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 GIFT OF 
 
 DANIEL C. OILMAN 
 
. 
 
 
 a/r/Z' ' 
 
LECTURES 
 
 ON THE 
 
 MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 BY 
 
 NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR, D. D., 
 
 LATE D WIGHT PPwOFESSOK OF DIDACTIC THEOLOGY 
 IN YALE COLLEGE. 
 
 " Of Law there can be no less acknowledged than that her seat is the bosom or 
 God — her voice the harmony of the world." 
 
 VOL. I. 
 
 NEW YOEK; 
 PUBLISHED BY CLARK, AUSTIN & SMITH, 
 
 3 PARK ROW & 3 ANN STREET. 
 1859. 
 
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1859, by 
 
 Noah Porter, Samuel G. Buckingham, and Walter T. Hatch. 
 
 In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern 
 District of New York. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 C. A. Alvord, Printer and Stereotyper, 15 Vandewater street. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Moral Government of God was the great thought of Dr. 
 Taylor's intellect, and the favorite theme of his instructions 
 in theology. It occupied his mind more than any and every 
 other subject. lie was ever ready to enter upon the investi- 
 gation of any truth that was nearly or remotely connected with 
 this. He was never weary of grappling with such inquiries, 
 whether they were suggested for the "first time by his own 
 ingenuity, or had been discussed with greater or less success 
 for centuries by speculative and earnest men. To vindicate 
 the ways of God to man, was the object to which all his ener- 
 gies were consecrated, and upon which were expended the 
 ardor of his glowing soul and the force of his strong and 
 steadfast will. Those secondary objects which the majority of 
 men, even students and theologians, esteem important, were 
 freely sacrificed to the accomplishment of this commanding 
 purpose. To this the whole living man was consecrated with 
 an activity and intensity which have not often been equaled. 
 
 This object directed all his studies. All his investigations 
 had their starting point from this central theme, and how- 
 ever far he may seem to some to have wandered in the 
 maze of scholastic distinctions or subtle refinements, he never 
 lost the clue by which he returned to the subject of his great 
 argument. Hence his interest in psychology. He studied 
 man as an intellectual and moral being, that he might under- 
 stand God's government over him. It was in the light of 
 man's relations to God, that he sought to know what are his 
 capacities, what his obligations, what his present condition, and 
 
IV INTRODUCTION. 
 
 what liis future destiny. With the same intent he investi- 
 gated with a passionate interest the nature of civil govern- 
 ment, the authority of human law in all its varieties, and the 
 principles by which the various forms of human society are 
 organized and held together. He reasoned, that man being 
 the subject of all these societies, duty being the obligation 
 common to all, and law the expression of the authority by 
 which they are sustained — they must furnish analogies to that 
 moral government of God which comprehends the universe 
 within its dominion. That he might understand this "civi- 
 tas Dei" this "kingdom of God," he studied law, authority, 
 and justice in their essential nature and constituent elements. 
 Indeed, concerning theology itself, he would have adopted 
 with few qualifications the definition given by Leibnitz, u Quce 
 est quasi jurisjprudentia qitcedam specialis, sed eadem funda- 
 mentalis ratione ceterarum. Est enim velut doctrina qucedam 
 de jure publico quod obtinet in rej?ubUca Dei in homines."* 
 Above all, he diligently and earnestly sought to find in the 
 Scriptures a true and consistent system of principles in respect 
 to the government of God ; and to develop such a system from 
 the Scriptures as should be also consistent with the teachings 
 of reason and conscience, he considered the great duty of the 
 student and the teacher of theology. Iiis views of theology as 
 the science which has this for its object, were elevated and 
 even sublime. The enthusiastic language in which he was 
 accustomed to express himself on this inspiring theme, will 
 not soon be forgotten by those who have heard him speak. 
 
 He tried every system of theology by this test : what are 
 the principles concerning the moral government of God on 
 which it rests, or what are the views of God's authority over 
 man which it inculcates? If its principles were judged to 
 be defective, vague, obscure or false — if the system did not 
 i commend itself to the conscience' by asserting those truths 
 to which the conscience responds, it was rejected wholly or 
 
 * Diss, de Aete Combin., pp. 20, 21, ed. Erd. 
 
INTRODUCTION. V 
 
 in part, whatever was the authority of the theologian or of the 
 church whose name it bore. 
 
 It was not, however, solely nor chiefly, from the relations of 
 this subject to scientific theology, that he regarded it as of 
 such commanding importance. His interest in this as in all 
 other subjects, even in theology itself, was founded in a strong 
 conviction of its practical usefulness. While he was a pastor, 
 he wrote two sermons on the Moral Government of God, in 
 order to vindicate the authority of His law, the justice of His 
 retributions, and the necessity of an atonement. His interest in 
 this subject was increased by the illustration of the practical 
 importance of just and well settled principles in regard to it, 
 which was developed in the Unitarian controversy. He con- 
 stantly and earnestly insisted, that by the Christian preacher 
 no subject needed to be so well understood, to enable him suc- 
 cessfully to defend and enforce the great truths of the gospel. 
 In his intercourse with his fellow-men and in the conduct of his 
 own life, he manifested a loyalty to the King of Heaven, even 
 in connection with the most trivial events, which lent a charm 
 to all the manifestations of his character. In times of a^o- 
 nizing sorrow, he would utter great truths concerning God's 
 administration, its glory and goodness, which showed that his 
 principles on these subjects were his daily sustenance and com- 
 fort. One of the most impressive scenes of his last days was 
 the utterance at parting with a friend, in tones of almost se- 
 raphic ardor, of the ascription of the apostle, " Now unto the 
 King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honor 
 and glory forever and ever." 
 
 The writers to whom Dr. Taylor was most indebted, and 
 whose principles he sought to apply, to complete, and in some 
 cases to correct, were Bishop Butler and Jonathan Edwards. 
 Bishop Butler suggested the principles and the course of 
 argument concerning the benevolence and equity of God's 
 government, which were matured by him into a more exact 
 system, and carried only to their legitimate conclusions. Presi- 
 dent Edwards was often in his hands, and the careful reader of 
 
VI INTRODUCTION. 
 
 these volumes will see the relation of many of the discussions, 
 to the teachings of that prince of New England divines, and 
 to the whole current of what is called New England theology. 
 The works of all the New England divines were the familiar 
 hand-books of his reading. He was also entirely at home with 
 the writers on natural theology, for which the English church 
 in other times was so distinguished. From all of these authors, 
 and the bold and energetic workings of his own mind, he rea- 
 soned out the system of principles and conclusions which is 
 found in these volumes. 
 
 These lectures were not delivered in precisely the same order 
 and continuous succession in which they are now presented 
 to the reader. They were given in different portions, as parts 
 of a course of theological instruction, each in its assigned 
 position, and were separated from each other by the discus- 
 sion of other topics. It was thought expedient, however, to 
 arrange them in a continuous series, so as to present a com- 
 plete and connected view of all that he wrote on this fun- 
 damental topic in theology. To' the lectures on moral gov- 
 ernment, have been appended other essays and lectures on 
 subjects that are naturally connected with this. 
 
 The first section embraces the discussion of the essential 
 nature of moral government, preliminary to any inquiries as 
 to what is the actual government of the universe, as we dis- 
 cover it by the light of nature. Section second treats of 
 that government as it is made known by the light of nature, 
 and discusses some of those questions of fact concerning the 
 actual administration of the universe, which are appropriate 
 to natural theology. The last four lectures of this section 
 present a brief view of the necessity and evidences of reve- 
 lation, so far as the light of nature and the lessons of human 
 experience furnish the materials for an argument. Section 
 third contains an extended discussion of the government of 
 God as exhibited in revelation. Such a discussion should, in 
 one view of the subject, according to the opinions expressed in 
 the first section by the author, comprehend a complete system 
 
INTRODUCTION. Vii 
 
 of revealed theology. It in fact gives us only his views of 
 the nature of the Jewish Theocracy, as being a representation 
 or visible manifestation of the unseen kingdom of God, and 
 a careful examination of the law of God as it is revealed in 
 this theocracy, and by the direct teachings of. the Scriptures. 
 The opinions of the author in respect to some of the most 
 important doctrines of the Scriptures, are however given with 
 great distinctness, in connection with the treatment of his 
 principal theme. Indeed, the most superficial reader of these 
 lectures cannot fail to see in them all, from the beginning to the 
 end — even the most abstract and metaphysical — a distinct and 
 direct reference to the doctrines of atonement and justification. 
 In the Appendix, will be found an essay on "Justice," which has 
 a double interest, as a vigorous handling of the theme in its 
 relations to civil society and the rights of man, and also in its 
 bearings upon certain theological theories of the atonement. 
 The essay on " the Providential Government and Purposes of 
 God" is intimately related to the just and exact understanding 
 of his moral government. The discussion of the question, " In 
 what sense God can purpose opposite events," naturally arises 
 in every attempt to vindicate the Holy One from responsibility 
 for moral evil. The essay on " the Penalties of the Civil Law" 
 is explained by its relation to the lecture, out of which it arises. 
 The discussion of Miracles seems to be required by the lectures 
 in the first volume that treat of the philosophical possibil- 
 ity and truth of the Christian revelation. The Lectures and 
 Appendix present the views of the author upon some of the 
 most important questions involved in the nature and the 
 evidences of natural and revealed theology. These views it 
 seemed desirable to collect and arrange in a single work. 
 
 The opinions expressed are given to the reader as the author 
 believed and taught, and in the language in which he uttered 
 them. His style was formed in the school of Butler and Ed- 
 wards, and owes some of its peculiarities to the constant repe- 
 tition of those definitions and distinctions, which he wished to 
 impress upon the ear and to fix in the minds of the pupils 
 
Vlll INTRODUCTION. 
 
 who heard him. His style was adapted to the ear, and not to 
 the eye ; it was formed in and for the lecture-room, not for the 
 printed page. Practiced critics and editors will easily under- 
 stand how difficult it is to condense or correct such a style. 
 
 It may be interesting to some of Dr. Taylor's friends and 
 pupils to know, that the first lecture in the second volume 
 was written only a few months before his death. It is almost 
 the last word concerning the importance of a correct and 
 vigorous theology which he was permitted to write, and may 
 be viewed as his dying testimony on this most important 
 theme. K P. 
 
 Yale College, Jan. 19, 1859. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 WHAT IS A PERFECT MORAL GOVERNMENT ? OR, MORAL 
 GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 LECTURE I. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Can we determine the nature of a perfect Moral Government? — A perfect Moral Govern- 
 ment denned. — The definition explained and vindicated in the following particulars : 
 I. Moral Government is an influence on moral beings. 
 II. Moral Government implies a moral Governor. 
 
 III. Moral Government is designed so to control the action of moral beings, as to se- 
 
 cure the great end of action on their part 
 
 IV. The influence of a perfect Moral Government is the influence of authority 1 
 
 LECTURE II. 
 
 V. A perfect Moral Government involves the exercise of authority through the medium of 
 law.— The nature of such a law.— First, It is a decisive rule of action to subjects.— Sec- 
 ondly, It must require benevolence as the best kind of action, and must forbid selfish- 
 ness as the worst kind of action. — Viewed in relation to these objects, and to the agent 
 who exercises them, these affections are supreme, intelligent, morally free, permanent, 
 and predominant 16 
 
 LECTURE III. 
 
 V. A perfect Moral Government involves the exercise of authority through the medium of 
 law. — The nature of such a law further unfolded. — Third characteristic of the law so de- 
 manded in a perfect Moral Government, viz. : it requires benevolence and forbids selfish- 
 ness.— Relation of predominant to subordinate action.— Benevolence and selfishness de- 
 fined. — These constitute the only kind of action possible to a moral being. — Manner in 
 which the law requires and forbids subordinate action. — Benevolence and selfishness the 
 only morally right and wrong actions ... - 47 
 
 LECTURE IV. 
 
 V. A perfect Moral Government involves the exercise of authority through the medium of 
 law. — The nature of law further unfolded. — 4. It must express the Lawgiver's prefer- 
 ence of the action required, to its opposite, all things considered — 5. It implies, that the 
 Lawgiver can be satisfied with obedience, and with nothing but obedience, on the part of 
 the subject— 6. It expresses his highest approbation of obedience and his highest disap- 
 probation of disobedience G9 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 LECTURE V. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Y. A perfect Moral Government involves the exercise of authority through the medium of 
 law.— The nature of such a law further unfolded.— 7. The law of a perfect Moral Gov- 
 ernment involves sanctions. — The relations of a Moral Governor to his kingdom more 
 particularly considered.— Legal sanctions defined.— They establish or ratify the authority 
 of the Moral Governor. — Thoy consist in natural good promised to obedience, and in 
 natural evil threatened to disobedience. — They establish the Moral Governor's authority 
 as its decisive proof. — They become decisive proof of the Moral Governor's authority 
 by manifesting his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of obedience, and 
 highest disapprobation of disobedience.— It is not incredible that God in the Scriptures 
 should express his highest approbation of obedience and his highest disapprobation of 
 disobedience to His law 82 
 
 LECTURE VI. 
 
 V. A perfect Moral Government involves the exercise of authority through the medium of 
 law. — The nature of such a law further unfolded. — 7. The law of a perfect Moral Gov- 
 ernment involves sanctions, (continued.) — 5th. Legal sanctions the necessary proof of 
 the Moral Governor's authority as the necessary manifestations and proofs of his benev- 
 olence in the form of his approbation of obedience and his highest disapprobation of dis- 
 obedience. — This shown by proving (1,) that legal sanctions are in some respect neces- 
 sary as the proof of the Moral Governor's authority ; (2,) that they are necessary for 
 this purpose, as the necessary proofs of his benevolence ; and (3,) that they are necessary 
 proofs of his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of obedience and high- 
 est disapprobation of disobedience. — The (1) and (2) of these arguments are treated in 
 this lecture. — (1.) Legal Sanctions are necessary in some respect as proof of the Moral 
 Governor's authority. — Argued from the import of the phrase legal sanctions ; from the 
 nature of the law of a perfect Moral Government ; from the nature of a law or rule of 
 action without sanctions ; from the fact that conformity and nonconformity to a rule 
 without sanctions would subvert the Moral Governor's authority. — (2.) They are neces- 
 sary as proofs of the Governor's authority as they are the necessary proofs of his benev- 
 olence.— Eeason given why attempts to prove the benevolence of God from the light of 
 nature are so unsuccessful 105 
 
 LECTURE VII. 
 
 Y. A perfect Moral Government involves the exercise of authority through the medium of 
 law.— The nature of the law further unfolded.— 7. The law of a perfect Moral Govern- 
 ment involves sanctions.— 5th. The necessity of legal sanctions shown.— (3,) because 
 they are the necessary proofs of his benevolence in the forms of his highest approbation 
 of obedience and highest disapprobation of disobedience.— This is argued ; first, from the 
 insufficiency of another mode of proving his benevolence ; second, from the nature of 
 legal sanctions as already explained ; third, from the view of the sanctions of the supreme 
 law of the state.— Remaeks : 1. Christianity is not a selfish system of religion ; 2. What 
 it is to make light of the divine threatenings ; 3. They who deny the view now given of 
 the sanctions of a perfect Moral Government cannot prove the benevolence of God 127 
 
 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 Y. A perfect Moral Government involves the exercise of authority through the medium of 
 law. — The nature of the law further unfolded. — Seventhly. The law of a perfect Moral 
 Government involves the requisite sanctions of the Moral Governor's authority. — 6th. 
 
CONTENTS. XI 
 
 Legal sanctions include the highest possible degree of natnral good, &c, and the highest 
 possible degree of evil.— Objections.— Punishment ought to terminate with sin ; if all 
 should disobey, all ought not to be punished; incredible and impossible that God should 
 adopt a moral system with such liabilities.— Conclusion 160 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD AS E^OWN BY THE LIGHT 
 
 OF NATURE. 
 
 LECTURE I. 
 
 Thesis to be established in three leading propositions.— First, God administers a Moral Gov- 
 ernment in some sense ; for, 1, men are moral beings ; 2, God has given them a law. — 
 Shown from the manifestation of the tendencies of action to good and evil.— No oppos- 
 ing evidence.— Perversion of a design does not disprove the reality of the design ; nor 
 the fact that such perversion was foreseen; nor that the perversion is universal. — The 
 perversion observed may bo temporary. — Tendency to wrong, not greater than to right 
 action. — Cause of the certainty but not of the necessity of such perversion. — The only 
 proper method of reasoning. — Conclusion 1 S4 
 
 LECTURE II. 
 
 3. First leading proposition continued.— God enforces conformity to his law by authority.— 
 (a) He assumes the right to give a law.— (6) He dispenses good and evil as powerful in- 
 ducements ;— for good and evil are the proper effects of right and wrong action ;— as self- 
 complacency and remorse are enjoyed and suffered ; reflection can be avoided only in 
 part; — (c) The providence of God in other ways works against evil and for good by dis- 
 cipline, restraint, sickness, disappointment, death.— Forebodings of evil after death. 203 
 
 LECTURE III. 
 
 Second leading proposition.— God's administration is equitable— proved by showing, 1. That 
 God has given the best law, 2. That he distributes good and evil equitably.— In opposition 
 to this proposition, the unequal distribution of good and evil has caused the chief diffi- 
 culty.— Various theories resorted to. — Is the difficulty real ?— (a) Greater difficulties in 
 denying God's equity than in admitting it.— (ft) No proof against it; for God is not in- 
 equitable in treating men better than they deserve, nor in treating them worse. More 
 rational to regard this distribution as explicable in some unknown way. God may be 
 administering a moral government under a gracious economy. — (c) There is satisfactory 
 proof for his equity— the arguments probable and cumulative 217 
 
 LECTURE IV. 
 
 Second leading proposition continued, viz. : God administers an equitable moral govern- 
 ment. — The possibility of a future state precludes all objections against the Divine 
 equity. — No presumption against a future state. — No proof the soul is material. — No 
 evidence that death destroys the soul.— Direct proofs of a future state.— Kind of evi- 
 dence furnished. — No cause known which can destroy the soul. — Every thing which has 
 begun continues to exist.— The present state unsuitable to the natural perfection of man. 
 — Argument from man's moral nature decisive 230 
 
Xll CONTENTS. 
 
 LECTURE V. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Second leading proposition continued, viz. : God administers an equitable moral govern- 
 ment. — God administers his moral government under a gracious economy. — Explana- 
 tion. — Proof 1. The manner in which he administers good and evil harmonizes with such 
 an economy. — 2. Distribution of good and evil proves a design to recover. — (a) A virtu- 
 ous life the happiest.— (b) Gifts of God tend to gratitude.— (c) Natural evils prove the 
 same design. — (d) The present a state of discipline. — (e) The happiness of man in his 
 own power. — {/) Without forgiveness, reclaiming influences vain. God's favor can be 
 secured only on the terms which Christianity prescribes, whether Christianity is or is 
 not from God 245 
 
 LECTURE VI. 
 
 Second leading proposition continued, viz. : God administers an equitable moral govern- 
 ment; also, God administers a moral government under a gracious economy.— Proof 3. 
 "We must suppose God to administer his government in the way of exact retribution, or 
 through an atonement. — One of these is true, or God is deficient in power, or malignant 
 in intention. — Just conception of Benevolence in God. — What is Justice in God. — Infi- 
 dels have false views of both.— Dispensations of God's Providence prove him not to ba 
 weak. — The equity of a moral government can be consistent with mercy only through 
 an atonement. — Alternative for the unbeliever 268 
 
 LECTURE VII. 
 
 Third leading proposition : God governs with rightful authority. — This proved by his benev- 
 olence. — Different opinions in respect to the method of proving his benevolence. — If it 
 cannot be proved by the right of nature, it cannot be proved at all. — The Scriptures as- 
 sert and assume that this benevolence is manifest by the light of nature 276 
 
 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 Third leading proposition continued, viz. : God governs with rightful authority. — The be- 
 nevolence of God may be proved, 1. From his natural attributes. — Nature of the argu- 
 ment. — 2. From his works. — Preliminary definitions and explanations. — God is proved to 
 be perfectly benevolent, by showing, {a) that the present system may be the best pos- 
 sible; (b) that it is the best possible.— Prop, (a) considered.— Objection from existence 
 of evil. — Evil is natural and moral. — Natural evil considered in the sufferings of infants, 
 of animals, and of men as moral beings 2SS 
 
 LECTURE IX. 
 
 Third leading proposition continued, viz. : God governs with rightful authority. — God is be- 
 nevolent, because the present system may be the best possible. — Objection from the exist- 
 ence of moral eviL — There may be an impossibility, in the nature of things, that it should 
 be prevented. Assuming that a moral system may be the best, 1. It may be impossible 
 to prevent all sin under a moral system.— 2. If this is not true, it may be impossible un- 
 der the best moral system 302 
 
 LECTURE X. 
 
 Third leading proposition continued, viz.: God governs with rightful authority.— God is 
 benevolent. — 2. The present system not only may be, but is the best possible to the 
 Creator. — (a) It is better than none. — Happiness greater than misery in this life. — Ee- 
 sults in a future world. — (b) It is the best possible. — No proof that a better could be 
 
CONTENTS. xiii 
 
 adopted.— The present, in its nature and tendencies, is the best conceivable, and there- 
 fore the be6t possible. — This argued under two heads; 1. From its general form as a 
 moral system, in respect to the kind of beings and the kind of influence used.— 2. From 
 its particular forms as a moral system, as involving influences from the nature and ten- 
 dencies of moral action, from moral government, from an equitable moral government, 
 and the same with a gracious economy. — Kemark 326 
 
 LECTURE XI. 
 
 APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT FROM NATURE, TO PROVE THAT 
 CHRISTIANITY IS FROM GOD. 
 
 Nature of Divine Revelation. — Argument for its necessity.— Different views of the grounds 
 of this. — I. Not necessary, because man cannot discover moral and religious truth ; 
 but II. Necessary, 1. To make known the truth in the most perfect method, espe- 
 cially by language.— Absurdity of objecting to this medium.— 2. To receive the prac- 
 tical influence of such truth. — The experiment by the light of nature decisive, shown 
 by the ancient philosophers. — Their views scanty, vacillating, erroneous. — Practical in- 
 fluence feeble on themselves and others. — Prevalence of immorality. — Their teachings 
 and example limited 350 
 
 LECTURE XII. 
 
 Argument for necessity of revelation continued : Prop. 2 continued. — Revelation necessary 
 to secure the practical influence of the truth. — Argued from the state of Pagan na- 
 tions at present.— From the influence of Deism.— Deists greatly indebted to Christian- 
 ity. — The influence of their systems is feeble, scanty and uncertain, denies the holiness 
 and justice of God.— Their views of sin and repentance defective.— Their morality 
 superficial. — Men are not made better by them. — Little zeal for reforming men by 
 them.— Give no comfort in death.— Prop. 3. Revelation necessary to make known 
 truth undiscoverable without it.— Conclusion 865 
 
 LECTURE XIII. 
 
 DreECT Argument.— Question proposed.— Preliminary remarks.— 1. Question to be decided 
 by human reason.— Limits of reason.— Perversion of reason.— 2. Rational to believe in 
 divine origin of Christianity on low evidence. — Relation of Christianity to our character 
 and life'. — Conclusions from this principle. — a. Unjust to demand high degree of evi- 
 dence. — b. Shows the true cause of Infidelity. — c. The most promising method of con- 
 vincing men of the truth. — rf. The reasonableness of faith in unlearned men. — 3. Com- 
 mon facts and principles must be assumed by all parties as premises of argument- 
 Illustrations.— How common premises may be fixed and agreed on.— Argument stated in 
 four propositions. — First two have been previously proved 382 
 
 LECTURE XIV. 
 
 Direct Aegixment continued.— Two remaining propositions considered.— Prop. 3. The im- 
 portance of revelation renders it probable, if not certain, that God would give a revela- 
 tion.— Opposed by some.— Their views discussed.— Man not competent to decide on the 
 manner, &c, of revelation.— Recapitulation of argument on necessity of revelation. — 
 Prop. 4. That which claims to be a revelation, is what it claims to be.— Conclusion. 403 
 
THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 WHAT IS A PERFECT MORAL GOVERNMENT! 
 
 OK 
 
 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 LECTURE I. 
 
 Can we determine the nature of a perfect Moral Government ?— A perfect Moral Government 
 defined. — The definition explained and vindicated in the following particulars : 
 I. Moral Government is an influence on moral beings. 
 II. Moral Government implies a moral Governor. 
 
 III. Moral Government is designed so to control the action of moral beings, as to secure th« 
 
 great end of action on their part. 
 
 IV. The influence of a perfect Moral Government is the influence of authority. 
 
 Moral Government may be said in general terms to be the 
 government of moral beings by the influence of authority. It 
 may be distinguished into different kinds, as it is vested in 
 different administrators, and is administered over different 
 communities. The more prominent of these different kinds 
 of moral government are the government of God over his 
 moral creation, which is above every other — the government 
 of the state or civil government, and the government of the 
 family or parental government. 
 
 We may suppose that both parental and civil governments, 
 as manifestly indispensable in some form to man's present 
 well-being, are alike the ordinances of a benevolent Deity, 
 and subservient to the end of that higher system in which 
 men are more directly the subjects of God's moral dominion. 
 
 For the purpose however of distinguishing the different 
 kinds of moral government, so far as to aid us in our present 
 Vol. I.— 1 1 
 
2 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 inquiry, we may suppose the family and the state each to ex- 
 ist as a distinct and independent community, and to be under 
 a jurisdiction peculiar and appropriate to itself. As members 
 of these particular communities, men would be under a neces- 
 sity of acting in one manner rather than in another, to secure 
 the highest well-being of the whole. As bound by such a ne- 
 cessity, and capable as moral beings of so acting as to defeat 
 this great end, and to produce the opposite result in misery, 
 they are the lit subjects of moral government, and actually as 
 members of the family and the state, live under such a gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 Our first notion of moral government is obviously derived 
 from that which is parental, and is extended and modified in 
 that conception which we form of the government of the 
 state. Since however, both are marred by undeniable imper- 
 fection, we can appeal to neither as a perfect example of moral 
 government. Nor can it be pretended that we have any ex- 
 ample of a perfect moral government, which in the present 
 world is fully unfolded to our inspection in all the detail of 
 its administration, and in all the completeness of its issues. 
 The most that can be claimed is, that there is such a govern- 
 ment entered upon — one in the actual progress of administra- 
 tion — one which, though not fully achieving its own perfect 
 end, the highest conceivable well-being of all — is yet so dis- 
 tinctly characterized by a strict adherence to the principles 
 of equity, though modified in their application by a gracious 
 economy, as clearly to reveal its absolute perfection. 
 
 By a perfect moral government then, is here meant not a 
 moral government which actually secures, but one which in 
 its true nature and tendency is perfectly adapted to secure, and 
 which unperverted would secure the great and true end of 
 such a government, even the highest conceivable well-being 
 of its subjects. We may suppose such a government to exist, 
 and the end which it is designed and fitted to accomplish, to 
 be partially or wholly defeated, solely through perversion by 
 its subjects. Such perversion however, would in no degree 
 obscure, but necessarily imply the absolute perfection of the 
 system. Nor if we suppose, that on account of the foreseen 
 perversion of a perfect system, it would be better in relation 
 to actual results to adopt another system, still the adoption of 
 the latter could be justified only on the ground of the foreseen 
 
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS. 3 
 
 perversion in fact of the former, and would therefore imply its 
 absolute perfection. We may further suppose that an abso- 
 lutely perfect system of moral government would be adopted 
 by an infinitely perfect Being, notwithstanding he should fore- 
 see some degree of actual perversion and counteraction of its 
 tendencies ; for it might still be true, that he should also fore- 
 see that the actual results of such a system w r ould be far bet- 
 ter than those of an imperfect system, even the best possible 
 which he can secure. 
 
 Can we then know what are the essential elements of a 
 perfect moral government — those elements which must consti- 
 tute such a government in the hands of an infinitely perfect 
 Being, the knowledge of which must be of the highest con- 
 cern to us, as the subjects of such a government? I answer, 
 that there is no subject which mankind generally better under- 
 stand ; none which they are under a more imperious necessity 
 of understanding than moral government in some of its exist- 
 ing forms ; none of whose reality they have a more constant 
 and sure conviction ; none of whose nature in all essential re- 
 spects they have a more adequate comprehension. There can- 
 not be an existing state of man, as related to man, there can- 
 not be a social state (and without this man can exist to no im- 
 portant purpose), from which the idea of a moral government 
 and the full conviction of its reality and necessity can be sepa- 
 rated. This conviction begins almost with our existence, even 
 so early as when the mother by some look or action first im- 
 presses the mind of the child with the necessity of submitting 
 his will to her will. Thus the condition of human infancy 
 places us from the beginning in society, and naturally and 
 necessarily introduces subjection to superior wisdom, power 
 and goodness. From the dawn of the intellect, our parents 
 jn-escribe things to be done, and forbid things not to be done, 
 approving and disapproving, rewarding and punishing accord- 
 ing to our doings. Thus they early assume authority over us, 
 aiming at one comprehensive result in all our doings — that 
 of bringing our will into conformity with theirs. 
 
 Now why is this, and who does not know why it is ? It is 
 because no family could subsist, much less be prosperous and 
 happy without it. No matter how powerful may be the mo- 
 tives in other forms of exhibition, to promote the harmony and 
 well-being of the domestic circle — no matter how strong the 
 
4 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 mutual affections which prevail, nor how wise and good the 
 counsels and advice which are given, it would all be naught, 
 were there no law, no authority, no calling to account, no 
 retribution, that is, no moral government. Why is this? Let 
 the appeal be made to any parent who has the heart of a 
 parent. Why is it, that he governs his children by authority; 
 why assume this prerogative as unquestionable? Is it, that he 
 takes pleasure in so doing for its own sake ? Is it, that he 
 loves for its own sake, to restrain their liberty, to cross their 
 inclinations and often to inflict suffering? Or, is it because 
 he knows their incompetence to govern themselves as well as 
 lie can govern them — because he knows their ignorance, their 
 passion, their waywardness, and because he knows, that he 
 should be wanting in affection and a due parental oversight 
 and guardianship, if he did not do, what he so surely knows to 
 be for the best? In a word, is it not because he knows the 
 necessity to the well-being of 'the family ', of maintaining, do what 
 else he. may, parental authority f What parent, what child, 
 what human being does not understand the nature, the design, 
 and the necessity of moral government ? Who does not know 
 all this, as it results from the nature of the human mind, as 
 surely as he knows the necessity of food and of common air, 
 which arises from the nature of the human body? 
 
 If we pass from the family to the state, we iind the same 
 familiar and well-known thing, having a wider range, and a 
 higher end ; though more rigorously maintained in its adminis- 
 tration, and more fully developed in its nature and essential 
 characteristics. Born, as most men are under some form of 
 civil government, they learn what it is for some ruling power 
 to exercise authority over many, as the necessary means of a 
 nation's welfare. Here we find for the most part a great vari- 
 ety of statutes and enactments, having respect to the overt 
 doings of men, but all based on one fundamental law; all 
 implying its existence, and its supreme obligation, — the law of 
 subjection to the powers that be. We find a sovereign Will 
 — a Moral Governor — and the great fact assumed, conceded, 
 and acted upon— the absolute necessity of authoritative law — 
 of a supreme unquestionable right to govern. We find a 
 necessity of it to the existence and well-being of the state — 
 yea, to the prevention of utter anarchy and wretchedness — 
 which no one in his senses can doubt, dispute or deny. Sup- 
 
NECESSARY TO TITE STATE. 5 
 
 pose what else we may, either in respect to him who governs 
 or those who are governed ; the authority of law must be 
 recognized and maintained, or all is lost. Whatever sacrifice 
 may be involved — whatever may be lost or gained, this one 
 thing — this indispensable means of the public weal must be 
 maintained. And who does not understand the nature, the de- 
 sign, the necessity of civil government ? Who does not know, 
 that without it human society could not exist — much less attain 
 any tolerable degree of prosperity and enjoyment? What 
 could be done without the fundamental law, claiming submis- 
 sion to authority — and what would this law be without author- 
 ity sustained by sanctions — without judges, courts, trials, ex- 
 ecutive officers, sentences passed and executed, and a sovereign 
 will, from which the whole emanates.* 
 
 I might exhibit the same thing, as it shows itself and its 
 necessity, in lower and feebler forms, in all the relations of 
 life. In our friendships, how much depends on the discharge 
 of certain duties ; how are we held under responsibility, and 
 failing here, how are we judged unworthy, and cast away. In 
 neighborhood intercourse, in private circles, in the forms of 
 politeness, and even in street civilities, who does not know, 
 what it is to be responsible to the will of another, who does not 
 know that in these matters there is a law, that a record is kept, 
 that offenders are marked, that there is a tribunal, a judgment 
 and a retribution ? Indeed were there two, and only two vol- 
 untary beings in the universe, in all respects equals and exist- 
 ing together for their mutual well-being, the will of one in 
 certain respects, would be law to the will of the other, involv- 
 ing the right to enforce it, and with power involving an 
 actual enforcement, by appropriate sanctions. It is the right 
 of one in many cases, to have his will done by another ; and, 
 wherever this right exists, especially with power to enforce it, 
 we have an exemplification of the essential characteristics of 
 moral government, whether this right extends to an individual, 
 a family, an empire or a universe. 
 
 We all know then, what moral government is, and that men 
 cannot exist in society without it. In that form of it called 
 civil government, the lowest culprit in his prison knows its 
 
 * In a representative government, I need hardly say, that the sovereign will is 
 that of the people manifested through their representatives. 
 
b MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 general nature, its principles, its end, and its absolute neces- 
 sity to this end, as well as the judge who condemns him. Not 
 one of us,if we could not rely on its protection, would dare to 
 go through the streets of our city. Without moral government, 
 we should no sooner venture into human society than venture 
 into a den of wolves. These things are enough to show how 
 necessary moral government is to man, and how well too the 
 thing itself is understood by man. 
 
 But if neither parental nor civil government furnishes a 
 perfect specimen of moral government, how can one know in 
 what its perfection consists ; or what such a government would 
 be in the hands of a Being of infinite perfection ? 
 
 I answer that we are able to trace with entire accuracy the 
 essential imperfections of every human specimen, and thus to 
 determine what is essential to constitute a perfect moral gov- 
 ernment. Knowing the end of a moral government, what is 
 fitted to defeat it, and to a greater or less extent, what is 
 adapted to that end and necessary to it, we can to tin's extent 
 decide, what is not and what is, essential to the perfection of 
 such a system. Man may not be qualified to give absolute 
 perfection to such a system, but it does not follow that he can- 
 not conceive of its perfection. Suppose that an absolutely 
 perfect watch has never been made, and never can be by man, 
 does it therefore follow, that it is not easy to conceive of such 
 perfection as within the reach of the power and skill which man 
 does not possess ; or that man himself cannot specify the very 
 changes in the materials or the structure, which would give it 
 absolute perfection? What is supposable in such a case, we 
 claim to be true in that under consideration. We are so well 
 acquainted with the subject, that we know wherein the imper- 
 fection in the work of man consists, and can trace it to its cause. 
 We know so well, what are the true object and end of a moral 
 government, we know so well that by some things that end 
 must be defeated, and we know so well that other things are 
 perfectly adapted to secure that end ; we know so well wherein 
 all human forms of moral government are imperfect, and so 
 well that such deficiencies could not mar a moral government 
 in the hands of an infinitely perfect Being ; we know so well 
 what are the principles of moral action, and what are the 
 means most perfectly fitted to influence moral beings — in 
 short, we know so many things, that we can be at no loss 
 
IS AN INFLUENCE ON MORAL BEINGS. 7 
 
 to decide what a moral government must be in all essential 
 respects, when administered by a perfect God. 
 
 I am not saying, that we can tell all that God will or will 
 not do in such an administration, but that we can decide what 
 he will and will not do, in certain important and essential 
 respects. I hope to show you, that there is truth on this sub- 
 ject which man can know, and from which, in its bearings on 
 his immortal interests he cannot escape, and that while there is 
 such a God as Jehovah is clearly revealed, we are not doomed 
 to look out on his ways and his doings as on chaos and dark- 
 ness, but that, with an effulgence as broad as his own creation, 
 and as clear as the light which is poured over it, he shows an 
 end and a system of means worthy of such an author — a moral 
 creation, comprising beings made in his own image, with ten- 
 dencies and sure results that will " answer the great idea of 
 him who made it." 
 
 I assume, then, what I shall hereafter attempt to prove, 
 and what is properly assumed for the purpose of explanation, 
 that a moral system, or a community of moral beings, as dis- 
 tinguished from any other system not moral, is the best means 
 of the best end, and that a perfect moral government over 
 such a community is the necessary means of accomplishing 
 this end, and is therefore dictated and demanded by perfect 
 benevolence. I now propose to define and explain what I 
 intend by a perfect moral government; and to justify the 
 definition. 
 
 By a perfect moral government I intend — 
 
 The influence of the authority, or of the rightful 
 authority of a moral governor on moral beings, designed so 
 to control their action as to secure the great end of action 
 on their part, through the medium of law. 
 
 In explaining and justifying this definition, I propose to 
 consider the several parts of it, more or less extensively, as the 
 case may seem to require. 
 
 I. A moral government is an influence on moral beings, or, 
 on beings capable of moral action. 
 
 While this will be readily admitted, there are some things 
 involved in it, which demand consideration. One is, that the 
 influence of moral government being an influence on moral 
 beings and designed to control moral action, is as diverse in 
 its nature from the influence of physical causes, as moral 
 
8 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 action is from a physical effect ; or as a moral cause is from a 
 physical cause. It is an influence, which is designed aud 
 fitted to give, not the necessity, but merely the certainty of its 
 effect; and which leaves the moral liberty of the subject 
 unimpaired. Hence, it is not essential to this influence that it 
 actually secure the kind of action which it is fitted to secure. 
 A perfect moral government may exist with all its influence, 
 and yet be wholly counteracted in its designed effect on its 
 subjects, since it is obvious that such a government may be 
 maintained over subjects in revolt as well as over subjects who 
 are loyal. Rebellion against government, cannot exist when 
 there is no government. A perfect moral government then, as 
 a government over moral beings, in respect to any cause of 
 action giving the necessity of action, leaves every subject as 
 free to perform the action which it aims to prevent, as to per- 
 form that which it aims to secure. 
 
 II. A perfect moral government implies a moral gov- 
 ernor. 
 
 In this respect a moral government differs from a moral sys- 
 tem, as a species differs from a genus. A moral system may 
 be conceived to exist either with or without a moral governor. 
 We can conceive of moral beings, who should act under the 
 direct influence of motives, so far as these reach the mind in 
 the perceived nature, tendencies and consequences of action, 
 though there were no influence of a superior being sustaining 
 the relation of a ruler or moral governor. The direct influence 
 of motives, as these are thus apprehended by the mind, and 
 that influence which results from the character and relation 
 of a moral governor, though different, may yet coexist ; and 
 either may be supposed to exist without the other. The 
 former without the latter would simply imply a moral system 
 without a moral government. The latter with or without 
 the former, would imply a moral system in that particular 
 form which includes a moral government. The peculiar influ- 
 ence therefore, which arises from the character and relation of 
 a moral governor, whether other influences combine with it or 
 not, is the essential constituting influence of moral govern- 
 ment. So far as moral beings act under the peculiar influen- 
 ces of a moral governor, so far and no farther, do they act 
 under the influence of moral government. 
 
 III. The influence of a perfect moral government is designed 
 
PROMOTES THE GREAT END OF ACTION". 9 
 
 so to control the action of moral beings, as to secure the great 
 end of action on their part. 
 
 It will be admitted that this influence is designed to control 
 the action of moral beings in relation to some end which 
 depends on their action in a community of such beings, and 
 which is the best end, and in this sense the great end of such 
 action. What then, is this end ? I answer — It is the produc- 
 tion of well-being, even the highest well-being of all, and the 
 prevention of misery, even the highest misery of all. A moral 
 being is capable of performing two and only two kinds of 
 moral action, and as a subject of moral government, is under 
 an absolute necessity of performing one or the other in all 
 action. He cannot, as a moral being, be inactive. His nature 
 and relations necessarily exclude alike inaction and all neu- 
 trality of action, or action in which he does not act morally. — 
 Again, the nature — the peculiar powers and properties of a moral 
 being — show that he is qualified to perform, what no other 
 being is qualified to perform — that kind of action, which tends 
 to produce the best conceivable end of all action, the highest 
 conceivable well-being of all sentient beings, both of himself and 
 of all others. It is this nature of a moral being, which gives 
 to his existence its peculiar value — its pre-eminent worth, com- 
 pared with the nature of any other being. It is this, which, as 
 a creature, raises man to companionship with his Creator and 
 with creatures the most exalted, and brings him under obliga- 
 tion to act with them in principle, in purpose and in all sub- 
 ordinate and executive doings, for the accomplishment of the 
 great end of all action here on earth, and amid the scenes 
 of eternity. 
 
 Exalted thus by his nature as a moral being, he is by the 
 same nature qualified to act in a manner which tends to 
 defeat the great end of his creation, and to bring on himself 
 and on all other beings, unmingled and perfect misery. And, 
 what adds inconceivable importance to such a being is, that he 
 cannot avoid, as we have said, acting in one or the other of 
 these two modes of acting now specified. Even in every sub- 
 ordinate action, he acts from principle, he acts with or in the 
 form of, a supreme elective preference. These existing to- 
 gether are often called his action ; and its tendency as moral 
 action is the tendency of his action in its principle ; or rather, 
 l* 
 
10 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 the tendency of the action in principle is its true tendency.* 
 To neglect to act in that mode which is fitted to secure the 
 great and true end of all action on his part, viz., the highest 
 well-being of all — is not only to sacrifice and defeat that end, 
 but it is necessarily to act in that mode, which in its true ten- 
 dency is fitted to produce the opposite result — the highest 
 misery of all. 
 
 Every thing of real significance in the being of a moral 
 agent, viewed in relation to himself and to other beings, every 
 thing virtuous and praiseworthy in the use of his exalted pow- 
 ers, every thing vicious and blamable in the abuse of them, 
 every thing that is dignified and honorable, every thing that 
 is mean and disgraceful, every thing that affords inward peace 
 and triumph, every thing that brings remorse and despair — 
 every good and every evil to himself and to others — all, all 
 depends on action. The highest happiness and the highest 
 misery of all, all that blesses and all that curses, life and 
 death, are in the power of action. Such issues, according to 
 the true nature and tendencies of things, depend on the action 
 of moral beings. 
 
 Here, then, the design of a perfect moral government is 
 manifest. The design of the pendulum of a clock to control 
 and direct its motion, so as to mark the divisions of time as 
 the true end of the machine, is not more obvious than is the 
 design of a perfect moral government so to control the action 
 of moral beings, as to secure the great end of action on their 
 part, viz., the production of the highest well-being of all, and 
 the prevention of the highest misery of all. 
 
 IY. The influence of a perfect moral government is the 
 influence of authority. 
 
 By the influence of authority, I mean that influence which 
 results from that right to command, which is founded in com- 
 petence and disposition to govern in the best manner, and 
 which imposes an obligation to obey. In other words, it is 
 the influence of a right to command which imposes an ob- 
 
 * A man may, in subordinate action, love his children, and seek their temporal 
 welfare. But if in so doing, he prefers as he may, this welfare of his children, or 
 any other limited good, to the highest well-being of all, then his action as a whole 
 tends to destroy the highest well-being of all, and to produce their highest misery. 
 For such action is essentially constituted by a principle, which would produce this 
 twofold result, rather than sacrifice the welfare of the children. 
 
IS THE INFLUENCE OF AUTHORITY. 11 
 
 ligation to obey, as this right results from competence and 
 disposition to give and maintain the best law. Intelligent 
 voluntary beings never act voluntarily without acting from 
 a regard to their own well-being. Instead however, of re- 
 lying wholly, or even partially on their own wisdom or 
 judgment, in respect to the best mode of action, or the mode 
 in which they ought to act, they may rely partially or even 
 wholly on the decision of superior wisdom and superior good- 
 ness. It is true, that the subjects of a moral government may 
 possess such knowledge of the nature and tendency of action 
 on their part, as to know, irrespectively of any decision of the 
 moral governor, that their own highest well-being as well as 
 that of all others can be secured only by conformity to the 
 law of his government. In this way natural good and evil 
 as directly known to result from the nature and tendency of 
 different kinds of action, may concur with the influence of au- 
 thority to secure their conformity to the law. But in that con- 
 formity to law which is secured by the single influence of 
 natural good and evil as motives, there is no recognition of the 
 moral governor's authority. The influence of authority is not 
 the direct influence of natural good and evil reaching the mind 
 through the known nature and tendency of action. It is that 
 influence which results from one's having a right to command 
 by virtue of the superior power, wisdom and goodness, which 
 qualify him to govern in the best manner. So far as this in- 
 fluence reaches moral beings, whether resisted or unresisted 
 by them, they are under the influence of moral government. 
 Where this influence does not exist, there is nothing which 
 can be called moral government. 
 
 Of the truth of the present position, the slightest attention 
 to the subject will satisfy us. If we suppose a parent or a 
 civil ruler to be without that right to command which imposes 
 an obligation to obey, we cannot regard him as having author- 
 ity, or as administering a moral government — or at most only 
 in pretense. Nor can we suppose one to possess this right 
 and exercise it through the medium of law, without admitting 
 the existence of that which is called a moral government. It 
 is then, this influence — the influence that results from the 
 right to command which imposes an obligation to obey, which 
 is an essential element of moral government. This is the in- 
 fluence of authority. 
 
12 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 The nature of this influence will be more manifest if we 
 look at the basis or source of the right, viz., the competence 
 and disposition of one to govern in the best manner. These 
 qualifications vest him with the right to govern, as they fur- 
 nish or constitute the evidence or proof that he will govern in 
 the best manner, or that his law is the best law, and will be 
 sustained as a decisive rule of action to subjects. Such a gov- 
 ernor ought to be obeyed. Moral obligation is the binding 
 influence of that necessitv, which a moral bein^ is under of 
 performing that action which is decisively proved to be the 
 best action, or to be best fitted to the great end of all action 
 on his part, viz., the highest well-being of all, both of others 
 and of himself. Xow the competence and disposition of the 
 moral governor to give and maintain the best law, is decisive 
 proof that the law which he gives is the best law, and that the 
 action which he requires is the best fitted to the great end of 
 all action, and as such is the best and necessary means of the 
 best end. These qualifications of the moral governor there- 
 fore, as decisive proof that he will govern in the best manner, 
 become a ground of obligation on the part of subjects to obey 
 his law. 
 
 It is true that the subject, in submitting to the influence of 
 authority, acts from a desire of the highest well-being of others 
 and of himself, as truly as he would, were he influenced by 
 the knowledge of the nature and tendency of action irrespect- 
 ively of the influence of authority. The two influences may 
 and often do coexist. Still, they are different influences. If 
 the nature and tendency of action, as directly apprehended 
 by the mind, or learned by experience, may be one kind of 
 evidence, the character of an infinitely perfect lawgiver may 
 be another kind of evidence that the action required is the 
 best kind of action. If evidence from both sources exists, 
 then the highest evidence supposable in the case exists. If, 
 however, we suppose the evidence from the character of the 
 lawgiver only exists, this is sufficient and decisive evidence 
 that the action required by his law is the best action, and 
 ought to be done. That this evidence is peculiarly fitted to 
 impress the human mind, when compared with any other, we 
 may have occasion to show hereafter. Be this as it may, the 
 exclusive competence and disposition of the moral governor 
 to give and maintain the best law being fully evinced, consti- 
 
THE RIGHT OF THE GOVERNOR. 13 
 
 tute sufficient and decisive proof that the law requires the 
 best kind of action. This fact being established, the necessity 
 of the action required to the great end of all action, viz., the 
 highest well-being of all, is also established. This necessity 
 of the action required, results in the obligation of the agent 
 to perform the action. Without the manifest necessity of the 
 action to the great end of all action, nothing can be conceived 
 to be true of it which can bind the agent to its performance. 
 With the necessity of the action to this end, nothing can be 
 conceived to set aside his obligation to its performance. So 
 far therefore, as there is any thing in respect to the character 
 or the relation of a moral governor, which creates obligation 
 to obedience on the part of subjects, it is the manifestation of 
 his competence and disposition to govern in the best manner, 
 as a proof that he will so govern. 
 
 In opposition to the view now maintained, the right to gov- 
 ern is supposed by some to rest on other grounds than com- 
 petence and disposition to govern in the best manner. Thus, 
 the right, in certain cases, is supposed to rest on some peculiar 
 relation. For example, the right of the parent to govern his 
 children, is supposed to rest simply on the relation of the pa- 
 rent. This is obviously mistaking the evidence of the right 
 for the basis of the right. Every such general doctrine or 
 truth as that now referred to, must be determined by some 
 general principle. The general principle, that parents will 
 govern their children better than others will govern them, is 
 justly inferred from the parental relation, and is therefore, the 
 true basis or ground of the parents' right. This is obvious ; 
 for if we reverse the principle — if w T e adopt the principle 
 that others than parents will govern children better than pa- 
 rents, the right to govern them would rest in other hands. 
 Again, it is often maintained that the right of a Creator to 
 govern his creatures, rests simply on his relation as their Crea- 
 tor. The error in this case must be obvious to every one who 
 distinguishes this single relation from the moral character of 
 a Creator. If we suppose him, then, to be a selfish or malig- 
 nant being, having only the designs of such a being to accom- 
 plish by the conduct of his creatures, how could the mere act 
 of creation give him the right to govern ? He could not possess 
 even the right to create beings for his own selfish purposes ; 
 how then, could submission to the will of such a Creator be the 
 
14: MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 duty of his creatures ?* It is true that the act of creation 
 may by its effects be supposed to evince the goodness of the 
 Creator, and so become evidence of his qualification to govern 
 in the best manner, and the ground of his rightful authority. 
 But the act of creation may also by its effects be supposed to 
 evince the malignity of the Creator, or to leave his designs 
 and his character in concealment and in doubt. The act of 
 creation does not necessarily involve his goodness. The act 
 of creation therefore, simply considered, cannot be an ade- 
 quate basis for the right to govern. 
 
 To sustain the right of civil jurisdiction, various expedients 
 have been resorted to, all of which confirm the view now main- 
 tained. Thus " the divine right of kings" has been a favorite 
 doctrine ; and to exhibit and enforce the right to rule, civil rulers 
 have assumed the exalted titles of " sacred majesty," " God's 
 vice-regent," " God's anointed," " God's representative ;" 
 have claimed descent from gods, and exacted divine worship, 
 and have pretended to have secret intercourse with some di- 
 vinity, or to be gods themselves. All this clearly betrays the 
 principle now maintained, as that which in the view of those 
 who govern and of those who are governed, is the true basis 
 of the right to govern. 
 
 Some evidently rest the right to govern by law simply on 
 the power to execute its sanctions. This theory obviously 
 places the entire influence of moral government in the influ- 
 ence of natural good and of natural evil, as the one is prom- 
 ised to obedience and the other threatened to disobedience ; 
 viewed only as motives to persuade to the one and dissuade 
 from the other. According to this view, might gives right, 
 and the veriest tyrant with power to execute the sanctions of 
 law, combined with the most fell malignity, has a righteous 
 claim for the unqualified submission of his subjects. On this 
 scheme there can be no fixed standard, no permanent and es- 
 sential elements of right and wrong moral action. All moral 
 distinctions are subverted, and any being having the power, 
 would have the right to fill the universe with misery. This 
 monstrous theory of moral government is the legitimate con- 
 sequence of the selfishness of this selfish world, looking only 
 at natural good and evil in the form of legal reward and 
 
 * Cicero says, that all religious and pious affection must cease, if love and be- 
 nevolence be denied to God. — De Nat. Deorum L, 144. 
 
THE RIGHT OF TIIE GOVERNOR. 15 
 
 penalty, as the only motives to secure obedience and prevent 
 disobedience to law. No account is made of the essential ele- 
 ment of a moral government, the influence of authority. The 
 right to govern, which results from competence and disposition 
 to govern in ttie best maimer — the right which imposes an ob- 
 ligation to obey, is unknown, and obedience and disobedience 
 to a moral governor as having this right, are impossible. 
 
 EEMAEK. 
 
 In view of the nature of rightful authority, how desirable it 
 is that men should be placed under this influence. 
 
WHAT IS A PERFECT MORAL GOVERNMENT? 
 
 LECTURE II. 
 
 V. A perfect Moral Government involves the exercise of authority through the medium of law. — 
 The nature of such a law. 
 First, It is a decisive rule of action to subjects. 
 
 Secondly, It must require benevolence as the best kind of action, and must forbid selfishness 
 as the worst kind of action. 
 Viewed in relation to these objects, and to the agent who exercises them, these affections are 
 supreme, intelligent, morally free, permanent, and predominant. 
 
 I have said that a moral government is — I. An influence on 
 moral beings ; II. That it implies a moral governor ; III. That 
 it is designed so to control the action of moral beings, as to 
 secure the great end of action on their part ; IY. That it is 
 the influence of authority. I now proceed to say — 
 
 Y. That a perfect moral government involves the exercise 
 of authority through the medium of law. 
 
 Here the question arises, what is law — the law of a perfect 
 moral government f 
 
 Generally speaking, the law of a perfect moral government, 
 is the will of the moral governor concerning the action of his 
 subjects, promulgated as an authoritative and perfect rule of 
 action to them. In this general answer to the question, there 
 would be perhaps a universal agreement in opinion, while 
 in respect to its particular import, there might be diversity. 
 Hence the question demands an answer in several important 
 particulars. I proceed, then, to say — 
 
 That the law of a perfect moral government, is the promul- 
 gated will of the moral governor, as a decisive rule of action 
 to his subjects, requiring benevolence on their part as the best 
 hind of action, and as the sum of obedience, forbidding selfish- 
 ness on their part as the worst hind of action and the sum of 
 disobedience, expressing his preference of the action required to 
 its opposite all things considered, his satisfaction with obedience 
 and with nothing but obedience on the part of subjects, and his 
 
THE LAW A DECISIVE RULE. 17 
 
 highest approbation of obedience and highest disapprobation of 
 disobedience; and including the appropriate sanctions of the 
 moral governor's authority. 
 
 This definition of the law of a perfect moral government, I 
 shall attempt to support in the following particular propo- 
 sitions : 
 
 1. The law of a perfect moral government is the promulgated 
 will of the moral governor as a decisive rule of action to his 
 subjects. The will of the moral governor must be promul- 
 gated, that it may be known by the subject, since there can be 
 no obligation on the part of the latter to. obey the will of the 
 former, if it cannot be known. At the same time, the will 
 of the lawgiver being clearly promulgated, ignorance of the 
 law becomes voluntary, and can be no excuse for disobedi- 
 ence. This will must be promulgated as a decisive ride of 
 action to subjects. Beings who have the prerogative of decid- 
 ing the question of duty for themselves irrespectively of the 
 decision or will of another, are not under law to another. A 
 rule of action propounded to others for consideration, leaving 
 the question of duty wholly to their judgment of the nature 
 and tendency of action, is not a law. Law differs widely from 
 wholesome counsel or good advice ; and one of its essential 
 characteristics is, that it is a rule of action, determining what 
 ought to be done. Without this conception of a rule of action, 
 that of law cannot be formed. Law, therefore, instead of leav- 
 ing the question of duty to the judgment of its subjects, to be 
 founded on other evidence, is an authoritative decision of the 
 question, from which there is no appeal. 
 
 This conception of law is founded in the truth of things. 
 The right to command which imposes an obligation to obey, 
 results from competence and disposition to give and maintain 
 the best law. When a rightful sovereign therefore, in the 
 form of promulgated law decides what the subject ought to do, 
 the right of the subject to rejudge the decision, or to decide 
 for himself, is wholly superseded. Whatever other rights 
 real or imaginary, the subject may be supposed to possess in 
 other circumstances, as a subject of law, he can possess none 
 which is inconsistent with this right of the sovereign. The 
 right to rule vests in him, because its exercise by him is neces- 
 sary to the general good. As the subject then, can possess no 
 right inconsistent with the general good, so he can possess 
 
18 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 none inconsistent with that right of the sovereign, which is 
 demanded by the general good. He cannot therefore even 
 raise the question of duty, without usurping a right which he 
 has not — nay more, without invading a right which pertains 
 exclusively to the sovereign — one of the most sacred and invi- 
 olable of all rights, the right of deciding that action or conduct 
 of subjects,on which the highest well-being of each and of all 
 depends. To suppose otherwise,is to divest the law of a right- 
 ful sovereign of its peculiar and essential characteristic as a 
 rule of action, and to degrade it to the level of mere advice. 
 It is to commit the question of what ought to be done by the 
 subject, to the incompetent judgment and self-will of one who 
 is bound to conform his decision to that of unerring wisdom 
 and goodness. It is to suppose, that the subject of the best 
 law is not bound to obey it, but has a right to disobey it, and 
 to make war on the general good. Law then, the law of a 
 perfect moral government, decides — settles the question of 
 duty on the part of its subjects, by superseding absolutely and 
 wholly the right of decision on their part. 
 
 2. The law of a perfect moral government must require be- 
 nevolence as the best kind of action, and forbid selfishness as 
 the worst kind of action on the part of moral beings. 
 
 The general proposition, that benevolence is the best kind 
 of action, and selfishness the worst kind of action conceivable 
 on the part of moral beings, can scarcely be supposed to need 
 the support of formal argument. In this general view of the 
 two kinds of action however, the mind, we think, but imper- 
 fectly appreciates the intrinsic worth of the one as moral 
 worth, and the intrinsic evil of the other as moral evil. A 
 thorough and sucessful analysis of the essential elements 
 which constitute the one the best, and the other the worst 
 kind of action on the part of moral beings, will, I think, 
 greatly serve to heighten our estimate of the moral worth, 
 excellence, and rectitude of the one, and of the moral evil, 
 pravity, and turpitude of the other, and thus reveal more dis- 
 tinctly to our admiration the attractive lineaments and clus- 
 tering beauties of the one, and to our abhorrence the repulsive 
 aspect and manifold deformities of the other. 
 
 It is proposed then, for the purpose of showing that a per- 
 fect moral government must require benevolence, and forbid 
 selfishness on the part of its subjects, to show, by unfolding 
 
MORAL PREFERENCES SUPREME. 19 
 
 some of the essential elements of these only two kinds of 
 moral action, that the one is the best and the other the worst 
 kind of action conceivable on the part of a moral being, inas- 
 much as one is perfectly or in the highest degree fitted to 
 prevent the highest misery, and to produce the highest well- 
 being of all other sentient beings, and of the agent himself; 
 and the other is perfectly or in the highest degree fitted to 
 prevent the highest well-being, and to produce the highest 
 misery of all other sentient beings, and of the agent himself. 
 
 I propose to consider these different acts of a moral being : 
 
 (1.) As they are related to other sentient beings than the 
 agent / and, 
 
 (2.) As they are related to the agent himself. 
 
 Let us, then, contemplate these acts — 
 
 (1.) As they are related to other sentient beings than the 
 agent. 
 
 I here remark — 
 
 In the first place, that each of these acts is a supreme affec- 
 tion ; in other words, it is an elective preference of its object 
 as supreme. By this, I mean to distinguish each of these 
 acts, not only from the other characteristics flbove specified, 
 and from all involuntary or constitutional preferences, but 
 even from all subordinate and executive preferences which are 
 voluntary or elective. 
 
 Benevolence then, as the act of a moral being, is an elec- 
 tive preference of the highest well-being of all other sentient 
 beings as his supreme object. Selfishness, as the act of a 
 moral being, is an elective preference of the world,* as his 
 supreme object. To explain further, every elective preference 
 of an object as supreme, is a choice between those objects and 
 those only which can come into competition as objects of 
 election or choice, and also a preference of every object which 
 is implied in or necessary to the existence of the supreme ob- 
 ject. Now, with the object of the benevolent preference, 
 viz., the highest good of all other sentient beings, the highest 
 good of the agent can never come into competition as an ob- 
 
 * By the term world, I here mean every possible good, which as an object of 
 choice by a moral being, can come into competition with the highest well-being, and 
 with what is necessary to or implied in the highest well-being of all other sentient 
 boings. 
 
20 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 ject of election or choice, for the highest well-being of the 
 agent depends on the highest well-being, or rather on his 
 choice of the highest well-being of all other beings. But 
 with the exception of his own highest well-being, and with 
 what is necessary to or involved in it (e. g., his own virtue, 
 which cannot be an object of choice*,) every other good to 
 thdagent, including the non-existence of evil in many forms, 
 even all worldly good can come into competition with the 
 highest well-being of all other beings as an object of prefer- 
 ence. The benevolent preference then, is not, and cannot be 
 a preference to the highest well-being of all other beings, to 
 the agent's own highest well-being, nor of his own highest 
 well-being to the highest well-being of all other beings. It is 
 a preference of the highest well-being of all other beings, to 
 all other good, including the non-existence of all evil, which 
 can come into competition with their highest well-being as an 
 object of choice. In this preference therefore, the agent pre- 
 fers the highest well-being of all other beings to any and 
 every good, including the non-existence of all evil, which can 
 be preferred by him to their highest well-being. It is, of 
 course, not indeed an uninterested, but a disinterested affection, 
 it being its true nature and tendency as a benevolent prefer- 
 ence, to sacrifice all good, and to submit to and incur all 
 evil, on his part, which can be necessary to secure the high- 
 est well-being of all other beings. Nor does it stop here. A 
 moral being, in preferring the highest well-being of all other 
 sentient beings as his supreme object, prefers every thing to 
 its opposite, which is necessary to or implied in the existence 
 of this object of his preference. Particularly he prefers to 
 its opposite, every thing in their condition and circumstances 
 which is necessary to the existence of this object, especially 
 the perfect virtue of all other moral beings, as the known neces- 
 sary means of their highest well-being. He also prefers to their 
 opposites, the non-existence of the highest misery, and of all 
 misery or unhappiness on the part of all others, with the non- 
 existence of all causes and means of these evils ; especially he 
 thus prefers the non-existence of the vice or wickedness of all 
 
 * One's own virtue maybe the object of a constitutional preference to its oppo- 
 site, but not of an elective preference or choice, since this would imply the absurdity 
 of choosing his choice. 
 
MORAL P REFERENCES SUPREME. 21 
 
 other moral beings, as the cause or means of their highest 
 misery. Thus we see the perfect adaptation of benevolence, 
 considered as an elective preference of the highest well-being 
 of all other beings as supreme, to secure this object, unclogged 
 by any regard of the agent to his own highest well-being, and 
 to any less happiness on his part, and involving a preference 
 to its opposite of every thing else which can be necessary to, 
 or implied in the existence of the object of his preference, 
 the highest well-being of all other sentient beings. 
 
 We shall now see, that from the nature of selfishness as an 
 elective preference of its object as supreme, the facts are far 
 otherwise. With the object of the sellish preference, viz., the 
 world, as the supreme object, the highest well-being of the 
 agent, the highest well-being of all other sentient beings, and 
 the non-existence of the highest misery of all such beings, 
 are necessarily in competition as objects of choice. The agent 
 in preferring the world as his supreme object, necessarily pre- 
 fers the non-existence of his own highest well-being to the non- 
 existence of the highest well-being, and the existence of the 
 highest misery of all other sentient beings, to the absence or 
 non-existence of the object of his selfish preference. Nor is 
 this all. A moral being in preferring the world as his supreme 
 object, necessarily prefers every thing else to its opposite, 
 which can be necessary to, or implied in the attainment of his 
 supreme object. He therefore prefers to its opposite every 
 thing in the condition and circumstances of all other sentient 
 beings, which can be necessary to the attainment of his ob- 
 ject ; particularly the non-existence of the perfect virtue, and 
 the existence of the perfect vice or wickedness of all other 
 moral beings, together with the non-existence of all other 
 causes or means of their happiness, and the existence of all 
 other causes or means of their unhappiness or misery, to the 
 absence, or non-existence of his supreme object. It is of 
 course the true tendency of the selfish preference on the part 
 of a moral being, to destroy all good — all happiness and the 
 means of it, and to produce all evil — all misery and the means 
 of it — on the part of all other sentient beings, which may be 
 necessary to secure the object of the preference. 
 
 This view of selfishness as a principle of action on the part 
 of a moral being, is abundantly recognized in the language of 
 common life, particularly in that of the Scriptures. (Yid. Jas. 
 
22 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 iv. 4.)* It places its object — the world — above every other 
 object in its affections ; and will therefore destroy the highest 
 good and produce the highest misery of all other beings, if 
 necessary to the accomplishment of its object. Though it may 
 not always reveal itself in the form of malice or hate, still it 
 lives and acts in the mind with constant and reckless neglect 
 and contempt, and therefore with practical opposition and 
 hostility to all other good than its own object. It is, of course, 
 as a principle of action, nothing but a principle of malevolence, 
 in the only true and essential form of malevolence. Such is it 
 in its essential nature ; nor is it less odious and destructive be- 
 cause, though it assume not the mere terrific form of infuriate 
 malice or hate in its overt doings, it carries on its work with 
 heartless indifference and open scorn for the highest good, and 
 the highest misery of all other beings. 
 
 Thus, each of these two kinds of moral action — benevolence 
 and selfishness — considered simply as an elective preference of 
 its object as supreme, places that object in choice, in affection 
 and in purpose, above every other object, which can come into 
 competition with it as an object to be sought. It involves, of 
 course, an unqualified determination — a full purpose of heart — 
 to sacrifice any good, the sacrifice of which, and to produce any 
 evil, the production of which, may be necessary for the accom- 
 plishment of its object. At the same time, no state of mind on 
 the part of a moral being is of such sure and infallible tendency 
 as a cause, to go out into the full production of its effect, as 
 the elective preference of an object as supreme. ]STor does a 
 moral being aim at or seek any object as supreme, except in 
 either the benevolent or the selfish preference. All other acts 
 of will, on the part of such a being fix on their objects in sub- 
 servience to the accomplishment of his supreme object; and 
 therefore terminate in these objects. It is only in the elective 
 preference of an object as supreme, that, a moral being so fixes 
 his will upon, and so directs his affections to that object — so 
 concentrates thought, and desire, and feeling upon it, as to be 
 unqualifiedly willing — even fully determined, to sacrifice any 
 and every good, and to incur any and every evil which may 
 be necessary to the attainment of that object. But this he 
 
 * " The friendship of the world is enmity against God." " The minding of the 
 flesh is enmity against God." 
 
MORAL PREFERENCES INTELLIGENT. 23 
 
 does in each elective preference of an object as supreme, Be- 
 nevolence then, as an elective preference of its object as 
 supreme, is in one respect the action and the only action of a 
 moral being, which is perfectly fitted to prevent the highest 
 misery, and in its stead, to produce the highest well-being of 
 all other sentient beings ; and selfishness, as an elective pref- 
 erence of its object as supreme, is, in one respect, the action 
 and the only action of a moral being, which is perfectly fitted 
 to prevent the highest well-being, and to produce the highest 
 misery of all other sentient beings. Benevolence, then, as an 
 elective act, and as related to other beings, is the best kind of 
 action in this respect, and selfishness as an elective act, and 
 as related to other beings, is in this respect, the worst kind of 
 action conceivable on the part of a moral being. 
 
 I remark — 
 
 In the second place ; that each of these moral acts is an 
 intelligent preference of its object as supreme. By this, I 
 mean, that in each of these elective preferences, the mind acts 
 with an intellectual apprehension of the objects of its choice. 
 In either case, the will and the affections are fixed on an object 
 as supreme, not with ignorance, but with knowledge; — not 
 amid the darkness of error, but under the light of truth. The 
 agent, whether he acts for weal or for woe, knows what he is 
 doing. lie has apprehended the tw r o great objects of moral 
 choice, their nature, relations and tendencies. All that knowl- 
 edge or truth can do, is done. He knows the object at 
 which he aims, in distinction from that at which he does not 
 aim. The end at which he aims — the end to be accomplished, 
 is clearly to be distinguished from the end not to be accom- 
 plished ; and is ever held in distinct vision before him. Thus 
 every conceivable security is furnished, that his supreme ob- 
 ject will never be mistaken ; — that his supreme object, or any 
 thing involved in or necessary to its existence, will not be 
 forgotten or lost sight of; nor in any way neglected by being 
 unthought of or out of mind ; nor that the opposite object will 
 be sought in its stead. What higher or more invaluable 
 security than this, can be given, that the benevolent prefer- 
 ence will act for, and thus accomplish its object — and what 
 higher or more fearful security than this, that the selfish pref- 
 erence will act for, and thus secure its object? How salutary 
 and excellent the intellectual element in the one; how de- 
 
24 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 structive and fatal the same element in the other ! And 
 further — by this intellectual element — this adequate, and con- 
 stant, and sure apprehension of the object of the preference, 
 the mind is prepared to decide at once, to a vast extent, with 
 its prior knowledge of subordinate, executive actions, the fit- 
 ness of such action to promote or to defeat its supreme object. 
 How is this decision, in a vast majority of cases, made with the 
 quickness of instinct ; and on this account, is the fitness of the 
 benevolent preference to good, and the fitness of the selfish 
 preference to evil, increased ! Thus it may be said, that all 
 that is valuable in being wise to do good, is combined ^in the 
 one, and all that is destructive in being wise to do evil, is com- 
 bined in the other, as each is an intelligent preference. Indeed, 
 were it not so, the mind could have no supreme object or end. 
 It would have no steady aim, and could be guided by nothing. 
 It would be like a ship in the darkest tempest, without helm 
 or compass ; while this constant intellectual apprehension and 
 aim clears away every cloud, lights up the star of direction, 
 and like the unerring needle, ascertains and guides the course. 
 Being thus an intelligent act — combining the perfect employ- 
 ment of the intellect for its own purpose, how is the fitness of 
 each moral preference to secure its object, perfected in another 
 respect? It is the benignant tendency and fitness of the be- 
 nevolent preference, active with unqualified and unerring aim 
 for its object in the light of truth; and it is the malignant 
 tendency and fitness of the selfish preference, active with un- 
 qualified and unerring aim for its object, under the same light ! 
 One is the act of a moral being, with the knowledge of good 
 and evil, aiming to prevent misery, even the highest misery, 
 and to produce the highest good of all other beings ; the other 
 is the act of a moral being with the knowledge of good and evil, 
 aiming to destroy the highest good, and to produce the high- 
 est misery of all other beings ! As intelligent action then, be- 
 nevolence, in another respect, is the best kind of action, and 
 selfishness the worst kind of action conceivable on the part of 
 a moral being. 
 
 I remark — 
 
 In the third place, that each of the elective preferences un- 
 der consideration, is a morally free action. A moral being 
 has power to make either of these preferences in the circum- 
 stances in which he acts, instead of the other; and is also 
 
MORAL ACTS PREVENT THEIR OPPOSITES. 25 
 
 under an absolute necessity of making the one or the other. 
 By making one therefore, he prevents the other in the only 
 possible way of preventing it. Now each of these elective 
 preferences has its peculiar tendency — the one its beneficial 
 tendency, the other its destructive tendency — considered sim- 
 ply as an elective preference of its object as supreme ; and 
 so it would be, though the actual opposite of each preference 
 were nothing more than its own non-existence. But the 
 actual opposite of each is not its own non-existence. A 
 morally free being is not merely under the necessity of mak- 
 ing one of these preferences or not making it, that is, of mak- 
 ing one or making no preference. If he does not make the 
 one, he does and must make the other. Make which he may, 
 he does more than make it — he prevents the opposite prefer- 
 ence which otherwise must be made. Moral agency must 
 serve one of two masters, when by serving one his designs 
 are accomplished, while the same service, preventing all ser- 
 vice to the other, defeats his designs. 
 
 In this view, free agency is the grand, not to say the most 
 momentous element in the nature of a moral being, as related 
 to the happiness and misery of other beings. By giving ex- 
 istence to one positive cause, whether of immense good or im- 
 mense evil to them — to one of which such a bein^ must <rive ex- 
 istence — he prevents the other. If a free moral agent makes 
 the benevolent preference, he not only gives existence to a posi- 
 tive cause of immense good to all other beings, but in so 
 doing he prevents the selfish preference in its stead, and so 
 prevents a positive cause fitted to destroy all happiness, and 
 to produce the highest misery of all other beings. If such a 
 being makes the selfish pritferenceJciQ not only gives existence 
 to a cause of immense evil to other beings, but in so doing he 
 prevents the benevolent preference in its stead, and so pre- 
 vents a cause fitted to prevent all misery, and to produce the 
 highest Avell-being of all other beings. 
 
 We are familiar with the precept, "Cease to do evil, and 
 learn to do well." Now, were a moral being merely to 
 cease to do evil, the simple act of ceasing from another ac- 
 tion so fitted to destroy happiness, and to produce misery, 
 would possess high worth and excellence. In like manner, 
 great pravity and turpitude would pertain to the simple act 
 of ceasing to do well. But, acting morally, he can no more 
 Vol. I.— 2 
 
26 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 cease to do evil, without doing well, than darkness can cease 
 without light ; and he can no more cease to do well, without 
 doing evil, than light can cease without darkness. There is 
 for a moral being, no neutral ground to stand on. A moral 
 being must be good, or he must be wicked. He must be for 
 the greatest good, or against it. He must be benevolent or 
 he must be selfish. Such is the nature of free moral agency, 
 that he must prevent himself from being the one by being the 
 other ; that by becoming in principle an angel of mercy, he 
 must prevent himself from becoming in principle a demon in 
 malignity ; and by becoming in principle a demon of malig- 
 nity, he must prevent himself from becoming in principle an 
 angel of mercy. In this respect then, what worth and excel- 
 lence in the one kind of action, what pravity and turpitude 
 in the other! Benevolence, on the part of a moral being, 
 prevents selfishness, with all its fitness to cause ruin and 
 wretchedness and woe to all other beings. Selfishness, on 
 the part of a moral being, prevents benevolence, with its fit- 
 ness to prevent the highest misery, and to secure the highest 
 good of all other beings. What else than benevolence can 
 prevent a cause of so much evil % "What else than selfishness 
 can prevent a cause of so much good ? As morally free ac- 
 tion then, viewed as related in this respect to the happiness 
 and misery of other beings, benevolence is the best kind of 
 action, and selfishness is the worst kind of action conceivable 
 on the part of a moral being. 
 
 I remark — 
 
 In the fourth place, that each of the elective preferences of 
 which I speak, is a permanent state of mind. By this I do 
 not mean that it is immutable, nor that it never changes ; but 
 that it remains in all practical doings. Indeed, when once 
 formed, it never changes, nor can change, unless the mind 
 changes denovo between the two great objects of moral choice. 
 This the mind is exceedingly unapt to do, chiefly because 
 the preference of an object as supreme, has a peculiar ten- 
 dency to perpetuate itself, by confining thought and feeling 
 to its object, and engrossing the whole mind with it. It 
 thus strengthens feeling, and strengthens itself, and becomes 
 permanent, so far as it can be, with a physical possibility 
 and yet with the lowest probability of change. It is with 
 these qualifications to be viewed as an abiding or fixed, as 
 
MORAL PREFERENCES PERMANENT. 27 
 
 opposed to a fitful or fluctuating state of mind. As soon as it 
 exists, and without use or custom, it is a supreme affection 
 fixed on its object as the chief good — as the portion of the soul 
 — and is thus in its very beginning what philosophers have 
 called it — a habit of the mind — in one form of it, the efa 
 tovMovtoq of Pythagoras, or " the habit of what ought to be." 
 It is formed to be permanent — to be engrossed with and ever 
 intent on its object — to be ever present in the mind in relation 
 to its object, that its object may never be disregarded, nor fail 
 to be attained for want of constancy or fixedness of affection. 
 Here then, in the permanency of the supreme elective prefer- 
 ence of a moral being, w T e have another element of its fitness to 
 secure its object. Without this element or characteristic, there 
 could be no such thing as moral character, the most momentous 
 fact in respect to moral beings, nor any manifestations of char- 
 acter in practical doings — none, of course, in its results of good 
 and evil. All, in principle, would be unfixed, fitful, and fluc- 
 tuating — at most an incessant series of transitions from one su- 
 preme affection or elective preference to the other. Neither 
 would abide long enough to produce results. An essential 
 element of moral character, whether good or bad, would be ut- 
 terly wanting, because an essential element of fitness to either 
 good or bad results would be utterly wanting. A constant 
 fluctuation, as opposed to permanency in these preferences, 
 would render that which has {he highest conceivable worth 
 utterly worthless, and that which is in the highest conceiv- 
 able degree injurious, utterly harmless. The absolute nature 
 of each might remain the same; but neither having a relative 
 nature, or sustaining any relation to any being or thing, could 
 be either useful or injurious, either good or evil, either right 
 or wrong. Whatever be supposed in opposition to perma- 
 nence in these preferences, so far as it is supposed, it anni- 
 hilates all the good of the one, and all the evil of the other ; 
 for so far it annihilates its existence, while with the element 
 of permanence in each, there is the continuance of all that is 
 good, useful or right, in the one, and all that is evil, injurious 
 or wrong, in the other. How then, is the peculiar and exclu- 
 sive fitness of the benevolent preference to prevent the highest 
 misery, and to promote the highest good of all other sentient 
 beings perfected by its permanency in the mind of the agent? 
 How, by the same element of the selfish preference,is disclosed 
 
28 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 its peculiar and exclusive fitness to destroy the highest good, 
 and to produce the highest misery of all other beings % Who 
 does not see in the permanency of the benevolent principle a 
 signal worth and excellence to approve and admire ; and in the 
 same characteristic of the selfish principle, a signal deformity 
 and odiousness to disapprove and abhor \ The benevolent pref- 
 erence once formed by a moral being partakes as it were of 
 his own immortality, and still lives and still acts to carry out 
 its own blessed issues forever. The selfish preference formed 
 by the same being, alike ceaseless in its activity and duration, 
 remains to accomplish its results in wretchedness and woe for- 
 ever. Who shall measure the worth of permanence in the 
 one, and thefearfidness of permanence in the other ? The one, 
 like the principle of self-preservation, which every moment 
 guards and perpetuates life and its blessings, is ever present 
 to guard and promote the highest well-being of a sentient 
 universe ; the other, alike permanent and effective, is ever 
 present to devastate and make wretched that universe. As 
 permanent action then, and viewed in relation to the happi- 
 ness and misery of all other beings, benevolence is the best 
 kind of action, and selfishness is the worst kind of action con- 
 ceivable on the part of a moral being. 
 
 I remark — 
 
 In the fifth place, that each of the elective preferences un- 
 der consideration, is a predominant act or state of the mind. 
 I call it predominant, as it controls and directs all other action 
 of the being in subservience to the accomplishment of its end 
 or object. Fixed on its object or end as supreme, its direct 
 and peculiar* tendency is, whether the object be good or bad, 
 to employ every power of the agent in subordinate action for 
 the accomplishment of its object. It brings into requisition 
 the whole inner and outer man, the intellect, susceptibility, 
 will, and heart, in all the various forms of thought, feeling, 
 affection, volition, with all the powers of executive action, 
 and all in subservience to. the supreme object. The labors, 
 the toils, and the hardships of self-denial in one case, are 
 made easy and light by a willing mind and a ready hand, 
 while in the other, to invade and destroy the rights, the peace, 
 the happiness of others, is a work of alacrity and exultation. 
 Thus an apostle suffers the loss of all things, and the hero 
 desolates kingdoms; and each is a cheerful martyr to his 
 
ONE OF THESE NECESSARY. 29 
 
 cause. Thus the supreme preference, in its true tendency, 
 takes absolute dominion in the soul, and reigns with control- 
 ing sway over the entire productive energy of the agent. 
 
 While such is the peculiar and exclusive characteristic of 
 the benevolent and selfish preference, every moral being is 
 doomed by a necessity of nature, to place himself under the 
 absolute dominion and control of the one or the other of these 
 preferences. It is an ordinance of his very being, that he can- 
 not serve both these masters, and must serve one. The pref- 
 erence of one of the only two objects of moral choice, excludes 
 the other from all thought except to oppose and resist it, and 
 therefore shuts off all controlling influence frofn it as an object 
 to be attained, as it were by its utter annihilation, and so con- 
 secrates his whole being to the attainment of the supreme ob- 
 ject, lie thinks, he feels, he wills, he acts; he lives, or as 
 the case may be, he dies for it. Such is the nature — such the 
 tendency of each of the two great moral principles or prefer- 
 ences of a moral being, as a predominant principle. What 
 now is it, as the benevolent — what as the selfish principle in 
 its relation to the happiness and misery of other beings ? What 
 is it in a being, whose exaltation in the scale of being likens 
 him to his Maker, in the nature and greatness of powers to pro- 
 duce results in happiness and misery ? What is it for a being, 
 like an archangel strong — strong in intellect, in emotion, in 
 will, in executive power, to be under the constant and entire 
 dominion of perfect benevolence ; — or what instead, to be un- 
 der the constant and absolute dominion of unqualified selfish- 
 ness ! In the one case, what high devisings and plans of 
 wisdom, what desires and affections of heart absorbed and 
 glowing with their object — what intensity and strength of firm 
 resolve, what ceaseless activity of all productive energies, 
 devoted to the prevention of the highest misery and the pro- 
 duction of the highest well-being of all ! In the other case, 
 what a like devotion of the same exalted powers, to the de- 
 struction of the highest well-being, and the production of the 
 highest misery of all ! Look now on the actual results as real, 
 and learn the benignant dominion of benevolence — the terrific 
 dominion of selfishness. Survey the broad field of eternity, 
 cheered,and brightened,and blessed with the fruits and harvests 
 of the joyous activities of reigning benevolence ; and then, the 
 same field made desolate, and dark, and dead in the woes of reign- 
 
30 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 ing selfishness. See in the one principle the brightest image of 
 that infinite uncreated excellence, that makes heaven ; see in 
 the other the very spirit that would convert all into the dark 
 world of hell. Measure now, in relation to other beings, the 
 perfect fitness of the one to good, and the perfect fitness of the 
 other to evil, as the predominant and reigning principle of a 
 moral being. What so manifest in the form of absolute knowl- 
 edge, as that benevolence is the best, and selfishness the worst 
 kind of action which, on the part of such beings can be conceived. 
 
 I now proceed, as I proposed, to consider — 
 
 (2.) The nature of benevolence, and of selfishness, as the ofae is 
 related to the happiness, and the other to the misery of the agent. 
 
 My design is to show, that benevolence on the part of a 
 moral being is perfectly fitted to give him the highest happiness 
 of which he is capable from action ; and that selfishness is per- 
 fectly fitted to give him the highest misery of which he is capa- 
 ble from action. 
 
 These things will appear, if we consider some of the essen- 
 tial characteristics of each of these kinds of action. 
 
 In the first place ; benevolence on the part of a moral being 
 is perfectly fitted to secure to him the highest happiness, and 
 selfishness the highest misery, of which he is capable from the 
 objects of action. By the object of action I mean all that 
 which a moral being in the elective preference of his supreme 
 object, may be truly said to will or choose, that is, the object 
 itself and the necessary means of obtaining it. With this ex- 
 planation of the object of action in view, I proceed to show that — 
 
 Benevolence on the part of a moral being is perfectly fitted to 
 secure to him the highest happiness of which he is capable from 
 any object of action. This may be shown thus : there is no 
 conceivable object of action from which a moral being is capa- 
 ble of deriving so much happiness, as from the highest happi- 
 ness of all other beings, including what is necessarily involved 
 in the existence of this object of preference, particularly the 
 non-existence of the highest misery of all other sentient beings, 
 and the perfect virtue of all other moral beings. But benevo- 
 lence is the action and the only action on the part of a moral 
 being, which is perfectly fitted to secure this object or end of 
 action. Benevolence therefore is the action and only action on 
 the part of a moral being, which is perfectly fitted to secure to 
 him the highest happiness of which he is capable from any 
 
CORRECT CONCEPTION OF GOOD OR J5VORTH. 31 
 
 object of action. Now the necessary and perfect means of a 
 good end, has all the worth or value of the end itself. Benev- 
 olence then, on the part of a moral being, as the necessary 
 and perfect means of the highest well-being of all other beings, 
 and as such the necessary and perfect means of the highest 
 happiness to himself, of which he is capable from any object 
 of action, has all the worth or value to him of his highest hap- 
 piness from any object of action. No equal worth or value to 
 a moral being can be conceived to pertain to any other action, 
 on account of its relation to the object of action. Or thus: 
 while action on the part of a moral being, which would have 
 no object of worth or value to him, could itself have no worth 
 or value to him, the worth or value of action on the part of 
 such a being to him is at least equal to the worth or value to 
 him of its object ; and the worth or value to him of its object, is 
 equal to the worth or value of the happiness of which he is ca- 
 pable from the object of action. In the present case, the action 
 is benevolence ; and the happiness of which the agent is capa- 
 ble from the object or end of the action, is the highest of which 
 he is capable from any object or end of action. Benevolence 
 therefore, has to him a worth or excellence equal to that of the 
 highest happiness which he can derive from any object or end 
 of action, and has, of course, the highest worth or value to 
 him, compared with any action conceivable on his part, in 
 relation to the object or end of action. 
 
 The same thing will appear, if we consider more particularly 
 the import of the word good, or what it is that constitutes 
 worth, value, excellence. The goodness, or the worth, or the 
 value, or the excellence of a thing, is not the absolute nature, 
 but the relative nature of that of which it is the predicate; 
 or, more particularly, it is the real nature of that of which 
 it is predicated, as related to sentient being. Even happiness 
 itself is not good, or has no worth or value, except as related 
 to a sentient being who can enjoy it. Were there no being 
 capable of happiness, and could there in the nature of things 
 be no such being, nothing could be good, nothing could pos- 
 sess worth, value, or excellence; for there could be neither 
 happiness, nor the means of happiness, nor yet even the idea 
 or notion of either. Nothing is good but happiness and the 
 means of happiness, including the absence of misery and the 
 means of its absence. Were every thing as it is — were God 
 
32 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 and his vast creation as they are, with the single exception of 
 all- capacity of happiness and all possibility of such capacity 
 — all would be utterly worthless. All the worth or value of 
 man or of any other moral being, consists in his capacity of 
 happiness and of that self-active nature which qualifies him 
 to produce happiness to other beings and to himself. All the 
 worth, or value, or goodness, or excellence, which pertains to 
 action on the part of a moral being, is its fitness or adaptation 
 to produce these results. The best kind of action, therefore, 
 on his part, is that which is exclusively and perfectly fitted to 
 produce the highest happiness of others, and his own highest 
 happiness. This kind of action in its relation to the happi- 
 ness of others, and its relation at least in one respect, to the 
 happiness of the agent himself, is benevolence or benevolent 
 action. This kind of action is good, not simply as it is per- 
 fectly fitted to produce the highest happiness of all other 
 beings, but also as by being thus fitted to produce the highest 
 happiness of all other beings, it is perfectly fitted to pro- 
 duce the highest happiness of the agent, of which he is capa- 
 ble from any object or end of action. Its being perfectly 
 fitted to produce the highest happiness of all other beings, 
 constitutes its worth or value to them, and it is the same fit- 
 ness on which the highest happiness of the agent in the case 
 depends, and which constitutes, in one respect, the worth or 
 value of the action to him / for his highest happiness, so far 
 as it depends on the objects of action, depends on the object 
 of this action, and so depends on the action itself, as exclu- 
 sively and perfectly fitted to produce the object on which the 
 highest happiness to himself, of which he is capable from any 
 object of action, depends. While therefore, in the manner ex- 
 plained, the worth or value of the action to the agent himself, 
 in one respect, essentially depends on or consists in the relation 
 of the action to the highest happiness of all other beings, it 
 also depends on the relation of the action to his own happiness. 
 Were the agent wholly unsusceptible to happiness from the 
 happiness of others, and as, therefore, lie must be wholly in- 
 different to their happiness, he must be wholly indifferent to 
 benevolence on his own part as the means of their happiness. 
 Benevolence in such a case could possess no worth or value 
 to him, either directly or indirectly. But being capable of 
 higher happiness from the highest happiness of all other beings 
 
WORTH OF HIS ACT TO TnE BENEVOLENT. 33 
 
 than from any other object of action, and benevolence being 
 the only action perfectly fitted to secure the highest happiness 
 of all other beings, it is perfectly fitted to secure to him the 
 highest happiness of which he is capable from any object of 
 action ; and of course, the highest happiness of which he is 
 capable from any action on account of its relation to the ob- 
 ject of action. 
 
 And now, what is the worth or value of this kind of action 
 on the part of a moral being to himself? It is not identical 
 with the worth to him of the highest happiness of all other 
 beings, or with the worth to him of his own happiness from 
 their happiness. But the worth of the action to him is 
 equal to the worth to him of either the highest happiness of 
 all other beings, or of his own happiness from their highest 
 happiness. The worth to him of the highest happiness of all 
 other beings, is its fitness to give him the highest happiness 
 of which he is capable from any object of action ; and the 
 worth to him of benevolent action is its perfect and exclusive 
 fitness to produce the highest happiness of all other beings, 
 and herein its perfect fitness to secure to him the highest 
 happiness of which he is capable from any object of action. 
 
 Nor is it necessary to the worth or value of benevolence on 
 the part of a moral being, that the highest happiness of all 
 other beings, or that his own happiness as the direct effect of 
 this object actually exist; for the action has the same nature 
 — the same fitness to produce these results, whether they are 
 actually produced or not. Nor in estimating the worth of be- 
 nevolence to the agent are we to view him as under the con- 
 trolling dominion of the selfish principle, when his suscepti- 
 bilities to the happiness of others, and to his own happiness 
 from it are rendered dormant and dead by the influence of 
 that principle. But we are to view the mind in the perfect 
 exercise of its powers, especially when its susceptibilities to 
 happiness, in the full play of their perfect activity, give their 
 perfect results. To appreciate then, the worth or value of be- 
 nevolence on the part of a moral being to himself, we must 
 measure the worth or value of that happiness which such a 
 being in the perfect use of his high powers and capacities, 
 would derive from the non-existence of the highest misery, 
 and the existence of the highest happiness of all other beings, 
 as the actual and true product of his own action. What a < 
 a* 3 
 
34 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 source of happiness to a moral being were such an object. 
 What but comparative insignificance and vanity were happi- 
 ness from the only other object of action — the world — on the 
 part of such a being. What other action on his part can 
 afford him such happiness from the object of action, and pos- 
 sess in this respect such worth or value to him as that which 
 should prevent the highest misery, and produce the highest 
 blessedness of God and of his sentient creation. "What worth, 
 what excellence, would such a scene of moral b'eauty and 
 magnificence, with all its blessedness, give to the action which 
 was its true and proper cause. 
 
 I now proceed to say, that — 
 
 Selfishness on the part of a moral being is perfectly fitted to 
 secure to him the highest misery of which he is capable from 
 any object or end of action. There is no conceivable object 
 or end of action on the part of a moral being, from which he is 
 capable of deriving so much misery, as from the highest mis- 
 ery of all other beings, including what is necessarily involved 
 in the object of his preference; particularly, the non-existence 
 of the highest happiness of all other beings, and the perfect 
 vice or wickedness of all other moral beings. Selfishness, as 
 we have seen, is the action and the only action of a moral 
 being, which is perfectly fitted to secure this object, or this 
 result of action, to other beings. Selfishness therefore is the 
 action, and the only action on his part, which is perfectly 
 fitted to secure to him the highest misery of which he is capa- 
 ble from any object or end of action. JSIow the necessary and 
 perfect means of a bad end, is as bad — as evil — as is the end 
 itself, to the being whose end it is. Selfishness then, on the 
 part of a moral being, as the only and perfect means of the 
 highest misery of all other beings, with all that is involved in 
 this evil, and as such a means, the only and perfect means of 
 the highest misery of which he is capable from any object 
 or end of action, is as great an evil to him, as is the object or 
 end itself, or as is his own highest misery from any object or 
 end of action. 
 
 The remarks already made respecting the word good, muta- 
 tis mutandis, apply to the word evil. The word evil, like the 
 word good, is a relative term ; that is, it denotes the nature of 
 that of which it is a predicate, as related to sentient being. 
 Even misery or suffering is evil only as related to a sentient 
 
EYIL OF HIS ACT TO THE MALEVOLENT. 35 
 
 being, who can experience or feel it. Nothing is evil bnt mis- 
 ery or suffering, and the means of it, including the absence of 
 happiness and the means of its absence. All the evil which 
 pertains to action on the part of a moral being, is its fitness 
 or adaptation to produce misery or suffering to other beings 
 and to himself. The worst kind of action therefore on the part 
 of a moral being, is that which is exclusively and perfectly 
 fitted to produce the highest misery of all other beings, and 
 his own highest misery. This kind of action in its relation to 
 the misery of others, and in its relation at least in one respect 
 to the misery of the agent himself, is selfishness. This kind of 
 action is evil, not simply as it is perfectly fitted to produce the 
 highest misery of all other beings, but also, as being on account 
 of this very fitness, or in this very fitness, perfectly fitted to 
 produce the highest misery of the agent, of which he is capa- 
 ble from any object or end of action. While therefore the 
 evil nature of the action as an evil to the agent, depends on its 
 relation to the highest misery of others, it also depends on the 
 relation of the action to himself. Were the agent entirely 
 unsusceptible to misery from the misery of others, and there- 
 fore necessarily entirely indifferent to their misery, he must 
 also be utterly indifferent to selfishness on his own part as the 
 means of their misery. Selfishness on his part, in such a case, 
 could be no evil to him. It is obvious then, that one essential 
 element of the evil of selfishness to the agent, is its perfect fit- 
 ness to produce the highest misery of all other beings, and in 
 this respect, or on this very account, its perfect fitness to give 
 him the highest misery of which he is capable from any object 
 or end of action ; and of course the highest misery of which he 
 is capable from any action, on account of its relation to the ob- 
 ject or end of action. 
 
 The evil of this kind of action to the agent is equal either to 
 the evil to him of the highest misery of all other beings, or to 
 the evil to him of his own misery from their highest misery. 
 Nor is it necessary to the intrinsic evil of the action, that the 
 actual results in misery to others or to himself actually exist. 
 But to appreciate the evil to himself of selfishness on the part 
 of a moral being, we must measure the evil of that misery 
 which such a being in the perfect unperverted action of his 
 powers and capacities, would derive from the non-existence of 
 the highest happiness, and the existence of the highest misery 
 
36 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 of all other beings, as the actual product of his own action. 
 "What a source of misery to such a being, were such an ob- 
 ject or end of action fully accomplished! What other action 
 on his part can bring to him so much misery from the ob- 
 ject of action, and in this respect, be so great an evil to him, 
 as that action which should destroy the highest blessedness of 
 this sentient universe, and fill it wuth w r oe ? 
 
 Thus it appears, that benevolence on the part of a moral 
 being is perfectly fitted to secure to him the highest happi- 
 ness, and selfishness, the highest misery, of which lie is capa- 
 ble from the objects or ends of action. Benevolence then, as 
 related in this respect to the agent's own happiness, is to him 
 the best kind of action, and selfishness as related in this respect 
 to the misery of the agent, is to him the worst kind of action. 
 
 I remark — 
 
 In the second place ; that benevolence on the part of a moral 
 being is perfectly fitted to afford him the highest happiness, 
 and selfishness, the highest misery, of which he is capable from 
 any action, as each is intelligent action. This characteristic or 
 element of the two kinds of action in its relation to the happi- 
 ness and misery of all other beings than the agent, we have 
 already considered. We now contemplate it in its relation to 
 the happiness and misery of the agent himself. Next in de- 
 gree to that happiness or that misery of which the mind is 
 capable from the action of the will and the heart, are that hap- 
 piness and that misery of which it is capable from the action 
 of the intellect in the form of knowledge. This happiness and 
 this misery on the part of a moral being, depend on what is 
 known, or on the objects of knowledge, and the use made of it. 
 Now a moral being, in all moral action, whether he acts for 
 good or for evil, for weal or for woe, acts intelligently. What- 
 ever he does — whatever object he aims at, whatever results he 
 produces, he acts not in ignorance, not under mistake, not with 
 doubt, but with knowledge. The two great objects or ends of 
 all moral action are known — known in their nature, known in 
 their difference, known in all their vastness, as the highest 
 happiness, and the highest misery of all sentient being. The 
 will, the heart, the entire susceptibility, and productive energy 
 — the whole man, acts not in the darkness of ignorance or error, 
 but in the light of truth. In respect to the most momentous 
 agency in the universe of causes, moral action, he knows what 
 
INTELLIGENT ACTION VERY GOOD OR EYIL. 37 
 
 is true, what is false, what is good, what is evil, according to 
 the eternal and immutable nature of things. Act as he may, 
 he acts with a just and adequate view and comprehension of all 
 that need be known, that the great end of all being — of all ex- 
 istence may be accomplished or be defeated. And now what is 
 such knowledge to such a being — what, if he acts morally 
 right ; what, if he acts morally wrong. Knowledge, how de- 
 lightful, joyous, in the one case — how exquisitely painful in the 
 other ! How diverse these acts, with the same results, done in 
 the darkness and blind stupidity of mere physical agencies or 
 causes! This perfect knowledge with right moral action — such 
 knowledge rightly used, applied, employed for its true end, we 
 see at once is the light of life to the soul. The knowledge of 
 all that can bless and of all that can curse a sentient universe — 
 knowledge of all that ought to be and ought not to be, with 
 knowledge, that all on his part which ought to be is — such 
 knowledge is the constant associate of perfect benevolence in 
 a moral being — in its absolute certainty, its clear and cloudless 
 effulgence, enlightening, directing, quickening all his spiritual 
 activities to their true result in the perfect blessedness of all — 
 who shall value its objects, who shall measure its extent, who 
 unfold its perfection, who utter its joys ! A moral being, per- 
 fect, immortal, ever living, ever acting under the approving 
 eye of Omniscience, and "seeing as he is seen, and knowing as 
 he is known !" 
 
 What now, is such knowledge to a moral being of the op- 
 posite character ? Knowledge consciously, deliberately, and wil- 
 fully resisted, hated, perverted — knowledge, while it excludes 
 all ignorance that might palliate guilt or mitigate its pangs, 
 reveals the full measure of both. Knowledge, when ignor- 
 ance were bliss — light a thousand-fold more terrific than 
 deepest darkness — light revealing a moral being to himself in 
 the work of destroying all good, and producing all evil ! What 
 degradation in rank, what perversion of faculties, what frustra- 
 tion of the high end of his being, what ruin to others, what 
 self-ruin — himself knowing all, and yet doing all — living, act- 
 ing amid the wreck and wretchedness of his own work, and 
 knowing all only to be wretched in all he knows ! 
 
 I remark — 
 
 In the third place, that another element of fitness in each 
 of the two kinds of action specified, to secure its result to the 
 
o8 MOKAL GOTEENMEXT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 agent, is that it is his own action. The same action duly con- 
 templated by one who is not its author, would afford him as 
 the action were good or bad, a high degree of pleasure or a 
 high degree of pain. But how would this pleasure or pain 
 be augmented were the action his own/ The action has now 
 a new element. It is his action. The mere fact, that that 
 which gives us pleasure or pain is ours, and more especially 
 that it is ours by production or authorship, is a source of a 
 high, distinct and peculiar pleasure or pain. We value happi- 
 ness, or we value natural beauty or excellence the more be- 
 cause it is our own; and we abhor misery, or we abhor natural 
 deformity or worthlessness the more because it is our own. 
 In respect to an action or work which is our own, which has 
 high worth or excellence, the fact is more striking and ob- 
 vious. Who that has read with pleasure and learned to ap- 
 preciate Milton's " Paradise Lost," would not be aware of a 
 new and peculiar pleasure, were that immortal poem the pro- 
 duct of his own genius ? In view then of an action charac- 
 terized by such unparalleled worth and excellence as perfect 
 benevolence on the part of a moral being, an action perfectly 
 fitted to prevent the highest misery, and to produce the highest 
 happiness of all other beings, perfectly fitted to please and bless 
 God and his sentient creation — to say, " I have done it," must 
 be a source of happiness, which in this respect, can have no 
 parallel, as the effect of any or all other action conceivable. 
 For a being capable of this happiness, to lose it, how great the 
 loss ; to secure it and perpetuate it in the perfect exercise of 
 his exalted powers forever, what a possession for immortality ! 
 On the contrary, the opposite action of a moral being, for 
 the same reason, is in a high degree painful. It is his own 
 action. No one can duly contemplate such action in its fear- 
 ful and fell malignity, even as the act of another being, with- 
 out a painful, revolting abhorrence. How then, must the pain- 
 fulness of this emotion be augmented when the action is his 
 own. The action has now another element. It is his action, 
 and the emotion is not mere abhorrence, but it is self-abhor- 
 rence, with that oppressive painfulness which admits of no 
 alleviation. Were it but the act of another, that would afford 
 sensible relief. But the whole weight and burden of author- 
 ship fall on him. The destruction of the highest happiness, 
 and the production of the highest misery forevermore, is the 
 
MORAL ACTION IMPLIES MORAL LIBERTY. 39 
 
 measure of the evil, of the turpitude of his own act. It is 
 his act, which can never be undone ; or rather, in view of its 
 remediless result, it is his act being done forever, and there- 
 fore, with the ruin ever before him, he sees himself the con- 
 tinued perpetrator of this deed of death. In view of such an 
 act — such a work, to be obliged to say, "I have done it" — 
 this is one element of that unqualified self-abhorrence which 
 completes the misery of a moral being, on account of wrong 
 moral action. What an inheritance were this, when apart — 
 alone, in the reflective solitude of eternity ! 
 
 I remark — 
 
 In the fourth place, that another element in each kind of 
 moral action, is that it is done with moral liberty. An in- 
 telligent agent, we may suppose, would reflect on a neces- 
 sary action having the same relations to the happiness and 
 misery of other beings as a free action, with emotions of pleas- 
 ure in the one case, and of pain in the other. But how would 
 the pleasure in the one case, and the pain in the other be 
 heightened in view of the action, as done with power to do 
 the opposite in its stead — done, when otherwise the opposite 
 must be done — done, when do which he may, he does more, 
 he avoids doing and so prevents the opposite action. What a 
 determination then, is that of free-will in moral action ! We 
 all know how moral liberty burdens the soul with moral 
 responsibility. If it discharge that responsibility, what joy 
 and triumph it finds in so doing ! If it violates it, how the 
 violation remains to oppress and crush the spirit! What 
 power of life and death to the soul, in moral liberty ! Where- 
 fore is this? It is that moral liberty, compared with what 
 would be without it, in one case doubles the happiness, and 
 in the other doubles the misery, of which the agent is cap- 
 able from action jvs it is related to its objects. 
 
 Consider this in respect to benevolence or benevolent action. 
 Either of two positive actions — the one with its tendency to 
 the highest conceivable good, or the other with its tendency 
 to the highest conceivable evil of other beings, is possible to 
 the agent. The action in respect to the objects of action, is 
 elective ; and determines one of these great issues of action, 
 and so prevents the other. The agent is under the absolute 
 necessity of doing one positive action or the other positive 
 action ; and when he can do either instead of the other, does 
 
40 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 that which in its true tendency blesses all, and in so doing 
 prevents the doing of that which in its true tendency curses 
 all. His therefore, must be the twofold joy of this twofold 
 achievement. And is there then no peculiar joy in avoiding 
 and so preventing the evil in such a case ? Who does not 
 know the joy of escaping death, w T hen life and death are placed 
 in an even balance ? And is there no peculiar joy, when right 
 and wrong moral action with their respective tendencies and 
 results are thus poised on moral liberty, in doing the right 
 when otherwise the wrong w T ould and must be done? What a 
 deliverance from evil is thus effected, in the accomplishment 
 of good ! What a sublime power in a moral being is the 
 wdll acting right, when otherwise it must act wrong ! Look 
 through heaven and earth, what other power is sublime — what 
 other is there to admire — in what other to rejoice ! Power 
 necessitated to act with a sure result for the highest happiness 
 or for the highest misery of all, and free to act for either instead 
 of the other, and acting right ! How is the conscious joy of 
 acting right heightened by the conscious and equal joy of not 
 acting wrong — becoming the twofold joy, that of action per- 
 fectly fitted to bless, and that of avoiding action perfectly 
 fitted to curse a sentient universe ! It is the moral liberty of 
 action, giving to the self-complacency of virtue, a signal, unsur- 
 passed element of joy — even the twofold blessedness within, of 
 electively preventing a hell and creating a heaven without. 
 What other action conceivable can afford such happiness to a 
 moral being ? 
 
 Let us now briefly contemplate selfishness or selfish action 
 as done in the exercise of moral liberty. Here the same ele- 
 ment so benign in benevolent action, becomes only a fearful 
 and deadly evil. In this kind of action there is also a twofold 
 performance, involving a tw 7 ofold issue. How great the evil, 
 in evil done and in good prevented. The agent by his one act, 
 spreads the broad field of sentient existence with desolation, 
 misery and w T oe, not where otherwise there had been nothing, 
 but where otherwise, by his own opposite act he had diffused 
 life, joy and perfect blessedness to all. By his one act he has 
 both destroyed the good and produced the evil. His there- 
 fore must be the twofold misery of this twofold deed of death. 
 And is there no additional peculiar misery in an act, which 
 while it produces so much evil also destroys so much good, 
 
MORAL ACTION, PREDOMINANT ACTION. 41 
 
 when the agent might as well have prevented the evil and 
 produced the good ? To stand at this fountain of life or of 
 death to all, and by one act to open the stream that shall flow 
 forth in desolation and woe unmingled, remediless, eternal, 
 when I might instead by another act, cause the rivers of pleas- 
 ure and of the fullness of joy to flow forevermore — to do that 
 which is thus fitted to curse, instead of that which is thus 
 fitted to bless all sentient being — it is this, which gives to re- 
 morse one of its peculiar elements of unecjualed agony. What 
 a fearful power is free-will, acting morally wrong ! Who shall 
 measure the conscious agony of acting morally wrong, enhanced 
 by the equal agony of not acting morally right in its place ! 
 Here is no necessity to alleviate what could not be avoided — 
 but conscious freedom — conscious moral liberty, with the two- 
 fold agony of the twofold work of destroying the highest hap- 
 piness, and of producing the highest misery of all other beings 
 — the twofold agony within, of preventing a heaven and of 
 producing a hell without ! What other action can give such 
 misery to a moral being? 
 
 I remark — 
 
 In the fifth place ; that another element in each kind of 
 moral action, is that it is predominant action. Under this re- 
 lation, it is what is commonly called the governing principle of 
 the mind, inasmuch as in its true nature and tendency, it reigns 
 over the wdiole man, controlling and directing all other action 
 in subservience to the accomplishment of its object or end. 
 We have already contemplated this relation of the two kinds 
 of moral action to the happiness and misery of others than the 
 agent. Nor is there perhaps any other relation under which 
 the one more impressively reveals itself as the means of happi- 
 ness, and the other of misery to the agent himself. . As a pre- 
 dominant principle, whether the morally right or the morally 
 w^rong principle, it sways and determines all, all thought, all 
 feeling or emotion, all desires, all volitions, all subordinate and 
 all executive action — the whole inner and outer man. It is the 
 grand central power, which takes under its dominion the en- 
 tire productive energy of a moral being. It thus employs 
 powers the most exalted — powers, which in comparison de- 
 grade all others — powers unparalleled for good and for evil — 
 cither for the best, or for the worst conceivable results of 
 power. 
 
42 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 Contemplate then, a moral being placing benevolence on 
 the throne, and giving it perfect dominion over himself. Yon 
 see in such a being, one made to live and to act for the pre- 
 vention of the highest misery, and for the production of the 
 highest happiness of a sentient universe. Behold these cano- 
 pying heavens — each world of this vast system perhaps the 
 residence of spiritual and immortal beings like our own ! Amid 
 what amplitude and splendors of existence a moral being is 
 destined to live and to act forever! With this destination 
 every thing comports. You see powers and capacities fitted 
 to this high end. You see subordinate objects, ends, motives — 
 the laws and modes of subordinate action, and executive doings, 
 combined to give completeness to the system. You see all 
 worthy of the infinite attributes of their author — all stamped 
 with and fitted for r never-ending existence. In such a being 
 you see benevolence the reigning principle — governing, guid- 
 ing, employing these high powers for these high ends — direct- 
 ing and consecrating all with delightful activity to the accom- 
 plishment of these results, and with the joyous anticipation of 
 accomplishing them forever. And now to sway such a scep- 
 ter — to reign over and employ such powers for such ends — 
 thus to govern and employ intelligence, and feeling, and 
 emotion, and will, and heart — the entire productive energy of 
 an immortal spirit, and that spirit one's self — what other do- 
 minion, what other condition of being, is worthy of a desire or a 
 thought ? What sublime dignity, what moral excellence, beauty 
 and glory, in the reigning principle itself! What absolute 
 perfection it imparts to the whole nature of a being the great- 
 est of all, save Him who made him ! What, compared with 
 this, are the splendors of earthly royalty, even of the monarch 
 of a thousand empires? Compared with him, this were the 
 apocalyptic angel, seen standing in the sun. Is there pleasure 
 — is there happiness in the possession and use of power? What 
 higher pleasure, what higher happiness than the possession and 
 perfect use of the powers of a moral being, guided and con- 
 trolled by perfect love to their perfect issues ? Particularly, 
 under the guidance and control of such a principle, how would 
 the intellect awake, in all its forms of action, and in the vastness 
 of its power ! How, in the delightful activity of its unimpaired 
 vigor, would it grapple with themes worthy of its strength ! 
 How, as destined to know and to know still more forever. 
 
EXCELLENT RESULTS OF BENEVOLENCE. 43 
 
 would it exult in its own expansion and enlargement ! How 
 would it remove the clouds and darkness, that intercept the 
 knowledge of all that is great, and good and fair, and devoted 
 to reasonings and contemplations which become the minds of 
 angels, partake of their happiness, in seeing and knowing all 
 in the sun-light of changeless truth ! How also, would the 
 dominion of such a principle extend to all the primary active 
 principles of our nature ! No dull inactivity would oppress 
 the mind ; no reluctant sloth more wearisome than the effort 
 it dreads, would stupefy the powers. Its self-active nature 
 would be ever awake in all its susceptibilities to objects with- 
 out and objects within — to the happiness of others and its own 
 in their beautiful coincidence — to moral rectitude in its love- 
 liness, and to moral pravity in its turpitude — to the attractive 
 fitness of all means to ends which are good, and to the revolt- 
 ing fitness of all means to ends which are evil. The desire 
 of knowledge, the desire of excellence, the desire of power, 
 the desire of the esteem and love of others, the desire of so- 
 ciety — every desire, tendency and appetency of our nature of 
 the class which seem least capable of perversion, would be in 
 place, and active to fulfill its function and to find its own 
 gratification. Under the reign of this principle, there would 
 be emulation without ambition, exaltation without pride, self- 
 approbation without vanity, distinction without envy, acquisi- 
 tion without avarice, temperance without austerity, economy 
 without meanness, liberality without prodigality, and excite- 
 ment without agitation. There would be no extremes either 
 in deficiency or excess, and no violence by conflict. How 
 too it would subdue, regulate, and direct all those propen- 
 sities, lusts, and passions which annoy, molest and make 
 wretched ; preventing internal anarchy, bringing all into 
 peaceful subjection, imparting order and harmony in their 
 attractive beauty, and employing all these essential elements 
 of our nature, even those which have been counted its grand 
 defects and blemishes, only as the instruments of our highest 
 well-being. Instead of the storms and tempests of ungoverned 
 appetite and passion, to darken and disturb the serenity within, 
 the ever-present shekinah would diffuse its perpetual luster and 
 influence. 
 
