^mr : -^if^; UNIVERSITY OF. CALIFORNIA. GIFT OF DANIEL C. OILMAN PROGRESS OF RUSSIA WEST, NORTH, AND SOUTH, BY OPENING THE SOURCES OF OPINION AND APPROPRIATING THE CHANNELS OF WEALTH AND POWER. DAVID URQUHART. " Voire vieille JEurope m^ennuit." — Napoleon. FOURTH EDITIOjJf. LONDON: TRUBNER & CO., 12, PATERNOSTER ROW. 1853. mi^-- /os-ff TUCKEE, I'EIXTEE, PEEET'S PLACE, OXTOB-D STREET. FOURTH EDITION. Time destroys Opinion and confirms Judg- ment : the occasion here would seem to suggest that in this matter the two are becoming recon- ciled. CONTENTS PAGE Preface to the Third Edition . . r . . . iii Preface to Second Edition " vii The Crossing of the Prtith atid the Passing of the Dardanelles xii Objects of the Work liv THE WEST. Part I.— SPAIN. CHAP. I. How circumstanced for the Developnicnt of Opinion r 1 II. Eeview of past History ...... lii III. Formation of Faction. Constitution of 1812 . . 27 IV. Revolt of the Isld dB Leon 61 V. Position of France in 1822. — Invasion of Piedmont and Naples 37 ^■VI. Congress of Verona ..,.,.. 40 VII. Invasion of 1823 53 VIII. Quadruple Treaty G2 IX. Future Marriages 72 Part IT.— HUNGARY. I. Political Value of Hungary . . . . . ,75 II. Events in Hungary 81 III. Diplomatic Review ....... 94 IV. Turkish Neutrality .114 V. Extradition of Rofttgees .123 THE NORTH. Part I.— SCANDINAVIA. I. Internal Constitution .,..,,, 145 II. External Relations • • • o . . ,, 158 ii CONTENTS. Part II.— THE DANISH SUCCESSION. CHAP. 2AQB I. TheEupture ........ 182 II. Interposition of Prussia 203 III. The War . ' .213 IV. Treaty of the 8th of May, 1852 232 V. The Diet of Copenhagen and the Danish Constitution . 268 VI. The position of Austria in the North and in the South as effected by the Treaty of the 8th of May . . 275 VII. The Baltic and the Euxine— The Sound Dues c ,- 280 THE SOUTH. Pakt I.— THE DANUBE AND EUXINEt I. The Commerce of Europe and Asia . . , . 291 II. Eussian Quarantine on the Danube, and the Coast of Circassia . . , . . . . . . 30^ III. Treaty with Austria for the Free I^'avigation of the Danube . . . » . . . • ■. • 345 IV. Apology for Eussia 347 V. Canal of the Danube 350 VI. The Evacuation of the Principalities in 1851 . . . 353 Part II.— THE LEVANT AND THE BED SEA. I. Commercial Eesources and Legislation of Turkey . . 373 II. Negotiations with Turkey . . ... . . 382 III. Commercial Treaty with Tiu'key of 1848 . . .386 IV. The Eed Sea— Egypt . . ... . . .411 V. The Canal of Suez 421 Conclusion i.Z7 PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. "Cdf dclire ne pent pas durer.'' * Augmt ^Otk. I PROFIT by the occasion afforded me by the demand for another edition to bring up the history to the last moment. I have indeed little to say as to events. I, for what I have said, the Emperor Nicholas for what he has done, have both been called madmen. It remains, therefore, for me but to express my acknowledgments to His Imperial Majesty for having redeemed my character for sanity, for I suppose the success of the present work is an evidence that it is redeemed, I take advantage of that expectation to offer some further considerations, suggested by the contemporary discussion of the subject. The Turkish Government is the only independent one in Europe. The present negotiations spring solely out of that independence. The Turkish Empire is fuU of Military vigour ; the dangers to which it is at present exposed result not from its weakness but from its strength. At the period of the last war the Turks were averse to that war, and had to be driven to it by their Government. At the present moment Army and Nation, Mussulmans and Christians, demand the war, and are restrained by their Government. At the first period Russia forced the war, — at present she will prevent it. * Unpublished Eussian Despatch, iv PKEFAOE TO THE Her advance to the Danube now sanctioned hj the Powers of Europe endangers Austria more than Turkey ; it has compromised the one into cooperation while it has only alarmed the other for its indepen- dence. The Turks as a nation refused to fight for the Principalities twenty-five years ago : five years ago they were indifferent to their occupation ; four years ago, a Treaty was signed without comment for their occupation by Russia up to the year 1856. The Christian populations of Turkey have hitherto accepted with joy the proffered protection of Russia. The people of Europe have hitherto viewed with indifference the occupation of the Provinces : they have never blamed theil' governments for co-operating with that of Russia, but on the contrary on all such occasions believed that they were opposing them. The Govermnents of Europe obtained support at home from their co-operation with Russia, and suffered no inconvenience from pursuing that course. The Crowns of Europe were unconscious of any degradation in consequence of the policy of their Governments, and their position of dependence was veiled or disguised as partial and temporary. The old Ivor Id was alone concerned, and Russia had to consider only the Porte, the Turks, the Christians of Turkey, the people, the Cabinets and the Crowns of Europe. Now to the altered position of the Old World, has to be added the interposition of the New. Here is the only new event, and the consequences of it are incalculable : the United States cannot now remain neuter, there is no alternative between their being enveloped by Russia in the diplomatic measures of the Old World, and their breaking through the vicious circle in which we are bound. The United States stand free from all diplomatic entanglements ; they have neither bound themselves not to send their men-of-war into the Euxine or to nay toll for their merchantmen passing the Sound; THIRD EDITION". v they have not come under the Turkish Treaty of commerce : though they actually do pay, at the rate of other nations in Turkey, and at the Sound there is no reason that they should do so, and it is not to be supposed that the citizens of America, if their attention be once directed to the subject will suffer their Government to endure an imposition in the one case no less than piracy, and in the other than an extortion. Resistance to the Sound Dues is comparatively an unimportant matter except in its moral effects, but resistance to the prohibitory duties on Turkish exports reopens the whole of that im- mense question upon which hinges the future fate of Europe, and indeed of America itself. The rapid increase of population in Europe, and the growing demand for grain places her in dependence upon Russia, Turkey, and the United States for sup- plies. The Russian exports were disappearing before the competition of two Turkish provinces, where Austria had prevented the imposition of the English Treaty of Commerce; in consequence of the enor- mous wealth pouring into them the Porte was about to emancipate the trade of the remainder of the Empire, — an event which must have closed the chapter of Russian history. Her advance on the Danube has averted the blow, stopped exportation and production there, and equally stopped the proposed abrogation of the export duty throughout the other provinces. The competition is now singly between Russia and the United States, and the mind and resources of Russia will henceforward be applied to the disorganization of the United States. To protect themselves, they must not only guard against the tempter who will seek to use their self-love in putting them forward, but also they must profit by their actual opportunities to take their stand by the side of Europe while it can be supported. It is now two years since I m.ade an appeal to the United Stales in this sense in a pamphlet on the vi PEEFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. Danube^"^ and I have the satisfaction of knowing that my words on that occasion have not been without effect on the results up to this hour obtained. It will not be at present presumptuous for me to say that my judg- ments have been confirmed by those of the Russian Cabinet. The Cabinet of Washington must have the means of testing the grounds of this judgment. If no propositions such as these I have indicated have been made it may disregard my past and present warnings: if they have, it must be traitorous not. to act^ and imbecile if it acts imprudently. One word as to Denmark. The abdication of the king is preparing ; so also of his uncle. The next prudent step will be the abdication of a few of the Gluksburgs. * " From the aberrations of the hour, the appeal lies to posterity, because unaffected by the passions that obscure our sight, and the fallacies that pervert our judgment. Severed by an ocean, you are to us a future age; as such I appeal from my countrymen to you, not for judgment only, but for remedy. We have a common interest, you may retrieve what the infatuation of England has sacrificed ; but to judge, you must know — read, and you will understand." PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. ft^ Settlement with Bussia. August 9th. "An immediate rise of the public securities^' is this morning proclaimed as the result of the welcome announcement of the acceptance by the Emperor of Russia of the proposal of the Powers, terminating a crisis which has so long held in suspense the political relations and commercial interests of the world. The British public and the British government are re- assured and delighted by the union of the great European States. It is no longer England, or England and France, interposing for the protection of Turkey. All principles, all interests, are united, and whatever bears the name of a European, is opposed to the Czar. But in all this there is nothing new — it is an old and sickening story; what it is worth I shall presently show : in the meantime let me direct my reader^s attention to an event both startling and new, which has tliis morning been equally announced to the inhabitants of these Isles. Last night, in the House of Lords, it was asked, Till SETTLEMENT WITH RUSSIA. "What has the Government of this Country DONE ?'^ This question Was followed by " cheers." Lord Clanricarde further asserted, that all Treaties between Russia and Turkey — why did he not add between Russia and England — were abolished by this act, and he therefore expected to hear that the English Squadron was inside of the Dardanelles. There is something even more wonderful still than this. The Minister for Foreign Affairs " agreed in. everything that had fallen from his noble friend," and " considered the entire evacuation of the Princi- palities as a sine qua non of any agreement whatever." On the same night Lord John Russell stated, in the Commons, his belief in the favourable acceptance of the proposals of the Powers by Russia. Putting the two propositions together, and dropping the im- material question of a first and a second proposal, we have now the Government nailed to the complete and immediate evacuation of the Principalities, because "any arrangement whatever" must imply instance in point of time. It is to be inferred, from the cheers of the two Assemblies, that England would be con- tent with such a settlement. But what shall happen if Russia does not accede ? Is your Ambassador then to be withdrawn? No. You will either not obtain the evacuation, or you will obtain it on terms, "First let us consider the question of occupation, in the war of 1828 three corps d^armees were sent across the Pruth ^ at present four corps d^armees have been sent across the Pruth. In the last war thirty gun-boats were sent into the Danube, at present one SETTLEMENT WITH EUSSLi. ix hundred and fifty gun-boats have been sent into the Danube, ("a few gun-boats/^ Clarendon.) In the last war the pontoons had to be made on the spot and failed ; at present they are all ready. The opera- tions therefore are on a larger scale than in 1828_, without there being an Ismail to take, which delayed a third of the forces during a third of the campaign. In 1828 those countries produced only the grain requisite for their own consumption, now 1,500,000 quarters are ready for exportation to England. That grain is now available for the troops of Russia, and may be set down in round numbers at ^.2,000,000. You will have to go to Russia for that grain ; it will cost you there a much higher sum, and the Russian treasury will receive from 10 to 15 per cent, in duties before it is exported. Russia therefore by the opera- tion profits from £5,000,000 to £6,000,000. That profit will equally be secured, whether she evacuates or not. The Provinces thus present to her resources for future operations infinitely greater than in 1828. In that year she had developed no comprehensive scheme ; there was no combination with Europe to give to her the succession to the crown of Denmark ; she was not pretending to occupy a province south of the Caspian in Persia; there was no revolution in China ; she had revealed no projects on Little Thibet ; and had not announced her intention of establishing herself on the Upper Himalaya.* There were then no Russian Princesses on a visit to Eng-land, * An offer was made to the Emperor of Qiina to support him against tlie insurgents, on condition of liis ceding Little Tliibet, wliich is only twenty days' march froui Calcutta. X SETTFLEMEN'I^ WiM-MUB^^- After tlie declaration of Eord' ' Clarendon and the ^ * mthdrawal of tlie Ehglisli agent- &oni Bucliarest^ bne^ niigiit have belietfed iii^-^tie' WaJciiatM-^ 'cotirge?^ Enssia \fill'Siitoit'to= aifytiiiiig-to w^^ 'the ^English- Minister lias made Tip- liis miyid-^if Eord Clartrndon were a Grand Tizier : -Bnt he is" only a member of a Cabinet^ and in that feabirfiety'alas!- there are Lord^-' Aberdeen,, John Unssell/ ami' Palmer stQn-; the latter is bnsy in- representing 'LotdStfetfordde Redcliffe as acting under the influen^^e of piqne. I do hot there- fore say that there will be no evacuation^ but this I say^ that Russia^ if she evacnateSj Ynil lose nothing by it_, for it will be "with an arrangement to establish a common interference of the Poioers with the subjects of Turkey. A lie has been placed on the lips of Europe in the word RussO'Greek Church. The one is a form of Revealed Religion^ the other is the worship of a man. In the official Church of Russia the Czar is '^ vicegerent of God upon earth/^ and as such is the object of *^^ FAITH ^^ and "worship." The disease that preys on the vitals of the Russian Empire is religious dissent originating in this sacrilege. The Nonconformists maintain the original faith^ such as it was when the Russian Church was in communion with that of Constantinople. The only name they give to themselves is that of " Old Believers/^ in Russian Starovirtze ; they are therefore identified with the 12,000,000 or 13,000,000 of Cluristian sub- jects of the Porte in Em'ope ; they are the objects of the most bitter persecutions on the part of the .SETTLEMENT WITH RUSSIA. xl Bussian Government, and the familiar term tliey fipply to the Emperor is *' Antichrist.'' The recent movements towards independence of the Malo- Bussians, amounting to about 10,000,000, is prin- cipally attributable to this schism and persecution. Were there no Mussulmans in Europe, and Russia free to extend her dominion to the Ionian Sea, we should find her, if she attempted it, at once engaged in the most furious of religious wars, with populations, old subjects and new, amounting to 2.0,000,000. This change in Russia Proper has required five cen- turies and a quarter, for it began in the year 1330. Eifteen generations of Muscovites have gone to their graves in the course of its completion. They were .induced to submit, in the hope that the concentra- ction of all power in the hands of the Czar would •^facilitate the subjugation of others. The Christian subjects Qf ,Turkey, born and bred under tlie habits of Mussulman toleration, filled with the most extra- . vagaut ambition by Muscovite art, will not resign in a single hour every political right and every con- scientious conviction, and that too in the hour of triumph and for the subjugation of themselves. The Tui'ks, if they had never strayed beyond their pas- turages of Broussa, would, on such a contingency, • be called in by the Christians for the protection of their Church and Faith. Such an event no doubt would be surprising, but it would not be new; the ablest polemical writer amongst the Greeks of the present age, has explained, in the very words I have • used, the fall of Constantinople in 1453. xii SETTLEMENT WITH RUSSIA. Since the year 1846^ the Sultan has become the immediate protector of the Starovirtze, by having secured for them the Apostolic succession of their priestliood after that priesthood was seized by Eussia, formed into regiments, and sent to die of ague in Lankeran, on the Caspian; he would stand in the same relation of Protector to his actual Greek sub- jects from the moment that he was driven into Asia by Russian arms. Such being the position of Russia with regard to the Christians of Turkey,, her object in a joint intervention of the Powers is evident; she could never have moved them to propose such an intervention, but (as in 1826, when the Greeks declared they would rather perish than allow of her interference) she terrifies the Powers by a threat to act alone, and then they rush forward to yield to her their support, on the pretext of clogging her action ! Then she can use the Sultan to establish her supremacy over the Oriental Church, whilst she uses it to break down the authority of the Sultan, Prom the moment that a common interference is established, any quarrel in the streets can bring down her squadron to Constantinople. The only danger is from Russian interference ; the only course for Europe to take is to prevent it. The course which Europe always does take is to sanction it, by co-operat- ing in it, giving to her their power for effecting it. To prepare for her possession, she has to raise a religious persecution between Mussulmans and Christians, bringing in England and France to attack Turkey ; she must engage Austria in a war of exter- SETTLEMENT WITH EUSSIA. xili niination with tlie neighbouring populations; by these means, or a union of the llonian and Russian Churches, she must break the confederacy of Greeks and Latins, which is sure to be formed against her. Besides these local operations, she has to work out a war between England and France, and a European revolution. Such are the preliminary steps to the elevation of the Christian subjects of Turkey to tho rank of serfs, and to the pa3ans of Christendom for the long promised mass in St. Sophia. Another illusion is, that the Christians of Turkey are Greeks, and consequently that they are united against the Mussulman rule. They amount to about 13,000,000, the Greeks not exceeding 1,000,000, and the half of them not a located population, but stranyei's, dispersed throughout the different cities. Unfortunately the Turks like them, and confide iu them (one of them is actually Ambassador in London), but every other race hates and despises them. The Wallachians and Moldavians amount to 4,500,000 -, the Bulgarians, the descendants of the Tartars of the Volga, to 4,500,000, some of these are Mussulmans ; the Bosnians, including the Serbians and Illyrians to 3,000,000, of these 1,000,000 are Mussulmans, and about 500,000 Roman Catholics ; the Albanians to 1,500,000, half of them Christians of the Eastern Church, half of them Mussulmans. It will thus be seen that the Greeks have no standing at all in European Turkey, save that which they derive from the Turks. One-third of the Mussulmans are allied in blood to the Russians, and three-fourths of the Chi'istians, south of the Danube, to the Turks. All XIV , SETTLEMENT WITH EUSSTA. these populations have accepted the Turks as masters ; not one of them would endure for a moment the supremacy of any of the others. If you had not the Turks^ you would require to invent them^ unless you wish to see European Turkey a chaos of bloodshed, not for the "svretched inhabitants alone, but for Europe, and when so exhausted to be annexed to Russia, transferring to her a position which, in her hands, must command the globe. What I have here said regarding the Greek and Russian Churches has been recently to the letter borne out by the statements in the Greek press, which reach us from the Levant. Their Smyrna organ wanas Russia not to "indulge in illusions." The EXrig, the organ of- Hellenism, explains the object of the Czar in extorting the protectorate of the Oriental Church to be to convert it into an " in- strument of his Panslavic schemes," and denies '^that the protection (!) of the Powers afforded to the Sultan is, as the journals of Russia pretend, the pro- tection of Mahometanism against Christianity, but the defence of the political inheritance of the Hellenes (Greeks) against Russian incorporation, in which every Hellenic spirit must wjsh them success." The correspondence of the Vienna papers is in the same sense. " There is no nation," says the Oest Deutsch Post, 'Mess inclined to be absorbed by Russia than the Greeks. When struggling for political existence, they looked on her as the victorious power that was to come to their assistance, but they rejected , the proffered hand so soon as they perceived that it 'was more inchned to imnose than to remove fetters." SETTLEiAIENT AVITH KUSSIA.: xv I cannot onut. noticing a grouml of confidence which hasarecentiy) for the hundreth' lime,; presented itself as a liovGltf; it is, "The Emperof has no money." The same thing was said in 1847, when he came fdnrard to support the Bank of England, as he had! already supported the Bank, of France, ^6,000,000; wer6 Tested in English and French securities, £32,000,000. of bullion were then held in deposit. She receives nearly £5,000,000, yearly from her mines, and actually her stock is quoted at 16 per cent, above par. She offers to remit a claim of 80,000,000 roubles for a province, being between the Caspian and Little Thibet, and to pay the differ- ence ; yet, according to * diplomatic report, " The guards, the crack corps at Zarskoi Zelo, are destitute of clothes and everything." Well then they can be clothed as well as fed in the Principalities — Napoleon believed Europe to be in danger from the poverty of Russia — she preserves the appetites of poverty, while knowing how to employ the seductions of wealth. It is her gold you have to fear, and not her steel. She makes a little go a long way, and she takes it from yourselves. ^'The evacuation of the Principalities is," says Lord Clarendon, " a sine qua non preliminary to a settle- ment." But will an evacuation of the Provinces be a settlement? Not xmless it be unconditional, as. far as Russia is concerned,' and provision be made against present injury and future aggression. Fir^st, then, the evacuation must take place without any eisgage- ment entered into by Tm^key. Secondly, an in- demnity to Turkey for pecuniary loss, and to the xvi SETTLEMENT WITH EUSSIA. trade of all nations on account of the accidents at the mouth of the Danube^ resulting from her neglect. Thirdly, the abrogation of all existing Treaties be- tween Russia and Turkey, and consequently of any pretence of interference with the subjects of the latter country. Fourthly, the abrogation of the Treaties of 1840 and 1841, equally violated by her act, and the consequent admission of men-of-war of all nations to the Black Sea. Fifthly, the modification of the English Treaty of Commerce of 1838, so as to obtain the free exportation of Turkish grain. Sixthly, the renunciation of all claims upon Persia, whether pecuniary or territorial. Seventhly, the abrogation of the Treaty of the 8th of May, 1852, and the conse- quent restoration of the succession and constitution in Denmark. This is the only settlement. This, if you are in egirnest, is what you will obtain ; there is no more difficulty in obtaining all, than in obtaining one. If you do not you are, in the words of Lord Clanricarde, ''^ parties to the present act of piracy, as you are to all the previous steps that led to it," Of the seven points which I have indicated, the essential are the admission of our vessels to the Black Sea, and the exportation of Turkish grain; no one will pretend that there is the slightest difficulty in obtaining either. They have even nothing to do with Russia, but only with Turkey. So long as you auffer a Russian Ambassador to reside in London you will not obtain them, for England is governed ficm Ashbiirnham House. XYU THE CHOSSING OF THE PEUTH, AND THE PASSING OP THE DARDANELLES. " Catherine perceived that she could not continue her aggressive system against Turkey without the aid and co-operation of the other Powers." — Wellesley Pole. This volume, tliougli not written with a view to the actual crisis, may not on that account be the less ac- ceptable : its interest lies not in the immediate facts, but in the motives and position of the parties to which this volume addresses itself. The actual alarm which affords so favourable a conjuncture for its ap- pearance may be thus of importance for averting future dangers — there are actually none in the sense that the people of this country understand; they may rest perfectly assured that there will not be now, and that there never will be hereafter, collision be- tween England and Russia. Who can set other powers by the ears, need not fight them. As to England, the question is one of balance, the tongue of which vibrates through the Straits which separate Europe and Asia, transferring to the one side or the other absolute supremacy and absolute subjection. It was deemed an act of unexpected and almost startling courage when an ex-Chancellor of England — a man pre-eminent for his intellectual powers, and xviii the:peutii and -wliOj had Russia had the good fortune of possessing him_, might have ah'eady reared the banner of the azure cross on the flagstaffs of Calcutta and the Dar- danelles — pronounced the pretensions of the Czar to be " fallacious_, ofFensive^ illogical, and insulting/* The pettiest attache of eveiy Russian Embassy- smiled with a contempt derived from position alike at the capacity and the feeling of that great lawyer. Crude mgenium cannot of itself prevail in human affairs, and toil and labour will ever bear away the palm. The geriiiis of Lord Lyndhurst is practised in detecting fallacy — the genius of Russia in conquering men ; she requires no lessons in logic ; you need some instruction in conduct : if it was worth Lord Lyndhurst's while to think upon a foreign matter, it was surely the acts of the members of the English, not the Russian Cabinet, which deserved his animadversion. You have long been in a slumber, and she has profited by your security ; you have long confided in her honour, she has profited by your friendship; your . eyes are at length opened, and your indignation aroused — does she suffer retribution, do you regain character? You discover that she is illogical— in rhetoric which has convulsed an Empire; you de- nounce her to be insane — in marching with your aid on the Bosphorus; you send your men-of-war to the Dardanelles— she seizes the Sound; she grasps the Danube ; you send — no, you do not send, a note — she usurps the vastest plain of Europe, and you do THE DARDANELLES. xk send an apology.* When slie has overrun a province you convoke a conclave ; you prevent war by re- moving landmarks ; and stop a burglar by opening the door. And all this is peace : two campaigns and a. dozen fortresses are offered up for the sake of the tranquillity of Europe ; and two Empires (Turkey and Austria) are stripped of their arms in the interest of their defence. There remains, however, another discovery to be made — not that you are cowards, but that you are impostors. Was there ever imposition compared with that of your pretending to cope with Russia ? She can be met only by men with minds equal to herself; equal to her in cunning, or at least superior to her in honesty ; you neither have the last, nor do you form the first. While she perverts truth and justice through love of power, you sacrifice right and power by fatuity. This is your struggle with Eussia, or rather your confederacy. The prophetic year 1853, closing the millenium of Kussia^s delay from her first entrance of the Golden Horn, has beheld the purposed excitation of the fanatic frenzy of the Muscovite race, and the direct * The Russian note of the 2d July, calling England and France to account for sending the squadrons to the coast of Turkey, was answered by the French Cabmet by one which it published on the 15th, and which Lord Clarendon declared to be the counterpart of a note transmitted by England. The French Minister therein, exculpates France from the charge of having interfered with the plans of Eussia ; he says : — " No, sir, I say it with all the power of conviction, the French Government in this grave discussion, has no reproach to make to itself." XX THE PP.UTH AND and simultaneous invasion of the two channels of wealth and power, on the north and the south of Europe. Unhappy Denmark ! it was only robbers she fell amongst in 1813; it is Thugs she has chanced upon noY/j the '^rouraaP' which your hands have wove and placed_, is round her neck^ and a quivering of life scarce remains in her limbs ; * a gun brig, with a wiU behind it, might have saved the Baltic; but, alas! your ludicrous ships-of-the-line were demonstrating in the Levant. Then the Emperor was all magna- nimity, then — February, March, April, and May last — ^Europe was so alive to Russia's designs that she never could attempt anything on the Crown of Den- mark, on its Constitution, or its Sound, Unhappy Turkey ! in vain have you escaped from anarchy and bloodthirstiness ; in vain have you restored order and inaugurated a rule of mildness and of charity ; vain have been the painful efforts to sub- due and extirpate the malconformities of centuries ; in vain the unparalleled success in reorganising a powerful army, which ensured you from foreign vio- lence and aggression ; you have trusted to England ; * On the day that this passage was sent to press — the 19th of July, the doom of Denmark was sealed ; it was formally announced to the Diet that despotic rule was restored, bearing out to the letter the statement in the body of this volume, that the Constitution would not be extinguished because the Diet refused to accept the Treaty, but that the Treaty would be used to extinguish the Diet. However, the event is annoimced to the British public by tlie Russian organ in the following fashion : — " In all this there is nothing of a coup tVetat, but a legitimate and constitutional way of modifying an impossible Constitution." — Times, July 30, Kote to 2d Edition. THE DAKDANELLES. xxi you have confided in lier Tvisdom, and, alas ! in her honour. Unhappy England! in vain have you expended thousands of millions to be prepared against sudden emergencies ;* in vain have your worthiest sons cogi- tated by night, and laboured by day, to improve the condition of the people in gaining for them cheap food : t in vain have your shipbuilders and mechani- cians laboured to perfect the terrible science of war ; in vain do you possess the alliance of the great mili- tarypower of the West;"j: in vain are you called mistress of the ocean ; alas ! the decree has gone forth to forbid your flag on the waters where is to be decided whether a barbarian man shall be master of Constantinople and protector of Calcutta. Here lies the whole matter • let us consider it. I must entreat the reader's patience, the task of con- ciseness is here a difficult one. He has as yet not been troubled upon this point ; it touches taxes and rates as well as honour and independence. * The Principalities, from 1806 to 1815, occasioned to England, by the war resumed on account of them, an outlay of 650 millions sterling ; since then vre have expended on armaments 350 millions, t " The occupation of tlie Principalities contributes at this moment to raise the price of wheat in Mark Lane, and to check the produc- tive labour of Mancliester and Lyons. For it must be remembered that altliough we live in an age when it is especially inconvenient and disagreeable to run a risk of war for distant political causes, yet those distant political causes are brought nearer than they ever were to our own doors, and affect even the supplies of food and tho demand for labour in the British Isles." — Times, Aug. 2, 1853. X The French Government has ordered its flag to be struck in tlie Principalities ; the representative of England is exchanging friendly communications with the Eussian General-in-Cliief regarding tlie navigation of-tlie Danube. zdi THE PP^UTII AND In tlic published note of the Frcncli government, M. Drouyn de Lliuys states, that the united squadron was only sent " to a bay freely open to the navies of all nations, and situated beyond those limits, which Treaties forbid to transgress in time of peace J' This statement is erroneous: he refers to the Treaty of 1841, signed between the Great Powers and Turkey, by which they are equally and in all times excluded, and Turkey is deprived of the sovereignty of its own waters. A Treaty holds only so long as there is peace, but if war is requisite to justify the passage, it is war with Turkey, not with Russia ; consequently the English and the French Governments do not under- stand their own engagements. Together with the inviolability of the Dardanelles, was established the integrity of the Ottoman Empire ; and in favour of the latter stipulation the former was allowed to pass. Russia had hitherto resisted every compact stipulating for the integrity of Turkey; on one occasion she refused to ratify a Treaty to that effect, which her Minister (Ouvril) had signed. She could safely admit it when the Dardanelles were closed ; from that moment the Western Powers could have nothing further to say respecting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This Treaty was signed at the moment that the Administration of which Lord Palmerston was Foreign Minister was going out of office ; it is dated exactly one week after the expiration of the Treaty of Hun- kiar Skellessi ; it passed at the time without notice or comment, being considered as merely closing the rupture betweim iEJnglancl and 3^ri,ce re§]l$cti:^g Syria. I at tlie time strove to awtikea attention as to its con- sequences yvitk no more effect than I liad previously -done, to warn, of its approach; in the height of the „ -quarrel with Prance, and when war was considered im- .: I minent^il asserted that '^thei matter would close with •J ran arrangement ihetweeii them Which would incorpo- -rate and extend [avec quelques artiGles de plus — for the letter I refer to was in French) the Treaty of Hunkiar Skellessi against which both had protested." But let . that matter pass ; let us drop the causes^, and ignore - for the moment the motives. You negotiated that Treaty, you negotiated yourselves out of the Black iSea; Turkey was never thought oX^Erance only was ii>€6nsidered.; you proposed it to her; you induced her /^to accept it; she accepted it because it was to ensure the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Wha.t con- nection was there between tile; two. ij^fiints — at least as you have linked them ? On that connection the present results are the commentary. Russia passes the -Pruth, — you can- . not enter the Dardanelles. Perhaps you were de- ceived; perhaps you believed that the non-passage by Bussia of the Bosphorus was the equivalent for the non-passage by you of the Daitlanelles ; let us see. In 1833, in consequence of the refusal of England to succour Turkey in the quarrel of Mehemet Ali, and by her advice, a Russian squadron with an army of disembarkation reached tlie Bosphorus. Before its departure Turkey was called upon to sign a Treaty, in recompense for this succour, \yhich was xxi7 THE PEUTH AND no other than a defensive alliance : the Powers beinjr severally bound to furnish succour in case the other was 'attacked: but a secret article was appended, by which the succours on the part of Turkey were trans- muted into a simple closing of the Dardanelles against any power with whom Russia might be at war. It was some months before Western Diplomacy made this great discovery, by perusing the document in the columns of the Morning Herald, but in fact it was modest, and knew the matter from the beginning. Lord Ponsonby had written from luxurious Naples, where he was aw^aiting the termination of the inci- dent before proceeding to his post, to announce that the Russian Squadron would not leave the Bosphorus until such a Treaty had been extorted. The Turkish Government had transmitted to the English Embassy the draught of the Treaty so soon as it was presented to them. The English Government, however, laid up the grievance, in its heaving breast, until a drago* man communicated the Secret Ai'ticle to the corre- spondent of the Morning Herald; then indignation arose, and energy was manifested in Downing Street. The English Embassy called the Porte to account, with exemplary vehemence, for its baseness and treachery, proving that the Secret Article constituted the Treaty '^ an offensive one against England ; ^* the sentiments of the English Government were com- municated to and re-echoed by that of France, and consequently the two squadrons proceeded on their way to the Dardanelles, to support the notes against Turkey, and to make a demonstratiou against Rvssin. THE DARDANELLES. xxt They declared that they "would act as if the Secret Article had never been signed/' which the vulgar interpreted that they would pass the Dardanelles. Russia replied that she would act " as if that Protest had never been made/-' Turkey, ground between the two millstones, was now constrained to sign the Con- vention of St. Petersburg, regulating the internal government of the Principalities so that henceforward "the relation of those Empires in respect to these Provinces became a domestic concern which no longer regarded foreign states.^' Such was the result of that Demonstration by the two first maritime powers of the World. The Treaty of Hunkiar Skellessi had, however, one redeeming point, — it was but temporary ; it wa« but to last for eight years, consequently the freedom of the Dardanelles would be restored on the 8th of July, 1841 : but, in the course of the previous autumn, another na,val Demonstration had taken place, but this time it was in concert with Russia and against France. However, the two countries were soon re- conciled, and that reconciliation was sealed as above seen by the Treaty of the 13tli of July, 1841, by whicK England and France bound themselves not to enter, not for a period of years but for ever ; not now in case of one or both being at war with Russia, but in peace as well as in war. There was therefore no delusion in respect to the nature of the Secret Article; the difference be- tween it and the Treaty of 1841, was merely the increase of its "offensive character/' Now if that sxvi J, THE f 3PinPEH.MA.NI>- article was of'^cBsivc wliilc it :;.. cod as ti com- pact ' Huo;ia a]idvTiu'Jie7,.ja9^ je^TQ?i.:o2Lciafl^ known xo i;ie. other Powei's, until ;-Engiand rendered to Uussia tiio • ser\4ce of publishing, • it^ what did it become when signed by England itself ? Could .the secret article of the Treaty of 1833 have been pleaded to-day against the entrance of our squadron? Com- ment is superfluous. England had prepared for the Treaty of Hunkiar Skellessi by her attempt to bomljard Constantinople in 1806j when she was at peace with Turkey. About ' that time she did bombard Copenhagen : there is a mesmeric attraction between the two Straits. The object of this felonious attempt was to force Turkey to surrender the Princijjalities to Russia^ with whom Turkey was also at peace ; the parallel attempt on Copenhagen was with an opposite pretext; the result in both cases, was the sajne^ except that at Constan- tinople you fortunately had neither a Lord Stratford de K-edcliffe as Ambassador nor a Sir William Parker as Admiral ; qualms of conscience did prevail over instructions^ and a chance was left to the Northerly ' wind ; your demonstration consequently sailed away with its shot and sliells on boards and Wallachia and Moldavia stilly to the exceeding annoyance of the English Government_, belong to the Porte. Thus the two Treaties for th« Dardanelles are the children of naval demonstrations_, with which at least the school- boys of Europe w^ould be acquainted had they occurred in the 105th a.nd 111th 01ympiads_, instead of the year of our Lord 1806 and 1833. Then they would have been historical not diplomatic qucitions^ as THE DAEDANELLSS. xxvii mvolving tlie fate not of Europe but , of the Pelo- ponnesus. '(! We must not however forget another demonstra*!; tion — that of 1849, when we sent a squadron not merely to a Bay freely open ^*^to the Navy of all nations,,^' but to the inside of those famous Straits, : violating "those limits which Treaties forbid to transgress in. times of peace/^ The curious reader will learn the consequences of this ^agorous act in a subsequent part of this volume. I have now empliatically to state that the Turks are not adverse to our passing the Dardanelles ; they were so doubtless in 1809, for the best of reasons^ for we had attacked them; but now regarding you as their protectors, their whole desire and hope consists in seeing, your force' uppn the only field where it can be available for them; they camiot conceive how are to be reconciled' your friendship, of which unfortunately they have no doubt, and your avoidance of- the only measure wliich caix render it: effectual. It must be evident to the commonest apprehension, that an English frigate in the Black Sea alters the balance of power between Russia aiid Turkey. Lord Palmer- ston has explained the sacrifice of Cracow, by the fact that line-of-battle ships could not reach that, town ; he has more recently ascribed the failure of protection of English navigation in the Danube to the " want of water in that river,^^ and in both state- ments he has fah'ly represented the feelings of the whole of the Populations of the East. As no one there ascribes the absence of your vessels to objec- xxviii THE PRUTH AND tions on the part of Turkey^ so every one explains it by objections on the part of Russia. So long as they are not there_, England counts for nothing, and Russia is accounted everything. I have had to struggle with incredulity whenever I have asserted that the Porte desired the passage of an English squadron ; but unquestionable confir- mation is afforded by the Correspondent of the Times, who announces that the inhabitants of Constantinople '^were so confident that the English and French flags would float side by side in front of Stamboul, that the quays were crowded with spectators on the watch, and ready to hail with shouts of welcome the first appearance of the Allies in Turkish waters.^' Pre- cisely the same thing occurred in 1834, when the news arrived of the speech of M, Bignon in the French Chamber. The Turks have not confined themselves to mere aspirations ; they took steps, though with a caution which surprised me at the time. The first time that Redschid Pasha visited these shores (he was then ambassador in Paris), it was to propose the entrance of the British squadron, but not till he had received the assurance that the request should not be refused. That assurance could not be obtained. Standing orders at Constantinople render the contingency im- possible.* * When I was Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople, I was not allowed to see the archives. One of the persons long employed in the embassy observed ; " There is a document there whicli they would never have allowed you to see, and which no English Minister dares to withdraw : it is to prevent the passage of the squadron." THE DAEDANELLES. xxix In 1830^ an English frigate, the Blonde, com^- mancled by Sir Edmond Lyons, at present repre- sentative of Great Britain at Stockholm, following the track of the Argo, passed the " blue Symplegades,'^ and performed the " Periplus '* of the Euxine. The Russians retorted by sending two line-of-battle ships into the Bosphorus, on which the Austrian Inter- nuncio observed, '^'^the Blonde has been brought to bed of twins, larger than herself/^ The Russian re- presentative remonstrated in London; a reprimand was sent to the venturesome captain, and the above referred to measure taken to prevent the recurrence of a similar offence. Lord Durham having chosen, on his way to St. Petersburg, the route of the Black Sea, to indicate that England apprehended the vul- nerable point of Russia — the guns of the man-of-war which carried him to Odessa, were lowered into the hold ! As it will have been observed that this exclusion has been maintained under no less than six foreign ministers, any one of whom by a couple of lines could have caused it to cease, and must have caused it to cease unless he had taken the other course, there wdll be nothing invidious in detailing the reasons wdiich one of them has himself assigned. The first con- versation I ever held with Lord Palmerston bore upon this point ; he entered into the discussion not idly, but after the late King had come into the same views and required him to discuss the matter with me. His objection was, that "any question pending be- tween Russia and England must be decided by the XXX THE PEUTH AND relative aggregate power of tlie 'two governmentsy'and as ours was the greatest we must control her action in all cases^ without reference to any local distribution of forces.-" It is long since I listened to these words_, but they are too deeply engraven in my memory for the possibility of the slightest mistake : they were uttered at the Bedford Hotel, Brighton, in 1831. No further direct and verbal communication took place between us; but some three years afterwards, on press- ing it again, I was given to imderstand that the Foreign Secretary had objected, that the Turks would never suffer it. I offered to bring from the Porte itself the contradiction in the form of a request, and this it was which led to the communications of Redschid Pasha, a letter of censure was addressed to myself, although I then held no office under the British Government. On a subsequent occasion, my endeavours were in the same indirect manner met by this argument, that "the passage of a squadron would be a blow struck at the independence of Tm-key, and that he could be no friend of the Turks who urged it.^-* Yet at the same time I was publishing, with the sanction of the Go- vernment, these words, — " While the Dardanelles are open, there is no decision of England to which Russia must not submit ; when they are closed there is no act of Russia which England will not have to endure.^^ These two propositions, I conceive, I have now established : 1st, that Turkey desired the presence of an English squadron in the Black Sea; the 2d, that the English minister has thwarted that desire ; no one but he has prevented its entrance. ^n^ DABD1^I:I.EES. xxxi If the Treaty of 1^41 did really present an obstacle^ ■w^s ever so glorious an opportunity as the present?^ what would it bav^ C0st?'iM^liat>did it' require? no- thing but the will. But Jlussia knew Well that that was wanting, and the end will be that you will con- firm Jfor the last tiuae your exclusion; already has Turkey under the fatal influence of her Ally abso- lutely taken her stand in her manifesto upon the Treaty of 1811! Again, why' did you not hire the frigates of Sar- dinia or of the two Sicilies, of Denmark, or of Spain? They have not negotiated; they have not excluded * Some very remarkable papers have appeared in the Morning Advertiser. The -writer has seen the whole case at a glance, although totally ignorant of the antecedents. On the point referred to in the text, he says : — " When the armies of the Czar collected on the Pruth, the united fleets of England and France should have anchored in Besika Bay. When Prince Menschikoff 's ultimatum was delivered, a corresponding ultimatum from England and from Ei-ance should have been despatched to St. Petersburg. The passage of the Pruth should have been declared the signal for the Porte to summon, if it chose, those fleets to Constantinople. When the Z?ruth was passed, if the Prutli was passed, tliose fleets should have been there. That was the spot from which to ' negotiate,' with spirit, honour, and effect. But that ultimatum would probably have prevented both the passage of the Pruth and the * negotiations.' The Czar would have looked twice before he provoked resolute counsels and a con- tiguous foe. He has played out his game as he pleased. He has staked craft against imbecihty, perfidy against creduhty, audacity agaiust cowardice, promptness against procrastination, common sense against 'statesmanship,' and himself against the Cabinet of All the Talents and the Empire, whether of ' peace' or * glory.' He has got every honour, and won every trick, and left the poor dupes of Erance and England witliout cards, coin, credit, or counters." In another article he says : — " These line-of-battle ships, these glorious ' screws,' tliese huge ' auxiliary propellers,' though flanked by France and joined to Turkey, dare not face the Eussians. Our miserable ministers tremble at the .prospect of their entering the channel of Constantinople." xxxii THE PRUTH AND tliemselves_, tlieir vessels miglit have been got clieap and no one could have quarreled with their entrance, certainly at least not Turkey. If the condescension was too great, there is a frigate or two of the United States in the INIediterranean. That Government has signed no Treaty for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, as it has signed no Treaty for the pay- ment of the Sound Dues. "Why not apply to it for a little spirited practice? You have exhausted tlie disgust and indignation of the Old World, be brave against the ridicule of the New.* Such were the advantages which Russia reckoned upon securing by the Treaty of 1811, but of course upon the grounds that it should be executcxl in so far only as it served her. Treaties are to her the scaffolds by which she builds; as she ascends, she knocks them down. That of Vienna in 1815 gave her Poland, but did not prevent her, in 1846, from disposing of Cracow. That of Adrianople in 1829 gave her the mouths of the Danube on conditions, bat does not prevent her, in 1853, from blocking up the entrance in violation of these conditions. That of Balta Liman, in 1849, gave her a conjoint occupa- tion, for seven years, of the Principalities, but docs not prevent her^ in 1853, from assuming and prac- tising a separate and exclusive occupation. So too that of London in 1841, gave her the exclusion of foreign * It would appear that this has actually taken place. " We are further informed that three American frigates are in the Bosphorus, the Commodore having asserted that the Treaty of 1841 did not concern him." — Times, 4th of August. THE DARDANELLES. xxxiii vessels of war from the Euxine on the condition of respecting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and so also it does not prevent her, in 1853, from violating that integrity. Let us suppose for a moment a Parliament and Government in England worthy of the name, and consider how, in the present emergency, the first would have dealt with the Treaty, and the second acted under it. In February, 1848, the whole of the foreign policy of Lord Palmerston was brought before Parliament under the form of a demand for papers on which were to be founded articles of impeachment. One of the chief, indeed I may say the principal, ground of charge was the series of transactions closing with the Treaty of 1811, "excluding from the Dardanelles the Allies of the Sultan." The closing passage was as follows : — " It (the Treaty of 1841) was designed to para- lyse the Porte; it was framed for the purpose of making it indispensable for the Sultan to accept whatever policy the Russian Czar might choose to impose upon him. Russia alone is here planning and executing her anterior combinations, or guiding herself by no suggestions but her own, whether she shall take possession of Constantinople now, or defer the consummation yet a little longer. Sir, there is but one way by which this great calamity can be averted. It is by repudiating the act of the noble Lord. But those who repudiate must punish. That, sir, is why, moved by their own criminal weakness. xxxiv THE PEUTII AND the Cabinet whicli succeeded that of which the noble Lord was a member,^ neglected to disown the treasonable] policy of the noble Lord_, and- to set aside the Treaties which are its monuments — the Treaty of Adrianople., which he adopted— the Treaty of liiinkiar Skeliessi^ to which he adhered — and more shameful stilly the Treaties of 18iO and 1841, which he made."^ At that time the House of Commons had its at- tention called to the subject by no event_, and it might judge the allegations if true, to be practically unimportant_, as curbing the ambition of a state then quiescent, or for protecting the indepen- dence of an Empire then unassailed. In fact they knew nothing on the subject and cared as little; being spoken to about the Dardanelles, they only opened their eyes in stupid wonder or closed them in contemptuous pity. Lord Palmerston^s reply, how- ever, constitutes a most important docunaent; now it will be understood ; the heads are : — That the Treaty was an act of reconciliation be- tween France and the other Powers ,• that the main consideration was, that no foreign ships of war should pass either Straits without the consent of the Turkish Government, that consequently, it ^' merely repeated the Treaty in 1809,'' and "the only thing it did was to record the same arrangement on the part of Austria, France, and Prussia;" that it ''^was a virtual abnegation of the Treaty of Hunkiar Skellessi," and "superseded that Treaty, and placed Turkey as it * Speech of Mr. Aiistey, Feb. 28, 1848. .THE DAllDANELLES. sxxv were under tlie care of all the five Powers." To these specific points was added a general declaration of the absence of all purpose of ^' exclusive ascendency over Turkey" on the part of Eussia. The results are described as having been most beneficial, that whereas, previous to its signature, the condition of the East ' had constantly been one of agitation or convulsion, all insecurity had since tlien disappeared : it had restored Turkey and put an end to all alarms on the score of Russia. . It has been said by an old EngUsh Statesman, '^ there is a time when evil measures escape detection, but there comes a time also when they are brought to light." For this measure, that time has now come, and for Parliament that for dealing with it. The violation of the territory of Turkey has taken place, not in consequence of a war of which the merits are uncertain, and in which the aggression might have been on the side of Turkey, but withoxit any war at all. The case is therefore in an incon- ceivable manner relieved from all embarrassment. It is the pure act to meet which the Treaty was pro- fessedly negotiated and signed. The English Govern- ment had but one course open, no option was left to it and no alternative as to the means to be employed. The act was one of aggression against Prussia, . Austria, and France, as well as against England and Turkey, being a violation of the Treaty with the four first powers as of the territoiy of the last. There might be negotiations between the Powers, . but there could have been no negotiation with Russia; xxxvi THE PIIUTH AND a summons to retire,, and a demand of indemnity, and the instant withdrawal of the representatives of ':he Allies, in case of refusal, together with the en- trance of their vessels, to see, in the one case, the retreat effected, and to prevent in the other the fur- ther passage, at least over the Euxine, of vessels or troops, — these were the negotiations to have opened with Russia. If the other Powers did not concur in these steps, that was their affair^ the obligations of England concern herself alone, and her power in this case rendered their decision a matter of the most utter insignificance. That France should have allowed to England the sole honour of such an achievement, could hardly be hoped for : she would have insisted on bearing a part. The only risk that could have .possibly attended the operation, was that of France being prepared to join Russia, and her having at the Dardanelles a superior force before the arrival of the British squadron — after the thing was done, all the power of France could not have undone it: the peculiar configuration of the Euxine must •render whoever enters first j omnipotent, not only there but throughout the globe. Such I say must have been the course of the Goverh- ment which I have supposed. Either the Parliament liad to abrogate the Treaty of 1841 on the grounds of its own guilty motives and injurious effects, or the Govern- ment had to execute the engagements of that Treaty — if they did not, it was for the Parliament to call them to account for its violation. No declaration of war was required : you declare no war against THE DAPtDAxVELLES, xxxvii pirates — you require no riot act to resist liouse- brealvers; your vessels were wanted in the Black Sea to stop Russians operations; a cutter would have stopped them. It would be worth to the Emperor his Crown — to Russia, perhaps, at this moment, her existence — to fire on an English man-of-war's punt if floating in the Euxine. But the Minister who made the Treaty of 1841 is actually a member of the Cabinet. He is in possession of all the facts : he is acquainted with the motives for which it was signed — those motives which he has stated in Parliament. He has now discovered the deception of which he has been the victim : he has now learnt the value of those declarations of Baron Brunow to which he listened in 1840, and which he detailed to the House in 1848; and has seen that the practical results of the Treaty of 1841 are anything but the security of the East. Must he not have remonstrated with his colleagues, deplored his former error, besought them now to atone for it^ and infused into their minds some of that daring energy which he has revealed in so many lands ? We must therefore assume, that, in violating its engagements, and in counselling Turkey to submit to the invasion of its territory, the Cabinet has acted in defiance of the member whose opinion, if he was ad- mitted as a colleague, niust have been held to be all authoritati-ve on this matter. The Treaty of 1841, adopting as a principle thsit which when formerly put forward by Russia as a preten- sion, excited the indignation of Europe and provoked xxxviii . THE PEUTH AND the protests of England and France^ amounts in fact to a revolution of all ideas on what has been termed the ''Eastern question/^ Any one starting from that point is utterly at sea, as the governments of Turkey and England have been. - The case of that country is as completely falsified by it as is that of Denmark by the Treaty of the 8th of May, 1852. When you adopt false ma^xims in contracts, and calling those contracts Treaties, institute these maxims as public law, of course there remains neither right upon which to take a stand, nor common sense by which to be guided. It has not failed to strike the discriminating British public that Russians conduct is strange and unaccountable ; but they content themselves inth referring it to the distracted mind of the Emperor. His "pridCj, vexation, and resentment,^^ have com- promised, say they, the position of Russia ; in other words, Nicholas is mad. He is so, just as Philip was mad to the Athenians ; insanity is not on that side : Nicholas is not mad, but Russia is in danger. The West is to her as a preserve, where she goes forth to hunt when in want of yenison, or sport ; she consults her pleasure only, and can subsist without its spoil. In the East it is her necessities that she Las to consult ; there she cannot slumber for an hour, or rest for a single day ; there it is ditches she has to dig, and ramparts to throw up ; it is war, not sport ; the contest is for very life. The same paper that announced the formation of a lilB ' DAEDA-NEliiife. xxxix- Ttfrkish camp oii 'tliei3orclers'''of 'Afia Minor for thei purpose of joining tlie Circassians in case of war-,'1 annouiiced also the regebti^ hj P^Klia'6f' pJ-oposals ^ for tHe cession of Astrabad, a^d the approaching^^ departure of the fleet ofi B^yprfc" for the. BosphoriiSi''' A universal ' repulsion of the ' East ' is now made- ' matitfcst: The dd^'^lopmeht of a^ great inilitaijf^"* pbv/er in Turkey^ the loss of the lever of religion^j-'"^ the animosity' of the populations westward of tHfe-- Blade Sea^ including Hungary, the continued siie?--^' cesses of the Circassians,,'!* and the rise and growth of a spirit of disaffection in her own soutliem Pro- vinces, are facts which no longer require proof or illustration. Unless she succeeds in altering the cir- cumstances, Russia will sOon find herself no longer menacing, but menaced^ There are other matters remaining behind still veiled from observation. Turkey has been engaged in recasting her Financial system; she has last year effected a change in respect to the chief in- ternal tax, which, by displacing the. farmers of re-, venue, has been no less a relief to the People than a profit to the TreasurJ^ The next step in contem- plation was one which would have burst the fetters in which its agricultural resources are at., * The Aacliener Zeitung^ of the 21th June, gives as news from Trebizond, "that Sbanayl has beaten a Eussian ai'iny, and taken twenty-three pieces of cannon, and an enormous amount of muni- tions of war. Five battalions of Poles and irregular troops went over to the Circassians, and Shamyl has issued a proclamation, offering protection to all deserters." xl THE PRUTH AND present bound. This Russia at every hazard had to prevent.