THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 RIVERSIDE
 
 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON
 
 NAPOLEON IN CORONATION ROHKS 
 
 I'.V ROHERT I.EFEVRE
 
 THE LIFE OF 
 NAPOLEON 
 
 ARTHUR HASSALL, M.A. 
 
 STUBMT OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD 
 
 WITH TWENTY-SINK ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 BOSTON 
 
 LITTLE, BROWN, & COMPANY 
 1911
 
 OC205
 
 PREFATORY NOTE 
 
 TOURING the years from Napoleon's birth in 1769 
 to 1796, when the Directory was firmly es- 
 tablished, Europe passed through a period of great 
 importance. In the East of Europe the Partitions of 
 Poland, 1772, 1793, 1795, and the successful wars of 
 Catherine II, against Turkey, ending in the Treaties 
 of Kainardji, 1774, and Jassy, 1792, had marked 
 the rise of Russia. That event tended to change 
 entirely the views hitherto held as to what should 
 constitute the balance of power in Europe, and had 
 led to important modifications in the foreign policy of 
 the chief European States. 
 
 The rise of Russia to a leading place in Europe 
 had to be recognized, while her intention to take 
 part in Western politics was unmistakably shown in 
 1799, when Suvorov, at the head of a Russian 
 army, entered Italy. While this revolution was in 
 progress in the North of Europe, other revolutions 
 of a different character were taking place elsewhere. 
 In Poland the years 1789-93 witnessed an attempt to 
 carry out a revolution, which, if effected, would have
 
 vi THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 given Poland an hereditary monarchy and a stable 
 Government. As Poland was a country of similar ex- 
 tent to that of France, the effect of the establishment 
 of a consolidated kingdom in the East of Europe 
 would have been immense. The year 1789 also 
 witnessed revolutions in Belgium and France that 
 in the former country being the result of Joseph II 's 
 attempts to change the character of the Government, 
 and to introduce reforms, while that in the latter 
 country was due to a desire not only to change the 
 form of the Government, but also to bring about 
 drastic reforms. 
 
 While the efforts of the Polish reformers and of 
 Joseph II ended in failure, the revolutionary party in 
 France succeeded beyond their wildest hopes. 
 
 The overthrow of the monarchy, the rise of the 
 war party, the desire of the revolutionists to spread 
 their doctrines all over Europe, and, during the pro- 
 cess, to vanquish England, rendered all other revolu- 
 tionary movements in Europe of little account, as 
 compared with the French Revolution. That Revo- 
 lution passed through a series of stages. In 1791 
 France had received a Constitution which the majority 
 of Frenchmen regarded as adequate. But the pre- 
 dominance, first of the Girondist party, and then of 
 the Jacobin party, together with the outbreak of war, 
 resulted in a system of terror in France which did 
 not come to an end till the safety of France from all
 
 PREFATORY NOTE vii 
 
 danger of foreign invasion was secured. In 1795 
 the Government of the Directory which ruled France 
 till 1 799 was established, and it was during a struggle 
 in Paris which preceded its advent to power that 
 Napoleon Bonaparte came prominently forward as 
 Barras' lieutenant. 
 
 " I "HIS book does not presume to give a final 
 verdict upon the character of Napoleon. 
 It simply aims at conveying as far as possible an 
 accurate impression of the man and his times. One 
 writer has truly said that "there is no age, no per- 
 sonality in history of greater interest, either to France 
 or to the world, than the Napoleonic era and Na- 
 poleon". Both as a soldier and as a statesman he 
 rose superior to all his contemporaries. He waged 
 war on a scale hitherto unheard of ; his reorganiza- 
 tion of France, and his arrangements for the govern- 
 ment of the client states, bear evidence of the 
 possession of statesmanlike qualities of a very high 
 order. 
 
 The pictures of Napoleon, given us by Madame 
 de Stael and Madame de Remusat, are now recognized 
 as being untrustworthy, and, therefore, of no historical 
 value. 
 
 The reader who has not sufficient leisure to study 
 the works of Sorel, Vandal, Thiebault and Fournier 
 cannot do better than read Mr. Rose's " Life of
 
 viii THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Napoleon " ; Lord Rosebery's, " Napoleon : the 
 Last Phase"; and Gourgaud's "Diary". By the 
 perusal of these works he will at anyrate obtain not 
 only something more than an outline of the history of 
 Europe during the years 1789-1815, but he will also 
 be enabled to form an estimate of Napoleon as a 
 Statesman and as a General. 
 
 Of the greatness of his genius there can be no 
 question, and Europe owes him an unspeakable debt 
 of gratitude. Without this "scavenger of God," it 
 is difficult to see how the sense of nationality in Italy 
 and Germany could have been aroused and stimu- 
 lated. Napoleon was not making an extravagant 
 statement when he said, " Centuries may pass before 
 circumstances combine to produce another such as 
 I was". 
 
 The Bibliography of the Napoleonic period is 
 rapidly increasing. The list of works connected 
 with the history of Europe during that period, and with 
 the life of Napoleon, fills 120 pages of Volume IX of 
 the " Cambridge Modern History ". Mr. Rose's " Life 
 of Napoleon " is probably the best known to English- 
 men, and well deserves its high reputation. Of 
 French works, Sorel's " History of Europe during the 
 Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era" is invaluable to 
 the student of the general history of the period. 
 Fournier's " Life of Napoleon," and Vandal's " Na- 
 pole"on et Alexandre I," have also a well-deserved
 
 PREFATORY NOTE ix 
 
 popularity in England, and add considerably to our 
 knowledge of the aims of Napoleon at various crises 
 in his career. 
 
 The perusal of these works, together with some 
 of the Memoirs of the time, will supply the reader 
 with very accurate information regarding Napoleon's 
 life and the times in which he lived. Of these 
 Memoirs, those of Generals Marbot, Junot, and Rapp 
 will be found especially interesting. Seeley's " Life 
 of Stein" and Oman's "History of the Peninsular 
 War" throw ample light upon the situation in 
 Germany and Spain during the critical years which 
 preceded and witnessed the fall of Napoleon. 
 
 Vol. IX - - " Napoleon" of the " Cambridge 
 Modern History " is in itself a mine of information, 
 and should be used as a guide-book for the whole 
 of the Napoleonic period. 
 
 For the early years of Napoleon's career I have 
 found " The Growth of Napoleon," by Mr. Norwood 
 Young, most suggestive. To Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, 
 of New College, Oxford, and to Mr. J. Holland Rose, 
 of Christ's College, Cambridge, I am under deep obli- 
 gations. Their writings upon the Napoleonic period 
 must be constantly consulted by any one who is 
 studying the history of Europe between 1789 and 
 1815. 
 
 " The Account of Napoleon's Life on St. Helena," 
 by Mr. Fisher, in Vol. IX of the "Cambridge
 
 x THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Modern History," and the publication by Lord 
 Rosebery of his brilliant description of the later days 
 of Napoleon in the volume entitled, " Napoleon : the 
 Last Phase," would, under ordinary circumstances, 
 have rendered any account by me of Napoleon's 
 captivity unnecessary. 
 
 Fortunately, the late Mr. John C. F. Ramsden, 
 of Willinghurst, Guildford, most kindly presented me 
 with a copy of Captain Henry Meynell's " Memoranda 
 of Conversations with Napoleon," which was pri- 
 vately printed in 1909, and of that volume I have 
 made considerable use in the last chapter of this book. 
 Captain Meynell's " recollections undoubtedly contain 
 fresh matter, in addition to what is related by Sir 
 Pulteney Malcolm," and will be of interest to all 
 students of the Life of Napoleon.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 PAGE 
 
 THE YOUTH AND RISE OF NAPOLEON, 1769-1795 . . i 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 THE ITALIAN AND EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS, 1796-1799 . 22 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPEROR, 1799-1804 . . 50 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 91 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807 146 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE BEGINNING OF NAPOLEON'S INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 
 
 AND THE CONGRESS OF ERFURT, 1807-1808 . . 174 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 NAPOLEON AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER, 1808-1812 . 202 
 
 xi
 
 xii THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 PAGE 
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON, Moscow, LEIPZIG, WATERLOO, 
 
 1813-1815 . . ... 236 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 SUMMARY OF NAPOLEON'S CAREER 274 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 ST. HELENA, 1815-1821 284 
 
 APPENDICES ......... 303 
 
 INDEX 3x3
 
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 NAPOLEON IN CORONATION ROBES . . . Frontispiece 
 
 From the Painting by Robert Lefevre 
 
 FACING PAGE 
 
 CONTEMPORARY CRAYON PORTRAIT OF BONAPARTE, by one 
 
 of his fellow-pupils (1785) ..... 6 
 
 In the possession of M. de Beaudricourt 
 
 MARIA LETIZIA BONAPARTE, " MADAME MERE " . . 12 
 From the Painting by Gerard at Versailles 
 
 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC ... 24 
 
 From the Painting by H. E. P. Philippoteaux at Versailles. 
 (Photograph by W. A. Mansell & Co.) 
 
 NAPOLEON AT THE BATTERY ...... 26 
 
 From a Water-colour Drawing of the period 
 
 THE i8TH BRUMAIRE 56 
 
 After a Contemporary English Engraving 
 
 THE FIRST CONSUL AT MALMAISON . . . .72 
 
 From the Painting by J. B. Isabey at Versailles. (Photograph by 
 Neurdein freres) 
 
 JOSEPHINE AT MALMAISON 88 
 
 From the Painting by Prud'hon at Versailles. (Photograph by 
 Neurdein freres) 
 
 NAPOLEON'S REDINGOTE AND COCKED HAT . . .128 
 
 From the Collection of Prince Victor 
 
 FACSIMILE LETTER FROM NAPOLEON TO GENERAL MASSENA, 
 
 1 8 September, 1805 . . . . . . .136 
 
 THE KING AND QUEEN OF PRUSSIA, WITH NAPOLEON AND 
 
 THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA, AT TILSIT . . .152 
 
 From the Painting by Gosse at Versailles. (Photograph by Neur- 
 dein freres)
 
 xiv THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 FACING PAGE 
 
 PAULINE BONAPARTE, PRINCESS BORGHESE . . .182 
 
 From the Statue by Canova in the Villa Borghese, at Rome. 
 (Photograph by Anderson) 
 
 JOSEPH BONAPARTE . . . . . . .196 
 
 From a Lithograph. (Photograph by Neurdein) 
 
 "THE EMPEROR" ........ 202 
 
 From an Engraving by Henry after the drawing by Vigneux. 
 In the possession ot Count Primoli 
 
 THE EMPRESS JOSEPHINE . . . . . .218 
 
 From the Painting by Gerard at Versailles. (Photograph by 
 Neurdein freres) 
 
 THE EMPRESS MARIE LOUISE 222 
 
 From the Painting by Ge'rard at Versailles. (Photograph by Le'vy) 
 
 MARSHAL NEY COVERING THE RETREAT .... 244 
 
 From the Pointing by Yvon at Versailles. (Photograph by Neur- 
 dein freres) 
 
 FAREWELL TO THE OLD GUARD AT FONTAINEBLEAU . 258 
 
 From the Painting by Horace Vernet in the Bibliotheque Nationale 
 
 RECEPTION BY THE SOLDIERS ...... 266 
 
 After the Painting by Steuben 
 
 THE KING OF ROME . . . . . . .270 
 
 From the Painting by Sir T. Lawrence, in the collection of the 
 Duke of Bassano 
 
 "SlRE, YOU MAY RECKON ON US AS ON YOUR OLD GUARD " 272 
 From a Lithograph by Raffet 
 
 NAPOLEON AT LONGWOOD 284 
 
 From a Sketch by General Gourgaud 
 
 THE EXILE 286 
 
 From a Water-colour Sketch made by an English Officer at Long- 
 wood, 24 July, 1820 
 
 NAPOLEON ON ST. HELENA 288 
 
 From a Lithograph by Horace Vernet 
 
 PORTRAIT CAMEO OF NAPOLEON AND SPECIMEN OF HIS 
 
 WRITING FROM ST. HELENA, 1818 . . . .294 
 
 NAPOLEON'S LAST DAY 298 
 
 From the Sculpture by Vicenzo Vela at Versailles
 
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xv 
 
 FACING PAGE 
 ON HIS DEATHBED 301 
 
 From a Sketch made by Captain Marryat, by the order of Sir 
 Hudson Lowe 
 
 RECEPTION OF THE BODY AT THE INVALIDES . . . 302 
 
 From a Drawing by Ferrogio and Gerard 
 
 THE TOMB OF NAPOLEON . . . . . .314 
 
 From an anonymous Lithograph
 
 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE YOUTH AND RISE OF NAPOLEON, 1769-1795 
 
 Birth and parentage of Napoleon Early life At the military 
 school in Paris Joins the army His views on religion In Corsica, 
 1789 In Paris, 1792 Corsica and Sardinia, 1792-3 "LeSouper 
 de Beaucaire " The Siege of Toulon, 1793 Italy, 1794 Vende- 
 miaire. 
 
 "NT APOLEON was to all intents and purposes an 
 * ^ Italian and one of the most remarkable Italians 
 that the world has ever seen. In one sense he was the 
 last as he was the greatest of that remarkable race 
 of adventurers who flourished in all parts of Europe 
 during the eighteenth century. 1 
 
 But the period from 1789 to 1815 which witnessed 
 the rise and fall of Napoleon cannot be said to belong 
 to any century. It certainly had few of the character- 
 istics of the eighteenth ; it was in no sense part of the 
 nineteenth century. It is the period which saw the 
 
 1 For a summary of the evidence bearing on the date of 
 Napoleon's birth, see Baring Gould, "Life of Napoleon Bona- 
 parte," p. 6. 
 
 i
 
 2 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 birth of Modern Europe, which event was directly 
 hastened by the instrumentality of Napoleon, who 
 acquired a most remarkable ascendancy over, and 
 exercised a most profound influence upon, France and 
 indeed Europe. France at the time of the beginning 
 of his ascendancy required order and organization, 
 and Europe needed reconstruction. The rule of the 
 benevolent despots had proved inadequate to the needs 
 of the time, and till the Peace of Tilsit Napoleon in 
 destroying the effete system of the Holy Roman Em- 
 pire, in expelling the Austrians from Italy and in ex- 
 posing the stagnation which had settled upon Prussia, 
 was laying the foundations of Modern Europe. After 
 Tilsit the inevitable though to him unexpected results 
 of his work began gradually to be seen in the rise of 
 national feeling in the countries which he had conquered 
 or overrun ; and the steady growth of that national 
 feeling in Europe led inevitably to his downfall. 
 
 Napoleon was born on 15 August, 1769, the 
 year of the birth of Castlereagh and Wellington. It 
 has, however, been asserted that he was born on 7 
 January, 1768, when the French authority over Corsica 
 was by no means fully established, and, therefore, if 
 Napoleon was born in 1768 it is incorrect to say that 
 Napoleon was born a French subject. 
 
 Napoleon was the second son of Charles Bona- 
 parte and Laetetia Ramolino, both members of Corsi- 
 can families. Charles Bonaparte was himself the son 
 of Joseph who had secured from the Grand Duke of 
 Tuscany the right to bear the Buonaparte arms.
 
 THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 3 
 
 This right was gained on 28 May, 1757, and in 1760 
 Joseph died. His son Charles was born at Ajaccio in 
 1746 and in June, 1764, married the beautiful Laetetia. 
 
 Corsica was at that time under the influence of 
 Paoli, who in 1767 invited Charles Bonaparte to leave 
 Italy and to take up his residence in Ajaccio. Conse- 
 quently Charles and Laetetia returned to Corsica in 
 1767, and, as has been stated, it is declared by some 
 writers that at Corte, on 7 January in the following 
 year, their first son Napoleon was born, and that Paoli 
 was his godfather. Madame Junot, however, relates 
 that on 9 November, 1799, she had a long conversa- 
 tion with Napoleon's mother who spoke emphatically 
 on the subject. " I know not why," she said, " it has 
 been reported that Paoli was Napoleon's godfather. 
 It is not true ; Laurent Jiubega (a relation of Na- 
 poleon) was his godfather." 1 Geltruda, wife of 
 Nicolo Parivisino, was his other godparent. Napo- 
 leon's elder brother, Joseph Nabulione, was born on 
 7 January, 1768, at Corte, and no doubt his second 
 Christian name is partly answerable for the confusion 
 between his birth and that of the great Napoleon. 
 
 In the struggle headed by General Pascal Paoli 
 against the forces of Louis XV, Carlo Bonaparte took 
 a conspicuous part, and was given the rank of Major. 
 On the final conquest of Corsica by the French, Carlo 
 was only persuaded to remain on the island through 
 the efforts of his uncle, a canon of the Church. In 
 
 1 " Memoirs of Napoleon," by the Duchess d'Abrantes, Vol. I, 
 p. 194. London, Bentley, 1836.
 
 4 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 1773 Carlo represented the Corsican nobles when a 
 deputation of the three estates was sent to the King 
 of France. Shortly after this visit he became pro- 
 curator e reale of Ajaccio. 
 
 On i January, 1779* Napoleon and his brother 
 Joseph were placed in a school at Autun under the 
 Abbe de Chardon in order that they might learn 
 French. 
 
 The Abbe in his Reminiscences tells us that 
 Napoleon's character was thoughtful, gloomy, and 
 imperious. In three months he had acquired a 
 satisfactory knowledge of French. 
 
 Fortunately for his family, Charles Bonaparte had 
 secured the friendship of General Count Marbceuf, 
 the Governor of Corsica, and it was owing to the 
 latter's influence that Carlo's second son, Napoleon, 
 was on 19 May, 1779, placed by the Marshal de 
 Sgur, the French Minister at War, as an Eleve du 
 Roi in the Ecole Militaire at Brienne in the province 
 of Champagne. At the Military College, where he 
 remained till October, 1784, his individuality at once 
 made itself, felt. 
 
 The Jicole Militaire was under the direction of 
 the fathers called Minims. There, under the supervi- 
 sion of Father Petrault, Napoleon learnt the rudiments 
 of mathematics, and at the same time studied ancient and 
 modern languages, geography, literature, history, and 
 every branch of military science. While at the Royal 
 Military Academy of Brienne Napoleon devoted him- 
 self to his studies. He showed moroseness of temper,
 
 THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 5 
 
 courted solitude, was absorbed in his own pursuits and 
 studies, and was unpopular with his schoolfellows. He 
 gloried in being a Corsican, and declared that he would 
 deliver Corsica from its dependence upon France. 
 
 His moods apparently varied ; at one time he 
 appeared to be a quiet, hard-working student, at 
 another time he would be quarrelsome and head- 
 strong. The general opinion, however, was that it 
 was impossible to persuade him to change his opinion 
 when once he had made up his mind. His character, 
 said Pichegru, who afterwards conquered Holland, 
 and was then on the staff of teachers, was inflexible. 
 
 In 1783 Keralio, a royal inspector of military 
 schools, recommended Napoleon, whose conduct he 
 described as most exemplary, and whose work showed 
 thought, for promotion to the Military School of Paris. 
 Before the recommendation could take effect Keralio 
 was succeeded by Reynaud who, however, in 1784 
 selected Napoleon with four others to go to the 
 Military College in Paris. There he remained from 
 October, 1784, to October, 1785, and was treated with 
 contempt by the noble students whose indolence and 
 extravagance contrasted markedly with the quiet 
 and studious character of the life led by the future 
 Emperor. 
 
 In August, 1785, after his final examination, 
 Napoleon received the appointment of sub-lieutenant 
 in the Artillery. He was thereupon ordered to join 
 the regiment of La Fere then stationed at Valence. 
 At Valence he remained with his regiment La Fere
 
 6 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 till September, 1786, when he left for long leave, and 
 returned to Corsica. He was still an ardent Corsican 
 and an admirer of Paoli, burning with a desire to 
 avenge his country's wrongs. He continued his 
 studies, working chiefly at mathematics and Italian, 
 and was a constant reader of the works of Corneille, 
 Racine, Voltaire, and Rousseau. 
 
 In Corsica he remained for a year, till September, 
 1787, when, owing to the possibility of war with 
 Prussia he was recalled. But Vergennes being dead, 
 French foreign policy under Montmorin entered upon 
 a tranquil period and all danger of war passed away. 
 Bonaparte therefore was able to visit Paris, where he 
 remained from September to December, 1787, when 
 he returned to Corsica, arriving at Ajaccio early in 
 January, 1788. His father died in the following 
 month. Bonaparte only remained in the island till 
 June when he rejoined his regiment at Auxonne. 
 While in Corsica he dined with the officers of the 
 French artillery garrison, and his conversation as 
 described by a brother officer makes it quite evident 
 that, though only eighteen years old, Bonaparte 
 showed himself far better informed than his brother 
 officers in knowledge of ancient and modern history. 1 
 It was evident that he was still a patriotic Corsican, 
 resenting the French occupation of his island home. 
 It was also quite evident that he was already far 
 better educated than the ordinary French officer, and 
 that he was always revolving in his mind social pro- 
 
 1 See Norwood Young, " Growth of Napoleon," pp. 157-8.
 
 THE FIRST PORTRAIT FROM LIFE TAKEN OF NAPOLEON 
 
 FROM A CRAYON SKETCH BY ONE OF HIS FELLOW PUPILS 
 
 ON IT is WRITTEN: "MIO CARO AMICO BUONAPARTE, PONTORMINI, DEL 1785, TOURNOXE'
 
 THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 7 
 
 blems. He remained with his regiment at Auxonne 
 from June, 1788, to September, 1789. Those months 
 mark an epoch in his career, for he now fell under 
 the influence of Baron J. P. du Teil, the Commander 
 of the Artillery School at Auxonne. 
 
 The outbreak of the Revolution in May, 1789, 
 was followed by mutinous acts on the part of the 
 regiment. On 23 August the officers took an oath 
 not to employ troops against the citizens unless 
 authorized to do so by the civil or municipal officers. 
 
 During these years from 1785 to 1789 Napoleon 
 had had some experience of the world, and had worked 
 hard. While at Valence and Auxonne the young 
 Corsican studied not only mathematics, in which he 
 acquired great proficiency, but also history. He was 
 also much influenced by Rousseau's writings, and de- 
 fended the latter's attack on Christianity in the " Social 
 Contract " against the criticisms of a Protestant pastor 
 of Geneva. In his view the perfection of society and 
 the welfare of mankind could be secured without the 
 aid of religion. He advocated the adoption of a 
 general uniformity of life, which could only be attained 
 by means of the State. According to him " the 
 Christian creed was directly hostile to a perfect polity," 
 for it encouraged individual liberty of thought, and 
 "by bidding men look forward to another life it 
 rendered them too submissive to the evils of the 
 present ". l 
 
 The adherence to these opinions explains not only 
 
 l See "Quarterly Review," No. 396, p. 340.
 
 8 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Napoleon's sympathy with the French Revolution, 
 but also his admiration of Robespierre, and his friend- 
 ship with the younger Robespierre. 
 
 His arrival in Corsica from Auxonne in the autumn 
 (September) of 1789 was followed by many stirring 
 events. He was already imbued with the revolution- 
 ary doctrines and at once joined a small party in Corsica 
 in organizing a revolutionary committee and a national 
 guard. In adopting these measures he encountered 
 much opposition. In Ajaccio the royalist party were 
 supreme, and De Barrin, the Commandant, suppressed 
 all revolutionary movements. In Bastia, the capital of 
 the island, however, the revolutionists prevailed. Sup- 
 ported by Paoli who had been amnestied, and facilitated 
 by the definite incorporation of Corsica with France 
 (decreed on 30 November, 1789, by the National 
 Assembly of France), revolutionary doctrines spread 
 in the island. A General Assembly met at Orezzo in 
 the autumn of 1790, Paoli being elected president, 
 and Napoleon took a leading part in the debates. 1 In 
 February, 1791, he rejoined his regiment at Auxonne, 
 taking with him his brother Louis, the future King of 
 Holland. He was not liked by his brother officers, 
 partly owing to his foreign extraction, partly to his 
 political views and bitter tongue. In June, 1791, he 
 was promoted to the rank of first lieutenant, and was 
 
 1 " A young artillery officer, extremely thin, very brown, with 
 piercing eyes, a serious expression, and a slight Italian accent." 
 Such is a description of Napoleon at this time. (See Norwood 
 Young, "The Growth of Napoleon," p. 224.)
 
 THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 9 
 
 sent to join the Fourth Regiment, then stationed at 
 Valence, a town which embraced with fervour the re- 
 volutionary cause. Bonaparte was now an avowed 
 supporter of the Republican party. He was a member 
 of the Revolutionary Club where he delivered in- 
 flammatory speeches, and on 14 July, the anniversary 
 of the fall of the Bastille, he and the other officers took 
 an oath of fidelity to the nation and the new Constitu- 
 tion. In September of the same year he again visited 
 Corsica, and found Ajaccio in a state of tumult. He 
 at once took part in the disputes that rent the town, 
 behaved with "unscrupulous violence," and was de- 
 nounced to the authorities in Paris by the Commander 
 of the garrison for instigating the disturbances of the 
 public peace. The French War Office took the view 
 of the Commander, declared that Bonaparte had 
 ignored the orders for his return to his regiment, and 
 struck him off the list of the army. Meanwhile, on 
 i April he had been promoted to second lieutenant- 
 colonel of the 2nd Battalion of Corsican Volunteers. 
 
 Nothing, however, remained for Bonaparte but to 
 get the order of the War Office rescinded, and accord- 
 ingly he left Corsica in May, 1792, and proceeded to 
 Paris. War against the Emperor had been declared 
 on 20 April, and officers would in all probability be 
 required for active service. On his arrival on 28 May, 
 he found that city in a most disturbed condition. " It 
 is flooded with strangers," wrote Napoleon to Joseph, 
 4 'and the discontented are very numerous. The 
 national guard which remained at the Tuileries to
 
 io THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 guard the King has been doubled . . . the news from 
 the frontiers is always the same : it is probable that 
 our troops will retire in order to carry on a defensive 
 war. Desertion is very frequent among the officers. 
 Our position is very critical in every respect." 
 
 He watched with disgust the proceedings of the 
 mob on 20 June. " Why," he said to Bourrienne, 
 " have they let in all that rabble (to the Tuileries 
 gardens), they should sweep off four or five hundred 
 of them with the cannon." On 22 June he wrote to 
 his brother Joseph a description of the scene. In a 
 further letter on 3 July, he expresses his contempt for 
 the revolutionists and for the men at the head of 
 affairs, as " being little worth the trouble one takes to 
 obtain their favour. You know the history of Ajaccio ; 
 that of Paris is exactly the same ; perhaps men here 
 are even smaller, worse, greater calumniators, and 
 more censorious." 
 
 His anxiety for the future of France was much in- 
 creased by the events of io August. On that day he 
 was a witness, from the other side of the Seine, of the 
 disorderly scenes which resulted in the fall of the 
 monarchy. In his opinion the Swiss, under good 
 leadership, would have easily and completely routed 
 their opponents. Unfortunately, however, Louis XVI 
 ordered the troops to cease firing, and that order sealed 
 the fate of the monarchy. On that day Napoleon was 
 himself in some danger, as he " excited many looks of 
 hostility and defiance as being unknown and suspect ". 
 
 In the meantime, on io July, he had been reinstated
 
 THE RISE OF NAPOLEON n 
 
 in the army, and had been given the rank of captain 
 in the Fourth Regiment. His rank as captain was 
 to date from 6 February, 1792, and he received his 
 arrears of pay. He left Paris early in September in 
 company with his sister, Marianne (Elisa), and arrived 
 safely at Ajaccio on 14 September. Early in 1793 
 he took part in an expedition against Sardinia which, 
 owing to no fault of his, proved a failure. Troubles 
 in Corsica forced the Bonaparte family to leave the 
 island, on n June, 1793, and after landing at Toulon 
 to proceed to Marseilles. 
 
 " What a flight it was," writes Captain Bingham, 
 " one exile became Emperor of France and King of 
 Italy ; another reigned first at Naples, then at Madrid ; 
 Lucien became Prince of Canino ; Louis sat on the 
 throne of Holland ; Marianne became Grand Duchess 
 of Tuscany ; Pauline a Princess ; and Abbe Fesch 
 a Cardinal." 1 Jerome and Caroline who were left 
 behind also became famous ; the former was destined 
 to be King of Westphalia, the latter to sit on the 
 throne of Naples. 
 
 Meanwhile, on 13 June, Bonaparte joined his 
 regiment at Nice, but he was soon called upon to take 
 part in the reduction of Avignon, which town with 
 Lyons, Marseilles, and Toulon refused obedience to 
 the Committee of Public Safety. Avignon was soon 
 reduced to submission, and on 28 July, Bonaparte, 
 now with the rank of Capitaine Commandant, pro- 
 
 1 Bingham, " Letters and Despatches of the First Napoleon," 
 Vol. I, p. 30. London, 1884.
 
 12 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 ceeded to Beaucaire. In consequence of a dispute 
 with some merchants whom he met there, he wrote 
 a dialogue called " Le Souper de Beaucaire," in which 
 he gave his reasons for adopting in Corsica Jacobin 
 principles in opposition to Paoli and his adherents. 
 It is evident that his volte-face was due to his con- 
 viction that Jacobin principles and not Corsican 
 patriotism were destined to win the day. By the 
 orders of Salicetti and other deputies then in Pro- 
 vence, the "Souper de Beaucaire" was in August 
 published at the expense of the Treasury. 
 
 Some writers would date Napoleon's rise from the 
 siege of Toulon. It is therefore of some interest to 
 notice the opinion already formed of him by his 
 brother Lucien. " I tell you," the latter wrote to 
 Joseph, on 24 June, 1792, " I have always discerned 
 in Napoleon an ambition not entirely egotistical, but 
 which overcomes his desire for the public good ; I 
 am convinced that in a free State he would be a 
 dangerous man. He seems to me to have a strong 
 inclination to be a tyrant, and I believe he would be 
 one if he were King." 1 
 
 In the autumn of 1793 Bonaparte, who had now 
 definitely decided to find his career not in Corsica but 
 in France, took part in the recapture of Toulon which 
 had handed itself over to the British and Spanish 
 fleets. Dommartin, who commanded the artillery, 
 was wounded on 7 September, and Bonaparte was 
 
 1 Quoted from Norwood Young, "The Growth of Napoleon," 
 pp. 271, 272.
 
 MARIA LETIZIA BONAPARTE, 'MADAME MERE 1 
 
 FROM THE PAINTING BY O7.KARU AT VERSAILLES
 
 THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 13 
 
 appointed in his place. He had now his first oppor- 
 tunity of seeing real warfare, and throughout the 
 operations for the recapture of Toulon he showed 
 consistent activity and courage. 
 
 It was an anxious time for the French officers who 
 upon any failure might fall into disfavour with the 
 ruling Committee of Public Safety in Paris and be 
 guillotined. Bonaparte did not approve of the way 
 in which Carteaux, the French commander, formerly 
 a painter, conducted the operations, and wrote letters 
 full of complaint and criticism to the Committee in 
 Paris. He also asked that an artillery officer of high 
 rank should be sent to Toulon. On 6 November, 
 Dugommier, " a brave veteran," and General du Tell 
 arrived. The former superseded Carteaux as com- 
 mander-in-chief, and the latter took command of the 
 artillery. 
 
 Success followed these changes. Whoever held the 
 fort 1'Aiguillette commanded the harbour. On the 
 night of 1 8 December the French captured the fort, 
 and on 19 December, 1793, the French forces entered 
 Toulon. Though Napoleon had throughout shown 
 undeniable ability, Du Teil and the whole artillery 
 staff must share in the credit of the capture of Toulon. 
 The legend that Bonaparte was in command of the 
 artillery was invented later, and Napoleon's statement 
 at St. Helena that Du Teil "understood nothing 
 about artillery," is not borne out by the testimony of 
 Dugommier who, when reporting on the siege of 
 Toulon, declared that Du Teil's " distinguished services
 
 i 4 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 . . . deserve the recognition of the nation," and that 
 he " showed in all his dispositions much intelligence 
 and military talents". 1 
 
 At the same time it is undeniable that Bonaparte 
 had acquitted himself well, and his fortunes began 
 with the success at Toulon. In the " Moniteur " of 7 
 December, 1793, Dugommier wrote : "Among those 
 who distinguished themselves most, and who aided 
 me to rally the troops and push them forward, are 
 citizens Buona Parte . . . Arena and Cervoni ". At 
 Toulon Bonaparte first met Junot, who attracted his 
 attention by his coolness under fire. He also at that 
 time acquired a lifelong ascendancy over Marmont. 
 
 Lord Acton, in his " Lectures on the French Re- 
 volution," points out that the first event of Bonaparte's 
 career was the spectacle of a British fleet flying before 
 him by the glare of an immense conflagration. He 
 also notices that in their retirement the English only 
 "imperfectly destroyed the French ships they could 
 not at once take away, leaving the materials for the 
 Egyptian expedition ". 2 
 
 The siege of Toulon was thus an event of some 
 importance in Bonaparte's career. 
 
 Napoleon was not long idle. The war between 
 France and Europe was at its height, and French 
 armies were fighting in the Low Countries, on the 
 
 1 Quoted by Norwood Young in " The Growth of Napoleon," 
 p. 326. London, John Murray, 1910. 
 
 2 Acton, "Lectures on The French Revolution," p. 315. 
 London, Macmillan, 1910.
 
 THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 15 
 
 Spanish frontier, and in Italy. In that quarter the 
 French force was divided into the army of the Alps 
 and the army of Italy. The latter army was com- 
 manded by General Dumerbion, a man of no military 
 capacity, and Bonaparte commanded the artillery. 
 He was ordered to draw up a plan of campaign for 
 both armies, but before his plan could be carried out 
 Robespierre had fallen, and the Government, by the 
 advice of Carnot, stopped the operations in Italy and 
 ordered the armies to occupy the chief passes of the 
 Alps. 
 
 During July Bonaparte had been sent by the 
 younger Robespierre on a mission to Genoa to per- 
 suade that city (which was ostensibly neutral) not to 
 allow the coalition to occupy its territory. The Re- 
 volution of Thermidor (27 July, 1794) was followed 
 by the arrest and imprisonment of Bonaparte in Fort 
 Carre near Antibes. The arrest was due to his well- 
 known friendship with the younger Robespierre and 
 generally with the Robespierre clique. However, on 
 20 August, he was set at liberty. His early difficulties 
 were not yet over. Corsica was practically in the 
 hands of the English, and in March, 1795, an expedi- 
 tion, in which were Bonaparte, his brother Louis and 
 Marmont, was fitted out to recover the island. The 
 English fleet, however, who were on the watch, cap- 
 tured two of the French ships and forced the re- 
 mainder to return to France. Bonaparte, who was 
 General of Brigade, then received orders to take 
 command of the artillery of the army of the west, and
 
 i6 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 in May he arrived in Paris. He had no wish to take 
 up his appointment, and an opportune illness enabled 
 him to be on furlough for some months, and conse- 
 quently he was in Paris during most of that eventful 
 year. During the first eight months he lived quietly 
 in Paris corresponding with his relations and watching 
 events. He professed and probably felt sympathy 
 with the revolutionists, and was opposed to all at- 
 tempts at a reaction in favour of the monarchy. On 
 29 May, 1795, in a letter to his brother Joseph he 
 says: "Gentlemen in green neckcloths are arrested 
 here on the suspicion that they are Jesuits. Many 
 are arrested suspected to be emigrants. We begin 
 to perceive that the Royalists are to be feared because 
 they believe themselves to be favoured, and that it is 
 time to end their hopes." 
 
 Joseph, who married Julie, the daughter of a rich 
 merchant, was now living in Marseilles, where he had 
 taken refuge owing to the insurrection in Corsica 
 against France. Napoleon was at this time engaged 
 to the sister of Julie, Eugenie D6sire, who later 
 became the wife of Bernadotte. In June, 1795, 
 Napoleon declares that he intends to have his portrait 
 painted, as such is the wish of Desiree, but at the 
 same time he writes in a melancholy vein. " Life," 
 he says, "is a flimsy dream soon to be over." From 
 his letters it would appear that Paris was assuming 
 its normal aspect and that confidence was returning. 
 
 1 " The Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte 
 with his Brother Joseph," p. 3. London, John Murray, 1855.
 
 THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 17 
 
 In a very interesting letter written on 18 July, he 
 gives a very remarkable account of the life of the 
 Parisians after they had emerged from the Reign of 
 Terror. 
 
 " Luxury, pleasure, and the arts are reviving here 
 in a wonderful manner. Yesterday they acted 
 'Phedre' at the Opera House for the benefit of a 
 former actress ; the crowd was immense from two 
 o'clock in the afternoon, although the prices were 
 trebled. Equipages and dandies are re-appearing. 
 . . . Libraries are formed, and we have lectures 
 on history, chemistry, botany, astronomy, etc. We 
 have heaped together here all that can make life amus- 
 ing and agreeable ; reflection is banished. Women 
 go everywhere ; to the theatres, to the public walks, 
 to the public theatres. ... A woman does not know 
 her value or the extent of her empire till she has spent 
 six months in Paris." 1 
 
 It was quite evident that the reaction had come 
 to stay. The singing of the " Reveil du Peuple " and 
 the " Marseillaise " in the theatres caused disturbances ; 
 there was a feeling of satisfaction that the Constitution 
 was approaching completion. In July he described 
 in a letter the overthrow of the emigres who had 
 landed at Quiberon, and wonders at Pitt's folly in 
 sending 1 2,000 men to attack France. The victory 
 at Quiberon, together with the conclusion of 
 peace with Spain, Naples, and Parma, undoubtedly 
 
 1 " The Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte 
 with his Brother Joseph," p. 6.
 
 i8 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 strengthened the hands of the executive and enabled 
 more attention to be paid to Italy, from which country 
 the Austrians and Sardinians were engaged in at- 
 tempting to expel the French. "We shall soon," 
 wrote Napoleon on i August, 1795, "have some 
 very serious work in Lombardy." In August it 
 seemed not unlikely that Napoleon might be sent to 
 Turkey as General of artillery in order to organize 
 the Sultan's artillery. Napoleon had decided that 
 in that event he would have Joseph appointed Consul. 
 Fortunately for Napoleon he was not sent to Turkey, 
 but remained in Paris watching very carefuily the 
 movements of the French armies and studying the 
 political situation. " The Constitution," he wrote on 6 
 September, "will be accepted unanimously ; the only 
 cause of alarm is the Decree retaining two-thirds of 
 the Convention." 
 
 His view proved to be correct, and it was only 
 through Napoleon's firmness and skill in suppressing 
 the rising of Vendmiaire that the obnoxious portion 
 of the Constitution was retained. 
 
 During September the Constitution had been 
 completed, and Napoleon on 12 September wrote 
 saying that the crisis was over, and that the Republic 
 was secure. Later in the month, however, he became 
 aware that the Constitution with its obnoxious clause 
 retaining two-thirds of the Convention was not going 
 to be accepted quietly. At two in the morning of 6 
 October (the night of 13-14 Vendemiaire) he wrote : 
 " At last all is over. The Convention order the
 
 19 
 
 Section Lepelletier to be disarmed. It repulsed the 
 troops. . . . The Convention appointed Barras to 
 command the military force : the committees ap- 
 pointed me second in command. We made our dis- 
 positions ; the enemy marched to attack us in the 
 Tuileries. We killed many of them they killed 
 thirty of our men, and wounded sixty. We have 
 disarmed the sections and all is quiet. As usual I 
 was not wounded. P.S. Fortune favours me." 1 
 
 Vende"miaire testified to the incapacity of the 
 royalists in France who, instead of biding their time 
 and trusting to the increase of their influence at the 
 annual elections, had blundered into a struggle for 
 which the Thermidorians had prepared. By means 
 of his cannon Napoleon had crushed the Jeunesse 
 Dorte, "had ensured the continuance under legal 
 forms of the Jacobin rule, and destroyed the hopes 
 alike of a royalist restoration and of a moderate 
 republic ". Mallet Du Pan 2 and others had hoped 
 for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. 
 But the time had not yet come for a restoration of 
 the Bourbons, and the upper classes, a large propor- 
 tion of whom were emigres, had not yet realized that 
 the greater part of the French nation would be 
 satisfied with nothing less than the Constitution of 
 1791. It would be impossible to realize the absolute 
 
 1 " The Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte 
 with his Brother Joseph," p. 23. 
 
 2 " Mallet Du Pan and the French Revolution," by Bernard 
 Mallet. London, Longmans, 1902.
 
 20 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 blindness of the emigres, or to comprehend their 
 incapacity to understand the political situation in 
 France, did we not possess in the history of the 
 Bourbon Restoration from 1814 to 1830 evidence 
 that most of the members of that family had even 
 then learned nothing. The emigres were by no 
 means displeased at the failure of Vendmiaire, 
 "because the livery of the ancien regime had not 
 been at once assumed," and because the royalism "of 
 its authors did not possess its sixteen quarterings " ! 
 How could any cause hope to succeed with such 
 supporters ? They were naturally the despair of all 
 moderate and sensible royalists who, like Mallet Du 
 Pan, aimed at the establishment of a constitutional 
 monarchy after the English type. 
 
 The advent of the Directory to power put an end 
 not only to all hopes of a Bourbon restoration, but 
 also to all chance of peace. During its tenure of office, 
 from 1795 to 1799, Napoleon laid the foundation of 
 his supremacy in France. In 1795 he was merely an 
 artillery officer who owed his prominence at Vende"- 
 miaire to the accident of his being in Paris at the time, 
 and to his friendship with Barras. In 1799 he was 
 the most prominent French subject, and sufficiently 
 powerful to drive the Directory from power, and to 
 seize the reins of office. 
 
 CHIEF DATES 
 
 Birth of Napoleon 15 August, 1769. 
 
 At school at Autun, and at Brienne . . . .1779. 
 At the military school in Paris 1784.
 
 THE RISE OF NAPOLEON 21 
 
 Sub-lieutenant in the regiment of La Fere . . . 1785. 
 In Corsica ......... 1786. 
 
 Visits Paris ......... 1787. 
 
 In Corsica and at Auxonne ...... 1788. 
 
 Outbreak of the French Revolution . . . .1789. 
 
 In Corsica .... August, 1789 to February, 1791. 
 
 At Auxonne .... February to June, 1791. 
 
 At Valence (first lieutenant) . . June to September, 1791. 
 In Corsica .... September, 1791 to May, 1792. 
 
 In Paris May to September, 1792. 
 
 Expedition to Sardinia . . . . . . .1793. 
 
 The Bonaparte family leave Corsica .... 1793. 
 
 The Siege of Toulon ....... 1793. 
 
 With the Army in Italy ...... 1794. 
 
 The Revolution of Thermidor .... July, 1794. 
 
 Vendemiaire ........ 1795.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 THE ITALIAN AND EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS, 1796-1799 
 
 Bonaparte commands the army in Italy His appearance 
 Justification of his appointment His victories The Preliminaries 
 of Leoben The Franco-Spanish Alliance The Papacy The 
 Cisalpine Republic Fructidor Peace of Campo Formio Bona- 
 parte at Rastadt In Paris The Egyptian Expedition The 
 Battle of the Nile Acre Bonaparte's return to France The 
 political situation, 1799. 
 
 T 7ENDEMIAIRE was destined to mark an epoch 
 * not merely in the history of France but also in 
 the history of Europe. The man who defeated the 
 insurgents was Bonaparte, " through whose genius the 
 Revolution was to subjugate the continent ". There is 
 no doubt that owing to his conduct in the conflict of 
 Vende"miaire Bonaparte obtained the Italian command. 
 He had by his conduct secured the favourable notice of 
 Carnot, he was supported by Barras, and before the 
 end of 1795 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of 
 the Interior. During the winter he took the greatest 
 possible interest in the Italian army, and never ceased 
 his efforts to secure the appointment of Commander- 
 in-Chief of the army of Italy. 
 
 On 2 March, 1796, when in his 27th year, 
 
 32
 
 THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 23 
 
 he received that appointment. On 9 March he 
 married Josephine, and on 27 March he arrived at 
 Nice, the head-quarters of the French army of Italy. 
 He had now the opportunity which he had been wait- 
 ing for, and the post which enabled him to show the 
 superiority of his qualifications to those of his contem- 
 poraries. 
 
 In appointing him to the command in Italy the 
 Directors were taking a considerable risk. But his 
 personality had impressed many of the leading men 
 in Paris ; his action during the events of Vendmiaire 
 had attracted attention ; he had already some acquain- 
 tance with the Italian theatre of war. He was con- 
 sequently in a position to push forward his demand 
 for the command of the army in Italy. Moreover, 
 he was familiar with the Italian language, and in this 
 respect was better suited than were such men as 
 Kellermann or Davoust for the appointment. He 
 was indeed better qualified for the post than any of 
 his contemporaries, for in addition to his acquaintance 
 with Italian he had received the best military educa- 
 tion ; he had gained valuable experience at the siege 
 of Toulon, and in 1794 he had drawn up for the 
 Italian campaign plans which would have proved 
 successful had Carnot not ordered a general retire- 
 ment. As it was, his plans were carried out under 
 his own direction in 1796. 
 
 His Corsican origin was in itself an advantage, 
 for "the Corsicans," we are told, "had a widespread 
 reputation for being persons of rare qualities, amongst
 
 24 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 whom a prodigy might easily be found V Moreover, 
 his Corsican rearing led him to treat his soldiers as 
 personal friends, and in this way he inspired feelings 
 of devotion to himself. His personal influence over 
 his soldiers never lessened. It was, moreover, an im- 
 mense advantage to be far removed from Paris. His 
 natural promptitude and habit of making rapid de- 
 cisions thus had full play, and when directions arrived 
 from Paris the matter treated of in those directions 
 had already been settled by Bonaparte in his own way. 
 He alone of the French generals secured perfect 
 freedom of action, which in itself was an unspeakable 
 advantage when opposing the generals of continental 
 powers, none of whom could have any freedom of 
 action. 
 
 Then Bonaparte's youth was another advantage. 
 In his early campaigns he was opposed by men much 
 older than himself, such as Beaulieu, Wurmser, and 
 Alvinzi men who could not easily adapt themselves 
 to new conditions of warfare. 
 
 His career falls naturally into two periods. The 
 first period begins with his arrival at Nice and ends 
 with the Treaty of Tilsit in 1 807. During that period 
 Napoleon effected a most useful work. He initiated 
 the growth of Italian unity, and he cleared the ground 
 for the firm establishment of the feeling of nationality 
 in Germany. That period saw his famous Italian cam- 
 paign, his Egyptian expedition, the Marengo, Auster- 
 
 1 Norwood Young, "The Growth of Napoleon," p. 359, 
 London, John Murray.
 
 NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC 
 
 FROM THE PAINTING By H. E. P. PHILIPHOTEAUX AT VERSAILLES
 
 THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 25 
 
 litz, Jena, and Friedland campaigns. It saw the 
 establishment of the French power in Italy, it saw 
 the power of the French Empire at its height. 
 
 From the Treaty of Tilsit may be dated the 
 second period in Napoleon's career, a period which 
 witnessed his superhuman efforts to ruin Great 
 Britain, by the stern enforcement of the continental 
 system. The attempted execution of this project 
 involved him in the Spanish and Russian Wars, and 
 in the War of Liberation which finally effected his 
 overthrow. 
 
 The description of Bonaparte given by Mr. Nor- 
 wood Young in " The Growth of Napoleon," is admir- 
 able. In 1796 "he measured 5 feet 5f inches, and 
 was very thin, with small hands and feet. His hands 
 were always in a clean and cared-for condition ; they 
 were his one vanity. He had a sickly, pale olive 
 complexion. His lank, chestnut hair he allowed, fol- 
 lowing a not unusual custom in the Republican Army, 
 to grow so long that it reached his shoulders. It was 
 this frail appearance, so unwarlike, so far removed 
 from the soldier type, that earned him the title of 
 petit caporal, and aided him in assuming the character 
 of an abnormal being." 1 
 
 Much of his success in the Italian campaign was 
 by some of his leading opponents in 1796 ascribed to 
 his Corsican blood. 
 
 The Archduke Ferdinand, it is said, had declared 
 that Bonaparte being a Corsican was enterprising and 
 
 1 Norwood Young, " The Growth of Napoleon," p. 357.
 
 26 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 likely to attack, while Colli's chief of staff, Costa de 
 Beaurepaire, wrote : " General Bonaparte, a creature 
 of Barras, is not known for any stirring achievement ; 
 but he is regarded as a profound theorist and a man 
 of genius ". l 
 
 On his arrival at Nice he found that all was ready 
 for an advance. Scherer's victory at Loano in 1794 
 had enabled the French to occupy a position suitable 
 as the starting-point of a fresh campaign. 
 
 The French army of Italy was at that time the 
 best in Europe, but when Napoleon reached Nice it 
 was in a dejected, half-starved condition. For two 
 years it had been campaigning on the outskirts of 
 Northern Italy and had become discontented and un- 
 disciplined. Bonaparte at once established his in- 
 fluence over them by the issue of a stirring address. 
 " Soldiers, you are ill-fed and almost naked. The 
 Government owes you much but can do nothing for 
 you. Your patience, your courage do you honour, 
 but bring you neither advantage nor glory. I in- 
 tend to lead you to the most fertile plains in the 
 world. Rich provinces, great cities will be in your 
 power. There you will find honour and glory and 
 wealth. Soldiers of the Army of Italy, will you be 
 found wanting in courage and constancy ? " 
 
 On arriving at Nice Bonaparte found opposed to 
 him the Austrian and Sardinian armies. On 12 April 
 he defeated the Austrians in the battle of Montenotte, 
 which has been described as a necessary operation 
 
 1 Norwood Young, " The Growth of Napoleon," p. 354.
 
 THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 27 
 
 but not a serious battle. According to an enthusi- 
 astic admirer of Bonaparte this was " the first in a 
 series of eighteen great pitched battles that he won 
 before the peace of Campo Formio in 1797, and the 
 names of which still reflect his early glory ". a 
 
 By his victory at Montenotte Bonaparte prevented 
 the Austrians from joining their Sardinian allies. 
 " My title of nobility," Bonaparte declared later, 
 " dates from the battle of Montenotte. On the follow- 
 ing day, 13 April, the Austrians again suffered defeat 
 at Milesimo, and on the i5th an Austrian division, 
 unaware that on the previous day the Austrian 
 forces had been defeated and driven from Dego, re- 
 occupied the village only to suffer a severe defeat at 
 the hands of Bonaparte. 
 
 All danger of a union of the Austrian and Sar- 
 dinian armies was now removed, and Bonaparte was 
 enabled, after a struggle at Mondovi, to force the 
 court of Turin to sign the armistice of Cherasco. 
 When the Piedmontese officers expressed surprise at 
 Bonaparte's impatience to receive the treaty duly 
 signed from the Sardinian Government, the conqueror 
 replied, " I may often lose a battle, but I shall never 
 lose a minute". Savoy and Nice were ceded to 
 France, the fortresses of Alessandria, Tortona, and 
 Coni were placed in the hands of the French, and 
 other fortresses were destroyed. Bonaparte had 
 now secured " the keys of the Alps," and he was 
 
 1 Kielland, " Napoleon's Men and Methods, "p. 19. London, 
 A. Owen & Co., 1909.
 
 28 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 able to concentrate his efforts upon the Austrian 
 army. 
 
 The Milanese were now open to the French attack, 
 and on 10 May the passage of the Adda at Lodi 
 was effected. Lodi, in Bonaparte's own words on the 
 evening of the battle, was not much of an affair ; later 
 in his career, however, he used both it and Montenotte 
 as a basis of the Napoleonic legend. The "as- 
 tonishing passage of the bridge of Lodi," became the 
 subject for painters. Bonaparte, by his personal 
 bravery on 10 May, had roused the enthusiasm of 
 the army which saluted him as le petit caporal. 
 
 Lodi was certainly an epoch in the life of Bona- 
 parte. Frequently during the previous years he had 
 indulged in ambitious hopes and fantastic dreams. 
 Before Vend^miaire his ambition had been noted, and 
 indeed during the early years of the Revolution he 
 had not unfrequently shown that his expectations 
 were by no means of a moderate order. 
 
 At St. Helena, however, he said to Las Cases : 
 " Vendemiaire and even Montenotte did not lead me 
 to regard myself a man out of the ordinary. It was 
 only after Lodi that the idea came to me that I might, 
 after all, indeed become a decisive actor on the 
 political stage. Then arose the first gleam of high 
 ambition." The success at Lodi strengthened Bona- 
 parte's position enormously. He became a popular 
 hero in Paris, and was henceforward free from all 
 interference on the part of the Directors, who no 
 longer dare oppose him.
 
 THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 29 
 
 On 15 May he entered Milan, and wrote to his 
 brother Joseph that the French were masters of all 
 Lombardy. Then followed the severe and prolonged 
 struggle over the famous "quadrilateral," ending with 
 the surrender of Mantua by the veteran Austrian 
 General Wurmser, and the supremacy of the French 
 in Northern Italy. 
 
 After occupying Milan Bonaparte issued a pro- 
 clamation for the purpose of inspiring the Italians with 
 ideas of liberty. He declared that his object was "to 
 restore the capitol ; to replace there the statues of the 
 heroes who have rendered it immortal ; to rouse the 
 Romans from centuries of slavery such will be the 
 fruit of our victories ; they will form an era in history ; 
 to you will belong the glory of having changed the 
 most beautiful part of Europe ". 
 
 This declaration did not prevent him from wring- 
 ing 20,000,000 francs from the Italians, or from de- 
 stroying Brescia. The French troops entered Verona ; 
 Beaulieu, the Austrian commander, retired into the 
 Tyrol, and Bonaparte began his long series of attempts 
 to capture the well-fortified town of Mantua. 
 
 Wurmser, Beaulieu's successor, entered Mantua 
 on i August, but was defeated at Lonato on 3 August 
 and at Castiglione on 5 August, and retired into the 
 Tyrol. In September Wurmser again entered 
 Mantua in order to reinforce the garrison, but he 
 himself was besieged. In November Alvinzi en- 
 deavoured to raise the siege. But though checked 
 on 12 November at Caldiero Bonaparte proved vie-
 
 30 
 
 torious in the three days' battle at Arcola (15-17 
 Nov.) and Alvinzi fell back to the mountains. For 
 some two months no serious operation was under- 
 taken and both French and Austrians received rein- 
 forcements. 
 
 On 14 January, 1797, however, an Austrian 
 army under Alvinzi, advancing down the Adige, was 
 defeated by Bonaparte, who on 16 January crushed a 
 column under Provera which had penetrated to the 
 suburbs of Mantua. 
 
 On 2 February, 1797, Mantua itself capitulated, 
 and the era of Hapsburg predominance in Italy came 
 to an end. From this time onwards the desire for 
 freedom and independence steadily developed in Italy. 
 
 During the Italian campaign many of those who 
 became celebrated French generals leaped into pro- 
 minence. Lannes, Berthier, Oudinot, Massna, and 
 others distinguished themselves and showed the pos- 
 session of military qualities which was at once recog- 
 nized by the young Bonaparte. His ambitious 
 schemes had now taken a concrete form, and he was 
 resolved to become the first man in France. 
 
 On 7 April, 1797, the advance guard of the 
 French arrny arrived at Leoben. The Austrians 
 were completely outgeneralled, and after one more de- 
 feat under the very walls of the Austrian capital itself 
 Austria would be at the mercy of the French con- 
 queror. In Vienna itself panic reigned, and, in spite 
 of the brave words of Thugut, the party in favour of 
 peace gained the day.
 
 31 
 
 Anxiety, too, for the welfare of the Court of 
 Naples rendered Francis eager to end the war ; the 
 new Tsar, Paul I, showed no desire to oppose the 
 French, and by its withdrawal from the Mediter- 
 ranean the English fleet could no longer impede 
 French operations in Italy. Preliminaries were there- 
 fore signed at Leoben on 18 April, but Thugut suc- 
 ceeded in postponing the conclusion of a definite 
 peace. 
 
 Various circumstances had contributed to this 
 striking success on the part of the young general. 
 Germany was still far from being united in opposition 
 to the French. Frederick William 1 1 of Prussia had 
 on 5 August, 1796, signed a secret supplement to the 
 Treaty of Basel, while Baden, Wurtemberg, and 
 Bavaria anticipating in a way the events of 1806, when 
 the Confederation of the Rhine was formed, had entered 
 into negotiations with the Directory. 
 
 Moreover, the action of Spain had facilitated in a 
 most striking fashion Bonaparte's conquest of Lom- 
 bardy. On 10 August, 1796, Charles IV, under the 
 influence of his minister Godoy, had at San Ildefonso 
 signed an offensive and defensive alliance with the 
 French Republic, and the Spanish fleet effected a 
 junction with the French fleet at Toulon. Spain had 
 declared war upon Great Britain on 9 October, 1796, 
 and the same month Sir John Jervis, finding himself 
 outnumbered, was forced to withdraw from Corsica 
 and the Mediterranean. No British fleet appeared 
 again in that sea for some eighteen months, in spite
 
 32 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 of the defeat of the Spanish fleet by Jervis in the 
 battle of St. Vincent on 14 February, 1797. 
 
 Moreover, before invading the Tyrol Bonaparte 
 had taken steps to secure his position in Central as 
 well as in Northern Italy. In 1796 he had occu- 
 pied the Legations of Ferrara and Bologna, and early 
 in 1797 he had advanced on Rome and forced Pius 
 VI to sign on 19 February the Treaty of Tolentino. 
 
 During 1796 he had fully realized the immense 
 power wielded by the Papacy, and had ignored the 
 orders of the Directory to destroy the Pope's authority. 
 At the same time while he was asserting that in order 
 to quiet the " alarmed consciences of many nations," 
 he was anxious to become the saviour far more than 
 the destroyer of the " Holy See," he was making pre- 
 parations to secure the all-important seaport of Ancona. 
 His policy to the Papacy at this period was in reality 
 that of an opportunist. He was resolved that the 
 Pope should realize that better terms would be ob- 
 tained from him than from the Directors. At the 
 same time he did not hesitate to impose upon " the 
 old fox," as in a private letter he styled the Pope, the 
 humiliating Treaty of Tolentino (19 February, 1797), 
 which insisted upon the payment of a heavy fine, and 
 the removal to Paris from Rome of one hundred works 
 of art. 
 
 The importance, however, of gaining over to his 
 side the clerical influence in Italy was not lost upon 
 Bonaparte, who in setting up a republican form of 
 government in Northern Italy declared that "the
 
 THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 33 
 
 morality of the Gospel is that of equality," and hence- 
 forth it is most favourable "to the republican govern- 
 ment" which he then imposed upon the Italians. In 
 following this policy Bonaparte was acting independ- 
 ently of the Directors, who would have preferred the de- 
 struction of the Papacy and the abolition of religion. 
 
 The success which attended Napoleon's arms had 
 thus completely outweighed the effects of the retreat 
 of Moreau from Southern Germany, necessitated by 
 the failure of Jourdan to hold his own against the 
 Archduke Charles, the failure of Hoche to land a 
 force in Ireland in December, 1796, and the arrival 
 in Portugal of a British force under Sir Charles 
 Stuart. 
 
 The cessation of hostilities with Austria, which 
 followed the negotiations at Leoben, left Bonaparte free 
 to complete the subjugation of Northern Italy. On 
 1 6 May Venice was occupied, the ancient Government 
 of Genoa was dissolved, and on 14 June the Ligurian 
 Republic was set up. 
 
 On 9 July the Cisalpine Republic, consisting of 
 the Northern Italian States, with the exception of 
 Piedmont, was formed and the Ionian Islands were 
 annexed to France. It only remained to convert the 
 Preliminaries of Leoben into a permanent peace. 
 Those Preliminaries, as the Austrian Court knew, had 
 been signed by Bonaparte without the authorization 
 of the Directory, then involved in a political and 
 religious crisis which threatened to result in its over- 
 throw. 
 
