/- 
 
 M C CLELLAFS MILITARY CAREER 
 
 REVIEWED AND EXPOSED: 
 
 THE 
 
 MILITARY POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION 
 
 * * 
 
 SET FOKTH AND VINDICATED. 
 
 
 Published by the Union Congressional Committee. 
 
 WASHINGTON": 
 
 PRINTED BY LEMUEL TOWERS. 
 1864. 
 
9 >. Tl ffl a4s ; 
 
 . 
 
 O IX 3- OH A 
 
 The following Chapters are a condensation arid revision of the series of 
 twelve articles in review of McClelland Report, by W^IAM S.WIWTOI?, 
 published in the New York Times, during the months of t^bruary, March, 
 and Apiil, 1864. In the p eparation of this criticism the author has to 
 acknowledge the use of a large mass of unpublished official documents. 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 I. McGlellan as a Political Strategist. 8 
 
 II. The " Young Napoleon " 4 
 
 III. A Hundred and Fifty Thousand Men " in Buckram " : 6 
 
 IV. The Modern Fabius and his False Pretences 8 
 
 V. "My Plan and Your Plan/ , 9 
 
 YI. MeClellan s Grievance the Detuchm^ht of McDowell s Corps 1J* 
 
 VII. "A Pickaxe and a Spade, a Spade.",. , 16 
 
 7IIL The Peninsular Campaign , 18 
 
 IX. How Pope got out of his Scrape 2d 
 
 X. Closing Scns in McClellan s Career , 2* 
 
 .noinU erfl vd 
 
 i. <a,v 
 
FCLELLAN S MILITARY CAREER 
 
 REVIEWED AND EXPOSED. 
 
 "^K L 
 
 MoOLEELAN AS A POLITICAL STRATEGIST, 
 
 It is a fact singularly characteristic of General McClellan that having won what 
 ever reputation he enjoys in the field of war, he is now running on this reputation 
 as the Presidential candidate of a party whose creed is peace and whose platform 
 casts contumely on the very war of which their nominee had for upwards of a year 
 the chief conduct. When we consider, however, that all his fame is founded on 
 defeats, it is not wonderful that his hopes should still be bound up in defeats. Gen 
 eral McClellan s Presidental prospects brighten just in proportion as our soldiers 
 suffer disaster, and he will only be certain of being President of our country when 
 it is certain we have no country at all. 
 
 There is no object more calculated to claim the sympathy of a generous people 
 than a defeated general; and unless his failure has been associated with circum 
 stances of personal turpitude he is pretty sure, sooner or later, to receive that sym 
 pathy. Machiavelli, that subtle observer, points out that the Romans never blamed 
 their unsuccessful commanders, esteeming that to a high-minded man the mortifica 
 tion of defeat was of itself punishment enough. Sertorius, Mithridates and Wil 
 liam of Orange were habitually unsuccessful generals, and yet history has not chosen 
 to cast contumely on their names : on the contrary, the memory of their failure^ ie 
 covered up by the remembrance of qualities of mind that deserved, if they could not 
 command, success. 
 
 It has been left for General McClellan, however, to claim net merely the sympa 
 thy of his countrymen (which would have been accorded him had his conduct been . 
 marked by the modesty of a soldier) but their admiration and highest re wards for a 
 series of exploits in which the country suffered only disaster. 
 
 General McClellan s candidacy for the Presidency does not begin with the nomi 
 nation at Chicago. While his soldiers were being struck down by thousands with 
 the fevers of the Chickahominy, the fever of the White House struck him. There 
 re a thousand thi ngs both in his military career and in his subsequent conduct 
 that can only be explained on this theory. No doubt he would have been glad to 
 have founded his Presidential pretensions on success ; but as this was not possible 
 he early conceived a characteristic change of base : he determined to found them on 
 defeat. He could not make failures triumphs, but he would adventure a flanking 
 movement in the field of politics more bold than any he ever essayed on the field 
 of war : he would throw the burden of all his failures upon an Administration which 
 thwarted all his brilliant plans and ensured defeat where he had organized vic 
 tory ! This desperate enterprise he has attempted to carry though in a document 
 published a few months ago, which, under the guise of a "Report," is really an 
 elaborate political manifesto. 
 
 Had General MoClellan not beea a prospective candidate for the Presidency, it 
 would be difficult to bring his so-called " Report" into any known category. If it 
 is less than a Report it is also more than a Report. It is less than a Report because 
 numerous dispatches of the time are omitted from this collection. It is also more 
 than a strictly military Report, because its basis is * n elaborate historical, and 
 argumentative recital, in which such dispatches as are sed by General AlcGIeiia , 
 are inlaid. Military Reports in the sense in whicii c > aJ.dier no ei-tun-is .ht 
 
 M26278 
 
term, are written either from the battle-field itself, or, in the impossibility of that, 
 as speedily after the action as it is possible for the staff to collect the requisite data, 
 There have been Generals who have seen fit at the close of their career to publish 
 their dispatcher in collected form. Such a legacy was left to military history by 
 the greai, Iron Duke. But what is peculiar in Wellington s publication of his dis- 
 pfttehes is that he has left these memorials of his career in their strict chronologi 
 cal order, in their exact original state: he "has not suppressed a line, nor added a 
 word of commentary, nor a word of argument, nor a word of accusation, nor a word 
 of justification. 
 
 Not eo General MeClellan s Report The labor of a whole twelvemonth, com 
 posed -in the leisure of retiracy, and after the publication of most of the material 
 likely to bear on his fame, its purpose seems Jess to record a series of military trans 
 actions than to vindicate his conduct and arraign the Administration No charge 
 is too great, none, i-oo. small, to draw out from him a replicationi^and he is equal- 
 Jy read} 7 , whether to bring railing accusations against his milmfc* Ui 8uperior8, to 
 bowl down the Committee on the Conduct of the War, or to blov. * *.he news 
 paper?. : 
 
 In this state of facts, & critical analysis of this so-called " Report " becomes a mat 
 ter which concerns the welfare of the country not less than the truth of history. It 
 is to this task I propose addressing myself. It will be our duty to {/Tee to the his 
 torical truth underlying the veneer which General McClellan has spread over events, 
 to endeavor to seize by the guiding-clue of unpublished dispatches how much here 
 set down as original motive is really afterthought, and to examine the foundation of 
 the charges which he heaps upon the Administration, if I do not succeed in prov 
 ing by documentary evidence that every one of General McClellari s failures was 
 the result of his own conduct and character, if I do not prove his career as a 
 whole to have been a failure unmatched in military history, and if I do not fasten 
 upon him conduct which in any other country in the world would have caused 
 him to be court-martialed and dismissed the service, I shall ask the reader to ac 
 cept his plea in abatement of judgment and accord him the patent of distinguished 
 generalship. But if I make good all I have said, I shall ask the reader to charac 
 terize in fitting terms the conduct of a man who, receiving the hearties t support of 
 the Government, the lavish confidence of the people, and the unstinted resources of 
 the nation, achieves nothing but defeat, and terminates a career of unexampled fail 
 ure by charging the blame upon an Administration whose only fault was not to hare 
 sooner to discovered his incapacity. 
 
 II. 
 
 THE " YOUNG NAPOLEON." 
 
 It was the good fortune of General McClellan to come into command while the 
 public mind was in a peculiar mood. The disastrous upshot of a forward move 
 ment in which the nation was conscious of having used too great urgency had given 
 rise to complete abnegation of all criticism on the part of the people and the pre. 
 Bull Run had educated us, and, in a fit of patriotic remorse, men renounced every 
 thing that might appear like pressure on the Government or the commanders of our 
 armies. 
 
 The nation did more : it literally threw open its arms to receive the young chief 
 thosen to lead its foremost array. He came in with no cold suspicion, but with a 
 warm and generous welcome. It will always remain one of the must extraordinary 
 phenomena of our extraordinary times that a young man without military experi 
 ence, leaping from a captaincy to the highest grade in our military hierarchy, and 
 bringing with him only the prestige of a series of small operations which another 
 than he planned and executed,* should have been at one received into the nation s 
 confidence and credited in advance with every military quality and capacity. It 
 may not be very flattering to our common sense to look back at the time when thU 
 bero of unfought fields was taken on trust as a "young Napoleou ;" but it remains, 
 nevertheless, a piece of history; and when a few wteks after assuming command, 
 he told his soldiers, " We have had our last retreat, we ha?e seen OUR last defeat 
 you stand by me and I ll stand by you," a too-confiding people applauded the bom 
 bast as having the true Napoleonic ring ! 
 
 Beyond a donbt these things showed the military juvenility of America; but they 
 were none the less the manifestations of a mood of mind whicfi an abl* Commander 
 
 *I mean of course General Rosecrans. The Report of that general, inoiudiug his operation* in 
 Western Virginia, will, it i hoped, soon b published. 
 
could have turned to immense account. General McClellan had but to ask, and it 
 was given him indeed it came without asking. Every energy of the Government, 
 and all the resources of a generous and patriotic people, were lavishly placed athia 
 disposal, to enable him to gather together an army and put it in the most complete 
 state of efficiency, so that offensive movements might be resumed at the earliest 
 possible moment. The time of that movement was, however, with a scrupulous 
 de)acacy left in the hands of the Commander himself. General McClellan com 
 plains of the " vehemence with which an immediate advance upon the enemy s 
 works directly in our front was urged by a patriotic people." I am very sura 
 that not only was no "immediate advance " urged, but that no advance at all was 
 expected during any portion of the period in which General McClellan says he was 
 engaged in organizing the army. " It was necessary," says he,* " to create a new 
 army for acl.ive operations and to expedite its organization, equipment, and the ac 
 cumulation of the material of war, and to this not inconsiderable labor all my ener 
 gies for the next three months were exerted." As General McClellan assumed com 
 mand of the army in the latter part of July (27th), the " three months" spoken of 
 would bring us to the 1st of November. Now it would nwt be difficult to show that 
 during no part, of that period did the public show anything like " vehemence " for 
 an advance. The country understood that a new army had to be organized; in 
 deed ther^ was if anything, a disposition to exaggerate both the time required for 
 this work and its inherent difficulties; and as a large share of the fame of General 
 McClellan rests on the theory of his having " organized " the army, it may be worth 
 while making a brief diversion to penetrate into the interior of this awful mystery 
 of organization. 
 
 One would suppose from the tone of General McClellan that when he came to the 
 Army of the Potomac there was no army to command. " I found," says he (pag 
 44), "no army to command a mere collection of regiments, cowering on the banks 
 of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat." Now, 
 the facts of the case are that he came into command of fifty thousand men, and they 
 were very far from being "a mere collection of regiments." The brigade and divi 
 sional organization existed and had existed, having been established by General 
 McDowell. The organization of modern armies is a matter long ago fixed, and > 
 not an affair which admits either of invention or of innovation. The hierarchy by 
 the battalion, brigade, division, and corps, first formulated in the Ordonnance du 
 Roi, is the military system of every European nation ; and our own military code is, 
 in fact, a translation of it. It is not clear, therefore, how there was room for the 
 exercise of any euch mysterious powers of organization as have been attributed to 
 General McClellan, and he certainly put forth none. He found the framework of 
 brigades and divisions, and he continued it, simply piling up more brigades and 
 more di visions. f There only remained to push the organization one step higher, 
 and that step he did not take. Our regular army having always been very email, 
 no higher unit of organization than the division had existed or had been required. 
 What became absolutely necessary as soon as the needs of the war created great 
 armies of one or two hundred thousand men was to establish the higher fighting 
 unit the corps d"armee without which no large army can effectively enter upon 
 an active campaign. General McClellan would never consent to the establishment Of 
 corps. The only novelty of organization, therefore, which it was possible for him 
 to institute, he would not and did not. He left the army an acephalous agglomer 
 ation of thirteen divisions, without correlation, unity or cohesion; and it became 
 necessary for the President, months afterwards, and ia opposition to General Mc 
 Clellan, to constitute corps just as the army was on the point of setting out on an a- 
 tive campaign. 
 
 The period of three months during which General McClellan, according to his 
 own statement, was engaged in reorganizing the army, having passed, the Gov 
 ernment and the nation became naturally anxious that the splendid army of over 
 a hundred and fifty thousand men, which had by this time grown up on the bank* 
 of the Potomac, should be turned to account Our foreign relations, our domestic 
 interests, our national honor every consideration conspired to urge an attack on th 
 insolent foe who held the Capital in siege. But during no period of the six months 
 succeeding the 1st of November and during all of which period the motives for an 
 
 * Report, p. 6. 
 
 t "Whatever credit is claimed for the practical organization of th army belongs to Brigadi**- 
 
 Oeneral mow Major-General) Silas Oasey, a painstaking tactician, who labored with tireless a- 
 
 ftiduity at the task of brigading the newly arrived regiments. The assumption of the credit 01 thte 
 
 wore by General MCljllan ia a flagrant instance of ic voa non 
 
 T * The fcnight Blew the boar, 
 
 Tte knight had the gloire." 
 
sdVance became progressively more and more imperative did or would General 
 McClellan consent to move his army. If there are a,ny considerations that go to 
 justify this delay, it is only fair to General McOlellan that he shall have the benefit 
 of their full weight, and this subject is worth examining with some fulness, because 
 there is a close logical connexion between that long inaction and all the subsequent 
 ill fortune of the Army of the Po-tomac. 
 
 IIL 
 
 A HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND MEN IN BUCKRAM." 
 
 There is one characteristic of General McClellan which displays itself so persist 
 ently, both in his Report and in his conduct, that it must belong to the very struc 
 ture of his intellect. What I mean is a certain inequality of vision which puts 
 facts out of all just relations, gives him one standard of judgment for himself and 
 another for others, and leads him to a prodigious over-estimate of immediate, and a 
 prodigious under-estimate of remote difficulties. " The first qualification in a general, 5 "* 
 says JNapoleon, " is a cool head that is, a head which receives just impressions, and 
 estimates things and object* at their real value. Some men are so constituted as to 
 see everything through a high-colored medium. Whatever knowledge, or talent, 
 or courage, or other good qualities such men may possess, nature has not formed 
 them for the command of armies, or the direction of great military operations.** 
 This key will aid us in the interpretation of that extraordinary tendency to exag 
 gerate the force of the enemy which we find him displaying at the very outset of 
 his career, and which continued to grow upon him throughout its whole course. 
 
 The first instance in which we have a distinct utterance from General McClellan 
 on the point of the relative strength of his own and the enemy s force is in a letter 
 addressed by him to the Secretary of War in the latter part of October, 1861.* In 
 this communication he uses the following language : 
 
 " So much time has passed, and the winter is approaching so rapidly, that but two courses are 
 left to the Government, viz.: to go into winter quarters, or to assume the offensive withforct 
 greatly inferior in numbers to tn army I regarded as desirable and necessary. 
 
 Now, the first question is, what number he regarded as not only "desirable " but 
 * nesessary" in order to enable him to assume the offensive. Happily, on this point 
 we have from himself precise information, for in a subsequent part of the same com 
 munication he gives what he calls an " estimate of the requisite force for an advance 
 movement by the Army of the Potomac." It is as as follows : 
 
 " Column of active operations. , 150,000 men, 400 gun, 
 
 Garrison of the city of Washington , 85,000 " 40 
 
 To guard the Potomac to Harper s Ferry * 5,000 " 12 " 
 
 To guard the Lower Potomac 8,000 " 24 " 
 
 Garrison for Baltimore and Annapolis 10,000 " 12 
 
 Total effective force required 208,000 men, 488 guns, 
 
 or an aggregate, present and absent, of about 240,000 men, should the losses by sickness, &c., nott 
 rise to a higher per centage than at present." 
 
 As the strength of an army, like any other means for the accomplishment of a 
 certain end, is necessarily controlled by the object to be accomplished and the re 
 sistance to be overcome, we must seek the rationale of the extraordinary estimate put 
 forth by General McClellan of the military force required as an indispensable condi 
 tion precedent to any offensive operations, in his calculation of the strength of the 
 army which the rebels were able to confront him withal. Fortunately on this point, 
 also, we are not left in the dark, for he goes on to state. that all his information 
 showed that in November, 1861, " the enemy had a force on the Potomac, not less 
 than 150,000 strong, well drilled and equipped, ably commanded, and strongly en- 
 tre-nched." 
 
