^IIIBRARYQ^ -^^lllBRARYiJc \\^E.l)NIVER% ^JIIVJJO'^ %OJI1V3-J0^ ^IJONYSOl^ ^OFCAIIFO/?^ .^WEUNIVERVa OS bT >v > g' ^lOSANGElfx> > so '^/sa3AiNn3\\v^ ^^lOSANCEUV. o ^^JAavaan-i"^ ^ ^OF-CAIIFO%, ''^(^AHvaaiH^ ^OFCAIIFO/?^ H £ <^tlIBRARYQc. A^lllBRARYQc. ^^ME-l)NIVER% _j^lOSANCEl^j> ^OJIlVOJO'f^ j,OF-CAlIFOi?;j^ ^-i/OJnVJJO'^ ^^Aavaani^ 'itJAavaan^' vvlOSANCa^ Ml o '^/^a3AiNii-3y\v NivtRS/^ ^mxsaus;^ -^IUBRARYQa Msoi^ "^/^aaAiNftawv^ %ojiiv3Jo>^ '^<»ojnv3-jo>^ ^OF-CALIFOff^ '^IVERy/A AjclOSANCElfx^ ^OFCAIIFO/?^ inNvsov^^ ^/5aiAiNa-3WV^ ^^Abvaan-^v^ "RARYQc ^ ^IIIBRARYO^ ^^Mt•UN^VfR5•/^ ^lOSANCFlfj-^ MIFO/?^ ^OFCAllFOff^ WAR DEPARTMENT, Wasiiinoton, ■/»/// /.S. inn. Till' followinj; nianunl on " .Musketry " is approvtHl and puli- lislicd for use in tlie instruction and training of tlie Armies of Uie United States. [0(52.001, A. G. O.] Ry order of the Secuetauy ok War : TASKER H. BLISS, Major (li'Hcral, Art i in/ Chief of Staff. Official: H. 1'. McCain. The Adjutant General. 3 r- 938C PREFACE. An organization's ultimate cfliciency in battle-fiold liriti;,' !>; dependent upon the thoroughness of its training in ImUviiiual marksmanship, leadership, and teamwork. Maxinuim results can not be obtained by (1) a poor slKuitiiig company under the best of leadership, (2) a good shooting com- pany under poor leadership. There can be no serious discussion among military men as to the relative value of individual and collective training in sliooting, as one is dependent upon the other. The course as given in the Small Arms Firing Manual for the development of the individual marksnuin should be carefully followed and every effort made to bring each man to as near a state of perfection as possible. It nuist be rememi)ered, however, that the S(^ldier is being ti-ained to work as one of a team, hence hand in hand with the training of the man to shoot should go the instruction and training to tit him to intelligently play his part in that team, be that part a leader or follower. Musketry is nothing more than teamwork in the conduct of fire. Instruction must be systematic if the best results are to be obtaintHl. The principles involved are first explained and then by practical demonstration, or actually doing it himself, the soldier has impressed upon him the U'ssoii it is desired to teach, or, in other words, he is first taught the WHY, and then by actually seeing the thing done or by doing it him.sclf he learns the HOW. This HOW is the important consideration, as Hohenloe in his letters on infantry says : " The officer connnanding a company very rarely finds himself in war in a position to make great tactical, and still less to make strategical, evolutions. " His o!)jective. whether in the offensive or the defensive, is, as a rule, very clearly marked out for him. Hut the struggle, so far as he can influence it, is decided by HOW he carries out 5 6 PREFACE, liis work, by HOW his iiioii take advantage of the ground, HOW they tiiul cover, HOW tliey shoot, and WHETHER they hit, and HOW they obey signals witli regard to advancing, lying down, aiming, and tlie nature of fire." Tlie object of the book is to present to the company officer a text on tlie WHY and HOW of MUSKETRY. The subject matter of this volume is based on the courses of instruction at the School of Musketry at Fort Sill, Okla. It is a compilation by Capt. O. P. Robinson, Nineteenth In- fantry, director of the experimental department of this school. It covers as completely as possible in a volume of this size the subject, and is, for the most part, based upon the course of MUSKETRY as taught at this school, and upon Maj. H. E. Eames' well-known book, " The Ritle in War." TABLE OF CONTENTS. Paragraph. Chapter I. — The Conduct of Fiuk 1-19 The private, position and duties 2-3 The corporal, position and duties 4-.T Tlie platoon sruides, position and duties 6-7 The platoon leaser, position and duties 8 The first sergeant 9 The raiijie estimators 10 The hufilers, position and duties 11 The captain, position and duties 12-1.3 The battalion staff, position and duties 14-15 The major, position and duties lG-17 The colonel, position and duties 18-19 Chapteu II.— Mimtaky Tkrms 20-21 Chapter III. — The Theory of Fire 22-50 Definitions 23 The trajectory 24-3r» The propelling forces 25 Gravity 26 Resistance of the air 27 Other factors affecting angle of departure, sighting of rifles, jump, drift, fixing the bayonet, rests, oily barrel, rigidity of tra- jectory 28-35 The sheaf 36-39 The danger space 40-43 Effect of .slopes and sites 44-49 Ricochets 50 Influence of the point of aim 51 Combined sights 52-54 The battle sight 55-56 7 8 TABLE OP CONTENTS. Paragraph. Chapter IV. — Instruments 57-87 Field glasses 58-72 The Galilean glass 59-60 The Porro prism glass 61-62 To determine interpupilary distance 63 To focus the eyepiece 64 Characteristics of a good field glass, power, light, field , 65 Suggestions for the use of glasses in the field 70 Care and preservation 71 Exercises in the use of field glasses 72 The mil as an angular unit of measure 73 The rear sight leaf 75 The finger 76 The mil rule 77 The musketry rule 78-81 The mil rule as a range finder and telemeter 81 Switching fire 86 Use of musketry rule in connection with combined sights 87 Chapter V. — Designation and Recognition of Service Targets 88-97 Target designation 90-97 Methods of designation (horizontal and verti- cal clock systems, use of auxiliary aiming target, reference point) 92-96 Suggested exercises 97 Chapter VI. — Visual Training 2. 98-100 Suggested exercises 99-100 Chapter VII. — The Determination of IIanges 101-130 Estimating distances 107-111 Collective estimating 112 Range estimators 114 Taking the range from a map 117 Obtaining the range from troops already engaged 118 Measuring the range directly on the ground 119 Estimating distance by sound 120 Range finders 121 Range cards and range marks 123-125 Simple range cards for attack and defense 124-125 Ranging 126-130 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 9 rarat'rnpli. ChAPTEK VIII. — FlUE DiSTRIBtJTION 131-140 Switch inethod VM In (lefeuse 138 Exercises in tarjret (listrii)ution 139-141 Aiming tripod 140 Chai>tek IX. — Auxiliary Aimi.ng Targets 142-14G The ranfie scale for u.so witii auxiliary targets 142-143 U.se of imisketry rule to obtain sight .setting 144 Choice of an aiming target :_ 145 Chaptek X. — Battle-Field Com mtn ration 147-1." Me.ssengers 141) Verbal messages 150 Duties of messengers 151 Exercises to teach conmiunication and the use of signals 152-ir)7 Chapter XI. — The Use of Cover 15S-1(;3 Firing from cover 162 Cover from shell fire 1G3 Chapter XII. — Battt.e-Fiei.d Reconnaissance and the Selection of Firing Positions 164-178 Battle reconnaissance 167 Personnel and training 169 Equipment 170 Area covered 171 Routes 172 Firing positions 173-175 Reconnaissance at night 176-178 Chapter XIII.— Fire Tactics 179-221 Troop leading 181-1S9 The choice of target 1!)() The density of the firing line 192-107 Kinds of fire (indirect, unalmed of position or covering, enfilade, concentrated, distributed, con- verging, nuitual supporting or covering) 19S-206 Rate and volume of fire 207-216 Distance between echelons 217-219 Observation of fire , 220-221 Chapter XIV. — Vulnerarility of Formations 222-227 CHAPTm XV.— Night Firing 228-231 Chapter X^'I. — Ammtnition Supply 232-237 Chaptfij XVII. — Musketry in Trench Warfare 238-240 10 TABLE OF CONTENTS. Paragraph. Chapter XYIII. — The Solution of Fire Problems 241-269 The solution 242-254 The tire estiniiite (tjl)servtition of tarjiets, de- termination of ranges, relative importance of targets, strength of firing lines, location of firing positions, classes of fire, rate of fire, time of opening fire, formations in advancing under fire, ammunition supply) 214-254 The fire order (announcement of the sight set- ting, designation of targets, directions as to occupation of fire positions, rate of fire, class of fire, time of opening fire, position of leader during fire) 255-261 Example of a problem with solution 262-269 Chapter XIX.— The Umpire 270-283 The critique 271-274 The umpire's assistant 275 The umpire's records 276 Form for umpire's record 278-2S3 Chapteij XX. — Preliminary Exercises (without ball ammunition) 284 Chapter XXI. — The Construction of Fire Problems- 297-300 Preparation 298 Form - 299 Mission 300 Chapter XXII. — Situations for Fire Problems 318-328 Chapter XXIII. — An Example of the Constructio.n, Solution, and Critique of a Fire Problem (Ball Ammunition) 301-317 Statement of the problem (troops, situation, object, time, target, ammunition, critique, situation for leader, requirement) 302-306 A solution 307-309 The critique (leadership and conduct — personnel, fire effect, general comment, was the mission ac- complished, explanation of comparison) 310-317 Chapter XXIV. — Problems Suitable for a Class "A" Range 329-332 For the squad 329 For the platoon 330 For the company (offensive) , 331 For the company (defensive) 332 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 11 I'uraKra])!). Chapter XXV. — Thk Statistical okmcicu 3S:{-:i02 Statistical records 33.'{-:W5 The form 334-333 Sources of information (l).v observation, from tlie umpire, from tlie ranf^e ollicer, from the com- mander of the lirinj; unit. l).v computation) 3:W Entries in the record (hits, true range, visibility, estimated ranf,'e, tiring data used, figures in tar- get, center of impact) - 337-344 Result conipai-ed with standard (liits, figures struciv. rale. time, shots, men, ricochets included) 34r)-,3."»2 liesults (hits and figures si ruck, rate, time, shots, men, ricochets included) 3.")."i-3r)(} <'(»mi»aris()ns (comparative strengths, comparative time, hits expected for shots fired, distribution expected from hits made) 357-359 Statistical otticer's tables 3rl)al mi»ssa^;es I'A To teacli tlie triiiisiulssioii of lirin^ dala raitidly and acf-n- rately and witliont dt'< rojisinii- ihc riitf of liiv ITiri To teach the prescril)ed si.-n;ils (II 47, I. I). 1{.) IHO To train an oriranizati' r. In sndi manner tlial tiie cliain of connnaiid and h'adersliip will nut he iiilcii-uiiled by casualties ir»7 To train the men not to shift their fire to unauthorized targets, hut tn c:ui or .">0 per cent disper.sion 37 S. IllustrMtiiii;' (l.uifiin- spare 41 4. Illustrating elTect of slopes and sites 4.'j 5. lilustratinj,' difference in tiring at targets on a slightly rising .slope and level ground 48 6. Illustrating upper and lower sheaf in combined sights ^li 7. Arrangement of lenses in the Galilean glass r»9 8. Illustrating the path of rays through the prisms of the I'orro prism glass 61 9. Illustrating method of measuring the field of a field glass 08 10. Illustrating the mil scale engraved on type EK glass 74 11. Method of holding rifle when rear sight is used as a mil measuring instrument 75 12. The mil rule 77 13. The nnisketry rule, front view 78 14. The musketry rule, hack view 78 1."). Designation of target, using mil scale 92 16. Designation of target, using rear sight 92 17. Designation of target, using fingers 92 18-19. Illustrating teaching of clock face systems___ 97 20. Illustrating needless movements in assuming firing positions I'K) 21. Illustrating evils of needless exposure when pre- paring to rush 100 22. Effect on trajectory of error in estimation of range 191 23. Range card for attack 123 24. Range card in defense 124 25. Sight correction in ranging 126 16 16 ILLUSTRATIONS. Paragraph. Fig. 26. Sight correction with glasses fitted with mil scale. 126 27. Showing nselessness of ranging when ground in front and rear of target is not visihle from firing point 128 28. Illustrating volleys in ranging 130 29. Illustrating individiial shot groups of a squad 132 30. Platoon fronts of a battalion in attack 135 31. Illustrating use of reference point 137 32. Illustrating the apportionment of fire sectors to companies in a battalion in defense 138 33. The aiming tripod 139 34. Illustrating the use of the aiming tripod 139 35. Illustrating distribution over target only partly visible 141 86. Illustrating method of teaching men to fire on that part of target which is directly opposite him 141 87. Illustrating the principle on which the use of the range scale is based in connection with auxiliary aiming targets 142 38. Use of field glass in designating an auxiliary aiming target ' 146 39. Illustrating chain of battle-field signals and chan- nels for transmission of commands within the battalion 148 40; Illustrating correct position firing from a fold in the ground 162 41. Illustrating incorrect position firing from a fold in the ground 162 42. Correct position for a right-handed man firing from behind a tree 162 43. Incorrect position of a right-handed man firing from behind a tree 162 44. Platoon columns — checkerboard formation 193 45. Platoon columns — echeloned from left to rear 193 46. Advance in thin lines 193 47. Illustrating bunching in rushing 195 48. Illustrating skirmish line crowded so den.sely that men can not fire 195 49. Illustrating indii'ect (aimed) fii'e 198 50. Illustrating unaimed or sw^eeping fire 198 51. Illustrating fire of position, or covering fire 199 ILLVSTRATIONS. 17 Paragraph. FIg.o2. IllustnUinf,' oiifilMdo fire 201 r»3. Ilhisti-iitinii (.oiutMil Tilted lire 202 54. IlliistraliiiK distributed fire 203 55. Converf^in^ lire . 204 5G. Mutual supportiufj or covering lire 205 57. Relative size of target offered yy a company of 15 squads in cctUunn of s((Uiitls, jjlaloon coluiuiis, squad columns, and skirmish line 224 58. Map for use in solution of example of map prob- lem 262 59-68. Maps illustrating situations for fire prob- lems 319-328 3529°— 17 2 MANUAL ON MUSKETRY. chapti:r I. THE CONDUCT OF FIRE. 1. The conduct of fire includes fire direction, fire control, juul fire discipline. FIRE DIRECTION is the function of the captain and higher commanders. Above the grade of captain the direction is princi- pally tactical. The maximum fire effect of an organization is attainable only through efficient fire direction. Efficient fire direction, on the part of the captain, implies the ability quickly and accurately to estimate any given situation, arrive at a cor- rect decision, and to issue simple and effective orders to carry out that decision. FIRE CONTROL is the function of subordinate leaders and their assistants within the company. It consists of the issue and transmission of orders and of the enforcement of fire disci- pline in such a manner as to carry into effect the will of the fire director. FIRE DISCIPLINE is a term used to express the degree to which the individual riflemen of an organization are amenable to fire control. As appliiHl to an organization, the expres.sion "good firo discipline " implies, first, that the individual riflemen po.ssess the knowledge and training requisite to good niarksniiinship, and, second, that their state of mind is such that their expert knowl- edge and training is placed promptly, willingly, and inielligently at the disposal of their leaders, to he used in delivering an effective fire when, where, whence, and in such maimer as the latter may dictate, and this in rigorous subordination of their own will. 10 20 MUSKETRY. Similarly appliod, tlio oxi)ression " poor fire discipline " im- plies that some or all of the riflemen of the organization are lacking in one or both of the essential attributes of " good fire discipline." In musketry, the instructor must distinguish betweiMi the things which the men merely need to know or to understand and those which need to be practiced until they become habits. For instance, the men should be taught : aiilitary terms. The fundamentals of the theory of rifle fire. The principles used in the construction and operation of the instruments used in the direction and control of fire. A system in the designation and recognition of targets. To use their eyes. The use of auxiliary aiming targets. Battle-field communication. The use of cover. Battle-field reconnaissance. The fundamentals of fire tactics, consisting of — Troop leading. Choice of target. The distribution of fire. The density of the firing line. The determination of the range. The time of opening fire. The kinds of fire. The rate and volume of fire. The distance between echelons. The service of observation of the enemy. The ammunition supply. The officer, to be qualified as an instructor, must understand: The construction and solution of fire problems, and exercises with and without ball ammunition. The duties of umpires, including the making of the critique, and use of umpire's reference tables. The duties of the statistical officer. On the other hand, the men must be trained by practice and repetition until the things they should do on the battle field have become fixed habits with them. The following oiitline gives in convenient form the duties of the personnel in the conduct of fire : Note. — It is to he emphasized that all cfficers and nonconimissioned officers must be thoroughly familiar with the duties of all below them. MUSKETRY. 21, I. THE PRIVATE. 2. Position. — Deployed in liiu': Oiu" yard per man (lliH, I. I). H. ), unless a greater extension is dlreeteil in the order U>r de- ployment (120, I. 1). R.). 3. Duties.— (0. 42-47, 1(»4, l.'^:^. VM. VAX, ^:v.). 141». l.'.2-ir.(;. iju:!. 2(>9. 23;i, 247, 2r>]. 2.".4. 2.V.. .-{ID. :5.'.4. and :{(;7, I. 1 >. It., ami 2ti. To drop into the nearest interval when reinforcing the firing line, and obey the orders of the nearest squad leader. 26. To transmit firing data rapidly and accui'ately to men of tlie supports joining the firing line, and this without decreasing his own rate of fire. 27. To cjill for range and target when reinforcing firing line. 28. To liave confidence in his own ability to hit. 29. To a system of sight setting and fixing bayonets in order that there may be no cessation of fire in the unit during tliis operation. 30. To prepare for rushes witliout decreasing tlie fire of tlie unit unduly. 31. To avoid unnecessary movement in preparing for rushes. .32. To spring forward at command, " Rush ! ". or, " Fol- low me ! " without preliminary rising. 33. To avoid bunching in rushing. 34. Not to swerve to the right or left in search of cover, but to advance in a straight line in order not to blanket the fire of men in his rear. 35. To droi> quickly at end of rush and crawl up to the line if in rear of it. 36. To appreciate the comparative vulnerability of men — (o) Making long rushes, (ft) Making short rushes. 37. To remain with" his own company, but if he acci- dentally becomes separated from his company or squad to join the nearest one. 38. To maintain silence except when transmitting or receiving firing data and charging. 39. To retain presence of mind. 40. To be careful not to waste ammunition. 41. To use the 30 rounds of ammunition in the right pocket section of the belt only upon the order of an officer. MUSKETRY. 23 42. To remain with tiie liiiiit^ line after bringing up ain- nuinition. 43. To utilize anummitiou of the dead or wounded. 44. Never to attempt to eare for dead or wounded duriiiii the action. 45. To have contidence in liis ability to use tlie bayonet. 46. To a firm determination to dose with the enemy. 47. To preserve the line in charging. 48. To untlerstand that a charge should be slow and steady. (The more agile men must not run away from the slower one.s. ) 49. To form up innnediately after the charge and follow the enemy with tire, not attempting a disorganized pursuit. 50. To understand that it is suicidal to turn his back to an enemy, and that if lie can not advance he must intrench and hold on until dark. 51. To construct hasty cover giving him protection from rifle and shrapnel bullets. 52. To intrench himself at night. 53. To conceal his trench. 54. To provide himself with substantial head cover. 55. To protect himself from flank and enfilade fire. 56. To make loopholes giving him a wide field of fire. 57. To make his trench a comfortable one, so that he can sit in it for several hours without constraint. 58. To count distant groups of objects or beings. 59. To recognize s(>rvice targets. 60. Never to fire until he understands what the target is, at what part he is to fire, and with what sight set- ting. II. CORPORAL. 4. Position. — (1) Marching in line as center skirmisher of squad (124. I. D. R. ) or, (2) when skirmish line is halted, innne- diately behind his squad. 5. Duties.— ! Tars. 42. 222, 2.-.2. 2.54, 2.-)5. 411, and .j51, I. D. 11.. cover in general the corporal's duties.) 1. Ileceives his instructions from the platoon leader. 2. .Vnnounces sight setting. 3. Points out indicated objectives to his squad. 24 MUSKETRY. 4. Assigns as the squad target that portion of the platoon target which corresponds to tlie position of tlie squad in tl>e platoon. 5. Announces class and rate of fire. G. When liis squad is ready to fire, looks toward the platoon leader and holds up his hand. At the platoon leader's signal to commence firing, he sees that the squad opens fire. Thereafter — 1. Requires all to fire from the shoulder. 2. Requires all to use' ordered rate of fire. 3. Assures himself that all fire at designated objective. 4. Prevents slighting of invisible portions of the target for more visible parts. 5. Prevents men from changing fire to unauthorized tar- gets not in the assigned front or sector. 6. Maintains constant observation to the front when squad is firing, for effect of fire ; when squad is not firing, for appearance of enemy. 7. Insures prompt obedience to orders to suspend and cease firing. 8. Makes men utilize ground to fullest extent for con- cealment in firing and advancing. 9. In sight setting, changing sights, and fixing bayonets has front rank perform operations first (rear-rank men increasing rate of fire) and then the rear rank follow while the front-rank men make up for loss of fire for the rear rank, thus insuring that the rate of fire for the squad does not fall off. 10. Prevents increasing vulnerability of the squad while preparing for a rush, and rushes as soon after cease firing as possible. 11. When other squads of his platoon are rushing, or the platoon which is covering the same target as is his platoon is rushing, he has his squad increase its rate of fire to make up for the lost-fire effect of the rushing element. 12. In rushing, causes men to spring to feet, running at full speed ; all men drop to the ground at the same time, and those who are in rear to crawl up to the line. MUSKETRY. 25 13. When rein forcing the liriiij; line, takes over the dulifs of disabled squad leaders. For this purpose his squad may ilroj) into line at one i)lace and he may move to the rij^ht or left where there is a squad leader needed. If there are no vaeaneies caused by disabled scjuad leaders, he drops into line and as- sists the squad leaders wlui nvr there. 14. Prevents decreasing; rate of lire when men are trans- niittiuK data to arriving: supports. 15. Prevents wasting of ammunition. 16. I'revents use of 30 rounds in right-pocket section of belts, exce])t on order of an oflicer. 17. Distributes amnuuiilion of dead and wouikIcmI jukI ammunition brought up from rear. 18. I'revents decreasing the rate of tire while ammunition is being distributed, or when at other times there is reasonable assurance that the fire will continue to be effective without further control. 19. Notilies the platoon leader when the ammunition in the bandoliers has been iised. 20. Looks to the rear only at the sound of his platoon leader's whistle "Attention." 21. Takes his position in rear of his squad when it is tir- ing and remains there, where he can control its fire, and only crawls into line and adds his ritle when all control is lost (short ranges). 22. To control his squad he does not walk up and down behind it, but rolls along behind his line and keejis down. 23. Leads his squad in moving to the front or rear. 24. Must know thoroughly the drill regulation signals, and have a good practical knowledge of the theory of lire. 25. In rushing, maintains the direction of advance of his squad, so as not to blanket the tire of scpiads in his rear. 26. Takes advantage of every lull in the action and every favorable opportunity to reorganize his s(piad and get it more under control. 27. Checks every breach of fire discipline, abates excite- ment, and prevents any man from leaving the squad to go to the rear for any purpose whatsoever. 26 MUSKETRY. 28. If called out of line to act as guide, notifies desig- nated private (103, I. I). R.) to take command of squad. III. PLATOON GUIDES. 6. Position. 1. Behind lii-ini: line, near the platoon leader. (163, I. D. II.) 2. Advancing in line, behind center of platoon. (213 and 223, I. D. R.) 3. "Advanci- l)y thin lines," leads even numbered lines. (218, I. D. R.) 7. Duties.— (104, 213, 223, 229, 2.52, 367, 375, and 376, I. D. R.) 1. The platoon leader's assistant, and may be assigned any duty the platoon leader sees fit. 2. Keeps adjoining units under observation. 3. Watches firing line. 4. Checks every breach of fire discipline. 5. Prevents skulking, men leaving the ranks at any time to care for wounded, etc. 6. Designates new squad leaders and organizes new squads when necessary. 7. Attaches men that h.ave become separated from their own squads to other squads. 8. Insures prompt and orderly advance. 9. On joining firing line from the support takes over du- ties of sergeants disabled. 10. May receive and transmit signals to the captain. 11. If the platoon leader is disabled, he takes over his duties. Hence he should know what the platoon leader is doing and how. 12. When taking over the duties of the platoon leader he calls the senior corporal of his platoon out to act as guide. IV. THE PLATOON LEADER. (The fire controller.) 8. Position. — Where he can best — 1. Control the squads constituting his platoon. (2.52, I. D. R.) 2. Observe the target and fire effect. (252, 414, 415, I. D. R., and 216, S. A. F. M.) 3. Observe the captain for signals or commands. (234 and 2.51, I. D. R.) MUSKETRY. 27 4. In "Advaiu'e l».v thin lines," leads odd nunihi'nMl lines. (218. I. I). U.) 9. Duties.— (0, 42, 104. 229. 231-233, 244, 24.'5-2o7, 310. .37r., ;iii(l .").")(». I. D. U.) Controls tlie lire of his platoon and in his lire orders — 1. Receives his orders from the company comm.iiKlt'r. 2. If necessary, may indicate the tire position that has been ordered. 3. Announces sight setting, 4. Points out designated targets to his platoon. If prac- ticable; otherwise to his corporals only, or 5. When the target can not be seen, indicates an aiming target. 6. Assigns targets to insure that the entire front or sector given him by the company commander will be covered with tire. 7. Gives class of tire. 8. Announces rate of tire. 9. If commanding a tlank platoon, details a man to watch for signals from the combat pjilrols. 10. When his corporals have signaled that their squads are ready to lire, signals the captain by looking toward him and holding up hand. 11, When captain signals " Commence tiring," repeats same to corporals. Thereafter— 1. Observes for tire effect, 2. When platoon is not tiring, takes the necessary steps to insure that the front assigned is kept luider constant observation for any appearance of the enemy or any change of position, 3. Changes sight setting of his platoon when necessary. 4. Regulates rate of tire. f). Increases rate of tire when large and distinct targets appear, and decreases it when the target becomes small and indistinct. 6. Prevents decrease in rate of fire when — (a) Changing sight setting. (b) Preparing for rushes. (c) Fixing bayonets. (d) Transmitting firing data to supports. (e) Distributing ammunition. 28 MUSKETRY. 7. Increases the rate of lire to cover the advance of adja- cent units ; for this purpose progress and move- ments of adjoining units are Ivept under observa- tion. 8. Maintains direction of advance of his platoon in rushing, so as not to bhinlfs. (2.34. I. D. R.) 13. Duties. — Before fire action : 1. In compliance with tlie ma.j«»r's orders, conducts his company to the i)lace of deployment in the best manner. (212 and 207. I. D. R.) 2. Designates target and allots jtart to each i^latoon. (24.'i and 240. I. D. R.) 3. Determines the range. (240 and 240. I. D. R.) 4. Announces sight settiug. (240, I. D. R.) 80 MUSKETRY. 5. Indicates the class of lire. (249, I. D. R.) 6. Time to open tire. (249, I. D. R.) 7. Informs tlie subordinates as to tlie location of the battalion commander and, when necessary, an- nounces his own position. During the action: 1. Observes fire effect. (249, 414, 415, I. D. R., and 216, S. A. F. M.) 2. Corrects material errors in sight setting. (249, I. D. R.) 3. Prevents exhaustion of ammunition. (249, 550, and 551, I. D. R.) 4. Distributes ammunition received from the rear. (249 I. D. R.) 5. Provides for the collection and distribution of the ammunition of the dead and wounded. (551, I. D. R.) 6. Notifies the major when the ammunition in the bandoleers has been used. 7. Is on the alert for the major's signals or commands. (226 and 234, I. D. R.) 8. In the absence of express directions from the major, if commanding a flank company, determines when advances by rushes shall be attempted. (311, I. D. R.) 9. Indicates size of fractions to rush. (311, I. D. R.) 10. Leads a rush by entire company. (223, I. D. R.) 11. Leads the charge. (319, I. D. R.) 12. When necessary, designates new platoon leaders and sees that new squads are organized and new squad leaders designated to replace those disabled. (104 and 375, I. D. R.) IX. BATTALION STAFF. 14. Positions. — Battalion adjutant and battalion sergeant ma- jor, with major. Mounted orderlies, both with major (one with major and one with adjutant) until horses are sent to rear, when both may be with the horses or one take the horses and the other remain with the major. MUSKETRY. 81 15. Duties. — All assist the major in any way dircctod by — (a) Kec'«»iiiiaissaiK-e. (5G5, I. D. U.. and 25, F. S. K.) (6) Observation of the firing line. (c) Maintaining contact with regimental headquarters. (d) Maintaining contact with the support. (e) Receiving, conununicating, and sending visual signals from and to front and rear. (/) Observing lire effects and progress of events. ((/) Keeping copies of all orders, messages, and other data necessary for his war diary. (35, F. S. K.) When there is only one range finder to the battalion, the bat- talion sergeant major is the " Battalion range taker." When not actually engaged in taking ranges, he assists the major as heretofore outlined or. preferably, he may be charged with the duty of maintaining communication with the companies of the firing line. The major designates a sergeant to take charge of the bat- talion combat train. Under the major's direction, this sergeant — (a) Conducts the combat train as far to the front with ihe battalion as directed. (6) Issues amnuinition to the battalion. (c) Takes the combat train to rendezvous for refilling, un- der direction of the regimental commander. The emi)ty combat wagons of a brigade are usually sent to the distributing station in a body. (d) Rejoins the battalion, if it is not in action, or, if it be engaged, joins or establishes communication with the regimental reserve. (548. 549. and 553, I. D. R.) X. THE MAJOR. The battalion is the attack unit whether acting alone or as a part of a larger force. (305. I. D. R.) 16. Position (the general rules for a colonel apply). 1. Where he can best — (c) Direct the reinforcing of the firing line from the support. (315, I. D. R.) (&) Observe the progress of events. (369. I. D. R. ) (c) Maintain contact with regimental headquar- ters. (309. I. 1). R.) 2. On the firing lino when all the supports have joined. (315, I. D. R.) 82 MUSKETRY. 17. Duties. — GENKRAL RULES. 1. Conducts liis hattaliou nccordinj;- to the sector nnd the mis- sion assigned liiui. 2. Directs first disposition of tlie battalion l)y tactical orders, giving subordinates — (a) Information of tlie enemy. (&) Position of supporting and neighboring troops. (c) The general object to be attained. (d) The special problem for each company. (291, I. D. R.) 30.3 I. D. R. the primary apportionment of the target. (e) The point of time, if practicable, at whicli tlie fire fight is to open. (304, I. D. R.) (/) Oi'ders for flank protection and reconnaissance, un- less specifically provided for by higher authority. (293, 397, and 398, I. D. R.) (g) His position and that of the next higher com- mander. 3. Controls, supports, dispatches, reinforcements from support to firing line. (226 and 297, I. D. R.) 4. Controls subsequent movements by suitable orders or com- mands. (291, I. D. R.) 5. Regulates ammunition supply, under which heading he (316 and 317, F. S. R. ; the combat train is the Immediate reserve supply of the battalion) — (a) Is responsible for the proper use of the combat train. (6) insures maintenance of the prescribed allowance at all times. (c) Causes combat trains to march Immediately in rear of the battalion unless directed otherwise. (548, I. D. R.) (d) When battalion deployed on his own initiative. Indi- cates whether extra ammunition shall be Issued. (294. I. D. R.) (e) When battalion deployed pursuant to orders from higher authority, causes issue of extra ammuni- tion imless specifically ordered not to do so. (294 and 548, I. D. R.) MUSKETRY. 33 (/) A\'li('ii coiiiliat wa^'otis jirc ciiiiit ic^d, directs tliciii to l)ri)]K'r rciuk'zvoiis (<> l»e rrlilletl. (HiS, I. I). R.) ((/) Sees tliJit eoiiihat wajrons and Itolts of men are re- lilled as soon as i)ossil»le afliT an «'iif;af,'t'iiK'iit. (."53. I. D. II.) (I. ;N!aiMtaiiis contact \\\\\\ ad.joiiiin:^ troojis. (30!). I. I). K.) 7. May liarnionizo ran.u'os used Ity tlio conipanii's on tlie lirini; line. 8. IX'tt'i-nunos when bayonets sliall be fixed. (31.S, I. D. R.) 9. Sul>jert to orders from liiulier autliority, «leterinines tlie l)oint from wlncli the cliarse is to be made. (310, I. D. R. ) Tt. Ord.-rs the charfie. (318, I. D. R.) SPECI.VT.. 1. In attack: (^0 May .select forn:ation in wliicli companii's advance. (212, I. D. R.) (b) Designates — 1. The direction of the objective. (303, I. D. R. ) 2. The companies for the firing line. 3. The compaines for tlie support. 4. The order and front of the comjianies in the tiring line. 5. The right or left company of the firing line as the base company, 6. If he desires, when the advance by rushes is to start. (311, I. D. R.) 2. In defense: (a) Describes the front of each company. (292, I. D. R.) (b) Assigns sector of tire. (244 and 302, I. D. R.) (c) Locates tire, communicating, and cover trenches. (d) Directs preparation of obstacles. (c) Assigns companies to construct trenches and ob- stacles. (/) Details troops to occupy trenches. (.321. I. D. R.) (i/) Causes firing line and supjiorts to fix bayonets when a charge by the enemy is imminent. (324, I. D. R. ) (h) Seeks opportunities for counter attack. (326, I. D. R.) 34 MUSKETRY. XI. THE COLONEL. 18. Position (.360. .380. ami .528, I. D. R.) 1. Advuncins to the battle field as — («) ludependent coininander ordinarily marches with the advance jiuard in order that he may— 1. Receive infoi-mation promptly. 2. Personally see the situation (reconnoiter). 3. Order the deployment. 4. Begin the action strictly iu accordance with his own wishes. (b) Subordinate commander. (427, I. D. R.) After re- ceiving his order for the action, precedes his com- mand as far as possible in order to — 1. Personally reconnoiter the ground. 2. Be prepared to issue his orders promptly. 2. During the action, such as will enable him to — (a) Observe the progress of events. (h) Receive and transmit messages and orders. (c) Be in constant, direct, and easy communication with the reserve. (369, I. D. R.) 19. Duties: («) After having received his orders, the regimental com- mander leads his regiment forward In column or in line of columns until the time arrives for issuing the regimental order. He then (426, I. D. R.) — (&) Assigns targets and sectors or .tasks to battalions and special units. (.842, 381, and 426. I. D. R.) (c) Provides for necessary reconnais.sance to front and flank. (428, I. D. R.) ((J) Announces his position and also that of the next higher commander. (e) Controls the reserve as the tactical situation de- mands. (441, I. D. R.) (/) Regulates ammunition supply. (316, F. S. R., and .552, I. D. R.) Note. — The colonel is assisted in the performance of his duties by the regimental staff. CHAPTER II. MILITARY TERMS. 