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 CLIVEDEN LIBRARY 
 
 Number. -^ 
 
 Date (p^^.l^.
 
 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY
 
 BY THE SAME AUTHOR 
 Crown 67'o, 51. nei lach. 
 
 THE LOST NAVAL PAPERS 
 
 (Fourth Edition) 
 A series of exciting stories which reveal the 
 English Secret Service as it really is— 
 silent, unsleeping, and supremely competent. 
 
 "William Dawson is a great creation, a sheer delight. 
 If Mr. Hennet Copplestone"s intriguing book meets with 
 half the success it deserves, the inimitable Sherlock Holmes 
 will soon be outrivalled in popularity by the inscrutable 
 William Dawson."— Z?rt;'/v Telegraph. 
 
 JITNY AND THE BOYS 
 
 (Sf.cond Elition) 
 
 " The book is full of the thoughts which make us proud 
 to-day and help us to face to-morrow. Yes, ' Jitny ' has my 
 blessing." — Punch. 
 
 " Motoring people could do nothing better than sit down 
 and have a spin, in imagination, by reading this book. A 
 clinking motor-car story."— /?a:/v Chronicle. 
 
 London : JOHN MURRAY
 
 THE 
 SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 WHAT IT IS AND WHAT WE OWE TO IT 
 
 BY BENNET GOPPLESTONE 
 
 AUTHOR OF 
 "THE LOST XAVAL PAPERS 
 
 " The Navy is a matter of machines only in so far 
 as material means must he employed to achieve 
 material ends. I look upon the ships and the 
 guns as secreted by the men just as a tortoise 
 secretes its shell."— Prologue. 
 
 IMPERIAL LIBRARY 
 
 LONDON 
 JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 
 
 1918
 
 All Rights Reskrvbd
 
 NOTE 
 
 Between June 1916 and February 1918 I con- 
 tributed a good many articles and sketches on 
 Naval subjects to The Cornhill Magazine. They 
 were not designed upon any plan or published 
 in any settled sequence. As one article led up 
 to another, and information came to me from my 
 generously appreciative readers (many of whom 
 were in the Service), I revised those which I had 
 written and ventured to write still more. This 
 book contains my Cornhill articles — revised and 
 sometimes re- written in the light of wider informa- 
 tion and kindly criticism — and several additional 
 chapters which have not previously been published 
 anywhere. I have endeavoured to weave into a 
 connected series articles and sketches which were 
 originally disconnected, and I have introduced 
 new strands to give strength to the fabric. Through 
 the whole runs a golden thread which I have 
 called The Secret of the Navy, 
 
 B. C. 
 
 March, 1918.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PROLOGUE 
 
 PAGE 
 
 After the Battle ..... 1 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 A Band of Brothers . . . . .19 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 The Coming of War ..... 43 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 The Great Victory . . . . .62 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 With the Grand Fleet : A North Sea 
 
 "Stunt" 80 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 With the Grand Fleet : The Terriers and 
 
 the Rats 98 
 
 vii
 
 viii CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 EAN : A Failu 
 Consequences 113 
 
 PAOE 
 
 The Mediterranean : A Failure and its 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 In the South Seas : The Disaster off Coronel 127 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 In the South Seas : Cleaning Up . .146 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 How the "Sydney" met the " Emden " . 171 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 From Strength to Strength . , .191 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 The Cruise of the " Glasgow " : Part I — Rio 
 
 to Coronel . . , . . .211 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 The Cruise of the "Glasgow": Part II — 
 
 Coronel to Juan Fernandez . ,234
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 IX 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 The Battle of the Giants : Part I 
 
 PAGa 
 
 257 
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 The Battle of the Giants : Part II 
 
 279 
 
 EPILOGUE 
 
 Lieutenant CiESAR 
 
 812 
 
 LIST OF MAPS 
 
 The North Sea 
 
 The Mediterranean Operations 
 
 The South Seas .... 
 
 How the " Sydney " met (the " Emden ' 
 
 The " Sydney-Emden " Action . 
 
 The Cruise of the "Glasgow" 
 
 The Pacific : Von Spee's Concentration 
 The Cruise of the " Glasgow " 
 
 The Battle of the Giants 
 
 FACIXa PAGE 
 
 66 
 118 
 136 
 174 
 
 186 
 
 214 
 
 225 
 246 
 
 262
 
 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 PROLOGUE 
 
 AFTER THE BATTLE 
 
 " CiESAR/' said a Sub-lieutenant to his friend, a 
 temporary Lieutenant R.N.V.E., who at the 
 outbreak of war had been a classical scholar at 
 Oxford, " you were in the thick of our scrap 
 yonder oft the Jutland coast. You were in it 
 every blessed minute with the battle cruisers, 
 and must have had a lovely time. Did you ever, 
 Cgesar, try to write the story of it ? '' 
 
 It was early in June of 1916, and a group 
 of officers had gathered near the ninth hole of 
 an abominable golf course which they had them- 
 selves laid out upon an island in the great landlocked 
 bay wherein reposed from their labours long lines 
 of silent ships. It was a peaceful scene. Few 
 even of the battleships showed the scars of battle, 
 though among them were some which the Germans 
 claimed to be at the bottom of the sea. There 
 they lay, coaled, their magazines refilled, ready 
 at short notice to issue forth with every eager 
 man and boy standing at his action station. And 
 while all waited for the next call, officers went 
 ashore, keen, after the restrictions upon free
 
 2 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 exercise, to stretch their muscles upon the infamous 
 golf course. It was, I suppose, one of the very 
 worst courses in the world. There were no pre- 
 pared tees, no fairway, no greens. But there was 
 much bare rock, great tufts of coarse grass greedy 
 of balls, wide stretches of hard, naked soil destruc- 
 tive of wooden clubs, and holes cut here and there 
 of approximately the regulation size. Few officers 
 of the Grand Fleet, except those in Beatty's Salt 
 of the Earth squadrons, far to the south, had 
 since the war began been privileged to play upon 
 more gracious courses. But the Sea Service, 
 which takes the rough" with the smooth, with 
 cheerful and profane philosophy, accepted the 
 home-made links as a spirited triumph of the 
 handy-man over forbidding nature. 
 
 " Yes,'' said the naval volunteer, " I tried many 
 times, but gave up all attempts as hopeless. I 
 came up here to get first-hand material, and have 
 sacrificed my short battle leave to no purpose. 
 The more I learn the more helplessly incapalale I 
 feel. I can describe the life of a ship, and make 
 you people move and speak like live things. But 
 a battle is too big for me. One might as well try 
 to realise and set on paper the Day of Judgment. 
 All I did was to write a letter to an old friend, one 
 Copplestone, beseeching him to make clear to the 
 people at home what we really had done. I 
 wrote it three days after the battle. Here it is." 
 
 Lieutenant Caesar drew a paper from his pocket 
 and read as follows : 
 
 ** My dear Copplestone, — Picture to yourself 
 our feelings. On \^'ednesday we were in the fiery 
 hell of the greatest naval action ever fought. A
 
 PROLOGUE: AFTER THE BATTLE 3 
 
 real Battle of the Giants. Beatty's and Hood's 
 battle cruisers— chaffingly known as the Salt of 
 the Earth — and Evan-Thomas's squadron of four 
 fast Queen Elizabeths had fought for two hours 
 the whole German High Seas Fleet. Beatty, in 
 spite of his heavy losses, had outmanoeuvred 
 Fritz's battle cruisers and enveloped the German 
 line. The Fifth Battle Squadron had stalled ofi 
 the German Main Fleet, and led them into the net 
 of Jellicoe, who, coming up, deployed between 
 Evan- Thomas and Beatty, though he could not 
 see either, crossed the T of the Germans in the 
 beautifullest of beautiful manoeuvres, and had them 
 for a moment as good as sunk. But the Lord 
 giveth and the Lord taketh away ; it is sometimes 
 difficult to say Blessed be the Name of the Lord. 
 For just when we most needed full visibility the 
 mist came down thick, the light failed, and we 
 were robbed of the fruits of victory when they 
 were almost in our hands. It was hard, hard, 
 bitterly hard. But we had done the utmost 
 which the Fates permitted. The enemy, after 
 being harried all night by destroyers, had got 
 away home in torn rags, and we were left in supreme 
 command of the North Sea, a command more 
 complete and unchallengeable than at any moment 
 since the war began. For Fritz had put out his 
 full strength, all his unknown cards were on the 
 table, we knew his strength and his weakness, and 
 that he could not stand for a moment against our 
 concentrated power. All this we had done, and 
 rejoiced mightily. In the morning we picked up 
 from Poldhu the German wireless claiming the 
 battle as a glorious victory — at which we laughed 
 loudly. But there was no laughter when in the
 
 4 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 afternoon Poldhu sent out an official message 
 from our own Admiralty wliich, from its clumsy 
 wording and apologetic tone, seemed actually 
 to suggest that we had had the devil of a hiding. 
 Then when we arrived at our bases came the 
 newspapers with their talk of immense losses, 
 and of bungling, and of the Grand Fleet's failure ! 
 Oh, it was a monstrous shame ! The country 
 which depends utterly upon us for life and honour, 
 and had trusted us utterly, had been struck to 
 the heart. We had come back glowing, exalted 
 by the battle, full of admiration for the skill of 
 our leaders and for the serene intrepidity of our 
 men. We had seen our ships go down and pay 
 the price of sea command — pay it willingly and 
 ungrudgingly as the Navy always pays. Nothing 
 that the enemy had done or could do was able to 
 hurt us, but we had been mortally wounded in the 
 house of our friends. It will take days, weeks, 
 perhaps months, for England and the world to be 
 made to understand and to do us justice. Do 
 what you can, old man. Don't delay a minute. 
 Get busy. You know the Navy, and love it v/ith 
 your whole soul. Collect notes and diagrams from 
 the scores of friends whom you have in the Service ; 
 they will talk to you and tell you everything. I 
 can do little myself. A Naval Volunteer who 
 fought through the action in a turret, looking 
 after a pair of big guns, could not himself see 
 anything outside his thick steel walls. Go ahead 
 at once, do knots, and the fighting Navy will 
 remember you in its prayers.'* 
 
 The attention of others in the group had been 
 drawn to the reader and his letter, and when
 
 PROLOGUE: AFTER THE BATTLE 6 
 
 Lieutenant Caesar stopped, flushed and out of 
 breath, there came a chorus of approving laughter. 
 
 " This temporary gentleman is quite a literary 
 character," said a two-ring Lieutenant who had 
 been in an exposed spotting top throughout the 
 whole action, " but we've made a Navy man of 
 him since he joined. That's a dashed good letter, 
 and I hope you sent it." 
 
 " Yes," said Caesar. " But while I was hesitat- 
 ing, wondering whether I would risk the lightning 
 of the Higher Powers, a possible court martial, 
 and the loss of my insecure wavy rings, the business 
 was taken out of my hands by this same man 
 to whom I was wanting to write. He got moving 
 on his own account, and now, though the battle 
 is only ten days old, the country knows the rights 
 of what we did. When it comes to describing 
 the battle itself, I make way for my betters. For 
 what could I see ? On the afternoon of May 31st, 
 we were doing gun drill in my turret. Suddenly 
 came an order to put lyddite into the guns and 
 follow the Control. During the next two hours 
 as the battle developed we saw nothing. We w^ere 
 just parts of a big human machine intent upon 
 working our own little bit with faultless accuracy. 
 There was no leisure to think of anything but the 
 job in hand. From beginning to end I had no 
 suggestion of a thrill, for a naval action in a turret 
 is just gun drill glorified, as I suppose it is meant 
 to be. The enemy is not seen ; even the explosions 
 of the guns are scarcely heard. I never took my 
 ear-protectors from their case in my pocket. All 
 is quiet, organised labour, sometimes very hard 
 labour when for any reason one has to hoist the 
 great shells by the hand purchase. It is extra-
 
 6 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 ordinary to think that I got fifty times more 
 actual excitement out of a squadron regatta months 
 ago than out of the greatest battle in naval history." 
 " That's quite true/' said the Spotting Officer, 
 " and quite to be expected. Battleship fighting is 
 not thrilling except for the very few. For nine- 
 tenths of the officers and men it is a quiet, almost 
 dull routine of exact duties. For some of us up 
 in exposed positions in the spotting tops or on the 
 signal bridge, with big shells banging on the 
 armour or bursting alongside in the sea, it becomes 
 mighty wetting and very prayerful. For the still 
 fewer, the real fighters of the ship in the Conning 
 tower, it must be absorbingly interesting. But 
 for the true blazing rapture of battle one has to 
 go to the destroyers. In a battleship one lives 
 like a gentleman until one is dead, and takes the 
 deuce of a lot of killing. In a destroyer one lives 
 rather like a pig, and one dies with extraordinary 
 suddenness. Yet the destroyer officers and men 
 have their reward in a battle, for then they drinlc 
 deep of the wine of life. I would sooner any day 
 take the risks of destroyer work, tremendous 
 though they are, just for the fun which one gets 
 out of it. It was great to see our boys round up 
 Fritz's little lot. While you were in your turret, 
 and the Sub. yonder in control of a side battery, 
 Fritz massed his destroyers like Prussian infantry 
 and tried to rush up close so as to strafe us with 
 the torpedo. Before they could get fairly going, 
 our destroyers dashed at them, broke up their 
 masses, bufieted and hustled them about exactly 
 like a pack of wolves worrying sheep, and with 
 exactly the same result. Fritz's destroyers either 
 clustered together like sheep or scattered flying
 
 PROLOGUE: AFTER THE BATTLE 7 
 
 to the four winds. It was just the same with the 
 light cruisers as with the destroyers. Fritz could 
 not stand against us for a moment, and could not 
 get away, for we had the heels of him and the 
 guns of him. There was a deadly slaughter of 
 destroyers and light cruisers going on while we 
 were firing our heavy stuff over their heads. Even 
 if we had sunlc no battle cruisers or battleships, 
 the German High Seas Fleet would have been 
 crippled for months by the destruction of its 
 indispensable "cavalry screen.'' 
 
 As the Spotting Officer spoke, a Lieutenant- 
 Commander holed out on the last jungle with a 
 mashie— no one uses a putter on the Grand Fleet's 
 private golf course— and approached our group, 
 who, wliile they talked, were busy over a picnic 
 lunch. 
 
 "If you pigs haven't finished all the bully beef 
 and hard tack," said he, " perhaps you can spare 
 a bite for one of the blooming 'eroes of the X 
 Destroyer Flotilla." The speaker was about 
 twenty- seven, in rude health, and bore no sign of 
 the nerve-racking strain through which he had 
 passed for eighteen long-drawn hours. The young 
 Navy is as unconscious of nerves as it is of indiges- 
 tion. The Lieutenant- Commander, his hunger 
 satisfied, lighted a pipe and joined in the talk. 
 
 " It was hot work," said he, " but great sport. 
 We went in sixteen and came out a round dozen. 
 If Fritz had known his business, I ought to be 
 dead. He can shoot verv well till he hears the 
 shells screaming past his ears, and then his nerves 
 go. Funny thing how wrong we've been about 
 him. He is smart to look at, fights well in a 
 crowd, but cracks when he has to act on his own 
 
 %
 
 8 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 without orders. When we charged his destroyers 
 and ran right in he just crumpled to bits. We 
 had a batch of him nicely herded up, and were 
 laying him out in detail with guns and mouldies, 
 when there came along a beastly intrusive Control 
 Officer on a battle cruiser and took him out of 
 our mouths. It was a sweet shot, though. Some- 
 one—I don't Jinow his name, or he would hear of 
 his deuced interference from me — plumped a salvo 
 of 12-inch common shell right into the brown of 
 Fritz's huddled batch. Two or three of his 
 destroyers went aloft in scrap-iron, and half a 
 dozen others were disabled. After the first hour 
 his destroyers and light cruisers ceased to be on 
 the stage ; they had flown quadrivious — there's an 
 ormolu word for our classical volunteer — and we 
 could have a whack at the big ships. Later, at 
 night, it was fine. We ran right in upon Fritz's 
 after-guard of sound battleships and rattled them 
 most tremendous. He let fly at us with every 
 bally gun he had, from 4-inch to 14, and we were 
 a very pretty mark under his searchlights. We 
 ought to have been all laid out, but our loss was 
 astonishingly small, and we strafed two of his 
 heavy ships. Most of his shots went over us." 
 
 " Yes," called out the Spotting Officer, " yes, 
 they did, and ricochetted all round us in the 
 Queen Elizabeths. There was the devil of a row. 
 The firing in the main action was nothing to it. 
 All the while you were charging, and our guns 
 were masked for fear of hitting you, Fritz's bonbons 
 were screaming over our upper works and making 
 us say our prayers out loud in the Spotting Tops. 
 You'd have thought we were at church. I was 
 in the devil of a funk, and could hear my teeth
 
 PROLOGUE: AFTER THE BATTLE 9 
 
 rattling. It is when one is fired on and can't hit 
 back that one thinks of one's latter end." 
 
 " Did any of you see the Queen Mary go ? " 
 asked a tall thin man with the three rings of a 
 Commander. "Our little lot saw nothing of the 
 first part of the battle ; we were with the K.G. 
 Fives and Orions." 
 
 " I saw her," spoke a Gunnery Lieutenant, a 
 small, quiet man with dreamy, introspective eyes 
 — the eyes of a poet turned gunner. " I saw her. 
 She was hit forrard, and went in five seconds. 
 You all know how. It was a thing which won't 
 bear talking about. The Invincible took a long 
 time to sink, and was still floating bottom up 
 when Jellicoe's little lot came in to feed after we 
 and the Salt of the Earth had eaten up most of 
 the dinner. I don't believe that half the Grand 
 Fleet fired a shot." 
 
 There came a savage growl from officers of the 
 main Battle Squadrons, who, invited to a choice 
 banquet, had seen it all cleared away before their 
 arrival. " That's all very well," grumbled one 
 of them ; " the four Q.E.s are getting a bit above 
 themselves because they had the luck of the fair. 
 They didn't fight the High Seas Fleet by their 
 haughty selves because they wanted to, you bet." 
 
 The Gunnery Lieutenant with the dreamy eyes 
 smiled. " We certainly shouldn't have chosen that 
 day to fight them on. But if the Queen Elizabeth 
 herself had been with us, and we had had full 
 visibility — with the horizon a hard dark line — we 
 would have willingly taken on all Fritz's 12-inch 
 Dreadnoughts and thrown in his battle cruisers." 
 
 " That's the worst of it," grumbled the Com- 
 mander, very sore still at having tasted only of
 
 10 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 the skim milk of the battle ; " naval war is now 
 only a matter of machines. The men don't count 
 as they did in Nelson's day." 
 
 " Excuse me, sir," remarked the Sub -Lieutenant ; 
 " may I say a word or two about that ? I have 
 been thinking it out." 
 
 There came a general laugh. The Sub-Lieuten- 
 ant, twenty years of age, small and dark and with 
 the bright black eyes of his mother— a pretty little 
 lady from the Midi de la France whom his father 
 had met and married in Paris— did not look like a 
 philosopher, but he had the clear- tliinking, logical 
 mind of his mother's people. 
 
 " Think aloud, my son," said the Commander. 
 " As a living incarnation of TEntente Cordiale, you 
 are privileged above those others of the gun-room." 
 
 The light in the Sub's eyes seemed to die out 
 as his gaze turned inwards. He spoke slowly, 
 carefully, sometimes injecting a word from his 
 mother's tongue which could better express his 
 meaning, lie looked all the while towards the 
 sea, and seemed scarcely to be conscious of an 
 audience of seniors, liis last few sentences were 
 spoken wholly in French. 
 
 *' No — naval war is a war of men, as it always 
 was and always will be. For what are the machines 
 but the material expression of the souls of the 
 men ? Our ships are better and faster than the 
 German ships, our guns heavier and more accurate 
 than theirs, our gunners more deadly than their 
 gunners, because our Navy has the greater human 
 soul. The Eoyal Navy is not a collection of 
 lifeless ships and guns imposed upon men by 
 some external power as the K aiser sought to impose 
 a fleet upon the Germans, a nation of landsmen.
 
 PROLOGUE: AFTER THE BATTLE 11 
 
 The Navy is a matter of macliines only in so far 
 as human beings can only achieve material ends 
 by material means. I look upon the ships and 
 guns as secreted by the men just as a tortoise 
 secretes its shell. They are the products of naval 
 thought, and naval brains, and, above all, of that 
 ever-expanding naval soul {I'esprit) which has been 
 growing for a thousand years. Our ships yonder 
 are materially new, the products almost of yester- 
 day, but really they are old, centuries old ; they 
 are the expression of a naval soul working, fer- 
 menting, always growing through the centuries, 
 always seeking to express itself in machinery. 
 Naval war is an art, the art of men, and where 
 in the world will one find men like ours, officers 
 like ours ? Have you ever thought whence come 
 those qualities which one sees glowing every day 
 in our men, from the highest Admiral to the 
 smallest ship boy — have you ever thought whence 
 they come ? '' 
 
 He paused, still looking out to sea. His com- 
 panions, all of them his superiors in rank and 
 experience, stared at him in astonishment, and one 
 or two laughed. But the Commander signalled 
 for silence. " Et apr^s,'' he asked quietly ; *' d'oii 
 viennent ces qualites ? " Unconsciously he had 
 sloughed the current naval slang and spoke in the 
 native language of the Sub. 
 
 The effect was not what he had expected. At 
 the sound of the Commander's voice speaking in 
 French the Sub-Lieutenant woke up, flushed, and 
 instantly reverted to his English self. " I am 
 sorry, sir. I got speaking French, in which I 
 always think, and when I talk French I talk the 
 most frightful rot/'
 
 12 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 " I am not so sure that it was rot. Your theory 
 seems to be that we are, in the naval sense, the 
 heirs of the ages, and that no nation that has 
 not been through our centuries-old mill can hope 
 to stand against us. I hope that you are right. 
 It is a comforting theory." 
 
 " But isn't that what we all think, sir, though 
 we may not put it quite that way ? Most of us 
 know that our officers and men are of unapproach- 
 able stuff in body and mind, but we don't seek 
 for a reason. We accept it as an axiom. I've 
 tried to reason the thing out because I'm half 
 French ; and also because I've been brought up 
 among dogs and horses and believe thoroughly in 
 heredity. It's all a matter of breeding." 
 
 " The Sub's right," broken in the Gunnery 
 Lieutenant with the poet's eyes ; " though a Sub 
 who six months ago was a snotty has no business 
 to think of anything outside his duty. The Service 
 would go to the devil if the gun-room began to 
 talk psychology. We excuse it in this Sub here 
 for the sake of the Entente Cordiale, of which he 
 is the living embodiment ; but had any other 
 jawed at us in that style I would have sat upon 
 his head. Of course he is right, though it isn't 
 our English way to see through things and define 
 them as the French do. No race on earth can 
 touch us for horses or dogs or prize cattle— or 
 Navy men. It takes centuries to breed the boys 
 who ran submarines through the Dardanelles and 
 the Sound and stayed out in narrow enemy waters 
 for weeks together. Brains and nerves and sea 
 skill can't be made to order even by a German 
 Kaiser. Navy men should marry young and 
 choose their women from sea families, and then
 
 PROLOGUE: AFTER THE BATTLE 13 
 
 their kids won't need to be taught. They'll have 
 the secret of the Service in their blood." 
 
 " That's all very fine," observed a Marine 
 Lieutenant reflectively ; " but who is going to 
 pay for it all ? We can't. I get 75. 6d. a day, 
 and shall have lis. in a year or two ; it sounds 
 handsome, but would hardly run to a family. 
 Few in the Navy have any private money, so how 
 can we marry early 1 " 
 
 " Of course we can't as things go now," said 
 the Gunnery Lieutenant. " But some day even 
 the Admiralty will discover that the English Navy 
 will become a mere list of useless machines unless 
 the English naval families can be kept up on 
 the lower deck as well as in the ward-room and 
 gun-room. Why, look at the names of our sub- 
 marine officers whenever they get into the papers 
 for honours. They are always salt of the sea, 
 names which have been in the Navy List ever 
 since there was a List. You mav read the same 
 names in the Trafalgar roll and back to the Dutch 
 wars. Most of us were Soldiers before that — shore 
 Soldiers who went afloat with Blake or Prince 
 Rupert — but then we became sailors, and so 
 remained, father to son. I can only go back 
 myself to the Glorious First of June, but some of 
 us here in the Grand Fleet date from the Stuarts 
 at least. It is jolly fine to be of Navy blood, 
 but not all pkim jam. One has such a devil of 
 a record to live up to. In my term at Dartmouth 
 there was a poor little beast called Francis Drake 
 — a real Devon Drake, a genuine antique — but 
 what a load of a name to carry ! Thank God, my 
 humble name doesn't shine out of the history 
 books. And as with the officers, so with the sea-
 
 14 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 men. Half of them come from my own county 
 of Devon the cradle of the Navy. They are in 
 the direct line from Drake's buccaneers. Most 
 of the others come from the ancient maritime 
 counties of the Channel seaboard, where the blood 
 of everyone tingles with Navy salt. The Germans 
 can build ships which are more or less accurate 
 copies of our own, but they can't breed the men. 
 That is the whole secret." 
 
 The Lieutenant-Commander, whose war-scarred 
 destroyer lay below refitting, laughed gently. 
 " There is a lot in all that, more than w^e often 
 realise when we grumble at the cursed obstinacy 
 of our old ratings, but even you do not go back 
 far enough. It is the old blood of the Vikings 
 and sea-pirates in us English which makes us 
 turn to the sea ; the rest is training. In no other 
 way can you explain the success of the Fringes, 
 the mine- sweepers, and patrols, most of them 
 manned by naval volunteers who, before the war, 
 had never served under the White Ensign nor 
 seen a shot fired. What is our classical scholar 
 here, Csesar, but a naval volunteer whom Whale 
 Island and natural intelligence have turned into a 
 gunner ? But as regards the regular Navy, the 
 Navy of the Grand Fleet, you are right. Pick 
 your boys from the sea families, catch them young, 
 pump them full to the teeth with the Navy Spirit 
 — I'esprit marin of our bi-lingual Sub here — make 
 them drunk with it. Then they are all right. 
 But they must never be allowed to think of a 
 darned thing except of the job in hand. The Navy 
 has no use for men who seek to peer into their 
 own souls. They might do it in action and dis- 
 cover blue funk. We want them to be no more
 
 PROLOGUE: AFTER THE BATTLE 15 
 
 conscious of their souls than of their livers. Though 
 I admit that it is devilish difficult to forget one's 
 liver when one has been cooped up in a destroyer 
 for a week. It is not nerve that Fritz lacks so 
 much as a kindly obedient liver. He is an iron- 
 gutted swine, and that is partly why he can't 
 run destroyers and submarines against us. The 
 German liver is a thing to wonder at. Do you 
 know —   — " but here the Lieutenant-Commander 
 became too Rabelaisian for my delicate pen. 
 
 The group had thinned out during this exercise 
 in naval analysis. Several of the officers had 
 resumed their heart- and- club -breaking struggle 
 with the villainous golf course, but the Sub, the 
 volunteer Lieutenant, and the Pongo (Marine) 
 still sat at the feet of their seniors. " May I say 
 how the Navy strikes an outsider like me ? " 
 asked Caesar diffidently. Whale Island, which 
 had forgotten all other Latin authors, had given 
 him the name as appropriate to one of his learning. 
 
 " Go ahead,'" said the Commander generously. 
 " All this stuff is useful enough for a volunteer ; 
 without the Soldiers and the Volunteers to swallow 
 our tall stories, the Navy would fail of an audience. 
 The snotties know too much." 
 
 " I was going to speak of the snotties," said 
 Csesar, " who seem to me to be even more typical 
 of the Service than the senior officers. They have 
 all its qualities emphasised, almost comically 
 exaggerated. I do not know whether they are 
 never young or that they never grow old, but there 
 is no essential dilference in age and in knowledge 
 between a snotty six months out of cadet training 
 and a Commander of six years' standing. They 
 rag after dinner with equal zest, and seem to be
 
 16 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 equally well versed in the profound technical 
 details of their sea work. Perhaps it is that they 
 are born full of knowledge. The snotties interest 
 me beyond every type that I have met. Their 
 manners are perfect and in startling contrast with 
 those of the average public school boy of fifteen 
 or sixteen— even in College at Winchester- and 
 they combine their real irresponsible youthfulness 
 with a grave mask of professional learning which 
 is delightful to look upon. I have before me the 
 vision of a child of fifteen with tousled yellow 
 hair and a face as glum as a sea-boot, sitting 
 opposite to me in the machine which took us 
 back one day to the boat, smoking a ' fag ' with 
 the clumsiness which betrayed his lack of practice, 
 in between bites of ' goo ' (in this instance Turkish 
 Delight), of which I had seen him consume a 
 pound. He looked about ten years old, and in a 
 husky, congested voice, due to the continual 
 absorption of sticky food, he described minutely 
 to me the method of conning a battleship in 
 manoeuvres and the correct amount to allow for 
 the inertia of the ship when the helm is centred ; 
 he also explained the tactical handling of a squadron 
 during sub- calibre firing. That snotty was a sheer 
 joy, and the Xavy is full of him. He's gone 
 himself, poor little chap - blown to bits by a shell 
 which penetrated the deck." 
 
 " In time, Caesar," said the Commander, " by 
 strict attention to duty you will become a Navy 
 man. But we have talked enough of deep mys- 
 teries. It was that confounded Sub, with his 
 French imagination, who started us. What I 
 really wish someone would tell me is this : what 
 was the ' northern enterprise ' that Fritz was
 
 PROLOGUE: AFTER THE BATTLE 17 
 
 on when we chipped in and spoilt his little 
 game ? " 
 
 " It does not matter/' said the Gmmery Lieuten- 
 ant. " We spoilt it, anyhow. The dear old 
 newspapers talk of his losses in big ships as if 
 they were all that counted. What has really 
 crippled him has been the wiping out of his des- 
 troyers and fast new cruisers. Without them he 
 is helpless. It was a great battle, much more 
 decisive than most people think, even in the 
 Grand Fleet itself. It was as decisive by sea as 
 the Marne was by land. We have destroyed 
 Fritz's mobility." 
 
 The men rose and looked out over the bay. 
 There below them lay their sea homes, serene, 
 invulnerable, and about them stretched the dull, 
 dour, treeless landscape of their northern fastness. 
 Their minds were as peaceful as the scene. As they 
 looked a bright light from the compass platform 
 of one of the battleships began to flicker through 
 the sunshine- dash, dot, dot, dash. " There 
 goes a signal," said the Commander. " You are 
 great at Morse, Soldiers, Read what it says, my 
 son." 
 
 The Lieutenant of jlarines watched the flashes, 
 and as he read grinned capaciously. " It is some 
 wag with a signal lantern," said he. '' It reads : 
 Question— Daddy,— what — did — you — do — in— 
 the— Great— War ? " 
 
 "I wonder," observed the Sub-Lieutenant, " what 
 new answer the lower deck has found to that 
 question. Before the battle their reply was : ' I 
 was kept doubling round the decks, sonny.' " 
 
 " There goes the signal again," said the Soldier ; 
 " and here comes the answer." He read it out
 
 18 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 slowly as it flashed word after word : " ' I laid 
 
 THE GUNS TRUE, SONNY/ " 
 
 "And a dashed good answer, too," cried the 
 Commander heartily. 
 
 " That would make a grand fleet signal before a 
 general action," remarked the CTimnery J.ieutenant. 
 " I don't care much for Nelson's Trafalgar signal. 
 It was too high-flown and sentimental for the 
 lower deck. It was aimed at the history books, 
 rather than at old tarry-breeks of the fleet a 
 hundred years ago. No — there could not be a 
 better signal than just ' Lay the Guns True ' — 
 carry out your orders precisely, intelligently, 
 faultlessly. What do you say, my Hun of a classical 
 volunteer ? " 
 
 "It could not be bettered," said Caesar. 
 
 " I will make a note of it," said the Gunnery 
 Lieutenant, *' against the day when, as a future 
 Jellicoe, I myself shall lead a new Grand Fleet into 
 action."
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 A BAND OF BROTHERS 
 
 " We few, we happy few, we band of brothers." — King Henry V. 
 
 My boyhood was spent in Devon, the land of 
 Drake and the home of the Elizabethan Navy. 
 A deep passion for the Sea Service is in my blood, 
 though, owing to family circumstances, I was 
 not able to indulge my earliest ambition to become 
 myself one of the band of brothers who serve under 
 the White Ensign. My elder brother lived and 
 died afloat. Two of my sons, happier than their 
 father, are privileged to play their parts in the 
 great ships of the Fleets. So that, though not 
 in the Service, I am of it, by ties of blood and 
 by ties of the earliest association. Whenever I 
 have sought to penetrate its mysteries and to 
 interpret them to my fellow countrymen, my 
 motive has never been that of mere idle curiosity. 
 The Royal Navy wields, and has always wielded, 
 a great material force, but the secret of its strength 
 lies not in the machines with which it has equipped 
 itself in the various stages of its development. 
 Vast and terrible as are the ships and the guns, 
 they would be of little worth if their design and 
 skilful employment were not inspired by that 
 spiritual force, compounded of tradition, training, 
 devotion and discipline, which I call the Soul of 
 
 19
 
 20 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 the Navy. In the design of its" weapons, in its 
 mastery of their use, above all in its consummate 
 seamanship, the Royal Navy has in all ages 
 surpassed its opponents ; but it has done these 
 things not through some fortuitous gift of the 
 Sea Gods, but because of the never-failing de- 
 velopment of its own Spirit. It has always been 
 at a great price, in the sacrifice of ease and in 
 the outpouring of the lives of men, that the 
 Navy has won for itself and for us the freedom 
 of the seas. Those who reckon navies in ships 
 and guns, in weight of metal and in broadside 
 fire, while leaving out of account the spirit and 
 training and devotion of the men, can never 
 understand the Soul of the Navy. For all these 
 material things are the expression of the Soul ; 
 they are not the Soul itself. 
 
 The Navy is still the old English Navy of the 
 southern maritime counties of England. It has 
 become the Navy of Great Britain, the Navy of 
 the British Empire, but in spirit, and to a large 
 extent in hereditary personnel, it remains the 
 English Navy of the Narrow Seas. Many counties 
 play a great part in its equipment, but to me 
 it is always the Navy of my own land of Devon ; 
 officers and men are the lineal successors of those 
 bold West Country seamen who in their frail 
 barks ranged the wide seas hundreds of years ago 
 and first taught to us and to the world the meaning 
 of the expression " sea communications." 
 
 There is not an officer in the permanent service 
 of the Fleets of to-day who was not trained in 
 Devon. On the southern seaboard of that county, 
 set upon a steep slope overlooking the mouth of 
 the most lovely of rivers, stands the Naval College
 
 A BAND OF BROTHERS 21 
 
 in which are being trained those who will guide 
 our future Fleets. A little way to the west lies one 
 of the greatest of naval ports and arsenals. From 
 my county of Devon comes half the Navy of 
 to-day, half the men of the Fleet, be they warrant 
 officers, seamen or engineers. The atmosphere 
 of Devon, soft and sleepy as it may appear to a 
 stranger, is electric with the spirit of Drake, 
 which is the spirit of Nelson, which is the spirit 
 of the boys of Dartmouth. For generation after 
 generation, in the old wooden hulks Britannia 
 and Hindustan, and afterwards in the Naval 
 College on the heights, the cadets during their 
 most impressionable years have breathed in the 
 spirit of the Navy. I have often visited them 
 there and loved them ; my brother, who worked 
 among them and taught them, died there, and 
 is buried in the little cemetery which crowns the 
 hill where, years ago in a blinding snowstorm, I 
 stood beside his open grave and heard the Last 
 Post wail above his body. I have always envied 
 him that great privilege, to die in the service of 
 the Navy and to be buried within hail of the boys 
 whom he loved. 
 
 The cadets of Dartmouth have learned that the 
 Sea Service is an exacting and most jealous mistress 
 who brooks no rival. They have learned that 
 the Service is everything and themselves nothing. 
 They have learned that only by humbly submitting 
 themselves to be absorbed into the Service can 
 they be deemed to be worthy of that Service. 
 The discipline of the Navy is no cast-iron system 
 imposed by force and punishment upon unwilling 
 men ; there is nothing in it of Prussian Militarism. 
 It is rather the willing subordination of proud
 
 22 THE SECRET OF THE NA\^ 
 
 free men to the dominating interests of a Service 
 to which they have dedicated their lives. The 
 note of their discipline is " The Service first, last, 
 and all tlie time/' The Navy resembles somewhat 
 a religious Order, but in the individual subordina- 
 tion of body, heart, brains and soul there is nothing 
 of servitude. The Naval officer is infinitely proud 
 and infinitely humble. Infinitely proud of his 
 Service, infinitely humble in himself. If an officer 
 through error, however pardonable, loses his 
 ship— and very young officers have command of 
 ships — and in the stern, though always sympa- 
 thetic, judgment of his fellows he must temporarily 
 be put upon the shelf, he does not grumble or 
 repine. He does not write letters to the papers 
 upon his grievances. He accepts the judgment 
 loyally, even proudly, and strives to merit a 
 return to active employment. No fleshpots in 
 the outer world, no honours or success in civil 
 employment, ever compensate the naval officer 
 for the loss of his career at sea. 
 
 From the circumstances of their lives, so largely 
 spent among their fellows at sea or in naval 
 harbours, and from their upbringing in naval 
 homes and training ships, officers and men grow 
 into a class set apart, dedicated as Followers of 
 the Sea, in whose eyes the dwellers in cities appear 
 as silly chatterers and hucksterers, always seeking 
 after some vain thing, be it wealth or rank or 
 fame. The discipline of the Navy is, like its 
 Soul, apart and distinct from anything which we 
 know on land. It is very strict but also very 
 human. There i's nothing in it of Caste. " I 
 expect,'" said Drake, " the gentlemen to draw 
 with the mariners." Drake allowed of no dis-
 
 A BAND OF BROTHERS 23 
 
 tinction between " gentlemen " and " mariners " 
 except that " gentlemen " were expected always 
 to surpass the " mariners '' in tireless activity, 
 cheerful endurance of hardships, and unshakable 
 valour in action. Drake could bear tenderly with 
 the diseased grumbling of a scurvy - stricken 
 mariner, but the gentleman adventurer who 
 " groused " was in grievous peril of a rope and a 
 yard arm. The gentlemen adventurers have given 
 place to professional naval officers, the mariners 
 have become the long service trained seamen in 
 their various grades who have given their lives to 
 the Navy, but the spirit of Drake endures to this 
 day. The Gentlemen are expected to draw with 
 the Mariners. 
 
 When a thousand lives and a great ship may be 
 lost by the lapse from vigilance of one man, very 
 strict discipline is a vital necessity. But as with 
 officers so with men it is the discipline of cheerful 
 willing obedience. The spirit of the Navy is 
 not the spirit of a Caste. It burns as brightly in 
 the seaman as in the lieutenant, in the ship's 
 boy as in the midshipman, in the warrant officer 
 as in the " Owner." It is a discipline hammered 
 out by the ceaseless fight with the sea. The Navy 
 is always on active service ; it is always waging 
 an unending warfare with the forces of the sea ; 
 the change from a state of peace to a state of War 
 means only the addition of one more foe — and 
 if he be a gallant and chivalrous foe he is wel- 
 comed gladly as one worthy to kill and to be 
 killed. 
 
 Catch boys young, inure them to Naval dis- 
 cipline, and teach them the value of it, and to 
 them it will become part of the essential fabric of 
 3
 
 24 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 their lives. A good example of how men of Naval 
 training cling to the discipline of the Service as 
 to a firm unbreakable rope was shown in Cap- 
 tain Scott's South Polar expeditions. Some of 
 the officers, and practically the whole of the crews, 
 were lent by the Navy, but the expeditions them- 
 selves were under auspices which were not naval. 
 At sea Captain Scott's legal authority was that of a 
 merchant skipper, on land during his exploring 
 expeditions he had no legal authority at all. Yet 
 all the officers and men, knowing that their lives 
 depended upon willing subordination, agreed that 
 the discipline both at sea and on land should be 
 that of the Navy to which most of them belonged. 
 The ships were run exactly as if they had flown 
 the White Ensign, and as if their companies were 
 under the Navy Act. Strict though it may be, 
 there is nothing arbitrary about naval discipline, 
 and those who have tested it in peace and war 
 know its quality of infinite endurance under any 
 strain. 
 
 The Navy is a small Service, small in numbers, 
 and to this very smallness is partly due the beauty 
 of its Soul. For it is a picked Service, and only 
 by severe selection in their youth can those be 
 chosen who are worthy to remain among its 
 permanent members. The professional officers 
 and men number only some 150,000, and the 
 great temporary war expansion — after the in- 
 clusion of Naval Reservists, Naval Volunteers, 
 and the Division for service on land, did little 
 more than treble the active list. The Navy, 
 even then, bore upon its rolls names less than 
 one-twelfth as numerous as in those legions who 
 were drafted into the Army. Yet this small
 
 A BAND OF BROTHERS 25 
 
 professional Navy, by reason of its Soul and the 
 vast machines which that Soul secretes and employs 
 with supreme efficiency, dominated throughout the 
 war the seas of the whole world. The Navy has 
 for so long been a wonder and a miracle that we 
 have ceased to be thrilled by it ; we take it for 
 granted ; but it remains no less a wonder and a 
 miracle. 
 
 Many causes have combined to make this little 
 group — this few, this happy few, this band of 
 brothers — the most splendid human force which 
 the world has ever seen. The Naval Service is 
 largely hereditary. Officers and men come from 
 among those who have served the sea for genera- 
 tions. In the Navy List of to-day one may read 
 names which were borne upon the ships' books 
 of hundreds of years ago. And since the tradition 
 of the sea plays perhaps the greatest part in the 
 development of the Naval Soul, this continuity 
 of family service, on the lower deck as in the 
 ward- room and gun-room, needs first to be empha- 
 sised. The young son of an officer, of a warrant- 
 officer, of a seaman, or of a marine, enters the 
 Service already more than half trained. He has 
 the spirit of the Service in his blood, and its col- 
 lective honour is already his own private honour. 
 I remember years ago a naval officer said to me 
 sorrowfully, " My only son must go into the 
 Service, and yet I fear that he is hardly fit for 
 it. He is delicate, shv, almost timid. But what 
 can one do ? " 
 
 "Is it necessary ? " I asked foolishly. He 
 stared at me : " We have served from father 
 to son since the reign of Charles II." So the boy 
 entered the Britannia, and I heard no more of
 
 26 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 him until one morning, years after, I saw in an 
 Honours List a name which I knew, that of a 
 young Lieutenant who had won the rare naval 
 V.C. in the Mediterranean. It was my friend's 
 son ; blood had triumphed ; the delicate, shy, 
 almost timid lad had made good. 
 
 The Navy catches its men when they are young, 
 unspoiled, malleable, and moulds them with deft 
 fingers as a sculptor works his clay. Ofiicers 
 enter in their early teens — now as boys at Osborne 
 who afterwards become naval cadets at Dart- 
 mouth. Formerly they spent a year or two 
 longer at school and entered direct as cadets to 
 the Britannia. The system is essentially the 
 same now as it has been for generations. The 
 material must be good and young, the best of it 
 is retained and the less good rejected. The best 
 is moulded and stamped in the Dartmouth work- 
 shop, and emerges after the bright years of early 
 boyhood with the naval hall mark upon it. The 
 seamen enter as boys into training-ships, and 
 they, too, are moulded and stamped into the naval 
 pattern. It is a very exacting but a very just 
 education. No one who has been admitted to 
 the privilege of training need be rejected except 
 by his own fault, and if he is not worthy to be 
 continued in training, he is emphatically not 
 worthy to serve in the Fleets. 
 
 Of late years this system, which requires abund- 
 ance of time for its full working out, has proved 
 to be deficient in elasticity. It takes some seven 
 years to make a cadet into a sub-lieutenant, while 
 a great battleship can be built and equipped in 
 little more than two years. The German North 
 Sea menace caused a rapid expansion in the
 
 A BAND OF BROTHERS 27 
 
 output of ships, especially of big ships, which far 
 outstripped the training of junior officers needed 
 for their service. The Osborne-Dartmouth system 
 had not failed, far from it, but it was too slow 
 for the requirements of the Navy under the new 
 conditions. In order to keep up with the demand, 
 the supply of naval cadets was increased and 
 speeded up by the admission of young men from 
 the public schools at the age when they had been 
 accustomed to enter for permanent Army com- 
 missions. A large addition was also made to the 
 roll of subalterns of Marines— who received training 
 both for sea and land work— and in this way the 
 ranks of the junior officers afloat were rapidly 
 expanded. There was no departure from the 
 Navy's traditional policy of catching boys young 
 and moulding them specially and exclusively for 
 the Sea Service ; the new methods were avowedly 
 additional and temporary, to be modffied or 
 withdrawn when the need for urgent expansion 
 had disappeared. The Navy was clearly right. 
 It was obliged to make a change in its system, but 
 it made it to as small an extent as would meet the 
 conditions of the moment. The second best was 
 tacked on to the first best, but the first best was 
 retained in being to be reverted to exclusively as 
 soon as might be. To catch boys young, pre- 
 ferably those with the sea tradition in their blood, 
 to teach them during their most impressionable 
 years that the Navy must always be to them as 
 their father, mother and wedded wife — the exacting 
 mistress which demands of them the whole of 
 their affections, energies and service, to dedicate 
 them in tender years to their Sea Goddess — this 
 must always be the way to preserve, in its purest
 
 28 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 iindimmed water, that pearl of great price, the 
 Soul of the Navy. 
 
 It follows from the circumstances of their 
 training and life that the Navy is a Family of 
 which the members are bound together by the 
 closest of ties of individual friendship and associa- 
 tion. It is a Service in which everybody knows 
 everybody else, not only by name and reputation 
 but by personal contact. During the long years 
 of residence at Osborne and Dartmouth, and 
 afterwards in the Fleets, at the Greenwich Naval 
 College, at the Portsmouth schools of instruction, 
 officers widely separated by years and ranlv learn 
 to know one another and to weigh one another in 
 the most just of balances — that of actual service. 
 Those of us who have passed many years in the 
 world of affairs, know that the only reputation 
 worth having is that which we earn among those 
 of our own profession or craft. And none of us 
 upon land are known and weighed with the intimate 
 certainty and impartiality which is possible to the 
 Sea Service. We are not seen at close contact 
 and under all conditions of work and play, and 
 never in the white light which an ever-present 
 peril casts upon our worth and hardihood. No 
 fictitious reputation is possible in the Navy itself 
 as it is possible in the world outside. Officers 
 may, through the exercise of influence, be placed 
 in positions over the heads of others of greater 
 worth, they may be written and talked about by 
 civilians in the newspapers as among the most 
 brilliant in their profession — especially in time of 
 peace— but the Navy, which has known them 
 from youth to age inside and out, is not deceived. 
 The Navy laughs at many of the reputations
 
 A BAND OF BROTHERS 29 
 
 whicli we poor civilians ignorantly honour. No 
 naval reputation is of any value whatever unless 
 it be endorsed by the Navy itself. And the Navy 
 does not talk. How many newspaper readers, 
 for instance, had heard of Admiral Jellicoe before 
 he was placed in command of the Grand Fleet at 
 the outbreak of war ? But the Navy knew all 
 about him and endorsed the choice. 
 
 What I write of officers applies with equal force 
 to the men, to the long service ratings, the petty 
 officers and warrant officers who form the backbone 
 of the Service. They, too, are caught young, 
 drawn wherever possible from sea families, moulded 
 and trained into the naval pattern, stamped after 
 many years with the hall mark of the Service. 
 It is a system which has bred a mutual confidence 
 and respect between officers and men as unyielding 
 as armour-plate. Before the battle of May 31st, 
 1916, the Grand Fleet had gone forth looking for 
 Fritz many times and finding him not. Little 
 was expected, but if the unexpected did happen, 
 then officers believed in their long service ratings 
 as profoundly as did these dear old grumblers in 
 their leaders. Many times in the ward-rooms of 
 the battle squadrons the prospects of action 
 would be discussed and always in the same way. 
 
 "No, it's not likely to be anything, but if it 
 is what weVe been waiting for, I have every 
 confidence in our long service ratings if the Huns 
 are really out for blood. You know what I mean 
 —those grizzled old G.L.I.s (gunlayers, first- 
 class), and gunners' mates and horny handed 
 old A.B.s whom we curse all day for their damned 
 obstinacy. The Huns think that two years make 
 a gunlayer ; we know that even twelve years are
 
 30 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 not enough. Our long service ratings would pull 
 the country through, even if we hadn't the me- 
 chanical advantage over Fritz which we actually 
 possess. And the combination of the long-service 
 ratings and the two-Power standard will, when we 
 get to work upon him, give Fritz furiously to 
 think.'' 
 
 Even when the great expansion among the big 
 fighting ships called for a corresponding expansion 
 in the crews, little essential change was made in 
 the system which had bred confidence such as 
 this. There was some slight dilution. Officers 
 and men of the R.N.R. and the Naval Volunteers, 
 to the extent of about 10 per cent., were drafted 
 into the first-line battleships, but the cream of the 
 professional service was kept for the first fighting 
 line. For the most part the new temporary 
 Navy, of admirable material drawn from our 
 almost limitless maritime population, was kept 
 at work in the Fringes of the Fleet — the mine- 
 sweepers, armed liners, blockading patrols, and 
 so on — where less technical navy skill was required, 
 and where invaluable service could be and was 
 done. The professional Navy has the deepest 
 respect and gratitude for the devoted work dis- 
 charged by its amateur auxiliaries. 
 
 The Navy is a young man's service. In no 
 other career in life are the vital energies, the 
 eager spirits, the glowing capacities of youth 
 given such ample opportunities for expression. A 
 naval officer can become a proud " Owner," with 
 an independent command of a destroyer or sub- 
 marine, at an age when in a civil profession he 
 would be entrusted with scanty responsibilities. 
 In civil life there is a horrible waste of youth ; it
 
 A BAND OF BROTHERS 31 
 
 is kept down, largely left unused, by the jealousy 
 of age. But the Navy, which is very wise, makes 
 the most of every hour of it. The small craft, the 
 Fringes of the Fleet as Mr. Kipling calls them, 
 the eyes and ears and guardians of the big ships, 
 the patrol boats, submarines and destroyers, are 
 captained by youngsters under thirty, often under 
 twenty-five. The land crushes youth, the sea 
 allows and encourages its fine flower to expand. 
 Naval warfare is directed by grave men, but is 
 to an enormous extent carried on by bright boys. 
 
 But the Navy which employs youth more fully 
 than any other service, also uses it up more 
 remorselessly. Unless an officer can reach the 
 rank of Commander — a rank above that of a 
 Major in the Army- — when he is little more than 
 thirty he has a very scanty chance in time of 
 peace of ever serving afloat as a full Captain. 
 The small ships are many in number, but the big 
 ships are comparatively few. Only the best of 
 the best can become Commanders at an age which 
 enables them to reach post rank in that early 
 manhood which is a necessity for the command 
 of a modern super-Dreadnought. Many of those 
 who do become Captains in the early forties have 
 to eat out their hearts upon half-pay because there 
 are not enough big ships in commission to go 
 round. It is only in time of war that the whole 
 of our Fleets are mobilised. Some years ago I 
 was dining with several naval officers from a 
 battle squadron which lay in the Firth of Forth. 
 Beside me sat a young man looking no more 
 than thirty-five, and actually little older. He was 
 a Captain I knew, and in course of conversation I 
 asked for the name of his ship. " The Dread-
 
 32 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 nought," said he. This was at the time when the 
 name and fame of the first Dreadnought, the first 
 all-big-gun ship which revolutionised the con- 
 struction of the battle line, was ringing through 
 the -world. And yet here was this famous ship 
 in charge of a young smooth-faced fellow, younger 
 than myself, and I did not then consider that I 
 was middle-aged ! " Are you not rather young ? " 
 I enquired diffidently. He smiled. " We need to 
 be young," said he. Then I understood. It 
 came home to me that the modern Navy, with 
 its incredibly rapid development in machinery, 
 must have in its executive officers those precious 
 qualities of adaptability and quick perception, 
 that readiness to be always learning and testing, 
 seeking and finding the best new ways of solving 
 old problems, which can only be found in youth. 
 Youth is of the essence of the Navy, it always has 
 been so and it probably always will be. Youth 
 learns quickly, and the Naval officer is always 
 learning. In civil life we enter our professions, 
 we struggle through our examinations as doctors 
 or lawyers or engineers, and then we are content 
 to pass our lives in practice and forget our books. 
 But the naval officer, whose active life is passed 
 on the salt sea, is ever a student. He goes back- 
 wards and forwards between the sea and the 
 schools. There is no stage and no rank at which 
 his education stops. Gunnery, torpedo practice, 
 electricity, navigation, naval strategy and tactics 
 are all rapidly progressive sciences. A few years, 
 a very few years, and a whole scheme of practice 
 becomes obsolete. So the naval officer needs for" 
 ever to be passing from the sea to the Vernon, or 
 the Excellent, or to Greenwich, where he is kept
 
 A BAND OF BROTHERS 33 
 
 up-to-date and given a perennial opportunity to 
 develop the best that is in him. From fifteen to 
 forty he is always learning, always testing, always 
 grovN^ing, and then— unless his luck is very great 
 — he has to give way to the rising youth of other 
 men and rest himself unused upon the shelf. The 
 highest posts are not for him. It is very remorse- 
 less the way in which the Navy uses and uses up 
 its youth, and very touching the devoted humble 
 way in which that youth submits to be so used 
 up. The Navy is ever growing in science and in 
 knowledge, it must always have of the best — 
 the remorselessness with which it chooses only of 
 the best, and the patience with which those who 
 are not of the best submit without repining to 
 its devices, are of the Soul of the Navy. 
 
 Admiral Sir David Beatty became Commander- 
 in-Chief of the Grand Fleet at the age of forty-five. 
 In years of life and of service he was junior to 
 half the Captains' List. He had sprung by merit 
 and by opportunity some ten years above his 
 contemporaries at Dartmouth. First in the Soudan, 
 when serving in the flotilla of gunboats, he won 
 promotion from Lieutenant to Commander at the 
 age of twenty- seven. Again at Tien-tsin in China, 
 his chance came, and in 1900, while still under 
 thirty, he reached captain's rank. When the 
 war broke out he was a Rear- Admiral in command 
 of the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, and was 
 given the acting rank of Vice-Admiral. He is 
 now an acting Admiral, and his seniors in years, 
 and even in rank, willingly serve beneath him. 
 Admiral Beatty is not a scientific sailor, and is 
 not wedded to the Service as are most of his 
 brother officers. But for the outbreak of war he
 
 34 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 would probably liave retired. Yet no one ques- 
 tions his pre-eminent fitness for his dazzling 
 promotion. He has that rare indefinable quality 
 of leadership of men and of war instinct which 
 cannot be revealed except by war itself. When, 
 by fortunate chance, this quality is discovered in 
 an officer it is instantly recognised as beyond price, 
 and cherished at its full worth. 
 
 The Naval system which teaches subordination, 
 also teaches independence. If to men roaming 
 over the seas in command of ships, orders come, it 
 is well ; if orders do not come it is also well — 
 they get on very well without them. If the entire 
 Admiralty were waped out by German bombs, 
 My Lords and the whole staff destroyed, the Navy 
 would, in its own language, " proceed '' to carry 
 on. In the middle of the political crisis of De- 
 cember 1916, when a new Naval Board of Admiralty 
 had just been appointed, I asked a senior officer 
 how the new lot were getting on. He said : 
 " There isn't any First Lord. The First Sea Lord 
 is in bed with influenza. The Second Sea Lord is 
 in bed with influenza. The Third Sea Lord is in 
 bed with influenza. The Fourth Sea Lord is at 
 work but is sickening for influenza. But the Navy 
 is all right." That is the note of serene confidence 
 which distinguishes the Sea Service. Whatever 
 happens, the Navy is all right. 
 
 The Navy is a poor man's Service. It is a real 
 profession in which the officers as a rule live on 
 their pay and ask for little more. Men of great 
 houses will enter the Army in time of peace and 
 regard it as a mild occupation, men of money will 
 enter for the social position which it may give to 
 them. But no man of rank or of money in search
 
 A BAND OF BROTHERS 35 
 
 of a " cushy job/* was ever such an ass as to 
 look for it in the Navy. Few officers in the Navy 
 — except among those who have entered in quite 
 recent years — have any resources beyond their 
 pay ; many of them are born to it, and in their 
 families there have been scanty opportunities for 
 saving. The Admiralty, until quite recently, re- 
 quired that young officers upon entry into the Navy 
 or the Marines, should be allowed small specified 
 sums until they attained in service pay the 
 eminence of about lis. a day, and also that a 
 complete uniform equipment should be provided 
 for them ; but after that initial help from home 
 they were expected to make their pay suffice. And 
 in the great majority of cases they did what was 
 expected of them. Living is cheap in the Sea 
 Service. Ships pay no duties upon their stores, 
 and there are few opportunities afloat for the 
 wasting of money. Mess bills in ward-room and 
 gun-room are small, and must be kept small, 
 or the captain will arise in wrath and ask to be 
 informed (in writing) of the reason why. Ere 
 now young men have been dismissed their ships 
 for persistently running up too large a wine bill ; 
 and to be dismissed one's ship means not only a 
 bad mark in the Admiralty's books, but loss of 
 seniority^^ which in turn means an extra early 
 retirement upon that exiguous half-pay which looms 
 always like a dark cloud upon the naval horizon. 
 
 Unhappily for its officers and the country the 
 Navy has not been a married man's service ; it 
 has been too exacting to tolerate a divided alle- 
 giance. Sometimes poor young things under stress 
 of emotion have got married, and then has begun 
 for them the most cruel and ageing of struggles —
 
 36 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 tlie man at sea hard put to it to keep up his posi- 
 tion, simple though it be ; the wife ashore in poor 
 lodgings or in some tiny villa, lonely, struggling, 
 growing old too fast for her years ; children who 
 rarely see their father, and whose prospects are 
 of the gloomiest. I do not willingly put my pen 
 to this picture. Young Navy men, glowing with 
 health and virile energy and the spirit of the 
 Service, are very attractive creatures to whom 
 goes out the love of women, but though they, too, 
 may love, they are usually compelled to sail away. 
 It is well for them then if they are as firmly 
 wedded to the Service as the Roman priest is to 
 his Church, and if they are not always as continent 
 as the priest, who is so free from sin that he will 
 dare to cast a stone at them ? If the country 
 and its rulers had any belief in heredity, of which 
 the evidence stares at them from the eyes of every 
 naval son born to the Service, they would grant 
 to a young officer a year of leave in which to be 
 married, and pay to him and to his mate a hand- 
 some subsidy for every splendid son whom they 
 laid in the cradles of the Service of the future. 
 
 Of late years there has been a change. The rapid 
 expansion of the Fleets has brought in many young 
 cadets of commercial families, whose parents have 
 far more money than is wholly good for their sons. 
 The Navy is not so completely a poor man's service 
 as it was even ten years ago. The junior officers 
 are, some of them, too well off. Not long since, a 
 senior Captain was lamenting this change in my 
 presence. " The snotties now," he groaned, ** all 
 keep motor bicycles, the sub-lieutenants are not 
 happy till they own cars, and the Lieutenant- 
 Commanders think nothing of getting married.
 
 A BAND OF BROTHERS 37 
 
 All this has been the result of concentrating the 
 Fleets in home waters. Germany compelled us 
 to do it, but the Service was the better for the 
 three-year commissions on foreign stations." All 
 this is true. The junior ranks are getting richer. 
 At sea they can spend little, but ashore and in 
 harbour there are opportunities for gold to corrupt 
 the higher virtues. For my part, however, I have 
 the fullest confidence in the training and the example 
 of the older officers. In this war there has been 
 nothing to suggest that the young Navy is less 
 devoted and self-sacrificing than the old. The 
 wealthier boys may take their fling on leave — 
 and who can blame them ? — but at sea the Service 
 comes first. 
 
 We love that most which is most hardly won. 
 And the Navy men love their Service, not because 
 it is easy but because of the hardness of it, and 
 because of the sacrifices which it exacts from them. 
 It fastens its grip upon them in those first years 
 between fifteen and twenty, and the grip grows 
 ever tighter with the flight of time. It is at its 
 very tightest when the dreadful hour of retirement 
 arrives. When War broke out, in August 1914, 
 it was hailed with joy by the active Navy afloat, 
 but their joy was as water unto wine in comparison 
 with that which transfigured the retired Navy 
 ashore. For them at long last the impossible had 
 crystallised into fact. For those who were still 
 young enough, the uniforms were waiting ready 
 in the tin boxes upstairs, and it was but a short 
 step from their house doors to the decks of a 
 King's ship. Once more their gallant names 
 could be written in the Active List of their Navy. 
 They hastened back, these eager ones, and if
 
 38 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 there was no employment for them in their own 
 rank, they snatched at that in any other rank 
 which offered. Captains R.N. became commanders 
 and even lieutenants R.N.E. in the Fringes. 
 Admirals became temporary captains. There were 
 indeed at one time no fewer than nineteen retired 
 admirals serving as temporary officers R.N.E,. in 
 armed liners. 
 
 If you would understand how the Navy loves 
 the Service, how that love is not a part of their 
 lives, but is their lives, reflect upon the case of one 
 aged officer. I will not give his name ; he would 
 not wish it. He had been in retirement for nearly 
 forty years, too old for service in his rank, too old 
 possibly for service in any rank. But his pleadings 
 for employment afloat softened the understanding 
 hearts at Whitehall. He w^as allowed to rejoin 
 and to serve as a temporary Lieutenant-Com- 
 mander in an armed yacht which assisted the 
 ex-Brazilian monitors sent to bombard the Belgian 
 coast. There against Zeebrugge he served among 
 kindly lads young enough to be his grandsons, 
 and there with them and among them he was 
 killed — the oldest officer serving afloat. And he 
 was happy in his death. Not Wolfe before Quebec, 
 not Nelson in the cockpit of the Victory, were 
 happier or more glorious in their deaths than was 
 that temporary Lieutenant-Commander (trans- 
 ferred at his own request from the retired list) 
 who fought his last fight upon the decks of an 
 armed yacht and died as he would have prayed 
 to die. 
 
 The Navy hates advertisement and scorns above 
 all things in heaven or upon earth the indiscriminat- 
 ing praise of well-meaning civilians. I sadly
 
 A BAND OF BROTHERS ^9 
 
 realise that it may scorn me and this book of 
 mine. But I will do my best to make amends. I 
 will promise that never once in describing their 
 deeds will I refer to Navy men as " heroes." I 
 will not, where I can possibly avoid doing so, 
 mention the name of anyone. I will do my 
 utmost at all times to write of them as men and 
 not as " b — - — angels." I will, at the peril of 
 some inconsistency, declare my conviction that 
 naval officers haven't any souls, that they are in 
 the Service because they love it, and not because 
 they care two pins for their country, that they 
 are rather pleased than otherwise when rotten 
 civilians at home get a bad fright from a raid. I 
 will declare that they catch and sink German 
 submarines by all manner of cunning devices, 
 from the sheer zest of sport, and not because they 
 would raise a finger to save the lives of silly pas- 
 sengers in luxurious ocean liners. I will do any- 
 thing to turn their scorn away from me except to 
 withdraw one word which I have written upon 
 the Soul of the Navy. For upon this subject they 
 would, I believe, write as I do if the gods had 
 given to them leisure for philosophical analysis — 
 which they are much too busy to bother about — 
 and the knack of verbally expressing their thoughts. 
 When I read a naval despatch 1 always groan 
 over it as an awful throwing away of the most 
 splendid opportunities. I always long to have 
 been in the place of the writer, to have seen what 
 he saw, to know what he knew, and to tell the 
 world in living phrase what tremendous deeds 
 were really done. Naval despatches are the baldest 
 of documents, cold, formal, technical, most for- 
 biddingly uninspiring. Whenever I ask naval 
 
 4
 
 40 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 officers why they do not put into despatches the 
 vivid details which sometimes find their way into 
 private letters they glare at me, and even their 
 beautiful courtesy can scarcely keep back the 
 sniff of contempt. " Despatches," say they, " are 
 written for the information of the Admiralty/' 
 That is a complete answer under the Naval Code. 
 The despatches, which make one groan, are written 
 for the information of the Admiralty, not to thrill 
 poor creatures such as you and me. A naval 
 officer cares only for his record at the Admiralty 
 and for his reputation among those of his own 
 
 craft. If a newspaper calls LieutenantA B 
 
 a hero, and writes enthusiastically of his valour, 
 he shudders as would a modest woman if publicly 
 praised for her chastity. Valour goes with the 
 Service, it is a part of the Soul of the Navy. It is 
 taken for granted and is not to be talked or written 
 about. And so with those other qualities that 
 spring from the traditions of the Navy — the 
 chivalry which risks British lives to save those of 
 drowning enemies, the tenderness which binds up 
 their wounds, the honours paid to their dead. 
 All these things, which the Royal Navy never 
 forgets and the German Navy for the most part 
 has never learned, are taken for granted and 
 are not to be talked ot or written about. 
 