 If it be true that at any period during the fall or winter of 1861 --2, the rebels had 
 "on the Potomac" an army of the strength claimed by General McClellan an army 
 of one hundred and fifty thousand men then we must concede that his estimate of 
 the army he himself needed namely, an effecting fighting column of the same 
 strength was not excessive, and that his reiterated demands for more men, even 
 a-t this early period, were the result of a wise appreciation of the necessities of the 
 ease. But if it can be shown that this rebel colossus of a hundred and fifty thou 
 sand men. was a monstrous delusion, the figment of a " heat-oppressed brain," we 
 shall reqi.ire to find other terms in which to characterize his conduct and his 
 clamor. 
 
 * Keport, p. 8. 
 
7 
 
 Now, I think I can show that the rebel army on the Potomac, so far from 
 being of the force of 150,000 men, was never more than one-third that number. The 
 battle of Bull Run was fought on the part of the rebels with a force of less than 
 thirty thousand men. General Beauregard, in his official report, says : " The effec 
 tive force of all arms of the (Confederate) Army of the Potomac on that eventfai 
 morning, including the garrison of Camp Pickens, did not exceed 21,833 men, an3 
 29 guns. The Army of the Shenandoah, (Johnston s,) ready f r action in the field, 
 may be set down at 6,000 men and 20 guns, and its total strength at 8,334" 
 
 We arc then to believe that the rebel army in the interval of three months, be 
 tween the end of July and the end of October, leaped from thirty thousand men to 
 a hundred and fifty Itiousand! Credat Judceus ! It is too monstrous to believe. H 
 would take double the time even to brigade such a herd of men. It would indee3 
 be difficult to say what the precise strength of the rebel force was during the period 
 referred to, especially as it varied greatly, having attained a certain maximum, 
 then declined by the expiration of the term of service, and then commenced to a- 
 eend once more when the first conscription came into force. I do not, therefore, 
 attempt to do this. I merely desire to show that the swelling figures that 
 affrighted the soul of the then head of the Army of the Potomac existed only in hie 
 imagination, and to fix a maximum beyond which it is certain the rebel army did 
 *ot go. 
 
 During the autumn of 1861, while the rebel army was still at Cent-rville, a letter 
 . written from that place fell into the hands of the military authorities. The writer, 
 referring to the flutter that existed in the ranks of their army in regard to the cre 
 ation of a certain number of Major Generals, tells how the Confederate Arm^ was 
 organized into brigades of four divisions each, like ours, but that they only pm tw 
 brigades into a division that is, they put eight regiments or battalions instead of 
 twelve, as we have. "Now," says the writer, "this makes quite a stir as to the 
 appointment of the twelve Major Generals." This wo ild give them twenty-foaf 
 brigades, or ninety-eix regiments, The average strength of their regiments at that 
 time certainly did not exceed that of our own at the same period, 600 men ; and 
 this would give them a total of 57,600 men.* 
 
 Now, it is worthy of note that General McClellan himself, six months after th* 
 date of his estimate of the rebel force *on the Potomac," at 150,000 men, gives 
 another estimate made by his chief of the secret service corps on the 8th of March, 
 in which the rebel troops at Manassas, Centreville, Bull Run, Upper Occoquan, aad 
 vicinity are put down at 80,000. Note that this was after the rebel conscription 
 bad gone into force and had swelled the Confederate ranks with its harvesting ; and 
 that, notwithstanding all this, it gives a >esult less by seventy thousand than the fig 
 ure made out by General McClellan in the month of November. At one stroke the 
 rebel hundred and fifty thousand in buckram had dwindled by a half! 
 
 From all these data, I believe I am authorized in concluding that Johnston at 
 no time had on the Potomac an army of over 50,000 men. And it was before this con 
 temptible force that our magnificent army of three times its strength no, not the 
 rmy, but its commander stood paralyzed for eight months! Such a spectacle th* 
 history of the world never before presented. 
 
 Whether General McClellan ever really believed that he had in front of him an 
 army of a hundred and fifty thousand men, or anything like that figure, is a poinl 
 which I do not preteed to determine.-}- But certain it is that having fixed upon 
 this number, all his subsequent efforts eeem to have beea directed, not to the taefe 
 f destroying the enemy before him, but of forcing the Government to give him.* 
 command which he could never have brought into action in any battle-field Vir 
 
 *Tbere are those, indeed, who put the rebel force on the Potomac at an even lower figure. Mr. 
 Harllvrt, who at this time was within the rebel Hoes and had access to good sources of informa 
 tion, says in t-fae notes to his translation of the pamphlet of the Prince de Joinvilieon the Aruxy l 
 the I otoraac. 
 
 " I have reason to believe that when the history of the present war shall come to be writiea 
 fairly and in full, it will be found that General Johnston never intended to hold Manassas and Gen- 
 treville against any serious attack ; that bis army at those points hnd suffered jrre;Uly during live 
 autumn arid winter of 1861 2, and that from October to March he never had an tfl&lve force & 
 more, tluin 40,000 men under his orders 
 
 t It is p^sible he did, for it is astonishing the tricks which the fears and the fancies of a mao 
 ibn* unhappily organized) will play him; and I am willing to believe that Grmrai McCleHa* 
 was quite as much deceived as deceiving It is possible General McCMlan really bettered the 
 tebel* had 150 000 men on the Potomac, when they never had a third of that number, just as 
 is possible lie believi d they had one hundred thousand, then two hundred thousand, then two 
 hundred and fifty thousand men on the I eninjnla, when the trujh w_as tkey ne_vejt had aver 70.J8W> 
 aen or as he- believed they invaded Maryland with a hundred and eighty thousand men, whea 
 their total force was fifty -five thousand. All this, I any. is possible; bal alas for the hapless o 
 ttoc whoee fate was committed to the keeping of a*cA a tender I 
 
8 
 
 innia furnishes. From this time forth begins a series of whinings and whimperings 
 lor troops, the most extraordinary ever put on record. " I have not the force I 
 asked for;" "send me more troops" became the perpetual cry. These, with the 
 occasional expression of his determination to " do the best he can" with what pitiful 
 force he had, and to " share its fate," form the staple of every communication. 
 
 Now, when General McClellan was forming this heroic resolve, will any one im 
 agine how much of a force he had? He had asked for 240,000 men, from which to 
 take a fighting column of 150,000. It is true, he was never able to get this number, 
 feut it is perhaps worth while determining what he did get. 
 
 It appears from the official reports that on the moming o the 27th October, the 
 aggregate strength of the Army of the Potomac was 168,&l8rnen present for duty, 
 169,452 On January 1, 1862, it was 219 707 present for duty, 191,480 On Feb 
 ruary 1, it was 222,196 present for duty, 193 142. Such was the pitiful bagatelle 
 of a force he had under his command 1 He had a.^ked for 240 000 ; he could^ never 
 get over 222,196; and one can sympathize with his sense of ill treatment in coa- 
 sequence. 
 
 We think, however, that we have read of brilliant campaigns and splendid victo 
 ries achieved with something less than two hundred and forty thousand men. If 
 we recollect aright Napoleon made his first great Italian campaign with under forty 
 thousand men ; fought Austerlitz with forty-five thousand and Marengo with thirty- 
 five thousand; and we think we have heard that Wellington, in the whole Penin 
 sular war, never had over thirty thousand ; that Turenne more frequently coga- 
 manded ten thousand than fifty thousand; that Maryborough won Blenheim with 
 fifty six thousand, and Ramil lies with sixty thousand troops; and that Frederick 
 the Great con ucted the Seven Years War, against a coalition of more than half of 
 Europe, with an army never exceeding a hundred thousand men. But they were 
 old fotties in those days, and it was left for the " Young Napoleon," who had never 
 Landled ten thousand troops in his life, to require double a hundred thousand to fill 
 op the measure of his swelling ambition. 
 
 In fact, the trouble was not, that General McClellan had too small a force; he had 
 too large a force. He had fashioned a Frankenstein which all his power could not 
 Control a sword was put into his hand which not only he was unable to wield, but 
 which dragged him to the ground. 
 
 IV. 
 
 THE MODERN FABIUS AND HIS FALSE PRETENCES. 
 
 Were it true that the army put into the hands of General MeCleLan, instead of 
 being twice or thrice the strength of the rebel force on the Potomac, as I have 
 shown, was in reality doubly outnumbered by an enemy "not less than 150,000 
 trong, well drilled and equipped, ably commanded, and etrorigly entrenched;" the 
 act might well give us cause before passing censure on an inactivity which, how 
 ever deplorable, would still have had much to warrant it But you have seen how 
 this pretence has been swept away by a scrutiny of facts; and I now proceed to 
 show that the only remaining excuses he offers are equally without foundation. 
 Thse are summed up in the following paragraph:* 
 
 "The records of the War Department show my anxiety and efforts to assume active offensi ve ope 
 rations in the fall and early winter. It is only just to say, however, that the, unprecedented con 
 dition of UM roads and Virginia toil would have delayed an advance till February, had the dU- 
 eipline, organization, and equipment of the army tn-.-n as complete at the close of the full us wad 
 necessary, and as I desired and labored against every impediment to make them." 
 
 The first element enumerated is the roads and the weather, the condition of which 
 General McClellan tells us was " unprecedented." If there be any inference to be 
 drawn from this expression and its context, it is that they were "unpreceder.tedly** 
 bad, for this reason is given in excuse for not moving. Now it is true that the con 
 dition of roads of Virginia during the fall and winter of 1861-2 was "unpreceden 
 ted," but unprecedently good and this, happily, is not a matter in regard to which 
 we are left to the unsure testimony of memory. We have cotemporary evidence 
 which establishes the fact by an accumulation perfectly irrefragable. General 
 Franklin, f testifying under oath to this specific point, an the 26th of December, 
 1861, says: " The condition of the roads is good." General Wadaworth,^ ou the 
 same day eays: "The roads are remarkably good perhaps not once in twenty year* 
 have the roads at Christmas been in as good condition as they are now. Having had 
 
 Report, p. W. 
 
 eort he Conduct ** tbe War> ToL * * ** 
 
9 
 
 long period of. dry vxather, the roads are very good." So General Fitz John 
 ,er,* in reply to a query as to the condition of the roads, says: " As far as I 
 
 this 
 Portei 
 
 know they are in excellent condition, excellent travelling condition." In like man 
 ner testified a score of officers; I need not cite their evidence, but will limit my- 
 telf to the testimony of a rebel witness. Pollard. f in a passage, the sting of which 
 is sharpened by its justice, says: r> A long, lingering, Indian summer, with roads more 
 hard, and skies more beautiful, than Virgitia had seen for many a year, invited the 
 enemy to advance. He steadily refused the invitation to a general action. The ad 
 vance of our lines was tolerated to Munson s Hill, within a few miles of Alexandria, 
 and opportunities w^re sought in vain by the Confederates, in heavy skirmishing, 
 to engage the lines of the two armies." 
 
 Precisely the same tendency characterizes General McClellan a estimate of the 
 comparative condition as of the comparative strength of his own and the enemy s 
 army. His communications of the period referred to make frequent mention of the 
 superior discipline, drill and equipment of the rebels, and the inferiority in these 
 respects of his own force. Now it is difficult to conjecture on what basis General 
 McClellan constantly makes this assertion of the superior fighting powers of the 
 rebels, unless with a credulity insulting to the manhood of the loyal States the 
 rebel rhodomontade on this head had been swallowed entire by him. Abstractly 
 considered, they ought to have been not better soldiers but worse ; for though their 
 habits of life and social training had been of a kind to make them ultimately very 
 excellent soldiers, they were calculated to make them very inferior soldiers at the 
 outset.^; And this view of it is fortified by historical testimony; the evidence of 
 all observers goes to show that previously to the organization of the permanent 
 Confederate Army in April and May, 1852, and while the provisional army was stifl 
 in existence and officers were elected by the men, nothing could exceed the laxitj 
 of discipline, the demoralization of temper, and the inferiority in arms, equipment, 
 and transportation, that marked the rebel force in Virginia. If that force afterwar3 
 became an army whose formidable valor and superb discipline we have too often 
 found out to our cost, it is to be attributed in great part to the time General Me- 
 Clellan gave them for consolidation, and the prestige they gained by their victo 
 ries over him. 
 
 But all comparison is superfluous; what I say is that General McClellan s claim 
 that there was anything in the discipline of his army to prevent his dealing a blow 
 at the enemy before him, is a shallow makeshift that will no longer serve. If it 
 had been designed to make a Prussian or an English army a thing of pipeclay and 
 pedantry, of the rattan and red tape there might be some force in the call for 
 months or for years, in which to perfect this painful and useless education. But for 
 modern armies there is but one way ; it is, after the rudiments of tactics are ae- 
 hard realities of war. It was in this way, and not by the pedantry of the martinet 
 that the armies of the Thirty Years War, of the American Revolution, and of the 
 great French Revolution, weref>rmed. In 1813 rough German levies fought almost 
 before they were drilled, and at Bautzen French recruits were victorious over the 
 elaborately trained machines that formed the armies of Austria, Prussia and Russia. 
 Disastrous as Bull Run was in its military results, it, beyond a doubt, did more t 
 make our men soldiers than all the reviews, parades, and sham fights, with which 
 General McClellan amused a country whose life and national honor were all the 
 while ebbing away. 
 
 I have now exhausted the several reasons alleged by General McClellan in excuse 
 for his long delay, from August, 1861, to April, 1862. I have shown that there ia 
 nothing in these excuses, whether drawn from the condition of the roads and the 
 season, or from the strength and discipline of our own army, or that of the rebels, 
 to justify it. No, no! Not all the shallow devices which a year of afterthought 
 ean bring to the extenuation < f military incapacity can either explain or exculpate 
 that fatal delay which gave the rebels their best ally, Time ; which made the timii 
 among us despair, and the proudest haag their heads with shame ; and which 
 almost authorized foreign recognition of the rebellion by our seeming inability to 
 put it down. 
 
 V. 
 "MY PLAN AND YOUR PLAN." 
 
 Whether General McClellan ever would have been ready to advance on the en- 
 my, is a problem the solution of which is known only to Omniscience ; but the spell 
 
 *Ihtd. p. 171. 
 
 tFirst year of the War, p. 178. 
 
 ^Prince de Joinvilie on the Army of the Potomac, p. 101. 
 
10 
 
 was at length broken, not by the motion of McClellan, but by a word of initiative 
 attered by the President. On the 27th of January, 1862, Mr. Lincoln issued - Gen- 
 eral War Order No. 1," directing "that the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day 
 for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against 
 the insurgent, forces. 
 
 As the reason for ordering a "genera? movement" on the day indicated may not be 
 universally intelligible and has frequently been made a matter of wonderment by 
 General McClellan s partisans, a word on that head will not be out of place. Shortly 
 after coming into command of the Army of the Potomac, General McClellan began 
 to urge that all the armies of the Union should be put under the direction of a 
 "singie will" In his letter of October, 1861, addressed to the Secretary of War, 
 we find him urging this with the utmost emphasis, and even making it an indispen 
 sable condition of any advance by the Army of the Potomac.* 
 
 Action, on ant/ terms, being the supreme desire of the Government, General Mo- 
 Clellan was, on the 1st of November, invested with the control of the armies of 
 the United States as General-in Chief. Bewildering though one finds the retrospect 
 of such impotence of ambition as inspired this man to take on his pigmy shoulders 
 a burden which a colossus like Napoleon never attempted to bear the task of at 
 once personally directing the operation of an army of two hundred thousand men 
 in an active campaign, and superintending the advance of half a dozen other ar 
 mies arrayed along a front of five or six thousand miles it remains, nevertheless, a 
 fact of history. 
 
 Having been vested with the control of all the armies of the Republic, General 
 McClellan conceived the plan of a simultaneous advance of all these forces a plan, 
 which considering that the several armies were, as I have said, distributed along 
 a front of five or six thousand miles, with lines of operation running through differ 
 ent climates and varying weather, was as impossible as it was puerile. At the wave 
 of the baton of the mighty maestro the whole vast orchestra was to strike up. 
 Until then, let all men hold there peace! In a word, we have here the first draft 
 of that famous " anaconda" strategy, which planted a dozen different armies on as 
 many lines of operation, all on the exterior circumference of the rebellion, leaving 
 the rebels the enormous advantage of their interior position and giving them ample 
 time to fortify at every point 
 
 And it was in view of this favorite plan of General McClellan for a simultaneous 
 advance along the whole line that the above Executive order directing a "general 
 movement " on the 22d of February was issued, f 
 
 An advance having at length been decided on, it remained to determine the line 
 by which this advance should be made, being in mind the double objective of 1st, 
 the rebel army at Manassas, and 2d, the rebel capital, Richmond. 
 
