GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN 'r J ,s (JEXERAL VON STEUBEN From Original by Earle, 1786. FREDERICK WILLIAM VON STEUBEN AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AIDE TO WASHINGTON AND INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE ARMY. WITH ACCOUNT OF POSTHUMOUS HONORS AT VARIOUS PLACES. BY JOSEPH B. DOYLE. AUTHOR OF MEMORIAL LIFE OF E. M. STANTON, JEFFERSON COUNTY TWENTIETH CENTURY HISTORY, ETC. Under the Auspieces of The Stanton Monument Association STEUBENVILI/E, OHIO THE H. c. cooi; CO. 1913.' rv : LIMITED EDITION THIS EDITION OF LIFE OF GEN. VON STEUBEN IS LIMITED TO SIX HUNDRED COPIES, OF WHICH THIS IS NO.. 130 • . . Copyright, 1913 by . : /faefh B. Doyle. .Rubtished, October, 1913. TO THE SOCIETIES OF THE SONS AND DAUGHTERS AMERICAN REVOLUTION WHOSE EFFORTS TOWARDS PRESERVING THE MEMORIES OF MEN AND EVENTS WHICH SECURED THE INDEPEN- DENCE OF OUR NATION, HAVE BEEN SUPPLEMENTED BY ALL THAT MAKES FOR CIVIC RIGHTEOUSNESS AND GOOD CITIZENSHIP THIS VOLUME IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED. PREFACE An apology seems scarcely necessary for offering to the reading public at this time a new biography of Baron Frederick William Von Steuben. It frequently happens that one's true place in history is not fixed at or near the period when the events in which he participated occurred, but long after, when the lengthening perspective allows a more mature and better judgment of what the characters were or what they accomplished. This is true especially of the Revolutionary heroes. So far as Washington was concerned there was never any serious doubt as to his position, although even he did not escape the detraction of factions or disappointment of friends. But, like the sun, whose influence is so decided that there could be no question as to it being the controlling factor in holding and regulating the whole solar system, Washington's figure looms so far above all others connected with the Revolution that the superiority so generally accorded him by his contemporaries has only become more evident with each succeeding year. Great, however, as he was in patriotism, enlightened in statesmanship, skilled in mili- tary affairs, albeit most of his early experience was in the backwoods, he was but human, and even his most enthu- siastic admirers will not claim that he could have brought his wonderful work to a successful issue without the counsel and assistance of the strong and capable men he gathered around hm. In fact there could be no better tribute to his genius than recognition of the fact that in his mind petty jealousy was non-existent, and that in chosing his immediate military family especially he rec- ognized no qualification save loyalty to the cause, viii. PREFACE integrity of purpose and ability to carry out the work assigned. Opinions may differ as to the relative standing of these associates, but there can be little doubt as to the two most closely allied to Washington in that memorable conflict whose skir- mishes, as Napoleon has justly observed, changed the entire history of the world. These two were Alexander Hamilton, whose great achievements towards laying the foundations of this Government we are just now begin- ning to appreciate, and the subject of this biography. This latter statement may surprise some who have regarded Steuben simply as a drillmaster, but it is sus- tained by a close study of the facts. From the time he joined the famishing little army at Valley Forge until he received the overtures for the surrender of Corn- wallis at Yorktown, he was at Washington's right hand, planning campaigns, looking after the troops, bringing order out of chaos, turning defeat into victory, and, on more than one occasion averting what threatened to be a fatal disaster. It is saying too much of any one man to assert that without him the conflict for freedom would have failed, although it certainly appears as though Washington was very nearly if not quite in that class, but where the scales are so closely balanced as they were more than once during the progress of the American Revolu- tion, it is not too much to say that had it not been for Steuben the result at that time might have been different. Prof. G. W. Greene in his able monograph, declares that : "In the military history of our Revolution, if we class men according to their services, no one after Washington and Greene stands so high as Steuben. For the services which Lafayette rendered, important as they were, were rather the effects of influence and position, rather than of individual superiority. All that Steuben owed to posi- PREFACE ix. tion was the opportunity of action, the action itself was the fruit of his own strong will and thorough knowledge of his service. He was the creator of our regular army, the organizer of our military economy. The impress which he made upon our military character remained there long after his hand was withdrawn. His system of reviews, reports and inspection gave efficiency to the sol- dier, confidence to the commander, and saved the treasury not less than $600&,000." Although professing liberal principles it is not claimed that when Steuben first turned his thoughts to- wards America he was actuated solely by the philanthrop- ic desire to aid a struggling cause. He was still com- paratively a young man, and doubtless had his ambitions, but his every action proves the absence of any low mer- cenary motive, and from the day he set foot on American soil he embraced the patriot cause with all the ardor of his nature, in which no discouragements ever caused him to falter for a moment. The tardy pecuniary recognition which he received for his services fell far short of what he had given up when he embraced the American cause, so, that, following the example of Washington, he may be said to have served this country entirely without com- pensation. His recent citizenship naturally precluded Steuben from taking a leading place along with Washington and Hamilton in the formation of a permanent Government, but this did not prevent him from manifesting an active interest in the matter, and assisting by his counsel and in- fluence towards the preparation and adoption of the Con- stitution. Sketches of Baron Steuben have appeared from time to time in various publications, and in 1859, Friedrich Kapp published a biography which was the result of sev- x. PREFACE eral years industrious and painstaking research. Him- self a German he visited this country and made a thor- ough investigation of the Baron's voluminous papers as well as consulting other original authorities, and the re- sult was a work that will always be a valuable standard of reference. But the very detail and thoroughness of this task has prevented its popularization to the extent that the merits of the work deserved. As the city of Steubenville, Ohio, has been honored by the gift of a portrait of Steuben by one of her artist sons the present is regarded as an opportune time for a presentation of the great German's life to the people whom he served so well and so faithfully. While acknowl- edgments are freely due to pre-existing publications, with- out whose aid the present work would have been hardly possible, yet advantage has been taken of all available new material, in a manner which it is hoped will add to the value of this production. Some space is given to the efforts of Beaumarchais in behalf of American independence, not only because het furnished the means which enabled Steuben to come to America, but because his activities have been largely a* sealed book to American readers, the historians generally dismissing the subject with a line. A publication in the fifties entitled Beaumarchais and His Times, wherein original documents are first published, demonstrates that this curious character exercised more influence on French politics than has been generally been supposed, but al- though this book was translated into English it is now rare and out of print. From it we have gleaned much valuable information. If this biography shall in a measure result in aiding ever so little in giving Baron Steuben his true place in the PREFACE xi. history of our revolutionary struggle, the writer will be more than satisfied. It may be added that the original pronunciation of the Baron's name was Stoyben with the accent on the first syllable, but the American use has Anglicised it into Stoo- ben, retaining, however, the original accent. The prac- tice in some quarters of accenting the second syllable either of the Baron's name or of the city of Steubenville is without any warrant of authority. In addition to the authorities mentioned above and others referred to later, special acknowledgment is due Dr. R. M. Griswold, of Kensington, Conn. ; George W. Featherstonaugh, of Schenectady, N. Y. ; Wm. M. Storrs, Corresponding Secretary of the Oneida Historical So- ciety, and C. M. Underhill, Librarian of the Oneida pub- lic library, for valuable assistance, and to Charles P. Filson for illustrations. Trusting that this work may do something, if ever so little, towards locating Steuben's true place in history it is given to the public. J. B. D. Steubenville, O., October, 1913. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER I. THE VON STEUBENS 5 A Family of Soldiers. Rise of the Prussian Monarchy. Baron Von Steuben's Birth and Early Career. Prom- inent in Seven Years' War. Humiliation of France. Retirement. Momentous Visit to Paris. CHAPTER II. A CRITICAL PERIOD 22 Rise of a Romantic Character. Beaumarchais and the American War. Inside Movements of the French Court. A Politico-Mercantile House. CHAPTER III. STEUBEN AND BEAUMARCHAIS 38 Germain's Plans Disclosed. Meeting of Steuben and Beaumarchais. Former Concludes to go to America, the Latter to Furnish Funds. Beaumarchais Subsequently Faces Bankruptcy and Death. CHAPTER IV. JOURNEY TO AMERICA 62 An Eventful Voyage. Storms, Fire and Mutiny. Recep- tion at Portsmouth and Boston. Journey to York. The Continental Congress. Resume of that Body and its Authority. Desperate Condition of the Colonies. CHAPTER V. CONGRESS AND VALLEY FORGE 79 Final Arrangements Made. Departure for the Army. Terrible Condition of the Troops. Supplies and Dis- cipline Equally Absent. Enormous Waste. Welcomed by Washington. Appointed Temporary Inspector. Rad- ical Reforms Introduced. CONTENTS xiii. CHAPTER VI. DRILLING THE ARMY 92 Steuben's Success at Converting a Mob into Soldiers. Commendation of Washington. Congress Fixes His Status. Official Jealousy. The French Alliance. CHAPTER VII. FROM VALLEY FORGE TO MONMOUTH 101 Howe Evacuates Philadelphia. Movements Across New Jersey. Battle of Monmouth Court House. Trea- son of Lee. Steuben's Well Drilled Troops Turn De- feat Into Victory. CHAPTER VIII. REMODELING THE aRMY 124 Steuben's Dissatisfaction. Desires a Position in the Line. New Code of Army Regulations. Printing Dif- ficulties. CHAPTER IX. CAMPAIGN OF 1779 139 Steuben Reviews the Situation. Barbarous Raids. Value of the Bayonet Demonstrated at Stony Point. Visit of the French Ambassador. Suggestions For the Future. CHAPTER X. A YEAR OF EVENTS 149 The George Rogers Clark Expedition. Victories of Paul Jones and the Navy. Spain Enters the Struggle. Troubles in the South. Paper Reforms. Bad Condi- tion of the Army. Steuben's Continued Efforts. Gloomy Prognostigations. CHAPTER XL A DISASTROUS PERIOD 165 Reverses in the South. Loss of Georgia and the Car- olinas. The Army Almost Discouraged. Equipoise of Washington and Steuben. Incompetency of Congress. The Baron Outlines Plans for the Future. Treachery of Arnold. An Interesting Incident. xiv. CONTENTS CHAPTER XII. SHIFTING OF THE CONFLICT 189 Seat of War in the South. England Adds Holland to Her Enemies. At War Against the World. Greene and Steuben Sent to Virginia. Former Assumes Command of the Southern Armies. Appeals to Steuben for Help. Desperate Condition of Affairs. CHAPTER XIII. ARNOLD'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN 201 Invasion of the State via James River. Capture of Richmond. Steuben's Efforts to Save the Dominion Without Men or Supplies. Arnold Retreats and is Be- sieged at Portsmouth. Virginia's Loyalty to the Pa- triot Cause. Still Aiding Greene. CHAPTER XIV. GREENE AND STEUBEN 217 Their Operations in the Carolinas and Virginia. Vic- tories and Good Generalship Recover the Carolinas. Arnold Bottled up in Portsmouth and Cornwallis in Wilmington. Arnold Saved Through Refusal of the French Commander to Co-operate. Arrival of Lafay- ette. Steuben Still Has the Burden. Second Foray up the Tames — Capture of Petersburg and Richmond. CHAPTER XV. THE WAR IN VIRGINIA 235 Lafayette Ordered to Steuben's Assistance — Cornwallis moves Northward — Steuben Prepares to Oppose Him — Magazines of Supplies Formed and Recruits Gathered — Lafayette Retreats to Fredericksburg — Steuben Extri- cates Himself from Point of Fork — Important Stores Saved — Brilliant Tactics — Cornwallis Outwitted — Steuben Gives up Going South, and Requested to Join Lafayette. CHAPTER XVI. APPROACHING THE CLIMAX 249 Steuben Joins Lafayette and Forces Cornwallis to Leave Richmond — Retreat to Williamsburg — Steuben's Illness — Arrival of Washington and Siege of York- town — Steuben Assigned a Command — Closing up the Trenches — Receives a Deputation from Cornwallis — The Surrender. CONTENTS xv. CHAPTER XVII. YORKTOWN AND AFTER 269 Review of the Political Situation — Strength in Weak- ness — Adoption of the Articles of Confederation — A Rope of Sand — Controversies With the Virginia Au- thorities — Vindication of Steuben — Financial Difficul- ties — Attack on New York Discussed — Peace Negotia- tions — France and Spain Suggest the Alleghenies for the Western Boundary — Steuben Appeals to the King of France. CHAPTER XVIII. DISBANDING THE ARMY 293 Difficulties of the Officers — Peace Officially Announced — Parting Scenes — Testimonials to Steuben — Plans a Military Academy — Visit to Frontier Posts — Washing- ton's Farewell Letter — A Belated Tribute. CHAPTER XIX. SOCIETY OF THE CINCINNATI 310 Organized by Steuben — A Storm of Opposition — Pre- senting Claims to Congress — A Wearisome Task — Adoption of the New Constitution — Tardy Justice. CHAPTER XX. LIFE IN NEW YORK 328 Activity in Public Affairs — Plans for a Regular Army — Popularity with the People — His Memorial on the Banks of the Ohio — A Western Land Project — Sugges- tion Concerning Prince Henry — Washington's Inaugu- ration — Social Distinction — Wit and Generosity. CHAPTER XXL THE NEW CINCINNATUS 339 Character of the Baron's Grant — Liberality to Set- tlers — Visit from Relatives — Politics and Literature — Preparing for War — Important Commission — Farm Life and Future Prospects. CHAPTER XXII. THE LAST ACT 349 Unexpected Death of Steuben — Stricken by Paralysis — A Melancholy Funeral — The Baron's Will — Desecration of His Grave, and Final Resting Place. xvi. CONTENTS CHAPTER XXIII. STEUBEN'S MILITARY FAMILY 356 North, the Founder and Namer of Fort Steuben — Walker — Duponceau — Fish — Ternant — Davies — Fleury — Fairlie — Smith and Others. CHAPTER XXIV. THE ARTISTS' FAVORITE 368 Original Portraits of Steuben by Peale, Earle, Simi- tiere, Trumbull and Pine — Copies and Reproductions. CHAPTER XXV. POSTHUMUS HONORS 374 Eulogies and Memorials — Monuments at Grave and Washington — Andrews's Portrait of Steuben — Portraits of George Rogers Clark and James Wilson by Filson. APPENDIX. THREE WARS CELEBRATION 381 Semi-Centennial of Most Northerly Invasion During the Civil War — Unveiling of Portraits — Dedication of Monuments and Cannon — Unveiling Maine Tablet. ILLUSTRATIONS GENERAL VON STEUBEN .... Frontispiece From Original, by Peale, 1786. Facing Page PORTRAIT OF STEUBEN. BY ANDREWS ... 50 In Public Library, Steubenville. O. JONATHAN STEUBEN'S BIRTHPLACE .... 80 CONGRESS HALL, YORK, 1778 80 VALLEY FORGE, CAMP OF SOUTHERN REGIMENTS 94 VALLEY FORGE. WASHINGTON'S HEADQUARTERS 94 MARCH OF WASHINGTON AND CLINTON . ACROSS NEW JERSEY 112 MONMOUTH BATTLE GROUND 118 STEUBEN'S HEADQUARTERS AT MIDDLEBROOK . 118 WEST POINT IN 1780 156 VERPLANCK HOUSE 156 STEUBEN'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN ... 194 HANOVER COURT HOUSE, VA 208 BLANDFORD CHURCH, VA 208 CHARLES P. FILSON 240 ELIPHALET F. ANDREWS 240 SURRENDER OF CORNWALLIS 262 WASHINGTON MEMORIAL CHAPEL, .... VALLEY FORGE 308 ILLUSTRATIONS FORT STEUBEN, FROM THE OHIO RIVER STEUBENVILLE, O., BUSINESS SECTION FORT STEUBEN, GROUND PLAN . STEUBEN'S WOODLAND HOME . OSWEGO AND FORT IN 1794 . WM. NORTH'S HOUSE AT DUANESBURG FEATHERSTONAUGH MANSION at DUANESBURG STEUBEN PORTRAIT, BY PEALE . . STEUBEN PORTRAIT, BY SIMITIERE . STEUBEN PORTRAIT, BY PINE SOLDIERS' MONUMENT, STEUBENVILLE STEUBEN'S FIRST MONUMENT . STEUBEN'S SECOND MONUMENT STEUBEN'S MONUMENT AT WASHINGTON GEN. GEORGE ROGERS CLARK . HON. JAMES WILSON GEN. JAMES M. SHACKELFORD . GEN. JOHN H. MORGAN .... MAP OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, O. Showing most Northerly Invasion of the Civil War MAINE MEMORIAL TABLET . JEFFERSON COUNTY COURT HOUSE Decorated for Three Wars Celebration. O. GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN INTRODUCTION The differences which arose during the second half of the eighteenth century between Great Britain and her American colonies were not long in attracting the atten- tion of observers, both civil and military, in continental Europe. Britain was coming to the front as a world- power, and no important movement within her borders or in any part of the world which acknowledged her su- premacy, could fail to interest those nations which had contended with her for mastery, or associated with her as allies. Even though there was no general comprehen- sion of the doctrines asserted by the restless Anglo-Sax- ons beyond the ocean, the mere fact that these pioneers challenged the authority of the Mother Country, no mat- ter to what extremes it might be carried, was sufficient. Less than a century before England had established par- liamentary government on a firm foundation, but on the continent absolutism ruled from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean. Theorists and Utopians existed, but they were beyond the realm of practical government. The term, "Soldiers of Fortune," still retained its liberal mean- ing, and when George III. later sent a detachment of his 2 GENERAL WILUAM VON STEUBEN Hessian mercenaries into the colonies, he only did what any other ruler in Europe would have done as a matter of course. It received no condemnation outside of Eng- land, at least, in government circles. Even the brutality with which these levies were made excited scarcely a re- monstrance beyond the immediate sufferers. Subjects were simply chattels to be exploited for the benefit of the ruler, and more than a peasant uprising was necessary to convince the powers that were, that the people had some rights which rulers were bound to respect. There had been rebellions previous to this, when the central govern- ment, weak and decaying, had not sufficient vitality to control the extremities or the designs of ambitious lead- ers, or when a certain class, goaded to the quick by op- pression and outrage, made a fruitless effort to break its bonds, and there were mutterings of a coming storm in France, but the world had not yet grasped the conception of going to war for an idea, especially the idea of protest- ing against taxation without representation. So, as we have said, the conflict attracted attention not only from the position of the parties but from the novelty of the princi- ples involved. When it became evident that the question could not be solved without recourse to arms, and that the American patriots were not averse to receiving foreign help in their struggle, the situation powerfully appealed to three classes of individuals. First: the Utopians of that day, who thought they saw in America the rise of a new star whose beams should diffuse the light of liberty over the whole world. Second, the soldiers of fortune already mentioned, who had no hesitancy in enlisting under any banner which gave promise of a profitable re- turn. Third, men trained to the profession of arms, who, while not altogether unmindful of their material interest, yet sympathizing with the cause in which the colonists INTRODUCTION 3 were engaged, were ready to share its hardships and its perils, determined to render it true and loyal service without regard to the final outcome. In this last class we can safely place Frederick William Augustus Henry Ferdinand Von Steuben, generally known by his familiar title, Baron Von Steuben. STEUBEN'S LIFE AND WORK CHAPTER I. THE VON STEUBENS A Family of Soldiers — Rise of the Prussian Monarchy — Baron Von Steuben's Birth and Early Career — Prominent in Seven Years' War — Humiliation of France — Retirement — Momen- tous Visit to Paris. The family from which Baron Steuben claimed de- scent traced a definite genealogy back for a period of at least six hundred years, and the name was variously written Steube, Stoebe, Stoyben (the present pronuncia- tion) and finally Steuben. Mr. Kapp, who has been most industrious in tracing this genealogy, first hears of the Steubens in Franconia, one of the duchies of mediaeval Germany lying along the river Main, and south of Sax- ony. In the early part of the thirteenth century a por- tion of the family, at least, came into Mansfield, now a part of Saxony, where they took up their abode, and were classed among those feudal noblemen invested with manors and estates. Conveyances of real property and other important legal documents attest their position in the community. The Steubens ranged themselves on the side of the Reformation in the sixteenth century, and seemed to have attached themselves at an early date to the Electors of Brandenburg, predecessors of the Kings of Prussia. In the course of time they lost most of their 6 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN landed estates, and it is chiefly as soldiers that they have left a reputation to posterity. Without going into their transactions in detail we come to Ernest Nicholas Von Steuben, a captain under the German Emperor, Ferdinand II., during the thirty years* war (1618-1648). It would be a puzzling and un- profitable task to attempt to unravel European and espe- cially German politics during this period. A reference, however, to the general situation may assist the reader in understanding the condition of affairs in these and subse- quent years. "The Holy Roman Empire," revived by Charle- magne, still existed so far as its name was concerned, but it had long since ceased to have any connection with Rome, and it would require a rather broad definition of the term "Holy" to thus describe it. The great heredi- tary kingdom founded by the Emperor of the Franks had degenerated into a loose confederacy of Teutonic states held together by an elective monarchy, but which were so nearly independent that they not only waged war against each other, but sometimes against the empire itself. The succession in the provinces, however, was hereditary except in the case of ecclesiastics, and upon the death of an emperor, sometimes before, his successor was chosen by seven Electors, they being the Archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier, and four lay magnates, the palatine of the Rhine, duke of Saxony, margrave of Brandenburg, and King of Bohemia. They were not obliged to choose one of their own number or even an inhabitant of their own provinces, in fact, choice of a non- resident ruler was the more usual custom. Francis I, of France, and Henry VIII. , of England, were both com- petitors for the Imperial crown when Charles V., mem- ber of the Austrian House, of Hapsburg and King of THE VON STEUBENS 7 Spain (Charles I.), was the successful candidate, in 1519. At that time Spain claimed all the American continent except the eastern part of South America, which the Pope had kindly given to Portugal, and this with his hereditary possessions including Austria, most of Italy and the Netherlands, together with the helplessness of France, made Charles's authority almost world-wide, so far as civilization was concerned, with England on the west and half-barbaric Russia on the east to alone seriously dis- pute his authority. As a ruler with such powerful back- ing the Emperor was a tremendous force, which had to be reckoned with in the religious wars of the sixteenth century, but in that sense Charles had no successors. Nevertheless the Empire ambled along amidst stress and strife, with varying fortunes for two centuries and a half until Napoleon in 1806 compelled the abdication of Francis II., who had occupied a shadowy throne for four- teen years, and "The Holy Roman Empire" ceased to ex* ist as a figure, as it had long previously ceased to exist in reality. When William L, King of Prussia, was, on Jan- uary 18, 1871, at the palace of Versailles, proclaimed Ger- man Emperor, it was not a revival of "The Holy Ro- man Empire," but the consolidation of a new nation, which had for sometime been crystalizing out of old ma- terial. Captain Von Steuben was compelled by wounds to retire during the early part of the Thirty Years' War, and at his death left a son, Ludwig, born in 1642. He, in turn, had one son, Augustine Von Steuben, born in 1661, and the latter had ten children, seven of them being sons. The fourth son, Wilhelm Augustine, father of the subject of this memoir, was born on April 22, 1699, doubtless in Brandenburg. Two years later Frederick I., Margrave of Brandenburg, which may be translated 8 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN "Count of the Marshes," brought sufficient pressure to bear on the Emperor Leopold I. to have the present province of East Prussia (of which he was duke) elevated to the rank of a Kingdom of Prussia, including all the territory heretofore controlled by the Electors of Bran- denburg. Under his able administration a new power had come to the front. Wilhelm Von Steuben entered the Prussian military service in 1715, and held one mili- tary post after another, part of the time in Russia until his death on April 26, 1783. In 1729 he married Mary Dorothea Von Iagow and from this union was born the son who was destined to play an important part in the American Revolution. There has been some dispute both as to the date and place of General Von Steuben's birth, and whether he was, after all, a native born subject of the King of Prus- sia. In Sparks's series of American biographies, Steuben is quoted as saying that had he been a native Prussian he would never have dared to petition for his discharge at the close of the Seven Years' War under penalty of being cashiered. Hence it has been supposed by some of the historians that he was born in Suabia or some other part of the Empire outside of Frederick's jurisdiction. Mr. Kapp, however, after careful investigation into original sources, places his birth on November 15, 1730 "at Madgeburg, a large Prussian fortress on the Elbe." Now Madgeburg is the capital of Saxony, and Saxony did not become a Prussian province until 1815, when it was made so by the treaty of Vienna after the downfall of Napoleon. It had an administrative independence, however, during the Middle Ages, the chief officer seeming to be the Arch- bishop, with secular powers, and with whom the citizens were generally at variance. It was almost destroyed dur- ing the Thirty Years' War, and at the peace of West- THE VON STEUBENS 9 phalia, in 1648, the Archbishopric was converted into a secular duchy to come under control of the Margrave of Brandenburg on the death of the administrator, Prince Augustus, of Saxony, which occurred in 1680. Thus, while not a native of Prussia proper, Von Steuben was to all intents and purposes a subject of Frederick William I., whose father, thirty years before, had had himself de- clared King of Prussia, and in whose army Von Steu- ben's father was a captain of engineers. While our sub- ject was quite a small boy his father was ordered to the Crimea at the request of the Russian government to assist in the war against Turkey, and afterward to Cronstadt as instructor of Russian officers, and he did not return until 1740 In the meantime, Frederick II., known as Frederick the Great, had ascended the throne. Young Steuben pursued his education in the Jesuit Colleges at Neisse and Breslau in Silesia, which had been recently conquered by the Prussians. He seems to have become proficient in mathematics, history, German and French. Concerning this period he writes : "The troubles of a military life, the narrow circumstances of my parents and their frequent changes of residence, did not permit them to give me any better education than that which a poor young nobleman in Prussia always receives. But while other young officers led a dissolute and extravagant life, I applied myself closely to study, and exerted myself not only to learn my profession, but to enlarge my knowledge of belles-letters and the practical science. Nevertheless, from want of time and the necessary means, I made only slow progress." Von Steuben's school life evidently did not exceed four years, for we find him with his father as a volunteer at the siege of Prague in 1744, when Frederick wrested Prague from Maria Theresa, Archduchess of Austria, 10 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN and Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, who had previously taken the city from Charles VII., of Bavaria, then Em- peror of the so-called Holy Roman Empire. Francis of Lorraine, later Grand Duke of Tuscany, had married Maria Theresa in 1736, who made him co-regent, and by her influence he was elected Emperor to succeed Charles VII., on September 13, 1745. In the meantime, Frede- rick was operating pretty much as a free lance in Ger- many, and converting what had been considered the phantom title of King of Prussia into very much of a reality. Although he spoke German incorrectly and pre- ferred French literature, yet he was a born leader, and around him clustered the first impulses of German (at least Prussian) nationality, which more than a century later were to bear their full fruition. Young Steuben was promoted to the rank of Ensign in 1749 and Second Lieutenant in 1753, becoming First Lieutenant in 1755. That his duties were not always pleasant, and that the Seven Years' War was already casting its preliminary shadows is disclosed by a letter from Schweidnitz in Silesia, written to his friend, Count Henkel Von Donnersmark, of the Supreme Count of Silesia, dated June 14, 1754, in which he says : "While you, my dear Count, are figuring in the Temple of Themis, I am condemned to a most revolting occupation. A work that Mr. De Balby has traced across a cemetery, requires the cutting of a deep ditch, in the course of which half-decomposed dead bodies are contin- ually disinterred. I fear for my poor soldiers. The noisome exhalations will become more insupportable as the season advances. I order vinegar, brandy, tobacco, in short, everything that I can think of for their protec- tion, to be served up to them. As yet I have no sick, but I fear the month of July. In order not to alarm them, THE VON STEUBENS 11 I am continually at work, notwithstanding my disgust for this abominable occupation, and my subordinates are obliged to follow my example — Ora pro nobis! The for- tifications are extensive, and appear to be well planned. I should like them to be more solid, and then this place would be well adapted for the King's purpose, to serve him as a great depot in case we go to war with la grande dame. I am occupied in taking a plan of the entire fort- ress, which we shall discuss when we meet. Unfortun- nately that will not be before the end of September. * * * What do your Berlin correspondents say? Are Mesdames Elizabeth and Mary Therese vexed with our Great King? I should be happy if they were. Al- though I am more gallant with the ladies than my mas- ter, I am extremely anxious to have an encounter, even as apprentice, with these two Amazons. Yes, my dear Henry, if there is a war, I promise you, at the end of a second campaign your friend will be either in Hades, or at the head of a regiment." In another letter Steuben tells of a visit to Glatz, also in Silesia, describing the fortifications of that place with the precision of an expert. Frederick's movements had not been unnoticed by his neighbors, who viewed his increasing strength not only with jealousy but with apprehension that if not crushed or at least curbed he would become a serious menace to them. He was already too strong to be at- tacked single-handed, so in 1756 a coalition was formed consisting of Austria, Russia, France, Sweden and Sax- ony to overcome him. He could raise an army of 150,- 000 men, and the coalition proposed to hurl 500,000 soldiers against him, but lack of concentration on the one side, and Frederick's military genius on the other placed the contending parties more on an equality than their 12 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN comparative resources seemed to indicate. England joined with Prussia, and furnished a welcome contin- gent of troops, but her greatest service was keeping France busy in America and India. Of course Frederick was in war against his Emperor who was the husband of Maria Theresa, although to do Francis justice, he was little more than Secretary to his vigorous minded wife, whose generals took care of her interests in the field. There was the "Army of the Holy Roman Empire" un- der command of the Prince of Saxe-Hildburghausen, but, as a writer remarks, "This latter army was not as formid- able as its title, and totaled only some 60,000 mostly undisciplined and heterogenous combatants." This is only mentioned to show the shadowy character of what had once been a world power. It would be foreign to the purpose of this memoir to follow the varying fortunes of the Seven Years* War ex- cept as they were directly connected with our subject. Steuben's regiment was known as the Thirty-First, being part of the army of Field Marshal, Count Schwerin. This regiment performed arduous service, and especially distinguished itself at the second battle of Prague on May 6th, 1757, where Steuben was wounded, but not seriously enough to compel his withdrawal from the ser- vice, for on November 5 of the same year we find him en- gaged at the battle of Rossbach, where Frederick gained one of his most brilliant victories, completely routing the allied army of 64,000 by a comparatively small force. His part in that battle remained as a fond memory with Steuben until his death. The next year Steuben withdrew from the regular army and entered the service of Gen. John Mayr, proba- bly the most prominent soldier of fortune of his day, then in the service of the King. Although standing armies THE VON STEUBENS 13 had largely replaced the desultory levies of the feudal system, yet there were still some free lances who had considerable latitude, and Von Mayr was one of them. An illegitimate child, of scarcely any education, and of less character, he entered the military service of the Duke of Lorraine at the age of 18 as a band boy, and was soon after made Sergeant. He attained a reputation for skill and daring during the Turkish war, and served the ten years from 1744 to 1754 in the army of the Elector of Saxony and afterward in the Netherlands. Having killed a brother officer in a duel, he was compelled to leave the Saxon army, and took service under Frederick the Great, to whom he was a welcome acquisition, who gave him an appointment as aide-de-camp, and after- wards charge of the semi-independent corps referred to above. Here he performed herculean service and be- came a terror to his enemies, for which he was given the rank of Major-General. Here it was that Steuben learned thoroughly those tactics and infantry manage- ment generally which were to prove so valuable in later years. Von Mayr died in January, 1759, and Steuben, who had won laurels sufficient to be attract the attention of military experts, returned to the regular army. He was appointed Adjutant to General Von Hulson, then operating in Saxony. On June 5, 1759, Gen. Hulson with about 10,000 men, left Dresden and united his forces with Gen. Von Dohna, near Frankfort on the Oder, where Steuben met his old comrades of the 31st regiment. On July 23, 1759, Gen. Wedell, who had succeeded Dohna, with only 26,000 men, engaged a force of 70,000 Russians. He was defeated with a loss of 6,000 men, which gave an opportunity for the Austrians and Russians to concentrate a force of 90,000 men en- trenched at Kunnersdorf. Frederick attempted to flank 14 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN them with 43,000 but met with a terrible defeat, losing- half his army, and being wounded himself. Among the wounded was Gen. Von Hulson, as well as Steuben. It was owing largely to the courage and skill of the 31st regiment in covering the retreat of the Prussians that Frederick's army was not completely annihilated, with possibly the capture of the King himself, as it guarded him from the field, a service which he recognized by awarding a week's extra pay to each member of the regi- ment. But, although beaten, Frederick was not con- quered, and continued with varying success to maintain a bold front to his foes, in which he was aided by a strong British contingent. Steuben took an active part in the campaign of the next two years, and in September, 1761, he was sent by the King, then at Bunzelwitz, with General Platen and 7,000 men to Poland, to make a di- version in the Russian rear. Frederick's fortunes were almost as desperate as those of Rome when Scipio de- cided to carry the first Punic war into Africa, and the results were somewhat similar. Platen's corps started on its march on September 11, and four days after met a convoy of Russian provisions and ammunition near Gostyn in Poland, defeated 4,000 troops, burned the train with its provisions, and captured 1,900 prisoners. It is a somewhat interesting coincidence that Steuben's father, while an engineer in the Russian service, built a bridge over the river Wartha by which the Prussian troops were enabled to cross. Platen's next movement was to the relief of Colberg, and Steuben's brigade of 2,000 troops was sent to Treptow, nearby to guard supplies intended for Colberg. This latter place was besieged by a force of 8,000 men, and running short of ammunition General Knobloch, the commandant, was compelled to surrender, Steuben negotiating terms with the enemy. This occur- THE VON STEUBENS 15 red on October 23, 1761, and Steuben with the other of- ficers was sent to St. Petersburg as prisoner of war. This turned out to be a blessing in disguise for Frederick, whose fortunes were now well nigh desperate. Steuben and his associates became very friendly with the Grand Duke Peter, who was also an admirer of Frederick. The Empress Elizabeth (one of the two Amazons whom Steuben in his youthful days desired to meet) died on January 5, 1762, and was succeeded by Peter, who at once withdrew from the alliance and opened peace nego- tiations with Frederick. It is said that he even ordered his troops in the field to co-operate with the Prussians. Be this as it may, an armistice was signed on March 16, and shortly after a treaty of peace was concluded by which Pomerania, which had been wrested from Prus- sia, was given back, and a contingent of 18,000 men placed at Frederick's disposal. Of course Steuben and his friends were released, and flattering offers made to the latter to induce him to join the Russian army. He preferred returning home, however, with General Knob- loch, where the King manifested his appreciation of Steuben's services by appointing him aide-de-camp on his personal staff with the rank of captain. Certainly the honor was none too great, for, humanly speaking, Rus- sia's defection at this time was Frederick's salvation, and this was largely due to Steuben. Russia's withdrawal was followed by that of Sweden, and although Spain by this time had been drawn into the fray, yet her aid, which was chiefly naval, could not offset these losses, coupled as they were with the exhaustion of France and Austria. William North, Steuben's aide-de-camp, gives an- other reason for Steuben's advancement at this time, which Mr. Kapp discredits, although he publishes North's statement as follows : 16 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN The Baron had been for sometime in the family and friend- ship of Prince Henry (William) the King's brother, of whom he never spoke but with the greatest tenderness and affection. In an unfortunate campaign of the Seven Years' War, the prince incurred the displeasure of his harsh brother, who di- rected him to retire from the army and ordered his aides-de- camp to their different corps, or put them on such unpleasant duty as might make them feel the misfortune of belonging to a man who had dared to displease, perhaps to disobey him. Steu- ben was sent into Silesia to recruit, equip and discipline within a certain period, a corps broken down by long and hard service. The pecuniary allowance for this object was entirely inadequate, but who in the Prussian service dared to murmur or remon- strate! By the assistance of friends funds were found, and the regiment, complete, was marched to headquarters within the time. Pleased with the prompt performance of a duty, of the arduousness of which the King was well apprised, the Baron received his compliments, and, in a little time after, the appoint- ment of aide-de-camp to the monarch, with the charge of super- intending the department of the quartermaster general. Whether all this detail is true or not, certain it is that Steuben was receiving a technical training which most thoroughly qualified him for the great work he afterwards accomplished on this side of the Atlantic. He is his own authority for the statement that in the last year of the was he was Quartermaster General and Adjutant Gen- eral to the King, and that in the winter of 1762-3 he had command of the regiment Von Salmuth, subsequently Hesse Cassel. During this period he w a s also member of an academy of young officers appointed by the King for the special purpose of studying the science of war and military tactics under the personal supervision of the monarch himself. The withdrawal of Russia and Sweden did not end the war, but the odds being now more even if not reversed Frederick and his generals, who had been trained in the hard school of experience, had matters pretty much their own way. The siege of Schweidnitz in 1762, and the vic- tory of Prince Henry over the "Empire" army at Frei- THE VON STEUBENS 17 berg, on October 29 of that same year, practically ended the struggle. The assassination of Peter III. on July 18, deprived Frederick of further assistance from Russia, but that had now ceased to be a necessity, and on February 15, 1763, a treaty of peace was conducted at Huberts- burg, recognizing Frederick's status quo ante, and that position has never since been questioned. If we except Frederick's successful establishment of his position, England was the greatest gainer by this war, and France the heaviest loser. By it were laid the foun- dation of the present British Empire, largely at the ex- pense of her continental neighbor, who lost all her Amer- ican possessions except four small islands in the West Indies, while she was entirely ousted from India proper. Probably her most humiliating position, however, was the order still in force dating back to the treaty of Utrecht in 1713, by which the fortifications of Dunkirk, her principal seaport, had been razed and the harbor filled up, an English resident being appointed to see that these conditions were not violated. There seems, how- ever, to have been a gleam of hope with a foresight, into the future that the very completeness of England's vic- tory would react upon itself. Count de Vergennes, then French Ambassador at Constantinople, is said to have de- clared that this treaty had removed from the English colonies their only fear of foreign aggression, and that so far as the mother country was concerned, "They will no longer need her protection; she will call upon them to contribute toward supporting the burdens they have helped to bring on her, and they will answer by striking of! all dependence." We are not sure that Vergenness ex- pressed himself as clearly as is here quoted, but he very likely, with the rest of his countrymen, counted on a day of reckoning. 18 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN The ending of the Seven Years* War naturally threw a great many officers out of active service, although a large standing army was retained, the beginning of that military burden which has rested so heavily on mod- ern Europe. Von Steuben, however, decided to quit the military service, the reasons for which have not been made very clear. The King in recognition of his services had given him a lay benefice attached to the religious chapter of Havelsberg, which was equivalent to an annual pension of 400 thalers, about $300, but nevertheless, it is said that he did not consider his claims to promotion sufficiently recognized. Others say he had a duel with one Count Anhalt, while a third report ascribes his re- tirement to discontent with the monotony of garrison life. A letter written in his later years ascribes his act to "an inconsiderate step and an implacable personal ene- my/' This would seem to give weight to the duel theory, but the baron's reticence leaves the matter somewhat ob- scure. In order to get his discharge he pretended to have poor health, but the King was apparently not willing to let him go. Residing a short time in Halle and Dessau, he then went to Hamburg, where he met Count St. Ger- main, at that time in the service of Denmark, who had something to do with his subsequent career. In May, 1764, he was at the springs of Wildbad, in Suabia in company with Prince Frederick of Wurtemberg, where he met the Prince of Hohenzollern-Hechingen. By the latter he was tendered the office of Grand Marshal of his Court, upon the personal recommendation of Prince Henry, of Prussia, and the Princess of Wurtemburg. In the meantime, Steuben having received his discharge from the Prussian army he accepted the new position, and left for Henchingen, the local capital. His apparent ditties were largely ceremonial, such as court presenta- THE VON STEUBENS 19 tions &c, of more importance in those days of detailed etiquette than would seem at first sight. In addition the Grand Marshal, if a man of ability, was usually the con- fidential adviser of the sovereign, where he had ample room to display his tact and genius. He held this office for ten years to the general satisfaction of the Prince and those with whom he came in contact. He seems to have been more than satisfied with this position after the ardu- ous labors of an active military life for he declined an offer to enter the service of the King of Sardinia in 1764, and similar offers made by the German Emperor, Joseph II., in 1766 and 1769. He accompanied the Prince on his visits to various courts, especially to that of France in 1771, where he made acquaintances who were destined to materially affect the future. During this period he pur- chased a county seat near Hechingen, where he no doubt expected to end his days, but this was not to be. The religious dissensions of the sixteenth century were still a disturbing element in Germany, and the Baron being a Lutheran, was obnoxious to the Roman Catholic influ- ence which was prevalent at court. Not caring to be the subject of intrigues then prevailing, he resigned his posi- tion, with the best of feelings between the Prince and himself, and went to Carlsrue. Here he took service in the court of the Margrave of Baden, who, on May 28, 1769, had honored him with the cross of the order, "De la Fidelite." This was an order established on June 17, 1715, by Charles, Margrave of Baden, and was limited to thirty members of noble extraction, unsullied lineage and irreproachable conduct. Steuben was the 167th member from the foundation of the society. Lossing was in error when, in his Field Book of the Revolution he ascribed this decoration to the King of Prussia. Although Steuben had been released from the Prus- 20 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN sian military service he held an honorary position under the Empire, being General of the Circle of Suabia, a sort of militia rarely called into active service. Possessing both leisure and a competency he spent a portion of his time in travel, thus meeting some prominent men, among them Count St. Germain, already mentioned. Steuben was still in the prime of life, and soon tired of this dilettante method of living. He desired to re-enter the military service, where there was a prospect of active work in a controversy then in progress, afterwards culminating in an armed conflict, over the Electorship of Bavaria. In accepting positions in foreign armies Prussian officers usually demanded a higher rank than they had at home, which demands interfered generally with their prospects. The German Emperor had more offers than he could ac- cept, especially in time of peace, but notwithstanding this Steuben was urged to pay his respects to him at Stutt- gardt, in 1777, with the probability that he would be taken into the Imperial army. Steuben, however, did not act on the suggestion, and the favorable opportunity, if it existed outside the mind of Steuben's advisers, passed by. In April of 1777, Steuben started to visit some Eng- lish friends whom he had met the previous year in the south of France. He went by way of Paris where he had many old friends, among them Count De St. Germain, then French Minister of War. This was on May 2d, and having informed the Count of his arrival, the latter sent him word not to come to Versailles, where the audience would be public, but he would meet him privately three days later at the Paris Arsenal, when he would have something of importance to communicate. This natur- ally aroused considerable curiosity in Steuben's mind, especially as an officer was to be sent to conduct him to THE VON STEUBENS 21 the rendezvous. In his notes he says, "I had formed no ambitious schemes, and was perfectly satisfied with my situation. I could not define the meaning of this enigma. I can certify, upon my honor, that among all the conjec- tures I made, the truth never occurred to me." CHAPTER II. A CRITICAL PERIOD. Rise of a Romantic Character — Beaumarchais and the American War — Inside Movements of th eFrench Court — A Politico- Mercantile House. What was then a mystery to the Baron is of course clear to all now in the light of subsequent events. As we have seen the peace of 1763 had left France despoiled of all her American possessions except a few small islands in the We^t Indies, and England became her beneficiary here as well as in Hindostan, while the degrading condi- tions in regard to Dunkirk and restriction of the navy continued, and the Kings of England added the title of France to that of their own land. As if this were not sufficient, England as mistress of the seas, boldly claimed the right to search neutral vessels for contraband of war, and this claim was exercised in a manner calculated to provoke the greatest possible irritation. That the ruling classes in France should be more than restive under such conditions could be counted on as a certainty, but where was the remedy? For two hundred years bad govern- ment and ruinous wars had so exhausted the country that it was on the verge of bankruptcy. Louis XV., under whom the treaty of 1763 had been signed, was dead, and his amiable but inefficient son had ascended the throne in 1774. Eleven years of peace had somewhat mitigated the condition of the wretched peasantry, but it was the conviction that the country was in no condition to at- tempt a war with anybody, much less all powerful Eng- land. There was, however, in literary circles at that time considerable doctrinaire discussion of freedom and A CRITICAL PERIOD 23 the rights of men, and to these the uprising in America promised an illustration of their theories. Consequently that cause was earnestly espoused by a class of which Marquis de Lafayette was the best exponent. Should America succeed in breaking the English fetters it might mark the beginning of the downfall of the British Empire, a consummation devoutly to be wished by every loyal Frenchman. Louis XVI. himself, was not very eager to send aid to the colonists. However anxious he may have been to get even with England, a rebellion of subjects against their King was not a cause which would appeal to an absolute monarch. The colonists themselves were at first rather slow to assert their independence. What they wanted was a redress of grievances, and there was always danger to an outsider who should inject himself into a family quarrel, lest the combatants might patch up their differences and, if not turning on the intruder with their combined forces, at least leave him to his fate. And could America even with the assistance of France, hope to carry on a successful conflict with Eng- land? This was very doubtful, and hence the greatest caution and circumspection must be used to avoid every- thing that would provoke English suspicion which would be promptly followed by severe retaliation. Lord Stor- mont, the then English Ambassador at Paris, had his detectives at work, and kept his government well in- formed of the progress of events. Fully aware of the resentment on the part of France against England the Americans counted on taking ad- vantage of it, and almost immediately after the Declara- tion of Independence, Silas Deane, Arthur Lee and Ben- jamin Franklin were apopinted a commission to contract foreign alliances, especially with France. Deane was al- ready in Paris, Lee was the agent for Massachusetts in 24 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN London, while Franklin, though still in America, was well known in France, where he had visited several years before. At this time Count Vergennes, whose prediction has already been quoted, was now Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Count de Maurepas was President of the Council of State, both being confidential advisers of the King, and in a position to exercise a controlling influence on the course of events. But before pursuing the thread of our narrative it is first desirable glance at another person who certainly held a most unique position in this or any other period. In the year 1732 in the St. Denis quarter of Paris lived a watchmaker named Andre Charles Caron, who had come from the province of Brie. On January 24 of that year, was born to him a son to whom was given the name of Pierre Augustin Caron. Pie was the only boy in a family of six children. He received a moderate edu- cation, his father intending to bring him up as a watch- maker, to which trade he was apprenticed on arriving at suitable age. A literary and musical taste shortly de- veloped, and although he followed his trade of watch- making until the age of twenty-four, yet his compositions along these lines attracted the attention of friends, to the disgust of his father, who preferred a good trades- man to a poor poet. That he was skillful in his calling is evidenced by the invention of an escapement for clocks and watches which was pirated by another party, but which a committee of the Royal Academy of Science found to belong to Caron. Having presented one of his new timepieces to Louis XV. he now signs himself "Watchmaker to the King," and as such had an entree to the palace at Ver- sailles. A favorite with the ladies Caron attracted the special attention of the wife of the Controleur de la A CRITICAL PERIOD 25 Bouche, in other words an officer of the King's pantry, apparently not a very elevated