. 
 subject-matter of, 618. 
 judicial constructions of, 619-623. 
 
 must defeat or interfere with plaintiff's recovery, 620, 621, 623. 
 how pleaded, 410, 565, 614, 624. 
 parties iu their relations with, 625-638. 
 the defendant, 616, 625-027. 
 the plaintiff, 617, 628-630. 
 
 when in favor of, or against, one or more of several defendants or 
 plaintiffs, 631-638. 
 against one, or some, of plaintiffs, 632, 633. 
 in favor of one, or some, of defendants, 634-636. 
 summary, 637. 
 
 want of necessary parties, 638. 
 subject-matter of, or nature of causes of action which may be, 639-679. 
 may be equitable causes of action, 35, 013, 622, 640-643, 668. 
 in actions to recover possession of chattels, 613, 067. 
 under the first branch of the definition of, 644-670. 
 
 interpretation of this clause, "transaction," and "connected 
 
 with the subject of action," 613, 618, 645-652. 
 where there is an election between tort and contract, .646, 648, 
 6.56, n., 664. 
 
 (1) arising from the contract set forth by plaintiff, 653-656. 
 
 (2) arising from the same transaction, 657-668. 
 
 in legal actions where both parties demand a money 
 
 judgment, 659-660. 
 where both are on contract, 659. 
 
 where plaintiff's claim is on contract, and defendants 
 for tort, 660-063. 
 for trespasses, nuisances, or negligences, 661, 662. 
 for fraud, 063. 
 where plaintiff's claim is for tort, and defendant's on 
 
 contract, 004. 665. 
 where both claims are for torts, 606.
 
 INDEX. 957 
 
 [the references are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 COUNTER-CLAIMS — continued. 
 
 in legal actions for the possession of lands or chattels, 
 
 643, 667. 
 ill equitable suits, 668. 
 (.3) connected with the subject of the action, 669, 670. 
 under the second branch of the definition, and set-offs, 671-679. 
 subject-matter of, 67ii. 
 
 when the right of action must accrue to defendant, 673. 
 allegations necessary in different cases, 673-675. 
 what causes of action are subject for, 665-679. 
 
 where there is an election between tort and contract, 677. 
 in equitable suits, 678, 679. 
 whether defendants are obliged to plead, 680. 
 form of verdict and judgment in, 681, 
 
 COUNTS, 
 
 use of the word, at common law and under reformed procedure, 336. 
 use of the common, under the reformed procedure, 436-438. 
 
 in actions on express contracts, 437. 
 
 criticism of the rules, 438. 
 one cause of action in two or more different, 467. 
 
 COVENANT, 
 
 nature of pleading in, 404. 
 
 CREDITORS AND DEBTORS, 
 
 suits by partnership creditors against purchasers agreeing to pay firm 
 
 •debts, 77. 
 assignment of things in action subject to defences of debtor, 85, 91-97. 
 joinder of creditors as plaintiifs, 143-146. 
 survivorship among joint creditors, 143. 
 
 parties in actions by creditors of corporations, 146, 184, 218, 259. 
 joinder of creditors in suits by or against assignees for creditors or In 
 
 bankruptcy, 175, 182, 253, n., 254,255, 291. 
 creditors' actions, plaintiffs in, 180-182. 
 
 defendants in, 243-247. 
 joinder of debtors as defendants, 200-207. 
 survivorship among joint debtors, 203-205. 
 satisfaction and discharge in case of joint debtors, 215. 
 parties in actions by creditors of estates, 166, 216, 251. 
 creditors when defendants in foreclosure suits, 233, n., 235, 239. 
 
 in action for partition, 250, 272, 274. 
 
 See Rights; Liabilities. 
 
 CROSS-COMPLAINTS, 
 
 affirmative equitable relief in legal action obtained by, 35. 
 provisions of codes relating to, 476. 
 general nature of, 682-684. 
 
 CROSS-DEMANDS. See Counter-Claims. 
 CUSTOM, 
 
 necessity for pleading, page 674, n.
 
 958 INDEX. 
 
 [the refebei^ces are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 
 D. 
 
 DAMAGES, 
 
 in joint torts, 215. 
 
 where parties are jointly and severally liable, 215, n. 
 
 how stated in complaint, where two or more causes of action, 466. 
 
 whether payment can be proved in mitigation of, 535. 
 
 defences in mitigation of, how pleaded, 569-572. 
 
 defence of recoupment of, new matter, 581. 
 
 recoupment of, under former procedure, 607, 608. 
 
 reduction of, in quanlum meruit and quantum valebant MnAerrei. proc, 609. 
 
 demands for liquidated and unliquidated, embraced in counter-claims, 
 
 613, 654, 055, 674. 
 damages sustained by defendant, is a defence of new matter, page 818, n. 
 general and special allegations, page 674, n. 
 
 DEBT, 
 
 nature of pleading in, 404. 
 
 DEBT DUE, 
 
 averment of, in action to foreclose, page 675, n. 
 
 DEBTORS. See Creditors and Debtors. 
 
 DEFECT IN REGISTRATION, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, n. 
 
 DEFECT OF PARTIES, 
 
 reached by demurrer, 124. 
 
 DEFENCES, 
 
 meaning of, 27-2.9. 
 
 equitable, to legal actions, 26-35. 
 
 former mode of defeating a legal action by an equitable right, 26. 
 
 nature of equitable, 27, 28. 
 
 whether it requires aflBrmative relief, or a right to it, on the part of 
 the defendant, 29, 30. 
 
 in actions on contract, 31, 34. 
 
 in actions to recover land, 32, 33. 
 
 in special cases, 34. 
 
 how pleaded, 33. 
 
 joinder of, with other, 34. 
 
 when affirmative relief will be granted to defendant, 35. 
 effect upon, by assignmetit of things in action, 82-98. See Assignment. 
 separate, by wife when sued with husband, 225. 
 joint or separate demurrer where several, 468, 497. 
 sham and irrelevant, stricken out on motion, 476. 
 new matter of codes when, 484. 
 partial, to be pleaded, 498. 560-572. 
 
 how pleaded, 499-500. 
 of denials, 501-561. See Denials. 
 of new matter, 562-590. See New Matter. 
 union of, in the same answer, .591-601. 
 
 provisions of codes relating to, 473, 591.
 
 INDEX. 959 
 
 [the beferekces ake to the sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 DEFENCES — continued. 
 
 how the separate, to be stated, 592-596. 
 must be complete, 592. 
 
 separate spcfific denials, how alleged, 593-596. 
 kinds of, that may be joined ; those in abatement and those in bar. 
 
 597. 
 inconsistent, 598-601. 
 
 DEFENDANTS, 
 
 who may be joined as, 185-284. 
 
 code provisions, 185. 
 principles of the reformed procedure concerning, 187. 
 manner of raising questions as to proper, 188-194. 
 nonjoinder, or defect of, 188, 180. 
 misjoinder of, 190, 194. 
 where all are improperly sued, 190. 
 where some are improperly sued, 191-193. 
 in legal actions, 195-218. 
 
 owners or occupants of lands, 195-197. 
 owners or possessors of chattels, 198, 199. 
 persons jointly liable on contracts, 200-205. 
 
 survivorship, 203-205. 
 persons jointly and severally liable on contracts, 206. 
 persons severally liable on contracts, 207. 
 persons liable for torts, 208-215. 
 settlement of decedents' estates, 216, 248-252. 
 in special cases, 217, 218. 
 in actions against husband and wife, or either of them, 219-225. 
 general nature of the legislation as to, 219. 
 against wife concerning her separate property, 220, 222. 
 for torts of wife, 221, 222. 
 
 personal liability of wife on contracts, 220, 223. 
 concerning homesteads, 224. 
 
 separate defences by wife when sued with husband, 225. 
 in equitable actions, 226-284. 
 
 general principles ; necessary and proper parties, 226-229. 
 foreclosure of mortgages, 230-242. 
 
 general doctrine, 230-232. 
 
 mortgagors and their grantees, 233, 234. 
 
 creditors, 233, n., 235, 239. 
 
 heirs and representatives, 233, n., 234, 275. 
 
 assignor.s, 217, n., 233, n., 236. 
 
 where several notes are given, 237. 
 
 occupants of the land, 238. 
 
 persons remotely interested in result, 238. 
 
 subsequent and prior encumbrancers, 233, n., 239. 
 
 wife of mortgagor, and of subsequent owners, 233, n., 240, 
 241. 
 
 case of homesteads, 242. 
 
 speci.al cases, 242. 
 in creditors' actions, 243-247.
 