 Consider too, its achievements in difficulties overcome and 
 deeds performed. Its work is to resist, to overcome, to control 
 
44 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 all obstacles and all enemies to truth, to virtue and happiness. 
 How it corrects prejudice and willful pertinacity of opinion, 
 with their false judgments and errors ! How it welcomes 
 truth not only in its light, but in its practical power! If error 
 is death, what victories are these? How it overcomes the 
 world, vanquishing every form of temptation, resisting corrupt 
 example, repelling the seductive attractions of wealth, honor 
 and pleasure, using the world as not abusing it, and rendering all 
 its gifts tributary to a pilgrimage hastening to a better country. 
 In its onward way, it is discouraged by no obstacles, stopped 
 by no fatigue, put to flight by no terrors ; but perpetuating its 
 own strength for higher achievements by its use, it becomes 
 stronger and stronger for its everlasting triumphs. What deeds 
 of magnanimity it has performed, in dungeons, on scaffolds, on 
 the rack, in the fire, to which worldly heroism furnishes no 
 parallel — deeds that need not the acclamations of admiring 
 men, for they are crowned with God's approbation. How too, 
 in all the varied forms of beneficence, it sends forth the almoners 
 of its bounty — the ministering spirits of its love ! By its prac- 
 tical sympathies, by its supplies of want, by the prevention of 
 evil, by the removal of suffering and the relief of sorrow, by the 
 instruction of ignorance, the reformation of vice and the restora- 
 tion to virtue, how, like our great Exemplar, it feeds the hungry, 
 heals the sick, gives sight to the blind, binds up the broken- 
 hearted, and raises the dead to life ! It is the spirit of well- 
 doing on angel-wings, waiting the orders of the throne, or 
 flying on errands of mercy in their execution. How it adorns 
 the mind with all the minor virtues of the inner man ! How 
 it meets crosses with cheerfulness, suffering with patience, 
 trials with submission, injuries with forgiveness, wrath with 
 meekness, persecution with prayer, rendering good for evil, 
 and blessing for cursing, and bringing all, by these conquests, 
 into sweet and peaceful subjection, how gracefully it sways 
 the scepter! ~No jarring elements or violent changes without 
 interrupt "the soul's calm sunshine and heartfelt joy." In 
 this sanctuary dwell truth and uprightness, integrity and jus- 
 tice, love and gratitude, kindness, good-will and mercy. Piety 
 also is here, with its adoring reverence, and love and gratitude, 
 with its steadfast hope in immutable goodness, its confidence 
 reposing in everlasting strength, and its fullness of joy flowing 
 from the fountains of eternity. This is benevolence reigning 
 
EVIL RESULTS OF SELFISHNESS. 45 
 
 in' the heart. How, under its perfect dominion, would the soul 
 be blessed! On earth, would those sister seraphs, holiness 
 and happiness, again dwell in every heart, and paradise be 
 regained ! Like the Supreme on the throne above, summon- 
 ing the angel hosts to His service, it calls forth the full and 
 bright assemblage of all the minor virtues and graces to do its 
 will, in blessing and in being blessed. This is the moral excel- 
 lence of a moral being with its happiness — that moral excel- 
 lence, whose worth, beauty, loveliness can be seen only in 
 heaven's light, whose raptures can be expressed only in 
 heaven's song. It is heaven itself. 
 
 Let us now contemplate the selfish principle enthroned in 
 the heart of a moral being. We see every thing reversed. 
 •L T nder this dominion, we see the same exalted powers — powers 
 unparalleled for good and for evil, employed for the worst con- 
 ceivable results of power. The high powers of intellect, of 
 emotion, of will and heart, which qualify for action amid the 
 scenes and grandeurs of eternity, powers and capacities which 
 reveal the image, are stamped with the immortality, and be- 
 speak the highest design of a creating Deity ; these powers, 
 with the productive energies and unchanging laws of executive 
 action, are devoted to the destruction of the highest happiness, 
 and to the production of the highest misery of a sentient uni- 
 verse ; these powers in their uncounteracted nature and tend- 
 ency — for so truth contemplates them — make sure their re- 
 sults. And now, what is it to the agent himself, thus to 
 employ such powers for such ends ? What is it, to establish 
 such a dominion over himself? What a perversion of facul- 
 ties, what a defeat of high destiny, what low and still lower 
 depths of degradation, what an outrage on nature, what utter 
 self-destruction ! More particularly, how under the influence 
 of the selfish principle the exalted power of intellect is em- 
 ployed ! This faculty of a moral being is made to preside over 
 and direct all his other powers. It gives to such a being the 
 knowledge of the greatest of all truths — that to he happy, he 
 must he good / and yet in forming and acting under the selfish 
 principle, it governs him by the greatest of all lies — that to he 
 happy, he must he selfish. "As a man thinketh in his heart, 
 so is he." He who thinks right, will feel and act right ; 
 he who thinks wrong, will feel wrong and act wrong. Every 
 impure affection, every corrupt principle, every criminal de- 
 
46 MORAL GOVERNMENT IX THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 sign, every wrong and vicious action, has its antecedent in 
 thought. Thoughts grow into desires, desires ripen into 
 resolves, and resolves terminate in execution. "Out of the 
 heart proceed evil thoughts." What next ? " Murders, adul- 
 teries, fornication, thefts, false witness, blasphemies." All 
 begins in thought. Thoughts are the precursors of all the 
 storms and tempests of the soul — the floodgates of all which 
 desolates, afflicts, corrupts and ruins the immortal mind. Thus 
 intellect, that high faculty, which so exalts a moral being 
 above every other, by giving him all truth necessary to the 
 highest perfection of being, gives him for his practical guid- 
 ance and control only falsehood and lies. "With such things 
 to be known, and with such intelligence to know them — such 
 treasures of wisdom and of knowledge, with such power to know 
 them by intuition, by consciousness, by reflection, by memory, 
 by reason and judgment, with such intelligence dwelling amid 
 the light of truth, of life, of blessedness, and yet every right and 
 true conviction is held in abeyance, and every practical opera- 
 tion of thought, of contemplation, of reasoning, gives error, 
 falsehood and death ! At the same time, this intelligence by 
 a necessity of its own nature, must see and know its own fear- 
 ful perversions and the fearful issues ! Who shall measure 
 the unhappiness, the miseries of such perversions of such a 
 power — of the violence and outrage done to this godlike faculty? 
 Consider now the influence of the selfish over all those primary 
 principles of the soul, which directly lead to all subordinate 
 emotions, desires and affections. And here its first effect is 
 to resist, counteract, and paralyze that highest susceptibility 
 of the mind — susceptibility to happiness from the well-being 
 of others. This part of our nature, which is the basis of all feel- 
 ing in respect to right and wrong doing, of all the affections, 
 desires, and emotions that respect the true well-being of others 
 and our own, is held in abeyance, or rather benumbed into 
 inaction and torpidity. 
 
LECTURE III. 
 
 V. A perfect Moral Government involves the exercise of authority through the medium of law.— 
 The nature of such a law further unfolded. — Third characteristic of the law so demanded in a 
 perfect Moral Government, viz. : it requires benevolence and forbids selfishness. — Relation of 
 predominant to subordinate action. — Benevolence and selfishness defined. — These constitute tho 
 only kind of action possible to a moral being. — Manner in which the law requires and forbids 
 subordinate action.— Benevolence and selfishness the only morally right and wrong actions. 
 
 Thirdly. The law of a perfect moral government requires 
 benevolence as the sum of obedience, and forbids selfishness as 
 the sum of disobedience on the peert of its subjects. 
 
 By this I mean that the law of a perfect moral government 
 absolutely and universally requires benevolence and benevo- 
 lence only, and that it absolutely and universally forbids self- 
 ishness and selfishness only, while by this universal require- 
 ment, it virtually or in effect requires subordinate action only 
 as such action becomes in the variable circumstances of its 
 subjects, the appropriate expression of benevolence; and by 
 this universal prohibition, it virtually or in effect forbids sub- 
 ordinate action only as it becomes in the variable circum- 
 stances of its subjects, the appropriate expression of selfishness. 
 
 Before I proceed to offer the proof of this proposition, I deem 
 it important to distinguish the different kinds of action on the 
 part of moral beings, which the law of a perfect moral govern- 
 ment may be supposed to respect. 
 
 Premising that by a moral being I mean not one who acts 
 or has acted morally, but one who, from his nature and condi- 
 tion, is qualified to act morally, and is under a necessity of so 
 acting, I proceed to say, that — 
 
 All the action which is predicable of such a being when he 
 acts, and which now demands consideration, may be included 
 in two kinds, viz., that in which he electively prefers some 
 object or end as his supreme or chief object, and that action 
 which is dictated or prompted by this preference.* Every 
 moral being as such comes under the necessity, from his nature 
 
 * That kind of action which takes place through the suspension of the governing 
 principle, and which is not prompted by it, and which is occasional and unusual, in 
 the present connection claims no particular consideration. 
 
48 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 and condition, of acting with his will and heart in respect to 
 some object or end, as his supreme or chief object or. end ; 
 that is, of electively preferring some object or end to every 
 other in competition with it, as an object of preference; or of 
 supremely loving some such object or end. This act or state 
 of the mind, as contemplated under somewhat different aspects 
 and relations, we commonly call the supreme affection, the 
 prevailing disposition, the governing principle, the controlling 
 purpose of the mind. The true nature and tendency of this 
 state or act of the mind is to dictate or prompt, to control or 
 govern all other action of the being. This state of mind, con- 
 sidered as action cognizable by law, is too often lost sight of by 
 moralists, as if moral obligation had no respect to the acts of 
 the will and heart' — -the most important of all action, because 
 the word action is most frequently applied to executive doings. 
 To avoid this error, I propose to distinguish the two kinds 
 of action by one peculiar and prominent characteristic, and 
 shall call the one predominant action, and the other subordi- 
 nate action. 
 
 Each of these kinds of action may be subdivided into two 
 other kinds. 
 
 Predominant action consists either in benevolence or in self- 
 ishness. These are the only predominant acts of which a 
 moral being is capable, and one or the other is predicable of 
 every being of whom moral character, viz., morally right or 
 morally wrong action, is predicable." Benevolence consists 
 in the elective preference of, or in electively preferring, the 
 highest well-being of all sentient beings, for its own sake, to 
 every object in competition with it, as an object of choice or 
 preference. Selfishness consists in the elective preference of, 
 or in electively preferring, some inferior good to the highest 
 well-being of all sentient beings, and is, of course, a preference 
 of this inferior good to the prevention of the highest misery 
 of all ; that is, a preference of the highest misery of all to the 
 absence of the inferior good, as these objects come into com- 
 petition as objects of choice or preference. 
 
 * In confirmation of some fundamental principles like the present, I shall refer 
 to certain passages in the sacred writings, simply as expressing the obvious decisions 
 of reason and common sense in such forms of statement, as to commend their truth 
 at once to the mind of every one, irrespectively of their divine authority. In the 
 present instance, I refer to Matt. vi. 24; xii. 30. 
 
BENEVOLENCE AND SELFISHNESS DEFINED. 49 
 
 It is important to our purpose to specify some of the char- 
 acteristics which are common to the two kinds of predominant 
 action, and those wherein they differ. 
 
 Each then, is an act of the will and heart, or an elective 
 preference, by which I mean that it includes two elements, 
 viz., choice and affection.* Each is an intelligent act, or an 
 act done with the present knowledge or intellectual appre- 
 hension of the nature of action, as related to the great and true 
 end of action on the part of a moral being. Each is a free act, 
 or an act done with entire exemption from the influence of 
 every cause of the act, which, in the circumstances in which it 
 takes place, renders the act necessary. Each is a permanent 
 act, or an act which tends to its own perpetuity, and is for the 
 most part perpetual. Each is predominant action, or action 
 which tends to secure all other action, as it becomes the neces- 
 sary means of accomplishing the end of the predominant action. 
 Such are the elements in which the two elective preferences 
 called benevolence and selfishness agree. 
 
 Wherein do these kinds of action differ? Thus. Benevo- 
 lence is action whose direct end is the great end of all action 
 on the part of a moral being, and which is perfectly fitted, in 
 all the circumstances of such a being, to produce this end, viz., 
 the highest well-being of all other sentient beings and of the 
 agent himself. Selfishness is action, whose direct end is some 
 end inferior to the great end of action on the part of a moral 
 being, and which is perfectly fitted, in all the circumstances 
 of such a being, to defeat this end, and to produce the opposite 
 end, the highest misery of all other sentient beings and of the 
 agent himself. 
 
 There is one end of action on the part of moral beings which, 
 as determined by their nature and their relations, may be said 
 to be the great end of all action on their part, or, as it is some- 
 times called, " the chief end" of such beings, viz., the highest 
 possible well-being of each and of all. This is an end, to the 
 
 * The morally right act or state of the mind is often spoken of as an act of the 
 will — an elective act, an act of choosing. Vide Dbut. xxiv. 15-24; Pro v. i. 29; 
 Isa. vii. 15; Luke x. 42. The more prominent element however, in this state of 
 mind is affection ; and hence it is most frequently designated in some manner which 
 presents it as a state of affection. In these cases however, the language is so used 
 as to show that it is a supreme affection ; or that it is love not as a mere constitu- 
 tional emotion, but as involving an act of the will; (i. e.) that it is an elective 
 preference. Matt. x. 37; xxii. 37; 1 John ii. 15, 16; Acts xi. 23. 
 
50 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 promotion of which, or to the prevention of which in the 
 promotion of the opposite end, the highest misery of all, all 
 action on the part of moral beings has, in a greater or less 
 degree, a relation of tendency or fitness. It is, therefore, em- 
 phatically the great end or the chief end of all action on their 
 part — not, indeed, as the end at which they actually aim, but 
 as that end at which they are qualified to aim and to promote, 
 and at which they must supremely aim if they would promote 
 or secure the great end of their being. There is one, and only 
 one kind of action on the part of a moral being, whose direct 
 end is the great end of all action on his part, viz., benevolence, 
 or the elective preference of this end to every other in compe- 
 tition with it, as an object of election or choice. In this sense 
 benevolence, as action whose direct object or end is the great 
 end of all action on the part of a moral being, may be said to 
 be the action, and the only action, which is perfectly fitted to 
 promote or accomplish this end. There is one, and only one 
 kind of action on the part of a moral being, whose direct end 
 is some end inferior to this great end, instead of this great end, 
 viz., selfishness, or an elective preference of the inferior end to 
 this great end, in which the agent virtually and actually pro- 
 poses to destroy all other good, and to produce the highest 
 misery of all for the sake of this direct and inferior end. In 
 this sense selfishness may be said to be perfectly fitted, and to 
 be the only action which is perfectly fitted to prevent the high- 
 est well-being of all and to produce the highest misery of all. 
 
 Thus every moral being who possesses a moral character, or 
 who acts morally right or morally wrong, electively prefers 
 some object or end as his supreme object or end. In this state 
 of his will and affections, and when under its contolling influ- 
 ence, he ever aims to promote or accomplish that object or 
 end. It maintains an habitual ascendency in the mind, dicta- 
 ting and controlling his particular acts, as these include par- 
 ticular thoughts, affections, desires, dispositions, volitions, and 
 overt doings, in subservience to the accomplishment of that 
 object or end. Without this predominant act or state of the 
 mind there could be no consistency in his conduct as a moral 
 being, and no uniformity of character — nothing which can be 
 called moral character. 
 
 Again, there is, as I have said, another kind of action, viz., 
 subordinate action. By subordinate action is meant all that 
 
SUBORDINATE ACTION, OF TWO KINDS. 51 
 
 kind of action which is dictated and controlled by predominant 
 action, by the supreme affection, governing principle or pur- 
 pose of the mind, and which is done in subservience to, or to 
 promote the end of the governing principle or purpose. This 
 kind of action may be divided into two particular kinds of 
 subordinate action. The one consists in particular elective 
 preferences, voluntary affections, dispositions or purposes, 
 in which no present or immediate action of either mind or 
 body is directly willed. This may be called immanent subor- 
 dinate action. The other consists in willing directly some 
 present mental or bodily action, and in the action willed. 
 This may be called executive subordinate action. Examples of 
 the former — justice, honesty, veracity, gratitude, humanity or 
 kindness to fellow-beings, patriotism, natural affection or love 
 of kindred, friendship, honor, etc. ; and their opposites — all 
 these, considered as habitual dispositions, affections, purposes, 
 principles — as mental acts or states, which involve acts of will, 
 or are elective preferences of their particular objects in which 
 no present acts are directly willed, are examples of immanent 
 subordinate action. Examples of the latter are the act of ren- 
 dering to another his due, the act of speaking truth, the act 
 of giving alms, etc., etc., and their opposites. These, con- 
 sidered as including in each instance the act willed and the 
 act of willing it, are examples of executive subordinate action. 
 For the purpose of distinguishing the elements of any action 
 of the latter class, we may call one element the imperative 
 volition, and the other the overt action. 
 
 In this view of subordinate action, it is obvious that the 
 direct end of such action, that is, the end directly aimed at by 
 the mind in such action, is not the great end of all action on 
 the part of a moral being, nor the opposite end, and that, in 
 this sense, subordinate action is not fitted to promote this end 
 nor to defeat it. On the contrary, the mind, the agent in all 
 subordinate action, directly aims only at some limited degree 
 of happiness or misery. In so acting, he can aim at the great 
 end of action only indirectly — that is, through the predominant 
 action. When such action is directly fitted to produce some 
 limited degree of happiness, which is necessary to the highest 
 well-being of all, then it is indirectly fitted to promote this 
 great end ; and when it is directly fitted to produce some 
 limited degree of happiness which is inconsistent with this 
 
52 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 great end, or some limited degree of misery which is incon- 
 sistent with it, then it is indirectly fitted to defeat this great 
 end, and to promote its opposite. 
 
 Having thus distinguished the different kinds of action on 
 the part of moral beings, I now proceed to show that the law 
 of a perfect moral government requires benevolence as the 
 sum of obedience, and forbids selfishness as the sum of disobe- 
 dience ; in other words, that it absolutely requires benevolence 
 and benevolence only, and forbids selfishness and selfishness 
 only, in all circumstances ; while by this requirement and 
 prohibition it virtually or in effect requires and forbids other 
 action, only as such action becomes in the variable circum- 
 stances of its subjects, the appropriate expression of benevo- 
 lence and selfishness. This will appear from the following 
 considerations : 
 
 First. Predominant action, either in the form of benevolence 
 or selfishness is not only unavoidable, but it is the only action on 
 the part of moral beings which, in all the circumstances essential 
 to their condition, is possible. The circumstances of moral 
 beings are of two kinds ; those which are essential to their 
 condition as moral beings, which are invariable, and which are 
 common to all their actual circumstances ; and those which 
 are not essential to their condition as moral beings, which are 
 variable, and therefore not common to all their actual circum- 
 stances. ISTow every moral being as such exists in such cir- 
 cumstances and sustains such relations, that he is under an ab- 
 solute necessity from his nature and his circumstances to per- 
 form predominant action, either in the form of benevolence or 
 of selfishness. He must choose either the highest well-being 
 of the sentient universe, or some inferior object as his supreme 
 object. The former is to him an object of possible choice. On 
 the choice of it depends his highest well-being. He is there- 
 fore under the necessity either of choosing it, or not choosing 
 it as his supreme good. If he chooses this object as his 
 supreme object, he is a benevolent being. If he does not, 
 then he chooses some inferior object, rather than this; and is 
 a selfish being. He is therefore under an absolute necessity 
 of performing predominant action, of becoming in heart — in 
 principle — in the governing purpose of the mind, either a 
 benevolent or a selfish being, which necessity is as fixed and 
 unavoidable as are his nature and his circumstances. Nor in 
 
PREDOMINANT ACTION DECIDES CHARACTER. 53 
 
 those circumstances which are essential to his condition as a 
 moral being, is any other action possible than predominant 
 action, either in the form of benevolence or of selfishness. All 
 other action is in the nature of things, dictated or prompted 
 by predominant action — is the consetpient and effect of pre- 
 dominant action — and therefore utterly impossible without 
 prior predominant action. All other action is subordinate 
 action; and all subordinate action is, in different respects, 
 circumstantial or conditional action. The possibility of such 
 action depends on variable circumstances, which are not essen- 
 tial to the condition of a moral being, nor common to all his 
 actual circumstances. No moral being can in disposition, 
 principle, affection, volition, purpose, become either just or 
 unjust, true or false, honest or dishonest, or perform any other 
 immanent subordinate act or action, until he has become 
 either benevolent or selfish ; and therefore not until predomi- 
 nant action in the form of benevolence or selfishness has taken 
 place. The same thing is true in respect to all executive sub- 
 ordinate action y for this also depends on prior predominant 
 action. All subordinate action therefore, since it depends on 
 prior predominant action, is in this respect circumstantial, as 
 it depends on variable circumstances, which are not essential 
 to the condition of a moral being. Nor is this all. A moral 
 being, in one set of variable circumstances, may be under the 
 necessity of performing either one kind of subordinate action 
 or its opposite ; for example, of being either just or unjust in 
 disposition or purpose, or in another case, of acting executively 
 either justly or unjustly. In another set of variable circum- 
 stances, he may be under the necessity of performing either 
 another kind of subordinate action or its opposite ; for exam- 
 ple, of being in purpose or will either true or false ; or in 
 another case, of speaking truth or falsehood. Thus, when sub- 
 ordinate action becomes possible by the existence of prior 
 predominant action, whether such possible subordinate action 
 be of one kind or of another kind, depends on those variable 
 circumstances which are not essential to the condition of a 
 moral being. And further, there is no kind of subordinate 
 action, which in any circumstances is fitted to subserve the 
 end of benevolence, which in some other circumstances may 
 not be fitted to subserve the end of selfishness, and be 
 prompted by this principle. Thus a man may love his kin- 
 
54 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 dred, or his country, lie may purpose to be just, honest, faith- 
 ful and true ; to give all his goods to feed the poor, and his 
 body to be burned, either from the benevolent or the selfish 
 principle. At the same time there are few if any kinds of 
 subordinate action, which in all circumstances are fitted only 
 to promote the end of selfishness, or which in some possible 
 circumstances may not be fitted to subserve the end of benev- 
 olence, and be performed from this principle." Thus the 
 general purpose to destroy, or this purpose in connection with 
 the act of destroying the dwellings of others, in ordinary cir- 
 cumstances would be ascribed to the selfish principle and 
 pronounced under this complex conception injustice ; and yet 
 the same act as immanent subordinate action, in the form of a 
 purpose or as including the executive act, when contemplated 
 as necessary on the part of firemen to prevent the burning of 
 a city, would be demanded by benevolence, and may be 
 prompted by this principle. So the immanent act including 
 the executive subordinate act which respects taking the life 
 of our fellow-beings, in one case is justly esteemed an act of 
 selfishness, and in another case an act demanded by benevo- 
 lence ; and may be prompted by benevolence. It may be a 
 question with some, in view of the example of the Saviour in 
 Luke xxiv. 19-28— to say nothing of defeating the design of 
 an assassin by stratagem or of attacking an invading army by 
 ambuscade, whether the act of deceiving so commonly consid- 
 ered as in all cases resulting from the selfish principle, and 
 equivalent to lying, may not in some cases be dictated by the 
 benevolent principle. Without deciding however, whether 
 there be any kind of subordinate action, which in all the vari- 
 able circumstances of moral beings, can be dictated only by 
 the selfish principle, it is evident that all that action which I 
 have called subordinate action, is prompted by predominant 
 action ; and that such action is absolutely impossible on the 
 part of moral beings, without prior predominant action. 
 
 Now that the law of a perfect moral government should 
 require and forbid action, which in the circumstances of the 
 
 * It should here be kept in mind, that justice, veracity, patriotism, and other 
 specific virtues, which involve the benevolent principle, and that injustice, lying, 
 murder, and other particular crimes or vices, which involve the selfish principle, 
 are not what is meant by subordinate action ; since in this mode of conceiving and 
 speaking, they include both predominant and subordinate action, 
 
RELATION" OF THE LAW TO SUBORDINATE ACTION. 55 
 
 beings to whom it is given, is utterly impossible on their part, 
 is preposterous and incredible. It is equally preposterous and 
 incredible, that the law of such a government should not 
 require benevolence and forbid selfishness in all circumstances 
 in which they are possible on the part of subjects. Since then 
 the law of such a government, absolutely requires and forbids 
 predominant action, and predominant action only in all the 
 circumstances of its subjects which are essential to their 
 moral condition, and therefore in all their circumstances, and 
 since benevolence and selfishness are the only kinds of pre- 
 dominant action, it follows, that the law of a perfect moral 
 government absolutely and universally requires benevolence, 
 and benevolence only, and forbids selfishness and selfishness 
 only, on the part of its subjects. 
 
 This view of the subject will be further confirmed, by con- 
 sidering the manner in which the law of a perfect Inoral 
 government requires and forbids subordinate action. This 
 law, as we have said, by its requirement and its prohibition 
 of predominant action, virtually or in effect requires and 
 forbids subordinate action only as such action becomes in the 
 variable circumstances of its subjects, the appropriate expres- 
 sion of benevolence and of selfishness. 
 
 As we have seen, predominant action on the part of the 
 subjects of law, is possible in all their circumstances as moral 
 beings, while in some of their circumstances subordinate action 
 is impossible. K ow it is the nature and tendency of predomi- 
 nant action to go forth into the appropriate expressions of itself 
 in subordinate action, according to the variable circumstances 
 of the subject, in which the possibility and necessity of such 
 action arise. Hence, to require predominant action in the 
 form of benevolence absolutely and universally, is virtually 
 and in effect, to require all its appropriate expressions in sub- 
 ordinate action, as the possibility and necessity of such action 
 arise in all the variable circumstances of the subject ; and to 
 forbid predominant action in the form of selfishness absolutely 
 and universcdly, is virtually and in effect, to forbid all its ap- 
 propriate expressions in subordinate action, as the possibility 
 and necessity of such action arise, in all the variable circum- 
 stances of the subject.* l^or is there any other mode in 
 
 * In those remarks, the knowlodge or possible knowledge of subordinate action 
 as the appropriate expression of predominant action, on the part of the subjects of 
 
56 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 which the law of a perfect moral government can require and 
 forbid subordinate action. To suppose that it should, is to 
 suppose that it should go beyond the obligation of the subject 
 in its requirement and prohibition ; subordinate action being 
 utterly impossible in some circumstances of the subject. The 
 law -therefore, does all it can do by absolute and universal 
 requirement, to secure all the subordinate action, which in all 
 the variable and all the possible circumstances of the subject, 
 can become the appropriate expression of benevolence ; and 
 all it can do by absolute and universal prohibition, to prevent 
 all the subordinate action which in all the variable and possi- 
 ble circumstances of the subject, can become the appropriate 
 expression of selfishness. In its absolute and universal re- 
 quirement of benevolence, it requires a permanent predomi- 
 nant principle of action in all the circumstances of the subject, 
 which gives the best security which the nature of things admits 
 of, that all subordinate action which is the appropriate expres- 
 sion of this principle in all the variable circumstances of the 
 subject, will be performed ; and in its absolute and universal 
 prohibition of selfishness, it forbids a principle of action in all 
 the circumstances of the subject, which gives the best secu- 
 rity which the nature of things admits of, that all subordinate 
 action which is the appropriate expression of this principle in 
 all the variable circumstances of the subject, will be pre- 
 vented. 
 
 Should it here be said that, according to this view of the 
 law under consideration, it cannot absolutely and universally 
 require and forbid any subordinate action whatever — not even 
 thus require justice or veracity, nor thus forbid injustice or false- 
 hood — I answer, that the law cannot require and forbid action 
 which, in the circumstances of the subject, is, from the nature 
 of the case, utterly impossible. It cannot require justice and 
 forbid injustice, when it is thus impossible that the subject 
 should be either just or unjust ; and the subject can be neither 
 just nor unjust, in any import of the language, until he has 
 become either benevolent or selfish. He must act in one or in 
 the other of these forms of predominant action before he can 
 perform any subordinate act whatever. When therefore, we 
 speak without qualification, as we often do, and yet with sufrl- 
 
 law, is assumed as implied in those circumstances, in which such action becomes 
 possible on their part. 
 
THE LAW GIVES CERTAIN PRECEPTS. 57 
 
 cient precision for all ordinary purposes of the law,as requiring 
 and forbidding certain kinds of subordinate action, all that can 
 be meant is, that by requiring and forbidding it in its prin- 
 ciple, it requires and forbids it virtually or in effect in all the 
 variable circumstances of the subject in which such action 
 becomes possible. In this mode the law requires and forbids 
 subordinate action, in the only conceivable mode of requiring 
 and forbidding it, by a perfect and universal law. Indeed, 
 were this mode of requiring and forbidding subordinate action 
 not adopted, subordinate action must be left, to an interminable 
 extent, wholly without requirement and prohibition in any 
 respect whatever; the supposition of particular precepts to 
 regulate all subordinate action being preposterous in the ex- 
 treme. 
 
 It is readily admitted, that the law of a perfect moral gov- 
 ernment, like the decalogue, may, for good reasons and to a 
 limited extent, specify in the form of particular requirements 
 and prohibitions, subordinate action to be done and not done. 
 But it is maintained that all such precepts, so far as they re- 
 spect merely subordinate action, are only formal specifications 
 or statements of such action, which as the appropriate expres- 
 sion of benevolence and selfishness in the variable circum- 
 stances in which it becomes possible, becomes in some sense 
 binding on the subject; and not moral precepts or laws which 
 imply the moral quality of such action ; that all such precepts, 
 though useful and important in many respects, especially as 
 they relate to action which is possible in nearly all the variable 
 circumstances of the subject, are yet to be interpreted in 
 regard to the universality of their application, as all such lan- 
 guage is, by the known limits of possibility and impossibility, 
 and by the known object and design of the precepts them- 
 selves. The universal form of the language of particular pre- 
 cepts is one thing; the universal application of such precepts, 
 even in all the variable circumstances of the subject, is another. 
 This distinction is recognized in respect to every particular 
 precept, so far as such relate to merely subordinate action, in 
 both parental and civil governments. This shows that such 
 precepts are not of the nature of absolute and universal law, 
 but are rather highly useful directions, which, however exten- 
 sive their application within the variable circumstances of the 
 subject, and however unqualified the language in which they 
 
 3* 
 
5S MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 are expressed, depend on the variable circumstances of the 
 subject for their binding force, and which, therefore, admit of 
 possible, though rare exceptions, so far as changes in these 
 circumstances may require exceptions, in view of the great 
 end of all action on the part of moral beings." Vide Palet, 
 Moe. and Pol. Phil., P. VI., c. 4. 
 
 It is evident then, that the law of a perfect moral govern- 
 ment absolutely and universally requires and forbids predomi- 
 nant action, and only requires and forbids other action, vir- 
 tually or in effect, as it becomes in the variable circumstances 
 of the subject, the appropriate expression of predominant 
 action. It is equally evident, that benevolence and selfishness 
 are the only kinds of predominant action on the part of moral 
 beings. It follows therefore, that the law of a perfect moral 
 government requires benevolence as the sum of all obedience, 
 and forbids selfishness as the sum of all disobedience on the 
 part of its subjects. 
 
 It seems greatly to perplex some moralists to distinguish the 
 mode in which, or the ground on which, the law of a perfect 
 moral government requires and forbids predominant action aa 
 the principle of subordinate action, from the mode in which, 
 or the ground on which, it requires and forbids subordinate 
 action itself. It seems to them that a law which, in the man- 
 ner explained, requires and forbids subordinate action in the 
 variable circumstances of the subject, only virtually or in ef- 
 fect, by the absolute and universal requirement and prohibi- 
 tion of predominant action, furnishes as a rule of action no 
 adequate security for the existence of one kind, and for the 
 prevention of another kind of subordinate action, and so 
 jeopardizes the interests of practical morality. To show how 
 entirely groundless such views are, it is sufficient to say, that 
 it is impossible, in the nature of things, that the law in its 
 absolute and universal requirement and prohibition, should 
 extend beyond the two kinds of predominant action, since in 
 such a case, it would extend beyond the limits of obligation 
 
 * This view of the precepts which respect subordinate action, though they are 
 given in absolute forms of language, derives decisive confirmation from the common- 
 sense interpretation of such precepts in Matt. xii. 1-13, particularly from the 
 universal application of the principle in verses 7th and 12th : that the greatest good 
 is to be done, in all cases, notwithstanding the unqualified language of particular 
 precepts. 
 
WHY PARTICULAR PRECEPTS, NECESSARY. 59 
 
 on the part of the subject. Besides, if the requirement of the 
 one and the prohibition of the other of the two great pre- 
 dominant principles of action, will not secure the sufficiently 
 known and obvious expressions of the one, and prevent the 
 sufficiently known and obvious expressions of the other of 
 these principles in appropriate subordination, how would such 
 subordinate action be secured in one case and prevented in the 
 other, by formally expressed particular precepts? The subject 
 who should obey the essential requirement and prohibition 
 of the law, would also, while the principle remains active and 
 controlling in the mind, obey all its sufficiently known and 
 obvious virtual requirements and prohibitions in subordinate 
 action, as they become applicable in all his variable circum- 
 stances ;* while if he should not obey the former, there would 
 not only be no security that he would obey the latter, but an 
 absolute certainty that he would disobey them in every instance 
 in which such disobedience should be necessary to accomplish 
 the end of his governing principle, though they were formally 
 expressed in particular enactments. Such enactments could 
 be only formal expressions of the virtual requirements and 
 prohibitions of the fundamental law, and could be of no ad- 
 vantage to the cause of practical morality in those cases, in 
 which these virtual requirements and prohibitions were suffi- 
 ciently known without them. 
 
 If these things are so in the cases supposed, i. e., in all cases 
 in which the virtual requirements and prohibitions of the 
 fundamental law are sufficiently known or sufficiently obvious 
 for all practical purposes, it may be naturally asked, why are 
 particular precepts in the form of requirement and prohibition 
 confessedly necessary in all forms of moral government, even 
 in that which is undeniably perfect? I answer, that these 
 precepts are necessary in all cases in which they are so, for 
 certain purposes peculiar to subordinate action in the variable 
 circumstances in which such action becomes possible. In some 
 cases they are necessary to remove unavoidable ignorance in 
 respect to the subordinate action, which were it not for such 
 ignorance, would be virtually required or forbidden by the 
 fundamental law. In some cases they are necessary to render 
 more manifest the fitness of the subordinate action thus vir- 
 
 * Not to do this is justly pronounced, to be guilty of the whole law. James ii. 
 10, and also ii. 14-25. 
 
60 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 tually required and forbidden, and thus to remove doubt and 
 uncertainty, and to prevent perverted and false judgments in 
 respect to it, and so to give greater security to the perform- 
 ance of one kind of such action, and to abstinence from the 
 other, than would otherwise exist. In some cases, if not in all, 
 they give definiteness to the kind of subordinate action which 
 they respect, as such action is the proof of obedience and dis- 
 obedience to the fundamental law. But, more than all, such 
 precepts are binding to an extent so nearly universal in all 
 the variable circumstances of men, and with exceptions so rare, 
 that exceptions need not be made, or if made, prove the rule, 
 and therefore can never be violated without great caution, 
 and in cases of obvious and undeniable utility. But the neces- 
 sity of these particular precepts for these or other similar 
 purposes shows that they respect only that kind of action 
 which is virtually required or forbidden in the variable cir- 
 cumstances of the subjects of law, and not the action which 
 constitutes the sum of obedience and the sum of disobedience 
 to the law of a perfect moral government. 
 
 It may be further said that particular precepts are often, not 
 to say commonly, promulged in that absolute and universal 
 form of language which imply their strictly universal applica- 
 tion and obligation. In reply to this, it were sufficient to allege 
 the utter and obvious impossibility of such an application of 
 this class of precepts, since all action to which they can be 
 applied is impossible, until the subject of law has become either 
 benevolent or selfish. If, by the universal application of these 
 precepts, be meant an application as extensive as the possibility 
 of subordinate action, this may be admitted in respect to some 
 kinds of such action, particularly some immanent subordinate 
 action; for example, justice and injustice as mere dispositions 
 of the mind. Still, it must be remembered, that such subor- 
 dinate action may be prompted either by benevolence or self- 
 ishness ; and that, therefore, considered in itself as merely 
 subordinate action, it can be no part of that which essentially 
 constitutes obedience or disobedience to the law of a perfect 
 moral government. Thus considered, such action can be re- 
 quired and forbidden by the law, only virtually or in effect, as 
 circumstantial action — action which becomes the appropriate 
 expression of benevolence and of selfishness in the variable 
 circumstances of the subject. As such action and such action 
 
OCCASIONS FOR PARTICULAR PRECEPTS. 61 
 
 only, can particular precepts be applicable to it in any case 
 whatever. As to those particular precepts which are designed 
 to regulate much other subordinate action, they are still more 
 remote from having a universal application; particularly 
 those which respect executive subordinate action. The prin- 
 ciple on which universal forms of language are used in com- 
 mon life is not that of the most strictly universal application, 
 but that of an application so nearly universal, that the excep- 
 tions are so rare and so obvious that they require no specifica- 
 tion, while the object of such precepts will be better answered 
 by an unqualified use of language than by the useless attempt 
 to specify exceptions. This principle, which might be illus- 
 trated and confirmed to any extent,* is peculiarly applicable 
 to particular legal enactments, which respect executive subor- 
 dinate action. The common-sense application of it to the in- 
 terpretation of such absolute precepts by the Saviour,f and the 
 same familiar application of it by Christians generally to justify 
 works of necessity and mercy on the Sabbath, are decisive on this 
 point. A parent forbids a son, in the form of absolute prohi- 
 bition, who is but partially recovered from recent illness, to go 
 into the water ; but unexpected circumstances occur, and the 
 action thus absolutely forbidden becomes necessary to save a 
 brother from drowning. Who, in such a case, would interpret 
 the precept to the letter ? None would deny the propriety and 
 truth of saying that the fundamental requirement of the divine 
 law is binding on all men ; and yet the proposition is not true 
 to the letter, since the obligation implies not merely the exist- 
 ence, but the moral relations of its subjects. None would deny 
 the propriety of the absolute form in which the penalty of law 
 is denounced against the transgressor, and yet, if the language 
 be pressed to the utmost, the penalty can never be remitted 
 consistently with truth. 
 
 In the use of all language, and especially in the use of the 
 language of law, there is an object to be attained. Such lan- 
 guage is therefore to be interpreted in reference to that object. 
 The object of language in the form of particular precepts is to 
 secure and to prevent subordinate action, as in the variable 
 circumstances of the subjects of law it will in one case pro- 
 mote, and in the other hinder in some limited degree, the 
 
 * Vide Matt. iii. 5; Comp. Heb. ix. 27 and xi. 5. f Matt. xii. 1-13. 
 
62 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 general good. The subordinate action may be supposed to be 
 that which, in all the variable circumstances of the subject in 
 which it becomes possible, will promote the general good. 
 The subordinate opposite action may be supposed to be that 
 which, in all the variable circumstances of the subject in 
 which it becomes possible, will hinder the general good. At 
 the same time, the subordinate action which in some cases is 
 fitted to promote the general good, will in other cases be 
 fitted to defeat this end, or the subordinate action which in 
 some cases is fitted to defeat, may be fitted in others to pro- 
 mote this end. Be these things however as they may, the ap- 
 plication of particular precepts is in all cases to be determined 
 in view of the nature and tendency of the executive subordi- 
 nate action required and forbidden in such precepts, in the 
 variable circumstances of the subject of law. 
 
 These things are deemed sufficient to show the truth of the 
 unqualified proposition, that he who is jjcrfectly benevolent , per- 
 fectly obeys the law of a 'perfect moral government. Isor can 
 this be denied on the ground that one who is thus perfectly 
 benevolent, may not fulfill all the precepts which respect sub- 
 ordinate action ; for it is undeniable, that he will obey every 
 such precept. 
 
 Once more. It is conceded, at least by all Christian mor- 
 alists, that the sum of all duty on the part of moral beings is 
 comprised in the great law of love or benevolence. But how 
 this can be true, except according to the views and principles 
 now presented, it would be impossible to show. 
 
 The same thing will appear, if we consider — secondly, 
 That predominant action in the form of benevolence, is the 
 only morally right action, and in the form of selfishness, is the 
 only morally wrong action on the part of moral beings. 
 
 It will be admitted, that the law of a perfect moral gov- 
 ernment requires morally right action as the sum of obe- 
 dience, and forbids morally wrong action as the sum of 
 disobedience. If then it can be shown, that benevolence is 
 the only morally right action, and that selfishness is the only 
 morally wrong action, it will follow, that the law of a perfect 
 moral government must require benevolence as the sum of 
 obedience, and forbid benevolence as the sum of disobedience. 
 
 That benevolence then is the only morally right action, and 
 that selfishness is the only morally wrong action, I argue — 
 
SIGNIFICATION OF RIGHT AND WRONG. 63 
 
 1st. From the established meaning of the words right and 
 wrong in common life, and from the meaning of the word 
 moral as applied to action. 
 
 The errors and incongruities of moral philosophers, which so 
 notoriously mar their discussions, and which occasion so much 
 apparently hopeless controversy, seem to result chiefly from 
 overlooking the true nature of the moral quality of action and 
 the kind of action to which moral quality exclusively pertains. 
 This oversight may be traced to several causes, primarily it is 
 believed, to the entire want of scientific precision in the use of 
 the words right and wrong, and other kindred terms. "With- 
 out however, attempting to unfold these causes, or to show the 
 magnitude of this error in scientific speculation, I propose to 
 distinguish right action which is moral, from right action 
 which is not moral / and wrong action which is moral, from 
 wrong action which is not moral. 
 
 For this purpose I remark, that among the most common 
 and important conceptions of the human mind, are those of the 
 different and opposite relations of different things to some 
 given end, either as fitted to accomplish or to prevent that 
 end. To express these conceptions, the words right and wrong 
 are of the most common and familiar use ; and when thus 
 used in their general import, may be thus defined : the word 
 right denotes the fitness of that to which it is applied, to pro- 
 duce or accomplish some given end / and the word wrong de- 
 notes the fitness of that to which it is applied, to prevent the 
 same given end. In the use of these words, some given 
 end is always assumed, in respect to the accomplishment or 
 prevention of which they are always applied. Thus assuming 
 the familiar end to be accomplished by a pen, a clock or a 
 watch, we apply the word right to its structure, to denote its 
 fitness to accomplish that end ; and the word wrong to denote 
 its fitness to defeat or prevent that end. In this maimer, one 
 or the other of these words may be properly applied to any 
 and to every thing of which either of the two specified rela- 
 tions of fitness to some given end, can be predicated. Even 
 the stroke of the assassin, as by its direction it is fitted to ac- 
 complish or to defeat its end, may be properly said to be right 
 or to be wrong. Nor can either of these words, when used 
 antithetically or in opposition to the other, be properly used 
 except to denote the specified relation to some assumed end. 
 
64 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 We can no more predicate right or wrong, the one as opposed 
 to the other of any conceivable thing, except to the specified 
 relation to some given end, than we can predicate red or blue 
 of ideas or other mental states. When a thing is said to be 
 right as opposed to wrong, it is said to be so as fitted to pro- 
 duce some given end, and when it is said to be wrong as op- 
 posed to right, it is said to be so as fitted to prevent that end. 
 Thus in the use of these words as opposed in import, an end is 
 always assumed, in relation to which a thing is said to be right 
 or wrong. In this antithetic use of the words, they can have 
 no conceivable meaning, unless they are used to denote some 
 relation to an end. The end assumed in respect to a particular 
 thing, as a pen, a clock or a watch, in respect to which it is 
 said to be right or wrong, is the end, the great or chief end, 
 for which the class of things and of course each particular 
 thing of the class is made. 
 
 Now, according to the universal principle of giving the same 
 general names to things of the same general nature, the same 
 general relations of fitness to promote or hinder the end, or the 
 great end of any thing, are denoted by the words right or wrong. 
 Of course, the same general ideas of fitness to produce or pre- 
 vent the end, or the great end of action on the part of moral 
 beings, are denoted by the words right and wrong, when applied 
 to such action. To deny this, is to deny a fixed and universal 
 principle in the use of words. It is to deny, in the language 
 of logic, that the genus is predicable of the species ; or that the 
 same word has one and the same general meaning as applied to 
 different things to which it can be truly applied in that mean- 
 ing. It is the same as to deny, that the word Hack or white 
 has the same general meaning when applied to a bird and a 
 horse of the same color, or that the word rectangular or trian- 
 gular has the same meaning when applied to different figures 
 of the same general form. It would not be less preposterous 
 to suppose, that the words right and wrong should be properly 
 applied to action in the general meaning now given to each, 
 and that they should also be thus applied to action, in another 
 and a widely different meaning. For it is undeniable, that one 
 kind of action, as fitted to promote the great end of all action 
 on the part of moral beings and to prevent the opposite end, 
 is truly and properly called right action. It is equally unde- 
 niable, that another kind of action, as fitted to prevent the great 
 
ACTION AS RIGHT AND MORALLY RIGHT. 65 
 
 end of all action on the part of moral beings, and to promote 
 the opposite end, is truly and properly called wrong action. 
 It is therefore as utterly incredible, that the word right or wrong 
 should be applied to action in another meaning which excludes 
 this meaning, or in any other generic meaning, as that the word 
 round should be universally applied to a body to denote its 
 form, and yet be properly applied also to denote its color. 
 
 Since then all action on the part of moral beings is either 
 fitted to promote the great end of action on their part and to 
 prevent the opposite end, or fitted to prevent this great end of 
 action and to promote its opposite ; and as the great end of all 
 action on the part of such beings is the highest happiness of 
 all, it follows, that the word right when applied in its general 
 meaning to such action, denotes its fitness to promote the high- 
 est happiness of all, and to prevent the opposite or highest 
 misery of all, and that the word wrong when thus applied, 
 denotes the fitness of action to promote the highest misery of 
 all and to prevent the opposite. 
 
 Again ; right action may be subdivided into two particular 
 kinds, viz. : right action which is moral or morally right action, 
 and right action which is not moral, or not morally right action. 
 Wrong action may be subdivided into two particular kinds, viz. : 
 wrong action which is moral or morally wrong action, and 
 wrong action which is not moral, or not morally wrong action. 
 
 The word moral as applied to action is a common predicate 
 of two very different kinds of action. Hence, to distinguish 
 moral action from action not moral, we have only to determine 
 this common import of the word moral as applied to two kinds 
 of action, or to right and wrong action. 
 
 The word morul is from the Latin mores, which denotes man- 
 ners or character ; more exactly, that permanent, predominant 
 act of the will and heart, which constitutes character as a predi- 
 cate of a moral being. For philosophic purposes however, it 
 is necessary to contemplate this meaning of the word moral 
 more elementarily. With the explanation already given of the 
 terms now to be used in the definition, I proceed to say — that 
 moral action is the intelligent, free, permanent, predominant 
 action of the heart, in which the agent elects some given object 
 or end as his supreme end, and which is thus directly fitted to 
 promote this end, and to prevent its opposite. 
 
 That all action of which the several characteristics now 
 
 5 
 
66 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 specified can be truly predicated, is moral action, I have at- 
 tempted to show in a previous lecture. I shall, therefore, only 
 remark at present, that the feelings of self-complacency and 
 remorse are the distinctive effects of moral action experienced 
 by the agent in view of the nature of such action, and that it 
 is impossible to conceive that any being should experience 
 either of these feelings in view of any other action than that 
 now specified, and that he should avoid one or the other in 
 view of such action. The being therefore, acts morally who 
 acts in the manner now specified, whether he acts or can act 
 in any other manner, or not ; while if we suppose him to act 
 in any other manner without acting in this manner, we cannot 
 conceive him to act morally. The action then now specified is 
 moral action, and the only action which is moral. 
 
 From what has now been said respecting the nature of right 
 and wrong action and of moral action, it follows, that the in- 
 telligent, free, permanent, predominant action of the will and 
 the heart, in which the agent electirely prefers the highest well- 
 being of all as his supreme object or end, and which is thus 
 fitted to promote this end and to prevent its opposite, the highest 
 misery of cdl, is morally right action, and the only morally 
 right action, and that the intelligent, free, permanent, predomi- 
 nant action of the will and the heart, in which the agent elec- 
 tively prefers some object or end inferior to the highest well- 
 being of all as his supreme object or end, and which is thus 
 fitted to prevent this end and to promote its opposite, the 
 highest misery of all, is morally wrong action, and the only 
 morally wrong action. 
 
 The same thing will be still further confirmed by consider- 
 ing the only other kind of action on the part of a moral being ; 
 viz., that which I have called subordinate action. This kind 
 of action is either right action, which is not morally right, or 
 it is wrong action, which is not morally wrong. 
 
 Though a moral being in respect to predominant action, 
 may be properly said to be always acting either morally right, 
 or morally wrong, yet in much of what is called action on the 
 part of a moral being, there is no moral quality. This is true 
 of all that action, which may be distinguished from the act of 
 the will and the heart, or predominant action, and in which the 
 agent aims only at some limited degree of happiness or misery, 
 or natural good or evil compared with the highest degree, and 
 
SUBORDINATE ACTION AS SUCH NOT MORAL. 07 
 
 which in this respect, is fitted directly to produce only such a 
 limited result. There are two kinds of such action; one is 
 right action, but not morally right — the other is wrong action, 
 but not morally wrong. 
 
 "When such action, that is subordinate action, is directly 
 fitted to produce some limited degree of natural good or evil, 
 which is necessary to the highest happiness of all, and thus 
 indirectly fitted to promote this great end of all action on the 
 part of moral beings and to prevent the opposite, then it is 
 right action but not morally right. It is right in the generic 
 import of the word as already defined, when applied to action 
 on the part of moral beings. As indirectly fitted, it is of 
 course fitted to promote the great end of all action, and to 
 prevent the opposite ; and is therefore right action. But it is 
 obvious at once, from what has been said, that it is not morally 
 right action. It has no one of the essential characteristics of 
 morally right action. It is not in the sense explained, either 
 the intelligent, or free, or permanent, or predominant action 
 of the will and heart. Nor is it the action in which the 
 agent supremely and directly aims at the great end of all 
 action, and which in this sense is perfectly fitted to promote 
 this end, and to prevent its opposite. Beside, the same action 
 with the same relation of fitness to the great end of all action 
 and to prevent its opposite, would be right in the same sense, 
 whether done from the morally right or from the morally 
 wrong principle. To suppose the right subordinate action to 
 be morally right, is to suppose that one may act morally right, 
 when he acts morally wrong at the same time. 
 
 Again ; when subordinate action is directly fitted to pro- 
 duce some limited degree of natural good or evil, which is 
 inconsistent with the highest happiness of all, and thus indi- 
 rectly fitted to prevent this great end of all action (and to 
 promote the opposite), then it is wrong action but not morally 
 wrong action. It is wrong in the generic import of the word ; 
 for being indirectly fitted, it is of course fitted to prevent the 
 great end of all action, and to promote its opposite. It is 
 therefore wrong action. But it is plainly not morally wrong, 
 inasmuch as it is obvious that it has no one of the essential 
 characteristics of morally wrong action. 
 
 In addition to these things, it is to be remarked that the 
 quality of all subordinate action changes as the variable cir- 
 
68 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 cumstances of moral beings change ; so that an action of this 
 kind which is right in one set of circumstances is wrong in 
 another set of circumstances ; and an action of this kind, 
 which is wrong in one set of circumstances, is right in another. 
 But morally right action is morally right in all the circum- 
 stances of a moral being ; and morally wrong action is morally 
 wrong in all the circumstances of a moral being. But action, 
 the quality of which as right and wrong changes as circum- 
 stances change, cannot be morally right nor morally wrong 
 action. Subordinate action, therefore, though it may be right 
 or wrong, cannot be either morally right or morally wrong. 
 It thus appears that no action except predominant action, is 
 or can be either morally right or morally wrong. But there 
 is no predominant action, except either benevolence or selfish- 
 ness. ISTo action then is morally right except benevolence, 
 and no action is morally w T rong except selfishness ;»in other 
 words, benevolence is the only morally right action, and self- 
 ishness is the only morally wrong action. Since therefore, it 
 is admitted that the law of a perfect moral government re- 
 quires morally right action as the sum of obedience, and 
 forbids morally wrong action as the sum of disobedience, it 
 follows, that the law of such a government must require 
 benevolence as the sum of obedience, and forbid selfishness 
 as the sum of disobedience. 
 
LECTURE IV. 
 
 V. A perfect Moral Government involves the exercise of authority through the medium oflaxr. — 
 The nature of law further unfolded. — 4. It must express the Lawgiver's preference of the action 
 required, to its opposite, all things considered. — 5. It implies, that the Lawgiver can be satisfied 
 with obedience, and with nothing but obedience, on the part of the subject.— 6. It expresses 
 his highest approbation of obedience and his highest disapprobation of disobedience. 
 
 These three propositions may at first sight appear to he so 
 nearly equivalent, as to supersede any necessity for distinct 
 consideration. The difference "between them however, and the 
 importance of distinguishing them, for the purpose of exposing 
 opposite errors, will be obvious from the discussion. 
 
 4. The law of a perfect moral government must express the 
 lawgiver's preference of the action required to its opposite, all 
 things considered. 
 
 Some have maintained it to be consistent with the nature of 
 such a law, that it express the lawgiver's preference of obedi- 
 ence to disobedience in themselves considered, while at the same 
 time he actually prefers disobedience to obedience, in many 
 cases at least, all things considered. In opposition to this view, 
 it is now maintained, that the law of a perfect moral govern- 
 ment expresses the lawgiver's preference of obedience to dis- 
 obedience all things considered, that is; when all things which 
 depend on the former are compared with all things which de- 
 pend or can be made to depend on the latter, either as its 
 own proper results, or by the infliction of punishment, or in 
 any other way. 
 
 This view of the import of the word law, or this nature of a 
 law may be tested by an appeal to common sense. Suppose a 
 father to enact a law, that his children shall not lie, cheat, nor 
 drink to excess. This being the unqualified form of the law, 
 suppose him to add by way of explanation : " On the whole, 
 or all things considered, I prefer, that you should transgress 
 rather than obey the law — that you should lie, and cheat and 
 drink, rather than tell the truth, and be honest and sober" — 
 would not common sense pronounce the so-called law a con- 
 temptible burlesque and a mockery ? And yet such, without 
 
<0 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 a shade of caricature, is the law of God in the view of infidels, 
 universalists, and all who maintain that sin is the necessary 
 means of the greatest good. If men will thus go against com- 
 mon sense, they must expect common sense to go against 
 them. 
 
 But this topic demands and will receive a more thorough 
 consideration hereafter. Some further remarks will, however, 
 not be out of place in this connection. A law then, which is 
 not an unqualified expression of the lawgiver's preference of 
 the action required to its opposite, all things considered, is not 
 a law. It expresses no will, no choice, no preference, and 
 therefore can in no respect be a command, either as a require- 
 ment or a prohibition. The will cannot prefer one thing to 
 another in themselves considered, and at the same time prefer 
 the latter to the former, all things considered. The mind may 
 involuntarily desire one thing more than another in themselves 
 considered. But an involuntary desire is not an act of will ; it 
 is not an act of choice, or an elective preference. The will or 
 mind can choose between two objects, and so prefer one to the 
 other only in view of them all things considered. To suppose 
 it to do both at the same time, is to suppose that it can choose 
 opposites at the same time, which is as absurd as to suppose 
 that a body should move in opposite directions at the same 
 time. Or, view this topic in another aspect. If the two 
 choices or preferences supposed may coexist in the same 
 mind and should so exist — which would show itself in exec- 
 utive action, or which of the two wills would a benevolent 
 being express in the form of law to his subjects? He wills 
 or chooses, that his subjects should act morally right rather 
 than morally wrong, considering the acts in themselves ; and 
 at the same time, he wills or chooses, that they should act 
 morally wrong, considering all things. He cannot express 
 with truth his will or choice that they should act morally 
 right, for he wills or chooses that they should act morally 
 wrong. He cannot with truth express his will or choice that 
 they should act morally wrong, for he wills or chooses that 
 they should act morally right. Let him express either of the 
 supposed wills in the form of law, and he is convicted of 
 falsehood by the existence of its opposite; which shows the 
 supposition of these two wills to be an absurdity. The doc- 
 trine of two wills on the part of a lawgiver, as now presented, 
 
THE LAWGIVER ACCEPTS ONLY OBEDIENCE. 71 
 
 is a simple absurdity, though extensively maintained by in- 
 fidels, universalists, and by some of worthier name.* If his 
 law is his will, it expresses his preference of the action required 
 to its opposite, all things considered. 
 
 5. The law of a perfect moral government implies, that the 
 lawgiver can be satisfied with obedience, and with nothing but 
 obedience on the part of subjects. The law of such a govern- 
 ment is, as we have seen, an unqualified expression of the law- 
 giver's preference of the action required to its opposite, all 
 things considered. As a lawgiver, so far as any thing on the 
 part of subjects is concerned, he must be satisfied either with 
 their obedience or disobedience. As willing or preferring the 
 former rather than the latter, he must be satisfied with the 
 former, and dissatisfied with the latter. To suppose otherwise, 
 is to suppose him to be dissatisfied when his will is done, and 
 satisfied when his will is not done but crossed and thwarted ; 
 which is the absurdity of supposing him dissatisfied when satis- 
 fied, or satisfied when dissatisfied. 
 
 Again ; the preference of a perfect moral governor expressed 
 in his law, is a preference of the indispensable means of the 
 best end, to the sure means of the worst end. The former is as 
 excellent and valuable — as much to be desired as the end of 
 which it is the means. The latter is as odious and abominable 
 — as much to be abhorred as the end of which it is the means. 
 If the former — obedience, does not take place on the part of 
 subjects, then the latter takes place on their part. And if a 
 perfect moral governor is not satisfied with the former, then he 
 must be satisfied, if at all, with the latter, i. <?., he must be 
 satisfied with that which he regards as odious and abomin- 
 able, even with the means of the worst conceivable end. The 
 absurdity is obvious. 
 
 The same thing may be viewed in another light. The action 
 required by his law, is either the best thing which can be re- 
 quired of subjects, or something else is better, or something 
 else is as good. If it is the best thing, then a perfect moral 
 governor must be satisfied with it, and with nothing else on 
 
 * It is not here denied, that a lawgiver may purpose or will that the act opposite 
 to that required by his law, shall take place, rather than not adopt the system, to 
 which, so far as his power to prevent it is concerned, the act is incidental. This 
 does not imply that he wills the forbidden act rather than the required act, all things 
 considered, under the system. 
 
723 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 the part of subjects ; since otherwise, he would be without 
 benevolence, and of course without authority. If something 
 else is better than obedience to law, then also, as not requiring 
 the best thing he is destitute of benevolence, and of course, 
 destitute of authority. If something else is as good, then he 
 expresses a false or groundless preference in his law, and is of 
 course destitute of the only character which can invest him 
 with authority. 
 
 Again ; if that which is required by the law, is not the only 
 thing on the part of the subject which will satisfy the law- 
 giver, then the question what will satisfy him or whether 
 any thing will, is left wholly undetermined. On this most 
 momentous of all questions, all is uncertainty and doubt ; or 
 rather deception and falsehood. None but a malignant being 
 could fail to put this question at rest, in the view of his sub- 
 jects. I need not say, that in such a case, neither law nor 
 moral government could exist. Or, if we suppose that the 
 moral governor can be satisfied with any thing but obedience 
 on the part of subjects, then by his law he furnishes no reason 
 to his subjects, why they should obey rather than disobey his 
 law. Nothing appears to show that he cannot be satisfied 
 with something on their part which is not obedience — some- 
 thing which he does not claim in his law; that he will not 
 accept of a substitute for obedience — some equivalent on the 
 part of subjects. He thus abandons all claim for obedience, 
 and adopts the principle, that one thing or another, any thing 
 or nothing will satisfy him. No rule of action — no law can 
 exist in such a case. 
 
 Further ; the same thing will be still more apparent, if we 
 advert to the grounds or reasons for satisfaction with obedience 
 on the part of the governor, and to the grounds or reasons 
 for dissatisfaction on his part with disobedience. In respect 
 to obedience, the grounds of satisfaction are two : first, obedi- 
 ence is the means of the highest well-being of the whole 
 community, and of the obedient subject; secondly, another 
 ground of satisfaction with the obedient subject is, that, by his 
 obedience he perfectly honors the law and fully supports the 
 authority of the moral governor. Nothing on the part of the 
 subject can amount to such a perfect recognition of the right- 
 ful authority of him who reigns, as the perfect obedience of 
 the subject. This gives to the law its highest honors, and to 
 
THE LAW DISSATISFIED WITH DISOBEDIENCE. 73 
 
 the authority of the governor that homage which enthrones 
 him in absolute dominion. Thus in the two respects specified 
 — the entire object and end — all that a perfect moral gov- 
 ernor can propose or desire from his subjects, is fully accom- 
 plished, and perfect benevolence is perfectly gratified by their 
 obedience. 
 
 In respect to disobedience, the grounds of dissatisfaction are 
 two. One is, that it tends to destroy the highest well-being, 
 and to produce the highest misery of the community and of 
 the disobedient subject. Disobedience to a perfect law is 
 selfishness. This as a principle of action, or rather as itself 
 action, tends to the destruction of the highest well-being and 
 the production of the highest misery in others and in its sub- 
 ject. Such action must, of course, be the object of high dis- 
 satisfaction to a benevolent or perfect moral governor. I say 
 nothing here concerning reconciliation with the transgressor 
 through an atonement. I only say, that with his character as 
 a transgressor, and the enemy of the highest well-beiug of all, a 
 perfect moral governor must be, in a high degree, dissatisfied. 
 The other ground of dissatisfaction with the transgressor is, 
 that by his act of transgression, he has done what he can to 
 destroy, and that which uncounteracted in its true tendency, 
 must destroy the authority of the moral governor. Actions, 
 in familiar phrase, sj>eak louder than words. The act of dis- 
 obedience says, in a manner the most unequivocal, the law is 
 not to be obeyed — the authority of the moral governor is to 
 be disregarded, and himself esteemed worthy only of unquali- 
 fied contempt. The transgressor does what he can therefore, 
 to bring into contempt, and thus to prostrate, and if nothing 
 be done to counteract the true tendency of his act, he does 
 what must effectually prostrate all law and all authority. 
 Who would or could respect a king, who either from weak- 
 ness, approbation, or policy, should acquiesce in the open 
 rebellion of a single subject, trampling on his law and con- 
 fronting his authority with undisguised contempt ? Suppose 
 every subject thus to defy his authority, and the triumphant 
 shout of rebellion to go throughout his empire, what is there 
 of law, authority, or government remaining ? Nothing. And 
 the reason is, that the act of transgression is a declaration and 
 a proof that the lawgiver, his law, and authority, are unwor- 
 thy of regard. It places the foot of rebellion on all that can 
 Vol. I.— 4 
 
74 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 be called authority, and all that is authority in the dust, 
 with the acquiescence of the moral governor. The proof is 
 decisive; the conclusion is not merely authorized but required, 
 either that he is incompetent or indisposed to uphold the best 
 law, or both ; and of course that he has no right to reign, and 
 is entitled to no submission. The principle is the same in 
 respect to a single instance of disobedience, considered as tes- 
 timony. It gives the same testimony. It establishes the same 
 fact — that so far as authority is concerned, there is none. For 
 what is done once may be done again ; what is done by one 
 may be done by all. The governor's acquiescence is the 
 result either of weakness, of timidity, of indifference, of appro- 
 bation, or of a selfish policy, and a single act of transgression 
 acquiesced in by him proves this. Such an act therefore, in 
 the very nature of the case subverts all authority. We may 
 indeed imagine that a moral governor should maintain his 
 place on his throne by dint of power. We may suppose him 
 to express due disapprobation of all other transgressors but 
 one. But if he fails to do this in respect to one transgressor 
 and so treats him with favor, under a merely legal system, his 
 authority is gone — subverted. He shows the partialities of 
 favoritism, and these subvert authority if any thing can. They 
 show him to be wanting in principle, and therefore wholly 
 destitute of that character which gives the right to rule ; they 
 show that he is as truly the friend of the disobedient as of the 
 obedient — that he does not regard obedience to the best law 
 as the indispensable means of the best end, and disobedience 
 to it as the sure means of the worst end. Thus disobedience, 
 without his disapprobation, subverts his authority, and he 
 acquiesces in the result. What right has he to reign ? 
 
 It may here be said, that under human governments, acts 
 of disobedience often occur without detection, and that even 
 subjects who are convicted as offenders are often pardoned, 
 and yet the authority of law is not subverted. This may be 
 admitted. But why is not the authority of law in these cases 
 subverted ? Is it because the principle now stated is not true ? 
 Or is it because every such government does what it can and 
 shows itself determined to do what it can, consistently with 
 its own weakness and imperfection, to counteract the tendency 
 of transgression, by upholding its authority in the punishment 
 of the guilty and the protection of the innocent ? The latter 
 
NECESSITY FOR PARDONING PREROGATIVE. 75 
 
 is the reason. In proof of it, let us suppose a civil ruler to 
 possess knowledge and power fully adequate to detect and to 
 punish without error and mistake, every offender against the 
 fundamental law of the state, could he refuse to do it — could 
 he refuse and be known to refuse to arrest the traitor and 
 bring him to punishment, and yet sustain his authority in the 
 view of his subjects ? Could treason be thus left to walk 
 abroad in the face of day, untouched, uncounteracted in its 
 tendency, and the authority of the king not be subverted ? 
 "What sort of justice and what sort of authority could belong 
 to such a ruler, suffering rebellion thus to trample on law ? 
 lie would be virtually employing his power to protect the 
 traitor, and so become his accomplice in crime. In respect 
 to the pardoning prerogative in human governments, whence 
 is it ? It rests solely on the ground of fallibility in the ad- 
 ministration of justice. If we suppose the infallibility of 
 omniscience, giving absolute security that the innocent shall 
 not be punished instead of the guilty, the pardoning preroga- 
 tive under civil law would be, or ought to be, unknown. 
 There could be no pretense for it ; for what sort of justice 
 would that be, which should punish some or many offenders 
 and not punish another known to be equally guilty ? The 
 act of remitting penalty in respect to a convict under a merely 
 legal system, must either rest on the presumption of his inno- 
 cence, or be an outrage on law. Thus every human govern- 
 ment, though necessarily imperfect in the hands of an imperfect 
 administrator, distinctly recognizes the principle of doing all 
 it can do to sustain its authority, by counteracting the tend- 
 ency of transgression to destroy it. By thus doing all it can 
 do for this purpose, it shows that it would do more if it could, 
 and thus avoid the very imperfections that mar its administra- 
 tion. It shows that, in its own estimation, the transgression 
 of law in its true tendency is the subversion of all law and 
 of all authority, by doing all it can do to counteract this 
 tendency. It thus recognizes, and therefore fully establishes, 
 that very principle of a perfect moral government which it is 
 supposed to disprove. 
 
 If it should here be said, that in many instances human gov- 
 ernments do not do what they can nor show that they are dis- 
 posed to do what they can, to sustain their authority in the 
 sense now maintained, and that still their authority is recog- 
 
ib MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 nized, I answer that in this view of a human government, 
 all that can be called authority is in truth mere appearance. 
 Language is used in these, as it is in many other cases, as if 
 that which it denotes had an actual existence, when it has not. 
 It is merely the language of appearance, and the thing when 
 duly reflected upon, is seen to be a mere quasi authority — 
 a thing imagined or supposed. Authority is recognized in 
 words, and even in unreflecting thought and action; as when 
 we speak of the rising and setting of the sun, or of the sweet- 
 ness of sugar, or the coldness of ice, as properties of these 
 things which resemble our sensations. As in these cases so in 
 the present case, by reflection, the error is easily and surely 
 detected and the ojyposite truth fully recognized. If in such 
 cases rulers and subjects seem to recognize authority, it is at 
 most only a recognition of something for the reality, which is 
 not ; while even this subserves the purpose of preventing the 
 evils of revolution and of anarchy. 
 
 While the act of transgression then in its true nature and 
 tendency subverts the authority of the moral governor, I now 
 proceed to show that the transgressor cannot in any way, 
 either by doing or by suffering prevent the actual effect. The 
 whole force and influence of his act to destroy the authority 
 of the moral governor, may be said to lie in the fact that the 
 subject has violated the claim for his obedience. It follows 
 therefore, that there is no way in which he can prevent the 
 actual subversion of all authority, except by satisfying the 
 unsatisfied claim for obedience. Can he then by any thing 
 which he can either do or suffer, satisfy this claim ? Can he 
 annihilate the act of transgression, or change it into an act of 
 obedience, or cause it to be true, that he has not transgressed ? 
 This is impossible. Can repentance or future obedience satisfy 
 this claim ? Repentance or future obedience can at most only 
 satisfy the claim in future. Were it otherwise, what would 
 the law be ? It would be in language and in import, not obey, 
 but sin and repent, transgress and reform. This would be al- 
 lowing present transgression on condition of future obedience. 
 Can works of supererogation ? These are out of the question, 
 the continued demands of law being co-extensive with the 
 powers of the subject. Can voluntary suffering? But volun- 
 tary suffering is not the thing which the law claims of the sub- 
 ject. The lawgiver threatens to inflict suffering, but no be- 
 
OBEDIENCE ONLY SATISFIES THE LAW. 77 
 
 nevolent lawgiver ever claimed voluntary suffering as the duty 
 of a subject. Voluntary suffering then cannot satisfy the 
 claim. The law has but one claim on the subject, and that is, 
 for his obedience. The lawgiver proposes nothing, aims at 
 nothing, desires nothing, except his obedience and his happi- 
 ness. How can misery be a substitute for happiness in the 
 estimate of a benevolent lawgiver? To suppose this is to sup- 
 pose him to say, " I am as willing that you should transgress 
 and be miserable, as obey and be happy." Besides, the most 
 that the transgressor can be supposed to accomplish either by 
 doing or suffering, is to evince his present regard for the law. 
 But he is bound to do or to suffer whatever can do this ; it 
 can therefore, only satisfy a present claim. Can punishment? 
 But punishment is not the act of the transgressor, but of the 
 lawgiver. It is not inflicted by him as a substitute for obedi- 
 ence. It is not an act of the lawgiver declaring himself as 
 well satisfied that his subjects should disobey and be pun- 
 ished, as obey and be blessed. It is an act of the lawgiver 
 designed, not to reform the subject and bring him to honor the 
 law, not to retrieve all the evils of transgression and so to be 
 an equivalent for the happiness it has destroyed, but to pre- 
 vent simply one of the evils of transgression, viz., the subver- 
 sion of law. It is simply the lawgiver's act, upholding his law 
 and authority. What then on the part of the transgressor can 
 satisfy the unsatisfied claim for his obedience ? Nothing. By 
 the act of transgression he has proclaimed that the law is un- 
 worthy of regard, and may be trampled in the dust by every 
 subject ; and this testimony is decisive of the fact, it is prima 
 facie evidence and uncounteracted by opposing evidence from 
 the governor himself, authorizes and demands the belief, that 
 the moral governor acquiesces in rebellion, that his law has 
 ceased as truly as had a repeal of it issued from his own lips, 
 and that he no more reigns with authority, than were he driven 
 an insulted and degraded exile from his throne. 
 
 The conclusion then on this topic is, that the law of a per- 
 fect moral governor is in its very nature an unqualified claim 
 for obedience on the part of every subject, and that whatever 
 it may threaten, it claims of the subject nothing but obedi- 
 ence. It knows of no substitute or equivalent for disobe- 
 dience on his part, nor yet on the part of the lawgiver him- 
 self; and therefore necessarily implies, that the lawgiver can 
 
T8 MOEAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 be satisfied with nothing but obedience on the part of the 
 subject. 
 
 6. The law of a perfect moral government expresses the law- 
 giver's highest approbation of obedience, and highest disappro- 
 bation of disobedience. 
 
 First. It expresses his highest approbation of obedience. By 
 highest approbation, I mean not higher approbation than he 
 may feel toward some other object, which cannot come into 
 competition with this as an object of approbation. A perfect 
 moral governor would feel as high approbation of the end of 
 right moral action, as of right moral action itself. But by 
 highest approbation, I mean, as high as he can feel toward any 
 object, and higher than any which he can feel toward any of all 
 the objects which can come into competition as objects of ap- 
 probation. 
 
 The law of a perfect moral governor expresses as we have 
 seen, his preference of the action required to its opposite, all 
 things considered. This preference is of course an elective 
 preference. It involves not only an act of will, but also affec- 
 tion, love, approbation of its object as it is in its own nature 
 and tendency ; and that degree of approbation which is suited 
 to the worth and excellence of the object. Obedience to the 
 perfect law of a perfect being is as we have seen the indis- 
 pensable means of the best end, even of the highest happiness 
 of the individual subject and of all others. As such a means 
 of such an end, it is as excellent and valuable, as much to be 
 loved, desired, approved and sought as the end itself. At the 
 same time, these objects — obedience and the highest happi- 
 ness of all, can never come into competition as objects of ap- 
 probation. A perfect moral governor therefore, must regard 
 obedience to his law with as high approbation as that with 
 which he can regard any other object, even the highest happi- 
 ness of all. Such approbation is necessarily involved in the 
 very preference which he expresses in his law, otherwise the 
 preference expressed in his law is not what it must be — a 
 preference of obedience as it is in its true nature and tend- 
 ency — the necessary means of the best end. Can he then 
 feel so high a degree of approbation of any other object, 
 which can come into competition with obedience as an object 
 of approbation, as that which he feels for obedience ? This is 
 impossible and absurd. To suppose it, is to suppose, that per- 
 
TIIE LAW EXPRESSES APPROBATION. 79 
 
 feet benevolence should feel as high approbation or love for 
 that which is neither the highest happiness of all nor the 
 necessary means of it, as it feels for these objects — which is to 
 suppose that to be benevolence which is not benevolence. 
 
 Again; the only object, which, under a moral government, 
 can be conceived to exist and to come into competition with 
 obedience as an object of approbation to. a moral governor, 
 must be some supposable degree of happiness with exemption 
 from some supposable degree of misery or suffering, in case of 
 disobedience. It is admitted that a benevolent being approves 
 of happiness, and of exemption from suffering in themselves 
 considered. But no happiness, and no exemption from suffer- 
 ing which are conceivable in case of disobedience, or con- 
 nected with it or depending on it, can be so highly approved 
 by a benevolent ruler as obedience to a perfect law. Suppose 
 what else we may, so long as obedience does not exist, the ne- 
 cessary means of the best end does not exist, nor the best end 
 itself. Of course nothing exists or can exist without obedi- 
 ence, of which a benevolent ruler can so highly approve and 
 love as obedience to his law. The expression of his preference 
 in his law therefore, being an expression of his approbation 
 of obedience as it is, is an expression of his highest appro- 
 bation of obedience. 
 
 This reasoning might be further enforced by considering 
 obedience in its particular relations as the means of the high- 
 est well-being of all. Such it is, not merely in its direct ten- 
 dencies to produce the highest happiness of the obedient and 
 of all others, but also in all its indirect tendencies. Not 
 however to specify these, I only advert to one of them al- 
 ready stated — its tendency to support the authority of the 
 moral governor. The obedience of his subjects is the testi- 
 mony and the homage of every intellect and every heart, to his 
 perfect qualification to reign ; and pre-eminently enthrones 
 him in rightful dominion. This is " the column of true ma- 
 jesty" in kings. When obedience exists, all exists that a per- 
 fect moral governor can propose or desire in respect to himself 
 and his subjects. And this he tells them in the preference — 
 the will given forth in his law. "What other object can he so 
 highly approve ? 
 
 Secondly. The law of a perfect moral governor expresses his 
 highest disapprobation of disobedience. By the highest dis- 
 
80 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 approbation, I mean as high as he can feel toward any object, 
 and higher than any which he can feel toward any of all the 
 objects which can come into competition as objects of disap- 
 probation. This is necessarily involved in the preference ex- 
 pressed in his law. This preference of the action required to 
 its opposite involves aversion, hatred, disapprobation toward 
 the opposite as it is in its true nature and tendency. It in- 
 volves a degree of disapprobation, which is suited to the de- 
 gree of turpitude and odiousness in disobedience. ISTow dis- 
 obedience to the law of a perfect moral government, in its true 
 nature and tendency, is the sure means of the worst end even 
 of the highest misery of the subject and of all others. As 
 such a means of such an end, it is as odious as fit to be abhor- 
 red and disapproved as the end itself. These objects however, 
 disobedience and the highest misery of all, can never come 
 into competition as objects of disapprobation. A perfect moral 
 governor therefore, must regard disobedience with as high 
 disapprobation as that with which he can regard the highest 
 misery of all. Such disapprobation of disobedience is involved 
 in the very preference expressed in his law. For this prefer; 
 ence involves aversion, hatred, disapprobation of disobedience 
 as it is in its true nature and tendency, that is as the means 
 of the highest misery of all. Can he then feel so high a de- 
 gree of disapprobation toward any other object which can 
 come into competition with disobedience as an object of dis- 
 approbation, as he must feel toward disobedience? This is 
 impossible. To suppose it is to suppose, that a being of per- 
 fect benevolence should feel as high disapprobation toward 
 that which is neither the highest misery of all nor the means 
 of it, as he feels toward these objects ; which is to suppose a 
 perfectly benevolent being, who is not perfectly benevolent. 
 
 This view of the subject is confirmed by considering the 
 specific tendency of disobedience to destroy the authority of 
 the governor. It not only tends as a kind of action to pro- 
 duce the highest misery of all, but as we have seen, it tends 
 to subvert the authority of law and government, and thus to 
 demolish the necessary and only security and safeguard against 
 this fearful issue. Intent on its work of ruin, it storms and 
 rases to the foundation the only citadel of defense and protec- 
 tion, that it may extend its desolations unhindered and unmo- 
 lested. It thus destroys the last hope and refuge of benevo- 
 
NO EVIL SO GREAT AS TRANSGRESSION. 81 
 
 lence itself; forcing it to yield its authority and its designs to 
 the ravages of fell malignity. What object so tit to be abhor- 
 red ? What can be called law, which does not express supreme 
 abhorrence of transgression ? What lawgiver can be entitled 
 to respect, who does not express in his law the highest disap- 
 probation of this deed of death — -this worst of evils as a cause 
 — an evil equaled only by its appropriate effect, the absolute 
 wretchedness of all? Thus, when disobedience exists, all ex- 
 ists that a perfect moral governor can deprecate, disapprove 
 and abhor as the cause of evil and the source of woe. It is 
 hostility and defeat to his entire and only design. It crosses 
 and frustrates his only will — his whole will as given forth in 
 his law. What other object can he so highly disapprove and 
 abhor ? 
 
 4* 6 
 
LECTURE V. 
 
 V. A perfect Moral Government involves the exercise of authority through the medium of laiv. — 
 The nature of such a law further unfolded.— 7. The law of a perfect Moral Government involves 
 sanctions.— The relations of a Moral Governor to his kingdom more particularly considered. — 
 Legal sanctions denned. — They establish or ratify the authority of the Moral Governor.— They 
 consist in natural good promised to obedience, and in natural evil threatened to disobedience. — 
 They establish the Moral Governor's authority as its decisive proof. — They become decisive 
 proof of the Moral Governors authority by manifesting his benevolenee in the form of his high- 
 est approbation of obedience, and highest disapprobation of disobedience.— It is not incredible 
 that God in the Scriptures, should express his highest approbation of obedience and his highest 
 disapprobation of disobedience to His law. 
 
 In preceding lectures, after defining a perfect moral govern- 
 ment in general terms, I entered on the inquiry, What is the 
 law of a perfect moral government f In answer to this in- 
 quiry, I attempted to show that such a law is a decisive rule 
 of action to subjects / that it must require "benevolence as the 
 best "kind of action, and forbid selfishness as the worst kind of 
 action conceivable on the part of subjects / that it requires be- 
 nevolence as the sum of obedience, and forbids selfishness as the 
 sum of disobedience on t/ie part of subjects ; that it expresses 
 the lawgiver's preference of the action required to its opposite, 
 all things considered; that it implies that the lawgiver can be 
 satisfied with obedience and with nothing but obedience on the 
 part of subjects ; that it expresses the lawgiver y s highest appro- 
 bation of obedience, and highest disapprobation of disobedience 
 on the part of subjects. 
 
 Continuing these remarks concerning the nature of law, I 
 proceed to say, 
 
 Seventhly : That the law of a perfect moral government 
 involves sanctions. 
 
 In treating of this important and much controverted part 
 of our subject, I propose to unfold the nature, the necessity, 
 and the equity of legal sanctions in relation to the authority 
 of the moral governor. Before however entering directly on 
 these topics, I deem it important to consider more particularly 
 than I have done, the relation which the moral governor sus- 
 tains to his kingdom, the qualifications for the office, especially 
 the moral character which he must possess and manifest as 
 
THE PECULIAR RELATION OF THE GOVERNOR. 83 
 
 the ground of his authority, and also the mode of manifesting 
 his qualifications to his subjects. 
 
 Assuming then what is now properly assumed, that a per- 
 fect moral government is the best means of the best end, and 
 therefore dictated and demanded by benevolence, I remark — 
 
 That a moral governor sustains a peculiar relation to his 
 kingdom — a relation distinguished from every other by its 
 peculiar object or end, and also by its peculiar function. 
 Every relation of every moral being toward other moral be- 
 ings which is dictated and demanded by benevolence, has its 
 peculiar object or end, and hence also its peculiar function, 
 or what are called in most cases its peculiar duties, including 
 those acts or doings, or some general comprehensive mode of 
 acting necessary to the accomplishment of the peculiar object 
 or end of the relation. Accordingly, benevolence in a moral 
 governor, while it aims at the highest happiness of all, is also 
 committed to another great object or end which is peculiar to 
 his relation, viz., to secure to the extent of his power, right 
 moral action, and to prevent wrong moral action on the part 
 of his subjects, ~by means peculiar to the relation of a moral 
 governor. I say that benevolence is committed — pledged — in 
 its very nature, and from the nature of this relation, to accom- 
 plish, as far as possible, this end by these means. Under a 
 system of moral government, as I have before said, all — all 
 depends on action. On the right and wrong moral action of 
 its subjects depend its issues in happiness or misery. The 
 weal or woe of the moral kingdom depends therefore, on what 
 the moral governor does or fails to do, to secure right and to 
 prevent wrong moral action on the part of his subjects. To 
 secure right moral action with its results in happiness, and to 
 prevent wrong moral action with its results in misery, by the 
 peculiar influence of a perfect moral government, must be the 
 grand object or end, and compared with any thing which can 
 come into competition with it, must be the supreme object or 
 end of a perfect moral governor. lie may care for and promote 
 individual well-being, only so far as this shall be consistent 
 with securing the greatest amount possible to him of right 
 moral action, as the means of the highest happiness of his 
 kingdom by the peculiar influence of a perfect moral govern- 
 ment. But to the accomplishment of this end by this means, 
 every thing which interferes with it must be sacrificed ; and 
 
84 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 every tiling which is necessary to the accomplishment of this 
 end by this means must be done, or the great end of benevo- 
 lence must be defeated. To accomplish this particular end 
 then — to secure the greatest amount of right moral action 
 which he can secure, as that which is necessary to the highest 
 well-being of all, by that influence which is peculiar to his 
 relation as a moral governor, is the entire function of his 
 office. A moral governor therefore from the very nature of 
 his relation as a benevolent being, is under the necessity not 
 merely of aiming to produce the highest happiness of his 
 kingdom, but of aiming to produce it bv securing the greatest 
 amount of right moral action. Nor is he as some vainly ima- 
 gine, under the necessity merely of aiming to produce the 
 highest well-being of his kingdom by securing the greatest 
 amount of right moral action which he can secure ; but he is 
 under the necessity of aiming to produce the highest amount 
 of right moral action which he can secure by the peculiar in- 
 fluence of a -perfect moral government. 
 
 What then is the peculiar influence of a perfect moral gov- 
 ernment f It is we have already seen, the single influence of 
 authority — of that right to command which imposes an obli- 
 gation to obey. This is that peculiar essential influence of a 
 perfect moral government, without which such a government 
 can have no existence. If right moral action can take place 
 under other influences, it cannot take place as obedience to a 
 moral governor without the influence of his authority on the 
 subject. Other influences may be combined with this influ- 
 ence, not to say must be combined with it, from the very 
 condition of all moral beings. But such other influences are 
 entirely distinct from this influence, and though necessary to 
 its existence, they are no part of it. They may exist without 
 this influence ; but when this influence does not exist, moral 
 government does not exist. Eight moral action clone under 
 the direct influence of natural good and evil as merely so 
 much motive and without any regard to the will of another, 
 is not done in submission to authority, and therefore is not 
 obedience to a moral governor. "Wrong moral action not 
 done in rejection of authority, is not disobedience to a moral 
 governor. The only influence by which one acting simply in 
 the relation of a moral governor can control, or attempt to 
 control the conduct of others as his subjects, is the single in- 
 
ON WHAT AUTHORITY DEPENDS. 85 
 
 fluence of authority. To suppose a moral governor therefore 
 without authority, is to suppose a moral governor without the 
 least governing influence, and is the absurdity of supposing 
 one to possess an influence which he does not possess — of sup- 
 posing a moral governor who is not a moral governor. "When 
 therefore there is no authority, there can be neither obedience 
 nor disobedience to a moral governor — neither a moral gov- 
 ernment nor a moral governor. Authority then — the right to 
 command which imposes an obligation to obey — is the pecu- 
 liar, essential, constituting influence of moral government; so 
 that where this influence exists moral government exists ; and 
 where this influence does not exist moral government does 
 not exist. 
 
 Again ; the authority of the moral governor — that right to 
 command which imposes an obligation to obey — depends on 
 his competence and disposition to govern in the best manner; 
 that is, on his knowledge and power as qualifying him, and 
 on his benevolence as disposing him to govern in the best 
 manner, and on the decisive manifestations of these qualifica- 
 tions and this character to his subjects. 
 
 That the moral governor's authority depends on the knowl- 
 edge and power which qualify him to govern in the best 
 manner, and on the full manifestation of these qualification? 
 for his office, is too obvious to be denied. These qualifications 
 not manifested to the conviction of his subjects, would be in 
 respect to constituting any part of the ground of his authority, 
 as though they were not ; and who can suppose that ignorance 
 and imbecility can give that right to command which imposes 
 an obligation to obey ? 
 
 The qualifications of knowledge and power admit of differ- 
 ent modes of manifestation in different cases — modes which 
 are peculiar to these attributes, when compared with that of 
 manifesting a perfect moral character. In that Being who 
 possesses omniscience and almighty power, these attributes 
 are abundantly manifested by his works of creation. Essen- 
 tial however, as the existence and the full manifestation of 
 these qualifications are to the authority of the moral governor, 
 it is in no respect necessary or important to my present pur- 
 pose to dwell on either, since the existence and the manifes- 
 tation of them in a moral governor in no respect depend on 
 legal sanctions. Legal sanctions, whatever may be their 
 
86 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 nature, their relations or their necessity, can neither impart 
 the requisite attributes of knowledge and power, nor be neces- 
 sary to prove their existence. At the same time, if we sup- 
 pose the moral governor to furnish the most abundant proof 
 of his qualifications in respect to knowledge and power, this 
 fact does not imply that he possesses the shadow of authority; 
 for his authority depends not merely on his knowledge and 
 power but also on his benevolence, and the full proof or mani- 
 festation of it to his subjects. If then legal sanctions have 
 any influence in establishing his authority, it must be some 
 influence on, or in relation to, the great question of his be- 
 nevolence. 
 
 That I may hereafter exhibit what I consider just and 
 adequate views of legal sanctions, I now invite further and 
 particular attention to benevolence on the part of the moral 
 governor and its manifestation as one essential ground of his 
 authority. 
 
 It is then undeniable, that benevolence is one thing in the 
 character, or rather that it is itself the character of the moral 
 governor, which, in connection with the requisite knowledge 
 and power, constitutes the essential ground of his authority. 
 When it is once decided on sufficient evidence, that he pos- 
 sesses that knowledge and power which qualify him to govern 
 in the best manner — so far as such qualification depends on 
 these attributes — and if this be not decided, the fact of his 
 authority cannot be established ; then the fact, and the only 
 fact which remains to be proved for the purpose of fully estab- 
 lishing his authority, is the fact of his perfect moral character 
 — his benevolence. 
 
 In this fact is involved another. The moral governor who 
 is truly or perfectly benevolent, must feel the highest appro- 
 bation of right moral action, and the highest disapprobation 
 of wrong moral action on the part of his subjects. These par- 
 ticular emotions in view of the true nature and tendency of 
 right and wrong moral action, are inseparable from the nature 
 of benevolence in every mind. 
 
 Again ; benevolence in the specific form of it now stated 
 as the character of the moral governor, must from the very 
 nature and design of his relation, be supremely concerned 
 and absolutely committed to secure so far as he is able, right 
 moral action in every instance, and to prevent wrong moral 
 
BENEVOLENCE INVOLVES THESE FEELINGS. 87 
 
 action in every instance by the influence of his authority. To 
 accomplish this end by this means, is the great object of be- 
 nevolence in a moral governor — the object by which this 
 august relation is distinguished from every other relation. 
 Benevolence on the part of a moral governor acting in this 
 single relation, can be conceived to aim at no other object. 
 The relation can be conceived to involve no other peculiar 
 function than the accomplishment of this end by this means. 
 We say then, that the grand, peculiar function of a moral 
 governor is, by the influence of his authority, to aim to secure 
 right, and to prevent wrong moral action on the part of his 
 subjects. But if he who occupies the throne does not aim to 
 secure right moral action, w T ith the highest approbation of it 
 as the means of the highest well-being of all, and to prevent 
 wrong moral action, with the highest disapprobation of it as 
 the means of the highest misery of all, then he is not benevo- 
 lent — he does not possess the character which is requisite to 
 his right to reign — he has no authority. 
 
 Besides, there is nothing in benevolence itself, on account 
 of which it can be requisite to the moral governor's authority, 
 except that it involves these feelings of highest approbation of 
 right, and highest disapprobation of wrong moral action. Sup- 
 pose benevolence to be any thing which it can be supposed to 
 be, without involving the feelings of highest approbation of 
 right and highest disapprobation of wrong moral action, and 
 what is it but downright selfishness, showing no smile of favor 
 for that which is the means of the highest welfare of all, 
 and no frown of wrath for that which is the means of the 
 highest misery of all ? What is it but selfishness in the form 
 of malignity, welcoming and conniving at crime and wretch- 
 edness, to subserve some private interest or purpose of its 
 own? And what is there in such a character, to give to its 
 possessor the right to control at will the conduct of others ? 
 Or soften the character as you will, if it does not involve the 
 feelings of highest approbation of right and highest disappro- 
 bation of wrong moral action, its possessor can have no will in 
 respect to right and wrong moral action in accordance with 
 their true nature and tendency — no preference of the one to 
 the other as the one is the means of the highest happiness of all, 
 and the other the means of the highest misery of all. Law as 
 a rule of action, cannot with truth express such a will or pref- 
 
8o MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 erence. Its language is the utterance of falsehood. The law- 
 giver has no such will, no such preference as the very nature 
 of law involves, and the very language of law expresses. 
 Whatever then the thing may be, by whatever name it may 
 be called — whatever amount of good it may impart in other 
 relations ; in a moral governor it is worthy only of execration 
 and contempt. Call it benevolence if you will, but as the at- 
 tribute of a moral governor, if it does not involve the high- 
 est approbation of right, and the highest disapprobation of 
 wrong moral action, it can give him no right to reign — no 
 authority. Benevolence — benevolence in the form of the 
 highest approbation of right and highest disapprobation of 
 wrong moral action, is essential to the authority of the moral 
 governor. 
 
 ]STor is this all. The manifestation of benevolence in the 
 form of the highest approbation of right and highest disappro- 
 bation of wrong moral action, is also essential to the moral 
 governor's authority. 
 
 The grand and peculiar object or end of a perfect moral 
 governor, is to secure right and prevent wrong moral action 
 on the part of his subjects, by the influence of his authority. 
 But his subjects cannot be reached by this influence and act 
 under it, or rather the influence itself cannot exist, except as it 
 results from a full manifestation of that character of the gov- 
 ernor which is a requisite ground of his authority, even per- 
 fect benevolence with its feelings of highest approbation of 
 right and highest disapprobation of wrong moral action. In- 
 deed these feelings are as we have seen, those very elements 
 of his perfect moral character, which constitute it an essen- 
 tial ground of his authority. It is obvious therefore, that 
 the full and decisive manifestation of these feelings to the 
 view of his subjects, is as necessary to his authority as the ex- 
 istence of the feelings themselves, or of the character which 
 involves them. To suppose Mm to authorize a doubt in the 
 minds of his subjects of this character and these feelings, is to 
 suppose him to authorize a denial of his authority. For what 
 right to command can he possess in the view of subjects, while 
 he leaves it with them an unsettled question, whether he feels 
 the highest approbation of right, and highest disapprobation 
 of wrong moral action. 
 
 "We may view this topic under other aspects. Responsibil- 
 
FOR WHAT IS THE GOVERNOR RESPONSIBLE. 89 
 
 ity for actual results in the weal and woe of liis kingdom be- 
 longs to the moral governor, so far as these results depend on 
 his maintaining the influence of his authority. His business — . 
 the grand function of his office, so to speak, is to secure, as far 
 as may be, right moral action as the means of the highest well- 
 being of all, and to prevent as far as may be, wrong moral 
 action as the means of the highest misery of all, by the single 
 influence of his authority. If the result in happiness fails, or 
 if through wrong moral action the highest misery of all fol- 
 lows, in consequence of his failure to sustain and use the influ- 
 ence of his authority, the responsibility is emphatically his 
 own. The highest happiness of all, and the prevention of the 
 highest misery of all, so far as they depend on the existence 
 and influence of his authority, are committed to his keeping. 
 He is responsible for these high interests of his kingdom, so 
 far as they depend on the influence of his authority. His con- 
 cern is to maintain this influence unimpaired and perfect, be the 
 sacrifice what it may. Nothing of equal value can come in- 
 to competition with the maintenance of his authority. When 
 it is once decided that a perfect moral government is the best 
 means of the best end, then it is also decided, that the main- 
 tenance of the moral governor's authority is the best means of 
 the best end. His only alternative therefore, is, either to be- 
 tray his trust, and thus to forfeit his character and his throne, 
 or to manifest those feelings toAvard right and wrong moral 
 action, which are the essential ground of his authority. Or 
 thus, the moral governor from the nature of his relation, is to 
 be looked to and confided in, as the faithful guardian of the 
 welfare of his kingdom by the influence of his authority. To 
 secure to his kingdom the highest happiness by this influence, 
 and to be confided in accordingly, is the sole purpose and end 
 of his high prerogative. Is he worthy, and does he show him- 
 self to be worthy of this confidence in the view of his sub- 
 jects? If so, then he must manifest those feelings toward 
 right and wrong moral action, which as a perfect being he 
 must possess, and the manifestation of which is essential to his 
 authority. How else can his subjects confide in that guardian- 
 ship, which is to be extended to his kingdom only through the 
 influence of his authority? What confidence can be reposed 
 in one, who, for aught that appears to the contrary, is indiffer- 
 ent to the conduct of his subjects, on which the happiness or 
 
90 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 misery of his kingdom depends, or who is or may prove him- 
 self to be, so far as any evidence to the contrary exists, the 
 friend and patron of wrong moral action ? And yet this is the 
 only just view of his character. Failing to furnish decisive 
 proof of his highest approbation of right, and of his highest 
 disapprobation of wrong moral action, he furnishes not the 
 shadow of proof, that he would express these feelings, even 
 should the expression of them be necessary to prevent the 
 universal wrong-doing, and with it the universal and perfect 
 misery of his kingdom forevermore. I do not say, that the 
 expression of these feelings is necessary to prevent this result 
 in his kingdom. He however, in the case supposed, can fur- 
 nish no proof to the contrary by what he does as a moral 
 governor. His own declaration cannot be proof, for as yet 
 his benevolence is not proved. Of course his veracity is not 
 proved, and is therefore justly questioned. There can there- 
 fore be no possible proof, in the view of his subjects in the 
 supposed case, that the supposed result would not follow ; and 
 no possible proof that the moral governor, foreseeing the re- 
 sult, would in any instance express the specified feelings to- 
 ward right and wrong moral action, were it necessary to pre- 
 vent the direful catastrophe; no proof, that he would manifest 
 the highest approbation of right moral action in a single in- 
 stance, or the highest disapprobation of wrong moral action in 
 a single instance, were it necessary to prevent his kingdom 
 from becoming a pandemonium of sin and misery. He proves 
 himself to be a selfish being; and there is not the shadow of 
 reason to conclude, that he would not consent to and so be- 
 come the responsible author of, the unmitigated and endless 
 woes of his kingdom, rather than express the feelings requisite 
 to prevent them, through legal sanctions. What authority or 
 right to reign can such a being possess ? Or thus, a being 
 who has the right to reign as a moral governor, is a benevo- 
 lent being, and has of course the necessary feelings of a benev- 
 olent being toward right and wrong moral action, the feelings 
 of highest approbation of the one, and of the highest disappro- 
 bation of the other. Having this character with its necessary 
 emotions toward right and wrong moral action, he will furnish 
 the requisite manifestation or proof of this material fact ; since 
 otherwise he can possess no authority in the view of his sub- 
 jects; that is, cannot use the necessary means of the great 
 
THE LAWGIVER MUST SHOW HIS PEELINGS. 91 
 
 end of benevolence, or of the highest happiness of his king- 
 dom, which benevolence requires him to use. Benevolence 
 no more requires him to aim at this end, than it requires him 
 to use the necessary means of it — than it requires him to mani- 
 fest his highest approbation of right and highest disapproba- 
 tion of wrong moral action. Or thus : to suppose a perfect 
 moral governor not to manifest the highest approbation of 
 obedience to the best law, and the highest disapprobation of 
 disobedience to the best law, is a palpable absurdity. It is to 
 suppose him to use the influence of his authority, an influence 
 which depends wholly on the manifestation of these feelings, 
 and yet that he does not manifest the feelings on which the in- 
 fluence thus depends; that is, it is to suppose him to use an 
 influence which can have no existence and which of course he 
 does not use. 
 
 Does the moral governor then establish and sustain his 
 authority ? This question depends on another ; does he fully 
 manifest his highest approbation of right, and highest disap- 
 probation of wrong moral action; does he show that he re- 
 gards the one kind of action as the means of the highest well- 
 being of all, and as such, as valuable as the end itself, and the 
 other as the means of the highest misery of all, and as such, as 
 evil as the end itself? This is the grand problem. I say 
 then repeating the question, does the moral governor show that 
 he regards right moral action with supreme approbation, and 
 wrong moral action with supreme disapprobation f Does 
 he so prove it as not to authorize a doubt of it ? If he does 
 not, then there is no proof of his benevolence and therefore 
 no proof of his authority. There is proof to the contrary. 
 Failing as the responsible guardian of the welfare of his king- 
 dom fully to manifest these feelings toward right and wrong 
 moral action — the highest approbation of the one as the means 
 of the highest welfare of all, and the highest disapprobation 
 of the other as the means of the highest misery of all — he de- 
 cisively evinces the opposite character, and can make no claim 
 or pretense to authority. 
 
 I remark once more, that the requisite manifestation and 
 proof of the moral governor's benevolence, in the form of his 
 highest approbation of right, and his highest disapprobation of 
 wrong moral action, and in this way the requisite proof of his 
 authority, must depend not merely on what he does in other 
 
02 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 relations^ hut also on what he does in this relation. From in- 
 adequate views of the relation of a moral governor and the 
 peculiar function of his office, it seems not to be an uncommon 
 opinion, that he may by acts and doings in other relations, 
 fully establish his character for benevolence ; that, from his 
 character thus established, may be inferred his appropriate 
 feelings toward right and WTong moral action; and that in 
 this way his authority or right to rule, so far as it depends on 
 this character and these feelings, may also be fully established. 
 
 On this fundamental point it is readily conceded, that to 
 the establishment of his authority as a moral governor, his 
 character as manifested in all his other relations must be unim- 
 peached and unimpeachable. It is indispensable to this pur- 
 pose, that his acts and his doings in all his other relations, 
 should not only be free from every thing which w r ould evince 
 the selfish principle, but consist in or include all the positive 
 acts of beneficence which are demanded by his other relations. 
 Otherwise he would furnish decisive proof against his benevo- 
 lence, and of course against his authority. But it is now 
 maintained, that these things — even the most decisive proofs 
 of benevolence possible in his other relations merely — cannot 
 prove his benevolence, and so establish his authority as a 
 moral governor. They may furnish a degree of presumptive 
 evidence — nay, the best evidence supposable in the case — of 
 that character which entitles him to assume the relation of a 
 moral governor. But no matter what proofs of his benevo- 
 lence he may furnish in his other relations, they are not suffi- 
 cient proofs of his benevolence, if in this relation he does not 
 perform that appropriate function of his office which benevo- 
 lence requires him to perform. To what purpose is it, that a 
 being furnishes every possible proof of his benevolence in 
 some or in many relations, if in another relation he utterly 
 fails to perform the duties or functions wmich in this relation 
 benevolence requires him to perform ? All his conduct in 
 other relations be it ever so unexceptionable, may he the dic- 
 tate of the selfish principle ; while his failure to perform the 
 duties or functions of this relation, is decisive j>roof that it is 
 the dictate of the selfish principle. 
 
 Now the moral governor sustains a peculiar relation — a 
 relation widely different from every other, and involving a 
 peculiar responsibility and a peculiar function. He is the 
 
BENEVOLENCE MUST SHOW ITS FEELINGS. 93 
 
 responsible guardian of a kingdom's welfare, as its weal or 
 woe depends on what lie does, to bring his subjects under the 
 influence of his authority. The grand and peculiar function 
 of his relation or office is to bring this influence to bear on 
 his subjects, that by it he may secure right and prevent wrong 
 moral action, the one being the means of the highest well- 
 being of all, and the other the means of the highest misery of 
 all. The question of his benevolence therefore, depends not 
 merely on what he does or has done in other relations, but 
 also on what he does in this relation. Does he as the moral 
 governor, perform the peculiar function of his office ? — does 
 he create the influence of his authority by what he does in 
 this relation? If not — if he does not bring his subjects under 
 this influence, so that they in acting must either submit to it 
 or resist it, then he is recreant to the grand and only function 
 of his office, and betrays the trust which he pretends to as- 
 sume. He thus shows himself not to be benevolent, and of 
 course to possess no authority. Benevolence therefore, re- 
 quires him to manifest his benevolence by what he does in 
 the relation of a moral governor, and in this way to establish 
 his authority. 
 
 Ivor is this all. Benevolence requires him also to manifest 
 in his relation as a moral governor, his benevolence in that 
 form which is peculiar and appropriate to this relation, viz., 
 in its necessary feelings toward right and wrong moral action 
 on the part of subjects. The happiness or misery of his king- 
 dom depends on his showing himself to feel toward right and 
 wrong moral action, as a benevolent being must feel. If he 
 
 CD J CD 
 
 does not show these feelings, he shows himself not to be be- 
 nevolent. As we have seen, all that there is in the nature of 
 benevolence which qualifies him to rule and can give him the 
 right to rule, is, that it involves these feelings and will mani- 
 fest them, for the accomplishment of the great end of benevo- 
 lence. If benevolence has any peculiar feelings toward hap- 
 piness and misery, it must have peculiar feelings toward right 
 moral action as the means of the highest happiness of all, and 
 toward wrong moral action as the means of the highest mis- 
 ery of all. If benevolence requires the moral governor to 
 make a full and decisive manifestation of his feelings toward 
 the highest happiness of all and the highest misery of all, then 
 it requires him also to manifest not less decisively its peculiar 
 
94 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 feelings toward right moral action, as the means of the high- 
 est happiness of all, and toward wrong moral action as the 
 means of the highest misery of all. But if he does not mani- 
 fest his benevolence in its peculiar and necessary feelings 
 toward right and wrong moral action, by what he does in his 
 relation as a moral governor, he cannot manifest it at all ; and 
 the proof from this is decisive, that he is not benevolent, and 
 can have no right to rule ; nay more, that he is not willing to 
 use the best and only proper means of securing the highest 
 happiness of all and preventing the highest misery of all, and 
 therefore is a selfish being and in moral character, nothing 
 better than a fiend. 
 
 Thus plain is it, that a moral governor is under an absolute 
 necessity of maintaining his authority in the view of his sub- 
 jects, if he maintains it at all, by what he does in the relation 
 of a moral governor ; in other words, by manifesting in this 
 relation his benevolence, in the form of his highest approba- 
 tion of right moral action, and his highest disapprobation of 
 wrong moral action on the part of his subjects. If he would 
 use the peculiar and essential influence of a perfect moral 
 government, the influence of authority — if he would establish 
 his right to reign, he must appear before his kingdom as the 
 unchangeable friend and patron of right moral action, and the 
 uncompromising enemy and avenger of wrong moral action, 
 showing that he loves the one as he loves the highest happi- 
 ness of his kingdom, and that he hates the other as he hates 
 the highest misery of his kingdom. He must appear in all 
 the excellence and loveliness and majesty of this character, 
 without a cloud or a spot to obscure its splendor. The glory of 
 his rightful dominion must be as the sun shining in his strength. 
 
 In view of what has now been said concerning the relation 
 of the moral governor to his kingdom, his qualifications for 
 the office, and especially concerning the moral character 
 which he must possess and manifest as the ground of his 
 authority, I now proceed to the direct consideration of legal 
 sanctions. My object is, to ascertain their nature, to show 
 their necessity to the existence of law and moral government, 
 and to unfold their equity in respect to the degrees of natural 
 good and evil which are requisite to their design. For the 
 purpose of presenting what I deem just and adequate views 
 of the subject, I propose to define, in somewhat general terms, 
 
LEGAL SANCTIONS DEFINED. 95 
 
 the phrase legal sanctions, or sanctions of law, and to explain 
 and defend the several parts of the definition. 
 
 Legal sanctions then — by which I mean the sanctions of the 
 law of a perfect moral government — consist in that natural 
 good promised to obedience, and in that natural evil threatened 
 to disobedience by the moral governor, which establish or ratify 
 his authority as the decisive or necessary proof of it, by mani- 
 festing his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation 
 of obedience and his highest disapprobation of disobedience, 
 and which for this purpose include the highest possible degree 
 of natural good in each case of obedience, and the highest pos- 
 sible degree of natural evil in each case of disobedience. 
 
 This definition may be fully comprised in the following par- 
 ticular propositions : 
 
 1st. Legal sanctions establish or ratify the authority of the 
 moral governor. 
 
 2d. They consist in natural good promised to obedience, 
 and in natural evil threatened to disobedience, by the moral 
 governor. 
 
 3d. They establish or ratify the moral governor's authority, 
 as the decisive proof of it. 
 
 4th. They become the decisive proof of his authority, by 
 manifesting his benevolence in the form of his highest appro- 
 bation of obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobe- 
 dience. 
 
 5th. They are the necessary proof of his authority, as being 
 the necessary manifestations and proof of his benevolence, in 
 the necessary form of his highest approbation of obedience, 
 and his highest disapprobation of disobedience. 
 
 6th. They include the highest possible degree of natural 
 good in each case of obedience, and the highest possible de- 
 gree of natural evil in each case of disobedience. 
 
 These several particular propositions I propose to explain 
 and to vindicate. 
 
 1st, Legal sanctions establish or ratify the authority of the 
 moral governor. If legal sanctions are tilings of any signifi- 
 cance, they sustain this particular relation to law — they estab- 
 lish or ratify it as an authoritative rule of action to subjects. 
 To speak of law as an authoritative rule of action, is only to 
 say, that it is a rule of action given by one who has authority 
 or that right to command which imposes an obligation to obey. 
 
96 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 That which gives to the law of a moral government its 
 binding force, or which constitutes its whole influence or char- 
 acter as a decisive rule of action, considered as the will of one 
 which ought to be obeyed because it is his will, is the author- 
 ity of the lawgiver or moral governor. Whether we speak of 
 legal sanctions as establishing the authority of law, or estab 
 lishing law as an authoritative rule of action, all that we can 
 mean is, not that they constitute but determine or establish 
 the fact, that it is the law of one who has the right to com- 
 mand — who has authority. The authority of law therefore — 
 its binding force or influence upon the subject, if established 
 at all, must be established by establishing the authority of 
 him whose law it is — by showing that he has that right to com- 
 mand which imposes an obligation to obey. This being done, 
 all is done which can give force to law, or invest it in the 
 view of subjects, with that characteristic which constitutes it 
 an authoritative and decisive rule of action to them. Nothing 
 can be, nothing can need to be established or sanctioned, for 
 the purpose of giving to law all the binding force which law 
 can have, except, that he who assumes the right to rule actu- 
 ally possesses and shows himself to possess the right. The 
 peculiar influence of legal sanctions then, is to establish or rat- 
 ify, in the view of his subjects the authority of the moral 
 governor. 
 
 2d. Legal sanctions consist in natural good promised to obe- 
 dience, and in natural evil threatened to disobedience by the 
 moral governor. By this I mean, that in respect to the matter 
 of them, they consist exclusively in such natural good and evil. 
 Whatever natural good and evil are as sanctions, and what- 
 ever else may be necessary to their being sanctions of law, 
 they are the only things which are or can be sanctions of law. 
 All men concur in calling natural good and natural evil an- 
 nexed to law in the manner now specified, legal sanctions. 
 Nor can this language be applied to any thing else, with the 
 least propriety or truth. Other things which are not legal 
 sanctions may be necessary on the part of the moral governor, 
 that he may establish his authority by natural good and nat- 
 ural evil as legal sanctions. Other things may be necessary to 
 this purpose, because the want of them would be proof against 
 his authority, and thus prevent the promised good and threat- 
 ened evil from sanctioning his authority, however adapted in 
 
LEGAL SANCTIONS, NATURAL GOOD AND EVIL. 97 
 
 themselves to the purpose. The impossibility that the moral 
 governor should establish or sustain his authority by other 
 means than by annexing natural good and evil to his law as 
 sanctions, I shall attempt to show hereafter. lie cannot do 
 this as we have already seen, merely by furnishing the requi- 
 site evidence of his qualifications to reign in respect to knowl- 
 edge and power. If in addition to this w T e suppose, that by 
 giving the best rule of action, and by a blameless and kind de- 
 portment in all other relations than that of a moral governor, 
 he does what he can without natural good and evil as legal 
 sanctions, to establish and sustain his authority, still none of 
 these things nor all of them combined can be legal sanctions ; 
 in other words, they cannot sanction his authority. Indeed 
 this supposition is wholly inadmissible, for all these things 
 may be done, and be justly believed to be done by a selfish 
 being who of course can possess no authority. His authority 
 could not be established by these things. When all this is 
 done, more must be done, or there can be no legal sanctions. 
 The best evidence of his authority must be furnished of which 
 the nature of the case admits. But such evidence cannot be 
 furnished without the promise to obedience of a proper de- 
 gree of natural good, and the threatening to disobedience of 
 a proper degree of natural evil. This is the evidence and the 
 only evidence, which wdien any tiling else supposable has been 
 done, determines — settles the question of his authority beyond 
 reasonable doubt. The sanctioning influence then, whatever 
 it is, pertains exclusively to natural good promised to obe- 
 dience as a reward, and natural evil threatened to disobedience 
 as a penalty. What is true in the nature of things however, 
 may more fully appear hereafter. I now appeal to the uni- 
 versal conceptions of mankind, as evinced by the only author- 
 ized use of language. On this ground I claim, that neither 
 the act of prescribing the best rule of action nor a blameless 
 and kind deportment, nor both combined, nor any thing else 
 except natural good as the reward of obedience, and natural 
 evil as the penalty of disobedience, can with the least propriety 
 or truth be called legal sanctions. The authority of the moral 
 governor then, cannot be either wholly or partially sanctioned 
 by other things than natural good as a legal reward, and nat- 
 ural evil as a legal penalty. If his authority is not fully and 
 exclusively sanctioned by these, it is not sanctioned at all. 
 Vol. I.— 5 1 
 
98 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 Legal sanctions then in the matter of them, consist exclusively 
 in natural good promised by the moral governor to obedience, 
 and in natural evil threatened to disobedience. 
 