* It will thus be seen that however injurious it may be to allow Europe to learn that Turkey is possessed of military power^ or to provoke and excite the national spirit of the Ottomans, still it was a higher object to divert their minds from peaceful internal ameliorations, and by expenditure on armaments to deprive the Treasury of the means of making those sacrifices, whether in fact, or in supposition, which necessarily attend every financial alteration. The Turkish military organisation is entirely local, and in that consists not only its excellence, but its economy. The Rediff follow their ordinary occupa- tions and assemble for exercise only during one month in the year. By forcing Turkey to arm, and to assemble her troops on the frontiers, besides the -sacrifice in money, there will be also the exhaustion •of spirit and goodwill. The army, especially the EedifF, however ardent at present, will be disgusted by being uselessly drawn from their native provinces, and the indignation of the Mussulmans will tui'n from Russia on their own Government.f * The Times correspondent from Berlin, under date of June 29tb, indicate3 for tlie first time an indistinct perception of this object. " The war which threatens now to break out may be also repre- sented as a struggle between restriction and freedom in commerce. The commercial resources of Turkey and the Danubian PrincipaUties are the prize which Kussia longs to carry off." t This admission was recently made by the Times : — " In fact, tlie indefinite prolongation of the present state of suspense may prove more injurious to the Porte than war itself. These preparations have THE DARDANELLES. xl It is the exportation of the Provinces of the Danube Tvhicli principally competes with those of Russia in the markets of Enghind-i^ and Europe, for tliey are sub- ject neither to the fiscal system of Russia, nor to the prohibitory duties established throughout Turkey by the English Treaty of Commerce. Her army -will therefore be fed by provisions that otherwise would have reached the Thames, to the exclusion there of grain from St. Petersbui'g and Odessa. The very connection which has sprung up between England and the Danubian Provinces will assist her in suppressing them. Her movement taking place at the shipping season, the City will be thrown into alarms respecting supplies, which a war with Russia would endanger ; and so the English Government, if ever called to ac- count for its present acts, will be able triumphantly to refer to the necessities of England as limiting their power of action. The occupation of the Principalities is a matter given a shock to the Ottoman Empire which it will long feel, if, in- deed, it ever recovers from the effects of them. While our attention is directed to the negotiations of the day, it must not be forgotten that there is at the bottom of these discussions the gi'eatcst question which the statesmen of this age have yet to solve." — June 27. • " Since we have opened our ports for the free importation of foreign grain, our trade with E,ussia has gradually dechned, but from the same period that of Turkey has gradually increased j and while the former has diminished nearly fifty per cent., the latter has risen to the same extent since 18i5. In 1850 the exports of Indian com from the port of Galatz, amounted to upwards of 1,100,000 quarters. Our exports of merchandize to G-alatz, in 1850, amounted to about £435,000, and to Ibrail to about £103,000. A third of our import- ations of foreign grain (value £12,000,000), is in the hands of the Greek merchants of the Mediterranean." — Bankers' Circular^ July 2nd, 1853. c xlii ^ THE PEUTH AND wholly distinct from the original quarrel with Turkey, but it Avas required as a preliminary. Russia has already twice entered the Principalities in time of peace, but in both cases there was a pretext ; in the first, the war raged in Europe, and the ambition of Napoleon sufficed ; in the second, there was a revo- lution. I have for the last two autumns been look- ing hourly for the news of a revolution in Yassy or at Bucharest ; however, had she obtained such an occasion, it would have been necessary to have re- commenced, on the conditions settled by the Treaty of Balta Liman. If the Russians had pushed the matter in reference to the Holy Sepulchre to a rupture, then the crossing of the Pruth would have been, considered by the Turks as an act of hostility, and dealt with as such. This then was never contemplated. If the occupation of the Principalities had been arranged between the ivio Courts as the consequence of an insurrection, then a Turkish force would have entered together with the Russian, and her object would have been frustrated. The fire having been drawn upon Beth- lehem, she quietly marches into Bucharest, and tells off the garrisons for the fortresses of the left bank of the Danube. One course only was open to the Porte, and it was to send forward her troops into the Provinces so soon as the Russians crossed the Pruth. If Russians step was not war, so, then this was not war ; and, if war, it was at a distance from Turkey, on a field where Russia could not make it. By this every point would THE DARDANELLES. ^^iii have been covered ; there was no difficulty in its exe- cution ; the troops were there, • and under the very- same general who had taken the same step in 1848, and had then been received' as a deliverer by the Wallaohians. With astonishment and indignation it has to be asked, ^' Vf hat meanness, what treacheiy, has been at work at Constantinople?'^ There has been, indeed, neither meanness nor treachery; the security of the East and the peace of Europe have been compromised only by generous confidence on the one hand and friendly caution on the other. General Vaientini describes the last war as a com- bat between a blind man and a seeing one ; and that war occurred when Turkey was in a state of total political and militai*y disorganisation. Pozzo di Borgo has assigned as the» ground of that war the necessity of breaking the new military organisation . of the Turks, vvhich prepared for Russia in his opinion dan- (jers for the future. These dangers are now realised, and still the game is between a blind man and a seeing one. Russia, by her present move, has incurred hazard that is terrible to contemplate. Never could she have risked it without a man of whom she was certain as representative of England at Constanti- nople.'^' It has been avowed in Parliament that there were no instructions sent out, that everything was remitted to the judgment, knowledge, and prudence of the Ambassador : and there could be no doubt that * At the beginning of the year, when there was some doubt as to Lord Strafford de Redcliffe being sent back againj the Russian representative took care to allow his satisfaction to be detected. xUv THE PPtUTH AND on the critical point for wliich all the rest was pre- paratary, and upon which everything was to hinge. Lord de Eedcliffe would suggest, and having suggested, imperiously require — caution;'^ there is scarcely less doubt that Colonel Rose, if left in charge of the Mission, would (being uninstructedj have said, " Of course, you must send your troops from the Danube if they send theirs from the Pruth." In fact, England having tremendous power and no policy, the gravest events must hinge upon the temperaments of the in- dividuals cast by accidents into determinating posts ; it is upon these accidents that Russia makes her game. In this case the individual diplomatist to whom I refer stands pre-eminent in our service, and his zeal and interest in favour of Turkey are as un- questionable as has been his courageous assertion in Parliament of British rights against Russian en- croachments. The matter is not therefore to be narrovred to the limits of individual merit or demerit. But the return of Lord Stratford de RedclifFe to his post was not the only measure required to make the game a safe one : it was equally requisite to pre- vent M. Von Prokesch from being there as repre- sentative of Austria, to which post he had actually been designated when Russia interposed, and in so open a manner that her interference w^as of public notoriety at Berlin and Vienna. Again, it was re- quisite to keep Riza Pasha out of office, and here she was served both by accident and by England ; she * The advice of Lord Stratford de Eedcliffe, in case of a war, to withdraw behind the Danube, has reached even the papers. THE DARDANELLES. xlv was equally fortunate in London, wlicre slic had now Lord Palmerston and Lord Aberdeen in the same cabinet, and neither of them ostensibly Foreign Minister. Thus were the cards shuffled and packed for 1853, and nothing left to the chapter of acci- dents. Let it now be remembered that it is but two years since she evacuated these very provinces. Within this short space of time have circumstances altered, or is her mind changed ? Not in the least : but she found that they were of no use to her while there was a joint occupation of a Turkish force. True there were but 10,000 Turks to 50,000 Russians, yet that force sufficed to paralyse her occupation and to prevent her from converting them into a basis of operations. There was also another slight inconve- nience, the contact with the Turkish troops suggested — DESERTION. The Muscovitcs are not apt scholars in Liberalism, and do not comprehend Revolution, but they are not insensible to the difference of food, pay, and treatment, which they then for the first time witnessed in an army composed of populations, many of whom spoke the same language as themselves : they revolved in their stupid minds whether it might not be more desirable to serve the Sultan than the Czar. The regiments so debauched when withdrawn across tlie Pruth were judiciously placed out of harm^s way. For these and other reasons it was judged advisable to put an end to the conjoint occupation, in order that a Russian force might return alone. I refer the reader to the Chapter in this volume on the xlvl ' , THE PBUTH AND Evacuation of tlie Provinces^ printed before the Prutli was crossed. It may now strike with astonishment,, that in 1851 there should have been a Turkish force in occupation. " What/^ I may be asked, ^^ becomes of your theory ? Either your assumption of English influence was groundless, or that influence was not exercised in the manner you describe/'' That matter is easily ex- plained. When Omer Pasha crossed the Danube in 1848, the English Ambassador loas not consulted , for the best of all reasons, that the Porte was not aware of the fact until it had occurred ; and it was kept in ignorance by its own functionaries for fear it should consult the English Ambassador. 1 now assert in the most emphatic manner, that by deficiency of military power Russia cannot attack Turkey. I assert, that as compared with the cir- cumstances of the late war, the forcQ of Turkey has multiplied many fold, and that that of Eussia has absolutely diminished. I do not refer to any ex- traneous support given to Turkey; I speak of an even-handed contest, of which the Principalities are to be, and must be, the theatre. If you commence by surrendering them, Turkey is, of course, placed in the same condition that India would be, by allowing Hussia to occupy the Punjab. In 1828 Turkey made no defence of the Princi- palities ; being a champaign country, a regular army would have been required for that purpose, and Turkey had none; yet Prussia, in the course of that campaign was beaten back. She had 200,000 men ; THE DAEDANELLES. xlvii in fact, her whole resources were called up after two years of preparation. In 1810, with half that force, she captured all the fortresses on the right bank of the Danube. Turkey has an atmy now to defend the Pruth, and, in the words of General Bern, better soldiers than Russia, and more of them, I insert textually a letter of his : — " To Mehemet All Pasha, Minister of War, "MoNSEiGNEUR — Not seeing the order arrive to com- mand my presence at Constantinople, 1 conceive it to be my duty to address to your Highness some considerations which appear to me to be urgent. •' I commence by declaring that the Turkish troops which I have seen — cavalry, infimtry, and field artillery — are ex- cellent. " In bearing, instruction, and military spirit, there cannot be better. The horses surpass those of any European cavalry. That which is inappreciable i^ the desire felt by all the officers and all the soldiers to fight against Russia. " With such troops I would wiUingly engage to attack a Hussian force double their number, and I should certainly be victorious. "And as the Ottoman Empire can march against the Ptussians more troops than that power can oppose to them, it is evident that the Sultan may have the satisfaction to see restored to his sceptre all the provinces treacherously withdrawn from his ancestors by the Czars of Moscow. ** I have the honour to remain, &c. ^MURAD." This opinion may be considered tinctured by the feelings of the man, but the fact is unquestionable xlviii THE PEUTH AND that Turkey can now muster on the theatre of war twice the number that Russia can bring against her; and if these are not all regulars^ they are the same irregulars who, in 1828, at Kurtepe, under every dis- advantage of position, beat twice their number of Eussian regulars. As to their quality, the opinion of General Aupick, expressed to the Sultan, in 1849, tallies with that of General Bern, '' Your majesty's troops,'^ he said^ ^^ are able to give a good account of any enemies that Avill be opposed to them." Even supposing that this army were forced to retreat, it would devastate the Provinces before it, and in its retreat entrench itself on the Danube. To place herself in a similar position to that at which she commenced the campaign of 1828, Eussia would require at least 400,000 men ; this force could not bo supported, and besides she has not got it. If the war be m^ade from the Danube, the idea is involved of the downfall of Turkey ; all enthusiasm is destroyed. Further is involved that of the co- operation, or consent of England and France, with the consequent depression upon the minds of the populations which extend from the Baltic all round to the Steppes of the Kirghis. If the war be made from the Pruth and a powerful Turkish army brought within hail, so to say of the Cossack country, the Tartars of the Crimea, the Poles and the Hungarians, it then is a (question of the fall of Eussian not Turkish power. Then most assuredly would be seen 100,000 Circassians on the Eastern plains of Eussia, and every population would strike for independence. The Sultan THE DAEDANELLES. iilix is now the protector of tlie old ^luscovite Cliurcli; their bishops and priests now repair to Constantinople for consecration ; he is the religious head of the Mus- sulman subjects of Russia, and the recent excitation of fanaticism will be a new spur to Catholic Poland and to the Starovirtze, who have already projected flight into Turkey. If then Russia were so insane as to make a war which had to commence when she invaded her neighbour's territory, she must leave in observation a body no less powerful than that which she would employ in the war. ' There remains the not immaterial question of sup- plies and transport. The Principalities being the theatre of war would be used for the support of the Turkish and not the Russian army ; the latter would advance only where the country was exhausted aud from whence the population had retired. The Turks in retreating would fall back on their resources ; the Russians in advancing would be removed from theirs; as they advanced they would not secure the country behind them, as their whole line would be exposed to incursions from the Dobroja (the slip of land inclosed between the Danube and Black Sea) ; they would have to bring everything, even forage and fuel by means of oxen waggons, across the Steppes of the Ukraine,* * "If Austria remained strictly neutral, and refused to supply proyisioQS by means of Transylvania, the Russian troops would be literally starved, and it would be pliysically impossible to convey the requisite suppKes for an army of 200,000 men by land through Bessarabia, for a smaller army woidd be useless to attempt any thing against Constantinople." — Military opinion quoted by Yienua Correspondent of the Times, Aug. 1. 1 THE PEUTH AND where there are no roads_, scarcely any inhabitants, no trees, no water, save along the rivers, and which with a short interval of spring passes from a Siberian winter to the summer of an African desert. Across the same country her reinforcements would have to pass, and the sacrifice of life on these occasions has always exceeded the loss of men in a campaign. On the other hand, the Turks would be close to their supplies ; steam has opened up for them a new resource : a water communication bisects the Empire ; from their capital they could receive supplies in the same number of hours that the Russians could from theirs in weeks, and that without loss or expenditure. The levies from the furthest maritime province might be brought up in a week, or at furthest a fortnight. Without go'ing further into the matter, I think that what I have said will remove every possible doubt that on the occupation of the Principalities without contest, depends v/hether or not Russia will make v/ar, that is to say, that if not so allowed to occupy them, she could not invade them, and that being so allowed, she then can and will invade Turkey. I do not intend to say that by giving her all this, you ensure her triumph, but I do say that her case is desperate, and that she is jforced to play a desperate game. A timely revolution at Constantinople, a momentary indignation of the Queen of England, or of the Emperor of the French, may plunge he!*, even before she enters on the further contest, into the most frightful perils, but once established on the Danube she can wait her time : thence she menaces THE DAEDAN-ELLES. li Austria just as mucli as Turkey. She lias tliere- fore other gieces on the board besides those we have seen moved. An attempt on Constantinople is not to be hazarded until England and France are "engaged in a hot war," or till Europe is engaged with a Uevolution. Beware then of the spring of 1854 ! I have now to point out the most alarming sign i and symptom of our degradation. It is not long since the allegation that a minister or a journal was under the influence of Eussia was received with in- dignation if not with contempt ; now that charge is in every one's mouth; we have avowedly a Russian faction- in England, — not indeed a faction, but a management, management of tlie Cabinet, manage- ment of the Press. We learn the fact from denun- ciations : it is considered monstrous, but the de- nouncers represent no party; no one will say that • there is an Anti-Ptussian faction. This especially is remarkable, that papers supposed to be severally under the influence of tlije two statesmen, now col- leagues in the same Cabinet, wlio have been in turn Foreign Secretaiy for more than a quarter of a century, are those which most vehemently de- nounce each other as "Russian;" I point out the fact, not for the benefit of Englishmen, they un- fortunately know it too well, but as a warning to the Turkish Government against that danger of English counsel which brings in its suite every other danger — Russian violence, Mussulman insurrection, and Christian revolt ; I therefore explicitly state that in the best informed circles, the Times is supposed lii THE PRUTH AND to represent the views of Lord Aberdeen^ and tlie Morning Post tliose of Lord Palmers^on : the Times is already well enough known at Constantinople ; the Morning Post has long been known here as the reputed organ of Eussia; the latter speaking of the former^ says : " A contemporary of ours — the tool of Russia — has plucked up courage enough to advise his country- men to be cowards. Such audacious baseness is as curious as his complicated errors and his perplexed understanding/^ * One result of the passage of the Pruth^ largely com- mented on in the public press,, is the dangerous position in which the Turkish Government is placed in reference to its own subjects. Is this effect confined to Con- stantinople ? Will it not react on the Governments of the Continent ? Must it not affect the position of Louis Napoleon ? The Queen of England, as a sove- reign, may not suffer ; but will any one say that the character of public men in England has not been degraded? I do not speak of the Members of the present Government alone : where is the Oppo- sition ? Is it safe in a Constitutional State that the word ^^ Russian " should be bandied about and stick wherever it strikes — that there should be no name in public life not stamped with incapacity or tainted * The Morning Herald writes : " It is merely as the head of the house, in which the present Premier occupies a subordinate position, of ' Times, Nicholas, Aberdeen, and Co.,' that we ever refer to what it puts forward." The Fress, the organ of a powerful party, charges Lord Clarendon -yith connivance with M. Brunow. The philosophical Spectator expresses similar opinions. The Morninrj Advertiser^ having the next largest cu'ctdation to the Times, repeats the same charges. THE DAllDANELLES. Uii with suspicion ?* It is only as yet tlie seed that is put in the ground; wait for the germination under the Russian dews of events and the March showers of invasion and revolution. The seed that is sown is the knowledge that the Government has co- operated in preventing Turkey from resisting an invasion : the harvest which English Statesmen will have to reap will be certainly contempt — probably exasperation — possibly impeachment. Yes, States- men of England, you are proceeding to reverse the comfortable maxim upon which you have slum- bered so tranquilly and so long; and England will have to thank you at last for recalling to her awakened memory that "the days of impeachment have not gone by/' for the remedial process of the law returns from the instant that she remem- bers it. In the meantime let the Cabinet filch mea- sures, and the Press masticate news,t for we must be worse before we can be better. Since reason has not availed to save us, we must look to vengeance. * An unusual number of Eussians have been allowed this year to travel, and they are also unusvially communicative ; amongst other things they say, " there -will never be any serious hostility against Eussia, for Russian gold makes its way into ParHaments and into Cabinets, and smooths matters down to the state the Emperor woaM have them," — Paris Correspondent of the Times. t The Times, of the 8th of July, inserts two leaders, the one prepar- ing the nation to support an energetic decision on the part of the Government, the other exposing the absurdity of taking any decision at all. The process of contradiction is carried still further. One oi these articles in the same paragi-aph ridicules " England and Franco putting themselves into a hostile attitude by the side of the hapless and helpless IMussulman," and asserts that " Eussia would consult her interests as little as her honour by forcing onwards in the face of a people as mihtary and as fanatic as herself," and against wliom kihe "can do but little, except in cooperation" with her allies. liv THE PEUTH AND Cliatliain in one breath threatened the vengeance of the iaw^ and the fury of the rabble,,* and that was only for an nnjust war which England herself had made : here^ for no passion, for no private end, with nothing to mislead the judgment, or disguise the facts, the fabric of the world is to be shaken because an English Minister does not dare to face a Kussian Ambassador. I will not conclude without a practical suggestion : In home matters the rule is — Measures, not Men ; in foreign matters it is men, not measures. Here you deal not with ideas, but with antagonists : you have to measure yourself, not against abstract ideas, but against talents : you have to cope, not with in- herent difficulties of matter, but with the purposes of men : it is a champion you require, not a propo- sition; skill of fence, not volubility of tongue : your champion must be at least equal to his adversary in the use of his weapons, in the knowledge of his manoeuvres, and must master him by the eye before he can touch him with the point. Such fencers cannot be fabricated by a sign manual ; and England has taken no heed to form such. Nor would the matter be worth referring to, had it not so happened that England by accident does possess such a man. She has but to take him, and commission him to pre- serve the commonwealth from detriment, Every difficulty would then disappear in five minutes. The person I refer to is in repute, in honour, and in office, but his office is that of Poo7^ Law Commissioner, * "If you are successful in this war, impeachment hangs oyer you ; if misuccessful, you will he torn to pieces in the streets." THE DAllDANELLES. • Iv He lias been in tlie diplomatic service, forcing his ^''^ way to the highest grades from the humble station of assistant-surgeon. He then chose to renounce that career when presenting to him every worldly at- traction ; not that 'he sought repose, or was unfit for toil. But this you will not do. It was once said by Colletti, — "It would be economical for England to expend three millions in forming a man to under- stand Russia ; but if she had such a man, she would only expend money to destroy him.^' And the reason is, that your public men know, or they do not know, that they are unfit to deal with her. This is the spell under which you are bound ; its existence is no reason why I should not seek to expose it. But I have another proposal to make, somewhat less un- endurable than the former — send aioay the Russian Ambassador, That would be worth more, ev,en, than a squadron in the Black Sea. Russia as yet, and especially at present, cannot dispense for an hour with your support. Ivu OBJECTS OF THE WORK. This volume was in the press in May, but was delayed by a visit to Denmark. I liad undertaken, it in anticipation of a crisis in Turkey, — by an oc- cupation of the Principalities in the autumn. By this delay the event has occurred before thepublication. I had conceived that by bringing together the pro- ceedings of Russia on various fields, and connecting them in point of time, a chance was afforded for dissipating the illusions by which, on each field and at each moment, she is enabled to carry her point. !May my fellow-countrymen perceive that in all she is undertaking against others, she is only preparing the means which will be employed against them. I now subjoin the Preface as originally written. When the ' Progress of Russia in the East,^ by Sir J. McNeill, was planned, I undertook to prepare an account of her progess in the North and A\'cst, These materials were, however, used in fragments for immediate publication ; I now complete the task, and chiefly out of events which have occurred since that time. Our object in 1836 was to prevent her future Iviii OBJECTS OF THE WOEK. progress by exhibiting the past; in 1853^ I have to sum up the march of acquisitions then undreamt of. The danger, which in 1836 we had to warn against, was the fall of Turkey : the resuscitation of the energies and power of that Empir,e have, so to say, caused, on that field, history to pause. The danger now is, war in Europe — a danger arising, not from the dispositions of France, but from the talents of Russia,* and into which we shall be plunged, not by any direct aggressions, not by any reciprocal violations of rights, for, fortunately, in both countries such questions must be submitted to legal adjudication, but by becoming mutually involved in false courses in third countries. In this review, I have, however,, excluded all direct mention of France, because its internal state results from the reaction of diplomatic proceedings in Spain, Turkey, Denmark, Hungary, &c. I have devoted to Spain considerable space, as there was elaborated the revolutionary ferment. The invasion of Spain, in 1823, brought the curtailment of the Electoral Fran- chise and of the duration of Parliaments in France, and provoked those endless agitations, ultimately resulting in the events of 1848. The Revolutions of that year, with the wars of * A great desideratum is a work on the Diplomacy of England, since 1792, showing how Russia has made for us our wars with France. The materials and the proof are to be found in the IMemoirs of Lord Malmesbury. Pretended histoiies .of England, France, &c., are mere perversions : for the last century, the only history is that of Eussia. OBJECTS OF THE WOllK. Jix that whichi succeeded it_, are neither isolated inci- dents, nor have they sprung from local and dis- tinct causes. At Copenhagen, Presburg, Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Bucharest, and Palermo, the germs had been severally cultured, the instruments pre- pared, and the parts distributed. The warlike operations that ensued were equally directed by the same hand. One ®f the victims has said, " the events of 1848-9 show, that in every Cabinet Russia has had a spy, and it is not too much to infer — an agent;''* she had no less in every conspiracy. If by conspiracies she upset Governments, so by Governments did she prostrate conspiracies.f The result is, that at this moment every Government looks up to her as its protector, and every conspi- rator as his patron. England was meanwhile engaged in managing mankind : her objects were the Constitution of Sicily, the improvement of the condition of central Italy, the independence of Lombardy, and the settle- ment of Hungary. All were in her hands; but somehow everything has slipped through her fingers, and in a word, the word of the Times, " The conti- nent of Europe is governed to-day by Colonels in Russian uniforms/' The entrance into Hungary of a Russian army was the great event of that period. A conquest was there * Kossuth. t Seven miliious of adult Frenchmen rushed, in terror, to the polling booths to vote against the Red Kepublic. Ix OBJECTS OF THE WORK. effected of Austria by the aid of her own troops, and the subjugation of the most warlike kingdom of Europe^ obtained by the loss in battle of less than a thousand Russians. The occasion was prepared by England, who revolutionised Italy, drawing the resources of Austria to the South ; who then com- promised the neutrality of Turkey, without which the war could not have been brought to a successful issue. I have, therefore, selected this field (Hun- gary) as illustration of the catastrophe of 18i^8, adding to it a sketch of the military and diplomatic events, and an exposure of the unparalleled trickery practised in reference to the extradition of the Refugees, and the falsehoods put forth in regard to the pretended support then given to Turkey. A separate chapter has been opened in the North, by the London Treaty of the 8th of May, 1852, bring- ing in the Emperor as Inheritor of Denmark. That matter being still in suspense, this statement may yet have a political application. At this moment the event hinges upon the belief of certain individuals that in spite of what they have done by that Treaty, the House of Romanoff will not succeed to the Danish Crown. The chief object of this publication is to dispel that illusion. These subjects I have subdivided into the West and the North. To the South of Russia lie the Ottoman Empire, the Euxine, the Caspian, and the Caucasus : I have here confined myself to the Com- mercial branch, exhibiting the steps which she has sue- OBJECTS OF THE WORK. hi cessively made to stop up the water- ways and suppress the production of the adjoining countries. After all, the facts are of importance, only as en- abling us to form a judgment of ourselves ; and herein lie the difficulty and the necessity of the task. " To praise tlie Athenians to the Athenians^' is easy, but superfluous. I avow that my attempt is no less than to dispraise Englishmen to Englishmen. If argument could have availed, the work to which I am desirous of making the present one an humble and unequal appendage, England's dependency must long ago have been broken, and the course of recent unhappy history arrested. But clearly knowledge avails nothing, and nothing can be done save when foUacy is at- tacked. Russia was the subject of the work of Sir J. M'Neill ; the Character of the Age is that of the present. I ha^'e endeavoured to trace home to the thoughts of each of us the causes of Russia's success. I can scarcely believe that any man of ordinary capacity will lay down this volume without asking himself the use of Constitutional Checks, Parlia- mentary Inquiries, and a Free Press, and exclaiming with Descartes, when he contrasted the power and . pomp of the French Monarchy with the misery of its People, — " La Methode doit etre mauvaise/' My acquaintance with the countries and men here treated of, has not been derived from books. All of the first I have visited ; with most of the second I have had intercourse, and with reference to the subjects. As to the events, I have watched them from Ixi; .OBJECTS OF THE WORK. near ; in respect to some of tliem, from, myself has originated the plan, or the opposition. With such transactions in the ordinary course of life, men exer- cising representative or ministerial functions can alone become acquainted; I have had the opportunity of taking part in them, on no other ground, whatever, save objections to measures or opinions. The key that has opened to me the door, has been a phrase, which almost invariably closes it — '^ You are wrong V' Whoever has worked out for himself his ov/n results upon any field, must be engaged in a war with pre- judice, and even if he is dealing only with a maxim of finance, or a combination of chemistry, must seek to show that truth is on his side. The field I have selected is the plateau that links the highest summits — the practical connexion of the welfare of kingdoms and empires with the observance of the moral law. This alone is permanent, fluctuating with no passion, touched by no majorities. Men may change and circumstances revolve, but the position of a nation with reference to other nations is irrevocably fixed by its acts, which • again return upon itself^ determining its own character. What motives have I not, then, for offering proof that I am right ? The evidence is that my anticipations have* been justified by results, and that even opinion itself has come round on many points on which it was most opposed to my conclusions*. I have to deal with history — not history that has died, but history in action. In so presenting it, I OBJECTS OF THE WOEK. hiii fcel as the Chorus of the Greek stage, annoancin^ the actors and foretelling the event; like it, too, lamenting in vain. The audience 1 may assemble, resembles also those who witnessed the performance of the "Seven Chiefs'' or the " (Edipus Tyi'annrs :'' for they come not to arrest a crime, but to witness a catastrophe ; not to act the part of citizens, but of spectators. The mimes and gladiators of old are replaced by 'Archons and Consuls; the nations themselves take the place of Antigone or Iphigenia, and are at once enchanted with the spectacle and victims of the plot. He who is not under the illusion, is as one who in a dream beholds a murder but cannot find breath to utter a cry ; for what does a cry avail when there remains no indignation for wrong ? The great realities of a people's life have become illusion, the drama is admired for its march, and pleases how- ever it may end. Where there is mismanagement it is not Institu- tions that are at fault, but Institutions that are falsi- fied. The organisation of a People is in its mind ; and errors are always retrievable where the root is not in misjudgment. That' ignorance of passing events for which an excuse is sought in the secrecy in which they are involved, or in. the form of Government, is but the result of the loss of the sense of right and wrong ; when that is possessed by a nation, its Government is under the necessity of giving a reason for whatever it does. The knowledge which is requisite for managing Ixiv OBJECTS OF THE WOEK. our business, is so also for protecting our cha- racter; spendtlirifts are more generally ruined by tlie dread of looking into neglected accounts than by tlie temptations wbicb lead them into excess. England within the last generation — that is to say, since the Treaty of July 6, 1827, for the pacification of the East, has become involved in a multitude of affairs for which her own history, and indeed the history of no country and of no age, furnishes no parallel. In consequence of the influence of her name, every matter she has touched has become, so to say, a capital, or revenue, liable to dissipation ; she has gone on recklessly squandering, and dreading to ex- amine the accounts. Whenbrought up by a humiliation she is ready to exclaim, " Oh, we must have no war \'^ Such a frame of mind is not one to overcome diffi- culties. Even this state might have its countervail- ing advantages did it proceed from mere cowardice, for then it would be accompanied with care and cunning ; but if reason" is prostrated, passion is not so ; we are as ready to buckle on om^ armour on the slightest difference with a State really powerful, as we are to quail before a riddle propounded to us by one physically weak. One preservative effect supposed to be realised by our popular Constitution, is the presence of pre- eminent men in pre-eminent stations. Such men are not only held to be capable of fathoming a trans- action, however complicated, and grasping the leading features of a case, however foreign in its nature or OBJECTS OF THE WOEK. 1x7 remote in its field, but also of rising above the errors of their times — a condition requisite even for permanent fame in the management of Domestic con- cerns. The results, however, do not bear out tlie in- ference. Since the death of one vi^hose name rises familiar to the mind and lip when it is a question of England's power and fame, we have seen no pre- eminent man, in the station of Foreign Minister. Such men have filled the posts of Premier and of Chancellor of the Exchequer. The character of our government is departmental ; the other ministers pe- riodicajly sit in council upon foreign matters, but in reality exercise no independent judgment, far less con- trol the mode of execution. The hours of office are laden with too many cares to permit of laborious in- vestigations in matters not affecting majorities, and the character of mind superinduced by free Insti- tutions, disqualifies politicians for seeing a world beyond the sphere of a debate, or the bourne of a division. Thus the only portion of England's affairs, with the exception of the Colonies, which is not so strictly limited by Act of Parliament that a clerk might perform the requisite duties, has been surrendered by common consent into the hands of mediocrity.* While by such hands is wielded in secret the power of this Empire, our Antagonist scrutinizes the earth for talents, and having found them, disciplines them * An exception may suggest itself to the reader ; but in that case the powers of the minister were revealed in his office, not displayed as the means of reaching it. Ixvi OBJECTS OF llIE WOEK. to an order wliich never has been matclied, and in- spires them with the prospect of a triumph never yet attained. There are united superiority of mind^ unity of system^, permanency of purpose^ the coercion of an iron rule, the inspiration of a golden harvest^ 'and the doubly fortifying sense of confidence in themselves, and contempt for the rest of mankind. Dr. Hamel^ in tlie St. Petersburgh Journal^ calls the attention of the Russian public to the fact that ^^ the current year couapletes three centuries of nearly uninterrupted amicable relations between Russia and England. ^^ The fact is also well worthy of the atten- tion of the British public ; there never har been col- lision between England and Russitt. Other States are our friends^ or our foes^ according to the various acci- dents 'of the times, Russia alone has undeviatingly and on system been our enemy, — against her alone of all the States of the world, have we never drawn the sword. In all times, under all administrations, England has been her private property. Flusters of opposition perio- dically flare out, but they are- commissioned, and inva- riably end vvdth " entire satisfaction '' on the sacrifice of the State, or interest, which had given rise to the discharge of notes, or the parade of ships of the line;* * In 1801, Denmark J in 1807, Denmark ; in 1823, Spain; in 1827, Persia ; in 1829, Turkey ; in 1831, Poland ; in 1833, the Dardanelles ; in 1836, the quarantine on the Danube ; in 1837, the Vixen and Cir- cassia ; in 1838, Persia ; in 1846, Cracow ; in 1849, Hungary and its exiles ; in 1850, Grreece ; in 1853, Wallachia and Moldavia — event not doubtful. On May 21, 1853, the representation of the Powers at Constanti- nople answered the appeal of the Turkish Government, by stating OBJECTS d"F THE WOEK. Ixvii a farce^ harmless indeed in itself, but of deadly effect on the States immediately endangered, who are thereby led to confide in us; the system marches with the regularity of machinery, the method of a drama/ and the facility of a dream. At no former period has the Commonalty occupied itself with the respective merits of implements of war; and that not with a view of achieving con- quests, but of resisting, purely ideal for the time, projects of Invasion. While needle guns and long range are evoked whenever we speak of France, is it not worth while to consider what the influence may be of the discoveries in chemistry, mechanics, and engineering, effected during this peace, on the designs of Kussia ? The vast extent of her own ter- ritory ; the distance which is placed between her and the vulnerable points of Europe and Alia, together with the obstacles presented to the movement of troops by her own deficiencies and mal-administration have hitherto paralysed the operations of her army. A new era opens for her with railways. With those already commenced in Poland, linked to Ger- many ; with that projected from Moscow reaching to Odessa, and established as she will soon be on the Isthmus of the Baltic, and the mouths of tlie Elbe and the Weser, she will be ready to smite Europe that they "are of opinion that in a question which touches so nearly the hberty of action and sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan, liis Excellency Kedchid Pasha is the best judge of the course to be adopted, and they do not consider themselves authorised in the present circumstances to give any advice on tlie subject." kviii OBJECTS OF THE WORK. at any point : she will come too as a protector. Thus have those Arts and Sciences which are the boast of Civilisation passed into the service of the Barbarian. This revolution in the art of war, coinciding with Eussia^s expansion to the North and South, renders the contest infinitely more deadly, or would do so if there were a contest. Nature seems capriciously to have formed Europe to illustrate these new inventions. It consists of a peninsula, stretching to the south-west, from a basis which is Russian territory; at each angle there is a vast space of sea, enclosed, and having a narrow entrance, or outlet. By means of galvanic batteries and submerged floating mines connected with them, these narrows may be rendered impassable. Neither is at present in her possession ; they may be sealed againSt her. In her possession, they will be sealed against Europe. Then will she command the materials requisite for war, and hold in her hands the food of nations. It has long been the habit to dispose of all warn- ings by the trite phrase " Russia is a poor country^ she cannot get money, and without money war can- not be made.^^ All these acquisitions have been effected in peace. Poor as she is, she has sa husbanded her means, and you have so mismanaged your wealth, that she has been able to come forward to support the tottering credit of the Banks of London and of Paris. The house of Rothschild may hold down the head of the Emperor on the grinding stone OBJECTS OF THE WORK. l^ix of an artful contract, but Russia commands tlie mo- netary operations of the two first capitals of the world, and controls their policy by the Stock Ex- change. To the nations of Europe the Currency is a wholly distinct matter from Metaphysics ; so are both from Military affairs ; all three are so again from Com- merce ; Politics is another walk, and another again is Diplomacy ; Religion is not only distinct, but has nothing to do with any one of them : the men engaged in each know nothing of the other. For those who manage the affairs of Russia every branch of science, every field of knowledge, and every motive of the human mind is equally possessed and mastered, and the combination of the whole is — Diplomacy. Knowledge is not Power, but he who is cunning is powerful. Did we bestow upon the great interests of the State the care which is given to the construction of a railway of ten miles, Europe would be at peace and at rest. Indeed the end might be secured at less cost; it suffices to withdraw your Embassies. How can an age, which derives its instruction for practical life from the history of Greece and Rome, be afflicted with the illusion that a Foreign Depart- ment is a necessary portion of a State? That system cannot work which involves two opposite and hostile maxims; it is self-condemned either way. To be rational, not to say prosperous, you must institute secrecy in your domestic concerns, or submit your external ones to control. If you will maintaiii Ixx OBJECTS OF THE WOEK. your Embassies, then sink your Navy.* Disposing of tlie " moral " means of tlie Admiralty and Horse Guards, the Foreign Office wiU put down this Empire, unless it be itself put down. * A sailor on board Admiral Duckworth's squadron, being asked what sort of vessels the Russians had, answered, " Russia wants no 'iiavt/ shs has ambassadors !^' N. B. I would direct attention to the Chapter on the "Evacuation of the Principalities,^^ p. 363, where the present circumstances are not only foreshadowed, but expressly stated. That Chapter is the resume of a Memoir drawn up at the end of 1850, showing that, Y/ith a concurrent Turkish force occupying the Principalities, Russia could make no impression on Turkey. THE WEST. Part I.— SPAIN. Pakt II.— HUNGARY. ** No man is by nature either an aristocrat or a democrat : their disputes relate not, then, to system of government, hut to their own advantage." — Lycukgus. These pages were written in Spain in 1846, and were to have been published under the title of " Account of Spain with Europe, in Invasions, Interventions, Mediations, and Mahriages/' as a warning- against the danger of two nubile Princesses. The manuscript somehow disappeared on its way to Madrid. A copy, however, having been taken by the precaution of a friend, and recently discovered, I have thought it might be of use for the "Europeans" themselves. PAUT I. SPAIN. CHAPTER I. Hoio circumstanced for the Developnent of Ojmiion. This age is distinguished by extent of knowledge and contrariety of judgments, — a misfortune no less tlian a con- tradiction, and which arises out of the habit of attacliing importance to News. Things which, if announced before- hand, would be held too improper to be possible, are, when done, taken as the data on which maxims are to be formed for our future guidance. Our morals as nations are what the morals of individuals would be who took for their standard facts, that is, the cases brought for trial before the courts of law. Thus it is that knowledge is divorced from -wisdom, and that we have much speech and little profit. Unless a man knows what, in a given case, ought to be done, he can never know what has been done ; information can be of service only to them wdio can class it, be it science, be it conduct. In the latter case, the difficulty of classing docs not arise from ignorance. The task is here to unlearn ; tlie life of the spirit is on the lip ; whoever chooses may stop on it the garrulity of his fellows, and this is all that is required to recover from the decrepitude of his times. 1 S SPAIN. The order of societies does not depend upon the equality of size and strength of its members, but on the submission of their difFerenees to that process of investigation which distinguishes men from animals. The rights of states are equally independent of numbers and dimensions, and consist in the human character of reason belonging to all the indi- viduals composing them. That differences be brought to adjudicatioi;, not only by the authorities of the nation, but by each separate man, is the purpose of international law. In this consists the equality of states, in this the freedom and virtue of each member of a community, and indeed his quality as a reasoning being. Individuals may, and generally do, profit by the wrong they do; not so eommuiiities, and therefore is a public crime by nature wholly different from a petty one. It thus interests no less the powerful than the weak to guard that public rule of right on which depends alike internal freedom and general peace. And in truth this is the excellent, the abiding part of all governments and of all systems : it is the health common to all, without the variety of the infirmities of each; it is the "law of nations," because respected equally by all. It emanates from no human authority, be- cause it is the source of all laws, and is enforced in every judgment rendered, for a village or for an empire. Iso compact violating it can bind ; against it no prescription hold. It requires no interpreter; it brings its own penal- ties when infringed, and its recompenses when obeyed; it lias not to be taught — it is already known ; it may for ii season be obscured, but each man can himself* find it again. Tins rule is no less simple than authoritative, and consists in these two commandments: " Tiiou siialt not steal,'* " Thou shalt do no muudek." There is no possible injury that a state can inflict, or suffer, not provided for by these two laws. It is not less in the conscience of all beliefs, than in the DEVELOPMENT OF OPINION. 3 theory of all legislations, and stands alike by Divine com- mand and human ordonance. The petty malefactor sins only, the malefactor community is degraded and enslaved. It has denied faith when it has broken law — lost conscience when abjuring freedom, and becomes an infidel at the same time as a robber. It will not fail to strike, that it is no hypothetical case which I am here putting. Every reader will understand that it is the actual condition of the states of Europe that I intend to describe, and there is no Spaniard who will ques- tion the accuracy of that description. But, as the individuals who compose tliose states are singly neither lovers of blood Jior seekers of prey, it must be by some great and general mental perversion that they have sunk as nations, to a con- dition abhorrent to themselves as men. This perversion is to be found in the representative form of government. Each man holds himself to be free from guilt, by tliat very absence of knowledge, which converts it into judicial lUndness. The law of nations is careful to arrest the beginnings of evil b/ keeping distinct the concents of indej)endent states. Any interference, however slight or disguised, is as grave a crime as slaughter or invasion. One state cannot even hold intercourse legally witli another, except in the same manner asi practised by private individuals when they go to law, and place their concerns in the hands of a lawyer. The sword of justice is placed in the hands of a king only'for self-defence. Communications not called forth by such necessity, coalitions founded thereon, destroy equality be- tween states, subvert international law, and extinguish the sense of right amongst mankind. This is what we call diplornncD* In the origin of every community, intercourse with foreign powers has been entirely prohibited, except as the result of * Tliere may bo treaties to interfere in the affairs of others, but these arc violations of the laws of nations, and such a treaty adds merely the guilt of conspiracy to that of violence. 4 SPAIN. a special and judicial decision. The kings and princes of our Gotliic races miglit decide upon internal affairs ; inter- national ones were only treated of in the common council. The senate and the councils of Ptome dispatched domestic business ; international affairs were decided and even ma- naged by a legal and religious body. Spain's last effort for her liberty, three hundred years ago, was directed against the assumption of her kings to make peace and war, and to conclude treaties without the assent of the Cortes,* In England, no minister of state can lawfully to this day hold so much as intercourse upon public matters with the minister of a foreign power, unless specially commissioned by the competent authority. Por every such transaction, a com- mission must issue under the great seal, and on the respon- sibility of the Chancellor of England himself; for this he requires a warrant of the privy seal, which can be appended only after a decision of the privy council, signed by the counsellors who advised the measure. f Such was the * " "No king shall make war with another king or queen — peace or truce, or any important act, without having taken council with twelve ricohombres and twelve elders of the country." — Fuero de INavarra, b. i, tit. 1. "Whenever the king shall have occasion to make war, he must assemble the procuradors or Cortes, to explain its causes, that they may say if the war is just or unjust ; so that, in the first case, the people, recognising it to be useful, shall furnish the necessary aids, and that, in the second, that no war may be declared or made." — Cortes of ValladoUd, 1520, readdressed by sixty-nine members of the Cortes to the King on the ]4th of April, 1814. No wonder that, "up to the commencement of the sixteenth century, the Cortes were always regarded by the Spaniards as their most precious institution, and as their port of safety iia unhappy times." — Ifirqflores, vol. i, p. 59. No wonder that the modern Cortes and constitution should be the source of the evils for which it was the remedy, and of the disease of Spain for which it was the cure. t This statute has been repealed. DEVELOPMENT OF OPINION. 5 elaborate care taken by our forefathers to preserve them- selves from foreign crimes. Theirs was the wisdom which exhibits itself in knowing how to keep things in order. There were few facts in those days because there was judg- ment, and there being judgment there were no opinions. "When tlie return to this rule is urged, the answer is, " This process is incompatible with our present multiplied relations ; no legal officer could take upon himself the responsibility of the things daily done by the governments of Europe." The object of restoring the ancient law is to put an end to the present practice, which consists in exercising a power in foreign countries which no minister possesses at home.* Such acts alone constitute our multiplicity of relations and their guilty character. This is what goes under the name of polky. Eut we have gone a step further. Parliaments and Cortes, instituted to control the officers of state, have usurped tlieir functions, and appoint them: thus have been revolutionised our Gothic kingdoms, and the liberties of their separate com- munities extinguished by their representatives. The same change extends itself to nr.tions : kingdoms are now extin- guished, as formerly boroughs were, by the representatives they appoint. Hence have ensued those varieties of conditions between communities which had hitherto been presented only between their members. Their equality before the law being lost, their relative position depends upon their respective strength and weakness. This has introduced the disthiction. of "FIRST AND SECOND RATE POW'ERS." Conferences of the first of these take upon themselves to decide upon what the second shall do, or be made to do, of their own free will,f by fear of consequences or dread of * For instance, levying a private war on tlie allies of the Queen of England, as a minister of England did in respect to Spain — con- spii'acies to bring about revolt, &c., as done again in Spain — changing the laws, customs, taxes of a province, as was done in Syria, &c. t " The principle that every nation has a right to manage its owa internal affairs, so long as it injures not its neighboiu*. To this 6 SPAIX. censure,* and this process is denominated moral ivfl-uence. To obtain this " infl-aenee" is the duty of the powerful ; to endure it, a nccessitj^ of the weak.f Tills amalg-amation does not require concurrence, or entail concert : alliances spring up, the counterpart of the factious in the separate states, such as the " Holy," the " Constitutional,'* the " Continental," " European," "Western," "Northern/* "Transatlantic." No single nation can make out what part it has been made to play, or what share it has had inthe ag- gregate efforts of " iniluence"on themselves, or on others : losing power over their acts they mistake their interests, and out of the chaos a false order has arisen; again relative strength and weakness lose their places, and the case is resolved into relative cunning. Law had been displaced in favour of force, force now yields to sechecy. Events appear the result of chance, and the hand that wins is that which is unseen. Every new event is a new perversion. Facts are as false as maxims, fallacious, and the sources of history are poisoned for future generations. The sum of these misjudg- priiiciple I most cordially assent. It i3 sound — it ought to bo sacred, and I trust that England will never be found to set the example of its violation." — Lord Palmerston's SpeecTi^ of 1st June, 1829. The cheers of both sides followed this declaration : the speech in which it was uttered, and of which it is in doctrine the leading feature, raised to the management of the foreign affairs of England the minister who has made Europe what she is to-day! * Sir E. Peel declared, in reference to Don Carlos, that so much as a recommendation was unj'astifiable from a stronger to a weaker state, because it would be the overthrow of the independence of the weaker one. f '* "VNHien protection was most needed by the Christian popu- lation of Syria, France Jiad tvttkdraton herself from interference altogetlier : since she has arjain taken her i^roper place in the con- ferences of the great powers on JEastern affairs, she evjoys her full share of influence, but no more. It must unquestionably fall to the lot of each power to obtain redress for injuries done to its own sub- jects — yet the general policy to be pursued in the province (of Turliey) must be regulated by general considerations" of the great pov/ers.— - GidzoU DEVELOPMENT OF OPINION. 7 ments resulting from the irresponsibility of ministers at liome, and secrecy in their acts abroad, is called Public Opinion. " He," said Mr. Canning, " will form but a poor estimate of the value of constitutional freedom who does not take into account the power of the press." Let us consider, also, the value of this mechanical contrivance for midtiplying ideas : we are certainly not destitute of materials. Between 1832 and 1846, Spain had been the subject of above 5,000,000,000 of printed columns, written, published, and read throughout Europe. Has Spain been benefitted, or has Europe been enlightened ? A province of Africa having been misgoverned by a civilised nation * for twenty-two years, the ^' Press" has been engaged thereon with equal intentness, with the effect of rendering it half waste, and France wholly savage. Need I proceed to other fields to con- vince at least the Spaniard that jNIr. Canning was a dreamer, or that he inflicted a sarcasm on fools, who hailed it as an oracle ? The association of Spain with the doctrines of Europe is accidental ; her adoption of its terms imitative only. The malady thus exhibits features more hideous than elsewhere, and a salutary effort is stiU within human reach; already has an authoritative voice been raised in w^irning, — "the opinions of Europe," said Savaadra, "are a worm eating into the bowels of our state." Unless Spain will so give peace to herself, she must remain degraded unto the field of Europe's bickerings, and be the source to her of endless suftering. Rome and Carthage maintained between themselves respect- ful and courteous relations for several centuries. In both, the law of nations was an object of special instruction, and enforced by an authority distinct from the executive. Carthage being older and more corrupt, first turned longing * " This great movement of emigration (5,000 cavalry, 30,000 foot, and more than 20,000 tents) changes the character of the struggle — Abd-el-Kader carries off the population that we have been able neither to or(/anise, adtninister, or govern.'''' — Algerie, « SPAIN. eyes upon Sicily. Eome became jealous, and the first Punic war ensued. Carthage next endeavoured to regain in Spain the ground she had lost in Sicily. Home sought to counteract lier in Spain by opposing to her there an " influence," instead of calling her directly to account. Thus on the soil of Spain commenced the struggle which ended in the extinction of the one and the decline and fall of the other. England and Prance remained from the Heptarchy down to the accession of William of Orange without cause of quar- rel, except such as arose out of conflicting claims of feudal seniorage. A new one then came, whence have sprung the great wars of a century and a half, and caused ten times the blood to flow t'hat had been spilled in war in ten times the previous number of years. This new cause was precisely the same as that which produced the wars between Home and Carthage and on the same field. Spain cannot be properly called neither a first-rate or a second-rate power. Unlike the first, she is engaged in no designs dangerous to the independence of her neighbours; and, unlike the second, she is not liable to be coerced. She is free from the immorality of the one, and above the neces- sities of the other. Yet has she neither the strength that springs from the absence of unjust purposes, nor the repose that results from an unassailable position. It is that her uprightness is not of the heart nor her strength of the spirit. Unassailable by arms, she is subdued by words. Guiltless of designs upon others, she is guilty of their designs upon herself. She who was recently the bulwark of the liberties of Christendom, presents a picture of degradation, such as was never seen even in the darkest age or amongst the corruptest people — Ministers alternately raised to power by the ma- chinations of rival foreign governments ; the road to office being treason and conspiracy. The like was not in Poland, even when occupied by foreign troops. Her factions spring neither from the power of a despot, nor the turbulence of a mob, nor the strength of an oligarchy, nor the privileges of an aristocracy, nor the power of a church, nor the reckless DEVELOPMENT OF OPINION. 9 misery of a nation ; but solely and simply from the assault made on the ancient rights, usages, and immemorial customs of a people, by the desire of some to be like strangers, and by the profit a few others make of the confasion so intro- duced. Spain's sole evil lies in a mistake. As contract is the basis of civil law, so much the more must it be so of international relations. Spain's dealings with foreign powers may, therefore, be considered as a succession of bargains, and yet she has nothing to seek or to gain from them, and the only pretext for bargaining between her and them must be Aer interest; as she cannot be coerced by them, it is only practicable by her will. Nevertheless, all such bargains are one-sided ; one paiiy only is taken into account, and that one is never Spain. In every matter discussed be- tween her and a foreign power, it is not the interest even of that power that is considered, but the purposes of its minis- ter, and that with reference only to the purpose of some other minister. Her sufferings are as indifferent to them as her lights. Anger and contempt, nay violence, ensue if she is not submissive, and she who has provoked no resentment by her conduct, discovers that she ecpially provokes it by pre- suming to have a will of her own. For any equality to exist, she should be seeking influence in England and France, supporting a M. Guizot or a Sir E. Peel, a M. Thiers or a Lord J. Eussell. She, proud, strong, tolerates a French or an English ministiy, and vir- tuous France and England Impose what they would not endure. But this interference may be a beneficial superin- tendence : tmly her foreign friends must be profoundly wise, if not singularly wicked. Every Spaniard is either ungrateful to a watchful providence or friendly to an evil genius, and while he remains in doubt, he combines the shame of guilt and the penalty of error. If it be said that he is no dupe of their benevolent pretexts, I ask, who but Spaniards render the foreigner preponderating? As well might an army in the field of battle expect to beat their enemy's left wing, by joining the 1 § 10 SPAIN. right, as they to subdue French influence by leaguing with England, or English influence by joining with France. If France and England differ in purpose, they are one in charr.cter. Their object is not conquest of her, but compe- tition between themselves. In their diverging views appear their coinciding immorality. She would be safe even if unendowed with sense, were she destitute of sensibility. There is a common expression in Spain, " Fo?c did it for your oicn cmds.'' This is a graceless recognition of benefit received. The foreign governments, on the other hand, have ever on their lips " The good of Spain^'' Let us test by recent facts the value of the admission and the assertion. When the French invaded Spain in 1823, it was professed that the sacrifice was made on account of Spain, to restore order. Some years after the minister revealed the true cause, French interest. And what was this "French" interest ? The restoring of vigour and spirit to the French armies, and the consolidating of the monarchy by the restriction of the electoral franchise and the prolongation of the term of parliament ! Purposes which, if revealed at the time to France, would have been held more hostile to France than to Spain. So soon as the foreigner had gained his end, er fancied he had done so, he retired, after having taken the poignard out of one desperate hand and placed it in another more savage still. England vehemently denounced this attack on the "in- terests" of England, but did nothing more. Had she then adopted the pretended doctrines, or associated herself with the secret purposes of the French minister? No. Her minister had concluded that the French would leave their bones in the Peninsula, and on the entrance of the French troops exulted in France's miscalcidation ! His reasoning on Spain, like that of the French minister, had nothing to do with Spain, but with France. " Eights of nations," " Eng- lisli inlluence," were all as nothing compared with the master question of triumph for England at the expense of France. Twenty years later there was a regency in Spain during DEVELOPMENT OF OPINION. 