20. Tlio avor;ifie man upon enlisting; in the Armj' finds him- self in a little coinnuinity set apart from the rest of the world, stranj,'e in its life, its customs, and its lanj^uage. Misunderstandinjis are avoided and instruction facilitated if the recruit in his early training is taught to talk tlie lany^age . The following exercise is suggested : The sciuad is taken to some prominent point from which there is a good view of the surrounding country, or. if available, a landscape target may be used. The instructor describes in detail simple prominent features, such as a part of the skyline or the line of a bank or hedge, and then requires each man in the squad to describe in similar terms another part of that line. The men are instructed as to : Skyline, horizon, crest of hill, ridge, knoll, peak, cliff, col or .saddle, gentle slope, steep slope, hollow or valley, spur, ravine, clearing, fold in the ground, dense cover, culvert, cut embank- iuent, sunken road, parapet, crossroads, road fork or road junc- tion, right and left bank of a stream, a path. The shape and nature of the ground is described ; whether it is level, undulating, or broken ; rock, sandy, or pasture land. Natural and artificial features, the different kinds of trees, fences, undergrowth, and the shape and size of the fields with the col(»r of the earth or crops growing are iiointed out and ex- plained. The approximate measurements of objects, roughly estimated, are given, a.s, for instance, whether they are large, small, of moderate size, tall, short, wide, or narrow. These rough measurements often help to distinguish objects, such as trees, fields, hedges, or houses, from one or more objects of a similar nature. Jlen are first practical in completing the description of sections or areas of ground and features com- menceproacli, etc. This is of the greatest military importance. Tlierefore, while on tliis subject the instructors train the men to recognize all features of military importance, such as good defensive positions, good lines of approach, good halting places for attack, covered approaches, dead ground, obstacles, and good or dangerous cover. When the men have learned to recognize all features of military importance the instructor indicates an area of ground and ques- tions each man of the squad as to what military features may be seen. The men then describe these military features in cor- rect terms. The men should also be taught simple geometrical terms, as round, square, conical, right angles, parallel, horizontal, vertical, perpendicular, etc., and such military terms as line, column, infantry, and cavalry, etc. CTTAITKK ITT. THE THEORY OF FIRE. 22. Tlio fire director works witli a most powerful and flexible medium — the fire of the modern rillc He should l>e a master of this medium. al>le to jrauw its powers and to recofndze its weaivuess. lie must know when it is protitalile to fire and when it is not profital)le. He should know how to increase fire elli- ciency when necessary acc rill(> to the target ihf). .(.S) Line of aim. — Tiie prolongation of llie line of collimation established by the front and rear sights or by the telescopic sight. ••'(4) Line of site. — The imaginary line joining the target and the axis of the l»i)re at the muzzle {bf). v(5) Line of departure. — The prolongati(»n of the axis of the bore at the iustaut the bullet !eaves the rifle {be). 37 38 MUSKETRY. (G) Angle of departure. — The viTticul ani^le between the line of departure and the line of site. It is the angle of elevation plus the jump. (7) Angle of elevation. — The vertical angle between the line of site and the prolongation of the axis of the bore when the riUc is aimed (/(). (8) ftuadrant angle of departure.^ — The vertical angle between the lino oi departure and a horizontal plane passing through the axis of the bore at the muzzle (y). It is the angle of departure plus the angle of site. (9) Quadrant angle of elevation. — The vertical angle between the axis of the bore when the rifle is aimed and a horizontal plane pa.ssing through the axis of the bore at the muzzle {x). It is the angle of elevation plus the angle of site. (10) Angle of site. — The vertical angle between the line of site and a horizontal plane passing through the axis of the bore at the muzzle (~). (11) Angle of fall. — The vertical angle between the.. line of site and the tangent to the trajectory at the point of fall (/>:). (12) Jump. — The vertical angle through which the barrel moves during the travel of the projectile from breech to muzzle (/). It is the difference between the angle of elevation and the angle of departure. (13) Point of impact. — The point at which the bullet strilies (14) Point of aim. — The point at which the line of aim is or should be directed (/). ^ (15) Initial velocity. — The rate of speed of the bullet as it leaves the muzzle. (16) Remaining velocity. — The velocity of the bullet at any point of the trajectory. (17) Plane of fire. — The vertical plane containing the line of departure. (IS) Drift. — The departure of the bullet from the plane of fire. (19) Ordinate. — The vertical distance between the trajectory and the line of sight. This distance is measured at any point in the flight of the projectile and on a line perpendicular to the line of sight. (20) Shot group. — The pattern made on the target by all of the bullets fired by an individual or a body of men. If made on a vertical target, it is called a vertical shot group; if on a horizontal target, a horizontal shot gi'oup. MUSKETRY. 30 ^(21) The sheai. — A cpiu ^ coiitainiii!^ all the trajectories of a series of shots. I^ is called an individual sheaf when the series of shots in tiie jtattern has l)een lired by a single individual. It is called a colle<'tive sheaf when the pattern is the result of the collective hriiiir of more than one individual. ,,(22) The rifling. — A jjun barrel is said to be rilled when it lias spirtijl jjrooves cut down the bore. The rifling directly affects the trajectory, by enabling the elongated bullet to be used instead of the round ball of former days. The advantage of this bullet over the round ball is that the long pointed bullet has great weight in comitarison to the surface directly olTered to the air. The combination of the rirting ami tlie long bullet also gives the bullet stability or steadi- ness of flight and increases the accuracy of the arm. THE TIJA.IKCTORY. n. The curvature or shape of the trajectory is influenced by — (1) The propelling force (explosion of the powder charge). (2) Gravity. (3) The resistance of the air. 25. (1) The proiiclliiu/ force. — The explosion of the charge drives the bullet forward and causes it to leave the muzzle with a very high rate of speed. This rate is called the initial velocity. The service amnmnition is loaded with a charge of powder which, when fired from a standard Springfield rifle with se- lected bullets and with the air at a temperature of 70° P. at the time of firing, gives a muzzle velocity of 2.700 feet per .second. That is to say, this bullet would travel 2.700 feet in the first second if the rate of motion remained unchanged. Due to unavoidable variations in manufacture, this standard Initial velocity will vary by plus or minus (±) 20 foot-seconds (f. s. ) even with the best ammunition. Further variations in initial velocity are caused by variations in temperature, barometric firessure, and humidity. For additional study o'f this subject the student is referred to Ordnance publication No. 192,'?, "Description of the United States magazine rifle." 26. (2) Gravity. — Gravity is the natural attraction which draws all unsupported bodies toward the center of the earth with ever-increasing speeroximation. thus: The height of the vertical-shot group is equal to the depth of the horizontal-shot group multiplied by the natural tangent of the angle of fall, and the depth of the horizontal-shot group is equal to the height of the vertical-shot group multiplied by the natural cotangent of the angle of fall. 37. When a number of marksmen fire either simultaneously or "at will" with tlu> same jioint of aim and the same eleva- tion the bullets will form a vertical-shot group having the 44 MTJSKETEY. general shape of an ellipse, with its major axis vertical, and will be symetrically grouped about the center of impact — not necessarily about tlie r^'^int of aim. They will be grouper case but a loss in the case of the cav- alryman. ^ 42. The term " danger space " is not to be confused with the* term "beaten zone." which means tlie intersection of the cone of dispersion (or sheaf) with the surface on wliich the objective f-f the fire .stands or the space on the ground in winch the bull^'ts strike in a series of shots fired by a body of soldiers with the same aiming i>oint and the same rear sight setting. Swept space is the danger space as modified by the ground slopes. In dealing with danger spaces it is usual to distinguish be- tween the danger space and the swept space, both of which are functions of the mean trajectory, and between these and the 4S MUSKETRY. dangerous zone, wliicli is a rvinctioii of tlie wliole or a part of tlie cone of lire. It will be observed that for a given height of target and point of aim the danger space is of tixed dimensions at the several ranges, while the swept space varies in addition with the slope of the ground, being shorter on rising ground and longer on falling ground than the danger space, and all the functions of the dangerous zone, such as the density of the group at given distances from the center of impact, etc., are correspondingly modified. 43. The fire controller must remember that the danger space under 700 yards is affected by the position of the firer (height of muzzle from the ground), the danger space increasing as the height of the muzzle decreases. At the longer ranges no mate- rial effect is felt from the different positions of the firer due to the Increased angle of fall. The Ordnance Department publishes a table of danger spaces calculated under the assumption that the gun when fired is 12 inches above the ground, that the height of a man is 6S inches, that the head of a man on horseback is 8 feet above the ground, and that the point of aim is at the center of the target. Under these conditions the total dangerous spaces for infantry and cavalry at the various ranges are given as follows : Range. Infantry. Cavalry. 100 6S0. 9 468. 3 200 547.3 666.5 300 540.4 676.8 400 672.9 633. 7 500 628. 3 670. 5 600 696. 7 731.9 700 420. S 801.5 800 301.8 473.8 900 233.7 3.32. 6 1,000 187.2 275.3 EFFECT OF SLOPES AND SITES. 44. The influence of the ground on fire effect is manifested by a modification of the depth beaten and grazed by the cone of collective fire. This depth decreases if the surface of reception rises, and increases if the surface of reception falls with respect to the line of site. The effect of slopes and sites on the efficacy of fire is so important that it is essential fcr all officers and noncommis- MUSKETRY. 49 sifHietl officers to understand tli(inni;:ldy t\\o itrohabilities of tire elTect as increased or dlniinisiied Ity tlie inclination of tlu? ground witli resi>ect to tiie line of site. In the attack, such information will guide them In adopting .suital)le forniJitions antl directinj; tlio tire of their or^'anizations to the best advania^re. In defcns«» sudi kno\\ie«3j'rf.*»3j'»»' t t 1 Fio. .5. Let CA be the line of site, C.U.I/ be the mean tra.iertory, CVY be the upper limit of the 75 per cent zone, and CLL be the lower limit of the 75 per cent zone. By reference to the figure it is i-eadily seen that when the column is on rising ground, RAR, only about one-fourth of tlie 62 MUSKETRY. column is under fire; on levt'l Kfound, DAB, about one-half of the cohunn is under fire ; while on falling ground, PAF, all of the oolumn is under tire. But it will be noted also that the changes in ground .slope do not effect any change in the position of the linear element A, at the head of the cohnnn, with reference to the mean trajec- tory. Hence, barring ricochets, the percentage of hits to be expected on the head of the column would be the same In any of the three cases notetl. From this comes the principle that ground slopes affect hits only in those portions of the target that are in front or in rear of the line at which the fire is directed. 47. The mistake must not be made of assuming that reverse slopes are safe because out of sight, and that the formation to adopt behind crests is the line of skirmishers. This false as- sumption has cost many lives in battle. As an illustration of the effect of fire against a line of skir- mishers on the reverse slope of a hill may be mentioned a fire problem conducted at the School of Musketry in which the tar- gets were invisible to the firers. Fig. 6. A skirmish lina of 127 kneeling figures on a i' reverse slope 50 yards in rear of the aiming point, on the crest, received 251 hits on 97 figures. Again, out of a total of 2,429 shots fired by a company of 122 men at a range of 900 yards in the same prob- lem, 116 figures out of the 127 were hit. 48. The following demonstration at the School of Musketry during the special course for noncommissioned officers, 1915, shows in a very graphic manner the difference in firing at tar- gets on a slightly rising slope and level ground. Object. — To illustrate the influence on the beaten zone of ground rising with respect to the line of sight and the scope of a single sight setting when the ground ?$ favorable. MUSKETRY. 68 Method. — (1) A )»l!il(»tiii <>r 24 men fired a series of 10 shots IHM- iiiiin with a sight settiiij; of 580 yards and ainiiii« at tar- get A. (2) Same siylit sotting iind aiming at target A, tiring s;ime ninnlier of" r<»un yards (ease 1, fig. 5), Results. — rMrst case — rising slope, (53 hit.s, target A; 11 hits, target B ; none, target C Target. — (2) Same target, case 2, figure 5, h>vel. Result. — Second case — level ground, 57 hits, target A; (JO hits, target B; 13 hits, target 0. From the foregoing, certain well-defined conclusions may be drawn with reference to the utilization of ground slopes. 49. On ground raisin g witlL respect to the line of sight the supports and reserves may be placed closer to the firing' line than on level ground, so far as danger from fire directed on the first line is concerned. The steeper the .slope the closer in tliey may be. On falling slopes the supports and reserves must be farther back than on level ground except when the slope exceeds the Jingle of fall enough to give a defiladed space nearer the firing line. A knowledge of anglt>s of fall, of slopes and of their relation to eacli other are of great importance to leaders of figliting men. The o.strichlike tendency to think the supports secure from fire because the enemy cun not see Ihem nuist be overcome. No one is expected to work out on the ground the fornuil;e for reduction of dispersions to different slopes, but it can be re- membered that the effect ive^ (75 perj^t^^lepth_of_beateu zone atSOt) yards extends from the muzzle to 5(30 yards ; at 1,000 yards it is reproache.s (the lieight of the origin being below the ])oint of aim). Moreover, the position of the shot group does not depend on the height of the origin of tire. (2) It gives a more advantageous position to the shot group and makes the zone grazed by the whole cone longer. (3) The ricochets from the lower half of the sheaf are effective. (4) When aim is taken at the middle of the object, if a shot is fired with a little too much elevation, or if too much of the front sight is used the bullet may pass above the head of a standing man. This is avoided by aiming at the bottom of the target. (5) The frcmt sight which covers about half the height of a man standing when the hitter is at a distance of 200 yards is not so likely to liide the ohject from view. With small objects, such as a trench where oidy a line of heads is visible, if aim be not taken at the bottom edge of the line of heads the front sight is likely to obscure the target in such manner that the soldier will get few hits. (6) The lower edge of a line of figures, be they only heads or prone figures, furnishes a more distinct aiming point than does the top edge of the target. COMIUNED SIGHTS. (Par. 217, S. A. F. M.) 52. rmnhined sights is the siiuult.meous use of two or more sight settings in order to increase the depth of the heaten zone. The object of combined sights is to cqnipensate for an error In the determination of the range and to increase the probability 58 MUSKETRY. of liittinp: the tar^ot. Such tire loses in concentration and lience must he offset hy an increase in vohinie. Tlie two i)r(>l)l(>ins connected with tlie use of conihined siglits are — (1 ) At wluit ran.Lic' slionld they first be used? (2) AMiiit sliouhl he tlie difference in sight setting? In theory, conihined sights are employed when the i)rohal)le error in the determination of the range exceeds half the depth of the effective (75 per cent) heaten zone. The number of sights to be employed is found by dividing twice the prol>able error in i-ange ))y the depth of the 75 i)er cent beaten zone, any fraction in the quotient being considered as 1. Lacking an instrument or table for determining the exact depths of beaten zones at given ranges, the fire director may accept this rule of thumb as giving fairly satisfactory results. The rule is as follows: Between 1,000 and 2,700 yards the depth of the effective (75 per cent) beaten zone of average shots is 150 yards ; at ranges less than 1,000 yards or greater than 2,700 yards the depth of this same zone is 200 yards. In using combined sights the elevations employed should differ from each other by an amount equal to the depth of the 75 per cent beaten zone, the center of the resulting-shot group being at the estimated range. For example, assuming a 10 per cent error and an estimated range of 1.400 yards, the total zone to be covered would be 280 yards. The depth of beaten zone being taken at 150 yards, then 150 is contained twice in 280, and hence two elevations should be used. As these eleva- tions are to differ by 150 yards, and as the resulting-shot group is to be centered at the estimated range (1,400 yards), then one elevation should be 75 yards less than 1.400, and the other 75 yards more tiian 1.400, 1. e., 1,325 and 1,475 are the elevations to he used. In like manner, assuming a 10 per cent error and an estimated range of 1,700 yards, the elevations required are found to be 1550, 1,700, and 1,8.50. ' 53. When the range is known combined sights are not used. Combined sights are not used by a force of less strength than two platoons. Paragraph 217, S. A. F. M., says, "The expe- dient will not usually be employed by bodies of less strength than a battalion." This statement apparently applies only to fire of position at the extreme ranges. MUSKETRY. 67 54. In tlio nvor.'ipro <-(»iiiii.iny. :inil coiisidprin? a prohnble error of 10 [tor (-cut ill tlip (h'tiMMiiiiiatioii of the rnii^re and also that the tactieal situath»n demands that a yiven tartlet he taken under tire, then eoinhined sights shouhl l)e used to eoinpen.sate for this It) per cent error as follows: Two elevations at ranges greater than l,fK)0 yard.s, three elevations at ranges greater than l.r/K) yards, and four elevations at ranges greater than 2,'.iiH) yards. Thes(» limiting ranges would he increased if the marksman- 8hip fell helow the average or if there was a greater precision in the determinatiftn of the range; they would he decreased when the marksmanship was hetter than the average and when the prohahle error in range was greater than 10 per cent. The use of combined siglits to compensate for probable errors [n range must not be confused with their use to secure distri- bution in d«'pth on a column formation. In the latter case the ranges at which combine^l sights are necessary and the num- ber of elevations required would depend upon the depth of the target and slope of the ground on which it stood. TIIK HATTI.K SHJIIT. 55. The .setting of tlie rear sight when the leaf is dovra is termed tlie " battle sight." In theory this sight corresp(nids to an elevation of 547 yards. In practice it is found that the average battle sight when used by troops corresponds to an elevation of al)f)Ut 4l'C) yards. It is not good practice to consider that the battle sight must be used at all ranges within its zone, i. e., at all ranges less than 436 yards. Tlie correct use of the battle sight is in emer- gencies when, for any reason, it is impossible to use the leaf sight with greater accuracy. Examples of a correct use of the battle sight would be when the vulnerable surface of the target is .so large, and it is at such close range that errors in sight setting of even several hundred yards would have no tendency to re will bi' obtained with the battle sight if the sohlier is tauglit to aim always at the bivast of tlie enemy irrespective of whether the enemy be mounted or dismounted and, in the hitter case, irrespective of his posture — standing, kneeling, sitting, or prone. f CHAPTER IV. INSTRUMENTS. 57. Certain instninionts are necessary for the proper ol)serva- tiiin and control of the lire of modern arms. These are The range finder. The field glass. The musketry rule. Conditions of Held service reqnire that these instnunonts l»e rnpcged in construction and simple to use. In jicneral. the field jrlass is required for oliservation of the terrain and the effect of fire ; some form of instrument, such as the mil scale, is re- quired for determining angles; and the range tinder is required, or at least desirable, for determining ranges. THK KA.\(;i-: FINDKR (see par. 121). 58. Field glasses. — The Itinocular glass, consisting of two com- plete optical .system.s, connected b.v a rigid or hinged frame, is universally u.sed for military purpo.ses. However, if one of the two optical systems should be damaged, or if parallelism of the two systems should be destroyed by accident to the frame or displacement of the lenses or prisms, it is well to remember that the field glass can still be used effectively as a monocidar. The two types of field glasses in connnon iise are tlie Galilean glass and the Porro iirisiii glass. 59. The Galilean glass. — The Galilean glass has convex objec- tives and concave eyepieces. It is of low power (magnifying from 2 to ;i diameters) and is a conii)aratively inexpensive instru- ment. The type A and tyjie 15 glas.ses of the Signal Cori)s are examples of this form <»f field glass. Figure 7 shows dia- gramatically the arrangement of lenses in the Galilean glass. 59 60 MUSKETRY. In this field glass the rays from an object are converged by llie object glass (O) and would normally focus at the focal plane (C) and there form the inverted image b — a were it not that the double concave eyeglass or ocular (/)) is so located in the barrel of the glass as to intercept the pencils before they are focused. This double concave eyeglass diverges these pen- cils and forms a magnified erect image a — b apparently at E. Due to the diverging action of the concave eye lens the cone of the pencils entering the eye is larger than the pupil of the eye, and therefore but a small part of the field gathered by the the object glass is utilized, which causes field glasses of this type to have a comparatively small field of view. Fig. 7. In the Galilean type of field glass the two optical systems are lasually mounted rigidly and a single focusing screw moves both eyepieces in or out for adjustment of the focus only. The concave-eyepiece lenses are quite large; and for ordinary eyes accurate adjustment for interpupillary distance is therefore unnecessary. This means that the two lens tubes do not have to be hinged so that their distance apart can be adjusted to correspond with the distance apart of the pupils of the eye. The optical principle of the Galilean glass makes it necessary to change the focus for maximum enlargement when viewing objects at different distances unless both objects are at a distance of several hundred yards from the observer. With this glass the eye, by being trained, can get a temporary focus with wrong adjustment of the eyepieces ; but this is very hard on the eyes, and the glass may seem to go out of focus after a time because of eye fatigue and inability to keep up the strain. For this reason the focusing of the Galilean glass .should be done carefully. MirSKETRY. ei 60. To focus the Galilean glass. — Start with the eyepiece well in, turn the fdcusinj; screw until the field is in !ii»parent focus, and then ;;() on heyund al)(»ut one turn of the .screw. Then very shiwiy turn tlie screw Ixick until the focus i.s obtained afiaiii. ir llii> ^^lass is tile jtersonal i)rniu'rty of the user, it is well to pul a niarlv on llie Itarrei corresponding to the correct focus for a ranjjce of about HOO yards. It will then he correct for every- thinji beyond tliat distance. If the user's eyes have marked different optical characteristics, so that the broad focus of this type of gla.ss will not be approximately correct for each eye, he siiouhl fret a glass of the prism type witli .separately adjusted eyi'ideces. However, there are ghisses of tlie (Jalilean type, of foreign manufacture, with interpupillary adjustment and sepa- rately adjustable eyei)ieces. • 61. The Porro prism glass. — The Porro prism glass has con- vex objectives and eyepieces and prisms for erecting the image and shortening the length of the glass. It can be built of the highest powers and has a practically universal focus. In the astronomical telescoi>e, whicli consists simply of a con- vex object gl a. ss and a smaller convex eyepiece, the image is magnified but inverted. It is possible to erect this image by a system of erecting lenses, but this increases the length of the telescope and usually decreases the brilliancy of the image and the clearness of definition. In 1850 Porro, a French engineer, discovered ,a combination of two prisms which, when inserted between the object glass and eyepiece of an astronondcal telescope, showed the image erect or in its natural position. These prisms have an additional advantage — the ray is twice turned upon itself, and the tele- scope can in con.sequence be shortened. Figure 8 shows the path of rays through tlie prisms. L Fig. 8. 62. The Porro prism glass h.ns two ndvantsges inherent in the astronomical telescope. It is possible to get a large magnifying power combined with a large field of view. In addition, by 62 MUSKETRY. the use of prisms, the glass can be reiluced iu size to very small dimensions. This alone makes it the ideal glass for military purposes. The Signal Corps furnishes four glasses of this type, viz, type C, 10 power; type D, 8 power; type E, 6 power; and type EE, similar to type E, but equipped with a mil scale ill the tieUl and with other constructional reliiiemeiits. A sp«'ial sight scale in addition t<.> the mil scale has been applied to the type EE glass (par. 74, tig. 10). The glasses of the prismatic type are usually built with a jointed frame which permits of an adjustment so that the dis- tance between the optical axes of the eyepieces can be made exactly that of the distance between the pupils of the user's eyes. There is a scale at the joint with tigures GO and 70 and intermediate divisions. The normal interpupillary distance is id»out 64 millimeters (2% inches) and this scale shows the distance between the optical axes of the eyepieces in milli- nieters. Many glasses have an adjustment ratchet or stop which drops into a notch, and being once set for a certain interpupillary distance the glass can be opened until the etop drops into Its notch and the iuterpupiUaiy distance will be correct for the user. 63. To determine interpupillary distance. — Point the glass at the sky and open and close the joint until the field ceases to be two overlapping circles and appears to be one sharply defined circle. The interpupillary distance can then be read in milli- meters from the scale at the joint. If one knows this constant for his eyes, he can at once set it off on the joint scale of a strange pair of glasses ; otherwise the determination must always be made and the glasses adjusted for interpupillaiT dis- tance before attempting to use strange glasses. 64. To focus the eyepiece. — All prism glasses have independ- ent focusing arrangements for each eyepiece. In some types both eyepieces focus with one screw, and, in addition, one of the eyepieces has an independent adjustment. In other types each eyepiece is independently adjustable and there is no common adjusting screw. An index is generally engraved on the barrel and the eyepiece screws in and out, a scale with a middle zero being engraved on its circumference. Each division of the scale corresponds to a movement in or out of one-third millimeter, the movement outward or lengthening the focus being indicated as +. and tlie opposite movement being indicated as — . For a person with normal eyes a prism glass with eyepiece scales set at is MUSKETRY. 68 in focus for evorytliiiij; hi'twccn iilxnjt ."o feet and intinily. If the t'jes are not normal, oi-. in any case, witli !i new glass, each optical system should he focused separately on some object several hundred yards distant after the interpupillary distance has been carefully determined and fidjusted. If tlie glass has the common ajusting screw and scale on hut one eyepiece the eyepiece without the scale should l)e focused lirst and then the other eyepiece adjusted by turning it without touching t lie com- mon niljusting screw. Anytic with one or both eyes abnormal may instantly focus ony prism glass if ho remembers and sets off on the eyepiece ficaleiji tlu» same roiulings that he uses on his own glasses. 65. Characteristics of a good field glass. — The standards for eomparison of field glasses are based on the capabilities of the unaided normal human eye. There are four properties, meas- urable by these standards, that every field glass has, viz, povircr, Jight, field, and definition. ^68. Power. — The power of a field glass Is defined as the ratio of the diameter of an object os seen tlirough the glass to the diameter as seen by the unaided eye. The power of a field glass can be determined with sufficient accuracy by focusing the Instrument on a wall, or, preferably, a range rod at least 200 yards distant. By looking at the object through the Instrument with one eye and at the same time view- ing the object with the other unaided eye it is possible to make a comparison of the apparent length or height of the two Images. The ratio of the two Is the power of the glass. The actual power of most glasses varies more or less from the l)ower marke (juaiity most lre(|uently nciilected in choosing a glass, is delinition ; that is, the shari)ness, the clearness, and the purity of the images seen through it. To obtain good definition it is necessary that si)herical and chromatic aberration be overcome, that the polish of the lenses be a.s perfect as possible, that the l3ns cement possess no in- equalities, that the lenses (and prisms, if any) be well focused and rigidly mounlcd with reference to one another, and, gen- erally, that the instrument be without optical defect. Faults in this direction are discovered at once by examina- tion of definition, whereas in determining the other constants they are hardly noticeable. In comparing tlie definition of any two instruments it is ordinarily necessary only to scan distant objects and observe to what extent details may be distinguished. The following test may be used : Focus on printed matter at a distance just b(\vond that at which perfect clearness is given and gradually approach until the letters are distinctly defined. The instrument with which tho print can he read at the greatest distance has the best definition. 70. Suggestions for the use of glasses in the field. — The strain upon the eye unaccustomed to the use of field glasses is very severe, and without proi)er traniing the advantage to be gained by using the glass is almost negligible. Therefore frequent liractice in observation, using tlie lieh! gla.ss, is necessary to insure proficieney. In using the glasses tliey should be securely focu.' the relation with the eyes con.stant but not so tight as to impress on them the beating of the imlse or the bodily tremors. It nuist be remenibereservation even under the best conditions may cause headache or dizziness. The observer should use tlie glasses as little as possible con- sistent with the work in hand and he should take every oppor- tunity to rest his eyes. Oflicers in charge of observing parties on work requiring continuous observation should see that the observers are frequently relieved and should give every con- sideration to men who complain of eyestrain or lieadaches from the use of field glasses. At present machine gun rompanies are equipped with a 10- power glass. Some men find it impossible to hold a glass of this power steady enough with the hands alone for proper ob- servation. This is largely a matter of practice, but for those who have difficulty in the use of these high-power glasses a re.st is recommended. This may consist of a simple rod with means of attaching it to the glass and permitting of a move- ment of the glass in azimuth and elevation. The rod may be forced into the ground or merely rest on the surface. The rod should be adjustable in length to permit of use while standing or kneeling; its use in the prone position is unnecessary. 71. Care and preservation. — The ordinary military field glass is a rugged, serviceable instrument. Occasionally screws work loose ; therefore all screws should be periodically tightened. In hot, moist climates there is a tendency for the Canada balsam cement between the lenses of the object glasses to deteriorate, and this causes spots on the object glass, but unless the damage is extensive the glass is still usable. The majority of cases of damage to lield glasses, especially those of the pi'ism type, can be traced to the fact that they have been taken apart by their owners who have been unable to put them together again with the exact original adjustment. It is seldom necessary to open a pair of field glasses for cleaning or otherwise, and when it is necessary the work should be done at the factoi'y or by an expert. If a glass has been damaged by a fall or blow and dupli- cation of the image occurs, it may sometimes be corrected by taking one of the lens tubes in each hand and while looking through the glasses cautiously twisting or tui'uing the hands until the duplication disappears. It is never possible entirely and permanently to correct duplication by this means, and the MUSKETRY. 67 Rlnsses sliould be reluriHMl to the iiiiiUcrs for ()V(M-haiil at th(> first (> in Ici-nis ol' n':ii- siixlils - tlic wonl sight Itcin^ nsctl. 76. ('I The finger. 'I'lic linLrcr ni.i.v he nscd in cnicrircncics iind should lie held .-d snch dislMncc Ironi the cyt' as to subtend r»() yards at I.M(M) yards. As the liu^'ers o{' all men are nut the E»=i> nc. 11. same width the distance that the finjier is to he held from the eye must he determined in each <-ase. 77. ((/) The mil rule. — A <5-in(h ruler with a cord 20 inches h)nf? forms a convenient mil' nieasurini: instrument. If con- structed as shown in tipure 12, it will st'rve for measurements of 3(M) mils or less. -/N ^[WN/X^/ts/^^A/WN- -t- 100 20 Inch Cord Fio. 12. THE MUSKETRY RULE. 78. The Ordnance Department makes a comLnnation mil rule and auxiliary rear-sight scale in the form of n musketry rule. (FiRS. l.S and 14.) With this instrument an anj,de may he measui-cd in mils or in terms of the scale ou the rille sight. 70 MUSKETRY. The musketry rule (.onsists of an aluniimmi bar 4f inches long, l\i inches wide and i\ inch thiclv. It is beveled on both ediies and has a grooved slot, in the contpr of whicli Fig. 13. two brass sliders may be moved back and forth. A small spiral spring and friction pin is- set in a hole in each slider so that the pin bears in the slot of the rule. This holds the slider Fig. 14. by friction at the point desired by the operator. A small steel stop pin set in the rule through the beveled edge and projecting into the slot for the sliders keeps the latter from being acci- dentally slipped out of the slots. MUSKETRY. 71 It will rarfly, if cvcf. ln> iicccssMry lo rciiiovo tiii" slidiTS from the rule; but if (liis should have to l>o done for any puri)oso, the stop pin should he pushed out to clear the slot, and ihe sliders may then be slipped into the enlarjietl part of the sl«)t and re- moved. Care should be taken not to lose the spiral sprins and pin which tit in the hole in the slider. In asseuiblinij; the slider, the friction spring; and i)in imist be in place, insert the slider in the enlarj^ed end of the slot, hold l)ack the friction pin with tlie point of a knife or similar instrument, and slip the slider into its grooves in the slot. Push back the stop pin when Ibis opera- tion is completed so that the slider can not slip out of the gi'ooves. 79. In measuring angles, the rule is designed to be held 15 inches from the eye and ])erpendicular to the line of sight. In order to insure this there is a small bole in the center line of the rule, and through this passes a nonstretching cord with a knot in it 15 inches from the rule. The knot is held just iinder the observing eye with one hand while the rule is held with the other hand at right angles to the line of sight, the cord stretched lightly, and the scale in use superimposed on the area under observation. The beveled e(). Announce objective. "A hostile patrol of four men." rUOCEUlIRK. 1. Men set sights at 1,000 yards. 2. All men look to tlieir right front (or along the 2 o'clock line). DESCRIPTION OF TARGET. T&rget Inaistinot using mil scale. rV^r^T— -;a RANGE - 1000 REFERENCE POINT - AT ELEVEN O'CLOCK - THAT SUAHP PEAK. TARGET - niREE IHIRrY O'CLOCK. 100 MU5 13 THE RIGHT OF AN EKSMT'S LINE (C - D) SO U1L3 UMG. Fu;. 15. Horiiimtol Observer. 3. The reference point (stone house) is found in the Indi- cated direction. :!r)i:9°— 17 c 82 MUSKETRY. DSSCBIPIION OF lAE^GET. Target inilotinot using rear sight. RANGK - 1000 tSimfSCE fOIMT - ta EUYBI O'CLOOC BtAT SHAXP PEAK. XARGBT > XHREE XUIRTY O'CLOCK 2 IS^&R SICH7S lb THE BEHT OP AH ENBWr without further orders as soon as the target appears. Reference points are not used when the target is plain and of suci Fig. is. Orders should always be as short as possible without losing clearness. Hence, to use a reference point when not called for is to add more to the order than necessary. Reference points should be definite and easily distingnished . Of what value is it to announce a reference point that is as hard to see as the target? Data given from reference point m ust be com plete . The distance from the reference point to the right, left, oi- center of the enemy's line should always be stated, as well as the width of the target that it is intended to cover. Do not sacrifice clearness to brevity. MUSKETRY. 