 3d. Legal sanctions, or natural good and evil as legal sanc- 
 tions, establish or ratify the moral governor's authority as the 
 decisive proof of it. The word sanction denotes a particular kind 
 of evidence or proof, viz., that which is the decisive and neces- 
 sary proof of that of which it is the sanction. I shall now 
 speak of it only as decisive proof, proposing to consider its 
 necessity hereafter. In some cases of moral evidence it is 
 justly deemed too weak to authorize belief, at least for practi- 
 cal purposes. This may be owing to its intrinsic insufficiency, 
 or to its being opposed to contrary evidence of the same kind. 
 In some cases of opposing evidence of this kind, we speak of 
 the balance of evidence or probability as in favor of what we 
 believe. In some such cases of belief, the degree of our assent 
 or the strength of our conviction, is not such as to exclude all 
 doubt, or is at least less than it would be, were there no op- 
 posing evidence. What we believe is not fully or decisively 
 established — there is not that ground for unqualified belief 
 which there would be, were the evidence wholly un counter- 
 acted by evidence on the other side. By decisive proof I mean, 
 not merely a slight balance of probability, nor merely what 
 may be called sufficient proof; but I mean that which implies 
 the absence of all opposing evidence or of all ground for doubt 
 or hesitation, and which in its own nature, there being no 
 opposing evidence, fully confirms and in this sense establishes 
 or ratifies that of which it is the proof. 
 
 Now to every one tolerably acquainted with the use of lan- 
 guage, it must be obvious, that nothing can be truly and prop- 
 erly called a sanction, except under the idea of it as a proof; 
 nor unless it implies, in the circumstances or case in which it 
 is a sanction, the absence of all opposing evidence or proof, 
 nor unless it is conceived to be a decisive proof, a proof which 
 in its nature so establishes or ratifies that of which it is the 
 sanction, as to remove all reasonable doubt. To illustrate by 
 an example. The sanction of a treaty with this country, is the 
 consent of the President and Senate. This consent is not only 
 a proof of the reality or validity of a treaty, but a proof which 
 implies the absence of all opposing evidence or proof, and 
 which in its own nature establishes or ratifies, to the exclu- 
 
LEGAL SANCTIONS, A PROOF OF AUTHORITY. 99 
 
 sion of all doubt, the reality or validity of the instrument or 
 writing called a treaty. It is under this view of it as essential 
 to a sanction, that such consent is called a sanction. 
 
 In accordance with this view of the nature of a sanction in 
 one respect, I maintain that legal sanctions are the decisive 
 proof oi the authority of a moral governor. Or thus I main- 
 tain, that natural good and evil as legal sanctions, are that kind 
 of evidence or proof of the moral governor's authority, which 
 implies the absence of all opposing evidence, and which being 
 in its own nature the best evidence of which the nature of the 
 case admits, establishes or ratifies his authority beyond all 
 reasonable doubt or hesitation. I do not say that natural 
 good and evil, be the degree of them what it may, are legal 
 sanctions in a case in which there is evidence from any other 
 source against the moral governor's authority. On the con- 
 trary I maintain, that they cannot be legal sanctions, except 
 in a case in which there is no such opposing evidence, and that 
 therefore, as legal sanctions, they imply the absence of all evi- 
 dence against the moral governor's authority. It is under this 
 idea or notion of them as legal sanctions that they exclude all 
 doubt of his authority, while in their own nature and tendency 
 when thus uncounteracted by opposing evidence, they establish 
 or ratify his authority. With this explanation in view, I now 
 ask, what can be more obvious in the use of language, than 
 that natural good and evil considered as legal sanctions, are 
 universally conceived of as the decisive proof of the law- 
 giver's authority ? If as legal sanctions they prove nothing, 
 then they sanction nothing ; and how then, or in what possi- 
 ble meaning can they be called sanctions? If as sanctions 
 they prove or establish any thing, it must be as we have seen, 
 the authority of the moral governor. And how can they 
 establish or ratify this, that is, confirm it beyond all reason- 
 able doubt, except as implying the absence of all opposing 
 evidence, and as being in their own nature decisive proof 'of 
 his authority? 
 
 Ith. Legal sanctions or natural good and evil as legal sanc- 
 tions, oecome decisive pr oof of the moral governor's authority, by 
 manifesting his benevolence in the form qf his highest approba- 
 tion of obedience and his highest disapprobation of disobedience. 
 Our object is now to show how or in ivhat manner natural good 
 and evil become decisive proof of the moral governor's author- 
 
100 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 ity. This cannot be, as we have before shown, by proving his 
 qualifications for the office in respect to knowledge and power. 
 These qualifications and the requisite proof of them must be 
 presupposed. Nor can it be, except in a case in which there 
 is opposing or counteracting evidence of any kind whatever. 
 For what we claim and all that we claim is, that natural good 
 and evil are legal sanctions, by being such in their true nature 
 and tendency, as to be decisive proof of his authority, when in 
 their influence as evidence, they are uncounteracted by oppos- 
 ing evidence. In this case, we say that they become decisive 
 proof of his authority, by manifesting his benevolence in the 
 form of his highest approbation of obedience, and of his highest 
 disapprobation of disobedience. 
 
 While natural good and evil constitute the matter of legal 
 sanctions, they do not, considered simply as natural good and 
 evil, become or constitute legal sanctions. Natural good prof- 
 fered or conferred, and natural evil threatened or inflicted, 
 may sustain very different relations ; and it is in respect to 
 these different relations, that we conceive and speak of them 
 as very different things. Natural good under one relation we 
 call payment, and under another hire, wages and the like. We 
 call it reward also, as conceived of under very different rela- 
 tions. The word reward is often applied to the consequence 
 of wickedness. Natural evil under one relation — that is, when 
 inflicted with the design of reforming an offender, we call chas- 
 tisement, discipline, and sometimes punishment; while evil 
 inflicted with no such design is also often called punishment. 
 What then, is the precise nature of a legal reward and of a 
 legal penalty or punishment f What is the peculiar relation 
 of natural good and evil as sanctions of law f And here, ac- 
 cording to what has been already said, it is obvious, that to be- 
 come sanctions of law, they must sustain some relation to law ; 
 and not only so, but in this particular relation to law, they 
 must tend to secure or render effectual, by establishing or rati- 
 fying the peculiar and appropriate influence of law, which as 
 we have seen, is its authority or the authority of the lawgiver. 
 Here then we have a sure criterion by which to determine 
 what causes natural good promised to obedience, and natural 
 evil threatened to disobedience to be legal sanctions; viz., that 
 they tend to secure and render effectual the peculiar influence 
 of law — the authority of the lawgiver or moral governor — by 
 
LEGAL SANCTIONS MANIFEST BENEVOLENCE. 101 
 
 establishing or ratifying this authority. What we now claim 
 is, that they have this tendency as decisive proof of his author- 
 ity, by manifesting his highest approbation of obedience, and 
 his highest disapprobation of disobedience. 
 
 It will not be denied, that natural good promised as the re- 
 ward of obedience, is a decisive manifestation of approbation 
 of obedience, by him who promises it ; nor, that natural evil 
 threatened as the penalty of disobedience, is a decisive mani- 
 festation of disapprobation of disobedience, by him .who 
 threatens it. The promise and the threatening would be all 
 which the case would admit of, prior to any acts of obedience 
 or disobedience. If now we suppose the fulfillment of the 
 promise in every case of obedience, and the execution of the 
 threatening in every case of disobedience, the most impressive 
 manifestation of the feelings specified is made which is con- 
 ceivable. And yet the promise of reward, and the threaten- 
 ing of penalty prior to all acts of obedience and of disobedi- 
 ence, being all the evidence of which the nature of the case 
 admits, are as truly decisive proof 'of the feelings specified, as 
 would be the actual conferring of the reward in the case of 
 obedience, and the actual inflicting of the penalty in the case 
 of disobedience. In either case, the feeling of approbation of 
 obedience, and the feeling of disapprobation of disobedience 
 would be fully and decisively proved to be real. 
 
 Nor is this all. The degree of natural good promised or 
 conferred as the reward, and the degree of natural evil threat- 
 ened or inflicted as the penalty, would be, in all just estima- 
 tion, the criteria and measure of the degree of the feelings of 
 which they would be the manifestations. When therefore, 
 the natural good conferred in such a case on the obedient 
 subject is such in degree as to manifest on the part of him 
 who confers it, the highest approbation of obedience, and the 
 natural evil inflicted on the disobedient subject, manifests on 
 the part of him who inflicts it the highest disapprobation of 
 disobedience, then supposing no counteracting evidence, the 
 authority of the moral governor is established or ratified. He 
 thus manifests the feelings which are essential to his character 
 as a perfect moral governor. He thus decisively proves the 
 fact, and the only fact which needs to be proved in the case, 
 viz., that he possesses that moral character which invests him 
 with the right to govern — that is, with authority. Having 
 
102 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 already evinced, by their proper evidence, Ills qualifications in 
 respect to knowledge and power for his responsible office, and 
 having furnished by his deportment, his acts and doings, no 
 evidence against his perfect moral character, he now proves 
 what only remains to be proved — that he has the feelings and 
 the character, and will act the part, of a benevolent moral 
 governor. By thus showing through the medium of natural 
 good and evil, his highest approbation of obedience, and his 
 highest disapprobation of disobedience, he shows that he re- 
 gards obedience to the best law as it is, the best kind of 
 action, and disobedience to the best law as the worst kind of 
 action — the one, as that which, in its true nature and tendency, 
 is the means of the highest well-being of all, and the other as 
 that which in its true nature and tendency is the means of the 
 highest misery of all. These are the feelings and the only 
 feelings of benevolence toward right and wrong moral action. 
 This decisive manifestation of them through the requisite de- 
 gree of natural good as a reward, and the requisite degree of 
 natural evil as a penalty, is therefore decisive proof of benev- 
 olence, and of course, decisive proof of authority. Indeed, 
 suppose what other mode of manifesting these feelings and 
 this character we may, if any such mode were supposable, 
 how feeble and unimpressive it must be, compared with that 
 which would be made through that degree of natural good as 
 a reward, and of natural evil as a penalty, which should be 
 the expression of these feelings 1 How would any other evince 
 that weakness of heart which would provoke contempt, when 
 compared with the power and majesty of emotions which, for 
 the sake of the highest universal good, express themselves in 
 such results of happiness to the obedient, and of misery to the 
 disobedient ! 
 
 Thus natural good and evil as legal sanctions, become de- 
 cisive proof of the moral governor's authority, by manifesting 
 his benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of 
 obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience. 
 They reveal his moral character, holding forth, in defiance of 
 doubt, his perfect benevolence, in its essential emotions of love 
 of right and abhorrence of wrong moral action. They show 
 the full strength of his will, fixed on securing so far as may 
 be, the best means of the best end, and on preventing so far 
 as may be, the sure means of the worst end. Thus they bring 
 
SCRIPTURAL SANCTION, NOT STRANGE. 103 
 
 out, in full and vivid manifestation, the glories of Him who 
 occupies the throne. Removing all ground of doubt in re- 
 spect to that character which gives him the right to command, 
 they tend to secure the full force and efficacy of his authority 
 in the confidential homage and unqualified submission of his 
 subjects, and, with these, the perfect blessedness of his king- 
 dom. 
 
 EE MAKE. 
 
 It is not to be thought strange or incredible, that the sanc- 
 tions of the law of God, as these are presented in the Scrip- 
 tures, should express his highest approbation of obedience, and 
 his highest disapprobation of disobedience. Without here 
 affirming that such sanctions are necessary to establish his 
 authority as the perfect moral governor of his moral kingdom, 
 I now ask, who can show that they are not necessary for this 
 purpose ? Who can show that the legal sanctions, which as 
 w r e have seen, would fully establish his authority, are not 
 necessary to establish it ? If this cannot be shown, then let 
 it not be thought incredible that such sanctions are annexed 
 to the law of that Being who reigns over the moral universe. 
 The incredibility of this is further diminished, if we reflect 
 that a system of moral government which includes these sanc- 
 tions, includes the highest degree of influence to secure right 
 and to prevent wrong moral action, which can be conceived to 
 be essential to a moral government. Suppose what other sys- 
 tem of moral government we may, it cannot involve much of 
 the influence to secure right and prevent wrong moral action 
 which this system involves. If any other system would in- 
 volve decisive proof of the perfect qualifications of the moral 
 governor in respect to knowledge and power, of the excellence 
 of his law as a rule of action, and of his absolute perfection 
 in moral character, so does this. But besides all this, and 
 more than all this, the system now r maintained presents mo- 
 tives in natural good and evil which admit of no parallel, and 
 which bind the will to right moral action, not indeed by 
 physical force, but by the most imperious necessity by which 
 it can be bound — the necessity of right moral action to secure 
 perfect happiness, and to avoid perfect misery forever. And 
 more still. In proof .that the action required ought to be 
 done, and that its opposite ought not to be done, it reveals 
 
104 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 through these sanctions, the will of an infinitely perfect being, 
 unveiling his infinite benevolence in its highest approbation 
 of obedience, and its highest disapprobation of disobedience. 
 Thus there is no truth and no evidence of truth, which can 
 be employed to secure right moral action, and which can be 
 supposed to be essential to a perfect moral government, which 
 the system now maintained does not employ, and employ in 
 the most impressive manner. There is no such truth in re- 
 spect to God, and the creatures of God formed in his image, 
 which is fitted to secure the great end of their being, which 
 is not made known in its full power to impress and control. 
 Pre-eminently by this system is God revealed — God, the 
 depths of whose wisdom none can fathom — God, the thunder 
 of whose power who can understand — God, in the enrapturing 
 glories of his goodness, smiling his approbation of right moral 
 action, and recoiling from wrong moral action in wrathful 
 abhorrence! What majesty and awful love! More cannot 
 be conceived. The universe of truth, of evidence, of motive, 
 is exhausted to give every essential perfection which can be 
 conceived to this system of moral government, and to bind the 
 will of moral beings to secure their own perfection in char- 
 acter and in happiness. Who then shall count it strange, that 
 God should place his moral creation under such an influence ? 
 Who knows — who can prove — that this degree of influence is 
 not necessary to the best results in happiness, and therefore 
 demanded by infinite goodness ? Who knows — who can prove 
 — that the highest blessedness of the moral universe — not to 
 add also, the prevention of the perfect misery of all — does not 
 require this manifestation of God through the medium of 
 legal sanctions, that all may see and know- what a friend he is 
 to right moral action, and what an enemy he is to wrong moral 
 action ? Who knows — who can prove — that the Book, which 
 declares that an infinitely perfect Being employs such an influ- 
 ence for such a purpose, declares a falsehood ? 
 
LECTURE VI. 
 
 V. A perfect Moral Government involves the exercise of authority through the medium of law. — 
 The nature of such a law further unfolded.— 7. The law of a perfect Moral Government involves 
 sanctions, (continued.)— 5th. Legal sanctions the necessary proof of the Moral Governor's 
 authority, as the necessary manifestations and proofs of his benevolence in the form of his appro- 
 bation of obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience. — This shown by proving 
 (1,) that legal sanctions are in some respect necessary as the proof of the Moral Governor's 
 authority; (2,) that they are necessary for this purpose, as the necessary proofs of his benevo- 
 lence; and (3,) that they are necessary proofs of his benevolence in the form of his highest 
 approbation of obedience and highest disapprobation of disobedience. — The (1) and (2) of 
 these arguments are treated in this lecture. — (1.) Legal Sanctions are necessary in some 
 respect as proof of the Moral Governor's authority. — Argued from the import of the phrase legal 
 sanctions; from the nature of the law of a perfect Moral Government; from the nature of a law 
 or rule of action without sanctions; from the fact that conformity and nonconformity to a rule 
 without sanctions would subvert the Moral Governor's authority. — (2.) They are necessary as 
 proofs of the Governor's authority, as they are the necessary proofs of his benevolence. — 
 Keason given why attempts to prove the benevolence of God from the light of nature are so 
 unsuccessful. 
 
 In the last lecture I proposed to show, that legal sanctions, 
 or the sanctions of the law of a perfect moral government, con- 
 sist in that natural good promised to obedience, and in that nat- 
 ural evil threatened to disobedience by the moral governor, ivhich 
 establish or ratify his authority as the decisive and necessary 
 proof of it, by manifesting his benevolence in the form of his 
 highest approbation of obedience, and his highest disappro- 
 bation of disobedience, and which include the highest pos- 
 sible degree of natural good in each case of obedience, and 
 the highest possible degree of natural evil in each case of dis- 
 obedience. 
 
 This proposition was divided into several particular propo- 
 sitions ; the four following of which I explained, and endeav- 
 ored to support, viz. : 
 
 1st. That legal sanctions establish or ratify the authority of 
 the moral governor. 
 
 2d. That they consist in the matter of them, exclusively in 
 natural good promised to obedience, and in natural evil threat- 
 ened to disobedience by the moral governor. 
 
 3d. That they establish or ratify the moral governor's author- 
 ity as the decisive proof of it. 
 
 •1th. That they become the decisive proof of it, by manifest- 
 5* 
 
106 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 ing Ills benevolence in the form of his highest approbation of 
 obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedience. 
 
 I now propose in this and the following lectures to show 
 the necessity of legal sanctions, and for this purpose, to explain 
 and prove the fifth of the particular propositions before stated, 
 viz. : 
 
 5th. That legal sanctions are the necessary proof of the 
 moral governor's authority, as the necessary manifestations and 
 proofs of his benevolence in the form of his highest approba- 
 tion of obedience, and his highest disapprobation of disobedi- 
 ence. 
 
 This proposition I shall attempt to establish by showing — 
 
 (1.) That legal sanctions are in some respect or under some 
 relation, necessary as the proof of the moral governor's author- 
 ity. 
 
 (2.) That they are necessary for this purpose, as the neces- 
 sary manifestations or proofs of his benevolence, and — 
 
 (3.) That they are necessary for this purpose, as the neces- 
 sary manifestations or proofs of his benevolence in the form of 
 his highest approbation of obedience, and of his highest disap- 
 probation of disobedience. 
 
 (1.) Legal sanctions are necessary in some respect or tinder 
 some relation, as the proof of the moral governor's authority. 
 
 This will appeal 1 — 
 
 In the first place, from the import of the phrase, legal sanc- 
 tions. I have already remarked, that the word sanction de- 
 notes a particular kind of evidence or proof, viz., that which is 
 the decisive and necessary proof of that of which it is the sanc- 
 tion. I have attempted to show that it denotes a decisive 
 proof — that is, a proof which implies the absence of all oppos- 
 ing proof or evidence, and fully establishes or ratifies that of 
 which it is the sanction. I now propose to show, that it de- 
 notes a necessary proof of that of which it is the sanction. By 
 this I mean, that it is that, without which there is not only no 
 proof of that of which it is the sanction, but proof to the con- 
 trary. On this point, I appeal to the example already referred 
 to. Without the consent of the President and Senate, there is 
 and can be not only no proof of the reality or validity of a 
 treaty between this nation and another, but there is decisive 
 proof to the contrary. We may suppose the evidence of the 
 fact in other respects to be what it may, still without the con- 
 
SANCTIONS AS PROOF OP AUTHORITY. 107 
 
 sent specified, no instrument purporting to be such a treaty 
 can possess the least validity. On the contrary, the want of 
 such consent is decisive proof of its validity. Thus plain is it, 
 that the word sanction denotes that which is the necessary 
 proof of that of which it is the sanction — necessary as being 
 that without which there can be no proof of the fact or truth 
 to be proved in the case, but must be proof to the contrary. 
 Since then the genus, as logicians speak, is always included in 
 the species, it follows, that legal sanctions, in the universal con- 
 ceptions of men, are the necessary proof of that of which they 
 are the sanctions. In the second place, the same thing is 
 evident from the nature of the law of a perfect moral govern- 
 ment. It is essential to the nature of such a law, that it be, 
 and that it be fully proved to be, an expression of the law- 
 giver's preference of obedience to disobedience, of his satisfac- 
 tion with obedience and with nothing but obedience on the 
 part of the subject, and of his highest approbation of obedience, 
 and of his highest disapprobation of disobedience. But no 
 possible proof without legal sanctions can be furnished, that it 
 is an expression of such feelings. The moral governor may 
 furnish all possible evidence of kind or benevolent feelings in 
 all his other relations, he may prescribe the best rule of action 
 in this relation, and all this may be prompted by other feel- 
 ings than those of true benevolence ; may be prompted by the 
 feelings and purposes of a purely selfish mind. There can be 
 nothing in the case to warrant the conclusion that he is not ac- 
 tuated by purely selfish designs ; nor that he has the feelings 
 toward right and wrong moral action, which his law in words 
 expresses, tlather, there is decisive proof to the contrary. As 
 a perfect moral governor, he is as we have seen, under the ne- 
 cessity of manifesting these feelings ; and as a benevolent being 
 will manifest them. He cannot be a benevolent moral gover- 
 nor without having these feelings, nor without making a full 
 and decisive manifestation of them. Not to manifest them 
 therefore, is proof decisive that they do not exist. Nor is this 
 all. This manifestation of these feelings toward right and 
 wrong moral action must be made, as we have also seen, if 
 made at all, by what he does in the relation of a moral gov- 
 ernor. But he can do nothing in this relation, except give the 
 best rule of action, annex sanctions to the rule, and execute 
 them as occasion shall occur in the conduct of subjects. Merely 
 
108 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 to give the best rule of action will not make the requisite mani- 
 festation. This act alone is entirely consistent with selfish 
 designs on his part. It is not the best evidence of the feelings 
 of benevolence toward right and wrong moral action, of which 
 the nature of the case admits, and therefore not all the evidence 
 which the case requires. It is only when the proof from legal 
 sanctions is added that the evidence becomes all that the nature 
 of the case admits of and requires, and is therefore decisive. I 
 am not now saying that legal sanctions will fully prove the 
 lawgiver's preference of obedience to disobedience. Nor am I 
 now saying any thing of the mode in which natural good and 
 evil in the form of sanctions become the proof of the expression 
 of such a preference. I am only saying, that without legal 
 sanctions there can be no proof of such a preference on the 
 part of the moral governor, that whatever else may be neces- 
 sary, natural good and evil as sanctions are necessary to evince 
 the reality of those feelings which the language of law ex- 
 presses, and that the want of such sanctions is full proof that 
 such feelings on the part of the lawgiver do not exist ; and of 
 course that what is called law in such a case, if any thing can 
 be so called, is not law ; and therefore there is no lawgiver 
 having authority. 
 
 We may view this topic in another light. The law of a per- 
 fect moral government is an authoritative rule of action. Can 
 then a rule of action without natural good and evil as the 
 sanctions of its authority, or which is the same thing, of the 
 lawgiver's authority, be regarded as an authoritative rule of 
 action ? Is it in this sense a law ? Plainly to pronmlge such 
 a rule in the form of a command — to give it forth in the man- 
 ner of one having the right to rule, claiming for it the majesty 
 of law, and for himself the unqualified homage of his subjects, 
 would be a burlesque on all legislation. Can a moral governor 
 claim the submission of the will of every subject to his will, 
 and furnish no evidence that he will reward obedience and 
 punish disobedience ; or rather furnish decisive proof that he 
 will do neither ! Do you call this a law — an authoritative rule 
 of action? No misnomer can be more palpable — none more 
 ridiculous. Is this performing the high function of his office '{ 
 Is such a rule of action the only means which one standing 
 before his kingdom as its rightful sovereign, and the supreme 
 guardian of its welfare, must use to promote and protect the 
 
LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS, NO AUTHORITY. 109 
 
 highest happiness of all? Such a rule would not only leave 
 this great end, which he is bound to protect, unprotected, and 
 show that it is wholly uncared for by him who is responsible 
 for its protection, but it would be an invitation to wrong 
 doing from the throne itself. For not to promise to reward 
 obedience, and not to threaten to punish disobedience, is not 
 only a pledge not to reward the one and not to punish the 
 other, but virtually to threaten to punish obedience, and to 
 promise to reward disobedience ; since not to reward is in a 
 degree to punish obedience, and not to punish is in a degree 
 to reward disobedience. Such a rule of action therefore, in- 
 stead of having the nature and tendency of law, instead of 
 being adapted to secure the highest happiness of all, would 
 tend to secure the highest misery of all. Who does not know 
 this ? Who would be governed, influenced at all, by a law 
 without sanctions as an authoritative rule of action? Who 
 would be concerned about doing or not doing the will of 
 another, from whom to say the least, obedience has nothing to 
 hope, and disobedience nothing to fear? He gives no secur- 
 ity, furnishes no evidence that the obedient shall be protected 
 and blessed and the disobedient be punished — none that lie 
 will not reverse the treatment of the two classes, should his 
 sinister and selfish designs demand it, or rather, he furnishes 
 good reason to believe that he will reverse it. Who then could 
 respect his character or his will, and regard him as entitled to 
 exercise the prerogative of absolute dominion, who confide in 
 him as the friend and protector of a kingdom's happiness, who 
 submit to his will as law ? He may in words, express kind 
 wishes, and in form propound the best rule of action. He may 
 show kindness in every other relation. But as a moral gover- 
 nor he shows none to his kingdom. He is recreant to the high 
 function of his office. He betrays his trust as the guardian of 
 universal happiness. He sinks the power and majesty of law 
 into the weakness of ineffective wishes, and justly incurs the 
 scorn and contempt due to unmasked hypocrisy. He thus de- 
 feats the great and sole end of moral government, and tempts 
 his subjects to war on each other and himself, without the 
 shadow of restraint from law and authority. 
 
 Again ; a rule of action without sanctions, viewed in the 
 most favorable aspect, is justly considered as mere advice. 
 But advice be the form of it what it may, is not law. The 
 
110 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 difference between them demands consideration. Advice be 
 it ever so wise and good, is a mere declaration of wliat is best 
 to be done. It implies no will or preference on the part of the 
 adviser of that which is advised to its opposite. It wonld still 
 be advice, though attended with a preference of the opposite 
 doing, and though prompted solely by sinister designs. Law 
 is the most unequivocal expression of the unqualified, absolute 
 will or preference of the lawgiver, that what is commanded 
 should be done. Compliance with the one is discretionary on 
 the part of him to whom it is given. He has the right un- 
 questionable and perfect, to rejudge the decision of the giver, 
 and is responsible to none for his individual judgment in the 
 case. He violates no right of another merely by rejecting the 
 counsel which is given. Compliance with the other admits 
 not of a question, even in thought. Law decides — settles the 
 question of what ought and ought not to be done, by supersed- 
 ing the right of all further inquiry. Its violation is the viola- 
 tion of a right the most sacred and inviolable of all rights — 
 the right to control that, on which the highest happiness of 
 each and of all depends. Advice whether complied with or 
 not, involves in respect to him to whom it is given, not the 
 least good or evil wdiich depends on the will of him who gives 
 it. Law enforces compliance by results in good and evil to 
 the subject which depend on the will of the lawgiver, and 
 wmich, while as motives to right reason, they must be decisive 
 and final for obedience, reveal the perfect character and per- 
 fect w T ill of him from whom it emanates. Advice carries with 
 it no binding influence from the character or will of him who 
 gives it, to the will of him to whom it is given. Law, instead 
 of leaving compliance with its claim to the mere option, to 
 the uninfluenced will of the subject, binds his will to compli- 
 ance — not indeed by physical force or necessity, but by that 
 obligation which is imposed by the right to command, the 
 strongest influence by which the will can be bound. This, as 
 we have seen, is the grand, peculiar, essential influence of law 
 — the influence of authority. But to prescribe a rule of action 
 without sanctions, as the law of a moral government, is to give 
 mere advice, which can possess no authority. It is to divest 
 law of its peculiar and essential nature and influence, and to 
 degrade it to a level with the counsels of imbecility, by com- 
 mitting the question of what ought and ought not to be done 
 
"WITHOUT SANCTIONS LAWGIVER UNFIT. Ill 
 
 to the judgment and will of an equal. It is for the moral gov- 
 ernor to disclaim, in the most formal manner, all authority 
 or right to rule. It is an open avowal that he has not the 
 character which entitles him to exercise the prerogative of 
 dominion — that he is a governor who neither has nor can 
 have the least governing influence. Surely a rule of action, 
 a law without sanctions, involving such a palpable dereliction 
 of all claim or pretense to rightful authority, cannot be an 
 authoritative rule of action — cannot be the law of a perfect 
 moral government. 
 
 In the third place, a law or rule of action without sanctions, 
 is a decisive proof that the lawgiver, either by imbecility or 
 by selfishness, or by both, is utterly disqualified to rule. As 
 a proof on the question of his qualification to rule, it is al- 
 together equivalent to refusing to reward obedience, and to 
 punish disobedience, when they exist. In such a case, the 
 moral governor cannot be supposed to be both competent and 
 disposed to execute legal sanctions, for then he would execute 
 them. He must then, either be both incompetent and indis- 
 posed to execute them — in which case he would be disqualified 
 to rule in every essential respect — or, he must be incompetent 
 and yet disposed, or competent and indisposed, to execute 
 them. Now, he is either able to confer a reward on the obedi- 
 ent, in the form of protection and favor, or he is not. If he is 
 not able to confer a reward, then he is the subject of an imbe- 
 cility which is an utter disqualification for office. If he is 
 able to confer a reward then, by conferring none, he manifests 
 no approbation of obedience, when the public good demands 
 that he should, and when, were he truly benevolent he would 
 manifest it by rewarding the obedient. He stands before his 
 kingdom therefore, convicted of indifference, or aversion to 
 obedience — to the very thing on which the highest happiness 
 of his kingdom depends. He thus shows himself to be, not a 
 benevolent but a selfish being, and of course to be utterly 
 disqualified to govern. Again ; he is either able to inflict a 
 penalty on the disobedient, or he is not. If he is not, then he 
 is disqualified to govern by his imbecility. If he is able, then 
 by inflicting no penalty for disobedience, he manifests no dis- 
 approbation of disobedience, when the public good demands 
 that he should, and when were he truly benevolent, he would 
 manifest it by the infliction of penalty. He stands before his 
 
112 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 kingdom therefore, convicted of indifference to, or approbation 
 of disobedience, the very thing which tends to produce the 
 highest misery of his kingdom. He thus shows himself the 
 unconcerned spectator of disobedience on the part of his sub- 
 jects, or rather the open patron of disobedience, and the open 
 enemy of the public good. He occupies the place of the only 
 guardian of the public good, as this depends on his mani- 
 festing his highest approbation of right and highest disap- 
 probation of wrong moral action. Indifference to either is 
 unmasked enmity to the public good. His disqualification to 
 rule on either supposition, is decisively proved. He gives a 
 law without sanctions, and the fact must be traced either to 
 incompetence or indisposition to execute sanctions, or to both. 
 In either case, he is proved to be disqualified to govern. Legal 
 sanctions then, are in some respect necessary, as proof of the 
 moral governor's authority or right to rule. 
 
 In the fourth place, conformity and non-conformity to a law 
 or rule of action without sanctions, alike disprove and subvert 
 the moral governor's authority. Conformity to the rule in 
 such a case would exist without a reward, and non-conformity 
 without a penalty. Conformity to the rule takes place, in a 
 case in which there is no proof of the governor's authority. 
 The subject therefore, does not act in conforming to the rule, 
 from respect to his authority, or under the influence of his 
 authority. He conforms to the rule for some other reason, 
 and under some other influence. The fact is undeniable and 
 notorious. It cannot be otherwise. The act of conformity is 
 not only no recognition of the moral governor's authority, but 
 as done, and known to be clone exclusively under another in- 
 fluence,^ is a distinct declaration, testimony, or proof on the 
 part of the subject, that the moral governor has no authority. 
 He acts just as he would act, for aught that appears to the 
 contrary, were no rule of action prescribed. He thus disclaims 
 all right in the author of the rule to govern him, and gives an 
 open and decided testimony against his authority. Nor is this 
 all. The moral governor, by conferring no reward, acquiesces 
 in this disregard of his authority ; for did he promise and con- 
 fer a reward, there would be no proof from the supposed act 
 of conformity that it was not rendered from respect to his 
 authority, but the contrary. Indeed, it would be impossible 
 in such a case that the subject should conform to the rule and 
 
WITHOUT SANCTIONS, AUTHORITY SUBVERTED. 113 
 
 not be influenced by his authority. The moral governor 
 therefore, by conferring no reward, acquiesces in the subject's 
 disregard of his authority, and so confirms the testimony or 
 proof from the act of the subject. Tims the act of conforming 
 to the rule, contemplated as an unrewarded act, augments the 
 proof, and shows, beyond all dotibt or denial, that the author 
 of the rule has no right to reign. 
 
 The same thing will appear, still more strikingly, from non- 
 conformity to a rule of action without a penalty. The act of 
 non-conformity or transgression is, in its true nature, an open 
 proclamation by the transgressor, that the character of the 
 governor does not entitle him to the submission claimed in his 
 law. And the proof in this form of testimon}^ or declaration 
 is decisive, provided the governor himself does not counteract 
 it by opposing proof in the execution of penalty. What force 
 or influence can there be or ought there to be, in the mere 
 dictum, of one — call it law if you will ; what force or influence 
 is there or ought there to be, in an expression of his will as 
 his will, when there is nothing in his doings and nothing in 
 his character to give it the least weight, or to entitle it to the 
 least respect ? Now it is in exactly such a case that the sup- 
 posed act of transgression, or as we may suppose, a universal 
 revolt, occurs. What is it as an act, and what is it as a testi- 
 mony? As an act, it is one of open defiance of the moral 
 governor — of absolute contempt of his want of qualification 
 to govern, and a decisive triumph of self-will over incompe- 
 tence and usurpation. As a testimony, under what aspect does 
 it present the supposed lawgiver except that of an utter dis- 
 qualification to rule — as had infancy itself ascended the throne 
 and given forth the law ? The law and the lawgiver would be, 
 and ought to be, despised. Rebellion would place its foot on 
 liis authority, and in a shout of triumph, seal its prostration. 
 Nor is this all. The moral governor by inflicting no penalty, 
 acquiesces in this contempt of himself and of his authori ij. 
 He refuses to counteract the testimony furnished by the act 
 of transgression to the fact that he has no right to reign. lie 
 thus confirms the proof furnished by the act of transgression ; 
 and so, the act as unpunished, utterly subverts his authority. 
 Who does not know all this ? Who does not know, that rebel- 
 lion unpunished legalizes rebellion — that it hides from every 
 eye the reality of a perfect moral governor, and covers with 
 
 8 
 
114 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 infamy him who pretends to exercise his prerogative ; that it 
 annihilates all possible evidence of his authority, and puts all 
 authority in the dust ? The proclamation of the rebel is, that 
 the mandate from the throne is unworthy of regard, and the 
 moral governor by his quiescent good wishes, confirms the 
 proclamation, and authorizes rebellion throughout his empire. 
 
 (2.) Legal sanctions are necessary to establish the authority 
 of the moral governor, as the necessary manifestations or proof 
 of his benevolence. If the relation of a moral governor is any 
 thing, it is a relation distinguished from every other by its 
 peculiar function. This peculiar function as we have seen, is 
 to create and establish the influence of his authority, that by 
 this influence, he may secure obedience to his will as the 
 means of the highest happiness of all, and prevent disobedience 
 to his will as the means of the highest misery of all. The in- 
 fluence of his authority depends on his moral character, on his 
 benevolence, and on the decisive manifestation or proof of his 
 benevolence. He can as we have seen, possess no authority 
 in the view of his subjects, unless it is made evident to them 
 that he is a benevolent being, and feels toward right and 
 wrong moral action on their part as a benevolent being must 
 feel. 
 
 The question then is, can he furnish the requisite proof of 
 his benevolence, and of the necessary feelings of benevolence 
 toward right and wrong moral action, and in this way estab- 
 lish his authority, or right to rule, without annexing sanctions 
 to his law ? 
 
 Here it is readily admitted, that other things beside legal 
 sanctions are or may be necessary, that the moral governor 
 may establish his authority by legal sanctions. Supposing 
 him to evince by the proper proofs, his qualifications in re- 
 spect to knowledge and power, it may still be necessary to the 
 purpose under consideration, that his deportment in all his 
 other relations beside that of moral governor, should be free 
 from all acts of unkindness or injustice — from every thing 
 which would decisively evince the selfish principle ; and also, 
 that it should be characterized by all those positive acts of 
 beneficence which are demanded by his other relations ; since 
 otherwise he would furnish decisive evidence against his be- 
 nevolence, and so against his authority. It may be necessary 
 for the same purpose, that he should prescribe the best rule 
 
THINGS NECESSARY BESIDES SANCTIONS. 115 
 
 of action. His blameless and kind deportment in his other 
 relations may furnish beforehand a degree of presumptive 
 evidence of the character which entitles him to assume the 
 relation of a moral governor. These things, provided the re- 
 quisite sanctions are annexed to his law, may be said to furnish 
 additional evidence of his authority; because his benevolence 
 and with it his authority, being in this case established by the 
 requisite sanctions, it is reasonable to conclude that what may 
 proceed from benevolence does proceed from benevolence. 
 But it is now maintained, that none of these things, nor all of 
 them together, nor any thing else, can without legal sanctions, 
 prove his benevolence, and so establish his authority. The 
 question of his benevolence, as we have before shown, de- 
 pends, not on what he does or has done in his other relations, 
 but on what he does in the relation of a moral governor. If 
 he would establish his right to rule, he must act benevolently 
 in this relation as well as in other relations. Benevolence im- 
 poses on him a momentous function which is peculiar to this 
 relation, the fulfillment of which is absolutely indispensable as 
 the proof of his benevolence. Whatever his conduct in his 
 other relations may have been or now is, if he fails to fulfill 
 the peculiar and momentous function of his present relation, 
 this failure is decisive proof that he is not a benevolent but a 
 selfish being. Benevolence therefore, requires him to mani- 
 fest his benevolence by what he does in his relation as a moral 
 governor. It requires him to fulfill the peculiar function of 
 his office, which is, to create and establish the influence of his 
 authority,by manifesting in his present relation his benevo- 
 lence in its necessary feelings toward right and wrong moral 
 action. If he would create and establish the influence of his 
 authority, he must act the part of benevolence in his present 
 relation; and if he would act the part of benevolence in his 
 present relation, he must manifest the necessary feelings of 
 benevolence toward the best and the worst kind of action on 
 the part of his subjects, by what he does in his present rela- 
 tion. All that there is in the nature of benevolence which 
 gives him the right to rule, or on which this right does or can 
 depend in the view of his subjects, is, that it necessarily in- 
 volves certain peculiar feelings toward right and wrong moral 
 action, and that it does and will make a full manifestation of 
 them in the moral governor, for the purpose of securing the 
 
110 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 one kind of action as the means of the highest happiness of 
 all, and of preventing the other as the means of the highest 
 misery of all. If then the moral governor does not in his 
 relation as a moral governor, make a full and decisive mani- 
 festation of these feelings of benevolence, he cannot prove his 
 benevolence, cannot fulfill the grand and peculiar function of 
 his office, and of course cannot establish his authority. 
 
 To recur then to the question now before us ; can the moral 
 governor in his present relation manifest in any way, the ne- 
 cessary feelings of benevolence toward right and wrong moral 
 action, and so establish his authority without legal sanctions? 
 
 Can he do this by mere professions of the supposed feelings? 
 Such professions may be made by the most insincere and false 
 pretender to benevolence, or rather, would be made in most 
 cases, by the veriest usurper and tyrant. Who that ever 
 claimed the right of dominion over others, did not profess to 
 aim at the general good, and to require submission to his will 
 only to promote this high end ? I clo not say that such profes- 
 sions are necessarily inconsistent with benevolence ; but I say, 
 that in themselves they are utterly insufficient as proof of benev- 
 olence : while the want of all proof from every other source, 
 would, notwithstanding such professions, be decisive proof to 
 the contrary. Mere professions of a principle of action in 
 cases in which if it exist, it will show itself in action, and in 
 which it does not thus show itself, are ever and justly regarded 
 as insincere and false. To say in such a case to a sufferer, 
 (depart in peace, be warmed, be fillecl,)and yet to give noth- 
 ing, is proof decisive of the want of the benevolent principle. 
 So in the case before us. If there are acts which the moral 
 governor may perform which would fully prove his benevo- 
 lence, and which therefore he would perform were he truly 
 benevolent, then no possible reason can be conceived for his 
 failure to show himself benevolent by the requisite acts, except 
 that he does not possess the character. Who would concede 
 the right to govern to such a mere pretender to benevolence ? 
 
 Again ; there are strictly speaking but three acts which a 
 being in the capacity or relation of a perfect moral governor 
 can perform, viz., the act of prescribing the best rule of action ; 
 the act of annexing the requisite sanctions to the rule; and the 
 act of executing these sanctions in cases of obedience and dis- 
 obedience. These acts may be viewed as comprising all that 
 
NOT ENOUGH, TO PRESCRIBE RULES. 117 
 
 lie does or can do in performing the function of this high rela- 
 tion. In assuming this relation, he cannot reward obedience 
 nor punish disobedience ; for neither obedience nor disobedi- 
 ence can exist. The question then now before us is reduced to 
 this: can he manifest the necessary feelings of benevolence 
 toward right and wrong moral action by merely prescribing 
 the best rule of action. We have already said enough to show 
 that such a rule of action without sanctions,not only could not 
 be an authoritative rule of action, but could not possess other 
 essential characteristics of the law of a perfect moral govern- 
 ment ; that it would be the mere advice of imbecility ; that it 
 could not be regarded as the truthful expression of any benev- 
 olent feeling whatever on the part of him who should give it, 
 but would amount to an open, palpable disclaimer of all author- 
 ity. I do not say, that the act of giving the best rule of action 
 is not necessary, that the moral governor may by legal sanc- 
 tions manifest or prove his benevolence. But I affirm, that 
 the act itself without legal sanctions, is not proof of his benev- 
 olence, lie does nothing in this case which a perfectly selfish 
 being may not be believed to do. He does nothing to show 
 that he feels toward right and wrong moral action, as a benev- 
 olent being must feel ; nothing to show that he truly prefers 
 the best kind of action to the worst, or the highest happiness 
 of all to the highest misery of all ; nothing to show that he will 
 befriend and bless the obedient rather than the disobedient, or 
 that he will not confer good on the latter, and inflict evil on 
 the former to the extent of his power. He commits himself in 
 no respect as the friend and patron of right moral action, nor as 
 the enemy and avenger of wronj? moral action. lie refuses to 
 do it when benevolence recpiires him to do it, and when were 
 he a benevolent being, he would do it. lie therefore proves 
 himself not to be benevolent. 
 
 Again ; if the manifestation of these feelings of the moral 
 governor be made at all, it must be made by some act or acts, 
 which are the appropriate and significant expressions of them, 
 by some act or acts which shall be justly and universally re- 
 garded as such expressions of them. We have already seen, 
 that by promising natural good to obedience, and threatening 
 natural evil to disobedience in some supposable degrees, the 
 moral governor in a case in which there is no evidence to the 
 contrary, would decisively and in the most impressive man- 
 
118 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 ner conceivable, express the necessary feelings of benevolence 
 toward right and wrong moral action, and so establish his 
 authority. Such sanctions as we have spoken of, would be de- 
 cisive evidence of these feelings, because they furnish the best 
 evidence of them of which the nature of the case admits. I 
 now say, that legal sanctions are the necessary evidence of 
 these feelings on the part of the moral governor. What then 
 is — what can be, truly or justly regarded as the decisive, un- 
 ambiguous expression of his feelings of approbation of obedi- 
 ence and his disapprobation of disobedience, except either, 
 when giving his law, the promise to reward obedience and the 
 threatening to punish disobedience ; or the actual conferring 
 of a reward for obedience when it exists, and the actual inflict- 
 ing of a penalty for disobedience when it exists. In giving his 
 law, he cannot reward obedience nor punish disobedience, for 
 there can be no obedience to be rewarded nor disobedience to 
 be punished. If then he does not promise to reward the one, 
 and threaten to punish the other, he does nothing and can do 
 nothing, to manifest the necessary feelings toward the two 
 kinds of action, nothing to show that it is not a matter of per- 
 fect indifference to him whether his subjects obey or disobey 
 his law. By annexing no sanctions to his law, he furnishes 
 decisive proof that he wills no consequences in good or evil, 
 no results in happiness or misery to his subjects as obedient or 
 disobedient, and of course, that he is not willing to use the least 
 influence in the form of motive, nor any influence arising from 
 the expression of his approbation or disapprobation clearly and 
 fully made, for the purpose of securing right and preventing 
 wrong moral action, and thus securing the highest happiness 
 of all, and preventing the highest misery of all. As a moral 
 governor then, in such a case he can manifest no feelings, and 
 of course no character, which entitles him to the least respect- 
 ful consideration from his subjects. Whatever may be his 
 claims or his professions or both, there can be no influence 
 from his character to secure the one kind of moral action nor 
 to prevent the other — none from his official prerogative or 
 right to rule — none which would not result from the character 
 of any other, even the most selfish being, who should make the 
 same claims and the same professions — none in a word, to 
 secure obedience and prevent disobedience to his will, because 
 it is the will and proved to be the will of a perfect being. 
 
LEGAL SANCTIONS PROOFS OF BENE YOLENCE. 119 
 
 Were obedience to exist, lie would make no manifestation of 
 such a will by conferring a reward. Were disobedience to ex- 
 ist, he would manifest no such will by inflicting a legal pen- 
 alty. What then, shall be said of his moral character? Where 
 in the view of his subjects is the proof of his benevolence ? 
 What becomes of the peculiar function of his office ? lie ut- 
 terly refuses to do the very things, which his high relation 
 as a moral governor, benevolence requires him to do, viz., to 
 manifest his benevolence as a practical principle in its neces- 
 sary forms of approbation of right and disapprobation of wrong 
 moral action. lie utterly neglects to establish his right to 
 rule. He refuses to bring that influence to bear on his sub- 
 jects, which is indispensable to secure the highest happiness 
 of all, and to prevent the highest misery of all — the influence 
 of his authority. Instead therefore, of manifesting his benev- 
 olence in its appropriate and necessary expressions, and so 
 performing the peculiar function of his office by bringing this 
 highest and best influence to control the moral conduct of his 
 subjects, he betrays a character which entitles him only to exe 
 cration,as a false and faithless protector of his kingdom's wel- 
 fare. Legal sanctions then are necessary to evince the benevo- 
 lence of a moral governor, and so to establish his authority. 
 
 Further ; the same thing will appear if we examine some of 
 the particular ways or modes in which it may be supposed 
 that a moral governor may evince his benevolence, and so 
 establish his authority without legal sanctions. — Vide Lect. 
 VII., p. 128. It may be said or supposed,that a greater amount 
 of obedience to the best rule of action might or would be se- 
 cured, and with it a greater amount of happiness without legal 
 sanctions than with them, and that in this way the benevolence 
 of the moral governor and his consequent right to rule may be 
 fully established. I answer, that by obedience in this case 
 cannot be meant conformity to the rule involving submission 
 to authority ; for according to the supposition, the so-called 
 obedience must exist as the proof of the governor's benev- 
 olence, and in this way as the proof of his authority. There 
 can therefore be no manifestation of his character as the ground 
 of his authority prior to the supposed obedience, and of course 
 no obedience involving submission to his authority. On the 
 contrary, he who should give the supposed rule of action, 
 would as we have seen, instead of manifesting the character, 
 
120 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 the manifestation of which is requisite to his authority, mani- 
 fest the opposite character, and so disprove and subvert his 
 authority. By obedience then in the present case, must be 
 meant mere conformity to the rule of action, or right moral 
 action performed solely under the influence of the perceived 
 nature and tendencies of moral action, with out involving the 
 least submission to, or respect for, authority. But to say that 
 there might be a greater amount of right moral action without 
 than with legal sanctions', is saying nothing to the purpose, 
 since it may as well be said that there might not be. To say 
 either, is merely to assert a natural possibility of things — a 
 possibility which must always be admitted in cases of moral 
 reasoning. The question is one of probability. And the prob- 
 ability of a greater amount of right moral action is greater, 
 other things being the same, under a greater degree of in- 
 fluence to secure it, than under a less degree of such influ- 
 ence ; while the degree of this influence is greater with legal 
 sanctions than without them. Besides, our object in the pres- 
 ent inquiry is not to determine the comparative excellence of 
 different systems of influence. It is, to ascertain what is the 
 nature of a perfect moral government under the general or 
 universal admission, that there is such a thing administered by 
 an infinitely perfect being over his moral creation, and that 
 whatever else it is, it is the necessary means of the greatest 
 amount of right moral action and of happiness. "We have said 
 enough already, to show that without legal sanctions there 
 cannot be a perfect moral government. To say then, that a 
 greater amount of right moral action might be secured without 
 legal sanctions than with them, is to say that such a result 
 might be secured without a perfect moral government ; that 
 is, that the result might be secured without the necessary 
 means of securing it ; which is absurd. Thus if we view the 
 present question as one of mere probability, all the probability 
 in the case is, that there would be a greater amount of right 
 moral action with legal sanctions than without them ; while 
 the fact that there would be, is fully admitted in the concession 
 that a perfect moral government is necessary to the greatest 
 amount of right moral action. But there is yet another view 
 of this important topic which demands consideration. If then 
 it be conceded that a greater amount of right moral action and 
 of happiness would take place under the supposed system, and 
 
NO PROOF POSSIBLE WITHOUT SANCTIONS. 121 
 
 that its adoption would therefore be demanded by benevo- 
 lence, still the benevolence of the being who should adopt it, 
 could never be proved. It has already been shown, that 
 neither his deportment prior to his assuming the relation of a 
 moral governor, nor the act of prescribing the best rule of 
 action, could be regarded as proof of his benevolence. Nor 
 could the least degree of proof on this point be furnished by 
 any degree of right moral action and of happiness snpposable 
 in the case. As I have already said, right moral action in 
 such a case, must be performed solely under the influence of 
 the perceived nature and tendencies of moral action. It can- 
 not therefore be performed out of respect for the character of 
 the lawgiver, and of course can furnish no testimony or proof 
 of its excellence. There can be no connection between the 
 right mural action and the character of the lawgiver. The 
 former therefore can furnish no proof of the excellence of the 
 latter. The amount of happiness consequent on such action 
 can in no degree depend on the will of the lawgiver ; for to 
 suppose this, would be to suppose a legal reward in a case in 
 which there is no legal reward. No possible proof then exists 
 or can exist in the case supposed, that he who assumes the re- 
 lation of a moral governor, feels toward right and wrong moral 
 action, as a benevolent being must feel. Were he a perfectly 
 selfish being, it is altogether credible that he should do all that 
 he is supposed to do. Nor is this all. But by failing to show 
 in his relation of a moral governor, the feelings of a benevolent 
 being toward right and wrong moral action,- he proves himself 
 to be a selfish/being. If then he is, according to the present 
 supposition a benevolent being, he is benevolent in a case in 
 which his benevolence cannot be proved, in which he acts 
 contrary to the plainest dictates of benevolence, and in which 
 therefore, according to the laws of evidence, he must be re- 
 garded as a selfish being. In such a case, there could of 
 course be no authority ; nothing which could be called a 
 moral government. I do not say that a benevolent being 
 would not adopt the supposed system, if the greatest good 
 required its adoption ; nor that it would riot be one kind of a 
 moral system. But 1 say that it would not be a jjerfect moral 
 government. Its influence would be simply that of the per- 
 ceived nature and tendencies of moral action ; and nothing 
 more and nothing less than were there no lawgiver supposed 
 Vol. I.— 6 " 
 
122 MOEAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 in the case. There could not be the shadow of that influence 
 which results from the law, the authority and the character of a 
 perfect moral governor. He who should assume the supposed 
 relation without annexing sanctions to his law, would have, 
 and would be entitled to have, no more and no other influence 
 over the conduct of his subjects, than any individual among 
 them who should propound the same rule of action. The great 
 object and end of the relation is to secure the highest well- 
 being of all, and to prevent the highest misery of all, by secur- 
 ing right and preventing wrong moral action ; and the great 
 and peculiar function of the relation is, to secure right moral 
 action, and to prevent wrong moral action by the influence of 
 his authority — an influence which depends on the manifesta- 
 tion of that approbation of the one kind of action, and of that 
 disapprobation of the other, which a benevolent being must 
 feel. But without legal sanctions he manifests no such feel- 
 ings, and thus proves himself to be a selfish being and desti- 
 tute of all authority. 
 
 Again ; it may be said, that a moral governor by promising 
 a reward to obedience, though he threatens no penalty to dis- 
 obedience, would prove his benevolence and so establish his 
 authority. I answer, that the thing supposed is impossible. 
 For how could the promise of a reward to obedience prove the 
 benevolence of the lawgiver, while he left disobedience to go 
 unpunished ? How could he show himself to feel as a benev- 
 olent being must feel toward right moral action, without also 
 showing himself to feel as a benevolent being must feel toward 
 wrong moral action ? All the proof of such feeling toward 
 right moral action furnished by the reward, would be wholly 
 counteracted by manifesting no appropriate feeling toward 
 wrong moral action ; or rather, to manifest no disapprobation 
 of wrong moral action, would be to show indifference or appro- 
 bation in respect to it ; and no being who feels either indiffer- 
 ence to or approbation of wrong moral action, can feel as a 
 benevolent being must feel toward either right or wrong 
 moral action. But not to dwell longer on this topic. Make 
 what supposition you will, if the moral governor confers no 
 reward for obedience, he expresses no approbation of the only 
 means of the best end, but rather disapprobation ; and if he 
 inflicts no penalty for disobedience, he expresses no disappro- 
 bation of the means of the worst end, but rather approbation. 
 
THE GOVERNOR SELFISH WITHOUT SANCTIONS. 123 
 
 In the one case, lie virtually punishes obedience by withhold- 
 ing a reward ; in the other, he virtually rewards disobedience 
 by withholding penalty. Suppose then what else we may, if, 
 in the capacity of moral governor, he does not annex sanctions 
 to his law, and if he does not reward obedience and punish 
 disobedience, his conduct must be traced to the selfish prin- 
 ciple in some form. It may be selfishness in the form of 
 caprice, despotic humor, favoritism, a spirit of self-aggrandize- 
 ment, the love of applause, or of a weak, indulgent tenderness 
 which sacrifices public good to individual happiness. But it 
 is selfishness still, and not benevolence ; for benevolence in a 
 moral governor must feel, and must express, approbation of 
 obedience and disapprobation of disobedience to the best law. 
 Xot to express these feelings, is not to show the necessary and 
 due regard to the only means of the highest happiness of all, 
 and the necessary and due abhorrence of the sure means of 
 the highest misery of all. Not to do it, is to establish the fact 
 that the moral governor is not himself governed by the prin- 
 ciple of perfect and immutable rectitude. Whom he will 
 reward, and whom he will punish, however it may be supposed 
 to be decided by other considerations, is not determined by 
 the perfection of his character. So far as this basis for confi- 
 dence is concerned, the good have as much to fear as the bad, 
 and the bad as much to hope for as the good. Perfection in 
 character is wanting in him who occupies the throne. Obedi- 
 ence, as submission to authority — as that confidential homage 
 and unqualified and joyous compliance in which the will of 
 the subject goes along with the will of a perfect ruler of all, 
 is impossible. There is no such ruler. The act of obedience, 
 and the act of disobedience, alike in their true tendency and 
 influence, disclaim and prostrate his authority, and the moral 
 governor, doing nothing to counteract the effect, legalizes re- 
 bellion from one end of his dominions to the other. 
 
 REMARK. 
 
 "We see why the attempts to prove the benevolence of God 
 from the light of nature have been so often, not to say uni- 
 formly, unsuccessful. The fact I think will not be denied, 
 that the arguments of the soundest theism on this most inter- 
 esting and momentous question have been, and still are, in the 
 
124 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 view of many of the most acute and ingenuous minds, marred 
 by manifest imperfection and weakness. Even many Christian 
 divines confidently maintain that the moral perfection of God 
 cannot be proved from the light of nature. My present design 
 is not to trace minutely the defects of the arguments now re- 
 ferred to, but rather to present what I deem a fundamental 
 defect common to them all, and which fully accounts for their 
 inconclusive and unsatisfactory character, viz., that in these 
 arguments the most important relation of God to his moral 
 creation has been wholly overlooked in its true and proper bear- 
 ing on the conclusion. And here let me not be misunderstood. 
 I do not say that this important relation of God has been de- 
 nied. It has been fully believed by every sound theist. But 
 I affirm that, in the best conducted arguments on the subject 
 with which I am acquainted, that no such account has been 
 made of the relation of God as the moral governor of men as 
 the exigency of the argument demands. If what has been 
 said in the present lecture be just, the question, whether a 
 being who assumes the relation of a moral governor is benevo- 
 lent, depends on another, viz., whether the sanctions of his law 
 manifest his benevolence in its necessary approbation of right, 
 and necessary disapprobation of wrong moral action. But in 
 what treatise or work in natural theology has the argument 
 for the divine benevolence been made to depend on the rela- 
 tion of God to men as their moral governor — on the nature, 
 principles and facts of this relation, and particularly on the 
 sanctions annexed to his law? On the contrary, is not the 
 uniform method of discussing the great question of God's 
 moral character from the light of nature, after having proved 
 his existence as Creator, and his natural attributes, to proceed 
 directly to the proof of his moral attributes — that is, to the 
 proof of his benevolence — without the least attempt to unfold 
 the nature of his high relation to his creatures as their perfect 
 moral governor ? But if God sustains this relation to men — 
 and surely no sound theist will deny it — then manifestly it is 
 the great, the paramount relation which he sustains to them — 
 a relation to which every other must be subservient, even 
 that of their Creator, and that of the providential Disposer 
 of all events in respect to them. This relation of God to his 
 creatures must therefore control and modify all the manifesta- 
 tions of himself to them, and especially the manifestations of 
 
GOD'S BENEVOLENCE, HOW PROVED. 125 
 
 his moral character. How can we judge of the moral charac- 
 ter of any being except from his works, his acts, and his do- 
 ings, their nature, design, tendencies and results? And how 
 can we judge of these without understanding and contempla- 
 ting: the relation which the being sustains to other beings 
 whom his acts and doings respect ? Suppose you were to wit- 
 ness a parent inflicting chastisement upon his child in some of 
 its necessary and severer forms, and yet were so ignorant of 
 the parental relation as not to be able to comprehend, or so 
 thoughtless as not to consider, the design of parental discipline; 
 or suppose you were to see a surgeon amputating the limb of 
 a patient, without a suspicion or a thought of the necessity of 
 the operation to save the life of the latter; or to see the exe- 
 cutioner of public justice inflicting the penalty of the law 
 upon the murderer, wholly ignorant or making no account of 
 the design of such infliction — how, in either case, could you 
 regard the evil suffered as the dictate and proof of benevolence, 
 or as other than the decisive proof of the opposite principle ? 
 So, if God is acting in the relation of a perfect moral governor 
 of his moral creation, and if all his acts and doings are con- 
 trolled and modified by this relation, to what purpose, without 
 appealing to this relation and to his acts and doings as dictated 
 and modified by it, shall we attempt to prove his benevolence, 
 or to judge for ourselves, or to lead others to judge of Ids 
 moral character? On this supposition no wonder that all 
 such attempts are vain. If we wo aid vindicate the ways of 
 God to man, we must understand, and lead others to under- 
 stand, his relation to man as a moral governor. To represent 
 him as merely the Creator of men, and the providential Dis- 
 poser of their allotments, and in these relations aiming only 
 to produce the happiness and to prevent the misery of his 
 creatures irrespective of their moral conduct, when he is act- 
 ing in the paramount relation of their lawgiver, and adhering 
 to every principle of strictest equity in his administration, is 
 to pour darkness on all his works and ways, and therefore on 
 his moral character; while to contemplate him in his true re- 
 lation — the high and august relation of a perfect moral gov- 
 ernor — would light up all the dark paths of his providence, 
 and cause all his goodness to pass before us. 
 
 That God is in fact administering a perfect moral govern- 
 ment over this world, will be readily conceded by every be- 
 
126 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 liever in divine revelation. It is true indeed that there is no 
 ground for the pretense that he carries this system of govern- 
 ment out to its full issues in the present life. Still it must be 
 admitted by all who receive the Christian revelation, that God 
 in his providence over men in this world, in no respect departs 
 from or violates a single principle of a perfect moral govern- 
 ment; but that on the contrary, he so adheres to every such 
 principle in his administration, that its perfection can in no 
 respect be impeached or denied. Why then is it incredible 
 that his providence, were it rightly read in the lessons which 
 it gives us, should show us that he is administering a perfect 
 moral government over this world, if not in the form of a 
 strictly legal economy with some delay of its just retributions 
 not inconsistent with its nature, at least in what, as we think, 
 is far more probable — in the form of an economy of grace ? 
 If the word of God reveals him to us as our moral governor, 
 exercising his rightful dominion through grace, why should it 
 be thought strange that his works and ways of providence, 
 well considered, should present him in the same exalted and 
 glorious relation ? Or rather, how can it be supposed to be 
 otherwise ? Can it be supposed, that in his works and ways 
 of providence he contradicts the testimony concerning himself 
 given in his word ? Does his written revelation exhibit him 
 to our faith in one relation, and his acts and doings in another ? 
 Is it credible, that his works when duly considered, should 
 make no decisive manifestation of the character and the rela- 
 tion which he sustains to his intelligent creation? What shall 
 be concluded, if his works furnish no confirmation of his dec- 
 larations ? What is this but contradicting in his word what 
 he is doing in his providence? If the book of revelation 
 reveals God administering over men a perfect moral govern- 
 ment blended with an economy of grace, the book of nature 
 — the book that tells us what he is oy what he does — if rightly 
 read, must show him as the righteous Sovereign, and las the 
 Eewarder of them that diligently seek Him. 
 
LECTURE VII. 
 
 V. A perfect Moral Government involves the exercise of authority through the medium of law. — 
 The nature of the law further unfolded. — 7. The law of a perfect Moral Government involves 
 sanctions. — 5th. The necessity of legal sanctions shown. — (3,) because they are the necessary 
 proofs of his benevolence in the forms of his highest approbation of obedience and highest dis- 
 approbation of disobedience. — This is argued; first, from the insufficiency of another mode of 
 proving Ins benevolence ; second, from the nature of legal sanctions as already explained ; third, 
 from the view of the sanctions of the supreme law of the state. — Remarks: 1. Christianity is 
 not a selfish system of religion ; 2. What it is to make light of the divine threatenings ; 3. 
 They who deny the view now given of the sanctions of a perfect Moral Government, cannot 
 prove the benevolence of God. 
 
 In treating of the necessity of legal sanctions in the preced- 
 ing lecture, I attempted to show, (1.) That they are necessary, 
 in some respect or under some relation, as the proof of the 
 moral governor's authority; and (2.) That they are necessary 
 for this purpose, as being the requisite proof of his benevo- 
 lence. 
 
 I now proceed to show, as I proposed — 
 
 (3.) That legal sanctions are necessary for this purpose, as 
 the required manifestations or proofs of his benevolence in 
 the form of his highest approbation of obedience, and of his 
 highest disapprobation of disobedience. 
 
 It has been shown that the moral governor is under the 
 necessity of establishing by decisive proof, his authority, or 
 right to reign ; that he cannot do this without proving his 
 benevolence, and that he cannot prove his benevolence and so 
 establish his authority, by any thing which he can do in his 
 other relations, nor by any thing which he can do in this rela- 
 tion, without annexing natural good and evil to his law as its 
 sanctions. "What I now propose to show is, that he cannot 
 prove his benevolence, without annexing sanctions to his law 
 which shall manifest his highest approbation of obedience, and 
 his highest disapprobation of disobedience; in other words, that 
 natural good and evil cannot become legal sanctions — that is, 
 cannot manifest the benevolence, and so establish the authority 
 of the moral governor, in any other ivay or mode, except by 
 manifesting his highest approbation of obedience, and his high- 
 est disapprobation of disobedience. 
 
128 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 I argue the truth of this proposition, 
 
 In the first place, from the insufficiency of certain particular 
 ways or modes in which natural good and evil are, or have 
 been supposed to become legal sanctions, other than that now 
 specified. Here I propose to examine such other modes than 
 the one now specified, some one of which so far as I know, has 
 been considered the proper mode. If natural good and evil can- 
 not become legal sanctions in any of these modes, it is fairly 
 inferred that they cannot in any other than that now maintain- 
 ed. I remark then, 
 
 That natural good promised or conferred as the mere dictate 
 of individual kindness, cannot possess the nature of a legal 
 reward; and that natural evil, threatened or inflicted as the 
 mere dictate of individual unkindness, cannot possess the 
 nature of a legal penalty. In such a case, the lawgiver in 
 annexing the supposed sanctions to his law, and also in their 
 execution, can have no benevolent regard for the public good, 
 and of course no such regard for the establishment of his own 
 authority as the necessary means of the public good. His 
 whole object in conferring the natural good, and in inflicting 
 the natural evil supposed, terminates in the happiness and 
 unhappiness of individuals as such, and in his own selfish grati- 
 fication. This implies an utter disregard of the highest happi- 
 ness of all, and of the necessary means of this end. It shows 
 him to be utterly regardless of the function of his high relation, 
 and recreant to his high trust. Whatever other tendencies 
 then his acts may be supposed to have, or whatever results 
 they may be supposed to produce, they can have no tendency 
 to establish his authority, and to secure by means of it the 
 highest well-being of his kingdom. On the contrary, the sup- 
 posed acts must be — the one in the form of favoritism or in- 
 dulgent tenderness, and the other in that of resentment or 
 revenge, the dictate of unqualified selfishness, and must there- 
 fore decisively disprove his authority. 
 
 Nor do natural good and evil employed merely as moral 
 discipline, constitute legal sanctions. It is altogether credible, 
 that a being perfectly benevolent should, prior to assuming the 
 relation of the moral governor of other beings, confer on them 
 much natural good, and inflict some natural evil, for the pur- 
 pose of securing better results, when they come to act under 
 his moral government, than he could otherwise secure. Such 
 
PUNISHMENT NOT CHASTISEMENT. 129 
 
 natural good and evil however, cannot constitute legal sanc- 
 tions. It is also credible, if we suppose a legal economy to be 
 connected, as it may be, with an economy of grace, that natu- 
 ral good and evil should be employed to reform the transgres- 
 sors of law. Such natural good and evil however, being merely 
 disciplinary in their design and tendency, cannot constitute 
 lejml sanctions. I admit indeed that natural evil inflicted for 
 the purpose of reclaiming an offender, is often called punish- 
 ment in the - popular use of the word. Hence such natural 
 evil is often mistaken for penal evil, or for the penalty of the 
 law. Such natural evil, as distinguished from legal penalty, 
 is properly called chastisement. It implies not less than the 
 legal penalty, that the subject is an offender, since otherwise 
 its infliction for the purpose of reformation would be obviously 
 absurd. It differs however essentially, under a perfect moral 
 government, from the legal penalty. Chastisement aims ex- 
 clusively at the reformation of the subject; legal penalty not 
 at all. Chastisement is inflicted in love; legal penalty, in 
 wrath. Chastisement, in its design and tendency, is a blessing 
 to its subject; legal penalty, an unmitigated curse. Chastise- 
 ment has a special respect to the individual's benefit ; legal 
 penalty respects the good of the public. Hence chastisement 
 cannot, under a perfect moral government, be the penalty of 
 the law, it being a ridiculous anomaly to threaten a transgres- 
 sor of law with the means of his reformation and of his deliv- 
 erance from the legal penalty; in other words, to threaten a 
 real, and to him the greatest blessing, as a legal penalty. 
 
 Nor is the-' conferring of a legal reward by the moral gov- 
 ernor, the payment of a debt, in the sense of that which is due 
 for something received, which is not clue. The lawgiver re- 
 ceives nothing in the obedience of his subjects but what is his 
 due. Obedience is a matter of obligation on their part, and 
 of rightful demand on his ; and surely he does not reward them 
 for paying their own debt. By this I do not mean that the 
 reward is not that which is due, at least on account of the 
 relation which conferring it has to the public good, as one 
 means of increasing the public good, and that it may not in 
 this sense be properly said that the reward is reckoned of debt 
 Kara to o(pi?.7][ia. This however cannot imply that the service 
 claimed or rendered is not due to the lawgiver, and that the 
 reward establishes the authority of the lawgiver simply by 
 6* 9 
 
130 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 satisfying the claim of the obedient subject. Indeed, the act 
 of satisfying the claim of the subject, be the ground of it what 
 it may, may be prompted by selfishness as well as by benevo- 
 lence, and can therefore furnish no proof of benevolence, and 
 none of authority on the part of the lawgiver. Besides, on the 
 supposition opposed, the lawgiver's authority could not be 
 established, until obedience should exist and the reward be con- 
 ferred. Of course, in the supposed act of obedience there could 
 be no recognition of authority. In short, if the "promise and 
 the conferring of a reward for obedience has no relation except 
 to satisfy a claim of the subject, then it has no relation to the 
 public good. It does not imply the least degree of approbation 
 of obedience as the means of the public good, and instead of 
 being proof of the lawgiver's benevolence, and so of his author- 
 ity, it is proof to the contrary. 
 
 ~Noy is the endurance of natural evil as a legal penalty the 
 payment of a debt on the part of the transgressor, by which 
 he satisfies the claim of the lawgiver, and thus establishes his 
 authority. For what has the subject received for which he 
 owes suffering as an equivalent ? Plainly, he cannot, in this 
 sense, be said to owe suffering as a debt.* lie has neither 
 done nor failed to do any thing for which suffering on his part 
 can be rendering an equivalent. The language of a benevo- 
 lent lawgiver is not, " I will be as well pleased and satisfied 
 with disobedience and the endurance of its penalty, as with 
 perfect obedience." Legal penalty is not a thing claimed by 
 the lawgiver and rendered by the traSgressor, but a tiling 
 threatened and inflicted by the lawgiver, and endured by the 
 transgressor. Considered simply as so much suffering endured, 
 it can have no tendency to manifest the benevolence of the 
 lawgiver. Kor can it have such tendency except it be consid- 
 ered as suffering inflicted by the act of the lawgiver, and as 
 such, becoming an expression of the emotion which benevo- 
 lence must feel toward transgression. Voluntary submission 
 to it on the part of the subject, is in no respect necessary to it 
 as a legal penalty. Its infliction is the act of the moral gov- 
 ernor, and in no respect the act of the transgressor, by which 
 
 * Sin, as an act of withholding obedience which is due, may be called a debt, as 
 in Matt. vi. : 12 ; not however as something due which can be paid by suffering the 
 legal penalty, nor by any thing else. 
 
SANCTION PRIMARILY NOT MOTIVES. 131 
 
 lie may satisfy any demand made on him by the lawgiver, and 
 thus establish his authority. 
 
 Nor do natural good and evil become legal sanctions, as 
 being so much motive to secure right and prevent wrong 
 moral action. By this I do not mean, that natural good and 
 evil as the matter of legal sanctions, must not have the influ- 
 ence of motives on the minds of subjects, that they may answer 
 the end of legal sanctions. Nor do I mean that the direct in- 
 fluence of natural good and evil as motives, is at all incon- 
 sistent with that peculiar influence which we call moral gov- 
 ernment, so that the two influences may not coexist. But I 
 mean, that the influence of natural good and evil as such, or as 
 so much motive merely, does not constitute them legal sanc- 
 tions. In such influence merely, there is no influence of 
 authority. The former may exist without the latter. If we 
 suppose the subject to be under the influence of natural good 
 and evil, as so much motive merely, he is not under the influ- 
 ence of authority, and therefore not under the influence of 
 moral government. If we suppose him to conform to the rule 
 of action under the former influence merely, the act would not 
 be done because the moral governor commands it, but done 
 simply to obtain natural good and to avoid natural evil ; and 
 of course done without the least regard to the will or character 
 of him who prescribes the rule. Now the object of a perfect 
 moral governor is not merely to secure right moral action, but 
 to secure it in a given way by a peculiar influence — the influ- 
 ence of his authority ; to secure it, I do not say exclusively, but 
 really by this influence. It is to bring his subject to act from 
 a respect to his will, as the will of a perfect being. Otherwise 
 the act of conformity to the rule would not be an act of obedi- 
 ence, as involving any recognition of his right to rule. Even 
 supposing the act to be morally right — an act done in view of 
 the true nature and tendency of moral action, still if done from 
 this influence merely, it would no more involve any regard for 
 the character of the lawgiver, as that which gives him the right 
 to rule, than were the subject hired to perform the act by a 
 fellow subject, Natural good and evil then, influencing the 
 subject as merely so much motive, are not legal sanctions. 
 
 Nor do natural good and evil become legal sanctions, on the 
 ground that it is right or just to reward obedience and to 
 punish disobedience, irrespective of the tendency of so doing 
 
132 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 to produce happiness and to prevent misery. The contrary 
 opinion is maintained by some at least in respect to penalty. 
 It is said that it is right to pnnish the transgressor of law irre- 
 spective of the general good — that it is ill-desert, and not the 
 good of society, which is the ground of his just liability to 
 punishment — that sin or transgression is an evil in itself and 
 deserves punishment for its own sake, and without respect 
 to its tendency to evil. Now in such statements as these, 
 it is obvious that distinctions are made without a difference. 
 It is readily admitted, then, that it is right to punish the trans- 
 gressor of law ; that it is ill-desert, which is the ground of his 
 just liability to punishment, and that sin or transgression is an 
 evil in itself. But it is denied that these things are true, or can 
 be conceived to be true, irrespective of the relation of punish- 
 ment to some good end, or to the public good. The real and only 
 question in the case then is, would it be right or just to punish 
 the transgressor of law, if no good end could be promoted by 
 his punishment? Or thus, would it be right or just to inflict 
 suffering in a case in which not the least good in kind or degree 
 could result, either to the sufferer or to any other being from 
 its infliction ? To say that it would be, is to say that it would 
 be right or just to inflict suffering purely for its own sake. 
 Could a being of perfect benevolence do this ? Could any 
 feeling short of unqualified malice prompt it ? "Would such an 
 act sustain the authority of the moral governor ? But it will 
 be said that there is inherent ill-desert in the trangression of a 
 perfect law, and that on this account it is right or just to inflict 
 punishment on the transgressor. But the ill-desert of trans- 
 gression is either its relation to the law as tending to destroy 
 its authority or the authority of the lawgiver and so to destroy 
 the public good which depends on the authority of law, or it is 
 not. If it is, and if punishment is justly inflicted on this ac- 
 count and as the means of sustaining this authority, then it 
 is inflicted in respect to a good end, even for the public good. 
 If it is not, then plainly the transgression of law sustains no re- 
 lation to law, on account of which it is right or just to punish 
 it. It leaves the authority of the law or of the lawgiver unim- 
 paired and in full force. It has done, and" can do no injury to 
 the law or to the authority of the lawgiver. There is no evil 
 to be prevented or to be redressed by punishment, no good to 
 be accomplished in respect to the law. Why then punish the 
 
PUNISHMENT FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD. 133 
 
 transgressor? Is it said that the ill-desert of transgression is 
 not its relation to law as tending to destroy its authority, but 
 its inherent moral turpitude considered simply as wrong moral 
 action ? Be it so ; but how can this be a good reason for in- 
 flicting suffering on the transgressor merely for its own sake, or 
 when no good end can be answered by its infliction? Is it said 
 that it is fit, or proper, or right, or what ought to be done, and 
 that we instinctively feel it to be so ? But why is it ? Right 
 to inflict suffering purely for the sake of inflicting it ! Who 
 are the beings that instinctively feel this to be right, and in 
 what world do they dwell ? Of such a species of beings we 
 have no knowledge, and with them if they exist, we utterly 
 disclaim all fraternity. Is it then said that transgression is evil 
 in itself, and that on this account and for its own sake, it de- 
 serves punishment? This is only saying in another form the 
 same thing. What then is the meaning of the language? 
 There are, generally speaking, two things, and only two, each 
 of which may be properly said to be evil in itself. The one is 
 suffering, including unhappiness and misery, and the other is 
 the direct means of suffering. Each is truly and properly said 
 to be evil in itself in distinction from being evil as the indi- 
 rect means of suffering. That suffering, i. e. unhappiness, pain, 
 or misery, is evil in itself will not be denied. So that which 
 is the direct means of suffering or of unhappiness, is properly 
 said to be evil in itself though it be also the indirect means of 
 it. Thus it is properly said, that ignorance or infamy is evil in 
 itself. But neither of these things is evil in itself in the same 
 sense in which unhappiness or suffering is. The transgression 
 of a perfect law, sin, wrong moral action, is also evil in itself, 
 not as being itself suffering, but as being in its own nature and 
 true tendency,^ direct means of suffering. This is all that 
 can be properly meant by calling transgression or sin evil in 
 itself. Not being identical with suffering or unhappiness, it 
 can be conceived to be evil,on\y as being in its own nature the 
 direct means of suffering. But how can this fact be a good 
 and sufficient reason for inflicting suffering on the transgressor 
 by a moral governor, when no good can result from the inflic- 
 tion ? It would be only to increase evil for evil's sake. And 
 we say again, that nothing short of unqualified malice could 
 inflict suffering in such a case. Or rather, we affirm that the 
 most unqualified malice could not do it. The supposed act is 
 
134 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 impossible in the nature of tilings. No being can find a motive 
 to inflict suffering on others any more than on himself, when no 
 good in his view either to himself, or to them, or to others, is 
 connected with or depends on the act. The supposition in- 
 volves the absurdity of choosing to act without a motive or a 
 reason — the absurdity of an event without a reason. The sup- 
 posed act bids defiance to even infernal malice. But it has 
 been said, if the justice of punishment is founded in the utility 
 of punishment, then it will follow, that if the public good would 
 be best promoted by punishing the innocent instead of the trans- 
 gressor, it would be right and just to punish the innocent, which 
 is revolting to every sentiment of our moral nature. It is read- 
 ily admitted, that to punish the innocent instead of the guilty, 
 would, as things are in their essential nature and relations, be 
 abhorrent to every true sentiment of right and equity. But 
 here two questions arise ; why is it thus, and how would it be, 
 were the nature and relations of things changed in the manner 
 supposed? Why is it thus? Is it not because the truth is 
 clearly seen and strongly felt by every mind, that the author- 
 ity of law, and with it the public good depend on and require 
 the punishment of the transgressor, and forbid the punishment 
 of the obedient subject? Does not every one know, even the 
 culprit at the bar, as well as the judge on the bench, that to 
 assert, that a due regard to the authority of law and with it to 
 the public good require the punishment of the transgressor, is 
 the same thing as to assert that justice requires his punish- 
 ment ? And now, if we suppose the essential nature of things 
 to be so changed, that the authority of law and the public good 
 as depending on it, would be destroyed, and absolute and uni- 
 versal misery follow, unless the innocent were to be punished, 
 would it not be right to make innocence, now become the true 
 and necessary cause of such fearful results, the ground of pun- 
 ishment? Could a benevolent moral governor voluntarily be- 
 come the author of such utter ruin and wretchedness,by suffer- 
 ing the innocent to escape punishment ? Plainly on the sup- 
 position now made, the nature of things would be so changed, 
 that innocence, obedience to law, would possess the same nature, 
 aud sustain the same relations as the ground of punishment, 
 which disobedience now sustains ; and if our moral nature ap- 
 prove of the punishment of the latter, it must in the case 
 supposed, approve of the punishment of the former. If it is 
 
SANCTIONS FROM JUST BENEYOLENCE. 135 
 
 dow right or just to punish the disobedient, it would then be 
 so to punish the obedient — to punish for a thing having the 
 same relative nature, though it should have another name. To 
 deny it, is to make a supposition to be reasoned on, and then 
 to disregard and overlook it in the reasoning. It is like sup- 
 posing the nature of things to be so changed that two and two 
 should be five, and then to deny that on this supposition two 
 and tw^o would be five, or that twice two and two would be 
 ten. Those philosophers then, who maintain the justice of 
 punishment, irrespective of its relations to the public good or 
 to any good — and the same thing is true mutatis mutandis — 
 in respect to the justice of reward, evidently fail to analyze 
 their own necessary ideas or conceptions of things. If the 
 question be put, why is it right to punish transgression, they 
 have no answer to give, but that it is right, or that it is right 
 because it is right, or some equivalent answer equally trivial 
 and irrelevant. If pressed further on the point, they tell us, 
 that the idea of moral rectitude or rightness is a simple idea — 
 an idea incapable of analysis and definition, and that the ques- 
 tion is wholly unauthorized, why is an action morally right, or 
 what is that in which its moral rectitude consists. This has 
 already been considered. 
 
 Nor do natural good and evil become legal sanctions, con- 
 sidered as the dictate of justice as distinguished from benevo- 
 lence; or, as annexed to law, apart from their subserviency to 
 public good. This view of the subject, which is not perhaps 
 essentially different from that just considered, instead of repre- 
 senting benevolence as the primary attribute, and justice as 
 one particular form of benevolence, represents them " as dis- 
 tinct and primary characteristics" or attributes of a perfect 
 moral governor.* Its advocates are obviously led to adopt it, 
 from an inadequate and false conception of the nature of be- 
 nevolence, as the comprehensive moral perfection of a perfect 
 ruler. By benevolence, they obviously mean that species of 
 sentimental kindness wdiich seeks the welfare of others as indi- 
 viduals, without regard to the highest well-being of the whole. 
 Such kindness is not the benevolence of a perfect moral gov- 
 ernor. It not only does not involve or imply the attribute of 
 justice, but would be palpably inconsistent with it. Benevo- 
 
 * Chalmers' Natural Theology, Vol. II., c. vi. 
 
136 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 lence, as the attribute of a perfect moral governor, is the 
 supreme love of the highest happiness of his kingdom, or an 
 elective preference of this object to every other that can come 
 into competition with it as an object of preference. It becomes 
 therefore, from its very nature in relation to the promotion of 
 the highest happiness, a disposition or purpose to promote it, 
 by every means necessary for its promotion. One of these is, 
 the establishment and support of the authority of a perfect 
 law, or of the lawgiver's authority, by legal sanctions. Benev- 
 olence dictates and demands this, and in its very nature neces- 
 sarily leads to a full and fixed determination or purpose to 
 secure and employ this means of the general good, or highest 
 well-being of all ; and as such a purpose is what we mean, and 
 all that can be meant, by justice as the attribute of a perfect 
 moral governor — call it by what name we will — righteousness, 
 holiness, justice — it is a disposition or purpose, prompted by 
 benevolence, to uphold the authority of the law, or of the law- 
 giver, by legal sanctions as the necessary means of the general 
 good. It is therefore one particular form or modification of 
 benevolence, or a particular disposition or purpose, prompted 
 by benevolence. Indeed, all we c all moral attributes in a per- 
 fect moral being, except benevolence, are only forms or modifica- 
 tions of benevolence in more particular dispositions or purposes. 
 Thus veracity is a particular disposition or purpose, prompted 
 by his benevolence, to speak truth ; pity, or compassion, is a 
 particular disposition or purpose prompted by benevolence, to 
 relieve suffering; mercy, as an attribute of a moral ruler, is a 
 particular disposition or purpose, prompted by benevolence, to 
 show favor to the guilty. Justice also, as the attribute of a 
 moral ruler, is a particular disposition or purpose prompted 
 by benevolence, to establish and maintain the authority of law 
 by legal sanctions, which, under a merely legal system, is in 
 all cases indispensable to the general good. It is true that 
 general benevolence dictates and requires other things also, for 
 other things are necessary to the general good. But it de- 
 mands the support of the authority of the moral governor as 
 one necessary, absolutely indispensable means of this end. 
 Thus viewed as a benevolent disposition to uphold his author- 
 ity^ the indispensable means of the general good, it consti- 
 tutes, or rather assumes the particular form, which we call 
 justice, as an attribute of a moral governor. Hence benevo- 
 
BENEVOLENCE AND JUSTICE COINCIDE. 137 
 
 lence, as the attribute of a perfect moral governor, never re- 
 quires any thing which is inconsistent with what justice in a 
 perfect moral governor dictates and demands ; for the support 
 of the authority of law is always as truly exacted by benevo- 
 lence as by justice. Kor does justice ever require any thing 
 inconsistent with benevolence ; for the support of the authority 
 of law by the requisite means of its support, is what justice 
 demands, and this is always necessary to the general good, and 
 therefore always dictated and demanded by benevolence. Be- 
 nevolence, no less than justice requires, under a perfect moral 
 government viewed as a merely legal system, the sacrifice of 
 individual happiness in the case of the transgressor; so that 
 justice in seeking his punishment, never claims what benevo- 
 lence forbids. What justice demands in such a case, benevo- 
 lence also demands. So if benevolence dictates and demands 
 an atonement, which shall fully support the authority of law in 
 the pardon of the transgressor, it claims nothing which justice 
 as the attribute of a moral governor forbids.* The entire claim 
 of justice is met, provided the authority of law be supported 
 in case of transgression, whether this be done by the execution 
 of penalty or by an atonement. There is therefore no antago- 
 nism here — no clashing of different attributes in the moral 
 governor — no violence done to benevolence, in answering the 
 inflexible demand of justice; and none to the inflexible demand 
 of justice, by conforming to any conceivable demand of benev- 
 olence. Justice, and all the particular moral attributes of a 
 perfect moral governor, may be distinguished not only from 
 each other, but also from his benevolence. But while each 
 particular attribute, so to speak, acts in subservience to benev- 
 olence, all act in perfect harmony. Benevolence is the central 
 sun which gives direction, and power, and results, to the whole 
 constellation of the particular moral attributes of a perfect 
 moral governor. If compassion demands relief for the suffer- 
 ing, or if mercy dictates favor to the guilty, so does benevo- 
 lence. If justice require legal sanctions, as it does under a 
 merely legal system, benevolence also demands them as the 
 necessary means of supporting the authority of the lawgiver, 
 and as such, of promoting the general good. 
 
 Such are some of the ways or modes — -and I know of no 
 
 * Vide Appendix on Justice, Vol. II., p. 000. 
 
138 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 other — iii which it lias been supposed that natural good and 
 evil can become legal sanctions, instead of that which is now 
 maintained to be the only mode. It is obvious however that 
 the j cannot become legal sanctions in any of these modes. 
 If this be so, it is a fair conclusion that they can become 
 legal sanctions in no other than that now maintained; that 
 is, except as manifestations of the moral governor's highest 
 approbation of obedience, and highest disapprobation of dis- 
 obedience. 
 
 I argue the same thing — 
 
 In the second place, from what has been already shown 
 respecting the nature of legal sanctions. We have seen that 
 the moral governor can establish his authority only by natural 
 good and evil annexed to his law as sanctions. Whatever else 
 may be necessary for this purpose besides natural good and 
 evil as legal sanctions, the establishing or sanctioning influence 
 is exclusively from natural good as the reward of obedience, 
 and from natural evil as the penalty of disobedience. But he 
 cannot establish his authority, as we have shown, without 
 manifesting his highest approbation of obedience, and his high- 
 est disapprobation of disobedience, and of course cannot estab- 
 lish his authority by natural good and evil as legal sanctions, 
 except as they manifest these feelings. Since then, natural 
 good and evil are necessary as legal sanctions; since they can 
 become such only as manifestations of the moral governor's 
 approval or disapproval, it follows, that they are necessary as 
 legal sanctions, solely because they are requisite for the pur- 
 pose of such a manifestation. 
 
 Or thus : it has been shown that the moral governor cannot 
 establish his authority without manifesting his benevolence ; 
 that he cannot do this by natural good and evil as legal sanc- 
 tions, unless they manifest the necessary feelings of benevolence 
 toward right and wrong moral action ; and that these are the 
 highest approbation of the one, and the highest disapprobation 
 of the other. As then the moral governor cannot establish his 
 authority by natural good and evil as legal sanctions, unless 
 they manifest his highest approbation of obedience, and his 
 highest disapprobation of disobedience, it follows, that they are 
 required as legal sanctions, solely because they are necessary 
 for the purpose of such a manifestation. 
 
 What has now been said will be more fully confirmed by 
 
SANCTIONS MUST MANIFEST THE LAWGIVER. 139 
 
 viewing the subject under some other aspects, and in some 
 other connections. I proceed then to remark — 
 
 In the third place, that it is utterly unsupposable and in- 
 conceivable, that natural good and evil should become legal 
 sanctions in any other mode, than as expressions or manifesta- 
 tions of the moral governor's highest approbation of obedience, 
 and highest disapprobation of disobedience. 
 
 Every one knows, that promising natural good to obedience, 
 in the form of law, and conferring it when obedience is ren- 
 dered, is the appropriate and most significant possible expres- 
 sion of approbation of obedience ; and that the threatening of 
 natural evil to disobedience, in the form of law, and inflicting 
 it when disobedience occurs, is the appropriate and most sig- 
 nificant expression of disapprobation of disobedience. The 
 degree of approbation in the one case, and of disapprobation in 
 the other, are justly estimated and measured by the degree of 
 natural good promised or conferred in the one case, and of 
 natural evil threatened or inflicted in the other. JSTow, when 
 these things are so — when, as we have seen, there is no other 
 conceivable reason that a perfect moral governor should annex 
 natural good and evil to his law as legal sanctions ; or rather, 
 when to annex them for any other conceivable reason or pur- 
 pose, would disprove his moral perfection and subvert his 
 authority, what good or sufficient reason could he have for 
 annexing natural good and evil to his law as legal sanctions, 
 and to do this for the purpose of establishing his authority, 
 except that they are necessary for this purpose, and because 
 they are the only significant and true, and therefore necessary, 
 expressions of his approval of obedience and disapproval of 
 the opposite. 
 
 Again ; if natural good and evil can become legal sanctions 
 in any other mode than by expressing the moral governor's 
 highest approbation of obedience, and highest disapprobation 
 of disobedience, it must be either by not manifesting any degree 
 of these feelings, or by manifesting some less degree of them 
 than the highest. Can he then establish his authority by nat- 
 ural good and evil as legal sanctions, without manifesting 
 through them some degree of the feelings specified ? This is 
 plainly impossible. For they can be proof of nothing on the 
 part of a moral governor on which his authority depends, un- 
 less they manifest on his part some degree of approbation of 
 
140 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 obedience, and some degree of disapprobation of disobedience. 
 As the appropriate and significant signs of these feelings, they 
 necessarily express them. Even if they are considered as 
 merely so mnch motive or inducement employed by him to 
 secure obedience and to prevent disobedience, they necessarily 
 imply a preference on his part for some reason or another — 
 either a selfish or a benevolent preference — of obedience to dis- 
 obedience, and of course some kind and degree of approbation 
 of the one, and of disapprobation of the other. It is true in- 
 deed, that if they express these feelings in their selfish form, 
 they become proof against his authority. But it is also true, 
 that if they are not regarded as expressions of these feelings in 
 any form, they can imply no preference of one kind of action 
 to the other, and therefore can prove nothing in respect to the 
 will, can establish nothing in respect to the feelings and char- 
 acter of the moral governor which can have the least bearing 
 on the question of his authority, any more than were they the 
 effects of an impersonal cause or physical agent. If then nat- 
 ural good and evil annexed to law as sanctions, do not manifest 
 some approbation of obedience, and some disapprobation of dis- 
 obedience on the part of the moral governor, they can prove 
 nothing which can have the remotest connection with estab- 
 lishing his authority — nothing in respect to the purpose for 
 which they are annexed to law. They can sanction nothing — 
 they can prove nothing which can give him the right to reign, 
 and therefore cannot be legal sanctions. 
 
 Again; it has been already shown that the moral governor 
 can make no decisive expression, and therefore can furnish no 
 decisive proof of his benevolence, except by natural good and 
 evil as legal sanctions ; nor by these, except as they express his 
 approbation of obedience, and his disapprobation of disobedi- 
 ence. If therefore he does not make such manifestation, he 
 furnishes no proof of his benevolence, and of course none of his 
 authority. On the contrary, his failure to manifest these feel- 
 ings by this means, decisively proves that he is not a benevo- 
 lent but a selfish being, and utterly disproves his authority. 
 Who would concede to another the right to govern — the right 
 to impose his will as an authoritative rule of action, who 
 should refuse to furnish the least proof of his approbation of 
 right, and his disapprobation of wrong moral action, and who 
 should thus furnish decisive proof of that selfishness which, to 
 
SANCTIONS EXPRESS HIS STRONGEST FEELINGS. 14.1 
 
 subserve its purposes, is as ready to befriend and patronize 
 wrong as right moral action — to sacrifice as to promote the 
 highest happiness of his kingdom? Plainly the moral governor 
 cannot establish his authority by natural good and evil as legal 
 sanctions, without manifesting through them some degree of 
 approbation of right, and some degree of disapprobation of 
 wrong moral action. 
 
 To recur now to the other side of the alternatives ; can the 
 moral governor establish his authority by annexing to his law 
 natural good and evil as sanctions, which manifest a less degree 
 of the feelings specified than the highest ? I answer ; that to 
 suppose that he can, is to suppose what is absurd and impossi- 
 ble. We have already seen that the moral governor, by annex- 
 ing that degree of natural good and evil to his law as sanctions 
 which would fully express the highest degree of the feelings 
 specified, would thus manifest the true feelings of benevolence 
 toward right and wrong moral action, and thus decisively 
 establish his authority. But it is obvious, that natural good 
 and evil in this case would become proof of his benevolence 
 solely by expressing his highest approbation of obedience, and 
 his highest disapprobation of disobedience. It is equally plain, 
 that no less degree of natural good and evil would express 
 these feelings. To suppose therefore, that any less degree of 
 natural good and evil as legal sanctions than is necessary 
 should manifest them, is absurd. To suppose that the mani- 
 festation of any other feelings either in kind or degree, than the 
 true and necessary feelings of benevolence, should prove benev- 
 olence, is equally absurd. The benevolence then of the moral 
 governor, and of course his authority, cannot be proved by any 
 degree of legal sanctions less than that which shall manifest his 
 benevolence in the form of its highest approbation of obedience, 
 and his highest disapprobation of disobedience. 
 
 Again ; the degree of natural good and evil annexed by the 
 moral governor as sanctions to his law, is the measure and cri- 
 terion of his approbation of obedience, and disapprobation of 
 disobedience. It is undeniable, that by some given degree of 
 natural good and evil as legal sanctions, he may express the 
 highest degree of these feelings toward right and wrong moral 
 action, and that by the lowest possible degree of natural good 
 and evil as legal sanctions, he would express less approbation 
 of right and disapprobation of wrong moral action, than the 
 
142 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 highest, and of course less of these feelings toward these objects 
 than the necessary feelings of benevolence. But we may as 
 well suppose that the expression of the least possible degree of 
 these feelings toward right and wrong moral action, is an ex- 
 pression of the necessary feelings of benevolence, as to suppose 
 that any expression of these feelings short of the highest, is an 
 expression of such feelings. But I need not say how preposter- 
 ous would be the attempt of a moral governor to prove his 
 benevolence and so to establish his authority, by expressing the 
 least possible degree of approbation of that kind of action, 
 which is the necessary means of the highest happiness of all, 
 and the least possible degree of disapprobation of that kind of 
 action, which is the sure means of the highest misery of all. 
 If then he annexes to his law a less degree of natural good and 
 evil, than that which is requisite to express his highest appro- 
 bation of obedience, and highest disapprobation of disobedi- 
 ence, he furnishes no proof of the necessary feelings of benevo- 
 lence, and of course no proof of his authority. On the contrary, 
 he expresses a lower degree of approbation of obedience and of 
 disapprobation of disobedience, than he as a benevolent being 
 must feel, that is, he expresses that degree of approbation of 
 right, and that degree of disapprobation of wrong moral action, 
 which none but a selfish being can feel. The moral governor 
 cannot establish or prove his authority, or rather he cannot 
 avoid disproving it, without annexing as sanctions to his law, 
 that degree of natural good and of natural evil which expresses 
 his highest approbation of right, and his highest disapprobation 
 of wrong moral action. 
 
 I remark yet again, that natural good and evil, which ex- 
 press a less degree of approbation of obedience, and a less de- 
 gree of disapprobation of disobedience than the highest, can- 
 not become legal sanctions by combining their influence with 
 other influences, to establish the moral governor's authority. 
 The contrary may be supposed. The supposition however is 
 manifestly absurd, since there could be no legal sanctions in 
 the case. Allowing what is indeed impossible, that benevo- 
 lence of the moral governor may be proved, and that his 
 authority may be fully or partially established by other evi- 
 dence than that furnished by natural good and evil as legal 
 sanctions, still neither this other evidence nor its sources can 
 be legal sanctions ; for nothing can be legal sanctions except 
 
LESS GOOD AND EVIL INSUFFICIENT. 143 
 
 natural good and evil. Nor in the case supposed can they be 
 such, since they do not by their own peculiar and exclusive in- 
 fluence establish the moral governor's authority. Nor is this 
 all. The natural good and evil in the case supposed, cannot 
 have the least tendency or influence whatever to establish his 
 authority. Not expressing his highest approbation of obedi- 
 ence and disapprobation of disobedience, they furnish not the 
 slightest evidence of these feelings, nor of course of the charac- 
 ter, which is requisite to authority. They may be evidence of 
 some kind or degree of approbation of right and of disapproba- 
 tion of wrong moral action, but in no such degree as a per- 
 fectly benevolent being must feel. Whatever evidence of 
 authority therefore may be supposed to be furnished by other 
 sources, none can be furnished by the natural good and evil 
 now supposed. On the contrary, these being expressions , are 
 also a proof 'of a less degree of approbation of 'right and of dis- 
 approbation of wrong moral action than the highest, and are 
 therefore evidence that the moral governor is not a benevo- 
 lent but a selfish being, and can possess no authority. No 
 other evidence then can establish the authority of the moral 
 governor, except that which is furnished by natural good and 
 evil as legal sanctions manifesting his feelings of benevolence 
 toward right and wrong moral action. No matter what evi- 
 dence or proof of benevolence he may be supposed to furnish 
 in his other relations, it is altogether neutralized and set aside 
 by his failure to annex as sanctions to his law, that degree of 
 natural good and evil which fully expresses his highest aj3pro- 
 bation of right and his highest disapprobation of wrong mora, 
 action. 
 
 If it should here be said — and I know of nothing more plaus- 
 ible on the question at issue ( Vide Lectuke VI.) — that a greater 
 amount of right moral action, and with it also of happiness, 
 might be secured by a less degree of natural good and evil as 
 legal sanctions than that now maintained, and that hence benev- 
 olence would require that a less degree of such good and evil 
 be annexed to the law as sanctions; I answer, in the first place, 
 that while the natural possibility of the supposed consequence 
 must be admitted in a system including moral beings, the moral 
 governor when assuming this relation in the promulgation of 
 his law, can furnish no proof to his subjects, that a greater 
 amount of right action and of happiness would be secured by 
 
144: MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 the supposed less degree of natural good and evil as legal sanc- 
 tions. It may be otherwise, and to suppose that it would not 
 be, is to make the supposition, when all the evidence in the 
 case, and the best evidence the nature of the case admits of, is 
 against its truth. It is supposing that a greater amount of 
 right moral action would be secured by a less degree of influ- 
 ence fitted to secure it, than by a greater degree of such influ- 
 ence. The only rational conclusion in the case then is, that a 
 greater amount of right moral action and of happiness would 
 be secured by the degree of legal sanctions now maintained, 
 than by any less degree. I answer, in the second place, that 
 there could be no evidence or proof of the benevolence of the 
 moral governor, but there would be decisive proof to the con- 
 trary. Nothing can be supposed to exist in the case, of the na- 
 ture of evidence to this main fact, except the mere declaration 
 of a being whose benevolence and of course his veracity are 
 to be decided by what he does as a moral governor, and this 
 too when all the evidence in the case is against the truth of his 
 declaration. His mere declaration therefore in respect to the 
 greater amount of right moral action and of happiness, cannot 
 be received as evidence of the fact nor of his benevolence. In 
 the third place, in the act of assuming this relation of a moral 
 governor, he comes under its high and peculiar responsibility. 
 He must now in the very act of assuming this relation, and in 
 claiming the homage of his subjects, either show himself re- 
 creant to this high responsibility, and thus decisively disprove 
 his right to rule, that is his authority ; or he must fulfill the 
 grand function of his office by proving his right to rule, that is, 
 establish his authority by the necessary means of doing so. He 
 cannot establish or prove his authority without furnishing de- 
 cisive proof of his benevolence ; and this he cannot do without 
 annexing that degree of natural good and evil to his law as its 
 sanction, which shall express the feelings of benevolence. On 
 the contrary, without annexing such sanctions to his law, he 
 shows himself selfish and recreant to his high and peculiar 
 responsibilities as a moral governor, disproves his benevolence, 
 and in consequence subverts his authority. 
 
 Nor can this decisive proof against his authority be set aside 
 or weakened by any supposable results in the conduct of his 
 subjects. Let us suppose a law without such sanctions as I ad- 
 vocate, and this law or rule of action to be followed with per- 
 
SANCTIONS NECESSARY. 145 
 
 feet conformity on the part of those to whom it is given, except 
 in one single instance. In this case there could be no proof 
 that a law with such sanctions as I advocate in its stead, would 
 not be followed by perfect conformity without even one excep- 
 tion. Of course, there could be no proof that the lawgiver, in 
 giving the law without such sanctions, acts benevolently. On 
 the contrary, the proof as above stated, that he does not act 
 benevolently, remains unimpaired and decisive. lie makes no 
 strong expression of the feelings of a benevolent being toward 
 right and wrong moral action, which he must do, or disprove 
 his benevolence and therefore his authority. Let us now sup- 
 pose the same law to be given, and to be followed with perfect 
 conformity on the part of subjects, without even a solitary ex- 
 ception. This would furnish no proof that the supposed law 
 would be followed by the supposed result, even for an hour or 
 a moment beyond the time in which it actually exists, nor that 
 a law with the sanctions which I advocate, would not be fol- 
 lowed with the supposed perfect obedience forever. There can 
 of course be no proof that the lawgiver, in the case supposed, 
 has annexed those sanctions to his law which benevolence re- 
 quires him to do. Nor is this all. There can be no proof that 
 he would annex such sanctions to his law as I advocate, did he 
 know that the greatest good required it, By annexing there- 
 fore the supposed limited sanctions to his law, he not only does 
 not prove his benevolence, but he never can prove it. He can 
 furnish no evidence that he has any other feelings toward right 
 and wron<>: moral action than those of a selfish beino-. The 
 proof then of his benevolence, depends not on any present 
 amount of right moral action on the part of subjects, under a 
 law without the sanctions which I advocate ; nor on any con- 
 jectures or supposed possibility respecting what would be the 
 amount of such action under such a law. It depends not on 
 what he declares respecting the result on right moral action, 
 but on what he does in the time, and in the act of assuming the 
 relation of one having a ri^ht to govern. The law must come 
 forth from the throne, bearing the testimonial of such authority 
 in its nature and form. It must be in itself, i. e. in its sanctions, a 
 decisive testimonial of the feelings and the character of the law- 
 giver. Instead of waiting for the conduct of subjects to create 
 its authority by their conformity to its demands, or leaving 
 them to conjecture its authority, which implies that it has no 
 Vol. I.— 7 10 
 
MO MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 authority, it must bear unqualified and decisive proof of this in 
 its very promulgation. As an expression of the feelings of per- 
 fect benevolence toward right and wrong moral action by the 
 moral governor, that is, of his highest approbation of the one, 
 and of his highest disapprobation of the other, its very an- 
 nouncement must invest it with authority. It must thus show 
 what the moral governor is in his character, by showing what 
 his feelings are toward right and wrong moral action, and as 
 depending on these, toward the weal and woe of his kingdom. 
 Why ? Because, in this way, and in this way only, can the 
 question of his authority be settled, when it should and must 
 be, viz., when he gives the law. Because, as we have seen, in 
 this way the best evidence which the nature of the case admits 
 of would be furnished, because such evidence is imperiously 
 demanded — because if he has the character which invests him 
 with authority, it will be furnished, and because therefore if it 
 is not furnished, it is decisive proof that he does not possess the 
 character. Make what other supposition you will concerning 
 his declarations or his doings, it is nothing better, and can be 
 regarded by his subjects as nothing better than the barefaced 
 hypocrisy of saying to a sufferer, ' Be warmed, be filled, and 
 giving nothing.' He can easily settle the question of his char- 
 acter and his authority — he can at once place it beyond all 
 reasonable doubt; he can thus bring that highest, best influence 
 on the minds of his subjects, an influence as desirable as the 
 highest happiness, and the prevention of the highest misery of 
 his kingdom. If he expects confidence in his character or 
 homage to his authority, why does he not show that he has the 
 feelings toward the conduct of his subjects and the welfare of 
 his kingdom, which alone can entitle him to their confidence, 
 and their homage, and enthrone him in rightful dominion. 
 Plainly if he does not do it — if he does not annex those sanc- 
 tions to his law which express the feelings of benevolence 
 toward right and wrong moral action, feelings which as a 
 benevolent being he must not only have but must express, then 
 he authorizes the belief that he is selfish and not benevolent, 
 and in consequence disproves his authority. And it will not 
 be pretended, that presenting himself to his kingdom in char- 
 acter nothing better than an infinite fiend, that he uses that 
 degree of influence to secure right moral action, which will 
 secure the greatest amount of such action which can be se- 
 
THE AUTHORITY OF THE CIVIL LAW. 147 
 
 cured, or that lie can secure the least degree of it, by that influ- 
 ence which is essential to secure to the greatest amount of it, 
 the influence of authority. Natural good and evil then, which 
 as legal sanctions express the moral governor's highest appro- 
 bation of right, and highest disapprobation of wrong moral 
 action, are necessary to prove his benevolence, and so to estab- 
 lish his authority. 
 
 In the third place, I remark, that the view now given of the 
 nature of legal sanctions, is substantially that which all men en- 
 tertain of the supreme law of the state, so far as they regard its 
 authority. I say, so far as they regard its authority, meaning 
 so far as they regard the law of the state as established and 
 administered by disinterested love of country. Such indeed 
 is the evidence of selfishness, even on the part of civil rulers, 
 as distinguished from true patriotism, that in our utmost 
 respect for civil government, we regard it as having a quasi 
 authority rather than a real authority, and find ourselves under 
 the necessity of imagining the latter, and acting as if we be- 
 lieved it, rather than actually believing it. Whether this be 
 an imaginary or real regard for the authority of the law, I in- 
 clude it under the language which I use, and contemplate it as 
 real. By that law of the state, which I call supreme, I mean 
 that which is essential to the government of the state as a moral 
 government, and obedience to which is the test of loyalty. The 
 ■reward of obedience to this law, in language which admits of 
 some qualification in extreme cases,* but needs none for our 
 present purpose, is the protection of life, liberty and property. 
 The penalty of this law is death. 
 
 If now we contemplate the nature of this reward, and the 
 condition on which it is conferred, we cannot fail to see its 
 peculiar characteristic as a legal sanction. In its nature, it is 
 obviously the highest good which a civil government can con- 
 fer as a common blessing on its obedient subjects. It is con- 
 ferred solely on condition of the subject's obedience to the 
 supreme law of the state. It is therefore a plain and unequiv- 
 
 * I say admits of qualification, etc., because no man has, as some modern fanat- 
 ical moralists and politicians maintain, an absolute right to either life, or liberty, or 
 property, i. e., in all cases or circumstances. When the public good demands the 
 sacrifice of either or of all these blessings, whether on account of crime or for the 
 defense of the state, or for the greatest public good in any way, the surrender must 
 be made. The state has a right to it, and the subject has no opposing right. 
 
148 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 ocal expression — a direct and decisive proof of the moral gov- 
 ernor's highest approbation of obedience to this law. No 
 subject can fail to regard it in this light, who reflects at all on 
 its design; nor can he regard it in this light, without regarding 
 it as a decisive manifestation of that character of the lawgiver, 
 which alone becomes him as the guardian of a nation's welfare, 
 and which alone gives him a right to rule. The subject doubt- 
 less will regard the reward as so much natural good, and as such, 
 a motive to conform to the demand of the law. But as an obe- 
 dient subject, as under and submitting to authority, he must re- 
 gard the reward as something more than simply so much nat- 
 ural good as a motive. He must regard it as that which by 
 manifesting the lawgiver's design to secure the highest welfare 
 of the state, gives majesty to his law, and inspires reverence 
 for his authority. Otherwise all we call the majesty of law or 
 the authority of civil government, is reduced to the contempt- 
 ible conceit of a mere contract or stipulation of so much hire 
 for a certain amount of service. To call such a contract gov- 
 ernment or law, or to speak of its authority, is to talk of what 
 has no existence. Yiewed as a legal sanction then, reward is 
 something more than so much natural good as a motive to ful- 
 fill the claim of law. It manifests the moral governor's highest 
 approbation of that on the part of the subject which ought to 
 be most highly approved, viz., his obedience, and carries to every 
 mind the conviction of that character of the governor which 
 gives him a right to rule, and thus establishes his authority. 
 
 The same thing is true in respect to the penalty of the civil 
 law, viz., it is designed to establish the authority of the gov- 
 ernor. This, as I maintain, it does, and is designed to do, as a 
 direct and decisive expression and proof of his highest disap- 
 probation of disobedience to the supreme law of the state. The 
 penalty of this law, as I have said, is death. Here it were 
 highly desirable, did our limits allow, to distinguish this pen- 
 alty of the supreme law of the state from those punishments or 
 penalties as they are often called, which are annexed to various 
 particular and subsidiary legislative enactments, as merely so 
 much good or evil in the form of motive to prevent transgres- 
 sion. This distinction I have attempted to trace in an appendix 
 to this lecture.* I will only say here, that it is evident that 
 
 * Appe^tdix I. 
 
THE AUTHORITY OF THE CIVIL LAW. 110 
 
 tills class of punishments are not legal sanctions ; inasmuch as 
 the subject who incurs them, is virtually treated as an obedient 
 subject, that is, he is virtually rewarded as such by being pro- 
 tected, with some qualification greater or less, in his life, lib- 
 erty and property. The offenses for which this class of punish- 
 ments is inflicted, do not, in the eye of the law, involve a 
 principle of hostility to the state. But the penalty of death — 
 the penalty of the supreme law of the state, is inflicted only for 
 such crimes as treason or murder — crimes, which in the eye of 
 the law, do involve a spirit of war on the happiness and exist- 
 ence of the state ; and which therefore require the expression 
 of the highest disapprobation of him who is the guardian of the 
 state. If now we consider this penalty in its adaptation and 
 fitness to this end, w r e shall see that there can be no ground to 
 doubt that it is designed to answer this end. And here it may 
 be safely assumed that there can be no hesitation on this point, 
 except this one, that death without torture is not, in the strictest 
 accuracy of speech, the highest degree of natural evil winch the 
 governor can inflict for disobedience. Hence it may perhaps 
 be inferred by some, that it is not designed as a direct and deci- 
 sive expression of his highest disapprobation of disobedience ; 
 but only as so much natural evil to deter from disobedience in 
 the form of motive. 
 