position, but one of those sinecures with which monarchs were wont to reward their favorites, and which carried with them a certain so- cial standing as well as a salary, generally a small one. M. Frauquet, the present incumbent, was considerably older than his wife, who in turn was about six years older than Caron. The aged husband was subsequently persuaded to give up his post in favor of Caron, and two months later was accommodating enough to die of apo- plexy on January 3, 1756, and on November 22 of that year, Caron married his widow. Then he added to his own name that of Beaumarchais, by which he is generally known. The title is said to have been borrowed from a small fief belonging to his wife, which, however, his enemies did not fail to insist existed only in imagination. But one step more was needed to enroll his name in the list of the nobility, and this was taken five years later when he purchased the office of Secretary to the King for 85,0000 francs, and henceforth he was legally entitled to call himself Monsieur de Beaumarchais. In the mean- time his wife died on September 29, 1757, from an attack of typhus fever. Years after, when engaged in lawsuits with his wife's relatives, he was charged by them with having poisoned her, but this charge was fully disproved. Beaumarchais had become proficient on the flute and harp, and by this means helped the four sisters of Louis XV. to while away many hours of a monotonous exist- ence. In a court permeated by petty jealousies this fa- voritism was provocative of insult from the courtiers, with one of whom he became involved in a duel in which his adversary received a fatal sword thrust, a result which Beaumarchais mourned until the day of his death. Subsequently he purchased another office having the high 26 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN sounding title. Lieutenant-General of the Preserves in the Bailiwick and Captainry of the Warren of the Louvre. His duties here were sort of a judgeship to preserve the right of the King to exclusive sporting within a radius of twelve or fifteen miles around Paris. Misfortune now fell upon him, and by a letter de cachet, for what reason is not very clear, he w r as consigned to the prison of For-1'- Eveque. His detention does not seem to have been very long, for we find him the next year (1764) making a journey to the Spanish court on behalf of his sister, whose betrothal to a Spaniard had been repudiated by the latter. He remained more than a year at Madrid, engaging in speculations as well as gallantries for which his musical and other accomplishments well fitted him. Returning to Paris in 1765, he became involved in another love affair, the details of which do not concern us, and in 1767 put forth his first drama, Eugenie, and from this time was prominent in literary as well as court circles. He re- married in April, 1768, his wife dying November 21, 1770. He was wealthy and prosperous at this time, al- though his enemies did not hesitate to insinuate marital poisoning a second time, but without offering any proofs. He soon after became involved in a series of lawsuits lasting some seven years, which greatly embarrassed him, and at times threatened his complete ruin. He again found himself at For-l'-Eveque, but secured his liberty on May 8, 1773, and the following March was sent by Louis XV. on a secret mission to London to pre- vent the publication of some court scandals which an ad- venturer proposed to print. The errand was successful, and the blackmailer reaped a rich harvest, but when Beaumarchais returned to Paris for his reward Louis XV. was dying, and on May 10, 1774, he passed away. Louis XVI. doubtless was not sufficiently interested A CRITICAL PERIOD 27 in the scandals of his fathers court to feel under very deep obligation to the agent who had succeeded in sup- pressing undesirable disclosures, but he soon had troubles of his own. There were threats of blackmailing pam- phlets from London affecting the new Queen Marie An- toinette, and, mindful of his previous work, Beaumarch- ais was naturally invoked to do what he could toward having them suppressed. So in June, 1774, he was sent back to London. We have not space to recount his ad- ventures here, at Amsterdam and in Germany, while pur- suing the object of his search. They would furnish ma- terials for a serio-comic opera quite as lively as his subse- quent dramatization of "The Barber of Seville. ,, He reached Vienna in the course of this journey where he had an interview with the Empress Maria Theresa, mother of Marie Antoinette, at Schoenbrunn castle. Al- though possessing a warrant in the handwriting of the King of France, Beaumarchais was arrested as an ad- venturer and confined a month, when he was released with the offer of a thousand ducats from the Empress, which he refused, and made his way back to Paris. He gave his services gratis, but the expense connected with the affair amounted to 172,000 francs ($35,000) to sup- press a couple of unimportant poems. The next adventure of Beaumarchais is more re- markable than any of its predecessors. There was at this time in London one Chevalier d'Eon, who had played a leading part in French politics, been a captain of drag- oons, Secretary of Legation and temporarily Minister Plenipotentiary from France to England. Having quar- reled with the Ambassador, Count de Guerchy, he was recalled by Louis XV., but was secretly detained by him at London with a pension of 12,000 francs. In some way about 1771, d'Eon then being 43 years of age, doubts 28 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN were raised concerning his sex, and bets were made on this question. Instead of settling the matter at once the Chevalier encouraged this mystery, and furthermore claimed to possess State secrets from 1763, which if dis- closed would start another war between France and England. Beaumarchais was sent to London to secure the papers bearing on this matter, and to him the Cheval- ier declared himself to be a woman. An order was re- ceived from Louis XVI. in 1775 to make this declaration public, and for d'Eon to assume the habit of his (or her sex). This was done, and at the age of fifty d'Eon donned female garments in which he appeared at Ver- sailles in 1777, and followed that attire until his death in 1810. Beaumarchais appears not to have doubted d'Eon's confession to him, and to have entertained the belief that d'Eon was actually in love with him. The au- thorities at the French Court, however, were no doubt skeptical, but adopted the theory for political reasons. A postmortem examination proved that d'Eon was a com- pletely formed man. The motives of the different parties to this decep- tion have been the subject of much controversy into which it is not necessary here to enter. Beaumarchais's visits to London during this period have a deeper inter- est to us than speculations concerning a chevalier's sex, for it is at this time that he begins to take an interest in American affairs, and in his dispatches to the King he passes abruptly from the lesser to the greater subject. His residence in London at this time not only brought him in contact with both the friends of America and the Court followers, but his business furnished a convenient cloak for acquiring information which was promptly conveyed to his government. At that time, John Wilkes was Mayor of London. He was a great demagogue, but A CRITICAL PERIOD 29 partly by his address and still more by the unconstitu- tional methods adopted by the Parliamentary majority to deprive him of the seat to which he was elected, he had created a strong following among the masses. He took up the cause of the colonies, more doubtless to annoy the government party than through any love for the Ameri- cans, and his house was a sort of rendezvous where Beau- marchais met disaffected partisans from both sides of the Atlantic. It was now 1775, Lexington and Bunker hill had demonstrated that the Americans would contest by force the exactions of the British Ministry, while the latter was preparing to put forth every exertion to pre- vent the rebellion from becoming a revolution. Beau- marchais carefully studied the signs of the times, and concluded that now or never was France's opportunity to humble her hereditary foe and to restore her fallen prestige. On September 21 of that year he addressed a long memorial to King Louis XVI., urging active aid to the insurgents. In fact his ardor is such that he wonder- fully exaggerates the military strength of the Americans as well as the power of their advocates in Engalnd. Among other things, he says : I have received particulars from an inhabitant of Philadel- phia, who had lately arrived from the Colonies and had just been present at a conference of the English ministers, who were thrown into the greatest trouble, and struck with terror by his recital. The Americans, determined to suffer everything rather than give way. and full of that enthusiasm for liberty, which has so often rendered the little nation of Corsica redoubtable to the Genoese, have 38.000 effective men, armed and resolute beneath the walls of Boston: they have reduced the English army to the necessity of dying of hunger in this town, or of seeking for win- ter quarters elsewhere, which it will do forthwith. About 40,000 men well armed, and as determined as the former, defend the rest of the country, without these 80,000 men having taken away a single laborer from the ground, a single workman from the manufactories. All those persons who were engaged in the fish- eries, which the English have destroyed, have become soldiers, and feel that they have to avenge the ruin of their families and 30 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN the liberty of their country; all those persons who took part in maritime commerce, which the English have brought to an end, have joined the fishermen to make war on their common perse- cutors; all the persons who worked in the harbors have in- creased the army of furious men, whose actions are all animated by a spirit of vengeance and hatred. I say, sir. that such a nation must be invincible, above all when it has at its back as much country as it can poessibly re- quire for retreating, even if the English could make themselves masters of all their seaboard, which they are far from having done. All sensible persons, then, are convinced in England, that the English colonies are lost to the mother country, and that is also my opinion. The open war which is taking place in Amer- ica is less fatal to England than the intestine war which must yet break out in London. The bitterness between parties has been carried to -the greatest excess since the proclamation of the King of England which declares the Americans to be rebels. * * * The least check which the royal army receives in America, by increasing the audacity of the people and the oppo- sition, may decide the affair at London at a moment when it is least expected, and if the King finds himself forced to yield, I say it with a shudder, I do not think his crown more secure on his head than the heads of ministers upon their shoulders. This unhappy English nation, with its frantic liberty, may inspire the man who reflects with true compassion. It has never tasted the sweetness of living peaceably under a good and virtuous King. They despise us, and treat us as slaves because we obey volun- tarily, but if the reign of a weak or bad prince has sometimes caused a momentary evil to France, the licentious rage, which the English call liberty, has never left an instant of happiness and true repose to this indomitable nation. King and subjects are equally unhappy. Now, to increase the trouble still more, a secret subscription has been opened in London at the houses of two of the richest merchants of the capital, where all the disaf- fected send their gold to be forwarded to the Americans, or to pay for the assistance which is supplied to them by the Dutch. It is apparent that Beaumarchais was not interested in America as such at this time. He was acting solely in the interest of France, keeping the King informed of the progress of events as he saw them. Either his own en- thusiasm or that of his informers led him into making some very wild statements. The heterogeneous army be- fore Boston never exceeded 20,000, and half of that was useless from lack of supplies, while, there was no army at all in the rest of the country unless a few scattered A CRITICAL PERIOD 31 companies of militia be considered such. Neither was the English public convinced at this time that the colonies were lost. The gold forwarded to America at this pe- riod was also largely mythical, and the predictions con- cerning the future prospects of the English and French thrones furnish curious reading in the light of subsequent events. He does not advocate any alliance at this junc- ture or open assistance, for that would at once provoke a war with England, for which France was not prepared. But he soon reaches the conclusion that "The Americans will triumph, but they must be assisted in their struggle, for if they succumbed, they would join the English, and would turn round against us. We are not yet in a fit state for making war; we must prepare ourselves, keep up the struggle, and with that view send secret assistance in a prudent manner to the Americans." But Vergennes was cautious and the King less than luewarm, which moves Beaumarchais on February 29, 1776 to indite another long epistle to his master in which he reviews the whole situation, and vividly portrays the consequences which must inevitably result to France from her continued inaction. After a discussion of the politi- cal situation in London, he adds : A secret deputy (Arthur Lee) from the colonies to London, quite discouraged by the inability of the efforts he has made, through me, with the French ministry, to obtain assistance in the shape of powder and ammunitions of war, says to me now, "For the last time, is France absolutely decided to refuse to us all assistance, and to become the victim of England and the fable of Europe through this incredible apathy? Obliged to give a positive answer, I wait for reply in order to give my own. We offer France in return for her assistance, a secret treaty of com- merce, which will transfer to her for a certain number of years after the peace, all the advantages by which we have, for more than a century, enriched England, besides guaranteeing her pos- sessions according to the forces at our disposal. Do you not ac- cept this? I only ask from Lord Shelburne the time a vessel would take to go and return, to inform the Congress of the 32 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN propositions of England, and I can tell you at present what resolutions the Congress will take on the subject. They will immediately make a public proclamation, by which they will offer to all the nations in the world, in order to obtain their as- sistance, the conditions I now offer unto you in secret. And in order to take vengeance on France, and force her publicly to make a declaration with respect to them, if we commit her be- yond recall, they will send into your ports the first prizes they take from the English; then, on whatever side you may turn, this war which you avoid and fear so much, becomes inevitable, for either you will receive our prizes in your ports, or you will send them back; if you receive them, the rupture with England is certain; if you send them back, instantly the Congress accepts peace on the conditions imposed by the Mother Country; the Americans in indignation, unite all their forces to those of Eng- land to fall on your islands, and to prove to you that the fine pre- cautions you had taken for preserving your possessions were just those which were to deprive you of them forever. Go, sir, go to France, set before them this picture of affairs; I will shut myself up in the country until your return, so as not to be forced to give an answer before receiving yours. Tell your min- isters that I am ready to follow you there, if necessary, in order to confirm these declarations; tell them that I hear the Con- gress has sent two deputies to the Court of Madrid with the same object, and I may add that they have received a very satis- factory answer. Could the French council possess now the glorious prerogative of being the only one to be blinded as to the glory of the king and the interests of his kingdom?" Such, sire, is the terrible and striking picture of our posi- tion. Your majesty wishes sincerely for peace. The resume of this memorial will furnish you, sire, with the means of preserv- ing it. Let us submit all possible hypotheses, and let us reason. What follows is very important. Either England will have the most complete success in America during the campaign, or the Americans will repel the English with loss. Either England will come to the determination already adopted by the King of abandoning the colonies to themselves, or parting from them in a friendly manner; or the opposition, in taking possession of the government, will answer for the sub- mission of the colonies on condition of their being restored to the position they were in 1763. Here are all the possibilities collected together. Is there a single one of them which does not instantly give you the war you wish to avoid? Sire, in the name of God, deign to examine the matter with me: First, if England triumphs over America, she can only do so by an enormous expenditure of men and money. Now the only compensation the English propose to themselves for so many losses is to take possession on their return of the French islands. A CRITICAL PERIOD 33 and thus irtake themselves the exclusive vendors of the valuable supply of sugar, which can alone repair all the injuries done to their commerce, and this capture would also render them forever the absolute possessors of the advantages derived from the con- traband commerce carried on by the Continent with these isl- ands. Then, sire, there would remain to you nothing but the option of commencing at a later period an unprofitable war, or of sacrificing to the most shameful of inactive peaces all your American colonies, and of losing 280.000,000 of capital, and more than 30,000,000 of revenue. Second, if the Americans are victorious they instantly be- come free, and the English, in despair at seeing their existence diminished by three-quarters, will only be the more anxious, the more eager to seek a compensation which will have become in- dispensable in the easy capture of our American possessions; and we may be certain that they will not fail to do so. Third, if the English consider themselves forced to aban- don the colonies to themselves without striking a blow, as it is the secret wish of the King they should do, the loss being the same for their existence, and their commerce being equally ruined, the result for us would be similar to the preceding one, except that the English, less weakened by this amicable surren- der than by a bloody and ruinous campaign, would only derive from it more means and facilities for gaining possession of our islands, which they would then be unable to do without, if they wished to preserve their own, and to keep any footing in America. Fourth, if the opposition takes possession of the govern- ment, and concludes a treaty of reunion with the colonies, the Americans, indignant with France, whose refusal will alone have caused them to submit to the Mother Country, threaten us from the present moment to unite all their forces with England in order to take possession of our islands. They will, indeed, only re-unite with the Mother Country on this condition, and heaven only knows with what joy the ministry, composed of Lords Chatham, Shelbnrne and Rockingham, whose dispositions to- wards us are publicly known, would adopt the resentment of the Americans, and carry on war against you without cessation, the most obstinate and cruel war. What, then is to be done in this extremity, so as to have peace and preserve our islands? You will only preserve the peace you desire, sire, by preventing it at all price from being made between England and America.and in preventing one from completely triumphing over the other; and the only means of attaining this end is by giving assistance to the Americans, which will put their forces on an equality with those of England, but nothing beyond. And. believe me. sire, that the economy of a few millions at present, may, before long, cost a great deal of blood and money to France. Believe me above all, sire, that the necessary preparations for the first campaign will alone cost 34 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN you more than all the assistance you are asked for now; and that the wretched economy of two or three millions (francs) will certainly make you lose, before two years, more than three hundred. If it be replied that we cannot assist the Americans without wounding England, and without drawing upon us the storm which I wish to keep off, I reply in my turn that this danger will not be incurred if the plan 1 have so many times proposed be followed, that of secretly assisting the Americans without compromising ourselves; imposing upon them as a first condi- tion that they shall never send any prizes into our ports, and never commit any act which shall tend to divulge the secret of the assistance^ which the first indiscretion on the part of Con- gress would cause it instantly to lose. And if your majesty has not at hand a more clever man to employ in the matter I under- take and answer for the execution of the treaty, without any one being compromised, persuaded that my zeal will supply my want of talent better than the talent of another could replace my zeal. How much of the above was bluff on the part of Arthur Lee and how much evolved from the brain of Beaumarchais it is impossible to say. But it makes very clear the underlying motive which was influencing those in control of French affairs, so far as it concerned the American war. It was not specially to aid an oppressed people struggling for liberty, it was not even revenge for past injuries or present humiliation, although these were strong factors. It was the instinct of self preservation. Possible future conditions exercised a more potent in- fluence than past history, although that had taught them what to expect. Should England either retain or lose the colonies without being crippled she might be expected to further increase her strength at the expense of France, and in this she would probably be aided by the very col- onists who a few years before had aided in expelling the French from Canada. The policy should be to assist the weaker side in this contest, to make it equal, all things considered, with the stronger, "but nothing beyond." It was not peace between the combatants that was desired, A CRITICAL PERIOD 35 but a war which should exhaust both sides to an extent that they would no longer be a menace to their neigh- bors. Sentiment had nothing to do with the matter, so far as the authorities were concerned it was a mere cal- culation of cost in men and money, and what course should be adopted which would best conserve the interests of France. American independence had not yet been formally declared, and this, of course, made Vergennes the more cautious upon entering upon a course which, to say the least, was beset with difficulties. But Beaumarchais kept up his importunities, and the conduct of the British in ref- erence to neutral ships was not calculated to soothe the susceptibilities of the French. It will be noted that Beaumarchais in his memorial to the King suggests that two or three million francs be advanced to the Americans, and intimates that he will be the secret agent to forward it if desired. This was too direct for Vergennes, but during the subsequent correspondence he gives a hint to the effect that "It would be contrary to all reasons and propriety to pretend that we ought not to sell any article of commerce to any person because it would be possible it might pass, at second hand, into America." This finally crystalized into the following suggestions: We will give a million (francs) secretly, we will try to in- duce the Court of Spain to unite with us in this affair, and sup- ply you on its side with an equal sum; with these two millions and co-operation of individuals who will be willing to take part in your enterprise, you will be able to found a large house of commerce, and at your own risk can supply America with arms, ammunition, articles of equipment, and all other articles neces- sary for keeping up the war. Our arsenals will give you arms and ammunition, but you shall replace them or pay for them. You shall ask for no money frjom the Americans as they have none, but you shall ask them for returns in products of their soil, and we help you to get rid of them in this country, while you shall grant them, on your side, every facility possible. In a word, the operation, after being secretly supported by us at 36 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN the commencement, must afterward feed and support itself; but on the other side, as we reserve to ourselves the right of favor- ing or discouraging it according to the requirements of our policy, you shall render us an account of your profits and your losses, and we will judge whether we are to accord you fresh assistance, or give you an acquittal for the sums previously granted. In accordance with this arrangement Beaumarchais on June 10, 1776, received one million francs from the French government, and two months later another mill- ion from Spain, which, however, was transmitted through the French authorities. These transactions afterwards proved a fruitful source of litigation. About this time Silas Deane arrived in Paris as the accredited agent of the American colonies to solicit money and military supplies, in which the insurgents were woefully lacking. Deane was presented to M. de Ver- gennes on July 17, 1776, and pleaded the cause of the colonies.. Of course Vergennes could do nothing directly, but sent Deane to Beaumarchais as a "merchant/' with whom it might be advantageous to enter into business relations. On July 18, Beaumarchais wrote to Deane that he proposed forming a business house for the pur- pose of providing the Americans with those things which they required and could not obtain in London. On the 20th, Deane wrote another letter to Beaumarchais asking a year's credit on supplies and promising payment in to- bacco, which Congress had purchased. This was agreed to, a large house known as Hotel de Hollande was hired, and Beaumarchais, watchmaker, comic opera writer and diplomat, suddenly developed into a Spanish merchant at Paris, under the somewhat fantastic title of Roderique Hortalez & Co. Within a few months he had quietly secured from the public arsenals some 200 mortars and cannon with shells and balls, 25,000 guns, 290,000 A CRITICAL PERIOD 37 pounds of powder with clothing and tents for 25,000 men. He also provided three vessels, the Amphitrite, Seine and Mercury, to carry this cargo, besides enlisting a number of French officers in the enterprise. Quietly as this project had been carried out it could not fail to attract some attention, and Lord Stormont on behalf of Great Britain addressed the most vigorous remonstrances to the French Government. Neither King nor ministry was ready to assume the consequences of an open rup- ture, and an order was issued forbidding the vessels from sailing. The Amphitrite, largest of the three ships, had already sailed from Havre but for some trifling cause stopped at Nantes and L'Orient, at which latter place she was detained. Finally, however, all three vessels got away, and, early in 1777, arrived at Portsmouth, N. H., with their welcome supplies for the American army. Two more ships followed, and by September, 1777, there had been sent to America stores to the amount of a million dollars. Remittances even in kind from America were very uncertain, and although the French authorities ad- vanced another million francs yet our "merchant" was considerably embarrassed. CHAPTER III. STEUBEN AND BEAUMARCHAIS. Germain's Plans Disclosed — Meeting of Steuben and Beau- marchais — Former Concludes to Go to America, the latter to Furnish Funds — Beaumarchais Subsequently Faces Bank- ruptcy and Death — Long Controversy With Congress. We now return to Baron Steuben, who, as we have seen, had arrived in Paris on May 2d, 1777, where a private rendezvous was appointed by Count St. Germain, for what purpose Steuben could not conceive. A few days after he was conducted by Baron De Pagenstecher, Colonel of the Legion Conde, to Germain's Cabinet or private room, where the Count after congratulations, spread out a map of America with the declaration, "Here is your field of battle. Here is a republic which you must serve. You are the very man she needs at this moment If you succeed your fortune is made, and you will ac- quire more glory than you could hope for in Europe for many years to come." Germain discoursed for sometime on the American situation, the resources of the country, the assurance of aid from France and Spain, and intimated the prospect of an open alliance between the Bourbon rulers of these two countries and the insurgents. The present needs of the Americans were shown to be that their army had no permanent formation, the enlistments were for short pe- riods, that through lack of proper management the waste was tremendous (as Washington had frequently pointed out) and that among those officers who had already sailed for America there was none specially qualified to take up this work. In short unless there was reform in STEUBEN AND BEAUMARCHAIS 39 this direction neither their own resources nor help from friends in Europe would enable the Americans to continue their resistance to a successful end. To all this and much more the Count added : "You perceive now why I wished you not to appear at Versailles; I would not even wish you to be seen much in Paris ; you must, however, see the Count De Aranda (the Spanish Ambassador) and the Prince De Montbarey, who are acquainted with this project; and in order that you may have every possible information with respect to the United States I will send Mr. Deane to you." It was hardly to be expected that such a proposition would appeal at once to Steuben. Brought up as he was among the leaders of his time, both military and civil, accustomed to the pageantry of the courts of Europe, to the civilization and culture of his day, the suggestion meant that he should sever the associations of a lifetime, and, as it turned out, forever ; to cross the 3,000 miles of stormy Atlantic which was then no slight undertaking, only to reach what was by many considered a wilderness with a fringe of civilization along a hinterland of bound- less extent; unfamiliar with the language, uncertain as to what reception he might expect, and at most to labor with untrained levies against the most powerful empire of the world; these were considerations which might cause any thoughtful man to hesitate. Baron Steuben was no adventurer in the generally accepted sense of that term. His reputation was high, he had a small but assured income for life, and there was no occasion for him to engage in any desperate interprise in order to en- hance his fame or secure a livelihood. In fact it was more than doubtful whether either would be enhanced by the project now presented. Naturally the Baron hesitated, and asked Germain 40 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN for his advice. The latter replied, "Sir, as a minister I have no advice to give you on these subjects ; but as your friend I would never advise you to do anything which I would not do myself were I not employed in the King's service." Steuben gave up his proposed trip to England for the present, and met Germain again the next day who repeated his advice not to visit Versailles, but gave him a letter to Caron de Beaumarchais, with whom we have already become acquainted, cautioning him to talk as lit- tle as possible concerning the matter. Beaumarchais, as before related, was already actively engaged in Ameri- can affairs. By him Steuben was introduced to Deane, and a few days later he met Benjamin Franklin, the other American commissioner who had arrived the pre- ceding December, and taken quarters at Passy, a suburb of Paris. Both of the commissioners were favorably im- pressed with Steuben, and from their information con- cerning him believed he would be most efficient in reduc- ing the raw recruits of the American army into a condi- tion which would enable them to contend on somewhat even terms with the trained soldiers of Great Britain. Although quite a number of French officers had em- barked in Beaumarchais's ships it was not believed that they were fitted for this much needed work, and the sequel showed that most of them were not of much ac- count in any direction. Among them was the marplot Thomas Conway, of Irish descent, who afterwards gave his name to a cabal against Washington. The conference, however, soon met with an obstacle in the shape of Steu- ben's expenses for the journey. He did not feel like embarking at his own cost, and 2,000 acres of land which Franklin offered him were useless as a means of raising the ready cash for the journey. Franklin declared that STEUBEN AND BEAUMARCNAIS 41 he could advance him no money, and that he could not make any permanent engagement. This was not unrea- sonable as the American Commissioners had no funds, and the utmost they could do was to recommend him to the consideration of Congress. While there was no seri- ous friction the conference seemed to have taken an air of brusqueness that irritated the Baron, who subsequently declared that Franklin addressed him in terms to which he "was then little accustomed." He consequently left Passy and returned to Beaumarchais, telling him of the result of the conference, that he proposed returning to Germany and wished to hear no more of America. The latter informed him if money was the only obstacle he would furnish him with a thousand Louis d'ors (about $4,000) and more if needed. The Baron, while grateful for the offer remained inflexible, and announced his de- termination to leave the next day for Rastadt in Baden after calling on Count St. Germain. He met the latter on July 24, and told him that he had abandoned the American project, that he had not sufficient ready money to equip himself and suite. Besides that the whole matter rested on an uncertainty, that not long before one Du Coudrai had been rejected by Congress notwithstanding a pre-engagement with the American Commissioners, and, last, but not least he might be intercepted by British cruisers before reaching America, in which case he would have no claim whatever on America for the resulting loss and inconvenience. Germain was vexed at the outcome, but requested Steuben to remain a couple of days at Ver- sailles and meet his former friend, Prince De Montbarey. That day after dinner Count de Aranda, the Spanish Ambassador, joined the party, and to him Germain in- troduced Steuben with the remark, "Here is a man who will risk nothing, consequently he will gain nothing." 42 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN It may be noted here that Spain was as anxious as France to see Britain humbled. In addition to the minor conflicts which had been carried on with more or less fre- quency since the destruction of the Great Armada, nearly two hundred years before, the capture of Gibraltar in 1704, and its subsequent retention ranked as a sore spot equal to that of Dunkirk in France. At the same time the result was too doubtful to justify an open conflict, be- sides the building up of an independent Anglo-Saxon power in America to threaten or furnish an example to the great Spanish Colonies was the last thing to be de- sired. Consequently the policy of Spain, like that of France, was to furnish sufficient aid to the Americans to keep England busy, with the hope that with the exhaus- tion of both combatants the two Bourbon kingdoms might reap some advantage. There was this difference, however, in France there existed a decided sympathy with the American cause on its merits, while in Spain there was nothing of the kind. In fact there could hardly be said that there was such a thing as public sentiment of any kind in Spain outside of Court circles. Bourbonism controlled everything. Baron Steuben's notes, which furnished the basis for accounts of his personal movements at this time, do not disclose his conversation with Aranda, if he had any, but the same day he met Prince de Montbarey, who was also an active supporter of the American project. Both he and Germain urged Steuben to reconsider his determina- tion, but he said he would visit Germany first, and then think over the matter. He left for Rastadt the next day, where he met Prince Louis William, of Baden, who was a lieutenant- general in the Dutch Army, and Governor of Arnheim. Almost immediately he received a letter from Beaumar- STEUBEN AND BEAUMARCHAIS 43 chais to the effect that Germain was expecting his return to Versailles, that a vessel was ready to leave Marseilles for America, and that he, Beaumarchais, would place at his disposal such funds as might be necessary. A similar letter was rceeived from Germain urging his immediate return. Prince William was consulted, who urged Steu- ben not to hesitate but take his chances, and that such an opportunity to win distinction was not likely to repeat itself. This turned the scale, and Steuben decided to cast his lot with the insurgents. By arrangement with the King of Prussia he transferred his canonry at Havels- berg, worth 4,600 francs per annum, to his nephew, Baron Van Canitz, and left for Paris. Arriving at Paris on August 17, 1777, the Baron on the 18th held a con- ference with St. Germain and Montbarey, where it was agreed that he would not endeavor to secure from the American Commissioners any money for traveling ex- pense or otherwise, but inform them of his intended de- parture for the United States, and request letters of in- troduction to leading members of Congress, as he desired to enter their army simply as a volunteer. His reasons for this course were afterwards given in a letter to Alex- ander Hamilton, dated January 27, 1790, in which he says: From the information I received from the ministers of France, that the preferment of foreigners to military employ- ments had been a cause of discontent in the American army. I foresaw the necessity of pursuing a different course from that which had been adopted by my predecessors, in order to gain admission into your army. Being sure of success in my enter- prise, as soon as the Commander-in-Chief should be aware of the advantages of my military arrangements, there was but one difficulty to surmount, and from, ttfie complexion of the times, that difficulty was of the greatest magnitude. It depended upon obtaining such a post in the army as would enable me to make use of the knowledge of my profession, and to render it bene- ficial to the interest of the United States, without exciting the 44 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN dissatisfaction and jealousy of the officers of your army. Any conditions proposed by me, under these circumstances, tending to insure me a recompense proportioned to my sacrifices and my services, would have rendered all my negotiations abortive. But proposals to serve the United States as a volunteer, without rank or pay, could give no umbrage. No person, sir, is better in- formed than yourself, how difficult it was, at that time, to in- troduce a foreigner into your army, even without any condition whatever. If, however, 1 should be charged with having made use of illicit stratagems to gain admission into the service of the United States, I am sure the army will acquit me, and I flatter myself, so also will the citizens of this republic in general. By advice of the Fernch ministers the Baron took the title of General, no doubt from his position in the Circle of Suabia already mentioned, which was in the main honorary, but which would be more effective in procur- ing him respectful attention abroad than that of Captain or aide-de-campe. On August 19, by the introduction of Montbarey, Steuben had an audience with Count de Vergennes, who remarked: "You are determined then to go to America?" and upon Steuben asking him if he thought the idea ex- travagant, he replied, "On the contrary it is the road to fame and distinction, but I strongly recommend you to make ar/rangement before hand, and not rely too implicit- ly on republican generosity." This advice was timely as events proved, but Steuben replied that he had no condi- tions to make with the Americans, and if the republic proved ungrateful that the French authorities would not forget him To this Vergennes replied, "You know very well that it is impossible for us to make conditions with you. I can only say to you, go — succeed, and you will never regret the step you have taken." There seems to have been considerable discussion as to the reforms which Steuben was expected to introduce into the American army, such as better inspection of arms, accoutrements and everything pertaining to the STEUBEN AND BEAUMARCHAIS 45 troops, more economical management of supplies, maneuvres, drill, battle formation &c. He secured letters of introduction from Franklin to Washington, Samuel Adams, Laurens, President of Congress, Robert Morris the financier, and other prominent men. The amount of money furnished by Beaumarchais is not stated, but that it was satisfactory appears from a letter written by him to his nephew, M. D. Francy, then in America, under date of December 6, 1778, in which he says : Recall me often to the memory and good wishes of Baron de Steuben. I congratulate myself, from what he told me, of having given so great an officer to my friends the "free men," and having in a certain way forced him to follow his noble ca- reer. I am in no way uneasy about the money I lent him to start with. Never did I make so agreeable use of capital, for I have put a man of honor in his true place. I hear that he is the inspector general of all the American troops. Bravo! Tell him that his glory is the interest of my money, and that I do not doubt that on those terms he will pay me with usury. Steuben had the choice of two ports from which to sail, L'Orient and Marseilles, and at the suggestion of Aranda he chose the latter. Beaumarchais had secured from the government the twenty-four gun ship, Heureux, which had been altered and the name changed to Fla- mand. It had been laden with a quantity of military stores including 1,700 pounds of powder, 22 tons of sul- phur, 52 brass cannon, 19 mortars with a quantity of smaller items which would make a welcome addition to the scanty resources of the Americans. The party sailed from Marseilles on September 26, 1777, and besides the Baron included Peter S. Duponceau, his secretary and interpreter, De l'Enfant, De Romanai, Des Epinieres and De Pontiere, his aides; and M. De Francy above men- tioned, who was traveling as Beaumarchais's agent in the endeavor to get his accounts straightened out with Congress. Steuben took the name of "Frank," and for 46 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN the benefit of any British cruisers which might overhaul them he bore dispatches from the French ministry to Marquis De Bouilly, Governor of Martinique. It is more than doubtful, however, if this would have availed any- thing had they been overhauled, for, although England and France were still nominally at peace their relations had become so strained that every movement was viewed with suspicion, and the captain of a British cruiser would have had little hesitancy in taking his prize into port once his suspicions were aroused. Having started the Baron on his journey to his new field in what afterward became his adopted country, it will not be amiss to follow a little further the fortunes of the man who was largely if not chiefly instrumental in furnishing the facilities which enabled Steuben to take the step which changed his entire career. We have seen that by this time Beaumarchais under the name of Ro- derique Hortalez & Co., had involved himself in the American enterprise to the extent of five million francs, and although he had received 3,000,000 from the French and Spanish governments, yet that did not prevent him being seriously embarrassed. All his private means had gone into this scheme, and expectations of recoupment by supplies of tobacco and other American products had not been realized. The American deputies even claimed as their own a cargo of rice worth 150,000 francs, which had been brought over by the Amphitrite on her return trip. The deputies had by this time begun to ask and receive advances of money from the French government directly, and Congress was, for awhile, uncertain whether Beaumarchais was really carrying on business as a mer- chant or was in fact merely a political agent of France. Beaumarchais himself stoutly maintained the former, but Arthur Lee, who had returned to America, gave out the STEUBEN AND BEAUMARCHAIS 47 latter impression. Congress was slow enough in carry- ing out its plain obligations, and hence it was not surpris- ing that any claim upon which rested the least shadow was likely to receive slight attention. Nevertheless Beaumarchais did not relax his efforts, and on December 6, 1778, he writes to Francy that he has a fleet of more than twelve sail, well armed, ready to proceed to the colo- nies, laden with stores of every kind. He also approves of advances made to Lafayette and others, who, to our discredit, had been "devoured by American usurers." In the meantime, the capture of Burgoyne, in which the sup- plies furnished by Beaumarchais were an important fac- tor, had so far raised the credit of the insurgents at Paris that the government had no hesitancy in advancing money to Deane and Franklin. England was not ignorant of what was going on, and in August, 1777, possibly as much with the intention of bringing matters to a crisis as from any other motive made a suggestion to France to enter into a treaty guar- anteeing to each other the possessions of the two King- doms in America. Threats were made that terms might be made with the Americans, when England would be at liberty to turn all her forces against France. This spider and fly proposition was declined, and Beaumarchais, fear- ful that the threat might be carried out, drew up numer- ous memorials to the government, protesting against fur- ther inaction, even drawing a form of manifesto, which could be and was afterwards used in notifying the Court of London that France had recognized the independence of the United States. News of Burgoyne's surrender reached Paris on De- cember 4, 1777. For months the outlook had been very discouraging, but it now appeared as though America would be able to hold her own. The ability to environ and defeat a large army of regular soldiers commanded 48 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN by experienced officers argued the existence of at least a defacto government, with which it would be good pol- icy to enter into a treaty of commerce and amity. This was all that was contemplated in the first instance. John Adams was opposed to to anything more than a commer- cial connection by which arms, cannon, saltpetre, etc., could be purchased in France, and the original instruc- tions to the commissioners contemplated nothing more. An intimation to the commissioners that the matter would be taken up led to an interview on the 12th between Vergennes and his Chief Clerk Gerard (afterwards min- ister to the United States), on one side, and the commis- sioners on the other, and on the 16th Gerard called at Passy and informed the latter that the King was ready to recognize American independence and enter into a treaty of commerce as well as an eventual treaty of al- liance. There was not much trouble in arranging the de- tails, but it was at once recognized that the moment this treaty was promulgated England would make open war against France, with or without a formal declaration. Hence a treaty of alliance was made, to be kept secret and only to become operative in case England declared war against France. In that event the contracting parties were to make common cause, and neither party was to lay down its arms until the independence of the United States was acknowledged by England. The King was to make no conquests on the American continent outside of Florida and Louisiana, and the possessions of each of the contracting parties were respectively guaranteed to each other. Provision was also made for the admission of other parties to the alliance. The treaties were signed on the 6th of February, but they were kept secret, and notice was not sent to London until March 13. Lord Storm ont left Paris as soon as STEUBEN AN DBEAUMARCHAIS 49 he got word of the matters from his government, arriv- ing at London on the 27th. As was expected England immediately began preparing for war with France, and the first shot was fired on June 18, 1778, when two Eng- lish and French frigates came together in which the for- mer, was worsted, but reinforcements having come up the Frenchman retired into Brest with twenty-five men killed and fifty-seven wounded. At this point it may be profitable to inquire to what extent the aid extended by France contributed directly or indirectly to the successful issue of the war for indepen- dence, and whether national freedom could have been obtained without that aid. As has been noted there was a party in Congress opposed to an alliance with France or any other nation other than what a treaty of amity and commerce would naturally bring. Great as was the British empire the distance of its centre from the seat of war gave it a serious handicap, especially with the small and slow-going vessels of that day. On the other hand the Americans had a comparatively immense territory, which the thinly stretched line of Britain's small army could hardly expect to cover, and they had a goodly array of fighting men. The population of the thirteen colonies in 1774 was estimated at about 2,600,000, of which Vir- ginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts held about half, and of which 500,000 were blacks. By the census of 1860, the State of Ohio had a population of 2,339,511, and during the four years of Civil War which followed, sent into the field an aggregate of 317,133 en- listments. Of course many of these men enlisted at least twice, but reducing the whole to a three-year average, gives 239,976 or nearly one in ten of the entire popula- tion. A similar basis would have given the revolution- ists an army of 260,000. Massachusetts alone had 120,- 50 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN 000 men capable of bearing arms. Of course nobody expected to put an army of even half that size in the field. The population was scattered over too great an extent of territory, and the proportion of those who were loyal to the British government was too large to permit anything of the kind. But allowing for all this the results were pitifully small. When Washington took command at Boston he found an army of 16,000 men of which 11,500 were from Massachusetts, and this was increased to 19,000 by reinforcements from Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia This was the largest single army of the war if we except the combined American and French forces at Yorktown in 1781, while during the dark days at Valley Forge the effective force was below 3,000 men. Small as was this force it was poorly equipped, there was a deficiency of guns, powder, provisions and everything which goes toward making the army an efficient military machine. The men were enlisted for short periods, and not all the efforts put forth by Washington could induce Congress to make suitable provisions for these things. As we shall see later that body was powerless to accom- plish all that was desired, but the prejudice against a standing army had much to do with the condition of af- fairs. When a colony was invaded the neighboring mili- tia would come to the field, and frequently rendered effi- cient help, but it was untrained, and as soon as pressure at that particular point had been lifted (and sometimes before) it would disperse, leaving a mere skeleton of Con- tinentals or regulars to hold the field or retreat as the sit- uation permitted. On one occasion Washington called for 6,000 Massachusetts militia, to which 120 persons responded. The country was rich in natural resources, and had it been able to secure command of the sea could doubtless have acquired all that was needful to equip its PORTRAIT OF STEUBEN, BY ANDREWS. Tn tlic Public Library, Steubenvillo, O. STEUBEN AND BEAUMARCHAIS 51 armies. But British cruisers prevented that, and the country being largely agricultural it was absolutely need- ful to procure these things from the outside as well as money. The latter probably could have been obtained, at least in the earlier years of the war, had there been an ef- ficient system of taxation which there was not. Here was where the aid of France operated most strongly. Without the money and supplies sent from that country it is difficult to see how any sort of an army could have been kept in the field. To such an extent had this come to be relied on that the French authorities more than once protested, and advised the American authorities to help themselves. The French government was reimbursed after the war for the advances made. It should be noted, however, that no effective military operations were car- ried on by the allied forces until Rochambeau brought his troops to Washington's support at the siege of Yorktown. An abortive attempt was made on Rhode Island (not the present state but the island on which Newport stands) and a repulse was suffered in an effort to recapture Sa- vannah, but whatever was accomplished on land was the work of Americans alone. A united America under good management could doubtless have effected its indepen- dence without outside aid, but America was far from be- ing united, and the inefficiency, jealousies and even trea- son were so great, that only the wisdom and herculean efforts of Washington were able to conduct the ship of state through the stress and storm of those years into a safe harbor. It may be interesting to note here the subsequent career of Beaumarchais who during this period had oc- cupied the centre of the stage. We may also note here the fact that he was better known at that day, by the general public at least, as the writer of a popular comic operas 52 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN than as confidential agent of the government or the main- spring in furnishing supplies to the American insurgents. To-day, however, very few who listen to "The Barber of Seville,' , have any idea that it is based on Beaumarchais's original composition. He began this work in 1772, but owing to lawsuits and the efforts of his numerous ene- mies it was not presented until February 23, 1775, when it proved a failure. The author retouched it, however, and upon second trial was an unbounded success. Aft- erwards the inspiration of Rossini gave it a dress that in- sured its immortality. Its companion piece, "The Mar- riage of Figaro," was completed in 1778, but it also had its tribulations, mainly on account of its supposed politi- cal sentiments, and it was not presented until April 27, 1784, when it took Paris by storm. There were those present who persisted in discerning hidden political allu- sions in the composition, and as a result upon an order issued by the King, said to have been written at the card table with a pencil on the seven of