85 The company is always deployed facing the target . 96. Tlu' syslciii of dcsi riliinu tar;;('ts as ^.'ivcn herein is tliat followed l).v most niilitar.v autlioritios on tliis suhjcct. Some writers sliortoii tlu» form .somewiiat by the so-called unit systeni, giving tlie mimher of rear siglits or fingers as "J. H. etc. but leaving out the unit, this l)eing understood by the men. The School of Musketry board at Fort Sill is unanimously of the opinion that it is preferable to add the unit of measure and say " 2 fingers," " sights," etc. The " face as I face " method, advocated by .some, is not good. A slight difference in the front is likely to cause confusion. Fm;. ]'.i. 97. Suggested exercises.^ — The recruits should lie taught the designation of targets in slow and easy steps. It is assumed that while studying the subject of Instruments he has learned to use the mil. rear sight, and fingers in the measurement of angles. I. — Object: To teach the use of horizontal and vertical clock faces. Method: Many men, due to lack of imagination, will find it hard to understand the ai)plication of the clock face t<» the designation of targets. 86 MUSKETRY. Fi^'uros IS iiiitl 1!» sliow a ;;riiiiliii'al iuf>tli1: teachiii.u," lliat has been succcsslully trunl. Tlie 2-clock faces aie uuule on regular G l)y (j laryet fraiut's. The strings indiciite the line of sight of tlie soldier. The center of tlie vertical clock is at the top of the post. The whole appa- ratus can be made in a very short time and is very useful in stimulating the men's imagination. II. — Object: To teach the selection of a reference point. Method: The squad is taken to some point from which several good reference points might be selected, and the good and bad features of several are pointed out. Men are cautioned that two points of a similar nature in the same field of view are not to be selected. For instance, one of several telegraph poles, one of several trees, etc. Each man is directed to take aim at the reference point and the aim is checked. III. — Object: To use a reference point in connection with the clock system. Method: A reference point is selected and described, using the horizontal clock. A target is named as " Target, 3 o'clock, two sights, a small biish." Each man aims his rifle at the bush, using a sandbag rest. The aim is verified by the instructor. This is repeated luitil all are proficient. IV. — Object: To teach when not to use reference points. Method: At this stage of the instruction it will be found that tlie men have become wedded to reference points and that they will use them in describing objects and targets when such de- scription is unnecessary. The squad under instruction is taken to some point screened from the target. The target is represented by a squad of men concealed a short distance in front of the men under instruc- tion. At a signal from the instructor the squad acting as the target stands up in plain view. The men under instruction then write their description of the target. All solutions are then read and errors pointed out. If advisable, a landscape target may be used to advantage in the designation and recognition of targets. CHAPTER VI. VISUAL TRAINING. 98. One of tlie e.ssentijils in teaching tlie designation and recognition of service targets is the cultivation of the recruit's vision, that is to teacli him what to look for and Jioir to loolc for it. (I'ar. ].")7, I. D. K., in part:) "The al)ilit.v to use liis eye is of great importance to tlie sohlier. The recruit should he trained in ol).s(»rviiig Ins surroundings from positions and wlien on the marcli." Scouts or patrols preceding the command going into action or those providing for security on the march or in action must be able to i-ecognize and distinguish hostile and frientlly troops. Exorcises framed to stimulate the soldier's power of vision should be connncnccd at the earliest period of his training and continued throughout his service, in order that he may appre- ciate, by daily association, the necessity for cultivating a quality of such importance in modern warfare. Visual training includes general reconnaissance, the i-ecog- nition of targets described, impressions as to size, and observa- tion of the result of fire. The training usually commences w^ith questions framed to develop the recruit's memory, his power of oi)servation and his ability to describe what he has seen. 99. Suggested exercises. I. — Object: To leach observation and memory. Method: The recruit is taken to a window in the barracks and directeil to look out the window for five seconds, then face about and descril)e what objects he has seen. His attention is then called to the numerous objects he missed. The ri'cruit is directtMl to count the panes in the windows of a building. The s(iuad is taken for a short march and upon return to tiie barracks or camp the men are called upon to tell what they saw on the march. II. — Object: To teach an effective method of searching a given area. 87 88 MUSKETRY. Method: To search a ^iveii area thoroughly the man's sight niust not be permitted to wander aimlessly, but must be di- rected in such manner tliat every portion of the area is sub- jected to rigid scrutiny. To meet this demand, a system Is necessary that will assure that no portion of the area is over- looked or slighted. There are two systems or methods in general use. Both sys- tems subdivide the area by a number of Imaginary lines, in one case these lines being at right angles to the line of sight and in the other case being parallel to it. The division by lines parallel to the line of sight usually will be productive of the better results. It is explained to the recruit that it is of no special impor- tance loliat system is used, but that it is important that some system be used that will give the required results. Having completed the explanation of' the exercise, the in- structor indicates certain boundaries in whicli various ob- jectives of a military nature have been placed beforehand and directs the men to search this area and describe all such ob- jectives as they are able to locate. As progress is made, the area, the amount of cover used, the size and number of the objectives, and the ranges are gradually increased. As a check on the man's imagination, the instructor occasion- ally designates an area in which no objectives have been placed. Up to this point only natural cover has been considered. It is also important for the soldier to become familiar with natural or cultural features, and then to note the changes that occur when the same objects have been adapted to military uses. Usually a saving in time may be affected by having this prac- tice in conjunction with that in field engineering. III. — Object: To teach the effect of distance on the appear- ance of objects, and the ivcognitlon of service targets. (I. D. R., 158, in part:) "They (the men) should be taught to distinguish from a prone position distant objects, particu- larly troops, both with the naked eye and field glasses." Method: Targets and men are placed beforehand in different positions at various ranges and on different radial lines from the point at which the exercise is to be carried out. Some of the targets are wholly exposed and some partly behind cover. The men undergoing instruction are informed where to look for the targets and are given the distance to each. The prin^ ciple illustrated is carefully explained, and it is pointed out MUSKETRY. 89 that a knowledge of tlic aiipcaraiicr nf larjiots at dift'oBciil ranjies is at times an iiivaluahie aid in tiic csliiiiatinii (if dis- tances, to ho tal even in the ojien without cover and that cover from view is often best obtaincNl by a suitable background. In the selectloi, of a background one must consider the possibility of hostile observation from the flanks as well as from the fi*ont. There is nothing more demoralizing, nothing in war that tends to lower the morale of a fighting force so much as to tind itself lying down within effective' or even decisive range of an enemy and. while losing men. yet be unable to locate the enemy. British .soldiers often had this experience in the Boer war. The Boers 90 MUSKETRY. woro piist iiinstci-s in tlie seleotiou of bnckgrounds, and when Hiey Silt down in a ))ositi<)n they were sure that Ihey had behind them rocks or (U'y jj;rass of the same color as their clotlies. In many engagements the Britisli fired hundreds of rounds at the hills without killiiiii n I5oer, simply because the Roers could not lie seen. \. — Object: To teach the effect of movement on the visibility of tar;;»^ts and the need for avoiding unnecessary movements in loadiufi and tiring. Method: It is explained that the enemy will use every en- deavor to obtain concealment and when seen at all will usually be in the prone position. Perhaps' only the head and shoulders are seen above the parapet of a trench, or part of the head and shoulders will appear from behind a tree or wall. Fig. 20. The Instructor then conducts the men to the point selected for the exercise. This point sliould admit of a wide arc of vision and should permit of an uninterrupted view for a distance of from 100 to 200 yards. Several assistants are posted beforehand at various short ranges and in various directions from the central point. They make use of no cover, but are in the prone position and are re- quired to remain quiet or at least to make no conspicucjus move- ments. The instructor informs the men that one of his assistants is lying prone at a distance of less than yards ; that he is in the open and in the general direction of [indi- cating by pointing the general direction of the first ob.1ective]. He then directs them to look the ground over carefully and attempt to locate this man. and then calls them up in turn and MUSKETRY. 91 causes them to point out liis jiosition. I'm- this j)iiii)<>so a rillc with sandbuK and liiiMxl may 1)0 used t at wiiat lie iK'Iieves to be Ibr objective. Should any of the men fail to locate the objective the in- structor signals to the assistant to raise his arm or move from side to .side. A very slijrht movement usually will betray his position. This is repeatetl until all the objectives have been located. 100. It is jtointed out to the s(|uad that — (a) A tifiure which is invisible to the naked eye while niotion- less catches the eye throujih movement, and (b) Wlule quick, short movements nuiy escape the eye. and even if seen may make location (iiHicull. movements i)rolonse. .# v*1S>-^^ Fui. L'l. even for a short time, catdi the eye and facilitate aiming. This object lesson empliasizes the rule that movements in the open should be confined to tho.se which are absolutely necessary, and that these should be made smartly. Recruits are trained to assume various firing positions rapidly and to perform the load- ing and aiming motions with as little movement as possible. All unnecessary movements in performing these motions are avoid(Ml. Note the unnecessary movement of the man on tiie h>ft in loading. In ligure 21 the men are preparing for a rush. Note that only one man (the man on the right) is keeping his head down, ('ompare the size target he offers to an enemy with that of the (»ther men in the squa trainiMt: in marksmanship. 105. The following table shows the theoretical effect of errors in the determination of the range: F.rroiH in yards. Hange used. 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 400 100 100 100 100 100 96 95 93 92 91 83 81 78 74 69 67 62 67 50 43 49 43 36 30 23 32 27 21 15 9 21 16 10 7 4 12 9 6 4 2 g 4.")0 (i oOO 3 5.')0 1 600 6.T0 100 90 64 38 18 7 3 700 100 88 59 32 13 5 1 750 100 80 65 27 10 3 SOO 100 84 SO 22 6 1 850 100 82 40 18 5 1 9(K) 100 80 41 13 3 950 100 78 37 11 2 1,000 100 100 75 73 32 30 8 7 1 1 1,050 1,100 100 100 100 100 100 70 69 67 65 63 27 24 20 18 15 5 5 4 3 2 1,150 1,200 1 1,250 1,300 1,3.50 100 59 13 1 ^ ijon 100 55 10 1 1,450 100 54 9 1 The figures in the body of the table show, in theory, the prob- able number of hits that would be obtained for any given esti- mate of the range and for any given error in that estimate. This is on tlie assumption that 100 hits will be obtained when there is no error in the decermination of the range. For example, assume a true range of 950 yards to have been determined as 1,000. The error is 50 yards. What is the effect of this error? In the column headed " Range used," find the amount corre- sponding to the estimated range (1.000). Follow this line to the right until entering the column correspondijig to the ern^- (.50). Here is found the number 75. This number 75 indicates that for every 100 hits that wouhl have been obtained with the correct range, but 75 hits would have been obtained with this particular error. 96 MUSKETRY. 106. Before fire for effect is opened ranges may be determined by one of the following methods: («) Estimatinf;- distances by the eye. (b) Taking the range from a map of large scale. (tO Obtaining it direct from infantry or artillery already engaged. {(J) Measuring the range directly on the ground. (c) Estimating distance by sound. (Fur, 82, S. A. F. M.) (/) Range tinders. (//) Mil rule. (Par. 78.) ( // ) Ranging fire. ESTIMATING DISTANCES. 107. Estimation of distance by the eye. — To estimate distance by the eye with accuracy it is necessary to be familiar with the appearance, as to length, of a unit of measure which can be compared mentally with the distance which is to be estimated. The most convenient unit of length is 100 yards. To impress upon the soldier the extent of a stretch of 100 yards two posts 100 yards apart, with short stakes between to mark each 2.5 yards, should be placed near the barracks or on the drill ground and the soldier required to pace off the marked distance several times, counting his steps. He will thus learn how many of his steps make 100 yards and will become familiar with the appear- ance of the whole distance and of its fractional parts. Next a distance of more than 100 yards will be shown him and he will be required to compare this distance wilh the 100-yard unit and to estimate it. Having made this estimate, he will be required to verify its accuracy by pacing the distance. A few minutes each day should be spent in the practice, the soldier often being required to make his estimate by raising his rear-sight leaf and showing it to the instructor. After the. first drills the soldier should be required to pace the distance only when the estimate is unusually inaccurate. The soldier should be taught that, in judging the distance from the enemy, his estimate may be corrected by a careful observa- tion of the clearness with which details of dress, the movement of limbs, or of the files in a line may be seen. In order to derive the benefit of this method the soldier will be required to observe closely all the details noted above in single men or squads of men posted at varying distances, which will be measured and announced. MUSKETRY. 97 Although the standing' :iiul kiici'liiii,' silhouettes used in fiehl practice atTord good olgects upon whifh to estimate distances, tlie instructor should make frcipuMit use of living tigures and natural ol)jects, as this is tiie class of targets from which the soldier will he compelled to estimate his range in active service. 108. Methods of estimating long distances by the eye. — The following methods are found useful : (a) The soldier may decide that the ohject can not be more than a certain distance away nor less than a certain distance; his estimates must be kept within the closest possible limits and the mean of the two taken as the range. (b) The soldier selects a point which he considers the middle point of the whole distance, estimates this half distance, and doubles it, or he similarly divides the distance into a certain number of lengths which are familiar to him. (c) The soldier estimates the distance along a parallel line, as a road on one side, having on it well-defined objects. (d) The .soldier takes the mean of several estimates made by different, persons. This method is not applicable to in- struction. Appearance of objects; how modi fled by varying conditions of light; difference of level, etc. — During instruction the men should he taught the effect of varying conditions of light and terrain ui)on the apparent distance of an object. Objects seem nearer — (a) When the object is in a bright light. (b) When the color of the object contrasts sharply with the color of the background. (c) When looking over water, snow, or a uniform surface, like a wheat field. (d) When looking from a height downward. (e) In the clear atmosphere of high altitudes. Objects seem more distant — (o) When looking over a depression in the ground, (ft) When there is a poor light or a fog. (r) When only a small part of the object can be seen. (d) When looking from low ground upward toward higher ground. (S. A. F. M.) 109. The manner in which the subject of estimating dis- tances is taught will depend in a large measure upon the local facilities as well as upon the experience and ingenuity of the instructor. 3529'— 17 7 98 MTJSKETRY. The following exercises are given as a guide to instructors, who may use them as they are or modify them at will to suit local conditions: Organization commanders should utilize the rest periods while drilling, etc., in estimating distance drills and should appreciate that after the first preliminary drills very few, if any, special drills are required to teach the men to estimate distance. As an illustration, the company is drilling around a central point, from which the company commander has previously deter- mined the range to otlier prominent points in the vicinity. The company halts at the central point. The men are directed to estimate the range to one of the objects and set their sights for that range. Time, 10 seconds. Squad leaders check sight set- ting. Captain announces true range. The course of training in estimating distances is divided into two distinct steps or stages : First. Creating in the memory of the soldier an Indelible pic- ture of the appearance of the unit of measure from every possible viewpoint. Second. Giving him practice in applying this unit of measure to all possible varieties of terrain and under all possible condi- tions of light and atmosphere. 110. First Stage. — First exercise. — A distance of 100 yai'ds (the unit of measure) is measured accurately on level, open ground and conspicuous marks are placed at each extremity of the line. It is explained to the soldier that this is the unit by which he is to estimate distances and that the attainment of pro- ficiency depends upon his becoming familiar with the appearance of this unit. He is then required to view this distance from each extremity of the line, and also from different points that are neither on the line nor in prolongation of it. He is then required to pace the distance several times that he may remember the average number of his paces per 100 yards. Second exercise. — The unit of measure is marked as in the first exercise. Considering one extremity of this line (the ex- tremity at which the soldier is to stand) as the center of an imaginary circle of 100 yards radius, stakes are placed on the circumference of said circle at every 30° or each hour of the clock. The stake "B" (see sketch) at the further" extremity of the unit of measure is made quite conspicuous and is con- MUSKETRY. 99 sidered as geing at 12 o'clock, "i'lu" other stakes are care- fully concejiled in sudi inaniicr that their location is not ap- parent from the center stake at "A." Tiiey are referreject by its appearance only, although it is well, should time admit, to use the appearance of the ob.iect as a check against the unit-of-measnre system. He further explains to the men that, in the use of the unit-of- measure system, the objective is to be considered merely as in- 102 MUSKETRY. (licating the direction of the line upon which tlie estimate is to Be niiule and as the limit to whicli the estimate is to extend. Tlie instructor then adds sucli remarks as may apply to the special peculiarities of the ground that is to be measured and explains that it is necessary for the soldier first to pick out some point in the direction of the objective that he considers to be 100 yards distant ; then to pick out a second point 100 yai'ds be- yond the first ; then a third point 100 yards beyond the second, and so on until tlie objective is reached. The men are now directed to estimate the distance to the objective, to write their estimates on a piece of paper, and, without communicating their decisions to each other, to turn in the written estimates to the instructor. Unless the instructor has had the true ranges measured before the exercise begins, he should adopt some speedy and accurate means of determining these distances such as a large scale map or with a range finder. If time must be taken to measure the true range with a chain or tape after each esti- mate, the enforced inactivity of tlie majority of the men is apt to cause their interest to lag, with the result that much of the instructional value of the exercise is lost. Speed is not sought in these first estimates. On the con- trary, as much deliberation is allowed as may be required to Insure results that are really estimates and not mere guesse-i. When all the men have handed in their estimates the in- structor announces the true range and enters into such explana- tion as he may deem necessary as to the amount and direction of unusual errors. Additional objectives are then selected and the same proce- dure repeated. When the men begin to exhibit a reasonable degree of accu- racy then speed is sought and the practice continued from day to day until the desired standard of proficiency is attained. In the selection of objectives it would be well at this stage of the training to include some that resemble the targets that would be encountered in combat. 112. Collective estimating. — The training of an organization in the estimation of distances is not complete until the leaders (and those individuals who, in the exigencies of a campaign, might be called upon to act as leaders), are able quickly to take advantage of the combined estimates of some or all of the indi- viduals under their command. MUSKETRY. 108 It is of little luoiiK'iit wliut system is used, so lotij; as it is simple and uniform in the organization. The followinf: system is suggested as meeting these require- ments : * Let two good estimators in each squad estimate the distance and signal their estimates to their respective squad leaders. The squad leaders (mentally) average the two estimates that they receive and signal these averages to their respective platoon leaders. The platoon leaders (mentally) average the mean esti- mates that they receive from their squad leaders anil then signal these averages to the company commander. The company com- mander then averages the two means that he receives from the platoon leaders and announces the result as the range to be used. It will l)e noted tliat by the use of this system no single leader is called upon to obtain the mean of more than two quantities, a comparatively simple task in mental arithmetic. And yet, finally, the company receives the means of 16 estimates as the range to be used. In the training of leaders and prospective leaders in the sub- ject of collective estimating, it is well to remember that it is the eye and not the ear that is to be trained, i. e., that the estimated ranges usually will be Hicnudcd to the leaders ratlier than com- municated to them by word of mouth. The preliminary exercLses in this subject are nothing more than a form of mental gj^mnastics. For example, some such exercise as the following might be used : The instructor assigns two men as assistants and furnishes each with a paper on which a series of assumed ranges are noted, thus — To No. 1 To No. 2 assistant. assistsint. 1 600 800 2 too 700 3 COO 400 4 1 (00 500 5 700 800 f. 900 700 7 700 500 etc. etc. The two assistants, standing about .5 or 10 yards apart, face the instructor at a distance of about 25 yards. The leaders 104 MUSKETRY. undergoing instruction are in line at convenient intervals fac- ing the assistants at a distance of about 15 yards, thus — Assistant No. 1. Assistant No. 2. Leaders. O Ins >^i actor. The instructor calls to the assistants, " Range No. 1." No. 1 assistant would then signal "600,' v/hile No. 2 assistant would signal " 800." The leaders then (ietermine the mean of these two quantities and, facing about, signal their results to the instructor. At first there should be an appreciable Interval between the time that the range is signaled by assistant No. 1 and the time when it is signaled by No. 2. As progress is made, however, this interval of time gradually may be reduced until finally both assistants signal their ranges at the same time. In similar manner, the instructor first demands absolute accuracy in the announcement of the mean ranges, speed being sought later but never at the expense of accuracy. 113. Leaders may be considered proficient in this work when, in the prone position, they can receive two ranges by signal, determine the mean accurately, and transmit that mean by an intelligible signal in a reasonable time. An organization may be considered proficient when, in the prone position, ranges are estimated by individuals in the firing Mne, transmitted by signal through squad and platoon leaders to the company commander, an accurate mean announced by him that shall not differ from the true range by more than 10 per cent, sights are set according to the range announced by the company commander, and all this in a reasonable time. To carry such a system farther, means could be devised to the end that each unit (squad and platoon) in the organization should it happen to be acting alone, could use easily and quickly the average of the estimates of its six or eight most skillful estimators. Doubtless there will be occasions, in the preliminary stages of an attack as well as during the preparation of defensive works, when there will be ample time to assemble the skillful MUSKETRY. 106 estimators of a coiiiiitmy jiiid obtain tlie mean of tlieir estimates without recourse to tlie cluinnel of squad and platoon leailers. On such occasions, however, tlie necessity for ostimatinR the distance i)roi)ai)ly will be lacUiiiR, for, as a general rule, in- struments will be available for this purpose. In the prepara- tion of delVusive works, it even would be feasilile to pace or actually to measure the dislaiice on tlie f^round before contact with the enemy had been estaiillshcd. The individual proficiency test is i)r(»scrib('d in paratrraph 8.'). S. A. F. M. 114. ((/ 1 Range estimators. — The estimatiuf; test ha vine been completed, five or six ollicers or men, selected from the most accurate estimators in the ccnupany, are (lesi<;nated " Ranjre esti- mators." (240, I. D. R., and SO, S. A. F. M.) Platoon leaders, by reason of their duties, are not suitable for detail as range estimators. The range estimators are given special training in the es- timation of ranges up to 2,000 yards. 115. The following is illusti'ative of the manner in which the range estimators should work. Assuming an attack against a prepared position, the captain having received orders as to the primary apportionment of the target or .sector of fire (303, I. D. R. ), he assembles the platoon leaders and range estimators and points out to both the target of the battalion and company. The range estimators inunediately begin their estimation of the range to the company target; the captain meanwhile con- tinues with his instructions to the platoon leaders. The instructions to the platoon leaders completed, the range estimators announce to the cajitain either their individual esti- mates or the mean of their estimates as computed by one of the estimators. The range estimators then take their custom- ary posts (240, I. D. R.) and the captain indicates to the platoon leaders the range to be usefl. The range estimators act in an advisory capacity to the cap- tain. The mean of their estimates will usually be the most accurate range available in biittle. The adoption by the cap- tain of the range thus determined, however, is not obligatory. Range estimators should be ready to signal their estimates of the range to the platoon leaders at any time during an action. Thorough training of range estimators is to be sought, irre- spective of the fact that the organization may be supplied with accurate range-finding instruments. 106 MUSKETRY. EXERCISE. 116. I. — Object: Determination of range by eye. Method: (a) Each organization commander will be accom- panied by his " range estimators." When called to the estimating point, the organization commander will be shown a line some- where upon which will be stationed a squad with a flag. At a signal from the officer in charge the squad will rise and its flag conspicuously displayed. The officer undergoing the test will then estimate the range in the manner contemplated in paragraph 240, I. D. R. When he has found the range he will call " Time " and announce the range. Five ranges will be determined in this manner. Time: Fifty seconds is the limit in which the range may be announced, counting from the appearance of the flag to the an- nouncement of the range. Standard of proficiency : Accuracy, 90 per cent. 117. (&) Taking the range from a map. — At the effective ranges of the small-arms projectile it rarely will be practicable to scale the distances directly from the map. Infantry ranges usually are so short in comparison to the scale of such maps as generally would be available to the company commander in the field that it is most difficult to measure them with the required degree of accuracy. It should be remembered also that the minute details of the terrain, by which the position of the guns and that of the enemy might be identified, usually will not be found on a small-scale map. while, on the other hand, experienced troops will avoid locating themselves in the vicinity of prominent landmarks, such as might be shown on a map of this character. In the rare instances when a company commander has a large- scale map available the determination of ranges from it is merely a matter of reading the map. Training in this phase of the determination of ranges might be taken up with most profit in connection with instruction in the subject of topography. 118. (c) Obtaining the range from troops already engaged. — This is merely a matter of inquiry on the part of the company commander of the nearest leader whom he finds on the firing line. This inquiry may be verbal or by the signals prescribed in the Drill Regulations. 119. (r7) Measuring the range directly on the ground.. — The distance on the ground may be measured by (1) the use of a tape or chain, (2) the pacing of horse or man, or (3) the instru- ments of precision of the engineer. MUSKETRY. 107 It Is obvious that none of these methods are practicable except on the defensive wlien ample time is available before the pos- sibility of contact with the enemy. Training in this, as in the use of maps for the determination of ranges, may be had in connection with the instruction in topography. 120. (<■) Estimating distance by sound. — On Ihi ; sul)ject tiie Small Arms Firing I\I:innal states: "Sound travels at tlie rate of 1,100 feet, or 306 yard.s, per second. If a gun is fired at a distance a certain time elapses before the sound is heard. If the number of seconds or parts of seconds between the flash and the report be carefully taken and multiplied by 366, the product will be approximately the distance in yards to the gun. Lacking special instruments of precision, this method will be of doubtful use on the battle field, owing to the difficulty of distinguishing the sound of the gun, who.se flash is seen, from tiiat of any other. It will probably be useful in determining the range to a hostile battery when it first opens fire." (Par. 82.) 121. (/) Range finders. — Training in the use of range-finding instruments depends upon the type of instrument that is sup- plied to the organization. Pamphlets describing these instru- ments are issued with them. In the training of au organization in the u.se of range finders it should be the endeavor not only to train the particular Indi- viduals who ai'e designated to use it, but also a number of otliers who should be perfectly competent to take the place ot the " range taker " should he become a casualty in action. Exercises should cover adjustments for height and distance, measuring ranges, and the preparation of range cards. EXERCISE. 122. I. — Object: Determination of ranges with the range finder. Method: The battalion range takers are taken to the point from which the ranges are to be taken. Instnmients out of adjustment. They will each, independently of the others, de- termine and announce the range. Ranges should be determined as quickly as possible, but accuracy must not be sacrificed. Time: Record kept for each man, for information of the ofli- cer in charge only. Standard of proficiency : Accuracy, 90 per cent. 108 MUSKETRY. RANGE CARDS AND RANGE MARKS. 123. Range card. — A range card is a device for giving ranges to various points in a field of fire for iise in attack or defense. Hange cards sliould bo prepared by organization commanders for their own nse and for use by platoon leaders and observers. When possible, the best vi^ay to prepare a range card is to use a piece of a large-scale map of the country on which to draw the range circles and direction lines. There will usually be more RANGE CAM) HJ ATTACK 300 ..SCHOOL flOUSE 400. RIVER 80Q_ FENCE 1200- .CR0S3 ROADS I Fk.. 23. — Simple range card for attack. time for preparing range cards in defense than in attack and consequently range cards prepared for defensive positions will, as a rule, be more elaborate than those made for use in attack. 124. A simple range card for attack. — Figure 23 shows a rough example of a simple range card made for use in attack. The ranges are taken from the crossroads at X to a series of prominent objects on or a little to either side of the line of ad- vance. The distance of each of these points from the enemifs position is carefully noted, and thus ranging during the attack is greatly facilitated. Note. — The point from which rancres are taken should always be de- scribed clearly on the card to facilitate orientation. MUSKETRY. 109 125. A simple range card for defense. — Figure 24 is an e\ ainitle of a ranj;o card for use in dcfciis*'. Tlie ranges In tliis case are supposed to be tatcen from a point "A" innnediatoly soutli of tlie church. The direction line from "A" to the cliurcli is lieavier than the other line to facilitate orienting the range card in the same manner as a map. When the card is oriented for the point from which ranges are taken — which is noted on the card — by pointing the thick direction line on the church, the other direction linos will indicate the ranges to other points RANGE CARD IN DEFENSE Fig. 24. — Simple range card for defense. marked on the card. Each point registered on the range card Is numbered consecutively from right to left. The actual marking of ranges on the ground by means of visil)le marks may be by providing range marks and 'i)lacing them on the side of large trees, houses, banks, small f(»lds in the ground, etc.. only visible to the jr lost. I*"'rom such indications wronfi conclusions may he drawn unless the formation of the ground is discovered. 129. Ranging nt moving targets is possihle only when the ohjectlve can not materially change its course. Sudi targets are wngon trains or artillery In cohnun*on a '"oad. The ground surface uuist ho such that the strike of the hullet can be observed. The best Indication Is given by the bullets striking lu loose, dry sandy soil. In the full of the year when tho cross Is dead the bullets will usually knock up enough dust from the grass to be visible. In noting the strike of the shots it should be remembered that the dust will be seen somewhat above tlie actual point of impact and to the right or left, depending upon the direction of the w'ind. A perfect condition will not as* a rule be realized. The ground may be wet or covered with turf, sod, tall grass, or brush, in which case the indications may be entii'ely lacking or else so slight as to form no basis of judgnient. When the sm-face of tlie ground is such as not to furnish any indication to an observer at the firing point of the effect of fire the correctness of the rear-sight elevation may some- times be inferred by careful observation of the actions or movements of the enemy. It is manifest that definite results are not possilile when the firing party is under heavy fire. Time nuist be available and the ob.server must be trained. The observer must be acquainted with the appearance and dimensions of the shot group as it will api)ear on various surfaces in order to recognize the center of impact, and he must liave had some experience in the observation of fire. To the untrained eye there will be a continuous space from front to rear of the target that is covered with bullets — that is, the center of the shot groups (the center of impact) of the two separate volleys will not be apparent. Ground rising with respect to the line of .site produces a shortening effect on the shot group. Rising slopes of less than one degree will not orrlinarily give very positive results. 