 3
 
 34 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Should the fall of the Directory take place it 
 seemed as if a reaction against its foreign as well as 
 its home policy would assert itself, and that con- 
 sequently Austria might secure more advantageous 
 terms from a new French Government whose policy 
 was opposed to that of its predecessor. That Thugut's 
 expectations were not groundless is apparent from 
 a consideration of the state of parties in France. 
 
 During 1796 and indeed till September, 1 797, when 
 the Revolution of Fructidor took place, there had been 
 little religious persecution. The Directors were far 
 more interested in foreign than in domestic matters, 
 and the Constitution of the year III apparently re- 
 moved all religious difficulties. The laws against 
 emigrants and refractory priests remained to a great 
 extent in abeyance, and it is asserted that up to 
 Fructidor only twenty priests suffered death under the 
 Directory. The Pope recommended with certain re- 
 servations obedience to the civil power, many priests 
 returned, and the churches were crowded. It is said 
 that by the summer of 1797 the old religious services 
 were conducted in 3 8,000 parishes. A crisis, however, 
 occurred a few months after the elections of 1797. 
 
 In May, 1797, elections to the Directorate and 
 Legislative Body took place. These elections gave 
 the country an opportunity of showing its dissatisfac- 
 tion with the majority of the Directors, and its hatred 
 of all who had been concerned with the Reign of 
 Terror. Of the Legislative Body only eleven out of 
 the 216 retiring members, most of whom stood again,
 
 THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 35 
 
 were elected, their places being taken by men of 
 moderate or royalist opinions. The reactionary or 
 Clichian party so called because its members met in 
 the Rue de Clichy was composed of able men who 
 were united in desiring to expel from power all who 
 had been concerned with the Reign of Terror, and in 
 wishing to carry out a peace policy abroad. The 
 party, however, was not united with regard to the future 
 government of France. Some of its members wished 
 to secure the return of the Bourbons, and the re-estab- 
 lishment of the ancien regime, while others advocated 
 a constitutional monarchy of the English type. But 
 the fact that the Bourbons would not accept the Con- 
 stitution of 1791 weakened the Clichian party, and at 
 the same time the desire for a universal peace was not 
 shared by the army or by Bonaparte. 
 
 The news of the signature of the Preliminaries of 
 Leoben was received with great satisfaction in Paris, 
 and the Directors at once sent Hoche to Holland to 
 prepare for the invasion of England. The financial 
 distress in France had been considerably relieved by 
 the fact that the large French armies were living at 
 the expense of other countries, while the money sent 
 back by the French generals came at a most opportune 
 time. 
 
 Moreover, three Directors, Barras, Reubell, and 
 Larevelliere, had resolved to spare no efforts to keep 
 themselves in power. In the early autumn they 
 appealed to Bonaparte who sent Augereau to Paris. 
 On 4 September, with 2000 soldiers, he carried out the
 
 36 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Revolution of 8 Fructidor. The reactionary move- 
 ment was suppressed with severity, and the Directory 
 was maintained in power for another two years. 
 Nevertheless though the Directory, owing to Bona- 
 parte's genius and to the efficiency of the French 
 armies, had overthrown the Austrians and gained 
 supremacy in Italy, failure attended its efforts to sub- 
 jugate Great Britain. Within a week of the signature, 
 on 17 October, of the Peace of Campo Formio, the 
 French plans for the invasion of England had already 
 been entirely overthrown, and England was saved from 
 immediate attack by the defeat of the Dutch fleet on 
 ii October, 1797, at the battle of Camperdown. 
 
 The Peace of Campo Formio revealed to the world 
 Bonaparte's determination to secure the supremacy of 
 France in the Mediterranean, and has an especial 
 importance in that he was now enabled to define his 
 Eastern ambitions. The Austrians might have Venice 
 so long as France secured the Adige boundary for the 
 Cisalpine Republic, and the Rhine boundary together 
 with the Ionian Islands. 
 
 The conquest of Italy was now virtually complete, 
 and the way prepared for the future expansion of 
 France in the Levant. Bonaparte's brilliant Italian 
 campaign had a far-reaching importance for Italy no 
 less than for France. The old order was overthrown 
 in Italy, and was followed by a slow though steady 
 growth of the feeling of nationality. Thus the 
 campaigns of 1796-7 constitute an epoch in the history 
 of Italian unity. None the less do those campaigns
 
 THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 37 
 
 mark an epoch in the history of France. The victories 
 won proved to be a distinct step in Napoleon's rise to 
 supremacy in France, and form " the starting-point 
 of a series of campaigns prompted by personal ambition 
 and a desire for national aggrandizement". 1 
 
 Moreover, the predominance of military instincts 
 over democratic theories was now assured. The 
 army had illustrated its political power in the events 
 of Fructidor. Henceforward its predominance be- 
 came unmistakable. The age of revolutionary princi- 
 ples was over, and a policy of aggression towards 
 foreign countries at once begins. As head of the 
 victorious army Bonaparte was now all-powerful, and 
 his ambitious policy was shortly revealed to an aston- 
 ished and unprepared world. 
 
 The years 1796 and 1797 were indeed of import- 
 ance to Europe no less than to Bonaparte. Europe 
 suddenly realized that in Bonaparte she had to deal 
 with a man whose military genius was only equalled 
 by his political sagacity no less than by his ambition. 
 
 From April till 30 October, 1797, Bonaparte and 
 Josephine lived in the villa of Passeriano near Udine. 
 Probably these months constitute the happiest period 
 in Napoleon's life. During that period his brother 
 Joseph was acting as French ambassador in Rome 
 and was engaged in continual negotiations with the 
 Pope. Bonaparte watched the intrigues of the Papacy 
 and the Court of Naples with ill-concealed impatience. 
 " I cannot believe it," he wrote on 29 September, 
 1 "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. VIII, p. 593.
 
 38 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 "though I have perceived for some time a sort of 
 coalition between the courts of Naples and Rome, 
 and even of Florence. It is the alliance of the rats 
 against the cat." 
 
 Had the Pope happened to die at this juncture it 
 appears certain that Bonaparte would have done all 
 he could to prevent the election of a successor. To 
 Bonaparte France was the first nation in the world, 
 and therefore he felt justified in adopting what his 
 enemies might consider a somewhat arrogant tone in 
 dealing with things spiritual as well as with things 
 temporal. 
 
 On 16 November, 1797, Bonaparte, who had been 
 in Milan since 30 October, set out from Milan for 
 Rastadt where the diplomatists of Germany were 
 gathered together to consider the new situation which 
 had arisen. The political problems of Germany, since 
 the conquest of the Netherlands and of the Milanese, 
 and the extension of France to the Rhine, had become 
 for the first time of some interest to the conqueror 
 of Italy. On his journey by way of Mont Cenis, 
 Geneva, and Basle he was treated with the greatest 
 respect. At Basle indeed the chief men of the city 
 made special efforts to win his favour, and Bonaparte 
 took the opportunity of congratulating them and the 
 Genevans upon their democratic feelings. He ar- 
 rived at Rastadt on the evening of 25 November, 
 and his arrival created no little stir. The members 
 of the peace deputation showed great anxiety to see 
 the conqueror of Italy, and Mr. Fisher relates how
 
 THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 39 
 
 they described " his yellow complexion, his thin body, 
 his lively gestures, and profound glance, his dress rich 
 but careless, his bearing courteous but unrestrained by 
 diplomatic forms". 1 
 
 During his stay at Rastadt he gained much know- 
 ledge of Germans and German politics. He realized 
 that French interest lay in the secularization of the 
 ecclesiastical territories and in winning over the 
 middle German states, which always tended to re- 
 gard Austria and Prussia with jealousy. To the en- 
 voys of the free towns to whom he expatiated on his 
 love of liberty he was especially civil, and he openly 
 expressed his contempt for Austria, and "his disgust 
 at the delay of the Austrian plenipotentiaries to appear 
 at the congress ". His avowed object in his conver- 
 sations was to show that Austria was the real enemy 
 of the Reich. 
 
 On 2 December, after arranging with the Austrian 
 envoy, Cobenzel, a military convention with regard to 
 Mainz and Venice, Bonaparte left Rastadt for Paris. 
 There he received the well-deserved "homage of an 
 enraptured people ". The Italian campaign of 1796-7 
 was of immense importance to Europe. It proved 
 the starting-point of the national movement in Italy. 
 From this time the Italians began to develop a crav- 
 ing for unity, and a feeling for nationality. For 
 France Bonaparte's successes marked "the definite 
 
 Wisher, "Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany," p. 32. 
 Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1903.
 
 40 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 ascendancy of military instincts over the democratic 
 theories of the Revolution V 
 
 Bonaparte reached Paris on 5 December, and 
 though the populace received him with acclamation 
 the Directors eyed him with distrust which found 
 some justification in a speech in which the young 
 conqueror hinted that he was uncertain whether he 
 should make a revolution in France or devote his 
 attention to the liberation of Greece. He was, how- 
 ever, soon appointed to the command of what was 
 termed the Army of England (General en chef de 
 l'arme d'Angleterre), and turned his thoughts to the 
 destruction of England's maritime power. England's 
 power in his opinion could be destroyed by direct in- 
 vasion, or by an attack through Egypt upon India, 
 or by a systematic attack upon her commerce as was 
 afterwards carried out by the continental system. 
 At this time he ostensibly spent most of February, 
 1798, in considering the possibility of an invasion of 
 England, the prospect of which roused the patriotic 
 feelings of the English nation, 2 but before the end of 
 
 1 " Cambridge Modern History," Vol. VIII, p. 593. 
 
 2 Over twenty of the Kent clergy raised regiments in their 
 parishes and placed themselves in command. This movement 
 was organized by the Hon. and Rev. Lord George Murray then in 
 charge of the Parish of Hunton near Maidstone. In April the 
 Archbishop of Canterbury issued a circular letter to the clergy of 
 his diocese in which he mentioned that the country was expecting 
 the appearance of a desperate and malignant enemy. He added 
 that if the "enemy set his foot upon our shores our hand with that 
 of every man must, in every way, be against those who come for
 
 THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 41 
 
 the month he reported against such a project and re- 
 commended the seizure of the mouths of the Rhine 
 and the Elbe, or an expedition to the Levant. The 
 adoption of the last suggestion would, he believed, not 
 only ruin England's commerce with the East Indies, 
 but would permanently destroy England's trade in the 
 Mediterranean, and would force her to relinquish her 
 hold upon India. For some months he had pondered 
 over his "Oriental plan" which in 1798 seemed to 
 him capable of realization. In 1798 England had 
 practically withdrawn from the Mediterranean. She 
 had relinquished her hold on Corsica, and though she 
 possessed Gibraltar had taken no steps to prevent the 
 Mediterranean from becoming a French lake. In 
 spite of its victories of St. Vincent and Camperdown, 
 the British fleet was in a very unsatisfactory condition, 
 as shown by the mutinies at the Nore and Spithead. 
 The fleets of Spain and Holland could now be united 
 with the French fleet, and this union would threaten 
 the British supremacy of the high seas. 
 
 The Peace of Campo Formio had given the French 
 the Ionian Islands of great value to France now that 
 she was supreme in Italy. The commandant of the 
 Knights of St. John at Malta had been won over by 
 bribery, while in India Tippoo Sahib of Mysore was 
 a French ally. It would seem that it only required 
 the French conquest of Egypt to bring to an end the 
 British dominion in India. 
 
 purposes of rapine and desolation, the avowed champions of 
 Anarchy and Irreligion, defying the Living God ".
 
 42 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 The Egyptian expedition has been described as 
 "little more than a dramatic interlude in Napoleon's 
 career ". At the same time it must be remembered that 
 though it proved to be a useful interval during which 
 the Directory rapidly collapsed, the Egyptian expedi- 
 tion had several claims to attention. In the first place, 
 during the months which were occupied by that ex- 
 pedition, it became clearly apparent that in religious 
 matters Bonaparte was an opportunist. During the 
 months after the settlement of peace at Leoben he 
 held a court at Milan, and while there fully realized 
 the importance of the Church as a great governing 
 power. He checked in Milan the excesses of the 
 Italian Jacobins who in 1796 had dragged the statue 
 of St. Ambrose through the streets, and who among 
 other profanities had turned several churches into 
 Jacobin clubs. Against these excesses a reaction had 
 set in which found a supporter in Bonaparte. He 
 won over many Italian bishops to his side, and at the 
 same time endeavoured to preserve a level balance 
 in religious matters. 
 
 When, however, he was in Egypt he endeavoured 
 to win over the Moslems by declaring that the French 
 had overthrown the Pope and the Knights of Malta. 
 Moreover, while in the East he did not hesitate to 
 try to win over the Christians of the Lebanon by 
 specious words. But all chance of gaining the de- 
 finite support of these Christians was lost as soon as 
 Sir Sidney Smith had astutely caused copies of Bona- 
 parte's Moslem proclamations, when he was in Egypt,
 
 THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 43 
 
 to be distributed among the inhabitants of the 
 Lebanon. 
 
 The Egyptian expedition has been compared to 
 the Russian campaign of 1812. Both were failures, 
 and in both cases Bonaparte left his army in diffi- 
 culties. But his secret departure from Egypt marked 
 an important stage in his rise to supreme power, 
 while his return from Smorgoni in 1812 in no sense 
 contributed to any restoration of his power. In many 
 respects, however, the Egyptian campaign is interest- 
 ing. For the first time the world was informed of 
 Bonaparte's ambitious but vague Eastern schemes. 
 Further, the occupation of Egypt by Frenchmen had 
 been suggested to Louis XIV, and though Bona- 
 parte's expedition ended in failure the interest of 
 France in Egypt continued all through the nine- 
 teenth century, till it received a severe check in 
 1882. 
 
 Further, the Egyptian expedition drew attention 
 to the military qualities not only of Klber and Desaix 
 but also of Junot, Rapp, Lannes, and Davoust. The 
 Egyptian expedition, too, brought home to Bonaparte 
 the absolute necessity for a powerful fleet. But Tra- 
 falgar ruined all chance of defeating the English at 
 sea, and his schemes were henceforth perpetually 
 checked by the want of a fleet. 
 
 Bonaparte's preparations for the Egyptian ex- 
 pedition were most elaborate. Early in 1798 he had 
 engaged several Arab interpreters ; he had arranged 
 for a number of the learned members of the lately
 
 44 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 founded Institute of France to accompany him ; for 
 the equipment of the expedition he had wrung 
 money from the Pope and the citizens of Rome. 
 Difficulties of all sorts financial and material had 
 been overcome, and on 19 May the fleet, composed 
 of contingents from Corsica, Genoa, Marseilles, and 
 Civita Vecchia, set sail. 
 
 The ostensible object of this expedition was to 
 drive the English as far as possible from their pos- 
 sessions in the Red Sea and the East, to cut through 
 the Suez Canal, to take possession of Egypt and the 
 Red Sea, to ameliorate the lot of the inhabitants of 
 Egypt, and to keep on good terms with the Turks. 
 Moreover, Napoleon had resolved to seize Malta, 
 and with its capture and with the establishment of 
 the French in Egypt an overwhelming blow, it was 
 believed, would have been struck at England's power 
 not only in the Mediterranean but also in Egypt and 
 the East. Admiral Brueys, however, was keenly 
 alive to the risks run by his unwieldy fleet, but for a 
 time those fears were falsified. 
 
 On 19 May Bonaparte wrote from on board 
 " 1'Orient," then at Toulon, that he was just setting sail, 
 and on the 25th that they were just about to pass Bastia, 
 adding that he had not been " sick on the open sea". 
 In his letters on the voyage he urges Joseph to be 
 kind to his (Bonaparte's) wife, Josephine, and these 
 directions, in view of what happened in later years, 
 have a pathetic ring about them. Malta, which owing 
 to the cowardice of the Grand Master the French
 
 THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 45 
 
 occupied after a harmless cannonade of ten days, is, 
 he declares, the strongest place in Europe. 
 
 By good luck the fleet escaped the notice of Nelson 
 who was cruising off Crete and reached Alexandria 
 in safety. That city was taken, the battle of the 
 Pyramids was fought and won on July 21, and Cairo 
 was occupied on 23 July. " Egypt," wrote Bonaparte 
 on 25 July, " is the richest country in the world for 
 wheat, rice, pulse, and meal." In the same letter he 
 indicates a feeling of deep distress with regard to the 
 conduct of Josephine during his absence. " I have," 
 he writes, " much domestic distress," and he adds the 
 remarkable statements that he " may be in France in 
 two months, that he intends on arriving in France 
 to shut himself up in a villa for the winter, that he is 
 tired of human nature, that greatness fatigues him, 
 that at 29 glory has become flat ". 
 
 There seems little doubt that his suspicions with 
 regard to Josephine occupied and disturbed his 
 mind during the whole of the Egyptian campaign. 
 
 Nelson's victory, known as the battle of the Nile, 
 on 1-2 August, had, however, destroyed the French 
 fleet and shut up Bonaparte and his army in Egypt. 
 Full of resource, however, Bonaparte resolved to con- 
 vert Egypt into a firm base and to continue his 
 efforts to rouse malcontents, such as Tippoo Sahib 
 in India, to rise against the English. In order to 
 overthrow a Turkish army then advancing by land 
 he proceeded to Palestine, but Sidney Smith's defence 
 of Acre, followed later by the lack of food and water,
 
 46 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 and by an outbreak of plague, caused the retreat of 
 the French army to Egypt. " The shadow of such 
 deeds as the massacre at Jaffa . . . and the charge of 
 having given opium to a large number of pest-stricken 
 French soldiers . . . was," it is said, "cast over the 
 figure of the young General." l In Egypt the Turkish 
 fleet had disembarked 1000 troops, who were, however, 
 overthrown at the battle of Aboukir on 21 July. 
 
 At St. Helena Napoleon recognized the decisive 
 character of the siege of Acre. " Without the Eng- 
 lish filibuster and the French emigrants who directed 
 the Turkish artillery, and who with the plague made 
 me raise the siege, I would," he declared, " have 
 conquered half Asia and come back upon Europe to 
 seek the thrones of France and Italy." 1 On his re- 
 turn to Egypt Bonaparte, it is believed, received news 
 from France which indicated that the "pear was ripe". 
 On 2 August Sir Sidney Smith sent him a packet 
 of papers, and he at once decided to return to France 
 with the utmost speed leaving his army in Egypt 
 under K16ber. 
 
 On 23 August he sailed with Marmont, Lannes, 
 and Berthier from Alexandria in a small frigate the 
 " Muiron" and landed at St. Raphael in the bay of 
 Frejus forty-seven days later, on 9 October, 1799. 
 
 At St. Helena Napoleon expressed his regret 
 that he had ever left Egypt. He would far rather 
 
 1 Kielland, "Napoleon's Men and Methods, "p. 33. 
 2 Quoted by Lord Rosebery, " Napoleon : the Last Phase," 
 p. 201.
 
 THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 47 
 
 have been Emperor of the East than Emperor of the 
 West. Had he taken Acre he would have marched 
 to India. "I should," he said, "have assumed the 
 turban at Aleppo, and have headed an army of 200,000 
 men. The East only awaits a man." He saw 
 clearly that a power in possession of Egypt could 
 threaten if not eventually conquer India. Leibnitz had 
 advised Louis XIV to occupy Egypt, but unlike 
 Napoleon the French monarch never realized that 
 France, mistress of Egypt, might (Napoleon said 
 would] become mistress of India. By becoming 
 ruler of the East, Napoleon would have emulated 
 Alexander the Great, for whom he had a deep ad- 
 miration. 
 
 His journey through France was a triumphal pro- 
 gress. Marbot describes the scene as Napoleon 
 passed through Lyons. Crowds blocked the streets, 
 and amid universal rejoicings cried, " Vive Bonaparte 
 qui vient sauver la patrie". He reached Paris on 16 
 October, and for three days refused to see Josephine. 
 It was only in consequence of Bourrienne's entreaties 
 that a reconciliation was effected. Napoleon's arrival 
 in France at this juncture proved to be a memorable 
 event in his career and in the history of Europe. 
 The Russian fleet could easily have rendered his safe 
 arrival in France impossible, but as had already 
 been often the case Napoleon was aided by the parti- 
 cularist aims of one or other of the allies. In the 
 
 1 Quoted by Lord Rosebery, "Napoleon: the Last Phase, 
 pp. 148-9.
 
 48 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 war of the Second Coalition the Austrians, bent on 
 territorial aggression, had first thwarted and then 
 quarrelled with the Russians, while the Russians 
 themselves instead of using their fleet for the purpose 
 of keeping Napoleon in Egypt were bent on securing 
 Malta, Ancona, the Ionian Islands, and Corsica. 
 
 The shortsightedness of the allies and their selfish 
 aims thus proved of incalculable value to Napoleon, 
 who was enabled to return to France at a very critical 
 moment in her history. On his arrival in Paris he 
 soon realized that the country, weary of the tyranny 
 and incompetence of the Directorate and of its inabil- 
 ity to govern or even to preserve order, was anxious 
 for peace abroad and for an honest, a stable, and a 
 methodical republican government at home. 
 
 He also found that his position was far different 
 from what it was after the Peace of Campo Formio. 
 Then he was a hero but only for the moment. 
 "They have only to see me," he said, "three times 
 at the play to tire of me. They would run after me 
 just as eagerly if I were on my way to the scaffold. 
 If I remain long without doing anything I am done 
 for." It was a far different state of things in October, 
 1799. Throughout France men longed for a strong 
 hand to drive back the foreigner and to restore peace 
 and order. With a unanimity which it is difficult to 
 explain, Frenchmen now concentrated their thoughts 
 upon Napoleon as the man who would be the saviour 
 of his country. 
 
 Napoleon's reconciliation with Josephine was, it is
 
 THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 49 
 
 said, brought about mainly by the recognition of the 
 fact that a serious quarrel with his wife might interfere 
 with the ambitious plans which he was meditating, 
 and which were executed some three weeks later. 
 
 CHIEF DATES 
 
 Bonaparte appointed Commander-in-Chief of the 
 
 Army in Italy . . . . .2 March, 1796. 
 
 The Battle of Montenotte .... 12 April, 1796. 
 The Battle of Milesimo ..... 13 April, 1796. 
 The Battle of Dego ..... 14 April, 1796. 
 The Treaty of Cherasco .... 14 April, 1796. 
 
 The Battle of Lodi 10 May, 1796. 
 
 Bonaparte enters Milan ..... 15 May, 1796. 
 The Battle of Lonato . . - . . . 3 August, 1796. 
 The Battle of Castiglione .... 5 August, 1796. 
 The Battle of Arcola . . . 15-17 November, 1796. 
 Capitulation of Mantua .... 2 February, 1797. 
 The Treaty of Tolentino . . . 19 February, 1797. 
 
 The French at Leoben ..... 7 April, 1797. 
 Revolution of the 8 Fructidor . . . 4 September, 1797. 
 The Peace of Campo Formio . . . 17 October, 1797. 
 At Rastadt . . 25 November to 2 December, 1797. 
 
 In Paris 5 December, 1797. 
 
 The Egyptian Expedition starts . . -19 May, 1798. 
 The Battle of the Nile .... 1-2 August, 1798. 
 The Siege of Acre ..... 1-2 August, 1798. 
 Bonaparte leaves Egypt . . . . 23 August, 1799. 
 
 His arrival in Paris .... 1 6 October, 1799.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPEROR, 1799-1804 
 
 France in 1799 Unpopularity of the Directory Brumaire 
 The Consulate Napoleon's character The Marengo campaign 
 Hohenlinden The Treaty of Luneville The Armed Neutrality 
 of 1800-1 Its failure Napoleon's policy to Naples and Portugal 
 The Treaty of Amiens Paris after the conclusion of peace 
 Popularity of the peace in France Napoleon Consul for life 
 The Constitution The Code Napoleon The Concordat Na- 
 poleon's defence of his religious policy General character of 
 the Consulate Cadoudal's conspiracy The execution of the 
 Due d'Enghien Napoleon becomes Emperor The French Em- 
 pire The court and nobility. 
 
 " I ^HE period from 1799 to 1804 begins with the fall 
 of the Directory and closes with the establish- 
 ment of the Napoleonic Empire. The weakness of 
 the Directory since the coup dttat of Fructidor, in 
 1797, had steadily increased, and its unpopularity had 
 become widespread. It had interfered with established 
 beliefs, it had failed to preserve order in the country, 
 its armies had been driven from Italy. France in 
 1799 was in a condition of anarchy and disorder; 
 liberty no longer existed, and all free institutions had 
 disappeared. The army was the real master of the 
 situation, but the army did not realize its power. 
 
 50
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 51 
 
 Fortunately it did not oppose the coup d'dtat of 
 Brumaire, which, badly arranged and clumsily carried 
 out, was found to have strong popular support. That 
 accomplished Bonaparte, having won Marengo and 
 re-established the credit of the French arms, speedily 
 climbed to a position of supreme power. In him 
 Frenchmen readily saw a necessary absolutism taking 
 the place "of a corrupt and inefficient oligarchy ". 
 
 The landing of Napoleon at Frejus thus proved 
 to be the turning-point in the history of Europe. 
 Between 1799 and 1815, in consequence of the safe 
 return of Napoleon from Egypt, Europe underwent 
 a thorough but necessary revolution. The quarrels 
 and jealousies of the allies during the war of the 
 Second Coalition, the selfishness of Prussia, the 
 divisions in Italy, the lethargic condition of Spain, 
 illustrate the necessity for a period of thorough reform. 
 
 Had the European body politic been in a sound 
 and healthy condition it could not have found a more 
 favourable situation than was presented to it in 1799 
 for reducing the overgrown power of France, but the 
 selfishness and shortsightedness of the allies, the want 
 of a cordial understanding, the complete lack of any 
 system of co-operation all combined to complete the 
 failure of the Second Coalition. " Fourteen years 
 were to elapse before there occurred so favourable an 
 opportunity of checking the overweening pretensions 
 of France ; and then it was a Europe vivified by 
 the reforms originating from the Revolution which 
 finally beat down the might of Napoleon."
 
 52 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 " We were plunging under full sail back to the 
 abyss of the Terror." 
 
 In 1799 the majority of Frenchmen desired peace 
 and order. The working men had acquired land, a 
 settled position, and a competence. To them the 
 period of revolution was over, and they had no wish 
 either to see the Bourbons restored or to plunge 
 France into further disorder. Among the lowest 
 orders in Paris Jacobin principles indeed prevailed. 
 But it can hardly be said that even among them the 
 Directory was popular. Since its triumph on the 8 
 Fructidor the Directory had became steadily more 
 and more unpopular. It had endeavoured to suppress 
 Catholicism by means of what were practically lettres 
 de cachet. The observance of the Dtcadi was in- 
 sisted upon, and no religious liberty was permitted. 
 Moreover, order was not preserved in the country, 
 which was infested by brigands. Rebellion was 
 chronic in the west of France, trade was disorganized, 
 the State was practically bankrupt ; on 19 July, 1799, 
 the daily journals recorded that "there is no longer 
 any business doing on the Bourse in Paris. Every 
 day money becomes tighter." So unpopular did the 
 Directory become that recruiting for the army was 
 rendered wellnigh impossible, and the recruits took 
 to brigandage. France was in a state of anarchy 
 and disorder when Napoleon escaped from Egypt. 
 On returning to France he found that the old en- 
 thusiasm of 1789 had vanished. Ten years of revolu- 
 
 1 Vandal, " L'Avenement de Bonaparte," Vol. I, p. 197.
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 53 
 
 tion had wrought many changes, and had dissipated 
 many hopes. The majority of Frenchmen " were so 
 thoroughly sick of Jacobinism, and all its works, that 
 they wished to rid themselves not only of the Revolu- 
 tion, but of the monstrous regime to which it had 
 given birth, though they had no desire to return to 
 the old one with all its abuses. They longed for 
 quiet, order, and a cessation of proscription at home 
 and of war abroad." l 
 
 Such was the opinion of Mallet du Pan who had 
 watched the events in France for so many years, and 
 whose judgment upon the Directory was remarkable 
 for its sagacity and accuracy. But Napoleon found 
 not only that the Directory had failed hopelessly in 
 its task of governing France, but that it had also 
 failed in its foreign policy. Though the French 
 armies had proved successful against the Russians in 
 Switzerland, and against the Russians and British in 
 Holland, Italy was lost. " The glory of our arms was 
 tarnished, our conquests lost, our territory threatened 
 with invasion." This somewhat exaggerated state- 
 ment represents, however, the general feeling in 
 France in the autumn of 1799. 
 
 The events which filled those momentous days 
 between 9 October, 1799, when Napoleon landed at 
 Frejus, and 9 November (18 Brumaire), when the 
 Directory was overthrown, were of momentous im- 
 portance to France and indeed to Europe. 
 
 On his arrival in Paris Napoleon found the 
 
 1 "The Edinburgh Review," No. 411, p. 79.
 
 54 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Government of the Directory disorganized and dis- 
 credited. " The Revolution having destroyed all the 
 old corporations, legal, religious, and industrial, had 
 left the individual face to face with the State, so that 
 an extreme theory of collective control had been 
 insensibly but logically substituted for the individualism 
 of 1789 V 
 
 But the local functionaries were incapable either 
 from ignorance or fear to perform their duties, as the 
 State which was bankrupt made no attempt "to 
 organize education, to tend the sick, to assist the 
 poor, to check brigandage, to punish crime, to check 
 disorder," or to carry on the work of internal ad- 
 ministration. France was in a most precarious 
 position. There was a general desire for an honest, 
 capable Republican Government, which in accordance 
 with the shortlived Constitution of 1791, should 
 recognize Roman Catholicism, and having assured 
 to France its natural frontiers of the Rhine, the Alps, 
 and the Pyrenees, should give the country a period of 
 peace. " Peace abroad, and methodical government 
 at home," was the desire of a large majority of 
 Frenchmen. 
 
 Till 1799 the power of the Directory was based 
 on military successes abroad, but the expulsion of the 
 French from Italy by the Russians and Austrians 
 was not in the minds of the French nation com- 
 pensated for by Massena's victory at Zurich on 25-26 
 September, by Suvorov's retirement into Bavaria, or 
 1 "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. VIII, p. 665.
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 55 
 
 by the evacuation of Holland by the Duke of York 
 in October. 
 
 Owing to the selfish and particularist aims of the 
 allies and to the inaction of Prussia, France though 
 temporarily deprived of Italy had in reality nothing 
 to fear from the European Coalition which had indeed 
 already broken up. Nevertheless the loss of Italy 
 had robbed the Directory of its one remaining hope 
 of continuing in power, and the army now demanded 
 a change of government. Everything being in a 
 chaotic and uncertain condition, an opportunity was 
 given to Abb6 Sieyes to carry out his famous intrigue 
 which had for its object the overthrow of the 
 Directory and the establishment of a government 
 more in harmony with the wishes of the French 
 nation. 
 
 The revolution of Brumaire has been described 
 as "a Day of Dupes"; Sieyes and those who sup- 
 ported him had no wish to set up a military despotism. 
 "All men, however," writes Marbot, "understood 
 that some great change was necessary and in- 
 evitable." Some thought a mere change of Directors 
 would suffice, others like Sieyes thought that the 
 reins of power should be placed in the hands of some 
 strong man, but one who would certainly not attempt 
 to establish a despotism. Of the possible leaders in 
 such a movement, Bernadotte, Massena, and Moreau, 
 the first-named was not considered to be sufficiently 
 capable, Massena was a mere soldier, and Moreau, 
 who was lazy, refused to lead a movement. He was
 
 56 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 not a politician, and in times of peace preferred hunt- 
 ing to politics. On his refusal to act, Sie"yes had 
 written to Napoleon then in Egypt acquainting him 
 with the condition of France. 
 
 The revolution of Brumaire was partly the work 
 of the tactful and courageous Lucien Bonaparte and of 
 the astute Talleyrand, but owed its success in no small 
 degree to Sie"yes. During the few weeks previous 
 to the coup d'ttat of Brumaire, Lucien had scope for 
 his undoubtedly great abilities. It was, however, 
 Sie"yes who, when Napoleon hesitated, said, "they," 
 the Council of 500, "have put you outside the law, 
 put them outside the Hall ". Lucien always con- 
 sidered that after Brumaire Napoleon regarded him 
 with jealousy. The feud between them became well- 
 nigh irreconcilable, and Lucien, with the title of Prince 
 of Canino, settled at Rome, devoting himself to artistic, 
 literary, and agricultural pursuits. During the crisis 
 of Brumaire he had certainly shown considerable tact 
 and courage. 
 
 The Directory fell without exciting the regret of 
 any section of Frenchmen. Its lack of governing 
 power, its failure to hold Italy, together with the 
 absence of social stability in France, and the financial 
 disorganization which everywhere prevailed, justified 
 the general satisfaction felt at the events of the 19 
 Brumaire. 
 
 But though the coup d'ttat had succeeded, " though 
 much was to be gained by the concentration of the 
 executive authority, and much also by the suppression
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 57 
 
 of extravagant political debate, the price was destined 
 to be such as no one in France imagined on that 
 November evening, while the deputies were rushing 
 wildly through the park, and the fog was falling 
 upon the last fevers of the French Revolution "- 1 
 
 Brumaire was not a victory of the army " it was 
 not by the sword that he had seized power" and 
 Napoleon found himself at the head of affairs in 
 France not by means of merely military support, but 
 rather through the instrumentality of public opinion. 
 Napoleon even after Brumaire was far from being 
 sure of the army, least of all of the garrison of Paris, 
 and one of his first duties was to negotiate with the 
 generals. Opposition also came from the "intel- 
 lectuals," the friends of Madame de Stae'l, from" ideo- 
 logues," and from professional men. Napoleon's 
 strength, it has been said, " lay in public opinion, in 
 the weakness of the Councils, the corrupt discredited 
 conventionals and terrorists, in the support of the work- 
 ing classes of Paris who feared reaction, as well as of 
 the middle classes eager for orderly government and 
 peace ". Moreover, the peasants and working men 
 generally throughout France " were sick of the Re- 
 public as understood by the Jacobins, of its corruption, 
 its horrors, and its bombast ". 2 
 
 From ii November to 25 December, 1799, the 
 three Consuls of the French Republic, Sieves, Roger 
 
 1 "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. VIII, p. 688. 
 2 See Aulard, "The French Revolution, a Political History," 
 translated by Bernard Miall. London, Fisher Unwin, 1910.
 
 58 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Ducos, and Napoleon, composed "an Executive Com- 
 mission invested with the full powers of the Directory ". 
 On Christmas Day the new Constitution, under which 
 the government was soon to fall entirely into the hands 
 of Napoleon, came into being. That Constitution, the 
 character of which will be described later, was obviously 
 drawn up in great haste, and bristled with imperfections. 
 Many of its clauses were vague, many of its arrange- 
 ments lacked defmiteness, in several cases machinery 
 was lacking for the due execution of several of its 
 enactments. 
 
 In 1799, however, France demanded a strong 
 government. The fear of Socialism was ever before 
 the eyes of the middle classes, and to avert the triumph 
 of Socialistic ideas the majority of Frenchmen were 
 willing for a time to sacrifice a certain amount of liberty. 
 Napoleon " believed in the magic of private property," 
 and was rewarded by the confidence which during the 
 Consulate and for many years after France placed 
 in him. 
 
 The character of Napoleon can only be understood 
 after a careful study of his life, and only by remember- 
 ing that he was an Italian in temperament. From his 
 earliest youth he was liable to violent outbursts of 
 temper Corsican passionateness which led him at 
 times to commit acts such as the execution of the Due 
 d'Enghien, which were, to say the least, regrettable. 
 He had no strict regard for truth, and "of the many 
 base, blackhearted lies which have been brought home 
 to Bonaparte, the slander of his dead colleague
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 59 
 
 (Admiral Brueys, who was defeated at the battle of the 
 Nile) is one of the basest ". The fact was he lied if it 
 was convenient to him to do so, and consequently not 
 much reliance can be placed on much that he said and 
 wrote at St. Helena. 
 
 His organization of France during the Consulate 
 shows his extraordinary breadth of view and his 
 mastery of detail, a powerful imagination, a largeness 
 of perception, the possession of an infinite patience 
 such were some of the qualities which he possessed in 
 a marked degree. Often when he refused to listen to 
 suggestions it was found that he had more knowledge 
 of the facts than those who tendered the advice. 
 "His Majesty's character," writes Gourgaud, "is a 
 combination of contrasts." 
 
 Before, however, Napoleon could show his remark- 
 able genius for organization, by not only making the 
 Constitution workable, but by using it as a means for 
 establishing himself as the despotic ruler of France, 
 it was necessary first to establish order at home and 
 then to deal with the external foes of France. 
 
 La Vendee was at that time in full revolt. Napoleon 
 at once issued a masterly manifesto offering an amnesty 
 to all who laid down their arms, but threatening death 
 to all who resisted. As Napoleon had an army on 
 which he could rely, and as to the astonishment of the 
 Vendeeans he showed respect for their religion, the 
 pacification of La Vendee was easily accomplished. 
 
 Till, however, Marengo had been fought and won 
 Napoleon's position was uncertain. France desired
 
 60 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 peace and rest, and it was only after Great Britain 
 and Austria had declined to consider any terms of 
 peace which did not include " the withdrawal of France 
 within her former frontiers, and the re -establishment 
 of the monarchy," that Napoleon opened the famous 
 campaign of 1800. 
 
 Opposed to France were the nations who had 
 formed the Second Coalition. England, Austria, 
 Russia, Turkey, Sweden, and Denmark had been 
 its original members. But Russia, owing to the con- 
 duct of the Austrians, had recalled its chief army under 
 Suvorov, from Italy, and had, moreover, become 
 temporarily alienated from England. 
 
 Napoleon with his habitual adroitness at once com- 
 prehended the situation. He released a number of 
 Russian prisoners, and sent them back to Russia with 
 a courteous message to Paul I. That half-demented 
 sovereign was at once won, and till his death be- 
 came a warm admirer of the First Consul. Freed 
 from all danger from an attack by Russia, or from 
 Prussia, which still pursued its neutral line of policy, 
 Napoleon was able to devote all his attention to the 
 Austrians in Italy. 
 
 The allies, by continuing hostilities, thus played 
 into the hands of Napoleon, whose real object was to 
 secure unlimited power by war and the support of 
 the army. That army was starving, and was anxious 
 for war as the speediest means of securing food, 
 money, honour, and comfort. Moreover, a success- 
 ful campaign would replenish the French Treasury
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 61 
 
 which under the wasteful, dishonest, and incompetent 
 rule of the Directory had run dry. 1 "Our task," 
 said Napoleon to the army on the day following 
 Brumaire, " is not to defend our own frontiers but to 
 invade the territory of our foes," and no sooner was 
 the renewal of the struggle with Austria and England 
 imminent than he held out to the army the hope of a 
 speedy end to all their anxieties. " Victory," he 
 assured the soldiers, " will give you bread." 
 
 Rarely was Napoleon's power of rapid organization 
 seen to greater advantage than during the early 
 weeks of 1800. Though Moreau had on the Rhine 
 some 1 10,000 men accustomed to war, Mass6na's 
 troops stationed near Genoa who numbered but 
 25,000 were disorganized. 
 
 Napoleon at once set to work to form with the 
 aid of Berthier a fresh army, and reinforced by some 
 18,000 of Moreau's force found himself on the plains 
 of Lombardy in the middle of May at the head of 
 70,000 men. 
 
 The crossing of the Great St. Bernard on 20 
 May was fraught with considerable danger. And 
 yet Napoleon, with his army dragging its artillery, 
 performed this difficult operation. The men " un- 
 
 1 " On ne pouvait esperer mettre fin a la detresse financiere 
 du pays qu'en faisant contribuer les voisins au paiement des 
 impots, soit en les annexant bonnement soit en creant sur les 
 frontieres de la France une ceinture de republique vassales ayant 
 a supporter leur part des charges de l'e"tat." Fournier, " Napoleon 
 I," Vol. I, p. 216. Paris, Emile Bouillon.
 
 62 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 locked the cannon from their stocks, put them in the 
 hollow trunks of trees, and then one-half the battalions 
 dragged them up the mountain while the other half 
 carried the arms and 'accoutrements of their comrades, 
 with stores of provisions for five days ". The fright- 
 ful precipice of St. Pierre demanded the greatest care, 
 and Napoleon nearly lost his life by slipping from his 
 mule down one of them. His guide, however, seized 
 him just in time, and was rewarded with 1000 
 francs. 
 
 On 22 May Ivrea was taken, and on the 28th 
 Napoleon wrote an account of its capture to Joseph. 
 "We fell down upon them here," he says, "like a 
 thunderbolt : the enemy did not in the least expect 
 us, and even now can hardly believe that we are 
 here." On 2 June he was at the gates of Milan. 
 
 In the battle of Marengo, fought on 14 June, 
 Napoleon, though at first technically beaten, was able 
 through the timely arrival of Desaix to defeat the 
 Austrians, with a loss of 9000 men killed and wounded. 
 
 Soon after the opening of the battle the Austrians 
 occupied the village of Marengo, and the French right 
 wing and centre were compelled to retreat. At three 
 o'clock in the afternoon the battle seemed lost, and the 
 aged Austrian General Melas left the field and sent 
 messages to Vienna to announce his victory. Till five 
 o'clock the French slowly retreated, and then Desaix 
 arrived only to be himself shortly afterwards killed 
 by a cannon ball. 
 
 But the troops which he brought with him amply
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 63 
 
 avenged his death, and led by Bondet threw themselves 
 upon the Austrian grenadiers who were commanded by 
 General Zack. At the same time Kellermann attacked 
 them on their flank, while the French left wing ad- 
 vanced. The village of Marengo was reoccupied and 
 a decisive victory was won. 
 
 During the closing scenes of this famous battle, 
 the confidence of the troops who had borne the heat 
 of the day was entirely restored by the courage shown 
 by " the little man on the white horse " who was ever 
 in the front, and no small part of the credit of the 
 victory was due to Napoleon, whose orders were 
 skillfully carried out by Desaix and Kellermann. 
 
 In Paris the victory was celebrated by illuminations, 
 and Louis, the Bourbon claimant to the French throne, 
 wrote to congratulate the successful general. 
 
 The battle of Marengo was the real turning-point 
 in Napoleon's career. Defeat would have ruined him 
 and his family. As it was, the reverses suffered by 
 the Austrians on the Danube during the summer of 
 i Soo, 1 culminating in their disastrous defeat by Moreau 
 at Hohenlinden, "a victory more brilliant and more 
 complete than that of Marengo," rendered Francis II 
 ready to consider the question of peace. Moreover, 
 the Austrians had been driven out of Italy which was 
 again in French hands, and at the same time the Tsar 
 Paul had not only entered upon a quarrel with Great 
 Britain over the question of Neutrals, but had made 
 
 l On 19 June Moreau had defeated Kray in the battle of 
 Hochstadt.
 
 64 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 advances to Napoleon. The distrust felt by both 
 Russia and Prussia of Austria contributed in no small 
 degree to the position of supremacy to which Napoleon 
 attained. Cobenzel who had succeeded Thugut as 
 Austrian Foreign Minister, and whose natural hesita- 
 tion in agreeing to the French terms was severely 
 criticized by Napoleon, was compelled most reluctantly 
 to agree to the proposed terms, and on 9 February, 
 1 80 1, signed what he styled the " terrible " Treaty of 
 Luneville. France was now assured in her possession 
 of the German districts on the left bank of the Rhine, 
 and, moreover, definitely obtained Belgium and 
 Luxemburg. In Italy she gained the frontier of the 
 Adige, and the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics were 
 placed under her protection. French troops occupied 
 Piedmont in the North and Taranto in the South, 
 and Tuscany now the kingdom of Etruria was 
 ruled by the Duke of Parma (a mere figurehead) ; 
 Rome was defenceless, and the King of Naples 
 owed his preservation to the influence of the Tsar Paul. 
 Marengo placed Napoleon's power on a sound basis 
 it was the first occasion since 1791 when public 
 rejoicings were spontaneous and universal. " The 
 French nation," Napoleon declared, " is satisfied with 
 the Treaty, and I am extremely pleased with it." 
 
 After the conclusion of the Peace of LuneVille 
 Napoleon seemed in a strong position. Contributions 
 from Holland, Portugal, and Italy enabled him to pay 
 his troops without taxing the French people, while in 
 various parts of Europe, especially in Germany, his
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 65 
 
 armies lived on the inhabitants among whom they 
 were quartered. Denmark, Sweden, and Russia were 
 prepared to war against England. He therefore pro- 
 posed to continue with vigour his struggle with Eng- 
 land, and to overcome her resistance by his occupation 
 of Egypt, and by intrigues in India and Ireland. The 
 hostility of Paul of Russia to England and the forma- 
 tion of the Armed Neutrality would prove, he thought, 
 of great value in the furtherance of his crusade against 
 the unconquerable Island kingdom. Paul, indeed, 
 carried away by his fantastic imagination, spoke of 
 invading India by way of Khiva and Herat. On 20 
 January, 1801, before the Treaty of Luneville was 
 signed Napoleon had declared that peace with the 
 Emperor was of no importance compared with the 
 Russian alliance, which he trusted would overpower 
 England and preserve Egypt to France. 
 
 The Armed Neutrality of 1800-1 seemed to Na- 
 poleon to offer an excellent opportunity of ruining 
 British trade in the North. He had failed to ruin 
 that trade in the East, but this time he had every 
 reason to expect success. Russia, Prussia, Sweden, 
 and Denmark had united in protesting against 
 England's right to search the ships of Neutrals, and 
 to confiscate as contraband of war all goods of belli- 
 gerents found on them. Thus at a period when 
 Russia and Prussia might reasonably have been ex- 
 pected to unite with England against France, those 
 Powers combined with Sweden and Denmark in an 
 attempt to weaken the leading opponent of Napoleon,
 
 66 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 A series of misfortunes, however, wrecked all the 
 hopes of Napoleon. Not only had the British seized 
 Malta on 5 September, 1800, but on 8 March, 1801, 
 the battle of Copenhagen in which the Danish fleet 
 was in great part destroyed, preceded by the failure 
 of the French fleet to succour the army left in Egypt, 
 and followed by the death of Paul I on 23 March, 
 upset the calculations which he had formed of striking 
 a severe blow at British commerce. "In concert with 
 the Tsar," he told Bourrienne, " I was sure of striking 
 a mortal blow at the English power in India. A palace 
 revolution has overturned all my projects." Never- 
 theless he still endeavoured to isolate Great Britain, 
 and hoped by closing the ports of Western and 
 Southern Europe to her ships to bring her to terms. 
 
 The new Tsar Alexander was, however, hostile 
 to Napoleon. Russia was a large producer of articles 
 carried by British ships, and as Great Britain was 
 Russia's chief customer the material interests, especially 
 of the landowners who were for the most part the great 
 nobles, were bound up with peace with the Govern- 
 ment of George III. On 17 June the Treaty of St. 
 Petersburg re-established good relations between Eng- 
 land and Russia. 
 
 Napoleon had already shown that he completely 
 under-estimated the vitality of a State like England 
 round which centred a far-reaching commercial system. 
 He never understood the maritime problem with which 
 he had to deal. H enceforward, however, the possibility 
 of closing the North of Europe to British trade, and of
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 67 
 
 combining the Baltic navies against the navy of Great 
 Britain, became one of the fixed ideas of his mind. 
 
 While he was endeavouring to support the 
 Northern Powers in a League against Great Britain, 
 he had not been idle in the South of Europe. 
 
 On 28 March, 1801, he made an agreement known 
 as the Treaty of Florence with the kingdom of the 
 Two Sicilies. By this Treaty Naples was to exclude 
 from her ports the ships and the commerce of England 
 and Turkey. The South of Italy was to be occupied 
 by 15,000 French troops in order to facilitate com- 
 munication with Egypt. His hope was that by means 
 of naval combinations the Northern ports could be 
 closed to English ships, that Egypt might remain in 
 French hands, and that England would be forced to 
 make peace. 
 
 However, on 21 March, the combined English and 
 Turkish armies won the battle of Alexandria ; on 27 
 June Cairo fell into the hands of the British, and on 2 
 September the French were compelled to make a con- 
 vention abandoning Egypt. 
 
 While he was hoping for French successes in the 
 Mediterranean, Napoleon had instigated Spain to 
 attack Portugal. On I October, 1800, he had con- 
 cluded with Spain the Treaty of Ildefonso, by which 
 Tuscany (the kingdom of Etruria) was promised to the 
 Queen of Spain's daughter who had married the Bour- 
 bon Prince of Parma. On 21 March, i8oi,the Prin- 
 cess took possession of the new kingdom. On its part 
 Spain ceded to France, Parma, Elba, and Louisiana,
 
 68 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 and promised to attack Portugal the ally of England. 
 A Spanish army, aided by a French corps, did indeed 
 invade Portugal, but on 6 June, 1801, the Treaty of 
 Badajos ended the war. Portugal, to the infinite 
 rage of Napoleon, who, however, had received a 
 large sum of money from the Portuguese, refused to 
 close her ports to English commerce. 
 
 Thus at the end of 1801, the sea power of Great 
 Britain remained unconquered. The Northern Coali- 
 tion had been dispersed ; the great States, apart from 
 France, showed friendly feelings towards Great 
 Britain. The control of the Mediterranean was still 
 in the hands of the British fleet ; the French had 
 failed in Egypt. 
 
 The situation certainly was far from favourable to 
 Napoleon. France was practically isolated, Russia 
 was ready to challenge her supremacy in Germany and 
 Italy ; the neutrality of Prussia was uncertain ; Austria 
 was anxious for an opportunity of evading the terms 
 of the Treaty of Luneville. All Napoleon's grandiose 
 projects had failed. The English were supreme in 
 Egypt and the Mediterranean ; Spain had made peace 
 with Portugal ; Denmark had been compelled by 
 Nelson to desert the Armed Neutrality. 
 
 Napoleon at once realized that his best policy was 
 to come to terms with Great Britain. On i October, 
 1 80 1, the preliminaries of peace with Great Britain 
 were signed. He had found it necessary to make a truce 
 with the English nation while he reorganized France 
 from within, and brought more completely under his
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 69 
 
 control Holland, Switzerland, Italy, and to some extent 
 Germany. In other words, he realized that a period 
 of peace would enable him to establish his own 
 supremacy on a firm basis in France, and French 
 supremacy outside her borders, while he would be 
 able to make adequate preparations to renew the 
 struggle with Great Britain in a few years. Thus his 
 first attempt to establish his supremacy over Europe 
 had failed. 
 
 In the negotiations at Amiens the French repre- 
 sentatives, of whom Joseph Bonaparte was the chief, 
 outwitted the English Government on many points. 
 England certainly gained Trinidad and Ceylon, but 
 the Dutch recovered the Cape of Good Hope. France 
 undertook to restore Egypt to Turkey, to guarantee 
 the integrity of Portugal, and to retire from Naples. 
 England agreed to evacuate Malta, never expecting 
 that the French would continue to occupy Holland, 
 Piedmont, and Switzerland. On 8 October peace was 
 formally made with Russia, the latter power engaging 
 not to support the Bourbons, while Napoleon engaged 
 not to aid the Poles. Treaties with Turkey and 
 Bavaria marked the final pacification of Europe. 
 
 Unfortunately Addington had not insisted upon 
 the independence of Holland and Switzerland. In his 
 opinion Article 1 1 of the Treaty of Luneville " which 
 expressly guaranteed the independence of the Batavian 
 Republic," and Article 2 of the Franco-Dutch Conven- 
 tion " of the 29 August, 1 80 1, which specified that the 
 French troops should only remain in the Batavian
 
 70 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Republic until the general peace," rendered the evacua- 
 tion of Holland a necessary and immediate consequence 
 of the Treaty of Amiens. Napoleon, however, refused 
 to evacuate Holland, and at the same time demanded 
 that the English should quit Malta without delay. 
 As neither party would yield, matters drifted on till 
 the outbreak of war in 1 803. 
 
 In her "Memoirs" the Duchess d'Abrantes has 
 given us a very interesting account of Paris on the 
 conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens. Paris was 
 thronged with foreigners, among whom were Charles 
 Fox, Lord and Lady Cholmondeley, the Duchess of 
 Gordon, and Lady E. Foster afterwards Duchess of 
 Devonshire. 
 
 " Nothing," we are told, " could exceed Napoleon's 
 extreme and rigid economy in all his private concerns ; 
 but when circumstances required it, he could equal in 
 magnificence the most sumptuous sovereign of the 
 East." 1 
 
 At this time he disliked foreigners, and in spite 
 of some attempts never succeeded in acquiring more 
 than a smattering of English. But he insisted that 
 foreigners should be treated with courtesy and shown 
 the art treasures in Paris. 
 
 An Englishman in Paris describes Napoleon at a 
 Review on 3 August, 1802. " Bonaparte," he says, 
 " wore a plain green coat with a narrow white cloth 
 edging at the seams . . . and a cocked hat without 
 
 1 " Memoirs of Napoleon," by the Duchess d'Abrantes, 
 Vol. I, p. 538. London, Bentley, 1836.
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 71 
 
 any lace. His hair is very black, and is cropped 
 very close to his head and neck, so that his ears are 
 all bare. It falls down over his brow. His com- 
 plexion is swarthy, his face long, a fine nose, his eyes 
 are very dark, and his eyebrows fall, or are drawn 
 down, much over his eyes. His cheek bones are 
 high, and his cheeks sink between the bones of the 
 face and those of the chin, which gives him a wasted 
 consumptive look. His upper lip projects in the 
 middle of his mouth considerably over the under one, 
 and his chin is sharp and prominent. . . . To me 
 he appeared to have the look of anxiety or rather of 
 fear. He was mounted on a beautiful Arabian grey 
 horse, one of the most perfect animals I ever saw. 
 . . . During all that period (nearly an hour and a 
 half) he never once opened his lips, nor did he turn 
 his head to the right or to the left. . . . No person 
 spoke to him, nor was he cheered or huzzaed, either 
 when he came into the Cour or when he departed." 1 
 After the settlement of peace with Great Britain, 
 France seemed to have secured what she had desired 
 for many years, a period of tranquillity. Napoleon 
 had been accepted as the head of the State, because 
 he had overthrown the Directory whose execrable 
 home policy had covered it with disgrace, and because 
 he had won Marengo and regained Italy. France 
 had entered upon a brilliant period in her annals 
 and if peace had been prolonged for ten or even for 
 
 1 Quoted by Harold Wheeler in " The Story of Napoleon," 
 p. 126, from the Diary of Robert Sym.
 
 72 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 five years it is difficult "to conjecture what might 
 have been the course of history ". 
 
 After Marengo Napoleon's position in France was 
 assured. The French nation, however, still desired 
 peace and a long continuance of peace. " The 
 millions who by successive plebiscites confirmed 
 Napoleon in the possession of sovereign power ex- 
 pected that he would establish orderly and methodical 
 government and maintain equality." They never 
 realized, however, that in setting up Napoleon they 
 were giving themselves a master whose aims ran 
 directly counter to those of the majority of the French 
 nation. 
 
 Most Frenchmen hoped to see the establishment 
 of a Republic, and of the Constitution, with modi- 
 fications, of 1791. Napoleon, on the other hand, lost 
 no time in bringing about the restoration of mon- 
 archical rule with himself as monarch. The nation, 
 satisfied with having secured what it called its 
 "natural" boundaries namely, the Rhine, the Alps, 
 and the Pyrenees desired peace. Napoleon, on the 
 other hand, never ceased planning for the extension 
 of France beyond her borders an extension which 
 could only be effected by acts of invasion, and a 
 period of conquest. Like the army, he desired war. 
 During the period of peace, indeed, he never ceased 
 from acts of aggression and from arranging plans of con- 
 quest. In 1802, after the conclusion of peace, he an- 
 nexed Elba, Piedmont, Parma, and Piacenza, while 
 from 1 80 1 to 1805 he was constantly devising schemes
 
 THE FIRST CONSUL AT MALMAISON 
 
 FROM THE PAINTING BY J. B. ISABEY AT VERSAILLES
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 73 
 
 against the English in India. These schemes indeed 
 failed, but it was not till 1810 that Mauritius was 
 captured from France and a continual menace to 
 British merchantmen removed. 
 
 In August, 1802, Napoleon was appointed Consul 
 for life, and a new period in French history is entered 
 upon. The Concordat with the Pope brought to 
 France international peace, while the Peace of Amiens 
 with England gave the country that rest from war 
 which all Frenchmen desired. The position of France 
 was, moreover, immensely strengthened by the dis- 
 cord which prevailed in Germany. On 25 February, 
 1803, tne reconstruction of Germany was decided upon, 
 and the Holy Roman Empire came practically to an 
 end. 
 
 The victory of Marengo placed Napoleon in a 
 position of supremacy in the world of politics ; the 
 Peace of Luneville and the Peace of Amiens streng- 
 thened enormously that position. France had now 
 obtained a welcome respite from war. She also 
 desired the establishment of order and a settled form 
 of government. Napoleon in 1802 had an excellent 
 opportunity of showing his skill as an administrator, 
 and at the same time of advancing towards the attain- 
 ment of despotic power. The Constitution of the 
 year VIII, or the Consulate, indeed bristled with 
 checks and balances, and Bonaparte as First Consul 
 seemed to all but a few astute heads simply a primus 
 inter pares. Frenchmen desired a restoration of the 
 Republic and a return to the Constitution of 1791.
 
 74 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 They aimed at personal security and freedom in place 
 of anarchy and oppression. A policy of tolerance 
 and the recognition of religion as the basis of society 
 were required to satisfy the majority of Frenchmen 
 who had seen with pleasure the overthrow of the 
 Directory. 
 
 Though the men who carried out the revolution 
 of Brumaire had no intention of giving to Napoleon the 
 position of a dictator, they had unconsciously acted 
 well for French interests in placing the successful 
 general at the head of the new Government. For 
 Napoleon was by nature an ideal administrator, with 
 a passion for efficiency. His administrative capacity 
 was simply prodigious, and no living man was his 
 superior in the art of organization. 
 
 But this power of evolving order out of chaos, of 
 choosing efficient instruments for carrying out the 
 work of reorganization, and of assuring to France 
 peace within her borders, was accompanied by an 
 overweening ambition. Napoleon was already de- 
 termined to make himself supreme, and to use the 
 general desire for reforms and reorganization as a 
 step towards imperialism. 
 
 The new Constitution itself, which had been 
 hurriedly drawn up, afforded opportunities for a man 
 of Bonaparte's determination for the creation of a 
 despotism. The Legislature was divided between the 
 Legislative Body of 300, and the Tribunate of 100, 
 both bodies being chosen by the Senate. The Tri- 
 bunate's duty was to discuss laws but not to vote,
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 75 
 
 while to the Legislative Body was assigned the duty 
 of voting on the laws which had been already dis- 
 cussed by the Tribunate. The Legislature thus had 
 no popular foundation, and its powers divided between 
 two bodies were closely curtailed and checked by the 
 Senate of eighty and by the Council of State, the 
 members of both bodies being nominated by the 
 Consuls. While the Council of State initiated the 
 laws, the Senate had power to veto any laws which 
 endangered the Constitution. 
 
 The Senate, while it erected and controlled the 
 Legislative Body and the Tribunate, soon found it- 
 self powerless before the strong Executive which it 
 had set up. Three Consuls appointed by the Senate 
 formed the Executive Authority, and the First Consul, 
 Napoleon, was given powers which soon enabled him 
 to sweep away all the checks which had been devised 
 by the Constitution. 
 
 The appointment of Ministers was given to Bona- 
 parte as First Consul, and he at once constructed a 
 Ministry after his own heart. Lucien Bonaparte 
 (who was succeeded in 1801 by Chaptal) became 
 Minister of the Interior, Pouche* remained Minister of 
 Police, Decres became Minister of the Navy, Barbe- 
 Marbois Minister of the Public Treasury, Dejean 
 Minister of Military Affairs, and in 1802 Regnier was 
 appointed Minister of Justice. 
 
 The local administration was organized with the 
 same care that characterized Napoleon's systematic 
 organization of the central administration.
 