 Admitting then, that in the strictest use of language (and 
 who makes such a use of it in common life ?) death without tor- 
 ture, is not the highest degree of natural evil which is possible 
 in the case, there are three suppositions to be made and consid- 
 ered. One is, that on this account death is not according to 
 the true mode of judging, viewed either by the governor or his 
 subjects as an expression and proof of his disapprobation, or 
 that it is not designed to be such by the governor, nor to be so 
 regarded by his subjects. From this supposition, it follows 
 that there is nothing in civil government, either as viewed by 
 the governor or his subjects,- which answers to the idea of 
 authority. There is no evidence from the penalty, and there- 
 fore none from any source, that he has the least degree of dis- 
 approbation of obedience, and therefore no evidence that he has 
 a right to rule. On the contrary, there is decisive proof that he 
 has not this right. Civil government of course is not in the 
 lowest sense a moral government. In its highest perfection, it 
 involves not an iota of that influence which is called authority. 
 
150 MOEAL GOVERNMENT IN" THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 Another supposition is, that the governor and his subjects ac- 
 cording to the true mode of judging — and it is difficult to see 
 how it can be otherwise — regard the penalty of death as ex- 
 pressing some degree of disapprobation of disobedience to the 
 supreme law of the state, but not the highest degree. On this 
 supposition there can be no ground of confidence in his charac- 
 ter as a civil ruler ; and of course no recognition of his author- 
 ity. As the head of an empire, that he may secure the confi- 
 dence of his subjects, and command their submission to his 
 authority as the rightful guardian of all, he is under a necessity 
 of annexing a penal sanction of peculiar severity to the supreme 
 law of the state. lie is obliged to show that he will sacrifice 
 the life of any subject,who like the traitor or the murderer, shall 
 war on the welfare and existence of the state, rather than sacri- 
 fice the state itself. To test the truth of this remark, let it be 
 supposed that he refuses to execute the traitor or the murderer, 
 because he is his friend, or his favorite, or even his son ; and 
 would not an enlightened and just public sentiment frown him 
 into infamy and contempt, as unworthy of his place and as hav- 
 ing no right to rule ? And why ? Is it that as the only guar- 
 dian of the state, he does not express some degree of disappro- 
 bation of a deed so hostile to the state which is less than the 
 highest degree ? Or is it, that in their estimation he does not 
 express the highest disapprobation of the crime by the inflic- 
 tion of death as the requisite penalty ? Plainly the latter, for 
 without this view of the penal sanction, there could be no proof 
 that the moral governor regarded the welfare of the state as the 
 supreme good ; that he would not sacrifice it to any inferior ob- 
 ject or end. Whether the penalty of death can be justly re- 
 garded as the expression and proof of his highest disapproba- 
 tion or not, it is undeniable that it must be so regarded, or 
 there can be no ground of confidence in his character as the 
 ruler and protector of the state, and of course no recognition of 
 his authority. A third supposition then is not merely that it is 
 so regarded, but that it is justly so regarded ; in other words, 
 that according to the true mode of judging in the case, both 
 the governor and his subjects regard the penalty of death as a 
 direct and decisive expression and proof of his highest disap- 
 probation of disobedience to the supreme law of the state, and 
 as such a legal sanction. But here the question arises, how 
 can death without torture be justly regarded as such an ex- 
 
DEATH, THE SUPREME EYIL. 151 
 
 prcssion? I answer, that in the common conceptions of all 
 men, death is the supreme evil to man. It is, as it were, con- 
 stantly in common speech, and of course in the common con- 
 ceptions of the human mind, distinguished as the greatest of 
 evils to man, considered as a being of earth and time. As such 
 it is signalized in all human thought, familiarized as the evil 
 most to be dreaded, and even personified as the king of terrors. 
 The idea of it, is of so great an evil — it so absorbs thought and 
 feeling by its own magnitude, that the ordinary suffering which 
 is an attendant circumstance, is unthought of as enhancing it. 
 If we dread its approach, if we adopt means to escape it our- 
 selves or to prevent it in others, it is death as death that we 
 think of, and not the sufferings it may bring with it. Or if we 
 suppose a degree of suffering to be connected with it, it would 
 be apt to attract and engross thought and feeling, and so to 
 divert the dread of the greater evil to the less ; and it is easier, as 
 everyone knows, to harden the mind against bodily suffering 
 than against death, when the mind conceives the latter as an 
 evil in its true magnitude. Nor can it be reasonably doubted, 
 that the threatening of death — of death simply — death as the 
 supreme evil in the habitual thought and feeling of the human 
 mind, is fitted to make a stronger impression than the threaten- 
 ing of any other evil. Different effects might to some extent 
 be produced on different minds by the supposed difference of 
 penalty. But I now speak of the most general effect, and the 
 thought and the fear of death are ever present to every mind 
 in their practical and controlling power. Now it is of this 
 universal habitual thought and fear of death, that the moral 
 governor in presenting the penalty of his law avails himself. 
 He conforms to this universal and familiar conception of the 
 human mind ; and when he would impress most effectually 
 every subject with his highest disapprobation of disobedience 
 to his supreme law, he makes that which in their constant and 
 familiar conceptions is signalized as the supreme evil —the great- 
 est of all evils — the expression and the proof of his disapproba- 
 tion. What so natural, what so fitted to his design? They know 
 how the lan^ua^e ouo-ht to be understood. He knows how it 
 will be understood. He knows their conceptions of the evil, 
 and is sure of the judgment which they will form of the degree 
 of his disapprobation of disobedience, when thus measured by 
 death as the penalty of his law. He thus shows himself the 
 
152 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 benevolent protector of the welfare of the state, by showing 
 himself in their just estimation the mortal enemy of rebellion 
 against it. In the most natural, obvious and impressive man- 
 ner, even in the only possible way, he manifests the highest 
 disapprobation of disobedience to his supreme law ; and so 
 also the feelings and the character on which his authority de- 
 pends. 
 
 Thus I have attempted to show, that the view now main- 
 tained of the nature of legal sanctions in a perfect moral govern- 
 ment, is substantially that which mankind generally entertain 
 of the sanctions of the supreme law of the state. If indeed we 
 find, in the wisest and best administration of human govern- 
 ment, some occasional departures from, or even violations of 
 the principles contended for, still we also find the most distinct 
 recognition of the principles themselves. Every such departure 
 or violation is so obviously the result of the comparative in- 
 feriority of the interests to be protected, and the necessary im- 
 perfection of a human administration, not to say of its corrup- 
 tion, as clearly to show,that they cannot mar the moral admin- 
 istration of a Being infinitely perfect. Here no departure from 
 the principles of eternal truth and righteousness can arise from 
 weakness or error, from indifference or aversion to the end to 
 be accomplished. The magnitude of the interests concerned, 
 the value of the law as the indispensable means of securing these 
 interests, the ill-desert of transgression as the destruction of this 
 law, the relation and the authority of the lawgiver, are to be 
 estimated, not by the standard of earth and time, but by that 
 of eternity. And if what has now been said in respect to the 
 sanctions of the law of the state be true, what can truth, and 
 wisdom, and goodness demand in the government of a king- 
 dom, where every act of every subject is virtually the perfect 
 and endless happiness or misery of all, but a full and unquali- 
 fied manifestation of the benevolence of Him that sitteth on the 
 throne, in his highest approbation of right and disapprobation 
 of wrong moral action ? What other influence can command 
 respect and reverence, or be fitted to secure confidential and 
 cheerful submission to his will, except that which emanates 
 from the sanctions of his law, revealing that character which 
 alone becomes the friend and guardian of universal happiness 
 — an influence from the manifestation of himself, clothing him 
 with majesty as with a garment? 
 
CHRISTIANITY NOT A SELFISH SYSTEM. 153 
 
 I shall conclude this lecture with three remarks : 
 1. Christianity is not a selfish system of religion. Infidels 
 have often said, that Christianity, inasmuch as it aims to influ- 
 ence men by rewards and punishments, is a selfish, mean, and 
 mercenary system. And I am sorry to say, that many of the 
 friends and advocates of Christianity have furnished too much 
 occasion fur this reproach. It has often been said in the 
 pulpit, that man cannot act under the influence of the divine 
 threatenings without acting in a selfish maimer ; and yet of- 
 tener, how this can be otherwise has been deemed an unsolvable 
 problem. The question more fully stated, is this : how can 
 the promised good and the threatened evil involved in these 
 sanctions be presented to the mind of man, without directly ap- 
 pealing to his selfishness ; or, how can man act in view of these 
 motives without acting in a selfish manner ? 
 
 I answer, that according to the view now given of legal sanc- 
 tions as involving natural good and evil, they appeal not to 
 human selfishness at all, but only to self-love, or to the consti- 
 tutional susceptibility of the mind to happiness and misery. 
 They do not appeal to selfishness, because that would be to 
 offer a less good than the greatest. But these sanctions proffer 
 the highest good of which man is capable — the happiness of 
 being good and doing good. And to choose this is to be dis- 
 interestedly benevolent. It is voluntarily renouncing every 
 good which can come into competition with the public weal, 
 and therefore truly virtuous. And further : the direct influ- 
 ence of these sanctions on the mind, as natural good and evil, 
 wholly terminates in awakening constitutional desires to se- 
 cure the one and avoid the other. Such desires are not volun- 
 tary states of the mind, not acts of the will, and therefore not 
 selfishness, which is an act of will. They are simply constitu- 
 tional feelings, inseparable from the nature of man as a sentient 
 being, without which man could become neither benevolent nor 
 selfish, but must be as insensible as a stone or a clod. By these 
 susceptibilities, with their resulting states of desire, he is quali- 
 fied, in one respect, to become either benevolent or selfish, and 
 can therefore become selfish only by his own fault, only by the 
 perversion of the influence, which is designed to secure the 
 opposite result, benevolence. Nor is this all. For, while the 
 reward and the penalty are designed and fitted to awaken 
 strong constitutional emotion, the design by no means termi- 
 
154 MOKAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 nates in this. They are designed to be subservient to an- 
 other and a higher purpose — to show God to the mind, and 
 to do it in the most impressive maimer conceivable ; to rouse 
 thought and sensibility and emotion to behold God in his 
 supreme approbation of obedience and supreme disapproba- 
 tion of disobedience; to see and know this fact as one in 
 which the mind has a direct personal concern. The design is 
 to show, in such a manner that the mind shall not fail to see 
 God in the glory of his holiness — with the full strength of his 
 infinite will fixed on securing right and preventing wrong moral 
 action. Such is the object presented through the medium of 
 these sanctions. And is it selfislmess,for man thus seeing clearly 
 and exactly what God is, to love him ? Is there any influence 
 more directly sanctifying in its tendency, more fitted to make 
 holy than that which is furnished by this vision of the perfect 
 God ? And is it mean or mercenary for man to yield himself to 
 do the will of infinite wisdom and goodness, and thus in heart, 
 in will and character, to become like God himself? 
 
 2. In the view which has now been given of legal sanctions, 
 we may see what it is to make light of the divine threaten- 
 ings. I here speak hypothetically. If God is administering 
 a perfect moral government over men, then in view of the 
 sanctions of such a government, what is it to make light of 
 them? "What are they? Manifestations of God, peculiarly 
 bright, glorious, and awful. They are manifestations of God 
 in that character, under that high relation to man, which is 
 more desirable, more exalted, more worthy of Himself, and more 
 useful to man, than any the human mind can conceive. If a 
 perfect God is not also the perfect moral governor of his moral 
 creation, what is he ? I am not now saying that he is. But if 
 he is not, I ask you what he is ? Have you decided, can you 
 decide surely and beyond all doubt, what that relation is which 
 God sustains to moral beings if not that of their moral gover- 
 nor ? Do not, then, make light of what are and what must be — 
 if he is their moral governor — the sanctions of his law. Prove 
 Christianity to be false if you can. But do you know, can you 
 prove, that God is not administering a perfect moral govern- 
 ment over his moral creation ? This is at least a possible truth. 
 There may be such a God, such a government, such sanctions. 
 And it is any thing but philosophy, reason, or magnanimity to 
 trifle with such possible reality as this. Say if you must, that 
 
DEISTS CANNOT PROVE GOD'S BENEVOLENCE. 155 
 
 you do not believe that proof is wanting ; but do not ridicule, 
 do not despise and make light of it, lest haply you make light 
 of God in the brightest splendors of his glory. 
 
 3. Those who deny the view iioav given of the sanctions of a 
 perfect moral government cannot prove the benevolence of 
 God. Deists, universalists, all those who deny either the fact 
 or the nature of God's perfect moral government, profess to be- 
 lieve that God is perfectly benevolent. This belief, to man in his 
 weakness and consequent dependence on his Maker, it would 
 seem must be quite welcome, not to say natural. It is the only 
 source of light in this dark world ; the only refuge from terror. 
 What an amount of misery must result from the thought of a 
 tyrant in the heavens, and of the cruelties to which his creation 
 must be exposed. Ignorant as men may be of goodness, and 
 little as they may esteem or desire it for themselves, all know 
 how to appreciate it when compared with the opposite charac- 
 ter, as that of the Being who holds in his hands their destiny. 
 Hence, even with those who entertain inadequate and false 
 views of its nature and its necessary doings, it is a fond and 
 favorite belief that God is good. 
 
 But it is a momentous question, can they, on their ^incijjle-s, 
 show any ground for this belief; can they prove that God is 
 good ? I answer, not unless they can show that he is adminis- 
 tering a perfect moral government over men. If this can be 
 proved, if it can be seen from the light of nature that he is 
 administering a perfect moral government over men involv- 
 ing on his part the highest approbation of right and the 
 highest disapprobation of Avrong moral action ; if it can be 
 shown that he has so hegun the administration of his moral 
 government in this world, that he can, and that he furnishes 
 sufficient evidence that he will finish it in another ; that he is 
 carrying forward such a system in respect to each individual of 
 our race as rapidly as its perfection demands, and this with a 
 singleness of purpose to complete what he has begun, and with 
 a benignity of execution which foretells results worthy of in- 
 finite goodness, especially if it can be proved that he is admin- 
 istering such a government under an economy of grace, then 
 indeed it may not be difficult to prove his perfect benevolence. 
 Then Ave may be able to show that he has adopted the best 
 conceivable system, that moral evil is incidental in respect to 
 divine prevention to this best system ; that natural evil is the 
 
156 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 necessary means of the greatest good ; and that the system it- 
 self, with its issues here and hereafter, is as decisive a proof of 
 the goodness of its author, as had no evil but the perfect and 
 universal happiness of his creation been the actual result. But 
 if on the other hand, it cannot be shown that God is admin- 
 istering a perfect moral government, involving the mani- 
 festation of his highest approbation of right, and his highest 
 disapprobation of wrong moral action, then his benevolence or 
 moral perfection cannot be proved. Yet more is true. If the 
 proof of benevolence is wanting in respect to a being who has 
 been acting for thousands of years in the view of his intelligent 
 and dependent creatures, the want of such evidence is itself 
 proof of the opposite character. 
 
 If you say,that aside from the fact that God is administering 
 a perfect moral government over men, there is abundant proof 
 of his benevolence, I ask, what is it and what are your premises ? 
 You must know or prove something to be true of God, that you 
 may frame an argument. If God then is not a perfect moral 
 governor of men, what is he? What relation or relations does 
 he sustain toward his dependent creatures, and what are his 
 designs and purposes concerning them ? If you cannot decide 
 these questions, then you know and can decide nothing to your 
 purpose. On the question of his moral character you have no 
 data, no premises ; and you must either believe nothing respect- 
 ing it, or believe that he is a selfish or malignant being, or that 
 he is good without evidence, and merely because you wish to 
 believe it. 
 
 What then is the proof that God is benevolent, on the sup- 
 position that he is not a perfect moral governor ? Is it said, 
 that as a being of infinite natural perfection, he must be also a 
 being of infinite benevolence ? I answer, not so, not of neces- 
 sity, for he is a free moral agent ; nor yet of certainty, for other 
 moral beings are wholly selfish, and yet are not so through the 
 imperfection of their natural powers. I admit indeed, that the 
 natural perfections of God furnish a presumption of his moral 
 perfection, even sufficient proof of it, if it can be shown to be 
 uncounteracted by opposing evidence. But it is a kind of evi- 
 dence which in its nature admits of opposing evidence, and may 
 be wholly neutralized and set aside by his acts and his doings, 
 by his treatment of his creatures. His natural perfections then, 
 in view of the existing evil under his government, furnish no 
 
CAN GOD BE BENEVOLENT AND ALLOW EVIL? 157 
 
 proof, nothing like proof, of his benevolence, until the existence 
 of evil be accounted for consistently with his benevolence. If 
 a father, in all that he lias done for his dependent offspring 
 from birth to manhood, has furnished no proof of affection and 
 kindness toward them by his conduct, to what purpose should 
 we appeal to his intellectual and physical superiority, or even 
 to the fact that he is their father? The evidence from his do- 
 ings, from the utter want of benevolent action, would be 
 decisive against his benevolence. Do you then appeal to the 
 doings of God, and claim that he proves himself to be good by 
 imparting more happiness than misery to his creatures, and 
 thus rendering their existence far preferable to non-existence ? 
 This fact, though it may be necessary to the proof, is not itself 
 proof of the goodness of the Creator. Beings who are not benev- 
 olent but are wholly selfish, often produce more happiness than 
 misery. Why then does not an omnipotent Creator impart per- 
 fect and unmingled happiness to his sentient creation ; why, 
 under his government, is there misery at all ? Do you say, 
 that nothing is contrived to produce misery, that every design 
 and adaptation is to produce good, that " teeth are made to eat 
 and not to ache." This is not true in such a respect as your 
 argument requires. Teeth are made to ache. lie who made 
 them, knew that they would ache, and for some reason or other 
 intended that they should ache. And the question is, why not 
 make teeth which would not ache ? Is there any pretense that 
 God has produced all the natural good he can, so far as mere 
 power is concerned ? Do you then say, that the fact that crea- 
 tures are not perfectly happy,is not owing to the want of power 
 in God, but to some limitation in the nature of things ; that the 
 'system by which alone the greatest good possible to the Crea- 
 tor can be produced involves, in respect to his prevention, evil 
 in the nature of things? What evil? You cannot say all the 
 natural evil which exists. Do you then say moral evil, and as a 
 necessary and useful consequence, natural evil ? Be it so. But 
 then, what is that system which thus.necessarily in the nature of 
 things involves moral evil ? Plainly a moral system, a moral 
 government ; and if it be proof of a perfect God, then it must 
 be a perfect moral government. But now you arc on our 
 ground. You are reasoning from the fact that God is admin- 
 istering a perfect moral government over men. And thus you 
 are compelled to reason, if you would find the shadow of proof 
 
158 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 that God is benevolent, or rather if you would set aside the 
 most decisive proof that he is not benevolent. And now if 
 you mean to reason in proof of the divine benevolence on this 
 ground, then do not forget it. God, you believe, is adminis- 
 tering a perfect moral government over men. If you do not, 
 and say that there is some other mode of proving his benev- 
 olence than on the ground that he is administering a perfect 
 moral government over men, then tell us what it is. This is 
 one of the great points in the argument for God's benevolence. 
 It is not to be passed over lightly, to be conceded for the mo- 
 ment, to be used for the purpose of establishing a conclusion 
 and then forgotten as the most momentous relation of God to 
 his moral creation. If God is not the perfect moral governor 
 of men, we want to know what he is, what are his relations, 
 designs, and doings toward the children of men ; we want to 
 know what his character is ; we want to know whether there is 
 nothing on the throne of the universe but omnipotent selfish- 
 ness or infinite malignity ; we want to know, in a word, what 
 the God of the infidel is. 
 
 He is not to have the benefit to his argument and his system 
 of the belief in a benevolent God, unless he can prove that in 
 truth there is such a God. This he cannot do without admitting: 
 the fact — which, as I maintain, is fatal to his infidelity — the truth 
 that God is administering a perfect moral government overmen. 
 He is shut up to this alternative. He must admit either that 
 God feels the highest approbation of right and the highest dis- 
 approbation of wrong moral action, or that he does not ; that 
 God reigns over us in the glory of a perfect moral dominion, 
 or that the Being who holds all destiny in his hands is a being 
 of unqualified selfishness, or even of infinite malignity. From 
 this dilemma there is no escape. 
 
 And now I request those infidels, universalists — all who deny 
 that God feels the highest approbation of right and highest dis- 
 approbation of wrong moral action, and as a perfect moral gov- 
 ernor will express these feelings — to look carefully at this point. 
 You believe in the perfect benevolence of God. But is your 
 faith rational according to your own principles ; has it the 
 least foundation or warrant unless God is the perfect moral 
 governor ? You believe in God's perfect benevolence. Why ? 
 Have you examined the foundations of your faith ? Have 
 you seen, that if you believe in God's benevolence, you must 
 
THE DEIST'S IDEA OF GOB. 159 
 
 believe in God's perfect moral government over yourself and 
 »all men? Have yon looked at the monstrons incongruity in a 
 God perfectly benevolent, and yet not feeling the highest ap- 
 probation of right, and the highest disapprobation of wrong 
 moral action? Or rather, for you will allow me to ask the 
 question, is not this aspect of God unwelcome and repulsive, 
 and excluded from your faith for the sake of what seems to 
 you the more attractive and lovely view of a being who is 
 good without being just, and virtually indifferent to the best 
 thing as the means of happiness, and to the worst thing as the 
 means of misery, right and wrong moral action? If so, see 
 where you stand. As a rational being you are bound to be- 
 lieve in an infinite God who is virtually indifferent to that ac- 
 tion in his creatures, which will secure their highest happiness 
 or misery — indifferent to the weal and woe, the life and death of 
 his own creation — a being who has no rectitude of principle, 
 and who, for aught that appears, will sacrifice to self-will, to 
 favoritism, to selfishness in some form, every interest of every 
 creature whose character can excite no love, awaken no hope, 
 inspire no confidence — whose heart is unmoved by pity, un- 
 touched by woe — a being, the bare thought of whom is enough 
 to fill the soul with consternation and dismay. If there is 
 any thing in reason, such is — such must be the God of the in- 
 fidel. And if the aspect of the God of Christianity is unwel- 
 come and repulsive, what is that of the God of infidelity? The 
 character of the former to a wise and good man (I know I 
 speak with the approbation of every man's conscience) is 
 ground only for hosannas of rapture — that of the latter would 
 make all things tremble but the dark throne on which he him- 
 self sitteth. 
 
LECTURE VIII. 
 
 Y. A perfect Moral Government involves the exercise of authority through the medium of law. 
 — The nature of the law further unfolded. — Seventhly. The Law of a perfect Moral Government 
 involves the requisite sanctions of the Moral Governor's authority. — 6th. Legal sanctions in- 
 clude the highest possible degree of natural good, &c, and the highest possible degree of evil. — 
 Objections. — Punishment ought to terminate with sin; if all should disobey, all ought not to 
 be punished; incredible and impossible that God should adopt a moral system with such 
 liabilities. — Conclusion. 
 
 I now proceed to show as I proposed — 
 
 6 tli. That the legal sanctions of a perfect moral government 
 include the highest degree of nattered good possible in each case 
 of obedience, and the highest degree of natural evil possible in 
 each case of disobedience. 
 
 The doctrine lias often been maintained) that natural good 
 and evil in their highest degree, annexed to the best law as its 
 reward and penalty, become legal sanctions by operating sim- 
 ply as motives (or inducements) to secure the greatest amount of 
 obedience. "We have seen however, that natural good and evil 
 employed merely in the way of motives, cannot become legal 
 sanctions. It is doubtless true that the natural good and evil 
 employed as legal sanctions, have beside their sanctioning in- 
 fluence and as necessary to it, another, even the influence of 
 motives. This with the sanctioning influence, or with that 
 which establishes the authority of the moral governor, may be 
 necessary to secure the greatest amount of obedience. If we 
 could suppose a system designed to secure the greatest amount 
 of right moral action by the mere influence of natural good 
 and evil as motives, and to the exclusion of the peculiar influ- 
 ence of moral government — the influence of authority — then we 
 could not say, that the highest possible degrees of natural good 
 and evil would not be necessary to the end proposed. Be this 
 however as it may, the present argument for the highest de- 
 grees of natural good and evil is not placed on this basis. It 
 rests solely on the ground that such degrees of natural good 
 and evil are necessary for another purpose, that of sanctioning 
 or establishing the authority of the moral governor. 
 
THE NATURE OF LEGAL REWARD. 161 
 
 This argument, in view of what has been already said, may 
 be thus briefly presented. Natural good and evil are necessary 
 as legal sanctions to the law of a perfect mural government ; 
 they are necessary as legal sanctions, for in their relation they 
 establish and sustain the authority of the moral governor; they 
 are so as being the necessary manifestations of his benevolence 
 in the particular forms of his highest approbation of obedience 
 and disapprobation of disobedience. This degree of approval 
 and disapproval can be manifested only by the highest possible 
 degree of natural good as the reward of obedience and of nat- 
 ural evil as the penalty of disobedience. It follows therefore, 
 that the highest possible degree of natural good as a legal re- 
 ward, and of natural evil as a legal penalty are necessary to 
 establish the authority of the moral governor. 
 
 This argument contains two premises in addition to others 
 already considered, which, obvious as they are, may need a 
 more particular consideration. 
 
 I remark then — 
 
 In the first place, that the legal reward must, for the purpose 
 specified, consist of the highest possible degree of happiness to 
 the obedient subject. + 
 
 I now speak of that degree of reward which pertains to a 
 perfect system of moral government — a system in which the 
 highest happiness of each individual is consistent with that of 
 the whole. Some indeed maintain the impossibility of such a 
 system, affirming that the sin and misery of a part are the ne- 
 cessary means of the greatest good of the whole. To this I here 
 briefly reply, that the assumption of a system in which the 
 highest good of each shall be consistent with that of the whole 
 as an impossibility, is wholly gratuitous and unauthorized, since 
 the supposition of such a system cannot be shown to involve 
 any contradiction or absurdity. And further, if such a system 
 of moral government is impossible, then a perfect system of 
 moral government is impossible ; indeed, any thing which can 
 be called a moral government is impossible ; for sin being ac- 
 cording to the supposition, the necessary means of the greatest 
 good, there can be no sincerity, truth, or benevolence, and of 
 course no authority in a lawgiver who should forbid it. And 
 lastly, the supposed perfect system is possible, nothing being 
 more absolutely certain, than that every moral agent and there- 
 fore every subject of a moral government can be morally per- 
 il 
 
162 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 feet, and that the moral perfection of each and of all in its true 
 tendency, would secure the perfect happiness of each and of all. 
 If then in such a system the moral governor does not secure 
 the highest happiness of the obedient subject which he can se- 
 cure, he does not choose to make the subject thus happy ; and 
 as the highest happiness of each obedient subject is consistent 
 with and necessary to the highest happiness of the whole, he 
 neither chooses the highest happiness of the individual, nor of 
 the whole. He is therefore not benevolent, and has no right to 
 give law to a moral kingdom. The same thing on the present 
 supposition may be shown in other forms. !Not choosing to 
 make the obedient subject happy in the highest possible degree, 
 the moral governor does not express the highest approbation of 
 obedience, and therefore does not feel it. lie therefore proves 
 that he is not benevolent, and of course subverts his authority 
 or right to command. Or thus, according to what has been 
 already shown, the decisive expression of the moral governor's 
 highest approbation of obedience, is indispensable as a proof 
 of such approbation, while not to make such an expression 
 gives equal evidence of the want of such approbation — proof 
 <*of the want of benevolence — of the opposite principle, and of 
 course of the want of all authority or right to rule. But the 
 only conceivable mode of proving his highest approbation of 
 obedience, is by conferring on the obedient subject on account 
 of his obedience the highest possible degree of happiness. 
 Otherwise he can furnish no proof that he does not feel, and 
 would not express higher approbation of disobedience than of 
 obedience. If then he does not confer on the obedient subject 
 the highest possible degree of happiness as a legal reward, he 
 does not regard obedience as he ought, or as a perfect being 
 must regard it. He shows himself to be destitute of benev- 
 olence, and therefore without authority. 
 
 Again ; if the moral governor does not confer the highest pos- 
 sible happiness on the obedient as a reward, there can be no 
 proof that he would do it, were it necessary to prevent the 
 universal disobedience, and with it the universal and perfect 
 misery of his kingdom. Xor is the supposition of such a ne- 
 cessity unauthorized. There can be no proof that it does net 
 exist. The declaration of the moral governor to the contrary 
 cannot be received as evidence ; for there is no proof of his 
 benevolence, and of course none of his veracity. Such a re- 
 
DEGREES AND CONTINUANCE OF REWARD. 163 
 
 ward may be necessary to prevent such a fearful issue. But 
 since the moral governor refuses according to the present sup- 
 position, to annex such a reward to his law, when as we have 
 seen it is dictated by benevolence and demanded by the highest 
 happiness of his kingdom, it follows, that there can be no proof 
 that he would confer such a reward were it necessary to prevent 
 the universal disobedience, and with it the universal and per- 
 fect misery of his kingdom. As he does not confer the reward 
 which is demanded by benevolence in the one case, there can 
 be no reason to conclude that he would in the other. What 
 confidence can be reposed in such a being — what authority can 
 he possess? — He, a being of whose benevolence there is not the 
 slightest evidence — of whose selfishness the proof is decisive, 
 and who may, as all are bound to believe, consent to and actu- 
 ally prefer the universal and perfect wretchedness of his king- 
 dom, rather than confer the highest happiness which he can 
 confer on perfectly obedient subjects. 
 
 Should it here be said v that the highest possible degree of 
 happiness as a legal reward, is inconsistent with different de- 
 grees of reward according to the merit of different subjects, I 
 answer, that the capacity of happiness in different subjects 
 would differ according to their character. If we suppose va- 
 rious degrees of merit in subjects who are perfectly obedient, 
 we must suppose different degrees of capacity for happiness. 
 Should each therefore receive as a reward the highest possible 
 amount of happiness, that is, the highest of which he is cap- 
 able, degrees of reward would exist, differing according to the 
 degrees of merit. 
 
 In respect to the duration of reward, I remark, that from the 
 very nature of law, it follows, that reward must continue while 
 obedience continues, and cease when obedience ceases. That it 
 must do so, is obvious from what has been already shown. To 
 suppose reward to be withheld from a subject who continues obe- 
 dient, is to suppose no approbation, but disapprobation of obedi- 
 ence on the part of the moral governor, and of course the want 
 of authority. That the reward must cease when obedience 
 ceases — every expression of approbation of the conduct of the 
 subject on the part of the governor is equally obvious. The 
 demand of the law is, that the subject render ceaseless obedi- 
 ence, and the subject is bound to render it. When therefore 
 he ceases to obey, he ceases to satisfy the claim of law — ceases 
 
164 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 to fulfill his obligation — ceases to be an obedient subject. All 
 ground of approbation by the moral governor ceases, and it 
 is impossible that he should regard and treat the subject as 
 obedient, without regarding and treating him as he is not; 
 without regarding the non-fulfillment of the claim of law, as 
 obedience to it. The governor can therefore never confer a re- 
 ward on the disobedient subject, without approving of his fail- 
 ure to satisfy the claim of law. If we suppose the disobedient 
 subject to reform, this cannot so change his relation to law as 
 to cause him to stand right in law, or to become the fit object 
 of favor and reward from the moral governor. He has not 
 satisfied the claim of law, but violated it. He never can satisfy 
 it. The lawgiver therefore must cease to express all approba- 
 tion of the subject by ceasing forever to reward, or he must 
 reward in view of his unsatisfied claim for obedience; that is, 
 he must pass by, overlook, and virtually approve and reward 
 transgression, and thus subvert his authority. 
 
 We may view this topic in another light. The disobedient 
 subject destroys all law and all authority. His act in its true 
 nature and tendency destroys all good and produces all evil. 
 His ill-desert is not so diminished by subsequent reformation, as 
 not to require that degree of penalty which is necessary to ex- 
 press the moral governor's highest disapprobation of such an 
 act. The deed has been done which creates the necessity for 
 such an infliction of evil. Without it, no adequate expression 
 can be made of the moral governor's feelings toward the act, 
 nor of his benevolence. But the principle now stated will 
 be still more obvious, when we consider the degree of penal 
 evil which is necessary to establish and sustain the moral gov- 
 ernor's authority. 
 
 I remark, then— 
 
 In the second place, that the legal penalty must consist 
 of the highest possible degree of misery to the disobedient sub- 
 ject. 
 
 Were the moral governor to inflict a less degree of suffering 
 as a legal penalty than the highest possible in the case, nothing 
 would or could appear to show that he would not inflict greater 
 suffering for something else, even for some act of obedience, than 
 he inflicts for disobedience. Why else, when every object and 
 end for expressing disapprobation at all, imperiously demands 
 the expression of the highest disapprobation, when as we have 
 
THE LEGAL PENALTY. 165 
 
 seen, nothing can justify him in inflicting natural evil as a pen- 
 alty, except the necessity of so doing to establish his authority 
 by showing his highest disapprobation of disobedience, or that 
 there is nothing which he so much abhors as this supreme evil, 
 why does he not show it ? Were he to make the transgressor 
 this enemy of all good, this author of universal and absolute 
 misery, in the highest degree miserable, that would put at 
 rest the question of his own supreme abhorrence of transgres- 
 sion. None could doubt that he is a being of perfect benevo- 
 lence, and has the necessary feelings of such a being toward 
 wrong moral action. If this be not done, then he can furnish 
 no proof that such is his character. He furnishes decisive 
 proof to the contrary. The appropriate necessary expression 
 of his highest abhorrence of rebellion is not made. Whatever 
 may be the reason for refusing to do it, it is an insufficient 
 reason. He furnishes not the shadow of evidence that lie acts 
 upon the principle of immutable rectitude of benevolence. He 
 does not show that he has that supreme abhorrence of rebel- 
 lion which a benevolent being must have, and as a perfect 
 governor must show himself to have. There is no evidence 
 that he does not inflict suffering, regardless of every good and 
 sufficient reason for inflicting it — regardless of every principle 
 of rectitude, and therefore as a matter of caprice or despotic 
 humor, at least as the dictate of the selfish principle. There is 
 proof rather that he is actuated by the selfish principle. Xot 
 acting in the relation of a moral governor, as a benevolent being 
 must act, he proves himself to be a selfish being. Why then, 
 if disposed, will he not inflict greater suffering on the obedient 
 than he inflicts on the disobedient ! What confidence can be 
 placed in the character of such a being ? What authority or 
 right to reign can he possess ? 
 
 Again; the moral governor, by not inflicting the highest 
 possible suffering on the transgressor, shows that he esteems 
 the transgression of Ids law a less evil than the infliction of 
 such a penalty. Transgression, if unpunished in one instance, 
 utterly destroys the authority of law — destroys the highest 
 happiness of all of which the authority of the law is the neces- 
 sary means, and produces all the misery, of the prevention of 
 which the authority of law is the necessary means. When 
 transgression occurs, the alternative on the part of the moral 
 governor is, either to consent to the destruction of his authority 
 
166 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 with these fearful results, or to sustain it, by expressing his 
 highest disapprobation of transgression in the infliction on the 
 transgressor of the highest degree of suffering. Such being 
 the alternative, he shows, by refusing to inflict the supposed 
 penalty, that he prefers a far greater evil to a less. JNo matter 
 what the reason or motive may be, none can be supposed for 
 not inflicting the requisite penalty, which will not bring upon 
 him the imputation of preferring the destruction of his author- 
 ity, and the production of all the misery, the prevention of 
 which depends on its support, to the infliction of that penalty 
 on the transgressor which is requisite to maintain his authority, 
 and to prevent the evil resulting from it* subversion. By re- 
 fusing to inflict this penalty, he shows that he esteems such a 
 deed, with its ruin and its miseries, a less evil than the inflic- 
 tion of the highest degree of suffering on the author of the 
 deed. By the infliction of such a penalty, its evil tendency 
 would be counteracted and its results prevented ; and yet 
 the moral governor refuses to inflict it. He becomes there- 
 fore the voluntary responsible author of all this evil. Who 
 would or could confide in his character, or submit to his au- 
 thority I 
 
 Once more ; if the moral governor does not inflict the high- 
 est possible suffering on the transgressor, there can be no evi- 
 dence or proof that he would inflict such a penalty, if it were 
 necessary to secure the obedience and perfect happiness of all, 
 and to prevent the disobedience and perfect misery of all for- 
 ever. I do not say, as some have said, that this penalty is 
 necessary to the result now specified. But I affirm that there 
 can be no proof that there is not. The moral governor's decla- 
 ration would be no proof on this point, for as yet his character 
 for benevolence and veracity is not established. There can 
 therefore be no possible evidence or proof in the view of his 
 subjects, that the supposed penalty is not necessary to secure 
 the obedience and perfect happiness of all, and to prevent their 
 disobedience and perfect misery forevermore; and therefore, 
 none that the moral governor, with the knowledge of this 
 necessity, would inflict the penalty — no proof that he would 
 punish a single individual, were it necessary on the one hand 
 to make his kingdom a paradise of holiness and joy, and on 
 the other, to prevent it from becoming a pandemonium of sin 
 and misery; no proof that he does not prefer the destruction 
 
TIIE LEGAL PENALTY ETERNAL. 167 
 
 of the perfect happiness and the production of the perfect mis- 
 ery of all, rather than inflict the same evil on one who is the 
 author of the direful result ; no proof that the least security — 
 the least barrier against sin, exists in the character of the moral 
 governor; that holiness and its joys will not utterly cease to 
 exist, and sin and its woes reign without restraint and without 
 mitigation ; the universe become an unqualified hell, and the 
 moral governor stand revealed in his true character, a selfish, 
 malignant being, the accessory of the transgressor, the patron 
 of sin, the responsible author of the eternal misery of all. 
 Such, according to the evidence in the case, and in the view 
 of his subjects, would be the character of a moral governor 
 who should refuse to inflict the highest degree of suffering, as 
 the penalty of transgressing the best law. 
 
 It can hardly be necessary to say, that according to the view 
 now given of legal penalty, the suffering of the transgressor, 
 if it be possible, must be unmingled and eternal. The only 
 supposable case in which an Omnipotent moral governor can- 
 not inflict unmingled suffering, is that of a penitent, reformed 
 transgressor. The natural possibility that a transgressor, under 
 a system of mere law, should reform or return to duty, and 
 the impossibility of rendering such a one perfectly miserable, 
 or as miserable as he might be rendered without reforming, 
 may be admitted. On the supposition however of the refor- 
 mation of a transgressor, he would still be capable of suffering 
 in some degree; and the highest degree of suffering possible in 
 his case, would fully evince the moral governor's highest dis- 
 approbation of his transgression. It would, as such an expres- 
 sion, fully establish his authority, and would be necessary for 
 this purpose. In the case of the impenitent transgressor, 
 unmingled suffering would be possible, and is therefore the 
 degree of suffering which, in his case, is requisite to sustain the 
 moral governor's authority. Its eternal duration is possible, 
 and therefore in all cases it must be eternal, that it may answer 
 the end of a legal penalty in a perfect moral government. 
 
 Some objections to the view of legal sanctions, which has now 
 been given, demand consideration. 
 
 Objection 1. It is said, that on the principle, that reward is 
 to be continued only while obedience continues, it follows, that 
 punishment is to be continued only while disobedience con- 
 tinues; in other words, that the repentance or reformation of 
 
168 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 the transgressor is a just ground of forgiveness and favor from 
 the moral governor.* 
 
 This objection derives all its plausibility from a false view 
 of the essential claim of law. It supposes that law does not 
 in its very nature claim uninterrupted obedience, or that pres- 
 ent conformity to law, however frequently it may have been 
 interrupted by transgression, is still obedience, and as such 
 justly entitled to the reward. If this be so, then all that the 
 law claims is to transgress and reform. The claim of the law 
 is satisfied by transgression and reformation. To transgress 
 and reform, is obedience to law by satisfying the claim of the 
 law. To transgress and reform is therefore all that the law 
 does, or can justly demand of its subjects. Without affirming 
 that the lawgiver in such a case would prove himself to be as 
 well pleased with transgression as with reformation on the part 
 of the subject, it is plain, that he shows himself to be as 
 well pleased with transgression and reformation as with unin- 
 terrupted obedience. This is too absurd to be maintained by 
 any. But why is it, that when obedience ceases, reward must 
 also cease, and punishment begin, never to cease ? It is be- 
 cause the law of a perfect moral government requires, and to 
 deserve the name of law must require, the uninterrupted obe- 
 dience of the subject, and because the lawgiver can sustain his 
 authority by the sanction of reward, only by rendering reward 
 to that which satisfies the claim of law. In rewarding for 
 uninterrupted obedience, he rewards on the only possible ground 
 of a just legal reward — that the claim for uninterrupted obedi- 
 ence is satisfied by the subject. In this way only can the 
 reward become an expression of his highest approbation of 
 that which satisfies his claim on the subject, and thus support 
 his authority. If obedience be interrupted by an act of diso- 
 bedience, the claim of the lawgiver is not satisfied by the 
 subject, and never can be. Of course the only ground of con- 
 ferring a reward, by which the lawgiver can accomplish the 
 
 * Many advocates of the doctrine of endless punishment unwarily admit, that 
 punishment is to be continued only while disobedience continues, by vindicating 
 the justice of such punishment on the ground of continued sin. They thus concede, 
 that without continued sin, eternal punishment would be unjust. I only say here, 
 that this is not vindicating the doctrine of revelation, which declares, that " cursed 
 is every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the £tw, to do 
 them." 
 
OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED. 1G9 
 
 end of a legal reward, does not exist, and never can exist. He 
 can express no approbation of the subject by a reward confer- 
 red on tlie ground of liis satisfied claim. If lie express appro- 
 bation at all, it must be in view of liis claim, as unsatisfied and 
 violated by the subject who is rewarded. By such an act, he 
 relinquishes his claim for uninterrupted obedience, — allows 
 transgression, which, in one instance, is the destruction of all 
 good, lie shows himself satisfied with, and approving trans- 
 gression, by becoming the friend and patron of the transgressor. 
 The reason then is obvious, why uninterrupted reward, accord- 
 ing to the very nature of law, is exclusively connected with 
 Uninterrupted obedience, viz., the claim, and only claim of law 
 on the subject, is satisfied by such obedience, and can be satis- 
 fied by nothing else. The reason is equally obvious, why unin- 
 terrupted punishment is connected with interrupted obedience, 
 and not exclusively with uninterrupted transgression — viz., the 
 claim, and only claim of law on the subject, is not satisfied by 
 transgressing and repenting, but is as truly unsatisfied and 
 violated as by continued transgression. 
 
 Again; it is objected, obedience during a limited period, 
 does not deserve a future endless reward, while disobedience in 
 one instance does deserve an endless punishment. The good 
 and ill-desert of conduct in a subject of moral government are 
 to be determined by, or rather they are themselves the relations 
 of his conduct to the support and the subversion of the moral 
 governor's authority. The obedience of the subject supports 
 the moral governor's authority so long, and only so long as it 
 is rendered. It does not extend its influence in this respect 
 through all futurity, and thus give eternal support to the law- 
 giver's authority. The subject while obedient, fulfills only a 
 present obligation, and satisfies a present claim. He therefore 
 does nothing, and can do nothing which can have any influence 
 to sustain the lawgiver's authority beyond the present effect of 
 his present obedience. Whether he will support this authority 
 in future, depends on his future obedience. Having then given 
 no support by his obedience to the authority of the lawgiver 
 for the future, he can deserve no reward for so doing. The 
 sole reason for conferring upon him a reward for his obedience 
 is, that his obedience supports the lawgiver's authority, while it 
 is rendered. If then his obedience ceases, so does its influence 
 in this respect and with it every reason for a reward, and of 
 Vol. I.— 8 
 
170 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN TIIE ABSTRACT. 
 
 course all desert of reward. But this is not all. The subject, 
 by ceasing to obey becomes disobedient ; and by this one act, 
 if its influence be uncounteracted by the execution of penalty, 
 he destroys the authority of the moral governor forever. He 
 can in no way prevent the effect, either by doing or by suf- 
 fering. He is as ill-deserving as were the effect to follow, as 
 had he laid the authority of the moral governor in ruin forever- 
 more, and must himself remain as ill-deserving forever. His 
 ill-desert can neither be diminished, canceled, nor annihilated. 
 The relation of transgression to law, its tendency to destroy its 
 authority and to subvert moral government is eternal. It is 
 true, the moral governor, by the execution of the legal penal ty, 
 can counteract this tendency, can prevent the actual effect, can 
 uphold his own authority. He can do this however, not by an- 
 nihilating the transgression of his law, nor its tendency to de- 
 stroy his authority, but only by punishment as his continued 
 act, expressing his continued supreme disapprobation of the 
 transgressor. The punishment cannot change at all the nature 
 and tendency of the transgression. It simply in the manner 
 already explained, counteracts this tendency of transgression, 
 and thus holds back the effect which would follow the moment 
 in which punishment should cease. The sole reason for inflict- 
 ing the penalty of law is not diminished nor removed by its 
 infliction for any limited period. Of course the ill-desert of 
 transgression is not lessened nor removed by such an inflic- 
 tion. The entire influence of the penalty is to uphold the 
 moral governor's authority, as a continued expression and 
 proof of his highest disapprobation of transgression. As the 
 tendency of transgression to destroy his authority is eternal, 
 the expression of his highest disapprobation of transgression in 
 the form of legal penalty must be eternal. 
 
 Let us look still further at the doctrine under consideration. 
 The principle on which the doctrine rests is, that equity or jus- 
 tice demands that the penitent reformed transgressor of law be 
 forgiven and rewarded. It is to no purpose to say, that the act 
 of forgiving the penitent transgressor is an act of sovereignty 
 on the part of the lawgiver; for it cannot be vindicated as such 
 under a merely legal dispensation, unless it be consistent with 
 benevolence in the form of general justice ; and if it be consist- 
 ent witl i general justice under such a dispensation, that the 
 subject of law be exempted from the penalty of law, then it 
 
REPENTANCE NOT ENTITLED TO PARDON. 171 
 
 must be inconsistent with general justice either to threaten to 
 punish, or actually to punish him for transgression. Of course 
 justice forbids his punishment, that is, demands his exemption 
 from the legal penalty. His exemption therefore is not by 
 sovereignty. 
 
 In respect to this principle, I remark, that it is a groundless 
 and unauthorized assumption. Who will pretend that he either 
 knows or can prove, that the great ends of a perfect moral gov- 
 ernment and of infinite benevolence can be secured by such a 
 principle? Who can know or prove, that were the moral gov- 
 ernor to act on this principle in a single instance, it would not 
 defeat every design of infinite goodness, and fill the universe 
 with unniingled and unending woe? 
 
 The principle derives no support from the practice of human 
 governments. Whatever may be the ground of pardon in these 
 cases, it is not the principle of equity or justice. When has the 
 principle been recognized and proclaimed in the family, that 
 murderers of fathers and murderers of mothers, or in the state, 
 that traitors, conspirators, men reeking with crime and blood, 
 are justly entitled to pardon and reward on condition of repent- 
 ance? On this principle, the vilest malefactor cannot be justly 
 jnmished, until it is first ascertained that he is not a penitent ; 
 for being so, he has an equitable claim to pardon and reward. 
 Why then in the name of all that is sacred in human rights, is 
 not this principle of equity recognized and acted upon ? Why 
 is not a court of equity established to vindicate these rights of 
 injured innocence? 
 
 On this principle a lawgiver has no right to punish transgres- 
 sion of law at all, but only to punish impenitence after trans- 
 gression. It is not rebellion, but solely the want of repentance. 
 
 So also the transgressor of law cannot be justly punished for 
 transgression which only deserves punishment. And if he can- 
 not be justly punished for transgression, he cannot be justly 
 punished for that which only deserves punishment ; cannot 
 be justly punished for that for which alone he can be justly 
 punished. 
 
 On the same principle repentance itself is impossible. There 
 can be no repentance where there is no guilt or ill-desert. But 
 if there is no ill-desert except in the want of repentance, then 
 there is nothing in transgression which can be repented of. The 
 transgressor has no reason to repent of any thing whatever, or 
 
172 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 at most of a transgression which furnishes no ground or reason 
 for repentance. Is it said, that by repentance, the transgressor 
 acknowledges that it would be just to punish him for his trans- 
 gression? Then plainly justice does not require that he go un- 
 punished, i. e., that he be pardoned for his repentance. Besides, 
 if it is just to punish, benevolence or the general good requires 
 punishment. How then can justice, benevolence, or the general 
 good require his punishment, and also his exemption from pun- 
 ishment ? 
 
 On this principle, there is nothing in transgression or sin, 
 neither guilt nor ill-desert to be forgiven ; nothing except im- 
 penitence after transgression. But there can be no impeni- 
 tence ; for impenitence implies previous sin, guilt or ill-desert. 
 So that there can be nothing to be forgiven, neither sin nor im- 
 penitence. Forgiveness therefore is impossible and inconceiv- 
 able. There can be no grace in forgiveness ; for grace is favor 
 or kindness to the guilty, and there is no guilt in transgression, 
 nor yet in impenitence. There can be no influence to deter from 
 transgression in law nor authority ; nor in anv thing else an in- 
 nuence to prevent any thing but impenitence and this can have 
 no existence. Repentance for sin cannot be a duty, for sin or 
 transgression involves nothing to be repented of. There can be 
 no reason on the part of the moral governor for prohibiting sin ; 
 nor for displeasure, should every subject transgress his perfect 
 law ; for the only evil in the case is impenitence after trans- 
 gression, which impenitence itself is impossible. Nor can the 
 moral governor with the least reason or propriety require obe- 
 dience to his law ; for as there is nothing morally wrong in 
 transgression, there can be nothing morally right in obedience. 
 In short, the principle that justice requires the forgiveness of 
 sin on condition of repentance, subverts all moral distinctions, 
 and every relation between the moral governor and his sub- 
 jects. 
 
 This subject may be presented in other lights. Let it be 
 supposed that a penitent transgressor is forgiven and restored 
 to favor. The natural and authorized conclusion on the part of 
 any and every other subject is, that if he transgresses and repents, 
 he also shall be forgiven and restored to favor. What then is 
 there in the legal penalty to prevent transgression ? Nothing. 
 Its sole influence is, as so much natural evil, to deter from 
 impenitence after transgression; for the moral governor has 
 
NO PUNISHMENT FOR IMPENITENCE. 173 
 
 authorized the conclusion, that, by repentance, the penalty shall 
 he avoided. What the moral governor then aims at, by an abso- 
 lute prohibition in the form of law with the absolute threatening 
 of the penal evil, is not to invent sin, but only to prevent its 
 continuance. For aught that appears, he is as well satisfied 
 with transgression and repentance, as with uninterrupted and 
 perfect obedience. Is such a ruler entitled to respect ; has he 
 a right to reign ? Or thus : what is there in the law to prevent 
 on the part of every subject, a continued series of alternate 
 acts of transgression and repentance ? Nothing. As the law 
 threatens to punish, not transgression, but only impenitence 
 after transgression, and as transgression according to the sup- 
 position is followed by repentance, there can be no place for 
 punishment. Let it then be supposed, that acts of transgres- 
 sion and of repentance occur in a series at such intervals as you 
 please to imagine, and what shall be said of the government 
 and the character of the lawgiver ? Can he be entitled to re- 
 spect, or possess the least authority, or the lowest possible 
 qualification to rule? In such a case, how could it appear that 
 the governor would annex an endless penalty to transgression, 
 if he knew that it would prevent all transgression? And if 
 this could not be known, how could it appear that he would 
 annex such a penalty, though he knew it to be necessary to 
 prevent universal and endless transgression without repentance, 
 and with the complete and endless misery of his kingdom ? 
 
 Without however dwelling longer on the absurdities of this 
 jxrinciple, there is one incontrovertible fact which must exempt 
 this part of the subject from all difficulty and doubt, viz., that 
 sin or transgression on its first existence, is the fit object of the 
 highest disapprobation, and therefore requires the highest de- 
 gree of penal evil. Sin, or the transgression of law, is a prin- 
 ciple of action in a moral being, and in its essential nature, is 
 at its first existence one and the same thing which it is in its 
 continuance. It is true, that by continuance, in certain circum- 
 stances, its strength as a principle of action may be increased, 
 and also its ill-desert. In some circumstances, this is undeniably 
 true. Under the reclaiming influences which they resist, evil 
 men wax worse and worse. Placed under such influences, they 
 are under the necessity of forming the selfish principle de novo 
 with greater or less frequency, and thus greatly increase the 
 strength of the selfish principle — their wickedness and guilt. 
 
1 74 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 By continuance, it may also extend its actual desolations, and 
 reveal to us more clearly its fell malignity ; and thus its intrin- 
 sic turpitude and ill-desert may be iudged by us to be greater 
 than in its beginning. But the question now is,not whether it 
 becomes deserving of penalty by increasing in strength, or by 
 developing its malignant tendency to our observation in actual 
 results. But the question is, whether sin becomes ill-deserving 
 or deserving of penalty by mere continuance; or whether it 
 would cease to be ill-deserving by being repented of? I an- 
 swer, that the mere continuance of the same principle both 
 in kind and degree, neither gives it its ill-desert nor increases 
 it one iota. Sin continued, differs not from sin begun, except 
 in the mere circumstance of continuance, which can in no re- 
 spect change the nature of sin or increase its ill-desert. Sin, 
 when it first exists, is and must be, in its nature, tendency, 
 and every essential relation of sin, all that it ever is or ever can 
 be. In its true nature and tendency, and in the lowest degree 
 of strength in which it can exist in the mind, and whether it 
 produce its appropriate results or not, it prostrates law, author- 
 ity, and moral government — it destroys all happiness and pro- 
 duces all misery. It does not therefore become the fit object 
 of the highest disapprobation by its continuance, nor by the 
 impenitence of the transgressor, nor yet by any thing connected 
 with or dependent on its continuance. It is so in its essential 
 nature. As such an object, as demanding the expression of 
 the moral governor's highest disapprobation in penal evil, it is, 
 when it first exists, all that in its nature which it ever can be. 
 The transgressor in his first act of transgression,strikes the death 
 blow at all good, and puts his hand to the production of com- 
 plete and universal misery. Then it is that the deed is com- 
 mitted — done in heart — requiring no continuance, no repetition, 
 no overt acts, no results in woe, to give it its full measure of 
 ill-desert as the transgression of law. Were the full results of 
 one sin instantly to follow its commission — the destruction of 
 all good, and of all the means of good, with woe unmingled, 
 complete, universal, and, without the execution of the supposed 
 penalty, eternal, who would not see in these results the nature 
 and ill-desert of sin, without supposing its continuance — would 
 not see that its nature and ill-desert could not be changed by 
 repentance, when its work was done \ Suppose now, that the 
 execution of the supposed penalty in comparatively a few in- 
 
NO PUNISHMENT FOR IMPENITENCE. 175 
 
 stances would retrieve the evil, and cause a universe of joy, 
 bespeaking the benevolence of its author, and lasting as eter- 
 nity, to rise on these ruins, would not the execution of the 
 penalty be demanded by benevolence; would not every voice 
 of reason and of conscience respond, 'The judgment is righteous 
 altogether V But if the supposed execution of the penalty 
 would be demanded to retrieve the evil, why is it not required 
 to prevent it ? We say that it is, as truly as a perfect moral 
 government is demanded by the highest good which an infinite 
 Being can produce. Sin then, as sin, does not derive its ill- 
 desert in the lowest degree from impenitence, nor can its ill- 
 desert be lessened by repentance. Being what it is in its 
 essential nature, and viewed as a principle of action irrespect- 
 ively of any increased strength of any actual results in evil, 
 either natural or moral, and continuing but for a moment, it is 
 the lit object of the highest disapprobation, and demands the 
 highest degree of natural evil as its penalty. 
 
 Objection 2. It may be said, that as punishment can be jus- 
 tified only on the principle that the greatest good requires it, 
 it would follow, that if all the subjects of a moral government 
 should rebel, benevolence would forbid their endless punish- 
 ment. If it be admitted, that in the case supposed, benevolence 
 would forbid eternal punishment, it does not follow that it 
 would forbid it in any actually existing case, nor in any case 
 in which a benevolent being can be supposed to adopt a perfect 
 moral government. ISor, to apply the objection to this world, 
 and supposing all to be in a state of disobedience, does it follow, 
 that benevolence might not inflict eternal punishment on all. 
 It cannot be shown that the moral governor might not punish 
 rebellion to whatever extent it may be supposed to exist in this 
 world, and yet, by creating other worlds, produce on the whole 
 an amount of creature happiness equal to that which would 
 exist without the supposed punishment. The possibility of his 
 so doing seems to be distinctly recognized in the Scriptures ; 
 and the admission of it is also important, if we would duly 
 appreciate the mercy of God in the work of redemption. 
 "Think not," said John the Baptist, to the unbelieving Jews, 
 " to say within yourselves, we have Abraham to our father ; 
 for I say unto you, God is able of these stones to raise up chil- 
 dren unto Abraham." As if he had said, God can destroy you 
 forever, and yet glorify himself by creating and blessing other 
 
176 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 beings. This is possible truth, and as such, it fully overthrows 
 the present objection, as applied to the endless punishment of 
 every human being. Such a punishment of the race may be 
 consistent with God's benevolence. If it here be asked, why 
 then did not God actually adopt this course? I answer, not 
 because as a benevolent being he was under the necessity of 
 adopting another — not because he could not secure as much (I 
 do not say he could secure more) creature happiness, by the 
 punishment of this world and the creation of another, as by 
 the redemption of this ; but because, viewing this world as 
 actually created — for it must be so, if we suppose it to de- 
 serve punishment — it may be true that he could himself find 
 more happiness in blessing with redemption creatures already 
 existent, than by creating others to be the subjects of an equal 
 degree of happiness. lie would thus derive the decisive mo- 
 tive to redemption from himself, and not from a greater amount 
 of creature happiness. In this view of the subject, with what 
 emphasis does he say, "!Not for your sakes do I this, but for 
 my own great name's sake." How rich is such mercy com- 
 pared with that which benevolence, as is supposed, requires 
 him to show to guilty beings ! The Christian must admit that 
 it is, and the infidel that it may be, consistent with God's per- 
 fect benevolence to punish a revolted world with everlasting 
 destruction. 
 
 More can be said on this point, Whether benevolence re- 
 quires the eternal punishment of the transgressors of law in 
 any actual case or not, it is undeniable, that there cannot be 
 a perfect moral government without it as the penalty of trans- 
 gression. According to the principles already presented, every 
 subject in this case, would be authorized and required to be- 
 lieve, by decisive evidence, that the moral governor does not 
 regard the transgression of his law with the highest disappro- 
 bation. He does not punish on this princij^le, but plainly 
 shows that he esteems it of less consequence that his law is 
 transgressed, than that that penalty be inflicted on the trans- 
 gressor, which is requisite to sustain his own authority as a 
 perfect moral governor. He would that the rebel should be 
 made less than completely and eternally miserable, rather than 
 secure and employ the necessary means of the highest happi- 
 ness of all for eternity ; yea, rather than furnish so far as any 
 evidence to the contrary is concerned, the necessary means of 
 
EXTREME PENALTY NOT IMPOSSIBLE. 1 V< 
 
 preventing the absolute misery of all for eternity. lie shows 
 that he does not regard obedience to his law as the supreme 
 good, and disobedience to his law as the supreme evil. He 
 shows himself too kind, too indulgent to the rebel, to make 
 him as miserable as the support of his own authority and the 
 highest happiness of his kingdom demand. In a word, he 
 shows himself to be truly a selfish and malignant being. And 
 what is law, authority, or moral government in such a case, but 
 a pretense and a mockery ? To talk of a perfect moral govern- 
 ment then, in a case in which benevolence will not allow the 
 authority of the governor to be sustained by an endless penalty, 
 is only to say, that a perfect moral government in such a case, 
 is impossible; that benevolence itself forbids the necessary 
 means of the highest happiness. 
 
 Objection 3. It is said, that it is incredible and impossible 
 that benevolence should adopt a moral government with a 
 legal penalty consisting in the highest degree of natural evil. 
 I answer, that to assume the impossiblity and incredibility that 
 benevolence should adopt such a system, is wholly gratuitous 
 and unauthorized. It cannot be shown, nor can it be rendered in 
 the lowest degree probable, that such a system of moral govern- 
 ment is not the necessary means of the best end which an in- 
 finitely perfect Being can accomplish. The supposition that it 
 is, involves no contradiction or absurdity. It may not only be 
 true, that such a system is the necessary means of such an end, 
 but that the end is so great that the supposed penalty in its 
 actual execution, is in the comparison insignificant, an evil 
 scarcely to be accounted of. Great as the evil may be to the 
 individual sufferers, it is to be estimated not simply as related 
 to them, but as related to the great end of the system — the 
 end which an infinite being can accomplish only by means of 
 it. This principle is familiar to every mind, and constantly re- 
 cognized by right reason as indubitable. Why are the crimes 
 of murder and treason punished with death, and this too con- 
 sidered only as fatal to certain great interests of time ? Is not 
 death a most fearful evil to man, viewed as a being of time 
 only ? Why then is it made the penalty of some single acts of 
 transgression? Because the interests which one such act de- 
 stroys, the great ends of human society can be secured by no 
 other means. Do you say, that the unminglecl and endless 
 misery of a being is an evil so immeasurably great, that it is 
 8* 12 
 
178 MORAL .GOVERNMENT IN TIIE ABSTRACT. 
 
 incredible that there should he any necessity for it as the 
 means of good ? But remember and admit, that the failure of 
 the end which it may be necessary to secure, may be an immeas- 
 urably greater evil. If you refuse to admit this, you are not a 
 fair reasoner. If you do admit it, then why should it be 
 thought incredible, that the penalty of the law should be the 
 unmingled and endless suffering of the transgressor ? If the 
 limited and comparatively inferior interests or end of an 
 earthly kingdom, demand for their security the penalty of 
 death, why may not the penalty under consideration be justly 
 inflicted on him who would destroy the interests and defeat 
 the end of an eternal kingdom. "Why may not an infinite 
 Being propose an end, the accomplishment of which shall re- 
 quire the infliction of the highest degree of natural evil on 
 those who would otherwise defeat that end, who would even fill 
 his creation with unmingled and endless woe ? The sum total 
 of penal evil actually inflicted under this system may be ten 
 thousand times less compared with the actual good of which it 
 is the necessary means, than the penal evil in any kingdom, 
 state, or even family on earth compared with the good which 
 results from it. 
 
 On this subject, if we would not be led by feeling instead of 
 reason, we must think of the end — the happiness to be pro- 
 duced — the misery to be prevented — the end worthy of an in- 
 finitely perfect Being, and which shall be a full expression and 
 manifestation of his infinite attributes — the end which such a 
 Being will and must accomplish! And who shall prescribe 
 limits to this, and undertake to tell how much evil may be jus- 
 tifiably incurred in its accomplishment ? But it will probably 
 be said, that infinite power can dispense with the supposed 
 penalty, and that thus its necessity is wholly superseded. I 
 answer, that a perfect moral government is the necessary means 
 of the end proposed ; and that no degree of power can dispense 
 with such a system, nor with any thing necessary to its perfec- 
 tion. Perfect benevolence must adopt the system. Power can 
 in no respect interfere with or change its nature. Omnipotence 
 is here under a restriction from the nature of things, the gov- 
 ernment of free moral agents. The power of an infinite Being 
 is as truly restricted by the nature of the subject as the power 
 of man ? What can power do ? It cannot secure as its proxi- 
 mate effect right, nor can it prevent wrong moral action. It 
 
ETERNAL PUNISHMENT CREDIBLE. 179 
 
 cannot destroy the power of moral beings to act morally wrong 
 without destroying their nature. In the language of Dr. Dwight, 
 " Men are beings possessed of the full power to originate any 
 and every moral action."* With this view of the nature of 
 men as moral beings, it is absurd to talk of God's producing in 
 them either rig] it or wrong moral action by dint of power; as 
 really so as to talk of producing thought and volition by a 
 machine, or breaking rocks with arguments, or governing the 
 winds by motives. I am not saying that God cannot by influ- 
 ences consistent with the nature of moral agency in men, in 
 many instances, prevent wrong and secure right moral action. 
 But I affirm, that in view of the nature of moral agency, it is 
 impossible to prove that God could prevent sin in the best 
 moral system. Moral agents can act morally wrong under 
 every possible influence from God. To suppose him to pre- 
 vent all wrong moral action on their part in all cases, may, for 
 aught that can be shown to the contrary, be supposing him to 
 do what in certain cases he cannot do, that is, that he can do 
 in certain cases, what he cannot do. Vide Matt. xiii. 24. 
 
 The system of a perfect moral government now maintained is 
 possible, is credible, though moral evil and its eternal punish- 
 ment in some cases be a foreseen and actual consequent. It 
 may be true that it is the best — the necessary and only means 
 of the best end which an infinite Being can accomplish. It 
 may have in his estimation more value than all the worlds and 
 beings which he has created; the end which he can accomplish 
 only by a perfect moral government may be so great and good, 
 that compared with it, the eternal destruction of such a world 
 as this, nay, of thousands of such worlds, would be only as an 
 infinitesimal compared with infinitude. It may at least be true 
 that it were better, that heaven and earth, the created universe, 
 should pass away, than that one jot or tittle should pass from 
 the law. 
 
 Do you say that this is telling what may be, that it is going 
 off into the unknown regions of possibilities ? I know it. But 
 that is where your objection goes, and we must follow. You 
 
 * The same writer also says, "My actions are intuitively seen by me not to be the 
 effects of an extraneous cause, or of something beside myself." "The changes 
 passing in my own mind are produced bj^my own active powers." "We are agents 
 possessing active powers by which we can originate changes." " Man chooses 
 while possessed of a power to choose otherwise." — Theology. Sermons, 24, 21. 
 
180 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 say it is impossible that God should adopt such a system as I 
 have described. I show you that you cannot prove it, and 
 have therefore no right to say it. Confess the possibility of 
 such a system, and so take back your objection and I am satis- 
 fied. My argument will then remain in unimpaired force. 
 
 I have thus in several lectures attempted to show what a 
 perfect moral government is, dwelling more particularly and 
 fully on the nature of its legal sanctions. In conclusion, I pro- 
 pose to make a few brief reflections on the subject and the 
 manner in which it has been treated. 
 
 You must have seen that the principles which I have at- 
 tempted to sustain by reason are those which belong to the 
 Christian system. If my endeavor has been successful, I have 
 furnished on the authority of reason a full vindication of these 
 great principles of Christianity, and have thus in effect re- 
 futed every objection to Christianity which is derived from 
 these principles. More particularly — 
 
 If the view now given of the nature of moral government be 
 correct, and if it be conceded that God is the perfect moral 
 governor of his moral creation, then a strong not to say the 
 strongest objection of the infidel against Christianity is re- 
 moved, viz., that its law, or rather the law on which this sys- 
 tem rests, involves such a fearful penalty. Most infidel writers, 
 Paine not excepted, have conceded and applauded the excel- 
 lence of the Christian morality — they have praised the law 
 of Christianity, but have denounced its penalty. In view of 
 what has been said in these lectures, I ask, what excellence 
 would pertain to this law without its penalty? "Would it pro- 
 pose or require the best kind of action, and so far as its excel- 
 lence as a rule of action should be understood, furnish strong 
 motives to obedience? Be it so. But it would not be a law — 
 the law of a perfect moral government ; for it could possess no 
 authority. It could not with propriety be called a rule of 
 action. It would be advice merely ; leaving the question of 
 conformity to the discretion of those to whom it is given, fully 
 authorizing them to do their own will without the least respect 
 to that of God. Yea, promulged in the form of law, it would 
 subvert all authority in God, disprove his goodness, and justify 
 abhorrence of his character and contempt for his government. 
 It would reveal not even such a God as guilt makes welcome, but 
 a being who would fill the moral creation with terror. And 
 
TIIE GOD OF INFIDELITY. 181 
 
 would such a law be excellent? What if it proposed right 
 action, while it revealed such a being on the throne of the uni- 
 verse, while itself was known to be — nut the law of truth, not 
 the will of perfect benevolence, but a lie of infinite malignity ! 
 Call this a rule of action, law, authority, moral government ! 
 It were but the pretense, the mockery of it in the hands of an 
 omnipotent fiend — the very patronage of iniquity, sanctioning 
 its unrestrained perpetration, and exemplifying its horrors in 
 the unmingled and unending miseries of the universe. Why is 
 it that men cannot see here, what they see and know every- 
 where else ? Who does not see and feel the power of law 
 when administered by that supreme regard to the general 
 good, which never wavers, never flinches, but carries it out in 
 the full measure of its penal inflictions, whoever may be the 
 transgressor? Were this the principle of our civil rulers, 
 were it fully understood and known that law was in the hands 
 of such a principle, what might and majesty it would possess ! 
 What would become of the crimes that stalk so openly and 
 shamelessly before our eyes? And if you want an illustration 
 of the imbecility of law contemned and fit only to be con- 
 temned, look at the too frequent use of the pardoning preroga- 
 tive by the executive of our states, and at the riots, bloodshed, 
 and murders perpetrated in anticipation of such clemency. If 
 an armed mob in a great city, infuriate to desperation, can so 
 impressively tell us what a law without a penalty is, why can 
 we not learn, that a law from God without a penalty reveal- 
 ing the feelings and the character of a perfect Being, would 
 be no law, Worse than no law, a calamity and a curse to his 
 moral creation ? Let us then judge of the law of God as it is ; 
 judge of it with those sanctions which reveal a perfect God; 
 judge of it in its true tendency, as the only law which is fitted 
 to bring — as actually bringing the will of every moral creature 
 of God into subjection to his will — then shall we see that the 
 law of the Lord is perfect, that were God to give a law to 
 moral beings without a penalty revealing his holiness, nay, his 
 full abhorrence of sin, it would veil in darkness his brightest 
 glories — would be the most fearful act of infinite malignity. 
 
 And here, I venture to say, that the main principle in the 
 reasonings of infidels is subverted, and their stronghold is broken 
 down. Who does not know, that the most plausible and the 
 most successful assaults on Christianity derive their force from 
 
182 MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT. 
 
 the fearful, and as it is represented, the incredible nature of its 
 sanctions ? How much has been said and written on the sub- 
 ject, to throw Christianity beyond the boundary of human cred- 
 ibility ! as if the supreme Lawgiver of the universe had nothing 
 to do in his administration, but to caress the foundlings of his 
 love, and to scatter blessings among them whether obedient or 
 disobedient ! How often are appeals made to all that is revolt- 
 ing in the cruelty of a tyrant; how often is this contrasted with 
 all that is touching in the tenderness of a mother; as if the 
 governor of the moral universe must be either a Xero or a 
 woman ! Surely a mother's tenderness, lovely as it is, does 
 not exactly qualify her to rule a pandemonium ! To resort to 
 such appeals in argument then,is not reasoning. To him who 
 knows enough to reason at all on the subject, there is a majesty 
 in law, there is certainly a majesty in God's dominion which 
 looks down with contempt on such expedients to degrade it. 
 
 But so it is. Thousands allow themselves to be misled by 
 feeling, and to overlook without a thought, the magnitude of 
 those interests, which for their protection employ, and will 
 forever employ, the attributes of the Infinite Being. Indeed, 
 if there be any case in which there can be no hope of a true 
 verdict, it is when the question arises, what is the just penalty 
 of transgressing the divine law, when the transgressor is the 
 judge? We may safely say, that there is no subject within 
 the limits of human inquiry , on which the human mind is more 
 liable to be unduly swayed by interest and feeling, nor one on 
 which such influence is less apt to be suspected. Argument in 
 moral science depends much for its apparent force and conclu- 
 siveness, on the impression which it makes on the mind. In- 
 difference to truth and error here, is in fact out of the question. 
 In the present instance, our reasoning, instead of meeting sen- 
 sibilities to welcome and receive its influence, has first to en- 
 counter the strongest tide of opposite emotion ; and so feeble 
 is its power to impress, that its failure to convince is ascribed 
 almost of course to its intrinsic weakness and insufficiency. 
 Though the argument should be absolutely conclusive, and 
 should utterly baffle every attempt to detect its weakness, it 
 would not be strange should it leave the mind unconvinced, 
 and be itself rejected as sophistry too ingenious to be detected. 
 Kor would it be any more surprising, should harshness of tem- 
 per, or at least the want of the more tender feelings of our 
 
TIIE FEELINGS SHOULD NOT DECIDE. 183 
 
 nature, be imputed to the author of an argument which sup- 
 ports so revolting a conclusion. 
 
 All this however is unphilosophical. Reproach not the ad- 
 vocates of Christianity for severity of temper, in maintaining 
 what may seem to you, gloomy or even terrific views of God's 
 moral government. How easy is it to recriminate with at least 
 equal plausibility! For what is more terrific than the God of 
 Infidelity? On your scheme, all is uncertainty, darkness, terror. 
 On ours only, is there light and hope even in well-doing. Hell 
 itself giveth both, for it upholds the empire of righteousness. 
 
 This is a subject then, which, above all others, calls on us to 
 protect the understanding from all the vagaries of the imag- 
 ination and all the feelings of the heart. Here if anywhere, 
 should the mind be disciplined to the use of simple intellect, 
 and be prepared to follow the light of evidence, to give up 
 every thing to the supremacy of argument, to adopt conclu- 
 sions however unwelcome, and to make sacrifices however 
 painful, the moment truth demands them. For truth, be it 
 said to her eternal honor, never can require a sacrifice which 
 our highest good does not also demand. 
 
 END OF SECTION I. 
 
THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD 
 
 AS KNOWN 
 
 BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE. 
 
 LECTURE I. 
 
 Thesis to be established in three leading propositions. — First, God administers a Moral Govern- 
 ment in some sense ; for, 1, men are moral beings ; 2, God has given them a law. — Shown from 
 the manifestation of the tendencies of action to good and evil. — No opposing evidence. — Perver- 
 sion of a design does not disprove the reality of the design; nor the fact that such perversion 
 was foreseen ; nor that the perversion is universal. — The perversion observed may be temporary. 
 — Tendency to wrong, not greater than to right action. — Cause of the certainty but not of the 
 necessity of such perversion.— The only proper method of reasoning.— Conclusion. 
 
 My object in several lectures on the subject proposed, is to 
 establish the proposition, that — 
 
 God is administering a perfect moral government over 
 
 MEN. 
 
 For this purpose I propose : 
 
 I. To show that God is administering a moral government 
 over men in some proper import of the language. 
 
 II. To prove the equity of his administration ; and — 
 
 III. To prove his rightful authority. 
 
 In proving the first of these propositions, we shall show that 
 God is administering a moral in distinction from a providential 
 government. In proving the second, i. <?., the equity of his ad- 
 ministration, we shall show that he has given to men the best 
 law ; that he strictly adheres to the principles of equity in its 
 administration, and will sustain its perfect authority. 
 
 In proving the third, i. e., his rightful authority, we shall 
 
GOD A MORAL GOVERNOR. 185 
 
 show his benevolence or absolute moral perfection. And when 
 these things are shown, the perfection of his moral government 
 is proved. 
 
 In the present lecture, I enter on the proof of the first of 
 these propositions, viz. : 
 
 I. God is administering a moral government over men in 
 some proper import of the phrase. 
 
 I have already defined moral government to be the influence 
 of authority on moral beings, exercised by a moral governor, 
 through the medium of law. To support the proposition now 
 before us, it is necessary only to show that men are moral beings, 
 that God has given them a lata, and that he enforces conformity 
 to his law by the influence of authority. 
 
 1. Men are moral beings; that is, they possess the powers of 
 moral action, and are placed in the circumstances requisite for 
 their exercise. The fact that men are moral agents, I shall here 
 take for granted ; having given what I deem sufficient proof of 
 it in other lectures, and also because I suppose it will not be 
 denied. 
 
 2. God has given to men a law, which is a decisive expres- 
 sion of a moral governor's preference of some action to its op- 
 posite. 
 
 That God has given a law to men, I argue, from the fact that 
 he has made them moral beings; in other words, from their 
 constitution and the circumstances of their existence. 
 
 Whatever may be the design of our constitution, and the cir- 
 cumstances of our being, of that design God is the author. 
 What I claim then is, that God in creating men moral beings, 
 and placing them in circumstances requisite to moral action, 
 clearly manifests his will or jjveference, that men should act 
 morally right rather than morally wrong. The proof of this 
 position rests on this obvious and undeniable principle, that 
 the clear manifestation of adaptation or tendency to an end in 
 the structure or nature of any thing which is made, is decisive 
 proof that this end was designed by the maker, provided there 
 is no opposing evidence. 
 
 I will now state as briefly as may be, the argument from 
 man's constitution and condition as a moral being, and then 
 show that there is no opposing evidence. 
 
 It is then impossible in the nature of things that God should 
 create a moral being, without placing -him under a stronger 
 
186 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 motive — a far higher inducing influence to the performance of 
 right,than to the performance of wrong moral action. "Whether 
 a moral agent be created or not, depends on the will of God. 
 But that right moral action is the necessary means of the 
 highest happiness of a moral agent, is eternal truth — truth 
 which no more depends on the will of God, than the equality 
 of all straight lines from the center to the circumference of a cir- 
 cle. Right moral action is benevolent ; wrong moral action is 
 selfish. According therefore to the essential and immutable na- 
 ture of things, right moral action,be the limited temporary self- 
 sacrifice it may involve what it may, tends to secure the highest 
 happiness of the agent, as well as that of others ; and wrong 
 moral action, afford what limited temporary enjoyment it may, 
 tends to secure the highest misery of the agent and of others. 
 These ideas enter into our necessary conceptions of right and 
 wrong moral action as their essential elements. As we cannot 
 conceive of matter without solidity and extension, no more can 
 we conceive of right and wrong moral action, without conceiv- 
 ing of the one as tending to secure the highest happiness, and 
 of the other, the highest misery of a moral being. 
 
 There is another philosophy, which maintains that the highest 
 happiness of the individual may come into competition, and so 
 be inconsistent with, the highest happiness of the whole, and 
 that therefore the individual may be bound to sacrifice his 
 own to the general good. This philosophy, endorsed as it is 
 by great names, I regard as absurd and self-contradictory, 
 though admitting that a moral being may be under obligation 
 to sacrifice much and even all of what may be called his own 
 happiness, for the sake of the general good. But there are two 
 facts here which must not be forgotten. The one is, that there 
 must be some motive to this voluntary sacrifice of his own 
 happiness, for there can no more be choice without a motive 
 than an effect without a cause, and there can no more be mo- 
 tive except in the form of good or happiness to the agent, than 
 there can be motive which is not motive. To suppose a being 
 then voluntarily to sacrifice absolutely all his own happiness 
 for the sake of the general good, is to suppose him to act with- 
 out a motive, that is, to act with a motive and without a mo- 
 tive at the same time, which is a contradiction and an ab- 
 surdity. 
 
 The other fact will explain the mystery. This is, that what- 
 
THE PERFECT HAPPINESS OF THE GOOD. 187 
 
 ever degree of tlic agent's own happiness may come into com- 
 petition with the general good, and which for this reason he 
 may he bound to sacrifice for it, still his own happiness, in one 
 respect — even his own highest happiness — can never come into 
 competition with general good. This is the happiness of being 
 good and doing good / the happiness of promoting the general 
 good, which lie can never he required to sacrifice. This is not 
 only his own highest happiness, but it will ever be great in pro- 
 portion to the sacrifice. Kay more ; just and adequate views 
 of the nature of a moral being, and the true tendencies of action 
 on his part, show that if perfectly benevolcnt,he must be per- 
 fectly blessed. To such a being, under every loss of happiness 
 possible to him, there are fountains remaining, adequate to fill 
 every capacity of happiness, even the fountains opened amid 
 the throne of God and the Lamb. Or in the language of phi- 
 losophy, such is the nature of a moral being, that perfection in 
 character is perfection in blessedness. This is the fact which 
 gives such peculiar grandeur and glory to a moral agent. 
 Moral agency in its very nature, involves a power so to oc- 
 cupy the mind, so to bless the moral being with the right 
 object of affection, that any loss or sacrifice of good which is 
 possible in the case shall be accounted as nothing. Paul un- 
 derstood this, when he spoke of " suffering the loss of all things, 
 and counting them as dung that he might win Christ," " as 
 having nothing and yet possessing all things." 
 
 Such then is the nature of man as a moral being, that his per- 
 fection in happiness depends on the use he makes of his powers ; 
 in other words, on his moral character. And if it be not true 
 from the very nature which God has given him as a moral 
 being, that one kind of moral action will secure his perfection 
 in happiness, and another produce his perfect misery, then is 
 the eternal distinction between right and wrong action an- 
 nihiliated. I claim then, that the obvious and undeniable 
 facts in the nature and condition of man as a moral being — 
 supposing no evidence to the contrary — are the most deci- 
 sive manifestations and proofs that the will of God is, that 
 man should always act morally right rather than morally 
 wrong. 
 
 Indeed it is inconceivable, on the supposition of no opposing 
 evidence, that there should be any single source of proof so decis- 
 ive as this, any so fitted to place the fact of the divine preference 
 
188 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 of right to wrong moral action on the part of man, beyond all 
 denial and doubt. If the design of the Maker can be discovered 
 from that which is made, if the structure and position of an 
 eye or a tooth show this, then do the nature and condition of 
 man as a moral being, show that he is made to act morally 
 right rather than morally wrong. It is then — on the supposi- 
 tion of no opposing evidence — the will of our Maker, it is the 
 law of God, that man should always act in the exercise of the 
 great principle of love or benevolence. 
 
 Our argument is thus far hypothetical. I proceed now to 
 inquire — is there any opposing evidence to set aside or weaken 
 that which has been adduced ? All that can be offered is fur- 
 nished in the fact of the universal perversion of moral agency 
 on the part of man. 
 
 All that can be necessary here is to ascertain and apply the 
 correct principle of judging in such a case. I maintain it to 
 be this — that the perversion of a design clearly manifested in 
 the structure and condition of a thing, which perversion can he 
 easily accounted for consistently with the reality of the design, 
 is no evidence against its reality. 
 
 To test the correctness of this principle, let us suppose a 
 watchmaker to have made a number of watches of exquisite 
 workmanship, foreseeing that in the wisest and best disposal of 
 them he can make, they will be so perverted or misused as to 
 defeat temporarily the end to which they are so perfectly 
 adapted. Let it be further supposed, that by giving the re- 
 quisite information and direction,he shows a most decided pref- 
 erence of the right to the wrong use of them, and with ample 
 skill and power to repair the machinery, and thus in a great 
 degree to redress the foreseen evil, he actually adopts a course 
 of measures which insures such a result.^ I ask, is the supposed 
 perversion in such a case to be traced to the will of the watch- 
 maker ? Is it not rather manifest,that the supposed perversion 
 is a direct contravention of his preference ? Do not the perfect 
 structure of the watches, and his directions respecting them, 
 furnish indisputable proof that in every instance he prefers the 
 right to the wrong use of them ? 
 
 On precisely the same principle of reasoning, I claim that 
 the perversion of moral agency on the part of man, does not 
 furnish the least opposing evidence to that given by his con- 
 stitution and condition, that God prefers right moral action to 
 
GOD PREFERS RIGHT TO WRONG ACTION. 189 
 
 wrong. I shall hereafter attempt to show, by the best kind of 
 moral evidence, that he will in fact repair in a great degree the 
 evil done, having actually adopted a course of measures per- 
 fectly fitted to such an end. All however that my present 
 purpose requires is, to say that these things may be true. This 
 cannot be controverted. It is possible that the greatest good 
 required exactly the present system, but not the perversion of 
 moral agency in a single instance, under the present system — 
 it may be true,tha,t it is impossible that God should adopt the 
 best moral system and prevent the perversion of moral agency 
 in any greater degree than he does prevent it ; it may be better, 
 that moral agency should in every instance be rightly used 
 rather than perverted under the present system ; and of course 
 it may be true that the Creator, notwithstanding the actual 
 perversion of moral agency, prefers that every human being 
 should act morally right rather than morally wrong. 
 
 If it be said that God might so have increased the tend- 
 encies to right action as to have prevented moral evil, either 
 wholly or partially, I answer ; this cannot be proved as I have 
 already shown, and is therefore entitled to no consideration. 
 Besides, to have altered the system in one iota, might have 
 been to change it for the worse, and produced more sin than 
 it would have prevented. The fact then that God did not in- 
 crease the tendencies to right action, is no proof that he does 
 not in every instance prefer right to wrong action under the 
 system as it is. 
 
 Is it further said that the omniscient Creator foresaw the 
 universal perversion of the moral agency, and therefore must 
 have intended or purposed its actual existence ? This is readily 
 admitted, admitted as the only truth which can form a basis 
 for confidence, submission and joy, in view of such an amount 
 of evil as exists under the divine government. But I have 
 said the perversion of moral agency may be in respect to di- 
 vine prevention, incidental to the best system. God then may 
 have purposed the existence of the evil, rather than not adopt 
 the best system to which the evil may be thus incidental. But 
 this fact would give no shadow of proof that he does not prefer 
 right to wrong moral action under this system. 
 
 Is it still further said, that all this would be quite credible, 
 were moral agency perverted only by an individual moral 
 agent, but not so in view of its universal perversion by a 
 
190 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 world ? I answer, that the perversion of moral agency h y a 
 single world may sustain the same relation to ,its non-perver- 
 sion in other worlds, which its perversion by a single individ- 
 ual would sustain to its non-perversion by all other individ- 
 uals, even the relation of an infinitesimal to infinitude. Of 
 course this perversion by a world affords no more proof that 
 the Creator does not prefer right to wrong moral action in 
 every instance, than would its perversion by a single indi- 
 vidual. 
 
 But not to rest the argument on the hypothesis of other 
 worlds. It is sufficient for my present purpose to say, that 
 there may he a future state of existence for man, and that the 
 present may be one of probation in relation to future allot- 
 ments, even under a redemptive system. The results may 
 show, supposing this to be the only world of sentient creatures, 
 that the greatest good required, not indeed the perversion of 
 moral agency rather than the right use of it under this system, 
 but the very system under which the perversion takes place. 
 Of course it may he true, as I have before shown, that God 
 prefers the right use of moral agency to its perversion, in every 
 instance of moral action under the present system. 
 
 It may be still further said on this point : the perfection or 
 imperfection of a moral system is not to be decided, merely by 
 what are or may be only its temporary results in obedience or 
 disobedience, but by its nature, its adaptations, tendencies and 
 probable issues. The reason is, that a moral government may 
 be perfect, and yet result in the temporary disobedience of its 
 subjects. Such possibility is inseparable from its nature as a 
 moral system. It may be in a high degree imperfect, and yet 
 result in temporary obedience ; such possibility being also in- 
 separable from its nature. Effects which are good or bad, and 
 which are connected with their causes by a physical necessity, 
 may be the just criteria of the nature of their causes. It is not 
 so however in respect to the supposed results of a system of 
 moral government. 
 
 Temporary obedience merely, is no proof of the perfection 
 of a system of moral government, nor is temporary disobedi- 
 ence proof of its imperfection; for such obedience may exist 
 under an imperfect, and such disobedience under a perfect 
 system of moral government. If therefore, from our knowledge 
 of the system itself — its law, its subjects, its author, his provi- 
 
GOOD AND EVIL TENDENCIES. 191 
 
 dence or conduct toward his subjects — we have no means of 
 forming a judgment respecting the tendencies and final issues 
 of the system, then plainly we have no sufficient data for any 
 conclusion respecting its perfection. It is indeed quite suppos- 
 able, that such premises should exist in the case, as not only to 
 warrant, but to demand a conclusion. Be this however as it 
 may, and momentous as the question is, what may prove in the 
 end under a moral government, to be merely temporary re- 
 sults in obedience or disobedience, are an utterly insufficient 
 basis for any conclusion respecting its perfection. If these are 
 the only sources of evidence on the question, then there is none. 
 All that we can say is, the system may be perfect and it may 
 not be. And yet philosophers have derived their principal, 
 not to say their sole objection against the perfection of God's 
 government and God's character, and in this way against his 
 revelation and against all religion, from the existence of moral 
 evil in the world. But who of them all knows whereof he 
 affirms ? Who in his ignorance, is certain that any degree of 
 moral evil in this world is inconsistent with such issues of the 
 system in a future state, as shall show, in brightest manifesta- 
 tion, the perfection of the system and the character of its 
 Author ? 
 
 But it may here be said, that there is a greater tendency, 
 under the present system, to wrong than to right moral action 
 on the part of all men, and that the author of the system de- 
 signed that it should be so. That the alleged greater tendency* 
 exists under the present system is denied, as involving an abso- 
 lute impossibility in the nature of things. The objection con- 
 cedes that men are capable of moral action, and are of course 
 moral beings. But a moral being is one whose highest happi- 
 ness depends, and who knows that it does, on acting morally 
 right. There can be no tendency to moral action in a moral 
 being, except ultimately to obtain happiness by acting ; and 
 the greater the happiness known by the agent to depend on 
 one kind of moral action, the greater the tendency to that 
 action. When he knows as a moral agent must, that his high- 
 est happiness depends on his acting morally right, there is of 
 
 * Tendency is that in the nature of an antecedent in a sequence which will give 
 the certainty of the consequent, provided there is not that in another antecedent 
 which will give the certainty of the opposite. 
 
192 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 course a greater tendency in his case to act morally right, than 
 to act morally wrong. To suppose a greater tendency in his 
 case to act morally wrong than morally right, is to suppose 
 that his highest happiness depends, and he knows it, on his 
 acting morally wrong, when his highest happiness does not 
 depend on his so acting, and when he knows that it does not — 
 which is a twofold contradiction, and an absolute impossibility 
 in the nature of things. I am not saying, that a moral being, 
 with that knowledge which is necessary to constitute him such, 
 may not act morally wrong. But I maintain that if he does, 
 he so acts, having the knowledge that his highest happiness 
 consists in acting morally right ; and that therefore in so doing, 
 he does not act according to the greater tendency. JSTor am I 
 saying, that when a moral agent acts morally wrong, there is 
 not a previous certainty of his so doing ; nor that there is not 
 a cause, ground, or reason of such previous certainty. But I 
 maintain that there is nothing in these, which, when speaking 
 reflectively for the purposes of philosophic truth, can be pro- 
 perly called a greater tendency to wrong than right moral 
 action — provided any thing more be meant by the language, 
 than that there is that in the nature of the motive — which in 
 distinction from power is the cause of the wrong moral act — 
 compared with the motive to right moral action, that gives 
 the certainty of the wrong instead of the right moral action. 
 I have no occasion to say, that the phrase may not be properly, 
 or according to common usage, applied to the cause of wrong 
 moral action in a further meaning than that now specified, nor 
 do I admit that it can be. It seems to me to be applied, in a 
 further meaning, by none but philosophers, and only by that 
 class of philosophers and divines who maintain the doctrine of 
 necessity as opposed to moral liberty, and to be therefore not a 
 proper, but a mere sectarian or partisan usage.* Granting how- 
 ever that common usage sanctions the propriety of speaking of 
 a stronger tendency to wrong than to right moral action, still, 
 
 * I know of no attempt to justify such language as " stronger motive," "strong- 
 est motive," "greater power or strength of motive," "greater or stronger tendency 
 of motive," to morally wrong than to morally right acts of will, as the language of 
 popular or common usage. The popular language of the Scriptures is directly and 
 abundantly the contrary. It would seem that divines, like President Edwards, 
 who so arbitrarily and unwarrantably use such language, should well consider this 
 topic as presented in the Scriptures. 
 
THE STRONGER TENDENCY. 193 
 
 as we have before shown, it is in every such case, the lan- 
 guage of appearance, and in its actual meaning when thus 
 employed, entirely false. And what if usage sanctions the 
 propriety of the language of appearance, in its false mean- 
 ing in certain cases and for certain purposes, does this show 
 that it is to be employed for scientific uses ? What if, for 
 the ordinary purposes of life, it is proper to speak of the sun 
 as rising and setting ; is the astronomer to adopt this language 
 for the purposes of science ? 
 
 But it may be asked — if there are two opposing tendencies 
 and one prevails over the other, is not the former a greater or 
 stronger tendency than the latter? I answer, that while this 
 may be said with propriety and with truth in respect to physi- 
 cal or natural phenomena, it cannot in the same meaning be 
 said respecting moral phenomena. In the one case, the oppos- 
 ing tendencies result from the opposing powers of opposing 
 antecedents, as when we speak of the greater force or stronger 
 arm prevailing over the weaker. But in respect to the ante- 
 cedents of moral phenomena or acts of will, there is no such 
 conflict of opposing powers ; and to speak as if there were, is 
 at best to use the language of appearance which in its actual 
 meaning is known to be false. And further, it may be trhily 
 and properly said, that there is a greater or stronger tendency 
 on the part of every moral being to morally right than to mor- 
 ally wrong action. If it be asked in what sense, I answer — 
 not in that in which, as we have seen, the language would be 
 known to be false, but in a very different meaning, viz. : to 
 denote the fact, that in the nature and circumstances of a moral 
 being, as these are actually known to us on a priori grounds, 
 and known as moral causes merely, there is more adaptation 
 or fitness to secure right than wrong moral action. While no 
 one can doubt the propriety of using the language in this 
 application, it cannot be supposed to be so used, except as the 
 language of appearance, and surely not to denote a ground of 
 the certainty of right moral action. So true is it in the proper 
 use of language, that there is a greater tendency to right than 
 to wrong moral action on the part of moral beings in the 
 sense now explained, that, judging on a priori ground, there 
 is far more reason for the conclusion that they will act 
 morally right, than that they will act morally wrong ; and 
 that wrong moral action on their part, in view of the tend- 
 Vol. I.— 9 13 
 
194 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 ency to right moral action, is cause for universal astonish- 
 ment as utterly irrational. 
 
 But it will be further asked, how is this if we judge a poste- 
 riori — how is it when we see a whole race of moral beings 
 uniformly acting morally wrong instead of morally right? 
 Can we in view of such a fact, say that there is not a greater 
 tendency in their case to act morally wrong than morally 
 right ? I answer ; first, that without denying the propriety 
 of saying that there is a greater or stronger tendency to wrong 
 moral action than to its opposite on the part of men, inasmuch 
 as the false language of appearance is often proper, I affirm 
 that the only truth in the case to which such language can 
 respect, is that there is a ground or reason of the certainty of 
 wrong moral action. There can be no evidence from the uni- 
 versal phenomenon of wrong moral action, of a greater tend- 
 ency to such action in the meaning in which such language 
 may now be supposed to be properly used. There may be 
 and in my view there is, a ground or reason for the certainty 
 of wrong moral action, which fact in the false and harmless 
 language of appearance is mistaken for a stronger tendency to 
 wrong moral action. But there can be no truth in the actual 
 meaning of this language of appearance thus employed. The 
 tendency to right and to wrong moral action in every moral 
 being implies no conflict between opposing poicers or influences 
 in which the one overcomes the other as being the superior or 
 greater power or influence. The only power in the case is the 
 will, which is equally adequate to either act. Power or influ- 
 ence as we have shown, cannot be predicated of motive or of 
 any thing which determines the will. Of course no greater 
 tendency which depends on such power or influence can be 
 truly inferred or predicated of it. There is the same possibil- 
 ity, so far as possibility depends on power, to either act instead 
 of the other. In view of this known power and possibility as 
 given by this power, neither the fact of right nor of wrong 
 moral action, nor the uniformity of either, can be the least evi- 
 dence of a greater tendency to one than to the other, which 
 depends on power or influence. The only sense in which it 
 can be said that there is a greater tendency to right than to 
 wrong moral action on the part of men, implies nothing which 
 can with truth be called greater power or influence to secure 
 right than wrong moral action, which also gives the certainty 
 
GROUND OF CERTAINTY. 195 
 
 of right moral action. Still less can it be supposed that what 
 may be called the less tendency to wrong moral action, should 
 involve any thing in its nature which makes it certain. We 
 are indeed, in view of the fact of wrong moral action on the 
 part of men, obliged to admit some ground or reason of the cer- 
 tainty of such action with power to the contrary. But this 
 is not and cannot be a greater tendency to such action, but is a 
 ground or reason of its certainty, notwithstanding a greater 
 tendency as above explained to right moral action. Such is 
 always the fact when the mind knowingly chooses the infe- 
 rior good. If it be asked, what gives this certainty of the 
 wrong moral action, we may or may not be able to assign 
 some one antecedent as the cause, ground or reason of this cer- 
 tainty in all cases. It may be the nearness of the inferior good, 
 or it may be the peculiar vividness of the mind's view of it, or 
 it may be any one of many other possible circumstances. Nor is 
 it in the lowest degree incredible, that the ground or reason of 
 this certainty should vary in different cases, and that no com- 
 mon characteristic of such antecedents can be affirmed, except 
 that they give the certainty of wrong moral action. Be these 
 things as they may, still the mind in every moral choice, 
 knows in the most absolute manner in which truth can be 
 known, that its own highest happiness depends on choosing 
 morally right. Otherwise the choice can have no moral char- 
 acter. I only ask, can reasoning from physical tendencies set 
 aside this truth of absolute knowledge, that the greater is the 
 happiness known to depend on an act of choice, the greater the 
 tendency to that act? If not, then instead of a greater tend- 
 ency to wrong than to right, there is a greater tendency to right 
 than to wrong moral action, under the present system. 
 
 But it may be said, still there is a cause, ground or reason 
 of the certainty of wrong moral action on the part of all men 
 under the present system. This is readily admitted. But this 
 cause, ground or reason of the mere certainty of wrong moral 
 action giving no necessity for it, but implying power to the 
 contrary, may in respect to divine prevention, be incidental 
 to the best moral system. Or thus, the present system not- 
 withstanding this metaphysical imperfection, may be not only 
 better than none, but the best possible to the Creator. This 
 cause, ground or reason of the certainty of wrong moral action 
 may be said to be a tendency to such action. Though it 
 
196 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 be less than that to tlie opposite, still it may be a tendency 
 which gives the certainty of wrong action. Some degree of 
 tendency to wrong action is unavoidable in a moral system ; 
 and while if it were greater to wrong than to right, it wonld be 
 flagrantly inconsistent with a moral system, yet that there 
 should be that which gives the certainty of wrong moral action, 
 is not necessarily inconsistent with the Creator's preference of 
 right to wrong moral action under the present system. He 
 may purpose this cause of the certainty of wrong moral action, 
 not as good in itself or as the means of good, but solely as an 
 evil incidental in the very nature of things to the best possible 
 system. He may prefer the existence of this evil and its con- 
 sequent in wrong moral action, so far as the latter exists, to the 
 non-existence of the best system and for no other reason. But 
 this is no proof, not the lowest degree of probable evidence, 
 that he prefers wrong to right moral action in a single instance 
 under the present system. On the contrary, according to the 
 present supposition of possible truth, the proof is decisive, that 
 he would prevent this tendency which results in wrong moral 
 action, were it possible to him to do so and yet adopt or not 
 perpetuate the system, that he permits it only as a metaphys- 
 ical evil inseparable by his power from the best system, and 
 that therefore while he adopts the best system, he prefers in 
 every instance right to wrong moral action under the present 
 system. Kor is this all. Since on the present supposition he 
 prefers the existence of this tendency to wrong moral action 
 solely to the non-existence of the best system, he does not pre- 
 fer it to a tendency that should give the certainty of right 
 moral action. On the contrary, this tendency to wrong moral 
 action must be a tendency to that which when compared with 
 right moral action, is contrary to his will. Of course his whole 
 will must be opposed to this tendency to wrong moral action, 
 compared with a tendency to right moral action in its stead. 
 The very tendency therefore, alleged as proof that he prefers 
 wrong to right moral action, implies and proves on the present 
 supposition his preference of right to wrong moral action under 
 the present system. And what sort of proof is that of his pref- 
 erence of wrong to right moral action, which for any thing 
 which can be shown to the contrary, may be a decisive proof 
 of the opposite preference. 
 
 The grand and only objection to our present position, derived 
 
GOD PREFERS RIGHT TO WRONG. 197 
 
 from the tendency to moral evil in the world, and its existence 
 and prevalence, is then without the least plausibility. 
 
 Here then I appeal to the great fact on which our present 
 argument rests, viz. : that God has created men moral beings, 
 thus adapting their nature to right moral action, and thus, from 
 the necessity of their nature as moral beings, causing tendencies 
 to right moral action, which clearly manifest his will or prefer- 
 ence that they should, in every instance, act morally right. 
 So far as tendencies can have any influence or bearing on the 
 question of what kind of moral action he prefers, the tendencies 
 to right moral action stand forth in the nature and circum- 
 stances of the beings, as the great and only fact to be taken 
 into consideration, when the question is, what is his will in 
 respect to the moral conduct of his moral creatures ? This fact 
 is proof, uncounteracted by the least opposing evidence, and 
 therefore unequivocal and decisive, that God prefers right to 
 wrong moral action. Analyze and scrutinize the true nature 
 and tendencies of things as we may, and we must see in what 
 God has done in respect to right and wrong moral action, 
 adaptation, fitness, tendency to one end, and to one end only — 
 to right moral action — insomuch that in this contemplation of 
 a moral agent, we wonder that he should ever do wrong. We 
 count all wrong-doing a disorder, and a violence done to the 
 nature and laws of a moral economy. It is eternal necessary 
 truth, that a moral agent is a being so constituted and so cir- 
 cumstanced, that virtue, perfect moral excellence, is the sure 
 and only means of his highest and perfect happiness. All that 
 can be called adaptation, fitness or tendency in the nature and 
 condition of moral beings, is a greater, higher adaptation, fit- 
 ness or tendency to right moral action than to wrong. The evi- 
 dence in the case all goes to prove, that the Creator of such 
 beings prefers right to wrong moral action on their part. This 
 will of God stands forth in the nature of man as a moral being 
 in as clear and bright manifestation's had this been a world 
 of universal obedience to that will. The question of the Crea- 
 tor's preference of right to wrong moral action is not touched 
 at all by the results whether in obedience or disobedience. 
 The system itself so far as any thing appears to the contrary, 
 is not only better than none, but, notwithstanding the evil, is 
 the best which a perfect God could adopt. The question there- 
 fore concerning his preference of right to wrong moral action, 
 
198 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 under this best system, is one which in the very nature of the 
 case,is to be decided in view of its adaptations and tendencies. 
 If the system when thus judged of, is not only better than 
 none, but the best conceivable for aught we know or can say 
 to the contrary, then it is proof decisive, viewed in its true 
 nature and tendency, that its Author prefers right to wrong 
 moral action. If under this same system there had been uni- 
 versal obedience, it would have added nothing to the evidence 
 of his preference, for he would have done no more to secure 
 obedience than he has now done. The proof on this supposi- 
 tion, would be furnished, not by the obedience of the subjects, 
 but solely by the nature of the system; so that if the system 
 does not prove his preference without, it could not prove it 
 with obedience. So likewise, universal disobedience lessens 
 not this evidence, for he does nothing less to secure obedience 
 than had universal obedience been the result. If then the 
 system with universal disobedience, does not prove his prefer- 
 ence, it could not prove it with universal obedience, for the 
 system would be the same on either supposition. 
 
 Such is undeniably the true and only legitimate mode of 
 reasoning on this subject. The question is not, what subjects 
 do ; but what has the moral governor done ? It is not what is 
 the conduct of subjects under the system, but what is the sys- 
 tem under which they act ? Take an example. Let it be once 
 ascertained that a father has done all that wisdom and good- 
 ness dictate to secure the obedience of his children, that the sys- 
 tem of influence is perfect, or which is the same thing in the 
 argument, that there is no proof that wisdom and goodness re- 
 quired him to do any thing more than he has done for the pur- 
 pose, or that to have done any thing more or less would not 
 have been for the worse instead of the better ; and his prefer- 
 ence of obedience to disobedience is alike conspicuous and un- 
 deniable, whether his children obey or disobey. Here then I 
 ask, what other than a moral . system, and what moral system 
 better than the present, could God in his infinite wisdom and 
 goodness have chosen, supposing him to be infinitely good? 
 Could he have adopted a system of moral government without 
 creating free moral agents to be governed by the laws of such 
 a jurisdiction? Could he have created moral beings without 
 giving them power to obey or disobey under that system, be it 
 what it might ? And now when they act wrong under such a 
 
HOW DO WE JUDGE IN LIKE CASES? 199 
 
 system of influence, which for aught that can he shown to 
 the contra?y, is the best fitted to secure their obedience, is 
 their wrong doing to be alleged as proof that he prefers it to 
 their right doing? In an analogous case of human govern- 
 ment parental or civil, would disobedience impart the slightest 
 shade of obscurity to the will of the parent or the legislator ? 
 Would not a similar system of adaptations and influences be as 
 decisive of a father's preference of obedience to disobedience as 
 had uniform obedience been the actual result ? Why then is it 
 not so in respect to God? Why should we not be as charitable 
 in our judgment of our Maker as of a fellow being ? Is there no 
 possible case in which law can be transgressed without proving 
 the insincerity of the lawgiver ? If so, then the transgression 
 of law is a solecism and a contradiction, for there can be no 
 law when there is no sincerity in a lawgiver. If then we say, 
 that because God is omnipotent, he can secure obedience in 
 every instance, and therefore if he does not, it must be because 
 he prefers disobedience to obedience in that instance, then God 
 cannot give a law — he cannot sincerely prefer obedience to dis- 
 obedience in any case in which the latter occurs. There is no 
 alternative but this. Either he can prevent all sin in the case 
 or he cannot. If he cannot, then he may be sincere in the pro- 
 hibition of it in his law. But if he can and does not, he can- 
 not be sincere in its prohibition in any case in which sin takes 
 place. Disobedience in the subject is decisive proof of insin- 
 cerity in the lawgiver, and of course that there is no law. But 
 if there is a possible or conceivable case,in which the trangres- 
 sion of a law from God should exist without proving his insin- 
 cerity, i. £., consistently with his real preference of obedience 
 to disobedience, what is this possible case, except that which we 
 have proved to be real? Were God the friend and patron of in- 
 iquity, would he have so formed and ordered all the adaptations 
 and tendencies to righteousness, that the soid of man should 
 find joy unmingled and perfect only in the practice of it ? Has 
 God so formed man, even in his own image, that he never can, 
 and knows that he never can be happy,but in the consciousness 
 of moral excellence, that he can secure in the highest measure 
 the gratification of every part of his sentient nature, only as he 
 spurns every sensual excess ; that he never can feel himself 
 truly ennobled, but by the high resolve of virtuous doings, that 
 he can never rise to his true grandeur and godlike elevation, 
 
200 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 only as he gives up himself, his passions and appetites, to the 
 control of perfect moral principle — what other conclusion can 
 be drawn from such premises, than that the Being who formed 
 us, loves the virtue that thus exalts, adorns and blesses his 
 creatures, and hates the vice that degrades, deforms and ruins 
 them ? Surely the design of the Creator is conspicuous in this 
 universal and undeniable tendency of things. I decide not 
 here that he loves virtue for its own sake, or whether his pref- 
 erence of virtue to vice is a benevolent or a selfish preference, 
 but only that he has this preference. To deny it, is to do vio- 
 lence to the most incontrovertible of all principles — it is to 
 maintain that a perfect adaptation to an end is no evidence 
 that the end is designed, or that the best hind of evidence that 
 God can furnish, is no evidence at all. The most august fact 
 in the creation of God, the moral constitution of moral beings, 
 is divested of all significance in reasoning, and the author of 
 that constitution of the high character of an intelligent and de- 
 signing Creator. Surely if the sun is placed in the heavens to 
 illumine and warm the earth, if the rain falls to water it and to 
 cause it to bring forth food for man and beast, if food and 
 drink are formed to nourish and refresh our bodies, then is the 
 mind of man created to be conformed to the law of benevolent 
 action. This is the will — this is the law of God. It comes to 
 us in the very nature and structure of the mind — it is given us 
 in the actual cognitions of the inner man, in the knowledge of 
 
 ~ 7 O 
 
 ourselves, and therefore in a manner not less distinct nor less 
 impressive, than were it sent in thunders from his throne. 
 
 In conclusion I remark, that the question we have now 
 discussed is one of the deepest concern. There is an Infinite 
 Being, who has given existence to man, and made him a moral 
 being. It is the will of his Great Creator that he should act 
 either morally right or morally wrong: On the latter suppo- 
 sition, what is this Infinite Being ? He is plainly the most 
 appalling object that ever terrified a phrenzied imagination. 
 You cannot conceive of another so fitted to overwhelm with 
 terror and dismay ; an Infinite Being preferring wrong to right 
 moral action ! the Great God the friend and patron of iniquity ! 
 What ground for hope, for confidence, for joy, could remain 
 under his dominion ? Who could pray, or praise, or love, or 
 rejoice? Whose hopes would not perish, whose heart would 
 not break, whose spirit would not sink and die in anguish? 
 
ONE OF TWO SUPPOSITIONS. 201 
 
 Yet men, to defend their schemes of faith, talk of a benevo- 
 lent God, who on the whole prefers vice to virtue — sin to holi- 
 ness ! What proof then that every creature of his power, 
 formed in his image, will not become a fiend, and his moral 
 universe a pandemonium ? Dream of any thing else, and enjoy 
 it as you may, but dream not, for consolation's sake, of a benev- 
 olent God who is the minister of sin ! Of all the absurdities 
 that ever disgraced Deism or Universalism, or any other system 
 of faith, that which combines the character of the perfect God 
 and a perfect Devil in one being is the most monstrous. 
 