 It is inevitable from the nature of its training 
 that the Navy should be intensely self-centred. 
 If one catches a boy when he has but recently 
 emerged from the nursery, teaches him throughout 
 his active life that there is but one work fit for 
 the service of man, dedicates him to it by the
 
 A BAND OF BROTHERS 41 
 
 strictest discipline, cuts him off by the nature 
 of his daily life from all intimate contact with or 
 understanding of the world which moves upon 
 land, his imagination will be atrophied by disuse. 
 He will become absorbed into the Naval life which 
 is a life entirely of its own, apart and distinct 
 from all other lives. There is a deep gulf set 
 between the Naval life and all other lives which 
 very few indeed of the Navy ever seek to cross. 
 Their attitude towards civilians is very like that 
 of the law-making statesman of old who said: 
 " The people have nothing to do with the laws 
 except to obey them." If the Navy troubled to 
 think of civilians at all— it never does unless they 
 annoy it with their futile chatter in Parliament 
 and elsewhere — it would say : " Civilians have 
 nothing to do with the Navy except to pay for 
 it." Keen as is the imaginative foresight of the 
 Navy in regard to everything which concerns its 
 own honour and effectiveness, it is utterly lacking 
 in any sympathetic imaginative understanding of 
 the intense civilian interest in itself and in its 
 work. We poor creatures who stand outside, I 
 who write and you who read, do in actual fact 
 love the Navy only a little less devotedly than the 
 Navy loves its own Service. We long to under- 
 stand it, to help it, and to pay for it. We know 
 what we owe to it, but we would'ask, in all proper 
 humility, that now and then the Navy would 
 realise and appreciate the certain fact that it 
 owes some little of its power and success to us. 
 
 I cannot in a formula define the collective Soul 
 of the Navy. It is a moral atmosphere which cannot 
 be chemically resolved. It is a subtle and elusive 
 compound of tradition, self sacrifice, early training,
 
 42 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 willing discipline, youtli, simplicity, valour, chivalry, 
 lack of imagination, and love of the Service— and 
 the greatest of these is Love. I have tried to 
 indicate what it is, how it has given to this wonder- 
 ful Navy of ours a terrible unity, a terrible force, 
 and an even more terrible intelligence ; how it 
 has transformed a body of men into a gigantic 
 spiritual Power which expresses its might in the 
 forms and means of naval warfare. I cannot 
 exactly define it, but I can in a humble faltering 
 way do my best to reveal it in its working.
 
 CHAPTEE II 
 
 THE COMING OF WAR 
 
 Our Navy has played the great game of war by 
 sea for too many hundreds of years ever to under- 
 rate its foes. It is even more true of the sea than 
 of the land that the one thing sure to happen is 
 that which is unexpected. Until they have 
 measured by their own high standards the quality 
 of an enemy, our officers and men rate him in 
 valour, in sea skill, and in masterful ingenuity as 
 fully the equal of themselves. Until August 1914 
 the Eoyal Navy had never fought the German, 
 and had no standards of experience by which to 
 assay him. The Navy had known the maritime 
 nations of Europe and fought them many times, 
 but the Germans, a nation of landsmen artificially 
 converted into sailors within a single generation, 
 were a problem both novel and baffling. Eighteen 
 years before the War, Germany had no navy 
 worth speaking of in comparison with ours ; during 
 those fateful years she built ships and guns, trained 
 officers and men, and secured her sea bases on 
 the North Sea and in the Baltic at a speed and 
 with a concentrated enthusiasm which were wholly 
 wonderful and admirable. " The Future of Ger- 
 many lies on the water,'' cried the Kaiser one day, 
 and his faithful people took up the cry. " We 
 
 43
 
 44 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 here and now challenge Britain upon her chosen 
 element."' Quite seriously and soberly the German 
 Kavy Law of 1900 issued this challenge, and the 
 Fatherland settled down to its prodigious task 
 with a serene confidence and an extraordinary 
 energy which won for it the ungrudging respect 
 of its future foes. 
 
 Perhaps the Royal Navy in those early years 
 of the twentieth century, and especially in 1913 
 and 1914, became just a little bit infected by the 
 mental disease of exalting everything German, 
 w^hich had grown into an obsession among many 
 Englishmen. At home during the War men 
 oppressed by their enemy's land power, would 
 talk as if one German cut in two became two 
 Germans. German organisation, German edu- 
 cational training, German mechanical and scientific 
 skill are very good, but they are not superhuman. 
 Their failures, like those of other folk, are fully 
 as numerous as their successes. In trade they 
 won many triumphs over us because British 
 trading methods were individualistic and were 
 totally lacking in national direction and support. 
 But the Eoyal Navy is in every respect wholly 
 distinct from every other British institution. It 
 is the one and only National Service which has 
 always declined to recognise in its practice the 
 British policy of muddling through. It is the one 
 Service wdth a mind and an iron Soul of its very 
 own. So that when Germany set to work to 
 create out of nothing a navy to compete with our 
 own, she was up against a vast spiritual power 
 which she did not understand, the Soul of the 
 Navy, that unifying dominating force which gives 
 to it an incomparable strength. She was up, too,
 
 THE COMING OF WAR 45 
 
 against that experience of the sea and of sea 
 warfare in a race of islanders which had been living 
 and growing since the days of King Alfred. The 
 wonderful thing is this : not that the German Navy 
 has at no point been able to bear comparison with 
 ours — in design of ships, in quality and weight of 
 guns, in sea cunning, in sea training and in hardi- 
 hood — but that in the few short years of the 
 present century the German Navy should have 
 been built at all, manned at all, trained at all. 
 
 As the German Navy grew, and our ships came 
 in contact with those of the Germans, especially 
 upon foreign stations, our naval officers and men 
 came to regard their future foes with much respect 
 and even with admiration. We knew how great a 
 task the Germans had set to themselves, and were 
 astonished at the speed with which they made 
 themselves efficient. I have often been told that 
 during the years immediately before the war, the 
 relations between English and German naval 
 officers and men were more close than those be- 
 tween English officers and men and the sailors 
 of any other navy. It became recognised that 
 in the Germans we should have foemen of un- 
 doubted gallantry and of no less undoubted skill. 
 There are few officers and men in our Fleets who 
 do not know personally and admire their opposite 
 numbers upon the enemy's side, and though our 
 foes have in many ways broken the rules of war 
 as understood and practised by us, one never 
 hears the Royal Navy call the Germans " pirates.'' 
 Expressions such as this one are left to civilians. 
 When Mr. Churchill announced that the officers 
 and crews of captured U boats would be treated 
 differently from those taken in surface ships, the
 
 46 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 Navy strongly disapproved. To tLem it seemed 
 that the responsibility for breaches of international 
 law and practice lay not with naval officers and 
 men, whose duty it was to carry out the orders 
 of their superiors, but that it lay with the superiors 
 who gave those orders. To retaliate upon sub- 
 ordinate officers and men for the crimes of their 
 political chiefs seemed cowardly, and worse — it 
 struck a blow at the whole fabric of naval discipline 
 not only in the German but in every other Service, 
 including our own. Our officers saw more clearly 
 than did the then First Lord that no Naval Service 
 can remain efficient for a day if it be encouraged 
 to discriminate between the several orders con- 
 veyed to it, and to claim for itself a moral right 
 to select what shall be obeyed and what dis- 
 obeyed. 
 
 Germany had no maritime traditions and a 
 scanty seafaring population to assist her. Her 
 seaboard upon the North Sea is a maze of shallows 
 and sandbanlvs, through which devious channels 
 leading to her naval and commercial bases are 
 kept open only by continuous dredging. God has 
 made Plymouth Sound, Spithead and the Firth of 
 Forth ; the Devil, it is alleged, has been responsible 
 for Scapa and the Pentland Firth in winter ; but 
 man, German man, has made the navigable mouths 
 of the Elbe, the Weser and the Ems. The Baltic 
 is an inland sea upon which the coasting trade had 
 for centuries been mainly in the hands of Scandin- 
 avians. Until late in the nineteenth century 
 Germany was one of the least maritime of all 
 nations ; almost at a leap she sprang into the 
 position of one of the greatest. It is said that 
 peoples get the governments which they deserve ;
 
 THE COMING OF WAR 47 
 
 it is certainly true that when peoples are blind 
 their governments shut their eyes. In the Country 
 of the Blind the one-eyed man is not King ; he is 
 flung out for having the impertinence to pretend 
 to see. In a state of blindness or of careless 
 indifference we made Germany a present of Heligo- 
 land in 1890. It looked a poor thing, a crumbling 
 bit of waste ro^^.k, and when the Kaiser asked for 
 it he received tne gift almost without discussion. 
 Both our Govermnent and Court at that time 
 were almost rabidly pro-German. We all cherished 
 so much suspicion of France and Russia that we 
 had none left to spare for Germany. Heligoland 
 was then of no great use to us, but it was of in- 
 calculable value to our future enemies. A German 
 Heligoland fortified, equipped with airship sheds 
 and long-distance wireless, a shelter for submarines, 
 was to the new German Navy only second in 
 value to the Kiel Canal. Islands do not " com- 
 mand " anything beyond range of their guns, 
 especially when they have no harbours ; but 
 Heligoland, though it in no sense commanded the 
 approach to the German bases, was an invaluable 
 outpost and observation station. It is a little 
 island of crumbling red rock, preserved only by 
 man's labour from vanishing into the sea ; it is 
 a mile long and less than one- third of a mile wide ; 
 it is 28 miles from the nearest mainland. Yet 
 when we gave to Germany this scrap of wasting 
 rock, we gave her the equivalent in naval value 
 of a fleet. We secured her North Sea bases 
 from our sudden attacks, and we gave her an 
 observation station from which she could direct 
 attacks against ourselves. 
 Heligoland, a free gift from us, was the first
 
 48 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 asset, a most valuable asset, which Germany was 
 able to place to the credit side of her naval balance 
 sheet. Other assets were rapidly acquired. In 
 1898 the building of the new navy seriously began, 
 in 1900 was passed the famous German Navy 
 Law setting forth a continuous programme of 
 expansion, the back alley between the North Sea 
 and the Baltic was cut through the isthmus of 
 Schleswig-Holstein, and Germany as a Sea Power 
 rose into being. The British people, at first 
 amused and slightly contemptuous, became 
 alarmed and the Royal Navy, always watchful, 
 never boastful, never undervaluing any possible 
 opponent, settled down to deal in its own supremely 
 efficient fashion with the German Menace. 
 
 Neither the British people nor the Royal Navy 
 were lacking in confidence in themselves, but 
 neither the people nor the Navy — we are, perhaps, 
 the least analytical race on earth — realised the 
 immovable foundation upon which their confidence 
 was based. The people were wise; they simply 
 trusted to the Navy and gave to it whatever it 
 asked. But the Navy, though fully alive to the 
 value of its own traditions, training, and centuries- 
 old skill, did not fully understand that the source 
 of its own immense striking force was moral rather 
 than material. J. ike its critics it thought over 
 much in machines, and when it saw across the 
 North Sea the outpouring of ships and guns and 
 men which Germany called her Navy, it became 
 not a little anxious about the result of a sudden 
 unforeseen collision. It was, if anything, over 
 anxious. 
 
 But while this is true of the Navy as a whole, 
 it is not true of the higher naval command. Away
 
 THE COMING OF WAR 49 
 
 hidden in Whitehall, immersed in the study of 
 problems for which the data were known and 
 from which no secrets were hid, sat those who had 
 taken the measure of the German efforts and 
 gauged the value of them more justly than could 
 the Germans themselves. They, the silent ones, 
 — w^ho never talked to representatives of the Press 
 or inspired articles in the newspapers — knew that 
 the German ships, especially the all-big-gun ships, 
 generically but rather misleadingly called " Dread- 
 noughts," were in nearly every class inferior copies 
 of our own ships of two or three years earlier. 
 The Royal Navy designed and built the first 
 Dreadnought at Portsmouth in fifteen months, 
 and preserved so rigid a secrecy about her details 
 that she was a " mystery ship " till actually in 
 commission. This lead of fifteen months, so skil- 
 fully and silently acquired, became in practice 
 three years, for it reduced to waste paper all the 
 German designs. The first Dreadnought was 
 commissioned by us on December 11th, 1906 ; 
 it was not until May 3rd, 1910, that the Germans 
 put into service the first Nassaus, which were 
 inferior copies. Our lead gained in 1906 was 
 more than maintained, and each batch of German 
 designs showed that step by step they had to 
 wait upon us to reveal to them the path of naval 
 progress. With us the upward rush was extra- 
 ordinarily rapid ; with the Germans it was slow 
 and halting— they were slow to grasp what we 
 were about and were then slow to interpret in 
 steel those of our intentions which they were able 
 to discern. Once our Navy had adopted the 
 revolutionary idea of the all-big-gun ship— the 
 design was perhaps an evolution rather than a
 
 60 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 revolution— ita constructors and designers de- 
 veloped the principle with the most astonishing 
 rapidity. The original Dreadnought was out of 
 date in the designers' ininds within a year of her 
 completion. After two or three years she was what 
 the Americans call " a back number/' and when 
 the War broke out we had in hand — some of 
 them nearly completed — the great class of Queen 
 Elizabeths with 25 knots of speed and eight 15-inch 
 guns, vessels as superior to the first Dreadnought 
 in fighting force as she was herself superior to 
 the light German battleships which her appearance 
 cast upon the scrap heap. And Germany, in 
 spite of her patient efforts, her system of espionage 
 — which rarely seemed to discover anything of 
 real importance — and her outpouring of gold, 
 had even then as her best battleships vessels little 
 better than our first Dreadnought. It is scarcely 
 an exaggeration to say that the five Queen Eliza- 
 beths and the five Royal Sovereigns which we put 
 into commission during the war, equipped with 
 eighty 15-inch guns, could have taken on with 
 ease the whole of the German battle fleet as it 
 existed in August 1914. Up to the outbreak of 
 war, at each stage in the race for weight of guns, 
 power and speed, Britain remained fully two 
 years ahead of Germany in quality and a great 
 deal more than two years ahead in magnitude of 
 output. During the war, as I will show later on, 
 the British lead w^as prodigiously increased and 
 accelerated. 
 
 In its inmost heart, and especially in the heart 
 of the higher command, the Koyal Navy knew 
 that German designers of big ships were but pale 
 copyists of their own, and that the shipyards of
 
 THE COMING OF WAR 51 
 
 Danzig, and Stettin and Hamburg could not 
 compete in speed or in quantity with its own 
 yards and those of its contractors in England 
 and Scotland. And yet knowing these things, 
 there was an undercurrent of anxiety ever present 
 both in the Navy and in those circles within its 
 sphere of influence. It seemed to some anxious 
 minds — especially of civilian naval students — that 
 what was known could not be the whole truth, and 
 that the Germans — belief in whose ingenuity and 
 resources had become an obsession with many 
 people — must have some wonderful unknown ships 
 and still more wonderful guns hidden in the deep 
 recesses behind the Frisian sandbanks. In those 
 days, a year or two before August 1914, men who 
 ought to have known better would talk gravely of 
 secret shipyards where stupendous vessels were 
 under construction, and of secret gunshops where 
 the superhuman Krupps were at work upon de- 
 signs which would change the destinies of nations. 
 Anyone who has ever seen a battleship upon a 
 building slip, and knows how few are the slips 
 which can accommodate them and how few are 
 the builders competent to make them, and how 
 few can build the great guns and gun mountings, 
 will smile at the idea of secret yards and secret 
 construction. Details may be kept secret, as 
 with the first Dreadnought and with many of our 
 super-battleships, but the main dimensions and 
 purpose of a design are glaringly conspicuous to 
 the eyes of the Koyal Navy's Intelligence Service. 
 One might as well try to hide a Zeppelin as a 
 battleship. 
 
 As with ships so with guns. I will deal in 
 another chapter with the Navy's belief, fully
 
 52 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 justified in action, in the bigger gun— the straight 
 shooting, hard hitting naval gun of ever- expanding 
 calibre— and in the higher speed of ships which 
 enables the bigger gun to be used at its most 
 effective range. There was nothing new in this 
 belief ; it was the ripe fruit of all naval experience. 
 Speed without hitting power is of little use in the 
 battle line ; hitting power without speed gives 
 to an enemy the advantage of manoeuvre and 
 of escape ; but speed and hitting power, both 
 greater than those of an enemy, spell certain 
 annihilation for him. He can neither fight nor 
 run away. Given sufficient light and sea room 
 for a fight to the finish, he must be destroyed. 
 The North Sea deadlock is due to lack of room. 
 
 Our guns developed in size and in power as 
 rapidly as did our great ships in the capacity to 
 carry and use them. Krupps have a very famous 
 name, made famous beyond their merits by the 
 extravagant adulation which for years past has 
 been poured upon them in our own country by 
 our own people. The Germans are a race of 
 egotists, but they have never exalted themselves, 
 and everything that is German, to the utterly 
 absurd heights to which many fearful Englishmen 
 have exalted them in England. Krupps have 
 been bowed down to and almost worshipped as 
 the Gods of Terror. Their supreme capacity for 
 inventing and constructing the best possible guns 
 has been taken as proved beyond the need of demon- 
 stration. But Krupps were not and are not super- 
 men ; they have had to learn their trade like 
 more humble folk, and naval gun-making is not a 
 trade which can be taken up one day and made 
 perfect on the next. Krupps are good gun-
 
 THE COMING OF WAR 53 
 
 makers, but our own naval gunsliops have for 
 years outclassed them at every point — in design, 
 in size, in power, in quality, and in speed of 
 production. The long wire-wound naval gun, a 
 miracle of patient workmanship, is British not 
 German. While Krupps were labouring to make 
 11 -inch guns which would shoot straight and not 
 " droop " at the muzzle, our Navy was designing 
 and making 12-inch and 13"5-inch weapons of 
 far greater power and accuracy ; when Krupps 
 had at last achieved good 12-inch guns, we were 
 turning out rapidly 15-inch weapons of equal 
 precision and far greater power. In naval guns 
 Krupps lag far behind us. And even in land 
 guns — well, the huge siege howitzers which bat- 
 tered Liege and Namur into powder, came not 
 from Essen but from the Austrian Skoda Works at 
 Pilsen ! And among field guns, the best of the 
 best by universal acclaim is the French Soizante 
 Quinze, in design and workmanship entirely the 
 product of French artistic skill. War is a sad 
 leveller, and it has not been very kind to Krupps. 
 
 Collectively, the Navy is a fount of serene 
 knowledge and wisdom, and has been fully con- 
 scious of its superiority in men, in ships, and in 
 guns, but individual naval officers afloat or ashore 
 are not always either learned or wise. Foolish 
 things were thought and said in 1913 and in 1914, 
 which one can now recall with a smile and charitably 
 endeavour to forget. 
 
 The Royal Navy was, and is, as superior to 
 that of Germany in officers and men as in ships 
 and in guns. Indeed the one is the direct and 
 inevitable consequence of the other. Ships and 
 guns are not imposed upon the Navy by some
 
 54 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 outside intelligence ; they are secretions from 
 tlie brains and experience and traditions of the 
 Service itself ; they are the expressions in ma- 
 chinery of its Soul. One always comes back to 
 this fundamental fact when making any comparison 
 of relative values in men or in machines. It 
 was the Navy's Soul which conceived and made 
 ready the ships and the guns. The officers and 
 men are the temporary embodiment of that 
 immortal Soul ; it is preserved and developed in 
 them, and through them is passed on to succeeding 
 generations in the Service. 
 
 Though the German Navy had not had time 
 or opportunity to evolve within itself that dominant 
 moral force which I have called a naval Soul, it 
 contained both offices and men of notable fighting 
 quality and efliciency. The Royal Navy no 
 more under-rated the personality of its German 
 opponents than it under-rated their ships and 
 their guns. We English, though in foreign eyes 
 we may appear to be self-satisfied, even bump- 
 tious, are at heart rather diffident. No nation 
 on earth publicly depreciates itself as we do ; no 
 nation is so willing to proclaim its own weaknesses 
 and follies and crimes. Much of this self-depre- 
 ciation is mere humbug, little more sincere than 
 our confession on Sunday that we are " miserable 
 sinners," but much of it is the result of our native 
 diffidence. No Scotsman was ever mistrustful of 
 himself or of his race, but very many Englishmen 
 quite genuinely are. And the Navy being, as it 
 always has been, English of the English, tends 
 to be modest, even diffident. It is always learning, 
 always testing itself, always seeking after improve- 
 ment ; it realises out of the fullness of its ex-
 
 THE COMING OF WAR 55 
 
 perience how much still remains to be learned, 
 and becomes inevitably diffident of its very great 
 knowledge and skill. No man is so modest as 
 the genuine unchallengeable expert. 
 
 If one cannot improvise ships and guns of the 
 highest quality by an exercise of the Imperial will, 
 still less can one improvise the officers and men 
 who have to man and use them. But Germany 
 tried to do both. The German Navy could not 
 secrete its ships and guns for there was no consider- 
 able German navy a score of years ago ; the 
 machines were designed and provided for it by 
 Vulkan and Schichau and Krupps, and the per- 
 sonnel to fight them had to be collected and trained 
 from out of the best available material. The 
 officers were largely drawn from Prussian families 
 which for generations had served in the Army, and 
 had in their blood that sense of discipline and 
 warlike fervour which are invaluable in the leaders 
 of any fighting force. But they had in them also 
 the ruthless temper of the German Army, which 
 we have seen revealed in its frightful worst in 
 Belgium, Serbia and Poland ; they knew nothing 
 of that kindly chivalrous spirit which is born out 
 of the wide salt womb of the Sea Mother. Many 
 of these officers, though lacking in the Sea Spirit, 
 were highly competent at their work. Von Spec's 
 Pacific Squadron, which beat Cradock off Coronel 
 and was a little later annihilated by Sturdee off 
 the Falkland Islands, was, officer for officer and 
 man for man, almost as good as our best. The 
 German Pacffic Squadron was nearer the realisa- 
 tion of the naval Soul than was any other part 
 of the German Navy. Admiral von Spec was a 
 gallant and chivalrous gentleman, and the captain 
 5
 
 56 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 of the Emden, ingenious, gay, humorous, unspoiled 
 in success and undaunted in defeat, was as English 
 in spirit as he was unlike most of his compatriots 
 in sentiment. The Navy and the public at home 
 were right when they acclaimed von Spee and 
 von Miiller as seamen worthy to rank with their 
 own Service. 
 
 The German Pacific squadron, being on foreign 
 service, had not only picked officers of outstanding 
 merit, but also long- service crews of unpressed 
 men. It was, therefore, in organisation and 
 personnel much more akin to our Navy than was 
 the High Seas Fleet at home in which the men 
 were for the most part conscripts on short service 
 (three years) from the Baltic, Elbe and inland 
 provinces. In our Service the sailors and marines 
 join for twenty-one years, and in actual practice 
 frequently serve very much longer. They begin 
 as children in training-ships and in the schools 
 attached to Marine barracks, and often continue 
 in middle life as grave men in the petty and 
 warrant officer ranks. The Naval Service is the 
 work of their lives just as it is with the com- 
 missioned officers. But in the German High 
 Seas Fleet, with its three years of forced service, 
 a man was no sooner half-trained than his time 
 was up and he gladly made way for a raw recruit. 
 The German crews were not of the Sea nor of the 
 Service. During the war, no doubt, they became 
 better trained. The experienced seamen were 
 not discharged and the general level of skill rose ; 
 the best were passed into the submarines which 
 alone of the Fleet were continuously at work on 
 the sea. In our own Navy, in consequence of 
 the very great increase in the number of ships,
 
 THE COMING OF WAR 57 
 
 both large and small, the professional sailors had 
 to be diluted by the calling- up of Naval Eeservists, 
 and by the expansion of the Royal Naval Volunteer 
 Reserve. But unlike Germany we had, fortunately 
 for ourselves, an almost limitless maritime popu- 
 lation from which to draw the new naval elements. 
 Fishermen at the call of their country flocked into 
 the perilous service of mine sweeping and patrol- 
 ling, young men from the seaports readily joined 
 the Volunteer detachments in training for the 
 great ships, dilution was carried on deftly and with 
 so clear a judgment that the general level of 
 efficiency all round was almost completely main- 
 tained. That this was possible is not so remark- 
 able as it sounds. The Royal Navy of the fighting 
 ships, even after the war expansion, remained a 
 very small select service of carefully chosen men. 
 Half of its personnel was professional and per- 
 fectly trained, the second and new half was so 
 mingled and stirred up with the first that the 
 professional leaven permeated the whole mass. 
 The Army which desired millions had to take what 
 it could get ; but the Navy, which counts its men 
 in tens of thousands only, could pick and choose 
 of the best. In the Army the old Regulars were 
 either killed or swamped under the flood of new 
 entrants ; in the Navy the professionals remained 
 always predominant. It was very characteristic 
 of the proud exclusiveness of our Royal Navy, 
 very characteristic of its haughty Soul, that the 
 teraporary officers were allotted rank marks which 
 distinguished them at a glance, even of civilian 
 eyes, from the regular Service. 
 
 Though, as events proved, the Royal Navy need 
 have felt little anxiety about the result of a fair 
 
 j: 
 
 1
 
 68 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 trial of strength with its German opponents, there 
 was one ever-present justification for that deeper 
 apprehension with which the Navy in peace 
 regarded an outbreak of war. It really was feared 
 lest our Government should leave to the Germans 
 the moment for beginning hostilities. It was 
 feared lest while politicians were waiting and seeing 
 the Germans would strike suddenly at their 
 ** selected moment/' and by a well-planned torpedo 
 and submarine attack in time of supposed peace, 
 would put themselves in a position of substantial 
 advantage. There was undoubted ground for this 
 fear. The German Government has not, and never 
 has had, any scruples ; it has no moral standards ; 
 if before a declaration of war it could have struck 
 hard and successfully at our Fleets it would have 
 seized the opportunity without hesitation. And 
 realising this with the clarity of vision which 
 distinguishes the Sea Service, the Navy feared 
 lest its freedom of action should be fatally restricted 
 at the very moment when its hands needed to be 
 most free. 
 
 A distinguished naval captain — now an admiral 
 — once put the matter before me plainly from the 
 naval point of view : 
 
 " If the Germans secretly mobilise at a moment 
 when a third of our big ships are out of com- 
 mission or are under repair, they may not only 
 by a sudden torpedo attack cripple our battle 
 squadrons, but may open the seas to their own 
 cruisers and submarines. We might, possibly 
 should, recover in time to deal with an invasion, 
 but in the meantime our overseas trade, on which 
 you people depend at home for food and raw 
 materials, would have been destroyed. And until
 
 THE COMING OF WAR 59 
 
 we had fully recovered, not a man or a gun could 
 be sent over sea to help France/' 
 
 " Surely we should have some warning," I 
 obj ected. 
 
 " You won't get it from Germany," said he 
 gravely. " The little old man (Roberts) is right. 
 Germany will strike when Germany's hour has 
 struck. If we are ready she will have no chance 
 at all and knows it ; she will not give us a chance 
 to be ready. When she wants to cover a secret 
 mobilisation she will invite parties of journalists, 
 or provincial mayors, or village greengrocers to 
 visit Berlin and to see for themselves how peaceful 
 her intentions are \ " 
 
 That is how the Navy felt and talked during 
 the months immediately before the War, and who 
 shall say that their apprehensions were not well 
 founded ? What it feared was unquestionably 
 possible, even probable. But happily for the 
 Navy, and for these Islands and the Empire which 
 it guards, those whom the gods seek to destroy 
 they first drive mad. The wisdom of Germany's 
 rulers was by all of us immensely over-rated. 
 They fell into the utter blindness of unimaginative 
 stupidity. They understood us so little that they 
 thought us sure to desert our friends rather than 
 risk the paint upon our ships and the skins upon 
 our fat and slothful bodies. They watched us 
 quarrelling among ourselves, talking savagely of 
 fighting one another in Ireland — we went on 
 doing these things until July 28th, 1914, four days 
 before Germany attacked Belgium !— and failed 
 to realise that the ancient fighting spirit was as 
 strong in us as ever, however much it might seem 
 to be smothered under the rubbish of politics and 
 
 /
 
 60 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 social luxury. And meanwhile, during those in- 
 tensely critical weeks of July, while Parliament 
 chattered about Ulster and politicians looked 
 hungrily for the soft spots in one another's throats, 
 the Royal Navy was quietly, unostentatiously 
 preparing for war. What the Navy then did, — 
 moving in all things with its own silent, serene, 
 masterful efficiency and grimly thanking God for 
 the dense political gas clouds behind which it 
 could conceal its movements from the enemy, — 
 saved not only Great Britain and the Empire ; 
 it saved the civilisation of the world. 
 
 Blindly Germany went on with her preparations 
 for war against France and Russia, including in 
 the programme the swallowing up of little Belgium, 
 and left us wholly out of her calculations. The 
 German battle Fleet, which had been engaged 
 in peace manoeuvres, was cruising off the Norwegian 
 coast. Grand Admiral Von Tirpitz had never 
 expected us to intervene, and no naval preparations 
 were made. The Germans were in no position to 
 interfere with our disposition, or to move their 
 cruisers upon our trade communications. But all 
 through those later days of imminent crisis the 
 English First Fleet lay mobilised at Portland, 
 whither it had moved from Spithead, until one 
 night it slipped silently away and disappeared into 
 the northern mists. The Second and 'Ihird Fleets 
 had been filled up and were completely ready for 
 war in the early summer dawn of August 3rd. 
 The big ships rushed to their war stations stretch- 
 ing from the Thames to the Orkneys and com- 
 manding both outlets from the North Sea ; the 
 destroyers and submarines swarmed in the Channel 
 and off the sand-locked German bases. The hour
 
 THE COMING OF WAR 61 
 
 had struck, everything had been done exactly as 
 had been planned. The German Fleet crept into 
 safety through the back door of the Kattegat and 
 Kiel, and on the evening of August 4th, the British 
 Government declared war. 
 
 Germany who thought to catch the Navy asleep 
 was herself caught. She had never believed that 
 we either would or could fight for the integrity of 
 Belgium. She went on blindly in her appointed 
 way until suddenly her sight returned in a flash 
 of bitter realisation that the Royal Navy, without 
 firing a single shot, had won the first tremendous 
 decisive, irreparable battle in the coming world's 
 war. Her chance of success at sea had disappeared 
 for ever. Before her lay a long cruel dragging 
 fight with the seas closed to her merchant ships 
 and her whole Empire in a state of blockade. 
 No wonder that then, and since, Germany's fiercest 
 passion of hate has been directed against us, and 
 above all against that Royal Navy which shields 
 us and strikes for us. Before a shot had been 
 fired she saw herself outwitted, outmanoeuvred, 
 outfought. " Gott strafe England ! "
 
 CHAPTEE III 
 
 THE GREAT VICTORY 
 
 In naval warfare there are many actions but few 
 battles. An action is any engagement between 
 war vessels of any size, but a battle is a contest 
 between ships of the battle-line— sometimes called 
 " capital ships " upon the result of which de- 
 pends the vital issues of a war. During the whole 
 of the long contest with Napoleon, there were only 
 two battles of this decisive kind — the Nile and 
 Trafalgar. 
 
 And although the fighting by sea and land 
 went on for ten years after Trafalgar had given 
 to us the supreme control of the world's seas, 
 there were no more naval battles. Battles at 
 sea are very rare because, when fought out, they 
 are so crushingly decisive. This characteristic 
 feature of the great naval battle has been greatly 
 emphasised by modern conditions. Upon land 
 armies have outgrown the very earth itself ; fight- 
 ing frontiers have become lines of trenches ; battles 
 have become the mere swaying of these trench 
 lines — a ripple here or there mark's a success or 
 failure — but the lines re-formed remain. Even 
 after weeks or months of fighting, if the lines 
 remain unbroken, neither side has reached a 
 decision. War upon land between great forces is 
 a long drawn-out agony of attrition. 
 
 62
 
 THE GREAT VICTORY 63 
 
 But while battles upon land have become much 
 less decisive than in the simpler days of small 
 armies and feeble weapons, fighting upon the 
 sea has become much quicker, much more crush- 
 ingly final, in its effects and results than in the 
 days of our grandfathers. Speed and gun power 
 are now everything. The faster and more power- 
 ful fleet — more powerful in its capacity for dealing 
 accurate and destructive blows — can annihilate 
 its enemy completely within the brief hours of a 
 single day. The more powerful and faster his 
 ships the less will the victor himself suffer. Only 
 under one condition can a defeated fleet escape 
 annihilation, and that is when the lack of light or 
 of sea room snatches from the victor a final de- 
 cision. If an enemy can get away under shelter 
 of his shore fortifications, or within the protection 
 of his mine-fields, he can defy pursuit ; but if 
 there be ample room and daylight Speed and Power 
 wielded by men such as ours, will prevail with 
 absolute mathematical certainty — the losers will 
 be sunk, the victors will, by comparison, be little 
 damaged. Every considerable engagement during 
 the war has added convincing proof to the con- 
 clusions which our Navy drew from the decisive 
 battle in the Sea of Tsushima betw^een the Japanese 
 and the Russians, and the not less decisive action 
 upon a smaller scale in which the Americans 
 destroyed the Spanish squadron off Santiago, Cuba. 
 In both cases the losers were destroyed while the 
 victors suffered little hurt. These outstanding 
 lessons were not lost upon the Royal Navy, its 
 officers had themselves seen both fights, and so 
 in its silent way the Navy pressed upon its course 
 always seeking after more speed, more gun power,
 
 64 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 and above all more numbers. " Only numbers 
 can annihilate," said Napoleon, and what the 
 Emperor declared to be true of land fighting is 
 the more true of fighting by sea. Only numbers 
 can annihilate. 
 
 Upon the evening of August 4th, 1914, I was 
 sitting in a London office beside a ticking tape 
 machine awaiting the message that the Germans 
 had declined our ultimatum to withdraw from 
 Belgium, and that war had been declared. " There 
 will be a big sea battle this evening," observed my 
 companion. " There has been a big battle,'* 
 observed I, " but it is now over." Although he 
 and I used similar language we attached to the 
 words very ditierent meanings. He thought, as 
 the bulk of the British people thought at that 
 time, that the British and German battle fleets 
 would meet and fight off the Frisian Islands. But 
 I meant, and felt sure, that the last thing our 
 Grand Fleet desired was to fight in restricted and 
 dangerous waters, amid the perils of mines and 
 submarines, when it had already won the greatest 
 fight of the war without firing a shot or risking a 
 single ship or man. There had been no ** battle " 
 in the popular sense, but there had in fact been 
 achieved a tremendous decisive victory which 
 through all the long months to follow would 
 dominate the whole war by sea and by land. Our 
 great battleships were at that moment cruising 
 between Scapa Flow in the Orkneys and the 
 Cromarty Firth on the north-eastern shores of 
 Scotland. Our fastest battle cruisers were in the 
 Firth of Forth together with many of the better 
 pre-Dreadnought battleships which, though too 
 slow for a fleet action, had heavy batteries available
 
 THE GREAT VICTORY 66 
 
 for a close fight in narrow waters. Many other 
 older and slower battleships and cruisers were in 
 the Thames. The narrow Straits of Dover were 
 thickly patrolled by destroyers and submarines, 
 and more submarines and destroyers were on 
 waj;ch off the mouths of the Weser, the Jade, the 
 Elbe and the Ems. Light cruisers hovered still 
 farther to the north where the Skagerrak opens 
 between Denmark and the Norwegian coast. The 
 North Sea had become a mare clausum — no longer, 
 as the mapmakers term it, a German Ocean, but 
 one which at a single stroke had become over- 
 whelmingly British. 
 
 Take a map of the North Sea and consider with 
 me for a moment the relative strengths and dis- 
 positions of the opposing battle fleets. There 
 was nothing complicated or super-subtle about 
 the Royal Navy's plans ; on the contrary they 
 had that beautiful compelling simplicity which is 
 the characteristic feature of all really great designs 
 whether in war or in peace. 
 
 There are two outlets to the North Sea, one wide 
 to the north and west beyond the Shetlands, the 
 other narrow and shallow to the south-west through 
 the Straits of Dover. The Straits are only twenty- 
 one miles wide ; opposite the north of Scotland 
 the Sea is 300 miles wide. But before German 
 battleships or cruisers could get away towards 
 the wide north-western outlet beyond the Shet- 
 lands they would have to steam some 400 miles 
 north of B.eligoland. Except for the Pacific 
 Squadron based upon Tsing-tau in the Far East 
 and cruising upon the east and west coasts of 
 Mexico, all the fleets of our enemy were at his 
 North Sea ports or in the Baltic — a land-locked
 
 66 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 sheet of water which for the moment is out of our 
 picture. From Heligoland to Scapa Flow in the 
 Orkneys — where Admiral Jellicoe had his head- 
 quarters and where he had under his hand twenty- 
 two of our most powerful battleships — is less than 
 550 miles. Jellicoe had also with him large 
 numbers of armoured and light cruisers. In the 
 Firth of Forth, less than 500 miles from Hehgo- 
 land, Admiral Beatty had five of the fastest and 
 most powerful battle cruisers afloat and great 
 quantities of lighter cruisers and destroyers. In 
 the Thames, about 350 miles from Heligoland, 
 lay most of our slower and less powerful pre- 
 Dreadnought battleships and cruisers, vessels of 
 a past generation in naval construction, but in 
 their huge numbers and collective armaments a 
 very formidable force to encounter in the narrow 
 waters of the Straits of Dover. 
 
 Three possible courses of action lay before the 
 German Naval StafT. They had at their disposal 
 eighteen battleships and battle cruisers built 
 since the first Dreadnought revolutionised the 
 battle line, but, as I have already pointed out, 
 these vessels, class for class and gun for gun, were 
 lighter, slower, and less well armed than were the 
 twenty-seven great war vessels at the disposal 
 of Jellicoe and Beatty. The Germans could have 
 tried to break away to the north with their whole 
 battle fleet, escorting all their lighter cruisers, in 
 the hope that while the battle fleets were engaged 
 the cruisers might escape round the north of Scot- 
 land, and get upon our trade routes in the Atlantic. 
 That was their first possible line of action — a 
 desperate one, since Jellicoe and Beatty with 
 much stronger forces lay upon the flank of their
 
 Scale of Miles 
 
 :.o lO'j 
 
 THE NORTH SEA. 
 
 200 
 
 66]
 
 THE GREAT VICTORY 67 
 
 course to the north, and the preponderating strength 
 and swiftness of our light and heavy cruisers would 
 have meant, in all human probability, not only 
 the utter destruction of the enemy's battle fleet 
 but also the wiping out of his would-be raiders. 
 Our cruisers could have closed the passages between 
 the Orkneys and Iceland long before the Germans 
 could have reached them. This first heroic dash 
 for the free spaces of the outer seas would have 
 been so eminently gratifying to us that it is scarcely 
 surprising that the Germans denied us its blissful 
 realisation. 
 
 The second possible course, apparently less 
 heroic but in its ultimate results probably as 
 completely destructive for the enemy as the first 
 course, would have been to bear south-west, hugging 
 the shallows as closely as might be possible, and 
 to endeavour to break a way through the Straits 
 of Dover and the English Channel. From H.eligo- 
 land to the Straits is over 350 miles, and we should 
 have known all about the German dash long 
 before they could have reached the Narrows. 
 Those Narrow Seas are like the neck of a bottle 
 which would have been corked most effectually 
 by our serried masses of pre-Dreadnought battle- 
 ships and cruisers interspersed by swarming hun- 
 dreds of submarines and destroyers with their 
 vicious torpedo stings. We can quite understand 
 how the Germans, who had read Sir Percy Scott's 
 observations of a month or two before on the 
 deadliness of submarines in narrow waters, liked 
 a dash for the Straits as little as they relished 
 a battle with Jellicoe and Beatty in the far north, 
 more especially as their line of retreat would have 
 been cut off by the descent from their northern
 
 68 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 fastnesses of our battle fleets. Not then, nor a 
 week or two later when we were passing our 
 Expeditionary Force across the Channel, did the 
 Germans attempt to break through the Straits 
 and cut us oft' from our Allies the French. 
 
 The third course was the one which the Germans 
 in fact took. It was the famous course of Brer 
 Rabbit, to lie low and say nuffin', and to wait for 
 happier times when perchance the raids of their 
 own submarines, and our losses from mines, might 
 so far diminish our fighting strength as to permit 
 them to risk a Battle of the Giants with some 
 little prospect of success. And in adopting this 
 waiting policy they did what we least desired and 
 what, therefore, was the safest for them and most 
 embarrassing for us. Never at any time did we 
 attempt to prevent the German battle fleets from 
 coming out. We no more blockaded them than 
 Nelson a hundred years earlier blockaded the 
 French af Toulon and Brest. We maintained, 
 as Nelson did, a perpetual unsleeping watch on 
 the enemy's movements, but our desire always 
 was the same as Nelson's — to let the enemy come 
 out far enough to give us space and time within 
 which to compass his complete and final destruc- 
 tion. 
 
 Although the Germans, by adopting a waiting 
 policy, prevented the Royal Navy from fulfilling 
 its first duty — the seeking out and destruction of 
 an enemy's fighting fleets— their inaction em- 
 phasised the completeness of the Victory of Brains 
 and Soul which the Navy had won during those 
 few days before the outbreak of war. It was 
 because our mobilisation had been so prompt and 
 complete, it was because the disposition of our
 
 THE GREAT VICTORY 09 
 
 fleets had been so perfectly conceived, that the 
 Germans dared not risk a battle with us in the 
 open and were unable to send out their cruisers 
 to cut off our trading ships and to break our 
 communications with France. Although the 
 enemy's fleets had not been destroyed, they had 
 been rendered very largely impotent. We held, 
 more completely than we did even after the crown- 
 ing mercy of Trafalgar, the command of the seas 
 of the world. The first great battle was blood- 
 less but complete, it had won for us and for the 
 civilised world a very great victory, and the 
 Royal Navy had never in its long history more 
 fully realised and revealed its tremendous uncon- 
 querable Soul. 
 
 It may be of some little interest, now that the 
 veil of secrecy can be partly raised, to describe 
 the opposing battle fleets upon which rested the 
 decision of victory or defeat. Before the war it 
 had become the habit of many critics, both naval 
 and civilian, to exalt the striking power of the 
 torpedo craft — both destroyers and submarines — 
 and to talk of the great battleship as an obsolete 
 monster, as some vast Mammoth at the mercy of 
 a wasp with a poison sting. But the war has 
 shown that the Navy was right to hold to the deep 
 beliefs, the outcome of all past experience, that 
 supremacy in the battle line means supremacy in 
 Sea Control. The smaller vessels, cruisers, and 
 mosquito craft, are vitally necessary for their 
 several roles, — without them the great ships cannot 
 carry out a commercial blockade, cannot protect 
 trade or transports, cannot conduct those hundreds
 
 70 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 of operations both of ofTence and defence which 
 fall within the duties of a complete Navy. But 
 the ultimate decision rests with the Battle Fleets. 
 They are the Fount of Power. While they are 
 supreme, the seas are free to the smaller active 
 vessels ; without such supremacy, the seas are 
 closed to all craft, except to submarines and, as 
 events have proved, to a large extent even to those 
 under-water wasps. 
 
 In August, 1914, our Battle Fleets available 
 for the North Sea — and at the moment of supreme 
 test no vessels, however powerful, which were 
 not on the spot were of any account at all — were 
 not at their full strength. The battleships were 
 all at home— the ten Dreadnoughts, each with 
 ten 12-inch guns, the four Orions, the four 
 K.G.V.s and the four Iron Dukes, each with their 
 ten 13-5-inch guns far more powerful thari the 
 earlier Dreadnoughts,— and were all fully mobilised 
 by August 3rd. But of our nine fast and invaluable 
 battle cruisers as many as four were far away. 
 The Australia was at the other side of the globe, 
 and three others had a short time before been 
 despatched to the Mediterranean. Beatty had 
 the Lion, Queen Mary, and Princess Royal, each 
 with eight 13-5-inch guns and twenty-nine knots 
 of speed, in addition to the New Zealand, and In- 
 vincible each with eight 12-inch guns. The First 
 Lord of the Admiralty announced quite correctly 
 that we had mobilised thirty- one ships of the 
 battle line, but actually in the North Sea at their 
 war stations upon that fateful evening of August 
 4th- which now seems so long ago— Jellicoe and 
 Beatty had twenty-seven only of first line ships. 
 They were enough as it proved, but one rather
 
 THE GREAT VICTORY 71 
 
 grudged at that time, those three in the Medi- 
 terranean and the Australia at the Antipodes. 
 Had there been a battle of the Giants we should 
 have needed them all, for only numbers can 
 annihilate. Jeliicoe had, in addition to those 
 which I have reckoned, the Lord Nelson and 
 Agamemnon — pre-Dreadnoughts, each with four 
 12-inch guns and ten 9 •2-inch guns — useful ships 
 but not of the first battle line. 
 
 Opposed to our twenty- seven available monsters 
 the Germans had under their hands eighteen com- 
 pleted vessels of their first line. I do not count 
 in this select company the armoured cruiser 
 Bliicher, with her twelve 8-inch guns, which was 
 sunk later on in the Dogger Bank action by the 
 ]3'5-inch weapons of Beatty's great cruisers. 
 Neither do I count the fine cruiser Goeben, a fast 
 vessel with ten 11 -inch guns vv^hich, like our three 
 absent battle cruisers, was in the Mediterranean. 
 The Goeben escaped later to the Dardanelles and 
 ceased to be on the North Sea roll of the German 
 High Seas Fleet. 
 
 Germany had, then, eighteen battleships and 
 battle cruisers, and had it been known to the 
 public that our apparent superiority in available 
 numbers was only 50 per cent, in the North Sea, 
 many good people might have trembled for the 
 safety of their homes and for the honour of their 
 wives and daughters. But luckily they did not 
 know, for they could with difficulty have been 
 brought to understand that naval superiority 
 rests more in speed and in quality and in striking 
 power than in the mere numbers of ships. When 
 I have said that numbers only can annihilate, 
 I mean, of course, numbers of equal or superior 
 
 6
 
 72 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 ships. In quality of ships and especially of men, 
 in speed and in striking power, our twenty- seven 
 ships had fully double tiie strength of the eighteen 
 Germans who might have been opposed to them 
 in battle. None of our vessels carried anything 
 smaller— for battle— than 12-inch guns, and fifteen 
 of them bore within their turrets the new 13"5-inch 
 guns of which the weight of shell and destructive 
 power were more than 50 per cent, greater than 
 that of the earlier 12-inch weapons. On the 
 other hand, four of the German battleships (the 
 Nassau class) carried 11 -inch guns and were fully 
 two knots slower in speed than any of the British 
 first line. Three of their battle cruisers also had 
 11 -inch guns. While therefore we had guns of 
 12 and 13 "5 inches the Germans had nothing more 
 powerful to oppose to us than guns of 11 and 12 
 inches. Ship for ship the Germans were about 
 two knots slower than ourselves, so that we always 
 had the advantage of manoeuvre, the choosing of 
 the most elective range, and the power of pre- 
 venting by our higher speed the escape of a defeated 
 foe. had the Germans come north into the open 
 sea, we could have chosen absolutely, by virtue 
 of our greater speed, gun power and numbers, the 
 conditions under which an action should have 
 been fought and how it should have been brought 
 to a finish. 
 
 An inch or two in the bore of a naval gun, a few 
 feet more or less of length, may not seem much 
 to some of my readers. But they should remember 
 that the weight of a shell, and the weight of its 
 explosive charge, vary as the cube of its diameter, 
 A 12-inch shell is a third heavier than one of 
 11 inches, while a ISS-inch shell is more than
 
 THE GREAT VICTORY 73 
 
 one-half heavier than a 12-inch and twice as 
 heavy as one of 11 inches only. The power of the 
 bursting charge varies not as the weight, but as 
 the square of the weight of a shell. Ihe Germans 
 were very slow to learn the naval lesson of the 
 superiority of the bigger gun and the heavier 
 shell. It was not until after the Dogger Bank 
 action when Beatty's monstrous 13 "5 inch shells 
 broke in a terrible storm upon their lighter-armed 
 battle cruisers that the truth fully came home to 
 them. Had Jellicoe and Beatty fought the G erman 
 Fleet in the w^ide spaces of the upper North Sea 
 in August, 1914, we should have opposed a fighting 
 efficiency in power and weight of guns of more 
 than two to one. Rarely have the precious qualities 
 of insight and foresight been more strikingly 
 shown forth than in the superiority in ships, in 
 guns, and in men that the Royal Navy was able 
 to range against their German antagonists in those 
 early days of August, when the fortunes of the 
 Empire would have turned upon the chances of 
 a naval battle. In the long contest waged between 
 1900 and 1914, in the bloodless war of peace, the 
 spiritual force of the Navy had gained the victory ; 
 the enemy had been beaten, and knew it, and 
 thenceforward for many months, until the spring 
 of 1916, he abode in his tents. Whenever he did 
 venture forth it was not to give battle but to kill 
 some women, some babes, and then to scuttle 
 home to proclaim the dazzling triumph which 
 " Gott " had granted to his arms. 
 
 It may seem to many a fact most extraordinary 
 that in August, 1914, not one of our great ships
 
 74 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 of the first class — the so-called " super-Dread- 
 noughts " — upon which we depended for the 
 domination of the seas and the security of the 
 Empire, not one was more than three years old. 
 The four Orions — Orion, Conqueror, Thunderer 
 and Monarch — were completed in 1911 and 1912. 
 The four K.G. Yives— King George V, Centurion, 
 Ajax, and Audacious in 1912 and 1913 ; and the 
 four Iron Dukes— /row Duke, Marlborough, Em- 
 peror of India and Benhow — in 1914. All these 
 new battleships carried ten 13*5-inch gims and 
 had an effective speed of nearly 23 knots. The 
 super-battle cruisers — Lion, Queen Mary and Prin- 
 cess Royal — were completed in 1912, carried eight 
 13 •5-inch guns, and had a speed of over 29 knots. 
 Upon these fifteen ships, not one of which was 
 more than three years old, depended British Sea 
 Power. The Germans had nothing, when the war 
 broke out, which was comparable with these 
 fifteen splendid monsters. Their first line battle- 
 ships and battle cruisers completed in the corre- 
 sponding years, from 1911 to 1914 — their " opposite 
 numbers " as the Navy calls them — were not 
 superior in speed, design and power of guns to 
 our Dreadnought battleships and battle cruisers, 
 which had already passed into the second class, 
 and which, long before the war ended, had sunk 
 to the third class. But the newness and over- 
 whelming superiority of our true first line do not 
 surprise those who realise that these fifteen great 
 ships were the fine flower of our naval brains and 
 soul. The new Navy of the three years immedi- 
 ately preceding the war was simply the old Navy 
 writ large. As the need had arisen, so had the 
 Navy expanded to meet it. The designs for these
 
 THE GREAT VICTORY 75 
 
 fifteen ships did not fall down from Heaven ; they 
 were worked out in naval brains years before they 
 found their material expression in steel. The vast 
 ships issued forth upon the seas, crushingly superior 
 to anything which our enemy could put into com- 
 mission against us, because our naval brains were 
 superior to his and our naval Soul was to his as 
 a white glowing fiame to a tallow candle. In a 
 sentence, while Germany was laboriously copying 
 our Dreadnoughts we had cast their designs aside, 
 and were producing at a speed, with which he 
 could not compete, Orions, K.G. Fives, Iron Dukes 
 and Lions. 
 
 The North Sea, large as it may appear upon a 
 map, is all too small for the manoeuvres of swift 
 modern fleets. No part of that stretch of water 
 which lies south of the Dogger Bank — say, from 
 the Yorkshire coast to Jutland — is far enough 
 removed from the German bases to allow of a sure 
 and decisive fleet action. There was no possibility 
 here of a clean fight to a finish. An enemy might 
 be hammered severely, some of his vessels might 
 be sunk — Beatty showed the German battle 
 cruisers what we could do even in a stern chase 
 at full speed — but he could not be destroyed. 
 On the afternoon and night of May 31st^June 1st, 
 1916, the Grand Fleet had the enemy enveloped 
 and ripe for destruction, but were robbed of full 
 victory by mist and darkness and the lack of sea 
 room. Nelson spoke with the Soul of the Navy 
 when he declared that a battle was not won when 
 any enemy ship was enabled to escape destruction. 
 So while the divisions of the Grand Fleet, and
 
 76 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 especially the fastest battle cruisers of some 
 twenty-eight to twenty-nine knots speed (about 
 thirty-three miles per hour) neglected no oppor- 
 tunity to punish the enemy ships that might 
 venture forth, what every man from Jeliicoe to 
 the smallest ship boy really longed and prayed 
 for, was a brave ample battle in the deep wide 
 waters of the north. Here there was room for a 
 newer and greater Trafalgar, though even here the 
 sea was none too spacious. Great ships, which 
 move with the speed of a fairly fast train and 
 shoot to the extreme limits of the visible horizon, 
 really require a boundless Ocean in which to do 
 their work with naval thoroughness. But the 
 upper North Sea would have served, and there 
 the Grand Fleet waited, ever at work though 
 silent, ever watchfully ready for the Great Day. 
 And while it waited it controlled by the mere fact 
 of its tremendous power of numbers., weight, and 
 position the destinies of the civilised world. 
 
 • 
 
 The task of the Royal Navy in the war would 
 have been much simpler had the geography of 
 the North Sea been designed by Providence to 
 assist us in our struggle with Germany. We made 
 the best of it, but were always sorely handicapped 
 by it. The North Sea was too shallow, too well 
 adapted for the promiscuous laying of mines, and 
 too wide at its northern outlet for a really close 
 blockade. Had the British Isles been slewed round 
 twenty degrees further towards Norway, so that 
 the outlet to the north was as narrow as that to 
 the English Channel— and had there been a harbour 
 big enough for the Grand Fleet between the Thames
 
 THE GREAT VICTORY 77 
 
 and the Firth of Forth — then our main bases could 
 have been placed nearer to Germany and our 
 striking power enormously increased. We could 
 then have placed an absolute veto upon the raid- 
 ing dashes which the Germans now and then 
 made upon the eastern English seaboard. As 
 the position in fact existed we could not place any 
 of our first line ships farther south than the Firth 
 of Forth — and could place even there only our 
 fastest vessels — without removing them too far 
 from the Grand Fleet's main concentration at 
 Scapa Flow in the Orkneys. Invergordon in the 
 Cromarty Firth was used as a rest and replenishing 
 station. The German raids — what Admiral 
 Jellicoe called their tactics of " tip and run " — 
 were exasperating, but they could not be allowed 
 to interfere with the naval dispositions upon which 
 the whole safety of the Empire depended. We 
 had to depend on the speed of our battle cruisers 
 in the Firth of Forth to give us opportunity to 
 intercept and punish the enemy. The German 
 battle cruisers which fired upon Scarborough, 
 Whitby, and the Hartlepools were nearly caught 
 — a few minutes more of valuable time and a little 
 less of sea haze would have meant their destruc- 
 tion. A second raid was anticipated and the 
 resulting Dogger Bank action taught the enemy 
 that the Navy had a long arm and long sight. 
 For a year he digested the lesson, and did not try 
 his luck again until April, 1916, when he dashed 
 forth and raided Lowestoft on the Norfolk coast. 
 The story of this raid is interesting. The Grand 
 Fleet had been out a day or two before upon 
 what it called a " stunt," a parade in force of the 
 Jutland coast and the entrance to the Skagerrak.
 
 78 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 It had hunted for the Germans and found them 
 not, and returning to the far north re-coaled the 
 ships. The Germans, with a cleverness which 
 does them credit, launched their Lowestoft raid 
 immediately after the " stunt " and before the 
 battle cruisers, re-coaling, could be ready to dash 
 forth. Even as it was they did not cut much time 
 to waste. It was a dash across, a few shots, and 
 a dash back. 
 
 Then was made a redisposition of the British 
 Squadrons, not in the least designed to protect 
 the east coast of England — though the enemy 
 was led to believe so — but so to strengthen Beatty's 
 Battle Cruiser Squadrons that the enemy's High 
 Seas Fleet, when met, could be fought and held 
 until Jellicoe with his battle squadrons could 
 arrive and destroy it. The re- disposition con- 
 sisted of two distinct movements. First : the 
 pre-Dreadnought battleships and battle cruisers 
 which had been stationed in the Forth were sent 
 to the Thames. Second: Admiral Evan-Thomas's 
 fifth battle squadron of five Queen Elizabeth 
 battle ships (built since the war began) — of twenty- 
 five knots speed and each carrying eight 15-inch 
 guns — Queen Elizabeth, Barham, Valiant, War- 
 spite, and Malaya — were sent from Scapa to the 
 Firth of Forth to reinforce Beatty and to give 
 him a support which would enable him and Evan- 
 Thomas to fight a delaying action against any 
 force which the Germans could put to sea. Three 
 of the Invincible type of battle cruisers were moved 
 from the Forth to Scapa to act as Jellicoe's advance 
 guard, and to enable contact to be quickly made 
 between Beatty and Jellicoe. But for this change 
 in the Grand Fleet's dispositions, which enabled
 
 THE GREAT VICTORY 79 
 
 the four splendid battleships — Barham, Valiant, 
 Warsfite and Malaya (the Queen Elizabeth was in 
 dock)— to engage the whole High Seas Fleet on 
 the afternoon of May 31st, 1916, while Beatty 
 headed oft the German battle cruisers and opened 
 the way for Jellicoe's enveloping movement, the 
 Battle of Jutland could never have been fought.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET : A NORTH SEA " STUNT " 
 ''So young and so nntender/" — KiNa Lear. 
 
 For more than eighteen months the Grand Fleet 
 had been at war. It was the centre of the great 
 web of blockading patrols, mine sweeping flotillas, 
 submarine hunters, and troop-transport convoys, 
 and yet as a Fleet it had never seen the enemy or 
 fired a shot except in practice. The fast battle- 
 cruisers, stationed nearest to the enemy in the 
 Firth of Forth, had grabbed all the sport that was 
 going in the Bight of Heligoland, or in the Dogger 
 Bank action. But though several of the vessels 
 belonging to the Grand Fleet had picked up some 
 share in the fighting — at the Falkland Islands 
 and in the Dardanelles - Jellicoe with his splendid 
 squadrons still waited patiently for the Day. 
 The perils from submarines had been mastered, 
 and those from mines, cast into the seas by a reck- 
 less enemy, had been made of little account by 
 continuous sweeping. The early eagerness of 
 officers and men had given place to a sedate patience. 
 At short intervals the vast Fleet would issue 
 forth and, attended by its screen of destroyers and 
 light cruisers, would make a stately parade of 
 the North Sea. All were prepared for battle when 
 it came, but as the weeks passed into months and 
 
 80
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET 81 
 
 the montlis into years, the parades became practice 
 " stunts," stripped of all expectation of encounter- 
 ing the enemy and devoid of the smallest excite- 
 ment. The Navy knows little of excitement or of 
 thrills— it has too much to think about and to 
 do. At Action Stations in a great ship, not one 
 man in ten ever sees anything but the job im- 
 mediately before him. The enemy, if enemy there 
 be in sight from the spotting tops, is hidden from 
 nine-tenths of the officers and crew by steel walls. 
 So, if even a battle be devoid of thrills— except 
 those painfully vamped up upon paper after the 
 event — a " stunt," without expectation of battle, 
 becomes the most placid of sea exercises, I will 
 describe such a " stunt " as faithfully as may be, 
 adding thereto a little imaginary incident which 
 will, 1 hope, gratify the reader, even though he 
 may be assured in advance that I invented it for 
 his entertainment. 
 
 It was the beginning of the afternoon watch, 
 and the vast harbour of Scapa Flow was very 
 still and sunny and silent. The hands were sitting 
 about smoking, or " caulking " after their dinner, 
 and the noisome " both watches " call was still 
 some fifteen minutes away. But though every- 
 thing appeared to be perfectly normal and sedate, 
 an observant Officer of the Watch, looking through 
 the haze within which the Fleet flagship lay almost 
 invisible against the dark hills, could see a little 
 wisp of colour float to her yards and remain. 
 Forthwith up to the yards of every vessel in harbour 
 ran an exactly similar hoist, and as it was dipped 
 on the flagship it disappeared from sight upon all.
 
 82 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 It was the signal to prepare for sea, and now mark 
 exactly how such a signal— seemingly so momen- 
 tous to a civilian — is received by the Navy at war. 
 If the Officer of the Watch upon a ship knows 
 his signals he will put his glass back under his 
 arm and think " Good, IVe got oil two days' 
 harbour watch keeping at least ; my first and 
 middle, too." The signal hands on the bridge 
 look at the calm sea, which w^ill for once not drench 
 them and skin their hands on the halliards, and 
 gratefully regard the windless sky under which 
 hoists will slide obediently up the mast and not 
 tug savagely like a pair of dray horses. The signal 
 bos'n turns purple with fierce resentment which 
 he does not really feel, for he will be up all day 
 and half the night beside the Officer of the Watch 
 on the bridge running the manoeuvring signals, 
 and he loves to feel indispensable. There is no 
 excitement on the mess decks, only a smile since 
 sea means a period of peace of mind when parades 
 and polishings are suspended, and one keeps three 
 watches or sleeps in a turret all night and half 
 the day. Besides there is deep down in the minds 
 of all the hope that, in spite of a hundred duds 
 and wash-outs and disappointments, this trip 
 may just possibly lead to that glorious scrap that 
 all have been longing for, and have come to regard 
 as about as imminent as the Day of Judgment. 
 The gunnery staff look important and the " garage 
 men " — armourers and electricians, commonly 
 called L.T.O.s, in unspeakable overalls carry- 
 ing spanners and circuit-testing lamps — float 
 round the turrets looking for little faults and 
 flies in the amber. The bad sailors shiver, though 
 there is hope even for them in the silence and
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET 83 
 
 calmness of tlie sky. There is no obvious bustle 
 of preparation, for the best of reasons : there 
 is nothing to do except to close sea doors and 
 batten down ; the Fleet is Already Prepared. 
 Let the reader please brush from his mind any 
 idea of excitement, any idea of unusualness, any 
 idea of bustle ; none of these things exist when 
 the Grand Fleet puts to sea. The signal which 
 ran up to the yards of the flagship and was repeated 
 by all the vessels in the Fleet read : " Prepare 
 to leave harbour," and simply meant that the 
 Fleet was going out, probably that night, and 
 that no oflicer could leave his ship to go and dine 
 with his friends in some other ship's ward-room. 
 
 By and by up goes another little hoist, also 
 universally acknowledged ; this makes the stokers 
 and the engine-room artificers, and the purple- 
 ringed, harassed-looking engineer ofhcers jump 
 livelv down below so as to cut the time notice 
 for full steam down by half and be ready to 
 advance the required speed by three knots or so. 
 
 The sun dips and evening comes on ; a glorious 
 evening such as one only gets fairly far north in 
 the spring, and a signal comes again, this time : 
 " Raise steam for — knots and report." Now 
 one sees smoke pouring forth continuously from 
 the coal-driven ships, and every now and then 
 a great gust of cold oil vapour from the aristo- 
 cratic new battleships whose fires are fed with 
 oil only. 
 