spades, Beaumarchais was arrested and taken to St. Lazarre prison, from which, owing to murmurs of the people, he was released five days after. His specific offense was that he had compared Louis XVI. to a tiger. The enterprise as a whole, how- ever, was profitable, and netted the author 2,275,625 francs. The Parisian popularity of the drama was doubt- less due more to the libretto than the music, and it prob- ably would soon have sunk into oblivion had it not been taken up and re-arranged by Mozart, whose melodies have given it a permanent place as a favorite with each succeeding generation. The declaration of war by England and the treaty of alliance between France and the United States dis- posed of any further surreptitious dealings (if the almost open transactions of the preceding year could be called STEUBEN AND BEAUMARCHAIS 53 such), and the firm of Hortalez & Co. went out of busi- ness. In the meantime Beaumarchais had collected a fleet of ten vessels laden with supplies to be conveyed across the ocean by the Fier Roderique, a sixty-gun frigate, which was expected to be more than a match for any ac- cidental British cruiser which it might meet. When off the island of Grenada in the West Indies it encountered the fleet of Admiral d'Estaing, who was preparing to fight the English Admiral John Byron. Recognizing that the Fier Roderique would make a welcome addition to his force d'Estaing took possession of the vessel without re- gard to the transports, and in the engagement which fol- lowed the ship was riddled with balls and her captain killed. The French claimed the victory in this battle of July 6, 1779, as the British fleet retired, and great credit was given to Beaumarchais for the assistance rendered by his vessel. But this did not recoup his financial loss which was so heavy as to almost bankrupt him, but the French government subsequently indemnified him. He was active afterwards in raising funds to repair the loss of Count de Grasse's fleet in 1782 for which he received the commendation of M. de Vergennes. He also engaged in numerous private speculations, some fortunate and some otherwise, among the latter a great edition of Voltaire's works, then tabooed in France. Then came his presenta- tion of "The Marriage of Figaro" to the advantage both of purse and reputation, although he devoted a consider- able portion of the proceeds to charitable purposes. Other popular dramas kept him before the public no less than ? series of lawsuits which prevented the people from for- getting him. In 1790 he built for himself near the site of the Bastile one of the most magnificent houses in Paris, in fact one which the people even of that gay city went to see a curiosity. The cost was over 1,600,000 54 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN francs, but when the government took over the property in 1818 to extend a boulevard, his heirs received only 500,000 francs. The furniture and ornaments were in keeping, in fact it is hard to tell just how much money was spent in this enterprise of which in less than thirty years not a trace remained. Beaumarchais superintended the destruction of the Bastile on July 14, 1789, and during the early period of the revolution expected great things from that movement. He was still writing plays which drew crowds to the the- atres, without anticipation of the troublous times which were to follow. In 1792 he undertook to procure for the revolutionary government, which was the only one then in France, 60,000 guns which had been deposited in Hol- land by Austria upon disarming of the Low Countries, but which were to be sent to the colonies to prevent their possible acquisition by France. De Grave, the minister of war, advanced for this purpose assignats of the face value of 500,000 francs, but whose actual value then was only about sixty per cent., as security for which Beau- marchais deposited paper worth more than twice that amount. He was to have further advances when needed. Events now succeeded each other with dazzling rapidity, and before arrangements could be completed with one ministry for the balance necessary to secure the guns it was succeeded by another. It was rumored that he had secreted the guns in his cellar, and a mob searched his house from top to bottom, but found nothing. Notwith- standing this he was arrested on the 23d of August, but on the 30th, just two days before the September massa- cres, he was released. Notwithstanding his narrow es- cape he went only a few miles from Paris, returning each night to urge the ministers to fulfill their contract. Final- ly he was sent to Holland for the guns with the promise STEUBEN AND BEAUMARCHAIS 55 that a remittance should be sent him through the French Ambassador at the Hague. He went via London, where he borrowed quite a large sum from an English mercan- tile friend, but on arrival at the Hague found neither re- mittance nor instructions, and events proved that he was sent away merely to get rid of him. Finally he learned that he had been accused before the Convention of secret correspondence with Louis XVI. and divers other things. Private letters warned him to return to England as he was liable to be abducted, and the guillotine was sure to be his fate in Paris, provided he was not murdered on the way. He returned to London, and on receiving de- tails of the accusations against him proposed returning to Paris to confute them, but his English creditor clearly anticipating the result of such a proceeding, declared that it would be too much "to lose both his money and his friend, ,, and arrested the latter for debt. His detention at the probably not uncomfortable King's Bench prison was certainly preferable to a Parisian dungeon with re- lease only through the guillotine, but sixty years of vicis- situde had not daunted the vigor of our subject, and he spent his enforced retirement in preparing a memorial which would vindicate him with the people if not with his judges. His Paris agent having raised sufficient funds to secure his release, and learning that the Convention held his family and property as hostages, he returned to Paris in March, 1793. "I have come," he wrote to San- tene, Commandant of the National Guard, "to offer my head to the sword of justice if I cannot prove that I am a great citizen." His address was long and daring, and unique in the annals of that period. He ridiculed Murat, then in power, and defended two ministers of Louis XVI. , who had been joined in the accusation with him. His very audacity possibly caused a hesitancy on the part of 56 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN the cut-throats who controlled the Convention, but a more potent influence was the fact that the revolutionists now needed the guns, and the only w r ay to get them was through Beaumarchais. The task was more difficult than at first, for rumors of the affair had reached the British government which was disposed to seize them as French property. So the Committee of Public Safety (what a misnomer) gave Beaumarchais a choice between con- demnation or going a second time to Holland after the guns. The English merchant above referred to had been induced to claim the guns as his property, which delayed proceedings until Beaumarchais could reach them. He succeeded in retaining the guns at Tervere, where they were located, but the Reign of Terror was now on in full force at Paris, so that not only was nothing done towards securing them, but the Committee of Public Safety al- lowed the name of its own agent to be placed on the list of emigres, his property to be confiscated anew, and his wife, sister and daughter to be imprisoned. They would have undoubtedly have gone to the guillotine, but before they were reached the 9th Thermidor (July 27) had come when Robespiere was overthrown, and eleven days later they were released. But they were in poverty, the hus- band, brother and father was in Hamburg, a prey to anx- iety and conflicting emotions; their property was put up for sale, and it was a problem as to how they were to live. The English finally seized the guns, but after threat- ening to confiscate them paid a portion of their value to Beaumarchais's agent. Returning to Paris on July 5, 1796 Beaumarchais found himself practically ruined. Creditors were pressing him on every side, and even the state, which was found by one commission to owe him 997,875 francs, now claimed him to be a debtor to the STEUBEN AND BEAUMARCHAIS 57 extent of 500,000 francs. He still lived in his palace, but had no money with which to pay taxes or make repairs. Nevertheless he continued to take interest in public af- fairs, pursued his literary labors, became friendly with Napoleon, and died suddenly of apoplexy on May 18, 1799. While the affairs of Beaumarchais at his death were so complicated that his fortune was apparently dissipated yet by good management his estate in the course of ten years had been brought up to nearly a million francs. This seems to have been exclusive of a large claim against the American government which Beaumarchais had ur- gently pressed during his lifetime, and was carried on by his daughter after his death. It will be recollected that on June 10, 1776, Beaumarchais received from Count Vergennes one million francs, for which he obligated himself to render account to said Vergennes. There was nothing in the receipt showing the source of the fund or what was to be done with it, but everybody including the principals to the transaction knew that it came from the French government, and that it was to be used in the pur- chase of supplies to be forwarded to America. With this, supplemented subsequently by another million from Ver- gennes and one from Spain as well as his own private means, Beaumarchais opened the Hortalez establishment, and began the forwarding of supplies &c. to America, to be repaid in the products of that country, until as before stated, by the fall of 1777, he had shipped products to the value of fully 5,000,000 francs. But returns were slow, and although Congress passed a vote of thanks to Beau- marchais for his work yet that did not pay his debts. As the original transactions were secret there was consider- able doubt in Congress as to whether he should be paid anything, especially as Arthur Lee had stated that these 58 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN goods were all furnished by the French government and that Beaumarchais was a mere figurehead. Finally this part was arranged, and on April 6, 1778, a formal con- tract was made by Congress acknowledging these claims, and in October of the following year bills of exchange amounting to 2,544,000 francs due three years after date, were sent to him through Franklin as payment on ac- count. This was not very satisfactory, especially as an effort was afterwards made to avoid payment of these bills, but they had passed into the hands of third parties. Disgusted with Congress Beaumarchais tried for awhile to deal with the states separately, and sent two cargoes, one to Virginia and the other to South Carolina, which were promptly paid for — in paper money, whose depre- ciation made it almost worthless. In 1781 Silas Deane returned to France, when Beaumarchais presented his unsettled account of 3,600,000 francs, which hung fire for two years. In the meantime, although the war was over, the American Congress, possessing no power of taxation, and the states treating requisitions with contempt, was under the necessity of making another appeal to France for funds, and in 1783, asked for a loan of 6,000,000 francs. The latter government before making this loan desired a re-statement of the accounts between the two govern- ments. It was soon figured that the King had loaned 18,000,000 francs directly, and had guaranteed 10,000,- 000 loaned by Holland on which he had paid the interest, and now proposed to advance 6,000,000 more, making a total of 34,000,000. He also had inserted in the contract that previous to the treaty of alliance in 1778 he had gratuitously given 3,000,000 francs and 6,000,000 more in 1781, or 9,000,000 in all. Nobody disputed the item of 1781, but as Franklin and Deane had only received STEUBEN AND BEAUMARCHAIS 59 2,000,000 previous to 1778 the query naturally arose as to whom was paid the other million. It was true that a concern known as the Fermiers Generaux had advanced a million previous to 1778, which was partly repaid in tobacco, and Franklin surmised that this might have come from the Crown. But inquiry being made of Ver- gennes the reply was that the King had nothing to do with it, but that the amount referred was a million de- livered from the royal treasury on June 10, 1776, which was the exact date that Beaumarchais received his first advance. While the Congress of that day was better at borrowing than paying, yet this reply was a sufficient justification for holding off the claim of Beaumarchais until the matter should be cleared up, for if he had been furnished with this sum as a gratuity to America then certainly the latter country should receive credit for it in the final settlement. The subsequent conduct of the French authorities, however, indicated a shifting of ground, either because, as Beaumarchais claimed, he was to account to it and to it only for this disbursement, or from an unwillingness to embarrass a subject in his settle- ment with a foreign power. A copy of the acknowledge- ment was denied, and even the name of the party to whom the million was delivered was refused. The present writer does not make even a pretense towards unraveling a mystery which was a subject of dispute and a puzzle to able financiers for over half a century, but it occurs to us that the original inclusion of this million francs in the contract of 1783 was a lapsus linguae which was after- wards attempted to be avoided when it was found that it involved a French subject. It must be remembered that Beaumarchais was not a party to the contract of 1783, in fact knew nothing about it, and nothing was mentioned therein of the million subsequently advanced him or the 60 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN million advanced by Spain. We have no account of him ever having been called upon by either of those Courts to repay any of these advances, but inasmuch as America had benefited by these operations they doubtless thought that she should not be suffered to offset them against valu- able services which had only partially been remunerated. Vergennes intimated as much, and his home government gave Beaumarchais moral support in pressing his claims. The Continental Congress passed into that of the Con- federation and the Confederation into the Nation, and still our claimant was pressing for a settlement. Finally, in 1793, Congress referred the matter to Alexander Ham- ilton, then Secretary of the Treasury, who, after careful investigation fixed the amount due at 2,280,000 francs, but suggested that settlement be deferred until further light be received from the French government concern- ing the disputed million. On June 24, 1794, Governeur Morris, United States Minister to the French republic, applied to Buchot, Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the receipt given by Beaumarchais, which was turned over to him. This was sufficient for Congress to refuse further allowance, although Beaumarchais vigorously declared that he had not received this or any sum as a gift, but that all the money furnished him was as a loan or invest- ment. So the controversy went on year after year, and the persistence of Beaumarchais was met by Congress with equal stubbornness, that body taking the position that the interest on this million francs had absorbed the balance due as found by Hamilton, and consequently they did not owe the claimant anything. Upon Beaumarchais's death the claim was taken up by his daughter, and in 1816 the Uinted States Govern- ment asked the Duke de Richelieu, French minister of foreign affairs if his government would declare formally STEUBEN AND BEAUMARCHAIS 61 that this million furnished June 10, 1776, had nothing in common with the supplies furnshed by Beaumarchais to the Unted States. He did so, but that did not settle the matter. Presidents Madison and Monroe in special mes- sages to Congress advised settlement of the claim, two Attorneys-General declared in favor of its legality, one committee of Congress had reported in its favor and one against, and in 1824 the daughter of Beaumarchais with her grandson, appeared personally at the Capitol. Finally the claim was pushed in the name of France, and in 1835, the matter was finally settled on the payment of 800,000 francs. Beaumarchais estimated his loss in the Virginia transaction at 3,000,000 francs through the depreciation of paper money, so that even granting that he had re- ceived a subvention of 3,000,000 francs which was never expected to be repaid, his American transactions do not seem to have been very profitable. CHAPTER IV. JOURNEY TO AMERICA. An Eventful Voyage — Storms. Fire and Mutiny — Reception at Portsmouth and Boston — Journey to York — The Continen- tal Congress — Resume of That Body and Its Authority — Desperate Condition of the Colonies. We interrupted the story of Baron Steuben's career to trace the character of one but for whose aid the Baron would probably not have come to America, and whose operations at a critical period were of greater importance than might be inferred from the meagre outlines usually given in the histories. Returning to the subject of this biography, it may be said that like an ancient navigator who had left his native land in search of a new country, much was he tossed about at least on sea if not on land. From almost the day of sailing the Flamand encountered violent gales, the first of three days* duration off the African coast with no Father Neptune present to calm the elements. Three times did her forecastle take fire, and the destruction of the ship with its 1,700 pounds of gunpowder on board seemed almost a certainty. Then the crew mutinied and there was a battle of fourteen to eighty-four, the passen- gers being in the former list, before the ringleaders were secured. Off the coast of Nova Scotia (they were evi- dently on the northerly route) another storm threatened to send the ship and contents to the bottom. Mr. Kapp writes of the Baron as "hastening to his journey's end, and trying to relieve the monotony of life on shipboard by mathematical calculations, exercising his companions in shooting at a mark, or reading books like the Abbe JOURNEY TO AMERICA 63 Raynal on America." We are not disposed to take issue with this statement, but from the facts related above, and which are also taken from Mr. Kapp's work, it can hardly be claimed that the voyage was a monotonous one or very favorable for target practice, although the shooter who could hit a mark while the vessel was on its beam ends, would have no occasion to blush for his work under more favorable circumstances. But all things, even ocean voyages, must come to an end in some way and on Decem- ber 1, 1777, after a most temptuous voyage of sixty-six days the Flamand sailed into the harbor of Portsmouth, N. H., which was at the time the usual port for vessels coming from France. Duponceau thus writes of their ar- rival : "It was a fine, clear, bright day. Nature had put on her gaudiest attire, no doubt to receive us." We have some doubt as to the gaudiness of nature at that date on the New England coast, but to the sea- worn mariners anything on earth under a bright sky looked good. That the Baron was of the same opinion is apparent from the following letter written at this time to his friend, Frank, in Hechingen : The more disastrous the passage the more flattering was my arrival in America. Before entering the port of Portsmouth I ordered my secretary to go ashore in a boat, and to inform General Langdon. the commander of the place, of my arrival, who came on board himself to take me and my officers ashore in his boat. While we were landing, we were saluted by the guns from the fortress and from the ships in the port. Several thousand of inhabitants welcomed me in the most flattering way. Mr. Langdon took us to his house to dine. In the mean- time all the inhabitants of the place crowded together "to see the elephant?" Although exhausted by the hardships of the voyage I went the next day to examine the fortifications; on the following day I received the troops of the garrison. It had been understood by the Baron that the Amer- icans had adopted the British uniform, and consequently he and his suite were arrayed in red coats with blue trim- 64 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN mings, which at first caused them to be taken for enemies, but this was soon rectified. News of Burgoyne's surren- der on October 17, previous, was announced to the guests at Langdon's dinner the next day, at which everybody felt greatly encouraged. Steuben's first care was to write to Congress and General Washington announcing his ar- rival and tendering his services, also inclosing copies of introductory letters from Deane, Franklin and Beau- marchais. His letter to Congress, dated December 6, is as follows: Honorable Gentlemen: The honor of serving a nation en- gaged in the noble enterprise of defending its rights and liber- ties, was the motive that brought me to this continent. I ask neither riches nor titles. I am come here from the remotest end of Germany, at my own expense, and have given up an honorable and lucrative rank. I have made no condition with your deputies in France, nor shall I make with you. My only ambition is to serve you as a volunteer, to deserve the confi- dence of your general in chief, and to follow him in all his oper- ations, as I have done during seven campaigns with the King of Prussia. Two and twenty years spent in such a school seem to give me a right of thinking myself among the number of expe- rienced officers; and if I am possessed of the acquirements in the art of war, they will be much more prized by me if I can employ them in the service of a republic such as I hope soon to see in America. I should willingly purchase, at the expense of my blood, the honor of having my name enrolled among those of the defenders of your liberty. Your gracious acceptance will be sufficient for me, and I ask no other favor than to be re- ceived among your officers. I venture to hope that you will grant this, my request, and that you will be so good as to send me your orders to Boston, where I shall await them, and take suitable measures in accordance. To Washington he wrote much to the same effect: Sir: The enclosed copy of a letter, the original of which I shall have the honor to present to your excellency will in- form you of the motives that brought me over to this land. I shall only add to it. that the object of my present ambition is to render your country all the service in my power, and to de- serve the title of citizen of America by fighting for the cause of your liberty. If the distinguished ranks in which I have served in Europe should be an obstacle, I had rather serve under your JOURNEY TO AMERICA 65 Excellency as a volunteer than to be an object of discontent to such deserving officers as have already distinguished them- selves among you. Such being the sentiments I have always possessed, I dare hope that the respectable Congress of the United States of America will accept my services. I could say moreover, were it not for the fear of offending your modesty, that your Excellency is the only person under whom, after hav- ing served the King of Prussia, I could wish to follow a pro- fession, to the study of which I have wholly devoted myself. I intend to go to Boston in a few days, where I shall present my letters to Mr. Hancock, member of Congress, and there I shall await your Excellency's orders. It is not to be supposed that the excellent English in which the above letters are couched came directly from the Baron. We have already seen that one objection to him coming to America was that, unlike German officers of to-day, he new little or nothing of the language of his new associates, and although he doubtless applied himself to study and practice in this direction, yet there had not been sufficient time or opportunity to acquire more than a mere smattering of his new tongue. In fact his defi- ciency in this direction was a serious handicap during the early part of his American career, and he did not speak English fluently until long after his arrival in this coun- try. He doubtless dictated his letters to Duponceau in German, or French, who rendered them into good Eng- lish. Before following the Baron on his travels, it may be interesting to note the military situation at this time. Since Washington had compelled the evacuation of Bos- ton on the 16th of March, 1776, Massachusetts had been entirely free from British troops, in fact the war was over so far as any occupation of that colony was concerned. With the exception of sporadic forays and harrowing of the coast the same might be said of all New England except the posts at Penobscott and Rhode Island, whose limited occupation had no appreciable influence on the 66 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN fortunes of war, and whose effect did not extend any distance into the interior. The surrender of Burgoyne through Schuyler's well laid plans, had relieved all imme- diate apprehension as to the highlands of the Hudson or that the northeastern portion of the Confederacy could be cut off, from the remainder. The British had com- mand of the sea which, while not sufficient to suppress American privateering, was invaluable in the movement of troops, as there were no interior communications ex- cept over unimproved roads which in the rainy season were converted into bottomless pits. There had been one or two abortive expeditions against the South, but their failure saved that section from the horrors of war for two years longer. In the centre, however, the situation was different. With a strong fleet and army the British held New York in a firm grip, and "Philadelphia had taken Howe" on September 26th preceding. Congress had re- treated to Lancaster, Pa., and then to York, where it was carrying on the shadow of government, while Washing- ton with the remnant of his forces had taken refuge in the woods of Valley Forge, twenty-three miles distant, where they were to spend the winter. New Jersey was destined to be the field of contending armies until near the close of the war, and from that cause probably suffered more than any other state. It will thus be seen that by keeping a sufficient distance from the coast to escape marine marauders and yet not so far as to be within the recognized territories of the Indians, there was reasonable facility of communication from one end of the Confedera- tion to the other, barring the ordinary perils of travel in a primitive country, including those from robbers and false brethren, otherwise Tories. After a delay of twelve days in Portsmouth, Steuben left for Boston, where he arrived on the 14th, the journey JOURNEY TO AMERICA 67 taking two days. Here he was well received and met John Hancock, who had just come from Congress at York, of which he had been president. Congress had ordered that preparations be made as complete as possi- ble for the Baron's journey to York, and Hancock super- intended the arrangements which were quite extensive, five negroes being engaged as drivers and grooms, and everything else in proportion. Washington's reply had directed Steuben to go to York, as it was only with Con- gress that negotiations could be made. All this took about five weeks, and in the meantime the Baron was hos- pitably received at dinner parties and elsewhere. Among the amusing incidents of that time Duponceau tells of a dinner party given by Mr. Hancock to the Baron where he (Duponceau) sat next to Samuel Adams, and hap- pened to call him Mr. John Adams : "Sir," said he, look- ing sternly at Duponceau, "I would have you know that there is a great difference between Mr. Samuel Adams," striking his breast and laying a strong emphasis on the word Samuel, "and Mr. John Adams," (they were sec- ond cousins). Duponceau says this remark let him into the little jealousies that existed between some of the great men of the day, and he was afterwards on his guard against addressing people by their Christian names. The party left Boston on January 14, 1778, and the Baron's secretary has fortunately preserved a pretty full account of their travels through the hinterland towards Pennsylvania. Duponceau tells us that — "Our party consisted of Baron Steuben and his servant, Carl Vogel, a young lad whom he had brought from Ger- many, M. De Francy, an agent of Beaumarchais and my- self. We traveled on horseback. Notwithstanding the recent capture of General Burgoyne, the situation of the United States at that time was extremely critical. The 68 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN enemy was in possession of Rhode Island, New York and Philadelphia, with well organized and disciplined troops, far superior in number to our own. Our army (if army it might be called) was encamped at Valley Forge, in the depth of a severe winter, without provisions, without clothes, without regular discipline, destitute, in short, of everything but courage and patriotism, and what was worse than all, disaffection was spreading through the land. In this dismal state of things the Baron was ad- vised to keep as far from the coast as possible, lest he should be surprised by parties of the enemy or by the Tories, who made frequent incursions into the country between New York and Philadelphia. We, therefore, shaped our course westward, crossing the states of Massa- chusetts, Connecticut, New York and Pennsylvania. We employed about three weeks in a journey of four hundred and ten miles in all, which at present (1836) would hardly require as many days." The party were at Springfield on Sunday, January 18, Hartford, Conn., on the 20th, crossed the Hudson at Fishkill, 58 miles above New York on the 28th, reached Bethlehem, Pa., on the 30th, Reading on February 2, Manheim on the 4th, and York on the 5th. No accident or misfortune befell the party while en route, but some of their adventures as related by Duponceau were quite in- teresting, among them the following : "We had been cautioned against putting up at a cer- tain tavern in Worcester County, Massachusetts, not far from the frontier of Connecticut. We were told that the landlord was a bitter Tory, and that he would refuse to receive us, or at least treat us very ill. We determined to avoid that place if it were possible. Unfortunately, when we were some distance from it. we were surprised by a violent snow storm; it was in the evening, and we JOURNEY TO AMERICA 69 were compelled to take shelter in the very house we wished to avoid. We had not been misinformed. The landlord at once said that he could not accommodate us. He had no beds, no bread, no meat, no drinks, no milk, no eggs ; all that he could offer us were the bare walls. In vain we remonstrated and prayed, he remained inflexible. At last Baron Steuben grew impatient and flew into a violent passion. After exhausting all his store of German oaths, he called in that language to his servant to bring his pistols, which he did. Then the Baron, presenting the deadly weapon at the frightened landlord, repeated the questions that he had in vain asked before: "Have you any bread, meat, beds, &c?" The answers were such as we desired; we were accommodated with good beds and a good supper, and our horses were properly taken care of. In the morning after our breakfast, we politely took leave of our host, who though a Tory did not refuse the continental money in which we liberally paid him. "Another anecdote which I now recollect, is strictly characteristic of those times. As we passed through the State of Connecticut, we put up one night at a house, where, for some reason that I do not remember, we were all obliged to sleep on the floor in the same room with the family, some on feather beds and some on blankets ; men, women and children, had all to bundle together, as it was called. The bedding was spread all around the room, and everyone took his place and went very composedly to sleep. The utmost decency was observed, though no fuss was made about it. There was so much innocence and simplicity in the manner in which these arrangements were prepared and made, that the idea of indelicacy did not even occur to us, and if in the morning we indulged in a smile at manners to which we were so little accus- 70 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN tomed, nothing was said or thought to the prejudice of the morality of the good people who had entertained us in the best manner they were able. (The same conditions prevailed among the inhabitants of the Virginia moun- tains down at least to the Civil War period, and similar instances may no doubt yet be found in out of the way places). "A great number of inns in town and country, bore the sign of the King of Prussia, who was still very popular, particularly among the Germans. I remember that at Manheim, the Baron with a significant look, pointed out to me, at the tavern where we dined, a paltry engraving hung up on the wall on which was represented a Prussian knocking down a Frenchman in great style. Underneath was the following appropriate motto : * "Ein Franzman zum Prenzen Wie eine Muecke.' (A Frenchman to a Prussian is no more than a mos- quito. ) "The good Baron appeared to enjoy that picture ex- ceedingly, and so no doubt did the German landlord to whom it belonged/ ' Baron Steuben's reception at York was a repetition of that at Boston. Gen. Gates, who was then cabaling against Washington, invited the Baron to become his guest during his stay, which offer was prudently declined. On the next day after his arrival he writes to Hancock : Please to accept my grateful thanks for all the kindness you have shown me during my stay in Boston. In this very mo- ment I enjoy the good effects of it, having taken the liberty of quartering myself in an apartment of your house in this town. My journey has been extremely painful, but the kind recption I have met with from Congress and General Gates on my ar- rival here has made me forget those past inconveniences. Now. sir, I am an American, and an American for life/ your nation has become as dear to me as your cause already was. You know that my pretensions are very moderate; I have submitted them to a committee sent to me by Congress. They seem to be JOURNEY TO AMERICA 71 satisfied, and so am I. and shall be the more so when I find the opportunity to render all the services in my power to the United States of America. Three members of Congress have been appointed for • concluding an arrangement with me to- morrow; that will not take long, my only claim being the confi- dence of your general in chief. It will not be amiss here to say a few words concern- ing the body before which Steuben was to appear. As early as 1765, upon the suggestion of James Otis, of Massachusetts, that colony with Rhode Island, Connecti- cut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland and South Carolina selected delegates to a gathering at New York to prepare a joint protest against the stamp act and other proceedings of the English par- liament. Governor Dunmore prevented the assembling of the Virginia legislature, and so no delegates were present from that colony, although public sentiment favored the Congress. This assembly, which met on October 7, adjourned after preparing suitable memorials to the King, and did not attempt to exercise any legislative power. Events progressed rapidly during the next nine years, and in 1774 Virginia took the initiative in proposing a gen- eral Congress in spite of the efforts of the Royalist gov- ernor to prevent it. It may be news to many persons that the principal grievance set forth by the statesmen of the Old Dominion, of that day, so far as they were personal- ly concerned, was that in spite of their repeated protests the King of England had forced them into tolerating human slavery. The troubles in the northern colonies, such as the matter of tea, the billeting of troops &c. were to them matters of principle and sympathy with their troubled brethren, rather than the experience of personal suffering. But slavery they did not want, and they pro- posed to get rid of it if possible. Had any one at that time ventured the prediction that Virginia would at some 72 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN future time engage in a war for the preservation of slavery he would have been classed as an idiot. In fact it would probably not be too much to say that negro slavery was more popular in New England than in Virginia until climatic conditions demonstrated its undesirability. Thomas Jefferson was prevented by illness from at- tending the convention which was called to consider the situation, but sent a paper that was presented by Peyton Randolph in which, after enumerating general wrongs he proceeds to this pointed declaration: "The abolition of domestic slavery is the great object of desire in those colonies where it was unhappily introduced in their infant state. But, previous to the enfranchisement of the slaves we have, it is necessary to exclude all further importa- tions from Africa ; yet our repeated attempts to effect this by prohibitions, and by imposing duties which might amount to a prohibition, have hitherto been defeated by his majesty's negative, thus preferring the immediate ad- vantage of a few British corsairs to the lasting interests of the American states, and to the rights of human na- ture, deeply wounded by this infamous practice." Brave words these, which the convention unanimously endorsed by the following resolution : "After the first day of November next we will neither ourselves import nor purchase any slave or slaves imported by any other per- son, either from Africa, the West Indies, or any other place." George Washington, Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, Edmund Pendleton and Peyton Randolph were elected delegates, and when the first Congress met in Carpenters' Hall in Philadelphia, on September 5, 1774, the last named was elected President. Forty-three dele- gates representing eleven colonies were presnt, North JOURNEY TO AMERICA 73 Carolina coming in on the 14th, and Georgia not until the following year. As to personnel this gathering probably never had a superior in the world's history. The two Adams's, John Hancock, Roger Sherman, Edward Rutledge and Liv- ingstones were only leading illustrations of the represen- tative men from every colony. The new body called itself the Congress, but what were its powers and duties, and whence were they derived? One historian writing of it at this period speaks of it as the Government, but quali- fies his expression by adding, "If such a body could be called a government." "The delegates themselves were not clear on this point ; some had been sent by legislatures of the different colonies, and some by conventions of the people, some claimed their authority to rest upon the natural rights of man, and others upon historical prece- dents which it must be confessed were not very strong. It could hardly be called anything more than a committee, whose acts unless ratified by some power behind them, had no more legal force than the resolutions of a literary or historical society." Yet during the seven years of its ex- istence "it exercised some of the highest functions of sovereignty which are possible to any governing body. It declared the independence of the United States; it con- tracted an offensive and defensive alliance with France: it raised and organized a Continental army; it borrowed large sums of money, and pledged what the lenders un- derstood to be the national credit for their repayment ; it issued an inconvertible paper currency, granted letters of marque, and built a navy. All this it did in the exercise of what in later times would have been called implied war powers, and its authority rested upon the general acqui- escence in the purpose for which it acted, and in the measures which it adopted." [Fiske]. 74 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN Von Hoist in his able Constitutional History takes the advanced ground "that Congress being a revolutionary body from its origin, the people by recognizing its author- ity placed themselves on a revolutionary footing, not as belonging to the several colonies but as a moral person ;" for to the extent that Congress assumed power to itself and made bold to adopt measures national in their na- ture, to that extent the colonists declared themselves pre- pared henceforth to constitute one people, inasmuch as the measures taken by Congress could be translated from words into deeds only with the consent of the people. Reasoning from these premises our historian concludes that there never was any such thing as a sovereign state in this country, that when the people of the colonies sent their delegates to the Congress, and that body assumed the sovereign functions of carrying on war, making treaties &c, the authority which had been recognized in the British crown was transferred bodily to Congress, which by virtue of its revolutionary authority became the sole repository of power. Hence the Articles of Con- federation which were afterwards proposed were not only a limitation of the powers previously possessed by Congress, but their adoption by the legislatures of the dif- ferent states was illegal, null and void. This was a mat- ter of not much moment, however, as these Articles were found from their start to be unworkable, and the country was fast drifting into anarchy, when the genius and patriotism of Washington and his associates again came to the front and framed the present Constitution, where the "One people" of the Declaration of Independence, ob- scured or ignored by the "Union between the States" ac- cording to the Articles of Confederation," was restored by "We the People," of the existing instrument, and this Constitution was ratified, not by the legislatures of the JOURNEY TO AMERICA 75 various states, but by Conventions chosen directly by the people for this purpose. But whether we regard the powers of the Continental Congress as theoretically autocratic, according to Von Hoist, or simply those of a committee of recommenda- tion, according to other historians, it will be more profit- able to consider what it actually did, rather than accord- ing to precedents it was empowered to do. There is no doubt that its force in the beginning existed largely in the character of the men who composed it. Those who con- trolled its councils exercised a similar influence in the local assemblies, and this with public opinion at their backs gave to their recommendations the force of law. The idea of independence was not formally considered in either the first or second Congress. Memorials to the King, voluntary abstention from commercial intercourse and passive resistance were the weapons with which it hoped to restore to the people their rights as Brit- ish subjects. But Lexington, Concord and Bunker's Hill shattered the hopes in that direction, and when Congress on June 15, 1775, elected George Washington, Com- mander in Chief of the "Continental Army," then back of Boston, it assumed in effect the highest functions of government, although more than a year was to elapse be- fore the formal declaration of independence was made. Canada was invaded and Montgomery lost his life, Wash- ington had compelled the evacuation of Boston, and the Southern states had actively resisted aggression, yet still America was counted as part of the British Empire. But the colonies were already practically independent, and Vir- ginia formally so by the adoption of a bill of rights which furnished the model for the greAt state paper, which, published on July 4, 1776, created the American Nation. Thus Congress proceeded as a bodv with unlimited pow- 76 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN ers to the culmination of its work. It authorized armies, appointed commanders, and issued state papers ad libi- tum, and at the beginning the patriotism and enthusiasm of the insurgents prevented the weakness of the govern- ment from becoming too apparent. But the wit of man has never yet devised a government that can exist on en- thusiasm. It may call spirits from the vasty deep, but will they come? Congress soon discovered that they would not. As it had no power to coerce a state or the citizens thereof it could only request money, men and supplies, and frequently none was forthcoming. The Continental army w a s at all times pitifully small, and more than once on the verge of starvation, without suf- ficient clothing to cover its nakedness. Almost the sole material resources of the Government were derived from French loans, voluntary contributions or the costly expe- dient of paper money issues which soon became practi- cally valueless. As a result of this condition the charac- ter of Congress itself rapidly deteriorated; the original leaders were in the army or at home taking part in the state governments. Had there been unity much of these evils might have been overcome, but, as if the situation were not bad enough, there were cabals and factions which threatened disaster, and while Washington with his little army was doing his best to confine the British to New York and neighborhood there were plots to displace him and put Gates in his place. There was such a prejudice against anything like a standing army that it was some time before Congress, in response to the General's earnest appeals, agreed to authorize a national force of eighty- eight battalions, about 44,000 men, and even then the matter might almost as well been let alone, as only a small fraction of that force was ever raised, and to the end the battles of the Revolution were fought by insignifi- JOURNEY TO AMERICA 77 cant forces of Continentals, supplemented in most cases by militia from that or adjoining states. That Duponceau fully realized the situation is evident from his following description of the situation during his stay at York : The Congress of the United States were not at that time the illustrious body whose eloquence and wisdom, whose stern virtues and unflinching patriotism had astonished the world. Their number was reduced to about one-half of what it was when independence was declared; all but a few of the men of superior minds had disappeared from it. Their measures were feeble and vacillating and their party feuds seemed to forebode some impending calamity. The enemy were in possession of our capital city; the^army we had to oppose to them were hun- gry, naked and destitute of everything. No foreign govern- ment had yet acknowledged our independence — everything around us was dark and gloomy. The only ray of light which appeared amidst the darkness was the capture of Burgoyne, which cheered the spirits of those who might otherwise have despaired of the commonwealth. But that brilliant victory had nearly produced the most fatal consequences. Saratoga was then what New Orleans has been since, the watchword of the discontented. A party was formed even in Congress, to raise the conqueror of Burgoyne to the supreme command of our armies. But the great figure of Washington stood calm and serene at hi? camp at Valley Forge, and struck the conspirators with awe. With the exception of a few factious chiefs, he was idolized by the army and by the nation at large. The plot was discovered and the plan frustrated without a struggle. Without any effort or management on his part, and by the mere force of his character, Washington stood firm and undaunted in the midst of his enemies, and I might almost say, looked them in the face. Such was the state of things when we arrived at York. Parties were then at their height, but as Congress sat with closed doors, the country at large was not agitated as it would otherwise have been. There were not wanting out of doors disaffected persons who railed at King "Cong.," and the bunch of "Kings" (such was the slang of the day among the Tories) but the great mass of the people was still in favor of the Revolution, and the press did not dare to utter a sentiment inimical to it. CHAPTER V. CONGRESS AND VALLEY FORGE. Final Arrangements Made — Departure for the Army — Terrible Condition of the Troops — Supplies and Discipline Equally Absent — Enormous Waste — Welcomed by Washington — Appointed Temporary Inspector — Radical Reforms Intro- duced. Upon information that Baron Steuben had arrived at York Congress appointed a committee consisting of Dr. John Witherspoon, of New Jersey; Messrs. Henry, of Maryland, and Thomas McKean, of Delaware, to wait on him and ascertain the terms on which he was willing to serve in the Continental army, and whether he had entered into any arrangement with Deane and Franklin. The conversation was carried on in French through Dr. Witherspoon, who acted as interpreter. As to previous arrangements the Baron declared that there were none, and he did not demand any rank or pay. He desired to join the army as a volunteer under the direction of the commander-in-chief, stating that he had relinquished places and posts in Germany amounting to about 600 guineas ($3,000) per annum, and in consideration of this he expected the United States to defray his necessary ex- penses while in the service; that if this country should fail to establish its independence, or if he should not suc- ceed in his endeavors, in either of these cases he should consider the United States as free from any obligations to- wards him; but if on the other hand, the United States should be fortunate enough to establish their freedom, and if his efforts should be successful, in that case he should expect full indemnification for the sacrifice he had made in coming over, and such marks of their liberality CONGRESS AND VALLEY FORGE 79 as the justice of the United States should dictate. He required commissions for the officers attached to his person, that of major and aide-de-campe for De Ro- manai, captain of engineers for De l'Enfant, captain of cavalry for De Depontiere, and captain for his secretary, Duponceau. More generous terms could hardly have been offered as the Baron not only tendered his services freely to Con- gress, but had given up a substantial income and home comforts and surroundings to embark in a doubtful ad- venture in a new country. The committee reported to Congress at once, which forthwith adopted the following resolutions: Whereas Baron Steuben, a lieutenant general in foreign ser- vice, has in a most disinterested and heroic manner offered his services to these states as a volunteer, 'Resolved, That the President present the thanks of Con- gress in behalf of these United States, to Baron Steuben, for the zeal he has shown for the cause of America, and the disinter- ested tender he has been pleased to make of his military talents, and inform him that Congress cheerfully accept of his services as a volunteer in the army of these states, and wish him to re- pair to General Washington's quarters as soon as convenient. All arrangements being complete the Baron and party left York for Valley Forge on the morning of February 19, and arrived at Lancaster, Pa., early in the afternoon of the same day. Lancaster was 24 miles east of York in an air line, of course a little farther by the usual roads. It was then the largest inland town in the United States, and on his arrival the Baron was received by a committee with Colonel Gibson at the head, and the party were in- vited to a subscription ball to be given that evening in their honor. The elite of the vicinity were present, and the Baron was no doubt highly pleased that many of the young ladies could converse with him in his native tongue, the community having been largely composed of 80 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN German settlers, whose thrift with that of their descen- dants has made that section one of the garden spots of the country. There was a banquet, and the festivities continued until 2 A. M. Here he met William North, who afterwards became his aide-de-camp and adopted son, who remarks in a note, "His reputation had preceded him, and those who remember his graceful entry and manner in a ball room, the novel splendor of his star and its accompanying orna- ments, can easily conceive the feelings of his countrymen and of their assembled wives and daughters; they might indeed, with honest feeling, have thanked God that they had no reason to be ashamed of him. ,, Whether the Baron remained over the next day at Lan- caster to recuperate from the festivities we are not told. It was something over fifty miles from there to Valley Forge, which was easily covered by the 23d when the cavalcade arrived at its destination. Washington was al- ready apprised of its coming, and Steuben writes :, "Upon my arrival in camp I was again the object of more honors than I was entitled to. General Washing- ton came several miles to meet me on the road, and ac- companied me to my quarters, where I found an officer with twenty-five men as a guard of honor. When I de- clined this, saying that I wished to be considered merely as a volunteer, the general answered me in the politest words that the whole army would be gratified to stand sentinel for such volunteers. He introduced me to Ma- jor-General Lord Stirling and several other generals. On the same day my name was given as watchword. The following day the army was mustered, and General Washington accompanied me to review it. To be brief, if Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, or the greatest field JONATHAN STEUBEN'S BIRTHPLACE CONGRESS HALL, YORK, PA., 1778. CONGRESS AND VALLEY FORGE 81 marshal of Europe had been in my place he could not have been received with greater honor than I was." Four days later Washington in notifying Congress of the Baron's arrival, says : "He appears to be much of a gentleman, and as far as I have had an opportunity of judging, a man of military knowledge and acquainted with the world." The first favorable impression which these two great men received of each other only deepened upon close acquaintance. While the sufferings of the patriot army at Valley Forge during the dark winter of 1777-78 have not been exaggerated it is not necessary to recapitulate them here. The whole story may be summed up in the statement that of the 17,000 men who at least nominally composed the force at the beginning of the winter sickness, naked- ness, death and desertions had reduced the number in February to a little over 5,000. There were provisions in the country, but not all Washington's vigorous remon- strances and petitions could move Congress to act effec- tively in furnishing the suffering troops with the neces- saries of life, let alone a proper military equipment. Thomas Conway, born in Ireland, educated in France, and an adventurer in America, had been appointed in- spector-general of the army sometime before, but he was more occupied in fomenting conspiracies against the commander-in-chief than in performing the duties of his office, finally resigning his commission in April, the most commendable act of his official career. Washington was also aware that in order to make effective soldiers of the Continentals they must be taught regular military tactics, to maneuver in concert, to obey promptly and automatic- ally and operate generally as an effective machine. The militia, acquainted with the use of arms, as were all the frontiersmen of that day could do most effective work $2 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN while behind entrenchments at Bunker's Hill, and later at New Orleans, but under reversed conditions or in the open field they