 76 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Over each Department was placed a " PreTet," 
 who presided over the Council of the Department, 
 while in the towns the Councils were presided over by 
 the Mayors who were appointed by the " PreTets ". 
 These " PreYets," who were chosen with great care, 
 proved admirable officials. They were already 
 skilled in administrative work, and under their super- 
 vision the local administrators worked well. 
 
 Civil and Criminal Tribunals were set up over 
 which was a Cour de Cassation at Paris. The judges 
 were appointed by the First Consul for life. To the 
 ordinary Frenchman Napoleon appeared to be re- 
 storing the Republic, and his title of First Consul 
 roused no feelings of suspicion. The measures taken 
 on the fall of the Directory were statesmanlike, and 
 France and her armies believed that a new era in the 
 history of revolutionary government had dawned. 
 Very few realized that the promulgation of the Con- 
 stitution of the year VIII was the first step in the 
 establishment of a despotism. 
 
 The Code Napoleon which carried out the codi- 
 fication of the French law was a remarkable illustra- 
 tion of Napoleon's energy. Like the legal reforms 
 of Justinian, Napoleon's Code remains the most per- 
 manent of the gifts of the Consulate to France. The 
 French Revolution had led to endless confusion, but 
 had also cleared the way for a code of uniform laws. 
 The French people, in Napoleon's opinion, desired 
 equality, and the Code Napoleon provided them with 
 equal justice, " one weight, one measure, one law ".
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 77 
 
 Henceforward all citizens had equal opportunities of 
 advancement. Already the Convention and Direc- 
 tory had made efforts to provide a code. But it was 
 not till after Marengo that a period of calm ensued, 
 and a committee of lawyers was appointed on 12 
 August, 1800, to draw up a Civil Code. " That code," 
 writes Mr. Fisher, "harmonized the discoveries of 
 democratic jurisprudence with the ripe and tested 
 wisdom of the legists of the monarchy." It remains 
 " the most durable monument of Napoleon's genius ", l 
 
 During his campaign in Italy in 1796-7 Napoleon 
 showed his realization of the value of Christianity as 
 an effective political force. His Moslem proclama- 
 tions during the Egyptian expedition were merely 
 temporary expedients to serve a certain purpose, and 
 after Brumaire he at once acted in opposition to the 
 belief held by men of revolutionary temperament and 
 as a rule by the army that Catholicism was hostile to 
 liberty. 
 
 The history of his efforts to carry out this striking 
 revolution in Republican policy is a signal proof of 
 his astuteness and determination. To those who 
 professed Catholicism Brumaire came as a most wel- 
 come relief. The unlimited persecution which had 
 disgraced the last two years of the Directory came to 
 an end, the laws of deportation were repealed, the 
 opening of churches was allowed, and gradually the 
 observance of Ddcadi was ignored by the religious 
 
 1 Fisher, " Napoleonic Statesmanship : Germany," Oxford, 
 The Clarendon Press, 1903.
 
 78 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 world. The condition of the clergy was at the time 
 pitiable, their lands had been confiscated, public 
 worship had been checked, and was barely legal, a 
 schism still divided the " non-juring " from the con- 
 stitutional clergy. 
 
 Nevertheless the Catholic Church remained a 
 great force, and her immense influence could not be 
 ignored. Of all the various religions adhered to in 
 France that of Catholicism rested on the most stable 
 foundations, and remained unchanged. Its influence 
 was fully recognized by Napoleon who determined to 
 direct its policy ; he saw that its complete re-establish- 
 ment was advisable if not absolutely necessary for the 
 success of his political schemes, but he was equally 
 resolved that the disendowment of 1790 must not be 
 interfered with. He was determined to carry through 
 a plan for the redistribution of dioceses and parishes, 
 and to procure not only the Papal recognition of the 
 constitutional orders, but also the Papal sanction to 
 his right to nominate to bishoprics, and to rearrange 
 the dioceses and parishes. 
 
 During the years from 1790 to 1794 the Church 
 had remained a State Institution in accordance with 
 the Civil Constitution of the clergy set up in 1 790 ; 
 the salaries of the clergy being paid from the public 
 treasury. But the vast majority of the clergy refused 
 to take the oath of allegiance which the revolutionists 
 demanded, and were in consequence subject to ex- 
 treme persecution. The Act of 1790 was simply "a 
 return to despotic precedents, and the old contempt
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 79 
 
 for human liberty," and by it thousands of the clergy 
 and faithful Catholics who had hitherto warmly sup- 
 ported the Revolution were alienated. 
 
 In September, 1794, by order of the Convention, 
 salaries paid to the conforming priests ceased, Church 
 and State were thus separated, and till Napoleon 
 made the Concordat with the Pope all creeds were 
 on the same level. But in France Catholicism was 
 still a force, and in spite of the persecuting policy of 
 the Directory from 1797 to 1799 the Catholics con- 
 tinued without any help from the State and inde- 
 pendent of Rome to hold their services. 
 
 For two years after Brumaire liberty of conscience 
 and liberty of worship were tacitly allowed, Catholic 
 services were not interfered with, the clergy reas- 
 sumed their clerical dress, the Seminarists began to 
 return to France and their duties. It seemed as 
 though Catholicism separated from the State would 
 remain simply a spiritual power. Protestantism was 
 not interfered with, 1 Jews were tolerated. The 
 doctrine of liberty and equality in religion seemed to 
 be fully recognized, the Gregorian Calendar came 
 more into use, and many shops remained closed on 
 Sundays. 
 
 Napoleon himself fully realized the strength of 
 Catholicism, the advantages of a union between 
 Church and State and the importance of enlisting on 
 
 1 It has been stated that at this time there were in France 
 3,000,000 Protestants, 17,000,000 Freethinkers, 15,000,000 Ca- 
 tholics. (See Pressense, " L'Eglise et la Revolution Franchise ".)
 
 8o THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 his side one of the great forces in French society. 
 While, however, he was quite willing to restore the 
 connexion between the Papacy and the Gallican 
 Church he was determined that bishops should be 
 nominated by himself and that he should direct their 
 policy. 
 
 He studied Bossuet's writings in order to make 
 himself conversant with the views of that strenuous 
 upholder of French liberties, and he only acted after 
 mature deliberation. 
 
 There is no evidence that Napoleon was in his policy 
 to the Church governed by any love for, or belief in 
 religion. His action was the result of cool calcu- 
 lation. By the restoration and public recognition of 
 the Catholic religion he secured the gratitude of a 
 considerable portion of Frenchmen. At the same time 
 he checked the growth of a voluntary movement 
 and brought the Church within his system of cen- 
 tralization. 
 
 The Papal acquiescence to the Concordat was 
 only obtained after much wrangling. It was obviously 
 the interest and desire of the Papacy to bring about 
 a renewal of the union of the French Government 
 and the Catholic Church. But the Pope struggled 
 hard against the necessity of accepting Napoleon's 
 terms, in accordance with which the Civil Constitution 
 of 1790 the democratic element being eliminated 
 was the basis of the proposed Concordat. The Pope 
 for some time resisted the demand that he should 
 recognize the " constitutional " priests and " con-
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 81 
 
 stitutional" orders, but Napoleon eventually secured 
 this recognition and himself nominated to the new 
 Episcopate at least ten from among the constitutional 
 clergy. Thus the Pope had to acknowledge the 
 validity of the constitutional orders, and to accept 
 Napoleon's future nominations to bishoprics, as well 
 as his plan for the redistribution of dioceses and 
 parishes. In other respects the Pope was compelled 
 to leave the civil power master of the clergy, who 
 being salaried were bound to conform to the edicts 
 of the State. The Government was to countersign 
 all addresses sent by the Pope to the clergy, to give 
 its sanction to the meeting of all councils and diocesan 
 synods, and generally to supervise the conduct of its 
 secular clergy. For the payment of the clerical 
 salaries the French taxpayers were called upon to pay 
 an immense sum. 
 
 On 15 July, 1 80 1, Gonsalvi and Joseph Bonaparte 
 signed the Concordat, the negotiations for which had 
 been carried on in Rome by Joseph who was in con- 
 stant correspondence with Napoleon. On 15 August, 
 at the suggestion of the Papal Legate, a "fete de 
 Napoleon " was celebrated in Notre Dame. At the 
 entrance the priests received Napoleon singing Ecce 
 mitto angelum meum, qui preparabit meant viam. 
 Many of those who witnessed the ceremony, and who 
 had taken part in the early years of the French Re- 
 volution, and struggled to destroy the power of the 
 Roman Church in France, resented bitterly its restor- 
 ation by a French Consul. In later years it is said 
 
 6
 
 S 2 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 that Napoleon regarded the Concordat as the great 
 mistake of his administration. He himself had no 
 fixed religious beliefs, and his restoration of the Catho- 
 lic religion in France was merely a matter of policy. 
 In 1802, however, he was about to place the French 
 Government on a monarchical basis, and by the 
 Concordat he had for the time secured the support of 
 " the disciplined host of the Catholic Church ". 
 
 In a memorial written at St. Helena in 1816 he 
 declares that when on the fall of the Directory he had 
 seized the helm he had " weighed the importance of 
 religion " and had decided to re-establish it. By 
 coming to an understanding with the Pope, he had 
 caused war to cease between the two clerical parties. 
 
 Besides, his understanding with the Pope allowed 
 him to use his influence sooner or later with 100,000,000 
 Catholics. 1 
 
 There is little doubt that Napoleon in restoring 
 Roman Catholicism in France was pursuing a 
 statesmanlike policy, and one that commended itself 
 to the masses in France. That being so, he was wise 
 in ignoring the opinions of the refractory clergy, of the 
 Jacobins, and of those who, like Madame de Stael, 
 desired the establishment of Protestantism in France. 
 
 Thus in 1801 by the Concordat Napoleon paci- 
 fied France, and by allowing religious liberty he had 
 acted wisely. " I wanted," he said, during his 
 captivity in St. Helena, "to establish universal liberty 
 
 1 " The Exile of St. Helena," by Philippe Gonnard, pp. 165-6. 
 London, W. Heinemann, 1907.
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 3 
 
 of conscience. I wanted everyone to be allowed to 
 think and believe in his own way, and all men, whether 
 Catholics, Protestants, Mahometans or Deists, to be 
 equal." 1 
 
 During the Consulate his measures had for their 
 aim, he declared, economy and the general benefit of 
 all classes. In 1799 the French nation was practically 
 without a system of education and a large proportion 
 of the people were uneducated. Their condition in 
 1799 may be appreciated if it is remembered that even 
 in 1804 96 per cent could not read. 
 
 Nevertheless the Press was not free, and before 
 long it became apparent that the foundations of a 
 powerful monarchy were being carefully laid. Order 
 had been established in Church and State, law was 
 enforced in the administration. 
 
 Guizot declared that " Napoleon's greatest and 
 most arduous achievement was the revivification of the 
 idea of authority an idea which it was thought that 
 the Great Revolution had completely discredited ". 
 
 Napoleon was a strong believer in the principle of 
 power and domination, and disbelieved in the principles 
 of private judgment and individual liberty. 
 
 The Consulate had many merits ; equality before 
 the law was recognized, merit was recompensed, 
 education was organized and its cost lowered in a 
 word, the interests of the community were secured by 
 a firm, intelligent, and stable Government. Napoleon 
 
 1 "The Exile of St. Helena," by Philippe Gonnard, p. 127.
 
 84 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 brushed aside the charge that he in 1804 usurped the 
 throne. According to him he found the crown in the 
 gutter and the French people placed it on his head. 
 He defended his creation of a nobility on the ground 
 that it contributed to the stability of the State to attach 
 to the idea of nobility the conception of services ren- 
 dered to the State. That his rule was mild was in 
 his opinion proved by the fact that his eight prisons 
 only contained 243 persons, and that the annual in- 
 spection of these prisons made by the Councillors of 
 State precluded any risk of arbitrary detention. 
 Napoleon in fact insisted that while he allowed re- 
 ligious liberty, his system of criminal justice gave 
 France a complete measure of political liberty. 
 
 After August, 1802, when Napoleon was appointed 
 for life, none could doubt that they would shortly 
 witness the establishment of the Empire. If Napoleon 
 had only given France a period of peace for ten or 
 even for five years he could have concentrated his 
 energies on civil and colonial enterprises. France 
 would have become so strong that "it is impossible 
 to conjecture what would have been the course of 
 European history ". 
 
 In 1803, when war with England broke out, the 
 world saw the definite opening of a new period marked 
 by the appearance of the Empire, and by the definite 
 attempt on the part of Napoleon to establish his 
 supremacy over Europe and to extend his influence 
 over Asia and Australasia. 
 
 Napoleon had satisfied the wishes of those who
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 85 
 
 desired the establishment of a methodical and orderly 
 government. His " administration surpassed in 
 methodical and intelligent vigour anything Europe 
 had hitherto seen ". Moreover, as regarded the peace 
 which Frenchmen desired, Napoleon protested that 
 peace had been the object of his most strenuous en- 
 deavours, but that "the inveterate malignity of the 
 enemies of France and of the Revolution refused 
 all terms compatible with her honour and safety ". 
 For a time Napoleon's glorious victories and the 
 plunder of conquered nations reconciled the French 
 nation to the wars in which France found herself, 
 while before the war with England had proceeded 
 little more than a year the Consulate gave place to 
 the Empire. That change in the government of 
 France had been hastened by the discovery of plots 
 against Napoleon's life. 
 
 The conspiracy of Cadoudal had been discovered 
 in February, 1 804, and Cadoudal himself was arrested 
 on 9 March. The plot had wide ramifications and 
 had been to a great extent hatched in London, and 
 both Moreau and Pichegru were implicated. Na- 
 poleon convinced himself, or appeared to convince 
 himself, that a prince was to head the movement, and 
 that the Due d'Enghien, then living quietly at Etten- 
 heim near the Rhine, was to take command of the 
 " assassins ". Without any delay d'Enghien was 
 seized on 14 March, and on 21 March he was shot at 
 Vincennes. On 16 April Pichegru died in prison ; 
 Cadoudal and several of his fellow-conspirators were
 
 86 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 executed, and Moreau who sailed in June to America 
 was pardoned. 
 
 Cadoudal's conspiracy, which undoubtedly threat- 
 ened the life of Napoleon, was the last of many minor 
 conspiracies during the Consulate. To Napoleon 
 Moreau represented the dissatisfied republicans, and 
 d'Enghien the relentless royalists. Napoleon had 
 now struck terror into the hearts of his opponents 
 and no further opposition to him was forthcoming. 
 "We have done more than we hoped to do," Cadoudal 
 had said while in prison, "we meant to give France a 
 King, and we have given her an Emperor." 
 
 No doubt in the case of the Due d'Enghien, 
 Napoleon was betrayed into an exhibition of " Corsi- 
 can passionateness," for though by no means cruel 
 by nature he was liable to outbursts of passion when 
 he committed deeds over which he grieved later. 
 But the execution of the Due d'Enghien was no 
 worse than the murder of the French envoys at 
 Rastadt on 28 April, 1799, by some Austrian hussars, 
 and very little worse than the abstention of the British 
 Government from checking plots against Napoleon's 
 life which were hatched in England. 
 
 On 1 8 May, 1804, Napoleon, at the age of 33 
 years and 8 months, took the title of Emperor with 
 the name of Napoleon I. The discovery of the 
 conspiracy of Georges Cadoudal in February had 
 hastened the establishment of the Empire. On 29 
 March Napoleon had declared that the interests of 
 France demanded an hereditary ruler, and on the
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 87 
 
 following day the Senate had petitioned him to be- 
 come their ruler de jure as well as de facto. His ac- 
 ceptance of the imperial dignity marked the close of 
 a development which had steadily proceeded since 
 the deposition of Louis XVI in 1792. 
 
 In that year, writes M. Sorel, "le peupleavait fait 
 la table rase ; il avait delegue sa souverainete a une 
 Convention de sept cents membres ; cette assembled 
 en avait delegue 1'exercice a un Comit6 de neuf 
 membres ; puis on etait passe\ a travers les plebiscites, 
 a un Directoire de cinq, a un Consulat de trois ; 
 1'evolution aboutissait a 1'unite". Napoleon had 
 ample justification for taking into his own hands the 
 government of France. There was danger of anarchy 
 from within, and there was the likelihood of invasion 
 from without. Constitutional government at that 
 time was impossible, and Napoleon realized that 
 concentration of authority in the hands of one man 
 was necessary. He was, he declared, the rider of a 
 spirited horse, who in order to keep a straight course 
 was compelled to control his steed with bit and curb. 
 
 For some years after the establishment of the 
 Empire the French coins which were issued bore 
 " Napoleon Empereur" on one side and " Republique 
 Francaise" on the other. The Napoleonic absolut- 
 ism was essentially different from the Bourbon absol- 
 utism. It was based on democracy not on privilege, 
 and " its keynote was equality equality of burdens, 
 and equality of rights". It was avowedly a govern- 
 ment of efficiency, and, moreover, it was a govern-
 
 88 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 ment of conciliation ; all Frenchmen could hope for 
 employment, and all internal discords were healed. 
 Thus equality, the passion of all Frenchmen, was 
 secured, and the laws civil and criminal dealt equal 
 justice to all. The Legion of Honour symbolized 
 equality, and was the reward of every kind of talent. 
 
 Within a few years of Brumaire Napoleon had 
 effected a complete revolution in the administration 
 of France. That administration became centralized, 
 and " its stability has survived every political crisis ". 
 He founded the University, he gave France the 
 Code Napoleon, he established the Bank of France, 
 he inaugurated the Come'die Franchise, he arranged 
 the Concordat. In place of the chaos in which France 
 was plunged in 1799 he established order, he regu- 
 lated education, he set on foot an administrative 
 system. No doubt the Napoleonic reorganization 
 was, as Taine declares, imperfect, but nevertheless it 
 remains the framework of French society, and has 
 outlived numerous upheavals and political crises. 
 "Napoleon," writes Mr. Bodley, "seemed to be 
 called into being a miraculous or at all events an ab- 
 normal figure to save the existence of France ; and 
 that his work has lasted without any serious effort to 
 upset it shows how good it was." 1 
 
 During the Consulate a new Court had been 
 
 gradually formed at the Tuileries, and the Paris 
 
 salons again became prominent and Paris life became 
 
 as gay as ever. Thus the way was prepared for a 
 
 1 Bodley, "France," Vol. I, p. 109.
 
 JOSEPHINE AT MALMAISON 
 
 FROM THE PAINTING BY J'RUD'HOX AT VERSAILLES
 
 THE CONSULATE AND EMPEROR 89 
 
 rapid development of the nobility of the Empire. 
 " An aristocracy is necessary to every nation," was 
 Napoleon's defence of the growth of dignitaries, civil 
 and military, during his rule in France. Moreover, 
 he asserted that the way to honour was open to every- 
 one. "During my reign," he asserted, "every 
 Frenchman could say to himself : ' If I deserve it I 
 shall be Prime Minister, Grand Officer of the Empire, 
 Baron, Count, Duke, or even King '. There was no 
 obstacle for anyone." By granting equality he could 
 say that the nobility was the people's nobility. 1 
 
 Before the close of 1804 Napoleon had conferred 
 immeasurable benefits upon the French nation. It 
 trusted him fully, and though desirous of peace, soon 
 reconciled itself to war with its hated enemy Great 
 Britain. 
 
 It was in fact not till after 1 808, when the brilliant 
 romance of Napoleon's early victories had worn off, 
 that the spirit of moderation, which marked the temper 
 of the French people in 1799 and the following years, 
 began to revolt against the later extravagancies of 
 the Imperial policy. 
 
 CHIEF DATES 
 
 The Revolution of Brumaire . . . November, 1799. 
 
 Bonaparte First Consul .... December, 1799. 
 
 Election of Pope Pius VII 1800. 
 
 Marengo . . . . . . . 14 June, 1800. 
 
 Hochstadt 19 June, 1800. 
 
 Treaty of Ildefonso . . . . i October, 1800. 
 
 1 Gonnard, " The Exile of St. Helena," p. 1 24.
 
 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Hohenlinden .... 
 
 The Second Armed Neutrality 
 
 The Treaty of LuneVille .... 
 
 Battle of Copenhagen ..... 
 
 Battle of Alexandria ..... 
 
 Death of Paul I, Accession of Alexander I 
 Treaty of Florence ..... 
 
 The Treaty of Badajos .... 
 
 The Concordat ...... 
 
 The Peace of Amiens ..... 
 
 Napoleon Consul for life .... 
 
 Creation of the Legion of Honour 
 Outbreak of war between England and France 
 French invasion of Hanover 
 Cadoudal's plot, execution of d'Enghien 
 
 . 2 December, 1800. 
 1 6- 1 8 December, 1800. 
 . 9 February, 1801. 
 8 March, 1801. 
 21 March, 1801. 
 24 March, 1801. 
 28 March, 1801. 
 6 June, 1 80 1. 
 15 July, 1801. 
 March, 1802. 
 May, 1802. 
 May, 1802. 
 May, 1803. 
 May, 1803. 
 March, 1804.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 
 
 Reopening of the war with England The camp at Boulogne 
 War with Austria and Russia Trafalgar Austerlitz The 
 Treaty of Pressburg The German Revolution Maida The end 
 of the Holy Roman Empire Joseph's rule in Naples Jena 
 Napoleon supreme in Germany His family policy The 
 Berlin Decree The Continental System. 
 
 HP* HE years 1803-5 are of enormous importance 
 in European history. They saw the opening 
 of the final struggle between Napoleon and Great 
 Britain ; they witnessed the slow beginnings of a new 
 life in Germany rendered possible by the revolution 
 effected in that country under the influence of the 
 First Consul. It is no longer possible to accept the 
 view of the late M. Sorel that Napoleon's wars after 
 1803 were "the logical, the necessary consequence of 
 the legitimate desire of France to secure her ' natural 
 limits,' and of the determination of Europe to deprive 
 her of all territory acquired after 1792". 
 
 It is equally impossible to assert that "after 1802 
 Napoleon did but continue the policy of the Directory, 
 of the Convention, of Louis XIV". It is probably 
 nearer the truth to say that Napoleon recognized that 
 
 91
 
 92 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 in England he found the irreconcilable opponent to 
 his determination to give France what he considered 
 as her natural frontiers. So long as he regarded 
 Holland and Belgium as lying within those natural 
 frontiers, so long would he find in England an irrecon- 
 cilable enemy. After 1803 Napoleon was by no 
 means content to aim at the objects desired by the 
 Convention ; he determined not merely " to restore 
 to France her 'natural limits,' but to make conquests 
 beyond her borders ". 
 
 With the opening of the struggle with Great 
 Britain, France entered upon a period of war which 
 continued till the entry of the allies into Paris in 
 1814, followed by the departure of Napoleon to Elba. 
 During the years from 1803-14, the war between 
 France and Great Britain never ceased, and conse- 
 quently there is much to be said for the view that 
 the " great drama of the Napoleonic period " centred 
 round that struggle. At the same time it is probably 
 true that Napoleon regarded the war with Great 
 Britain as merely a temporary obstacle to the realiza- 
 tion of his Eastern schemes the establishment of 
 French influence in Turkey; the partition of its 
 dominions, being accompanied by the setting up of a 
 subservient Sultan at the head of a small kingdom en- 
 circling Constantinople ; the establishment of French 
 supremacy in the Mediterranean, and the conquest of 
 India. 
 
 Till 1811 such appears to be the main object, the 
 ground plan of Napoleon's policy.
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 93 
 
 While waiting for a favourable concatenation of 
 events which should enable him to emulate and sur- 
 pass Alexander, he was led by his wars with Austria, 
 Prussia, and Russia to emulate Charles the Great, and 
 to continue and develop the policy of Francis I, of 
 Richelieu, and of Louis XIV towards Germany. 
 His conquests in Central Europe were followed by 
 the careful organization of the States included in the 
 Confederation of the Rhine, and of Italy. 
 
 His supremacy in Germany and Italy necessitated 
 the establishment of rulers in the various parts of 
 Europe which acknowledged his sway, and therefore 
 he inaugurated a family policy which was fully de- 
 veloped in 1810 when his brothers were ruling in 
 Holland, Spain, and Westphalia Northern Italy 
 under a stepson ; Southern Italy under a brother-in- 
 law ; Tuscany under a sister. 1 The rulers of Bavaria, 
 Baden, and Wiirtemberg had all married relations 
 of Napoleon whose son, the King of Rome, was 
 intended to govern Italy. This family policy had, 
 however, for its chief object the overthrow of Great 
 Britain. That accomplished the Emperor would be 
 able to carry out his Oriental schemes. 
 
 No one reading the account of Napoleon's doings 
 between the opening of the negotiations at Amiens 
 and the outbreak of war in 1803 can accept his as- 
 sertion, made when a prisoner at St. Helena, that he 
 was pacific at heart, that he was fired by the benevolent 
 intention of bestowing liberal institutions upon the 
 1 Fisher, " Bonapartism," p. 45.
 
 94 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 reorganized nations of Europe, and that his admirable 
 intentions had been frustrated by " the implacable 
 hatred " of the rulers of Europe wicked men who 
 had " never ceased to make war on France and her 
 principles ". 
 
 At St. Helena Napoleon insisted at great length 
 and with much emphasis that England forced war 
 upon him in 1803. He desired "general peace as 
 the only condition of the regeneration of Europe," but 
 from the Campo Formio settlement a coalition " fostered 
 and upheld by England," who "was paying Europe 
 for trying to kill France," existed either publicly or 
 privately. He declared, moreover, that England, 
 aware that peace would bring to France prosperity 
 and render her the metropolis of the world, insisted 
 upon a renewal of war in I8O3- 1 Even the Peace of 
 Amiens, he asserted, was due solely to the loyalty of 
 Cornwallis, and was concluded against the wishes of 
 the English Ministry. " I honestly thought at Amiens," 
 Napoleon said, " that the fate of France, of Europe, 
 and of myself was settled and that war was ended. It 
 was the English Cabinet which rekindled everything." 
 Ignoring the question of Holland, he endeavoured 
 to prove that the retention of Malta by England was 
 the real cause of the war in i8o3- 2 
 
 He averred, moreover, at St. Helena that in 1803 
 he had been driven into universal war, and into 
 assuming the Dictatorship of Europe, in order to 
 
 1 Gonnard, "The Exile of St. Helena," pp. 146, 147. 
 
 2 Ibid. p. 148.
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 95 
 
 obtain that peace which he always so sorely desired. 
 While making these assertions Napoleon omitted to 
 add that though he desired peace in 1802 and 1803, 
 he wanted it on his own terms. He further omitted 
 to point out that at the time of the rupture of the 
 Peace of Amiens he showed no intention of being 
 satisfied with the possession of the "natural" boun- 
 daries of France the Rhine, the Alps, and the 
 Pyrenees. 1 Therefore such assertions as the following 
 may sound plausible, but they are historically worth- 
 less. " I honestly thought at Amiens," he declared 
 at St. Helena, "that the fate of France, of Europe, 
 and of myself was settled, and that war was 
 ended. If England and France could have acted 
 together, how much good we might have done ! We 
 should have brought about the emancipation of all 
 nations, we should have established peace and pro- 
 sperity everywhere." But in all these reflections he 
 makes no allusion to his aggressions in Switzerland 
 and elsewhere during the period of peace, or to his 
 continual occupation of Holland contrary to the terms 
 of the Treaty of Luneville. 
 
 In 1803 Napoleon had by the continuance of his 
 policy of aggression, carried on during a period of 
 peace, made the reopening of war inevitable. That 
 war was to be not only a war of propaganda, and a 
 war of aggression, but a duel between Great Britain 
 and France, during which Napoleon eventually 
 
 1 Gonnard, " The Exile of St. Helena," pp. 149-53.
 
 96 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 found himself faced by the new force of militant 
 democracy. 
 
 By Article 10 of the Treaty of Luneville Napoleon 
 guaranteed the independence of the Batavian Republic. 
 This guarantee was repeated in Article 2 of the 
 Convention of the Hague. This evacuation was to 
 take place as soon as peace was concluded with Eng- 
 land. As soon, therefore, as the Peace of Amiens had 
 been signed the British Government were justified in 
 expecting that the evacuation would take place. To 
 England the independence of Holland was a matter 
 of vital necessity. So long as Holland was in the 
 hands of Napoleon, the Cape of Good Hope, lately 
 restored to the Dutch, might at any moment " become 
 the base of operations of French cruisers and priva- 
 teers preying upon English East Indiamen V 
 
 Napoleon's object in 1 802 and onwards was simply 
 to subjugate all Europe in order to destroy Great 
 Britain's trade, and to exhaust her so completely that 
 there should be no existing check to his scheme of 
 universal empire. Like Alexander the Great, he 
 desired not only to conquer Europe but to subjugate 
 India. Like Charles the Great, he was resolved 
 while executing his schemes for the establishment of a 
 world-empire to carry out a policy of family aggran- 
 disement. In Holland, Spain, Westphalia, and Italy 
 he endeavoured, as has already been stated, when at 
 the height of his power in 1 8 10, to establish his relations 
 as sub-kings, who should look to Paris for direction. 
 
 1 Coquelle, " England and Napoleon," p. 18.
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE. 1803-1806 97 
 
 The action of Napoleon in forcing Great Britain 
 to plunge into war proved in the end to be a fatal 
 mistake. And apparently no one realized more 
 clearly than did Napoleon in his calmer moments, the 
 necessity for a period of peace in order to complete 
 his preparations. 
 
 Somewhat naturally French writers have endea- 
 voured to fix the blame for the reopening of the war 
 upon Great Britain. The breach of the peace, they 
 say, was due to the treacherous refusal of the English 
 to evacuate Malta, though the French had withdrawn 
 from various positions in South Italy. Thus they 
 assert that while the French had loyally fulfilled their 
 engagements, the English had in a most dishonest 
 manner refused to carry out their promises. Unless 
 the ordinary reader has a close and accurate know- 
 ledge of the history of the time, he is liable to be de- 
 ceived by such an inaccurate presentation of the facts. 
 The evacuation of Southern Italy was not a matter 
 with which the Treaty of Amiens had anything to do. 
 That evacuation had been arranged between Napoleon 
 and the King of Naples by the Treaty of Florence 
 signed on 28 March, 1801. 
 
 About the annexation of Piedmont to France, 
 and the invasion of Switzerland both effected during 
 the period of peace the same French writers say 
 nothing. Nor do they seem to realize that the con- 
 tinued occupation of Holland, in direct contravention 
 to the terms of the Treaty made by Napoleon with 
 Austria, could not be tolerated by Great Britain. 
 
 7
 
 98 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 That Power had shortly after the Treaty of Amiens 
 showed her desire for peace in an unmistakable 
 manner. She had restored Minorca to Spain, and 
 Martinique, Goree, Saint Pierre, Miquelon, and the 
 Isle of Saint Marcouf to France. Moreover, she had 
 not only withdrawn from Elba, but had declared her 
 willingness to surrender Malta. Before, however, 
 Malta had been evacuated British Ministers became 
 convinced of Napoleon's bad faith as seen in his 
 annexation of Piedmont, his occupation of Switzer- 
 land, and his refusal to evacuate Holland. 
 
 It is difficult to explain or understand Napoleon's 
 conduct, when it seems undoubted that he desired a 
 continuance of peace in order to develop the internal 
 resources of his country, and by this means to place 
 France in the foremost position in Europe. That he 
 really recognized the advantages to be gained by 
 France from a prolongation of peace seems to be 
 proved from the fact that England, not France, de- 
 livered the ultimatum in the spring of 1803 an d 
 declared war. 
 
 The real explanation of the outbreak of war would 
 seem to be found in Napoleon's failure to understand 
 the character of the English nation ; his failure to 
 appreciate the depth of the national resentment in 
 England at his actions and general attitude, and his 
 belief that the Addington Cabinet was incapable of 
 any active resistance to his policy. 
 
 He never realized that his overbearing and in- 
 sulting conduct increased the risk of a fresh outbreak
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 99 
 
 of war between England and France. In the 
 autumn of 1802 he was forced to recognize the failure 
 of his ambitious projects connected with Louisiana and 
 the Mississippi, for the success of which the subjuga- 
 tion of San Domingo was necessary. The failure in 
 San Domingo rendered it imperative that the issues 
 between England and France should be settled in 
 Europe. Undismayed at his failure in the West, 
 Napoleon redoubled his efforts in Europe. In answer 
 to the Dutch he declared that he would not withdraw 
 his troops from Holland till England had carried out 
 the terms of the Treaty of Amiens and had ceased 
 her intrigues at The Hague. He was resolved to get 
 Malta into his hands and to use it as a base for his 
 operations in the East, and only too late realized that 
 the English occupation of Malta was regarded by his 
 enemies as a set-off to his occupation of Holland and 
 Switzerland, to his annexation of Piedmont, and to 
 his creation of the kingdom of Etruria, and of the 
 Ligurian Republic both of which were under the 
 control of France. Moreover, he never appreciated 
 the depth of the hostile feeling to him which was 
 aroused in England by his virtual prohibition of the 
 entry of English manufactures into France. It was dis- 
 tinctly the interest of Great Britain to renew the war, 
 and the opportunity of tearing up the Treaty of Amiens 
 was gladly seized upon by many leading Englishmen. 1 
 
 1 In his preface to " Napoleon's Men and Methods," by A. 
 Kielland, Mr. Oscar Browning writes : " There can be no doubt 
 but that it (the Treaty of Amiens) was broken by England ".
 
 ioo THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Sebastiani's report which appeared early in 1803 
 had stirred up the indignation of the English Govern- 
 ment, which in face of the open avowal of the Em- 
 peror's designs in the East became more determined 
 than ever to retain its hold on Malta as a check to 
 Napoleon's projects. As early as the autumn of 1 802 
 Napoleon had sent Brune to Constantinople in order 
 to re-establish French influence in Turkey. Thus, 
 while the strain of the Emperor's trade prohibitions 
 increased the tension between the two countries, and 
 the continual occupation of Holland by French troops 
 rendered war on the part of England justifiable and 
 unavoidable, the appearance of Sebastiani's report 
 rendered war wellnigh inevitable. 
 
 On 6 March, 1803, Napoleon had despatched 
 General Decaen with an insignificant force to the 
 East Indies, and till his return peace was essential for 
 the development of his plans. 
 
 Decaen's instructions were, we are told, " drawn 
 up in such a manner as to make it clear that war was 
 not anticipated till about September, I8O4". 1 On n 
 March, 1803, however, Napoleon had learnt with 
 profound irritation that England was thoroughly 
 alarmed at his threats, and was arming in order to 
 preserve Malta, and generally to be prepared in case 
 of the fresh outbreak of war. 
 
 Napoleon was undoubtedly taken aback at the 
 English attitude. Decaen could not reach the East 
 Indies for some weeks, and upon a declaration of war 
 1 " Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, p. 209.
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 101 
 
 might with his whole force be captured. Moreover, 
 the French fleet was by no means ready for war, and 
 a considerable portion of it was operating in the West 
 Indies against San Domingo. Nevertheless, in order 
 probably to be ready for all emergencies, troops were 
 at once collected, naval preparations were made, and 
 England's perfidy was denounced to the rulers of 
 Spain, Russia, and Prussia. In fact, before the close 
 of March, all arrangements were made for operations 
 in Hanover and elsewhere should war suddenly break 
 out. 
 
 What, too, increased the tension between the two 
 countries towards the close of 1802 and in the early 
 weeks of 1803, and rendered the preservation of 
 peace wellnigh impossible, was the general belief in 
 England that Napoleon meditated an early invasion 
 of the country. On this point English opinion was, 
 however, probably wrong, though Napoleon's violent 
 language to Lord Whitworth, and his restless ambi- 
 tion, fully justified the apprehensions felt by the 
 English people. 
 
 Napoleon had probably no idea that his menaces 
 and talk of invading England would be taken seriously. 
 It must have been obvious to him that France re- 
 quired a period of tranquillity. Moreover, as has been 
 pointed out, time was required for the development 
 of his plans for the conquest of India, for the over- 
 throw of the English power in the East, and for the 
 strengthening of the fleet, which was in a disorganized 
 condition.
 
 102 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 " L'Angleterre! Voila la racine des discordes 
 Europiennes. " By these words Napoleon from the time 
 of the rupture of the Peace of Amiens endeavoured to 
 explain and to extenuate his endeavours to dominate 
 the whole of Europe. From 18 May, 1803, the date 
 of the reopening of the war with England, to 1814, 
 41 all his wars with Austria and Prussia, with Spain 
 and Russia, which acted with such solvent power 
 upon the old fabric of Europe, rose out of the war 
 with England and are connected with it "- 1 Before 
 the actual declaration of war between England and 
 France in 1803, Napoleon had indeed shown his pre- 
 science by quietly preparing to occupy Hanover. In 
 April, 1803, troops, as has already been stated, were 
 massed at Nimeguen, and no sooner had war with 
 Great Britain begun than General Mortier at the 
 head of 22,000 troops entered Hanover. Weakness 
 prevailed at Hanoverian governmental head -quarters, 
 and on 8 June the Convention of Suhlingen, followed 
 on 5 July by the Elbe Convention, placed Hanover 
 in the hands of Napoleon. Hanover, by this rapid 
 movement of troops, so characteristic of Napoleon, 
 was closed to British trade, and moreover found itself 
 compelled to support the army of occupation. 2 The 
 first step towards the establishment of the continental 
 system was thus taken, and proved the forerunner of 
 a policy which aimed at hermetically closing Europe 
 to Great Britain's commerce. 
 
 1 Fisher, " Napoleonic Statesmanship : Germany," p. 49. 
 
 2 See Ward, " England and Hanover ".
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 103 
 
 Three days after the Convention of Suhlingen 
 had been signed Decaen, escorted by Admiral Linois, 
 arrived before Pondicherry, but the British authorities 
 in Madras refused to hand over the town. 
 
 Before the end of the year Arthur Wellesley over- 
 threw the Mahrattas at Assaye and Argaum, while 
 Lake overthrew Scindiah's forces and occupied Delhi. 
 
 " In three months the results of the toil of Scin- 
 diah, the restless ambition of Holkar, the training 
 of European officers and the secret intrigues of 
 Napoleon were all swept to the winds." Perron, a 
 French adventurer who had drilled the armies of the 
 Mahratta chiefs, returned to France in disgrace. Na- 
 poleon's disappointment at the failure of his hopes 
 was deep, though Decaen and Linois, who escaped 
 to the lie de France, managed during the ensuing 
 years to inflict serious losses upon British trade by 
 their frequent captures of merchantmen. 
 
 No man in Europe was more fitted than Napoleon 
 for the immense struggles which lay before him. His 
 mind was constantly revolving plans, the success of 
 which depended entirely on his military ability and 
 vigilance. Napoleon's power of work was extraordin- 
 ary, and the account of his activity as given by Meneval 
 fills one with astonishment. He often called his 
 secretary in the middle of the night, or at four in the 
 morning, when he would dictate letters or sign docu- 
 ments. His ideas, we are told, developed, as he 
 
 l Rose, "The Life of Napoleon I," Vol. I, pp. 377, 378. 
 London, George Bell & Sons, 1902.
 
 104 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 dictated, with "an abundance and a clearness which 
 showed that his mind was firmly riveted to the subject 
 with which he was dealing ; they sprang from his head 
 even as Minerva sprang, fully armed, from the head of 
 Jupiter ". l During his labours he would often send for 
 sherbet and ices, and the work finished he would return 
 to bed. He had most elaborate reports supplied by 
 Ministers of War and Marine, and these he so thor- 
 oughly mastered that he always knew the exact strength 
 of each regiment, the positions which they were to 
 occupy in time of war, and the places at which they should 
 be stationed in the time of peace. He loved to study 
 these reports, especially those relating to the ships of 
 the navy. His memory, however, was so retentive 
 that he knew better than his Ministers the composition 
 of each corps. His memory was equally good with 
 regard to places or persons, and his power of concen- 
 tration upon a given subject was most remarkable. 
 He rarely wrote himself, but preferred to dictate his 
 wishes to a secretary. He had no difficulty in finding 
 words with which to express his thoughts, and usually 
 his words were alive with fire and energy. He was 
 equally at home in dealing with commercial, financial, 
 diplomatic, military, or governmental matters, and could 
 pass from one subject to another without any difficulty. 
 Fortunately for himself he could go to sleep at will, 
 and he would often spend whole days without appar- 
 ently doing any work. 2 
 
 1 De Me"neval, " Memoirs of Napoleon," Vol. I, p. 368. 
 Hutchinson, London. 
 
 z lbid. Vol. I, pp. 374, 376.
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 105 
 
 Much of the success which attended his projects 
 was due to the enormous care with which he made his 
 preparations. Nothing was left to luck. His plans 
 were subjected to the closest scrutiny, and by his 
 calculations and arrangements adverse chances were 
 minimized. It would have been surprising if his plans 
 which had been prepared with so much skill and care 
 had failed. These remarks, however, are only true 
 with regard to Napoleon's campaigns in Germany and 
 to some extent in Italy. His campaigns were only 
 successful so long as they did not clash with national 
 feeling. Against national feeling, and against Great 
 Britain's sea power, his most careful calculations ended 
 in failure. 
 
 During many years he entirely under-estimated the 
 immense strength which Great Britain wielded through 
 her naval supremacy, and he entirely failed to ap- 
 preciate the power which a country possesses when 
 once national feeling is aroused. 
 
 The question whether Napoleon really intended 
 to invade England at this time, 1803-5, has been 
 fully discussed by many writers. 
 
 Evidence for and against has been produced, and 
 even now historians are divided in opinion. There 
 seems little doubt that in England there was a wide- 
 spread belief in the reality of the danger. In spite 
 of the view of Bourrienne and Miot de Melito that 
 " the invasion scheme was only a feint intended to 
 dissimulate his (Napoleon's) plans of conquest on the 
 Continent," most historians to-day prefer to accept the
 
 io6 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 view of Mneval, Napoleon's secretary, corroborated 
 by Napoleon himself when a prisoner at St. Helena, 
 that the invasion of England was intended. Captain 
 Mahan has no doubt that Napoleon's invasion schemes 
 were certainly not "a blind," and agrees with the 
 opinions of Ney, Marmont, and Davoust ; while as 
 late as 1906 Dr. Rose, inhis introduction to "Napoleon's 
 Last Voyages," declares that the Emperor's " extensive 
 preparations on the northern coast " make it " difficult 
 to believe that he did not really intend to strike at 
 London ". In this view he is also supported by 
 Barante (a friend of Daru, Secretary-General of the 
 Minister of War who was with Napoleon at Boulogne), 
 and who, after calling attention to the enormous pre- 
 parations made at Boulogne, suggests that "Des le 
 commencement de 1805, ^ tenait en reserve un autre 
 vaste entreprise pour la substituer a la descente si 
 elle (la descente en Angleterre), ne pouvait etre tente. 
 La grand armee campde sur les cotes de France de- 
 puis Brest jusqu'a Amsterdam serait dirige contre 
 1'Autriche." 1 
 
 Whatever view is held with regard to the proba- 
 bility of an invasion of England, the Boulogne army, 
 at any rate, proved an irresistible weapon in the 
 hands of Napoleon during his campaign against Aus- 
 tria in the autumn of 1805. 
 
 At the time of the opening of the campaign Great 
 Britain was in a position far different from that which 
 
 1 See "Quarterly Review," No. 415, p. 435.
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 107 
 
 she occupied at the time of the accession to power of 
 the Addington Ministry. 
 
 The year 1803, which saw the rupture of the 
 Peace of Amiens, was remarkable in many ways. 
 Wellesley's victories of Assay e and Argaum over the 
 Mahrattas secured the British position in India from 
 all chance of immediate downfall, while in Ireland 
 the arrest and execution of Robert Emmet averted 
 all danger of any serious rising. In the following 
 year Pitt formed his second Ministry, and at once sup- 
 ported with enthusiasm the Russian proposals for the 
 formation of a European Coalition against France. 
 
 During the period when an expedition from 
 Boulogne to England seemed feasible Napoleon fre- 
 quently revolved in his mind the question of an 
 expedition to India. The choice of a general cap- 
 able of leading such an expedition was difficult, and 
 while thinking the matter over he often regretted 
 the death of Desaix at Marengo. That general had 
 just those political gifts which fitted him for carry- 
 ing out an undertaking as stupendous as an expedi- 
 tion to India would prove to be. 
 
 Meneval, whose secretarial work brought him into 
 close contact with Napoleon, has no doubt with regard 
 to Napoleon's intention of invading England. He 
 himself had little doubt that such an invasion would 
 be eminently successful. One victory would place 
 London in the hands of the Emperor, and in three 
 months the British Isles would be completely con- 
 quered.
 
 io8 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 It was only, he says, the unfortunate blunder of 
 Admiral Villeneuve in putting back into Cadiz instead 
 of coming to join the Brest fleet, and Austria's 
 declaration of war, which led to the abandonment of 
 this great enterprise. 
 
 During the early months of 1805 Napoleon had 
 not been idle. The success of his projects for the 
 invasion of England depended upon the ability of the 
 French admirals to deceive Nelson and to concen- 
 trate in the English Channel. Meanwhile, his 
 presence was demanded in Italy, where the position 
 of the French required strengthening. On 10 May, 
 1805, Napoleon entered Milan. His journey, we 
 read, was one triumphal procession, and while in 
 Milan his salon was crowded by diplomatists. On 26 
 May he was crowned with the iron crown of Italy, 
 and a herald proclaimed him as " Napoleon Emperor 
 of the French and King of Italy ". 
 
 Realizing that the possession of Genoa was indis- 
 pensable in his struggle with England, he united the 
 city and its possessions to his Empire and virtually 
 opened the continental blockade. While in Italy, 
 however, his great project of an invasion of England 
 was seen to be impossible owing to the activity of 
 the English fleet, and the consequent failure of Ville- 
 neuve to reach the English Channel. 
 
 Meanwhile, news of the formation of a great 
 European Coalition reached the ears of Napoleon who 
 on 8 July left Turin, arriving in Paris on the nth. 
 Till 12 August, however, he clung to his hope that
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 109 
 
 an invasion of England would be possible. After 
 that day he realized that his project of an invasion of 
 England was impossible, and he turned his attention 
 to the consideration of "a continental war". On 
 12 August he wrote that unless Austria disarmed he 
 would march against her. 
 
 This decision marked the beginning of what was 
 an all-important development in Napoleon's plans. 
 He had already resolved to become master of the 
 Mediterranean. The overthrow of Austria was the 
 first step towards the supremacy of Napoleon, not 
 only in Germany but also over the Mediterranean. 
 It marked the second stage in the revolution which 
 had already broken out in Central Europe. 
 
 Simultaneously with the beginning of the life-and- 
 death struggle with Great Britain had begun the re- 
 construction of Germany. That reconstruction was 
 virtually a revolution, the outbreak of which facilitated 
 to an enormous degree Napoleon's conquest of Austria 
 and later of Prussia. In the case of France it must be 
 remembered that it was not till she had experienced 
 more than ten years of struggles within and without, 
 after the revolution of 1789, that she found under the 
 government of the Consulate an opportunity of estab- 
 lishing a well-ordered government, of reorganizing and 
 placing on a sound basis her finances, and of effecting 
 a satisfactory settlement of the relations of Church and 
 State. 
 
 The French Revolution was a movement which 
 occupied several years and passed through several
 
 no THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 stages. Similarly the Revolution of Germany did 
 not take place in one year, but also passed through 
 several stages and was marked by four distinct events. 
 These events have been summarized as follows : 
 
 1. The Principal Resolution of the Imperial Deputa- 
 tion which, asserted in 1803, secularized the Empire 
 and inaugurated the absorption of the small by the 
 large States. 
 
 2. The war of the Third Coalition. The Peace 
 of Pressburg found Austria at the mercy of Napoleon 
 who had been aided by Baden, Bavaria, and Wur- 
 temberg. 
 
 3. The creation of the Confederation of the 
 Rhine, 1806, which marked the final end of the Holy 
 Roman Empire. 
 
 4. The formal abdication of the Emperor Francis 
 II from his position as Emperor in August, 1806. 
 
 " The French Revolution," writes Mr. Fisher in 
 his " Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship in Ger- 
 many " (p. 22), "supplied the electric shock which 
 woke Germany from her lethargy," while M. Joseph 
 Reinach, the author of " De 1'influence historique de 
 la France sur rAllemagne," says the same thing in 
 even more emphatic language : " La Revolution 
 fran9aise est pour rAllemagne ce que le Nil est pour 
 1'Egypte, le fleuve createur qui couvre la veille terre 
 de ses flots, la f6conde et fait sortir les moissons de 
 son sein". 1 
 
 In 1789 and the years immediately following 
 1 See "Quarterly Review," No. 415, p. 440.
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 in 
 
 neither the German Government nor German society 
 was prepared to welcome the French Revolution, 
 though in no country was a complete Revolution 
 more necessary than in Germany. 
 
 Under the influence, however, of the French 
 Revolution, and of Napoleon's victorious campaigns 
 which ended at Campo Formio and Luneville, the 
 political map of Germany became completely changed. 
 The old ideas which had for ages dominated the small 
 German principalities disappeared, and gradually a 
 new conception of the meaning of such words as 
 Patriotism and State were evolved. A national 
 literature began to spring up, and gradually the literary 
 supremacy in Europe which had been enjoyed by 
 England during the early years, and by France 
 during the later years of the eighteenth century, 
 passed to Germany. Equally important was the 
 effect of the Revolution of 1803 u P n the map of 
 Germany. Over 300 small States disappeared, and 
 when the Holy Roman Empire definitely came to an 
 end in 1806, Germany consisted of Austria and 
 Prussia, and a number of secondary States of which 
 Bavaria, Saxony, and Hesse were the chief. This 
 Revolution, as drastic as any which had hitherto been 
 effected in Europe, was thus due in the first place to 
 the conquests of Napoleon and to the selfish policy of 
 Austria which had long since ceased to recognize its 
 Imperial responsibilities. The Revolution was also 
 furthered by the absence of any national feeling in 
 Germany, and by the fatal neutrality of Prussia
 
 ii2 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 during the last four months of 1805 when the des- 
 tinies of Germany hung in the balance. 
 
 The conduct of Prussia provided indeed ample 
 evidence of the necessity of a revolution, and it is 
 difficult to avoid the conviction that Napoleon's vic- 
 tories at Austerlitz and Jena, and his consequent 
 supremacy in Germany, were in the end unspeakably 
 beneficial to the whole of Central Europe. 
 
 In 1803 Germany, like France in 1789, definitely 
 began her revolution, that revolution which first and 
 foremost demanded the destruction of the Holy 
 Roman Empire with its three centres, political at 
 Vienna, legislative at Ratisbon, and judicial at 
 Wetzlar, and with its division of Germany into 
 circles for administrative, taxative, and judicial pur- 
 poses a revolution which had been begun at Campo 
 Formio and LuneVille. It was now definitely pro- 
 claimed to the world in February, 1803, by the 
 Principal Resolution of the Imperial Deputation. 
 
 Hitherto there had been little evidence of a re- 
 volutionary spirit in Germany ; but at the same time 
 there was no trace of any national feeling. This 
 absence of the feeling of nationality had rendered 
 German opinion indifferent to the partial disappear- 
 ance of many of the ecclesiastical States before 1803. 
 
 The revolution which was begun in Germany in 
 1803 implied the secularization and Protestantization 
 of the Empire and a complete change in Austria's 
 position in Germany. 
 
 The peculiar influence which Austria had hitherto
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 113 
 
 exercised in the affairs of Germany was at once de- 
 stroyed, but Austria's power was thereby strengthened 
 and consolidated. Her territory, too, became more 
 compact, though the position which hitherto had given 
 her "a natural authority and pre-eminence in the 
 affairs of the Empire " was taken from her. 
 
 Austria's position in Germany had hitherto been 
 of a most remarkable and peculiar character. Her 
 rulers since 1438 (if we except the years 1742-5 
 when a Bavarian Elector had been Emperor) had 
 been Emperors as well as Austrian monarchs, and 
 her connexion with Germany was of a most intricate 
 character. The majority in the Electoral College 
 had been Roman Catholic ; she had held a majority 
 in the Imperial Diet. She had thus for centuries 
 wielded a " natural authority and pre-eminence in the 
 affairs of the Empire ". 
 
 All this was now changed, and the revolution 
 which gave her a more compact territory lost her this 
 position of pre-eminence in Germany. The Chamber 
 of Electors henceforth was to number ten ; of its mem- 
 bers, the Archbishop of Mainz remained the one 
 ecclesiastical elector, though he was transplanted to 
 Ratisbon, the new Electors being the rulers of Baden, 
 Wiirtemberg, Hesse- Cassel, and Salzburg. 
 
 In the Chamber of Princes the majority passed 
 from the hands of the Roman Catholics into those of 
 the Protestants, from the South to the North, from 
 the party of Austria to the party of Prussia. Owing 
 to the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine by the 
 
 8
 
 ii4 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 French that Chamber of Princes now only numbered 
 eighty-two instead of a hundred. Of these twenty- 
 six (instead of as of old thirty-four) votes were 
 spiritual, and fifty-six (instead of sixty) temporal. 
 The Third Chamber, that of Imperial towns, of 
 which only six (Hamburg, Bremen, Llibeck, Frank- 
 fort, Augsburg, Nuremberg) existed, now disappeared. 
 
 Thus the Empire was definitely secularized, for 
 the spiritual princes were for the most part non-existent, 
 the temporal princes having taken possession of many 
 of the secularized bishoprics. The majority, too, was 
 now definitely Protestant, the Protestants numbering 
 fifty-three and the Roman Catholics eighty-three. 
 Thus with the strengthening of Prussia, Bavaria, 
 Baden, and Wiirtemberg, the whole internal balance 
 of power was overturned, and it was evident that 
 Germany was nearing the end of her mediaeval 
 constitution. 
 
 The^rj-/ stage in the German Revolution was thus 
 accomplished, the Empire became secularized and 
 Protestantized ; and the pre-eminence of Austria in 
 Germany was undermined. It only required the 
 Austerlitz campaign to complete the final stages in a 
 revolution which entirely changed the character and 
 political position of Germany. 
 
 On 23 August, 1805, the French troops received 
 the order to march. Napoleon's decision had not been 
 taken too soon. The long period of inaction had been 
 accompanied by the increase of military offences, by 
 desertion, and insubordination. For some two years
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 115 
 
 the army had experienced repeated disappointments, 
 in striking contrast to the occasional periods of eager 
 expectation, and the general condition of the troops 
 was becoming serious. With the order to march the 
 moral tone was at once restored, and full of hope and 
 determination the army set out for the Danube. 
 While Napoleon was engaged on the Austerlitz cam- 
 paign, his brother Joseph was his representative in 
 Paris, and during the next few months the latter re- 
 ceived some interesting letters from the Emperor. 
 On 23 September Napoleon left Paris, and from 25 
 September to i October was at Strassburg ; on i 
 October he was at Wurzburg on the Neckar, and there 
 on 2 October he heard at the Court Theatre the German 
 " Don Juan," the music of which he much admired. On 
 9 October his head-quarters were at Zusmarshausen, 
 where was fought, in 1648, one of the last battles of the 
 Thirty Years' War, and on the evening of that day he 
 reached Munich, having surrounded Ulm with his 
 troops. 
 
 The surrender of that city by Mack followed on 
 20 October, 1 but Napoleon, who on 27 October was 
 still at Munich, now realized that the equivocal conduct 
 of Prussia might develop into open hostility. Never- 
 theless he showed no feeling of nervousness as to the 
 
 1 A week after the capitulation of Ulm, Captain J. W. Wright, 
 R.N., who had been taken prisoner in 1804 at Quiberon Bay, came 
 to a violent end in Paris. His death, like that of the Due d'Enghien, 
 has been described as one of the episodes in Napoleon's career 
 which proved " most repugnant to British opinion ".
 
 n6 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 result of the campaign. " Before a fortnight," he wrote, 
 " I shall have opposed to me 100,000 Prussians and 
 60,000 Austrians, sent from Italy or from the other 
 reserves of that kingdom. I shall conquer them, but 
 probably not without loss." 1 
 
 On 30 October he was at Braunau, " one of the keys 
 of Austria, well fortified and full of magazines," and 
 on 15 November he arrived at Vienna, where he 
 captured vast stores of ammunition, 2000 pieces of 
 cannon and 100,000 muskets. 
 
 The weather during October had been cold, with 
 heavy snow and hard frost. So far Napoleon had met 
 with little opposition, and had already formed a poor 
 opinion of the Russians. The Russian army, he says, 
 rob and steal everywhere to the great disgust of the 
 people. The Russian officers "look down on the 
 Austrians who seem no longer to like fighting ; the 
 men (Russians) are brutes who do not know an 
 Austrian from a Frenchman ". The critical moment 
 was now at hand, though even as late as 28 November 
 when the Prussian Haugwitz appeared at the French 
 head-quarters, Napoleon seemed to think that peace 
 might be at once concluded. He was anxious to re- 
 turn to Paris, and wrote from the seat of war to hasten 
 the completion of the Tuileries. Meanwhile, stirring 
 events of vast import to France and to Napoleon's 
 schemes had taken place elsewhere. 
 
 Saint-Cyr had been ordered to occupy Naples, and 
 in case he should not be able to hold his own against 
 1 " Correspondence with Joseph," Vol. I, p. 60.
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 117 
 
 any combined attack by the British and Russians, 
 Napoleon had decided to send Villeneuve's fleet to 
 Italy. That fleet was lying off Cadiz, but Villeneuve 
 was in disgrace, and in consequence on 18 September 
 Admiral Prasily was ordered to proceed at once to 
 Cadiz to supersede Villeneuve (who was to repair to 
 Paris), and to sail to Naples. A rumour of Napoleon's 
 intention to supersede him reached Villeneuve from 
 Madrid, and thinking that Nelson's fleet numbered less 
 ships than it really did he sailed on 19 October from 
 Cadiz with the intention of proceeding to Naples. 
 The battle of Trafalgar, fought on 2 1 October, saw the 
 destruction of twenty -one of the thirty -three ships that 
 composed Villeneuve's fleet. Great Britain's suprem- 
 acy of the sea was by that battle finally assured. 
 
 The battle of Trafalgar was in one sense a mere 
 episode in the great campaign which England, in 
 alliance with Russia, was waging against Napoleon. 
 The latter undoubtedly regarded Italy as the starting- 
 point for operations in the Ottoman Empire, as well as 
 against the British power in I ndia. While Pitt directed 
 Great Britain's foreign policy, Lord Barham, 1 the 
 director of naval strategical operations, "handled the 
 fleet with a mastery never equalled since Anson's days ". 
 
 The campaign of 1805, from the British and Russian 
 side, was intended to be one of combined aims, and 
 alliances with the great military Powers of the Con- 
 tinent were to be secured. France was to be prevented 
 
 1 Charles Middleton became Admiral in 1787, and was created 
 Lord Barham in 1805.
 
 n8 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 from seizing Sicily, the base of the supplies for the 
 British fleet ; and if possible a combined force of 
 Russians and British was to be landed in Southern 
 Italy. Thus the British navy was to be employed on 
 the Italian coast, and, provided Prussia joined the 
 Coalition, in the North Sea and Baltic. Thus the 
 battle of Trafalgar had a most damaging effect upon 
 Napoleon's plan for securing Sicily and supremacy 
 in the Mediterranean. 
 
 In 1806 Sicily was safe from danger of becoming 
 a French possession, and the British in possession 
 of the Cape controlled the route to India. Thus the 
 adoption by the British Government in 1805 f a policy 
 of " aggressive action and interference with Napoleon's 
 designs," had in spite of Prussia's defection and 
 Austria's defeat been to a great extent successful in 
 the Mediterranean. The British fleet remained in 
 undisputed command of the sea. " The ships at 
 Trafalgar," it has been said, "were the victors at 
 Waterloo." 
 