 Dinner in the ward-room starts in a blaze of 
 light and a buzz of talking, and the band plays 
 cheerfully on the half-deck outside. The King's 
 health is drunk and the band settles down to an 
 hour of ragtime and waltzes, the older men sip
 
 84 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 their port, and the younger ones drift out to where 
 the gun-room is already dancing lustily. Our 
 wonderful Navy dances beautifully, and loves 
 every evening after dinner to execute the most 
 difficult of music-hall steps in the midst of a wild 
 Corybantic orgie. In the choosing of partners 
 age and rank count for nothing. The ward-room 
 and gun-room after dinner are members of one 
 happy family. 
 
 Then suddenly the scene is transformed. In 
 the doorway of the anteroom and dining-room 
 appears framed the tall form of the Owner, who 
 in a dozen words tells that the Huns are out. They 
 are in full force strolling merrily along a westerly 
 course far away to the south. Already the battle- 
 cruisers from the Forth are seeking touch with the 
 enemy, and the light stuff and the advance 
 destroyers, the screen of the Grand Fleet, have 
 already flown from Scapa to make contact with 
 the battle cruisers. Our armoured cruisers have 
 moved out in advance and the Grand Fleet itself 
 is about to go. 
 
 As the ward-room gathers round the Owner, the 
 band packs up hastily and vanishes down the 
 big hatch into the barracks or Marines' mess, to 
 stow its • instruments and put on warm clothing. 
 Those snotties who have the first watch scatter, 
 and the remainder gather in the gun-room to turn 
 over the chances on the morrow which seems to 
 their eager souls more mist- shrouded and pro- 
 mising than have most morrows during the long 
 months of waiting. 
 
 Let us now shift the scene to the compass plat-
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET 85 
 
 form or Monkey's Island of one of the great new 
 oil-fired battleships of the Fifth Battle Squadron, 
 one of the five ships known as Queen Elizabeths 
   — all added to the Navy since the war began and 
 all members of the most powerful and fastest 
 squadron of battleships upon the seas of the 
 world. They have a speed of twenty-five knots, 
 carry eight 15-inch guns in four turrets arranged 
 on the middle line, and have upon each side a 
 battery of six 6 -inch guns in casemates for dealing 
 faithfully and expeditiously with enemy destroyers 
 who may seek to rush in with the torpedo. As 
 our ship passes out into the night, the port and 
 starboard 6-inch batteries are fully manned and 
 loaded, and up on the compass platform, in control 
 of these batteries, are two young officers — a 
 subaltern of Marines and a naval sub-lieutenant — 
 to each of whom is allotted one of the batteries. 
 One has charge of the port side, the other of the 
 starboard. I have called the Navy a young 
 man's service, and here we see a practical example ; 
 for beneath us is the last word in super-battleships 
 dependent for protection against sudden torpedo 
 attack upon the bright eyes and cool trained brains 
 of two youngsters counting not more than forty 
 years between them. I will resume my descrip- 
 tion and put it in the mouth of one of these youth- 
 ful control officers— the Marine subaltern who a 
 year before had been a boy at school : 
 
 " Going to the gun-room I warn the Sub, my 
 trusted friend and fellow control officer on the 
 starboard side, and depart to my cabin, where 
 I dress as for a motor run on a cold day. I have 
 a great Canadian fur cap and gorgeous gloves 
 which defeat the damp and cold even of the
 
 86 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 North Sea. As I stand on the quarter deck for 
 a moment's glance at the sunset, which I cannot 
 hope to describe, there comes a sound, a sort of 
 hollow metallic clap and a flicker of flame. They 
 are testing electric circuits in the 6-inch battery, 
 and No. 5 gun port has fired a tube. These 
 sounds recur at short intervals from both sides 
 for a couple of minutes. Then the gun layers 
 are satisfied and stop. I go along the upper 
 deck above the battery — which is in casemates 
 between decks — and reach the pagoda, and then 
 pass up, up, through a little steel door, above the 
 signal bridge and the searchlights to the airy, 
 roomy Monkey's Island with the foremast in the 
 middle of the floor, holding the spotting top — 
 usually known as the topping spot, an inversion 
 which ironically describes its exposed position 
 in action— poised above our heads. There is a 
 little charthouse forward of the mast on its raised 
 dais of the compass platform proper, where the 
 High Priest busies himself between his two altars, 
 the old and the new. 
 
 *' Looking ahead it is already dark. The sea 
 is still and the ships are dim black masses. We 
 have already weighed — the Cable Officer's call 
 went as I passed along the upper deck — and are 
 gliding to our station in the Squadron, all of 
 which are moving away past those ships which 
 have not yet begun to go out. Gradually we leave 
 the rest of the Grand Fleet behind, for our great 
 speed gives us the place of honour, and so pass 
 outside and breast the swell of the open sea. 
 
 " We find that the wind has risen outside the
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET 87 
 
 harbour, but there has not yet been time for a 
 serious swell to get up. The water heaves slowly, 
 breaking into a sharp clap which sets our attendant 
 destroyers dancing like corks, but of which we 
 take no notice whatever. This is one way in which 
 the big ships score, though they miss the full 
 joy of life and the passion for war which can be 
 felt only in a destroyer flotilla. Our destroyer 
 escort has arisen apparently from nowhere and 
 we all plough on together. At intervals we tack 
 a few points and the manoeuvre is passed from 
 ship to ship with flash lamps. Behind us, though 
 we cannot see them, follows the rest of the Grand 
 Fleet, in squadrons line ahead, trailing out up 
 to, and beyond the horizon. 
 
 " That night watch on my first big ' stunt ' 
 
 lives in my memory. Never before had I been 
 
 by myself in control of a battery of six 6-inch guns 
 
 for use against light fast enemy craft, which might 
 
 try the forlorn hazard of a dash to within easy 
 
 torpedo range of about 500 yards. Torpedoes are 
 
 useless against rapidly moving ships unless fired 
 
 quite close up. This form of attack has been 
 
 very rare, and has always failed, but it remains 
 
 an ever-present possibility. Even in clear weather 
 
 with the searchlights on — which are connected 
 
 up to me and move with me — one cannot see for 
 
 more than a mile at night, and a destroyer 
 
 could rush in at full speed upon a zig-zag track 
 
 to within point blank range in about a minute. 
 
 Direct-aimed fire would fail at such a rapidly 
 
 moving mark. One has to put up a curtain of 
 
 fire, fast and furious for the charging vessel to 
 
 7
 
 88 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 run into. But there is no time to lose, no time 
 at all. 
 
 " There was a bright moon upon that first night, 
 so everything was less unpleasant and nerve-rack- 
 ing than it might have been. Somehow in the 
 Navy one seems to shed all feelings of nervous- 
 ness. Perhaps this is the result of splendid health, 
 the tonic sea air, and the atmosphere of serene 
 competent resourcefulness which pervades the 
 who^e Service. We are all trained to think only 
 of the job on hand and never of ourselves. 
 
 " From the height of the compass platform there 
 is no appearance of freeboard. The ship's deck 
 seems to lie flush with the water, and one sees 
 it as a light- coloured shaped plank— such as one 
 cut out of wood when a child and fitted w^ith a 
 toy mast. The outline is not regularly curved 
 but sliced away at the forecastle with straight 
 sides running back parallel with one another. 
 
 * A ' turret is in the middle of the forecastle, which 
 is very narrow ; and behind it upon a higher level 
 stands * B ' with its long glistening guns sticking 
 out over ' A's ' back. From aloft the turrets 
 look quite small, though each is big enough for a 
 hundred men to stand comfortably on the roof. 
 The slope upwards is continued by the great 
 armoured conning tower beliind and higher than 
 
 * B ' turret, and directly above and behind that 
 again stands the compass platform. Overhead 
 towers the draughty spotting top for the turret 
 guns. Behind again, upon the same level as my 
 platform, are the two great flat funnels spouting 
 out dense clouds of oily smoke. When there is 
 a following wind the spotting top is smothered 
 with smoke, and the officers perched there cough
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET 8» 
 
 and gasp and curse. It is then worthy of its 
 name, for it is in truth a * topping spot ! ' 
 
 " We are a very fast ship, but at this height the 
 impression of speed is lost. The ship seems to 
 plough in leisurely fashion through the black 
 white-crested waves, now and then throwing up 
 a cloud of spray as high as my platform, to descend 
 crashing upon ' A ' turret which is none too dry 
 a place to sleep in. We don't roll appreciably, 
 but slide up and down with a dignified pitch, 
 exactly like the motion of that patent rocking- 
 horse which I used to love in my old nursery. 
 
 " Down below, though they are hidden from 
 me by the deck, the gunners stand ready behind 
 their casemates, waiting for my signal. The 
 guns are loaded and trained, the crews stand at 
 their stations, shells and cordite charges are ready 
 to their hands. The gun-layers are connected 
 up with me and are ready to respond instantly to 
 mv order. 
 
 "So the watch passes ; my relief comes, and I go. 
 
 " I was on watch again in the forenoon, and then 
 one could see something of the Granl Fleet and 
 realise its tremendous silent power. We had 
 shortened speed so as not to leave the supporting 
 Squadrons too far behind and one could see them 
 clearly, long lines of great ships, stretching far 
 beyond the visible horizon. Nearest to us was 
 the cream of the Fleet, the incomparable Second 
 Squadron— the four Orions and four K.G. Fives 
 — which with their eighty 13 •5-inch guns possess 
 a concentrated power far beyond anything flying 
 Fritz's flag. Upon us of the Queen Elizabeths,
 
 90 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 and upon the Second Battle Squadron, rests tlie 
 Mastery of the Seas. Far away on the port 
 quarter could be seen the leading ships of the 
 First Battle Squadron of Dreadnoughts, all ships 
 of 12-inch guns, all good enough for Fritz but 
 not in the same class with the Orions, the K.G. 
 Fives or with us. Away to starboard came 
 more Dreadnoughts, and Royal Sovereigns — as 
 powerful as ourselves but not so fast — and odd 
 ships like the seven- turre ted Agmcourt and the 
 14- inch gunned Canada. It was a great sight, 
 one to impress Fritz and to make his blood turn 
 to water. 
 
 "For he could see us as we thrashed through 
 the seas. It looked no larger than a breakfast 
 sausage, and I had some difficulty in making 
 it out— even after the Officer of the AVatch had 
 shown it to me. But at last I saw the watching 
 Zeppelin— a mere speck thousands of feet up and 
 perhaps fifty miles distant. Our seaplanes roared 
 away, rising one after the other from our carry- 
 ing-ships like huge seagulls, and Herr Zeppelin 
 melted into the far-off background of clouds. He 
 had seen us, and that was enough to keep the 
 Germans at a very safe distance. He, or others 
 like him, had seen, too, our battle cruisers which, 
 sweeping far down to the south, essayed to play 
 the hammer to our most massive anvil. In the 
 evening, precisely at ten o'clock, the German 
 Nordeich wireless sent out a volley of heavy chaff, 
 assuring us that we had only dared to come out 
 when satisfied that their High Seas Fleet was in 
 the Baltic. It wasn't in the Baltic ; at that mo- 
 ment it was scuttling back to the minefields 
 behind Heligoland. But what could we do !
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET 91 
 
 When surprise is no longer possible at sea, what 
 can one do ? It is all very exasperating, but 
 somehow rather amusing. 
 
 " We joined the Battle Cruiser Squadron in the 
 south and swept the ' German Ocean ' right up 
 to the minefields off the Elbe and Weser, and north 
 to the opening of the Skagerrak. Further we 
 could not go, for any foolish attempt to ' dig out ' 
 Fritz might have cost us half the Grand Fleet. 
 Then our ' stunt ' ended, we turned and sought 
 once more our northern fastnesses.'' 
 
 t S I 
 
 It was during the return from this big sweep 
 of the North Sea that our young Marine chanced 
 upon his baptism of fire and his first Great Adven- 
 ture. His chance came suddenly and unexpectedly 
 — as chances usually come at sea — and I will let 
 him tell of it himself in that personal vivid style 
 of his with which I cannot compete. 
 
 ** The wonderful thing has happened ! I have 
 been in action ! It was not a great battle ; it* 
 was not what the hardiest evening newspaper 
 could blaze upon its bills as a Naval Action in 
 the North Sea. From first to last it endured for 
 one minute and forty seconds ; yet for me it was 
 the Battle of the Century. For it was my own, 
 my very own, my precious ewe lamb of a battle. 
 It was fought by me on my compass platform 
 and by my bold gunners in the 6-inch casemates 
 below. All by our little selves we did the trick, 
 before any horrid potentates could interfere, and 
 the enemy is at the bottom of the deep blue sea — 
 it is not really very deep and certainly is not blue.
 
 92 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 What I most love about my battle is that it was 
 fought so quickly that no one — and especially 
 none of those tiresome folk called superior officers 
 
 — had any opportunity of kicking me off the stage. 
 All was over, quite over, and my guns had ceased 
 firing before the Owner had tumbled out of his 
 sea cabin in the pagoda, and best of all before 
 my gunnery chief had any chance to snatch the 
 control away from me. He came charging up, 
 red and panting, while the air still thudded 
 with my curtain fire, and wanted to know what 
 the devil I was playing at. * I have sunk the 
 enemy, sir,' I said, saluting. ' What enemy ? ' 
 cried he, ' I never saw any enemy.' ' He's 
 gone, sir,' said I, standing at attention. *I hit 
 him with three 6-inch shells and he is very dead 
 indeed.' * It's all right,' called out the Officer 
 of the Watch; laughing, ' This young Soldier 
 here has been and gone and sunk one of Fritz's 
 destroyers. He burst her all to pieces in a manner 
 most emphatic. I call it unkind. But he always 
 was a heartless young beast.' Then the Bloke, 
 who is a very decent old fellow, cooled down, said 
 I was a lucky young dog, and received my official 
 report. He carried it oil to the Lord High Captain 
 
 - whom the Navy people call the Owner-- and 
 the great man was so very kind as to speak to me 
 himself. He said that I had done very well and 
 that he would make a note of my prompt attention 
 to duty. I don't suppose that I shall ever again 
 fight so completely satisfying a naval battle, for 
 I am not likely to come across another one small 
 enough to keep wholly to myself. 
 
 " I will tell you all about it. I was up on my 
 platform at my watch. My battery of 6-inch guns
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET 93 
 
 was down below, all loaded with high explosive 
 shell, weighing 100 lb. each. All the gunners 
 were ready for anything which might happen, 
 but expecting nothing. So they had stood and 
 waited during a hundred watches. It was greying 
 towards dawn, but there was a good bit of haze 
 and the sea was choppy. The old ship was doing 
 her rocking-horse trick as usual, and also as usual 
 I was feeling a bit squeamish but nothing to worry 
 about. As the light increased I could see about 
 2,000 yards, more or less — I am not much good 
 yet at judging sea distances ; they look so short. 
 The Officer of the Watch was walking up and 
 down on the look-out. ' Hullo,' I heard him say, 
 ' what's that dark patch yonder three points on 
 the port bow ? ' This meant thirty degrees to 
 the left. I looked through my glasses and so did 
 he, and as I could see nothing I switched on the 
 big searchlight. Then there came a call from 
 the Look Out near us, the dark patch changed to 
 thick smoke, and out of the haze into the blaze 
 of my searchlight slid the high forepeak of a 
 destroyer. I thought it was one of our escort, 
 and so did the Officer of the Watch ; but as we 
 watched the destroyer swung round, and we could 
 see the whole length of her. I can't explain how 
 one can instantly distinguish enemy ships from 
 one's own, and can even class them and name 
 them at sight. One knows them by the lines and 
 silhouette just as one knows a Ford car from a 
 Rolls-Royce. The destroyer was an enemy, plain 
 even to me. She had blundered into us by mistake 
 and was now trying hard to get away. I don't 
 know what the Officer of the Watch did — I never 
 gave him a thought— my mind simply froze on
 
 94 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 to that beautiful battery of 6-incJi guns down 
 below and on to that enemy destroyer trying to 
 escape. Those two things, the battery and the 
 enemy, filled my whole world. 
 
 Within five seconds I had called the battery, 
 given them a range of 2,000 yards, swung the guns 
 on to the enemy and loosed three shells— the first 
 shells which I had seen fired in any action. They 
 all went over for I had not allowed for our height 
 above the water. Then the Boche did an extra- 
 ordinary thing. If he had gone on swinging 
 round and dashed away, he might have reached 
 cover in the haze before I could hit him. But 
 his Officer of the Watch was either frightened 
 out of his wits or else was a bloomin' copper- 
 bottomed 'ero. Instead of trying to get away, 
 he swung back towards us, rang up full speed, 
 and came charging in upon us so as to get home 
 with a torpedo. It was either the maddest or 
 the bravest thing which I shall ever see in my life. 
 I ought to have been frightfully thrilled, but some- 
 how I wasn't. I felt no excitement whatever ; 
 you see, I was thinking all the time of directing 
 my guns and had no consciousness of anything 
 else in the world. The moment the destroyer 
 charged, zig-zagging to distract our aim, I knew 
 exactly what to do with him. I instantly shortened 
 the range by 400 yards, and gave my gunners 
 rapid independent fire from the whole battery. 
 The idea was to put up a curtain of continuous 
 fire about 200 yards short for him to run into, 
 and to draw in the curtain as he came nearer. As 
 he zig-zagged, so we followed, keeping up that 
 wide deadly curtain slap in his path. There was 
 no slouching about those beautiful long-service
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET 95 
 
 gun-layers of ours, and you should have seen the 
 darlings pump it out. I have seen fast firing in 
 practice but never anything like that. There 
 was one continuous stream of shell as the six guns 
 took up the order. Six-inch guns are no toys, 
 and 100-lb. shells are a bit hefty to handle, yet 
 no quick-firing cartridge loaders could have been 
 worked faster than were my heavy beauties. Every 
 ten seconds my battery spat out six great shells, 
 and I steadily drew the curtain in, keeping it 
 always dead in his path, but by some miracle of 
 light or of manoeuvring the enemy escaped destruc- 
 tion for a whole long minute. On came the 
 destroyer and round came our ship facing her. 
 The Officer of the Watch was swinging our bows 
 towards the enemy so as to lessen the mark for 
 his torpedo, and I swung my guns the opposite 
 way as the ship turned keeping them always on 
 the charging destroyer. Away towards the enemy 
 the sea boiled as the torrent of shells hit it and 
 ricochetted for miles. 
 
 ** At last the end came ! It seemed to have 
 been hours since I began to fire, but it couldn't 
 really have been more than a minute ; for even 
 German destroyers will cover half a mile in that 
 time. The range was down to 1,000 yards when 
 he loosed a torpedo, and at that very precise 
 instant a shell, ricochetting upwards, caught him 
 close to the water line of his high forepeak and 
 burst in his vitals. I saw instantly a great flash 
 blaze up from his funnels as the high explosive 
 smashed his engines, boilers and fires into scrap. 
 He reared up and screamed exactly like a wounded 
 horse. It sounded rather awful, though it was 
 only the shriek of steam from the burst pipes ; it
 
 d6 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 made one feel how very live a thing is a ship, how 
 in its splendid vitality it is, as Kipling says, more 
 than the crew. He reared up and fell away to 
 port, and two more of my shells hit him almost 
 amidships and tore out his bottom plates like 
 shredded paper. I could hear the rending crash 
 of the explosions through my ear-protectors, and 
 through the continuous roar of my own curtain 
 fire. He rolled right over and was gone ! He 
 vanished so quickly that for a moment my shells 
 flew screaming over the empty sea, and then I 
 stopped the gunners. My battle had lasted for 
 one minute and forty seconds ! 
 
 " ' But what about the torpedo ? ' you w411 ask. 
 I never saw it but the Officer of the Watch told me 
 that it had passed harmlessly more than a hundred 
 feet away from us. ' You sank the destroyer,' 
 said the Officer of the Watch, grinning, ' but my 
 masterly navigation saved the ship. So honours is 
 easy, Mr. ]\[arine. If I had had those guns of 
 yours,' he went on, ' I would have sunk the beggar 
 with about half that noise and half that expenditure 
 of Government ammunition. I never saw such 
 a wasteful performance,' said he. But he was only 
 pulling my leg. All the senior officers, from the 
 Owner downwards, were very nice to me and said 
 that for a youngster, and a Soldier at that, I hadn't 
 managed the affair at all badly. 
 
 ** I thought that the guns' crews had done fine 
 and told them so ; but the chief gunner — a stern 
 Marine from Eastney — shook his head sadly. 
 No. 3 gun had been trained five seconds late, he 
 said, and w-as behind the others all through. He 
 seemed to reckon the sinking of the destroyer as 
 nothing in condonation of the shame No. 3 had
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET 97 
 
 brought upon his battery. I condoled with him, 
 but he was wounded to the heart. 
 
 " The Officer of the Watch said that all the time 
 the destroyer was charging she was firing small 
 stuff at our platform with a Q.-F. gun on her 
 forepeak. And I knew nothing about it ! This is 
 the simple and easy way in which one earns a 
 reputation for coolness under heavy fire.'*
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET : THE TERRIERS 
 AND THE RATS 
 
 " You missed a lot, Soldier/' said the Sub-Lieu- 
 tenant to his friend the Marine Subaltern, " through 
 not being here at the beginning. Now it is alto- 
 gether too comfortable for us of the big ships ; 
 the destroyers and patrols get all the fun while 
 we hang about here in harbour or put up a stately 
 and entirely innocuous parade of the North Sea. 
 No doubt we are Grand in our Silent Might and 
 Keep our Unsleeping Vigil and all the rest of the 
 pretty tosh which one reads in the papers — but 
 in reality we eat too much for the good of our 
 waists and do too little work for our princely pay. 
 But it was very different at the beginning. Then 
 we were like a herd of wild buffaloes harassed 
 day and night by super-mosquitoes. When we 
 were not on watch we were saying our prayers. 
 It was a devil of a time, my son.'' 
 
 " I thought that you Commanded the Seas," 
 observed the Marine, an innocent youth who had 
 lately joined. 
 
 The Sub-Lieutenant, dark and short, with twenty 
 years to his age and the salt wisdom of five naval 
 generations in his rich red blood, grinned capa- 
 ciously, " So the dear simple old British Publia 
 
 98
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET 99 
 
 thought. So their papers told them every day. 
 We did not often then get a sight of newspapers — 
 there were no regular mails, as now, and none of 
 the comforts of an ordered civilised life, as some ass 
 wrote the other day of the Grand Fleet. What 
 the deuce have we to do with an ordered civilised 
 life ! Fighting's our job, and that's what we 
 want, not beastly comforts. While we were being 
 chivied about by Fritz's submarines it was jolly 
 to be told that we Commanded the Seas of the 
 World. But to me it sounded a bit sarcastic at 
 a time when we had not got the length of com- 
 manding even the entrances to our own harbours. 
 That's the cold truth. For six months we hadn't 
 a submarine proof harbour in England or Scotland 
 or Ireland though we looked for one pretty dili- 
 gently. We wandered about, east and west and 
 north, looking for some hole where the submarines 
 couldn't get in without first knocking at the 
 door, and where we could lie in peace for two 
 days together. Wherever we went it was the same 
 old programme. The Zepps would smell us out 
 and Fritz would come nosing around with his 
 submarines, and we had to up anchor and be off 
 on our travels once more. At sea we were all 
 right. We cruised always at speed, wdth a destroyer 
 patrol out on either side, so that Fritz had no 
 chance to get near enough to try a shot with the 
 torpedo. A fast moving ship can't be hit except 
 broadside' on and within a range of about 400 
 yards ; and as we always moved twice as fast 
 as a submerged U-boat he never could get within 
 sure range. He tried once or twice till the 
 destroyers and light cruisers began to get him 
 with the ram and the gun. Fritz must have had
 
 100 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 a good many thrilling minutes when he was fiddling 
 with his rudder, his diving planes and his torpedo 
 discharge gear and saw a destroyer foaming down 
 upon him at over thirty knots. Fritz died a clean 
 death in those days. I would fifty times sooner 
 go under to the ram or the gun than be caught 
 like a rat in some of the dainty traps we've been 
 setting for a year past. We are top dog now, but 
 I blush to think of those first few months. It 
 was a most humiliating spectacle. Fancy fifty 
 million pounds worth of the greatest fighting ships 
 in the world scuttling about in fear of a dozen 
 or two of footy little submarines any one of which 
 we could have run up on the main derrick as 
 easily as a picket boat. If I, a mere snotty in 
 the old Olympus, felt sore in my bones what must 
 the Owners and the Admirals have felt ? Answer 
 me that, Soldier? " 
 
 " It's all right now, I suppose," said the Marine. 
 
 " Safe and dull," replied he, " powerful dull. 
 No chance of a battle, and no feeling that any day 
 a mouldy in one's ribs is more likely than not. 
 If Fritz had had as much skill as he had pluck he 
 would have blown up half the Grand Fleet. Why 
 he didn't I can't imagine, except that it takes a 
 hundred years to make a sailor. Our submarine 
 officers, with such a target, would have downed a 
 battleship a week easy." 
 
 " Fritz got the three Cressys." 
 
 " He simply couldn't help," sniffed the Sub- 
 Lieutenant. " They asked for trouble ; one after 
 the other. Fritz struck a soft patch that morning 
 which he is never lilvely to find again." 
 
 ** Had the harbours no booms ? " 
 
 ** Never a one. We had built the ships all right,
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET 101 
 
 but we had forgotten the harbours. There wasn't 
 one, I say, in the east or north or west which Fritz 
 could not enter whenever he chose to take the 
 risk. He could come in submerged, a hundred 
 feet down, diving under the line of patrols, but 
 luckily for us he couldn't do much after he arrived 
 except keep us busy. For as sure as ever he stuck 
 up a periscope to take a sight we were on to him 
 within five seconds with the small stuff, and then 
 there was a chase which did one's heart good. 
 I've seen a dozen, all much alike, though one had 
 a queer ending which I will tell you. It explains 
 a lot, too. It shows exactly why Fritz fails when 
 he has to depend upon individual nerve and 
 judgment. He is deadly in a crowd, but pretty 
 feeble when left to himself. We used to think 
 that the Germans were a stolid race but they 
 aren't. They have nerves like red-hot wires. I 
 have seen a crew come up out of a captured sub- 
 marine, trembling and shivering and crying. I 
 suppose that frightfulness gets over them like 
 drink or drugs or assorted debauchery. Now for 
 my story. One evening towards sunset in the 
 first winter — which means six bells (about three 
 o'clock in the afternoon) up here — a German 
 submarine crept into this very harbour and the 
 first we knew of it was a bit alarming. The com- 
 mander was a good man, and if he had only kept 
 his head, after working his way in submerged, he 
 might have got one, if not two, big ships. But 
 instead of creeping up close to the battleships, 
 where they lay anchored near the shore, he stuck 
 up a periscope a 1,0C0 yards away and blazed a 
 torpedo into the brown of them. It was a forlorn, 
 silly shot. They were end on to him, and the
 
 102 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 torpedo just ran between two of them and smashed 
 up against the steep shore behind. Ihe track of 
 it on the sea was wide and white as a high road, 
 and half a dozen destroyers were on to that si^b- 
 marine even before the shot had exploded against 
 the rocks. Fritz got down safely— he was clever, 
 but too darned nervous for under-water work — 
 and then began a hunt which was exactly like one 
 has seen in a barn when terriers are after rats. 
 The destroyers and motor patrols were every- 
 where, and above them flew the seaplanes with 
 observers who could peer down through a hundred 
 feet of water. In a shallow harbour Fritz could 
 have sunk to the bottom and lain there till after 
 dark, but we have 200 fathoms here with a very 
 steep shore and there was no bottom for him. A 
 submarine can't stand the water pressure of more 
 than 200 feet at the outside. He didn't dare to 
 fill his tanks and sink, and could only keep down 
 in diving trim so long as he kept moving wdth his 
 electric motors and held himself submerged with 
 his horizontal planes. Had the motors stopped, 
 the submarine would have come up, for in diving 
 trim it was slightly lighter than the water dis- 
 placed. All we had to do was to keep on hunting 
 till his electric batteries had run down, and then 
 he would be obliged to come up. Do you twig, 
 Soldier?" :> t '^ ^- ?>', M 
 
 "But he could have sunk to^^the bottom if he 
 had chosen ? " 
 
 " Oh, yes. But then he could never have risen 
 again. To have filled his tanks would have meant 
 almost instant death. At 200 fathom.s his plates 
 would have crumpled like paper." 
 
 " Still I think that I should have done it."
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET 103 
 
 " So should I. But Fritz didn't. He roamed 
 about the harbour, blind, keeping as deep down 
 as he could safely go. Above him scoured the 
 patrol boats and destroyers, and above them 
 again flew the sea planes. Now and then the air 
 observers would get a sight of him and once or 
 twice they dropped bombs, but this was soon 
 stopped as the risk to our own boats was too 
 great. Regarded as artillery practice bomb 
 dropping from aeroplanes is simply rotten. One 
 can't possibly aim from a thing moving at fifty 
 miles an hour. If one may believe the look outs 
 of the destroyers the whole harbour crawled with 
 periscopes, but they were really bully beef cans 
 and other rubbish chucked over from the warships. 
 When last seen, or believed to be seen, Fritz was 
 blundering towards the line of battleships lying 
 under the deep gloom of the shore, and then he 
 vanished altogether. Night came on, the very 
 long Northern night in winter, and it seemed extra 
 specially long to us in the big ships. Searchlights 
 were going all through the dark hours, the water 
 gleamed, all the floating rubbish which accumu- 
 lates so fast in harbour stood out dead black 
 against the silvery surface, and the Officers of 
 the Watch detected more periscopes than Fritz 
 had in his w^hole service. The hunt went on with- 
 out ceasing for, at any moment, Fritz's batteries 
 might peter out, and he come up. It was a bit 
 squirmy to feel that here cooped up in a narrow 
 deep sea lock were over a hundred King's ships, 
 and that somewhere below us was a desperate 
 German submarine which couldn't possibly escape, 
 but which might blow some of us to blazes any 
 minute." 
 
 8
 
 104 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 " Did any of you go to sleep ? " asked the 
 Marine foolishly. 
 
 The Sub-Lieutenant stared. " When it wasn't 
 my watch I turned in as usual /^ he replied. " Why 
 not? 
 
 "In the morning there was no sign of Fritz, so 
 we concluded that he had either sunk himself to 
 the bottom or had somehow managed to get out 
 of the harbour. In either case we should not see 
 him more. So we just forgot him as we had for- 
 gotten others who had been chased and had escaped. 
 But he turned up again after all. For twenty- 
 four hours nothing much happened except the 
 regular routine, though after the scare we were 
 all very wide awake for more U-boats, and then 
 we had orders to proceed to sea. I was senior 
 snotty of the Olymj)\is, and I was on the after 
 look-out platform as the ship cast loose from her 
 moorings and moved away, to take her place in 
 the line. As we got going there was a curious 
 grating noise all along the bottom just as if we 
 had been lightly aground ; everyone was puzzled 
 to account for it as there were heaps of water under 
 us. The grating went on till we were clear of our 
 berth, and then in the midst of the wide foaming 
 wake rolled up the long thin hull of a submarine. 
 A destroyer dashed up, and the forward gun was 
 in the act of firing when a loud voice from her 
 bridge called on the gunners to stop. " Don't 
 fire on a cofFm," roared her commander. It was 
 the German submarine, which after some thirty 
 hours under water had become a dead hulk. All 
 the air had long since been used up and the crew 
 were lying at their posts— cold meat, poor devils. 
 A beastly way to die."
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET 106 
 
 " Beastly/' murmured the Marine. " War is a 
 foul game/' 
 
 " Still," went on the Sub-Lieutenant, cheerfully, 
 " a dead Fritz is always much more wholesome 
 than a live one, and here were a score of him safely 
 dead/' 
 
 " But what had happened to the submarine ? " 
 asked the }<Iarine, not being a sailor. 
 
 " Don't you see ? " explained the Sub -Lieutenant, 
 who had held his story to be artistically finished. 
 " What a Soldier it is ! Fritz had wandered about 
 blind, deep down under water, until his batteries 
 had given out. Then the submarine rose, fouled 
 our bottom by the merest accident, and stuck 
 there jammed against our bilge keels till the 
 movement of the ship had thrown it clear. It 
 swung to the tide with us. The chances against 
 the submarine rising under one of the battleships 
 were thousands to one, but chances like that have 
 a way of coming ofi: at sea. Nothing at sea ever 
 causes surprise, my son." 
 
 The Sub -Lieutenant spoke with the assurance 
 of a grey-haired Admiral ; he was barely twenty 
 years old, but he was wise with the profound salt 
 wisdom of the sea and will never get any older or 
 less wise though he lives to be ninety. 
 
 Though our friend the young Lieutenant of 
 Marines was no sailor he was a scholar, trained in 
 the class-rooms and playing fields,, of a great 
 English school. He was profoundly impressed, 
 as all outsiders must be, by the engrained efficiency 
 of the seafolk among whom he now dwelt, their 
 easy mastery of the technicalities of sea craft, and
 
 106 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 their almost childish ignorance of everything that 
 lay outside it. It was borne in upon him that 
 they were a race apart, bred to their special work 
 as terriers and racehorses are bred, the perfect pro- 
 duct of numberless generations of sea fighters. It 
 was borne in upon him, too, that no nation coming 
 late to the sea, lil^e the Germans, could, though 
 taking an infinity of thought, possibly stand up 
 against us. Sea power does not consist of ships 
 but of men. For a real Navy does not so much 
 design and build ships as secrete them. They 
 are the expression in machinery of its brains and 
 Soul. He arrived at this conclusion after much 
 patient thought and then diffidently laid it before 
 his experienced friend. The Sub-Lieutenant ac- 
 cepted the theory at once as beyond argument. 
 
 " That's the whole secret, my son, the secret of 
 the Navy. Fritz can't design ships ; he can 
 only copy ours, and then he can't make much of 
 his copies. Take his submarine work. He has 
 any amount of pluck, though he is a dirty swine ; 
 he doesn't fail for want of pluck but because he 
 hasn't the right kind of nerve. That is where 
 Fritz fails and where our boys succeed, because 
 they were bred to the sea and their fathers before 
 them, and their fathers before that. Submarining 
 as a sport is exactly like stalking elephants on 
 foot in long grass. One has to wriggle on one's 
 belly till one gets within close range, and then 
 make sure of a kill in one shot. There's no time 
 for a second if one misses. Fritz will get fairly 
 close up, sometimes — or did before we had taken 
 his measure- but not that close enough to make 
 dead sure of a hit. He is too much afraid of being 
 seen when he pops his periscope above water. So
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET 107 
 
 lie comes down between two stools. He is too 
 far oil for a certain hit and not far enough to escape 
 being seen. That story I told you the other day 
 was an exact illustration. The moment he pops 
 up the destroyers swoop down upon him, he 
 flinches, looses off a mouldy, somehow, anyhow, 
 and then gets down. That sort of thing is no 
 bally use ; one doesn't sink battleships that fool 
 way. Our men first make sure of their hit at the 
 closest range, and then think about getting down 
 — or don't get down. They do their work with- 
 out worrying about being sunk themselves the 
 instant after. That's just the difference between 
 us and the Germans, between terriers and rats. 
 It's no good taking partial risks in submarine work ; 
 one must go the whole hog or leave it alone." 
 
 " Eisks are queer things," went on the Sub- 
 Lieutenant, reflectively; "the bigger they are, the 
 less one gets hurt. Just look at the seaplanes. 
 One would think that the ordinary dangers of 
 flight were bad enough— the failure of a stay, the 
 misfiring of an engine, a bad gusty wind — and so 
 we thought before the war. It looked the f orlornest 
 of hopes to rush upon an enemy plane, shoot him 
 down at the shortest of range, or ram him if one 
 couldn't get a kill any other way. It seemed that 
 if two planes stood up to one another, both must 
 certainly be lost. And so they would. Yet time 
 and again our Flight officers have charged the 
 German planes, seen them run away or drop into 
 the sea, and come off themselves with no more 
 damage than a hole or two through the wings. 
 It's just nerve, nerve and breeding. When we 
 dash in upon Fritz with submarines or seaplanes, 
 taking no count of the risks, but seeking only to
 
 108 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 kill, he almost always either blunders or runs. 
 It isn't that he lacks pluck — don't believe that 
 silly libel ; Fritz is as brave as men are made — 
 but he hasn't the sporting nerve. He will take 
 risks in the mass, but he doesn't like them single ; 
 we do. He doesn't love big game shooting, on 
 foot, alone ; we do. He does his best ; he obeys 
 orders up to any limit ; he will fight and die 
 without shrinking. But he is not a natural 
 fighting man, and he is always thinking of dying. 
 We love fighting, love it so much that we don't give 
 a thought to the dying part. We just look upon 
 the risk as that which gives spice to the game." 
 
 " I believe," said the Marine, thoughtfully, 
 " that you have exactly described the dillerence 
 between the races. With us fighting and dying 
 are parts of one great glorious game ; with Fritz 
 they are the most solemn of business. We laugh 
 all the time and sing music-hall songs ; Fritz 
 never smiles and sings the Wacht am Rhein. I 
 am beginning to realise that our irrepressible 
 levity is a mighty potent force, mightier by far 
 than Fritz's solemnity. The true English spirit 
 is to be seen at its best and brightest in the Navy, 
 and the Navy is always ready for the wildest of 
 schoolboy rags. If I had not come to sea I might 
 myself have become a solemn blighter like Fritz." 
 
 In the ward- room that evening the Marine re- 
 peated the Sub-Lieutenant's story and was assured 
 that it was true. The Navy will pull a Soldier's 
 leg with a joyous disregard for veracity, but there 
 is a crudity about its invention which soon ceases 
 to deceive. They can invent nothing which
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET 109 
 
 approaclies in wonder the marvels whicli happen 
 every day 
 
 The talk then fell upon the ever engrossing topic 
 of submarine catching, and experiences flowed forth 
 in a stream which filled the Marine with astonish- 
 ment and admiration. Hs had never served an 
 apprenticeship in a submarine catcher and the sea 
 business in small sporting craft was altogether 
 new to him. 
 
 " It is a pity," at last said a regular Navy 
 Lieutenant, " that submarines are no good against 
 other submaries. That is a weakness which we 
 must seek to overcome if, as seems likely in the 
 future, navies contain more under-water boats 
 than any other craft," 
 
 " That is not quite true," spoke up a grizzled 
 Royal Naval Reserve man, and told a story of 
 submarine v. submarine which I am not permitted 
 to repeat. 
 
 • • • • • 
 
 " Yes," said the Commander of the Utopia 
 (the ]\Iarine's ship), " very clever and very in- 
 genious. But did you ever hear how the Navy, 
 not the merchant service this time, caught a 
 
 submarine off the Lightship. That was 
 
 finesse, if you please, Mr. Royal Naval Reserve." 
 
 Our young Marine hugged himself. He had set 
 the Navy talking, and when the Navy talks there 
 come forth things which make glad the ears. 
 
 " You know the Lightship," went on 
 
 the Commander, a sea potentate of thirty-five, 
 with a passion for music-hall songs which he sang 
 most divinely. " She is anchored on a shoal which 
 lies off the entrance to one of the busiest of our 
 English harbours. Though her big lantern is
 
 ilO THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 not lighted in war time the ship remains as a day 
 mark, and two men are always on board of her. 
 She is anchored on the top of a sandbank where at 
 low water there are not more than twelve feet, 
 though close by the channels deepen to thirty 
 feet. A little while ago the men in the Lightship 
 were interested to observe a German submarine 
 approach at high water — of course submerged — 
 and to take up a position about a hundred yards 
 distant where the low-water soundings were 
 twenty-two feet. There she remained on the 
 bottom from tide to tide, watching through her 
 periscope all the shipping which passed in and 
 out of the harbour. Her draught in cruising 
 trim was about fourteen feet, so that at high water 
 she was completely submerged except for the 
 periscope and at low water the top of her conning 
 tower showed above the surface. At high tide 
 she slipped away with the results of her observa- 
 tions. The incident was reported at once to the 
 naval authorities and the lightship men were 
 instructed to report again at once if the sub- 
 marine's performance was repeated. A couple of 
 days later, under the same conditions, Fritz in his 
 submarine came back and the whole programme 
 of watchfully waiting was gone through again. 
 He evidently knew the soundings to a hair and lay 
 where no destroyer could quickly get at him 
 through the difficult winding channels amid the 
 sandbanks except when the tide was nearly at 
 the full. Even at dead low water he could, if 
 surprised, rise and float and rapidly make off to 
 where there was depth enough to dive. H e couldn't 
 be rushed, and there were three or four avenues 
 of escape. Fritz had discovered a safe post of
 
 WITH THE GRAND FLEET 111 
 
 observation and seemed determined to make the 
 most of it. But, Mr. Eoyal Naval Reserve, even the 
 poor effete old Navy has brains and occasionally 
 uses them. The night after the second visit an Ad- 
 miralty tug came along, hauled up the lightship's 
 anchors, and shifted her exactly one hundred yards 
 east-north-east. You will note that the German 
 submarine's chosen spot was exactly one hundred 
 yards west-south- westof the lightship's old position. 
 The change was so slight that it might be expected 
 to escape notice. And so it did. Three days passed, 
 and then at high tide the U-boat came cheerfully 
 along upon its mission and lay off the lightship 
 exactly as before. The only difference was that now 
 she was upon the top of the shoal with barely twelve 
 feet under her at low water instead of twenty-two 
 feet. The observers in the lightship wdnked at one 
 another, for they had talked with the officer of the 
 Admiralty tug and were wise to the game. The tide 
 fell, the submarine lay peacefully on the bottom, 
 and Fritz, intent to watch the movements of ships 
 in and out of the harbour, did not notice that the 
 water was steadily falling away from his sides 
 and leaving his whole conning tower and deck 
 exposed. Far away a destroyer was watching, 
 and at the correct moment, when the water around 
 the U-boat was too shallow to float her even in 
 the lightest trim, she slipped up as near as she 
 could approach, trained a 4-inch gun upon Fritz 
 and sent in an armed boat's crew to wish him good- 
 day. Poor old Fritz knew nothing of his visitors 
 until they were hammering violently upon his fore 
 hatch and calling upon him to come out and sur- 
 render. He was a very sick man and did not 
 understand at all how he had been caught until
 
 112 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 the whole manceuvre had been kindly explained 
 to him by the Lieutenant- Commander of the 
 destroyer, from whom I also received the story. 
 
 * You see, Fritz, old son,' observed the Lieutenant- 
 Commander, * Admiralty charts are jolly things 
 and you know all about them, but you should 
 sometimes check them with the lead. Things 
 change, Fritz ; lightships can be moved. Come 
 and have a drink, old friend, you look as if you 
 needed something stiS.' Fritz gulped down a 
 tall whisky and soda, gasped, and gurgled out, 
 
 * That was damn clever and I was a damn fool. 
 For God's sake don't tell them in Germany how I 
 was caught.' * Not for worlds, old man ' replied 
 the Lieutenant-Commander. ' We will say that 
 you were nabbed while trying to ditch a hospital 
 ship. There is glory for you.' " 
 
 " A very nice story," observed the Royal Naval 
 Reserve man drily. 
 
 " I believed your yarn," said the Commander 
 reproachfully, " and mine is every bit as true as 
 yours. But no matter. Call up the band and 
 let us get to real business." 
 
 Two minutes later the ante-room had emptied, 
 and these astonishing naval children were out on 
 the half-deck dancing wildly but magnificently. 
 Commanders and Lieutenants were mixed up with 
 Subs., clerks and snotties from the gun-room. 
 Rank disappeared and nothing counted but the 
 execution of the most complicated Russian 
 measures. It was a strange scene which perhaps 
 helps to reveal that combination of professional 
 efficiency and childish irresponsibility which makes 
 the Naval Service unlike any other community of 
 men and boys in the world.
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE MEDITERRANEAN ". A FAILURE AND ITS 
 CONSEQUENCES 
 
 War is made up of successes and failures. We 
 
 English do not forget our successes, but we have 
 
 an incorrigible habit of wiping from our minds 
 
 the recollection of our failures. Which is a very 
 
 bad habit, for as every man realises, during his 
 
 half-blind stumbles through life, failure is a most 
 
 necessary schoolmistress. Yet, though Chilians 
 
 seem able to bring themselves to forget that in 
 
 war we ever fail of success, soldiers and sailors do 
 
 not forget, and are always seeking to make of their 
 
 admitted mistakes, stepping stones upon which 
 
 they may rise to ultimate victory. On land one 
 
 may retrieve errors more readily than at sea, for 
 
 movements are much slower and evil results declare 
 
 themselves less rapidly. I am now compelled to 
 
 write of a failure at sea very early in the war, 
 
 which was not retrieved, and which had a trail 
 
 of most disastrous consequence ; and I hope to 
 
 do it without imputing blame to anyone, no blame, 
 
 that is, except for the lack of imaginative vision, 
 
 which is one of our most conspicuous defects as a 
 
 race. 
 
 All of those who read me know that the blows 
 which we have struck in France and Flanders, ever 
 since the crowning victory of the Marne — that 
 
 113
 
 114 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 still unexplained miracle which saved western 
 civilisation from ruin — are the direct consequence 
 of the success in the North Sea of our mobilised 
 fleets in August, 1914. But few know— or if 
 they do, have pushed the knowledge testily from 
 their minds — of a failure in the Mediterranean, 
 also in August of 1914, a failure which at the 
 time may have seemed of little account, yet out 
 of which grew in inevitable melancholy sequence, 
 a tragical train of troubles. Though we may 
 choose to forget. Fate has a memory most damnably 
 long. Nothing would be more unfair than to lay 
 at the door of the Navy the blame for all the 
 consequences of a failure which, it has been 
 officially held, the officers on the spot did their 
 utmost to avert. Men are only human after all, 
 and the sea is a very big place. We need not 
 censure anyone. Still, we should be most foolish 
 and bUnd to the lessons of war if we did not now 
 and then turn aside from the smug contemplation 
 of our strategical and tactical victories, and seek 
 in a humble spirit to gather instruction from a 
 grievous pondering over the consequences of our 
 defeats. And of this particular defeat of which 
 I write the results have been gloomy beyond 
 description— the sword in the balance which threw 
 Turkey and Bulgaria into alliance with our enemies, 
 and all the blood and the tears with which the 
 soil of the Near East has been soaked. 
 
 When war broke out all our modern battleships 
 were in the North Sea, but of our nine fast battle 
 cruisers four were away. The Australia was at 
 the other side of the world, and the Inflexible 
 (flag), Indomitahle and Indefatigable were in the 
 Mediterranean. We also had four armoured
 
 THE MEDITERRANEAN 115 
 
 cruisers, and four light cruisers in the Mediterranean 
 — the armoured Defence, Duke of Edinburgh, 
 Warrior and Black Prince, the light fast Gloucester 
 of the new " Town " class, a sister of the Glasgow 
 and the Bristol, and three other similar cruisers. 
 The Germans had in the Mediterranean the battle 
 cruiser Goeben, as fast, though not so powerfully 
 gunned, as the three Inflexibles of ours. She 
 carried ten 11 -inch guns, while our battle cruisers 
 were each armed with eight 12 -inch guns. The 
 Goeben had as her consort the light cruiser Breslau, 
 one of the German Town class built in 1912, a 
 newer and faster edition of the earlier Town 
 cruisers which were under von Spec in the Pacific 
 and Atlantic. She could have put up a good fight 
 though probably an unsuccessful one against the 
 Gloucester, but was no match for the Defence, 
 the Warrior, the Black Prince or Duke of Edin- 
 burgh. Our squadrons in the Mediterranean were, 
 therefore, in fighting value fully three times as 
 powerful as the German vessels. Our job was to 
 catch them and to destroy them, but unfortunately 
 we did not succeed in bringing them to action. 
 The story of their evasion of us, and of what their 
 escape involved is, to my mind, one of the most 
 fascinating stories of the whole war. 
 
 War officially began between France and Ger- 
 many upon August 3rd at 6.45 p.m. when the 
 German Ambassador in Paris asked for his pass- 
 ports, and between Great Britain and Germany 
 upon August 4th at 11 p.m., when our ultimatum 
 in regard to Belgium was definitely rejected. But 
 though then at war with Germany, England did 
 not declare war on Austria until midnight of 
 August 12th. A queer situation arose in the
 
 116 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 Mediterranean as the result of these gaps between 
 the dates of active hostilities. Upon August 4th, 
 the German cruisers could and did attack French 
 territory without being attacked by us, and all 
 through those fateful days of August 5th and 6th, 
 when our three battle cruisers were hovering 
 between Messina and the Adriatic and our four 
 armoured cruisers were lying a little to the south 
 oft Syracuse, Italy was neutral, and Austria was 
 not at war with us. Our naval commanders were 
 in the highest degree anxious to do nothing which 
 could in any way offend Italy — whose position 
 as still a member of the Triple Alliance with Austria 
 and Germany was delicate in the extreme — and 
 were also anxious to commit no act of hostility 
 towards Austria. Upon August 4th, therefore, 
 their hands were tied tight ; upon the 5th and 6th 
 they were untied as against the German cruisers, 
 but could not stretch into either Italian or Austrian 
 waters. The German Admiral took full advantage 
 of the freedom of movement allowed to him by 
 our diplomatic bonds. 
 
 Let us now come to the story of the escape of 
 the two German cruisers, indicate as clearly as 
 may be how it occurred, and suggest how the 
 worst consequences of that escape might have 
 been retrieved by instant and spirited action on 
 the part of our Government at home. Naval 
 responsibility, as distinct from political responsi- 
 bility, ended with the escape of the Goehen and 
 Breslau and their entry into the Dardanelles on 
 the way up to Constantinople which then, and 
 for nearly three months afterwards, was nominally 
 a neutral port. 
 
 On July 31st, 1914, the Goehen, a battle cruiser
 
 THE MEDITERRANEAN 117 
 
 armed with ten 11 -inch guns, and with a full 
 speed of twenty-eight to twenty-nine knots, was at 
 Brindisi in the territorial waters of Italy, a country 
 which was then regarded by the Germans as an 
 ally. She was joined there on August 1st by the 
 Breslau, a light cruiser of some three knots less 
 speed than the Goeben and armed only with twelve 
 4*1 -inch guns. The German commanders had 
 been warned of the imminence of hostilities with 
 France — and, indeed, upon that day French terri- 
 tory had been violated by German covering troops, 
 though war had not yet been declared. The 
 French Fleet was far away to the west, already 
 busied with the transport of troops from Algeria 
 and Morocco to Marseilles. Based upon Malta 
 and in touch with the French was the British 
 heavy squadron of three battle cruisers. The 
 Indefatigable, a heavier and faster vessel than 
 either of the sisters Inflexible or Indomitable, was 
 certainly a match for the Goeben by herself ; the 
 three battle cruisers combined were of over- 
 powering strength. Accompanying the battle 
 cruisers was the armoured cruiser squadron — 
 Black Prince, Duke of Edinburgh, Warrior and 
 Defe7ice — together with the light cruiser Gloucester. 
 The other light cruisers and the destroyer escort 
 do not come directly into my picture. The 
 Gloucester — which, as she showed later, had the 
 heels of the Breslau though not of the speedy 
 Goeben — was despatched at once to the Adriatic 
 to keep watch upon the movements of the Germans. 
 So long as the Germans were in the Adriatic, the 
 English Admiral, Sir Berkeley Milne, could do 
 nothing to prevent their junction with the Austrians 
 at Pola, but upon August 2nd, they both came
 
 118 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 out and went to Messina, and so uncovered the 
 Straits of Otranto, which give passage between 
 Messina and the Adriatic. The English battle 
 cruisers then steamed to the south and east of 
 Sicily, bound for the Otranto Straits. R ear- 
 Admiral Troub ridge, in command of the English 
 armoured cruisers, remained behind. 
 
 Upon August 1st, the Italian Government had 
 declared its intention to be neutral, and upon 
 the 3rd the Italian authorities at Messina refused 
 coal to the German ships, very much to the out- 
 spoken disgust and disappointment of the German 
 Admiral who had reckoned Italy as at least passively 
 benevolent. But being a man of resource, he 
 filled his bunkers from those of German vessels 
 in the harbour, and early in the morning of August 
 4th — having received news the previous evening 
 that war had broken out with France, and was 
 imminent with England — dashed at the Algerian 
 coast and bombarded Philippeville and Bona, 
 whence troops had been arranged to sail for France. 
 When one reflects upon the position of Admiral 
 Souchon, within easy striking distance of three 
 English battle cruisers, which at any moment 
 might have been transformed by wireless orders 
 into enemies of overwhelming power, this dash 
 upon Philippeville and Bona was an exploit 
 which would merit an honourable mention upon 
 any navy's records. Souchon did, in the time 
 available to him, all the damage that he could to 
 his enemy's arrangements, and then sped back to 
 Messina, passing on the way the Inflexible (flag), 
 Indmnitahle, and Gloucester, which had thus got 
 into close touch with the Germans, though they 
 were not yet free to go for them. The enterprising
 
 THE MEDITERRANEAN 119 
 
 Souchon had cut Ms time rather fine, and come 
 near the edge of destruction ; for though at the 
 moment of passing the Inflexible and hidomitahle, 
 England was still at peace with Germany, war was 
 declared before he reached the neutral refuge of 
 Messina on August 5th. Milne's hands were 
 thus tied at the critical moment when he had both 
 the elusive German cruisers under the muzzles of 
 his hungry guns. 
 
 At Messina the Goehen and Breslau were again 
 refused coal, and were ordered to be clear of the 
 port within twenty-four hours. Italy was reso- 
 lutely neutral ; it was a severe blow. Upon the 
 .night of August 4th-5th had come another blow 
 — a wireless message, picked up at sea, that England 
 had declared war. The position of the Germans 
 now appeared to be desperate, more so to them 
 than even to us, for Admiral Souchon had already 
 been warned by the Austrians not to attempt the 
 passage of the Straits of Otranto, and had also 
 received direct orders at Messina from Berlin to 
 make a break eastwards for Constantinople. His 
 prospects of eluding our Squadrons and of reaching 
 the Uardanelles must have seemed to him of the 
 smallest. It is of interest to note, as revealing 
 the hardy quality of Admiral Souchon, that these 
 orders from Berlin reached him at midnight upon 
 August 3rd before he made his raid upon Philippe- 
 ville and Bona. He might have steamed o^ at 
 once towards the east in comparative security, 
 for England was not yet at war and our battle 
 cruisers were not yet waiting upon his doorstep. 
 But instead of seeking safety in flight he struck 
 a shrewd blow for his country and set back the 
 hour of his departure for the east by three whole 
 
 9
 
 120 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 days. He sent off a wireless message to Greece 
 asking that coal might be got ready for his ships 
 near an inconspicuous island in the iEgean. 
 Admiral Souchon may personally be a frightful 
 Hun — I don't know, I have never met him — but, 
 I confess that, as a sailor, he appeals to me very 
 strongly. In resource, in cool decision, and in 
 dashing leadership he was the unquestioned superior 
 of the English Admirals, whose job it was to get 
 the better of him. 
 
 Upon August 6th, a day big with fate for us 
 and for South Eastern Europe, the Goeben and 
 Breslau were at Messina with steam up. They 
 had again obtained coal from compatriot ships 
 and could snap their fingers at Italian neutrality. 
 Watching them was the light cruiser Gloucester, 
 which was no match at all for the Goeben, and 
 strung out to the north-east, guarding the passage 
 from Messina to the Adriatic, were the three 
 English battle cruisers Inflexible, Indomitcible and 
 Indefatigable. The English armoured cruisers. 
 Black Prince, Duke of Ediyiburgh, Defence and 
 Warrior, were cruising to the South oft Syracuse. 
 It is not contended that these four vessels could 
 not have been oil Messina, and could not have met 
 and fought Souchon, when at last he issued forth. 
 The contention is — and since it has been accepted 
 by the Admiralty as sound, one is compelled humbly 
 to say little— that none of these cruisers was suffi- 
 ciently armed or armoured to risk action with a 
 battle cruiser of the Goeben s class. It is urged 
 that if Milne had ordered the armoured cruiser 
 squadron to fight the Goeben, their Admiral, 
 Troubridge, might have anticipated the fate of 
 Cradock three months later at Coronel. Not one
 
 THE MEDITERRANEAN 121 
 
 of them had a speed approaching that of the 
 Goeben, and their twenty- two heavy guns were 
 of 9'2-inch calibre as opposed to the ten 11 -inch 
 guns of the Germans. That they would have 
 suffered serious loss is beyond doubt ; but might 
 they not, while dying, have damaged and delayed 
 the Goehen for a sufficient time to allow the two 
 Inflexibles and the Indefatigable to come down 
 and gobble her up ? It is not for a layman to 
 offer any opinion upon these high naval matters. 
 But ever since the action was not fought, and the 
 Goeben and Breslaii escaped, whenever two or 
 three naval officers are gathered together and the 
 subject is discussed, the vote is always thrown 
 upon the side of fighting. The Soul of the Navy 
 revolts at the thought that its business is to play 
 for safety when great risks boldly faced may yield 
 great fruits of victory. 
 
 The dispositions of the English Admiral were 
 designed to meet one contingency only — an attempt 
 by the Germans to pass the Straits of Otranto and 
 to join the Austrians ; he had evidently no sus- 
 picion that they had been ordered to Constantinople 
 and took no steps to bar their way to the east. 
 The handling of his two ships by Admiral Souchon 
 was masterly. Until the latest minute he masked 
 his intentions and completely outmanoeuvred his 
 powerful English opponents. Issuing from Messina 
 on the afternoon of August 6th, he made towards 
 the north-east as if about to hazard the passage 
 to the Adriatic, and the small Gloucester, which 
 most gallantly kept touch with far superior forces 
 — she was some two knots slower than the Goeben, 
 though rather faster than the Breslau — fell back 
 before him and called up the battle cruisers on
 
 12J THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 her wireless. Souchon did not attempt to interfere 
 with the Gloucester, for she was doing exactly what 
 he desired of her. He kept upon his course to 
 the north-east until darkness came down, and then, 
 swinging suddenly eight points to starboard, pointed 
 straight for Cape Matapan far ofl to the south-east 
 and called for full speed. Then and then only he 
 gave the order to jam the Gloucester's wireless. 
 
 He did not wholly succeed, the Gloucester's 
 warning of his change of route got through to the 
 battle cruisers, but they were too far away to 
 interpose their bulky veto on the German plans. 
 For -two hours the German ships travelled at full 
 speed, the Goeben leading, and behind them trailed 
 the gallant Gloucester, though she had nothing 
 bigger in her armoury than two 6 -inch guns, and 
 could have been sunk by a single shell from the 
 Goeben's batteries. Twice she overhauled the 
 Breslau and fired upon her, and twice the Goeben 
 had to fall back to the aid of her consort and drive 
 away the persistent English captain. The gallantry 
 of the Gloucester alone redeems the event from 
 being a bitter English humiliation. All the while 
 she was vainly pursuing the German vessels the 
 Gloucester continued her calls for help. They 
 got through, but the Goeben and Breslau had 
 seized too long a start. They were clear away 
 for the Dardanelles and Constantinople, and 
 were safe from effective pursuit. 
 
 Vice-Admiral Souchon knew his Greeks and his 
 Turks better than we did. He coaled his ships 
 at the small island of Denusa in the Cyclades with 
 the direct connivance of King Constantine, who 
 had arranged for coal to be sent over from Syra, 
 and ignored a formal message from the Sublime
 
 THE MEDITERRANEAN 123 
 
 Porte forbidding him to pass the Dardanelles. 
 He was confident that the Turks, still anxious to 
 sit upon the fence until the safer side were dis- 
 closed, would not dare to fire upon him, and he 
 was justified of his confidence. He steamed 
 through the Narrows unmolested and anchored 
 before Constantinople. There a telegram was 
 handed to him from the Kaiser : " His Majesty- 
 sends you his acknowledgements.'' One must 
 allow that the Imperial congratulations were 
 worthily bestowed. Souchon had done for Ger- 
 many a greater service than had any of her generals 
 or admirals or diplomats ; he had definitely com- 
 mitted Turkey to the side of the Central Powers. 
 
 • • • • • 
 
 If of all words of tongue and pen 
 The saddest are " It might have been," 
 More sad are these we daily see, 
 " It is, but hadn't ought to be." 
 
 Bret Harte. 
 
 For the escape of the Goehen and Breslau, the 
 Royal Navy was responsible, but for the conse- 
 quences which grew out of that escape the respon- 
 sibility rests upon La haute Politique at home. 
 The naval failure might have been retrieved within 
 forty-eight hours had our Foreign Office under- 
 stood the hesitating Turkish mind, and had realised 
 that Souchon's breach of the Dardanelles Con- 
 vention — which bars the Straits to foreign war- 
 ships—had brought to us a Heaven-sent oppor- 
 tunity to cut the bonds of gold and intrigue which 
 bound the Turkish Government to that of Germany. 
 Every Englishman in Constantinople expected 
 that a pursuing English squadron of overwhelming 
 power would immediately appear ofi the Turkish
 
 124 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 capital and insist upon the surrender or destruction 
 of the German trespassers. Just as Souchon had 
 passed the Dardanelles unmolested, so ]Milne with 
 his three battle cruisers— had orders been sent to 
 him — might have passed them on the day follow- 
 ing. The Turks own no argument but force, and 
 the greater force would have appeared to them 
 to be the better argument. Milne, had he been 
 permitted by the British Foreign Office, could 
 have followed the Goehen and Bi'eslau to Constan- 
 tinople and sunk them there before the eyes of the 
 world. Had he done so, the history of the war 
 would have been very different. Upon the Cabinet 
 at home must rest the eternal responsibility for 
 not seeing and not seizing the finest and least 
 hazardous opportunity that has been offered to 
 us of determining by one bold stroke the course of 
 the war. The three English battle cruisers could 
 not have seized Constantinople any more effectively 
 than the English Squadron, without military co- 
 operation, could have seized it seven months later 
 had it succeeded in forcing with its guns the passage 
 of the Narrows. But they could have revealed 
 to the vacillating Turks, as in a lightning flash, 
 that the Allies had the wit to see, and the boldness 
 to grasp the vital opportunities offered by war. 
 "But our Government had neither the wit nor the 
 courage, the wonderful chance was allowed to slip 
 by unused, and the costliest failure of the war was 
 consummated in all its tragic fullness. 
 
 All through August and September and right 
 up to the moment when, late in October, Turkey 
 was forced into the war by German pressure, our 
 Foreign Office hugged the belief— God alone knows 
 how acquired — that diplomatic pressure at Con-
 
 THE MEDITERRANEAN 125 
 
 stantinople could counteract the display of success- 
 ful force embodied in the frowning guns of the 
 Goehen and the Breslctu. In the eyes of a non- 
 maritime people two modern warships within easy 
 gunshot of their chief city are of more pressing 
 consequence than the Grand Fleet far away. Our 
 Government accepted gladly the preposterous story 
 that these German ships had been purchased by 
 the Turks — with German money — and had been 
 taken over by Turkish officers and crews. It is 
 pitiful to read now the official statement issued on 
 August 15th, 1914, through the newly-formed 
 Press Bureau : " The Press Bureau states that 
 there is no reason to doubt that the Turkish Govern- 
 ment is about to replace the German officers and 
 crews of the Goehen and Breslau by Turkish officers 
 and crews.'' As evidence of Oriental good faith 
 a photograph of the Goehen flying the Turkish 
 naval flag was kindly supplied for publication in 
 English newspapers. What could be more con- 
 vincing ? Then, when the moment was ripe and 
 there was no more need for the verisimilitude of 
 photographs, came the rough awakening, an- 
 nounced as follows : 
 
 " On October 29th, without motive and without 
 anything to show that such action ivas pending, 
 three Turkish torpedo craft appeared suddenly 
 before Odessa. . . . The same day the cruisers 
 Breslau and Hamidieh, bombarded several com- 
 mercial ports in the Black Sea, including Novo- 
 rossisk and Theodosia. In the forenoon of 
 October 30th, the Goehen bombarded Sevastopol 
 without causing any serious damage. By way of 
 reprisals the Franco-British squadron in the Eastern
 
 126 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 Mediterranean carried out a demonstration against 
 the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles at 
 daybreak on November 3rd/' 
 
 No comment which I might make could bite 
 more deeply than the bald quotation describing 
 this irruption of Turkey as " without motive and 
 without anything to show that such action was 
 pending." Caeci sunt oculi cum animus alias 
 res agit — The eyes are blind when the mind is 
 obsessed.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS ! THE DISASTER OFF CORONEL 
 
 . Sunset and evening star 
 And after that the dark. 
 