11 the minority of the Queen, nominally English. The French agents judged the opportunity come for labouring at the great work. They set themselves about upsetting the Pte- gency, and, like a Bedemar or a Boutenieff, by conspiiacy and bribes. So hurried were they, that it was against an. order of things which had only a year to live, that this assault was planned. The administration wliich they assailed was, however, the most hostile that Spain ever had to the material interests of England. It had refused that so much agitated treaty of commerce ; it had shut out the Basque provinces from English trade ; and had actually cut off Gibraltar from the coast navigation. It had also adopted the system of French centralisation, opening new projects of ambition, by violating the Fueros of the Basques ; and of all these acts it was on England herself that fell the odium and obloquy. Why does France break down this minister (Espartero) so invaluable to her in Spain? — to secure in Paris a triumph over England to the ministry of peace every- vvhcre and always. But it was not France, but Spaniards, who effected these things. The thought of attempting them sprung only out of Spanish resignation, and then the act is quoted as evidence of Spanish independence. She has blended the name of her factions with that of her neighbours. It is not Whig or Tory. It is not Liberal or Legitimist. It is French or English — the old story of the hats and bonnets of Stockholm. With this new maxim of intervention must have arisen new methods of management. If one of the business men of the great European governments were inclined to be con- fidential, he would tell you that foreign transactions have to be considered under three points of view : — First — As affecting the chambers. Secondly — As adecting the other powers. Thirdly — The case itself. Supposing a lawyer into whose hands a case is put, wcra to reason in this fashion, his language would be plainly this*. " Before I look int^ its merits, I must consider if some one 13 SPAIX. will make it worth my while to abandon it." Such is the rule of the great nations in the most solemn matters, and of persons selected as preeminent for all the qnalities that can adorn a man. or preserve a state, and into whose hands is remitted the fullest power for the execution of the most sacred functions according- to the highest justice ! Abd-el-Kader makes from Morocco an irruption into the Algiers territory. The French people are all excited. The government has to act. Morocco had done nothing. It was Morocco and not France, that was endangered by Abd-el- Kader. It was the African army that preserved Abd-el- Kader as the means of carrying on war. The French government were no sharers in this wish, and had no more (ksigns against Morocco than Morocco upon them. But they have to consider the case with reference to the opening of the cJtamhers. They must prepare a paragraph for the king's speech, and want a victory or a surrender. An ulti- matum is sent, and thus may a vrar of extermination be opened or rendered subsequently inevitable, merely to justify a paragraph in the speech, which half an hour after it is delivered, is worthless and forgotton. The next point which they would have to consider is Eng- land, whether or not she would take offence, and, if so, how it would affect their conjoint negotiations at Buenos Ayres, or the Lebanon, or Queen Pomare. In fact, as in dealing with Spain, in sending the ultimatum, Morocco would be the last thing thought of. But more insignificant considerations even than these determine the greatest events. Some years ago, France made war upon the Spaniards of Mexico, because they resisted a demand which the French government knew to be fraudulent, and had a year before as such refused to entertain. But the editor of the * Journal de Paris,' Mons. Fonfrede, had been at Bordeaux, and there became the guest and ad- vocate of the claimant. At this time, a division had arisen between the chief members of the cabinet, M. Guizot and J>Iolc, and the latter desirous of securing the ' Journal de DEVELOPMENT OF OPINION. 13 Paris' against the former (that paper having been established by the king), came into the terms of M. Eonfrede, which were war with Mexico. No sooner was the money extorted, than proceedings were taken at Bordeaux against the claimant by Ids French creditors ; and it was proved that the entire value of the cargo, for a portion of which the Mexican government had had to pay £60,000, was under £6000 ! The legal disproof before the French courts of the claim France had enforced by war so shocked the press, that no journal would give publicity to the fact except — for a consideration : the * Memorial Bordelais ' got 3,000 francs (£120) from the Mexican Consul for the insertion of the report ; an extract in the 'National' cost 10,000 francs (£100). M. Mole lives — his days neither conscience nor the law will shorten. The poor editor alone suffered, for his end was hastened by tlie discovery of the fraud in which he had been made an unconscious instrument. England sanctioned this outrage on Mexico, understanding its nature just as well as M. Mole, and tamely suffered the injury inflictecl upon her own trade. Indeed, it was she who gave effect to the French blockade by acknowledging it, when the French courts of law refused to admit it. Such are the villanies that pass under the name of policy among nations who call themselves free, Chiistian, and civilized. The first step Spain has to take is to draw a line between Europe and herself. Her force consists only in the detestation •with which she utters the word "stranger;" without this «he can have neither virtue nor peace. She suffers at once from Europe's character, tliougJits, and acts, — how deep ought that abhorrence to be ! Besides the Spaniard, Europe presents four primitive races not infected with the vulgarisms of London and Paris — the Jews, the Turks, the Gipsies, and the Russians. They make no distinction of English or French, German or Italian. They know them, or hate and despise them as one. To the Jew, they are tlie *' heathen'' will ; to the gipsey, " Buseo : ' by this distinction, these 14 SPAIN. wanderers and outcasts contrive to live. Let us glance at their mighty compeers. Who, deserving the title of philosopher, has not been astounded at the permanency of an empire sustained in Europe by. not more than a million and a half of Tartar sheplierds, and its resistance to the assaults of two redoubtable neigh- bours, backed by the hatreds, the opinions, and the arms of all Europe ? This is the secret, the Europeans to them are " dogs." They despise not the Christians, their own sub- jects ; they opened a refuge to the persecuted Christians of Europe, and the Jews expelled from Spain. This contempt of the Turks for Europe has been Europe's safeguard, for it has sustained their empire. In that contempt all good things are included — respect for law which Europe has forgotten — freedom from faction, which is Europe's pride. Who has not gazed with amazement, if not with fear, on the expansion of the Colossus of the North ? Ignorant and savage, divided and debased, that power threw off simul- taneously with Spain the yoke of the Mussulman ; where is Spain to-day — where Eussia ? The Eussian knows well the map of Europe and the^ names of its people, yet they are to him all as one, they are the sclmab the " dumb.'* Alas, that they are not so ! Deem not that the progress of Eussia is attributable ta characters belonging to the Sclavonic race. The Pole is of the same race ; his state was great and glorious when Eussia was as wc?ak as now she is ambitious. The Pole, like the Spaniard, imitated Europe, and in his factions allied himself with this and that neighbour till he had prepared them and Poland for a partition. The weeds of Paris became the flowers of Warsaw, as now they are of Madrid. May the fate that has overtaken the one, serve to avert it from the other. In England, great and small, wise and. simple, con- sider FOKEiGN AFFAIRS uot as the affairs of England, but as the affairs of other people. To tell them that DEVEL0P]\1ENT OF OPINION. 15 England is intriguing in Spain, conveys no more sense than if they were told that she was intriguing in the moon. Thus is a free seope left to all intrigue, and we have nothing to depend upon save the practical obstacles that rise in our path. If the Spanish people have these causes of grievances against the people of England or of Erance, what are the grievances thiit these have against the Spanish people ? ]May not the Ereiich say with justice to the Spanish, we do not Icnow what our government does, diplomacy is a mystery impenetrable to us but not so to you, upon you is the edge, upon us only the after recoil? You feel the blow, and you tell us not — nay, you invite it. Had you not, as for instance in 1834, accepted, nay, clamoured for, intervention, there would have been no diplomatic pottering, no fortifica- tions of Paris, and England and Erance would have reposed in the security of their united strength. AYhat a position is not open to the minister in Spain who shovdd take his stand against all interference ? He would expose himself to no danger, because a foreign power worlcs only on the dissatisfaction of the people, and dissatisfac- tion spring from this very cause. Spain has no invasion to dread. Such a minister would command the services, wherever useful, of both the foreign governments. What induce- ments are there not in the ministerial declarations of London and Paris — " I will not interfere unless Erance does." " I will not interfere unless England does." One condition is however requisite, that of popularity. Party sustains the minister in the Cortes, but neither party nor Cortes will sustain him in Spain. No minister can be popular except one who knows how to govern Spain : and for this he must be a Spaniard. It is not from that class that her ministers and her members of Cortes are chosen. These, like her Hybrids of old, are begotten only upon Spanish mothers, and like them speak a foreign tongue — these Political Economy, those Latin. Try Spaniards in tongue, and dress, and heart, and then you would see how easy what I have spoken would be 16 SPAIN. to do. Then you would see Spain no longer the dependant of foreign councils, the discussed of their parliaments, or the pitied of their market-places — no longer the victims of stockjobbers, scribblers, milliners ; but in her traditions, her manners, her dignity, her equal distribution of wealth, reading a lesson to distracted Europe. devolution here comes never from the people, but from the government. Disorders do not spring from the soil, but from the Cortes. Any government would be strong that contented itself with governing, and abstained from legislating. A Spanisli lady, who had been present at a conversation with some Spanish " politicians," remarked after they were gone — " I don't see why we should do for a nation wliat it would be absurd to do in a family — for nations are only many families. If things went wrong in this house, I should have to put them in order — not to copy what next door had been done for some other purpose. What is good, is good for itself, and I am a fool if I have to borrow it." It has been said by one of the strangers to whom they applied to construct for them -a constitution, that of all species of literary labour, the easiest is legislation. They have gone a step farther, and dispensing with the trouble of compiling, have been content to translate : they have not thought worth while to execute what they translated, and for thirty years have been fighting for a constitution which they have never read. The constitution of every country is tliat which is un- written ; for the first enacted laws only mark the incipient aberrations. When these accumulate, come reforms having- reference to special wrongs. It is impossible to transfer from one country to another the rectification of an abuse, for the subject matter does not exist, and the primeval unwritten thought cannot be transferred. But it is not to be supposed that the reform had been in its own land applicable, for the people who have endured a wrong must be incapable of recti- fying it, A naked man you may clothe, but to introduce a con- stitution is introducing a costume — you must strip him naked DEVELOPMENT OE OPINION. 17 first, and if he is unwilling you will have tlie old set of clothes rent and the new trampled under foot. Constitutions cannot be propagated like trees by slips, nor like lettuces by seed. You make drawings of a machine and construct another like may it, but you cannot so fashion men. You may run metal into a mould, but you cannot cast a nation. It would be more wise or less foolish to use the English or the Erench tongue as a means of rectifying the provincial accent of Catalonia or the Asturias than the laws of either countiy to improve their condition; it would be as judicious to substitute the language of either country for that of Castile, and as practicable too, as to replace the customs of the one by the constitution of the other. To take our laws, that is, our modern ones, which are the remedies of our evils, and to impose them upon Spain, is the same thing as to take the medicines from the bed- side of one patient and pour them down the throat of another, m- the infected bandages of a man diseased to strap down a man in health. Tlie good that is in England and Erance is in the people, — their knowledge, activity, and enterprise. The government is the source of all our social ills : these w^e bear up against by our individual qualities, and Spain would copy our go- vernment as a means of making up for the want of our industry ! Plow is it that the rulers have not perceived a truth so evident ? Because they are hybrids, foreign bastards — neither Spaniards nor Eomans — European Creoles, whom their fathers- despise and their mothers cast off. They are changed not at l)irth indeed, but at nurse. Spain will have foreign nurses, and they bring her home gipsies. This spell can only be broken when some one man, how- ever humble in station, shall arise, capable of grappling with the intellectifal fallacies of Europe. Until then — vast, yet compact, with a people of provinces but of one name and race, liable to invasion with difficulty, open everywhere to receive support, and standing between the two great rival powers of Em-ope, each of which are alert and ready as one man to fly 18 SPAIN. to her succour if assailed bodily by the other — she will remain the sport of minions and the plaything of intrigue. During the last century, while as yet no Spaniard was known by any other designation, than that of his country and his province, the Peninsula was the chief cause of the great European wars. It was then only the ambition of disposing of her crown, or the desire of acquiring her possessions . There was in each of her two neighbours a guilty purpose, but there was as yet no conspiracy to undermine her independence by working upon her broils. Circumstances then altered ; the violence of popular commotion having ceased in the one country, and rude trials having matured wisdom in the other, a new system commenced — schemes of conquest were denounced, justice was the policy adopted, freedom the treasure in which they gloried : but, not indifferent in their happiness, they sought to extend to all around the benefits they enjoyed. What is the accomplishment ? Who shall know the begin- ning and believe the end, or seeing the end recollect the beginning ? Then was faction born in Spain : it reached maturity at its birth. They caUed on either side to their aid, the parental sympathies of the neighbouring states, but Constitutionalist and Absolutist soon became English and French. Thus has opened for Spain the old prospect under new names : thus again re- appears for Europe the old dangers. England and Prance now join to do for their common gain, that which eacli would have then regarded as a national loss. Eor her thrice in three generations has Christendom been wasted with war. On the next signal blast she will no longer be the guiltless victim, but the guilty cause. Her hands will have taken down the buckler from the wall and pulled the spear from the earth. Her hands will have saddled in their stalls the "pale horse of death and the red of destrutetion," to ride up to the bridle in Spain's best blood. To Kome she gave a sword — for Europe she prepares a torch. 19 CIIAPTEPt II. Review of past History, The structure of Spain, not a peculiarity of race, has giTen to events at the remotest periods a consanguineous character. It is an island with the dimensions of a continent — fortresses with pasturage grounds — deliles and rocks and mountains, with arable land for tens of millions of men. As there is nothing like it in the composition of any other portion of the earth, so is it unlike it in its fate and histoiy to the remainder of the human race. Circassia is an inaccessible range, and it may be a barrier of heroic defence ; Switzerland, a fortress of rocks, without the substance of a nation, leaving no room for a throne — a centre of contending interests, sustained by the jealousy of neighbours more than by the heights of tlia Alps. Spain, suri'ounded on three sides by the ocean as a ditch, on the fourth by the Pyrenees as a rampart, and not exposed to immediate and constant danger, is armed neither in mind nor in body against invasion \ defence by the distribution of the mountains, and the hardiliood and local attachment of the inhabitants, commences only after she has apparently been prostrated. She has thus exhibited an unvarying paradox to the eyes of successive generations, being the easiest of nations to be overrun, and the last to be subdued. Here, then, it is not Iberian, Goth, Saracen, or Spaniard, whose character we have to examine, but it is the influence on man of a certain configuration of country, where mountain and plain are mixed together in sufficient dimensions and extent to present a large mass of human beings, forming a cliampaign and sea-board kingdom, with the attachments of mountaineers and their defences. The attachment to their community and their customs stiffened them against the centralisation of power, and made* them hold, in an equal degree their enemy, the government 20 SPAIN. that invaded tlieir franchises, or the foreigner that occupied their soil. They did not however divide apart into clans and cantons : and constituting a general government, there was the form of monarchy and the practice of republicanism. The strangers thoughtthat influence over the governmentwas influence over Spain, but when they pressed upon its weakness, they only strengthened the unknown Spanish people; therefore have results belied in every case judgment, and triumph over her has been a prelude to defeat. In this anti-national con- dition of their government, the Spaniards have been deprived in every crisis of the advantage of concerted action, but have regained that of local and individual resolution. If an enemy presented itself on the shore of Kent, all England would rush thither as to the point of defence : broken there, she would bow the neck. Austria could be subdued at an Austerlitz, and Paris even taken at a Waterloo. Not so in Spain: the enemy is at Pampelona; the Biscayan says " bueno. I shall be ready at Bilboa ;" and so on, district after district, mountain after mountain. ' The Spaniard waited at home, as he did in the days of the Scipios, to defend liis house and his fueros, and does not hold them lost by what happens elsewhere, whether the victory of an army or the vote of a Cortes. This similarity of character, and events at the most remote periods, is rendered so striking by present circumstances, that I may be permitted to revert to Carthage and Eome. To both Republics Spain then stood as she ^vould now to England and Prance, were she at the time the peninsula of Ilindostan. It is to be observed, that that war was not an invasion of Spain, but a contest in Spain. We derive our impressions of the event from Eoman writers. Had we the annals of •Cartilage open to us, we should And that alarms for the encroachujents of Rome had invested the Carthaginians with the character of jprotectors. This is proved in the very event ihat completed the subjection of Spain to Carthi>ge, and that •occasioned the war between Carthau'e and Rome. RETROSPECT. 21 Spain then furnislied to Hannibal means for the invasion of Italy, alike by the occupation of the Roman armies far from home, and by the auxiliaries who aided him at Trebia and Thrasymene ; but these would not have availed unless Spain had furnished other and indispensable resources. We have standing armies defrayed out of the ordinary expenditure of the state ; but in ancient times there w-as iKiither standing expenditure nor the resource of temporary loans. The nations feebly organised for assault were power- fully organised for defence; disciplined invasion required gold in hand. This gold was furnished to Hannibal by the mines of Spain. The whole military history of the ancient world is one of metal. It was the treasure of Susa and Ecbatania that rendered illustrious the field of Marathon and the narrows of Thermopylae. It was the mines of Philippi that brought the subjugation of Greece, and reared the empire of Alexander. It Avas the treasures of Toulouse that, changing masters, effected the conquest of Gaul ; so was it the mines of Bar- celona that brought first the passage of the Alps, and then the disaster of Cannce. No sooner was Italy, by means of Spain, ovcrnin, than Spain rose against Caiihage. In about the same time that it had taken the three chiefs of the house of Hanno to subject her to the Carthaginians, the three Scipios transferred her to Rome. Scarcely had the conquest of Carthage been effected, than the Spaniards, abandoned and betrayed by the only power that could have defended them, rose again to assert her liberty as well as their own, and replied to the Roman pro-consul that their fathers had left them steel to defend, not gold to redeem, their inheritance : Rome, - porting their monarch, nor expected advantages as a conse- quence of their triumph, were taught to believe that there must be some virtue in the Constitution when they discovered so much vice in those who hated it. Thus in four years was Spain, always indiflerent to what passed at Madrid or wliicli had reference to its central Government, thoroughly disgusted at the existing state of things, and prepared to accept with favour any change. So far, the direct agency of no foreign Government appears, but now the necessary elements for foreign intrigue had been created in the engenderment by imitation of the contrarieties, which in the other countries of Europe have sprung from real causes, and required centuries for their development. 81 CHAPTEH lY. Bevolf of the Ma de Leon, In the coarse of the year 1819, troops had been collectecl in the arsenal of Cadiz, called Isla de Leon, destined for the re-conquest of the American colonies : they were neither recruits nor regiments, but composed of soldiers di-afted from the whole army, with the view of purifying it of restless spirits engendered by the war of Independence and of dan- gerous opinions evolved by contact with the French. The expedition had been planned no less for the safety of old Spain than for the recovery of the new. But instead of instantly despatching this menacing corps, it was retained in a confined and inattractive cantonment, and lay for many months in an inaction that must have disorganized the best disposed and best officered troops. The principle that had dictated the drafting of the men had also been followed in tlie selection of the officers. What then was to be expected ? In fact, it was of public notoriety that a revolt was preparing, and the views of the government w^ere held to be a mystciy solvible only by the supposition that these projects had high support. The General went to Madrid to represent the danger — he was displaced. Two captains of me4i-of-war reported their vessels which were to transport the troops to America to be unseaworthy — they w^re deprived of their command. The Government then adopted a measure, the effect of which was too clear not to have been foreseen, that of gi-anting one step in rank to each officer ; every incentive to undergo the dangers and the sufferings of a transatlantic campaign in crazy vessels was thus removed. In a word, nothing was left undone to foment discontent and to en- courage insurrection ; the Conspiracy was perfectly public. But who withm the Government could be suspected? This 32 SPAIK matter was under the clirect control of tlie king, and none of his immediate counsellors either belonged to the opposite party or were suspected of treachery. There was, indeed, a ■second party within the royal one, that of Don Carlos, but still less to it than to that of Ferdinand could such designs be at- tributed. So far the public facts — indubitable and systematic support given by the Government to the Conspiracy, almost, indeed, its Organisation — no clue w^hatever to the motives or "the persons who wielded this sinister influence. A quarter of a century has effaced the interest connected ^'ith this event, but the period is not so extensive as to have cngulphed all contemporary evidence. In the hope of finding some clue I repaired to the spot : the first person whom I met was the astronomer of San Fernando, wdio from his observatory, twenty-five years before, had watched the motions of that tumultuous Camp. To my question respecting the source, his answer w^as " Eussia." I inquired whether he expressed an opinion prevalent at the time : he answered, ■*' Everybody knew that it was her doing ; she had great in- fluence at the Coui't of Ferdinand VII ; she openly patronised "the Conspiracy ; she had here a most intelligent agent, a Pole, and M. Tatetschef himself came down." It w^as in the silent streets of San Fernando that these "U'ords w^ere uttered : they proceeded from a man grave by his character, distinguished for his acquirements, and who was utterly unconscious of their bearing and their value. Here Wtfs no theory that twisted cases ; no foresight warning of future peril : it was merely a fact which he recorded, the knowledge of which had led to no conclusions, and which w\as about to die away in the narrow circle of the village where it had occurred. It was impossible here to resist the temptation of experi- menting upon the cataract on Europe's eye; I therefore objected to Signor Cercera, that Eussia w^as an iibsolute power and very far away ; that she could have nothing to do with Spain, or, having so, could have no hand in Con- spiracies, His answer was to the following effect : — BEYOLT OF THE ISLA DE LEON. 33 " "What you say is no doubt true, but I have only repeated the general belief at the time ; if, however, I were to express an opinion of my own, I woidd say, that although she may be in principle absolutist, she had a hand in the revolt, because she had an interest in the success, — an interest of a pecuniaiy nature. The vessels in Avhich the expedition was to be •embarked consisted of nine sail of the line, belonging to Eussia, which had been detained during the war, and on the peace, not being in a state to reach the harbours of the Bailie, ^he had sold them to the Spanish Government for a good price. If they were not deemed able to reach the Baltic in 1814, there was little chance of their reaching America in 1819, so that if the expedition had sailed, it woidd certainly have gone to the bottom, and she wotdd have been called on to refund the price of the ships. At all events, this was the way in Avhich at the time we explained her patronage of the revolt." Again I ventured to object that the mystery was not solved ; that the influence at the Court of Eerdinand, which had enabled her to make that government foment a Con- spiracy, must have sufficed a hundredfold to cause the ex- pedition itself to be abandoned. Again my inibrmant was ready with an answer : — " A few years after the revolt, in reading the message of the American president, after the death of the Emperor Alexander, I discovered that she had another motive ; for in that document it is said that Eussia had given to the Go- vernment of Washington the assurance that she would prevent the sailing of the Spanish expedition, and had given her .guarantee that it should never quit the port of Cadiz .'^ On further objecting, that this furnished no key to the transaction, as this end could equally have been obtained without the Conspiracy, it came to my turn lo be questioned ; and when I pointed out the chain and sequence of events, wliich all hung upon d'lsla de Leon, viz. the Constitution of Spain, the spreading the flame of political discord 34 SPAIN. so the infiammable materials prepared in other parts of Europe, whence the convulsions of Italy ; the imposition by the Northern powers of an armed Intervention by France^ the reaction in Spain, the monarchical reaction in France, leading to a democratic one ; and these being steps only in a progress of exhaustless patience and matchless enterprise towards the dominion of a desolated world ; when, I say, I offered this as the explanation, there was nothing therein either visionary or startling to a man who knew of his own knowledge that the Proclamation in Isla de Leon of the Cadiz Constitution of 1813 had been the work of that Go- vernment which had instituted the " Holy Alliance." It was by a word dropped on the subject of this Eevolt at the opposite extremity of Europe thr^ I was fu'st attracted towards those subjects, and, indeed, I may say at once initiated into their mysteries. I had arrived from Greece, at Constantinople, just in time to be present at a fete given to commemorate the Peace of Adrianople. I was much sur- prised to find myself the object of the sedulous attention of a Eussian diplomatist who had recently been on a mission to Greece. He took the trouble to indoctrinate me : the Greeks, he informed me, had from a horde of pirates been humanised by the magic genius of a single man who was now the idol of their aifections, at once their Lycurgus and their Mahomet.* Astonishment deprived me of speech, and I sat listening in amazement. I had seen so far already as to know that the conduct of England and France in Greece had been atrocious and perfidious, and I looked to Eussia as the only hope for that country, as she might be inclined towards them on the score of religion, and her agents could not be so stupid as those of her allies. When the Eussian had done with me, in my perplexity I asked one of the Prussian secretaries of Legation the meaning of the words I had heard, and inquired if Eussia * This was in reference to Capo d'Istrias, — a man universally abhorred and ultimately assassinated, and whom England had forced upon the Grreelcs. KEVOLT or THE ISLA DE LEON. 35 could really liave some object in injuring Greece. He smiled, and said, " Did you ever hear of Isla de Leon ?" I an- swered, " No." " You know, at least," he replied, " that Spain is always in trouble. Her trouble con^menced with that Eevolt. That was Russia's tcork, and such is her work everywhere." Distance is nothing to systems that work by the spirit, and Eussia's victories have been gained more by wheels than gunpowder, by courtiers than armies, — the deep no less than the land furnishes her a path. The viewless messages which thus reach Europe's bounds span the Atlantic ; and the Colonies lost to Spain, and which she was bargaining with the United States that Spain should not retake, were on the very point, had it not been for the resistance of Canning, to render her the centre of a European Combination for their recon,quest, and of an American Confederacy for their defence. The barbarians who have heretofore subdued Europe pre- sented a physical object; also they had virtues and introduced laws. This Invasion is one which the eye cannot see, nor the hand resist ; it is not the march of armies, but the spread of infection. The Vandals, to kill the living by the dead, slaughtered their prisoners around the cities they besieged ; so Eussia has found the secret of infecting Europe with its own corruption. Preserving intact the spirit of barbarism, she culls from Europe its sciences of philosophy and destruc- tion. Gibbon concludes his observations on the fall of the Eoman empire of the West with these memorable words of unparalleled infatuation : — "Cannon and fortification now form an impregnable barrier, and Europe is secure from any future eruption of barbarians, since before they can conquer they must cease to be barbarous. Then gradual advancement in the science of war would always be accompanied, as we may learn from the example of Eussia, with a proportion of improvement in the aj'ts of peace and, civil 'policy ! they themselves must deserve a name amongst 36 SPAIN. the polished nations they subdue. We may therefore acquiesce in the pleasant conclusion, that every age of the world has increased and still increases the real worth, the happiness, and the knowledge of 'the human race." Four short years had thus sufficed to plant in Spain the fulcrum of Paction, hitherto unknown ; the levers were to be worked from afar, by what process it will be now our task ta trace, — with what effect, future generations alone can tell. CHAPTER V. Position of France in 1822. — Invasion of Piedmont and Najjles. To speak in 1823 of a Spanish war was to recall the previous one, in which above half a million of Frenchmen had perished. The object proposed in so perilous an enterprise was not a disputed succession : it v/as to obtain redress for no injuries, there was no Frencli interest involved; it was to change institutions, in an inverse sense to those of France. It presented, then, insuperable difficulties, and involved the reappearance of the armies of England in the Peninsula. Wellington survived. Napoleon was gone, and but seven years had elapsed since the Allies had, for the second time, entered Paris, having the first time marched thither from the Pyrenees. No enterprise could present itself under features more forbidding to the Prencli nation. The king was not in favour of the plan ; the President of the Council was most adverse to it; the royalist minority deemed it insane; the Constitutionalist majority held it an attack I'pon themselves. No men of genius supported, by their private judgment or senatorial eloquence, the unpopular measure. At this horn*, when all secrets have been laid bare, we can scarcely discover a known name not hostile, save those of JVI.de Montmorency and i\I.de Chateaubriand: of these the first was the minister of foreign affairs, the latter the ambassador in London. M. de Montmorency fell a sacrifice to his ardour in this cause, even before the CyngTess of Verona had termi- nated its sittings, and jM. de Chateaubriand had been backed by England, as the opponent of " extreme measures." Astounding as such a statement may be, the proofs of its accuracy lie within the reach of any diligent man. There are the columns of the ' Moniteur,' the official documents, and the published exculpation of M. de Chateaubriand. SPAIN. Tlie event iias proved that these apprehensions of Spanish resistance were unfounded ; may not, therefore, the pro- moters of the war have calculated with greater accuracy the chances than the public ? We have their most secret com- munications before us : from these I extract the leading points, as given by the author of the Invasion. He considered the people of Spain intractible, not attached to "legitimate principles more than to constitutional ;" he held the whole case "to reside in the character of the king;" he was the political disease of Spain; he was "false, iml)ecile, and treacherous;" the people of Spain were vindictive, and the restoration of the absolute king would be the signal of every excess to which " they were entitled by their traditional habits of arrogance." He held the In- vasion to be most dangerous, and to place the French armies entirely at the mercy of England : he looked on failure as " the fall of the Eourbons in Trance," and the beginning of a convulsion "more dangerous than that of 1793." Had he looked to prompt and easy success, had he come with a scheme of government to introduce, he might have been set down as fit for a place in St. Luke's ; but he had no such hope or plan. How shall we describe him if not in his own words, " It is not he that is fabulous, but the age ?" Let us now consider the dispositions of foreign Powers. Prance was then humbled. She was admitted to no Con- claves : she had just escaped from a project of further partition projected by England : she was hated by the despotic Powers for her supposed liberalism, and by the Constitutionalists for her entrance into the " Holy Alliance." She was then linked by no entente cordiale with England, but looked upon her neighbour as engaged ^n a national policy to humble and weaken her. The Spanish Constitution was considered England's work : an eventual occupation of Spain was therefore, justly to be considered " a possible war vath England." Canning was minister. As to the Continental Powers, and especially the Holy Alliance, it may be supposed that they were not only favour- POSITION OF FRANCE IN 182%, 39 able but so ardent in the matter, as to make common cause with her when repeating across the Pyrenees the recent expeditions of Austria across the Alps. The cases, however, were widely different. In these Interventions, Austria acted in the pursuit of a definite policy on a field abandoned to her at the Congress of Vienna ; there was no danger of a war thence arising between her and England. Prussia did not apprehend that she would extend her power, or change in a dangerous manner her own character, but knew full well that she would be only weakened. France alone coidd hav£ taken umbrage at Austrian Inter- vention in Italy ; it was against her that the blow was aimed, and she was prostrate. The Holy Alliance had, moreover, defioimced these Eevolutions from the beginning. No danger for the person of the king could arise from the hostile operation. The Invasion of Spain by France presents the counterpart in aU respects of this picture ; there the Eevolution had been recognised, the powers had their ambassadors at IVIadiid — the Eussian ambassador, who was also a Spanish general (Pozzo di Porgo), had taken part in the appointment of the ministry. The Invasion was considered not an easy suppression of doctrines, but as a great war with incalculable consequences. Austria and Eussia reduced the question to this dilemma, " either France will be victorious, or she will be beaten :'* in the first case she will regain her preponderance — in the second Eevolution its strength. Where then was the support of the promoters of the project against their King, their Colleagues, the Chamber, the Charter, the Parties, in a word — France ? Let us open the " Congress of Verona" — I mean the volume. 40 CHAPTEE YJ. Congress of Verona. TiiE Conference at Verona was attended, not like that of Laybach, by the members of the Holy Alliance only, but also by the Representatives of other States and of England, wlio had protested against such meetings, declaring that she " never contemplated that the alliance of the great Powers was to be converted into a conclave for the government of independent states." The Conference ended without any decision : no joint declaration of principles was published, and no concerted action of any description resolved on. There were five major points discussed, which I place according to their order of discussion and supposed im- portance : 1st. The Slave Trade. 2d, Suppression of piracy in America and the Spanish Colonies. 3d. The differences between Bussia and the Porte. 4th. The affairs of Italy. 5th. The Revolution in Spain. These subjects were treated severally by the Powers di- rectly interested. The smaller States were excluded from the discussion on the affairs of the Porte, and Prance, though not excluded, was allowed no consultative voice ; from those of Italy, she was etitirely excluded. Those on which she was called to treat were the Slave Trade, the Spanish Colonies, and Spain. The first two were introduced by the English Govern- ment ; the role of Prance was limited to declining to accede to the English proposals. Prance herself intro- duced Spain in the form of a question as to how far tbe Powers would lend to her their sanction or co-operation in eventual circumstances, such as, for instance, a declaration of war by Spain. CONGEESS OP VERONA. The French Commissioners had however been enjoined l>y their instructions 'Ho avoid presenting themselves to the Congress as reporting on Spanish affairs,"" because, says the President of the Council, " should Spain declare war against ris, we do not require succours, and avc could not even admit of them, if the result were to be the passage of foreign troops across our territory." He proceeds to show the impossibility of con- quering Spain, or of maintaining there an army of occupation. Tliese instructions were framed to meet and counteract supposed warlike dispositions on the part of the Congress, which might place France in the alternative of defending the Spanish devolution against Europe, or of attacking it on behalf of Europe. The French Plenipotentiary, in the teeth of these specific orders, did, . as we have seen, make himself the reporter on Spanish affairs, and, in so doing, applied the words of M. Yillele, in reference to a defensive war against Spain to an Intervention in Spain, and so identified the proposed measure with those operations against Piedmont and Naples, which the President of the Council had energetically repudiated. In his communication to the Congress of the 20th October, he says : — " Besides, the Spanisli Government may suddenly determine npon a formal aggTession. France must therefore foresee as possible, and perhaps even as probable, a war with Spain. 15y the nature of things, and in the sentiments of moderation by which she seeks to regidate her conduct, she must consider this war as strictly defensive. Full of confidence in the justice of the cause she will have to defend, and honouring herself with \i^\'m^ to pi-eserve Europe from the revolutionary scourge, &c." He then proceeds to indicate a middle course as possible between war and peace, — that of breaking off diplomatic intercourse ; and his proposal is, that the other Courts shall also withdraw their Representatives. This step, not in his instructions, was that best calculated to exasperate Spain, and to identify France with the Holy Alliance. H« himself contemplates' this result. "This measure, which 43 SPAIN. would have so much the more effect as it would be consum- mated by a perfect concord between the high powers, might bring grave consequences. It would probably exasperate tlie men who at present govern Spain, but they alone would have to incur the responsibility." He then proceeds to put three questions : 1st. If the Allies will break diplomatically with Spain wlien Trance does ? 2d. In case of war, what moral support could be lent to Prance ? 3d. What material succours could be afforded in case she demanded it V^ Thus introduced, the Conference examined the cases of war, as follows : 1st. That of an attack on the French territory. 3d. The dethronement of the king, or legal proceedings against his person or his family. 3d. A formal act of the Spanish Government to change the legitimate succession. Here were added two new cases not contemplated in the French instructions, and upon the whole collectively the French Plenipotentiary demanded a decision. Prussia and Austria answered, " that if the conduct (the subsequent con- duct) of the Spanish Government in respect to France or her ambassador at Madrid was such as Xo, force the latter to break off diplomatic connection," they would then do the same. *'That if, in despite of tJie care the French Government takes to prevent a war with Spain, that war came to break out" (by Spain's act), they would yield to her their moral support. '^That if the events or the consecpiences of a war made France feel the necessity for more active succour, they ■would consent to that kind of succour in so far as the neces- sities of their position might leave them the faculty of so doing." England protested against the whole proceeding, and declared that the interference of foreig-n Pofvers was in every case calculated to exasperate and not to allay faction ; CONGRESS OF VERONA. 43 that this sentiment was stronger in Spain than in any other country, and that the very existence of such communications tended to put in danger those august pei-sons for whose security they were undertaken. "Russia alone," says M. de Chateaubriand, "answered energetically, yes, to all the proposals of France. She is ready to withdraw her ambassador — she is ready to give to Prance, in every case, every moral and material support with- out restriction and without condition." Proposals of France ! They were at the time iiTiknov^n to the French Cabinet. The proposals assented to by Russia were her own. But let us hear her view of the case : — " Anarchy reduced to principle, and power become the price of insolence to the throne and to religion — disorder delivering up to a destructive scourge entire populations — the almost consummated loss of the rich possessions in the new world — the public fortune dissipated — the most subversive doctrines openly preached : some faithful subjects array themselves for the defence of their Sovereign, and this Sovereign forced to proscribe them. Abroad, the sad spectacle which is presented in the countries which the artizans of the trouhUs of Europe had destined to be the prey of Revolution. Last year, the two Sicilies ou fire, and the Allied Powers constrained to place there legitimate power under the edges of their arms. Piedmont convulsed, and endeavouring to propagate revolt in the north of Italy, and provoking the same Intervention and the same assistance. Assuredly it is impossible that such a state of things should not excite the regrets and the inquiries of aZ^ the Europecm powers." "This frank note," says the French Plenipotentiary, the historian of the Congress, "dissipated all fears relative to the war with Spain." The fears of the French Government were lest the war should be rendered inevitable — those of the French Plenipotentiary lest it should not be made. The next step was to propose the withdrawal from Madrid of the Representatives of the other powers hefore that of France. This was to be a concerted meamrey taken by the Allies SPAIN. who liad promised only to support and follow France when, attacked. This carried, it is n-ext proposed to send seporaie Notes justifying the rupture. As Trance was not yet to come to her rupture, the composition of these Notes was for Austria and Prussia a rather difficult enterprise : the first harps on Piedmont, the second is full of apprehension for war.* Eussia, however, hits the blot, and buries the wT.apon to the hilt. " Prance has seen herself compelled to confide to an army the care of her frontier, and perhaps she will have equally to confide to it the care of causing provocations to cease of wliich she is the object." Those whose judgments await results may conceive that the cautious and guarded terms of the early communications of Austria and Prussia were a disguise, and that their real dispositions were revealed in their subsequent acts. How, indeed, could it be possible that in the course of a few days they should be changed, on the most important affair of Europe, from one settled course to another exactly the reverse ? But what portion of this statement is not liable to the same objection ? What, for instance, more incompre- nensible than that the French Minister should have been opposed to the war, and have forbidden his agents to make any report on the affairs of Spain? Those who allege such impro- prieties, knownot the magic of the human mind, nor the sorcery of the powerful spirit over the weak. Eussia had at Verona the kings and statesmen of Europe brought within her reach, and placed in the very palm of her hand. The balls being together on the table, she could make the points off them, and wdn the game without dropping the cue. She proposed from France to the Conference what the French * "C'est elle qui, par la contagion de ses pi'incipes et de ses exemples, et par les intrigues de ses principaux artisans, a crec les revolutions de Naples et du Piemont." — Austrian note. "L'efl'et inevitable de tant de desordres se fait surtout sentir dans I'alteration des rapports entre I'Espagne et la France. L'irritation qui en resuite est xle nature ^ donner les plus fortes alarines pour la j;)aix autre les deux royaumes." — Frussian note. CONGRESS OF YEJftONA. 45 Government never projected ; slie induced tlie Conference to reply to the proposal so as to bring consequences wliich they never anticipated. Associating herself to their action, she in- terpreted their act in words which, not daring to repudiate them, they had to accept as their own. She misled Austria and Prussia as to the disposition of the Trench Ministry through the treachery of its agent, and represented to the French Ministry their extorted consent as a coercion \ The tardy protestation of England, which at the commence- ment would have nipped the system in its bud, came then but to vex and exasperate M. de Villele, and to furnish Eussia with the occasion of launching at England an insolent defiance in the name of the " Continental Alliance." All this may be gathered from the published documents but beyond these, we are in possession of still more surprising materials. To what a pass has diplomatic secrecy reduced the human race and understanding, when the phrases of an intriguer couched on a sheet of paper can inflict on the world tortures and desolation, such as in former times would have required the iiTuption of savage hordes, or the rare and terrible phe- nomenon of a conquering genius. The following passage bears its own comment : — " In order to render intelligible the difl'crent parts of the Congress of Verona, it is now necessary that I should give an account of my private coiTcspondence with M. Villele. It will be seen that the Verona correspondent (himself), by a natural connivance with his own desires, exaggerates the desire of the sovereigns for the war, with the exception, as we have already said, of the Emperor of Eussia. I* sought to fix the deter- mination of the President of the Council, for his ideas were less fixed than mine, upon an enterprise with which I asso- •ciated the safety and honour of France. I was not Minister or Foreign Affairs, and there was not the least appearance that J should soon be called to exercise the functions so worthily * M. de Chateaubriand always uses the word we. > SPAIN. filled by the Duke de Montmorency. But I fluttered myself that if I could get my plan adopted by M. Villele, that, on my return to London, 1 should be able to contribute to render the execution of it more easy, by standing so well •with George IV and with Mr. Canning." The reader may be curious to see some fragments of this correspondence. "Verona, 31st Oct. — The despatch of M. de Montmorency wqll carry you to-day nearly the conclusion of the Spanish affairs in tlie sense of your instructions. To-night we have a Conference to consider the means of making known to Europe the dispositions of the alliance. Kussia is well disposed to- wards us {La Riissie est aimahle pour nous). Austria serves Vis in this question, although she be for the rest all English. Prussia follows Austria. The desires of the Poivers are strongly in favour of a loar with Spain. It is for you, my dear friend^ to see if you ought not to seize this occasion, perhaps unique, of replacing France in the rank of military powers — of re- accrediting the white cockade in a short war, almost without danger, and towards which the opinion of the royalists and the army strongly pushes you. All Continental Europe will be for you, and England, if she take oifence, will not even have time to lay hold of a colony. As to the chambers — success covers everything. To destroy a focus of Jacobinism, to establish a Bourbon upon the throne, by the hands of a Bourbon, are results to overbalance all secondary considera- tions J and, after all, how are we to get out of our* present position ? Are we eternally to keep an army of observation at the foot of the Pyrenees ? Can we, without exposing our- selves to the hisses and contempt of all parties, send back our soldiers some moraing to their garrisons." " 30th November. — ^Do not believe, my dear friend, that in speaking of the ' advantages of this war,' I do not feel the serious consequences it might bring. England softens her- self, and appears at this moment less opposed to the interests of Continental Europe, but if our fleets were long in activity, and if Russian soldiers icere put in motion, the double jealousy CONGriESS OF VERONA. 47 of our insular neighbours might be re-awakened. You are therefore quite right not to precipitate yourself blindfold into hostilities of which it is necessary to calculate all the chances, &c. " I must tell you, my dear friend, a thing which, however, will not pain you. You are accused here to the man who dees all (or rather the man to whom evei7thing that is done is attributed) of extreme moderation. I have been enveloped as your friend in tliis charge, I have been therefore treated coldly, because I was suspected of wishing to look twice before precipitating my counti-y into the chances of a war that might become European; and then it happens .that I alone have remained Constitutional, when no one will hear of Constitution. What is to be done ? Take all this in pa- tience ^nd in pity; however, after the departure of M. de Montmorency, I will play a nobler part. " I perceive already the symptoms of favour to come ; above all, will I succeed if you write to me, and if it is known that I am your man, for whilst finding some fault with your prudence there is the highest idea of your capacity, ^w reste, I must tell you in this long letter, that I write with a flowing pen, that Austria and Prussia are by no means ardent for the w^ar, and if you should be so disposed, it would he very easy to came obstacles to he started on the part of the Cabi- nets of Vienna and Berlin. " Postscript. — Whatever he the resolution of the Cotmcil of tJie Tuileries, the other Cabinets seem determined to send their Notes and withdraw their Agents from Sjpain.^' " Verona, 28th November. — We are, it appears to me, in a most difficult position ; whatever we do here is pleasing to no one. France acts by constraint (a la main forcee) ; Russia is dissatisiied because ^ve do not go far enough; Austria has moved only that she might not come to a rupture with Russia ; Prussia trembles at the least disturbance ; and England opposes everything. Whilst we fancied we had succeeded in doing something at Verona, the real business w^as managed elsewhere. We see now the cause of the 48 SPAIN. violent notes of the Duke of* Wellington. « * * It is tliere- fore not a simple war with Spain, but a possible one with England." Now let us turn to M. Villele: on the same day, but in answer to the p-evious postscript he writes : — " 28tli November. — I see that it is upon us that will roU the whole weight of the detennination with respect to Spain. I have no objection if they give us both the balls; but if it is only one we are to have, I am not to be seduced by the appearance of so much honour. The whole matter rests on the Notes of Russia, Frussia, 'and Austria. If their cqntents are o£ a nature to Iririg a rupture, it is clear that we shall be immediately in war, or in a state so like it as not in reality to have any choice to make. "At the end of the year I shall have twenty-five millions in hand, all expenses paid — Why should these unhappy external affairs come to trouble such prosperity ?" The measures of England having iraitated M. Villele^ he writes, on the 5 th of December, a most important letter, ia which he expatiates on the needlessness of the course in which they were engaged, gives expression to his suspicion that they were played upon, and of his fears of the ulti^ mate triumph of the extreme party in Spain, in Erance, and throughout Europe. He recoils, however, from any measur.'? which would wear the appearance of concurrence with England, but is terrified at the idea of separating from the Allies.* He therefore implores the Erench Plenipotentiaries to obtain from the Allies that their Ambassadors should not be withdrawn from Madrid, and that the ultimate decision should be remitted to a Conference at Paris. He concludes his earnest and supplicatory letter in these terms : — "May it please God, for my country's sake and for Europe's, to cause them to desist from a resolution which, * On the one side, it would be friglitfid {affreux) for us, and we could not resolve upon such a step, to separate ourselves from tho Emperor of Russia, — to imitate whom ? the only power whom vi& have reason to mistrust, — England. CONGEESS OF VEllONA. 49 witli profound conviction, I announce beforehand as about to compromise the safety of France herself." To the opinion of this statesman I must add a passage concurrently written by Mr. Canning : — " Leave the Spanish Revolution to burn itself out within its own crater. You have nothing to apprehend from the erup- tion if you do not open a channel for the lava through the Pyrenees." M. de Chateaubriand answers from Verona on the night of the 20th December : — "As soon as I received your letter of the 5th, I had with Prince ^letternich this morning a conversation of the last im- portance. The Emperor of Prussia has also granted me an audience, and this generous Prince spoke to me for more than an hour with an interest for the King and for France truly admirable. In two words, the three Pov/ers will not withdraw their notes and will despatch them to Madrid, granting us, however, a few days to act with them if we be so disposed." Here ends the Congress of Verona. "It results from this correspondence," says M. dc Chateau-. briand, " that M. Villele and I had each of us a fixed idea : I wanted the war, he wanted peace ; and I attributed to all the Allies the sentiments of Alexander, and told the President of the Council that the strongly pronounced wish of all was for the war. M. de Montmorency was also for the war, but he had altogether another object, and his opinions were openly expres*sed. I clothed my determination under doubts, and feared that in revealing too much, I should spoil all." It is here necessary to remark that M. de Chateaubriand did not share in the more enlightened opinion of the present day in respect to Russia, and held her to be neither stupid nor weak. In a work in which he avows his entire devotion to her chief, he admits her to be most subtle, powerful, and ambitious ; he speaks of the Emperor as *' the Potentate to whom Napoleon had bequeathed Europe. ^^ His avowed puifjose is to restore the military power of France, to make her " » 3 50 SPAIN. useful ally to Russia' in the accomplishment of that prophecy. He and his colleague received each, as compensation for the ingratitude of their country, a pension from the Emperor of 25,000 francs. But M. de Chateaubriand was a religious man, and had published on " The Genius of Christianity." I cannot resist the temptation of inserting a letter of Mr. Canning to M. de Chateaubriand, written after the matter was decided, and to the last person in the world on whom it was worth while to expend paper and ink. It is curious to observe how completely the man of genius, desti- tute of the sense of action, and conversant only with ideas . and words, is at the mercy of the intriguer. *' London, January 2l5^, 1823. " I think these changes unfortunate, but still I do not despair if you cont'miie to he for peace, and if your just estimate of the dangers of war to France does not yield to your belief of its facilities, and your anticipation of its glories ; but I own some of your topics alarm me more than your reasonings tranquillise me upon that point. " When I speak of the dangers of war to France, do not suppose that I undervalue her resources or power. She is as brave and as strong as ever she was before. She is now the richest, the most abounding in disposable means, of all the states of Europe. Here are all the sinews of war, if there be the disposition to employ them. You have a million of soldiers, you say, at your caU. I doubt it not ; and it is double the number, or thereabout, that Napoleon buried in Spain. You consider a "premier succcs au moins" as certain. I dispute it not. I grant you a Erench army at Madrid. But I venture to ask, what then ? If the King of Spain and the Cortes are by that time where they infallibly CONGRESS OF VERONA. 