 On 1 8 November, while at Znaym, Napoleon re- 
 ceived the first news of Trafalgar, and of the failure of 
 the hopes which he had founded on the possession of 
 a strong fleet. All his hopes of acquiring immediate 
 mastery of the Mediterranean were shattered. Unde- 
 terred, however, by the failure of the plans which he 
 had formed of overthrowing the sea power of Great 
 Britain, Napoleon pursued a bold course. His posi- 
 tion was most critical, for had Prussia declared war his 
 line of communications might have been easily cut by
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 119 
 
 the Prussian troops. While, however, the King of 
 Prussia hesitated, Napoleon was aided by the impetu- 
 osity of the Tsar who brought on the battle of Austerlitz 
 under conditions favourable to the exercise of the 
 French Emperor's military skill. On the evening of 
 i December, Napoleon received the plaudits of his 
 army as he rode round the camp to the light of torches 
 made of straw. On 2 December the battle of Auster- 
 litz was fought, and proved, as far as Austria was 
 concerned, decisive. 
 
 The right wing which played the most important 
 part in the battle was led by Soult, the left wing by 
 Lannes ; while Bernadotte was in command in the 
 centre. Murat led the cavalry which was drawn up 
 in two lines. Under Napoleon were ten battalions of 
 the guard supported by some battalions of grenadiers 
 under Oudinot. 
 
 Soon after the sun had risen the battle began, and 
 after two hours of hard fighting the Russian Field- 
 Marshal, Kutusof, who had the chief command, was 
 forced to relinquish his attempt to regain the heights 
 of Pratzen and to give way. Lannes and Murat 
 drove back the enemies' right wing, General Rapp 
 made a remarkable charge with the cuirassiers, the 
 General being himself badly wounded, and when 
 Napoleon arrived to support Soult the battle was 
 virtually over. 
 
 In the matter of pensions to the relations of the 
 French soldiers who had fallen, Napoleon behaved, as 
 he always did, in a princely manner, while to the leading
 
 120 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 generals he gave honours and estates. Eugene Beau- 
 harnais became Viceroy of Italy ; Berthier, Prince of 
 Neuchatel ; Murat, Grand Duke of Berg. Not long 
 afterwards his brother Louis was created King of 
 Holland, and Joseph, King of Naples. Bavaria, 
 Wurtemberg, and Baden had aided him, and while 
 the two former were made kingdoms, the last-named 
 was created a Grand Duchy. 
 
 Many officers were also handsomely rewarded for 
 their energy and bravery. In a letter to Joseph, 
 written the following day, Napoleon infers that he 
 tried to save a column of Russians who had taken re- 
 fuge on a frozen lake. Till quite lately it was believed 
 that the French batteries by the Emperor's orders 
 first fired on the ice near the shore and then on the 
 parts of the ice on which the Russians stood, and that 
 6000 Russians were thus destroyed. 1 Two days later 
 Francis of Austria sued for terms, and at 4 o'clock 
 on the morning of 27 December, 1805, the Peace of 
 Pressburg was signed by Talleyrand, Prince Lechten- 
 stein, and General Gurlay, and the war between 
 France and Austria came to an end. 
 
 The Treaty of Pressburg was for Napoleon a great 
 triumph. Throughout the whole campaign he had 
 shown remarkable resourcefulness and determination. 
 He had on 20 December declared that if peace was 
 not quickly made, there would be an engagement 
 which would not leave the Austrian monarchy "the 
 
 1 The whole story of the drowning of the Russians is now dis- 
 credited.
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 121 
 
 shadow of a resource ". His overthrow of Austria 
 was at once followed by the beginning of a system 
 of establishing his brothers and relations as kings, 
 and on 31 March, 1806, he inaugurated the system 
 by the issue of an order to his brother Joseph to 
 assume the Neapolitan Crown. 
 
 The Treaty of Pressburg was followed by the 
 Treaty of Schonbrunn (Jan., 1806) with Prussia, the 
 Government of which by its vacillating policy had de- 
 livered itself into the hands of Napoleon. Disappoint- 
 ment at its conduct was the immediate cause of the 
 death of Pitt. 
 
 The way was now cleared for the third step in the 
 German Revolution, viz. the setting up of the Con- 
 federation of the Rhine. Its establishment marked 
 the definite end of the Holy Roman Empire, and led 
 immediately to the fourth and last stage in the 
 German Revolution, marked by the abdication by 
 Francis of Austria of his Imperial Crown. 
 
 The brilliance of the victory of Austerlitz has 
 blinded many historians to the doubtful wisdom of the 
 Treaty of Pressburg. That Treaty completed the 
 humiliation of Austria, and carried out the aims of 
 successive French rulers and ministers since the days 
 of Francis I. That monarch, like Richelieu, Mazarin, 
 Louis XIV and Fleury, had aimed at the subjugation 
 of the Hapsburg monarchy and the partition of its 
 territories. The Treaty of Pressburg saw Austria 
 shut out of Italy and Switzerland, and driven back 
 from the Rhine. It saw Bavaria and Wiirtemberg
 
 122 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 created monarchies, with which the new Grand Duchy 
 of Baden divided between them the Austrian pos- 
 sessions in the West. By that Treaty Napoleon 
 thought he had once and for all crushed Austria, and 
 rendered her unable for all time to hinder the exe- 
 cution of his world- wide Imperial schemes. Four 
 years later, when in 1809 Austria again tried issues 
 with France, Napoleon realized his mistake of 1805. 
 In spite of the severity of the terms of the Treaty 
 of Pressburg, Austria was able to reorganize her armies, 
 and to regain her strength. Looking back on the 
 events of 1805 ^ ' ls evident that Napoleon ought 
 either to have utterly destroyed Austria or to have 
 adopted Talleyrand's advice and returned to the 
 policy of Bernis and Kaunitz which is known as the 
 Diplomatic Revolution. From 1756 to 1792 France 
 and Austria were nominally allies, 1 and Talleyrand 
 argued that a Franco-Austrian alliance would render 
 Russia helpless and would exclude Great Britain from 
 the Continent. Such an alliance, in his opinion, could 
 have been effected by the grant of the Danubian 
 Principalities to Austria as a compensation for her 
 exclusion from Italy and Germany. 
 
 Relying, however, on his alliance with Prussia 
 which shortly came to an end, and on the stability of 
 the Confederation of the Rhine which he had already 
 begun to build up, Napoleon, perhaps naturally, re- 
 
 1 Since 1774, when Louis XVI became King of France, and 
 Vergennes the chief Minister, the Franco-Austrian alliance had 
 been practically non-existent.
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 123 
 
 fused to believe in the possibility of any future danger 
 from Austria. 
 
 Moreover, as his chief object at that time was the 
 ruin of England's trade, it was most important to 
 secure the adhesion of Russia and Prussia to his 
 " continental system ". The grant of the Danubian 
 Principalities to Austria would permanently alienate 
 Russia. 1 Filled with confidence at the overwhelming 
 success of the French arms, Napoleon, therefore, 
 hastened in the early months of 1806 to complete the 
 edifice of the Confederation of the Rhine and to take 
 steps for securing French supremacy in the Mediter- 
 ranean. The idea of a settlement of Germany by 
 means of a Confederation of the smaller German 
 princes acting in subordination to France was first 
 conceived in the sixteenth century. Richelieu had 
 endeavoured to put the idea into execution, and 
 Mazarin, in assisting in the formation of the League 
 of the Rhine, could rest satisfied that he had seriously 
 weakened the power of the Hapsburgs and had given 
 France a leading position in Germany. It was only 
 the folly of Louis XIV that to a great extent undid 
 the work of the two astute cardinals. At the time of 
 the Austrian Succession War Belle- Isle returned to 
 the policy of Richelieu and Mazarin, and elaborated 
 a plan which in its general features anticipated that 
 followed by Napoleon. But Austria proved too strong, 
 the French were driven from Germany, and the only 
 
 1 Atkinson, "A History of Germany, 1715-1815," p. 404. 
 London, Methuen & Co.
 
 i2 4 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 result of Belle-Isle's policy was the advancement of 
 Prussia. The Franco- Austrian alliance of 1756 gave 
 Germany, after the close of the Seven Years' War, 
 rest for thirty years which was broken by the Wars 
 of the French Revolution. During those wars one 
 party in the Directory advocated the policy of driving 
 Austria eastwards, and Prussia behind the Elbe, and 
 forming a confederation of the secondary German 
 States under the aegis of France. In 1806 Napoleon, 
 sure of his Prussian alliance, carried out the German 
 policy of the ancien regime with his own additions 
 and stamped with his own individuality. 
 
 The Confederation of the Rhine, which was finally 
 agreed upon on 17 July, 1806, consisted of a number 
 of princes of the Empire. A Diet composed of two 
 colleges the College of Kings and that of Princes 
 settled the affairs of the Confederation, of which 
 Napoleon was named Protector. Indirectly Germany 
 gained much from Napoleon's enforced simplification 
 of its territory. The small courts which had been 
 hotbeds of corruption were swept away, and the 
 German people enjoyed for a time better government 
 than had been bestowed on them by the vast host of 
 petty princes. But the primary object of Napoleon's 
 policy to Germany was to ensure the subordination 
 of the members of the Confederation to himself. The 
 better the States were governed the greater would be 
 their ability to contribute men and money for the 
 furtherance of his schemes. In the articles which 
 regulated the Confederation it was expressly laid
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 125 
 
 down that "there should be between the French 
 Empire and the Confederate States of the Rhine, 
 collectively and separately, an alliance in virtue of 
 which every continental war, in which one of the 
 contracting parties might be involved, would become 
 immediately common to all the others," and the 
 actual number of troops to be supplied by each 
 State was mentioned. The establishment of the 
 Confederation of the Rhine brought to an end the 
 Holy Roman Empire. And on 6 August, 1806, 
 Francis of Austria formally renounced the Imperial 
 title. 
 
 After the overthrow of Prussia at Jena and 
 Auerstadt Saxony joined the Confederation of the 
 Rhine, and its Elector received the title of King, and 
 bound himself to supply Napoleon with 20,000 troops. 
 Napoleon had thus made a considerable advance to- 
 wards the realization of his idea of making Europe 
 into a single State or Confederation of States under 
 the hegemony of France, with a " unity of codes, of 
 opinions, of views, of interests ". There is no doubt 
 that the pressure which he brought to bear upon 
 Prussia at the time of the Treaty of Tilsit to join the 
 Confederation of the Rhine, had for its object the 
 political annihilation of that State. As it was, Prussia 
 was only saved from extinction by Alexander's op- 
 position to Napoleon's harsh treatment of the country, 
 and by the Spanish rising which diverted Napoleon 
 from his design to effect Prussia's complete destruction. 
 For some years, however, Prussia was a quantity
 
 126 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 ) and Napoleon's command of the immense 
 military resources of the Confederation of the Rhine 
 enabled him to overthrow Austria in 1 809 and to in- 
 vade Russia in 1812, without any fear of opposition 
 from Prussia. Being unable to annex Prussia to the 
 Confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon, after Jena, 
 robbed Prussia of her Polish possessions, and set 
 up the kingdom of Westphalia. 
 
 "Among the political creations of Napoleon in 
 Germany," writes Mr. Fisher, " the most curious and 
 important was the kingdom of Westphalia." It was 
 formed in 1 807 and consisted of lands taken from the 
 King of Prussia, the Duke of Brunswick, and the 
 Elector of Hesse-Cassel. It extended from the 
 Elbe to Osnabriick, and from Bremen to Marburg, 
 and thus included Prussians, Brunswickers, and 
 Hessians. Over this small but important State, 
 Napoleon placed his youngest brother Prince Jerome, 
 with the title of king. A good constitution given to 
 the new kingdom by Napoleon was rendered in the 
 end ineffective by a licentious Court and a lazy and 
 voluptuous King. Jerome's incompetence was soon 
 recognized by Napoleon, who took the kingdom under 
 his care and succeeded in establishing for a short time 
 some sort of order. "A good system of finance, a 
 zealous and well-directed administrative class, and 
 a sound though somewhat autocratic constitution," 
 was given to the Westphalians, who till the Moscow 
 campaign were prepared to accept Napoleon's system
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 127 
 
 with equanimity. 1 But Jerome's incapacity, Napoleon's 
 interferences, the increasing financial burdens, the de- 
 mand for soldiers, all arrested civil progress, and the 
 Russian expedition finally brought to an end the 
 history of the Westphalian kingdom. 
 
 From the history of Napoleon's policy during the 
 first six months of 1806 two facts seem clear. His 
 mind was not bent on the immediate subjugation 
 of Prussia, and he had as yet not formulated "any 
 permanent plan for the settlement of Europe ". 2 After 
 the overthrow of Prussia at Jena and Auerstadt in the 
 autumn of 1806, the formation of the kingdom of 
 Westphalia in 1807, an ^ the conclusion of the Treaty 
 of Tilsit in 1807 with Russia, the German policy of 
 Napoleon becomes more intelligible, and we are able 
 to appreciate its advantages, its defects, and its results. 
 
 The policy itself was no new one. It had been, as 
 has been said, advocated and in part carried out by 
 Francis I, by Richelieu, by Louis XIV, and by Fleury. 
 But in the days of Napoleon the policy could be justified 
 on surer grounds than on previous occasions. Since 
 the days of Fleury the partitions of Poland had taken 
 place, and projects for the partition or the absorption 
 of Bavaria by Austria had again and again appeared. 
 In 1744, in 1778 and 1785, in 1793 and in 1799 
 Austrian statesmen had considered the possibility of 
 
 1 Fisher, " Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship : Germany," 
 p. 291. Oxford, The Clarendon Press. 
 
 2 " Bonapartism," pp. 52-3. Oxford, The Clarendon Press.
 
 128 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 a union of Bavaria with the Hapsburg monarchy. 
 There seemed nothing dishonest or reprehensible on 
 the part of a strong power considering schemes for 
 rounding off its territory by the absorption of weaker 
 States. Before 1806 the conquest of the Rhine 
 frontier by France had necessitated a considerable re- 
 adjustment of German territories, and the overthrow 
 of Austria at Austerlitz was followed by the forma- 
 tion of the Confederation of the Rhine in 1 806. That 
 Confederation had in itself much to commend itself to 
 the inhabitants of Germany. The number of German 
 principalities had been reduced from 365 to 39 in 1803. 
 In 1806 the middle States, such as Bavaria and 
 Wiirtemberg, gained large and important accessions 
 of territory, their rulers, moreover, receiving royal titles. 
 On 17 July the Treaty of the Confederation of the 
 Rhine was signed in Paris, by fifteen princes of the 
 Empire, of whom the Kings of Bavaria and Wiirtem- 
 berg, the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, the Duke 
 of Cleves and Berg (Prince Joachim Murat), and 
 Dalberg, the Arch-Chancellor, were the most im- 
 portant. The affairs of the Confederation were to be 
 managed by two colleges. Of these the College of 
 Kings included the Arch-Chancellor, henceforward to 
 be styled the Prince- Primate, the Kings of Bavaria 
 and Wiirtemberg, and the Grand Dukes of Berg, 
 Hesse- Darmstadt, and Baden. The College of Princes 
 included the remainder of the princes. Of this Con- 
 federation of Princes the Emperor of the French was 
 Protector.
 
 NAPOLEON'S REDINGOTE AND COCKED HAT 
 
 FROM THE COLLECTION OF PRINCE VICTOR
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 129 
 
 Arrangements were also made in the Treaty of the 
 Confederation of the Rhine for the simplification of 
 the map of Germany. Hitherto Germany may be 
 said to have consisted of the large kingdoms of Austria 
 and Prussia, of a number of middle States such as 
 Bavaria, Saxony, Baden, Wilrtemberg, Hesse and the 
 Nassaus, and of a number of small principalities held 
 by the Imperial knights, and by the free towns. The 
 petty courts connected with this last section of German 
 rulers were now swept away. The celebrated Stein, 
 who belonged to this category of lesser princes, lost 
 his estates, but seems to have realized that a recon- 
 structed Germany was impossible so long as these 
 "petty courts, full of picturesque anomalies," but "the 
 hotbeds of tiny and contemptible intrigue," l were al- 
 lowed to exist. Though the ancient sovereign rights 
 of these dispossessed princes were thus destroyed, 
 they were left in the enjoyment of many of their 
 privileges. 2 
 
 A step of vital importance in the interests of the 
 future administrative unity of Germany was thus taken, 
 and the way was thus unconsciously being prepared 
 for the growth of a feeling of nationality. From 1806 
 "the formation of a united Germany without the 
 Hapsburgs became one of the permanent political 
 ideas in the German mind ". 3 Some years had, how- 
 
 1 Fisher, "Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany," p. 119. 
 Oxford, The Clarendon Press. 
 
 2 Ibid. p. 119. 
 
 3 Fisher, " Bonapartism," p. 53. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 
 9
 
 i 3 o THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 ever, to elapse, and many bitter experiences had to be 
 undergone before Germany as a whole could unite in 
 a concerted movement for the expulsion of French 
 soldiers from its soil, and for the partial elimination of 
 French ideas from the German system. It took seven 
 years to eradicate from the members of the Confedera- 
 tion of the Rhine their pro-French and selfish ten- 
 dencies. It was not till 1813 that the whole German 
 people united in the War of Liberation. 
 
 At the time, however, of the formation of the Con- 
 federation, its members recked little of their duties to 
 their -country and had no realization of the possible 
 future of Germany. " They were alike traitors to a 
 great historic tradition, and blind to the higher things 
 of the future. It was one of those moments in history 
 when vulgar greed is made the instrument of social 
 and political improvement." 
 
 The growth of German nationality was thus a direct, 
 but as far as Napoleon was concerned a most unex- 
 pected, result of the French conquest. Though France 
 indeed made Germany, it did so contrary to the inten- 
 tion of Napoleon. One of the Emperor's objects was 
 to form Europe into a Grand Empire which, under the 
 direction of France, should overcome Great Britain. 
 Europe, in fact, was to become a vast French camp in 
 which preparations for the overthrow of Great Britain 
 should never cease till the downfall of Great Britain 
 had been accomplished. The national interests of 
 
 1 Fisher, "Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany," pp. 119, 
 1 20. Oxford, The Clarendon Press.
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 131 
 
 the rest of Europe were, in view of this object, to be 
 mercilessly disregarded, and the characteristics of 
 Napoleon's system were to be " its close far-reaching 
 network, these all-pervading Imperial eyes, the omni- 
 potence of the civil authority in a military empire ".* 
 Paris was to be the centre of the Empire, French was 
 to be the official language, a fusion of heterogeneous 
 races was to be accomplished the whole to be 
 governed by a supreme centralized bureaucracy. 
 
 Napoleon at this period of his career made no pre- 
 tence of being actuated by any but purely selfish 
 motives, though from St. Helena he assured the world 
 that he had always been actuated by the most noble 
 and justifiable ambitions. The German princes were 
 to become permanently the allies of France, which 
 was to dictate the policy which they were submissively 
 to follow. By Article 35 of the Confederation of the 
 Rhine it was provided that there should be between 
 the " French Empire and the Confederate States of 
 the Rhine, collectively and separately, an alliance in 
 virtue of which every continental war, in which one 
 of the contracting parties might be involved, would 
 become immediately common to all the others ". In 
 France Napoleon's Empire was based upon the sup- 
 port of the peasantry. In Germany he was allied not 
 with the peasants but with the princes. Thus his 
 position in Germany depended upon "personal prestige, 
 the force of arms, and the alliance of the ruling princes ". 
 Faced by the War of Liberation, which was "a move- 
 
 1 Fisher, " Bonapartism," p. 58.
 
 132 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 ment of peoples " and an " outburst of the old passion 
 for political liberty," Napoleon fell. 
 
 The campaign of Austerlitz thus had far-reaching 
 results for Europe. The dissolution of the Holy 
 Roman Empire implied a revolution in Germany, the 
 full effects of which were only recognized after many 
 years of war, and after many revolutionary movements. 
 
 The immediate effect which attracted the attention 
 of European rulers and statesmen was the firm superim- 
 position of the Napoleonic system upon the middle 
 States of Germany, and the advancement of members 
 of his own family. Bavaria and Wiirtemberg became 
 kingdoms, and Baden a Grand Duchy. Berthier, 
 whose absence from his side was so serious a matter 
 for Napoleon during the Waterloo campaign, was 
 made Prince of Neuchatel, and Murat, who had 
 married Caroline Bonaparte, Grand Duke of Berg 
 and Cleves ; Eugene Beauharnais, son of Josephine, 
 was appointed Viceroy of Italy, and married a daughter 
 of the ruler of Bavaria. Soon afterwards, in March, 
 1806, Joseph Bonaparte became King of Naples, and 
 on 5 June, 1806, Louis Bonaparte was declared King 
 of Holland, while to Pauline Bonaparte was given the 
 principality of Guastalla which was ceded to the 
 kingdom of Italy a few months later (Aug., 1806). 
 Duchies in Italy were also carved out and bestowed 
 upon generals like Soult and politicians like Talley- 
 rand. By these means a new nobility was gradually 
 formed. 
 
 In 1807 Jerome Bonaparte became King of
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 133 
 
 Westphalia which State was created for the purpose 
 of keeping Prussia in check and as a step in the denation- 
 alization of Germany. But the foolish and incapable 
 rule of Jerome, coupled with the unpopularity of the 
 continental system, resulted in the failure of Napoleon's 
 policy, and the "trend of public opinion set steadily 
 away from Paris and towards Berlin ". 
 
 With the abdication of the Emperor Francis on 6 
 August, 1806, from his position as Emperor, the Holy 
 Roman Empire thus came definitely to an end. Just 
 as the modern history of France opens with the 
 meeting of the States-General in 1789, so the modern 
 history of Germany dates its beginning from the events 
 of 1806. 
 
 At the same time, however, the years 1805 and 1806 
 mark definitely the beginning of a new period in the 
 history of France and in the career of Napoleon. 
 Hitherto, though many indications can be found of 
 ambitious projects with regard to the extension of 
 French domination over the Mediterranean and in the 
 East, there was no definite proof that Napoleon aimed 
 at the complete subjugation of Austria and Prussia. 
 But the formation of the Third Coalition gave him 
 the opportunity of crushing Austria, while the rashness 
 of Prussia afforded him an excuse, for a time removing 
 that Power from the list of great European nations. 
 The overthrow of Prussia at Jena on 14 October, 1806, 
 came upon Europe like a thunderbolt. It had not 
 been realized how superior were the French armies 
 to those of Prussia, nor what an advantage it was for
 
 i 3 4 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 France to be able to draw her armies from not only 
 France proper but also from " the whole left bank of 
 the Rhine, with Belgium and Holland, Switzerland, 
 Piedmont, much of Lombardy and the South- Western 
 States of Germany itself". 1 The victory of Austerlitz 
 had ended once and for all any hope that Napoleon 
 would continue to adopt a temporizing policy towards 
 Austria and Prussia, and it only required the rash de- 
 claration of war by Frederick William to complete the 
 subjugation of Germany by the French Emperor. 
 
 The decline and fall of Prussia forms one of the 
 most dramatic events of the early years of the XlXth 
 century, and resulted in the unquestioned supremacy 
 of Napoleon in central and southern Europe. In 
 1805-6 Napoleon "had eliminated Austria from the 
 German system, and left Germany divided between 
 Frederick William and himself". 2 He had thus suc- 
 cessfully carried out a policy which with varying success 
 had been aimed at by Francis I, Richelieu, Mazarin, 
 Louis XIV, and Belle-Isle. 
 
 So long as the League of Princes was directed 
 against the Hapsburgs it had within it the elements of 
 stability. In 1806 Napoleon and the King of Prussia 
 divided Germany between them, and the policy desired 
 by the Directory in 1 795 had been carried out. Never- 
 theless there was a sense of insecurity in Prussia, where 
 the death of William Pitt had been deeply regretted 
 among the educated classes, who had recognized in him 
 
 ^eeley, "Life and Times of Stein," Vol. I, p. 163. 
 2 Fisher, "Bonapartism," p. 382.
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 135 
 
 Napoleon's most formidable opponent. Nevertheless 
 peace between France and Prussia continued during 
 the first eight months of 1806 till Napoleon's pro- 
 vocative policy, which to his astonishment was im- 
 mediately resented, resulted in the war with Prussia, 
 the French victories of Jena and Auerstadt, and till 
 1813 the complete dominance of France in Germany. 
 During the first half of 1806 there was no apparent 
 likelihood of war between France and Prussia. The 
 fall of the Holy Roman Empire clearly showed how 
 useless were the efforts of Russia and England to re- 
 strain the onward course of Napoleon's policy. Both 
 England and Russia entered into negotiations with 
 Napoleon, who appeared not to be disinclined to 
 consider peace proposals. He seemed anxious to 
 consolidate his new position as Head of the German 
 Body of Princes, and at the same time to make pre- 
 parations for carrying out his policy of extending the 
 French power in the East. Prussia, which was not a 
 member of the German Confederation, was to be lulled 
 into a sense of security by the prospect of being Head 
 of a North German Confederation. It would appear 
 that Napoleon's real intention was to exclude Prussia 
 from all influence in Germany, but early in August, 
 when his negotiations with Russia and England came 
 to a close, Napoleon concluded that those two Powers 
 were forming a new Coalition with Prussia. It was 
 at this moment that his famous offer of Hanover to 
 England, followed by the murder of Palm, the book- 
 seller, on 25 August, aroused a bitter feeling in Prussia.
 
 136 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 These two circumstances tended to decide the vacillat- 
 ing Prussian army to prepare for war. 
 
 Already on 9 August the Prussian army had 
 been mobilized, and Frederick William was led to 
 believe that his cause was by no means a hopeless 
 one. 
 
 Napoleon at first treated the Prussian preparations 
 with contempt. His mind had been occupied during 
 the first six months of 1 806 partly in the reconstruction 
 of Germany, but mainly with the future of Italy. He 
 was resolved to secure Sicily and the mastery of the 
 Mediterranean. He would thus be able to carry out 
 those Eastern projects which had been so rudely in- 
 terrupted by the battle of the Nile, by his failure to 
 take Acre, and by his defeat at Trafalgar. In 1806 
 his Italian schemes seemed to him to have in them the 
 elements of success. 
 
 Though, however, Joseph established himself 
 in the kingdom of Naples, he was unable to take 
 Sicily. Indeed, an English squadron under Sir 
 Sidney Smith could have destroyed the town of 
 Naples by bombardment early in May. The situation 
 was graphically described by Sidney Smith. " The 
 city," he says, " was illuminated on account of Joseph 
 Bonaparte proclaiming himself King of the Two 
 Sicilies ! The junction of the ' Eagle ' (the other ships 
 being the ' Pompei,' ' Excellent,' ' Intrepid,' and 
 ' Athenian ') made us five sail of the line, and it would 
 have been easy for their fire to have interrupted this 
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 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 137 
 
 the unfortunate inhabitants had evil enough on them ; 
 that the restoration of the capital to its lawful sovereign 
 and its fugitive inhabitants would be no gratification 
 if it should be found a heap of ruins, ashes, and bones, 
 and that as I had no force to land and keep order in 
 case of the French army retiring to the fortresses, I 
 should leave an opulent city a prey to the licentious 
 part of the community who would not fail to profit by 
 the confusion the flames would occasion : not a gun 
 was fired." 
 
 In Napoleon's correspondence there is no indication 
 that he realized that the existence of Joseph's capital 
 was due to the humanity of an English Admiral, nor 
 is there any allusion to the fact that Sidney Smith, on 
 ii May, dislodged the French garrison from the 
 Island of Capri : "which from its situation protecting 
 the coasting communication southward was a great 
 object for the enemy to keep, and by so much one for 
 me to wrest from him ". 
 
 On 1 1- 1 2 May the French on Capri agreed to a 
 capitulation, and the English Admiral undertook to 
 convey the French officers and soldiers to the mainland. 
 On 24 May Napoleon wrote to Joseph that he had 
 foreseen what would happen at Capri, and that the 
 only way to keep a " solitary island was to put into it a 
 great many troops or none at all ". In the same letter 
 he warned Joseph not to be " intoxicated by the de- 
 monstrations of the Neapolitans," and assures him that 
 Sir Sidney Smith is a man whom it is easy to deceive 
 . . . "all that he wants is to make a noise, and the
 
 i 3 8 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 more you talk about him the more he will intrigue ". 
 Napoleon had no doubt that he could capture Sicily 
 and so become supreme in the Adriatic and indeed 
 in the Mediterranean. On i August he assured 
 Joseph that a year sooner or a year later he would be 
 master of Sicily. 
 
 The defeat of Reynier on 4 July, in the battle 
 of Maida a battle which had a beneficial effect upon 
 the spirits of the English troops who realized that the 
 French were^not irresistible had simply led Napoleon 
 to criticize severely the military operations in Italy. 
 The capture of Gaeta later in the month somewhat 
 reassured him, and he remained determined to secure 
 Sicily. The victory of Maida, moreover, showed that 
 the British Government, which since Trafalgar had 
 been inspired by a false sense of security, had now 
 realized the importance of preventing the French 
 occupation of Sicily. That island was regarded by 
 Napoleon as the stepping-stone for France towards 
 the East. Had it not been for the outbreak of the 
 war with Prussia he would certainly have visited 
 Naples at the end of September. As it was, he con- 
 tinued throughout the remainder of the year, and 
 indeed throughout 1807, to sen d frequent and minute 
 instructions to Joseph for the administration of his 
 kingdom. In spite of the revolt in southern Italy, 
 consequent on the British victory of Maida, Joseph 
 during the ensuing two years succeeded in establish- 
 ing order in the finances and contentment among
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 139 
 
 the people. His constructive work in Naples deserves 
 the highest praise. 1 
 
 These Italian projects were, however, interrupted 
 by the attitude taken up by Prussia in August. On 
 12 September Napoleon wrote that "Prussia is 
 arming in a most ridiculous manner ". He had no 
 fear of the Prussian army, and was justifiably confi- 
 dent. He knew that he could shortly be at the head 
 of 150,000 troops and had little doubt that he could 
 reduce Berlin and St. Petersburg to submission. 
 When once he realized that Prussia was resolved 
 upon war he made his preparations in characteristic 
 fashion. 
 
 Pretending that he was engaged in Paris in hunt- 
 ing and other amusements, he made ready to crush 
 Prussia if the necessity of doing so was forced upon 
 him. By 18 September it became evident that a war 
 with Prussia had become wellnigh inevitable. The 
 European horizon, he declared, " is rather dark ; it is 
 possible I may soon be at war with the King of Prussia". 
 It is said that at Paris on 26 September, Napoleon, 
 while studying a map, foretold the overthrow of the 
 Prussian army about 15 October. On i October he 
 left Mainz for Wurzburg, where he assembled his 
 army, and a dispatch sent on 3 October to Roche- 
 foucauld, the French ambassador in Vienna, "gives 
 a most vivid picture of Napoleon's mind at this time ". 
 In it he declared that he was resolved to break off 
 
 1 " Napoleon's Correspondence with Joseph," Vol. I, pp. 
 120-3.
 
 140 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 all alliance with Prussia. "I will," he writes, "have 
 no alliance with a power so changeable and so con- 
 temptible." 
 
 At the same time he declared that he was willing 
 to be at peace with her, as he felt he had no right to 
 shed uselessly the blood of his subjects. None the 
 less, though he desires a continental alliance to support 
 his maritime projects, he will not rely upon the friend- 
 ship of Prussia, for "she is now, as she was in 1740, 
 and always has been, without consistency and without 
 honour ". In the same dispatch he declares himself 
 in favour of an Austrian alliance based on the inde- 
 pendence of Turkey. An Austrian alliance, he writes, 
 would secure the peace of Europe and enable him to 
 turn his attention to his fleet. " I am not," he re- 
 iterates, " opposed to a system which might unite me 
 more closely to Austria." 
 
 In this interesting dispatch we see that his real 
 aim was maritime supremacy, which would secure the 
 predominance of France in the Mediterranean and 
 in the Councils of Turkey. Though the outbreak of 
 war with Prussia was only a matter of days, he re- 
 garded such a war with contempt, and merely as a 
 slight interruption in his vast plans for securing a 
 position of supremacy in Europe. England, he 
 declared, will be tired of constant failure and will soon 
 make peace. In any case he expected in a month or 
 two to be master of the Mediterranean. 
 
 On his part Frederick William could at any rate 
 point to the fact that his relations with Russia were
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 141 
 
 on a friendly footing, and he had some reason to ex- 
 pect aid from England, if not from Austria, in the 
 event of the outbreak of a war with France. In 
 consequence of the Partitions of Poland his territory was 
 larger than that ruled over by Frederick the Great, 
 and the Prussian army was still regarded as one of 
 the most formidable armies in Europe. The outbreak 
 of war with France in October, 1806, a war which 
 continued till July, 1807, brought with it a rapid 
 disillusionment to all those who had not, like the old 
 Duke of Brunswick, realized the change which had 
 come over the Prussian army since the days of 
 Frederick the Great. The King of Prussia and his 
 generals were confident of victory. Of the two 
 Prussian armies one was under the King and Bruns- 
 wick, the other was under Prince Hohenlohe. Both 
 armies were completely defeated, the former at 
 Auerstadt, by Davoust, who was created Prince of 
 Auerstadt for his brilliant victory ; the latter at Jena, 
 by Napoleon. 
 
 On 27 October Napoleon rode triumphantly into 
 Berlin and was welcomed by the population effusively 
 and enthusiastically. An and- French feeling did not 
 exist in Germany in 1806 or 1807. That feeling was 
 created later by French excesses. Such of the Prussian 
 forces as had not yet been annihilated or captured 
 retreated in the direction of the still formidable 
 Russian army, while Napoleon spent the winter in 
 Eastern Prussia whence he directed affairs in Paris 
 and in Italy. Before the end of the year Napoleon
 
 142 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 had secured a useful ally in Saxony whose Elector was 
 given the title of King on 4 December, and who joined 
 the Rhenish Confederacy. On the other hand, the 
 Duke of Brunswick, the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, and 
 the Prince of Orange were deprived of their posses- 
 sions. 
 
 Napoleon, though forced for a few months to divert 
 his attention from his Mediterranean schemes to the 
 task of crushing Prussia, never, however, ceased to 
 revolve plans for the destruction of the power of 
 Great Britain ; the only real obstacle, as he believed, 
 to his supremacy in Europe. On 1 1 November he 
 wrote to his brother Joseph, in Naples, that the news 
 of his successes in Prussia had thrown London into 
 consternation. He added that the occupation of 
 Hamburg, which he had just effected, together with 
 the declaration of the blockade of the British Islands 
 by the Berlin Decree, would increase that uneasiness. 
 
 The language used in drawing up the Berlin 
 Decree on 21 November gives some indication of 
 the feelings held by Napoleon towards England. It 
 is asserted that England's monstrous abuse of the 
 right of blockade is "altogether worthy of the age of 
 barbarism," and is "advantageous to that power to the 
 prejudice of every other ". Consequently Napoleon 
 decreed that the British Isles were in a state of 
 blockade, that all commerce and correspondence with 
 them was prohibited, that all Englishmen found in 
 any country were prisoners of war, and that the use 
 of English goods was forbidden. These and other
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 143 
 
 articles were issued by Napoleon in the hope that 
 British trade would be ruined, and that England 
 would be compelled to sue for peace. 
 
 This thunderbolt was followed up by the Milan 
 Decree of 17 December, 1807, and Napoleon hoped 
 that British commerce would by means of these de- 
 crees be destroyed. These decrees, however, had 
 not the desired effect and must be numbered among 
 Napoleon's colossal failures. Owing to the lack of 
 a fleet he was unable to blockade the British ports, 
 and so to bring about the submission of his hated foe. 
 Moreover, these decrees first brought home to the 
 populations of Europe the real character of the 
 tyranny of the French Emperor. " Every poor man 
 who was debarred from the means of providing sugar 
 or cloth for his family felt a grievance." Sugar was 
 at that time brought chiefly from Britain's colonies, 
 and the Decree depriving continental Europe of sugar 
 was keenly resented. Beetroot factories, however, 
 rapidly sprang into existence, and the resentment at 
 the effect of the Decree upon the supply of sugar was 
 gradually modified. 
 
 It was not till a few years later that the thorough- 
 going enforcement of the continental system proved 
 too great to be borne, and contributed greatly to the 
 rising of the nations against the Napoleonic domi- 
 nation. 
 
 With regard to the subject of sugar, Napoleon, 
 when on St. Helena, declared "that if the war with 
 England had lasted two or three years longer, France
 
 144 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 would not have had any further occasion for Colonies, 
 as he had already caused to be made in France, sugar 
 from the Beet Root". 
 
 As a memento of the overthrow of Prussia the Car 
 of Victory, in copper, by Schadow, which stood on the 
 top of the Brandenburger Thor, at the end of the 
 Unter den Linden, was carried off to Paris and not 
 restored till after the fall of Napoleon. 
 
 With the defeat of Prussia at Jena and Auerstadt 
 came the punishment of Saxony for the support which 
 its ruler had given to Frederick William. At Posen, 
 on 1 1 December, the Elector was forced to accept 
 Napoleon's terms. Saxon troops were to aid 
 Napoleon in combating the Prussians and Russians, 
 while the King of Saxony was to pay a heavy subsidy 
 and to become the faithful ally of Napoleon. The 
 rulers of Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick were deposed, 
 William Frederick of Orange, who governed a small 
 principality Fulda-Corvey suffered the same fate. 
 " Napoleon was now Master of Northern Germany 
 from end to end." 1 
 
 CHIEF DATES 
 
 War between France and Great Britain .... 1803. 
 Napoleon Emperor of the French . . . March, 1804. 
 His coronation ...... December, 1804. 
 
 The camp at Boulogne 1803-1805. 
 
 Outbreak of war with Austria and Russia . . . 1805. 
 Trafalgar, Ulm ...... October, 1805. 
 
 Austerlitz ....... December, 1805. 
 
 Wisher, " Napoleonic Statesmanship," p. 141,
 
 WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 145 
 
 Peace of Pressburg (France and Austria) . January, 1806. 
 
 Treaty of Paris (France and Prussia) . . February, 1806. 
 
 Joseph Bonaparte King of Naples . . . March, 1806. 
 
 Battle of Maida July, 1806. 
 
 The Confederation of the Rhine . . . June- July, 1806. 
 
 End of the Holy Roman Empire . . . August, 1806. 
 
 Jena and Auerstadt October, 1806. 
 
 The Berlin Decree ..... November, 1806. 
 
 10
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807 
 
 Napoleon and the Mediterranean The Russian campaign 
 Eylau, Heilsberg, and Friedland The Treaty of Tilsit Position 
 of Prussia Summary of Napoleon's political activities, January- 
 June, 1807 His correspondence with Joseph The real meaning 
 of the Treaty of Tilsit Napoleon's policy after Tilsit The seizure 
 by England of the Danish fleet The Treaty of Fontainebleau 
 The plan of the Partition of Portugal The real aims of Napoleon 
 and Alexander Napoleon's policy to the Papacy His religious 
 policy explained at St. Helena Consideration of his policy after 
 Tilsit France after Tilsit The growth of national feeling in 
 Europe. 
 
 A FTER the conclusion of the Treaties with Austria 
 + \ at Pressburg on I January, and with Prussia at 
 Paris on 15 February, 1806, Napoleon had devoted 
 his energies to the completion of the reconstitution of 
 Germany, and to attempts to secure Sicily. The 
 overthrow of Austria and the subservience of Prussia 
 had removed all obstacles in the way of the dissolution 
 of the Empire and of the formation of the Confed- 
 eration of the Rhine. On 6 August, 1806, the Em- 
 peror Francis II had recognized that the Empire no 
 longer existed, and became Francis I Emperor of 
 
 Austria. As Protector of the Confederation of the 
 
 146
 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807 147 
 
 Rhine which included, apart from Prussia and Austria, 
 the principal states in Germany, Napoleon had se- 
 cured a dominant position in Central Europe. 
 
 His determination to become all-powerful in the 
 Mediterranean had been shown by his strenuous 
 efforts in 1 806 to obtain Sicily. The victory of Maida, 
 won by Sir John Stuart on 4 July, had checked the 
 execution of Napoleon's plan, while the discovery of 
 his duplicity in connexion with his secret negotiations 
 with Russia, Great Britain's ally, had alienated Fox, 
 and on his death Lord Howick resolved not to trust 
 the French Emperor any longer. Napoleon, however, 
 did not withdraw from his determination to secure 
 the island. His possession of Sicily would, in his 
 opinion, change the face of the Mediterranean. It was 
 only the presence of British forces that prevented 
 Joseph Bonaparte, and after him Murat, from con- 
 quering the island between 1807 and 1812. 
 
 In 1806 and 1807, however, the chances of the 
 British Empire being able to hold its own against 
 Napoleon seemed doubtful. The war between France 
 and Prussia in the autumn of 1806 had resulted in 
 the occupation of Berlin by the French. Recognizing 
 the impossibility of winning Great Britain over to an 
 acquiescence in his policy, Napoleon had resolved to 
 crush her at all costs. His Berlin Decree, issued on 
 21 November, 1806, was intended to exclude Great 
 Britain from the Continent until she restored her 
 colonial conquests. Before, however, he could carry 
 out his policy of excluding Great Britain from all
 
 148 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 intercourse with the Continent, or could partition 
 Prussia, Napoleon had either to crush or to come to 
 some agreement with the Russian Emperor. To 
 occupy Russian troops in Turkey, Napoleon sent 
 Sebastiani to Constantinople. In December, 1806, 
 Turkey declared war upon Russia, and Napoleon 
 sent French officers to aid the Turks. He thus com- 
 pelled Alexander to maintain a considerable force on 
 the Turkish frontier during the first six months of 1807. 
 He also carried on negotiations with Persia, and 
 Alexander, fearful for her Eastern interests, felt com- 
 pelled to keep troops near Persia. At Eylau, on 
 8 February, 1 807, Napoleon fought a drawn battle with 
 the Russians, but in May Lefebre captured Dantzic 
 valuable as a base from which the army could be 
 furnished with corn ; on 10 June, a most sanguinary 
 conflict, known as the battle of Heilsberg, took place 
 with no decisive results ; and on 14 June Napoleon 
 won a battle at Friedland, which proved to be in its 
 effects of decisive importance. That battle was 
 shortly followed by the Treaty of Tilsit. The Treaty 
 of Tilsit was a great relief to Napoleon. Until he 
 had come to terms with Russia no settlement could 
 be made with regard to Prussia, nor could the con- 
 tinental blockade, first established by the Berlin 
 Decree in November, 1 806, be enforced. Moreover, 
 Eylau had made a period of peace necessary for 
 Napoleon. The French losses had been immense, 
 and the discouragement of the army profound. 
 Fortunately for him a strong body of Russian
 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807 149 
 
 opinion insisted on peace after the Russian defeat 
 of Friedland. 
 
 Friedland, a battle which the rash Bennigsen, the 
 Russian general, ought never to have fought, took place 
 on 14 June, and the Russians lost over i5,ooomenkilled 
 and wounded. It was a victory for Napoleon (whose 
 losses were about a half less than those of the Russians) 
 as decisive as was that of Marengo. 
 
 The retreat of the Russians after the battle was 
 not seriously interfered with, and during the night 
 following no effort to pursue was made. Probably 
 Napoleon was anxious not to make a permanent 
 enemy of Alexander ; if so, this would explain the in- 
 action of the French cavalry. He had already, in 
 March, 1807, when writing to Talleyrand, declared 
 that he would prefer a Russian to an Austrian alliance. 
 In his struggle with Great Britain it was essential to 
 secure the co-operation of Russia with its long sea- 
 board. If he could put an end to the trade between 
 England and Russia an important step would have 
 been taken towards the subjugation of the Island king- 
 dom. The importance of the victory of Friedland, 
 therefore, cannot be exaggerated. On 19 June the 
 Russian army recrossed the Niemen ; on 21 June an 
 armistice was agreed upon ; and on the same day 
 Alexander informed Frederick William of Prussia 
 that he had resolved to ally himself with France. 
 
 Alexander's motives for this sudden change of atti- 
 tude were various, and there is no doubt that the atti- 
 tude and views of his generals had considerable weight
 
 150 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 with him. At the Russian head-quarters there was an 
 almost general demand for peace, and the Grand 
 Duke Constantine, who was supported by Czartoryski, 
 Kurakin the Gallophil Russian Minister, and others, 
 informed Alexander that the temper of the army 
 being what it then was, he could not but remind him 
 of the fate of his father the Tsar Paul. Alexander, 
 moreover, had developed an admiration for Napoleon, 
 and he was justly irritated with the English Govern- 
 ment which had given him little or no help, and which 
 was enforcing against Russia "a most stringent mari- 
 time code ". Though Alexander, as late as the battle of 
 Friedland, had given the King of Prussia no hint of 
 a possible change of policy, the Russian generals had 
 for some time past conceived the greatest contempt 
 for the Prussians, and after Friedland openly objected 
 to sacrifice Russia for Prussia. Budberg, a Livonian, 
 had succeeded Czartoryski on 17 June, 1806, as 
 Chancellor, and hitherto his sympathies had been 
 decidedly Prussian. Though he was compelled to 
 accept his master's new policy, and to inform Harden- 
 berg on 21 June, 1807, that the Russian political 
 system of alliances was completely changed, he realized 
 even thus early that an alliance between Alexander 
 and Napoleon could not, in the nature of things, be 
 of long duration, nor could it offer to Europe any 
 chance of a period of tranquillity. On i September, 
 1807, before the Treaty of Tilsit was six weeks old, 
 he informed Leveson-Gower, the British envoy in St. 
 Petersburg, that "the continental peace cannot be
 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807 151 
 
 of long duration : any peace with France must be 
 considered as a momentary respite, and by no means 
 as affording any prospect of permanent tranquillity ; 
 neither the French Government, nor the French 
 people, is ripe for peace ; they retain too much of their 
 revolutionary restlessness. We must employ this 
 moment of repose in preparing the means of resistance 
 against another attack." 1 
 
 By the terms of the Treaty, which was finally con- 
 cluded on 9 July, Prussia lost heavily, being reduced 
 to half her original dimensions. While East Frisia 
 was given to Holland, most of her provinces west of 
 the Elbe were included with Hesse, partly in the 
 Grand Duchy of Berg, partly in the new kingdom of 
 Westphalia which was to be ruled by Jerome Bona- 
 parte. Her Polish Provinces, with the exception of 
 Bialystock which was to go to Russia, and Dantzic 
 which became nominally independent, were to form 
 the Duchy of Warsaw, under the King of Saxony 
 to whom was given Cottbus. Alexander, moreover, 
 gave up all claim to Corfu, Cattaro, and the Ionian 
 Isles, and declared his readiness to recognize Joseph 
 Bonaparte as King of Sicily, if Ferdinand was given 
 the Balearic Isles or Crete. 
 
 By the secret articles it was decided, if Great 
 Britain did not make peace by i November and re- 
 store all conquests made since 1805, tnat France and 
 Russia, which now joined the continental system, 
 should unite against her and call upon Austria, Den- 
 
 1 Quoted in " Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, p. 304.
 
 152 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 mark, Sweden, and Portugal to co-operate. More- 
 over, it was decided, if Turkey did not make peace 
 within three months, that France and Russia would 
 unite against her. 
 
 Prussia was thus abandoned by Alexander, who, 
 however, never allowed Napoleon to annihilate her. 
 Great Britain and Turkey were the chief objects of the 
 opposition of the two kings. Both countries, in the 
 event of the non-acceptance of the terms offered them, 
 were to be attacked by the united forces of Napoleon 
 and Alexander. Prussia had lost about half of her 
 territory, was forced behind the Elbe, and became 
 subservient to France and Russia. Had it not been 
 for the opposition of Alexander to Napoleon's proposals 
 for her destruction Prussia would have disappeared 
 from the list of nations, and the Vistula would have 
 become the dividing line between the French and 
 Russian monarchies. 
 
 During the period between the overthrow of 
 Prussia and the Peace of Tilsit with Russia, i.e. 
 between October, 1806, and July, 1807, Napoleon had 
 been in Eastern Europe. During the severe weather 
 which always characterized the winters in that portion 
 of Europe he enjoyed excellent health. At the same 
 time his political activities never ceased. In Novem- 
 ber, 1806, he had issued the celebrated Berlin Decree 
 declaring the British Isles in a state of blockade and 
 prohibiting all commerce with them. He kept up a 
 constant correspondence with Joseph and sent most 
 minute instructions with reference to the government
 
 THE KING AND QUEEN OF PRUSSIA WITH NAPOLEON AND 
 THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA AT TILSIT 
 
 AFTER A. PAINTING BY GOSSE AT VERSAILLES
 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807 153 
 
 of Naples. From Naples he withdrew large numbers 
 of troops for his forthcoming campaign in Poland. 
 In December, 1806, the whole of Poland had declared 
 for Napoleon, and troops were being raised in every 
 direction. The attitude of Austria, however, caused 
 Napoleon some uneasiness, and though he received 
 from Vienna pacific assurances he very character- 
 istically acted as though hostilities were likely to 
 break out. He formed two camps, one at Verona, 
 and one at Brescia, and he advised Joseph not to 
 send for his wife from Paris till the political situation 
 in Italy was more assured. Already he had adopted 
 the plan of employing men of all nationalities in his 
 Grande Armde. 
 
 The Polish legion in 1806 was in Naples, but was 
 recalled to serve against Russia. Several thousands 
 of Neapolitans were also summoned to serve in 
 Germany and elsewhere. In January, 1807, Napoleon 
 ordered Joseph to send him the regiments which had 
 been defeated at Maida, as he wished to have them 
 under his own eye. "They have," he said, "to wipe 
 out the shame of having been beaten by the English." 
 It is unnecessary to wonder at Napoleon's successful 
 career when one marks not only his close attention to 
 the smallest details, but also the fact that this attention 
 to detail did not in any way interfere with his concep- 
 tion of Empire. In the early months of 1807, though 
 his attention was concentrated upon his campaign 
 against Russia, he never ceased to follow the events 
 in Joseph's kingdom of Naples with the closest interest.
 
 154 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 On 28 January he wrote to Joseph : " Your fortunes 
 and victories have interposed between us vast 
 countries ; you are on the shores of the Mediter- 
 ranean, I am on those of the Baltic ; but on the 
 harmony of our measures we tend towards the same 
 object. Keep a watch on your coast : do not suffer 
 it to be approached by the English or by their 
 commerce." A curious sidelight is thrown on the 
 aspirations and high spirit of the French soldiers 
 when we read of the murmurings of the troops in 
 Naples because they have not the opportunities 
 enjoyed by their comrades in Poland of acquiring 
 distinction. Somewhat naturally the news of the 
 prodigious victories gained in Germany, and of the 
 promotions won, increased their dissatisfaction with 
 their own position engaged " in a painful and obscure 
 war ". Napoleon's reply to Joseph's letters with 
 reference to this discontent was very characteristic. 
 " Allow no complaining. With the French you must 
 show firmness. The army of Naples has no cause 
 for murmuring. Say to them, ' Do you complain ? ' 
 Ask General Berthier, he will tell you that your 
 Emperor has been living for weeks upon potatoes, 
 and bivouacking in the snows of Poland. You may 
 judge from this of what happens to the officers ; they 
 get nothing to eat but mere meat. 1 . . . Neither the 
 staff nor the colonels nor the other regimental officers 
 have taken their clothes off for the last two months, 
 some not for four months (I myself have been a 
 
 1 Napoleon's " Correspondence with Joseph," Vol. I, p. 233.
 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807 155 
 
 fortnight without taking" off my boots) in the middle 
 of snow and mud . . . fighting with our bayonets 
 frequently under grape shot . . . After having de- 
 stroyed the Prussian monarchy, we are fighting against 
 the remnant of the Prussians, against Russians, 
 Cossacks, and Kalmucks, and the tribes of the North 
 who formerly conquered the Roman Empire. We 
 have war in all its fierceness and all its horrors. In 
 such fatigues every one has been more or less ill, 
 except myself, for I never was stronger ; I have 
 grown fat." 1 From this remarkable letter we can 
 learn the secret of Napoleon's rapid and overwhelming 
 successes. Indomitable resolution, careful forethought, 
 a readiness to share in all the discomforts of a cam- 
 paign such qualities were bound to bring success to 
 their possessors. 
 
 During the winter campaign of 1806-7 Napoleon 
 had ample opportunity of exhibiting to the world his 
 possession of these qualities, as well as his consummate 
 knowledge of the currents of European opinion. His 
 acquaintance with the immediate needs of his army 
 was equally complete. Writing to Talleyrand who 
 was at Warsaw on the evening of 1 2 March, he urges 
 him to send every day to his head-quarters at Osterode, 
 eight days' journey from Warsaw, 50,0x30 rations of 
 biscuit and 20,000 pints of brandy. " The success," 
 he says, " of the greatest combinations, indeed the fate 
 of Europe, depends on a question of subsistence." 5 
 
 Napoleon's "Correspondence with Joseph," Vol. I, p. 232. 
 * Ibid. pp. 234-5.
 
 156 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 " If I have bread," he continues, " to beat the Russians 
 is child's play." He was right. During a long 
 winter campaign, such as Napoleon was experiencing, 
 the question of the commissariat was of the first 
 importance. The matter was, as he declared, "more 
 important than all the negotiations in the world 
 . . . these rations and pints of brandy will spoil the 
 combinations of all the hostile powers ". Throughout 
 May, while the fate of France and indeed Europe 
 hung upon the success of the French arms over those 
 of the Russians in the coming final struggle, Napoleon 
 was writing instructions to Joseph on even minute 
 points. His confidence in his ability to defeat the 
 Russians and to triumph over all his difficulties was 
 justified, for the victory of Friedland, fought on 14 
 June, the anniversary of Marengo, was followed by 
 the Treaty of Tilsit. The battle of Friedland was 
 indeed, as Napoleon declared, as decisive as those of 
 Marengo, of Austerlitz, and of Jena. 
 
 While the negotiations were proceeding which 
 eventuated in the Treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon kept his 
 attention firmly fixed on the Mediterranean, and never 
 ceased to consider plans for establishing his supremacy 
 in that quarter. 
 
 Corfu (which with Cattaro had been definitely 
 assigned to France) was to become an important 
 French station ; Joseph was to begin the construction of 
 two ships of seventy-four guns to be launched in the 
 spring of 1 808 ; Napoleon's mind was evidently full of 
 plans for the development of the French power in the
 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807 157 
 
 Eastern Mediterranean. An officer was sent from Tilsit 
 to Corfu to act as chief of the staff ; Joseph was to keep 
 some "brigs or gun boats at Taranto, Otranto, or 
 Brindisi in order to keep the communications open 
 between Corfu" and Naples. Corfu was to be 
 victualled immediately, and everything necessary was 
 to be sent there. Throughout his correspondence with 
 Joseph, Napoleon insisted on men of action being chosen 
 to carry out all his plans. " I look upon men of 
 learning and brilliancy," he declared, "as I do upon 
 coquettes. " 
 
 During the eight months which followed the con- 
 clusion of the Treaty of Tilsit, i.e. from July, 1807, to 
 i April, 1808, Napoleon remained, with the excep- 
 tion of a short visit to Milan, in or near Paris, while 
 Joseph, a king since 1806, remained in his kingdom of 
 Naples. 
 
 During these months Napoleon's main aim was to 
 deliver the Continent from the presence of the English 
 and to force England to come to terms with him. 
 Consequently he concentrated his attention not only 
 upon the conversion of the Baltic and the Mediter- 
 ranean into French lakes, but also upon becoming 
 supreme over the whole of the Spanish Peninsula. 
 
 The Treaty of Tilsit marks the firm establishment 
 of Napoleon's power over Central Europe. The 
 treaty of Luneville had given France the left bank of 
 the Rhine, a priceless possession, for the attainment of 
 which Frenchmen had longed through many cen- 
 turies. Napoleon himself was only 32 years old in
 
 158 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 1 80 1 when he gave France this invaluable territory. 
 Between the conclusion of the Treaty of Luneville 
 and the Treaty of Tilsit, Europe had itself experienced 
 a revolution which to a great extent had been acceler- 
 ated by Napoleon's defeat of Austria. In 1805 Austria 
 had been overthrown ; in July, 1806, the Holy Roman 
 Empire had come to an end, and in October of the 
 same year Prussia had been crushed. In June, 1807, 
 the Treaty of Tilsit with Russia closes a period of un- 
 precedented successes. 
 
 At the same time the Peace of Tilsit, unlike the 
 Peace of Utrecht or the Peace of Paris in 1763, did 
 not mark an epoch in European history, nor did it 
 effect a permanent settlement of questions which had 
 long been in dispute. It rather belongs to that class 
 of temporary arrangements which like the Peace of 
 Ryswick or the Peace of Amiens merely gave breath- 
 ing time to the combatants. Soldiers might indeed 
 hope that a period of rest from war would follow the 
 pacification arranged by Napoleon and Alexander, but 
 Napoleon himself regarded the peace "as the begin- 
 ning of a new time of activity, in which the forces of 
 the Continent were to be used for the humbling of 
 Great Britain, and in due course for the prosecution of 
 new schemes in the East ".* 
 
 The task of humbling Great Britain was no easy 
 
 one, and as upon its realization depended the success 
 
 of his Eastern schemes Napoleon at once took the 
 
 matter in hand. By securing his predominance in the 
 
 1 "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, p. 294.
 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807 159 
 
 Baltic and in the Spanish Peninsula, Napoleon hoped 
 to intimidate Great Britain's allies, ruin her trade, and 
 force her to agree to his terms. His domination of 
 the land would, he thought, amply compensate for his 
 failure to dominate the sea, and by a firm enforcement 
 on his part of the Berlin Decree Great Britain would 
 be brought to her knees. According to his expecta- 
 tions this Decree would "deal a deadly blow" at the 
 Island State. 
 
 The attempt to carry out what was one of the 
 principal objects of his policy, viz. the complete humili- 
 ation of Great Britain, thus involved Napoleon in 
 various schemes. French supremacy in the Baltic, the 
 complete conquest of Spain and Portugal, French 
 ascendancy in the Mediterranean, the destruction of 
 the Turkish power on its complete subordination to 
 France, the continued subordination of the German 
 powers to his will, and the continuance of the Russian 
 alliance were all absolutely necessary for the success 
 of Napoleon's designs against Great Britain. Thus 
 the Emperor's undertakings were indeed "complex 
 and many-sided " ; but through them all runs one main 
 thread. Once Great Britain ruined and conquered, 
 then the difficulties in the way of the realization of 
 Napoleon's Eastern schemes would be comparatively 
 small. 
 
 There seems little doubt that at Tilsit Napoleon 
 had looked forward "to the accession of the Danish 
 fleet to the naval resources of France, Russia, Holland, 
 Spain, Northern Italy, and probably Portugal".
 
 160 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Such a combination would, he thought, be sufficient 
 to drive Great Britain from the Baltic and Mediter- 
 ranean and bring about her submission. Russia, 
 Holland, Northern Italy, and Spain could be counted 
 upon for support in the anti-British crusade. It only 
 remained to coerce Denmark and Portugal. 
 
 Canning was therefore fully justified in his seizure 
 of the Danish fleet, and in thus destroying Napoleon's 
 plan of looking upon the Danish navy as " the right 
 wing in the naval operations eventually to be carried 
 out against the mistress of the seas ". 
 
 Before the seizure of the Danish fleet by Canning, 
 Napoleon had determined (i) to do all in his power 
 to keep Russia a subservient ally, and (2) by bringing 
 Portugal and Spain into the continental system to 
 force England to come to terms, and to complete his 
 plans for the complete enslavement of Italy. His 
 endeavour to obtain control over the Mediterranean 
 in 1805 na d been foiled by the battle of Trafalgar. 
 He now endeavoured to secure the same object by 
 establishing his power over Portugal as well as Spain. 
 In the autumn of 1807, however, the bombardment 
 of Copenhagen, followed by the seizure of the Danish 
 fleet by Canning, struck a severe blow at the attempt 
 to force Denmark into the Napoleonic system. 
 