 During the years 1912 and 1913 the Captain of 
 the British cruiser Monmouth, the senior English 
 Naval Officer on the China Station, and Admiral 
 Count von Spee, commanding the German Far- 
 Eastern Squadron were close and intimate friends. 
 The intimacy of the chiefs extended to the officers 
 and men of the two squadrons. The English and 
 Germans discussed with one another the chances 
 of war between their nations, and wished one 
 another the best of luck when the scrap came. 
 The German Squadron, which has since been 
 destroyed, was like no other in the Kaiser's Navy. 
 It was commanded by professional officers and 
 manned by long-service ratings. It had taken 
 for its model the English Navy, and it had absorbed 
 much of the English naval spirit. Count von 
 Spee, though a Prussian Junker, was a gentle- 
 man, and with Captain von Miiller, who after- 
 wards made the name of the Emden immortal, was 
 worthy to serve under the White Ensign. Let 
 us always be just to those of our foes who, though 
 they fight with us terribly, yet remain our chivalrous 
 
 127
 
 128 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 friends. I will tell a pretty story which will 
 illustrate the spirit of comradeship which existed 
 between the English and German squadrons during 
 those two years before the war. 
 
 In December 1912 the Monmouth was cruising 
 in the Gulf of Pechili, which resembles a long 
 flask with a narrow bottle neck. Admiral von 
 Spee, who was lying with his powerful squadron 
 off Chifu, in the neck of the bottle, received word 
 from a correspondent that the second Balkan War 
 had brought England and Germany within a short 
 distance of " Der Tag." Von Spee and his officers 
 did not clink glasses to " The Day " ; they were 
 professionals who knew the English Navy and its 
 incomparable power ; they left silly boastings to 
 civilians and to their colleagues of Kiel who had 
 not eaten of English salt. Count von Spee thought 
 first of his English friend who, in his elderly cruiser, 
 was away up in the Gulf at the mercy of the 
 German Squadron, which was as a cork in its 
 neck. He at once despatched a destroyer to find 
 the Monmouth's captain and to warn liim that 
 though there might be nothing in the news it 
 were better for him to get clear of the Gulf. 
 " There may be nothing in the yarn," he wrote, 
 *' I have had many scares before. But it would 
 be well if you got out of the Gulf. I should be 
 most sorry to have to sink you." When the 
 destroyer came up with the Monmontli she had 
 returned to Wei-hai-wei, and the message was 
 delivered. Her skipper laughed, and sent an 
 answer somewhat as follows : " My dear von Spee, 
 thank you very much. I am here. J'y suis, 
 J'y Teste. I shall expect you and your guns at 
 breakfast to-morrow morning." War did not
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 129 
 
 come tlien ; when von Spee did meet and sink 
 the Monmouth she had another captain in com- 
 mand, but the story remains as evidence of the 
 chivalrous naval spirit of the gallant and skilful 
 von Spee. 
 
 In November 1913 the Monmouth left the China 
 Station, and before she went, upon November 6th, 
 her crew were entertained sumptuously by von 
 Spee and von Miiller. She was paid ofi in January 
 1914, after reaching home, but was recommissioned 
 in the following July for the test mobilisation, 
 which at the moment meant so much, and which 
 a few weeks later was to mean so much more. 
 When the war broke out, the Monmouth, with her 
 new officers and men, half of whom were naval 
 reservists, was sent back to the Pacific. The 
 armoured cruiser Good Hope, also commissioned 
 in July, was sent with her, and the old battleship 
 Canopus was despatched a little later. Details of 
 the movements of these and of other of our war 
 ships in the South Atlantic and Pacific are given 
 in the chapters entitled " The Cruise of the Glas- 
 goiv." The Glasgow had been in the South Atlantic 
 at the outbreak of war, and was joined there by 
 the Good Hope and Monmouth. 
 
 Meanwhile war had broken out, and we will for 
 a few moments consider what resulted. The 
 Emden, Captain von ]\liiller, was at the German 
 base of Tsing-tau, but Admiral von Spee, with the 
 armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, was 
 among the German Caroline Islands far to the 
 south of the China Sea. The Dresden was in the 
 West Indies and the Leipzig and Niirnberg on the 
 West Coast of Mexico (the Pacific side). The 
 Japanese Fleet undertook to keep von Spee out
 
 130 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 of China waters to the north, and the Australian 
 Unit— wliich then was at full strength and included 
 the battle cruiser Australia with her eight 12-inch 
 guns and the light cruisers Melbourne and Sydney, 
 each armed with eight sixes— made themselves 
 responsible for the Australian end of the big sea 
 area. The Emden, disguised as an English cruiser, 
 with four funnels— the dummy one made of 
 canvas- got out of Tsing-tau under the noses of 
 the Japanese watchers, made off towards the 
 Indian Ocean, and pursued that lively and solitary 
 career which came to its appointed end at the Cocos- 
 Keeling Islands, as will be described fully later on 
 in this book. The Australian Unit, burning with 
 zeal to fire its maiden guns at a substantial enemy, 
 sought diligently for von Spee and requisitioned 
 the assistance of the French armoured cruiser 
 Montcalm, an old slow and not very useful vessel 
 which happened to be available for the hunt. 
 Von Spee was discovered in his island retreat and 
 pursued as far as Fiji, but the long arm of the 
 English Admiralty then interposed and upset the 
 merry game. We were short of battle cruisers 
 where we wanted them most — in the North Sea — 
 so the Australia was summoned home and the 
 remaining ships of the Unit, no longer by them- 
 selves a match for von Spee, were ordered back 
 to Sydney in deep disgust. " A little more," 
 declared the bold Australians, who under their 
 English professional officers had been hammered 
 into a real Naval Unit, " and we would have done 
 the work which the Invincible and Inflexible had 
 to do later. If we had been left alone there would 
 not have been any disaster off Coronel." While 
 one can sympathise with complaints such as this
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 131 
 
 from eager fire-eaters, one lias to accept their 
 assertions with due caution. The German High 
 Seas Fleet was at that time a more important 
 objective than even von Spec. So the Australia 
 sailed for England to join up with the Grand Fleet, 
 and von Spec had rest for several weeks. He was 
 not very enterprising. Commerce hunting did 
 not much appeal to him, though his light cruisers, 
 the Dresden and Leipzig, did some little work in 
 that line when on their way to join their Chief 
 at Easter Island where the squadron ultimately 
 concentrated. On the way across, von Spec 
 visited Samoa, from which we had torn down the 
 German flag, but did no damage there. On 
 September 22nd, he bombarded Tahiti, in the 
 Society Islands, a foolish proceeding of which 
 he repented later on when the Coronel action left 
 him short of shell with no means of replenish- 
 ment. For eight days he stayed in the Marquesas 
 Islands taking in provisions, thence he went to 
 Easter Island and Masafuera, and so to Valparaiso, 
 where the Chilian Government, though neutral, 
 was not unbenevolent. He was for three weeks 
 at Easter Island (Chilian territory), coaling from 
 German ships there, and in this remote spot — a 
 sort of Chilian St. Kilda — remained hidden both 
 from the Chilian authorities and from our South 
 Atlantic Squadron. 
 
 We must now return to the British Squadron 
 which had been sent out to deal with von Spee 
 as best it might. Cradock with such a squadron, 
 all, except the light cruiser Glasgoiv, old and slow, 
 had no means of bringing von Spee to action under 
 conditions favourable to himself, or of refusing 
 action when conditions were adverse. Von Spee,
 
 132 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 with his concentrated homogeneous squadron, all 
 comparatively new and well-armed cruisers, all 
 of about the same speed of twenty- one or twenty- 
 two knots, all trained to a hair by constant work 
 during a three years' commission, had under his 
 hand an engine of war perfect of its kind. He 
 could be sure of getting the utmost out of co- 
 operative eiiorts. The most powerful in guns of 
 the English vessels was the battleship Canopus, 
 which, when the action off Coronel was fought, 
 was 200 miles away to the south. She bore 
 four 12-inch guns in barbettes— in addition to 
 twelve sixes — but she was fourteen years old and 
 could not raise more than about thirteen to fourteen 
 knots except for an occasional burst. Any one 
 of von Spec's ships, with 50 per cent, more speed, 
 could have made rings round her. Had Cradock 
 waited for the Canojjus — as he was implored to 
 do by her captain, Grant, — and set the speed of his 
 squadron by hers, von Spec could have fought 
 him or evaded him exactly as he pleased. " H 
 the English had kept their forces together,'' wrote 
 von Spec after Coronel, " then we should certainly 
 have got the worst of it." This was the modest 
 judgment of a brave man, but it is scarcely true. 
 If the English had kept their forces together von 
 Spee need never have fought ; they would have 
 had not the smallest chance of getting near him 
 except by his own wish. Admiral Cradock flew 
 his flag in the armoured cruiser Good Hope, which, 
 though of 14,000 tons and 520 feet long, had only 
 two guns of bigger calibre than 6-inch. These were 
 of 9 2 inches, throwing a shell of 380 lb., but the 
 guns, like the ship, were twelve years old. Her 
 speed was about seventeen knots, four or five
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 133 
 
 knots less than that of the German cruisers she 
 had come to chase ! The Monmouth, of the 
 " County Class/' was as obsolete as the Good 
 Hope. Eleven years old, of nearly 10,000 tons, 
 she carried nothing better than fourteen 6-inch 
 guns of bygone pattern. She may have been 
 good for a knot or two more than the Good Hope, 
 but her cruising and fighting speed was, of course, 
 that of the flagship. 
 
 The one efiective ship of the whole squadron 
 was the Glasgow, which curiously enough is the 
 sole survivor now of the Coronel action, either 
 German or English. Out of the eight warships 
 which fought there off the Chilian coast on No- 
 vember 1st, 1914, five German and three English, 
 the Glasgow alone remains afloat. She is a modern 
 light cruiser, first commissioned in 1911. The 
 Glasgow is light, long and lean. She showed that 
 she could steam fully twenty-five knots and 
 could fight her two 6-inch and ten 4-inch guns 
 most efiectively. She was a match for any one of 
 von Spec's light cruisers, though unable to stand 
 up to the ScharnJiorst or Gyieisenau. The modern 
 English Navy has been built under the modern 
 doctrine of speed and gun-power — the Good Hope, 
 Monmouth, and Canopus, the products of a bad, 
 stupid era in naval shipbuilding, had neither speed 
 nor gun-power. The result, the inevitable result, 
 was the disaster of Coronel in which the English 
 ships were completely defeated and the Germans 
 barely scratched. The Germans had learned the 
 lesson which we ourselves had taught them. 
 
 When one considers the two squadrons which 
 met and fought off Coronel, in the light of ex- 
 perience cast by war, one feels no surprise that
 
 134 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 the action was over in fifty-two minutes. Cradock 
 and bis men, 1,600 of them, fought and died. 
 
 Sunset and evening star 
 And after that the dark. 
 
 The Glasgow would also have been lost had she 
 not been a new ship with speed and commanded 
 by a man with the moral courage to use it in order 
 to preserve his vessel and her crew for the further 
 service of their country. Von Spee, who had 
 the mastery of manoeuvre, brought Cradock to 
 action when and how he pleased, and emphasised 
 for the hundredth time in naval warfare that speed 
 and striking power and squadron training will 
 win victory certainly, inevitably, and almost with- 
 out hurt to the victors. Like the Falkland Islands 
 action of five weeks afterwards, that off Coronel 
 was a gun action. No torpedoes were used on 
 either side. It was one of the last purely gun 
 actions which will probably be fought in our time. 
 
 • • # • • 
 
 At the end of October the British and German 
 squadrons were near to one another, though until 
 they actually met oft Coronel the British com- 
 manders did not know that the concentrated 
 German Squadron was off the Chilian coast. Von 
 Spee knew that an old pre-Dreadnought battle- 
 ship had come out from England, though he was 
 not sure of her class. He judged her speed to be 
 higher than that of the Canopus, which, though 
 powerfully armed, was so lame a duck that she 
 would have been more of a hindrance than a help 
 had Cradock joined up with her. Von Spee had 
 an immense advantage in the greater handiness
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 135 
 
 and cohesiveness of his ships. The Scharnhorst 
 and Gneisenau were sisters, completed in 1907, 
 and alike in all respects. Their shooting records 
 were first-class ; they were indeed the crack 
 gunnery ships under the German ensign. Their 
 sixteen 8 ■2-inch guns — eight each — fired shells of 
 275 lb. weight, nearly three times the weight of 
 the 100-lb. shells fired from the 6-inch guns which 
 formed the chief batteries of their opponents the 
 Good Hope and Monmouth. They were three 
 months out of dock but they could still steam, as 
 they showed at Coronel, at over twenty knots in 
 a heavy sea. The light cruisers Dresden, Leipzig 
 and Nurnherg were not identical though very 
 nearly alike. Their armament was the same — 
 ten 4 "l -inch guns apiece — and their speed nearly 
 the same. The Dresden was the fastest as she 
 was the newest, a sister of the famous Emden. 
 None of the German light cruisers was so fast or 
 so powerful as the Glasgow, but together they 
 were much more than a match for her, just as 
 the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau together were 
 more than a match for the Good Hope and Mon- 
 mouth. When, therefore, von Spee found himself 
 opposed to the British armoured cruisers he was 
 under no anxiety ; he had the heels of them and 
 the guns of them ; they could neither fight success- 
 fully with him nor escape from him. The speedy 
 Glasgow might escape — as in fact she did — but 
 the Good Hope and the Monmouth were doomed 
 from the moment when the action was joined. 
 
 I have dwelt upon the characteristics of the 
 rival squadrons at the risk of being wearisome 
 since an understanding of their qualities is essential 
 to an understanding of the action. 
 
 10
 
 136 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 On October 31st, the Glasgow put into Coronel, 
 a small coaling port near Concepcion and to the 
 south of Valparaiso, which had become von Spec's 
 unofficial base. He did not remain in territorial 
 waters for more than twenty-four hours at a time, 
 but he got what he liked from German ships in 
 the harbour. The Glasgow kept in wireless touch 
 wdth the Good Hope and Monmouth, which were 
 some fifty miles out at sea to the west, and von 
 Spec picked up enough from the English wireless 
 to know that one of our cruisers was at Coronel. 
 At once he despatched the Niirnberg to shadow 
 the Glasgow^ to stroll as it were unostentatiously 
 past the little harbour, while he with the rest of 
 the squadron stayed out of sight to the north. 
 In the morning of November 1st out came the 
 Glasgow and made for the rendezvous where she 
 was to join the other cruisers and the Otranto, 
 an armed liner by which they were accompanied. 
 The wireless signals passing between the watching 
 Nilrnherg and von Spec were in their turn picked 
 up by the Good Hope, so that each squadron then 
 knew that an enemy was not far off. Cradock, 
 an English seaman of the fighting type, deter- 
 mined to seek out the Germans, though he must 
 have suspected their superiority of force. Neither 
 side actually knew the strength of the other. 
 Cradock spread out his vessels fan - wise in the 
 early afternoon and ordered them to steam in this 
 fasliion at fifteen knots to the north-east. 
 
 At twenty minutes past four the nearest ships 
 on either side began to sight one another, and 
 until they did so Cradock had no knowledge that 
 he had knocked up against the whole of the German 
 Pacific Squadron. The German concentration had
 
 *JuanFernand 
 
 Masafuera 
 
 SantaM 
 
 G.ofPe 
 
 . ^f''-- °f f^a-ge//. 
 
 
 'Or-o 
 
 THE SOUTU SEAS. 
 
 136]
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 137 
 
 been effected secretly and most successfully. When 
 the Scharnhorst, von Spee's flagship, first saw the 
 Glasgow and Monmouth they were far ofi to the 
 west- south-west and had to wait for more than 
 half an hour until the Good Hope, which was still 
 farther out to the west, could join hands with them. 
 Meanwhile the German ships, which were also 
 spread out, had concentrated on the Scharnhorst. 
 They were the Gneisenau, Dresden, and Leifzig, 
 for the Niirnberg had not returned from her watch- 
 ing duties. Cradock, who saw at once that the 
 Germans were getting between his ships and the 
 Chilian coast, and that he would be at a grave 
 disadvantage by being silhouetted against the 
 western sky, tried to work in towards the land. 
 But von Spee, grasping his enemy's purpose, set 
 the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau going at twenty 
 knots due south against a heavy sea and forced 
 himself between Cradock and the coast. When 
 the two light cruisers drew up, the four German 
 ships fell into line parallel with the English cruisers 
 and between them and the land. All these pre- 
 liminary manoeuvres were put through while the 
 two squadrons were still twelve miles apart, and 
 they determined the issue of the subsequent action. 
 For von Spee, having thrust the English against 
 the background of the declining sun and being 
 able, with his greater speed, to hold them in this 
 position and to decide absolutely the moment 
 when the firing should begin, had effectively won 
 the action before a shot had been fired. So long 
 as the sun was above the horizon the German 
 ships were lighted up and w^ould have made 
 admirable marks could Cradock have got within 
 range. But von Spee had no intention of letting
 
 138 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 him get within range until the sun had actually 
 set and had ceased to give light to Cradock's 
 gunners. His own men for an hour afterwards 
 could see the English ships standing out as clearly 
 as black paper outlines stuck upon a yellow canvas 
 screen. " I had manoeuvred," wTote von Spee 
 to a friend, on the day following the action, " so 
 that the sun in the west could not disturb me. . . . 
 When we were about five miles ofi I ordered the 
 firing to commence. The battle had begun, and 
 with a few changes, of course, I led the line quite 
 calmly." He might well be calm. The greater 
 speed of his squadron had enabled him to out- 
 manoeuvre the English ships, and to wait until 
 the sunset gave him a perfect mark and the English 
 no mark at all. He might well be calm. Dark- 
 ness everywhere, except in the western sky behind 
 Cradock's ships, came down very quickly, the 
 nearly full moon was not yet up, the night was fine 
 except for scuds of rain at intervals. Between 
 seven and eight o'clock — between sunset and 
 moonrise — von Spee had a full hour in which to 
 do his work, and he made the fullest use of the 
 time. At three minutes past seven he began to 
 fire, when the range was between five and six 
 miles, and he hit the Good Hope at the second salvo. 
 His consort the Gneisenau did the same with the 
 Monmouth. It was fine shooting, but not extra- 
 ordinary, for the German cruisers were crack ships 
 and the marks were perfect. At the third salvo 
 both the Good Hope and Momnouth burst into 
 flames forrard, and remained on fire, for German 
 shell rained on them continually. They could 
 rarely see to reply and never replied elTectively. 
 The Good Hope's lower deck guns were smothered
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 139 
 
 by the sea and were, for all practical purposes, out 
 of action. Yet they fought as best they could. 
 Von Spee slowly closed in and the torrent of heavy 
 shell became more and more bitter. We have no 
 record of the action from the Good Hope and 
 Monmouth, for not a man was saved from either 
 ship. The Glasgow, which, after the Otranto had 
 properly made off early in the action — she was not 
 built for hot naval work— had both the Dresden 
 and the Leipzig to look after, could tell only of 
 her own experiences. Captain Luce in quiet sea 
 service fashion has brought home to us what 
 they were. " Though it was most trying to receive 
 a great volume of fire without a chance of returning 
 it adequately, all kept perfectly cool, there was 
 no wild firing, and discipline was the same as at 
 battle practice. When a target ceased to be 
 visible gunlayers simultaneously ceased fire.'' 
 Yet the crews of active ratings and reservists 
 struggled gamely to the end. It came swiftly and 
 mercifully. 
 
 We have detailed accounts of the action from 
 the German side, of which the best was written 
 by von Spee himself on the following day. There 
 is nothing of boasting or vainglory about his simple 
 story ; though the man was German he seems to 
 have been white all through. I have heard much 
 of him from those who knew him intimately, and 
 willingly accept his narrative as a plain statement 
 of fact. Given the conditions, the speed and 
 powers of the opposing squadrons, the skilful 
 preliminary manoeuvres of von Spee before a shot 
 was fired, and the veil of darkness which hid the 
 German ships from the luckless English gunners, 
 the result, as von Spee reveals it, was inevitable.
 
 140 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 He held his fire until after sunset, and then closing 
 in to about 10,000 yards— a little over five miles — 
 gave the order to begin. He himself led the line 
 in the ScharnJiorst and engaged the Good Hope, 
 the Gneisenau following him took the Monmouth 
 as her opposite number. The Leipzig engaged 
 the Glasgoiv, and the Dresden the Otranto. The 
 shell from the 8 •2-inch batteries of the German 
 armoured cruisers — each could use six guns on a 
 broadside— got home at the second salvo and the 
 range was kept without apparent difficulty. The 
 fires which almost immediately broke out in the 
 Good Hope and Monmouth gave much aid to the 
 German gunners, who, when the quick darkness of 
 the southern night came down, were spared the 
 use of their searchlights. '* As the two big enemy 
 ships were in flames," writes one careful German 
 observer, " we were able to economise our search- 
 lights." Then, closing in to about 5,000 yards, 
 von Spee poured in a terrific fire so rapid and 
 sustained that he shot away nearly half his am- 
 munition. After fifty-tw^o minutes from the firing 
 of the first shell the Good Hope blew up. " She 
 looked," wrote von Spee, " like a splendid fire- 
 work display against a dark sky. The glowing 
 white flames, mingled with bright green stars, 
 shot up to a great height." Cradock's flagship 
 then sank, though von Spee thought for long 
 afterwards that she was still afloat. The Otranto 
 had made her escape, but the Monmouth, which 
 could not get away, and the Glasgow — which at 
 any moment could have shown the enemy her heels 
 — still continued the unequal fight. The night 
 had become quite dark, the flames in the Monmouth 
 had burned out or been extinguished, and the
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 141 
 
 Germans had. lost sight of their prey. The ScJiarn- 
 horst and Gneisenau worked round to the south, 
 and the Leipzig and Dresden were sent curving 
 to the north and west, in order to keep the English 
 ships away from the shelter of the land. Just 
 then the light cruiser NUrnherg, which had been 
 sent upon the scouting expedition of which I 
 have told, arrived upon the scene of action and 
 encountered the crippled Monmouth. Had the 
 English cruiser been undamaged, she could soon 
 have disposed of this new combatant, but she was 
 listing heavily and unable to use her guns. 
 Running up close the NUrnherg poured in a broad- 
 side which sent the Monmouth to the bottom. 
 The Glasgow, badly damaged above water, but 
 still full of speed and mettle, could do no more. 
 The big German cruisers were coming up. Her 
 captain took the only possible course. Shortly 
 before the stricken Monmouth disappeared under 
 the waves he made off at full speed. 
 
 No one was picked up, either from the Good 
 Ho'pe or the Monmouth. Von Spec, who was not 
 the man to neglect the rescue of his drowning 
 enemies, gives an explanation. He was far from 
 the Good Hope when she blew up, but the NUrnherg 
 was quite close to the foundering Monmouth ; 
 why was no attempt made at rescue in her case 
 at least ? It was dark and there was a heavy sea 
 running, but the risks of a rescue are not sufficient 
 to excuse the absence of any attempt. The 
 NUrnherg had not been in the main action, she was 
 flying up, knowing nothing of what had occurred, 
 when she met and sank the Monmouth. Her 
 captain saw other big ships approaching and 
 thought that one of them was the Good Hope,
 
 142 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 This is von Speeds excuse for the omission of his 
 subordinate to put out boats — or even life lines — 
 but one suspects that the captain of the Nilrnberg 
 had a bad quarter of an hour when next he met 
 his chief. 
 
 The German squadron was undamaged, scarcely- 
 touched. Three men were wounded by splinters 
 in the Gneisenau. That is the whole casualty list. 
 One 6-inch shell went through the deck of the 
 Scharnhorst but did not explode — the " creature 
 just lay down " and went to sleep. " It lay there/' 
 writes von Spee, " as a kind of greeting." The 
 light German cruisers were not touched at all. 
 But though the German squadron had come through 
 the fight unharmed, it had ceased to be of much 
 account in a future battle. The silly bombard- 
 ment of Tahiti, and the action off Coronel, had so 
 depleted the once overflowing magazines that not 
 half the proper number of rounds were left for 
 the heavy guns. No fresh supplies could be 
 obtained. Von Spee could fight again, but he 
 could not have won again had he been opposed 
 to much lighter metal than that which overwhelmed 
 him a few weeks later off the Falkland Islands. 
 
 On the second day after the action von Spee 
 returned to Valparaiso. Though his own ship 
 had fought with the Good Hope and he had seen 
 her blow up he did not know for certain what had 
 become of her. This well illustrates the small 
 value of observers' estimates of damage done to 
 opponents during the confusion of even the simplest 
 of naval fights. Distances are so great and light 
 is so variable. The destruction of the Monmouth 
 was known, but not that of the Good Hope. So 
 von Spee made for Valparaiso to find out if the
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 143 
 
 English flagship had sought shelter there. In- 
 cidentally he took with him the first news of his 
 victory, and the large German colony in the 
 Chilian city burned to celebrate the occasion in 
 characteristic fashion. But von Spec gave little 
 encouragement. He was under no illusions. He 
 fully realised the power of the English Navy and 
 that his own existence and that of his squadron 
 would speedily be determined. He " absolutely 
 refused " to be celebrated as national hero, and 
 at the German club, where he spent an hour and 
 a half, declined to drink a toast directed in offensive 
 terms against his English enemies. In his conduct 
 of the fights with our ships, in his orders, in his 
 private letters, Admiral von Spec stands out as 
 a simple honest gentleman. 
 
 He was a man not very energetic. Though 
 forcible in action and a most skilful naval tactician, 
 he does not seem to have had any plans for the 
 general handling of his squadron. If an enemy 
 turned up he fought him, but he did not go out 
 of his way to seek after him. Pie dawdled about 
 among the Pacific Islands during September and 
 at Easter Island during most of October ; after 
 Coronel he lingered in and out of Valparaiso doing 
 nothing. He must have known that England 
 would not sit down in idle lamentation, but he 
 did nothing to anticipate and defeat her plans for 
 his destruction. His shortage of coal and am- 
 munition caused him to forbid the commerce 
 raiding which appealed to the officers of his light 
 cruisers, and probably the same weakness made 
 him reluctant to seek any other adventures. For 
 five weeks he made no attempt even to raid the 
 Falkland Islands which lay helplessly expecting
 
 144 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 his stroke, and when at last he started out by the 
 long safe southern route round the Horn, it was 
 to walk into the mouth of the avenging English 
 squadron which had been gathered there to receive 
 him. One tiling is quite certain : he heard no 
 whisper of the English plans and expected to meet 
 nothing at the Falkland Islands more formidable 
 than the Canopus, the Glasgow, and perhaps one 
 or two " County Class '' cruisers, such as the 
 Cornwall or Kent. He never expected to be 
 crunched in the savage jaws of two battle cruisers ! 
 Whilethis kindly, rather indolentG erman Admiral 
 was marking time off the Chilian coast, the squadron 
 which was to avenge the blunder of Coronel was 
 assembling from the ends of t^e earth towards 
 the appointed rendezvous off the Brazilian coast. 
 The Bristol, a sister of the Glasgow, had come in 
 from a long cruise in the West Indies, during which 
 she had met and exchanged harmless shots with 
 another German wanderer, tlie Karlsruhe. The 
 Invincible and Inflexible were racing down from 
 the north. The Cornwall and Kent, burning to 
 show that even " County " cruisers were not 
 wholly useless in battle, and the armoured cruiser 
 Carnarvon were already in the South Atlantic. 
 The poor old Canopus and the Glasgow had fore- 
 gathered at Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands 
 on November 8th, but were immediately ordered 
 north to ^lontevideo to meet the other cruisers 
 on the passage south. They left in accordance 
 with these orders, but the Canopus was turned 
 back by wireless, so that Port Stanley might have 
 some naval protection against the expected von 
 Spee raid. Here the Canopus was put aground 
 in the mud, painted in futurist colours, and con-
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 145 
 
 verted into a land fort. Witli her four 12-inch 
 guns she could at least have made the inner harbour 
 impassable to the Germans. The Glasgow docked 
 for repairs at Rio, and then joined the avenging 
 squadron which had concentrated of! Brazil, and 
 with them swept down to the Falkland Islands 
 which were reached upon the evening of Decem- 
 ber 7th. All the English ships, to which had been 
 committed the destruction of von Spee, had then 
 arrived. The stage was set and the curtain about 
 to go up upon the second and final act of the 
 Pacific drama. Upon the early morning of the 
 following day, as if in response to a call by Fate, 
 von Spee and his squadron arrived. After five 
 weeks of delay he had at last made up his mind to 
 strike.
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS : CLEANING UP 
 
 Now is the winter of our discontent 
 
 Made glorious summer . . . 
 
 And all the clouds that lour'd . . . 
 
 In the deep bosom of the ocean buried. 
 
 The naval operations whicli culminated in tlie 
 action oft' the Falkland Islands are associated 
 vividly in my mind with two little personal in- 
 cidents. On November 12th, 1914, a week after 
 the distressful news had reached this country of 
 the destruction by the enemy of the cruisers Good 
 Hope and Monmouth of! the Chilian coast, a small 
 slip of paper was brought to me in an envelope 
 which had not passed through the post. I will 
 not say from whom or whence that paper came. 
 Upon it were written these words : " The battle 
 cruisers Invincible and Inflexible have left for the 
 South Atlantic.'" That was all, twelve words, 
 but rarely has news which meant so much been 
 packed into so small a space. The German Sea 
 Command would have given a very great deal 
 for the sight of that scrap of paper which, when 
 read, I burned. For it meant that two fast 
 battle cruisers, each carrjdng eight 12-inch guns, 
 were at that moment speeding south to dispose 
 for ever of von Spec's Pacific Squadron. The 
 battle cruisers docked and coaled at Devonport 
 
 146
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 147 
 
 on November Oth, lOth, and 11th ; hundreds of 
 humble folk like myself must have known of their 
 mission and its grim purpose, yet not then nor 
 afterwards until their work was done did a whisper 
 of their sailing reach the ears of Germany. 
 
 The Invincible and Inflexible coaled off St. Vin- 
 cent, Cape Verde Islands, and again south of the 
 Line. At the appointed rendezvous off Brazil they 
 were joined by the Carnarvon, Kent, Cornwall, 
 and Bristol, the armed liner Orama, and many 
 colliers. Weeks had passed and yet no word of 
 the English plans, even of the concentration in 
 force, reached von Spee, who still thought that 
 he had nothing more formidable to deal with than 
 a few light cruisers and the old battleship Canopus. 
 
 Nothing is more difficult to kill than a legend, 
 and perhaps the most invulnerable of legends is 
 that one v/hich attributes to the German Secret 
 Service a superhuman efficiency. I oft'er to the 
 still faithful English believers two facts which in 
 a rational world would blast that legend for ever : 
 the secret mission of the Invincible and Inflexible 
 to the Falkland Islands in November-December 
 1914, and the silent transport of the original 
 British Expeditionary Force across the Channel 
 during the first three weeks of war. And yet, 
 I suppose, the legend will survive. The strongest 
 case, says Anatole France in Penguin Island^ is 
 that which is wholly unsupported by evidence. 
 
 The second incident which sticks in my mind 
 was a scene in a big public hall on the evening of 
 December 9th. Lord Rosebery was in the middle 
 of a recruiting speech — chiefly addressed, as he 
 plaintively observed, to an audience of baldheads 
 —when there came a sudden interruption. Pink
 
 148 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 newspapers fluttered across the platform, the 
 coat tails of the speaker were seized, and one of 
 the papers thrust into his hands. We all waited 
 while Lord Rosebery adjusted his glasses and read 
 a stop-press message. What he found there 
 pleased him, but he was in no hurry to impart his 
 news to us. Pie smiled benevolently at our 
 impatience, and deliberately worked us up to 
 the desired pitch of dramatic intensity. Then at 
 last he stepped forward and read : 
 
 " At 7.30 a.m. on December 8th the Scharnhorst , 
 the Gneisenau, the Nilrnberg, the Lepizig, and the 
 Dresden were sighted near the Falkland Islands 
 by a British Squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir 
 Frederick Sturdee. An action followed in the 
 course of which the Scharnhorst (flying the flag of 
 Admiral Graf von Spec), the Gneisenau, and the 
 Leipzig were . . . sunk." 
 
 At that word, pronounced with tremendou.i 
 emphasis, 6,000 people jumped to their feet; 
 they shouted, they cheered, they stamped upon 
 the floor, they sang " Rule Britannia " till the 
 walls swayed and the roof shuddered upon its 
 joists. It was a scene less of exultation than of 
 relief, relief that the faith of the British people 
 in the long arm of the Royal Navy had been so 
 fully justified. Cradock and the gallant dead of 
 Coronel had been avenged. The mess had been 
 cleaned up. 
 
 "I thought," said Lord Rosebery, as soon as 
 the tumult had died down, " I thought that would 
 wake you up." 
 
 At Devonport the Invincible and Inflexible had
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 149 
 
 been loaded " to the utmost capacity,'"' not only 
 with stores and ammunition for their own use, but 
 with supplies to replenish the depleted magazines 
 of their future consorts. They steamed easily 
 well out of sight of land, except when they put in 
 to coal ofi St. Vincent, and made the trip of 4,000 
 miles to the rendezvous near the Line in a little 
 over fourteen days. They cleared the Sound in 
 the evening of November 11th, and found the 
 other cruisers I have mentioned awaiting them 
 at the appointed rendezvous on the Brazilian coast 
 in the early morning of November 26th. Two 
 days passed, days of sweltering tropic heat, during 
 which the stores, brought by the battle cruisers, 
 were parcelled out among the other ships and 
 coal was taken in by all the ships from the atten- 
 dant colliers. The speed of a far-cruising squadron 
 is determined absolutely by its coal supplies. 
 When voracious eaters of coal like battle cruisers 
 undertake long voyages, it behoves them to cut 
 their fighting speed of some twenty-eight knots 
 down to a cruising speed of about one-half. By 
 the morning of Saturday, November 28th, the now 
 concentrated and fully equipped avenging Squadron 
 was ready for its last lap of 2,5C0 miles to the 
 Falkland Islands. The English vessels, spread 
 out in a huge fan, swept down, continually search- 
 ing for the enemy oii the coasts of South America, 
 where rumour hinted that he had taken refuge. 
 The several ships steamed within the extreme 
 range of visible signalling — so that no tell-tale 
 wireless waves might crackle forth warnings to 
 von Spec. It was high summer in the south 
 and the weather glorious, though the temperature 
 steadily fell as the chilly solitudes of the Falklands
 
 150 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 were approached. No Germans were sighted, 
 and the Falkland Islands were reached before 
 noon on December 7th. The Squadron had already 
 been met at the rendezvous and joined by the 
 light cruiser Glasgow. The old Canopus, so slow 
 and useless as a battleship that she had been put 
 aground on the mud of the inner harbour (Port 
 Stanley) to protect the little settlement there, 
 was found at her useful but rather inglorious post. 
 Most of the vessels anchored in the large outer 
 harbour (Port William) and coaling was begun at 
 once, but though it was continued at dawn of 
 the following day it was not then destined to be 
 completed. 
 
 Up to this moment the plans of Whitehall had 
 worked to perfection. The two great battle 
 cruisers had arrived at the rendezvous from 
 England, the Squadron had secretly concentrated 
 and then searched the South Atlantic, the Falkland 
 Islands had been secured from a successful surprise 
 attack which would have given much joy to our 
 enemies, yet not a whisper of his fast approaching 
 doom had sped over the ether to von Spee. 
 Throughout the critical weeks of our activity he 
 had dawdled irresolutely off Valparaiso. All our 
 ships were ready for battle, even the light cruiser 
 Glasgow, so heavily battered in the Coronel action 
 that her inside had been built up with wooden 
 shores till it resembled the " Epping Forest,*' after 
 which the lower deck had christened it, and she 
 had a hole as big as a church door in one side 
 above the water-line. She had steamed to Rio 
 in this unhappy plight and had been there well 
 and faithfully repaired. Captain Luce and his 
 men were full of fight ; they had their hurts and
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 161 
 
 their humiliation to avenge and meant to get 
 their own back with interest. They did ; their 
 chance came upon the following day, and they 
 used it to the full. 
 
 Whitehall had done its best, and now came a 
 benevolent Joss to put the crowning seal upon its 
 work. Coronel was bad black Joss, but the Falk- 
 land Islands will go down to history as a shining 
 example of the whiteness of the Navy's good Joss 
 when in a mood of real benignity. We desired 
 two things to round ofi the scheme roughed out 
 at the Admiralty on November 6th : we wanted 
 — though it was the last thing which we expected 
 — we wanted the German Pacific Squadron to 
 walk into the trap which had so daintily been 
 prepared, and they came immediately, on the 
 very first morning after our arrival at the Falkland 
 Islands, at the actual moment w^hen Vice-Admiral 
 Sturdee and Rear-Admiral Stoddart (of the Car- 
 narvon), with heads bent over a big chart, were 
 discussing plans of search. They might have 
 come and played havoc with the Islands on any 
 morning during the previous fiver weeks, yet they 
 did not come until December 8th, when we were 
 just ready and most heartily anxious to receive 
 them hospitably. We wanted a fine clear day 
 with what the Navy calls " full visibility/' We 
 got it on December 8th. And this was a very 
 wonderful thing, for the Falkland Islands are 
 cursed with a vile cold climate, almost as cold 
 in the summer of December as in the winter of 
 June. It rains there about 230 days in the year, 
 and even when the rain does not fall fog is far 
 more frequent than sunshine. The climate of the 
 Falklands is even some points more forbidding 
 
 11
 
 152 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 than the dreadful climate of Lewis in the Hebrides 
 which it closely resembles. Yet now and then, 
 at rare intervals, come gracious days, and one of 
 them, the best of the year, dawned upon December 
 8th. The air was bright and clear, visibility was 
 at its maximum, the sea was calm, and a light 
 breeze blew gently from the north-west. Our 
 gunners had a full view to the horizon and a 
 kindly swell to swing the gunsights upon their 
 marks. For Sturdee and his gunners it was a 
 day of days. Had von Spee come upon a wet 
 and dull morning all would have been spoiled ; he 
 could have got away, his squadron could have 
 scattered, and we should have had many weary 
 weeks of search before compassing his destruction. 
 But he came upon the one morning of the year 
 when we were ready for him and the perfect 
 weather conditions made escape impossible. Our 
 gunnery officers from, their spotting tops could 
 see as far as even the great 12-inch guns could 
 shoot. When the Fates mean real business there 
 is no petty higgling about their methods ; they 
 ladle out Luck not in spoonfuls but with shovels. 
 The Squadron which had come so far to clean 
 up the mess of Coronel was commanded by Vice- 
 Admiral Sir F. C. Doveton Sturdee, who had been 
 plucked out of his office chair at the Admiralty 
 — he was Director of Naval Intelligence — and 
 thrown up upon the quarter-deck of the Invincible. 
 He was the right man for the job, a cool-headed 
 scientific sailor who would make full use of the 
 power and speed of his big ships and yet run no 
 risk of suffering severe damage thousands of miles 
 away from a repairing base. Those who criticise 
 his leisurely deliberation in the action, and the
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 158 
 
 long-range fighting tactics which dragged out the 
 death agony of the Scharnhorst for three and a 
 half hours and of the Gneisenaii for five, forget 
 that to Sturdee an hour or two of time, and a 
 hundred or two rounds of heavy shell, were as 
 nothing when set against the possibility of damage 
 to his battle cruisers. His business was to sink 
 a very capable and well-armed enemy at the 
 minimum of risk to his own ships, and so he 
 determined to fight at a range — on the average 
 about 16,000 yards (9 J land miles) — which made 
 his gunnery rather ineffective and wasteful, yet 
 certain to achieve its purpose in course of time. 
 
 Just as von Spee at Coronel, having the 
 advantage of greater speed and greater power, 
 could do what he pleased with the Good Hope and 
 Monmouth, so Sturdee with his battle cruisers could 
 do what he pleased with von Spee. The Invincible 
 and Inflexible could steam at twenty-eight knots 
 — they were clean ships — while the Scharnhorst 
 and the Gneisenau, now five months out of dock, 
 could raise little more than twenty. The superior- 
 ity of the English battle cruisers in guns was no 
 less than in speed. Each carried eight 12-inch 
 guns, firing a shell of 850 lb., while von Spec's 
 two armoured cruisers were armed with eight 
 8 ■2-inch guns, firing shell of 275 lb. Sturdee, 
 with his great advantage of speed, could set the 
 range outside the effective capacity of von Spec's 
 guns, secure against anything but an accidental 
 plunging shot upon his decks, while the light 
 German 6-inch armour upon sides and barbettes 
 was little protection against his own 12-inch 
 armour-piercing shell. Sturdee could keep his 
 distance and pound von Spee to bits at leisure.
 
 164 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 The •'• visibility" was perfect, space was unlimited, 
 the Germans had no port of refuge, and from dawn 
 to sunset Sturdee had sixteen hours of working 
 daylight. He was in no hurry, though one may 
 doubt if he expected to take so unconscionable 
 a time as three and a half hours to sink the Scharn- 
 Jiorst and five hours to dispose of the Gneisenau. 
 It was not that Sturdee's gunnery was bad — 
 relatively, that is, to the gunnery of other ships 
 or of other navies. The word bad suggests blame. 
 But it was certainly ineffective. After the Falk- 
 land Islands action, and after those running 
 fights in the North Sea between battle cruisers, it 
 became dreadfully clear that naval gunnery is 
 still in its infancy. All the brains and patience 
 and mechanical ingenuity which have been lavished 
 upon the problem of how to shoot accurately from 
 a rapidly moving platform at a rapidly moving 
 object, all the appliances for range-finding and 
 range-keeping and spotting, leave a margin of 
 guesswork in the shooting, which is a good deal 
 bigger than the width of the target fired at. The 
 ease and accuracy of land gunnery in contrast 
 with the supreme difficulty and relative inaccuracy 
 of sea gunnery were brought vividly before me 
 once in conversation with a highly skilled naval 
 gunner, " Take a rook rifle," said he, " put up 
 a target upon a tree, measure out a distance, sit 
 down, and fire. You will get on to your target 
 after two or three shots and then hit it five times 
 out of six. You will be a land gunner with his 
 fixed guns, his observation posts, his aeroplanes 
 or kite balloons, his maps upon which he can 
 measure up his ranges. Then get into a motor- 
 car with your rook rifle, get a friend to drive you
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 155 
 
 rapidly along a country road, and standing up 
 try what sport you make of Mtting the rabbits 
 which are running and jumping about in the 
 fields. That, exaggerated a bit perhaps, is sea 
 gunnery. We know our own speed and our own 
 course, but we don't know exactly either the 
 enemy's speed or the enemy's course ; we have 
 to estimate both. As he varies his course and his 
 speed— he does both constantly— he throws out 
 our calculations. It all comes down to range- 
 finding and spotting, trial and error. Can you be 
 surprised that naval gunnery, measured by land 
 standards, is wasteful and ineffective ? " " No," 
 said I, " I am surprised that you ever hit at all." 
 
 The English Squadron began to coal at half- 
 past three upon that bright summer miorning of 
 December 8th, and the grimy operation proceeded 
 vigorously until eight o'clock, when there came 
 a sudden and most welcome interruption. Columns 
 of smoke were observed far away to the south- 
 east, and, presently, the funnels of two approaching 
 vessels were made out. There were three others 
 whose upper works had not yet shown above the 
 horizon. Coaling was at once stopped and steam 
 raised to full pressure. Never have our engineer 
 staffs more splendidly justified their advance in 
 ofi&cial status than upon that day. Not only did 
 they get their boilers and engines ready in the 
 shortest possible time, but, in the subsequent 
 action, they screwed out of their ships a knot or 
 two more of speed than they had any right to do. 
 The action was gained by speed and gun power ; 
 without the speed — the speed of clean-bottomed
 
 156 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 ships against those which, after five months at 
 sea, had become foul— the power of the great 
 guns could not have been fully developed. So, 
 when we remember Sturdee and his master gunners 
 and gunnery officers in the turrets and aloft in 
 the spotting tops, let us also remember the master 
 engineers hidden out of sight far below who gave 
 to the gunners their opportunity. 
 
 The battle cruisers, whose presence it was desired 
 to conceal until the latest moment, poured oil 
 upon their furnaces and, veiled in clouds of the 
 densest smoke, awaited the rising of the pressure 
 gauges. In the outer harbour the light cruisers 
 collected, and from her immovable position upon 
 the mud-banks the old Canopus loosed a couple 
 of pot shots from her big guns at the distant 
 German at a range of six miles. Admiral Graf 
 von Spec and his merry men laughed — they knew 
 all about the Canopus. Then, when all was 
 ready, the indomitable Glasgow, the Kent (own 
 sister to the sunken Monmouth), and the armoured 
 Carnarvon issued forth to battle. In the words 
 of an eye-witness, later a prisoner, " The Germans 
 laughed till their sides ached." A few more 
 minutes passed, and then, from under the cover 
 of the smoke and the low fringes of the harbour, 
 steamed grandly out the Invincible and In-flexible, 
 cleared for action, their huge turrets fore and aft 
 and upon either beam bristling with the long 
 12-inch guns, their turbines working at the fullest 
 pressure, the flag of Vice-Admiral Sturdee fluttering 
 aloft. There was no more German laughter. 
 Von Spec and his officers and men were gallant 
 enemies, they saw instantly the moment the 
 battle cruisers issued forth, overwhelming in their
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 167 
 
 speed and power, that for themselves and for their 
 squadron the sun had risen for the last time. 
 They had come for sport, the easy capture of the 
 Falkland Islands, but sport had turned upon the 
 instant of staggering surprise to tragedy ; nothing 
 remained but to fight and to die as became gallant 
 seamen. And so they fought, and so they died, 
 all but a few whom we, more merciful than the 
 Germans themselves at Coronel, plucked from the 
 cold sea after the sinking of their ships. 
 
 The German Squadron— the two armoured 
 cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, each with 
 eight 8 •2-inch guns, and the three light cruisers 
 Niirnherg, Dresden, and Leipzig, each armed with 
 ten 4 T -inch guns — made off at full speed, and 
 for awhile the English Squadron followed at the 
 leisurely gait for the battle cruisers of about 
 twenty knots so as to keep together. It was at 
 once apparent that our ships had the legs of the 
 enemy, and could catch them when they pleased 
 and could fight at any range and in any position 
 which they chose to select. That is the crushing 
 advantage of speed ; when to speed is added gun 
 power a fleeing enemy has no chance at all, if 
 no port of refuge be available for him. In weight 
 and power of guns there was no possible com- 
 parison. The Invincible and Inflexible, which 
 had descended from the far north to swab up the 
 mess of Coronel, were at least three times as 
 powerful as the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, crack 
 gunnery ships though they might be. Their 
 12-inch guns could shoot with ease and with 
 sufficient accuracy for their purpose at a range 
 beyond the full stretch of the German 8 •2-inch 
 weapons however deftly they might be handled.
 
 168 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 Their lO-inch armour upon the turrets and conning- 
 tower was invulnerable against chance liits when 
 closing in, and the armoured decks covering their 
 inner vitals were practicably impenetrable. The 
 chances of disaster were reduced almost to nothing- 
 ness by Sturdee's tactics of the waiting game. 
 When at length he gave the order to open fire 
 he kept out at a distance which made the per- 
 centage of his hits small, yet still made those 
 hits which he brought ofi" tremendously effective. 
 A bursting charge of lyddite in the open may 
 do little damage, even that contained in a 12-inch 
 shell, but the same charge exploded within the 
 decks of a cruiser is multiplied tenfold in destruc- 
 tiveness. 
 
 Presently the German Squadron divided, the 
 enemy light cruisers and attendant transports 
 seeking safety in flight from our light cruisers 
 despatched in chase while the armoured cruisers 
 held on pursued by the two battle cruisers and 
 the armoured Carnarvon, whose ten guns were of 
 7 '5- and 6-inch calibre. The Carnarvon, light 
 though she was by comparison with the battle 
 cruisers, did admirable and accurate work, and 
 proved in the action by no means a negligible 
 consort. There was no hurry. A wide ocean 
 lay before the rushing vessels, the enemy had no 
 opportunity of escape so long as the day held 
 clear and fine, and the English ships could close 
 in or open out exactly as they pleased. During 
 most of the fight which followed the Invincible 
 and Inflexible steered upon courses approximately 
 parallel with those of the Germans, following them 
 as they dodged and winded like failing hares, 
 always maintaining that dominating position which
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 159 
 
 in these days of steam corresponds with Nelson's 
 weather gauge. It followed from their position 
 as the chasers that they could not each use more 
 than six guns, but this was more than compen- 
 sated for by the enemy's inability to use more 
 than four of his heavier guns in the Scharnhorst 
 or Gneisenau. 
 
 I have met and talked with many naval officers 
 and men who have been in action during the 
 present war, and have long since ceased to put a 
 question which received an invariable answer. 
 I used to inquire " Were you excited or sensibly 
 thrilled either when going into action or after it 
 had begun ? " This was the substance though 
 not the words of the question. One does not talk 
 in that land fashion with sailor-men. The answer 
 was always the same. " Excited, thrilled, of 
 course not. There was too much to do." An 
 action at sea is glorified drill. Every man knows 
 his job perfectly and does it as perfectly as he 
 knows how. Whether he be an Admiral or a 
 ship's boy he attends to his job and has no time 
 to bother about personal feelings. Naval work 
 is team work, the individual is nothing, the team 
 is everything. This is why there is a certain 
 ritual and etiquette in naval honours ; personal 
 distinctions are very rare and are never the result 
 of self-seeking. There is no pot-hunting in the 
 Sea Service. Not only are actions at sea free 
 from excitement or thrills, but for most of those 
 who take part in them they are blind. Not one 
 in twenty of those who fight in a big ship see 
 anything at all — not even the gun-layers, when the 
 range is long and they are " following the Control." 
 Calmly and blindly our men go into action, calmly
 
 160 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 and blindly they fight obeying exactly their 
 orders, calmly and blindly when Fate wills they 
 go down to their deaths. In their calmness and 
 in their blindness they are the perfected fruits of 
 long centuries of naval discipline. The Sea Service 
 has become highly scientific, yet in taste and in 
 sentiment it has changed little since the days of 
 Queen Elizabeth. The English sailor, then as 
 now, has a catlike hatred of dirt, and never fights 
 so happily as when his belly is well filled. The 
 officers and men of the battle cruisers had been 
 coaling when the enemy so obligingly turned up, 
 and they had breakfasted so early that the meal 
 had passed from their memories. There was 
 plenty of time before firing could begin. So, 
 while the engineers sweated below, those w4th 
 more leisure scrubbed the black grime from their 
 skins, and changed into their best and brightest 
 uniforms to do honour to a great occasion. Then 
 at noon " all hands went to dinner." 
 
 The big guns of the battle cruisers began to 
 pick up the range of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau 
 at five minutes to one, three hours after the chase 
 had begun, when the distance from the enemy's 
 armoured cruisers was some 18,000 yards, say ten 
 land miles. And while the huge shots fly forth 
 seeking their prey, let us visit in spirit for a few 
 minutes the spotting top of the Invincible, and 
 discover for ourselves how it is possible to serve 
 great guns with any approach to accuracy, when 
 both the pursuing and pursued ships are travelling 
 at high speed upon different courses during which 
 the range and direction are continually varying.
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 161 
 
 The Invincible worked up at one time to twenty- 
 nine knots (nearly thirty-four miles an hour), 
 though not for long, since a lower speed was better 
 suited to her purpose, and the firing ranges varied 
 from 22,000 yards down to the comparatively close 
 quarters of six miles, at which the ScharnJiorst 
 and, later, the Gneisenau were sent to the bottom. 
 From the decks of the Invincible, when the main 
 action opened, little could be seen of the chase 
 except columns of smoke, but from the fire-control 
 platform one could make out through glasses the 
 funnels and most of the upper works of the German 
 cruisers. At this elevation the sea horizon was 
 distant 26,000 yards (about 15 J land miles), and 
 upon the day of the Falkland Islands fight " visi- 
 bility '' was almost perfect. When an enemy 
 ship can be seen, its distance can be measured 
 within a margin of error of half of one per cent. — 
 — fifty yards in ten thousand ; that is not difficult, 
 but since both the enemy vessel and one's own 
 ship are moving very fast, and courses are being 
 changed as the enemy seeks to evade one's fire 
 or to direct more efficiently his own guns, the 
 varying ranges have to be kept, which is much 
 more difficult. It follows that three operations 
 have to be in progress simultaneously, of which 
 one is a check upon and a correction of the other 
 two. First, all the range-finders have to be kept 
 going and their readings compared ; secondly, the 
 course and speed of one's own ship have to be 
 registered with the closest accuracy and the 
 corresponding speeds and courses of the enemy 
 observed and estimated ; thirdly, the pitching of 
 one's shots has to be watched and their errors 
 noted as closely as may be. All this delicate
 
 162 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 gunnery work is partly mechanical but chiefly 
 human. The Germans, essentially a mechanically 
 inhuman people, try to carry the aid of machinery 
 farther than we do. They fit, for example, a 
 gyroscopic arrangement which automatically fires 
 the guns at a chosen moment in the roll of a ship. 
 We fire as the roll brings the wires of the sighting 
 telescopes upon the object aimed at, and can 
 shoot better w^hen a ship is rolling than when she 
 is travelling upon an even keel. We believe in 
 relying mainly upon the deft eyes and hands of 
 our gun-layers — when the enemy is within their 
 range of vision — and upon control officers up aloft 
 when he is not. German gunnery can be very 
 good, but it tends to fall to pieces under stress 
 of battle. Ours tends to improve in action. 
 Machinery is a good servant but a bad master. 
 
 As the shots are fired they are observed by the 
 spotting officers to fall too short or too far over, 
 to one side or to the other, and corrections are 
 made in direction and in range so as to convert a 
 ** bracket '' into a " straddle " and then to bring 
 ofi accurate hits. 
 
 When, say, the shots of one salvo fall beyond 
 the mark and the shots of the next come down 
 on the near side, the mark is said to be " bracketed." 
 When the individual shots of a salvo fall some too 
 far and others too short, the mark has been 
 " straddled." A straddle is a closed-in bracket. 
 At long ranges far more shots miss than hit, 
 and we are dealing now with ranges up to ten or 
 twelve miles. The bigger the gun the bigger the 
 splash made by its shell w^hen striking the water, 
 and as the spotting officers cannot spot unless 
 they can clearly make out the splashes, there is
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 163 
 
 an accuracy — an ultimate effective accuracy — in 
 big guns with which smaller ones cannot compete 
 however well they may be served. For, ultim- 
 ately, in naval gunnery, when ships are moving 
 fast and ranges are changing continually, we 
 come down to trial and error. We shoot and 
 correct, correct and shoot, now and then find the 
 mark and speedily lose it again, as the courses 
 and speeds are changed. Unless we can see the 
 splashes of the shells and are equipped with guns 
 powerful enough to shoot fairly flat — without high 
 elevation — we may make a great deal of noise 
 and expend quantities of shell, but we shall not 
 do much hurt to the enemy. 
 
 The Falkland Islands action was the Royal 
 Navy's first experience in long-range war gunnery 
 under favourable conditions of light — and it was 
 rather disappointing. It revealed the immense 
 gap which separates shooting in war and shooting 
 at targets in time of peace. The battle cruisers 
 sank the enemy, and suffered little damage in 
 doing their appointed work, and thus achieved 
 both the purposes which Admiral Sturdee had 
 set himself and his men. But it was a wasteful 
 exhibition, and showed how very difficult it is to 
 sink even lightly armoured ships by gun-fire alone. 
 Our shells at the long ranges set were falling 
 steeply ; their effective targets were not the 
 sides but the decks of the Germans, which were 
 not more than seventy feet wide. If one reflects 
 what it means to pitch a shell at a range of ten 
 miles upon a rapidly moving target seventy feet 
 wide, one can scarcely feel surprised that very few 
 shots got fairly home. We need not accept au 
 pied de la lettre the declaration of Lieutenant
 
 164 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 I.ietzmanu— a damp and unhappy prisoner — that 
 the Gneisenau, shot at for five hours, was hit 
 eilectively only twenty times, nor endorse his 
 rather savage verdict that the shooting of the 
 battle cruisers was " simply disgraceful/' But 
 every competent gunnery oihcer, in his moments 
 of expansive candour, will agree that the results 
 of the big-gun shooting were not a little disap- 
 pointing. The Germans added to our difficulty 
 by veiling their ships in smoke clouds and thus, 
 to some extent, cancelled the day's " visibility." 
 
 No enemy could have fought against over- 
 whelming odds more gallantly and persistently 
 than did von Spec, his officers, and his highly 
 trained long- service men. Many times, even at 
 the long ranges at which the early part of the 
 action was fought, they brought ofi' fair hits upon 
 the battle cruisers. One 8 •2-inch shell from the 
 Scharnhorst wrecked the Invincible^s ward-room 
 and smashed all the furniture into chips except 
 the piano, which still retained some wires and part 
 of the keyboard. Another shell scattered the 
 Fleet Paymaster's money-box and strewed the 
 decks with golden bullets. But it was all useless. 
 Though the Invincible was the leading ship, and 
 at one time received the concentrated fire of both 
 the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau, she did not 
 suffer a single casualty. And, while she was 
 being peppered almost harmlessly, her huge shells, 
 which now and then burst inboard the doomed 
 German vessels, were setting everything on fire 
 between decks, until the dull red glow could be 
 seen from miles away through the gaping holes in 
 the sides. It was a long-drawn-out agony of Hell. 
 
 Firing began seriously at 12.55 and continued,
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 165 
 
 with intervals of rest for guns and men, till 4.16, 
 when the Scharnhorst sank. Three hours and 
 twenty- one minutes of Hell ! Through it all the 
 Germans stuck to their work, there was no thought 
 of surrender ; they fought so long as a gun could 
 be brought to bear or a round of shell remained 
 in their depleted magazines. Every man in the 
 Scharnhorst was killed or drowned ; the action was 
 not ended when she went down and her consort 
 Gneisenau, steaming through the floating bodies 
 of the poor relics of her company, was compelled 
 to leave them to their fate. For nearly two hours 
 longer the Gneisenau kept up the fight. The battle 
 cruisers and the smaller Carnarvon closed in upon 
 her, and at a range of some six to seven land miles 
 smashed her to pieces. By half-past five she was 
 blazing furiously fore and aft, and at two minutes 
 past six she rolled over and sank. Her guns spoke 
 up to the last. As she lay upon her side her end 
 was hastened by the Germans themselves, who, 
 feeling that she was about to go, opened to the 
 sea one of the broadside torpedo flats. She sank 
 with her ensign still flying. If the whole German 
 Navy could live, fight, and die like the Far Eastern 
 Pacific Squadron, that Service might in time 
 develop a true Naval Soul. 
 
 Those of the crew who remained afloat in the 
 water after the Gneisenau sank were picked up 
 by boats from the battle cruisers and the Carnarvon 
 — we rescued 108 officers and men. Admiral 
 Sturdee sent them a message of congratulation 
 upon their rescue and of commendation upon their 
 gallantry in battle, and every English sailor did 
 his utmost to treat them as brothers of the sea. 
 Officers and men lived with their captors as guests,
 
 166 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 not a8 prisoners, in ward-room and gun-room, and 
 on the lower deck the English and Germans fought 
 their battle over again in the best of honest fellow- 
 ship. " There is nothing at all to show that we 
 are prisoners of war," wrote a young German 
 lieutenant to his friends in the Fatherland, express- 
 ing in one simple sentence — though perhaps un- 
 consciously — the immortal spirit of the English 
 Sea Service. A defeated enemy is not a prisoner ; 
 he is an unhappy brother of the sea, to be dried 
 and clothed and made much of, and to be taught 
 with the kindly aid of strong drink to forget his 
 troubles. 
 
 There is little of exhilaration about a sea fight, 
 such as that which I have briefly sketched. It 
 seems, even to those who take part in it, to be 
 wholly impersonal and wholly devilish. Though 
 its result depends entirely upon the human element, 
 upon the machines which men's brains have 
 secreted and which their cunning hands and eyes 
 direct, it seems to most of them while in action to 
 have become nothing loftier than a fight between 
 soulless machines. One cannot wonder. The 
 enemy ship — to those few of the fighting men who 
 can see it — is a spot upon the distant horizon from 
 which spit out at intervals little colmims of fire 
 and smoke. There is no sign of a living foe. 
 And upon one's own ship the attention of everyone 
 is absorbed by mechanical operations — the steam 
 steering gear, the fire control, the hydraulic or 
 electric gun mechanism, the glowing fires down 
 below fed by their buzzing air fans, the softly 
 purring turbines. And yet, what now appears 
 to be utterly inhuman and impersonal is in reality 
 as personal and human as was fighting in the days
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 167 
 
 of yard-arm distances and hand-to-hand boarding. 
 The Admiral who, from his armoured conning- 
 tower, orders the courses and maintains the 
 distances best suited to his terrible work ; the Fire 
 Director watching, aiming, adjusting sights with 
 the minute care of a marksman with his rifle ; the 
 officers at their telescopes spotting the gouts of 
 foam thrown up by the bursting shells ; the 
 engineers intent to squeeze the utmost tally in 
 revolutions out of their beloved engines ; the 
 stokers each man rightly feeling that upon him 
 and his efforts depends the sustained speed which 
 alone can give mastery of manoeuvre ; the seamen 
 at their stations extinguishing fire caused by 
 hostile shells ; the gunners following with huge 
 blind weapons the keen eyes directing them from 
 far aloft ; all these are personal and very human 
 tasks. A sea fight, though it may appear to be 
 one between machinery, is now as always a fight 
 between men. Battles are fought and won by 
 men and by the souls of miCn, by what they have 
 thought and done in peace time as a preparation 
 for war, by what they do in war as the result of 
 their peace training. 
 
 The whole art of successful war is the concentra- 
 tion upon an enemy at a given moment of an 
 overwhelming force, and the concentration of 
 that force outside the range of his observation. 
 Both these things were done by the Royal Navy 
 between November 6th and December 8th, 1914, 
 and their fruits were the shattered remains of 
 von Spee's squadron lying thousands of fathoms 
 deep in the South Atlantic. But nothing which 
 the Admiralty planned upon November 6th would 
 have availed had not the Royal Navy designed 
 
 12
 
 168 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 and built bo great a force of powerful ships that, 
 when the far-oflt call arose, two battle cruisers could 
 be spared to travel 7,000 miles from the North 
 Sea to the Falkland Islands without sensibly 
 endangering the margin of safety of the Grand 
 Fleet at home. 
 
 While the Invincible and Inflexible were occupying 
 the front of the battle stage and disposing of the 
 hostile stars, the English light cruisers were enjoy- 
 ing themselves in the wings in a more humble 
 but not less useful play. The cruiser Kent aston- 
 ished everybody. She was the lame duck of the 
 Squadron, a slow old creature who could with 
 extreme difficulty screw out seventeen knots, so 
 that, in the company of much faster boats, her 
 armament of fourteen 6-inch guns appeared to be 
 practically wasted. Yet this elderly County cruiser, 
 so short of coal that her fires were fed with boats, 
 ladders, doors, and officers' furniture, got herself 
 moving at over twenty- one knots, chased and 
 caught the Nurnberg — which ought to have been 
 able to romp round her if one of her boilers had 
 not been out of action— and sank the German 
 vessel out of hand. Afterwards her officers claimed 
 with solemn oaths that she had done twenty-four 
 knots, but there are heights to which my credulity 
 will not soar. One is compelled on the evidence 
 to believe that she did catch the Niirnberg, but 
 how she did it no one can explain, least of all, I 
 fancy, her Engineer Commander himself. The 
 Leipzig was rapidly overhauled by the speedy 
 Glasgow, who sank her with the aid of the Cormvall 
 and so repaid in full the debt of Coronel. The 
 cruiser Bristol, a sister of the Glasgow, was sent 
 after the German Squadron's transports and
 
 IN THE SOUTH SEAS 169 
 
 colliers, and, in company with the armed liner 
 Macedonia, " proceeded," in naval language, "to 
 destroy them/' Out of the whole German 
 Squadron the light cruiser Dresden (own sister 
 to the Emden) alone managed to get away. She 
 had turbine engines and fled without firing a shot. 
 She passed a precarious hunted existence for three 
 months, and was at last disposed of of! Robinson 
 Crusoe's Island on March 14th, 1915. The Glasgow, 
 still intent upon collecting payment for her injuries, 
 and our aged but active friend the Keyit, were in 
 at her death, which was not very glorious. I will 
 tell her story in its proper place. So ended that 
 most dainty operation, the wiping out of the 
 German Pacific Squadron and the cleaning up 
 of the mess of Coronel. Throughout, our sailors 
 had to do only with clean above- water fighting. 
 There were no nasty sneaking mines or submarines 
 to hamper free movement ; the fast ship and the 
 big gun had full play and did their work in the 
 business-like convincing fashion which the Royal 
 Navy has taught us to expect from it. 
 