3529°— 17 8 114 MUSKETRY. When the indications of impact are sufficient to form a basis of judgment it may be stated as a rough rule that tlie fire will be properly adjusted when about one-third of the shots of a trial volley appear to strike in front and two-thirds in rear, it being remembered that the direct hits will pass through and strike in rear of the target. Let it be assumed that the bullets fall about as shown In figure 28. - It is apparent that there are a few bullets that have fallen between the center of impact of both groups, but there is a distinct center of Impact to each volley, and in this case thQ center of the upper one being at 100 yards over the new range to be used would be about 100 yards less than the upper, the amount dependent upon the degree of slope. ^•i-iiia Tilrtj 130. Not more than two trial volleys should be required for fire adjustment, and as soon as the range is determined a cliange should be made at once to " Fire at will " at a rate suited to the range and the visibility of the target. In making rear-sight corrections it is necessary to make positive changes. It IS an insufficient and faulty procedure to attempt to correct adjustment through indefinite instructions, such as directing the men to aim a "little lower" or a "little higher." Habitual practice on favorable ground may tend to cultivate too great a dependence on signs of impact for making rear-sight correc- tions. This must be guarded against. Even on favorable ground, where large numbers of troops are engaged, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for commanders and leaders to distinguish indications of their own fire from that of other troops. However partial or imperfect the signs of Impact, close ob- servation should be resorted to in every case, as slight indi- cations may sometimes furnish a basis for rear-sight correc- tions. Good field glasses are indispensable for observing the effect of fire, and the necessary skill in their use, through which cor- MUSKETRY. 115 n'll (■(iiiclusiims imiy lie (Iriiwii. is (u lie iiciiiiircd only tlir<)u;;li practice. (>l)si'rv!i(inii frdiii tlic ll.iiiks or from a point iil>ove flio liriii;; p:irty will ofti'U be pitssihic. Such a jHtsition is far preferable t(» one at the line of the lirers, as observation is facilitateil ami the accuracy of the corrections is incn-ascd. To an observer on or behind a flank of the tirers, shots whicli pass over the target will appear to fall toward the flank ou which the ob- .server is posted. Those shots which drop short will appear to fall toward the other flank. Therefore if the greatest num- ber of shots seem, to an observer on the right flank, to fall to the right of the target the sight setting being used is too great, and if they seem to fall to the left the sight setting Is too small. CHAPTER VIII. FIRE DISTRIBUTION. 131. The combined fire of an organisation must necessarily be either concentrated or distributed. In concentrated tire the men all use the same sight setting and aim at the same point. This class of fire is favorable for observation and has great effect but only at one spot. (The distribution of fire over the entire target is of special importance — 240, I. D. R.). Fire may be distributed either in depth or width. The object of distribution in depth (combined sights— par. 52) is to increase the length of the beaten zone from front to rear. Distribution in width is for the purpose of keeping all parts of the enemy's line under such an effective fire that no part of Firing Line . Shot Groujo . a n D a D a • D D Fig. 29. that line can fire undisturbed. Therefore fire distribution is an essential to the gaining of fiiv superiority. 132. Distribution is both individual and collective. The in- dividual soldier fires at that part of his platoon or squad target which corresponds to his position in the platoon or squad. The combined result of the platoon or squad fire is a line of individual .shot groups, each overlapping the one adjoining, the whole malving the squad or platoon. Proper fire distribution means that all of the target and not part of it is kept under fire. This is not as easy as one might think, and the attainment of proficiency necessitates much prac- tice on the part of leaders and men. 116 MUSKETRY. 117 133. In the original doitloyineut for battle, the division com- uuuultT assi;j;n.s U> liis ItiiKadcs a i)art of the j^ciicral Iroiil or objective in sucli niaiincr lliat tlie (livision's objective is all coveretl. Tliese brijiatle fi'diils art- siibiiividrd a.irain ijnwn llirouu'ii the rcp^iinciils In battalions, conipaiiios, iiiid |ilatoons. The division ot tlio objective into parts and the assiLcnnienI to units nuist b<> made witli .u^reat care. It the .-idjacent thinks of two organizations advancinji from slij^htly different directions guide on the same iioini in liH> cnciiiy's line diii-ing the advance, tliey will arrive in a (.-onlinuous lint- ujion its frtmt. If the ])oint is in advance of the line, there will be crowding and overlapping. Tliis is objectionable, as it causes confusion and may sul)ject one portion of tlie line to the tire of the »)ther. Casualties during the advance may tend to reduce this dillicnlty. If the guiding i)oint is in rear of the enemy's line, tliere will be a gap between the two organizations, which, however, may be filled, if desirable. If two organizations are advancing in the same direction, contiguous to each other (as in a ]iurely frontal attack), no difliculty is encountered. This is the simplest form of attack. The higher the connnander the easier the siibdivision of his target. The leaders of smaller units, battalions, comjianies, and platoons have the ditlicult task. 134. The battalion conun.mder must describe the targets to his caj)tains in such terms that there will be no chance of a misunderstanding. The drill regulations prescribe that the major designate: (rt) The direction of the advance or, (b) Tlie objective for each company of his battalion in tin- firing line or, ((•) The position of the enemy or. (if) The gencM'al object to be obtained and the special i)rolih'in for each company, and (e) The order anil front of each company, (/) The right or left company as the base company. The above are principles which are comparatively easy to state. Their i)racticid applic-ition to conci-el*' cases is not always so simple. Taking the first — that of giving the direction of attack. Von Kiesling gives a i)roblem where a railroas the theoretical method. No rule can be made in the al)stract that will apply to all concrete cases. 137. The use of reference points and the mil rule (par. 92) should eliminate most of the dilliculties in the distribution of the target. (See Designation and Recognition of Service Tar- gets. ) This Implies facility on the part of the iiiajoi- and all ofiicers in the conversion of mils into yards, fingers, and rear sight. The l)est possible designation of the target nuist be made. In moving from one |)osition lo another, and after the target has been a.ssigned. it must be kept under constant observaticm, care being exercised to guard against the apparent shifting of the target when viewed from somo point other than that at which it was first pointetl out. It nmst be rcmcmltered that objects viewed from dilTtM-cnt angles do not always look the same. P^or instance, in case 1. figure '.U, the captain from his position at 0, and in the manner (h'scril^ed, points out the target to the lieutenant of the left i)latoon. The lieutenant moves to point 120 MUSKETRY. X without making any measurement or paying any particular attention to the target. At point X he assigns the target to his platoon, Init the left o'f the platoon is assigned to the foot of the trees. Twenty mils of the company target to the left of the tree is not covered. Had he, the lieutenant, found the point C in the line, or with his mil rule measured off 100 mils from the foot of the tree -while with the captain and picked up the point A in the line, lie could have moved to X observing the point C constantly, or measured off 100 mils from A as seen from his new position, and he would have had the entire target covei-ed as in case 2. By this method of keeping the target constantly imder observa- tion and measuring off the distance in the manner iiidicatod, errors in reassignment of targets may be avoided. C-f\sa I . explain to Lt here directs The KComp»rn4S iarqet IS lOO rriih /o/>J its r.ijhl »/ thil Irem" FlO. 31. 138. In defense. — In apportioning the battalion target to the companies on the firing line, the difference between the bat- talion in- attack and defense should be noted. In defense the division of the battalion sector should be made with reference to physical objects, if possible. This has reference to the fire .vector which is not to be confused with the actual amount of gi-ound the battalion trenches cover. An order to one of the companies might be something like the following: "Company C, with its right I'esting on this point [indicated on the ground], will intrench on a front of 100 yards, covering the sector from the railroad, inclusive, to the tree [both indicated on the ground J, exclusively, crossing fire with the battalion on our right and with Company B on its left." (Fig. 32.) MUSKETRY. 121 The incii iniisf he ti-.-iincd imt Id sli;^lit invisible iM)r1i<)ns (»r tii(> l!irjrc(. 139. Exercises in target distribution.- It is ;issuiium1 lluil :iil !ir(> acc'iistniucd to iiiciisniiii;; widlli.s l»y tlii' use of tliQ mil .scak', rear .'^ifrlit. and tlie u.>rmiiiation of lli(> ran^ic by tin- nsc of r:iiij.'(' esii- malors. and the issuance of lire orders. Method: Tlie tarjrets for these exercises niiiy be either r(>i)re- sented, ontlined. or assnm;'d. Wlien rei»resenled osc. The limit.s of the objcclive arc indicated by llaus, and may iiH'lnde tl.e «Mitir(> line <;r oid,\ a jioi-tion of it. A . A ^/-u■ F £ F/RE S£:CTOR com.tn£:a/c// c J3^ A Co. If Fi '2Ct()) in a manner that would be feasible under the assumed conditions of the problem. Each sultordinat;' connuander in t\irn issues his tire order in a similar maimer. When the tire ordens have been issued, each leader (by use of the aiming tripod, figs. 33-34) indicates what he believes to be the limits of the objective or of the fraction of the objective upon which he has been ordered to direct his fire. cx \ / SMI put Ion I totlr. urc.1 tad no sax* I cov«t«4 Daal th«t Ob]. SUA' or c lion redu ivarod !• the ^aml] Inec ice Fig. a DoalOAtlon reduced to i in v.lu. n, front covcr*4 Ic ooli half tHat of tht ••■ ■.bjrctlo.. 34. Tills Itein.ir done, tlie instructor causes the flags again to be displiiyed at the target, verities the sighting of the aiming tri- pods, checks the elevations used with the true range to the objective, and then gives a critique on the execution of the exercise. 140. The aiming tripod heretofore mentioned is made as fol- loirs: Referring to figure 33.\, the base, AB, and the arms, DE and FCJ, are made of hardwood. They are each about y^ inch square in -cross section and about 10 inches in length. At its center the base is made fast to the tripod (any camera or sket<'hing triixid is satisfactory for this purpose) by a bolt and wing nut at G. 124 MUSKETRY. 'I'liis point is made loose enouj:;h to permit of the base bein^ tunuMl in a liorizontal phme without undue muscubir exertion, but thei-e must still be sutRcient friction at this point to prevent: the base being turned on the tripod by the action of a strong wind. In like manner the amis ai-e fastened to the ends of the base at A and B, the pivot of the arms being about i an inch off the center to permit of the device being folded as shown in ligure 33B. The pointers, HD, IE, .IF, and KG, may be made of any avail- able pieces of thin sheet metal — zinc, copper, brass; tin. etc. The shape and size of these pointers, as cut from the flat metal sheet, are as shown in figure 33C. This piece is then bent in the shape show^n in figure 33D. These pointers are riveted to tlie ends of the arms in such manner as to permit of their being placed in an upright position for use, figure 33A, or folded down for packing or transporta- tion, figure 33B. In use the tripod is set up with the base approximately per- pendicular to the line of fire. When the leader has received his fire order, he decides upon what he believes to be the loca- tion of his target, and then, using the pointers as front and rear sights, directs the arm DE at the point which marks the rigb.t flank of his particular fraction of the objective, while tlie arm FG is similarly directed at the left flank. In judging of the execution of any particular exercise, the instructor takes into account the probable material effect of the fire, assuming it to have been carried out in strict compliance with the fire order. (Chap. XVIII, pars. 255-201.) 141. It is not sufficient for the instructor to state that the range is in error by a certain amount. He should observe the manner in which the range was determined and decide whether this method would have been practicable under the assumed conditions ; point out the possible or probable causes of error ; show how these errors may be eliminated or at least reduced in amount ; and state wdiether the error is or is not excessive. The instructor next turns his attention to the manner in which the target has been designated and to the precision of direction and control resulting from this designation. The instructor's conclusions as to the correctness or incorrect- ness of the designation are based on his own observation of the manner in which the leader and his subordinates issue their fire MUSKETRY. 125 onlcrs. Tlw pcrfcctiiin of (listriliiitiuii is vcriru'd by the aiiiiiiiK tripod. Ileferriiiff to figure 34. let TV be the line of tar.irots, and .1 aiKl li bo the lla^'s marking: the flanks of tlie particular fraction of that line at which fire is to be directed. I^et G rer»resent the position of the gunner or leader, and the lines fin and fib rep. resent the two lines of aim as sIkjwu by the arms of aiming tripod. Case A shows that the designation and the understanding ot the designation were perfect, the arms of the aiming tripod pointing with precision at tlie flanks of the target. Cases B and C show that the designation or the understanding of it (the instructor determines by observation whether the error lies with the leader or the subordinate), is lacking in accuracy to such an extent as to reduce the effect of the fire by one-half; in case B because twice the allotted front is covered and hence the assigned target received but half of the volume of fire that should have been directed upon it ; in case C but half of the target is covered with fire. In case D no credit whatever can be allowed for designation, as there is no portion of the target that is covered with fire. By showing how the effect of fire is reduced by the combined errors in range and designation, the instructor may give a forci- ble demonstration of the fact that the best marksmanship is of n(. avail if acting under the direction of a faulty fire order. Take case B for example and assume that the true range of 800 yards was estimated at 900 yards. From the table (par. lO.j) it is found that this error will reduce the hits from TOO to 50. As only half of the fire is directed at the target these 50 hits would also be reduced by one-half. Hence good marksmen, who are capable of making 100 hits on the target if properly directed, make only 25 hits because of the errors of their leaders. This exercise may be varied in several ways. One variation is to point out the target to the leader and then require him to occupy a position several hundred yards nearer the ob.ifH'tive and there issue his fire order. A second variation is similar to the first except that the new position is well off to one flank as well as to the front. Advantage of this exercise may be taken to instruct the men in distribution and also in not slighting invisible portions of the target for more prominent parts. 126 MUSKETRY. For (liis purpose a part of the assijiiicd target should lie only partially visible. The fire leaders give the orders, indicating target to be covered, etc., and the men align their rifles, u.sing sandbags or other improvised re.sts, or the aiming tripod. The alignment of the rilles is then verified by the instructor, and usually at first it will be found that none of the rifles are aimed at that part of the line which is partially concealed. At this poinl it should be explained to the men that the enemy's men occupying that part of the line at which their rifles were not aimed represent a part of the enemy's line that is not disturbed at all, as no one Is firing at them. As a result they will do just as good shooting as on the target range. A C h I B T^g CNtwy '.I'm;;* u\ "; ""lilt, .S\\\ "I,,; i '• :\^^. \ nili'.h'. P,\o\//' ,llin : 1 > '.\\\ \^ Fig. 35. Mil !'V\\\\\ Attack IMG FORCe. It can be readily seen that if the enemy holds the line A-B, figure 35, and the attacking force keeps A-C and DE only under fire, that that part of the enemy C-D and EB will do good execution. II. — Object: As for first exercise tactical walk. Method: Assume the target assigned to the colonel. G've the colonel's attack order, then the major's, carrying this down to the platoon leaders of one or more platoons. Fig. 36. These designations should always be made at the same distance from the target that they would be made were a real enemy there. Two or three men should act as subordinates to deter- mine whether or not the subdivision is understood. III. — Object: To teach, "Men are so instructed that each fires on that part of the target which is directly opposite him " (245 I. D. R.), or, in other words, the individual fires at that MUSKETRY. 127 p;irt of his platoon or s(ni;i(l target wliicli rorrospoiKls \i> liis position in tliat iilatnon. Method; Malve a frauic :> by <"> foot on the order of an A |ar.i,'ot I'miiu'. Cover tliis I'liinio w iiii taii;ot cloth antl tlien paste tliereoM Itlanlc paper. Ordinary yellow wrapping paper will answer liie i)urpi>st». Taste a row ol' i)laclv target pasters al)onl 4 ilU'lu's from the bottom edi^e of tlie tarjiet, as in li.mire 3(1. Handliaj; n^sts are pr(jvided at the tirinj.? point for tlie rifles, The Individual soldier is then called to the firing point and (old that his squad or platoon is firing at a line of the enemy, representetl by the row of black pasters on the target, and that he is No. 3, front rank, or some other number, of the ftr.st, second, third, or fourth squad of his platoon, He Is then directed to sight his rifle at that part of the line at which he thinks he ^liould tire, using the sandbag. The instructor then verifies the sighting. For convenience in verifying the pasters may be numbered in pencil in such manner as not to be visible to the soldier at the tiring point This target may be used by the squad actually firing and usin:^ the gallery rifle and .22 ammunition. The corporal is given a part or the whole of the target to cover; he then gives his fire onhM* and the squad tires. Tlie distribution is verified by tlie liits. CHAPTER IX. AUXILIARY AIMING TARGETS. 142. If the tiirset cm not be seen with the naked eye, platoon leaders select an object in front of, or behind it. designate this as tlie aiming target, and direct a sight setting v. hlch will carry tlio cone of tire into the target, (Par. 247, I. D, R.) THE RANGE SCALE FOR USE WITH THE AUXILIARY TARGETS. This is the reversed and reduced reproduction of the gradua- tions of the rear sight leaf of the rifle. The theory upon which this device is constructed will be understood by reference to figure 37. B TAR8ET Fig 37. 143. The illustration shows a cross section through two hill features with the flrer at F and the target at A (1,000 yards distant from F). It also shows two possible aiming points at B and at C and the trajectory necessary to hit the target at A. Case 1. — The target at A is clearly visible. Thei rifle is there- fore aimed directly at the target with sight setting 1,000 yards. The line of aim is the line F-A, the angle of departure is the angle a and the trajectory is the line F-B'-A which the bullet travels and so strikes the target at A, as intended. No matter what auxiliary target is used, the bullet will travel this same trajectory and strike at A when the appropriate sight setting is used. Case 2. — The target A is invisible except through glasses. Aim can not now be taken at the target and an auxiliary aiming 128 MUSKETRY. 129 target is necessary. At C is a well-defintvl point. If tlie rille is aiiniHl at V tlie desireil trajectory will be produced when the angle of departure is c, the line of aim /''-(', the sight setting on the sight is (Hiunl to F-C. Cane 3. — The target at A is invisililc and the sky line at Ji is chosen as an aiming target. If the rille is aimed at B with an elevation b, the line of aim will be F-B, the angle of departure will be b, and the bullet will travel along the trajectory F-B'-A, passing the line of aim at the range F-B' and striking the tar- get at -1, as desired. USE OF THE MUSKETRY RULE TO OBTAIN SIGHT SETTING TO BE USED WITH AUXILIARY AIMING TARGET. 144. An auxiliary aiming target having been chosen, approxi- mately in line with the target and above or below it, an estimate or measurement of the range to the target is matle. Both sliders on the musketry rule are then set to this range. The rule is held so that the zero is up and the distance of 15 inches is obtained by means of the cord and knot. (Par. 78.) If the aiming target is above the target, the upper slider is now moved up until both the target and the aiming target can just be seen through the gap between the sliders. The scale reading opposite I lie upper slider is that to be set on the rifle sights of the firers if they are to aim at the auxiliary aiming target and expect to hit the target. If the aiming target is below the target, the procedure is the same, except that the lower slide Is moved down tintil both the aiming target and target are visible. The sight setting for the firers is then that opposite the lower slider. The rule of thumb for this operation is: Aiming target beyond target elevation to be used /c,s,s than that for direct aim ; aiming target nearer than target, elevation to be used greater than for direct aim. CHOICE OF AN AIMING TARGET. 145. The choice of an aiming target depends primarily on the available features of the terrain that are innnediately in line with the area that is to be covered with fire. At onlinary ranges care must be taken not to choose an aiming target so that a minus sight setting will result. Sky lines are often not available on this account. Assuming that the enemy's line to .s.^L'n"— 17 9 ISO MUSKETRY. l)o covered with fire is of tlie same len.iitli as tlie attacking line, tliere are three satisfactory aiining targets from a theoretical standpoint. First, an aiming target consisting of a point so far in rear of tlie enemy's line (several miles) that the fire will be slightly convergent. In this case the distribution and accuracy of fire should be excellent, but if the aiming target is too close the flanivs of the enemy will not be covered. Second, an aiming target consisting of a well defined hori- zontal line within 100 yards or so of the enemy's line. In this case the accuracy of fire slioukl be excellent. Lzo Fig. 38. Third, an aiming target consisting of a point half way be- tween the firing line and the enemy, so that tlie fire crosses at the aiming target. Tlien tlie fire of the right flank strikes the enemy's right flank. In tliis case the accuracy and distribution should both be excellent, but here, again, if the aiming target is not exactly half way to the enemy the fire may cover too much or too little of the enemy's line. 146. Considerable judgment and experience is required in the choice of aiming targets. Excellent results may be obtained by their judicious use, but they should rarely if ever be used if the real target is visible to the firing line. Figure 38 shows the use of the field glass in designating an auxiliary aiming target. All men must understand that they are to take just as careful aim and hold just as carefully when using an aiming target as when firing at tlie actual target. Otherwise they can not expect their fire to be effective. MUSKETRY. 131 All oHiccrs and noncoiniiiissioiaHl oUiters should have practical instruction in the selection and designation of auxiliary aiming targets. This is well taught by means of terrain exercises. The enemy is outlined hy suitable field targets. The men under instruction select an aiming target, determining the range to l)e used, etc., and write tlu'lr data on slips of pajier of convenient size. These slips are then taken up by the instructor and read and criticized on the spot. CHAPTER X. BATTLE-FIELD COMMUNICATION. 147. The Signal Corps furnishes electrical communication, supplemented by other means, down to and including brigade headquarters. Communication within the brigade Is ordinarily by means of visual signals, written or verbal messages, and, except in posi- tion and siege warfare, seldom by electrical means. LUES iKSiOin aua or sicaiis. Par. 163-I.O.R. Fig. 39. The personnel for this duty within the brigade is furnished by the troops themselves. Paragraph 1562. A. R., requires that at least two men in each organization be proficient in visual signaling. The number of qualified signalists in a company or troop should by no means be limited by these provisions. As many men as possible should be qualified in the general service code (wigwag) and In sending and receiving messages by semaphore. In delivering short verbal messages. In transmitting firing data. In using the prescribed battle-field signals (41-47, 1. D. 11.). In the duties of messengers. 132 MUSKETRY. 133 148. Fifrure 39 illiislralt's tlie chain of battle-field signals and the channels for the transmission of commands within the bat- talion. The trainin;; of the battalion must be such that this chain is not interrupted by casualties. All sifj;nals are reiieated back to prevent errors. It is to be noted that tlie men resi)onsible lor maintenance of this communication do nut necessarily face continuously in the direction indicated ])y the ])oints, as they are also chart^ed with other duties ; but they do look in that direction instantly at the sound of the whistle "Attention," and at otlii-r times they frequently j,'lance in that diri'ction. MESSENGERS. 149. The occasion will be rare wIhmi verbal messages may be carriLHl on the battle field in the attack. However, the importance of this feature of a soldier's training i.s so apparent and it is so closely related to musketry that the following short paragraph on verbal messages is included: VERBAL MESSAGES. 150. Verbal messages should alirays be brief, and, if sent by otlii'r than a staff oflicer, be linuted to the minimum number of items. The messenger should repeat the message before starting and understand what he is to carry. Within the regiment the distance over which messengers will move will usually be short. If the messages are brief and clear-cut, like telegrams, there should be little confusion. The messenger nuist be instructed specifically as to whom lu> will deliver the message, and whether or not there is a reply. A verbal message which is the subject of a fatal change in sense by the omission of one word should be avoided. For example: " The support will not move north of Cache Creek." This message is subject to a reversal in meaning by the omis- sion of " not." antl should read : " The supjxirt will halt south of Cache Creek." The verbal message should include the address and the name of the .sender, for example : " To Capt. Jones, " Halt south of Cache Creek. " Fn>ni Col. Smith." 134 MUSKETRY. After delivering? the message, tlie messenger will ask if there is a reply. Unless otherwise instructed, he will return to the sending authority and deliver the reply, or report the message delivered and that there was no reply. DUTIES OF MESSENGERS. 151. (1) Keeps himself informed as far as possihle as to the location of the headquarters of the units to which communica- tion is maintained, both to the rear and front. (2) Studies and notes the best routes to the various units. (3) Before starting with the message, asks the following ques- t ions if not clear : (a) What is the official designation of the person to whom I am to deliver the message? (6) Where is this person? (c) What is the nearest and shortest way there? Or, can I be given a map of the route? (d) Is there an answer? (e) Am I to report back as soon as the message is de- livered? If not, to whom shall I report? (4) Important messages in writing, unless confidential, should be understood by the bearer so that they may Ije delivered ver- bally if the written message is destroyed to prevent the infor- mation falling into the hands of the enemy. (5) Always repeat a verbal message word for word to the sender before starting. Be sure to understand the meaning. Do iK^t attempt to merely memorize the words, but beware of false interpretation. (G) The envelope containing the message will bear: (a) Address; complete location of addressee not given or entirely omitted. The organization to which the addressee belongs should not be included in the address if it is possible to identify him in some other manner, as " C. O., advance guard," " C. O., outpost." (&) The name of the messenger. (c) Date and hour of departure. (d) Rate of speed. Do not use the terms ordinary. rapid, urgent ; instead tell the mounted messen- ger either to walk, to walk and trot, to trot, to trot and gallop, to gallop, or to go at top speed. Tell the dismounted messenger either to walk, to double time, or to run. MUSKETRY. 136 (c) ir iiKiuiited and Kiveii a written message to deliver on which tlie sju'ed is not indicated, ask for it. Tliis constitutes an iniijortant safeguard to tlie messenger. With verbal messages a messenger usually receives instructions as to speed ; if in doubt, aslv. (7) On reaching ilostination, call out " Message for." After inti'liigi'nl searcli, if the person to wlioni the message is sent can not be found, try to lind .some other person wlio can talce full advantage of the inlorniation. Wlictlier or not tliis can In* done, always report back to the sender all facts in tiie case. (8) Ask if there is a reply. (9) If the recipient fails to do so, request that the envelope be initialed or signitl and the time and date be recorded thereon. (10) If aware of the nature of the message and you know of any circumstances atfecting the situation which may have arisen since you left the .sender, rei)()rt the circumstances after e and record thereon the date and exact time he reads the message. The messenger will rcMpiest. if necessary, that this be done. (1.S) Written messages in danger of falling iiiio tlic iiiinds of the enemy may be sent in code. EXERCISES TO TEACH COMMUNICATION AND THE USE OF SIGNALS. 152. 1. — Object: To teach the wigwag. Method: The wigwag is easily taught by talcing tli(» letters up in groups in the order of — Dot letters. Dash letters. I>ot-(lasli letters. Dash-dot letters. Mixed letters. 153. II. — Object: To teach the semai)hore. 136 MUSKETRY. Method: Teach the semaphore in the following groups as a part of calisthenics: A, B, C, D, E, F, and G. K, L, M, N. P, (}. R. and S. T, U, Y, signals, letters, J, and V. H, I, O, W, X, and Z. Opposite letters, A— G, B— F, H— Z, I— X, J— P, K— V, O— W. Opposite letters, IM — S, Q — Y, T — letters, L — signals, N— U. 154. III. — Object: To teach the men to deliver short verhal messages. Method: Form the squad in single rank. The instructor gives a simple verbal message to the man on the extreme I'ight (or left) of the line to be passed down the line to tlie man on the other flank. This is repeated at odd times, while resting at (hill, waiting for assembly, etc., until the men become proficient. 155. IV. — Object: To teach the transmission of firing data rapidly and accurately and without decreasing the rate of fire. Method: A squad or platoon is deployed at two-pace intervals and given certain firing data ; the men simulate firing. A sec- ond squad or platoon is then deployed and reinforces the first, the men taking their places in the Intervals between the men already firing. Without changing the rate of fire the men originally on the line transmit to the new men the firing data. Thirty seconds after the reinforcements join the line the original firing party is withdrawn. Sight setting and the un- derstanding of the target is then checked. This exercise may be varied by giving certain firing data to a flank man and direct its transmission through the squad. 156. V. — Object: To teach the prescribed signals. (41-47, I. I). R.) Method: The squad or platoon in line. A signal is made by the. instructor and the men ai'e called upon to tell what it means. As progress is made a command is given and the men are told to make the signals. This practice may be had at odd times, while the men are resting, waiting for formations, etc. After the signals are learned officers should conduct all battle practice, extended order, etc., by signals only. If during in- struction the men have been accustomed to depend on the use of signals they may be expected to respond to them on the battle- field. MUSKETRY. 137 Do not (It'viso a lot of at«'Ction a^'ainst rille tire, hut is dantrerous. Isolati'(l hushes or clumps of underf^rowth which do not afford protection from tire are dant^erous if occupied in view of the enemy, hecause they offer clearly defined tarj^ets, and the con- cealment they Rive is of no value if the enemy knows they are occupied. Kocks may also be dangerous on account of the liability of men being injured by fragments. Hedges, banks, and walls give the enemy a good aiming target and may obstruct the advance of troops. Loss of lire effect nuist not be sacrificed to cover from view. It is al.so preferable to lie in the open than to stop behind cover which offers a good target but which does not protect from tire. The men must be taught to crawl, to tire from all positions — behind trees, doorways, and small folds in the ground. 161. Crawling. — ((Jrenadier says:) It is much more difficult to crawl well Ihan would at first be supposed. It is quite certain that the men will at first think that there is nothing to be learned about crawling. It is very etach four or five men and take them to the further side of the hollow. Let them advance toward the platoon, Init as .soon as they enter the fold in the ground make them throw themselves flat, and let them crawl forward, keeping as close to the ground 140 MUSKETRY. as possible. This sliould iiialu' clear to the jilatoon the great pos- sil)ilities in crawliiif?. Now practice the men in crawling:. If the f^round is damp, men can practice indoor. To offer the least possible mark when crawling a man — (1) Should lie absolutely flat, with his elbows to the front, liis wrists imder his chin. His back should be hollow. (2) To advance he should bring one knee forward, keeping the inside of the knee flat to the ground and his back hollow. Above everything he must not draw this knee under him. He nuist then push himself forward with this leg, helping his progress with his elbows. In good crawling a man presents scarcely more of a target when moving than when stationary. Fig. 40. Most rifle bullets in war go too high. A line of men, when crawling, presents a very poor target to rifle fire. Almost every bullet will pass over their heads. By night a company might well crawl to within a few yards of the enemy without suffering any loss. • FIRING FROM COVER. 162. Firing from cover is best taught by practical illustra- tion. Half of the squad or platoon alternate in taking the firing positions behind cover. The men not taking position observe. Errors are corrected, and the men are impressed with the impor- tance of reducing the size target they present to the enemy and at the same time being able to fire effectively. Figure 40 illustrates the correct position firing from a fold in the ground. Note the excellent position of the man behind the tree. MUSKETRY. 141 In ligiire 41 note tlio iiicoircct position of tlie man on tiie t'Xtrt'ine li'ft — too nuidi exposure. Fig. 41. A rislit-lninded man shouUl always tire from the rij^lit side of a tree and the left side of an open door or window. Fig. 42. In lifiurc l.'