were practically useless before the trained veterans of Europe. With his multiplicity of duties Washington could not undertake this work, even if he were fitted for it, which is doubtful, for it has been demonstrated that the qualities of a great general and drillmaster are seldom if ever united in the same person, as was demonstrated at awful cost in our late Civil War. Had Washington been a McClellan, it is safe to say that American independence would never have been won. So it is not surprising that Steuben was a welcome addition to the military family at Valley Forge, and that Wash- ington, who was not slow in discerning the good qualities of his associates, soon realized that he had a valuable asset in Frederick's aide-de-camp. It will not be amiss to detail some of the Baron's impressions on reaching camp. He says : My determination must have been very firm that I did not abandon my design when I saw the troops. Matters had to be remedied, but where to commence was the great difficulty. In the first place I informed myself relative to the military adminis- tration. I found that the different branches were divided into departments. There were those of the quartermaster general, war commissary, provisions commissary, commissary of the treasury, or paymaster, of forage &c. But they were all bad copies of a bad original. That is to say. they had imitated the English administration, which is certainly the most imperfect in Europe. * * * Each company and quartermaster had a commission of so much per cent, on all money he expended. It was natural, therefore, that expense was not spared — that wants were discovered where there were none; and it was also natural that the dearest articles were those that suited the com- missioners best. Hence the expense of so many millions. The effective strength of the army was divided into divi- sions, commanded by major generals: into brigades commanded by brigadier generals; and into regiments, commanded by colo- nels. The number of men in a regiment was fixed by Congress, as well as in a company — so many infantry, cavalry and artillery. But the eternal ebb and flow of men engaged for three, six and CONGRESS AND VALLEY FORGE 83 nine months, who went and came every day. rendered it impos- sible to have either a regiment or a company complete; and the words company, regiment, brigade, and division were so vague that they did not convey any idea upon which to form a calcula- tion, either of a partcular corps or of the army in general. They were so unequal in their number that it would have been im- possible to execute any maneuvers. Sometimes a regiment was stronger than a brigade. I have seen a regiment consisting of thirty men, and a company of one corporal. Nothing was so difficult, and often so impossible, as to get a correct list of the state or a return of any company regiment, or corps. As in the English service, there was a muster-master general, with a number of assistants. It was the duty of this officer to ascer- tain and report every month the effective state of the army, for the payment of men and officers. This operation took place as follows: each captain made a roll of his company, whether ab- sent or present, after which he made oath before a superior of- ficer that this return was correct "to the best of his knowledge and belief." The muster-master counted the men present, and the absent were marked by him for their pay upon the oath of the captain. I am very far from supposing that an officer would voluntarily commit a fraud, but let us examine the s>tate of the companies, and we shall see the correctness of such returns. The company had twelve men present; absent, one man as a valet to the commissary, two hundred miles distant from the army, for eighteen months; one man valet to a quartermaster attached to the army of the north, for twelve months; two as drivers of carriages; and so many more as bakers, blacksmiths, carpenters, even as coal porters, for years together, although the greater number were only engaged for nine months at the outset. But a man once on the roll of a company remained there everlastingly, as forming part of the effective strength, ex- cept in case of death or desertion, under the very eyes of the captain. According to these rolls the strength of the army for pay and provisions was calculated. The regimental returns fur- nished to the adjutant general every week, for the information of the general in chief, as to the strength of the army, were not much more exact. I am sure that at that time a general would have thought himself lucky to find a third of the men ready for action whom they found on paper. The soldiers were scattered about in every direction. The army was looked upon as a nursery for servants, and every one deemed it his right to have a valet: several thousand soldiers were employed in this way. We had more commissioners and quartermasters at that time than all the armies of Europe to- gether; the most modest had only one servant, but others had two and even three. If the captains and colonels could give no account of their men they could give still less an account of their arms, accoutrements, clothing, ammunition, camp equip- 84 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN age, etc. Nobody kept an account but the commissaries, who furnished al! the articles. A company which consisted, in May, of fifty men. was armed, clothed and equipped in June. It then consisted of thirty men; in July it received thirty recruits, who were to be clothed, armed and equipped; and not only the clothes but the arms were carried off by those who had com- pleted their time of service. General Knox assured me that previous to the establish- ment of my department there never was a campaign in which the military magazines did not furnish from 5,000 to 8,000 mus- kets to replace those which were lost in the way I have de- scribed above. The loss of bayonets was still greater. The American soldier, never having used this arm, had no faith in it, and never used it but to roast his beefsteak, and indeed often left it at home. This is not astonishing when it is considered that the majority of the states engaged their soldiers for from four to six months. Each man who went away took his mus- ket with him, and his successor received another from the pub- lic store. No captain kept a book. Accounts were never fur- nished or required. As our army is, thank God, little subject to desertion, I venture to say that during an entire campaign there have not been twenty muskets lost since my system came into force. It was the same with the pouches and other accoutrements, and I do not believe that I exaggerate when I state that my arrangements have saved the United States at least 800,000 French lives a year. The arms at Valley Forge were in a horrible condition, covered with rust, half of them without bayonets, many from which a single shot could not be fired. The pouches were quite as bad as the arms. A great many of the men had tin boxes instead of pouches, others had cow horns; and muskets, car- bines, fowling pieces and rifles were to be seen in the same company. The description of dress is most easily given. The men were literally naked, some of them in the fullest extent of the word. The officers who had coats had them of every color and make. I saw officers at a grand parade at Valley Forge mount- ing guard in a sort of dressing gown made of an old blanket or woolen bed cover. With regard to their military discipline, I can safely say no such thing existed. In the first place there was no regular formation. A so-called regiment was formed of three platoons, another of five, eight and nine, and the Cana- dian regiment of twenty-one. The formation of the regiments was as varied as their mode of drill, which only consisted of the manual exercise. Each colonel had a system of his own, the one according to the English, the other according to the Prus- sian or French style. There was only one thing in which they were uniform, and that was, the way of marching in the maneu- vers and on the line of march. They all adopted the mode of marching in files used by the Indians. Mr. De Conway had in- CONGRESS AND VALLEY FORGE troduced platoons and many other things, but as he was not liked, they had allowed all his instructions to fall into disuse, so that I scarcely found a trace of them. It is also necessary to remark that the changing of the men. the reduction and con- tinual incorporations deprived the corps and regiments of all consistence. There was another evil still more subsersive of order in an army: the captains and colonels did not consider their companies and regiments as corps confided to them by the United States for the care of the men as well as the preserva- tion of order and discipline. The greater part of the captains had no roll of their companies, and had no idea how many men they had under their orders. When I asked a a colonel the strength of his regiment, the usual reply was; "something be- tween two and three hundred men." The colonels, and often the captains, granted leave of absence as they thought proper, and not only that, but permissions to retire from the service. The officers were not accustomed to remain with the troops when the army was in camp; they lived in houses, often several miles distant. In winter quarters they nearly always went home, and there were often not more than four officers with a regi- ment. In the campaign of 1779 I found a Massachusetts regi- ment commanded by a lieutenant. The idea they had of their duty was, that the officers had only to mount guard and put themselves at the head of their regiment or company when they were going into action. * * * Each colonel encamped his regiment according to his fancy. There were guards and pick- ets, and sometimes too many; but the officers did not know their duty, and in many instances, did not understand the object of the guard. An infantry of internal guards for the commissaries of forage and provisions, and for the quartermaster, weakened the strength of the army, the more so, because these guards were never relieved, and remained from one year to the other. Their arms were lost and they were all the servants of the com- missary, who often granted them leave not only for six months, but without limitation. It would be an endless task to enumer- ate the abuses which nearly ruined the army. The above is a general view of the situation of the American army as I found it at Valley Forge in the month of February, 1778. Having given the views of a military expert as to the condition of the army at Valley Forge it may not be amiss to turn for a moment, at least as a relief, to an- other side of the picture. Washington's headquarters were in the old two-story stone house still standing at the foot of the valley near the present Reading railway sta- ll. In front was a little stream which emptied into 86 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN the Schuylkill, the ground at that time sloping from the side of the house down to the river, which is now shut off by the high railway embankment. Here and close by was located Washington's immediate military family, begin- ning with Alexander Hamilton and including Greene, Laurens, Meade and Tilghman. Lafayette had compara- tively comfortable quarters on a neighboring hill, and be- sides the American officers there was the somewhat hete- rogeneous collections of foreign notables including Steu- ben, Du Portail, De Neuville, Custine, Fleury, Du Pies- sis, three Armands, Ternant, Pulaski and Kosciuski. They were not altogether without the presence of the gentler sex, for Duponceau says: "We dined twice or thrice a week with General Washington. We visited him also in the evenings, when Mrs. Washington was at headquarters. We were in a manner domesticated in the family. As to the situation of our army suffice it to say that we were in want of provisions, of clothing, of fodder for our horses, in short of everything. I remember see- ing the soldiers popping their heads out of their miserable huts, and calling out in an undertone, 'No bread, no sol- dier!' Their condition was truly pitiful, and their cour- age and perseverance beyond all praise. We who lived in good quarters did not feel the misery of the times so much as the common soldiers and the subaltern officers, yet we had more than once to share our rations with the sentry at our door. We put the best face we could upon the matter. Once, with the Baron's permission, his aides invited a number of young officers to dine at our quar- ters, on condition that none should be admitted that had on a whole pair of breeches. This was, of course, as pars pro toto; but torn clothes were an indispensable requi- site for admission, and in this the guests were very sure not to fail. The dinner took place. The guests clubbed CONGRESS AND VALLEY FORGE 87 their rations, and we feasted sumptuously on tough beefsteak and potatoes, with hickorynuts for our dessert. Instead of wine we had some kind of spirits, with whicli we made 'salamanders', that is to say, after filling our glasses, we set the liquor on fire, and drank it up flames and all. Such a set of ragged, and, at the same time, merry fellows, were never brought together. The Baron loved to speak of that dinner and his 'sanscullottes', as he called us. Thus this denomination was first invented in America and applied to the brave officers and soldiers of our revolutionary army. In the midst of all our dis- tress there were some bright sides of the picture, which Valley Forge exhibited at that time. Mrs. Washington had the courage to follow her husband to that dismal abode, and other ladies also graced the scene. Among them was the lady of General Greene, a handsome, ele- gant and accomplished woman. Her dwelling was the resort of foreign officers, because she spoke the French language and was well versed in French literature. They often met at each other's quarters, and sometimes at General Washington's, where the evening was spent over a cup of tea or coffee. There were no levees or formal soirees, no dancing and playing or amusements of any kind, except singing. Every gentleman or lady who could sing, was called upon in turn for a song." Bad as w r as the situation Washington had in mind the driving of the British out of Philadelphia in the spring, as he had driven them out of Boston two years before. But with the army in its present condition any movement against the trained levies of Great Britain would be worse than futile. Although Congress the preceding December had created the office of inspector general with the osten- sible object of correcting these evils, yet in the hands of the intriguing if not traitorous Conway, the situation was 88 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN aggravated to the breaking point. Being answerable to Congress and not to the general in chief, the latter was powerless to compel the inspector to perform his duties, with the outcome as given above. But with the advent of the Baron ready and anxious to serve under Washing- ton, the situation was at once changed, and with Con way- out of the road there was no delay in instituting neces- sary reforms. So he promptly accepted the position of temporary inspector to which Washington appointed him, and entered upon his duties early in March. The task was not merely to bring order out of chaos. There were prejudices to overcome, state pride and other idiosyncracies to be handled carefully, and several plans of operation were drawn up before any was finally adopted. In this work the Baron had the valuable as- sistance of General Greene, Colonel Laurens and Colonel Hamilton Time was, of course valuable, and the Baron and his associates worked late each night to develop their plans. Finally an outline was proposed by which an in- spector general should be appointed at once who should establish a uniform system for forming the troops, exer- cises and maneuvers, and for the duties of guards, pick- ets and sentries. Also define the duties of every officer, the manner in which lists and accounts should be made, or books kept; review the troops at least once a month, and make written reports to the commander-in-chief and war committee of Congress, with a number of other de- tails not necessary to enumerate here, but whose carry- ing out would bring order and system where there had heretofore been confusion. Washington approved the plan and asked Steuben if he were willing to undertake its execution. An affirma- tive answer was given, provided the necessary support and assistance were afforded which was done at once, and 89 brigade and division inspectors appointed, whom the Baron praised highly for their assistance. He thus tells how he began his work : I commenced operations by drafting one hundred and twenty men from the line, whom I formed into a guard for the general in chief. I made this guard my military school. I drilled them myself twice a day. and to remove that English prejudice which some officers entertained, namely, that to drill a recruit was a sergeant's duty and beneath the station of an officer. I often took ithe musket myself to show the men that manual exercise which I wished to introduce. All my inspec- tors were present at each drill. We marched together, wheeled, etc., and in a fortnight my company knew perfectly how to bear arms, had a military air, knew how to march, to form in column, deploy and execute some little maneuvers with excellent pre- cision. It must be owned that they did not know much of the man- ual exercise, and I ought to mention the reasons why I departed altogether from the general rule of all European armies, and commenced with the manual exercise in drilling recruits like children learning their alphabet. In the first place I had no time- to do otherwise. In our European armies a man who has been drilled for three months is called a recruit; here in two months I must have a soldier. In Europe we had a number of evolu- tions very pretty to look at when well executed, but in my opinion absolutely useless so far as essential subjects are con- cerned. * * * I nevertheless taught my company to carry arms, stand at ease, present arms, to load, take aim, fire by platoons, and to charge bayonets. Another reason that induced me to pay but little attention to this eternal manual exercise, was that several of my predecessors commenced with it, and before they had surmounted these preliminaries, were obliged to quit the service, having lost their influence and before the officers had an opportunity of seeing the practical advantage of this elementary instruction. This induced me to revise the old system, and instead of commencing with the mannual and platoon exercises and ending with maneuvers, I commenced with maneuvers and ended with the exercise. I had my company of guards exactly as I wished them to be. They were well dressed, their arms cleaned and in good order, and their general appearance quite respectable. I pa- raded them in the presence of all the officers of the army and gave them the opportunity of exhibiting all they knew. They formed in column, deployed, attacked with the bayonet, charged frount etc. It afforded a new and agreeable sight for the young officers and soldiers. Having gained my point, I dis- persed my apostles, the inspectors, and my new doctrine was largely embraced. I lost no time in extending my operations 90 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN on a large scale. I applied my system to battalions, afterwards to brigades, and in less than three weeks. I executed maneuvers with an entire division in presence of the commander in chief. The Baron's efforts met with favor, and leading Amer- ican officers were ready to bear testimony to the good that he was accomplishing. Instead of carelessness there was a generous rivalry among the regiments and divisions as to which should make the best appearance, and do its work most efficiently, and officers, who previously had a contempt for that sort of thing now vied with each other in instructing their men in the manual of arms. Of course the Baron was considerably hampered by his want of familiarity with the English language, although it may be presumed that he had acquired some knowledge of it since his departure from France in the preceding month of September. Mr. North relates his experience at the first parade, when the troops, neither understand- ing the command nor how to follow in a changement to which they had not been accustomed, even with the in- structor at their head, were getting fast into confusion. At this moment, Capt. B. Walker, then of the second New York regiment, advanced from his platoon and of- fered his assistance to translate the orders and interpret to the troops. "If I had seen an angel from Heaven I should not have more rejoiced/' said the Baron. Walker was appointed his aide-de-camp, and remained a close friend during the rest of his life. During this period the Baron rose at 3 A. M., smoked a pipe while his valet dressed his hair, drank a cup of coffee, was on horseback at sunrise, and with, or without, his suite, galloped to the parade. The tardy were not reprimanded, a look from the Baron was sufficient to in- duce resolutions for future reform. So the work was inaugurated whose efficiency and good results were to be CONGRESS AND VALLEY FORGE 91 tested 'ere many months on the field of battle, as well as on the march. Baron Steuben had been at Valley Forge about a month when he extended his instruction to general, al- though elementary, movements of the army. In this line Washington on March 28. issued the following general order : On Sunday, the 29th of March, at ten o'clock in the fc re- noon, all brigade inspectors, with the officers who are to mount guard on Monday, will attend at headquarters, where the inspec- tor general will instruct them in what is to be done the next day. Then Baron Steuben, a lieutenant general in foreign ser- vice, and a gentleman of great military experience, having obligingly undertaken the exercise of inspector general in the army, the commander in chief, till the pleasure of Congress shall be known, desires he may be respected as such, and hopes and expects that all officers, of whatever rank in it, will afford every aid in their power in the execution of his office. Lieuten- ant Colonels Davies, Brooks and Barber, and Mr. Ternant, are appointed to act as sub inspectors, the three former retaining their rank and order in the line. The importance of establish- ing a uniform system of useful maneuvers and regularity of dis- cipline, must be obvious; the deficiency of our army in those respects must be equally so; but the time we probably shall have to introduce the necessary reformation is short. With the most active exertions, therefore, of officers of every class, it may be possible to effect all the improvements that may be essential to success in the ensuing campaign. Arguments need not be multiplied to kindle the zeal of officers in a matter of such great moment to their own homes, the advancement of the service, and the prosperity of our armies. In a subsequent order he said : The sub and brigade inspectors are to be pointedly exact in pursuing the written instructions of the inspector general, that the strictest uniformity may be observed throughout the army. They are not to practice one single maneuver without his direction, nor in a method different from it. Any alteration or innovation will again plunge the army into that contrariety and confusion from which it is endeavoring to emerge. CHAPTER VI. DRILLING THE ARMY. Steuben's Success at Converting a Mob Into Soldiers — Com- mendation of Washington — Congress Fixes His Status — Official Jealousy — The French Alliance. Such was Steuben's skill and industry that by April 29, he was able to put the whole army through the "grand maneuvers," but as yet he was a mere volunteer, acting at the request of Washington, without rank or pay. But the month's trial had evidently been fully satis- factory to the commander-in-chief, for on the 30th we find him sending this report to Congress : : The extensive ill consequences arising from a want of uni- formity in discipline and maneuvers throughout the army, have long occasioned me to wish for the establishment of a well- organized inspectorship, and the concurrence of Congress in the same views has induced me to set on foot a temporary institu- tion, which, from the success that has hitherto attended it, gives me the most flattering expectations, and will, I hope, obtain their approbation. Baron Steuben's length of service in the first military school in Europe, and his former rank, pointed him out as a person peculiarly qualified to be at the head of this department. This appeared the least exceptionable way of in- troducing him into the army, and one that would give him the most ready opportunity of displaying his talents. I therefore proposed to him to undertake the office of inspector general, which he agreed to with the greatest cheerfulness, and has per- formed the duties of it with a zeal and intelligence equal to our wishes. * * * I should do injustice, if I were to be longer silent with regard to the merits of Baron Steuben. His knowl- edge of his profession, added to the zeal which he has displayed since he began the functions of his office, leads me to consider him as an acquisition to the service, and to recommend him to the attention of Congress. His expectations with respect to rank extended to that of major general. His finances, he ingenu- ously confesses, will not admit his serving without the inciden- tal emoluments, and Congress, I presume, from his character and their own knowledge of him, will, without difficulty, gratify him in these particulars. DRILLING THE ARMY 93 Congress, on May 5, responded to Washington's appeal by approving his plan for the institution of a well organ- ized inspectorship, and appointed Steuben to the office of inspector general, with the rank and pay of major-gen- eral, his pay to commence from the time he joined the army and entered into service of the United States. It was ordered that there be two ranks of inspectors under the direction of the inspector general ; the first to superin- tend two or more brigades, and the second to be charged with the inspection of only one brigade. In response to this on May 16, Steuben (now General) wrote to Con- gress expressing his thanks for the honor conferred on him, and promising that he would endeavor to deserve, more and more, the good opinion it had entertained of him in intrusting to him so extensive a department as the inspection of the army. Matters had already been looking much better in camp when, on May 4, was received intelligence of the French alliance. This naturally raised everybody's spirits to a remarkable degree, and all sorts of rejoicing made the woods resound during those bright spring days. The reaction was so great that it threatened a detrimental ef- fect. If they had been able to withstand Great Britain alone what might they not be able to do with the aid of their powerful ally? Many relaxed their efforts, suppos- ing the war to be practically over. They, especially the foreign element, did not understand the bulldog tenacity of Great Britain, a trait inherent in the Anglo-Saxon race. It has been claimed indeed, that the French alliance actually deferred the termination of the war instead of hastening it ; that after Burgoyne's surrender the strength of the peace party in England had grown to such an ex- tent that overtures looking to independence would proba- bly have been made during 1778 had not the French al- 94 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN liance intervened, which event roused the pride of every Briton and united all parties against their hereditary enemy. Among those who thought they saw peace in sight was Baron Steuben, who, on May 7, before receiv- ing his commission as Major General, wrote to Henry Laurens, President of Congress, congratulating him on the treaty so advantageous to both powers and expressing his pleasure in seeing the independence of America es- tablished on so solid a basis. He adds : "I may not, per- haps, have an opportunity of drawing my sword in your cause, but no matter, be free and happy, and I shall not regret having undertaken the voyage to offer you my ser- vices." Laurens did not lose his head, and four days later deprecating any hasty conclusions from recent events, he cautions, "That we are not to roll down a green bank and toy away the ensuing surrender. There is blood, much blood in our prospect, and in all appearance, in my view, there will be opportunity and incitement to unsheath your sword. Britain will not be humbled by a stroke of policy; she will be very angry, and if she is to fall, her fall will be glorious. We, who know her, ought to be pre- pared. A powerful army in our field may, I should say will, be the only means of securing an honorable peace. If we universally adopt and indulge the idea of peace, it would be presumptuous in me to intimate to a gentleman of Baron Steuben's experience, what probably will be the consequence. I am desirous of banishing from the minds of the people the assurance, even the hopes, of a peace for the present year." As a matter of fact three years and a half of bloody conflict were ahead before even the glimmer of peace was in prospect. As an appropriate commemoration of the alliance, however, Washington requested a general man- VALLEY FORGE, TOP OF HILL, ENCAMPMENT SOUTHERN REGTS. WASHINGTON'S HEADQUARTERS, VALLEY FORGE. The wins on the left was a log dining room built by Washington, since replaced by stone. DRILLING THE ARMY 95 euver by the entire army, which passed off successfully. The right was commanded by Major General Lord Stirl- ing, Lafayette on the left, with Baron De Kalb on the second line. The army advanced in five columns to the signal of a cannon shot, taking a position on the hill top where it deployed and fired a shot. This was followed by a grand dinner, no doubt with a more plentiful supply of provisions than was manifest during the cold winter days of their discontent now made a joyous summer. While still standing at the table Washington delivered to Steuben the latter's commission of Major General and inspector of the army, which he had just received from Congress, and and congratulations and felicitations were in order. We must remember that the pictures of Valley Forge are not all sombre. The next day Washington issued the following order: The commander in chief takes great pleasure in acquainting the army that its conduct yesterday afforded him the highest satisfaction. The exactness and order with which all its move- ments were formed, is a pleasing evidence of the progress it has made in military improvement, and of the perfection to which it may arrive by a continuance of that laudable zeal which now happily prevails. The general, at the same time, presents his thanks to Baron Steuben and the gentlemen acting under him for their exertions in the duties of their office, the good effects of which are already so apparent, and for the care, activity and prosperity with which they conducted the business of yesterday. Notwithstanding this encouraging outlook trouble was brewing. At first sight one would suppose that military officials from the importance of their duties and the ar- duousness of their work, especially in time of war, would be the last persons to waste time and labor in stickling for points of etiquette or precedence. Certainly when the bullets begin flying the leaden balls are no respecter of persons, and will ruthlessly cut down the highest rank quite as readily as the lowest if it is in the way. But 96 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN everybody who has had anything to do with soldiering knows, sometimes to his cost, that he cannot be too care- ful lest somebody's prerogative be infringed, and the slightest breach in this respect, even if done through ignorance or inadvertance, is at least next to an unpar- donable sin. The most rigid dinner party rules are no- where in comparison. It is difficult to see how the new arrangement for drilling the army, and making the troops subject to the call of the general drillmaster for that special purpose could interfere with the authority of the regular commanders, but they evidently thought dif- ferently. Mr. Kapp says that a cabal was formed against the Baron, headed by Major Generals Lee, Lafayette and Mifflin, but is not necessary to adopt this term in the more offensive sense. These officers considered, however, that the inspector was unwarrantably interfering with the troops under their command, and, doubtless through their influence, the general in chief issued an order that major generals should, in future exercise their divisions themselves, and that the brigadiers should do the same with their brigades, but they must adhere to the system prescribed by the inspector. The result was that the of- ficers having neither leisure nor inclination to perform this work it was neglected, to the great detriment of the army. Referring to this Steuben afterwards wrote: All the brigadier generals threatened to quit the service. I, however, in no way changed my conduct; I continually pur- sued the object I had in view, and flattered nobody, not even the general in chief. The nature of my office in the army obliged me to a severity to which our officers were then little accustomed, but I was equally severe towards my inferiors, and am so still at present. And here is my greatest triumph. The same brigadiers who opposed the inspectorship, are eager today to serve under my orders. These same officers, whom I never had flattered, honor me now with the title of friend and father. In the military career the testimony of the inferiors is the most honorable; our subalterns used to be our most severe judges. DRILLING THE ARMY 97 The affection and estimation of my officers fill my heart with the greatest pride and satisfaction. The situation thus became rather strained. It is possi- ble and not unnatural that the Baron would be disposed to magnify his office, and were the soldiers still in re- cruiting camps he could no doubt have exercised his pow- ers to the fullest extent without serious conflict. But they were in the field, practically confronting the enemy, and consequently the claim of the generals to authority over their commands, subject only to the general-in-chief, could not be ignored. So when Steuben made a trip to Congress to have his affairs arranged on a more perma- nent footing, Hamilton, doubtless under the direction of Washington, wrote to that body as follows : The Baron is a gentleman for whom I have a particular esteem, and whose zeal, intelligence and success, the conse- quence of both, entitle him to the greatest credit. But I am ap- prehensive, with all his good qualities, a fondness for power and importance, natural to every man, may lead him to wish for more extensive prerogatives in his department than it will be for the good of the service to grant. I should be sorry to excite any prejudice against him on this account; perhaps I may be mistaken in my conjecture. The caution I give will do no harm if I am right; if I am not it may be useful. In either case the Baron deserves to be considered as a valuable man, and treated with all the deference which good policy will warrant. On the first institution of this office the general allowed him to exercise more ample powers than would be proper for a continuance. They were necessary in the commencement to put things in a train with a degree of dispatch which the exigency of our af- fairs required; but it has been necessary to restrain them even earlier than was intended. The novelty of the office excited questions about its boundaries; the extent of its operations alarmed the officers of every rank for their own rights. Their jealousies and discontents were rising to a height that threat- ened to overturn the whole plan. It became necessary to apply a remedy. The general has delineated the functions of the in- spectorship in general orders, a copy of which will be sent to Congress. The plan is good and satisfactory to the army in general. * * * There is one thing which the Baron has much at heart, which, in good policy he can by no means be indulged in — it is the power of enforcing that part of discipline which we understand by subordination, or an obedience to orders. This 98 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN power can only be properly lodged with the commander in chief, and would inflame the whole army if put into other hands. Each captain is vested with it in his company; each colonel in his regiment; each general in his particular command, and the commander in chief in the whole. With this statement before it Congress was naturally slow to comply with the wishes of Steuben, and the war was practically over before he realized his desires. There was considerable correspondence, and the war board of Congress bore willing testimony to the good work which had been accomplished between February and June under- most disadvantageous circumstances, whose value was soon to be tested in a practical way. In fact the commit- tee drew up quite an elaborate report, which was pre- sented to Congress, formally creating the office of inspec- tor general with a corps of brigade inspectors under his immediate orders. These were to be approved by the commander in chief and reported to Congress, and were to have the rank of lieutenant colonels or majors. All regulations for the discipline and police of the army were placed in the hands of the inspector general, with the ap- proval of the commander in chief, until Congress should establish a permanent system; he should also have the privilege of selecting six young men to act as light dragoons, who should receive the pay and rations of en- signs. They were to be instructed in laying out camps and other such proper service as the inspector general should order. Other officers were authorized to be ap- pointed as needed, in fact the machinery was so elaborate that to a lay mind it appeared likely to clog by its own weight. Certainly it was sufficiently complicated for an army much larger than the Continental force was then or likely to be in the near future. But. however that may be Congress did not adopt it, and this department was left to get along under temporary arrangements made by DRILLING THE ARMY 99 the commander in chief. Steuben continued to conduct his work as best he could, and there does not seem to have been any interruption in the harmonious relations existing between Washington and himself, although he must have known that the general had not encouraged Congress to give him supreme authority so far as his duties were concerned. On June 15 Washington issued orders providing that the brigadiers should exercise their brigades and the colonels their regiments according to the rules established by the inspector and approved by the general in chief with "grand maneuvers" occasion- ally under charge of the inspector, whose directions rela- tive to the exercise and agreeable to the rules laid down are to be observed by every officer of inferior rank who might command. On the daily parade of the guards the inspector general or the sub-inspector of the day was to exercise the parade under the general order of the day. This seemed to satisfy the general officers, for we hear no more complaints, and if Steuben was dissatisfied he concealed his feelings, for on the 18th he wrote to Washington : It gives me great satisfaction to see that your Excellency has taken such a wise step in my department as to engage the general officers and field officers of regiments to take command of the troops in our daily exercise. Nothing could be more use- ful in the present moment. I had wished, sometime ago, it might be the case, but in meanwhile I was endeavoring with the gentlemen under me, to make the officers and soldiers a lit- tle more perfect, in order to enable the general officers to oass immediately to grand maneuvers, and save them the trouble of descending to those toilsome and fastidious details which we cheerfully encountered from the beginning for the good of the service. No pains will be spared on my part to help on the general officers, and I shall always think myself happy if I can contribute in any manner whatsoever to the advancement of the American army, and prove a useful instrument in your hands. As it will take a few days for the general officers to become ac- quainted and familiar with the instructions and principles here- tofore approved of and established by your Excellency, and for 100 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN the officers and soldiers to arrive at a tolerable degree of perfec- tion in the performance of the evolutions and maneuvers before practiced, I will seize this opportunity with your Excellency's leave, to take a short journey to York, there to settle some af- fairs with my friend. Mr. De Francy, and take my leave of him before he goes to South Carolina, as Congress has not yet come to any positive determination about the department. If your Excellency foresees that I can be of some use, I beg you will give me such orders and directions about the whole as you think proper. I must likewise beseech your Excellency to give me the satisfaction to let me know whether you are satisfied, as I am, with the officers your Excellency has appointed under me, and whether you are willing to have them continued in the exer- cise of that office. I will likewise propose to your Excellency the reuniting the office of brigade inspector to that of brigade major with the denomination of brigade majors, which officers will be taken from the line of majors, and not as it was before, some being captains, others majors or colonels. There is such an analogy between both offices as renders it, in my opinion, almost indispensable to join them in one office, were it but to prevent difficulties naturally arising between two officers acting in two different analogous departments, between which there is no certain line drawn. Upon these different heads I beg your Excellency's opinions and orders. While the Baron appears thus ready to accept the situation and make the best of it, the opinion of compe- tent judges is that the army suffered by the change, and although much had been accomplished yet it would have been in far better condition to accomplish the work before it, had there been better opportunity for the Baron to work out his plans in his own way. But the stirring events which were now to follow produced such an en- tire change in the state of affairs as to put the whole question of drills and maneuvers at least temporarily in the background. CHAPTER VII. FROM VALLEY FORGE TO MONMOUTH. Howe Evacuates Philadelphia — Movements Across New Jersey; Battle of Monmouth Court House — Treason of Lee — Steuben's Well-Drilled Troops Turn Defeat Into Victory. By the middle of June the 5,000 half clothed, half starved motley force at Valley Forge had been increased to 15,000 fairly well drilled troops, thanks to the untiring energy of the inspector general. The French alliance had not yet brought any substantial aid, in fact, as we have seen, the first effect was detrimental, but there was a feeling of encouragement that the situation on the whole had been bettered. The first instinct was naturally to- wards Philadelphia, where Lord Howe had passed a very comfortable winter. Balls and dinners, cards and other recreations whiled away the cold months, and if the revel- lers thought of the little army out at Valley Forge, it was with a feeling of contempt and perhaps a determination to go and clean out the nest as soon as spring opened. Washington to some extent did interfere with supplies reaching the city from the back country, but Phliadelphia was not situated on a peninsula connected by a narrow neck with the mainland as was Boston, nor was the Con- tinental force as large as in the other case. Then in front of the city were the fertile Jersey farms, and so long as British ships commanded the Delaware there was little danger of the city being starved out. So they went along with their gayeties which culminated in a sort of carnival on May 18 called the Michianza. Among those who were prominent in those festivities were Miss Mar- garet Shippen, subsequently the wife of Benedict Arnold, 102 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN and the ill fated Major Andre. After this demonstration Lord Howe sailed for England leaving Sir Henry Clin- ton in charge of the invading army. When the latter heard of the French alliance and that Count D'Estaing was approaching with a strong fleet, he was alarmed at the prospect of losing control of the Delaware in front with Washington in his rear, and concluded to retreat towards New York. The movement began early in June, and 3,000 Tories with their effects having been sent around by water the army began its retreat across New Jersey encumbered with twelve miles of baggage wagons. The rear guard left Philadelphia on the morning of the 18th, and that evening American troops encamped in the city. General Arnold was placed in command from York, and Philadelphia once more became the capital. The main American army did not enter Philadelphia, but crossed the Delaware into New Jersey, at Corryell's ferry fifteen miles above Trenton, near where Washington had crossed on Christmas night, 1776, to win the battle of Trenton. Steuben on learning of the evacuation and that the army had moved, left York to rejoin it, stopping at Philadelphia en route, where he was joined by Duponceau. Sanitary matters received littie public attention in those days, but the British authorities seem to have been grossly negligent even for that period, for Duponceau describes the city as being in a most filthy condition. He says, "I joined Baron Steuben at the State House in Second street, the celebrated boarding house so much spoken of in Graydon's memoirs. Such was the filth of the city that it was im- possible for us to drink a comfortable dish of tea that evening. As fast as our cups were filled myraids of flies took possession of them, and served us as the harpies did the poor Trojans in the AEneid. Some said they were FROM VALLEY FORGE TO MONMOUTH 103 Hessian flies, and various jokes were cracked on the occa- sion, for the evacuation of the city had put us all in good spirits, and we enjoyed ourselves very well, the filth not- withstanding. The next day a house was provided for us in New street, where we stayed but a few days, being anx- ious to join the army. That quarter of the city was then inhabited almost entirely by Germans; hardly any other language than the German was heard in the streets, or seen on the signs in front of the shops, so that Baron Steuben fancied himself again in his native country. A great number of the inns in town and country bore the sign of the King of Prussia, who was very popular, espe- cially among the Germans. We were, however, not capti- vated with the delights of Capua ; we bade adieu to Phila- delphia and all its German attractions, and joined General Washington's army in New Jersey." When Clinton left Philadelphia he had 17,000 men, a force slightly larger than that of the Americans, but he was hampered by the long wagon train already mentioned, which not only impeded his march but required a con- siderable force for its protection. He crossed the river to Gloucester Point opposite the lower end of the city, and moved eastward to Haddon heights and Mount Holly, the latter about twenty-five miles east of the pres- ent city of Camden. From here there were two routes to New York, one via Brunswick to South Amboy, which would bring them to the lower New York bay, and the other via Freehold, which would bring them to Sandy Hook, a little farther from their ultimate destination. There was very little difference in distance, but there was enough to be said in favor of the northerly route to make the choice doubtful were the way clear. But it could not be said to be clear. Washington was twenty-five or thirty miles above, moving on almost a parallel line. 104 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN Would he attack Clinton ? was the question. The moment he heard of the preparation for evacuation Washington determined to strike a blow, notwithstanding there was some disparity of strength in favor of the British. A council of war was called on the 17th, at which Lee de- clared the enemy would move south and it was not advis- able to attack. What motive Clinton could have for moving south, with the French fleet daily expected in the Delaware, is not discernable at this late day. Neverthe- less, Lee carried all the generals with him except Greene, Lafayette, Wayne and Cadwallader. Washington was not deteYred, but pushed across the river as above related. There he sent a force of six hundred men under command of Maxwell, with a thousand Jersey militia to destroy the roads, a work in which they were as much at home as had been their contemporaries who hampered Bur- goyne's army the preceding Autumn. Morgan with a force of six hundred men was ordered to annoy the enemy's flank while the main army moved to Hopewell near Princeton. There on the 24th another council was called where Lee declared that they should rather build a bridge of gold for the retreat of their enemies than attack such a well disciplined army. Lafayette protested that it would be a disgrace to allow the British to make their way unopposed across New Jersey; that without extreme risk they could attack the rear, and take advant- age of anything that might occur. Steuben, who had again reached the army, concurred in this, and Washing- ton decided to follow that policy, which was in accord- ance with his own views. In order to a full understanding of these and subse- quent events it is necessary to diverge a little to glance at the career of General Charles Lee, who will occupy quite a prominent place in the following pages. He was FROM VALLEY FORGE TO MONMOUTH 105 in no way related to the Virginia Lees, and never became an American in the true sense of the word. He was born in England in 1731, being the son of Lieutenant Colonel John Lee who married the daughter of Sir Henry Bun- bury, and afterwards became a general. Through family influence he received a commission when only eleven years of age, and although his education was not thorough he became quite a linguist. When twenty-four years old he commanded a company of grenadiers in the 44th British infantry, which took part in the French and In- dian war along the New York border. He became so familiar with Johnson's Mohawk warriors that he was adopted into one of the tribes under the name of Boiling Water. He was shot through the body while assaulting the French breastworks at Ticonderaga, but was present in the next campaign at the siege of Fort Niagara, which was successful. Afterwards he took a military journey across Lake Erie, and down the Allegheny river (then called the Ohio) to Fort Pitt, and back seven hundred miles across the country to Crown Point. Here he joined General Amherst and remained with him until Canada was conquered. Two years later as a colonel he served under General Burgoyne in Portugal, where he won some renown by capturing an old Moorish castle which had been occupied by the Spaniards. Being quite as ready with pen as with sword he became mixed up in English politics, and like Wilkes, was soon out of favor with the government. Seeing there was no chance of advance- ment at home he concluded to go to Poland, where war was anticipated. Stopping to see Frederick the Great en route he discussed American affairs with that King, and on arriving at Warsaw secured the appointment as aide to Stanislaus Augustus, who had been elected King of Poland. The latter was not strong enough to engage in 106 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN war at that time, and at the King's suggestion he accom- pained the Polish ambassador to Constantinople, meeting with almost as many adventures as the redoubtable Cap- tain John Smith. By 1766 he was back in England with a letter from the King Stanislaus, favoring his appoint- ment to some military duty. But the ministry turned a cold shoulder to him, and in 1768 he again left for Poland where he expected to get a command in the Russian ser- vice, which he evidently did not consider inconsistent with his previous relations with Stanislaus, in fact it was apparently with the approval of the latter. Writing in anticipation of his new position he says : "I am to have command of Cossacks and Wallacks, a kind of people I have a good opinion of. I am determined not to serve in the line. One might as well be a church warden." The next year he was given the rank of major general in the Russian army, which crossed into Moldavia, where oc- curred a battle with the Turks near Chotzim in which Lee's Cossacks suffered severely. The conflict was doubt- ful, but the threatened approach of another Turkish army of 17,000 men caused the Russians to retreat, and the campaign was abandoned. After this Lee spent some- time traveling over Europe, being afflicted with rheuma- tism, gout and "Hungarian fever," and was mixed up in several duels, in one of which he killed his antagonist. He continued his attacks in the public press upon the British ministry, wielding a caustic pen, and for a while he was suspected of being the author of the celebrated Junius letters. Coming to America in 1773, he took up the cause of the colonies, not because he cared anything for the Americans or their principles, but as a means of getting even with the then British ministry. His Euro- pean adventures, of which we have given only the merest outline, naturally gave him considerable prestige, and it FROM VALLEY FORGE TO MONMOUTH 107 was generally considered that he would be a most valua- ble acquisition to the patriot cause. The two foci of dis- affection were Virginia and Massachusetts. While mat- ters in the latter colony were rapidly converging to a dra- matic climax, in the former the whole community was preparing for the crisis which her statesmen foresaw could not much longer be delayed. The natural leader and adviser in this condition of affairs was Washington, and visitors to Mount Vernon to discuss public affairs were both frequent and numerous. Among them were Charles Lee and Horatio Gates, both natives of England, and the latter the reputed son of a captain in the British army, although it has been hinted that his father was an English peer. He was a volunteer under General Edward Cornwallis. Governor of Halifax, was wounded in the Braddock campaign, served in the West Indies, and aft- erwards in a troop known as the Royal Americans. He desired, however, a better office, but failing to secure it he left London for America in 1772 as deeply soured against the British ministry as Lee, with whom his career furnishes a very close parallel, although he never went to the length of selling out to the English. Gates purchased an estate in Berkeley County, Virginia, where Lee also came and settled on an adjoining tract. Both of these gentlemen having had considerable experience in military affairs their visit was no doubt quite welcome to Wash- ington, but, as Irving remarks, "It is doubtful whether the visits of Lee were as interesting to Mrs. Washington as to the general. He was whimsical, eccentric, and at times almost rude; negligent also, and slovenly in person and attire, for though he had occasionally associated with kings and princes, he had also campaigned with Mohawks and Cossacks, and seems to have relished their 'good breeding.' What was still more annoying in a well regu- 108 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN lated mansion, he was always followed by a legion of dogs which shared his affections with his horses, and took their seats by him when at table. 