 [For what follows I have none but German 
 evidence, yet am loth to disbelieve it. I cannot 
 bring myself to conceive it possible that the dull 
 Teutonic imagination could, unaided by fact, 
 round oft' in so pretty a fashion the story of the 
 Falkland Islands. ]\Iy naval friends laugh at me. 
 They say the yarn is wholly impossible.] 
 
 More than a year afterwards some fishermen 
 upon the barren Schleswig coast observed a little 
 water-worn dinghy lying upon the sand. She 
 was an open boat about twelve feet long, too frail
 
 170 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 a bark in which to essay the crossing of the North 
 Sea. Yet upon this little dinghy was engraved 
 the name of the Niirnherg ! Like a homing pigeon 
 this frail scrap of wood and iron had wandered 
 by itself across the world from that far distant spot 
 where its parent vessel had been sunk by the 
 Kent. It had drifted home, empty and alone, 
 through 7,000 miles of stormy seas. I like to 
 picture to myself that Odyssey of the Nilrnberg's 
 dinghy during those fourteen months of lonely 
 ocean travel. Those who know and love ships 
 are very sure that they are alive. They are no 
 soulless hulks of wood or steel or iron, but retain 
 always some spiritual essence distilled from the 
 personality of those who designed, built, and sailed 
 them. It may be that in her dim blind way this 
 fragment of a once fine cruiser, all that was left 
 of a splendid squadron, was inspired to bring to 
 her far-away northern home the news of a year- 
 old tragedy. So she drifted ever northwards, 
 scorched by months of sun and buffeted by months 
 of tempest, until she came at last to rest upon 
 her own arid shores. And the spirits of German 
 sailors, which had accompanied her and watched 
 over her during those long wanderings, must, when 
 they saw her ground upon the Schleswig sands, 
 have passed to their sleep content.
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 HOW THE " SYDNEY " MET THE " EMDEN " 
 
 Forward, each gentleman and knight ! 
 Let gentle blood show generous might 
 And chivalry redeem the fight ! 
 
 The Luck of the Navy is not always good. There 
 are ward-rooms in the Grand Fleet within which 
 to mention any Joss except of the most devilish 
 blackness may lead to blasphemy and even to 
 blows. One can sympathise. Those who sped 
 on May 31st, 1916, across 4C0 miles of sea and 
 who, though equipped with all the paraphernalia 
 of fire-directors, spotting- ofhcers, range-finders, 
 control instruments, grizzled gun- layers and tre- 
 mendous w4re- wound guns, failed to get in a single 
 shot at an elusive enemy, are dangerous folk to 
 chaff. If to them had been vouchsafed the great 
 chance which came to the Salt of the Earth and 
 the Fifth B. S. there would not now be a German 
 battleship afloat ! Still, in face of blazing examples 
 of bad Joss such as this, I will maintain that there 
 are pixies sitting up aloft who have a tender regard 
 for the Royal Navy and who, every now and then, 
 ladle out to it toothsome morsels of unexpected, 
 astounding, incredible Luck. 
 
 For how else can one explain the action at the 
 Falkland Islands ? There was sheer luck in every 
 
 171
 
 172 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 detail of it, luck piled upon luck. Sturdee with 
 his two battle-cruisers raced through 7,Gt)0 miles 
 of ocean, from Plymouth to Port Stanley, and 
 not a whisper of his coming sped over the wireless 
 to von Spee. Yet hundreds knew of Sturdee's 
 mission — even 1 knew before he had cleared the 
 Eiiglish Channel. During five weeks, from the 
 Coronel battle until December 7th, the Falkland 
 Islands were exposed almost helpless to a raid 
 by von Spec's victorious squadron. Yet he delayed 
 his coming until December 8th -the day after 
 the Invincible and Inflexible had arrived to gobble 
 him up. As if these two miracles were not sufficient 
 — a month of silence in those buzzing days of 
 enemy agents and wireless telegraphy, and von 
 Spec's arrival of! Port Stanley at the moment 
 most dangerous for him and most convenient for 
 us— the Fates worked for the Navy yet another. 
 They gave to Sturdee upon December 8th, 1914, 
 perfect weather, full visibility, and a quiet sea in 
 a corner of ocean where rain and fo^ are the rule 
 and clear weather almost a negligible exception. 
 The Falkland Islands do not see half a dozen 
 such days as that December 8th in the whole 
 circuit of the year. Von Spee came and to Sturdee 
 were granted a long southern summer day, perfect 
 visibility, a limitless ocean of space, and a benign 
 easy swell to swing the gunsights kindly upon 
 their mark. It was a day that gunners pray for, 
 sometimes dream of, but very rarely experience in 
 battle. 
 
 Less conspicuously but not less benignantly did 
 the kindly Fates work up the scene for the destruc- 
 tion of the Emden. They made all their prepara- 
 tions in silence and then switched up the curtain
 
 HOW THE SYDNEY MET THE EM DEN 173 
 
 at the moment chosen by themselves. In the Falk- 
 land Islands action Luck interposed to perfect 
 the Navy's long- laid plans and to add to the scheme 
 those artistic touches of which man unaided is 
 incapable. But the Sydney-Emden action was 
 fortuitous, quite unplanned, flung off at a moment 
 when Luck might have seemed to be wholly on 
 the side of the raider. The Emden had destroyed 
 70,000 tons of shipping in seven weeks and vanished 
 after each exploit upon an ocean which left no 
 tracks. She seemed to be as elusive and dangerous 
 as the Flying Dutchman. But perhaps her com- 
 mander, von Mliller, a most ingenious and gallant 
 seaman, had committed that offence which the 
 Athenians and Eton boys call hubris, and had 
 neglected to pay due homage for the good fortune 
 which was poured upon him in plenty. For the 
 Fates wearied of their sport with him and with 
 us, withdrew their mantle of protection, and 
 suddenly delivered the Emden to the Sydney with 
 that artistic thoroughness which may always be 
 seen in their carefully planned work. Luck is no 
 bungler, but Luck is a most jealous mistress. If 
 Sturdee and Glossop are wise they will sacrifice 
 their dearest possessions while there is yet time. 
 The Invificible is at the bottom of the North Sea 
 and the Inflexible was mined in the Dardanelles. 
 The Sydney is a pretty little ship and I should 
 grieve to see her suffer for her good luck of three 
 years ago. 
 
 Take a chart of the Indian Ocean and draw a 
 line from Fremantle in Australia to Colombo in 
 Ceylon. The middle point of this line will be seen
 
 iU THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 to lie about fifty miles east of the Cocos -Keeling 
 Islands. Now draw another line from Cocos to 
 the Sunda strait, a line which will be seen to bisect 
 at right angles the Fremantle-Colombo line. After 
 this exercise in Euclid examine that point without 
 parts and without magnitude, fifty miles east of 
 Cocos, where the tracks intersect. It is a very 
 interesting point, for upon the tropical night of 
 November 8th, 1914, it was being approached by 
 two hostile naval forces each of which was entirely 
 ignorant of the nearness of the other. Coming 
 up from Australia bound for Colombo steamed a 
 fleet of transports under the charge of Captain 
 Silver of H.M. Australian light cruiser Melbourne. 
 Upon the left of Captain Silver, and nearest to 
 the Cocos Islands, was Captain Glossop in the 
 sister ship Sydney, and away to the right was a 
 Japanese light cruiser. Upon the line from the 
 Sunda strait to the Cocos Islands was steaming 
 the famous raider Emden, with an attendant 
 collier, bound upon a mission of destruction there. 
 The Emden crossed the head of the convoy about 
 three hours before it reached the point of inter- 
 section of the two tracks, and went on to demolish 
 the cable and wireless station on the Islands. 
 Meanwhile, wholly unconscious of the scene-setting 
 upon which the Fates were busy, the convoy 
 sailed on, crossed the Emden s track and cut that 
 vessel off from any chance of escape to the east. 
 To the west the ocean stretches unbroken for limit- 
 less miles. At half-past six in the morning the 
 Emden appeared of! the Cocos Islands and the 
 watching wireless operators at once sent out a" 
 warning to all whom it might concern that a foreign 
 warship was in sight. It greatly concerned Captain
 
 ^cZ 
 
 NorthKeelin|l. V' 
 
 ■; Direction I. 
 
 Cocos-Keelin^ 1? ''x 
 
 o c :e ^ jsr 
 
 Freemantley' ::3 
 
 < 
 
 174] 
 
 HOW THE "SYDNEY" MET THE " EMDEX.
 
 HOW THE SYDNEY MET THE EM DEN 175 
 
 Silver of the Melbourne, who ordered Captain 
 Glossop to proceed in the Sydney to the Islands 
 in order to investigate. The Sydney was nearest 
 to the Islands, was a clean ship not three weeks 
 out of dock, was in trim for the highest possible 
 speed and, though largely manned by men in 
 course of traim'ng, was in charge of experienced 
 officers " lent " by the Royal Navy to the Australian 
 Fleet Unit. 
 
 In the old sailing-ship days it was more common 
 than it is now for fighting ships to pass close to 
 one another without detection. Whole fleets used 
 then to do it in a way which now seems almost 
 unbelievable. The classical example is that of 
 Napoleon and Nelson in June 1798. On the night 
 of June 30th-July 1st, Napoleon with a huge 
 fleet of transports, escorted by Admiral Brueys' 
 squadron, crossed the Gulf of Candia and reached 
 Alexandria on the afternoon of the 1st, Nelson, 
 who had been at Alexandria in search of his enemy, 
 left on June 29th, and sailed slowly against adverse 
 winds to the north. Though the French and 
 British fleets covered scores of miles of sea they 
 passed across one another, each without suspicion 
 of the presence of the other. Nelson was very 
 short of frigates. It is not remarkable that the 
 British convoy and the Emden on the night of 
 November 8th, 1914, should so nearly have met 
 without mutual detection ; what is wonderful is 
 that the Emden should have chosen the day and 
 hour for raiding the Cocos Islands when a greatly 
 superior British force was barely fifty miles distant 
 and placed by accident in a position which cut of! 
 all prospect of escape. It was a stroke of Luck 
 for us which exactly paralleled the occasion of
 
 176 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 von Spec's raid a month later upon the Falkland 
 Islands. 
 
 By seven o'clock Glossop and the Sydney were 
 ready to leave upon their trip of investigation- - 
 they had no knowledge of what was before them 
 -and during the next two and a quarter hours 
 they steamed at twenty knots towards the distant 
 cable station. In the meantime the Emden had 
 sent a boat ashore and the work of destruction of 
 the station was completed by 9.20 a.m. Every- 
 thing fitted exactly into its place, for the Fates 
 are very pretty workmen. The Emden knew no- 
 thing of the Sydney's coming, but as Glossop sped 
 along his wireless receivers took up the distress 
 calls from Cocos. He learned that the enemy 
 warship had sent a boat ashore— and then came 
 interruptions in the signals which showed that 
 the wireless station had been raided. Naval 
 officers do not get excited— they have too much 
 of urgency upon which to concentrate their minds 
 —but to those in the Sydney must have come some 
 thrills at the unknown prospect. Their ship and 
 their men were new and untried in war. Their 
 guns had never fired a shot except in practice. 
 Before them might be the Emden or the Konigsberg 
 or both together. They did not know, but as 
 they rushed through the slowly heaving tropic 
 sea they serenely, exactly, prepared for action. 
 
 The light cruiser Sydney, completed in 1913 for 
 the Australian Unit, is very fast and powerful. 
 She is of 5,600 tons, built with the clipper bows 
 and lines of a yacht, and when oil is sprayed upon 
 her coal furnaces can steam at over twenty-five 
 knots. She bears upon her deck eight 6-inch 
 guns of the latest pattern, one forward, one aft,
 
 HOW THE SYDNEY MET THE EM DEN 177 
 
 and three on either beam, so that she can fire 
 simultaneously from five guns upon either broad- 
 side. Her lyddite shells weigh one hundred pounds 
 each. She was, and is, of the fast one-calibre 
 type of warship which, whether as light cruiser, 
 battle-cruiser, or heavy battleship, gives to our 
 Navy its modern power of manoeuvre and con- 
 centrated fighting force. Speed and gun-power, 
 with the simplicity of control given by guns all 
 of one size, are the doctrines upon which the New 
 Navy has been built, and by virtue of which it 
 holds the seas. The Sydney was far more power- 
 ful than the Emden, whose ten guns were of 4'1 
 inches firing shells of thirty-eight pounds weight. 
 The German raider had been out of dock in warm 
 waters for at least three and a half months, her 
 bottom was foul, and her speed so much reduced 
 that in the action which presently began she never 
 raised more than sixteen knots. I n speed as in 
 gun-power she was utterly outclassed. 
 
 Let us visit the Sydney as she prepares for action 
 on the morning of the fight just as she had prepared 
 day after day in practice drill at sea. Before the 
 foremast stands the armoured conning tower — 
 exactly like a closed-in jam-pot — designed for the 
 captain's use ; forward of the tower rises the 
 two-storeyed bridge, the upper part of which is 
 the station of the gunnery control officer ; upon 
 the mast, some fifty feet up, is fitted a spotting 
 top for another officer. This distribution of 
 executive control may look very pretty and 
 scientific, but Glossop, who had tested it in practice, 
 proposed to fight on a system of his own. If a 
 captain is cooped up in a conning tower, with the 
 restricted vision of a mediaeval knight through a
 
 178 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 vizard, a gunnery lieutenant is perched on the 
 upper bridge by the big range-finder, and another 
 lieutenant is aloft in the spotting top, the diffi- 
 culties of communication in a small cruiser are 
 added to the inevitable confusion of a fight. So 
 the armoured jam-pot and the crow's nest aloft 
 were both abandoned, and Glossop placed him- 
 self beside his Gunnery Lieutenant Rahilly upon 
 the upper bridge w^ith nothing between their bodies 
 and the enemy's shot except a frail canvas screen. 
 Accompanying them was a lieutenant in charge 
 of certain instruments. At the back of the bridge 
 — which measured some ten feet by eight— stood 
 upon its pedestal the principal range-finder with 
 a seat at the back for the operator. This con- 
 centration of control upon the exposed upper 
 bridge had its risks, as will presently appear, but 
 it made for simplicity and for the rapid working 
 both of the ship and of her guns. Another lieu- 
 tenant, Geoffrey Hampden, was in charge of the 
 after control station, where also was fitted a range- 
 finder. When a ship prepares for action the 
 most unhappy person on board is the Second in 
 Command— in this instance Lieutenant-Com- 
 mander John F. Finlayson (now Commander) — 
 who by the rules of the Service is condemned to 
 safe and inglorious, though important duties in 
 the lower conning tower. Here, seeing little or 
 nothing and wrapped like some precious egg in 
 cotton wool, the poor First Lieutenant is preserved 
 from danger so that, if his Chief be killed or dis- 
 abled, he at least may remain to take over com- 
 mand. 
 
 From the upper fore bridge of the Sydney we 
 can see the guns' crews standing ready behind
 
 HOW THE SYDNEY MET THE EM DEN 179 
 
 their curved steel screens and note that as the 
 ship cuts through the long ocean swell the waves 
 break every now and then over the fo'c'sle and 
 drench the gun which stands there. At 9.15 land 
 is sighted some ten miles distant and five minutes 
 later a three-funnelled cruiser, recognised at once 
 as the Emden, is seen running out of the port. 
 Upon the Sydney a bugle blow^s, and then for 
 twenty minutes all is quiet orderly work at Action 
 Quarters. To the Emden the sudden appearance 
 of the Sydney is a complete surprise. Her destruc- 
 tion party of three officers and forty men are still 
 ashore and must be left behind if their ship is to 
 be given any, the most slender, chance of escape. 
 Captain von Miiller recognises the Sydney at once 
 as a much faster and more heavily gunned ship 
 than his own. His one chance is to rush at his 
 unexpected opponent and utilise to the utmost 
 the skill of his highly trained gunners and the 
 speed with which they can work their quick-firing 
 guns. If he can overwhelm the Sydney with a torrent 
 of shell before she can get seriously home upon 
 him he may disable her so that flight will still be 
 possible. In rapid and good gunnery, and in a 
 quick bold offensive, may rest safety ; there is no 
 other chance. So out he comes, makes straight 
 for the Sydney as hard as he can go and gives her 
 as lively a fifteen minutes as the most greedy of 
 fire-eaters could desire. 
 
 When the two cruisers first see one another they 
 are 1^0,000 yards distant, but as both are closing 
 in the range comes quickly down to 10,500 yards 
 (six land miles). To the astonishment both of the 
 Captain and Gunnery Lieutenant of the Sydney, 
 who are together looking out from the upper fore
 
 180 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 bridge, von Milller opens fire at this very long 
 range for his small 41-inch guns and gets within 
 a hundred yards at his first salvo. It is wonderful 
 shooting. His next is just over and with the 
 third he begins to hit. At the long range the 
 Emdens shells fall steeply — at an angle of thirty 
 degrees ^rarely burst and never ricochet from the 
 sea. They whine overhead in torrents, plop into 
 the sea on all sides, and now and then smash on 
 board. One reaches the upper fore bridge, passes 
 within a foot of Lieutenant Eahilly's head, strikes 
 the pedestal of the big range-finder, glances ofT 
 without bursting, cuts off the leg of the operator 
 who is sitting behind, and finishes its career over- 
 board. If that shell had burst Glossop and his 
 Gunnery Lieutenant, together with their colleague 
 at the rate- of- change instrument, must have been 
 killed or seriously wounded and the Second in 
 Command would have been released from his 
 thick steel prison. Not one of them was six feet 
 distant from where the shell struck in their midst. 
 The range-finder is wrecked and its operator killed, 
 but the others are untouched. A few minutes 
 later two, possibly three, shells hit the after con- 
 trol, wound everyone inside, and wipe that control 
 of! the effective list. 
 
 But meanwhile the officers of the Sydney and 
 their untried but gallant and steady men have 
 not been idle. Their first salvo fired immediatelv 
 after the Emden opened is much too far, their 
 second is rather wild and ragged, but with the 
 third some hits are made. The Sydney had for- 
 tunately just secured her range when the principal 
 range-finder was wrecked and the after control 
 scattered, and Gunnery Lieutenant Rahilly is able
 
 HOW THE SYDNEY MET THE E 31 DEN 181 
 
 to keep it by careful spotting and rate-of-cliange 
 observations. Glossop, who has the full command 
 given by superior speed, manoeuvres so as to keep 
 out to about 8,000 yards, to maintain as nearly 
 constant a rate of change as is possible, and to 
 present the smallest danger space to the enemy. 
 The Emden's first effort to close in has failed, and 
 now that the Sydney's 100-pound shells begin to 
 burst well on board of her the Emden's one chance 
 upon which von Miiller had staked everything has 
 disappeared. During the first fifteen minutes the 
 Sydney was hit ten times, but afterwards not at 
 all ; the Emden was hit again and again during 
 the long-drawn-out two hours of her hopeless 
 struggle. After twenty minutes the Emden's for- 
 ward funnel went and she caught fire aft. Her 
 steering gear was wrecked and she became depen- 
 dent upon the manipulation of her propellers, 
 with the inevitable falling off in speed to about 
 thirteen knots. During the early critical minutes 
 of the action the Sydney had the Emden upon her 
 port side, but all her casualties were suffered upon 
 the starboard or disengaged side due to the steep- 
 ness with which the German shells were falling. 
 Once she was hit upon the two-inch side armour 
 over the engine room and the shell, which this 
 time burst, left a barely discernible scratch. An- 
 other shell fell at the foot of a starboard gunpedestal 
 in the open space behind the shield, burst and 
 wounded the gun's crew but left the gun unhurt 
 except for a spattering of a hundred tiny dents. 
 The electric wires were not even cut. It is remark- 
 able that during the whole of the action no electric 
 wires in any part of the Sydney were damaged. 
 As I have told, both gun controls of the Sydney
 
 182 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 were hit during the first few minutes though only 
 the after one was put out of action ; the Emden, 
 less fortunate, had both her controls totally 
 destroyed and all the officers and men within them 
 killed. 
 
 After the lapse of about three-quarters of an 
 hour the Emden had lost two funnels and the fore- 
 mast ; she was badly on fire aft and amidsliips, 
 so that at times nothing more than the top of the 
 maimiiast could be seen amid the clouds of steam 
 and smoke. Her guns, now occasionally firing, 
 gave out a short yellow flash by which they could 
 be distinguished from the long dark red flames 
 of the Sydney's bursting lyddite. Once she disap- 
 peared so completely that the cry went up from 
 the Sydney that she had sunk, but she appeared 
 again, blazing, almost helpless. Glossop, who 
 had been circling round to port, then drew in to 
 a range of 5,500 yards — which in the absence of 
 the range-finder was wrongly estimated at under 
 5,000— and determined to try a shot with a torpedo. 
 It was a difficult shot as the torpedo gunner was 
 obliged to set his g}^roscope to a definite angle 
 and then wait until the rapidly turning Emden 
 came upon his bearing. But in spite of the diffi- 
 culties it was very good ; the torpedo ran straight 
 for its mark and then stopped short at the distance 
 of 5,000 yards for which it had been set. The 
 torpedo crews, naturally enough, wanted forth- 
 with to let off all their mouldies, just to show the 
 gunners how the business should be done with, 
 but the hard-hearted Glossop forbade. The 
 moment after the one had been fired he swung the 
 ship round to starboard, opened out his range, and 
 resimied the distressful game of gun-pounding.
 
 HOW THE SYDNEY MET THE EM DEN 183 
 
 The Emden also went away to starboard for about 
 four miles and then von Miiller, finding that his 
 ship was badly pierced under water as well as on 
 fire, put about again and headed for the North 
 Keeling Island, where he ran aground. The 
 Sydney followed, saw that her beaten enemy was 
 irretrievably wrecked, and went away to deal 
 with the Emden's collier — a captured British ship 
 Buresk — which had hovered about during the 
 action but upon which Glossop had not troubled 
 to fire. The Emden fired no torpedoes in the 
 action, for though von Miiller had three left his 
 torpedo flat was put out of business early in the 
 fight. 
 
 Though the Emden was beaten and done for, 
 the gallantry and skill with which she had fought 
 could not have been exceeded. She was caught 
 by surprise, and to some extent unprepared, yet 
 within twenty minutes of the Sydney's appearance 
 upon the sky line von Miiller was pouring a con- 
 tinuous rain of shell upon her at over 10,000 yards 
 range and maintaining both his speed of fire and 
 its accuracy until the hundred-pound shots bursting 
 on board of him had smashed up both his controls, 
 knocked down his foremast, and put nine of his 
 ten guns out of action. Even then the one remain- 
 ing gun continued to fire up to the last. The 
 crew of the Sydney, exposed though many of them 
 were upon the vessel's open decks — a light cruiser 
 has none of the protection of a battleship — bore 
 themselves as their Anzac fellow-countrymen upon 
 the beaches and hills of Gallipoli. At first they 
 were rather ragged through over- eagerness, but 
 they speedily settled down. The hail of shell 
 which beat upon them was unceasing, but they 
 
 13
 
 184 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 paid as little lieed to it as if tliey liad passed their 
 lives under heavy fire instead of experiencing it for 
 the first time. Upon Glossop and his lieutenants 
 on the upper bridge, and in the transmission room 
 below, was suddenly thrown a new and urgent 
 problem. With the principal range-finder gone 
 and the after-control wrecked in the first few 
 minutes, they were forced to depend upon skilful 
 manoeuvring and spotting to give accuracy to 
 their guns. They solved their problem ambulando, 
 as the Navy always does, and showed that they 
 could smash up an opponent by mother wit and 
 sea skill when robbed of the aids of science. It is 
 good to be equipped with all the appliances which 
 modern ingenuity has devised ; it is still better 
 to be able at need to dispense with them. 
 
 I love to write of the cold fierce energy with 
 which our wonderful centuries-old Navy goes forth 
 to battle, but I love still more to record its kindly 
 solicitude for the worthy opponents whom its 
 energy has smashed up. Once a fight is over it 
 loves to bind up the wounds of its foes, to drink 
 their health in a friendly bottle, and to wish them 
 better luck next time. When he had settled with 
 the collier Buresk, and taken off all those on board 
 of her, Glossop returned to the wreck of the Emden 
 lying there helpless upon the North Keeling Island. 
 The foremast and funnels were gone, the brave 
 ship was a tangle of broken steel fore and aft, 
 hut the mainmast still stood and upon it floated 
 the naval ensign of Germany. Until that flag had 
 been struck the Sydney could not send in a boat 
 or deal with the crew as surrendered prisoners. 
 Captain Glossop is the kindliest of men, it went 
 against all his instincts to fire at that wreck upon
 
 HOW THE SYDNEY MET THE EMDEN 185 
 
 which the forms of survivors could be seen moving 
 about, but liis duty compelled him to force von 
 Miiller into submission. For a quarter of an 
 hour he sent messages by International code and 
 Morse flag signals, but the German ensign remained 
 floating aloft. As von Miiller would not surrender 
 he must be compelled, and compelled quickly and 
 thoroughly. In order to make sure work the 
 Sydney approached to within 4,000 yards, trained 
 four guns upon the Emden, and then when the 
 aim was steady and certain smashed her from end 
 to end. The destruction must have been frightful, 
 and it is probable that von Miiller's obstinacy cost 
 his crew greater casualties than the whole previous 
 action. These last four shots did their work, the 
 ensign came down, and a white flag of surrender 
 went up. It was now late in the afternoon, the 
 tropical night was approaching, and the Sydney 
 left the Emden to steam to Direction Island some 
 fifteen miles away and to carry succour to the 
 staff of the raided cable and wireless station. Be- 
 fore leaving he sent in a boat and an assurance 
 that he would bring help in the morning. 
 
 Although the distance from Direction Island, 
 where the action may be said to have begun, to 
 North Keeling Island, where it ended, is only 
 fifteen miles the courses followed by the fight- 
 ing vessels were very much longer. They are 
 shown upon the Glossop-von Miiller plan, facing 
 page 186. The Emden was upon the inside and 
 the Sydney — whose greatly superior speed gave 
 her complete mastery of manoeuvre — was upon 
 the outside. The Emden's course works out at 
 approximately thirty-five miles and the Sydney's 
 at fifty miles. The officers and men who are
 
 186 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 fighting a ship stand, as it were, in the midst of 
 a brilliantly lighted stage and may receive more 
 than their due in applause if one overlooks the 
 sweating engineers, artificers, and stokers who, 
 hidden far below, make possible the exploits of 
 the stars. At no moment during the whole action, 
 though ventilating fans might stop and minor 
 pipes be cut, did the engines fail to give Glossop 
 the speed for wliich he asked. His success and 
 his very slight losses — four men killed and sixteen 
 wounded — sprang entirely from his speed, which, 
 when required, exceeded the twenty-five knots for 
 which his engines were designed. When therefore 
 we think of Glossop and Rahilly, who from that 
 exposed upper bridge were manoeuvring the ship 
 and directing the guns, we must not forget Engineer 
 Lieutenant-Commander Coleman and his half- 
 naked men down below, who throughout that 
 broiling day in the tropics nursed those engines 
 and toiled at those fires which brought the guns 
 to fire upon the enemy. 
 
 True to his promise Glossop brought the Sydney 
 back to the Emden at eleven o'clock on the morning 
 of November 10th, having borrowed a doctor and 
 two assistants from Direction Island, and then 
 began the long task — which the Navy loves only 
 less than actual battle — of rescue and care for the 
 sufferers by its prowess. North Keeling Island 
 is an irregular strip of rock, boulders and sand 
 almost entirely surrounding a large lagoon. It is 
 studded with cocoanut palms and infested with 
 red land-crabs. An unattractive spot. l^h.Q Emden 
 was aground upon the weather side and the long 
 rollers running past her stern broke into surf before 
 the mainmast. Lieutenant R. C. Garsia, going
 
 N. Keeling I 
 Emden E 
 
 aishore \\'fc 
 
 Horsburgh I.Q A\,'t: 
 
 tl^ S) Direction I. 
 
 Sydney's Course 
 
 Emden''s Course 
 
 S,,S2 &-C. Positions of 'Sydney" 
 
 E|, E2 &c. Corresponding positions of Emden 
 
 Scale of Sea Miles- 
 
 __j I I ' I I 
 
 -1 ' ' I 
 
 12 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10 n 12 13 14- 15 
 THE " SYDISTEY-EMDEN" ACTION", 
 
 18G]
 
 HOW THE SYDNEY MET THE EM DEN 187 
 
 out to her in one of the Sydney's boats, was hauled 
 by the Germans upon her quarter-deck, where he 
 found Captain von Miiller, whose personal luck 
 had held to the last, for he was unwounded. Von 
 Miiller readily gave his parole to be amenable to 
 the Sydney's discipline if the surviving Germans 
 were transhipped. The Emden was in a frightful 
 state. She was burned out aft, her decks were 
 piled with the wreck of three funnels and the fore- 
 mast, and within her small space of 3,500 tons, 
 seven officers and 115 men had been killed by high- 
 explosive shell and splinters. Her condition may 
 be suggested by the experience of a v/arrant officer 
 of the Sydney who, after gravely soaking in her 
 horrors, retailed them in detail to his messmates. 
 For two days thereafter the warrant officers' mess 
 in the Sydney lost their appetites for meat : one 
 need say no more ! The unwounded and slightly 
 wounded men were first transferred to the boats 
 of the Sydney and Buresk, but for the seriously 
 wounded Neil-Eobertson stretchers had to be 
 used so that they might be lowered over the side 
 into boats. This had to be done during the brief 
 lulls between the rollers. By five o'clock the 
 Emdeyi was cleared of men and Captain von Miiller 
 went on board the Sydney, which made at once 
 for the only possible landing place on the island 
 in order to take of! some Germans who had got 
 ashore. To the surprise of everyone it was then 
 discovered that several wounded men, including 
 a doctor, had managed to reach the shore and 
 were somewhere among the scrub and rocks. 
 Night was fast coming on, the wounded ashore 
 were without food or drink — except what could 
 be obtained from cocoanuts — and were cut off
 
 188 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 from all assistance except that which the Sydney 
 could supply. The story of how young Lieutenant 
 Garsia drove in through the surf after dark — at 
 the imminent hazard of his whaler and her crew 
 — hunted for hours after those elusive Germans, 
 was more than once hopelessly " bushed," and 
 finally came out at the original landing place, is 
 a pretty example of the Navy's readiness to spend 
 ease and risk life for the benefit of its defeated 
 enemies. In the morning the rescue party of 
 English sailors and unwound ed Germans, supplied 
 with cocoanuts and an improvised stretcher made 
 of bottom boards and boathooks, at last discovered 
 the wounded party, which had not left the narrow 
 neck of land opposite the stranded Emclen. Lieu- 
 tenant Schal of the Emden, who was with them, 
 eagerly seized upon the cocoanuts and cut them 
 open for the wounded, who had been crying for 
 water all night and for whom he had not been able 
 to find more than one nut. The wounded German 
 doctor had gone mad the previous afternoon, in- 
 sisted upon drinking deeply of salt water, and so 
 died. The four wounded men who remained alive 
 were laboriously transferred to the Sydney and the 
 dead were covered up with sand and boulders. 
 " A species of red land-crab with which the ground 
 is infested made this the least one could do." 
 The reports of Navy men may seem to lack grace, 
 but they have the supreme merit of vivid simplicity. 
 That short sentence, which I have quoted, makes 
 us realise that waterless crab-haunted night of 
 German suflering more vividly than a column of 
 fine writing. 
 
 All was over, and the packed Sydney headed 
 away for her 1,600-mile voyage to Colombo.
 
 HOW THE SYDNEY MET THE EMDEN 189 
 
 To her company of about 400 slie had added 11 
 German officers and 200 men, of whom 3 officers 
 and 53 men were wounded. The worst cases 
 were laid upon her fo'c'sle and quarter-deck, the 
 rest huddled in where they could. It was a trying 
 voyage, but happily the weather was fine and 
 windless, the ship as steady as is possible in the 
 Indian Ocean, and the Germans well behaved. 
 Von Miiller and Glossop, the conquered and 
 conqueror, the guest and the host, became friendly 
 and mutually respecting during those days in 
 the Sydney. I like to think of those two, in the 
 captain's cabin, putting their heads together over 
 sheets of paper and at last evolving the plan of 
 the Sydney-Emden action which is printed here. 
 Von Miiller did the greater part of it, for, as Glossop 
 remarked, " he had the most leisure." A cruiser 
 skipper with 400 of his own men on board and 200 
 prisoners, is not likely to lack for jobs. To the 
 von Miiller-Glossop plan I have added a few 
 explanatory words, but otherwise it is as finally 
 approved by those who knew most about it. 
 
 Some single-ship actions remain more persistently 
 in the public memory and in the history books 
 than battles of far greater consequence. They are 
 easy to describe and easy to understand. One 
 immortal action is that of the Shannon and the 
 Chesapeake ; another is that of the Sydney and 
 the Emden. It was planned wholly by the Fates 
 which rule the Luck of the Navy, it was fought 
 cleanly and fairly and skilfully on both sides, 
 and the faster, more powerful ship won. I like 
 to picture to myself the Sydney heading for 
 Colombo, bearing upon her crowded decks the 
 captives of her bow and spear, her guns and her
 
 190 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 engines, not vaingloriously triumphant, but humbly 
 thankful to the God of Battles. To her officers 
 and crew their late opponents were now guests 
 who could discuss with them, the one with the 
 other, the incidents of the short fierce fight dis- 
 passionately as members of the same profession, 
 though serving under different flags, just as Glossop 
 and von Miiller discussed them in the after cabin 
 under the quarter-deck when they bent their heads 
 over their collaborated plan.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 FROM STRENGTH TO STRENGTH 
 
 Since I have not been so foolish as to set myself 
 the task of writing a history of the Naval War, 
 I am not hampered by any trammels of chrono- 
 logical sequence. It is my purpose to select those 
 events which will best illustrate the workings of 
 the British Naval Soul, and to present them in 
 such a manner and in such an order as will make 
 for the greatest simplicity and force. Naval war- 
 fare, viewed in the scattered detail of operations 
 taking place all over the world, is a mightily con- 
 fusing study ; but, if it be analysed and set forth 
 in its essential features, the resultant picture has 
 the clarity and atmosphere of the broad sea horizon 
 itself. There is nothing in naval warfare, as 
 waged by the Royal Navy, of that frightful con- 
 fusion and grime and clotted horror which has 
 become inseparable from the operations of huge 
 land forces. Sailors live clean lives — except when 
 the poor fellows are coaling ship ! — and die clean 
 deaths. They have the inestimable privilege of 
 freedom both in the conception of their plans and 
 in their execution. The broad distinction between 
 land and sea service was put clearly to me once 
 by a Marine officer who had known both. " At 
 sea/' he observed, " one at least lives like a gentle- 
 
 191
 
 192 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 man until one is dead." It must be very difficult 
 to live or to feel like a gentleman when one is 
 smothered in the mud of Flanders' trenches and 
 has not had a bath for a month. 
 
 Although, as I have shown, the Grand Fleet at 
 the outbreak of war was, in effective battle power, 
 of twice the strength of its German opponents, no 
 time was lost in adding largely to that margin of 
 strength. Mines, with which Germany recklessly 
 sowed the seas whenever she could evade the 
 watchful eyes of our cruisers and destroyers, and 
 the elusive and destructively armed submarine, 
 were perils not lightly to be regarded by our great 
 ships. We took the measure of both these dangers 
 in due course, but in the early months of war they 
 caused a vast amount of apprehension. In addi- 
 tion, therefore, to dealing directly with these 
 perils the whole power of our shipyards, gun 
 shops, and armour-rolling mills was turned to 
 the task of increasing the available margin of 
 battle strength so as to anticipate the possibility 
 of serious losses. 
 
 And here we had great advantages over Germany. 
 We not only had a far longer and far greater ex- 
 perience, both in designing and constructing ships 
 and guns, but we had a larger number of yards 
 and shops where battleships and battle cruisers 
 could be completed and equipped. Throughout 
 the fourteen years of the peace contest Germany 
 had always been far behind us in design, in speed 
 of construction, and in the volume of output. 
 We built the first Dreadnought in little more than 
 fifteen months — by preparing all the material in 
 advance and taking a good deal from other ships 
 — but our average time of completing the later
 
 FROM STRENGTH TO STRENGTH 193 
 
 models was rather more than two years apiece. 
 The exalted super-battleships occupied about two 
 years and three months before they were in com- 
 mission. Germany, — which so many fearful folk 
 seriously look upon as superhuman in efficiency — 
 never built an ordinary Dreadnought in peace 
 time in less than two years and ten months, and 
 always waited for the chance of copying our 
 designs before she laid one down. It is reasonable 
 to suppose that in the early days of war the German 
 yards and gun shops worked much more rapidly 
 than during the peace competition, but as our 
 own qiucker rate of construction was also enor- 
 mously accelerated it is in the highest degree 
 unlikely that our speed of war output was ever 
 approached by our opponents. We had at the 
 beginning far more skilled labour and, what is 
 more important, far more available skilled labour. 
 Since it was only by slow degrees that we enlisted 
 a vast army for Continental service while Germany 
 had to mobilise the whole of hers at the beginning 
 of hostilities and to call upon the millions of 
 untrained men, the drain upon our manhood was 
 for a long time far less than the drain upon hers. 
 As time went on labour became scarce with us, 
 even for naval work, but it could never have 
 been so scarce as with the Germans when after 
 their immense losses they were driven to employ 
 every possible trained and untrained man with the 
 colours. 
 
 We had yet another advantage. In August, 
 1914, as the result of the far-seeing demands of 
 the British Admiralty we had twice as many 
 great ships under construction in this country 
 as Germany had in the whole of her North Sea
 
 194 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 and Baltic yards. This initial advantage was an 
 enonnous one since it meant that for eighteen 
 months Germany could make no effective efforts 
 to catch up with us, and that at the end of that 
 period we should inevitably have in commission 
 an increase in battle strength more than twice as 
 great as hers. The completed new lead thus 
 secured early in 1916, added to the lead obtained 
 before the outbreak of war, then made our position 
 almost impregnable. We were thus free to con- 
 centrate much of our attention upon those smaller 
 vessels — the destroyers, patrol boats, steam drifters, 
 fast submarine catchers and motor boats — which 
 were urgently needed to cope with Germany's 
 attacks upon the world's merchant ships. 
 
 Early in 1915, six months after the outbreak of 
 War, our shipyards and gun shops had turned 
 out an extraordinary quantity of finished work. 
 There had been some loss in skilled labour through 
 voluntary enlistment in the Army, but the men 
 that were left worked day and night shifts in the 
 most enthusiastic and uncomplaining spirit. The 
 war was still new and the greatness of the Empire's 
 emergency had thrilled all hearts. Some co6l- 
 ness came later, as was inevitable — poor human 
 nature has its cold fits as well as its hot ones — 
 and there was even some successful intriguing by 
 enemy agents in the North, but the great mass of 
 British workmen remained sound at heart. The 
 work went on, more slowly, a little less enthusi- 
 astically, but it went on. 
 
 During the first six months we completed the 
 great battle cruiser Tiger, a sister of the Lion 
 with her eight 13'5-inch guns, and the sisters 
 fought together with those others of their class —
 
 FROM STRENGTH TO STRENGTH 195 
 
 tlie Queen Mary and Princess Royal— in the Dogger 
 Bank action in January, 1915. We took over 
 and completed two battleships which were building 
 for Turkey and under their new names of Erin 
 and Agincourt they joined Jellicoe in the north. 
 The second of these great vessels — ravished from 
 the enemy — had fourteen 12-inch guns (set in 
 seven turrets) and the other ten 13"5-inch. We 
 completed two vast super-ships, the Queen Elizabeth 
 and another like to her, both with a speed of twenty- 
 five knots and eight 15 -inch guns apiece. The 
 battle cruisers, Indomitable and Indefatigable, speed- 
 ing home from the Mediterranean, had raised the 
 Battle Cmiser strength in the North Sea to seven 
 fine vessels of which four carried 13 ■5-inch guns 
 and the three others 12-inch weapons. Even 
 though the Inflexible and Invincible were still 
 away — they were not yet back from fighting that 
 perfect little action in which the German Pacific 
 Squadron had been destroyed — we had a battle 
 cruiser force against which the rival German vessels 
 could not fight and hope to remain afloat. 
 
 After six months, therefore, Jellicoe had received 
 four new battleships — two of them by far the 
 most powerful at that time afloat — and Beatty 
 had been joined by three battle cruisers, one of 
 them quite new. The Grand Fleet was the 
 stronger for six months of work by seven ships. 
 
 As compared with our increased strength of 
 seven ships, (five quite new) , Germany had managed 
 to muster no more than three. She completed two 
 battleships of a speed of twenty and a half knots, 
 each carrying ten 12-inch guns. Neither of these 
 vessels was more powerful than our original Dread- 
 nought class and they were not to be compared with
 
 19G THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 our King CTeorge V's, Orions or Iron Dukes and 
 still less with our Queen Elizabeths. That Ger- 
 many should, six months after the war began, 
 be completing battleships of a class which with us 
 had been far surpassed fully four years earlier 
 is the best possible illustration of her poverty in 
 naval brains and foresight. Germany had also 
 completed one battle cruiser, the DerffHinger, of 
 twenty-seven knots speed and with eight 12-inch 
 guns, which in her turn w^as not more powerful than 
 our Invincibles of live years earlier date. The 
 Derffllmger could no more have stood up to our new 
 Tiger, than the two battleships just completed 
 by our enemies could have fought for half an 
 hour with our two new Queen Elizabeths. So 
 great indeed had our superiority become as early 
 in the war as the beginning of 1915 that we could, 
 without serious risk, afford to release two or 
 three battle cruisers for the Mediterranean and 
 to escort the Canadian and Australian contingents 
 across the seas, and to send to the Mediterranean 
 the mighty Queen Elizabeth to flesh her maiden 
 guns upon the Turkish defences of the Dardanelles. 
 Ship guns are not designed to fight with land forts, 
 and though the Queen Elizabeth's 15-inch shells, 
 weighing over 1,900 lb. apiece, may not have 
 achieved very much against the defences of the 
 Narrows their smashing power and wonderful 
 accuracy of control were fully demonstrated. 
 
 Inconclusive though it was in actual results, 
 the Dogger Bank action of January, 1915, proved 
 to be most instructive. It showed clearly three 
 things : first, that no decisive action could be 
 fought by the big ships in the southern portion of 
 the North Sea — there was not sufficient room to
 
 FROM STRENGTH TO STRENGTH 197 
 
 complete the destruction of the enemy. Secondly 
 it demonstrated the overwhelming power of the 
 larger gun and the heavier shell. Thanks to the 
 skill of the Navy's engineering staffs it was also 
 found that the actual speed of our battle cruisers 
 was quite a knot faster than their designed speed, 
 and since no similar advance in speed was noticeable 
 in the case of the fleeing German cruisers it could 
 be concluded that the training of our engineers 
 was fully as superior to theirs as was unquestionably 
 the training of our long- service seamen and gunners 
 superior to that of their short-service crews. As 
 the fleets grew larger our superiority in personnel 
 tended to become more marked. We had an 
 almost unlimited maritime population upon which 
 to draw for the few thousands whom we needed — 
 before the war the professional Navy was almost 
 wholly recruited from the seaboards of the South 
 of England — we had still as our reserves the east 
 and west coasts of England and Scotland. But 
 Germany, even before the war, could not man 
 her fleets from her scanty resources of men from 
 her seaboards, and more and more had to depend 
 upon partially trained landsmen. If one adds 
 to this initial disadvantage in the quality of the 
 German sea recruits, that other disadvantage of 
 the cooping up of her fleets — sea training can only 
 be acquired fully upon the open seas — while ours 
 were continually at work, patrolling, cruising, 
 practising gunnery, and so on, it will be seen that 
 on the one side the personal efficiency of officers 
 and men, upon which the value of machines wholly 
 depends, tended continually to advance, while 
 upon the German side it tended as continually 
 to recede. It was the old story. Nelson's sea-
 
 198 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 worn fleet, though actually smaller in numbers and 
 weaker in guns than those of the French and 
 Spaniards at Trafalgar, was so infinitely superior 
 to its opponents in trained officers and men that 
 the result of the battle was never for a moment 
 in doubt. 
 
 At the time of the Dogger Bank action, which 
 confirmed our Navy in its growing conviction that 
 Speed and Power of guns were of supreme import- 
 ance, the Germans had no guns afloat larger in 
 calibre than 12-inch and seven of the ships in 
 their first line were armed with weapons of 11 
 inches. They then mustered in all twenty big 
 ships which they could place in the battle line 
 against our available thirty- two, and of their 
 twenty not more than thirteen were of a class com- 
 parable even with our older Dreadnoughts. They 
 had nothing to touch our twelve Orions, King 
 Georges, Iron Dukes, all with 13-5-inch guns, and 
 upon a supreme eminence by themselves stood 
 the two new Queen Elizabeths which, if need be, 
 could have disposed of any half-dozen of the weaker 
 German battleships. In the Jutland Battle four 
 Queen Elizabeths — Barham, Warspite, Valiant and 
 Malaya — fought for an hour and more the whole 
 High Seas Fleet. It is no wonder, then, that the 
 Germans did not come out far enough for Jellicoe 
 to get at them. And yet there were silly people 
 ashore who still prattled about the inactivity of 
 the Royal Navy and asked one another " what it 
 was doing.'' , - ,? 
 
 There is a good story told of the scorn of the 
 professional seamen afloat for the querulous 
 civilians ashore. When the Lion was summoned 
 to lead the battle cruisers in the Dogger Bank action
 
 FROM STRENGTH TO STRENGTH 199 
 
 she was lying in tlie Forth undergoing some slight 
 repairs. As she got up steam a gang of dockyard 
 mateys, at work upon her, pleaded anxiously to 
 be put ashore. They had no stomach for a battle. 
 But there was no time to worry about their feel- 
 ings ; they were carried into action with the ship, 
 and when the shots began to fly they were con- 
 temptuously assured by the grizzled old sea-dogs, 
 that they were in for the time of their lives. " You 
 
 wanted to know/' said they, " what the b y 
 
 Navy's doing and now you're going to see." 
 
 While the power of the Grand Fleet dominated 
 the war at sea, some thirty supply ships and 
 transports safely crossed the English Channel 
 every day, and troops poured into Britain and 
 France from every part of our wide-flung Empire. 
 But for that silent, brooding, ever- expanding 
 Grand Fleet, watching over the world's seas from 
 its eyries on the Scottish coast, not a man or a 
 gun or a pound of stores could have been sent to 
 France, not a man could have been moved from 
 India or Australia, Canada or New Zealand. But 
 for that " idle " Grand Fleet the war would have 
 been over and Germany victorious before the 
 summer and autumn of 1914 had passed into winter. 
 During the war sea power, as always in naval 
 history, has depended absolutely upon the power 
 in men, in ships, and in guns of the first battle 
 line. 
 
 At the beginning of 1915, in addition to the 
 completed ships which I have already mentioned, 
 Greafc Britain had under construction three ad- 
 ditional Queen Elizabeths — Malaya, Barham, and 
 Valiant— Sill of twenty-five knot speed and carry- 
 ing eight 15 -inch guns apiece. She had also on 
 U
 
 200 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 the stocks in various stages of growth five Royal 
 Sovereign battleships designed for very heavy 
 armour, with a speed of from twenty- one to twenty- 
 two knots, and to be equipped with eight 15-inch 
 guns each. 
 
 • • • • • 
 
 It will be seen how completely during the war 
 the Royal Navy had " gone nap " on the ever 
 faster ship and the ever bigger gun. Calculations 
 might be partially upset by weather and visibility 
 — as they were in the Jutland Battle — but even 
 under the worst conditions speed and gun power 
 came triumphantly by their own. Our fast and 
 powerful battle cruisers, and our four fast and 
 more powerful Queen Elizabeths, — the name ship 
 was not present — could not on that day of low 
 visibility choose their most effective ranges, but 
 the speed and power of the battle cruisers 
 enabled them to outflank the enemy while the 
 speed and hitting power of the Barham, Valiant, 
 War spite and Malaya held up the whole of the 
 German High Seas Fleet until Jellicoe with his 
 overwhelming squadrons could come to their 
 support. Even under the worst conditions of 
 light, speed and gun power had fully justified 
 themselves. 
 
 Let us for a moment consider what are the 
 advantages and disadvantages of the bigger and 
 bigger gun ; the advantages of speed will be 
 obvious to all. To take first the disadvantages. 
 Big guns mean weight, and weight is inconsistent 
 with speed. The bigger the gun, the heavier it 
 is, the heavier its mountings, its turrets, and its 
 ammunition. Therefore in order that weight may
 
 FROM STRENGTH TO STRENGTH 201 
 
 be kept down and high speed attained, the ships 
 which carry big guns must carry fewer guns than 
 those which are more lightly armed. The Orions, 
 K.G. Fives, and Iron Dukes each bear ten 
 13"5-inch guns within their turrets, but the battle 
 cruisers of which the Lion is the flagship, built 
 for speed, can carry no more than eight. The 
 Queen Elizabeth battleships, designed to carry 
 15-inch guns and to have a speed of twenty-five 
 knots, mount eight guns only against the ten of 
 the earlier and more lightly armed super-Dread- 
 noughts. Speed and weigl^ being inconsistent, 
 increase in speed and increase in size of guns can 
 only be reconciled by reducing the number of 
 guns carried. The fewer the guns carried, the 
 fewer the salvoes that can be fired at an enemy 
 during a fixed time even if the rate of fire of the 
 big guns can be kept so high as that of the smaller 
 ones. When opposing ships are moving fast upon 
 divergent courses, ranges are continually varying 
 and the difficulty of making effective hits is very 
 great indeed. The elaboration of checks and 
 controls, which are among the most cherished of 
 naval gunnery secrets, are designed to increase the 
 proportion of hits to misses which must always 
 be small even when the light is most favourable. 
 If the heavy gun were no more accurate than the 
 light one, then the smaller number of guns carried 
 and the reduced number of salvoes, would probably 
 annul the benefit derived from the greater smashing 
 power of the heavier shell when it did hit an enemy. 
 The ever- expanding gun has, therefore, disadvan- 
 tages, notable disadvantages, but as we shall see 
 they are far more than outweighed by its great and 
 conspicuous merits.
 
 202 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 The first overwhelming advantage of the big 
 gun is the gain in accuracy. It is far more accurate 
 than the ligliter one. As the fighting range in- 
 creases so does the elevation of a gun, needed to 
 reach an object within the visible limits of the 
 horizon, sensibly increase. But the bigger the 
 gun and the heavier its shell, the flatter becomes 
 its trajectory. And a flat trajectory — low eleva- 
 tion — means not only more accurate shooting, 
 but a larger danger zone for an enemy ship. At 
 24,000 yards (twelve sea miles) a 12-inch shell is 
 falling very steeply and can rarely be plumped 
 upon an enemy's deck, but a 15-inch shell is still 
 travelling upon a fairly flat path which makes it 
 effective against the sides and upper works of a 
 ship as well as against its deck. The 15-inch shell 
 thus has the bigger mark. It also suffers less from 
 deflection and, what is more important, maintains 
 its speed for a much longer time than a lighter 
 shell. Increased weight means increased mo- 
 mentum. When the 15-inch shell gets home upon 
 its bigger mark at a long range it has still speed 
 and weight (momentum) with which to penetrate 
 protective armour. When it does hit and penetrate 
 there is no comparison in destructiveness between 
 the effect of a 15-inch shell and one of twelve inches. 
 The larger shell is nearly two and a half times as 
 heavy as the smaller one (1,960 lb. against 850), 
 and the power of the bursting charge of the big 
 shell is more than six times that of the smaller 
 one. Far distant ships, big ships, can be destroyed 
 by 15 -inch shells when, even if occasionally hit 
 by one of twelve inches, they would be little more 
 than peppered. The big gun therefore gives to 
 our Navy a larger mark, greater accuracy arising
 
 FROM STRENGTH TO STRENGTH 203 
 
 from the lower trajectory, and far greater destruc- 
 tive hitting power in comparison with the lighter 
 guns carried by most of the G erman battleships. 
 
 But the advantages of the big gun do not end 
 here. Gunnery, in spite of all its elaboration of 
 checks and controls, is largely a matter of trial 
 and error. All that the checks and controls are 
 designed to do is to reduce the proportion of errors : 
 they cannot by themselves ensure accurate shoot- 
 ing. Accuracy is obtained through correcting the 
 errors by actual observation of the results of shots. 
 This is called " spotting.'" When shells are seen 
 to fall too short, or too far, or too much to one 
 side or the other, the error in direction or elevation 
 is at once corrected. But everything depends 
 upon exact meticulous spotting, an almost in- 
 credibly difficult matter at the long ranges of 
 modern sea fighting. Imagine oneself looking for 
 the splash of a shell, bursting on contact with the 
 sea ten or more miles away, and estimating just 
 how far that splash is short or over or to one side 
 of the object aimed at. It will be obvious to any- 
 one that the position of a big splash can be gauged 
 more surely than that of a small one, and that the 
 huge splash of the big shell, which sends up a 
 column of water hundreds of feet high, can be 
 seen and placed by spotting officers who would be 
 quite baffled if they were observing shots from 
 12-inch weapons. In this respect also, that of 
 spotting results, the big gun with its big shell, 
 greatly assists the elimination of inevitable errors 
 and increases the proportion of effective hits to 
 misses. If then we get from bigger guns a higher 
 proportion of hits, and a much greater effective- 
 ness from those hits, then the bigger gun has
 
 204 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 paid a handsome dividend on its cost and has 
 more than compensated us for the reduction in 
 its numbers. AVliere the useful limit will be 
 reached one cannot say, nothing but experience 
 in war can decide, but the visible horizon being 
 limited to about fifteen sea miles, there must come 
 a stage in gun expansion when increase in size, 
 accuracy, and destructiveness will cease to com- 
 pensate for smallness of numbers. And the Umit 
 will be more quickly reached when during an 
 action the light does not allow the big gun to use 
 its accuracy at longer ranges to the fullest advant- 
 age. 
 
 Although one's attention is apt to be absorbed 
 by the great ships of the first battle line, the 
 ultimate Fount of naval Power, a Navy which 
 built only vast battleships and cruisers would be 
 quite unable to control the seas. A navy's daily 
 work does not consist of battles. For the main 
 purposes of watching the seas, hunting submarines, 
 blockading an enemy, and guarding the com- 
 munications of ourselves and our iVllies, and also 
 for protecting our big ships against submarines 
 and other mosquito attacks, we needed vast 
 numbers of light cruisers, patrol boats, destroyers, 
 armed merchant cruisers, steam drifters and so 
 on, and these had to be built or adapted with as 
 great an energy as that devoted to turning out 
 the monsters of the first battle line. The con- 
 struction of light cruisers and destroyers — the 
 cavalry of the seas— kept pace during 1915 and 
 1916 with that of the big fighting ships, while the 
 turning out of the light fast craft essential for
 
 FROM STRENGTH TO STRENGTH 205 
 
 hunting down enemy submarines, far surpassed 
 in speed any other building operations. At the 
 beginning of the war we had 270 light mosquito 
 vessels ; at the end of 1917 we had 3,500 ! 
 
 Nothing like the tremendous activity in warship 
 building during 1915 has ever been seen in our 
 country. Mercantile building was to a large extent 
 suspended, labour was both scarce and dear, 
 builders could not complete commercial contracts 
 at the prices named in them, the great yards 
 became " controlled establishments " with priority 
 claims both for labour and material. Conse- 
 quently every yard which could add to the Navy's 
 strength, whether in super-battleships or cruisers, 
 destroyers or in the humble mine sweeper, were 
 put on to war work. The Clyde, typical of the 
 ship-building rivers, was a forest of scaffolding 
 poles from Fairfield to Greenock within which 
 huge rusty hulls — to the unaccustomed eye very 
 unlike new vessels — grew from day to day in the 
 open almost with the speed of mushrooms. A trip 
 down the teeming river became one of the sights 
 of the city on the Clyde and, though precautions 
 were taken to exclude aliens, the Germans must 
 have known with some approach to accuracy the 
 numbers and nature of the craft which were under 
 construction. What was going on in the Clyde 
 during that year of supreme activity, when naval 
 brains were unhampered by Parliament or the 
 Treasury, was also going on in the Tyne, at Barrow 
 and Birkenhead, in the Royal Dockyards — every- 
 where day and night the Navy was growing at a 
 speed fully three times as great as in any year in 
 our history.
 
 206 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 Twenty two months after war broke out, in 
 May of 1916, Jellicoe's battle line had been 
 strengthened during the previous twelve months 
 by the addition of no less than seven great vessels. 
 Three more Queen Elizabeths were finished and so 
 were three Royal Sovereigns, and in addition a fine 
 battleship, which had been building in England for 
 Brazil, was taken over and completed. She was 
 named the Canada, had twenty-three knots of 
 speed, and was designed to carry ten 14-inch guns. 
 There were thus available in the North Sea, 
 allowing for occasional absences, from thirty-eight 
 to forty-two great ships of the battle line, of 
 which no fewer than eight carried 15-inch guns 
 of the very latest design. This huge piling up 
 of strength was essential not only to provide 
 against possible losses but to ensure that, in 
 spite of all accidents, an immense preponderance 
 of naval power would always be available should 
 Germany venture to put her fortunes to the hazaixi 
 of ^battle. And accidents did occur. The coast 
 lights had all been extinguished and ships at sea 
 cruising at night were almost buried in darkness. 
 As time went on it became more and more certain 
 that a Battle of the Giants could have but one 
 result. 
 
 I have now carried the story of naval expansion 
 down to the time of the Jutland Battle— May 31st, 
 1916 — and will show by how much o^ir paper 
 strength had increased between August 4th, 1914, 
 and that date, and how much of that strength 
 was available when the call for battle rang out. 
 It happened that none of our battle cruisers was 
 away upon overseas enterprises, so that we were 
 in good circumstances to meet the call. There
 
 FROM STRENGTH TO STRENGTH 207 
 
 had been added to tlie Fleets one battle cruiser, 
 the Tiger, with 13-5-inch guns, five Queen Eliza- 
 beth battleships with 15-inch guns, three Royal 
 Sovereign battleships with 15-inch guns (Royal 
 Sovereign, Royal Oah and Revenge), the Erin 
 battleship with 13'5-inch guns, the Canada battle- 
 ship with 14-inch guns, and the Agincourt battle- 
 ship with fourteen 12-inch guns. At the beginning 
 of the war our total strength in battleships and 
 battle cruisers of the Dreadnought and later more 
 powerful types was thirty-one; on May 31st 
 we had in and near the North Sea a full paper 
 total of forty- two ships of the battle line. 
 
 But the Royal Navy which is always at work 
 upon the open seas can never have at any one 
 moment its whole force available for battle. 
 The squadrons composing the Fleets were, how- 
 ever, exceedingly powerful, far more than sufficient 
 for the complete destruction of the Germans had 
 they dared to fight out the action. As the battle 
 was fought the main burden fell upon thirteen 
 only of our ships— Beatty's four Cat battle 
 cruisers assisted by the New Zealand and Inde- 
 fatigaUe, Hood's three battle cruisers of the In- 
 vincible class, and Evan-Thomas's four Queen 
 Elizabefh battleships. Jellicoe's available main 
 Fleet of twenty-five battleships, including two 
 Royal Sovereigns with 15-inch guns, the Canada 
 with 14-inch guns, and twelve Orions, K. G. 
 Fives and Iron Dukes with 13 •5-inch guns, which 
 was robbed of its fought- out battle by the enemy's 
 skilful withdrawal, was almost sufficient by itself 
 to have eaten up the German High Seas Fleet. 
 
 During the battle we lost the Queen Mary with 
 13 •5-inch guns, and the Invincible and hide-
 
 208 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 fatigahle with 12-inch guns, all of which were 
 battle cruisers. So that after the action our total 
 battle cruiser strength had declined from ten to 
 seven, while our battleship strength was unim- 
 paired. 
 
 It is not easy to be quite sure of what the 
 Germans had managed to do during those twenty- 
 two months of war. I have given them credit 
 for completing every ship which it was possible 
 for them to complete. They were too fully occupied 
 with building submarines to attack our merchant 
 ships, too fully occupied with guns and shells for 
 land fighting, and too much hampered in regard 
 to many essential materials by our blockade, to 
 be able to effect more than the best possible. 
 Eiimour from time to time credited them with 
 the construction of " surprise " ships carrying 
 17-inch guns, but nothing unexpected was revealed 
 when the clash of Fleets came on May 31st, 1916. 
 Huge new battleships and huge new guns take us 
 at the very least fifteen months to complete at 
 full war pressure— most of them nearer two years 
 —and the German rate of construction, even when 
 unhampered by a blockade and the calling to the 
 army of all available men, has always been much 
 slower than ours. The British Admiralty does 
 not work in the dark and doubtless knew fully 
 what the Germans were doing. 
 
 If we credit the Germans with their best possible 
 they might have added, by May 1916, four 
 battleships and two battle cruisers to their High 
 Seas Fleet as it existed early in 1915. One of 
 the battleships was the Salamis which was building
 
 FROM STRENGTH TO STRENGTH 209 
 
 at Stettin for Greece wlien the war broke out. 
 She was designed for a speed of twenty-three 
 knots, and to carry ten 14-inch guns. The other 
 three battleships were copies of our Queen Eliza- 
 beths, though slower by about four knots. They 
 were to have been equipped with eight 15-inch 
 guns, though Germany had not before the war 
 managed to make any naval guns larger than 
 12-inch. The battle cruisers [Hindenhurg and 
 Liietzow) were vessels of twenty- seven knots with 
 eight 12-inch guns, not to be compared with our 
 Cats and no better than our comparatively old 
 class of Invincibles. 
 
 The story of the Salamis and its 14-inch guns 
 forms a very precious piece of war history. The 
 guns for this Greek battleship had been ordered in 
 America, a country which has specialised in guns 
 of that calibre. But when Germany took over the 
 ship the guns had not been delivered at Stettin, 
 and never were delivered. They had quite another 
 destination and employment. Our Admiralty in- 
 terposed, in its grimly humorous way, bought the 
 guns in America, brought them over to this country, 
 and used the weapons intended for the Salamis to 
 bombard the Germans at Zeebrugge and the Turks 
 in Gallipoli. One may speculate as to which 
 potentate was the more irritated by this piece of 
 poetic justice — the Kaiser in Berlin or his brother- 
 in-law " Tino '' in Athens. 
 
 At their utmost, therefore, the Germans could 
 not have added more than five vessels to their 
 first line (they had lost one battle cruiser), thus 
 raising it at the utmost to twenty-five battleships 
 and cruisers, as compared with our maximum of 
 forty-two much more powerful and faster ships.
 