 Shall we then adopt the other supposition ? Then there is an 
 Infinite Being, who has given a law to man — whose will it is, 
 that man should always act morally right rather than morally 
 wrong. This Being can make his creature, man, supremely 
 happy or supremely miserable, as he obeys or disobeys his will. 
 "What will he do in fact ? To impute to him the imbecility of 
 mutable purposes — to suppose the want of all purpose in the 
 exercise and products of his infinite attributes, or an utter in- 
 difference to the accomplishment of them, we cannot. If his 
 designs are not benignant, they are at least such in respect to 
 vastness of comprehension, strength of decision, and grandeur 
 of object, as to exempt their author from contempt; they are 
 such as accord with the infinitude of his natural attributes. 
 He may, for aught we now say, be a benevolent, or he may be 
 a malignant Being. But having infinite power and knowl- 
 edge, he will not so act as to incur the contempt of his intelli- 
 gent creation. His designs and doings, in their nature and 
 results, will be great, like their author. They will be such, 
 that human reason cannot look on the reality and make light 
 of it. What then is it for man to know that he is absolutely 
 in the power of such a Being, and that he has always crossed 
 his will ! — done what he could to defeat the design of his Crea- 
 tor in giving him existence ! ! And yet who is the man that 
 has not done it ? There is no such man. What then are our 
 prospects ? Is death the end of all ? That cannot be proved. 
 What then is to be the issue of God's great design in creating 
 man a moral being, the most exalted in kind which he can cre- 
 ate? Will it be abandoned in indifference or in fickleness? 
 Will the great design of all his works be relinquished as im- 
 practicable by an Omniscient and Almighty Creator ? Will it 
 prove to be a plan, for entering on which there were no reasons, 
 9* 
 
202 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 or for abandoning which new ones will occur ? Will this great 
 design of God toward men, which stands forth first, and bright- 
 est, and greatest among them all, come to naught ? Will death 
 arrest the whole moral economy of God, and bring on it failure 
 and defeat ? I do not say here that it will not. But if it is 
 rational in some cases to hope, is it not as rational also to fear ? 
 Were your life, your every interest, thus in the hands of a 
 mysterious stranger of your own species, whose will you had 
 always intentionally thwarted, would you not rationally fear to 
 meet him ? And when that stranger is your Creator, the Infi- 
 nite Being who has made you to obey his will, and you have 
 disobeyed it, have you no concern to know the issues of the 
 design of your creation ? Is there to be no full and final con- 
 summation of this moral economy ? Are your wishes, hopes, 
 fancies, dreams, good evidence that the great question between 
 God and his moral creation will go unsettled, and terminate in 
 insignificant and degrading mockery? Or, have you good 
 reason to expect that you shall one day encounter the displeas- 
 ure of one whom you have so much displeased ? Can the will 
 of any being — can the will of God be crossed, even that will 
 on which the end of his creation depends, and he not be dis- 
 pleased ? When you think of the violence done to your own 
 moral nature, and the practical defiance of the known will of 
 the Being that made you ; when you listen to that voice of re- 
 monstrance and of warning from within which you cannot 
 silence, and to those distinct and impressive whisperings of 
 self-condemnation which you cannot mistake, do you not know 
 that there is an account between yourself and your Maker yet 
 unadjusted? Can you feel that all is safe? In spite of your- 
 selves, of all your wishes and your hopes, do you not fear a 
 retributive hour — do you not expect to meet an avenging 
 God? 
 
LECTURE II. 
 
 8. First leading proposition continued.— God enforces conformity to his law by authority.— (a) 
 He assumes the right to give a law. — (b) He dispenses good and evil as powerful inducements; 
 — for good and evil are the proper effects of right and wrong action ; — as self-complacency and 
 remorse are enjoyed and suffered; reflection can be avoided only in part;— (c) The providence 
 of God in other ways works against evil and for good by discipline, restraint, sickness, disappoint- 
 ment, death. — Forebodings of evil after death. 
 
 Isr support of tlie proposition, that God is administering a 
 moral government over men in some import of the language, I 
 have adduced the facts — 
 
 1. That men are moral beings. 
 
 2. That God has given them a law or rule of action. 
 I now proceed to show as I proposed — 
 
 3. That he enforces conformity to this law by the influence 
 of authority. 
 
 By this I do not intend to decide whether he does or does 
 not evince the equity of his administration and his rightful 
 authority. It is common to speak of the authority of a parent 
 or of a civil ruler, notwithstanding the manifest imperfections 
 in the administration of his government. In such a case, we 
 mean that he assumes and exercises the right to give law or 
 prescribe a rule of action to others, and treats them in many 
 respects, as if this right truly and properly belonged to him. 
 He does so particularly by showing that he can dispense good 
 and evil, and that it is his purpose to do so in such a manner as 
 to create a powerful motive — a good and sufficient reason for 
 doing his will because it is his %villj in other words, for submit- 
 ting to it without further inquiry, as the ultimate standard, the 
 true and decisive rule of duty. 
 
 It is in this general and somewhat indefinite sense, that I now 
 speak of God as enforcing conformity to his will by the influ- 
 ence of authority. As the parent, whatever imperfections and 
 even inconsistencies may mar the government which he exer- 
 cises over his children,may still be said to govern by authority, 
 in like manner God governs men. • That more than this is true, 
 I shall attempt to show hereafter. This is all that I maintain 
 at present, it being necessary to show that God is administering 
 
204 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 a moral government over men as distinguished from any other, 
 before I attempt to prove the perfection of his moral govern- 
 ment. 
 
 I remark, then — 
 
 In the first. place, that God assumes and exercises the right of 
 giving a law or of prescribing a rule of action to men. We 
 have already shown in the preceding lecture, that God has 
 clearly manifested his will to men in respect to their moral 
 conduct by giving them a rule of action. This is in its own 
 nature an act of sovereign prerogative — an assumption and 
 exercise of the right to govern. The nature of virtue, of right 
 moral action is not a creation, dependent on and coming forth 
 from the divine will. That does not make it right though it 
 may prove it to be so — in other words, it is not right because 
 he wills it, but he wills it because it is right. But the nature 
 of man is a creation, making manifest the design of his Creator 
 in giving him existence. God as the author of man's nature 
 and condition, has placed him under the necessity of acting 
 morally right to secure his own well-being. He has, etymolog- 
 ically speaking, bound him by the cords of this necessity, that 
 is in common language, placed him under a moral obligation 
 to act morally right. In so doing God claims his conformity 
 to the rule of right action. This God does not by compact, not 
 by permission or consent — but in the exercise of his own su- 
 preme right or sovereign prerogative. Thus then the infinite 
 Being who made us, assumes the relation of a governor over us 
 by law, thus taking the position of claiming submission to his 
 will, on the ground that he has a right to it. I am not saying 
 that he has this right (this may appear hereafter) ; but that 
 he assumes it in the very act of giving a law, and that this as- 
 sumption is itself and by itself, a clear and convincing intima- 
 tion that he will vindicate and sustain this right, if not per- 
 fectly, to that degree which shall entitle it to respect. 
 
 No man can think of the greatness of God, how entirely he 
 has the happiness of man at his own disposal — how clearly he 
 has manifested his will respecting human conduct, and espe- 
 cially, how worthy of such a Being is the august relation of a 
 perfect moral governor, without feeling a peculiar influence, 
 an absolute and imperious aecessity urging him to unqualified 
 submission to his will. 
 
 There is a reason for this. Nothing is more certain than the 
 
111- 
 
 ANTICIPATIONS OF JUDGMENT. 205 
 
 execution of will, to the extent of the agent's power. On this 
 well known principle it is, that no human being, with the 
 knowledge of God's will respecting his conduct, can contravene 
 it and reflect on what he has done, without the apprehension 
 of some retributive evil, nor perform it without anticipatin 
 some expression of his favor. How plainly is this almost i 
 stinctive feeling seen in children, nay in friends, neighbors — in 
 all relations, that of utter strangers not excepted. To imagine 
 that men should regard it otherwise in respect to God, is to 
 suppose them ignorant of the great law of voluntary action — 
 the law which connects with will the doing of what is willed, 
 and the entire suspension of this law in a Being who is Al- 
 mighty. Who can believe that God would be pleased with 
 the conduct of creatures who are formed in his own image, and 
 make no expression of his pleasure in good conferred, and be 
 displeased with their conduct, and express no displeasure in 
 evil inflicted ? Can the infinite Being show, in the very nature 
 of men, the end for which he made them, viz., right moral 
 action, that he values the end as all that gives importance to 
 their being, and do nothing which is in any respect fitted to 
 secure the accomplishment, and to prevent the frustration of 
 his will ? Why else does he assume and exercise the right to 
 give law ? Why appear before his rational and moral creation 
 in the exercise of such prerogative ? Why has he entered upon 
 this moral economy, if it is to be abandoned as a disgraceful 
 mockery in the view of his moral creation ? Is he too weak to 
 maintain and vindicate the high prerogative he has assumed ? 
 This will not be pretended. Will his heart fail him — will he, 
 in the tenderness of his relentings, sink all that is venerable 
 and awful in the character of a lawgiver and judge, in the 
 weakness of parental indulgence ; and so consent in the issue 
 to expose himself to the ridicule, the contempt, and the defi- 
 ance of a mere pretender to authority ? Is God to stand before 
 his moral creation, in the assumption of the high prerogative 
 of its sovereign king, and yet in the mere pageantry of one 
 from whom obedience has nothing to hope, and transgression 
 nothing to fear ? What an absurdity ! Shall God give a law, 
 and leave it unsanctioned by good and evil ? Become a law- 
 giver, but not a judge ? Shall his law be distinctly promulged, 
 being written on every heart, and yet no judgment and no retri- 
 bution follow ? No. The mere giving of a law by our Maker 
 
206 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 is proof that we live under a retributive economy. Law be- 
 speaks a judge. It tells of a throne in heaven, occupied by a 
 living, reigning monarch, who takes judicial cognizance of the 
 conduct of his creatures, and executes legal sanctions as they 
 obey or disobey his will. 
 
 In the second place, God so dispenses good and evil to men 
 in this world, as to create a powerful inducement to do his will 
 because it is his will. By this I mean, that God so dispenses 
 good and evil to men in this world as to influence them to right 
 moral action, not simply by the appropriate tendencies and con- 
 sequences of actions, but also by the certainty of happiness or 
 misery, as they obey or disobey. The performance or non-per- 
 formance of an action, in view of its appropriate tendencies and 
 consequences, is one thing. But to perform an action, because by 
 so doing I shall please, and by not performing it shall displease 
 another and a superior being on whom my happiness may or 
 must greatly depend, is quite another thing. The former I 
 might do, were there no superior being to be pleased or dis- 
 pleased with my conduct. The latter implies a direct regard 
 to the will of another ; because he can, and, as I have reason to 
 believe, will dispose of my happiness or misery according to 
 my actions. To be governed by this is to act from the influ- 
 ence of authority. What I now claim is, that God dispenses 
 good and evil to men in this world in order to create this influ- 
 ence; i. <?., so that we have reason to believe, that by right 
 moral action we shall secure his favor, with its appropriate 
 expressions in good conferred, and by wrong moral action shall 
 incur his displeasure, with its appropriate expressions in evil 
 inflicted. I am not now saying what degree of good and of 
 evil we are to expect from obedience and disobedience; but 
 that we are led by the actual providence of God to expect good 
 and evil as the consequences of right and wrong action, in such 
 a degree as to make it for our true interest to please him. 
 
 I remark then, that amid all the seeming mystery connected 
 with the distribution of good and evil in this world, there is 
 one fact too palpable to be denied, viz. : so far as good and 
 evil, happiness and misery, are seen to depend on the moral 
 conduct of man, (and they are seen to depend on it to a great 
 extent) all that good is the effect of virtue, and all that evil is 
 the effect of vice. I know indeed that it is maintained by some, 
 that vice often produces more happiness than virtue would 
 
ACTIONS AND THEIR TENDENCY. 207 
 
 produce in its stead. This I utterly deny. In some cases, 
 greater good appears to follow vice, than we in our short-sight- 
 edness can see would follow virtue in its stead. This, be it 
 remembered, is the estimate of our ignorance, and no proof of 
 the fact alleged. Aside then from the groundless nature of 
 this assumption, there is another equally so, viz., that the good 
 which follows vice is its direct and appropriate effect. For in 
 what case is the supposed greater good, which is said to follow, 
 seen and known to be its true and appropriate effect ? This is 
 absolutely impossible in the nature of things. Yice consists 
 simply in a selfish or malignant intention, in which the mind 
 proposes to sacrifice both its own and also the greater good of 
 others to the less. The sole tendency of this state of mind is 
 to produce such a result. At the same time, the known ten- 
 dency of virtue is to produce the greatest good, both to others 
 and to the agent. How then can vice be the true and proper 
 cause of greater good than virtue? How can it be the cause 
 of that which it has no tendency to produce, and when virtue 
 is known to be the only true and proper cause of the greatest 
 good, in all cases ? This can never be till the nature of things 
 is changed, and virtue becomes vice, and vice virtue. 
 
 "Nor is this all. Whatever good may follow a vicious or 
 wicked action, of that good, the vice or wickedness of the 
 action is not the true and proper cause. I readily admit that 
 vice may, in one sense of the language, be said to be the means, 
 and even the cause of good, viz., it may be folloived with good. 
 In this sense, we may properly speak of the pleasures of sin. 
 I also admit, that in all voluntary action of that kind in which 
 man aims to obtain any good, there is a tendency to secure or 
 produce it, and of course that this is true of all voluntary sin- 
 ful action. But then it is to be remembered that it is true of 
 it only as voluntary, and not as sinful. Bishop Butler has 
 made this important distinction between actions and that qual- 
 ity which constitutes them virtuous or vicious. lie says, "An 
 action, by which any natural passion is gratified, or fortune 
 acquired, procures delight or advantage, abstracted from all 
 consideration of the morality of such action ; consequently the 
 pleasure or advantage in this case is gained by the action itself, 
 not by the morality, the virtuousness or viciousness of the 
 action, though it be perhaps virtuous or vicious. Thus to say, 
 such an action or course of behavior procured such pleasure 
 
208 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 or advantage, or brought such inconvenience or pain, is quite 
 a different thing from saying that such good or bad effect was 
 owing to the virtue or vice of such action or behavior. In 
 one case, an action abstracted from all moral consideration pro- 
 duced its effect. In the other case — for it will appear that 
 there are such cases — the morality of the action, the action 
 under a moral consideration, i. e., the virtuousness or the 
 viciousness of the action, produced the effect." (Analogy, P. I. 
 chap. 3.) To say then that an action which is vicious produces 
 good, is a very different thing from saying that vice, as such, 
 produces good, or that vice, in its own proper nature and ten- 
 dency, produces or is the cause of good. 
 
 Still further ; a vicious action which is said to produce good, 
 is complex, consisting of three elements, viz. : the selfish prefer- 
 ence, which is the governing purpose of the mind, the specific 
 volition to perform the requisite external action, and the exter- 
 nal action itself. In strict accuracy of conception, the vice is 
 exclusively predicable of the selfish principle, and in no degree 
 of the two other elements of the action. If now we look at 
 the true nature and tendency of this selfish purpose, and judge 
 of it in relation to its appropriate effect on the mind, and as 
 wholly uncounteracted by any opposing cause, what is it ? 
 Plainly, its tendency is to act on the conscience in instant and 
 overwhelming remorse, and thus to prevent the overt act 
 which is the true and proper cause of the proposed good, and 
 so either to prevent the acquisition or enjoyment of the good. 
 It is only in counteracting this tendency of the selfish prin- 
 ciple by at once searing and hardening conscience into a state 
 of insensibility, that the pleasure aimed at can be experienced. 
 Is it then the nature and tendency of this selfish principle to 
 produce happiness in the human mind, when its only tendency, 
 uncounteracted, is to overwhelm it in the instant agonies of 
 remorse? The same remarks, mutatis mutandis, apply to 
 virtue. All the good or happiness then which follows vice, 
 and in this sense is said to be produced by it, is known to re- 
 sult from something else than vice as its true and proper cause ; 
 and all the evil that follows virtue, is known to result from 
 something else than virtue as its true and proper cause.* So 
 that the true tendency of virtue, uncounteracted by opposing 
 
 * Vide Lecture VH. 
 
SELF-COMPLACENCY AND REMORSE. 209 
 
 causes to produce happiness and nothing but happiness, both 
 to the agent and to others; and the tendency of vice uncoun- 
 teracted by opposing causes to produce opposite results, are 
 never in the providence of God in the least obscured by the 
 good or evil which may ensue. It follows therefore, that so 
 far as happiness and misery in this world can be traced to 
 the moral conduct of men as their true and proper cause, all 
 that good is, in the providence of God, the proper effect of 
 virtue, and all that evil the effect of vice. I speak not here of 
 that happiness and misery in the world, which are not the 
 direct and proper effects of virtue and vice, but of those which 
 are. Of all this I say, the happiness is exclusively the effect 
 of right, and the misery of wrong moral action. Why then is 
 this ? What is the lesson to be learned from this method of 
 God's providence ? What is it, but that God is pleased with 
 virtue and displeased with vice? "What is it, but that if we 
 would secure the favor and avoid the displeasure of God, so 
 far as these depend on our conduct ; and if we would hope to 
 secure good and avoid evil, as these depend on his feelings 
 toward us, we must perform right and avoid wrong moral 
 action ? Surely, no rational mind can fail to value the appro- 
 bation and deprecate the disapprobation of that great Being 
 who holds the welfare of his creatures entirely at his own dis- 
 posal, as they shall obey or disobey his will. But how, in view 
 of the laws of his providence, which are as undeviating as the 
 ordinances of heaven — how, except by right action, can we 
 hope or feel the least security that Ave shall obtain his favor 
 and its blessings, or avoid his displeasure with its evils? How 
 powerful then the persuasive to virtue, as the only kind of 
 moral action by which we can hope for the approval of an infi- 
 nite Being; and how T powerful the dissuasive from vice, as that 
 by which we must expect to incur his displeasure. In other 
 w r ords, how great the motive to do the will of God, because it 
 is his will. 
 
 This reasoning will acquire still greater force, if we consider 
 more particularly the appropriate results of right and wrong 
 moral action in self-complacency and remorse. These results, 
 with the delightful anticipations of the one and the painful 
 forebodings of the other, are, in every just estimate of the good 
 and evil of human life, of the highest moment to man. And 
 yet how easily, by different providential arrangements, might 
 
 14 
 
210 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 the satisfaction we feel in right, and the remorse we feel for 
 wrong action, be prevented. Indeed, it is quite conceivable 
 that these consequences should be so prevented, by the provi- 
 dence of God, as to show on his part an indifference to moral 
 conduct, or even a preference of wrong to right action. Why 
 then is it — for the fact is undeniable — that good men feel that 
 self-approbation, with its sustaining tranquillity and cheering 
 anticipations, which they value above all earthly enjoyments ? 
 They are, at best, imperfect in moral character — they have 
 acted the part of rebels against God. How easily then might 
 their offended Sovereign so order their condition as to fill and 
 overwhelm them with remorse for the past, and with despair 
 for the future ? What then are the joyful hope and triumphant 
 anticipations of the good man, but the most decisive indica- 
 tions and proofs, furnished by the providence of God, of his 
 friendship and favor ? What is this, but God manifesting him- 
 self as the friend and patron of virtue, inviting and alluring 
 man to do his will, by giving a present reward to even imper- 
 fect obedience. 
 
 On the other hand, why does not God conceal all displeasure 
 toward the workers of iniquity? That excessive tenderness 
 which some sentimental theologians are so fond of ascribing to 
 the Deity, is wont in earthly parents to be very cautious on 
 this point — to be at great pains to hide all displeasure, and to 
 prevent all remorse for offences. Such however is not the 
 method of God in his providence. Instead of being designed 
 for this purpose, his providential arrangements are peculiarly 
 adapted to opposite results. So much so, that it is not possible 
 for men .to avoid the full measure of remorse for their sins 
 without much effort — without surmounting great obstacles — 
 without doing palpable violence to the most obvious tendencies. 
 God in his providence, as it were, forces this remorse upon 
 them ; and in such a manner and in so many ways, that his pur- 
 pose, that they shall feel it and regard it as an expression of his 
 displeasure for their conduct, becomes conspicuous. 
 
 The confinement of the criminal in his solitary dungeon with 
 its inevitable results in reflection and self-reproach, is not more 
 expressive of its design than the providence of God, in securing 
 to such an extent this species of mental suffering in the bosoms 
 of the guilty, is of his purpose to make manifest his displeasure 
 toward them. Who, in the remorse and painful forebodings 
 
T IT E FRO V T D E X C E OF GOD. 21 1 
 
 of conscious guilt, docs not feel the tokens of God's indigna- 
 tion ? Who, under these frowns of an infinite being, does not 
 find a powerful motive to submit to his will and his authority? 
 If we should behold the yet undisclosed spectacle of an assem- 
 bled world, a judgment seat, and the judge thereon dispensing 
 a full retribution to the righteous and the wicked, we should be- 
 lieve in the authority of God as a lawgiver. Why then do we 
 not see in the retributions of that conscience of which God is the 
 author, as these are disclosed to us in the certainties of experi- 
 ence — why do we not see in this present judgment and execu- 
 tion of the sentence, that God reigns in the exercise, if not of a 
 righteous, at least of sovereign authority. 
 
 It is here most readily conceded, that reflection may be 
 avoided, and that by voluntary absorption in sensual pleasure, 
 by diverting thought and sensibility from our guilt, the full 
 efFects in remorse of conscience may be avoided. Should it 
 here be asked, if the design of our Maker be, that remorse 
 should follow vice to impress us with a sense of his displeasure, 
 why is it put within our power to avoid the full effect ? I an- 
 swer, that the possibility of our so doing may be inseparable 
 from the nature of human mind, and the circumstances in 
 which the greatest good requires that we should be placed. 
 The benignant designs of God may (and we shall see reason 
 hereafter to believe they do) require that man should not be 
 overwhelmed by the agonies of remorse, nor left without its 
 painful and salutary forebodings. Be this however as it may, 
 the fact now alleged does not at all obscure the real tendency 
 of vice to this result. For in every case in which the full meas- 
 ure of remorse is not realized, we know that we have counter- 
 acted an actual and powerful tendency to that effect ; and that 
 there is nothing in the constitution of the mind which is the 
 natural cause of quietness of spirit as the result of vicious prac- 
 tice. In short there is nothing to conceal, but every thing to 
 make manifest the tendency of virtue to mental tranquillity 
 and happiness, and of vice to opposite results. What then 
 shall we conclude, but that he who is the author of conscience, 
 and who has given it its supremacy and its power to legislate, 
 to judge, and to execute its awards, is himself a lawgiver, a 
 judge, and the executor of judgment ? We should be satis- 
 fied of the designs and dispositions of a monarch, communi- 
 cated through the instructions of a well accredited viceroy. 
 
212 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 And what are the laws and the lessons of conscience, but those 
 of the viceroy of the King of heaven ? If virtue be demanded 
 by the authority of conscience, and if obedience be followed by 
 a satisfaction and serenity which form a rich reward, and if 
 vice be forbidden by the same authority of conscience and 
 visited with the severe though temporary agonies of remorse, 
 then is it as rational to believe that the author of conscience 
 reigns over men as a moral governor, as if we saw him on a 
 throne in the midst of us, giving forth his law with his own 
 voice, and with his own hand dispensing gifts to the obedient, 
 and inflicting punishment on the rebellious. The testimony of 
 conscience is entitled to our belief in the one case, as truly as 
 would be the testimony of our senses in the other. 
 
 In the third place, the providential dispensations of God in 
 many other forms, duly contemplated, lead to the same conclu- 
 sion. If men would reason concerning the designs of God 
 from his acts, as they do from the acts of a fellow-creature, no 
 impression I apprehend would be more strongly made on the 
 human mind than that God reigns over this world as a law- 
 giver; — if not on the principles of perfect righteousness, at 
 least in the exercise of sovereign authority. If they were as 
 willing to contemplate God under this relation as under any 
 other, and to form those conclusions which best accord with 
 and explain the design of his providential dealings, they would 
 see God in every thing. And here the first premise in all our 
 reasonings should be the fact, that all men are transgressors of 
 his law; and beyond all question, deserve the highest possi- 
 ble punishment, provided the greatest good requires a perfect 
 moral system. And now, what is the treatment of this sinful 
 world by its Maker but a course of providence, which speaks 
 severe displeasure, even indignation, for their iniquity, mingled 
 with so much forbearance and kindness, as also to manifest his 
 love of righteousness ? Who does not endure, in the various 
 forms of pain, disappointment, and other earthly calamity, 
 sufficient evil at least to awaken the thoughts of God's dis- 
 pleasure for his sins ; and though not perhaps in his own case, 
 yet in others, how does God permit the same principle of moral 
 evil to go forth unchecked, to desolate human happiness and 
 to break human hearts, that none may be ignorant of its fear- 
 ful and fell malignity, and of the woes which he will inflict 
 on the determined workers of iniquity? What tokens of the 
 
EVENTS XOT DIRECTLY CAUSED BY SIN. 213 
 
 severity of his displeasure toward sin, and of tlie measure of 
 evil with which he may visit it, does this world furnish ! On 
 the other hand, what restraints does he put on human selfish- 
 ness, and especially in the methods in which he governs it by 
 human selfishness, does he show how he abhors its appropriate 
 doings! To my own mind, this is one of the most striking and 
 affecting facts in his providence — without which the world 
 would become a very pandemonium. By so doing, he com- 
 pels as it were human selfishness itself to perform the very 
 external deeds which benevolence would dictate, and thus se- 
 cures to a great extent the results of benevolence, and shows 
 in the most impressive manner, how happy, how blessed the 
 world would become, were benevolence the universal principle 
 of human action, and how it would rejoice him to bless a world 
 of perfect virtue. 
 
 There is yet another class of evils, from which a most impres- 
 sive lesson may be learned. I refer to those (inflicted, be it re- 
 membered, on a sinful world) which are not in the way of natu- 
 ral consequence the appropriate effect of sin. In view of these 
 evils brought on mankind, by famine, tempests, fire, earth- 
 quakes, pestilence, an d other like causes, whose connection 
 with sin in the way of natural consequence is entirely undis- 
 coverable, what lesson is taught the children of men ? Is it 
 said, they are the natural results of the laws of a material sys- 
 tem ? But who ordained these laws ? God, the intelligent, 
 designing author of this moral creation, permits their appal- 
 ling action on his creatures, all of whom, we know, have in- 
 curred his displeasure by sin ! Can we then suppose these evils 
 to be imposed without any reference to moral character ? Are 
 they all deserved, and is this fact to have no place, in account- 
 ing for the infliction ? Are these natural and appropriate 
 expressions of the displeasure of their Author toward his sinful 
 creatures, and yet shall we affirm that they are not so ? Do 
 you say that they can be accounted fur in some other way? 
 But can it be done as consistently with all the facts, and there- 
 fore as rationally ? And is not the most philosophical solution 
 also the most credible and the best ? Suppose God wished to 
 make a clear and strong impression on the human mind of his 
 high and awful sovereignty, in supporting his authority as a 
 moral ruler; suppose that he wished to show us that he might 
 and that he woul 1 not confine penal evils to the mere natural 
 
214 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 consequences of sin, but that, in vindication of Ms prerogative 
 to reign, he had in store still other penalties for the rebellious. 
 Are not these evils, and the manner of their infliction, exactly 
 fitted to manifest and impress his design % Can any other mode 
 of manifesting it be conceived, so fitted to this end ? Do you 
 ask, why are these evils so limited and partial? — why does he 
 not desolate the earth in his anger ? I answer, that would con- 
 ceal his design to restore man to duty and to happiness (as I 
 shall show hereafter). God, it should be remembered, has 
 more designs than one to make manifest to his accountable 
 creatures; and it would not be difficult to show, that his provi- 
 dence is in all respects adapted in perfect wisdom to this great 
 purpose. In some modes and forms of providence he mani- 
 fests one design, and in other modes another, and without the 
 least conflict or incongruity in doing so. And now I ask, what 
 is that which we are considering — what are tempests, earth- 
 quakes, pestilences, which carry desolation and woe over large 
 portions of the earth, in such terrific forms as to compel even 
 God-defying Atheism to cry for God's compassion ? There is 
 a way of testing an honest judgment on this question. It is, 
 to put one's self into circumstances in which there shall be no 
 temptation to judge unfairly, but every inducement to judge 
 honestly, for practical purposes. Let any one imagine himself 
 under some of these forms of evil ; the tempest is bursting on 
 his head, the earth is reeling to and fro like a drunken man — 
 or the ship is on fire in mid-ocean — every arm is palsied, every 
 face pale with despair, and God only can help — who, despair- 
 ing of life, would not feel himself to be a sinner, and, filled 
 with forebodings of greater evils to come, ask for God's mercy? 
 What then are these evils, honestly judged of, but manifesta- 
 tions of displeasure, which God makes in the exercise of his 
 own irresponsible sovereignty, and in vindication of his high 
 authority as moral governor ? 
 
 Death, separated from the mode and circumstances in which 
 it takes place, is an evil deserving our serious consideration. 
 What then is death ; what is it to all those creatures of God 
 who are able, as God designed they should be, to know and 
 feel it as it is ? " Death," in nearly the words of another, " is 
 a most serious and appalling event. It is nature's supreme 
 evil; the terror of God's creation, the monster king, from whose 
 touch and glance every living thing recoils. Death destroys 
 
RECAPITULATION". 215 
 
 both action and enjoyment ; it mocks at wisdom, strength and 
 beauty, disarranges our plans, robs us of our treasures, deso- 
 lates our homes, breaks our heart-strings, and blasts our hopes." 
 Death separates us from all we know and love on earth, extin- 
 guishes affection, confidence, joy, and life itself; it either car- 
 ries us to God's judgment-seat gr it does not — lands us in a 
 state of untried existence or in the gulf of annihilation. " Xo 
 wonder nature trembles before it. Reason justifies the fear." 
 "It is but a tribute to the value of the life which is our Ma- 
 ker's gift. To make light of death is an outrage on reason, on 
 nature, and on nature's God." To such an evil has God sub- 
 jected man. What is it but an expression of displeasure, an 
 act of awful sovereignty. I do not say what will follow it. I 
 take as it is, a known matter of fact to all God's rational and 
 moral creatures. What is it but a proof of God's displeasure 
 — proof that he reigns in vindictive sovereign majesty, aveng- 
 ing his high prerogative to rule, if not in exact righteousness 
 at least in authorizing and compelling reason to fear a more 
 dreadful retribution. 
 
 Thus I have attempted to show, that God enforces conformity 
 to his law by that influence which I have called authority. In 
 other words, in view of what God has done in the creation and 
 condition of man as a moral being, and what he does in his 
 providence over this world, there is a very powerful motive to 
 do the will of God, because it is his will. I now ask in view 
 of wdiat has been said, is there any object more worthy of being 
 made the great end of life, than that of obtaining the approba- 
 tion and avoiding the displeasure of that Being who reigns 
 over this world, and who holds all destiny in his hands ? Is 
 there any other way in which we can so rationally hope for 
 substantial good, even in this world — any other in which we 
 can avoid fear — not to say terror — in the prospect of leaving 
 it ! Say not that all is uncertain after death. Be it so ; and 
 this is the most that can be said to alleviate the prospect. All 
 then is uncertain after death ! But is it not the part of wisdom 
 to be prepared for the worst ? All is uncertain after death ! 
 And is no thought to be taken of even possible evils — and is no 
 preparation to be made against them ? All is uncertain ! But 
 is this all that can be said ? Is there nothing probable after 
 death? Look at the facts ; God has made man a moral being, 
 fitted to be held responsible for his doings — he has placed him 
 
216 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 under law as a rule of action — all adaptations, tendencies, the 
 whole nature and relations of things show that if man would be 
 happy, he must be good. Look at your own character. In bold, 
 habitual defiance you have crossed the will, and so incurred the 
 displeasure of the infinite Being who holds all destiny in his 
 hands. Look at his providence. He tells you in a manner not 
 to be mistaken, that he is displeased. He tells you in every 
 painful thought, fear and misgiving, in every sting of anguish 
 that conscience inflicts, in every evil which sin brings upon 
 yourself and every sinner — in the sorrows, tears, woes and 
 death of a groaning creation around you. He tells you also 
 of a degree of displeasure that confines not its expressions in 
 evil to the direct natural results of wrong-doing. He shows 
 himself to you maintaining his prerogative to reign by inflict- 
 ing other evils in a mode of awful sovereignty. He will ter- 
 minate your existence on earth by an event full of terror as 
 being the end of life, an event which will decide either that 
 your soul with its stupendous faculties will be blasted into an- 
 nihilation — blessed with a joyous immortality, or plunged into 
 pain, despair and horror. Such is God. All this he hath 
 done, and this he will do. And is there nothing probable after 
 death ? Tlrink of these things. Think of the question which 
 death will decide in respect to yourself. A question, the mere 
 uncertainty of whose decision is enough to convulse a universe 
 with trembling. Is thoughtless sin then the wisest, safest, best 
 preparation for meeting God in death ? I say not what will be. 
 I ask you only to think of what with fearful probability may 
 be. Do you say you can meet it with composure, and drive 
 away the forebodings of conscious guilt? I tell you no — not if 
 reason remains and conscience lives. Nero had not firmness 
 of nerve enough for this. Yoltaire, with his settled deadly 
 hate of Christianity, could not do it. There is a God. He 
 hath given a law. That law to the guilty mind will bespeak a 
 Judge. The throne of heaven to the eye of conscience will be 
 filled with a living, reigning, sin-avenging God. 
 
LECTURE III 
 
 Second leading proposition. — God's administration is equitable — proved by showing, 1. That God 
 has given the best law, 2. That he distributes good and evil equitably. — In opposition to this 
 proposition, the unequal distribution of good and evil has caused the chief difficulty. — Various 
 theories resorted to.— Is the difficulty real ? — (a) Greater difficulties in denying God's equity 
 than in admitting it. — (b) No proof against it ; for God is not inequitable in treating men better 
 than they deserve, nor in treating them worse. More rational to regard this distribution as 
 explicable in some unknown way. God may be administering a moral government under a 
 gracious economy. — (c) There is satisfactory proof for his equity — the arguments probable and 
 cumulative. 
 
 In support of our leading proposition, — that God is adminis- 
 tering A PERFECT MORAL GOVERNMENT OVER MEN, I have at- 
 tempted to show, that he is administering a moral government, 
 as a peculiar kind of government, and in some proper import of 
 the language. I now proceed, as I proposed, to show — 
 
 II. The equity of his administration. 
 
 For this purpose it is necessary only to show — 
 
 1. That God has given to men the best law ; 
 
 2. That in the distribution of good and evil in this world, 
 he does not show himself as departing from, but by this means 
 and others, as adhering to the principles of exact equity. 
 
 I remark then : 
 
 1. That God has given to men the best law. What I main- 
 tain on this topic is, that the law of benevolence, or the law of 
 benevolent action is the best law ; and that God has given this 
 law to men. After what has been said in previous lectures, I 
 deem it sufficient to add, that men, as moral beings, know that 
 they are under the law which requires them to prefer the high- 
 est happiness of all — of God and his sentient creation — to every 
 object in competition with it, and so to will, purpose, or intend 
 at all times, and in all circumstances, to do the greatest good 
 in their power. 
 
 2. God, in the distribution of good and evil in this world, 
 does not show himself as departing from, but by this means and 
 others, as adhering to the principles of exact equity. 
 
 If a moral governor gives the best law, and also does, or 
 Vol. I.— 10 
 
218 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 shows himself determined to do those things which are necessary 
 to manifest or express his highest approbation of obedience, 
 and highest disapprobation of disobedience, the equity of his 
 administration is established. He may not establish his right- 
 ful authority ; he may be a selfish being, and in other ways 
 prove himself such, yet in the case now supposed, the equity 
 of his administration cannot be impeached. 
 
 It is not however supposed, that God manifests the highest 
 approbation of obedience, and the highest disapprobation of 
 disobedience in this world, in every possible way or mode of 
 their manifestation. It is not pretended that he fully and di- 
 rectly expresses these feelings in the distribution of good and 
 evil in this world, or makes it according to the principles of 
 exact justice or perfect equity ; though, as I claim, this distri- 
 bution involves no violation of these principles, — nothing in- 
 consistent with a strict adherence to them. What I maintain 
 is, that while he does not show that he adheres to these princi- 
 ples merely by the distribution of good and evil, his manner of 
 doing so, even in this world, is such, that taken in connection 
 with other things, it fully and convincingly shows his adher- 
 ence to them. 
 
 This is quite supposable. A temporary, short suspension of 
 full and exact retribution does not necessarily involve the least 
 departure from, or violation of, any of the principles of exact 
 justice, nor, as the case may be, does it in the least degree ob- 
 scure the fact, that a moral governor adheres to these principles 
 in his administration. There may be good and sufficient reasons 
 for the temporary suspension of rewards and punishments, and 
 at the same time, full and satisfactory proofs that the principles 
 of exact justice are not violated nor abandoned. 
 
 The unequal distribution of good and evil in this world, 
 as it is called, has occasioned the principal difficulties on this 
 interesting subject. It has appeared on a superficial view of 
 Divine Providence, to involve a plain departure from, or rather 
 a palpable violation of, the principles of exact justice. The 
 error lies in not regarding the system of God's moral government 
 over men as begun or entered upon, but not yet finished — as in 
 progress, not completed — a system, perfect in all its principles 
 as one of influence, not yet carried out into all its issues and 
 results. Hence, it is often represented, not only as imperfect 
 in its present stage of progress, but as actually marred with 
 
A DIFFICULTY PRESENTS ITSELF. 219 
 
 palpable injustice in the distribution of good and evil. The 
 righteous it is said, are often cast down in affliction, while the 
 wicked are crowned with prosperity. 
 
 Hence, it is naturally asked, if God sustains his authority as 
 a perfect moral governor by adhering to the principles of strict 
 equity in his administration, why does he distribute good and 
 evil in this world in a manner so apparently inconsistent with 
 these principles ? This difficulty, so far as I know, has not been 
 removed by any satisfactory explanation. Some theologians, 
 to give plausibility to their reasonings, have resorted to the 
 theory of a future life, in which, as they would have us believe, 
 these violations of justice will cease, and be followed with mer- 
 ited rewards to the righteous, and just punishments to the 
 wicked.'" This solves no difficulty; for it concedes that the 
 principles of justice are in this world actually violated; and 
 how can even a single violation of justice be consistent with 
 the perfect equity of his administration? — Others that they 
 may avoid, rather than meet and remove the difficulty, have 
 adopted an arbitrary and unauthorized notion of justice in 
 God,— one which represents it as neither dictated by benevo- 
 lence, nor as consistent with it, and which would therefore, 
 dishonor the throne of a usurper and a tyrant, f Thus it is, that 
 occasion has been furnished for the triumph of Infidelity in its 
 favorite conclusion, — that the moral government of God, instead 
 of being maintained according to the unbending principles of 
 eternal justice, is a mere system of tenderness, which does not 
 distinguish between right and wrong ; and indulgence, which 
 accommodates itself to all iniquity. Thus it is, I may also add, 
 that many who take the name of Christians, to quell the dis- 
 turbance and alarm which they feel when they think of Heaven's 
 Sovereign as a God of justice and of judgment, sink all that is 
 venerable and awful in his dominion, into the lovely and easily 
 defied imbecility of parental fondness. 
 
 In view of the supposed difficulty arising from the manner in 
 
 * " Shall oppressed righteousness never be taken under the protection of Provi- 
 dence? Shall the cry of the innocent never roach the throne of justice? Are the 
 wrongs and grievances of the good and the righteous never to be redressed?" — Lo- 
 gan. Sermons, p. 240. Even Bishop Butler speaks of God as rewarding virtue and 
 punishing vice, as such, so that every one shall, upon the whole, have his deserts, &c." 
 He speaks of this as " the completion of that moral government" which G-od has begun 
 in this world. — Analogy, p. 120. What language is this for a Christian divine? 
 
 \ Vide Chalmers's Theology. 
 
220 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 which God distributes good and evil in this world, it may be 
 well to inquire, before Ave abandon the equity of his moral ad- 
 ministration, whether there are not greater difficulties in deny- 
 ing than in admitting it, or rather, whether the difficulty which 
 appears so formidable is not rather imaginary than real, and 
 whether the evidence is not decisive and satisfactory, that he 
 adheres to the most exact principles of equity, without the 
 shadow of violation of them, in his moral government over 
 men. 
 
 Such are my own views of the subject; and to these three 
 topics of inquiry I shall now direct my remarks. 
 
 I propose to show in respect to the equity of God's moral ad- 
 ministration : 
 
 In the first place, that there are greater difficulties in denying 
 than in admitting it. 
 
 In the second place, that there is no proof against it ; and 
 In the third place, that there is satisfactory proof in support 
 of it. 
 
 In the first place, there are greater difficulties in denying 
 than in admitting that God adheres to the principles of equity 
 in his moral administration. The importance and bearing of 
 this remark are, not that it proves even if true, our present 
 position, but that if true, it shows how extremely irrational is 
 the confident denial of it. 
 
 God, as we have seen, has furnished unequivocal proofs of 
 the fact that he administers a moral government over men. 
 This fact creates a strong presumption against the supposition 
 that he would destroy all ground of confidence in his character 
 and of respect for his authority, by violating the principles of 
 equity in the distribution of good and evil. The difficulty of 
 admitting such a conclusion is great and peculiar, when we re- 
 flect that the author of this system is the omniscient, almighty 
 and immutable Creator. That such a God should give exist- 
 ence to moral beings, adapting their nature to the great end of 
 conformity to the rule of benevolent action ; that he should 
 show that rule to be the expression of his will by every part of 
 their nature and every circumstance of their condition, so that 
 their perfection in character and in happiness depends on con- 
 formity to that will ; that he should clearly evince his purpose 
 to dispose of their happiness as obedient or disobedient, in such 
 a manner as to make it their true and highest interest to obey 
 
NO EVIDENCE FOR WANT OF EQUITY. 221 
 
 Ins will ; that lie should reveal himself as immutable in his de- 
 signs — adopt a course so fitted to secure the confiding homage 
 of his moral creation, and at the same time utterly defeat that 
 end by palpable violations of equity in the distribution of 
 good and evil — to believe all this involves us in no trivial 
 difficulties. It is to suppose that by one course of action he 
 furnishes entirely sufficient and satisfactory evidence of the 
 equity of his government, and yet that by another course of 
 action lie proves the utter want of equity in his administra- 
 tion. That an earthly ruler should fall into such inconsist- 
 ency, through want of foresight or power, or from fickleness of 
 purpose, we might believe. But to ascribe such inconsistency 
 to God, is to suppose it to exist in a case in which the only 
 known causes for it do not exist. If then it be difficult to be- 
 lieve the equity of God's moral government on account of 
 the apparently unequal and unjust distribution of good and evil 
 in the world, it is more difficult in view of other undeniable 
 facts, to believe that this government is not administered in ac- 
 cordance with the principles of entire equity. If to believe its 
 equity we must reject evidence, it is not less true that to disbe- 
 lieve its equity we must reject evidence more decisive. If it is 
 irrational to believe it, it is more irrational to disbelieve it. 
 
 I remark — 
 
 In the second place, that there is no evidence from the distri- 
 bution of good and evil in the world, that God does not act on 
 the principles of strict equity in his moral administration. The 
 only conceivable ways in which God can show the want of 
 equity in the distribution of good and evil, are the follow- 
 ing : either by conferring less good, inflicting more evil than 
 is deserved, or by conferring more good or inflicting less evil 
 than is merited ; or in other words, by treating his subjects 
 worse or better than they deserve. 
 
 I remark then — 
 
 That he evinces no want of equity by treating any of his 
 subjects worse than they deserve. Diversified as are the moral 
 characters of men, there is one truth too obvious and too im- 
 portant to be overlooked in this argument — viz., that none of 
 the subjects of God's moral government are entitled to the 
 least good, but as transgressors of his law deserve evil only. 
 This remark I deem worthy of particular attention, not only on 
 account of its bearing on the present argument, but because, if 
 
222 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 I mistake not, it has been overlooked or denied by most ethical 
 writers. In the ablest treatises on this subject, I find it con- 
 stantly assumed, not only that there are wicked men who do 
 not receive deserved punishment in this life, which is indeed 
 undeniable, bnt that there are good men who do not receive a 
 merited reward — an assumption I must think as palpably false 
 as can be easily imagined in the view of every mind which has 
 any adequate conception of the divine law, and the principles 
 of human action. Recognizing then the nndeniable fact of 
 human guilt and the principles of merit and demerit before 
 advanced ; and remembering how much more good all who are 
 accountable for their conduct enjoy, and how much less evil 
 they suffer than they deserve, God's providential distribution 
 of good and evil is exempted in one respect from the reproach 
 of injustice. There is no deficiency of good as a reward, there 
 is no excess of evil as a penalty. All enjoy more good and 
 suffer less evil than they deserve.* God then does not violate 
 the principle of equity by withholding from any of his subjects 
 merited good, nor by inflicting on any undeserved evil, i. e., by 
 treating any of his subjects worse than they deserve. 
 
 Again ; God evinces no want of equity by treating any of 
 his subjects better than they deserve. The good conferred is 
 far greater, and the evil inflicted on all far less than their de- 
 serts. The main point however is not decided by this fact. It 
 is true indeed, if we assume that equity demands the execution 
 of penalty immediately on transgression, that to treat the 
 transgressor better than he deserves, by delaying the execution 
 of the penalty, would be a violation of equity, which however 
 may allow what it does not require. It allows the instant 
 punishment of the transgressor ; but it cannot be truly said to 
 demand it in all cases. An atonement may be provided, or 
 delay to punish may be required for some useful purpose, some 
 reasons of State. In respect to the present fact, viz., that God 
 treats his subjects better than they deserve, there are two ques- 
 tions to be decided. One is, whether he is executing legal 
 sanctions, or whether the good is conferred as a legcd reward^ 
 and the evil inflicted as a legal penalty. The other is, whether 
 
 * The case of infants, however it may affect the question of divine benevolence, 
 presents no peculiar difficulty on the present subject. For they are either moral 
 agents or they are not. If they are, they are sinners, and their sufferings are de- 
 served. If they are not, the present position does not respect them. 
 
NO EVIDENCE FOR WANT OF EQUITY. 223 
 
 the present, or even any execution of legal sanctions, in all 
 conceivable cases, is necessary to and demanded by the perfect 
 equity of his administration. 
 
 It is here important also to ascertain, on the supposition of a 
 violation of the principles of equity in treating subjects better 
 than they deserve, wherein such violation consists. It is con- 
 ceded then, that the withholding of merited good and the 
 infliction of deserved evil, would be a violation of the rights 
 of the individual subject or subjects, admitting of no vindica- 
 tion. Could such a tact be found under the government of 
 God, any attempt to vindicate the equity of his administration 
 would be vain. But to treat subjects better than their desert, 
 is at least no violation of their rights as individuals. But if 
 it can be clearly shown that the public good suffers by treating 
 subjects better than they deserve, then the act is as truly one 
 of injustice to the public, as the treatment of individuals worse 
 than they deserve would be an act of injustice to them. In 
 respect to these two modes, there is one possible and very 
 material difference. While a moral governor cannot treat sub- 
 jects worse than they deserve, without palpable injustice to 
 them as individuals, and I may say to the public also, it is 
 quite possible that he should treat them better than their de- 
 serts, without injustice either to them as individuals or to the 
 public. The case is supposable, that some temporary delay in 
 the execution of penalty after the commission of crime, should 
 greatly subserve the public good and increase the efficacy of 
 law. "No rights of the public, or of individuals, would be in- 
 terfered with or violated by it, and no injustice done to either. 
 Kor is this all. It is also supposable that a moral governor, 
 especially one of infinite wisdom and power, should devise and 
 adopt some expedient by which subjects should be treated 
 better than they deserve, or even be entirely exempted from 
 penal evil, without a violation of the rights of the public. Such 
 cases are credible, there being no evidence to the contrary. 
 Why then say that it can make no difference, whether we sup- 
 pose that God, in the distribution of good and evil in this 
 world, executes legal sanctions or not, since if he does, he vio- 
 lates the principles of equity, by treating subjects better than 
 they deserve; and if he does not, he abandons them altogether 
 and leaves his authority as a lawgiver wholly unsupported ; 
 for I readily concede, that if God does dispense good and evil 
 
224 MOEAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 in this manner, as legal sanctions, (and this is extensively main- 
 tained by theologians) he violates the principles of equity. To 
 treat men so much better than they deserve, and this in the 
 execution of legal sanctions, would be manifest injustice to the 
 public. But I deny that there is the least evidence, that in 
 the distribution of good and evil in this world, he is executing 
 legal sanctions ; and of course, that there is the least evidence 
 furnished by it, that he is not adhering to the principles of 
 strict equity in his moral administration. 
 
 On this position the decision of the question now before us 
 chiefly depends. 
 
 I remark then — 
 
 That it is more rational to regard the apparently unjust 
 distribution of good and evil as a fact incomprehensible by 
 us, and yet in some unknown manner consistent with the 
 equitable administration of God's moral government, than to 
 pronounce it absolute proof of want of equity in his adminis- 
 tration. Let it be remembered that the only possible or sup- 
 posable inconsistency in the case is, that he treats his subjects 
 better than they deserve during a very short period of their 
 existence, even -that of human life. It is not incredible that 
 there should be much that is incomprehensible under the gov- 
 ernment of God. This is indeed no reason why we should 
 overlook or disregard the least legitimate evidence against the 
 equity of his government; but it is a reason why we should 
 carefully discriminate between what is and what is not legiti- 
 mate evidence. If any thing occurs under the government of 
 God which we can pronounce an undoubted violation of the 
 principles of equity, then we may and ought so to do. If we 
 knew that God treated any of the subjects of his moral govern- 
 ment worse than they deserved, we should be authorized and 
 required to assert the existence of injustice in his moral admin- 
 istration, and if we knew that in the execution of legal sanc- 
 tions, or in that punishment which he inflicted on transgressors 
 to sustain his authority, he treated any better than they de- 
 served, this too, as we have seen, would be a decisive manifes- 
 tion of injustice to the public. But we do not know nor can 
 we prove, that the treatment in question is in the way or form 
 of a strictly legal procedure, and of course that it is not per- 
 fectly consistent with the equity of his administration. It is 
 not difficult to see how or in what manner this may be. A 
 
GRACIOUS ECONOMY SUPPOSABLE. 225 
 
 temporary delay of punishment may be one means of more 
 effectually securing the end of punishment. As in human gov- 
 ernments, public trials are of great importance in giving effect 
 to law ; so in the divine, men in this world, like the criminal 
 waiting his day of trial and execution, may be destined to meet 
 God in judgment, and to receive a just retribution in a future 
 state of existence. I speak here of the mere credibility of this, 
 which is all that my argument now requires. The reasonable 
 supposition that punishment may be delayed as a useful expe- 
 dient of moral government, and that subjects should for a little 
 season be treated better than they deserve, precludes all evi- 
 dence from such treatment against the perfect equity of God's 
 administration. 
 
 Again; there is yet another w^ay in which to treat subjects 
 better than they deserve, may be consistent with the equity of 
 God's moral government. It is a reasonable supposition that 
 God may he administering this government under a gracious 
 economy, or through an atonement, It does not, as facts show, 
 lie beyond the limits of conjecture. There is no proof to the 
 contrary. Our ignorance of the ways or means, by which God 
 woidd dispense pardon to the transgressors of law consistently 
 with his justice, is no proof that there are none. To affirm such 
 an impossibility in respect to God, would be obvious presump- 
 tion on the part of human ignorance. ^Tor does the fact that 
 some heathen philosophers maintained the impossibility that 
 a just God should forgive sin, prove that there is not sufficient 
 evidence, under the light of nature, to authorize even the belief 
 of the contrary. To say nothing of the prevalence of the oppo- 
 site opinion evinced by expiatory sacrifices, the assertion of 
 such an impossibility must be admitted to be false by the Chris- 
 tian, and wholly unauthorized by the infidel. It is not incredi- 
 ble then, that God in some way, or by some expedient, should, 
 consistently with perfect justice, become placable to offending 
 man. The fact therefore, that he treats the subjects of his 
 government better than they deserve, furnishes no evidence 
 that he does not administer his government on the principles 
 of strictest equity. 
 
 That there may be no misunderstanding on this point, let me 
 
 say that I do not affirm that the distribution of good and evil 
 
 in this world, either is or is not consistent with the equity of 
 
 God's moral administration. I affirm only the possibility of 
 
 10* 15 
 
226 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 such consistency, — that there is no proof that the one is incon- 
 sistent with the other ; and that, for aught we can say to the 
 contrary, it may be consistent with it. We know not cither ; 
 and as mere ignorance is not competent to make an argument, 
 neither is it competent to make an objection. The fact, in and 
 of itself, is no evidence for or against the equity of God's moral 
 administration. We are thus turned back to what we know, 
 and have proved, — to those facts which we have already estab- 
 lished. These, as I now claim, and proceed to show — 
 
 In the third place, furnish satisfactory proof that God adheres 
 to the principles of equity in his moral administration. To 
 estimate justly the force of our present arguments, let it be 
 kept in mind, that there is no evidence against the truth of our 
 position, — that there is not, in the entire providence of God, 
 the least departure from the principles of exact justice, in his 
 moral administration. The question then is, whether there are 
 any facts, which in such a case furnish legitimate and satisfac- 
 tory proof that he does adhere to these principles. This is 
 what I now claim. To illustrate the nature and the force of 
 this argument, let us recur again to our example. A skillful 
 artificer has begun to make a watch : — so much of the ma- 
 chinery falls under our observation, and we know so well its 
 essential parts, that we can be at no loss in respect to the object 
 of its construction. He has entire ability to finish, and to give 
 it that perfection, as a whole, which shall correspond with the 
 absolute perfection of all the parts which we have seen. There 
 is no reason to believe that he will not finish what he has begun, 
 while from his known decision of purpose and vigor in execu- 
 tion, as well as from the actual progress of the work, there is 
 every reason to believe that he will. I ask now, is it rational, 
 or is it not, to believe that the watch-maker will complete his 
 work? Will he omit to insert the mainspring, or any other 
 essential or important part of the machine '? No one can doubt, 
 or think of doubting. 
 
 Such then, is the argument now to be presented for the equity 
 of God's moral government over men. I shall offer it only in a 
 general form, intending to consider it more particularly hereafter. 
 
 God then, has in fact established a moral government over 
 men, and actually entered on its administration. He has shown 
 his great design to administer such a government over them by 
 the constitution of their nature, and all the circumstances of 
 
WHAT ISSUE IS PROBABLE. 227 
 
 their condition. He lias given tliem a law or rule of action, 
 not less clearly than had it come forth with a living voice from 
 his throne. In this fact, and in all the modes of his providence 
 he shows himself as assuming the right to reign over men as a 
 lawgiver ; and maintains that right by also showing that he 
 has their happiness entirely at his own disposal, and will in fact 
 dispose of it, as they obey or disobey his will, so as to make it 
 for their true and highest interest to obey. He thus clearly 
 reveals himself as their sovereign, claiming submission in the 
 way of supreme prerogative, and reigning in the exercise of 
 absolute authority. His administration is in no respect marred 
 by the slightest act of injustice. Nothing has transpired to 
 prevent God, the next moment, and with the ease of omnipo- 
 tence, from revealing himself in the glories and terrors of exact 
 justice. Will he ever do this? Will he, or will he not, after 
 this short and momentary life, give this jierfection to that sys- 
 tem of moral government which he has begun? Has he de- 
 parted from the principles of perfect justice in dispensing good 
 and evil to his accountable subjects? Never. Will he ever 
 depart from these principles ? Will he consent, that this moral 
 system shall want the strength, dignity and glory which these 
 principles alone can give it, and terminate in failure, dishonor 
 and mockery? Will not a system of jurisprudence begun by 
 heaven's Sovereign, and carried forward, not only without in- 
 justice, but with every indication of exact justice which the 
 present stage of its progress, so far as Ave can say, admits, be 
 carried out to a full and perfect consummation in the issues of 
 perfect righteousness? I say not here what these issues will 
 be — I decide not whether man's probation will or will not be 
 prolonged after death ; whether a merely legal economy will or 
 will not be followed by a just retribution to all, nor whether 
 the final results will or will not be those of a gracious econ- 
 omy. But I ask, whether the results will not show that God is 
 now, and ever has been administering his moral government 
 over men on the principles of perfect equity ? The grand ques 
 tion is, what idea shall we form of God as the governor of his 
 moral creation ? It becomes us to fix on some view of God in 
 this relation that shall be definite, intelligible, rational, and on 
 which we can rely. Is the throne of God then sustained only 
 by the arm of his power, threatening us with the terrors of 
 omnipotent despotism ? Has it no other basis than the sensi- 
 
228 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 tiveness and imbecility of paternal fondness and indulgence? 
 Or does it stand in its true grandeur on the pillars of eternal 
 justice ? The first I concede is palpably inconsistent with the 
 abundance and benignity of his gifts, as well as too appalling 
 to be admitted even by those whose principles lead to such a 
 conclusion. If now we adopt that view of God which repre- 
 sents him as too indulgent to adhere to the unbending princi- 
 ples of exact justice, then what is to be done with certain stub- 
 born matters of fact ? Why has God so obviously assumed 
 the high prerogative of moral dominion over men ? Why has 
 he given them a law absolutely perfect in precept and unbend- 
 ing in its claims? Why in the very nature, adaptation and ten- 
 dencies of all things within and without us,has he shown that 
 there is absolutely no sure and infallible way to avoid complete 
 misery and obtain perfect happiness, but by obedience to his 
 law? Why does he compel men to know and feel, notwith- 
 standing all their wishes to the contrary, that whatever may be 
 the issues of his government, they will be at least above all 
 contempt, — such as accord with the attributes of an infinite 
 Being, and enthrone him, if not in the confidence and affec- 
 tions, at least in the homage and awe of his intelligent creation? 
 Why is it that he places himself before man so constantly in all 
 the majesty and terrors of absolute and august sovereignty by 
 the calamities, woes, and death of his sentient creation — afflict- 
 ing, agonizing the work of his own hands, and yet never swerv- 
 ing from the principles of perfect justice ? Is this fiction, or is 
 it fact? Is all this nothing but the overflowings of sentimental 
 tenderness ; or are these the results of God's displeasure for 
 man's wickedness, telling us what perfect justice can, and with 
 fearful probability will, do in some future hour of full retribu- 
 tion? Death — that heaviest thunderbolt of God's wrath that 
 ever falls on this groaning creation — what is death ? What is 
 it ? what will it do with that frail imagination of yours that 
 God is all tenderness? Look over these terrors of God and say 
 are they to lead us to suppose ourselves the mere " nurslings 
 of hie fondness," instead of the subjects of his righteous and 
 holy dominion? Is all this only to make us light-hearted when 
 death comes to look at us in earnest? Is all this designed only 
 to lead us to make merry around the death-bed of others or on 
 our own, or to amuse ourselves with trifles when we or others 
 are falling into the hands of the living God? ]S"o. The fear 
 
TIIE GREAT DESIGN OF GOD. 229 
 
 of God as a righteous lawgiver and judge, is no superstitious 
 fear. God does not reveal himself to us throned in the soft 
 and smiling radiance of an indulgent deity, caring more for 
 our happiness than for our moral conduct. He does not show 
 himself diffusing only bliss over this world without respect to 
 the doings of those who dwell on it. If he shows himself deserv- 
 ing any thing, it is to make man good that he may he happy ; 
 if he shows approbation, it is of virtue ; if disapprobation, it is 
 of vice; if he shows himself immutable in any thing, it is in his 
 approval of the one and in his disapproval of the other. In a 
 word, if God shows himself as aiming at any thing, designing 
 any thing in his government of this world, it is to maintain the 
 perfect equity of his moral administration. What he has so 
 obviously begun in the assumption of this high prerogative, in 
 giving his perfect law to his moral creatures, and in this whole 
 economy of legislation, he will finish. It is his great design. 
 To this all things else are manifestly subservient. It is the all 
 in all of God,our maker,to enthrone himself amid the grandeurs 
 of eternity, the righteous moral governor of his moral creation. 
 Death will not arrest the progress of this design, nor defeat its 
 consummation. It will only disclose the actual results of prin- 
 ciples already manifest — only draw aside the curtain that now 
 faintly conceals the full effulgence of God, within that high and 
 inviolable sanctuary, where justice and judgment are the habit- 
 ation of his throne forever. 
 
LECTURE IV. 
 
 Second leading proposition continued, viz. — God administers an equitable moral government. — 
 The possibility of a future state precludes all objections against the Divine equity. — No pre- 
 sumption against a future state —No proof the soul is material.— No evidence that death 
 destroys the soul. — Direct proofs of a future state. — Kind of evidence furnished. — No cause 
 known which can destroy the soul. — Every thing which has begun continues to exist. — The 
 present state unsuitable to the natural perfection of man. — Argument from man's moral nature 
 decisive. 
 
 In the last lecture I attempted to show that God administers 
 an equitable moral government over men. 
 
 In considering the argument against this position, derived 
 from the distribution of good and evil in this world, I endeav- 
 ored to show, that the only fact which can be supposed to fur- 
 nish the least evidence against the equity of his administration, 
 viz., that he treats men better than they deserve during this 
 short and comparatively momentary state of existence, furnishes 
 not the shadow of such evidence. This fact I claimed, mi the 
 supposition of a future state, may answer some highly useful 
 and necessary purpose, and that if we suppose even a strictly 
 legal economy, it may, like the temporary delay to punish 
 offenders against human governments, subserve the very ends 
 of public justice; that it cannot therefore, be alleged as in the 
 least degree inconsistent with the exact equity of his moral ad- 
 ministration, or as involving any departure from, or violation 
 of, the principles of exact equity. Hence it was claimed, that 
 God might at any moment show, that in entire consistency with 
 all his doings, he has ever adhered and that he ever will adhere 
 to these principles, and that he might do this in either of two 
 ways — either by inflicting a full and merited retribution on 
 all, or by showing that he administers his government under a 
 gracious economy. Having thus shown that there is not the 
 slightest evidence against, I presented the direct evidence for, 
 the equity of his moral government. I showed that he is actu- 
 ally administering a moral government— that to administer 
 such a government over men is manifestly his great design — 
 one to which his works of creation and providence are obvi- 
 
THE SUPPOSITION OF A FUTURE STATE. 231 
 
 ously subservient; a design which stands forth first, greatest, 
 brightest of all ; that he has manifested his equity by giving to 
 men the best law — the only law which a being of perfect jus- 
 tice would or could give ; that he is able to administer his gov- 
 ernment in perfect equity, and that he has, so to speak, scrupu- 
 lously avoided treating any of his subjects worse than they 
 deserve, while in treating them better, he has not furnished the 
 least reason to doubt hie equity. With these things in view, it 
 was claimed that we are shut up to one of these conclusions, 
 either that this chief design of the Infinite Being will fail in 
 defeat and mockery, which is utterly incredible; or that he 
 ever has been, and is still adhering, and ever will adhere to 
 the principles of justice in his moral administration. 
 
 Thus the supposition or the bare possibility of a future state 
 is sufficient to neutralize every objection to the equity of God's 
 moral administration. It leaves in its full and unimpaired force 
 the evidence for its equity, which uncounteracted by oppos- 
 ing evidence is abundant and decisive. Nor is this all. The 
 possibility of a future state in connection with such evidence 
 for the equity of his administration, reveals the certainty by 
 revealing the necessity of a future state, that God may finish 
 what he lias begun, and what as an omniscient, almighty and 
 immutable being lie must finish. We say then not only that 
 there may be, there will be (for there must be) a future state, in 
 which God will unfold by the requisite issues the perfect equity 
 of his moral government over men. What else can be sup- 
 posed or thought of? What otherwise will become of the 
 great, the most obvious design of God in the creation and gov- 
 ernment of this world ? Shall we suppose such a design aban- 
 doned ? Is Omniscience at fault in the plan ; is Omnipotence 
 discomfited in the execution; arc infinite attributes thwarted 
 of an end worthy of such attributes ; in place of reality is there 
 pretense and pageantry, instead of majesty and glory is there 
 the self-degradation of an Infinite Being ? What shall we say ? 
 Plainly without a future state of being for man, the works and 
 ways of God present the most insolvable of all problems — the 
 most intractable of all enigmas. His designs, his doings, his 
 character, what he is, what we his creatures are, and what we are 
 to be — all this entire moral system is but a feverish dream of un- 
 certainty, agitation and pain — a chaos of darkness and terror — - 
 while the mere supposition of a future state is like the word of 
 
232 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 the Creator, when in respect to this material system he said, 
 " Let there be light, and there was light." As a mere suppo- 
 sition, while it at once reveals its own reality, it pours the efful- 
 gence of noon-clay on all the works of creation and providence, 
 and shows God as the ^righteous moral governor of his moral 
 creation, reigning to display the harmony, grandeur and glory 
 of his perfect dominion. 
 
 Tiie necessity of a future state in order that God may ac- 
 complish what lie has so obviously begun, is decisive as an ar- 
 gument, and it is not my design to dwell longer upon this 
 particular mode of reasoning. Indeed to see the great facts of 
 creation and providence which disclose so clearly the chief de- 
 sign of God in respect to man, is also to see the necessity and 
 reality of a future state in which by its requisite issues the 
 equity of God's moral government over this world will be un- 
 folded. I will only add on this topic, that if called upon to 
 engage in controversy with one who denied a future state, I 
 should place my chief reliance on this argument, and feel 
 strong for the contest. 
 
 The question however of a future state has been controverted 
 so much on other grounds, and has been supposed to involve- 
 so many difficulties, that to examine these modes of reasoning 
 may serve to strengthen an argument in some minds, if any 
 additional strength is needed. In this mode of argument, then 
 I proceed to show that — 
 
 There is a future state of existence for man. 
 
 I propose to show as briefly as may be : 
 
 In the first place, that there is not even a presumption 
 against the fact ; and 
 
 In the second place, to offer direct proofs of the fact of a 
 future state. 
 
 In the first place, there is not even a presumption against the 
 fact. 
 
 Some philosophers have maintained that the soul is a mate- 
 rial substance, or that its existence depends on our bodily or- 
 ganization, and hence have denied its immortality. That the 
 soul is material, or that its existence depends on any organiza- 
 tion of matter, is in my view wholly a gratuitous and unauthor- 
 ized assumption. 
 
 Its immateriality however I do not consider as a fact of any 
 importance on the question of its immortality. The only use 
 
NO PROOF AGAINST IT. 233 
 
 which seems to be made of it,is to refute an objection against 
 the possibility of the soul's future existence. It can however 
 in no respect answer even this purpose, since the annihilation 
 of the soul or its continued existence is equally possible to the 
 Creator, whether it be material or immaterial. It must be ad- 
 mitted that the soul may have a future existence whether it be 
 a material or a spiritual substance. 
 
 Again ; there is no evidence that death destroys the soul. I 
 am not saying that death does not produce this effect, but sim- 
 ply that there is no evidence that it does produce it. We know 
 to some extent the actual effects of death, but we cannot say 
 that the destruction of the soul is one of them. We do not 
 know on what the continued existence of the soul and of its 
 powers proximately depends. We do not therefore know 
 enough of death to say whether it will or will not destroy 
 the soid. Its existence with all its powers in perfect exercise, 
 may depend on that which death cannot touch. There is in- 
 deed an intimate connection in many respects between the soul 
 and the body. But we have no such knowledge of the nature 
 and mode of this connection, as to authorize us to decide that 
 the soul cannot exist without the body, and even in a more 
 perfect state. Should this be proved hereafter, it would not 
 contradict or be inconsistent with any fact of our present 
 knowledge. Death indeed removes the souls of others from 
 our view. It drops its dark curtain over the future, but it tells 
 us nothing of its doings or its effects beyond death. The na- 
 ture of things then reveals no certain connection between death 
 and the destruction of the soul. 
 
 Again ; there is no evidence from any known phenomena 
 against the future existence of the soul. It is from this source 
 that the most forcible objections against our doctrine and the 
 most plausible arguments for the opposite opinion are derived. 
 What then are the phenomena — what are the facts ? This is 
 the question which must be answered with precision. All that 
 can be pretended is, that certain states of the body, those of 
 disease, of intoxication, of old age, obviously impair the mental 
 faculties, and, as the case may be, suspend or remove all vis- 
 ible evidence of their existence, while death puts an utter end 
 to it. 
 
 To the question, then — do these facts furnish the slightest 
 evidence that the soul ceases to exist at death ? 
 
234: MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 I answer — 
 
 All the facts now referred to may be comprised in these two 
 — impaired faculties, and the suspension or final cessation of 
 all visible evidence of their existence. 
 
 And first, let us look carefully at the supposed evidence from 
 impaired faculties. That some diseases, and that old age often 
 impair the faculties of the mind, cannot be doubted. But 
 many do not produce this effect ; and in some cases, disease 
 actually destroys life, and leaves the mind, even to the last, in 
 the vigor and activity of perfect health. This fact shows that 
 the mind is not so dependent on the state of the body as neces- 
 sarily to languish and die under the very causes that destroy 
 the body. It shows more, that there is not the slightest reason 
 for supposing that disease destroys the existence of powers, 
 which, even in its progress, it often leaves wholly unimpaired 
 till death. There are similar exceptions in regard to the influ- 
 ence of age. Generally, indeed, as bodily health and vigor 
 decay, the mental faculties decline. If there are no decisive 
 exceptions to this fact, still there is nothing sufficient to show 
 that the existence of the mind necessarily depends on the life 
 of the body. Indeed, the influence of some diseases, and of 
 old age to impair mental vigor, is in no respect inconsistent 
 with the supposition, that the body, in some particular states, 
 is a mere incumbrance to the mind, and produces effects which 
 would wholly cease by their separation ; so that the mind, be- 
 ing wholly disconnected with the body, would possess greater 
 vigor, and awake to new and hitherto unknown activity. Here 
 we must not confound one cause with another; we must not 
 consider disease as terminating in death, but disease, as such, 
 producing its own proper and known effects on the mind. 
 Suppose then, (although there are many decisive exceptions to 
 the fact) that disease always, during its continuance, impairs 
 or deranges the powers of the mind. Yet, does it destroy 
 them ? In far the greatest number of cases, when the cause is 
 removed, does not the effect cease; or rather, does not the 
 cause often cease, without the- destruction of the mind as its 
 consequent ? Does the impairing of mental powers necessarily 
 involve their destruction ? Do you see and know any other 
 effect of disease but the former, and this merely temporary ? 
 Does one effect involve the other ? You might as well say, 
 that because a blow on the head produces a momentary de- 
 
NO PROOF AGAINST IT. 235 
 
 rangement of the mental faculties, it actually lands tlie soul in 
 annihilation. 
 
 Do you say, that it is not meant that disease as such ever 
 destroys the mind ? Why then is it so often asserted ? If the 
 meaning he, that disease weakens the faculties in many cases 
 with greater or less rapidity, and terminates in death as its 
 proximate effect, he it so ; hut this is only specifying another 
 result of disease, viz., death. Take then all its effects. If the 
 result of disease, in mental imbecility, does not show the soul's 
 annihilation, does death prove it to our observation or our 
 knowledge ? 
 
 This brings us to the other fact, viz., the cessation of all 
 visible evidence of the soul's existence. This is admitted ; and 
 be it remembered, it is all that can be claimed. But does the 
 cessation of the visible evidence of the soul's existence prove 
 that it has actually ceased to exist ? The want of evidence of 
 the existence of a thing is surely no proof of its non-existence. 
 In some cases, as that of drowning when followed by resusci- 
 tation, the evidence of the existence of an intelligent agent 
 wholly ceases from our observation. But who infers the de- 
 struction of the agent ? I do not say, that the cessation of 
 evidence of his existence proves that he did not cease to exist ; 
 this is proved by resuscitation; but that the cessation of the 
 evidence of existence docs not prove that he did cease to exist. 
 I am willing to concede that it shows the suspension of the 
 intellectual operations, but it does not prove the non-existence 
 of the agent. 
 
 Between this case and that of death, there is indeed otic 
 important difference. In the event of death, the evidence that 
 there is a mere suspension of the mental operations, or rather 
 the evidence that the agent continued to exist furnished by 
 resuscitation, is wholly wanting. We cannot say that the agent 
 has not, nor can we say that he has ceased to exist. The event 
 of death proves nothing, and, in itself considered, authorizes 
 no belief. And if, as we have seen, the cessation of the visible 
 evidence of continued existence is perfectly consistent with the 
 fact of its continuance, as in the case of apparent drowning, 
 then, in the event of death, this evidence may entirely cease, 
 and yet resuscitation may follow. 
 
 I admit another fact often appealed to in this argument; viz., 
 that death destroys what other causes of the suspension of the 
 
236 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 mental powers do not affect, viz., the organs of sensation and 
 all the functions of animal life. But we have the most decisive 
 proof that the continuance and activity of the mental powers 
 do not depend on the continuance of the bodily organs. Even 
 those ideas which are derived through these organs may be as 
 vivid when they are not, as when they are the media of recep- 
 tion. Of this the phenomena of dreams are decisive. If the 
 mind without the organs of sensation can recall the ideas of 
 sensation without their objects, a fortiori it can form ideas of 
 sensation without the organs and their objects; so that death 
 destroys the powers of sensation and still less those of reflection, 
 no evidence can be adduced. To infer that it does from the 
 mere want of evidence that it does not, is as truly unphilo- 
 sophical, as to infer that sound sleep is a state of annihilation. 
 
 If it here be said that the cases are materially different, since 
 in one we have the evidence of continued existence from sub- 
 sequent phenomena, I readily admit it. But then these show 
 that the conclusion of non-existence is not authorized by the 
 sus})ension of visible intellectual operations, so all that can be 
 said in a case in which such subsequent phenomena do not ex- 
 ist is, that there is no evidence of continued existence, and not 
 that there is evidence of non-existence. 
 
 If it be further said that as there is no evidence of continued 
 existence after death, either in the event itself or in any subse- 
 quent phenomena, it is irrational to believe in such existence, 
 I most readily admit it, so far as death and its subsequent 
 phenomena can be supposed to furnish evidence. We are not 
 authorized to believe in the future existence of the soul on this 
 ground merely, nor be it remembered, are we authorized to dis- 
 believe it. When there is no evidence there should be no faith, 
 and no faith should not be confounded with believing. If the 
 event of death authorizes no faith on the question whether the 
 soul will exist after death, then it does not authorize the belief 
 that it does not exist. The event of death then, and all its at- 
 tendant and consequent phenomena, are to be laid aside as 
 having no bearing on the question before us. Provided there 
 is no other source of evidence, we are bound to believe nothing 
 respecting the future existence of the soul. 
 
 Laying aside then the event of death as having no bearing on 
 the question under consideration, I proceed, 
 
 In the second place to offer direct proofs of a future state. 
 
PROOF IN SUPPORT OF IT. 237 
 
 Before I adduce the proposed proofs, I would make a remark 
 or two respecting the nature or kind of evidence to he offered. 
 It is not pretended, then, that it is of that kind which excludes 
 the possibility in the nature of things of the truth of the oppo- 
 site proposition. The evidence is of that kind which logicians 
 call probable or moral, as distinguished from demonstrative, 
 evidence which in a thousand cases to one, controls the prac- 
 tical faith of men, and must control it, or they must act the 
 part of idiots or madmen. Nor are there any arguments either 
 in natural or revealed theology which are in the strict sense 
 demonstrative, that is, the opposites of which involve known con- 
 tradiction. This remark is of more importance in relation to 
 the present subject than to many other cases. The bare pos- 
 sibility, the mere may be that death is the end of our existence, 
 is peculiarly apt to prevent or weaken the force of the existing 
 evidence to the contrary. JSTow let it be remembered that a 
 may be is not an argument. There is a may be, that you will 
 never leave this room alive ; it may be, that when you take 
 food the next time it will produce strangulation and death, 
 and to give no other example, it may be that if you reason 
 yourself into the belief of either of these things, or that death is 
 the end of man, you will reason falsely. How exceedingly ir- 
 rational it is to reject moral evidence, and especially when it 
 consists of an accumulation of probabilities on one side of a 
 question, merely because there is a possibility of the truth of 
 an opposite conclusion, all men see and feel in the ordinary 
 business of human life. They know that on tin's principle 
 they could not act nor even subsist. God has made the hu- 
 man mind to be influenced by moral evidence in assenting 
 to truth as really as in assenting to truth in the form of in- 
 tuition. It might perhaps be said, that it was designedly so 
 because it is necessarv to moral beings in a state of moral 
 discipline. Be it so or not, the philosopher who reasons and 
 concludes in morals or theology with an argument no better 
 than may be, ought to be eulogized at most as a may be philos- 
 opher. 
 
 To proceed now with the direct proofs of a future state, 
 
 I remark — 
 
 That there is no cause known which will destroy the exist- 
 ence of the soul. It is reasonable to believe that things will 
 continue as they have done in our experience, unless there be 
 
238 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 some cause known to us that will produce a change. This is 
 the kind of evidence or rather of reasoning on which Ave rely, 
 and on which the mind is made to rest its belief in cases innu- 
 merable. For example, how confidently we believe on this 
 ground, simply that the sun will rise and set to-morrow, and 
 that our lives will be prolonged for some time to come. So 
 powerful is the influence of this kind of evidence, that when it 
 accords with our wishes as it does in respect to the continuance 
 of our present life, it is often unimpaired by high degrees of 
 opposing evidence. Without however attempting to measure 
 the degree of faith which is authorized by this kind of evi- 
 dence, it is undeniable that such a degree as to make it prac- 
 tical in regard to the business of life is not only authorized but 
 required. But if we have sufficient to justify or require any 
 degree of faith, that the life of the body will be continued 
 another year or even another day, we have much more to just- 
 ify the belief that the soul will exist after death and forever. 
 The evidence from past exj)erience simply considered, may 
 justly be viewed as the same in both cases. But in respect to 
 the life of the body, we know that there are many causes of its 
 destruction, some one of which may terminate it at any hour or 
 moment ; while in respect to the life of the soul, we know of 
 none that ever did or ever will terminate it. I need not say 
 how strong would be our belief in the continued endless life 
 of the body, if we knew no cause of its termination. How 
 firm then according to the same principle, ought to be our 
 faith in the endless life of the soul. 
 
 The principle of belief now referred to in connection with 
 the known immateriality of the soul, is that on which primarily 
 rests the universal belief of mankind in a future existence. 
 ]Nor can the soundness of the principle, nor the reasonableness 
 of the faith be questioned. When has man known any thing 
 to cease to be, without a cause? Why then, in this case, should 
 we believe, that what has been, and now is, will not continue 
 to be; while we neither know, nor have the least reason to 
 believe, that there is any cause that will prevent its continued 
 existence ? 
 
 Again; every thing within our observation, which has be- 
 gun, continues to exist ; it is therefore reasonable to believe 
 that the soul will do so. The body indeed seems to perish ; but 
 we know, that while it decays, it does not actually and truly 
 
NOTHING IS ANNIHILATED 230 
 
 perish. From the creation of the visible universe to the pres- 
 ent moment, we have not the slightest reason to believe that 
 one atom of it all has ceased to be. What we term decay and 
 death in the animal and vegetable kingdoms is not annihila- 
 tion, bnt only a change of parts and relations, and a name for 
 another form of continued existence. If then every particle 
 of matter, even of our own bodies, to which God has given 
 existence, continues to exist, is it philosophical to disbelieve, 
 or even to doubt the continued existence of the soul ? If every 
 thing else, after all that can be called decay or death, continues 
 to exist, the rational conclusion is that the soul does also. The 
 dust, so to speak, returns to the dust as it was and yet it is care- 
 fully preserved ; why then docs not the spirit ascend to God who 
 gave it 1 Is it rational, is it philosophical to deny and overlook 
 such analogies ? Where had been the discoveries of Newton, 
 had he disregarded them ? Where had been all science, had men 
 not believed that what is true of some things which they know, 
 is also true of other things which they do not know ? It be- 
 longs to him who denies or doubts the continued existence of the 
 soul after death, to produce some positive proof of a departure 
 from the entire analogy of nature in respect to this agent. Thus 
 the death of the body, the very thing from which the destruc- 
 tion of the soul has been inferred, becomes proof to the con- 
 trary. If death does not even destroy the body, or rathe]* if it 
 is only a change involving the continued existence of every 
 particle of it, why should it destroy the soul, or rather, why 
 not result in its continued existence ? Which is the logical in- 
 ference? Death is a change in which every particle of the body 
 continues to exist, therefore the soul ceases to exist j or death is 
 a change in which every particle of the body continues to exist, 
 therefore the soul continues to exist. In the one case, the prem- 
 ises and conclusion have no conceivable connection. In the 
 other, they have the same that led Newton to believe that the 
 same law of gravity which pertained to a falling apple, controls 
 the motions of every planet. Even if the mind is matter, why 
 i,s it that not a single atom of unthinking matter is destroyed, 
 and every atom of thinking matter must be annihilated ? Why 
 is it that the almighty Preserver of one should so carefully take 
 care of its every particle, and yet so carefully and scrupulously 
 annihilate the other? Is this the doctrine of reason, of philos- 
 ophy ? True, we admit the possibility of its destruction by the 
 
240 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 Creator. But must not some reason be found, some motive dis- 
 covered for the exclusive annihilation of that which we call 
 mind, of that which gives all its value and worth to the crea- 
 tures of his power ? Why should the Creator of man preserve 
 every thing in his creature which is strictly corporeal and com- 
 paratively worthless, and destroy every thing that is mental 
 and meet for immortality; why preserve every thing that 
 likens man to the dust beneath his feet, and destroy all that 
 constitutes the image of Himself? Would the father of a child 
 do this ? Would the maker of a watch act on such a princi- 
 ple ? Well may we ask philosophy, if man's resemblance to 
 his Maker is only the reason for blasting his creation into an- 
 nihilation. 
 
 Further, I argue the doctrine of a future state from the ob- 
 vious unsuitableness of the present to the perfection of the na- 
 ture of man. In the material world, the more our knowledge 
 extends, the more of order and of system, of design and of 
 adaptation appears in all that we behold, until the conviction 
 is forced upon us that the Maker of all forms no abortive pur- 
 poses. If we look at the nature and condition of animals, we 
 find a striking coincidence between them, their condition being 
 so accommodated to their instincts and their powers, that the 
 obvious design of their being may be fully attained in this 
 world. Hence it is, that while if we had nothing to reason 
 from but their past life with our ignorance of their utter de- 
 struction by death, we should rationally infer their future ex- 
 istence ; yet in view of the obvious adaptation of their nature 
 to their present condition, and of the fact that the end of their 
 existence is here fully attained, it is irrational to believe that 
 they continue to exist after death, l^ot so however in respect 
 to man. If man's being terminates with his life, then does his 
 present existence present the most inscrutable of all mysteries, 
 the most insolvable enigma to be found in all the works of 
 God. We can tell with more or less confidence, for what all 
 things else are created, but to decide what is the end of that 
 creature of God for whom every thing else is made, that being 
 who bears the likeness of his Creator, defies and baffles all 
 philosophy. Our Maker, who delights to unfold his wisdom 
 and his power to our inspection in the manifestation of the 
 adaptations, objects and ends of all his other works, even in 
 the structure of an insect, conceals the design of the greatest of 
 
THE DESIGN OF THE CREATOR. 2±1 
 
 them all in utter darkness ; or rather what is far more inexpli- 
 cable, he shows that the most exalted design is under an abso- 
 lute necessity of utter failure and defeat. Nor is this all. He 
 exhibits himself in the decisive character of a deceiver, obliging 
 us to regard adaptations and tendencies as no evidence of plan 
 and of the actual results of his works. He thus unsettles all 
 our principles of reasonings from these sources, and whether 
 such facts give us annihilation or immortality, our conclusion 
 has no claim to confidence. This is too unphilosophical for our 
 opponents to believe. What then is the Creator's great design 
 in jnvin<2: existence to such a creature as man? If we consider 
 his intellectual faculties, the foundation laid in his constitution 
 for unlimited improvement, the wide range for acquisition 
 opened through the immensity of space and duration ; what is 
 man qualified to become, or rather what is he not qualified to 
 become compared with any thing he is during this momentary 
 life ? Is it credible that God has thus fitted the human mind 
 for progress, furnished it with so beautiful an arrangement of 
 faculties for every kind of acquisition, and incited it by an im- 
 pulse that ceaselessly awakens it to the pursuit — so formed 
 it, that by every effort it becomes stronger and more eager for 
 further attainments, that when this mind has been thus quali- 
 fied, disciplined, and prepared to go on to perfection, the 
 very improvement it has made should become a reason for 
 arresting its progress in annihilation ? Are we to believe that 
 He who made man what he is, will destroy his own work, 
 merely because if permitted to live, he would accomplish the 
 high end for which he made him ? 
 
 The argument from the moral nature of man is made still 
 more impressive by the superiority of its design and object. 
 If there is no existence for man beyond the present state, 
 what can we suppose to be the design of his Creator in form- 
 ing him a moral being? What powers, what capacities are 
 involved in his nature! What capacity to enjoy, and what 
 power to impart happiness to others ! Who can reflect on 
 the nature of such a creature, his intelligence, his suscepti- 
 bility, his will, his conscience, the dignity, the excellence of 
 which he is capable, the moral victories and triumphs he may 
 win, his fitness to hold on his way with archangels, strong in 
 advancing all that good which infinite wisdom could devise 
 and infinite benevolence could love, the graces with which he 
 Vol. I.— 11 1G 
 
242 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 may be adorned, and the beatitudes with which he may be 
 blessed, and not believe that he is made to be one with the 
 God who created him — a partaker of his blessedness, a com- 
 panion of his eternity ? 
 
 If we consider what an almost total failure there is, even on 
 the part of every good man, to attain in any respect the great 
 end of his creation ; how weak in resolution and feeble in heart 
 — how little success in subduing his passions and governing his 
 temper — how much of life is spent before he even begins to 
 live in obedience to the demands of duty and of conscience — 
 how remote he is from the uniform and settled tranquillity of 
 perfect virtue — what dissatisfaction he feels with the present, 
 unappeased by all the world can offer — what an impatience 
 and disgust with the littleness of all he finds — what an ever 
 restless nspiration after nobler and higher things — what anti- 
 cipations and hopes from futurity, never realized here on earth 
 — how does our spirit labor under a sense of the incongruity 
 between his attainments and his powers; and unless there is a 
 future state, what an insignificance is imparted to all that can 
 be called virtue here on earth, and also to man himself. 
 
 What too shall we say of all those proofs of the power, the 
 wisdom, the goodness of the great Author of all things, which 
 are presented to us in all his works, and the satisfaction there is 
 in knowing and contemplating such a Being ? To what pur- 
 pose are we rendered capable of elevating our thoughts to 
 him, if we are never to learn any more of his character than 
 we know in this short life? For what object has he given 
 proofs of his overruling power and providence, and excited 
 man to look to him with submission, confidence, and affection, 
 if man has no interests to be cared for but those of a day? 
 Why, in a word, has he made those manifestations of his God- 
 head, and of those relations to man, and of man to himself, 
 which constitute the basis of all that we call religion, if all 
 these are to cease at death ? I do not say it would be abso- 
 lutely worthless even then, but it would sink to comparative 
 insignificance. It would be the religion of a being who has no 
 God but for the brief moment of this mortal life — the love, the 
 hopes, the confidence of an insect of an hour, instead of the 
 religion of an immortal, trusting in God for the gifts of his 
 goodness through a coming eternity. 
 
 Indeed, nothing is more obvious to reason, than that life to 
 
SUPPOSE THERE IS NO FUTURE LIFE. 243 
 
 man would be but a short series of animal sensations, and death 
 only the changing of the relation of a few particles of matter. 
 To live as he would, and as well as he might, were death the 
 end of him, would at the same time be a perversion of powers 
 — an outrage on nature, unmatched in the works of God. The 
 true and proper business of life would be changed. All that 
 could be called the end of his existence would become scarcely 
 worthy of a thought ; and, as a being of a day, he would sink 
 to an insignificance which would render the course he pursued 
 through the world, a concern too trivial for consideration. Why 
 then are those powers given to man, which fit him to rise to 
 such an inconceivable height in the scale of being, without a 
 motive to aspire to such elevation, or the possibility of attain- 
 ing it ? Why this destiny to self-degradation ? In all his other 
 works nothing is waste, nothing is useless. Every organ, appe- 
 tite, faculty, hope and desire, in every creature has its coun- 
 terpart object. Man is an exception to this absolute univer- 
 sality. For his moral nature, for that part of man which alone 
 gives value to existence with its high capacities and aspira- 
 tions, the universe presents no objects of corresponding worth 
 and greatness. Or rather, viewed in relation to man's moral 
 nature, every thing is great. The material universe around 
 him, the total sum of human existence, the events that happen on 
 our globe are great. All the analogies, tendencies and relations 
 everywhere conspicuous, are great, and manifest great designs 
 and results. This material system bespeaks a corresponding 
 moral system which is great, and furnishes unquestionable inti- 
 mations of a vast scheme whose disclosures will be great. The 
 moral system as here developed is great in its authority, its 
 law, in all its tendencies, and actual results. God is great. 
 Man is great. His nature bespeaks the dignity of an immortal, 
 and looks onward to the grandeurs of eternity. Eternity is 
 great. And yet man, for whom all this greatness exists — 
 placed amid it all, and next in greatness to his God — man, 
 made, designed, and fitted for eternity, exists but a moment ! ! 
 Is it credible ? Is it not a violence to the harmonies of crea- 
 tion, a defeat and failure of God's designs, that no rational man 
 can believe % Is it not giving a contemptible insignificance to 
 the very image of God in his own creatures ? Is it not reflect- 
 ing most severely and dishonorably on the wisdom and the 
 power that gives them existence ? JN r o human mind, with these 
 
244 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 views of God and of man, can rest in such a conclusion. Shall 
 a God of infinite natural perfection form myriads of beings so 
 much in his own image, and doom their powers to use- 
 lessness and waste while they live, and the beings themselves 
 to an instant annihilation ? It were a farce in creation ; 
 the infinite God sporting in the exercise, and with the prod- 
 ucts of his infinite attributes. No. Man is made for a higher 
 purpose than can be answered by this short life; and that this 
 purpose may be accomplished, he will never cease to be. 
 
 Thus I have attempted to show, that while there is not the 
 shadow of evidence against a future state, there are, entirely 
 aside from the moral government of God, many considerations, 
 which, especially when combined, give a high degree of proba- 
 bility of such a state. 
 
 The argument then for the equity of God's moral govern- 
 ment over men, as we have presented it, stands thus: the 
 argument, from the fact that God has given men the best law, 
 and from the manner in which he distributes good and evil in 
 this world, with other considerations, is in its nature decisive, 
 provided there is no proof to the contrary. The mere suppo- 
 sition of a future state removes every particle of pretended 
 evidence against the equity of this administration ; while with 
 the possibility of a future state, the necessity of it, that God may 
 complete that equitable system of moral government which he 
 has obviously begun, places the fact of such a state beyond all 
 rational doubt, or rather forces it on human belief. In addition 
 to these things, we have shown, that aside from the fact of 
 God's moral government, and on other grounds, there is also a 
 high probability of a future state. Our conclusion then is, that 
 there is a future state, in which God can, and therefore will, 
 unfold the equity of his moral administration over men; in 
 other words, God is administering an equitable moral govern- 
 ment. 
 
LECTURE V. 
 
 Second leading proposition continued, viz. : God administers an equitable moral government.— 
 God administers his moral government under a gracious economy. — Explanation.— Proof 1. 
 The manner in which he administers good and evil harmonizes with such an economy. — 2. 
 Distribution of pood and evil proves a design to recover. — («) A virtuous life the happiest. — (/') 
 Gifts of God tend to gratitude.— (t) Natural evils prove the same design.— (d) Tin; present a 
 state of discipline.— (t) The happiness of man in his own power.— (/) Without forgiveness, 
 reclaiming influences vain. God's favor can be secured only on the terms which Christianity 
 prescribes, whether Christianity is or is not from God. 
 
 It has been extensively maintained by the advocates of reve- 
 lation, that it is the exclusive honor of Christianity, not merely 
 that it reveals the mode of God's favor to the guilty, but that 
 we are also indebted to it for the belief of even the possibility 
 of his favor. How far the human mind, uninstructed by a 
 divine revelation, would in fact have pushed its inquiries on 
 this interesting subject, is one question; how far it could have 
 done this, is another. The probability is, that the conclusions 
 of the human mind would in fact have been in a high degree 
 doubtful and unsatisfactory, if not against the doctrine of the 
 divine placability. This however might easily be traced to 
 other causes than the want of sufficient evidence of such placa- 
 bility. The aversion of man to the knowledge of God would 
 be a sufficient cause both of imperfect investigations and false 
 conclusions ; Christianity may have suggested truths or prin- 
 ciples, which would not, though they could, have been discov- 
 ered without it ; and in this way at least we may be able to 
 prove the placability of God, without assuming any of the 
 declarations of Christianity as of divine authority. The de- 
 monstration of a problem in geometry is not less independent 
 of Euclid's authority, because he first suggested the construc- 
 tions on which the demonstration depends. 
 
 Nor is there any dishonor done to Christianity by maintain- 
 ing the sufficiency of human reason to make this discovery ; 
 but rather the magnitude of the gift, and the grace that con- 
 ferred it, are greatly diminished on the contrary supposition. 
 
246 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 To Christianity, we may still be indebted for our conclusion, 
 in point of fact, though not of necessity. For although the 
 doctrine of the divine placability might be traced by the light 
 of reason, this by no means shows that revelation was not, in 
 one sense, necessary to the actual knowledge or belief of the 
 doctrine. It only shows the ground of that necessity to be, 
 not the want of evidence in the works and providence of God, 
 nor of incapacity in the human mind to discover it, but the 
 perverseness and criminal blindness of the mind itself. And 
 surely the kindness of a benefactor, who secures the actual 
 vision of those who willfully shut their own eyes, is not less 
 conspicuous than that of one who first brings upon them the 
 constitutional calamity of blindness, and afterward removes it. 
 On this principle, we see not only the grace and mercy of God 
 manifested in the most illustrious maimer, in giving a revela- 
 tion to men; for it is a gift to the guilty, made necessary by 
 their own perverseness. On the other, though it may indeed 
 be a gift of goodness, it cannot be a gift of mercy, there being 
 no obligation to believe without it. Nor is this all. On the 
 supposition that the providence of God clearly evinces his plac- 
 ability to guilty man, we have a double testimony to the truth 
 of the revealed declaration, that God is reconciling the world 
 to himself. We see the ways of God, his acts and his doings, 
 to be coincident with his declarations ; while on the other sup- 
 position, there is palpable contradiction between what he does 
 and what he says. How is the stamp of divinity impressed on 
 God's revelation by such a coincidence. 
 
 It is not true however, that all the advocates of Christianity 
 have denied that the divine placability can be discovered from 
 the light of nature. President Edwards, speaking of the out- 
 ward provision which God makes for the temporal well-being 
 of man, says, " that it is a great argument, that God is not an 
 implacable enemy of mankind, in a settled determination finally 
 to cast them off, and never again to admit them to favor." — 
 Miscel. Observations. 
 
 The Apostle also, (Heb. ii. 7) has laid down a general prin- 
 ciple, which must be decisive on this point with the believer in 
 his authority. " He that cometh to God, must believe that he 
 is, and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek 
 him." He also declares, that men, having not a revelation 
 from God, are without excuse for not glorifying him as God. 
 
THE SECOND SUPPOSITION. 247 
 
 (Rom. i. 20.) It is not impossible then that the heathen should 
 come to God, or that they should glorify him as God ; aud of 
 course it is not impossible that they should believe that he is, 
 and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him. 
 There is evidence then furnished by the light of nature, that 
 God is a rewarder. True it may be, that I may not be able to 
 exhibit this evidence as it actually exists. That it does exist, 
 admits of no doubt, if the Scriptures be true. With the full 
 persuasion of the fact that such evidence does exist, the pro- 
 priety of attempting to unfold it cannot be doubted. 
 
 The argument for the equity of God's moral government, in 
 a previous lecture, rested on two suppositions, which I proposed 
 to show are matters of fact. This was attempted in the last 
 two lectures in respect to the first supposition, viz., that of a 
 future state. 
 
 It now remains to show, that 
 
 God administers his moved government over men under em 
 economy of grace. 
 
 By this, I mean an economy under which, through an atone- 
 ment, God can, consistently with the perfect equity of his ad- 
 ministration, show favor to the guilty. It will be remembered, 
 according to the principles already advanced, that God, to 
 evince the equity of his administration, must show the highest 
 approbation of obedience to his law, and the highest disappro- 
 bation of disobedience. By an atonement then, I mean some 
 expedient or provision, by which he shows as high disapproba- 
 tion of transgression as he would by the punishment of trans- 
 gressors. Here I admit and maintain, that it would be wholly 
 beyond the power of the human mind to devise or discover 
 any expedient by which this equivalent manifestation of disap- 
 probation could be made. At the same time it is to be remem- 
 bered, that man is not to limit the conceptions of the omniscient 
 mind by those of his own. Whether man can or cannot see 
 how, or by what means an adequate atonement can be made, 
 it would be manifest presumption to affirm that the infinite 
 God cannot. We must admit the possibility of the fact, and 
 if we find good and sufficient evidence, must believe, that 
 though we know not the particular mode that God has devised 
 and adopted, yet that he has some expedient by which he can 
 reconcile the pardon of transgressors with the equity of his 
 moral administration. 
 
248 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 In support of the fact, that God administers his moral gov- 
 ernment under an economy of grace, I remark — 
 
 In the first place, that the manner in which God distributes 
 good and evil in this world, entirely harmonizes with such an 
 economy. This appears in the general fact, that in distributing 
 good and evil in this world, he evinces no undue or inappro- 
 priate feelings toward virtue or vice. That he shows any want 
 of a due regard to virtue, cannot be pretended, on the suppo- 
 sition of a gracious economy. There is no deficiency of reward 
 — no treating of virtuous subjects worse, though all are treated 
 better than they deserve, which perfectly accords with a system 
 of grace. 
 
 Again; God evinces no approbation or disapprobation of 
 vice as such. Let us briefly examine the providential facts 
 which can be supposed to bear on this point. We see that the 
 imperfectly virtuous — and such only are the best of men — do, 
 so far as virtue is in its nature connected with self-complacency 
 and peace of conscience, or with any attendant or consequent 
 happiness, reap the appropriate benefits of their imperfect vir- 
 tue. These are indeed, in some degree, beyond prevention, 
 except by the annihilation of the subject, and are therefore no 
 evidence of God's approbation of sin in good men, even under 
 a merely legal dispensation. Besides, were these benefits of 
 imperfect virtue not experienced by its subjects, how could 
 there be any evidence of God's gracious design to allure men 
 to the practice of virtue, or to restore them to his favor ? It is 
 plain, that without them no manifestation of an economy of 
 grace could be made; and instead of being inconsistent with 
 such an economy, they perfectly harmonize with, and are even 
 demanded by it. 
 
 Another fact, which may be supposed to bear on the point 
 now before us is, that those who are wholly vicious, even the 
 most abandoned, experience only in a very imperfect degree 
 the appropriate evils of vice in remorse of conscience. In this 
 fact we see, on the part of man, an obvious counteraction of 
 the design of God, as it is decisively manifested in the nature 
 and tendencies of things. The fact therefore that wicked men 
 avoid these evils by thus obviously counteracting these tend- 
 encies, is not properly and truly the effect of what God does, 
 or fails to do, except in one respect, viz., that he does not place 
 them in such a condition, or in such circumstances, that the 
 
ENJOYMENT OF GOOD. 249 
 
 full effects of vice, in remorse of conscience, will be felt. But 
 to do so, would be to place them under the full retribution of 
 law. Of course all indications of an economy of grace must 
 cease, and absolute despair of the divine favor must be the 
 consequence. This exemption then, in the case of the wicked, 
 from the full measure of remorse of conscience, while it evinces 
 on the part of God no approbation of vice and no want of dis- 
 approbation of it, under an economy of grace, is plainly con- 
 sistent with, and required by, such an economy. 
 
 Further ; the enjoyment of various other kinds of good 
 which are not deserved, and exemption from various other 
 kinds of evil which are deserved require consideration. I re- 
 mark then, that the enjoyment of this good and the exemption 
 from this evil are obviously the effects of those general laws 
 whose operation and results are seen to be wholly independent 
 of the moral character of man as marking its diversity ; and 
 that therefore they do not evince any approbation of vice, or 
 any want of disapprobation of it, on the part of God. If we 
 consider the enjoyments of this class possessed by the imper- 
 fectly virtuous man, we shall see that God in bestowing them 
 evinces no approbation of his moral imperfection. For exam- 
 ple, such a man by his skill and activity acquires wealth with 
 its numerous advantages and comforts. But it is manifest at 
 once that these blessings are not the appropriate effects of his 
 moral imperfections, but of his skill and industry. To confirm 
 this view of the subject, we see others equally virtuous, either 
 through unskillfulness or by unavoidable providential calam- 
 ities, the victims of poverty with all its evils. We are unavoid- 
 ably led therefore to trace this class of enjoyments to other 
 causes than moral character, so far as the present question is 
 concerned. We see clearly that the providential Disposer of 
 events does not, in the distribution of these favors, act on the 
 principle of expressing approbation of imperfect virtue or of 
 vice, but that they result from the operation of those general 
 laws, which act irrespectively of moral character. These laws 
 and their results for aught we can see, must exist, or the ajmro- 
 priate indications of an economy of grace must wholly cease.* 
 
 For the same reason the good things enjoyed by the vicious 
 are no expression of God's approbation of vice. We see in- 
 
 * Butler's Analogy, Part I. Chap. 3, § 4. 
 11* 
 
250 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 deed the industrious knave cultivate the soil and reap the har- 
 vest, and also the indolent, be their moral character what it 
 may, leave it uncultivated and live in penury. Hence no one 
 ascribes this difference in providential allotment to diversity 
 of moral character ; none regards the prosperity of the skillful 
 and industrious villain, as an expression of God's approbation of 
 his character, but all ascribe it to other causes whose operation 
 and effects are wholly irrespective of moral character. If it 
 here be said, that under the providence of God it is the appro- 
 priate tendency of certain vices to procure enjoyments ; of ava- 
 rice for example to secure wealth, of ambition to acquire honor, 
 &c, I reply that these things are not true in any respect which 
 bears on the present subject ; for we see avarice, for example, 
 acquiring wealth only when connected with skill and industry, 
 while we find it existing in an equal degree when attended by 
 indolence or unskillfulness, acquiring nothing. Besides, it is 
 apparent that a virtuous regard to wealth, connected with skill 
 and industry, has a direct tendency to secure an adequate, not 
 to say an equal, degree of wealth, and greatly to augment its 
 enjoyments. Indeed it would be easy to show, were it neces- 
 sary, that under the providence of God the amount of happi- 
 ness connected with avarice, ambition and sensuality, is far less 
 than results from the opposite virtues. The supposed tendency 
 of these vices is not real, and the acquisition of wealth by ava- 
 rice, of honor by ambition and of pleasure by sensuality, is 
 no expression of God's approbation of these vices. These en- 
 joyments then are to be traced to other causes — to that opera- 
 tion of general laws which is independent of moral character, 
 and which is in no respect inconsistent with God's disapproba- 
 tion of vice, except that he does not place men in a state of 
 exact retribution; and therefore under an economy of grace 
 they are in no respect inconsistent with his disapprobation. In 
 other words, all that can be called the good consequences of 
 vice, are the unavoidable results of those laws which necessarily 
 pertain to an economy of grace, and therefore harmonize with 
 and are required by such an economy. 
 
 Once more. Exemption from that class of evils in the case 
 of the wicked, to which I have referred, is no expression of 
 God's want of disapprobation of vice. This is sufficiently ob- 
 vious from the principles already advanced. Such exemption 
 or exact retribution is the only conceivable alternative. At 
 
DISTKIBUTION OF GOOD AND EVIL. 251 
 
 least it must exist to some extent, or tlie system of general laws 
 which for aught we can see is inseparable from an economy of 
 grace must be abandoned, or man must be placed in a state of 
 exact retribution, which would render such an economy impos- 
 sible. 
 
 Thus it appears that the mode in which God distributes good 
 and evil in this world is not inconsistent with the administra- 
 tion of a moral government under an economy of grace, but 
 perfectly harmonizes with such an economy. If now we re- 
 flect on the proofs adduced in former lectures, as furnished 
 by the nature of man and the condition in which he is placed, 
 that God is administering a moral government over him in 
 some form, that there is nothing in his providential dispensa- 
 tions at all inconsistent with his adhering to the strict princi- 
 ples of equity in his administration, but clear and satisfactory 
 intimations that he does adhere to them, then we are shut up 
 to one of these conclusions ; viz., either God will execute after 
 the short respite of human life a full and exact retribution on 
 every individual of this sinful world ; or show that he is admin- 
 istering his government under a gracious economy. If we re- 
 flect again on the view of the subject that has now been given, 
 particularly on the fact, that while in all his dispensations God 
 so scrupulously avoids any expression of feelings, which appear 
 to be at variance with a due degree of approbation of virtue, 
 and of disapprobation of vice, every thing in this distribution 
 of good and evil harmonizes with an economy of grace, just as 
 we should suppose it would. We see also a coincidence and 
 harmony which remove all presumption against, if they do 
 not create a presumption in favor of the conclusion, that God is 
 administering an equitable moral government under a gracious 
 economy. 
 
 I now proceed to offer more direct evidence on the point be- 
 fore us, and remark — 
 
 In the second place, that God in the distribution of good 
 and evil clearly and decisively evinces a design to restore man to 
 virtue and hajipiness. 
 
 This design of God is so conspicuous and capable of such ex- 
 tensive illustration and confirmation, and yet to every contem- 
 plative mind is so remote from demanding either, that I shall 
 advert only to the leading sources of argument, and in the brief- 
 est form possible. 
 
252 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 I observe — 
 
 (1.) That the providential dispensations of God furnish deci- 
 sive proof, that in respect to worldly or physical enjoyments, a 
 virtuous course of life is the happiest. Whatever may be the 
 practical estimate of mankind on this question — whatever ob- 
 scurity the sophistry of the passions or of the heart may throw 
 around it, none fail to perceive and know that intemperance or 
 excess of every kind, i. <?., selfishness in all its specific forms of 
 action, greatly impairs our comfort and our happiness on earth. 
 In illustration and proof of the fact, I can only advert to a few 
 obvious instances. "Who does not know that honesty is the 
 best policy? By honesty I mean not overt action merely, 
 but that which is dictated by right moral principle. Who does 
 not know the advantages of a virtuous compared with a vicious 
 course of life in respect to health and all our bodily enjoyments, 
 to the possession of wealth and the pleasures it is capable of 
 affording — in a word, to all those blessings which we comprise 
 under the general name of worldly prosperity? Here also 
 might be considered the favor, kindness, honor, influence se- 
 cured by the one, and the alienation, neglect and infamy en- 
 tailed by the other ; the warm approbation and interest felt in 
 the prosperity of the virtuous, and the indignation occasioned 
 by the triumphs of villainy ; and especially the obvious desire 
 of all men to sustain in the eyes of others a character for virtue. 
 How does this last fact show the value of a reputation for vir- 
 tue as the means of human happiness, and that to insure the 
 results we must sustain the character. 
 
 Here it is proper to mention the consequences of virtue and 
 of vice to mankind as subjects of parental and civil govern- 
 ments. These are too obvious to need any specification. They 
 bear however as directly on our argument as any other forms 
 of good and evil, since they are the results of institutions in- 
 separable from our earthly condition, and made so by the ap- 
 pointment of God. 
 
 The consequences of a virtuous and vicious course of life to 
 the inner man claim a more particular consideration. I have 
 already had occasion to exhibit the nature and tendency of vir- 
 tue to give perfect happiness to its subject, and those of vice to 
 produce unqualified misery. I now refer to their actual effects, 
 to some of which I will briefly advert. Consider their influ- 
 ence on our worldly desires and sensual appetites, which if un- 
 
VIRTUE LEADS TO IIAPPINESS. 253 
 
 gratified, are the most fruitful source of unliappiness to man. But 
 let the objects of these desires and appetites be what they may, 
 wealth, honor or pleasure, they are never gratified. So long 
 as they are uncontrolled by virtuous principle, they are always 
 excessive, always stronger than the nature and value of their 
 object warrant, and beyond its power to gratify. Lust, ambi- 
 tion, avarice torment the breast which cherishes them, and in 
 their nature are only specific forms of selfishness, deceiving, 
 enslaving and vexing the mind, while in their consequences 
 they are often calamitous and dreadful. The abandoned 
 drunkard is only a full length portrait of uncontrolled appe- 
 tite. Though avarice, ambition and other lusts do not in each 
 individual instance produce the same degree of evil, yet the 
 aggregate which each has occasioned in this world is scarcely 
 less, perhaps greater, than that which drunkenness has pro- 
 duced. Assuredly we all know that the world is full of un- 
 liappiness through the influence of ungoverned and selfish aj> 
 petite. !Now true virtue leads its possessor to love and desire 
 different objects according to their relative and real value. It 
 gives to the greatest and to every inferior good its proper place, 
 and thus removes all excessive desires and with them the cause 
 of inward torment. 
 
 Consider now the influence of virtue, as it regulates our pas- 
 sions. No small portion of the unliappiness of man results from 
 envy, anger, peevishness, impatience, revenge. Who can deny 
 their power to annoy and torment the mind ? Who can say, 
 as he wishes for enjoyment to-morrow, that he hopes to be 
 angry, fretful,' envious, revengeful ? Is he who indulges these 
 tempers happy in himself, or is he the man who contributes to 
 the happiness of others, or is he a tormentor of himself and of 
 others ? And yet these passions disquiet more or less every 
 human bosom in which true virtue has not broken their do- 
 minion. Look now at the man who governs himself. How 
 gracefully he sways the scepter ! With what serenity and dig- 
 nity he passes onward through life ! How equable his career ! 
 In a world full of jarring elements and violent changes, no 
 clouds of discontent, no whirlwinds of passion, obscure or dis- 
 turb the steady sunshine of the soul. Like the sun in the 
 heavens, he is far above the storms and tempests that infest 
 and darken and agitate all beneath him. 
 
 Similar remarks apply to all those peculiarities of temper 
 
254: MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 and propensity, which are seriously calamitous to individuals. 
 Is one the victim of that melancholy that throws its gloom 
 over every bright prospect — is he hurried into calamities by 
 indecision and levity of spirit — has he that selfish insensibility 
 that shuts him out from all the sympathies and joys of earthly 
 friendships — has he become the victim of dissipation and way- 
 ward prodigality, what other remedy so effectual as to bring 
 him under the influence of virtuous principle ? What like this 
 can fix the inconstant, embolden the timid, strengthen the 
 weak, reclaim the abandoned, and save the lost — what else can 
 correct every infirmity, heal every mental disease, and give 
 health and strength and perfection to the soul of man ? 
 
 But the most terrible of all calamities which shake the soul, 
 is the fear of an avenging Gocl. We know what thoughtless- 
 ness and worldliness, absorption in business and pleasure, can 
 do to blind us to this evil. But we know as well that it cannot 
 be wholly avoided by wicked men. Even the hardiest in guilt 
 cannot become wholly insensible to these forebodings. Cati- 
 line and Nero felt remorse of conscience. The hardihood of a 
 fiend cannot prevent it. There is the impression of a futurity 
 on all human spirits. Every one has a conscience. All know 
 that they have always and deliberately crossed and thwarted 
 the will of another, and that he is no less than an infinite Being ; 
 they know, that thus to cross the will of that Being is to 
 offend him, and that they have always done it. They are 
 afraid of death because they are afraid of God. They know 
 that if there is a just retribution to sustain the prerogatives of 
 heaven's Sovereign, and unfulfilled penalties to avenge their 
 violation, they must fall on them. There is an emphatic voice 
 of remonstrance and warning which they cannot quell, and a 
 fearful looking for of judgment they cannot avoid. What is 
 the remedy for these evils, and for those that spring from this 
 alienation of the creature from his Creator — from this aversion 
 of heart to the Almighty Sovereign of heaven and earth, but 
 to return to affection and friendship — what but virtue, religion ? 
 I say not here whether God be placable or not. But I ask, 
 what other hope have we, or can we have, if not from conform- 
 ity to his will ? Suppose him a selfish, even a malignant Being, 
 what better can we do than to return to duty; what better, if 
 we would secure the friendship of such a Being, than to do his 
 will. If he is placable — aye, if too he is infinitely good, then 
 
ADVANTAGES OF VIRTUE. 255 
 
 what may wc not hope for ? The answer is in the feelings of 
 an immortal, who lias seen and felt his desert of punishment — 
 of the vengeance of the Almighty, bnt is now reposing in the 
 bosom of infinite love. 
 