'I must have some ob- ject to embrace/ said he, misanthropically, 'when I can be convinced that men are as worthy objects as dogs, I shall transfer my benevolence, and become as staunch a philanthropists as the canting Addison affected to be.' " What the Americans wanted, however, or thought they wanted, were trained soldiers without regard to their so- cial qualities, so on the outbreak of the hostilities Lee was welcomed to the army at the inflated value which he set upon himself. He was made second major general by Con- gress, thus placing General Ward the only one between him and Washington, and was sent to assist in the siege of Boston. Here he chiefly distinguished himself by opening correspondence with the British authorities in that city, but the Massachusetts Congress promptly re- pudiated him as a negotiator. Desiring a separate com- mand Washington assigned him to New York, then threatened by the British, where he carried matters with a high hand. Sir Henry Clinton who with two companies of infantry and a few Highlanders had anchored in the harbor, moved down the bay, and on January 11th, 1776, disappeared. This bloodless victory raised Lee higher than ever in public opinion, as well as in his own conceit. He wrote to Washington, "When I leave this place the provincial Congress will relapse into their hysterics, the men of war will return to their wharfs, and the first regi- ments from England will take quiet possession of the town." On March 1st Congress, to the relief of Washington who had already discovered him to be both "violent and fickle," placed Lee in command of the forces south of the Potomac, and on the 7th he left for that section. He FROM VALLEY FORGE TO MONMOUTH 109 went to Charleston, S. C, which was threatened with an attack from the sea, where his principal occupation seems to have been to ridicule a palmetto fort which Colonel Moultrie had erected on Sullivan's island, and advise its abandonment. Moultrie, however, held on to the fort, and repulsed the British fleet and army with such success that the expedition sailed back to New York, not to re- turn until more than two years after. Coming north, and apapropriating to himself the honors won by Colonel Moultrie, a prototype of some of our Civil War generals, Lee took part in the retreat from New York, more than once disobeying the orders of Washington and thus im- periling the safety of the entire army. By the resigna- tion of Ward he had become senior major general, and by the death or other displacement of Washington he would become the general in chief. To this end he culti- vated disaffection which was already bordering on trea- son. He even wrote letters hinting that he might accom- plish something of importance were he made dictator, if only for a short time. While these movements were going on across New Jersey, Lee spent a night at a tavern four miles from Moristown. The next morning he wrote a confidential letter to Gates, saying, among other things, that "a cer- tain great man is most damnably deficient. " He had barely finished the letter when a party of thirty British dragoons surrounded the house, and carried him off dressed only in a flannel dressing gown and slippers. He was alarmed lest he might be treated as a deserter, having been an officer in the British army, fears which his cap- tors took no means to allay. Had they only known it the capture of Lee was the greatest blessing that could have happened to the Americans, and had they been wise they would have left him to his fate. But they did not 110 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN know this, and the occurrence was regarded as one more added to the list of disasters. In truth everything looked desperate, only Washington retained his poise, until the battles of Trenton and Princeton again revived the droop- ing spirits of the patriots. In the meantime Lee was con- fined a prisoner in New York City Hall, not without danger of the halter, in which situation Sir William Howe was very willing to place him. He concluded, however, to write home for instructions, and was ordered to send Lee to England for trial. He was already on board ship, when Washington, hearing of these proceed- ings notified Lord Howe that he held five Hessian officers as hostages for Lee's safety, and no further exchanges would be made until he was assured that Lee would be treated as prisoner of war. While all this was going on a full year passed away and Lee had made up his mind to "sell out." His treason, which was not discovered until eighty years after, and consequently was unknown to his contemporaries and the early historians, was worse than th a t of Arnold's because it was without provocation, deliberate, selfish and cold blooded. He first induced the Howes to believe that he had some influence with Con- gress, which might induce that body to consider peace proposals on the basis of return to their former allegiance, and by permission sent a letter requesting that a commit- tee be sent to confer with him. This communication was treated with contempt, and Lee's next step was to suggest a plan of campaign by which the British might move on and capture Philadelphia. He declared that the people of Maryland and Pennsylvania were "loyal," and if Howe were once in possession of the rebel capital he could dic- tate terms to the Americans. To this end he suggested that 14,000 men should be ordered to drive Washington out of New Jersey, and 4,000 should sail for Chesapeake FROM VALLEY FORGE TO MONMOUTH 111 bay, and capture Annapolis and Alexandria. The plausi- bility of the schem appealed to the Howes, and had they been able to carry it out with the rapidity that was in- tended Philadelphia would have fallen in June instead of the latter part of September, and a sufficient force could have been detached up the Hudson to co-operate with Burgoyne. But Washington's admirable tactics defeated their plan, and although Howe entered the ''rebel capi- tal" and spent the winter there the victory was in the main a barren one, while the failure to relieve Burgoyne insured his capture which was followed by the French alliance. Of course nothing was known of Lee's treason in the American camp, and the British General Prescott having been captured Lee's jailors, knowing he would be useful to them in the American army while as a prisoner he was simply a nuisance, gladly gave him in exchange for Prescott after having paid him 1,100 guineas for his services. Pie arrived at Valley Forge in May, and, as we have seen, immediately began putting all sorts of obstacles in the way of Washington's plan for breaking up Clin- ton's army. Desiring to get some definite information as to Clin- ton's movements Washington now detailed Steuben to make a reconnaisance, and the latter on June 25 discov- ered that the British were moving toward Monmouth Court House (afterwards known as Freehold), and Sandy Hook. A dispatch to Brigadier General Scott in- timated that the British were on the direct road to Mon- mouth Court House, and suggesting that the latter ad- vance his corps to Hightstown a neighboring village, sit- uated as its name indicated on a rising ground, also mak- ing the further suggestion that this information be com- municated to the other officers. While Clinton had the start of Washington from Philadelphia, yet he had the 112 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN longer journey, and was doubtless hindered by the greater quantity of impedimenta, so that he did not reach Monmouth Court House (Freehold) until June 27, with Steuben close on his heels. On the morning of that day the latter encamped a couple of miles to the left of the Court House, and at noon sent the following dispatch to Washington who was pushing forward with the main army three miles in the rear : We arrived here this morning, and it being the best position we can find to observe the motions of the enemy have remained; we have advanced our parties so near as to fire a pistol at their horsemen while feeding their horses. They now lay encamped, one line on the main road by the court house, and another line extended on their left from the head of the column, which is not advanced 150 paces beyond the court house, having sent a man there to discover; they have some tents pitched, and their horses are at pasture, and have not the least appearance of mov- ing. When we first arrived here, they had a party of infantry posted in a wood on their left and about five hundred paces in our front, from which we could discover several detachments to go to the adjacent houses, two of which they have burnt, viz.: Colonel Henderson's and Mr. Wickoff's. So soon as they move, I shall endeavor to discover their route, and immediately ac- quaint you. Steuben was not without adventures while obtaining this information. Once while alone in a field he noticed two horsemen coming from a neighboring wood, which he knew by their uniform to be British soldiers. He at once discharged his pistols, and turning his horse, he leaped a fence, and successfully reached camp, losing his hat, however, by the way, a feat that was afterwards emulated successfully by Sumter in North Carolina. Al- though the horsemen yelled to him to stop they did not fire at him, for the reason given below. Steuben's two aides had approached the British lines nearer than Steu- ben, and he supposed they were captured, but while mak- ing his report to Washington the aides, one of them, Benjamin Walker, put in an appearance. "How is this ?" FROM VALLEY FORGE TO MONMOUTH 113 exclaimed the Baron, "I thought you were taken prison- er?" "O, no," replied Walker, "they were intent on the high prize and overlooked us." "Have you brought my hat?" was next inquiry. "O no, Baron, we had no time." The next evening a prisoner being brought to headquar- ters saw the Baron, and said, "I believe, General, I had the honor of seeing you yesterday, and thought to get a more splendid prize than your hat." "Why did you not fire?" said the Baron, to which the other replied, "You were recognized by General Knyphausen, and our orders were rather to take you, if we could do it without harm- ing you." The accompanying diagram shows the movement of the two armies across the state of New Jersey, the south- erly line from Gloucester Point through Haddonfield, Mt. Holly, Crosswicks, Allentown, Freehold (Mon- mouth) and Middletown to Port Monmouth indicating Clinton's march, and the northerly one through Hope .veil, Hightstown and Englishtown indicating Washington's. On the night of the 27th General Knyphausen had passed through Monmouth conveying the wagon train. It was the right wing of the British army about 6,000 strong, and encamped on the Middletown road just beyond the Monmouth village as indicated by figure 1 of the diagram. Clinton's left wing numbering some 8,000, stopped be- fore entering the village as indicated by figure 2. Lee with the American advance was five miles northeast of the British line at a point indicated by figure 3, while Wash- ington with the main army was at Englishtown, three miles behind (figure 4). Now was the time to fight, if ever. Clinton's anxiety to avoid a battle was one of the best indications of American success, provided the mat- ter was properly handled. Although Lee was second in command, yet his churlishness, and his refusal to advance Ill GENERAL WILLIAM VCtt on the ground that he would surely be defeated, had in- duced Washington to put Lafayette in Iris place. But on the 27th Lee repented his position, and probably with the view of being better able to carry out his traitorous de- signs petulantly complained of mistreatment, and asked to be restored to his command. As he had not yet lost his reputation in the country, although Washington had be- gun to distrust him, it was decided to give him back his place, and the general wrote to Lafayette requesting his withdrawal, adding, "my fortune and my honor are in your hands; you are too generous to ruin one or the other." Lafayette generously acceded, and Lee was placed in charge of the advance. The Aveather had been very warm for several days, interfering somewhat with energetic operations, but at noon on the 27th, Washing- ton called a general council, with instructions to prepare at once for an engagement the next morning. We have seen that through Steuben's efforts infor- mation was at hand regarding the exact whereabouts of the enemy. Details of the plan of attack were left to Lee, but when Lafayette, Wayne and Maxwell called on him for orders he had none to give, no plan of action was formed, nor did he make any preparations even to the ex- tent of familiarizing himself with the field ot action. That night he was ordered by Washington to detach a party of skirmishers to delay the British if they should attempt to retreat, but he lay quietly in camp, doing nothing. At five o'clock on the morning of the 28th Washing- ton learned that the British army had begun to move from Monmouth towards the coast. He ordered Lee to attack at once, and he would be prompt in sustaining him. Lee hesitated and moved so slowly that Cornwallis with the left wing had passed through Monmouth towards Middle- FROM VALLEY FORGE TO MONMOUTH 115 town when he found himself flanked by the Americans, with Lee immediately on the north, Wayne close behind, and Lafayette, who had come through Monmouth, threat- ening him on the south. Menaced on three sides it seemed that Cornwallis was doomed, but Lee would neither make the attack himself nor suffer his subordinates to do so. Lafayette insisted on attacking- but to this Lee replied: "You don't know the British soldiers, we cannot stand against them." Whereupon Lafayette sent a dispatch to Washington that his presence was needed on he field at once, and Laurens sent two similar messages. At last securing orders, or rather permission, to attack the ene- my's left Lafayette started, but before traversing one- fourth the distance he received counter orders for his re- turn. Wayne also started to make a charge, but received orders to make only a feint. The result of all this an hour or two were spent in marching and counter-march- ing with finally a complete halt, thus giving the British ample time to reform their columns to either resist a front attack or charge upon the Americans in turn. This nat- urally caused some indioT\ant comment, and to an officer Lee said : "I have orders from Congress and the com- mander in chief not to engage/' a most palpable false- hood. By this time Clinton had gotten his wagon train well out of the way protected by Knyphausen, who had sent back reinforcements to Cornwallis. It was now about 8 o'clock when Clinton turned a force against Lee consisting of two regiments of cavalry, with grenadiers, guards and Highlanders, a body which should have beer repulsed, but to everybody's astonishment Lee directed a retreat. No good reason being apparent this argued some unknown danger which created a panicky feeling among the troops. The order was still good, however, with no serious confusion, thanks to training which had 116 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN been given by Baron Steuben, until Lee directed them across a causeway which spanned a marshy ravine. Crowded into a narrow space the ranks were thrown into disorder and men were falling from heat more than from British bullets, until on the westerly side the retreat be- came a complete rout. Here they met Washington, at the point indicated by figure 7 in the diagram. The latter demanded of Lee, "What is the meaning of this?" The traitor stammered, "Sir — Sir!" The question was re- peated when Lee said "You know the attack was contrary to my advice and opinion." Tradition relates that this was one of two occasions when the Father of His Coun- try was known to swear. Certain it is he used very ener- getic language in telling Lee that he should not have taken the command unless he intended to fight. Lee still protested that he did not think it prudent to bring on a general engagement, but was sharply interrupted by Washington with, "I expect my orders to be obeyed," Lee was ordered to the rear, and Washington set to worV at the perilous task of reforming the lines in the face of the advancing enemy. It was the first time the American troops had to face such a problem, and now was demonstrated the value of the four months' training given by Baron Steuben. Ban- croft says that even Laurens hoped for no more than an orderly retreat, and Hamilton's thought was to die on the spot, while Lee sitting idly on his horse in the rear re- marked to bystanders that "the attempt was madness, and could not be successful." But, lc and behold, the dis- organized mob in response to orders immediately wheeled and formed under fire with as much coolness and preci- sion as they could have shown on parade, and while they stopped the enemy's progress, Washington rode back and brought up the main body of the army. FROM VALLEY FORGE TO MONMOUTH 117 Steuben commanded the left wing, and in his subse- quent deposition before the Lee court martial he relates some of the incidents of that day. "After reconnoitering," he says, "I returned from Monmouth, in order to make my report to the commander in chief, whom I found at Englishtown. Having seen that the enemy was march- ing and doubting of our being able to overtake them, and having seen nothing in my way but some militia, which followed at some distance, I stopped at a house in English- town to take some rest, where I stayed about an hour and a half. I afterwards continued my road to meet the com- mander in chief. On my way I heard several firings of cannon, and made the greatest haste to arrive near the general, whom I found on the high ground, beginning to form the troops as they arrived. It was there I saw General Lee's division retreating in great disorder, fol- lowed by the enemy, whose strength I conceived to be 1,500 men of infantry, and about 150 horse. "As I was employed in placing a battery, General Lee passed by me, without speaking to one another. About a quarter of an hour after, the commander in chief or- dered me to stop the retreating troops and form them to- ward Englishtown. I sent some officers forward to stop the men, and I went there myself, accompanied by Mr. Ternant and my aides-de-camp to form them. As I passed through Englishtown I found General Lee on horseback before a house. He asked me where I was going. I ac- quainted him with my orders, upon which he said to me that he was very glad of my having taken that charge upon me for he was tired out. I assembled part of Gen- eral Maxwell's brigade and part of General Scott's de- tachment, which I formed behind the creek of English- town. General Maxwell was himself there. Scarce had the troops taken their position, when General Patterson 118 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN arrived with three brigades of the second line and de- sired to know where he was to be stationed. I placed his three brigades a little more in the rear on a high ground, and I established a battery on the right wing, in front of the second brigade of General Smallwood. The cannon- ade continued more or less briskly till past five o'clock. Half an hour after it had cleared, Colonel Gemat arrived and brought me an order from the commander in chief that the enemy was retreating in confusion, and that I should, therefore, bring him a reinforcement. I ordered General Maxwell to take the command of the troops I had placed behind the creek, and to remain there till fur- ther orders. I then marched off with the three brigades of the second line. As I passed through Englishtown I again met General Lee, who asked me where I was going. I imparted him the order I had received from the general in chief, which I declared in the very expressions of Col- onel Gemat, that the enemy was retreating with confu- sion. L T pon the word 'Confusion,' he took me up and paid, 'that they were only resting themselves, but' said he afterward, 'I am sure there is some misunderstanding in your being sent to advance with these troops.' I told him that I had received the order from Mr. Gemat. I ordered, however, General Muhlenberg to halt, and sent for Captain Walker, my aide-de-camp, who repeated, in the presence of General Lee, the order which Colonel Ge- mat had brought me. 'Then,' said he, 'You are to march,' and I went on with the troops." The British were now driven back across the ravine over which Lee had retreated, the principal action being at figure 5 indicated in the diagram, with an American battery at figure 6 playing at their right. Darkness check- ed the pursuit, and the Americans lay on their arms all night, expecting to renew the conflict in the morning. But MONMOUTH BATTUE GROUND. View from Wayne's position when Monckton fell. Old parsonage on left occupied during battle by Freeman. Beyond the house right and left was the morass, with elevations in the distance where Washington's army was drawn up. The British grenadiers were on the elevation on the extreme right, and two figures in the open field show where Mocckton fell. STEUBEN'S HEADQUARTERS AT MIDDLEBROOKE. Wings have since been added. FROM VALLEY FORGE TO MONMOUTH 119 at midnight Clinton withdrew his troops leaving his dead unburied, his wounded, in the hands of the Americans, and hurriedly retreated to Middletown where his two wings were again united. On the American side there were 3G2 killed and wounded, and on the British, over 400, while over 2,000 deserted before and after the battle. While the treachery of Lee prevented what might have proved the practical annihilation of Clinton's army, yet the fruits of the battle were decidedly with the Ameri- cans. It demonstrated their ability to withstand the trained levies of Europe, and once more confined the British to the occupancy of New York and a post on Rhode Island. Had the French fleet come up to expecta- tions Clinton's army might still have been captured and the war ended then and there. But Count d'Estaing did not arrive at the mouth of the Delaware until July 8, too late to intercept Lord Howe's vessels, and two of the largest ships could not get over the bar at New York, so an expedition to Newport was planned, which turned out a failure. On receiving British reports Frederick the Great ex- claimed: "Clinton gained no advantage except to reach New York with the wreck of his army. America is probably lost to England." Alexander Hamilton after- wards remarked that he had never known or conceived the value of military discipline till that day, and this with numerous other expressions which might be quoted, testi- fied to the skill and thoroughness with which the Baron had done his work. The battle was over, and Lee's traitorous project had cignally failed. With characteristic impudence, however, the next day he wrote a letter to Washington demanding an apology for the language used by the general on the 120 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN battlefield. Washington replied that what he had said was dictated by duty and warranted by the occasion, and adding that as soon as possible Lee should have the op- portunity of justifying himself to the army, to Congress, to America and to the world in general, or of convincing them that he was guilty of a breach of orders and of mis- behavior before the enemy, in not attacking them as he had been directed, and in making an unnecessary, dis- orderly and shameful retreat. To this Lee answered, "You cannot afford me greater pleasure than in giving me the opportunity of showing to America the sufficiency of her respective servants. I trust that temporary power of office and the tinsel dignity attending it will not be able, by all the mists they can raise, to obfuscate the bright rays of truth." It has long been said that whom the gods would de- story they first made mad, and in Lee's case he had been so flattered and cajoled that he had no doubt brought himself to the belief that in such a controversy with Washington he would come out ahead. Lee was at once placed under arrest and a court martial convened, which, after a month's investigation found him guilty of disobe- dience of orders in not attacking the enemy, misbehavior on the field in making an unnecessary and shameful re- treat, and gross disrespect to the commander in chief. His sentence, which in any European army at that time would have been death, was toned down to the exceeding- ly mild punishment of suspension for one year. This was no doubt due to the belief that he had simply lost his judgment through excitement. Had the commission known that his pockets were still distended with British gold in payment for his treason he would, of course, have not gotten off so easily. FROM VALLEY FORGE TO MONMOUTH 121 We have noticed that Steuben was one of the wit- nesses before the court martial which was the cause of some caustic comments by Lee, that gentleman not having yet learned by experience the art of holding his tongue. This roused Steuben's ire to such an extent that he sent Lee the following note dated Philadelphia, December 2, 1778: It has been reported to me, sir, that in your defense you have allowed yourself to cast indecent reflections on my ac- count. I made haste to arrive at Philadelphia to inquire into the matter, and I find the report confirmed by the journal of the court martial, of which I got possession an hour ago. and where I read the following paragraph, "Of all the very distant specta- tors &c." were I now in my own country where my reputation is long established, I should have put myself above your epi- grams and would have despised them. But here I am a stranger. You have offended me, I desire you will give me satisfaction. You will chose the place, time and arms, but as I do not like to be a distant or slow spectator, I desire to see you as near and as soon as possible. You will explain to Captain Walker, who will deliver this to you, if your present situation will per- mit you to bring this affair to as quick a conclusion as I wish it. Lee evidently did not want a duel for he replied to the Baron's epistle : I believe you have misunderstood the sense of this article of my defense. Very likely the sentence, "very distant specta- tors" has appeared to you a reflection cast upon your courage. If such be your opinion, I assure you that I had not the least idea of it. I am ready to acknowledge it to all the gentlemen of your acquaintance, to all the world if you will. It is true that I found fault with your forwardness (as I took it to be) to wit- ness against me. I was piqued and thought myself justified in making use of the phrase which you have seen in print, but I repeat it without the least intention of intimating a reflection on your courage. Steuben accepted the apology or whatever it might be called, apparently with approval of Hamilton, who, December 19, writes him from Washington's headquar- ters: 122 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN t I have read your letter to Lee with pleasure. It was con- ceived in terms which the offense merited, and if he had any feeling, must have been felt by him. Considering the pointed- ness and severity of your expressions, his answer was a very modest one, and proved that he had not a violent appetite for so close a tete-a-tete as you seem disposed to insist upon This evasion, if known to the world, would do him very little honor. With the closing of this incident Lee and his charac- ter might be safely dropped, but a brief reference to his subsequent career may not be without interest. He de- fended himself very plausibly before Congress, which, after a consideration of three months affirmed on Decem- ber 5, the decision of the court martial by a vote of 15 to 7, the word "shameful" having been stricken out of the finding. Lee continued to carry on his campaign against Washington through the press, and became so vitupera- tive that Colonel Laurens, one of Washington's aides, challenged him, and in the subsequent duel Lee was wounded in the side. In the spring of 1779 he retired to his Virginia estate as he declared, "to learn to hoe tobac- co, which is the best school to consummate a general. This is a discovery I have lately made." Here with his dogs and horse he lived a kind of hermit life, in a shell of a house, the different apartments of which were indicated by chalk lines on the floor. Towards the termination of his suspension he heard that Congress proposed to drop him from the service on the ground of economy, where- upon he wrote an insolent letter to the President of that body which resulted in his summary dismissal. His es- tate running down through mismanagement he visited Philadelphia while negotiating its sale. There he was taken down with fever, and died in an obscure inn. One clause of his will read: "I desire most earnestly that I may not be buried in any church or churchyard, or within a mile of any Presbyterian or any Baptist meeting house, for, since I have resided in this country, I have kept so a a FROM VALLEY FORGE TO MONMOUTH IS much bad company while living that I do not choose to continue it when I am dead." Probably because his will was not opened until after the funeral, this injunction was not carried out, and Lee was buried with military honors in the yard of Christ Church, Philadelphia, his funeral being largely attended by citizens and prominent men. He had the faculty of making warm friends who, like those attached to Mc- Clellan in the Civil War, held to him through evil as well as good report, and Washington Irving gives him credit for many good traits, but none of these knew of the con- vincing proof of treason afterwards disclosed in the ar- chives of a British manor house. CHAPTER VIII. REMODELING THE ARMY. Steuben's Dissatisfaction — Desires a Position in the Line — New- Code of Army Regulations — Printing Difficulties. Clinton having reached New York with his beaten army there was nothing further to do in New Jersey, so Washington marched almost directly north along the west bank of the Hudson, which he crossed at King's Ferry, and encamped at White Plains about thirty miles north- east of New York, the relative positions of the two armies being much the same as in the latter part of 1776. Cer- tainly the British had not made much progress, and had Washington been backed by a strong government which could have utilized the resources of the country the end must have come soon, notwithstanding the British still had control of the sea. Newport was abandoned that fall, and Clinton and Washington sat watching each other, neither strong enough to capture or oust the other. In the march from Monmouth to White Plains, where they arrived July 2, owing to the absence of American officers at the Lee court martial elsewhere, Steuben was appointed to command Lee's division, a work which he performed with credit. On the 22nd however, Washington issued a general order incorporating this division in his own com- mand, and directed Steuben to resume his office of in- spector general. The latter was not unnaturally dissat- isfied with this. He had been performing the office of drillmaster for several months and the value of his work had been conceded. Moreover he had demonstrated his capacity to command, both in battle and on the march. He was deeply interested in the cause of American inde- REMODELING THE ARMY 125 pendence, for which he had made serious sacrifices. Be- sides even the office of inspector, which he was now asked to resume, had only been placed on a temporary basis, and there was considerable doubt as to how far his jurisdiction extended. He went forthwith to Washing- ton, and objected to this arrangment, and intimated a few days later, if not then, that he would feel compelled to resign if not given a command where he would be in active service. Washington regretted this situation, but said if he complied with the Baron's wishes every brig- adier in the army would throw up his command, that during the march from Monmouth De Kalb, Lafayette and Steuben, all foreigners had commanded the army and that eight brigadiers had declared that in making Steuben inspector Congress had only intended to give him the nominal rank of major general, and that they did not propose to have him advanced over their heads. There was also another thorn in the Baron's side. One Colonel De la Neuville who had been inspector in Gates's army refused to acknowledge Steuben's authority, and thus the very work which the latter had been appointed to do was thrown into confusion. Even if the Baron should waive his claim to a command, which he appears after consider- ation to have been willing to do, it was apparent that mat- ters could not continue on their present footing, so he asked leave of absence to present the matter before Con- gress, which had now resumed its sittings at Philadelphia. This was granted, and the following resume of the situa- tion was sent by Washington to President Laurens : Baron Steuben will also be in Philadelphia in a day or two. The ostensible cause for his going, is to fix more certainly with Congress his duties as inspector general, which is necessary. However, I am disposed to believe that the real one is to ob- tain an actual command in the line as a major general, and he may urge a competition set up by Monsieur Neuville for the inspector's place this side of the Hudson, and the denial by him 126 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN of the Baron's authority, as an argument to effect it. and for granting him the post as a means of satisfying both. I regard and esteem the Baron as an assiduous, intelligent and expe- rienced officer, but you may rely upon it, if such is his view, and he should accomplish it, we shall have the whole line of brigadiers in confusion. They have said but little about his rank as major general as he has not had an actual command over them; but when we marched from Brunswick, as there were but few major generals, and almost the whole of the brigadiers were engaged at the court martial, either as members cr witnesses, I appointed him pro tempore, and so expressed it in orders, to conduct a wing to the North river. This meas- ure, though founded in evident necessity and not designated to produce to the brigadiers the least possible injury, excited great uneasiness and has been the source of complaint. The truth is we have been very unhappy in a variety of appoint- ments, and our own officers much injured. Their feelings from this cause have become extremely sensitive, and the most deli- cate touch gives them pain. I write as a friend, and therefore with freedom. The Baron's services in the line he occupies can be important, and the testimonials he has already received are honorable. It will also be material to have the point of inspec- tor generalship, now in question between him and Monsieur Neuville, adjusted. The appointment of the latter, it is said, calls him inspector general in the army commanded by General Gates, and under this, as I am informed, he denies any subor- dination to the Baron, and will not knew him in his "official capacity." There can be but one head. On July 26, Washington wrote another letter to the President of Congress to be delivered by the Baron him- self, in which, after again rehearsing the facts previously related, he adds : Justice concurring with inclination constrains me to testify that the Baron has, in every instance, discharged the several trusts reposed in him with great zeal and ability, so as to give him the fullest title to my esteem as a brave, indefatigable, ju- dicious and experienced officer. I regret there should be a necessity that his services should be lost to the army; at the same time I think it my duty explicitly to observe to Congress that his desire of having an actual and permanent command in the line cannot be complied with without wounding the feelings of a number of officers whose rank and merits give them every claim to attention, and that the doing of it would be productive of much dissatisfaction and extensive ill consequences. This does not proceed from any personal objections on the part of those officers against the Baron; on the contrary most of them whom I heard speak of him, express a high sense of his militar3 r REMODELING THE ARMY 127 worth. It proceeds from motives of another nature, which are too obvious to need particular explanation, or may be summed up in this, that they conceive such a step would be injurious to their essential rights and just expectations. That this would be their way of thinking upon the subject I am fully convincd, from the effect which the temporary command given him, even under circumstances so peculiar as I have mentioned, produced. The strongest symptoms of discontent appeared on that occa- sion. The matter was reviewed by Alexander Hamilton in a letter to Elias Boudinot, member of Congress from New Jersey, of the same date as that above, in which he ex- pressed the highest opinion of Steuben's military qualifi- cations, and expressed the hope that some arrangement could be made by which he could be retained in the army. Among other suggestions he says : "Perhaps the princi- ples on which the general's arrangement is formed may be preserved, and at the same time the objects of the in- spectorship enlarged so as to render it a more important employment. Perhaps a resolution of Congress giving the Baron a right to be employed on detachments might, for the present, compensate for the want of a permanent command in the line, and might not be disagreeable to the officers. You can sound him on these heads. I need not caution you that this is a matter of great delicacy and importance, and that every step taken in it ought to be well considered." It will be plainly seen from the above that Washington, Hamilton and all who had control of affairs at the front were anxious to retain Steuben in the army upon such terms as they could grant and he could honorably accept. It is true that Washington in a letter to Governeur Mor- ris, discussing this very matter, gives expression to the wish that they had not a single foreigner among them except Lafayette, but this momentary expression of irri- tation, doubtless excited by the claims and pretensions of 128 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN some of the adventurers before mentioned, is not to be weighed against the constant tribute to the Baron's ef- ficiency which he always paid, and the warm friendship which always existed between the two until severed by death. Neither should it be taken as a reflection on De Kalb, Pulaski, Kosciuszko and some others who braved perils even to death in the patriotic cause. However fervent may have been the desire of Baron Steuben for a major general's command in active service it soon became apparent to him that this was out of the question, at least for the present, so, on his arrival at Philadelphia he accepted the situation, and devoted his energies towards securing the settlement of the inspector- ship on a satisfactory basis. Neuville's position was the first obstacle in the way, but on August 2, 1778, Govern- eur Morris wrote to Washington that though the faith of Congress was, in some measure, plighted to Neuville it was not their intention that his brevet should give com- mand, and this he proposed to have expressed by a par- ticular resolution. As to the claims of the Baron for a command in the line he was satisfied that Congress would not grant it. As predicted by Morris Congress promptly decided in favor of Steuben as ranking officer, at which Neuville resigned and returned to France. Congress then ap- pointed a committee consisting of Messrs. Boudinot and Chase and General Reed to receive proposals from the Baron, who on August 7 presented a memorial covering the whole matter in detail. This with regulations subse- quently adopted will be found quite fully reported in Mr. Kapp's work, but an outline is probably as much as will interest our present readers. After referring to the ab- solute necesisty of uniformity in the army and to the ac- knowledged fact that the commander in chief has it not REMODELING THE ARMY 129 in his power to attend in so particular a manner to the details of the different departments he suggests that the office of inspector general should be confided to some in- telligent general officer, well versed in the theory and practice of maneuvering troops, the composition and for- mation of the different corps of an army, the customs of different armies, the necessary equipment of the troops, all which should come under his notice. Uniformity in supplies, discipline and camp duties was especially urged. The inspector should be under the immediate control of the Congressional board of war, also subject to the com- mander in chief. No foreigner should be intrusted with this charge, but if Congress thought otherwise a Conti- nental brigadier (native) should be associated in the work with the view of himself one day becoming inspec- tor general. Sub-inspectors should be appointed from the army, but no one to inspect his own regiment. The exercise and maneuvering of the troops should always be under the direction of the inspector general, and there are many suggestions under this head. The practice of European armies was cited and comparisons made of the difference in conditions on each side of the Atlantic. The report was most able and exhaustive in every respect, but, like may other public memorials it was destined for some time to get no farther than the hands of the com- mittee. On the evening of August 28 intelligence of the fail- ure of the French fleet and General Sullivan to capture Newport, reached Philadelphia, and Congress adopted a resolution requesting Steuben to forthwith repair to Rhode Island, and give his advice and assistance to Major General Sullivan and the army under his command. Whether Congress had such a high opinion of Steuben's military abilities that it believed that his presence 130 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN at Newport would aid in extricating Sullivan from a precarious situation (provided he arrived in time) or whether it was a polite method of temporarily shelving the inspector problem the re- sult was the same. Steuben left Philadelphia the next morning and reached Washington's camp at White Plains on the 31st, where he learned that Sullivan's retreat to Providence had been safely effected. There then being no object in going to New England Steuben, at Wash- ington's request, remained at White Plains until late in September, when the army moved northward, finally going into winter quarters in the highlands. During this period the Baron continued exercising and drilling the troops as nearly as possible according to the methods pre- scribed in his memorial, relying on Washington's com- mands for his authority. On September 17, President Laurens wrote to Steuben expressing his gratification that the latter had not proceeded to Rhode Island, as it would have been a disagreeable embassy, and adding that the committee would soon report on the inspectorship but that Congress was so overcharged with business as to render it impossible to guess when it would be taken un- der consideration, and concluded. Richard Peters, of the War Board, also wrote : I hope to hear of your being more agreeably circumstanced than formerly as to your business at camp. It is an obvious matter that our army are in want of discipline, although their improvements in this respect are amazing, and as our men are docile and caapble, it is a pity that any obstacles should be thrown in the way of their receiving instructions. While you are here, I would wish to make every use of your willingness to serve this country, therefore. I wish to see the inspection in its full vigor, for the greater our discipline, the sooner we shall discomfit our enemies and be at peace, which to me is the most desirable of all objects, except my liberty and the independence of my country. When you have ceased to be serviceable as a soldier, you shall sit down with us and enjoy the pleasing calm REMODELING THE ARMY 131 which will succeed the present tempest. Apropos, we will and must take possession of the Bermudas and you shall be gov- ernor. It will be observed that the American cause did not lack optimists even under discouraging circumstances. Steuben, at this time also received a letter from Lieu- tenant Colonel Ternant who had been appointer inspector of the Southern troops, and was now in Philadelphia, which encouraged the belief that the plan would soon be adopted. But Congress dallied day after day, and finally recommitted the whole question to a committee. Steuben wrote to Joseph Reed, chairman of the committee, urging action and suggesting that he might hasten matters by appearing before them in person, but "as experience teaches me that offered services do not always prove ac- ceptable, I shall wait with respectful silence for the orders of Congress, which are to regulate all my actions." How- ever, when winter came Steuben went to Philadelphia mainly to arrange and put in order a code of military regulations to introduce a thorough uniformity in the service. He pressed upon Congress the necessity of early action, and in a letter to the President he declares him- self ready to make any sacrifice to carry out the wishes of those in control, with a few side remarks concerning his envious critics. He also wrote to Washington on De- cember 6, in a somewhat discouraging mood, saying : On my arrival in the city I delivered your Excellency's let- ter to Mr. President Laurens, accompanied by one from , acquainting Congress in what manner I intended to proceed to business. I afterwards, in another letter, requested to know to whom I was to apply for the necessary information on the sub- ject. To these letters I have had no other reply than a resolve, directing the board of war to furnish me with every informa- tion I may want on the subject. I have not hitherto been able to get a sight of the plan proposed by a former committee, and to which your excellency subjoined your remarks, nor can I get the least information in whose hands that plan is. All I can 132 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN learn from Mr. President Reed, who presided in that commit- tee, is, that that plan, though founded on the one I proposed, differed from it materially, and that the authority of the inspec- tor general was therein much more extended than I proposed, and when I can procure the other I shall see wherein we have differed. However, it may be, I repeat that I shall, without the least deviation, conform to any remarks your Excellency has been pleased to make. I shall endeavor to convince Your Excellency and the whole army, that nothing but the good of the service, and not any personal views, shall direct my actions. The American soldier under my orders is, at the same time, a member of the republic I serve. If every officer and soldier would consider me in the same light, it seems to me many ob- stacles would be avoided. With respect to your Excellency, I again beg you to consider me as an instrument in your hands for the good of the army which has the honor to serve under your orders. Washington replied thanking the Baron for his as- surances of loyalty, and promising his cordial support to- wards carrying out any plan that might he agreed upon both out of personal considerations and for the benefit and improvement of the army. Hamilton wrote in the same vein, but the inertia of Congress was too great to be immediately overcome. It was February 18, 1779 when the report of the committee appointed to confer with Washington was taken up, and a resolution adopted, providing that there should be an inspector general of the armies of the United States with the rank of major general, who in all future appointments should be taken from the line of major generals. The duties of inspector and his assistants were to be as has already been indicated, and he was allowed eighty-four dollars per month for extraordinary expenses in addition to the pay and rations of a major general. On March 29th a letter was read from Steuben accompanied by a system of regulations for the infantry together with a communication from the war board stating that the Baron's plans had been submitted to that body and also REMODELING THE ARMY 133 to the commander in chief and had received their ap- proval, and asking the sanction of Congress, which was given, and thus after a loss of much valuable time it looked as though something permanent was to be ac- complished. The arrangement now made by Congress involved the preparation of a complete book of regulations for the army. Steuben did not wait for its authorization before beginning this work, but, anticipating the result, and realizing that it would be a labor of weeks if not of months to prepare this code, began work on it soon after he arrived in Philadelphia, and spent most of his time on it during the winter. He associated with himself in this work Colonel Fleury, Captains Walker and De TEnfant, and M. Duponceau, his secretary. His original scheme included four divisions; first, the service of infantry in the field ; second, in garrison and on parade ; third, caval- ry; fourth, light troops. The first and third parts were completed during the winter, the others were never fin- ished, and the cavalry division was not printed. The first part consisted of twenty-five chapters, of which a full summary may be found in Mr. Kapp's book, but as the details are of greater interest to military tacticians than to the general reader we give only the headings of the chapters as indicating the scope of the work. The book was entitled, "Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States," divided as follows : Chapter first, arms and accoutrements; second, necessity of officers being acquainted with the manual and answer- able for the general instruction of the regiment; third, company formation; fourth, regimental formation; fifth, instruction of recruits ; sixth, company exercises ; seventh, battalion exercises ; eighth, points of view ; ninth, forma- tion and display of columns; tenth, march of columns; 134 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN eleventh, march in line ; twelfth, disposition of field pieces attached to brigades; thirteenth, firings; fourteenth, march of an army or corps; fifteenth, baggage on the march; sixteenth, laying out a camp with order of en- campment ; seventeenth, manner of entering camp : eight- eenth, regulations for preserving order and cleanliness ; nineteenth, roll calls ; twentieth, general inspection ; twen- ty-first, drum beats ; twenty-second, guard service ; twen- ty-third, arms and ammunition and their preservation; twenty- fourth, treatment of the sick; twenty-fifth, re- views. In addition there were detailed instructions for the general conduct of the officers and privates. The hu- manitarian spirit of these instructions, which were some- what advanced for that period, is indicated by the follow- ing: A captain cannot be too careful of the company the State has committed to his charge. He must pay the greatest atten- tion to the health of his men, their discipline, arms, accoutre- ments, ammunition, clothes and necessaries. His first object should be to gain the love of his men by treating them with every possible kindness and humanity, inquiring into their com- plaints, and, when well founded, seeing them redressed. He should know every man of his company by name and character. He should often visit those who are sick, speak tenderly to them, see that the public provision, whether of medicine or diet, is duly administered, and procure them, besides, such comforts and conveniences as are in his power. The attachment that arises from this kind of attention to the sick and wounded, is almost inconceivable; it will, moreover, be the means of preserv- ing the lives of many valuable men. There is much more to the same effect, which con- clusively proves that though the Baron was a strict dis- ciplinarian, he was not a mere martinet. Concerning the difficulties of the project Kapp says : "Seldom was a work composed in such a manner as this. Every chapter was first roughly written in German, then translated into REMODELING THE ARMY 135 bad French, then put in good French by Fleury, trans- lated again into bad English by Duponceau, afterwards written in good English by Captain Walker, and when all this was completed, Steuben did not understand a word of it himself, from his ignorance of the English lan- guage." Notwithstanding our respect and admiration for Mr. Kapp's careful researches we are inclined to question the accuracy of this last statement. Baron Steuben had now been in the country about sixteen months. During that period he was constantly in asso- ciation with men who spoke only English, was compelled to give orders to troops who knew no other language, and in various ways came in close contact with it almost every hour of the twenty-four, except the limited period allotted to sleep. He was well educated and was already proficient in French as well as his native German. It is not possible that he had learned to speak English fluently during the time he had been in America, in fact he never did so, but it is in the highest degree improbable that in all that time he had not learned to understand a word of this language. The truth doubtless lies between these two extren.es. The Baron was not able to write out his book in English in the first place, but when translated by his assistants there is no reason to suppose that he was unable to read it, or to understand substantially what it meant. His labors were greatly increased by the dearth of military publications in America, so he had to depend mostly on his recollections of the Prussian Code, and the lack of familiarity of his translators with the military terms of that code greatly increased the difficulty. On completion of the work it was sent to Washington for examination, who gave it his hearty approval with the comment : "As the fine season is advancing you will, I 136 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN flatter myself, shortly have the satisfaction, so rarely en- joyed by authors, of seeing your precepts reduced to prac- tice, and I hope your success will be equal to the merits cf your work." Steuben in reply said : The engraving of the plates and correcting the press, will, I am afraid, detain me till the middle of April, and, as before that time the season will permit the troops to exercise, I think it would be necessary they should be exercised in detail on the principles laid down. If Your Excellency approves it, I will send Colonel Fleury, who has assisted me in composing the regulations to receive your orders on the subject. * * * I shall have the honor to forward to your Excellency a model of the several tools mentioned in the regulations, and which I think are necessary, if circumstances will allow me to procure them. Congress ordered 3,000 copies of the work printed, but the tr bibles were not yet over. Mr North says : "To sketch, re-sketch the plates, and fit them for the engraver —the engraver, the paper, the types and printer, with dif- ficulty to be found. None but those who lived in those dark days of poverty and dearth of everything, can think a thousandth part of all the penury with which we were surrounded. The Blue Book has at last appeared and was studied, and, except the Bible, was held in the high- est estimation." In the face of these difficulties the book was not ready for distribution until June, causing the Baron, who never seems to have been celebrated for his patience, to become more than restive. As illustrative of their dif- ficulties Timothy Pickering on June 19, writes to Steuben : We expected to send you more copies of the regulations, of which the bookbinder gave us encouragement, but his work- men failed him. It is not so easy to get work executed in America as in Europe. Here, under the present scarcity of hands, you can place no dependence on your workmen — to-day they are with you, and to-morrow on board of a privateer, with hopes of making their fortunes. I have, indeed, had much trou- Remodeling the Army 137 ble with the Regulations, but I went through it with pleasure, because I judged they would prove highly useful to my country. * * * Should I again discover marks of extreme impa- tience, and even asperity, in the inspector general, I will impute them to his anxiety to introduce a perfect order and discipline in the army, and to his zeal in securing the safety and indepen- dence of America. Peters writes to the same effect, and after a some- what jocular introduction concerning the Baron's impa- tience, adds seriously: We should violate our private feelings if we personally dis- regarded you, and we should, in my opinion, our public trust, did we not by every means in our power, assist you in the im- portant business of your department Real embarrassments have occasioned our not complying with our, as well as your, wishes, and however trifling the rubs thrown in our way may seem to one used to countries full of needy artificers, and stored with materials for work, yet to us they are not unimportant, or, what is worse, uncommon. These difficulties will continue dur- ing our present war, and as we cannot conquer we must en- deavor to bear them. There is considerably more along the same line, mixed with mild reproof, which the Baron doubtless took in good part. As an illustration of the minor difficulties of the occasion it is related that two copies of the Regula- tions which the Baron had ordered handsomely bound for Washington and the French minister could not be completed, because the bookbinder, (there seems to have been but one in Philadelphia) after searching through the entire city, was not able to procure any gold leaf for gild- ing. Congress, on April 5, passed a resolution to the ef- fect that Baron Steuben, inspector general, be informed by the President that Congress entertain a high sense of his merit, displayed in a variety of instances, but especially in the system of military order and discipline formed and presented by him to Congress. Similar testimonials were offered by officials of the 138 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN different states to whom copies of the work were sent, each one testifying that the manual not only filled a want that was severely felt, but was invaluable in the existing condition of affairs. Copies of the work sent to Europe also elicited high praise from competent experts. Congress, at Steuben's request, appropriated a thou- sand dollars for Colonel Fleury, eight hundred for Wal- ker, six hundred for De l'Enfant, and four hundred for Duponceau. We may appropriately conclude this branch of our subject by the following account of an occurrence as related by the Baron himself : "Although the Board of War was only composed of Peters and Pickering, there was always a member of Congress who took part in their deliberations. At this time it was Mr. Root, of Connecticut, who filled this of- fice. I came one day to the war office, probably at the time they were deliberating how they should reimburse me for the expense I had been at while employed prepar- ing my work. Mr. Root asked me how many copies had been printed. I said, three thousand. 