 210 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 Four of their battleships were the obsolete Nassaus 
 with twelve 11 -inch guns and two of their battle 
 cruisers {Molthe and Seydlitz) were also armed with 
 11 -inch guns. If a successful fight with our Grand 
 Fleet was hopeless in August 1914, it was still 
 more hopeless in May 1916. We had not doubled 
 our lead in actual numbers but had much more 
 than doubled it in speed and power of the vessels 
 available for a battle in the North Sea. In gun 
 power we had nearly twice Germany's strength at 
 the beginning ; we had not far from three times 
 her efiective strength by the end of May of 1916. 
 It is indeed probable that Germany was not so 
 strong in big ships and guns as I have here 
 reckoned. She did not produce so many in the 
 Jutland Battle. I can account for five battle 
 cruisers and sixteen battleships (excluding pre- 
 Dreadnoughts) making twenty- one in all. I have 
 allowed her, however, the best possible, but long 
 before the year 1916 it must have been brought 
 bitterly home to the German Sea Command that 
 by no device of labour, thought, and machinery 
 could they produce great ships to range in battle 
 with ours. We had progressed from strength to 
 strength at so dazzling a speed that we could not 
 possibly be overtaken. Had not the hare gone to 
 sleep, the tortoise could never have come up with 
 it— and the British hare had no intention of sleep- 
 ing to oblige the German tortoise. There is every 
 indication that Germany soon gave up the contest 
 in battleships and put her faith in super-sub- 
 marines, and in Zeppelins, the one to scout and 
 raid, and the other to sink merchant vessels and 
 so between them either to starve or terrify England 
 into seeking an end of the war.
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE " GLASGOW " 
 
 Part I. — Eio to Coronel 
 
 (July 27tli to Nov. 1st, 1914) 
 
 Everyone has heard of the light cruiser Glasgow^ 
 how she fought at Coronel, and then escaped, 
 and is now the sole survivor among the warships 
 which then represented Great Britain and Germany ; 
 how she fought again off the Falkland Islands, 
 and with the aid of the Cornwall sank the Leipzig ; 
 how after many days of weary search she discovered 
 the Dresden in shelter at Juan Fernandez, and 
 with the Kent finally brought that German cruiser 
 to a last account. These things are known. But 
 of her other movements and adventures between 
 the declaration of war in August of 1914 and that 
 final spectacular scene in Cumberland Bay, Juan 
 Fernandez, upon March 14th, 1915, nothing has 
 been written. It is a very interesting story, and 
 I propose to write it now. I will relate how she 
 began her fighting career as the forlorn solitary 
 representative of English sea power in the South 
 Atlantic, and how by gradual stages, as if endowed 
 with some compelling power of magnetic attrac- 
 tion, she became the focus of a British and German 
 naval concentration which at last extended over 
 
 211
 
 212 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 half the world. This scrap of a fast light cruiser, 
 of 4,800 tons, in appearance very much like a large 
 torpedo-boat destroyer, with her complement of 
 370 men, worthily played her part in the Empire's 
 work, which is less the fighting of great battles 
 than the sleepless policing of the seas. The battle- 
 ships and battle cruisers are the fount of power ; 
 they by their fighting might hold the command 
 of the seas, but the Navy's daily work in the 
 outer oceans is done, not by huge ships of the 
 line, but by light cruisers, such as the Glasgoiv, 
 of which at the outbreak of war we had far too few 
 for our needs. 
 
 In July 1914 the Glasgow was the sole repre- 
 sentative of British sea power upon the Atlantic 
 coast of South America. She had the charge of 
 our interests from a point some 400 miles north of 
 Eio, right down to the Falkland Islands in the 
 cold south. She was a modern vessel of 4,800 
 tons, first commissioned in 1911 by Captain Marcus 
 Hill, and again in September 1912 by Captain John 
 Luce, and the officers and men who formed her 
 company in July nearly four years ago, when the 
 shadow of war hung over the world. She was well 
 equipped to range over the thousands of miles of sea 
 of which she was the solitary guardian. Her turbine 
 engines, driving four screws, could propel her at 
 a speed exceeding twenty- six knots (over thirty 
 miles an hour) when her furnaces were fed with 
 coal and oil ; and with her two 6-inch and ten 4-inch 
 guns of new pattern she was more than a match 
 for any German light cruiser which might have 
 been sent against her. 
 
 Upon July 27th, 1914, while lying at Rio de 
 Janeiro her captain received the first intimation
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 213 
 
 that the strain in Europe might result in war 
 between England and Germany. Upon July 
 29th the warning became more urgent, and upon 
 July 31st the activity of the German merchant 
 ships in the harbour showed that they also had 
 been notified of the imminence of hostilities. They 
 loaded coal and stores into certain selected vessels 
 to their utmost capacity, and clearly purposed 
 to employ them as supply ships for any of their 
 cruisers which might be sent to the South Atlantic. 
 At that time there were, as a matter of fact, no 
 German cruisers nearer than the east coast of 
 Mexico. The Karlsruhe had just come out to 
 relieve the Dresden, which had been conveying 
 refugees of the Mexican Revolution to Kingston, 
 Jamaica. Thence she sailed for Haiti, met there 
 the Karlsruhe, and made the exchange of captains 
 on July 27th. Both these cruisers were ordered 
 to remain, but a third German cruiser in Mexican 
 waters, the Strasshurg, rushed away for home and 
 safely got back to Germany before war was declared 
 on August 4th. Thus the Dresden and Karlsruhe 
 were left, and over against them in the West 
 Indies lay Rear-Admiral Cradock with four 
 " County " cruisers — Suffolk, Essex, Lancaster, and 
 Berwick (sisters of the Monmouth) — and the fast 
 cruiser Bristol, a sister of the Glasgow. Though 
 the Glasgow, lying alone at Rio, had many anxieties 
 — chiefly at first turning upon that question of 
 supply which governs the movements of warships 
 in the outer seas — she had no reason to expect an 
 immediate descent of the Dresden and Karlsruhe 
 from the north. Cradock could look after them 
 if they had not the good luck to evade his attentions. 
 Upon August 1st, the Glasgow was cleared for
 
 214 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 war, and all luxuries and superfluities, all those 
 things which make life tolerable in a small cruiser, 
 were ruthlessly cast forth and put into store at Rio. 
 She was well supplied with provisions and am- 
 munition, but coal, as it always is, was an urgent 
 need — not only coal for the immediate present, 
 but for the indefinite future. For immediate 
 necessities the Glasgow bought up the cargo of a 
 British collier in Rio, and ordered her captain 
 to follow the cruiser when she sallied forth. Upon 
 August 3rd, the warnings from home became 
 definite, the Glasgow coaled and took in oil till her 
 bunkers were bursting, made arrangements with 
 the English authorities in Rio for the transmission 
 of telegrams to the secret base which she proposed 
 to establish, and late in the evening of August 4th, 
 crept out of Rio in the darkness with all lights 
 out. During that fourth day of August the 
 passing minutes seemed to stretch into years. 
 The anchorage where the Glasgow lay was in the 
 outer harbour, and she was continually passed by 
 German merchant steamers crowding in to seek 
 the security of a neutral port. War was very near. 
 Captain Luce had already selected a secret 
 base, where he hoped to be able to coal in shelter 
 outside territorial waters. His collier had been 
 ordered to follow as soon as permitted, and he 
 headed off to inspect the barren rocks, uninhabited 
 except by a lighthouse-keeper, which were to be 
 his future link with home. His luck held, for the 
 first ship he countered was a big English steamer 
 bound for Rio with coal for the l^razilian railways. 
 In order to be upon the safe side, he commandeered 
 this collier also, and made her attend him to his 
 base. There, to his relief, he found that shelter
 
 2141 
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW.
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 215 
 
 from the surf could be found, and that it was 
 possible to use the desolate spot as a coaling base 
 and keep the supply sliips outside territorial waters. 
 He used it then and afterwards ; so did the other 
 cruisers, Good Hope and Monmouth, which came 
 out to him, so also did that large squadron months 
 later which made of this place a rendezvous and 
 an essential storehouse on the journey to the 
 Falklands and to the end of von Spec. We were 
 always most careful to keep on the right side of 
 the Law. 
 
 I will not give to this base of the Glasgow its 
 true name ; let us call it the Pirates' Lair and 
 restore to it the romantic flavour of irresponsible 
 buccaneering which I do not doubt that it enjoyed 
 a century or so earlier. In the Glasgow's day it 
 mounted a lighthouse and an exceedingly in- 
 quisitive keeper whom German Junkers would 
 have terrorised, but whom the kindly English, 
 themselves to some extent trespassers, left un- 
 harmed to the enjoyment of his curiosity. He, 
 lucky man, did not know that there was a war on. 
 
 Realise, if you can, the feelings of the officers 
 and men of this small English cruiser lying isolated 
 from the world in her Pirates' Lair. Their impro- 
 vised base, not far from the main trade routes, 
 might at any moment have been discovered — as 
 indeed it was before very long ; it was the territory 
 of a neutral country, a country most friendly 
 then and afterwards, but bound to observe its 
 declaration of neutrality. They knew that coal 
 and store ships from England would be sent out, 
 but did not know whether they would arrive. 
 They were in wireless touch with the British repre- 
 sentatives at Rio, Pernambuco, and Montevideo, 
 
 16
 
 216 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 but authentic news came in scraps intermingled 
 with the wildest rumour. They, or rather their 
 captain, had to sort the grains of essential fact 
 from the chaff of fiction. As the month of 
 August unfolded, their news of the war came 
 chiefly from German wireless, and those of us 
 who lived through and remember those early 
 weeks of war also remember that the news from 
 enemy sources had no cheerful sound. For some 
 weeks they were free from anxiety for supplies, 
 provided that their base could be retained, yet 
 the future was blank. I do not think that they 
 worried overmuch ; the worst time they had 
 lived through was during those few days in Rio 
 before war broke out, and those days immediately 
 afterwards when they were seeking those corners 
 of their Lair least exposed to gales and surf. Very 
 often coaling was impossible ; more often it was 
 both difficult and dangerous. 
 
 It may seem strange that for many weeks — 
 until well into September — the Glasgow heard 
 nothing of Cradock and his West Indies Squadron. 
 Yet it was so. Cradock in the Suffolk had on 
 August 5th met the Karlsruhe coaling at sea, and 
 signalled to the fast Bristol to look after her. The 
 Bristol got upon the chase and fired a shot or two, 
 but, speedy though she was, the Karlsruhe ran 
 away from her and was seen no more and heard of 
 no more until she began her ravages upon steamers 
 to the south of Pernambuco. Cradock, thinking 
 she had gone north, and moreover having charge 
 of the whole North Atlantic trade on its western 
 side, became farther and farther separated from 
 the Glasgow, and even went so far away as Halifax. 
 I\Ieanwhile the Dresden slipped down and entered
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 217 
 
 the Glasgow's sea area on August 9th, though her 
 movements were not yet known. On the 13 th Captain 
 Luce learned that the Monmmith was coming out 
 to him under a captain who was his junior, so that 
 upon himself would still rest the responsibility 
 for the South Atlantic. He was now beginning 
 to get some news upon which he could act, and 
 already suspected that the Dresden or the Karlsruhe, 
 or both, had broken away for the south. He could 
 hear the Telefunken wireless calls of the Dresden 
 to her attendant colliers from somewhere in the 
 north a thousand miles away. During his cruises 
 from the Lair he was always on the look out for 
 her, and once, on the 16th, thought that he had 
 her under his guns. But the warship which he 
 had sighted proved to be a Brazilian, and the 
 thirst of the Glasgow's company for battle went 
 for a while unslaked. The Dresden, for which the 
 Glasgow was searching, had coaled at the Rocas 
 Islands, there met the Baden, a collier of twelve 
 knots, carrying 5,000 tons of coal, and together 
 the two vessels made for the south and remained 
 together until after the Falkland Islands action 
 had been fought. The Dresden picked up a second 
 collier, the Preussen, and set her course for the 
 small barren Trinidad Island, another old Pirates' 
 Lair some 500 miles from that of the Glasgoiv, at 
 which she in her turn established a temporary base. 
 At one moment the Dresden and Glasgow were not 
 far apart, the wireless calls sounded near, yet they 
 did not meet. This was on the 18th, when the 
 Glasgow was coaling at her base, and two days 
 before she went north to join up with the Monmouth 
 off Pernambuco. 
 This journey to the north coincided in time with
 
 218 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 the Dresden's passage to Trinidad Island, so that 
 by the 20th the two cruisers were again a thousand 
 miles apart, but with their positions reversed. 
 While the Glasgoiv had been going up, the Dresden 
 had been going south and east. For awhile we 
 will leave the Dresden, which after spending two 
 days under the lee of Trinidad Island went on her 
 way to the south, drawing farther and farther 
 away from the Glasgow and more and more out of 
 our picture. Her movements were from time to 
 time revealed by captures of British ships, of 
 which the crews w^ere sent ashore. Her captain, 
 Liidecke, at no time made a systematic business 
 of preying upon merchant traffic, and upon him 
 rests no charge of inhumanity. It may be that 
 commerce raiding and murder did not please him ; 
 it may be that he was under orders to make his 
 way at the leisurely gait of his collier Baden — he 
 left the Preiissen behind at Trinidad Island — 
 towards the Chilian coast, and the ultimate meeting 
 with von Spee. 
 
 At sea off Pernambuco on August 20th, the 
 Glasgoiv met the Monmouth, which had been com- 
 missioned on August 4th, mainly with naval 
 reservists, and hastily despatched to the South 
 Atlantic. Rumour still pointed to the presence 
 of the Dresden in the vicinity, and it seemed likely 
 that she might meditate an attack upon our 
 merchant shipping in the waters afterwards greatly 
 favoured by the Karlsruhe. The two English 
 cruisers remained in the north for a week, hearing 
 much German wireless, which was that of the 
 Karlsruhe, and not of the Dresden. On the night 
 of the 27th the armed liner Otraiifo heralded her 
 approach, and on the follovving day the Glasgow
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 219 
 
 met her at the Rocas Islands. Captain Luce had 
 now progressed from the command of one cruiser 
 to the control of quite a squadron, three ships. 
 Already the concentration about the small form 
 of the Glasgow had begun. 
 
 The bigness of the sea and the difiEiculty of finding 
 single vessels, though one may be equipped with 
 all the aids of cable and wireless telegraphy, will 
 begin to be realised. I have told how the Dresden 
 passed the Glasgow on the 18th. She had been 
 at the Kocas Islands on the 14th. The Karlsruhe, 
 too, had been at the Rocas Islands on the 17th. 
 She, also, had come south, though Cradock, with 
 his squadron, was hunting for her in the north 
 up to the far latitudes of Halifax. The two 
 German cruisers, which had seemed so far away 
 from the Glasgow when she was at Rio calculating 
 possibilities on August 1st, had both evaded the 
 West Indies squadron and penetrated into her 
 own slenderly guarded waters. 
 
 Upon August 30th the Glasgow, Monmoidh, and 
 Otranto were back at their Pirates' Lair, which 
 they could not leave for long, since it formed their 
 rather precarious base of supply, and there they 
 learned that the Dresden had sunk the British 
 steamer Holmwood far to the south of! Rio Grande 
 do Sul and must be looked after at once, since 
 she might have it in mind to raid our big shipping 
 lines with the River Plate. Here on the 31st 
 they learned also of the action in the Heligoland 
 Bight, and of the German invasion of France, and 
 of the retreat from Mons. The land war seemed 
 very far of!, but very ominous to those Keepers 
 of the South Atlantic in their borrowed base upon 
 a foreign shore thousands of miles away.
 
 220 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 My readers, especially those who are the more 
 thoughtful, may ask how the Glasgow was able 
 with a clear conscience to hie away to the north 
 and leave during all those weeks our big shipping 
 trade to Brazil, Uruguay, and the Argentine 
 uncovered from the raiding exploits of all the 
 German liners lying there which might have issued 
 forth as armed commerce raiders. The answer 
 is that none of the German liners had any guns. 
 The spectre of concealed guns which might upon 
 the outbreak of war be mounted, proved to be 
 baseless. The German liners had no guns, not 
 even the Caj) Trafalgar, sunk later, September 
 14th, off Trinidad Island by the Carmania. The 
 Cap Trafalgar's guns came from the small German 
 gunboat Eber, which had arranged a meeting with 
 her at this unofficial German base. The project 
 of arming the Cap Trafalgar was quite a smart one, 
 but, unfortunately for her, the first use to which 
 she put her borrowed weapons was the last, and 
 she went down in one of the most spirited fights 
 of the whole war. The Carmania had come down 
 from the north in the train of Rear- Admiral 
 Cradock. 
 
 At the beginning of September the Glasgoiv and 
 the Monmouth shifted down south, in the hope of 
 catching the Dresden at work off the River Plate. 
 There they arrived on the 8th, but found no prey, 
 though rumours were many, and unrewarded 
 searches as many. The Otranto came down to 
 join them, and down also came the news that 
 Cradock in his new flagship, the Good Hope, sent 
 out to him from England, was also coming to take 
 charge of the operations. Upon September 11th 
 the Dresden was reported to be far down towards
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 221 
 
 the Straits of Magellan and for the time out of 
 reach, so the Glasgow's squadron returned to its 
 northern Lair and the junction with the Good Hoj)e. 
 From Cradock the officers learned that the Cornwall 
 and Bristol, with the Carmania and Macedonia, 
 had arrived on the station, and that the old battle- 
 ship Canofus was coming out. At the beginning 
 of the war there had been one ship only in the 
 South Atlantic, the Glasgow ; now there were 
 no fewer than five cruisers and three armed liners, 
 and a battleship was on the way. One ship had 
 grown into eight, was about to grow into nine, 
 and before long was destined to become the focus 
 of the most interesting concentration of the whole 
 war. 
 
 We have now reached September 18th, by which 
 date the Dresden was far off towards the Pacific. 
 She reached an old port of refuge for whalers 
 near Cape Horn, named Orange Bay, on the 5th, 
 and rested there till the 16th. At Punta Arenas 
 she had picked up another collier, the Santa Isabel, 
 and, accompanied by her pair of supply vessels, 
 passed slowly round the Horn. At the western 
 end of the Magellan Straits she met with the 
 Pacific liner Ortega, which, though fired upon and 
 called to stop, pluckily bolted into a badly charted 
 channel and conveyed the news of the Dresden's 
 movements to the English squadron, which for 
 awhile had lost all trace of her. 
 
 It was not yet clear to Cradock, who was now 
 in command of the Southern Squadron — to dis- 
 tinguish it from the Northern Squadron, which 
 presently consisted of the armoured cruiser Car- 
 narvon (Rear-Admiral Stoddart), the Defence, the 
 Cornwall, the Kent, the Bristol, and the armed
 
 222 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 liner Macedonia — it was not yet clear tliat the 
 Dresden was bound for the Pacific, and a rendezvous 
 with von Spee. It seemed more probable that her 
 intention was to prey upon shipping of! the Straits 
 of Magellan. In order to meet the danger, he 
 set of! with the Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow, 
 and the armed liner Otranto to operate in the far 
 south, employing the Falkland Islands as his base. 
 The Glasgow's Lair of the north now remained for 
 the use of Stoddart's squadron. 
 
 In the light of after- events one cannot but feel 
 regret that the old battleship Canopus was attached 
 to the Southern Squadron — Cradock's — instead of 
 the armoured cruiser Defence, a much more useful 
 if less powerfully armed vessel. The Defence was 
 comparatively new, completed in 1908, had a 
 speed of some twenty-one to twenty-two knots, and 
 was more powerful than either the Scharnhorst 
 or the Gneisenau. The three sisters, Defence, 
 Minotaur, and Shannon, had indeed been laid 
 down as replies to the building of the Scharnhorst 
 and Gneisenau, and carried four 9 •2-inch guns and 
 ten 7"5-inch as against the eight 8 •2-inch and six 
 6-inch guns of the German cruisers. 
 
 I have reached a point in my narrative when it 
 becomes necessary to take up the story from the 
 German side, and to indicate how it came about 
 that five cruisers, which at the beginning of the 
 war were widely scattered, became concentrated 
 into the fine hard-fighting squadron which met 
 Cradock at Coronel. The permanent base of the 
 Scharnhorst and Gneisenau was Tsing-tau in China, 
 but it happened that at the end of July 1914 they 
 were more than 2,000 miles away in the Caroline 
 Islands. The light cruisers Niirnberg and Leipzig
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 223 
 
 were upon the western coast of Mexico, and, as 
 I have already told, the Dresden was off the eastern 
 coast of Mexico. The Emden, which does not 
 concern us, was at Tsing-tau. The Scharnhorst 
 and Gneisenaii were kept out of China waters by 
 the Japanese fleets and hunted for and chased 
 to Fiji by the Australian Unit. On September 
 22nd von Spee bombarded Tahiti, in the Society 
 Islands, at the moment when the Dresden, having 
 safely passed through the Atlantic, was creeping 
 up the Chilian coast and the Nurnherg and Leipzig 
 were coming down from the north. All the German 
 vessels had been ordered to concentrate at Easter 
 Island, a small remote convict settlement belonging 
 to Chili and lost in the Pacific far out (2,800 miles) 
 to the west of Valparaiso. 
 
 While, therefore, Cradock and his Southern 
 Squadron were steering for the Falkland Islands 
 to make of it a base for their search for the Dresden, 
 von Spec's cruisers were slowly concentrating 
 upon Easter Island. There was no coal at the 
 Falklands — they produce nothing except sheep 
 and the most abominable weather on earth — 
 but it was easy for us to direct colliers thither, 
 and to transform the Islands into a base of supplies. 
 The Germans had a far more difficult task. All 
 through the operations which I am describing, 
 and have still to describe, we were possessed of 
 three great advantages. We had the coal, we had 
 the freedom of communications given by ocean 
 cables and wireless, and we had the sympathy of 
 all those South American neutrals with whom we 
 had to deal. Admiral von Spee and his ships 
 were all through in great difficulties for coal, and 
 would have failed entirely unless the German ships
 
 224 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 at South American ports had run big risks to seek 
 out and supply him. He was to a large extent 
 cut off from the outside world, for he had no cables, 
 and received little information or assistance from 
 home. The slowness of his movements, both before 
 and after Coronel, may chiefly be explained through 
 his lack of supplies and his ignorance of where we 
 were or of what we were about to do. 
 
 It is comparatively easy for me now to plot out 
 the movements of the English and German vessels, 
 and to set forth their relative positions at any date. 
 But when the movements were actually in progress 
 the admirals and captains on both sides were very 
 much in the dark. Now and then would come a 
 ray of light which enabled their imagination and 
 judgment to work. Thus the report from the 
 Ortega that she had encountered the Dresden with 
 her two colliers at the Pacific entrance of the 
 Magellan Straits showed that she might be bound 
 for some German rendezvous in the Pacific Ocean. 
 A day or two later came word that the ScJiarnhorst 
 and Gneisenau had bombarded Tahiti, and that 
 these two powerful cruisers, which had seemed 
 to be so remote from the concern of the South 
 Atlantic Squadron, were already half-way across 
 the wide Pacific, apparently bound for Chili. It 
 was also, of course, known that the Leipzig and 
 Nurnberg were on the west coast of Mexico to 
 the north. Any one who will take a chart of the 
 Pacific and note the positions towards the end of 
 September of von Spec, the Dresden, and the Niirn- 
 herg and Leipzig, will see that the lonely dot marked 
 as Easter Island was pretty nearly the only spot 
 in the vast stretch of water towards wliich these 
 scattered units could possibly be converging. At
 
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 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 225 
 
 least so it seemed at the time, and, in fact, proved 
 to be the case. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau 
 reached Easter Island early in October, the Niirn- 
 herg turned up on the 12th, and later upon the 
 same day the Dresden arrived with her faithful 
 collier the Baden. Upon the 14th down came the 
 Leipzig accompanied by colliers carrying 3,000 
 tons of coal. The German concentration was 
 complete ; it had been carried through with very 
 considerable skill aided by no less considerable 
 luck. The few inhabitants of the lonely Easter 
 Island, remote from trade routes, cables, and 
 newspapers, regarded the German squadron with 
 complete indifference. They had heard nothing 
 of a world war, and were not interested in foreign 
 warships. The island is rich in archaeological 
 remains. There happened to be upon it a British 
 scientific expedition, but, busied over the relics 
 of the past, the single-minded men of science did 
 not take the trouble to cross the island to look at 
 the German ships. They also were happy in their 
 lack of knowledge that a war was on. 
 
 I have anticipated events a little in order to 
 make clear what was happening on the other side 
 of the great spur of South America while Admiral 
 Stoddart's squadron was taking charge of the 
 Brazilian, Uruguayan, and upper Argentine coasts, 
 and Admiral Cradock, with the Good Hope, Glasgow, 
 Monmouth, and Otranto — followed by the battle- 
 ship Canopus — were pressing to the south after 
 the Dresden. Stoddart's little lot had been swept 
 up from regions remote from their present con- 
 centration. The Carnarvon had come from St. 
 Vincent, the Defence from the Mediterranean, 
 where she had been Troubridge's flagship in the
 
 226 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 early days of the war ; the Kent had been sent 
 out from England, and the Cornwall summoned 
 from the West Coast of Africa. The Bristol, as 
 we know, was from the West Indies and her fruit- 
 less hunt for the elusive Karlsruhe. The South 
 Atlantic was now in possession of two considerable 
 British squadrons, although two months earlier 
 there had been nothing of ours carrying guns except 
 the little Glasgow. 
 
 After the news arrived from the Ortega about the 
 Dresden's movements, Cradock took his ships 
 down to Punta Arenas, and thence across to Port 
 Stanley, in the Falkland Islands, where he was 
 joined by the Canopus, a slow old ship of some 
 thirteen to fourteen knots, which had straggled 
 down to him. I have never been able to reconcile 
 the choice of the old Cdnopus, despite her for- 
 midable 12-inch guns, with my sense of what 
 was fitting for the pursuit and destruction of 
 German cruisers with a squadron speed of some 
 twenty- one knots. From Port Stanley the Glasgow 
 and Momnouth were despatched round the Horn 
 upon a scouting expedition which was to extend 
 as far as Valparaiso. Already the Southern 
 Squadron was beginning to suffer from its remote- 
 ness from the original Pirates' Lair of the Glasgow. 
 The Northern Squadron, collected from the corners 
 of the earth, were receiving the supply ships first 
 and skimming the cream off their cargoes before 
 letting them loose for the service of their brethren 
 in arms to the south. It was all very natural and 
 inevitable, but rather irritating for those who had 
 now to make the best of the knuckle end of the 
 Admiralty's joints. 
 
 The trip round the Horn of the Glasgow and
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 227 
 
 Monmouth was very rough indeed ; the English 
 cruisers rolled continually gunwhale under, and 
 had they chanced to encounter the Dresden — which 
 was not then possible, for she was well up the 
 Chilian coast — neither side could have fired a shot 
 at the other. At Orange Bay, where they put in, 
 they discovered evidence of the recent presence 
 of the Dresden in rather a curious way. It had 
 long been the custom of vessels visiting that remote 
 desolate spot to erect boards giving their names 
 and the date of their call. Upon the notice board 
 of the German cruiser Bremen, left many months 
 before, was read in pencil, partially obliterated by 
 a cautious afterthought, the words ''Dresden, 
 September 11th, 1914.'^ 
 
 During the early part of October, the two 
 cruisers Glasgow and Monmouth worked up the 
 Chilian coast and reached Valparaiso about October 
 17th. It was an expedition rather trying to the 
 nerves of those who were responsible for the safety 
 of the ships. Perhaps the word "squirmy'' will 
 best describe their feelings. Already the German 
 concentration had taken place at Easter Island to 
 the west of them ; they did not positively know 
 of it, but suspected, and felt apprehensive lest 
 their presence in Chilian waters might be reported 
 to von Spee and themselves cut of! and overwhelmed 
 before they could get away. Coal and provisions 
 were running short, the crew were upon half 
 rations, and any imprudence might be very severely 
 punished. 
 
 During October the Glasgow and Monmouth 
 were detached from the Good Hope, and it was 
 not until the 28th that Cradock joined up with 
 them at a point several hundred miles south of
 
 228 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 Coronel, wliitlier they had descended for coal and 
 stores after their hazardous northern enterprise. 
 Here also was the Otranto, but the Canopus, 
 though steaming her best, had been left behind 
 by the Good Hope, and was, for all practical pur- 
 poses, of no account at all. She was 200 miles 
 away when Coronel was fought. On October 28th, 
 after receiving orders from Cradock, the Glasgow 
 left by herself bound north for Coronel, a small 
 Chilian coaling port, there to pick up mails and 
 telegrams from England. The Glasgow arrived off 
 Coronel on the 29th, but remained outside patrolling 
 for forty- eight hours. The German wireless about 
 her was very strong indeed, enemy ships were 
 evidently close at hand, and at any moment might 
 appear. They were indeed much nearer and more 
 menacing than the Glasgow knew, even at this 
 eleventh hour before the meeting took place. 
 On October 26th Admiral von Spee was at Masa- 
 fuera, a small island off the Chilian coast, on the 
 27th he left for Valparaiso itself, and there on the 
 31st he learned of the arrival in the port of Coronel 
 of the English cruiser Glasgoiv. The clash of 
 fighting ships was very near. 
 
 On October 31st the Glasgow entered the harbour 
 of Coronel, a large harbour to which there are two 
 entrances, and a rendezvous of! the port had been 
 arranged with the rest of the squadron for No- 
 vember 1st. Her arrival was at once notified to 
 von Spee at Valparaiso. The mails and telegrams 
 were collected, and at 9.15 on the 1st the Glasgow 
 backed out cautiously, ready, if the Germans were 
 in force outside, to slip back again into neutral 
 waters and to take the fullest advantage of her 
 twenty-four hours' law. She emerged seeing
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 229 
 
 nothing, though the enemy wireless was coming 
 loudly, and met the Good Hope, Monmouth, and 
 Otranto at the appointed rendezvous some eighty 
 miles out to sea. Here the mails and telegrams 
 were transferred to Cradock by putting them in 
 a cask and towing it across the Good Hope's bows. 
 The sea was rough, and this resourceful method 
 was much quicker and less dangerous than the 
 orthodox use of a boat. Cradock spread out his 
 four ships, fifteen miles apart, and steamed to 
 the north-west at ten knots. Smoke became 
 visible to the Glasgow at 4.20 p.m., and as she 
 increased speed to investigate, there appeared two 
 four-funnelled armoured cruisers and one light 
 cruiser with three funnels. Those four-funnelled 
 ships were the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and 
 until they were seen at that moment by the Glasgow 
 they were not positively known to have been on 
 the Chilian coast. To this extent the German 
 Admiral had taken his English opponents by 
 surprise. " When we saw those damned four 
 funnels," said the officers of the Glasgoiv, " we knew 
 that there was the devil to pay." 
 
 I have already told the story of the Coronel 
 action and I will not tell it again. Von Spec held 
 oft" so long as the sun behind the English gave 
 them the advantage of light, and did not close in 
 until the sun had set and the yellow afterglow 
 made his opponents stand out like silhouettes. 
 He could see them while they could not see him. 
 During the action, the light cruiser Glasgoiv, with 
 which I am mainly concerned, had a very unhappy 
 time. The armed liner Otranto cleared off, quite 
 properly, and the Glasgow, third in the line, was 
 exposed for more than an hour to the concentrated
 
 230 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 fire of the 4-1-inch guns of both the Leipzig and 
 Dresden, and afterwards, when the Good Hope had 
 blown up and the Monmouth been disabled, for 
 about a quarter of an hour to the 8 •2-inch guns of 
 the Ghieisenau. Her gunnery officers could not 
 see the splashes of their own shells, and could not 
 correct the ranges. When darkness came down 
 it was useless to continue firing blindly, and worse 
 than useless, since her gun flashes gave some 
 guidance to the enemy's gunners. At the range 
 of about 11,000 yards, a long range for the German 
 41 -inch guns, the shells were falling all round 
 very steeply, the surface of the sea was churned 
 into foam, and splinters from bursting shells rained 
 over her. It is a wonderful thing that she suffered 
 so little damage and that not a single man of her 
 company was killed or severely wounded. Four 
 slight wounds from splinters constituted her total 
 tally of casualties. -At least 600 shells, great and 
 small, were fired at her, yet she was hit five times 
 only. The most serious damage done was a big 
 hole between wind and water on the port quarter 
 near one of the screws. Yet even this hole did 
 not prevent her from steaming away at twenty- 
 four knots, and from covering several thousand 
 miles before she w^as properly repaired. I think 
 that the Glasgow must be a lucky ship. After the 
 Good Hope had blown up and the Monmouth, 
 badly hurt, was down by the bows and turning 
 her stern to the seas, the Glasgow hung upon her 
 consort's port quarter, anxious to give help and 
 deeply reluctant to leave. Yet she could do 
 nothing. The Monmouth was clearly doomed, and 
 it was urgent that the Glasgoiv should get away to 
 warn the Canopiis, then 150 miles away and pressing
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 231 
 
 towards the scene of action, and to report the 
 tragedy and the German concentration to the 
 Admiralty at home. During that anxious waiting 
 time, when the enemy's shells were still falling 
 thickly about her, the sea, to the Glasgow's com- 
 pany, looked very, very cold ! At last, when the 
 moon was coming up brightly, and further delay 
 might have made escape impossible, the Glasgow 
 sorrowfully turned to the west, towards the wide 
 Pacihc spaces, and dashed of! at full speed. It 
 was not until half an hour later, when she was 
 twelve miles distant, that she counted the seventy- 
 five flashes of the Niirnberg's guns which finally 
 destroyed the Momnouth. I am afraid that the 
 story of the cheers from the Momnouth which sped 
 the Glasgow upon her way must be dismissed as 
 a pretty legend. No one in the Glasgow heard 
 them, and no one from the Monmouth survived to 
 tell the tale. Captain Grant and his men of the 
 Canopus must have suffered agonies when they 
 received the Glasgow's brief message. They had 
 done their utmost to keep up with the Good Hope, 
 and the slowness of their ship had been no fault 
 of theirs. Grant had, I have been told, implored 
 the Admiral to wait for him before risking an 
 engagement. 
 
 The journey to the Straits and to her junction 
 with the Canopus was a very anxious one for the 
 Glasgow's company. They did their best to be 
 cheerful, though cheerfulness was not easy to come 
 by. They had witnessed the total defeat of an 
 English by a German squadron, and before they 
 could get down south into comparative safety the 
 German ships, running down the chord of the arc 
 which represented the Glasgow's course, might 
 
 16
 
 232 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 arrive first at the Straits. That there was no 
 pursuit to the south may be explained by the one 
 word — coal. Von Spee could get coal at Valparaiso 
 or at Coronel — though the local coal was soft, 
 wretched stuff — but he had no means of replenish- 
 ment farther south. One does not realise how 
 completely a squadron of warships is tied to its 
 colliers or to its coaling bases until one tries to 
 discover and to explain the movements of warships 
 cruising in the outer seas. 
 
 While running down towards the Straits — for 
 twenty-four hours she kept up twenty-four knots 
 — the Glasgoiu briefly notified the Canopus of 
 the disaster of Coronel and of her own intention 
 to make for the Falkland Islands. Beyond this, 
 she refrained from using the tell-tale wireless 
 which might give away her position to a 
 pursuing enemy. Upon the evening of the 3rd 
 she picked up the German press story of the 
 action, but kept silence upon it herself. On the 
 morning of the 4th, very short of stores — her 
 crew had been on reduced rations for a month 
 — she reached the Straits and, to her great 
 relief, found them empty of the enemy. She 
 did not meet the Canopus until the 6th, and 
 then, with the big battleship upon her weather 
 quarter, to keep the seas somewhat off that sore 
 hole in her side, she made a fortunately easy passage 
 to the Falkland Islands and entered Port Stanley 
 at daylight upon November 8tli. Thence the 
 Glasgoiv despatched her first telegram to the 
 authorities at home, and at six o'clock in the 
 evening set off with the Canopus for the north. 
 But that same evening came orders from England 
 for the Canopus to return, in order that the coaling
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 233 
 
 base of tlie Falklands miglit be defended, so the 
 Glasgow, alone once again after many days, pursued 
 her solitary way towards Kio and to her meeting 
 with the Carnarvon, Defence, and Cornwall, which 
 were at that time lying of! the River Plate guarding 
 the approaches to Montevideo and Buenos Ayres. 
 The Glasgow had done her utmost to uphold the 
 Flag, but the lot of the sole survivor of a naval 
 disaster is always wretched. The one thing which 
 counts in the eyes of English naval officers is the 
 good opinion of their brethren of the sea ; those 
 of the Glasgow could not tell until they had tested 
 it what would be the opinion of their colleagues in 
 the Service. It was very kind, very sympathetic ; 
 so overflowing with kindness and sympathy were 
 those who now learned the details of the disaster, 
 that the company of the Glasgow, sorely humiliated, 
 yet full of courage and hope for the day of reckon- 
 ing, never afterwards forgot how much they owed 
 to it. At home men growled foolishly, ignorantly, 
 sank to the baseness of writing abusive letters to 
 the new^spapers, and even to the Glasgow herself, 
 but the Service understood and sympathised, and 
 it is the Service alone which counts.
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE " GLASGOW '' 
 
 Part II.— Coronel to Juan Fernandez 
 
 (Nov. 1st, 1914, to March 14tli, 1915) 
 
 We left the British cruiser Glasgow of! the River 
 Plate, where she had arrived after her escape, 
 sore at heart and battered in body, from the 
 disaster of Coronel. The battleship Canopus re- 
 mained behind at Port Stanley to defend the newly 
 established coaling-station at the Falkland Islands. 
 Her four 12-inch guns would have made the inner 
 harbour impassable to the lightly armoured cruisers 
 of Admiral von Spec had he descended before the 
 reinforcements from the north arrived ; and the 
 colliers, cleverly hidden in the remote creeks of 
 the Islands, would have been most difficult for 
 him to discover. It was essential to our plans 
 that there should be ample stores of coal at the 
 Falklands for the use of Sturdee's punitive squadron 
 when it should arrive, and every possible precaution 
 was taken to ensure the supply. As it happened, 
 von Spee did not come for five weeks. He was 
 at his wits' end to find coal, and was, moreover, 
 short of ammunition after the bombardment of 
 Tahiti and the big expenditure in the Coronel fight. 
 So he remained pottering about of! the Chilian 
 
 234
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 235 
 
 coast until he had sv/ept up enough of coal and 
 of colliers to make his journey to the Falklands, 
 and to provide for his return to the Lair which 
 he had established in an inlet upon the coast. 
 
 At the English Bank, off the River Plate, the 
 Glasgow had joined up with the Carnarvon, Defence, 
 and Cornwall, and her company were greatly 
 refreshed in spirit by the kindly understanding 
 and sympathy of their brothers of the sea. The 
 officers and men of the Glasgow, who had by now 
 worked together for more than two years, had 
 come through their shattering experiences with 
 extraordinary little loss of moral. They had 
 suffered a material defeat, but their courage and 
 confidence in the ultimate issue burned as brightly 
 as ever. Even upon the night of the disaster, 
 when they were seeking a safe road to the Straits, 
 uncertain whether the Germans would arrive there 
 first, they were much more concerned for the 
 safety of the Canopus than worried about their 
 own skins. Their captain and navigating lieu- 
 tenant had thrust upon them difficulties and 
 anxieties of which the others were at first ignorant. 
 The ship's compasses were found to be gravely 
 disturbed by the shocks of the action, their mag- 
 netism had been upset, and not until star sights 
 could be taken were they able to correct the error 
 of fully twenty degrees. The speed at which the 
 cruiser travelled buried the stern deeply, and 
 the water entering by the big hole blown in the 
 port quarter threatened to flood a whole compart- 
 ment and make it impossible for full speed to be 
 maintained. The voyage to the Straits was, for 
 those responsible, a period of grave anxiety. Yet 
 through it all the officers and men did their work
 
 236 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 and maintained a cheerful countenance, as if to 
 pass almost scatheless through a tremendous 
 torrent of shell, and to get away with waggling 
 compasses and a great hole between wind and 
 water, was an experience which custom had made 
 of little moment. No one could have judged from 
 their demeanour that never before November 1st 
 had the Glasgow been in action, and that not until 
 November 6th, when she had beside her the support 
 of the Canopus's great guns, did she reach com- 
 parative safety. 
 
 The Glasgow's damaged side had been shored up 
 internally with baulks of timber, but if she were 
 to become sea- and battle-worthy it was necessary 
 to seek for some more permanent means of repair. 
 So with her consorts she made for Rio, arriving on 
 the 16th, and reported her damaged condition to 
 the Brazilian authorities. Under the Hague Con- 
 vention she was entitled to remain at Rio for a 
 sufficient time to be made seaworthy, and the 
 Brazilian Government interpreted the Convention 
 in the most generous sense. The Government 
 floating dock was placed at her disposal, and here 
 for five days she^was repaired, until with her torn 
 side plating entirely renewed she was as fit as ever 
 for the perils of the sea. Her engineers took the 
 fullest advantage of those invaluable days ; they 
 overhauled the boilers and engines so thoroughly 
 that when the bold cruiser emerged from Rio she 
 was fresh and clean, ready to steam at her old full 
 speed of some twenty-six knots, and to fight any- 
 thing with which she could reasonably be classed 
 in weight of metal. By this time the Glasgow 
 had learned of the great secret concentration 
 about to take place at her old Pirates' Lair to the
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 237 
 
 north, and of those other concentrations which 
 were designed to ensure the destruction of von 
 Spec to whatsoever part of the wide oceans he 
 might direct his ships. 
 
 The disaster of Coronel had set the Admiralty- 
 bustling to very good and thorough purpose. No 
 fewer than five squadrons were directed to con- 
 centrate for the one purpose of ridding the seas 
 of the German cruisers. First came down Sturdee 
 with the battle cruisers Invincible and Inflexible 
 to join the Carnarvon, Glasgow, Kent, Cornwall, 
 and Bristol at the Pirates' Lair. Upon their arrival 
 the armoured cruiser Defence was ordered to the 
 Cape to complete there a watching squadron ready 
 for von Spee should he seek safety in that direction. 
 One Japanese squadron remained to guard the 
 China seas, and another of great power sped across 
 the Pacific towards the Chilian coast. In Australian 
 waters were the battle cruiser Australia and her 
 consorts of the Unit, together with the French 
 cruiser Montcalm. Von Spec's end was certain ; 
 what was not quite so certain was whether he 
 would fall to the Japanese or to Sturdee. Our 
 Japanese Allies fully understood that we were 
 gratified at his falling to us ; he had sunk our 
 ships and was our just prey. Yet if he had loitered 
 much longer oft Chili, and had not at last ventured 
 upon his fatal Falklands dash, the gallant Japanese 
 would have had him. Luck favoured us now, as 
 it had favoured us a month earlier when the Emden 
 was destroyed at the Cocos-Keeling I slands. Those 
 who have read my story of the Emden in Chapter IX 
 will remember that but for the fortune of position 
 which placed the Sydney nearest to the Islands 
 when their wireless call for help went out, the
 
 238 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 famous raider would in all probability have fallen 
 to a Japanese light cruiser which was with the 
 Australian convoy. 
 
 The mission of the Invincible and Inflexible, and 
 the secrecy with which it was enshrouded, is one 
 of the most romantic episodes of the war. I 
 have already dealt fully with it. But there has 
 since come to me one little detail which reveals 
 how very near we were, at one time, to a German 
 discovery of the whole game. The two battle 
 cruisers coaled at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands 
 — Portuguese territory, within which we had no 
 powers of censorship — and at the Pirates' Lair 
 off the Brazilian coast. Their movements began 
 to be talked about in Rio and the River Plate. 
 Men knew of the Coronel disaster and shrewdly 
 suspected that the two great ships were on their 
 way to the South Atlantic. A description of their 
 visit had been prepared, and was actually in type. 
 It was intended for publication in a local South 
 American paper. That it was not published, 
 when urgent representations were made on our 
 behalf, reveals how scrupulous was the considera- 
 tion with which our friends of Brazil and the 
 Argentine regarded our interests. There were 
 no powers of censorship, the appeal was as man to 
 man, an Englishman to a Portuguese, and the 
 appeal prevailed — even over the natural thirst of 
 a journalist for highly interesting news. The 
 battle cruisers coaled and passed upon their way, 
 and no word of their visit went forth to Berlin or 
 to von Spec. 
 
 The Glasgow was among the British cruisers which 
 greeted Sturdee at the Pirates' Lair, and as soon 
 as ammunition and stores had been distributed
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 239 
 
 and coal taken in, the voyage to the Falkland 
 Islands began. The squadron arrived in the 
 evening of December 7th, and at daybreak of the 
 8th von Spee ran upon his fate. The part played 
 by the Glasgow in the action was less spectacular 
 than that which fell to the battle cruisers, but it 
 was useful and has some features of interest. 
 Among other things it illustrates how little is 
 known of the course of a naval action — spread over 
 hundreds of miles of sea — while it takes place, and 
 for some time even after it is over. 
 
 On the morning of December 8th, at eight o'clock, 
 the approach of the German squadron was observed, 
 and at this moment the English squadron was 
 hard at work coaling. By 9.45 steam was up and 
 the pursuit began. The Glasgow was lying in the 
 inner harbour with banked fires, ready for sea at 
 two hours' notice, but her Engineer Lieutenant- 
 Commander Shrubsole and his staff so busied 
 themselves that in little over an hour from the 
 signal to raise steam she was under weigh, and 
 an hour later she was moving in chase of the enemy 
 at a higher speed than she obtained in her con- 
 tractors' trials when she was a brand-new ship 
 three years earlier. Throughout the war the 
 engineering staf! of the Royal Navy has never failed 
 to go one better than anyone had the right to 
 expect of it. It has never failed to respond to 
 any call upon its energies or its skill, never. 
 
 In order that we may understand how the 
 Dresden was able to make her escape unscathed 
 from her pursuers — she bolted without firing a 
 shot in the action — I must give some few details 
 of the position of the ships when the German 
 light cruisers were ordered by von Spee to take
 
 240 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 themselves off as best they might. Shortly before 
 one o'clock the Glasgow, a much faster ship than 
 anything upon our side except the two battle 
 cruisers, was two miles ahead of the fiagsliip In- 
 vincible, and it was Sturdee's intention to attack 
 the ScharnJiorst and Gneisenau — hull down on the 
 horizon— with liis speediest ships, the Invincible, 
 Inflexible, and Glasgoiv. Our three other cruisers 
 — Carnarvon, Cornwall, and Kent — were well astern 
 of the leaders. At 1.4 the ScharnJiorst and 
 Gneisenau turned to the eastward to accept battle 
 and to cover the retreat of their light cruisers, 
 which were then making off towards the south- 
 east. Admiral Sturdee, seeing at once that the 
 light cruisers might make good their escape unless 
 the speedy Glasgow were detached in pursuit, 
 called up the Carnarvon (Rear-Admiral Stoddart) 
 in his support, and ordered Captain Luce in the 
 Glasgow to take charge of the job of rounding up 
 and destroying the Leipzig, Niirnberg, and Dresden. 
 The Glasgow, therefore, began the chase at a grave 
 disadvantage. She first had to work round the 
 stern of the Invincible, pass the flagship upon her 
 disengaged side, and then steam off from far in 
 the rear after the Cornwall and Kent, which had 
 already begun the pursuit. The Leipzig and 
 Niirnberg were a long way off, and the Dresden 
 was even farther. This cruiser, Dresden, though 
 sister to the Emden, was, unlike her sister and the 
 others of von Spec's light cruisers, fitted with 
 Parsons' turbine engines. She was much the 
 fastest of the German ships afc the Falkland Islands, 
 and beginning her flight with a start of some ten 
 miles quickly was lost to sight beyond the horizon. 
 The Cornwall and Kent had no chance at all of
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 241 
 
 overtaking her, and the Glasgow, whose captain 
 was the senior naval officer in command of the 
 pursuing squadron of the three English cruisers, 
 could not undertake a long stern chase by herself so 
 long as the Leipzig and Niirnberg were in his course 
 and had not been disposed of. He was obliged 
 first to make sure of them. Steaming at twenty- 
 four and a half knots, the Glasgow drew away from 
 the battle cruisers and began to overhaul the Leipzig 
 and Niirnberg. She decided to attack the Leipzig, 
 which Avas nearest to her, and to regulate her speed 
 so that the Cornwall and I{ent — both more powerful 
 but much slower ships than herself — would not be 
 left behind. As it happened the engineering staffs 
 of these not very rapid " County " cruisers rose 
 nobly to the emergency, the Cormvall was able to 
 catch the Leipzig and to take a large part in her 
 destruction, while the Kent kept on after the 
 Niirnberg and, as it proved, was successful in 
 destroying her also. One of the ten boilers of the 
 Niirnberg had been out of action for weeks past 
 and her speed was a good deal below its best. 
 
 The sea is a very big place, but that portion of 
 it contained within the ring of the visible horizon 
 is very small. To those in the Glasgow, pressing 
 on in chase of the Leipzig, the scene appeared 
 strange and even ominous. They could see the 
 ScJiarnJiorst and Gneisenau far away, moving 
 apparently in pursuit of themselves, but the 
 battle criusers hidden below the curve of the 
 horizon they could not see. When firing from the 
 Invincible and Inflexible ceased for a while — as 
 it did at intervals — it seemed to the Glasgow's 
 company that they were sandwiched between von 
 Spec's armoured cruisers and his light cruisers,
 
 242 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 and that the battle cruisers, upon which the result 
 of the action depended, had disappeared into space. 
 The telegraph room and the conning-tower doubt- 
 less knew what was happening, but the ship's 
 company as a whole did not. To this brevity of 
 vision, and to this detachment from exact informa- 
 tion, one must set down the extraordinarily con- 
 flicting stories one receives from the observers of 
 a naval action. They see what is within the horizon 
 but not what is below it, and that which is below 
 is not uncommonly far more important than that 
 which is above. 
 
 Shortly before three o'clock the Glasgow opened 
 upon the Leifzig with her foremost 6-inch gun 
 at a range of about 12,000 yards (about seven 
 miles), seeking to outrange the lighter 41 -inch 
 guns carried by the Gterman cruiser. The distance 
 closed down gradually to 10,000 yards, at which 
 range the German guns could occasionally get in 
 their work. They could, as the Emden showed in 
 her fight with the Sydney, and as was observed at 
 Coronel, do effective shooting even at 11,000 
 yards, but hits were difficult to bring off, owing 
 to the steepness of the fall of the shells and the 
 narrowness of the mark aimed at. For more than 
 an hour the Glasgow engaged the Leipzig by her- 
 self, knocking out her secondary control position 
 between the funnels, and allowing the Cornwall 
 time to arrive and to help to finish the business 
 with her fourteen 6-inch guns. At one time the 
 range fell as low as 9,000 yards, the Leipzig's 
 gunners became very accurate, and the Glasgow 
 suffered nearly all the casualties which overtook 
 her in the action. 
 
 About 4.20 the Cornwall was able to open fire,
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 243 
 
 and the Glasgow joined her, so that both ships 
 might concentrate upon the same side of the 
 Leipzig. Just as Admiral Sturdee in his fight with 
 the Scliarnhorst and the Gneisenau could not 
 afford to run risks of damage far from a repairing 
 base, so the Glasgow and the Cornwall with several 
 hours of daylight before them were not justified 
 in allowing impatience to hazard the safety of 
 the ships. They had to regard the possible use 
 of torpedoes and to look out for dropped mines. 
 Neither torpedoes nor mines were, in fact, used 
 by the Germans, though at one time in the course 
 of the action drums, mistaken for mines, were seen 
 in the water and carefully avoided. They were 
 cases in which cartridges were brought from the 
 magazines, and which were thrown overboard 
 after being emptied. As the afternoon drew on 
 the weather turned rather misty, and the attacking 
 ships were obliged to close in a little and hurry 
 up the business. This was at half-past five. 
 
 From the first the Leipzig never had a chance. 
 She was out-steamed and utterly out-gunned. 
 Her opponents had between them four times her 
 broadside weight of metal, and the Cornwall was 
 an armoured ship. She never had a chance, yet 
 she went on, fired some 1,500 rounds — all that 
 remained in her magazines after Coronel— and did 
 not finally cease firing until after seven o'clock. 
 For more than four hours her company had looked 
 certain death in the face yet gallantly stood to 
 their work. From first to last von Spec's con- 
 centrated squadron played the naval game ac- 
 cording to the immemorial rules, and died *like 
 gentlemen. Peace be to their ashes. In success and 
 in failure they were the most gallant and honour-
 
 244 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 able of foes. At seven o'clock the Leipzig was 
 smashed to pieces, she was blazing from stem to 
 stern, she was doomed, yet gave no sign of sur- 
 render. 
 
 At this moment, when the work of the Glasgow 
 and the Cornwall had been done — the Cormvall, 
 it should be noted, bore the heavier burden in 
 this action — she was hit eighteen times, though 
 little hurt, and played her part with the utmost 
 loyalty and devotion — at this moment flashed the 
 news through the ether that the ScJiarnhorst and 
 Gneisenau had been sunk. The news spread, and 
 loud cheers went up from the English ships. To 
 the doomed company in the Leipzig those cheers 
 must have carried some hint of the utter disaster 
 which had overtaken their squadron. It was not 
 until nine o'clock (six hours after the Glasgow had 
 begun to fire upon her) that she made her last 
 plunge — if a modern compartment ship does 
 not blow up, she takes a powerful lot of shell to 
 sink her — and the English ships did everything 
 that they could to save life. The Glasgow drew 
 close up under her stern and lowered boats, at the 
 same time signalling that she was trying to save 
 life. There was no reply. Perhaps the signals 
 were not read ; perhaps there were not many left 
 alive to make reply. The Leipzig, still blazing, 
 rolled right over to port and disappeared. Six 
 officers, including the Navigating Lieutenant-Com- 
 mander, and eight men were picked up by the 
 Glasgow's boats. Fourteen officers and men out of 
 nearly 300 ! The captives were treated as honoured 
 guests and li^ade much of. Oar officers and 
 men took their gallant defeated foes to their 
 hearts and gave them of their best. It was not
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 245 
 
 until two days later, when news arrived that 
 the Leipzig's sister and consort the Niirnberg had 
 been sunk by the Kent, that these brave men 
 broke down. Then they wept. They cared little 
 for the Dresden—a, stranger from the North 
 Atlantic — but the Niirnberg was their own consort, 
 beside whom they had sailed for years, and beside 
 whom they had fought. They had hoped to the 
 last that she might make good her escape from 
 the wreck of von Speeds squadron. When that 
 last hope failed they wept. When I think of von 
 Spec's gallant men, so human in their strength 
 and in their weakness, I cannot regard them as 
 other than worthy brothers of the sea. 
 
 In the Coronel action the Glasgow, exposed to 
 the concentrated fire of the Leipzig and Dresden 
 for an hour, and to the heavy guns of the Gneisenau 
 for some ten minutes, did not lose a single man. 
 There were four slight wounds from splinters, 
 that was all. But in her long fight with the Leipzig 
 alone, assisted by the powerful batteries of the 
 Cornwall, the Glasgoiv suffered two men killed, 
 three men severely wounded, and six slightly 
 hurt. Such are the strange chances of war. 
 After Coronel, though they had seen two of their 
 own ships go down and were in flight from an 
 overwhelming enemy, the officers and men were 
 wonderfully cheerful. The shrewder the buffets 
 of Fate the stiffer became their tails. But after 
 the Falklands, when success had wiped out the 
 humiliation of failure, there came a nervous 
 reaction. Defeat could not depress the spirit of 
 these men, but victory, by relieving their minds 
 from the long strain of the past months, made 
 them captious and irritable. Perhaps their spirits
 
 246 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 were overshadowed by the prospect of the weary 
 hunt for the fugitive Dresden. 
 
 • • • •   
 
 By wondrous accident perchance one may 
 Grope out a needle in a load of hay. 
 
 Four German cruisers had been sunk, but one, 
 the Dresden, had escaped, and the story of the 
 next three months is the story of a search — 
 always wearisome, sometimes dangerous, some- 
 times even absurd. The Straits of Magellan, the 
 islands of Tierra del Fuego and of the Horn, and 
 the west coast of the South American spur are a 
 maze of inlets, many uncharted, nearly all unsur- 
 veyed. The hunt for the elusive Dresden among 
 the channels, creeks, and islands was far more 
 difficult than the proverbial grope for a needle 
 in a load of hay. A needle buried in hay cannot 
 change its position ; provided that it really be 
 hidden in a load, patience and a magnet will in- 
 fallibly bring it forth. The Dresden could move 
 ,from one hiding-place to another, no search for 
 her could ever exhaust the possible hiding-places, 
 and it was not positively known until after she 
 had been run down and destroyed where she had 
 been in hiding. That she was found after three 
 weary months may be explained by that one word 
 which explains so much in naval work — coal. The 
 Dresden after her flight from the Falkland Islands 
 action was short of coal ; von Spec's attendant 
 colliers, Baden and Santa Isabel, had been pursued 
 and sunk by the Bristol and the armed liner 
 Macedonia, and she was cast upon the world with- 
 out means of replenishing her bunkers. This was, 
 of course, known to her pursuers, so that they
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW. 
 
 246]
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 247 
 
 expected, and expected rightly, that she would 
 hang about in some secluded creek until her 
 dwindling supplies drove her forth upon the seas 
 to hunt for more. Which is what happened. 
 
 Upon the evening of December 8th, after the 
 Glasgow and Cornwall had disposed of the Leipzig, 
 there were one English and two German cruisers 
 unaccounted for. The Kent had last been seen 
 chasing the Niirnherg towards the south-east, 
 while the Dresden was disappearing over the curve 
 of the horizon to the south. Upon the following 
 morning no news had come in from the Kent, and 
 some anxiety was felt ; it was necessary to find 
 her before proceeding with the pursuit of the 
 Dresden, and much valuable time was lost. It 
 happened that during her fight with the N Umber g, 
 which she sank in a most business-like fashion, 
 the Kent's aerials were shot away and she lost 
 wireless contact with Sturdee's squadron. The 
 Glasgow was ordered off to search for her, but 
 fortunately the Kent turned up on the morning of 
 the 10th deservedly triumphant. She had per- 
 formed the great feat of catching and sinking a 
 vessel which on paper was much faster than her- 
 self, and she had done it though short of coal 
 and at the sacrifice of everything wooden on 
 board, including the ward- room furniture. She 
 was compelled with the Glasgow and Cornwall to 
 return to Port Stanley for coal, and this delay was 
 of the utmost service to the fugitive Dresden. 
 Though the movements of that cruiser, in the 
 interval, were not learned until much later, it 
 will be convenient if I give them now, so that the 
 situation may be made clear. The Dresden had 
 owed her escape to her speed and to the occupation 
 17
 
 248 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 of the Glasgow — the only cruiser upon our side 
 which could catch her — with the Leipzig. She got 
 clear away, rounded the Horn on the 9th, and on 
 December 10th entered the Gockburn Channel on 
 the west coast of Tierra del Fuego. At Stoll Bay 
 she passed the night, and her coal-bunkers being 
 empty sent men ashore to cut enough wood to 
 enable her to struggle up to Punta Arenas. She 
 ran a great risk by making for so conspicuous a 
 port, but she had no choice. Coal must be obtained 
 somehow or her number would speedily go up. 
 She was not entitled to get Chilian coal, for she 
 had managed to delude the authorities into supply- 
 ing her upon five previous occasions during the 
 statutory period of three months. Once in three 
 months a belligerent warship is permitted, under 
 the Hague Rules, to coal at the ports of a neutral 
 country ; once she claims this privilege she is 
 cut off from getting more coal from the same 
 country for three months. But the Dresden again 
 managed, as she had already done four times 
 before, to secure supplies illegitimately. She coaled 
 at Punta Arenas, remained there for thirty-one 
 hours — though after twenty-four hours she was 
 liable to internment — and left at 10 p.m. on the 
 13th. It was this disregard for the Hague Rules 
 which led to the destruction of the Dresden in 
 Chilian territorial waters at Juan Fernandez three 
 months later. We held that as she had broken 
 international law deliberately many times, she 
 was no longer entitled to claim its protection. 
 She could not disregard it when it knocked against 
 her convenience, and shelter herself under it when 
 in need of a protective mantle. She had by her 
 own violations become an outlaw.
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 249 
 
 At 2.30 a.m. on the 13th, Sturdee learned that 
 the Dresden was at Punta Arenas. The Bristol, 
 which was ready, jumped of! the mark at once ; 
 the Inflexible and the Glasgow, which were not 
 quite ready, got off at 9.15. Thus it happened 
 that the Bristol reached Punta Arenas seventeen 
 hours after the Dresden had left, to vanish, as it 
 were, into space, and not to be heard of again for 
 a couple of months. What she did was to slip 
 down again into the Cockburn Channel and lie 
 at anchor in Hewett Bay near the southern exit. 
 On December 26th she shifted her quarters to an 
 uncharted and totally uninhabited creek, called 
 the Gonzales Channel, and there she lay in idle 
 security until February 4th. 
 
 During the long weeks of the Dresden's stay in 
 Hewett Bay and the Gonzales Channel, the English 
 cruisers were busily hunting for her among the 
 islets and inlets of the Magellan Straits, Tierra del 
 Fuego, and the west coast of the South American 
 spur. The Carnarvon, Cornwall, and Kent took 
 charge of the Magellan Straits, the Glasgow and 
 Bristol ferreted about the recesses of the west 
 coast with the Inflexible outside of them to chase 
 the sea-rat should she break cover for the open. 
 The battle cruiser Australia came in from the 
 Pacific and with the " County " cruiser Newcastle, 
 from Mexico, kept watch off Valparaiso. The 
 Dresden, lying snug in the Gonzales Channel, was 
 not approached except once, on December 29th, 
 when one of the searchers was within twenty 
 miles of her hiding-place. The weather was thick 
 and she was not seen. The big ships did not long 
 waste their time over the search. It was one 
 better suited to light craft, for lighter craft even
 
 260 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 than the Glasgoiv or Bristol, for whom the uncharted 
 channels often threatened grave dangers. Armed 
 patrols or picket boats, of shallow draught, were 
 best suited to the work, and in its later stages were 
 furbished up and made available. 
 
 On December 16th the battle cruisers Invincible 
 and Inflexible were recalled to England, and the 
 Canopus went north to act as guardship at the 
 precious Pirates' Lair which has figured so often 
 in these pages. The Australia passed on her way 
 to the Atlantic, across which the Canadian con- 
 tingents were in need of convoy, and the super- 
 vision of the Dresden search devolved upon Admiral 
 Stoddart of the Carnarvon. The admiral with the 
 Carnarvon and Cornwall remained in and out of 
 the Magellan Straits, while the captain of the 
 Glasgow, with him the Kent, Bristol, and Newcastle, 
 was put in charge of the Chilian Archipelago. 
 Gradually as time went on and the Dresden lay 
 low^ — all this w^hile in the Gonzales Channel — other 
 ships went away upon more urgent duties and the 
 chase was left to the Glasgow, Kent, and an armed 
 liner Orama. The Bristol had butted herself 
 ashore in one of the unsurveyed channels and was 
 obliged to seek a dock for repairs. The great 
 concentration of which the Glasgow had been the 
 focus was over, she was now back at her old police 
 work, though not upon her old station. She had 
 begun the war in sole charge of the South Atlantic ; 
 the wheel of circumstance had brought her, with 
 her consorts, to the charge of the South Pacific. 
 