 960 INDEX. 
 
 [tSB REFSRBNCeS ARE TO THE SECTIONS EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE INDICATED.] 
 
 DEFENDANTS — cimunucd. 
 
 nature of creditors' actions, 243. 
 judgment debtor or his representatives, 244, 247. 
 his assignees, 245, 246. 
 his trustees, 247. 
 in actions concerning decedents' estates, 216, 248-252. 
 
 personal representatives and heirs when necessary, 249, 
 
 2.50. 
 legatees, distributees, or beneficiaries, when not proper, 216, 
 251. 
 when necessary, 175, 216, 252. 
 in actions involving trusts, 253-256. 
 trustees necessary', 253. 
 when beneticiaries necessary, 254, 255. 
 in enforcement of implied trusts, 256. 
 in actions against corporations and stockholders, 257-261. 
 to wind up corporations, 257, 258. 
 by creditors against stockholders personally liable, 146, 184, 
 
 218, 259. 
 by stockholders against corporations, 260. 
 by assignees of stock. 261. 
 in actions for specific performance, 263-265. 
 in actions to quiet title, 266-269. 
 
 all adverse claimants to be joined, 266-269. 
 where mistakes in deeds, etc., are to be corrected, 268. 
 in actions for partition, 270-274. 
 
 general rules of equity concerning, 270, 271. 
 creditors and lieu-holders when to be, 270-272. 
 wife of tenant in common, 273, 274. 
 personal representatives when to be, 273. 
 in actions concerning partnership matters and for an accounting, 
 
 262, 275. 
 in actions for rescission or cancellation, 276, 278. 
 in actions for enforcement of liens, 279-281. ' 
 
 mechanics' liens. 279. 
 pledges of securities, 280. 
 in actions for contribution, 282. 
 in actions by tax-payers, 283. 
 in actions to redeem, 284. 
 in actions by or against one person in behalf of all interested, 285-298. 
 
 See Actions. 
 persons severally liable upon the same instrument aa, 299-307. See Lia- 
 bilities. 
 proper joinder of, connected with proper joinder of causes of action, 373- 
 
 384. See Causks of Action. 
 •when all causes of action are against a single, or against all alike, 385- 
 
 399. See Causes of Actio.n. 
 manner of answering or demurring when several, 468, 497. 
 effect of admi.ssions by one of several, on others, 469. 
 defences relating to joinder or capacity of, new matter, 587. 
 in their relations wi'.ii c(junter-clairas, 62.5-038. See Couxter-Ci.ai.ms.
 
 INDEX. 961 
 
 [the references arb to the sections except when otherwise iwdicatbd.] 
 DEFENDANTS — continued. 
 
 whetlier, must plead counter-claims, GSO. 
 
 pleadings on the part of. See Answkr; De.mals; New Matter ; 
 Countek-Claims ; Cross-Complaints. 
 
 DELIVERY, 
 
 how to plead, page 676, n. 
 
 DEMAND, 
 
 necessity of alleging, page 676, n. 
 
 DEMURRERS, 
 
 general rules as to, page 608, n., page 708, n. 
 
 nonjoinder or defect of parties plaintiff as gi-ound of, 123, 124. 
 
 for want of legal capacity to sue, 125. 
 
 misjoinder of plaintiffs, whether a ground of, 126-133. 
 
 nonjoinder or defect of parties defendant, as ground of, 188, 189. 
 
 misjoinder of defendants as ground of, 190-194. 
 
 to complaint, provisions of codes relating to, 327. 
 
 when proper in misjoinder of causes of action, 337. 
 
 effect of sustaining, for misjoinder of causes of action, 337-339. 
 
 proper causes of action mingled in one count, as ground of, 341. 
 
 to causes of action separately stated, but improjjerly joined, 342, 343. 
 
 to improper causes of action mingled in one count, 314, 345. 
 
 to insufficient, imperfect, incomplete, and informal allegations, 442-444. 
 
 to redundant, immaterial, and irrelevant allegations, 445, 446. 
 
 joint or separate, where several causes of action, defences, or defendants, 
 
 468, 497. 
 to answer, provisions of codes relating to, 477. 
 to answer, confined to new matter in, 486. 
 use of general, 487. 
 motion substituted for special, 487. 
 
 to special defences equivalent to general denials, 519, 522, 523. 
 statute of limitations, when to be raised by, 589, 590. 
 
 DENIALS, 
 
 of immaterial allegations, 469. 
 
 effect of admission in one part of answer on. in another, 469, 600. 
 questions that arise upon, are those of form, 485. 
 defence of, 501-561. 
 kinds of, .501, .502. 
 
 external forms of, general or specific, 504. 
 specific, nature and objects of, 50-5-507. 
 allegations admitted by failure to deny, 469, 508. 
 in form of a negative pregnant, .509-514. 
 negative pregnant defined, 509. 
 cases holding that no issues are formed by, 510-512. 
 contrary cases, 513, 514. 
 argumentative, and specific defences equivalent to general, 515-523. 
 argumentative, described, 515-518. 
 examples of argumentative, 519. 
 special defences equivalent to general, 520-523. 
 Indiana rule, 522, 523. 
 61
 
 962 INDEX. 
 
 [the befebekces are to the sections except when othebwise indicated.] 
 
 DENIALS — continued. 
 
 general, of all allegations not otherwise admitted or referred to, 
 
 524-527. 
 allegations of issuable facts and not conclusions of law to be denied, 
 528-5:50. 
 of knowledge or information, 531, 532. 
 issues raised by, and what proved under them, 53.3-558. 
 same rules applicable to specific as to general, 533. 
 general, compared with general issues at common law, 534. 
 nature and office of, and issues formed by general, 535-545. 
 cases describing general, 535-541. 
 what plaintiff must, and defendant permitted to, prove 
 
 under general, 542. 
 material, issuable facts put in issue by general, 54-3-545. 
 general nature of evidence and defences provable under general, 
 546-549. 
 effect of general, depends upon allegations of plaintiff, 546 
 
 547. 
 ■what cannot be proved under, .548, 549. 
 some particular defences admissible under general, 550-558. 
 in actions for services, 550. 
 for injurie.s througli negligence. 551. 
 on notes, and for goods sold, 552. 
 for conversion of chattels, 553, 580. 
 in actions to recover possession of chattels, 538, 554. 
 in actions to recover possession of land, 555. 
 for malicious injuries, 556. 
 in certain equitable actions, 557. 
 other miscellaneous actions. 558. 
 Bome special statutory rules, 559, 5Go. 
 denying corporate existence, 559. 
 denying partnership existence in Wisconsin, 559. 
 in actions on written instrument.-^. 560. 
 general, cannot be treated as sham. 561. 
 distinction between, and new matter, 567, 568. 
 separate specific, how alleged, 593-596. 
 
 DESCRIPTION, 
 
 rules as to, in pleading, page 676, n. 
 DETINUE, 
 
 joinder of defendants in action of, 211. 
 nature of pleading in, 404. 
 
 DEVISEES AND LEGATEES, 
 
 personal representatives necessary parties in suits by, 166, 175. 
 
 are not parties in suits by personal representatives, 175. 
 
 parties in suits by residuary, or where legacy is charged on land, 175, 
 
 216, 2.52. 
 parties in suits by legatees for accounting, 172, 173. 
 to be parties in suits to set aside will.s, 178, 2.52. 
 are not parties in suits by creditors of estate, 216, 251. 
 legatees when to sue for debts due the estate, 216.
 