'How many/ he replied, 'Shall you require for the officers of the army?' 'About eighteen hundred,' was my answer. 'There will, therefore be about twelve hundred left over,' said Mr. Root, 'the book will sell well.' He then made a calcula- tion in an undertone, and resumed, 'But you could sell the remaining copies, and that would pay your expenses while in town.' If I had not remarked that Mr. Peters bent his head and blushed at hearing this proposal, I should certainly have told them my mind in pretty strong language. For a long time I did not utter a word ; at last I rose and said to Mr. Root that I was the more astounded at his proposition as I had not asked for any reimburse- ment of my expenses out of the public money." CHAPTER IX. CAMPAIGN OF 1779. Steuben Reviews the Situation — Barbarous Raids — Value of the Bayonet Demonstrated at the Capture of Stony Point — Visit of the French Ambassador — Suggestions For the Future. Toward the close of 1778 we find Clinton still hold- ing New York and Newport, and although the rest of the county was measurably free yet there were no signs that England Intended relaxing her grip. Her command of the sea continued to paralyze foreign trade, which reacted disastrously on domestic interests. Washington with a totally inadequate force was trying to hold the back country, and the prospect, to say the best, was not en- couraging. At this time Steuben in a letter to James Lowell, Chairman of the Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs, gave the following succinct review of the situation : We have fortunately escaped a serious danger at Rhode Island. The enemy cannot boast of having gained the least ad- vantage over the allied fleet, or over our army. A change in the wind has favored him and caused the failure of our plan. As it is but fair to render justice even to our enemies, we ought to admit that the English and the wind have made us miss two highly important strokes — that on the Delaware because the French fleet did not arrive a little earlier, and that on Rhode Island. If, when I made war under the King of Prussia, we had escaped two such strokes in one campaign, we should have called that a successful campaign. Here we are now on the de- fensive, a species of warfare extremely difficult and oftentimes dangerous. We have two objects to attain — equally important — to retain possession of the North river, and to bring our main force close to Boston. In case the enemy should undertake any operation, these two objects are very far distant from one an- other. Our land force, such as it is, must be ready to resist, at the right or the left, wherever the enemy thinks proper to 140 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN attack us. Now what will become of that unhappy province, the Jerseys, which is actually menaced with devastation and fire by the enemy? Lord Cornwallis has entered it with a body of probably six thousand men. Will Lord Stirling be able to op- pose such a force with his three brigades, the number of which I will not mention, so as not to annoy you? Perhaps you will say, "The militia of New Jersey." But is the militia still ani- mated by the same spirit as it was when America had no regular army? Now, allowing for the said three brigades, and two more at Providence, look at this side of the river and tell me what other forces have we there? Do not be deluded, sir, by the rolls of our regiments or brigades; deduct therefrom, unhesitatingly, one-third for those who, either for the want of clothing or shoes, are unable to make a single march in the present season of the year, when the nights are already cold and wet. I am not afraid to tell you the truth, disagreeable as it is; no, on the contrary, I consider it my duty to show you the actual situation of our army. I beg you, rather, sir, to examine attentively the land forces which the enemy possesses on this continent; look at their number, their nourishment, clothing, arms, order and dis- cipline; see how much we are inferior, in all respects to them, and then answer me if our game is not a very hazardous one? How long will our country continue to stake her fortune on the issue of one day? How many more millions has the de- vastation of the Jerseys devoured than it would have taken for the states to have completed the regiments upon the plan adopted by Congress, in which case we should have had an army of forty thousand men? Had we this force, nay, had we only thirty thousand, would the enemy ever have dared to put a foot out of New York island? Too numerous an army is ex- pensive, but too small an army is dangerous. In 1776 General Washington had the glory to maintain himself at the head of an army of eighteen thousand men. I sincerely hope that he may not have that glory a second time. If too much backward- ness had not been exhibited in this matter the war would prob- ably have been already at an end. In order to secure peace on a solid and honorable basis, it is prudent to redouble every preparation for carrying on the war. * * * In consequence of the bad discipline, the service of picket guards of patrols is entirely neglected in our army. Our cavalry is without a leader — not a single officer of that arm understands the duty. They are brave, I have no doubt, but bravery alone does not consti- tute an officer. Generals might plead and Congress might request, but states continued indifferent, and matters continued to jog along without any material change. During his sojourn in Philadelphia, at the request of CAMPAIGN OF 1779 141 General Reed, Baron Steuben spent several days with that gentkman examining the country around the city, espe- cially on the Jersey side, with the view of constructing defenses which, fortunately, were never needed. Impatient to get back to active service Steuben, without wniting for the final action of Congress, which now seemed assured, on March 26 hastened to rejoin the amiy in northern New Jersey. He went to work imme- diately, straightening out matters which needed attention. The nominal strength of the army, according to the reso- lutions of Congress, was eighty battalions of infant;-) of 477 privates each, so that the whole should be about 40,- 000 men. but the real strength was scarcely half this num- ber. The force under Washington's direct command at this time numbered just 11,067 men, and with this little force he w?£ expected to keep Sir Henry Clinton in New York (if not capture him with the city) and prevent sporadic raids along the coast and frontier. Steuben di- vided the army into six divisions known as the Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Massachusetts and North Carolina. He drilled them thoroughly in the use of the bayonet, which was soon to figure in the capture of an important stronghold, and his formation of light in- fantry proved so effective that after the Revolution it was introduced into other European countries in contradistinc- tion to the massing which had proved so fatal to Brad- dock and others. Reviewing and drilling were thv order of the day, even after the army had taken the field. Arms must be polished, officers attentive to the wants o r their men, the sick visited and cared for, and the improvement of the army was marked in every direction. A fe ,v details given by North indicated the amount and character of the work \e* formed. He says : 142 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN I have seen the Baron and his assistants seven long hours inspecting a brigade of three small regiments. Every man not present must be accounted for; if in camp, sick or well, they were produced or visited, every musket handled and searched, cartridge boxes opened, even the flints and cartridges counted; knapsacks unslung, and every article of clothing spread on the soldiers' blanket, and tested by his little book, whether what he received from the United States within the year was there, if not, to be accounted for. Hospitals, stores, laboratories, every place and every thing were opened to inspection, and inspected, and what officer's mind was at ease if losses or expenditures could not, on the day of searching be fully and fairly accounted for? The inspections were every month, and wonderful was the effect, not only with regard to economy, but in creating a spirit of emulation between different corps. I have known the subal- terns of a regiment appropriate one of their two rations to the bettering of the appearance of their men, but this was at a later period of the war, when supplies and payments were more regular. The year 1778 closed and 1779 opened with a series of barbarous raids both on the Northern and Southern coasts, the main object being evidently to induce Wash- ington to send part of his forces to protect these sc ittered posts. But Washington knew that such a procedure would prove his undoing, for any material weakening of his army along the Hudson would be the signal for an advance by Clinton up that river, and by the occupation of strategic points he would cut the American Confedera- tion in two, and conquer each part in detail. The Amer- icans with their fortifications at West Point held a firm grip on the highlands of the Hudson, with two smaller posts farther down, Stony Point on the west side, and Verplanck's on the east bank of the river. But while the Americans were fortifying Stony Point Clinton cap- tured the place, and with its batteries reduced the works at Verplanck's. It was deemed essential that Stony Point be retaken, and the task was entrusted to General An- thony Wayne, whose "madness" was contr-Vled by method, which brought victory on more than one occa- CAMPAIGN OF 1779 143 sion. There was but one way to retake the fortress and that was by assault. But the usual storming party would be subject not only to the fire of the occupying garrison but to crossfires from Verplanck's and the river, which would make success out of the question. There was but one resource, a bayonet charge under cover of darkness. Every dog within three miles was killed, and at midnight on June 15, 1,200 Americans with unloaded guns an 1 fixed bayonets advanced on the works. They were on top of the breastworks before discovery, and although the British made the best resistance possible the cold steel of r.'ie bayonet was too much for them, and after a loss of sixty-three, the remainder of the garrison 553 in numbe:, surrendered. The American loss was fifteen killed and eighty-three wounded. The value of the bayonet as a fighting arm, which Steuben had labored to impress on the 'irmy, was now fully demonstrated, and the next day after rhe battle when he visited Stony Point in company with Washington, he was enthusiastically greeted by the soldiers who declared that in the future they would take care of their bayonets and use them for other purposes than digging trenches or roasting meat. At Steuben's request a general order was issued (which could now be enforced) directing that in the future all bayonets should be continually fixed to the musket, and the men were not to wear any more belts and sheaths for the purpose of carrying them. Bayonets, belts and sheaths were saved by this operation, and the former from this time forth be- came an integral part of each soldier's equipment. Owing to the great changes in fire arms and infantry tactics there has been some question in late years of the value of the bayonet, but for a century it held its place with no one to doubt its efficiency. Shortly after this M. Gerard, the French minister to 144 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN the United States was superseded by Chevalier De la Lu- zerne, who arrived in Boston the latter part of August. Steuben was then doing some reviewing at Providence, R. I., and was requested by the minister to accompany him to Washington's headquarters, which he desired to visit. Accordingly he met the minister at Hartford, and the two continued their journey via Wethersfield, New Haven, Fairfield and Danbury to Fishkill on the Hudson, where Washington had already arrived. The pair, al- though strangers to each other, had the opportunity of be- coming pretty well acquainted on their journey through Connecticut, and Steuben remarks of his companion : "Although he received me with the utmost politeness, I saw that he knew nothing of me, and that the French ministry had not informed him how it happened that I had come to this country. This convinced me that they had sent me adrift, and that I was to manage for myself as well as I could. I took good care not to allow M. De la Luzerne to perceive what I thought, and mentioned only incidentally my acquaintance at Versailles and the way I came to America, and determined to play the part of an American officer who had no other protection or support." It was evidently a case of out of sight, out of mind, and it is very probable that the Baron did not oc- cupy the thoughts of the French officials to any great ex- tent after he left that country. American officers were naturally not thoroughly posted as to the details of etiquette to be observed in re- ceiving foreign embassadors, while Steuben, from his previous experience was perfectly at home in these mat- ters. Before the party arrived at Fishkill, Hamilton wrote to Steuben asking him "to send on an express to the General (Washington) informing him of the daily stages which it is proposed to make and the time of your CAMPAIGN OF 1779 145 intended arrival at camp. If the General should meet M. De la Luzerne at Fishkill as a private gentleman will he think the compliment amiss? This is entre nous. I see no impropriety in it, but shall be obliged to you to favor me with your opinion on this, and on any other point that may occur to you, avec franchise. At his Excellency's debarkation at headquarters Major Gibbs has a violent inclination to make a little flourish at the head of his men. Will this be an infringement on your plan ?" This plan seems to have been entirely satisfactory, in fact it was the only appropriate one, the minister not having yet presented his credentials to Congress. The visitor was greeted on his arrival with an artillery salute and a military reception in the fortress, and everything passed off agreeably. As Washington afterwards wrote, "He was polite enough to approve my principle, and con- descended to appear pleased with our Spartan living. In a word, he made us all exceedingly happy by his affability and good humor while he remained in camp. After an in- spection of the army and fortifications the minister pro- ceeded on his journey to Philadelphia." Washington at this time requested a written opinion from Steuben as to the military situation, which was given at some length on July 27, from which we take the following extracts : Our present situation is about the same as it was at the commencement of the campaign. The enemy is still numer- ically superior. Their troops are better provided than ours. They are better able to carry out their plans, and, on account of their ships, they are masters of the coast and of the mouth of North river. The taking of Stony Point was a great advantage for our side. It has not only encouraged the army but the people. It has shown the enemy that our generals knom how to make a plan, and that our officers and soldiers know how to carry it out with boldness and precision. It has delayed the field oper- 146 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN ations of the enemy, but it has not altogether defeated their plans. Let us examine what those plans probably are: The great preparations which the enemy have made to protect themselves on both sides of the river at King's Ferry, the time, labor and expense they have employed in fortifying this point — can they have any other object than the burning and plundering the coast of Connecticut? Would they have fortified Stony and Verplanck's Points to terminate their conquests there for this campaign? Neither supposition is at all probable. Their plans must be more comprehensive. Having fortified these two points, and leaving a sufficient garrison in them (it will be re- membered that the Americans evacuated Stony Point three days after its capture by Wayne) they are at liberty to take the rest of their forces wherever they think proper, and in case of a reverse these two points are a support for their troops and a harbor for their vessels. They will then invade the country with a view to encouraging us to follow them by detachments, or with our full force, while they will be ready at any moment to make an attack on West Point with three or four thousand men and the vessels necessary for their transport. If, on the other hand, we do not allow ourselves to be drawn from our present position by their invasion, it is possible that they may send a corps of five or six thousand men, on either side of the river, to seem to threaten our flanks, and try to maneuver in our rear, so as to attack West Point. This, however, seems to me very difficult, particularly on the side of the fort. Whatever means they employ, I am positive that their oper- ations are directed exclusively to getting possession of this post, and of the river as far as Albany. If this is not their plan they have not got one worth the expense of a campaign. On their success depends the fate of America. The consequence is, there- fore, that there is nothing of greater importance to us than to avert this flow. Let them burn what they have not burned al- ready, and this campaign will add to their shame, but not to their success. Were West Point strongly fortified, supplied with sufficient artillery, ammunition and provisions, and a garrison of two thousand men, we ought not to be induced to take our forces more than a day's march from it. To have the means of relieving it, I go further and say that our army should be de- stroyed or taken before we allow them to commence an attack on West Point. * * * Were it possible to place a brigade or two somewhere between Sufterns and Fort Montgomery, the enemy would be compelled to keep mere men and ships near Stony Point, and although I do not think it advisable to risk a second enterprise against the same point, I should wish the enemy to apprehend it. * * * Let us defend North River and hold West Point, and the end of our campaign will be glori- ous. The above is my opinion on the present condition of af- CAMPAIGN OF 1779 147 fairs. The arrival of our ally's fleet on the coast would ma- terially change our plan of operations. No general movement was made by either army, and the summer passed away quietly so far as operations in this section were concerned. The Baron and his assist- ants were indefatigable in bringing the army up to as high a standard as possible with the facilities at his com- mand. He seems to have largely conquered the preju- dices which still existed among the Americans against foreigners, and Duponceau tells us that though he was a strict disciplinarian he was much beloved by the soldiers as well as by civilians. One woman asked permission to name her child after him when he said, "How will you call him ?" "Why to be sure," was the reply, "I'll call him Baron." Occasionally he would swear in German, then in French, and then in both languages together, and when these vocabularies were exhausted he would call aides to continue the operation in English until the desired maneuvers were successfully performed. On September 28th he sent some copies of his regulations to Benjamin Franklin at Paris with a short review of his work in the army, which he considers on the whole quite satisfactory. He says if other correspondents "tell you that our order and discipline equal that of the French and Prussian armies, do not believe them; but do not believe them either, if they compare our troops to those of the Pope; and just take a medium between these two extremes. Though we are so young that we scarcely begin to walk we can take already Stony Point and Paulus Hook (near New York) with the point of the bayonet, without firing a single shot. * * * All I can assure you of is that the English will not beat us if we don't beat ourselves." There was the usual trouble, however, arising from expiring enlistments and scanty supplies which effectually 148 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN prevented Washington from making any serious efforts towards the reduction of New York, which was now the only important post held in the North since Rhode Island had been abandoned by the enemy. Clinton finding he could accomplish nothing substantial in his own neigh- borhood decided to turn his face towards the South, where the British had won several important victories, and it became evident that the principal military opera- tions would soon centre in that section. Leaving Kny- phausen with a strong force to guard New York, he and Cornwallis on Christmas Day, 1779, with five men of war and 8,000 troops sailed for Georgia, and afterwards received 3,000 more, bringing the army in that section up to 13,000 men. Savannah had been for sometime in possession of the British, and Charleston was now the objective point. Its capture was not ac- complished, however, until May 12th of the following year. In the meantime, Washington, having sent all the Virginia and North Carolina troops south to aid in re- pelling the invasion went into winter quarters near Mor- ristown, New Jersey. The winter was exceptionally se- vere, and it was almost Valley Forge over again. Snow lay two feet deep on the ground, and the troops suffered severely before they could build their log huts to keep from freezing. Continental money was worth about thirty cents on the dollar, and nobody wanted to take it at any price. Sometimes the army would be without bread, sometimes without meat, and sometimes without both, for days at a time. Congress seemed unable to do anything, and the men were kept from starving largely through voluntary contributions of the New Jersey farmers. The Hudson was frozen over, and Knyphausen added to his army considerable loyalist militia to resist CAMPAIGN OF 1779 149 any effort which the Americans might make to cross on the ice and attack the city, but such an effort was beyond Washington's power. Nevertheless nobody thought of giving up the contest. Steuben kept up his drills and ex- ercises, and as he now had the entire confidence and good will of the army his task in this direction was compara- tively easy. He had troubles, however, in another way, in that his expenditures necessarily exceeded his income. Out of his small allowance he was obliged to purchase supplies for his servants and horses, and as a result his financial condition soon became a matter of serious con- cern. Washington on August 17, 1779, called the atten- tion of Congress to this matter with a memorandum of warrants he had given Steuben on his own authority. Strictly speaking this was not legal, and could only be justified by the urgent necessity which existed. He asked that the Board of War be vested with discretionary power to meet this class of emergencies, by granting such amounts from time to time as might be necessary and reasonable. As usual, however, Congress did nothing, and the situation became more strained as Washington did not feel justified in issuing such warrants without specific authority to do so. Some of the American officers were in the same condition as Steuben, but as they re- ceived aid from their respective states their situation was more endurable than the Baron's, who had nothing to fall back upon. To tide over the fall and winter at Morris- town, Mr. Boudinot made him a loan, and at last Steuben, whose patience was naturally exhausted, asked Congress for an increase of pay or dismissal. It will be remembered that his compensation was nominally $2,000 per annum, but this was paid in Continental currency, then almost worthless- Finally Congress, on March 7, 1780, voted him an extra allowance of 250 louis d'ors, quoted at $3.83 150 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN each, but which being paid in bills of exchange on Paris, the Baron was compelled to discount them at a loss of 40 per cent, thus realizing the munificent sum of $580.50. Had it no: been for the urgent requests of his associates Steuben would no doubt have resigned his position at this time. Colonel Benjamin Walker, the Baron's aide- de-camp, among others, wrote him, "I cannot but dread the moment when such an event shall take place, for much am I afraid we should again fall into that state of absolute negligence and disorder from which you have in some measure drawn us." But Steuben held on, hoping for better times and better things. It will be remembered that so far as the sinews of war were concerned Congress was practically reduced to French loans and paper money issues, whereas a strong government possessing adequate powers of taxation would probably not have been obliged to resort to either, at least to more than to a limited extent. CHAPTER X. A YEAR OF EVENTS. The George Rogers Clark Expedition — Victories of Paul Jones and the Navy — Spain Enters the Struggle — Troubles in the South — Paper Reforms — Bad Condition of the Army — Steuben's Continued Efforts — Gloomy Prognostications. However interesting in themselves it would be for- eign to the purpose of this work to follow the numerous forays and expeditions, which, along the coast and back at the frontier, followed each other at frequent intervals. Harrowing as they were to the communities thus afflicted they cannot be said, so far as the British efforts were concerned, to have had much influence on the final result of the war, in fact the outrages thus committed aroused such indignation as to incite the patriots to renewed ef- forts and counter expeditions. One of these latter, under the command of George Rogers Clark, which penetrated to the Mississippi and gave the whole of the territory northwest of the river Ohio, then a part of the province of Quebec, to the United States, is deserving of larger space than it has yet received in our general histories. A writer has called Clark the Hannibal of the West, but the comparison fails to do justice to the conqueror of the West. Like Hannibal Clark penetrated far into the ene- my's country, but, unlike Hannibal, he refused to retreat, and, turning threatened annihilation into victory, gave to his country not only that great empire which now in- cludes the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and part of Minnesota, but indirectly prevented the confinement of the new nation to a narrow strip along 152 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN the Atlantic ocean, with the Allegheny mountains prac- tically the western boundary. During this period our little navy had also been doing excellent work on the ocean, and John Paul Jones was able to strike terror even along the English coast. Early in 1779 Spain by entering into an alliance with France had practically declared war against England with the object of recovering Florida, Minorca and especially Gibraltar, whose continued possession by Great Britain was equal to a running sore in the body politic of the Iberian peninsula. England now had 314,000 soldiers in different parts of the world, but her enemies were giv- ing her so much trouble that she could not reinforce her armies in America to any great extent, in fact Clinton was compelled to send 5,000 men to the West Indies which involved the evacuation of Newport, and from that time until the end of the war, New York was the only place of importance north of the Chesapeake held by the British. It was a golden opportunity for the Americans, but Washington with his inadequate resources could do nothing but watch, while his little army stretching in a thin line from Danbury, Connecticut, to Elizabethtown, New Jersey, mantained a pretty effective blockade so far as the back country was concerned. British ships could ascend the Hudson as far as the highlands, but so long as the Americans held West Point this was of very little use. In this condition of affairs Clinton not unnaturally turned his thoughts towards the South. He had not for- gotten his defeat at Fort Moultrie in 1776, but the situa- tion had changed somewhat since then. Savannah had been captured by the British in the fall of 1778, and they still held that city notwithstanding an effort the next year by the combined Americans and French forces for its re- A YEAR OF EVENTS 153 capture, in which Count Pulaski was slain. Subsequent battles in Georgia and South Carolina were unfavorable on the whole to the Americans, and with the royalist sen- timent known to exist in those two states it was believed that a new base for successful operations could be found. Washington, ever on the alert, fully appreciated the new danger, especially when he learned that Clinton and Cornwallis on Christmas Day, 1770, had sailed for Sa- vannah with 8,000 men, leaving Knyphausen in command at New York, which had been strengthened by the forces from Rhode Island and posts on the Hudson. But the same situation confronted him, the inadequacy of his army, which alike prevented the sending of large rein- forcements south or any successful movement against New York. In fact the expiration of terms of enlistment threatened to reduce the main army, now having only 13,070 men, by at least one-fourth. At this juncture he ordered Steuben, in whom he continued to manifest in- creased confidence, to go to Philadelphia to confer with Congress in regard to reforming the army and placing it on a more permanent basis. The prejudice against any- thing looking towards the formation of a standing army had previously considerable influence in preventing the enactment of legislation whose necessity was now so ap- parent, in fact the very existence of the army was at stake. Steuben arrived at Philadelphia on the 22d of Jan- uary, 1780, and the next day delivered Washington's re- port to Hon. Samuel Huntington, then President of Con- gress. On the 26th he was informed that the Board of War was ordered to confer with him on the state of the army. There was also talk of a committee to visit the camp in order to give a new formation to the army, and incorporating forty-one regiments. Steuben was also in- 154 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN formed by the French minister that the latter was on the point of asking Congress what means it intended to em- ploy for the operations of the next campaign, that he might give notice to his court and to the chiefs of squad- rons to make their arrangements. He also gave assur- ance that they might reckon on the arrival of the French fleet in case the Americans were able to co-operate. Steuben left very full notes of this period, and letters which have been translated by Mr. Kapp, which give a flood of information obtainable from no other source. The Baron appeared before the Board of War on the 26th, where he found the members well disposed towards his plans and apparently willing to do all in their power to reinforce the army and promote vigorous operations. Several schemes were proposed, and the Baron expressed his willingness to accept any that would bring them an army. Finally on January 28 he presented to the Board a lengthy memorial reciting what had been done towards reducing the army to a uniform organization in the face of serious obstacles, and even that, incomplete as it was, promised to be totally destroyed by the expiration of terms of enlistments, leaving fragments of battalions and regiments which could not be thrown together without encountering such opposition as threatened to disrupt the whole scheme. Even supposing the army could be re- cruited by filling each skeleton regiment it would bring the force to 58,000, not only an unnecessary number, but one which would be beyond the ability of the states to support. But in order to oppose the enemies in the North and South it was necessary that the army should be considerably augmented, and sufficiently provided with necessaries for the next campaign. That the Baron did not consider an immense number necessary for this A YEAR OF EVENTS 155 purpose is evident from the figures given below, which do not include officers, sergeants, drummers, wagoners, artificers, servants or camp followers of any kind, but only actual fighting men. His very conservative estimate of the number of these needed is as follows : Infantry 23, 616 Cavalry 1,000 Artillery and artificers 2,000 Train of Artillery 400 Train of the army 2,952 Total 29,968 Of this he assigned the forces under Washington as follows : Infantry 16,000 Cavalry 600 Artillery and artificers 1,200 Train of Artillery 300 Retainers &c 2,000 Total 20,000 He would allow 1,816 in garrisons, and the balance to General Lincoln in South Carolina. To accomplish this he proposed that — "Each state should only level its regiments — each to consist of three hundred and twenty- four men. They ought then to divide each regiment into eight companies, and one of light infantry. Each com- pany should consist of thirty-six men, out of whom four should be drawn to be put under the quarter-master gen- eral's orders, who might employ them as wagoners, etc., and thereby save the enormous expense to which we are subjected by the considerable pay those wagoners receive, which it is known is no less than that of a captain of in- fantry." 158 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN Considerable space is also devoted to measures for subsistence, clothing &c, and above all, 10,000 stand of arms by the beginning of the following May, without reckoning on those which were expected from France. The moments were precious, and the Baron reminded the Board that if the recruits did not join their regi- ments by the 1st of April the trouble and expense of as- sembling them would avail nothing. He adds in conclu- sion : "Our late disappointment at the southward should strike us; two thousand men more under the orders of General Lincoln would have insured us the defeat of the enemy in Georgia, and we would now have no fatal con- sequences to apprehend on that side. I cannot forbear observing here that most of the individuals of this con- tinent are tired of the present war. I wish this consider- ation may induce us to do our utmost to bring it to a happy termination in one glorious campaign/* While some made objections to certain details of the Baron's plans, on the whole they were well received, of which fact he apprised Washington on January 30, and asked for the Board of War returns of the present con- dition of the troops, supplies &c. To this on February 8 Washington replied from Morristown to the effect that before arranging details it should be decided whether it would be in their power to make an offensive movement, or must they confine themselves to a defensive campaign, and on this point he says : It is not possible to decide this question without a more intimate knowledge of our resources of finance than I at pres- ent possess, and without ascertaining whether our allies can afford a squadron for an effectual co-operation on this conti- nent. I think, with vigorous exertions, we may raise a sufficient number of men for offensive operations, if we were able to maintain them; but from the view I have of our affairs, I do not believe the state of our treasury will admit this without i"*&m& WEST POINT IN 1780. From print in New York Magazine, 1790. On left is portion of old Fort Constitution. Opposite on a high point is Fort Clinton, the two connected by the great chain 450 yards long. In the distance are two mountains crowned with North and Middle redoubts. The view is from Constitution island. THE VERPL'ANCK HOUSE. Steuben's Headquarters near West Point, where the Society of the Cincinnati was formed. A YEAR OF EVENTS 157 assistance from abroad. Whether this is to be obtained, Con- gress alone can judge. On the other hand, from the particular situation of the enemy's posts in this quarter, I should not ad- vise you to calculate measures on the principle of expelling them, unless we had certain assurances that an adequate naval force will be ready to co-operate with us through all contin- gencies. If foreign aid of money and a fleet are to be depended upon, I should then recommend that all our dispositions should have reference to an offensive and decisive campaign, and in this case I should ask at least one-third more men than you esti- mate, to be immediately raised by a general draft. But as I doubt whether these two preliminaries can be placed upon such a footing of certainty as to justify our acting in consequence, I imagine we must of necessity adopt the principle of a defensive campaign, and pursue a system of the most absolute economy. On this principle, however, if I unedrstand your estimate, I do not think it will be more than sufficient. When the deductions for unavoidable casualties are made this number will give us less than twenty thousand for our efficient operating force. This is as little as we can well have to contain the enemy within bounds, and prevent their making any further progress. Including the detachment which lately sailed from New York they have near twenty thousand men fit for actual service in these states, to say nothing of the recruits they will probably send over to complete their battalions, &c. While conferences with the War Board were still in progress Steuben busied himself in arranging details for the anticipated recruiting, examination of the recruits and assignment for service. None under eighteen or over fifty years of age should be received, and the regulations could not be improved upon to-day. Special attention was given to the cavalry. As usual, however, Congress failed to fully comply with the suggestions of Steuben, although they were fully supported by Washington. In lieu thereof on Feb- ruary 5, the following resolutions were adopted : That, for the ensuing campaign, the states be respectively required to furnish, by draughts or otherwise, on or before the 1st day of April next, their respective deficiency of the number of 35,211 men exclusive of commissioned officers, which Con- gress deem necessary for the service of the present year. 158 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN It was provided that all the men whose service did not expire before the last of the following September should be credited on the quotas of their respective states, and for this purpose the general in chief was directed to make returns to the states of the men so credited. This action led to a lengthy correspondence between Steuben and Washington in regard to carrying out of details. As before intimated the lack of men was not the only diffi- culty to be encountered. Arms and accoutrements were quite as important, and, according to information fur- nished by the Board of War there were only about five hundred stand of arms on which they could rely, while nothing could be expected from abroad before the follow- ing June or July. There was necessarily considerable delay in making out the returns which fretted the Baron, who declared, "We shall certainly lose two months at a time when we ought not to lose two days." While this was going on the Baron did a little in- vestigating on his own accunt, and found in the Philadel- phia manufactories and magazines 3,200 stand of arms in good order. A return of 2,000 was made from Albany, and a similar number at Carlisle. Pa., which could be brought together by the beginning of April. He also found 4,000 large muskets without bayonets, which were too heavy for campaign purposes but suitable for use in fortifications. He proposed to have 2,000 cleaned and sent to West Point. In addition 2,000 new cartridge boxes were discovered, which would be useful in the army. At this time a letter was received from Franklin in Paris, in which he expressed no doubt that a request made by Congress of the King for arms, ammunition and clothing for the army, would be granted. The hopes raised by this condition of affairs were soon succeeded by discouragement. A letter to Wash- A YEAR OF EVENTS 159 ington, dated March 15, shows that practically nothing had been done to carry out the plans proposed. Congress still dallied with details, and especially neglected to de- cide whether the number of regiments was to be pre- served, or whether a general incorporation was to take place, a matter simple enough in itself, but a necessary preliminary to my effective work in the future. The Baron in despair concluded to quit Philadelphia and re- turn to the army, but Chancellor Livingston requested him to remain and make one more effort towards securing Congresional action through the War Board. As the season was now so far advanced and so much valuable time had been lost it was decided to abandon the reforma- tion idea, and instead recruit the existing skeleton regi- ments up to their maximum strength. Once more the Baron reformed his plans to meet the new exigency, by which each regiment was to consist of 317 fighting men exclusive of the commissioned officers, drummers, fifers, and be divided into nine companies of thirty-five men each. A brigade of four regiments would have 1,268 fighting men, and fifteen brigades at the grand army would make a body of infantry of 18,703 men under arms. By this time Washington's entire force in New York and the Jerseys had been reduced to 10,400 rank and file, includ- ing 2,800 whose terms of enlistment would expire the last of May, which would leave him with less than 7,000 troops, stretched around a crescent of over one hundred miles. With this little army poorly supplied he had to watch the 11,000 well armed and well trained British sol- diers strongly fortified and concentrated at New York City, and be ready at any opportune moment to move to- wards Boston, up the Hudson or back across the Jerseys as circumstances might require. The Virginia and North Carolina brigades had already been sent south, and the 160 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN critical situation there would soon make further demands. There were some Canadians serving in the army at this time, but their number was not large. On the 28th the Baron again wrote to Washington that Congress had done nothing with his memorial, which still lay on the table, and as he says, "every wheel of the machine seemed stopped." He pronounced the situation very critical, and although some attempts had been made to improve the financial situation, no imme- diate results could be expected in that direction. He con- cludes this epistle with the following pregnant remarks : x My anxiety for our northern affairs. I cannot help saying, is considerably increased by the last accounts, which seem to announce a determination of General Lincoln to defend Charles- ton with all his force. This to me appears to be playing a hard game. Another danger which threatens us, and which is much to be dreaded is the declared division between Virginia and Pennsylvania, the latter state having actually passed a law for the raising fifteen hundred men to defend their pretended rights. All these things offer but a dull prospect, rendered still more dull by the cabals and factions which reign among us. The civil departments of the army, at a time when their whole at- tention should be taken up in providing for the approaching campaign, are in such a state of dissatisfaction and confusion, that I am very apprehensive they will make things still worse than they are. You will perhaps think, my dear General that I am in anx- iety for things which are out of my sphere; but when you con- sider that all my happiness depends on our success, you will not blame me for the interest I take in the cause. The same mo- tives make me apprehensive that the necessary arrangements will never be firmly established without your personal assistance; and I submit to you, My dear General, whether your presence is not absolutely necessary at Congress in the present critical situation of our affairs. Your right to the confidence both of Congress and the people is too well founded not to command the greatest attention to everything you propose. The time is precious, and the prospect before us is threatening. _ Your pres- ence will animate our councils as it does our armies. My at- tachment to the cause, and the respectful confidence I have in your presence, induce me to express in the strongest terms the desire I have to see you here. A YEAR OF EVENTS 161 Washington's reply to this earnest epistle is dated April 2. After referring to some details of the proposed reforms he says : Your anxiety on the score of southern affairs cannot exceed mine. The measure of collecting the whole force for the de- fense of Charleston ought, no doubt, to have been well con- sidered before it was determined. It is putting much to hazard, but at this distance we can form a very imperfect judgment of its propriety or necessity. I have the greatest reliance on Gen- eral Lincoln's prudence, but I cannot forbear dreading the event. Ill as we can afford a diminution of our force here, and not- withstanding the danger we run from the facility with which the enemy can concentrate their force at our weak points, be- sides other inconveniences, I have recommended to Congress to detach the Maaryland division to reinforce the southern states. Though this determination cannot, in all probability, arrive in season to be any service to Charleston, it may assist to arrest the progress of the enemy, and save the Carolinas. My sentiments concerning public affairs correspond, too, much with yours. The prospect, my dear Baron, is gloomy, and the storm threatens. Not to have the anxiety you express at the present juncture, would be not to feel that zeal and in- terest in our cause by which all your conduct shows you to be actuated. But I hope we shall extricate ourselves, and bring everything to a prosperous issue. I have been so inured to dif- ficulties in the course of this contest, that I have learned to look upon them with more tranquility than formerly. Those which now present themselves no doubt require vigorous exertions to overcome them, and I am far from despairing of doing it. Steuben replied on the 6th with the oft-told tale of procrastination, and embodying the suggestion that he had previously made to Congress, that in view of the de- lay and lateness of the season a committee be appointed with full power in concert with Washington to make every arrangement necessary for the ensuing campaign. Washington had, in the meantime, written to President Huntington concerning the alarming condition of affairs and before Steuben's letter was dispatched a committee was appointed, consisting of Messrs. Schuyler, Mat- thews and Peabody to take up the matter. They were 162 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN instructed to proceed at once to headquarters to carry out as far as possible the reforms suggested by Steuben, and during the Summer they made reports and continued their labors until August 11, when they were discharged. Congress took up the matter, however, the following Au- tumn, and adopted the Baron's system when the war was nearly over. While Steuben was in Philadelphia, details of his work in the army were carried out as far as possible by his aide de camp, Colonel Walker, who, with immense amount of trouble, succeeded in getting returns of more or less completeness. Even with the support of Wash- ington it was very hard to enforce the regulations, and it was no doubt with unfeigned satisfaction that the Baron was welcomed back to his military duties about the mid- dle of April. Steuben was accompanied to headquarters by Chevalier D© la Luzerne, the French minister, in whose honor, the army, under Steuben's direction, was put through a series of maneuvers, which elicited the warmest praise from their distinguished visitor. CHAPTER XL A DISASTROUS PERIOD. Reverses in the South — Loss of Georgia and the Carolinas — The Army Almost Discouraged — Equipoise of Washington and Steuben — Incompetency of Congress — The Baron Out- lines Plans for the Future — Treachery of Arnold — An Inter- esting Incident. The apprehensions of Washington and Steuben in regard to the army in the South were soon abundantly verified. General Lincoln was a brave and energetic of- ficer, but he made the mistake of allowing his army to be cooped up in Charleston instead of escaping as Washing- ton did from New York in 1776. As a result, the city being invested by a superior force on land and sea, he was compelled on May 12, 1780 to surrender with all his force. The 3,000 Continentals were held as prisoners, and the militia and male citizens were paroled. The loss was most serious as it turned South Carolina as well as Georgia almost completely over to the British, although Marion, Sumter and other partisan rangers kept up a de- sultory warfare. Sir Henry Clinton returned to New York leaving 5,000 men with Cornwallis to complete the reduction of the South by the invasion of North Carolina and Virginia. A crisis was at hand, and not only were more troops needed south of the Potomac, but a compe- tent general to command them. Washington had un- limited confidence in Greene, notwithstanding the latter had made some mistakes in the early part of the war, and desired that he might be sent to collect the remnants of the southern army. But Gates, who, with the assistance of Arnold, had won his laurels at the expense of Schuyler 164 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN at Saratoga, nothwithstanding his character had suffered by the disclosures of the Conway cabal, was still regarded as an able general, and on June 13 Congress placed him in command of the Southern army. He left for the field of operations with the best wishes of everybody, al- though his old-time friend and associate Charles Lee, sent him a warning note to "Take care that your north- ern laurels do not turn to southern willows." He arrived at Hillsboro, North Carolina, on June 19, and relieved General De Kalb, who had managed to keep together what was left of the army. It was a situation demanding extraordinary care and prudence, but Gates does not seem to have exercised even ordinary faculties. Without going into details, which are related by Eiske and other historians, it is sufficient to say that he was surprised by Cornwallis, near Camden, S. C, and on August 16, suf- fered a crushing defeat. His army was captured, slaugh- tered or scattered and De Kalb killed, while Gates only saved himself by a precipitate flight to Hillsboro, nearly two hundred miles distant, which he covered in less than four days. The way to North Carolina and Virginia was now open to the invader, but before following the course of events in that section we will return to the Jerseys. Steuben was at his old work keeping the army in the best shape possible. The new levies ordered by Con- brought the army down below the danger point, while the lack of supplies and worthlessness of the Continental money embarrassed every step. The latter had fallen to two cents on the dollar, and before the end of 1780 it took ten paper dollars to make a cent. In these days of alleged high prices it may be interesting to observe that corn was then quoted at $15 per bushel, butter at $12 a pound, flour $1,575 a barrel and other things in propor- tion. Of course these were not specie prices but based A DISASTROUS PERIOD 165 on paper which had already produced the familiar pro- verb "Not worth a Continental," that has survived to the present day. As the army was paid in currency, when paid at all, the situation was particulary hard on both officers and privates, when it required an officer's salary for the entire year to purchase a suit of clothes. Wash- ington attempted to supply the army with food by req- uisitions from the surrounding country, a proceeding always objectionable, but which he carried out as lightly and impartially as possible, paying therefor in certificates which were receivable for taxes, not a very good make- shift but one that served its purpose for the time. When the pay of a private of a private soldier for a month would not buy a bushel of wheat for his suffering family, it is not surprising that there were desertions. The people were getting tired of the war, and even among the patriots there was talk as to whether it would not be better to make terms and end the struggle