 Although the Glasgow's company had had many 
 experiences of the risks of war, they had never 
 felt in action the strain upon their nerves which 
 was always with them day in day out during that
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 261 
 
 long weary hunt for the Dresden in the Chilian 
 Archipelago. They explored no less than 7,000 
 miles of narrow waters, for the most part uncharted, 
 feeling their way by lead and by mother wit, be- 
 coming learned in the look of the towering rocks 
 which shut them in, and in the kelp growing upon 
 their sea margins. The channels wound among 
 steep high cliffs, around which they could not see. 
 As they worked stealthily round sharp corners, 
 they were always expecting to encounter the 
 Dresden with every gun and torpedo tube registered 
 upon the narrow space into which they must 
 emerge. Their own guns and torpedoes were 
 always ready for instant action, but in this game 
 of hide-and-seek the advantage of surprise must 
 always rest with the hidden conscious enemy. This 
 daily strain went on through half of December 
 and the whole of January and February ! One 
 cannot feel surprised to learn that in the view of 
 the Glasgow's company the actions of Coronel and 
 the Falklands were gay picnics when set in com- 
 parison with that hourly expectation throughout 
 two and a half months of the sudden discovery of 
 the Dresden, and that anticipated blast of every 
 gun and mouldy which she could on the instant 
 bring to bear. Added to this danger of sudden 
 attack was the ever- present risk of maritime disaster. 
 It is no light task to navigate for three months 
 waters to which exist no sailing directions and 
 no charts of even tolerable accuracy. Upon Cap- 
 tain Luce and upon his second in command, Lieu- 
 tenant-Commander Wilfred Thompson, rested a 
 load of responsibility which it would be difficult 
 to overestimate. 
 It was not until early in March that any authentic
 
 252 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 news of the movements of the Dresden became 
 available. Upon February 4th she had issued 
 forth of the Gonzales Channel and crept stealthily 
 up the Chilian coast. To the Glasgow had come 
 during the long weeks of the Dresden's hiding many 
 reports which she was obliged to investigate. 
 Many times our own cruisers were seen by ignorant 
 observers on shore and mistaken for the Dresden ; 
 out would flow stories which wandering by way 
 of South American ports — and sometimes by way 
 of London itself — would come to rest in the Glas- 
 gow's wireless-room and increase the burden thrown 
 upon her officers. More than once she was taken 
 by shore watchers to be the Dresden, and urgently 
 warned from home to be on the look-out for herself ! 
 At last the veil lifted. The Dresden, with her 
 coal of Punta Arenas approaching exhaustion, was 
 sighted at a certain spot well up the Chilian coast 
 where had been situated von Spec's secret Lair. 
 The news was rushed out to the Glasgow, and since 
 her consort, the Kent, was nearest to the designated 
 spot this cruiser was despatched at once to in- 
 vestigate. As at the Falklands action, her 
 engineers rose to the need for rapid movement. 
 For thirty-six hours continuously she steamed 
 northwards at seventeen knots, and arrived just 
 before daybreak on March 7th. Nothing was then 
 in sight, nor until three o'clock in the afternoon 
 of the following day, the 8th. While in misty 
 weather the Kent was waiting and watching out at 
 sea, a cloud bank lifted and the Dresden was re- 
 vealed. She had not been seen by us since the 
 day of her flight, December 8th, exactly three 
 months before ! The Dresden was a shabby 
 spectacle, her paint gone, her sides raw with rust
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 253 
 
 and standing high out of the water. She was 
 evidently light, and almost out of coal. The Kent 
 at once made for her quarry, but the Dresden, a 
 much faster ship, drew away. Foul as she was, 
 for she had not been in dock since the war began, 
 the Kent was little cleaner. The Dresden drew 
 away, but the relentless pursuit of the indefatigable 
 Kent kept her at full speed for six hours, and left 
 her with no more than enough fuel to reach Masa- 
 fuera or Juan Fernandez. By thus forcing the 
 Dresden to burn most of the fuel which still 
 remained in her bunkers, the Kent performed an 
 invaluable service. This was on March 8th. Juan 
 Fernandez was judged to be the most likely spot 
 in which she would take refuge, and thither the 
 Glasgow, Kent, and Orama foregathered, arriving 
 at daybreak on the 14th. In Cumberland Bay, 
 600 yards from the shore, the Dresden lay at 
 anchor ; the chase was over. She had arrived 
 at 8.30 a.m. on the 9th ; she had been in Chilian 
 waters for nearly five days. Yet her flag was still 
 flying, and there was no evidence that she had 
 been interned. Cumberland Bay is a small settle- 
 ment, and there was no Chilian force present 
 capable of interning a German warship. 
 
 I will indicate what happened. The main facts 
 have been told in the correspondence which took 
 place later between the Chilian and British Govern- 
 ments. I will tell the story as I have myself 
 gathered it, and as I interpret it. 
 
 The Dresden lay in neutral Chilian waters, yet 
 her flag was flying, and she had trained her guns 
 upon the English squadron which had found her 
 there. There was nothing to prevent her — though 
 liable to internment — from making off unless steps
 
 254 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 were taken at once to put her out of action. She 
 had many times before broken the neutrality 
 regulations of Chili, and was rightly held by us 
 to be an outlaw to be captured or sunk at sight. 
 Acting upon this just interpretation of the true 
 meaning of neutrality, Captain Luce of the Glasgow, 
 the senior naval officer, directed his own guns and 
 those of the Kent to be immediately fired upon the 
 Dresden. The first broadside dismounted her fore- 
 castle guns and set her ablaze. She returned the 
 fire without touching either of the English ships. 
 Then, after an inglorious two and a half minutes, 
 the Dresden's flag came down. 
 
 Captain Liidecke of the Dresden despatched a 
 boat conveying his " adjutant " to the Glasgow 
 for what he called " negotiations," but the English 
 captain declined a parley. He would accept 
 nothing but unconditional surrender. Liidecke 
 claimed that his ship was entitled to remain in 
 Cumberland Bay for repairs, that she had not 
 been interned, and that his flag had been struck 
 as a signal of negotiation and not of surrender. 
 When the Englishman Luce would not talk except 
 through the voices of his guns, the German adjutant 
 went back to his ship and Liidecke then blew her 
 up. His crew had already gone ashore, and the 
 preparations for destroying the Dresden had been 
 made before her captain entered upon his so-called 
 " negotiations." 
 
 It was upon the whole fortunate that Liidecke 
 took the step of sinking the Dresden himself. It 
 might have caused awkward diplomatic com- 
 plications had we taken possession of her in 
 undoubted Chilian territorial waters, and yet we 
 could not have permitted her any opportunity of
 
 THE CRUISE OF THE GLASGOW 255 
 
 escaping under the fiction of internment. Nothing 
 would have been heard of internment if the English 
 squadron had not turned up — the Dresden had 
 already made an appointment with a collier — and 
 if we had not by our fire so damaged the cruiser 
 that she could not have taken once more to the 
 sea. Her self-destruction saved us a great deal 
 of trouble. In the interval between the firing 
 and the sinking of the Dresden, the Maritime 
 Governor of Juan Fernandez suggested that the 
 English should take away essential parts of the 
 machinery and telegraph for a Chilian warship 
 to do the internment business. Neither of these 
 proceedings was necessary after the explosion. 
 The Dresden was at the bottom of Cumberland 
 Bay, and the British Government apologised to 
 the Chilians for the technical violation of territorial 
 w^aters. The apology was accepted, and everyone 
 was happy — not the least the officers and men 
 of the Dresden who, after months of aimless, hope- 
 less wanderings, found themselves still alive and 
 in a sunny land flowing with milk and honey. 
 After their long stay in Tierra del Fuego the 
 warmth of Chili must have seemed like paradise. 
 The Dresden yielded to the Glasgow one item of 
 the spoils of war. After the German cruiser had 
 sunk, a small pig was seen swimming about in 
 the Bay. It had been left behind by its late friends, 
 but found new ones in the Glasgow's crew. That 
 pig is alive still, or was until quite recently. Grown 
 very large, very hairy, and very truculent, and 
 appropriately named von Tirpitz, it has been 
 preserved from the fate which waits upon less 
 famous pigs, and possesses in England a sty and a 
 nameplate all to its distinguished self.
 
 266 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 With the sinking of the Dresden the cruise of the 
 Glasgow, which I have set out to tell, comes to a 
 close. She returned to the South Atlantic, and 
 for a further stretch of eighteen months her officers 
 and men continued their duties on board. But 
 life must for them have become rather dull. There 
 were no more Coronels, or Falkland Islands actions, 
 or hunts for elusive German cruisers. Just the 
 daily work of a light cruiser on patrol duty in time 
 of war. When in the limelight they played their 
 part worthily, and I do not doubt continued to 
 play it as worthily, though less conspicuously, 
 when they passed into the darkness of the wings, 
 and other officers, other men, and other ships 
 occupied in their turn the bright scenes upon the 
 naval stage.
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS ! SOME IMPRESSIONS 
 
 AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 Part I 
 
 It is strange how events of great national import- 
 ance become associated in one's mind with small 
 personal experiences, I have told with what 
 vividness I remember the receipt in November 
 1914 of private news that the battle cruisers In- 
 vincible and Inflexible had left Devonport for the 
 Falkland Islands, and how I heard Lord Rosebery 
 read out Sturdee's victorious dispatch to 6,000 
 people in St. Andrew's Hall, Glasgow. In a 
 similar way the Jutland battle became impressed 
 upon my mind in an unforgettable personal fashion. 
 On May 22nd, 1916, 1 learned that Admiral Beatty 
 had at his disposal the four *' Cats " — Lion, Tiger, 
 Queen Mary, and Princess Royal — of about twenty- 
 nine knots speed, and each armed with eight 13 "S- 
 inch guns, the two battle cruisers New Zealand 
 and Indefatigable, of some twenty- seven knots of 
 speed, and carrying each eight 12-inch guns, and 
 the Queen Elizabeths, of twenty-five knots, all of 
 which were armed with eight of the new 15 -inch 
 guns, which were a great advance upon the earlier 
 thirteen- point-fives. The ships of the Fifth Battle 
 Squadron had all been completed since the war 
 
 257
 
 258 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 began. Tlie Queen Elizabeth herself went into 
 dock at Rosyth for repairs, so that for immediate 
 service tlie squadron was reduced to four ships — 
 BarJiam, Valiant, Warspite, and Malaya. 
 
 Upon the following Saturday, May 27th, I was 
 invited to lunch in one of the battleships, but 
 upon arrival at South Queensferry, I found the 
 Fleet under Short Notice for sea, and no one was 
 allowed to leave the ships, or to receive friends 
 on board. It was a beautiful day, the long, light- 
 coloured Cats and the Futurist-grey battleships 
 were a most noble sight, but I felt too much like 
 a Peri shut out of Paradise to be happy in observing 
 them. A day or two later, Thursday, June 1st, 
 was fixed for my next visit, but again the Fates 
 were unkind. When I arrived in the early morn- 
 ing and stood upon the heights overlooking the 
 anchorage, Beatty's Fleet had gone, and, though 
 I did not know it, had even then fought the Jutland 
 battle. In the afternoon, news came with the 
 return to the Forth of the damaged battleship 
 Warspite surrounded by her attendant destroyers. 
 That was on the Thursday afternoon, but it was 
 not until the evening of Friday that the first 
 Admiralty message was issued, that famous message 
 which will never be forgotten either by the country 
 or by the Navy. The impression which it made 
 may be simply illustrated. I was sitting in my 
 drawing-room after dinner, anxiously looking for 
 news both on national and personal grounds, when 
 a newsboy shrieked under my window " Great 
 Naval Disaster : Five British Battleships Sunk." 
 The news printed in the paper was not so bad as 
 that shouted, but it was bad enough ; it gave the 
 impression of very heavy losses incurred for no
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 269 
 
 compensating purpose, and turned what had really 
 been a conspicuous naval success into an apology 
 for a naval disaster. As a humble student, I 
 could to some extent read between the lines of 
 the dispatch and dimly perceive what had hap- 
 pened, but to the mass of the British public, the 
 wording of that immortal document could not 
 have been worse conceived. To them it seemed 
 that the End of All Things was at hand. 
 
 The story runs that the first bulletin was made 
 up by clerks from scraps of messages which came 
 over the wireless from the Grand Fleet, but in 
 which the most important sentence of all was 
 omitted. " The Germans are claiming a victory,'^ 
 wailed the Admiralty clerks through the aerials 
 at Whitehall. '* What shall we say ? " " Say,'' 
 snapped the Grand Fleet, " say that we gave them 
 hell ! " If the Admiralty had only said this, 
 said it, too, in curt, blasphemous naval fashion, 
 the public would have understood, and all would 
 have been well. What a dramatic chance was 
 then lost ! Think what a roar of laughter and 
 cheering Avould have echoed round the world if 
 the first dispatch had run as follows : 
 
 " We have met and fought the German Fleet, 
 and given it hell. Beatty lost the Queen Mary 
 and Indefatigable in the first part of the battle 
 when the odds were heavily against us, but Jellicoe 
 coming up enveloped the enemy, and was only 
 prevented by mist and low visibility from destroy- 
 ing him utterly. The Germans have lost as many 
 ships as we have, and are shattered beyond repair.'' 
 
 That message, in a few words, would have given 
 a true impression of the greatest sea fight that 
 the world has known, a fight, too, which has
 
 260 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 established beyond question the unchallengeable 
 supremacy of British strategy, battle tactics, sea- 
 manship, discipline, and devotion to duty of every 
 man and boy in the professional Navy. In the 
 technical sense, it was an indecisive battle : the 
 Germans escaped destruction. But morally, and 
 in its practical results, no sea fight has been more 
 decisive. Nearly two years have passed since that 
 morning of June 1st when the grey dawn showed 
 the seas empty of German ships, and though the 
 High Seas Fleet has put out many times since 
 then, it has never again ventured to engage us. 
 Jutland drove sea warfare, for the Germans, be- 
 neath the surface, a petty war of raids upon 
 merchant vessels, a war — as against neutrals — 
 of piracy and murder. By eight o'clock on the 
 evening of May 31st, 1916, the Germans had been 
 out-fought, out-manoeuvred, and cut oft' from their 
 bases. Had the battle begun three hours earlier, 
 and had visibility been as full as it had been in 
 the Falkland Islands action, had there been, above 
 all, ample sea room, there would not have been 
 a German battleship afloat when the sun went 
 down. There never was a luckier fleet than that 
 one which scrambled away through the darkness 
 of May 31st -June 1st worked its way round the 
 enveloping horns of Jellicoe, Beatty, and Evan- 
 Thomas, and arrived gasping and shattered at 
 Wilhelmshaven. We can pardon the Kaiser, who, 
 in his relief for a crowning mercy, proclaimed the 
 escape to be a glorious victory. 
 
 But though the Kaiser may, after his maimer, 
 talk of victories, German naval officers cherish 
 no illusions about Jutland. If one takes the 
 trouble to analyse their very full dispatches, their
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 261 
 
 relief at escaping destruction shines forth too 
 plain to be mistaken. Admiral S cheer got away, 
 and showed himself to be a consummate master 
 of his art. But he never, in his dispatches, claims 
 that the British Fleets were defeated in the military 
 sense. They were foiled, chiefly through his own 
 skill, but they were not defeated. The German 
 dispatches state definitely that the battle of 
 May 31st " confirmed the old truth, that the large 
 fighting ship, the ship which combines the maximum 
 of strength in attack and defence, rules the seas." 
 The relation of strength, they say, between the 
 English and German Fleets, " was roughly two 
 to one." They do not claim that this over- 
 whelming superiority in our strength was sensibly 
 reduced by the losses in the battle, nor that the 
 large English fighting ships— admittedly larger, 
 much more numerous, and more powerfully gunned 
 than their own — ceased after Jutland to rule the 
 seas. Their claim, critically examined, is simply 
 that in the circumstances the German ships made 
 a highly successful escape. And so indeed thev 
 did. 
 
 The Jutland battle always presents itself to my 
 mind in a series of clear-cut pictures. Very few 
 of those who take part in a big naval battle see 
 anything of it. They are at their stations, occupied 
 with their pressing duties, and the world without 
 is hidden from them. I try to imagine the various 
 phases of the battle as they were unfolded before 
 the eyes of those few in the fighting squadrons 
 who did see. Perhaps if I try to paint for my 
 readers those scenes which are vividly before me, 
 I may convey to them something of ^^^hat I have 
 triad to learn myself.
 
 262 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 Let us transport ourselves to the signal bridge 
 of Admiral Beatty's flagship, the battle cruiser 
 Lion, and take up station there upon the after- 
 noon of May 31st, at half-past two. It is a fine 
 afternoon, though hazy ; the clouds lie in heavy 
 banks, and the horizon, instead of appearing as 
 a hard line, is an indefinable blend of grey sea and 
 grey cloud. It is a day of " low visibility," a 
 day greatly favouring a weak fleet which desires 
 to evade a decisive action. We have been sweep- 
 ing the lower North Sea, and are steering towards 
 the north-west on our way to rejoin Jellicoe's 
 main Fleet. Our flagship. Lion, is the leading 
 vessel of the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, and 
 following behind us, we can see the Princess Royal, 
 Queen Mary, and Tiger. At a little distance be- 
 hind the Tiger appear the two ships which remain 
 to us of the Second Battle Cruiser Squadron, the 
 Indefatigable and New Zealand, fine powerful 
 ships, but neither so fast nor so powerful as are 
 our four Cats of the First Squadron. Some five 
 or six miles to the w^est of us we can make out, 
 against the afternoon sky, the huge bulk of the 
 Barham, which, followed by her three consorts, 
 Valiant, Warspite, and Malaya, leads the Fifth 
 Battle Squadron of the most powerful fighting 
 ships afloat. We are the spear-head of Beatty's 
 Fleet, but those great ships yonder, silhouetted 
 against the sky, are its most solid shaft. 
 
 Word runs round the ship that the enemy has 
 been sighted, but since we know nothing of his 
 numbers or of his quality — Jutland, though anti- 
 cipated and worked for, was essentially a battle 
 of encounter — our light cruisers fly oil' to make 
 touch and find out for us. Away also soars a
 
 200 
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS. 
 
 362]
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 263 
 
 seaplane, rising from the platform of our carrying 
 ship Engadine, a clumsy- looking seagull, with its 
 big pontoon feet, but very fast and very deftly 
 handled. The seaplane flies low, for the clouds 
 droop towards the sea, it is heavily fired upon, 
 but is not hit, and it returns to tell us — or rather 
 the Admiral, in his conning tower below — just 
 what he wishes to learn. There is an enemy 
 battle cruiser squadron immediately in front of 
 us, consisting of five armoured ships, with their 
 attendant light cruisers and destroyers. The Ger- 
 man battle cruisers are : Derfflinger (12-inch guns), 
 Lutzow (12-inch), Moltke (11-inch), Seydlitz (11- 
 inch), and another stated by the Germans to be 
 the Von der Tdnn, which had more than once been 
 reported lost. Since our four big battle cruisers 
 carry 13'5-inch guns, and two other guns of 12-inch, 
 and the four battleships supporting us great 
 15-inch weapons, we ought to eat up the German 
 battle cruisers if we can draw near enough to see 
 them distinctly. By half-past three the two 
 British battle cruiser squadrons are moving at 
 twenty-five knots, formed up in line of battle, 
 and the Fifth Battle Squadron, still some five 
 miles away, is steaming at about twenty-three 
 knots. The Germans have turned in a southerly 
 direction, and are flying at full speed upon a course 
 which is roughly parallel with that which we 
 have now taken up. During the past hour we 
 have come round nearly twelve points — eight 
 points go to a right angle — and are now speeding 
 away from Jellicoe's Grand Fleet, which is some 
 forty miles distant to the north and west. Since 
 we are faster than Jellicoe, the gap between us and 
 him is steadily opening out. 
 
 18
 
 264 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 From the signal bridge, a very exposed position, 
 we can see the turret guns below us and the spotting 
 top above. The turrets swing round, as the 
 gunners inside get their directions from the gunnery- 
 control officer who, in his turn, receives every few 
 moments the results of the range-finding and rate- 
 of-change observations which are being continually 
 taken by petty officers charged with the duty. 
 Further corrections will be made when the guns 
 begin to shoot, and the spotting officers aloft 
 watch for the splashes of the shells as they fall 
 into the sea. Naval gunnery, in spite of all the 
 brains and experience lavished upon it, must 
 always be far from an exact science. One has to 
 do with moving ships firing at other moving ships, 
 many factors which go to a precise calculation are 
 imperfectly known, and though the margin of 
 error may be reduced by modern instruments of 
 precision, the long fighting ranges of to-day make 
 the error substantial. The lower the visibility, 
 the greater becomes the gunner's uncertainty, for 
 neither range-finding nor spotting can be carried 
 on with accuracy. Even on the clearest of days 
 it is difficult to " spot '" a shell-splash at more 
 than 14,000 yards (eight land miles), a range which 
 is short for the huge naval gun. When many 
 guns are firing, it is not easy to pick up the splashes 
 of one's own shells, and to distinguish between 
 their water-bursts and the camouflage put up by 
 an enemy. 
 
 At our position upon the signal bridge, though 
 we are there only in spirit, we probably feel much 
 more of excitement than does any officer or man 
 of the big ship upon which we have intruded our 
 ghostly presence. Most of them can see nothing ;
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 265 
 
 all of them are too busy upon their duties to 
 bother about personal feelings. There is an atmo- 
 sphere of serene confidence in themselves and their 
 ship which communicates itself even to outsiders 
 like us. At 3.48 the enemy is some 18,500 yards 
 distance, and visible, for the light has improved, 
 and firing begins almost simultaneously from us 
 and our opponents. The first crash from the 
 Lion's two fore-turrets nearly throws us off the 
 bridge, so sudden and fierce it is, and so little does 
 its intensity seem to be subdued by our ear- pro- 
 tectors. But as other crashes follow down the 
 line we grow accustomed to them, grip tightly at 
 the hand-rail, and forget ourselves in the grandeur 
 of the sight unfolding itself before us. Away, far 
 away, is the enemy, hull down, smothered in smoke 
 and by the huge gouts of spray thrown up by our 
 bursting shells. He is adding to the splashes by 
 firing his own side batteries into the sea, to confuse 
 the judgment of our spotters. 
 
 At each discharge from our ship, a great cone of 
 incandescent gas flames forth, cutting like a sword 
 through the pale curtain of smoke. From the 
 distant enemy ships we can see thin flashes spurt 
 in reply, and his shells pitch beside us and over 
 us, lashing our decks with sea foam and sometimes 
 throwing a torrent of water over the spotting 
 top and bridge. Before five minutes have passed, 
 we are wet through, our ears are drumming in 
 spite of the faithful protectors, and all sensation 
 except of absorbed interest in the battle has left us. 
 At any moment we may be scattered by a bursting 
 shell, or carried to the bottom with our sunken 
 ship, but we do not give a thought to the risks. 
 
 While we are firing at the enemy, and he is
 
 266 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 firing at us at ranges varying from ten to eight 
 miles, a fierce battle is going on between tlie lines 
 of big ships. Light cruisers are fighting light 
 cruisers, destroyers are rushing upon destroyers. 
 At an early stage in the action, the German Admiral 
 Hipper- in command of the battle cruisers — 
 launched fifteen destroyers at our line, and was 
 taught a rough lesson in the quality of the boys 
 who man our T.B.D.s. Twelve of our heavier and 
 more powerfully armed destroyers fell upon the 
 German fifteen, huddled them into a bunch, and 
 had started to lay them out scientifically with 
 gun and torpedo, when they fled back to the shelter 
 of their own big ships. Following them up, our 
 destroyers delivered a volley of torpedoes upon the 
 German battle cruisers at less than 3,000 yards 
 distance. Probably no damage was done, for it 
 is the forlornest of jobs to loose mouldies against 
 fast manoeuvring ships, but lack of success does not 
 in any way dim the splendour of the attempt. As 
 light cruisers and destroyers fight and manoeuvre, 
 the torrent of heavy shells screams over their 
 heads, flying as high in their course as Alpine 
 mountains, and dropping almost vertically near 
 the lines of battle cruisers. 
 
 As soon as we turned to the south in pursuit of 
 Hipper's advance squadron of battle cruisers, 
 Admiral Evan-Thomas closed his supporting battle- 
 ships upon us, and we can now see them clearly 
 about two miles away on our starboard quarter, 
 formed in line of battle, the flagship Barliam leading. 
 At eight minutes past four they join in the fight, 
 firing at a range of 20,000 yards (twelve miles), 
 not an excessive distance for their tremendous 
 flat-shooting 15-inch guns if the light were good,
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 267 
 
 but too far for accuracy now that the enemy ships 
 can be seen so very indistinctly. Up to now the 
 German gunnery has been good ; our ships have 
 not often been seriously struck, but the shells in 
 bunched salvoes have fallen very closely beside 
 us. Our armour, though much thinner than that 
 of the battleships behind us, is sufficient to keep 
 of! the enemy's light shells — our 13 •5-inch shells 
 are twice the weight of his 11 -inch, and the 15-inch 
 shells fired by the Queen Elizabeths astern of us 
 are more than twice the weight of his 12-inch. 
 We feel little anxiety for our turrets, conning 
 towers, or sides, but we notice how steeply his 
 salvoes are falling at the long ranges, and are 
 not without concern for our thin decks should 
 any 12-inch shells of 850 lb. weight plump fairly 
 upon them from the skies. By half-past four the 
 German fire has slackened a good deal, has become 
 ragged and inaccurate, showing that we are getting 
 home with our heavy stuff, and the third ship in 
 the line is seen to be on fire. All is going well, 
 the enemy is outclassed in ships and in guns ; we 
 are still between him and his bases to the south- 
 west, he is already becoming squeezed up against 
 the big banks which stretch out one hundred miles 
 from the Jutland coast, and for a while it looks as 
 if Beatty had struck something both soft and good. 
 But a few minutes make a great change. All 
 through the last hour we have been steaming fast 
 towards the main German High Seas Fleet and 
 away from Jellicoe, and at 4.42 the leading German 
 battleships can be seen upon the smoky horizon 
 to the south-east. Though we do not know it 
 yet, the whole High Seas Fleet is before us, in- 
 cluding sixteen of the best German ships, and it
 
 268 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 were the worst of folly to go any farther towards 
 it. We could, it is true, completely outflank it 
 by continuing on our present course, and with 
 our high speed might avoid being crushed in a 
 general action, but we should have irrevocably 
 separated ourselves from Jellicoe, and have com- 
 mitted a tactical mistake of the biggest kind. We 
 should have divided the English forces in the face 
 of the enemy, instead of concentrating them. So 
 a quick order comes from the conning tower below, 
 and away beside us runs a signal hoist. " Sixteen 
 points, starboard.'' Sixteen points mean a com- 
 plete half-circle, and round come our ships, the 
 Lion leading, turning in a curve of which the 
 diameter is nearly a mile, and heading now to 
 the north, towards Jellicoe, instead of to the 
 south, away from him. Our purpose now is to 
 keep the Germans fully occupied until Jellicoe, 
 who is driving his battleships at their fullest speed, 
 can come down and wipe Fritz off the seas. As 
 we come round, the German battle cruisers follow 
 our manoeuvre, and also turn through sixteen 
 points in order to place themselves at the head of 
 the enemy's battle line. 
 
 As we swing round and take up our new course, 
 we pass between the Queen Elizabeths and the 
 enemy, masking their fire, and for a few minutes 
 we are exposed in the midst of a critical manoeuvre 
 to the concentrated salvoes of every German 
 battleship within range. The range is long, the 
 German shells fired with high elevation fall very 
 steeply, and we are safe except from the ill-luck 
 of heavy projectiles pitching upon our decks. 
 From the signal bridge of the Lion we can see 
 every battle cruiser as it swings, or as it approaches
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 269 
 
 the turning point, we can see the whole beautiful 
 length of them, and we also see a sight which has 
 never before been impressed upon the eyes of man. 
 For we see two splendid battle cruisers struck and 
 sink ; first the Indefatigable, and then the Queen 
 Mary. It is not permitted to us to describe the 
 scene as actually it presented itself to our eyes. 
 
 Beatty has lost two battle cruisers, one of the 
 first class and one of the second. There remain 
 to him four — the three Cats and the New Zealand ; 
 he is sorely weakened, but does not hesitate. He 
 has two duties to carry out — to lead the enemy 
 towards Jellicoe, and so to dispose of his battle 
 cruisers beyond the head of the German lines as 
 powerfully to aid Jellicoe in completing their 
 envelopment. Beatty is now round, and round 
 also comes the Fifth Battle Squadron, forming 
 astern of the battle cruisers, and with them engaging 
 the leading German ships. The enemy is some 
 14,000 yards distant from us in the Lion (8| 
 miles), and this range changes little while Beatty 
 is speeding first north and then north-east, in 
 order to cross the " T " of the German line. We 
 will continue to stand upon the Lion's bridge during 
 the execution of this most spirited manoeuvre, 
 and then leave Beatty' s flagship in order to observe 
 from the spotting top of a battleship how the four 
 Queen Elizabeths fought the whole High Seas 
 Fleet, while our battle cruisers were turning its 
 van. What these splendid ships did, and did to 
 perfection, was to stall the Germans off, and so 
 give time both for the enveloping movement of 
 Beatty and for the arrival and deployment of 
 Jellicoe's main Fleet. 
 
 By five o'clock Beatty is fairly of! upon his
 
 270 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 gallant adventure, and during the next hour, the 
 hardest fought part of the whole battle, the gap 
 between the battle cruisers and the four supporting 
 battleships steadily widens. If the Germans are 
 to be enveloped, Beatty must at the critical moment 
 allow sufficient space between himself and Evan- 
 Thomas for Jellicoe to deploy his big Fleet between 
 them, and this involves on the part of the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief a deployment in the midst of 
 battle of a delicacy and accuracy only possible to 
 a naval tactician of the highest order. But both 
 Beatty and Evan-Thomas know their Jellicoe, to 
 whom, at few-minute interv^als, crackle from the 
 aerials above us mreless messages giving with 
 naval precision the exact courses and speeds of 
 our ships and the bearings of the enemy. For an 
 hour — up to the moment when we turned to the 
 north — we ran away from Jellicoe, but during 
 the next hour we steam towards him ; we know 
 that he is pressing to our aid with all the speed 
 which his panting engineers can get out of his 
 squadrons. Beatty's battle cruisers, curving round 
 the head of the German line at a range of 14,000 
 to 12,000 yards, are firing all the while, and being 
 fired at all the while, but though often hit, they are 
 safer now than when they were a couple^^of miles 
 more distant. 
 
 We have now reached a very important phase 
 in the battle. It is twenty minutes past six. 
 At six o'clock the leading vessels of Jellicoe's 
 Grand Fleet had been sighted five miles to the 
 north of us and his three battle cruisers — In- 
 vincible (Admiral irJood), Inflexible, Shnd Indomitable 
 — have flown down to the help of Beatty. They 
 come into action, steaming hard due south, and
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 271 
 
 take station ahead of us in the Lion. By this 
 lengthening of his line to the south Beatty has now 
 completely enveloped the German battle cruisers, 
 which turn through some twelve points and 
 endeavour to wriggle out of the jaws of the trap 
 which they see closing remorselessly upon them. 
 They are followed in this turn by the battleships 
 of the High Seas Fleet which, for more than an 
 hour, have been faithfully hammered by Evan- 
 Thomas's Queen Elizabeths, and show up against 
 the sky a very ragged outline. The range of 
 the battle cruisers is now down to 8,000 yards, 
 and they get well home upon battleships as well 
 as upon opponents of their own class. We do not 
 ourselves escape loss, for the Invincible, which 
 has become the leading ship, is shattered by 
 concentrated gunfire. The gallant Hood, with his 
 men, has gone to join his great naval ancestors. 
 
 And now let us put the clock back to the hour, 
 4.57, when the Queen Elizabeths had completed 
 their turn to the north, and had taken up position 
 astern of Beatty to hold of! the main German 
 Fleet while he is making his enveloping rush. 
 From the spotting top of the battleship upon 
 which we have descended we get a most inspiring 
 view, though every now and then we are smothered 
 in oily smoke from the huge flat funnels below 
 us, and are drenched with water which is flung 
 up in torrents by shells bursting alongside. The 
 enemy ships upon which we are firing are some 
 18,000 yards distant, we can with great difficulty 
 make them out amid the smoke and haze, and we 
 wonder mightily how the keen- eyed spotting officers 
 beside us can judge and correct, as they appear
 
 272 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 to be doing, the bursts of our shells more than 
 ten miles distant. Our guns, and those of our 
 consorts, are firing deliberately, for we do not 
 know how long the battle will endure, and the 
 supply of 15-inch shell and cordite cannot be 
 unlimited in the very biggest of ships. We learn 
 from the spotting officers that all our ships, except 
 the Valiant, have been hit several times while 
 coming into action by dropping shots, but that no 
 serious harm has been done. Meanwhile the shells 
 are falling fast about us, and all of our ships are 
 repeatedly straddled. The Warspite suft'ered the 
 most severely, though even she was able to go 
 home to the Forth under her own steam. This 
 is the battleship whose steering gear went wrong 
 later in the action, and which turned two complete 
 " O's" at full speed. Eound she went in great 
 circles of a mile in diameter, spitting shots with 
 every gun that bore upon the enemy during her 
 wild gyrations. Fritz began well, but does not 
 seem able to stand punishment. He rarely hits 
 us now, though we are giving him a much better 
 mark than he presents to us. For we are sil- 
 houetted against the almost clear sky to the west, 
 while he — and there are a great many of him — is 
 buried in mist and smoke to the east. Rarely 
 can our range-finding officers take a clear observa- 
 tion ; rarely can our spotters make sure of a 
 correction. Yet every now and then we note 
 signs that our low-flying, hard-hitting shells — each 
 one of which weighs not much short of a ton ! 
 — are getting home upon him at least as frequently 
 as his shots are hitting us. Three of his battle- 
 ships are new, built since the war began, but the 
 rest are just Konigs and Kaisers, no better than
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 273 
 
 our Dreadnoughts of half a dozen years ago. We 
 would willingly take on twice our numbers of such 
 battleships and fight them to a finish upon a clear 
 summer's day. 
 
 Our battle tactics are now plain to see. They 
 are to keep out to the farthest visible range, to 
 avoid being materially damaged, and to keep 
 Fritz's battleships so fully occupied that they 
 will have no opportunity of closing in upon Beatty 
 when he completes his envelopment. We can see 
 our battle cruisers some three miles away, swinging 
 more and more round the head of the German 
 line, and the enemy's battle cruisers edging away 
 in the effort to avoid being outflanked. Far away 
 to the north appears the smoke of the three battle 
 cruisers which are speeding ahead of Jellicoe's 
 main Fleet ; they are getting their instructions 
 from Beatty's Lion, and are already making for 
 the head of his line so as to prolong it, and so to 
 complete the envelopment which is now our urgent 
 purpose. Our Queen Elizabeth battleships are 
 not hurrying either their engines or their guns. 
 We are moving just fast enough to keep slightly 
 ahead of the first half-dozen of the German battle- 
 ships ; we are pounding them steadily whenever 
 a decent mark is offered us — which unhappily is 
 not often — and we have seen one big ship go down 
 smothered in smoke and flames. The time draws 
 on and it is already six o'clock ; we have borne 
 the burden of the fight for more than an hour, 
 though it seems but a few minutes since we turned 
 more than twenty miles back to the south, and 
 first gave Fritz a taste of what the Fifth Battle 
 Squadron could do. We are slowing down now, 
 and the gap between us and Beatty is widening
 
 274 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 out, for we know that Jellicoe is coming, and 
 that he will deploy his three battle squadrons 
 between us and our battle cruisers, which, extended 
 in a long line, with Hood's Invincible in front, are 
 well round the head of the German ships. The 
 w^hole German Fleet is curving into a long, close- 
 knit spiral between us and Beatty, and, if the 
 light will hold, we have it ripe for destruction. 
 We have played our part ; the issue now rests 
 with Jellicoe and the gods of weather. 
 
 Everything for which we and the battle cruisers 
 have fought and suffered, for which w^e have 
 risked and lost the Queen Mary and Indefatigable, 
 is drawing to its appointed end. Our Fifth Battle 
 Squadron has nearly stopped^ and has inclined 
 four points towards the east, so as to allow the 
 gap for Jellicoe's deployment to widen out. Firing 
 upon both sides has ceased. We have great work 
 still to do, and are anxious to keep all the shells 
 we yet carry for it, and the enemy is too heavily 
 battered and in too grievous a peril to think of 
 anything but his immediate escape. We are 
 waiting for Jellicoe, whose squadrons are already 
 beginning ^to^deploy. 
 
 While the Queen Elizabeths wait, ready at any 
 moment to resume the action whenever and 
 wherever their tremendous services may be called 
 for, we will leave the Fifth Battle Squadron, and, 
 flying far over the sea, will penetrate into the 
 Holy of Holies, the conning tower of the Fleet 
 flagship wherein stands the small, firm-lipped, 
 eager- eyed man who is the brain and nerve centre 
 of the battle. There are those who have as sharp 
 a thirst for battle — Beatty has; and there are
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 275 
 
 those who have been as patient under long-drawn- 
 out delays and disappointments — Kitchener was ; 
 yet there have been few fighting men in English 
 history who could, as Jellicoe can, combine 
 enduring patience with the most burning ardour, 
 and never allow the one to achieve mastery over 
 the other. Watch him now in the conning tower 
 of the Iron Duke. He has waited and worked 
 during twenty- two months for just this moment, 
 when the German High Seas Fleet have placed 
 their cards upon the table, and he, exactly at the 
 proper instant, will play his overwhelming trumps. 
 If ever a man had excuse for too hasty a movement, 
 for too great an eagerness to snatch at victory, 
 Jellicoe would have one now. His eyes flash, 
 and one may read in them the man's intense 
 anxiety not to allow one moment of unnecessary 
 delay to interpose between his Fleet and the 
 scattering enemy. Yet until the exact moment 
 arrives when he can with sure hand deploy his 
 squadrons into line of battle, and fit them with 
 precision into the gap made for them between 
 Beatty to the east and south and Evan-Thomas 
 to the west and south, he will not give the order 
 which, once given, cannot be recalled. For as 
 soon as his Fleet has deployed, it will be largely 
 out of his hands, its dispositions will have been 
 made, and if it deploys too soon, the crushing 
 opportunity will be missed, and the Germans will 
 infallibly escape. So, with his divisions well in 
 hand, he watches upon the chart the movements 
 of his own and Beatty's vessels, as the wireless 
 waves report them to him, and every few minutes 
 goes to the observation hoods of the conning tower, 
 and seeks to peer through the thick haze and
 
 276 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 smoke which still hide from him the enveloping 
 horns of the English ships, and the curving masses 
 of the enemy. If he could see clearly his task 
 would be less difficult and the culmination of his 
 ho]3es less doubtful. But he cannot see ; he has 
 to work by wireless and by instinct, largely by 
 faith, trusting to the judgment of Beatty and 
 Evan-Thomas, far away, and himself subject to 
 the ever-varying uncertainties of sea fighting. 
 He goes back to the chart, upon which his staff 
 are noting down the condensed essence of all the 
 messages as they flow in, and then, the moment 
 having arrived, he gives the word. Away run the 
 signal flags, picked up and interpreted by every 
 squadron flagship, and then repeated by every 
 ship. The close divisions of the Grand Fleet 
 spread out, melt gracefully into lines — to all 
 appearance as easily as if they were battalions of 
 infantry^ — they swing round to the east, the fore- 
 most vessel reaching out to join up with Beatty's 
 battle cruisers. As the Grand Fleet deploys, 
 Evan-Thomas swings in his four Queen Elizabeths 
 so that the Barham,, without haste or hesitation, 
 falls in behind the aftermost of Jellicoe's battle- 
 ships, and the remainder of the Fifth Battle 
 Squadron completes the line, which stretches now 
 in one long curve to the west and north and east 
 of the beaten Germans. The deployment is com- 
 plete, the whole Grand Fleet has concentrated, 
 the enemy is surrounded on three sides, we are 
 faster than he is, and more than twice as power- 
 ful ; if the light will hold, his end has come. 
 Although from the Iron Duke we cannot now see 
 the wide enveloping horns, yet we have lately 
 been with them and know them. The main Fleet
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 277 
 
 in whose centre we now steam, consists of Dread- 
 noughts, Orions, King George the Fifths, Iron 
 Dulles (all acting as flagships). Royal Sovereigns, 
 with 15-inch guns, the Canada, with 14-inch guns, 
 and that queer Dago ship the Agincourt, with her 
 seven turrets all on the middle line, and each 
 containing two 12 -inch guns. Not a ship in our 
 battle line has been afloat for more than seven 
 years, and most of them are less than three years 
 old. The material newness of the Grand Fleet is 
 a most striking testimony to the eternal youth of 
 the Navy's ancient soul. 
 
 We have now concentrated in battle line the 
 battleships of our own main Fleet and six battle 
 cruisers, after allowing for our losses, and the 
 Germans have, after making a similar allowance, 
 not more than fourteen battleships and three battle 
 cruisers. I do not count obsolete pre-Dreadnoughts. 
 The disparity in force is greater even than is shown 
 by the bare numbers, which it is not permitted to 
 give exactly. Scarcely a ship of the enemy can 
 compare in fighting force with the Queen Elizabeths 
 or the Royal Sovereigns, or even with the Iron 
 Dukes, Orions, and King George the Fifths. Of 
 course he made off ; he would have been a fool if 
 he had not— and Admiral Scheer is far from being 
 a fool. 
 
 Our concentrated Fleet came into action at 6.17, 
 and at this moment the Germans were curving in 
 a spiral towards the south-west, seeking a way out 
 of the sea lion's jaws. They were greatly favoured 
 by the mist and were handled with superb skill. 
 They relied upon constant torpedo attacks to fend 
 Oif our battleships, while their own big vessels 
 worked themselves clear. We could never see
 
 278 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 more than four or five ships at a time in their van, 
 or from eight to ten in their rear. For two hours 
 the English Fleet, both battlesliips and battle 
 cruisers, sought to close, and now and then would 
 get well home upon the enemy at from 11,000 to 
 9,000 yards, but again and again under cover of 
 torpedo attacks and smoke clouds, the Germans 
 opened out the range and evaded us. We could 
 not get in our heavy blows for long enough to crush 
 S cheer, and he could not get in his mosquito 
 attacks with sufficient success wholly to stave us 
 off. For us those two hours of hunting an elusive 
 enemy amid smoke and fog banks were intensely 
 exasperating ; for him they must have been not 
 less intensely nerve-racking. All the while we 
 were hunting him, he was edging away to the south- 
 west—" pursuing the English " was his own 
 humorous description of the manoeuvre — and both 
 Jellicoe and Beatty were pressing down between 
 him and the land, and endeavouring to push him 
 away from his bases. All the while our battleships 
 and battle cruisers were firing heavily upon any 
 German ship which they could see, damaging many, 
 and sinking one at least. The return fire was so 
 ragged and ineffective that our vessels were scarcely 
 touched, and only three men were wounded in the 
 whole of Jellicoe's main Fleet. By nine o'clock 
 both Beatty and Jellicoe were far down the Jutland 
 coast, and had turned towards the south-west 
 in the expectation that daylight would reveal to 
 them the German Fleet in a favourable position 
 for ending the business.
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS : SOME IMPRESSIONS 
 
 AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 Part II 
 
 At the close of my last chapter I took a mean 
 advantage of my readers. For I broke off at the 
 most interesting and baffling phase in the whole 
 Battle of the Giants. It was easy to write of the 
 first two phases — the battle-cruiser action up to 
 the turn where the Queen Mary and Indefatigdble 
 were lost, and the phase during which Beatty, 
 though sorely weakened, gallantly headed off the 
 German line, and Evan-Thomas, with his Fifth 
 Battle Squadron, stalled off the Main High Seas 
 Fleet in order to allow Beatty the time necessary 
 for the execution of his manoeuvre, and Jellicoe the 
 time to bring up the Grand Fleet. This second 
 phase of the battle was perfectly planned and 
 perfectly executed. It will always stand out in 
 the pages of English Naval History as a classical 
 example of English battle tactics. I could have 
 described these two phases with much more of 
 intimate detail had the Censor permitted, but 
 perhaps I gave enough to make clear what was 
 sought to be done and what was, in fact, achieved. 
 When Jellicoe had deployed his potent squadrons, 
 fitting them in between Evan-Thomas and Beatty 
 
 19 279
 
 280 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 and curving round the head of the German line, 
 which by then had turned back upon itself and 
 taken the form of a closely knit spiral, the Germans 
 appeared to be doomed. They were not enveloped 
 in the strict sense of being surrounded — we were 
 twice as strong as they were in numbers of modern 
 ships and nearly three times as strong in effective 
 gun power, yet we had not nearly sufficient numbers 
 actually to surround them. A complete envelop- 
 ment of an enemy fleet rarely, if ever, occurs at sea. 
 But though Admiral S cheer was not surrounded 
 he was in the most imminent peril of destruction. 
 Jellicoe and Beatty were between his ships and the 
 Jutland Coast, and as they pressed towards the 
 south and west were pushing him away from the 
 Wet Triangle and the security of his home bases. 
 We had him outmanoeuvred and beaten, but we 
 did not destroy him. Why was that ? 
 
 No question is more difficult to answer fairly and 
 truthfully. I have discussed this third critical 
 phase of the battle with a great many officers who 
 were present — and in a position to see what hap- 
 pened — and with a great many who, though not 
 present, had means of informing themselves upon 
 essential details. I have studied line by line 
 the English and German dispatches and have 
 paid more regard to what they do not tell than to 
 what they do tell. It is stupid to reject Admiral 
 Scheer's dispatch as fiction ; it is not, but it is 
 coloured with the purpose of making the least of his 
 tactical defeat and the most of his very skilful 
 escape. Jellicoe's dispatch is also coloured. I do 
 not doubt that the statements contained in it are 
 strictly true, but there are obvious omissions. 
 By a process of examination and inquiry I have
 
 - THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 281 
 
 arrived at an answer to my question. I put it 
 forward in all deference, for though I am of the 
 Navy in blood and spirit, and have studied it all 
 my life, yet I am a layman without sea training in 
 the Service. 
 
 The first point essential to an understanding is 
 that Jellicoe's deployment was not complete until 
 late in the afternoon, 6.17 p.m. G.M.T., that the 
 evening was misty, and the " visibility " poor. 
 Had the encounter between Beatty's and Hipper's 
 battle cruisers occurred two hours earlier, and had 
 Jellicoe come into action at 4.15 instead of 6.15, 
 one may feel confident that there would not now 
 be any High Seas German Fleet, that we could, since 
 May 31st, 1916, have maintained a close blockade 
 with fast light craft of the German North Sea and 
 Baltic bases, and that the U-boat activity, w^hich 
 still threatens our sea communications and has had 
 a profound influence on the progress of the war, 
 would never have been allowed by us to develop. 
 Upon so little, two hours of a day in late spring, 
 sometimes hangs the fate of nations. 
 
 The afternoon was drawing towards evening ; the 
 light was poor, the German lines had curved away 
 seeking safety in flight. But there remained con- 
 fronting us Hipper's battle cruisers and Scheer's 
 faster battleships, supported by swarms of torpedo 
 craft. We also had our destroyers, many of them, 
 and light cruisers. There was one chance of safety 
 open to S cheer, and he took it with a judgment 
 in design and a skill in execution which marks him 
 out as a great sea captain. His one chance was 
 '^o to fend of! and delay Jellicoe and Beatty by 
 repeated torpedo attacks driven home, that the 
 big English ships would not be able to close in
 
 282 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 upon the main German Fleet and destroy it by 
 gun-fire while light remained to give a mark to the 
 gunners. iVnd so S cheer decided to " attack," and 
 did attack. In his dispatch he deliberately gives 
 the impression — for the comfort and gratification 
 of German readers— that he successfully attacked 
 our Grand Fleet with his main High Seas Fleet. 
 He was no fool of that sort. He attacked, but it 
 was with torpedo craft supported by Hipper's 
 battle cruisers. 
 
 The range of a modern torpedo, the range at 
 which it may occasionally be effective, is not far 
 short of 12,000 yards, about seven land miles. 
 This, when the visibility is low, is about the extreme 
 effective range for heavy guns. The guns can shoot 
 much farther, twice as far, when the gunners or 
 the fire directors up aloft can see ; but gunnery 
 without proper light is a highly wasteful and in- 
 effective business. At the range — usually about 
 12,000 yards, though sometimes coming down to 
 9,000 yards — to which the German torpedo attacks 
 forced Jellicoe and Beatty to keep out, only some 
 four or five enemy ships in the van could be seen at 
 once; more of the rear squadron could be seen, 
 though never more than eight or twelve. Our 
 marks w^ere usually not the hulls of the enemy's ships 
 but the elusive flashes of his guns, S cheer used his 
 torpedo craft in exactly the same way as a skilful 
 land General — in the old days of open fighting — 
 used his cavalry during a retreat. He used them 
 to cover by repeated charges, sometimes of single 
 flotillas, at other times of heavily massed squadrons, 
 the retirement of his main forces. 
 
 If, therefore, we combine the factor of low 
 visibility and the approach of sunset, with the other
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 283 
 
 factor of tlie long range of tlie modern torpedo, we 
 begin to understand why Jellicoe and Beatty were 
 not able to close in upon their enemy and wipe him 
 ofl the seas. From the English point of view the 
 third phase — that critical third phase to which the 
 first and second phases had led up and which, under 
 favourable circumstances, would have ended with 
 the destruction of the German Fleet— found us in 
 the position of a " following '" or " chasing '" fleet. 
 But from the German point of view the same phase 
 found their fleet in the position of " attackers.'* I 
 have shown how these points of view can be recon- 
 ciled, for while the main German Fleet was intent 
 upon getting away and our main fleet was intent 
 upon following it up and engaging it, the German 
 battle cruisers, supported by swarms of torpedo 
 craft, were fighting a spirited rearguard action and 
 attacking us continually. The visibility was poor 
 and mist troubled both sides. But the escape of 
 the Germans was not wholly due to the difficulty of 
 seeing them distinctly. If we could have closed in 
 we should have seen his ships all right ; we did not 
 close in because the persistence and boldness of his 
 torpedo attacks prevented us. 
 
 The third phase, which lasted from 6.17 p.m. until 
 8.20 p.m., was fought generally at about 12,000 
 yards, though now and then the range came down 
 to 9,000 yards. The Germans, fending us of! 
 with torpedo onslaughts, did their utmost to open 
 out the ranges and used smoke screens to lessen 
 what visibility the atmosphere permitted. Their 
 gun-fire was so poor and inefi'ective that Jellicoe's 
 Main Fleet was barely scratched and three men only 
 were wounded. But we cannot escape from the 
 conclusion that S cheer's rearguard tactics were
 
 284 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 successful, he did fend Jellicoe off and kept Mm from 
 closing, and he did withdraw the bulk of his fleet 
 from the jaws which during two hours were seeking 
 to close upon it. He made two heavy destroyer 
 attacks, during one of which the battleship 
 Marlborough was hit but was able to get back to 
 dock under her own steam. The third phase of the 
 Jutland Battle was exactly like a contest between 
 two boxers— one heavy and the other light — being 
 fought in an open field without ropes. The little 
 man. continually side-stepping and retreating, kept 
 the big man off ; the big man could not close for 
 fear of a sudden jab in his vital parts, and there 
 were no corners to the ring into which the evasive 
 light weight could be driven. 
 
 If one applies this key to the English and German 
 descriptions of the third phase in the Jutland Battle 
 one becomes able to reconcile them, and becomes 
 able to understand why the immensely relieved 
 Germans claim their skilful escape as a gift from 
 Heaven. They do not in their dispatches claim 
 to have defeated Jellicoe, except in the restricted 
 sense of having foiled his purpose of compassing 
 their destruction. They got out of the battle very 
 cheaply, whatever may have been their actual losses. 
 This they realise as plainly as we do. Relief shines 
 out of every line of their offtcial story and is com- 
 pressed, without reserve, into its concluding sen- 
 tence. " Whoever had the fortune to take part in 
 the battle will joyfully recognise with a thankful 
 heart that the protection of the Most High was 
 with us. It is an old historical truth that fortune 
 favours the brave.'' 
 
 I am afraid that I can do little to elucidate the
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 285 
 
 fourth phase of the Battle of the Giants^ the night 
 scrimmage (one cannnot call it a battle) during 
 which our destroyers were seeking out the enemy 
 ships in the darkness and plugging holes into them 
 at every opportunity. And that dawn upon 
 June 1st, of which so much was hoped and from 
 which nothing was realised ? Who can describe 
 that ? Nothing that I could write would approach 
 in sublimity the German dispatch. Consider what 
 the situation was. Jellicoe and Beatty had worked 
 far down the Jutland Coast and had partially edged 
 their way between S cheer and the German bases. 
 Their destroyers had sought out the German ships, 
 found them and loosed mouldies at them, lost them 
 again and found them again ; finally had lost them 
 altogether. At dawn the visibility was even lower 
 than during the previous evening— only three to 
 four miles — our destroyers were out of sight and 
 touch and did not rejoin till 9 o'clock. No enemy 
 was in sight, and after cruising about until 1 1 o'clock 
 Jellicoe was forced to the conclusion that Scheer 
 had got away round his far- stretching horns and 
 was even then threading the mine fields which 
 protected his ports of refuge. There was no more 
 to be done, and the English squadrons, robbed of 
 the prey upon which they had set their clutches, 
 steamed off towards their northern fastnesses. 
 There the fleet fuelled and replenished with ammuni- 
 tion, and at 9.30 a.m. on June 2nd was reported 
 ready for action. The German description of that 
 dawn is a masterpiece in the art of verbal camou- 
 flage : "As the sun rose upon the morning of the 
 historic First of June in the eastern sky, each one 
 of us expected that the awakening sun would 
 illumine the British line advancing to renew the
 
 286 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 battle. This expectation was not realised. The 
 sea all round, so far as the eye could see, was 
 empty. One of our airships which had been sent up 
 reported, later in the morning, having seen twelve 
 ships of a line- of -battle squadron coming from the 
 southern part of the North Sea holding a northerly 
 course at great speed. To the great regret of all it 
 was then too late for our fleet to intercept and 
 attack them.'' The British Fleet, which the writer 
 regretted not to see upon the dawn of a long day 
 in late spring, was of more than twice the strength 
 of his own. It would have had sixteen hours of 
 daylight within which to devour him ; yet he 
 regretted its absence ! The Germans must be a 
 very simple people, abysmally ignorant of the sea, 
 if this sort of guff stimulates their vanity. 
 
 In war the moral is far greater than the material, 
 the psychological than the mechanical. One can- 
 not begin to understand the simplest of actions 
 unless one knows something of the spirit of the 
 men who fight them. In sea battles, more than in 
 contests upon land, events revolve round the 
 personalities of the leaders and results depend upon 
 the skill with which these leaders have gauged the 
 problem set them, and dispose their forces to meet 
 those varying phases which lead up to a conclusion. 
 It is borne in upon us by hard experience that the 
 southern part of the North Sea is not big enough 
 and not deep enough to afl'ord space for a first-class 
 naval battle to be fought out to a finish. The 
 enemy is too near his home bases, he can break off 
 an action and get away before being overwhelmed. 
 Yet even in the southern North Sea there is room
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 287 
 
 in whicli to dispose great naval forces and in which 
 to manoeuvre them. Fleets are not tucked up by 
 space as are modern armies. Jutland was a 
 battle of encounter and manoeuvre, not of heavy 
 destructive fighting. There was a dainty deftness 
 about the first two phases which is eminently 
 pleasing to our national sea pride, and however 
 we may growl at the tactical incompleteness of the 
 battle we cannot but admit that, taken as a whole, 
 it was as strategically decisive an action as has 
 ever been fought by the English Navy throughout 
 its long history. It re-established the old doctrine, 
 which the course of the Sea War has tended to thrust 
 out of sight, that Command of the Sea rests as 
 completely as it always has done in the past upon 
 the big fighting ships of the main battle line. Upon 
 them everything else depends : the operations of 
 destroyers and light cruisers, of patrols and even 
 of submarines. For upon big ships depends the 
 security of home bases. Surface ships alone can 
 occupy the wide spaces of the sea and can hold 
 securely the ports in one^s own country and the 
 ports which are ravished from an enemy. Sub- 
 marines are essentially raiders, their office is the 
 obstruction of sea communications, but submarines 
 are useless, even for their special work of obstruction, 
 unless they can retire, refit, and replenish stores at 
 bases made secure by the existence in effective being 
 of a strong force of big fighting ships. Had Jutland 
 been as great a tactical success as it was a strategical 
 success, had it ended with the wiping out of the 
 German High Seas Fleet, then, as I have already 
 stated, the U-boat menace would have been 
 scotched by the destruction of the protecting screen 
 behind which the U-boats are built, refitted, and
 
 288 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 replenished. No small part of the German relief 
 at the issue of Jutland is due to their realisation 
 of this naval truth. They express that realisation 
 in a sentence which contains the whole doctrine of 
 the efficacy of the big ship as the final determinant 
 in naval warfare. Admiral Scheer in his dispatch 
 declared that the battle of May 31st, 1916, " con- 
 firmed the old truth that the large fighting ship, 
 the ship which combines the maximum of strength 
 in attack and defence, rules the seas." They do 
 not claim that the English superiority in strength — 
 which they place at " roughly two to one"— was 
 sensibly reduced by our losses in the battle, nor 
 that the large English fighting ships — admittedly 
 larger, more numerous, and more powerfully gunned 
 than their own — ceased after Jutland to rule the 
 seas. The German claim, critically considered, 
 is simply that in the circumstances it was a very 
 lucky escape for the German ships. And so indeed 
 it was. It left them with the means of securing 
 their bases from which could be carried on the 
 U-boat warfare against our mercantile communica- 
 tions at sea. 
 
 When the day arrives for the veil which at present 
 enshrouds naval operations to be lifted, and details 
 can be discussed freely and frankly, a whole litera- 
 ture will grow up around the Battle of the Giants. 
 Strategically, I repeat — even at the risk of becoming 
 tedious - it was a great success, both in its inception 
 and in its practical results. Tactically its success 
 was not complete. The Falkland Islands and 
 Coronel actions were by comparison simple affairs 
 of which all essential details are known. Jutland, 
 from six o'clock in the evening of May 31st until 
 dawn upon June 1st, when the opposing fleets had
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 289 
 
 completely lost touch, the one with the other, is a 
 puzzling confusing business which will take years 
 of discussion and of elucidation wholly to resolve — 
 if ever it be fully resolved. If one may be per-^ 
 mitted to describe the three actions in a few words 
 apiece one would say that Coronelwas both strategic- 
 allyand tactically abrilliant success for the Germans. 
 Von S pee concentrated his squadron outside the range 
 of our observation, placed himself in a position of 
 overwhelming tactical advantage, and won a shat- 
 tering victory. At the Falkland Islands action we 
 did to Von Spee exactly what he had done to us at 
 Coronel. This time it was the English concentration 
 which was ePiected outside the German observation, 
 and it was the German squadron which was wiped 
 out when the tactical clash came. The first two 
 phases of Jutland were, in spite of our serious losses 
 in ships, notable tactical successes ; they ended 
 with Beatty round the head of the German Fleet 
 and Jellicoe -deployed in masterly fashion between 
 Beatty and Evan-Thomas. Then we get the 
 exasperating third phase, in which the honours of 
 skilful evasion rest with the Germans, and the fourth 
 or night phase, during which confusion became 
 worse confounded until all touch was lost. And 
 yet, in spite of the tactical failure of the third and 
 fourth phases, the battle as a whole was so great 
 a success that it left us with an unchallengeable 
 command of the sea — a more complete command 
 than even after Trafalgar. The Germans learned 
 that they could not fight us in the open with the 
 smallest hope of success. One of the direct fruits of 
 Jutland was the intensified U-boat warfare against 
 merchant shipping. The Germans had learned in 
 the early part of the war that they could not wear
 
 290 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 down our battleship strength by under-water 
 attacks ; they learned at Jutland that they could 
 not place their battleships in line against ours and 
 ^hope to survive ; nothing was left to them except to 
 prey upon our lines of sea communication. And 
 being a people in whose eyes everything is fair in war 
 — their national industry — they proceeded to make 
 the utmost of the form of attack which remained 
 to them. Viewed, therefore, in its influence upon 
 the progress of the war, the Battle of Jutland was 
 among the most momentous in our long sea history. 
 I have discussed the Battle of the Giants so often, 
 and so remorselessly, with many officers who were 
 present and many others who though not present 
 were in a position to know much which is hidden 
 from onlookers, that I fear lest I may have worn 
 out their beautiful patience. There are two out- 
 standing figures, Beatty and Jellicoe, about whose 
 personalities all discussion of Jutland must revolve. 
 They are men of very different types. Beatty is 
 essentially a fighter ; Jellicoe is essentially a student. 
 In power of intellect and in knowledge of his pro- 
 fession Jellicoe is a dozen planes above Beatty. 
 And yet when it comes to fighting, in small things 
 and in great, Beatty has an instinct for the right 
 stroke at the right moment, which in war is beyond 
 price. Whether in peace or in war, Jellicoe would 
 always be conspicuous among contemporaries ; 
 Beatty, unless war had given him the stage upon 
 which to develop his flair for battle, would not have 
 stood out. He got early chances, in the Soudan 
 and in China ; he seized them both and rushed up 
 the ladder of promotion. He was promoted so 
 quickly that he outstripped his technical education. 
 As a naval strategist and tactician Jellicoe is the
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 291 
 
 first man in his profession ; Beatty is by professional 
 training neither a strategist nor a tactician —he was 
 a commander at twenty- seven and a captain at 
 twenty-nine — but give him a fighting problem to be 
 solved out in the open with the guns firing, and he 
 will solve it by sheer instinctive genius. In the 
 Battle of Jutland both Beatty and Jellicoe played 
 their parts with consummate skill ; Beatty was in 
 the limelight all through, while Jellicoe was of! the 
 stage during the first two acts. Yet Jellicoe's part 
 was incomparably the more difficult, for upon 
 him, though absent, the whole issue of the battle 
 depended. His deployment by judgment and 
 instinct — sight was withheld from him by the 
 weather — was perfect in its timing and precision. 
 He should have been crowned with the bays of a 
 complete Victor, but the Fates were unli:ind. He 
 was robbed of his prey when it was almost within 
 his jaws. Do not be so blind and foolish as to 
 depreciate the splendid skill and services of Lord 
 Jellicoe. 
 
 I find the writing of this second Chapter upon the 
 Battle of the Giants a very difficult job. Twice I 
 have tried and failed ; this is the result of the third 
 efltort. My failures have been used to light the 
 fires in my house. Even now I am deeply conscious 
 of the inadequacy of my tentative reflections. 
 Upon so many points one has not the data ; upon 
 so many others one is not allowed — no doubt 
 properly — yet still not allowed to say what one 
 knows. Though sometimes I write grave articles, 
 many of my readers know that by instinct I am a 
 storj^- teller, and to me narrative by dialogue comes
 
 292 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 more readily than a disquisition. Therefore, if 
 you will permit me, I will cast the remaining portion 
 of this chapter into the form of dialogue and make 
 of it a discussion between two Admirals, a Captain, 
 and myself. One of these Admirals I will call a 
 Salt Horse, a man who has seen service during half 
 a century but who has not specialised in a technical 
 branch such as gunnery, or navigation, or tor- 
 pedoes. A Salt Horse is an all-round sailor. The 
 other Admiral I will call a Maker, and regard him 
 as a highly competent technical officer in the design 
 and construction of ships of war, of their guns, and 
 of their armour. The Captain, a younger man, I 
 will call a Gunner, one who has specialised in naval 
 gunnery in all its branches, and one who knows 
 the old methods and those which now are new and 
 secret. These officers have not been drawn by 
 me from among my own friends. They are not 
 individuals but are types. iVny attempts which may 
 be made at identifying them will fail and justly fail — 
 for they do not exist as individuals. Let this be 
 clearly understood. They are creations of my 
 own ; I use them to give a sense of vividness to 
 a narrative which tends to become tedious, and 
 to bring out features in the Battle of Jutland 
 which cannot without impertinence be presented 
 directly by one, like myseli who is not liimself a 
 naval officer. 
 
 Bennet Copplestone, an intrusive and persistent 
 fellow, begins the conference by inquiring whether 
 Beatty had, in the professional judgment of his 
 brother officers, deserved Admiral Jellicoe's praise 
 of his "fine qualities of gallant leadership, firm 
 determination, and correct strategic insight." Was 
 he as good as his public reputation ? I knew, I said,
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 293 
 
 a good deal too mucli of the making of newspaper 
 reputations and had come to distrust them. 
 
 " Beatty is a real good man," declared the Maker. 
 " He sticks his cap on one side and loves to be 
 photographed looking like a Western American 
 ' tough.' But under all this he conceals a fine 
 naval head and the sturdiest of hearts. He is a 
 first-class leader of men. I had my own private 
 doubts of him until this Jutland Battle, but now 
 I will take off my hat in his presence though he is 
 my junior." 
 
 The Maker's colleagues nodded approval. 
 