51 will be, in the * Isla do Leon,' I see plenty of war if you onc<3 get into it, but I do not see a legitimate beginning to it, nor an intelligible object. You would disclaim to get into such a war by the side-door of an incidental military incur- sion; you would enter in front with the cause of war blazoned on your banner. And what is that cause ? Is it to be learned from the notes and despatches of four Continental Powers? or from M. de Villele's only? Is it vengeance for the past, or security for the future ? You disclaim the former, no doubt, but how is the latter to be obtained by war ? I understand a war of conquest ; I understand a war of succession, — a war for the change (on the one hand), or the conservation (on the other) of a peculiar dynasty. But a war for the modification of a political Constitution, a war for the two Chambers, and for the extension of the regal pre- rogative — a war for such objects as these I really do not understand, nor do I conceive how the operations of it are to be directed to sucli an end. You would not propagate La Charte as Mahomed did the Alkoran, or as in the earliest part of your Revolution Erance did the Rights of ]\Ian. Con- sider, is there not some forbearance on the part of Spain in not throwing these things in your teeth? Might she not, when informed that her change of Constitution had not been bloodless, desire that it should be compared with 1789 and 1792-3 ? Might she not, when accused by Russia of a forcible change of government, remind the Emperor Alexander of the events which preceded his own accession, and the treaty of Tilsit which made over Spain to Buonaparte? Might she not speak to Prussia of promises of free Insti- tutions made by a King, and violated ? Might she not accept Prince Metteniich's appeal to the former union of Spain and Austria, and turning to us (if we took part in the lecture) say that she was ready, like England in 1683, to preserve her laws and liberties by a small change in the reigning dynasty, and to place an Austrian Prince with enlarged powers upon her throne ? Surely the discussions with which 52 SPAIIT. tiie war lias been prsfciced are as liazardous as the war itself. Consider before what an audience you plead. How many of their passions are against you ! — how few of their sympathies are with you ! * * * And do you make war to free such a monarch from all restraint ? And do you hope to have man- kind with you?'* 53 CITAPTEK Yir. Invasion of 1823. On entering the Spanish territory, the Due D'AngouIeme issued a . proelamation (2d April), which opens in these words : — " The King of France, in withdrawing his Ambassador from Madrid, hoped that the warning would have recalled the Spanish Government to more moderate sentiments. Two months and a half have passed, and His Majesty has awaited in vain to see an order of things established in Spain com- ' patible with the security of its neighbours." The Note of the French Government which had preceded the recall of the Ambassador contained the following passage ; *' The Government of His Majesty will not hesitate to seek guarantees in more efficacious dispositions for the protection of the material interests of France, should they continue to be compromised, and should she lose the hopes of an ameliora- tion, which, with pleasure, she awaits from the sentiments which have so long united the Spaniards to the French in a sage liberty." Such were the hopes in which she awaited the two months and a half spent in active preparation for Invasion, in con- sequence of a provocation which she had tranquilly endured for two years, and which Invasion her King from the throne had the year before declared that " malevolence alone" could suspect. The Due D'AngouIeme having with laconic vagueness explained the grounds of the Invasion, thus exposes the con- duct he is about to pursue : — " Spaniards — everything will be done for you and icitJi you. — ^The French are, and only will be your auxiliaries j — your 64 SPAIN. own flag will alone Vv'ave over your cities; — the provinces that my soldiers shall traverse, will be administered in the name of Ferdinand, by Spanish authorities : — we do not pretend to impose upon you laws, we only desire to restore to you order." Three days before the date of the Duke's Proclamation, another had appeared, also issuing from the French territory; it contained these words : — " Spaniards, to you belongs the glory of exterminating the Revolutionary Hydra. *'The Provisional Junta of Government declares that sovereignty resides entirely in the King, and emanates from him. "Spaniards, your Government declares that it does not recognise, and holds as null, all the public and administrative acts, as well as the measures of a Government established by [Rebellion, and that consequently it temporarily re-establishes things in the state in which they were previous to the 7th March, 1820.'* The place from which it was dated, and the concurrent transmission of the two Proclamations, prove the connivance. At a subsequent period the French Government attempted to exculpate itself by its inability to restrain the Party it had placed in power, without exposing its troops to the fury of a reaction. But of what further violence could it be guilty ? The proclamation of the Dake was not his voluntary act, nor one to which he had assented, — it was sent to him only at the moment that it was to be published, and with pressing orders that the publication should not be delayed an hour.* * " The Due d'Angouleme found at Toulouse the members of the ex -regency of Urgel. He received them very coldly, and only as private persons. He showed attention only to the Baron d'Eroles, but whether it was that his opinions had undergone a change, or that he had been overreached by some intrigue, it is certain that, in direct contradiction witli liis moderate ideas, a provisional junta made its appearance on the 6th of April at Bayonne, composed of Eguia, Erol, and Gromez Calderon, and which, without waiting to know whence its power came to it, or who it represented, com- INVASION OP 1823. 55 The only course was the appointment of the Due D'Angouleme as Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, until the close of the expedition. The political circumstances of the country rendered this imperative, and it presented no administrative difficulty even of detail, the municipal bodies having there the entire management, and standing distinct from the Cortes and their system. Whilst the issue remained uncertain, there was absolutely nothing for a general govern- ment legitimately to do. Two savage factions stood in face of each other: liow could France restore order if not by standing as a moderator between them ? To announce that her annies sliall advance as stalking horses, for the vengeance of a proscribed minority, was a device to accumulate obstacles in their van, to surround the march with dangers, and to mark their track with the desolation of a civil Avar. To tell the one party that the door of vengeance was open, was to shut against the other the hope of reconciliation, and to bring upon the army a fate similar to that with which it threatened Spain. Had the design been executed in the spirit in which it was planned, 100,000 Frenchmen would have marched to their graves ; Spain would have been a chaos of convulsion, of which the counterpart would soon have appeared in Prance herself; and the Russian troops, which, as we leani from M. de Chateau- briand, were to be put in motion, would have found their concerted destination. However, the Spaniards are not a reading people, and they had made up their minds upon the matter in a manner which Shakspeare has anticipated in the words, " A plague on both your houses." The Due d'Augouleme was hailed as a liberator ; the Prench troops were everywhere received v^^ith menced from that day by declaring null every act since the 7th of March, 1820 ; and that dcelai-ation, although calculated seriously to injiu-e the cause of restoration, and to produce the worst effects in France, was not the less sanctioned by the proclamation of the Prince- Generalissimo at Oyarzun on the 9th of April." — Mar, de Mirajlores. 5G SPAIN. open arms ; tlie Cortes fled without striking a blow ; everv- thing was remitted into the hands of Erance ; every thing- expected from her neutrality, moderation, generosity, and wisdom. The accomplishment of those ardent desires for the well-being of Spain, of which France was the agent, but all Europe the source, was now at hand, and the Spanish people, while disarming by its bearing the suspicions of the Northern Powers, had given to itself irrefragible titles to the sympathies of the Prench people, and to the gratitude of the French Government, by the touching confidence with which they had remitted their destinies into her hands. At this moment, the field was bare ; no cloud had come over the mind of the nation ; the rapidity of events had carried atten- tion away from the Junta, and shortness of time had noi; recalled it to their acts. But on the day before entering Madrid was issued the Proclamation of xilcovendas, con- verting the Junta, wdth the addition of two imbecile and obnoxious names, into a regency. It is difficult for us to admit into our minds the value of this term. The character of inviolability belongs to a Sovereign precisely because of the higher sphere in which he moves, whence, himself uninfluenced by zeal of theory or lust of profit, he moderates and restrains these passions, disturbers of communities. What is it to invest with such a quality persons taken from the midst, and in this case already rejected from the mass, by failure of their faculties, or ab- horrence of their character ? To these men are then given Ministers to countersign their acts, French armies to execute their decrees or guard their persons, and the heir of the French Crown to insult, as evidence of their dig-nity. A million of French bayonets are in the rear ready at their call, and the moral influence and physical arms of another million of Ptussians, if requisite, " to muzzle the Monster of Eevolution, and to establish the Empire of the La.ws and Order." Such a measure v/as never planned at^Madrid — such a scheme never invented at Paris : its ])arentag;c belongs to a latitude more fertile in vigorous conceptions. INVASION OP 1823. 57 It was, of course, requisite, not only that the scheme !:honld not come from Paris, but also that it should be beheld issuing from Spanish soil. Tiiis was still found to be im- practicable. Some Institutions did survive the Constitution of 1812, and were extant even at Madrid itself: these were the two Councils of Castile and of the Indies, which had not taken to flight with the Cortes. On them was to be imposed by Instructions from Paris (how was Paris so well informed?) *the duty of engendering the Eegency. They positively had the hardihood to declare " that they could find no precedent to authorise such a step, either in the laws or usages of the Spanish monarchy, or in the histories of the Eegencies that had been established during minorities or interregnums." They do not, however, object to their Presidents being members of it when it is established. Upon this the French are obliged themselves to father the act, and a Decree issues, which, after naming the persons, declares the Eegency consiiituted — " In the name of His Majesty the King of Prtance, :iY Sovereign and Uncle." It is signed Louis Antoine, and countersigned De ^Maktignac, the Ambassador of France. The Eegency speedily makes a declaration of principles, and announces (Proclamation of the 4th June) that it Avill not listen to the voice of passion, and " that it well knows how to use the power confided to it to prevent persecution and excess.'* But events soon gave the interpretation of these words, and as their motives afi^orded nothing abstnise to public curiosity, that curiosity transferred itself to Paris, where the contradic- tion between Avords and deeds was at once interesting and enigmatic. The coincidence with the Court of Ferdinand YII, during the Conspiracy of the Isla de Leon, was not indeed recalled, however deserving of recollection ; but as then, at Madrid, everything was refeiTcd to a " secret influence," so was now everything attributed to an " occtdt (jovernmenV^ at Paris. In both cases the public instinct had been true, but in neither was the public reason exerted. 3f 58 SPAIN. As to the dispositions of tlie Due d'Angoulerae there Qould he no doubt, and he commanded the army — by that army alone could the Kegency exist for an hour : the provinces of the East, West, and South, were still nominally under the rule of the Cortes. If the Regency played false to its Com- mander, it must have done so at its own peril — a peril too grave to be incurred, — or by intelligence with Paris. In that {;ase tlie agents of the secret Government would be acting in opposition to the responsible Ministry in Prance and the Commander of her armies in Spain. Let us look at their acts : a couple will suffice. Within a week of the Proclamation, a Decree issued for arming the ultra faction, under the title of " corps of voluntary royalists," a body that soon rivalled the Strelitz of Ivan the Terrible. On the 27th June a Decree appeared without a parallel, even in revolutionary Prance, entitled "■For the xmrijication of civil servatits,"" by which every person employed for the pre- vious three years (it was soon afterwards extended to the military also) was subjected to an examination, by a secret tribunal, as to whether or not he had done or said anything '* by which the servants of the King and the good cause may have suffered." There was no method of procedure laid down ; every method was good ; all information was available, and all proceedings secret. The body thus affected is numerous beyond the limits of English conception, and even of Prench calculation : the multitude of clerks is, in fact, the master grievance of Spain : there was not one of this body not affected to one or other faction, because, in fact, they constituted the factious class. But this decree struck not alone antagonists ; every one of them from that hour was an accused person, without knowledge of the accusation, without opportunity of defence. Servility became the bread of the public servant, the fear of delation his companion. The vices of men, or even their weakness, the jealousies of vicinage, the competitions of self-love, were worked into the tissue of civil power, transmitted into patriotism, and gratified under the INVASION OF 1S23. 59 form of public zeal. You will find the description of such things in the psiges of Tacitus, but it was a native Despot who enforced them on Home. Here ten times ten thousand prizes were held out to invention, and who shall count the solaces for pique ? But iu the novelty of circumstances, the advantage was not possessed of professional informers, and in town and city, in village and hamlet, they were separated from the neighbour, the relative, the dependant, and the friend, by an uncertain and meandering line. But the Due d'Angouleme could not suppress his indigna- tion, and he issued a Proclamation, in which he declared him- self tlie arbiter of contending parties, and resolved not to allow the triumph of France to become the triumph of faction. The French Minister is furious ; he instantly writes to the Ambassador, whom he had ordered to be " King of Spain," to nulbfy by every means the Proclamation of tlie Prince : Lis words are — amortir le coup. The Prince had to submit to the humiliation of an explanation, which was, in fact, a retractation. Did the French Minister really believe that a republican reaction and the destmction of the French would have been the consequence of this step ? By no means. In his private communications now published he describes it as having produced the "best effects, even amongst the corps of royalists, who complain that by punishing the constitutional troops who had laid down their arms, new enemies are con- stantly raised to them." This is no after-thought ; it is written nine days after the Decree, namely, on the 17 th of August. Again, ten days later he writes to the Ambassador at INIadrid, who had been sending him all the absurd gossip of the Puerta del Sole, as follows : — "You have been listening to the cries of the Spanish royalists and to the complaints of diplomatic agents, enemies of France. You have not seen, as I have here, the answers of the Commandants of the Fortresses, who all declare that they are desirous of suiTendering themselves, but are pre- vented, because in laying down theii* arms they would be 60 SPAIN. imprisoned and massacred hy the orders of ine Tiegency. You. have not seen tlie reports of the cruelties of Merino and the other royalist chiefs, and, consequent!}'-, you have not been in a state to judge of the effect." Can it be believed that the sentence immediately following is this : "line seule ordonance a tout gate? " The only act of the Prince was that Proclamation : it was directed against the only danger that Prance had to .fear — the only husmess in which the Eegency was engaged. I subjoin a Spanish statement of the case, from the intro- duction to the Marquis of Miraflore's valuable collection of State Papers : — "In six short weeks this change has been effected, so powerfid were the means and so instant the agents, the Due d'Angouleme having, in the mean time, remained a passive spectator, restrained by that same occult influence which had already not only coerced his judgment, but compromised him in its own measures. His patience was at last exhausted, and he fulminated against the regency, on the 8th August, the Decree of Andujar. On this a howl arose from the clubs and journalists of Madrid, and, far more important, a whisper came to him from Paris. He had dared to take at lengih a step, according to his pledge, to arrest excesses and vengeances. He had dared to take measures for the safety of Ills army, thereby compromised. He had dared to endeavour to keep faith v/ith those who had laid down their arms by Compact with Prance, and on the condition of an Amnesty, and he was consequently bearded to the face by the regency and its minions, threatened with the resistance of the armies of Spain, in case he attempted to withdraw from their lusts the victims of their vengeance. He was told by the rabble of the streets of Madrid that he had attacked Spanish indepen- dence, and it was notified to him from Paris that ' vengeance was a customary liahit of the Spanish nation;^ that he had exceeded the powers with which he was invested, mistaking the views of the King's government ; that his act would seriously compromise it in face of the Northern Powers.'* INVASION OF .1823. 61 The easy inarch of the French, so contraiy to all expect a- tion, brought to the clearest demonstration two truths. The first, that the party of the Cortes had no root : the second, that the Eoyalist party had, if possible, still less, for it had been expelled by that very Government which vanished before the French. The Spaniards are the proudest of people, and the - ablest to resist a foe ; but France was their friend, or they expected her to be so. They looked to being rescued by her out of the hands of 200,000 brawling Philistines, who had got hold of them as a Dragoman does of a traveller, or an Ambassador. The grave and important part of the matter is, however, the insight it affords into the causes of the present condition of Europe, and into the working of its governing system. The Minister of one power here appears acting for another, who is kept out of view. To serve this foreign master, he had accepted every consequence, and employed every means, even to the last. What the urgency was that impelled Mm, may be estimated from the obstacles against which, apparently unaided, he had to contend — thei aversion of his colleagues, the exasperation of England, the opposition and disgust of the agent whom he employed, — no less a person than the heir to the French Crown, in face of the anticipated contingency of a general triumph of Kevolution, and a Musco- vite occupation of France. The path was too intricate to liave been hit by chance, — the difficulties too great to have been conquered by accident, — the consequences too appalling not to have been avoided, — the results too evident not to have been foreseen. That Minister was no longer M. de Yillele, but M. de Chateaubriand, suddenly transferred to the Foreign Office at Paris, and dismissed so soon as the Spanish operation was completed. 63 CHAPTEIl VIII, Quadruple Treaty, The Decade does not elapse witliout a new convulsion ; Prencli troops are again crossing the Bidassoa, not as foes but friends, and this time, according to the original scheme of Chateaubriand, wearing the Spanish cockade. But in the meantime the colours had changed. It is no longer in- violable right to succession that had to be maintained, — it is no longer to support a King against a Constitution, but to maintain a Queen set up by one. Strange reflections might be suggested by such events to the inhabitants of the other planets, but in this earth they are not extraordinary. England, who was so decidedly convinced in 1823 of the guilt and foUy of interference in the affairs of neighbours, is now en- gaged with Erance in this same scheme, and, indeed, has seduced her into it. This is a matter which admits of no discussion ; if not seen at a glance it cannot be seen at all. Now what had we to expect ? Time had passed his baud over the wounds of former strife, and covered even the cica- trices : mutual jealousies had ceased between England and Erance ; they admitted community of political interests, and a new bond had arisen between them, — that of similarity of opinions in regard to government, and of Institutions. Y\'as it possible then to conceive that both should concur, or that even one should undertake, any foreign operation not unmistakeably just, profitable and necessary ; or that the freedom of the people should suffer any measure to be under- taken, except after the fullest exposition and the freest consent ? This union of the nations was not merely one of sympathy, it also involved the profoundest political objects ; it Avas at once an enjoyment and a security. It must have b(!en their first care to preserve these bles.«ings, and therefore to QUADRUPLE TREATY. 63 avoid the rock on which their amity had been formerly ship- wrecked. That rock was Interference. Nothing could occur directly between them to impair their good-will, and of all foreign waters of which they had to steer clear, the chief were those of Spain. In the East the positive encroachments of a third Power might excuse in this respect rnisjudg- ments, and even rectify the effects of errors; but in the Peninsula there was no safety-valve, there was no liglitning conductor ; and so sure as cither moved, and so doubly sure when both combined, was the great alliance of the West ruptured. I speak not here of the general sense of a nation unapplied to a particular case; I speak not of an abstract sense of right, unadopted as a specific conclusion, by influential states- men. Intervention as a Principle had been judged — Spain as a field had been excluded. Not to multiply quotations, I will refer for England to the declaration of the then Minister for Foreign Afl:airs, that the "Principle of Non- intervention was sound, and ought to be held sacred ;" and for France to that of the Duke de Broglie, that " the Govern- ment when sought to pursue a policy of influence (he referred to Spain) played the part of a dupe, and prepared for itself a harvest of difficulties.** Both declarations were received in the respective Senates without a dissentient Avhisper, aud with every sign that men can give of satisfaction. My first knowledge of this transaction, although a year subsequent to the signature of the Treaty, was derived from the King of England himself.* AVhen pointing out the absence of aU action on our part in face of Russia's activity * I have no hesitation in mentioning the circumstajice, as it was settled with his best friend, Sir Herbert Taylor, that the whole of the transactions in which the King had taken part, in reference to the East, should be made pubhc ; and shortly before liis death tliere was transmitted to me a mass of letters for • that pm-pose, completing the series with those already in my possession. The execution of tliis plan has been delayed, partly in dehcacy to certain individuals still alive, partly from the indifference prevailing in regard to sucli matters. 64 SPAIN. everywhere, his Majesty replied, " There is something now preparing which will be a heavy blow to her." I remained silent and stupified, apprehending some new Treaty like that of the 6th of July. After a pause, he went on to say, " We are going to hit her in Spain." " Into what hole have you fallen!" The exclamation escaped me. Out of this con- versation arose an article, afterwards published in the first number of the 'British and Foreign Eeview,' pointing out the necessary consequence of this Intervention, to be that rupture of the alliance between England and France which it afterwards produced, and further indicating Kussia as the only possible soiu'ce whence the idea could have come. It may appear at first sight unwarrantable to place on the same line the diplomatic parclmient of 1834, and the warlike sword of 1823. But in tmth the pen was the weightier instrument of the two ; the object and effect were in both, eases the same. The restoring of an expelled Faction, and the re-invigorating of a struggle on the point of cessation, equally prolonged confusion. Though an Army v/as employed in the one case, and a Treaty in the other, that Treaty was an alliance and an engagement ; it involved the employment of the re- sources of the Allies. By it England and France concuiTed to eff'ect wdiat, in 1823, France undertook to do alone, in spite of England. If corresponding results did not follow, it was not that powder was wanting. Mercenaries and auxiliaries, supplies and arms,* w^ere indeed furnished, but they w^ere administered with care and in moderate doses. The Invasion had been prompted by no French interest, and had originated in no decision of the French Government : yet for the transaction there v/aS an explanation, and it was accepted at the time. Whatever use a Cabinet placed beyond the circle of Europe's habits and principles might make of Eevolution, or of the fear of it, still it was not the less true that such fears did exist, and that they were very real and pressing. It having been stated (and * A quarter of a million stand were sent, and scattered so as to arm both parties. QUADEUPLE TREATY. 65 believed) by M. Villele, that France had sent an army to the Tagus to avoid having to send one to the Khine, the value of the reason remained indeed open to dis- cussion, but the fact was unquestionable. For the Treaty of 1834, no such pretext as this is to be found. The Go- vernment of Madrid was endeavouring to put down an insurrection of a fortieth part of the population, inhabiting provinces not integral parts of the kingdom, but an annexed domain. They had taken up arras, as they possessed by Treaty the right of doing, in consequence of the infringement of their laws. There was here nothing to alarm any foreign Govern- ment or faction ; there was indeed no association possible between the parties in Spain and the opinions of Europe, unless by changing the parts. Nothing could be more republican than the followers of Don Carlos, nothing more tyrannical than the Constitutionalists of Madrid. Supposing that any neighbouring and benevolent Govern- ment had desired to put an end to these troubles, nothing was easier. The Madrid exchequer was empty, save of de- bentures ; the arsenal was exhausted, except of the swords of Eoland and the Cid, not available on the occasion ; their armies were destitute when not defeated; there was no heart to their cause ; the insurgents paraded the Peninsula, and once might have entered Madrid. A friendly adviser would have had every weapon on his side ; indeed, they could not get oi^ without aid, and the question was opened by their requesting it. Tliey obtained it. Those who enabled them to go on could not have wished them to desist, and, it is to be inferred, had prompted them to begin. This is just what had happened before: the only difference is, that the "occult Government" is now in London. The only way to deal with the case is to consider what in a hmm fide transaction must have been the reply of the British Cabinet to this demand for aid from that of Madrid. " The embarrassments experienced, and the dangers appre- hended by the Cabinet of Madrid," it must have said, " are the 66 SPAIN. consequences of its own acts in violating tlie riglits of domains of tiie Crown secured by Treaty. No just Government, and no enlightened people, can look with favour upon such pro- ceedings, and least of all the people and the Government of Great Britain. " The Government of Great Britain cannot accept, as relevant to the matter, the arguments into which that of Madrid has been pleased to enter. That Government may be perfectly in the right respecting the value of a representa- tive form of Government, and the inhabitants of Biscay may be wholly in the wrong in rejecting the share in the general representation that is offered them ; it may equally be true that the usages and privileges of these provinces are not in accordance with the spirit of this age, but neither were they in accordance with that of Charles V, Philip II, or Philip V, as estimated at Madrid. " This appeal to the Government of His Majesty is more- over singularly timed. The present Administration accepted office for the purpose, amongst others of a similar nature, of carrying into effect the maxims of free trade, long professed by the liberal party. This Administration is actually engaged. in restoring municipal freedom to the boroughs of England. Both principles appear to be expressed and contained in the form of rights in the ancient Spanish word ' Fuero,' which the Biscayans are actually in arms to defend, and the troops of Her Catholic Majesty engaged in putting down. The aid of the English Government is thus sought for the purpose of extinguishing in Biscay the very system which, by seeking to establish at home, it evinces its desire to see extended to the rest of Spain. " England is a commercial nation,^ her chief external object is to lireak down the baniers that oppose the free circulation of trade. The grounds of' her recent differences wdth Spain have been the system of commercial restriction which the influence of England has been exerted to remove, as an injury to her own trade, and as also a drawback to the pros- perity of Spain ; and you expect England's aid in extending QUADEUPLE TREATY. 67 Custom House lines to provinces free hitherto by immemorial usage and by solemn Treaty ! These liberties of the subjects of Her Catliolic Majesty become thus rights of His Majesty's subjects, and England can no more suffer them to be invaded by the Crown of Spain than it could by the Crown of France. " If the objects sought by the Spanish Government were as legitimate as they are illegitimate ; if they were as conducive to its repose as they are the reverse ; if they were as con- genial as they are repugnant to the sympathies of thp British nation and its present Government ; if they were beneficial as they are injurious to British interests and rights — slill would it be impossible for the British Government to take any part in differences between the Crown of Spain and its suljjects. England has no ground of war with the Basque Provinces if their belligerent rights be recognised ; and if not, what the Spanish Government requires would be legal only after a Declaration of war against the Crown of Spain itself. " But that Intervention which, in every case, would be a crime, would further, in that of Spain, be a folly, and nothing would more prejudice the parties in whose favour Interventicmi was exercised, than that Intervention itself." These latter sentences are not hypothetical, they are the words of the Duke of Wellington addressed to the Allied Sovereigns at Verona. The first question is : why did the English Government not adopt this, the natural course? We are left without any answer. The second is : why did it select that whicli it followed ? It gained nothing by the course it did adopt, and it coidd gain nothing ; it lost much, and that loss could not but have been anticipated: it sacrificed lives and money; but it acquired no influence in Spain : it failed to obtain a commercial Treaty, and the Colony of Gibraltar, up to this period admitted to the coasting trade of the Peninsula, wag excluded. But the signal loss incurred was that of the good- will of France : dragged by England into mediation, and then 68 SPAm. alarmed at tlie tmscrupulous measures proposed, tliougli not consigned in the Treaty, Louis Philippe turned for support to the Northern Alliance, called into existence by the " Constitu- tional League of the West." Where then are we to look for the origin of the Quadruple Treaty, save in that Cabinet which alone has profited by it ? the same which concerted the Conspiracy of the Isla de Leon, and managed the Conference of Yerona. The reader may, perhaps, be surprised to find no mention of Don Carlos. The reason is, that he had nothing to do with the transaction. The Insurrection was not raised by him ; it merely availed itself of him. In any other portion of the Peninsula, the title of the Prince might be a good ground for Insurrection, only it was not used as such : in the Basque Provinces it could be none. The " Lord of Biscay" is the de facto king of Spain, fulfilling, of course, the conditions attached to the lordship. There alone the question of kingly title could not be entertained, and there only could be entertained that of provincial right. The question of succession, as regards the remaining provinces, was wholly distinct from that of form of Government, The Constitution had been established under Ferdinand. However, consti- tution and succession, fueros and legitimacy were so mixed together, that the whole field was covered with a mist, which changed to a mirage, and presented to the eyes of Europe the reflection of its Q\n\ lanes and alleys ;* but the illusion was for the vulgar only. Those who directed affairs knew in 1834, as well as in 1833, that "neither party had any roots." The attempted subversion of the Basque Pro- * I had at Bayonne a discussion with the chiefs of the Insurrec- tion, in presence of some of theu' supporters. The chiefs had assumed the false ground of hereditary right, not only in consequence of the contaminating contact with Europeans, but also in the hope of ribbons and decorations. On coming away, one of the members of the municipality of Bilboa, who before had his mind closed to all argument by respect for his chiefs, said to me, " I now see that we have been rattled like dice, and sheared like sheep !'* QUADRUPLE TREATY. 69 viiiccs was the sole cause of the disturbance, as afterwards sliown when they sent off Don Carlos, nor would lay down their arms till the Convention of Bergara recognised the fueros. The complicity of M. de Chateaubriand with the Russian Cabinet is established by direct evidence, furnished by him- self : he was but a short time in office. He had the manage- ment of no other important matter, and but for the documents, which he has himself made public, it would have been difhcult to prove the source of the expedition, and impossible to establish his guilt. The Quadruple Treaty was the work of a man of another mould, capable of no inadvertence, who never speaks save on compulsion, and then only in reference to the occasion and the prejudices of his hearers. All that it was ever requisite for him to say in Parliament, limited itself to " Don Carlos,'* and " Constitution :" for the time he rendered himself perfectly secure by the affectation of a savage hatred against the one,* and of a sentimental affection for the other ; but the organs of the Government could not be so reserved, and by them, especially the Morning Chronicle, the Treaty was attri- buted to Talleyrand. f In the shifting grounds assumed at various times, this credit was, when the Treaty had become popular, withdrawn, and it was then revealed to the nation that England had the merit of having produced the statesman who had engendered this vast and "truly British plan.'* When at another time it fell into disrepute as having estranged Prance, then it was boldly charged by the organ of the Poreign Office on M. Thiers. It is perfectly true that M. Thiers exerted himself to extort the consent of Louis Philippe to the measures proposed by the English minister, and for my part I was led into the belief, not of Thiers's * In the rapidity of incidents, the reader may hare forgotten tho order sent out to Spain, to refuse access to Don Carlos on board of any English vessel, even if flying for his life. t Talleyrand's assent waa convoyed in a note in these terms, and these alone : " Puisque vous le vouhx, soitj* 70 SPAIN. suggestion of the measurCj but of his zealous concurrence in it ; however, during that Minister's recent visit to Spain, I had the opportunity of ascertaining the truth. When charged with his concurrence on this occasion, as having produced all the subsequent dangers of Europe, he answered, " Good God ! I had no love of the Treaty, but I yielded to it as a choice of evils ; the English alliance was everything to me, and it was to be had 07ily on this condition. I did not know why Lord Palmerston was so bitter about it, but this I did know, that he was the inevitable man." Finally, the Morning Chronicle treats us with a cabinet picture of the transaction, in which with the laborious accuracy of a Teniers, the various groups are exhibited, some in the market-place, some looking out at the window, some entering at the door. It is varnished and framed to hang up as a pendant to that other picture by the pencil of Canning of the expedition to Portugal, dear to aU lovers of art. "On Eriday the news was received; on Saturday the Cabinet was called together, &c." " On Thursday, the application from the Spanish Minister "vvas received ; on Eriday the Council sat ; on Saturday, the adliesion of the Minister of Portugal was obtained; on Sunday the Erench Ambassador was applied to, &c." But if the Minister could thus shuflie oif the Parliament and the public, by what means could he circumvent his colleagues ? If I had merely the testimony of William IV, now dead, it might be a very dangerous assertion to make that he had brought a body of English gentlemen to concui with him in this measure, — those gentlemen comprising the most distinguished members of the party who had sent Mr. Adair to St. Petersburgh, and the chief of them being Lord Grey himself, compromised in that very act, — on the grounds of its being a blow against Kussia. But in an inadvertent moment he has himself revealed the fact in an article in the Morning Chronicle^ which, of all his contri- butions to the press, is the only one which has been brought QUADRUPLE TEEATY. 71 home to him, and that not by me, but by another journalist, and on grounds wholly irrespective of the cause of my present reference. Meeting a charge which at the time had produced some sensation, he writes in the Morning Chronicle of the ICthof January, 1844. " TJie originator and signer of the Qiiadrtiple Treaty which withdrew Spain from Russian influence ; the statesman who embarked with such frankness and boldness in the Consti* tutional League of the West j and icho^ on the Indies and the Danube y the Persiati Gulf and the BardanelleSy made the boldest stand of any European politician against the encroachments of Ptussia in Eui'ope and in Asia — he, * * * Eussian in Soul !" I might here ask, what had he to do with overthrowing Eussia, who, in regard to the East, had declared himself * satisfied with her declarations and conduct ;" who, in regard to Poland, had declared the rights of the Emperor to be *' undeniable ;" who, in regard to France, had broken the English Alliance? But we are past inferential conclu- sions ; here is a fact which is dii'ect and incontrovertible ; if the object in Spain was to oppose Eussia, why was it kept secret? If opposition to Eussia was intended, why was Spain selected as the field ? What are the results ? W' hen tracing the plot of the Congress of Verona, that which I had to state every Englishman could take in at a glance, but no Frenchman admit, or conceive. AVhat I have said of the Quadi-uple Treaty will be equally plain to the Frenchman and obscure to the Englishman. The Spaniard will have no difficulty in apprehending the one transaction and the other. '<2 CHAPTER IX. Future Marriages. As some slight compensation and atonement for the evils inflicted on Spain by my country, the limits of which diplo- matically include Europe, and Muscovy to its furthest Calrauck bounds ; and at the same time as a warning against the evils which she is again about to inflict, Thave presented to Spaniards this picture of the genius of Western systems, and of the men of modern genius. From k they may collect that the highest intelligence on earth has deeply pondered the means of decomposing their country ; that by its " occult" command over the Western Pentecraty, glittering with the tinsel of a Yillele and a Canning, a Wellington and a Metternich, and alas, too, of a Talleyrand^ — it has converted Spain into a Pandora's box for Europe. Can any reasonable Spaniard now doubt that a maep.iage car. serve Eussia as well as a Constitution, or a Succession ? Let your proverbial gallantry, if not your political foresiglit, at kjast forbid, that ladies and their affections shall be, because seated on or near your Throne, converted into cards and dice in a game of perfidy and fraud. To prevent this is the easiest of things; settle the matter at home; allow no diplomatist to put his hand in ; Fortune offers a solution without doing violence to Nature. You have two marriage- able pinces. 73 POSTSCBIPT. Ilmj, 1853. The appreliensions which induced me to draw up the fore- going paper have been verified to the extent of nearly producing a war between England and France. Out of the "Spanish Marriages" came the confiscation of Cracow, and, within a short time, the fall of Louis Philippe and the revo- lution of 1848, on which the Cossacks entered Hungaiy. To that field I now pass on. It is a fact here deserving of record, that the mutual exasperation of the two countries, in reference to the Spanish marriages, bore upon the Treaty of Utrecht, which the English Minister asserted had been violated by the»nnion of a son of Louis Philippe and a Spanish princess. This Treaty, as that Minister had himself, on a previous occasion, stated in Parlia- ment, had ceased to exist, having lapsed by war, and not having been restored at a subsequent peace. Had the author of the 'History of Civilisation' been a little earlier* ac- quainted with this fact, there could have been no quarrel in 1847, and no revolutions in 1848. • A note was sent to the French Embassy in London, inquiring in what article in the Treaties of Luneville, Amiens, or Vienna, the Treaty of Utrecht had been restored. It arrived two hom-s after the note of M. Guizot, taking ground upon the Treaty, had beea transmitted. PART ri. HUNGARY. CHAPTER I. Political Value of Hungary, Canning electrified the year 1826 by a quotation from the iEneid, "Celsa sedet ^olus aree," &c. It was not that it was charmed by a "calida juuctura" in ^olus and England, but in Opinion and wind. For war, Ambition, it was perceived, was no longer required ; it could be engendered by thoughts alone ; hurricanes to overwhelm Empires, and tempests to subvert Thrones, could now be evolved from tropes and metaphors. It took, however, two and twenty years for the poetic pro- position to become historical, which it did in 1848, when the Continental Governments were blown up, with the single exception of the country (Spain) whence had been derived the explosive matter. The man, in the Eastern tale, who let the genius out of the bottle was only alarmed at his own work ; but the nations of Europe, when they had ruptured their bags, were confounded at themselves : after a wild dance over hill and dale, they hurried back again to slmt themselves in, and to sew themselves up. It was not, however, Canning's iEolus, who, reversing his trident, had let forth Em'us and Nothus', England did not ride the whirlwind, and had not been the Merlin of the storm. It is not, indeed, to be expected in the country of the winds, that operations should be veiy distinct, or the figure of the genius very discernible ; and thus 76 HUNGAEY. when thimderbolts do fall, the startled nations may attribute them to a wrong Jove. The astute, but earnest Emperor, Leopold the Second, had elaborated in the alchemy of his German brain two antagonistic Trhiciple-i, which threatened to devastate Germany in the accident of their corporeal collision, — as he imagined them to be embodied severally in the neighbours of Germany on the North and on the West. That Emperor consequently adjusted his policy to meet this contingency, and thence that tempo- rising scheme for Hungary, which has not been without its influence on recent events. Napoleon too had his notions ; thjey agreed with those of Leopold in respect to number, but differed in character. The German's principles were Despotism and Anarchy; the Corsican's, He volution and Ambition. In the first case, Germany was only to be victimised ; in the second, Europe herself Avas to be the prize. So he too was swept from the scene, and passed away as a myth, only that he left behind him a wreck, and a paradox. He bequeathed Europe to Ambition (Alexander), as Leopold had prepared Austria for Despotism (Paskie witch). As for his prophecy of our be- coming " Eepublican or Cossack," what child does not now see that these are but two stations on the same road, — all the roads lead one way : "Empire" brought the Calmucks to Paris ; " Constitution" tlie Baskirs to Pesth. Thus, whilst the winds of '48 were blowing, and mankind was engaged in ascertaining their direction and estimating their effects, ^Russia leisurely laid one mailed hand on the heart of Austria, and stretched with the other arm, an encircling embrace around the Danish Belt. Here, for a time, pauses the epic, which opened at Isla de Leon, and we proceed to the incidents of the Hungarian canto. We have heard enough that the inhabitants of Hungary are Magyars, but what it was important to know, and what for the best of reasons no one comprehends, is, that the Magyars are not Europeans : this trutli the legislation of a hundred Diets and the rhetoric of a thousand Kossuths caiinot POLITICAL VALUE. 77 peiTert ; it is a fact which the Camarilla of Vienna, the Foreiga Office of London, and Field Marshal Prince Paskiewitch him- self cannot alter. The upper basin of the Danube is not in- cluded in the region of the winds, and owes as yet no fealty to the sceptre of ^Eolus. Had it been so, the chaos of the conti- nent would ere this have been reduced to the order that reigns at Warsaw ; the Hungarians, like the Spaniards, are an un- reasoning mass : slow in Progress, backwards in Civilization. Wars in the West lead to great eflfusion of blood, but to little alteration of frontiers ; those in the East alone deter- mine great results. In the one case, contest is a mere shock of equally powerful arms, or equally futile doctrines; in the other, it is a tide sweeping on to dominion for a thousand years. On the descendants of Attila and his Seven Hordes hangs at this hour the future fate of European society ; for Poland, and especially Hungary, though subjugated, stand even as the wreck of a battered wall in the victor's way. Identity of race is no motive for political union ; but when two people have the same interests and the same enemies, and happen to be of the same race, their enemy being of a different one, then indeed does that relationship become profitable and noble. The Turks are slow to move, and not likely, under any considerations of advantage, to unite them- selves with a Christian people. But their ancient associations with the Hungarians, acting like gravitation on inanimate bodies, steadying for a time at least the Eastern bulwarks of the fabric of general power, afford to Europe a reprieve and a security not the less real because she is unconscious of its existence. It is doubtless true that the fiercest wars have been carried on between the two people : so long as Hungary stood by herself, so long as the ancient line of monarchs, or the elected sovereigns, possessed the supreme sway, she dreaded the Turkish power ; the very ties which united the people rendered that hostility all the more intense. When a member of the House of Hapsburg was elected to the throne, the position was reversed. Then Austria, the Empire, Germany, IIUNGAP.Y. and the West, became for Hungary the sources of dread and the causes of suffering, and she turned towards the Sultans as to Protectors. This change occurred in the sixteenth century, when Turkey had ceased to he dangerous, but was still powerful. It was, in fact, at the instigation of the defeated competitor of Ferdinand (brother of Charles Y) that the Turks invaded Austria and besieged Vienna. If Hungary did, under the most trying circumstances, preserve her ancient Institutions down to these evil days, it is to be attributed to that confidence, no less than to that Constitution's inherent worth. So long as this latent alliance with Turkey imposed on Austria respect for the Constitution of Hungary, that country was the main strength of the Emperor at Vienna : its support was yielded to him' on every contingency, not by a blind and slavish submission, but by a free loyalty of the people, exercisedthrough theorgan of their legitimate Eepresentatives, Maria Theresa was enabled to maintain the seven years' war against Prussia, only after carrying her infant son to the Diet at Presburg, and entrusting him and herself to its chival- rous guardianship. Again, against Napoleon was Francis- enabled to make head in consequence of the enthusiastic declaration of the Diet of Presburg and its steady refusal to accede to the overtures of Prance. But the circumstance peculiarly bearing upon present events, was the war of the Spanish succession. The Austrian encroachments had at that time driven Hungary into rebellion. Louis XIV did not neglect the occasion thus offered to him, not only of paralys- ing Austria, and depriving the Allies (England and Holland) of her support, but of subduing the Empire itself while securing the inheritance of Spain. There were, hov/ever, then in England, not Diplomatists but Statesmen : Bolisigbroke was still writing despatches, and had not taken to essays. The Cabinet of St. James perceived that Austria could be no Ally if Hungary was her foe, and that Hungary could be her friend only on one condition, — the preservation of her rights ; tiierefore, on being applied to by the Huiigcirians, POLITICAL VxVLUE. 79 it hastened to offer its good offices, which were successful in a settlement of differences between the two nations, Hung:ary and Austria, and the two Sovereigns, though one person, the Kinrf and the Ihnperor. This Treaty, concluded under the mediation of England, was signed at Szathmar, in 1711. In treating of Spain in 1834, we could find no reason for England's intei-fcrencc ; in Hungary, in 1848, we are equally destitute of a reason for her non-interference ; and if we accept the only reason suggested in the one case, — that of opposition to Russia where no Eussia appeared, we can only be the more perplexed in accounting for the other. Let us consider in what position Hungary will now stand $0 Austria in any future war. Let us take the cases of a rupture with Turkey, with Erance, and with Russia. 1. The sympathies between the Turks and the Hungarians , were, after all, one-sided. The recollections enduring in the hearts of the former, had in the latter been in recent times overlaid by their connection with Europe; thus Austria, in her last three wars with Turkey, found no difficulty in obtaining from the Diet its contingent in troops and its con- tribution in money. Were a war now to break out, she would be under no necessity indeed to apply to Presburg for a contingent, and the Hungarians would without opposi- tion be enrolled, and sent forward to the frontier. Need I ask what effects would follow the first hostile shot ? — even if the troops did not pass over to the Sultan, Hungary would rise as one* man, to shake off the now^ detested yoke of Austria. S. The Diet of Presburg, which declared against Louis XIV and Napoleon, no longer existing, the first symptom of a difference with Erance would force Austria to send all her disposable force away from the Rhine, and to concentrate it •on the Danube. In such a war Hungary would no longer be the right hand of Austria, but the principal Ally of her enemy. She would be to Austria what Poland is to Russia, multiplied sevenfold. 3. Of a war with Russia I need not speak. If Russia's 80 HUNGARY. whole disposable force was r'squired to bring Hungary, even after an exhausting struggle, into submission to Vienna, how can Austria presume to stand a moment before that Ally, now backed by the Dependency which her own arms had before reduced. Had England known that it was her own hand which had stifled Poland, Hungary might have been spared. If she could nowunderstand that itwas again her hand that had stifled Hungary, Austria and Turkey may hereafter be spared. I shall make the endeavour to put her in possession of this truth, from the Blue Books. We must first, however, glance at the petty treacheries within, by which armies were led to slaushter. 81 CHAPTEE II. Events in Hungary, At the very moment of the dispersion of its Government Hungary was achieving at Pakozd its first victory. The vaunting Jellachich was absohitely beaten by a handful of men ; he signed a suspension of arms, and decamped in the night, leaving ten thousand of his rearguard prisoners. The Austrian Government, infuriated at the murder of Count Lamberg and the defeat of Pakozd, declared Jellachich, who had been so easily defeated, and so ignominiously driven out, Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, and reinforced his army with the garrison of the capital. A sanguinary Insurrection at Vienna itself was the result. The Hungarian army had pursued Jellachich to the frontier; there it halted, waiting legal authority to cross. The Diet at Vienna gave an evasive answer, and enabled Windischgratz to assemble and dispose his forces for the bom- bardment of the city. The Hungarian army arrived too late, and was placed by treachery in the power of the Austrians ; its general, Moga, said before the court martial, by which, he was afterwards tried, that the Austrian generals did not hiou) how to take complete advantage of the opportunity he had given them. Kossuth, on the field of battle (Schwechat), displaced Moga, and made over the command to Gorgey : from that hour the Russian Intervention became inevitable. It has been supposed that the treason of Gorgey was an after- thought : I have it from Hungarian officers that, at that very- moment, he spoke undisguisedly of the futility of the struggle i* • He had personal ties with the establishment of the Archduke Michael. Strange expressions are attributed to liim, wliich -vver© interpreted aa marks of genius, as those of Szechenyi were of madness. 82 HUNGAliY. yet it was the oifer to lead the troops to "Vienna that induced Kossuth to give him the command. Gorgey retreated across the frontier, followed bv Win- dischgriitz ; both armies then remained in inaction for weeks ! In consequence of Gorgey's representations of the necessity of concentration, the troops were collected from all parts, and phiced under his command. Windischgratz at last advanced. Gorgey had drawn out his forces on an extended line — they were driven in upon every point, save one (Wiesel- burg) ; he announced to the Government this action as a victory, and retreated. Pirst, he neglected to take up a position on the Lake Neusiedler, from which he could not have been dislodged ; next, he passed through Eaab, neg- lecting equally the intrenchments, which had, at great expense, been thrown up ; then avoiding the impregnable position of Comom, he made a straight course to Budp.. as if, like the flying Scythian, to draw the Austrians on. Pertzel advancing with about 13,000 men, reached Moor, when Gorgey was distant about fifteen miles, and making sure of support, engaged the advanced guard of Windischgratz — he was left to be beaten. Himself neglecting the Capital, its defences, its defenders, and the Danube, passed by Buda in hurried flight, evacuated the town, and abandoned the defence of the river and of the castle. Had he made a stand anywhere, he would have been joined by Pertzel's, and other small coi-ps then on their march; new le\4e3 were hastily being raised, and the army of 20,000 men in the south was marching to join him ; even while his army was at the lowest number it could not have been left in the rear ; had he stood still anywhere Windischgratz could not have penetrated into Hungary. Gorgey had, during his retreat, TVTitten to the Committee of Defence to say that he could not insure the safety of the capital twenty -four hours : the Diet, in consequence, retired to Debretzin. He now issued a Proclamation, in which he charged the Diet with abandoning the army, and declared EVENTS. 85 that tlie army thenceforward would act for itself. This appeal was not responded to by the soldiers. Then, leaving the plain at the mercy of the enemy, he carried his army northward among the mountains. He divided it into two corps, — one of 10,000 men, commanded by Guyon, the other of 15,000, which he headed in person. These advanced or retreated, for it is difficult to define his operations, on parallel lines. He suffered the corps of Generals Simonich, Goetz, and Jablanowzski, to enter unopposed by dif- ferent passes, and was pursued by them. On the riftht flank he was cut off from the plain country by the main army of Windischgriitz advancing from the Danube to the Theiss: in front, his passage was barred by Scblick, who, entering from the north, had taken up his position along the line of the great Gallician road, with 25,000 men, and occupied passes which it was supposed 100,000 men could not force. Gorgey had always kept suspiciously close to the Gallician frontier ; he had been deaf to every appeal from Guyon for cooperation : now no escape was left him, save by entering Gallicia and capitulating. Then it was that Guyon, at the battle of the Braniszko pass, unexpectedly opened a passage to both corps ; Gorgey allowed Schlick to carry off the remnants of his army "when they were in his hands.* Obliged through Guyon' s inconvenient victoiy to effect his junction with the main army under Dembinski, he w;as present at the battle of Kapolna, where the Hungarians were deci- sively engaged with the main army of Windischgratz ; he abandoned his post : he then called his officers together, and deposed the Commander-in-Chief. Next day the action was renewed without results ; both parties retreated. After the first day at Kapolna, Windischgriitz had written to announce too hastily the utter discomfiture of the Hungarians, and thereupon was issued the rroclamation abolishing Hungary • This action, scarcely paralleled for its fortunate audacity and its important consequences, was the theme of coarse jokes in Gorgey's teut and at liis table. 84 HUNGAEY. as an independent State. Up to tliis hour the Hungarians were acting by virtue of the royal authority. Kossuth now decided that a bold push should be made on Vienna with the main force under the command of Gorgey, strengthened by the garrison of Comorn, leaving 10,000 men to invest Buda. Gorgey sent against Vienna 10,000, and 37,000 to Buda, of which 7,000 were cavaby. After storming several times, he wrote to say he could not take it. Kossuth replied, " Since you have sacrificed Vienna to Buda, at least take Buda." Gorgey afterwards accounted for the loss of the occasion, time, and men, by Kossuth's intermeddling. He then managed to consume week after week in inaction, till the Eussians were in the centre of Hungary. This was the denouement of the Drama, and its action thereafter has little interest. Narrated of some former time, would not the tale discredit history ? Might not the existence of Kossuth and Gorgey be denied, with more show of reason than that of Python and Chimaira ? Their motives defy, their achievements sur- pass, scrutiny and possibility. An adventurer is taken out of the lower grades, to be made General of an army by a country lawyer, who has become head of a nation ; this army is the sole defence of the insargent nation ; it is before the Capital of an Empire, where its presence alone had created a E^evolution. The adventurer carries this army in flight through a difiicult and narrow border district, where in all times this kingdom had made good its stand, or at least, attempted it : as he retreats reinforcements pour in; by merely standing still he can resume the offensive, still on he goes, leaving here to the right, a position which could not be turned; there to the left, a fortress that could not be taken. He passes by the Capital with all its resources, bisected by a mighty river ; he terrifies and disperses the Government by false reports, and then denounces them as cowards; having led the enemy into the centre of the country, he carries his army to the mountains, through the passes of which other bodies are EVENTS. 85 a'bout to penetrate ; he stops no gnp, but presents himself to be chased by eaeli of them, as they successively enter; finally, he places himself in a trap betv/een the corps which have so penetrated, and those which had followed him into the plain. A native army caught by foreigners in its owii gorges ! He is extricated by a disorderly miracle. INIean- while he leaves the Government to shift for itself, in ignorance of his intentions, prospects, condition, movements, and for six weeks of his, or his army's, existence. "Forced by the victoiy of his subordinate to join the new army, under a new Commander-in-chief, he wrenches from it by disobedience a decisive vietoiy, and deposes his Chief! The authority of this adventurer depended all this while on the breath of the countiy lawyer. If such had been related of the war of Troy, who would not have set down the story as a fcible, and who would have heard of Homer as a poet ? But this is nothing. The Hungarians, martial and civilian, hold this adventurer to be their first soldier, and in all these achievements a true patriot!