 It is quite certain that up to November General McClellan held no other view of 
 a forward movement than a direct advance on the enemy before him. At what 
 time and by what counsels he altered his mind in this regard are points on which 
 we have no information. But a change of purpose had meantime taken place, and 
 when the President, four days after the promulgation of this General Order for an. 
 advance, issued Special War Order No. 1, directing a flanking movement on the 
 rebel position at Manassas, it immediately appeared that he and General McClellan 
 had different views in regard to the line of operatious to be taken up. 
 
 Against this proposition General McClellan set his face with a determination much 
 stouter than the logic which he employed to support that determination. Having 
 obtained permission to submit his objections to the plan, we find a long letter from 
 him addressed to the Secretary of War, under date of February 3,^ i" which the 
 question of the comparative advantages of a movement on the enemy at Manassas, 
 or a transfer of his army to a base on the lower Chesapeake, is- elaborately dsscus- 
 aed. This is a problem of capital importance, and so I shall enter with son>e ful 
 ness into the analysis of his reasoning endeavoring not to omit a single point of 
 any weight or value. 
 
 At the outset of his discussion of a movement on the enemy at Manassas, by the 
 rebel right flank, General McClellan makes certain admissions as to the advantages 
 of such an attack, to which I call the particular attention of the freaper, for I 
 regard them as decisive of the whole question as to the comparative advantage of 
 an attack on Manassas, or a transfer of base to any point on the lower Chesapeake. 
 He admits that an attack on the rebel right flank by the line of the Oocoquan would 
 
 * Eeport. page 67. 
 
 t General Mcflellen had promise*!, if made General-in-Chief, to assume the offensive before th 
 25th of November. I need hardly say that this promise was as little kept as all his others. 
 $ Report, pages 4S-48. > *W i# 
 
11 
 
 * prevent the junction of the enemy s right with his centre," affording the oppoto- 
 nity of destroying the former; would remove the obstructions to the navigation 
 of the Potomac ;" would l< reduce the lenghth of wagon transportation/ and would 
 * strike directly at his main railway communication." 
 
 Assuming the successful execution of this plan what would have been the result? 
 Let General McClellan answer himself: 
 
 " Assuming the success of this operation, and the defeat of the nemy as certain, the question 
 at once arises as to the importance of the results gained. I think these results would be confined 
 to the possession of the fi3ld of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac by the ene 
 my, an<l the moral effect of the victory; important results, it is true, but not decisive of the war, 
 nor securing the destruction of the enemy s H&in army, for he could fall back upon, other positions, 
 and fight ua again and again, should the condition of his troops permit." 
 
 A tactical victory in the field, the compulsory retreat of the enemy from his cher 
 ished position, the relief the blockade of the Potomac, and the "moral effect of the 
 victory" with the losses, disasters, and demoralization that would have been inflict 
 ed on them all of which General McClellan admits were within his grasp, by the 
 movement indicated were surely well worth the effort. Why, considering 
 what a priceless boon such a result would have been at that time, the whole nation 
 would have called him blessed 1 But it would not have been " decisive of the war" 
 such was the wildly puerile ambition that possessed him; and in order to end the 
 war, he resolved to seek a theatre where it was perfectly evident beforehand and 
 became a sad matter of fact afterward, that he would fitd all the obstacles there 
 were at Manassas with none of its advantages. 
 
 This theatre of war was some point on the lower Chesapeake bay, either Urbana 
 on the Rappahannoek or Fort Monroe. The advantages of this base, according to 
 Mc Clellan s reasoning, is that "it affords the shortest possible land route to Rich 
 mond, striking directly at the heart of the enemy s power in the East," and that 
 " the roads in that region are passable a-t all seasons of the year." 
 
 It is on this enormous assumption that he bases the whole plan of campaign ! He 
 proposes to embark his troops at Alexandria, go down the Chesapeake bay, and up 
 the Rappahannoek to Urbana, or down to Fortress Monroe, with the view of there 
 finding a passage to Richmond, where the roads would be -passable at all seasons." 
 It is hard to tell where to begin answering a statement like that. How did he know 
 the roads there were " passable at all seasons? " It would certainly be natural to 
 conclude, from the mere physical geography of the region, that the roads are not 
 * passable at all seasons." We have there precisely the physical conditions to 
 make impassable roads a region on the drainage and "divides" of rivers, where 
 the streams, losing their force, spread out in swamps and bogs. But if, going be 
 yond theoretical considerations, General McClellan had taken the trouble to look at 
 the map, he would have noticed, on the march of fifty miles from Urbana to Rich 
 mond, the " Dragon >Swamp," and half dozen other swamps, besides the Pamunky 
 the Matapony, and the Chickahominy. On the Peninsula we need not say he woidd 
 have found ; we know what he did find. It is melancholy to think that the fate of 
 a campaign should be intrusted to a mind capable of such stupendous assumptions. 
 
 The fat t of the matter is, McClellan s mind had already broken down before tke 
 problem given him to solve, his courage had oozed out, and in this mood he was willing 
 to look anywhere, anywhere away from the task before him. But it was not long be 
 fore he practically demonstrated that, in transferring his base from Washington to 
 the lower Chesapeake, he merely shifted, but did not remove the difficulty. Codwni 
 non animum mutant qwi trans mare currunt. In running " across the sea," indeed, 
 he changed hie "sky," but not the task imposed upon him. It still met him in the 
 face as kuotty and more knotty than before. It was with a quite prophetic con 
 sciousness of this fact that President Lincoln, on the same day as that on which 
 General McCellan s letter is dated, sent to him the following note : 
 
 EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, February 3, 1862. 
 
 MY DKAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the 
 Potomac. Yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannoek to Urbana, and across land 
 to the terminus of the railroad on the Fork river ; mine to move directly to a point on the rail 
 road southwest of Manassas. 
 
 If you will give satisfactory answers to the following* questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to 
 yours : 
 
 1. Does not your plan invole a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine ? 
 
 2. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine? 
 8. Wherein is a victory more, valuable, by your plan than mine? 
 
 In fact, would it not be less valuable in this: that it would break no great line of the enemy * 
 communication, while mine would? 
 6. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine? 
 
 Yours, truly, , AOUA.IIAM LINCOLN. 
 
 The sagacity of these queries is not less conspicuous than the compendious cora- 
 
12 
 
 pletemess with which they cover the whole ground. They were never answf red 
 aimply because they were and are unanswerable. But President Lincoln, feeling 
 &e weight of the maxim, that a general will do better following an inferior plan 
 which is his own than a superior one which is the conception of another, and, above 
 ftH, desirous that some move should be made, and willing to sacrifice any miuor con 
 sideration to that end, allowed General McOlellan to have his own way. 
 
 That general and his partisans hare a great deal to say about the supposed inter 
 ference on the part of the authorities at Washington with his plans and purposes, 
 and no opportunity is lost to give currency to the notion that it was the intermed 
 dling of a species of * Aulic Couacil " at Washington which caused those failures 
 which a juster criticism is compelled to lay at t,he door of his own military incapa 
 city. This subterfuge will no longer serve, for the evidence of his own report,, when 
 carefully collated , utterly explodes this claim. It is a fact worthy of note that the 
 investigations of modern German historians have conclusively proved, that the vitu 
 peration which an intense partisanship cast upon the Austrian Aulic Council, and 
 which has passed into and long held a place in the acceptance of history, is its* If 
 utterly without foundation, and some degree of historical justice is now done a 
 body which bade fair to *njoy a maligned immortality. But it needs no nice his 
 torical criticism to show that the shallow claims of the same sort, put forth to ex 
 tenuate McClellan s blunders, are even more baseless. If the President, as the Con 
 stitutional head of the army, is blanuable in any aspect of his dealings with that 
 general, it is because he abnegated himself too much surrendered too much of his 
 own authority, and gave into the hands of an untried man a power little short of 
 the despotic. While history will recognize that the actuating motive in this was an 
 unselfish atd patriotic desire to leave General McClellan un trammeled liberty of 
 action, it is questionable whether it will not at the same time condemn the Presi 
 dent s surrender of his own convictions. 
 
 But while General McClellan was making his preparations for the withdrawal of 
 his army to Annapolis, he was saved all further trouble on this head by a movement 
 on the part of the Confederates, no less startling than their retirement from their 
 fortified position at Manassas and on the Potomac. 
 
 The withdrawal of the rebels from the line of Manassa?, Centreville, and the 
 lower Potomac began in February, was completed on the 8th of March, and became 
 known to General McClellan and the Cabinet on the following day. The action 
 taken by McClellan <n this event was most extraordinary. In place of sending a 
 light movable column to take up a prompt pursuit of the rebels, with the view of 
 harassing their rear, he waited till two days after their definite withdrawal, and then 
 instituted a general movement of the whole army, not wilh any adequate military 
 view, and with no purpose of attempting to make up with the rebels, but, as he 
 says, for the purpose of giving the troops "an opportunity to gain some experience 
 on the march and bivouac preparatory to the campaign" a kind of education of 
 whick, truly, they stood in great need.* 
 
 To any commander not hopelessly wedded to a preconceived idea, the withdrawal 
 f the rebels from Manassas behind the Rapidan, before a single man had been 
 shipped for the new base, would have suggested the wisdom and eveu the neeesxity 
 of a change of plan. All th conditions under which the purpose of a transfer of 
 the army to Urbana or the Peninsula was formed were changed by that event. The 
 cardinal conception in making a flank movement by water was the hope which 
 General McClellan entertained of being able to reach a point on the line of retreat 
 f the rebels or to reach the front of Richmond before they could* circumstances 
 under which they would doubtless have given battle with great disadvantage. 
 
 The move of the enemy ought to have suggested to General McClellan that, 
 whatever their purpose was, it was next to certain that they would be in force to 
 axeet him at whatever point of the coast he might choose to land. It should have 
 suggested to him that all opportunity of making an offensive manoeuvre was now 
 at end, and that all he could now hope to do was to make a transfer of base. 
 It suggested to him none of these things.\ It eimply suggested to him to change 
 the proposed coast expedition. To make Urbana, on the Rappahannock, after the 
 rebe s had retired behind that river, was out of the question, for if he might hope, 
 under cover of the navy, to effect a landing, ii would certainly not be possible for 
 him to debouch from his point of debarkation. Under these circumstances the line 
 
 * The Prince de Joinville calls this movement to Manassas and back again * a promenade" a 
 good name for it, but the most senseless and aimless " promenade " ever conceived bv a g. neral 
 nf the rniost of actual war The promenade" gave the soldiers an opportunity of seeing for 
 themselves the pitiful obstacles of quaker guns and one-horte unarmed earthworks that had so 
 feng alrighted the soul of their general, though the experience we are sure, did not come hom 
 to those brave men without proibuud mortification aad disgust. 
 
13 
 
 of the Peninsula which he had before spoken of as one promising "less celerity 
 and brilliancy of result," and only to be adopted in case "the worst came to the 
 worst " remained ; and this he immediately chose. 
 
 But I shall show that this decision was made under circumstances that brought 
 him into direct conflict with the President s most explicit orders touching the safety 
 of Washington, and in palpable and most inexplicable violation of the conditions 
 which the council of corps commanders adjudged essential to any movement by the 
 line of the Peninsula. I shall farther show that this decision forms the initial 
 point of all his subsequent disastera in that hapless campaign. 
 
 VI. 
 McCLELLAN 8 GRIEVANCE THE DETACHMENT OF MoDO WELL S CORPS. 
 
 While Mr. Lincoln was disposed to waive his judgment with regard to the stra 
 tegic rmrits of the two plans of advance on the enemy, he by no means felt at liber 
 ty to permit General McClellan to proceed in the execution of his movement by 
 water without placing him under such conditions as should remove as much as poa- 
 ible the danger of an assault upon the capital by the en^my. And yet even hero 
 he did not undertake to decide as a military man, upon the force which might ba 
 necessary for the safety of Washington, but referred that question to the concurrent 
 opinion of General McClellan and the four Generals in command of the four army 
 orps into which the Army of the Potomac had been divided, simply stipulating 
 that no change of base of the Army of the Potomac should be made without 
 leaving such a force in and about Washington as should leave the Capital entirely 
 ecure, not merely in the opinion of General McClellan himeelf, but in the opinion 
 also of all the four Generals in command of the four army corps constituting lf& 
 army.* This obliged him to hold a conference with these commanders, in the 
 coarse of which they consented to the proposed movement by the Peninsula on, cer 
 tain specific conditions, to which I invite the particular attention of the reader. 
 They are as follows to wit: 
 
 1st. That the enemy s vessel Merrimac, can be neutralized. 
 
 2d That the raeana of transportation, sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new 
 be&e can be ready at Wa.*hingtonand Alexandria to move down the I otomac; and 
 
 8. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy s batteries 
 on York Kiver. 
 
 9th. That the fore* be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of secu 
 rity for i;s 8al ety"from menace. (Unanimous.) 
 
 II. If i he foregoing cannot be, the artny should then be moved against the enf-my, behind the 
 Eappaliannock, at the earliest possible moment, and the means for constructing bridges, repairing 
 railroads and stocking them with materials sufficient for supplying the army, should at once be 
 collected Cor both the Orange and Alexandria and Aquia and Bichmond Railroads, t Unanimous ^ 
 
 N. B. That with the forts on the right bank of the I otomac fully garrisoned, and those on the 
 left bank occupied, covering force, in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice. (Keyes, 
 Heintzelman and McDowell.) A total of 40,000 men lor the detence ol the city would suffice . 
 (jUiuaner.) 
 
 In the interpretation of these opinions of the corps commanders, it must neces 
 sarily be supposed that the three Generals who concurred in opinion, intended that 
 all the fortifications around Washington should be " manned " or " occrpied," and 
 that, over and above this, tk>re should be a distinct unit, of force capable of beinpf 
 moved, of twenty -five thousand men. A? three of the Generals concurred in thw 
 opinion the opinion of the fourth may be thrown out of view, although it is not cer 
 tain whether his opinion was intended to apply to a movable force over and abova 
 ihe garrisons, or to include the garrisons in his estimates of forty thousand men. 
 
 It is evident that the opinion of the three agreeing Generals was lbr v McClellan 
 ihe regulating opinion, with which he was bound to comply in carrying out the 
 order of the President 
 
 Now it is remarkable that, in October, when he contemplated a forward move 
 ment, he estimated, the force necessary to be left in and about Washington, at thirty- 
 five thousand men ; and this, be it observed, when the proposed movement contem 
 plated the presence ot the main bod^ 1 of the army in front of the Capital, available 
 in its protection and defetfce. If this force of thirty-five thousand men was deemed 
 necessary by General McClellan, as the proper garrison of Washington, when the 
 whole army was expected to be engaged in front of the Capital, much more would 
 this force be necessary when the proposed movement looked to the removal of the 
 main body of the army to the Peninsula, far beyond the possibility of being irnrac- 
 
 * President s General War No. 3, Beport, p. 58, 
 
diately available for the defence of Washington, should the movements of the enemy 
 endanger the Capital. 
 
 The conclusion is irresistible, therefore, that General McOlellan was bound by the 
 President s order to leave, as the garrison of the forts around Washington, not lesa 
 than thirty-five thousand men; and over and above this a movable unit of force, 
 or, in other words, an army of twenty-five thousand men, without taking into con 
 sideration the troops necessary for the defence of Baltimore or Harper s Ferry, or 
 the guards along the Potomac, both above and below Washington ; for the garri 
 sons necessary for these places were all estimated for separated in his report of 
 October, 1861. 
 
 It is plain from this statement, the verity of which is matter of official record, that 
 when General McClellan received the order of the 8th of March, and had obtained 
 the.opinion of the four Generals, as just stated, his first duty was to comply with the 
 President s order as a condition prior to issuing any order himself in furtherance of 
 his plan of a campaign on the Peninsula. He should first have designated the 
 troops necessary for the security of Washington, not according to his own individ 
 ual judgment, but in conformity with the opinions of the four Generals, or of the 
 three which concurred in opinion. His next point of duty was to consider whether 
 his remaining force, after deducting the force designated for the security of Wash 
 ington, would be such as to justify him in undertaking a campaign by his proposed 
 line : and if he thought it was not, it was his plain duty to represent the case to the 
 President before .giving any orders, having in view his proposed campaign. 
 