 His failure there only increased Napoleon's 
 intention of succeeding in Portugal, Spain, and Italy. 
 The resistance which he met with in the Spanish 
 Peninsula in 1808 was of enormous importance, be- 
 cause he was forced to postpone his Mediterranean and
 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807 161 
 
 Eastern plans, and the delay in the realization of these 
 plans caused by that resistance gave time to Prussia 
 and Austria under Stein and Stadion " to reorganize 
 the resources of those countries, and prepare them for 
 vigorous and effective resistance in the future". 
 
 On 27 October, 1807, Napoleon's plans with re- 
 gard to Spain and Portugal began to take shape in 
 the Treaty of Fontainebleau. He had already in 
 1 806 discussed the question of the partition of Portugal 
 with Godoy. By the Treaty of Fontainebleau the 
 greater part of Portugal was to be divided between 
 the Queen of Etruria (a Spanish princess) and her 
 son, the grandson of Charles IV, and Godoy, the 
 disposal of the intermediate districts to be settled later. 
 By the Treaty, too, it was arranged that while the 
 greater part of the Spanish forces were to be sent 
 to Portugal, 28,000 French troops (to be followed by 
 another 40,000 if required) were to be admitted into 
 Spain. 
 
 Thus the partition of Portugal was to be carried 
 out for two objects : 
 
 (1) In order to deal a severe blow at Great 
 Britain's maritime trade. 
 
 (2) In order to provide an exchange for Tuscany. 
 " It is," Napoleon wrote, " very difficult for a branch 
 of the House of Spain to be established in the middle 
 of Italy." The truth of this is apparent when it is 
 remembered that Napoleon had determined to 
 "secure complete domination in Italy in matters 
 commercial, religious, and political". Portugal was 
 
 H
 
 i62 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 like Venice in 1797 to be sacrificed in order to satisfy 
 the political and commercial aims of Napoleon. 
 
 Though Portugal declared in October, 1807, her 
 adhesion to the continental system, Junot and French 
 troops invaded the country only to find that on 29 
 November the Prince Regent had escaped by the aid 
 of the British fleet. 
 
 The possession of Spain and Portugal, in Na- 
 poleon's opinion, would be followed by far-reaching 
 results. The supremacy of the British in the Mediter- 
 ranean would be destroyed. Sicily and Malta would 
 inevitably fall into the hands of France, and the Span- 
 ish naval resources would enable him to carry out his 
 Eastern schemes. 
 
 At the time of the Treaty of Tilsit Napoleon 
 had heard of the deposition of Selim II, the reforming 
 Sultan of Turkey, and the accession of Mustapha IV. 
 In concert with Alexander, Napoleon at once decided 
 upon a joint spoliation of the Turkish Empire. Be- 
 fore, however, this plan could be carried out it was 
 necessary to secure complete predominance in Spain. 
 Thus Turkey was for the time safe from French 
 interference, while after the Conference of Erfurt 
 prudential motives prevented Alexander from under- 
 taking any extensive operations against Turkey. 
 
 Till July, 1808, however, Napoleon hoped to be 
 able to carry out his designs for the subjugation of 
 Turkey, and for the conquest of Egypt and India. 
 But from that time (July, 1808) events in Spain forced 
 him (i) to forego his Eastern projects, (2) to modify
 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807 l6 3 
 
 his plans generally, (3) to meet Alexander at Erfurt. 
 Thus the summer of 1808 proved to be of momentous 
 importance in Napoleon's career, while to Europe 
 generally the effect of the events in Spain cannot be 
 over-estimated. 
 
 During all the years from 1797 to 1808, Napoleon 
 had never dismissed from his mind his Asiatic and 
 Colonial designs. H is views were by no means limited 
 to a mere European supremacy, the attainment of 
 which was by him regarded as a preliminary measure 
 to extensive Eastern conquests. 
 
 During the first six months of 1806, before his 
 plans were interfered with by the hostility of Prussia, 
 his mind was mainly occupied with designs for securing 
 Sicily and the Mediterranean. By the conclusion of 
 peace with Great Britain he hoped to obtain a respite 
 from war long enough to enable him to form a powerful 
 fleet. 
 
 But circumstances forced him to postpone the exe- 
 cution of these projects and to devote all his attention 
 to the struggles with Prussia and Russia. 
 
 After Tilsit, however, he was enabled to return 
 to his earlier plans. The Continent was now under 
 his ascendancy. It was united under his command 
 in antagonism to Great Britain, and he himself was 
 apparently in a position to resume his Asiatic schemes. 
 France had indeed no adequate fleet, but he hoped 
 soon to be in a position to use the fleets of Denmark, 
 Spain, and Portugal, and having established his supre- 
 macy over those countries, to include in his system the
 
 1 64 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Spanish and Portuguese colonies of Central and 
 Southern America. Thus in order to secure a com- 
 plete mastery over the Baltic and the Mediterranean, 
 and to place his Empire on an equality with Great 
 Britain as a colonizing power, Napoleon had merely 
 to secure the alliance of Denmark and Spain, just as 
 he had secured the alliance of Bavaria and other 
 German secondary States. 
 
 The war with Spain broke out in 1 808, and though 
 Napoleon regarded it in the light of a rising which 
 could easily be suppressed, its outbreak interfered with 
 the execution of his schemes in the Mediterranean, 
 and forced him to postpone his designs with regard to 
 Turkey and the East generally. 
 
 Simultaneously with the national uprising in Spain 
 in 1808, marked by the capitulation of Baylen and the 
 Convention of Cintra, there became apparent a feel- 
 ing of general dissatisfaction on the part of the Tsar 
 Alexander with the conduct of Napoleon in relation 
 to the Treaty of Tilsit. Alexander had come away 
 from Tilsit with his mind bent upon conquests in 
 Turkey. The French alliance was never popular in 
 Russia, but, as Alexander and his minister Romanzoff 
 were well aware, successful enterprises against Turkey 
 would still all discontent and satisfy the Russian 
 people. But at Tilsit Napoleon had asserted his right 
 to act as arbiter in the war between Russia and 
 Turkey, for he feared if war continued Turkey would 
 throw itself into the arms of Great Britain. In all 
 future operations against Turkey, the eventual partition
 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807 165 
 
 of which was ever in Napoleon's mind, Russia and 
 France in his opinion must act simultaneously and in 
 unison. 
 
 Moreover, Napoleon, in the Secret Treaty con- 
 cluded at Tilsit, had definitely laid it down that when- 
 ever the partition of Turkey should be taken in hand 
 "the town of Constantinople and the province of 
 Roumelia" should not be included in the territory 
 handed over to Russia. 
 
 If, however, Russia was bound by the Treaty of 
 Tilsit to retire from the Danubian provinces, Napoleon 
 was equally bound by the same Treaty (Article 4) to 
 withdraw his troops from Prussian territory. While 
 the wish nearest to Alexander's heart was the annexa- 
 tion of much of Turkey, including Constantinople, the 
 determination of Napoleon to destroy Prussia was 
 equally strong. Prussia had steadily refused to enter 
 into the Confederation of the Rhine, and inconsequence 
 Napoleon was resolved to bring about her political 
 annihilation. A suggestion by Napoleon that an 
 arrangement might be come to by which he should 
 work his will upon Prussia without interference, while 
 Alexander should be allowed to keep the Danubian 
 provinces, was peculiarly distasteful to the latter 
 monarch. His sympathies had been aroused by the 
 misfortunes of the Prussian King and of his wife, Queen 
 Louise, and his mind revolted from a bargain which 
 meant the utter ruin of the Hohenzollern House. 
 
 Thus no definite settlement was come to on these 
 important questions, and the opening of 1808 found
 
 1 66 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 the French and Russian Emperors each dissatisfied 
 with the conduct of the other. While things were in 
 this position the Spanish rising took place. Its effect 
 upon the relations of Napoleon and Alexander was 
 manifested in unmistakable fashion in October, 1808, 
 at Erfurt. No one, however, least of all Napoleon, 
 imagined during the early months of that year that the 
 course of events in Spain was destined to be more 
 than a temporary check upon the development of 
 Napoleon's fortunes. 
 
 In fact Napoleon imagined that his position after 
 Tilsit rendered him the dictator of Europe, and it was 
 not till 181 1 that he began to realize fully the existence 
 of obstacles to the full attainment of his ambitious 
 views. 
 
 One result of the position attained by Napoleon at 
 the time of the Treaty of Tilsit was the altered tone 
 which he adopted in his relations with the Papacy. 
 It became evident that his object was to enslave the 
 Church. He pictured himself as the head of a vast 
 European dominion in which he was to rule the con- 
 sciences of his subjects through his vassals, the Pope 
 and Bishops. This he thought could be accomplished 
 without any direct assumption of authority in things 
 spiritual. 
 
 To this scheme Pius VII, to his eternal credit, 
 offered strenuous opposition, and in consequence 
 Napoleon determined to transfer the Papacy to Paris 
 or some other French town, to enforce the adoption 
 of the distinctive principles of Gallican theology, and
 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807 167 
 
 generally to dictate the Papal policy. As a means of 
 carrying out this vigorous policy Napoleon relied upon 
 the hearty co-operation of the Gallican Episcopate. 
 
 In 1806 he issued the Catechism of the Empire 
 which was agreed to by the Papal Legate but not by 
 the Pope, who, however, made no formal protest. 
 Early in 1808 the occupation of Rome by French 
 troops commanded by Miollis announced to the world 
 the declaration of war between the French Emperor 
 and the Pope. The struggle between these poten- 
 tates was nominally over that article in the Concor- 
 dat which provided that the Prelates nominated by 
 Napoleon should be instituted to their office by the 
 Pope. Pius VII, a prisoner at Savona since 5 July, 
 1 809, declined to recognize the appointments to vacant 
 bishoprics, on the ground that Napoleon, being 
 guilty of culpable conduct to the Papacy, was not in 
 a fit position to exercise the right of nomination, and 
 on this ground he refused to institute Cardinal Maury 
 to the Archbishopric of Paris. 
 
 In consequence of this determination on the part of 
 Pius, no less than twenty-seven sees were vacant in 
 1809, and Napoleon in order to secure his aims 
 appointed in November, 1809, an Ecclesiastical Com- 
 mission to deal with the crisis. He further attempted 
 to conciliate Pius by offering him the Papal posses- 
 sions south of the Apennines. Pius, however, 
 refused to treat except from Rome, which he was, 
 however, not to see again till 1814. The situation 
 was not unlike that of 1682 when Louis XIV
 
 1 68 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 thought of setting up an independent Gallican Church, 
 and, moreover, Napoleon's Commission recommended, 
 as had been done in 1682, the summoning of a national 
 representative Council. 
 
 The reply of Pius to Napoleon's appointment of 
 an Ecclesiastical Council was a Papal Bull excom- 
 municating all who had been guilty of aggressions 
 against the Holy See, but its only effect at the time 
 was to irritate the Commission which practically en- 
 dorsed Napoleon's policy. In 1809 the question of 
 Napoleon's divorce from Josephine and his marriage 
 with Marie Louise of Austria (after the divorce had 
 been recognized by the Senate) was referred to the 
 Consistory Court of Paris. This marriage caused 
 much searching of hearts among the Cardinals who 
 in November, 1809, were ordered to proceed to Paris. 
 Many who were doubtful of the legality of the 
 marriage refused to go, and were imprisoned or 
 exiled, but Maury and those who agreed with him 
 drew up on 16 January, 1810, an address in support 
 of Napoleon's wishes. 
 
 From this time Napoleon made no secret of his 
 zeal for the Gallican principles as laid down in 1682, 
 and for the extinction of the independence and 
 autonomy of the Church. 
 
 During 1810 and 1811 the struggle proceeded 
 and in June, 1812, Pius was taken to Paris. In 
 December, however, the failure of the Russian ex- 
 pedition and the overthrow of the Grand Army were 
 accomplished facts, and the attitude of Napoleon was
 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807 169 
 
 at once changed. In January, 1813, the Treaty of 
 Fontainebleau was made by Napoleon with Pius who, 
 shortly afterwards, was allowed to return to Rome. 
 The fall of the Empire was accompanied by a re- 
 traction of the Treaty by Pius who, like many 
 temporal monarchs, regained that liberty of action of 
 which he had been like them deprived for so many 
 years. 1 
 
 At St. Helena Napoleon wrote and spoke of his 
 religious policy. He fully realized how powerful a 
 lever was religion in the hands of a ruler, and how 
 necessary it was to be on good terms with the Pope. 
 " By being on good terms with the Pope," he said, 
 " one can govern the consciences of a hundred million 
 Catholics. . . . What an immense influence that 
 means ! What a hold on public opinion ! " 2 He 
 explained his rupture with the Papacy by the facts 
 that though Pius VII had some affection for him, 
 politics caused the breach between them. The Pope, 
 he declared, desired above everything else temporal 
 power, and that as soon as he realized that he could 
 not enjoy it, he entered upon a course of first secret 
 and then open hostility to the French Emperors. 
 Napoleon declared, moreover, that he always made a 
 distinction between the Pope as Prince and the Pope 
 as Pontiff. At the same time he firmly asserted 
 
 1 This subject is very adequately treated in Jervis's "History 
 of the Galilean Church," a work to which I am much indebted. 
 
 2 Gonnard, "The Exile of St. Helena," p. 164. London, 
 Heinemann, 1909.
 
 1 70 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 (though his letters furnish conclusive proof that the 
 removal of Pius to Avignon was carried out by his 
 express orders) that though General Miollis was jus- 
 tified in removing the Pope from Rome yet that 
 he acted without orders. Rome was in a dangerous 
 condition, a rising was probable, and the removal 
 of Pius to Savona was, in his opinion, a wise step. 
 Though Pius was well treated he at once transformed 
 " the political conflicts into a religious war " ; and his 
 refusal to institute the Bishops chosen by Napoleon 
 justified the calling of the Council of 1811. The 
 summoning of this Council, so Napoleon stated, was 
 meant to be the first step in the direction of handing 
 over to the State the immediate control of religious 
 affairs. The political resistance of the European 
 sovereigns had led to an extension of his plans, and 
 similarly the struggle with Pius caused him to de- 
 velop his projects for securing full control of the 
 religion of his subjects. But all his projects were 
 overthrown by the events of 1812 and the following 
 years, owing to the uprising of Europe against the 
 French domination. Such was Napoleon's explana- 
 tion of his anti-papal policy. The Papacy had its 
 revenge. After 1812 "the Pope, the Spaniards, and 
 the sailors who maintained the continental blockade " 
 were together responsible for that rising of the nations 
 which eventually freed them from the Napoleonic 
 despotism. 
 
 An interesting question arises with respect to 
 Napoleon's position after Tilsit Had he not under-
 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807 
 
 taken the invasion of Spain in 1807-8, nor of Russia 
 in 1812, would he have remained Emperor till his 
 death ? Madame de Stael held the view that war was 
 necessary to him for the preservation of his absolutism. 
 " A great nation," she says, " would not have endured 
 the monotonous and degrading weight of despotism, if 
 military glory had not continually roused and animated 
 public sentiments." Mr. Bodley holds the contrary 
 view. In his opinion, Napoleon having finished his 
 great work of organization, but " given to the army 
 eleven years of legitimate glory from Castiglion to 
 Friedland, had an unexampled opportunity of ruling 
 peacefully a contented people". 1 There is much to 
 be said in support of this view ; but Napoleon, ignorant 
 of the real strength of the British navy, and still 
 more ignorant of the determination and vitality of the 
 British nation, was resolved to carry out his Eastern 
 schemes. It is seldom realized how dear to him were 
 those schemes. Supremacy in the Mediterranean, the 
 downfall of the British power in India, the subjection 
 of England to his will these seemed to him in 1807-8 
 when at the height of his power to be objects well 
 within his reach. 
 
 Consequently after Tilsit his character degenerates. 
 " The lawgiver, the organizer, the statesman disap- 
 pears ; he is only the conqueror, conscious of his skill 
 in the terrible game of war, which distorts his imagina- 
 tion and drags him in a furious wanton course to 
 Madrid, to Moscow, and to Leipsic." 2 
 
 1 Bodley, " France," Vol. I, p. 1 1 1. 2 Ibid. Vol. I, p. 1 1 1.
 
 172 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 " After Tilsit, and especially after the Austrian mar- 
 riage," writes another biographer, 1 " Napoleon was 
 suffering from conceit and ' pride '. For ten years he 
 had wielded absolute power, and those ten years 
 had changed him from a strenuous hard-worker, who 
 studied the situation with great care, to a self-willed 
 despot, who expected everything to go as he wished 
 because he wished it, and imagined himself a being 
 apart from mankind endowed with supernatural 
 powers." 
 
 Tilsit saw Napoleon at the height of his power. 
 From the date of that treaty the foundations of his 
 empire became unsound. Had the Emperor abandoned 
 projects of aggression, had he modified the continental 
 system, had he refrained from endeavouring to force 
 his policy upon Spain, had he recognized the immense 
 power of the Roman Church, it is quite possible that 
 the rule of his family in France might have been 
 perpetuated. But his " restless egotism " and the 
 growth of "the despotic habit" appeared more and 
 more unmistakably after 1807, an d his policy became 
 "increasingly dissociated from the opinion and the 
 tradition of France". After 1807 France, satisfied 
 with the establishment of the Napoleonic Empire, 
 desired peace. 
 
 The substitution of Champagny and Maret the 
 Duke of Bassano for Talleyrand as confidential ad- 
 visers marks the increase of Napoleon's impatience 
 of able and independent advisers. Thus while the 
 
 1 Norwood Young, "The Growth of Napoleon," p. 389.
 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807 173 
 
 growing opposition to the continental system was 
 tending to rouse in Germany a spirit of revolt, in Spain 
 the abhorrence of Napoleonic rule was sapping his 
 military strength. Moreover, as the years following 
 Tilsit proceeded, the French people realized that the 
 spirit of moderation was more and more absent from 
 the schemes of the Emperor, who, moreover, by his 
 anti-papal policy, alienated many of those who adhered 
 to the Roman Catholic faith. 
 
 CHIEF DATES 
 
 War between Russia and Turkey . . . December, 1806. 
 Napoleon takes Dalmatia and Ragusa . . December, 1806. 
 Venice united to the Italian Kingdom . . December, 1806. 
 British Orders in Council .... January, 1807. 
 
 Eylau . . . . . . .8 February, 1807. 
 
 Convention of Bartenstein (Russia, Prussia, Sweden) April, 1807. 
 Heilsberg ....... 10 June, 1807. 
 
 Friedland . . . . . . . 14 June, 1807. 
 
 Treaty of Tilsit 9 July, 1807. 
 
 Formation of Grand Duchy of Warsaw . . July, 1807. 
 
 British seizure of Danish fleet . . . September, 1807. 
 Treaty of Fontainebleau .... October, 1807. 
 French invasion of Portugal . October-November, 1807.
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE BEGINNING OF NAPOLEON'S INTERVENTION 
 IN SPAIN AND THE CONGRESS OF ERFURT, 1807- 
 1808 
 
 After Tilsit Growth of national feeling and of national 
 opposition to Napoleon Junot's invasion of Portugal Napoleon's 
 Mediterranean schemes The importance of Spain Napoleon 
 in Italy, 1807 The Milan Decree The meaning of the con- 
 tinental system Advantages to Spain of a French alliance 
 Its importance for Napoleon's Mediterranean policy Napoleon's 
 policy to Spain The Bayonne interview Explanation of Na- 
 poleon's action The influence of religion in Spain Summary of 
 the events leading to the Spanish rising Accession of Joseph The 
 Spanish rising Baylen and Cintra Murat, King of Naples 
 The Congress at Erfurt Its meaning and importance. 
 
 'TRILL Tilsit Napoleon had been the scourge of 
 Europe. Europe demanded a scourge, and in 
 the words of Lord Rosebery, he purged "the floor 
 of Europe with fire "- 1 All the ancient monarchies were 
 compelled "to set their houses in order," with results 
 highly beneficial to themselves and to Europe. In 
 1799 it seemed as though Europe would escape from 
 reform ; in 1815 she had not only been forced to adopt 
 reforms but had experienced a revolution. After 
 
 x Lord Rosebery, "Napoleon: the Last Phase," p. 228. 
 J 74
 
 INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 175 
 
 Tilsit Europe definitely entered upon a new period in 
 its career. 
 
 The Revolution which had done its work in France 
 had, unwittingly and unconsciously, instilled new life 
 into Europe. National feeling was created, and 
 simultaneously with its unexpected assertion in Spain 
 began to show itself in many parts of Germany. In 
 1813 it was strong enough to force Napoleon back 
 into France, and in 1814 it brought about his downfall. 
 But in 1807 Napoleon, carried away by his successes, 
 culminating in the Treaty of Tilsit, determined to 
 bring the Spanish Peninsula under his immediate in- 
 fluence. His policy towards Spain well illustrated 
 his extraordinary confidence in himself, his belief in 
 his destiny, his audacity, and his gambling spirit. At 
 St. Helena he recognized how mistaken had been his 
 policy to Spain. 
 
 While Junot was traversing Spain in the later 
 months of 1807 Napoleon's activity never ceased. 
 Junot occupied Lisbon on 13 December, 1807; on 
 23 November Napoleon had entered Milan on his 
 way to Venice. He was resolved, as far as Italy 
 was concerned, to close all Italian ports to English 
 ships. Leghorn and Ancona were at once forced 
 into obedience, and Napoleon returned to those pro- 
 jects of domination in the Mediterranean which he 
 had cherished when, at the age of 26, he had com- 
 manded 30,000 men in Egypt, and had never 
 abandoned. France had, indeed, owing to the su- 
 periority of the English fleet, lost her colonies and
 
 176 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 much of her commerce. But the establishment of 
 French supremacy in the Mediterranean implied not 
 only the conquest of Macedonia and of Egypt and 
 complete mastery over Dalmatia and the Ionian Isles, 
 but also the subjugation of Spain. The Mediterranean 
 would thus be closed to the English, Spain in pos- 
 session of Gibraltar and subservient to France would 
 hold the keys of this new Empire, the possession 
 of which would amply compensate France for the loss 
 of her colonies. 
 
 The way to the complete success of the continental 
 blockade, therefore, lay through Spain, and Napoleon's 
 mind during this period never wandered far from 
 Spain. Unless his plans in Spain were successful all 
 the money expended in the south of Italy would be 
 wasted. And Naples had proved "un gouffre sans 
 fond, d'hommes et d'argent ". Napoleon, indeed, was 
 far from being satisfied with Joseph's government. An 
 easy-going man, without any special political capacity, 
 and one who was, moreover, apt to become discon- 
 tented with his position, Joseph was tolerant even 
 with those who openly declared their preference for a 
 Republican to an Imperial form of government. What 
 was more serious, the Calabrian district of the Neapoli- 
 tan kingdom was infested with brigands, while at 
 Reggio the English held their own. 
 
 On his return to Milan after visiting Venice and 
 Mantua, Napoleon issued on 17 December, 1807, tne 
 Milan Decree the complement of the Berlin Decree of 
 21 November, 1806. By it every ship no matter of
 
 INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 177 
 
 what country which accepted the English Orders in 
 Council was declared liable to capture. Also every 
 ship sailing from or to England, or from or to one of 
 the English colonies, was, if possible, to be seized. 
 In fierce terms Napoleon condemned the English 
 declaration that the flag did not render the cargo free 
 from the danger of capture. In adopting this tone 
 and these measures Napoleon was in fact repeating 
 the French Navigation Act of September, 1793, and 
 the declarations of the Committee of Public Safety. 
 
 In adopting this policy Napoleon ignored the 
 possibility of an uprising of the nations against a 
 system which touched every man. He seems to 
 have imagined that in order to secure adhesion to his 
 disastrous policy he had simply to procure the easily- 
 obtained acquiescence of the rulers. By the con- 
 tinental system not only were the nations of Europe 
 ruined, they were humiliated. For their acceptance 
 of the continental blockade implied absolute sub- 
 servience to a tyrannical foreigner. 
 
 The tyranny of the English edicts was not so 
 apparent to the ordinary inhabitant of continental 
 Europe as was the French domination, the severity of 
 which was felt by him every day of the week. 
 
 If he happened to live in one of the provinces 
 which had been torn from Austria or Prussia he found 
 himself placed under the rule of a stranger. He was 
 surrounded by Custom House officials, by a foreign 
 gendarmerie ; he was liable to domiciliary visits ; he 
 saw his children forced to serve in the French armies ; 
 
 12
 
 178 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 he was ruined by the weight of taxation. Owing to 
 the continental system he was now faced by the fear 
 of starvation. 
 
 Till the continental system threatened Europe 
 Napoleon had reason to believe that there was no 
 danger of any serious opposition to his supremacy. 
 His successes had been extraordinary, and so easily 
 obtained that he never realized their superficial char- 
 acter. He had "partitioned kingdoms, overthrown 
 dynasties, erected kings," but he never realized the 
 possibility of Europe rising to shake itself free from 
 his domination. 1 
 
 For the success of his schemes, the establishment 
 of the French power in the Mediterranean and the 
 active co-operation of Spain and Portugal in the 
 policy of the continental blockade were absolutely 
 necessary. That accomplished it would then become 
 necessary to make some satisfactory arrangements 
 with Russia. That Power had interests in the Medi- 
 terranean which, if strenuously upheld, might interfere 
 seriously with Napoleon's projects. The firm friend- 
 ship of Russia was absolutely essential to the success 
 of his plan. While he was forcing the acceptance of 
 his will upon Spain and Portugal, he relied upon the 
 Tsar to prevent any rising on the part of Austria or 
 Prussia. 
 
 To a man of the imaginative character of Napoleon 
 nothing was impossible. He determined to use all 
 
 1 Sorel, "L'Europe et la Revolution Franchise," Vol. VII, 
 p. 236. Paris, Plon.
 
 INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 179 
 
 his efforts to turn the attention of Russia towards the 
 Baltic. The seizure of certain of Sweden's posses- 
 sions would necessitate removal of Russian troops 
 from the Danube to Finland. Later, he hoped to 
 turn the attention of Russia towards Asia. The 
 conquest of Russia and even of India would have 
 a twofold effect. Alarmed at the threatened attack 
 upon their Indian possessions the English would 
 evacuate the Mediterranean, and would hasten to 
 make peace with France. And at the same time the 
 absence of the Russian armies in Asia would give 
 Napoleon a free hand with regard to Egypt and 
 Turkey. 
 
 At the end of January, 1808, Savary returned 
 from a mission to Russia and Napoleon realized that 
 Alexander would not acquiesce as easily as he had 
 hoped in his schemes. Moreover, he was at the same 
 time brought to realize that the British Government, 
 undeterred by its apparent isolation in Europe, was 
 resolved to continue the war to the bitter end. The 
 declared opinion of the English Parliament implied 
 war to the death. 
 
 Nevertheless no thought of failure crossed Na- 
 poleon's mind. He was busy arranging for the 
 inclusion of the whole of the Spanish Peninsula in his 
 continental system, and he never imagined that he 
 would meet with any serious opposition. 
 
 Moreover, during the early months of 1808, he had 
 ever reason to believe that French supremacy in the 
 Mediterranean would be firmly secured.
 
 i8o THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 The Treaty of Tilsit, as has been seen, " had en- 
 abled Napoleon to turn from the contests of the North 
 towards his cherished schemes for securing supremacy 
 in the Mediterranean "- 1 
 
 Alexander had relinquished his hold on the Ionian 
 Islands in favour of Napoleon, who in February, 1808, 
 dispatched a fleet under Ganth^aume who seized and 
 occupied Corfu. This success was regarded by 
 Napoleon as a preliminary step to the establishment 
 of his supremacy in the Mediterranean and to the 
 partition of Turkey between France, Russia, and 
 Austria. 
 
 But before these ambitious projects so dear to 
 Napoleon could be carried out, the Spanish rising took 
 place, an event which led to the overthrow of his 
 Eastern schemes and indirectly to his own fall. 
 
 After Tilsit Napoleon, as has been pointed out, 
 looked forward confidently to the overthrow of Great 
 Britain, the ruin of her Eastern Empire, and the firm 
 establishment of France as the leading power in the 
 world. To overcome Great Britain he relied upon 
 the Russian alliance, the Berlin and Milan Decrees, 
 his coercion of Denmark and Portugal, and the com- 
 plete subservience of Spain. 
 
 The issue of the Berlin Decree in November, 
 1 806, was followed by the English Orders in Council, 
 January to November, 1807, an d by the Milan Decree, 
 and a long and bitter struggle ensued in the case of 
 
 1 Johnston, "The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy," 
 Vol. I, p. 172. London, Macmillan & Co., 1904.
 
 INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 181 
 
 the British nation, a struggle for life. As Napoleon 
 realized that he could not attack Great Britain directly 
 he devised his plan of commercial strangulation. In 
 spite of the temporary relief afforded to British manu- 
 facturers by the Spanish rising which enabled them to 
 pour their goods into Spain and the Spanish colonies, 
 the manufacturing districts in England underwent 
 great misery. The relief, however, afforded to British 
 commerce by its ability to trade with Spain, Portugal, 
 and their colonies, together with Napoleon's adhesion 
 to the old mercantile theory, enabled the British nation 
 to struggle through the terrible years 1810 and 1811. 
 Thus Napoleon's two gigantic blunders the war with 
 Spain and his permission to export corn into England 
 finally put an end to all chance of the establishment 
 on the part of France of a great world Power giving 
 laws to Europe and developing the resources of a 
 vast colonial Empire. 1 
 
 The Berlin and later the Milan Decree no doubt 
 caused great inconvenience to the inhabitants of Great 
 Britain, but in themselves they were not sufficient to 
 establish Napoleon's ascendancy in Europe. The 
 seizure of the Danish fleet in September, 1807, relieved 
 the British Government from any fear of the destruc- 
 tion of its naval power in the Baltic, but at the time 
 it proved but a slight advantage to Great Britain and 
 interfered with Napoleon's plans to only a moderate 
 extent. 
 
 1 " Lectures upon the History of the Nineteenth Century," 
 P- 77-
 
 i82 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 The real issue between Napoleon and Great 
 Britain had to be fought out in the Spanish Peninsula. 
 Napoleon's Empire was in reality staked upon his 
 success or failure in Spain. 
 
 With Spain as a cordial ally, Napoleon would be 
 able to compete with Great Britain as a naval and 
 colonizing power. Since 1795 Spain had been the 
 nominal ally of France, and her ruler was as subser- 
 vient as were the rulers of Bavaria and Wurtemberg. 
 Portugal could not hope to resist any force that Spain 
 might bring against her, and as far as her resources 
 and position as a European power were concerned 
 might be placed in the same category as such states 
 as Sardinia, Naples, Hanover, and Brunswick. 
 
 For Spain the advantages to be derived from her 
 reorganization by Napoleon seemed undeniable. A 
 hundred years previously Louis XIV had saved her 
 from undergoing the fate of Poland by bringing her 
 into close relations with his monarchy, and by carrying 
 out by means of his agents the complete rehabilitation 
 of the Spanish administration. With the accession 
 of Philip V, the Bourbon grandson of Louis, new life 
 was instilled into Spain, and till the death of Charles 
 III, in 1788, she had enjoyed the benefits of the 
 efforts made by her Bourbon rulers and by such 
 enterprising ministers as Alberoni, Patino, Wall, 
 Squillacci, D'Aranda, and Campomanes. 
 
 Spain in 1807 was still passing through a period 
 of misgovernment which followed the death of 
 Charles III. Her army was worthless; her navy
 
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 INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 183 
 
 had been wellnigh destroyed at Trafalgar. But had 
 her army and navy been placed at the disposal of 
 Napoleon, had she been treated as an honoured ally 
 of France, as Bavaria had been treated, and been 
 given a share of Portugal then Spain would have 
 become a client state of France, and would have 
 aided not only the establishment of French supremacy 
 in the Mediterranean, but would have contributed to 
 the complete isolation of Great Britain. 1 
 
 Instead, however, of adopting this course and 
 taking steps to make his alliance with Spain durable 
 and valuable, Napoleon insisted on placing his brother 
 Joseph Bonaparte on the Spanish throne. Louis XIV 
 had indeed pursued a somewhat similar course, but he 
 acted in accordance with the wishes of the Spanish 
 people. In 1700 the death of Charles II had left 
 Spain without a ruler, and in order to avert partition 
 at the hands of France, Austria, and Great Britain, 
 the Spaniards invited Philip, the grandson of Louis, 
 to become their king. In 1807, however, Spain had 
 a king and a crown prince, but Napoleon, adopting 
 a high-handed course, procured their abdication, and 
 without consulting the wishes of the Spanish nation 
 forced upon it as king Joseph Bonaparte. 
 
 Napoleon's three months' sojourn at Bayonne in 
 1808 may be said to mark the turning-point in his 
 career. It was then that he decided upon the fatal 
 mistake of transferring his brother Joseph from 
 Naples to Spain. 
 
 J See Seeley, "Life of Stein," Pt. IV, ch. i.
 
 1 84 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Mistakes he had already made, but his miscal- 
 culation with regard to the true policy to be carried 
 on in his relations with Spain proved overwhelmingly 
 disastrous. Spain had always gravitated naturally 
 towards France, and Napoleon could without much 
 difficulty have counted upon the ready subservience 
 of the Spanish monarch. 
 
 Some justification has been urged on behalf of 
 what seems to be an extraordinary blunder and a 
 fatal miscalculation on the part of Napoleon. The 
 Government of Spain, it is asserted, and with truth, 
 was the worst in Europe. The existing abuses were 
 manifest to the world, and their existence was the more 
 incapable of defence if it be remembered that under 
 Charles III abuses had been checked and the country 
 placed in a prominent position among European 
 Powers. By restoring order in Spain and by carry- 
 ing out reforms similar to those instituted by Charles 
 III, Napoleon, it would seem, might have resuscitated 
 the vast Spanish Empire, modernized it, and launched 
 it afresh on a career not unworthy of its past traditions. 
 
 In an age, too, which has been styled one of "in- 
 ternational lawlessness," Napoleon considered that 
 the benefits likely to accrue to Spain and her people 
 would justify in the eyes of the world his daring 
 and revolutionary policy. To a man of Napoleon's 
 vigour, capacity, enterprise, and ambitions, the oppor- 
 tunity of reforming and launching on a successful 
 career, a great country like Spain with all its infinite 
 resources must have seemed irresistible. The corrup-
 
 INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 185 
 
 tion in every department of the Spanish Govern- 
 ment was so manifest that to him the benefits, which 
 would be derived from the reform of abuses, would 
 easily outweigh a few high-handed and revolutionary 
 acts. 
 
 Without drastic measures it would seem impossible 
 to rescue Spain from the effects of the rule of the most 
 contemptible of the Bourbon race. Moreover, the 
 very existence of a Bourbon ruler was repugnant to 
 Napoleon and to every exponent of French revolu- 
 tionary principles. 
 
 Napoleon, too, realized that the misgovernment of 
 Spain could not be cured under the weak rule of 
 Charles IV, and that the Spanish alliance during the 
 last few years had been of little value to France. Its 
 debt was enormous, its fleet was practically valueless, 
 its army in a state of dissolution : in a word, its 
 alliance with France had proved of small advantage to 
 Napoleon. By taking possession of Spain, Napoleon 
 would deal "a final blow to the House of Bourbon," 
 he would remove from France all danger of finding in 
 Spain during the ensuing years an enemy, he would 
 advance the interests of his own house, and, above all, 
 by striking a blow at Great Britain from which as he 
 hoped she would not recover, he would be enabled to 
 carry out his ambitious Eastern schemes and establish 
 the world-wide supremacy of France. He had thus 
 many and plausible reasons for treating Spain on a 
 plan totally different from that which he had adopted 
 with regard to Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden.
 
 1 86 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 With his immense army he felt, moreover, able to act 
 not only as a reformer but, if necessary, as a conqueror. 
 
 Moreover, the establishment of Spain under his 
 direct control would mark the completion of the con- 
 tinental system and would place in his hands her fleet 
 and colonial Empire. Cadiz and Carthagena would be 
 invaluable bases for expeditions, the command of the 
 Mediterranean would pass to France, half of the new 
 world would be under her rule. Great Britain would 
 assuredly be ruined. 
 
 It has been argued that the true policy of Spain 
 was to accept Napoleon's intervention and reforms in 
 the spirit in which his vassal states in Germany had 
 accepted them. By so doing Spain like Bavaria 
 would have found herself in a strong position after 
 Napoleon's downfall. Spain, according to this view, 
 should have sacrificed her political independence for a 
 time in order to regain prosperity and, later, indepen- 
 dence. Her true interests, it is further alleged, were 
 opposed to those of Great Britain ; and by entering 
 into the Peninsular War she merely supported the 
 cause of British trade and that of the Roman Church. 
 
 Plausible as this view may seem, it errs in ignoring 
 the fact that Spain in resisting Napoleon was struggling 
 for the independence of Europe, and was the first 
 continental power to oppose the " international law- 
 lessness " which characterized the Napoleonic regime. 
 
 There is, moreover, no doubt that Spain differed 
 widely from the German States which Napoleon had 
 so far been chiefly concerned with. No national life
 
 INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 187 
 
 existed as yet in Germany nor in Italy. In neither 
 of those countries had he been opposed by the people. 
 His entry into Berlin after Jena was accompanied by 
 the plaudits of the Prussian inhabitants of that city. 
 Neither in Germany nor in Italy had the people been 
 allowed any share in political affairs. Both countries 
 also had been divided among so many rulers that a 
 feeling of nationality did not exist. Neither Germany 
 nor Italy were independent countries, and in neither 
 case was the State the nation. Neither country was 
 held together by that all-powerful influence religion. 
 
 In no respect did Spain differ from Germany so 
 greatly as in the matter of religion. In Spain religion 
 was the strongest existing force. To Napoleon's 
 offer of reforms which should benefit the common 
 interests of the Spaniards, the reply was that his 
 projects endangered the existence of Catholicism in 
 Spain. The Spaniards were held together by a tie of 
 supreme force that of religion, 1 " a religion fierce, 
 ignorant, intolerant ". 
 
 Moreover, in Spain the feeling of patriotism, which 
 as yet did not exist in Germany and Italy, was always 
 latent, and after the Bayonne interview was roused 
 and rapidly developed. " When the State fell to 
 pieces the nation held together and proceeded to put 
 forth out of its own vitality a new form of State." 
 When Napoleon imagined that he had established his 
 brother Joseph on the throne of Spain, he was startled 
 by finding that an unexpected obstacle to the realiza- 
 
 1 Seeley, " Life and Times of Stein," Pt. IV, ch. i, p. 83.
 
 188 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 tion of his hopes had appeared an obstacle which 
 "proved fatal to his (Napoleon's) Empire". 1 With 
 the outbreak of this Spanish revolt may be dated the 
 definite beginning of the fall of Napoleon. 
 
 In 1806 it had become evident to Napoleon that 
 the tie which by the Treaty of 1795 held Spain to 
 France was a very slight one. During the campaign 
 of Jena a proclamation issued by Godoy calling upon 
 the Spanish people to prepare for war, convinced 
 Napoleon "that a Bourbon on the Spanish throne 
 was a tiresome neighbour too weak as an ally, yet 
 dangerous as a possible enemy ". 2 The possibility of 
 an attack by Spain while he was occupied in central 
 Europe, and the conviction that no Bourbon could be 
 a faithful ally of one who had sprung from the Revolu- 
 tion, decided Napoleon, after the conclusion of peace 
 with Alexander at Tilsit, to take in hand the affairs of 
 Spain and Portugal. Already in March, 1807, he had 
 obtained from Godoy 18,000 of the best Spanish troops 
 who were stationed on the Baltic. Thus was Spain 
 at a critical moment in her history deprived of an 
 invaluable source of defence. At the end of July 
 Napoleon had returned to Paris, and early in August 
 French troops began to assemble at Bayonne with the 
 ostensible purpose of forcing Portugal to carry out 
 the Berlin Decree. The half-measures proposed by 
 the Prince Regent in reply to Napoleon's demand for 
 the seizure of all British merchants in Portugal were 
 
 1 Seeley, "Life and Times of Stein," Pt. IV, ch. i, p. 85. 
 
 2 Oman, " History of the Peninsular War," Vol. I, p. 3.
 
 INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 189 
 
 not considered satisfactory. On 13 October a pro- 
 clamation was issued in Paris that "the House of 
 Braganza had ceased to reign ". 
 
 On 1 8 October a French army, under Junot, 
 entered Spain, and on 30 November he entered 
 Lisbon only to find that on the previous day the 
 Prince Regent sailed for South America. The 
 formal annexation of Portugal by France was the 
 next step in Napoleon's policy. On 13 December 
 the tricolour was hoisted in Lisbon. 
 
 The history of Napoleon's occupation of Portugal 
 is of considerable interest. It shows that while the 
 Emperor was denouncing Great Britain for her 
 rapacity and disregard of conventions in seizing the 
 Danish fleet, he was himself contemplating a very 
 similar line of conduct in Portugal. The occupation 
 of Portugal by the French, too, decided Napoleon to 
 continue his designs for the dethronement of the 
 Spanish Bourbons. 
 
 On 14 April, 1808, Napoleon reached Bayonne, 
 and the next day he wrote to acquaint Joseph in 
 Naples with the position of affairs. " I am," he said, 
 " expecting the Prince of the Asturias who has taken 
 the name of Ferdinand VII, and I am also expecting 
 the unfortunate Charles IV and the Queen. The 
 Grand Duke of Berg (Murat) is at Madrid, General 
 Dupont is at Toledo. I have divisions at Aranjuez 
 and at the Escurial," and he might have added at 
 Barcelona, Figueras, Pampeluna, St. Sebastian and 
 Burgos.
 
 igo THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 It is quite clear from this letter and one a very 
 important one written on 18 April that the occupa- 
 tion of the Spanish Peninsula by French troops and 
 the substitution of Joseph for Charles or Ferdinand was 
 part of the scheme for the expulsion of the English 
 from the Mediterranean, and had been projected long 
 before Canning's seizure of the Danish fleet. For, 
 while explaining to Joseph the political situation in 
 Spain, Napoleon alludes with satisfaction to Corfu and 
 to the fact that Scylla that important post is being 
 fortified. He was more firmly resolved than ever to 
 carry out the continental system and to ruin England, 
 which was, as he knew, beginning to suffer from the 
 effects of her long war. " Nothing but peace with 
 that country," he declared, "can make me sheathe 
 the sword and restore tranquillity to Europe." 
 
 On 5 May, 1808, Charles IV and Ferdinand VII 
 resigned the crown of Spain to Napoleon. Already 
 on 2 May a serious insurrection had broken out in 
 Madrid, which might have warned Napoleon of the 
 danger of proceeding too hastily. But neither that 
 rising nor the 'insurrections which had taken place in 
 various parts of Spain between 22 and 30 May had 
 any effect upon Napoleon's plans. On 1 1 May he 
 had informed Joseph that he was King of Spain, and 
 indicated to him the advantages of that position. " It 
 is a throne which places you at Madrid, a three days' 
 journey from France. ... At Madrid you are in 
 France ; Naples is the end of the world." Lucien 
 Bonaparte (the Prince of Canino) would probably
 
 INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 191 
 
 have made a better king of Spain than Joseph. He 
 had considerable oratorical powers ; he had more 
 energy : the success of the coup cFttat of Brumaire 
 was, to a great extent, due to him. He knew his 
 limitations and would not have meddled in military 
 affairs. If success could have attended the Spanish 
 experiment (which is very doubtful after the perfidy of 
 Bayonne) it would have been with Lucien or Murat 
 at Madrid. 
 
 Joseph had, however, proved himself an able 
 diplomatist both at Luneville and at Amiens. His 
 work at Naples, too, had been most creditable. He 
 had restored order to the finances, he had swept 
 away feudal abuses, he had reorganized the taxation, 
 he had established and preserved order. In trans- 
 ferring him to Madrid, however, Napoleon committed 
 a great blunder. 
 
 On 6 June Joseph was proclaimed King of 
 Spain and the Indies by Napoleon ; on 7 June he 
 arrived at Bayonne ; on 9 July he entered Spain ; on 
 20 July he arrived at Madrid. Two days later 
 Dupont's capitulation at Baylen took place, and on 
 i August Wellesley landed in Portugal. 
 
 Meanwhile Joachim Murat, who had married 
 Caroline Bonaparte, had accepted the throne of 
 Naples and on 6 September he entered his capital. 
 He at once infused new life into his kingdom, in- 
 augurated reforms, and endeavoured though in vain 
 to capture Sicily. In 1812 he joined the Moscow 
 expedition as commander of the cavalry. It was
 
 i 9 2 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 evident to him that the future of his kingdom of 
 Naples would be decided in the north of Europe. 
 
 The rising in Spain in 1808 marks the opening of 
 a new epoch in European history. It shows that the 
 real meaning of the Revolution under Napoleon was 
 gradually becoming patent to keen observers. The 
 war of 1792 can, indeed, be adduced as the first 
 example in the eighteenth century of a war which 
 was essentially national, but in its later phases the 
 effects of the Revolution were essentially cosmo- 
 politan and anti-national. 
 
 The rising in Spain, like the rising in Austria in 
 1809 and of Germany in 1813, was decidedly national, 
 and the growth of the spirit of nationality was directly 
 opposed to the teaching of the Revolution. The 
 more predominant Napoleon's influence became in 
 Germany the more the spirit of nationality was 
 checked. How fatal to liberty was French influence 
 can be realized if it be noted that the adoption of 
 French doctrines led to the suppression of the old 
 estates in Bavaria and Wiirtemberg, and to the com- 
 plete abolition of the old-established forms of self- 
 government. 
 
 The rising in Spain was, if we look into its real 
 meaning, the unconscious expression of a revolt 
 against "the uniformity and the break with old-estab- 
 lished customs caused by the French ". From 1 807 
 onwards were sown the seeds of the romantic revival in 
 Europe, and of the reaction against Rousseau's teach- 
 ing. The rising in Spain illustrates the force of the
 
 INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 193 
 
 opposition which the French Revolution, as directed 
 by Napoleon, was already as early as 1808 calling 
 into existence. 
 
 Spain had hitherto given no sign of being able 
 to resist invasion. No other country in Europe has 
 suffered so many conquests, probably none has been 
 embroiled in so many civil wars. At the same time, in 
 justice to the Spanish patriotism, it must be remembered 
 that the French invasion of Spain, as undertaken by 
 Napoleon, was the best organized that had ever swept 
 over the land. The resistance of the Spaniards, which 
 could not have proved as effective as it did without 
 the aid of the English (any more than the English 
 intervention could have proved as effective as it did 
 without the Spanish rising), was characterized, like 
 all Spanish risings, by reckless bravery and by lack 
 of discipline. Probably, however, the Napoleonic 
 struggle produced the nearest approach to united 
 action on the part of the Spaniards that has ever been 
 witnessed. 
 
 The French failure in the Peninsula is mainly to 
 be attributed to Napoleon himself. Only his violent 
 breach of good faith could have united the Spaniards 
 with the Portuguese and the English. Once roused, 
 the stubborn racial identity of the Spaniards speedily 
 asserted itself, and the national antagonism to France 
 was intensified by religious fanaticism. The Spanish or- 
 ganization, indeed, never rose much above the guerilla 
 order, but with the aid of the English it proved suffi- 
 cient to hold the French at bay till the break-down of 
 
 13
 
 i 9 4 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 the continental system, and the hostility of Russia 
 forced Napoleon to devote his chief attention to Central 
 and North-Eastern Europe. 
 
 Instead, therefore, of securing the naval and mercan- 
 tile resources of the Spanish Peninsula, Napoleon, by 
 his haste, by his lack of appreciation of the difference 
 between Spain and Central Germany, was led to com- 
 mit one of his greatest blunders, viz. his treacherous 
 action at Bayonne. Instead of adding enormously to 
 the naval and mercantile resources of France by his 
 seizure of Spain, " he brought on a struggle that was 
 to occupy the energies of a quarter of a million or 
 more of his best troops for five years to come, that 
 was to empty his coffers, and worst of all in his sight 
 was to give most timely relief to England V From 
 the opening of the Spanish war British goods began 
 to pour into Spain, and the Spanish colonies for the 
 first time in the history of Great Britain began to 
 admit British merchandise. Thus Napoleon's mis- 
 taken policy in the Spanish Peninsula saved Great 
 Britain from that ruin which he imagined was made 
 inevitable from the date of the arrival of Junot at 
 Lisbon. 
 
 In saying that the risings in Spain, Austria, and 
 Germany were national, care must be taken to dis- 
 tinguish the movement in Spain from that of Germany, 
 and that of Germany from that of Italy. It is often 
 asserted with some truth that the Spanish rising in- 
 
 1 " Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth Century : 
 England and Napoleon," p. 74.
 
 INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 195 
 
 augurated a general movement in Germany and Italy 
 against the Napoleonic regime, and that before the 
 " rising of the nations " Napoleon fell. Symptoms 
 of a national movement in various parts of Europe 
 appeared after the Treaty of Tilsit. In Spain, in 
 Austria, and in Prussia can be found evidence of the 
 steady growth of political feeling antagonistic to the 
 aims of Napoleon. 
 
 In that struggle against the French predominance, 
 we must distinguish the idea of nationality as it showed 
 itself in Spain and as it was gradually evolved in Italy, 
 from the idea of nationality as it was adopted in 
 Germany. 
 
 The idea of nationality as it appeared to the 
 Spaniards and later to the Italians "pointed to the 
 political unification of populations having a language 
 and literature, a character and memories, in common," 1 
 while on the other hand the German sentiment was 
 primarily connected with the feeling of race, which, 
 while admitting " the existence of ruling and subject 
 races, never dreamt of relaxing the German hold on 
 Poles or Italians ". Thus at the Congress of Vienna 
 the hold of Prussia and Austria over parts of Poland 
 or Italy was recognized. 
 
 In the Spanish resistance to Napoleon religion 
 played an important part. Napoleon's treatment of 
 the Pope was deeply resented in Spain. In the war 
 against Napoleon the Spaniards fought not only for 
 
 1 " Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth Century," p. 42.
 
 i 9 6 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 national independence, but also for the cause of religion 
 against the infidel. 
 
 The Spanish rising in 1 808, however, has a special 
 importance in that it marked the beginning of a 
 series of risings before which Napoleon eventually fell. 
 
 In 1809 the Austrians rose ; in 1812 the Russian 
 opposition to Napoleon led to the Moscow expedition ; 
 in 1813 the War of Liberation, ending with the down- 
 fall of the French Emperor, began. 
 
 In 1808 it was evident to Napoleon after the 
 capitulation of Baylen (July) and the Convention of 
 Cintra (30 August) that his Eastern schemes must be 
 postponed, and that the opposition to the execution of 
 his plans in Spain must be at once checked, no matter 
 at what cost. 
 
 Joseph seems from his arrival in Madrid to have 
 gauged the situation far more accurately than did 
 Napoleon. Before he had heard of the Baylen dis- 
 aster he had written to the Emperor pointing out the 
 evil results which must follow upon Caulaincourt's 
 pillage of churches in Cuenza. And on 24 July he 
 assured Napoleon that he (the Emperor) had been 
 deceived and that glory would be shipwrecked in 
 Spain. At the same time he promises to do his best 
 in the difficult situation in which he finds himself. 
 With honest generals, good troops, and 50 millions, 
 something might yet be done to retrieve the position. 
 
 On 28 July Joseph heard of Dupont's capitulation 
 and retired from Madrid to Miranda between Burgos 
 and Valencia, having been only eight days in Madrid,
 
 JOSEPH BONAPARTE 
 
 FROM A LITHOGRAPH
 
 INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 197 
 
 The capitulation of Baylen was followed by a 
 respite from serious operations by the French for a 
 period of some three months. Napoleon, on hearing 
 of the disaster, followed a few weeks later by the 
 battles of Roliga on 17 August, ofVimeiroon2i August, 
 and of the Convention of Cintra on 30 August, at 
 once ordered a large body of his most experienced 
 troops which were then in Germany to march into 
 Spain. The necessity for the departure of troops for 
 Spain compelled Napoleon to remove all his soldiers 
 from Prussia, though he left garrisons in the fortresses 
 of Custrin, Glogau, and Stettin. The removal of the 
 troops was not, however, begun till Prussia had 
 agreed to a humiliating convention, which only per- 
 mitted her to possess an army of 42,000 and forbade 
 the organization of any form of a militia. The French 
 troops could not, however, reach Spain before October, 
 and in the meantime Napoleon went to Erfurt in 
 order to assure himself of freedom from all anxiety 
 in central Europe, while he concentrated his efforts 
 upon the suppression of the Spanish insurrection. 
 
 His policy, which included the Partition of Turkey 
 and the conquest of Egypt and India, had, since the 
 Treaty of Tilsit, developed in a most extraordinary 
 fashion, but its success depended on (i) the acqui- 
 escence of Russia, (2) the conquest of Spain. At first 
 it seemed that from Russia he would receive cordial 
 support in the execution of his plans. In Russia, Count 
 Budberg had been succeeded as Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs by Count Romanzoff, a strong supporter of the
 
 198 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Russian alliance and " a firm believer in Russia's 
 mission to effect the overthrow of Turkey ", l At 
 Tilsit, however, Napoleon had played the part of 
 arbiter, and he proposed not only to act as arbiter 
 in all questions relating to the complex Eastern 
 question, but above all to prevent Constantinople 
 and the province of Roumelia from falling into the 
 hands of Russia. 
 
 Alexander was naturally irritated at Napoleon's 
 attitude with regard to Constantinople, and as the 
 French troops had not, according to Article 4 in the 
 Treaty of Tilsit, been withdrawn from their occupation 
 of certain Prussian fortresses and districts, he did 
 not withdraw the Russian forces from the Danubian 
 provinces. 
 
 Dupont's capitulation, followed by the battles of 
 Roli^a and Vimeiro and by the Convention of Cintra, 
 made it all the more necessary for Napoleon to place 
 his relations with Alexander on a firm basis. A free 
 hand in Spain for a few months was all that he asked 
 for. He sent Ney to Spain, and he wrote to Joseph 
 to say that shortly 100,000 more men would be sent 
 to his assistance and that in the autumn Spain would 
 be conquered. Joseph, however, held a very different 
 view. In his opinion the Spaniards would never be 
 reconciled to his rule. 
 
 Early in September, then, Napoleon arranged for 
 vast reinforcements to proceed to Spain, while he im- 
 pressed upon Joseph the necessity of acting withseverity 
 1 " Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, p. 805.
 
 INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 199 
 
 towards all the disaffected. Three weeks later he 
 was at Erfurt, where on the 2yth the conferences, which 
 lasted till 1 3 October, began. At this brilliant gather- 
 ing, at which were present numerous kings and princes, 
 and where Goethe, "the representative of the cosmo- 
 politanism and lack of patriotism which had enabled 
 Napoleon to attain to his predominant position," 1 re- 
 ceived the Cross of the Legion of Honour, the French 
 Emperor was compelled to yield to many of Alex- 
 ander's demands. On 13 October he wrote that 
 he had arranged all with the Emperor of Russia. 
 As the price of Alexander's non-interference with 
 Napoleon's seizure of Spain, Russia was to have 
 Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia. " I am," he said, 
 " to start to-morrow for Paris, and in a month's time 
 I shall be at Bayonne." He was full of confidence. 
 " At present," he wrote, " the enemy's presumption is 
 so great that I am inclined to think he will remain 
 where he is. The nearer he is to us the better. A 
 well -arranged manoeuvre might terminate the war 
 by a single blow, and for this my presence is neces- 
 sary." 2 
 
 In reality the price which he had paid for Russian 
 non-intervention with his plans in Spain was a heavy 
 one. He still occupied certain fortresses in Prussia, 
 which he never intended to evacuate, and he was 
 willing to recognize the possession by Russia of 
 Moldavia and Wallachia if he could keep Prussia, the 
 
 Atkinson, "A History of Germany, 1715-1815," p. 523. 
 2 " Napoleon's Correspondence with Joseph," Vol. I, p. 336,
 
 200 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 total ruin of which he desired, in his possession. This 
 scheme had never met with Alexander's approval and 
 at Erfurt was dropped, owing to the necessity recog- 
 nized by Napoleon for doing nothing which would 
 in any degree alienate the Tsar. The whole Eastern 
 question was left unsettled, for it was recognized that 
 it was unadvisable to press Turkey lest she should 
 throw in her lot with England Moreover, it was 
 agreed that the acquisition by Russia of Moldavia 
 and Wallachia should be deferred. " The Spanish 
 rising," it has truly been said, "saved Prussia from 
 
 virtual extinction and the Turkish Empire from parti- 
 
 ^" i 
 tion. 
 
 But some years were to elapse before Napoleon, 
 unlike his brother Joseph, realized the true meaning 
 of the Spanish insurrection. In the spring of 1808, 
 while planning the deposition of the Spanish Bourbons, 
 he had been preparing for an Eastern expedition. He 
 continued to regard the opposition in Spain to Joseph 
 as a matter of little moment, and till the failure of the 
 Moscow expedition he never seems to have realized the 
 possibility of the total failure of his schemes in Spain. 
 
 Though after the close of the Erfurt Conference 
 Napoleon was in Spain during November and Decem- 
 ber, he was fully aware of the trend of events in 
 Germany, and at the end of December, 1808, he 
 declared Stein to be an outlaw. Stein, who had been 
 dismissed on 24 November by Frederick William, to 
 whom his ministers' project for an insurrection was 
 1 "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, p. 31$.
 
 INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 201 
 
 distasteful, found himself obliged to leave Berlin with 
 the utmost diligence and secrecy on 6 January, 1809, 
 and fled to Buchwald, the residence of the Count 
 Reden in Silesia, arriving there on 9 January. Being 
 in imminent danger of capture, he hastened to cross 
 the border into Austrian territory, and thus escaped 
 Napoleon's vengeance. That he was enabled to 
 escape successfully was due to the assistance which he 
 received from the Count and Countess Reden. 1 This 
 incident, one result of which was that Stein was en- 
 abled later to influence in a marked degree the Tsar 
 during the War of Liberation, is an admirable proof 
 of Napoleon's resolve to crush Prussia completely, and 
 of his realization of the danger from the growth of 
 national feeling in Germany. It is, moreover, an 
 excellent instance of the pertinacity with which he 
 pursued his schemes. 
 
 CHIEF DATES 
 
 Occupation of Portugal by Junot . . . November, 1807. 
 The Milan Decree ..... December, 1807. 
 French troops occupy Spanish fortresses . February, 1808. 
 Abdication of Charles IV of Spain . . March, 1808. 
 
 Abdication of Ferdinand at Bayonne . . . May, 1808. 
 Annexation of Tuscany to France . . . May, 1808. 
 
 Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain .... May, 1808. 
 Beginning of Spanish risings .... May, 1808. 
 
 The Baylen Capitulation ..... July, 1808. 
 Battle of Vimeiro, Convention of Cintra . August, 1808. 
 Congress of Erfurt ..... October, 1808. 
 
 1 "A Pietist of the Napoleonic Wars and After," p. 81 seq. 
 London, John Murray, 1905.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 NAPOLEON AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER, 
 1808-1812 
 
 After Erfurt Napoleon in Spain Corunna Napoleon's 
 return to Paris The situation in Paris War with Austria Its 
 causes Prussian neutrality The views of Stadion, Archduke 
 Charles, Stein, Scharnhorst The Wagram campaign Napoleon's 
 Hungarian policy The Peace of Vienna (Schonbrunn) Na- 
 poleon in Paris The Austrian marriage Napoleon divorces 
 Josephine The importance of the Russian alliance The con- 
 tinental system at its height Position of Great Britain The 
 continental system versus the continental blockade The year 
 1 8 10 Abdication of Louis King of Holland The Russian Ukase 
 of 31 December, 1810 Its importance upon the relations of 
 Napoleon and Alexander. 
 
 TTAVING arranged matters at Erfurt with the 
 
 Tsar, and having secured a free hand in Spain, 
 
 Napoleon returned to France with the intention of 
 
 crushing without delay all opposition in Spain and of 
 
 driving the English from the Peninsula. 
 