 INDEX. 963 
 
 [the references are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 
 DOING EQUITY, 
 
 necessity of allegation, page 676, n. 
 
 DOUBLE AGENCY, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, n. 
 
 DURESS, 
 
 how pleaded as a defence, r,64. 
 
 DUTY, 
 
 necessity of alleging, page G7G, u. 
 
 E. 
 EJECTMENT, 
 
 equitable defences to, 32, 33. 
 
 not maintainable at common law by equitable owner or holder, 36. 
 
 whether maintainable under the reformed pmceihire, 37-41. 
 impropriety of present use of word, 49. 
 by owners in common and joint owners, at common hiw, lo."). 
 
 under the reformed procedure. 135-187. 
 under reformed procedure resembles ancient real actions, 195. 
 defendants in, 195-197. 
 
 joinder of other causes of action with, 388, 389, 397, 398. 
 nature of pleading in, at common law, 404. 
 defences admissible under general denial in, 555. 
 what defences in, to be specially pleaded, 582. 
 equitable defences to, to be specially pleaded, 555, 582. 
 
 ELECTION, 
 
 to waive tort and sue on contract, 48. See Tort. 
 
 ELECTION CONTEST, 
 
 necessary allegations, page 676, n. 
 
 EQUITABLE ACTIONS, 
 
 distinction between legal and, abolished, 4, 10-13. 
 
 principles as to union of legal and, adopted by the courts, 5-15. See 
 
 Actions. 
 plaintiffs in, 161-184. See Plaintiffs. 
 defendants in, 226-284. See Df.fendants. 
 against personal representatives of joint debtors, 203-205. 
 provisions concerning suits by or against one on behalf of others apply 
 
 to both legal and, 290. 
 counter-claims, when permissible in, 637, 668, 678, 679. 
 
 EQUITABLE ASSIGNEES, 
 
 to be plaintiffs, 65, 73, 78, 149. 
 
 EQUITABLE CAUSES OF ACTION, 
 
 distinction between legal and, 415, 416. 
 
 EQUITABLE DEFENCES, 
 
 to legal actions, 26-35. See Defences. 
 
 to be specially pleaded in ejectment, 555, 582.
 
 964 INDEX. 
 
 [the bbfbsences are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 
 EQUITABLE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, 
 
 union of legal and. in tlie civil action, 16-25. See Actu)N's. 
 
 legal remedy on equitable ownership or right. 36-41. See Actions. 
 
 equitable demands as subjects for counter-claims, 613, 622, 64U-643, 668. 
 
 EQUITY, 
 
 doctrines of, applied to parties to the civil action, 50, 61, 113-117, 187. 
 
 to plaintiffs, 113-117. 
 
 to defendants, 187. 
 doctrine of latent equities, 86. 
 
 equities between successive assignors and assignees, 86-89. 
 doctrines of, adopted in actions concerning wife, 1.52. 
 rules of, concerning actions to quiet title, 266. 
 
 partition, 270, 271. 
 
 as to parties in actions by or against one on behalf of others, 289, 
 297, n. 
 pleadings in, 401. 
 
 ESTATES OF DECEDENTS, 
 
 defendants in actions concerning, 216. 
 in equitable actions, 248-252. 
 
 ESTOPPEL, 
 
 against assignor of things in action, 88, 89. 
 defence of, new matter, 588. 
 how to plead, page 676, n. 
 
 EVIDENCE, 
 
 not to be alleged in pleading, 411, 420-422. 
 , matters of, not admitted by failure to deny, 469, 508, 544. 
 admissible under the general denial, 542, 546-549. 
 
 determined by allegations of complaint, 546, 547. 
 
 what admissible, 548, 549. 
 
 EXCEPTION IN CONTRACT, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 817, n. 
 
 EXCEPTIONS IN STATUTES, 
 
 how to plead, page 677, n. 
 
 EXCEPTIONS TO RULE OF LAW, 
 pleading, page 677, n. 
 
 EX CONTRACTU ACTIONS, 
 
 causes of action ex contractu alleged, and ex delicto proved, 452-455. 
 election to use, 48, 387, 458-464. See Tokts. 
 
 counter-claims where election between ex delicto and, 646, 648, 656, n., 
 604, 077. 
 
 EX DELICTO ACTIONS. See Ex Contractu Actions. 
 
 EXECUTION, ISSUANCE AND RETURN OF, 
 pleading, page 677, n. 
 
 EXECUTION OF INSTRUMENT, 
 
 pleading, page 677, n.
 
 INDEX. 9G5 
 
 [the references ABE TO THE SECTIONS EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE INDICATED. ] 
 
 EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 
 
 set-off against, of claims due from decedents, 97. 
 
 suits by, in their own names, 109. 
 
 .suits by, under the reformed procedure, 143. 
 
 cannot sue for torts to hxnd after death of owner, 136. 
 
 are indispensable parties in administration suits, 160, 249, 250. 
 
 plaintiffs in suits against, for accounting, 172, 173. 
 
 persons interested in estate not parties in suits by, 175. 
 
 must all be parties in suits by, 175. 
 
 executors parties in §uits to set aside wills, 178. 
 
 suits against, under the reformed procedure, 203-205, 253. 
 
 suits by creditors to be onlj' against, 216, 251. 
 
 actions by legatees or distributees, for debts, when, incapacitated, 216. 
 
 when parties defendant in foreclosure suits, 233, n., 234, 235. 
 
 of judgment debtors, defendants in creditors' suits, 244. 
 
 of trustees, when co-defendants with surviving trustees, 253. 
 
 as parties, 256, n. 
 
 when parties in suits for specific performance, 107, 263, 264, 
 
 when defendants in actions for partition, 273. 
 
 of mortgagee, defendants in suits to redeem, 284. 
 
 joinder of causes of action by, or against, in representative and personal 
 
 capacity, 378, 396. 
 capacity to sue, not put in issue by general denial, 587. 
 counter-claims by, or against, 627, 630, 676. 
 EXHIBITS, 
 
 Function of, in pleading, page 543, n. 
 
 F. 
 FACTS, 
 
 what, and how pleaded in pleading by allegation, 400. 
 
 in equity, 401. 
 
 at common law, 402, 404-406. 
 
 under the reformed procedure, 411, 420-426, 528-530. 
 nature of, constituting cause of action, 417-419. 
 
 only, constituting cause of action to be pleaded, 13, 347, 418, 424, 425. 
 issuable, and not legal conclusions to be denied, 528, 530, 545. 
 material and issuable, only, put in issue by general denial, 543-545. 
 constituting new matter, how set forth, 563, 505. 
 what, and how stated, in counter-claims, 505, 614, 624. 
 FAILURE TO SAVE GOODS, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, n. 
 
 FALSE IMPRISONMENT, 
 
 right of action in cases of, several, 148. 
 plaintiffs in suits for, 157, 159. 
 
 FELLOW SERVANT, INJURY BY, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, n. 
 
 FICTIONS, 
 
 abolished, 328.
 
 966 INDEX. 
 
 [the BEFSSZSCE3 AEE TO THE SECTIONS EXCEPT WEZS OTHEBmSE ISBIC ATBD. ] 
 
 FIRE SET BY INSURED, 
 
 i.s a defence of new matter, page SIS. n. 
 
 FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER, 
 
 pleading iu actions of, page 677, n. 
 
 FORECLOSURE, 
 
 pleading in actions of, page 677, n. 
 
 FOREIGN LAWS, 
 
 how to plead, page 677, n. 
 
 FORFEITURE, 
 
 i3 a defence of new matter, page 81 S, n. 
 
 FRAUD, 
 
 how pleaded as a defence. 563. 
 
 counter-claim.s for. where plaintiff's demand is on contract, 663. 
 
 actions for, by husband and wife, 15.5. 
 
 how to plead, page 678, n. 
 