 If General McOlellan had taken this course, which both candor and duty required, 
 he would have been spared the painful position of being in the wrong in the con 
 flict which ensued, consequent on the necessity which his conduct had devolved 
 upon the President, of making good his own orders, after General McClellan left 
 Washington for the Peninsula, for it was not until after his departure that the Pres 
 ident became acquainted with the fact that, should McClellan s orders be carried 
 out, his own express orders would be disobeyed : that is, Washington, or the fortifi 
 cations around it, would not be manned as required, in the opinion of the three 
 Generals, nor would there be a covering army of twenty-five thousand men, as 
 required by the same opinion. On the contrary, it was discovered that the amount 
 of force left in and about Washington, and in front of it, at Warrenton and at other 
 points, fell short of twenty thousand men, most of them being hew troops, and though 
 ot disorganized, they were by no means organized, as was clearly set forth in offi- 
 ial statements, and the force fell short numerically of that which he was required 
 to leave by some forty thousand men!* 
 
 Not, as 1 have said, till after General McClellan s departure did the consequence 
 of his disingenuous conduct, which left, the Capital of the nation in a condition 
 almost to be taken by a single coup de main, become apparent. It then became 
 the President s imperative duty to take measures to secure the end which General 
 MeClellan had so grossly neglected, and he did so in the following order : 
 
 ADJUTANT-GENERAL S OFFICE, April 4, 1862. 
 
 By direction of the President, General McDowell s army corps has been detached from the 
 force under your immediate command, and the General is ordered to report to the Secretary 
 of War . Letter by mail . 
 
 L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General, 
 General McClellan. 
 
 If the exposition already given has the force and the truth, and the force of 
 truth which I think belong to it, it will have been made apparent that it was 
 General McClellan s own neglect of the command of the President, embodying 
 the opinions of the Corps Commanders, that drew upon him the consequences, 
 whatever they were, of the above order for the detention of McDowell s Corps 
 an order which was issued for no other reason than because General McClellau had 
 failed in his duty, and thereby, in the judgment of all men, the facts being 
 known, was precluded from all right of comment upon the President s order, and 
 he himself must be held responsible for whatever consequences resulted from that 
 order. 
 
 I state this simply to establish the principle in the case; but I shall, in the 
 equel, demonstrate that the consequences of McDowell s detention were by no 
 means as important as General McClellan is disposed to allege, because, of the three 
 divisions of McDowell s Corps Franklin s was sent to him immediately, and McCalPs 
 
 * If General Me* lellan made the full and fair report of all the transactions of this period which a 
 decent respect for the truth of history demands, he would have inserted at this point the report the 
 General Wadsworth, Military Governor of Washington, on the strength and condition of the forc 
 left lor the defence of the Capital a document which was certainly accessible to him. It will bs 
 found at p 816 (V^ol. 1) of the Keport on the Uonduct of the War. 
 
 ,.,--._ j 
 
15 
 
 in ample time to participate in the battles before Richmond ; I shall demonstrate 
 that, had McDowel s entire Corps been sent to him at the time that Franklin s di 
 vision was forwarded, General McClellan could hare made no use of it, for reasons 
 which will appear at the proper time ; and I shall demonstrate that McDowell * 
 force at Fredericksburgh was quite as useful to General McClellan as it would have 
 been if sent to him, since its presence threatening Richmond called off an equal por 
 tion of the enemy s force, which he would otherwise have had in his front. 
 
 Another point must here be explained, having some connection in General Mc- 
 Clellan s mind, with the action of the President in the detention of McDowell s 
 Corps, and it is this: There was among the troops ia front of Washington, consti 
 tuting a portion of the Army of the Potomac, a dvision of about eleven thousand 
 men, under the command of General Blenker. Shortly before the departure of Gen 
 eral McClellan for the Peninsula, the President had a personal interview with him, 
 in which he expressed his desire to send that division to what was called the Moun 
 tain Department, in Middle Virginia, with the view of enabling General Fremont to 
 move a co-operating column in conjunction with the advance of the army of tb 
 Potomac. General McClellan was opposed to the movement of that division, bat 
 finally acquiesced in it In his allusion to this interview with the President, Gen 
 eral McClellan states that the President assured him no further reduction of hia 
 army destined for the Peninsula should be made; and he then refers to the order 
 detaining McDowell s Corps as a violation of the expressed promise made by the 
 President. 
 
 "The President," eays he, "having promised, in an interview following his order of March 9L 
 withdrawing Blenker s division of 10,1)00 men from my command, that nothing of the sort should 
 be repeated that I might rest assured that the campaign should proceed, with no further deduc 
 tions from the fore" upon which its operations had been planned, I may 9onfti to havintfbttn 
 shocked at thin order, " etc. * 
 
 In this " fine frenzy " there is a sad want of ingenuous statement ; for General Me- 
 Clellan knew, he could not but have known, that the promise referred to must have 
 been made by the Presideat, with the implicit understanding that his own orders 
 touching the security of Washington would be carried out. The President placed too 
 much leliance upon General McClellan s sense of duty and propriety to intimate 
 a doubt as to his faithful obedience to his very pointed and written orders, looking 
 to the security of the capital. Under these circumstances General McClellan had 
 no right to appeal to the promise of the President, except in terms of humility for 
 the attempt to practice a deception upon the high functionary who made it, whose 
 relations to the Commander of the Army of the Potomac was necessarily of so con 
 fidential a character as to make the utmost candor on the part of the subordinate 
 a duty of the -first importance ; for it cannot be expected of the Chief Magistrate of 
 a great people to watch with jealous suspicion the chief officers in command of his 
 armies, lest they should deal covertly with him in their execution of his proper or 
 ders. If an evasion of duty is an offence of the most shameful character in any 
 subordinate towards his superior, utterly subversive of all discipline in an army, 
 and destructive of its efficiency, much more is this a crime of the first magnitude 
 in a general officer, on whose unity of action with the purposes of his superior the 
 success of an army almost entirely depends. 
 
 I now proceed to the consideration of the other condition, the fulfillment of 
 which was, in the opinion of the Corps Commanders, an essential prior to any move 
 ment by the line of the Peninsula. It is the following terms, to wit: "That the 
 enemy s vessel, the Merrimac, can be nutralized." On this point the opinion of 
 the Corps Commanders was unanimous. 
 
 It is hardly conceivable how General McClellan could disregard the warning of 
 his four Generals on this point, and undertake his expedition in spite 6f the know 
 ledge which he must himself have had of the power of the Merrimac f It is true 
 that General McClellan drew from Commodore Goldsborough a declaration that he 
 could neutralize the Merrimac. But this opinion went no further, as Genercl Mc 
 Clellan ought to have known, that an assurance that, with the aid of the Monitor, 
 and of his other navnl vessels, he could prevent the Merrimac from leaving Eliza 
 beth River, or, at all events, prevent her passing by Fortress Monroe into Chesa 
 peake Bay. 
 
 But in order to do this, that is, in order to "neutralize " the Merrimac, General 
 McCleilan must have known that the power of Commodore Goldsborough was itself 
 neutralized by Ihe Merrimac ; so that it was impossible for the navy at Fortress Moii- 
 
 * Report p. 56. 
 
 t The written instructions of the confederate navy department to the commanders of the 
 Merrimac show that he was under orders to pass out bejond Fortress Monroe and destroy Mc- 
 Cieuan s water transportation in Chesapeake -Bay, 
 
16 
 
 toe to give General McClellan any effectual aid, either on the James or York rivere, 
 tne presence of the navy, as just intimated, being necessary to watch the Merrimae. 
 It is important to understand fully this state of things, because General McClellan 
 complains, in his Report, of the want of assistance from the navy, when, in point of 
 fact, he had no right to count upon it, and would have had no right even if his four 
 Generals had not warned him of the dangerous power of the Merrimae. The navy 
 was doing all it possibly could do in covering his water line of commuuications, and 
 fead no force left with which to perform any other work. This he ought to have 
 known and no doubt he did know it, and hence I say his complaints on this head 
 are not ingenous. They are the resort and the after- thought of a defeated General, 
 whose failure was due to himself; but who has sought in this go-called "Report" 
 to throw the responsibility upon others. 
 
 The result of this reasoning is, I think, to show that not one of the conditions 
 defined by the council of Corps Commanders as essential?, prior to the adoption of 
 the Peninsula route, was complied with by General McClellan. He neither left 
 Washington secure, nor secured the neutralization of the Merrimae, nor secured 
 the co-operation of the navy. In absence of these requirements, his plain duty was 
 the adoption of the other alternative agreed upon by the Corps Commanders in th 
 following terms : " If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against 
 ike enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment." But this Gen 
 eral McClellan did not do. He had determined to move the army to the Peninsula, 
 and in doing so, he took upon himself the responsibility of all the results that grevr 
 nt of his disobedience of orders. 
 
 Yet you will presently see him turning round and with incredible effrontery 
 charging bad faith and the blame of his failures on those he had thus grossly de 
 ceived. And from that day to this he and his following have made the withholding 
 ef McDowell s corps his great grievance the gravamen of all their charges against 
 the Administration the convenient pack-horse on which to place that burden of 
 that will bear him down to a historic infamy I 
 
 *A PICKAXE AND A SPADE, A SPADED 
 
 There is now, I suppose, not the shadow of a doubt that had the Army of th 
 Potomac been simply allowed to walk on up the Peninsula, it would have been abl 
 to walk over all the force which General Magruder had to oppose it. It is now known 
 how contemptible that force was. General Magruder s official report* of his opera 
 tions on the Peninsula shows that his whole army consisted of eleven thousand 
 men ; of these, six thousand were useless to him, being placed in garrison at Glou 
 cester Point, Mulberry Island, etc. "So that it will be seen," adds he, " that th* 
 balance of the line, embracing a length of thirteen miles, was defended by about 
 Jive thousand men." What is now a matter 6f certainty was then a matter of 
 ehrewd conjecture. General Wool, whose position at Fortress Monroe gave him 
 very possible information regarding the enemy, repeatedly represented to General 
 McClellan how trifling the rebel force was and begged him to push on before the rebels 
 should have time to concentrate. Disposing his feeble force with admirable skill, 
 moving it about from point to point, and putting forth the wiles and strategems of 
 war he succeeded in so frightening General McClellan that, after a single reconnois- 
 eance, he eat down to dig. <- To my utter surprise," saj s General Magruder, "he 
 permitted day after day to elapse without an assault. In a few days the object of 
 his delny was apparent. In every direction, in front of our lines, through the in 
 tervening woods, and along the open fields, earthworks began to appear." Of simi 
 lar tenor is the conversation reported by Col. Frernantle, of the Coldstream Guards, 
 who met General Magruder in Texas last sumuer.f "He (Magruder) told me," he 
 ays, " the different dodges he had resorted to, to blind and deceive McClellan as to 
 his strength ; and he spoke of the intense relief and amusement with which heat 
 length saw that General, with his magnificent army, begin to break ground before 
 miserable earthworks defended only by 8,000 men" 
 
 Grimly amusing though the retrospect of such a spectacle is, it involve* 
 a great deal that is much too humiliating to permit our entirely appreciating 
 it. Shirking the duty of moving on the rebels at Manassas, General McClellan 
 sought the Peninsula with the express view of making a "rapid and brilliant" cam 
 paign. His first measure in execution of this campaign is to sit down before th 
 
 * Confederate Reports of Battles, page 557. t Three Months in the Southern States. 
 
17 
 
 five thousand rebels present to dispute his progress. All that can possibly save this 
 from being hereafter esteemed a bit of monstrous burlesque, is that it is vouched for 
 by the irrefragable evidence of history I * 
 
 If the defensive line which th rebels had constructed across the Isthmus from 
 Yorktown along the line of the Warwick, was really a position of the enormous 
 strength claimed by General McClellan, I can only say that he should have taken 
 this element into account when he determined on his plan of campaign. It is a 
 lame and impotant excuse for him to put forth that he did not, know the rebels had 
 a fortified position on the Peninsula, that he was wholly ignorant of the nature of 
 the topography, that he was not aware that the Warwick river ran in the direction 
 it does, and that he found the roads in a horrible condition. He was repeatedly 
 forewarned that he would find fortifications on the Peninsula jnst as well as at Ma- 
 nassas ; but with that extraordinary levity of mind that characterizes him, he in 
 sisted on seeing all rose colored in the distance, and, exemplifying perfectly the 
 Latin saying, Omne ignotnm pro magnifico, the less he knew of the nature of the 
 theatre of war he was about to seek (and he after confessed it was an unknown re 
 gion to him) the more allurements it had for him. 
 
 But without denyifig that the position which the rebels held across the Isthmus 
 W&B one naturally strong, I deny utterly and altogether that that it presented 
 anything which need have been any considerable obstacle to the advance of the 
 overwhelming numbers of the Army of the Potomac. The line held by the rebels 
 the general line of the Warwick, which heads within a mile of Yorktown was 
 defended by a series of detached redoubts connected by rifle-pits, and it was not less 
 than thirteen miles in extent. Now, all experience proves that a line so extended 
 is only formidable when the works are fully manned, and there is present, beside, 
 A moveable force, capable of rapid concentration at any point the enemy may assail. 
 The very length of such a line becomes its weakness ; there must be some point at 
 which it can be forced; and this, once done, the works become a disadvantage, 
 rather than a defence.* 
 
 On the point of the absolute necessity devolving upon McClellan to assault the 
 works at Yorktown, the moment he reached and reconnoitered them, there is, in 
 deed, no room for argument. Any one who will inspect the map will see the read 
 iness with which the line of the Warwick might have been forced, and, this once 
 done, Yorktown was turned. And this is the proper place to mention an incident 
 touching the true details of which General McClellan is as reticent as he always is 
 touching anything which in the smallest degree tells against himself. One of th 
 division commanders occupying a point where he knew he could force tne enemy s 
 line, sent a portion of his command, chiefly Vermont troops, to cross a dam which 
 the rebels had constructed, arid assault their position. This they did, and gallant 
 ly advancing under heavy fire actually took possession of the rebel works. But 
 this was all contrary to General McClellan s favorite system of regular approaches, 
 and would have proved thnt the President s recommendation to pierce the enemy s 
 line, instead of being "simple folly," as McClellan pronounced it, was the highest 
 wisdom. It must have been for this reason for there is no other to be found that 
 the brave fellows who had been guilty of this brilliant irregularity, were left utter 
 ly without support, and were finally forced to fall back with serious loss! I sup 
 pose there is but one man in the world who will not now admit that the "folly " 
 in the siege of Yorktown rested, as it so often does, exclusively where the timidity 
 belonged and that man is General McClellan. And if it will add anything to the 
 completeness of this demonstration to say that the rebels never expected to hold 
 Yorktown, we have their own testimony tojthat effect. Mugruder rightly describe* 
 the impression General McClellan s conduct produced when he speaks of the " in 
 tense amusement and delight with which he at length saw that genera! bei?in to 
 break ground before miserable earthworks defended by a feeble force of eight thou 
 sand men." 
 
 But if the rebel force was feeble at the outset and not in condition to offer any 
 serious resistance to an eve n moderately vigorous attack, it was quite certain that 
 it would not long be allowed to remain so. The enemy, finding unexpectedly that 
 they could hold the Army of the Potomac in check until a secondary defensive 
 line nearer Richmond could be prepared, would have shown an inbecility which 
 they have never displayed, had they not done so. The high probability that they 
 
 * Military history presents no more formidable fortified line" than those of Meliaigne and Bou- 
 hain, and yet Marlborough forced these, thongh defended by H superior force; and if this C > 
 be done in the case ->f positions held by a superior force, what thall we say of a line held 
 
 chain, and yet Marlborough forced these, thongh defended by a superior force; and if this C >uld 
 be done in the case ->f positions held by a superior force, what thall we say of a line held by 
 five thousand against over a hundred thousand. The comparison, hi fact, ia as ludicrous aa it 
 
 would be to compare the one general with the other I mean, of course, a Marlborougb 
 With a Mci;lellan. 
 