 On i August, 1808, Sir Arthur Wellesley had 
 landed in Portugal, and before the month was closed 
 the battles of Roli^a and Vimeiro had been fought 
 and won by the English, followed a few days later by 
 the Convention of Cintra. 
 
 But Napoleon brushed aside these events as 
 
 202
 
 THE EMPEROR 
 
 FROM AN ENGRAVING BY HENRY AFTER THE DRAWING BY VIGNEUX
 
 AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 203 
 
 incidents of no importance. On 1 1 August he had 
 assured Joseph that the English were not worth con- 
 sideration, and that they never had more than a 
 quarter of the troops that they professed to have. He 
 was resolved to overwhelm all opposition in Spain, 
 and had arranged for the removal of the Grand Army 
 from Germany to the Peninsula as soon as he was 
 sure of Russia. In fact, before he reached Erfurt, 
 considerable bodies of troops had begun to march 
 towards Spain. 
 
 He had left Erfurt on 14 October and arrived in 
 Paris on the night of the 1 8th. On 3 November he 
 was at Bayonne. At that moment the French fortunes 
 in Spain were at a low ebb. Joseph had been com- 
 pelled to abandon Madrid, one French force had 
 capitulated to the English at Cintra, another to the 
 Spaniards at Baylen. The remaining French troops 
 had retired beyond the Ebro. The first French cam- 
 paign in Spain had failed. With the arrival of 
 Napoleon the second campaign was entered upon 
 with vigour, and in three months Joseph had re- 
 entered Madrid, the English had been driven out of 
 the country, and the Spanish resistance was confined 
 to guerilla warfare in the southern and western pro- 
 vinces, and to the defence of a few towns. So long 
 as Napoleon was in Spain his generals obeyed his 
 commands and acted harmoniously. But it was only 
 during Napoleon's stay in Spain that the French 
 cause met with continuous successes. As soon as he 
 left the country the weakness of Joseph and the
 
 204 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 quarrels of the French generals enabled the English 
 first to acquire a firm foothold in Portugal, and then 
 gradually with the aid of the Spaniards to free Spain 
 of the French. The influence, too, of the priests, an 
 influence which Napoleon ignored, was immense, and 
 was used to encourage the peasants to take advantage 
 of the geographical peculiarities of the country, and to 
 cut off isolated French columns and detached parties. 
 
 At Bayonne, however, Napoleon speedily restored 
 order in place of the chaos which reigned in the 
 French armies. He at once saw that the troops 
 were properly clothed and fed. Greatcoats and shoes 
 were the chief desiderata, and these were immedi- 
 ately supplied. 
 
 From Burgos he instructed Joseph how the work 
 of reorganizing the police and the finances should be 
 carried out. His presence in Spain soon made itself 
 felt. On 10 and n November Marshal Victor de- 
 feated Blake at Espinosa; on 23 November Ney 
 defeated Castanos at Tudela ; while a week later 
 Napoleon himself overthrew a force of 7000 at Sono 
 Sierra, the French loss being " almost unappreciable ". 
 On 4 December Napoleon entered Madrid. 
 
 Meanwhile Sir John Moore had marched from 
 Portugal to Sahagun in order to strike a blow at 
 Marshal Soult and the French line of communica- 
 tions, and on 24 December began his famous retreat. 
 Napoleon, as is well known, turned aside in order to 
 crush the audacious English general. He was full of 
 hope of exterminating Moore's force. " If," he wrote
 
 AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 205 
 
 on 27 December, "they retire, they will be pushed so 
 vigorously to their ships that half of them will never 
 re-embark." 
 
 And on 31 December he again wrote: "There 
 could not have been a better sedative for Spain than 
 to send her an English army ". However, on the 
 road to Astorga Napoleon received dispatches from 
 Paris which not only acquainted him with the intrigues 
 of Talleyrand and Fouche, but also informed him of 
 the warlike preparations being made by Austria. 
 
 Napoleon therefore returned to Benevento, leaving 
 to Soult the duty of pursuing Moore, who eventually 
 defeated the French army at Corunna, and though he 
 lost his own life in the battle succeeded in securing 
 the embarkation of his army in the English ships. 
 From Benevento Napoleon proceeded to Valladolid 
 in order to be able to communicate more rapidly with 
 France, and remained there from 8 January, 1809, till 
 he returned to Paris. While still in Spain he wrote 
 many interesting letters to Joseph. He declared that 
 he had no hopes of peace in Europe during 1809, 
 owing to the fierce hatred of England and to the 
 events in Constantinople. As far as Spain was con- 
 cerned, however, he thought that she was settling into 
 tranquillity ; and while at Valladolid, too, he en- 
 deavoured to place the French army in Spain on a 
 sound footing and to weed out all incompetent 
 officers. He criticized very severely the operations 
 of the Duke of Dantzic (Lefebre). " That Marshal," 
 he wrote, " commits nothing but follies ; he cannot
 
 206 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 read his instructions. It is impossible to entrust him 
 with the command of a corps, which is a pity, as he 
 shows great bravery in battle." 1 On 10 January 
 Napoleon wrote definitely to Joseph : " Send back 
 the Duke of Dantzic to me at Valladolid ; he shall 
 no longer command the 4th corps ". 2 
 
 During his stay at Valladolid he received confir- 
 mation of the hostile attitude of Austria. " War with 
 Austria," he wrote on 7 January, "seems imminent, 
 and her troops are already encamped upon her fron- 
 tiers." In consequence he at once began to with- 
 draw several of his more able generals and officers 
 from Spain for service in Germany. 
 
 On 15 January he wrote very explicitly to Joseph : 
 " The Court of Vienna is behaving very ill ; she may 
 have to repent of it. Do not be uneasy. I have 
 troops enough even without touching my army in 
 Spain to go to Vienna in a month." 
 
 Then he adds very characteristically : " You must 
 tell every one, and let it be generally believed in the 
 army, that I shall return in three weeks or a month. 
 In fact my mere presence in Paris will reduce Austria 
 to her usual insignificance, and in that case I shall 
 come back before the end of October. " 3 
 
 He had no presentiment of the complications and 
 difficulties which were to result from his enforcement 
 of the continental system, and which would prevent 
 him from ever returning to Spain. He imagined 
 
 1 "Napoleon's Correspondence with Joseph," Vol. II, p. n. 
 "^ Ibid, p. 13. 3 Ibid. p. 27.
 
 AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 207 
 
 when he left Valladolid on 16 January, 1809, that 
 Spain would settle down quietly ; and so convinced 
 was he that her tranquillity was assured that he told 
 Joseph that as soon as Saragossa had surrendered he 
 might send for his wife and children. They could 
 stay at Marrac (Napoleon's villa near Bayonne) for 
 about three weeks from the date of their arrival 
 there on 25 February, and, Saragossa fallen, they 
 could then proceed to Madrid. 
 
 During the Emperor's absence from Spain, Bes- 
 sieres, the Duke of I stria, who was in command of the 
 Imperial Guard and whose head-quarters were at 
 Valladolid, was ordered to send to him daily a courier 
 with dispatches. 
 
 On 1 6 January, at 6 a.m., Napoleon mounted his 
 horse and rode out to Valladolid attended only by 
 Savary, and began his journey au grandissime galop 
 across " the lonely guerrilla haunted mountains". He 
 arrived in Paris on 23 January, at 8a.m., in excellent 
 health. With the return of Napoleon to France 
 " began," says Thiers, " the series of faults, the results 
 of the selfishness and the jealousy of our generals, 
 which lost the cause of France in Spain, and, by 
 losing it in Spain, lost it also in Europe ". 
 
 On his arrival in Paris Napoleon realized the exist- 
 ence of a network of intrigues. Not only were the 
 royalists in La Vendee active, but his own personal 
 followers were engaged in plots against him. Of 
 these the chief were Fouche and Talleyrand. All 
 his rage was concentrated upon Talleyrand, and on
 
 2o8 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 28 January he covered his minister with reproaches. 
 " Vous etes un voleur, un lache, un homme sans foi " 
 such were the terms used during an invective which 
 lasted half an hour. Though, however, Talleyrand 
 was removed from the post of Chief Chamberlain he 
 still continued in Napoleon's service. In later years 
 Napoleon regretted that he had not consigned Talley- 
 rand to prison, for the fallen minister never ceased to 
 intrigue with the Austrians and Russians. 
 
 Napoleon, however, was full of confidence with re- 
 gard to the future. On the 27th he wrote that his 
 prompt arrival in Paris had at once changed the tone 
 of Austria, and that " fear has succeeded to her ar- 
 rogance and her extreme confidence". However, he 
 was not lulled into a sense of false security ; the con- 
 scription continued to be levied with rapidity, and 
 troops continued to march towards Italy and the 
 Rhine. 
 
 Since her overthrow in 1805 Austria had steadily 
 made preparations for a renewal of her struggle with 
 Napoleon. Count Stadion, who became Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs in 1806, and the Archduke Charles, 
 Commander-in-Chief since February, 1806, had under- 
 taken a complete reform of the Austrian army. In 
 the autumn of 1808 Stein and a strong party in 
 Prussia and in Vienna desired the immediate declara- 
 tion of war. All north-west Germany was, it was 
 thought, ready to rise, and Napoleon's absence in 
 Spain seemed to be an admirable opportunity for 
 throwing off the French yoke.
 
 AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 209 
 
 Both Stein and Scharnhorst desired a universal 
 rising of the German nation, " in concert with such 
 armies as Prussia could send to the field under 
 Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, helped by the money and 
 stores of England ".* Stein argued that as continued 
 submission to Napoleon on the part of Prussia would 
 lead to ruin, resistance in alliance with Austria to 
 France could not place his country in a worse position 
 than that in which she then stood. Prussia had little 
 to lose, for as things then were, her annihilation was 
 certain to come about in a few years at the hands of 
 France. 
 
 The king, however, refused to adopt the war 
 policy of his ministers. He had no confidence in his 
 own subjects ; he mistrusted Austria, the hereditary 
 foe of his house ; he still relied upon Russia. His 
 decision, which was strengthened by an interview with 
 Alexander on his way to Erfurt, proved to be of the 
 most immense importance, and deeply influenced the 
 future history of Prussia and Germany. As things 
 turned out, Prussia was eventually saved by Russia, 
 and the close relations which in consequence subsisted 
 between the two Powers deeply affected later Euro- 
 pean history. 
 
 The autumn of 1808, when Napoleon after the 
 Conference of Erfurt had proceeded to Spain, seemed 
 for Austria and Prussia an admirable opportunity for 
 rising against Napoleon. But the inaction of Prussia, 
 and the attitude of Alexander who had promised to 
 
 1 Seeley, " Life and Times of Stein," Pt. X, ch. n. 
 14
 
 210 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 help Napoleon if the Emperor Francis attacked 
 France, prevented Austria from beginning hostilities 
 during Napoleon's absence in Spain. 
 
 As it was, the war broke out in the spring of 1809 
 after Napoleon had returned in triumph from Spain. 
 Nevertheless Napoleon's position in Europe was by 
 no means what it had been at Tilsit. The events 
 at Bayonne made it clear that no confidence could be 
 placed in his promises, and "that no amount of sub- 
 servience would make a dependent State secure even 
 of its existence if it should suit him to decide other- 
 wise". 1 It was this conviction that explains and justi- 
 fies the Austrian determination to enter upon war 
 with Napoleon. It was the opinion of Stadion, who 
 was supported by Metternich, that the postpone- 
 ment of war would enable Napoleon to choose his 
 own time for attacking Austria. Further, unless 
 Austria took the lead no rising in North Germany, 
 where hatred of Napoleon was intense, could be ex- 
 pected. Moreover, by her preparations, Austria had 
 disclosed her hostility to Napoleon, and this fact, apart 
 from other considerations, justified the conference of 
 8 February, 1809, m deciding upon war. 
 
 Napoleon, who since his return from Spain had 
 been preparing for the outbreak of hostilities with 
 Austria, seems to have expected that he would receive 
 active support from the Tsar. The position taken 
 up by Russia with regard to Austria, therefore, came 
 as a profound disappointment to Napoleon. Alex- 
 
 1 Atkinson, "A History of Germany, 1715-1815," p. 525.
 
 AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 211 
 
 ander had already gained from his alliance with 
 Napoleon all the advantages that he could hope for. 
 He held Finland ; he was prepared to occupy the 
 Danubian Principalities. He had no wish to see 
 Prussia or Austria trampled under foot by Napoleon. 
 Speranski, his minister, held similar views, and on 
 various grounds advocated for Russia a firm and 
 pacific policy. He, therefore, in January, 1809, urged 
 the continuance of peace. "It is," he said, " in our 
 interest to prevent a rupture between France and 
 Austria." If Austria declared war, he would be 
 compelled by his engagements with France to oppose 
 actively the Emperor Francis. If, however, France 
 took the first hostile step, the Tsar, though realizing 
 the delicate position in which he would be placed, did 
 not consider that he was necessarily compelled to 
 join in the war. 1 
 
 On 30 March, 1809, Napoleon set his army in 
 motion, and the war broke out. For the last time 
 Austria acted as the national leader of Germany. 
 Alexander's position was an unenviable one. A re- 
 volution had taken place in Sweden, the Turks had 
 adopted aggressive measures, and war was on the 
 point of being declared by them upon the Tsar over 
 the question of the Danubian Principalities. Alex- 
 ander adopted a middle position. He issued a 
 manifesto against Austria, and at the same time 
 
 1 Sorel, "L'Europe et la Revolution Frangaise," Vol. VII, 
 p. 544-
 
 212 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 informed Napoleon that he was fully occupied in 
 Finland and on the Danube. He was prodigal of 
 assurances and promises. He let it be known in 
 Vienna that he would not take any definitely hostile 
 line of action ; at the same time he sent a most trust- 
 worthy agent to act as a spy upon Napoleon's 
 movements. The relations between the French 
 Emperor and the Tsar were very different from what 
 they had been at Tilsit or even at Erfurt. 
 
 In the campaign which followed the outbreak of 
 war the slowness of the Austrians in April consider- 
 ably lessened their chance of success. Their failure 
 at Eckmiihl on 22 April destroyed all hope of a 
 general rising in Germany. Risings under Ferdinand 
 von Schill and Frederick William of Brunswick did 
 indeed take place in May and July. But Schill, after 
 heroic efforts, perished in Stralsund, while the Duke, 
 with his Black Legion, after a raid into Brunswick, 
 was compelled to escape by ship to Ireland. 
 
 No help came to Austria from North Germany, 
 and though her army won a victory on 21 and 22 
 May at Aspern, she was defeated at Wagram on 
 4 and 5 July. 
 
 The battle of Wagram was "a masterpiece of 
 Napoleon's strategy and organization ". Never was 
 his genius, his determination, and his resourcefulness 
 better exemplified. Very characteristically, during his 
 preparations, he had encouraged every kind of gaiety 
 in Vienna, in order to re-establish on the part of his 
 allies and army full confidence in himself. At the same
 
 AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 213 
 
 time he realized that upon his own energy and ability 
 depended the success of his efforts. 
 
 The practical valuelessness of the Russian alliance 
 was now manifest to him, and henceforth he was aware 
 that he could no longer rely upon Alexander to aid him 
 in his enterprises. 
 
 On 4 and 5 July the battle of Wagram had been 
 fought and the Austrians had been defeated. But the 
 French losses were immense, and Austria was by no 
 means crushed. Her defeat was in part due to the 
 neutrality of Prussia, and to the aid given to Napoleon 
 by certain German states. With Polish aid Austria 
 could have been completely crushed, but to take any 
 step which might encourage the Poles to demand in- 
 dependence would bring about the total alienation and 
 open hostility of Russia. 
 
 On 14 October the Treaty of Vienna or Schon- 
 brunn was concluded. The war had proved disas- 
 trous to Austria and to all her supporters. In February, 
 1810, Hofer, who headed the Tyrolese in a vain attempt 
 to aid Austria, perished, and the Tyrol was divided. 
 Austria was by the Treaty of Vienna cut off from the 
 sea ; she lost an immense amount of territory ; she was 
 forced to join the continental system. 
 
 To Napoleon the war with Austria in 1809 brought 
 with it considerable risks, and though he was ultimately 
 successful the contest had proved an unusually severe 
 one. On its conclusion, too, the prospects of the reali- 
 zation of his plans were not altogether bright. Wel- 
 lesley's presence in the Spanish Peninsula was making
 
 2i 4 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 itself felt. England might create a diversion in the 
 Netherlands or in North Germany, Prussia might join 
 Austria, national risings in Germany might take place. 
 
 Moreover, in the east of Europe he had, so far, 
 been unable to carry out his ambitious projects. In 
 a letter of October, 1802, he had said : " My plan 
 would be to make Hungary the centre of a great 
 Eastern Empire, and I would place one of my brothers 
 at the head of it " . This idea he had never lost sight 
 of, and between 1800 and 1809 he had never ceased 
 his efforts to detach Hungary from its allegiance to the 
 House of Hapsburg. He hoped to effect his object 
 by negotiations with the Magyars which would result 
 in the outbreak of an insurrection. These efforts went 
 on uninterruptedly during periods of war no less than 
 during intervals of peace. Secret missions were sent 
 to Hungary, and the persons sent carried letters from 
 Napoleon which bear witness to his political genius. 
 They show his ability to grasp the essential points of 
 the situation in Hungary, though he had had few 
 opportunities of knowing anything whatever about 
 that country or its inhabitants. They certainly attest 
 Napoleon's knowledge of human nature. Proclama- 
 tions were dispatched to Hungary in the Hungarian, 
 French, and Slavonic languages, and it was evident 
 that Napoleon expected the outbreak of a widespread 
 insurrection of the Magyars against the reigning Haps- 
 burg House. 
 
 In May, 1809, when the issue of his campaign 
 against Austria was as yet doubtful, he addressed a
 
 AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 215 
 
 proclamation to the Hungarian nation. " The name 
 Hungarian," he had declared in an earlier period, " is 
 connected abroad with the idea of revolution " ; and in 
 the proclamation he openly invited the Magyars to 
 desert the House of Hapsburg, and to choose a king 
 from amongst his brothers. But the proclamation 
 had not the expected effect, and Napoleon's projects 
 in Hungary miscarried. 
 
 Since his adoption of the Imperial title Napoleon 
 had \ostprestige with the Hungarian population, and, 
 moreover, his treatment of the Poles had roused the 
 fears and suspicions of the Magyar nobility. Hungary, 
 therefore, did not prove a profitable ground for French 
 agitation as carried on by Napoleon. His attempts, 
 however, to establish a Napoleonic dynasty in that 
 country are a further illustration of his ceaseless 
 activity and of his ambitious designs. 
 
 The overthrow of Austria at Wagram, and the 
 conclusion of peace, rendered the question of the future 
 policy of Napoleon a very serious one for all European 
 potentates and statesmen. 
 
 Joseph, King of Spain, expected that the French 
 Emperor would himself proceed to Spain and, with 
 strong reinforcements, overwhelm Wellington whose 
 success at Talavera on 27 July had prevented the 
 French from invading Portugal, though it was not 
 sufficiently decisive to save Andalusia. 
 
 Stein, on the other hand, predicted with extraordin- 
 ary accuracy that the overthrow of Austria would be 
 followed by an attempt on the part of Napoleon to
 
 216 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 subjugate Russia. " When Russia is subjugated," he 
 wrote, " France will find in the use it will make of its 
 fragments, in the passive obedience of the miserable 
 and selfish German princes, and the insurrectionary 
 spirit of the 1 2,000,000 Poles, the means of weakening 
 Russia still further." But his poor opinion of the 
 ability of Russia to defend itself, and his estimate of 
 the character of the Tsar Alexander, proved to be 
 very inaccurate. He styles Alexander " a weak, 
 sensual prince who, as the head of a nation the great 
 mass of which are slaves, will not long maintain the 
 fight against civilized Europe ". 
 
 The first part of Stein's prediction, viz. that 
 Napoleon would deliberately attack Russia, proved 
 correct, but he himself in 1812 and 1813 willingly 
 recognized how erroneous were his estimate of 
 Alexander's character and of the power of resistance 
 possessed by the Russian nation. 
 
 After the conclusion of the Treaty of Vienna on 
 1 4 October, Napoleon's intention seems to have been 
 to conduct in person the war in Spain. On 7 October, 
 while at Schonbrunn, he writes that his purpose is to 
 proceed to Spain in December with 80,000 infantry 
 and 15,000 or 16,000 cavalry. But at Paris he found 
 himself involved in an infinity of distractions. The 
 Government demanded his presence, his alliances 
 required his constant attention, and the situation in 
 Holland his direct supervision. Moreover, the ques- 
 tion of a second marriage now began to occupy his 
 thoughts.
 
 AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 217 
 
 Though compelled to renounce all idea of conduct- 
 ing a campaign in Spain, he never, however, con- 
 sidered the failure of the French arms possible. 
 Massena, Ney, and Soult would, he thought, quickly 
 overthrow all Spanish opposition. In a short time 
 he hoped to unite part of Spain permanently to 
 France, to bring about the resignation of Joseph, 
 and to rule the remainder of Spain by means of his 
 marshals. In 1810 Holland was on the abdication of 
 Louis brought under Napoleon's immediate super- 
 vision. A similar fate was now being prepared for 
 Joseph and for Spain. 
 
 The weeks between November, 1 809, and March, 
 1810, constitute a critical period in Napoleon's career. 
 They may in a sense be regarded as the turning-point 
 in the history of the French Empire. He had over- 
 thrown all his enemies on the Continent ; Germany 
 was at his mercy ; the Spanish insurrection, in his opin- 
 ion, would shortly be suppressed. The sea power of 
 Great Britain alone remained unsubdued. But since 
 the Walcheren disaster Napoleon was more confident 
 than ever in his ability to subjugate Great Britain. 
 
 The enforcement of the continental blockade for 
 a few months would, he felt certain, suffice to bring 
 about the submission of the English. That accomp- 
 lished, and the conquest of Spain effected, he would 
 be master of the Continent, and be able to return to 
 his Eastern schemes. 
 
 Meanwhile, though outwardly everything seemed 
 to betoken the continuance of the successful career of
 
 2x8 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Napoleon, signs were not wanting to show that much 
 discontent prevailed in all parts of Europe. 
 
 "It was in the years between Wagram and the 
 retreat from Moscow that the attitude of the German 
 people towards Napoleon finally crystallized into one 
 of uncompromising hostility." 1 
 
 In France the desire for peace was almost uni- 
 versal ; abroad the arrest of Frederic Staps on 
 10 October, 1809, na d illustrated the hatred felt for 
 Napoleon in Germany. At any moment illness, or 
 the hand of an assassin, might leave France with- 
 out a ruler. 
 
 The insecurity of his position which such events 
 and considerations brought home to Napoleon made 
 it all the more necessary, in his opinion, that he should 
 have an heir, so strengthen his position, and found a 
 dynasty. 
 
 His intention was, after having divorced Joseph- 
 ine, to contract a marriage alliance with Russia. By 
 entering the sacred circle of royalty he could look 
 forward to the firm establishment of his position, and 
 eventually to peace. 
 
 After Wagram, however, he appears to have lost 
 sight of the fact that the Napoleonic system in Europe 
 hinged upon the Tilsit and Erfurt arrangements, in 
 other words upon the friendly co-operation of Russia. 
 Neither does he appear to have fully realized the 
 unpopularity in Russia of the French alliance. From 
 1807 to 1810 it is true that Alexander, aided by his 
 Atkinson, "History of Germany, 1715-1815," p. 547.
 
 THE EMPRESS JOSEPHINE 
 
 FOM THE PAINTING BY GERARD AT VERSAILLES
 
 AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 219 
 
 minister Michael Speranski, endeavoured to modernize 
 Russia somewhat after the example of France to 
 abolish the absolute Russian autocracy and to intro- 
 duce to some degree a system of popular representa- 
 tion. But the Russian nation was not sufficiently 
 civilized to appreciate Alexander's reforming ideas, 
 while Napoleon's increasing ambition and his Austrian 
 alliance forced Alexander in 1810 to concentrate his 
 attention upon foreign politics and upon the necessity 
 of securing for Russia some alleviation from the 
 continental system. 
 
 In 1808 Napoleon's opposition to any scheme by 
 which Russia should obtain Constantinople had made 
 a rift in the Russo- French alliance, and that rift was 
 widened when in April, 1810, the French Emperor 
 married Marie Louise of Austria. 
 
 Napoleon had, indeed, after the Peace of Vienna 
 in 1 809, made proposals for the hand of the Grand 
 Duchess Anna, sister of the Tsar. But the Empress 
 Dowager, who hated Napoleon, consistently opposed 
 the match. In order not to receive a refusal the 
 latter had entered into negotiations for the hand of a 
 Hapsburg princess. On 4 January, 1810, a conven- 
 tion with regard to Poland had been signed by the 
 representatives of Napoleon and Alexander. This 
 Napoleon now refused to ratify, and that refusal, 
 together with Napoleon's marriage in April with Marie 
 Louise, implied a radical change in his foreign policy 
 and foreign relations. In this matter the Russians 
 were at fault. As a condition of Napoleon's marriage
 
 220 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 with a Russian princess, Alexander had extracted 
 from the French Emperor a promise that the kingdom 
 of Poland should never be re-established. But then 
 the Russians hoped to put off Napoleon with evasive 
 words. On 4 January, 1810, the Treaty with regard 
 to Poland was signed. Alexander thought that he 
 had won a signal triumph, that he had carried out his 
 wishes with regard to Poland, and that he had saved 
 his sister from a mesalliance. But he soon found that 
 Napoleon had outwitted him. 
 
 The latter had already laid his plans with consum- 
 mate skill. On 15 December, 1809, the divorce of 
 Josephine had been finally accomplished, and Napoleon 
 had at once sounded first Madame Metternich and 
 then Metternich with regard to a marriage with Marie 
 Louise of Austria. Thus when on 27 January, 1810, 
 Napoleon convinced himself from a perusal of Caulain- 
 court's dispatches from Russia that Alexander had no 
 intention of giving him his sister in marriage, he at 
 once continued with Austria the negotiations with 
 regard to which Alexander was ignorant, and more- 
 over he refused, as has been stated, to ratify the 
 Treaty of 4 January, 1810. 
 
 As the success of his continental system apparently 
 depended entirely upon the continuance of the 
 Russian alliance, Napoleon would seem to have been 
 incurring a serious risk in entering upon the Austrian 
 marriage. He seems, however, to have thought that 
 not only would any possible loss arising from the 
 weakening of his friendship with Russia be amply
 
 AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 221 
 
 compensated for by the Austrian marriage, but that 
 at any rate the Russian alliance would continue till he 
 had forced England to come to terms. He had little 
 doubt that England's submission would be brought 
 about within a very short period. 
 
 On 28 January, 1810, the question of Napoleon's 
 marriage was formally discussed at a meeting of the 
 chief French Ministers at the Tuileries, all except 
 Talleyrand being unaware of what had already oc- 
 curred in respect of this matter. Opinions were 
 divided, some being in favour of a Russian, some in 
 favour of an Austrian match. 
 
 On 6 February, however, Napoleon received in- 
 formation which made it quite clear that a Russian 
 match was impossible. He had, as has been seen, 
 already anticipated a refusal, and on 7 February the 
 marriage contract with Marie Louise, daughter of 
 Francis, Emperor of Austria, was signed. This mar- 
 riage Napoleon was convinced would strengthen his 
 position immensely. 
 
 Meanwhile it was, he thought, good policy, while 
 strengthening himself in Germany by means of his 
 marriage with Marie Louise, to continue active opera- 
 tions in Spain, and generally to maintain the status 
 quo in Europe. Thus, should Great Britain refuse to 
 come to terms he would be in an unassailable position. 
 The year 1810 may thus be said, as far as outward 
 appearances went, to mark the period at which Na- 
 poleon reached the summit of his power. 
 
 On 28 March Marie Louise arrived at Compiegne,
 
 222 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 and the marriage was celebrated in Paris with 
 illuminations, while, with the exception of London 
 and St. Petersburg, congratulations poured in from 
 all the chief European capitals. 
 
 Various circumstances, however, soon occurred to 
 bring disillusionment to Napoleon's ambitious hopes. 
 The effect of the marriage upon the relations of 
 Austria and Russia was not what he had expected. 
 Instead of Russia and Austria becoming mutually 
 hostile, they tended to come together. Not that Na- 
 poleon anticipated an outbreak of hostilities between 
 France and Russia, but he relied upon the assistance 
 of Austria should such hostilities take place. Further, 
 he hoped to force England to make peace, and in 
 order to do so he endeavoured to unite all the con- 
 tinental powers against the Island kingdom. " 1810," 
 writes Sorel, " marque 1'heure de la pleine mer, de la 
 mer tale et par un jour radieux." With the exception 
 of England Europe had been conquered, for in Spain 
 no one dreamt of the ultimate failure of the French. 
 Outwardly Napoleon seemed satisfied. Never had 
 he spent so long a period in France as he did during 
 1810. Europe had seen the rise and fall of the 
 Roman Empire, and of the Empire of Charles the 
 Great ; it had now witnessed the rise of the Na- 
 poleonic Empire. Napoleon compared himself to a 
 Roman Emperor and his government to that of 
 Diocletian. Since 1799 he had created an adminis- 
 tration and had given France a code, and his work
 
 THE EMPRESS MARIE LOUISE 
 
 FROM THE TAINTING BY GERARD AT VERSAILLES
 
 AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 223 
 
 as an administrator and legislator indeed survived his 
 fall and lives on in the present day. 
 
 If Frenchmen did not enjoy the liberty which they 
 had gained at the Revolution, they had at any rate 
 secured equality. Any loss of liberty was amply com- 
 pensated for by the position which France had gained 
 in Europe. 
 
 Moreover, France was prosperous, and such was 
 the hatred of England that the continental system was 
 by no means generally unpopular among the French 
 people. In fact the hardships incident to it fell mainly 
 on the Germans, the Dutch, and the Italians. With 
 the producers the protective system was popular, and 
 all Frenchmen, feeling secure in life and property, were 
 united in supporting Napoleon in his fierce crusade 
 against the British. War was confined to countries 
 outside France, which itself did not feel any of the 
 hardships of war with the exception of the conscription 
 which, being necessary, was generally regarded till 
 1812 with equanimity. " The period between the end 
 of 1810 and the middle of 1812," says Pasquier, "was 
 the calmest period enjoyed by the French nation since 
 the consulate." " Never," writes Balzac, " even in the 
 great days of the monarchy, was the French aristocracy 
 richer or more brilliant. " l 
 
 During the years immediately succeeding the 
 Treaty of Vienna, Russia, and indeed Austria, were 
 
 1 Quoted by Sorel, " L'Europe et la Revolution Franchise," 
 Vol. VII, p. 466.
 
 224 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 however merely biding their time, and only in form 
 were adhering to the continental system. Their am- 
 bassadors had indeed been withdrawn from London, 
 but Metternich avowed to Bathurst before his depar- 
 ture from Vienna, that Austria's peace with Napoleon 
 was simply an opportunity for preparations for war, 
 while between England and Russia no open hostilities 
 had taken place, the Russian fleet captured in the 
 Tagus being merely detained in an English port till the 
 inevitable conflict between Napoleon and Alexander 
 should break out. 
 
 All Napoleon's hopes of carrying out the contin- 
 ental system therefore depended upon the continuance 
 of the Russian alliance, and thus Alexander held the 
 key of the position. If once Alexander relaxed the 
 restrictions upon English trade with Russia, all hope 
 of bringing about the submission of Great Britain, and 
 of seeing the realization of Napoleon's European 
 and Oriental schemes, would vanish into thin air. 
 
 After the overthrow of Austria at Wagram and the 
 conclusion of the Treaty of Vienna, Napoleon therefore 
 seemed to all outward appearance to be at the height 
 of his power. But as long as Great Britain continued 
 to defy him, his successes on the Continent were not 
 sufficient and left the main object of his hopes unsatis- 
 fied. His Eastern schemes could not be carried out 
 so long as the English fleet rode triumphant on the 
 Mediterranean. Malta, and Sicily, and Portugal still 
 remained unconquered, and his hold upon Spain was 
 fiercely contested.
 
 AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 225 
 
 He was, therefore, more firmly than ever resolved 
 to carry out the continental system in its entirety and 
 to compel England to make peace. But that system 
 had as yet never been systematically enforced. In 
 Holland and in the Austrian dominions British goods 
 found an entrance, and what was more serious Alex- 
 ander showed signs of disagreeing with Napoleon on 
 many fundamental points. 
 
 It was only by the most constant and rigorous 
 system of supervision that Napoleon could hope to 
 make the continental system effective. Consequently 
 it was of the greatest importance to keep Russia true 
 to her alliance with France. 
 
 Already, however, in 1810, it was beginning to be 
 apparent that Napoleon's continental system could 
 not be strictly enforced. 
 
 The war of 1809, though temporarily disastrous to 
 Austria, had had one noteworthy result. " It destroyed 
 in the eyes of Europe the halo of invincibility that 
 had encircled the head of Napoleon." 1 It had syn- 
 chronized, too, with the risings of Schill, the Duke of 
 Brunswick, and Hofer, which, though themselves unsuc- 
 cessful, indicated the growth of a feeling of nationality 
 in Germany, the result itself of the French victories 
 and domination. At the same time Napoleon showed 
 no misgivings as to the ultimate success of his 
 schemes. 
 
 After the defeat of Austria at Wagram and the 
 Treaty of Vienna (Schonbrunn) he had, however, 
 
 1 " Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, p. 360.
 
 226 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 some justification for regarding the future with con- 
 fidence. Germany was as yet far from being united. 
 Prussia, owing to Frederick William's feeling of distrust 
 of Austria, had not joined in the late war, in which 
 indeed Napoleon had been aided by several of his 
 German vassal states. The Bavarian and Fran- 
 conian rulers regarded him as their defender against 
 the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns, and in other parts 
 of Germany the people showed no disposition to throw 
 off the military rule imposed by France. 
 
 It was not till after the Wagram campaign that the 
 Napoleonic regime became generally unpopular in 
 Germany, and that "the attitude of the people of 
 Germany towards Napoleon finally crystallized into one 
 of uncompromising hostility". 1 This change, which 
 brought about the overthrow of Napoleon, was due to 
 the gradual enforcement, after the Wagram campaign, 
 of the continental system. In order to ruin England 
 Napoleon threw away all the advantages which he had 
 hitherto gained. As the German states realized that 
 they were being sacrificed to the continental system 
 they rapidly developed an intense feeling of hostility 
 to Napoleon. 
 
 The failure of the Walcheren expedition in the 
 summer and autumn of 1809 made the annexation of 
 Holland an easy matter. His brother Louis, whom 
 he had made King of Holland, had ruled, as far as 
 possible, in the interest of the Dutch. From 1806 
 when Louis (the morbid elements of whose singular 
 
 1 Atkinson, "A History of Germany, 1715-1815," p. 547.
 
 AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 227 
 
 character have lately been well brought out 1 ) was 
 placed over Holland, trade with England had by no 
 means been wholly prevented, and the Dutch coasts 
 had not, in accordance with Napoleon's wishes, been 
 sealed up against British merchandise. Napoleon had 
 indeed stated in a dispatch to Louis that he intended 
 " to conquer the sea by the land," and while he was at 
 Erfurt in October, 1808, he again had warned Louis 
 that trade between England and Holland was carried 
 on and that it must be put an end to. Louis, however, 
 whose difficulties under the terrible grip of the con- 
 tinental system were only equalled by the generosity 
 of his aims for his Dutch subjects, paid little attention 
 to these orders, and Napoleon as a first step annexed 
 the Island of Walcheren in January, 1810. 
 
 For some six months a correspondence between 
 Napoleon and Louis took place, while at the same time 
 Fouche entered into secret negotiations with England. 
 In July Napoleon discovered Fouche's intrigue, dis- 
 missed him, and Louis fled to Bohemia, and the same 
 month Holland was annexed to the French Empire. 
 Apparently Napoleon, like Fouche, had himself con- 
 sidered the possibility of coming to terms with Great 
 Britain, for in "The Times" of Saturday, 17 March, 
 1810, it is stated that "a French flag of truce from 
 Boulogne having on board dispatches for the British 
 government had been met by the Cherokee gunboat 
 whose captain received the dispatches from the French 
 Foreign Office and proceeded with them to Dover 
 
 1 Atteridge, "Napoleon's Brothers". Methuen, 1909.
 
 228 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 where he arrived (accompanied by the French vessel) 
 at nine o'clock the same evening". In " The Times" 
 comment was made on the occurrence. The funds 
 rose a trifle on the prospects of peace, but it is evident 
 from the attitude of the article that there was small 
 chance of peace. " There are not twenty men in the 
 kingdom," it stated, " who think that anything like 
 security is to be obtained by a treaty of peace. We 
 therefore believe that Bonaparte's proposals will meet 
 with a cool reception. We are under the obligation 
 of a solemn compact with the Spaniards to make 
 common cause against France, and not to make peace 
 with that Power except by common consent." The 
 article goes on to express confidence in the patriotism 
 of the ministers, though it criticizes severely their 
 system of government, and the necessity for internal 
 reform. " Nevertheless, in spite of the corruption, ex- 
 travagance, and favouritism which it is asserted mark 
 the existing system of government, it is hoped that 
 the nation will not droop, but maintain a manly and 
 erect position against its foreign foe, who either by 
 treachery or violence has saddened the rest of Europe, 
 and who only proposes peace as conducive to his 
 designs of conquest. Our domestic enemies may be 
 gradually shaken off ; or if not they do but weaken 
 the other will overwhelm us." 
 
 This expression of the determination of the British 
 nation to struggle on is especially interesting when it 
 is remembered how dark the future must have appeared 
 to thoughtful Englishmen in 1810, when the effects of
 
 AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 229 
 
 Napoleon's commercial system, in shaking his supre- 
 macy in Europe, were not yet apparent. Though 
 reduced to great misery the English people, however, 
 received some relief from the export of corn from the 
 states ruled by Napoleon. 
 
 Fortunately, though imports from England were 
 practically forbidden, Napoleon permitted the export 
 of corn from the Continent to Great Britain, and thus 
 enabled his enemy to survive the terrible year of 1810 
 a year when, owing to the failure of the harvest, the 
 price of wheat advanced to 1 1 8s. the quarter. 
 
 In 181 1 the crisis was over, and in March of that 
 year the official report stated : " From Europe the im- 
 portations from places from which the British flag is 
 excluded have been immense ". 1 
 
 Napoleon, however, was still full of confidence as 
 to the ultimate success of his policy, and he had some 
 justification for that confidence. 
 
 In 1810 Wellesley seemed to be making little 
 headway in Spain, and taking into consideration the 
 failure of the Walcheren expedition in the previous 
 year, the marriage of Napoleon to Marie Louise in 
 1810, and the occupation of Russia in a war with 
 Turkey one need not be surprised at Napoleon's 
 anticipation of a triumph over England, and of the 
 firm establishment of his supremacy over Europe. 
 
 On 24 March, 1811, he assured a deputation from 
 the General Councils of Commerce and Manufactures 
 
 1 Quoted in " Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, p. 
 372-
 
 2 3 o THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 in France that "in about six months his sword would 
 pierce England to the heart V At the very moment, 
 however, that Napoleon made this statement he was 
 aware that owing to the action of Alexander the con- 
 tinental system was breaking down. 
 
 In 1810 Napoleon had realized that there was no 
 time to be lost and energetic measures were taken to 
 enforce the continental system. Before the end of 
 August Napoleon had occupied Liibeck, Lauenburg, 
 Hamburg, all the left bank' of the Elbe as far as 
 Bremen, and Oldenburg though as yet it was not 
 formally united to his Empire. 2 He had thus ac- 
 quired the means of constructing a vast fleet, and he 
 felt confident that by 1812, if the continental blockade 
 had not forced the English nation to make peace, he 
 would have Great Britain at his mercy. He never 
 for one moment imagined that Alexander would 
 adopt a hostile attitude, at any rate before 1812. 
 Alexander's position was indeed one of great and 
 unexpected strength. On 19 September, 1809, he 
 signed a treaty with Sweden which left him in posses- 
 sion of Finland. The annexation of Finland being 
 thus accomplished he was able to concentrate his at- 
 tention upon Poland. Alexander wished not only to 
 abolish the name of Poland, but to use that country as 
 an advanced western post of the Russian Empire. On 
 
 1 Quoted in " Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, p. 
 380. 
 
 2 Sorel, "L'Europe et la Revolution Franchise," Vol. VII, p. 
 452-
 
 AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 231 
 
 this subject there was now little hope of an agreement 
 being come to between him and Napoleon, and the 
 closing months of 1810 saw the beginning of a crisis 
 in the affairs of Europe which was only ended at 
 Waterloo. That crisis was brought on by the refusal 
 of Alexander on 31 December, 1810, to carry out the 
 continental system. 
 
 By the end of December, 1810, Napoleon was 
 thus suffering from two misfortunes the Spanish 
 resistance, and the refusal of Russia to adhere to the 
 continental system. Napoleon's Spanish blunder in 
 1808 had saved Great Britain from the necessity of 
 yielding to Napoleon. At the beginning of 1808 the 
 British merchants were threatened with bankruptcy, 
 but most unexpectedly Spain and the markets of 
 Central and South America were suddenly thrown 
 open to them. The transference of the Portuguese 
 Royal Family to Brazil was accompanied by the 
 opening of trade between Great Britain and a portion 
 of South America. 
 
 This temporary relief was followed in 1810 and 
 especially in 1811 by a relapse and reaction, and Mr. 
 Rose says that " 1811 must be regarded as the crisis 
 in the commercial struggle between us and our 
 mighty antagonist ".* 
 
 The continental system which was at its height 
 
 in 1810-11 has suffered from endless attacks, but from 
 
 Napoleon's point of view it was defensible. There is 
 
 nothing to show any determination on his part to make 
 
 1 Rose, " Napoleonic Studies," p. 194.
 
 232 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 it perpetual. On the contrary he regarded it as a 
 temporary measure intended to bring about the ruin 
 of Great Britain. "It came," writes Mr. H. H. 
 Wilson, "perilously near to effecting its object. . . . 
 The control of the Baltic by Napoleon, especially 
 in 1810-11, shook England to her foundations. In 
 1812 the British people were face to face with actual 
 famine." 1 
 
 That Great Britain had not yielded earlier was 
 due to improved agriculture and the factory system. 
 She was not dependent upon the Continent for clothing, 
 and owing to the introduction of machinery was able 
 to produce goods which were necessary to the con- 
 tinental nations and which were imported secretly. 
 After Tilsit, and more particularly after the Treaty of 
 Vienna in 1809, Napoleon had entered into a most 
 determined conflict with Great Britain. Against 
 England's continental blockade which was first notified 
 to the world in the Orders in Council, Napoleon elabor- 
 ated the continental system. From 1809 Europe 
 gradually but steadily rose against Napoleon, and the 
 continental blockade strangled the continental system? 
 
 Warnings had indeed reached Napoleon of the 
 disastrous effect which the adhesion to the continental 
 system would have upon his fortunes. Bourrienne, 
 whose advice was so often disregarded, after a visit 
 to Hamburg for the purpose of enforcing the con- 
 tinental system upon the citizens, wrote that "the 
 
 1 "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, p. 241. 
 2 Rose, "Napoleonic Studies," p. 197.
 
 AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 233 
 
 hurling of twenty kings from their thrones would have 
 excited less hatred than this contempt for the wants of 
 nations ". l 
 
 The Continent depended upon the fleets of England 
 for cloth, leather, and colonial produce, which Napoleon 
 believed came entirely from English colonies. In 
 spite of Napoleon's orders to the contrary, Bourrienne 
 relates how he was compelled to obtain army clothing 
 from England. Had he not done so the French 
 troops then quartered in Hamburg, Bremen, and 
 Liibeck would have perished from cold. 2 
 
 The famous Russian Imperial Ukase of 31 De- 
 cember, 1810, was the result of this intolerable pressure 
 which Napoleon had brought to bear upon Russia. 
 The British commerce with Russia had been for a 
 time cut off, and Alexander found it necessary to 
 break away gradually from the continental system. 
 
 A crisis in Napoleon's fortunes was indeed arrived 
 at on 31 December, 1810. On that day, as has been 
 stated, Alexander issued his edict modifying his ad- 
 hesion to the continental system. Napoleon was 
 furious. "This was," he exclaimed, "the leak that 
 was sinking the ship." His rage was natural. He 
 had deliberately staked all upon the overthrow of 
 Great Britain by means of his continental system. 
 
 On 6 August, 1810, he had issued a severe decree 
 to check English smuggling, but in order to enforce 
 that decree he had posted French troops in Stettin, 
 in the Prussian ports, in Lubeck, Hamburg, Lauen- 
 
 1 Rose, "Napoleonic Studies," p. 198. 2 Ibid. p. 199.
 
 234 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 berg, and along the west bank of the Elbe. On 
 19 October he had issued his famous order that all 
 British goods were to be publicly burnt, and on 
 10 December he announced to the Senate the an- 
 nexation of all the Hanse towns and the region be- 
 tween them and Holland, which included Oldenburg. 
 
 Oldenburg, however, was held by a relative of 
 the Tsar, but was a favourite resort of smugglers, and 
 therefore was included in this order ; thus Russia's 
 dynastic interests were affected. 
 
 Napoleon had also on 17 November forced Sweden 
 to declare war upon England, and he hoped to close 
 the Baltic to English commerce. It seemed as though 
 a few months of consistent adhesion by Napoleon's 
 allies to the continental system would have the desired 
 effect, and that Great Britain would be compelled to 
 accept the French terms. But Alexander's decision 
 to break away, even in a slight degree, from the 
 trammels of the continental system ruined Napoleon's 
 plans, and saved Great Britain from all necessity of 
 even considering the question of entering upon ne- 
 gotiations. It also led to the events of 1813 and 1814 
 the Moscow campaign, the battle of Leipzic, and 
 the abdication of Napoleon. 
 
 CHIEF DATES 
 
 Napoleon in Spain December, 1808. 
 
 Stein advocates declaration of war by Prussia 
 
 and Austria December, 1808. 
 
 Battle of Corunna ..... January, 1809. 
 
 Napoleon returns to France .... January, 1809.
 
 AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER 235 
 
 War with Austria .... 
 
 Battles of Abensberg and Eckmiihl 
 
 Napoleon annexes the Papal States 
 
 Battle of Aspern .... 
 
 Battle of Talavera 
 
 Battle of Wagram 
 
 The Walcheren expeditions 
 
 Peace of Vienna (Schonbrunn) 
 
 Convention between Russia and France about 
 
 Poland (not ratified) .... 
 Marriage of Napoleon to Marie Louise 
 Annexation of Holland by Napoleon 
 Invasion of Portugal by Massena . 
 The Fontainebleau Decrees 
 The Russian Ukase modifying its support of 
 
 the continental system 
 
 March, 1809. 
 . April, 1809. 
 May, 1809. 
 May, 1809. 
 July, 1809. 
 July, 1809. 
 July-November, 1809. 
 October, 1809. 
 
 January, 1810. 
 
 April, 1810. 
 
 July, 1810. 
 
 August, 1810. 
 
 October, 1810. 
 
 December, 1810.
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON, MOSCOW, LEIPZIG, 
 WATERLOO, 1813-1815 
 
 Napoleon's religious policy a cause of his fall The effect of 
 the continental system The Decree of 31 December, 1810 
 Alexander's alienation from Napoleon The Polish question 
 The Moscow expedition The composition of Napoleon's army 
 Borodino Moscow The retreat At Smorgoni Napoleon 
 leaves the army In Paris Lutzen and Bautzen The Armistice 
 of Plaswitz Leipzic The campaign of 1814 The abdication 
 of Napoleon The restoration of Louis XVIII The allied 
 sovereigns in England Napoleon in Elba the Congress of 
 Vienna Indifference of the allies to the possibility of Napoleon's 
 escape Napoleon's return to France The Hundred Days 
 Waterloo Napoleon in St. Helena. 
 
 '~p v HE fall of Napoleon was brought about by a 
 -*- variety of causes religious, commercial, political. 
 Of these the religious causes are apt to be overlooked, 
 though their importance cannot be exaggerated. 
 During the Consulate and the early years of the 
 Empire he posed as the friend and champion of religion. 
 "Religious liberty" seemed to him as dear as civil 
 liberty. Though Roman Catholicism was restored, 
 
 and became the State religion of France, the Jews 
 
 236
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 237 
 
 and Protestants were treated with the utmost tolera- 
 tion. 
 
 During his exile he asserted that he had been 
 anxious to establish universal liberty of conscience, 
 and that he desired " all men whether Catholics, Pro- 
 testants, Mohammedans, or Deists to be equal". But 
 during the years of his decline and fall the Protestants 
 alone of the various religious bodies in France had no 
 ground of complaint against him. Among the Jews 
 and the Roman Catholics, on the other hand, there 
 had grown up a bitter feeling of hostility to the 
 Emperor. With the Jews opposition to Napoleon 
 first began when on 17 March, 1808, he issued a 
 decree for the regulation of their worship and trade. 
 The articles which were contained in the decree 
 were considered by the Jews an infraction of the 
 assurances which he had already given them, and 
 were couched in insulting terms. As a result, a 
 powerful opposition was at once engendered among 
 the Jews, who henceforth supported the efforts of the 
 secret societies to effect the Emperor's downfall. 
 
 The alienation of the Roman Catholic Church was, 
 however, far more serious. The great majority of 
 his subjects belonged to that Church, and its influence 
 was enormous and widespread. Perhaps the greatest 
 mistake made by Napoleon was his attack on the 
 Papacy and his imprisonment of Pius VII. The 
 security of his government depended upon the good- 
 will of the Pope, and though Napoleon recognized 
 the immense influence of Roman Catholicism in
 
 238 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 France, Spain, Italy, and Southern Germany, he 
 seems after 1807 to have thought that he was strong 
 enough to insist upon the passive obedience of the 
 Papacy. 
 
 The alienation of the Church, more than any 
 single cause, had contributed to the fall of James II 
 of England ; it had brought about the failure of the 
 schemes of the Emperor Joseph II ; it proved the 
 most important factor in undermining the basis of 
 Napoleon's power. As First Consul Napoleon had 
 fully recognized the importance of religion as repre- 
 sented by Roman Catholicism, and none of his 
 measures were more statesmanlike than those by which 
 he won over the French Roman Catholics to his 
 side. As Emperor, however, he gradually drifted 
 away from that statesmanlike position towards religion 
 which as First Consul he had adopted. His loss of the 
 goodwill of the Pope was accompanied by the ever- 
 increasing hostility of the French clergy, whose in- 
 fluence among the mass of the people cannot be 
 overrated. Thus, during the later years of the 
 Emperor, the resentment of the clergy even to his 
 rule was ever increasing. Having " undermined the 
 basis of popular support " on which Napoleon had 
 placed his throne, the Church intrigued for a return of 
 the Bourbons. 
 
 Thus Napoleon's religious policy teemed with 
 blunders. He drove the Jews to intrigue with the 
 powerful secret societies ; he failed to realize " that the 
 Holy See was a power to be reckoned with " ; he
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 239 
 
 turned against him the religious opinion of most of 
 his subjects. 
 
 The commercial and political causes of Napoleon's 
 fall are closely interwoven. The submission of Austria, 
 the overthrow of Prussia, the formation of the Confed- 
 eration of the Rhine, the powerlessness of Italy, and the 
 Russian alliance had enabled Napoleon to develop 
 gradually but steadily his continental system. The 
 rising in Spain he regarded merely as a temporary 
 difficulty which would shortly be overcome. The 
 success, however, of Napoleon's policy depended 
 chiefly upon the continuance of the alliance of 
 Russia, the only continental Power which could treat 
 with Napoleon on equal terms. 
 
 It was therefore of first-rate importance to keep 
 Alexander firm to his alliance with Napoleon. 
 
 The refusal, therefore, of Alexander, on 31 De- 
 cember, 1810, to adhere strictly to the continental 
 system was a deadly blow to Napoleon's most cherished 
 designs. Napoleon, as has been stated in a previous 
 chapter, had earlier in the same year refused to sign a 
 convention with Alexander directed against the aspira- 
 tions of the Poles for national independence. Thus 
 at the beginning of 181 1 serious differences had arisen 
 between the two monarchs. Each had been wounded 
 in his tenderest point. 
 
 To Alexander the definite refusal of Napoleon's 
 aid in suppressing the Polish national aspirations was 
 as important as was the continuance of the continental 
 system to Napoleon. Naturally, therefore, the year
 
 240 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 1 8 1 1 was an anxious one for both sovereigns, each 
 of whom accused the other of making preparations 
 for war. Upon that war hung the fate of Poland, as 
 well as that of the continental system, if not indeed 
 that of Europe. 
 
 For this struggle Napoleon was not as well pre- 
 pared as he had been for the war of 1805 or indeed 
 for the war of 1809. The Grand Army of 1805 was, 
 according to Napoleon, " the best he had ever com- 
 manded," and the overthrow of Austria had been 
 followed by the willing submission of the states which 
 were formed into the Confederation of the Rhine. In 
 1 809, though he again conquered Austria, signs were 
 not wanting that the French victory was not likely to 
 be followed by results as satisfactory to Napoleon as 
 those which flowed from the victory of Austerlitz. 
 
 The alliance of Napoleon and Alexander at Tilsit 
 had appeared to affirm the complete overthrow of the 
 European system and to establish the Napoleonic 
 supremacy in Central, Western, and Southern Europe. 
 That Napoleon himself thought such was the case is 
 evident from the zeal which he showed in carrying 
 out the continental system, hoping thereby to effect 
 within a short period the commercial strangulation of 
 Great Britain. 
 
 But, as has been stated, the enforcement of the 
 system tended to encourage the new national move- 
 ment in Central Europe, which was itself encouraged 
 by the outbreak of the Spanish resistance to Napoleon's 
 schemes.
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 241 
 
 In 1809 the determination of Austria to defeat 
 Napoleon was based upon national considerations. 
 Austria in 1809 represented the rising spirit of nation- 
 ality in Germany, and at the same time continued 
 that struggle with France for supremacy in Europe, 
 which dated from the wars of Charles V and Francis 
 I. The war roused great enthusiasm in Germany, 
 and though Austria was defeated it was now recognized 
 that Napoleon was not invincible. The national 
 awakening of Germany had begun "the first step 
 towards the overthrow of Napoleon's power ".* 
 
 Nevertheless, in spite of the warnings from Ger- 
 many and in spite of the continuance of the Spanish 
 war, and the growing tension between France and 
 Russia, Napoleon continued to insist upon the en- 
 forcement of the continental system. 
 
 In 181 1 he regarded war with Russia as necessary 
 for the success of his plans for the destruction of 
 Great Britain. In order to make success certain he 
 assembled an army which numbered "610,000 men 
 with 1242 field pieces, and 130 siege guns". 2 
 
 But neither Napoleon nor his army were what 
 they had been in 1805. In 1812 he was himself 
 physically and mentally unequal to the immense 
 strain of the Russian campaign, while his army was 
 largely composed of soldiers of various subject nations, 
 and was lacking in coherence and not well officered ; the 
 
 1 " Cambridge Modern History," Vol. X, p. 360. 
 
 2 Ibid. p. 488. 
 16
 
 242 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 commissariat, also, was far from being in a satisfactory 
 condition. 
 
 At Verdun, through which a great part of the 
 Imperial Guard passed on their way to Wilna (the 
 head-quarters of the forces which were being assembled 
 to act against Russia), an Englishman, J. Spencer 
 Stanhope, was living on parole, having been taken 
 prisoner while travelling in Spain. 
 
 He gives an interesting description of Napoleon as 
 he saw him passing through Verdun in his carriage on 
 his way to the front. 
 
 Napoleon had travelled all night and did not look 
 at his best. "His face looked swollen, his complexion 
 sallow and livid. In his eyes was a depth of reflection, 
 a power of intention (if I may so call it) of seeing 
 into the souls of men ; there was a murkiness, a dark 
 scowl, that made me exclaim ' nothing in the world 
 would tempt me to go one hour in that carriage with 
 that man ! ' " 
 
 The late M. Albert Sorel brings forward a long 
 list of authorities to show the accuracy of his statement 
 that as early as August, 1810, Alexander had be- 
 gun his preparations for an attack upon the French 
 Emperor. 1 He estimates that in February, 1811, 
 Alexander had 230,000 men ready to further his plans. 
 Those plans included the substitution of Russian for 
 French influence in Poland, and a close alliance with 
 Prussia, Sweden, and Austria. Once a general rising 
 
 1 Sorel, " L'Europe et la Revolution Frangaise," Vol. VII, 
 p. 508.
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 243 
 
 had been planned against the French domination, 
 Alexander felt that he could count upon the support 
 of the Dutch, the active assistance of Great Britain, 
 and the continued opposition in Spain to Napoleon's 
 plans. Moreover, the dispersion of the French troops 
 would in his opinion facilitate the success of an aggres- 
 sive movement by an army strong in numbers and 
 impregnated with a hatred of French domination. 
 
 Alexander had many substantial reasons for his 
 determination to resist the growth of Napoleon's in- 
 fluence. The latter's avowed intention of securing 
 a mastery over the Mediterranean and the adjacent 
 countries, his retention of the Ionian Islands, his op- 
 position to the idea of a Russian occupation of Con- 
 stantinople, his sudden marriage on 2 April, 1810, 
 with the Austrian Duchess Marie Louise, before the 
 proposed match between him and a Russian princess 
 had been formally broken off, the hardship suffered by 
 Russian trade owing to the continental system, and 
 lastly the annexation on 10 December, 1810, of the 
 Duchy of Oldenburg (with the whole coast-line from 
 Friesland to Denmark), which belonged to a near rela- 
 tive of the Russian Tsar had decided Alexander to 
 take a step which led directly to Napoleon's Moscow 
 expedition. 
 
 Among the causes of the friction between Alex- 
 ander and Napoleon the Polish question was an import- 
 ant one. Both the monarchs fully recognized the 
 military value of Poland ; both became rivals for the 
 friendship of the Poles. In this contest for the favour
 
 244 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 of Poland Alexander was worsted, though early in 
 1811 he made a vigorous attempt to gain the Poles 
 by liberal promises. In 1812 Napoleon definitely 
 realized that Alexander would not support the con- 
 tinental blockade. The Tsar's refusal to unite with 
 Napoleon " in severe repressive measures against 
 British and American trade," made it necessary for 
 Napoleon either to abandon the continental system 
 or to compel Alexander to support it. 
 
 The alienation of Alexander began, as has 
 been shown, in 1810. In 1811 that monarch 
 entered upon his preparations for war ; on 29 March, 
 1812, he dismissed his chief minister Speranski, who 
 was succeeded by ShishkofF, a representative of the 
 old Russian party which was opposed to the policy of 
 Tilsit. 29 March, 1812, is said to mark "a turning- 
 point in Alexander's career, for he now entered deliber- 
 ately upon a life-and -death contest". 1 The date has, 
 indeed, a wide significance, for it marks the opening 
 of the period of Russia's supremacy in Europe a 
 period which was not closed till the Crimean War. 
 
 Early in May, 1812, Napoleon proceeded to Dres- 
 den, where he met the rulers of Austria and Prussia and 
 a host of German princes. While there he heard that 
 Alexander, who in April had secured the alliance of 
 Sweden, had concluded on 28 May the Peace of Bucha- 
 rest with the Turks. 
 
 Moreover, in June, Napoleon, who till his arrival 
 at Moscow remained hopeful of winning over Alex- 
 
 1 "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, pp. 487-8.
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 245 
 
 ander, disappointed the Poles by refusing to recognize, 
 in accordance with the wishes of the Polish Diet, the 
 restoration of the kingdom of Poland. 
 
 Nevertheless Napoleon remained, as ever, con- 
 fident in the success of his policy. His army, which 
 included contingents from Austria, Prussia, Poland, 
 Italy, Saxony, the Rhine Provinces, and Westphalia, 
 was superior in numbers to that of Alexander and was 
 under experienced officers. 
 