* This too after his treachery has been accomplished and immasked. I had not read one contemporary line respecting these events ; and it was only at Kutayah, in the midst of the chief actors, that I com- menced to inquire respecting them. From the origin Gorgcy's treason appeared : it was the- very first fact that presented itself: the plain narrative of the retreat from Vienna Avas not evidence, but demonstration. "When I stated this it was met with incredulity — no, with anger. They could not brook the thought of having been led like dumb animals to slaughter.! * I liave one exception to make in favour of General Guyon, who not only suspected him, but denounced liim as a traitor to Kossuth. t Count Szechenyi knew all from the beginning. His brother, chamberlain to the Archduchess Sophia, came to Pesth to detach him from the Insurrection when the Hungarians knew not that they were to be insurged. He was doubtless initiated under a bond of secrecy, but had resolved to abide the consequences. In the Cabinet, as in private conversation, he often broke out in a wild 86 IIUNGAUY. The successes of the Hungarians after all their defences had been broken in, and Austria's forces assembled in the champaign centre of their country, does appear incompre- hensible : but Eussia had'not made the Eevolution for Austria: her agency was at work as well in the Austrian Camp as in the Vienna Cabinet : Hungary might be filled with bravery, endowed with patriotism, adorned with genius ; she might bring forth armies by hundreds of thousands, and create tens of millions of resources, yet what did these avail? the humblest Eussian attache knew from the beginnino; what was to be done with her. After the event, a British Statesman did indeed connect the fall of Hungary with the mission of Lord Minto : had Sir James Graham only anticipated (time is everything in Diplomacy) he could have prevented the Catastrophe. Strangely has been overlooked the fact, that the Russian troops reached the centre of Ilungarij without firing a shot. Their entrance had, however, long been of public notoriety ; the Poles in the Hungarian service earnestly pressed the subject on the attention of all the Members of the Govern- ment ; Dembinski who commanded the northern army, had proposed to anticipate the danger by entering Gallicia : the Government sent to him positive instructions not to move northwards, and orders to the army to disobey him, if he did. To prevent the possibility of any obstacle being placed, by accident or insubordination, to the Eussian advance, the Hungarian army was recalled, and marched to the south- ward. No great importance will, at present, be attached to the strain, which was taken to be indications of that madness which afterwards seized hira. He would laugh when they spoke of success, sneer at their plans, speak of scaffolds as the issue, of barbarian, hordes awaiting but the signal, and yet he continued to share the danger, Tv/ice he attempted suicide. An eminent person, whom I will not name, went mad on discovering the treachery of Jellachich, as did the Austrian Minister, Count Stadion, on being made acquainted witli the purpose of inviting the Russians. EVENTS. 87 fact, because there is no one who has not decided that the struggle was desperate, and that a victory, more or less, won by the Hungarians, and a check or defeat, incurred by the Hussians, could noways alter the issue, and only swell the list of casualties ; but the fates were then balanced. Had the Russians been once beaten, the warwould have revived — Eussia taking the place of Austria, retired £i*om the ring. Whatever the chances in military operations, there was another in this duel in favour of tlie Hungarians. In various quarters, statements have appeared of the disposition of the Russian troops to desert. These coidd not be inventions, because such a notion has no existence amongst us. I believe them to have been founded, because perfectly analogous to other cir- cumstances within my knowledge. In contact with Europeans the armies of Eussia are intractable and unimpressionable as lumps of iron, or masses of clay ; but many ties unite the populations of the East of Europe ; the men composing them belong to different races, very variously affected to the Hussian Empire and to its neighbours. The fact is notorious, that the Eussian army of occupation in the Danubian Pro- vinces had rendered itself so much an object of suspicion to the Government, that when it was withdrawn, the regiments were broken up, and dispersed to remote parts of the Empire. This was in consequence of its contact with the Turkish troops, against whom its animosities may be supposed to have been most vehemently excited. Under these circum- stances, it was not improbable that a check, or a defeat suffered by the Eussians might have been followed by the desertions even of entire corj)s, and it has been stated,, that overtures to that effect had been positively made as an encouragement to the Hungarians to offer practical resistance.* At all events the withdrawal from the passes, of the Hungarian force, was a fact, which at the time, excited considerable * " During the Russian intervention, Russian officers of high rank promised both to Kossuth and to Dembinski to pass over with the forces they commanded in the event of a pitched battle being won." — Letter ly the Author of^^ The Revelations of Russia." 88 HUNGARY. attention, and was explained as being a plan to entrap tlio Enssian army. This was the view of the case presented at St. Petersburg to the representative of England, who com- municated it to his court.* At a Council held to decide upon the Intervention, it has been reported, that Paskiewitch and a majority of the members was opposed to the measure on the grounds of danger to the Empire, in the event of a reverse. Are we then to infer that the reasons for deciding on the Intervention, which, as has been stated, "the Emperor Nicholas did not think fit to communicate to the Council'* referred to Kossuth, no less than to Gorgey ? The facts I have mentioned, I first learned from Dembinski at Kutayah : he gave to them this colour, and, indeed, did not hesitate to- charge Kossuth with treason. On this I applied to Kossuth himself, laid the statement before him, and asked for an explanation. He, to my amazement, admitted the general accuracy of the facts, and, in respect to them, offered the following explanation, which not having been taken down at the time, I cannot pretend to give precisely in his words, though I believe, that the words I am about to quote were the very ones that he used : " When I applied to the English Government for its good offices in settling our differences with Austria, the answer I received was, that it could not interfere in a * domestic concern.' I was astonished at this answer, but at least»I took it as assured that England would sutler no other ])ower to intrude itself on those * domestic concerns.' As soon should T have doubted of my existence, as of England's determination never to allow Russia to enter Hungary. I * He writes on the 7th of August, 1849 :— " It is difficult to reconcile the energy and courage which have been shown by the principal Hungarian chiefs and the troops under their immediate orders, with the statements which form the introduction to this despatch, withoiit considering ^ixo, unresisted march of the Eussianar on Debretzin to be part of a preconceived plan." EVENTS, 89 therefore treated all warnings as the visions of idle brains. I did not wish, however, to furnish Russia with any pretext, and I thought also the moment fjivourable to bring our whole strength against Austria, while she was deceived into the expectation of Russian succour. I suspected nothing but the Austrian Camarilla, I now sec that there was nothing but treachery within and without." This confidence in England had, however, a still more fatal effect than that of leaving unguarded the passes of the Carpathians : it carried their attention away from the only point to which they had to look — from the only Power that could have befriended them ; and where, as proved on so many memorable occasions, tlicre was a field for the action of their own intelligence. Their very first business was to send to Constantinople ; the first care of any official, deserving the name of a man, was to select for that great, but arduous duty, the first capacity that Hungary possessed. It was not the people* of Hungary that were blind — it was the Kossuths and the Bathyanyis. No doubt, as we shall pre- sently see, the Turkish Government had been placed in diificult and embaiTassing position by the ^rior occupation of its northern provinces : but the game was difficult on both sides. Without that prior occupation there would have been no Revolutions in 1848 ; the pivot of the whole diplomatic action, was the Russian force at Bucharest. Whatwas required at Constantinople was an agent able to show to the Turkish Government the collusion of the Western Powers, Avith Russia. This is the truth, and unless known, nothing can anywhere be done. But the Government of Hungary had not mastered the diplomatic position of Europe, and conceived the matter to be a militaiy one, and the parties to be itself and Austria. After all great science was not required. Excited as was the Turkish nation — alarmed as were its leading statesmen, in- * In travelling through Hungary I haye had the money for post horses returned to me, because I was known to be a friend of the Tui-ks. 90 HUNGAKY. dignani and confident as was its armj% little urgency was required to bring it to a decision to declare war, that is to say- to effect a pacification. But the only Hungarian with capacity for action, had been sent to England, where he was engaged in an attempt, by the offer of a Commercial Treaty, to purchase England's support. They sent to Constantinople a foreigner and Englishman, Avho had given himself out as a secret agent of the Eoreign Office, and was in fact a near relative of the second officer of that department. To the incidents of this mission I will subsequently refer. When the Russians had thus been let in, the Governm^ent with Kossuth, who had now discovered his mistake, retired to Segedin, where he made a remarkable speech, his recollec- tions of which, at my request, he has thus set down : — " Now, by the Eussian invasion, our glorious struggle is raised to a higher pitch. In our battles henceforth will be fought the battle of the freedom of the world. To be the liberators or the martyrs of the world, that is our destiny. The people of Europe know it to be so. They know our cause to be their cause ; and they would help us — help them- selves in helping us, but they cannot do it, because their Governments have enchained their will, and many of them have betrayed their people to foreign domination. Do not be angry fo-r it at the nations of the world — pity them rather. It is their misfortune, not their fault. We stand alone, alone with the Almighty God, and our arms : but though by mis- chief shaken,, still we stand. I don't know if we shall come forth as victors out of the gigantic struggle, because I don't know if my people will stand at my side, like a single man, as it has stood till now. Could I but know this, I could prophecy you victory ; I would tell you, that we will shake the infernal giant, who presumes to impose his laws upon the world — we will shake him to his very foundation in his own home. But, however this may be, this one thing I know, if we be victors we shall have rescued the world — if we fall we shall have fallen martyrs to tlic world. Will you EVENTS. 91 accept ttis saint mission from God — will you fight? WiJl you vanquish if you can — die if you must — for the freedom of the world?" It being important to know that Kossuth, whatever may "be the opinions entertained of him, had formed his judgment on the causes of his country's subjugation at the time, and on his own grounds ; I insert a report of the speech from the journal of IVIr. Longworth, with which he has kindly furnished me : that journal was on the point of publication, when he received a Consular appointment, and it was con- sequently suppressed. " As far as the Austrians were concerned, and for anything they could do, the war had been terminated ; the God of battles had unequivocally declared himself for Hungary ; but against that decree they had appealed to the Russian Czar — they had invoked the aid of, the eternal enemies of human rights and human liberties. That appeal had been responded to, and the Muscovite masses and wild Cossack hordes were already there to promote peace and order, and to settle a question of constitutional right with their lances and bayo- nets ; while Hungar)% deserted by all the world, was left to fight single-handed and alone, not her own battle only, but — shame to England ! and double shame to France ! — the battles of freedom, justice, and humanity. If such be the will of Providence, be it so — let God's will be done, and as from Debretzin we went forth to reconquer the liberties of Hungary, we will march from Szegcdin to restore freedom to the world." Tliere is a wild fanaticism in the manner of this self- sacrifice, which scarcely finds a parallel, it recalls the fas- cination of the devotees of Alamout, and the frenzy of the defenders of the temple of Salem. It scarcely seems to be a historical fact, at least of our times. But the effort, gigantic as it was, was all in vain, and craft prevailed. 92 IIUNGABY. As on former occasions, the overpowered Hungarians seek refuge in Turkey. It had never before entered into the thouglits of Austria to demand their Extradition, and no alteration had taken pkice in the Treaties between the two Empires. Eussia was only Austria's friend ; no refugees had passed out of lier territory, but out of that of Austria. Never-' theless, the two Governments demand thcii* surrender, and on its refusal threaten war. The Treaties referred to freebooters and malefactors, and contained different stipulations : the Austrian Surrender or Internment, the Eussian Surrender, or Expulsion. The English Government promised to Turkey support on the condition of her complying wdth its advice, which was Uxjmlsion. In terms it denied the right claimed by Eussia ; iji fact it admitted it, and it applied the alternative of the Eussian Treaties to the Austrian case. The entrance of the squadron into the Dardanelles occurred after Eussia had yielded, but had it happened at an earlier period, it could not have altered the despatches. England exercised no influence for the liberation of the refugees until the middle of April, 1851. That is to say, not until Kossuth had entered into com- munications with Mazzini, whose agent (Mr. Lemmi) was his private secretary when he left Kutayah. Liberated at the close of 1850, he would have proclaimed to Europe, "That Eussia had in every Cabinet a spy, if not an agent:'' liberated in June, 1851, he was fit to write the Marseilles Letter, and unconsciously to play his part in the co?ip (Tttat of the 2d of December. At the first period his *' war " would have been a real one, against the real foe, one of words, levelled at St. Petersburgh, not of rockets at Yienna. I cannot dismiss this extraordinary man, in whom alone have been evolved the convulsions of Hungary, without acknowledging the service that he has rendered in one respect, and which to render required no small amount of fidelity and courage : he uttered in the ears of the people of England the EVENTS. 93 words, "Secret Diplomacy :" the last sounds upon his lips, as his political existence passed into Buddhistic Nirvana, and as the green glades of the New Forest were fading on his view, were : — *' Gentlemen, read tlie Blue Bools.'^ I adopt the instruction, I open these Blue Books, to the contents and peiwersions of which my attention was first called by a letter of his from Kutayah : from them I give the *' diplomatic," that is to say, the real history of the transaction, a Comedy in incident — a Tragedy in result ; uniting to the action of an epic, the extravagance of a romance. u CIIAPTEE in. Diplomatic Review. The internal changes wliicli occurred in Hungaiy in the early part of 1848 must not be classed with the Revolutions of that year throughout the rest of Europe. That country was, indeed, vehemently agitated at the time by discussions, originating in an attempt of the Austrian Government to change the provincial administration and to prevent the Diet from taking measures for the emancipation of the serfs. The events of Paris had the effect of enabling them to carry in- stantaneously in the Diet these long matured purposes, which were wholly of a constitutional kind. It is true that, in the excitement of the moment, other speculative propositions were introduced, which, had they come into operation, would no doubt have in time changed the character of Hungaiy, and destroyed that resistance to the encroachments of the Government of Vienna which it had so long presented : but like the Constitution of Spain in 1812, these remained a dead letter, and were, in fact, ignored on both sides. There was, therefore, no Eevolution in Hungary. But this was not all. The Hungaiians have no sympathy with the Germans in general, far less with those of Vienna. Neither had they any sympathies with the revolutionary move- ments of the West. The liberal Constitution which the Viennese Insurrection produced, was to them an object of not less distaste or aversion, than the avowed despotism or the masked intrigues of that Cabinet. This disposition was evinced in their refusal to take any part therein ; and, in fact, it was to Kossuth at the critical moment that the Emperor owed the preservation of his crown, and perhaps of his life. So far from the existence of any real animosity towards the legi- timate authority of the Empire, the Hungarian Government ENGLISH MEDIATION. 95 recognised the importance of sustaining its military povvcr, and even in tlie dubious exercise of that power in Lombardy, the Diet did not refuse its contingent of men, although it appended conditions which rendered it unavailable, but con- ditions which its honour and security required. In fact, all alarms regarding Hungary had subsequently to the month of April ceased in Europe, and the collision with the Austj-ians arose out of no internal measures whatever It was simply an international transaction, originating in an attack on a body of Hungarians by a force under the com- mand of a chief at that very moment publicly proclaimed as a rebel by the Emperor, although immediately afterward appointed his Eepresentative. I subjoin in a note some extracts from the Blue Books,* which will show that in what I have said of the relations between Austria and Hungary, I but re-echo the opinion of the English Am- * " The Hungarian revolution is now complete." — Mr. BlacJcwell ' 18th March, 1848. " Count Louis Batthyanyi has been here during some days, and the Ministry formed by him seems to give satisfaction in Hungary, and will be agreed to by this Government. It appears to me that there are reasons which might influence the patriots who take tho lead in the Hungarian Diet, to content themselves with what tliey have obtained." — Lord Fomonhy, March 18th. "The great object of di'cad to the Huugarians is the Kussian Power ; and it may perhaps appear that the measm-es pursued by the Hungarians, tending as they do to a breach with the Austrians, will prove to be primary means for bringing that Power into Hungary which is the most di-eaded by the Hungarian leaders." — Lord IPonsonhify 3d May. " I had the opportunity tliis evening of ascertaining from Prince Paul Esterhazy and from Count Batthyanyi, and the Cliief Minister of Hungary, that the Hungarian G-overnment had not made any such demand, but, on the contrary, the Hungarian Ministry were ready to furnish the Emperor with 100,000 men, if needed ; that they had said to his Imperial Majesty, they only W9.nted to keep in their coimtry some 15,000 to 20,000 men, to maintain order amongst a population amounting to 14,000,000 or 15,000,000. It is impossible 4o doubt the word of the above-mentioned personages, and giving credit to them, it follows that verj much, aiid indeed most of what 96 HUNGAEY. bassador at Vienna, and, as may therefore be inferred, of the British Government. That opinion was that the " Eevolu- tion " had not disturbed the connection of Austria and Hungary, and that any danger arising from it was connected with Ptussia. In a former chapter I have stated that the existing relations betv/een Austria and Hungary had been, for the last time, settled by a Treaty concluded under the mediation of England in 1711. The two nations were at war. Hungary applied to England for her good offices ; these she readily yielded, on the ground of the necessity of supporting Austria, then her Ally against France. Much stronger grounds than those upon which England based her interference in Sicily were here presented, and much graver circumstances than those which had induced her interference in 1711 : equally greater were the facilities whicli she possessed. Then she had to seek Austria's aid ; now Austria feared her : at the former period her in- ducement was the curbing of the Octogenarian ambition of, Louis XIV : now it was the closing of the centre of Europe against Eussia. She had the absolute command of the whole question, of Austria by her power, of Hungaiy by her influence; the unexpected and truly wonderful efforts made by Hungary, and the hopelessness of its subjugation by all the power of Austria, combined to furnish everj'- inducement to the British Cabinet to act with vigour, which it is possible for necessity to impose, or advantages to invite. It was under these circumstances that at the close of 1848, an agent of the Hungarian Government arrived in London, and addressed to the Foreign Office a request to be allowed to communicate with it on the then state of affairs. Before quoting the reply which he received, I must mention that that Office had shown no hesitation to enter into communication had appeared alarming in the situation of Hungary has disappeared.'* — Lord Ponsonb?/, 3d May. " The Count (Batthyanyi) appeared to think it very necessary to keep up the mihtary power of the Austrian Empire." — Lord Fonsonb^/f 5th of May. ENGLISH MEDIATION. 97 with the insurgents of any country ; that it had furnished arms to the Sicilitlns ; that it had saluted there the Re- volutionary flag ; and tliat the foreign Minister himself had requested letters of introduction from IMazzini to the diflerent clubs of Italy for the son of Lord Eddisbury, the Under Secretary of State. I have also to remark that the Hungarians were at the period in question, whatever their former relations with the Court of Vienna, now in possession on unquestionable grounds of belligerent rights. The reply was the following : — *' Lord Eddisbury to * "-^ * ''lore'ujn Office, Lecemher 12, 1848. "Sir, — In reply to yoiu* letter of the 15th instant, I am directed by Viscount Pabnerston to say that Her Majesty's Government can take no cognizance of those internal guestions between Hungary and the Austrian dominions to which your letters refer ; but that the British Government has no diplo- matic relations with Hungary except as a component part of the Austrian Empire, and can receive communications respect- ing Hungary o^ily throiigli the diplomatic organ of the Emperor of Austria at this Court, " I am, &c., " Eduisbl'hy." It had already been suggested by the Ambassador at Vienna, and was of public notoriety, that Austria unable herself to reduce the Hungarians, would call in the armies of Eussia, already advanced to the frontier, and stationed in the neighbouring Turkish provinces. This reply must therefore be considered as written with that result in view — a result which the interposition of England could have alone averted. Its effect on the Hungarians must be self-evident, but it is used equally for the Austrians. It is sent to Vienna enclosed in the follov/ing despatch : — 4 9S HUNGAEY. ''Foreirjii Office, December 20, 1848. " My Lord, — I liercwitli transmit to your Excellency, for your information, a copy of a letter which I have caused to be addressed to a person representing himself as charged with communications from Hungary. " T am, &c., " Palmerston." This is the only ostentible communication* made to Vienna during the whole course of these pi'oceedings, that is to say, from February, 1848, down to August, 1849; when therefore the Intervention takes place, the formal com- munication of \A4iich reaches London on May 11th, 1849,f we are quite prepared* to find that the British Minister has nothing to say, though perhaps not so for his announcing directly to the Government of St. Petersburgh that fact. He writes as follows on the 17th of May. ''Foreign Office, May 17, 1849. " Much as Her Majesty's Government regret this Inter- ference of llussia, the causes which have led to it, and the effects which it may produce, they nevertheless have not con- sidered the occasion to be one which at present calls for any formal expression of the opinions of Great Britain on the matter." \ * There is another about the Diet which has no diplomatic bearing. f It is announced the same day to Parliament in the following terms : — " Her Majesty's Grovernment had this day received infor- mation from the Chargee d' Affau-es at Tienna, that an apphcation for military assistance in a war between Atistria and Hungary, was sent by Austria to tlie Russian Grovernment, and the application had been attended, to, and was going to be complied with ; and, although no Russian troops had as yet entered, a Russian force was expected. Her Majesty's Government had taken no steps to offer their media- tion between Austria and Hungary, and the Austrian Grovernment liad no desire for such mediation." — Lord Falrnerston, May 11th, 1849. ENGLISH MEDIATION, The Bussian Intervention so prepared for, and so accepted, by the English Minister, appears, however, to have been treated by him in his communications with certain of the Hepresentatives abroad as by no means likely, and as indeed impossible^ in consequence of the communications he had received from the Kussian Ambassador. In the Despatches to and from St. Petersburgh there is not a line upon this matter ; in those from Vienna, it is repeatedly mentioned. Lord Ponsonby more than once announcing his conviction, but not a word is addressed to him by the Foreign Minister. With Constantinople it is different : in the cor- i^spondence as published there is indeed nothing ; but an incidental reference in the Despatches of Lord Ponsonby makes us aware of the fact. He quotes (Nov. 7, 1848) a passage' from a suppressed Despatch of Lord Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canniii», on which he proceeds to make com- Fients, showing that he considered it levelled against him jno less than against Sir Stratford Canning. The passage 5s as follows : — '^ Tliej'e are some who imagine that the aav'.'^'"^^^ ^^ that force in those'' (the Danubian) "provinces is not wlioui/ nnconneded with the events which have been passitig in Hungary ; and that the Emiperor has contemplated the pos- sibilHy of his being asked by the Austrian Government to .assist m restoring order in Pesth." We are left in the dark as to the remarkable passage which must have followed this quotation, but it does not require a very active imagination to fill up the void. Sir S. Canning has to be reconciled to the Occupation of Wallachia, and to be relieved from apprehensions as to the Invasion of Hungary. I therefore supply the omission with as much confidence as if I had before me the archives of the Foreign Oflice. I have more tlftm once set down beforehand wl)at that minister would say : I may venture after tlic event on wliat be has said ; — 100 HUNGAEY. "Your Excellency is, however, far too judicious not to have observed that these troops, having entered without orders from the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, the operation can scarcely have been combined with any ulterior views ; that as the corps is not large, its entrance has been sanctioned (as stated in a communication I have received from Count Nesselrode), by the Porte ; that having for its object the maintenance or re-estabKshment of order, and being limited to the perform- ance of that service, Her Majesty's Government do not feel themselves called upon to make any representation on the subject. Russia, moreover, has certain relations witli those Principalities as a protecting Power, by virtue of Treaties, and therefore it is not entirely a case of the entrance of the troops of one Government into the territory of another." Every word here is Lord Palmerston's own.* This i& the only possible explanation of his conduct. Vvhy, then, is it suppressed ? Explanation ! Who inquires into any- thing ? The British nation does not ; the world does not. All the Minister has to care for is an intemperate Despatch of one Ambassador (Sir Stratford Canning), and a captious question of one member of the House of Commons (Lord Dudley Stuart). When by a phrase he has secured the reluctant services of the one and the agitated friendship of the other, his difficulties are overcome. The Tyrian. Hercules was represented with a closed fist and an open palm : this was the impersonation of art, a type reproduced wherever the science has prevailed ; above all, in the Blue Books of the Foreign Office. The reader may be curious to know why Lord Ponsonby made the quotation, and what he said thereupon. He said this : — "/ have little doubt that the Emperor of Eussia * Questioned on the 2d March, 1849, in tlu House, respecting the entrance of the Russians into Transylvania, he s\js, they went for the protection of the " frontier towns," " but they did not, I think, take any other part in the hostilities going on." ENGLISH MEDIATION. 101 would give the most efficient aid to the Emperor of Austria in Hungary." But he says something more, and hesitates not to tell his chief that, in case of need, the same aid will be aftbrded for Italy ! To judge by the Blue Books, the .English Government must have treated the Hungarian war as a matter altogether subordinate and insignificant ; not only as of no importance, but as a thing that positively had no existence ; for how otherwise explain the total inaction, and next to total silence, of a Government not remarkable for its indifference, and of a Miidster not characterised by either imbecility or diffidence, and who at the very time was exerting himself with ceaseless, unscrupulous, and inexplicable activity on every other field, to raise embarrassments to Austria and to furnish facilities to Eussia ? Now listen to Lord Palnierston in the House of Commons, on the 21st of July : — " I firmly believe that in this war hehceen Austria and Hungary there is enlisted on the side of Hungary tlie hearts and souls of the whole people of that country. I believe that the other races distinct from the Magyars have forgotten the former feuds that existed between them and the Magyar population, and that the greater portion of the people have engaged in what they consider a great national contest. " I take the question that is now to he fought for on the plains of Hungaiy to be this , whether Hungaiy shall con- tinue to maintain its separate Nationality as a distinct Jcingdom, and with a Constitution of its own, or whether it is to be incorporated more or less in the aggregate Constitution that is to be given to the Austrian Empire. It is a most painful sight to see such forces as are now arrayed against Hungary, proceeding to a war fraught with such tremendous conse- quences on a question that it might have been hoped would haze been settled peacefully. It is of the utmost importance to Europe 'that Austria should remain gi'cat and powerful ; but it is impossible to disguise from ourselves that if the war is to be fought out, Austria must, &c 102 HUNGAEY. " If, on tlie other hand, the war beinj^ fought out to the uttermost, Hungary should by superior forces" (what forces ?) *' be entirely crushed, Austria in that battle will have crushed her own right arm. Every field that is laid waste is an Austrian resource destroyed ; every man that perishes upon the field among the Himgarian ranks is an Austrian soldier deducted from the defensive forces of the Empire. " It is, I say, devoutly to he wisJied that this great contest may be brought to a termination by some amicable arrange- ment between the contending parties which shall on the one .hand satisfy the national feelings of the Hungarians, and on the other hand not leave to Austria another and a larger Poland within her Empire.'* Why was not this written in a Despatch in the previous December, when the communications of Hungary were re- jected with scorn, and transmitted to Vienna ? Why not in November when Lord Ponsouby had exposed the absurdity of Lord Palmerston's assumption that the Eussians would not interfere ? Why not in the previous month or months — why not at the origin of the difference ? Why then was it said in Parliament in July — after, too, Eussia had been told in May that the English Minister had nothing to say. This speech, delivered amidst peals of applause by the sup- poirters of the Government, filled with admiration their opponents. The unwonted earnestness of its tone, the deep bearing of its judgments, and the balanced arrangement and order of its exposition, made them see in the Minister by whom it was delivered a Statesman of v/hom England " was proud." Who now on reading it could believe that when it was uttered, the Eussian armies were in the centre of Hungary, and that the cheering audience knew the fact ! It concludes in these terms : — " In i\\Q p7'esent state oi the matter. Her Majesty's Govern- ment have not thought that any opportunity has as yet presented itself .that could enable them, with any prospect of ENGLISH MEDIATION. 1 advantage, to make any official communication of those opinions which they entertain on this subject." In the present state of the matter ! Could it become better ? Not a word tiU Eussia has interfered: he waits to speak until he has an audience cowed. The Russia that never rises to his lips, is all that is in their thoughts, and their honour and courage are redeemed by the considerate ** as TCET." Supposing the Government up to the 21st of July had perceived nothing, and that only on the 31st of July, it had been startled at the awful consequences, — what was there to prevent its interposing then? " Oh," says Lord Palmerston, "Austria is indisposed to admit our Mediation." Were Austria's feelings consulted when the Italian Despatch ot the 11th of September, 1847, was written, or her indigna- tion regarded when it w^is published, without the reply? The question was now with Russia, not Austria: then it was a " domestic aifair" — a Foreign Power interposes, and then the Austrian question is discussed ! Of course, Austria is indisposed to an English Mediation ; she has not forgotten Switzerland, Lombardy and Sicily; but that indisposition springing from fear, afforded the assurance of success. But having been informed that in tins case England will not meddle, she of course presses on, and in all haste. The checking of a commercial account is an easy matter ; not so diplomatic entries, even if given complete, and in extenso ; how much more so when the real business is done by ' private communications," and even the ostensible docu- ments are only inserted in extract ? StiU we must endeavour to make out the balance sheet. By the Hungarian war, by the condition of Italy and Germany, by the fears entertained on the side of Poland, and by the excitement prevailing throughout the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Austria were both neutralised. England's control over both was entiic; without drawing a weapon 104 IIUNGAEY. she could have broken them to pieces. Independently of these adventitious circumstances, the Foreign Minister was a man equal to carry into effect against the opposition of Hussia, any legitimate object of British policy, and that minister had declared that the driving matters to extremity in Hungary, even as between it and Austria, was a matter the most alarming to British interests, and to those of all Europe. These points understood, the value of the " as yet" will be seen: the "as yet" was for Eussia and not for England. This is not the first time that such an entry was made. When Austria and France applied to the same Minister for his co-operation in preventing the fall of Poland, his answer was " not yet."* The " yet" came with order restored at Warsaw. Now it comes with order at FestJi, On the 1st of August England proposed to mediate. Had Austria's indisposition been removed ? Was it the triumph of the Hungarians, or of the Russians, that had brought the change. The Despatch opens historically : — * The Despatch in question was published by M. Louis Blanc, in his Histoire de Dix Ans. It has been several times read in the House of Commons, without its autlienticity being questioned by Lord Palmerston. Tlie following is an extract : — " That the amica- ble and satisfactory relations between the Cabinet of St. James's, and the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, would not allow his Britannic Majesty to undertake such an interference. The time was not^ yet oome to undertake such a plan with success against the wiU of a sovereign whose rights were indisjputahle.^^ M. Louis Blanc thus mentions the transaction: " M. Walewski was despatched to sound the disposition of the Cabinet of the Tuileries and that of St. James's : the Palais Royal did not reject the overtures of Austria, but simply declared that it was ready to join England, if England would consent to the project. M. Walewski then proceeded to London ; but the answer of the British Cabinet was ' widely different from that of the French.' Lord Palmerston avowed * without reserve' that France and ' oio other Toiver^ was the ohject of the ^distrust ami fear of England.^ ^^ This passage I have also read in the House of Commona without ft negation. ENGLISH MEDIATION. 105 ** This war, which in its outset seemed to be a conflict between a discontented portion of the population of Hungary, and the Executive Government of Fie?ina, has gradually assumed the character and proportions of an important European iramaction.'* After enumerating the forces on. both sides, Russia is slipped in in the following fashion : — "And in aid of this Austrian force, the whole disposable force of the Russian Empire has been hrougUt up to take part in the war." What can mean writing as follows from London to Vienna P "To such an extent indeed has the Russian army been employed in this transaction, that it has been found necessary that between 20,000 and 30,000 of the Russian guards, who form the usual garrison of St. Petersburgh, should be marched to the south, to take up positions evacuated by other divisions which have been sent to take the field in Hungary; and the combined Austrian and Russian forces operating in Hungaiy are said to amount to 300,000 men." If Russia makes this effort, analogous ends are in view ; but this the reader must not suspect, so he is' immediately informed that Russia is " operating for interests icJiich cart only be indirectly and constructively its own." The sub- jugation of Hungary, he says, involves two questions : " Eirst, How far the triumph will turn to the real and permanent advantage of Austria." He touchingly replies to himself, " The discontent of the heart will not be extinguished because tlie hand has been disarmed," and assures the Austrian Cabinet that Hungary will become " a political can- cer, corroding the vital elements of the Empire's existence." The second question is, " What will be the compensation to be made for the gigantic exertions by which she will have been enabled to achieve that triumph?" He is here not quite so explicit, and reverts to a ftuniliar formula : " That lOQ HUNGAUT. the English Government is eniltled to inquire^ whether any arrangements are in contemplation at variance with the let- ter, or the spirit, of the Treaty of Vienna." What ! when the interests of Russia have only just been stated as "indirect and constructive." As there was no one who did not see that the Emperor of Eussia now commanded at Vienna, so was there no one who had imagined, that a new delimitation of frontiers was required. The Despatch was written not to save the people of Hungary, but to satisfy those of England ; not to influence the Cabinet of Vienna, but to stultify that of St. James's; not to put in the hands of Prince Schwartzenberg, but in those of the printer of the House of Commons. It continues : " Her Majesty's Government would most Jieartily rejoice^ if they could entertain a hope, that this conflict between an entire nation," (discontented portion ?) " and the armies of two great Mnpires might be brought to an early termination by an arrangement," 7/' they could entertain ! They do entertain. " It appears to her Majesty's Government, that matters have NOT yet gone so far as to render such an arrangement impossible." " Not yet" again — with the Russians in the centre of the country — after the abolition of Hungary as an independent State — after their dethronement of the King ! You have no remonstrance, or protest, to show at Vienna, you answer the Hungarians, that you know Hungary only through Baron KoUer, you send that answer to Vienna, — consequently the wonderful hope is soon turned to joy by the " happy and early return to good order and peace." * See Despatch, callmg Eussia to accoiiiit for her proceedings in Central Asia, October 26th, 1838. ENGLISH MEDIATION. 107 Tins Despatch pretends to no other character than that of " reflections" on " One of the most important events that Europe has of late years experienced. '* It surely does not require to be a j\Iinister of State to make reflections on im- portant events: if nothing but reflections arc to be expected from 'Ministers of State, the expense is very superfluous, and the secresy very absurd. These reflections might just as well appear in a leader, when they might be read by the Govern- ment to which they are addressed, and if without profit, at least without off'ence. Then follows the specification of '' the best means of carrying into eflect i\\Q purposes of her Majesty's Government," which is by "reading this Despatch to Prince Schwartzenberg, and giving him a copy of it." A second Despatch, of the same date, directs the Ambas- sador to state, that he will feel great pleasure in attending, without the least delay, to any intimation which he may receive of the wishes of the Austrian Government to enter • into negotiation with the Hungarians. Good God ! Tvhere is Baron KoUer? It is just, however, possible, that when the proposal of Mediation was sent, the Minister might not have been certain that the case was desperate. Let us see. On the 3d of July, a long Despatch was Avritten at the English Embassy, at Vienna, of which the following is the first paragraph : — " The operations of the Austrian and Russian armies in Hungary are pushed on with vigour, and have been attended with such success, since I last had the honour to address your lordship on this subject, that a not distant end of the civil war may he confidently looked to.''* This was received seven days before the Speech in the House, and eighteen days before the Off^er of Mediation. On the 14th of July, a mass of intelligence is again despatched, the first paragi-aph of which announces the occupa- tion without resistance of the Capital of Hungaiy. This was 108 HUNGAPtY. received on the day the Speech in tlie House of Commons was delivered, and eleven days before the Offer of Mediation. On the 17 th of July it is announced that Marshal Pas- kiewitch is advancing on the left bank of the Danube, towards Comorn, to cut off the retreat of the Hungarians — that General Grabbe has passed the mountains from the nai-th — that the Eussian corps in Transylvania have repulsed General Bern, and taken twelve pieces of cannon, and that there are "no accounts of any large Hungarian forces in the field except the two mentioned." This is received seven days before the Offer of J\Iediation. On the 21st of July, Lord Ponsonby writes, " the Hunga- rian army from Comorn is under the command of Gorgey, and is said to be about 50,000 strong, with 120 pieces of cannon. Being foiled in their attempt to pass by Waitzen, and from thence by Pesth to Czegled they retreated under cover of the night towards the north, and the third corps of the Eussian army under General Elidiger is now in pursuit of them," and further reports, " that the capital of Transylvania had been occupied by the Pvussian corpse of General Liiders." This arrives tbree days before the Offer of Mediation. On the 22d of July, Lord Ponsonby writes, " the Hun- garian army under Gorgey was by the last accounts retreating along the road which leads from Waitzen to Balassa-Gyarmath and Losoncz, at which latter place it was supposed they would arrive on the 19th instant. They are closely pursued and continually harassed by the Eussian corps of General Eiidiger, and.the official reports state that the men were deserting ' in thousands.' " The second edition of the Gazette of this morning says that the Hungarians imder Bem in Transylvania had met with another defeat from the corps of General Liiders ; and that the Austrian corps of Count Clam-Gallas was marching upon Cronstadt to occupy the district which had been reduced." Now, not a moment is to be lost, and in two days after the receipt of this communication, an elaborate despatch is on its way to Vienna with the Offer of Mediation. ENGLISH MEDIATION. 109 It is curious that the day before a messenger should arrive from St. Peiersburg:h without, at so critical a moment, bringing a single line worthy of insertion in the Blue Book. However, by whoever devised, the plan was inimitable. Under such circumstances a Mediation was a bold and even original conception, but the result entirely depended on the apropos; the moment was to be hit between the im- possibility of its having effect, and the possibility of pro- posing it. That moment was calculated with an astronomical precision that would have done honour to aHalleyor allerschel: a day before, it might have been attended to ; a day after it could not have been sent. Nor is this all ; it is so managed that it is sent and never arrives ; and is published in London, without having been received at Vienna ! It so happened, that exactly the day before it reached Yienna, Prince Schwartzenberg had started for Warsaw. Of course it coidd not be communicated to any other member of the Austrian Government ; Lord Ponsonby has, therefore, to express in reply his regrets that he has had no oppor- tunity " of canying out your Lordship's instnictions :" however, " his Highness will probably not return before the end of the week." Before that week ended, Hungary was finally blown up, and, of course, there was no further any need to carry out his Lordship's instructions : the Mediation born in a " Not yet," expired in a " No longer." On the 23d day of the self-same month that had witnessed the Rise and Occultation of this Lunar phenomenon from the Bedford Hotel at Brighton, — "Baron Bmnow presents his compliments to Viscount Palmcrston, and has the honour to communicate, &c., in the persuasion that he will learn with satisfaction an event whicli puts an end to the shedding of human blood, S:c." What had Baron Brunow to do with communicating on a subject on which his Government had been three months before informed that England had nothing to say : how 110 HUiN-GAEY. should he usurp the post of Baron KoUer, from whom alone communieationb could be received respecting the *' component parts" of the "Austrian dominions," or assume that his information at Brighton was so far in advance of that of the British Minister in Downing-street ? But mark how accident helps Eussia, — the foreign Minister positively was without intelligence : — " Lord Palmerston presents his compliments to Baron Brunow, and must rejoice in Ua^ming, &c." The same enthusiastic and hopeful temperament induces Lord Palmerston to congratulate on the same Event the Austrian Government which had not condesciendcd to an- nounce it. Psychologically, the incident is curious, and the Despatch deserves the honour of insertion in extenso. " Viscount FalmeYstGn to Viscount Fonsonby. ''Foreign Office, August 28, 1849. " My Lord, — I have to instruct your Excellency to express to the Austrian Government the satisfaction which Her Majesty's Government haVe felt at hearing that the calamitous •war which for the last two months has desolated Hungary, has been brought to a close hy a pacification which Her Majesty's Government hope will prove in its results beneficial to all parties concerned. The eyes of all Europe will of course now be directed to the proceedings of the Austrian Government in a matter which has excited so deep and general an interest ; and Her Majesty's Government would fail in the performance of their duty, if they were not to instruct you to express the anxious hope which they feel in common with the people of this country, that the Austrian Government will make a generous use of the successes which it has obtained, and that in the arrangements which may be made between the Emperor of Austria and the Hungarian nation, due regard will be had to the ancient Constitutional rights of Hungary. A settlement founded on such a basis. ENGUSII MEDIATIOIS^ 111 with such improvements as the altered circumstances of the present times may require, will be the best security, not only for the welfare and contentment of Hungary, but for the future strength and prosperity of the Austrian Empire. Your Excellency will read this Despatch to Prince -Schwartzenberg, and will give him a copy of it. " I am, &c. " (Signed) Palmesston.'* Her Majesty's Government's hopes, endeavours, and advice, are, however, always exposed to misadventure ; Prince Schwartzenberg makes the most unbecoming return, and sends a ferocious reply, which concludes in these terms : — "The world is agitated by a spirit of general subversion. England herself is not exempt from the influence of this spirit ; witness Canada, the Island of Cefalonia, and finally, unhappy Ireland. But wherever revolt breaks out within the vast limits of the British Empire, the English Government always knows how to maintain the authority of the law, were it even at the price of ton-ents of blood. " It is not for us to blame her. Whatever may, moreover, be the opinion which we fonii as to the causes of these insur- rectionary movements, as well as of the measures of repression employed by the British Government in order to stifle them, we consider it our duty to abstain from expressing that opinion, persuaded as we are that persons are apt to fall into gross errors, in making themselves judges of the often so complicated position of foreign countries. " By this conduct we consider we have acquired the right to expect that Lord Palmerston will practise with respect to us a perfect reciprocity, " You will read this Despatch to his Lordship, and you will give him a copy of the same." Such are the contents of the first Blue Book. I have, however, oftiitted two important particulars : first, that the addresses from the.cities of England in favour of Hungary arc 112 HUNGAHY. communicated regularly to Vienna, Constantinople, and St. Petersburg}! ; second, that the Kussian Government has been informed that it is the opinion of Lord Palmerston, that " it is highly desirable that the troops of each country should be kept within their own frontiers." Although, as proof, nothing more is required or need be added, I cannot conclude this part of the subject without recurring to some of the points where prevailing misjudgments facilitated deception. If we turn to the negotiations of 1793, which preceded the Coalition against Prance, it will be seen that England attached peculiar importance to the signature of the Emperor of Austria being appended as " King of -Hungary;" — England was then under a Tory administration, — not Tory only in the English sense, but Anti-Eevolutionaiy in the European one. It is, therefore, neither in the archives of the Poreign Office, nor in the practice of English Diplomacy, that it was found that Plungary was a "component part" of the "Austrian do- minions," — as the already cited transactions of 1711 show that it was neither unseemly nor impossible to hold commu- nication with a Nation in arras against its Sovereign. In 1711, we wished to strengthen Austria as an Ally ; in 1848, we apprehend (as it is professed) the subversion of her inde- pendence, and we adopt the opposite course. We reject the application of the one, and adopt as the rule of our conduci the unwillingness of the other. Avowed desires remain barren, important interests are superseded, acknowledged dangers incurred, through ceremonious reserve. A reserve, however, unknown in the meridians of Italy and Denmark, where the forms of office and the courtesies of life are forgotten. "Was it that subversive doctrines had not as yet taken root in Hungary? Was it that Italy was to be convulsed that Hungary might be put down ? This scrupulousness might still be intelligible, if the Hun- garian agent had been commissioned by persons merely disaffected, or engaged simply in plots, but Hungary enjoyed ENGLISH. MEDIATION. 113 a de facto existence, her flag had been inaugurated by vic- tories ; that flag was neither "fanciful" nor " piratical," like that of the German Empire on the coast of Denmark ; she possessed belligerent Rights and was at war, and is told that she can be communicated with only through the Hepresenta- tive of the Power with whom that war is being carried on ! If this reply was intended to repress inordinate hopes on the part of the Hungarians, the matter of it might be under- stood, however reprehensible the manner, but then it would have been carefully concealed from Austria, that her preten- sions might not be inflamed. Yet a communication so evidently designed to prevent a settlement passes with suc- cess as proof that the opposite result had been desired and sought. The salient features are: vehemence in the House of Commons, silence at St. Petersburgh ; contradiction between Minister and Ambassador ; the adoption of opposite sides m reference to a war by the British embassies, that of Vienna rejoicing in every deieat of the one party, that of Constanti- nople exulting in every check of the other, and all combining, in one result : whoever recoils from the admission of system, must fall back on incoherence \ but in such a case, to what must incoherence lead ? The residt, however, of the war wholly hinged upon a point excluded from view, or fallaciously disguised under the terms "Turkish Neutrality." He, whoever he was, who reduced the Ottoman Empire to that predicament, and not Prince Paskie witch, placed Plungaiy at the " feet of the Czar," lU CHAPTEE IV. Tur/dsk Neutrality. Foe all military purposes Turkey was a party in the war ; she did not send forward Armies, but she lent her territoiy for the Eussian operations, along a frontier of several hundred miles ; opening passages through the mountains of the North and East into Transylvania, which otherwise would have been inaccessible, and giving entrance from the South through the gorge of the Danube into the plains of Lower Hungary. The resources of these Provinces — money, provisions, and means of transport, were also usurped by Eussia, and rendered sub- servient to the war. The Austrians when beaten found refuge there, and supplies, and thence they again issue to attack Hungary. The Eussian armies did not indeed enter Serbia, but there also were organised bodies of Invasion, not perhaps dangerous in the field, but calculated to excite intestine feuds by their relationship to the populations of the Banat. The enlistment took place under the auspices of the Eussian Consul, and the money was paid at " the Consulate." These effects were not limited to the period when Eussia became a party in the war, but were in operation from its very com- mencement, and the Eussian troops themselves had been engaged in Transylvania three months before the avowed Intervention took place. Had Turkey remained neutral, the Hungarians would have been secure on the whole of their Southern and Eastern frontiers, and could have brought up their entire disposable force to the North ; so that the results in a military point of view, may be said to have been deter- mined by the participation of Turkey in the war. This participation was, however, not voluntary. Her readiness, after the fall of Hungary, to meet the combined TURKISH NEUTEALITY. 115 forces of Russia and Austria to save a few of the exiles from an ignominious fate, dispenses me from the necessity of proving that the Turkish nation was ready to incur the risks, and undergo the sacrifices of a war to save Hungary, and the desistance of those two Empires from pressing their demand after, as I shall presently show, they had received the con- curi'ence of England and France, equally relieves me from the necessity of proving, that its military resources were equal to such an enterprise. Turkey had at the time 212,000 disciplined men, and could have raised, without difficulty, 100,000 iiTCgidair horse, the whole of which she could have sent forward without any inconvenience or risk. She could have supplied the Hungarians with arms, of which they were principally in need, and the presence of a single Turkish regi- ment woidd have changed the whole face of the contest in Hungary. If then the participation of Turkey in the war on the side of Russia influenced the result, the assurance of her non- participation on the side of Hungary was requisite for its inception. It was a wonderful plan to combine, and it was settled in anticipation. It entirely depended upon the introduction of a Russian force into the Turkish Provinces of the Danube, which was executed when the Hungarian war was as yet undreamt of, save by visionaries, and when no difference existed between Russia and the Porte. It was, therefore, a direct attack upon the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and a violation of the Treaty of 1840, to which England, but not Ei-ance, was a party. It could only, there- fore, be carried by the concurrence of England ; the evidence of that concurrence is to be found, not only in the absence of all opposition but in the effectual support given at Con- stantinople, and the declarations mad^ in the House of Com- mons, where the English Minister stated falsely, that it was a measure undertaken with the consent and concurrence of the Turkish Government.* This Occupation was then sanctioned -•■ See Speeches, 1st Sept. 184S ; 2d March, 181.9 ; 22d March, 1849 116 HUNGARY. by a Treaty, against which tlie Turkish Government, in vain, sought the support of the English Ambassador, and by that Treaty it was to continue to the year 1856. Henceforward the *' Neutrality" of Turkey was practicable only by the cessation of the Occupation by Eussia, against which such precautions had been taken. That " Neutrality" could be observed only by saying to Eussia, " you shall not entet; " it could not be maintained by saying, *' you shall not go out." Had the Eussian troops been on the Pruth, the Turkish troops would have been at Pesth ; but the Eussian troops, being on the Danube, it was the Cossacks who arrived at Pesth. And it is England who has compromised the Porte into this false position, who urges upon it the maintenance of its "Neutrality." Eeduced to this dilemma, the " Neutrality" of Turkey had merely reference to the departure of the Eussian troops from Wallachia, where alone their presence had been endured on the score of their being required to maintain internal tran- quillity ; at least, it was not by urging at Constantinople the maintenance of Turkish " Neutrality" no more than by writing to St. Petersburgh, that it had nothing to say respecting the " neut?rdUy" of Russia, that is, the Invasion of Hungary, that any results could be obtained in the sense of the principles expounded to Parliament on the 21st July, 1849. The entrance, in June, 1848, of the Eussian troops into the Provinces had indeed been, according to the British Minister, "without orders from St. Petersburgh." On the 1st of Eebruary, 1849, these insubordinate and erratic forces, equally "without orders," enter Transylvania ! Immediately, Sir Stratford Canning says to the Porte : — " I do not doubt that my Government will consider the said Intervention as prejudicing the rights of the Porte, and as calculated to make a most painful impression on the Porte, owing to the serious consequences which may follow." He writes home (4th Eebruary) that the Erench Ambassador had read to him a Despatch, "Which expressed goodwill towards the Porte, and a just sense of all that was objection- TURKISH NEUTEALITY. 117 able in the late proceedings of Russia. We separated with an understanding that our respective interpreters should wait on Aali Pasha this morning with instructions calculated to encourage the Forte in maintaining subdantially the view taken by its Commissioner at Bucharest of the Military Intervention in Transylvania authorised by the Russian Government"* Lord Palmerston answers, February 28th — " I have to observe to your Excellency on this matter, that undoubtedly the passage of Russian troops through Turkish territory for the .purjiose of interfering in the civil war in the Austrijin dominions, was an infraction of the neutrality which the Forte had determined to adopt in regard to that dvil war, and was a Jit subject of remonstrance on the part of the Porter As if he were speaking of a theme for a sonnet, or a subject for an essay. Sir Stratford Canning writes again on the 5 th April — *' The Porte has not materially relaxed its preparations for an untoward contingency. Besides the circumstances which I have mentioned elsewhere, fresh orders have been sent to repair the defences of Yarna and Silistria ; the Militia is col- lecting in the adjacent Province of Broussa, and the Pasha of * The Consul at Bucharest thus details the views of the Turkish Commissioner, Fuad Effendi, 22d February, 1847 : — "His Excellency begged General Duhamel to consider the effect of such a departure from all tlie principles of non-intervention which European Cabinets had laid down, that such a measure might lead to the adoption of a line of conduct on the part of France towards Austria on the ItaHan question, which France herself would regret to be forced to adopt ; that any measure of this nature was an infraction of the law of nations, and of the treaty of 1841, to which Eussia herself was a party ; and that, in the name of the Sultan, as his Representative, he declared himself opposed to the movement. "I must do Fuad" (Effendi?) "the justice to say I found him firm and consistent, and resolved to continue so ; but very anxious for instructions from Constantinople. " Tliese are critical and difficult times, and I hope your Excellency will continue to favour me with your kind advice and instructions.'* 118 HUNGAEY. Bosnia is ordered to have in readiness the whole disposable force of his neighbourhood." Noio Lord Palmerston with despatch and explicitness replies, 24th April — " I have to acquaint you that Baron Brunow has stated to me that it is not the intention of the Emperor of Eussia, in consequence of the retreat of the Eussian detachment from Hermanstadt, to order his troops to advance into Transyl- vania, or to take any part in the civil war now raging in that province or in Hungary ; but that His Imperial Majesty will content himself with bestowing on the commander^ and officers, and men of that detachment, his approbation of tlie manner in which they made their retreat, after having held in check for many hours a very superior force .'' Q) I have' underlined the last sentence, to call attention to the value of a disjunctive particl^, in reducing to the soberest dimensions the Intervention of a foreign Power in a " civil war," and in persuading another foreign Power, thereby vitally endangered, to take the matter coolly. .On the same day that this Despatch was written in Down- ing Street, Mr. Magennis was writing from Vienna : " The reports from the Danubian Provinces mention the concentration of large bodies of Russian troops along the Transylvanian frontier. I can hardly doubt that the double motive of combating Polish anarchy and of overthrowing revolutionary principles in Hungary would insure the com- pliance of the Eussian Government with any application from hence for aid." But Sir Stratford Canning, by the same messenger which brought from Lord Palmerston information of the Emperor of Eussia's intention to take no farther part in the war, received the official announcement of the Intervention ! What must have been the reflections of that Ambassador ? Can this incident have any connexion with the sudden burst of indignation, which startled a Christmas . dinner party of TURKISH NEUTRALITY. 