 I might dwell here on the advantages of virtue in every con- 
 dition of human life. In youth, what else can so protect from 
 every danger and evil, and open such bright prospects for 
 future life ? In old age, when decrepitude of body and the 
 sinking faculties of the mind seem to open our graves, what 
 else shall console us ? Under affliction, how disconsolate were 
 human sorrow, with no appeal but to the unfeeling rock that 
 crushes us. Friends forsake or betray us — all whom we love 
 die — disease assails, which no remedies can reach, — poverty 
 sinks us from affluence to want ; death comes — every arm is 
 palsied, every countenance is pale in weakness and despair — 
 what shall sustain us ? Nothing but virtue — nothing but re- 
 ligion — nothing but doing the will of God. The love of God, 
 the fixed purpose to do his will, gives hope of his favor. No- 
 thing else can convert our very trials into blessings, and give 
 the hope of a brighter world. This can change the gloom of 
 the dark valley into the twilight of an eternal morning, and 
 the dark grave into the gate of heaven. All else is darkness 
 without light, guilt without hope, fear, remorse, terror, ruin 
 and wretchedness. 
 
 Why then are there, in the providence of God, such clear 
 and abundant advantages in the practice of virtue, if it be not 
 his design to allure men to the practice of it ? Why does he 
 thus shut them up to virtue, to religion, as their only hope of 
 his favor, if not to assure them that in this way they shall 
 obtain it. 
 
 (2.) The blessings of life, contemplated as the gifts of a 
 divine Benefactor, tend by a strong influence, to reclaim men 
 to the practice of virtue. It is philosophic truth, that "the 
 goodness of God leadeth to repentance." Nor is there any 
 kind of moral influence so powerfully adapted to this end as 
 manifested kindness, which is sure to produce affection in re- 
 turn. This influence reaches the last and lowest stages of 
 human profligacy; for few are so obdurate as not to feel its 
 thrilling efficacy. Nor can I conceive it possible, that an un- 
 perverted mind should contemplate this sinful world, in its un- 
 worthiness of the favors of its Maker, and also the ceaseless 
 
256 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 and abundant communication of blessings to those who deserve 
 only his displeasure ; the solicitude with which he watches, the 
 care with which he protects, the compassion with which he 
 relieves, the kindness with which he blesses, and not feel a 
 mighty and an almost irresistible attraction to do the will of 
 such a Benefactor. How is it possible that intelligent beings, 
 qualified as we are, to read the clear intimations of our Maker's 
 will in our constitution and circumstances as moral beings, 
 and made as we are, the constant objects of his more than 
 paternal care and kindness, can doubt or disregard his design 
 to recover us to obedience and to the enjoyment of his favor? 
 What child, in similar circumstances, could question the design 
 of paternal love ? 
 
 (3.) The natural evils of life justly and soberly estimated be- 
 speak the same design. We no sooner inquire into the end 
 which these evils are fitted to accomplish in respect to man, 
 than we see that it is to restrain men from vice and restore 
 them to virtue. The most striking fact in regard to these evils 
 is, that to a vast extent they result from the wrong state of the 
 heart and conduct of the life. It is suffering in connection with 
 sin, telling us a truth we cannot fail to know, that if we would 
 prevent the effect, we must remove the cause ; and far more 
 distinctly and more impressively, that as God loves our happi- 
 ness he loves also our virtue, and that he will secure the one 
 only by means of the other. So plainly, so forcibly is this great 
 truth taught in the providence of God, that every man knows 
 and feels it in much the same manner as that, if he would avoid 
 the sensation of being burned he must keep himself from the 
 fire. By these evils too the insufficiency and vanity of earthly 
 joys are made obvious in a manner the most impressive to the 
 wayward mind of man. Let him take his lesson from these 
 evils, let him take it from the sufferings, the agonies, the last 
 breath of a dying man, and who would not realize what the 
 world is? In the evils of life we are furnished with abundant 
 opportunities for the exercise of all, and especially of the more 
 difficult and nobler virtues. Even in those evils to which we 
 are subject through what we call inadvertence or rashness, 
 rather than by the execution of any criminal purpose, we find 
 a powerful check to imprudence and temerity, and an impres- 
 sive lesson of discretion and care, which may be indispensable 
 to our moral well-being. Who can estimate the benefits of 
 
EYILS OF LIFE BENEFICENT. 257 
 
 watchfulness to moral beings? The necessity of continued oc- 
 cupation and labor for our comfortable subsistence is also indi- 
 rectly, and yet in the most important respects subservient to 
 our moral interests. Its single influence to remove us from the 
 temptations of sloth, and to deprive us of leisure to contrive 
 and perpetrate iniquity, is sufficient to show its salutary effects 
 on the conduct of men — to show us that what we are so apt to 
 esteem one of the most intolerable calamities, is one of the 
 greatest of heaven's blessings. It can scarcely be pretended, 
 that the moral and of course all the real interests of a world in 
 which calamities, disease, pain and death possess so benign a 
 tendency and yet produce so little good effect, would be im- 
 proved by any diminution of these evils ; nor can it well be 
 doubted that they evince the design of their author to re- 
 strain man from the perversion of his moral nature, and to re- 
 store him to virtue and happiness. What would this world be 
 without these ? "Were there no disappointments, no sufferings, 
 no death, how ferocious, how desperate were human selfishness. 
 It would be a pandemonium rather than a paradise, over whose 
 crimes and woes even God's mercy would despair. In a word 
 then, in all the evils of human life we discern only the disci- 
 pline and the chastisements of a father's hand, and see only 
 "the graver countenance of his love," intending our profit by 
 making us partakers of his holiness and his favor. 
 
 The present state of man is obviously one of trial and disci- 
 pline, and as such is fitted and designed to form his character to 
 permanent virtue. On this most important topic I have not 
 time to dwell. The illustration of it by Bishop Butler in his 
 Analogy, (P. I., Chaps. 4 and 5,) to those who will read his 
 remarks, supersedes the necessity of any attempt on my part 
 to exhibit the subject. Not merely the theological student 
 and the Christian, but every man who would understand the 
 true nature and design of his existence in this world, should 
 read and read often, these chapters of Butler. 
 
 The general doctrine which he establishes is, that the present 
 world is a state of moral discipline adapted and designed to 
 improve and ultimately to confirm man in virtue and hap- 
 piness in a future world. This adaptation he has traced in a 
 variety of particulars with such clearness of illustration and 
 force of argument, that the reality of it cannot be doubted by 
 any candid mind. He has not indeed applied this great fact to 
 
 17 
 
258 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 this particular purpose, but the fact being admitted, who can 
 doubt its application ? If it be obvious and undeniable, that the 
 constitution of man and the entire course of God's providential 
 dispensations toward him are fitted to reclaim him from sin 
 and to improve and confirm him in virtue and happiness, I ask 
 whence such adaptation, if God does not design to accomplish 
 this end. It is to no purpose to say that in respect to the 
 greater part of men this design is not accomplished. The light 
 of nature leaves the future particular results of the present 
 state in many respects unknown and indeterminate. Proba- 
 tion, and with it this course of moral discipline, may also be con- 
 tinued under even more favorable auspices, till the end shall 
 be accomplished in manner and degree worthy of the attri- 
 butes of its Author. Admit however the fact to be as sup- 
 posed, it must be traced to the voluntary perversion of the 
 design of God on the part of men, and the perversion of a 
 design is decisive of its reality. 
 
 (5.) The happiness of mankind, to a great extent — I may 
 even say their perfect happiness — is placed in their own power. 
 Immeasurably the greatest portion of the miseries of human 
 life are the result of sin and moral imperfection. Suppose that 
 all men were perfectly conformed to the rule of benevolent 
 action, how would this dismal world, as we are often prone to 
 esteem it, and darkened and afflicted as it is by sin and its woes, 
 be cheered and brightened ! Let all unkindness between man 
 and man cease ; let envy and malice, fraud, cruelty, contention, 
 covetousness, pride, ambition and sensuality come to an end ; 
 let these be followed by perfect benevolence, under all its 
 forms of meekness, humility, contentment, self-denial, upright- 
 ness, confidence, sympathy, a universal courteousness and cor- 
 diality ; let benevolence go forth in an uninterrupted train of 
 deeds of beneficence, and liberality pour abroad its gifts, and 
 let gratitude and love reign pure and unruffled in every heart, 
 and these be attended with submission, trust and joy, with the 
 other delightful emotions of piety, and how trivial would be 
 every possible evil — how would this world of sorrow cease to 
 groan, and be transformed into a primeval Eden ! How would 
 all nature smile in beauty and pour forth its bounties to bless, 
 and the sunshine of every heart welcome a present God, and 
 tell us of a paradise regained ! Does such a fact, in respect to 
 this world of his creatures, bespeak no design of their Maker ? 
 
PERFECTION INSURES BLESSEDNESS. 259 
 
 Can an individual doubt, in respect to the part which God de- 
 sires that he should act ? Can such a weight of motive as arises 
 from this amount of good to each and to all, from the obvious 
 practicability of its attainment as placed in their power, be 
 furnished without being designed to move such beings to act 
 accordingly % The question admits of but one answer, and this 
 too plain to be stated. The whole world feels this influence. 
 "With it there is a sense of duty and of obligation, which presses 
 hard and almost irresistibly on the human conscience, to em- 
 bark in this enterprise of blessing the world ; and there is a 
 sense of guilt and self-condemnation which fastens on the soul, 
 and compels those who live only to defeat this design of their 
 Maker, to carry a wounded spirit with them through all their 
 pilgrimage. Who can reflect on these things as the result of 
 God's providential dispensations, without regarding them as 
 the ceaseless efforts of his grace to recover man to virtue and 
 to happiness? 
 
 There is another fact, which has too important a relation to 
 this part of the argument to be left unnoticed; one which gives 
 a peculiar grandeur and glory to a moral agent — that such is 
 the nature of a moral being, that perfection in character is per- 
 fection in blessedness. Moral agency involves, in its very 
 nature, the power so to occupy the mind and bless the moral 
 being with the right object of affection, that any loss of good, 
 and any pain or suffering which are possible in the case, shall 
 be accounted almost as nothing. (I might say, and maintain 
 the position, that it would be in the power of a moral being, if 
 morally perfect, to avoid all suffering, even from omnipotence 
 — at least from every created cause. I have no doubt of this 
 fact, as one given in the true philosophy of the mind.) But I 
 present the position with the slight qualification, almost entirely 
 to avoid suffering. 
 
 This may be illustrated in many forms, and in the commonest 
 things. How frequently then, when thought and sensibility 
 are wholly given to some object of absorbing interest, do we 
 receive bodily injury without feeling or knowing the fact ? 
 Every thing is relative, not only in thought but in feel ing. How 
 unworthy in a Croesus to grieve for the loss of a farthing ! 
 Archimedes was so absorbed in the solution of his problem, that 
 he lost his life in the sacking of the city, without being aware 
 of his danger. Soldiers, wounded and bleeding in battle, have 
 
260 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 fought on, insensible of their wounds, till they were falling in 
 death. Paul, in his own language, "suffered the loss of all 
 things, and counted them but dung, that he might win 
 Christ ;" and considered himself " as having nothing, and yet 
 possessing all things." Martyrs, on the rack and in the 
 fire, have triumphed, with hymns of praise on their lips and 
 heaven in their hearts. The nature of mind explains all this. 
 "When then the object that engrosses the mind of a moral 
 being is God — as he is, his designs, the end, the results at 
 which he aims and which he will accomplish — when the 
 heart, the whole soul of a moral being, is fixed as it may be 
 on such an object, and so becomes "filled with all the fullness 
 of God," why should it be thought strange that the tortures of 
 the rack and the fire should leave the perfect blessedness of 
 the mind unimpaired ? Such is undeniably the nature of a 
 moral being. By perfection in character he secures perfection 
 in happiness, and becomes incapable of misery ! Evil, suffer- 
 ing is possible to man only through his moral imperfection. 
 
 I am not saying that perfect holiness will ever exist in this 
 world ; experience and observation forbid us to expect it. But I 
 have called your attention to the fact now stated, that I might 
 ask, what is the design of God, in giving existence to moral 
 beings ? Has he not placed their happiness in their power — 
 happiness without alloy, absolute and perfect? And what is, 
 what can be his design, but to induce man to attain it ; what 
 but to persuade him to do the will and enjoy the friendship 
 of his Creator ? 
 
 (6.) I only add in support of this conclusion,that if there is no 
 forgiveness with God, and if the proof is decisive that there is 
 none, then all this course of effort to reclaim to obedience 
 must of necessity be vain and worse than in vain. Under the 
 conviction that there is no forgiveness with God, the world 
 would become desperate in rebellion. That God then by the 
 entire course of providence should thus aim to restore man to 
 virtue, and yet authorize and even render unavoidable a con- 
 viction which must render all his efforts to reclaim abortive, is 
 incredible. The providential dispensations of God then author- 
 ize and require the conclusion that there is forgiveness for the 
 guilty. Indeed in view of what has been said, I ask is there in 
 the entire providence of God any thing in the least degree in- 
 consistent with this great design of his grace — is there any 
 
RECAPITULATION. 261 
 
 want of adaptation in the means adopted for its accomplish- 
 ment; can any course of providential dispensation be conceived 
 more decisively expressive of a design to restore a lost world to 
 duty and to happiness. 
 
 I now recur to what I claim to have proved, that God is ad- 
 ministering his moral government on the principles of exact 
 equity. In view of this fact we are brought to the unavoidable 
 conclusion, that he will in a future world unfold these principles 
 either in exact retribution or through an atonement. The former 
 is indeed far more probable, than that he has abandoned the 
 principles of eternal justice in his moral government. At the 
 same time that man's present state is simply that of respite 
 from deserved punishment under a merely legal dispensation, 
 must be regarded as highly, even altogether incredible, when 
 compared with the supposition of a gracious economy. In 
 view then of the equity of God's administration, and all those 
 influences to restore man to virtue, and those intimations of 
 forgiveness so conspicuous in this course of his providence, the 
 only conclusion is that God is administering his moral govern- 
 ment through an atonement, or under a gracious economy. 
 
 One remark in conclusion. You see that if you ever become 
 the objects of God's favor, you must do so on the same ground 
 and on the same conditions which Christianity reveals and pre- 
 scribes. Without an atonement for your sins, like that which 
 Christianity reveals, there is no hope that you can be forgiven; 
 without repentance for sin, the renunciation of it by doing the 
 will of God, and a cheerful unqualified trust in his pardoning 
 mercy, there is no true happiness for you here or hereafter. 
 
 Come then and act up to the dictates of right reason. If you 
 have not proof that Christianity is from God, you have proof 
 that with God there is forgiveness for the penitent sinner, and 
 for none but him. There is, there can be no religion for you 
 but one whose basis is an atonement for sin — a religion which 
 involves a penitent and a contrite heart which hopes for mercy 
 from God as the righteous avenger of sin. Act up then to the 
 dictates of your sober judgment — conform the dictates of con- 
 science to the will of the Being who made you, who in all his 
 providence either smiles to invite you to his friendship, or 
 frowns only to deter you from the guilt and the ruin of sin. 
 Embrace that religion by which the infinite God, your Maker, 
 your Redeemer would bless, and without which he will curse 
 
262 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 you forever — that religion which is the perfection of your na- 
 ture, the end of your existence. If truth is better than false- 
 hood, if happiness is more desirable than misery, if God as your 
 friend is better than God as your enemy, if to meet him as your 
 Saviour is better than to meet him as the avenger of sin, if to 
 go to his judgment-seat fearless and triumphant is better than 
 to go there in despairing terror, if heaven is better than hell, 
 choose this hour with a penitent, humble and steadfast heart, 
 the service of a redeeming God. 
 
LECTURE VI. 
 
 Second leading proposition continued, viz.— God administers an equitable moral government; 
 also, God administers a moral government under a gracious economy. — Proof 3. We must 
 
 * suppose God to administer his government in the way of exact retribution, or through an 
 atonement. — One of these is true, or God is deficient in power, or malignant in intention. — 
 Just conception of Benevolence in God. — What is Justice in God. — Infidels have false views of 
 both. — Dispensations of God's Providence prove him not to be weak. — The equity of a mural 
 government can be consistent with mercy only through an atonement. — Alternative for the 
 unbeliever. 
 
 In the preceding lecture, I entered on the proof of the prop- 
 osition, that God is administering an equitable moral govern- 
 ment over men under an atonement. 
 
 I now resume the same subject, and, w T ith some recapitulation 
 of principles and arguments adduced in former lectures, shall 
 attempt to prove the same thing, by showing — 
 
 In the third place, that the only admissible suppositions are, 
 that God is administering his moral government over men 
 either in the w r ay of exact retribution, or through an atone- 
 ment ; and that as the former supposition is wholly inadmis- 
 sible, it follows that he is administering it under an atonement, 
 I propose to show — 
 
 First, That God is administering his moral government over 
 men either in the w r ay of exact retribution or under an atone- 
 ment ; and 
 
 Secondly, That he is administering it not in the former, but 
 in the latter mode, or under an atonement. 
 
 First. God is administering his moral government over men 
 either in the one or the other of these modes of administration. 
 If he is not, it must be that it is either through want of power, 
 or through an unkind or malignant intention toward individual 
 subjects, or through that excessive lenity which sacrifices the 
 general good to individual happiness. 
 
 It is not through want of power. On this point no argument, 
 in view of the omnipotence of God, can be necessary. 
 
 It is not through malignant intention • i. «?., not w 7 ith the de- 
 sign of inflicting punishment hereafter with undue severitv, or of 
 
264 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 treating his subjects worse than they deserve. This supposition 
 would be wholly gratuitous, since there is not a pretense that 
 in the whole course of his providence there is the least viola- 
 tion of individual rights. J^or would it be merely gratuitous, 
 but against strong evidence to the contrary. Every thing that 
 can bear on the question, in the divine administration, is decis- 
 ive of benevolence to man; all that can be alleged with the 
 least plausibility, against the exact equity of his government, 
 being the fact that he treats his subjects better than they 
 deserve — a fact surely very remote from authorizing even a # 
 conjecture that he will treat them hereafter more severely. 
 Besides, malignity itself, though the manifestation of it might 
 subvert rightful authority, cannot violate the principles of 
 equity, in treating the rebellious subjects of God (and such are 
 all men) worse than they deserve, for they all deserve evil. 
 God then cannot be supposed to depart from the principles of 
 exact equity in his moral administration, through malignant 
 intention toward individual subjects. 
 
 Again; nor can he be supposed to do this through excessive 
 lenity. This, in the form in which it is often presented, is the 
 most plausible of the suppositions which are now to be ex- 
 ploded, and derives its plausibility wholly from the name given 
 it. It is called benevolence, and thus held up to our admira- 
 tion as the sum and perfection of moral excellence and beauty. 
 And what is more calamitous to the cause of truth, the defend- 
 ers of the equity of God's government have often conceded, 
 that benevolence is the proper name of the thing intended ; 
 denying that the divine moral perfection is comprised in this 
 attribute, even when an apostle has said that " God is love," 
 and maintaining, that justice in God, instead of being only a 
 modification or specific form of benevolence, is another and 
 distinct attribute, dictating and demanding what benevolence 
 forbids.* 
 
 Let us then form some definite conceptions on this most 
 momentous of all questions — what is benevolence in God f At 
 least let us distinguish it from what it is not, and from what 
 often bears its desecrated name.-f What then is benevolence in 
 God? 
 
 * Dr. Chalmers' Bridgewater Treatise. 
 
 f I am not here deciding that God is benevolent, but only reasoning ex concessis; 
 i. e., on the assumption of the infidel, that God is benevolent. 
 
THE STRONGHOLD OF INFIDELITY. 265 
 
 Is any thing wliicli does not disapprove and abhor sin as the 
 supreme evil, and which will not show even the highest disap- 
 probation of it ? In opposition to this, we are told that such 
 is not the benevolence of God, and that instead of viewing him 
 in the character of a just and righteous Sovereign, we are to 
 regard him in no other relation than that of a benignant, ten- 
 der parent, who so delights in the happiness of his family, that 
 to promote it he will sacrifice all that can be called law, jus- 
 tice and equity. 
 
 We here come to the stronghold of Infidelity. Let us then 
 ascertain the precise question to be decided. It is not whether 
 God, as a benevolent Being, delights in the happiness of his 
 moral creation, and desires to promote it in the only way in 
 which it can be secured. But can he accomplish that end 
 without the influence of an equitable moral government; in 
 other words, can God be benevolent without being just f 
 
 What then is benevolence in God f And what is justice in 
 God f Benevolence in God is a disposition to secure the high- 
 est happiness, and to prevent all misery. Of course it must 
 disapprove, hate, and abhor that which necessarily destroys 
 the highest happiness and tends to produce all misery. But 
 such is the nature and tendency of sin. What then is justice 
 in God? It is simply one specific form or modification of 
 benevolence; i. c, in respect to sin, it is benevolence, and no- 
 thing but benevolence, disapproving, abhorring, and determin- 
 ing to punish sin in the subjects of his government, as that 
 which undermines his authority, and tends to destroy the high- 
 est, happiness, and to produce all evil. God then, as a benevo- 
 lent being, must feel the highest disapprobation and abhorrence 
 of sin. In proportion as he loves happiness and hates misery, 
 he must abhor sin, as that which destroys the one and produces 
 the other. To suppose a benevolent God then, who is not also 
 a just God, is to suppose a benevolent God who is not benevo- 
 lent. 
 
 Nor is this all. God as the governor of moral beings must 
 show by his acts that he thus disapproves of and hates sin. He 
 must come before his kingdom with the demonstration of his 
 benevolence in the form of justice, either by a retribution or 
 some equivalent manifestation of his supreme abhorrence of this 
 evil. Words without actions in such a case are no proof in a 
 question of character. In a moral kingdom all results in hap- 
 Vol. I.-12. 
 
MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 piness and misery depend on the moral conduct of its subjects, 
 and that depends on the influences nnder which they act. Of all 
 these there is one which is absolutely essential ; viz., that of the 
 moral governor's supreme approbation of right and supreme dis- 
 approbation of every wrong moral action on their part. This is 
 the only influence by which as a moral governor, he can move 
 them. Motives as consisting simply in natural good and evil, 
 whether furnished by the perceived nature and tendencies of 
 action, or through the medium of promised good and threat- 
 ened evil, are not the influence of moral government. This in- 
 fluence arises only from the perfect character of the governor, 
 as manifested in his supreme approbation of right and supreme 
 disapprobation of wrong moral action. If he has these feelings 
 then he will manifest them by his acts. To suppose otherwise, 
 is to suppose him not to use the most perfect means for the 
 most perfect end ; to give no evidence of his real character and 
 of his right to govern — no proof that he is not the friend and 
 patron of iniquity, none that he is entitled to the confidence or 
 submission of his subjects. Nay more, it is to suppose him 
 to give decisive proof to the contrary ; for in such a case, if he 
 had the feelings of supreme approbation of right and supreme 
 disapprobation of wrong action he would manifest them. The 
 good of his kingdom demands it. Benevolence dictates and 
 imperiously requires it, as the necessary means of the best end. 
 If then he does not manifest these feelings, the proof is deci- 
 sive against their existence, and of course that he is not worthy 
 of the confidence and submission of his subjects, and not enti- 
 tled to the throne. 
 
 Were the whole moral universe a heaven of joy and rap- 
 ture, what security for its continuance even for an hour ? 
 
 And why under the government of a selfish deity, will not 
 all good and all hope terminate at any moment in the agonies 
 and woes of sin ? "What sort of obedience to God would that 
 be, secured by such influences, when there is no ground of con- 
 fidence, respect or love furnished in his character ? And what 
 such ground could there be in the character of a God whose so- 
 called benevolence dispenses with all justice and all equity, 
 which does not supremely abhor, but actually patronizes and 
 befriends, protects and rewards iniquity ? Than that sort of 
 benevolence, there is nothing worse in point of principle in 
 Satan himself. Adorn it with what tender names you will, 
 
THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD. 267 
 
 of parental love and kindness, yon wonld actually despise it 
 in an earthly parent or a civil magistrate, and it ought to be 
 and would be despised in God himself by all his intelligent 
 creation. It sinks all that is venerable and awful in heaven's 
 sovereign as a God of benevolence, guarding the general good 
 of his kingdom at the sacrifice of individual good, not into that 
 which is lovely,but into that which is contemptible. Such is 
 the God whom Infidelity worships, cheating itself with names 
 and words, while in the incense it offers to a fancied deity, it 
 despises the object of its own adoration. Nay, rather it for- 
 gets that the real object of its homage is and must be in prin- 
 ciple, a being of absolute selfishness or infinite malignity. I 
 only ask, is it possible, is it conceivable, that a benevolent 
 is not also a just God ? Can there be a benevolent God 
 who does not supremely abhor and who will not show that 
 he abhors the worst thing in the universe ? Can a perfectly 
 benevolent God be supposed to depart from the principles of 
 eternal righteousness? Will he despoil his high and inviolable 
 sanctuary of all its sacredness — his dominion of all its majesty? 
 Will he yield to that excessive lenity or indulgent tenderness 
 which will darken all his glories — will he by this most fearful 
 act of infinite malignity fill his moral creation with terror and 
 dismay ? 
 
 Let us now briefly appeal to the providence of God. Here 
 let it be remembered, that God must be supposed either to be 
 strictly just as a moral governor, or to be so concerned for the 
 happiness of individual subjects, that he consents for their sake 
 to sacrifice the -equity of his moral government, and with it the 
 highest happiness of his moral kingdom. Do then the dispen- 
 sations of his providence authorize us to ascribe to him, even in 
 conjecture, the latter character? Why — if he relincpiishes the 
 character of a righteous moral governor for that of an in- 
 dulgent parent — does he give such clear and decisive indica- 
 tions of his supreme approbation of virtue and disapprobation 
 of vice? Why does he render it the most manifest of all truths, 
 that there is no way in which man can secure his own perfect 
 happiness, or be safe against perfect misery, except by the prac- 
 tice of virtue ? Why has he created beings whose very nature 
 and condition on the least reflection, bring before the mind the 
 everlasting distinction between right and wrong moral action, 
 and constrain them to feel that by the latter they are defeating 
 
268 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 the high end of their own creation, and doing the most palpa- 
 ble violence to the will of an infinite Creator ? Why if reluct- 
 ant to make man ultimately as miserable as strict equity de- 
 mands — why if thus indifferent to the rights of the public, is 
 there no instance of individual, or at least of public injustice? 
 Why, if God is all tenderness, does he so distinctly express his 
 displeasure toward iniquity in the various ways of his provi- 
 dence, and actually produce such fearful forebodings of a com- 
 ing retribution,that the heart of every man trembles while going 
 on in iniquity — that every man is afraid of death because he is 
 to meet God? Why is it that no error, artifice or system of 
 opinions has ever been devised, adequate to quell the dread and 
 the disturbance which the wicked feel when they think of the 
 Sovereign of heaven ? Why is it that Universalism, Infidelity, 
 Atheism have so often cried for his mercy when summoned 
 by death into his presence ? 
 
 Advert to another class of evils ; I mean those which God 
 brings on men, not as the natural consequence of crime, but in 
 the exercise of his high and irresponsible sovereignty, such as 
 those which result from disease and pestilence. Is there not 
 a cause? Who can suppose that they are brought on moral 
 beings without reference to their character ? Who that knows 
 that he is a sinner, a rebel against God, can feel these evils in his 
 own person without the reflection, if not that he deserves them, 
 at least that God is not too good to inflict the extremest evils on 
 his creatures ? What is their design but to tell us of a degree 
 of displeasure, which confines not its expressions in evil to the 
 direct natural results of wrong doing, and that he has still 
 other and more fearful treasures of wrath for the workers of 
 iniquity? What if all the sufferings and death which have 
 been endured on the face of this earth since its creation, could 
 be arrayed before the eye in present and distinct vision ? What 
 if all the sorrows and pains, and sighs and tears, and all the dis- 
 tress by sickness, pestilence, famine, earthquakes, shipwrecks, 
 wars, the rack, the gibbet, and the fire — what if all the weep- 
 ing w r idows and orphans, all the lamentation and mourning 
 of parents and children, of husbands, wives, brothers, sisters — 
 what if all the massacres, the shrieks, agonies and groans of 
 the dying — the seas of human blood and the mountains of 
 human corpses — what if these scenes of woe and horror which 
 have been witnessed on earth could be brought before us, and 
 
THE ALTERNATIVE. 269 
 
 all be acted and felt over again as a present reality under our 
 direct inspection. How should we be overwhelmed, and what 
 should we think of that God who made and governs such a 
 world as this? With such a spectacle of terror before us, 
 should we reflect on nothing but his tenderness, and with our 
 consciousness of guilt expect nothing but favors from his 
 hands? What does the history of this world disclose, if not 
 visible marks and traces of the vengeance of God upon it, in 
 every age and every hour? And do these bespeak mere in- 
 dulgence? Surely whatever other weakness or inconsistency 
 may be ascribed to God, nothing is more inconsistent with the 
 whole course of his providential dealings with men, than the 
 weakness or inconsistency of excessive lenity. On whatever 
 other basis man may rest his hopes of God's favor, that of mere 
 tenderness, it w^ould seem, must be the last. The entire history 
 of his providence furnishes not an instance of kindness at the 
 expense of justice, but discloses to all who read the record, a 
 severity of dispensation which proclaims that a sovereign law- 
 giver and a righteous judge is on the throne of the universe. 
 We do, we must see a God frowning at sin. And if amid these 
 frowns we also witness the smiles of mercy, still they are too 
 dark and awful to authorize the hope of his favor through the 
 mere relentings of tenderness. 
 
 We are then brought to the conclusion, that God is administer- 
 ing an equitable moral government over men, either according 
 to the principles of exact retribution or through an atonement. 
 In other words, God will show his supreme disapprobation of 
 sin, either by inflicting unmingled and endless misery on a 
 world of transgressors, or by some other expedient which shall 
 equally manifest such disapprobation. 
 
 Solemn and tremendous as is this alternative, it is and must 
 be real ; and from it there is no escape, according to any prin- 
 ciples of correct reasoning. The benevolence of God, if we 
 assume it as the infidel does — his providence, in all its facts 
 and principles — every consideration that bears on the subject, 
 conducts to our conclusion; while no fact, no principle, fur- 
 nishes the least opposing evidence. Deny our conclusion, and 
 you deny the perfect justice of God ; deny his justice, and you 
 must deny his benevolence. Admit then, that he is a God of 
 absolute selfishness, of infinite malignity, or admit his benevo- 
 lence, and with it his supreme abhorrence of sin, and the mani- 
 
270 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 festation of that abhorrence, either in an exact retribution here- 
 after or through an atonement. 
 
 This brings us to the question, in which of these only possible 
 or conceivable modes, is God administering his moral govern- 
 ment over this sinful world f This leads me to say, 
 
 Secondly, That he is administering it, not in the former 
 mode, but under an atonement. 
 
 This position is fully sustained by two facts and a principle. 
 The facts are these: the first, that God is administering an 
 equitable moral government over men; the second, that the en- 
 tire course of his providence bespeaks his design to restore man 
 to duty and to favor. The principle is, that the perfect equity 
 or justice of a moral governor, can be reconciled with mercy to 
 transgressors only through an atonement. 
 
 In respect to the first of these facts, we have seen that God 
 administers a moral government over men; that he does it 
 through the medium of the best law; and that this fact, un- 
 counteracted by any opposing evidence, is decisive proof of the 
 perfect equity of his administration ; that instead of furnishing 
 any opposing evidence, the entire course of his providence shows 
 him, as it were, most scrupulously avoiding every shadow of 
 injustice — discloses the true tendency of obedience to his will, 
 to bless, and of disobedience, to ruin the soul of man forever, 
 and exhibits him in that severity of dispensation which com- 
 ports only with the majesty of a sovereign lawgiver and right- 
 eous judge. We have seen that he has destined the subjects 
 of his government to a future state of being, thus furnishing 
 an opportunity for the perfect display of the equity of his 
 administration ; while the manner in which he removes them 
 to that world tells of such a result, in the most fearful forebod- 
 ings of every departing spirit ; and that whether we assume 
 and reason from his benevolence or from the facts of his provi- 
 dence, no other supposition can for a moment be admitted, than 
 that of the perfect equity of his government. Shut up then 
 to this conclusion on the one hand, we see at the same time on 
 the other, the most satisfactory indications of his benignant 
 design to restore man to duty and favor. The same course of 
 providential dispensations, along with the lessons it gives of 
 the equity of his administration, shows not less clearly the les- 
 sons of his mercy to the penitent transgressor. Every thing, as 
 we have seen, entirely harmonizes with such an economy, and 
 
AN ATONEMENT NECESSARY. 271 
 
 is fitted and adapted to the end of bringing man back to his 
 duty and the friendship of his Maker ; every motive which 
 can reach and move a rational, voluntary being, whether de- 
 rived from his present or future well-being ; every thing in the 
 form of manifested kindness and good-will on the part of a 
 divine Benefactor; every thing in the form of paternal chas- 
 tisement, in the nature and condition of man, adapted and 
 designed to form his character to permanent virtue ; his happi- 
 ness placed so completely in his own power as a moral being — 
 every thing to invite to obedience, and to awe from transgres- 
 sion, which is conceivable in such a system; while all these 
 adaptations, influences, efforts to reclaim, must be worse than 
 in vain — must evince even malignity of intention on the part 
 of the Creator, if he has no design to forgive and to save. 
 
 With these things in view, let us now advert to the principle, 
 viz., that the perfect justice of God, as a moral governor, can 
 he reconciled with mercy to transgressors only through an atone- 
 ment. This is the impossibility, already sufficiently illustrated, 
 that God should be either benevolent or just, without manifest- 
 ing his supreme abhorrence of sin. I need not say, that it were 
 easy for infinite wisdom to devise, and infinite power to exe- 
 cute, a plan by which such a manifestation shall be made, in 
 the pardon of transgressors. Here then let us judge, whether 
 God has not adopted some plan by which the principles of 
 eternal justice are consistent with favor to a revolted world. 
 What else can be true, or even supposed possible, but that he 
 is administering a perfectly equitable system of moral govern- 
 ment over men under an economy of grace ? 
 
 I say not here what will be the actual results of this economy 
 in a future world. All that the light of nature can give on 
 this point is at most, the general conclusion, that these results 
 will be such as will accord with that benignity of design so 
 conspicuous in his providential dealings. The great fact itself 
 however, appears, to my own mind, to be shown by all the 
 evidence of which the nature of the case admits. If it be pos- 
 sible to manifest to rational beings the adoption of such a sys- 
 tem without a revelation, i. <3., by merely providential dispen- 
 sations, I see not why the evidence actually furnished of A just 
 God and a Saviotjk, does not demand the most unhesitating 
 belief. 
 
 To conclude. If these things are so, we see on what ground 
 
272 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 Infidelity must stand. The infidel must believe either in a 
 malignant Deity, or in a future exact retribution of this sinful 
 world, or in the great cardinal fact of Christianity, viz., that 
 there is an atonement for sin. Let us look at this. If the infi- 
 del denies a full, just and exact retribution of this sinful world, 
 and also an atonement for sin, then he is shut up to the admis- 
 sion of a selfish, malignant Deity. He may call him benevolent; 
 but it is a name without the reality. Such a God is not be- 
 nevolent, for he is not just. He is unjust. He is regardless, 
 reckless of the greatest happiness of his moral creation — unjust 
 to his kingdom — malignant. 
 
 Again ; if now the infidel still denies an atonement for sin, 
 and admits the benevolence of God, then he is shut up to the 
 admission of a full and exact retribution of this sinful world in 
 utter and endless misery. On his own premises there is no 
 escape. If any thing is true in moral reasoning, it is this : that 
 a benevolent God, as a moral governor, and thus the guardian 
 of his kingdom, must feel and must express an abhorrence of 
 the supreme evil of sin, and must make that expression either 
 by a full and exact retribution or in some other way; i. e., 
 through an atonement. The infidel denies an atonement. The 
 consequence is inevitable. Every subject of God's moral gov- 
 ernment is a transgressor, and doomed, without hope, to utter 
 and endless misery. Does he say, this is in itself incredible, 
 impossible ? I reply, it is neither. The destruction of such a 
 world as this for its rebellion against God, may be less, in com- 
 parison with his universal kingdom, than the penalties which 
 every benevolent parent inflicts on his children compared with 
 the end of their infliction ; it may be, as I have said, an infini- 
 tesimal compared with unlimited vastness. The infidel then, 
 on his present premises, is compelled to admit, that every 
 human being is doomed to everlasting destruction. And if he 
 will adopt such premises, let him abide the conclusion. He 
 professes to reason. Let him see that he adopts premises that 
 throw the midnight of despair over a guilty world ; premises, 
 which give only " a certain fearful looking-for of judgment 
 and fiery indignation." 
 
 Again; if the infidel denies that such a retribution awaits 
 this sinful world, and still maintains that God is benevolent, 
 then, as a rational man, he must admit an atonement, even 
 that of Christianity. If God is benevolent, he is also just ; and 
 
THE ATONEMENT OF CHRISTIANITY. 273 
 
 if liis justice is not manifested and vindicated by a future just 
 retribution, then it must be by an atonement. But will any 
 rational man admit an atonement and reject that which Chris- 
 tianity reveals ? Let him ask, how — by what other means or 
 expedient — can a sin-avenging God become merciful to trans- 
 gressors of his law ? How can he make a manifestation of his 
 abhorrence of sin equal to that of turning a rebellious world 
 into hell ? How can the throne of eternal justice be upheld in 
 all its strength and glory, and the defied penalties of sin be 
 averted from the guilty ? Here, all is mystery and utter dark- 
 ness. Before this problem, the intellect of man retires baffled, 
 and confounded. ~No answer can be given; no conception can 
 be formed. Christianity — Christianity alone, gives the solution. 
 Christianity alone reveals a triune God, and shows us his throne 
 upheld by the man that is also the eternal Logos, and a guilty 
 world redeemed. Christianity thus solves the problem which 
 God alone can solve. Christianity, on this most momentous 
 of all subjects, and with this sufficient proof of its divine ori- 
 gin, removes all rational doubt, satisfies all rational inquiry, 
 and gives all rational assurance. If there is an atonement for 
 sin, then we safely affirm, it is and must be that which Chris- 
 tianity describes. It is the only adequate atonement conceiva- 
 ble by the human mind. It is this alone which can still the 
 agitations of conscious guilt, and bring relief to the laboring 
 heart of sinful man. In its very nature and perfection, it bears 
 the impress of God as its author. And can man, reasoning 
 from his necessities as a sinner against a just and holy God, 
 and admitting the fact of an atonement for sin, deny the atone- 
 ment of Christianity ? No man has done — no man ever will 
 do it. The only alternative here is, either no atonement, or the 
 great atonement of the son of God. 
 
 You see then what ground the infidel — every man that rea- 
 sons from any possible premises in the case, must take. He 
 must either deny the benevolence of God, — i. <?., believe in a 
 selfish, malignant deity, or in a benevolent God, with a future 
 just retribution of this sinful world ; or he must receive Chris- 
 tianity, with its great atoning sacrifice. 
 
 And now, what are the facts ? The infidel rejects all atone- 
 ment for sin. He rejects the doctrine of a future retribution, 
 and, of course, actually lands in the belief of a selfish, malignant 
 deity ! I know indeed, that the words will not suit him; that 
 12* 18 
 
274 MORAL GOVERNMENT EROM NATURE. 
 
 lie calls God benevolent, and loves to dwell on the goodness, 
 and the kindness, and the tenderness of the Creator toward his 
 creatures, as if he could cause an infringement on the Godhead 
 by mere words, or compliment it with tender epithets out of 
 its own divinity, and so make a benevolent, an unjust God. 
 Such is however the fact, in his own conceptions. He con- 
 ceives of a God who will sacrifice the majesty of law, the glory 
 of his moral dominion, and the happiness of his moral creation, 
 in tenderness to rebels ; a God, who stands before his intelli- 
 gent universe the friend and patron of iniquity. This is the 
 real, the only conception which he can form. It is no exag- 
 geration, no caricature; it is given in his avowed creed of a 
 benevolent God who is not just. In the sincerity of my heart 
 then I say it ; and if the infidel would reflect on his own con- 
 ception, he would see that the real object of his homage, 
 instead of a perfect God, is a perfect demon. Man, sinful, 
 immortal man, has nothing better to confide in, than the tender 
 mercies of an infinite fiend ! 
 
 And now permit me to add ; Christianity is false or Chris- 
 tianity is true. If false, then you must either believe in a self- 
 ish malignant deity, and consent to dwell forever amid the 
 darkness and terrors of his fearful dominion, or you must be- 
 lieve in God's benevolence and, abide the more fearful doom of 
 his just and eternal indignation. If Christianity is true — I had 
 almost said, if it can be true — if there is but a slight probability 
 of its truth — -if it reveals what the intellect of man could never 
 have conceived — tells us of an adequate and perfect atonement 
 for sin under the government of a holy and just God; and prof- 
 fers pardon and life where otherwise all is hopeless guilt and 
 death for eternity ; if it thus harmonizes with, illustrates, unfolds, 
 confirms the clearest intimations of his providence — then what 
 is Christianity, and what is Infidelity ? Christianity with only 
 these characteristics comes as a messenger from God with God's 
 credentials. It conducts us into the very sanctuary of his glories, 
 where justice reigns and mercy triumphs in still brighter splen- 
 dor. In this holy of holies it points us to the great and perfect 
 sacrifice for this world's redemption, and shows us without a 
 vail of mystery, a just God and yet a Saviour. Infidelity sneers 
 and prefers a malignant deity. The infidel rejects the message, 
 denies the proof, despises the sacrifice, and seals his own dam- 
 nation. "Who that has reason and will use it, will reject 
 
CONCLUSION. 275 
 
 Christianity for the darkness, the terrors of Infidelity ? Who 
 that has reason, will reject Christianity, with its consolations 
 in time, its prospects for eternity, its deliverance from sin and 
 hell, its regions of immortality and joy — its God — its Saviour? 
 The gospel — the gospel — how unquestionable — how sure its 
 announcement of its own character — "glad tidings of great 
 joy to all people!" 
 
LECTURE VII. 
 
 Third leading proposition: God governs with rightful authority. — This proved by his benevo- 
 lence. — Different opinions in respect to the method of proving his benevolence. — If it cannot be 
 proved by the light of nature, it cannot be proved at all. — The Scriptures assert and assume that 
 this benevolence is manifest by the light of nature. 
 
 To establish the leading proposition before us ; viz., that 
 God is administering a perfect moved government over men, it 
 is necessary, as we have already said, to prove the equity 
 of his administration and also his rightful authority. The 
 former I have already attempted. To prove the latter, it is 
 necessary to show his competence and also his disposition 
 to govern in the best manner. His competence is proved by 
 showing that he is a being of infinite knowledge and power. 
 His disposition to govern in the best manner, which involves 
 also his perfect or infinite benevolence, now claims our con- 
 sideration. 
 
 Whether God is a being of perfect benevolence, is seen at 
 once to be one of the most momentous of all the inquiries which 
 can engage the human mind. It is not difficult for men to be- 
 lieve in what they may regard as the goodness of God, under 
 an entirely false conception of its nature ; nor is it uncommon 
 that men believe it, even with some just views of what it is, 
 without ever having seen or heard or formed an argument by 
 which it can be proved. I need not say of what high concern 
 it is to us, not only that we have a right apprehension of the 
 nature of God's goodness, but that our faith in its unchange- 
 able reality rest on evidence which can be weakened by no 
 sophistry, and which can be shaken by no skepticism. "We 
 have seen how prone the human mind is to form fundamen- 
 tally false views of the nature of God's goodness, and to hazard 
 all the interests of its immortal being on its own vain imagina- 
 tions — mere pictures of its fancy. 
 
THE ARGUMENT FOR GOD'S BENEVOLENCE. 277 
 
 I must be allowed to say, that I have not met with any proof 
 of this divine attribute, or any argument from reason in sup- 
 port of it, which would stand the test of a close logical scrutiny. 
 JSTor can it be pretended that there is such an argument fully 
 drawn out and formally maintained in the Scriptures. Am I 
 then asked, whether I suppose that the faith in God's moral 
 perfection, of the pious, of those in humble life as well as of 
 the great, the wise, and the learned, lias had no sufficient 
 basis or warrant ? That is another question, and one to be an- 
 swered with a decided negative. It is one thing for the mind 
 to perceive proof or evidence, or even to go through a process 
 of reasoning which fully sustains a conclusion, and another to 
 state that process; and especially so to state it, that it shall be 
 exposed to no objections which that mind cannot answer. As 
 the knowledge of what a man is, what a tree is, what govern- 
 ment is, what law is, what virtue is, is different from that 
 which enables one to state with exact precision what he knows, 
 so for the minds of men universally, to apprehend the evidence 
 of God's goodness in such a manner as to authorize and de- 
 mand their faith, and to be a just ground of condemnation 
 if they disbelieve, is a very different thing from being able to 
 present in formal statement, all the premises and principles on 
 which a just conclusion depends, with such logical precision, 
 that the argument when stated, shall be unansAverable. How 
 much false reasoning has been used by great and good men 
 in support of truth ! How many just conclusions have been 
 adopted and acted upon, even with reason, for which men 
 can give no reason ! 
 
 The difficulties which have been supposed to embarrass the 
 great question now before us, have led some minds of singular 
 acuteness and power to conclude, that there is no proof from 
 any source, or from all sources combined, that God is good. 
 Some have maintained, that the benevolence of God can be 
 proved, both from the light of nature and from revelation, as 
 separate and independent grounds of argument; others, that if 
 proved at all, the argument must be derived chiefly ; others, 
 that it must be derived wholly from revelation ; and others 
 still, that a conclusive argument can be derived exclusively 
 from the light of nature, and that otherwise the divine benev- 
 olence cannot be proved at all. 
 
 It has been a question with some, whether it be of any impor- 
 
278 MORAL GOVERNMENT PROM NATURE. 
 
 tance that the two sources of proof be separated from each other. 
 That they should frequently be combined, especially in popular 
 exhibitions of the subject, I believe; that having evinced the be- 
 nevolence of God, by satisfactory proof from the light of nature, 
 we can and may augment it by appealing to revelation, I see no 
 reason to doubt. At the same time,I am convinced that we must 
 find satisfactory proof of the benevolence of God from the light 
 of nature, before we can appeal with the least propriety or force 
 to revelation ; and that of course the light of nature must be 
 resorted to, as furnishing a separate and independent ground 
 of argument. If this be not done, then we must come to the 
 revelation of God without proof of his moral perfection, either 
 assuming his veracity, which is only one form of his benev- 
 olence, and therefore involves the very thing to be proved, 
 without which we are forbidden by the laws of evidence to 
 believe his declarations. The bearing of these considerations 
 upon heathenism, and deism or infidelity, are sufficiently ob- 
 vious to show the importance and necessity of producing 
 from the light of nature, if possible, the universal and un- 
 hesitating belief of the perfect benevolence of the Creator. To 
 the mind not fully convinced of the goodness, and consequently 
 of the truth or veracity of God, the questions, whether God has 
 actually given a revelation to the world, and what that revela- 
 tion contains, must be comparatively trivial and uninteresting 
 inquiries. 
 
 Beyond this, if there is no proof of God's moral perfection 
 from the light of nature, then revelation itself finds the human 
 mind free from all obligation to him, which results only from 
 these prior proofs, and which imparts such high concern to the 
 inquiry, whether such a being has given to man the oracles 
 of eternal truth. How entirely different the questions are, 
 whether a perfect God has given a revelation to the world, 
 and whether it can only be claimed to be a revelation from a 
 being whose moral perfection can be legitimately doubted or 
 denied. 
 
 Besides, if God, in his works of creation and providence, 
 manifests his goodness to the clear apprehension of his moral 
 creatures, who can doubt their obligation to mark his footsteps 
 here, and to adore and worship with grateful praise amid these 
 displays of his Godhead ? Who shall refuse " to look through 
 nature up to nature's God," because he has in his revelation 
 
CAN IT BE PROVED FROM REVELATION? 279 
 
 manifested tlie same glories in still brighter splendors ? If he 
 has opened two books before us, why should we not learn from 
 both what God is? Especially, if the light of nature furnishes 
 the only proof of the moral perfection of the Creator in such 
 a respect, that without it, none which is sufficient and satisfac- 
 tory can be furnished by revelation, then, in exploring the field 
 of evidence spread out before us in the w T orks of God, the most 
 diligent research becomes us. 
 
 In expressing the opinion that the benevolence of God can- 
 not be proved from revelation, I would not be understood to 
 affirm, that when the fact is once fairly proved from the light 
 of nature, additional evidence in support of it cannot thus 
 be derived. When I am convinced, on sufficient grounds, of 
 the excellence of another's character, I reasonably regard those 
 acts which may proceed from benevolence as actually proceed- 
 ing from, and as additional proofs of it. Nor would I be 
 understood to say, that no aid can in any respect be derived 
 by us from a revelation, in the investigation of this subject. 
 This is quite possible. Thus, without assuming the veracity of 
 God, which, as I have said, would be assuming the thing to be 
 proved, the revelation may contain propositions whose truth 
 the mind perceives, independently of their divine authority. 
 These propositions may furnish the premises of a conclusive 
 argument. The argument however, would still be one from 
 reason, as truly as a demonstration of a problem in geometry, 
 though it depends on the definitions of Euclid. A revelation 
 may even contain the same argument which is furnished by the 
 light of nature. In this case also, it would be, strictly speak- 
 ing, one from reason, though reason would never have discov- 
 ered it without a revelation. 
 
 I shall now attempt to show, 
 
 That the benevolence of God cannot he proved by any argu- 
 ment derived merely from revelation, as distinguished from an 
 argument derived from the light of nature. 
 
 Every proof on this subject, derived merely from revelation, 
 must depend on some declaration or declarations of its Author. 
 These must be supposed to consist of those in which he directly 
 declares his own moral perfection, or of those in which he as^ 
 serts such designs and doings, as in their own nature shall be 
 proof of his moral perfection. In neither case however, can 
 mere declarations be relied on, any further than we assume 
 
280 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 and rely upon the veracity of the author. But veracity in 
 God, in the only form in which Ave can rely upon it in him, is 
 only one form of his benevolence, and necessarily implies it. 
 To assume his veracity then, is to assume his benevolence, 
 which is the very thing to be proved. Or thus : if we rely on 
 the veracity of the Author of revelation, we must do so either 
 with reason or without reason. If with reason, then we have 
 proof of his veracity, and of course of his benevolence, prior to, 
 and independently of his declarations. If we rely on his vera- 
 city, prior to and independently of his declarations, without 
 reason, then we gratuitously assume his veracity, and of course 
 his benevolence ; that is, we assume the very thing which is to 
 be proved. If then the benevolence of God cannot be proved 
 from the light of nature, it cannot from revelation, and there- 
 fore cannot be proved at all. 
 
 The contrary however, has been strenuously maintained ; 
 and it may give more satisfaction if we examine some of the 
 grounds of this claim. These, so far as I deem them worthy 
 of notice, are the three following, viz. : 
 
 1. It is claimed that the declarations of any being, and there- 
 fore of God, are entitled to credit, on the general principle 
 which gives credibility to testimony. 
 
 2. It is claimed, that any being may establish, and that 
 God has established his character for veracity, on the ground 
 of the uniform coincidence of his declarations with facts — as 
 that many of the historical facts of Scripture are confirmed 
 by profane history ; that all its predictions, promises, and 
 threatenings, have in due time been fulfilled ; and that in this 
 way we have a full confirmation of the veracity of their 
 author. 
 
 3. It is claimed, that the Scriptures themselves, in their own 
 character, or in the nature of what they assert concerning God, 
 his designs and doings, especially the giving of his perfect law, 
 with the pure and holy precepts of the gospel, the grand 
 scheme of redemption, and his purpose to counteract and over- 
 rule all evil for the production of the highest good of the uni- 
 verse, furnish abundant and decisive proof of the benevolence 
 of God. 
 
 ]N~ow it is obvious, that the question at issue depends, in 
 each of these modes of reasoning, on the veracity of the wit- 
 ness. If this be not presupposed and assumed, there can be 
 
HOW FAR TESTIMONY IS CREDIBLE. 281 
 
 no argument or proof in either case. What I claim then is, 
 that the assumption of the veracity of the witness is, as the 
 case is now presented, made on grounds which are wholly in- 
 sufficient, and in a manner forbidden by the laws of just rea- 
 soning. 
 
 And first in regard to testimony, and the general principle 
 of its credibility. It is so obviously for the interest of men, in 
 most cases, to speak truth rather than falsehood, that there is a 
 strong and convincing probability that, in most cases, they 
 actually do so. With this probability the results fully accord ; 
 for men speak truth in a vast majority of instances. A decla- 
 ration, with these presumptions in favor of its truth, is what 
 we call credible testimony, and what we justly esteem, in 
 many cases, even from a stranger, good and conclusive evi- 
 dence. But how is it, when presumptions against its truth, 
 and not in its favor, exist? If he who testifies is justly pre- 
 sumed to be liable from a regard to his own interest to do so 
 falsely, it destroys the weight of his testimony. Hence no 
 man is allowed to testify before any civil tribunal in his own 
 case. " If I bear witness of myself," said the Saviour, " my 
 witness is not true." 
 
 Here then we have one principle which utterly vitiates all the 
 supposable proof of God's benevolence, which is derived merely 
 from revelation, whether he bears witness of himself in assert- 
 ing it, or in the form of asserting other facts as proofs of this. 
 Who does not know how well it comports with the character 
 of the most selfish and ambitious of rulers, even of the veriest 
 tyrants, to boast of their benevolent designs, and to parade 
 their schemes of public utility for the advancement of their 
 selfish purposes ? Can we then rely with confidence, and this 
 in a case in which our highest interests are pending, on the ve- 
 racity and so on the mere testimony of another, when he may 
 be under a powerful inducement to testify falsely ? But the 
 case before us is much stronger. It is one in which, if real 
 benevolence exist, proof of it must also exist, and yet does not. 
 It is maintained on one side of the present question, that God 
 as the Creator and providential governor of the world, fur- 
 nishes by his acts no proof of his benevolence. Now such a 
 fact, if it be a fact, is entitled to something more than a mere 
 negative influence in the argument. It is a direct positive proof 
 against his benevolence which sets aside every possible declara- 
 
2m 
 
 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 tion of it. To what purpose would a parent whose treatment 
 of his dependent offspring for a long course of years, had given 
 no proofs of his love, make and repeat assertions of his kind- 
 ness? It is the hypocrisy which unmasks itself by saying to 
 the naked and to the hungry, " Depart in peace, be ye warmed 
 and filled," and giveth nothing. " As the body without the 
 spirit is dead,"so benevolence without works, as truly as faith, is 
 dead also. 
 
 This mode of reasoning applies not less to the Creator than 
 to his creatures. That he should give existence to such a world 
 as this, and govern it by his providence for thousands of years, 
 and yet furnish no convincing evidence of his goodness to the 
 pensioners of his bounty — that the most sincere and humble in- 
 quirer into the ways of his providence should be unable to find 
 the least trace of goodness — one solitary footstep of benevo- 
 lence to call forth his gratitude and praise — this surely were 
 enough not merely to authorize doubt and suspicion, but it 
 would amount to a direct and positive proof against his good- 
 ness. If he is good, why are there no proofs of his goodness in 
 his acts ? Why is the wide field of his providence thus barren 
 of all that can bespeak the love of the Creator to his own crea- 
 tures ? What has employed the resources of his Godhead, while 
 his dependent offspring have been thus forsaken and unblessed ? 
 Actions speak louder than words. His providence tells his char- 
 acter, and is a full revelation of a selfish heart. And is such 
 evidence to be set aside by his own testimony to his own 
 excellence ? Is such the character of the being, revealed by 
 the most decisive of all manifestations, confirmed by the most 
 unquestionable of all proofs, by acts and doings, by his treat- 
 ment of the myriads of his dependent creatures since time 
 began ; and is he to command our confidence by mere asser- 
 tions of his goodness ? Are mere words to be believed ? Are 
 creatures with such an experience at the hands of their Creator, 
 to be required to render to him the homage of their gratitude 
 and praise ? Every voice would be dumb, every heart would 
 be cold. And yet on no other basis have many able divines 
 rested the proof of God's benevolence. 
 
 But we are told that God has established his character for 
 veracity on the ground of the uniform coincidence of his dec- 
 larations with facts. With our authorized and habitual con- 
 victions that the Author of the Scriptures is a being of perfect 
 
DECLARATIONS UNSUPPORTED BY WORKS. 283 
 
 goodness and truth, our belief in his testimony is justly con- 
 firmed and strengthened by tracing the exact and uniform co- 
 incidence between his declarations and facts. But how would 
 it be, provided we had no antecedent reason to believe that he 
 would speak truth rather than falsehood ; and especially if we 
 had good antecedent reason for denying his moral perfection, 
 and with it his veracity? Though we suppose a coincidence 
 between facts and the declarations of another to any indefinite 
 extent, still there are other ways in which he may wholly for- 
 feit a character for veracity. There is truth in the vulgar say- 
 ing — that he who will steal will also lie. A man may uni- 
 formly speak truth from selfish considerations, and yet in other 
 ways evince that want of moral principle which destroys all 
 ground of confidence in his veracity, and pre-eminently in his 
 declarations of the excellence of his own character. Be the 
 coincidence then between facts and the declarations of God 
 what it may, still the principles already stated apply. In the 
 case supposed, he testifies in his own case, while were he per- 
 fectly benevolent, there would be proof of his benevolence 
 from his works. These considerations, especially the latter, 
 set aside all evidence from his mere assertions that he is good, 
 and even prove that he is not good. This is obviously, entirely 
 overlooked by those who maintain, that the coincidence of 
 his declarations with facts is proof of his veracity. They as- 
 sume that a failure to manifest his goodness by his works, is no 
 proof that he is not good. The more however we should re- 
 flect on such a fact, if it were a fact, the stronger would be its 
 impression. For how could this world of creatures thus cast 
 away from the favor and affection of their Maker — thus doomed 
 to an exile and an orphanage in which no tokens of paternal 
 love should gladden their existence — how could they confide 
 in the character of such a Father ? 
 
 But it is said, that in his revelation God declares his will in 
 the form of his perfect law, as well as the great design of redeem- 
 ing mercy, and the purpose to render evil, even moral evil, the 
 means of the highest possible good to his creation. Be it so. 
 But then it is his mere declaration which has no higher claims 
 to our confidence than any other. As testimony in respect to 
 his own particular designs, it is his testimony to his own excel- 
 lence. It is his own testimony of his unexecuted will as a 
 lawgiver, and of his unexecuted purposes as a providential 
 
284 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 disposer of events. And not only so, — it is testimony de- 
 signed to evince his goodness, when, according to the suppo- 
 sition on which we reason, there is no proof of his goodness 
 from his works ; and when therefore as we have shown, there 
 is decisive proof that he is not good ; and of course when no 
 confidence is due to the supposed testimony. 
 
 But let us briefly advert to the particular facts which are 
 now alleged. And to take the last first ; it is said that the 
 Scriptures teach that moral evil in the world is the necessary 
 means of the greatest good, and will be overruled for the pro- 
 duction of this result ; and great, even the chief reliance in this 
 argument has been placed on this assumption. Without here 
 proposing a full examination of this gratuitous assumption, I 
 shall simply say that the Scriptures teach no such dogma ; and 
 that if they did, it would prove that their author, in preferring 
 the worst kind of action to the best, is himself the worst of beings ; 
 is insincere as a lawgiver, the friend and patron of sin, and an 
 enemy to the happiness of his own creation. But it is said that 
 in his revelation God has given to men the best law. This is ad- 
 mitted ; and further, that the act of giving such a law is good and 
 sufficient evidence of his goodness were it uncounteracted by op- 
 posing evidence. He has given the best law. But how shall we 
 know that this law is a real expression of his will, especially if, 
 as it is also said,he prefers, all things considered, wrong to right 
 moral action ? The act of giving the best law is no prool of his 
 benevolence, unless it be also proved that the law is a real ex- 
 pression of his will, of his preference of right to wrong moral 
 action, all things considered. But it would not be out of char- 
 acter for a deceiver to resort to the artifice of giving the best 
 law for the very purpose of deception ; and especially when it 
 is supposed as it now is, that all his other acts and ways of 
 providence fail to prove his goodness and so prove that he is 
 not good, how can we doubt that the act is done for the pur- 
 pose of deception? I am not saying that the well attested fact 
 that God has revealed the best law can have no place in any 
 argument for his goodness, but in view of the supposed fact 
 that there is no other proof of his goodness from his works of 
 creation and providence, that the giving of the best law can 
 furnish no proof of his goodness, but is rather to be viewed as 
 an artifice of deception. 
 
DECLARATIONS UNSUPPORTED BY WORKS. 285 
 
 But it is said that God in his revelation declares his great 
 design of redeeming mercy. This is of course admitted. But 
 it is still simply his own declaration, and the same objections 
 lie against this as against all others considered as proofs of 
 his goodness. The excellence of this scheme is obvious and 
 undeniable.. But what does it amount to but proof of wis- 
 dom to devise the most perfect means for the most perfect 
 end, while it so greatly fails to accomplish under the govern- 
 ment of its author, the end to which it is adapted, and for 
 which it is professedly devised ? And under this aspect, how 
 is it to be regarded when it is supposed that the works of his 
 providence decisively disprove his goodness, except as another 
 artifice to deceive his dependent creatures ? 
 
 The general principle on which the preceding discussion has 
 proceeded is, that works, not words, are the legitimate evidence 
 on a question of character. Though cases occur in which dec- 
 larations are coincident with conduct, and augment the proof 
 of moral rectitude, and though they may be entitled to credit, 
 when they can be supposed to be made only with a benevolent 
 design ; yet in all cases in which the declarations may be 
 fairly traced to some selfish or sinister design, and especially 
 in which benevolence or moral rectitude, if it exist, will mani- 
 fest itself in conduct and does not, the proof is decisive against 
 the existence of such a principle. 
 
 "The word of God itself," says President Edwards, "is no 
 demonstration of the supreme distinguishing glory of God any 
 otherwise than by the works of God, and that in two ways. 
 First, as we must have the perfections of God first proved by 
 his works, in order to know that his word is to be depended on. 
 Secondly, as the works of God appealed to and declared in the 
 word of God, declare and make evident that divine greatness 
 and glory which the word declares. There is a difference be- 
 tween declaration and evidence. The word declares, and the 
 works are proper evidence of what is declared." — Miscell. 
 Observations. 
 
 If these remarks are just, then whatever illustrations or ad- 
 ditional evidence of the divine goodness may be furnished by 
 those works and designs of God, which are declared in his 
 word, when we have acquired confidence in his moral per- 
 fection by a contemplation of his works of creation and provi- 
 
286 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 dence, it is plain that without this previous ground of con- 
 fidence, the word of God can furnish no sufficient proof that 
 he is good. 
 
 The Scriptures also fully sustain the views which have now 
 been taken of this important subject. First, in demanding the 
 faith of men in Christianity, they always either assume on 
 sufficient grounds the moral perfection of God, or they prove 
 it from the light of nature. In those cases in which men ad- 
 mitted the moral perfection of God, the Lord Jesus Christ and 
 his apostles for the most part at least, rest their claim for the 
 reception of the gospel, on the fact that its doctrines and its 
 precepts are from God. In those other instances in which the 
 claim could possess no force with men who did not admit the 
 moral perfection of the Deity, or when they would increase its 
 power, they appealed to the works of God. One of the most 
 decisive of these arguments, when properly understood, is used 
 by our Lord in the short but incontrovertible assertion, " He 
 maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth 
 rain on the just and on the unjust." Matt. c. v. v. 45. To ap- 
 preciate the force of this argument however, we must revert 
 to the concession of those to whom it was addressed, and the 
 corresponding and proper assumption of our Lord; viz., the 
 great fact of God's perfect moral government over men as the 
 best means of the best end, and as such the only system wor- 
 thy of a perfect God. With this great fact admitted by the 
 mind, we at once see and feel the force of our Lord's appeal 
 to the ceaseless and rich bounties of God's providential good- 
 ness, as conferred on creatures so guilty and so ill-deserving. 
 Another is made by the apostle when enforcing on the Gen- 
 tiles at Lystra, and also at Athens, their obligation to become 
 the worshipers of the true God: " Who in time past suffered 
 all nations to walk in their own ways ; nevertheless, he left not 
 himself without witness — in that he did good, and gave us rain 
 from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food 
 and gladness." Acts, xiv. 16, 17 ; and xvii. 23, 28. 
 
 Secondly. The apostle in the first chapter of the Epistle to 
 the Romans, very fully affirms that the moral perfection of 
 God is manifest under the light of nature. Here he not only 
 asserts the abundant manifestation of God in his works, even 
 his whole deity, but on this basis declares that under these 
 
DECLARATIONS UNSUPPORTED BY WORKS. 287 
 
 manifestations merely, they are without excuse, because they 
 glorified him not as God. What more could men do even 
 under the light of revelation? And to put the particular 
 question now at issue beyond all further debate, the apostle 
 expressly asserts their inexcusableness, because they were un- 
 thankful. I only ask how could they be under obligations to 
 be grateful to a being, of whose goodness they had no proofs 
 and which therefore they were bound to disbelieve ? 
 
LECTURE VIII. 
 
 Third leading proposition continued, viz. : God governs with rightful authority. — The benevo- 
 lence of God may be proved, 1. From his natural attributes. — Nature of the argument. — 2. 
 From his works.— Preliminary definitions and explanations.— God is proved to be perfectly 
 benevolent, by showing, (a) that the present system may be the best possible; (/;) that it is 
 the best possible. — Prop, (a) considered. — Objection from existence of evil. — Evil is natural and 
 moral.— Natural evil considered in the sufferings of infants, of animals, and of men as moral 
 beings. 
 
 To complete the argument for the perfection of God's moral 
 government over men, it remains to prove his benevolence. 
 
 On this interesting subject we have two sources of argument 
 — the natural attributes of God, and his works of creation and 
 providence. 
 
 I. The argument from his natural perfections. 
 
 This argument has not, I think, been often, if ever, presented 
 in its full force. It being obvious that the evidence from this 
 source, whatever it may be, must after all depend in one re- 
 spect on what appears in his works — so depend on this, that if 
 they, including what he does and fails to do, furnish decisive 
 proof against his benevolence, little reliance can be placed on 
 any argument derived from his natural attributes. Hence in 
 almost all inquiries on the subject, the attention has been 
 chiefly and properly directed to the works of God ; and in view 
 of the difficulties which these are supposed to offer, the argu- 
 ment from the former source has rarely been presented as hav- 
 ing the strength which it actually possesses. In saying this 
 however, I do not mean to imply that it has any force, until 
 the difficulties which result from the existence of evil are fully 
 removed. If this can be done, or if all decisive proof against 
 his benevolence can be removed, then, in my view, this argu- 
 ment will be in a high degree conclusive. 
 
 I will here briefly attempt to unfold the nature of it, assum- 
 ing that there is no counteracting evidence from any other 
 source. 
 
 To estimate this kind of evidence of moral character — that 
 which arises from the nature and circumstances of moral be- 
 
ARGUMENT FROM GOD'S WORKS. 280 
 
 ings — it should be remembered, that while it is quite supposa- 
 ble that it should be wholly counteracted by opposing evidence 
 from conduct or works, it is, when thus uncounteracted, in a 
 high degree convincing and satisfactory. As contemplated, for 
 example, our first parents in paradise, or the angels in heaven, 
 and reasoned a priori from their constitution and circumstances, 
 w^ith no opposing evidence, we should conclude strongly in 
 favor of their moral perfection. If however, we had known 
 other beings of the same constitution and in similar circum- 
 stances, who had sinned, our confidence in this conclusion 
 would be greatly diminished; and if such cases were common, 
 it would be lessened still more, until it is easy to see that we 
 should reasonably doubt, or form an unfavorable opinion. 
 
 In respect to the Infinite Being, this a priori argument can 
 be weakened only by one or both of these considerations — that 
 beings far inferior to him, though formed in his image, have 
 become selfish ; and that no account can be given of existing 
 evils under 4iis government, which shall be consistent witli his 
 benevolence. The former consideration loses nearly, if not all 
 its influence, from the fact that the beings are creatures, finite, 
 and greatly limited in their powers, to say nothing of the man- 
 ner in which they commence their moral existence. The argu- 
 ment then, from the infinite natural perfections of God, for his 
 benevolence, if weakened at all, must be weakened only by the 
 existence of evil. This, we hope to show hereafter, has no such 
 influence. If so, then the argument from his natural perfec- 
 tions is justly regarded as conclusive. 
 
 II. The argument from his works. 
 
 There is perhaps no single question in natural theology, to 
 the investigation of which more theological talent has been 
 applied, than to this — whether the benevolence of God can be 
 proved from the light of nature, or from his works? The dif- 
 ficulties which have been supposed to pertain to it, and which 
 have been regarded as peculiarly formidable, result from the 
 existence and prevalence of evil in the world. Accordingly, 
 the problem, whence cometh evil under the government of a per- 
 fect God, has employed from the earliest ages the ingenuity 
 of speculative minds, and given rise to various theories for its 
 solution. The most celebrated of these are the theory of pre- 
 existence, the theory of the Manicheans, and the theory of opti- 
 mism. The last of these, if we understand by it the general 
 Vol. I.-13. 19 
 
290 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 doctrine, that the present system of means and influences, com- 
 pared with any other, is the best possible to the Creator, has 
 not only obtained the greatest prevalence, but seems to me to 
 be the only one which is entitled to consideration. Different 
 philosophers however, who have agreed in this general doc- 
 trine, have adopted two different specific theories, or have 
 maintained two kinds of optimism. One class have maintained 
 that all evil, both natural and moral, is the necessary means of 
 the greatest good ; while the other has denied this in respect to 
 moral evil, and maintained, that in respect to divine preven- 
 tion, it is incidental to the best system of means. These spe- 
 cific theories then agree in this : that the system which God 
 has adopted, including both the beings created and the influ- 
 ences under which they act, is to him the best possible system. 
 They agree also in respect to natural evil, that it is the neces- 
 sary means of the greatest good, but differ in respect to moral 
 evil, as I have already stated. They both proceed however on 
 the assumption, as every theory to be in the lowest degree 
 plausible as a vindication of the divine benevolence must, that 
 there is an impossibility somewhere in the nature of things, 
 that God should adopt a system wholly excluding moral evil. 
 They differ however in respect to the question, where in the 
 nature of things this impossibility lies ; the one supposing it to 
 be in the nature of moral evil, as being the necessary means of 
 the greatest good, and that therefore God could not produce 
 the highest good or happiness without sin or moral evil as the 
 means of it ; the other supposes that the impossibility may or 
 does lie, not in the nature of moral evil^ but in the nature of a 
 moral system, as the necessary means of the greatest good, and 
 that therefore God could not produce the highest happiness 
 without adopting a moral system, to which moral evil, in re- 
 spect to his prevention, is incidental. 
 
 If time allowed, it might be useful to show how the contro- 
 versies on this subject have been occasioned and prolonged by 
 the ambiguities of language, and unauthorized assumptions in 
 reasoning. This however I shall attempt no farther than I 
 think it necessary to give precision to some of the phraseology 
 which I adopt in the present discussion. 
 
 By benevolence then, when applied to God, I mean a dispo- 
 sition or governing purpose to produce the greatest good, or 
 the highest happiness in his power. Of course, to evince his 
 
D E F E C T I V E A 11 G U M E N T . 291 
 
 benevolence, lie must show that lie actually does that which is 
 fitted on the whole to produce the greatest good in his power. 
 It is however maintained by some able writers on the subject 
 of the divine goodness, to be a sufficient proof of it, that there 
 is more happiness than misery in the world, and that the pres- 
 ent system, with its results, is better than none. It is undoubt- 
 edly true, that unless these things are so — at least, unless it can 
 be shown that the present system with its results is better than 
 none, it can furnish no proof of the benevolence of the Creator. 
 But if these facts be established, it will not follow necessarily 
 that God is benevolent ; for that there is more happiness than 
 misery in the world, is no proof that the Creator might not 
 have produced a still greater amount of happiness than he 
 does or will produce ; nor from the fact, that the present sys- 
 tem with its results is better than none, does it follow, that the 
 Creator might not have adopted a system still better. And 
 surely no argument can be necessary to show that a perfectly 
 benevolent Creator will adopt the best system in his power. 
 
 In this assertion however, it is not implied that God has not 
 given existence to some other world or worlds, in which there 
 is more happiness than in this. My meaning is, that if God is 
 benevolent, he could not have made a better world than this 
 in its stead. For it by no means follows, that because he has 
 made another world in which there is more happiness, that be- 
 nevolence did not require the creation of this. Not to have 
 created just such a world, or to have created any other in its 
 stead, might have ruined all other worlds. Nor is this all. 
 The existence of this world may be better than its non-exist- 
 ence, as resulting in a greater amount of happiness to the uni- 
 verse than would exist without it. Not to have created this 
 world just as it is compared with creating it, or creating any 
 other in its stead compared with creating this, might have 
 diminished the amount of happiness on the whole, compared 
 with that which depends on the creation of this world. 
 
 There is perhaps no view of this subject, which has so much 
 plausibility, and which is more apt to embarrass the investiga- 
 tion of it, than that now adverted to. God it is said, or thought, 
 has made one heaven of perfect happiness, why not make an- 
 other, instead of such a sinful, suffering world as this ? I an- 
 swer : you overlook at least two things, either or both of which 
 may be true in fact ; the one is, the mutual dependence of 
 
292 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 worlds, like that of the members of a human body ; the other 
 is, that not to have created this world might have left a defi- 
 ciency in the sum of happiness in the universe, which could 
 not have been supplied by creating any other in its stead. Be 
 these things however, as they may, the position is incontrovert- 
 ible, that a benevolent God will produce the greatest good in his 
 jpoiuer ; and that therefore whatever he does in any given in- 
 stance, must be not only better than to do nothing, but the best 
 thing which he can do in that instance. 
 
 It is well here to recur to an important distinction made in 
 another connection, between the greatest possible good, and the 
 greatest good possible to God. It has been often assumed, that 
 the greatest good possible or the greatest conceivable good, is 
 possible to God; and that therefore the greatest conceivable 
 good, and the greatest good possible to God are identical. This 
 is obviously an unauthorized assumption. For what is plainer, 
 than that God may have created a system, which will result in 
 the greatest good possible to him ; i. <?., the greatest good which 
 he can secure ; but which would result in still greater good, 
 were creatures to employ their powers in a perfect manner. 
 Whether it is to be assumed, that God can so control the agency 
 or actions of his creatures, as to secure the greatest possible 
 good, which would result from his agency and theirs combined 
 and perfectly employed, will be a topic of future inquiry. The 
 only remark demanded for my present purpose is, that if it may 
 be true, that the greatest possible good is not possible to God, 
 then it cannot be necessary to the proof of his benevolence to 
 show, that he has secured, or will secure, the greatest possible 
 good ; for it is obvious, that a being decisively evinces his 
 benevolence who shows that he does all the good possible to 
 him, though less good be produced than would have been, had 
 others afforded their active co-operation. 
 
 The phrase, greatest possible good, is often used by different 
 writers, and even by the same writer in different senses, and 
 has thus occasioned controversy and false conclusions. Hence 
 has resulted the doctrine, that sin is the necessary means of the 
 greatest good. Assuming that a benevolent God must produce 
 the greatest possible good, meaning the greatest possible on 
 the supposition that creatures produce as much good by their 
 agency as they can, many have inferred, and justly from such 
 premises, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest possi- 
 
GREATEST GOOD POSSIBLE TO GOD. 293 
 
 ble good. For if the greatest possible good, that is, the great- 
 est good possible from the combined agency of God and of 
 creatures, is produced, then it is done by that agency as actu- 
 ally employed, and is of course produced to a vast extent by 
 sin. Of course, there could not have been as much good ef- 
 fected by any action of creatures in its stead, as by sinful action. 
 Sinful action therefore, would be the necessary means of the 
 greatest possible good. Not here to dwell on the palpable ab- 
 surdity, that the worst kind of action should be the best kind 
 of action ; nor even to specify other absurdities equally pal- 
 pable, involved in this supposition, I wish only to remark, 
 that it cannot be necessary to maintain, that sin is the neces- 
 sary means of the greatest good, for the purpose of proving the 
 benevolence of God. If the present system is better than none, 
 it will be sufficient for the purpose of proving the benevolence 
 of the Creator to show, that he will secure as much good as he 
 can, or as is possible to him, although more good would have 
 been the result, had men done their duty. It is surely a strange 
 principle, that a being, to evince his benevolence, must produce 
 more good than he can, even all the good which might be pro- 
 duced by the active co-operation of all other beings; or, that 
 it is not enough for this purpose, that he produce the greatest 
 good in his power. 
 
 The question then is this : — What is sufficient proof of this 
 fact f I answer, these two things ; that it appears that what 
 he does is better than to have done nothing ; and that there is 
 no proof that he could have done better. If these two things 
 can be shown,- they afford sufficient and decisive evidence that 
 he does all the good in his power, and is therefore benevolent. 
 This proof may be increased. 
 
 When what he does is better than to have done nothing, and 
 when there is no proof, that he could have done better, then, 
 if what he does can be clearly shown to be fitted in its true 
 nature and tendency to produce the highest conceivable or the 
 highest possible good, this greatly augments the proof of his 
 benevolence ; because it most decisively proves that he has done 
 all the good he can, whether the greatest conceivable good be 
 actually produced or not. 
 
 Take for illustration, a system of parental education. Sup- 
 pose it plainly better than none, and that there is not the slight- 
 est reason to believe that the parent could have done any thing 
 
294 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 better than he lias done, who could doubt his benevolent inten- 
 tion ? In addition to these things, suppose the system adopted 
 by the parent is seen and known beyond a doubt, to be fitted 
 to accomplish the result in the highest conceivable degree, then 
 who can doubt whether he has done all he could to accomplish 
 the best result, whether it be actually secured or not ? 
 
 On these simple and obvious principles, I now propose to 
 prove that — 
 
 God is perfectly benevolent. 
 
 I propose to show — 
 
 1. That the present system may be not only better than none, 
 but the best possible to the Creator. 
 
 2. That it is not only better than none, but is the best pos- 
 sible to the Creator. 
 
 The design of the former position is to meet in the outset of 
 our argument the full force of the objection to God's benevo- 
 lence, which is derived from the existence of evil. For if the 
 present system, notwithstanding the evil which exists, may be 
 not only better than none, but the best possible to the Creator, 
 then the existence of evil furnishes no evidence at all that God 
 is not perfectly benevolent. 
 
 The common assumption by those who regard the present 
 subject as embarrassed with difficulty is, that evil so far as it 
 exists, is so much evidence against the benevolence of the 
 Creator. It is however an assumption which in this unquali- 
 fied form is flagrantly gratuitous. It is not true that the com- 
 munication of good or the infliction of evil simply considered 
 determines the design of its author. Good may be imparted 
 by malevolence, and evil may be inflicted by benevolence or 
 kindness. This remark in respect to evil is of vital importance 
 in the present discussion, and one with which the mind should 
 be familiar. There are two principles in respect to the exist- 
 ence of the evil in this world, which furnish a triumphant vin- 
 dication of the divine benevolence ; viz. : 
 
 First, Evil which is or which may be the necessary means 
 of the greatest good possible to God, may be inflicted by benev- 
 olence, and is therefore no proof against his benevolence. 
 
 Secondly. Evil which is or which may be necessarily inci- 
 dental {in respect to GooVs prevention), to that which is the neces- 
 sary means of the greatest good possible to God, is no evidence 
 that God is not benevolent. 
 
SUFFERINGS OF INFANTS AND ANIMALS. 295 
 
 These two principles may be illustrated by an example. A 
 surgeon amputates the arm of a patient to save his life. There 
 are two evils in the case. One is the loss of the arm, and this 
 is the necessary means of the greatest good. The other is the 
 pain or suffering which is inseparable from the operation, and 
 this is necessarily incidental, so far as the physician's power to 
 prevent it is concerned, to that which is the necessary means of 
 the greatest good in the case. Kow who does not see how very 
 irrational and perverse one must be, in this view of the evils 
 supposed, or even if he only knew that they might be such 
 evils, to deny the kindness of the physician in this attempt to 
 save the life of his patient. 
 
 Under these two classes, I claim that all the evil in this 
 world may be comprised, and that therefore it does not fur- 
 nish the slightest evidence against the benevolence of God. 
 This I shall now attempt to show : 
 
 The evil in the world is natural evil and moral evil. I pro- 
 pose to consider — 
 
 1. Natural evil. 
 
 All natural evil may be comprised in the sufferings of in- 
 fants, the sufferings of animals, and the sufferings of men as 
 moral beings. 
 
 1. The sufferings of infants. If infants are to be considered 
 as moral and accountable agents — a doctrine which cannot be 
 learned from the light of nature, their case furnishes no pecu- 
 liar difficulty, since on this hypothesis it cannot be shown that 
 they suffer more than they deserve. If however they are not 
 moral agents' at this period of existence, they are soon to as- 
 sume this relation with all its responsibilities, and in circum- 
 stances of powerful temptation from natural good. How far it 
 may be useful to such beings, to know by experience what 
 natural evil is, before accountability commences, how far such 
 knowledge may be necessary to weaken the poAver of tempta- 
 tion by augmenting the dread of the consequences of sin, how 
 far it may serve to restrain from desperate wickedness, and even 
 to prevent subsequent reformation from becoming morally im- 
 possible, it does not become us to decide. Some degree of suf- 
 fering inflicted by the parental hand, even previous to ill desert, 
 is the indispensable means of teaching the child its duty, and 
 thus securing submission to parental authority. 
 
 Be this as it may, human ignorance is not competent to as- 
 
'296 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 sert that the sufferings of infancy are not, much less that they 
 cannot be, either incidental to the necessary means of the great- 
 est good, or be themselves the necessary means of the greatest 
 good possible to God. 
 
 2. The sufferings of animals. These also may be unavoid- 
 ably incidental to the necessary means of the greatest good 
 possible to God, or the necessary means of that good. 
 
 It is undeniable that a great proportion of the sufferings 
 of the animal creation, is occasioned by man ; and though 
 we are prone to inquire why they were made with such 
 capacities of suffering, yet it is too much for human igno- 
 rance to determine, that they could answer all the purposes 
 of their existence without these capacities. It may be true 
 that the greatest good required that animals should be what 
 they are, and men what they are, and that it were impossible 
 to prevent those sufferings of the former which result from the 
 cruelty of the latter. With respect to those sufferings which 
 result from the fact, that different tribes of animals prey on 
 each other, assuming that the greatest good required that they 
 should be what they are in other respects, these sufferings may 
 also be unavoidably incidental to their nature and condition ; 
 or this method of destruction, while some method may be re- 
 quired to prevent the evils of superfecundity, or to furnish that 
 additional enjoyment that results from the succession of one 
 race after another, may be the means of greater good in that 
 increased happiness which is derived from this species of food, 
 than could be produced without it. Be these things however, as 
 they may, it is plainly too much for human ignorance to assert 
 that the sufferings of animals may not be either the unavoidable 
 result of the necessary means, or be themselves the necessary 
 means of the greatest good which is possible to the Creator. 
 Nor does it become us to decide, even on the supposition that 
 no conceivable mode can be devised to explain the suffering of 
 animals, which shall be consistent with the Creator's goodness 
 to them, that no purposes can be answered by it in respect 
 to his moral kingdom, which are worthy of his benevolence. 
 The very mysteriousness of this providential procedure, may 
 well heighten the awe of man toward the supreme Disposer of 
 all. For if he inflicts such an amount of suffering on this part 
 of his unoffending creation, what has man to expect for his 
 provocations and crimes ? What a lesson does the fact of ani- 
 
SUFFERINGS OF MEN. 297 
 
 mal suffering read to us respecting the sovereignty of the Cre- 
 ator? Who can say that this is not in many cases the indis- 
 pensable means of convincing man that God can and will in- 
 flict suffering on him, and thus of keeping the moral universe 
 in awe of its rightful sovereign ? Without however, insisting 
 that any of these specific suppositions accord with what is real, 
 it is sufficient enough for my purpose, that the objector cannot 
 show that they do not. It is enough that they may, in these 
 and still other ways, which our minds have not conceived of, 
 be consistent with the benevolence of the Creator. It is a case 
 in which he might, for aught we can show to the contrary, fur- 
 nish ample explanation of his goodness, and it must be shown 
 that he cannot, or the objection from animal suffering must be 
 abandoned. 
 
 3. The sufferings endured by men, as moral beings. These, 
 with the sufferings of infants and animals, include the whole of 
 natural evil. The consistency of natural evil, so far as it is en- 
 dured by beings who are accountable to their Creator for their 
 moral conduct, with his benevolence, it would seem could never 
 be called in question, if it be remembered how much less these 
 sufferings are than they deserve. For the most abundant good- 
 ness admits at least, that each should suffer all that he deserves. 
 If it should here be said, that the greatest good did not require 
 a system of moral government, and that therefore to establish 
 it, and to inflict suffering on the transgressors of its law is not 
 consistent with benevolence, I reply that this is a new objection, 
 taken not from the infliction of suffering, nor from the degree 
 of it, but from the nature of the system. In other words, the di- 
 vine goodness is impeached on the ground, that God has adopted 
 a system of moral government. This topic will presently be 
 examined. The objection therefore now under consideration, 
 and which is taken from the sufferings of men who are account- 
 able for their conduct, is abandoned. And well it may be, so 
 far as there can be any question respecting the divine goodness 
 toward men in their individual capacity. For with what face 
 can men who suffer immeasurably less than they deserve, com- 
 plain that God is not good to them ? 
 
 On the supposition, and w T e are authorized, after what has 
 been said to make it, that the greatest good required this sys- 
 tem of moral government, the sufferings of men as its account- 
 able subjects, instead of proving that God is not good because 
 13* 
 
298 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 they are so great, are proof, if of any thing, that he is not good 
 because they are not greater. For if there be any proof from 
 this fact, it must be that he disregards the public good, by not 
 inflicting the full penalty of the law on transgressors. The 
 consistency of this fact with his goodness, i. e., with his regard 
 to the public good, has been already evinced. It is worthy of 
 remark, that many, not to say all, writers on the present sub- 
 ject, have overlooked the most plausible ground of objection, 
 viz., the deficiency of human suffering compared with human 
 demerit, and rested their objection on the high degrees of it 
 which exist; an objection which it would seem could be made 
 by none but the culprit himself, and this only because he is 
 perversely blind to the measure of his own guilt. 
 
 Besides this answer, furnished according to the first principle 
 laid down, the second principle supplies another equally deci- 
 sive. For who can doubt the necessity and utility of this influ- 
 ence of human sufferings ? We have already shown that they 
 are not legal sanctions, but simply paternal chastisements — cor- 
 rective dispensations, whose design to recover men to virtue 
 and to happiness cannot be unseen or unacknowledged by the 
 most perverse. Yiewed in this light, they are, as we shall show 
 hereafter, to be ranked among the most decisive proofs of our 
 heavenly Father's kindness toward the froward and guilty 
 children of men. It may be said, that there are general laws 
 established by the Creator, which would still continue and re- 
 sult in great natural evil to men, were they exempt from sin ; 
 that teeth would still decay and ache, that manifold calamities, 
 by accidents, by diseases, &c, would still be the portion of man 
 in this world ; that this shows that the sufferings which are 
 brought on men are not the consequences of sin, but result from 
 those laws and tendencies of things which the Creator has es- 
 tablished, irrespectively of man's moral character. 
 
 This objection I have already had occasion to notice, though 
 under a different bearing. It deserves however, particular 
 notice in this application of the facts on which it rests. 
 
 In answering this objection, it is important to ascertain with 
 as much precision as may be, how much and what kinds of 
 evil would still befall men, were they to become perfectly and 
 universally holy. And here it is undeniable, that if all the 
 sufferings that result directly and indirectly from human selfish- 
 ness, under all its modifications of ambition, pride, envy, ava- 
 
SUPPOSE THERE WERE NO SIN". 299 
 
 rice, lust and excess ; and from all its acts in war, contest, 
 fraud, falsehood and violence, were to cease from the earth; and 
 if these were to be succeeded by universal benevolence, under 
 all its modifications of kindness, forgiveness and compassion, 
 with all the bright and inseparable train of beneficent deeds; 
 and if with these things were to be associated that piety, which 
 by its confidence, its hopes, and its joys, can sustain and cheer 
 and gladden the soul, even under the severest trials; in a word, 
 if perfect and universal holiness were to reign on the earth, 
 human miseries would shrink away almost from human thought. 
 So trivial would be our remaining sufferings, compared with 
 the abundance of our bliss, that we could scarcely think of 
 them, except as at most, inexplicable phenomena, for which an 
 omniscient Creator could easily account, and which could there- 
 fore never awaken a doubt in respect to his overflowing good- 
 ness. 
 
 Nor ought it here to be forgotten what effects universal 
 holiness would produce on the animal constitution of man, in 
 removing its present tendencies to disease and pain — on the 
 mental constitution, in its greater vigor and more successful 
 activity, in its discoveries of remedies for the remaining ills of 
 life, and of the means of improving in all respects our earthly 
 condition. It is easy to see that these things might, not to say 
 would, be beyond all our present conceptions. That the world, 
 under these causes, would approximate to its paradisiacal state 
 of happiness, can hardly be deemed a chimerical anticipation 
 by any one who compares the improvements and blessings of 
 civilized life, especially under the influence of Christianity, with 
 a state of barbarism. 
 
 It might still be insisted, that no such diminution of human 
 sufferings would result from these causes, as to preclude the 
 force of the present objection, that still many of the laws of 
 nature would continue to operate, and to produce pain, disease, 
 and death itself. To this I Avould further reply, that it is not 
 incredible that the world, and the laws of its phenomena, are 
 formed and established by the Creator as the fit and best resi- 
 dence of those whose universal and perpetual sinfulness he 
 foresaw ; and that what now goes on, without change or varia- 
 tion, in these laws and their results, because there is no change 
 in the human character to demand it or to render it useful, 
 would undergo all those alterations from the hand of the Cre- 
 
300 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 ator, which should render the world a fit residence of holy 
 beings, should such a transformation of human character take 
 place. Even such changes, so far as they would be requisite, 
 would be slight, if what has been said of the benign efficacy of 
 universal holiness be true, and might be easily effected, if not 
 by natural causes, at least by the miraculous power of the 
 Almighty. 
 
 Or, if this be not a satisfactory supposition, it is still remote 
 from an incredible hypothesis, that the Being, who, as we have 
 already shown, reveals himself so illustriously as the rewarder 
 of them that diligently seek him, should translate to a world 
 of perfect happiness those whose character should fit them for 
 that exalted state of being. 
 
 But not to dismiss the objection even here. Let the facts on 
 which it rests be conceded in their utmost extent ; let it be 
 granted, that many evils would still befall us in this world as 
 the result of its established laws, though men universally were 
 to become holy ; that teeth would decay and ache, bones be 
 subject to fracture and pain, and the body to disease and death; 
 still it is quite possible, and may therefore be supposed, that 
 this remainder of evil should be either the necessary means of 
 a benevolent end, or inseparable from the necessary means of 
 such an end. 
 
 It is not enough to say of this, class of evils, as Dr. Paley 
 has said, " that they are never perceived to be the object of con- 
 trivance." There is doubtless truth in his remark, and it is 
 happily illustrated when he says, " teeth are contrived to eat, 
 not to ache." And again — " no anatomist ever discovered a 
 system of organization calculated to produce pain and disease ; 
 or, in explaining the parts of the human body, ever said, this 
 is to irritate, this to inflame, &c." Though there is truth in 
 the remark that the teeth are not contrived to ache, yet the 
 fact falls short of the point of the objection which it is designed 
 to meet; for the objector will ask, who made the teeth? — did 
 not an omniscient and omnipotent God ? — and why, knowing 
 that if made they would decay and ache, did he not, as he 
 might have done, make them so that no such evil should fol- 
 low? I answer, that so far as the objection maintains that 
 these evils could and would have been prevented by a benevo- 
 lent Creator, it asserts what cannot be proved. For, allowing 
 that the evils now adverted to would still befall men, though 
 
CONCLUSION. 301 
 
 perfectly holy, it is not impossible that they are either the 
 necessary means of good, or inseparable from such means. It is 
 not incredible that even perfectly holy beings, to answer in the 
 best manner the purposes of an immortal existence, may need 
 to pass through a course of moral discipline, of which the ex- 
 perimental knowledge of natural evil shall be an indispensable 
 part. To suffer from carelessness or indiscretion, is eminently 
 fitted to produce watchfulness and prudence, and may in this 
 case be even necessary to prevent the successful assaults of 
 temptation in the present or a future world. And even suffer- 
 ing, which shall be unavoidable by any means, may be indis- 
 pensable to give a strength and permanence to the principle 
 of submission to the divine will, which God could secure by no 
 other means. But it cannot be necessary to imagine the spe- 
 cific forms and ways in which the evils of life now referred to 
 may be the necessary means of a benevolent end, or insepara- 
 ble from such means. According to the principles we have 
 laid down, to show that such may he the fact, is enough to 
 remove all the weight of this objection. 
 
 I have thus attempted to show, that the natural evil which 
 there is in the world furnishes no evidence that God is not 
 benevolent. The argument rests on the general and undenia- 
 ble principle, that the mere existence of evil, resulting either 
 directly or indirectly from the agency of any being, is not 
 evidence that he is not actuated by a benevolent purpose. We 
 have seen that evil may he inflicted from a benevolent design, 
 and this in different ways, or on different principles. We have 
 seen also, that all the natural evil which there is in the world, 
 for aught we know or can prove to the contrary, may he in- 
 flicted according to some one or more of these principles, from a 
 benevolent design on the part of the Creator. Why then should 
 this evil be alleged as proof that he is not benevolent ? Is not 
 chastisement dictated by love, and are its sufferings properly 
 alleged as proof of unkindness ? and though we cannot say that 
 all the natural evil in the world either is or maybe placed in this 
 category, yet we say that it may he as truly the dictate of kind- 
 ness as the corrections of a father's hand. In this view of the sub- 
 jective may conclude that the existence of natural evil is abso- 
 lutely no evidence that the present system, with its results, is not 
 the best system possible to God. It may therefore be the best sys- 
 tem possible to God, notwithstanding the existence of natural evil . 
 
LECTURE IX. 
 
 Third leading proposition continued, viz. : God governs with rightful authority. — God is benevo- 
 lent, because the present system may he the best possible. — Objection from the existence of 
 moral evil. — There may be an impossibility, in the nature of things, that it should be prevented. 
 Assuming that a moral system may be the best, 1. It may be impossible to prevent all sin 
 under a moral system.— 2. If this is not true, it may be impossible under the best moral 
 system. 
 
 In the last lecture, I commenced the argument in support of 
 the benevolence of God by proposing to show, 
 
 That the present system may be not only letter than none, but 
 the best possible to the Creator. 
 
 In that lecture I considered the objection to the divine be- 
 nevolence, derived from the existence of natural evil. I now 
 propose to consider that which is derived from the existence 
 and prevalence of moral evil. 
 
 This is justly esteemed the principal objection. It is de- 
 manded, if natural evil is a necessary and useful consequence 
 of moral evil, why did not God prevent moral evil ? Why did 
 he not adopt, as he might have done, a moral system, which 
 should result in the perfect and endless holiness and happiness 
 of his moral creation; at least one which should have pre- 
 vented the present extensive prevalence of moral evil ? Or, if 
 this was impossible, then it may be demanded again, why 
 adopt a moral system at all ; or, if he could not adopt a moral 
 system, nor any other which should be better than none, then 
 why adopt any system of creation ? 
 
 This I think, is the objection derived from the existence and 
 prevalence of moral evil in its full force. And it is obvious 
 that it derives all its plausibility from the single assumption, 
 that God, either by adopting a different system from the pres- 
 ent, or none at all, could have done better than he has done. It 
 is equally obvious, that fully and fairly to meet this objection, 
 it is sufficient to show that the present system, notwithstanding 
 the existence and prevalence of moral evil, may be not only 
 better than none, but the best possible to the Creator. For if 
 
THE PHRASE, MORAL SYSTEM. 303 
 
 it may he true, then there is no evidence or proof to the con- 
 trary, and none is authorized to assert it. Of course the objec- 
 tion is groundless, and must be abandoned. 
 
 That the present system may he better than none, I shall for 
 the present take for granted, and this for two reasons ; one is, 
 that in view of the excess of happiness over misery in the 
 world, the possibility that the present system is better than 
 none can scarcely be supposed to need proof; the other is, that 
 I shall hereafter have occasion to prove that it is better than 
 none. Indeed, I have adverted to this part of the objection 
 rather as what might be said, than as what has been or is likely 
 to be strongly urged. It is important however to show in 
 this part of the discussion, that the present system, notwith- 
 standing the existence of moral evil, may he the best possible 
 system to the Creator. 
 
 By the word system, or the phrase moral system, must be 
 meant all that which results in moral action, or in any way de- 
 termines it to be what it is, including the nature of the moral 
 beings themselves, and all the influences under which they act 
 as such beings. The system must thus be distinguished from its 
 results in moral action, as a cause from its effect, and thus be 
 viewed as not including either sin or holiness as any part of 
 the system under which they exist. 
 
 Some who maintain that the present system not only may 
 be, but is the best possible to the Creator, attempt to show, that 
 the reason that God does not prevent moral evil under it, is 
 not that there is any impossibility in the nature of this moral 
 system, or of any moral system, that he should prevent it ; but 
 that the moral evil which exists, is the necessary means of the 
 greatest good. When it is said, that there is no impossibility 
 that God should prevent all sin under the present system, the 
 meaning must be, either that he can prevent it by some changes 
 which would not impair its essential nature, or by direct inter- 
 positions of his power on the mind, thus leaving the nature of 
 the system wholly unchanged in every other respect. 
 
 In opposition to this theory, it is now maintained that there 
 may he an impossibility, in the nature of things, that God 
 should prevent all sin under any moral system whatever, and 
 the present degree of moral evil under the best moral system; 
 and that therefore moral evil in its present degree may exist, 
 not because it is the necessary means of the greatest good, but 
 
304: MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 because, in respect to divine prevention, it is incidental to a 
 moral system, which is not only better than no system, bnt the 
 best possible to the Creator. 
 
 The former of these theories has, in my own view, been so 
 fully abandoned, even by its professed advocates in recent con- 
 troversy, that I shall not here attempt a full exposure of its in- 
 trinsic absurdities and obvious inconsistencies with acknowl- 
 edged truths. I propose to notice it only as it may come in 
 my way, in defending the theory which I adopt. 
 
 If it can be shown, that there may be an impossibility in the 
 nature of things, that God should prevent all moral evil under 
 a moral system, and the present degree of moral evil under the 
 best moral system, then it will follow, that the moral evil 
 under the present system may exist; because, in respect to 
 divine prevention, it is incidental to one which is not only bet- 
 ter than none, but the best possible to the Creator, and is there- 
 fore no evidence against his perfect benevolence. 
 
 Before I proceed directly to sustain this theory, I deem it 
 important to remark, that no prejudice against it ought to be 
 entertained by the disciples, and especially by the advocates of 
 Christianity. It has often been said, that the existence of moral 
 evil under the government of a perfect God, is a profound, un- 
 solvable mystery, and that it has hitherto baffled the research 
 of the most powerful minds in every age. Hence we are often 
 met with the reproving interrogatory, why not let it alone f I 
 answer, first, because the enemies of truth will not let it alone ; 
 and for the defenders of truth to shun the inquiry, is to aban- 
 don it without a defense, and to concede, in the field of argu- 
 ment, a complete triumph to IJniversalism, to Deism, and to 
 Atheism. When the universalist reasons thus : God is infinitely 
 good, and therefore disposed to make all his creatures holy and 
 happy forever; he is omnipotent, and can secure this result, 
 and therefore most certainly will secure it ; and when, on the 
 basis of this conclusion, he forces the doctrine of endless pun- 
 ishment, by false interpretation from the sacred page — when 
 the infidel, from the same premises, comes to the same conclu- 
 sion respecting the holiness and happiness of God's moral crea- 
 tion, and either because he has more sense or candor than the 
 former, admits that this doctrine of future punishment is plainly 
 taught in the Scriptures, and, for this very reason, denies that 
 a benevolent God is the author of the book ; and when the 
 
PARABLE OF THE TARES. 305 
 
 atheist, on the supposition of a benevolent and an omnipotent 
 God, infers that there could be no evil, and because there is 
 evil, denies the existence of such a being, it is in vain, and 
 worse than in vain, to cry out "mystery" in refutation of the 
 argument. Such men as Yoltaire and Hume, and multitudes 
 of far inferior discernment, know that this is not reasoning. 
 Their reply is, we knew that you could not answer ; and they 
 despise you for holding opinions which you are confessedly 
 unable to defend. But further; the inquiry concerning the 
 origin of moral evil is not to be avoided, for the Bible has not 
 shunned it. Indeed, it would seem incredible that it should. 
 Who can believe that Christianity has been given to the 
 world, exposed to an objection which is incapable of all refuta- 
 tion, and which undermines not only its divine origin, but the- 
 ism itself? It has not. Its divine author has formally stated 
 and fully solved the great problem, whence cometh moved evil? 
 lie has solved it for the instruction not merely of philosophers, 
 but of the people, and on substantially the same principle on 
 which it is now proposed to solve it by reason. This he has 
 done with unsurpassed perspicuity and force, in " the parable 
 of the tares of the field." In this parable we are taught the 
 following truths : 
 
 1st. That the kingdom — the reign of heaven — the moral 
 government of God under a gracious economy — is perfectly 
 fitted to its great design of reforming and saving all men. 
 
 2d. That the fact that there are wicked men, or that there 
 is moral evil, rather than its opposite, under this best system, 
 is in direct - contravention of this great design of its divine 
 author. 
 
 3d. That the reason that moral evil exists, is that there is an 
 impossibility, in the nature of the case, that God should pre- 
 vent it, under the system, which exempts him from all respon- 
 sibility in respect to its existence ; and 
 
 4th. That the interpositions requisite to remove the evil, 
 would do more hurt than good, by diminishing the amount of 
 holiness under the system.* 
 
 * In confirmation of this view of the parable, I ask, whether the householder 
 did not prefer a crop of pure wheat to one mingled with tares, all things considered ; 
 whether he preferred the tares, as the necessary means of the greatest good, to 
 wheat in their stead; whether the introduction of the tares when men slept, did 
 not involve an impossibility on his part of preventing it, which exempted him from ! 
 
 20 
 
306 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 Here then we have the same solution of the problem whence 
 cometh moral evil, which is now proposed with only this differ- 
 ence, that what the Saviour teaches as a fact, a doctrine, is now 
 for a particular purpose in argument, proposed merely as a 
 theory or possible truth. Why should such a theory be en- 
 countered with prejudice on the part of the friends and advo- 
 cates of Christianity ? 
 
 I now proceed to show on the principles of reason, that — 
 
 There may he an impossibility in the nature of things, that 
 God should prevent all sin or moral evil under the best system. 
 
 Assuming what will probably not be denied, that a moral 
 system may be the best system, I propose to show : 
 
 1. That there may be an impossibility that God should pre- 
 vent all sin under a moral system ; and 
 
 2. That if it be possible, that he should prevent all sin under 
 any moral system, there may be an impossibility that he should 
 prevent all sin under the best moral system. 
 
 1. There may be an impossibility in the nature of things, 
 that God should prevent all sin under any moral system what- 
 ever. 
 
 That such an impossibility may exist, is evident from the 
 nature of a moral system, for it necessarily includes the exist- 
 ence of moral beings; and sin or moral evil cannot be pre- 
 vented in moral beings, by any power or influence which de- 
 stroys their moral agency. To suppose this, is to suppose sin 
 
 all responsibility in respect to their existence, and remove the necessity of any fur- 
 ther vindication ; and whether, if he had foreseen the attempt to introduce them, 
 he would not have prevented their introduction, if he could, without incurring a 
 greater evil than their introduction? Are not these the undeniable facts and prin- 
 ciples by which the Saviour, in this parable, vindicated the character of God, in 
 view of existing moral evil in the world ? Can philosophy show the vindication to 
 be founded in false principles ? If it should here be asked, who made the devil ? 
 I answer, God made the devil, but he made himself a devil. If it be said, that still, 
 as a creature of God, God is responsible for his character, — I answer, the parable 
 obviously proceeds on the opposite assumption, viz. : that according to the popular 
 view of the subject, the devil is the great enemy of God, and of his designs, for 
 whose character and conduct God is not responsible — no more so, than the house- 
 holder is for the character and conduct of his enemy. Otherwise, the professed 
 explanation of the parable is a gross sophism, designed to deceive those to whom 
 it was addressed. Whether therefore we say, that the devil is the personification 
 of the source of evil in the world, or a real person, and therefore a creature of God, 
 still our Lord assumes the existence of this source of evil as that for which God is 
 not responsible, and as that which results in an impossibility that God should pre- 
 vent the evil which exists under the present system. 
 
THE IMPOSSIBILITY DEFINED. 307 
 
 to be prevented in moral beings who are not moral beings. 
 But moral agency implies free agency — the power of choice — 
 the power to choose morally wrong as well as morally right, 
 under every possible influence to prevent such choice or action. 
 Moral agency and of course moral beings can no more exist 
 without this power, than matter can exist without solidity and 
 extension, or a triangle without sides and angles. Let it then 
 be kept in mind that I now speak of preventing sin in moral 
 beings, free moral agents, who can sin under every possible in- 
 fluence from God to prevent their sinning. But if such beings 
 do what in this respect they can do under every possible influ- 
 ence from God to prevent their sinning, they certainly will sin 
 when it is impossible that God should prevent their sinning. 
 And why may it not be so ? Who knows or who can prove, 
 that such cases will not occur under any possible moral sys- 
 tem ? No man knows nor can prove it. Therefore let no man 
 assert it. There may be an impossibility that God should pre- 
 vent all sin or moral evil under any moral system. The as- 
 sumption that God can prevent all moral evil in a moral sys- 
 tem, is wholly groundless and unauthorized, and the objection 
 to his benevolence, derived from the existence of moral evil, 
 which rests entirely on this assumption, is also groundless, and 
 ought to be abandoned. 
 
 I do not say that there is an impossibility that God should 
 prevent all sin under a moral system ; nor even that it may not 
 be true that there is not such an impossibility ; but I affirm 
 simply, that there may he. This is sufficient for my present 
 purpose, that of answering the objection to the divine benevo- 
 lence, derived from the existence of moral evil. For on this 
 supposition, moral evil under the present system, in respect to 
 divine prevention, may he incidental to a system which may 
 be not only better than none, but the best possible to the 
 Creator ; and is therefore no proof against his benevolence. 
 
 Here this grand objection to the benevolence of God might 
 be left as fully refuted. But many things may be said to 
 strengthen the objection and to weaken the force of the reply 
 to it, which has now been made. 
 
 These things may be comprised in alleging that the sup- 
 posed theory is inconsistent with the omnipotence of God, and 
 in supposed proofs, that God can prevent all sin in a moral 
 system. 
 
308 MOKAL GOVERNMENT EROM NATURE. 
 
 In the first place, it is often alleged that to suppose that there 
 may be any impossibility that God should prevent all sin in a 
 moral system, is highly dishonorable to God, inasmuch as it 
 virtually denies his power as an omnipotent Being. The plau- 
 sibility of this gratuitous assumption is such to most minds, 
 through want of reflection, that it has perplexed the argument 
 for God's benevolence more than every other consideration. In 
 reply to this, I claim in the first place that they who assert that 
 any impossibility that God should prevent all moral evil under 
 a moral system, is inconsistent with his omnipotence, should 
 either prove the assertion or retract it. What right has any 
 one in reasoning to assert what he neither knows nor can prove 
 to be true ? Who does not know that there is a kind of impos- 
 sibility in many cases, which God has no power to remove or 
 overcome. It is impossible that God should cause a thing to 
 be and not to be at the same time, that he should make two 
 and two to be five, or a part equal to the whole. There is an 
 impossibility to God in each of these cases which involves a con- 
 tradiction. Reminding the objector of what every tyro in rea- 
 soning knows, that this kind of impossibility limits the power 
 of God in such a sense as fully to justify us in denying his 
 power in such cases, let him address himself to an argument 
 showing that the same kind of impossibility does not exist in 
 the case now under consideration. When he shall do this, we 
 shall begin to suspect that his present objection to our theory is 
 something more than either designed or undesigned sophistry. 
 I reply again to this assertion with a denial of its truth. The 
 impossibility now supposed of God's preventing all sin under a 
 moral system, if it be real, is not inconsistent with his omnipo- 
 tence. It is not that kind of impossibility which is given by a 
 direct conflict between the power of the creature and the power 
 of God, because the power of the creature to sin is superior to 
 God's power. Such a direct conflict between the power of 
 moral beings to sin and God's power, is as inconceivable as 
 that the forces which produce the motion of the planets should 
 be interfered with by the power of motives or arguments. The 
 direct prevention of sin, or which is the same thing, the direct 
 production of holiness in moral agents by dint of Omnipo- 
 tence, is an absurdity, inasmuch as it implies that God is the 
 efficient, proximate natural cause of their moral acts, and that 
 they act morally without acting as moral agents, i. <?., without 
 
THE IMPOSSIBILITY DEFINED. 309 
 
 being tlic proximate, efficient causes of their own acts. What 
 then is the impossibility of God's preventing all sin in moral 
 beings, which it is now supposed may exist? I answer: It is 
 an impossibility, the supposition of which involves a contradic- 
 tion in the nature of the case. It is the impossibility of God's 
 preventing moral beings from sinning by any thing which lie 
 can do, when beings who can sin in despite of God, do in 
 this respect what they can do. To suppose that in such cases 
 they should be prevented from sinning, is to suppose them to 
 sin and to be prevented from sinning at the same time, which 
 is a contradiction and an impossibility. And would such an 
 impossibility if it exists, dishonorably limit the power of God? 
 Would it imply the want of any degree of that power which 
 constitutes omnipotence? Must we then, if we could duly 
 honor God, assert that he has power to accomplish contradic- 
 tions, or to accomplish that, which for aught that can be shown 
 to the contrary, may involve a contradiction and an impossi- 
 bilitv in the nature of things — assert that to be true of God 
 which for aught that can be known or proved to the contrary, 
 may be false? Is God honored by the confident asseverations 
 of mere ignorance, and on such a basis is either his goodness or 
 his omnipotence to be denied ? Plainly if the supposed impos- 
 sibility of God's preventing all moral evil under a moral sys- 
 tem actually exists, it no more dishonorably limits his power 
 than the impossibility that the act should be prevented and not 
 prevented at the same time, or than two and two should be 
 five, or a part equal to the whole. 
 
 It is also to be said, that the doctrine that sin is the necessary 
 means of the greatest good, denies the power of God in the 
 same sense as that in which the theory now maintained can be 
 said to deny it. According to this doctrine God cannot — he 
 has not power to secure the greatest good, without sin as the 
 means of this end. It limits the Holy One of Israel by the 
 impossibility of securing good, which results from the nature of 
 sin ; for it assigns this impossibility as the very reason for the 
 existence of sin. Thus on both schemes, an impossibility in 
 the nature of things is involved. In the one case it is main- 
 tained that there may be an impossibility of God's preventing 
 all moral evil under a moral system, resulting from the nature 
 of moral agency as involving power to sin under every possible 
 influence to prevent it ; in the other, that there is an impossi- 
 
310 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 bility that God should produce the greatest good without sin, 
 resulting from the nature of sin as the necessary means of the 
 greatest good. 
 