 But Napoleon himself was not in good health, 
 and mentally he had weakened, not having the same 
 power of decision as heretofore, and not having the 
 same sense of proportion. Though immense, his 
 army had no coherence, and was now called upon to 
 undertake a campaign under conditions not hitherto 
 met with. 
 
 On 24 June the French army crossed the Niemen ; 
 on 17 August Napoleon drove the Russians out of 
 Smolensk ; on 7 September he fought the drawn 
 battle of Borodino. Had Napoleon used his guard 
 he would have won a decisive victory. Se"gur asserts 
 that he was ill at Borodino ; this assertion, however, 
 has been denied. In any case the non-employment of 
 the guard at Borodino was a blunder of some mag- 
 nitude, and, moreover, seems to indicate that he was 
 no longer the Napoleon of the Italian campaigns. 
 
 As is well known, the arrival of the army at Moscow, 
 which was destroyed by fire by the Russians, was the 
 limit of Napoleon's success. Alexander refused to 
 yield, and Napoleon had no alternative but to retreat.
 
 246 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 In that famous retreat which began on October, 1812, 
 the French army was decimated by cold, disease, and 
 the continuous onslaught of the triumphant Russians. 
 Having arrived at Smorgoni, Napoleon, on 5 December, 
 decided to leave his army and with a few companions 
 to return rapidly to Paris. 
 
 The description given us by Spencer Stanhope of 
 Napoleon's arrival in Paris from Smorgoni is full of 
 interest. " I hurried to the Tuileries. He was, indeed, 
 returned, but in an inferior sort of a hackney carriage. 
 Paris was much agitated, and menacing placards con- 
 tinued to be posted, though they were rapidly re- 
 moved by the police. Napoleon, however, who was 
 in excellent health, opened the Senate in state, the 
 brilliancy of the Imperial procession being little less 
 than magnifique. The glass coach in which he and 
 the Empress sat was drawn by cream-coloured horses, 
 and in its progress to the Chamber he greeted the 
 crowd with a smile which was strikingly beautiful ; 
 there was a fascination about it which even in spite of 
 my previous impressions (at Verdun) I could not 
 resist." 
 
 In his speech, which was written, Napoleon an- 
 nounced the total destruction of his army, but declared 
 that he required neither men nor money. 
 
 The events in the east of Europe, however, soon 
 necessitated a new conscription, and Napoleon went 
 
 1 " Memoirs of Anna Maria Wilhelmina Pickering, together 
 with Extracts from the Journal of her Father, John Spencer 
 Stanhope," pp. 487-90. London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1903.
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 247 
 
 in person to the Invalides to ascertain if any of the 
 pensioners were fit for service. His return from this 
 visit was marked by an absence of cries of "vive 
 I'Empereur" and by a shower of petitions which were 
 thrown in at his carriage window. Before the 
 Emperor left for the front a masked ball was given 
 at the Tuileries. The Emperor was present and 
 had a long conversation with Cambace'res. 
 
 What the effect of a successful war against Russia, 
 upon Europe generally, and Great Britain in particular, 
 would have been can only be surmised. By her 
 seizure of the Danish fleet and by her interven- 
 tion in the Spanish Peninsula, Great Britain had 
 taken very effective steps to hamper Napoleon's 
 efforts to dominate Europe. But the success of the 
 campaign against Russia would have laid Europe at 
 the feet of Napoleon, and it is quite possible that he 
 would have returned to his plan of 1804-5 f an 
 invasion of England. Thus the success or failure of 
 Napoleon's invasion of Russia was a matter of vital 
 interest to the inhabitants of Great Britain no less 
 than it was to the Spaniards, and indeed to the whole 
 of continental Europe. In July, 1812, both countries 
 had made treaties with Alexander, upon whose suc- 
 cess so much depended. 
 
 The colossal failure of the Russian campaign, 
 ending in Napoleon's hasty departure from Smorgoni 
 for Paris on 5 December, had brought upon France 
 defeat and disaster. In spite of Napoleon's herculean 
 efforts in the spring of 1813, rewarded as they were
 
 248 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 by the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen, Central 
 Europe was determined to shake itself free from his 
 control. Its efforts were unexpectedly facilitated by 
 Napoleon's assent to the armistice of Plaswitz. 
 
 The armistice of Plaswitz on 4 June proved to be 
 one of Napoleon's most fatal blunders. Lutzen and 
 Bautzen had certainly proved costly victories, and his 
 troops were not in a fit condition for another campaign. 
 But the Austrians were not as yet openly hostile, the 
 Russo- Prussian alliance could not survive more defeats, 
 and further victories would strengthen Napoleon's 
 wavering allies. It is true that there were many 
 arguments in favour of an armistice. The Saxon 
 campaign, with its hardly-won victories, had convinced 
 Napoleon of the necessity of refitting, reorganizing, 
 and increasing his forces. Moreover, he wished to 
 delay further operations until his army in Italy, under 
 Eugene, was able to make a demonstration on the 
 frontier of Carniola. Napoleon did not realize the 
 magnitude of his failure in Spain, nor the possibility 
 of Austria joining his foes, nor the national character 
 of the opposition to him in Northern Germany. 
 
 That the acceptance by Napoleon of the armistice 
 of Plaswitz was a blunder of the most enormous 
 magnitude is now recognized. In an Austrian State 
 Paper, written in 1813, are these remarkable criti- 
 cisms : " La plus grande faute qu'ait fait Napoleon 
 dans sa carriere militaire, c'^tait avoir consenti a 
 1'armistice ". And again : " Enfin, en commetant la 
 faute de consentir a 1'armistice, il en fit une qui lui otait
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 249 
 
 la chance de rester le plus puissant souverain, c'tait 
 de n'avoir pas entendu les propositions de paix a 
 Prague, a prix de legers sacrifices de son cote ". J In 
 making this armistice Napoleon was clearly throwing 
 away the advantages which he had gained by his 
 victories at Liitzen and Bautzen. 
 
 No doubt Napoleon was convinced that his 
 reasons for making the armistice were sound. He 
 desired a period of peace during which he could reor- 
 ganize his cavalry, and strengthen it by reinforcements. 
 Moreover, he underrated the strength of Austria 
 and was confident that he could overcome his foes. 
 
 During the armistice, which lasted till 10 August, 
 the Russians and Prussians were able to reorganize 
 their forces, to recover from their defeats at Liitzen and 
 Bautzen, and to arrange a plan of campaign. Early 
 in July the news arrived of Wellington's victory at 
 Vittoria, and it had a most encouraging effect upon the 
 allies. Moreover, Austria, then guided by Metternich, 
 finally decided, in consequence of Napoleon's refusal 
 to accept her proposals, to join Russia, Prussia, and 
 Sweden. Between 10 August and 15 October a 
 number of pitched battles were fought, the total result 
 of which was that the French army was finally brought 
 to bay at Leipzic, where on 16, 17, 18 and 19 Oc- 
 tober the allies won a decisive success. All that re- 
 mained for Napoleon was to make a rapid retreat to 
 France pursued by the allied forces. 
 
 1 Quoted by J. Holland Rose in his " Napoleonic Studies," 
 P- 255.
 
 250 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 The battle of Leipzic brings into prominence many 
 of the chief causes of the decline and fall of Napoleon. 
 In the first place, he was not able, as in former years, 
 to count upon the whole-hearted support of the French 
 nation nor upon continual supplies of French soldiers. 
 
 The condition of France in 1799 had, indeed, 
 rendered Caesarism inevitable and necessary. But 
 "the break-down of system and tradition in France," 
 we read, " left men unsettled and prepared for contin- 
 ual change". The failure of the Russian campaign 
 brought out all the weak points of Napoleon's position. 
 He had no second in command in whom he could 
 place absolute confidence ; many of the great generals 
 of his early wars were dead or worn out. National 
 enthusiasm is now seen in the Prussian not in the 
 French armies, composed as they were at this time to 
 a large extent of foreigners. 1 
 
 During the campaign which opened on 10 August 
 and ended at Leipzic Napoleon had committed many 
 blunders. The numerous isolated engagements fought 
 in August and September had all ended in defeat, and 
 were in direct defiance of the principles which guided 
 his famous campaign in Italy in 1796 and 1797. 
 
 When the battle of Leipzic was fought he had at 
 least 100,000 troops holding various fortresses. The 
 absence of these troops on the days of the battle 
 rendered Napoleon's defeat certain. At Leipzic and 
 in the ensuing campaigns in 1814 and 1815 it is the 
 
 1 About 60 per cent of Napoleon's army in 1812 were non- 
 French.
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 251 
 
 Prussians not the French who show a national enthusi- 
 asm. It is the Prussians who were "electrises au 
 dernier degre". 
 
 After Leipzic there was no attempt made on the 
 part of the Grand Army to resist its foes till the Rhine 
 had been crossed. For great as were the military 
 results of the battle, its political results were no less 
 striking. Bavaria had on 10 October made terms 
 with Austria at the Treaty of Ried ; after Leipzic the 
 other members of the Confederation of the Rhine 
 hastened to follow her example. The tide of nation- 
 alism, to Metternich's alarm, rose rapidly, and till 
 Napoleon's overthrow received no check. 
 
 After winning at Hanau on 28 and 29 October 
 over the Bavarians his last victory on German soil, 
 Napoleon, with the remains of his army, passed the 
 Rhine. Germany was at last freed from the rule of 
 the French Emperor. 
 
 Much, however, remained to be done if Europe was 
 to be relieved of all fear of future attacks by France. 
 Napoleon had no intention of acquiescing in his defeat 
 at Leipzic. France was, it is true, exhausted, but 
 Napoleon, who most unwisely had left many French 
 garrisons in Northern Germany, trusted that the 
 threat of invasion would have effects similar to those 
 produced in 1792 and 1793, when France, even in an 
 unprepared condition and with only young and un- 
 disciplined troops, defeated and broke up a European 
 coalition. 
 
 But there was a radical difference between the
 
 252 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 situation in 1793 and 1813. In 1813 Europe no 
 longer as in 1793 relied upon effete monarchies in its 
 struggle with the French Revolution. In 1793 France 
 alone of European countries was alive with the spirit 
 of nationality and patriotism; in 1813 practically the 
 whole of Europe was actuated by that spirit, and was 
 burning to drive the French invaders within their own 
 boundaries. Had Napoleon accepted the excellent 
 terms known as the " Proposals of Frankfort," offered 
 to him in November, France would have received the 
 boundaries of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. 
 
 But, fortunately for Europe, Napoleon trusted to 
 the dissensions of the allies, and his refusal of the 
 terms rendered peace impossible, and for a time united 
 the allies in one common object viz. his own over- 
 throw. 
 
 Thus Napoleon's self-confidence, coupled with his 
 obstinacy, and his failure to realize the strength of the 
 desire for revenge which animated the Russians and 
 Prussians, as well as the growth of a national feeling 
 in Germany, and the increasing discontent in France 
 at the continuance of expensive wars, led him irresist- 
 ibly to his fall. 
 
 That the allies fully realized the magnitude of the 
 task involved in the overthrow of Napoleon is evident 
 when we remember that their forces numbered some 
 300,000 men. That these forces were not too numer- 
 ous is evident when one studies the marvellous cam- 
 paign in France during the first three months of 1814. 
 Never had Napoleon shown greater skill than during
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 253 
 
 those months, when with a comparatively small army 
 he kept his enemies at bay, and maintained in the most 
 masterly fashion an unequal struggle against over- 
 whelming odds. 
 
 On 25 January, 1813, Napoleon, having appointed 
 the Empress Regent and placed Joseph in charge of 
 Paris, set out for Chalons -sur- Mar ne, the head-quarters 
 of his army. At Chatillon the allies held a congress 
 and entered into negotiations with the Duke of Vicenza 
 who, as Napoleon's envoy, was endeavouring to ex- 
 tract from them terms which the Emperor would accept. 
 
 But as yet Napoleon refused to acknowledge 
 defeat, or the necessity of considering seriously the 
 question of terms. The allies, on account of the diffi- 
 culties of obtaining adequate supplies, had distributed 
 their forces over a wide area, thus giving that great 
 master of the art of war, Napoleon, a splendid op- 
 portunity of attacking them in detail. 
 
 Wide intervals separated the invading forces, which 
 ought to have concentrated their efforts upon the im- 
 mediate destruction of Napoleon's remaining army. 
 
 Thus the army led by Schwarzenberg advanced 
 down the valley of the Seine to Troyes, while the 
 smaller army, headed by Bliicher, marched along the 
 valley of the Marne to St. Dizier. Napoleon at once 
 decided to attack the latter. On 28 January he at- 
 tacked the enemy at St. Dizier and separated the 
 divisions commanded by Bliicher and York. At 
 Brienne on 29 January he attacked Bliicher whose 
 forces consisted mainly of Russians, and forced him
 
 254 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 back in the direction of Schwarzenberg's army. How- 
 ever, on i February, Bliicher advanced, and after a 
 severe struggle during a snowstorm occupied La 
 Rothiere. Bliicher's victory cost Napoleon some 
 6000 men and seventy guns. 
 
 Napoleon then fell back upon Nogent-sur-Seine, 
 while Bliicher, breaking up his army into detachments, 
 endeavoured to march north of him and so to reach 
 Paris. 
 
 Napoleon now seized the opportunity which the 
 over-confidence of the allies had given him. He at 
 once fell upon a force of 5000 detached Russians whom 
 he practically annihilated, and with the aid of Marmont 
 drove larger detachments under Sacken and York 
 towards Soissons. Bliicher was compelled to forego 
 his ambitious scheme and hastily fell back. Napoleon 
 then turned rapidly upon Schwarzenberg's advanced 
 guard, and with the aid of Oudinot and Macdonald 
 drove it back in disorder beyond Troyes. 
 
 Bliicher, however, on 24 February attacked Mar- 
 mont on the Marne and forced him to retire towards 
 La Ferte-sons-Jouarre. 
 
 Till Castlereagh's arrival at the allied head- 
 quarters, Napoleon's hopes, that owing to jealousies 
 the "cohesion of the Coalition" would weaken, were 
 by no means groundless. And those jealousies 
 were increased by the initial successes of Napoleon 
 in the early days of the campaign of 1813. 
 
 Napoleon's energy, activity, and determination, 
 indeed, never left him during this trying time. On
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 255 
 
 5 March he tells Joseph, who was then in Paris, that 
 he has ordered the instant trial and execution of the 
 commandant of Soissons, who had evacuated that 
 town without firing a shot. On the following day 
 he writes that he intends to drive the enemy towards 
 Laon and then to march upon Chalons and Arcis. 
 " It is," he says, "indispensable to hold the Seine for 
 five or six days at Nogent, Bray, and Montereau." 
 On 8 March he won the battle of Craonne, defeating 
 the Russian army under Sacken, but the following day 
 Joseph wrote a despairing account of the situation as 
 it appeared to him in Paris. There the funds had 
 fallen on 8 March to ^51. Civil war, with the head- 
 quarters of the opposition to Napoleon at Bordeaux, 
 seemed likely to break out, while all through these 
 anxious days the allied troops were steadily drawing 
 nearer to Paris. To Joseph a peace, giving France 
 her ancient limits, seemed absolutely necessary. But 
 Napoleon showed no sign of yielding to Joseph's en- 
 treaties. On 9 March Bliicher defeated at Laon the 
 French Emperor, who retreated to Rheims. 
 
 Napoleon was thus seriously threatened by two 
 armies, that of Bliicher and that of Schwarzenberg. 
 Still hoping for success Napoleon resolved to attack 
 the Austrians. On 20 March the decisive battle of 
 Arcis-sur-Aube was fought, and Napoleon's troops 
 were completely overwhelmed by Schwarzenberg's 
 army. The decisive character of this battle gives 
 it a place among the notable battles of the world. 
 Napoleon had played his last card, and had lost.
 
 256 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 On 28 March the envoy Wessenberg, on his way 
 from London to join the Austrian Emperor, was 
 brought by some French troops, as a captive, to St. 
 Dizier, the head-quarters of Napoleon. The French 
 Emperor had still hopes of winning Austria to his 
 side. He therefore released Wessenberg, and be- 
 fore the latter's departure endeavoured to impress 
 upon him the difference of the interests of Austria 
 from those of her allies. He asked Wessenberg to 
 tell his sovereign how anxious he (Napoleon) was 
 for peace, and assured him that all he asked for was 
 France with the frontiers that he found on his acces- 
 sion to the throne. He declared that he was even 
 ready to give up all his colonies if he could keep the 
 mouth of the Scheldt, for he was sure that England 
 would not insist on the cession of Antwerp if Austria 
 did not support her. 1 Events later in the year 1814, 
 when England, and Austria, and France united 
 against Russia and Prussia in opposition to the 
 schemes of those powers at the Congress of Vienna, 
 somewhat justified his declaration to Wessenberg 
 that " the time will come when Austria will stand in 
 need of me ". 
 
 It was, however, too late, for three days later the 
 allies were before Paris. Napoleon, with some justi- 
 fication, throughout these eventful weeks had based 
 his hopes upon the break-up of the alliance in conse- 
 quence of the differences which had always existed 
 between the allies. The objects aimed at by Russia 
 1 Quoted by Rose in " Napoleonic Studies," p. 266.
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 257 
 
 and Prussia were by no means acceptable to Francis 
 of Austria or to Metternich. And Napoleon's rush 
 eastwards was " based on diplomatic no less than on 
 military grounds V Instead, however, of the alliance 
 breaking up, his enemies marched upon Paris. Since 
 20 March Austria had unreservedly thrown in her lot 
 with the other members of the alliance, and from that 
 date all negotiations with Caulaincourt had ceased. 
 The cause of this unexpected union of the allies is to 
 be found in a letter sent on 1 9 March by Maret to 
 Caulaincourt. This letter, evidently dictated by 
 Napoleon, had fallen into the hands of the allies. The 
 letter speaks for itself : 
 
 " 1'Empereur desire que vous restiez dans le vague 
 sur tout ce qui serait relatif a la livraison des places 
 d' Anvers, Mayence, et Alexandrie, si vous 6tiez obligd 
 a consentir a ces cessions, etant dans 1'intention, meme 
 quand elle aurait ratifie le traite de prendre conseil de 
 la situation militaire des choses. Attendez a dernier 
 moment." 2 
 
 The end was now at hand. On 29 March the 
 Empress fled from Paris, and on 30 March the last 
 battle took place outside Paris. As soon as the 
 victory of the allies seemed assured Joseph and Jerome 
 Bonaparte fled from the capital, while an armistice was 
 arranged. 
 
 On the same day Napoleon left Fontainebleau 
 
 1 Rose, "Napoleonic Studies," p. 268. 
 
 2 Quoted by Mr. Rose from Fournier's work on the " Congress 
 of Chatillon ".
 
 258 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 with some cavalry for Paris. On hearing that Paris 
 had capitulated he returned in despair to Fontaine- 
 bleau. 
 
 On 3 1 March the Tsar and the King of Prussia 
 rode into Paris. Napoleon had staked all upon the 
 chance of quarrels breaking out among the allied 
 sovereigns, and had lost. During the ensuing ten 
 days he was the prey to doubt and uncertainty. On 
 4 April the Senate decreed his deposition, and 
 Napoleon found that his resolve to strike a last blow 
 was not supported by his marshals. He then decided 
 to abdicate in favour of his son. Meanwhile, 
 Marmont, on condition " that the personal safety and 
 liberty of Napoleon should be respected," had decided 
 to throw in his lot with the allies. There was now 
 nothing to fear from any action on the part of 
 Napoleon, and on the initiative of Alexander, the 
 envoys from Fontainebleau Caulaincourt, Ney, and 
 Macdonald were informed that Napoleon's abdica- 
 tion must include his whole family. 
 
 On 1 3 April Napoleon accepted the terms offered 
 him by the allies known as the Treaty of Fontaine- 
 bleau. By that treaty he was granted a liberal 
 revenue, and the island of Elba, which he had chosen 
 in preference to Corsica or Corfu, in full sovereignty. 
 
 Moreover, the Empress was given the Duchies of 
 Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla. 
 
 A week later, after an affecting farewell to those 
 troops who were still faithful to him, Napoleon set out 
 for Elba.
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 259 
 
 Owing to the firmness of the English ministers 
 all the statuary taken from the Vatican to the Louvre 
 was restored except a few statues of little value. 
 Many magnificent pictures taken from various Italian 
 churches were sent back to Pius, and with them and 
 some 500 MSS. carried off by the French in 1798 and 
 in 1814 restored, he laid the foundation of the famous 
 Vatican Library. Still, the invasion and occupation 
 of Italy had resulted in no little loss as regards its 
 art treasures. The costly tiara of Paul III had been 
 broken up by Napoleon, and its loss was by no means 
 compensated for by the Sevres candalabra which he 
 presented to the Pope in 1814. 
 
 Napoleon's journey to Elba was full of incident. 
 He was accompanied by Colonel Campbell, and was 
 forced to adopt all sorts of expedients and disguises 
 to avoid the fury of the populace in the South of 
 France. At one time he dressed himself as a post- 
 boy and wore a white cockade a necessary disguise, 
 for the mob in one place had erected a gallows and 
 were determined to hang him. Once on board the 
 English frigate he declared to Colonel Campbell, with 
 whom he was on very friendly terms, that for the first 
 time for several years he felt in security. 1 
 
 The Duchess d'Abrantes gives an interesting ac- 
 count of Napoleon's departure from Fontainebleau. 
 On 20 April, with him, she tells us, were Colonel 
 Campbell, General Schuvalov, General Koller, M. de 
 
 1 " Chronicles of the Families of Atholl and Tullibardine," 
 Vol. IV, pp. 253, 254.
 
 260 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Schack, representing England, Russia, Austria, and 
 Prussia respectively, and an escort of 1500 foreign 
 troops. In his carriage, which was drawn by six horses, 
 was General Bertrand. The Emperor, we are told, 
 was calm and serene, and "bowed with that wonted 
 smile so peculiar to him ". At Orgon his life was in 
 danger from an infuriated mob, and at Avignon he 
 disguised himself in a travelling coat of General 
 Roller's. Before embarking for Porto Ferrajo he 
 stayed a day and a half with his sister Pauline. 
 
 The reaction in France after Napoleon's fall has 
 been described by many writers. From all parts of 
 the world people flocked to the French capital. 
 Among other visitors was Lord James Murray who, 
 sailing from Southampton on 25 April, arrived at Paris 
 on the 27th. In his letters he describes many interest- 
 ing incidents. The Rue Napoleon had been at once 
 changed into the Rue de la Paix, and Napoleon's 
 statue in the Place de Vendome, hitherto at " the top 
 of a most beautiful column of bronze, made out of the 
 cannon that had been taken by him at different periods," 
 had been " lowered down with a rope about the neck ". 1 
 On 3 May the King of France made his entry into 
 Paris, the carriages and horses used on this occasion 
 being those that had belonged to Napoleon, but "it 
 was easy,", we are told, "to perceive that his arms had 
 been blotted out for those of the Bourbons ". Never- 
 theless there was no good feeling in Paris between the 
 
 1 " Chronicles of the Families of Atholl and Tullibardine," 
 Vol. IV, pp. 252, 253.
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 261 
 
 French and the allies. Duels were frequent, and 
 many lives were lost. The country was in a most 
 unsettled state and Paris, so long as the allied armies 
 were in occupation, remained unsettled. 
 
 At Malmaison the ex-Empress Josephine was 
 living and received some of the allied officers with 
 courtesy. On 7 May Lord James Murray visited 
 her, and a few days later was invited to a dejeuner 
 at her house. 
 
 On 7 June there arrived in London the Tsar, the 
 King of Prussia, and his sons, Marshal Blucher, Count 
 Platoff, General Barclay de Tolly, and many other 
 heroes in the struggle against Napoleon. They re- 
 mained in England till the end of the month, visiting 
 Oxford and being present at the Ascot races. In the 
 autumn the famous Congress of Vienna took place, 
 and hardly had the most important matters been settled 
 when in March, 1815, the news arrived of Napoleon's 
 escape from Elba. The army declared in his favour, 
 and Louis XVIII fled to the Netherlands. In Ger- 
 many, as elsewhere, the consternation caused by these 
 events was extreme. 
 
 During Napoleon's residence in the Villa San 
 Martino in Elba, the whole of Europe had been in a 
 state of unsettlement. The question of the future of 
 Italy was in itself sufficient to occupy the energies of 
 the leading statesmen of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, 
 and Prussia. While the Hapsburgs openly desired to 
 re-establish their power in Italy, it was felt that if the 
 Austrian policy was carried out Italy would find her-
 
 262 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 self more crushed and humiliated than ever, and, more- 
 over, that a strong inducement would be given to the 
 Italians to welcome the restoration of the power of 
 Napoleon. In July, 1814, it was rumoured that 
 Napoleon and Murat were united in planning some 
 operation in Italy. And in September it was evident 
 to the Austrians themselves that the movement in 
 favour of Italian independence must be recognized, 
 and that great care should be taken not to arouse the 
 fears of the Italian patriots. It was necessary for 
 Austria to manager f esprit National de Italie. There 
 was no doubt, too, that Castlereagh, who represented 
 English opinion, was in favour of constitutional go- 
 vernment in Italy. In order "to scare the Bourbons, 
 Piedmont, Tuscany, and the rest, into granting or 
 maintaining constitutional rule," 1 he held out to those 
 Powers the possibility of Napoleon's escape. 
 
 It is seldom realized at the present day not only 
 how ineffective were the obstacles placed by the allies 
 to the escape of Napoleon from Elba, but also with 
 what indifference some of the allies regarded the possi- 
 bility of such an escape. In fact the leading Powers 
 were far more concerned with securing their own 
 gains than in safeguarding Europe from the return of 
 the Corsican. 
 
 The united action of the allies in effecting the 
 
 complete downfall of Napoleon after Leipzic, as has 
 
 been already remarked, was only brought about by 
 
 Castlereagh's persuasion, strengthened by the perusal 
 
 1 " Quarterly Review," January, 1810, p. 255.
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 263 
 
 of the letter which disclosed the duplicity of the 
 French Emperor. After Napoleon's arrival in Elba 
 the danger of the establishment of Russian influence 
 in Europe appeared, at any rate to Metternich, to be 
 the paramount question. 
 
 Napoleon had indeed succumbed, but now Alex- 
 ander was raising pretensions which might easily 
 become of a Napoleonic character. If Napoleon 
 escaped from Elba, overthrew the Bourbons, and 
 established himself in Paris, it might be advisable for 
 Austria to ally with him. Such an alliance would 
 upset the plans of the Italian secret societies of which 
 Metternich was deadly afraid ; it would, moreover, 
 seriously interfere with Alexander's projects with re- 
 gard to Poland. In fact, Alexander, when faced by 
 the alliance of Austria, France, and Great Britain, 
 which was arranged in 3 January, 1815, had threatened 
 to "let the monster go" (the "monstre que," in 
 Talleyrand's words, " le Czar se reservait de lacher "). 
 
 In fact, early in 1815, "each of the allies was 
 threatening the others with Napoleon ".* But while 
 Metternich's attention was chiefly devoted to the 
 task of checking Russian aspirations and safeguarding 
 Austrian interests in Italy, Castlereagh was honestly 
 desirous of securing the maintenance of constitutional 
 government in France, Piedmont, and Tuscany. 
 The fear of the escape of Napoleon from Elba would, 
 he hoped, force the representatives of the ancient 
 dynasties to realize how much depended upon the 
 
 1 " Quarterly Review," January, 1910, p. 255.
 
 264 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 contentment of the peoples over which they ruled. 
 In fact, unless the rulers of France, Piedmont, and 
 Tuscany acted upon liberal principles, it was certain 
 not only that the Italian party of independence would 
 cause trouble, but that in Paris itself, where there were 
 "so many discontented and so little to prevent mis- 
 chief," there would be a dangerous upheaval which 
 would lead to disturbances throughout France. 
 
 The Treaty of 3 January, 1815, which had divided 
 the allies into two parties, had revealed to the world 
 the possibility of endless confusion and uncertainty. 
 However, though the prospects of peace remained for 
 a time clouded, the realization of the immense impor- 
 tance to Europe of the continuance of friendly rela- 
 tions between the allies led to an amicable settlement 
 of all outstanding difficulties, and Napoleon could no 
 longer count upon disunion among his enemies. 
 
 But in France it was otherwise. The return of 
 the Bourbons had called forth a certain amount of 
 enthusiasm, but before the end of 1814 that enthusi- 
 asm had vanished, the army had become disaffected, 
 the peasants had become anxious for their property ; 
 in the ministry of Louis XVIII there could not be 
 found either strength or discretion ; the king himself 
 showed no ability for dealing with a situation which 
 required a strong man and a coherent policy. 
 
 " Paternal anarchy " was the description given to 
 the Government which was, moreover, faced with the 
 necessity of imposing heavy taxes in order to meet 
 the financial deficit The Imperial Guard, too, was
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 265 
 
 alienated, while the attitude of the monarchy towards 
 the Legion of Honour caused deep dissatisfaction. 
 The affair of General Excelmans, who was prosecuted 
 by the Government (for writing a letter in which he 
 offered his services to the King of Naples should he 
 be deposed by the Congress of Vienna), and acquitted 
 on 25 January, 1815, did much to weaken the Bour- 
 bons. In the early months of 1815 the condition of 
 things in Paris and in the provinces might be described 
 as a state of tension. Rumours of plots and counter- 
 plots added to the excitement, and Fouche planned 
 the deportation of Napoleon to some distant spot, and 
 the setting up of the regency of Marie Louise in place 
 of the Bourbon monarchy. 
 
 Meanwhile Napoleon was calmly watching the 
 course of events from Elba. He had hoped for the 
 outbreak of war between the great Powers ; but 
 though his hopes in this respect were disappointed, the 
 situation in France became each day more favourable 
 to him, and less favourable to the Bourbons. The 
 allies were well aware that he was inadequately 
 guarded, and both Louis XVIII and Castlereagh 
 realized that there should have been chosen "another 
 position in lieu of Elba for the seat of Napoleon's 
 retirement". Louis himself had written that unless 
 Napoleon was deported to Africa "ouverrait un jour 
 rhomme de 1'ile d'Elbe paraitre en Italic". 
 
 After the beginning of 1815 a descent from Elba 
 by Napoleon was regarded by all the Powers as 
 possible, if not actually imminent. Their disputes and
 
 266 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 conflicting interests had prevented the adoption of any 
 adequate measures for preventing the escape of Na- 
 poleon from his island home. 
 
 On 28 March the Countess Reden, on hearing of 
 Napoleon's escape from Elba, writes that she is "in no 
 fear of that horrible Napoleon being able to make any 
 lasting progress ". A few days later, on 3 1 March, she 
 adopts a more despondent tone : " It is a long time," 
 she says, writing from Silesia, " that I have been so 
 upset as I have been by the news to-day. I never could 
 have imagined that it could be so bad, nor that the 
 advance could be so rapid as 120 miles in twenty 
 days, and no difficult march but a triumphal progress." ] 
 
 On 5 March it was announced in Paris that 
 Napoleon had landed in France. His arrival at once 
 dissipated into thin air intrigues of Fouche against 
 the Bourbons, and shook the insecure foundations of 
 the Bourbon monarchy itself. Nothing testifies elo- 
 quently to the sagacity of Napoleon, and to his 
 marvellous influence, as does the history of the return 
 from Elba. Whatever may be said in criticism of his 
 life and policy, it is impossible to overlook the fact 
 that he was head and shoulders the most influential 
 man of his time. Mr. Fisher, whose knowledge of 
 Napoleon and the period is so profound, has in a few 
 lines described the position. " Napoleon," he writes, 
 " was not brought over from Elba by plot or con- 
 spiracy. He came because he had correctly divined 
 
 1 "A Pietist of the Napoleonic Wars and After," p. 100. 
 London, John Murray, 1905.
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 267 
 
 the situation in France. His march to the capital is 
 one of the miracles of history. He fought no battle ; 
 he shed no blood ; he was greeted by the peasantry 
 all along the route as a saviour and a friend ; not a 
 soldier would fire on him ; his name was a talisman 
 which drew all the valour of the kingdom to itself. 
 He often rode before his troops unattended ; yet no 
 one offered him violence. . . . Never had the instinct 
 for action been more faultless, his demeanour more 
 enchanting in its direct and spontaneous ease : Roule 
 to, boule, roi cotillon, Rends ta Couronne & Napotton, 
 blithely sang men, women, and children along his 
 triumphal way." 1 
 
 Between 1795 and 1799 the French nation had 
 accepted and tolerated the increasingly vicious and 
 unpopular rule of the Directory, because the Bourbons 
 and their supporters would not promise to accept the 
 land settlement which had been effected between 1789 
 and 1795; in March, 1815, the Bourbons fell, and 
 Napoleon returned because Louis XVIII had taken 
 no steps "to make secure every peasant- holding in 
 France ". The suspicions of the provinces had been 
 aroused, while the susceptibilities of the army had not 
 been soothed. Thus not only the army but the whole 
 of Northern, Eastern, and Central France welcomed 
 the return of the Napoleonic regime. 
 
 " The Cent Jours" it has been truly said, " will al- 
 ways remain one of the most extraordinary epochs " of 
 Napoleon's life. " Within three months he created an 
 1 "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, pp. 573-4.
 
 268 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 army which all but proved successful in the Water- 
 loo campaign. Is there in history any more astound- 
 ing exhibition of human energy?" In his Memoirs 
 Thibault declares that he observed in April, 1814, a 
 marked change in Napoleon's appearance. "His look," 
 he says, " had lost its power and intentness ; his fea- 
 tures had lost all their expression and their character of 
 strength. His contracted mouth no longer retained its 
 old magic. His head had no longer that carriage which 
 marked the ruler of the world." Nevertheless, 
 Napoleon, as in the 1814 campaign, was about to 
 enter into a struggle during which his energy as in 
 1814 would startle the European world. 
 
 Napoleon, having broken the convention of April, 
 1814, was now in the position of an outlaw, and was 
 regarded by the allies " as the enemy and disturber 
 of the peace of the world " To secure the support of 
 all Frenchmen he posed as a liberal sovereign, and 
 issued a liberal programme known as the Acte Addi- 
 tionelle. But he had no opportunity for giving satis- 
 factory proofs of his readiness to rule as a constitutional 
 monarch, for with the overthrow of King Joachim 
 (Murat) in Naples, in May, he found himself destitute 
 of allies and compelled single-handed to withstand all 
 Europe. In the famous campaign that followed 
 Napoleon won Ligny, though Quatre Bras was a dis- 
 tinct check to his troops. 
 
 Napoleon, it is said, ought to have attacked early 
 on the morning of 18 June. But at St. Helena 
 Napoleon speaks of " the pelting rain which so
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 269 
 
 soaked the ground that it was impossible for me to 
 attack at daybreak ". 
 
 All evidence points to the fact that the state of the 
 ground throughout the day made it difficult for the 
 gunners to work their guns. Napoleon, therefore, who 
 had good reason for knowing what an important part 
 was played by artillery, was fully justified " in allowing 
 the ground to dry sufficiently to permit of the move- 
 ment of the guns". It was not till about 11.30 a.m. 
 that the battle of Waterloo began. 
 
 The French army was drawn up in three lines, and 
 throughout the day Napoleon insisted on frontal attacks, 
 refusing to follow Reille's advice and to try flank 
 movements. He, like Grouchy, had failed to foresee 
 Bliicher's great flank march to join Wellington. 
 Napoleon, however, after he had realized that the 
 Prussians were marching to aid Wellington, hoped to 
 win the battle before their arrival. While separate 
 attacks were made upon the farms of Hougoumont 
 and La Haye Sainte, four vast columns at 1.30 at- 
 tacked Wellington's left centre. After a fierce struggle 
 the French were driven back. At 4 p.m. Milhaud 
 led a cavalry charge (5000 horsemen) against the 
 British squares which, however, though crippled by the 
 French artillery, were unbroken. 
 
 Ney thereupon brought to Milhaud's aid the re- 
 mainder of the cavalry, 5000 strong, but they too failed 
 to break in upon the British and German squares. By 
 this time (4-6 p.m.) the leading Prussian divisions 
 under Biilow were in touch with Napoleon's right
 
 270 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 flank, and Napoleon was compelled to use against them 
 some 14,000 of his reserve. But the steadiness of the 
 British, together with a fatal delay on the part of 
 Napoleon, enabled Wellington to win the day. At 
 6.30 the French captured La Haye Sainte, but it was 
 not till forty minutes later that Napoleon decided to 
 send forward the old guard to deliver a final attack 
 upon Wellington's squares. During these precious 
 forty minutes Wellington reformed and strengthened 
 his fighting line, " and a solid front was once more 
 displayed " by the British army. He was thus able 
 to resist the final assault of the French columns led by 
 Ney. The fire of Maitland's Brigade and of Col- 
 borne's battalion (the 52nd Regiment) threw the 
 French into hopeless disorder, and at that moment 
 Ziethen's Prussian corps advanced from the north- 
 east towards La Belle Alliance. 
 
 The battle of Waterloo thus proved a decisive 
 French defeat, and Napoleon fled to Paris, arriving 
 there on 21 June. The Chambers at once asserted 
 their authority which Napoleon, broken down in spirit, 
 decided not to oppose, though his brother Lucien 
 counselled resistance. 
 
 On 22 June, in deference to a message from the 
 Chambers threatening his deposition, unless he him- 
 self resigned the throne, he decided to take the advice 
 of Lucien and to resign in favour of his son, whom he 
 styled Napoleon II. 
 
 On 25 June he retired to Malmaison, where he 
 remained till 29 June. On 7 July the allies entered
 
 
 THE KING OF ROME 
 
 FROM THE 1'AIXTIXG BY SIR T. LAWRENCE IN' THE COLLECTION OK THE DUKE OF BASSAKO
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 271 
 
 Paris; on the 8th Louis XVIII returned to the 
 Tuileries ; on 3 July Napoleon arrived at Rochefort, 
 and on the i5th he surrendered to Captain Maitland 
 of the " Bellerophon ". 
 
 Napoleon's attempt to carry out a revolution in 
 1815 had thus ended in failure. Brumaire signified 
 the desire of the majority of Frenchmen for the 
 establishment of order at home and an honourable con- 
 clusion of the war. There was then no break in the 
 course of the French Revolution ; the men who 
 applauded the overthrow of the Directory were 
 supporters of the Constitution of 1791. The same 
 men deserted Napoleon in 1814. In 17 99 the French 
 nation saw in Napoleon their one hope of the estab- 
 lishment of order and of a glorious peace ; in 1814 
 Napoleon had made use of the powers given him to 
 establish a despotism, while his desire for a universal 
 supremacy united all Europe against France. In 
 1815 Napoleon attempted too late to return to the 
 programme of 1799. 
 
 At St. Helena Napoleon insisted that he was al- 
 ways anxious to bring to an end his dictatorship, and 
 that if he had conquered at Waterloo he would have 
 established constitutional government in France. If 
 he had defeated the Russians in 181 2, he said, he would 
 have associated his son with the Empire and his con- 
 stitutional reign would have begun. On his return from 
 Elba he realized that the French nation was not satis- 
 fied with equality but desired liberty in addition. He 
 assured O'Meara that his victory at Waterloo would
 
 272 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 have been followed by the adoption of a constitutional 
 form of government. 1 But he refused to realize the im- 
 mense disasters which his ambition since the Treaty of 
 Tilsit had brought upon Europe, and that in the 
 interests of European peace the British Government 
 was justified in sending him to St. Helena. 
 
 CHIEF DATES 
 
 Birth of the King of Rome .... March, 1811. 
 
 Battle of Albuera ...... May, 1811. 
 
 Alliance of Sweden with Russia . . . April, 1812. 
 Peace of Bucharest between Russia and Turkey . May, 1812. 
 Outbreak of war between Russia and France . June, 1812. 
 Peace between England and Russia . . . July, 1812. 
 Battle of Salamanca ...... July, 1812. 
 
 Battle of Borodino ..... September, 1812. 
 
 The French enter Moscow . . . September, 1812. 
 The French evacuate Moscow .... October, 1812. 
 
 Napoleon leaves the army at Smorgoni . 5 December, 1812. 
 Treaty of Kalisch between Russia and Prussia February, 1813. 
 Beginning of the War of Liberation . . February, 1813. 
 The battles of Liitzen and Bautzen . . . May, 1813. 
 The Armistice of Plaswitz . . 4 June-g August, 1813. 
 
 Battle of Vittoria June, 1813. 
 
 Treaty of Toplitz (Austria and Prussia) . September, 1813. 
 Treaty of Ried (Austria and Bavaria) . 10 October, 1813. 
 Battle of Leipzic ..... 16-19 October, I % 1 3- 
 Wellington in France .... November, 1813. 
 The Conference of Chatillon .... February, 1814. 
 The decisive battle of Arcis-sur-Aube . .20 March, 1814. 
 The allies enter Paris . . . . .31 March, 1814. 
 Abdication of Napoleon .... 13 April, 1814, 
 
 1 Gonnard, "The Exile of St. Helena," p. 132.
 
 Cfl i.
 
 273 
 
 First Treaty of Paris ...... May, 1814. 
 
 The allied sovereigns in England .... June, 1814. 
 
 Congress of Vienna meets .... September, 1814. 
 
 Return of Napoleon March, 1815. 
 
 The Hundred Days .... March- June, 1815. 
 
 The battle of Waterloo 18 June, 1815. 
 
 Second abdication of Napoleon .... June, 1815. 
 
 He lands in St. Helena 17 October, 1815. 
 
 Second Peace of Paris ..... November, 1815. 
 Death of Napoleon ..... 5 May, 1821. 
 
 18
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 SUMMARY OF NAPOLEON'S CAREER 
 
 Justification of Napoleon's victories Political morality in 
 Europe at a low ebb The cases of Silesia and Poland The 
 European situation in 1807 Summary of the events leading to 
 Napoleon's supremacy His political sagacity at Brumaire His 
 decline and fall after Tilsit The political effects of the continental 
 system The rising of the peoples of Europe. 
 
 ~\JO one who has studied the history of the 
 * ^ eighteenth century can regret the rise of 
 Napoleon. Similarly, no one can deny that the 
 rising of the nations in the years succeeding the 
 Treaty of Tilsit was justified and necessary. 
 
 Europe, in the closing years of the eighteenth 
 century, required a revolution. The aims and policy 
 of Frederick the Great and Catherine II made it 
 quite evident that government, according to the 
 principles of " enlightened despotism," was a failure. 
 The seizure of Silesia and the partitions of Poland 
 were acts of robbery, and deprived Europe of any 
 adequate ground of complaint when Napoleon treated 
 Austria and Prussia as they had treated Poland and 
 Silesia. The jealousy which divided Prussia and 
 
 Austria, the corrupt character of many of the 300 odd 
 
 274
 
 SUMMARY OF HIS CAREER 275 
 
 states into which Germany was divided, the domina- 
 tion of the foreigner in Italy, were circumstances 
 which seemed to preclude any improvements in the 
 political condition of Europe. In other words, Europe 
 required a revolution, and till that revolution had taken 
 place it was worse than useless for a country like 
 England to pour money into the treasuries of the 
 Powers whose triumph over the French, before 1810, 
 would have been a European disaster. Till his 
 death Pitt never realized how thoroughly rotten was 
 the political condition of the countries which he was 
 supporting with funds. Instead of allowing his health 
 to be weakened by anxieties concerning Austria and 
 Prussia, he should have confined his energies to the 
 strengthening of Great Britain's army and navy. 
 
 It was not till all Europe, having passed through 
 a severe ordeal, was in arms that Napoleon succumbed. 
 
 It was indeed fortunate for Europe that the French 
 Revolution produced a man whose personality and 
 abilities were as pronounced as those of Alexander 
 the Great, Julius Caesar, Charles the Great or Louis 
 XIV. During the years from 1807 to 1812, Napoleon 
 seemed to have the whole of continental Europe in his 
 power. Europe was completely overawed by him ; 
 it was doubtful in 1810-1 if Great Britain would 
 not be starved into surrender ; it seemed not un- 
 likely that his influence would impress itself upon 
 Asia and Africa. 
 
 That France had acquired this enormous influence, 
 that these immense possibilities lay before her, was
 
 276 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 due to the ability of a single man Napoleon, and to 
 the absence of any national feeling in Germany and 
 Italy. Without him the French Revolution would 
 not have had its immense significance to Europe ; but 
 at the same time it must be remembered that without 
 the French Revolution Europe would not have fallen 
 under the sway of Napoleon. 
 
 The French Revolution had by 1794 run its 
 course. France was secure from foreign invasion ; 
 her boundaries had been extended ; her foes were 
 divided ; the fate of Poland attracted the chief atten- 
 tion of the three great Powers Russia, Prussia, and 
 Austria. Consequently, on the relaxation of external 
 pressure, the need for rigorous and precautionary 
 measures at home ceased. The Committee of Public 
 Safety, whose policy was identified with despotism and 
 terror, was no longer united or necessary to France. 
 Its instability was evident, and its abolition was con- 
 sequently desirable. At the same time a strong 
 though a milder form of government was desirable, 
 for the European war still continued, and it was 
 necessary to stamp out the civil war in La Vendee 
 and elsewhere. In 1794 and 1795 France was in 
 urgent need of the restoration of order and of the 
 establishment of a settled form of government. In 
 October, 1795, the revolution of Vend&niaire was 
 crushed by Napoleon, and France was given the 
 government of the Directory. 
 
 During the following years Napoleon was twice 
 called upon to interfere in the internal affairs of France.
 
 SUMMARY OF HIS CAREER 277 
 
 In 1797 his soldiers suppressed the rising of Fructidor, 
 and in 1799 he himself carried out the revolution of 
 Brumaire, on which occasion he represented the desire 
 of the great majority of the French nation for the over- 
 throw of the Directory, for the conclusion of an honour- 
 able peace abroad, and for the restoration of order at 
 home. For the carrying out of these aims a states- 
 man as well as a soldier was required. 
 
 It was indeed necessary that the chief of the army 
 should be a man of surpassing intellectual force a 
 man who not only could defeat his enemies in the 
 field but who could reduce order out of chaos, who 
 could place the religious question on a satisfactory 
 basis, who could restore the finances, and who, in a 
 word, could unify France and give her a stable govern- 
 ment. For this work " an irresistible force of head and 
 sword was necessary ". That force was Napoleon. 
 
 It had never appeared likely that the Directory 
 would be more than a temporary expedient. The de- 
 fects in its constitution had been amply demonstrated. 
 From the moment of its establishment it was obvious 
 that the Directory could not hope to provide a perma- 
 nent solution of the existing political, social, and 
 religious problems ; it proved merely a step towards 
 the establishment of a military despotism. 
 
 That Napoleon was able to take advantage of the 
 situation at Brumaire was due to the fact that while in 
 1799 he represented the need of order and settlement 
 in France, he also represented a period of conquest 
 and glory. The failure of the French generals in
 
 278 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Italy during his absence in Egypt merely tended to 
 increase the reputation of the man whose victories in 
 Italy in 1796 and 1797 had been crowned by the 
 Peace of Campo Formio. Valmy had inaugurated 
 the beginning of a war of aggrandizement, and with 
 it the Napoleonic era. Superior in intellectual qualities 
 to Hoche, Massena, and other revolutionary generals, 
 Napoleon had shown superiority in military qualities. 
 Thus in 1799 he was pre-eminent among the revolu- 
 tionary generals, he was the outcome and child of the 
 militant Revolution, and he was fitted to become its 
 leader and master. 
 
 In 1 799 he rescued France from a serious dilemma. 
 To the majority of Frenchmen the " Principles of 
 1789" and the Constitution of 1791 represented their 
 aspirations. The middle classes and the peasants had 
 acquired much of the national property. Moreover, 
 the weakness of the government of the Directory, 
 which was at the same time oppressive and ineffective, 
 had been unable to preserve order, or to enforce 
 the law, or to afford protection to the majority of the 
 French people. A restoration of the Bourbons would 
 mean a sacrifice of all that had been gained by the 
 Revolution. At this crisis Napoleon stepped in. 
 Having succeeded in securing the adhesion of the 
 army he acted in accordance with public opinion, and 
 obtained the support not only of the peace-loving 
 middle classes but also of the working classes of Paris 
 who shared in the general fear of a royalist reaction. 
 Brumaire, followed by Marengo, implied the stability
 
 SUMMARY OF HIS CAREER 279 
 
 of the Revolution, and secured the establishment of an 
 orderly and methodical government. A centralized 
 despotism was indeed set up, but freedom was with 
 certain modifications recognized, and equality so dear 
 to Frenchmen was maintained. France apparently 
 had secured all that she desired peace with her 
 boundaries extended to her "natural frontiers," and 
 an admirable administration. 
 
 The outbreak of war in 1 803 was indeed contrary 
 to the wishes of the French people, but the glory of 
 Napoleon's victories, and the plunder of the conquered 
 nations, soothed any irritation that might have been 
 felt, and reconciled the nation to a period of war and 
 conquest which culminated at Tilsit. 
 
 The victory of Napoleon at Austerlitz in December, 
 1805, had been followed by the completion of the 
 necessary revolution in Germany, marked by the final 
 disappearance of the system of the Holy Roman 
 Empire; the humiliation of Prussia in January, 1806 
 the event which finally caused Pitt's death was a 
 necessary preliminary step to the complete reorgan- 
 ization of that power after Jena. 
 
 From 1807, however, Napoleon gradually entered 
 upon the period of his decline and fall. His successes 
 in Germany and Italy blinded him to the fact that in 
 attempting to conquer Russia he might meet with 
 geographical difficulties which were not to be found 
 in central Europe. Moreover, he failed to appreciate 
 the steady growth in Germany of a national sentiment 
 which his conquests had produced. Nor did he realize
 
 2 8o THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 that in Spain religious fanaticism might lead to a 
 resistance the like of which he had not hitherto met 
 with. Indeed, his remarkable ignorance not only of 
 economic truths but also of the character of the British 
 constitution, and of the political and social condition 
 of the British nation, led him to commit the greatest 
 blunder of his career the attempted enforcement of 
 the continental system upon all Europe. His policy 
 to the Papacy after 1807 was also a blunder of the 
 greatest magnitude and its effects were far-reaching. 
 
 At St. Helena he declared that the malignant and 
 implacable jealousy of England made a lasting peace 
 impossible, as that Power insisted upon the withdrawal 
 of France within its former limits. The statement 
 was obviously inaccurate. As is well known, Napoleon 
 was resolved to force England to accept his terms of 
 peace. Had she done so Napoleon would have been 
 firmly established as master of Europe. His de- 
 termination to overthrow Great Britain, therefore, led 
 him to dominate every European Power which 
 possessed a harbour. Only thus he believed could 
 he carry out effectively the continental system and 
 conquer England. 
 
 From the outbreak of war with Great Britain in 
 1803 Bonapartism could under no circumstances be 
 described, as Napoleon at St. Helena described it, 
 as essentially pacific. There is much that can be 
 said in defence of his aggressions and conquests 
 before Tilsit, and little sympathy can be felt for the 
 fate of Austria and Prussia so long as their policy was
 
 SUMMARY OF HIS CAREER 281 
 
 dictated by selfishness, and so long as neither sought 
 the welfare of Germany or considered even the welfare 
 of their own subjects. In 1807, however, France had 
 secured, through the heroism of her Republican 
 armies, her " natural " boundaries the Rhine, the 
 Alps, and the Pyrenees. There was no question of 
 his sacrificing these boundaries so dear to every 
 Frenchman. But at this period the ambition of 
 Napoleon ran counter to the national interests of 
 France. It was obvious that " it was not for the good 
 of France, but to satisfy his own restless and extra- 
 vagant ambition that the flower of her youth were 
 taken from the fields to perish in the snows of Russia 
 or the sierras of Spain ". 
 
 Henceforward "the spirit of moderation and good 
 sense" in France, "which had been overcome by the 
 brilliant romance of the early victories, revolted against 
 the extravagance which marked the later designs ". 
 These designs, which included the subjugation of 
 Great Britain, the conquest of Spain, the re-establish- 
 ment of the Polish kingdom and the defeat of Russia, 
 miscarried, because in the first place while Spain was 
 struggling for its independence, the invasion of Russia 
 was undertaken and ended in failure, and secondly, 
 because central Europe gradually revolted against 
 the intolerable pressure of the continental system. 
 Upon the success of that system Napoleon's schemes 
 hung. Moreover, when the revolt against the con- 
 tinental system definitely began, Germany, now 
 roused from her "sleep of lethargy" and taught by
 
 282 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 adversity, had acquired national aspirations and took 
 the lead. The Confederation of the Rhine had been 
 an alliance between Napoleon and the princes, and 
 the War of Liberation was " a movement of peoples 
 rather than princes ". 
 
 The chief blunders of Napoleon's career thus seem 
 to have been, first his treatment of the inhabitants of 
 the states which formed the Confederation of the Rhine. 
 He not only took no steps to gain the affection of 
 the peasants, but allied himself with the princes and 
 relied upon these alliances, his "personal prestige," 
 and especially upon the force of arms for the perman- 
 ent establishment of his authority. 
 
 Moreover, after 1807, ^ e alienated from him the 
 inhabitants of the German states by the continental 
 blockade, and by the fiscal system which he imposed 
 upon them. 
 
 By 1812 the prosperity which these states had 
 formerly enjoyed was absolutely destroyed by the 
 continental system, by military billeting, and by the 
 forced enlistment in the French armies of the youthful 
 portion of the inhabitants. Unlike the Rhine Depart- 
 ments on the left bank of the river which were wisely 
 ruled, and which until 1814 did not surfer from the 
 visitation of war, the states on the right bank of the 
 Rhine which were included in the Confederation seized 
 the opportunity offered them, after the disasters of 
 the Moscow campaign, and joined in the War of 
 Liberation. 
 
 The second of Napoleon's disastrous blunders was
 
 SUMMARY OF HIS CAREER 283 
 
 the invasion of Spain and the attempt to place Joseph 
 on the Spanish throne. Later, at St. Helena, he re- 
 cognized how mistaken had been his policy in the 
 Peninsula. The third of his chief mistakes was his 
 treatment after 1807 of the Pope. It is impossible 
 to estimate the full effects of this policy, for the influ- 
 ence of the Roman Church was widespread and im- 
 possible to appreciate at its exact value. Napoleon 
 like a gambler had staked all upon the success of the 
 continental system, and had lost. 
 
 In 1813 and 1814 the effect of all his blunders 
 and miscalculations made themselves felt, and resulted 
 in the fall of the great French Emperor.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 ST. HELENA, 1815-1821 
 
 Arrival of Napoleon His religious views Lord Rosebery's 
 criticisms of the leading biographers Captain Henry Meynell's 
 Memoirs Napoleon's appearance His habits His opinions 
 upon Ossian's " Poems," Egypt, the growth of nationalities, India, 
 a Suez Canal, the siege of Toulon, Vende"miaire, the Moscow 
 expedition, the Italians, the character of the French people, 
 the invasion of Spain, the true policy of Louis XVIII, Ney, 
 Scotland and England The question of the treatment of Napoleon 
 Views of Lord Rosebery and Dr. Rose The debt of Europe to 
 Napoleon. 
 
 15 July, 1815, Napoleon took refuge in the 
 " Bellerophon," hoping to find a refuge in Eng- 
 land. After an anxious month of waiting, he heard that 
 the British Government had on 28 July decided that he 
 was to be sent to St. Helena, an island belonging to 
 the East India Company. The voyage to that island, 
 under the charge of Admiral Cockburn, began on 7 
 August, and on 17 October, 1815, Napoleon arrived at 
 his destination. 
 
 After a sojourn of two months in a cottage called 
 "The Briars" he moved on 10 December to Long- 
 wood, in which residence he spent the rest of his life. 
 
 With Napoleon were twenty-five persons, includ- 
 
 284
 
 NAPOLEON AT LONGWOOD 
 
 FROM A SKETCH BY GENENAL GOURGAUD
 
 ST. HELENA, 1815-1821 285 
 
 ing Generals Bertrand and Gourgaud, the Count 
 Montholon, Dr. Barry O'Meara, and Las Cases as 
 secretary. He was allowed about a dozen servants, 
 and Bertrand and Montholon were accompanied by 
 their wives. 
 
 Till 14 April, 1816, Admiral Cockburn, who was 
 in command of the squadron, was responsible for the 
 care of the Emperor and for the government of the 
 island. He was succeeded as commander of the 
 squadron first by Admiral Malcolm, and on June, 1817, 
 by Admiral Plampin, while Sir Hudson Lowe took 
 over the government of the island. 
 
 With Cockburn and Malcolm Napoleon was on 
 friendly terms. His relations with Plampin were not 
 very intimate, while with Hudson Lowe they soon 
 became strained. 
 
 The exile of Napoleon is of some importance, 
 owing partly to the sympathy which his captivity 
 aroused, and partly to his writings. By the latter the 
 Napoleonic legend was created which later had an un- 
 mistakable influence upon French and indeed upon 
 European politics. 
 
 Napoleon desired that his life on St. Helena should 
 be regarded by posterity as a period of martyrdom, 
 and so far as the French nation was concerned he 
 succeeded in his aim. For, owing to the "haze of 
 sentiment" aroused by the captivity of the great Em- 
 peror and by his writings, his nephew, Napoleon III, 
 was enabled to found that second Empire which came 
 to so untimely an end in 1870.
 
 286 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Whether or not Napoleon " had religion " will 
 always remain a moot point. From his conversa- 
 tions with Gourgaud on St. Helena it would seem 
 that he was distinctly hostile to Christianity. But he 
 probably spoke deliberately in a spirit of opposition 
 to Gourgaud who was a professed Christian. The 
 Revolution had abjured Christianity, and the army was 
 distinctly non-Christian. Napoleon as the child of 
 the Revolution, and as the head of the army which was 
 his chief support, showed marked strength of mind 
 when he insisted upon the restoration of the French 
 Church and the conclusion of the Concordat. Never- 
 theless, it is impossible to say that Napoleon had ever 
 any definite religious beliefs. 1 
 
 Lord Rosebery gives us some sound criticism upon 
 the chief descriptions left us of Napoleon in St. Helena. 
 " Gourgaud's account," he says, "is the most faithful 
 transcript, and far superior to the other records. 
 Montholon is not so reliable, or so intelligent. Las 
 Cases pads and fabricates. O'Meara's book is a 
 translation into English of conversations carried on in 
 Italian. It is both spirited and interesting, but does 
 not inspire any confidence." 2 The "Memoranda of 
 Conversations with Napoleon," by Captain Henry 
 Meynell, has, however, lately been privately printed 
 since the appearance of Lord Rosebery's work, and 
 upon it the present chapter is based. 
 
 Captain Henry Meynell saw Napoleon on 20 
 
 x Lord Rosebery, "Napoleon: the Last Phase," p. 171. 
 2 Ibid. p. 165.
 
 w > 
 
 J a 
 X I
 
 ST. HELENA, 1815-1821 287 
 
 June, 1816, on the occasion of a formal visit to Long- 
 wood by the English admiral. His description of 
 Napoleon's personal appearance is of interest. " He 
 struck me," writes Meynell, "as resembling a picture 
 painted by Robert Lefevbre, only Considerably stouter. 
 His face remarkably pale, a very thick neck, and 
 Broad Shoulders, a well-made Leg and Foot, in Height 
 about 5 feet 5 inches (it was remarked by Lady 
 M., a few days afterwards, that he had also a very 
 Handsome Hand). In his dress he was not particularly 
 neat. He wore a single-breasted Green Coat, or Habit 
 de Chasse with a velvet Collar and Silver Buttons, 
 having the figures of different animals on them. He 
 had on the Star of the Legion of Honour, White 
 Breeches, Silk Stockings, and Shoes, with Gold Oval 
 Buckles. He kept his Cocked Hat under his left arm, 
 with that hand generally in his Pocket, the other was 
 occupied with a Snuff Box out of which he took a good 
 deal of snuff. His figure though fine is certainly not 
 graceful. He spoke quick, and I thought his French 
 difficult to understand. His countenance was pleasant 
 and he seemed in good humour." Then Meynell 
 describes his course of life. "He is irregular in his 
 meals, but generally breakfasts at n and dines at 
 eight. He Remains in his Apartment until 4 in the 
 afternoon when he walks or drives out until sunset. 
 Bertrand has since informed me that he often gets up 
 in the middle of the night and writes, or reads for an 
 hour or two, having contracted that habit at an early 
 period when Commanding his Armies."
 