119 the British merchants, when striking; the table with his clenched fist, he exclaimed, "And I serve such vmi /" The " official" intelligence which reached Yienna on the 3d of May must have thence arrived in London in a week. Is Baron Brunow called to account for his imposition, or Russia for her act ? No ! The ^Minister, as we have seen, hastens to announce to Russia that he lias " nothing to say T* Sir Stratford Canning nevertheless goes on writing : — " The signal continued successes obtained by the Hun- garians in Transylvania and the Banat are attended with consequences which threaten to comp'omise the Porte's neu- trality, and to expose its adjacent provinces to the calamities of war. In addition to the number of private refugees who have poured into Serbia and Wallachia, it is known that General Puchner's array, to the amount of 12,.000 men, has again sought refuge in the latter Principality. " This near approach, or rather actual presence, of a danger long foreseen ami pointed out, has afforded me an opportunity ^ which I have not neglected^ of again urging the Porte to maintain its neutrality in a more steady and efficient manner. My repeated communications upon the subject with Aali Pasha have not been wholly fruitless." Lord Palmerston replies on the 2d of July : — " Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which you describe yourself in it to have held to the Porte, with tJie view of inducing it to maintain a strict neutrality in regard to the contest now going on in Hungary. The Porte ought for its own sake to maintain and assert the neutrality of the Turkish territory, as far as it is able to do so, icithout coming into hostile collision with its stronger neighbours'' Sir S, Canning had fancied that he was able to force his Government by committing it. He is now told to take care how he compromises Turkey. 120 HUNGAKT. Stronger neighbours ! Austria defeated and requiring Eussia's aid — Eussia forced to bring up her last resources ;* the Ilungaricin armies still unsurrendered : — a single move- ment of the Turks in advance taking the Russians in the rear calling the Cossacks and the Poles to independence, — this is the stoiy of Poland over again. When charged in the House of Commons with having stopped the preparations of Sweden, Turkey, and Persia, to support Poland, and with having rejected the proposals of Austria and Prance to the same effect, he answered (1 st of March, 1848), " I saved them from a useless and a fatal step, for Eussia was stronger than Sweden, stronger than Turkey, stronger than Persia, as she was stronger than Poland." Of course, it was to be inferred, though it was not stated, that she was also stronger than Austria, and stronger than Prance : she was so, but it was by his means. The argument, how- ever, was An aggregate of strength is an accumulation of weakness : by this argument fell, first Poland, and then Hungary, — the fall of the one prepared the way for the fall of the other : they have been laid prostrate not only by the same logic, but by the same logician. I have already mentioned the mission of a Hungarian agent to Constantinople : — the circumstances, as they were related to me, respecting it are too remarkable to omit : — ^if true, they require to be known and if false, contradicted. His arrival, I have been informed, was hailed with delight by the party in the Divan for war, who, though not strong enough to carry such a decision, were able to obtain not only that communication should be opened with him, but also that practical aid should be aflbrded to the Hungarians by a supply of arms, and by suggesting to them the occupation of the fortress of Orshova, which, standing on an island of the Danube where it breaks through the chain of the * A month later he himself writes : " The whole disposablb POECE OP THE Russian Empire has been beougut up to take PAEr IN THIS WAR." TUKKISH NEUTRALITY. 121 Cai-pathians, is the Padlock of Hungaiy on the side of Walla- chia, and which, if held by the Hungarians, would have pre- vented the entrance of the Russian troops, and so far preserved Turkey's honour and "Neutrality." A person of character and distinction was therefore selected to communicst.e Avith the agent,- who, without circumlocution, informed him that 200,000 stands of arras would be landed on the left bank of the Danube, which the Hungarians would pay for in raw produce ; and further, that the fortress of Orshova was at that moment occupied by only a few troops. The Envoy rushed to communicate this unexpected success to the British Ambassador, who, in his well-known zeal for Hungary, dis- dained to be outstripped, offered to place England in the position which Turkey \vas about to occupy, and named an English house at Constantinople (Messrs. Hanson) for the management of the speculation. The agent rushed back again to inform his Turkish friends of his "golden achieve- ment" {J'ai fait une affaire d'or), and to his astonishment perceived that his joy was not shared ; the Turkish Govern- ment instantly withdrew its proposals, within three days it was called to account by the Russian and Austrian Embassies, and of course no muskets were shipped from the Thames. These facts I give as I have received them ; I have them under no pledge of secrecy. Certain it is that at this period rumours were generally spread of arms to be furnished by Turkey to the Hungarians, and of her being on the point of declaring in their favour. The name of the agent is Mr. Browne, cousin of Lord Stanley of Alderley. When the affair is quite over, a day after the demand of Extradition has been despatched from Warsaw, Lord Palmerston indulges in a safe epigram on Turkish Neutrality, which he transmits to the agitated consul at Bucharest : — "I have to observe to you that the laics of neutrality require that equal vieastcres should be meted out to both of the contending parties ; and that eit/ier both or neither should be allowed to enter and to make use of the Turkish territory'* 123 HUNGAEY. This is the "neutrality " of the Dardanelles— aU nations are ecimlly excluded, but the Kussians are inside. There now remained only to exchange the congratulatory notes between Downing Street and the Bedford Hotel on the restoration of " order and peace ;'' and so closes one chapter of the "union of England and Kussia to maintain the peace of the world."* *J)ecJar^tion of Lord Durham. 123 CHAPTEE V. Extradition of Befugees, Twenty days after the offer of Mediation has reached Vienna, Sir Stratford Canning writes (38th August). " To-day, the Austrian Minister has presented a strong official note demanding the extradition of all refugees, without entering into any distinction of offences. ** In point of fact the Porte's neutrality has been sacrificed in a far greater degree to the military operations of Russia and the unfortunate necessities of Austria than to any partiality for a people having many traditional claims to their sympathy and goodwill, &c. Under these circum- stances / only anticipate your lordsJiip^a opiniofi, when I submit that the Ottoman ministers are fairly entitled to sup- port in continuing to carry out * a principle' [what principle, — neutrality, or its sacrifice?] which it has been my duty, and to all appearance that of General Aupick also, to inculcate." Any negotiations with respect to this matter had to be carried on in London with the Eepresentative of Austria, or at all events at Vienna ; and if anything was to be done not a moment had to be lost. The Despatch reached London on the 9th of September. The matter was one which presented not the slightest difficulty of judgment. I have already stated the case ; not only were the Treaties clear, but there were precedents in point. The intelligence had reached London long before this communication of Sir Stratford Canning; the foimer demand had been expedited from Warsaw on the 14th of August, as from Vienna news could reach London in half the time that it took to travel to Constantinople, the demand must have been known to Lord Palmerston before it could be so to Sir Stratford Canning. 124 HUNGARY. If not, ot what earthly use can Ambassadors ha ? Still even Sir Stratibrd Canning's communication is left unanswered for tUlrteerv days, and then not a single line is addressed to Yienna, — the reply reaches Constantinople after the matter has been settled at St. Petersburgh. This single statement disposes of the whole case. The *' bottleholding" is simply reduced to being out of the way. It was not for nothing that Kossuth said and repeated ^;o often, "Eead the Blue Books !" But the difficulty was to find readers. Of what avail w'ould be tlie publication of logarithms for a Nation that did not understand arithmetic ? No one in England studies Diplomacy, or knows anything of diplomatic action, and then they are knocked down with "Blue Books." The contents are nothing, the volume and cover everything. It suffices then to say, " Take my word, or — read that." No one knows better than the EngliiOi Minister that the printing of ostensible Despatches is not the way to enlighten a Parliament or instruct a Nation, aiid that for that purpose explanation and exposition are re- quired, and not precisely of that nature with which a Pinsbury deputation is content. Here are the words he once used when in opposition : — " We should know what have been the principles upon wdiicli our Government has acted, — what has been the spirit in which the influence of England has been exerted, — what objects have been aimed at, and by what means we have sought to attain them." These w^ords were uttered in leading an opposition against the Govennnent of wdiich Lord Aberdeen was Eoreign Secretary, because it was not sufficiently Uussian ! A man must know what is right, in order systematically to prac- tise wdiat is Avrong. I arrived in Turkey, a few days after the demand of Extradition w^as made. 1 w^as confidentially, informed of it by one of the local governors intimately connected with hiiib Personages, who all considered war imminent, and urged iir EXTRADITION OE EEEUGEES. 125 to proceed without delay to Constantinople. My answer was — * There is not the slightest chance of war. The demand is a feint. The real point is elsewhere.* I returaed in five or six weeks to the same place, and the same Functionary was again the first to announce to me an a2)proaching settlement ; and I then explained as follows,. the reasons for my opinion which I refused to give on th& former occasion, which was that the Sultan could not surren- der the Refugees, and Austria and Russia were destitute of power to force him to do so. I had brought a Paris Caricature, representing the President as a Bear's Cub, and placed if before him. * You mean,' said he, *that a quan*el is got up to throw dust in the eyes of the Parisians.* This Functionary had no difficulty in comprehending and admitting the necessity in which Russia stood of disguising from the people of Europe, the collusion with herself of their Governments ; but it was with difficulty that he admitted, and never woidd have done so, unless in consequence of the result, her powerlessness, even when backed by Austria, to attack the Ottoman territoiy. It is most strange how nations not diplomatic, will mistake their strength and weakness. Here Turkey after the Herculean effort of creating an army of 300,000 men, and filled from frontier to frontier with indig- nation in which there was no distinction between Mussulman and Christian, believes that it owes its protection from a danger which never existed, not to this real strength of mhid and body, but to a Foreign protection which never was given ; whilst Europe, being unconscious of the existence of this army and this feeling, attributes the same result to an exercise of its own power, with the **Blue Books" in its hand which prove that no such power was ever exercised. Suffice it to say, that if Russia invaded the Tartarian wilds included in the Chinese Empire, she would only sacrifice an Army, and she has never committed such a folly ; but had she in the month of September, 1849, sent an army across the Danube, it is her Existence that she would have sacrificed. These are the 12G HUNGAEY. grounds upon wliich I treated witli calculated scorn, justified by the result, the pretended alarming complication in re* ference to the Refugees ; and whether I am right or wrong in assuming that the object of it was to enable Louis Napoleon to wind his horn and blow a blast of simulated defiance, at all events I must be right in the assertion, that the object which the Eussian Cabinet had in view, was some other than that which was professed. The pretence of having given support to Turkey is based not upon the act or declaration of the British Government, which it was impossible that it should be, since none existed, but upon opinions and words of Sir Stratford Canning; who was not kept at Constantinople without an object, that of effectually disguising by his opinions the purposes of his chief, of affording a cloak of his known integrity, while at the same time removing from Parliament an inconvenient Critic, On the 3d of September, he writes as follows : — " On grounds of humanity not unmixed with considerations affecting the Porte's character and future policy, I have not hesitated to advise a decided resistance to the demand of Extradition. I have further endeavoured to dissuade the Turkish Ministers from pledging themselves to any measure of restraint, not clearly prescribed by the terms of Treaties, and from contracting any engagement not leaving a certain latitude of action for the future." Next day. Prince Eadzevil arrives with the autograph letter of the Emperor, not given in the "Blue Books." It is as follows : — " The leading principles of the Alliance between the two Empires, and which have been signalised so strikingly by the Ottoman authorities on the Danube in their steps against the gangs of Magyars which threw themselves on the Ottoman territory, give me the most intimate conviction that Y. M. will recommend a question which I have much at heart to the most serious attention of your Ministry. Such is the object EXTEADIIION OF BEFUGEES. 127 • of tlie representations with which I have entrusted my Eepresentative at Constantinople, relative to some Polish Kefugees who, having been guilty of high treason against my Government, have lately taken so criminal a part in the events wliich have ravaged Hungaiy. " With the sincere desire that no cloud may rise between the two Empires, I attach a peculiar value to the solution of this affair, fully confident that the representations of M.Titoff will find a favourable reception with your Majesty. I request you to accept the assurance of the feelings of high considera^ tion and inviolable attachment, with which I am " Your Majesty's good Brother, "Nicolas/* ' The French Ambassador sends in haste to inform Sir &. Canning of the menacing nature of these communications, and Sir Stratford, in his Despatch of the 5th of September, mentions that the Internuncio was to have the next morning an audience of the Sultan to obtain an assurance that the Eefugees should be " intertie" and " surveiUe." Observe that this is on the f flit of September. He goes onto state, " there is no indication of a change in the intentions of the Porte :" that " the impression of every one is, that the Porte is placed in a most painful and dangerous dilemma t/ie result of its present isolation. . . . The ultimate issue will depend upon the prospect of support from England and France."* , * The complete sentence is as follows : — " In the meantime there is no indication of a change in the intentions of the Porte, though the serious, not to say alarming, nature of the position is deeply felt* The Sultan's firmness will, however, be put to a severe trial, and so ■will that of his enlightened Minister ; nor can I pretend to say what counsels will ultimately prevail. The first impression of e^ery one is, that the Porte is placed in a most painful and dangerous dilemma^ between the conflicting sentiments of honour and humanity on the one side, and of apprehensions, the natural result of its present isolation, on the other. The resource of an appeal to Europe may sustain it for the present : but the ultimate issue will naturaHv clepend upon the prospect of support from England and France* 128 HUNGARY. • Between the 5tli and the 6th of September, when Prince Eadzevil took his departure, discussions which took place, were regularly communicated to Sir S. Canning, and by him transmitted home. Now before the documents were published, and when the English Government was taking credit for having supported Turkey, a credit irreconcileable with the concession of internal surveillance which the Porte had made, it boldly ext;;icated itself by a falsehood and a charge — it charged the Turkish Government with concealing from it these communications. Prince Eadzevil came to demand a "Yes," or a "No," in eight and forty hours : he adopted towards the Sultan forms the most offensive, language the most haughty. The Porte extricated itself from the dilemma with that dexterity which it always evinces when forced into action : it told the Envoy that the answer would be given at St. Petersburgh, to which place an Ambassador of the Sultan was already on his way. An afutograph letter from the Sultan to the Emperor was presented to him, which he declined to take charge of. The Porte had now definitively taken its stand in its *' isolation," " without the support of England and Prance," and consequently, whether that support did, or did not arrive, it equally had to bear the consequences. It hastily called up its reserves, and an army of 65,000 men was assembled at the capital. Throughout the country, as I can testify, (travelling as I was through it at the time), far from the doubts or apprehensions which appear to have prevailed in higher quarters and to have divided the Ministry, there was but one feeling of indignation and confidence : "every male, from sixteen to sixty ;" such was the reply received in a village w^hen I asked them how many men they would send to the Danube. Nor was the Sovereign behind his People : when it was told the Sultan that this demand was about to be made, he started up and exclaimed : " Shall I, who am Master of the Empire, be denied the right of refuge, which I cannot refuse to the meanest of my subjects, in the EXTRADITION OF REFUGEES. 129 case even of a culprit? Sooner let the Empire itself perish !" The die was now cast; the honour or disgrace of the course rested alone with the Porte : no despatch had arrived from England.* Here is the view of the case as stated by Sii- Stratford Canning on the 17th of December : — "Allow me to add, my lord, that in proportion as I admire the courageous firmness with which the Sultan and his Government have determined to make this stand in the cause of humanity and of the fair rights of honour and dignity, against a demand alike objectionable in substance and in form, I feel a deepening anxiety for the result of their resistance, and for the degree of support which Her Majesty's Government and that of France may find themselves at liberty to afford, not only in the first instance, but in still graver circumstances, should the present partial rupture unfortu- nately assume a more serious and menacing character." Under this alarm for Turkey and doubts of England, Sir S. Canning- writes to Admiral Parker, to know whether any portion of Her Majesty's squadron was " available for any purposes of demonstration;'' and wliether he was " at liberty, without bringing attention on the real ohject, to place it * " It ouglit never to be forgotten that the peremptory refusal of the Sultan to deliver up tluse gallant defenders of a righteous causa to the base and merciless vengeance of Austria and Russia, was given before he knew whether he should be supported in that refusal by the Western Powers of Europe or not. It must be also remembered, that the conduct of those Western Powers had not always been such as to lead him to the conclusion that they would be sure to assist him. Yet he waited not for the arrival of a British fleet in the waters of Turkey, nor for any intimation of its approach, but at «ncc, without lies-itation, decided that the brave sons of liberty who craved the protection of Turkish hospitality, should receive it at «rhatever cost. But for this noble act, so worthy of a great Sovereign, and of that character wliich the Turks have always maintained, Kossuth would, beyond all doubt, have been consigned to the same iguorrdnious death as his fellow-patriot, Louis Batthyanyi." — Letter of Lord Dudley Stuart, 5 ISO IIUNGAEY. at once in somewhat nearer communicaiion witli Her Majesty's Embassy ?" but on this communication the impulsive admiral did not think fit to move. Fuad Effendi arrived at St. Petersburgh, with the autograph letter from the Sultan, and had his audience on the 16th of October. The glacial bearing assumed at Constantinople has thawed in the more genial climate of the North, and as anti- cipated by Lord Ponsonby,'* the adjustment of the matter experiences no difficulty. On the 1 6th October, the British Minister at St. Petersburgh, however, was loithout instructions ; things are so close run that on that day he has to announce to Count Nesselrode, that he has none, — the orders had been sent to Admiral Parker to sail to the Dardanelles ten days before. Now observe the dates : the Russian demand of Extradition was dated Warsaw, 14th of August : the Austrian, was made at Constantinople, on the 25th of August ; the Despatch announcing it arrived in Lon- don on the 9th of September : the whole case was detailed in Sir Stratford Canning's Despatch of the 3d September, and its enclosures : the final proceedings, including the application of the Turkish Government, both through its own Ambassador, and through Sir Stratford Canning, together with the rupture of diplomatic relations with Austria and Russia, reached London on the 1st of October; on the 3d, Lord Palmerston was in possession of the departure of Fuad Effendi for St. Petersburgh. If time and distance interfered to prevent his action at Constantinople, nothing prevented the transmission of his decision to St. Petersburgh. He now further delays for six days. A thunderingDespatch is then writ- ten so as to arrive the day after the settlement, and, of course, never to be presented. These are his explicit words in the ]Iouse — " It is due, however, to the Eussian Government to say, that the day before our friendly representation reached St. Petersburg^, the Eussian Government had stated, that it * " I can assure you that there wUl be nothing worse than dis- satisiaction on the part of Austria. !No strong measure will be taken."— ',&orcZ Tonsonhy, 2d October. EXTEADTTION OF REFUGEES. 131 no longer insisted on the demand for SuiTender, but consented to the alternative of Expulsion."* Now clearly the matter was ended. Why then despatch tbe squadron ? If not settled with Fuad EfFendi, theii the question lay between England and Russia, and a deckratioh of war must have followed ; and the squadron would have to be recalled home for the Baltic.f The fact, however, of the sailing of the squadron was not communicated, ostensibly, to St. Petersburgh on the 6th of October. Now supposing any mischance had occurred, and the arrival of the Despatch on the 6th of October had been hastened a few hours, or the aiTangement of Fuad Effendi retarded ; and the parties had thus been brought up with doubled fists, a show of something more than "bottle- holding" would have been required. How convenient to have the squadron got out of the way ! This would not have been the first time when the sacrifice of professed purposes and important interests has been excused on the pretext of the employment elsewhere of the disposable British naval force. This naval demonstration enabled Russia to regain her haughty position, compromised by her apparent surrender, and Count Nesselrode overwhelmed the trembling English • 7th Februai-y, 1850. f Viscount Palmerston to Viscouni Po^isonby, " Foreign Office, November 2, 1849. *• Mt Lord, — With reference to your Excellency's Despatch of the 21st ultimo, reporting the feelings entertained by the Austrian Minis- ters with respect to what they term the menace made by England and France, I have to point out to your Excellency that a movement of Her Majesty's squadron to the upper end of the Mediterranean cannot be considered as a tlireat against Austria. If the squadron had moved up the Adriatic and had taken post opposite to Tenice or Trieste, the case might have been different. I am, &c. PaIiMEBSTON,** The Despatch to which this is a reply is not given. 132 HUNGARY. Eepresentative at St. Petersburgh with words of contumely and scorn, restraining his laughter, he said : — ** I am an old man. I hope to end my days in peace : I have laboured to preserve it for Europe ; never did I expect that it would be the Government of England, which by an in- solent violation of solemn compact, should again cast upon the world the Torch of Discord. But Russia is prepared ; strong in her position and rights, strong in her power and in her conscience, she accepts a defiance, and lays upon your head the responsibility and the consequences." It was this demonstration that paralysed the willing efforts of General Lamoriciere, and forced Euad Effendi to sur- render the advantages of the growing indignation throughout Europe ag£iinst Russia, and admiration for Turkey. Sir Stratford Canning, who under different circumstances had suggested that the squadron should have been brought to the neighbourhood of the Embassy, no sooner learns that Admiral Parker has violated the atrocious Treaty of July 13, 1841, by entering the Dardanelles, than he implores him to depart. He addresses him in the strain of a Guebre, depre- ciating Ahriman : — " With the deference which is due to your superior judg- ment, I would 'centure to suggest as the more advisable course, that you should leave your present anchorage, unless requested by the Pofte to stay, and transfer the squadron to some neighbouring station, whence it 7nay return, should its valuable services be wanted again, without any inconvenient delay.** This is on the 4th of November, but is not given in the "Blue Book" at that date. Before it is introduced his Despatch of the 5th, mentioning simply the removal of the squadron from the exposed situation of Bisika Bay to a preferable anchorage. Next comes one to Lord Blomfield rather more explicit, mentioning that the Russian Minister EXTRADITION OF EEFUGEES. 133 has intimated to him the embarrassment thence accniing, as now concessions were rendered impossible. Next follow a variety of Despatches, ^/?re of which are from Lord Palmerston : one of the 24^/i of November announced the termination of the question, and expresses the regret of her Majesty's Go- vernment that Sir W. Parker should have talcen this step. It is after all this preparatory matter that Sir Stratford Canning's Despatch is inserted. In its proper order it would have been at p. 66; it is removed to p. 71.* On the retreat of the squadron, a concentric fire assails the Foreign Office. These Notes and Despatches occupy nearly one half of the printed correspondence, and cast the reader adrift on currents and counter-currents, leaving him stranded on the grave responsibility assumed by the English Government of risking war with Russia, and then floating him off on its dexterity in having without that conti^igency rescued Turkey ! " Now in the political world gi-ave questions are weighed in the balance of common sense, which between Cabinets sincerely lovers of peace is nothing else than that of good faitnr This from the con-espondent of the Bedford Hotel. I have purposely left unnoticed Lord Palmerston's two first Despatches, because like the offer of Mediation at Vienna, and the friendly remonstrance to St. Petersburgh, they were never used. That of the 24th of September, placed in front of the Correspondence, justified in all respects Sir S. Canning's opinions, and incloses an extract (as if it were not to be had at Constantinople), from the Treaty of Belgrade. But then comes this sentence. " The utmost that could he demanded would be that they should not be allowed to reside pei-manently in the Turkish empire." This is the rider to a proposition that no demand can be made, and is that with which Russia herself closes : — tliis * This is no novel manoeuvre ; I have had already to point out its employment in reference to the " Maine Boundary," and the " Con-espondence with Persia." 134 HUNGARY. communication ought to have been made at Vienna : it is never communicated even to the Austrian Internuncio, at Constantinople, and there is not a word to Lord Ponsonby, notwithstanding his reiterated assurance that Austria was not in earnest.* We now come to the last stage — the bevy of Despatches, which, on the 6th of October were discharged towards the four winds of heaven. The Treaties between Eussia and Turkey stipulate for refugees, the alternatives of Expulsion or Surrender. The Austrian Treaties, those of SuiTeuder or " Internment." To Vienna, the English Minister says : — " The Sultan is not bound to comply with the application made by the Austrian Minister." Nevertheless, he has duties of " good neighbourhood to fulfil!"! To St. Petersburgh he says : — " Now her Majesty's Government readily admit that the stipulations of that article entitle the Ptussian Government to make the application wJiich tliey ham made; but her Majesty's Government would beg to submit, for the friendly * " It is to be observed, however, that the demand of the Austrian Gr-oremment was made before the surrender of Q-orgey to the Eussian General-m- Chief was known at Vienna, and the demand seettis to have referred principally to the Hungainan detachment, which was driven into Wallachia from Orshova, on the l7th of August ; and it is to be expected that no v.' that the war is over, a demand of this kind will no longer be pressed, but if it is pressed, it ought certainly not to be complied with." t " But the Sultan has duties of good neiglibourhood to fulfil totvards Austria; and those duties require that he should not permit his territory to be made use of as a place of shelter, from which com- munications should be carried on for the purpose of distm'bing the tranquillity of any of the States which compose the Austrian Empire. " The Sultan is therefore bound to prevent these Polish refugees from hovering upon the frontiers of Hungary or Transylvania ; and he ought to require them either to leave tlie Turlcish territory, or to take up their residence in some part of the interior of his dominions, where they may have no means of communicating with the dis- contented in the Austrian States." EXTEADITION OF BEFUGEES. 135 consideration of the Government of Eussia, that this same article distinctly gives to the Sultan an alternative wJdcJi lie is eqiially entitled to choose ; for by the stipulations of that articte each of the contracting parties is at liberty either to sui'render refugees, being subjects of the other party, or to expel them from its own territory. It is clear, therefore, that the Sultan is not hound hj treaty to comply with the application made to him by the Russian Minister at Con- stantinople for the surrender of the Polish refugees ; and that he would fulfil to the very letter the obligations of the Treaty, by requiring those Polish refugees to depart from his dominions." To explore these mysteries would require a Torch, and to expose them a Volume. In the Despatch to Turkey, there is a general preface, in which, on the one hand, the obligation of Turkey to comply with the demands appear 'ta be denied ; and, on the other, the separate conditions of the Austrian and Russian Treaties are mingled together ; so that the stipulation of the Russian Treaty, namely. Expulsion, is made to apply to the Hungarians. The Despatch to Austria is a direct contra- diction of the Despatch to Russia ; the Despatch to Russia a mdlification of that to Austria. By the first, the Sultan is " not bound by Treaty ;" by the second he is " bound by Treaty," as he must be if only " entitled to choose" between two alternatives. Both of those views are opposed as pole to pole to the Despatch of the 24th September, in which it is stated that the article of the Ti'eaty of Belgrade (to which the others are analogous), " obviously relates to cases of a very different kind^rom that of the war just ended," . . . and that " such officers and soldiers cannot be deemed to be the persons intended to be described by these expressions, or ' cette sorte de gens,' or to be classed with ' voleurs et brigands.' " Here are then a series of distinct propositions, by means of which the position which the English Ambassador had taken up at Constantinople is totally reversed, being first adopted and re-echoed by the Minister in London ; then by a 136 HUNGAEY. series of appcEcled conditions, transpositions, injunctions, modifications, and inferences, the Sultan is declared bound by the very compacts which Sir S. Canning and the French Ambassador, in reply to a formal demand, had declared he was not bound. This Despatch, timed so as not to arrive at St. Peters- burgh, till one day, as Lord Palmerston states — till two days, as appears by the Blue Book — after the settlement with Fuad EfFendi, is also timed to arrive at Constantinople two days before the arrival of the news from St. Petersburgh. Sir S. Canning and the Turkish Government are consequently in ecstacy, and believe with the public of Europe, that it is the backing of England that saved Kossuth from being hung, and the Sultan from being deposed. To this English friendly remonstrance. Count Nesselrode replies by declaring that he could never admit " the prin- ciple of foreign interference in the relations of Russia and Turkey." This is the result of your brave demonstration at the Dardanelles ! It will have been seen that the Hungarians were exposed to the alternative of " Internment," the Poles of " Expulsion." The Hungarians are shut up at Kutayah. But what happens to the Poles ? Russia's demands could only extend to the Polish refugees from Poland, who had already dwelt twenty years in Tiu'key with 'French passports. It was not then from Turkey that they were to be de- manded, but from Erance ; and France, who is with England resisting the demands upon Turkey, surrenders them ! No secret was made of a private letter from General Lahitte, then French Minister for Foreign Afifeirs, to Count Nesselrode, in which he entreats that minister to accept the concession which France had made as sufficient proof of the absence of all sympathy with Turkey, and thus spare the French Government the humiliation of their immediate Ex- pulsion. He only asks for delay until " the affair has blown over."* * I recollect this jDlirase in the lottcr " 81 la Tnrc[nie ne s' execute pa.?:' EXTRADITION OF REFUGEES. 137 As to steps taken by England for the liberation of the refugees, there were absolutely none during eighteen months; that is to say, till April, 1851. Why she acted then I have already explained. Kossuth had fallen into the fangs of Mazzini. Had the English Government been with Turkey, the detention of the exiles could not have endured one hour; if their subsequent liberation was by its influence, it would have been effected eighteen months before. A communication was at an earlier period made to the Porte by the British Ambassador, and believed by the Hungarians and their friends to have been to urge their liberation. But it turned out afterwards to be for their transfer from Kutayah to some other place. It was at the time a common remark at Constantinople, that Austria received no backing in her endeavours to retain them from her Ally. In fact, the interests of Russia and Austria were now opposed : Austria dreaded — Russia desired — revolution. If it stood alone, this general belief in Europe, after the publication of the ' Blue Books,' would be utterly incon- ceivable. To its infatuation there is no bounds : they are equally incapable of disbelieving a falsehood, and of believing a fact. This reflection is forced unon me by a debate which occurs as these pages are passing tlirough the press, in which Lord Dudley Stuart (5th May, 1853) speaks of the " glorious course taken by the Noble Lord for procuring their release," and this was a speech in which he charges that Noble Lord with having pursued with respect to them in England, a course the very reverse, and again, as usual, ends witli the *' expression of his satisfaction at hearing the statement of the Noble Lord." A statement in the House of Commons ! I have already quoted Kossuth's judgment of the con- nection of the Diplomacy of Great Britain with the fall of Hungary I must now give the first impressions made upon him by the perusal of the ** Blue Book" in reference to the case of the refugees. The letter indeed presents in small 138 HUNGAEY. compass the whole matter, and it was the perusal of it which first induced me to look into the documents. " As another gift to the fatal anniversary, I got this veiy day a letter giving me charming notices out of your Par- liament's "BlueVBooks" — very charming indeed. There I have the pleasm'e to read the Despatch to Lord Pousonby (<3th October, 1849), where my Lord the Secretary of the State for the Foreign Affairs of Her Majesty is the first who professes the Sultan to have duties of good neighbourhood to fulfil towards the States wJiicJi compose the Austrian empire // I wonder how his Lordship is at home with history, and chiefly its diplomatic parts, — how he has to give the sanction of England to the incorporation of Plungary, whose inde- pendence was in the 18th century guaranteed by England it«elf^ — to give the sanction of England to the incoiporation of Hungary by Eussian arms, — but no ! not arms, — by Eussian diplomacy. To be sure, his Lordship must have given like warm recommendations to Austria and Eussia, en- gaging them to fulfil the duties of good neighbourhood towards the Sultan — proof of the incessant revolts stirred up in Bosnia and Bulgaria by Austrian agents and Prussian gold — proof of it, Milosh, who is pretty near to upset poor Karageorgievich — in Servia. A pretext is wanted for the non-evacuation of Moldo-Wallachia, and for the occupation of Servia. You will have the pretext, be sure of it. *'I read with equal pleasure in the same Despatch, that the Sultan is bound to give us our residence in some part of the Interior where we may have no means of communicating with the discontented in the Austrian States. A fine cir- cumscription of our Kutayah Casarna, is it not ? " There is still more to be found. The instructions to be given to Sir Parker by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, whence we learn that the gallant admiral was not directed to support the Sultan in his generous opposition to the insolent pretensions of Eussia and Austria ; but that he was directed to take us on board if, and onlv if, he should EXTKADITION OF KEFUGEES. 139 be invited by the Sultan, through Sir S. Canning to take up his squadron to Constantinople to the very purpose of giving us a fine beefsteak on board an English man-of-war in the Bosphorus ; a thing rather a little difficult, as we happened at the very time to be somewhat closely guarded at Widdin, on the northern verge of Bulgaria. Of course, Sir S. Canning did not invite us, and so the formidable squadron had nothing better to do than to hoist sails for Malta. " Well, after all, the ' Blue Book' taught me nothing new. I have known this by heart long ago. The only thing I would be anxious to know is, how Faraday or Licbig would find out the chemical affinity between these Despatches and the Declaration of his Lordship in the House of Commons, that he was ve'iy much dissatisfied with the issue of the refugee question, but that he could not help, as the Sultan made the ofi:'er to give us a residence in the interior without any previous knowledge, not to say, approbation of the British Ministry. As also the chemical affinity between Sir W. Parker's instructions and the compliments on the energy of his Lordship having sent the gallant Admiral to support the Sultan in our behalf (see Mr. Roebuck's Vote of Con- fidence Motion), and the toast of Admiral Napier at the diplomatic dinner, after compliments which his Lordship acknowledged with pride. *' But enough ; it is with a bitter smile that I write these lines — you will excuse me, I am a poor exile, Sir, and there are mighty men who are able to do me more wrong in a day than I can digest in a year. For myself I would not care, but for my poor coimtry, which I might yet help to become once more, if not great and glorious— greatness is relative, and glory is vain — but free." That the whole was a concerted game may be inferred from this alone, that France and England were acting in concert. What I have above stated in reference to the Poli&h EefugeeSj can leave no shadow of doubt' as to the collusion of 140 HUNGAET. Louis Napoleon and the Cabinet of Russia ; but that fact does not stand alone ; what influence, what coin placed him in the Presidential chair ? By whom was concerted the coup d'etat of the 2d of December ? It was recently mentioned by the Twies Correspondent from Paris, that he had avowed his connection with Eussia to a Eep -iblican Deputation, which came to him from the Continent. It is impossible to conceive a country in more absolute dependence than Prance. Eussia can knock down the Puppet she has set up. In 1848, M. Tocqueville, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, met arguments urged by a Deputation of the Opposition with these words : — • " Gentlemen, remember there are the Cossacks ! " The French Ambassador at Constantinople has not hesitated to speak of the Eussian Army as the Ally of his Government against the "Eed Eepublic." The French Consul, at Belgrade, when applied to for support against his Eussian colleague, said, "You seem not to be aware that my President has no other support than the Emperor of Eussia." At the period in question, when he was expelling the Poles from Paris and sacrificing them at Constantinople, and at the same time inculcating " Turkish Neutrality and urging resistance to the demanded Extradition," Louis Napoleon had to dread the Eevolutionists on the one side, and on the other a formidable Pretender in the Comte de Chambord. Eussia had both in her hands, and was parading her support of the latter. He was held not only by his fears, but by his hopes ; — she could make him Emperor, or cast him into the mire; we have, therefore, general grounds and special acts, which prove the collusion of France, and render anything else impossible. All this is known to the English Minister. What then is his position between France as his confidante and Eussia as his antagonist ? If it be a Comedy played by France, is it very monstrous to suppose that it is also a Comedy played by England ? In fact if France had been really acting against Eussia, would England have been acting with her ? We have seen what happened in 1806: what again happened in 1831: EXTRADITION OF REFUGEES. 141 and what again in 1839, when Marshal Soult really did resolve to send a squadron through the Dardanelles. M. Odillon Barrot once used these words, " The events of half a f^entury prove that, whenever France has decided on taking a course contrary to Russia, she is certain to find England against her." So soon as by Russian aid Hungary was pacified, Hun- garian regiments were sent to the Baltic (where Russia could not as yet show herself) in furtherance of the design upon the Crown of Denmark. We are thus conducted by the chain of events, no less thaji by the limits of geography, from the West to tk-e North. 143 THEN RT H. Paet I.— SCANDINAVIA. Pakt II.— the DANISH SUCCESSION. " It was quite enough in delivering Finland to the Bussians to have afforded them the means of a step in advance toioards the Sound, as a point from which they will not he less menacing at a future day, when, the Russian Colossus with one foot on the Dardanelles and another on the Sound, will make the whole world his slave, and liberty will have fled to America. How' ever chimerical all this may seem now to narrow minds, it toill one day be a cruel reality : for Europe, umoisely divided like the towns of Greece in presence of the Kings of Macedonia, will have probably tJie same lot.''' — Tiiicua. 144 These Chapters were vvritten and partly appeared in 1843 and 1844. I preserve their original form because of the anticipation which they contain of events which have sub- sequently come to light, — the best proof of the accuracy of the Fiews put forward, and the best disproof of the events wliing the result of mere chance. PART I. SCANDINAVIAN KINGDOMS. CHAPTER I. hiternal Constitution. While the attention of Europe has been fixed on the Pro- gress of Eussia in the East, it has overlooked regions within her own bounds. This Empire, and its more colossal Am- bition threaten, however, the fishermen of the icy North as well as the shepherds of the Torrid zone. Within a few hours' sail of our coasts lies a richer and an easier prey than the plains of Zungaria and the valleys of the Oxus. Three kingdoms still intervene between her frontiers and the ocean, and inclose between the arras of two promon- tories the Euxine of the North. Their shores are washed with the very waters which guard our island ; they are in- habited by the races from whom we have drawn our origin — who speak almost a common language with ourselves — with whom we are most nearly connected by the ties of faith, in addition to those same political interests which have asso- ciated us with the people and kingdoms of the East. DENMARK. It was the original Constitution of this Government which was transplanted to England ; its laws have descended from a monarch who was also king of England. This of all the Teutonic kingdoms is the one in which the power of the 7 146 SCANDINAVIA. Aristocracy raised itself highest, and spread its roots deepest, extinguishing- the authority of the Crown, and repressing the energy of the People. It had, however, undergone a change, which brought it into close affinity with the Aris- tocracies of the Sclavonic nations. Nobility, unrestricted to the tenure of land, was perpetuated by descent. To it indeed was exclusively reserved power, and the faculty of possessing real properly, but in its excessive expansion it had commingled with the nations, and like the Slilachsitz of Poland, was to be found in every profession, and in the humblest grades. The geographical position, however, of Denmark, its unrivalled facilities, amounting almost to a command of the trade of the North, raised from parallel causes, though with varying effect, a powerful Burgher class, on the same basis on which had arisen the Sea Kings of earlier times. The descendants of these were now doomed to be displaced by +heir more vigorous though more modest successors. An unfor- tunate and unprovoked war with Sweden, in 165 7, brought the matter to issue; the inability of the nobles to defend the state over which they domineered was exhibited in the loss -of nearly a half of the kingdom, the strength of which was thus proved to consist in the capital alone. The burghers thus established their right to rule the country they had saved ; and consequently at the close of 1660 that remarkable revulsion which it has taken three centuries in Europe to accomplish, was effected in almost a single day ; the Aris- tocracy was put down by the middle classes, and instantly that class put itself down before the Crown. Thus was brought into existence the celebrated Lex Regia of Denmark, wherein the king, Frederick the Third, acting by the authority of the nation, declared himself and his successors, each for himself, possessed of full, absolute, and despotic power, with legis- lative facidties affecting church and state, taxes and troops, and constituted responsible under no circumstances to any human tribunal, but "to his conscience and to God alone."* * The majority of the kijig was reduced from twenty-eight to fonrteeyi. INTERNAL CONSTITUTION. 147 But by the very care with which Despotism was rendered complete, a counterpoise was provided. The monarch could dispense with haws no less than enact them ; every successive kin<^ so found himself unshackled by the past, and thus the power was constituted personal and not leo;islative, being limited by the condition of self- transmission. This Constitution has proved one of the best, if not tlie best, in Europe, for in fact it may be said to be no Constitution at all. Administration, which is so weighty a task to modern politicians, is only difficult in consequence of the Concentration in the capital of impossible functions. Denmark having its ancient local bodies, had only to apprehend new laws, and, above all, the existence of a body arrogating to itself the right of making them. As regards the Central Government, arbitrariness is no doubt an evil, but there may be still worse evils, and the worst are those that are systematic. Naked absolutism may coerce the will, but it does not pervert the judgment of nations, and even if it degrades their character, it does not destroy their common sense. Under such a system there might be a few servile dependents, but there was no multitude of brawling patriots. It did not engender the class oi politicians, nor with them habits of pretence and facilities of imposition. There was no fictitious responsibility to destroy the fear of consequences, no majorities to cloak schemes of a Cabal — no cunning or overbearing associations could instal themselves as Ministries — no wavering hallucinations transform them- selves into public zeal : there was no permanent lie respecting "servants of the crown;" for all that was done, and in the eyes of all, the king was responsible, and being so, the public functionaries were in truth his servants. It was not, therefore, for special reasons, but on general grounds, that with a Constitution the most abominable which theoretically could be conceived, Denmark enjoyed contentment and weU-being, and acquired riches, and, having a national character, possessed freedom.* Therefore, could the Danish * " From this allusion to the chief articles of the new Constitution, 148 SCANDINAVIA. Monarch truly declare that "Denmark had no interest in the war against France, as tlie Danisli crown had nothing to fear from the dissatisfaction of its people." The people are, nevertheless, not of one race, nor are they under the same laws or governing systems, nor have they been united from time out of mind. This harmony is, therefore, simply the result of the absence of legislation. Each section limited its activity to the bounds of its own existence, respected the habits, customs, and laws of its neighbours, or, what was better still, never thought upon the subject, and when there were troubles it was because of passions, not propositions. Denmark Proper constitutes no more than three-fifths of the whole monarchy, the remaining two-fifths being Holstein, which is German, and Schleswig, which is in part German and in part Danish. These Duchies possess distinct laws and rights, with their peculiar " Laud" and " Stadt" Administration : these privileges have been maintained during four centuries, no less by their own strength than by the interest of the reigning dynasty, the roots of which were in the Duchies. Their importance is not only great in themselves, but also as linking Denmark to the Continent, and superadding so to say, a territorial and military, to its own maritime existence. When at the close of the fourteenth century the Crowns of it will be seen that, Frederick arrogated to himself a power which no other monarch on earth ever claimed — not even the Czar of Eussia. Here was boundless, irresponsible, tmmitigated despotism, without a single provision in favom- of the life, the substance, or the liberty of any subject, high or low. In China the Emperor is restrained by the laws, which he can neither violate, nor change. So it is in Thibet ; so in all Mahommedan countries, where the Koran is the unchanged and unchangeable law, alike for rulers and people. So it was in ancient Persia, in Egypt, in Assyria, in Greece, in Eome. So it has been in the great middle age Empires — in Tartary, Mexico, Peru. It was reserved for the most limited, and the most insigni- ficant (so far as territory and revenues are concerned) king in Em-ope, to establish a despotism such as the world had never seen." — Dunham's Denmark^ Siveden, and Norway, v. iii, p. 180-1. INTERNAL CONSTITUTION. 149 Sweden and of Norway were united with that of Denmark, under terms which required that they should be always placed upon the same head, Schleswig and Holstein were not so united. When under Frederick III the tenure of the crown was altsred to one of hereditary succession, with the admission of females, it was not attempted to introduce the same law in the Duchies, where the feudal right of male suc- cession was established. The separation apprehended on the failure of the present direct line arises solely from the supercession of the Salic law in Denmark. But, by his amplitude of despotic power, the King of Denmark may annul that provision. However, in an age when the gravest concerns are transacted in secret, and the concealed hand is the one that wins, this is not to be expected, as a neighbouring power covets the Sound with her whole heart. Constitutions had been promised to the nations who had enabled their sovereigns lo overthrow Napoleon — a promise which was forgotten for fifteen years, until the people took for a time the matter into their own hands. The people of Denmark had had no share in this service, had made no such demand, and received no such promise. The despotism of the other kings of the Continent was by usurpation — the despotism of the kings of Denmark was by law ; yet Frederick VI determined to concede to his German feof of Holstein a Constitution ; but not to make any invidious dis- tinction, he conceded the same to the remainder of his States. It was carried into effect in 1835. We have seen an overbearing Aristocracy tranquilly set aside; we have seen a powerless king transmuted into an absolute one : now we see a Constitution freely conceded tc the peo])le by that Crown to which its people had before freely conceded arbitrary power. The authority allowed to the Representative Body was, however, no more than Consultative, which, in the circum- stances of the country, was a more valuable security than that nominally absolute control over the Finances which we 150 SCANDINAVIA. have seen so unprofitably exercised in the great Constitutional Governments. But the value of this Constitution resided in there being no general representation, but Provincial Diets — — two for the Duchies, and two for the remainder of the Monarchy. This distinction is of the highest importance in a diplo- matic point of view, and it is one regarding which the study of former ages (from which alone our mental habits are derived, and with the events of which our memories are stored) affords us neither maxims nor facts. The great change and experiment now in progress, and the conse- quences of which can only be evolved in future times, is the assimilation of people to people by the process of thought. I enter not into its causes, its general character, or abstract effects : I point to the facility v/hich it affords for action, greater than in other ages could have been acquired by armies ; for it is more important in a view to ultimate incor- poration, to disorganize a people by its own laws, than to prostrate it by external blows, however heavy. If then you have at once a spirit of imitation, whetlier of modes of dress or forms of Government, and a vicious maxim afloat, it becomes as easy to ruin an empire as to set a fashion. Notwithstanding the variety of disorders to which the po- litical body is exposed within, and of accidents from without, scarcely since the invention of " Constitution," has a grave misfortune befallen any people which has not been infected with it. The convulsions of Europe, for the last thirty years, have sprung out of the agitations of Spain, and those agitations were created solely by a surreptitious Constitution : Europe might now be tranquil and at rest, if the Spanish Constitution had resembled that of Denmark, for then it would have restored, instead of destroying, the Cortes of the king- doms of the Peninsula. It is then to be inferred that Eussia was able to exercise in Spain an influence in 3 812, which she was not pos- sessed of in Denmark till 1835 ; after that country had existed for nearly two centuries under a despotism which INTERNAL CONSTITUTION. 151 has been designated the "disgrace of the human race. ' It has already been remarked by a king of Sweden — Gnstavus III, that "opposition rises constantly upon the steps of Russia, in the hatred engendered in the new subjects she acquires, and the new neighbours she presses upon ; but this re8is,tance is always conquered by the influence she manages to obtain over Cabinets at a distance." This is true of Nations no less than Cabinets. These Provincial Diets were composed of the Representa- tives of three classes — the large landed proprietors, the small landed proprietors, and the burghers — following in this respect pretty nearly the ancient Constitution of England. The members are elected for six years, and they sit only once in two years. Up to the present time they have justified the confidence reposed in them. They commenced mth the disordered finances, and indeed may be said to have confined themselves to that branch. They have obtained the yearly publication of a detailed Budget, and within six years the change effected by their supervision has been so considerable, that in 1842 there was a large surplus in the Treasury, which, in 1836, had before it the prospect of Bankraptcy. Out of a revenue of a million and a half, they have contrived to squeeze a Sinking Fund for the extinction of the permanent monstrous debt of £12,000,000 sterling. The press is entirely free in respect to the discussion of home afi'airs, but under strict surveillance in respect to foreign politics : by the most sensible of all evidence, Denmark might have known that these are the first of domestic con- cerns : she has seen by their means her maritime power annihilated, her territory reduced by dismemberment to half its size; she is now divided between German and Danish parties, trifling as yet, but incipient; whilst the precariousness of the Royal Line opening eventual claims, which bring Serfdom as their consequences, casts a gloom over the future which reflects itself by anticipation on the heart of every 152 SCANDINAVIA. Dane.* By the deficiency of this one element of public cha- racter and Administration, Denmark is exposed not merely to lose the fruits of its internal prosperity, but its very existence as an independent Crown and a free People. The favourable picture of the present thus encourages no satisfactory prospect for the future. There is no country so destitute of precedent and sequence of Law and Institution in any sense ; and if she were cast into new convulsions, there is absolutely for her no shelter, and no holding ground. Despotic power has lost its traditions ; Constitutional Government lives only day by day on the breath of Despotism. The Lex Regia is not abro- gated; there has only been introduced a contradictory system, indeed the two are woven together, and this state of things can- not long last without impairing the common sense, and de- stroying the judgment of the nation. When we have arrived at this point, we have arrived at the end of a subject, — when that point is turned the affairs of a nation become only news, and can further interest only journalists, diplomatists, and cynics. NOEWAY. Norway and Denmark were united in 1380, by the here- ditary succession in the former kingdom of Olaf the Second, who had been elected forDenmark. This connection is generally referred to the- great Union of Calmar, when, under Margaret, the daughter of Waldemar IV, and mother and successor of Olaf, the three Scandinavian Crowns were declared to be for ever conjoined. The link was of short duration as regards Sweden, and productive only of present suffering and per- manent ill-will ; the separation is attributed to the oppressions of the Danish kings, for the common kings residing at Copen- hagen were regarded as Danish. Eut if no such effects "O" * See * Morning Herald,' 12ih September, 1842. INTERNAL CONSTITUTION. 153 followed in Norway, and if that Union by absence of inter- ference * and disloyalty has subsisted down to our times only then to be broken by foreign violence, the cause of the difference must be looked for not in the dispositions of the kings of Copenhagen, but in the character of the Norwegians and Swedes. Faction will invite Despotism: without it Despotism may remain an abstract virtue, but never become a fountain of events for history. The Swedes were factious, the Norwegians were not. The Norwegians are a people to whom the word pnmitive may in its most emphatic and valuable sense be applied — simple and upright ; at a distance from the wars of the great European States, witliout losing their bravery or their spirit ; — at a distance from the contaminating commotions of in- ternal discord, without losing public zeal and patriotic aOfections ; strong in their mountains, and rich in their splendid harbours, they pursued their various mountaineer and maritime enterprises with industiy, patience, and fru- gality ; visiting the remotest regions of the earth, they returned home, bringing with them the profits only-of their intercourse with the world — innocent gold, not corrupting thoughts. It was a union thus consecrated by time, by benefits, by affections, that the Cabinets of Europe undertook to dissolve, in a Conference undertaken to restore the nations to their rights : it was an allegiance so rooted in time, a loyalty so approved by affection, that the kings of Europe resolved to shatter ; commencing with the fiction of a usurpation, they said, " We shall do this with Norway, our possession : we shall take her from one king, and we shall give her to another :" and they did so ; and they told their own people that the one king had offended them, and that the other had pleased them, and the people were content ! But indeed, in this case, the Congress of Vienna was only required to ratify * A civil code had been compiled under Christian IT, but it was from the local usages and ordinances of former kings. In eccle- siastical matters there was a Canon copied from that of Denmark. u 154 SCANDINAVIA. a measure in the previous year enacted and accon;iplislied. England alone undertook to perform this service, which she accomplished at Kiel on the 14th January, 1814, and to which, as the prototype of the Treaty of May, I shall have to treat of particularly when I come to the external relations of the Scandinavian kingdoms. The people of Norway were not, however, like the people of Europe, — they would not be disposed of like animals. They armed to resist. The Crown Prince of Denmark, then their viceroy, put himself at their head, and, reverting to their ancient rights, they elected him their king. The odds, how- ever, against them were terrific ; in fact, they were a pro- tocolised people, — one which wakes some morning and finds all the world its foes, and not a friend on earth. They, therefore, provided against the possible execution of the Ukase of Kiel, by establishing a general order for the government of the kingdom, which 1 am reduced to designate by a hateful word. But this Constitution did not subvert the internal liberties of the people ; and so good a countenance did they show, that the prudent King of Sweden thought it best to accept it together with them : not having been copied from the democrats of Paris, nor guaranteed by the Con- gress of Vienna, it exists to this day ; in fact, it was a wise, and not a foolish one. The Storting of Norway was a body resembling what the Parliaments anciently were in England, that is to say, of the Peers and a delegation of the Communes, to whom every matter was referred. There was now but a sole chambeij. with the controlling veto of the king ; this power was re- duced in practice to a nullity, as it could be exercised in respect to any measure but twice. The Storting thus pos- sessed whatever 'legislative power was to be exerted in the country, and held also the administrative functions : the army, navy, and exchequer, were under its control. After the Union with Sweden was settled, a modification took place "by the introduction of a Stadtholder, or Viceroy, who might be a Swede. Having been before rided by the Lex Regia of INTERNAL CONSTITUTION. 