before there should come the inevitable collapse. Desertions at that time averaged over a hundred a month, and Washington in writing to Presi- dent Huntington calls attention to the fact that with the end of the year the terms of half the army would expire, with the condition that "The shadow of an army that will remain will have every motive except mere patriotism to abandon the service, without the hope which has hitherto supported them, of a change for the better. This is almost extinguished now, and certainly will not outlive the campaign unless it finds something more sub- stantial to rest upon. To me it will appear miraculous if our affairs can maintain themselves much longer in their present train. If either the temper or the resources of the country will not admit of an alteration, we may expect soon to be reduced to the humiliating condition of seeing the cause of America in America upheld by foreign arms." 166 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN On June 6 Knyphausen concluded to make a diver- sion into New Jersey, and for this purpose landed a force at Elizabethtown point. The town itself was guarded by American militia, who, having warning, withdrew in time not only to avoid capture, but with the help of reinforce- ments and some Continental troops they harassed the British all the way to Connecticut Farms, a distance of about five miles. From there the Americans retreated a few miles farther to Springfield where they took a strong position, which Knyphausen, although his force was greatly superior, did not attempt an attack, and that even- ing began a retreat back to the point. Steuben, as Wash- ington's chief of staff, seems to have supervised the move- ments of the Americans, for all reports were sent to his quarters as well as deserters and prisoners. He also drew up a general plan to utilize the New Jersey militia during this invasion which subsequent movements of the enemy rendered unnecessary. Clinton arrived at New York from the South on June 17, and two days later came across the bay to view the situation in New Jersey. He did not think much of it, but before withdrawing his troops concluded to try the effect of a diversion. Making a feint at threatening Wash- ington's army in the rear, he again advanced to Spring- field about thirty miles northwest. Greene had taken up a strong position beyond the town which Clinton concluded not to attack, but that evening ordered a retreat after burning the village. Skirmishers and militia harassed the British along the entire route, repeating the Lexington experience. The British troops reached Staten Island by a bridge of boats which was then removed. Later Clin- ton embarked 8,000 troops on an expedition to retake Rhode Island, which he had given up the preceding fall, but owing to the inactivity of Arbuthnot, the naval com- A DISASTROUS PERIOD 167 mander, it came to nothing, and Clinton wrote home that it would be impossible to conquer America without rein- forcements. Bancroft states that during the first week in June the troops under Washington's immediate command numbered but 3,760 men fit for duty, and these Congress could neither pay nor supply with food. But dark as was the prospect the commander in chief and the little band which composed his staff did not despair. As he did once before at the request of Washington, Steuben drew up a general review of the situation with suggestions and plans for the future, especially the coming campaign. First as to the existing situation, concerning which he says: The great preparation made by the belligerent powers in Europe since last December, announced an intention on both sides to render this campaign as decisive as possible. The in- tentions of the Court of France were made known to the honor- able Congress the beginning of January last by the minister, who at the same time exhorted the United States to employ every effort in making the necessary preparations for a vigorous campaign on their part. It is not now necessary to examine into the motives that prevented the different Legislatures from making the necessary arrangements. But it is proper to know that, instead of augmenting our force, it has diminished near five thousand men whose term of service has expired. About this time Charleston was invested, and it did not require any superior knowledge in the art of war to presume the place would fall. This has, in fact, happened; and by the capture of the garrison we have suffered a loss of two thousand five hun- dred men. These, added to the five thousand above mentioned, make about one-half the force we had last campaign. On the arrival of Marquis De Lafayette, the latter end of April, we were assured of the intention of the Court of France to send a fleet of ships of the line and seven or eight thousand troops to co-operate with the Americans in such a manner as Congress should judge for the interest of the United States. It was then thought proper to reinforce the army, and accordingly Congress recommended, and the states resolved, to raise troops for that purpose. But the bad state of our finances, with other difficulties which have occurred, has prevented the execution of 168 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN these resolves to the present moment. Such is the situation of things at this time. The enemy having left a garrison of three thousand men at Charleston, are returned with the remainder of their force to New York, where they have about ten thousand regular troops and four thousand new levies, in all about fourteen thousand, together with four ships of the line in the harbor, besides which it is reported that Admiral Graves has arrived at Penob- scott with a fleet, the force of which we have not ascertained. On the other hand we are in expectation of the arrival of promised succor from our allies, and expect to reecive from the different states the number of men and every other assistance necessary to co-operate with them, and strike a decisive stroke whenever the commander in chief shall think proper to direct his operations. From this the Baron proceeds to outline a course of campaign, which, it must be confessed, appears very am- bitious considering the resources at hand and what might reasonably be expected. The paper seems almost to com- bine the present cheerfulness of Mark Tapley with the future visions of Don Quixote. First was the reduction of New York with the capture of the garrison which would terminate the war. Second was the conquest of Canada in order to secure the frontier from savage raids and secure the peace of the continent. Third was the reduction of Halifax and Penobscot. Fourth was the re- taking of Charleston, and fifth was the reduction of the Floridas, in which assistance might be expected from the Canadas. New York was of course, regarded as the cru- cial point, where, as we have seen, the enemy had 14,000 men, well fortified and supplied. According to military authorities to successfully invest and reduce a fortified place requires a force three times as large as the garrison, but the Baron thought it might be done in this case with double, or 28,000 men. Counting the existing American force at 7,000, which we have seen was very liberal, and expecting 6,000 or 7,000 French troops in addition the Americans would then have about 14,000 all told, and A DISASTROUS PERIOD 1G9 consequently would need at least 14,000 additional re- cruits. He thought if these recruits were furnished by August 1 and properly supplied with provisions and for- age (two very violent assumptions) the enterprise might be inaugurated. Co-operation might also be expected from the French fleet, but there was very little certain in- formation on this point. The process of investment is worked out with very elaborate detail, but as the scheme was based upon resources which were never furnished it is not necessary to follow it here. The same may be said concerning the invasion of Canada and the capture of Quebec, which, under the circumstances was as visionary as a hobo's dream of sumptuous banquets in marble halls. Charleston and Florida were to await the results of oper- ations in the North. Possibly Washington's features relaxed into a grim smile as he read this memorial, which contained the es- sence of military strategy had there been the means to carry it out. In the meantime came news of Gates's de- feat, and the summer was wearing away without any- thing being accomplished. On September 10 another paper was submitted by the Baron, which, taking into ac- count their present condition, is quite different in tone from the former. Although disclosing the serious con- dition of affairs it contains no note of despair, but is filled with valuable suggestions. All idea of present of- fensive operations is abandoned, the writer pertinently remarking : What can be undertaken against an enemy placed on three islands, superior in naval force and at least equal in land force, without mentioning the advantages that an army of veterans has over one the half of which is composed of young recruits? We cannot even expect to keep them within their limits. They have it in their power to pass the rivers and make incursions wherever they think proper, and I shall be much astonished if 170 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN the enemy do not assemble their whole force, pass the river (the Hudson) and try to engage us in general action. If any consideration prevents them it is that, having so large a propor- tion of German troops, they are apprehensive of their deserting on such an occasion, while the English fleet blocks the port of New York, and thereby prevents a junction with the French troops. Some changes are suggested which would give bet- ter facilities for resisting the enemy in the event of an at- tack, and the Baron proceeds to a discussion of affairs in the South, which is of special interest as that section was destined soon to become the principal theatre of war : Upon a general view of the situation, and especially after the unhappy affair to the southward, I think that our only object should be to stop the progress of the enemy till some more for- tunate events permit us to act on our part. To do this I would not only wish the army to be kept together, but I should wish for as speedy a junction as possible with the French troops. * * * What appears to me most likely is, that the enemy, after the defeat of General Gates, will endeavor to push their conquest to the southwest, and being sure that we are not able to undertake anything against the three islands, they will em- bark what troops can be spared, and make a descent on Vir- ginia, where there is nothing but militia to oppose their prog- ress. How to stop them in that quarter is the most difficult to answer. The successive detachments we have already sent have lost us the troops of six states. Always inferior to the enemy, and not supported by the provincials or militia, they have been sacrificed as far as they have been sent. Can we risk now to expose the Pennsylvania line to the same fate? At any rate we can not before the junction of the French troops with our army. * * * To attempt to retake by detachments of our army, what we have lost in that quarter, we shall in the end be defeated by detail. I could cite many examples where whole armies have been defeated by detachment. Prince Eugene, against the French, risked his reputation and the loss of the house of Austria for having weakened his army by detachment — he was totally defeated by detail. But our own experience will suffice. The troops of six states have already been lost, and if these states cannot or will not replace their troops the State of New Hampshire would at least be left to defend the whole thirteen states. To detach any part of the army at present seems to me of more dangerous consequences than any prog- ress the enemy can make to the southward. In fact they can only ravage the country, and this we cannot hinder even with A DISASTROUS PERIOD 171 a superior force; and should they take possession of any places on the coast, so soon as the maritime forces of our allies be- come superior to theirs on the coast they must abandon them. * * * The greatest danger, in my opinion, that can threaten the country is a defeat of our army. The disaffected would be- come discouraged, and all our resources become more difficult. We should even in that case lose every advantage that we might reap from the arrival of a fleet of our allies to our as- sistance. My opinion then is absolutely this, to play a sure game, and rather suffer some little insult than risk the whole; to keep our army together as much as possible, and prepare ourselves to act with vigor when our allies come to our assist- ance. This lengthy and pregnant memorial concluded with the suggestion that the only assistance Washington could then give the Southern states would be to send one or two well posted officers to give necessary instructions. A winter campaign against Charleston is suggested in case the expected French fleet arrived with sufficient reinforce- ments. The importance of this memorial cannot be overesti- mated. The pressure upon Washington to send further detachments to check the progress of the enemy in the South was very great, and while he no doubt realized in his own mind the importance of keeping the grand or main army intact as far as possible he was no doubt glad to be sustained in his position by such an unanswerable presentation of the facts and conclusions therefrom. Mention of expected aid from France has no doubt been noticed in the above memorials. This does not refer to the general assistance which had been received from that country since the outbreak of the war but to a spe- cial expedition which was expected that summer. So far the results of the French alliance had been disappointing at least to the general public, who could not realize the value of the assistance which had been given in the form of money and supplies and the indirect help afforded by 172 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN keeping busily engaged elsewhere forces that would have otherwise been turned against America. The only two instances where the forces had attempted to co-operate had been disastrous, largely at least through divided coun- sels. By 1780, however, mainly through the representa- tions of Lafayette, who had returned to France in 1779 and remained several months, there was a change of pol- icy. Lafayette urged Vergennes to dispatch at least 12,000 men to America under a competent general, who, however, would be completely subordinate to Washing- ton, and thus the combined armies would succeed in "dealing England a blow where she would most feel it." Lafayette returned to America in April, 1780, with the information that such an expedition was projected, and on July 10 there arrived at Newport Admiral Ternay with seven ships of the line and three frigates, carrying 6,000 men under command of Count Rochambeau. This was only half the number needed, but the balance was promised as soon as transportation could be procured. Unfortunately the French fleet was blockaded in Narra- gansett bay by a strong British squadron, and Rocham- beau did not care to move his troops while this danger existed. The other 6,000 were blockaded in Brest harbor and never got away from France. Thus all the schemes for that year miscarried, and offensive plans did not get beyond the paper stage. Another year was to elapse be- fore even Rochambeau's force could be utilized. During this summer General Robert Howe was in command at West Point, against which Washington be- lieved Clinton had designs while making feints in New Jersey. He had seen active service in the South, but had been unfortunate in losing Savannah while trying to de- fend it against a force three times as great as his own, and at the request of the South Carolina delegates in Con- A DISASTROUS PERIOD 173 gress he was superseded by General Lincoln who was equally unfortunate at Charleston. A fear existed in the army that he might not be able to defend West Point, so Washington, not wishing to remove him, about the mid- dle of June sent Steuben to Howe as a confidential ad- viser, a commision which he filled with tact and delicacy until the 1st of August, when Benedict Arnold succeeded to the command. While there, as elsewhere, the Baron paid particular attention to the condition of the army, bringing the personnel and equipment up to the highest standard for any emergency that might arise. Referring to the soldiers one of the officers remarked that when they marched from the parade they appeared equal to the storming of another Stony Point. Furloughed men were recalled, and a needed reformation carried out in every department. Expected arms from France failed to arrive, and complaints of insufficient supplies were only relieved from monotony by their justice, but Steuben labored on amid all discouragements, a sample of which is related in a letter to General Knox, dated July 27, which is only one of several to the same effect : "Among the 3,000 arms arrived from Albany 900 only have bayonets, nor do I know where to procure them. We shall also be very short of cartridge boxes. I have ordered 1,500 to be repaired here God knows if it will be done. These fifteen days past I have been endea- voring to get arms from Chester to Newburg, where I have prepared a store for their reception, to deliver them to the brigades. I have also been ten days trying to get the arms from Albany from on board the sloops, but neither one nor the other can be done. My orders are less respected than those of a corporal. The army is un- der marching orders, and nearly 4,000 are unarmed. The arms are here, and cannot be delivered because nobody 174 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN will do his duty. There were at Philadelphia, I believe, 5,000 arms with bayonets, and 1,500 new cartridge boxes, with drums, fifes and other articles, and there are, I be- lieve, 1,000 arms at Carlisle. In our present circum- stances they should all be collected or we shall lose the campaign." By this time Washington had removed his head- quarters to Tappan, between West Point and New York, in order the better to watch Clinton and form a junction with Rochambeau when opportunity offered. Here he was joined by Steuben, when Arnold took command at West Point, and it was here no doubt that he presented his memorial of September 10 which furnished a basis for future movements. To follow the marching and counter-marching of armies, to recount the stories of sieges and battles is al- ways more interesting than picturing the details of camp life, the daily drill, looking after supplies, instructing and preparing officers as well as the rank and file to properly perform their duties. But just as the latter is absolutely necessary to any efficient work against the enemy so is it necessary to give some account of it, even at the risk of being tedious, in order that there may be due apprecia- tion of the character and services of him to whom the duty of carrying on this branch of the service is allotted. It was now three years since Steuben had cast his lot with the American insurgents, and during most of that period he had labored in season and out of season in performing the duties assigned him. If he could not get what he thought he should have, he took what he could get, whether it was a question of authority or a matter of supplies. As a member of Wash- ington's official family he had earned the unlimited con- fidence of the commander in chief and the respect of every A DISASTROUS PERIOD 175 member of his staff. His special work had shown good results, and undoubtedly contributed largely to saving the army at Monmouth, as well as adding to its efficiency on other occasions. While temporarily holding a command in the line, he demonstrated his fitness for the position so clearly that one is forced to the conclusion that had not jealousy of foreigners prevented his assignation to a per- manent post the story of some reverses to the patriot army might have been different. He had the confidence of the rank and file as well as that of the inferior officers, which was in itself a marked assistance in carrying on his opera- tions. Yet we have seen from the West Point letter that he was still hampered unreasonably in his work, and this was largely due to the neglect of Congress to provide him with ample powers and assistance in the way of subordin- ate officers. When that body on February 25, 1779, re- solved to establish the office of permanent inspector in- stead of the temporary arrangement then existing, it seemed to think that the mere creation of the office, with the book of regulations as subsequently adopted would furnish an automatic machine which would perform the work required without further action. Washington, by special orders relating to the duties of inspector, sub- inspectors, brigade majors and others concerned, rendered invaluable aid towards carrying out Steuben's plans, so that by 1780 the discipline and exercises of the troops were as good as the shifting from expiration of enlist- ment terms and other courses would permit. The next move was to stop abuses of furloughs and discharges as well as the waste which prevailed. To do this it was re- quisite that there should be a consolidation of the muster master's and inspector's departments. The two heads were in constant conflict until Congress on January 12, 1780 annexed the former to the inspector's department, 176 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN so that accounts of men and supplies should be made to the inspector. In pursuance of this action Steuben reor- ganized his department, creating new offices to which should be attached these additional duties, the department to consist of an inspector general and assistant, one for each division being a Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel, sub inspector for each brigade to be a major or senior cap- tain, an inspector for artillery, and one for cavalry. These officers were to be allowed such assistance in men or ani- mals as they might need, and the commander in chief should make regulations for the whole body. The matter was taken up by Congress, which body, on September 25 passed a set of resolutions adopting the idea as a whole, but making material changes in detail which were not very satisfactory to the Baron, who was not slow to express his dissent therefrom. None but a military person would care to follow these differences with particularity, but the main objections on the part of the Baron appear to be summed up in a letter from Phila- delphia to Washington, dated October 23d, as follows : The monthly addition of five to eight dollars to the pay of officers of such merit as those whom your Excellency has chosen for the inspectorship, appears to me so very mean that I will not take upon myself to make them such a proposition. When the ancient majors of brigade, who, in the first institu- tion, were taken from the line of lieutenants or ensigns, had an addition to their pay of twenty-four dollars per month, how can nine dollars now be proposed to a colonel for discharging so important and painful function? I am now endeavoring to find how much the muster master's department has cost the states. I am sure that the addition I ask for the officers of inspector- ship will not amount to an eighth-part of it. Several resolu- tions in this arrangement are contradictory to one another, and others are not sufficiently clear. I am therefore determined to present a memorial to Congress in order to have the inspec- tor's department established on the footing proposed by your Excellency, without any alteration. If Congress desire that I should continue in this office, I flatter myself that they w'll have a regard to my representation. A DISASTROUS PERIOD 177 As usual, however, the Baron had been going ahead attending to his duties both as inspector and as a member of Washington's staff. Among other things he drew up a plan for the daily assembling of the general officers with the commander in chief by which the different branches were kept in close touch with each other, also for punishing officers absenting themselves without leave, with other matters of like nature. Scarcely half the re- cruits requisitioned so bravely by Congress had put in an appearance, but these had to be trained and absorbed by the rest of the army. Congress again attempted to pro- vide a regular army, at least on paper, by providing that from and after January 1, 1781, said army should con- sist of four regiments of cavalry, four of artillery, forty- nine of infantry exclusive of Colonel Hazen's regiment of foreigners, and one regiment of artificers. The cavalry was to consist of six troops, each of 64 non commissioned officers and privates ; artillery regiments to consist of nine companies of 65 each, the infantry of nine companies of 64 each, and the artificers of eight companies of 60 each, making a total of 1576 cavalry, 2,340 artillery, 28,124 in- fantry, and 480 artificers, or 32,520 in all besides com- missioned officers and the various non combatants such as musicians, teamsters &c. These were apportioned among the states with an urgent request to fill up their quotas not later than January 1, enlistment to be made for the war if possible, but if these could not be obtained then recruits to be taken for not less than one year unless sooner re- lieved. The sum of fifty dollars was allowed as bounty, and each recruiting officer was granted $2 premium for every soldier obtained. Some changes were made in this plan, but as a whole it was retained until the end of the war. Steuben now had a new job on hand, namely the for- 178 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN mation of the fresh army which Congress proposed to create. This he outlined in a lengthy memorial in which great stress was laid on retaining as many of the old offi- cers as possible. As finally arranged the infantry, cavalry and trains of the army should amount to 32,058 men, with 3,153 in the artillery, sappers and miners. His views were adopted by Washington and subsequently by Congress, and it looked as though he would now have a chance to work out his ideas under more favorable circumstances than ever before. Unfortunately for this object the con- dition of affairs in the South called him away from the main amy, and the reforms which he had so carefully planned were practically shelved for a year. There was soon to be a shifting of the active theatre of war, but before giving it attention, it may be well to recall the celebrated plot of Arnold and Clinton, which, had it been carried out to a successful consummation would have furnished a most tragic climax to what has been not inappropriately called the year of disasters. The character of Benedict Arnold certainly was a mixed one, and in his earlier days he possessed traits that cannot but excite one's admiration, although even then he had his critics who had at least some foundation for their detrac- tions. Running away from his home at Norwich, Con- necticut at the age of fifteen he joined an expedition against the French, but not enjoying military restraint he deserted and came back home. At the outbreak of the Revolution he was in the mercantile business at New Haven, and immediately after the battle at Lexington went to Cambridge at the head of the militia company of which he was captain. He proposed an expedition against Crown Point and Ticonderoga, but Ethan Allen having organized a similar expedition under authority of the State of Connecticut, he served under him as a volun- A DISASTROUS PERIOD 179 teer. Becoming angry at an investigation ordered by the Massachusetts authorities he left the expedition and re- turned to Cambridge. His expedition to Quebec that fall through the Maine woods furnished an episode of suffer- ing and endurance seldom equalled. Severely wounded in the futile attack on Quebec, he succeeded to the com- mand of the combined forces on the death of Montgomery who had joined him by way of Montreal, which point he held until the following April, when he was compelled to retreat. Charges were made against him of having mis- appropriated goods belonging to Montreal merchants, but an investigating committee pronounced these charges ut- terly baseless. Later he made a brilliant fight against odds on Lake Champlain, and when Congress in 1777 created five new major generalships it was thought Arn- old would be given one of them. But although ranking brigadier he was passed over entirely on the ground that Connecticut already had two major generals. He was so indignant ?.t this injustice that he wanted to resign from the army, but Washington persuaded him to remain, and he afterwards did some brilliant work in defeating a band of British raiders at Ridgefield, Conn. He was now com- missioned major general, but without the ranking to which he was naturally entitled, and he was sent to join the army of the North against Burgoyne. Gates had suc- ceeded Schuyler in time to reap the fruits of victory due to Schuyler's arrangements, very much as credit was largely given to another who had the advantage of Ad- miral Sampson's work at Santiago over a hundred years later. Being jealous of Arnold's military reputation which had been won during the Canadian expedition Gates provoked a quarrel with him which led to Arnold being relieved of his command, but when the second bat- tle of Saratoga began and the situation appeared serious, 180 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN at the request of his brother officers Arnold dashed into the affray and rendered brilliant service, contributing ma- terially to that day's victory. During this fight the bone of his left leg was fractured above the knee by a shot from a German wounded soldier who was lying on the ground, and as Arnold fell from his horse one of his men rushed to bayonet the German. Arnold cried out, "For God's sake, don't hurt him he's a fine fellow," The soldier was saved, and so, unfortunately, was Arnold. Had he died on that field, his name would have been enrolled among those of American heroes. Admiral Mahan in the intro- duction to his "Life of Nelson," remarks : "It is the ap- pointed lot of some of History's chosen few to come upon the scene at the moment when a great tendency is nearing its crisis and culmination. Fewer still, but happiest of all, viewed from the standpoint of fame, are those whose de- parture is as well timed as their appearance, who do not survive the instant of perfected success, to linger on sub- jected to the searching tests of common life, but pass from our ken in a blaze of glory which thenceforth for- ever encircles their names." The application of this truth to many instances both in public and private life will recall itself to the mind of the reader, but none is more striking than in the case of Arnold. For his actions at Saratoga Congress gave Arnold a vote of thanks and advanced him to his proper rank. But his evil genius still pursued him. When Clinton evac- uated Philadelphia, and Washington was endeavoring to head him off while crossing the Jerseys, he placed Arnold in command of the troops in the city. During the winter the Tories had had a joyous time with balls and banquets, and now the other side had its inning. Arnold took the lead in lavish entertainments and entered on a course of extravagance which soon led him into pecuniary embar- A DISASTROUS PERIOD 181 assments, out of which he tried to extricate himself by speculations which only involved him more deeply. Per- haps this might have been overlookeed, but among his particular friends was a Miss Shippen, a member of one of the old Tory families, to whom he was betrothed and who afterwards became his wife. As a result Tories more than patriots figured at his enter- tainments, a state of things not conducive to harmony. While Arnold was absent on a visit to Washington at Morristown, President Reed and the Pennsylvania Exec- utive Council preferred a series of charges against him, which were not only laid before Congress, but scattered broadcast over the country. They accused him of having allowed a ship to improperly come into port, using public wagons for transporting private property, allowing people to enter the enemy's lines, illegally buying a prize vessel lawsuit, imposing menial offices on certain per- sons, and making private purchases while the shops were closed by his orders. At this distance these charges on their face look rather frivolous, and the committee of in- vestigation evidently thought so too for about the middle of March, 1779, it reported that the complaints were groundless except as to the use of the wagons and irregu- lar granting of a pass, and as there was no evidence of wrong intent even here a verdict of acquittal was recom- mended. Instead of granting this Congress listened to the representations of Reed that more testimony was forthcoming, and the matter was finally referred to a court martial which held the matter up until January 26 following, when a verdict was rendered acquitting Arnold of all intentional wrong, but directing that he be repri- manded for his "imprudence." Washington was compelled to issue the reprimand which he made as delicate as pos- sible. But Arnold, with his feelings outraged, and per- 182 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN haps influenced more than he himself suspected by his Tony associates, had already made a secret crossing of the Rubicon. He is said to have written a letter to Sir Henry Clinton the previous April intimating that he might go over to the British if he were indemnified for what loss he might incur, and a correspondence ensued through the medium of Clinton's Adjutant Major John Andre, using the signature of John Anderson. Possibly profiting by their experience with Lee the British authorities were evidently not willing to pay a very large amount for Ar- nold's adhesion unless it brought with it something of more substantial value than simply his own person. Dur- ing the progress of the court martial he was not in a posi- tion to deliver anything of value, but in July, 1780, he re- quested Washington, who still had full confidence in him, to give him command of West Point, the key to the high- lands, which Clinton coveted more tha nany other post in America. Burgoyne had tried in vain to reach it, and its loss would sever the northern portion of the Confederacy into two disconnected parts. Arnold took command there on August 3, with the full confidence that when he should openly desert to the British he would not go empty handed. We have outlined Arnold's career up to this time for the reason that it has not been so generally pub- lished as the later transactions leading to the arrest of Andre, the discovery of the plot and the escape of the chief offender. These are familiar to every schoolboy. Washington had gone to Hartford to hold a conference with Count Rochambeau, and had he returned by the regular route his capture would probably have been one of the results of the successful fruition of Arnold's scheme. He, however, took a more northerly route, and arriving at Fishkill, eighteen miles north of West Point two or three days earlier than was expected he sent word A DISASTROUS PERIOD 183 to Arnold that he would meet him at breakfast the next morning. Instead of doing so, however, he spent the time examining some fortifications with Knox and Lafay- ette. It was while Arnold was breakfasting that he learned of the discovery of his treason, and fled while Washington was still on the opposite side of the river. The traitor was beyond reach of punishment, but the unfortunate Andre was in the toils. A court martial of fourteen officers was called to pass on his case, of which Steuben was a member, General Greene presiding. The conclusion was inevitable, and on September 29 An- dre was unanimously condemned to death, the sentence being carried out on October 2. His fate, although in accordance with all the rules of war, excited the sympa- thy even of his judges, but their duty was clear. Steuben was especially sympathetic, and in referring to the case said, "It is not possible to save him. He put us to no proof, but in an open, manly manner, confessed every- thing but a premeditated design to deceive. Would to God the wretch who drew him to death could have suf- fered in his place." Sympathy for Andre only intensified the feeling against Arnold, and in Steuben's mind especially this feeling was one of horror and detestation as is forcibly ilustrated by the following incident related by Pomeroy Jones in his history of Oneida County, New York : "On one occasion after the treason the Baron was on parade at roll call when the detested name, Arnold, was heard in one of the infantry companies of the Connecticut line. The Baron immediately called the unfortunate pos- sessor to the front of the company. He was a perfect model for his profession; clothes, arms and equipments in the most perfect order. The practiced eye of the Baron soon scanned the soldier, and, 'Call at my mar- 184 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN quee, after you are dismissed, brother soldier/ was his only remark. After Arnold was dismissed from parade, he called at the Baron's quarters as directed. The Baron said to him, 'You are too fine a soldier to bear the name of a traitor — change it at once, change it at once.' 'But what name shall I take?' replied Arnold. 'Any that you please, take mine, if you cannot suit yourself better, mine is at your service.' Arnold at once agreed to the propo- sition, and immediately repaired to his orderly, and Jon- athan Steuben forthwith graced the company roll, in lieu of the disgraced name of him who had plotted treason to his country. After the United States had conquered their independence our hero returned to Connecticut, and on his petition the General Court legalized the change of name. [The records show that this was done not by the court but by legislative enactment in January 1783.] A few years after, he wrote the Baron, who had now set- tled on his lands in northern New York, that he had mar- ried and had a fine son born, and that he had named him Frederick William. The Baron replied that when the son should arrive at the age of twenty-one he would give him a farm. The Baron soon after paid the debt of na- ture, but hi? letter was carefully preserved. A few years after its settlement Jonathan Steuben moved to the town of Steuben (N. Y.) with his family. When Frederick William arrived at his majority, the letter was presented to Colonel Walker, one of the Baron"s executors, who at once executed to him a deed in fee of fifty acres of land, but which had been previously leased to Samuel Sizer, and as the recipient preferred the enjoyment of the land to the receipt of the rents, he purchased the lease, and at once went into possession. "Jonathan lived to become a pensioner and died some fifteen or sixteen years since (about 1836). His widow A DISASTROUS PERIOD 185 survived him; she also drew a pension. In the war of 1812 Frederick William went with the militia to Sack- ett's Harbor, where he was taken sick and died. For his services his widow also received a pension. He was or- derly sergeant of his company, and with the name of the Baron he teems to have inherited at least a portion of his distinguished qualifications, for he was considered one of the best disciplinarians in his regiment." At the risk of some repetition it may be of some in- terest to note a sequel to the above account. When the present writer was collecting data for this memoir of Steuben he happened to observe in the monthly bulletin of the Sons of the American Revolution a note stating that Dr. R. M. Griswold, of Kensington, Connecticut, a collateral descendant of Jonathan Steuben, the latter be- ing his great uncle, had made an address on this subject before the Colonel Jeremiah Wadsworth Branch, S. A. R. On communicating with Dr. Griswold he courteously furnished an abstract of his reminiscences from which we take the following : "More than fifty years ago when a small boy I spent much of my time with my paternal grandmother, who, before she was married, was Ann Arnold, daughter of Samuel Arnold, of the southeast or so-called Hock- anum district of East Hartford. In a closet of the old farmhouse where she lived and which was her father's I found an old flintlock musket which I persuaded my grandmother to allow me to rest upon the backs of two kitchen chairs, while I took imaginary shots at bears and Indians and red coats, for she told me that this old gun was the one with which "Uncle Jonathan Steuben used to shoot the red coats." To what species of animal the red coats belonged my boyish imigination did not extend, but it is certain that I classed them as some kind of wild 186 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN animals. There was something about the history of this gun and of Uncle Jonathan to whom it formerly be- longed, of which my grandmother and the rest of the family were very proud, the reason for which will be found below. Jonathan Steuben was born Jonathan Ar- nold. His father, Ensign John Arnold and his grandfather, Sergeant John Arnold, lived and died in the family homestead in East Hartford or Hock- anum, which burned more than sixty years ago. En- sign John married Lucy, daughter of Thomas Wads- worth, who lived adjoining his father's house on the north, and here Jonathan was born February 27, 1757. This house is still standing in an excellent state of preser- vation (as will be seen by the illustration). "When a little over eighteen years of age he en- listed, and served until the end of the war, most of the time in Col. Huntington's regiment of infantry. Later he served in Colonel Sheldon's regiment of light horse, and still later on detached duty in various places under command of Baron Steuben as instructor of new troops. Immediately after the attempted delivery of West Point to the British by Arnold, when the army was stationed at Verplanck's Point under command of Baron Steuben, at roll call one morning the name of Jonathan Arnold was heard and responded to. The Baron said, "Let the man by the the name of Arnold step three paces to the front." Jonathan Arnold stood six feet two inches in his stocking feet, and when Steuben saw him he said, "You are too fine a looking soldier to bear the name of Arnold, change it!" To Arnold's inquiry as to what name he should take the Baron said, 'If you have none better, take mine, and I will be your godfather.' His name was at once changed on the company's roll to Jonathan Steu- ben, and as such he remained until the rest of his life, the A DISASTROUS PERIOD 187 General Assembly legalizing the change in 1783. "Jonathan Steuben became a warm friend and bosom companion of William North, the Baron's aide de camp, and the Baron himself kept very close watch on his young namesake. After the latter's discharge at the close of the war he returned to his old home in East Hartford, and married Lucy Porter, of Hockanum, said to have been the handsomest girl in Hartford County. By her he had eleven children, six of whom are of record as hav- ing been horn in East Hartford ; two daughters dying young, were buried in East Hartford cemetery. "In 1790 the State of New York granted Baron Steu- ben a large tract of land near the present city of Utica, parcels of which were given by the Baron to his friends, among whom Jonathan Steuben was remembered, and in 1805 he with Colonel North and others removed to this section and settled what was afterwards known as the village of Steuben. Not long before his death Baron Steuben, accompanied by William North and Jonathan Steuben visited the latter's relatives in East Hartford, and this visit my grandmother seemed to remember with peculiar pride and pleasure. "In February, 1890, 115 years after Jonathan Ar- nold entered the Colonial service, I had a letter from the only surviving; member of his eleven children, William North Steuben, of Gilroy, Santa Clara County, Califor- nia. He wrote that he was the youngest of the children, having been born on August 7, 1808 ; that he removed from York State to California in 1849, and that he was named after Colonel North. An older brother, Frederick William, named after the Baron, died at Sackett's Har- bor on November 1, 1814, while in the service of his country during the second war with England. Another brother, Benjamin Walker, died in Illinois, December 25, 188 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN 1888. The latter left four sons, and William Nortfi Steuben left two sons. He was delegate from the Cali- fornia Society of Sons of Revolutionary Sires to the Cen- tennial celebration of the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1883. Although 82 years old at the time of writing the letter above referred to he was in good physi- cal and mental health. He died in 1904." CHAPTER XII. SHIFTING OF THE CONFLICT. Seat of War in the South — England Adds Holland to Her Enemies — At War Against the World — Greene and Steuben Sent to Virginia — Former Assumes Command of the South- ern Armies — Appeals to Steuben for Help — Desperate Con- dition of Affairs. British victories in the South, and the practical re- duction of Georgia and South Carolina made it apparent that the main seat of war must soon be transferred to that quarter. Gates, by his mismanagement more than by his actual defeat at Camden, had so thoroughly discredited himself that everybody recognized the necessity for an immediate change of commanders. Mindful of its pre- vious experience Congress this time concluded to leave the selection to Washington, who promptly appointed General Nathaniel Greene to the command of all the Southern armies. It may be remarked here that in December, 1780, England, as if she had not her hands full already, de- clared war against Holland. The alleged cause was the capture of some papers from an American packet contain- ing a proposed treaty of commerce between the United States and Holland, but the real cause was the fact that the Dutch drove a profitable trade with France and America daring the conflict. Russia, Denmark and Swe- den had also become unfriendly to England on account of her arbitrary searching of neutral ships and the confisca- tion of goods found therein, and had united in what was known as the armed neutrality. It almost seemed as though the contest was developing into a struggle of 190 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN England against the world, and while American pros- pects looked desperate it was also a most critical period for the British empire. In May, 1781, the armed neu- trality league was joined by Prussia, the following Octo- ber by the German (Holy Roman) Empire, in July, 1782, by Portugal, in September, 1782, by Turkey, and the fol- lowing February by Naples. Thus by the close of the Revolution the doctrine that "free ships make free goods" became a firmly established principle of international law, to which TTngland, however, did not give a formal assent until 1856. Sensible of the demoralization that now prevailed throughout the South, and convinced that Greene would need all the assistance possible in restoring order out of chaos, Washington proposed sending Steuben with him as assistant. He was not only expected to be useful in the formation and regulation of raw troops, as he had been in the northern army, but besides performing the duties of inspector general it was expected that he should be given a command suitable to his rank. In his letter of notification to Steuben, dated October 22, Washington dwells on his services as being most essential to the south- ern army and adding : "I wish you may have been able previously to obtain a satisfactory establishment of your department, which, in your absence, will become more necessary than it has been heretofore. But if it is not done, I would not have it detain you. Assure yourself that, wherever you are, my best wishes for your success and happiness attend you."' The appointments of Greene and Steuben were con- firmed by Congress on October 30, with a flattering testi- monial to the value of the Baron's services, with the be- lief that both generals would be very useful in their new field. There was also encouragement in the types of both SHIFTING OF THE CONFLICT 191 men. They were above petty jealousies, and placed their cause high above all other considerations. They had been intimate friends at Valley Forge, and had worked in harmony in their efforts to improve the condition of the army. In fact the whole situation now was better in one respect at least. The traitors, the factionists, the mutin- nists and incompetents who held high official positions had been gradually weeded out, and as towards the close of the late Civil war, there was more working together instead of the pulling apart, which had characterized earlier stages of the conflict. Alexander Hamilton wanted to go south with Greene and Steuben, but Wash- ington did not feel that he could yet spare him from his immediate official family. During the whole southern campaign +here never was a disagreement between Greene and Steuben. The two generals left Philadelphia for their new field early in November. With the former were his two aides, Major Burnett and Colonel Morris, and with Steu- ben were Major Walker and his Secretary Duponceau. After a short stop at Chester the party separated, Gen- eral Greene tarrying to make some arrangements with the governors of Delaware and Maryland, and the others proceeding directly to Virginia, stopping to pay a brief visit to Mrs. Washington at Mount Vernon, where they were cordially received and invited to remain to dinner. Duponceau says, "The external appearance of the man- sion did not strike the Baron favorably. 