18 
 
 would both reason and act in this way seems to have been duly appreciated by the 
 President, who .communicated this impression to General MeClellan in mirneroui 
 dispatches, of which the following of April 6th, is a sample : " You now have over 
 one hundred thousand troops with you, independently of General Wool s command. 
 I think you had better break the enemy s lirie frooi Yorktown to Warwick river at 
 once. They will probably use time a* advantageously you can." So again, three 
 days afterward: " By delay, the enemy will relatively gain upon you; that is, he 
 will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements, than you can by reinforcements 
 alone" Never was utterance more prophetic; for, says General Magruder, in his 
 official report: "Through the energetic action of the (Confederate) government, r*- 
 inforcements began to pour in, and each hour the Army of the Peninsula gre* 
 stronger and stronger until anxiety passed from my mind as to the result of an attack 
 vpon us" With these facts, it is submitted to the reader whether we are not justi 
 fied in connecting by the closest logical bond of antecedent and consequent thia fa 
 tal delay and all the disastrous results of the campaign on the Peninsula? 
 
 At length, after a mouth of delay, the rebels, whether ashamed of themselves at 
 putting the grand Army of the Potomac to such unnecessary trouble, or because the 
 position of McDowell corps at Fredericksburg became too serious a menace to Rich 
 mond, withdrew from Yorktown as secretly as they had withdrawn from Manassaa. 
 General McClellan had comsumed many weeks, including the whole month of April, 
 in preparing to breach the fort at Yorktown. It is impossible to say how many 
 weeks more he would have gone on digging and hauling, and it is a matter of record 
 that he had just sent a request that the heavy siege guns in the fortifications for the 
 defence of Washington should be taken out of their works and shipped to him, when, 
 at length, the day after the withdrawal of the rebels, he " discovered " they had 
 gone! Corning into possession of the deserted position, he immedUtely asked if he 
 might inscribe "Yorktown " on his banners, and telegraphed a dispatch which he 
 has forgotten to reproduce, to the effect that he would " push the enemy to the 
 wall." [ ueail airily re:n*rk that taU wall" was never found ; and we were 
 left to exclaim with Pyramus: 
 
 "Thou wall! 0, wall ! O, sweet and lovely wall, 
 (Show me thy chink to blink through with mine eyne." 
 
 We shall presently follow General McClellan in his subsequent movements on the 
 Penin?uia ; but before dismissing the consideration of the siege of Yorktown, we 
 must remark, in a word, that we find ourselves unable to accord to that siege the 
 admiration which General McClellan challenges for it. We are requested to admire 
 the thirty or forty miles of corduroy road constructed by his army, the miles of 
 trenches and rifle pits opened, and the huge batteries placed, none of which, by the 
 way, was ever allowed to open its fire. But we could admire the corduroy road 
 more, were it not, according to General McClellan s own statement, a mere piece of 
 supererogation the roads in that region being "passable at all seasons of the year." 
 We could admire the colossal digging- and delving more, could we shut, out the 
 ghastly vision of the thousands of lives lost by the epidemics of th* region into 
 which our army had been led and the useless servitude to which it had been con 
 demned, or push aside the spectacle of those brave fellows digging at once a double 
 ditch a grave as well as a trench. We could admire more the profiles of his bas 
 tions and his batteries, did they not irresistibly present themselves to our imagina 
 tion as huge monuments of the folly of a man who, seeking -the Peninsula to exe 
 cute a strategically offensive campaign, sat down, at the first show of resistance, to 
 a feeble tactical defensive. 
 
 VIII. 
 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 
 
 It now stands historically determined that at the time the Army of the Potomac 
 landed upon the Peninsula, the rebel cause had reached its lowest ebb The splen 
 did victories won by the Union armies in the West armies whose ardor even the 
 McClellan policy, while it ruled, had not been able to restrain, and which, when 
 once freed from that incubus, sprang forth into glorious activity had carried dis 
 comfiture and demoralization to the rebel ranks, terror and dismay to the whole 
 population, arid fearful forebodings to the souls of the guilty leaders. 
 
 And while this was true of the rebel cause and the rebel armies generally, these 
 influences were also powerfully felt by the rebel array in Virginia. It must 
 be remembered that this was before the passage even of the first Conscription Act, 
 and while the rebel army was suffering from the excessively defective military ays- 
 
19 
 
 ^ 
 
 tern under which the " Provisional Army " was organized. Its Winter at Manas- 
 gas had greatly reduced it by disease and expiration of the terra of service of the 
 one year troops, and there is the best evidence to show that it effected its with 
 drawal from Manassas and Centreville in a condition of very great demoralization. 
 Under these circumstances, there is hardly the shadow of a doubt that, had the 
 rebels been promptly followed up after their retreat behind the Rappahannock, our 
 army would have entered Richmond on the heels of a routed and dissolving mob, 
 and taken possession of the Capital which the rebel leaders then expected to 
 abandon. 
 
 In this state of facts, the historian finds himself brought face to face with the 
 puzzling problem of determining how it happens that, in the words of Gen. BARNARD, 
 (see Report of Engineer Operations,) " the date of the iniation of the campaign of 
 this magnificent Army of the Potomac was the date of the resuscitation of the rebel 
 cause, which seemed to grow strong pari passu with the slow progress of its 
 operations?" 
 
 What the first favoring influence was, we need be at no loss to determine. The 
 unexpected delay of the whole month of April before Yorktown the military 
 strength of which was so ludicrously inadequate to have arrested the march of our 
 army, that it was long before the rebels would believe the evidence of their own 
 eyes that MCCLKLLAN had actually called a halt gave the rebels ample time to 
 look about them, to form their plans and to set on toot their execution. The first 
 fruit of this was the Conscription Law, which, let it be observed, was passed by the 
 Confederate* Congress at Richmond on the 16th day of April, in the midst of 
 McCjLELLAN s tragi-comedy of the spade before Yorktown ; and this was immediately 
 followed by the re organization of the Confederate army. Moreover the bitter 
 manner in which the defeats of the West brought home to the leaders the military 
 maxim that in attempting to cover everything one covers nothing, had taught 
 them the policy of concentration, and they speedily began its application in Vir 
 ginia. 
 
 The effect of these measures was, of course, not immediate ; but Gen. MCCLELLAV 
 delayed long enough at various points to permit their full development. Faulty in 
 strategy though the transfer of the army to the Peninsula must be considered 
 faulty as involving a necessary division of force and an enormous waste of time, 
 without eliminating or diminishing any of the difficulties of the direct advance, but, 
 on the contrary exaggerating them, all nevertheless, considering the low ebb to 
 which the rebel fortunes had sunk, and the weak and demoralized condition of the 
 rebel army in Virginia, at the initiation of the campaign on the Peninsula, we are 
 warranted by the facts in saying that a vigorous advance fron. Fortress Monroe 
 would have brought the Union army into position to fight a battle for the posses 
 sion of Richmond, with the chances of success decid-dly on our side. This might 
 again have been possible, a month later, after the battle of Williarnsburg. It might 
 still have been possible another month later on the heels of Fair Oaks. But it was 
 reserved for Gen. MCCLELLAN, by a display of timidity and indisposition to act 
 amounting absolutely to disease, to weary and wear out the patience of Fortune 
 till at length she ceased to present any more golden opportunities. What was pos 
 sible to us in April, was no longer possible in August, and the force which, as we 
 now know, had abandoned Yorktown without plans of future notion, and which was 
 driven out of Williamsburg, was able three months afterwards thanks to 
 MCCLELLAN S considerate delays to assume the offensive and throw his army pell- 
 mell back in disastrous retreat on the James, 
 
 But I anticipate. On the "discovery" of the withdrawal of the rebels on. the 
 morning of the 6th of May, Gen. STONEMAN, with his cavalry Corps and four batte 
 ries of horse artillery, was sent in pursuit. He was followed by HOOKER S Division 
 of HEINTZELMAN S Corps. Subsequently the divisions of KEARNEY, COUCH, and CASEY 
 (of SUMNER S Corps) were sent forward. STONEMAN came up with the enemy s rear 
 guard at Williamsburg, where a defensive line had been thrown up, which, how 
 ever, it is evident, JOHNSTON was not minded to hold, since his whole army had 
 passed beyond Williamsburg. It was therefore, simply for the purpose of securing 
 the safe withdrawal of the trains that the rebel rear turned sharply on STONEMAN at 
 Williamsburg; and, it being found that Union infantry supports were coming up, 
 LONGSTREET S division was actually ordered back to that point. It was between his 
 command and the divisions of SUMNER S and HEINTZKLMAN S corps that, on the fol 
 lowing day, the crude, ill-planned, unnecessary, but, for us, bloody encounter, which 
 figures in history as the battle of Williamsburg, took place. 
 
 Gen. MCCLELLAN, in his Report, skims this affair in a few vague touches a fact 
 that might be accounted for from the circumstances that, not having been person- 
 
20 
 
 ally present at this his first battle, he could know nothing of it from his own know 
 ledge, were it not for the other circumstance, that there are on record dispatches 
 revealing, on the part of Gen. MCCLELLAN, motives and moods of mind totally at 
 variance with the representations of his Report. I do not affirm that the fact of 
 their being extremely damaging to his military pretensions could have anothing to 
 do with their omission. I simply submit to the consideration of candid minds to 
 determine what is the real motive of a historical deficit otherwise so unaccount 
 able. 
 
 Gen. MeCLKLLAN does not mention, when speaking of the column he "immediate 
 ly " sent in pursuit of the enemy, that, had he been left to the motions of his own 
 hesitating and cautious spirit, no column ever would had been sent in pursuit atalL 
 It was only after the repeated and united solicitations of several of the commanders 
 had at length succeeded iu elevating his mettle up to the point of action, that th 
 consented to a force being sent in pursuit, the battle of Williamsburg. 
 
 When, too, it was sent, it was under circumstances that made the horrible confusion 
 and disorder that reigned at Williamsburg perfectly inevitable. 
 
 While Gen. MCCLELLAN had remained behind at Yorktown, for the purpose, as 
 he says, of "completing the preparations forthe departure of Gen. FRANKLIN S and 
 other troops to West Point by water" a task which, under the circumstances, 
 that is, considering that Gen. FRANLIN S Division had remained on shipboard 
 ever since it arrived, for the very good reason that, spite of Gen. MCCLELLAN I 
 call* for reinforcements, he could not find room on the Peninsula to place what 
 he had, and that FRANKLIN S movement was a mere diversion and not the main 
 business on hand, might surely have 1 been entrusted to the General who was to 
 (jomrnand it. About noon cf Monday the Prince DE JOINVILLE and Gen. SPRAGUB 
 went dot?n to Yorktown, to induce Gen. MCCLELLAN to come up and take charge of 
 operations which were going so badly for us. When told the condition of affairs in 
 front, Gen. MCCLELLAN remarked that he had supposed "those in front could at 
 tend to that little matter." After some time, however, he started from Yorktown, 
 reached the vicinity of Williamsburg, just at the close of the battle, and for th 
 first time came face to face with the actual aspect of tha problem there presented. 
 
 Now, if one looks into Gen. McCiellan s so called "Report," with a view to dis 
 cover what purpose he then and there formed in face of the state of facts at Wil- 
 liarasburg, he will look in vain. But it happens that there are dispatches in exis^ 
 tence which do photograph Gen. McCiellan s mind at this period, and as it is my 
 aim to pierce to the historical truth ui.derl ing the veneer which he has spread over 
 these transactions, I will tax the patience of the reader so far as to follow with some 
 minuteness the dissection of one of Gen. McCiellan s unpublished telegrams. 
 
 Whan, toward nightfall, Gen. McClellan arrived before Williamsburg. the enemy 
 still held his p< sition there. The troops in the front had been fighting within 
 hearing of McClellan during the entire day, but not within his personal supervision, 
 and he was, for the most part, ignorant of the true state of affairs. He thought 
 that the enemy had a securely intrenched position at Williamsburg, and had thut 
 opposed his further advance at that time and he determined to lose time before 
 Williamsburg, just as he had done at Yorktown This is snth cieutly apparent from 
 the following telegram of May 6, which, notwithstanding its great historical impor 
 tance, Gen. AfeClellan has not eeen fit to re-produce: 
 
 BIVOUAC IN FBONT OF WILT.IAMSBTTROH, ) 
 May 5-10 P. M. f 
 
 After arranging for movement up York river, I vas urgently sent for here. I find Joe Johnston 
 in front of me in strong force probably greater, a good deal, than my own, and very strongly 
 intrenched. Hancock has taken two redoubts, and repulsed i arly s brigade by a real charge of the 
 bayonet, taking 1 colonel and 150 prisoners, killing at least two colonels and as many lieutenant- 
 colonels, and many privates. His conduct was brilliant in the extreme I do not know our exact 
 loss, but fear Hooker has lost considerably on our le:t Ilea>nfrom pr son-ers that they intend 
 disputing ev ry x ep to Richmond I shall run thf, rink of at le*t holding them in check her*, 
 while I resume, the original plan Afy entire force t.s, undoubtedly, connidera ly inferior to tlutt 
 qfthe rebels, who titill fight well ; but I will do all I can with the force at my disposal. 
 
 o. B. MCCLELLAN. 
 
 Major General Commanding^ 
 Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 
 
 This telegram certainly contains some very extraordinary features, remarkably 
 illustrative of the peculiar genius of General McClellan. 
 
 He had been "urgently sent for" as if heavy firing in his front during the day 
 had not been urgently calling him forward from the moment he heard it, without 
 waiting for a summons by special messengers. 
 
 Hancock had made a "real charge with the bayonet," as if to charge the enemy 
 with t,he bayonet was something surprising to the last degree, and not to be looked 
 for from any portion of his army. 
 
21 
 
 He " fears that Hooker has lost considerably," because he knew, but knew very 
 little more, that Hooker had been under heavy fire during several hours of the day, 
 while he was superintending the movement of Franklin s division (of McDowell s 
 corps) up York river. 
 
 Having found his advance checked at Williampburg, he very gravely informs the 
 Secretary of War that he " will run the risk of at least holding them in check, 1 while 
 what? "Why, being checked himself, he will run the risk of holding the enemy in 
 check "while he resumes his original plan" an indefinite expression, which may 
 refer to either of two plans, that of turning Gloucester, or that of employing regu 
 lar eiege operations, such as he had employed before Yorktown.* 
 
 His entire force he represents as " undoubtedly considerably inferior to that of 
 the rebels a second allusion in the same telegram to an opinion which all the cir 
 cumstances, even at the time, showed to be unfounded, the enemy having just then 
 precipitately fled from Yorktown and having been driven immediately afterward 
 by " a real charge with the bayonet" certainly no signs of superiority on their 
 part. 
 
 He says that the enemy "still fight well, although the fighting at Williamsburgh, 
 that very day, was the first that his army had seriously encountered since General 
 McClellan had been in command of it. 
 
 And, finally, he concludes the telegram by an evident allusion to the McDowell 
 subject of complaint, assuring the Secretary of War that he " will do all he can with 
 the force at his disposal" language indicating very great, if not extreme, despond 
 ency, fearfully foreboding the disasters of a campaign just commenced. 
 
 This telegram was written at 10 o clock on the evening of the 5t,h of May, in 
 which we see, as just intimated, that General McClellan speaks of holding the enemy 
 in check at Wiliiamsburgh ; while, in fact, the enemy, as he then thought, had not 
 only checked his advance, but was in position behind "strong intrenchments," as he 
 calls them, to hold him in check ; and he deliberately reports his purpose of resum 
 ing his original plan, the execution of which -would have required time, instead of 
 breaking through the enemy s lines. 
 
 But what was the true state of the case ? This maybe seen by the telegram 
 of the next morning, dated at Williamsburgh, and addressed to the Secretary of 
 War. 
 
 HBADQTTABTKRS ARMY OF POTOMAC, ) 
 WILLIAMSBUKG, Va , May 6. ) 
 
 I have the pleasure to announce the occupation of this place as thf result of the hard-fought ac 
 tion of yesterday. The effect of Hancock s brilliant engagement yesterday atternoon WHS to turn the 
 lelt oT thi ir Hue of works He was strongly reinforced, and the enemy abandoned the entire posi 
 tion during ;he night, leaving all his sick and wounded in our hands The victory is complete. 
 
 * * * Am I authorized to follow the example ot other generals, and direct the names 
 of battles to be placed on the colors of regiments ? "We have other battles to fight before reaching 
 Richmond. 
 
 G, B. McOLELLAN, 
 Major General Commanding. 
 