> iioU' ihe incorrect position — liring from left side of th(> tree. 142 MUSKETRY. COVER FROM SHELL FIRE. 163. It is explained to the men that nioi?t shells fall at a steeper angle than does a bullet and that shells either burst on I he ground or in the air. Cover from those that burst on the ground can only be obtained by means of a hole or trench. Anything that will stop a bullet will stop fragments or bullets from a shell that bursts in the air. Houses that can not be seen by the enemy may furnish pro- tection against sliell fragn)ents. The lower rooms are the safer, as the roof is ordinarily not of sufficient thickness to stop any- FiG. 43. thing. Houses which the enemy can see are death traps and to l)e avoided. To obtain cover from a bullet is rather easy, as its trajectory is fairly flat, like the rays of a searchlight. To escape from pieces or fragments of bursting shells is much harder, and to do so one must lie very close to the cover, as they fall almost vertically, like rain. It is to be noted that the pack carried on the back renders a great deal of protection against bursting fragments when the men are in the prone positif)n. In the early stages of the pres- ent war and before the introduction of the steel helmet many men placed the small intrenchlTig shovel on the pack in such manner as to give them, when in the prone position in the optMi. a great deal of protection for the back of their necks and heads. CHAPTER XIL BATTLE-FIELD RECONNAISSANCE AND THE SELEC- TION OF FIRING POSITIONS. 164. For the purposo of study, huttie-liolil roconnaissaiu-o may ho divided into two chisoly related parts. I?atlle rei-oii- iiaissance furnishes information of the terrain and the enemy ; comhgt reconnaissance deals with the security of the conunand during the advance and engagement. 165. The resimental objective is divided between the l)at- talion.s on the firing line. From the colonel tli(> major receives information of the hostile position, intervening terrain, the general situation, proposed plan of action, and the limits of the battalion objective. By battle-field reconnaissance the major acquires the accurate knf)wledge of the hostile lines and the intervening terrain essen- tial to Ills conduct of the attack. He will thus guard against premature dei)loyment, avoid hostile lire while in dense forma- tion.s, and attempt to arrive within elTective range of the enemy before opening tire. 166. All attacks may be considered under three heads: 1. When there is a delay in the face of the enemy — a few hours to several days — permitting thorough exploration of the battlefield terrain. 2. When the attack is immediate. Tn thi.*^ case the func- tions of the battle reconnaissance and combat patrols may be merged in the same individuals, or the two patrols may advance together. 3. Intinite dcgrcM's of blending of the above two situations. The true attack connnences after the advancing firiiig line has reached the firing ;^osition nuirked by the combat patrols. 167. Battle reconnaissance explores the ground to be trav- ersed by a imit advancing to an attack. This subject covers tlie nmte, fire positions, targets, and includes all information desirable for a cDnunander to receive before moving forward to an unknown position. 14.3 144 MUSKETRY. 168. Combat reconnaissance guards the advance against sur- prise, clears the way to the positions desired, and protects the flanks. A l)attle-reconnaissance patrol seeking information on tlie eve of an engagement may become, by its position, a combat l)atroI and provide tlie necessary security to tlie flanlv and front during the ensuing action. Wlien the major begins tlie advance upon the enemy, in pur- suance of his orders, he must provide for the reconnaissance in liis own immediate front — and flanlcs if necessai-y — to avoid unexpected encounters with the enemy. This security is pro- vided during the early stages of the advance by patrols. Ac- cording to their instructions, the flank patrols may become the combat patrols of the fire fight, as responsibility for the flanks does not cease with the opening of fire. The patrols to the front advance through the zone of artillery fire, press on to within effective range for musketry, under 1,000 yards (807, I. D. R. ), select and, when possi!)le, occupy and outline the first position of the firing line. The strength and number of these patrols is determined by the terrain. In open country oi^.e patrol per company on the firing line might suffice to precede the line of skirmishers. If the terrain be broken or covered with vegetation, several patrols may be required. In many cases it will be necessary to cover the battalion front with a thin skirmish line of selected men sent forward to develop the hostile lines, select firing positions, and cover the advance of the firing line. It may be necessary to fight for this infor- mation. 169. Battle reconnaissance requires training in map reading, recognition of important military features on the terrain, and sketching. BATTLE RECONNAISSANCE PERSONNEL AND TRAINING. Battle reconnaissance is a part of the subject of security ami information, but is strictly limited to the work done when in the proximity of the enemy and possibly in contact with him. Except when necessary to drive back hostile detachments, the battle reconnaissance patrol will be small— one, two, or seldom more than three men. Officers will frequently be util- ized. These patrols receive their instructions either from the major or from the captains acting under specific instructions from the major. MUSKETRY. 145 This duty of battlf rocoimaissiince tails for special training;, courage, good judttinent. and initiative on the part of the indi- vidual. Proficiency is rc(|uir('d in visual sifrnalin;; and in send- inj; verbal and written niessaixes. 170. The equipment for men on this duty is that prescribed for any patrol leailer — compass, musketry rule, watch. ]ieiicils, notebook, lield-messa^'e blanks, and, when practicable, a map of the count rty. The special training essential to the piojier jxTformance of this important duty includes — («) Map readinj^ for .sectors, routes, and liriiijr jxisitions. (?>) Reconnaissance of the terrain for routes, sectors, lirlng positions, tarjrets, and reports thereon. (c) Sketchin;:. 171. The area covered in battle reconnaissance by any one patrol will usually be a rectangle lying between the battalion front and the section of the enemy's line assigned the battalion as an objective. The terrain to be reconnoitered by each bat- talion will thus be a rectangle with a maximum length of about 3 miles and a maximum breadth of 500 yards. When the bat- talion sector is on a tlank the territory will be extended on that side to a distance not exceeding 1,000 yards, or to Include the terrain covered by the combat patrols. The battalion acting alone is charged with the reconnaissance of its front and lx)th flanks. But in this case much of the work to the flanks will be should permit approach without detection by the enemy and be free from any serious obstacles which might hinder the ad- vance. The following points should be considered in choosing the route, all of which can be shown on a route sketch, using mar- ginal notes: A. Footuifi. — A route off the roads where the gi'ound is smooth and hard avoids objectionable features connected with the use of trails and roads. 3529°— 17 10 146 MUSKETRY. (o) A triiil iiiiiy cause troops to iiinrcli in columns of twos or files, but is often the most practicable route. (h) Road: (1) Avoid roads leading toward enemy. They are .<;ure to be under observation and fire and are where troops are expected. (2) Hostile artiUery will have data and ranges to reference points previously located in anticipation of targets appearing on roads. (3) Movements on roads may disclose, by dust clouds, position of columns otherwise hidden. B. Defilade. — The route should be protected from hostile ob- servation and fire by utilizing: (o) The dead space behind hills. (6) Deep creek bottoms and sunken road's. (e) Woods or other high vegetation. C. Exposed zones. — A route should avoid exposed areas when possible. If such areas must be traversed, routes will be locate<1 so that proper formations for crossing can be taken prior to emerging from the last cover. Areas where uniforms blend with the terrain may be crossed with little loss. D. Areas concealed from view of the enemy may be enfiladed by hostile fire, providing the enemy has an observer in the air or on some commanding position to direct the fire. Report will therefore be made of any aircraft observed and the location of any points from which hostile observers may note an advance through the sector. E. Streams. — It is desirable that no streams be crossed that are difficult to ford. If streams must be crossed, avoid, if pos- sible, established bridges and fords. Report direction of flow, depth and character of bottom, height and character of banks. F. Obstacles. — Routes should avoid any serious natural or artificial obstacle to the advance. Natural obstacles include : 1. Cliffs, diflicult slopes, ravines. 2. Bogs, deep water. 3. Cactus or other impeding vegetation. Artificial obstacles : 1. Specially constructed obstacles, 2. Thorny hedges. 3. Wire fences. 4. Pits, ditches. G. The route should not bring the column in view of enemy near a prominent object that may serve as hostile registration or aiming point. MUSKETRY. 147 173. Firing positions. — A knowledge of features constituting an ideal liiing position for attack .ir for defense is essential in battle reconnaissance. The followiiiK constitute the features to be sought in hring positions and included in a verbal or written report: A position luiving all these advantages will be found rarely, if ever. The one should be selected which conforms the closest to the description, remembering that the pos'ition is chosen for its .suitability for use as a fire position rather than for its suitability as corn: 174. Finny position^Attack (152, 4UG, 407, 4.jU, I. D. R.) : 1. Clear held of tire. 2. Within ellective range of enemy. 3. Length of front sufficient to accommodate command. 4. Ground should perniit constant observation of the enemy and yet enable the men to secure some cover when not actually tiring. 5. Not marked by any objects tiie range to which may be known to the enemy. Hedges, fences, and sky lines are particularly to be avoided. 6. Can be approached luider cover. 7. Presents no dilliculties to liuiher advance. 8. Flanks not enfiladed. 175. Firing position — Defense (489, I. D. R.) : 1. Clear tield of lire. Grenadier says: "A favorable field of fire should extend about 300 yards to the front. Before this* war 800 yards would have been considered ideal. " The reason for this change of opinion are these : If on Monday morning you had a tield of fire of 800 yards, the Germans would crawl up close to you on Monday night and entrench tliemselves, so that by Tuesday morning you would only have a field of fire of 300 yards. " There is another most important reason : The German ar- tillery fire from concealed positions, and their fire (as they can not see you) is directed by telephone by an officer near their infantry firing line. " If your field of fire is 800 yards, their ofiicer at that range can see your trenches and direct fire upon them. But if your field of fire is 300 yards he will, to do this, have to approach so close to you that he can not safely carry out his duty, so that ^ou will suffer less from artillery fire. 148 MUSKETRY. "Also, if your field of fire is only 300 yards, the Germans to attack you must brinj; their infantry within this range. " It will be vei-y ditticult for the German gunners to fire at your trenches for fear of shots, which go short, hitting their own men. So choose a field of fire from 150 to 350 yards. " By night this can be done by sending out a nonconnnissioned officer the required distance. He will then show a flash lamp from below the level of his jacket toward the trench, and shield ic from view in other directions as he would a match from the wind." 2. Length of front suitable to size of command. 3. Flanks secure. 4. Lateral communication. 5. Cover for supports and reserves. 6. A position the enemy can not avoid, but must attack or give up his mission. The locations of firing positions are determined by taking prone observations at intervals along the lines under investiga- tion. A position viewed from a standing position may appear ideal. The low^ command of the prone skirmisher is affected by tall grass, gentle folds in the ground, low-lying cactus, etc. Such features are accentuated only by the observer actually placing himself in the prone position and viewing the hostile target. The patrol leader is given the battalion objective be- fore starting forward. Positions selected will be such that the enemy presents as favorable a target as possible. The firing position selected should lie within effective range of the enemy — 800 yards — if possible. The actual firing posi- tion should lie along the military crest facing the enemy. It may be necessary for the patrol to halt behind the crest of the ridge and reconnoiter the enemy from this position, although reporting the actual firing position farther to the front. Natural or cultural features which offer clearly defined targets for the enemy's fire and afford no protection from its effects are to be avoided, especially if they must be occupied in view of the enemy. 176. Reconnaissance at night. — The terrain to be covered dur- ing a night operation should be reconnoitered both by day and in the darkness by trained men, who will act as guides during the movement. Battle reconnaissance covers the exploration of the battalion sector for certain military features after the advance against the enemy has been ordered by tlie higher commander. MUSKETRY. 149 Reconnoitering at night may be closely relatefl to battle re- connaissance. An attack at daybreak must he carefully plmnned beforehand. The terrain must bo thoroughly patrolled, and the different units, including the battalions, assigned their areas, and each will move forward through at least a portion of the battalion sector in separate colunms. The orders for an attack at daylight will not be published generally until the actual movement forward is Inaugurated. The majors, under their confidential orders, however, will send forward patrols specially trained in battle recoimaissance to study the terrain within the battalion sector with special refer- ence to the night advance. These patrols are instructed regard- ing the secrecy of their movements. An attack delivercnl at day- break necessitates an advance during what are often the dark- est huurf; of the night, with the possibility of Its interruption by a counter attack at any time. The first and most ini/iortant step in the preparation of any night operation consists in obtaining accurate information con- cerning the ground to be traversed and the pctsition of the enemy. This necessitates as close a reconnaissance as is possible, and the reconnaissance should be made by night as well as by day. Ground presents such a different appearance at night that it is often dillicult to identify a spot which has been seen previously in daylight. Small incidents of the sur- face which may not attract attention in daytime are some- times sulRcient to throw troops into disorder if encountered luiexpectedly in the dark. Every possible precaution must be taken to prevent an acci- dental collision between any two columns either before or after reaching their objectives. Bloody encounters between friendly forces meeting unexpectedly in the dark are not infre- quent in history. 177. Night advances vill be preceded and guided by selected men who have reconnoitered the ground both by day and at night. These " guides " will precede the colunm at distances varying from 50 to 100 yards, according to the light, contact being maintained by means of connecting files. This duty of guiding columns at night will naturally de- volve upon Ihe selectnl ofTicers and men trained in the impor- tant duty of battle reconnaissance. The battle sector of a battalion is never of extensive breadth, and must be reconnoitered in the dark as well as by day. Whenever possible the day reconnaissance should precede the 160 MUSKETRY. night. The guide sliouUl be faiuilijir with the identity of the north star and carry a compass with a luminous face. Tlio aliility lo move freely and with confidence through the dark is easily cultivated. With training men develop a keen sense of direction, and the more adventurous a liking for the work. With the development of modern firearms, especially artillery and machine guns, night advances if not night attacks may have great influence in the attainment of victory. The officers and men who show the requisite qualities for battle reconnaissance, as well as other phases of the subject of security and information, shoiild not fail to develop the ability to explore country at night. Such men are invaluable in guiding night advances. 178. The reports by a battle reconnaissance patrol will cover the routes, firing positions, targets, and all other military infor- mation of value to the commander of the firing line. The reports made by a leader of a battle reconnaissance patrol will be in the form of visual messages ; brief messages, w^ritten and verbal ; sketches sent back by a member of his patrol ; and a verbal or written report illustrated by route and landscape sketches. When these patrols take the form of skirmishers at extended intervals, covering the advance of the firing line at a distance of from 100 to 1,000 yards, the inform'Otion will be transmitted largely by risyal signals. Brief messages of fact can be trans- mitted quickly by signals. For example, the presence of small hdstile patrols, which are being driven back, may be indicated by holding the rifle over the head horizontally. (29. F. S. R.) This signal would explain any scattere<^l firing. The final report, verbal or written, will detail the military features of the sector, covering the route, fire positions, targets, and ranges. The patrol leader must understand clearly his mission. He must know what to look for, be able to describe intelligently what is seen, to locate what is seen with reference to features on the terrain, the time and place to make his report. In other words, where to go, itifiat to look for, limr to describe, wlien to report, and to iclinm to report. The power of accurate observation is the result of training. Due largely to differences in their boyhood environment, this power varies greatly among recruits. A man raised in thinly settled country will naturally give close and careful attention to the entire landscape. Given judgment, keen eyesight, pres- MUSKETRY. 161 ence of mind and courage, t^uch a man only requires instruction in the military matters to make an excellent patrol leader. The tueasagcfi and rvportft miifit he elear, emicixe, and acettrate. The ability to paint a clear and accurate word picture of a sec- tion of co»iiitry is, however, beyond the jwwcr of most men. It is no less dillicuit for the person receiving: the report to form a mental picture of the country described. Kesort is had, tlierelore, to slcctclta to illustrate and supple- ment the report. A rouuh sketch with all distances estimated will usually convey more real information of military value than many words. CHAPTER XIII. FIRE TACTICS. 179. The Infantry Drill Regulations, paragraphs 351, 354, 400, and 401, says in part : " Modern combat demands the highest order of training, dis- cipline, leadership, and morale on the part of the infantry." " The infantry must have the tenacity to hold every advantage gained, the individual and collective discipline and sliill needed to master the enemy's fire, the determination to close with the enemy in attack, and to meet him with the bayonet in de- fense. * * * Good infantry can defeat an enemy greatly superior in numbers, but lacking in training, discipline, leader- ship, and morale." " In a decisive battle success depends on gaining and main- taining fire superiority. Every effort must be made to gain it early and then to keep it. " Attacking troops nuist first gain fire superiority in order to reach the hostile position. Over open ground attack is possible only when the attacking force has a decided fire superiority. With such superiority the attack is not only possible, but suc- cess is probable and without ruinous losses. " Defending troops can prevent a charge only when they can master the enemy's fire and inflict heavy losses upon him." " To obtain fire superiority it is necessary to produce a heavy volume of accurate fire. Every increase in the effectiveness of the fire means a corresponding decrease in the effectiveness of the enemy's fire." 180. Fire superiority means the attainment and continuance, l)y troops better trained, better controlled, and with a higher morale than the enemy, of such an effective fire over the enemy's lines as to shake his morale, causing him to aim imperfectly, if at all, and thereby destroy the effectiveness of his fire. The gaining of fire superiority is dependent, among other things, upon : (1) The troop leading (par. 181). (2) The choice of target (par. 190). (3) The distribution of fire (Chap. VIII). (4) The density of firing lines (par. 192). (5) The determination of the range (Chap. VII). (6) The time of opening fire (par. 196). 152 MUSKETRY. 158 (7) The kind of fire (par. 198). (8) The rate and volume of fire (par. 207). (9) The distance between echelons (par. 217). (10) The service of observation of the eiieiny and of Ihc effect of fire (par. 220). (11) The aniniunition .supplifs ((Miap. XIV). TROOP LEADING. 181. Troop leading is the technique of command. — The art of leadership con.sisls in apiilyinu sduiid tactical principles to con- crete ca.ses on the battlefield. " Self-reliance, initiative, aggressiveness, and a conception of teamwork are the fundamental characteristics of successful leadership." (,3.")8, I. D. II.) Military education, through the performance of actual duties, is not sullicient to acfjuire a mastery of this sui)ject. Theory nuist be combined with practice, and much of what is necessary to learn is conuuon to the entire graduation of conmianders, al- though the viewpoint is different from every round of the ladder. To be a succe.ssful troop leader implies a thorough under- standing of men, ta^tk^iil jDiincli^s jukI their application, and the requ^isTte^ abijity to i.ssue orders to meet given situations as they may ari.se. A knowledge of the psychological elTect, of the effect that different orders luider diilerent conditions will produce upon the mind of the individual man, is of vital importance to the troop leader. Maude gives the attitude of the instructor in peace as follows : " I tell you this now in peace, because there is time and I am teaching; in war there is no time. I receive orders and obey them unquestionaldy, because I have confidence in my chief and know that he has cards in his hands which I have not seen, and in turn you must then obey me until I fall and there is no one left to give you further instructions ; then you must act for yourself, each according to Ins laiiU, in liaiiiiony with the general principles of the whole army." 182. Correct orders are possible only after an estimate of the situation has been made and a definite decision reached, (leu. Morrison says : "The objection raised to the process or method of estimating the situatiou that it is too loug except iu map problems and that 154 MUSKETRY. in actual practice one must act luoro promptly is not well takeu. It miglit be if it were contemplated to write the estimate all out, l)ut this is not the case. The mind works rapidly in ac- customed channels. The child beginnins the study of arithmetic is very slow in determining the sum of 7, 8, and 9, but later the answer is announced almost at sight. The same is true of tactical problems ; it may be a slow process at first, but with a little practice the decision is reached very quickly, is likely to be correct, and to be the one you will not want to change every few minutes. An accountant who guesses at the sum of a column of figures, instead of correctly adding them, would not be liable to make more errors than would a commander who failed to properly estimate the situation." Material differences manifest themselves between the actions of small bodies acting independently and bodies in larger commands. In all problems it is necessary to come to a clear and correct decision, do it promptly, and execute it vigorously. The deci- sion is followed by the order. 183. The arrangement of the order, or sequence of its details, should follow some logical system. The sequence of details given in the Field Service Regulations for tactical orders and that for fire orders herein (par. 255) follow such a logical system. These systems should not, as a rule, be departed from. In other words, a commander should be so in the habit of following this definite plan in the issuance of ordei's that he will be absolutely certain he is not omitti'ig an important detail when acting under the mental strain inci- dent to combat. It should be unnecessary to state that points which have no application to a particular situation are simply left out. The troop leader must have the quick military per- ception which enables him to give the necessary order to meet the particular situation which confronts him. To instruct yrm must explain. The division commander explains his views to his brigadiers, allotting to each his part in the general scheme of operations ; the brigadiers, in turn, explain and distribute the work to their colonels, and so on down to the corporal and his squad, and in peace this is all possible. In war it may be possible to go into this detail and it may not. The officer who issues orders must weigh the time factor against all other circumstances surrounding the particular situation, and do it instantly. MUSKETRY. 185 A troop leader, in dealing: with this time factor, must not only consider the necessity for rapidity of action to pain the initiative over the enemy but must also consider the actual time necessary for the issuance of correct orders. If he estimates that he has 10 minutes within which to issue his orders he must remember that his subordinate leaders are entitled to their pro- liortional share of this time. He luust not take eipht minutes of the time and allow subordinates only two. It takes time to digest the order, to formulate and issue it to subordinates and for the subordinates, in turn, to comprehend and act upon it. 184. The order, written or verbal, must be as short and to the point as clearness will permit. Brevity must not, however, be .secured at the expense of lucidity. The order of the leader of an advance jiarty mi};ht, for instance, in a meeting engagement be simply "As skirmishers, guide right (left). 'March'; Battle sight, ' Fire at will.' " while that of a cajitain whose C(imi>auy is part of a larger force in a general attack against a prei)ared position might go into great detail. One mu.st not forget that time, when available, spent in explanation is not lost. The rule should be to give all the information necessary to enable each and every one to play his part in the general scheme. The order must above all things be clear, concise, and defi- nite. There should be no possibility of a misunderstanding. Von Verdy says : " The criterion of a good order will always be simplicity and clearness ; if one word is stricken out of any good order it will become unintelligible; and any word that can be stricken out and .still leave the order intelligible is superfluous and conse- quently harmful." Most important of all in an order is that it be easily nndei- stood ; the clearer it is the more remote is the possibility of a misunderstanding. It is not an easy matter to issue a good order. It is an art that must be acquired and practiced. The amount of detail given in an order depends upon the situation and the rank and training of the recipient. 185. Tasks must be definitely assigned. The comparatively wide fronts of deployed units increase the difliculties of control. A comjiany commander with his company deployed on a front of 128 yards can not hope to exercise any control except through his platoon commanders and subordinates. Subordinjites must therefore be given great latitude in tlie execution of their tasks. 166 MUSKETRY. The success of the whole depends upon how well each subordi- nate coordinates his work with the general plan. (371, I. D. R.) 186. The latitude alloived officers is in direct proportion to the size of their commands. Each should see to the general execu- tion of his task, leaving to the proper subordinates the super- vision of details and interfering only when mistakes are made that threaten to seriously prejudice the general plan. (370, I. D. R.) At peace maneuvers the majors are everywhere, and the cap- tains do the work of all platoon commanders. It is said, in justifying this action, that it is necessax'y for instruction and will be corrected by the first bullet. All should kn(»\v that this is not true. As a man acts in peace so will he also act in war. Habit can not be changed by one bullet. " When issuing orders a connnander should indicate clearly what is to be done by each subordinate but not how it is to be done. He shoud not encroach upon the functions of a subordi- nate by prescribing details of execution unless he has good rea- son to doubt the ability or judgment of the subordinate and can not substitute others." (382, I. D. R.) If clear and concise instructions are given as to the action to be taken in the combat by each part of the command, tasks, fronts, or sectors being assigned in accordance with a definite, simple plan, conveying definite ideas and leaving no loophole, the conduct of the subordinates will generally be correspondingly satisfactory. 187. Subordinate leaders, up to and including company com- manders, are mainly occupied with fire control and fire direc- tion, and should influence their men by their personal example ; superior commanders have other tasks which they must not neglect for the purpose of interfering in the spheres of action of their subordinates. During the action the superior com- mander can influence its course only by employing his reserves. The difficulties of troop leading increase as the power of the commander to control and direct all ranks in action by word of command decreases. Those means must be adopted in action that will facilitate the transmission of orders. This requires, first of all, the choice of an appropriate position for the leader. The begin- ning of an action should find him as far forward as possible ; (luring the advance to the battle field with the advance guard, for neither messages nor a map can adequately take the place MUSKETRY, 167 of ii personal view of the t'lieiny. of neiKhhoring units, and of the jrround. So phiced he can best direct the tirst deployment upon which the future course of the action so largely depends, secure advantaj,'es by niaiciuf? prompt decisions in the face of the enemy, save his troops from making detours, handle them in accordance with a definite plan, and preclude arbitrary action on the part of the commander of the leading unit. The post of the comnuuider in action must l)e such as will enal)le him to observe the progress of events and to connnunicate Ills orders. After having announced where he will be during the action, he should not quit that place irithout Iraviun some one tlicrr to direct iiicssenf/ers and others tvhere to find him. 188. A commander takes full and direct charge of his firing line only when that line has absorbed his whole comnumd. " Full and direct charge " is not to be construed that a major, when he sends in his last company, moves up close to the firing line and takes over the duties of the captains, determining the sizes of the elements to rush, how they will rush, etc. But it does mean that a major's duties have changed somewhat. Hefore the last company went into the line the mnj(tr's posi- tion was back where he could observe the firing line and at the same time control the movement of the support and regulate the ammunition supply. After the last company is engaged he has no support to look after, and he moves up where he can insure the coordination and cooperation of his companies. At the same time he nnist be back far enough so that he can attend to his still important duties of regulating the ammuni- tion supply and of directing any supports sent him from the reserve. He does not disturb the existing machinery of com- mand, but does lend to the firing line the effect of his personal presence near the line and leads the charge of his battalion. When the last element of the regiment goes into the line, the colop.el moves up in tlie same way. as does the brigade comman- der with the last fraction of his brigade. Certain qualities are necessary in the troops themselves before it is possible to lead them to victory. Assuming that they have been trainetl in the mechanics of their profession, there must hi' added the development of a true soldier .spirit, of character, of loyalty to themselves, their comrades, and their superiors. LoyaJtii is part of the soldier's creed and needs no discission. 189. Initiative in a junior officer or noncommissioned officer is the adoption of the proper methods to carry out orders given him, or the acting in a manner different from that ordered when 168 MUSKETRY. it is found that clue to conditions whicli were not considered wlien tlie original order was issued sucli action becomes neces- sary. Manifestly to use initiative an officer and noncommissioned oflicor must l)o trained. No one would or could expect an officer, untrained in his profession, to act independently and still have his action fit in with the general plan except by accident, and accidents of this kind are too rare, even improbable, for a com- mander to consider in forming his plans. To the company officer and nonconnnissioned officer initiative in the fire fight means the correct utilization of the means In his hands, men and rifles, to increase the probability of the force to which he belongs gaiinng fire superiority and the resultant vic- tory. His action must be such that it fits in with the general plan. THE CHOICE OF TARGET. 190. The target chosen should be the hostile troops most dan- gerous to the firers. These will usually be the nearest hostile infantry. When no target is especially dangerous, that one should be chosen which promises the most hits. Frequent changes of target impair the fire effect. Unimpor- tant targets impair fire discipline and accomplish nothing. At- tention should be confined to the main target until substantial reason for change is apparent. An opportunity for delivering flanking fire, especially against artillery protected in front by shields, is an example warranting change of target, and should never be overlooked. Such fire demoralizes the troops subjected to it. even if the losses inflicted are small. In this manner a relatively small number of rifles can produce Important results. (408-410, I. D. R.) Each unit in the attack is assigned a definite frontage or ob- jective. (Chap. VIII.) On the defensive it is given a specified sector to cover with its fire. The unit is responsible that the enemy does not advance in that sector. The hostile troops most dangerous to the firers are those making the most progress In that sector. As the combat develops it generally resolves itself into a line of separate fights, and small groups of the enemy under natural leaders work their way forward at different points of the line and become the rallying points upon which a strong line is built by the attackers. It is the sum of the efforts of these groups that make up the final strength in the assault, hence their initial efforts must be checked at once. MUSKETRY. 159 Individuals must be trained not to fire outside the assigned sector without orders. If tlie tire <»f an organization is diverted to anotiier sector, it should l)e sliilted l)ael\ to its own sector as soon a.s possil)le after the appearance of a target tlierein. It i.s to be renienii)ered that tiie men will, as a rule, tire only on that part of the enemy nearest tiieui, as this will appear to tiiein to be the source of greatest danger. Large and vulnerable targets, that olTer gi'eat returns for the expenditure of ammuiution, should not be neglected. At the same time tire superiority over the entire line mu.st be main- tained. Troops deployed and under tire can not change front ; in case a false deployment has been made, other troops should be sent forward in the correct dirtn-tion and the men already deployed pulled out and re-formed. The correct way to meet an enfilade fire is with fresh troops. In a meeting engagement, troops as they come successively on or into the line of battle take as their part of the target the enemy directly in front of them. EXERCISES. 