 G. 
 GENERAL DENIALS, 
 
 specific defences equivalent to, 520-.523. 
 
 of all allegations not otherwise admitted or referred to, 524-527. 
 
 issues raised by. and what proved under them, 533-558. See Denials. 
 
 cannot be treated as sham, 561. 
 
 defences in mitigation not to be proved under, 571, 572. 
 
 verification of, page 787, n. 1. 
 
 GENERAL ISSUES, 
 
 compared with general denials, 534. 
 
 GRANTORS AND GRANTEES, 
 
 when grantee cannot sue in his own name for breach of covenants, 75. 
 suits by mortgagees against grantees assuming mortgage debt, 77, 218. 
 suits by grantees in name of grantors, 81. 
 grantees of mortgagors as defendants in foreclosure suits, 233, 234, 242. 
 
 GUARANTORS, 
 
 whether, can be sued jointly with principal debtors, 306, 307. 
 
 GUARDIAN AND WARD, 
 
 suits by guardians of infants, lunatics, etc., in their own names. 110. 
 suits by guardians for seduction or injuries to wards, 5S, 150. 
 defendants in suits against guardians of lunatics, idiots, etc., 253, n. 
 
 GUARDIANS, 
 
 as parties, 256, n. 
 
 H. 
 
 HEIRS, 
 
 parties in suits to set aside, or enforce trusts of, wills, 178, 252. 
 
 when to be sued jointly for decedents' debts, 216. 
 
 when parties defendant in foreclosure suits. 233, n., 234. 
 
 of judgment debtors not defendants in creditors' suits, 244.
 
 INDEX. 967 
 
 [the references abb to the sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 necessaiy defendants in suits to reach lands of decedents, 252, 254. 
 when parties in suits for specific performance, 177, 263, 264. 
 
 HOMESTEADS, 
 
 wife a defendant in actions concerning, 224, 242. 
 
 HUSBAND AND WIFE, 
 
 actions by, concerning wife's property, person, or character, 151-160. 
 actions against, or wife alone, 219-225. 
 
 general nature of the legislation, 219. 
 
 against wife concerning her separate property, 220, 222. 
 
 for torts of wife, 221, 222. 
 
 personal liability of wife on contracts, 220, 228. 
 
 wife a defendant in actions concerning homesteads, 224, 242. 
 
 separate defences by wife when sued with husband, 225. 
 husband, when defendant in foreclosure suits, 233, n., 239. 
 ■wife, when defendant in foreclosure suits, 233, n., 240. 241. 
 defendants in foreclosure of mortgage on homestead, 242. 
 wife of tenant in common, party in action for partition, 273, 274. 
 defence that party is a married woman, new matter, 587. 
 counter-claims in suits by married women, 630. 
 
 HYPOTHETICAL PLEADING, page 601, n. 
 
 I. 
 
 IDIOTS, 
 
 whether guardians of, can sue in their own names, 110. 
 are proper defendants in actions against guardians, 253, n. 
 
 IMMATERIAL ALLEGATIONS, page 612, n. 
 
 INCONSISTENT ALLEGATIONS, page 612 n. 
 
 INFANTS, 
 
 suits by guardians of, in their own names, 110. 
 
 INFORMATION AND BELIEF, 
 pleading on, page 601, n. 
 
 INJURY, 
 
 necessity of averring, page 678, n. 
 
 INJURY BY FELLOW SERVANT, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, n. 
 
 INJURY TO PERSON, 
 
 meaning of statutory term, page 679, n. 
 
 INNOCENT PURCHASER, 
 allegation of, page 679, n. 
 
 INSURANCE, 
 
 suits by third persons, to whom it is stipulated the loss shall be paid, 77. 
 
 INTEREST, 
 
 allegations respecting, page 679, n. 
 
 INTERVENTION, 
 
 assignor of part of a demand allowed to intervene, 75.
 
 968 INDEX. 
 
 [the refebences are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 INTERVENTION — continued. 
 
 provisions of the codes concerning, 310. 
 
 nature of provisions concerning, found in codes generally, 320-322. 
 when permitted, 321. 
 examples, 322. 
 Iowa and California system of, 323-325. 
 cases illustrating, 323. 
 cases in California, 324. n. 
 importance of the system, 325. 
 INVALIDITY OF ST.-VTUTE OR ORDINANCE, 
 
 allegation of, page 679, n. 
 IRRELEVANT ALLEGATIONS, page 612, n. 
 IRREPARABLE IN.IL'RY, 
 allegation of, page 680, n. 
 
 JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION, 331-399. See Causes of Action. 
 JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS, 18.3-281. See Defendants. 
 JOINDER OF PLAINTIFFS, 111-184. See Plaintiffs. 
 JOINT OWNERS OF CHATTELS, 
 
 legal actions by, 138-142. 
 JOINT OWNERS OF LAND, 
 
 legal actions by, 135-137. 
 JUDGMENTS, 
 
 for excess of claims of debtors against assignees, impossible, 83, 95, 628. 
 
 how far binding, and how taken advantage of in actions by or against 
 one on behalf of others, 29."}-297. 
 
 where persons severally liable on upon the same instruments are joined, 
 304. 
 
 defences of former, new matter, 578. 
 
 how to plead, page 680, n. 
 
 on counter-claims, 681. 
 JURISDICTION, 
 
 pleading facts showing, page 680, n. 
 
 want of, is defence of new matter, page 819, n. 
 JUSTIFICATION, 
 
 defence of, how pleaded, 564, 580, 581. 
 
 L. 
 
 LACHES, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, n. 
 
 LAND.S, 
 
 equitable defences in actions to recover, 32, 33. 
 
 whether eciuitable owner can maintain action for possession of, 36-41. 
 
 plaintiffs in suits concerning, by owners of, 135-137.
 
 INDEX. 969 
 
 [the eeferences are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 LANDS — continued. 
 
 plaintiffs in suits concerning wife's, 151-lCO. 
 owners of, out of possession, suits by, for injuries to, 149. 
 jiarties in equitable suits concerning, by holders of joint rights; parti- 
 tion, boundaries, etc., 168. 
 holders of Intiire estates in, to be parties in equitable suits concerning, 
 
 170. 
 joinder of owners of sepaiate interests in, in equitable suits concerning, 183. 
 defendants in actions, other than for torts, against owners or occupants 
 of, 195-197. 
 for joint torts to, 213. 
 defendants in suits concerning wife's, '220, 222. 
 joinder of causes of action relating to, 388, 389, 397-399. 
 defences admissible under general denial in actions to recover, 555. 
 what defences to be pleaded as new matter, 582. 
 LAW, 
 
 conclusions of, pleaded at common law, 402, 404. 
 
 not to be pleaded under the codes, 411, 423-425. See Legal Con- 
 
 CLUSIO.N'S. 
 
 cases illustrating, 424, 42.'). 
 
 may be pleaded when common counts are used, 436-438. 
 not to be denied in pleadings, 528-530, 545. 
 
 LEGAL ACTIONS, 
 
 distinction between equitable and, abolished, 4, 10-13. 
 
 principles as to union of equitable and, adopted by the courts, 5-15. See 
 
 ACTIOXS. 
 
 equitable defences to, 26-35. See Defkxces. 
 plaintiffs in, 13.5-150. See Pl.\intiffs. 
 defendants in, 19.5-218. See Defendants. 
 
 LEGAL CONCLUSIONS, 
 
 not to be pleaded, page 564, n. See Law. 
 
 LEGAL EFFECT, 
 
 pleading according to, page 542, n. 
 
 LEGAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, 
 
 union of equitable and, in one civil action, 16-25. See Actions. 
 legal remedy on equitable ownership or right, 36-44. See Actions. 
 LIABILITIES, 
 
 joint, joint and several, and several, 187-242. See Defendants. 
 joinder of persons severally liable upon the same instrument, 299-307. 
 provisions of the codes relating to, 299-300. 
 effect of, on, 301. 
 judicial interpretation, 302, 303. 
 judgment in, 304. 
 
 code provisions apply to joint and several, 305. 
 surety or guarantor, and principal debtor, 306, 307. 
 counter-claims in case of joint, joint and several, and several, 634, 637. 
 LIBEL AND SLANDER, 
 
 right of action in cases of, generally several, 148. 
 partners uniting in suits for, 147.
 