 If either theory is true, God may be properly said to be lim- 
 ited by an impossibility in the nature of things. And which is 
 the most dishonorable to him, the supposition that he cannot 
 produce the greatest good without sin as the means of it ; or that 
 he cannot prevent that, the prevention of which may involve a 
 contradiction — i. e., he cannot prevent beings from sinning who 
 can sin in despite of his power to prevent them? The former is 
 utterly absurd and inconceivable. For how can it be impossi- 
 ble that God should produce the greatest good by the best kind 
 of moral action. Or how can it be. true that he cannot pro- 
 duce the greatest good without that kind of moral action, 
 which is fitted to destroy all good and to produce all evil? 
 How can that which is confessedly wholly an evil, only an 
 evil — an evil without qualification, be the necessary means of 
 the greatest good? How can the worst kind of action con- 
 ceivable, be the best kind of action? If not, then how can it 
 be impossible that God should produce the greatest good with- 
 out sin as the means of it ? Plainly the supposition of such an 
 impossibility is the most palpable of all impossibilities. There 
 can be no such. If then, one of the supposed impossibilities 
 must exist, shall we suppose it to be that which may or that 
 which cannot exist. 
 
 Further ; there is no conceivable theory by which the benev- 
 olence and omnipotence of God — in other words, by which the 
 existence of a perfect God can be vindicated, without supposing 
 an impossibility in some respect that he should prevent moral 
 evil, which is consistent with his benevolence and his omnipo- 
 tence, and which is the reason of his not preventing it, The most 
 plausible argument ever devised in defence of Atheism is prob- 
 ably that of Epicurus. This argument, when applied to moral 
 evil, is substantially the following: "God either would prevent 
 all moral evil, and could not / or he could prevent it, and would 
 not ; or he neither would nor coidd prevent it ; or he both would 
 and could prevent it. If he would and could not, then he is not 
 omnipotent ; if he would not and could, then he is not good ; if 
 he neither would nor could, then he is neither good nor om- 
 nipotent ; if he both would and could, then moral evil would 
 not exist. But moral evil does exist. Therefore there is no 
 
THE ATHEIST'S ARGUMENT. 311 
 
 God who is both good and omnipotent." Now where lies the 
 fallacy of this boasted argument? an argument which in some 
 form has been often repeated in triumph even to the present 
 day. There are two assumptions in this argument, one of 
 which is fully authorized ; the other is wholly unauthorized. 
 The former is that moral evil is not the necessary means of the 
 greatest good, but is wholly an evil ; for if it be the necessary 
 means of the greatest good, it would not be, as is claimed in 
 this argument, inconsistent with the divine goodness. This 
 assumption is fully authorized ; for how can the worst kind of 
 moral action conceivable, be the best kind of moral action? 
 The other, is the assumption that if God cannot prevent all 
 moral evil under any and every created system, then he is not 
 omnipotent ; for if there may he an impossibility that God should 
 prevent all moral evil under a moral system, or under the best 
 system, which impossibility is consistent w T ith his omnipotence, 
 then the fact that he cannot prevent it, is no proof that he is 
 not omnipotent ; while if there can be no such impossibility, 
 then God as both good and omnipotent would prevent all 
 moral evil. But he does not, and it follows therefore from the 
 present assumption, that if God is good he is not omnipotent. 
 Indeed the existing moral evil being wholly an evil, must be 
 supposed to exist, either because if God is good, he is not om- 
 nipotent ; or because if he is omnipotent, he is not good, or be- 
 cause he is neither omnipotent nor good ; or because there is 
 an impossibility of his preventing the evil, which impossibility 
 is consistent with his goodness and his omnipotence. Thus we 
 are driven by unanswerable reasoning either into blank Atheism, 
 or into the admission of some impossibility of God's preventing 
 all moral evil, which impossibility is consistent with his good- 
 ness and his omnipotence. Such an impossibility may result 
 as we claim, from any moral system, or at least from the best 
 system. The assumption then that there can be no such im- 
 possibility, or that if God cannot prevent all moral evil under 
 any, even under the best system, then he is not omnipotent, is 
 unauthorized ; and constitutes the fallacy of the foregoing argu- 
 ment for Atheism, 
 
 It is here worthy of remark, that the advocates of the doc- 
 trine, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, 
 while they advance in so doing that which is palpably absurd, 
 also maintain the groundless assumption of the atheistic argu- 
 
312 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 ment. To vindicate the goodness of God, they maintain the 
 palpable absurdity, that what is wholly an evil is the necessary 
 means of the greatest good ; and to vindicate his omnipotence, 
 that there is no impossibility of his preventing all moral evil 
 tinder any moral system whatever. They thus give their sanc- 
 tion to a principle which by just reasoning sustains downright 
 Atheism. For if sin is, and who does not know it is, wholly an 
 evil, and if there is no sense in which God cannot prevent it 
 under the present system consistently with his omnipotence, 
 then in view of the existing sin it follows either that God is not 
 good or not omnipotent, or that he is neither good nor omnipo- 
 tent. 
 
 But it is claimed, that there is the most decisive proof that 
 God can prevent all sin, under any moral system whatever. 
 
 1. It is said, that as an omnipotent Being, he must have 
 power to direct and control the conduct of his creatures as he 
 pleases, or according to his will. By the will of God must 
 here be meant, either his will as a lawgiver, in which he pre- 
 fers, all things considered, that right moral action should (not 
 shall) take place in all cases, rather than wrong ; or, his provi- 
 dential will — his decree — in which he purposes that the event 
 willed shall take place. If the former will be meant, then it 
 is not admitted that God has power to control the conduct of 
 his creatures, in all cases, according to that will. It is unde- 
 niable, that he does not in all cases ; while it is equally so, that 
 as benevolent and omnipotent, he would thus control it, were 
 there no impossibility of his so doing, consistent with his be- 
 nevolence and omnipotence. Such an impossibility is of course 
 not inconsistent with these attributes. If by the will of God, 
 be meant his providential will — his decree — then I deny that 
 he has such a will to prevent the sin which actually takes place. 
 Foreseeing the certainty of the sin, he could not will nor pur- 
 pose actually to prevent it ; but, on the contrary, must, rather 
 than prevent it by destroying moral agency, or for some other 
 reason, have purposed its actual existence. God therefore, 
 whatever may be his will as a lawgiver, has no will or purpose 
 that any sin shall not take place, which does take place. He 
 has power actually to direct and control, as he wills actually to 
 direct and control, the conduct of his creatures, and of course, 
 power to bring to pass whatsoever he wills shall come to pass. 
 
 2. It is often said, that it is incredible that God should not 
 
ANSWER TO OBJECTIONS. 313 
 
 be able to prevent all sin in moral beings by tlie influence of 
 motives. I answer, that if there may he such an impossibility, 
 then such an impossibility is not incredible. Indeed, why is it 
 incredible that God should not be able, by motives, to prevent 
 beings from sinning, who possess power to sin under all possi- 
 ble motives which he can employ to prevent them. 
 
 3. It may be said, that God can create moral beings of such 
 a nature as shall certainly prevent their sinning. If by " such 
 a nature," be meant what some mean, viz., a holy nature as a 
 constitutional property of the beings, I deny that such a nature 
 can be literally created by God. To suppose holiness- to exist 
 in a creature of God, prior to all voluntary exercise or act on 
 the part of the creature, is to suppose holiness to exist before 
 it exists, which is absurd. In short, whatever nature God may 
 be supposed to create in moral beings, they must have power 
 to act morally w T rong, under every preventing influence from 
 God. And who can prove that such beings will not act mor- 
 ally wrong, and that it may not be impossible that God should 
 prevent it ? 
 
 4. The appeal is often made to facts. It is said, that God 
 does and can prevent some moral beings from sinning ; and if 
 he can prevent some, he can prevent all. This is a palpable 
 non sequitur. All moral beings have the power to avoid sin- 
 ning, as well as power to sin. That some, who have the power 
 to avoid sinning, should be prevented from sinning, is indeed 
 altogether credible. But why is it not also, that it should be 
 impossible for God to prevent some from sinning, who have 
 power to sin under every possible preventing influence. To 
 deny such impossibility, is " talking quite at random, and in 
 the dark." Besides, there are no known instances of the pre- 
 vention of sin in moral beings, except under a system in which 
 others have not been prevented. And how do the facts alleged, 
 prove that God could have prevented all sin, either under the 
 present moral system or under any other? Nor could the sin 
 of any who have sinned, have been prevented by God without 
 some changes and interpositions for the purpose. Those requi- 
 site to prevent one sin, and especially to prevent all the sin 
 which has taken place, supposing the system in other respects 
 to be the same, might, in despite of future preventing interpo- 
 sitions, have resulted in more sin than could have been pre- 
 vented. To assert therefore that God might have prevented 
 
 Vol. I.— 14. 
 
314 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 all sin in a moral system, or in any moral system, is to make 
 mere arbitrary assertions, no man knowing enough of possibili- 
 ties in the case, to adduce the shadow of proof of the truth of 
 what he asserts. 
 
 5. But the objector may appeal (and I readily consent that 
 he should) to the facts of revelation. He may speak of angels, 
 who have never sinned and never will, and of the redeemed in 
 heaven, who never will. But revelation brings to our knowl- 
 edge neither angels nor men confirmed in holiness, except those 
 w T ho are confirmed under a moral system in which sin takes 
 place. And who can show that any changes requisite to pre- 
 vent the sin which has taken place, supposing that such changes 
 might have been made, would not have resulted ultimately in 
 a vast increase of sin ? It may be said, that our first parents 
 were for a time holy, and that, had their circumstances been 
 continued exactly the same, they would have continued holy ; 
 for the same antecedents would have been followed with the 
 same consequent. I answer, that it is impossible, in the nature 
 of things, that the antecedents should continue exactly the 
 same. When they had lived one day or hour in obedience to 
 the divine will, some things were necessarily true of them 
 which were not when they had thus lived but half a day, or 
 half an hour. One change in the antecedents might lead to 
 another. In the progress of their being, how many thoughts 
 and feelings — what diversified associations and excitement of 
 constitutional propensities would arise, which never occurred 
 during the short period of their continued obedience ! And il 
 none but the omniscient Being could foresee these things, then 
 who but he can pronounce on the result ? 
 
 6. If the objector should still insist, that a God of infinite 
 wisdom and power might have devised and adopted a moral 
 system which would have excluded all moral evil, then I ask, 
 what moral system ? Can lie specify it ? Can he delineate 
 minutely its essential, constituent elements ? — the exact nature 
 and degree of influence it must possess, that it may be effectual 
 to prevent all moral evil ? Could any thing be more presump- 
 tuous and audacious than such an attempt ? And if he does 
 not know what moral system, or that any moral system would 
 be effectual to the prevention of all moral evil under it, how 
 does he know that God could devise such a system ? I am not 
 saying that he could not ; but I affirm, that no one can prove 
 
OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED. 315 
 
 that lie could. The fact that moral beings can sin under any 
 and every preventing influence from God, forever precludes the 
 possibility of proving a priori, that they will not, and that 
 there may not be an impossibility that God should prevent all 
 moral evil under a moral system. It may be, that, had the 
 nature of man, or his circumstances, or both, been different in 
 any respect from what they are, or had any other influence in 
 kind or degree been resorted to than has been, the system in 
 other respects being the same, then the consequence, in despite 
 of any and all further preventing interpositions, would have 
 been an immeasurably greater amount of moral evil than has re- 
 sulted, or will result from the present system. Had the powers 
 of man been greater than they are; had he commenced exist- 
 ence with the more perfect faculties of manhood ; had his sus- 
 ceptibilities, propensities, circumstances, been in any manner 
 different, the results in moral evil, for aught we know or can 
 prove to the contrary, would have been vastly worse than those 
 of the present system as it is. Under the imagined change for 
 the better, still man might have sinned. To sin in circumstances 
 more favorable to virtue, might imply greater strength in the 
 sinful principle or purpose, formed in resistance of the greater 
 obligations and motives to virtue — even a desperation which 
 would render vain all efforts to reclaim ; which would prevent, 
 by rendering useless, an economy of grace, and thus result in 
 universal and hopeless sin and woe. 
 
 7. Should the objector still insist, that some changes might 
 have been adopted by an all-wise and omnipotent Creator, 
 which would have prevented the present prevalence of moral 
 evil, I ask, what changes ? Does he say, greater force of intel- 
 lect, and consequently more just and adequate views of the 
 nature and relations of the great objects of moral choice would 
 have secured the end ? I reply, that men do not sin through 
 any such deficiency in this faculty of the soul, as to show, that 
 to augment its strength, would change the result in practice. 
 Besides, any finite strength of intellect is consistent with power 
 to sin, and cannot therefore be alleged as proof that the subject 
 of it will not sin. 
 
 8. Is it then said,, that greater strength of intellect, and a 
 diminished strength of the propensities to natural good, would 
 secure the result; I reply, that however vigorous the intel- 
 lectual perceptions, and however weak the propensities to 
 
316 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 natural good, so long as the latter are real, and such as are 
 essential to moral agency, they must be capable of an excite- 
 ment which shall render possible the choice of their gratifica- 
 tion, since otherwise moral agency could not exist. It is im- 
 possible therefore to prove a priori, that such a moral agent 
 will not sin. 
 
 9. Is it then said by the objector, that if sin were to be fol- 
 lowed with the immediate execution of its curse on the trans- 
 gressor, this would certainly diminish the degree of moral evil 
 in the world ? I answer, that the consequences might be 
 immeasurably worse. Indeed, when we reflect that mankind 
 actually possess sufficient intellectual capacity to perceive the 
 difference between right and wrong moral action, and the infi- 
 nite preponderance of motive to the former compared with the 
 pleasures of sin, and think of the universal sinfulness of our race, 
 the presumption rests on no slight basis, that to make this world 
 a place of immediate retribution, would be to change it, with all 
 its bright prospects from a state of trial, into a world of despera- 
 tion in sin and suffering. In such a system, one sin would cut 
 off all hope of the divine favor; and who could decide that all 
 would not sin once ? Thus the amount of moral evil might far 
 surpass what now exists, and this world, instead of being a 
 place of probation, cheered with intimations of mercy and for- 
 giveness, might become the theater of retributive vengeance to 
 all. 
 
 10. Should the objector propose any other emendation of the 
 system, it would be equally nugatory. No one is competent 
 to devise or suggest a change, which he, or any other man, can 
 pronounce to be an improvement, without the most palpable 
 presumption. To show how utterly groundless are all objec- 
 tions to the present system, derived from the existence of moral 
 evil, we need only remark, that the present state of man is, or 
 at least may be, one of moral discipline, in reference to the 
 formation of his moral character for immortality ; that it is, or 
 at least may be, peculiarly fitted to give stability to moral 
 principle, and thus to secure ultimately immutable moral per- 
 fection in man ; and that every thing which pertains to it, as 
 a system from God, may be indispensably necessary to secure 
 the greatest amount of holiness and happiness to the uni- 
 verse which God can secure. Who then shall say, or be re- 
 spected for saying, that any change in the system which he 
 
OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED. 317 
 
 can devise or suggest, would improve it ? Who would take 
 the responsibility of effecting, if he could, the least alteration 
 in the system which the supreme Creator has adopted ? 
 
 11. After all, the objector may say, if man cannot devise a 
 system of greater perfection than the present, this is no proof 
 that the Creator, a being of infinite perfection, cannot. I reply, 
 that this is a mere evasion of the point at issue. My object 
 has. not been to prove that the Creator could not have devised 
 and adopted a better system than the present ; though I may 
 hereafter show that we have good reason to believe that he 
 could not ; but to show that it cannot be proved that God 
 could have adopted a better system than the present — that it 
 may be true, so far as existing evil is concerned, that he could 
 not, and that the assertion that he could, is presumptuous 
 in the extreme. Hence the objection to God's benevolence 
 derived from the existence of moral evil and therefore from 
 natural evil, and which is designed to show that the present 
 system is not the best possible to the Creator, being founded 
 wholly in the ignorance of the objector, is to be laid entirely 
 aside as nugatory and vain. The conclusion is, that it may 
 he impossible that God should exclude all moral evil from 
 a moral system y and of course from the best moral sys- 
 tem ; and that therefore, great as the amount of morcd evil is 
 under the present system, it may be the best possible to the 
 Creator. 
 
 Some theologians however, instead of receiving the theory as 
 now presented, have proposed a modification of it, maintaining 
 that while God can prevent all sin under some moral system, 
 it may be true that he cannot prevent all sin under the best 
 nloral system. More particularly they maintain that the pres- 
 ent system may be the best, inasmuch as it comprises those high 
 degrees of temptation and other moral means, which while they 
 become the sure occasion of the sin of some, are necessary to 
 secure higher degrees of holiness on the part of others, and thus 
 higher degrees of happiness on the whole, than God could se- 
 cure under some other system, under which he could prevent 
 all sin. 
 
 My objection to this modification of the theory already pre- 
 sented, is not that it asserts that it may be true that God can- 
 not prevent sin under the best moral system. That this may 
 be true, I assert and maintain. But my objection is twofold; 
 
318 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 viz., the theory asserts that God can prevent all sin under some 
 moral system ; and that it affirms certain specific or particular 
 characteristics of the present moral system as those which may 
 constitute it the best system, when there is much reason for be- 
 lieving that they do not. 
 
 I proceed then to say : 
 
 First. That the affirmation that God can prevent all sin 
 under some moral system, is gratuitous and unauthorized. I 
 know no advocate of this part of the theory, who has at- 
 tempted to prove the affirmation that God can prevent all sin 
 under some moral system. I admit that it may he true that 
 he can ; but claim to have shown that it may be true that he 
 cannot. If there is no proof either that God can or that he 
 cannot prevent all sin under any moral system whatever, then 
 the affirmation, that he can prevent all sin under some moral 
 system, is wholly unauthorized. Besides when it is once admit- 
 ted that God cannot prevent all sin under a moral system which 
 is the best, how can it be shown that he can prevent all sin un- 
 der a moral system which is not the best? May it not be true 
 for aught that appears to the contrary, that God cannot pre- 
 vent all sin under any other moral system, as well as that he 
 cannot under the best moral system? Is not the assertion 
 then that God can prevent all sin under some moral system, 
 altogether unauthorized ? Is there any evidence or proof that 
 the assertion is true rather than false ? Secondly. There is not 
 only no proof that the higher degrees of temptation with other 
 moral means, which are supposed to be essential to the best 
 system, are necessary to secure or will secure the highest degrees 
 of holiness, but much evidence to the contrary. How does it 
 appear that a moral being cannot love God with all his heart, 
 mind, soul and strength, i. <?., as much as he can love him, 
 under a low as well as under a high degree of temptation, or 
 as well under one system of means, as under another ? How 
 can it be shown that a moral being can or will love God more 
 than he can — more than with all his strength, because tempta- 
 tion is great ? Can it be shown that his strength will be in- 
 creased as temptation is increased? And if this cannot be 
 shown, how can it be rendered in the lowest degree probable 
 that the greater the temptation to sin, the greater will be the 
 degree of holiness ? On the contrary, if there is any principle 
 to be reasoned from in the case, it is that the greater the degree 
 
POSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS. 319 
 
 of temptation to sin, other things being the same, the less will 
 be the degree of holiness. It is on this very principle that or- 
 thodox divines as a class, account for the universal depravity of 
 unrenewed men, and the low degree of holiness in those who 
 are renewed. They trace these results to the high degree of 
 temptation which arises from their propensity to sin. Is it a 
 uniform fact that the increase of temptation results in the in- 
 crease of holiness? Is temptation a means of grace? Or is it 
 to be received as a general principle, that if good men would 
 be perfect in holiness, they must shun temptation? There is 
 plainly a strong probability then, against the supposition, that 
 to increase the degree of temptation should increase the degree 
 of holiness. But for the sake of the argument, let it be con- 
 ceded that such would be the result of high degrees of tempta- 
 tion in respect to a part of the subjects of a moral system; 
 how does it appear that what would thus be gained in holiness 
 and happiness by them, would not be more than overbalanced 
 by greater degrees of sin and misery to another? If it be 
 said that it may not be so, the answer is, that it may he so, and 
 there is no evidence that it would not be so, not to say, the 
 probability is, that it would be so. Thirdly. There can be no 
 proof that God can prevent all sin under a moral system, or 
 that having adopted a moral system, he can prevent all sin 
 without destroying moral agency. Suppose what is called the 
 best system of means and measures to be adopted, God either 
 can or he cannot prevent all sin under this system, and of course 
 without destroying moral agency. If he can prevent all sin 
 under this best moral system, and this by the mere exertion of 
 his power, without at all changing the system of means, and of 
 course without destroying moral agency, why does he not thus 
 prevent all sin ? Would an omnipotent being in such a case 
 deprecate the requisite interposition of his power? Why then 
 as a benevolent and an omnipotent being, does he not interpose 
 his pow T er, and thus prevent all sin and secure perfect holiness 
 and happiness forever under this best system of means and meas- 
 ures? Is it said that sin itself is the necessary means of the 
 greatest good ? But this preposterous dogma the advocate of 
 this theory rejects. Can any reason then be given why God, 
 having adopted the best system does not prevent all sin, except 
 that he cannot without destroying moral agency ? Is it said 
 that to prevent all sin by the supposed interposition of power, 
 
320 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 would be preventing it " in such a way as would derange and 
 impair the best possible system of means ?" But the system of 
 means according to the supposition, is unchanged. It remains 
 the same in all that gives it excellence, or constitutes it the best 
 system of means, whether sin be prevented in the manner sup- 
 posed or not. "Why then is not all sin prevented by the sup- 
 posed interposition of divine power ? Is it said that it may be 
 true that to prevent all sin and to secure universal and perfect 
 holiness and happiness forever by this method, would lessen 
 the amount of holiness and happiness compared with what 
 would otherwise exist ? Be it so. But it may also be true 
 that such would not be the effect; and the reason that God 
 does not prevent all sin may be another; viz., that he cannot 
 without destroying moral agency. Besides, the thing sup- 
 posed, viz., that God should prevent all sin under the system, 
 and by so doing lessen the comparative amount of holiness, is 
 impossible. To suppose less holiness than perfect holiness or 
 the highest possible, to be the effect of the supposed divine in- 
 terposition, is to suppose less holiness than ought to be, which 
 is sin ; and surely God cannot be supposed to adopt a method 
 of preventing all sin which will produce sin ! Is it then said 
 that God cannot prevent all sin and secure universal and per- 
 fect holiness forever under the best system, merely by the 
 direct interposition of his power ? Be it so. Then the ques- 
 tion returns, how does it appear that he can prevent all sin 
 forever under any moral system, that is, prevent it forever 
 without destroying moral agency? By doing this he can pre- 
 vent all sin. How does it appear that he can prevent it, if he 
 introduces a moral system without destroying moral agency ? 
 It is admitted that it may be true that God cannot prevent all 
 sin under the best moral system. Why may it not be true that 
 the very reason that he cannot, is that he cannot prevent all 
 sin, having adopted any moral system, without destroying 
 moral agency ? And if this may be the reason that he cannot 
 prevent all sin under the best moral system, why may it not 
 be a reason that he cannot under any other system which is 
 not the best ? Adopt what moral system he may, the possibil- 
 ity of sinning which is given by moral agency in despite of 
 divine power to prevent it remains, and excludes all proof that 
 sin will not take place under the system. 2s~o man therefore 
 can either know or prove, that there is any way in which God 
 
SIX, UNDER THE BEST SYSTEM. 321 
 
 can prevent all sin if lie adopts a moral system, unless lie de- 
 stroys moral agency. 
 
 I now proceed to show as I proposed : 
 
 2. That if it be conceded that God can prevent all moral evil 
 under some possible moral system, it may still be impossible 
 that he should prevent all moral evil, even the present degree 
 of moral evil under the best moral system. 
 
 I do not say that conceding the former, the latter would be 
 probable. Still it may be true, that were God to adopt the 
 system under which he could prevent all moral evil, either on 
 account of the small numbers of beings which the system 
 would require, or on account of their limited capacity, or 
 for some other reason, he would greatly lessen the happiness of 
 his creation compared with adopting another system under 
 which he cannot prevent all moral evil. The present moral 
 system as consisting of a given number of moral beings, and 
 possessing exactly the nature, the powers, susceptibilities, pro- 
 pensities which they do possess, and placed in exactly the 
 circumstances in which they are placed — for aught that ap- 
 pears to the contrary, may be the only system by means of 
 which God can produce the highest happiness which he can 
 produce. 
 
 Any other system, which would prevent the existing degree 
 of moral evil — if such a system be possible — might greatly im- 
 pair the results in happiness, as these depend, not indeed on 
 the existence of moral evil as the means of happiness, but on 
 the nature of the moral system itself; that is, on the number 
 and nature,,, the powers and capacities of the beings, and the 
 various kinds of influence and sources of happiness which the 
 best moral system includes. There may then be an impossi- 
 bility, not indeed that God should produce the greatest good 
 without the existing moral evil as the means of it, but that he 
 should prevent the existing moral evil under the present sys- 
 tem. Moral beings, under this best moral system, must have 
 power to sin, in despite of all that God can do under this system 
 to prevent them; and to suppose that they should do what they 
 can under this system, viz., sin, and that God should prevent 
 their sinning, is a contradiction and an impossibility. It may 
 be true that such beings, in this respect, will do what they can 
 do — that is, will sin — when of course it would be impossible 
 that God, other things remaining the same, should prevent 
 14* 21 
 
322 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 their sinning without destroying their moral agency. Grant- 
 ing then the possibility, that God should prevent all sin under 
 some moral system, still it may be impossible that he should 
 do it, without either adopting some other system of means than 
 the best, or, having adopted the best, without destroying it by 
 destroying moral agency. 
 
 In opposition to this conclusion however, there are some who 
 will still reply, that "with God, all things are possible;" that, 
 as an omnipotent being, he can prevent all sin under one sys- 
 tem of means and measures as well as under another, even as 
 well without means as with ; that he can prevent all sin in 
 moral beings, by the direct and immediate interpositions of 
 mere omnipotence — by mere dint of power — by acts of literal 
 creation, producing holiness in all. 
 
 It is readily admitted, that in the true sense of the language, 
 "All things are possible with God." But what are often and 
 properly called things in one sense, cannot be properly called 
 things in another. In the most general sense, any mere object 
 of thought is properly called a thing. Of these objects there 
 are two classes. The one class are things (thought-things) 
 which are not real, and those which are not possible ; while the 
 other class are things which are either real or possible. Thus 
 to make two and two equal to five, is impossible. Does it then 
 imply any deficiency of power in God, that he cannot make 
 two and two equal to five? No more does it imply any 
 deficiency in power on his part, that he cannot prevent, in sup- 
 posable cases, beings who can sin, in despite of his power, i. e., 
 moral beings from sinning, under the best moral system. In 
 the nature of things, there may be an impossibility which in- 
 volves a contradiction. If such impossibilities limit the power 
 of God, or are inconsistent with his omnipotence, who can be- 
 lieve or assert his omnipotence? When it is said, that "with 
 God all things are possible," who can suppose that the all 
 things includes things which involve contradiction and im- 
 possibility in their very nature, and infer that God can make 
 two and two to be five, or the diameter of a circle to be equal 
 to its circumference, or can prevent beings in all cases from 
 sinning, who can sin, under every preventing influence from 
 him? 
 
 Is it then said, that God, as an omnipotent being, can pre- 
 vent all sin under one moral system as well as under another — 
 
CORRECT VIEWS OF OMNIPOTENCE. 323 
 
 as well without means as with ? Then I ask, why can lie not 
 secure any other result without means as well as with? — why 
 can he not secure the greatest good, without sin as the means 
 of it; and if he can, how is sin the necessary means of this 
 end ? If it is limiting the power of God to suppose that he 
 cannot accomplish his designs without means, then it is limit- 
 ing his power to assert that he cannot secure the greatest good 
 without sin as the 7neans. It is wholly unsupported by facts ; 
 for in what instance lias God ever prevented sin in a moral 
 being, without means ? It is absurd and self-contradictory. If 
 sin be prevented in moral beings, it must be prevented by their 
 acting, and acting morally right, in view of motives. Is it then 
 said, that God can prevent all sin in moral beings by any de- 
 gree of motives, and especially by that degree which is com- 
 prised in the best moral system ? But who knows, or can 
 prove this, who is authorized to assert it ? No one. The asser- 
 tion is wholly arbitrary, and he who makes it knows not 
 whether lie asserts truth or falsehood. That system of means 
 and measures, which is necessary to the greatest good which 
 God can secure, may be inconsistent with God's preventing all 
 moral evil under the system. According to this view, sin is 
 wholly an evil — evil in all its tendencies; and still God per- 
 mits and purposes its existence, rather than not adopt the best 
 moral system. As the husbandman does not sow good seed in 
 his field for the sake of the tares, i. e., because he prefers tares 
 to wheat ; but notwithstanding the tares, which he may foresee 
 will come in among the wheat, and for the sake of the good, 
 which will still far overbalance the evil; so God may have 
 adopted the present moral system, not for the sake of the sin, 
 or of any good of which it is the means, but notwithstanding 
 the evil, and for the sake of the overbalancing good, of which 
 the system is the necessary means. 
 
 After all, the great question, concerning the goodness and the 
 power of God, which results from the existence of moral evil 
 under his government, depends not so much on either of the 
 particular theories which have now been propounded, in prefer- 
 ence to the other, as on an assumption which is opposed to 
 both, viz., that God can prevent all moral evil under any moral 
 system whatever, by the direct and immediate interpositions 
 of mere power. It is this which is relied upon in common by 
 atheists, deists, universalists, and a large class of orthodox di- 
 
324 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 vines, in their reasonings on the subject. "We have seen how 
 this assumption, in connection with other premises, leads to 
 Atheism, Infidelity, and Universalism ; and also how utterly 
 feeble and insufficient is the defence of the orthodox against 
 these errors, while they admit its truth. So long as this as- 
 sumption is made and conceded — so long as it is admitted that 
 God, by the mere interpositions of his power, can prevent all 
 moral evil under any moral system whatever, the problem, 
 why does he not prevent it, will remain incapable of solution. 
 Kor can it be thought strange, that one class of minds, in view 
 of existing moral evil, should deny the existence of a being of 
 boundless goodness and power ; that another should deny, that 
 the book which asserts the endless sin and misery of multitudes 
 of our race is a revelation from a perfect God ; that another, 
 receiving the book as divine, should deny that it contains a 
 doctrine so plainly inconsistent with the character of its author. 
 That moral evil, with its manifold calamities and woes, exists, 
 cannot be denied ; and so long as it is admitted that a benevo- 
 lent God can, by the mere interpositions of his power, prevent 
 the evil under the best system, the conclusion, to a greater or 
 less extent, will be, either that there is no such being, or that 
 if there is, he will sooner or later terminate the evil, in the 
 universal holiness and happiness of his moral creation. The 
 monstrous absurdity, that sin is the necessary means of the 
 greatest good, will not be received by all as the only alterna- 
 tive except that of Atheism ; or if received as such by some, 
 still the undeniable truth that a benevolent God will do all the 
 good he can, will not be rejected by all for the sake of avoiding 
 Infidelity and Universalism. The error obviously lies in the 
 gratuitous and unauthorized assumption, that there can be no 
 impossibility of God's preventing moral evil under a moral 
 system, or at least under the best moral system, which impos- 
 sibility shall be as truly consistent with his omnipotence, as is 
 the impossibility of making two and two to be five, or a part 
 equal to the whole. When this truth, that there may be such 
 an impossibility, shall be seen and familiarized by the mind, as 
 presented by just views of moral agency and of a moral sys- 
 tem, then, and not till then, can the present system, notwith- 
 standing the existence of moral evil, be seen to stand forth as 
 an eternal monument of the wisdom, power and goodness of 
 its Author ; then, and not till then, will men learn to vindicate 
 
SIN UNDER THE BEST SYSTEM. 325 
 
 the ways of God to man, not by the far-fetched and unnatural 
 principles of a vain philosophy, but by the natural, obvious, 
 common-sense principle, by which they vindicate and applaud 
 the wisest and best of earthly rulers, when his laws are trans- 
 gressed — the principle, that notwithstanding the evil he has 
 done, he has done the best thing which he can do. 
 
LECTURE X. 
 
 Third leading proposition continued, viz. : God governs with rightful authority. — God 3s benevo- 
 lent. — 2. The present system not only viay be, but is the best possible to the Creator. — (a) It 
 is better than none. — Happiness greater than misery in this life.— Eesults in a future world. — 
 (l>) It is the best possible. — No proof that a better could be adopted. — The present, in its nature 
 and tendencies, is the best conceivable, and therefore the best possible. — This argued under 
 two heads; 1. From its general form as a moral system, in respect to the kind of beings and 
 the kind of influence used. — 2. From its particular forms as a moral system, as involving influ- 
 ences from the nature and tendencies of moral action, from moral government, from an equita- 
 ble moral government, and the same with a gracious economy. — Remark. 
 
 Ln t the two preceding lectures, I have attempted to show that 
 there is no proof against the benevolence of God, by showing 
 that the present system, with its results, may be not only better 
 than none, but may be the best possible to the Creator. 
 
 I now proceed, 
 
 To offer direct proofs of his benevolence. 
 
 Before I adduce the proposed proof, I will give an illustra- 
 tion of the argument on which I rely. A system under which 
 evil exists, may be shown by decisive evidence to be the best 
 possible system. It is obvious however, that this must be 
 shown in a somewhat different manner from what it would be 
 were there no evil connected with the system. To illustrate 
 then by an example : a physician may perform the best pos- 
 sible operation of which the case admits, in amputating the 
 limb of a patient, notwithstanding the pain which is insepa- 
 rable from it. If all that can be shown in the case is, that the 
 evils connected with the operation may be either inseparable 
 from the necessary means of the greatest good, or may be them- 
 selves the necessary means of the greatest good, then, although 
 the operation would .not prove the physician to be benevolent, 
 it would oblige us to admit that he may be benevolent, not- 
 withstanding these evils. The question, when judged of merely 
 by the facts now supposed, ought to remain undecided; or 
 rather, cannot be decided in the negative. To this point, our 
 preceding discussion respecting the question of the divine be- 
 nevolence, so far as it depends on the existence of evil, has 
 conducted us. 
 
INTRODUCTORY SUPPOSITIONS. 327 
 
 Let it now be supposed, that to amputate the diseased limb 
 is better than to do nothing, and that there is no evidence that 
 the physician has not done the best thing in his power, and 
 there is good reason to believe the benevolence of the physi- 
 cian in the act, This may be said to be the lowest ground on 
 which we are authorized to believe that he is benevolent. It 
 is however, sufficient for this belief. 
 
 We will now suppose a stronger case — that the amputation 
 of the limb is known to be the necessary means of the greatest 
 good, and that all the evils connected with it either may le 
 inseparable from it, so far as the power of the physician to 
 prevent them is concerned, or may he themselves the necessary 
 means of the greatest good. In such a case we have better 
 grounds for awarding to the physician a benevolent design in 
 the operation. 
 
 We will now suppose a case still stronger. Suppose not only 
 that the amputation of the limb is known to be the necessary 
 means of the greatest good, and that all the evils connected 
 with it, except those which are the necessary means of the 
 greatest good, are inseparable from the operation beyond the 
 power of the physician to prevent them ; that they result solely 
 from the voluntary intemperance of the patient himself, and 
 this when the physician does every thing in his power to 
 prevent them, and the only legitimate conclusion is, that he 
 is as benevolent as had this class of evils not existed. If we 
 still further suppose, in respect to the other class of evils, 
 viz., those which are the necessary means of the greatest good, 
 that they become thus necessary only by the perverseness of 
 the patient himself in his intemperance, then the conclusion 
 is, that the physician is as benevolent as had these evils not 
 existed, while these evils become themselves proof of his be- 
 nevolence. 
 
 On these suppositions, it is obvious that the benevolence of 
 the physician is as fully proved by the supposed operation, as 
 the using of the best means of the best end can prove him to 
 be, or as had results in good, without the slightest degree of 
 evil, followed in the case, If now we suppose once more, that 
 he combines with this operation every other expression of real 
 kindness, then more indisputable and decisive proofs of benev- 
 olence could not be furnished. By all these forms of proof, it 
 is now claimed that the benevolence of God is evinced to the 
 
328 MORAL GOVERNMENT PROM NATURE. 
 
 human mind by that system of things, with its results, which 
 he has adopted. 
 
 The argument as a whole, may be thus stated in a hypo- 
 thetical form, with the conclusion : 
 
 If there is no proof, so far as results are concerned, that God 
 could have adopted a better system than he has adopted — if 
 this system, in view of its results, is better than none — if this 
 system be the best possible to God, and so the necessary means 
 of the greatest good possible to him to secure — if all the evil 
 connected with the system is either inseparable from the best 
 system, in respect to divine prevention, or is the necessary 
 means of the greatest good possible to God ; and if God, in 
 addition to all this, actually shows kindness to his creatures, in 
 every other conceivable form which is consistent with the great- 
 est good possible to him — then it will follow, that 
 
 God is benevolent — even as benevolent as had the best pos- 
 sible, or best conceivable results, been actually secured. 
 
 Having attempted to show that the present system may ~bc 
 not only better than none, but the best possible, I now proceed 
 to show as I proposed : 
 
 2. That it is not only better than none, but is the best pos- 
 sible to the Creator. 
 
 (1.) The present system is better than none. This I propose 
 to show : 
 
 First. From the comparative amount of happiness and misery 
 in the present world. 
 
 Secondly. From the results of the present system in a future 
 world. 
 
 I appeal — 
 
 First ; to the comparative amount of happiness and misery 
 in the present world. 
 
 We claim then, that the amount of happiness so far tran- 
 scends the amount of misery, as to put an end to all doubt on 
 the question, whether the present system with its results is not 
 far better than none. To contemplate the actual experience of 
 men, and to institute such inquiries as the following, must de- 
 cide this question. Where is the individual to be found who 
 does not at every moment of life enjoy so much in present pos- 
 session, or in hope of future good, as to render his existence de- 
 sirable? How few— how very few are the instances of calamity 
 and suffering with which manifold and rich blessings are not 
 
AMOUNT OF HAPPINESS. 329 
 
 combined — how few individuals within our own knowledge, 
 who are not enjoying every useful and necessary gift of divine 
 bounty, and prepared and qualified to enjoy any additional 
 happiness that might be furnished ! Who is not ready to wel- 
 come the knowledge or information that gratifies curiosity — 
 to be entertained with the humor of the wit, or the ingenuity 
 of the artist? What an amount of all that can be called hu- 
 man misery, is chiefly imaginary; and how may that which is 
 real be diminished by contentment, by submission, or by resort- 
 ing to available sources of happiness. Even when war, famine 
 and pestilence pour in their floods of suffering and distress, how 
 large a portion of the wide earth, untouched by their desola- 
 tions, exhibits scenes of joy and gladness, while the sufferers 
 themselves cling to life through the remembrance of joys that 
 are past, or the hope of those that may come ! In short, when 
 we look over the world and see all its millions with exceptions 
 which scarcely are to be thought of, retiring to rest every 
 night, with the quiet and assured anticipation of the supply of 
 the essential wants of to-morrow, and reflect that this is founded 
 only on the uniform experience of the past, how can we fail to 
 pronounce this a happy world — one at least in which existence 
 is far better than non-existence ? If we turn our thoughts to 
 the innumerable sources of enjoyment in the animal, rational 
 and moral departments of creation — if we contemplate the in- 
 visible existence that peoples every leaf, the sportive mazes of 
 the insect tribes that abound in the atmosphere and the waters 
 — the notes of joy which are heard from every grove, the de- 
 lighted activity of the larger animals, the wonderful provision 
 made for their supply of food, the obvious and nice adapta- 
 tions in their nature and condition for their comfortable or 
 joyous existence; if we consider man's capacity for enjoyment 
 from the wide creation around him, through the organs of 
 sense, and the amount of good which would in this way be fur- 
 nished, were the means of it never perverted ; if we think of 
 the numerous channels of higher pleasures which are opened 
 to man in his intellectual and social nature, and reflect how 
 these are supplied by the everflowing streams of divine bounty 
 in all the tender relations of life ; and then reflect on the anni- 
 hilation of all these earthly joys in the utter darkness and deso- 
 lation of non-existence, how can we either wish not to have been 
 or to cease to be ? 
 
330 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 If we contemplate men as moral beings, how are the vicious 
 and guilty even exempted by divine compassion from the 
 overwhelming agonies of remorse ! — how are the virtuous 
 solaced and gladdened as with the peace of heaven! !Nor 
 ought we to overlook the capacity of happiness involved in 
 the very nature of moral beings ; what a condition of per- 
 fection and of bliss it places within their power, and one 
 not to be despaired of, but rather to be hoped for and ex- 
 pected by the well-founded belief of the enrapturing truth, 
 that God is, " and is the rewarder of them that diligently seek 
 him." 
 
 If now we take the most gloomy view of human existence, 
 so far as it can bear on the present inquiry, we can at most 
 find but here and there an individual bosom so desolate of all 
 good, so oppressed with present griefs and gloomy forebodings, 
 as to consent to plunge into the dark gulf of non-existence, 
 w T hile myriads are exulting in life and its joys. How would 
 these myriads, instead of counting their existence undesirable, 
 prefer its endless duration as it is, rather than hazard a dimi- 
 nution of their happiness by any essential and yet uncertain 
 change in their condition? Supposing the prospect of im- 
 provement to be fair and promising, very few with the uncer- 
 tainty remaining whether the change would not be for the 
 worse instead of for the better, would rationally in their own 
 view incur its risk. This shows how we value life, being so 
 well satisfied with its blessings, that to hazard the uncertain- 
 ties of a change in our condition of existence, would be deemed 
 the height of folly. It shows how readily, were the alternative 
 a great diminution of happiness or non-existence, we should 
 prefer the former, and how appalling would be the prospect of 
 ceasing to be, compared with our present existence and the 
 abundance of its joys. Every thing in human society, in the de- 
 vices of man, the laws made to protect human life, the remedies 
 used to heal diseases, the safeguards from accident and danger, 
 the provision of food and raiment, in short, every preservative 
 of life, shows that its loss is esteemed the greatest to which man 
 in this world is liable. To preserve life is the great end to 
 which human solicitude has ever been directed, and for which 
 human ingenuity and skill have been exhausted. Nor can 
 there be a doubt that it would still be so, were death known to 
 be an eternal sleep — at least to such an extent, as to show how 
 
AMOUNT OF HAPPINESS. 331 
 
 • 
 
 highly man values tlie existence wliicli his Creator gives him in 
 the present world. 
 
 Should it here be said, that I have now taken but a partial 
 view of the results of the present system — that, although it be 
 true that our earthly existence merely, is greatly to be preferred 
 to non-existence, yet there is a future state, and a majority of 
 men actually leave this world with that character, which in- 
 sures their future unmingled and endless misery — I answer as 
 before, that if we suppose a majority of men to die in sin, the 
 light of nature does not decide that the present life is the whole 
 of man's probation; and that therefore it may he true, that the 
 design of God to recover men to virtue and to happiness, so 
 conspicuously manifested here, will secure the perfect happi- 
 ness of far the greater part of mankind hereafter. Indeed, this 
 cannot, from the light of nature, be shown to be in the lowest 
 degree improbable. Here then I might form a conclusive 
 argument for the divine benevolence, thus : as there is no evi- 
 dence that God is not doing all the good in his power, or that 
 he could adopt a better system than the present ; and as the 
 present system, in view of its results in the present world, is 
 better than none, it follows that God is benevolent. 
 
 But not to rest the argument on this ground merely, I re- 
 mark secondly, that the present system, in view of its results 
 in a future world, is better than none. Here it may be asked, 
 with some degree of incredulity, what can we know, or ration- 
 ally believe, under the mere light of nature, respecting the allot- 
 ments of men in a future state ? I answer, we can know all that 
 which legitimate evidence warrants us to believe ; and the decla- 
 rations of God on this subject are not the only kind of evidence 
 of which the case admits. His doings may as truly indicate 
 his designs, and tell us what will be their results, as his decla- 
 rations. 
 
 Here then I appeal to what has already been shown respect- 
 ing the present system. I shall however but briefly appeal to 
 these facts, intending more particularly to consider them in a 
 subsequent argument, to show that the present system is the 
 best possible to the Creator. The same facts show that the 
 present system is better than none, as they evince the designs 
 of God toward men in a future state. 
 
 The facts to which I refer are briefly these : the creation of 
 the most perfect beings in kind ; the end of their creation, as 
 
332 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 « 
 
 indicated by their nature, which is the best conceivable ; the 
 actual giving of the best law, or rule of action ; the adminis- 
 tration of a moral government involving this perfect law, and 
 a strict adherence to the principles of perfect equity, and not 
 only this, but connected with it, an economy of grace; every 
 thing in the condition and circumstances of man fitted to re- 
 store him to virtue and haj)piness, and to secure him in this 
 state of perfection; while no change is conceivable, which 
 would add perfection to the system as the means of this high 
 end. What then can we — ought we to believe, will be the 
 results of such a system in a future world % Will this high 
 design of a Being of infinite wisdom and power be wholly de- 
 feated % Will our present state, so bright with the smiles of 
 his mercy, be followed by one only dark and dreadful, under 
 the frowns of his anger ? When God is so clearly aiming to 
 restore man to holiness and happiness, is there nothing to hope 
 for but universal sin and exact retribution ? True it is, that 
 from the light of nature alone, we cannot in all respects give a 
 definite answer to the present inquiry. But we are constrained 
 to give one that is general, and altogether decisive on the point 
 before us. The nature of the present system, so clearly and 
 extensively benignant in its design, proves that this design will 
 not be wholly abortive, but in some good degree accomplished. 
 This system, begun by infinite wisdom and power, and carried 
 onward through all the generations of men, clearly indicates 
 results in a future state corresponding with its own benignity 
 and grace. To hesitate or doubt on this point, especially in 
 view of the infinite natural perfection of the Being whose de- 
 sign it is, is to do violence to the laws of belief, as well as to 
 disregard and distrust the only possible proofs of the divine 
 placability. 
 
 In view then of what we must suppose will be the actual 
 results of the present system in a future world, we must also 
 believe that the present system, viewed in relation to these 
 results, is better — far better than none, and the best possible to 
 the Creator. 
 
 The way is now prepared to offer direct proofs of the benev- 
 olence of God from his works. 
 
 Argument I. The first argument is, that there is no proof, so 
 far as results are concerned, that God could have adopted a 
 better system than the present, and there is proof that the present 
 
THE TWO ARGUMENTS. 333 
 
 system is better than none. That there is no proof so far as re- 
 sults are concerned, that GqcI could have adopted a better system 
 than the present, I have already attempted to prove, by showing 
 that it may be such a system notwithstanding the existence 
 of natural and moral evil. If what has been said on this sub- 
 ject be true, then their existence is to be wholly laid aside 
 as entitled to no consideration in the argument. We have 
 shown that all existing evils may be either the necessary 
 means of the greatest good possible to the Creator, or in re- 
 spect to divine prevention may be incidental to the best sys- 
 tem possible to the Creator. Of course if there be other facts, 
 which, were there no existing evil, would be sufficient to prove 
 his benevolence, then as the existing evil furnishes no proof 
 that he is not benevolent, or that the present system is not the 
 best possible to the Creator, this evil must, in a fair argument, 
 be laid out of consideration. The present system may be, not- 
 withstanding the existence of the evil, the best possible to the 
 Creator. 
 
 Again; it has been shown that the present system is bet- 
 ter than none. And if this is true, and there is no evidence 
 that God could have adopted a better system than the present, 
 then it follows that the present system is the best possible to 
 the Creator, and that he is therefore benevolent. 
 
 It may be well to remark here, that the argument, according 
 to the illustration of it before given, is cumulative. "When we 
 have established the two premises of the foregoing argument, 
 we have furnished a valid proof of the divine benevolence, and 
 therefore in each of our remaining positions we shall increase 
 the proof. 
 
 I now offer a second general argument : 
 
 Argument II. The present system in its nature and tenden- 
 cies is the best conceivable, and therefore the best possible to 
 the Creator. 
 
 I have said that the proof of the divine benevolence is cumu- 
 lative. What I claim for it in this respect is, that when as in 
 our first argument, it is shown that in view of the results of the 
 present system, it is the best possible to the Creator, then if in 
 view of the nature and tendencies of the system, it be shown 
 that it is the best conceivable, we have still further proof 
 that it is the best possible to the Creator, and so much addi- 
 tional proof of his benevolence. The nature and tendencies of 
 
334: MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 the system, if they can be shown to be the best conceivable, 
 now become in view of the perfection of the system as judged 
 by its results, so much uncounteracted and independent proof 
 of the highest possible perfection of the system ; proof as de- 
 cisive and complete as were the system actually followed 
 by the highest conceivable good which it is fitted to produce. 
 Nor is this all. But when, as we have shown, not only 
 there is not the least counteracting evidence from any other 
 source, but the present system, judged of by its results, is 
 the best possible to the Creator ; then each and every adapta- 
 tion, fitness, tendency of the system to the production of the 
 highest conceivable good, is so much additional proof that the 
 Author of the system designed the highest conceivable good ; 
 and is therefore so much additional proof of his benevolence 
 in adopting the system. In this mode of reasoning then,I now 
 proceed to show that the present system is the best possible to 
 the Creator, by proving that in its nature and tendencies it is 
 the best conceivable system. 
 This I shall attempt to show : 
 
 1. From its general form as a moral system ; and 
 
 2. From its more particular forms as such a system. 
 
 That the present system then is the best conceivable, and 
 therefore the best possible to the Creator, I argue — 
 
 1. From its general form as a moral system. As a moral 
 system in distinction from any system not moral, it is in hind 
 the best conceivable. It is so, if we consider the kind of beings 
 and the kind of influence which it involves. 
 
 And first in respect to the kind of beings. These are of course 
 moral beings ; and as such are formed in the image of God 
 himself. No other work of the Creator could so employ his wis- 
 dom and his power — no other creatures could be so exalted in 
 the scale of existence — no other product could so manifest the 
 infinitude of his natural attributes. On no other could he look 
 with so much self-complacency. "There is," said Augustine, 
 "but one object greater than the soul, and that object is its 
 Creator." Had God then not adopted a system of creation 
 including moral beings, the highest place in the scale of 
 created being had been vacant, and without them the inter- 
 val between mere animal existence and God himself, had been 
 unoccupied. 
 
 What then had been a system of creatures, endowed only 
 
THE HIGHEST KIND OF BEINGS. 635 
 
 with animal sensation, compared with a system of beings capable 
 of holy affections and holy activity, and each and all capable 
 of possessing perfect, even the highest degree of happiness 
 conceivable? If God were good, what else could he do but 
 create mind — beings in his own image, with intelligence to 
 know himself, his character, his will, his designs, his works ; 
 with hearts to burn with love, with wills to obey his perfect will 
 — with conscience to feel the high deservings of right and wrong 
 moral action, and to sway all the powers of the soul in the 
 harmony of perfect virtue; beings with sympathies and social 
 tendencies, capable of living in the past, the present, and the 
 future — capable of entering into fellowship with God, and of 
 awakening his confidence and his complacency as the executors 
 of his high counsels ; beings so powerful in intellect, as to be able 
 to look with open face on the full effulgence of his Godhead, 
 so capacious of heart as to receive the fullness of joy at his 
 right hand, and who thus filled with all the fullness of God, 
 might stand around his throne as mirrors of his own creation, to 
 reflect the light of his glory forever ? For such a creation what 
 shall be substituted ? The present system then, in respect to 
 the kind of beings which it includes, is the best conceivable, 
 and in this respect, there being no counteracting evidence, fur- 
 nishes another independent and decisive proof of the Creator's 
 goodness. 
 
 The same thing is true of the present system, as it employs a 
 moral influence. After what has been already said, I may as- 
 sume the position as incontrovertible, that the universal and 
 perfect holiness of a moral creation is necessary to the highest 
 conceivable happiness of such a creation. It is equally unde- 
 niable, that the kind of influence which is peculiar to a moral 
 system, is indispensable to the production of holiness in the 
 least degree in moral beings. It is of course necessary to the 
 highest degree of holiness, and therefore to the highest degree 
 of happiness. 
 
 In this view of this kind of influence, and of the system 
 which includes it, the system has all the value which would 
 pertain to a moral creation made perfectly blessed by perfect 
 moral excellence. And who can estimate the worth of an in- 
 fluence which is indispensable to such a result ? Who will 
 attempt to conceive of any other as its substitute? ISor is this 
 its only feature. There is a high and ennobling pleasure in 
 
336 MORAL GOVERNMENT PROM NATURE. 
 
 using this influence, nor scarcely less in feeling it. To uphold 
 and move the material universe in all its regularity and beauty, 
 to give form, and life, and activity to the whole intelligent crea- 
 tion — to pervade, sustain, and animate all as the handywork of 
 Omnipotence, is a source of high delight to the infinite Author 
 of all. But to influence mind — to be the author of that system 
 of truth, of evidence, of motive, which is adapted to control 
 and direct intelligent, free, moral beings, and to secure the 
 high end of their existence — fitted to accomplish such a result 
 in beings with powers adequate to defeat it — to bring forth an 
 influence which shall give absolute perfection to a moral uni- 
 verse for eternity, without in the least infringing on the noble 
 prerogative of their freedom, imposes a new demand on omnip- 
 otence, and imparts a grandeur and glory to God's dominion, 
 which excludes from thought every other. 
 
 At the same time, to be the subject of such influence — to 
 live under that system, and those manifestations of truth, which 
 are thus adapted to move moral beings, and to secure such re- 
 sults — a system which has tasked the wisdom and the power 
 of the infinite Being, and whose results can fail only through 
 the perverseness of creatures, when in respect to the kind of 
 influence God could do no more; to have such interests placed 
 within one's own power — committed to choice, enlightened and 
 guided by intelligence to comprehend them — to be able to se- 
 cure the result designed by an act of will, and if secured, to 
 say, " I have done it, when I could have done the opposite" — 
 to live under a system, where the alternative is the self-perfec- 
 tion or self-destruction of an immortal being — this is to occupy 
 a place of exaltation and dignity, which none can transcend or 
 equal. If such a being rises, what a height of glory ! If he 
 falls, what ruin! The alternative is indeed tremendous, but is 
 demanded by the essential perfection of the system, and its 
 foreseen and glorious results. Every tendency justly estimated 
 is adapted to a successful and triumphant issue. The influence 
 from the doom foreseen is only salutary. It can be incurred 
 only by voluntary perversion and fault ; it can come only by 
 the great law of choice between life and death, without which 
 a more dreadful ruin must come to all — without which the in- 
 finite Being himself must sacrifice his perfect character, and 
 with this his perfect blessedness. 
 
 Such then is the influence which is involved in the present, 
 
THE HIGHEST KIND OF INFLUENCE. 337 
 
 as a moral system. How degrading to creatures, liow unwor- 
 thy of a perfect God, were any other in its stead ! How re- 
 pulsive, how revolting a system of coercion — or rather, what 
 degrading absurdity in the thought of controlling moral beings 
 by physical agency, or by the mechanism of cause and effect ! 
 The mind, created in God's image, must be governed, if at all, 
 by the influence which moves him in all his doings — even by 
 that truth which fixes and reveals the eternal relations of 
 things, and gives the soul its life in perfect holiness and perfect 
 bliss. Without this influence of the system, what will become 
 of its issues, in all the self-complacency, free, voluntary, joy- 
 ous activity, and eternal triumphs, of which perfected moral 
 beings are capable? On this influence in distinction from 
 every other, these results all depend. Its tendency is to pro- 
 duce such, and only such — even the highest conceivable good 
 of the best conceivable system of creatures. This tendency of 
 this influence in a system which is better than none, and which, 
 for aught that can be shown to the contrary, is the best possi- 
 ble to the Creator, is as conspicuous, and as obviously designed 
 by its Author to secure its benign and blessed results, as were 
 they actually secured. The present system then, as it involves 
 a moral influence in distinction from any other, is the best 
 conceivable, and in this respect furnishes another independent 
 and decisive proof of God's benevolence. 
 
 That the present system is the best conceivable, and there- 
 fore the best possible to the Creator, I argue — 
 
 2. From its more particular forms as a moral system. Here 
 I appeal to it as comprising four particular forms of a moral 
 system : that influence to secure perfection in character and in 
 happiness, which results from the perceived nature and tenden- 
 cies of moral action ; the influence of a moral government ; that 
 of an equitable moral government ; and that of an equitable 
 moral government under a gracious economy. 
 
 In the first place, the present system comprises that influence 
 to secure perfection in character and in happiness, which results 
 from the perceived nature and tendencies of moral action. 
 These are plainly and impressively manifested in the constitu- 
 tion and condition of the human mind. I need not here repeat 
 the facts on this part of the subject, which have been so re- 
 cently presented. In view of them, I may ask, what more in 
 this respect could God have done? The answer is, nothing — 
 Vol. I.— 15. 22 " 
 
338 MORAL GOYERNMEXT FROM NATURE. 
 
 which for aught that appears to the contrary, would not have 
 been for the worse. If we contemplate the knowledge of truth 
 which is thus given to every mind, in its source, its nature, its 
 power, can any thing be conceived in this respect to heighten 
 the excellence of the system? It is knowledge of the fixed 
 and immutable relations of right and wrong, given in the very 
 nature and elements of our being; knowledge of good and 
 evil in their highest conceivable degrees, and of the only means 
 of obtaining the one and avoiding the other ; knowledge of all 
 that man need to know as a being made for immortality, that 
 he may secure his perfection in character and in happiness ; 
 knowledge, which is pressed upon thought and susceptibility 
 in experience, and as it were every moment ; knowledge, which 
 can be practically resisted and counteracted only by the most 
 desperate violence and infatuation of which moral beings are 
 capable ; knowledge which even when thus resisted puts its 
 firm grasp on the conscience and holds it there: still opens the 
 bright visions of hope in the self-complacency of virtue, and re- 
 veals the terrors of self-condemnation in the remorse of guilt, 
 and thus distinctly and at every step of life is telling man of a 
 retribution in that heaven or hell which he carries in his own 
 bosom ; knowledge therefore which is fitted so far as knowl- 
 edge from these sources can be, to secure in the best manner 
 and in the highest degree, man's perfection in character and in 
 happiness. 
 
 This tendency of this knowledge is as manifest as were the 
 result actually secured. It is furnished in a system which is not 
 only better than none, but which for aught that can be shown 
 to the contrary, is the best possible to the Creator. It is there- 
 fore as obviously designed by the author of the system to se- 
 cure the result which it is fitted to produce, as were that result 
 actually secured. The present system then, as it comprises 
 that influence from the perceived nature and tendencies of 
 moral action, which is fitted to promote the highest blessed- 
 ness of God's moral creation, furnishes another proof of the 
 highest conceivable perfection of the system and of the benev- 
 olence of its author. 
 
 In the second place, the present system comprises a moral 
 government. Moral government in the lowest import of the 
 terms, includes a moral governor, a rule of action as the ex- 
 pression of his will — good promised to obedience and evil 
 
PARTICULAR FORMS OF INFLUENCE. 330 
 
 threatened to disobedience. These things, though they do not 
 necessarily include the equitable administration of a moral 
 government, are essential to what can be properly called a 
 moral government. Without now insisting on the equity of 
 God's moral administration over men, still he is administering 
 a moral government over them, and such a moral government 
 as is consistent with the system's being the best possible, and 
 also better than none. In this view of a moral government, I 
 claim that it is an excellence which is essential to the perfec- 
 tion of the system. Let then the present system without, 
 be compared with one which includes a moral government, 
 and be contemplated in relation to the great end of a moral 
 system. What would it be, when compared with one which 
 exhibits the infinite Creator of men, as also their sovereign 
 Lawgiver and Judge? In this relation that great Being is 
 presented to the mind as taking a deeper, stronger interest in 
 the moral conduct of his moral creatures as the means of their 
 perfection and happiness, than in any and every thing besides. 
 In this relation he makes a clear expression of his preference 
 of right to wrong moral action on the part of every subject, 
 and shows them that their highest interests can be secured 
 only by obedience to his will. With their happiness and mis- 
 ery at his disposal, he authorizes only the expectation on their 
 part that all depends on their conduct. Whatever conviction 
 of duty then we may suppose men to derive from any other 
 source — what additional strength and power must be given 
 to that conviction by the clear and decisive promulgation of 
 the will of God in exact accordance with it! How feeble 
 and fluctuating — how evanescent, easily forgotten and disre- 
 garded the conviction derived from one source only, com- 
 pared with the same derived from both ; how must the con- 
 viction of duty first obtained from our nature and condition 
 and the tendencies of moral action, be impressed by its known 
 coincidence with the will, the law of Him who holds all 
 destiny in his hands ! While our very being reveals the ab- 
 solute and unalterable law, that if we would be happy and 
 not miserable we must be good, the execution of this law is 
 made known in the immutable will and resistless power of an 
 infinite being. But if we suppose no moral government over 
 this world, then no evidence can be found of a retribution for the 
 right and wrong doing of men. The distribution of good and 
 
340 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 evil in this world is not in the lowest sense retributive. Aside 
 from God's relation as a moral governor of men, legal sanc- 
 tions — good and evil awarded to sustain authority — a Judge to 
 approve and condemn, to reward and to punish are not to be 
 thought of. But with a moral governor in view, and he no 
 other than the infinite Creator of all, holding the allotment in 
 the happiness and misery of every creature in his power, and 
 giving a full indication of his purpose to make them in a high 
 degree happy or miserable as they obey or disobey his will, 
 what other influence can be substituted for this, in a system 
 which is better than none, and which for aught that can be 
 shown to the contrary, is the best possible? It is an influence 
 which can be viewed in such a case as tending only to good, 
 and to good in the highest conceivable degree. The present 
 system therefore, as it comprises a moral government on the 
 part of God, has another excellence which is essential to its 
 highest conceivable perfection, and in this respect furnishes 
 another independent and decisive proof of the benevolence of 
 its author. 
 
 In the third place, the present system includes cm equitable 
 moral government. There is a sense in which the equity of a 
 moral administration or of a moral government may imply the 
 benevolence of the moral governor. I use this language how- 
 ever as I have before said, merely to characterize what may be 
 called his providential dispensations as being in accordance 
 with the principles of equity, whether we suppose him to be a 
 benevolent or a selfish being. In other words, by the equity 
 of God's moral administration over this world — I mean that his 
 providential dispensations are what they would be on the sup- 
 position of his perfect benevolence, without assuming that such 
 is his character. In this sense the equity of his administration 
 whether he be a benevolent or a selfish being, consists in his 
 giving the best law or rule of action, and in annexing to this 
 law those sanctions in good and evil which express his highest 
 approbation of right and highest disapprobation of wrong moral 
 action, and which are requisite as such expressions to sustain 
 his authority. 
 
 I claim to have shown already, that God is administering in 
 the sense now stated, an equitable moral government over 
 men,*and that without so doing it would be impossible that he 
 should show himself to be entitled to the least respect as a 
 
GOD'S EQUITY PROVES BENEVOLENCE. 341 
 
 moral governor. The impossibility of this on the supposition 
 of his not giving the best law, will not be denied. So if we 
 suppose him to annex to the best law, less degrees of natural 
 good and evil than the highest as the sanctions of his law, it 
 would show that he approves of right moral action less than 
 supremely, and disapproves of wrong moral action less than 
 supremely. Such a manifestation of feeling toward these ob- 
 jects would be decisive; that he does not regard things as they 
 are ; that he does not act on the principle of eternal rectitude — 
 that of regarding the best kind of action as the best, and the 
 worst kind of action as the worst ; that instead of showing him- 
 self disposed to sustain his authority, and to employ this influ- 
 ence for the welfare of his kingdom, he acts on principles of 
 partiality, favoritism, injustice, tyranny; that he is therefore a 
 selfish and malignant being, and in no respect entitled to the 
 homage of his subjects, or to the throne he occupies. 
 
 But in the present system, instead of thus subverting his 
 authority as a moral governor by disproving his benevolence, 
 God, as we have seen, adheres to strict equity in his moral 
 administration. lie gives the best law or rule of action, and 
 by the requisite legal sanctions, expresses the highest approba- 
 tion of right, and the highest disapprobation of wrong moral 
 action. lie does the very things in these essential respects 
 which he would do were he a being of perfect benevolence ; 
 the very things, without which he cannot prove his benevolence 
 and sustain his authority as a moral governor. For what other 
 higher or better influence can be substituted for this, for the 
 purpose of securing the greatest amount of right moral action, 
 and thus the greatest amount of happiness, in a moral creation ? 
 Could any higher or better influence for the purpose be derived 
 from natural good and evil, considered as merely so much mo- 
 tive employed to secure right and prevent wrong moral action ? 
 Could it result from giving any other law than the best — from 
 expressing in the form of law any other preference than of the 
 best kind of action ? Could any higher or better influence for 
 the same purpose result from legal sanctions, considered as the 
 expressions of any other particular feelings or emotions toward 
 right and wrong moral action, than those of the highest appro- 
 bation of the one and the highest disapprobation of the other ? 
 In these respects plainly, no other influence conceivable can 
 possess the same salutary tendency. In this way only can he 
 
34:2 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 manifest those attributes of a perfect moral governor, which, we 
 call his holiness^ justice ; — holiness in all its love and compla- 
 cency toward moral excellence, and in that inaccessible purity 
 which recoils from, and in that withering abhorrence which 
 forbids the approach of the least moral defilement ; — -justice in 
 that serene and awful majesty of its inflexible purpose to sweep 
 a rebellious world into the abyss of ruin, rather than suifer the 
 least obscurity or infringement of his right to reign. Under 
 no other manifestation of God, could obedience to his will be 
 rendered as the will of a perfect being. There might indeed, 
 be a moral system, and moral influences, and if you please, a 
 moral government ; but there could be no moral government 
 in the hands of a perfect being ; none in that distinctive char- 
 acter which results from the absolute prerogative of rightful 
 dominion. Unless Ave see God through the medium of an 
 equitable administration, we cannot see him as immutably holy 
 and just, and can therefore never confide, love, and obey. In 
 a word, it is only through an equitable moral administration, 
 that God as a moral governor, can manifest his perfect char- 
 acter. 
 
 Now I do not say, that such an administration necessarily 
 excludes all opposing evidence on the question of his moral 
 character; but that when it exists, as it does in the present 
 case without the least opposing evidence — when it exists as an 
 element of a system, which, in view of its results, is, so far as 
 we have seen, the best possible to the Creator, it can be viewed 
 only as an essential element of the perfection of the system, 
 and as such, another and decisive proof of its perfection and of 
 the benevolence of its Author. In such a case, what other 
 view can be taken of his giving his perfect law — perfect in its 
 precept, and perfect in its sanctions — except that of the most 
 unequivocal and decisive expression of his supreme and benev- 
 olent preference of right moral action, and as its consequence, 
 the highest possible happiness of his moral creation ? "What 
 can be the design of making such an expression of these feel- 
 ings, in this most impressive form conceivable, except that by 
 so doing he may secure this result ? Were this actually accom- 
 plished by this means, who then could doubt its adaptation to 
 the end, and the benevolent design of its Author ? But its 
 tendency to this result is a matter of absolute knowledge, and 
 would be no more obvious than it now is were the result actu- 
 
AN ECONOMY OF GRACE. 343 
 
 ally produced. And now, when the design of its Author to 
 secure this result, instead of being obscured by the slightest 
 shade of evidence to the contrary, is confirmed by the manifes- 
 tation of his benevolence in every other form, this design is as 
 conspicuous and undeniable as is the tendency to this result 
 of the same element of the system. Neither can be denied or 
 doubted. The design of God in administering an equitable 
 moral government over men, in order that the end should be 
 produced, for which it is perfectly adapted, stands forth as con- 
 spicuous as were that end actually accomplished in the highest 
 conceivable happiness of his moral creation. In view then of 
 the equity of God's moral administration, we say that it is one 
 element of the best possible system, which is not only an indis- 
 pensable, but an independent and decisive proof of equity in 
 principle ; thus revealing on the throne of moral dominion, a 
 God of perfect holiness and perfect justice, and of course, a God 
 of perfect benevolence. 
 
 In the fourth place, the present system is the best conceiva- 
 ble, as it includes an equitable moral government under an 
 economy of grace. That God is administering such a govern- 
 ment over men, I persuade myself has been shown in former 
 lectures. We have seen that the manner in which he distrib- 
 utes good and evil in this world entirely harmonizes with an 
 economy of grace ; that while there is nothing in the whole 
 history of his providence inconsistent with the strict principles 
 of equity in his administration, there are still decisive intima- 
 tions that he has not abandoned these principles — that every 
 thing in the manner in which he treats this world of transgres- 
 sors, clearly and impressively bespeaks his will that they should 
 return to duty and to happiness, rather than continue in sin, 
 and die forever. "We see him furnishing to all the most deci- 
 sive proofs that their highest happiness can be found only in 
 obedience to his Will — drawing them to repentance by the most 
 powerful influence, that of manifested kindness; by those "cords 
 of love and bands of a man," which it would seem no perver- 
 sity of heart could resist ; dispensing natural evil, under the 
 kindest forms of necessary moral discipline or paternal chastise- 
 ment, with the obvious design to reclaim and bless his disobe- 
 dient children — making the present state of man most obviously 
 one of trial and of discipline, and as such, designed and fitted 
 to form his character to permanent virtue and happiness — 
 
344 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 placing man's present enjoyment so far and so clearly in Ms 
 own power, as to show beyond the possibility of doubt, that a 
 universal and perfect moral reformation would transform the 
 world, darkened and afflicted as it is by sin and its woes, into 
 a primeval paradise ; thus in every conceivable form and mode 
 of dispensation, clearly evincing his power to sustain such a 
 system of justice and of grace — forbidding a surmise either of 
 malignant intention, or of weak and indulgent connivance at 
 iniquity, and so rendering every other supposition inadmissible, 
 except, that while he sustains the principles of eternal righteous- 
 ness inviolate, he is, in the fullness of love and mercy, aiming 
 to restore a lost world to duty, to favor, and to happiness. 
 Thus does the great Creator present himself to his guilty moral 
 creation, a just god, and yet a saviour. 
 
 Here then we see the crowning excellence of the present 
 system. I shall not attempt to specify in detail those parts of 
 God's providence which are eminently fitted to extend and 
 heighten our admiration of this system of justice and of grace. 
 To sustain the principles of eternal righteousness unsullied and 
 unobscured, and show himself placable to the guilty, and even 
 solicitous to reclaim and bless — to uphold in all their stability 
 the pillars of his throne, and yet give it the attractions of a 
 throne of grace — this is a system which combines with every 
 other conceivable excellence, the highest, brightest of them all, 
 that of an economy of grace. The present system then, in an- 
 other respect, i. e., as including an economy of grace, is the 
 best conceivable. 
 
 The argument for God's benevolence, as thus furnished by 
 the light of nature, may be thus presented. The present sys- 
 tem with its results, is better than none; notwithstanding the 
 evil which exists, the system may be the best possible to the 
 Creator ; while in its adaptations and tendencies to good, it is 
 in every respect the best conceivable. God therefore is benev- 
 olent, Were a physician to perform an operation on a patient, 
 which were better than to do nothing, and though connected 
 with some pain, might still be the best possible, and in respect 
 to all its tendencies, were it ascertained to be the best conceiva- 
 ble operation, who would doubt his benevolence. 
 
 Were it however my principal object here to prove the be- 
 nevolence of God, I might proceed greatly to increase the force 
 of the present argument. For having once shown, on the 
 
OTHER PROOFS OF BENEVOLENCE. 345 
 
 premises now presented, that God is benevolent, it were per- 
 fectly legitimate to infer not merely that all existent evil may 
 he consistent, but that it is consistent with his benevolence, 
 either as the necessary means of the greatest good, or as in- 
 cidental in respect to his prevention, to that system which is 
 the necessary means of the greatest good. 
 
 In respect to natural evil, viewed as it must be, as the nec- 
 essary means of the greatest good, instead of furnishing an 
 objection to his benevolence, it becomes an additional proof of 
 it. As to moral evil, viewed as it must now be : viz., as inci- 
 dental in respect to divine prevention to a system in which 
 God has done all that was possible to prevent it, and to secure 
 universal holiness in its stead, it leaves the benignity of his 
 design unobscured ; and we are obliged to say, there is all the 
 proof of God's benevolence, which there would have been, had 
 the universal and perfect holiness and happiness of his moral 
 creation been the actual result. 
 
 Having arrived at this point, I might bring forward, as still 
 further proofs, furnished in the fact that he shows kindness to 
 his creatures in every conceivable form which is consistent 
 with their greatest good ; and this, not in respect to its salutary 
 tendencies and relations, in view of which it has given so much 
 force to our preceding arguments, but under two very different 
 relations: viz., as so much good or enjoyment merely, and as 
 such, all that in degree, which is consistent with the highest 
 good of the recipients ; and also, as so much good conferred on 
 sinful, ill-deserving creatures, whom, as a benevolent and just 
 God, he might have utterly destroyed. To all this good, we 
 must add the grand and glorious results of that system of 
 grace and mercy in future and eternal happiness, as conferred 
 on guilty beings whose endless destruction had been alike con- 
 sistent with justice and benevolence. 
 
 Here let us then advert, first, to what had been the proofs 
 of God's benevolence, had perfect holiness and happiness actu- 
 ally resulted to his moral creation. Wc have this proof at hand, 
 for we have proved that he most truly and sincerely designed 
 this result. Let us now advert again to what would have 
 been the condition of this world of transgressors, had God, as 
 he might, displayed his benevolence and been just, instead of 
 displaying his benevolence in pardoning grace. Let the fear- 
 ful results of exact retribution in the woes of the second death, 
 
 15* 
 
346 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 be compared with the riches of his long-suffering, and the ever- 
 flowing streams of his providential bounty in this world, and 
 with (as our previous argument authorizes us to expect in the 
 world to come) the eternal blessedness of a multitude which no 
 man can number, of pure, holy, and happy spirits, so vast, so 
 glorious, that the few incorrigibly wicked whom necessity con- 
 fines in the prison of state, shall be only as an unnoticed speck 
 amid the overwhelming glory of the whole. 
 
 I have thus attempted to exhibit the proofs of God's benevo- 
 lence, as shown by the light of nature. And what other or 
 higher proofs could be furnished by his works or his doings, I 
 am compelled to say, is beyond my power to conceive. Con- 
 templated as a state of trial and preparation for results in 
 eternity, the nature, the condition, and the prospects of man, 
 manifest infinite wisdom and power, directed by infinite good- 
 ness, aiming at results which shall forever tell the Creator's 
 capacity to bless. To specify an imperfection, or suggest an 
 improvement, defies the power of the human intellect. This 
 world then, must be esteemed not as furnishing merely some 
 faint intimations, some slight grounds of conjecture that God 
 is good, but as presenting to every eye that witnesses the oper- 
 ations of his hands, one of the brightest theaters of his infinite 
 benevolence — a scene in God's creation, in which,, counter- 
 acted indeed in its fullest results by human wickedness, it only 
 awakes to new and unheard of desires and efforts to bless : 
 benevolence which shines forth like a sun, when all that might 
 seem to obscure its light, only serves to give new warmth and 
 splendor to its beams. For in what brighter forms of love and 
 goodness could God appear, than as the God of redemption to 
 this guilty, lost world ? 
 
 If now I have proved that God is a being of perfect benevo- 
 lence, it follows that he administers his moral government over 
 this world in the exercise of rightful authority. Having before 
 proved that God administers a moral government over men in 
 some proper import of the phrase ; having shown that he ad- 
 ministers his moral government in equity and in the exercise 
 of rightful authority ; I have established my leading proposi- 
 tion, that 
 
 God administers a perfect moral government over men. 
 
 I conclude with one reflection on the views which have been 
 given of the moral government of God over this world, viz. : 
 
TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY DESIRABLE. 347 
 
 Hoio undesirable that Christianity were not a revelation 
 from God. If Christianity is not a revelation from God, still 
 every thing of vital importance to man which Christianity 
 says, is true, except its grand peculiarity, the manner in which 
 this world's redemption from sin is achieved — every thing is 
 true, except its discovery of a triune God, the Father, the Son, 
 and the Holy Ghost, in their respective relations to the work 
 of man's redemption from sin. If Christianity is not a revela- 
 tion, still there is an infinite being who has given existence 
 to creatures, formed in his own image, and destined to live 
 and to act, for weal or for woe, through a coming eternity. 
 For the accomplishment of his eternal counsels, God has as- 
 sumed the high relation of a perfect moral governor of these 
 creatures of his power. Perfectly benevolent, he is also in- 
 flexibly just. He will never sacrifice the majesty of law, the 
 glory of his moral dominion, and the happiness of his moral 
 creation, in tenderness to rebels. His throne stands in all its 
 grandeur on the pillars of eternal justice, and, though changed 
 into a throne of grace, still in all its darkness and tempest, it 
 speaks undiminished terror to the determined transgressor. It 
 is changed into a throne of grace, but only to the rebel who is 
 penitent and contrite in heart. It is a throne of grace, that, 
 with its attractions and its charms, it may win rebellion to 
 loyalty. 
 
 If then, Christianity is not a divine revelation, every thing (I 
 mean every thing substantial, for I certainly admit that Chris- 
 tianity sheds a new and brighter light on all moral truths), 
 with the exceptions made, which Christianity teaches, is true. 
 Every thing respecting God, man, time, and eternity — every 
 relation of God to man, and of man to God — every relation, 
 tendency, and consequence of right and wrong moral action — 
 every foundation of hope, ground of fear, retrospect of the past, 
 reality of the present, prospect of the future — the same proba- 
 tion, the same law, the same economy of mercy, the same 
 judgment and retribution, the same heaven and hell — all, all 
 in every great and substantial respect, is the same. Christian- 
 ity, with the exception made, is only a republication in brighter 
 characters, of the truths of God and of nature — of God and 
 nature immutable as its author. If Christianity then is not a 
 divine revelation, where are we ? Just where we are if it is a 
 revelation, with this difference, the light it sheds on the scheme 
 
348 MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM NATURE. 
 
 of redemption is extinguished! How the perverseness of rebels 
 is to be subdued to love, and if subdued, how can a just God re- 
 ceive them to favor ; here all is mystery unsolvable — darkness 
 impenetrable, even appalling! Man, a sinner, and guilty as 
 he is, I admit might repent, and might hope for mercy from 
 his Maker. But would he? Man, in the bondage of sin, 
 what chains so strong? — man, dead in sin, what death so 
 hopeless? who shall deliver? what power shall raise to life, 
 give health, and strength, and beauty immortal to this victim 
 of sin and death but the power of him who made him ? Man, 
 I said, might hope for mercy. But with a clear perception of 
 his fearful guilt and God's fearful justice ; when looking at a 
 sin-avenging God as he must, and asking, how can such a God 
 show the same abhorrence of sin and yet forgive, which he 
 would show by the endless destruction of a rebellious world, 
 then it is that the fears and dismay of guilt take hold on the 
 spirit, and hope trembles, faulters, expires. I say not that it 
 must be so, but that it always has been, and always will be, 
 at least with exceptions not to be named. For remember, it is 
 not the hope of the infidel that we need — the hope that God is 
 unjust — the hope like his, that reposes in a selfish, malignant 
 deity ; it is not the hope which fancy and the love of sin beget, 
 and which rushes fearless on the thick bosses of Jehovah's 
 buckler, without knowing who or what he is ; it is the hope 
 which looks upon a just God, and with a sense of his righteous 
 indignation, reposes sweetly in his mercy. And yet there 
 is so much terror here, there is so much midnight darkness and 
 thunder, that the feeble rays of mercy do not suffice. Guilt 
 will look up with confidence only when it sees the throne of 
 God upheld by the man that is his fellow. Take away " the 
 incarnate mystery," extinguish the light which reveals the 
 great atonement of Christianity, (ignorance and presumption 
 might indeed hope in a selfish deity, in an unjust God, and 
 realize a just perdition), but extinguish this light, the light 
 which reveals God's mercy through his Son, and let in the 
 terrors of guilt and of God on this sinful world, and how would 
 they weep and howl in the frenzies of despair ! Thanks — may 
 I not say it — thanks to the impostor, if such he was, who de- 
 vised the great atonement of the gospel. Falsehood — can we 
 say less ? — falsehood is better than truth ! Imposture ? False- 
 hood? No. Here is the seal of God. It is just the atone- 
 
TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY DESIRABLE. 349 
 
 ment which man needs, the atonement which he must have, to 
 embolden conscious guilt to approach a spotless God ; the only 
 atonement which will in fact, give hope and peace and heaven 
 to a guilty world. God devised it. God revealed it, that all 
 other manifestations of his mercy might not be in vain. With 
 no known instance of actual forgiveness, with no formal decla- 
 ration of God that he will forgive, with the burden of conscious 
 guilt upon us, and with no possible conception of any expedi- 
 ent by which God could show mercy, we should in fact, be 
 conducted to the most fearful forebodings of wrath. In this 
 midnight of gloom and terror all our research and all our rea- 
 sonings would actually terminate. And back again to this 
 midnight, from the light which beams upon us from the gospel 
 of God would the infidel conduct us. Let him go, if he will, 
 into all this darkness and dwell amid its terrors. Let him go, 
 if he will, to the bar of a just God on the footing of his own 
 righteousness, and be tried by his innocence or his merit ; let 
 him trust an unjust, selfish, malignant deity, for he has no 
 other God. But give me hope in a God of mercy. I speak 
 what you feel, and what I feel, when I say, I am a sinner — a 
 sinner against a holy, just, and perfect Gocl. I need his mercy. 
 I am a guilty, lost immortal. I need deliverance from de- 
 served and endless misery. Oh ! hide not from me the mercy, 
 the abundant mercy of God in Christ Jesus. 
 
LECTURE XI. 
 
 APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT FROM NATURE, TO PROVE THAT 
 CHRISTIANITY IS FROM GOD. 
 
 Nature of Divine Bevelation. — Argument for its necessity. — Different views of the grounds of 
 this. — I. Not necessary, because man cannot discover moral and religious truth: but II. Neces- 
 sary, 1. To make known the truth in the most perfect method, especially by language. — Absur- 
 dity of objecting to this medium. — 2. To receive the practical influence of such truth. — The 
 experiment by the light of nature decisive, shown by the ancient philosophers. — Their views 
 scanty, vacillating, erroneous. — Practical influence feeble on themselves and others. — Preva- 
 lence of immorality. — Their teachings and example limited. 
 
 By a divine revelation, we may understand some mode 
 adopted by our Creator of imparting the knowledge of reli- 
 gious and moral truth to the human mind, more direct than 
 any such knowledge obtained by the light of nature; or em- 
 ploying human reason on the character, the works and provi- 
 dence of God. On the question whether a divine revelation is 
 necessary to man, the parties have, in my view, often adopted 
 unqualified assertions, which are erroneous and even fatal to a 
 satisfactory conclusion. 
 
 On the one hand, it has been affirmed that all the knowledge 
 which is necessary or useful to man as a moral being may be 
 obtained from the works of God, and that every other mode of 
 discovering truth to the human mind on the part of God, is 
 impossible, incredible, and useless. On the other, the utter in- 
 sufficiency of human reason to make the least useful discovery 
 of moral and religious truth from the mere light of nature, and 
 the consequent absolute necessity of a direct revelation from 
 God, have been strenuously maintained. It is true, that some 
 of the advocates for the necessity of a revelation, concede that 
 the light of nature furnishes the means of much important 
 knowledge, and often seem to contend only for the necessity 
 of further discoveries by the light of revelation. And yet the 
 same writers assert with frequency, " that human reason can- 
 
WHY REVELATION IS NECESSARY. 351 
 
 not attain any certain knowledge of the will or law of God, or 
 of the true happiness of man."* This incongruity, which ap- 
 pears to characterize the discussions on this subject by leaving 
 the real question vague and indeterminate, has contributed in 
 no small degree to unsettle opinions and to perpetuate discus- 
 sion. To what extent the necessity of a divine revelation exists, 
 and what are the precise grounds or reasons of it, are points of 
 the first importance to all satisfactory views on the subject, as 
 well as to the termination of the controversy with the opposers 
 of revelation. 
 
 It may be admitted generally and indefinitely, that a reve- 
 lation is necessary to man, and yet its ends or purposes, and 
 the extent, grounds, or reasons of the necessity, may be left 
 undecided. In a state of utter darkness, light is necessary as 
 the only medium of vision. But we may suppose a degree of 
 light adequate for a distinct sight of surrounding objects, and 
 yet that a man should refuse to see them, and this in a case in 
 which Greater light would result in actual vision. In the one 
 case, light is necessary, because man cannot see without it ; 
 in the other, to secure his actual vision, because he loill not. 
 Again, there may be a degree of light adequate to the dis- 
 tinct vision of some objects and not of others ; and the 
 consequence may be, either that neither class of objects will 
 be seen, or that the former only will be. In these cases, the 
 particular purposes or ends, on account of which greater light 
 is necessary, are different, as are the objects to be seen. The 
 grounds or reasons of the necessity differ — greater light in the 
 one case, being necessary to actual vision of any of the objects; 
 in the other, necessary to the actual vision of all the objects. 
 Further ; a greater degree of light may be necessary, not be- 
 cause man cannot, nor because he will not see every object, 
 but to enable him to see every object with greater distinctness 
 and effect than would otherwise be possible. 
 
 So in respect to a divine revelation. It may be necessary 
 for a great variety of particular purposes or ends, and the 
 grounds or reasons of the necessity in respect to these ends 
 may be very different. To maintain the general proposition 
 that a divine revelation is necessary, is not fitted to convey 
 precise and definite views on this important subject, nor to 
 
 * Horxe. 
 
352 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 terminate this part of the controversy with the opposers of rev- 
 elation. 
 
 While therefore, I maintain the general doctrine, that a 
 divine revelation is necessary to man, to prevent misapprehen- 
 sion, 
 
 I remark — 
 
 I. That a divine revelation is not necessary to this world, 
 because man cannot discover much moral and religious truth 
 without it. The advocates of the utter incompetence of human 
 reason to make any such discoveries, seem to have fallen into 
 the error, by mistaking the lamentable ignorance of the world, 
 for proof of an entire incapacity for knowledge, and from a mis- 
 guided zeal to magnify the gift of a revelation, and the grace 
 that conferred it. That this mode of reasoning is unauthorized, 
 may be confidently decided, in view of its intrinsic deficiency, 
 and on the authority of revelation itself. It is intrinsically de- 
 ficient, since the mere fact of ignorance is no proof of incapacity 
 for knowledge. In revelation itself the ignorance and crimes 
 of the heathen world are never traced to incapacity for knowl- 
 edge, but the clear manifestation of God, and the consequent 
 inexcusableness of man both for his ignorance and his crimes, 
 are constantly asserted, and these are traced to the humiliating 
 fact " that men did not like to retain God in their knowledge." 
 
 The attempt to exalt the grace of God in the gift of a rev- 
 elation by depreciating man's capacity for knowledge, is still 
 more to be regretted. Admit, as the reasoning assumes, the 
 entire incompetence of the human mind to obtain any knowl- 
 edge of religious truth, and the grace of God in conferring a 
 revelation on the world is wholly subverted. On the part of 
 men there could be neither obligation nor crime. The neces- 
 sity of a revelation is created by their Maker and not by them- 
 selves. Revelation could not be a gift to a sinful world, 
 criminally resisting the light of truth and perverting the means 
 of knowledge, and thus deserving to be given up to a repro- 
 bate mind. But it is a provision absolutely necessary to con- 
 stitute men moral and accountable beings, and therefore de- 
 manded, if they are held responsible for their conduct by every 
 principle of equity. It is a matter of debt, of justice; and 
 grace is no more grace. This attempt therefore, to magnify 
 the grace of God in the gift of a revelation wholly defeats its 
 object. 
 
WHY REVELATION IS NECESSARY. 353 
 
 In proof of the position that the human mind is competent 
 to discover much important truth without a revelation, I might 
 appeal to what I have already shown to be true concerning 
 God and concerning man, from the mere light of nature. I 
 might appeal also to the actual discoveries of such truth, especi- 
 ally to the writings of many of the ancient philosophers. 
 
 The appeal to revelation itself on this point would he still 
 more decisive. On this authority it might be shown that man 
 can know the very truths to a considerable extent, without a 
 revelation, which the advocates for its necessity affirm that he 
 cannot know without it. For example, the being and perfec- 
 tions of God, his moral government, his moral character ; the 
 law of his moral government, and of course the sum of human 
 duty — to a great extent the specific duties toward God, toward 
 man, and toward himself; the doctrines of human sinfulness, 
 of the necessity of a change of moral character ; the placability 
 of God ; the immortality of the soul, future rewards and pun- 
 ishments. 
 
 Here it would be a very useful inquiry, how far the Scrip- 
 tures will bear us out in the assertion of this matter of fact — 
 not only by appealing to their explicit declarations, and their 
 clear implications, but especially to the variety of forms, and to 
 the great extent in which the sacred writers make the previous 
 knowledge of mankind the basis of their reasonings, instead of 
 resting on their authority as inspired teachers, although this is 
 never abandoned. 
 
 But whatever ground the advocate of Christianity may take, 
 the infidel will admit that the human mind is competent to 
 discover much religious and moral truth without a revelation. 
 
 I proceed to show — 
 
 II. That a divine revelation is necessary to the world — 
 
 (1.) To give the highest conceivable perfection to the mode 
 of making known the truth to the human mind. 
 
 (2.) To any extensive and useful discovery of truth to the 
 human mind. 
 
 (3.) To the discovery of some important truths, which man 
 could not discover without it. 
 
 (1.) A divine revelation is necessary to the highest conceivable 
 perfection of the mode of making 'known the truth to the human 
 mind. There are only two conceivable modes of discovering 
 truth to the human mind by our Creator: viz., through the 
 
 23 
 
354 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 medium of his works of creation and providence and by a rev- 
 elation. My object is not to compare the excellence or desir- 
 ableness of these two modes, bnt simply to show that the mode 
 which combines both, is better than that which should include 
 but one ; or rather is the best conceivable. Xor does my ob- 
 ject require me to examine the different specific modes of 
 making a revelation which are possible, although it were easy 
 to show the superiority of that mode to every other in which it 
 is claimed that God has made a revelation. I speak only of 
 some mode of revelation, as additional to the mere light of 
 nature, and maintain that it is indispensable to the highest con- 
 ceivable perfection in the mode of discovering religious and 
 moved truth to the human mind. This position is, to my own 
 mind, so palpably obvious, that had it not been denied, it could 
 scarcely require or justify an attempt to prove its truth. Who 
 does not know the power of speech and written language to 
 convey truth with peculiar precision, clearness, and effect? 
 Why is it that the very men who deny all revelation, and pro- 
 fess, while so doing, to impart to the world the light of truth, 
 resort to oral and written language as the medium of convey- 
 ance ? Why not leave the world to spell out truth on this 
 great question from the nature of things, as affording ample 
 light without the addition of speech and writing to instruct 
 them? Plainly because they believe that by this addition 
 they adopt the most effective mode of imparting knowledge 
 and of giving it permanence, impression, and prevalence in the 
 minds of other men. And will they pronounce their own con- 
 demnation, by pronouncing that mode of conveying truth use- 
 less, on which themselves rely as the best ? And if not useless 
 on the part of men, why useless on the part of God ? God has 
 confessedly formed the human mind to be taught and instructed 
 by himself, through the medium of his works. And is it not 
 equally manifest that he has formed the human mind to be 
 taught and instructed through the medium of language? Is 
 not this mode of conveying knowledge one which involves 
 every facility and every advantage? If God has qualified 
 men to learn truth from what he does, has he not also qualified 
 them to learn truth from what he says? Why then should 
 it be thought a thing incredible, that God should adopt one 
 method as well as the other, or rather, that he should adopt 
 both ? If his children are to read and learn his character, will, 
 
REVELATION BY LANGUAGE. 355 
 
 and designs, their duty and destiny from his teachings, why 
 not avail himself of their capacity to be taught through the 
 medium of language ? Why may he not instruct them by his 
 words as well as by his works; why not give them two books 
 as well as one — the book of revelation as well as the book of 
 nature? Would not the latter mode be as natural, as effectual 
 — as truly in accordance with their accustomed manner of learn- 
 ing truth as the former ? Are not the advantages of the latter 
 so great, so obvious, as to render it exceedingly desirable to all 
 who would wish to learn ? Why is it that we wish every thing 
 in art, science, literature, history, morals, and religion, that is 
 true and of importance to be known, reduced to writing ? Why 
 is it that laws must be written and published, that contracts, 
 bonds, deeds, mortgages, every title to an estate, must be put 
 upon record? Because this is confessedly the most perfect 
 method of securing the knowledge of facts. No man is igno- 
 rant of the importance and necessity of written records and 
 books on every subject of moment pertaining to this world. 
 And yet if we speak of a book from God, teaching man how to 
 secure the great end for which God made him, we talk of a 
 useless book — aye, of one worse than useless. Books from 
 men, even on religion, if it be of the right sort, are of inesti- 
 mable value ; but a book from God, teaching such a religion 
 as God might be supposed to teach, would be a thing of naught. 
 You cannot feel too much contempt for it ! And this is a con- 
 sistency of which to boast ! 
 
 But not to dwell on absurdity so glaring, let us for a moment 
 reflect on the end to be secured and the mode of accomplishing 
 it. The end is, so to instruct this sinful world in religious and 
 moral truth, that it shall become effectual to its moral reforma- 
 tion. Now, without disparaging at all the light of nature, 
 without supposing God to reveal one other truth to man 
 than what may be learned from it, I ask what mode of bring- 
 ing this very system of truth before the human mind would be 
 best fitted to the end to be accomplished ? Simply that which 
 we call the light of nature, or that which should combine with 
 it — the light of a revelation through the medium of human lan- 
 guage. Such a revelation, such books from deists, from infi- 
 dels, are at least regarded by themselves as an improvement in 
 the method of imparting instruction to men. Why then may 
 we not suppose that such a book as God could make, would 
 
356 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 also be an improvement on their productions ? Suppose then 
 God to qualify certain men, to declare the same system of truth 
 to the world through the medium of written language ; sup- 
 pose him to give the most indubitable proofs that they are thus 
 qualified and commissioned by God himself for this work ; let 
 us suppose the book actually written, containing simply that 
 system of truth which the light of nature discloses, presenting 
 these sublime doctrines concerning God — his nature, his charac- 
 ter ; the great facts respecting man — his nature, his character, 
 his destiny ; his relations to him, promulgating the great law 
 of God's moral government in its perfect requirement ; its 
 diverse specific precepts, its high and awful sanctions ; making 
 known an economy of mercy, unfolding with new clearness a 
 future state with its regions of immortality in bliss and woe — 
 let us suppose this system of truth set forth to the human 
 mind in all the simplicity, perspicuity, force, and conclusiveness 
 of which human language admits ; by argument, illustration, 
 exemplification ; shown to us in real life, embodied in rites of 
 worship, and carried out in all the forms of human action ; 
 presented in history, poetry, parables, allegory, epistles — in 
 every conceivable form fitted to render it intelligible, impres- 
 sive ; easy to be fixed in the memory, and ready for use at all 
 times ; accessible to all minds, fitted to all classes of men in all 
 circumstances and relations ; capable of being brought in all 
 its clearness and power on the human mind, from the beginning 
 of moral and accountable agency, and ever and always from 
 its own pages, as well as through its ordinances and appointed 
 ministry, pouring its light over a world like the sun in mid- 
 heaven. Suppose God to give such a book to this world, hav- 
 ing that perfection which his own inspiration could give it, 
 would it be no valuable addition to the mere light of nature ? 
 Would such instruction from God possess no value ? "Would 
 this light from heaven, truth enforced by the authority of God, 
 the very testimony of the living God, be nothing ? Would it 
 be nothing to man that his God should speak to him? Or, is 
 such a revelation from God absolutely necessary to give the 
 highest conceivable perfection to the mode of discovering re- 
 ligious and moved truth to the hitman mind f Let any honest 
 man who understands the use and power of language answer 
 this question. 
 
 (2.) A divine revelation is necessary to secure to any extent, 
 
WHAT HAS PHILOSOPHY DONE? 357 
 
 the practical influence of religions and moral truth on the 
 human mind. 
 
 In support of this position I shall attempt to show, that such 
 an experiment has been made, as to prove, that the great end of 
 man's creation woui be entirely defeated without a revelation 
 from God. In other words, facts enable us to decide what the 
 human intellect would accomplish in the discovery of religious 
 and moral truth, and what would be the practical results un- 
 der the mere light of nature ; and that these discoveries and 
 results show that the moral reformation of men would never 
 be accomplished to any considerable extent, without a divine 
 revelation. 
 
 The question is not as to the sufficiency of this light, but as 
 to its actual efficacy in leading men to duty and to happiness. 
 Has it in fact ever done it ? 
 
 I appeal then in the first place, to the ancient heathen philos- 
 ophers. And here I might say, there is great reason to be- 
 lieve that nothing in the writings of these philosophers, of the 
 least value either in theology or morals, was strictly the result 
 of their own mental efforts. Many of them confess that they 
 derived their knowledge from very ancient traditions, to which 
 they assigned a divine origin. " What Socrates said of the 
 deity," observes Dryden, " what Plato writ, and the rest of the 
 heathen philosophers of several nations, is all no more than 
 the twilight of revelation, after the sun of it was set in the race 
 of Noah ;" while the Christian fathers furnish abundant proof 
 that Plato especially learned much from the Hebrews while he 
 was in Egypt. Of Zoroaster, of whom deists have had much 
 to say, it has been shown by Dr. Hyde in his treatise " De Re- 
 ligione Yeterum Persarum," that Zoroaster had been a disciple 
 of one of the Jewish prophets, and that all the writings ascribed 
 to this philosopher are unquestionably spurious. I cannot but 
 add here the apparent prediction, but yet real conjecture of 
 Plato, founded probably on the traditions and truths he de- 
 rived from the Jews in Egypt. He says, " We cannot know 
 of ourselves what petition will be pleasing to God, or what 
 worship to pay him, but that it is necessary that a lawgiver 
 should be sent from heaven to instruct us ;" and such a one did 
 he expect ; and " oh," says he, " how greatly I do desire to see 
 that man and who he is !" He goes further, and declares this 
 lawgiver must be more them a man, "for since every nature is 
 
358 ARGUMENT PROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 governed by another nature that is superior to it, as birds and 
 beasts by man, he infers that this lawgiver who was to teach 
 man what he could not know by his own nature, must be of a 
 nature superior to man — that is, of a divine nature." He gives 
 indeed, as lively a picture of the person, qualifications, life, and 
 death of this divine man, as had he been acquainted with the 
 fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. He says " that this just person 
 must be poor, and void of all recommendations but that of 
 virtue alone; that a wicked world would not bear his instruc- 
 tions and reproof; and that therefore within three or four 
 years after he began to preach he should be persecuted, im- 
 prisoned, scourged, and at last be put to death." "Would it 
 then be strange if all in the writings of Plato and other ancient 
 philosophers, which has been held up to our admiration, should 
 have been directly or indirectly derived from divine revela- 
 tion ? 
 
 Laying aside however, this consideration, and conceding all 
 that can be claimed in respect to the unaided powers of the 
 ancient philosophers, let us inquire what they actually accom- 
 plished in morals and religion. The answer must be admitted 
 to be decisive upon the point before us. The fact appealed to, 
 is that of the employment of the most powerful human intellects 
 on this subject, with unparalleled devotion, and under the high- 
 est advantages. Who will pretend that more would ever be 
 accomplished in this department of human knowledge, under 
 the mere light of nature, than was done by Socrates, Plato, 
 Seneca, Cicero, and other eminent philosophers of antiquity ? 
 When has the world seen, when could it expect to see, men of 
 brighter genius, of higher intellectual power, of superior liter- 
 ary accomplishment, of such unrivaled industry, toil, and 
 self-consecration too, in philosophic research ? Whatever may 
 be thought of the intellectual stature of Bolingbroke, Gibbon, 
 Hume, and Yoltaire, they appear diminutive compared with 
 these giants of the Academy and the Lyceum. 
 
 What then did these philosophers accomplish? What for 
 themselves, and what for the world ? 
 
 And here we have no occasion to deny any excellence or 
 impute any imperfection or defect which is not real, in their 
 systems of philosophy. It is conceded then that passages may 
 be found which seem to express exalted conceptions of God and 
 of some of his attributes. In some of their moral codes, par- 
 
WHAT IIA.S PHILOSOPHY DONE? 359 
 
 ticularly in the Etliics of Aristotle and the Offices of Cicero, 
 some beautiful theories of morals and precepts fitted for the 
 regulation of external conduct are to be found. Some of them 
 admit that virtue is the chief good and its own reward ; and 
 some of them, at times at least, indulged in sublime specula- 
 tions respecting the nature and immortality of the soul. But 
 after all, what was the amount of their knowledge or belief on 
 these great subjects, and what were the actual results to them 
 and to the world ? 
 
 While some of these philosophers asserted the being of God, 
 others openly denied it ; few, probably none of them believed 
 God, in the proper sense, to be the Creator of the world ; most 
 of them were polytheists, and all of them either sincerely or 
 hypocritically sanctioned, defended, and practiced idolatrous 
 worship, and enjoined it as the duty of every citizen. 
 
 In respect to a future state, whatever may be said of their 
 arguments, the best of the philosophers spoke doubtfully ; none 
 of them applied the fact to its proper use and end ; most of 
 them entertained of it the most puerile and contemptible con- 
 ceits. They did believe in future punishment, and their ideas 
 of future rewards were so indefinite, low^, and sensual, as to 
 give no importance to their faith. In short, as to the merit 
 and demerit of right and wrong moral action, the happiness 
 and misery in kind and degree of which the soul is capable, a 
 just judgment of a righteous God, and the grand and awful 
 idea of accountability — they believed nothing — or at least en- 
 tertained conceptions so inadequate and so false as to amount 
 to nothing. - 
 
 In respect to morals, nothing like a true system was to be 
 found in the writings of any one of them, nor of all of them 
 together. On the great, the vital question — in fact the only 
 question — viz., in what does the supreme happiness of man 
 consist, Varro tells us that there were three hundred different 
 opinions among the philosophers. Cicero says, that these opin- 
 ions were so numerous and discordant that it is impossible to 
 enumerate them ; while it may be added, that in respect to 
 the true nature of moral excellence — viz., disinterested love — 
 true benevolence either in God or man — no one of them seems 
 to have formed a conception. Where this is not understood, it 
 is in vain to talk of morals, of piety, or religion. Every thing 
 is wrong in principle. Call it by what names you will, ascribe 
 
360 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 to it what restraining and regulating power you will on tlio 
 conduct of the life, it is nothing but the selfish principle, the 
 sum and essence of all moral evil. Did these philosophers 
 then ever teach intelligibly and truly, that love to God and 
 love to man is the sum and substance of all moral excellence ? 
 — that love is the fulfilling of the law — and that all else with- 
 out it is in a moral respect nothing but sin ? So far as I can 
 find, never in any decisive instance, while, with the exception 
 of a few, instead of inculcating the expression of this principle 
 in loving enemies and forgiving injuries, they accounted re- 
 venge lawful and commendable. Pride and ambition (prin- 
 ciples which have caused more wretchedness on earth than 
 any other), were esteemed the best incentives to virtuous and 
 noble deeds. Suicide was deemed lawful, and a proof of true 
 heroism. Lying lawful, when profitable ; theft, adultery, for- 
 nication, infanticide, cruelty to children, inhumanity to slaves, 
 degradation of the female sex, gratification of sensual appetite 
 and unnatural lusts ; in a word, the most flagitious practices 
 were countenanced on the part of the philosophers, both by 
 argument and example. 
 
 Even the doctrines of the wisest and best, notwithstanding 
 the slight hints or the faint and transient glimpses of truth they 
 include, were as a whole, uncertainty, darkness, jargon, pueril- 
 ity. What truth concerning God, his character, law, govern- 
 ment ; or concerning man, his character, his relations, his pros- 
 pects, at all fitted in its combination with error, to give any 
 just or adequate conception of either God or man, or to reform 
 a lost world ? The answer is given in matter of fact. Philoso- 
 phers, statesmen, poets, priests, and people, were avowedly 
 addicted to the most abominable uncleannesses and crimes ; 
 the gods they worshiped were guilty of the same enormities; 
 their sacrifices were deformed with cruelty and the most horrid 
 rites ; their sacred groves were consecrated to prostitution, 
 their temples were brothels. Think of such worship rendered 
 to the three hundred Jupiters mentioned by Yarro, or to the 
 three hundred and sixty-five gods mentioned by Orpheus, or to 
 thirty thousand by Ilesiod— gods celestial, aerial, terrestrial, 
 and infernal ; gods worshiped by rites profane, cruel, debauch- 
 ed ; gods worshiped by shameless prostitution and the immo- 
 lation of human victims ! "With this entire corruption of all 
 religion was of course connected an ecpial corruption of morals 
 
WHAT HAS PHILOSOPHY DONE? 361 
 
 both in public and private life. Fraud, theft, injustice, suicide, 
 adultery, fornication, systematic abortions, murder of infants, 
 and the most unnatural crimes, ambition, hatred, and fell re- 
 venge ; gladiatorial shows, and all the atrocious cruelties of war 
 and rapine not only abounded but were patronized, counte- 
 nanced, authorized by law, connived at and practiced by 
 statesmen and philosophers, and publicly reprobated by none. 
 From this source, the corruption of all religion and morals, 
 aided by the depravity of the human heart, flowed forth a 
 torrent of crimes and abominations desolating a world of all 
 that is good and happy in virtue and religion, and leaving all, 
 all in moral darkness and moral death. Its state became more 
 and more hopeless as time rolled on. Even in the land of 
 Judea the last feeble rays of divine truth were almost extinct, 
 while this vast portentous cloud hung over the nations, thick- 
 ening, darkening, and foreboding only the blackness of dark- 
 ness forever. 
 
 I now ask, whether God has not made a sufficient experi- 
 ment on the question, what human reason would accomplish 
 in the discovery of religious and moral truth, and what would 
 be the practical results under the mere light of nature ? What 
 reason or shadow of reason is there to believe that modern 
 deists, or any other men, or any individual man, under the 
 mere light of nature, and to the end of time, w T ould have be- 
 come wiser or better than Socrates, Plato, Seneca, or Cicero ? 
 When or where has human genius shone more brightly, or the 
 power and majesty of the human intellect more excited our 
 admiration and wonder than in the poets, the orators, the legis- 
 lators, the philosophers of antiquity? And when, to the end 
 of the world, could we hope for better results in the discovery 
 of moral truth in the formation of moral character? "What 
 then could be hoped for from philosophy, from human reason, 
 under the mere light of nature ? Is not the experiment abso- 
 lutely decisive ? Is not the necessity of a divine revelation to 
 secure to any extent the salutary practical influence' of religious 
 and moral truth on the human mind, placed beyond all denial ? 
 
 In confirmation of this argument, if it can need any, we 
 might appeal to many other considerations. So far as there 
 was any thing really commendable in the instructions of the 
 philosophers, they were delivered to their immediate pupils, 
 and in no respect to the great mass of the community. Indeed, 
 
362 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 their ethical systems were far too refined for the common peo- 
 ple ; their discourses being rather subtle disputations, where 
 truth was left obscure, doubtful, and subject to controversy. 
 Nothing was settled. What one affirmed, another denied. 
 "What could be expected of the common people, when the 
 penetration and the labors of the philosophers resulted in dis- 
 agreement, contradiction, and uncertainty? Allow that they 
 discovered and proved some truths in speculation, what author- 
 ity could they give them in practice ? What philosopher could 
 secure submission to his rules of life ; or what can human law 
 effect in the renovation of the heart ? " Your systems of vir- 
 tue," says Tertullian, "are but the conjectures of human phi- 
 losophy, and the power which commands is merely human ; so 
 that neither the rule nor the power is indisputable ; and hence 
 the one is too imperfect to instruct us fully, the other too weak 
 to command us effectually ; but both these are effectually pro- 
 vided for by a revelation from God. Where is the philoso- 
 pher that can so clearly demonstrate the true good as to fix 
 the notion beyond dispute ? And what human power is able 
 to reach the conscience and bring down that notion into prac- 
 tice ? Human wisdom is as liable to error as human power is 
 to contempt." What would be the influence of a system of 
 truth coming from man, compared with that of the same sys- 
 tem clothed with God's authority ? In addition to all this, let 
 the idolizers of human reason remember that the wisest of the 
 ancient philosophers and legislators were fully convinced, by 
 their own experience, on this great question. Socrates and 
 Plato both confessed that they needed a divine revelation to 
 instruct them in matters of the greatest consequence. Cicero 
 and others, instead of the vain conceits of some modern deists 
 respecting the powers of man employed in religious and moral 
 inquiries, often acknowledged their imbecility and darkness. 
 These great men were so impressed with the actual state of the 
 world, and the waywardness and corruption of the human 
 heart, that they not only often acknowledged that there were 
 no human means of reformation, but expressed a strong hope 
 and expectation, that God would one day give to man a revela- 
 tion that should dispel the dark cloud in which the human 
 mind was involved. In short, it is notorious that nearly the 
 whole system of religion and of worship, with its sanctions 
 of future rewards and punishments, with its oracles, divina- 
 
VALUE OF CHRISTIANITY. 363 
 
 tions, mysteries, were in fact political expedients, useful fic- 
 tions, originated and perpetuated by legislators, from the ne- 
 cessity of keeping the people in awe, and under greater venera- 
 tion for human laws. If the world could stand without a real 
 revelation, experience had proved at least one thing, that it 
 could not stand without a pretended revelation from God. 
 After such an experiment then, an experiment which left the 
 world in a most deplorable condition of darkness, crime, and 
 wretchedness; an experiment which convinced the very men 
 that made it of its utter inefficacy; which actually led them to 
 abandon all hope of the world's reformation without a revela- 
 tion from God, and which actually compelled them to resort to 
 the pretense of such a revelation, to give even any salutary re- 
 straining influence to human law ; I say, who after such an ex- 
 periment can doubt the absolute necessity of a revelation from 
 God, to secure to any extent the reforming influence of moral 
 truth on the human mind ? 
 
 One brief reflection ! What a value does the view we have 
 taken of this world, of the ignorance, the depravity, the crimes, 
 the miseries of mankind in every age and in almost every 
 country for six thousand years, give to Christianity, and this, 
 whether it be a revelation from God or not. "Who will not 
 read and study the Bible, whether he be an infidel or a Chris- 
 tian? Christianity, as a system of morals, whether it be of 
 God or not, is true. Here, here, it gives light where all was 
 uncertainty, confusion, darkness, without it. Here, where the 
 thickest gloom of moral midnight overspread a lost world, it 
 comes as the morning sun to remove the darkness and reveal 
 the day. In or is this all. In its proposed way of our accept- 
 ance with an offended God, if there is any way — I mean in the 
 general form of an atonement for sin — it is also true. The 
 great question then, in every substantial respect, is not between 
 Christianity and Infidelity, but between Christianity and noth- 
 ing. If Christianity is false, Infidelity is false. Reject the 
 morals of Christianity as false, and all here is midnight. We 
 can know nothing to be true. Reject also the great fact of 
 some atonement for sin, under the government of a just and 
 perfect God, and there is no mercy, no hope. Oh, how would 
 Socrates, how would Plato, have hailed such light as this ! 
 Who that has it shall despise it ? Who will not study, under- 
 stand, apply, such truth as the Bible contains? Whose eye 
 
36tL ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 will not weep, and whose heart not break, that a fellow-crea- 
 ture, a friend, a companion, is not willing to read this book and 
 weigh with candor the evidence of its origin from God ? Oh ! 
 what maniac madness to sport on the verge of eternity, with 
 the dream that Christianity is false — an immortal mind, deny- 
 ing such truth, and attempting to sustain and cheer itself, as it 
 were, at the foot of God's judgment-seat, with the empty, 
 vapid declamation about the sufficiency of human reason — and 
 this with the knowledge of the fact, that for six thousand years 
 this boasted human reason has only plunged a lost world into 
 error, sin, and death, without hope! And if all these were 
 without excuse, what will, what must become of the man who 
 will not love the truth, and embrace the truth, and obey the 
 truth, which he knows Christianity reveals ? 
 