'If, said he, 'Washington were not a better general than he was an architect, the affairs of America would be in very bad condition/ The house at that time might be considered handsome, and perhaps elegant ; but at present, the most that can be said of it is, that it was a modest habitation, quite in keeping with the idea that we have of Cincinna- 192 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN tus, and of those of the other great commanders of the Roman republic. In the interior we saw only two rooms, separated by an entry, one of which was a parlor, the other the dining room. They were respectably but not luxuri- ously furnished. The Baron having accepted the invita- tion we sat down to dinner. Mrs. Washington was ac- companied by a young lady, a relative, whose name, I think, was Miss Custis. The table was abundantly served but without profusion." From Mount Vernon the party went to Richmond, where they met Greene about the middle of November. Matters were in about as bad shape as possible, very much like the condition of the northern army when Steuben first entered upon his duties. Everybody was a law unto himself. The fragments of the army were scattered over a large extent of country, largely disorganized and prac- tically without supplies of either food, clothing or am- munition. The victory at King's Mountain on October 7, another by Sumter over Tarleton on November 20, and a few small engagements had revived the hopes of the patriots and warned Cornwallis that his march north- ward would not be altogether a holiday affair. But marching north he was, and with reinforcements en route and no considerable organized force to oppose him he was reasonably sure of success. While the war centre was now principally along the boundary line between North and South Carolina, yet it was evident that Virginia must be principally depended upon both for men and supplies. The Old Dominion had heretofore fought the battles of the patriots at a distance, and only a few months before her hardy sons under Clark had conquered an empire, but so far her own set- tlements had escaped the worst ravages of war. Self- interest as well as patriotism dictated that the enemy SHIFTING OF THE CONFLICT 193 should be kept at arms' length as long as possible, so previous to his departure for the Carolinas, Greene placed Steuben in command in Virginia. The latter's task was sufficiently arduous. He was expected to organize the raw recruits into serviceable volunteers and have them sent forward with adequate supplies, as well as to take care of any invasion which might occur from the coast. Greene left Richmond on November 20, and took com- mand at Charlotte, N. C, on December 2. His parting word to Steuben was to keep a lookout for the enemy who were hovering around Chesapeake bay, but left him with full liberty to govern himself as circumstances might require. He suggested, however, that the Baron secure as soon as possible accurate reports of the military resources of the state to be forwarded to him, acting as far as possible in concert with the state authorities. Re- cruiting was to be carried on as vigorously as possible, and any troops which might arrive from Washington's army were to be sent south without delay. It is scarcely necessary to state that Steuben's position was a most dif- ficult one. Expecting an invasion the state authorities were naturally more anxious concerning the direct de- fense of their own firesides than supplying the army in the distant Carolinas. Here as elsewhere the National idea was as yet imperfectly realized, and they could not grasp the fact that permanent relief could only be ob- tained through the destruction of Cornwallis's army. The Baron on the other hand had an eye single to the general welfare, without special consideration for local interests. Jefferson, who was governor at this time, seems to have seconded Steuben's efforts as far as prac- ticable, although, according to Prof. G. W. Greene, he was "governing in a way which has afforded his adver- saries an ample field of crimination, and cost his eulo- 194 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN gistic biographers much labor to defend." Whatever may be the justice of this stricture it is very certain that the inertia of the state machinery and the indifference of the people were not easily overcome. This had been more or less the condition in every state since the begin- ning of the war. Whenever a section was invaded the yeomanry, from Lexington to Savannah, would flock to repel the invader, but when the crisis was past the undis- ciplined force would melt away like snow in summer time, leaving the commander with but a handful of soldiers who could be depended upon for regular military service. With a change of form it was mediaeval practice trans- ferred to America long after it had been abandoned in the old world. There were plenty of men in Virginia but everything was disorder, abundant resources (except possibly arms and ammunition) but reckless extravagance and want of system, personal bravery but an almost su- pine indifference. This all reacted on the people, who began to doubt whether they could ever achieve inde- pendence under such a state of affairs. With his usual energy Steuben went to work to im- prove the condition of affairs. His demands were suf- ficiently comprehensive. First he asked that the state furnish its quota of troops, under the new plan, thor- oughly equipped for the field for a winter campaign ; that a magazine of 10,000 barrels of flour, 5,000 barrels of pork and beef, and two hundred hogsheads of rum be established at Taylor's ferry on the Roanoke river; near the present town of Boydton in Mecklenburg County, near the North Carolina line; 3,000 head of cattle be driven at once to camp; 100 good road wagons to be furnished, with driver, four horses and harness complete to each wagon ; forty artificers for the army ; provisions at different points of rendezvous ; a military chest with SHIFTING OF THE CONFLICT 195 5,000 pounds ($25,000) specie or the value thereof, and sufficient advances be made to the officers as would en- able them to properly equip themselves. These requisi- tions doubtless made the local authorities open their eyes, but, as we shall see, did not have an equal effect upon their hands. There was a corps of regular soldiers in the state under command of General Lawson, and Greene, whose necessitates in this respect were very urgent, desired that it be sent at once to the front. Lawson arrived in Richmond on November 26, but did not report to Steu- ben until two days later. His force consisted of 378 men, and Steuben proposed to review them on the 30th, and send them *die next day to join Greene, at once in- forming Greene of his action. When the men appeared for review at Petersburg, forty-one were missing. The remainder were ordered to march the following morning, but instead of starting General Lawson told Steuben that the Legislature had ordered the men discharged at Peters- burg, which was verified by a copy of the order received by Steuben from Jefferson the next day. Efforts to in- duce the men to enlist for a longer period were fruitless, and the corps was allowed to disperse. In writing to Greene on this matter Steuben told him that he need not regret their absence as from the poor condition of the corps in respect to discipline, arms &c. with the short pe- riod of enlistment it would have given very little service. General Greene responded that he did not regret the fail- ure of the corps to join him as on account of its short time of service it would have been of little use. Neither was he surprised at the condition of affairs in Virginia, especially as to the troops. They had been at home and so long neglected that all sense of duty and discipline was lost. He urged the Baron, however, to press the state 196 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN for supplies and the officers to obey. He also urged that reinforcements be sent forward as rapidly as possible, as the enemy had been strengthened and their own forces divided. Steuben, of course did his best, but the results were not commensurate with his efforts. On November 27 he wrote a vigorous letter to Jefferson in which he pointedly declared that "Instead of forwarding to General Greene the reinforcements he expects, we are keeping a number of corps dispersed about the state, where no enemy has been these eight days, thereby exposing General Greene with an inferior force to the enemy, and exhausting what little provision was collected in the state." General Greene confirmed the Baron's statements, and warned the authorities that this course persisted in must exhaust their resources, and recommended that they should not keep in the field a man more of the militia than was absolutely necessary for covering the country from the enemy's ravages. But it seemed as though little or nothing could be accomplished, nor could data be secured showing the actual number of the militia or the terms of enlistment. In a letter to Washington of December 18, Steuben thus reviews the situation : "This state, having only a handful of regulars in the field, is continually ransacked by bands of officers and soldiers, who have always a pretext for not joining their regiments, and who are drawing pay and rations for doing no service at all, while they are committing excesses everywhere. Since the Virginia line was detailed to the southern army, it was never regularly formed; nay since I have been in the United States it has not had a regular organization. Your Excellency will recollect that in Valley Forge the brigades of Woodford and Scott consisted only of a few soldiers and officers, confusedly mixed together without any distinction of companies or regiments. In such a condition every corps must be ruined. The officers do not care for their soldiers, and they scarcely know the officers who have to command them." SHIFTING OF THE CONFLICT 197 At this time Generals Muhlenberg, Wilson and Nel- son had three separate corps in Virginia, the first named having about 900 men. Steuben proceeded to select 400 from this corps and send them at once to Greene. On December 3d, however, a delegation came to his head- quarters in Petersburg and presented a paper, signed by the officers, complaining of ill usage from the state and refusing to march until affairs were placed on a more satisfactory basis. Steuben represented to General John P. Muhlenberg and Colonels Greene and Harrison the serious consequences of this proceeding, and by their in- fluence the complaint was withdrawn. Proper equipment was provided, and on December 14 the detachment, con- sisting of 456 men, started to reinforce Greene. Steuben edeavored to continue the policy previously indicated of sending forth regular troops to Greene as fast as their places could be filled with new recruits. But the matter of equipment as well as discipline was ever pressing. The remainder of Muhlenberg's corps was ordered to Petersburg, and Colonel William Davies sent to Chesterfield, a few miles distant, to establish recruit- ing headquarters. As soon as two hundred were col- lected they were formed in companies of fifty to be sent to the army. General Greene had already complained of the condi- tion of the Virginia troops under his command, which, according to his statement, were literally naked, dirty and deficient in discipline, and gave notice that no more would be received in that condition. He also urged, what Steuben had before suggested, the formation of provision magazines upon the Roanoke. He tells Steu- ben to "Use every argument you can to convince the Assembly of the necessity of clothing their troops. If they mean they shall render any service, or do not wish 198 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN [them] to fall a sacrifice to death, desertion and disease, I beg them to give their men good covering, for without it this will be their portion." On December 8 Steuben wrote to Washington de- tailing the difficulties with which he had to contend, but a repetition would be monotonously uninteresting. As a simple illustration the Lawson Corps, previously men- tioned, had been created at great expense. But the en- listment was only for six months, and by the time the men were brought together their terms were so nearly expired that it was not worth while to send them to the front. Consequently they disbanded without having ren- dered any service whatever. The year was now closing, and little had been ac- complished, but late in December the Assembly directed the enlistment of 3,000 men for the war or a draft for eighteen months. Steuben considered this force too small, but, according to his usual custom, concluded to make the best of it, and at once prepared plans for a gen- eral rendezvous at Chesterfield, with sub-stations at other points. The number of recruits assembled at Chesterfield does not seem to have exceeded six hundred, and, even for this small number, it was difficult to get supplies. While the winter climate was materially milder here than in the northern states, it was sufficiently severe to cause considerable suffering among the poorly-clad troops, who were without blankets or sufficient clothing to cover their nakedness. A letter from Colonel Davies to Steuben, dated December 31, says: "Shoes and blankets, and, in- deed, almost every ki nd of clothing, are universally wanting. I think not more than one hundred and fifty can take the field as at present clad, but with clothing I think four hundred might march. Indians are not more SHIFTING OF THE CONFLICT 199 naked, nor half so miserable. We have seventy good tents, but we have not, nor have I have been able to get, notwithstanding my frequent applications, any cords to make loops with." Some blankets had, indeed, been collected, but they were monopolized by Lawson's Corps, which did not need them, as it was disolved, and it is presumed that his men carried the blankets home. There was also woeful lack of dicipline, officers without men, and men without officers. Those in charge of the sub-stations told the same story, and we seem to approach the grotesque when Colonel Davies asks for a couple of whips and hand saws to replace some borrowed ones which they had been compelled to return.. The little hospital was over- crowded, and three men died in their tents for lack of proper care and surroundings. This condition led to thievery, and, in one instance, at least a store was broken open and valuable articles taken. Steuben was unwell at this time, but worked with- out ceasing to remedy the situation, intending as soon as he had matters in proper shape to join Greene in the Carolinas. Greene himself was anxious for this, and, on December 28, wrote to Steuben that he was "without a single general officer with me in this camp, except Gen- eral Huger, who is a brigadier for this state, and not desirous of commanding other troops ; it is my wish you should come forward as soon as you have made the neces- sary arrangements on the Virginia line. We are now in a camp of repose, and, could we get clothing, we might im- prove our discipline. Your aid in this and many other matters will be essential, both to me and the service." This desire on the part of both generals was never carried out. A new condition of affairs soon arose in Vir- ginia, which, as well as Greene's movements in the 200 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN South, permanantenly separated the two commanders. Steuben was now to have his hands more than full in the direction of events that finally led to the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown and the ending of the war. CHAPTER XIII. ARNOLD'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. Invasion of the State Via James River — Capture of Richmond — Steuben's Efforts to Save the Dominion Without Men or Supplies — Arnold Retreats and is Besieged at Portsmouth — Virginia's Loyalty to the Patriot Cause—-Still Aiding Greene During previous years of the war Virginia, es- pecially along the coast, had not escaped the raids which had harrowed the people of the South. The brutal de- struction by Matthews, in May, 1779, and the attempt by Leslie, in 1780, when Portsmouth was the principal sufferer, were still fresh in the memories of the people. Now there was a more serious danger at hand. Benedict Arnold, zealous to justify himself in the minds of his new allies, and glut his revenge on those with whom he had been formerly associated, was placed at the head of an expedition to Virginia. Clinton, no doubt, de- spairing of dividing the northern section of the Con- federacy by capturing the posts on the Hudson, natur- ally turned his eyes southward, where events had pro- vided an active theatre of operations. Virginia was the oldest and richest and most populous of the provinces. Destroy her resources, and the Southern patriots would be paralyzed and the Northerners discouraged. With all the territory south of the Potomac reduced to subjection it would be impossible for Washington and his army to carry on the war much longer. In fact, the year had scarcely closed when a mutiny of Pennsylvania troops, on account of their miserable condition, threatened the most serious consequences, and the outbreak was only suppressed by the exercise of the most tactful conduct, mingled with firmness. 202 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN Moved by these considerations, Clinton, in De- cember, 1780, dispatched Arnold to Virginia with a com- pany of ships carrying 1,600 men. The fleet was dis- covered off Willoughby Point, the site of the Jamestown Exhibition of 1907, on December 31, and two days later it was in the James River. The wretched condition of affairs at that time can scarcely be imagined. Every available recruit had been sent southward to Greene, and the few companies of militia which had been organized were worse than useless. It appeared as though all the invader had to do was to march through the country, at wil, burning, destroying and killing as he went. Steuben was the only regular army general in the state, and to him the panic-stricken people unconsciously turned. The campaign which followed was remarkable in more ways than one. That Steuben, by his Herculean efforts, saved the state from destruction there is little doubt ; that with an inferior force he impeded the opera- tions of the enemy to such an extent as to nullify largely the object of the expedition, and was on the point of complete victory, when superseded by Lafayette, is made very clear by Mr. Kapp, whose collection and presentation of official papers bearing on this part of the war make a valuable contribution to American history. Here was a campaign of two months' duration, which, in interest, at least, was equal to several others of the war, although not so dramatic in the way of battles, which seems to have largely escaped the attention of other historians. Ban- croft devotes twelve lines to it, and Fiske an equal num- ber, most of which are taken up by an anecdote concern- ing Arnold's conversation with a prisoner. Of course, this field was quite a distance from New England, but a pow- erful glass, if not inverted, might have shown that con- siderable action was going on down there. ARNOLD'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN 203 Irving, in his "Life of Washington," gives a satis- factory, though brief outline, of this campaign, and in the official reports of Steuben and other papers already re- ferred to, we have a pretty full account of this crucial period of the war. The Baron's first report was made to Greene on January 8, in which he says : "On the 31st of December the Governor informed me of a fleet of twenty-seven sail having arrived at Wil- loughby point, in consequence of which I immediately dis- patched Colonel Senf and Captain Fairlie down to the south side to procure intelligence of their strength and destination, and General Nelson was sent the same day — down the north side — to act as circumstances might re- quire. Notwithstanding these precautions, we did not receive the least intelligence till the 2d of January, when the Governor informed me that nineteen ships, two brigs and ten sloops and schooners were in Warrasquiack Bay, and were getting under way to proceed up the (James) river, and that their destination was Petersburg. I di- rectly waited on the Governor and Council, and requested four thousand militia might be called out, estimating the enemy's force at two thousand five hundred. "The distressed situation of the Continental troops at Chesterfield Court House would only permit one hun- dred and fifty of them to be ordered out. These I formed into a battalion and sent to Petersburg to cover the pub- lic stores, and at the same time sent Colonel Carrington there to remove them. I also took proper measures for the removal of the stores and hospital from Chesterfield in case the enemy should move that way. "The next day, on the 3d of January, we were ad- vised of the enemy's arrival at Williamsburg, where Gen- eral Nelson had collected about one hundred and fifty 204 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN militia. Here a flag was sent, to which General Nelson returned a verbal answer — that he would defend the town. They landed a few troops at Jamestown, but re- embarked them immediately up the river. At midnight their foremost vessel passed Hood's, where we had a bat- tery of two iron ten-pounders and a brass howitzer. Three shots were fired, two of which struck the vessel, on which the rest of the fleet brought to. A party landing below, the militia, about ninety, evacuated the battery, and the cannon and howitzer fell into their hands. They burnt the carriages of the guns and carried off the how- itzer. "The 4th, in the morning, we received intelligence that the fleet lay at Westover (twenty-five miles below Richmond), and were preparing to disembark. It was then evident their object was Richmond, and orders were immediately given for the removal of the public stores. As the enemy had twenty-five miles to march before they reached the town, I was in hopes a force would collect sufficient at least to check their progress, but, to my sur- prise, about one hundred men were all that could be as- sembled. These I sent down under command of Major Dick, a state officer, to whom I gave orders to harass the enemy by firing at them from every favorable piece of ground. These orders were, however, badly executed. The enemy moved that evening to Four Mile Creek, where they encamped about eleven o'clock. "What few Continental stores were in town I sent to Westham (six miles up the river), having previously ordered Major Claiborne up the river to collect boats there to transport them across. I also ordered the one hundred and fifty Continental troops to march from Petersburg and take a position opposite Westham, and, Colonel Davies, having sent all the stores and the hos- ARNOLD'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN 205 pital from Chesterfield, was ordered to the same place with the remainder of his naked troops. The state stores, of which there were great quantities in town, were under the direction of Colonel M., by whose inactivity and downright negligence a great part was lost. Of their artillery I secured, myself, five pieces which were mounted, the rest, consisting of three brass and a great number of iron pieces, fell into the enemy's hands. Not a single man, except those I sent out, undertook to op- pose the approach of the enemy. I thought it prudent to cross the river in the evening and took my quarters in Manchester (opposite Richmond), and the next day, about twelve o'clock, the enemy took possession of the town, havivng marched twenty-five miles with eight hun- dred and fifty men and about thirty horses, without re- ceiving a single shot. They left about half their force in town and proceeded immediately with the rest to West- ham, where they burnt all the public buildings, consist- ing of a foundry, with a boring mill, powder magazine and some small shops, and returned to Richmond the same evening. The Continental stores had all been sent across the river, and some of the state stores. What part was left I have not yet learned. About three hundred militia had arrived at Westham on their way down, and arms were actualy recrossing for them, but hearing of the enemy's approach, and, ,being unarmed, they dis- persed. "The next morning I ordered the battalion of Con- tinental troops, to which I had attached two of the state pieces of artillery, to Manchester (opposite Richmond), where there were about two hundred militia collected. With these I intended to oppose any attempts they might make to cross. They, however, did not attempt it, but about eleven o'clock began to set fire to the public build- 206 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN ings, and before one o'clock had entirely gutted the town (Richmond). They burnt a rope walk, the public work shops and two or three public stores. Two of the in- habitants came out with propositions from Arnold to pay for half of the tobacco on their giving hostage for the delivery of the whole to vessels he should send for it. The Governor refused to agree to it, and as they did not come out as a flag, I refused their return. The tobacco, however, was left unhurt." One of Arnold's objects was to capture Governor Jefferson at Richmond, but Jefferson left the city the preceding night on horseback for Tuckahoe, a village some fifteen miles northwest of the capital, where his family was staying, desiring to remove them to a point more distant from the marauders. This having been ac- complished he came down to Manchester the next day in time to witness the entry of Arnold's troops into Rich- mond. The town had been abandoned by most of the citizens, who, from the surrounding hilltops, witnessed the devastation of their homes. There seem to have been a couple of hundred militia in the place, who also retreated to the hills after firing a few volleys. The de- tachment which committed the destruction at Westham was under command of Colonel Simcoe, after whom one of the Canadian lakes, now a summer resort, was named. Steuben thus proceeds with his account: "The enemy marched that night to their former position at Four Mile Creek, where they encamped, and yesterday got to Westover. On their return great ex- cesses were committed by straggling parties. As there were great quantities of grain and flour at the mills near Warwick, I marched my little force on the 6th in the even- ing to that place. Yesterday I advanced to Osborn's, and this day I arived here at Petersburg. I find about four ARNOLD'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN 207 hundred and fifty militia here under Colonel Gibson, whom I had ordered to take the command in the absence of Generals Muhlenberg and Weedon. On the first inti- mation of the enemy's approach I wrote these gentlemen, but have heard nothing from them. The public stores, of which great quantities were in this town, were all re- moved by the great exertions of Colonel Carrington and Colonel Gibson. Yesterday General Smallwood arrived here, and has been so obliging as to stop and afford us his assistance. Some vessels of the enemy were sent up this river (the Appomattox) to take or destroy some merchant vessels lying there, but by the disposition Gen- eral Smallwood made with some ships, guns and the militia, they were obliged to abandon the enterprise. General Nelson, during all this time, was on the other side of the river. On the 3d he was twelve miles above Williamsburg with one hundred and seventy-five men; the next day he moved four miles higher, and wrote me from Long Bridge, on Chickahominy, that the enemy were moving down to their shipping, and that the rain the preceding night had incapacitated his men for im- mediate service. In fact, the enemy returned as they went, without a single shot, and have lain quietly at West- over in a scattered manner all this day. "As the stores were all removed hence and a con- siderable force of militia collected, I do not imagine the enemy will attack this place. I have some hopes of being able to annoy them from Hood's on their return. The river there is very narrow, but we have yet no guns. I have sent to have those we have there remounted and shall march there myself with all the militia I can arm, so soon as I hear the enemy are moving down. The greatest distress we now feel is want of arms ; the great part of those belonging to the state were damaged by 208 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN the militia during the late invasion, or were scattered at different places and never collected or repaired. Those at Richmond were, on the enemy's approach, sent off in such disorder that part of them are not yet found. The militia are coming in, and no arms to put in their hands, while, on the other side, General Nelson has one thousand five hundred stand and only five hundred men/' By the 11th Steuben had moved his headquarters to near Hood's, on the James river, from where he con- tinues his report of operations, as follows: "The enemy lying still at Westover on the 9th, and some vessels which had lain at the mouth of the Ap- pomattox, dropping down that day to their fleet, I thought it evident they had no design against Petersburg, and therefore ordered the few militia who were assembled there to march to Prince George Court House, and went there myself, that I might be more at hand to prepare against any movement of the enemy. The 10th, in the morning, I was informed they were embarking their troops, and on reconnoitering them myself from Coggin's Point, I found their embarkation completed, and the ves- sels preparing to sail. "It had been found impracticable to remount the canon at Hood's, or to prepare any obstruction to their passing that place. Of this, however, the enemy were ignorant, and, thinking it very probable they would land a party to examine these works before they attempted to pass, I ordered three hundred infantry and about thirty horse, under Colonel Clark (George Rogers) to lie in ambush to receive them. About twelve o'clock the fleet got under way, and at four o'clock I saw them, from Hood's, come to within cannon shot. At dark they landed troops for eighteen boats — deserters, say five hun- dred — who immediately attacked a small picket we had M some v«mcI» wh»rh h*<^ m* ther< there to mar there myself, th against any movement riing, I was informed they were on reconnoitering them myself lj mpletedj ignor a pa to pa horse, undci ambush got under w >d's, cor thin cannoi landed trooj een boats dred — who imr y attacked ; 1 1 1 WIS HANOVE COURT HOUSE, VA., ERECTED 17 10. m wniriii'ii riii'i'fii v.\ '■?:"■-&■. HANOVER COURT HOUSE. VA., ERECTED 174 0. BLANDFORD C'TICIJCil. \ A. ARNOLD'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN 209 and pursued them to within forty paces of the ambuscade, when our troops gave them a fire, but on returning it and charging bayonets, the militia immediately fled/' After throwing the cannon into the river the enemy re- turned to their ships, which at daylight were five miles below. I ordered three hundred infantry and two troops of horse down to Cabin Point, and encamped with the remainder — about five hundred men at this place. As an attempt might be made at Williamsburg, and as Gen- eral Nelson had only four hundred men, I ordered five hundred and sixty militia, who were on their way to join me, to cross the river and reinforce him. "The next great object for the enemy being Hunt- er's works and the stores at Fredericksburg, I wrote the Governor to countermand the militia from that quarter. General Weedon had already advanced with about three hundred and fifty as far as Hanover Court House before he received the Governor's letter. It is left with him to return or not, according as he, from the knowledge of the force that can be collected, may think necessary. I cannot yet form any judgment of the future operations of the enemy. Should they mean to pillage Williams- burg, Nelson's corps may harass, but cannot prevent them. If they take possession of Norfolk I shall collect what force is necessary and endeavor to keep them in check, or if they should go into the Potomac, I shall im- mediately march to form a junction with the militia under General Weedon and cover Fredericksburg. "The militia are coming in from all quarters, but with- out arms, for which they apply to me. I have delivered about five hundred we had belonging to the Continentals. Those of the state were so scattered in removing them on the alarm that their officers cannot collect them again. The troops have neither tents nor camp kettles. It is im- 210 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN possible to describe the situation I am in — in want of everything, and nothing can be got from the state — rather from want of arangement than anything else." In a few days Steuben made another report to the Board of War, and we cannot do better than to follow his detail of succeeding operations : "The enemy having passed Hood's on the 13th, I marched with seven hundred militia to Cabin Point. The Continental troops, being too naked to keep the field, were sent back to Chesterfield Court House. On the 14th the enemy landed at Hardy's Ferry, twenty-two miles below Cabin Point, and began their march towards Smithfield. Supposing Colonel Parker, with the militia of the lower counties, would opose them in front, I de- tailed Major Willis with three hundred infantry and fifty horses to harass their rear. My orders were badly exe- cuted, and the enemy entered Smithfield on the 15th with- out opposition. Having that day received a reinforce- ment of four hundred men, I immediately detached them, under General Lawson, with orders to march towards Smithfield, and act in conjunction with Colonel Parker, who, I supposed, had retired towards Suffolk. On Gen- eral Lawson's approach the enemy crossed Nansimond river at Sleepy Hole and encamped on the opposite bank, and General Lawson, being joined by the roops under Colonel Parker, occupied Smithfield. The 19th the enemy marched to Portsmouth, where Arnold established himself, and their vessels fell down to Hampton Roads." Arnold had made his raid, and while the history of the preceding three weeks had not made a pleasant chap- ter for the patriots, it was scarcely more so to the British. Considerable property had been destroyed, the forces op- posed had not been effective in repelling them, and along the river from its mouth to the head of navigation at ARNOLD'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN 211 Richmond they had operated pretty much as they pleased. But in one important respect the expedition was a lament- able failure. In New England, the Middle States and in the farther South, wherever the British arms advanced they found a strong Tory sentiment which was of great aid in facilitating the work of the regular troops, but in Virginia it was either non-existent or so small as to be of little or no practical significance. The Virginians may have displayed mismanagement in defending their own firesides, but they had no intention of giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Colonel Meade, writing to Alex- ander Hamilton, begs leave to "Observe in justice to the people at large, that there are fewer disaffected by far in his state than any other in the Union, and that the people turn out with the utmost cheerfulness. The misfortune on the present invasion was, that in the confusion, arms were sent everywhere, and no timely plans laid to put them into the hands of the men who were assembling. The Baron has no doubt given the General the particu- lars of the whole affair. He can hardly be himself and say anything on the subject that ought not to be credited." Of course, the greate rpart of the state was left un- touched by Arnold. He never trusted his troops at any great distance from his ships, and Steuben's manceuving, for, like Washington in 1778-9, he could do but little more, confined the raided territory within very narrow limits. As an illustration of the deficiencies, even in minor details, General Nelson, having a message to send from Williamsburg, apologized for transmitting it verb- ally, as he had no pen or ink. Governor Jefferson co- operated with Steuben to the extent of his power, and bore willing testimony to the General's merits. In a letter to Washington he declared that the Baron's vigilance had in a great measure supplied the want of force in prevent- 212 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN ing the enemy from crossing the river, which might have been very fatal, and that he had been assiduously em- ployed in preparing for the militia, as they should assem- ble, pointing them to a proper object, and other offices of a good commander. James Lovell also wrote to Steuben on the 22d, saying : "I am still unable to promise you a supply of arms and clothing. But I cannot refrain from expressing to you by this opportunity how much I am affected with pleasure by any occurrence which re- dounds to your glory. The Governor of Virginia men- tions very honorably your conduct with a small body of militia, of which you have condescended to take the com- mand, while a traitorous villain was striving to make ex- tensive ravage on James river. I would to God you were at the head of a body suitably equipped to execute the directions which your great military knowledge enables you to give whenever you are in a field of action. I re- gret much the mortification which I know your warm zeal in our cause must have met with from your inequality of men, artillery, and, in short, every means of giving a final blow to Arnold's schemes. I regret more that you have no prospect but the continuance of such disadvan- tages." So long as Arnold's ships had command of the sea it was impossible to capture or starve him out. He might be forced to disembark, but to do this would require a stronger and better trained army than was at hand. He might be shut off on the land side from making further raids, and this Steuben proposed to do. He established his headquarters at Smithfield, about twenty-five miles northwest of Portsmouth, while Colonel Parker, General Lawson and General Muhlenberg had detachments at various points, making a semi-circle a few miles outside of Portsmouth. General Nelson was stationed at Wil- ARNOLD'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN 213 liamsburg with a thousand infantry and some cavalry to watch that section. With all this on his hands, Steuben did not forget Greene, and as soon as he had Arnold safely cooped up in Portsmouth, he again turned his attention to raising troops for the Southern general. But if the process was slow when the people were not excited over invasion, it can be imagined what the situation was with the enemy within their gates. It was natural that there should be objection to raising and equipping troops to be sent per- haps hundreds of miles away when they could not rid themselves of the invader who had harassed their own territory, and was liable to repeat the operation. They were unable to see that the whole was greater than any one of the parts, and indifference developed into a hos- tility which threatened to bring Steuben into conflict not only with the people but with the state authorities. Just when a soldier ceased to be a militiaman and became a Continental was not always clearly defined, and contro- versies arose as to liability for expenditures. The Baron naturally looked at everything from a national stand- point, and could not understand why the interests or de- sires of a state should interfere with those of the country at large, while among the people the national idea had scarcely gained a foothold. Neither Jefferson nor his followers had yet realized that there cannot be two heads to military movements, and the following from the Gov- ernor to Steuben undoubtedly voiced the sentiment of the former's partisans: "We did not think proper to resign ourselves and our country too implicitly to your demands, and thought we had some right of judgment left to ourselves. We can only be answerable for the orders we give, and not for their execution. If they are disobeyed from obstinacy 214 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN of spirit or want of coercion in the laws it is not our fault. We can only endeavor to engage the willing. The Ex- ecutive has not by the laws of this state any power to call a freeman to labor even for the public good without his consent, nor a slave without that of his master." This epistle was in answer to a criticism by Steuben upon the lack of support given by the state authorities during the late invasion. Efforts to raise the three thousand militia provided by law continued during February, but recruits came very slowly. By the 12 th four hundred men had been collected at Chesterfield, which was doing comparatively well under the circumstances. In one instance, where a man brought his son, a mere boy, to take his father's place, the Baron promptly sent the youth home and placed the father in the ranks. The troops started south, but had only gone a short distance when the father was tacitly allowed to desert. Wholesale desertions of militia were not uncommon ; in fact, their enlistment frequently seemed like pouring water into a sieve. Even the state authori- ties did not always keep faith with the men. For in- stance, they would bargain with a man for 6,000 or 7,000 pounds (Continental money), pay him 1,000 or 1,500, and promise the remainder in two or three months. They fail to pay, and the soldier deserts, thus relieving the com- munity from payment of the balance; at the same time it received credit for a recruit furnished. In short, the state had no money, provisions or credit. During the late civil war there was considerable talk concerning shoddy contractors who furnished inferior materials to the army. They had their prototypes in the Revolution. To cite a few instances, 1,495 yards of cloth which the Governor estimated would make 400 suits made only 350 coats, as the cloth was only half the guar- ARNOLD'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN 215 anteed widths. One day's use wore out the shoes. That the petty officers were dishonest under such circum- stances and took advantage of the general demoralization to enrich themselves is not surprising. To prevent the enormous waste which was going on Steuben, on April 10, filed an order prohibiting the issue of more than a three days' supply of provisions at one time without a special order from the commanding gen- eral or field officers. That Greene appreciated Steuben's difficulties as well as the help afforded in spite of them is shown by a letter of February 3, in which he says : To your address and industry. I feel myself principally in- debted for what is coming. Whatever misfortune may happen for want of force it is no fault of ours. The Southern States are in such a defenceless condition that they must fall under the dominion of the enemy unless reinforcements are imme- diately sent from the northward. Such destruction of public stores is enough to ruin a nation. These are some of the happy effects of defending the country with militia, from which "Good Lord deliver us!" O. that we had in the field., as Henry V. said, some few of the many thousands that are idle at home. Probably in reply to this letter, Steuben wrote to Greene, on February 17, that a thousand militia had been ordered to join him immediately from five counties named, and that he was trying to dispatch four or five hundred men from Chesterfield. In order to meet Greene's needs the Baron aranged with Jefferson to send militia from Augusta, Rockingham and Shenandoah counties, but none could be found to take their places and they refused to leave their homes, so the project was abandoned. Augusta was the frontier county, and in- cluded what is now Western Pennsylvania. Efforts were also made to secure recruits from Delaware and Mary- land, but nothing was accomplished. Campbell's detach- ment got away on February 25, and four hundred under Colonel Greene from Chesterfield. Third, fourth and 216 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN fifth detachments were promised on April 1, April 15 and May 1, but they were not sent. Virginia appeared to be a squeezed lemon so far as sending more troops south- ward was concerned, and, besides, there was soon to be another shifting of action in respect to the war that was to make a most radical change in every direction, both in the personnel of the actors in Virginia and in their operations. CHAPTER XIV. GREENE AND STEUBEN. Their Operations in the Carolinas and Virginia — Victories and Good Generalship Recover the Carolinas — Arnold Bottled Up in Portsmouth and Cornwallis in Wilmington — Arnold Save Through Refusal of the French Commander to Co- operated — Arrival of Lafayette — Steuben Still Has the Bur- den — Second Foray Up the James — Capture of Petersburg and Richmond. It may help us to a better understanding of subse- quent events in Virginia if we leave that state for a short time and follow Greene in his operations. The Southern Army, notwithstanding some small victories by indepen- dent partisan bands, had not recovered from the demorali- zation caused by the defeat of Gates. Greene's entire force, about two thousand strong, was less than two- thirds that of Cornwallis, while its efficiency, through lack of supplies and discipline, had been reduced almost to the vanishing point. But in addition to his own ability Greene had with him subordinate officers of exceptional bravery and genius. Sumter, Marion and Morgan, with their little bands, had prevented the fire of patriotism from being utterly extinguished and now, in addition, were Kosciusko, the Hungarian patriot; Henry Lee, the famous lighthouse cavalryman, and Lieutenant-Colonel Washington, a distant relative of the commander-in- chief. There was here an assemblage of brains and brav- ery which went far to offset the disparity of strength between the two armies. It was, of course, Greene's policy to avoid a general engagement until he could put his army in better condition and receive the expected re- inforcements from Virginia. In the meantime he divided 218 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN his force into two sections, taking the larger part, about one thousand one hundred strong, to Cheraw Hill, South Carolina, from which point Lee and Marion threatened to cut off the communications of Cornwallis with the coast, while to the west were Morgan and Washington, with the aid of the militia, threatening the inland posts held by the British. Cornwallis now had a hostile army on both flanks. If he moved on Greene the interior posts were in danger, while if he went the other way Greene would go to Charleston and effectually cut him off from the sea. His only other course was to move northward into North Carolina, which he did with two thousand men, leaving one thousand one hundred under Tarleton to look after Morgan. In these movements both parties seemed to defy the elementary rules of modern warfare. Keep your own force together and beat the enemy in detail was a military axiom never violated without peril, but here both sides were doing this to the fullest extent. On January 7 Tarleton and Morgan met at the Cowpens (a name given to a general cattle coral in the grazing district), and Tarleton was completely routed. The British lost two hundred and thirty killed and wounded and six hundred prisoners, while the remaining two hundred and seventy were so scattered and demor- alized as to be utterly useless as an army. Morgan, by a forced march, now rejoined Greene, and the whole army moved northward, with Cornwallis following. It was Greene's plan to draw his opponent as far as possible from his base, and the plan succeeded admirably. On February 9 he reached Guilford Court House, North Carolina, about thirty miles south of the Virginia border, and there he determined to await Cornwallis, in the mean- time urging Steuben to hurry forward the promised re- inforcements. But, as we have seen, although Steuben GREENE AND STEUBEN 219 now had Arnold practically shut up in Portsmouth, yet it was impossible to furflll Greene's expectations. Never- theless the latter, by good generalship, managed to keep Cornwallis at bay until March 15. By that time all the troops which Steuben could send from Virginia had ar- rived, and these, with accessions from other quarters, brought the army up to four thousand four hundred and four men, while Cornwallis had been reduced to two thousand two hundred and thirteen; all, however, hard- ened veterans, while fully half of Greene's was made up of raw recruits. A battle opened here in the morning and continued all day with varying fortune, but in the evening Cornwallis secured possession of a hill from which it was impossible to dislodge him. He held the hill for a couple of days, and then retreated to Wilmington, the nearest seaport, having lost over one-fourth of his army and throwing open the southern provinces to Greene, who did not hesitate to take advantage of the situation. Leaving Cornwallis to figure out what he should do next he returned directly south on April 6, and within three months had reduced nearly every British post in South Carolina, and the victory at Eutaw Springs on September 8 shut the remnant of the British army up in Charleston, while the state government resumed its usual functions. This ended the war in the far South so far as large military operations were concerned. The British still held Charleston and Savannah, but the three states of North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia were now practically under American control and re- mained so until the close of the war. We can now return to Virginia, where events had been moving so rapidly that the Old Dominion by this time occupied the centre of the stage. During the month of February Muhlenberg, under Steuben's direction, con- 220 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN tinued to watch Arnold in Portsmouth much as a cat does a mouse which it cannot reach, but which it is ready to pounce upon should it attempt to come out of its shel- ter. Unfortunately the shelter in this case had a back door, namely the water, over which the mouse could es- cape if the situation should become desperate. On the 16th, however, three French war vessels were discerned at the mouth of James river, supposed to be the advance guard of a large fleet. Surely the mouse was now trapped, and Nelson wrote at once to Steuben, "What you expected has taken place. I give you joy with all my soul. Now is our time; not a moment ought to be lost!" The rejoicing, however, was premature. The three vessels had left the main fleet off Rhode Island and were making a cruise from New York to Charleston. But it was hoped by Steuben that there was sufficient force to accomplish his purpose, and he sent Captain Duponceau to arrange with the French commander, De Tilly, for the movement on Portsmmouth. At first it seemed as though the project would be carried out. General Gregory was ordered to collect a force along Dismal Swamp, which began at Portsmouth, and be in readiness to move at Steuben's direction, and an express service was estab- lished between his camp and Suffolk, county seat of Isle of Wight County, by means of which orders could be transmitted in a few hours. General Muhlenberg ad- vanced from Suffolk to within sixteen miles of Ports- mouth, and General Nelson, at Williamsburg, was or- dered to hold himself in readiness to march as soon as needed. Williamsburg was to be covered by General Weedon's corps, which would come from Fredericksburg, and guard a battery at Newport News, which was erected to protect the French fleet should it be compelled GREENE AND STEUBEN 221 to retire to York river. There were six or seven armed merchant vessels in the James river which were expected to be used as auxiliaries to the fleet. Boats were col- lected to transport troops and munitions across the river, among the latter there being eight eighteen-pound cannon and two mortars. The militia were so encouraged by the situation that General Muhlenberg advanced towards Portsmouth and surprised a picket guard, and, after a skirmish, in which two men were killed, captured a ser- geant, twelve privates, a wagon and two horses. He was now within a mile and a-half of the town, and every- thing promised a speedy capture. But the best laid plan of men, if not mice, gang aft a glee, as was now discov- ered. The French commander refused to go up the Eliza- beth river, which was virtually a part of the bay, where Arnold had anchored his vessels, on the plea that it was unsafe, and stated that he proposed to leave as soon as the wind permitted. The golden opportunity of captur- ing Arnold, something specially desired by Washington, was needlessly thrown away. The disappointment of officers and men who were thus balked of their prey was very keen, and it was not surprising that many de- nounced the French alliance which so far had not ex- hibited a single tangible result, although, as we have shown, the indirect benefit was very great. In the meantime Washington, no doubt without de- tailed knowledge of the fact that Steuben had Arnold practically in his power, and could beyond doubt have captured him with his entire force had there been proper co-operation on the part of the French commander, de- cided to make a move which would relieve Virginia of this invasion, and for that purpose proposed to utilize the main body of the French fleet and a portion of the land forces which were still lying idle at Newport. Ad- 222 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN mirai Destouches agreed to sail for the Chesapeake to blockade Arnold, and carried with him a corps of one thousand one hundred and twenty French infantry de- tached from Rochambeau's force. At the same time a corps of twelve hundred light infantry with some artil- lery was detached from the American force around New York and sent over land in charge of General Lafayette, who was expected to reach Virginia in time to co-operate with the French fleet in the capture of Portsmouth. Washington on February 20 notified Steuben of the pro- posed expedition, urging him to make such arrangements with respect to the militia and supplies and take such position as he judged would be most conducive to the success of the enterprise. Lafayette was instructed to open a correspondence with Steuben, informing the latter of his approach, and requesting him to have a sufficient body of militia ready to act in conjunction with the new arrivals. Washington's parting injunction was that should Arnold be captured he was not to be treated as an ordinary prisoner of war, but summarily executed. La- fayette on February 24 wrote to Steuben from Morris- town, declaring that "nothing will be wanting to hurry the detachment, which you will find to be an excellent body of troops. I hope the French ships will strictly blockade Mr. Arnold, and as your position will no doubt exclude the possibility of his taking any advantage by land, I hope we may, before long, give a good account of him. Should he by chance make any proposition, no communication ought to be held with him that might countenance any pretension to his being a prisoner of war." Lafayette and his force marched south, and on his arriving at the Head of Elk, which is about forty miles northeast of Baltimore, at the upper end of Chesapeake GREENE AND STEUBEN 223 Bay, on March 3d, he wrote to General Muhlen- berg: "In all cases I am to request you that no communi- cation be held with Arnold that may in any way give him the least claim to the advantages of a prisoner of war." From all of which it appears that the capture of Arnold was looked upon as the principal object of the expedition. As may be supposed, Steuben did not look on this new movement with any great degree of satisfaction. In the face of tremendous difficulties and mainly with the help of untrained militia, he had forced Arnold into Portsmouth, which with the co-operation of a suitable naval force he felt sure of capturing. The mouse had been almost within his grasp, and had it not been for the refusal of the French naval commander to blockade the mouth of the river the British must surely have surren- dered. Now when he had matters in better shape than ever, with the French fleet almost in sight, he could bring the campaign to an end with advantage to the country and credit to himself. In a letter to Greene, dated March 3, he thus expresses himself: Tomorrow I set out for Williamsburg to finish my prepara- tions for the arrival of the marquis and fleet. I have com- municated to him the plan of operation I should have followed had the fleet been here to assist me. I think the same plan, with very little alterations should now be adopted. I flatter myself that a marquis and minus six hundred troops that are coming, it would have been in my power to have delivered to you Mr. Arnold, but this honor is reserved for another. But do not thjnk, my dear general, that this idea, however mortify- ing, will in the least relax my zeal in the affair; on the con- trary, I hope the marquis will find everything prepared for his arrival. The Baron was not one to sulk in his tent when there was a duty to be performed, and he went vigorously to work collecting supplies for the coming of Lafayette, boats, horses and provisions, with the usual scarcity of 224 GENERAL WILLIAM VON STEUBEN everything that was needed. Muhlenberg had only eight rounds of ammunition and provisions for four days, so that had the promised reinforcement from the state ar- rived, it would doubtless have been of little use. Steuben had declared that the fortifications of Portsmouth could be taken sword in hand, but this idea was based on the expectation of having the "swords" to do it with, which in this case meant ammunition, etc. As stated, Lafayette arived with his troops at Elk Head on March 3, from which point they were trans- ferred to Annapolis by water. As it would be useless to move the troops to Portsmouth until the arrival of the fleet, Lafayette took an open boat down the Chesapeake bay to arrange with Steuben for a convoy and other necessaries. He found the latter at Yorktown on the 14th, full of business and expecting the co-operation of five thousand militia. Lafayette wrote to Washington the next day, giving a summary of the situation, con- cluding, "In your first letter to the Baron, I wish, my dear General, you would write to him that I have been much satisfied with his preparations. I want to please him, and harmony shall be my first object." We have already seen, however, that the expected resources were largely on paper, although the ultimate failure of the expedition cannot be charged to this cause. The French fleet was already due, but there was no sign of it. While waiting Lafayette went down to Muhlen- berg's camp at Suffolk on the 19th, and while there had a light skirmish with the enemy. But Steuben never re- laxed his operations ; Arnold's outposts were attcked and all communication with the country was cut off. His capture was regarded as a certainty, and when, on the 20th, a large fleet was seen entering the bay there was jubilation among the Americans. The fleet came in GREENE AND STEUBEN 225 slowly, and it was not until the 23d that the colors on the vessels were discovered to be British and not French. Admiral Arbuthnot had followed D'Estouches down the coast, and had engaged the latter sixty miles off the en- trance of Chesapeake bay. The result appeared to be a drawn battle, but the French admiral turned back to Newport to repair damages, a most fatal procedure for the Americans, while the British proceeded to Ports- mouth for the same purpose, a situation which could not have been more favorable to Arnold. Lafayette, who seems to have construed his orders to limit his Southern operations simply to the capture of Arnold, as soon as he learned the new situation of affairs, returned to Annapolis, from where he transported his army back to Elk Head, with the intention of again join- ing Washington in the North. By this time the British force in Virginia was greatly augmented, and Clinton had sent General Phil- lips with two thousand men to relieve Arnold. The latter was subsequently sent back to New York, and Phillips was now in command at Portsmouth with about three thousand five hundred troops. Steuben's force was not able to confine this army inside of Portsmouth, and it was evident that Virginia was to suffer yet more largely from the ravages of war. But notwithstanding Steuben went to work with the object of at least saving the stores and supplies which had been collected at various points if he could not check the enemy. The next day after the arrival of Phillips he ordered Muhlenberg to concentrate all his troops at one point, which it would be impossible to do after Phillips had begun to move. Colonel Parker, who had a difficult journey across Dismal Swamp, suc- ceeded in uniting with the main force, so that by April 3 he was able to report to Steuben that in his judgment ZU GENEMlil WILUAM -VO^ $f©UBEN hi& divisio^ locked near Suffolk, was in the best po&itiotf either' 'io ^prevent the enemy from making- htfstile^ek^ Cursions Untoi-the country or to keep pace witfr H fheffi should they move up James river, which was anticipated? But desertions] soon crippled his force to suck an e&tem! as ttfc 'endknger i the i safety of -his command;- %M • he v wa& forcedtoretire farther back into the country: : qv/»W It may fe' remarked here that while • Lafayette was in camp Steufeh had formulated a 'plan fo¥ !