191. I. — Object: To train the men not to .shift their fire to unauthorized targets, but to continue firing in the assigned sector and at the designated objective until ordered to change. Method: The squad or platoon on the defensive as part of a general line watching a designated .sector. Troops to the right and left, assumed or represented. The enemy represented by two details, each detail to consist of from four to six men con- cealed in the foreground. One of the details representing the enemy at a signal appears in the designated sector at a range of about 600 yards. The defense opens tire (sinuiiated tiring). In a few seconds later the second detail appears at a signal at a much closer range, Init outside the assigned sector. Some of the men will inva- riably shift their tire to the second target. The exercise is made more realistic if the instructor will give the men a short talk before the exercise is started on the choice of targets, and mention, as an incidental point, that the men should not shift their fire to unauthorized targets without or- ders. Then quietly advise one or two men what is to happen, and that when the second target appears they are to call out, "There they are; look out, etc." 160 MUSKETRY. THE DENSITY OF THE FIRING LINE. 192. Based upon the estimate of the situation, a commander must decide the number of men that he is to put in the firing line. This decision determines the amount of fire tliat he will direct uikhi the enemy. Manifestly, 50 men on a front of 100 yards can not develop as heavy a fire as can 100 men on the same front. Extending the skirmisliers to wide intervals keeps lo.sses at a minimum, but such a line can not cau.se the enemy as much loss as can a heavy line. Two conflicting elements here enter : (1) The desire to avoid losses l)y the use of a firing line with the men at wide intervals. (2) The desire to attain the gi'eatest fire effect by putting the largest possible number of rifles in the firing line. One hundred men on a 200-yard front can obtain the same fire effect on a given target as can the same number of men on half that front. But in battles there must be taken into consideration the question of fire effect per yard of front and the space necessary for deployment of other troops. In very small combats, patrols, and outposts, a line deployed at wide intervals is possible and at times may be preferable. The difficulty in controlling a line of this kind must always be taken into consideration. In large engagements tactical considerations and the lack of room usually demand a thick line. Increasing the number of rifles in the firing line increases in direct proportion the vulnerable area of the line, but the per- centage of losses will be lower in the thicker line. For instance, doubling the number of men in the line does not double the number of men hit, because the volume of fire on the enemy'.^ line is double that possible with the weak line; consequently the accuracy of the enemy's fire is reduced. The subject of the proper density of the firing line, while really pertaining to the study of maneuver tactics, is such as to justify an inquiry here into those conditions which must be considered before determining in a given case the density of the attacking lines. Each must, of course, be decided on its merits. All movements on the battle field have but one end in view — the development of the fire in a greater volume and more effectively directed than that of the opposing force — and, although the bayonet plays an important part, it is MUSKETRY. 161 superiority of firo tlmt (Iccidcs tlir contlict by permitting an advance to wliere tlie bayonet may be used. Tacticians approacli tliis subject from eitlier one or tbe other of two quite different viewpoints. In one case, and un- fortunately in tbe too connnon case, the mental attitude is " How best can I reduce the loss of life?" while the other and correct attitude is " IIow can I iiicrcaso the elTect of my fire?" Both (luestions must be answered before a satisfactory solution can be reached, hut since they lead to opposing replies one must dominate and the other assume a secondary i)Iace. The first gets nowhere and can not lead to a success of any mag- PUtOON eoUUMS CKICXIItKMI^ rOMUTtOX. « 1^ 11 1 i i * & A » 3ev; the second attains results. In the first the oflicer attempts to regulate the effect of the hostile fire, and in the second he seeks to control the effect of his own fire. If small losses are to be the guiding principle, it is best that the army stay at home and suffer no losses jit all. 193. The infantry advancing to the attack from the point where it first comes under artillery fire to its first firing posi- tion is concerned with only one question. "To reach that firing po.sition with a inininunu loss of life." This is true not only from humanitarian motives, but also because the point 3529°— 17 11 162 MUSKETRY. where the rifle fire must l^egiii is larjrely dependent upon the losses sustained. The fewer the losses the farther forward the lino fan advance without firinc, and the farther it advances without firing the surer is fire supremacy gained when the line does begin tlie fire. Hence under artillery fire only the infantry may be formed in platoon colunms, checkerboard formation (fig. 44), or the coUunns <'cheloned to the rear (fig. 4.^), or thin lines (fig. 46) (never in squad columns), thus offering to artillery the least favorable target. This advance is continued even into the first stages of the defenders' long-range infantry fire. «- I .1 Fig. 45. — Platoon echeloned from left to rear Platoon columns, being very vulnerable to the direct fire of infantry and machine guns, must deploy into thin lines or as skirmishers at wide intervals to pass over ground swept by the enemy's direct-aimed fire. It must be clearly understood that there may be no necessity for all the columns to deploy at the same time. When advancing on a wide front one platoon may be compelled to pass over a dangerous piece of ground in a skirmish line. But the platoons to the right and left may still be in a ravine or behind a hill which hides them completely. After having crossed dangerous ground the platoon reforms its column without halting and continues the advance. Capt. E. J. Solano, in writing of the present war, says : " Small columns in what are known as ' artillery formations ' should MUSKETRY. 163 never l)i' adhered to when there is a iJOssiljUity of their cumin;; xmder close or inediuin ranjre tire of infantry or machine jyuns. Troops liavc suffered severely frojn insnllicient extension, and tlie adoption of ri;:id lines, ami also I'rom i»ushin;r forward in close formations without taking; the proi)er military precautions. Loose, elastic formations, adapted to the ground, "with men at 8 or 10 i)aces interval are the least vulnerahle. Several limes it has heen necessary to advance under unsul)- dued artillery tire. Small columns at 50 yards interval and 3(X) yards distance have heen found to he the hest method of avoid- ing casualties. The nineteenth brigade lying in tln' open In this r "••-'• J.,, 1 ! 1 ., „...^.. ,.♦ C»r^«'*l« . J rrortf P»»it Fig. 4G. — Advance in thin lines. 1. (Siich niinihprs) forw.Trd : 2. March. formation were shelled hy two batteries for half an hour and had only 25 casualties." (Musketry.) 194. When, however, the point is reached beyond which the men will not advance without tiring, the attacker begins to build u\) a tiring line of sutlicient density to produce an erticient fire. At this range, which should not be greater than 800-1,200 yards few hits can be expected. Therefore to secure a sullicient lunnber of hits the tire M'ill then be Increased in volume. A rai)idity of tire of more, than five shots per minute at this range reduces the number of hits in a given unit of time, unless the target be an exce])tionally large and vulnerable one. hence there remains no other alterna- tive than a tiring line of at least one man ]ier yard, whicii ex- 164 MUSKETRY. perience shows to be the space ordinarily iicodccl l)y a man for freedom of movement in tirlnj,'. It is, of course, a serious mistalve to malce the liriiij,' line too tliick, for thereby one increases losses with no conipensatinji; train, l)ut with a line as tliiclv as may be with proper i-ocmi for handling? tlie ritle, supremac.v of tire is not only attained sooner, but tlie wliole attaclv is made in less time, the men are kept out in the rain of bullets for a shorter time and the spirit of the at- tack is not allowed to lag. A thin firing line may be used when the situalion is still in doubt — that is, in a reconnaissance. k- ^1/ -^ ■;:\cynif 2: ... ^ _ M •m||^^^H|BhL i^^^^^ ■Hi M^^^ » ^^'-*^'^ ^"^Wt^ I^BHE^p^^p^ P^n^ffllvHHp^H -?v^^- /^^ "^^^As^iB - 5« IV ^bP'^'v^^ 'flllV^ " w^ ^ T^ '^ft Fic. 47. In the Spanish-American War and in the Philippines thin lines were used successfully, but the inferiority of the Spanish and P^ilipino troops must be considered. These were proper cases for the use of tliin lines. 195. Officers and noncommissioned officer.^ should thoroughly appreciate the relation existing between the strength of the firing line and the resulting hits to be expected. The men should be taught the necessity for thick lines, but should be warned to avoid bunching in rushing and the accompanying crowding together so thickly that they can not use their rifles. Figure 47 shows a line rushing, the men all bunched to- gether. Tliis makes an excellent target. The men rushing bunched, as in figure 47, were halted, and hgure 48 sliows what happens — the men in a part of the line MUSKETRY. 165 lire crowded so closely together that they can not use thi-ir rifles. Hence their vulneral)ility as ii target lias heen in- creased by crowding togetlier, and at the same time there is a loss of lire elTect. Kuntpean writers in the i)resent war all warn against the evils of hunching in the advance and insist that, when rushing, individual men nnist be trained to advance in a straight line toward the enemy, not swerving to the right or left in search of cover. The strength in rear, the supports and reserves, should be such Ihat the tiring line can be maintained at the i)roper density. ^.» •:- *- * '««ftClMM^i^<^<^l^ TIXIK OF OPENING KIKE. 196. The soldier's first impulse when fired upon is to re- turn the fire. In other words, to shoot up his courage. The men must be taught the futility of long-range fire, and they must be so trained that their leaders can get them to within an effective range before fire is opened. It nuist be impressed upon all that the attacking line does not stop to open fire, but it only opens fire when stopped or until further progress can not be made without firing. The weight of all military authority is to the effect that an attack in which the attacking line stops to open fire before hav- ing reached a range at which the fire will be effective (800 to 1.2()() yards) never succeeds. Consid(>rations of time, target, ammunition, and morale make it imi)erative that the attack withhold its fire and press forward to a first firing jtosition close to the enemy. 166 MUSKETRY. Full ii(lv;iiil;ifie of the lA'rraiii is taken and the men are kept in .small cdlunms in oi'der i«i i»revent individuals droppinii down and commencing to fire without orders. It is to be remembered tliat troops advancing to the attack' without coveu will suffer losses. Men must be trained to ex- pect these, but each and every one should have firmly imbued in his soul that to stop to commence firing before reaching a close range is to lose the fight. An enemy can not be shot out of his trenches. The bayonet wins the battle. Fire, as a general rule, should rarely be opened by infantry in attack when satisfactory progress can be made without it. The leading troops, in particular, should save every possible round for the final struggle for superiority of fire at close range, as the replenishment of ammunition to the firing line at that time will be almost, if not entirely, impossible. Fire properly controlled and directed is effective against large targets at vei-y great ranges. Infantry should not hesitate to seize opportunities for long- range fire against troops massed, such as reserves and other formed bodies, provided that the opening of fire does not pre- maturely disclose the position. Long-range fire is permissible in pursuit on account of the moral effect of any fire under the circumstances. In the defense, ranges are more easily determined, and the enemy usually presents a larger target. The defender may therefore open fire and expect results at longer ranges than the attacker, and particularly if the defenders intend a delaying action only. If the enemy has powerful artillery it will often be best for the defending infantry to withhold its fire until the enemy offers a specially favorable target. Vigorous and well-directed bursts of fire are then employed. The troops should therefore be given as much artificial protection as time and means permit, and at an agreed signal expose themselves as much as necessary and open fire. (404, I. D. R.) Lony-naige targets are primarily for artillery and maehine guns. The disadvantages of long-range fire are : (1) Its effect is insignificant when compared with the amount of ammunition used. (2) Amanmition is hard to replenish during the attack. (3) The individual firer can hope to keep up his fire only for a certain length of time. His arm and eye get tired, the rifle MUSKETRY. 167- lidt, ami ho (loi's not take tlu- (miihlt' to aim (tr l)rim,' tlic piece to his shoulder. (4) Tiie I'liemy's morale is increascHl. (5) The surprise elTect of the lire is often lost. (6) It often indicates the jxisition of troops .wliicli nii;;iit otherwise be unnoticed by the enemy. The major usually indicates the point or time at which the lire fight is to open. (304, I. D. R.) He may do so in his order for deployment or he may follow the firing line close enough to do so at the proper time. If it is impracticable for him to do either, the senior lino odicor with tlio tiring lino in each l>attalion .selects the time for opening fire. Conditions may retpiire a com- pany c(tmmander to open fire at some i)laco other than that designated by the battalion commander. However, the provi- sions of the Drill Regulations should be followed whenever possible, and, as a rule, the battalion commander should desig- nate the tiring position. The firing line should, if possible, ad- vance without firing to within 800 yards of the enemy's lino. At this first firing position the attack seeks to gain fire superiority. Fire on the hostile main j»ositit)n should not bo opened until all or nearly all the firing line can join the fire. The major. of cavalry, and 1 comfjunj of eiigineer& Part of the force occnpied a sunken road. The Japanese attacked the front early in the morning but oonld make no progress. Finally seven daring infantrymen of the Japanese Army worked their way around into a position frcMn which they tvooght an enfilading fire on the Rassian left. The fire of these seren mm caused the Russian line to give way. tot. In figure 53 the line A ha» concentrate as oot to endanser tbfr flanks of adraacMl por- tfoos of tke Srfas liae. 170 MUSKETRY. Fig. 52. The lino at R enfllado.s that at A. COUCENTRAIED FIRE. A Firing line. 3 Enemy machine gun* Flu. 53. MUSKETRY. DISTRIBUTED FIRE. 171 A Attacking line. B Enemy line. Fi(i. r,4. B CONVERGINa HRE. A & B Two firing llnep directing their fire on an Infaitry column at C. Pin. r>5. 172 MTJSKETRY. It is also to be noted that tire of position is sometimes called covering lire. 206. Fire is also classified according; to the manner of its delivery. Tlie Infantry Drill Regulations prescril^e volley, at will, and clip fire. Volley fire is the simultaneous discharge by a number of men of their rifles at a word of command. Mat-ual supporting or covering fire. ^ -^ The enemy Attaciting line In the days of a slow-loading rifle of limited range, the impor- tance of volley fire was due to the fact that it enabled the leader to develop the greatest volume of fire in tactically favorable moments, or, in other words, when large targets were visible for a short time only. The pause also permitted the powder smoke of the old black powder to clear away. Slodern combat ts conducted under different conditions. Except for fire of position and in the determination of ranges, volley fire heed not be considered. Fire at will is that class of fire in which the marksman, having; been given the range and the objective, sets his sight, opens fire at the command of the director or controller, and thereafter continues to fire independently. MUSKETRY. 173 This is tlic only class of liri" that luvd be seriously considered ; it iniplit's tliat the men are thoroughly trained in fire discipline and control. Clip lire is sinijily a means \vlierel\v the officer may control llio amount of ainiMiiiiiti()n that he desires used at any iiariicular tirint; point. THE RATE AND VOLUME OF FIRE. 207. Other conditions l)eins equal, the ellicacy of fire depends upon the rate at which casualties are produced in the enemy's ranks. It is apparent, therefore, that the deciding factor is not the prrrrntofic of hits, but the number of hits obtained within a \init of time. A great number of hits jxt minute is obtained by (1) increa.s- ing the individual rate of accurate fire and (2) directing the fire of more rilles at the particular objective in question. 208. There is necessarily a limit to rapidity of fire which, if exceeded, will result in some loss of accuracy. This rate of effective fire depends upon a number of factors : (1) It will be faster for trained than for untrained troops. (2) It will be faster at a large than a small target. (3) It will be faster at a target which stands out in bold relief than at one which is vague in outline and whose color blends with a neutral background. (4) The physical condition and the morale of the \intrained troops has a marked influence on the rapidity of effective fire. (5) The aiming position also has its effect — one can fire faster from an easy position than from a cramped one. (6) It will be faster at .short than at long range. (7) It will be faster at the beginning of an action than after firing has continued for some time. 209. There is some variety of opinion as to the rates of fire which are consistent with accuracy, and it is obvious that in proposing a standard of jierforniance no more can be done tlian to present an apjtroximation to which there must be some ex- ceptions. The standard rates of fire proposed below are based upon experience and observation at the Musketry School (Mon- terey). When firing a single clip the rate is obviously faster than when two or more clips are fired. 174 MUSKETRY. Range. f 200 10 per minute ] 300 I 400 7.5 per nunute J 600 [ 700 I 800 5 i)er minute i 900 [1, 000 (At greater ranges 3 per minute, 209, S. A. F. M.) This rate includes tlie time required for recliarging tlie maga- zine wliieli is tal^en to be 10 seconds. Sliould tlie rate of fire at any range fall very much below the rate given it may be said that a proper use has not been made of the time element, and should the rate be very much in excess of the standard given, it may be concluded that there has been some loss of accuracy. The rates given should not exclude higher rates of fire, in the case of large and very conspicuous targets, such as dense skirmish lines, bodies of cavalry, or batteries of artillery. An exceptionally low rate does not improve the accuracy of the fire, and on the other hand the rate of 10 shots per minute can not be exceeded by the average soldier without a loss in accuracy. A high rate of fire may easily degenerate into un- aimed fire. 210. The following table shows the result of experimental firing by a squad of average marksmen at the School of Mus- ketry : [Targets, 8 E, spacert at 1 yard center to center. Range, 500 yards.] Rate of fire per minute. Number rounds fired. Hits. Hits per minute. Targets hit. Per cent of acciu-acy (hits). Per cent of distri- bution. 15 10 5 10 15i 80 ItiO SO SO 124 2.3 44 31 19 21 Hi 22 15J 19 21 6 8 8 8 8 14.37 27.75 19.44 23.75 16.94 71 100 100 100 100 From this table it is apparent that there is a correct rate of fire for the different ranges and for the different degrees of training of the men. Manifestly if two forces are firing against MUSKETRY. 175 each other at lliis rnn^c ami one maintains a tire of l(t slmis per man per minute ami tlie otlier fires at tiie rate of H shots iici- man per minute, tlie lirst should have fire superiority. It Is to be remembered that rapid fire is primarily rapid manipuhition of the piece, i. e., reloadiiiitixud^aiining. 211. The rale of fire is dependent to a ^Teat extent on the size and visibility of tlie target. The larger the target and the more plainly it stands out the quicker and easier can the soldier catch his aim. On tlie other hand, if the target is small and indistinct it takes more time to find the aiming point after each discharge of the rifle. Short bursts of rapid fire, especially if they are in the nature of surprise fire, should and will be very effective. There are two forms of rapid fire : That which might be called the ordinary rate, as given in the Standard for Field Firiiig, and quoted above, and then a very high rate of fire maintained for a few minutes, which the English call the mad minute. The latter is used against favorable targets appearing during the fight and which demand a veritable whirlwind of fire (such as repulsing a cavalry charge, the moment before charging, etc.). This kind of fire can, however, be kept \ip for only a short time, not exceeding two to four minutes, on account of the enormous expenditure of ammunition, the fatigue of the men, and the excitement which a prolonged and continuous rapid fire pro- duces on tlie men (the physiological effect). Col. von Sdicrf says: " The physiological influence of a rapid fire on the nervous system of the combatants is such that at the end of a very short time, wliich can not reasonably last more than five minutes, tlie troops on the otTensive will either dash forward or retire." The expenditure of ammunition during these minutes of ex- treme rapid fire will be enormous, but such targets and such opportunities to inflict a heavy loss upon the enemy fully justify the expenditure. The rate of fire attained in these bursts without loss of effect depends directly upon the peace training of the troops; with men properly trained it niny be as hi^di as l^^ to 20 shots a minute. With untrained or partially trained troops it is. of course, the height of folly to exjiect them to reach this standard ; their dispersion increases to such dimensions as to be of absolutely no value. 176 MUSKETRY. 212. The riinse influences the rapidity of fire, as the greater tlie distance the more is time necessary in aiming, the position of the firer becomes more and more strainetl, and the target is more difficult to see and to hit. Pauses in the fire in the past were necessary to let the smoke clear away ; at present they are of advantage in giving the men a breathing spell, rest eyes and nerves, enable ammunition to be distributed, and allow organizations to re-form. During such pauses good cover, good observation of the enemy, and instant readiness to resume the fire are essential. ^ The officer or noncommissioned officer, in determining the rate of fire, must consider the replenishment of ammunition. With 220 rounds on the person, the man will be able to maintain a 10-round rate for only 22 minutes. All of the foregoing factors must be taken into consideration, and then, if the mission is such that it demands a high rate, even with its tiring effect upon the men and the expenditure of ammunition, it should be ordered without hesitation. EXERCISES. 214. I. — Object: To train men to fire at the ordered rate. Method: A squad or platoon in the prone position. The in- structor first explains the necessity and the reason for the men maintaining an ordered rate of fire. He then, by counting 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc., in a minute indicates the different rates after which the men are given a target and a rate of fire. The men then simulate firing, time being kept by an assistant. This is repeated until the men can fire at any ordered rate. 215. II. — Object: To train the men to load rapidly. Method: Loading from belt, pockets fastened, with a clip of dummy cartridges, in the belt. All positions standing, kneeling, sitting, and prone. The squad or platoon in line, instructor commands load. Maximum time limit of 10 seconds each in best five out of seven consecutive trials. It should be impressed upon the soldier that rapid fire is principally rapid loading. 216. III. — Object: To train men to set sights quickly and accurately. Method: The squad is formed in single rank, arms at the order. The instructor commands " Range ." All men then set their sights and come to the order. All sights should be correctly set in 10 seconds. MUSKETRY. 177 THE DISTANCE BETWEEN ECHELONS. 217. The distance !)e(\veen echelons depends upon (o) the object to be attained, (b) tlie nature of the action, and (c) tlie terrain. In an attaclc tlie distances between echelons siiould be de- creased in the course of the action. Leaders of all grades should be animated by but one desire, that of being in front in order to participate in the gaining of the victory. The duration of the crisis of the action is usually brief, and in a very few rapidly passing nioiiit'nts tlie leader must decide what to do with the troops remaining available. ^\■hen an immediate decision is not sought, it is advisable to increase distances in order to keep the echelons held in rear from coming under fire. In any case, the distance between sup- ports and the firing line should be less than the distance be- tween the firing line and the enemy. Supports should be close enough to the firing line (in an attack) to prevent, by timely interference, a retrograde move- ment of the latter. All commanders must be ready with supports to stop any movement to the rear. While the lines in rear can not be kept entirely out of hostile fire during an attack, care must nevertheless be taken that they be held far enough back to prevent their feeling the full effect of the fire directed at the firing line. 218. Supports held too close to the firing line in open country will cease to exist as such. The boldest join the firing line of their own accord and the timid seek cover. The supports on the defensive are usually placed a short distance immediately in rear of, or within the firing line (in- trenched) at the points where they are to be employed. On ac- count of the difficulty of bringing supports up for the purpose of repulsing an as.sault they must be held so near the line that they can readily reinforce it under all emergencies. This may compel distances as small as 50 yards, notwith- standing the consequences of the cover trenches coming within the dispersion area of artillery directed at the fire trenches. The prompt reinforcement of the firing line at the critical mo- ment is a delicate matter. The enemy's artillery fire, having supported his infantry at the decisive range, will next be di- rected to cover the rear of the position. It Is at this moment 3520°— 17 12 178 MUSKETRY. that the supports attempt to reinforce the fire trench. If, therefore, the supports are placed too far to the rear they may not only fail to arrive in time, but in order to come up at all must cross ground likely to be swept by artillery fire. 219. Reserves, both sector and general, must be so located that they can reach all equally important points of the firing line with equal facility. The reserves should generally be placed far enough to the rear to escape the effect of " overs " from hostile artillery ; that is, not nearer than 300 yards. For a discussion as to the position of supports on rising and falling slopes and on level ground, see paragraph 44. OBSERVATION OF FIRE. 220. The actions of the enemy are usually the only reliable indication of the location of the sheaf of fire against him. It is especially difficult to judge of the disti'ibution of bullets from their strike in front of and in rear of the target. Sug- gestions from the subordinate leaders, whose \iew of the target Is generally restricted, are often more confusing than valuable. If the assailant finds that the defender's fire is steady and continuous, he may assume that his own fire is ineffective. If the defender sees the front line of the assailant advancing with confidence but the supports In confusion, he may take it that his rear sight elevation is too high ; when the advance is hesi- tating but continuous, that it is too low ; if the enemy halts to fire and gains ground by rushes, that it is correct. If one observes that the hostile bullets are going wild, some striking far short, others very high and very ineffective, he has fire superiority, and it is time to gain distance to the front. On the other hand, althougli he may be suffering no losses, if he sees that the enemy's bullets, well massed, are striking, say, 50 j ards in his front, he has no fire superiority ; the enemy has simi^ly underestimated the range, and his, the observer's, advance will bring him into the center of the beaten zone. But this is the opportunity to gain fire superiority. The men are suffering little or no loss ; they should be less affected by the enemy's fire and should do better work. If this opportunity is well used, fire superiority should soon be wrested from the enemy. MUSKETRY. 179 221. ( Htscrvation lo the Irdiil iiiiist 1k> <'(tiit iiiuons juid unin- terrupted both for tlie elTect of tiie fire upon the enemy and for his movements. Tlie Hanks must also be watched ; this is pro- vided for by flank or combat patrols. Tlie battalion staff assist the major in observation and the buglers assist the captains ; the guides assist the platoon leaders. Not the least important is the oi)servation of the adjoining troops. Tlieir action may show the effect of the fire upon the enemy. If they are advancing, the fire is ajiparently so effec- tive that the enemy can not divert his fire to them. Their con- tinued advance, however, will draw more fire to them. The ad- vance of oue fraction of the line takes the pressure off the ad- joining ones. Good field glas.ses are indispensable in observing the effect of fire and in locating an enemy whose position Is not exactly known. On the defensive, when troops are in trenches and not firing. all the men are not kept watching to the front, but one or two men in each platoon are designated to watch. The other men rest. Any man who sees anything unusual should at once call out, thereby attracting his squad or platoon leader's attention to it. This is a rule. CHAPTER XIV. VULNERABILITY OF FORMATIONS. 222. The vulnerability of a formation is its likelihood of being struck by hostile fire. That formation which by computation is shown to receive the greatest number of hits from a given num- ber of hostile shots is said to be the most vulnerable. Rifle fire only is considered. The relative vulnerability of several formations is, therefore, determined by computing the number of hits expected, under identicaJ conditions, on each of the several formations and then comparing these expected results. A brief synopsis of vulnerability is here given in order that the student may have at a glance the deductions that have been made regarding the subject. 223. In the study of this subject tvro conflicting interests are to be considered : (1) The avoidance of losses ; (2) a heavy firing line. The first demands very wide intervals between individuals in the skirmish line; the second a very heavy line — only enough intervals between skirmishers to permit of the free use of the rifle and bayonet. ( Par. 192. ) Troops may come under aimed and unaimed fire. Aimed fire is fire that is directed at the particular body whose vulnerability is being di.scussed. TInaimed fire is that fire in which some of the shots aimed at and intended for some other objective fall into the area occupied by the body whose vulnerability is being considered. There is a slight difference in the method of calculating the vulnerability of formations under aimed and unaimed fire. The vertical dispersion of average marksmen between 500 and 1.000 yax'ds is about 1 foot greater than the lateral dispersion, hence the height of the target under aimed fire is a greater factor than is the lateral width of the target. In other words, a loag, low target will not get as many hits as a target, say, of half the length but twice as high. ISO MUSKETRY. 181 Under unainied fire tlic iminhcr of hits to bo expected is abso- lutely dcjKMidciit uiioii tlie viTtical square surface presentotl to the cuciiiy's liri% liccjiuse tlie lire is cousidrnMl as evenly dis- tril)iilc(l over lltt' front coven'd i)y (lie line rcct-ivin;; (lie fire. - mmmmmmmm tB mttm i mm^M umiimit Fig. 224. tlie tar 225. lowiiij; (1) (3) (5) 226. vulner vulner From top to bottom tiirure 57 shows the relutive size of ;;('ts (tlTered by a ((tmpany of l~) s([ua(ls in — Column of squads, Platoon colunuis, Squad columns, A sline of skirmishers. (7) Column of platoons. U is thus api)arent that, in general, the line is Ica.st U)le under^ainied fire, and the line of small columns Jea.st ible under unaimed fire. CHAPTP]R XV. NIGHT FIRING. 228. "The invisibility afforded by darkness neutralizes the power of the ritie to a great extent by making it impossible to employ the ordinary means of lire adjustment. In night attack the purpose of the offensive is to gain rapidly and quickly a position where the issue may be decided in a hand-to- liand encounter, or a position from wliich the superiority of tire may be gained at daylight." The offensive should not use fire action at night. It can not be too strongly impressed upon all ranks that to fire during a night attack, on the olfensive, is not only useless but is abso- lutely criminal. The bayonet is the weapon tliat decides the issue. Hence it sliould be fixed and the cliamber and magazine, if possible, should be empty. It is exceedingly unlikely that the enemy will be completely surprised, but every second of delay between the discovery of the attacking force and the delivery of the assault is of price- less value to the defense ; it must, therefore, be understood by all ranks that when the enemy opens fire the only course open to them is to press on to tlie assault and cross bayonets with the enemy. Xi(/]if (iff ticks arc onlji iiossihic iritli troops hifihlii trahu'd. 229. Many men up to the time of their enlistment have passed their lives entirely in big cities or large towns and have rarely been beyond the range of street lights. Such men. when first taken out in the dark, are helpless ; they start at every shadow, stumble on level ground, make a lot of noise, and are generally in such a state of nervous excitement tliat they are hardly responsible for their actions. Yet these men. by a short course of careful training and individual instruction, can soon learn to work together with confidence in the darkest night 182 imSKETEY. 183 If in daylight the moral is to the physical as three is to oin'. there can he no doubt but that at night the proportion is many times greater. 230. A body of troops on the defensive may arrange to sweep open ground, an njtproach. or a bridge wliich may be used by the enemy by having their rilles in rests, so that they sweep tlie ground without any aiming by flie soldier. These rests are put in place in daylight. The ritle should n(»t be fastened in the re.st. as that would delay taking it out for hand-to-hand tighting. Illuminated aiming marks giving a horizontal line of sight may also be used, and the flashes from the enemy's rifles may be used as aiming marlvs. The firing should be at very short ranges only. The best assistance in tiring at night is to illuminate the fore- ground by searchlights, but this is iisually impossible except in trench warfare. r>onfires may be lighted. These must be prepartnl in advance and lighted when the lookout gives the alarm. Star shell rockets were used by the .Japanese in 1904, and in the present war all sorts of appliance.s — flare.s, searchlights, and star rockets — have been used with good effect. 231. It should be reiterated that every infantryman must l)e imbued witli the idea that at night the only weapon he can trust is the bayonet, and that the more promptly he uses it the better his chances of success. In the dark every advantage is on the side that takes the ini- tiative; numbers are of little account, for a resolute bayonet (•barge delivertHl by even a single picket may. if it comes unex- pectedly, demoralize an-li man in tlie coniltal wagons. Tlie jjattalion is the tactical unit, and the major, as its com- mander, controls the supports, hence he also controls the de- livery and distribution of ammunition on the battle field to the firing line. When the battalion is deployed on the major's initiative, he indicates whetlier extra amnuinition shall be issued ; when de- ployed pursuant to orders from hijrhcr authority, he causoi* the i.ssue of the extra anununition unless speciHcally ordered not to do so. This accounts for the 120 rounds in the combat wajron. 233. In rendering a decision as to the issue of this extra am- munition from the combat wapon a commander (the major o>- higher connnauder ) must consider : (1) How long the tight will prob.ibly last. A short advance or rear-guard action might not require the issue of extra amnuinition. (2) How much anununition will ha used, considering rates of fire, etc. (3) The nature of the terrain, whether or not it will permit of communication during the action. Thus it will be easier to deliver anununition to the firing line over ground broken by ravines, gullies, etc., than it will be over level ground. (4) The extra load for the soldi?r ; his advance will l)e slower and more fatiguing carrying extra anununition than without it. 234. Ammunition is supplied during the action by collecting that of the dead and wounded and by sending it forward bv reinforcements, supports, and special squads detailed for th.it l)urpose. Full advantage should be taken of every lull in the action, of cover, and other favorable conditions to distrilmtc annnti- nition. The ammunition of the dead and wounded is best collected by the supports as they move forward to join the firing line. 185 186 MUSKETRY. Men wounded not severely enouj^h to prevent movement on their part should pass their ammunition to the men on their rii?ht and left. Reinforcements going forward should always carry amnmni- tion for the men in the firing line. It is to be remembered, how- ever, that these men are carrying 220 rounds each of their own ammunition. Hence about two additional bandoleers each will be almost the limit for tliem. Special squads may be sent forward with ammunition. All men carrying ammunition to the firing line first deliver the ammunition, then join the line and take part in the tiring. Men are not sent back from the firing line for ammunition. 