155 Denmark, Nonvfiy thus suddenly passed from the purest Absohitisrfl to the purest Democracy. In this soil both teees have bonie fruit equally good. On these conditions, Norway was no great boon : the apparent sacrifice of their independence as a nation had only the effect of engenderiug the sense of independence as a people. They were armed too to maintain it. The Swedish map, indeed, exhibits a large accession of territory : statistical returns a large increase of maritime and military force; the budget an augmentation of resources, but of this increment the Swedish king could not dispose. In attempting to form a party in Nonvay, and to open it to regal and ministerial corruption, results have followed the very reverse of the experience of all other modem countries, and the Norwegian, ruot the Swedish, element has prevailed. The common flag has undergone a change expressive of the increased considera- tion of the former ; the Swedish kings have relinquished in practice their faculty of appointing to the Stadtholdership one of their Swedish subjects ; and nobility as an order of the state, and as a class, has been abrogated, notwith- standing the exercise of the veto of the King in two successive Stortings. The Bill was first passed in 1817, again in 1821 : the Storting by a wise provision is only assembled every third year; in 1824 it became law by the course of the Constitu- tion. Bemadotte, when he accepted the Convention of Moss, had complacently remarked, Nous changerons tout cela ! By the transfer Denmark lost strength, but Sweden acquired none : the power which in the former case was positive, becomes negative in the latter. But Norway was given to Sweden as a compensation ; thus at the same time strength was withdrawn, and weakness conferred. Denmark and Sweden can now no longer cooperate for their defence ; and Norway, instead of rallying in the common cause, will rejoice in the peril of the Crown, by which it has been betrayed, and of that by which it has been annexed. Let it, however, be remembered that this has been effected by a stipulation of that Treaty considered the public law of 156 SCANDINAVIA. Europe, violated indeed with impunity, wherever further "Progress" is practicable in the wolfish ways of our times, but firm and binding in so far as it crushes worth and per^- petuates disorder. SWEDEN. The Diet is composed of four estates, sitting each by itself, — the Nobility, the Clergy, the Burghers, and the Pea- santry, each being represented by individuals belonging to itself. The head of every noble family has the faculty of admission to the Assembly of nobles : here, as formerly in Denmark, nobility descends to all the issue. In the early Gothic States whilst the primitive order still remained unbroken, no inconvenience arose from multiplicity of Councils whether general or local, but with administrative concentration and indirect taxes, the case is widely different, and instead of opposing obstacles to bad measures, encum- bers the march of necessary business, interposes delays, afl'ords endless occasions to successful intrigue and disap- pointed ambitions and maintains a permanent struggle of organised and co-ordinate interests. Political life in Sweden was a school of corruption, and the soil was adapted for the growth of that rankest of intellectual weeds — the idea of change, although by law capital punishment was the penalty of innovation : thus since the accession of the line of Olden- burg, Sweden has presented a scene of continual struggles, in which the king looked abroad for support against domestic faction, and which opened to foreign influence the mass of politicians. Stockholm was divided between the Hats and the £o?inets : the first representing the Aristocracy, the second the Democracy ; but which have acquired historic importance from the connection of the one with France, and of the other with Eussia. Sweden, like Norway and Denmark, has had its Eevolution ; but, unlike these, it had reference solely to foreign matters. Gustavus III, on his succession, having beforehand planned INTERNAL CONSTITUTION. 157 tlie emancipation of his country, avoided taking the ordinaiy oath to observe the existing laws and tlieir interpretation by the Senate, and managed to effect a Eevolution, at the time considered the annihilation of Faction, and which both of these, sick of themselves, combined to celebrate. It amounted, however, to no more than vesting in the hands of the king* the prerogative of peace and war. The result, however, was not fortunate, the Eussian Cabinet (which had bound itself by the Treaty of Neustadt to take no concern touching the form of the Sw^edish Government) found means to upset an order of things, which the endeavours of Prussia and Austria were exerted to support, and which, if maintained, would have prevented the partition of Poland. * * "His (Gustavus III) new Constitution, in fifty-seven articles, was received as the perfection of Legislation. They confen*ed con- siderable power on the Sovereign ; enabled him to make peace, or declare war, without the consent of the Diet ; but he could make no new law, or alter any already made, without its concui'rence ; and he was bound to ask, though not always to follow, the advice of his Senate, in matters of graver import. The form of the Constitu- tion was not much altered ; and the four orders of deputies still remained. On the whole it was a hberal Constitution. If this Kevolution was agreeable to the Swedes themselves, it was odious to Catherine II, who saw Russian influence annihilated by it, and who expressed her resolution to restore the system of Government which it had subverted : but the representations of Prussia and Austria induced her to rest satisfied with a barren menace." — Dunham^s JListory of Sweden^ JDenmarIc, a}id Isorvoay^ iii, p. 2U3. 158 CHAPTER II. Ewternal Helations. The internal and external condition of the Scandinavian kingdoms are so closely interwoven, that it is difficult— -indeed impossible, to separate them. All which in this rapid sketch I have attempted to do is to separate Diplomacy as acting on Institutions and as acting on Dismemberment, and the play of anterior Alliances leading to it. To the latter point I shaU now more particularly address myself. Whatever pain the decay of the two other Scandinavian kingdoms may occasion, still more lamentable is the sight of the degradation of that people who has placed in the highest historic rank the name of Scandinavia, and which is distinguished above all other European nations as the chivalrous foe of the enemy of Europe. A line of heroic princes has made the name of Sweden familiar even to our schoolboy recollections ; tlie genius of her monarchs and the valour of her soldiers have largely influenced the destiny of Europe; and to Sweden is Protestantism indebted for its triumph at the Treaty of Westphalia. But if the name of Sweden is illustrated by great and chivalrous acts, by trophies of just arms and sacrifices to honour, her name is also rescued from oblivion by others of a different character — she has marked her career in Europe by ambitious projects. Here, as everywhere, injustice abroad has borne its fruits at home — if unsuccessful, ruin ; if successful, fetters. That point in Swedish history which chiefly bears on the present subject is that of Charles XII. Py an instinct common to Erederick II and Napoleon, he felt that in the Eastern world lay the strength that could be evoked against Eussia. It was this thought that carried a Swedish army to the Ukraine, and which left Scandinavian bones at Pultava. EXTERNAL KELATIONS. 159 This apparently insane march spread through the East the fame and the name of Sweden ; thus magnified, it was re- flected on Europe with enduring splendour. It was this struggle which developed Russia's military power; Charles rendered to iier the same service which the Lacedaemonians did to the Thcbans, and further, by his failui'c first spread the delusion of her inaccessibility. Gustavus the Third seized the occasion of the war of Catherine with the Turks to retake the provinces wrested from Sweden, and to check the power of the Czarina. The windows of her palace were shaken by his cannon, and a large proportion of the Russian navy sunk ; but she knew how to raise up enemies to him at home in Faction and at sea in Denmark, and it was this enterprising Monarch who put his hand with her to a Treaty to ^'mahUain tlie Principle of the Baltic as a CLOSE SEA, lOith the guarantee of its coast against all acts of hostility, violence, or aggression luJiatever, and further to employ for that purpose aU the means in tlve power of the respective contracting parties.''^ It thus fell to the lot of Gustavus the Third to establish the maritime, as of Charles the Twelfth, the military power of Russia. G ustavus now having learnt that Ink was worth more than Gunpowder, threw the idle Sword away and took to the Printing Press. In one of the most remarkable works of recent times, — " The Danger of Europe," he exposed the worthlessness of canial weapons against a Cabinet, versed in every evil art, which knew how to contaminate and circumvent. It appro- priately replied by the Assassin's Bullet. The fleets to be excluded by the compact with Gustavus III. from the Baltic were those of England. It was Sweden who had implored, and implored in vain, their presence. The power of Sweden and of Denmark was now given to her as protection, — when at length Retaliation came, it fell, not on Cronstadt, but on Copenhagen ! Who will not mentally revert to more recent events in the Black Sea and at Constantinople ? The fates and events of these kingdoms are so closely inter- 160 SCANDINAVIA. woven that tlie catastrophe of Copenhagen affected Sweden as much as if it had occurred at Stockholm. Copenhagen had been bombarded, not merely as a remote effect of the Armed Neutrality of Catharine, but as an im- mediate one of that of Paul. Whatever the cause, by the fact, England was momentarily rendered supreme in the Baltic; but a letter from Alexander, who had just succeeded to the pos- session of the crown, to Nelson, who had just succeeded to the command of the fleet, sufficed to turn the bows of the English vessels westward, and to leave again Kussia dominant over that now prostrate Sea. She then concluded a peace with England of which Denmark was the sole sacrifice.* Denmark, not having a chivalrous monarch nor a factious people, saw in the French war no field of enterprise and no necessity of exertion ; she therefore remained at peace, profit- ing by the convulsions around her, increasing her trade and restoring her marine. It was necessary to smite -her with a second blow ; the ready hand of England was again available. But Eussia herself was at war with France and the Ally of England : how was this to be effected ? Shortly before the second Bombardment of Copenhagen, Napoleon desired to make peace, and after the Battle of Austerlitz all Europe desired peace, Eussia excepted. Negotiations be- tween England and France had been opened and carried to a successful conclusion, even at Paris itself, and every matter pending between the two Powers had been adjusted. But England and Eussia at the beginning of the war had agreed not to make a separate peace, and England, faithful to her engagements — she always is faithful to Eussia — broke * " The Expedition" {against CopenJiagen) "was imposed upon England by the frantic and deceitfiil conduct of Paul." — BelVs Russia^ vol. iii, p. 260. " Denmark alone had any just reason to be dissatisfied with these arrangements : she was compelled to submit to the abandonment of those principles for the maintenance of which she had expended so much blood and treasure, and saw herself forsaken by the very power who forced her into that confederation which plunged her into tlie war with England."— Jizf?,, p. 261-5. EXTEPtXAL TvELATIONS. 161 off tlie neg^otiation, because Eiissia wanted and Napoleon would not let her have, Moldavia and Wallachia. The French armies consequently march to the North and extinguish Prussia. The reasons now redoubled on the part of France for desiring peace, but Russia encouraged Napoleon to go on by sacrificing to him 60,000 Russians in the short cam- paign of Dantzig and tlie battle of Friedland ; and then, liaving just before frustrated liis peaceful overtures, she made this the pretext for partitioning Prussia, whom she had forced to continue the war, and betraying England, whom she had pushed into it. A faitliless ambassador of her own then betrayed to England the secret article of the Treaty of Tilsit.* The English Cabinet, thus enlightened, bombarded Copenhagen the second time. Prussia now declared against England, engaging Denmark in a reciprocal guarantee /or ^/^ tranquillity of the Baltic^ which, as she asserted, had been established with the privity of the Cabinet of St. James' s.f • The secret ai-ticle referred to Denmark ouly generally, in common ■with Sweden, Portugal, and Ansti'ia herself; it applied in like'man- ner to Turkey, whose Capital England was also induced to attempt to bombard, and with the same efl'ect as in Denmark. t " Wounded in his dignity, in the interests of his people, in his engagements with the Courts of the North, by this act of violence committed in the Balticy which is an inclosed sea, tvliose tranquillify had been for a long period, and ivith tlie privity of the Cabinet of St. Jameses, the subject of reciprocal yuarantee, did not dissemble his resentment against England, and annomiced to her, &c."- — Manifesto of the 20th October, 1807. The same document contains this passage : " Then it was tliat England suddenly quitted that apparent lethargy to which she liad abandoned lierself : but it was to cast upon the North of Europe new firebrands, which were to enkindle and nourish the flames of war, which she did not wish to see extinyuished. Her fleets and her troops appeared upon the coasts of Denmark, to execute there an act of violence, of which history, so fertile in examples, does not furnish a single parallel. A tranquil and moderate Power, which by long and unchanging wisdom had obtained in the circle of Monarchies a moral dignity, sees itself assaulted and treated as if it had been forging plots, and meditating the ruin of England ; and all to justify its prompt and total spoliation." 6 162 SCANDINAVIA. Sweden, however, remained true to England, and this found herself at war with Russia, who offered to her peace, "on the condition that the King of Sweden will without delay join Russia and Denmark in shutting the Baltic against England."* The offer was however rejected, and England proffered, for the second time, the transfer to her of Noncay. Sweden's participation in the war only enabled Russia to occupy one half of her territory, Finland. We now come to the great Event of the North, in which the Tribunal of Vienna exercised the high and double functions of grace and justice — where, passing from the meaner occu- pation of restoring rights, it proceeded to the higher duties of awarding punishment and conferring recompense ; taking a kingdom in its hand, it abstracted it from the delinquent and conferred it on the meritorious, — Denmark being punished for being on the unfortunate side, Sweden being recompensed for being on the other. But strange to say, the punished Government had been by the judges themselves forced in its option, and had voluntarily abandoned its party, and the recompensed Government was itself simultaneously dis- membered ! This transaction, unparalleled in the atrocity of its avowed purpose, but almost incredible in the perfidy of the agency employed, has been brought to light in all its details in works of unquestionable authority; " the facts," says the continuator of Bignon, "have been irrevocably acquired for history:'* recent events show that they have not been acquired for : instruction. Since the above quoted words were written loi'ther light has been thrown on the matter by a Swedish publication, which has, indeed, attracted no notice beyond the limits of Scandinavia. I content myself, however, with the exposition as it is given by the historian of Erench Diplo- macy. When Alexander met Bernadotte at Abo, in 1813, it was secretly arranged between them that Sweden at the general * Manifesto, 10th February, 1808. EXTEHNAL RELATIONS. 163 pacification sliould not reclaim Finland, and that Russia should obtain for her Noi-way, as an equivalent. Into this arrangement England entered, and engaged, if necessary, to assist in an active manner with her fleet, to cany it into effect: Norway being soon after afflicted with famine, an opportunity was afforded which the British Government did not neglect. The reasons put forward for the transfer breathed, however, nothing but goodwill, and an anxious regard for the well- being of the countries concerned. The British Government •had only in view the advantages that were to be secured by *'the reunion of the Scandinavian Peninsula, and the re- establishment of the natural limits between the two states." The Danish Cabinet replied that " it considered as efficiently natural the limits which, for two centuries, had separated its Btates from those of Sweden. No power had made greater efforts than Denmark to assure its independence, and the King w^as resolved to resist every new design against the secui-ity of his subjects. He could not adopt the principle that they were susceptible of being bartered against strangers, ^s furniture or flocks might be trucked against others — a doctrine destructive of the independence and happiness of 'iiations, the avowed object of the Coalition." To these arguments the English Minister replied by the appearance of an English fleet before Copenhagen. One of the vessels anchored at the entrance of the port, and the British agent, Mr. Thornton, landed from it. He gave the Danish Government forty-eight hours before commencing hostilities, to sign a Treaty of which the principal conditions were the concession of Norway, the instant surrender of the province of Drontheim, and a contingent of 25,000 men to conquer the indeinnities, which might afterwards accrue to Denmark. Denmark this time was not prepared to succumb, and England thought it more prudent to desist. Denmark's alliance with France had neither been the result of sympathy, nor of conquest ; but solely, as appeal's on the face of tlie 164 SCANDINAVIA. negotiations, becraise of tlie " resentment wliicli she nourislied against Great Britain," because of her previous conduct. Novr the only obstacle to her joining the Coalition was her dread of the dismemberment of Norway. She even dis- patched Envoys to London and to St. Petersburgh ; but in the meantime a Eussian Envoy was sent to Copenhagen. Count Bernsdorfs mission to London was not less to pre- vent Norway from being starved, than to negociate for its preservation. The English Cabinet interposed calculated delays, apparently with the object of insuring success to the mission of Prince Dolgorouki, — a mission which was one o-f the most unworthy diplomatic rascalities (indigne rouerie diplomatique) of which history has to preserve the accusing memory; by it the Cabinet of Copenhagen, lulled into a fatal security, suffered itself to be compromised against France :"* then the mask was dropped. Count Bernsdorf was frankly informed that England considered Norway only in the light of a Swedish province, and summarily dismissed without being suifered even to transmit to the Prince Eegent, a letter entrusted to him by his master. Count Moltke fared no better at St. Petersburgh : on his first audience, the Emperor Alexander told him that Prince Dolgorouki, if he had guaranteed to Denmark the possession of Norway, had 'exceeded his powers, and that " the engagements contracted in that respect with Sweden, and in concert with England were for ever inviolable." The Treaty was signed in the beginning of 1814, as a contract between Siceden and Denmark alone. On the same day, however, England figures as signing at the same place a Treaty of Peace with Denmark. By the 13th Article, the * To Denmark, the Hanseatic Towns were offered as a compensation if she would join the Allies. She refused the bribe, but joined the aUiance, and a collision actually took place between the Danish and the French troops ; after recording the fact, M. Bignon proceeds, ** The Danish Grovei'nment by an odious machination, thus found itself at once at war with the Coahtion, and with Napoleon who had just triumphed at Lutzen." — EUt. de France^ t. xii, p. 81. EXTERNAL RELATIONS. 165 King of Sweden engages to exercise his authority with the allies, to obtain at the general pacification that indemnity for Denmark, which he has evinced his disposition to afford by the cession of Pomeiania and the Isle of llugen.* England revives the former Treaties of Peace and Com- merce, but not of Guarantee : Denmark, independently of the former Guarantees, now naturally demanded one for the pos- sessions that had been left to her ; the omission was therefore not one of inadvertence ; indeed England took to herself Heligoland, a portion of the Gottorp territory, the possession of which she had guaranteed in 1721. Russia signs no Treaty at Kiel. It now remained to settle matters with Norway. Here there was no capital that could be threatened with Bom- bardment; but a dispensation of Providence, which might have softened the heart of an enemy or a tyrant, was taken advantage of by these diplomatic spoilers, and as already said English cruisers intercepted the grain destined for Norway, while the King of. Denmark prohibited its exporta- tion under penalty of death. That people could not be brought to believe that England was acting by a settled pui-pose, and despatched envoys to London to implore justice and mercy. They contrived to smuggle themselves into England, but the Government, dreading still the Public or the Parliament, had them seized and sent home. , The Swedish jand Danish Commissioners were empowered to use the following language (7 July, 1814) to the elected King of NorAvay. " The cession of Norway has been guaranteed by the great * Art xiii. S. M. le Roi de Sakle desirant contribuer, autant qu'il sera possible et qu'il dependra d'elle, t\ ce que S. M. le Roi do Danemarc obtienne quelque dedominagement pour la cession du royaiirae de Norvege, ce dont S. M. donne une preuve manifesto par la cession de la Pomeranie Suedoises et derilcdeEugen,elle cmployera toute son autorite aupres des hautes puissances alliees pour obtenir independamment de cela, lors d'une paix generale, un dedoinmagement proportionne pour la cession de la liorvego. 16G SCANDINAVIA. powers,* the Allies of Russia. This decision is iiTevocable. The High Powers consider this reunion'* (?) " as one of the \ases of the new system of political equilibrium, and in case of ;i"efusal the Russian General Benningsen (the same who had betrayed to destruction the Eussian army in the campaign of Dantzig) who occupies Holstein with 50,000 men is authorised to invade Schleswig and the Prussian troops will march to the succour of the Swedes. The undersigned find themselves therefore in the position of having to announce that they are not mediators between Sweden and Norway but rather HERALDS OF ARMS, whose dutj it is to insist on the execution of the Treaty of Kiel." This array of power and resolution, of cruelty and astuteness had, however, one salutary effect in breaking that bond of servility and dependence by which the smaller states arc cursed and the greater tempted. The fortunate conditions which Norway obtained depended, however, not alone upon her own dispositions, but also on the repugnance felt in Sweden itself to the annexation. The patriotic portion of that people held the acquisition to be both dangerous and unjust, and w^ere shrewd enough to suspect even the purpose for which it was forced upon them, namely, the dismember- ment, at the general pacification of a province far otherwise important — Finland. The party entertaining these views was powerful, and numbered even members of the Administration. The annexation was carried so to say by a Eussian faction as^ it was forced on Norway ultimately by a threat of Eussian intervention ; yet Eussia is innocent of the whole transaction. Eussia, be it remembered, was the patron of Denmark, and it was because of the alliance of Denmark with her that England had first devised the dismemberment. At the first treaty of Vienna the powers therefore found Norway transferred to Sweden, Swedish Pomerania, as an instalment of compensation, transferred to Denmark; and * In Bignon, vol. xiv, p. 184, the word is Quatre Puissances^ but on reference to the Swedish documents it appears to be a mieg^uota- tiozu EXTERNAL 11ELA.TI0NS. 167 Russia in possession of the Swedish province of Finland. This was not the state of things before the war ; they do not restore Finland to Sweden, or Norway to Denmark ; or even aftbrd to the latter the promised compensation. How- ever, Sweden has yet energy enough to become a party to the secret Quadruple Alliance with England, Austria, an-etaining only a portion of Holstein, but being according to the peculiar and anomalous practice of these Duchies co- regent with the king, sought in 1720 the support of Peter I of Kussia. That monarch hastened to profit by an opportunity so favourable for obtaining at once the control over both the Scandinavian Kingdoms, for the Duke of Holstein had claims, or rather pretensions, on the Crown of Sweden which were not unfavourably regarded by a powerful party in that country. By espousing his cause Peter hoped to advance the two great objects he had then at heart — objects intimately connected, ihough apparently most incongruous — the acknowledgment of the assumed title of Emperor, and the emancipation of Hussian vessels from the Sound dues. Prussia had at once acknowledged the title, and appears to have done so under the belief that it was to confer some supremacy in the North in regard to communications by water, such as belonged to the old Emperors of Germany in regard to those by land ; and that consequently the navigation of the Baltic would be opened. Under similar impressions Denmark had refused to concede the title. The two demands had been simultaneously pressed at Copenhagen and equally resisted by the Danes ; matters being in this position, Peter required the reinstatement of the Duke of Holstein — and by threatening a descent expected to exhaust Denmark by preparatives, or to threaten her into jfukKUSsion. ** His Majesty," says an old writer, " had seen himself the Court of Denmark, and was acquainted with her genius and ministry, which made him seem resolved to pursue the matter he had in dispute with her. He had two pretensions on that Crown : one was the restitution of the dominions taken from the Duke of Holstein ; the other the freedom of his ships in the Sound. The Bnssian Emperor imagined that he now saw a favourable opportunity to strike this double blow ; for if he beat the Danish Squadron built by his example, or by way of precaution, nothing could hinder his making a descent THE EUPTUBE. 183 in Jutland and Holstein; but be this as it may, by this management he obliged Denmark to run into such expenses every year as very much di-ained tbeir coffers."* Peter, however, saw that something more might be made out of the case than a mere temporary embarrassment to Denmark; and that by connecting the claims of the Duke with the Imperial House, he might extend the bounds of the inheritance of ambition which he left to his successors ; he therefore confei-red upon the Duke the hand of his daughter, and the solemnization of this marriage was the last act of his reign and life. This was the first alliance of the Czars with a Princely House, and even if the event proved not as brilliant as might be anticipated, the concession was small of a daughter doubly illegitimate, f Catherine, his widow and successor, was well disposed to carry out his views in this respect, when she too was re- moved from the troubles of this earth. The dissensions of the House of Eussia entirely altered the dispositions of her successors, and the Gottorp claims found no longer support in the policy of that Government. The King of Denmark now negotiated with the Emperor as head of the German Empire, of which Holstein is a fief; and a Treaty was signed between them, by which the claims of the Duke of Holstein on the Duchies were set aside, and a compensation of 1,000,000 crowns allowed (if claimed within a certain time). To this Treaty X the Empress Anne of Eussia acceded. Nevertheless, the Duke rejected with scorn the indemnity, and indignantly protested against this attempted interference with his Eights. His son, afterwards raised to the Imperial Throne on renouncing Protestantism, * Motley's Life of Peter I, v. iii, p. 338. t The husband of Catherine and the wife of Peter, Eadoda Lapoukin, were both alive when she was bom ; and therefore she and her son and her sister Ehzabetk were not so much as mentioned on the succession of Anne. X The prototype and antitype of the Treaty of the 8th Maj, 1852. 1 84 THE DANISH SU CCESSION". under the name of Peter III, in like manner rejected the oflered compensation, and refused to admit the validity of the Treaty. So soon as this unhappy Prince obtained pos- session of the sceptre, he prepared to recover his paternal inheritance. His suspected Lutheranism, his paraded " Ger- manism," had rendered him obnoxious ; however, he had recovered by the first acts of his government the heart of the Eussians, when these measures against Denmark* afforded to his wife (afterwards Catherine II) the m'eans of casting him from a Throne to a Dungeon and a Tomb. That Revolution which changed the face of Europe was thus connected with the Duchies. The Danish minister and party (for Denmark then had a party at Sf. Petersburgh) lent, in common with those of Vienna and Versailles, their aid to Catherine, and were initiated into the Conspiracy; on the moment of its triumph she conveyed to the Danish minister the assurance that he need be under no apprehension as to the Duchies ; but she carefully avoided concluding any- thing, and sent her husband's uncle. Prince George of Holstein, as Governor to Kiel. " Though she employed neither fleets nor armies, she kept that Court floating between hope and fear," f and so domineered no less imperiously at Copen- hagen than at Warsaw : it was enough to whisper the word " liolstein," to solve every difficulty, and to cause every obstacle to bend to her will. This course had, nevertheless, its inconveniences and limits ; the other powers were seriously indisposed, and at times resentful. The Incorporation of either Duchy was * In a despatch (not published) from IMr. Keith to Lord Crranville, July 12, 17G2, giving an account of the detln^onement of Peter III, it is stated that "the discontent among the guards was heightened by the resolution his Imperial Majesty had taken of carrying a great part of that corps into Germany, in his expedition against Denmark, which was a measure dii^agreeable to the whole nation, who stomached greatly their being drawn into new expenses and new dangers for recovering the Duchy of Sleswick, which they considered as a trifling object, and entirely indifferent to Russia." t Cast^ra, vol. ii, p. 239. THE PtUPTLTtE. 185 impracticable without war, and more might be gained by cession than by possession. So in 1707 Catherine bargained for a conditional suiTcnder of her son's rights, which was ratified by her son, afterwards the Emperor Paul, in 1773, — eleven years after her accession and pledge. Great were the rejoicings at Copenhagen : the event was celebrated by fes- tivities, and commemorated by a medal ; the victory was attributed to the talents of Bernsdorf, but the honour was shared with the gold he had lavished at St. Petersbiirgh. It soon, however, appeared that a price had been paid in another coin, that of a Secret Alliance ; in consequence of which Denmark soon found herself constrained to join Russia against Sweden, and henceforward bound in subserviency never afterwards to be broken. The " renunciation " amounted therefore to a bargain, and that of a flagitious nature. In reviewing the transaction, the disgusted reader will conclude by exclaiming, " so then this matter is settled ;" it is but the commencement, and the discussions which are to ensue take their departure fi-om the now admitted point of Denmark's obligations and Russia's magnanimity. Thfe claim of Russia was twofold : it affected a portion of Schleswig, iind a portion of Holstein ; the first was dropped entirely and unconditionally. The father of Peter had been even constrained to drop the title of Schleswig. England and France had bound themselves in a treaty of guarantee* to defend the King of Denmark in the possession of Denmark against " any foreign Power whatever who should come and attack it^." Prussia, Austria, and even Russia herself had acceded to this arrangement ; therefore no pretensions in 1773 could be set up upon Schleswig, and yet it is her acknowledgment of the state of things that has been inter- preted a renunciation. • See Treaty with Sweden, lith July, 1720; British Guarantee, 16th July, 1720 ; of France, IStli August, 1720, severally renewed and confirmed, IGth April, 1727, and 15th Marcli, 3742. 186 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. As to Holstein, the claim itself bore but on a little more than a quarter of the Duchy, and was by no means a clear case. Its admission involved a division of the fief, the In- divisibility of which was a fundamental part of the Law by which Holstein could alone be inherited. Denmark had, therefore, open to her one of two courses, — that of resisting the claim, or of negociating for its abandonment. She took neither ; she admitted the claim, and submitted to its super- cession, — " hoc fons malorum." The claim was to slumber so long as the male line of Erederick III survived; then would arise the question of Agnatic and Cognatic succession between the Duchies and the Kingdom, — here Kussia waited for Denmark: that question could not fail to arise as she had an interest in raising it. The claim which she could not have enforced at the time, she gets acknowledged by postponing, and thus reserves to herself all the chances of a future disputed suc- cession for the Kingdom itself. It is not, however, the Secret Treaty which alone she obtained as immediate compensation; she received another infinitely greater than the matter in dispute, giving her territory further to the west, lying between Germany and the sea, namely, the counties of Delmenhorst and Oldenburg. She did not alarm Europe by annexing them to her own dominions, but caused them, indeed, to be forgotten as Eussian territory, by another act of generosity : she erected them into the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg, and placed them under the apparently independent sway of the Junior Branch of the House of Gottoi-p. It so happens, however, that these counties were not absolute Dependencies of the crown of Denmark, which could cede in them no more than the rights which itself possessed. That Tenure was limited to the male line of Frederick HI, and so in likcmanner was Eussia's Eenunciation ; the bargain was therefore temporary on both sides. These countries had been transferred to Denmark in 1667 in consequence of an arrangement with the Duke of Ploen, the next heir to Gunther, THE EUPTURE. 187 llie last Count, who died in that year, and on the condition that ** if the male line of the Eoyal House should become extinct, ** that the two counties should return to them and their male *' descendants, and likewise to the Agnates of their princely "house."* I may here parenthetically observe that Bremen stands in the territory of Oldenburg as Hamburg does in that of Holstein ; that it commands the entrance of the Weser as Holstein does that of the Elbe. These two rivers are the sole outlets of Germany, and the possessor of them, if equally possessed of the Sound and the Eyder, holds the communi- cations of the whole of the North. The an'angement with Paul as to Holstein had therefore reference solely to the male descendants of Frederick III. On their extinction the Holstein equivalent reverted to Eussia, and the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg to the Duke of Augustenburg. With such claims and after such preparations, how are we to account for the fact that in the recent troubles we neither see her troops, nor hear her name, and that all the Powers or the world, she excepted, are there intei-posing by arms, or interfering by Mediation.! By this prudent reserve what fields are opened for adjustment- — what a harvest spread for ambition. ! It is now assumed that on the failure of the male line of Prederick III, no pretensions can be put forward by the Agnatic line, and that the Duchies follow of right the same order of Succession as the Kingdom. It may be so, but so recently as 1843 the perturbation of the Danish Court and of the whole Monarchy on this score was so extreme that they hailed with delight the marriage of Prince Frederick of Hesse with a daughter of the Emperor of Russia, as a means of escaping from Partition. This combination, however, failed by an accident such as even the best laid schemes are • Griiner, p. 109. t At the time this was written Kussia had not articulated a word in public. 1^5 THE DiVNISH SUCCESSION. exposed to. The Archduchess died in giving birth to a dead child, and the Emperor was at once afflicted with the loss of a daughter and a Crown :* tlie daughter indeed could not be restored to life, but other means remained for securing the Crown. Shortly after the death of the Princess, a Eoyal Ordinance appeared, which became the signal of discontent for one portion of the possessions of the King of Denmark, and falsely directed the theories and ambition of the other. From that hour Denmark and the Duchies were established as having hostile interests in which were woven up on the one side the succession of the Crown with Local Eights, and on the other, the integrity of the Monarchy with Popular Privi- leges : I refer to the Letters Patent of 1846, which declared the succession according to the Lex JRegia to be extended to the Duchies, but at the same time acknowledging that respecting " Holstein " there are circumstances which oppose our asserting with equal certitude the title of all our lines to this Duchy." Supposing this step to have been perfectly legal its effect was destroyed by this admission ; but it doubly unsettled the matter : first, by the manner in which it dealt with the Duchies ; secondly, by letting in the pretensions of a third Power — Eussia, while exciting the opposition of a neigh- bouring state, the German Confederation. The results of the measure were so unmistakeabie that they must be assigned as its object, namely, the encouragement of the Duchies to resist, and the excitement of Denmark by their insolence and extravagance. To render this matter clear I must revert to the antecedent circumstances. The House of Gottorp, so long as it had been in possession, had done its best to assimilate Schleswig to Holstein, and to introduce German ideas together with tlie use of the German language. The University of Kiel had been established with that view, and education followed that impulse long after the " Poor Emperor ! he has lost by one blow a daughter and a kingdom," — General SJcrznechi. THE RUPTUEE, 189 family had been swept away. The same policy had been recently revived by the Duke of Augustenburg, through a mere personal agency, partially making use of the Press. The Danish Government at both periods regarded this movement with indifference, and in fact, so late as the year 1842, no proposition of a specific kind had been uttered on either side. In that year the States of Holsfein were the first to raise the question of succession by the simple declaration that it was uncertain, and the Eoyal Commissioner undertook to transmit to the Government the wishes of the Assembly that 'it should be settled in such a manner as to prevent a«y possible separation. On this the Diet of the Insular portion of Denmark declared itself for the application of the Suc- cession according to the Lex Regia to the Duchies. Now the States of Holstein were violently disturbed ; they pro- tested against the pretemion of the Government to decide by itself the question of the Succession; and declared that Schleswig and Holstein were independent states hereditarily following the Agnatic Line. Such were the short and trifling antecedents, but they suffice to remove any possible delusion as to the peaceable submission of the Duchies* to an act of authority so inju- diciously exerted. It is further to be observed that at the very moment it w^as transmitted, the Lieutenant Governor was the Prince of Schleswig Holstein, and the Duke of Augustenburg, w^ho has acquired the character of the first intriguer in Europe, held supreme influence in those Dependencies, So totally was neglected every precaution, that the Grand Duke of Olden- burg instantly transmitted his protest against the act to the * " Is it supposed that the Duke of Augustenburg will sell his birthright for a mess of pottage ? or is it expected tliat the peojile of the Duchies will yield ? They will not bo coaxed, nor will they be menaced into unworthy submission. They do not want any com- promise, but they want that * separate and equal station,' to which in such an event they are entitled by tlie laws of their * common country."* — Oermanicus Vindex, in the Times, January, 1846. 190 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. Germanic Confederation. That body declared that the King of Denmark never could have intended what he had said, and that monarch politely acknowledged the correctness of their interpretation. Had the measure been a bond fide one, must not the sentiments of the Diet have been previously ascertained — must not the adhesion of at least the Gottorp Line been secured — and would not a Lieutenant Governor have been despatched to the Duchies qualified to cope -^ith the influence of the Augustenburgs, and to carry out the ordinance ? But if the Duchies were intemperate, they were not revo-' lutionary, if they were irritated by the letter of the King, they were attached to the succession of the Crown. But we have nothing to do with the Duchies, the power was' in the hands of Denmark ; she therefore was responsible for the errors and acts of the Duchies no less than for her ovv'n; ever^^thing was in her hands. That very agitation for the " Indivisibility " of the Duchies for which the war was made,* if unfounded in right, presented to the Danish Crown the most important securities, for it protected Denmark, or pro- perly handled woidd have protected her, from the invasion of Germanism, as formerly the Governing Union of these Duchies had protected her against Germany. The suggestion of the Letters Patent did not of course come from St. Petersburg, but from Paris j it was offered as a means of escaping from Kussia.f At the time I was * Mr. Wegener, after showing that Sclileswig and Ilolstein were separate Duchies originaUj belonging to different countries, and conjoined and disjoined through many centuries in various degrees by acts of violence or motives of expediency, exclaims, " And it is for this doctrine of Indivisibility that our country is deluged in blood, and Europe tlireatened with war." t At that moment the Spanish marriages were in preparation, and Louis Philippe was accused of seeking to gain Kussia to secure himseK against the effects of his ruptm'e with England. The Times said he was ready, in return for some show of countenance from a Russian ambassador, "to sacrifice everything from Cracow to THE EUPTURE. 191 made aware of the scheme by a letter, of which I obtained knowledge, from Christian YIII to the Due de Cazes, who had been sent for this purpose by Louis Philippe to Copenhagen. The Memoir of Mr. Bunsen has, however, since established the fact, as also that of an engagement on the part of France to support by arms the Danish Govern- ment if necessary.* The object of Christian VIII was to preserve the " Integrity of the Succession," a maxim soon converted into " In- tegrity of the Monarchy." Thus was let in " Union of Administration," then came " Unity of Representation." On the one side the sense of right was strained, on the other, the chord of ambition struck, — the passage was short to martial glorj^, and that involved diplomatic composition. If you wish to lead an individual into a false coui'se instil a fallacious maxim : how much easier with millions and with fallacious terms. The "Integrity of the Succession" might have been secured in two ways : the establishment of the Cognatic Line in the Duchies, or of the Agnatic in the Kingdom. There was no difficulty in either. Before 1660 the Duchies and the Kingdom had been ruled by the same line of monarchs for two hundred years, that line being hereditaiy in the Duchies, and maintained in Denmark in succession, although there only elective. In con- sequence of the Revolution of that year, the Crown there was also rendered hereditary, but with the admission of females, and hence arose the difference between the succession of the two portions of the United State : but the Lex Begia of 1665, Constantinople;" and the Morning Chronicle, the official organ, pointed to tlie scaffold as the consequence of his betrayal of the interests of France and Europe. * " It was only too much to be feared that the plan now proposed was nothing but the execution of the project which the late French Government had recommended, and as it appears with a decided promise of French support against any claims of the Gennanio Diet and the German Nation." — Bunsen, p. 31, 192 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. was not a fundamental law, beyond the establishment of despotic power, and any successor of Erederick III could " alter, repeal, or dispense with " every existing law. Chris- tian YIII succeeded to this unlimited power and by a stroke of the pen could have brought back the old "Unity of Succession with the Duchies." "Were it not so, the Law itself has been virtually repealed by being broken in two points, and these its principal pro- visions. It settles conjointly the succession of Denmark and Norway, expressly stating, in section 19, that both kingdoms *' shall remain undivided in the possession of one absolute and hereditary King of Benmarh and Norway .^^ In section 2^ it is enacted that the Kings of Denmark and Norway enjoy " uncircumscribed and unlimited power and authority in the strongest sense that any other Christian hereditary and despotic King can be said to enjoy the same, * * * * and for the further strengthening of the same, we will and COMMAND that whosoever presumes to speak or act anything which may be prejudicial to our absolute power and authority, be proceeded against as a traitor to our Crown and dignity, and be severely punished, as usual in cases of High Treason." Thus then the Lex Regia has been extinguished by the Congress of Vienna, and there no longer exists the Potentate from whom it emanated, viz. a King of Denmark and Nor- way. If it did remain in force Christian VIII would have been, and Erederick VII w^ould be, together with the minis- ters of both, liable to the pains and penalties of high treason; having plotted to subvert " that absolute sovereignty," by the introduction of a Constitutional form of government. It is to be remarked, that the hereditary and absolute character and quality of the Monarchy were esentially com- bined; that the hereditary was auxiUary to the absolute; that the absolute was the aim and purpose of the State reasons of that time : whence it is to be inferred that the absolute cha- racter cannot be attacked without destroying the hereditarj', either in regard to the legal or the political view of the case. THE EUPTURE. 193 The object of the Revolution of 1660, was the establishment of despotic power : the introduction of a Constitution vitiates the proceeding, and nullifies all its consequences. It re- mained to revert to the anterior state, or to create a new one. In the one case the Crown of Denmark again becomes elective ; in the other, you must deal with the succession of the Crown as you have with the Institutions of the countiy. But supposing that Denmark had been indisposed to accept the Line of Augustcnburg — ^a supposition not entertained at the time, it then would have remained to obtain the consent of the Duchies to the Cognatic succession under the Line of Hesse ; but in that case, it had to be proposed to them, not enforced on them. By this course it certainly was possible to fail, but by the course adopted it was impossible to succeed, except indeed by civil war. The integrity of the succession had therefore been sacrificed to Prince Frederick of Hesse, * the son-in-law of the Emperor, who was himself excluded so soon as he lost his wife. No one has denied the facility of this adjustment. •• It is clear," says Mr. Bunsen, " that the late King of Denmark might have easily prevented the disruption of his Estates, by establishing, in virtue of his absolute power, the male succession in Denmark. But whether an overthrow of the male succession in the Duchies flattered certain dynastic propeimties (/) and national vanity^!), or offered the additional attraction of the prospects of getting rid of ancient incon- venient constitutional liberties (/), this very simple means has not been adopted."! A manner so lax of dealing with a question so grave, in a document purporting to be a State paper, put forth in justi- * "Wliat can be more strange than tlie dropping of this candidate? Would he not have served the purposes of the Treaty as well as Princess Louisa and licr husband ? Is it not clear that the object was tlic displacing of the intervening heii's : who Russia chooses to put out of the way of course is never after heard of. There are cir- cumstances, however, of a dehcate nature affecting the legitimacy ot that family which have placed them at Russia's mercy. t Memoir to Lord Palmerston, p. 25. 194 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. fication of an Invasion, and in prospect of an European war arising out of the event, fills the mind with astonishment. The only conclusion to be drawn is, that the case was inten- tionally embroiled. Every passion and every frailty of humanity, had been called forth to obscure the judgment of the parties in a matter in which a Eoreign Power had so great an interest at stake. It was, in fact, a contest between the Eussian and Danish Cabinets : Denmark having no man equal to cope with those employed by Eussia, the consequences which have followed must, under similar circumstances, follow in every transaction, public or private. We now pass to the second stage : we have closed the chapter of "Integrity of Succession;" we come to that of " Inte- grity of Monarchy," — the generous concession of Legislative Amalgamation, replaces the abortive act of Arbitrary Power. It is in the spirit of our times, not by ambition, but on principle to concentrate power ; customs, rights, are held to be only distinctions which separate men and impair the strength of Governments. This is the blight on every political ex- periment ; by it despotism reaps the victory, whenever the people wins the battle. It does not therefore suggest of necessity any profound or malignant purpose to hear of a Constitution proposed by the Danish, or any other monarch, for " the whole of his States ; " yet a prince like Christian VIII, could not have fallen into such a scheme either through liberalism or inadvertence, which were neither to his nature, antecedents, nor his circumstances. In the case of fractions nearly equally balanced, the vulgar doctrines of Centralisation could not apply, and he had before his eyes the experience of surrounding nations. The last event which had disturbed the tranquillity and threatened the peace of Europe was an attempt to impose on a population of 300,000 souls, in the Pyrenees, the b&ne- fits of a liberal Constitution; and although the Queen of Spain at the head of ninety-seven and a half per cent, of the Spanish people, against two and a half per cent, was backed by the active interference of England, Prance, and l^rtugal, yet did she run a naiTow risk of losing her Crown, and after THE EUPTUEE. 195 the expenditure of forty millions sterling, and the periodical devastation of Spain during six years, did these ancient liberties of that trifling popidation triumph in the Conventioii of Bergara over the power and the wisdom of civilised and Constitutional Europe. Or going back to the last century, did not a similar cause biing on those disturbances of Eui'ope which ended in the great llevolution of France, and caused to England the loss of her magnificent Transatlantic possessions ? Was not this a result of her wishing to cooce-ntrate Administrative power, and giving undue extension to Parliamentaiy authority ? A more recent and apposite experience is presented by Eassia herself, — a fact which, though hidden from the eyes of Europe, could scarcely be unknown to Christain VIII, The Cossacks, little as it may be suspected abroad, are not a mere troop of irregular horse, but a constituted Eepublic separated from Eussia in a far more distinct manner than the Duchies are from Denmark ; they admit no Eussian to civil or military rank or post, and utterly repudiate the Eccle- siastical pretensions and usurpations of tlie official Eussian Church. An Ukase was published assimilating their Admi- nistration to that of the other provinces of the empire : their contingent had by precaution been already despatched to dis- tant frontiers ; nevertheless the Deputy Hetman instantly sent orders for the regiments of reserve to rendezvous at the point of th«ir teiTitories nearest to Moscow. Tlie Emperor did not accuse them of beginning the war, but with an army of 1,200,000 men at his disposal explained the Ukase as a mistake. It is possible to conceive that Eussia should seek to get rid of a Constitution which interfered with her nuKtary system and religious miity — that the doctrinaires of Madrid should attempt to efface a contrast that put to shame their constitutional freedom when sustained only by a population insignificant in nimibers — that England should have erred in estimating the'strengtli and dispositions of a colonial popula- tion, unarmed, unorganised, unrepresented, and only an out- lying portion of her immense domains ; but that Denmark 196 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. should have, out of her own head, de\dsed an Administrative union with the Duchies is too preposterous to believe. The Government of Copenhagen had neither project of conquests nor of religious concentration with which their rights or creed interfered ; these provinces were neither insignificant nor remote ; there could be no mistake as to their disposition or their power to resist ; they compose two-fifths of the popida- tion of the kingdom, and constitute one half of its wealth; without them Denmark is nothing — less than nothing with them in arms against her. Denmark furnishes exclusively the maritime force of the kingdom, of little or no avail against the Duchies : and a contest would assuredly give to them powerful allies, and draw down on her the chances of a terrible retribution. Dismemberment was not then the limit of the consequences to be apprehended from such a design, but was one so evident as not to escape the penetra- tion even of a child. Christian VIII is gathered to his fathers, and Fre- derick YII reigns in his stead. The dying King addresses a letter imploring him to walk in his footsteps ; the successor with Oriental deference kisses the signature, and with filial piety obeys the command. Within three days the benevolent intentions of the new monarch are announced by a Procla- mation. The Constitution was not, however, absolutely enacted. The King called on the different portions of the kingdom to elect in common with himself, men of trust and experience to advise respecting it. He declared at the same time that the "existing Laws and Institutions of the Provincial States'* should be respected, and also " the existing union of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein." The Duchies were not Bcduced by the ofi"er of equality, the temptation of controlling the Exchequer, or of seeing the Parliament held in their tenitory alternately with Copenhagen: but they did not conceive that the case was desperate, and proposed to comply with the orders of the King to select advisers ; these were not empowered to concur in any centralized representation, and were intrusted to speak and advise in an opposite sense. THE RUPTURE. 197 Up to the middle of February, 18i8, nothing had been done that could not be recalled. The caution of the mode of procedure, tlie determined manner in which it was met, alike gave promise of the adoption of a course which should prevent the catastrophe of civil war ; and this solution was the more to be expected from the fact that, in the then, reigning agitation of men's minds, the Crown of Denmark, which had ever had a leaning towards those Dependencies which, in the Chancery style of Denmark were "personal" to itself, had in the Duchies a sure support. The Dews of Faction, however, watered the Seeds which an Enemy had sown, and the popular party prepared the way for Russia's Combinations at Copenhagen no less effectually than at Berne or Bucharest, Paris or Palermo. We must now glance at the internal events which reversed in a few days the relative position of the parties. There were on the accession of Erederick VII, three parties : tliat of the Court, that of the Liberals, and that of the Ducliies. The Court looked to the Duchies as a Bulwark against the popular Invasion, and deprecated an amalgamation which would reduce them to a powerless minority. It sided therefore, with the Duchies, and both were united against the Radicals. The objects of the Liberals were the diminishing of the Royal Prerogative, the establishing of a Representative Constitution, and a Centralized Administration ; with these views, the facsimile of those of Paris, they associated "Dan- ism," the counterpart of the "Germanism" of Erankfort. In both points the obstruction they met, and the danger they had to apprehend, proceeded trom tlie Duchies : there Avas b,^ • army of which the King could dispose — there a place oi refuge whither in a possible contingency he might fly. The Duchies at once presented a popular triumph to achieve, a Danish territory to assimilate, and a German principle to subdue. The practical point was the rupture oftheii* Federal Bond.* * Their watcliwoi'd was " Denmai'k to the Eyder." iN'o doubt, Den- mark extended to the Eyder and beyond it : it was not the question of power that was raised, but the figment of imifonnity, and tliis 198 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. Holstein, backed by the German people, and linked to the German Confederation, it was dangerous to attack, and hope- less to subdue ; Schleswig could be attacked and subdued only by isolating it. The plan was therefore simply this — to incorporate Schleswig and cut Holstein adrift; hence the anomaly of a simultaneous proposition of "Incorporation" and " Separation." By this single blow they expected to gefc rid of German interference, to extend Danish nationality, to deprive the Crown of a German fief, to take from it the sup- port of the Aristocratic Duchies, and place it in a position in which it could no longer resist the elevation of Parliamentary Privilege on the ruins of royal Prerogative and Popular Plights. liow had such a debate been reserved for the fourth century of the co-existence of these Estates ? for one half that period the Danish Crown had been sufficiently despotic and not moderately ambitious. Had they become more powerful, or the Duchies more weak? No, "Germanism" and "Danism" had arisen. Now will be understood the object of the proposal of the King, in the nomination of " men of experience." He was himself to nominate sixteen, eight for Denma-rk, and eight for the Duchies ; Denmark was to choose eighteen, and the Duchies as many. The sixteen nominees and the eighteen men of the Duchies secured to him a majority against the Eadicals.f Now came the news from Paris. Everywhere it is the same story : be it Bucharest — be it Palermo — be it Presburg — be it Vienna — be it Berlin — be it Copenhagen — be it "Sendsburg ; at each events are, at the close of February, furor of "Denmark to the Eyder" has deprived of all teiTor, *' Russia to the Sound." t The Eoyal Power was attacked tlirough the Duchies : the Court Ministry were held up to public odium as " Datmh Sclileswig- Holstein." In the Fcedrelandet (the movement paper) the Ministry of Count Molkte is denounced for having for its principal object "the preservation of Holstein," and he is charged with being equally ready to sacrifice " Danism in the one Duchy, and GermanUm m the other." THE EUPTURE. 199 184S, conducted to that point where the narrator has to say, **Now came the news of Paris, and the explosion took place : " " Preordinations of good luck " * too systematic to be misunderstood ! The Molkte ministry fell. The men of the Clubs, the men whose watchword was "Denmark to the Eyder," who had threatened to write with the sword the laws of Denmark on the backs of the Duchies, came into power. There were no longer three parties : the Court was absorbed into the Liberals, and nothing stood in the way of the plans of the Casino. Schleswig was now to be a Danish province, and Holstein cast to Frankfort, or any otb.er monster, with an appetite for the meal. These measures were of course no justification for the re- volt of the Duchies, but is it to be expected that the people of the Duchies should be more wise than the people of Copenhagen ? the insanity was in the air, and each has load enough of shame without added thereto that of criminating the other. The Danes deny to-day that intimi- dation was used to their Sovereign ; the Duchies, that they had claimed anything beyond their former privileges ; in fact they both had a fit of delirium which they have now forgotten. If both were wTong, so both were right ; for the wrong of each was the justification for the other. The following statement has been furnished to me as explanation and justification of the proceedings of Denmark : " On Januaiy 28th, 1848, the King signed an ordinance, by which he conferred a Constitution on his States, with a common Chamber for the Kingdom and the two Duchies, to be assem- bled regularly at fixed periods in places to be determined afterwards, and alternately in the Kingdom and the Duchies. " The Constitution was to be submitted for examination to Deputies, of which the majority should be elected by the Provincial States, the same number for the Duchies as foi the Kingdom, though the population of the former was not equal to that of the Kingdom. •*The Separatist party in the Duchies did not conceal * Lord Malmesbiuy. 