 At ten o clock during the night of the 5th of May, General McClellan formally re 
 ports that he will hold the enemy in check, when, in fact, his real opinion was that 
 the enemy held him in check ; and he quite distinctly declares his purpose of resort 
 ing to measures requiring tune to obtain possession of Williamsburgh, when at the 
 moment of writing thtt dispatch General Hancock, by acting in the spirit of the 
 President s recommendation to break the enemy s lines, but without specific instruc 
 tions from General McClellan, had turned their position, and had actually com 
 passed what General McClellan despaired of accomplishing, except by slow opera 
 tions. On the morning of the 6th of May General McClellan, passing suddenly from 
 a state of extreme despondency, reports exultingly that the victory of the 5th of 
 May " is complete." 
 
 In the state of despondency he exaggerates the strength of the enemy, plainly an 
 excuse for his delay before Yorktown, and sets it down as " considerably greater 
 than his own ;" but^says he will do all he can with the force at his disposal when 
 the facts show that the enemy abandoned Yorktown without waiting for an attack, 
 and were driven out of Williamsburgh by a brilliant assault made by troops acting 
 under an inspiration, which General McClellan s extreme "caution" could not alto 
 gether restrain. 
 
 It is by precisely such manipulation as this that is, by constantly putting aa 
 
 *2Lnd here it may be observed, that while he was employed before Yorktown, the enemy con 
 structed his line of defence six or eiuht miles in the rear, where General McClellan proposed to 
 consume more time, giving the enemy h-isure for the construction ot anwiher line still further in the 
 rear, as if he intended to aid the enemy in disputing " every step to Kichmond ; the purpose of 
 the enemy, according to information received Irom " prisoners." 
 
origiaal motives what were really afterthoughts, and by an adroit use of the sup- 
 pressio veri that General McOlellan endeavors to give a false coloring to actions 
 and events. But unfortunately for the success of this operation, there are too many 
 "damned spots" that will not "out" for all his washing. 
 
 Of these there is now another that must be set forth. 
 
 When General McOlellan, after the battle of Williamsburgh took up his march by 
 the line of the York river, and thence along the railroad to the Chickahorniny, in 
 stead of striking across obliquely to the James, and using that river as his line of 
 supplies a course rendered possible by the destruction of the Merrimac we are, 
 according to his Report, to believe that it was with extreme reluctance that he 
 adopted this plan, to which he attempts to make it appear that he was reduced by 
 the intermeddling of the authorities at Washington. 
 
 In response to General McClellan s constant calls for reinforcements it was deter 
 mined that McDowell s corps, at Fredericksburgh, should move overland to make a 
 junction either north or south of the Pamunkey, with the right of the Army of the 
 Potomac, and co operate in the reduction of Richmond. 
 
 Informed of this determination by a dispatch from the Secretary of War, under 
 date of May 18, General McClellaii goes off in a fit of well simulated rage, and de 
 clares that this determination, and the necessity it imposed of taking the line of the 
 York river, destroyed all his plans. " This order," he says, " rendered it impossible 
 for me to use the James river as a line of operations, and forced me to establish our 
 depots on the Pamunkey and to approach Richmond from the north. * * 
 * The land movement obliged me to expose my right in order to secure the func 
 tion ; and as the order for General McDowell s march was soon countermanded, I 
 incurred great risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage and frustrated the 
 plan of campaign" 
 
 Now, is General McClellan so short of memory, or is he purposely guilty of so 
 shameless an inconsistency, that he dares to make such an assertion as this, when 
 he is himself on record, under solemn? oath, in a sense directly the reverse ? 
 
 In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, General Mc 
 Clellan in reply to the specific questions " Could not the advance on Richmond 
 from Williamsburgh have been made with better prospect of success by the James 
 river than by the route pursued, and what were the reasons for taking the route adop 
 ted !" stated as follows : 
 
 "I do not think that the navy at that time was in a condition to make the line of the James 
 river perfectly secure for our supplies. The line of the Pamunkey offered greater advantages in 
 that re-pect. The place was in a better position to effect a junction with any troop* that might 
 move from Washington on th Frederickxburgh linf.. I remember that the iita of moving on 
 the James river was seriously discussed at that time. But the eondusion was arrived at ihut t 
 under the circumstances then existing, the rvute actually followed was the best. 1 1 
 
 I leave to others the task of harmonizing these " points of mighty opposites," 
 and of determining which is original motive and which afterthought. If they can 
 not be harmonized, I leave the reader to stamp with -its fitting characterization 
 this assertion of General McClellan s. 
 
 But the truth of history requires me to go farther, and to point out that it was not 
 at Williamsburgh but at Roper s church, whei*e the army was, ten days previously, 
 that it was necessary to decide whether he would there cross the Chickahominy 
 (undefended) and approach the James river, (then open to us by the destruction of 
 the Merrimac,} or continue on the Williamsburgh road toward Richmond. The de 
 cision was made then and there, and the decision was to move by the York and 
 Pamunkey. So that so far from its being true, as claimed by General McClellan 
 that the dispatch of the Secretary of War ordering" him to connect by land with 
 McDowell, obliged him to renounce a route by which, as he would now lead us to 
 believe, he could have taken Richmond, the truth is that the choice of route was 
 voluntarily made by General McClellan ten days before- this order he quotes was given, 
 and yet he has in his report the astounding assurance to complain of the order in 
 question as subjecting him to " great risks," of which the enemy finally " took ad 
 vantage" and "frustrated the plan of campaign!" 
 
 What the enemy took advantage of and what he would have been a fool had he 
 not taken advantage of was Gen. McClellan s own ill judged scheme of operations, 
 by which he gave the Rebels an interior position between himself and the force 
 covering Washington. Just as Gen. McDowell was about to start from Frelericks- 
 burg, with a reinforcement of forty thousand men, came the news of Jackson s raid 
 up the Shenandoah Valley, and Gen. McDowell was ordered by the Presid nt to 
 send first one division, then another, and then his whole force, to follow Jackson 
 a request which is evident from Gen. McDowell s dispatches, he complied with with 
 
23 
 
 
 
 extreme reluctance, as it, for the time being, diverted him from his proposed march 
 to joia McCl-llan, which he had extremely at heart. 
 
 Thus early was the order detaining McDowell s corps to cover Washington fully 
 justified ! This, as well as all the circumstances of the case, are fully set forth in a 
 dispatch from the President, under date of May 25, in which, after giving the details 
 of Jackson s movement and the dispositions that had been made in consequence, hfi 
 concludes as follows: 
 
 If Me Dnw ell s force wa* now beyond our rea< h, ice should Z utterly helpless. Apprehension 
 of something like, this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, has always been my reason 
 for withholding McDowell s force from you. Please understand tfiis, and do the best you oan 
 with the force you have." 
 
 I submit if this language does not display, on the part of the President, a temper 
 worthy the name of sublime, especially when we consider it was addressed to 
 the man who, of ail others, had most tried his patience the man whose conduction 
 numberless occasions, had deserved his severest displeasure the man to whom the 
 President had conceded unlimited means for preparing one of the most powerful 
 armies ever raised in any country the man who, after all, evaded by an attempted 
 artifice, the orders of his constitutional chief, thereby exposing the capital ot the 
 nation to be sacked by the enemy, and exposing also his really grand army to defeat 
 and danger of imminent destruction? 
 
 The countermanding of the order given to McDowell, gave McClellan what waa 
 far more valuable to him than the actual reinforcements which that General would 
 have brought to wit, an excuse, or the semblance of an excuse for further delays. 
 For a long time he and his friends were able to saddle on that detention all the 
 blame of his failures; but this shallow trick has ceased to be possible since the 
 publication of the documents in the case; and I may add that it has ceased to be 
 possible since the publication of Gen. McClellan s own report. 
 
 Gen. McClellan states that "the information that McDowell s corps would march 
 from Fredricksburgh on the following Monday, (the 26th,) and that he would be 
 under my command, was cheering news, and I now felt that we would on his arrival 
 be sufficiently strong to overpower the large army confronting MS." This is simulated 
 joy and had no being in the bosom of Gen. McClellan at the time. The fact is Gen. 
 McCK-llan did not wish Gen. McDowell *to join him by an overland march; he 
 wished him to corne by water on his rear, and stated at the time that he would 
 rather not have him at all than have him come overland! This fact is abundantly 
 
 Thus, under date of 
 join me overland in 
 
 time fur the coming battle" (One would suppose from this that he was going to 
 fight a battle in ten minutes.) But if he did not think McDowell would be able to 
 join him in time" bv an overland march of fifty miles, (an easy three or four 
 days march,) how co. i he expect him to join him in time by the water route, 
 when, according to his experience, the transit could not have been accomplished 
 short of a fortnight? This is iterated and reiterated day after day, and finally, in 
 a dispatch, under date of June 14, he says, with still greater emphasis: 
 
 " It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are completely under my 
 eontro!. I received a telegraph from him requesting that McCall s Division might be placed so 
 aa to join him immediately on his arrival, i hat request does not breathe the proper spirit. 
 Whatever troops come to me must be so disposed of HP to do the most good . Id. not t eel feel that, 
 in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed, Gen. McDowell should wish the 
 general interest to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command. If I cannot fully 
 control a I his troops, I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I 
 ?ave, and let others be responsible for the results." 
 
 Now, speaking of what does and, what does not " breathe the proper spirit," I 
 would like to ask whether this astounding declaration of Gen. McClellan "breathes" 
 exactly the " proper spirit?" According to his own repeated declarations, he was 
 in a position in which reinforcements were absolutely essential, and yet he prefer* 
 not to have them at all, unless he can have them by a route, coming by which they 
 would have required thrice the length of time, and by which they would also have been 
 put out of the possibility of offering any protection to the threatened Capital of the 
 nation. The only advantage his plan presented is that it would have enabled him 
 to break up McDowell s divisions as they arrived, and assign them to the commands 
 of his own favorites, and rid him of the man whom he had come to regard with the 
 green eye of jealousy. I submit to the candid reader to determine whether Gen. 
 McClellan is in a situation to throw himself back on his injured innocence, and 
 claim for himself and his conduct such pure and elevated and unselfish and patriotic 
 motives, or whether all these claims are not the most hollow and unmitigated 
 pretence. 
 
 r u*/ w j rev* /tu-fc /t&y/c. t&i ttt-c- i/t>u/i> /tuuo /itst/t, wuto wcit-M/mi j.iiio 
 
 proven by numerous dispatches, published and unpublished. 1 
 May 21, he writes: " I fear there is little hope McDowell can j( 
 
24: 
 
 Of events on the Chickahominy, so damning to McClellan, BO humiliating to 
 the whole country, there is neither the space nor the patience here to fpeak.* 
 Two decisive battles were fought on the Chickahominy Fair Oaks and Gained 
 Mill. They were not battles of McClellan s seeking they were brought on by the 
 rebels, and we are thus presented with the odd spectacle of a General seeking a 
 special theatre of war for the purposeof waking not only an offensive, but a " rapid " 
 and "brilliant" movement, compelled each time he met the enemy to fight on the 
 defensive. We have the further spectacle of a man who was constantly clamoring 
 for reinforcements, fighting his two chief battles, the first with one half , the second 
 with less than one third his force I 
 
 To the last we find him persisting in the demand for more troops to the last 
 we find him the man who was ready to 
 
 "Drink up Esile, eat a crocodile," 
 
 doing nothing with what he had. " If at this instant " says he, the day after the 
 battle of Games Mill, " I could dispose of ten thousand fresh men, I could gain the 
 victory to-morrow " a statement to which we might reply that, had he not allowed 
 Porter s corps to be slaughtered the day before, he would have had the ten thousand 
 he there lost. But it is very remarkable that, with an enemy "two hundred 
 thousand" strong, and behind "strong entrenchments," he should have deemed 
 himself capable of "gaining the victory" with a feeble reinforcement of ten thousand 
 men. which would have been no more than he had during all the time he did not 
 ** gain a victory." In fact, his victories on pap^r and in hypothesis, are part of the 
 wonderful phenomena of Gen. McClellan s character. 
 
 Having lost his base, and the enemy being planted across his communications, it 
 only remained for Gen. McClellan to beat a retreat to the James River. This act 
 he dignified at the time by the euphenism of " change of base " a phrase which 
 has since then acquired a ludicrous meaning it will long to lose. 
 
 The retreat to the James, considering the bulk of the enemy was on the left bank 
 of the Chickahominy and a long march off, was not difficult. But, notwithstanding 
 this fact, and that the troops were put in the most obvious positions, and that in 
 no case was Gen. McClellan present at any of the engagements of the 4> seven days 
 fight "this movement has been claimed as a master piece of strategy compara 
 ble, say his admirers, only to Moreau s retreat through the Black Forest. And I 
 dare say that the credit in th~e one case is about as just as in the other; for Napoleon 
 proclaims that Moivau s retreat was "the greatest blunder he ever committed." 
 " As the Directory," adds he, " could not give Moreau credit for a victory, they did 
 for a retreat, which they caused to be extolled in the highest terms ; but, instead of 
 credit, Moreau merited the greatest censure and disgrace for it." I leave the 
 parallel to the reader s own apprehension. 
 
 In all the battles during this retrograde movement, we have the same utter want 
 of hed Gen McClellan in each ca?e being absent getting a fresh position to fall 
 back upon. This is the first time that we have known that it is the first and highest 
 duty uf a Commanding General to reconnoitre positions for a retreat. "The Corps 
 Commandt rs," says Gen. Heintzleman, in his testimony before the Committee on the 
 Conduct of the War, "fought their troops according to their own ideas. We helped 
 each other. If anybody asked for reinforcements, I sent them? if I wanted rein 
 forcements, F sent to others. He [McClellan] was the most extraordinary man I 
 ever saw I do not see how any man could leave so much to others, and be so confident 
 that enerythiiig would go just right" Even at the last of the series of battles, when 
 a defeat would have thrown his army into the James River, at Malvern, we find 
 him, with the exception of a brief period previous to and at the end of the fitrht, 
 away "on board a gunboat," and this, notwithstanding the admitted fact that the 
 innate valor of our troops gave the enemy so decided a repulse that, if vigorously 
 followed up, they might even then have been followed up into Richmond. 
 
 So enkls the story of the strange, eventful campaign on the Peninsula a campaign 
 which, though ill-planned, was worse executed, and in which the utter incapacity 
 of the Commanding General to take advantage of even such opportunities as fortune 
 threw in his way, was most signally demonstrated. Gen. McClellan did not bring 
 back with him such an army as he had taketo away. He brought back an army 
 demoralized, worn down by useless toil, reduced by sickness, almost unmatched in 
 the annals of war. He found the rebel cause at the lowest ebb, and the rebel army 
 
 * A full criticism of the whole of McClellan s military conduct on the peninsula will be found 
 In the series of articles in the N. Y. Times, reviewing McClellan s Report, by the present writer. 
 
25 
 
 demoralized and dispirited. He left one in the flood-tide of success, the morale of 
 the other restored by the prestigeof great victories. 
 
 IX. 
 
 HOW POPE GOT OUT OF HI3 "SCR APR" 
 
 If the army had sustained itself nobly throughout the Bad campaign on the Pen 
 insula, it cannot be denied that so much fruitless toil and so much disaster had 
 impaired its morale,, w\\\\e the looses in battle and the epidemics of the region had 
 greatly thinned Us ranks. It therefore became a serious question when the army 
 arrived at Harrison s Landing whether it should be allowed to remain or be brought 
 away.* At first there seems to have been no other intention than to reinforce McClel- 
 lari and let him try it once again. He had promised if furnished with twenty thou 
 sand men to assume the offensive and attempt a fresh advance towards Richmond. 
 Accordingly Shield s division was sent him and other troops were about to be forward 
 ed wh^n he put up his request to 50,000 men, and finally demanded reii forcemenU 
 "rather much over than under 100,000 strong." It was utterly impossible to furnish 
 this number, and this reason joined to the fact thatamaj> rity of the highest officers 
 of the army of the Potomac counsefed a withdrawal, and that a movement to effect 
 a juncr.ioti with the forces in front of -Washington, now under General Pope, wai 
 essential to cover the Capital against the attack which the rebels were absolutely 
 certain to make, and for which they were at this very time actually preparing, de 
 termined the Administration to recall the army from the Peninsula. 
 