 288 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 On 25 June, 1816, the Admiral and Lady Malcolm, 
 with Meynell, again visited Napoleon who was most 
 gracious. He talked a good deal to Lady Malcolm, 
 asked her if she liked hunting, as he understood that 
 ladies in England were partial to that amusement. He 
 also talked to her about Ossian's " Poems," which he 
 admired, said that he had brought them into fashion on 
 the Continent and declared that he had ever been ac- 
 cused of having his head filled with Ossian's clouds. 
 The Italian translation of them he admired the most. 
 He further asked her if she thought them genuine, and 
 whether she did not think that Macpherson had written 
 them. Lady M. replied " that she did not think Mac- 
 pherson capable of writing them, that the Highland 
 Society had taken much pains to investigate it, and 
 proved their authenticity V 
 
 Captain Meynell frequently accompanied the Ad- 
 miral and Lady Malcolm on their visits to Napoleon, 
 and made careful notes of the conversations in which 
 he took part. These visits extended over a year, with 
 a break from 21 September to 25 November, 1816, 
 during which period the Admiral and Captain Mey- 
 nell visited the Cape. 
 
 The " Memoranda " contain, as can be guessed, 
 much that is of very great interest. One of Napoleon's 
 favourite topics was Egypt. He declared that Admiral 
 
 1 Captain Henry Meynell (H.M.S. " Newcastle "), " Memo- 
 randa of Conversations with Napoleon, St. Helena, 1816," pp. i, 2, 
 3. (Printed for private circulation.) Guildford, A. C. Curtis, 
 1909.
 
 ST. HELENA, 1815-1821 289 
 
 Brueys could have averted his destruction at the Battle 
 of the Nile if he had followed his (Napoleon's) advice 
 and taken the fleet into Alexandria. 
 
 Any orders of his (Napoleon's), however, were 
 rendered futile by the Bedouin Arabs who interposed 
 between Alexandria and his army which he had led 
 into the interior. He spoke a good deal about 
 Kleber whom he considered a brave and clever man, 
 and expressed the opinion that had that general lived 
 the French occupation of Egypt would have continued. 
 If, Napoleon said, the French had kept possession of 
 Egypt, the English would sooner or later have lost 
 India. For, in possession of the Red Sea, all Indian 
 commerce would have been controlled by the French. 
 Therefore, he was of opinion that Alexandria was 
 of more importance to England than Malta, for as 
 things were it was only the weakness and ignorances 
 of the Turks which prevented the British trade with 
 India from being ruined. 
 
 One day or another, he said, you will see Egypt 
 destroy the East India Company. The preservation 
 of Turkey as a European power, was, however, in 
 his opinion as essential for British as it was for French 
 interests. 
 
 One of the most emphatic of Napoleon's assertions 
 at Longwood was that Bonapartism was essentially 
 pacific. He asserts repeatedly that he was always 
 pacific, and that it was only "the malignant and 
 implacable jealousy of England that rendered a 
 peaceful policy on his part impossible ", To him at St. 
 
 '9
 
 2 9 o THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Helena it seemed that the best means to render 
 Bonapartism acceptable to the France of the Restora- 
 tion was to represent it as not only peaceful but as 
 the patron and supporter of nationalities. That there 
 was a certain amount of truth in these assertions is 
 undeniable, for one result of Napoleon's career was 
 to rouse the feeling of nationality in Italy which was 
 never quenched, while it is undoubted that the 
 restoration of Poland as a kingdom would have re- 
 sulted from Napoleon's defeat of Russia in the Moscow 
 campaign. But Napoleon's Empire was not peaceful, 
 its existence was not compatible with liberal institu- 
 tions, and it was only in a very modified sense the ally 
 of the Church. 
 
 "At Tilsit," he said, in the hearing of Captain 
 Meynell, " the Emperor Alexander was, as always, 
 strongly desirous of driving the Turks out of Europe." 
 But a study of the map, Napoleon declared, convinced 
 him that it was not in the interests of France to allow 
 Constantinople to fall into the hands of the Russians 
 and Austrians. He was, however, well aware that 
 in the event of a war between Russia and Turkey the 
 Greeks would on this matter side with the Russians, 
 who would free them from the Turkish yoke. 1 
 
 These views represent the attitude taken by France 
 towards Turkey since the days of Francis I, while in 
 Louis XIV's reign the importance of Egypt to the 
 French monarchy had been insisted upon, though in 
 
 1 As is well known, Greece secured its independence a few 
 years after Napoleon uttered these words.
 
 ST. HELENA, 1815-1821 291 
 
 vain, by Leibnitz. As it was, Louis XIV entered 
 into close relations with Siam, and, had he not been 
 fully occupied in Europe, he might have anticipated 
 the policy of the Directory and of Napoleon in 
 Egypt. 
 
 At St. Helena Napoleon, we are told, had in his 
 possession a memoir on the subject of opening the 
 Ancient Canal from Suez to Cairo. "He thought it 
 practicable, and it was his intention to have done it. 
 He had ascertained that the Nile at Cairo was nearly 
 on a level with the Red Sea. He proposed effecting 
 this by means of the waters of the Nile, the embank- 
 ments of which are 4 feet higher than the Red 
 Sea." 1 
 
 Napoleon, as is well known, had very elaborate 
 plans for establishing the French power in Egypt, and 
 for using Egypt as a stepping-stone to India. In 
 addition to the canal from Suez to Cairo, he had in his 
 mind one from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. 
 
 The Red Sea had been carefully surveyed, the 
 proposed Canal was declared practicable, the expense 
 was calculated to amount to about 18,000,000 francs, 
 and two years' labour would, he thought, suffice for 
 its construction. 2 
 
 If the French, he said, had kept Egypt, sooner 
 or later the English would have lost it, and he would 
 have made the India (!) Company trade with him. 
 " Merchants," he declared, "were of the country that 
 gave them most profit. Those of London had fre- 
 
 1 Meynell, loc, tit. p. 14. 2 Ibid.
 
 292 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 quently supplied him with money. On his return 
 from Elba he had several propositions, one from a 
 very rich house. He had this proposal with him. 
 He was to repay them with Government funds, but it 
 was to have been a secret how those funds were dis- 
 posed of. The Admiral (Sir Pulteney Malcolm), as 
 on a former occasion, observed that he hoped one of 
 these days we should see all these things published. 
 B. laughed." l 
 
 On the same day on which he spoke of Egypt he 
 related how Paoli had advised him to enter the 
 English service. But he considered that a revolution 
 offered opportunities for a young man, apart from the 
 fact that he spoke French, " was of their religion and 
 understood their manners". Paoli was angry, but 
 the two men respected each other. 
 
 A few years later the siege of Toulon gave 
 Napoleon an opportunity of showing his military 
 abilities. That siege, he declared, " was the beginning 
 of my rise," and owing to the fact that a number of 
 the soldiers had been made officers there were few 
 artillery men there who were men of science. His 
 success at Toulon gained for him reputation, and he 
 was " fortunately in Paris just in time for the Revolu- 
 tion of the 1 3 Vend6miaire ". Then he was sent to 
 Italy where, as he added somewhat modestly, he 
 "gained further reputation," while from Egypt he 
 returned at " a fortunate moment ". 
 
 With regard to the Russian campaign, he declared 
 
 1 Meynell, loc. cit. p. 12.
 
 ST. HELENA, 1815-1821 293 
 
 that he " was in too much of a hurry. I should have 
 remained a year on the Niemen and in Prussia, and 
 then devoured Prussia." But had he taken Moscow 
 and crushed Russia, he might have returned to his 
 Eastern schemes. " Would it not then be possible 
 for a great French army with auxiliaries from Tiflis 
 to attain the Ganges? Once touched by a French 
 sword, the scaffolding of mercantile power in India 
 would fall to the ground. It would be a gigantic 
 expedition, I admit, but practicable in the nineteenth 
 century." l He, however, consoles himself with the 
 reflection that the Russians already in Persia (!) have 
 not far to go to reach India. 
 
 The burning of Moscow, he confessed, in Captain 
 Meynell's hearing, strengthened the position of Russia 
 in the East, for it not only enraged the Greeks, whose 
 religious susceptibilities were roused, but it also ruined 
 his plans. He went to Moscow instead of to St. 
 Petersburg, because "round Moscow there was a 
 fine country with abundance of grain," and he felt 
 that he could have dictated terms of peace from 
 Moscow. 
 
 The much criticized invasion of Russia was caused 
 by Alexander's non-fulfilment of the Treaty of Tilsit, 
 and by his (Napoleon's) desire to establish on a solid 
 foundation the kingdom of Poland ''as a barrier 
 against the Russians, for sooner or later they would 
 overrun Europe ". 
 
 1 Quoted by Lord Rosebery, "Napoleon: the Last Phase," 
 p. 201.
 
 294 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 His remarks about the Belgians, Piedmontese, and 
 Italians contained much that was true. All these, he 
 asserted, wished for his success at the battle of Water- 
 loo. " The Piedmontese preferred being a province of 
 France to being an independent kingdom under that 
 king of Sardinia." 
 
 Speaking of his invasion of Spain, he confessed 
 that the system which he pursued in that country was 
 contrary to the opinion of the nation, and that there- 
 fore he failed. In his opinion, expressed in the 
 " Memorial de Sainte-Hlene," 1 Spain and England 
 were in a similar political condition, both countries being 
 dominated by a tyrannical oligarchy. "The Spanish 
 nation despised its government ; it was crying out for 
 regeneration. I felt sorry for Spain, and seized the 
 only opportunity for regenerating the country." 
 
 He showed, as was only to be expected, an accurate 
 knowledge of the character of the French people, and 
 his remarks with regard to the Bourbons, had they 
 been known and acted upon by that family, would 
 have saved France from the Revolution of 1830. 
 
 Louis XVIII on his return to France would, in 
 his opinion, have done wisely "to have considered 
 himself as the Beginner of the Fifth Dynasty," and 
 he ought to have said to the people ..." Grave 
 changes have induced you to recall my family to the 
 throne ; I will forget all that is past and commence a 
 new dynasty ". As it was, the Bourbons were inse- 
 
 1 P. Gonnard, "The Exile of St. Helena," p. 142. London, 
 William Heinemann.
 
 'JEfR-ZE MSS 
 
 DOCTEVR ' 
 
 JE Ay TAOWX ET A 
 
 DE CRO1 Rl- TOUT CE (>V? 
 
 rrrEME 
 
 <?UE JZ C 
 
 PORTRAIT CAMEO OF NAPOLEON AND SPECIMEN OF HIS 
 WRITING FROM ST. HELENA, 1818
 
 ST. HELENA, 1815-1821 295 
 
 curely seated on the throne, " that they sat on a 
 smothered volcano ".* 
 
 On another day he again spoke of the Bourbons. 
 Louis XVIII "was a well-disposed man, but there 
 was a party that he could not keep in order who would 
 Boulverse France ". That party contained the most 
 violent royalists whom the Government could not 
 control. In fact, his estimate of the Bourbons was 
 singularly correct. The Duke of Orleans, in his 
 opinion, was " the only one of the Bourbons who 
 could settle France. . . . He had made himself popu- 
 lar by wearing the Legion of Honour which was 
 apparently a trifle," but "apparent trifles are great 
 things at times in France. Reason nothing." 5 
 
 Of the Comte d'Artois he had formed a poor 
 opinion, which was fully justified after his accession as 
 Charles X to the French throne. His wearing of the 
 Order of St. Esprit, " which all those who have been 
 born since the Revolution hate " because it demands 
 from the wearer " four generations of nobility of 
 Blood," was a great blunder. He had also twelve 
 officers on his staff not one of whom had fought with 
 the army, and as they had fought in the ranks of his 
 enemies none bore the Legion of Honour. 
 
 He was, moreover, of the opinion that Louis 
 XVIII should have abolished the Legion of Honour. 
 " It will," he said, "always call me to remembrance, 
 but as they have continued it they should not vilify 
 me, they should praise me for what I did, that brought 
 
 1 Meynell, loc, cit. p. 5. ' 2 Ibid. p. 18.
 
 296 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 glory to France." And then, with true prophetic 
 instinct, he added : " I will tell you what will happen, 
 when I am personally out of the question in thirty 
 years, the Government will be obliged to yield to 
 public opinion, and raise a monument to me for the 
 glory of the nation ". 
 
 He gave, too, an interesting account of his return 
 from Elba, but added little to what is generally known, 
 beyond a few personal details of his experiences on 
 his journey to Paris. He spoke highly of Colonel 
 Moncey and of Soult, but of Ney he remarked that 
 while " a hero in the field he was not clever in other 
 respects". He clearly showed that "he had com- 
 mitted himself to the Bourbons. His conduct on the 
 whole was bad." 
 
 Many of his remarks showed discernment and a 
 correct appreciation of political situations. Thus, he 
 said with some truth that Italy was longing for a 
 constitution as were many of the German states. 
 And he was probably right in his surmise that when 
 the Emperor of Austria travelled through Italy he 
 mistook the applause he met with for it was intended 
 not for him but for his daughter (Bonaparte's wife) 
 who was travelling with him. In fact the Belgians, 
 Italians, and Piedmontese preferred his (Napoleon's) 
 rule to that of their present masters. 
 
 In all his remarks about the Continent he showed, 
 as was to be expected, accurate knowledge. But in 
 all his statements and questions regarding England 
 and Scotland there is that curious ignorance which is
 
 ST. HELENA, 1815-1821 297 
 
 still to be found on the Continent. The character of 
 the British nation is proverbially misunderstood in 
 Europe, and Napoleon on that subject was no more 
 well informed than the large majority of his subjects. 
 
 There was, perhaps, some ground for his belief 
 that the inhabitants of Scotland drank very hard, and 
 that the Prince Regent, when young, had been a hard 
 drinker. He seemed interested in Scotland, spoke of 
 its manufactures, and declared its climate was too 
 damp for poetry a remark which will not be appreci- 
 ated by the admirers of Burns. 
 
 He could not understand how Scottish Peers could 
 become English Peers, and asserted that the Douglas 
 family was the greatest in Scotland. On these points 
 the Admiral enlightened him, explaining the position 
 of Scottish Peers since the Union, and telling him that 
 in addition to the family of Douglas the Campbells 
 and others held positions of some importance. 
 
 His ignorance of the English and of England was 
 indeed profound. He often asserted that his landing 
 in England and entry into London would be followed 
 by the overthrow of the British monarchy with the 
 ready acquiescence of the British people. At the 
 same time he recognized that the national spirit of the 
 British was superior to that of the French, that the 
 English were more practical than the French, and 
 were braver. Like many historians, he could not 
 understand why at the conclusion of peace in 1814-5 
 they derived so little benefit from the long war. 
 
 With regard to the strict enforcement of regulations,
 
 298 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 based on the view that the escape of Napoleon from 
 St. Helena was possible, it is unnecessary to say much. 
 Lord Rosebery has lately, in his incomparable style, 
 thrown ridicule upon the measures taken by Sir 
 Hudson Lowe to ensure the safety of his prisoner. 
 He shares the opinion held by the Duke of Welling- 
 ton, that considerable freedom might have been allowed 
 to Napoleon provided the landing-places were carefully 
 guarded. But apparently the great Duke was not 
 aware of the actual position of affairs on St. Helena, 
 and Lord Rosebery ignores the Government records 
 of the years covering Napoleon's captivity. Napo- 
 leon's escape from Elba was in every one's memory, 
 and Napoleon's success in quietening the suspicions of 
 Sir Neill Campbell, the Commissioner, was a warn- 
 ing to the officials in St. Helena. Escape from St. 
 Helena was possible ; schemes of escape were being 
 devised, and, with Campbell's example before him, 
 Lowe was fully justified in adopting all necessary pre- 
 cautions. Napoleon, it is true, stated at St. Helena 
 that he had no desire to escape ; he had made similar 
 statements while in Elba. And moreover, there is, 
 we are assured by Mr. Rose, 1 evidence in the British 
 Archives which fully explains and justifies Lowe's 
 precautions. 
 
 As is well known, Napoleon, during his exile on St. 
 Helena, left all the materials for the formation of the 
 Napoleonic legend. He claimed that he represented 
 
 ^ose, "Napoleonic Studies," p. 328. George Bell & Sons, 
 1904.
 
 NAPOLEON'S LAST DAY 
 
 FROM THE SCUL1TURE BY VICENZO VELA AT VERSAILLES
 
 ST. HELENA, 1815-1821 299 
 
 the principles of the Revolution, and that as far as 
 was possible he had recognized those principles. He 
 asserted that equality the passion of the French 
 middle and lower classes was fully established by 
 him "an equality of the burdens, and an equality of 
 all rights ". The Legion of Honour which could be 
 offered to every one was, he asserted, the symbol of 
 equality. Whether the creation of a new nobility did 
 not collide with the principle of equality was a point 
 on which at St. Helena he expressed some doubts. 
 " I fancy I was wrong," he said, " because it weakened 
 that system of equality which the nation liked so 
 much." 1 
 
 As regarded the principle of liberty, Napoleon as- 
 serted that he did support liberal institutions that both 
 civil and religious liberty existed in France under him. 
 But he declared with justice that in 1 799 and during 
 the ensuing years a strong government in France was 
 absolutely necessary. 
 
 " I never usurped the crown," he said ; " I lifted it 
 out of the gutter, and the people put it on my head." 
 France at that time ( 1 799) was isolated, and might 
 "have perished under the blows of United Europe". 
 He had ample justification for his policy during the 
 Consulate. The French were incapable of self-govern- 
 ment, and Napoleon was acting wisely in ruling with 
 a firm hand. On his escape from Elba he declares he 
 realized that the French had become capable of ap- 
 preciating the value and meaning of liberty, and con- 
 
 1 Rosebery, "Napoleon : the Last Phase," p. 125.
 
 300 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 sequently that he was prepared in future to rule 
 constitutionally. 
 
 With regard to his treatment of foreign nations, 
 Napoleon's position was less sound. He owned, 
 however, that he had made a mistake in attempting 
 to place Joseph on the Spanish throne, for he thus had 
 wounded the national feeling of the Spaniards. He 
 apparently thought that England was in a political 
 condition similar to that existing in Spain, and that 
 both countries, like France before 1789, required com- 
 plete regeneration. 
 
 The Moscow expedition, however, prevented him 
 from achieving success in Spain. That expedition, 
 he declared, was forced on him by the hostility of 
 Russia. Had it succeeded he would have established 
 Poland as a powerful barrier to the advance of Russia 
 westwards. 
 
 Much that he said about the future aggrandizement 
 of Russia, and of the future rivalry of Russia and 
 Great Britain in Asia, showed remarkable prescience. 
 
 Throughout his conversations and writings it is 
 never apparent that he recognized the influence of the 
 continental system in bringing about his downfall. 
 He never seemed to realize that from 1805 the growth 
 of national feeling in Germany constituted a real 
 danger to his vast schemes. Nor did he realize that 
 England, Prussia, Russia, and Austria would under no 
 circumstances accept peace on his impossible conditions. 
 His continued assertions at St. Helena that his Em- 
 pire meant peace, and that his pacific intentions were not
 
 ST. HELENA, 1815-1821 301 
 
 understood, have never yet been accepted by any one 
 who has made even a cursory study of Napoleon's life. 
 
 The closing years of Napoleon's exile on St. 
 Helena have been admirably described by Mr. Rose 
 in his " Life of Napoleon". 
 
 In 1820, when his relations with the governor had 
 become more cordial, and the restrictions imposed 
 upon him were lessened, he seems to have been con- 
 tented. Early in 1821 illness supervened, and on 
 5 May he died. In 1840 his ashes were removed 
 with great pomp to the Invalides in Paris. A few 
 years afterwards a member of his family, Napoleon III, 
 restored the Empire which lasted till 1870. A great 
 ruler and an unsurpassed leader in war, Napoleon 
 remains one of the most remarkable products of 
 European civilization. He was the man " who bridled 
 the Revolution, and remoulded the life of France, who 
 laid broad and deep the foundations of a new life in 
 Italy, Switzerland, and Germany, who rolled the 
 Western on the East, in the greatest movement known 
 since the Crusades". 1 
 
 He did more : in France " he restored the adminis- 
 trative centralization of the ancien regime with those 
 improvements which the Revolution had rendered 
 possible a centralization, scientific, uniform, all-per- 
 vasive, untrammelled by the spirit of locality, caste, or 
 corporation ; no great modern community of men has 
 ever received so much from a single human mind ". 2 
 
 1 Rose, "Life of Napoleon," Vol. II, p. 574. 
 
 2 "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, pp. 769, 771.
 
 302 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 But he left England supreme on the sea, with her 
 colonial and maritime power more firmly established 
 than ever, and he left the Continent to a great extent 
 subservient to Russian influence till the close of the 
 Crimean War. Napoleon's career may be termed 
 " an explosion of human energy ". Was it a maleficent 
 or a superb one ? I think superb.
 
 APPENDICES 
 
 I. LIST OF NAPOLEON'S MOST FAMOUS GENERALS. 
 II. LEADING MINISTERS DURING THE EMPIRE. 
 III. NAPOLEON'S MARSHALS. 
 
 IV. THE MEMORANDA OF CAPTAIN H. MEYNELL, R.N. 
 V. LORD BARHAM. 
 VI. A LIST OF THE CHIEF AUTHORITIES FOR THE 
 
 NAPOLEONIC PERIOD. 
 VII. THE EDICT OF 19 OCTOBER, 1810. 
 VIII. GENEALOGY OF THE BONAPARTES.
 
 I. NAPOLEON'S GENERALS 
 
 Augereau, Duke of Castiglione. 
 
 Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte-Corvo, Crown Prince of Sweden. 
 
 Berthier, Duke of Neufchatel, Prince of Wagram. 
 
 Bessieres, Duke of Istria. 
 
 Davoust, Duke of Auerstadt, Prince of Eckmuhl. 
 
 Beauharnais, Eugene, Viceroy of Italy, Prince of Venice. 
 
 Grouchy, Count of the Empire. 
 
 Jourdan, Count. 
 
 Junot, Duke of Abrantes. 
 
 Lannes, Duke of Montebello. 
 
 Lefebre, Duke of Danzic. 
 
 Macdonald, Duke of Taranto. 
 
 Marmont, Duke of Ragusa. 
 
 Massena, Duke of Rivoli, Prince of Essling. 
 
 Moncey, Duke of Conegliano. 
 
 Mortier, Duke of Treviso. 
 
 Murat, Grand Duke of Berg and Cleves, King of Naples. 
 
 Ney, Duke of Elchingen, Prince of Moskwa. 
 
 Oudinot, Duke of Reggio. 
 
 St. Cyr, Gouvion, Marquis. 
 
 Soult, Duke of Dalmatia. 
 
 Suchet, Duke of Albufera. 
 
 Victor, Duke of Belluno. 
 
 20 305
 
 3 o6 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 II. LEADING MINISTERS DURING THE EMPIRE 
 
 Cambace'res, Prince of Parma, 1804. 
 Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza. 
 Champagny, Duke of Cadore. 
 Clarke, Duke of Feltre. 
 Fouche, Duke of Otranto. 
 
 Lebrun, Duke of Plaisance, Governor-General of Holland. 
 Maret, Duke of Bassano. 
 Savary, Duke of Rovigo. 
 
 Talleyrand, Prince of Benevento, 1804 ; Vice Grand Elector, 1807 ; 
 Prince of Talleyrand, 1814. 
 
 III. NAPOLEON'S MARSHALS 
 
 Massena 
 Jourdan 
 Bernadotte 
 
 Lannes 
 
 - appointed in 1804. 
 Soult 
 
 Ney 
 
 Davoust 
 
 Kellermann __ 
 
 Victor, appointed in 1807. 
 
 Macdonald \ 
 
 Marmont j- appointed in 1809. 
 
 Oudinot J 
 
 Suchet, appointed in 1811. 
 
 St. Cyr, Gouvion, appointed in 1812. 
 
 Pomatowski, appointed in 1813.
 
 APPENDICES 307 
 
 IV. THE MEMORANDA OF CAPTAIN H. MEYNELL, 
 
 R.N. 
 
 Captain Meynell was born in 1789, and was the second son 
 of Hugo Meynell of Hoar Cross, Co. Stafford, his mother being the 
 Hon. Elizabeth Ingram, daughter of Charles, gth Viscount Irwi^ 
 of Temple Newsam, Yorkshire. Having entered the Navy in 
 1803, he saw service in the Mediterranean and in the East Indies. 
 In 1816 he was serving as Captain in the " Newcastle," the flagship 
 of Rear-Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm, the Commander-in-Chief 
 at St. Helena station. He often accompanied the Admiral on the 
 latter 's visits to Napoleon, and his recollections " undoubtedly 
 contain fresh matter in addition to what is related " in " A Diary of 
 St. Helena, 1816-1817," by Lady Malcolm : " They supplement and 
 confirm the account given in the ' Diary,' and are of value and 
 importance as showing the effect upon Captain Meynell of 
 Napoleon's manner and personality. For these reasons Captain 
 Meynell's independent recollections have been rightly thought 
 worthy of publication." 
 
 V. LORD BARHAM 
 
 Charles Middleton, first Baron Barham, had served in the Navy 
 and risen to the rank of Admiral. In 1794 he was Lord Com- 
 missioner of the Admiralty; in 1805 became First Lord of the 
 Admiralty and was created Baron Barham.
 
 3 o8 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 [A full bibliography of the Napoleonic Period is to be found 
 in Vol. IX of the "Cambridge Modern History".] 
 
 AUTHORITIES GENERAL 
 
 Taine, " Les origines de la France Contemporaine ". 
 
 Lanfrey, " Histoire de Napoleon ". Paris, 1875. 
 
 Rose, "Life of Napoleon I". London, Bell, 1902. 
 
 Browning, "Napoleon : the First Phase". London, Lane, 1905. 
 
 Fournier, "Napoleon I". 
 
 Mahan, " The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution 
 
 and Empire ". London, 1892. 
 Marbot, " Memoires," 3 vols. Paris, 1891. 
 "Thiebault, Memoires de," 5 vols. Paris, Plon, 1893-5. 
 Seeley, " Life and Times of Stein ". 
 Bodley, "France ". London, J. Murray. 
 Morse Stephens, " Periods of European History," Vol. VII (1789- 
 
 1815). Rivingtons. 
 
 Atkinson, "A History of Germany". London, Methuen, 1909. 
 Pasquier, "Histoire de mon temps," 6 vols. Paris, 1893. 
 Johnston, "Napoleon: a Short Biography ". London, 1904. 
 " The Cambridge Modern History," Vols. VIII and IX. 
 Rose, " The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era and the French 
 
 Revolution and Napoleonic Epoch ". Cambridge University 
 
 Press. 
 Wheeler, "The Story of Napoleon". London, Harrup & Co., 
 
 1910. 
 
 Fisher, " Bonapartism ". Oxford, 1 908. 
 Sorel, " L'Europe et la Revolution Franchise," 8 vols. Paris, 
 
 1904. 
 
 Sloane, " Life of Napoleon Bonaparte," 4 vols. New York, Cen- 
 tury Company. 
 Mahan, " Life of Nelson ".
 
 APPENDICES 309 
 
 Camden, Theophilus, "The History of the Rise, Progress, and 
 
 Overthrow of Napoleon Bonaparte ". London, Nuttall, Fisher 
 
 & Dixon, 1814. 
 
 Fyffe, " Modern Europe," Vol. I. 
 Seeley, " A Short History of Napoleon ". London, Seeley & Co., 
 
 1886. 
 Wolseley, "The Decline and Fall of Napoleon". London, 
 
 Sampson, Low, Marston & Co., 1895. 
 
 AUTHORITIES SPECIAL 
 
 Masson and Biagi, " Napoleon Inconnu ". 
 
 Marcaggi, " La Genese de Napoleon ". 
 
 Brotonne, " Les Bonapartes et leur Alliances ". 
 
 Colonna de Cesare Rocca, " Le Nid de L'Aigle ". 
 
 Chuquet, " La jeunesse de Napoleon ". Paris, 1 899. 
 
 Norwood Young, " The Growth of Napoleon ". London, 
 
 J. Murray, 1910. 
 
 Masson, "Napoleon et sa famille". Paris, 1897. 
 Nasien, " Memoires sur 1'Enfance . . . de Napoleon ". Paris, 
 
 1852. 
 
 Levy, "Napoleon Intime". Paris, Plon, 1893. 
 Debidour, "L'Eglise et I'dtat en France". Paris, 1898. 
 Thiers, " The Consulate and the Empire ". 
 
 Fisher, "Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany". Oxford, 1903. 
 Browning, " England and Napoleon in 1803". London, 1887. 
 Petre, "Napoleon's Campaign in Poland". London, 1901. 
 Vandal, "Napoleon et Alexandre ". Paris, 1896. 
 Johnston, " The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy ". London, 
 
 Macmillan & Co., 1904. 
 
 Ducere, "Napoleon a Bayonne". Bayonne, 1897. 
 Vandal, " L'Avenement de Bonaparte," and " Napoleon et 
 
 Alexandre ". 
 Wheeler and Broadley, " Napoleon and the Invasion of England ". 
 
 London, 1909. 
 Gonnard, " The Exile of St. Helena ". London, Heinemann, 1909.
 
 3 io THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Mallet, " Mallet du Pan and the French Revolution ". London, 
 
 1902. 
 Michel, " Correspondance ine'dite de Mallet du Pan avec la Cour 
 
 de Vienne, 1794-8". Paris, 1884. 
 Hall's "Voyages". Constable, Edinburgh, 1826. 
 Abell, "Recollections of the Emperor Napoleon on the Island of 
 
 St. Helena ". London, Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1873. 
 Coquelle, " Napoleon et 1'Angleterre ". Paris, 1 904. 
 Desbriere, "La Compagne Maritime de 1805, Trafalgar". Paris, 
 
 1907. 
 
 Eraser, "The Enemy at Trafalgar". London, 1906. 
 Segur, " Hist, de Napoleon et de la Grande Armee pendant 1812 ". 
 
 Paris, 1824. 
 
 Atteridge, "Napoleon's Brothers". London, Methuen, 1909. 
 Rose, "Napoleonic Studies". London, Bell, 1904. 
 Rose, "The Berlin Decrees" (Eng. Hist. Review). 
 Bourrienne, " Memoires sur Napoleon" (1795-1814), 10 vols. 
 
 Paris, 1823-30. 
 
 Bourrienne "Vie de Napoleon," 3 vols. Paris, 1831. 
 Chaptal, " Mes Souvenirs sur Napoleon". Paris, 1893. 
 Horsburgh, " Waterloo : a Narrative and Criticism ". Methuen. 
 Houssaye, "1814, 1815". Paris, 1910. 
 Rosebery, " Napoleon : the Last Phase ". London, Humphrey, 
 
 1900. 
 Gourgaud, "Sainte-He"lene Journal inedit de 1815 a 1818," 2 vols. 
 
 Paris, Flammarion, 1899. 
 
 Lady Malcolm (the Journal of), " A Diary of St. Helena ". Lon- 
 don, Innes, 1899. 
 Meynell, " Memoranda of Conversations with Napoleon, St. Helena, 
 
 1816". (Printed for private circulation.) Guildford, Curtis, 
 
 1909. 
 
 Oman, "The Peninsular War ". Oxford, 1909. 
 Shand, "The War in the Peninsula". 
 Ilchester, "The Spanish Journal of Elizabeth Lady Holland". 
 
 Longmans, 1911.
 
 APPENDICES 311 
 
 George, " Napoleon's Invasion of Russia ". 
 
 Blennerhassett, " Life of Talleyrand ". 
 
 Dorchester, "Recollections of a Long Life". London, 1909. 
 
 Weil, "Joachim Murat ". Paris, 1909, 1910. 
 
 Ropes, "Campaign of Waterloo". London, 1893. 
 
 Jackson, "Memoirs". London, 1903. 
 
 VII. THE EDICT OF 19 OCTOBER, 1810 
 
 " The Times " of 5 November, 1810, has some severe remarks 
 upon Napoleon's Decree (ordering all British goods to be burnt) 
 of 1 9 October, " which must increase in an immeasurable degree 
 the universal detestation in which he (this despot) is held on the 
 Continent. 
 
 " We could hardly have conceived that, violent, despotic, and 
 unjust as we know him to be, he would have had recourse to an 
 act of such tremendous and general oppression, as will be found 
 in the Decree. . . . 
 
 " Nothing less than military execution can enforce the horrible 
 provisions of such a Decree, which affords a triumphant proof of 
 the inadequacy of all the previous laws against the introduction of 
 Colonial produce, and British manufactures."
 
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 INDEX 
 
 ACRE, 45-47- 
 
 " Acte Additionelle," the, 268. 
 
 Addington, 69, 98, 107. 
 
 Ajaccio, 8, 9, 10, ii. 
 
 Alberoni, 182. 
 
 Alexander I, 66, 125, 149-152, 
 162, 163, 178-180, 188, 
 198-200, 209, 216, 225, 
 23, 231, 233, 234, 239, 
 240, 244, 245, 261, 263, 
 292. 
 
 Alexander the Great, 47, 96, 
 
 275-. 
 
 Alexandria, 27, 45. 
 Alvinzi, 24, 29, 30. 
 America, Central, 164, 231 ; 
 
 Southern, 164, 189, 231. 
 Amiens, Peace of, 70, 73, 93-95, 
 
 97-99, 107, 158, 191. 
 Ancona, 32, 175. 
 Andalusia, 215. 
 Anna, Duchess, 219. 
 Antwerp, 257. 
 Arcis - sur - Aube, Battle of, 
 
 255- 
 
 Arcola, Battle of, 30. 
 Argaum, Battle of, 103, 107. 
 Armed Neutrality, the, 65-68. 
 Ascot, 261. 
 Asia, 179, 300. 
 Aspern, Battle of, 212. 
 
 Assaye, Battle of, 103, 107. 
 
 Astorga, 205. 
 
 Auerstadt, Battle of, 125, 127, 
 144. 
 
 Augsburg, 114. 
 
 Austerlitz, Battle of, 24, 25, 114, 
 115, 119, 1 20, 128. 
 
 Austria, 102,109, 111-128, 146, 
 149, 161, 168, 172, 177, 
 180, 194, 206, 209, 210, 
 218-222, 225, 240, 241, 
 
 244, 245, 252, 256, 263, 
 274, 276, 290, 300. 
 
 Austrian Succession War, the, 
 
 124. 
 
 Auxonne, 6, 7, 8. 
 Avignon, n, 170. 
 
 BADAJOS, Treaty of, 68. 
 Baden, 31, 93, 120, 122, 128, 
 
 129, 132, 185. 
 Baltic, the, 181, 232. 
 Balzac, 223. 
 Bank of France, 88. 
 Barante, 106. 
 Barbe"-Marbois, 75. 
 Barclay de Tolly, 261. 
 Barras, 19, 20, 22, 35. 
 Basel, 31, 38. 
 
 Bassano, Duke of. See Maret. 
 Bastia, 8. 
 
 313
 
 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Bathurst, 224. 
 
 Bautzen, 248, 249. 
 
 Bavaria, 31, 69, in, 121, 122, 
 
 127, 128, 129, 132, 182, 
 
 183, 185, 1 86, 192, 251. 
 Baylen, Capitulation of, 191, 
 
 196, 197, 263. 
 Bayonne, 187, 199, 203. 
 Beaulieu, 24, 29. 
 Belgium, 64, 294. 
 Belle-Isle, 123. 
 " Bellerophon," the, 271. 
 Berg, 128-151 ; Grand Duke 
 
 of. See Murat. 
 Berlin Decree, the, 147, 148, 
 
 160, 176, 180, 181, 188. 
 Bernadotte, 16. 
 Bernis, 122. 
 Berthier, 61. 
 Bessieres, 207. 
 Bialystock, 151. 
 Black Legion, the, 212. 
 Blake, General, 204. 
 Bliicher, 253-255, 261. 
 Bodley, Mr., 88, 171. 
 Bologna, 32. 
 Bondet, 62. 
 Borodino, 245. 
 Boulogne, 106, 107. 
 Bourbons, the, 35. 
 Bourrienne, 47, 66, 105, 233. 
 Brazil, 231. 
 Bremen, 114, 230. 
 Brescia, 153. 
 Brueys, Admiral, 44, 59. 
 Brumaire, 53, 56-58, 77, 88, 
 
 191, 271, 277, 278. 
 Brune, 100. 
 Brunswick, 182; Duke of, 126, 
 
 141, 212, 225. 
 Bucharest, Treaty of, 244. 
 
 Budberg, Count, 150, 197. 
 Bulow, 269. 
 
 CADIZ, 1 86. 
 
 Cadoudal, 85, 86. 
 
 Calabria, 176. 
 
 Caldiero, 29. 
 
 Cambaceres, 247. 
 
 Campbell, Colonel, 259, 298. 
 
 Campbells, the, 297. 
 
 Camperdown, Battle of, 41. 
 
 Campo Formio, Treaty of, 36, 
 48, 94, in, 112, 278. 
 
 Campomanes, 182. 
 
 Canino, Prince of, 190. 
 
 Canning, 160, 182, 190. 
 
 Cape of Good Hope, 69. 
 
 Carniola, 248. 
 
 Carnot, 15, 22, 23. 
 
 Caroline Bonaparte, n, 191. 
 
 Carteaux, 13. 
 
 Carthagena, 186. 
 
 Castanos, 204. 
 
 Castlereagh, 2, 254, 262, 263. 
 
 Catherine II, 274. 
 
 Cattaro, 151. 
 
 Caulaincourt, 196, 220, 257, 
 258. 
 
 Ceylon, 69. 
 
 Champagny, 172. 
 
 Chaptal, 75. 
 
 Chardon, Abbe, 4. 
 
 Charles III, 182, 184; IV, 31, 
 185, 189, 190; V, Em- 
 peror, 241 ; the Great, 93, 
 96, 222; the Archduke, 
 33, 208. 
 
 Charles Bonaparte, 2-4. 
 
 Cherasco, 27. 
 
 Cherokee, the, 227, 228. 
 
 Cholmondeley, Lord, 70.
 
 INDEX 
 
 Church, the, 77 seq. 
 
 Cintra, Convention of, 164, 196- 
 
 198, 202, 203. 
 Cisalpine Republic, the, 10, 33, 
 
 36. 
 
 Cleves, 128. 
 Clichians, the, 35. 
 Cobenzel, 36, 39, 64. 
 Cockburn, Admiral, 285, 288, 
 
 292. 
 
 Code Napoleon, the, 76, 77, 88. 
 Colli, 26. 
 
 Comedie Franchise, the, 88. 
 Concordat, the, 73, 79, 80-82. 
 Confederation of the Rhine, the, 
 
 31, 93, 121-129, 135, 142, 
 
 145, 147, 165, 239, 240, 
 
 251, 282. 
 Coni, 27. 
 Constantinople, 100, 165, 205, 
 
 219, 290. 
 Constitution of 1791, the, 19, 
 
 54, 73 2 7!> 278. 
 Consulate, the, 109, 300. 
 Continental System, the, 177- 
 
 179, 217, 219, 222, 224, 
 
 225, 230-234, 244. 
 Convention, the National, 91. 
 Copenhagen, 160. 
 Corfu, 151, 156, 157, 180, 190, 
 
 258. 
 
 Cornwallis, Lord, 94. 
 Corsica, 3-6, 8, 9, n, 12, 15, 
 
 23-26, 31, 41, 258. 
 Costa de Beaurepaire, 26. 
 Cottbus, 151. 
 Craonne, Battle of, 255. 
 Crimean War, the, 302. 
 Czartoryski, 150. 
 
 DANUBIAN Principalities, the, 
 211. 
 
 D'Abrantes, Duchess, 259. 
 
 Dalberg, 128. 
 
 D'Aranda, 182. 
 
 D'Artois, 295. 
 
 Daru, 100. 
 
 Davoust, 23, 43, 106, 141. 
 
 De Barrin, 8. 
 
 Decaen, 100, 103. 
 
 Decres, 75. 
 
 Dego, 27. 
 
 Dejean, 75. 
 
 D'Enghien, 85, 86. 
 
 Delhi, 103. 
 
 Denmark, 65, 66, 68, 152, 160, 
 
 163, 181, 189, 247. 
 Desaix, 62, 107. 
 De Schack, 260. 
 Desiree, 16. 
 Diocletian, 222. 
 Diplomatic Revolution, the, 
 
 122. 
 Directory, the, 20, 31, 32, 48, 
 
 54-5 6 , 7i, 9 1 , !34, 267, 
 
 271, 277. 
 
 Dommartin, 12, 13. 
 Don Juan, 115. 
 Ducos, 58. 
 Dugommier, 13, 14. 
 Dumerbion, 15. 
 Dupont, 189, 196, 198. 
 Du Teil, 13, 14. 
 
 EAST INDIES, 100, 101. 
 Egypt, 14, 24, 40-48, 68, 71, 
 
 162, 175, 176, 179, 289- 
 
 292. 
 Elba, 67, 72, 92, 98, 259-266, 
 
 271. 
 Elbe, 234 ; Convention of the, 
 
 102. 
 
 Elisa Bonaparte, u. 
 Emmet, Robert, 107.
 
 316 
 
 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 England, 25, 35, 36, 40-47, 84, 
 86, 89,92, 94, 97-103, 105, 
 109, 142, 147, 162-164, 
 179, 182, 183, 193, 194- 
 216, 217,221-224, 256,261. 
 
 Erfurt, 163, 167, 200, 202, 209, 
 
 212. 
 
 Espinosa, Battle of, 204. 
 Etruria, Queen of, 67, 161. 
 Ettenheim, 85. 
 Eylau, 148. 
 
 FERDINAND VII, 189, 190; 
 
 Archduke, 25. 
 Ferrara, 32. 
 Fesch, Abbe, u. 
 Finland, 211, 230. 
 Fisher, H. A., quoted, 266. 
 Fleury, 121, 127. 
 Florence, 37 ; Treaty of, 97. 
 Fontainebleau, 258 ; Treaty of, 
 
 161, 169. 
 
 Fouche, 75, 207, 227, 266. 
 Fox, C. J., 70, 147. 
 Francis I, 93, 127, 241, 290; II, 
 
 no, 120, 133, 147, 210, 
 
 211, 221, 296. 
 
 Frankfort, 114; Proposals of, 
 
 252. 
 
 Frederick the Great, 274. 
 Frederick William II, 31 ; III, 
 
 149-151, 200, 226, 261. 
 Frejus, 51, 53. 
 Friedland, Battle of, 25, 148, 
 
 149. 
 
 Fructidor, 36, 37, 50, 52, 277. 
 Fulda-Corvey, 144. 
 
 GALLICAN CHURCH, the, 168. 
 Gantheaume, 180. 
 Genoa, 33. 
 George III, 66. 
 
 German Revolution, the, 110- 
 
 114. 
 Germany, 110-114, J 73> J 94 
 
 221, 241, 279-282, 301. 
 Gibraltar, 41. 
 Godoy, 31, 161, 188. 
 Gonsalvi, 81. 
 Gordon, Duchess of, 70. 
 Goree, 98. 
 Gourgaud, 59, 286. 
 Great St. Bernard, 61. 
 Grouchy, 269. 
 Guastalla, 258. 
 Guizot, 83. 
 Gurlay, General, 120. 
 
 HAGUE, the, 99. 
 
 Hamburg, 114, 142, 230, 233. 
 
 Hanau, Battle of, 135, 251. 
 
 Hanover, 101, 102. 
 
 Hanse Towns, the, 234. 
 
 Hardenberg, 150. 
 
 Herat, 65. 
 
 Hesse-Cassel, in, 113, 126, 
 
 142, 144. 
 
 Hesse-Darmstadt, 128. 
 Hoche, 35, 278. 
 Hochstadt, 63. 
 Hofer, 213, 225. 
 Hohenlinden, 63. 
 Hohenlohe, Prince, 141. 
 Holkar, 103. 
 Holland, 35, 41, 69, 92, 94, 96, 
 
 97, ioo, 166, 216, 223, 
 
 226, 227. 
 Holy Roman Empire, the, 73, 
 
 in, 279. 
 Ho wick, Lord, 147. 
 
 ILE DE FRANCE, 103. 
 India, 41, 44, 45, 65, 92, 162, 
 171, 293.
 
 INDEX 
 
 Ionian Islands, 33, 36, 38, 48. 
 Ireland, 65. 
 
 Italy, 15, 53, 56, 159, 160, 161, 
 223,241,261,278,279,301. 
 
 JAFFA, 46. 
 
 Jena, Battle of, 25, 125, 133, 
 134, 144, 187, 188. 
 
 Jerome Bonaparte, n, 151. 
 
 Jervis, Sir John, 31, 32. 
 
 Jeunesse Dore"e, the, 19. 
 
 Jews, the, 236, 237. 
 
 Joseph Bonaparte, 3, 9, 10, 12, 
 16, 37, 81, 121, 132, 153- 
 157, 176, 183, 187, 190, 
 191, 203, 217, 255, 257, 
 283. 
 
 Joseph II, 238. 
 
 Josephine, 23, 37, 44, 45, 48, 
 49, 168, 218, 261. 
 
 Jourdan, 33. 
 
 Julius Caesar, 275. 
 
 Junot, 43, 189, 194 ; Madame, 3. 
 
 KAUNITZ, 122. 
 Kellermann, 23, 62. 
 Kent, 40. 
 Keralio, 5. 
 Khiva, 65. 
 Kleber, 43, 46. 
 Koller, 259, 260. 
 Kray, 63. 
 Kurakin, 150. 
 
 LAETETIA, 2, 3. 
 
 La Fere, 5. 
 
 La Haye, Sainte, 269, 270. 
 
 Lake, General, 103. 
 
 Lannes, 30, 43. 
 
 Laon, Battle of, 255. 
 
 Larevelliere, 35. 
 
 La Rothiere, Battle of, 254. 
 
 Las Montholon, 286. 
 
 La Vendee, 207. 
 
 Lauenburg, 230, 233, 234. 
 
 Lebanon, the, 42. 
 
 Lechtenstein, Prince, 120. 
 
 Lefebre, 148, 205, 206, 287. 
 
 Leghorn, 175. 
 
 Legion of Honour, 295. 
 
 Legislative Body, the, 74, 75. 
 
 Leibnitz, 47, 290. 
 
 Leipzic, Battle of, 171, 234, 249- 
 
 251, 262. 
 
 Leoben, 30, 31, 33, 35. 
 Lepelletier Section, 19. 
 "Le Souper de Beaucaire," 12. 
 Levant, the, 36, 41. 
 Leveson-Gower, 150. 
 Liberation, War of, 25, 28, 130- 
 
 132, 196, 201. 
 Ligny, Battle of, 268. 
 Ligurian Republic, 33, 99. 
 Linois, Admiral, 103. 
 Lisbon, 189, 191. 
 Loano, 26. 
 Lodi, 28. 
 Louis XIV, 43, 47, 91, 93, 123, 
 
 134, 181, 275, 290, 291; 
 
 XVIII, 260, 261, 267, 271, 
 
 294-296; King of Holland, 
 
 8, n, 217, 226, 227. 
 Louisbourg, 115. 
 Louisiana, 67, 99. 
 Liibeck, 114, 230, 233. 
 Lucien Bonaparte, n, 12, 56, 
 
 75, 190, 191, 270. 
 LuneVille, Treaty of, 64, 65, 73, 
 
 in, 112, 157-158, 191. 
 Lutzen, Battle of, 248, 249. 
 Lyons, n. 
 
 MACDONALD, 254. 
 Macedonia, 176.
 
 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 Mack, 115. 
 Madras, 103. 
 Madrid, 204. 
 Magyars, the, 214, 215. 
 Maida, 138, 147, 153. 
 Mainz, 39, 113. 
 Maitland, Captain, 271. 
 Malcolm, Lady, 288; Sir P., 
 
 285, 292. 
 
 Mallet du Pan, 19, 20. 
 Malmaison, 261, 270. 
 Malta, 41, 69, 70, 94, 97-100, 
 
 224. 
 
 Mantua, 29, 30, 176. 
 Marbot, 55. 
 Marengo, Battle of, 51, 62, 63, 
 
 71-73. 77. I0 7> U9. I 57, 
 
 278. 
 
 Maret, 172. 
 Marianne, n. 
 Marie Louise, 168, 219-222, 
 
 229, 257, 258. 
 Marmont, 106, 254, 258. 
 Marrac, 207. 
 Marseillaise, the, 1 7 . 
 Marseilles, u, 16. 
 Martinique, 98. 
 Massena, 30, 54, 55, 61, 217, 
 
 278. 
 
 Mauritius, the, 73. 
 Maury, 168. 
 Mazarin, 121, 123. 
 Mediterranean, 16, 31, 36, 41, 
 
 44, 9 2 > 
 
 142, 
 
 163, 164, 171, 175, 176, 
 
 178, 179, 183, 190, 224. 
 Melas, 62. 
 
 Me'neval, 103, 104, 106, 107. 
 Metternich, 210, 220, 224, 249, 
 
 263. 
 Meynell, Captain Henry, 286 
 
 fff. 
 
 Milan, 29, 42, 157, 175 ; Decree 
 of, 143. J 76, 177, 181. 
 
 Milesimo, 27. 
 
 Milhaud, 269. 
 
 Minorca, 98. 
 
 Miot de Me"lito, 105. 
 
 Miquelon, 98. 
 
 Mississippi, the, 99. 
 
 Moldavia, 199, 200. 
 
 Moncey, 296. 
 
 Mondovi, 27. 
 
 Montenotte, 26-28. 
 
 Moore, Sir John, 204. 
 
 Moreau, 33, 55, 61, 63, 85, 86. 
 
 Mortier, 102. 
 
 Moscow, 171, 196, 218, 245, 
 246, 293, 300. 
 
 Munich, 115. 
 
 Murat, 147, 262, 268. 
 
 Murray, James, 261. 
 
 Mustapha IV, 162. 
 
 NAPLES, 1 7, 37,97, 121, 153, 154, 
 
 157, 182, 183. 
 Nassau, 129. 
 
 Navigation Act, French, 177. 
 Nelson, 45, 108, 117. 
 Ney, 106, 217, 258, 296. 
 Nice, 26-27. 
 Nimeguen, 102. 
 Notre Dame, 81. 
 Nuremberg, 114. 
 
 OLDENBURG, 230. 
 
 O'Meara, 271, 286. 
 
 Orange, William Frederick of, 
 
 144. 
 Orezzo, 8. 
 Orgon, 260. 
 Ossian, 288. 
 Osterode, 155. 
 Otranto, 157.
 
 INDEX 
 
 Oudinot, 30, 254. 
 Oxford, 261. 
 
 PALM, 135. 
 
 Paoli, 3, 6, 8, 292. 
 
 Papacy, the, 238, 280, 283. 
 
 Paris, 5, 6, 9-1 1, 203, 222. 
 
 Parma, 17,67, 92, 258. 
 
 Pasquier, 223. 
 
 Passeriano, 37. 
 
 Patino, 182. 
 
 Paul I, 31, 60, 63,65, 66; III 
 
 (Pope), 259. 
 Pauline, 260. 
 Perron, 103. 
 Persia, 149, 293. 
 Philip V, 182. 
 Piacenza, 72, 258. 
 Pichegru, 5, 85. 
 Piedmont, 33, 69, 97-99, 263, 
 
 264. 
 
 Pitt, 107, 121, 134, 275. 
 Pius VI, 32, 37, 38, 44; VII, 
 
 105, 106, 166-170, 237, 
 
 2 59, 28 3- 
 Plampin, 285. 
 
 Plaswitz, Armistice of, 248, 249. 
 
 Platoff, 261. 
 
 Poland, 69, 141, 153, 215, 219, 
 
 220, 230, 239, 245, 263, 
 
 274, 276, 290, 293. 
 
 Pondicherry, 103. 
 
 Portugal, 68, 152, 159-164, 178, 
 180, 188, 189, 193, 204, 
 215, 224. 
 
 PreTets, the, 76. 
 
 Pressburg, Treaty of, no, 121, 
 122, 146. 
 
 Prince Regent, the (English), 162, 
 297 ; (Spanish), 188, 189. 
 
 Principal Resolution of the Im- 
 perial Deputation, no, in. 
 
 Prussia, 55,65,66, 109-113,115, 
 116, 121, 123-126, 129, 
 
 iSS^S 6 . *39> MO, 144, 
 
 146, 163, 165, 177, 178, 
 
 195, 209, 239, 244, 245, 
 
 247-249, 252, 256, 258, 
 
 261, 269, 271, 274, 276, 
 279, 300. 
 Pyramids, Battle of the, 45. 
 
 QUATRE BRAS, 268. 
 Quiberon, 17. 
 
 RAPP, 43. 
 
 Rastadt, 38, 39, 87. 
 
 Ratisbon, Diet of, 112. 
 
 Reden, Countess, 266 ; Count, 
 201. 
 
 Reggio, 176. 
 
 Regnier, 75. 
 
 Reubell, 35. 
 
 Reynaud, 5. 
 
 Richelieu, 93, 121, 123, 127. 
 
 Ried, Treaty of, 251. 
 
 Robespierres, the, 8, 15. 
 
 RoliQa, Battle of, 197, 198. 
 
 Romanzoff, 197. 
 
 Rome, 32. 
 
 Rose, Dr., 106. 
 
 Rosebery, Lord, 174, 286. 
 
 Roumelia, 165. 
 
 Rousseau, 6, 7. 
 
 Russia, 47, 53, 65, 101-102, 
 135, 148-158, 160, 166, 
 179, 180, 222, 233, 234, 
 239, 246-249, 251, 253, 
 254, 258, 261, 271, 290, 
 300. 
 
 Ryswick, Treaty of, 158. 
 
 SACKEN, 254. 
 Sahagun, 204.
 
 320 
 
 THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON 
 
 St. Helena, 13, 59, 82, 93, 94, 
 
 i3 J . J 43 l6 9. 26 8, 271, 
 
 280, 283-302. 
 Saint Marcouf, 98. 
 St. Petersburg, Treaty of, 66. 
 Saint Pierre, 98. 
 St. Vincent, Battle of, 32, 41. 
 Salicetti, 12. 
 Salzburg, 113. 
 San Domingo, 99, 101. 
 San Ildefonso, Treaty of, 31, 67. 
 Saragossa, 207. 
 Sardinia, n, 18, 182. 
 Savary, 207. 
 Saxony, in, 129, 144, 245, 250, 
 
 251. 
 
 Schadow, 144. 
 Scharnhorst, 209. 
 Schill, 212, 215. 
 Schonbrunn, Treaty of. See 
 
 Vienna. 
 
 Schuvalov, 259. 
 Schwarzenberg, 254, 255. 
 Scindiah, 103. 
 Scotland, 297. 
 Scylla, 190. 
 Sebastiani, 100, 148. 
 Second Coalition, the, 51, 66. 
 Secret Societies, 237. 
 Selim II, 162. 
 Senate, the, 75. 
 Seven Years' War, the, 124. 
 Shishkoff, 244. 
 Siam, 291. 
 
 Sicily, 136-139, 162, 191, 224. 
 Sieves, 55-57. 
 Silesia, 274, 276. 
 Smith, Sir Sidney, 42, 45, 46. 
 Smolensk, 215. 
 Smorgoni, 43, 246, 247. 
 Sono Sierra, 204. 
 Sorel, A., 87, 91, 222, 223. 
 
 Soult, 119, 217, 296. 
 
 Spain, 17, 41, 93, 96, 101, 102, 
 159-164, 166, 170, 171, 
 175, 176, 178, 181-190, 
 193, 210, 213, 215-217, 
 
 221, 224, 229, 231, 239, 
 
 240, 247-249, 279-282, 
 294, 300. 
 
 Spencer Stanhope, 246. 
 
 Speranski, 211, 219, 244. 
 
 Squillacci, 182. 
 
 Stadion, 161, 208-210. 
 
 Stae'l, Madame de, 68. 
 
 Staps, 218. 
 
 Stein, 161, 200, 201, 209, 215, 
 
 216. 
 
 Strassburg, 115, 212. 
 Stuart, Sir John, 147. 
 Suez Canal, A, 44, 291. 
 Suhlingen, Convention of, 102, 
 
 103. 
 
 Suvorov, 54, 61. 
 Sweden, 65, 152, 211, 230, 249. 
 Switzerland, 69, 97-99, 301. 
 
 TAINE, 88. 
 
 Talavera, 215. 
 
 Talleyrand, 120, 122, 149, 155, 
 172, 207, 208, 263. 
 
 Taranto, 62, 157. 
 
 Thermidor, 15. 
 
 Thiebault, 268. 
 
 Thiers, 207. 
 
 Third Coalition, War of the, no. 
 
 Thugut, 30, 31, 34. 
 
 Tilsit, Treaty of, 2, 24, 25, 125, 
 148, 150-153, 156, 158, 
 162-165, 170-175, 180, 
 188, 195, 197, 198, 212, 
 232, 272, 274, 279, 290, 
 
 ,. 293 ; 
 
 Times," the, 227, 228.
 
 INDEX 
 
 321 
 
 Tippoo,4i, 45. 
 Tolentino, Treaty of, 32. 
 Tortona, 27. 
 Toulon, 23, 292. 
 Trafalgar, 43, 160. 
 Tribunate, the, 74, 75. 
 Trinidad, 69. 
 Tudela, Battle of, 204. 
 Tuileries, the, 246, 247. 
 Turkey, 18, 69, 92, 100, 140, 
 
 i5 2 T 59> l62 > X 79> J 97, 
 198, 200, 211, 229, 244, 
 290. 
 
 Tuscany, 67-264. 
 
 Tyrol, the, 213. 
 
 UDINE, 37. 
 Ulm, 115. 
 University, the, 88. 
 Utrecht, Treaty of, 158. 
 
 VALENCE, 5, 7. 
 
 Vatican Library, the, 259. 
 
 Vendee, La, 36, 39, 59. 
 
 Vendemiaire, 18-20, 292. 
 
 Venice, 175, 176. 
 
 Verdun, 242, 246. 
 
 Verona, 153. 
 
 Victor, Marshal, 207. 
 
 Vienna, Treaty of (1809), 216, 
 
 224-226 ; Congress of, 261- 
 
 266. 
 Vimeiro, Battle 0^197, 198. 
 
 Vincennes, 85. 
 Vittoria, Battle of, 249. 
 
 WAGRAM, Battle of, 212, 218, 
 225, 226. 
 
 Walcheren, 217, 227; Expedi- 
 tion, 226, 227, 229. 
 
 Wall, 182. 
 
 Wallachia, 199, 200. 
 
 Warsaw, Duchy of, 151. 
 
 Waterloo, Battle of, 231, 269. 
 
 Wellesley, Arthur, 2, 191, 202, 
 215, 229. 
 
 Wessenberg, 256. 
 
 West Indies, 101. 
 
 Westphalia, 96, 126, 127, 245. 
 
 Wetzlar, 112. 
 
 W'hitworth, Lord, 101. 
 
 Wilna, 242. 
 
 Wilson, Mr. H. H., 232. 
 
 Wright, Captain, 115. 
 
 Wurmser, 24, 29. 
 
 Wurtemberg, 31, 93, 113, 121, 
 122, 128, 129, 132, 185, 
 192. 
 
 Wurzburg, 139. 
 
 YORK, General, 253, 254. 
 
 ZACK, 62. 
 Ziethen, 270. 
 Zurich, Battle of, 54. 
 
 21
 
 ABERDEEN : THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
 
 Date Due 
 
 IMP ! 9 "59 
 
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 DEC 28 
 
 1964 
 
 
 
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 1986 
 
 
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