235. There are two methods of distributing ammunition brought forward to the firing line: (1) The men that bring the ammunition forward fall into the firing line and pass bandoleers to the men on the right and left of them. The men already in the line help themselves from the bandoleers and pass them on or each man keeps a bandoleer. (2) The ammunition carriers halt in rear of the firing line and under the direction of the platoon leaders and platoon guides roll along, keeping close to the ground, throwing the ammunition to the men on the firing line. There is very little difference as to the efficiency of either method, providing the men are properly trained. The men must be so trained that there will be no decrease in the rate of fire during the distribution. 236. Men detailed to carry ammunition should, before starting forward, be deployed on a front equal to that of the line to which they are carrying ammimition, thus insuring uniform distribu- tion. EXERCISES. I. — Object: To train the battalion in the supply and distribu- tion of ammunition to the firing line. Method: Assume an attack. One or two companies are desig- nated as the firing line, the other companies as the support. The firing line deploys and simulates firing. The support carrying empty bandoleers to represent the extra ammunition is sent in as reinforcement, part into the line and part on the flank. These bandoleers are distributed. All communication is by signal. MUSKETRY. 187 This exercise may be varied in many ways. One variation. Cause the firinfi line to make its attack, certain designated men drop out representing wounded and dead men ; tlieir anununitioti is collected and distributed. 237. The distril)Ution of extra ammunition from the combat wagons is very siinpie. One nR'thud is to form the companies in double colunm, one column on eadi side of the road. The combat wagt)ns drive between the colunui.s and suflicient full boxes are thrown off for each company. Tills ammunition is distributed to the men of the company under the direction of one of the lieutenants (the captain probably receiving orders from the major at this time). As the wagon approaches a company the senior lieutenant meets it and calls out the number of boxes required for his company. One box (1.2(M1 rounds) for 10 men. All ofhcers should know at all times the number of men present in ranks in their company ; hence a simple division of the number of men by 10 gives the number of boxes required. The distribution to a war strength battalion has been made in this manner in four minutes. Extra ammunition is not issued to officers, to the first ser- geant, or the musicians. These men have other more impor- tant duties to perform that make heavy demands upon their powers of endurance, aud they should not be unnecessarily weighted down. On the defense extra ammunition is stored in the trenches in convenient locations. Usually boxes are placed at intervals in recesses dug in the front wall of the trench under the parapet. CHAPTER XVII. MUSKETRY IN TRENCH WARFARE. 238. Nothing in the present war (1917) has affected the gen- eral principles of war as known and accepted by military men. Many of the so-called lessons of the war are as old as the hills. The situation of two armies facing each other in long en- trenched lines is that of siege warfare. The same methods of fighting ( modified by the employment of the increased power of the more modern weapons, and some of the weapons of the ancients, war clubs, etc.) are employed to-day as they were in the Crimea and at Port Arthur, only on a scale so vast as to be almost incomprehensible to the average mind. The world's inventive and creative genius has been taxed to the utmost to develop ways and means of using and combatting gas attacks, grenades and bombs, snipers, and the machine gun, but the r51e of musketry (the use of the rifle and its bayonet) has not changed. All authorities insist that intelligent fire direction, strict fire control, and a fire discipline foundetl upon careful instruction and implicit obedience to orders is more essential to success than it has ever been before. 239. The following special precautions for the care of rifles in the trenches have been found necessary : (1) Rifles must be kept clean and well oiled, and it has been found necessary to make an inspection daily, or even oftener. Particular care must be taken to see that the chamber is scrupu- lously clean. If it is permitted to become dirty, great difficulty in extraction is likely to be experienced. It has also been found that cartridges get rusted into their clips, and that they should be moved at least weekly. The bolt and magazine must be tested daily to make sure that they are working freely. Many accidents will be avoided if men are never allowed to keep a cartridge in the chamber. (2) A large number of cases have occurred of rifles becoming unserviceable from the following causes : 188 MUSKETRY. 189 (a) Mud in tlu' lock, owiii;,' to tlit' rillc Ikmiik rested on a wet parapet or dropped on wet ground. The remedy for this is to cover the bolt with a cloth wrapper or an old sock when- ever the rifle is not in use and to place canvas on the i)arapet. The protectiiiir niMterial can he itulled hack wIhmi it is refiuiree designated for the various units to occupy in the opening lire fight against their particular assigned target. In addition to tlie position from which the fire fight is commenced, the order may announce a second fire position in tlie foi'eground that will be occupied in the advance. In defen- sive rear-guai-d and outpost actions it is quite evident that di- rections may be given for the occupation of several fire po- sitions. There are times when these directions will be unnec- essary, and there are occasions when such directions will be so clearly related to the firing that they will logically form pare of the fire order. 258. Rate of fire. — The rate of fire may or may not be an- nounced in the order. With well-trained troops the rates given in S. A. F. M., paragraph 209, would probably be employed without caution. However, as the rate of fire is so directly re- lated to the vulnerable area of the target as well as to the range, it may be better to announce the rate desired in order to insure that the proper volume of fire is attained within the re- quired time. The rate is increased or decreased by the com- mands " Faster " and " Slower." 259. Class of fire. — The selection of the kind of fire should result from the estimate and be announced in the order as " Fire at will " or " Clip fire." 260. Time of opening fire. — Ordinarily this would be confined to the estimate and no expression given to it in the order. How- ever, so diversified are the factors in a fire order that some such time announcement as " Open fire when you are ready," etc., may be pertinent. 261. Position of leader during firing. — The company com- mander or commander of a small firing line will ordinarily be opposite the center of the rear of the line he is directing or upon that flank which offers the best opportunity for control of the line, observation of the enemy targets, and the fire effect. His position must be such that control is dii'ect or where his will is easily and promptly transmitted. He must be in a posi- tion to control the ammunition supply. His position must not be fixed, but it must be known to all of his subordinates. A leader, who has decided to take position on the flank of his deployed line, to observe better the fire fight, and who feels that his subordinates should be informed as to his location, as communication might thus better be facilitated, should include his post in the fire order. MUSKETRY, 195 I'titil facility is obtained in tlie solution of fin' prohleius, the con trolling factors sliould 1)0 talion up in some such orderly manner as shown in the forepoinfr. It is almost certjiin that a decision reached after consideration of the factors noted will be of more value and more nearly correct than if based simply Oil mental impressions. There will be few occasions in which all of the factors enumer- ated above will have to be thought out In (he estimate and an- nounced iu the tire orders. In fact, the simplicity of most problems, particularly those conducted on "A" ranges will make it unnecessary to give any consideration to many of them. Again, it must be remembered that at the moment wlien the fire orders nmst be issued many of the factors embraced in the estimate will liave been considered, some of them in an involun- tary manner. On some occasions the fire order may be as simple as " Fire at will." 262. An example of a map problem and a possible solution. (See Chap. XXI for methods in the construction of fire prob- lems. ) Fig. 58. Capt. X's company (eight squads) has left the main body on a special mission, " To marcli south to reconnoiter and to protect bridges at A." (Fig. 58.) On arrival at B the point signals, " Halt. Enemy in sight in force." Capt. X directs rapid assembling near B and joins the second lieutenant, who is now with the point. The second lieutenant presents Capt. X with the results of his observation, as follows : About 50 led horses in south fringe of woods just east of railroad bridge, about 10 mounted men halted about 300 yards northeast of bridges tearing out wire fence, about 35 men dismounted moving from led horses toward rail- 196 MUSKETRY. road bridge, and alioiit IT) iiKninted men at C movinR north alotifi road. Requirements: (1) Tlie fire estimate; (2) tlie fire orders. A SOLUTION. 263. The fire estimate. — The captain, with his glasses, studies tlie front, verifies the targets pointed out, calls the lieutenant's attention to the telegraph poles and to the wire fence and directs him to obtain range with his musketry rule and to remain in observation of the target. The captain hastily looks over the ground for fire positions. On arrival of the company the platoon leaders and range estimators are assembled and targets pointed out with direction to estimate ranges. The captain, in the meantime is weighing the relative importance of the targets. He determines their target value as follows: (1) The men moving toward bridges, the captain's mission being to protect the bridges and the appearance being that these dismounted men are on a mission to destroy them. The mounted men north and northeast evidently have missions as covering patrols. (2) The led horses. Good target and oppor- tunity for large number of hits. If horses are routed, the effectiveness of the troop as a mounted organization has been destroyed, and besides the moral effect of such rout would probably materially impair the troopers dismounted action. (3) The detachment north of bridge. Unless they are fired upon they may continue on their mission. It seems possible to at least throw them into confusion and defeat the accom- plishment of their task. (4) The small detachment is con- tinually presenting a better target, is not dangerous, and can well be covered by a few men. The captain determines the target value and assigmuent as follows: Target I, 4 squads; Target II, 2 squads ; Target III, 1 squad ; Target IV, 1 squad. The captain estimates that he can accomplish something more than his " mission " ; therefore he detei'mines to take advantage of the vulnerable targets presented to him and endeavor to completely destroy the effectiveness of this hostile troop. The captain estimates that, as the ranges obtained by the lieu- tenant and the range estimators practically agree, there is no necessity for the use of " ranging fire " or " combined sights," and that " fire at will " is the proper class of fire to be used. He estimates the situation as requiring the delivery of a heavy MUSKETRY. 197 volume of accurate fire. Tlie increase he presents the following situation : " f )ur battalion retn.-iiiis jit Y (some point ti> tlie west). Tins <'omp;iny h;is been sent forward to recomioiter the enemy's out- post iHtsition aloiif^ the ridjie B-C, with a mission to devehtp tlie enemy's stren.^lh ;it B. Our reconnoiteriuK patrols have fraimxl this ridge and halted. Corp. Z reports that he saw 10 or 15 men in the lieavy brush north of the road at B, and that one of the members of his patrol saw tit least that number near the house just south of the road." Capt. X directs the odicers to study tlie terrain near B with their field glas.ses, the first lieutenant to the north and the sec- ond lieutenant to the south of the road. The buglers are di- rected to use tlieir held ghis.ses on the terrain near C. All are directed to take the prone position and remain in con- cealment from an imaginary enemy on ridge B-C. (A few drab targets placed north and south of the road at B and near C would add materially to the exercise.) In ab i>o consiileroil. Umpikk's llKcoiu) ()!•• Combat Fikinc; kou Ckitiquk. Organization eouiniandinK- Kxercise Order Date 1. LKADKKSIIIl' AND CONDUCT, 278, The major: General — («) Effective .snpervision of battalion, (h) Ilarnionizinsr ran?:es. (c) Tactical orders. (d) Ilegulatinj? ammunition supply. (e) Control of supports. (/) Primary apportionment of target. (g) Provision for flank protection. (h) Observation of enemy and adjoining troops. (i) Deptb of deployment, extent and density of firing line. (j) Fixing bayonets, (k) The charge. Jn attack: (a) Selection of formation in which to advance, (&) Direction of advance. (c) Objective for each company. (d) The general object or special problem for e^ch company of the order and front of each com- pany. (e) The base company. (/) Time or place for opening fire. In defense: (a) Assignment of sectors, (b) Determination of ranges. (c) Communication to company. 279. The captain, first sergeant, and buglers: (a) Leader's knowledge of the situation. (b) Explanation of the situation to the company, (c) Reconnaissance of the target. 206 MUSKETRY. ((0 Use of iield gUiJSses. (c) Dangerous ffrou])in.ii of platoon leaders and range esti- mators. (/) Estimation of range. (g) Designation and apportionment of target. (/() Clearness of fire orders to subordinates. (i) Advance of the unit to first firing position. (/) Concealment. (A) Time of preparation from receipt of situation to " Com- mence firing." (l) Observation of fire effect. (m) Correction of material errors in sight setting. (n) Orders, if any, for distribution of ammunition. Its economical and judicious expenditure. (o) The position of first sergeant and buglers and duties performed. (p) Time of cease firing. (q) Signals. 280. The platoon leaders and guides: (a) Execution of the captain's commands and directions. (b) Announcement of correct sight setting. (c) Clearness in designation of target or aiming point. (fZ) Additional instructions given to carry out captain's will, (e) Correction of sight setting. (/) Designation of an aiming point. (g) Observation of fire effect. (7i) Use of field glasses. (i) Orders to platoon guides. ij) Use of signals. (k) Constant communication Ijetween the platoon leaders and captain. (?) Observation and regulation of the rate of fire, (m) Their positions. 281. The corporals: (a) Alertness for commands and signals. Proper trans- mission of signals. ( h ) Observation of the conduct of the squad. (c) Assistance in enforcing fire discipline and abatement of excitement. (d) Participation in the firing. (e) Their positions. MUSKETRY. 207 282. The privates: (d) Fso of fovpr. (b) Exf'itcinciit or nmfusion. (r) Use of sisht sotting iiniioutu'ed and dianjies dirofted. (d) Firinp on desifrnatod objootive or in tlie assigned sec- tor and fhanse of target when directed. (e) Readily responding to the .signals, particidarly "Com- mence firiufr." "Suspend lirinfr," and "Cease flrinfr." (/) I^nnecessary cessation of fire, partictdarly when bay- onets were Itein.c: fixerinciples of fire dirtxition. (h) The detailed elements of fire control as given in (Miapter I, herein. (r) Time «'lements. 293. VIII.— Object: Fire discipline. 212 MUSKETRY. Method: The company is marched to an indicated point where a tactical situation will be presented. For the purposes of comparison and comment the following will be noted : (a) Use of ground. (b) Target designation. (c) Determination of front of target. (d) Assignment of objectives to platoon. (e) Determination of range. (/) Kind of fire used. (g) Causing fire to be opened at proper time. (/^) Reinforcement of firing line. (i) Fire discipline. Ability of men in firing line to transmit firing data (location of target, what the target is, what portion to fire at, range to be used, rate of fire to be employed) to re- inforcements when they arrive on the firing line, and to do this without any marked cessation in the rate of fire. For this exercise two platoons will be on the firing line, deployed at one-pace intervals, the other two platoons constitut- ing the support ; after fire has been opened, the firing line will be reinforced in such a manner that the men of the support will occupy the intervals between the men on the firing line. Firing data will be transniitted from man to man. Twenty seconds later the original firing line will be withdrawn at the command of the director. The reinforcing liue will then set their sight at the range given them and 10 seconds later, at the command of " Time," will aim their rifles ^t what they believe to be their portion of the target. The sight setting and the aiming of the rifles will then bo verified and the probable value of the fire determined. 294. IX. — Object: To apply all the principles of fii-e direction, fire control, and fire discipline covered in previous exercises, and in addition the use of suitable means to maintain fire supe- riority during advances of the firing line, particularly the proper distribution of fire cover of the entire target during rushes. 295. Object: The application of all the principles of fire direc- tion, fire control, fire discipline covered in previous exercises and in addition the particular application of the various pre- scribed methods of commimication. Method: The company is assigned a mission requiring it to take up a position and to open fire on an advancing column. MUSKETRY 213 The situiitioii will be so drawn as to hriiij; out some of 1 1n- authorized methods of cominunication. Company and phitoon commanders will not use tlie voice when any part of their unit is tiring, nor at any otlier time when their will can be expressed by a signal. Pertinent paragraphs on the subject of comnnniication are as follows : Paragraphs 31, 3:{, H'k 41, 4l!, 4:j, 47, 3S4-3.S.S, 1. I ). U., i,.iia- grai)h 32, F. S. U. 296. XI. — Object: Supply of ammunition of tiring line (prob- lem to involve in its solution all of the principles covered in previous exercises). Method: The battalion commander will be handed a tactical situation requiring a march in the presence of an active enemy and hiter an attack on this enemy's position. It will be con- ducted by means of the prescribed commands and signals, in accordance with the rules laid down in I. 1>. II. under the head- ing " Fire " and "Attack," paragraphs 303 to 319. The battalion will be at war strength, accompaniwl by its combat train ; machine gun company and five mounted orderlies attached. Combat train loaded as prescribed in Tables of Organization for sui>plies other than ammunition. Before going into action packs will be dropi)e(l and left under suitable guard (3G8, I. D. K. ). Other pertinent paragraphs are 294, 418, and 419, I. D. R. CHAPTER XXL THE CONSTRUCTION OF FIRE PROBLEMS. 297. A fire problem is an iucident or phase in tlie solution of a tactical problem and should always be so treated. The preparation of a fire problem requires not only a sound knowledge of tactical principles and the requisite experience in constructing tactical problems, but also a detailed knowledge of the theory of rifle fire and of targets and ranges. In the preparation of a problem the following points should be con- sidered : PREPARATION. 298. («) The problem should be so constructed as to impart a lesson in fire tactics. (b) The strength of the fire unit should be determined in connection with the tactical lesson to be taught. (c) A tactical situation should be selected that will best illus- trate the lesson to be imparted. It is believed that the fire problems in general should present one phase of an action. For example, firing on artillery, on moving bodies, opening of an attack, carrying the exercise to the second firing position. On extended well-equipped B ranges it will be possible to work out a shifting scene of action, presenting a number of new targets to an advancing line, or advancing targets to a stationary line. {d) An estimate should be made of the sight setting that should be used and the rate of fire that should be employed. (e) The ground and the direction in which the firing will occur should be considered. The terrain, whenever possible, should be new to the commander. The securing of a great variety of terrain will usually be impracticable, but there can be pi-esented to the connnander new situations involving the use of different targets at different points. (/) Attention should be given to the targets that will be em- ployed, having special reference to those that may be available. The target should generally be equal to approximately the num- 214 MUSKETRY. 216 ber of men or to the front of the detachment tirinj^. If not, it creates a false inijirossion. For instance, a company of 100 rilles tiring on a target of 20-30 yards in width, but targets greater in ninnl)er tliau tlie tirers, are sometimes used in order to determine wlietlier or not tlie tire was confined to a particular sector or objective, as directed, or more fre targets are simulating an attack. Targets should be placed in a formation corresponding to the phase of the action. Ordinarily the figures should be placed one to every yard of front. The enemy will take care to expose himself as little as possible. It will be unusual to have a row of kneeling figures to fire upon at the close ranges. Close-order bodies in all prcjbability would remain a target for a. very short period of time. Artillery targets sliould be spaced with about 20 yards interval. Cavalry charges might be represented by targets appearing in succession at 800 yards, at 700, at 600. at 500, etc., each line disappearing from view a few moments before tlie next appears. (ff) The amount of ammunition necessary to bring about the result desired should be the result of calculation. The number of cartriilges issued should be enough to disable theoretically a selected percentage of the targets. If 3.000 rounds are required to disable about one-third of the targets and 1.500 rounds are issued, then only about 15 per cent of the figures can be expectinl to be hit. This failure would rest on the problem maker and not on the troops. For determination of number of rounds to be carried by each man (see paragraph .373). (7() Notation should be made of the time element for the par- ticular unit involved and its bearing upon a time schedule for organization which may follow in the solution of the same problem. (/) The time element, in connection with the tluration of fire, must be determined by first deciding on the rate of fire to be used at that range, consideration being given to the tactical require- ments and to the vulnerable area of the target. For example, if a proper rate be eight per minute, then the number of car- tridges to be given to each man, divided by eight, will give the number of minutes firing. This calculation forms the basis for the time element and is better than a pure guess, even though a liberal all(»wance be made for the difference between practical and theoretical time. 216 MUSKETRY. (j) To insure fre.sh situations for each commander, every effort must be made to Iceep those next to fire from receiving information about the problem. (A) The question of pits to be constructed and the necessary details to carry out successfully the plans adopted should ])e uiven weight and all possible economy made of men and mate- rial. (/) The problem should be tested to determine if it can be solved in a manner that would prevent the desired lesson from ))eing taught. FORM. 299. Tactical situation. — The situation should present a sim- ple logical -sclieme. This gives an opportunity to judge of the tactics employed and while the fire feature of the problem must receive proper consideration it is to l)e remembered that no effect should be expected with an organization conducted tacti- cally in such a manner that it could not reach the firing position. MISSION. 300. It should be definite, and logically emanate from a simply-represented situation. The requirement ordinarily might include: (tticer to prepare a foiiihat-liriiif,' problem with l)all ammunition. Upon i-eceiving this order Maj. X prepared the followinj: : 302. Statement of the problem (see fig. oS). — Troops: One company of infantry. Situation: Two hostile units are engaged in a fire fight. The hostile unit is reinforced on one flank. Object: The primary object is to give practice in directing part of the fire of the company to cover a secondary objective, at the same time keeping the main objective covered with a well- distributed and proper volume of fire. Secondarily, it gives practice in quick decisions, target designation, quick change of objective, requiring rapid estimate of tire data, and i-apid Lssuing and transmi-ssion of orders for tiring, use of signals, use of the battle sight, and the principles of fire direction, control, and dis- cipline. Time: ' The umpire causes the fire to cease one minute after (lie exposure of the second target or two minutes after the first shot is fired. Target: Main objective. A line of 80 prone figures (target F) range about GOO yards. Secondary objective: A line of 20 prone figures range about ."lOO yards. Figures in both objectives on a frontage of 1 yard per figure. ' Percentage of flRures desired struck, about SO for the first minute of firing ou each target. From prone table (par. HG5) on GOO-yard line 48, the nearest to 50, is found in the one-minute column, and from the same table on 500 B. S. line 50 is found in the nne-ininute column, so two minute^s Is selected as the firing time 217 S18 MUSKETRY. Ammunition: ^ Twenty I'ounds of bull ammuuitiou, per man, carried in the belt. Critique: Principal points. Note assiKnnieiit of targets to platoon leaders in order to properly distribute tlie fire on the main objective. Note metliud to bring tire to bear on secondary objective. 303. Situation for leader. — Your battalion commander has sent your company forward under the following order : "A civilian reports that about 50 of the enemy occupy the ridge at ' B ' and that about two hostile companies are halted at a stream about a mile east of ' B.' Combat patrols now cover your right and left flanks. Attack the enemy at ' B ' and drive him from his position. I shall move the remainder of the battalion south and east and attack the enemy reported at the stream. I shall maintain conuuunication with you." 304. Requirement — Execution of the order. — Having decided upon the character of the problem, Maj. X goes over the ground where from memory he knows his problem can be adapted to the terrain. This action is to insure himself that no small folds of the ground, vegetation, etc., will interfere with the conduct of the problem as planned. Target. Range. Time. Rate (from Table 1). Rounds. Main objective Secondary objective. COO 500 7.5 8.3 Upon request of Maj. X, three battalion staff officers were directed to report to him for instruction. Two were assigned, one each to two platoons, to observe the fire control of the cor- porals and the fire discipline of the privates, and the third, accompanied by a competent signalist, was assigned to observe the conduct of the troops, from the viewpoint of the enemy, by means of a periscope in the pit. 305. Maj. X prepared the following memoranda for the ad- jutant, to be delivered to the range officer and to the com- mander of the company selected for the fire problem : (1) The maximum number of rounds per man required wll be the amount needed by those men who fire for one minute on the main objective and then switch to the secondary objective for one minute, or 7.5 plus 8.3, a total of 15.8. Adding 10 per cent and issuing full clips, the estimate would be 20 rounds, which would be a sufficient number of rounds for each man. (Par. 372-373.) MUSKETRY. 219 Confidential memorandum liom the adjutant to First Lieut. Y, ranpe and statistical otlicer : "You will jtrepare the ran^*' l'<>i" a combat i)rol)lem. Copy of the situation and niemorandiini to Capt. A inclosed herewith. Tarjrets: 80 F targets on ridjie at B. Target ' I ' three beams 20 F targets, concealed at G ready to appear on signal ' up ' from Maj. X. Firing position at ' A.' " The points, A, B, C, E, and X are indicatotl on rang*' map and well known to Lieut. Y. 306. Memorandum from the adjutant to Capt. A: "The com- manding otlicer directs that you report with your company in the field equipment, 20 rounds ball ammunition per man, to Maj. X, at E, at 7 a. m., February 21, 1910." Upon arrival at E Capt. A presents Maj. X with a statement of his company's strength and organization which was as fol- lows : 1 company commander and 2 buglers. 4 platoon leaders (2 officers). 6 platoon guides. 10 squad leaders. 70 rifles in the firing line. Total, officers 3, enlisted men 90. Organized into four platoons — first and fourth platoon three squads each, second and third platoon two squads each. Maj. X informs Capt. A that he will have five minutes in which to explain the situation to his company. He directs the captain " to load " in the present position of the company. A SOLUTION. 307. The fire estimate. — Capt. A calls his company to ".Vt ease," then reads his problem carefully and explains the situa- tion to all. The captain directs Scrgt. R to take charge of the company and the platoon leaders and range estimators to join the captain. Upon arrival near the crest the target is located, and all who have glas.ses sweep the front for further details. The range estimators announce the range. The captain selects the firing position for the company and directs Sergt. R (the platoon leaders are with the captain) to deploy the company, indicating where the right shall rest. He determines upon the sight setting and upon the assignment of targets, using the lone tree on the ridge B as a reference point in the apportionment of the target. He decides that the class of fire shall be " Fire at will " and the rate to be the ordinary rate at this range, at least 220 MUSKETRY. until he is convinced by tlie observation of the fire effect that the sight setting is correct and that the vulnerability of the target permits a higher rate. He notes the woods to his left front and decides to caution the fourth pltitoon leader for particular observation in that direction for conceiiled targets. He determines to open fire as soon as platoon leaders signal " Ready." He decides to take station on the left of the line to observe the fire and study its effect. The fire orders. — Target: That line of prone figures on that ridge, width 134 mils. Reference point: That tree ("D" pointing out same). First and second platoons, target 70 mils wide, 35 mils each side of the tree. Third and fourth platoons, target 70 mils wide, commencing 30 mils toward 9 o'clock from the tree. Each platoon will cover the entire target assigned to the two platoons. The fourth platoon will observe the woods to our left front. Fire at will. Sergt. M will be in rear of the center of the company to re- ceive and transmit signals. I shall be on the left of the line. Capt. A later signals " Commence firing." At the end of one minute's firing Maj. X signals " up," or telephones to the pit, and the secondary target at " C " comes up. Capt, A signals the leader of the fourth platoon " Battle sight " and " Swing cone of fire one finger (one sight leaf or 50 mils) to the left" and signals the third platoon " Fire faster." 308. At the end of the second minute Maj. X causes " Cease firing " to be sounded. The pit record was as follows: Target 1. Target 2. Figures hit (direct hits). Direct liits. Rico- chets. MUSKETRY. 221 Two battalion stalT oflicers who were assigned each to two platoons to observe the fire control of the corporals and the fire discipline of tlie privates make their report to MaJ. X. Maj. X. preparatory to delivering the critique, directed Capt. A to briefly outline his observation of tiie exercise, particu- larly with respect to causes, if any, for factors which may have reduced the elTectiveness of the lire. 309. Capt. A stated as follows: I feel assured now that my announced sight setting was too great. I believe that It should have been decreased at least 50 yards. However, I think that the number of hits on the main target was about average. The fire seemed well distributed, although I believe that the first platodu's target received the greater number of hits. The rates seemed ai)out correct. The lack of control in the third platoon was due to Sergt. E's lack of musketry training. Referring to the letteretl subheads of the umpire's record (par. 378), Maj. X delivered the following critique: 810. (1) Leadership and conduct. — The captain, first sergeant, and buglers: (a) The situation was thoroughly understood by the captain. {b) His explanation to the company was not clear. Prob- ably the result of not talking sulliciently loud to be heard l>y all. At least 10 men stated that they did not hear the capain. {(■) The target was well reconnoitered. (d) Field glasses were properly used. (e) E)uring the time that the estimators were obtaining the range and the captain was making his fire estimate, the captain, platoctn leaders, and estimators were dangerously grouped. {/) The sight setting announceil was 50 yards over the true elevation. This was probably due to the fact that the target was in a ckmded light, and that it was not clearly defined against a favorable background. (Par. 81, S. A. F. M.) (g) The designation of the target seemed clear. (h) The fire orders were clearly stated, but the captain failril to announce the rate, which is a function of fire direction. The rates used seemed ai)out correct. (t) The advance of the third platoon crawling to the crest was poorly carried out ; more concealment should have been ob- tained. The advance of the first platoon was excellent. There was too much talking going on in the third platoon. This caused some confusion. The seventh and eighth squads deployed too slowly. I'aragraph 124, I. D. 11., states that the men deploy " moving at a run." 222 MUSKETRY. (i) The second and third platoons moved too far to the front, sacrificinj; bettor conceahnent and paining nothing in the fire position. (k) The preparation consumed 10 minutes. Considering the situation, this is too long and is mainly due to lack of proper utilization of time, and the slowness in making the fire esti- mate. The time would have been reduced had the captain issued his orders to the platoon leaders while the estimators were ob- taining the range. The deployment of the company could have been ordered as soon as it was apparent where would be the filling position. (l) The captain did not utilize the buglers in obsterving the enemy, the target, and fire effect. (Par. 235, I. D. K. ) (m) On account of the dust near the enemy's right and rear of the target the shot strikes should have been visible to the captain or buglers and the error in sight setting corrected. (n) It is thought that the ammunition distribution between the two targets was excellent. It is thought that the deflection of but one platoon's fire on the new target was excellent and that ammunition was wisely expended. (o) See (Z) above. The first sergeant led the second platoon. Sergeant M did not receive and transmit signals as promptly as should have been done. (p) Firing ceased two minutes after first shot was fired and one minute after second target appeared. (q) The signal " Swing cone of fire to the left" should have been made with the palm of the hand to the left, pointing in the direction of the new target. 311. Platoon leaders and guides: (a) Commands and directions were carried out. (&) Correct sight setting was announced. (c) The designations of the target given by second and third platoon leaders were not clear ; it is evident that the third platoon leader has no idea of the " Finger system." (d) No additional instructions to carry out the captain's will seemed necessary except as noted in (e) below. (c) The first platoon leader "lowered" 50 yards. The other platoon leaders made no correction. (/) No aiming point was necessary. (g) The observation of fire effect by the third platoon leader was very poor. In the fourth platoon there was too much MUSKETRY. 