 The order for the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula was given by Gen 
 eral Hal leek, on the 3d of August. The point to which it was ordered was Aquia 
 Creek, for the purpose of making a junction with the forces under Pope on the 
 Rappahatmock. It is hardly necessary to say that after this course was determined 
 upon the utmost possible promptitude in execution of the design was absolutely 
 necessary, for there could be HO doubt that the purpose of the rebels looking to 
 ward a movement on Washington would receive the most powerful stimulus by the 
 knowledge of the withdrawal or the army from the Peninsula. 
 
 But instead of this, we find General McClellan sitting down to expostulation, and 
 after he had exhausted this, we see him throwing every practical obstacle in the 
 way of getting the army back. He urges " the terribly depressing effect on the North 
 and the strong probability that it would induce foreign powers to recognize our ad 
 versaries," whereas the fact is, there was hardly an intelligent man in the North 
 who was not looking with the most intense anxiety to the removal of the army to 
 a position where it could be interposed between the enemy and the menaced Capi 
 tal of the nation. He promises, however, if hia counsel does not prevail, to "obey 
 the order with a sad heart." 
 
 This "sadness " of his heart seems to have so enfeebled his hand, that though he 
 was ordered to commence the removal of the army on the 3d of August, day after 
 day passed before anything was done toward it. "It is believed," writes General 
 Halleck to him under date of the 5th, "that it [the removal] can be done now 
 without serious danger. This may dot be so should there be any delay" 
 
 Finally, on the 10th, he received dispatches which should have stirred the most 
 sluggish nature to activity : " They are fighting General Pope to-day there must be 
 EO further delay in your movements ; that which has already occurred was unexpected 
 and mu.it be satisfactorily explained" This only gives McCiellan an opportunity to 
 show the enormous "inherent difficulties of the movement" difficulties* which were 
 pointed out to him before he-etarted to take the army to the Peninsula, but which he 
 then made light of and he ends by adding : "It is not possible for any one to place 
 this army where you wish it in less than a month ; if Washington is in danger now 
 this army can scarcely arrive in time to save it /" What a cheering person General 
 McClellan is! 
 
 Without following these transactions through all their maddening details, suffice 
 it ta say that it was the 20th of the month seventeen days after the order for with 
 drawal wa given before the army was ready to embark at Yorktown, Fortress 
 
 * There is connected with this portion ol McClellan s career one curious piece of history that 
 merit* a passing notice here. Headers of the Report will not have failed to have noted an extra 
 ordinary lett r addressed by General McOlellan to the President, from Harrison s Bar, under date 
 of July 7, giving his "views" on the political situation. This document opens with this state 
 ment that trie " rebellion Ao-s attxumtd the character of a war " a discovery which, perhaps, 
 explains the peace principles on which General MoJlellan had been operating, but which it is 
 a misfortune he did not make at an earlier date. It then proceeds to indicate a politico-military 
 programme of the moral suasion stamp, stating that " a declaration of radical views, especialif 
 I 
 
26 
 
 Monroe and Newport s News. And with this I leave it, to find it turning up 
 again at Alexandria, where I shall have to rview a series of events, the most ex 
 traordinary, perhaps, in General MeClellan s extraordinary career. 
 
 The whole rebel array was now rapidly marching northward to overwhelm Pope 
 and precipitate itself on Washington. If Gen. MeClellan s own estimate of the rebel 
 force, at 200 000, was correct, Pope had upon him a force six times his strength, 
 and, as it was, he certainly had upon him a force three or fowr times his strength. 
 His instructions were to " stand fast" on the Rapoahannock to "fight like the 
 devil and contest every inch of ground." In this task, he was cheered by the 
 announcement that from Alexandria he would speedily receive heavy rein 
 forcements, among which was the corps of Franklin, which he designed to move to 
 Gainesville, a position which covered Manassas Junction, and watched the gaps in 
 the Piedmont Ridge. 
 
 With the view of giving effect to this purpose, Gen. Halleck, on the morning of 
 the 27th of August, telegraphed to McClellan, who had arrived in Alexandria the 
 day before, and through whom all reinforcements to Pope must pass, that " Fraak- 
 lin s corps should march in the direction of Manassas as soon as possible." Had 
 this order been obeyed, Jackson s forces, defeated and driven by Pope ou the 2Hh, 
 would have been met near Centreville the next afternoon and crushed. 
 
 Now I ask of the reader to bring all the attention and patience he can command, 
 while I show with what fertility of device, and what prodigality of ingenuity, 
 Gen. McClellan contrived so to arrange things that Pope should not get a man of 
 these reinforcements; but should be left with his feeble force of less than forty 
 thousand men to a death-grapple with the enemy that had lately defeated McGlel- 
 lan s once splendid army of one hundred and fifty thousand men: in other words, 
 should be left to I use Gen. McClellaa s own choice phraselogy "get out of his 
 tcrape" And I shall show that so completely successful was he that not a single 
 man ever reached Pope after McClellan arrived at Alexandria. <>, 
 
 In this expose I shall take up events in their chronological order, beginning with 
 the date of the first dispatch to McClellan with reference to the forwarding of re 
 inforcements. I shall show what was the state of facts in front, what were the ne- 
 eessities of the occasion, what orders Gen. McClellan received, and how he carried 
 them out Let me add that I shall not draw from the testimony of Gen. Pope, nor 
 from the overwhelming array of facts developed by the Committee on the Conduct 
 of the War. I shall confiine myself to the simple setting forih of the text of the 
 series of telegrams that passed botween headquarters and Gen. McClellan, though 
 I ahall.be forced to draw from many dispatchea which Gen. McClellan, for reasons 
 best known to himself, has not seen fit to reproduce in his eo-called " Reporu" 
 
 T/te 27A of August. At 10 A. M., Gen. Halleck telegraphs McClellan: 
 
 * Franklins Corps should march in that direction [Manassae] as soon aa possible." 
 At 10 20 Gen. McClellan replies: 
 
 " I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march, and to repair far* [Alexaadrla] ** > 
 j*r<w, to inform me a* to hit meant of transportation." 
 
 At noon Gen. Halleck reiterates, with emphasis, his order to Fraaklin to 
 march. 
 
 ** Franklin s? corps should more out by forced marches, carrying three or four days provUlon." 
 &c< 
 
 To this Gen. McClellan replies at 1 15 P. M. : 
 
 Franklin s artillery hayeno horses, except for four guns;" and adds: "Ida notsee that UH 
 orce 6v ough in hand to form a connection with Pope, whose taoa-ct position we do not 
 
 Is it not very strange that in order that Franklin shou d march with his corps, Gen. 
 McClelLin should begin by calling him awayyVowtit? If Franklin s arrillery lacked 
 horses, why did he not take horses which were in abundance in Alexandria? That 
 this was so, I shall presently establish conclusively; and I shall also show that 
 neither McClellan, nor Franklin, ever applied for transportation to the Quarterma*9~ 
 Department, which was ready instantly to furnish it. 
 
 upon Slavery, witt rapidly disintegrate our present armies. Now, what is notable, in this 
 paper is, that it uxts writen in Washington before he leftf>r his Peninsular catuptiifln. and wot 
 intended to be ixtnied in Richmond He fancied he would there.be in a position t< dictate terms 
 and indicate the public policy. Not finding his expected opportunity to flre off the shot he had 
 prepared, he took the best occasion he could find ; and so, putting on a "tag" at the beginning 
 and the end, he brought it out at Harrison s Landing Its ineffable impudence th haggard 
 and untimely look it wears, and the inherent Absurdity of the proposition t" deal leniently 
 with those at whose hands he had ju*t euflervd disastrous defeat, are sufficiently accounted for *j 
 the eircum stances detailed. 
 
27 
 
 The 28A of August. On the morning of the 28th, Halleck telegraphs directly to 
 franklin : 
 
 " On parting with (Jen. McCIellan. about 2 o clock this morning, it was understood that you 
 were to move with your corps to-day toward Mannssas Junction, to drive the enemy from the 
 railroad. I have just learned that the genei4l has not returned to Alexandria. If you have not 
 received his order, act on this." 
 
 To this, at 1 P. M., McCIellan, not Franklin, replies: 
 
 "Your dispatch to Franklin received. I h;ive been doing all possible to hurry artillery and 
 cavalry. The moment that Franklin can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery h shall 
 go * * * * * * Please see Barnnrd, and be sure the works toward the Chain 
 Bridge are perfectly secure. I look upon those works, Ethan Allen and Marcy, as of the first 
 importance " 
 
 At 3 30 P. M., Halleck impatiently telegraphs McCIellan : 
 
 " Not a moment rmist 1)6 lost in pursuing as large a focce as possible toward Manasses, so as 
 to communicate with Pope before the enemy is reinforced." 
 
 To this McCIellan repliel at 4 40 P. M.: 
 
 " Gen. Franklin is with me here. I will know in a few minutes the condition of artillery and 
 cavalry. We are not yet in a condition to move may be by to-morrow morning." 
 
 At 8 40 P. M., Halleck still more imperatively telegraphs: 
 
 "There must be no further delay in moving Franklin s corps toward Manassas ; they must go to 
 morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready, there will be no ne 
 cessity to go at all for Pope Witt either be defeated or victorious loithout our aid. If there is a 
 want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their 
 relief." 
 
 To which Gen. McCIellan replies at 1 P. M. : 
 
 Your dispatch received. Franklin s corps has been ordered to march at 6 o clock to-morrow 
 morning. Sumner has about 14,000 infantry, without cavalry or artillery, here." 
 
 These dispatches e^ive the history of the 28th of August. Not one of these is 
 published by Gen. McCIellan in his Report. They show the reiterated orders Gen. 
 McCIellan received to send reinforcements to Pope, and the imminence of the crisis 
 that was upon that General. They show on the part of McCIellan the shallow sub 
 terfuges he employed to avoid obeying these orders. In this whole series of excus 
 es, there is but one that presents even the show of sebstantiallity namely the sup 
 posed lack of transportation ; but the utter baselessness of this pretence is made 
 manifest by a dispatch of Gen. Halleck a day or two afterward, in which he says: 
 "I learned la$t night (29th) that the Quartermasters Department would have given 
 him (Franklin) plenty of transportation if he had applied for it any time since A 
 arrival at Alexandria." 
 
 The 29^7* of August. At length, two whole days after the imperative order was 
 given to Gen. McCIellan to have Franklin "move out by forced marches," he is able 
 to say, "Franklin s corps is in motion." To be sure, Gen. McCIellan confesses that 
 his repeated promises throughout the the two previous days to send Franklin for- 
 ward were all sham, for he says; "I should not have moved him but for your press 
 ing orders of last night." Still he is at length under way, and thei# is yet a possi 
 bility that he will reach Pope in time. Yaiu hope I He halts Franklin at Anan- 
 dale and coolly telegraphs to Halleck: 
 
 " Do you wish the movement of Franklin s corps to continue t He is without reserve ammuni 
 tion and without transportation." 
 
 Gen. Halleck must be a very mild mannered man, for he simply replies : 
 
 " I want Franklin* s corps to move far ennugh to find out something about the- enemy. Perhaps 
 he may get such information at Anandale as to prevent his going further ; otherwise, he will 
 push on toward Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Manassas, Cither by telegrams 
 or through Franklin s scouts. Our people must move more actively, and find out where the ene 
 my is. lam tired of guesses." 
 
 Gen. McClellau had now exhausted all the resources of a diabolical ingenuity in 
 order to keep Pope from receiving reinforcements. He had by this means gained 
 two days and a half; that is, from 10 A. M. of the 27th until 3" P. M. of the 29th. 
 He knew that Pope had by this time the whole rebel army upon him. He knew 
 that a grteat battfoft was that very morning and afternoon going on, for the roar of 
 the artillery came to his ears at Alexandria, where he held thirty thousand loyal 
 Americans in the leasa, while their brothers in arms were being overwhelmed. It 
 was a crisis with McCIellan, and he must either let the troops go forward to Pope 
 or devise a new system of tactics. He could no longer pretend that he did not 
 know where Pope was he could no longer pretend that he did not know how far 
 Gen. Halleck wished Franklin to advance. He was brought to the wall by Gen. 
 Halleck s emphatic order. " Our people must find out where the enemy is /" 
 
 Gen. McCIellan was equal to the emergency. He drops the correspondence with. 
 Halleck, and cooLy indites to the President of the United States the following dia- 
 
28 
 
 patch, the most extraordinary ever penned by any man wearing a soldier s uniform. 
 I pause for a moment to ask the reader to take in a full realizing sense of the 
 import of the following amazing words: 
 
 "The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect 
 that the *nmy were evacuating (Jenterville and retiring towards Thoroughfare Gap. This is by 
 no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted. First To concen 
 trate -all our available forces to open communication with Pope. Second To lew, Pope to get 
 out of his scrape, and at once to use all means to make the Capital perfectly safe. No middle 
 eourse will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do and I will do all in my power to ae- 
 eomolish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey 
 whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary 
 orders. It will not do to delay longer." 
 
 Expressive silence is the only possible comment on this astounding proposition, 
 for the profound horror and contempt such words inspire take away all power of 
 <jool dissection. It is said that when Mr. Lincoln read this dispatch he fell back in 
 tiis chair in a half fainting fit,and even at this distance of time it is hardly possible 
 to read it without a sinking of the heart. 
 
 General MiiClellan in the above proposition suggests two courses. I need not 
 say that they are substantially one and the same. He knew that Lee s junction with 
 Jackson was now certain rFitz John Porter had attended to that. In either case, 
 therefore, Pope was perfectly certain to be left to " get out of his scrape." 
 
 But what was the " scrape " out of which Pope was to get? Into what horrible 
 indiscretion so unwarranted that to leave him to get out" of it was only just 
 punishment on him had he rushed? Will it be believed that he got into "the scrape" 
 at the urgent instance of General McClellan, who begged Pope to make a diversion 
 in his favor? Will it be believed that, with the loyal alacrity of a true soldier, he 
 had, in obedience to this request, thrown himself down on the Rapidan to compel 
 the enemy to loose his hold on the Army of the Potomac that he received the 
 whole weight of the rebel force precipitated upon him that with masterly general 
 ship he kept back that force for seventeen days, fighting in that time several large 
 battles, in which, repeatedly successful, he gave the rebels their first taste of true 
 punishment that by this means he succeeded in gaining time sufficient for General 
 McCiellan to bring back his army to the defence of the Capital? Yet such are the 
 facts which history records. Now we understand. This was the "scrape " Pope 
 was to get out of! 
 
 The 30//i of August. I have exhausted the main action in this strange drama, 
 but there remains an episode that should take its place in this recital. So far as the 
 keeping back of reinforcements ges, General McClellan had done his best that Pope 
 should not "get out of his scrape." But there remains a touch beyond this. Pope s 
 ammunition, rations and forage were now exhausted, and he sent to Washington to 
 procure supplies. General McClellan was to fill the orders. You shall now see how 
 he did it. 
 
 To the request for ammmunition, General MeClellan telegraphs at 1 : 10 p. m. : 
 "I know nothing^)/ the calibre of Pope a artillery" Yet he was within two minutes 
 telegraphic communication with the Ordnance Bureau at Washington, where he 
 might have had full information on this point. 
 
 To the request for rations, General Franklin replies : 
 
 I have been instructed by General McClellan to inform you that he will have all the available 
 waguns at Alexandria loaded with rations for your troops, and all of the care al&e, a* oon as you 
 will, ttend in a cavalry escort to Alexandria as a guard to tea traiu. 
 
 I cannot better set forth thia matter in its true bearing-} than by giving th 
 following passage from General Pope s official report : 
 
 M About daylight of the 80th, I received a note from General Franklin, written by direction of 
 General Mci lellan, informing me that rations and forage would be loaded in r ,o all the available 
 wagons and cars at Alexandria, as soon as I w^uld send bacd a cavalry escort to guard the trains. 
 Such h letter, when we were fighting the enemy, anl Alexandria was swarming with troops, need* 
 no comment. Bad as was the condition of our cavalry, I was in no situation to spare troops from 
 the front, nor could they have gone to Alexandria and retunred within the time by tohich toe 
 must have had provisions or have/ > lien back in the direction <if Washington; nor do I 964 
 usfiat xerv-ice cavalry could have rendered in guarding railroad zratna." 
 