200 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. tlieir dissatisfaction at this Hof/al act of favour. On the 17tU of February, 1848, an assembly was held at Kiel to consult on the steps to be taken, and it was decided to choose Depu- ties opposed to the Union. " Whilst parties were in this position of mutual appreJien- uon and embarrassment, intelligence arrived of the events at Paris, and the Schleswig-Holsteiners regarded the opportu- nity arrived for realizing those projects. A meeting of members of the States of the two Duchies took place at Eendsburg the 18th of March, 1848, when it was determined to send a deputation to Copenhagen to represent to the King the desires of his subjects in the Duchies, and the state of the country. *' The establishment of a separate Constitution for Schles- wig Holstein, based on universal sufltrage — formation of a civic guard — complete freedom of the Press and of meeting, — immediate union of Schleswdg to the Confederation — im- mediate dismissal of President Scheel : such were in substance the demands addressed to the King. " Messrs. Beseler, Reventlow, Preetz, and Bargum, were authorised again to convene the Assembly in case of emergency. The Deputation left Kiel the 31st. "Tlie news of the Assembly at Rendsburg reached Copenhagen early in the morning on the 20th, together with the intimation that the Deputation would arrive two days after. The sensation it caused was very great. That evening (20 March) there teas a great meeting at the Casino (club), when it was determined to solicit the king to change his ministry and elect another wdio had sufficient determination and energy to defend the rights of the crown in regard to Schleswig, whilst yielding to Germany what should be demanded in regard to Holstein. The following morning a deputation presented an address to the King, who replied that the Ministry was dissolved, and another should be formed, which did not take place until three days afterwards (24th). It is superfluous to repeat that the King could not give an answer to the Deputation of Kiel before the formation of the New Ministry. They therefore could not leave Copen- THE IIUPTUEE. 201 liagen before the evening of the 24ili. But before their departure tlie revolt had already broken out in Holstein. The niglit of tlie twenty-third or twenty -fourtli, without waiting for the reply of tlie King, it was decided at Kiel to appoint a Provisional Government. The Prince of Augus- tenburg immediately repaired to Eendsburg on the morning of the twenty-fourth, where he seduced the garrison to embrace the side of the revolt, on the pretext that tlie King was a prisoner at CopenJia[/en.^^ This ex parte statement of Denmark may, if we except the opinion respecting the Royal A et of Favour in the conferring of a common Constitution, be taken, also as that of the Duchies. . After all, Denmark has lost the Duchies and herself ; what satisfaction can she dbrive from saying we can demon- strate the Divisi])ility of the Duchies ^- — we can prove that the Agnates had no right. About the same time that the Duchies elected Christian I the Principalities on the Danube gave themselves to the Sultans of Turkey. In the course of the four hundred years that have since elapsed, that Empire has passed through the extremest vicissitudes ; the Provinces in question have been the field of furious wars and tlie object of the fiercest con- tention. There is no region, probably, of the earth that has more severely suftered, and that under circumstances which might justify the people in charging their misery upon their Sovereign. Contrast now the dispositions of Wallachia and Moldavia towards Turkey, and those of Schleswig-Holstein towards Denmark : " Turkey to the Pruth " was never a watchword in the Streets of Constantinople. " These provinces were not a conquest of the sword, tliey * Mr. Wegener lays gi-cat stress on the change tliat was made in the Arms of Denmark in 1721, by removing those of Schleswig from the Shield of Pretence, and placing it in eliief in quarter with the Danish Arms. The argument is indeed conclusive against the case set up by tlie Duchies, but it establishes against Denmark all that it is requisite to establish. 203 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. yielded themselves voluntarily to the Empire, and the Sultan has no power to dispose of them save by their own consent.'* Such on one occasion was the reply of the Poi-te to a Foreign Power. With such maxims a state may endure even in face of Eussia, and even without capacity. The crisis of the Duchies in 1840 had its exact parallel on the Danube. The Principalities went quite as far as the Duchies : they declared their entire Administrative Inde- pendence, inaugui'ated their Provincial Government, and institirted even their Civic Guard. On the other hand the Porte went quite as far as the Casino Government of Copenhagen : it seized the chiefs invited to a confer- ence and carried them off ; it fulminated a manifesto against the Eevolution, and appeared ever to sanction the en- trance of foreign troops to put it "down. But yet there was no animosity of the Porte against the VVallachians, or of the Wallachians against the Porte : on the con- trary, there was the most perfect reliance of each upon the other : how are we to account for this extraordinary difference in exactly similar cases ? It is simply that the Wallachians and the Turks were men of more sense than the Danes and the Schles\^dg-Holsteiners ; but sense is natm-al to man — folly is exotic; it is never reason that has to be accounted for, but eiTor. The Turks and the Walla- chians, besides the advantage of having no theories, had the good fortune to know tlieir enemy : it was the presence of 60,000 Bussians which constituted the bond of their amity ; it was the concealment of the hand of Eussia that suffered the mutual animosities of Denmark and of the Duchies to fasten upon each other. Look at the results. Schleswig-Holsteiners ! where now are your "ancient rights ? " — Danes ! where your " liberal constitution? "* * *' Pendant que les autres nations de I'Europe sont aux prises avec des questions de vie materielle et d'existance sociale, le peuple russe vous demande la Turquie, (La Danemark) en compensation de son servage et en recompense de sa docilite." — L' Occupation do Constantinople. Par un Piplomate Eusse, p. 5. 203 CHAPTEK IT. Interposition of Prussia. The Duchies are up, Rendsburg is surrendered by the Banish Commandant in his dressing-go\Am, and they muster about 5,000 men. But the Danes, who had already been taldng their measures for the occupation of the country, suddenly enter with double that force, drive them from their positions, and they fly to the Eyder ; and here this silly affair would have ended had not a foreign army presented itself on their path. The Quixotic regiments were not transported by a magician's wand, but conveyed to the spot comfortably by a railway : they were no band of sympa- thisers — no, nor even an Auxiliary Legion : they were the troops of a Great Power which, by a single word, might have stopped the quarrel. Now, without so much as the mere form of a Proclamation, they enter the territories of thd Danish King, they do not, even like footpads, say, " Stand, and deliver !" This act has been explained, simply with reference to immediate interests and ephemeral doctrines : the sympathy of the Germans for the Duchies, the necessity in which the King of Pmssia stood to conciliate favour at Berlin, the necessity of crushing the . revolutionary elemrent,* the influ- * " It was only tlie wish to prevent the Eadical and Republican Elements of Germany from exercising any pernicious influence that Lad moved Prussia to the steps she had adopted ; tlie idea of a North- Albingian Repubhc being apt to endanger Denmark as well as the neighbouring frontier of Germany," — Note of Major AVildenbruch, the Prussian Plenipotentiary to the Danish Government, April 8, 1848. " The King considered himself in duty bound to take measures in 204 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. • ence wliicli liad been acquired over him by the Duke of Augustenberg, &c. No doubt that the movement was poi^uhir at Berlin ; but will this account for the conduct of the King of Prussia ? Without the encouragement which he had afforded, and of which the evidence is to be found in his autograph letter to the Duke of Augustenberg, never could the Duchies have hazarded that step ; the declaration of his resolution to maintain the rights of the Agnatic Princes and the Duchies, had it been a bond fide one, would have been transmitted to Copenhagen, not to Augustenberg. He prolonged the war, by ensuring the defeat of his own troops and his allies ; he sacrificed at the settle- ment all he had contended for by arms ; not being thereto constrained, but acting as a party to entrap others. To understand, then, the motives of Prussia, we must revert to antecedent transactions explanatory of her permanent interests, engagements, and necessities. At the close of the last war, Prussia had been reduced to the iX)ndition of a tliird-rate Power; at the peace, she was recon- structed into one of the first order, tlu'ough the influence of Eussia. All her neighbours were dismembered for her advan- tage, — Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Hanover, Saxony, and Poland. It was to coerce the resistance of the Congress in this respect, that the Emperor Alexander spoke of the " million of bayonets confided to him by Providence." Kussia did not act by caprice, but by careful and profound calculation ; she was, in fact, securing to herself a "German Empire under a second name." Talleyrand so successfully strove at the first Con- gress of Vienna to convince the other Powers of this danger, that lie induced England, Prance, Austria, and Sweden to enter into a secret defensive alliance against Russia •and Prussia ; to counteract which, as alrea^Iy stated, Eussia had recourse to the opening to Napoleon of his prison doors at order to prevent the movement in Lombaixly, from taking a Repub- lican dii-ection." — Note by tlie Sardinian Minister Pareto to the British Ambassador at Tuiin, lilareh 23, 1S'18. INTERPOSITION OF PRUSSIA. 205 Elba. From that time the conduct of Prussia has iuvanal)ly confirmed, alike the fears of "(.'alleyrand, and the expectations of Russia. » During the Russo-Tui'kish war of 1828-9, a Memoir was drawn up by Russia's ablest diplomatist, on her relations with tlie different Powers of Europe ; that memoir has been published, and removes every ambiguity ; Prussia is disposed of in a single and short paragraph, as a Government which can give to Russia no umbrage. " Prussia," says he, " a son role tout fait." Her rule is that of encroachments (empiete- mens), " and the objects of her amhltlon under her hand.'' It was in Germany that these encroachments were to take effect — she was to balance, then subvert, Austria. The present King did not yield to his predecessor in those qualities and in that ambition (if the word may be so employed) which had been signalised in his predecessor. To him was made to apply the old monkish prophecy, Pastor expectat gregem, Germania, regem. And it failed not to be remarked that his accession had occurred in the con-esponding year of this century to that of Frederick the Great in the last, and of the great Elector in the one which had preceded it. Pmssia was one of the first victims of the explosion of 1848 ; she was not only swept internally, but was nearly driven, by the, revolutionaiy fury, against her northern Protector. The King succeeded in turning on the Poles the popular frenzy excited against Russia ; then a diversion was furnished in the Puchies for the young fervour so troublesome at Frankfort, so alarming at Berlin. But it was not that a door was to be opened to military enterprise ; revolution was to be shamed by discom- fiture, and to be put down by disgrace. It thus happened that the immediate objects at home of the King of Prussia exactly tallied with Russia's objects in Denmark ; and tlie service which would have been required from his unwilling obedience was no less grateful to hia character than convenient for his position. 206 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. An Invasion is, however, a war; and although we have dispensed in these days with the forms requisite to legalise war, there has, as yet, been no such act without a printed gloze of some description to cover it; an Ultimatum — a Proclamation — or, at all events, a Treaty, or a Protocol. Here there was nothing of the kind. It is the first point that presents itself, and it is of the deepest importance, because such a document must have appeared unless there was an impossibility in the way ; the impossibility was that of adducing any specific statement whatever. The Pmssian Government could have committed itself, then, to no asser- tion, either in respect to what it claimed, or to what it purposed. A declaration of war required a previous demand of redress, and there was none; a manifesto required at least an enunciation of principles where the purpose was to betray the very cause that was professed; the Prussian Government coidd march its troops, but could not open its mouth. In this dilemma it adopted the expedient of publishing a pamphlet in London, to wliich importance was given by calling it a Memoir addressed to LordPalmerston by ^Mr.Bunsen. But even this pamphlet does not professedly undertake to explain the Invasion and to justify the war — ^it is a long, rambling piece of special pleading, and the Invasion is slipped in in a post- script, as if a mere piece of news, confirmatory of the writer's apprehensions. The Prussian Minister is careful privately to throw discredit upon his own production, by describing it as the child of enthusiasm and zeal, in the parturition of which, he had obeyed the mere instincts of his generous nature, and which was likely to compromise his official, and to extinguish his diplomatic, existence. Mr. Bunsen has at least proved that in this age devotion is not extinct, and that men are to be found ready, like the Persian of old, to undergo any mutila- tion of face or fame, when there are despots to serve and Babylonians to circumvent. Stripped of misrepresentation and other verbiage, Mr. • Bunsen's argument is this: Schleswig andHolstein areinse- INTEEPOSITION OF PRUSSIA. 207 pai'able; therefore, Holstein being a German fief, Sclileswig is Grerman also : and thus, Prussia is justified in making proposals to cut Sclileswig in two ; because the Danes reject the proposal they make an " attack on Germany," and Prussia is jus- tified in " repelling force by force." When in the Postscript he learns that this force has been employed, the Prussian troops are described as having entered to support the "basis OP MEDIATION," and because " to have waited one MOMENT LONGER WOULD HAVE STULTIFIED GERJfANY." * After this the King of Denmark is frankly told that he has been befooled from the beginning, * for that nothing was easier than to have settled the succesbion, without mixing up with it other matters." Why was not this stated in 1846, or in 1844 ? Why is it urged in 1848 as a railing accusation? But this is a Diplomatic Document : where is the reply ? what did England say to it — what to its publication? Here is an enigma. Did England accept this view of the case, or did she not? two months solved the difficulty; after the parties are fully compromised, England steps in with an offer of mecHation, which is the echo of Mr. Bunsen's Memoir, and the ct tinterpart of Russia's proceedings.f Now let us see in what strain jVfr. Bimsen deals with Bussia. It is utterly impossible that here We shall not detect him if he be playing false. He begins by asserting (at p. 3), that the question possesses no European interest because of the generosity of Russia in renouncing her claims. Was this tme ? If false could he be mistaken. Further on (p. 19), he contradicts himself, not by saying that Eussia had not renounced, but by asserting that she had no claims to * Memoir, p. 58. t " First, that the Duchy of Schleswig be divided into two parts with reference to the German or Danish nationality of its inliahitants^ tlie southern and Gt^rman part being to be called the Soutliem Duchy ; the Northern or Danish part being to be calied the Northern Duchy. On the other liand, Northern Schleswig would bo attached by it* law of succession to the Crown of Denmark, and the sovereignty 0¥ THAT Duchy would be inseparably united with the Danisli Crown." — Lord Palmerston's Proposal of Mediation^ June 23, 1848. 208 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. renownce. What riglit had My. Biinsen thus to dispose of the claims of Russia ; and if it be the Pmssian government that speaks, how has it not ascertained the views of the Eussian government respecting its own claims. Can any one believe that the Minister of a Power so dependent, and an individual so astute, should venture such a sneer on such an assertion of his own caprice ? Such language on the part of Prussia and such conduct could never have been endured had it not been commanded. While Mr. Bunsen relieves the mind of Europe from any anxiety in regard to Russia in respect to this special case, he is far from blind to lier ge;ieral purposes; in this respect no man can be more watchful, or alert. He places before the Danes and the Duchies, who, of course, had never dreamt of such a thing, the appalling fact (after the quaiTel is made) of the longing to possess the Sound * by a neighbouring sovereign who "never yet refused the appeal of a king whose despotic tendencies had aroused his subjects against him." It never rains but it pours ; Mr. Bunsen might have done something if he presented his one Giant to the imdivided gaze of his audience, but he manufactures a second ; Eussia is ambitious, but Prance is active. If Eussia covets the Sound and loves Despotism, these after all are mere affections of the mind, — the practical danger is from Prance, who has prompted the schemes of the King of Denmark — who in fact has created the Schism in the Duciiies ! * Mr. Bunsen, on pldlosopliical grounds, namely, the civilisiiig and the " Japhetismg " of the Orientals, professes his anxious desii-e to see the power of Kussia established on the Bosphorus. On Ger- manic grounds, he devotes himself to preventing her ascendancy on the Sound. He is, no doubt, not destitute of valid reasons- by which to reconcile the apparent discrepancy, if disci'epancy there be. To his diplomatic management Kussia is cliiefly indebted for the present result : she is possessed of no agent more indefatigable or tortuous ; none have worked for her with more consciousness or premeditation ; he is to be found at every corner with a different story, and able to effect for her what her avowed agents could not •ccouTiplisli. INTERPOSITION OF PRUSSIA. 209 How, it may be asked, could bare decency permit the introduction into a State paper of propositions so imseemly and contradictions so preposterous ? It is managed in this manner ; the " Memoir " is preceded by a " Preface," and that "Preface" is under another name. The anonymous indi- vidual, if I may so call him, is the introducer of jNIi-. Bunsen to the British Public ; it is Mr. Bunsen who publishes the Introducer and the Introduction ; the Memoir attacks France, the Introduction Russia. Although it is anticipating events, yet with a view of present- ing connectedly the part which Prussia has taken I shall here introduce her share in the conclusion of the matter. After being a belligerent in two campaigns, having taken up arms for the defence of the rights of the Duchies and of the Duke of Augustenburg, she withdrew from the contest, making a separate peace -with Denmark in which nothing was stipulated in reference to the causes of the war. It would have been natural that such conduct should have been cloaked by some form of conditions, however deceptive — some pretext of nego- tiation, however hollow ; but exactly the opposite course was pursued. She paraded, and in an epigrammatic form, her treachery to the Ally whom she had compromised ; and tke peace she signed was known tlu'oughout the World as the " Paix pm'c et simple." This " Pure and simple peace " was a peace with a secret article, and that secret article was an engagement to sanction beforehand whatever the King of Denmark chose to do. * Why was this article secret ? Having thus tied up her hands, she ostensibly figured in the conferences as a recusant. She refused to sign, with England, Denmark, and Russia, the Protocol oiiginally proposed, and while she thus held out to the Duchies the semblance of pro- tecting their interests, she made her adhesion to the Protocol * « AHicle Secret, le 2 Juillet, 1850. "S. M. le Roi de Pvussc s'engage h. prendi-e } art aux negociationa dont S. M. le Eoi de Daiiemarc prendra I'mitiative a reffet de regler I'ordre de succession dans les etats reuiiis sous le sceptre de S. M.. Danoise.** SIO THE DANISPI SUCCESSION. contirxgent on the modifying of one of the original ph4*ascs in. '^uch a manner as to exclude the very mention of their existence, and the substitution of another which implied that *' Integrity of the Monarchy " which has been construed to signify the extinction of the Duchies.* ^lien this Protocol was converted into a Treaty — the Treaty of the 8th of May, 1853, her Minister in London was actively employed at once in extorting the reluctant adhesion of the English Ministry and in threatening the parties v»^hose lights were disposed of into submission and silence. A course so systematic could not have resulted from mere blindness. The Cabinet of Berlin must have been fully- possessed of the bearings of the case as affecting no less the interests of Prassia, than of Denmark, and of Europe. These I am able to give in the words of the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affaii's when the Treaty was signed. " Having been for some time occupied with this affair, I have come to a most intimate conviction concerning the embarrassments and positive disadvantages to which Prussia would expose herself by the signature of the London Protocol. No human intellect has as yet been able to devise any advan- tage that might be obtained for Prussia by such a proceeding, for there is not a fable in the range of mythology less credible than the supposition, that the policy of Denmark should more closely join the North of Germany and Prussia in consequence of the union with the Duchies being rendered perpetual. On. the contrary, it is the irrational hatred of the Duchies against everything that is German, more especially against Prussia, * Troposed Draught of the Protocol, Proposed emetula" «S. 2. En consequence Elles reconnaissent Hon ly Prussia. la sagesse des vues qui determinent S. M. le Boi de Danemarc a regler eventueUement Vordre de succession dans sa Eoyale maison de maniere a faciliter les arrangements auxj moyons desquels f les liens qui rattaclieut les I f " I'integrite de la Duches de Holstein et de Slesvic a la monar- monarchie Danoise chie Danoise demem^ent intactes." I demem-era intacte," INTERPOSITION OF PRUSSIA. 211 which will be perpetuated by such a lasting union. Wliy then increase hostile influences in the North of Gennany. The policy of Prussia will at last be all but shut out from anything like free movement in its proper temtoiy. Would your Majesty have chosen to labour for a pei-petual union o Hanover mth England ? or would your Majesty have chosen to interfere in hostility to the Basque Provinces, which were then defending their Fueros, and their Male Succession ? Sire^ the Duchies, too, had their Fueros, and they will in future stand up to defend their Male Succession. In attempting to break the Legitimate Succession in the Duchies, violently and without a free remmciation on the part of those concerned, the dangerous principle of Arbitrary Power is installed in the place of positively existing Hereditary Rights ; numerous Preten- ders, and families of Pretenders wiU be established, the seed of futui-e insurrections and those in favour of Legitimacy will be liberally sown. If your Majesty should give orders to sign the London Protocol, your Majesty will at all events sooner or later be obliged to interfere in favour of the illegithnaie course, against the right and the interest of the Duchies, and even against the interest of your Majesty's own dominion. I pray to God that your Majesty may, at any risk, keep yourself free from establishing the Principle of * Integi'ity * which is not in existence, but 'wMch is only in- tended to be artificially created. The right of Denmark with regard to such " Integrity " has hitherto no other foundation than her own desire. And your Majesty can find no difficulty in keeping yourself thus free, if you shall think fit to adhere io the old declaration given once by Prince Mettemich, and by the late M. de Canitz, and which has since been maintained, viz. that the proposed principle of * Integrity ' is not to be pre- ferred, but that it is to be postponed to the Principle of Legitimate Succession, — that is to say to the Right of the Agnates, and that it is only after all the "parties concerned shall Tiave freely renounced, that there can be any question of the Principle of Integiity." * * Memoir to the King of Prussia, by M. Usedom, 4th Feb., 1851« 212 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. That these objections were not considered frivolous, nor their views visionary, is proved by the fact that J\I. Von Usedom was not dismissed from the service, and that he was selected to conclude this very negotiation. What a picture have we not here of the public morality of Prussia ! No doubt can be, I think, now rationally entertained that every step taken by Prussia was collusive. Such indeed is the present universal impression of the people in favour of whom she appeared to interpose ; the first words that saluted me in the Duchies* were, " the Pnissians were our enemies, not the Danes ; they came with orders to spare the Danes and sacrifice us." We must now turn to tlie military events which have left behind them this impression. • This clmpter ou the Interposition of Prussia is now added. 213 CHAPTER IIL Tlie War. The war was, so to say, extingiiislied at its birth. Scarcely Had the insurgent forces assumed an attitude and occupied positions, when the Danes, akcady prepared for the Invasion, of the Duchies, entered and di*ove them before them. In fact the Danes consisted of a well-conditioned, equipped, and commanded force of 10,000 men. The hasty gathering of the Duchies amounted to but lialf the number ; but when on the 23d of April they met in their flight 14,000 Prus- sians crossing the Eyder to their support, and learned that all the neighbouring States were pouring forth their thousands to join them, matters assumed a diflerent aspect, and the desperate and triumphant ca\ises changed sides, — that is to say, the aimy so lately in pursuit was exposed to being annihilated, finding itself hemmed in in its sudden retreat between a dyke and a defile on the North of Schleswig ; but the first exercise of the Prussian authority was to sound the recall, the reason assigned being that it was the hour for dinner. The soldier on the battle-field is not the best judge of the combinations by which battles are won, or of the blunders by which they are lost ; and the reputations of generals are not staked upon the evanescent impressions of a camp : but there are cases in which he who runs may read, and where a camp follower may see as clearly as a strategist. Such was the case at present ; and beside the fact of the impression made upon troops as yet destitute of experience, we have hat of the result. Moreover, a vehement altercation took place behveen the Commander of the troops of tlie Duchies and 214 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. tlie Prussian General, to whom the latter replied in these terms : " The responsibility rests with me, and not with j^ou. Nothing is lost. The Danish army wiU be annihilated in a week ; and it is but fair to reserve some of the laurels for the troops of the Confederation." The Hanoverians, Mecklenbrn-gers, Oldenburgers, Bruns- wickers, pour in by railways, and General Wrangel found himself at the head of 50,000 men, five-fold the number of the retreating foe, and dispositions were made for a hot pursuit the following morning. At four o'clock a.m. the infantry were under arms, and the cavalry mounted, but no word "march " was given. There they stood, the men under their accoutrements, the cavaliy on the backs of their horses, hour after hour looking on while the Danes quietly defiled. At nine o'clock, that is to say after five hours' fatigue, the pursuit commenced. The Prussians were pushed out so as to (mtflanh the retreating force, on the right and on the left. The Confederates however, under the Duke of Brunswick and General Halkett fell upon them. Immediately was sounded the Prussian recall ! In this multitude of nations it was diffi- cult to prevent liberties being taken incompatible with militaiy discipline. The General was urged at least to send a body to intercept the retreat of the Da»nes to the Isle of Alsen, where they would take refuge under the guns of their ships. He is reported to have replied "God only knows where they will go !" The Duke of Brunswick was so indignant, that after a stormy discussion v/ith General Wrangel, he refused to take any further part in the Campaign, threw up his command in disgust, and returned home. The Danes had positively been suffered to return, and carry off the baggage they had aban- doned, bringing their horses to reyoke to the waggons and guns. Tlie Danish force being expelled and the Duchies freed, what remained to be done ? Surely it was to open negotiations with Denmark. No, Denmark was to be invaded ; General Wrangel entered Jutland by orders from. Berlin, and in defiance of the Protest of the Schleswig-Holsteiners. * * *' Prince Frederick of Sclileswig-Holstein, the then Commander of • THE WAB, , 215 At least then the object must have been to press the war to a conclusion ; there were no Danish forces in Jutland, the Danes, at the utmost, amounting to 15,000 men, were in the Isle of Alsen, where they were observed by a superior force of the Confederates, who mustered in all 53,000 men, whilst the main body of General Wrangel, who had taken care to carry with him the Sclileswig-Holsteiners, were in Jutland. Nothing, therefore, prevented his occupation of the whole mainland, but he remained perfectly inactive. Notwithstanding the superior force under General Halkett, stationed opposite the island of Alsen, the Danes were allowed to cross the strait, to establish a tete du pont, to construct a bridge, to seize on the heights which commanded it, on them to build redoubts, and plant heavy artillery ! When these works had been completed, he commenced operations, by besieging them, he placed his troops in a half circle round Duppel ; this point being in direct communication with the tete du pont and the island, could in a single night be occupied by the Danish force which would then find itself in the centre of the Germans, and be able by a sortie to beat and destroy them in detail. This was foreseen by the whole army of the besiegers, except the General, and it was executed with equal facility and success by the besieged. On the 28th of May, at the dawn of day, the Danes feE upon the Germans with their entire force. Halkett sent aides- du-carap to order one division after another ; each in suc- cession arrived too late. But where was General Wrangel ? in the north of Jutland ? No, he had returned into Schleswig ; and had entered it four the Troops of the T)\xc\i\es,jprotested and remonstrated agoxnst passing the frontier of Jutland on the 1st of May, 1848. This measure was not only suggested, but 'imperatively ordered by General WrangeL' Piince Frederick represented that the Ducliies carried on a wholly * defensive' war, and not an * offensive' one. He then wanted hia corps to be left as a reserve to tlie Confederate Army on the northern frontier of Schles\\'ig. This too was overruled, and this forced step furnished one more argument to prove the rebelhous intentions of th» Duchies." — Note by a Schlesvoig-Holsteiner, 216 . THE DANISH SUCCESSION. days before the catastropJie of Liq^pel ; the distance was but twenty leagues; lie was marcliing to the support of the Germans but he also arrived too late. The murmurs of an army beaten and baffled at every turn by an inferior force were not to be restrained, — something had to be undertaken. An attack was now made on the Danish redoubts, and the Prussian guard was led to the storm, but fortune did not favour them ; at all events it could no longer be said that the Prussian General had orders " to spare the Danes and expose the Confederates." Their reciprocal position having now been rendered suffi- ciently interesting and dramatic, Denmark and the Con- federation come to an arrangement; surely then the affair of the Duchies is settled. No, it was not for this that M. de Cazes had been sent to Copenhagen, M. Bunsen's horn winded in London, and the Prussian recall so often sounded in Schleswig. In this arrangement the Duchies are entirely forgotten ; England is, however, at hand to take up their, cause ; she strides into the arena as Mediatrix. Nothing can happen in Europe, Asia, in the New World, or on the coasts of Africa without a London Protocol — could the Duchies escape ? The case was sufficiently grave and sufficiently urgent,. nor liad the English Government been taken by surprise, yet the matter to tins moment had been wholly ignored ; whilst the war had raged her minister had been called upon for explanations — had admitted that England was bound by the old Treaties of Guarantee, which as we have seen had been dropped in 1814 ; it was consequently expected that he was taking measures for carrying that Guarantee into effect ; when this hope had proved delusive, he explained his conduct by saying that the Guarantee, though it did exist did not apply to the present case ; by this ambiguity both parties were encou- raged and each believed it had the support of England. Aftei* the campaign had worked itself out, then England interposes to mediate. Prom that mediation the results are that six months are afforded to the bellic^erents to recruit their strenoih.. THE WAK. 217 This course of England is perfectly parallel to that of Prussia, who secured victories to Denmark while she lent armies to the Duchies : and as the military failures of the one are ex- plicable by no inexperience of the General, so are the diplomatic mistakes of the other referable to no incapacity in the minister. The Campaign of 1849 opened by the entrance of 20,000 Danes into Schleswig. The Duchies mustered a nearly equal force, consisting, however, in a considerable degree of German volunteers and Prussians; they were commanded by a Prussian General — Bonin, who had been sent by the Cabinet of Berlin to supersede the General of the Duchies. * There soon arrived 50,000 troops of the Confederation, of which nearly the half were Prussians ; in fact, the Duchies furnished to the King of Prussia a Siberia and a Circassia, where the turbulent found occupation and the seditious repose. The Danes were speedily driven back, and, following them, the Scldeswig-Iiolsteiners entered Jutland, and were soon joined by the Prussians, under General Pritwitz, who had succeeded Geneiiil AVrangel. He divided this powerful Army into two bodies : the one, composed of Prussians and Hessians, was sent in pursuit of a body of Danes, a third of their number ; — the Schleswig-Holsteiners, to the amount of 14,000, were despatched to blockade Eredericia, which was ojjeti to the sea, of which the Danes had the command ! The heights of Goulsk, three leagues from the fortress, were ci'owned with redoubts : these were taken by assault, and * Wliilst Prince Frederick, General-in-Chief of the array of tljo Ducliie!?, \va3 in Schleswig trying to reorganise his troops, a deputy? at the Diet at Kiel obsei-ved, that " Fortune favoured tlic Duchies by giving them the opportunity of obtaining a distinguislicd Prussiau oCicer as their general, whose appointment would avert such disastvards by a communication from the Se- cretary of State for Foreign Affairs to one of the excluded Princes, who, begging to be informed regarding the nature and conditions of the instrument by which the ancestral rights and honours of his House, the independence of his country, and his private property and possessions were disposed of, was referred to the henceforward memorable shops, No. 6, Great Turnstile, Lincoln's-Inn Fields, and No. 32, Abingdon Street, Westminster, where the Treaty was to be obtained for a penny. English diplomatic correspondence is generally of a heavy description, but there are occasions upon which it can become lively, that is, when it happens that in " making up the policy of the Cabinet," there is incidentally a nation to ci-ush, or an individual to insult. The article in the Times -^ proceeded from " authority ;** the Treaty was signed on the 8th; it appeared on the 11th, and required at least two days for composition ; it did not proceed from an Bmjlhli authority ; for while stamping the responsibility on Lord Malmesbuiy it refers all the honour and credit to others. It contains, moreover, details with which tlie English Government could not have been ac- quainted, and falsifications of which it could not be guilty, f According to the Thms it is a truly British Document, it is not only a Treaty, but it is one of native manufacture. Inquiring one day in a shop for a travelling bag of Russian leather, some domestic calf skin, slightly perfumed, was offered for my admiration and acceptance: demurring somewhat, the shopman haughtily replied : " Sir, I warrant it ! " Thus it is .with the British public ; it must accept as the occasion may be, a " warranted " bag, or a • The article will be found in extemo at the end of the Chapter. t For instance, it reuresents the Princess Louisa as granddaughter of Frederick YI. TREATY OF AL\Y. 237 ** wan-anted " Treaty, from the tradesman of Bond Street, or Printinir House Square. There is however this diflerence, that it is equally difficult to obtain a bag that is Russian, and a Treaty that is not. This Article in the Times might appear to indicate a very superfluous care for the enlightenment of the English Nation, but in fact it was not to instruct England in respect to Denmark, but to overawe Denmark in the name of England. The sli])s of type, incomprehensible to the British public, were to be the declaration of England's judgment, and the exposition of her policy. Not a line appeared in any other paper. AYell has a Russian diplomatist said, " The Press is ■a Power which no intelligent Government will neglect ; " with what ease is it wielded when one Monster Journal, like Aaron's rod, has swallowed up all the rest. Now let us look «t this Treaty. It commences as a Treaty of Guarantee for the maintenance of the " Integrity of the Danish Monarchy as connected with the general interests of the balance of Power ; " solar the countei*part of the Treaty of 1840 in respect to Turkey. Now the maintenance of the Integrity of a country has no referenoe to internal laws, but foreign aggression. In this there is no Guarantee given for the Integrity thus introduced. The Turkish Treaty of Integrity was to effect, as far as it could, the hereditary Separation of Egypt and to sanction the occu- pation of Constantinople by a Russian military force. The Danish Treaty of Integrity is for the transfer of that Integrity to Russia by the subversion of internal law. It goes on to state that the means of securing this Inte- gi'ity is by the devolution of the Crown " upon the Male Line to the exclusion of Females:" that is, it abro- gates the Lex Beg'ia. ArtiC'.e first declares, that with the assent of the various Cognates, and by their Renunciation?, the Crown is to devolve upon Prince Christian of Gliicksburg. This is in a breath admitting and denying the Lex Regia ; for though the Tnncess Loui.sa and his descendants might come in by the 238 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. renunciations of tiiose that stood before her, for which no Treaty was required, her husband could not so come in. But in the preamble the Male Succession is introduced to the exclusion of Females, whilst Prince Christian is made to renounce (in the letters of Eenunciation not presented to Parliament) eveiy claim in his own right, and to acknow- ledge that he comes in merely in virtue of the rights of his wife. The Article then goes on to declare the Princess Louisa to be " born a Princess of Hesse by order of Primo- geniture from Male to Male,'' (What on earth has this to do with the matter ?) and thereafter the Succession is to follow the ^^ Issue Male in the direct Line " of this Marriage. But why is Prince Christian necessary to secure the In- tegiity of the Danish Monarchy ? What superiority has he that he should be preferred before Prince Prederick, or the others who stand above him ? What excellence is there in his dii-ect Line that all behind it should be cut off ? Why should a daughter, or a granddaughter of his be less qualified than a son, or grandson, to wear a Crown, transmitted through a female, and the integrity of whose possessions has been secured by the care and wisdom of all Europe ? The mean- ing of the Integiity is the supercession of Russia's Holstein claims; those having been admitted, she drives her bar- gain. Prince Christian suited her on account of these various reasons which render the Treaty monstrous and con- tradictory. By fixing on him she forces seven renunciations from the Cognates, that of Princess Louisa included, and cuts out the whole of the Agnates, who would come in after her and before her husband as Cognates. She admits him on the condition of excluding the Females and the indirect branches of his own line, so that on their failure the whole of the ascending and descending Lines are utterly excluded. These are the grounds upon which the Protocol of Warsaw asserts that the " Integrity of the Banish Monarchy can be realised under no other consideration'' But Prince Christian has to accept the Crown on condi- tions the most extraordinary. He has fii'st to renounce all TREATY OF MAY. Sa9 right in his own person ; he has secondly to accept the office merely as a delegation from his wife — a delegation in itself illegal, since by the Lex Regia no princess mamed to a reign- ing King can succeed. He however contributes his share to the figment of con- joint succession. Princess Louisa brings the inheritance exclusive of Holstein ! Prince Christian brings the Ilolstein inheritance ; but here again he is only a Locum tenens. " What," says the Danish report, *' has been brought into effect by this transaction ? His Majesty, the Emperor, has deigned to transfer the exeecise of the rights which he may have on Holstein to the Prince of Gliicksburg and his male descendants."* Thus, in the person of Prince Chris- tian of Gliicksburg, does Russia enter into virtual possession of Denmark, not only by the power she has exercised through her Allies in disposing of the crown at her good pleasure, but, also, by the very terms on which that crown is to be held, elaborately set forth in numerous acts of renunciation reciprocally obtained from the very parties who are put in possession, no less than from those who are excluded. When in 1773, Russia first devised her renunciation in favour of the male descendants of Frederick the Third, at least no violence was done to the established order of succes- sion ; yet the two renunciations are accepted as identical in nature. By the one she bided her time, by the other she has aeized it. There is an old maxim, " crawl to get up, and stand when you are on the top :" it is not, however, applicable to Prince Christian. The hill-top to which he will ascend is itself commanded, and it is depressed by his elevation. Denmark, long sunk under the weight of protection, has, by recent events, especially the war and the enormous debt which it has entailed, and then by the Intervention been wiped out from the number of independent States. But this is not alL In all the adjustments, care has been taken to ensure * Report, p. 33. ^ 240 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. invalidity ; Pretenders can be raised up against him on every field and on every principle. Russia holds tliem in leashes in her right hand and in her left; and she can upset a Dynasty of Copenhagen as easily as one of Paris. By the second Article, the high contracting parties, on the failure of the House of Gliicksburg, " engage to take into consideration the further propositions which his Majesty the King of Denmark may deem it expedient to address to them.'* This King of Denmark will be the one so set up. While the rights of inheritance are laid prostrate, the faculty of the People of Denmark to dispose of itself in like manner disappears.* When I first advanced this view of tlie case, I was not aware that the Ai'chivist of tlie Danish crown, the strenuous advocate of the Treaty, in so far as regards the line of Gliicksburg, went to the full extent of my objections on tliis point. He says, " should Prince Christian and his sons die -without male successors, who would then inherit ? no one is alle to answer that question. Denmark would be disinherited by the abolition of the Lex Eegia, Holstein would invite a crowd of Pretenders — Augustenburg, Gliicksburg, Imperial Russia, and Oldenburg Princes." It is very possible that these Pretenders may arise, but there is another possibility which comes first, and that is, that Russia shall herself claim as Heir-general. As the Gottorp line branches off from Prcderick I, that is to say before the establishment in Denmark of Plereditary Right, such a pretension might have little Aveight in a court of law; but wdth this Treaty before us, it must be evident that in the Coui't where this matter will have to be decided, the objection * " We are not ignorant that tlie arguments wlncli may be drawn from stri(!t right to prove that the election of a successor by concert. of the Khig and the Danisli Diet, would in that alone be obhgatory on the countries dependent on the Danish Crown. Hut these arguments are not generally admitted, and above all it appears that the Govern.' ment does not achnoioledge their force : it is therefore to be deskad that they should never be advanced," — Heporf, p. 54. TKEATT OF MAY 341 will have none. Thus she resei-ves the threefold chance — nomination to the Crown, Pretenders to be set np, and Heir* ship'General ; to be used according to circumstances. But before these comes another, which is a certainty. Before the Treaty of the 8th of IMay, the Holstein claims might as a last -resort have been disposed of by the cession of the district ; now it cannot be got rid of, it is a millstone fastened round Denmark's neck. All other claims are abolished by Treaty, all other Succession in- terdicted, all right of the Danish people to act for them- selves destroyed; the Holstein claims alone maintain, ad- mitted by Denmark, recognised by the Powers. When then the Male Line now set up comes to be extinguished by the course of nature, or the decree of fate, the Heir to the fraction of Holstein will find himself Heir to the entire monarchy, the maintenance of the Integrity of which, as the Treaty tells us, is so intimately "connected with the general interest of the balance of power in Europe," and of such high " importance to the preservation of peace.'* As was natural, this Treaty, which " stidtified " * the Governments which signed it, produced a similar effect upon the people for whom it was intended. The Danes, lost in its contradictions, while crushed under its weight, vainly endeavoured to fathom the purposes for which it was signed, or to discover the principles upon which it proceeded: to such a pitch did confusion rise, that the opposition in the Diet was based upon the Treaty itself. The learned writer to whom I have already referred, speaks as follows : — " Neither this London Treaty, nor the Warsaw Protocol, however little we may admire the pen of the publicist who excogitated the latter, really contains anything which compels the Government to throw up the succession for the kingdom of Denmark according to LexRegia. The contracting Powers * "This Treaty is a masterpiece j it has compromised and stul- tified every Minister aud every Cabinet that has liad anything to do with it. Thank God it was no work of mine !" — Words aftrthuled to Lord Mahneshury. 243 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. undoubtedly executed these Treaties under the suppositioa that this law of succession would remain as before, only the person of Prince Christian being temporarily and for the nonce inserted. They could never dream of the Danish Government in direct contradiction to the 'note* laid before them, wishing to sacrifice the hereditary right of the Danish dynasty, and thereby transfer all legitimate claims into the hands of the Kussian Gottorp house. The contracting Powers are there- fore justified in complaining that the unexpected plan now laid before the Parliament constitutes a new Danish State* right, one which they were by no means prepared to support when they concluded the Treaty in question."* He continues : — " TJie abrogation of the Succession hy Lex Hegia moJces tks House of Gottorp the sole legitimate ^rete^ider to Holstein : THE INTRODUCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE ' INDIVI- SIBILITY OF THE Monarchy ' enables this Pretendek TO extend his claims TO THE "WHOLE OP THE DANISH Kingdom. Could the Great Powers have signed a Treaty to change first principles and make the Danish monarchy a Eussian Gottorp secundo-geniture." Up to the time that the Treaty was signed the questioa was never mooted as to Eussia coming in as Heir- General, or as succeeding to the whole in virtue of the fragment of Holstein; the piece had been a travesty of Hamlet with the part of the Prince of Denmark left out: there had. therefore been no necessity to argue against an objection, never raised ; in fact Hussia was heard of as renouncing claims, not as advancing pretensions. It was not tDl after the 8th of May that this view was presented, in this country, in my own pamphlet, printed and circulated within the same month, and towards the end of the year by Mr. Wegener's pamphlet, circulated in the Copenhagen Diet. These opinions gradually found their way to the public, • C. F. Wegener's ' Defence ior the PuU Hereditary Eight/ p. 21. TIffiATY OF MAY. 24.3 iittised opposition in the Danish Diet, and created consider- able alarm in influential quarters in this country; Russia now found herself under the necessity of counteracting the effect, and her manner of doing so is highly characteristic of the power of secresy. Individuals have sought explana- tions from the Eussian Representative, andj after having received them have altered their tone. I speak not of soli- tary instances; the very same words have been repeated at remote points : — *' I can assure you, that after the Line of Gliicksburg Russia tvill not come in." Pressed for expla- nation, they have refused any; invited to state what it is that is to prevent her coming in, or who it is that is to come in in her stead, they have declined to open their lips. The uninitiated will, no doubt, be startled by such a state- ment; they may suppose that money is the argument in such cases employed. No doubt money is there if necessary, and in heavy sums too ; but that, I say it by no means to the credit of the pai'ties concerned^ is seldom required. A government that has an object is so entii-ely master of those which have none, that it can work with the most trifling means : it only can meet with intelligent opposition in the case of an individual in a position of authority or influence, who combines in his own mind the faculties, and has worked out for himself the elements of knowledge which accrue to her from the long operations of her system. Such incidents must be exceedingly rare, if indeed they can be said in any . case to be possible ; as well expect that a man, by natural intuition, should be able to lay down a railway, as that a European Statesman should be able to cope with a Russian Diplomatist. The individuals to whom in the present case I refer, when nnder the necessity of making a public declara- tion, speak in this fashion : " The designs of Russia are very alarming, and consequently all Europe ',is on the alert, so that no apprehension need to be entertained that she wiU be allowed to come in for Denmark :" the Danish minis- ter expressed himself thus in the Diet. Such is the theme 244 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. of tlie * rrtidrelandet,'* which plays at Copenhagen the part of the ' Times.' Mr. Wegener's pamphlet above quoted was made the subject of a note from the Russian Government calling upon Denmark to declare herself; to avow, if she entertained them, her suspicions, or to punish the traducer. The author was disavowed, and although not displaced from his official situation, criminal proceedings have been takea against him before the Courts. This, then, is the point upon which Eussia dares not explain herself. Before adverting to its solution I must notice two general maxims enunciated in the Treaty. The succession in England is Female as well as Male, and so is by law the Succession in Denmark : why should England * The day aftor my arrival at Copenhagen, that paper in a ve- hement article, of which I got the credit, dwells on tliat feature of the Testament of Peter the Great, which prepares the double iiheritance for Russia of th6 Black Sea and the Baltic : it tells a story of a miraculous image of the Virgin Mary being constantly kept in a travelling carriage and four horses waiting in tlie Palace Yard for the moment when it is to start with the cortege of a Russian army for Constantinople ; it continues : " With regard to the Sound, it is a different busmess altogether. Here there are no religious groundsi* Doubtful and mipopular hereditary claims are not possessed of the power which religion exercises on popular passions. In the Sound instead of Legends, there are but hereditary pretensions ; instead of the Holy Virgin, we have but IIolstein-Grottorp ; and in the place of the travelling carriage and four, the second article of the Treaty of Loudon. More powerful agents will be required to render Den- mark and the North, Russian. The remainder of Europe besides ioill look with Jealousy on such mews on the part of the Czar; the evidences of that jealousy are getting more numerous from day to day (!) In the mean time it is well enough that we should all of us watcli and pray lest we fall into temptation, and it is more especially the bomiden duty of every Danish administration with the utmost care to avoid even the semblance of a Russian Protec- torsliip. It is by such means that Russian policy in our days, like the Roman poUcy of old, encu'cles the minor states by ties, which will in a short time cost them their independence." TREATY OF MAY. 245 adopt the principle of exclusive male Succession ? I put aside for the present, the results, and I ask on what English prin- ciple could this declaration be founded — does not a Queen sit upon our throne ? On what Danish principle could it be founded — is the Princess Louisa a male ? What Interest has England in the Integrity of the Danish Monarchy ? I speak not of the Holstein claims, but I ask how, after proposing the separation of Schleswig into two parts, and treating during three years the Duchies as independent of the Succession of Denmark, you can sud- denly proclaim the maxim of "Integrity?" Is this to be accounted for by anything that has appeared? Even if you had in nowise sanctioned the pretensions of the Duchies, and if these pretensions were gi-oundless, what right have you to interpose and decide the matter ?* Let ns look at the case with the help of the map. Supposing Eussia to extend her dominion, or her influence, over Den- mark, then if the Duchies were separated, the present Canal of the Eyder might be enlarged for the passage of sea-going vessels, and not only would the controlling power of the Sound be destroyed, but a channel opened, saving a cir- cuitous navigation of nearly 400 miles ; it must, therefore, be a primai-y object for England, from the moment that the substantive independence of Denmark is perilled, to separate from her the Duchies, f • See note at the end of the chapter cm. the " Distinct Successioo of Denmark and the Duchies." t " The question of the Sound Dues is moi*c closely connected with that of Succession in tlie Duchies than may be evident at first sight. By the new Tariff of the ScUeswig-IIolsteiu Canal, to commence from May 1, 1850, the number of articles subject to duty has been reduced from 518 to 240. The preference can only be expected to be given to the Canal passage, if the expenses of the latter, com- pared with the Sound Dues, will hold out the prospect of a clear saving to the shipowner and merchant. This reasoning will hold good in the case of these parallel water communications being placed under the control of two different governments, when the Canal duty on the one hand, and the Sound duty on the other, will 246 THE DANISH SUCCESSION. Before you had mped out the intermediate Lines, before you had limited the Gliicksburg Line itself, before you had established the principle of " Integrity," you had, if you interfered in the matter at all, one thing to do, and it was the only intelligible object fen- the interference *©£ Foreign powers, to obtain, or enforce, Russia's renun^ ciation of her claims on Holstein. This was the bar— the only bar to the union under the Cognatic Line, or to the separation ; this was the only ground of Russia's inter- ference, and consequently the only danger which it involved. In 1773 the renunciation was made, but with a limit; in 1853 it is again made, and again -wdth a reserve. Why did not the Powers require that it should be absolute? the Transaction in 1773 was between Denmark and Russia alone ; then there was no " additional pledge for the security of the peace of Europe;" in 1852, this " additional pledge " is a sanction to these groundless claims. ; The claim, I say, is groundless, and if it were not, the Powers had no right to admit it since they had not examined it. If they interfere for "the peace of Europe" they cannot proceed upon Denmark's voluntary submission. It is groundless in feudal law, except as a claim upon the whole Duchy of Holstein, which is not advanced. If grounded, it is extinguished by compensation already received. The renunciation of 1773 was purchased by a Sea-et Treaty which gave to Russia the faculty of disposing of the military and naval power of Denmark for her own aggrandisement : this faculty has been exercised in a manner to ensure that aggrandisement, and that not only at the expense of others, but also at the expense of the territory areciprocally act as a regulator upon eacli other. RiYal interests will secure every facility to the public ; whereas, in the opposite case^ any fui-ther reduction of the Sound dues would depend upon the issue of the repeated negotiations, in which Eussia vrould once more enhst on the side of Denmark j or to say more justly, of tliat clienfc of hers whom she might have succeeded in raishig to the joint dominion of the Kingdom and the Ducliies." — Pi-ofessor Wiirm to liord Palmerston on the Schleswig-Holstein Question, p. 16-18. TREATY OF MAY. 247 and power of Denmark itself. It was first called into operation when Gustavus III of Sweden was waging a successful war against her in the north, and the Turks waging one which might otherwise have issued favourably for them upon the Dnieper. She made use of the Treaty to cause Denmark to attack Sweden ; breaking the power of that State, she was enabled to terminate the war in the east in a manner which soon put her in possession of the Crimea and the Euxine. The results were still more profitable in the north : the ai-med Neutrality followed, the prostration of the Scandinavian Kingdoms, the dominion of the Baltic, and finally the anni- hilation of Denmark's maritime power by England's reta- liation. These i-esults are permanent ; they are not offered back, now that she resumes her right to a fragment of Hol- stein by a new renunciation a thousand times more pro- fitable than any possession. Let it be remembered that these Hereditary claims of Eussia flow from an illegitmate daughter of Peter I married to the heir of the line of Gottorp, whose son ascended the Russian throne by a revolution. It may indeed be said that these consequences of the Secret Treaty depended upon the possession of other means and their use, and that if abiKty had been on the side of Denmark, and inability on the side of Russia, as it might have been, the Treaty would have borne no such fruits. I can admit to its fullest extent the objection, and place the issue solely on the next count. She got Delmenhorst and Oldenburg conditionally on her renunciation. On her resuming her claims they were to revert to the Agnatic Line, or say, to Denmark. Can she simultaneously use the renunciations and possess the equiva- lent ? Was not this the point which the Powers had to examine ; until they had decided upon it could they have treated with her at all ? •> In the negotiations not a word is dropped respecting the grand Duchy of Oldenburg, it is ceded to her absolutely by silence. If so, what claim can she have on Holstein f 248 THE. DANISH SUCCESSION. Was there then any difficulty in treating for her renunciation, leaving it even at her option to retain the one, or to retake the other ? But I am understating the case ; it is no longer a poi'tion of Holstein, but Holstein altogether. In the three lleports presented to the Diet on the 10th January, 1853, the expres- sion of " portions of the Duchy of Holstein" is never intro- duced except when speaking of the King of Denmark ; wheu the claims of the Emperor are mentioned, it is as bearing upon the " ancient Duchy-fief of Holstein." In reference to the Grand Ducal portion acquired by the cession of 1773 this expression occurs : ^'doubts piecail as to the validity of the said right of inheritance, the pretensions of the Gottorp Lines, and the Koyal Danish House being in conflict. It w^ould appear, however, that the be?