 970 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 ('the REFEKENCES are to the sections except WHEK OTHEBWISB INDICATED.] 
 
 LIBEL AND 6LASDER — continued. 
 
 plaintiffs in suits for, to wife, 154. 156, 157, 159. 
 
 defendants in suits for, 208. 214. 
 in suits against wife for, 221. 
 
 causes of action for, joined with other, 390. 
 
 allegations in actions for, page 680, n. 
 LICENSE, 
 
 defence of, new matter, 712. 
 LIENS, 
 
 plaintiffs in actions to foreclose vendors'. 169. 
 
 holders of distinct, not joined as plaintiffs in actions to enforce, 181 
 
 holders of, when defendants in actions for partition, 270-272. 
 
 defendants in actions to enforce, 279-281. 
 mechanics', 279. 
 pledges of securities, 280. 
 
 See MORTGAGKS. 
 
 LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See Statute of Limitatioxs. 
 LIQUID ATIOX, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, n. 
 LUNATICS, 
 
 whether guardian of, can sue in his own name, 110. 
 
 are proper defendants in actions against guardians, 253, n. 
 
 M. 
 
 MARRIED WOMEN. See Husband and Wife. 
 
 MLSJOINDER OF PARTIES, 
 effect of, 126-133. 
 
 MISNOMER OF DEFENDANT, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, n. 
 MISTAKE, 
 
 parties in actions to quiet title by correcting. 268. 
 parties in actions to correct, 268, n. 
 
 MORTGAGES, 
 
 equitable defences in actions to foreclose, 33. 
 
 suits by mortgagees against grantees assuming mortgage debts, 77, 218. 
 
 plaintiffs in suits to foreclose and redeem, 16!), 170. 
 
 defendants in suits to foreclose, 230-242. 
 
 general doctrine; necessary and proper parties, 230-232. 
 
 mortgagors and their grantees, 233, 234. 
 
 creditors when necessary or proper defendants, 235, 239. 
 
 heirs when necessary, 233, n., 234. 
 
 personal representatives when necessary. 233, n., 234, 235. 
 
 assignor of mortgage note when not necessary, 217, n., 233, n., 236. 
 
 when several notes are given, 237. 
 
 occupants of the land, 23S. 
 
 persons remotely interested in result, 238.
 
 INDEX. 971 
 
 [the references are to the sections except when- otherwise indicatbd.] 
 MORTGAGES — conlinued. 
 
 subsequent and pri<n- encumbrancers, 2-;3, n.. 230. 
 wives of mortgagors and subsequent owners, 233, n., 240, 241. 
 beneficiaries, in suits against trustees, 2;j3, n., 241, n. 
 case of homesteads, 242. 
 
 persons claiming adversely to mortgagor, 242. 
 trust deeds foreclosed as, 242. 
 defendants in suits to redeem, 284. 
 counter-claims insults to foreclose, G68, n., 678, 679. 
 
 MOTIONS, 
 
 general rules as to, page 600, n., page 717, n. 
 misjoinder of plaintiffs objected to by, 126-133. 
 
 of defendants, 190-1.94. 
 proper causes of action mingled in one count, corrected by, 341. 
 causes of action separately stated but improperly joined, corrected by, 343. 
 improper causes of action mingled in one count, corrected by, 344, 34.5. 
 to correct insufficient, imperfect, incomplete, or informal allegations, 442- 
 
 444. 
 to correct redundant, immaterial, and irrelevant allegations, 445-446. 
 sham and irrelevant answers and defences stricken out on, 476. 
 use of, to correct defects of form in answer, 487, 490. 
 argumentative denials corrected by, 518. 
 
 specific defences equivalent to general denial corrected by, 522, 523. 
 MULTIFARIOUSNESS, 
 
 discussed and defined, 380, page 508, n. 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. See Corporations. 
 
 NAMES OF PARTIES, 
 
 pleading, page 680, n. 
 
 NEGATIVE AVERMENTS, 
 
 necessity of, page 681, n. 
 
 NEGATIVE PREGNANT, 
 
 denials in the form of, 509, 514. 
 definition of, 509. 
 
 cases holding that no issues are formed by, 510-512. 
 contrary cases, 513, 514. 
 
 NEGLIGENCE, 
 
 defences admissible under general denial in actions for, 551. 
 counter-claims for, where plaintiff's demand is on contract, 661, 662. 
 how to plead, page 681, n. 
 
 NEGOTIABLE PAPER, 
 
 equitable defences to actions on, 34. 
 
 suits by assignees of, 66-69, 78. 
 
 doctrine of estoppel as applied to transfer of quasi, 88, 89. 
 
 transferred after maturity, subject to equities, 91, n., 92, n., 94. 
 
 defendants in actions on joint notes, 200.
 
 972 INDEX. 
 
 [tub ttBrEREIfCBB ARE TO THB BBCTIONS BXCEPT WHE!* OTHERWISB INDlCATEl).] 
 
 NEGOTI AHLE PArEll — continue,!. 
 
 actions against persons severally liable on, 207, '_'99-;J()7. 
 
 assignor of mortgage note not necessary defendant in foreclosure suit, 
 
 J 17, n., 23o, n., 2>(j. 
 parties in foreclosure suits when sr-vcral notes given, 'JM. 
 defences admissible under general denial in actions on, 052, OGO. 
 defence of want of consideration, new matter, 5H5. 
 
 NEW iMATTEK, 
 
 classes of answers containing, when defensive and when not, 4Sl. 
 questions that arise upon, may be either of substance or form, 485. 
 demurrer confined to, 4S6. 
 
 difference between, and pleas by way of confession and avoidance, 549. 
 defences of, 562-590. 
 
 how pleaded, 410, 5G3-5G7. 
 
 when to be pleaded, and when general denial sufficient, 548, 549, 567, 
 
 568. 
 distinction between, and denials, 507, 508. 
 in mitigation of damages, how jileaded, 509-572. 
 in abatement, how pleaded, 573, 574. 587. 
 particular defences held to be, 575-590. 
 payment, 576, 577. 
 arbitration and award, 578. 
 former recovery, 578. 
 
 in actions to recover possession of chattels, 554, 579. 
 in actions for torts, 580, 581. 
 in actions concerning lands, 582, 
 in actions upon contracts, 583-58(i. 
 joinder an<l capacity of parties, 587. 
 miscellaneous defences; license, estoppel, accord and satisfaction, 
 
 etc., 588. 
 statute of limitations, when to be pleaded as, and when raised 
 by demurrer, 555, 557, 589, 590. 
 
 NEW PAirriES, 
 
 bringing in, 308-319. See J'aktiks. 
 
 NEW PROMISE, 
 
 allegation of, page 083, n. 
 
 NON-IN'COKrORATIOX. 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, n. 
 
 NON-PAYMENT, 
 
 allegation of, page 683, n. 
 
 NOTICE, 
 
 when necessary to protect assignee from set-off, 85, 91, 94. 
 
 kind of, necessary to protect assignee from transactions between assignor 
 
 and debtor, 95. 
 defence other than set-off, available from time of, 98. 
 
 nuisancp:, 
 
 counter-claims for, where plaintiff's deman<l is on contract, 061, 662. 
 See Toiris.
 
 IKDEX. 973 
 
 [THK BMrZBXSCU JLZE TO THB RSCTI0X8 BXCEPT WHKV OTBKBWUB urOICATSO.j 
 
 o. 
 
 OB.JECT OF ACTIOX, 
 
 what is, 347. 
 OFFICERS, 
 
 auiti by public, 107. 
 against, 217. 
 
 ORDINANCE-S, 
 
 how to plead, page 679, n., page 68i, n. 
 
 P. 
 