LECTURE XII. 
 
 Argument for necessity of revelation continued: Prop. 2 continued — Revelation necessary to 
 secure the practical influence of the truth.— Argued from the state of Pagan nations at pres- 
 ent. — From the influence of Deism. — Deists greatly indebted to Christianity. — The influence 
 of their systems is feeble, scanty and uncertain, denies the holiness and justice of God. — Theii 
 views of sin and repentance defective. — Their morality superficial. — Men are not made better 
 by them. — Little zeal for reforming men by them. — Give no comfort in death. — Prop. 3. 
 Revelation necessary to make known truth undiscovcrable without it. — Conclusion. 
 
 In continuing the argument for the necessity of a divine 
 revelation to any useful discovery of truth, I appeal — 
 
 In the second place, to the state of pagan nations at the pres- 
 ent time. 
 
 This point needs no illustration. The facts on this subject 
 are familiar to all, and they carry with them their own infer- 
 ences. 
 
 In the third place, I appeal to the influence, of Deism. It is 
 claimed by that class of philosophers called deists, that the 
 book of nature is the only book to be studied, or that deism as 
 a system derived from human reason under the light of nature, 
 is all that is requisite actually to instruct and guide the world 
 in respect to religion and morals. 
 
 My first remark on this part of the subject is, that this class 
 of philosophers, have derived the best parts of their system 
 from the very revelation which they reject and affect to de- 
 spise. Let it then be conceded, that in their system of faith 
 there is much truth concerning God and concerning man — 
 truth, which human reason rigidly employ v^, might and would 
 discover under the mere light of nature. But it is one thing 
 to grant that these doctrines of deism are discoverable, and 
 quite another to affirm, that they have been actually discov- 
 ered by the light of nature. What then is the fact ? It is here 
 to be remarked, that the name of deist was unknown till about 
 the year 1565, when Christianity had been in the world more 
 than fifteen centuries. How then did it happen, that Socrates, 
 and Plato, and Aristotle, and all the wisest philosophers groped 
 
360 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 in such darkness during so many ages, and that this purified 
 and perfect system of truth called deism, should be first discov- 
 ered and taught by men who lived and were educated under 
 the meridian sun of Christianity ? Had these men at this 
 period of the world, made such advances in knowledge as to 
 leave the philosophers of Greece and Rome and all other na- 
 tions out of sight, and to be able effectually to guide them- 
 selves and the rest of the world by their own reason ? Can 
 they lay claim to superior genius or mental culture ; or did the 
 light of nature shine brighter on them than on all who lived 
 before? This cannot be pretended. No; what they knew, 
 and all they knew, more than was known and taught by the 
 sages of antiquity, they learned from God's revelation. Chris- 
 tianity had shamed away the grosser errors and vices of the 
 pagan philosophy, and shed its blazing light so intensely on 
 the mind, as to compel men as it were to see its perfect system 
 of moral and religious truth, and to adopt so much of it as 
 to shield them from contempt. They stole a torch from the 
 temple of God and called it the light of their own reason. The 
 fact cannot be mistaken — the pretension to discovery is ridicu- 
 lous. As well might a New Zealander residing among the 
 discoveries in the arts and sciences made in Christendom for 
 the last hundred years, pretend to be their sole author. Are 
 not such pretensions to discovery from the light of nature ridic- 
 ulous, contemptible, beyond all possible respect ? 
 
 But I will waive this point, and ask, what is this system of 
 truth which is to accomplish so much for the moral reforma- 
 tion of the world? No one can tell what it is! To whom 
 shall we apply — where shall we find it ? Shall we resort to the 
 deistical writers en masse and listen to their instructions ? But 
 the ear is stunned with contradiction, inconsistency, disagree- 
 ment, controversy, mutual censure and recrimination without 
 end. When it must be optional in the highest sense with all 
 to adopt one or another or none of these systems, what is to be 
 expected but the same jargon among the disciples, as prevails 
 among the masters ; or rather, what but the rejection of every 
 system ? Or if every one is to read and judge for himself, what 
 will be the consequence but confusion, compared with which 
 that of Babel were harmony of sweetest music ? Who that 
 knows any thing of man, or of the experience of past ages, will 
 not regard as perfectly ridiculous the scheme of bringing this 
 
THE DEIST'S PREMISES DEFECTIVE. 367 
 
 world to receive any system even of truth, which lias no higher 
 authority than that of human reason. 
 
 But further, without insisting on this fatal obstacle, there is 
 yet another. Their system can possess no authority, not even 
 that of reason itself. The most perfect system of deism con- 
 sists in these particulars, that there is one God possessing in- 
 finite natural and moral perfection; that God is to be wor- 
 shiped and served in the forms of piety and of virtue; that 
 God will forgive our sins against him on condition of repent- 
 ance ; and that he will reward the good and punish the bad in 
 a future state. Now I readily admit that these propositions 
 are all true, in their proper import, and that they can all be 
 proved to be true, by human reason. But what I now main- 
 tain is, that the infidel cannot, by reason, prove any one of 
 them to be true. He cannot, because he denies the premises 
 by which alone these propositions can be thus proved to be 
 true. lie denies the justice of God, the equity of his moral 
 administration over this world ; and, denying this, he can 
 prove nothing concerning God or man of the nature of relig- 
 ious or moral truth arising out of the character of God, or 
 the relations between God and man. Denying that God is 
 just as a moral governor, he cannot prove that God is benevo- 
 lent. Denying that perfect benevolence in God involves in its 
 very nature exact and perfect justice, he denies the very nature 
 of benevolence ; he denies an essential element of all moral rec- 
 titude, and utterly subverts the distinction between right and 
 wrong. The God of Infidelity then is not, and cannot be, a be- 
 nevolent God-; but is and must be a selfish and malignant deity. 
 This spoils alike its entire system of theology and of morals. 
 A God of such a character cannot have the least claim to any 
 worship or service from man, either in the form of piety or vir- 
 tue. With such a view of God, there can be no love, no confi- 
 dence, no gratitude, no piety, no virtue toward him, for there 
 is no fit object of these affections. All moral relations between 
 him and his moral creation are subverted. Moral obligation, 
 obedience, disobedience, sin, duty, can have no place. Where 
 is moral obligation ? Such a God has no right to command. 
 Where is obedience or disobedience ? He has no authority. 
 Where is the standard of duty ? The will of God is the will of 
 a selfish or malignant being. Where is the object of one right 
 affection? God is exhibited only as an object of abhorrence 
 
'368 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 and of dread. Where is sin against God ? It were sinful to 
 love, and right to hate such a being. Where is repentance ? 
 There is no cause for contrition in the past, and no return to 
 duty for the future. Where is forgiveness ? There is nothing 
 to be forgiven. Where is the ground of trust or hope? The 
 vain illusion that a selfish being, who is more likely to destroy 
 than to promote the interests of his creatures, may prove in- 
 dulgent through partiality or favoritism. Where the prospect 
 of immortality ? No purpose or plan of God, no designs either 
 of justice or mercy, require a future state for their accomplish- 
 ment, Where are rewards and punishments ? All are a mock- 
 ery — at best the expressions of unjust lenity or unjust severity. 
 Where is religion ; where is virtue ; where is the principle of 
 recovery from the gulf of moral ruin ; where is relief for the 
 alarmed conscience ; where is mercy, peace, hope, heaven ; 
 where is a perfect God ? All is a blank. Indeed, a system 
 of religion which denies the gkeat relation of god as the 
 righteous moral governor of men, is all error, all delusion. 
 It is worse than not true. It is most fearfully false. It is 
 worse than nothing, worse than any thing. The God of such 
 a system can be viewed in the light of truth only under two 
 aspects — as the patron of iniquity, or an omnipotent tyrant, 
 Ko God at all were better than the God of Infidelity. What 
 man not already the hopeless victim of his wrath, would not 
 wish that God were benevolent, though benevolence involves 
 perfect justice. Under any other idea of him, there is nothing 
 but that which in wanton malice patronizes iniquity with all its 
 woes or tortures, nothing but that which is fitted to overwhelm 
 with terror. Such then are the unavoidable results which rea- 
 son gives from the premises of the infidel. If we can suppose 
 him inconsistent enough to believe any thing better himself, he 
 cannot prove it to be true, he cannot enforce it on the minds 
 of other men by the authority of reason. He must give up 
 his premises, and admit the great fact of a just God, or aban- 
 don all pretense to reasoning. His premises do not give his 
 conclusions, but others which are opposite and appalling. What 
 then can be hoped for, from a system of reason in which there 
 is no reason ? Will the world be reformed by a system of 
 faith professedly founded in reason, and yet so obviously built 
 on falsehood ? Yain is the dream. Deism, with all the seem- 
 ing comeliness of its most unexceptionable form, has, according 
 
WHAT IS THE INFIDEL'S FAITH? 369 
 
 to its own principles, no warrant, no authority, from human 
 reason. It is an utterly baseless system. 
 
 But I have another inquiry to make concerning this system : 
 viz., what is it? The deist — at least a few deists — professes to 
 believe that there is a perfect God ; that he is to be worshiped 
 and served by piety and virtue ; that he will forgive our sins 
 on condition of repentance; and that good men will be re- 
 warded and bad men punished in a future state. 
 
 This, so far as it goes, sounds well in words, but what does 
 he believe concerning God? He tells us he is good. But 
 what is goodness in God ? We have seen that it is that senti- 
 mental tenderness, that indulgent lenity that sacrifices the gen- 
 eral good to individual happiness ; goodness that does not 
 abhor the supreme evil, goodness that refuses to adopt the 
 best means of the best end. Does the infidel then believe in 
 God as he is ? Does he conceive of him in the glory of that 
 holiness which recoils from sin with supreme and eternal indig- 
 nation, in the glory of that justice which will maintain his law, 
 uphold his throne, sustain the interests of holiness, and express 
 his supreme and immutable abhorrence of sin, though it in- 
 volves the eternal destruction of a rebel universe ? "Who does 
 not know, that all such exhibitions of God, are, in the view of 
 infidels, repulsive, odious, intolerable falsehood? Who does 
 not know, that they can tolerate no idea of God but that which 
 exhibits him as more concerned for the happiness of his crea- 
 tures than for their virtue; that view of God, which represents 
 him as entirely dispensing with the eternal nature, relations, 
 and dependences of things ; and therefore as sacrificing the in- 
 terests and the principles of righteousness to make his creation 
 happy, by which he must inevitably make that creation wretch- 
 ed; that view of God which exhibits him in the glory of his 
 mercy, sacrificing his justice, in the plenitude of his goodness as 
 a tender, indulgent friend and patron of iniquity — a selfish ma- 
 lignant deity? Such is the good, the benevolent, the perfect 
 God of Infidelity ! I ask here, are these words merely, and not 
 things? The same hollow emptiness, the same meaningless 
 nothing, or rather the same fearful falsehood characterizes every 
 part of the infidel's creed. What is sin ? A venial evil — the 
 merest trifle — nay, rather, so far as it exists, the best means of 
 the best end ! What greater practical error than to believe the 
 worst kind of moral action to be the best kind of moral action ? 
 16* 24 
 
370 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 Where is the true exhibition of the nature and tendency of sin 
 against God, as hostility to him and all good and the source of 
 absolute and universal woe ; as the subversion of God's law, 
 his government, his throne, his kingdom, as the destruction of 
 all good — yea, of God himself, as the infallible source of misery, 
 unmingled, complete, eternal. Are such the views of the true 
 nature and tendency of sin which Infidelity gives us ? Nothing 
 like it. They are, of all things, the views which infidels most 
 abhor. That sin is such an evil, involving such fell destruction, 
 such guilt or ill-desert, and that a perfect God must feel and 
 act toward it accordingly, is, in their estimation, the most in- 
 credible of all nonsense. These views of sin are the false, 
 absurd, austere, gloomy, self-torturing views of hair-brained 
 fanatics. 
 
 With such conceptions of God as the infidel entertains, what 
 must that be which he calls piety? Can love, reverence, confi- 
 dence, submission, gratitude, joy, be exercised toward the God of 
 Infidelity? How preposterous. Can every thing be taken away 
 from the character of God which awakens dread and disturb- 
 ance when sinful beings think of heaven's Sovereign ; can every 
 moral attribute of the Godhead be amalgamated into one — that 
 of unqualified tenderness; can all that is venerable and awful in 
 God be sunk into that which is so grateful to the rebel ; with 
 such a view of God can the heart of his worshiper feel the holy 
 reverence and awful love which are due to a perfect God? 
 True piety, in all the sacredness and solemnity of devout emo- 
 tion, adoring the tender, sentimental, weak-hearted God of In- 
 fidelity ! When does the infidel contemplate God in his true 
 character, that awful goodness which connects misery with sin, 
 and welcome the aspect of such a God ? When does he look 
 upon that august and inviolable sanctuary, where the fires of 
 his indignation forever burn to guard the approach of the least 
 moral pollution, and adore, and love, and praise, with grateful 
 and exulting joy? We all know that such a God is the object 
 of aversion and ridicule, and even of blasphemy, with infidels. 
 All their piety, all their joy in God, is, and can be, nothing 
 but those selfish, sordid emotions which are founded in the be- 
 lief that an unprincipled deity will be indulgent to them in 
 their rebellion. 
 
 And further ; what is that which the infidel calls repentance f 
 xsot sorrow for sin as it is — not as hostility to God, and the 
 
INFIDEL VIEWS OF RELIGION. 371 
 
 frustration of his designs ; not sorrow for sin, as that which in 
 the estimation of God and of truth, deserves his wrath in the 
 endless misery of the sinner. But rather, it is regret for a tri- 
 vial evil, for that toward which God feels no supreme abhor- 
 rence, hut which he on the whole prefers to its opposite — sor- 
 row in a word, for that which in their estimation and in that of 
 God, is the best means of the best end, with a determination to 
 forsake it! And as to future rewards, what are these — what is 
 the heaven of Infidelity ? Nothing positive, nothing definite — 
 a general undefined state of happiness irrespective of moral 
 character. It may be the heaven of Mohammed, or it may 
 be the blissful elysium of heathen poetry, or a paradise of 
 earthly sweets in some other form. But it is not a world of 
 happiness, because sin is not there, and because holiness is 
 there reigning in all its purity and its joys. The happiness of 
 the infidel's heaven is not that which is peculiar to holy spirits 
 in communion with a holy God. It is any thing but a perfect 
 God in fellowship with creatures bearing his perfect image. And 
 what is future punishment? Not a supreme and endless misery 
 inflicted as the expression of the wrath of God against sin ; but 
 at most paternal chastisement, disciplinary evil, kind inflictions 
 to reform and to save ; evil inflicted according to the exigency, 
 so that they who are not reformed by less shall be reformed by 
 more, so that rebellion itself, much as it may abhor the service 
 of God, shall be compelled by dint of suffering to surrender to 
 God's authority, and thus to serve him at best with a rebel 
 heart. No other motive, nothing but the compulsory influence 
 of natural evil is thought of or presented. Thus it is that Infi- 
 delity in its fairest form is plausible in ivords only. In 'respect 
 to truth, it means nothing which it seems to mean. It knows 
 nothing of God as he is — nothing of holiness or of sin, of piety, 
 virtue, repentance, or of the nature of those influences by which 
 alone moral beings can be governed and blessed. All it means 
 under its fair show of words, is error the most destructive. And 
 in further confirmation on this point, I appeal to any man ac- 
 quainted with the writings or the character of infidels, and ask, 
 is there a more palpable solecism than a pious infidel — a de- 
 vout, spiritual, heavenly-minded infidel ? 
 
 If now we appeal to Infidelity's code of morals, what is it? 
 True morality is in the heart. Men talk of good morals. What 
 are they? Benevolence in the heart; love to God and love to 
 
dl2 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 man. Holiness, a spiritual principle, which as much surpasses 
 all that infidels call morality as a living man does a dead man. 
 In all the writings then of infidels, I fearlessly affirm, that the 
 inculcation of the great, the true, the only principle of morality 
 cannot be found. It follows of course, that whatever else may 
 be true of their system, it includes not the slightest tendency 
 to reform men in respect to morality. In most if not in all 
 cases, there is an open and avowed contempt for many of the 
 particular virtues which adorn the character of man as a social 
 being, and which are essential to the happiness of an earthly 
 community. At the same time the most heartless, sordid self- 
 ishness is inculcated in many forms, and many of the most 
 degrading and destructive vices, with an almost unlimited in- 
 dulgence of the sensual appetites, are countenanced and even 
 formally vindicated. A few testimonies from the least excep- 
 tionable of deistical writers must suffice on this topic. Lord 
 Herbert asserts that lust and anger are no more to be blamed 
 than the thirst occasioned by the dropsy, or the drowsiness 
 produced by lethargy. Mr. Hobbes, that the civil law is the 
 only foundation of right and wrong — that every man has a 
 right to all things, and may lawfully get them if he can. Lord 
 Bolingbroke resolves all morality into self-love, meaning selfish- 
 ness, and teaches that ambition, the lust of power, sensuality 
 and avarice may be lawfully gratified if they can be safely, 
 that man lives only in the present world, that the chief end of 
 man is to gratify the appetites and inclinations of the flesh, 
 that adultery is no violation of the law of nature, that polyg- 
 amy is a part of this law, and modesty is inspired by prejudice 
 or vanity. Mr. Hume maintained that self-denial and humility 
 are not virtues, but are useless and mischievous, and that pride, 
 self-valuation, &c, are objects of moral approbation, that adul- 
 tery must be practiced if men would obtain all the advantages of 
 life, and if practiced secretly and frequently would be no crime 
 at all ! But I need not go into further details. Substantially 
 the same things or worse, are to be found in all this class of 
 writers of most distinction. 
 
 If now we refer to their characters, we shall see that in 
 their practice they gave proof of their faith. Lord Herbert, 
 Hobbes, Lord Shaftsbury, Woolston, Tindal, Chubb, Lord Bol- 
 ingbroke, Collins, were all guilty of the vilest hypocrisy and 
 lying on the face of their publications; professing in words 
 
CHARACTER OF INFIDELS. 373 
 
 high respect for Christianity, while they felt toward it the 
 most deadly hate, wearing a mask of friendship that they 
 miorht stab it to the heart. The morals of Rochester and 
 Wharton were notoriously degraded. Woolston was a blas- 
 phemer ; Blount was a suicide ; Tindal and Morgan were 
 shameless hypocrites. Yoltaire was an adulterer, and as famous 
 for falsehood, treachery, envy, profligacy, low sensuality and 
 cruelty, as for his exalted talents. Rousseau, by his own pub- 
 lished confession, was a thief, a liar, and a debauchee. Thomas 
 Paine, than whom perhaps no one has done more by his writ- 
 ings to extend Infidelity in this country and in Europe, was in- 
 famous for his hostility to all morals and all religion, for his 
 impiety, blasphemy, licentiousness and adultery, and sunk at 
 last into all the filth and wretchedness of a sot; an object of 
 pity and contempt to his own deluded disciples. 
 
 In presenting these examples, I do not pretend that every 
 deist has been thus degraded by open vice and immorality. 
 Doubtless there are cases in which pride, respect for character, 
 literary ambition, and other causes have predominated over 
 the grosser appetites ; but in many of these an avowed hos- 
 tility to the true principle of morals, a ridicule of the milder 
 virtues, an extreme indifference and selfishness in respect to 
 the best interests of man, have varied the aspect without less- 
 ening the guilt of their principles or their conduct. Nor let 
 it here be said that some of the professed disciples of Chris- 
 tianity have also been depraved and wicked men. We admit 
 it. But this we reply is notwithstanding Christianity — it is in 
 spite of it, riot its effect ; while the wickedness and the profli- 
 gacy of professed infidels are the genuine fruits and effects 
 of their religion itself. The proof from facts is decisive. Such 
 has been the character of the teachers of the one system almost 
 without an exception, while the contrary character has been 
 that of the teachers of the other, with almost no exception. 
 In respect to the disciples of the two systems, in the one case a 
 hundred to one have been openly wicked and profligate, in the 
 other not one in a hundred has been. 
 
 Again ; infidels themselves do not believe in the salutary, 
 reforming tendency of their own system. What have they 
 done, I do not say to propagate their faith, but to propagate it 
 for practical, reforming purposes ? what, to secure any useful 
 practical influence on the human mind ? Is it not notorious 
 
o(4: ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 that the grand, the supreme object, end, and aim of this class 
 of men, has been to pull down and destroy Christianity, and to 
 set up Infidelity in its stead? Is it not a fact that Infidelity, so 
 far as it comprises truth in words, is a mere show, an empty 
 pretense of truth, brought forward only as matter of display 
 in argument; never as having any practical bearing on the 
 conscience ; never exhibited as a system embodying obliga- 
 tions, persuasives, motives — the least tendency or power to re- 
 claim from sin and death — but used as an imposing semblance 
 of truth — a foil to set off and commend the most destructive 
 error. Does the infidel care what men believe, provided only 
 that they do not believe Christianity ? Or rather, so far as he 
 teaches any thing positive, does he not inculcate false views of 
 God, of his character, of his relations ; and false views of man, 
 his duty, his character, his prospects? Is it not a system to 
 console rather than disturb human wickedness ? Where are 
 the truths brought forth for practical purposes which are 
 taught by the light of nature itself? Where, in the writings 
 or addresses of this class of men, is God presented to the human 
 mind as he is — God in his holiness, his justice, or even in his 
 mercy, for practical purposes ; where do you find any exhibi- 
 tion of sin as it is, in its true moral deformity, turpitude, and 
 odiousness ; repentance in its ingenuous relentings, its godly 
 contrition, brokenness of heart, and abhorrence of all sin ; of 
 the graces of humility, meekness, forgiveness, active benefi- 
 cence, with the self-denial and self-government which they in- 
 volve ; where any exhibition of the rewards of the righteous 
 and the punishments of the wicked pressed on the hopes and 
 the fears of men as incentives to piety and virtue? Where is 
 there any assault on corrupting error save that of Christian- 
 ity, or any defence of truth, except that Christianity is false. 
 Where is truth (I speak of truth taught by the light of nature), 
 developed by illustration, defended and confirmed by argu- 
 ment, and pressed home on the bosoms and business of men in 
 its practically reforming power ; where are the sinful practices 
 of men exposed and condemned ; where are the corrupt princi- 
 ples of the human heart, its selfishness, deceitfulness,its lusts and 
 inordinate passions, its worldliness, pride, and rebellion against 
 God laid open ; where is the law of God in its broad and spiritual 
 demands unfolded ; where is the full-length portrait of man 
 drawn as a sinner against God without excuse, and without 
 
WHY INFIDELS DO NOT PREACH. o<0 
 
 hope save in the mercy of a just God — mercy without merit — - 
 mercy that can save while justice can destroy; where is the 
 entreaty and the expostulation, the earnest solicitude, the be- 
 seeching tenderness, the faithful reproof, that true-hearted kind- 
 ness that consults not the passions but the welfare of men, not 
 their inclinations but their duties, that offends rather than de- 
 ceives, that utters painful truth rather than flatters to destruc- 
 tion, that humbles, and rebukes, and wounds, rather than not 
 save ; where is the study, and the toil, and the prayers, the 
 compassion, the tears, that become a reformer of fellow-beings 
 ruined for eternity ? Where are their Baxters, and Leigh tons, 
 and Doddridges, their Edwardses, and Davieses ? A death-like 
 silence answers. There is not one Christian book that does not 
 contain the essential elements of moral truth, illustrated, ap- 
 plied, enforced ; you cannot find one infidel book that does. 
 What signifies then all this pretense of infidels about reform- 
 ing the world by the light of reason? If there is truth in their 
 system, fitted and sufficient to reform and save their fellow- 
 creatures from the doom of sin, and if they sincerely believe it, 
 why not bring it forth for this high purpose, and go abroad on 
 this errand of salvation with that apostolic zeal, self-denial, and 
 devotedness, which become such a cause. Sin still maintains 
 its dark and gloomy dominion, with scarcely an exception, 
 throughout this wicked world, frowning resistance and defiance 
 a gainst God and goodness. 
 
 Why, as true men and good men, do they not open their 
 powerful battery of truth, and make their artillery thunder on 
 the strongholds of sin and death ? Honest men, believing that 
 they have the means of such a triumph, and yet doing nothing ! 
 Friends of God and of man, true-hearted philanthropists, do you 
 believe that Infidelity will reform and save a lost world ; then 
 apply it to that purpose, show your faith by your works. In the 
 name of truth and reason let us have the experiment. Oh, but 
 Christianity is in the way. Then go where there is no Chris- 
 tianity. Christianity in the way ? But Christianity, by their 
 own confession, is the best, even a perfect system of morals. 
 Why not then take truth — truth where they can find it — 
 truth, if the devil be the author of it ; and carry it forth in its 
 enlightening, transforming, and saving power, upon this dark 
 and wicked and dying world ? The infidel sincere ! An apostle 
 of Infidelity loving the souls of men ; truly believing that a 
 
376 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 lost world is to be reclaimed to God by deism ; aiming to ac- 
 complish this end by this means ! No. Every thing shows 
 that his grand, his only object is, to destroy Christianity. He 
 lives to annihilate its truths and to throw the reins loose on the 
 neck of rebellion against God. He hates Christianity. He 
 hates its author; he lives with the watchword on his lips, 
 " Crush the wretch ;" and to any labors, undertaken and pur- 
 sued from jDrinciple, for the glory of God and the salvation of 
 men, he will not make the least pretension. Labors for the 
 conversion and salvation of men ! There is not an infidel who 
 would not be ashamed of, and even resent, the imputation. 
 
 Once more, what have been the actual effects of Infidelity, 
 the practical results on the human mind. I speak of its 
 effects where it has been most successful in respect to its real 
 object of displacing the influence of Christianity and securing 
 the prevalence and legitimate results of its own principles. 
 Here I might appeal to the testimony of that multitude who 
 have been converted from Infidelity to Christianity p what is 
 their conversion in every instance by their own frank confes- 
 sion but a conversion from sin to holiness — what is it in most 
 cases but a conversion from vice, profligacy, hostility to all 
 that is good — what but a resurrection from moral degradation 
 and death ? Facts innumerable of this kind betray the camp 
 of the enemy — they show us the interior of this sepulcher. 
 But has Infidelity any such facts to show — facts of men made 
 better by renouncing Christianity for Infidelity ? Converts to 
 Infidelity from among devout and enlightened disciples of 
 Christianity, confessing their guilt for having embraced it, 
 confessing vice and crime, profligacy and debauchery as the 
 results of receiving and obeying Christianity ! Baxters, Leigh- 
 tons, Doddridges, Brainerds, Edwardses, such men in the in- 
 tegrity of their hearts renouncing the corrupting influence of 
 Christianity for the sanctifying power of Infidelity ! All the 
 world knows the absurdity, the self-contradiction, the utter im- 
 possibility of such a thing ; and know as well that the differ- 
 ence between Christianity and Infidelity is the difference be- 
 tween truth and error — truth that blesses and saves, and error 
 that curses and destroys the souls of men — the difference be- 
 tween life and death. 
 
 What has been the reforming influence of Infidelity, of human 
 reason rejecting Christianity, or perverting it, or obscuring its 
 
DOES INFIDELITY REFORM? 377 
 
 light ? What was the cause of the decay and of an almost 
 utter extinction of religion and virtue among men, from the 
 seventh to the sixteenth century? The corruption of Christi- 
 anity left the human mind to be governed by human reason 
 and depraved morals, superstitions multiplied, heathenism re- 
 vived under the garb of Christianity, spiritual tyranny was 
 established, moral duties exchanged for vows, pilgrimages, aus- 
 terities ; God, his worship, his service forgotten ; selfishness, vice, 
 crime, a long, fearful night of woe. And what brought back 
 the day ? TV" as it Infidelity ; was it human reason, unaided by 
 revelation, or was it the book of God, reopened and republished 
 by the reformers? 
 
 Take any period in this world's history and show when or 
 where, in a solitary instance, Infidelity has ever raised the 
 human mind from the gulf of ignorance and moral degrada- 
 tion ; show where Infidelity first planted religion, or preserved 
 it when planted, or revived it when it had declined, or purified 
 it when it had been corrupted.* Show the spot made bright 
 and fruitful by its boasted irradiations of light. "Where has it 
 prevailed without producing darkness, sterility, and death? 
 Need we speak of the actual experiment made in France not 
 half a century ago ? Need we refer to the corruption of all 
 ranks of her people ? Have we forgotten the goddess of rea- 
 son, the temples of reason, the religion of reason, the abolition 
 of the Sabbath, the proclamation of death as an eternal sleep, 
 and God voted out of existence ? Have we forgotten that the 
 reign of reason was the reign of terror ? 
 
 I only ask, on this part of our subject, what are the effects 
 of Infidelity in the hour of death? This is the hour of truth 
 and honesty. Now comes a grand catastrophe, and what is 
 that religion worth which condemns, and deserts, and betrays 
 the soul at last. And what is the testimony then of dying in- 
 fidels ? In whatever manner infidels die, the testimony fur- 
 nished by their deaths, though circumstantially different, is, on 
 the main fact, substantially the same. How many are their 
 confessions, that Infidelity has been only the cause of profligacy, 
 crime, and ruin ? How many criminals have avowed that In- 
 fidelity is the cause of the crimes expiated by their ignomini- 
 ous deaths ! How many have imprecated curses on the hour 
 
 * Wilson. 
 
378 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 in which they first saw an infidel book, or on the murderer of 
 souls, who put it into their hands ! But who has heard a dying 
 Christian,lament or curse the day in which he believed in his 
 Saviour? How then does the infidel die? Does he die in 
 obdurate insensibility ? Often. But what a state of mind to 
 meet death with ! What is the question now in a moment to 
 be decided? Whether Ins soul, with its stupendous powers is 
 to be blasted into annihilation, expanded to the fruition of its 
 God, or filled with endless despair and woe. And this soul, 
 callous to its every interest, indifferent to its God, without a 
 prayer for mercy, repelling every thought, suppressing every 
 emotion that becomes a dying immortal — yes, a cherished, 
 hardened insensibility, on the brink of eternity, and so soon to 
 meet the God of eternity — asleep, for aught he knows or cares, 
 on the brink of everlasting damnation! 
 
 Does the infidel die in the pride and presumption which 
 ventures on the footing of his merits to challenge the justice 
 of his God? Thus died Rousseau claiming the favor of his 
 Maker, and affirming that he returned him his soul pure and 
 immaculate as he had received it ! What a lie — what daring 
 of God to his face ! 
 
 Does the infidel die in the careless levity of cold-hearted 
 skepticism? Mr. Hume is our example. He amuses himself. 
 He reads perhaps Don Quixotte, or the Tales of Genii. He 
 laughs at death, joking about Charon and his boat, and the 
 fabled Styx, and playing at his favorite game of whist. And 
 on his death-bed finishes, what ? — his Essay on Suicide, vindi- 
 cating self-murder. Thus dies the applauded hero of Infidelity ! 
 Thus David Hume fell into the hands of the living God ! What 
 an unnatural contempt of death and of the tribunal of the final 
 Judge! Was it all pretense, or was it the brand of God's 
 reprobation ? \ 
 
 Or does the infidel die in the anguish of despair ? How nu- 
 merous the examples — how agonizing their cries! How did 
 Paine die? Under the compulsive power of conscience he 
 declared, " That if the devil ever had had an agent on earth, 
 he had been one." When his infidel friends said to him, 
 "You have lived like a man," (lived like a man!) "and we 
 hope you will die like one!" he said to one near him, " You 
 see what miserable comforters I have." To the woman whom 
 he had seduced from her husband, her friends, her religion, he 
 
THE INFIDEL AT DEATH. 379 
 
 said, "The principles I have taught you will not bear yon 
 out." As death approached, he began to betray those terrors 
 which before he laughed a't. lie would not be left alone night 
 nor day, nor suffer his attendant to be out of his sight, and 
 often for a long time together would exclaim in anguish, " O 
 Lord, help me ! O Christ, help me!" 
 
 Look now at the death of Voltaire. This prince of infidels 
 is overwhelmed with terror! What does he think now of 
 his infidel friends? "It is you," said he, " who have brought 
 me to my present state — begone ! I could have done without 
 you all." What now does he think of that Saviour he had 
 pronounced " a wretch ?" Alternately he blasphemes God, 
 and supplicates his mercy exclaiming, " O Christ, O Jesus 
 Christ !" till his friends flew from his bedside horror-struck, 
 declaring the sight too terrible to be borne."* 
 
 I have no time, nor is there need for comment. I have 
 only to ask, does philosophy, does human reason in that form 
 of it called Infidelity, supersede the necessity of a revelation 
 from God? What is Infidelity? In its fairest form, it is a 
 theft on revelation, and yet refusing to wear the garb it has 
 stolen, except to cover its own nakedness and shame ! It has 
 no support in its real form, not the shadow of warrant from 
 reason, but is a manifest defiance and contempt of all reason. 
 It has no truth, no principles. It obliterates all distinction 
 between right and wrong, and subverts the moral dominion of 
 God. It denies his true character ; it proposes to give him 
 neither honor, love nor service ; it despises holy affections, 
 spiritual enjoyments, heavenly anticipations, and gives up the 
 whole man to the dominion of the lower appetites, and the 
 sensuality of earth and time. It forgets all connection with 
 eternity and the God of eternity. Of heaven as a home, of 
 eternal happiness in fellowship with God, it has no hope. Of 
 hell as the place of his retributive wrath it has no fears. In a 
 word, Infidelity is a total disruption of the human mind from 
 the only living and true God — a wretched device for the in- 
 dulgence of the worst propensities of a fallen spirit. Will 
 such a system reform the world, or must we look to one which 
 has upon it the stamp, the seal of truth, of God, of heaven? 
 
 I need only state the third proposition, viz. : 
 
 * Wilson, Lect. XXII. 
 
380 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 3. That a divine revelation is necessary to the discovery of 
 some important truths which man could not discover with- 
 out it. 
 
 The important truths here referred to, are the doctrine of the 
 Trinity, and those doctrines which depend on it, as the doc- 
 trine of atonement made by the Son of God, and the renewing 
 influence of the Spirit of God. 
 
 In conclusion, allow me, my young friends, affectionately to 
 entreat you to avoid Infidelity. I have briefly shown you 
 what it is. Can it be true ? Can it be true that man, a crea- 
 ture of God, and formed in his image, is left to live, and act, 
 and die, under a system of faith, so fatal to the high end of his 
 creation, so dishonorable to his Father in heaven, so full of dark 
 despair to the soul? Let the infidel in his scorn for truth, and 
 in the miserable pride of exalting beyond measure the light of 
 reason, shut his eyes on the glories of Christianity. Let him 
 hold up his feeble, fading taper kindled by the light of the sun 
 of revelation ; let him pretend that it is his own, and try to 
 extinguish the very luminary at which he lighted it. But be 
 not deceived. Be not so lost to reason, to conscience, to the 
 known end of your being, so lost to all experience, to truth, to 
 God and all real good, as to listen to this empty declamation 
 about human reason. Follow him not in his infatuated wan- 
 derings. What does reason teach ? Reason employed on the 
 nature of things, of God, of man, of all moral truth. Reason em- 
 ployed on facts given in all experience. What does reason thus 
 employed teach ? That Infidelity as it is, is false — that Chris- 
 tianity, whether a revelation or not, as a moral system is true. 
 Who does not feel his blood chill at that vain pride, that love 
 of error and of sin, that can reject the moral system of Chris- 
 tianity, and treat with scorn and sarcasm and objection, a sys- 
 tem so full of hope and peace and joy to his own guilty spirit? 
 Who does not know that if he embraces Infidelity as a prac- 
 tical system, that his soul is lost, ruined, without help even 
 from its God ? Who does not know that eternal truth binds 
 such a soul in chains of everlasting darkness, guilt and woe ! 
 Who does not know that in so doing he is playing at the despe- 
 rate game of daring not only Almighty God, but everlasting 
 truth ? That he forms a hell in his own bosom, that God can- 
 not bless and save such a self-ruined immortal? 
 
 Yield then to reason. Obey the truth. Put on this pan- 
 
CONCLUSION. 381 
 
 opoly,even the whole armor of God. Now in the beginning of 
 life, in this season of temptation — in this condition of danger 
 from the frivolity, the thoughtlessness, the vanity of youthful 
 companions, remember God your Creator in the days of 
 your youth. Religion is always an ornament. In youth it is 
 a finish and a crown — it gives a charm to every accomplish- 
 ment, a luster to every excellence ; and " rich are the tints of 
 that beauty, and sweet the fragrance of those blossoms on 
 which in the morning of life the Lord God sheds down the 
 dews of his blessing." 
 
LECTURE XIII. 
 
 Direct Argument. — Question proposed. — Preliminary remarks. — 1. Question to be decided by 
 human reason. — Limits of reason. — Perversion of reason. — 2. Rational to bftlieve in divine 
 origin of Christianity on low evidence. — Eolation of Christianity to our character and life. — 
 Conclusions from this principle.— a. Unjust to demand high degree of evidence.— b. Shows 
 the true cause of Infidelity. — c. The most promising method of convincing men of the truth. 
 — rf. The reasonableness of faith in unlearned men.— 3. Common facts and principles must be 
 assumed by all parties as premises of argument. — Illustrations. — How common premises may 
 be fixed and agreed on. — Argument stated in four propositions. — First two have been previously 
 proved. 
 
 The inquiry now proposed is — 
 
 Whether the system of religion contacted ln the Bible 
 is from God ? 
 
 Before however we enter into the investigation of this in- 
 quiry, there are some preliminary topics which deserve a brief 
 consideration. 
 
 I remark then, 
 
 1. That the question proposed must be decided on the author- 
 ity of human reason. Deistical writers have maintained that 
 the belief of a divine revelation involves the renunciation of 
 reason. This is a favorite topic with Bolingbroke, Yoltaire, 
 Hume, and many others. " Our most holy religion," says Mr. 
 Hume, " is founded on faith not on reason ; and it is a sure 
 method of exposing it, to put it to such a trial as it is by no 
 means fitted to endure." Well had it been for the cause of 
 truth, had the professed friends of Christianity given no coun- 
 tenance to this sentiment. Every enlightened friend of revela- 
 tion will and must disclaim it. Christianity on its own author- 
 ity is a reasonable service, and its demand on all its disciples is, 
 " Be ready always to give an answer to every one that asketh 
 you a reason of the hope that is in you." Reason is our only 
 guide in religion, in examining the evidences of a revelation, in 
 ascertaining its import, in believing its doctrines, and in obey- 
 ing its precepts. If there ever was a religion addressed to 
 human reason, and insisting that its every claim be adjudged 
 at this tribunal, that religion is Christianity. Reason and 
 
TRUE USE OF REASON. 383 
 
 truth can never war with each other. Reason is that high 
 and noble power, whose sole prerogative it is to discover truth, 
 to weigh the evidence of truth and to receive it, and it is not 
 in the nature of the human mind, to believe either what it does 
 not understand, or what when understood, it regards as irra- 
 tional or absurd. We may indeed very rationally believe that 
 there is more in a thing than we understand. We may believe 
 a fact, the mode, the how of which we do not comprehend, but 
 then the mode, the how is not the object of our faith. Con- 
 cerning this, having no understanding, we have and can have 
 no faith. 
 
 The true use of reason in matters of religion can easily be 
 apprehended, if we would remember two things — one is, that 
 man is not omniscient, and the other that he knows some- 
 thing. Xot being omniscient, there are things which lie be- 
 yond the grasp of his intellect, wdiich for aught he knows may 
 be true or may be false, and in respect to such, while we have 
 no evidence either of their truth or falsehood, reason forbids all 
 faith. But if in respect to these things, evidence come to us, 
 whether it be by extending our vision by a telescope, or 
 whether it be by sufficient testimony of men who have seen 
 what we have not seen, or by visitors to our planet from some 
 other parts of the universe — or whether it be by God himself, 
 or by messengers from God. I say, if we have legitimate evi- 
 dence respecting things, which from the limitation of our knowl- 
 edge we must admit may be true, then on the basis of such 
 evidence, reason requires faith. To a well authenticated mes- 
 sage from God on such matters, reason in the act of uncon- 
 ditional surrender, appears in its true dignity, its highest glory. 
 Who that knows what God is, can refuse to listen to a message 
 which he believes comes from him ? True, if we could suppose 
 a well authenticated message from God delivering known false- 
 hood, then the case would be altered. We should have oppos- 
 ing decisive evidence, truth opposing truth, reason in her own 
 absolute infallibility giving opposite results — reason reduced to 
 a quandary from which with all its boasted prowess there would 
 be no deliverance — reason that is no longer reason, but a name 
 of worthlessness and contempt. But reason is now supposed to 
 be in a condition in which it cannot be reason. The case sup- 
 posed can never be, if there is such a thing as reason. The 
 exercise of reason giving results, implies truth and the evidence 
 
384 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 of truth. There cannot be the former without the latter. A 
 well authenticated message from God can no more deliver 
 known falsehood, than two and two can be five. If it does, it 
 is not from God; if it is from God it gives infallible truth. 
 Eeason then having ascertained that God speaketh, must deem 
 it its highest honor to bow to his declaration with implicit con- 
 fidence. To oppose such a message with fancies and theories 
 of our own devising, is an infamous violation of reason's pre- 
 rogative, by exalting shameless ignorance to her throne — and 
 as to being rational or philosophical, is as ridiculous as was ever 
 schoolman with his quiddities, or a Cartesian with his whirl- 
 pools. 
 
 Further ; while there are some things which fall without, there 
 are others that fall within the limits of human knowledge and 
 human judgment. The human mind can and must judge of 
 the truth and falsehood of many things for itself, in entire in- 
 dependence of a revelation. And not only so, it can judge of 
 truth and falsehood within given limits, and every item of its 
 actual faith within these limits, shall be as truly rational as 
 were man omniscient, The mind is made to know some things, 
 and to believe some things. To refuse to confide in faith, or 
 those judgments which are given by evidence, is to throw 
 away and in effect to annihilate one part of the mind itself, 
 that on which man is doomed to place reliance more exten- 
 sively than on any other ; and he who does it, if he does not 
 thereby in fact become, must expect in all equity to be 
 esteemed, an idiot. This part of the mind is made to be 
 used, and its results are as truly and properly to be confided 
 in, as those of intuition or demonstration. Man then to a great 
 extent can judge of truth and falsehood, of possible and impos- 
 sible things, of evidence, its kinds, its weight absolute and 
 comparative — particularly, he can judge of the merit and de- 
 merit of testimony, as these depend on the character and cir- 
 cumstances of the witness, and on the subject matter of what 
 he testifies. He can judge of and perceive the truth and false- 
 hood of such credentials as the performance of a miracle or the 
 fulfilment of a prophesy, he can judge of the signs of honesty 
 and veracity, of dishonesty and imposture, of mental imbe- 
 cility and strength, of credulity and incredulity, of soundness 
 of mind, and fanatical or enthusiastic illusion and extravagance, 
 as these are indicated in the manner, the style, the tone, the 
 
WHAT CAN REASON DECIDE? 385 
 
 countenance, the intellectual operations, the benevolent design, 
 the uncompromising principle, the undaunted constancy of the 
 witness. lie can judge to a great extent of fitnesses and adap- 
 tations, of the tendencies of the great principles of action in men 
 and in God ; of what is right, what is wrong, of what man is 
 made for, of what he is, and what he ought to be. lie can see 
 what God is, what he has done and has not done, what he is 
 doing, what he will do and what he will not do. All this to a 
 great extent reason can do, has a right and is bound to do. 
 Otherwise it matters not as to the rationality of our faith, 
 whether we are Mahomedans, Boodhists, Infidels, or Christians. 
 If reason can make no distinctions, discover no differences, con- 
 fide in no judgments, it were as rational to be one thing as 
 another, to confide in malignity as in benevolence, to receive 
 the illusions of Satan as the inspirations of the Holy Ghost. 
 
 Human reason too can judge of the subject matter of testi- 
 mony, and this in every respect in which it is important to a 
 sound and rational conclusion. It can decide in some cases 
 what can be true, and what cannot be true ; and it can decide 
 when it cannot decide either, and can thus assign a limit to its 
 own decisions. It can settle the important previous question, 
 wli ether the subject matter of the testimony lies within its 
 antecedent knowledge, or whether it does not. If it does not, 
 but comes to us as information from a region which reason has 
 not explored, and from its own limitations cannot explore, then 
 reason can judge whether in its own nature it be credible or in- 
 credible. If incredible, it can and ought to reject it. If credi- 
 ble, it can then judge whether the allegation be sustained by 
 evidence or not. If not thus sustained, then again it can and 
 ought to reject it ; if thus sustained, then why refuse to learn 
 from one competent to instruct and entitled to confidence? 
 Again, the subject matter may lie within our antecedent knowl- 
 edge, and cases of this kind may be supposed to be very diverse. 
 It may be one in which the knowledge communicated is in- 
 significant and worthless in itself, or in which its communica- 
 tion from heaven would be unnecessary and useless because 
 already fully possessed and acted upon, or one in which the 
 knowledge though highly useful is not possessed at all, or only 
 partially and imperfectly, or in which the knowledge is possess- 
 ed but perverted, and needs to be presented in some new and 
 more impressive form, or it may be one in which the knowl- 
 Vol. I.— 17. 25 
 
386 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 edge is attainable only, but not attained, and never will be, 
 ■without such a mode of communication, or it may be one which 
 shall be characterized by several of these facts. Of the sub- 
 ject matter, in all these respects human reason is competent to 
 form the requisite judgment. On the contrary, the fact to be 
 believed may be supposed to be utterly incredible in itself. 
 For example, should the witness tell us that the planets do 
 not revolve around the sun, that the sun itself does not shine, 
 that the rivers do not run into the ocean, that the three angles 
 of a triangle are not equal to two right angles, that a part is 
 equal to the whole, or that man is a perfect being, loving God 
 with all his heart, and his neighbor as himself, we should and 
 we ought at once to confront him with our philosophical de- 
 monstrations, our daily experience and observation, our own 
 intuition and consciousness. Thus human reason can judge, 
 has a right, and is bound to judge of each and every thing re- 
 specting a revelation which has, or can have, any bearing on 
 faith or no faith. Here is the prerogative, to sit in judgment 
 on the credentials of heaven's ambassador, and on the message 
 which he brings. When there is no evidence, let it have no 
 faith. When there is evidence, let it judge according to evi- 
 dence, and every item of its faith, whether in the form of assent 
 or dissent, is as truly rational and trust-worthy as were its 
 knowledge infinite. 
 
 But reason may be perverted. Yes, and that is our concern, 
 and its consequences will be ours. Reason may be perverted ; 
 is reason then all our strength and all our reliance? Yes. But 
 when I say this I mean reason ; not reason perverted. When 
 I speak of and commend Christianity, I mean not a corrupted, 
 false Christianity. When I speak of man, of his exaltation 
 and dignity, of his noble powers, and the achievements of 
 which he is capable, I mean not a corpse corrupted in its grave. 
 Reason perverted is not reason, it is folly, madness. And be- 
 cause reason may be perverted, is it therefore not all our re- 
 liance and all our strength in the discovery of truth ? Reason 
 may be perverted, and therefore is not to be used! What 
 then, in the name of reason, shall we use ? Answer, in the 
 name of reason, and not use your reason, if you can. Or an- 
 swer with self-consistency, and say our folly, and you are 
 welcome to the results. What nonsense to pretend to prove 
 by reason that there is no reliance on reason ! 
 
LOW DEGREE OF EVIDENCE. 387 
 
 2. It may be rational to believe in the divine origin of Chris- 
 tianity, on the supposition of a comparatively low degree of 
 evidence of the fact. Those who reject Christianity have often 
 insisted that a peculiarly high degree of evidence is requisite, 
 to warrant faith in the divine origin of this system of religion. 
 This claim is based on the principle, that a benevolent God in 
 giving a religion to men, on the reception or rejection of which 
 such tremendous consequences depend, would not fail to furn- 
 ish such a degree of evidence as would infallibly secure human 
 belief. To this I reply, that it either proceeds on the principle 
 that faith can be compelled by evidence, to the entire exclusion 
 of disbelief, or it does not. If it does, it rests on a false princi- 
 ple. The human mind can disbelieve, and has disbelieved, 
 against the highest probable, and even against demonstrative 
 evidence. Besides a compelled faith would be utterly incon- 
 sistent with moral responsibility on the part of man. "What 
 moral worth, what respect for God or confidence in his charac- 
 ter would be involved in a faith which a man could not shun 
 nor avoid. Nor is this all, it is in fact claiming that the whole 
 system of Christianity shall be changed from a moral system 
 to one of physical influence, and of course that it shall neither 
 be right to receive nor wrong to reject it. The act of reception 
 would be of physical necessity, not moral obedience. Is it then 
 said, that the evidence might be so increased as to secure faith 
 without compulsion ? I answer, that any supposable increase 
 of evidence, instead of securing faith, might prove the greatest 
 calamity, since for aught that appears, men might still reject 
 that evidence and thus greatly augment the guilt of unbelief. 
 Suppose then, that when Christianity was introduced into the 
 world, it had been written in the heavens above us in letters of 
 light and fire so that all the dwellers on earth would read it, 
 " Christianity is a revelation from God," this would have 
 compelled the faith of men to the exclusion of disbelief, or it 
 would not. If it would, then it would have been inconsistent 
 with a moral system, and faith itself had been no virtue. If 
 it would not, then like any other miracle, as that of the rend- 
 ing rocks, the opening graves, the rising dead, the quaking 
 earth and darkened sun, it might have only aggravated the 
 guilt of every unbeliever. We are therefore utterly incompe- 
 tent to decide what would be the dictate of benevolence in the 
 case. The rn'oper question for us then, is not what a benevo- 
 
388 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 lent God would do, but what it is rational for ns to do, in view 
 of what he has actually done. Or, to present the question 
 which I now wish to examine, more precisely — is it rational on 
 our part to believe in the divine origin of Christianity, on the 
 supposition of a comparatively low degree of evidence of the 
 fact? 
 
 The infidel then will not complain, if we impute to him the 
 opinion, that the religion which he takes so much pains to de- 
 stroy, is unfriendly, or at least unnecessary to human happiness. 
 Nor, if he can make good this opinion, shall we have any con- 
 troversy with him in respect to the reasonableness of his demand 
 for a higher degree of evidence that this religion is from God. 
 Such a religion would, in its very nature, furnish a strong pre- 
 sumption against its divine origin, and a very high degree of 
 evidence be fairly required to counteract, if indeed any degree 
 could counteract, such a presumption. 
 
 But if a religion demands our faith in its divine origin, and 
 if to believe it divine, is obviously, and in every respect essen- 
 tial to our true and best interests, then the case is materially 
 changed. It is a common mistake, that a man's interest ought 
 to have no influence on his faith. There are cases in which it 
 removes presumptive evidence to the contrary, and even be- 
 comes evidence of truth. Were one of you to be told that 
 your father had disinherited you in his will, it would require 
 more evidence to make you believe it, than if you were told 
 that he had bequeathed to you your portion of his estate. True 
 it undoubtedly is, that his interest should never leact him to 
 believe without, or against evidence. But sound reason often 
 dictates faith, and faith that shall be practical, in view of what 
 may be termed comparatively very slight evidence. If in a 
 particular case my interest will not be injured by believing — 
 if it may he greatly injured by not believing, and if it may he 
 essentially promoted by believing, then to believe on the ground 
 of slight evidence, so far as to control action, is the dictate of 
 sound reason. 
 
 That this principle of faith is the dictate of sound reason and 
 common sense, may be shown by its universal application in 
 all the affairs of human life. A scheme for the accumulation 
 of wealth occurs to the merchant, which can result in no possible 
 loss, which may produce large acquisition, and which, neglected, 
 may involve him in ruin. A sick man may soon die, unless 
 
SUPPOSE OUR "WELL-BEING IS CONCERNED. 389 
 
 some proposed remedy be used ; the use of it can do no pos- 
 sible injury, but may restore him to health. Now what is the 
 dictate of reason in respect to faith — that degree of faith which 
 is necessary to action — however slight the evidence or proba- 
 bility, if it be real evidence, that a good result will be secured ? 
 Ought such evidence to be rejected or disregarded ? Would 
 that be sound reason ? But in the case before us, we have in- 
 terests at stake immeasurably more momentous. We are con- 
 fessedly in the hands of an Almighty Being, and at his disposal 
 forever. A system of religion, claiming to be from Him, is in 
 our possession, and demands our faith in its divine origin, on 
 the alternative of endless happiness or endless misery. To be- 
 lieve it to be divine, we will now suppose, can result in no real 
 evil, but may result in immeasurable good ; not to believe it 
 to be divine may result in immeasurable evil. Who can ration- 
 ally hesitate what to believe, be the balance of probability from 
 other sources in support of the divine origin of this religion 
 ever so small ? 
 
 The case would be still stronger, if we were here to assume 
 (what would be perfectly legitimate, in view of our former 
 conclusions,) viz., that to yield to the practical influence of 
 Christianity is indispensable to man's highest happiness in this 
 world. Nor would it be too much to assume, as a point con- 
 ceded by the most respectable infidel authors, that the practical 
 tendency of Christianity is to perfect man in character and in 
 happiness. If then we suppose that a man may conform his 
 character substantially to this system of religion, without be- 
 lieving it to be divine, still it is undeniable that such a faith 
 would secure to it a far higher and more perfect influence. I 
 may go farther still. If we suppose there is no evidence to the 
 fact of the divine origin of this religion, except that which 
 arises from its perfect adaptation to man's moral perfection and 
 consequent happiness, it were the highest, noblest act of reason 
 to believe. And further still, on the supposition of this per- 
 fect adaptation to this high end, I say, if Christianity be a de- 
 lusion, disturb not my faith in its divine origin. If falsehood 
 is better than truth, then let us have falsehood. As a moral 
 being, who has much to enjoy and to hope for in time, and 
 who may live onward in the ages of eternity, I cannot dispense 
 with the influence of such a faith, nor abandon its consolations 
 and its prospects. 
 
390 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 I might add did our limits allow, that on the supposition of 
 a low degree of evidence for Christianity, while more proof 
 might be useless and worse than useless, there may be great 
 advantages in exactly that degree of evidence which God has 
 furnished. Particularly, it may be one benignant part of that 
 system of moral discipline by which our honesty and integrity 
 of principle are to be tried and confirmed, by which men are 
 to be made considerate, impartial, and attentive to every degree 
 of evidence ; to be kept from levity, and contempt, and ridicule, 
 on a subject on which their eternal well-being, and that of a 
 world, may depend. 
 
 If the principle of faith which I have now presented be 
 rational, it shows the following things, viz. : 
 
 (1.) The injustice of the demand for any peculiarly high de- 
 gree of evidence in favor of Christianity as the only legitimate 
 ground of faith. 
 
 (2.) It shows the true cause of Infidelity in those who make 
 this demand for higher evidence, viz., that they do not regard 
 Christianity as adapted to promote their true and best inter- 
 ests, and that they do not like it as a system of religion. It 
 involves, in their view, a derangement of their plans, and a 
 thwarting of their inclinations. I am not now saying whether 
 they are right or wrong in this opinion, but simply that such 
 must be their opinion. For when was it known that a man dis- 
 believed against even the slightest balance of probability, while 
 he fully regarded it for his interest, in every respect, to believe? 
 
 (3.) It shows what, in many cases, is the most promising 
 method of convincing men of the divine origin of Christianity, 
 viz., to show them its adaptation to man's present and future 
 well-being. If such be the real nature of this religion, its re- 
 ception or rejection must depend greatly on its being seen and 
 understood to be what it really is. As long as the thing itself 
 is not understood, its rejection, if not rational, is not strange, 
 but easily accounted for. Why should a man receive a system 
 of religion of which he knows nothing, merely because some 
 one tells him it is from heaven? Kay more; why should he 
 even examine the question of its divine origin ? He sees no- 
 thing in its nature or its adaptations that give any importance 
 to the question, whether it come from heaven or not ; nothing 
 of course, to render it worth a demonstration. And if with 
 this ignorance of the thing itself, we suppose the conviction to 
 
REAL IMPORT OF THE SCRIPTURES. 391 
 
 be associated of its utter uselessness, and even of hostile tend- 
 ency to good results, why should such a mind, with these views 
 of the matter, care to know what the evidence of its divine 
 origin is ? By what asseverations of the divine origin of Ma- 
 homedanism could you induce the population of New Eng- 
 land seriously to examine the question ? 
 
 But now suppose a man to become well acquainted with the 
 Bible, and to find that the book actually develops the most 
 perfect system of means for the accomplishment of the most 
 perfect conceivable end — a mighty scheme for a mighty pur- 
 pose — a scheme and a purpose worthy of an infinite being, 
 nothing less than a scheme or system of means to secure to a 
 world of his intelligent and immortal creatures, perfection in 
 character and perfection in happiness. Suppose him to see 
 that the scheme is as simple as it is grand, as perfect in its 
 adaptation as it is glorious in its end, as indispensable as it is 
 useful — that it is so in the very nature of things, that it is and 
 must be so from the very constitution of the human mind, and 
 that the belief of it as divine has as direct a tendency to secure 
 the result in the absolute perfection of every human being, as 
 the belief of danger to produce alarm, or the prospect of good, 
 the desire and pursuit of it. I ask, would not such a man be 
 very apt to say, " I shall examine the evidence of the divine 
 origin of this book, here is something worthy of such an origin, 
 every presumption that it is the imposture of empirics, villains 
 and enthusiasts is removed — it may be from God, it comports 
 with his character, it is the very thing and the only thing fitted 
 to accomplish the design of Him who made man, it is that, and 
 exactly that which a benignant Creator would do for his own 
 creatures — my highest, best immortal interest may depend on 
 the question — I must see and know whether God has done this 
 thing or not." I am not now saying what the result of such 
 an examination would be, but that without some just knowl- 
 edge of what Christianity is, no man will examine the question 
 of its divine origin, and with such knowledge, no man who has 
 not become reckless of God, and of his own immortal nature 
 and immortal interests will refuse to examine it. It may be 
 from God, all it says of God may he true, all it says of the Sav- 
 iour, of the miracles of his power and grace, of the scenes of 
 immortality and retribution — all it says of those who believe 
 not may he true. He who refuses with this tremendous perad- 
 
392 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 venture in view, despises God, despises a soul, the next greatest 
 thing to God, and that soul is his own. 
 
 (4.) It shows the reasonableness of faith in that great num- 
 ber of believers in Christianity, who do not and who cannot 
 consistently with the other duties of life, become acquainted with 
 but a small part of the evidence on the question. Of this class 
 of men not one in a thousand has the leisure, or the talents, or 
 the learning requisite to examine and weigh one-half of the 
 evidence, especially what is called the external evidence. 
 What qualification have the greater part of believers in Chris- 
 tianity to enter into the controversy with Hume or Yoltaire ? 
 And have they therefore no reasonable faith? Have the 
 common people no reason to believe the almanac because they 
 are not astronomers — to believe that an eclipse will happen as 
 foretold because they are incompetent to calculate an eclipse 
 themselves ? Have the same class of men no reason to believe 
 that boats and locomotives are propelled by steam, because the 
 jmilosopher has evidence that it must be so, which they have 
 not ? Plainly we may have sufficient evidence of truth with- 
 out having all that which others possess. And in the present 
 case, the author of the gospel may have intended that its great 
 object and end and its perfect adaptation to that end, should be 
 its chief evidence, especially to the great mass of mankind. Of 
 this they may be perfectly competent judges. This, according 
 to the laws of evidence, may be altogether sufficient to an 
 honest, while more would be utterly insufficient to a dishonest 
 mind, and while to neglect this, may be to neglect the very 
 ground on which God has rested the proof, and required belief 
 of by far the greater part of mankind. Accordingly, I hope to 
 show that from the Bible alone, in the adaptation of its con- 
 tents to man's perfection in character and happiness, a most 
 conclusive argument may be derived that it is from God, one 
 on the strength of which the unlettered peasant, ignorant as 
 lie is of all history, and destitute as he is of all learning, shall 
 be more rational in his belief than Hume, Yoltaire and Gib- 
 bon in their unbelief with all their scholarship. 
 
 (5.) If the principle of faith before stated be rational, it will 
 enable us to form a juster estimate of the amount of the actual 
 evidence, and to see how abundant and overwhelming it must 
 be to a well balanced mind. Nothing is more remote from 
 the truth than the supposed confession by the advocates of Chris- 
 
VARIETY OF ARGUMENTS. 393 
 
 tianity, that it rests its claim on a low degree of evidence. So 
 far from it, there is scarcely any single question on which in 
 their view evidence may be so accumulated. Witness " the 
 piles of authorship," not merely as made up of repetitions, hut 
 of divers arguments resting on independent grounds, and 
 drawn from distinct sources. Let the works of Butler, of 
 Lardner, of Paley, of Wilson, of Erskine, of Gregory, and 
 many other modern authors, tell how in the estimation of the 
 friends of Christianity, its proofs have been augmented in later 
 times and down to the present hour. It is not then to he as- 
 sumed,thsit the claim for the divine origin of Christianity rests 
 on any thing like a low degree of evidence. It is a question 
 to be tried, a question not to be disposed of in favor of such a 
 claim, till some hundredth or thousandth part of the evidence 
 shall be examined and overthrown by those who make it. If 
 any considerable part of the evidence offered and relied on is 
 substantial, then indeed it is abundant and overwhelming. 
 iSTay more; there is evidence in every form, of every kind 
 and degree which can be well imagined on the subject ; evi- 
 dence, in the language of another, fitted alike for " the high 
 achievement of silencing Infidelity in the lofty and academic 
 walks of life, as well as to carry Christianity into workshops 
 and cottages." Christianity in the fullness of her strength, if 
 one-half of what is claimed for her be true, has arguments for 
 Jew and Gentile, for bond and free, for men of a false religion 
 and men of no religion — arguments " by which she may con- 
 front the powers of literature, and compel the most arrogant of 
 her disciples to do her homage, and those also by which her 
 ministers from the pulpit may spread a well grounded faith 
 amidst the multitude of the people." 
 
 I am not now saying that such evidence does in fact, but 
 only that it is claimed to exist ; and that on the true principle 
 of rational faith, if only a considerable part of what is claimed, 
 does exist and is substantial evidence, then it is abundant 
 and even overwhelming, to an enlightened and well-balanced 
 mind. 
 
 3. While it is essential to a fair argument on the question 
 of a revelation from God, that the facts and principles which 
 constitute the premises should be mutually understood and 
 admitted by the parties, it is true that to a considerable ex- 
 tent they are not thus understood and admitted. These facts 
 17* 
 
394 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 are very numerous, and while some of them are understood 
 and admitted by the parties, others are not, and others only 
 in some general respects, but not in those on which the con- 
 clusion depends. I need not say, that it is to no purpose that 
 the parties reason in such a case for the conviction of one 
 another. In my own view, the fact that there has been so 
 much of this mode of argumentation, is a principal reason that 
 this controversy has not long since been terminated, so far as 
 its continuance has depended on any show of argument. I 
 say not whose fault it is. But so much is undeniable, that the 
 premises of the argument, if any thing is accomplished by 
 reasoning, must be understood and admitted by the parties. 
 What is not understood must be explained, and if denied must 
 be proved or abandoned. To see the bearing of these remarks 
 let us take a case. 
 
 Suppose you have received a letter from another, having the 
 signature of your father, and the question should arise, whether 
 it is actually written by him. Now to take the question ah in- 
 itio', if you have no father, the debate is ended before it can be 
 really begun. If you have a father, then there is room for the 
 question whether the letter be from him. Again, if you have a 
 father, and yet there is some absolute impossibility that he 
 should be the author of the letter, or of any letter whatever, 
 this precludes all further debate ; while if the possibility of his 
 writing a letter be admitted, then the question in this respect 
 is open for discussion. Again, let it be supposed that he is one 
 of the wisest and most affectionate of parents, and that the 
 letter, in respect to its contents, is wholly and even contempti- 
 bly useless and unnecessary, as advising you to eat and drink 
 and breathe, if you would live; or suppose that without any 
 sufficient cause or reason, and under pretexts known to be en- 
 tirely groundless, it consists of threatenings to injure you — 
 even to withdraw all support and kindness, and to cast you out 
 as a disinherited exile; suppose that in one of these respects 
 the contents of the letter are absolutely irreconcilable with 
 the known character of the father, here again there is a strong 
 presumption against the supposed authorship. Again, let it be 
 supposed that the father is not only most judicious and affec- 
 tionate, but a man of high literary and scientific acquisitions ; 
 that he is, above all things, intent to secure the scholarship of 
 
LETTER FROM A FATHER TO HIS SON". 395 
 
 his son, and peculiarly competent to aid him in attaining the 
 highest literary eminence, and that the letter is written in sub- 
 servience to this object ; that it contains counsels, directions, 
 inducements, and information, which are peculiarly fitted, and 
 even necessary, to secure the end on which his heart is set ; in 
 a word, it is just such a letter as such a father in such circum- 
 stances would write to such a son, and you perceive some of 
 the strongest reasons for believing that he actually wrote it. 
 Again, as we suppose certain other things to be true or not to 
 be true — the handwriting, the style, the manner, &c, &c, to 
 be or not to be those of the father ; or the letter to contain or 
 not to contain allusions, implications, coincidences, statements 
 of facts, of a certain character — these things, as they may be 
 supposed to be or not to be, would have an important bearing 
 on the question. Again ; let it be supposed that the letter de- 
 clares, that for the purpose of placing the authenticity of the 
 letter itself beyond all reasonable doubt, that the father has 
 done what in the case would be deemed a very singular and 
 extraordinary thing — something which neither he nor any other 
 man ever did before — something indeed, which if done would 
 settle the question, but which, in your view of the case, it 
 is absolutely incredible that he should do — so incredible, that 
 no evidence, especially no testimony, can, in your view, when 
 simply placed and balanced against its inherent incredibility, 
 be esteemed sufficient proof that he has done it, and yet that 
 the authenticity of the letter is made to depend on the fact that 
 he has done this very thing. Here again is something which 
 bears against the alleged source of the letter. But now again, in 
 view of the high importance and even necessity of your believ- 
 ing it to be from your father, in order to accomplish its object, 
 let us imagine what was not before supposed, that your father 
 is fully apprised of some cause, some peculiar structure of your 
 mind, some propensity or mode of thinking, that will prevent 
 you from believing the letter to come from him without the 
 supposed extraordinary marks of its authenticity ; and that he 
 knows, and that you and others know, if the object of the let- 
 ter is to be attained, this is altogether the best way to attain it. 
 Now, in view of the father's ardent and supreme desire to 
 accomplish the object, there arises a strong presumption that 
 he will adopt the very method, which, under another view of 
 
396 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 the case, appeared so entirely incredible ; for yon now see a 
 reason why he should do it, even one which renders it almost 
 incredible that he should not. 
 
 Thus you see how, on the supposition of one kind of prem- 
 ises, the mind is led to one conclusion, and on the supposition 
 of another kind, to the opposite conclusion, respecting the sup- 
 posed origin of the letter. Just so it is in respect to the great 
 question, whether God has given a revelation to man. The 
 cases are entirely analogous. And the force of an argument 
 for a divine revelation on each individual mind will depend on 
 the views which that mind has of what God is, what his char- 
 acter is, what his relations to man are, what he has done, and 
 what he has not done, what is and what is not his great end in 
 man's creation, and what are his particular designs toward him ; 
 what he will do to accomplish his designs; what man is, what 
 his character is, what his relations and his destiny are; and 
 what the Bible is, what it is in its design, adaptation and tend- 
 ency, and how it agrees or disagrees with the character of God 
 and with his relations and designs toward man. It is only as 
 we understand these things, that we^are competent to make an 
 argument on this subject, or to judge of one when it is made. 
 It is only as the parties in this controversy understand and are 
 agreed in these great facts and principles respecting God, and 
 man, and the Bible, that they are prepared to enter on the dis- 
 cussion with any prospect or hope of advantage. How could 
 any man be a competent judge of the question concerning the 
 supposed letter, who knew nothing of the character, the designs, 
 the relations of the father, nothing of the son, and nothing of 
 the contents of the letter ? You see then, that unless the par- 
 ties in the present discussion are agreed in the premises, the 
 discussion must be fruitless. 
 
 Now I readily admit, that in many of the facts which con- 
 stitute the premises they are agreed, but I maintain that in 
 many others they are not ; and that so long as they are not, the 
 argument for the divine origin of Christianity must prove in- 
 effectual. I said they are agreed in some of the premises. 
 They agree that there is a God of infinite natural perfection ; 
 that he is a being of a perfect moral character, or infinitely 
 benevolent, disposed to secure the greatest amount of happi- 
 ness which in the nature of things he can secure; they agree 
 that he is the providential governor of the world, and, as the 
 
PARTIES NOT ENTIRELY AGREED. 397 
 
 omniscient author of all tilings, his providential will must ex- 
 tend to all actual beings and events ; they may also agree that 
 he is the moral governor of men, in some very general and 
 indefinite sense. But in respect to the particular nature of the 
 government which God exercises over this world, and therefore 
 in respect to the precise method, way, or means by which God 
 aims to secure the happiness of his creatures, whether it in- 
 volves necessarily in the nature of things, a perfect moral gov- 
 ernment of free moral agents by law, with a strict adherence 
 to all the peculiar principles and influences of such a system as 
 the best means of the best end ; and if it does, whether such a 
 system does or does not in its own nature involve the existence 
 of evil, natural and moral, and whether it does or does not in 
 its own nature preclude the final termination of all evil — 
 whether there is a future state, and whether we have any 
 means of deciding what will be man's condition hereafter— 
 what hopes and what fears he would be authorized to entertain 
 from the light of nature, — whether man, without a revelation, 
 would or could, on the basis of evidence, look forward with 
 cheering anticipations to the future, or whether he would be 
 compelled by the most decisive evidence only to forebode a 
 fearful hour of retribution — on these, and many other main 
 questions, the parties are not agreed. Ko one can have at- 
 tentively read the controversy on both sides of this great 
 question, without seeing that one of the parties reasons on 
 one set of premises and principles, and the other party on 
 another. 
 
 Were we to see an artificer employed in constructing a ma- 
 chine, though we were ignorant of its nature and its design, 
 still, if we knew that he was neither deficient in power, skill, 
 materials, or disposition to finish it, but was fixed and immuta- 
 ble in his resolution to give it ultimately, and as rapidly as the 
 case allows, its highest perfection, we should have no doubt 
 that the machine, whatever it might be, would be finished, and 
 the end proposed accomplished. 
 
 Again ; if now we suppose the purpose or end aimed at to 
 be ascertained, this at least, in many cases, would give us the 
 means which he would adopt, or was adopting, to accomplish 
 his end. If his object was to propel a boat through the water, 
 we should expect him, in these days, to make a steam-engine. 
 If his object was to see what is to be seen in the moon, we 
 
398 ARGUMENT PROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 should expect liim to make a telescope; or if it was to mark 
 the divisions of time, we should expect him to make a watch 
 or a clock. 
 
 Again, let ns now suppose that the machine is so far ad- 
 vanced, that any competent judge can decide beyond all mis- 
 take, both what the machine is, and what is its object or end. 
 Then also such a jndge can decide with entire confidence in 
 respect to many particular things ivhich will be done and 
 vihich will not be done by the artificer, in order to complete 
 the machine and accomplish his end. Let it now be supposed 
 that you and I are spectators of the progress of the work, and 
 this particular question to arise between us and to engage us 
 in fierce debate, viz., whether the machine when finished will 
 contain a main-spring or not f And let us further suppose, 
 that although there is in fact no reason to doubt on the point, 
 that by some strange obliquity or imbecility of mind on the 
 part of one of us, we are not agreed as to what the machine is, 
 and you insist that the man is making a telescope, and I insist 
 that he is making a watch. Xow to what purpose shall we 
 discuss the question concerning the main-spring, unless we can 
 settle the preliminary question, whether the artificer is in fact 
 making a watch or a telescope ? And how can the debate be 
 prolonged a moment with the least show of reason until this 
 previous question is correctly decided ? 
 
 Substantially like this, in my view, is the state of the con- 
 troversy between the opposers and the advocates of a divine 
 revelation. The former have such views of the character 
 of God, of his object and end in the creation and govern- 
 ment of this world, and especially of the means he has actu- 
 ally adopted to accomplish this end, that they can no more 
 see a reason why God should give a revelation to men, and 
 such a revelation as the Bible is supposed to contain, than 
 why a skillful artificer should insert a main-spring or a pend- 
 ulum in a telescope. Hence their constant asseveration — it 
 is utterly impossible, or if obliged to qualify a little by being 
 reminded of God's omnipotence, and of the manifestation of 
 his direct agency in creation, still they affirm that consider- 
 ing the character and designs of God, and the object and na- 
 ture of Christianity, it is irrational, even utterly incredible, that 
 it should be the subject of a direct interposition from heaven. 
 
 The advocates of Christianity however from their premises 
 
WHAT MAN CAN KNOW. 399 
 
 come to the directly opposite conclusion. With their views of 
 the character of God, of his great object and end in the crea- 
 tion and government of this world of intelligent beings, and 
 especially of the means or system which he has adopted for 
 the accomplishment of this end, there is the same reason to 
 conclude that God would give a revelation to the world, and 
 the very revelation claimed, which there is for concluding that 
 the supposed artificer in making a watch, would insert a main- 
 spring to complete the instrument. Why should not God as 
 well as man give completeness to the means of an end ? 
 
 But here we come to another vital question, viz., is man comjM- 
 tent to say what God will do and what he will not do f Is not the 
 subj ect altogether too high for us ? When we think what God is, of 
 the eternity of his government, and of our distance from all direct 
 and personal observation of him and the depth of his counsels, 
 are not the form and mode of the management of his empire, 
 wholly inaccessible to all our faculties ? I answer, if this indeed 
 be so, then let us cease all inquiry, for to what purpose is it to in- 
 quire or reason or form opinions where nothing can be known ? 
 If it is all darkness here, then it is as dark to the infidel as to 
 the Christian, and if the Christian cannot say what God will do, 
 the infidel cannot say what he will not do. We may be right 
 or we may be wrong in our conclusions, and that is all that can 
 be said of the matter. But is it credible that a benevolent 
 God has doomed his dependent creatures — creatures who know 
 that their all depends on what God will or will not clo, to the 
 darkness and agony of utter uncertainty. Can it be that the 
 almighty and supreme disposer of all destiny has given us no 
 intimation of his designs ? True indeed it is, that man is in- 
 competent to say in many respects what God will or will not 
 do ; but in other resj)ects, and we may safely say in all which 
 are important to man's well-being, man is competent to say 
 what God will and what God will not do. 
 
 The great point here undoubtedly is to distinguish what we 
 can know or prove, from that which we cannot know or prove. 
 And what I maintain is, that we can do this to such an extent 
 as to furnish the sure premises of irrefragable argumentation 
 on the most momentous of all questions to man, viz., what 
 must be his destiny and on what it depends ? Kor should it 
 be forgotten, that the argument must of course be confined ex- 
 clusively to what we do know or can prove ; and that we are 
 
400 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 to place no reliance on what we do not know, ignorance being 
 alike incompetent to make either an objection or an argument. 
 The premises being conceded, all they involve and give, must 
 be conceded also. If there is a benevolent God, then man can 
 say, if such a God does any thing, what he does will be better 
 than to do nothing. If he proposes an end, it will be the best 
 end which he can accomplish. If he adopts the means of ac- 
 complishing an end, the means will be the best which he can 
 adopt. If man can know what the best end is, as he most 
 assuredly can, viz., the highest well-being of all, and if man 
 can also ascertain what are the necessary and best means of 
 accomplishing this end, then he can say that God will pro- 
 pose this end and adopt these means. If man can ascertain 
 that a perfect God has actually adopted a given system of 
 means for a given end, then can he say that system is the best. 
 If man can know that any practicable thing is either essentially 
 or circumstantially necessary to the perfection of this system of 
 means, then also he can say God will do that. Thus knowledge 
 gives knowledge, if w T e know one thing we know another — if 
 we know what a triangle is, we may know its angles to be 
 equal to two right angles — if we know that whiteness exists, 
 we know also that there is something white. On the contrary, 
 if that knowledge is wanting which is necessary to further 
 knowledge, then of course such further knowledge will not ex- 
 ist. If I know that one has made a watch, then I know what 
 a watch is ; and knowing what a watch is, I know it has a 
 main-spring — if it answers the purpose for which it is made, I 
 know it must be wound up, and if I also know either that no 
 one could, or that no one would do this but the maker, and 
 know that it has been done, then I know that he has done it. 
 But if I do not know any one of these things on which my 
 knowledge of another thing depends, then I do not know the 
 latter. In the same manner is our knowledge of God and of 
 his doings more or less extended or limited. If we know or 
 can prove certain things concerning God, then we can know 
 and prove certain other things, and are as truly competent to 
 say in such cases what God will do and what he will not do, as 
 we are in like cases to say what a man will do, and w T hat he 
 will not do. 
 
 Xor can I dismiss the topic here. To maintain the doctrine 
 of this necessary ignorance of God on the part of man, is not 
 
WHAT MAN CAN KNOW. 401 
 
 only to provide a refuge from the power of truth, it is to sub- 
 vert all reasoning respecting God and the relations subsisting 
 between God and his creatures. Whether there be a God or 
 not, whether he be omnipotent, wise and good or not, are 
 things of no importance for man to know, and for this decisive 
 reason, such knowledge gives no results. On this principle 
 God might as well be without power, without intellect, without 
 goodness — the idolater's god — a thing "which the smith fash- 
 ioneth with tongs and with hammers," or such as the prophet 
 supposed who " perad venture sleepeth or is on a journey," as a 
 being of infinite perfection. If we cannot say what God will 
 and will not do, then there would be as much ground for love, 
 for confidence, for hope, for joy in one sort of deity as an- 
 other, and to see omnipotent malignity or even blind chance 
 on the throne of the universe, would be as sufficient a basis for 
 exultation and joy, as to behold a perfect God reigning there ; 
 for whatever perfection be ascribed to him, there is no telling 
 what he will do and what he will not do. 
 
 On the other hand, if we know that it were better or more 
 desirable that there should be one sort of deity than another, 
 and better simply and solely because by knowing what he is, 
 we can know to some extent what he will do and what he will 
 not do, then we also know that the doing of some things is bet- 
 ter than the doing of some other things. And knowing these 
 things we know yet more. We know that a perfect God see- 
 ing the end from the beginning, and being immutable in his 
 purposes, will accomplish his plans, and carry them on and out 
 with all possible perfection to their results. And when the 
 plan or system of things is actually adopted and developed to 
 our inspection in its essential characteristics, we can tell what 
 it is and what it is not. We can decide whether it is a system 
 of mere physical agents, whether God reigns merely over mate- 
 rial forms and animal life and sensation, and is the spectator 
 only of the laws of matter and the acts of instinct, or whether 
 he has adopted a moral system, and reigns over it according to 
 the principles and laws of such a jurisdiction. 
 
 The argument for a divine revelation materially depends on 
 the fact that God is administering a perfect moral government 
 over man. 
 
 The proposition to be proved from this source is, that the 
 
 SYSTEM OE RELIGION CONTAINED IN THE BlJJLE IS FROM GoD. 
 
 26 
 
402 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 The argument divides itself into the following propositions : 
 
 I. God administers a perfeet moral government over men. 
 
 II. By the administration of this government, God proposes 
 or decrees to reform and bless a great multitude of our race. 
 
 III. The importance and necessity of a revelation to the ac- 
 complishment of this end, create a strong probability or a moral 
 certainty that God would give a revelation to men. 
 
 IY. That which is claimed to be a revelation from God, and 
 which is contained in the Bible, is what it claims to be. 
 
 The first two of these propositions have been sufficiently dis- 
 cussed in preceding lectures. We need only consider the two 
 which remain. 
 
LECTURE XIV. 
 
 Direct Argument continued. — Two remaining propositions considered. — Prop. 3. The importance 
 of revelation renders it probable, if not certain, that God would give a revelation. — Opposed by 
 some. — Their views discussed. — Man not competent to decide on the manner, &c, of revelation. 
 Recapitulation of argument on necessity of revelation. — Prop. 4. That which claims to be a 
 revelation, is what it claims to be. — Conclusion. 
 
 Our third leading position is the following, viz. : The impor- 
 tance and necessity of a revelation to the accomplishment of the 
 great end of God in the creation and government of this world, 
 furnish a strong probability, not to say a moral certainty, that 
 God would give a revelation to men. 
 
 In the present lecture I propose to establish this position, and 
 also briefly the fourth, viz. : 
 
 IV. That which is claimed to be a revelation from God, and 
 which is contained in the Bible, is what it claims to be. 
 
 I proceed then to establish the third leading position, viz. : 
 
 III. The importance and necessity of a revelation to the 
 accomplishment of the end of God in the creation and govern- 
 ment of this world, furnish a strong probability, not to say a 
 morcd certainty, that God would give a revelation to men. 
 
 This position has to encounter a strong prejudice, which I 
 have already had occasion to notice in another connection. 
 Among the advocates of revelation, there are those who would 
 rely wholly on what is called the external evidence of Christian- 
 ity. They tell us " that we are utterly unable to say what God 
 w T ill do, and what he will not do; that the subject is altogether 
 too high for us; that we have had experience of what man will 
 do in given circumstances, but we have had no experience of 
 what God will do in given circumstances ; and that to pretend 
 to determine what God will do, or what he will not do, in any 
 given circumstances, is an act of glaring rebellion against the 
 authority of the Baconian philosophy." That none of those 
 
4CM: ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 defenders of Christianity, who have relied on the internal evi- 
 dence, have violated the true principles of reasoning, I am not 
 concerned to show. Be this as it may, the above opinion, in 
 the broad and unqualified form of statement in which it is pre- 
 sented, is utterly incredible, as well as destitute of the least 
 claim to the true mode of philosophizing. For to what pur- 
 pose is it to inquire, or reason, or form opinions at all concern- 
 ing the acts and the doings of God, if nothing can be known or 
 concluded on the subject? What matter is it who or what 
 God is, if from our knowledge of what He is, we can in no re- 
 spect infer what he will do and what he will not do ? Why is 
 it that these men, who so zealously contend for an exclusive 
 reliance on the external evidence of Christianity, are so suspi- 
 cious of all attempts to decide what God will do and will not 
 do ? Do they themselves not believe that a perfect God, if he 
 professes to give a revelation to man, will speak truth in that 
 revelation? Do they not believe that a perfect God will not 
 work miracles in attestation of falsehood ? And is not this 
 inferring and believing what God will do and will not do, in 
 given circumstances ? At least in two respects then, let them 
 qualify their broad and sweeping position. 
 
 Besides, are these two the only respects in which we are 
 competent to say what God will do and what he will not do ? 
 If there are no other acts or doings which we can surely and 
 safely affirm that a perfect God will perform, how can we ever 
 prove that there is a perfect God ? And if we cannot prove 
 this by his acts and his doings, and this on the principle that a 
 perfect God will do some things and will not do other things, 
 then how can we know that he is a perfect God, or, if he gives 
 a professed revelation, that he will speak truth ; or if he works 
 miracles, that he does not work them in attestation of false- 
 hood ? The plain matter of fact is, that there are two modes 
 of reasoning in respect to intelligent voluntary beings, which 
 are alike founded in experience, and accord with the Baconian 
 philosophy. Thus, in certain cases, experience fully authorizes 
 us to reason from the acts of voluntary beings to their charac- 
 ter, their principles, their designs, and to determine what these 
 are. In other cases, having ascertained the latter from their 
 acts and doings in some respects, experience fully authorizes us 
 to reason from these to their acts and their doings in other re- 
 spects, and to determine what these will be and will not be. 
 
OBJECTION TO INTEIINAL EVIDENCE. 405 
 
 If I know that an artificer lias begun to make a watch, with 
 adequate power and skill to finish and give it the highest per- 
 fection, and if I know him to possess an unfaltering firmness 
 of purpose, I may infer that he will perfect what he has begun, 
 as particularly, that he will insert a main-spring in the watch. 
 And further, if I know that he is fully resolved to secure in 
 the most perfect degree possible to him the true use of the 
 watch ; and if I know that he is making, or has actually made it 
 for the use of another, who will never understand its true use un- 
 less the maker instructs him, then I may infer that he will give 
 this instruction; and if the requisite instruction respecting the 
 true use of the watch should be liable to, or should be foreseen 
 to be actually connected with some incidental evil, still it is quite 
 supposable, that the maker should evince, in the most decisive 
 manner, an inflexible purpose to give not only the highest per- 
 fection to the watch, but' to every thing which can be regarded 
 as the means of its perfection; so that if the end fails in any 
 degree to be accomplished, it shall be seen that the failure is 
 in no respect truly and properly attributable to any thing 
 which he has done or failed to do. That such premises give 
 such conclusions respecting man is obvious ; they can do no 
 less in respect to God, when it is remembered that he is a Being 
 absolutely and immutably perfect. 
 
 If then we can know or prove certain things concerning 
 God, then we can know and prove certain other things con- 
 cerning him, and are, in view of the immutability of his pur- 
 poses, more competent to say what God will do and what he 
 will not do in given circumstances, than we are to decide the 
 same things in respect to man. If we can know or prove what 
 the best end of creation is, as we most assuredly can — viz., 
 the highest well-being of all — and if avc can also ascertain 
 what are the necessary and best means of accomplishing this 
 end, then we can say that a perfect God will propose this end 
 and adopt these means of accomplishing it. And further, if 
 we can know or prove that any practicable thing is either 
 essentially or circumstantially necessary to the perfection of 
 this system of means, or to secure the end in the most perfect 
 degree possible to him, then we can infer, that notwithstanding 
 any incidental evils, he will give perfection to this system of 
 means. It is not true, then — it is indeed utterly incredible, 
 that a benevolent God has doomed his moral creation, even 
 
406 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 under the light of nature, to the darkness and agony of utter 
 uncertainty in respect to what he will do and what he will not 
 do. The supposition, as it would be easy to show, subverts all 
 natural and all revealed theology. 
 
 But here let me not be misunderstood. I am not saying, 
 if we were to assume simply that God is benevolent, that we 
 could, with no knowledge of his doings, make the same sure 
 inferences which we can now make. I readily concede also, 
 that man in his actual condition is wholly incompetent to say, 
 in many respects, or in respect to many things, what God will 
 do and what he will not do. The great point is to distinguish 
 what man, in his actual condition, can know or prove, from 
 what he cannot know or prove, respecting the doings of God. 
 The presumption that fearlessly ventures to dogmatize its de- 
 cisions in the dark, and the timidity that rejects truth in the 
 broad daylight of evidence, are alike reprehensible. 
 
 To come then to the particular inquiry before us, can we dis- 
 tinguish what cannot be known or proved from what can be 
 known or proved in respect to God's giving a revelation to this 
 world? What I maintain is, that we can do this to such an 
 extent as to decide with entire confidence that God would give 
 a revelation to man; and from this fact, and in view of the 
 nature, the adaptations and actual results of that system of 
 religion which is contained in the Scriptures, we must con- 
 clude that Christianity is a revelation from God. 
 
 To prevent misapprehension then, and the confounding of 
 one thing with another, I would here explicitly concede that 
 we may be wholly incompetent to say in what manner God 
 would give a revelation to man, or at what time, or to what ex- 
 tent. In these respects we may be unable through the want of 
 all requisite premises to form any conclusion. More particu- 
 larly in regard to the time when God would do this, I would 
 say, that under the mere light of nature, we might be ignorant 
 whether the revelation would be made in this or a future state. 
 Human reason might be utterly incompetent to judge whether 
 man's probation would not continue after death, and whether 
 further discoveries of religious and moral truth would not be 
 deferred to some indefinite period of man's future existence. 
 In regard to the manner, we may be incompetent to deter- 
 mine whether it will be orally or by writing, by the ministry 
 of men or of some superior agents, or even by a direct com- 
 
THINGS WHICH WE CANNOT KNOW. 407 
 
 munication from himself. Li regard to the extent, we may be 
 unable to say, whether he will give it to all men of all ages 
 and nations, or only to a part of the race. Still we can say 
 that he will give it to such an extent, as shall be sufficient 
 to prevent the utter defeat and frustration of his design in 
 adopting the system. If he does not give a revelation to some 
 extent, this design will wholly fail. We must conclude there- 
 fore that he will give a revelation to some extent, and to that 
 degree which will best subserve his benevolent end, though we 
 cannot determine what that extent is. In maintaining there- 
 fore that there is proof from the light of nature, that God would 
 give to men a revelation, I affirm nothing in respect to the time, 
 the manner, or the extent of such a revelation beyond what has 
 now been stated. On these topics I do not pretend that we 
 have the requisite premises for any conclusion. It is obvious 
 however, that we may still have abundant proof of the fact, 
 that God would give a revelation. We may have sufficient 
 premises for one conclusion, though we have none for another. 
 To recur to the example, we may have decisive proof that a 
 watch-maker will complete the watch he has begun, and that 
 he will give the requisite instructions concerning its true 
 object, to him for whose use he makes it, and yet we may pos- 
 sess no means of deciding tvhen, in what manner, and to what 
 extent he will do the latter. While in respect to these particu- 
 lar points of inquiry, all may be left indeterminate and uncer- 
 tain ; still the fact that he has begun to make the watch, that 
 he has proceeded so far in the work, surmounting all obstacles, 
 and showing in every conceivable way that he is fully intent 
 on the accomplishment of his design, that nothing can come 
 into competition with it, nor hinder him from doing all that is 
 necessary to give entire perfection to every thing fitted to 
 secure the end aimed at ; the fact ascertained by the most 
 abundant and decisive experience, that he for whose use he 
 makes the watch, will never so understand it as to secure the 
 end without instructions from the maker — these things being 
 known, render the conclusion unavoidable, that the requisite 
 instructions concerning the use of the watch will be given. 
 We have all the reasons for this conclusion which are or can 
 be well conceived of, in respect to the acts and doings of volun- 
 tary beings in any case whatever. There is according to the 
 supposition, no possible ground of doubt in respect to the ulti- 
 
408 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 mate end of the watch-maker, nor in respect to his purpose to 
 give the highest possible perfection to the means of accom- 
 plishing it, nor the necessity of instructions in the use of the 
 watch to the perfection of these means. Who then can doubt 
 in regard to the fact that such information will be given ? 
 
 Such is the argument by which we prove from the light of 
 nature that God would give a revelation to men. To present 
 the argument, we now recur to what we have attempted to 
 prove in the preceding course of lectures. 
 
 We have seen that man from the nature of his constitution 
 and the condition in which he is placed, is a moral being — 
 that conformity to the law of benevolent action is the true and 
 only means of his perfection in character and in happiness. 
 We have seen that God, his Maker, administers a perfect 
 moral government over this world, through an economy of 
 grace ; that in this system he aims at the great, the best con- 
 ceivable end by the best conceivable means, or that this sys- 
 tem of means is in every conceivable respect perfectly adapted 
 to the best conceivable end — that God has proposed the high- 
 est happiness of his moral creation which he can secure as 
 the end of his government; that he gives to the system of 
 government which is the means of this end every conceivable 
 perfection — that to this end and the perfection of this system 
 of means every thing else in his whole course of providence — 
 all that can be called good, is subservient, and every thing that 
 is evil, if it can be made to contribute to this end, is used for 
 this purpose — that every evil which to him is incidental to the 
 system and unavoidable in the nature of things, if the system be 
 adopted, is incurred, or to speak in the language of theology, is 
 purposed or decreed rather than not adopt and carry out the 
 system. We have seen, that in administering his moral govern- 
 ment under a gracious economy, God manifests himself as a just 
 God and yet a Saviour — that in this way he evinces the fact of 
 an atonement, though not the matter and method of it, thus 
 manifesting the immutability of his purpose, not only to ac- 
 complish the end of the system adopted, but to give the sys- 
 tem itself the highest perfection in respect to fitness and adap- 
 tation to its end, so that instead of spreading the gloom of 
 despair over this world of sin and guilt, he authorizes the 
 belief of a future state,in which the order, beauty and splendor 
 of his moral administration will be completed in the blessed- 
 
WILL THE DESIGN BE ABANDONED? 409 
 
 ness of the righteous, and in the merited punishment of the in- 
 corrigibly wicked — results, which in the comparative amount 
 of happiness and misery, will fully accord with the benignity 
 and grace manifest in the system of means adopted for their 
 accomplishment. 
 
 Such then is the great, the comprehensive design of God in 
 the creation and government of this world, as presented to us 
 by the light of nature. Reason duly employed on the subject 
 gives us the whole and every part of it. It gives us not only 
 the end, viz., the highest perfection of his moral creation, in 
 character and in happiness, possible to the Creator, but also 
 the perfection of the system of means, both in every essential 
 respect as a system of moral government under grace, and in 
 every circumstantial respect as involving all that can be con- 
 ceived to be necessary to prevent the failure of the end, and 
 to secure its most perfect accomplishment. 
 
 I now ask, what will become of this great plan of God the 
 Creator ? "Will his design in creating men moral beings — be- 
 ings the most exalted in kind which he can create, be aban- 
 doned through indifference or fickleness ? Will the great object 
 of all his works — that to which every thing beside is subordi- 
 nate and subservient — be relinquished as impracticable by an 
 Omniscient and Almighty Creator ? Will it prove in the issue 
 to be a design, for entering upon which, he who sees the end 
 from the beginning, will see that there were no reasons, or for 
 abandoning which he will discover new reasons 1 Will that 
 design of God, in forming beings in his own image, which 
 stands forth first, brightest, greatest of them all, terminate in 
 utter failure and defeat? Will the progress of this plan of God 
 come to a sudden end — the moral constitution of his creatures, 
 this whole moral system, be divested of all significance, and its 
 author of all his wisdom and honor, and all that can deter from 
 iniquity and secure the moral perfection of moral beings ; all 
 that can bless man, exalt God ; all that can make heaven 
 rejoice and hell tremble, be frittered away into an insignificant 
 and degrading mockery ? If the immutability of God, the in- 
 finite perfections of his Godhead — if the clear manifestation of 
 designs worthy of himself — if their superior excellence as 
 stamping all others with insignificance, and if their ceaseless 
 development and unfaltering progress for six thousand years, 
 give any security in respect to what God will do, then must 
 Vol. I.— 18 
 
410 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 we look for a full and perfect consummation of God's great 
 design as the moral governor of men. 
 
 I now advert to another position, which I persuade myself 
 has been fully established in preceding lectures, viz., the neces- 
 sity of a revelation from God. 
 
 I attempted to show that there is a necessity of such revela- 
 tion, in three respects : 
 
 First. To give the highest conceivable perfection to the mode 
 of discovering truth to the human mind. 
 
 Secondly. To any extensive and useful discovery of truth to 
 the mind. 
 
 Thirdly. To the discovery of some important truths, which 
 the human mind could not discover without a revelation. 
 
 The question now is, whether, in view of this necessity of a 
 revelation as existing in these respects, we have reason to con- 
 clude that God would give a revelation to mam I proceed 
 then to show — 
 
 First, that the necessity of a revelation to give the highest 
 conceivable perfection to the mode of discovering truth to the 
 human mind, supposing it to be necessary for no other purpose, 
 furnishes decisive proof that God would give a revelation to 
 men. The argument here rests on two facts which have already 
 been established, viz., that a revelation is necessary to the high- 
 est conceivable perfection in t/ie mode of discovering truth to 
 the human mind ; and that God has actually evinced his design 
 to give perfection to that system which he has adopted to re- 
 claim and save this lost world. That a revelation is necessary 
 to the highest perfection of a reclaiming system, so far as per- 
 fection in adaptation, fitness, and tendency to secure the end 
 of such a system is concerned, no one will deny. Nor can I 
 imagine any possible ground for doubt on the question, whether 
 God, for this reason, would give a revelation to men, except 
 one, viz. : the possibility that through perversion on their part, 
 it might prove for the worse instead of for the better — become 
 a curse instead of a blessing. To this I answer, that admitting 
 this possibility, it furnishes no proof that it would in fact 
 prove to be for the worse, nor that God would not give a reve- 
 lation. I answer again, that the whole history of his provi- 
 dence, as I have abundantly shown, evinces a fixed purpose to 
 give perfection to his system of moral government under a 
 gracious economy, or to his system of reclaiming influence 
 
THE SYSTEM PERFECT. 411 
 
 irrespectively of its foreseen perversion on the part of his sub- 
 jects. This foreseen fact of perversion in its (almost) absolute 
 universality, has not prevented him from giving to the system 
 every essential perfection, nor from giving it every circumstan- 
 tial perfection, to such an extent as to remove all presumption 
 against the fact ; while what he has done furnishes the highest 
 probability of the fact that he will, sooner or later, add that 
 of a revelation. Without supposing that God designs actu- 
 ally to reclaim and save one of the human race, I maintain 
 that one design of God is too conspicuous in his providence to- 
 ward this world to be denied or doubted, viz., his design to 
 give absolute perfection to his system of reclaiming influences. 
 The fact that he has done so much for this purpose already, in 
 an economy of grace, bringing every conceivable influence in 
 the universe to bear on this great object, and doing every con- 
 ceivable thing to accomplish it except that of giving a revela- 
 tion, is as truly decisive of his design to give perfection to this 
 system as had he done more. Whatever may be supposed to 
 be the reason for giving such perfection to this system as he 
 has actually given — whether he proposes to reclaim some of 
 our guilty race or not, or whether we can or cannot assign any 
 reason for this perfection of the reclaiming system, or whether 
 we can or cannot say why he has not already added a revela- 
 tion, supposing that he has not, one thing is decisively proved, 
 viz., that he chooses to give it the highest conceivable perfec- 
 tion. Take the case of the watch-maker. Suppose the work 
 has progressed to a certain point — that he has done every thing 
 but one which is necessary for accomplishing the end proposed ; 
 he has finished a perfect watch, he has put the parts together, 
 has inserted the main-spring, oiled the machinery, wound it up, 
 placed it in the hands of a son for whose use he made it ; he 
 has done all this at no ordinary expense of time and labor, and 
 with no ordinary degree of self-sacrifice; in a word, he has 
 thus done all that can be conceived to be adapted and fitted to 
 secure the end, except he has not told the possessor of the 
 watch how to wind it up. And now, with all these proofs of 
 his real design, do you, can you believe that he will never ex- 
 plain that to him ? Suppose you cannot tell the results of giv- 
 ing this instruction — whether it will prove for better or for 
 worse ; suppose you can give no reason for delaying to give it 
 for a few minutes or a few hours, can you therefore believe that 
 
412 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 the requisite instruction by the watch-maker on this material 
 point will never be given ? This, with any fair-minded man, 
 could not be a matter of hesitation or doubt. So in respect to 
 the reclaiming system of God. In view of what he has actually 
 done toward giving it perfection as a system of adaptations and 
 fitnesses, there is decisive reason for believing that he will give 
 it absolute perfection ; and in view of the necessity of a reve- 
 lation to this, there is all the reason for believing that he would 
 give a revelation, which there is for belies- ing that he would 
 perfect the system. And there is all the reason to believe that 
 he will perfect the system, which the actual perfection of it in 
 all respects but one can furnish. Having done all things neces- 
 sary to its perfection but one, is there not a moral certainty 
 that he will do that also ? Having done so much, he has fur- 
 nished, so far as this kind of evidence is concerned, all that is 
 possible in the case, more being impossible without giving a 
 revelation. If too we reflect on what God actually does to 
 give perfection to this system, how the object stands forth the 
 first and the highest, and as it were the whole and sole object 
 of nature, of providence, and of grace ; how all things are sub- 
 ordinated to this ; how all influences from himself, his charac- 
 ter, his relations, his friendship and favor, his displeasure and 
 his wrath — every influence from man himself, every influence 
 from earth and heaven, from time and eternity, is brought to 
 subserve this design, who can doubt that, sooner or later, the 
 Being with whom one day is as a thousand years, and a thou- 
 sand years as one day, will give to such a system perfection 
 absolute ? The probability is the highest of which the nature 
 of the case admits. If the acts and doings of God can prove 
 any thing, they show that he would give a revelation to men. 
 
 It is easy to account for what he has done, on the supposition 
 that he intends to do more ; but it is not possible to account 
 for what he has done, unless you suppose that he intends to do 
 more. 
 
 God, by perfecting the system, would give higher proof that 
 he preferred holiness to sin, than he would or could give. There 
 is no reason for concluding that he will not perfect the system ; 
 there is therefore all the reason for concluding that he will per- 
 fect it, that the above consideration affords. 
 
 I proceed to show — 
 
 Secondly. That the necessity of a divine revelation to secure 
 
REVELATION HIGHLY PROBABLE. 413 
 
 to any extent any useful practical knowledge of religions and 
 moral truth to man, in connection with other facts, furnishes 
 further proof that God would give a revelation to man. Let 
 us look at the facts as already established. God, as we have 
 seen, has, as the Creator and Governor of this world, proposed 
 the best conceivable end, and has also adopted the best system 
 of means for its accomplishment, with the single exception that 
 it does not include a revelation. This great end is the highest 
 happiness of his creation; the system of means is a perfect 
 moral government under an economy of grace. This end will 
 fail, and this system of means will be in vain, and worse than 
 in vain, without a revelation. If facts — if the experience of a 
 world for thousands of years can prove any thing, it has 
 proved, that without a revelation from God, all the generations 
 of men will live and die in sin. At the same time, the nature, 
 the immutable principles of God's perfect moral government, 
 give another and still more appalling result — the complete and 
 eternal misery of all these creatures of God. The great, the 
 awful experiment has been made in respect to what man as a 
 subject of God's moral dominion, will do without a revelation. 
 It has proved that he will sin, and only sin. The throne of 
 God, though a throne of grace, stands on the pillars of eternal 
 justice, proffering no pardon, giving no hope to impenitent 
 transgressors, but frowning in terrific majesty, and dooming a 
 world of such transgressors to just and fearful retribution. The 
 alternative is, either the failure of God's great end in creation, 
 even the moral perfection and consecpient perfect happiness, of 
 every moral being, involving, as it must, the utter and endless 
 misery of all, or the gift of a revelation from God to this lost 
 world. 
 
 I maintain the high probability of the latter. To estimate 
 this aright, we must recur to all those providential dealings of 
 God to restore man to virtue and to happiness, which so clearly 
 and so impressively disclose his design as a moral governor. 
 If it be said, all this may be without a providential purpose 
 actually to restore any ; I admit the bare possibility of it, but 
 this is not evidence, it is only probability. How then is this 
 probability to be estimated ? Is there even the slightest pre- 
 sumption that God would give existence to such a world, to 
 such myriads of immortal beings, with the foresight, and there- 
 fore with the providential purpose that each and all should be 
 
414 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 miserable forever? Every presumption is against it. The 
 merest surmise of such, a fact without evidence, is unauthorized 
 and injurious, and proscribed by every principle of just reason- 
 ing. The entire want of evidence of such a fact, in view of his 
 perfect benevolence, is proof against it. Indeed as we have 
 already shown, there is the most satisfactory proof, that the 
 Creator will secure such results in the holiness and happiness 
 of this part of his moral creation, as will furnish bright displays 
 of his infinite goodness. Nay more. We have seen in that 
 economy of grace and mercy which he has clearly disclosed in 
 all the ways of his providence, the sure pledge of results, in the 
 holiness and happiness of men corresponding with its benignity 
 and grace. Who are the objects of all this grace? The crea- 
 tures of his power, the children of his love ! Will God then 
 adopt such a system of means to reclaim and save, giving it 
 every conceivable adaptation and tendency to such an end — will 
 he bring all creation and providence to attest his sincerity, and 
 his overflowing kindness toward his disobedient children, with- 
 out a design actually to reclaim and save, and with the knowl- 
 edge and the purpose that the only result shall be the aggrava- 
 tion of the guilt and the ruin of all ? Reflect and see what 
 benignity and grace assail a thoughtless, wicked world at every 
 step of life! What solicitude and earnestness to reclaim his 
 wayward children, which none but a perfect God could feel or 
 manifest ! What riches of long-suffering and forbearance — 
 (what evil that is not the infliction of paternal love) — what 
 goodness leading to repentance and drawing with the cords of 
 love and with the bands of a man — what yearnings of compas- 
 sion, what bowels of mercy — what a length, breadth, height, 
 depth in God's restoring love ! And do such love and mercy 
 thus seek their objects with the foresight that it will, and the 
 purpose that it shall augment the guilt and ruin of them all ? 
 Is such the errand on which this mercy of God comes to this 
 ruined world ? Oh no. It is the breaking, the bursting forth 
 of the heart of infinite love in acts of sincerest mercy actually 
 to reclaim and save all that can be saved ! It is the mercy of 
 God, doing for each, and for all, and at every moment, all that 
 can be wisely done. It is the decree of God unchangeable, actu- 
 ally to reclaim and save a multitude which no man can num- 
 ber, out from all nations, and kindreds, and people and tongues 
 — a decree of God unchangeable, to bring home to himself bright 
 
STILL ANOTHER NECESSITY. 415 
 
 hosts of holy, happy immortals, to satisfy, and bless, and rejoice 
 that heart which sought their salvation ! But without a revela- 
 tion all will be lost — this design of mercy will fail ! Surely that 
 mercy will not withhold from the guilty beings it decrees to 
 save, the revelation they need. No act of paternal kindness — 
 no gift of a father's love is so sure, as that of revelation from 
 its God to this lost world. 
 
 Once more — 
 
 Thirdly: The necessity of a revelation to the discovery of 
 some important truths which man could not discover without 
 it, proves that God would give a revelation. I have already 
 taken occasion to show how utterly hopeless would have been 
 the condition of this sinful world, without the discovery which 
 the Scriptures make to us concerning the manner in which its 
 redemption is achieved — in other words the revelation of the 
 triune God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, in their 
 respective relations to the work of man's redemption from sin. 
 The two great problems are, how shall the perverseness of 
 rebels be subdued to love ; and if subdued, hoiv can a just God 
 receive them to favor f Here all is mystery unsolvable, darkness 
 impenetrable and appalling ! How could human reason alone 
 and unaided have discovered the mystery of redemption ? Even 
 when God has revealed it, reason is lost in this abyss of love 
 and mercy, and needs all its submission to believe! Man, sin- 
 ful as he is, I admit, might repent and might hope for mercy 
 from his Maker. But would he? What bondage so strong as 
 bondage to sin — what death so hopeless as death in sin ? Who 
 shall deliver? What power shall give life, and health, and 
 beauty immortal to these victims of sin and death? I said 
 man might hope for mercy. But with a just apprehension of 
 God's fearful justice and his own desert of its fearful doom — 
 looking upon a sin-avenging God as he must, and asking how 
 can such a God show the same abhorrence of sin and yet for- 
 give, as he would by turning a rebellious world into hell, then 
 it is that the terrors of God come over us ; hope trembles and 
 expires. ISTot that it must be so, but it always has been and 
 always will be, with exceptions that need not be mentioned. 
 It is not hope in a God all tenderness which we need. It is that 
 which looks upon a just God, and with a sense of his righteous 
 indignation toward sin, reposes calmly and sweetly in his mercy. 
 But there is so much terror here, so much darkness and tern- 
 
416 ARGUMENT FROM NATURE APPLIED. 
 
 pest around the throne of God, that in the eye of guilt, the rajs 
 of mercy fade and will not suffice. Guilt will look up with 
 confidence, only when it sees the throne of God upheld by "the 
 man that is his fellow." Take away " the incarnate mystery," 
 extinguish the light that reveals the great atonement of Chris- 
 tianity, and where is hope for human guilt ? Zeno, Socrates, 
 Plato, Pythagoras, Epicurus, Porch, Academy, Lyceum, Infi- 
 delity, Deism, Philosophy, Human Peason, all, what can ye do, 
 what can ye substitute for the blood of the Son of God? Ex- 
 tinguish that light which reveals the mercy of God through his 
 Son, and let in the terrors of guilt and of God on this sinful 
 world, and how would each and all, in the gloom or frenzy of 
 despair, take their way down to everlasting burnings? Will 
 a redeeming God then withhold that light from the world he 
 would redeem ? Will he abandon every purpose of mercy — 
 render every other manifestation of it vain, and worse than in 
 vain; will he give up his lost creature to the perdition of hell, 
 when he has, for the light of nature teaches it, actually made 
 an atonement ? Will he do this by concealing from their view 
 what that atonement is ? Has he made, and given abundant 
 proof that he has made the only atonement, by the knowledge 
 of which conscious guilt will ever be emboldened to approach 
 a spotless God — the only atonement, the knowledge of which 
 will ever give hope and peace and heaven to a guilty world ; 
 and will he refuse to give the knowledge of this atonement ? 
 Has he done all this in fact for us, and will he, by refusing to 
 tell what it is, leave us only to a certain, fearful looking for of 
 judgment and fiery indignation ! It is incredible. I say not 
 at what time in this world's history, nor whether in this or a 
 future state ; but that, sooner or later, the God of grace — that 
 God who tells us in all his works and ways that he has in pur- 
 pose or in fact, made an adequate atonement for human guilt, 
 will also reveal its nature and its power. Having done the 
 greater, he will also do the less. Xo act of an immutable God, 
 no gift of his mercy, can be more certain than that of a revela- 
 tion, declaring to the faith, the wonder, the gratitude, the joy 
 of redeemed men, " God so loved the world that he gave his only 
 begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not per- 
 ish, but have everlasting life." 
 
 I have thus attempted to establish my third leading position : 
 III. That the importance and necessity of a revelation to the 
 
THE BIBLE, WHAT IT CLAIMS TO BE. 417 
 
 great end of God in the creation and government of the world, 
 give a strong probability, not to say a moral certainty, that he 
 would give a revelation to men. 
 
 The next and last position now claims consideration, viz. : 
 IV. That which is claimed to be a revelation from God, and 
 which is contained in the Bible, is what it claims to be. 
 
 The argument is this : God will give a revelation to this 
 world. We take the Bible, and if we had heard nothing of it 
 before, we read, examine, understand it ; we see that it is ex- 
 actly such a book as we have decisive reasons to believe God 
 would give to man, harmonizing with all our just views of the 
 character, the relations, the government of God ; adapted won- 
 derfully and perfectly to the wants, the character, the condition 
 and prospects of man ; fitted to secure the high end of his crea- 
 tion, even his perfection in character and in blessedness. Its 
 actual effects confirm and illustrate its j)erfection as the means 
 of this great end. The writers of the book assert its divine 
 origin. It had not a human origin, for we have proved the 
 necessity of just such a book from God, and that man would 
 never make such a book. Now I ask, whence came this book ? 
 What is its origin ? Is it from God, or is it not ? 
 
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