 I must let this close this exposition of the extraordinary aeries of transactions 
 H Alexandria, in which I have done little else than allow official dispatches to tell 
 their own story. I leave the reader to form his own judgment and pronounce his 
 own verdict. But one remark remains. I have hitherto had occasion to call in 
 question General McClellan s capacity. The conduct here set forth invitee a ques 
 tion of his loyalty. I cannot enter General McClellan s private thought, and piuok 
 out the "heart of his mystery." It is possible that bis conduct at Alexandria was 
 nothing more than the effect of heartless selfishness and ambition, which can lead 
 
29 
 
 up to the very door of treason without passing "within. It is now certain that it 
 was the avowed purpose of McClellan and his friends so to arrange matters as that 
 the army should, to use their expression, "fall back into his arms" at Washington. 
 For this end it was essential that Pope should not obtain reinforcements, for had be 
 received the thirty thousand troops that lay idle at Alexandria, he would beyond a 
 doubt have beaten the rebel army. That he should do so was manifestly not at aM 
 in General McClellan s programme. 
 
 Looking at General McClellan s conduct as it stands revealed in his own dispatches, 
 I can only pay to him, " if this be loyalty, make the most of it." 
 
 CLOSING SCENES IN McCLELLAN S CAREER. 
 
 If, now, after the cxposb I have made of the conduct of General McClellan in th 
 extraordinary series of transactions recorded in the preceeding chapter, the ques 
 tion be asked, why it was that, after behavior which in any other country in the 
 world would have caused him to be court-martialed, we rind that general not only 
 NOT called to account, but presently restored to the full command of the Array of 
 the Potomac, L fraukly reply that this question must be left to history to an 
 swer. History will not fail to ask the question, but the answer will be given both 
 with a fuller knowledge of all the facts in the case than we now posses?, and under 
 circumstances when those considerations of the public gi>od that now put a check 
 on our venturing on even such revelations as it is in our power to make, will no 
 longer be in force. We can, however, anticipate the verdict in so far as to say that 
 history will recognize that, in his action in this matter, Mr. Lincoln was moved only 
 by the purest and most patriotic motives, and if his yielding of intellectual convic 
 tions which he must even then have formed, iiidk-ated a blameable weakness, he 
 erred only from the excess of his unselfish anxiety for the public good, at a tim 
 when things and the thoughts of men were plunged into utter chaos and collapse. 
 Pope had now " got out of his scrape " aa best he could, and the army had fal 
 len back to Washington, where the arrangements of McClellan s friends to have it 
 "fall into his arms" were crowned with all the success they could have desired. 
 Pope iell back to the works in front of Washington on the 2d of September; on th 
 same, McClellan took command, and Lee, filing off the left, proceeded to do what Gen 
 eral McClell.in, in his first memorandum, had staked his military sagacity "no capa 
 ble general" would do that is, he crossed the Potomac to make his first invasion 
 of the loyal States. 
 
 It is not my purpose to review the Maryland campaign with that fullness of de 
 tail that has characterized the analysis of the previous portion of General McCleJ- 
 lan ti career, for my aim is not so much to dissect the historical facts themselves a* 
 to dissect General McClellan s character and conduct as revealed in these facte. 
 Now, in this regard, what remains funishes really nothing essentially new. We are 
 presented with the same characteristics of genius and generalship which we hav 
 already discovered the same unreadiness to move promptly at:d act vigorously ; 
 the same clamoring for " more troops" before advancing; the same reference to 
 the great superiority of numbers on the part of the enemy. It is, after all, a dismal 
 Btory, and has probably already tested the human stomach to its utmost limits. 
 
 In the Maryland invasion, the intentions of Lee, after striking Frederick, appear to 
 have ai;ued exclusively at the capture of Harper s Ferry. His combinations for this 
 end are now fully revealed by an order of Lee s found at Frederick, and which dis 
 closes the whole programme of operations. By this it appears that the commands 
 of Jackson, Longstreet, McLaws, and Walker that is, in fact, the whole rebel army 
 with the exception of the division of D. H. Hill were aligned parts in the cap 
 ture of Harper s Ferry. The single division of D. II. Hill and part of Stuart s cav 
 alry formed the rearguard destined to check any pursuit of MeClellan, while th 
 whole rebel force ehould move to the accomplishment of the end proposed. 
 
 In a military point of view this was a bold operation, and the rebel general shouk! 
 have been umde to pay dearly for venturing upon it, And yet, if wo consider that 
 the combinations of a commander are necessarily largely influenced by his knowl 
 edge of the character of his opponent, we must admit that Lee, aware of the tardy 
 genius of McClellan, was authorized in taking a step which, against a vigorous op 
 ponent, ought to have secured his destruction. At any rate, the event fully jusu 
 fied his action. McClellan, intrusted with the duty of meeting and crushing th* 
 invading army, moved out by elow and easy stages at aw average nf fix milex a d<ty 
 and accommodated Le with all the time be Deeded. Of courae, ho was able t 
 
30 
 
 accomplish his designed object the capture of Harper s Ferry, its garrisons and 
 stores; but connected with this, and General McClellan s responsibility for it, there 
 are one or two circumstances that deserve more detailed examination. 
 
 There is no doubt that the moment Lee crossed the Potomac, the forces at Har 
 per s Ferry were placed in a false position and should have been promptly with 
 drawn. But we find no recommendation to this effect by General McClellan during 
 the period in which it was possible to carry it out. His first utterance on the sub 
 ject is in a dispatch to General Halleek, dated " Camp near Roekville, Sept. 10," 
 in the following terms : 
 
 " Colonel Miles is at or near Harper s Ferry, as I understand, with nine thousand troOps. He 
 can do nothing where he is, but could be of great service if ordered to join me. I suggest that he 
 be ordered to join me by the most practicable route." 
 
 Now let us consider what the result of the execution of this order would have 
 been. Lee s instructions to Jackson, Longstreet, <fcc., to move to the capture of 
 Harper s Ferry, are dated the day previous, Sept. 9. An order, to Colonel Miles "to 
 join him by the most practicable route," as recommended by McClellan, would, 
 therefore, have simply brought his force into the arms of the rebel army, and Jackson 
 would have been saved the trouble of even the semblance of investment he thought 
 proper to make of Harper s Ferry. In this state of facts General Halleck s reply of 
 the same day to the dispatch of McClellan is as sensible as could possibly have been 
 given : 
 
 " There is no way for Colonel Miles to join you at present ; hia only chance is to defend his 
 works till you can open communication with him." 
 
 "Till you can open communication with him ;" but with a "pursuit" at the rat* 
 of six miles a day against an enemy moving at the rate of twenty, was there much 
 chance to " open communication ?" Moreover, McClellan lost the opportunity 
 offered him of moving by the direct route to Harper s Ferry. Lee calculated that 
 by threatening with his rear guard the passage into Pennsylvania he would draw 
 McClellan off from the flank march which was open to him to Harper s Ferry. In 
 this calculation he was correct, and while he was engaged with a feeble detachment 
 of the rebel force at South Mountain, the garrison at Harper s Ferry, 12,000 strong, 
 * with all its vast military stores, on the 14th fell into the hands of Jackson. As a 
 military tribunal has pronounced judgment on this sad affair, there is no need of 
 going into it here ; it is proper, however, to cite the conclusion of its finding, which 
 is in the following terms: 
 
 " The commission has freely remarked on Colonel Miles, an old officer, who has been killed in 
 the service of his country, and it cannot from any metives of delicacy refrain from censuring those 
 in high command, when it thinks such censure deserved. The General in-Chief has testified that 
 General McClellan, after having received orders to repel the enemy .invading the State of Mary 
 land, marched only six miles per day, on an average, whn pursuing this invading army. The 
 General-in-Chief also testifies that in his opinion General. McClellan could and shonld have re 
 lieved, and protected Harper * ferry, and in this opinion the commission fully concur." 
 
 General McClellan s dispatches of this period, carefully suppressed by him from 
 his " Report," show that from the first step he took out of Washington in pursuit of 
 Lee, he was haunted by those horrible visions of the fabulous legions of the enemy 
 that we have seen constantly oppressing him. While still at Rockville, under date 
 of the 9th September, we find him writing : " From such information as can be ob 
 tained, Jackson and Longstreet have about a hundred and ten thousand, (110,000) 
 men of all arms near Frederick, with some cavalry this side." 
 
 The monstrosity of this estimate is readily apparent from the fact that even had 
 the Corps of Jackson and Longstreet been at the full (40,000 men each) their united 
 commands could only have numbered eighty thousand ; but it is perfectly well 
 known that, after the series of severe actions thz-ough which they had gone, their 
 corps did not count one-half their complement. But General McClellan was des 
 tined to go several thousand better on this estimate. Reversing the usual maxim 
 that 
 
 " Tis distance lends enchantment to the view, " 
 
 the nearer McClellan approached the enemy, the vaster his proportions grew. On 
 the llth we find him stating that "almost the entire rebel army in Virginia, 
 amounting to not less than 120,000 men, is in the vicinity of Frederick city ;" and 
 a day or two afterward that army had resumed its old Chickahominy proportions 
 of " 180,000 men !" Now with regard to Lee s army in Maryland, we have infor 
 mation more than usually precise respecting its strength. It all passed through 
 Frederick city, where it was carefully counted, and where it was found to number, 
 how many do you suppose? It was found to number precisely fifty five thousand 
 effective men ! Remember, now, that MoClellan s old Peninsular army, swelled in 
 
31 
 
 Washington by a great part of the command of Pope, numbered at thia time over a 
 hundred and twenty thousand men that is, that McClellan s force outnumbered the 
 enemy s more than two to one and you will have the proper test by which to judge 
 of his generalship in the actions which followed. 
 
 The rear guard left by Lee at South Mountain fully succeeded in delaying t^e ad 
 vance of McClfllan until such time as Jackson and Hill had compelled the surrender of 
 Harper s Ferry and the capitulation of the garrison. But even after arriving before 
 Antietam Greek he had still an opportunity on the 16th of September the day be 
 fore the battle to strike Lee before Jackson returned. This opportunity, also, he 
 threw away. Says an English military critic, who always deals tenderly with 
 McClellan: "Examining the proceedings of the 16th of September^ by the account 
 most favorable to the Federal leader, there can be no doubt that the extreme cau 
 tion which he then displayed caused him to throw away the opportunity of crush 
 ing the enemy, which the resistance of Harper s Ferry, brief though it was, placed 
 before him." 
 
 Duri.-g that night Jackson arrived with his corps, and the next day, September 
 Itth, vheii the movement of Hooker drove McClellan into battle, Lee had his whole 
 force massed at Antietam. But his whole force was doubly outnumbered by that 
 of McClellan. The battle was delivered without order or ensemble the attacks 
 being made feebly aud in driblets. Says General Sumner, in regard to the manner 
 of conducting the battle of Antietam : 
 
 u liave always believed that, instead of sending these troops into that action in driblets as they 
 were sent, if General McClellan had authorized me to march these 40,000 men on the left flank o 
 the enemy, we could not have failed to throw them right back in front of the other divisions o 
 our army on our left Buruside s, Franklin s, and Porter s corps. As it was, we went in. division 
 after division, until even one of my own divisions was forced out, the other two drove the. enemy 
 and held their positions. My intention was to have proceeded entirely on by their left and move 
 down, bringing ihem right in front of Burnside, H ranklin and Porter. 
 
 Question. And all escape for the enemy would have been impossible? 
 
 Answer. I think so. * 
 
 On the night of the 18th the enemy, abandoned their position, their ammunition 
 being exhausted, and returned across the Potomac into Virginia, without molestation. 
 McClellan slowly followed and took up a position along the Potomac, on the Mary 
 land side. Lee established himself at the mouth of the valley, just south of Har 
 per s Ferry. 
 
 If any combination of circumstances can be conceived calculated to prompta gen 
 eral to energetic preparations to retrieve his tarnished laurels, it was such an ex 
 perience as General McClellen had passed through. The campaign toward Richmond, 
 undertaken on his favorite line and began with loud promises of the speedy annihi 
 lation of the enemy, had ended in that enemy s assuming the initiative, invading 
 the territory of the loyal States and compelling McClellan s hasty retreat to cover 
 the capital. The country, which had lavished its resources to furnish, that General 
 with an incomparable aVmy, felt the profoundest humiliation and mortification 
 at the disastrous disappointment of its just expectations, and after Lee s retreat be- 
 
 fan to look anxiously for a blow to be struck that would retrieve the national 
 onor. Antietam having been fought about the middle of September, there was 
 a prospect of a season of a couple of month?, during which the state o/ the roads 
 nd the w- ather would favor military operations, and one would suppose that 
 he -would eagerly avail himself of this opportunity to strike a blow. As usual 
 with him he was during this period constantly promising to do so. On the 2Yth he 
 wrote to General Halleck : " When the river rises so that the enemy cannot 
 cross in force. I purpose concentrating the army somewhere near Harper s Ferry 
 and then moving," etc. Well, shortly after, this condition was fulfil. 1 sd, and still 
 he remained inactive. The burden of all his communications of this period was for 
 more men, and still more men.though he had now under his command an army 150,000 
 trong. On the 6th of October he was peremptorily ordered to cross the Potomac and 
 give battle to the enemy, or drive him South. Your army must move now while 
 the roads are good." Week after week passed without the order being obeyed. 
 To cover up his disobedience he has much to say in his Report of the deficiency of 
 the army in sh< es, clothing, etc.; but the hollowness of this pretense is fully dis 
 played in the letters of General Meigs and Halleck, and even by his own chief 
 quartermaster, General Ingalls. Besides, even if there were slight deficiencies in 
 this respect, as there will be in every army, (though no army in the world was ever 
 upplied as McClellan s was,) it would still have been better for him to have moved 
 
 aiting to 
 
 orps commander in his army to the writer, 
 
 Report oo the Conduct of th War,. TO!, I, p. 308, 
 
 -with this drawback than, by waiting to supply the deficit, to throw the time of 
 moyintr over to the bad season. Said a corns commander in his arrnv to the write? 
 
82 
 
 on the rainy November morning when the movement finally began, "We could 
 better have advanced in September or October with the army barefoot than we can 
 now perfectly supplied 1 " j 
 
 After nearly two months delay, General McClellan was pried from his base by an 
 imperative order, just as he had been pried out of Washington by the like means in 
 the preceding April, and he began his forward movement by the inner line, east of 
 the Blue Ridge. But it Boon became evident from the slowness of his movements, 
 the spirit in which he acted, and the complications into which he had plunged 
 himself with the military authorities at Washington, that no good results could be 
 expected from his campaign. He was accordingly ordered to reeign command^f 
 the army at Warrentoa, on the 5th of November. 
 
 Thus closes a career certainly among the most extraordinary on record, and not 
 less extraordinary from the record General McClellan has given of it to the world in 
 the "Report which has formed the subject-matter of this critique. But it is not yet 
 possible for any man to follow out in the complex web of historic cause and effect 
 all the results that have come, and may yet come, from that career. These results 
 are more and other than military, and they did not cease when his military career 
 closed. If, having failed as a military commander, he had left us merely the legacy 
 of disaster we inherited from him, if we had been only destined to find that the 
 man we had chosen for a leader in the dread ordeal into which the nation was 
 plunged by the war was a mere blunderer and incompetent, we might curse our 
 folly and thank heaven for having raised up other men to fight our battles. But he 
 left us another heritage than that of military calamities. He darkened men s minds, 
 end paralvzed their arms, with doubts and fears. The nation had put forth its 
 strength lavishly only to see it wasted ; but we could have borne this, had not th 
 very springs of confidence been sapped by the charge that all this waste, these dis 
 asters, were due to the incompetence and malevolence of the Administration. While 
 still in command, McClellan lent the weight of his endorsement to the rising spirit of 
 faction which sought to throw all the blame of his failures upon an Administration 
 which the people were taught to believe had by its influence baulked all his bril 
 liant plans, and withheld the material needed to their execution. On being removed 
 from command. McClellan put these slanders formally on record in his so-called 
 Report. He has ended by becoming the leader of a party which, going on the effect 
 produced by these vilifications of the Administration, seeks to obtain control of the 
 destinies of this nation. I have attempted to expose the falsity of these charges, 
 rf not with the expectation of silencing the clamor of men seeking their greatness in 
 their country s ruin, at least with the hope of disabusing honest men of mistaken 
 notions long assiduously inculcated, and anticipating for the military conduct of 
 Mr, Lincoln s Administration a part of that justice which history will accord it. 
 
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