 PARENT AND CHILD, 
 
 action by mother or father for seduction of daughter, 58, 150. 
 action by parents for injuries to child, 58, 150. 
 PARTIE.S, 
 
 to the ci^al action, 50—325. 
 doctrine of, 50, 00, 61. 
 
 coDQmon law and equity theories contrasted, 50. 
 provisioos of codes relating to, 51-59. 
 general theory of code provisions, 00, 01. 
 real party in interest to be plaintiff, 62-81. .See Real Party r>' In- 
 terest. 
 effect of assignment of things in action upon defences thereto, 82-98. 
 
 See Assignment. 
 when trustees of express trusts may sue, 99-110. See Tkusteks 
 defect of. reached by demurrer, 124. 
 misjoinder of, effect of, 126-133. 
 
 who may be joined as plaintiffs, 111-184. See Plaintiffs. 
 who may be joined as defendants, 185-284. See DEf exdants. 
 when one may sue or be sued on Vjehalf of aU interested, 285-298. 
 proFioions of codes concerning, 285. 
 interpretation of, 286, 288-290. 
 facts to be alleged, 287, 288, 298. 
 examples of decided cases, 291, 292. 
 
 nature of action, and effect upon those represented. 29.3-297. 
 who are parties, and how persons may become. 293. 294. 
 how far the judgment is binding, and how taken advantage of, 
 25.>-297. 
 persons severally liable on the same instrument, 299-307. See Liabili- 
 ties. 
 bringing in new, :^tS-319. 
 
 provisions of codes concerning, 308, .309. 
 three proceedings provided for. 311-314. 
 
 when necessary to complete determination of controversy. 315-319. 
 when code provisions are peremptory, 316. 
 
 when discretionary, 317. 
 examples. 318. 
 importance of provisions, 319,
 
 974 INDEX. 
 
 [the BEIXnENCBS ARE TO THE SECTIONS EXCEPT WHEN OTHEBWISB INDICATED.] 
 
 PARTIES — co/i^/iue^/. 
 
 intervening of, 320-325. See Intervention. 
 
 proper joinder of causes of action connected with proper joinder of, 364- 
 
 399. See Causes op- Action. 
 defences relating to joinder and capacity of, are new matter, ."iS?. 
 in their relations with counter-claims, 625-638. See Countek-Claims. 
 
 PARTITION, 
 
 action for, by tenant in common holding legal or equitable title, 43. 
 parties interested to be before court in action for, 168, 274. 
 defendants in actions for, 270-274. 
 
 general rules of equity concerning, 270, 271. 
 
 creditors and lien-holders, when to be, 270-272. 
 
 wife of tenant in common, 273. 274. 
 
 personal representative when to be, 273. 
 
 PARTNERS, 
 
 actions by, or against, other, to recover shares of firm property, 42, 262. 
 
 actions by, or against, in name of partnership, 59, 81, 149. 
 
 actions by creditors of partnership against purchasers promising to pay 
 
 firm debts, 77. 
 joining as plaintiffs in actions for personal torts, 147. 
 actions by, concerning chattels, 140, 144. 
 rights and powers of surviving, 141. 
 account between, parties in, 171, 262, 275. 
 whether dormant, should be plaintiffs at common law and under code, 144. 
 
 whether they should be defendants, 202. 
 refusing to join as co-plaintiffs, may be made defendants, 187, n. 
 joinder of, as defendants, in actions on contract, 201. 
 
 in actions for personal torts, 214. 
 
 in actions to enforce mechanics' liens, 279. 
 provisions of codes concerning joinder of " coparceners " and " copartners," 
 
 300. 
 denying existence of partnership in Wisconsin, 559. 
 counter-claims by, or against, 627, 632, 635, 675. 
 
 PARTNERSHIP, 
 
 allegation of, page 684, n. 
 
 PASSENGER, 
 
 how to plead relation of, page 684, n. 
 
 PAYMENT, 
 
 whether, can be proved in mitigation of damages, 535. 
 defence of, when new matter, 535, n., 511, 576, 577. 
 
 PENALTIES, 
 
 pleading in actions for, page 684, n. 
 
 PERFORMANCE, 
 
 how to plead, page 684, n. 
 
 PETITION. See Complaint. 
 
 PL.UXTIFFS, 
 
 real parties in interest to be, 62-81. See Real Party in Interest. 
 who may be joined as, 111-181.
 
 INDEX. 975 
 
 [the references are to TirE SECTIONS EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE INDICATED.] 
 
 PLAINTIFFS — conlinued. 
 
 provi.sions of the codes concerning, 111. 
 principles of the reformed procedure concerning, lli'-117. 
 equitable theory adopted, 113-117. 
 judicial construction, llS-llJli. 
 manner of raising questions as to proper, 123-lo3. 
 nonjoinder, or defect of, 123, 124. 
 want of legal capacity to sue, 125. 
 misjoinder, how objected to, and effect of, 126-133. 
 in legal actions, 135-150. 
 
 owners in common and joint owners of land, 135-137. 
 
 of chattels, 138-142. 
 holders of joint rights arising from contracts, 143-145. 
 
 of several rights, 146. 
 holders of joint rights arising from personal torts, 147. 
 
 of several rights, 148. 
 in special cases, 149, 150. 
 in actions by or between husband and wife, 151-1 GO. 
 in equitable actions, 161-184. 
 
 theory of parties in equity, 161-163. 
 
 owner of legal estate made party in action by equitable owner, 
 164-167. 
 by beneficiary, 164. 
 by assignees, 165. 
 by legatees, distributees, etc., 166. 
 holders of equitable rights to be parties, 168-178. 
 
 where holders have joint rights or interests, 168, 169. 
 in actions for partition, boundaries, etc., 168. 
 concerning personal property, 169. 
 to foreclose and redeem, 169, 170. • 
 for accounting, 171-173. 
 by trustees, 174. 
 by executors, etc., 175. 
 by assignees in bankruptcy, etc., 175. 
 of future estates to be parties, 176. 
 in actions for specific performance, 177. 
 heirs-at-law or devisees when parties, 178, 252. 
 holders of antagonistic interests not to be joined a.s, 179. 
 joinder of holders of separate, but not antagonistic, interests, 
 180-183. 
 creditors. 180-182. 
 beneficiaries, 182. 
 
 other holders of distinct interests, 183. 
 holders of distinct liens, 184. 
 actions by or against one person on behalf of all interested, 285-298. See 
 
 Parties. 
 proper joinder of, connected with proper joinder of causes of action. 373- 
 
 884. See Causes of Action. 
 defences relating to joinder or cajjacity of, new matter, 587. 
 in their relations with counter-claims, 625-638. See Counter-Claims. 
 pleadings on the part of. See Complaint ; Rei'LY.
 
 976 INDEX. 
 
 [the EEFERENCE3 ARE TO THE SECTIONS EXCEPT WHEN OTHEEWISE Ih'DICATBD.] 
 
 PLEADING. 
 
 theory of, iu the civil action, 14. 15. 
 doctrine of unity in procedure as applied to, 14, 15. 
 of equitable defences, 33. 
 three types of, prior to codes, 400-406. 
 by allegation, 399. 
 in equity, 401. 
 at common law, 402-406. 
 technicality of, 403. 
 requisites in different actions; ejectment, trover, debt, assumpsit, 
 
 etc., 404. 
 nature of allegations in, 405. 
 assumpsit, illustrating, 406. 
 principles uf the reformed, 407. 
 
 old systems abolished, and codes the only sources of authority, 408, 
 
 409. 
 apply to answers containing affirmative matter, 410, 478-565. 
 "cause of action " defined, 346-348, 412-414. 
 
 distinction between legal and equitable causes of action, 415, 416. 
 nature of facts constituting cause of action, 417-419. 
 facts only, constituting cause of action to be pleaded, 13, 347, 418, 
 
 424, 425. 
 material facts only to be pleaded, 411, 420, 423, 426. 
 evidence not alleged, 411, 420-422. 
 in legal actions. 411, 420. 
 in equitable actions, 411, 421, 422. 
 legal meaning not alleged. 411, 423-425. 
 sufficiency or insufficiency of alleg., cases illustrating, 427-430. 
 promise, allegation of, improper in actions on implied contracts, 431- 
 
 435. 
 comn)on counts, use of. 15, 436-438. 
 
 in actions on express contracts, 437. 
 criticism of the rule, 438. 
 to be liberally construed, 439-441. 
 
 insufficient, imperfect, incomplete, or informal allegations, how ob- 
 jected to, 442-444. 
 redundant, immaterial, and irrelevant allegations, how objected to, 
 
 445, 446. 
 proofs must correspond with allegations, 447-455. See Phooks. 
 amendments of, 456, 457. 
 
 election between actions ex contractu and ex delicto, 48, 3S7, 458-464. 
 See Torts. 
 on the part of plaintiff. See Co.mi'Laint; IIkply. 
 
 on the part of defendant. See Axswku; Dk.\i.\ls; New Matter; 
 Counter-Claims ; Cross-Complaints. 
 