 " There was nothing much in the first part," 
 went on the Maker. " Any of us could have done 
 it. His pursuit of the German battle cruisers up to 
 their junction with the High Seas Fleet was a 
 reconnaissance in force, which he was able to carry 
 through without undue risk, because he had behind 
 him the Fifth Battle Squadron. His change of 
 course then through sixteen points was the only 
 possible manoeuvre in order to bring liis fleet back 
 towards Jellicoe and to lead the Germans into the 
 trap prepared for them. So far Beatty had done 
 nothing to distinguish him from any competent 
 fleet leader. Where he showed greatness was in 
 not diverging by a hair's breadth from his plans 
 after the loss of the Indefatigable and the Queen 
 Mary. Mind you, these losses were wholly un- 
 expected and staggering in their suddenness. 
 He had lost these fine ships while fighting battle 
 cruisers fewer in numbers and less powerful in guns 
 than his own squadrons. A weaker man might 
 have been shaken in nerve and lost confidence in 
 himself and his ships. But B eatty did not hesitate. 
 Although he was reduced in strength from six battle
 
 294 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 cruisers to four only, he dashed away to head off 
 the Germans as serenely as if he had suffered no 
 losses at all. And his splendid dash had nothing 
 in it of recklessness. All the while he was heading 
 ofi' the Germans he was manoeuvring to give himself 
 the advantage of light and to avoid the dropping 
 shots which had killed his lost cruisers. All the 
 while he kept between the Germans and Jellicoe 
 and within touch of his supporting squadron of 
 four Queen Elizabeths. Had he lost more ships 
 he could at any moment have broken of! the action 
 and, sheltered by the massive Fifth B.S., have 
 saved what remained. As a mixture of dash and 
 caution I regard his envelopment of the German 
 line, after losing the Queen Mary and Indefatigable, 
 as a superb exhibition of sound battle tactics and 
 of sublime confidence in himself and his men. But 
 I wish that he would not wear his cap on one side 
 or talk so much. He has modified both these 
 ill-practices since he became Commander-in-Chief. 
 That is one comfort. "" 
 
 " Nelson was a poseur,'^ said I, " and as theatrical 
 as an elderly and ugly prima donna. He posed to 
 the gallery in every action, and died, as it were, 
 to the accompaniment of slow music. It was an 
 amiable weakness.'" 
 
 " Jellicoe doesn't pose," growled the Maker. 
 
 " Jellicoe hates advertisement," I observed. 
 " Whenever he used to talk to the gangs of news- 
 paper men who infested the Grand Fleet, he always 
 implored them to spare his own shrinking person- 
 ality. It is a matter of temperament. Jellicoe 
 is a genuinely modest man ; Beatty is a vain one. 
 They form a most interesting contrast. Life would 
 be duller without such contrasts. One could give
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 295 
 
 a score of examples from military and naval history 
 of high merit allied both to modesty and vanity/' 
 
 " That is true/' said the Maker, " but the Great 
 Silent Sea Service loathes advertisement like the 
 very devil, and it is right. The Service would be 
 ruined if senior officers tried to bid against one 
 another for newspaper pufis/' 
 
 '* Yet I have known them do it,'' said I drily, and 
 then slid away from the delicate topic. " Let us 
 return to the first part of the action, and examine 
 the division of the Fleet between Jellicoe and^, 
 Beatty. Was this division, admittedly hazardous, 
 a sound method of bringing the Germans to 
 action ? " 
 
 The Gunner took upon himself to reply. 
 
 ** It is not, and never has been, possible to bring 
 the Germans to action in the southern part of the 
 North Sea except with their own consent. There 
 is no room. They can always break off and retire 
 within their protected waters. Steam fleets of the 
 modern size and speed cannot force an action and 
 compel it to be fought out to a finish in a smaller 
 space than a real ocean. You must always thinlc 
 of this when criticising the division of our fleets. 
 Beatty was separated from Jellicoe by nearly sixty 
 miles, and strengthened by four fast Queen Eliza- 
 beth battleships to enable him to fight an action 
 with a superior German Fleet. He was made 
 just strong enough to fight and not too strong to 
 scare the Germans away. In theory, the division 
 of our forces within striking distance of the enemy 
 was all wrong ; in practice, it was the only way of 
 persuading him into an action. Both sides at the 
 end of May, 1916, wanted to bring olt a fight at sea. 
 Fritz wanted something which he could claim as a 
 
 20
 
 296 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 success in order to cheer up his blockaded grumblers 
 at home, who were getting restive. We wanted to 
 stop the projected German naval and military 
 onslaught upon Russia in the Baltic. The wonderful 
 thing about the Jutland Battle is that it appears 
 to have achieved both objects. Fritz, by sinking 
 three of our battle cruisers, has been able to delude 
 a nation of landsmen into accepting a highly 
 coloured version of a great naval success ; and we, 
 by making a sorry mess of his main fleet, did in fact 
 clear the northern Russian flank of a grave peril. 
 The later Russian successes in the South were the 
 direct result of Jutland, and without those successes 
 the subsequent Italian, French, and British 
 advances could not have been pushed with anything 
 like the efiect secured. Regarded in this broad in- 
 ternational w^ay, the division of our fleets justifi ed by 
 its results the risks which it involved. What I 
 don't understand is why we suEered so much in 
 the first part of the action when Beatty had six 
 battle cruisers and four battleships against five 
 battle cruisers of the enemy. He lost the Indefatig- 
 able and Queen Mary while he was in great superior- 
 ity both of numbers and of guns. Then, when the 
 German main fleet had come in, and he was carrying 
 out an infinitely more hazardous operation in the 
 face of a greatly superior force, he lost nothing. 
 If the Indefatigable and Queen Mary had been lost 
 during the second hour before Jellicoe arrived I 
 should have felt no surprise— we were then deliber- 
 ately risking big losses — but during the first hour 
 of fighting, when we had ten ships against five — 
 and five much weaker individually than our ten — 
 we lost two fine battle cruisers. I confess that I 
 am beaten. It almost looks as if at the beginning
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 297 
 
 the German gunners were better than ours, but that 
 they went to pieces later. What do you think ? " 
 He turned to the Salt Horse, who spoke little, but 
 very forcibly when he could be persuaded to open 
 his lips. 
 
 " Everyone with Beatty, to whom I have spoken," 
 declared the Salt Horse, " agrees that the German 
 gunnery was excellent at the beginning; We were 
 straddled immediately and hit again and again 
 while coming into action. Our gunners must have 
 been a bit over-anxious until they settled down. 
 We ought to have done something solid in a whole 
 hour against five battle cruisers with our thirty- 
 two 13'5-inch guns and thirty- two 15-inch. And 
 yet no one claims more than one enemy ship on fire. 
 That means nothing. The burning gas from one 
 big shell will make the deuce of a blaze. There is 
 no explanation of our losses in the first part, and 
 of Fritz's comparative immunity, except the one 
 which you, my dear Gunner, are very unwilling to 
 accept. Fritz hit us much more often than we hit 
 him. There you have it. I have spoken.'' Admiral 
 Salt Horse, a most abstemious man, rang the bell 
 of the club of which we were members, and ordered 
 a whisky and soda. " Just to take the taste of that 
 admission out of my mouth," he explained. 
 
 The Maker of Ships and Guns smiled ruefully. 
 " I have reckoned," said he, " that the Cats fired 
 twenty rounds per gun during the first hour and 
 the Queen Elizabeths ten. That makes 640 rounds 
 of 13 '5 -inch shell and 320 rounds of 15-inch. Three 
 per cent, of fair hits at the ranges, and in the condi- 
 tions of light, would have been quite good. But 
 did we score twenty- eight hits of big shell, or any- 
 thing like it ? If we had there would have been
 
 298 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 much more damage done than one battle cruiser 
 on fire. The Salt Horse has spoken, and so have I. 
 I also will wash the taste of it out of my mouth/' 
 
 '* You will admit/' muttered the Gunner, " that 
 in the second part, after Beatty and the Queen 
 Elizabeths had turned, our control officers and long- 
 service gunners came into their own ? " 
 
 " Willingly," cried Admiral Salt Horse. " Nothing 
 could have been finer than the hammering which 
 Evan-Thomas gave to the whole High Seas Fleet. 
 And Beatty crumpled up his opposite numbers 
 in first-class style. Our individual system, then, 
 justified itself utterly. Fritz's mechanical control 
 went to bits when the shells began to burst about his 
 fat ears, but it was painfully good while it lasted. 
 Give Fritz his due. Master Gunner, it's no use 
 shutting our eyes to his merits." 
 
 I had listened with the keenest interest to this 
 interchange, for though I should not myself have 
 ventured to comment upon so technical a subject as 
 naval gunnery, I had subconsciously felt what the 
 old Salt Horse had so bluntly and almost brutally 
 expressed. 
 
 *' We have arrived, then, at this," observed I, 
 slowly, '* that during the first hour, up to the turn 
 when the main High Seas Fleet joined up with 
 Hipper's battle cruisers, our squadrons got the worst 
 of it, though they were of twice Fritz's numbers 
 and of far more than twice his strength. It is a 
 beastly thing for an Englishman to say, but really 
 you leave me no choice. Though I hate whisky, 
 I must follow the example set by my betters." 
 
 The Master Gunner laughed. " In the Service," 
 said he, " we learn from our mistakes. At the 
 beginning we did badly on May 31st, but after-
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 299 
 
 wards we profited by the lesson. What more could 
 you ask for ? . . . Civilians/' said he, aside to his 
 colleagues^ " seem to think that only English ships 
 should be allowed to have guns or to learn how 
 to use them/' 
 
 " Now that we have given Fritz his due/' said I, 
 " let us get on to the second part of the battle, 
 Act Two of the naval drama. You all agree that 
 the handling of our damaged squadrons by Beatty 
 and Evan-Thomas was magnificent, and that the 
 execution done by us was fully up to the best English 
 standards ? " 
 
 " Yes," replied the grim Salt Horse, to whom 
 I had specially appealed. " We will allow both. 
 Beatty's combination of dash and caution was 
 beyond praise and the gunnery was excellent." 
 
 " None of our ships were sunk, none were seriously 
 hit," put in the Gunner. " On the other hand we 
 certainly sank one German battle cruiser and one 
 battleship, and very heavily damaged others. I 
 don't know how many. I think that we must 
 accept as proved that not many German ships of 
 the battle line were sunk in any part of the action. 
 When badly hit they fell out and retired towards 
 home, which they could always do. During the 
 second part both fleets were steaming away from 
 the German bases, so that a damaged enemy ship 
 had only to stop to be left behind in safety. A 
 good many ships were claimed by our officers as 
 sunk when they were knowm to have been damaged 
 and had disappeared ; but I feel sure that most of 
 them had fallen out, not been sunk." 
 
 " The outstanding feature," cried the Maker of 
 Guns, *' was the superiority of our gunnery. We 
 have always encouraged individuality in gun- laying,
 
 300 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 and have never allowed Fire Control to supersede 
 the eyes and hands of the skilled gun-layers in the 
 turrets. Control and individual laying are with us 
 complementary, not mutually exclusive. With 
 the Germans an intensely mechanical control is of 
 the essence of their system. They are very good 
 up to a point, but have not elasticity enough to 
 deal with the perpetual variations of range and 
 direction when fighting ships are moving fast and 
 receiving heavy punishment. Fritz beat us in the 
 first part, but we, as emphatically, beat him in 
 the second." 
 
 We then passed to a technical discussion upon 
 naval gunnery, which cannot be given here in detail. 
 I developed my thesis, aggravating to expert gun- 
 ners, that when one passes from the one dimension — 
 distance— of land shooting from a fixed gun at a 
 fixed object, to the two dimensions — distance and 
 direction — of moving guns on board ship firing 
 at moving objects, the drop in accuracy is so enor- 
 mous as to make ship gunnery frightfully ineffective 
 and wasteful. I readily admitted that when one 
 passed still further to three dimensions— distance, 
 direction, and height — and essayed air gunnery, 
 the wastefulness and ineli'ectiveness of shooting 
 at sea were multiplied an hundredfold. But, as .1 
 pointed out, we were not at the momeiit discussing 
 anti-aircraft gunnery, but the shooting of naval 
 guns at sea in the Jutland Battle. 
 
 Of course I brought down a storm upon my 
 head. But my main thesis was not contested. It 
 was, however, pointed out that I had not allowed 
 sufficient weight to the inherent difficulties of 
 shooting from a moving ship at a moving ship ten or 
 a dozen miles away, and that instead of calling
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 301 
 
 naval gunnery " wasteful and ineflective " I ought 
 to be dumb with wonder that hits were ever brought 
 off at all. I enjoyed myself thoroughly. 
 
 " Don't be hard on the poor man," at last inter- 
 posed the kindly Salt Horse. " He means well 
 and can be useful to the Service sometimes though 
 he has not had a naval training. The truth is/' 
 he went on confidentially, " we all feel rather wild 
 about the small damage that we did to Fritz on 
 May 31st : small, that is, in comparison with our 
 opportunities. Our gunnery officers and gun-layers 
 are the best in the world, our guns, range-finders 
 and other instruments are unapproachable for 
 precision, our system of fire direction is the best 
 that naval brains can devise and is constantly being 
 improved, and yet all through the war the result 
 in effective hits has been most disappointing — 
 don't interrupt, you people, I am speaking the 
 truth for once. Fritz's shooting, except occasionally, 
 has been even worse than ours, which indicates, I 
 think, that the real inner problems of naval gunnery 
 are not yet in sight of solution. You see, it is quite 
 a new science. In the old days one usually fired 
 point blank just as one might plug at, a haystack, 
 and the extreme range was not more than a mile 
 and a half ; but now that every fighting ship carries 
 torpedo tubes we must keep out a very long way. 
 I admit the apparent absurdity of the situation. 
 Here on May 31st, two fleets were engaged off and 
 on for six hours — most of the time more of! than on 
 — and the bag for Fritz was three big ships, and for 
 us possibly four, by gun-fire. The torpedo practice 
 was no better except when our destroyers got in 
 really close. During all the third part of the action, 
 when S cheer was fending us off with torpedo
 
 302 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 r 
 
 attacks he hit only one battleship, the Marlborough, 
 and she was able to continue in action afterwards 
 and to go home under her own steam. Yet upon 
 a measured range at a fixed mark a torpedo is good 
 up to 11,0C0 yards, nearly six miles. In action, 
 against moving ships, one cannot depend upon a 
 mouldy hitting at over 500 yards, a quarter of a 
 mile. If gunnery is wasteful and inefficient, what 
 about torpedo practice in battle ? " 
 
 " What is the solution ? " I asked, greatly 
 interested. 
 
 " Don't ask me ! " replied the Salt Horse. " I 
 knew something of gunnery once, but now I'm on 
 the shelf. I myself would risk the mouldies and 
 fight at close quarters — we have the legs of Fritz 
 and could choose our own range— but in-fighting 
 means tremendous risks, and the dear stupid old 
 public would howl for my head if the corresponding 
 losses followed. The tendency at present is to- 
 wards longer and longer ranges, up to the extreme 
 visible limits, and the longer the range the greater 
 the waste and inefficiency. Ask the Gunner there, 
 he is more up-to-date than I am." 
 
 The Master Gunner growled. He had listened to 
 Admiral Salt Horse's homily with the gravest dis- 
 approval. He was a simple loyal soul ; any 
 criticism which seemed to question the supreme 
 competence of his beloved Service was to him rank 
 treachery. Yet he knew that the Salt Horse was 
 as loyal a seaman as he was himself. It was not 
 w^hat was said which caused his troubled feelings — 
 he would talk as freely himself before his colleagues 
 — but that such things should be poured into the 
 ears of a civilian ! It was horrible ! 
 
 ** After the first hour, when our gunners had
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 303 
 
 settled down," said he gruffly, " their practice was 
 exceedingly good. They hit when they could see, 
 which was seldom. If the light had been even 
 tolerable no German ship would have got back to 
 port." 
 
 " I agree," cried the Maker of Guns and Ships. 
 " We did as well as the light allowed. Fritz was 
 all to pieces. The bad torpedo practice was Fritz's, 
 not ours. The worst of the gunnery was his, too. 
 We have lots to learn still — as you rightly say, naval 
 gunnery is still in its infancy— but we have learned 
 a lot more than anyone else has. That is the one 
 thing which matters to me." 
 
 " Have we not reached another conclusion," I 
 put in, diffidently, " namely, that big- ship actions 
 must be indecisive unless the light be good and the 
 sea space wide enough to allow of a fight to a 
 finish ? We can't bring Fritz to a final action in the 
 lower part of the North Sea unless we can cut him 
 off entirely from his avenues of escape. In the 
 Atlantic, a thousand miles from land, we could 
 destroy him to the last ship — if our magazines held 
 enough of shell — but as he can choose the battle 
 ground, and will not fight except near to his bases, 
 we can shatter him and drive him helpless into port, 
 but we cannot wipe him off the seas. Is that 
 proved ? " 
 
 " Yes," said the Gunner, who had recovered his 
 usual serenity. "In my opinion that is proved 
 absolutely." 
 
 " One talks rather loosely of envelopment," 
 explained the Maker, " as if it were total instead 
 of partial. The German Fleet was never enveloped 
 or anything like it. What happened was this : 
 As the Germans curved away in a spiral to the
 
 304 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 south-west our line curved in with them, roughly 
 parallel, also to the south-west, keeping always 
 between Fritz and the land. We were partly 
 between him and his bases, but he could and did 
 escape by getting round the horn which threatened 
 to cut him off." 
 
 " Could not Jellicoe,'' I asked, " have worked 
 right round so as to draw a line across the mouths 
 of the Elbe and Weser, and to cut Scheer com- 
 pletely off from the approaches to Wilhelmshaven'? " 
 
 "Not without immense risk. He would have 
 had to pass into mine fields and penetrate them all 
 through the hours of darkness. He might have 
 lost half his fleet. Our trouble has always been 
 the extravagant risk involved by a close pursuit. 
 When the Germans retire to their protected waters 
 we must let them go. The Grand Fleet is too vital 
 a force to be needlessly risked. When Jellicoe's 
 main stroke failed, owing to the bad light and the 
 German retirement, the battle was really over. 
 Jellicoe's blow had spent itself on the air. The 
 Germans were almost safe except from our torpedo 
 attacks, which were delivered during the night with 
 splendid dash and with considerable success. But 
 that night battle was the queerest business. When 
 the sun rose the enemy had vanished. Fritz says 
 that we had vanished. I suppose, strictly speaking, 
 that we had. At least we were out of his sight, 
 though unintentionally. Touch had been lost and 
 the enemy had got safely home, taking most of his 
 damaged ships with him. Nothing remained for 
 us to do except to return to our northern bases, 
 recoal, and refit. The Jutland Battle was indecisive 
 in one sense, crushingly decisive in another. It left 
 the German Fleet undestroyed, but left it impotent
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 305 
 
 as a fighting force. Thereafter it sank into a mere 
 guard for Fritz's submarine bases." 
 
 " And the gunnery in the third part ? " I asked 
 with a sly glance towards the Gunner. He rose 
 at the bait. 
 
 "I do not doubt that, measured by the per- 
 centage of hits to rounds fired, Copplestone would 
 call it wasteful and inefficient. But the Navy 
 regards the gunnery in the third part as even better 
 than in the second, as proving our superiority over 
 the Germans. They were then at their worst while 
 we were at our best ; we rapidly improved under 
 the test of battle, they as rapidly deteriorated. 
 The facts are certain. The enemy ships were hit 
 repeatedly both by our battleships and battle 
 cruisers, several were seen to haul out of the line 
 on fire, and at least one battleship was observed to 
 sink. Throughout all the time — two hours — 
 during which Jellicoe's main fleet was engaged his 
 ships were scarcely touched ; not a single man was 
 killed, and three only were wounded. Is that not 
 good enough for you ? 
 
 " You have forgotten the Invincible," remarked 
 that candid critic whom I have called Salt Horse. 
 "She took station at the head of Beatty's line at 
 6.21. Her distance from the enemy was then 
 8,000 yards. It was a gallant service, for Beatty 
 needed support very badly, but by 6.55 the Invin- 
 cible had been destroyed. The Iron Duke passed 
 her floating bottom up. She must have been caught 
 by the concentrated fire of several enemy ships. 
 It was a piece of luck for Fritz ; the last that he 
 had. Apart from the downing of the Invincible, I 
 agree that the third part of the battle showed our 
 gunnery to be highly effective, and that of the
 
 306 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 Germans to be almost wholly innocuous. It was 
 his torpedoes we had then to fear, not his guns." 
 
 " During the third part," said the Maker, " the 
 ranges were comparatively low, from 9,000 to 
 12,000 yards, but the visibility was so bad that 
 damaged ships could always betake themselves out 
 of sight and danger. I am disposed to think that 
 most of Fritz's sorely damaged ships did get home 
 — in the absence of evidence that they did not— 
 for we never really closed in during the whole of 
 the third part of the battle. Fritz was continually 
 coming and going, appearing and disappearing. 
 His destroyer attacks were well delivered, and 
 though one battleship only was hit, our friend the 
 Marlborough, we were kept pretty busy looking 
 after ourselves. Jellicoe was like a heavy-weight 
 boxer trying to get home upon a little man, skipping 
 about just beyond his reach. We had the speed 
 and the guns and the superiority of position, but 
 we couldn't see. That is the explanation of the 
 indecisiveness of the third part of the Jutland 
 Battle, that part which, wdth decent luck, would 
 have ended Fritz's business. Our gunnery was 
 then top-hole. Take the typical case of the flagship 
 Iron Duke. She got a sight of a Koenig at 12,000 
 yards (seven miles), straddled her at once, and 
 began to hit at the second salvo. That is real 
 gunnery, not much waste about it either of time or 
 shell. Then towards sunset the Lion, Princess 
 Royal, and New Zealand engaged two battleships 
 and two battle cruisers at 10,000 yards. Within 
 eighteen minutes three of the Germans had been set 
 on fire, two were listing heavily, and the three 
 burning ones were only saved by becoming hidden 
 in smoke and mist. That is the way to get on to a
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 307 
 
 target and to hold on, I agree with our old friend 
 Salt Horse that the long ranges during the first 
 part of the action, 18,000 to 20,000 yards— 
 and even more for the Queen Elizabeths— are 
 altogether too long for accuracy unless the condi- 
 tions are perfect. The distances are well within 
 the power of the big-calibre guns which we mount, 
 but are out of harmony with the English naval 
 spirit. We like to see our enemy distinctly and to 
 get within real punishing distance of him. Com- 
 pare our harmless performance during the first 
 part with the beautiful w^hacking which we gave 
 Fritz in the third whenever we could see him. 
 The nearer we get to Fritz the better our gunners 
 become and the more completely his system goes to 
 bits. Which is just what one would expect. Our 
 long- service gunners can lay by sight against any 
 ships in the world and beat them to rags, but when 
 it comes to blind laying directed from the spotting 
 tops much of the advantage of individual nerve 
 and training is lost. Like Salt Horse, I am all for 
 in-fighting, at 10,000 yards or less, and believe that 
 our gun- layers can simply smother Fritz if they are 
 allowed to get him plainly on the wires of their 
 sighting telescopes." 
 
 " There is not a petty officer gun-layer who 
 wouldn't agree with you," remarked the Gunner 
 thoughtfully, " but the young scientific Gunnery 
 Lieutenants would shake their heads. For what 
 would become of the beautiful fire-direction system 
 which they have been building up for years past if 
 we are to run in close and pound in the good old 
 fashion ? Ten thousand yards to a modern 15-inch 
 gun is almost point blank." 
 
 "Our business is to sink the enemy in the shortest
 
 308 THE SECRET OE THE NAVY 
 
 possible time/' cried Admiral Salt Horse, " and to 
 fight in the fashion best suited to what Copplestone 
 here rightly calls the Soul of the Navy. Long- 
 range fighting is all very well when one can't do 
 anything else— during a chase, for example — but 
 when one can close in to a really eiTective distance, 
 then, I say, close in and face the risks. In the 
 Jutland Battle we lost two battle cruisers at long 
 range and one only after the ranges had shortened. 
 Fritz shot well at long range, but got worse and 
 worse as w^e drew nearer to him, until at the end his 
 gunnery simply did not count. Our ancestors had 
 a similar problem to solve, and solved it at the 
 Battle of the Saints in brutal fashion by breaking 
 the French line and fighting at close quarters. 
 There is a lot to be learned from the Jutland Battle, 
 though it is not for an old dog like me to draw the 
 lessons. But what does seem to shout at one is 
 that the way to fight a German is to close in upon 
 him and to knock the moral stuffing out of him. 
 The destroyers always do it and so do our sub- 
 marines. I am told that the way the destroyers 
 charged battleships by night, and rounded up the 
 enemy's light stuti by day, was a liberal education 
 in naval psychology. We are at our best when the 
 risks are greatest -it is the sporting instinct of the 
 race that sustains us. But Fritz, who is no sports- 
 man, and has a good deal more of imagination than 
 our lower deck, cracks when the strain upon his 
 nerves passes the critical point. Our young officers 
 and men have no nerves ; Fritz has more than is 
 good for him ; let us take advantage of his moral 
 weakness and hustle him beyond the point when 
 he cracks. He is a landsman artificially made into 
 a seaman ; our men are seamen born. In a battle-
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 309 
 
 ship action the personal factor tends to be over- 
 borne by the immensity of the fighting instruments, 
 but it is there all the time and is the one thing which 
 really counts. We give it full scope in the des- 
 troyers, submarines, and light cruisers ; let us give 
 it full scope in the big ships of the battle line. Let 
 our Men get at Fritz ; don't seek to convert them 
 into mere parts of a machine, give their individu- 
 ality the fullest play ; you need then have no fear 
 lest their work should prove wasteful or ineffective. '^ 
 
 The Master Gunner, a man ten years younger 
 than old Salt Horse, smiled and said " I am afraid 
 that the gunnery problem has become too com- 
 plicated to yield to your pleasing solution. A few 
 years ago it would have been considered a futile 
 waste of shells to fight at over 10,000 yards, but the 
 growth in the size of our guns and in our methods of 
 using them have made us at least as accurate at 
 20,000 yards as we used to be at 10,000. At from 
 9,0€0 to 12,000 in good light we are now terrific. 
 All my sympathies are on your side ; the Navy 
 has always loved to draw more closely to the 
 enemy, and maybe our instincts should be our guide. 
 I can't say. If we could have a big-ship action 
 every month the problem would soon be solved. 
 Our trouble is that we don't get enough of the Real 
 Thing. You may be very sure that if our officers 
 and men were told to run in upon Fritz and to 
 smash him, at the ranges w^hich are now short, they 
 would welcome the order with enthusiasm. The 
 quality and training of our sea personnel is glorious, 
 incomparable. I live in wonder at it." 
 
 " And so do I," cried the Maker, a man not ready 
 to display enthusiasm. "One has lived with the 
 professional Navy so long that one comes to take
 
 310 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 its superb qualities for granted ; one needs to see 
 the English Navy in action to be aroused to its 
 merits. On May 31st very few of those in Evan- 
 Thomas's or Jellicoe's squadrons had been under 
 fire — Beatty's men had, of course, more than once. 
 If they showed any defect it was due to some slight 
 over- eagerness. But this soon passed. In a big- 
 ship action not one man in a hundred has any oppor- 
 tunity of personal distinction — which is an uncom- 
 monly good thing for the Navy. We have no use for 
 pot-hunters and advertisers. We v/ant every man 
 to do his little bit, devotedly, perfectly, without any 
 thought of attracting attention. Ours is team 
 work, if men are saturated through and through 
 with this spirit of common devotion to duty they 
 sacrifice themselves as a matter of course when the 
 call comes. More than once fire penetrated to the 
 magazines of ships. The men who instantly rolled 
 upon the blazing bags of cordite, and extinguished 
 the flames with their bodies, did not wait for orders 
 nor did they expect to be mentioned in dispatches. 
 It was just their job. But what I did like was 
 Jellicoe's special mention of his engineers. These 
 men, upon whose faithful efficiency everything 
 depends, who, buried in the bowels of ships, carry 
 us into action and maintain us there, who are the 
 first to die w^hen a ship sinks and the last to be 
 remembered in Honours lists, these men are of more 
 real account than almost all those others of us who 
 prance in our decorations upon the public stage. 
 If the conning tower is the brain of a ship, the 
 engine-room is its heart. When Jellicoe was speed- 
 ing up to join Beatty and Evan-Thomas his whole 
 fleet maintained a speed in excess of the trial speeds 
 of some of the older vessels. Think what skilful
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE GIANTS 311 
 
 devotion this simple fact reveals, what minute 
 attention day in day out for months and years, so 
 that in the hour of need no mechanical gadget may 
 fail of its duty. And as with Jellicoe's Fleet so all 
 through the war. Whenever the engine-rooms 
 have been tested up to breaking strain they have 
 always, always, stood up to the test. I think less 
 of the splendid work done by destroyer flotillas, 
 by combatant officers and men in the big ships, by 
 all those who have manned and directed the light 
 cruisers. Their work was done within sight ; that 
 of the engine-rooms was hidden.'" 
 
 " I wish that the big public could hear you,'' I 
 said, " the big public whose heart is always in the 
 right place though its head is always damned 
 ignorant and often damned silly." 
 
 The Maker of Guns and Ships turned on me, this 
 calm, cold man whom I had thought a stranger to 
 emotion. "And whose fault is that ? You are a bit 
 of an ass, Copplestone, and inconveniently inquisi- 
 tive. But you can be useful sometimes. When you 
 come to write of the war at sea, do not wrap your- 
 self up in a tangle of strategy and tactics of which 
 you know very little. Stick to the broad human 
 issues. Reveal the men who fight rather than the 
 ships which are fought with. Think of the Navy 
 as a Service of tlesh and blood and soul, no less than 
 of brains and heart. If you will do this, and write 
 as well as you know how to do, the public will not 
 remain either damned ignorant or damned silly." 
 
 " I will do my best," said I, humbly. 
 
 21
 
 EPILOGUE 
 
 LIEUTENANT CJESAR 
 
 Now in the names of all the gods at once, 
 Upon what meat doth this our Coeear feed, 
 That he is grown so great ? 
 
 When the war is over and tens of thousands of 
 young men, who have drunk deep of the wine of life, 
 are thrown back upon ginger ale, what will be the 
 effect upon their heads and stomachs ? I do not 
 know ; I have no data, except in the one instance 
 of my friend, Lieutenant Caesar, R.N.V.R. 
 
 I must write of him with much delicacy and 
 restraint, for his friendship is too rich a privilege 
 to be imperilled. His sense of humour is danger- 
 ously subtle. Caesar is twenty-three, and I am — 
 well, fully twice his age — yet he bears himself as 
 if he were infinitely my senior in years and experi- 
 ence. And he is right. What in all my toll of 
 wasted years can be set beside those crowded twenty- 
 two months of his, now ended and done with? 
 The fire of his life glowed during those months 
 with the white intensity of an electric arc ; in a 
 moment it went black when the current was cut of! ; 
 he was left groping in the darkness for matches and 
 tallow candles. I dare not sympathise with him 
 openly, though I feel deeply, for he would laugh 
 and call me a silly old bufler — a term which I dread- 
 above all others. 
 
 312
 
 EPILOGUE: LIEUTENANT CESAR 313 
 
 The variegated career of Lieutenant Csesar fills 
 me with the deepest envy. When the war broke 
 out he was a classical scholar at Oxford, one of the 
 bright spirits of his year. His First in Greats, 
 his prospects of the Ireland, his almost certain 
 Fellowship — he threw them up. The Army had 
 no interest for him, but to the Navy he was bound 
 by links of family association. To the Navy there- 
 fore he turned, and prevailed upon a somewhat 
 reluctant Admiralty to gazette him as a Sub- 
 Lieutenant in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. 
 " A classical scholar,'" argued Whitehall, *' is about 
 as much use to us as a ruddy poet. What can this 
 young man do away from his books ? '" Csesar 
 rapidly marshalled his poor accomplishments. He 
 could row — no use, we are in the steam and petrol 
 age ; he had been a sergeant of O.T.C. — no thanks, 
 try the Royal Naval Division ; he could drive a 
 motor-car and was a tolerable engineer. At last 
 some faint impression was made. Did he under- 
 stand the engines of a motor-boat ? It appeared 
 that he did ; was, in fact, a mildly enthusiastic 
 member of the Royal Motor Boat Club at Southamp- 
 ton. " Now you're talking,'' said Whitehall. 
 " Why didn't you say this at once instead of wasting 
 our time over your useless frillings ? " The official 
 wheels stirred, and within two or three weeks Csesar 
 found himself gazetted, and dropped into a fine 
 big motor patrol boat, which the Admiralty had 
 commandeered and turned to the protection of 
 battleships from submarines. At that time we 
 had not a safe harbour anywhere except on the 
 South Coast, where they did not happen to be 
 wanted. For many months Csesar patrolled by 
 night and day deep cold harbours on the east
 
 314 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 coast of Scotland, hunting periscopes. It was an 
 arduous but exhilarating service. His immediate 
 chief, a Lieutenant R.N.V.K., was a benevolent 
 American, the late owner of the boat. Pie had 
 handed her over without payment in return for a 
 lieutenant's commission. " I was once," he 
 declared, " a two-striper in Uncle Sam's Navy. I 
 got too rich for my health, chucked the Service, 
 and have been eating myself out of shape. Take 
 the boat but, for God's sake, give me the job of 
 running her. She's too pretty for your thumb- 
 crushing blacksmiths to spoil." When reminded 
 that he was an alien, he treated the objection as 
 the thinnest of evasive pleas. " I haven't any use 
 for that poor prune Woodrow," he wrote, " King 
 George is my man ; there are no diamonds in his 
 garters." The Lords of the Admiralty, who never 
 in their sheltered lives had read such letters as 
 now poured in upon them, gasped, collapsed, and 
 gave to the benevolent neutral all that he asked. 
 
 Caesar worshipped the big motor-boat and her 
 astonishing commander. His first love wrapped 
 itself round the twin engines, two of them, six- 
 cylinders each, 120 horse-power. They were ducks 
 of engines which never gave any trouble, because 
 Caesar and the two American engineers — I had 
 almost written nurses — were always on the watch 
 to detect the least whimper of pain. But though 
 he never neglected his beloved engines, the 
 mysterious fascinations of the three-pounder gun 
 in the bows gradually vanquished his mature 
 heart. Her deft breech mechanism, her rapid 
 loading, the sweet, kindly way she slipped to and 
 fro in her cradle, became charms before which he 
 succumbed utterly. Caesar and the^gun's high-
 
 EPILOGUE: LIEUTENANT CAESAR 315 
 
 priest, a petty officer gun -layer, became the closest 
 of friends, and tlie pair of them would spend hours 
 daily cleaning and oiling their precious toy. The 
 American lieutenant had his own bizarre notions of 
 discipline — he thought nothing of addressing the 
 petty officer af^ " old horse '" ; but he worked as 
 hard as Caesar himself, kept everyone in the best of 
 spirits through the vilest spells of weather, and was 
 a perpetual fount of ingenious plans for the undoing 
 of Fritz. The Mighty Buzzer — named from her 
 throbbing exhaust — was a happy ship. - v| 
 
 The Buzzer's career as a king's ship was brief, 
 and her death glorious. One night, or rather early 
 morning, she was far out in the misty jaws of a 
 Highland loch, within which temporarily rested 
 many great battle- cruisers. Csesar despised these 
 vast and potent vessels. " What use are they ? " 
 he would ask of his chief. " There is nothing for 
 them to fight, and they would all have been sunk 
 long ago but for us.'' Fast motor-boats, with 120 
 horse-power engines, twenty-five knots of speed — 
 thirty at a pinch, untruthfully claimed the Lieu- 
 tenant — and beautiful 3-pounder guns were, in 
 Caesar's view, the last word in naval equipment. 
 The Lieutenant would shake his head gravely at his 
 Sub's exuberant ignorance. " They are gay old 
 guys just now," he would reply, " and feeling pretty 
 cheap. But some day they will get busy and knock 
 spots of! Fritz's hide. You Britishers are darned 
 slow, but when you do fetch a gun it's time to shin 
 up trees. The Germs have stirred up the British 
 Lion real proper and, I guess, wish now they'd let 
 him stay asleep." 
 
 The Buzzer had chased many a German sub- 
 marine, compelling it to dive deeply and become
 
 .316 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 harmless, but never yet had Ca?sar been privileged 
 to see one close. Upon this misty morning of her 
 demise, when he gained fame, she was farther out 
 to sea than usual, and was cruising at about the spot 
 where enterprising U-boats were wont to come up 
 to take a bearing. I am writing of the days before 
 our harbour defences had chilled their enterprise 
 into inanition. Csesar was on watch, and stood at 
 the wheel amidships. The petty officer and a blue- 
 jacket were stationed at the gun forward. Our 
 friend's senses were very much alert, for he took his 
 duties with the utmost seriousness. Near his boat 
 the sea heaved and swirled, and as he saw a queer 
 wave pile up he became, if possible, even more alert 
 and called to his watch to stand by. The sea went 
 on swirling, the surface broke suddenly, and up 
 swooped the hood and thin tube of a periscope. 
 It was less than fifty yards away, and for a moment 
 the lenses did not include the Buzzer within their 
 field of vision. For Caesar, his watch on deck, and 
 the sleepers below, the next few seconds were 
 packed with incident. Round came the Buzzer 
 pointing straight for the periscope, the exhaust 
 roared as Csesar called for full speed, and the gun 
 crashed out. Away went periscope and tube, 
 wiped off by the spreading cone of the explosion, as 
 if they were no more substantial than a bulrush, 
 and up shot the Buzzer's bows as Csesar drove her 
 keel violently upon the top of the conning tower 
 of the rising U-boat. Keel and conning-tower 
 ripped together ; there was a tremendon s rush of 
 air-bubbles, followed by oil, and the U-boat was 
 no more. She had gone, and the Buzzer, with six 
 feet of her tender bottom torn off, was in the act to 
 follow. As she cocked up her stern to dive after
 
 EPILOGUE: LIEUTENANT C^SAR 317 
 
 her prey there was just time to get officers and crew 
 into lifebelts and to signal for help. Caesar met in 
 the water his commanding officer, who, though 
 nearly hurled through his cabin walls by the shock, 
 and entirely ignorant of the cataclysm in which he 
 had been involved, was cheerful as ever. " Sakes/' 
 he gasped, when he had cleared mouth and nose of 
 salt water, " when you Britishers do get busy, 
 things — sort of — hum.'' 
 
 A destroyer rushing down picked up the swimmers 
 and heard their story. The evidence was con- 
 sidered sufficient, for oil still spread over the sea, 
 and there were no rocks within miles to have 
 ripped out the Buzzer's keel, so another U-boat 
 was credited to the Royal Navy and Caesar became 
 a lieutenant. It was a proud day for him. 
 
 But he had lost his ship, and was for a time out 
 of a job. The new harbour defences were under 
 weigh and fast motor-boats were for a while less in 
 demand. The Admiralty solved the problem of 
 his future. *' This young man,'' it observed, *' is 
 nothing better than a temporary lieutenant of the 
 Volunteer Reserve, but he is not wholly without 
 intelligence and has a pretty hand with a gun. 
 We will teach him something useful. " S o the order 
 was issued that Lieutenant Caesar should proceed to 
 Whale Island, there to be instructed in the mys- 
 teries of naval gunnery. " You will have to work 
 at Whale Island," warned the captain of his 
 flotilla, " and don't you forget it. It is not like 
 Oxford." This to reduce Caesar to the proper 
 level of humility. 
 
 Up to this stage in his career Lieutenant CsBsar, 
 though temporarily serving with the Royal Navy, 
 knew nothing whatever about it. His status was
 
 318 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 defined for me once by a sergeant of Marines : 
 " A tempory gentleman, sir, 'ere to-day and gone 
 to-morrow, and good riddance, sir." Upon land the 
 corps and regiments have been swamped by tem- 
 poraries, but at sea the Regular Navy remains in 
 full possession. In the barracks at Whale Island, 
 where Caesar was assigned quarters, he felt like a 
 very small schoolboy newly joining a very large 
 school. His fellow-pupils were R.N.R. men, 
 mercantile brass-bounders with mates' and masters' 
 certificates, and R.N.V.R.'s drawn from diverse 
 classes. To him they seemed a queer lot. He lay 
 low and studied them, finding most of them wholly 
 ignorant of everything which he knew, but pro- 
 foundly versed in things which he didn't. The 
 instructors of the Regular Service gave him his 
 first definite contact with the Navy. " My original 
 impression of them," he told me laughing, " was 
 that they were all mad. I had come to learn 
 gunnery, but for a whole week they insisted upon 
 teaching me squad drill, about the most derisory 
 version of drill which I have ever seen. Picture 
 us, a mob of mates out of liners and volunteers out 
 of workshops and technical schools, trailing rifles 
 round the square at Whale Island, feeling dazed 
 and helpless, and wondering if we had brought up 
 by mistake at a lunatic asylum. After the first 
 week, during which Whale Island indulged its 
 pathetic belief that its true metier is squad drill, 
 we were all rigbt. We got busy at the guns, and 
 found plenty to learn." It was at Whale Island 
 that he received the name of Csesar, the one Latin 
 author of which his messmates had any recollection. 
 During the first month of his training he daily 
 cursed Winchester and Oxford for the frightful gaps
 
 EPILOGUE: LIEUTENANT CESAR 319 
 
 which they had left in his educational equipments 
 He could acquire languages with anyone, but mathe- 
 matics, that essential key to the mysteries of gun- 
 nery, gave him endless trouble. But he had a keenly 
 tempered brain and limitless persistence. Slowly 
 at first, more rapidly later, he made up on his 
 contemporaries, and when after two months of the 
 toughest work of his life he gained a first-class 
 certificate, he felt that at last he had tasted a real 
 success. 
 
 Time brings its revenges. As a Sub in a motor- 
 boat he had affected to think slightingly of the 
 great battle-cruisers which his small craft protected, 
 but now that he w^as transferred to one of the new 
 Cats of the First Battle Cruiser Squadron his views 
 violently changed. Battleships were all very well, 
 they had huge guns and tremendous armour, but 
 when it came to speed and persistent aggressiveness 
 what were these sea monsters in comparison with 
 the Cats ? Why nothing, of course. Which shows 
 that Caesar was becoming a Navyman. Put a 
 naval officer into the veriest tub which can keep 
 herself afloat with difficulty, and steam five knots 
 in a tideway, and he will exalt her into the most 
 efiicient craft beneath the White Ensign. For she 
 is His Ship. 
 
 Lieutenant Caesar very quickly became at one 
 with his new ship, and entered into his kingdom. 
 Whether upon the loading platform of a turret 
 or in control of a side battery, he serenely took 
 up his place and felt that he had expanded to fill it 
 adequately. His tone became obtrusively pro- 
 fessional. When I asked for some details of his 
 hardships and his thrills, he sneered at me most 
 rudely. " There are no hardships," he declared ;
 
 320 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 *' we live and grow fat, and there is not a thrill 
 to the whole war. My motor-boat was a desperate 
 buccaneer in comparison with these stately Founts 
 of Power. Every week or two we do a Silent Might 
 parade in the North Sea, but nothing ever happens." 
 This was after the Dogger Bank action for which 
 he was too late, and before the Jutland Battle. 
 He wrote to me many veiled accounts of the North 
 Sea stunts upon which the battle-cruisers were per- 
 sistently engaged, but always insisted that they 
 were void of excitement. 
 
 *' Dismiss from your landsman's mind," he would 
 write — Caesar was now a sailor among sailors — 
 *' all idea of thrills. There aren't any. When the 
 hoist Prepare to Leave Harbour goes up on the 
 flagship, and black smoke begins to pour from every 
 funnel in the Squadron, there is no excitement and 
 no preparation— for we are already fully prepared. 
 We go out with our attendant destroyers and light 
 cruisers and scour at will over the ' German Ocean ' 
 looking for Fritz, that we may fall upon him. But 
 he is too cunning for us. I wish that we had some 
 scouting airships." 
 
 This wish of Lieutenant Caesar was, I believe, 
 shared by every officer in the Grand Fleet from the 
 Commander-in-Chief downwards. Airships cannot 
 fight airships or sea ships, and are of very little 
 use as destructive agents, but they are bright gems 
 in the firmament of scouts. 
 
 I asked Caesar why he did not keep notes of his 
 manifold experiences. " It is against orders," 
 answered he sorrowfully. *' We are not allowed 
 to keep a diary, and I have a rotten memory for
 
 EPILOGUE: LIEUTENANT CESAR 321 
 
 those intimate details which give life to a story. 
 If I could keep notes I would set up in business as a 
 naval Boyd Cable." But I am afraid that Caesar 
 was reckoning without the Naval Censor, a savage, 
 hungry lion beside whom his brother of the Mili- 
 tary Department is a complacent lamb. Caesar 
 has a pretty pen, but his hands are in shackles. 
 
 Caesar bent his keen eyes upon those with whom 
 he was associated, studied their strength and weak- 
 ness, and delivered judgment, intolerant in its 
 youthful sureness. 
 
 " The young lieutenants," he wrote, " are wonder- 
 ful. Profoundly and serenely competent at their 
 own work, but irresponsible as children in every- 
 thing else. Their ideas of chaff and ragging never 
 arise above those of the fifth form. Whenever they 
 speak of the Empire they mean the one in Leicester 
 Square. Shore leave for them means a bust at 
 the Trocadero, with a music-hall to follow, prefer- 
 ably with a pretty girl. Their notions of shore 
 life are of the earth earthy, not to say fleshy, but 
 at sea work they approach the divine. There is 
 not a two-striper in my ward-room who could not 
 with complete confidence and complete competence 
 take the Grand Fleet into action. But of education, 
 as you or I understand the word, they have none. 
 The Navy has been their strictly intensive life since 
 they left school at about thirteen. Of art, or 
 literature, or music — except in the crudest forms — 
 they know nothing, and care nothing. And this 
 makes their early retirement the more tragical. 
 They go out, nine-tenths of them, before they 
 reach forty without mental or artistic resources. 
 The Navy is a remorseless user up of youth. Those 
 who remain afloat, especially those without com-
 
 322 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 batant responsibilities, tend to degenerate into 
 S.O.B.s/^ 
 
 I will not translate ; Csesar is too young and too 
 clever to be sympathetic towards those of middle 
 age. 
 
 One afternoon in spring Lieutenant Csesar was 
 plunged without warning into the Jutland Battle. 
 He and his like were placidly waiting at action 
 stations in their turrets, when the order came to 
 put live shell into the guns. For six hours he 
 remained in his turret, serving his two 13'5-inch 
 guns, but seeing nothing of what passed outside 
 his thick steel walls. When I implored him to 
 recount to me his experiences, he protested that he 
 had none. 
 
 " You might as well ask a sardine, hermetically 
 sealed in a tin, to describe a fire in a grocer's shop,'* 
 wrote he. "I was that sardine, and so were nearly 
 all of us. Those in the conning tower saw some- 
 thing, and so did the officers in the spotting top 
 when they were not being smothered by smoke 
 and by water thrown up by bursting shells. But 
 as for the rest of us— don't you believe the stories 
 told you by eye-witnesses of naval battles. They 
 are all second or third hand, and rubbish at that. 
 When 1 have sorted the thing out from all those 
 who did see, and collated the discrepant accounts, 
 I will give you my conclusions, but I shall not be 
 allowed to write them. For a literary man the 
 Navy is a rotten service." 
 
 Caesar at this time wrote rather crossly. He had, 
 I think, visualised himself as the writer some day 
 of an immortal story of the greatest naval battle in
 
 EPILOGUE: LIEUTENANT CESAR 323 
 
 history. Now that he had been through it, he 
 knew as little of it at first hand as a heavy gunner 
 in France does of the advancing infantry whose 
 path forward he is cutting out. 
 
 The isolation of a busy turret in action may be 
 realised when one learns that Csesar knew nothing 
 of the loss of the Queen Mary, Indefatigable, or 
 Invincible until hours after they had gone to the 
 bottom. He had heard nothing even of damage 
 suffered by his own ship until, a grimy figure in 
 frowsy overalls, he crawled through the roof of his 
 big sardine tin and met in the darkness one of his 
 friends who had been in the spotting top. 
 
 " There was a frightful row going on as we sat 
 there on the turret's roof," wrote Caesar to me. 
 " Our destroyers were charging in upon Fritz's 
 flying ships, which with searchlights and guns of 
 all calibres were seeking to defend themselves. 
 We could not fire for our destroyers were in the way. 
 The horizon flamed like the aurora borealis, and 
 now and then big shells, ricochetting, would scream 
 over us. I enjoyed myself fine, and had no wish to 
 seek safety in my turret, of which I was heartily 
 sick. That is the only part of the action which I 
 saw, and the details were buried in confusion and 
 darkness. All the rest of the day I had been serving 
 two hungry guns with shells and cordite, and firing 
 them into unknown space. I was too intent on my 
 duties to be bored, but I did not get the least bit of 
 a thrill until I climbed out on the roof. Still I am 
 glad to. have been in the Battle, and, I love my big 
 wise guns." 
 
 It was while his battle-cruiser was being refitted,
 
 324 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 and when lie had just returned from a few days^ 
 leave, that the wheel of his destiny made another 
 turn. He was howked struggling and kicking out 
 of his turret as one plucks a periwinkle from its 
 shell, and cast into a destroyer attached to the 
 North Sea patrol. He had, as I have told, an easy 
 knack of picking up languages. To a solid know- 
 ledge of German he had added in past vacations 
 more than a speaking accjuaintance with the 
 Scandinavian tongues — Norse, Danish, and Swedish 
 — and his industry was now turned to his undoing. 
 Naval gunners were more plentiful than boarding 
 officers who could converse with the benevolent 
 and unbenevolent neutral, and Caesar's unfortunate 
 accomplishments clearly indicated him for a new 
 job. At first he was furious, but became quickly 
 reconciled. For, as he argued, fighting on a grand 
 scale is over, Fritz has had such a gruelling that 
 he won't come out any more ; North Sea stunts 
 will seem very tame after that day out by the 
 Jutland coast ; patrolling the upper waters of the 
 North Sea cannot be quite dull, and cross-examining 
 Scandinavian pirates may become positively excit- 
 ing. So Caesar settled down in his destroyer, in so far 
 as any one can settle down in such an uneasy craft. 
 Csesar now formed part of the inner and closer 
 meshes of the North Sea blockade designed to inter- 
 cept those ships which had penetrated the more 
 widely spread net outside. Many of the master* 
 whom he interviewed claimed to have a British safe- 
 conduct, but Caesar was not to be bluffed. With a 
 rough and chocolate-hued skin he had acquired 
 the peremptory air of a Sea God. 
 
 ** It is rather good fun sometimes,'" he wrote to
 
 EPILOGUE: LIEUTENANT CiESAR 326 
 
 me. " We can't search big ships on the high seas 
 at all thoroughly, and we don't want to send them 
 all into port for examination, so we work a Black 
 List. I have a list from the War Trade Depart- 
 ment of firms which are not allowed to ship to neutral 
 countries, and of all suspected enemy agents in 
 those countries. The Norse, Danish and Dutch 
 skippers are very decent and do their best to help, 
 but the Swedes are horrid blighters. Whenever 
 there is any doubt at all we send ships into port to 
 be thoroughly examined there. You may take 
 it that not much gets through now. Next to a com- 
 plete blockade of all sea traffic for neutral ports — 
 which I don't suppose the politicians can stomach — 
 our Black List system seems to be the goods. I 
 get good fun with these merchant skippers, and am 
 becoming quite a linguist, but the work is lest 
 exciting than I had hoped. It is amusing to see a 
 7, 000- ton tramp escorted into port by a twenty- 
 foot motor-boat which she could sling up on her 
 davits, but even this sight becomes a matter of 
 course after a while. I have seen something of war 
 from three aspects, and seem to have exhausted 
 its sensations. They are greatly overrated.'' 
 
 But Lieutenant Caesar was destined to have one 
 more experience before war had used him up and 
 relaid him upon the shelf from which he wa» 
 plucked in September 1914. A destroyer upon 
 patrol duty is still a fighting vessel, and fights joy- 
 fully whenever she can snatch a plausible oppor- 
 tunity. Csesar had sunk a submarine, served 
 through the Jutland Battle, and assisted to stop 
 the holes in the British blockade, but he had not yet 
 known what fighting really means. That is reserved
 
 S2e THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 for destroyers in action. One after-noon he was 
 cruising not far from the Dogger Banlc, when the 
 fiound of light guns was heard a few miles off towards 
 the east. The Lieut.-Commander in charge of our 
 unit in H.M.S. Blockade obeyed the Napoleonic 
 rule and steered at once for the guns. In about 
 ten minutes a group of small craft wreathed in 
 smoke, lighted up at short intervals by gun flashes, 
 appeared on the horizon, and roaring at her full 
 speed of 34 knots the British destroyer swept down 
 upon them. Presently seven trawlers were made 
 out firing with their small guns at two German 
 torpedo boats, which with torpedo and 23-pounder 
 weapons were intent upon destroying them. One 
 trawler was blown sky- high while Csesar's ship was 
 yet half a mile distant^ and another rolled over 
 shattered by German shell. "It was a pretty 
 sight,'" said Caesar, when I visited him in hospital, 
 and learned to my deep joy that he was out of 
 danger. " When we got within a quarter of a mile 
 we edged to starboard to give the torpedo tubes a 
 clear bearing on the port bow. A shell or two 
 flew over us, but the layers at the tubes took no 
 notice. They waited till we were quite close, not 
 more than two hundred yards, and then loosed a 
 torpedo. I have never seen anything so quick and 
 smart. I saw the mouldy drop and start, and then 
 a huge column of water spouted up, blotting out 
 entirely the nearest German boat. The water fell 
 and S(!;t us tossing wildly, but I kept my feet and 
 could see that German destroyer shut up exactly 
 like a clasp-knife. She had been bust up amidships, 
 her bow and stern almost kissed one another, and 
 she went down vertically. The other turned to 
 fly, firing heavily upon us, but our boys had her
 
 EPILOGUE: LIEUTENANT CESAR 327 
 
 in their grip. We had three fine guns, 4-inch semi- 
 automatics. We hit her full on the starboard 
 quarter as she turned, and then raked her the whole 
 length ol her deck. I did not see the end, for 
 earth and sky crashed all round me, and I went to 
 sleep. When I awoke I was lying below, my right 
 leg felt dead, but there was no pain, and from the 
 horrid vibration running through the vessel I knew 
 that we were at full speed. 
 
 Did we get the other one ? ' I asked of my 
 servant, whom I saw beside me. * She sunk 
 proper, sir," said he. ' You, sir, are the only 
 casuality we 'ad.' It was an honour v/hich I 
 found it difficult to appreciate. * What's the 
 damage ? ' I muttered. * I'm afraid, sir,' he 
 replied diffidently, * that your right leg is blowed 
 away.' Then I fainted, and did not come round 
 again till I was in hospital here. My leg is gone at 
 the knee ; I lost a lot of blood, and should have lost 
 my life but for the tourniquet which the Owner 
 himself whipped round my thigh. They have 
 whittled the stump shipshape here, and I am to 
 have a new leg of the most fashionable design. 
 The doctors say that I shall not know the difference 
 when I get used to it, and shall be able to play golf 
 and even tennis. Golf and tennis! Good games, 
 but they seem a bit tame after the life I've led for 
 the last two years. " Ceesar fell silent, and I gripped 
 his hand. I • 
 
 " It isn't as if you were in the Regular Service," 
 I murmured. " It isn't your career that's gone. 
 That is still to come. You've done your bit, 
 Caesar, old man." 
 
 His eyes glittered and a tear welled over and 
 rolled down his cheek. That was all, the only sign 
 
 22
 
 328 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 of weakness and of regret for the lost leg and the 
 lost opportunities for further service. When he 
 spoke again it was the old cheerful Csesar whom I 
 knew. " It seems funny. A month or two hence 
 I shall be back at Oxford, reading philosophy and 
 all sorts of absurd rubbish for my i irst in Greats. 
 From Oxford I came, and to Oxford I shall return ; 
 these two years of life will seem like a dream. A 
 few years hence I shall have nothing but my medal 
 and my wooden leg to remind me of them. It has 
 been a good time, Copplestone— a devilish good 
 time. I have done my bit, but I wasn't cut out 
 for a fighting man. There is too much preparation 
 and too little real business. I should have ex- 
 hausted the thing and got bored. In time I should 
 have become an S.O.B. like some of those others. 
 No, Copplestone, I have nothing to regret, not even 
 the lost leg. It is better to go out like this than 
 to wait till the end of the war, and then to be among 
 the Not Wanteds.'' 
 
 " They've made you a Lieutenant-Commander," 
 I said slowly. 
 
 " Two and a half stripes," he murmured. " They 
 look pretty, but they are only the wavy ones, not 
 the real article. I was never anything but a 
 ' tempory blighter, 'ere to-day and gone to- 
 morrow, and good riddance.' It was decent of 
 them to think of me, but stripes are no use to me 
 now. I shall be at Oxford with the other cripples, 
 and the weak hearts, and the aliens, and the con- 
 scientious objectors — what do the dregs of Oxford 
 know of stripes ? " 
 
 I saw as much as I could of Csesar during the
 
 EPILOGUE; LIEUTENANT CAESAR 329 
 
 weeksthat followed. His mental processes interested 
 me hugely. He has an enviable faculty of concen- 
 trating upon the job in hand to the complete 
 exclusion of everything outside. He forgot Oxford 
 in the Service, and now seemed to have almost 
 forgotten the Service in his return to Oxford, and 
 to what he calls civilisation. He was greatly taken 
 up w4th the design for his wooden leg. I met him 
 after his first visit to Roehampton to be measured, 
 and found him bubbling over with enthusiasm. 
 "Such legs and arms!'" cried he. "They are 
 almost better than meat and bone ones. I saw a 
 Tommy with a shorter stump than mine jumping 
 hurdles and learning to kick. He was a professional 
 footballer once. Another with a wooden arm 
 could write and even draw. In a month or two's 
 time, when my stump is healed solid and I have 
 learnt the tricks of my new leg, it will be a great 
 sport exercising it and trying to find out what it 
 can't do. A new interest in life." 
 
 " You seem rather to like having a leg blown 
 of?," I said wondering. 
 
 He is extraordinarily exuberant. I looked for 
 depression after a month in hospital, but looked in 
 vain. He builds up a future with as much zest as 
 a youthful architect executes his first commission. 
 The First in Greats is " off " ; Caesar says that he 
 has not time to bother about such things. " I 
 shall read History and modern French and Russian 
 literature. History will do for my Final Schools, 
 and Literature for my play. I shall learn Russian. 
 Then when I have taken my degree I shall go in for 
 the Foreign Office. My wooden leg will actually 
 help me to a nomination, and the exam, is nothing. 
 It's not a bad idea ; I thought of it last night."
 
 330 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 " You don't take long over a decision/' I re- 
 marked. 
 
 " I never did/' said lie calmly. 
 
 When he returned to Oxford early in November 
 he urged me to pay him a visit. I was in London 
 a week or two later and having twenty-four hours 
 to spare ran up to Oxford, established myself at the 
 Clarendon, and summoned Caesar to dine with me. 
 All through the meal wonder grew upon me. For 
 my very charming guest was an undergraduate in 
 his fourth year, bearing no trace of having been 
 anything else. We talked of Balzac, Anatole 
 France, and Turgeniev. I listened politely to 
 Caesar's views upon German and Russian Church 
 music. I learned that the scarcity of Turkish 
 cigarettes was causing him distress, that his rooms 
 were delightful, and that Oxford was a desert swept 
 clear of his old friends. The war was never once 
 referred to. ' His conversation abounded in slang 
 with which I was not familiar — I come from the 
 other shop. It was an insufferable evening, and 
 I saw Caesar hobble away upon his crutches with 
 positive relief. He could use his leg a little, but 
 the stump was still rather sore. That hobble was 
 the one natural and human thing about him. 
 
 I passed a wretched night, came to a desperate 
 resolution early in the morning, and carried it out 
 about nine o'clock. Caesar was in his " delightful 
 rooms." They certainly had a pleasant aspect, 
 but the furniture disgusted me ; it might have been 
 selected by a late- Victorian poet. I looked for a 
 book or a picture which might connect Caesar with 
 the R.N.V.K., and looked in vain. He was busy 
 trampling upon the best two years of his life and 
 forgetting that he had ever been a man. It should
 
 EPILOGUE! LIEUTENANT C^SAE 331 
 
 not be. Presently he came in from his bedroom 
 and began to talk in the manner of the night before 
 but I cut him short. " Caesar/' I said brutally, 
 '* you are no better than an ass. Look at these 
 rooms. Is this the place for a man who has lived 
 and fought in a motor-boat, a battle-cruiser, and 
 a t.b.d. ? You have sunk a German submarine, 
 served in the Jutland Battle, and lost a leg in your 
 country's service. Hug these things to your soul, 
 don't throw them away. Brood upon them, write 
 about them, for the love of Heaven don't try to 
 forget them." 
 
 I saw his eyes light up, but he said nothing. His 
 lips began to twitch and, knowing him as I did, I 
 should have heeded their warning. But un- 
 checked I drivelled on : 
 
 ** Are you the man to shrink from an effort 
 because of pain ? Did you grouse when your leg 
 was blown of! ? Wring all you can out of the future. 
 Read History, join the F.O., study Russian. But 
 do these things in a manner worthy of Lieutenant- 
 Commander Caesar, and don't try to revive the 
 puling Oxford spark that you were two years ago 
 before the war came to sweep the rubbish out of 
 you." 
 
 He gave a clumsy leap, tripped over his new leg, 
 and fell into a chair. Lying there he laughed and 
 laughed and laughed. How he laughed ! Nob 
 loud, but deeply, thoroughly, persistently, as if to 
 make up for a long abstinence. 
 
 " Confound you ! " I growled. " What the 
 deuce are you laughing at ? " 
 
 ** You," said Caesar simply. 
 
 At the word the truth surged over me in a 
 shameful flood. That preposterous dinner with
 
 332 THE SECRET OF THE NAVY 
 
 its babble of Balzac and Turgeniev, Church music, 
 and Turkish cigarettes. These rooms stripped of 
 all reminders of two strenuous years of war. That 
 Oxford accent and the intolerable Oxford slang. 
 " Csesar," I shouted, joining in his exuberant 
 laughter, '* you have been pulling my leg all th« 
 time.'^ 
 
 " All the time," said he. " My bedroom is full 
 of stuff that I cleared out of here. Last night, 
 Copplestone, your ever- lengthening face was a 
 lovely study, and I have wondered ever since how 
 I kept in my laughter." 
 
 " You young villain," cried I, overjoyed to find 
 that Csesar was still my bright friend of thsR.N.V.R. 
 *' How shall I get even with you ? " 
 
 " I owe you some reparation," said he, ** and here 
 it is." He hobbled over to his desk and drew out 
 a great roll of paper. " This is the first instalment ; 
 there are lots more to come. For the last month 
 I have been trying to remember, not to forget. I 
 am writing of everything that I have done and 
 seen and heard and felt during those two splendid 
 years. Everything. It will run to reams of paper 
 and months of time. When it is finished you shall 
 have it all. Take it, saturate yourself in it, add 
 your spells to it. We will stir up the compound of 
 Copplestone and Csesar until it ferments, and then 
 distil from the mass a Great Work. It shall be ours, 
 Copplestone— yours and mine. Will you have me 
 as your partner ? " 
 
 " With the greatest pleasure in life," I cried. 
 
 We discussed our plans in full detail, and parted 
 the best of friends. Caesar is rekindling the ashes 
 of a life which I had thought to be extinguished ; 
 soon there will be a great and glowing fire of realised
 
 EPILOUE: LIEUTENANT C^SAR 333 
 
 memory which will keep warm the years that are 
 to come. He has solved the problem of his immedi- 
 ate future. But what of those others, those tens of 
 thousands, who when the war is over will seek for 
 some means to keep alive the fires which years of 
 war have lighted in their hearts ? Are they to be 
 merged, lost, in the old life as it was lived before 
 1914 ? Are they to degenerate slowly but surely 
 into S.O.B.s, intent only upon earning a living 
 somehow, playing bad golf, or looking on at football 
 matches ? I do not know, I have no data, and it is 
 rather painful to indulge oneself in speculation. 
 
 This sketch was published a year ago. Two 
 months after I had visited Csesar at Oxford he 
 called upon me in London. He was in uniform, 
 and explained that he had quickly grown tired of 
 sick leave and had recalled himself to Service. 
 " I can't go to sea again/' said he, " with this timber 
 toe but I am at least good for an office job ashore." 
 But Caesar was not made to fit the stool of any 
 office, and when I last heard from him was an 
 observer in the E.N.A.S. 
 
 In this fashion he has rounded of! his experiences, 
 and basely failed me, his friend and biographer, 
 ©f the scanty data with which to answer the ques- 
 tion set forth in the first sentence of this chapter. 
 
 THE END
 
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