228 observation for a probable new target and not enough for fire effect. The observation of the fifst platoon leader was ex- cellent (h) Glasses were used with good effect. (f ) With th(! exrcption of the order jriven by the first platoon leader, to his platoon guide, viz, •' In addition to your regular duties you will iioep in constant comnmiiicatitin with the cap- tain," there seems to have been no particuhir use made of the phitooii miiilc's. None of tlioin iiroperly performed their duties except the guide of the first platoon. (j) The arm-and-hand signals, as a general rule, were made too quickly, accuracy giving way to si)eed. This caused some confusion and delay. Exactness of execution must be demaudcil In all arm-and-hand signaling. One has no time to solve arm puzzles. {Ic) The second, third, and fourth positions at time were out of constant communication with the captain. (/) See (h) under heading "Captain" above. The first and fourth platoon leaders announced a rate, but no attempt seemeil to have been made to regulate it. (/») The positions of the platoon leaders were such that they could easily control their platoons. 312. Corporals: ((/) Tlic corporals of the sixth and seventh squads were not on the alert for commands and signals. The corporal of the eighth squad transmitted the signal "Commence firing" im- properly. (?>) The corporals of the first, second, and third squads showed a high state of training in the conduct of their squads. The corporals of the sixth, seventh, and eighth squads need spe- cial nmsketry instruction. {<•) As a rule, the corporals did not enforce fire discipline, due principally to the lack of instruction in how to carry out this duty. (d) The corporals did not participate in the firing. It is thought that by not doing so they were better able to perform the duties with which they were charged. (c) Eight of tlie corporals were sliglitly in rear of the center of their squads, their heads being near the feet of the men to the front. Two were cm the line. The former position seems better from which to control the conduct of their squads. 224 MUSKETRY. 313. The privates: (a) A number of men in the third platoon did not take the best cover obtainable. They were too far to the front. {b) There was too much confuision in the third platoon, due to unnecessary tallving. Tlie inefficiency of some of the squad leaders had the natural result of causing some of the squads to develop self-appointed leaders, creating the usual confusion apparent in bodies tliat are weakly led. (c) Eight men were checked as not taking the announced sight setting. (d) About five men of the third platoon were checked firing on the target assigned to the first and second platoons. The left of the third platoon changed targets without command when the second target appeared. (e) About five men fired after "Cease firing" had been ordered. (/) Tliere was practically a cessation of fire in the first pla- toon when the leader signaled " Lower 50 yards." 314. Maj. X then directed Lieut. Z, who had observed the conduct of the troops from the pit, to read his notes, which were as follows: 7.06 a. m. : Several head of cattle were seen to run from under cover of ridge A, as if they had been driven out. Later I heard two blasts from whistles of different tones. 7.07 : A group of about seven men could be seen near the clump of bushes on ridge A. Two were observing with field glasses. 7.08 : The arm signal "As skirmishers " was observed made by one of the above group. 7.09 : The line appeared crawling to the ridge crest. The right seemed to be as well concealed as the ground would permit, the left center was badly exposed, and made an excellent target. The whole line seemed too far advanced. 7.10 : Observed on three or four occasions what I thought to be platoon guides or squad leaders, in crouching positions, move in rear of the line. 7.11 : Firing opened ; range seemed over at first, but decreased later with apparent good effect. 7.12: I located the company commander by observing a mes- senger leave him and go to the rear. I was later convinced of his position by the man near him, presumably a bugler, dis- playing a signal fiag. From the white square on the red field, I assumed the organization to be Company A. MUSKETRY. 225 I read a message signaled with a liandkonhit'l' liom the left of the line: " Kuciiiy in woods to our front." There w.is a iiotieeable cessation of liri! at one time in tlie right of the line. The eonnnand " I'^irc faster" was lic.inl distinctly. 7.13: I read a signal AM wigwagged with the hat by some one in rear of the left of the line — i»roliahly the jtlatoon guide of Ihe left platiMdi. This information was unusually inijxtrtant. as It showed an annuuiution seareity after about two minute.s' firing. The estimated strength of the tiring line was 00 ritles — deter- nilned witii musketry rule, knowing the range 000, and reading (he width of the line in n)ils, 110. (Width of the line In yards e See par. 317. 316. General comment. — .Tudgment of the result; Target 1. — Estimated visibility 700. 3529°— 17 15 226 MUSKETRY. Average shots, at tlie true range, would have struck 50 figures, and with a visibility of " 700 yards " 42 figures. You struck 40 figures. Taryet 2. — Estimated visibility normal. (Pai's. 317 and 340.) Average shots, at the true range, would have struck 10 figures. You struck 9 figures. Your performance seemed about equal to average shots and is considered satisfactory. 3. Was the mission accomplished? Yes. A — B Captain Oath Jnfantnj, Umpire, 317, Memorandums-Explanatory of the eemparison: Company strength, 10 squads, first and fouith platoons, 3 squads each. Corporals in i-ear of line. TO rifiee In the firing line, Target 1. 80 F, range 600, TisiUUty 700, 70 men firing 1 minute, 70 men less 21 (fourth platoon) firing 1 minute. 70 plus 49 equal 119. ^^ equal 59j, say 60 men firing 2 minutes. There are 60 men firing 2 minutes on 80 targets ; reducing the men and the targets to the same number in order to get the time factor for reference to table, we have 80 men firing on 80 prone targets for 1^ minutes and from the table, 700-yard line, the percentage of figures hit shows 53, or 42 targets. Target 2. 20 F, range B. S. (500). VisiUUty normal. Target was exposed for 1 minute. Twenty men (21) firing 1 minute on 20 prone figures at range 500 with the battle gig^it. From the table 50 per cent, or 10 targets. CHAPTER XXTTT. SITUATIONS FOR FIRE PROBLEMS. 318. The examples given here are for the purpose of instruc- tion, but it is only by actual construction and solution of prob- lems that the subject is mastered. The following siluatioiis arc oircrcd as an aid in (lir iircpara- tion of prohk'ins : 319. A blue company on coiiihat reconnaissance lias worked its way around the rijrht Hank of tlie red position, and on arrival at B observes a red battery about to unliinber at ^1. (Fig. 09.) N ,Rd''t^^ifio<>Y$rcli Fig. 50. 320. A company of infantry is reconnoitering the enemy's outpost position with a mission to develop the enemy's strength at B. (Fig. 60.) N ^ "A o\Tln\ IT T- ^^ — 5—1 — Fio. 60. oor 228 MUSKETRY. 321. Two hostile units are engaged in a tire fight. The hostile unit is reenforceil on one Hank. (Fig. 61.) N ;^[-'' ^R^^^ -5^f^* f^^ntfC (fOO yc^$ FiQ, 61. 322. A red unorganized force occupies windows and tops of buildings on north side of plaza. A blue company from A has deployed at B-C. (Fig. 62.) \jmwmmmmmmA n- ~|r~ no. 62. MUSKETRY. 229 323. A rear-fj:ii;ir(l l).i(liilioii is (U'ployed at C Tlie pursiiiiij^ enemy has app^'ari'd at .1. (V'lii. U.'5. ) Pio. 63. 324. A hattalidd is sent from V, to cover the left of the blue position. Un arrival at A two red companies are .seen advanc- inj: through the brush in .squad columns. (Fig. 64.) loM M I t M I H < J i f C » ^^^^ i Fio. 64. 325. A blue advance guard battalion, ui)on arrival at .1. is directed to halt, cover bridges, and prevent enemy crossing. Enemy about J mile west of bridges, now ai»i>roacliiiig. (Fig. (;"). ) 326. Tlic reds have taken up a concealed position t)n the west of hill A, whose face is covered with a uniform brush. The blue leader from B, with his fieUl gla.sses, has located the reds along the 30-foot contour, (Fig. (jG. ) MUSKETRY. f Fig. 65. M etut t ^n^ciooo yy^ Fig. 66. MUSKETRY. Sdl 327. A l)luo Itattalidii is inlreiiclaHl at .l-.l to prevent hos- tile landiiij;. Shells are falliii;; on and near intrenclnuents from a ship east of E. (Fiy. 07.) ,,4^V \ ^•^'S >^, \ Fig. 67. 328. A blue rcKinicnt has reached 1), a rounds i)er man. FOR THE COMPANY (OFFENSIVE). 331. Object: To illustrale lire directioii, control, and disci- pline. Situation: A company is ordered to attack an enemy whose pfisition is indicated to the company connnander. Action: The company will be dejtloyed in line of skirmishers abont l.L'OO yards from the jiits under connnand of the cai)tain. The umpire will indicate the first firing position and direct the captain to move his company forward and open fire. One min- 234 MUSKETRY. ute and a half after the company opens fire it will cease firing and the targets will be marked. Tlie iiumber of targets struck will be signaled to the umpire, who will determine whether fire superiority has been gained. Should the company have failed in this respect it will remain in position and fire for another minute and a half, continuing in this position and firing for periods of a minute and a half until the ammunition is expended or fire superiority gained. In case fire superiority is gained, three minutes will be given for the next period of lire, during which the company will be required to advance not less than .50 yards, the details of the advance being left to the captain. Following the advance the umpire will determine whether fire superiority has been retained. If not, the company will remain in position as at the beginning. This procedure will continue luitil the ammunition has been expended. Target: A line of prone silhouettes, equal in number lo the nuH!l)er of men in the tiring line, 1 yard apart, center to center, resting on the ground, and placed about 900 yards from first firing position. Ammunition: 30 rounds per man. The distance gained and the number of figures hit during liiis exercise might be used as a basis for judging the relative proficiency of the companies of a regiment. This would furnish a stimulus that would add to the interest of combat firing. When favorable soil exists for a trench of proper dimensions to be constructed the targets for the exercise outlined above could be so arranged and manipulated that it would be imnec- essary for the company to cease firing in order to ascertain whether or not fire superiority had been gained. The beam-disappearing target would be arranged in this pit by resting the beams on pieces of timber placed crosswise in the ])it and sunk sufficiently deep to allow only the visil)le part of the target to be seen flush with the ground. Four beams should be fastened together so that one man from a central position could operate 32 targets. Two lines of figures pointing in oppo- site directions would be fastened to each beam so that a turn of ISO degrees would expose first one line and then the other. After firing was begun, each line of targets would alternately be exposed one minute. From the number of targets hit each minute, an oflicer in the pit would deternfine when fire supe- riority had been gained and whether it was being kept. By a system of flag signals this information would be read at the MUSKETRY. 286 Hrinjr point. Aftor opciiiii;,' lire the citiiipany would remain .sta- tionary until tire suiieriority had heon j;ainef i)rone silliouettes on disappearing ap- paratus — number of silhouettes equal to the number of men fir- ing, 1 yard apart between centers. The four lines placed in column at distances of 90, 75, and 60 yards from rear to front. Distance to first target about 900 yards. The first target re- mains in view one and one-half minutes after fire has been opened, when it disappears. At intervals of 30 seconds the sec- ond, third, and fourth targets appear and remain in view one and one-half minutes each. Ammunition: 30 I'ounds per man. Time: The time for preparing for the first opening of fire will be taken from the appearance of the first target. The average distance of the targets, the total number of figures hit, and the total time of actual firing will form a basis for the umpire to determine whether or not the company gained fire superiority. CHAPTER XXV. THE STATISTICAL OFFICER. THE STATISTICAL RECORDS. 333. The statistical recoi'd of combat firing is kept by the statistical officer under the direction of the umpire. Disposition. — The statistical ofiicer makes such disposition of the records as the umpire may direct. 334. The form. — The form shown below is a convenient one, though no particular form is prescribed. It is believed, however, that the data included on this form is essential to a thorough analysis of any firing. The columns headed " Target 1," " Target 2," etc., may be used to record the results on several targets, on a single target from several firing points, on several fractions of a single line, or, when the firing is at a single target from a single firing point, to record the results obtained by successive " orders," thus keeping, on a single sheet, the results of as many repetitions of the same exercise as there are columns in which to record them. In case certain items of the record are found to be not perti- nent to certain exercises, they may be omitted at the discretion of the umpire. 236 MUSKETRY. St.\ti.stic.\l Kkcokd of Comh.vt Fiking. 287 Orpanizat ion Commandln);. KxiTciso Onior School ol Miiskolry, Fort SiJI, Oklu 10 DATA. Hits. Target 1. TargiH 2. Target 3. Target 4. Target .5. Hits: Direct, in sector or on as- sit;nc(l objective Ricliwhet, in sector or on lussigned objective Ontside sector True range VLsibilily " Estimated ranRC Firing data used: Elevation Deflection .\imiiig point Figures m target: Number and kind m sector or objective Number per yard of front. . Struck by richochetsonly. . Struck outside sector or ob- jective Cfinter of impact The Critique — Remarks on Statistical Record — Result Com- pared WITH Standard. [Same time and strength.] 1 Rcsult. Standard. 3 o i 1 "3 -2 1 ■6 c3 1 to "a Accuracy Hits Distribution Figures stnick Volume Kate Time Shots 1 Men :::::::: 1 ; • Y--!--- 1 1 ■ Richochcts included (yes or no) COMPARISONS ON OTHER BASES. (a) Comparat i ve st rengths 1 (6) Comparative time (c) Hiisc\]i(Mtc(l for shots fired ' (d) Distribution e.xpected for hits made ....|.... 1 ' 1 1 1 1 , 1 ■■■ ..Statistical Officer. 238 MUSKETRY. STATISTICAL OFFICERS' SOURCES OF INFORMATION. 336. The information required by the statistical officer for the completion of his record is obtained, in general, by observation: From the umpire, from the range officer, from the commander of the firing unit, by computation. By observation: Estiuiuted range. Firins data used. Time. From the umpire: Visibility. Ilifocliets includerl, yes or no. From the range officer: True range. Number of figures in target per yard of front. Number and kind of figures within the sector or assigned objective. Hits, direct and ricochet, obtained within and without the sector or assigned objective. Figures struck within and without the sector or assigned objective. Figures struck by ricocliets only. Center of impact. From the commander of the unit firing: Number of men firing. Number of shots fired. By computation: Such further entries as are required in the record he obtains by computation. ENTRIES IN THE RECORD. 337. Entries in the record should include hits, true range, visi- bility, estimated range, firing data used, figures in the target, center of impact. 338. Hits. — After the firing is completed and the targets have been marked the statistical officer secures a record of the hits obtained, direct and ricochet, within and without the sector or assigned objective, from the range officer or from the signal squad, as is most convenient. In case the statistical oSicer's post is some distance from the signal station, then arrange- ments should be made to have this information sent to him promptly by messenger. MUSKETRY. 289 In cnse all the flfruras In (lie t;ir;,'t't lie wlfhln the limits of the objective or sector, then ohvlously there wuuUl be no entry on the line " o\itsi(ie sector." Whether or not ricochets are to be scored and recorded sejv arately will depend ui)on the natnro of the exercise and will be decided in each case by the uniiiire. However, it must be noted tiiat the tal)les are based on direct hits only, 339. True range. — This is obtained from the range officer, and should be the result of an exact measurement, not an estimate. 340. Visibility. — The tables from which the standard of com- parison is ot)tained, as explained hereafter, are based ui)()n the hypothesis that the target (tr aiming point Is clearly visible, thus expressing the ja-obabie maximum of expectancy. When this condition does not exist— and it seldom does in field tiring — It becomes necessary to modify the standard by reducing It to meet existing conditions. The amount of this reduction is termed the "visibility," and is the opinion of tho umpU'e expressed in terras of range. For example, the true range to a target being 600 yards, the umpire may estimate the visibility as "G50." That Is to say, It is his belief that the conditions are such that the probable maximum result to be expected Is the same as when tiring at a clearly visible target at 650 yards and that the standard Is to be computed on that basis. 341. Estimated range. — The estimated range may or may not agree with the siglit setting announced. During the progress of the exercise, the statistical officer remains In the vicinity of the commander of the unit engaged in the practice and, by close observation, learns the estimated ranges. Should the result of his observation leave him doubtful as to the correct figures, he may inquire of the unit commander after the firing is completed or at such other time as not to in- terrupt the progress of the exercise. 342. Firing data used. — lOh^vation, DetkH'tion, Ainalng point. The statistical officer obtains this Information In the same manner In which he obtains the estimated range, i. e., by obser" vatlon and Inquiry. When an auxiliary aiming point is used, it is recorded briefly fxs "tj-ee," " bush," " rock," "house," "hedge," etc, and it 240 MUSKETRY. sometimes may be of advantage also to note its distance and direction from the target. Tliis may i)e done by recording tlie distance (in mils) in Arabic numerals, followed by the direction (clock notation — target at center of vertical clock) recorded in Roman numerals. Thus "Tree-50-IV" would mean that the aiming point was a troe 50 mils from the target in the direction of 4 o'clock. 343. Figures in target. — Numiier and kind in sector, or assigned objective. Number per yard of front. Struck by richochets only. Struck outside sector, or assigned objective, This information i.s obtained by the statistical officer froni the range officer. The first two items may be obtained from the statement of the exercise. 344. Center of impact. — This information is obtained from the range officer or from the signal squad, as Is most convenient, The statistical officer is informed as to whether the fire was equally distributed throughout the entire front of the target or was concentrated in one or more well-defined shot groups. The record should be brief, and, merely for the sake of uniformity, the following abbreviations are suggested. With reference to the target, R, L, and C refer to its right, left, and center : Right R Left : _. L Center ^^ : C Right center quarter s RC/4 Left center fifth LC/5 Center third C/3 Right half : . R/2 Distributed Dist. Should there be any apparent necessity for more precise in- formation than can be given in this manner, it is better to divide the front of the objective into several parts and to obtain a separate record of the hits and distribution in each part. Cer- tain exercises might require that a record be kept of the num- ber of hits on each figure in the target. In such cases this in- formation would be recorded on a separate sheet and attached to the record, when entries in the body of the record might lead to confusion or misunderstanding. . - - 345. Result compared with standard. — There are several stand- ards by whicli the material results of combat fi.ring may be MUSKETRY. 241 judged, but the one here used is an expression of the probable result to be expected from an equal number of average shots firing at the correct range and with the correct elevation and for the same length of time. Entries under standard should include hits, figures struck, rate, time, shots, men, ricochets included, yes or no. To coiupute the standard the statistical olflcer must have at baud the following data: Visibility. Time, or duration of the fire, in minutes. Number of men firing. Numi)er and kind of figures in the target. An example will serve best to show the method of arriving at the standard. Assume the following data: Range. 500; visibility, 650; time, 2 minutes; men, 100; figures in target. 100, kneeling, 346. Hits,— Consult Table I (par. 361). In the left-band col- xinin, beaded "Range yards," find the figure "650" (visibility). Follow tliis 6.50 line to the right until entering the subcolnnm "Kneel " (kinds of figures in the target) in the column " Num- ber of hits." Here is foijnd the amount "1.074," which is the number of bits to be expected from one average shot in one min- ute. This amount nuiltiplied by 2 (time) gives 2,148, or the number of bits to be expected from one average shot in two minutes. This product nmltiplied by 100 (men) gives 214.8, which is the number of hits to be expected from 100 men firing for 2 minutes and is the standard sought. Fractions less than one-half ordinarily are disregarded, and so this would be recorded as 215. 347. Figures struck. — Taking the probable number of bits (215) as the basis, first find the number of times each figure in the target would be struck on the average. As there are 100 figures in the target and there are 215 hits, then 215 divided by 100 would give the average number of hits per figure, or 2.15. Consult Table II, In the column "H" find the amount 2,15. Then the amount on the same line in the adjacent col- umn "D" to the right expresses the percentage of figures in the target that should be struck with a fire equally distributed throughout the entire front of the objective. In the present instance the amount 2.15 is found in colunm H. Disregarding fractions less than one-h:ilf, the amount taken from column D is 88. As this amount expresses percentage only, and as it is 3529°— 17 16 242 MUSKETRY. number that is souRlit, then 88 nuiltipliod by the number of figures in the target (100) and this product divided by 100 will give the number of figures that should have been struck. In'this case, as the number of figures in the target is an even 100, the number and percentage are the same, 88. Using the umpire's reference table, kneeling figures, and interpolating for range 650 in the 2-minute column, the percentage is found to be 88. 348. Rate. — The expected rate of fire, expressed in shots per man per minute, is found in Table I at the intersection of the line corresponding to the visibility 650 with the column headed " Rate of fire." In this example it is 7.0. 349. Time. — The time recorded under " Standard " and imder " Result " are identical — i. e., it is the actual duration of the fire in minutes. The statistical officer often will find his computations sim- plified if in recording the time he will express fractional parts of a minute decimally instead of as seconds. 350. Shots. — This is the number of shots that would have been fired had the correct rate been used. Multiply the rate by the time and this product by the number of men. In this example 7 (the rate as found in the table) times 2 (the time in minutes) times 100 (the number of men firing) equals 1,400, which is the number of shots that should have been fired. 351. Men. — This is the number of men in the firing line who did or should have used their rifles in the exercise in question. The men recorded under " St;uidard " and " Result " are the same. 352. Ricochets included, yes or no. — Under certain conditions it might be expected that a given number of ricochets would occur in addition to the direct hits found from Table I. In such a case the umpire would decide upon whether or not he desired to consider the ricochets separately, and if so, he would notify the statistical officer as to the percentage to be expected.^ The recording of this amount as " 20 per cent," for examp'.e, under " Standard " would indicate that ricochets were to be included and that 20 per cent were to be expected in addition to the direct hits. If the umpire- decides that ricochets are not to be considered, then the word " No " appears in place of the percentage. MUSKETRY. 243 In case ricoclit'ts arc nsi(lt'n'viii»l in the tahle l)y the perccnt- a^o of ricochets as announced hy tlie umpire. He tluMi uses this increased nuniher of hits in his further computations. The entries under result should include hits, figures struck, rate, time, shots, men, ricochets included, yes or no. 353. Hits and figures struck. — Tiiese ainoinits are tiie ones oI)tained from the ran;re ollicer, as explained above, and induih* ricochets or not as directed by the umpire. 354. Rate. — Tliis is the rate of fire actually obtained, and is found by dividing the total number of cartridj,'es fired l)y tlie product of the men and time. 355. Time, shots, men. — This is merely a record of fact as to tlie duration of tlie fire, tlit> total number of shots fired, and tlie number of men in the firing line who did or should have used tliiMr rillcs (lui'ing tlu> exercise. 356. Ricochets included, yes or no. — This i.s a statement as to wliether or not the results recorded under hits and figures struclc include ricochets. It would be unu.sual to include ricochets in the standard and not in the result, or vice versa. 357. Comparisons on other basis should include comparative strengths, comparative time, hits expected for shots fired, dis- tribution expected for hits made. Comparative strengths. — A given firing line produces si given numlier of casualties in tlie enemy's ranks (.strikes a given number of figures in the target) in a given time. What is sought then is how many riflemen of average ability, using the correct elevation and rate and distributing their fire equally throughout the entire front of the target, will be required to produce the same number of casualties in the same time. . This may be found from the " Umpire's reference tallies " as explained in Cliai)ter XXVI, or, if more preci.se results are desired, by the .solution of the following equation : n^ N ''B T F' Mg is the number of men (.ftandard conditions) producing equal results. H is an amount found from the distribution table. Table 11, as liereinafter sliown. N is the number of figures in the target — within tlie sector, or assigned objective. 244 MUSKETRY. B is an amount found from Table I, as hereinafter shown. T is the time or duration of the fire in minutes. F is the number of figures in the target per yard of front. To find the value of H, multiply the number of figures struck by 100 and then divide this product by the number of figures in the target. Consult Table II and find" an equal amount to this quotient in column D. The amount on the same line, in colunui II to the left, is the value of H sought. Example: Number of figures in target, 50. Number of figures struck, 26. Then 26X100-^50=52, and in the column D of Table II (fourth column from the left) is found the amount 51.8, which is the closest approximation of 52. In the column H, to the left and on the same line, is found the amount 0.73, wliich is the value of H sought. To find the value of B, consult Table I. In the column " Num- ber of hits," select the appropriate subcolumn depending upon the kind of figures (kneeling or prone) in the target. The value of B sought will be found at the intersection of this subcolumn with the line corresponding to the visibility. Example: Prone figures. Visil)ility, 800. Follow the 8(X) line to the right until entering the colunm " Number of hits, prone," there is found the amount, 0.384, which is the value of B sought. Example of use of equation: Number of figures struck, 48. Number of figures in target, 65 kneeling. Visibility, 950. Figures in target per yard of front, J. Time, 2 minutes. Substituting in the equation. 1.08(H)XG5{N) ^70.20_ ^^« 0A7i{B)X2{T)X}4iF) .474 ^^^ That is, it would take 148 average shots to strike 43 out of 65 kneeling figures in two minutes. 358. Comparative time.^ — How much time should be used by average shots of a given number to strike a given number of figures. MUSKETRY. 246 Thl.s can be found in tlu> same manner ns the comparative stri'nf,'th from the iniiph-e's reference table or with Kreat«>r i>re- cision l)y a transposition of the above eiiuation to read — _ Ji>L ^' BMF Tlie values are the same as in the original e(|uation except that Tb Is the time or duration of the lire in minutes (standard cdu- ditions) producing ecjual residts. 359. Hits expected for shots fired. — Consult Table I. Multiply (he pert'ceutage of hits, as found on the line corresponding to the visibility, by the number of shots fired. The product is the numlier of lilts expected for shots fired. 360. Distribution expected for hits made. — Solve as " fijrures struck" under "Standard." 361. Statistical officer's tables.^The rate of fire and the per- centage and number of hits on the prone and kneeling figures expected at each range are shown in Table I. The percentage of figures in a linear target that should be struck by an evenly distributed fire, based on the average number of hits per figure, is shown in Table II. Talilc I. [Black tifiures indicate " l)attlp sight."] Per cent of hits. Number of hits. lianpe, yards. Kate of fire. Prone. Kneel. Prone. Kneel. 200 10.833 20. 05 .^3.41 2.172 3. 619 18.52 33.05 2.006 3.580 250 10.41(1 16. 78 29.19 1. 748 3. (Ml 16.01 28.61 1.668 2.980 300 10. 000 14.49 25. 87 1. 4 19 2. 587 14.08 25.59 1.408 2.559 350 9. 5Si 12.91 2:5.40 1.2:57 2.242 12.89 22.41 1.235 2.148 400 9. lOti 11.67 21.40 1. 070 1.962 11.62 19.72 1.065 1.808 450 8.7.50 10. 79 19. 88 . 944 1.740 10.05 16.13 .980 1.411 .500 8. .333 10. 00 18. 57 .s:« 1.547 8.30 12.86 .692 1.072 550 7.9ir. 9. 30 17.35 . 73(i 1. 374 600 7.500 K6ij 16.22 .6-19 1.217 a50 7. 0S.3 K05 15.16 .570 1.074 700 6. fi(>fi 7. 54 14.17 .5a3 . 9 15 750 (!. 2.50 7. Oi 13. 27 . 4:{9 .829 800 5. 8.33 6. 59 12.45 . 3.8-1 .726 S50 .5.411) 6. IS 11.71 .:{:t5 . 6.34 900 .5.000 .5. 7S 11.00 . 289 .5.50 950 4. .583 5. 42 10. 34 . 218 .474 1,000 4. 106 ,5. 12 9.77 .213 .407 246 MUSKETRY. 362. The degree of precision desirable in the iise of this table is dependent upon the duration of the tire and upon the amount of anuuunition expended. In " Rate of fire " and " Number of hits " use one place of decimals when firing less than 5 minutes, two places when firing less than 10 minutes, and three places when firing more than 10 minutes. In " Per ceiit of hits " use no fraction when less than 100 shots are fired, one place of decimals when less than 1,000 are fired, and two places when more than 1,000 are fired. The amounts in the body of the table under " Rate of fire " indicate shots per man per minute when firing at the correct rate. The amounts under " Per cent of hits " indicate the per- centages of hits to be expected from average shots on lines of prone or kneeling figures occupying a frontage of 1 yard per figure. For different spacing of the targets multiply the amount in the table by the number of figures per yard of front. The amounts under " Number of hits " indicate the number of hits to be expected fi'om one average shot in one minute (cor- rect rate and elevation being used) on lines of prone or kneeling figures occupying a frontage of 1 yard per figure. For different spacing of targets multiply the amount given in the table by the number of figures per yard of front. The amounts in the body of the table are based upon the fur- ther supposition that the targets are clearly visible. MUSKETRY. Tit hi,' II. 247 H. D. H. D. H. 0.61 D. H. D. 0.01 1.0 0.31 26.7 45.7 0.91 59.8 0. 02 2.0 0.32 27.4 0. 62 46.2 0.92 60.2 0. 03 3.0 0..33 28.1 0.63 46.7 0.93 60.6 0. 04 3.9 0.34 28.8 0.64 47.2 0.94 60.9 0. 0.') 4.9 0.35 29. 5 0. m 47.8 0. 95 61.3 0. ()(> 5.8 0.36 30.2 0.66 48.3 0.96 61.7 0.07 6.8 0.37 30.9 0.67 48.9 0.97 62.1 0. OS 7.7 0.38 31.6 0.68 49.4 0.98 62. 5 0. Oil 8. 6 0.39 32.3 0.69 49.8 0.99 62.8 0.10 9.5 0.40 32.9 0.70 50.3 1.00 ta.2 0.11 10.6 0.41 33.6 0.71 50.8 1.02 63, 9 0.12 11.3 0.42 34.3 0.72 51.3 1.04 64.7 0.13 12.2 0.43 34.9 0.73 51.8 1.06 65. 4 0.14 13.1 0.44 35.6 0.74 52.3 1.08 66.0 0.15 13.9 0.45 36.2 0.75 52.8 1.10 66.7 0.16 14.8 0.46 36.9 0.76 .5;}. 2 1.12 67. 4 0.17 15.6 0.47 37. 5 0.77 53.7 1.14 6N. 0.18 16.5 0.48 38.1 0.78 54.2 1.16 68.6 0.19 17.3 0.49 38.7 0.79 54. 6 1.18 ()9. 3 0.20 18.1 0.50 39.4 0.80 55.0 1.20 69.9 0.21 18.9 0..51 40.0 0.81 55.5 1.22 70.5 0.22 19.7 0.52 40.5 0.82 56.0 1.24 71.1 0.2:5 20. 5 0.53 41.1 0.83 56.4 1.26 71.6 0.24 21.3 0.54 41.7 0.84 56.8 1.28 72.2 0.25 22.1 0. 55 42.3 0.85 57. 3 1.30 72.7 0.26 22.9 0. 56 42.9 0.86 57.7 1.32 73.3 0.27 23. 7 0.57 43.4 0.87 58.1 1.34 73.8 0.28 24.4 0.58 44.0 0.88 58.5 1.36 71.3 0.29 25.2 0..59 44.6 0.89 .W. 9 1.38 74.8 0.30 26.0 0.60 45.1 0.90 59.3 1.40 75.3 248 MUSKETRY. Tabic II — Continued. n. D. H. 1). II. D. 1.42 1.44 1.46 l.-!8 1.50 1.52 1.54 1.56 1.58 1.60 1.62 1.64 1.66 1.68 1.70 1.72 1.74 1.76 1.78 1.80 1.82 1.84 1.86 1.88 1.90 1.92 1.94 1.96 1.98 2.00 75.8 76.3 76.8 77.2 77.7 7S. 1 7S. 6 79.0 79.4 79.8 80.2 80.6 81.0 81.4 81.7 82.1 82.4 82.8 83.1 83.5 83.8 84.1 84.4 84.7 So.O 85.3 85.6 85.9 86.2 86.5 2.05 2.10 2.15 2.20 2.25 2.30 2.35 2.40 2.45 2.50 2.55 2.60 87.1 87.7 88.4 88.9 89.5 90.0 90.4 90.9 91.4 91.8 92.2 92.6 4.50 5.00 99.0 99.3 5.50 6.00 99.5 99.8 1 1 1 1 ■ . 2.65 2.70 92.9 93.3 1 2.75 2.80 93.6 93.9 i . ... 1 1 2.85 2.90 94.2 94.5 1 I ' 2.95 3.00 94.8 95.0 3.25 3.50 96.4 97.8 3.75 4.00 98.3 98.7 "l If every figure in the target is hit H times on the average, then frcm the table, D per cent of the figures will be hit. CHAPTER XXVT. THE UMPIRE'S REFERENCE TABLES. 364. Distribution factor. — Tlic coiisidcration.s influencing tlio effect of fire are numerous, and while some of them can he clearly sh()\^^l in terms of hits made or figures struck, there are many which must he hased entii-ely on ohservation and opinion. However, .so soon as the principal factors are ivnown, from a consideration of the record of any firinj;, a trained lunpire can at once express an intelligent decision as to the prohahle result of the action. What is wanted is a prompt decision from the best obtainahle judgment as to the efficacy of the fire and the solution of the fire problem. lu order to add force to tlie decision, it is sometimes advisahle to make a comparison with average shots. In order that this comparison may not involve "complicated calcuhitions " various tables have been compiled in order that the percentage of figures struck may be taken fi-om the table at a glance and without com- putation. The compiled table represents the result expected from average shots firing at a correct maximum rate and dis- tributing their fire perfectly while using the correct sight set- ting. It must be remembered that the accomplishment of the mission in a fire problem is based usually on the number of targets dis- abled. The " comparison," therefore, is based on this factor. 365. The two tables which follow, if printed on both sides of a card of convenient size are of value to umpires, not only as a ready reference in judging of the results of fire, but also in for- nuilating problems with ball cartridges. Tlicre are problems in which the \ise of these tables would be neither feasible nor necessary, and others in which the de- cision of the umpire is amply supporte>ui one iiiimilf. For 200 rilles. half the time. For fiO rilles, double the time. For half the density of tarfjet (1 lij.'ure jier 2 yards of front ). double the time. (6) To estimate the aiiiounl of aimiiunilioii (o issue for any partieular exercise, imiltiply the duration of lire by the correct rate for that ranj^e (see Table I, under "Statistical record") or by the umpire's e.stimated rate. It is advisable to add 10 I)er cent to this estimate in order to provide ammunition to men whose rate of fire is greater than that ordered. This to equalize the amnninition unexpended by men who are using a slower rate than onleivd, due to either lack of training, ground, or vegetation preventing view of assigned targets, to jams, etc. Assume an exercise in which four targets of prone figures were to be used and fire to be continued until 30 to 40 per cent of the figures have been struck. The range to target No. 1 is about 800 yards, to No. 2 is 700 yards, to No. 3 is 600 yards, and to No. 4 is 500 yards. The issue of ammunition would be computed as follows : Target. Range. Time. Rate. Rounds. 1 800 700 600 500(B.S.) 1 1 5.8 6.6 7.5 8.3 5.8 2 6.6 3 5.6 4 6.2 Add 10 per cent. 24.2 2.4 26.6 That is, in this exerci.se, 30 rounds per man would be issued- 30 instead of 27 merely to save time by issuing only full clips. jhin' V ^^ '"TI'^ORNT^ TTBRARY ^V*^^ hfivp ctnii a order to strike Jill l-.,|-,l<'^ I.'',-,,!,! 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