 POSSESSION, 
 
 how to plead, page 685, n. 
 
 PRAYER, 
 
 for, and granting of both legal and equitable reliefs, 17, 18. 
 granting' of legal relief only, 19, 20.
 
 INDF.X. 977 
 
 [the references are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 PRAYER — continued. 
 
 for equitable relief, but legal granted, where necessary facts for legal 
 alleged, 11, 21. 
 
 legal relief, but equitable granted, where necessary facts for equitable 
 alleged, 11, 22. 
 for equitable or legal relief, effect of, where facts alleged are not proved, 23. 
 for relief, effect of, 11, 21, 22, 471. 
 for relief as supplying name of counter-claim, 624. 
 
 PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 
 
 actions by principal as real party in interest on contracts made by agent, 
 
 70, 105, n. 
 actions by agent on contracts made for principal's benefit, 79, 103, 105. 
 when agent must join in suit with prin., 1G4. 
 jointly sued for torts, 213. 
 
 PRIVILEGE, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, u. 
 PROMISE, 
 
 allegations of, on implied contracts, 431-435. / 
 PROOFS, 
 
 must correspond with allegations, 447-45-"). 
 
 immaterial and material variances, and total failure of, difference 
 
 between, 447, 448. 
 variances, cases illustrating, 440. 
 total failure of, cases illustrating, 450, 451. 
 causes of action ex contractu alleged, and ex delicto proved, 452-455. 
 
 Q. 
 
 QUIET TITLE, 
 
 defendants in actions to, 266-269. 
 
 nature of the action, 266. 
 
 all adverse claimants to be joined, 266-269. 
 
 where mistakes in deeds, etc., are to be corrected, 268. 
 pleading in actions to, page 685, n. 
 
 E. 
 
 RATIFICATION, 
 
 how to plead, page 685, n. 
 
 of altered instrument, is a defence of new matter, page 818, n. 
 
 REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. 
 
 definition, 62, n. 1. 
 to be plaintiff, 62-81. 
 
 assignment of things in action at com. law, 62. 
 assignees to sue in their own names, 63-76, 165. 
 when the assignment is absolute, 64. 
 when equitable, 65, 73, 149. 
 when of negotiable paper, 66-69, 78. 
 62
 
 978 INDEX. 
 
 [the BSFEBEMCES are to the sections except when OTHEBWISE I>-D1CATED.] 
 
 REAL PARTY IX 1}^TEREST — continued. 
 when conditional or partial, 70, 75. 
 illustrations, 71, 72. 
 
 assignor to be joined in certain States, 73, 1G5, 217, 23fi, 261. 
 when the assignment is made pending action, 74. 
 possibility of one suing " to the use of " another, 76. 
 suits by one for whose benefit a promise is raad^; to another, 77-218. 
 
 by the person to whom the promise is made, 78. 
 special instances ; principal and agent, etc., 79, 105, u. 
 suits by taxpayers to restrain, remove, or redress public wrong, etc., 80. 
 suits by grantees of land in names of grantors, 81. 
 defence that party is not, new matter, 587. 
 RECEIVERS. 
 
 actions by and against, 258, n. 
 how to plead capacity of, page 685, n. 
 RECITAL, 
 
 pleading by way of, page 601, n. 
 RECOUPMENT, 
 
 defence of, new matter, 581. 
 
 under the former procedure. 607, 608. 
 
 embraced by counter-claim, 612, 019, n. 
 
 See Countkk-Claims. 
 REDUNDANT ALLEGATIONS, page 612, n. 
 REFORMATION, 
 
 parties in actions for, 278, n. 
 how to plead, page 685, n. 
 RELEASE, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, n. 
 RELIEF, 
 
 prayer for. See Prayer. 
 
 different kinds of, from one cause of action, page 466, n. . 
 REMEDIES, 
 
 definition of, 2. 
 
 distinction between, not abolished by reformed procedure, 9. 
 
 union of legal and equitable rights and, in one civil action, 16-25. See 
 
 Actions. 
 legal, on equitable ownerships or rights, 36-44. See Actions. 
 differences between civil actions are only in primary rights and, 4.5-47. 
 distinction between, and causes of action, 250, 251. 
 REPLEVIN, 
 
 impropriety of present use of word, 49. 
 
 joinder of plaintiffs in, at common law and under reformed procedure, 
 138-142. 
 of defendants, 108, 211. 
 causes of action in, united with other, 307. 
 defences admissible under general denial in, 538, 554. 
 
 when new matter, 554-579. 
 counter-claims in, 643, 667, 
 pleading in actions of, page 68.5, n.
 
 INDEX. 'J79 
 
 [the references are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 
 REPLY, 
 
 general rules as to, page 703, n. 
 defects in complaint not cured by, 470. 
 provisions of codes relating to, 478, 479. 
 
 RESCISSION, 
 
 defendants in actions for, •270-278. 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, n. 
 
 RIGHTS, 
 
 primary duties and. what are, 1. 
 
 remedial duties and, described and defined, 1-3. 
 
 no alteration or direct effect upon primary duties and, 8. 
 
 effect of misconception of remedial, l)y plaintiffs, 11. 
 
 union of legal and equitable remedies and, in one civil action, 16-25. 
 
 See Actions. 
 legal remedies on equitable estates or, 34-44. See Actions. 
 differences between civil actions are only in primary, and remedies, 45-47. 
 joint and several, 112-178. See Plaintiffs. 
 distinction between remedial, and causes of action, 348. 
 counter-claims in case of joint, joint and several, and several, 633, 637. 
 
 S. 
 
 SEDUCTION, 
 
 action by parents for seduction of child, 58, 150. 
 
 by woman for her own, 58, 150. 
 pleading in actions for, page 686, n. 
 
 SET-OFF, 
 
 to things in action when assigned, 82-98. See Assignment. 
 provisions of codes relating to, 475. 002. 
 under the former procedure, G05, 606. 
 
 under the codes, 671-679. See Counter-claims. 
 embraced by counter-claims, 611, 619, n., 672. 
 
 SETTLEMENT, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, n. 
 
 SLANDER, 
 
 allegations in actions for, page 680, n. 
 
 SPECIFIC DENIALS, 
 
 nature and objects of, 505-507. 
 mode of alleging separate, 593-596. 
 
 See Dfnials. 
 
 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 
 
 plaintiffs in actions for, 177. 
 defendants in actions for, 263-265. 
 
 parties to the contract, their heirs and representatives, 263. 
 
 persons acquiring subsequent interests, 263-265. 
 
 heirs or representative.s of vendor and vendee, 264. 
 defences admissible under general denial in actions for, 557.
 
 980 INDEX. 
 
 [thb bbferences are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 
 STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
 
 pleading contracts within, page 686, n. 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, u. 
 
 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 
 
 whether to be specially pleaded in ejectment, 555. 
 
 in specific perfonnance, 557. 
 when and how pleaded, and when raised by demurrer, 589, 590. 
 
 STATUTES, 
 
 how to plead, page 079, n., page 686, n. 
 
 STATUTORY BARS, 
 
 must be pleaded specially, page 818, n. 
 
 STOCK, 
 
 estoppel, as applied to transfer of certificates of, 88, 89. 
 defendants in suits by assignees of, 201. 
 
 STOCKHOLDERS, 
 
 parties in actions against, 146, 184, 218, 259. 
 
 in actions by, 258, 200. 
 allegations in actions against, page 086, n. 
 
 SUBJECT OF ACTION, 
 
 meaning of, 309, 381-384, page 493, n. 
 
 as used in connection with counter-claims, 613, 618, 651, 652, 669, 670. 
 
 SUBROGATION, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, n. 
 
 SUICIDE, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, n. 
 
 SUMMONS, 
 
 when service of, on husband is service on wife, 225. 
 
 as indicating election between actions ex contractu and ex delicto, 464. 
 
 SURETIES, 
 
 contribution among, 282, n. 
 
 when liable on the .same or separate mstriiments, joinder of, 300, 301. 
 whether can be sued jointly with principal debtor, 307. 
 counter-claims by, 625, 626. 
 
 SURGEON, 
 
 how to plead qualification of, page 686, n. 
 
 SURVIVORSHIP, 
 
 among joint creditors at common law and under codes, 143. 
 among joint debtors, 203-205. 
 
 T. 
 
 TAX-P.\YER.S, 
 
 actions by, to restrain, remove, or redress public wrong, etc., 80. 
 
 joinder of, as plaintiffs, 183. 
 
 defendants in actions by, 283. 
 
 actions by one for benefit of other, 292.
 
 INDEX. 981 
 
 [the rbfkbences are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.] 
 
 TENDER, 
 
 how to plead, page 686, n. 
 
 THEORY OF CASE, 
 
 necessity of theory in pleading, page 656, n. 
 
 THINGS IN ACTION, 
 
 defences to suits by assignees of, 82-98. 
 
 See Assignment. 
 THIRD PERSONS, 
 
 action by, for whose benefit contracts have been made, 77. 
 
 TIME. 
 
 pleading, page 687, n. 
 
 TITLE, 
 
 how to plead, page 687, n. 
 
 TORTS, 
 
 to person or character, plaintiffs in suits for, 147, 148. 
 
 to lands, plaintiffs in suits for, lo6. 
 
 to chattels, plaintiffs in suits for, 140-142. 
 
 to person, property, or character of wife, plaintiffs in suits for, 1.53-160. 
 
 defendants in suits for, where tort may be treated as breach of contract, 
 
 212. 
 defendants in suits for, 208-215. 
 of wife, defendants in suits for, 221, 222. 
 "when causes of action arising from, can be joined with those on contracts, 
 
 392, 394, 395. 
 proved, where causes of action arising from contracts alleged, 452-455. 
 election to waive tort, and sue on contract, 48. 387, 458-464. 
 
 as regards joining of causes of action, 387. 
 
 doctrine of election discussed, 48, 387, 458, 459, 462. 
 
 cases in which election permitted, 460-462. 
 
 manner of indicating election, 463, 464. 
 justification by one of several defendants, good for all, in action for 497. 
 defence of justification for, how pleaded, 564, 580, 581. 
 defences of new matter, in actions for, 580, 581. 
 
 what demands arising from, are counter-claims, 613, 636, 649, 656, n. 
 counter-claims where election between tort and contract, 646, 648, 656, n., 
 
 664, 677. 
 counter-claims where plaintiff.s' claims are on contracts, and defendants' 
 for, 660-663. 
 
 for trespasses, nuisances, or negligences, 661, 662. 
 
 for fraud, 663. 
 counter-claims where plaintiffs' claims are for, and defendants' on con- 
 tracts, 664, 665. 
 counter-claims where both claims are for, 666. 
 
 TRANSACTION, 
 
 meaning of, 359-368, page 491, n. 
 judicial interpretation, 355-365. 
 true interpretation, 366-368. 
 as used in connection with counter-claims, 613, 618, 636, 6.50.
 
 982 INDEX. 
 
 [the references are to the sectiuxs except when otherwise indicated.] 
 
 TRESPASS, 
 
 impropriety of ^iresent use of word. 49. 
 
 plaintiffs in actions for, to lands or chattels, 135, 136, 138, 140-142. 
 by owners of lands out of jiossession, 149. 
 defendants in actions for, 210, 213. 
 
 joinder of causes of action for, with other, 388, 389, 395. 
 how to plead in actions for, page (388, u. 
 
 counter-claims for, where plaintiff's demand is on contract, 661, 662. 
 TROVER, 
 
 action analogous to, by equitable owner of chattels, 43. 
 
 impropriety of present use of word, 49. 
 
 plaintiffs in action of, 138, 140-142. 
 
 defendants in action of, 210, 211. 
 
 joinder of causes of action for, with other, 389, 397. 
 
 nature of pleading in, at common law, 404. 
 
 counter-claims on contracts, in actions of, 664. 
 
 TRUSTEE AXD CESTUI QUE TRUST, 
 
 trustees of expres.s trusts, when may sue, 99-110. 
 
 provisions of codes concerning, 99. 
 
 meaning of the term, 100-102. 
 
 persons '• with whom, or in whose name, a contract is made for the 
 benefit of another," 103-105. 
 
 special instances of, 106. 
 
 public officers ; counties ; towns, 107. 
 
 persons expressly authorized by statute to sue, 108. 
 
 executors and administrators, 109. 
 
 guardians of infants, lunatics, etc., 110. 
 ownership of trustees joint where land is conveyed to several, 135. 
 trustees when co-plaintiff's in actions by l)eneficiaries, lfi4. 
 accounting, parties in suits against trustees for, 173, 182, 253, n., 254, n., 
 
 255. 
 cestuis que trustent when co-plaintiffs in actions by trustees, 174. 
 
 to be parties in foreclosure suits against trustees, 233, n., 241, n. 
 defendants in suits against trustees, in creditors' actions, 247. 
 
 in administration suits, 252. 
 beneficiaries, defendants in suits against trustees to redeem, 284. 
 joinder of causes of action by or against trustee, in personal and repre- 
 sentative capacity, 378, 396. 
 counter-claims by or against, 627, 630, 076, n. 
 
 TRUSTS, 
 
 of will, heirs-at-law to be j^arties in suits to enforce, 178. 
 plaintiffs in suits to administer, 173, 182. 
 defendants in actions involving, 253-256. 
 
 trustees necessary, 253. 
 
 personal representatives of trustee, when to be joined with surviving, 
 253. 
 
 beneficiaries, when necessary, 254, 2.55. 
 
 where there is a breach of trust, 253, 255, n. 
 
 in enforcenienl of implied, 256.
 
 INDEX. 983 
 
 [the BEFERENCES are to the sections except when 0THEBWI8B IKUICATEU.j 
 
 u. 
 
 ULTRA VIRES, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 818, u. 
 UNCERTAINTY, 
 
 cases of, in pleading, page GOI, n. 
 
 UNDUE influi:nce, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 819, n. 
 
 unreasonableness, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 819, n. 
 USE, 
 
 suing to use of another, 76. 
 
 V. 
 VALUE, 
 
 allegations of, in pleading, page 689, n. 
 VARIANCES, 
 
 between proofs and allegations, 447-455. See Proofs. 
 VENDOR AND VENDEE, 
 
 equitable defences in actions by vendor to recover lands, 33. 
 
 plaintiffs in suits to foreclose vendor's lien, 170. 
 
 parties in actions by or against, for specific performance, 177, 263-265. 
 VERIFICATION. 
 
 rules respecting, page 669, n. 
 
 w. 
 
 WAIVER, 
 
 how to plead, page 689, n, 
 
 of formal defects, page 603, n. 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 819, n. 
 WANT OF FUNDS, 
 
 is a defence of new matter, page 819, n. 
 WANTONNESS, 
 
 how to plead, page 689, n. 
 WARD. See Guardian and Ward. 
 WIFJL See Husband and Wifk. 
 WILLS, 
 
 parties in actions to set aside, 178, LJ52. 
 WRITTEN INSTRUMENT, 
 
 how to plead, page 689, n.
 
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