,r, State Ubroy 
 
 stj p)- 3 - 
 
 APPEAL 
 
 TO THE 
 
 PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 FOR A 
 
 W-lxauunation of tfe 
 
 OF THE 
 
 GENERAL COURT MARTIAL 
 
 IN HIS CASE. 
 
 BY 
 
 MAJ. GEN L FITZ JOHN PORTER, 
 
 WITH ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS. 
 
 MOBBIST.OWN, N. J 
 1869. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Appeal to the President. 
 I. General McClellan s Opinion. 
 IT. Dr. Guernsey s Review. 
 
 III. General Longstreet s Letter. 
 
 IV. General Wilcox s Letter. 
 V. Colonel Marshall s Letter. 
 
 VI. Letter to General Grant. 
 
 VII. General Pope s Protest to a re-examination. 
 VIII. Reply to General Pope s Protest. 
 IX. Original appeal for re-hearing, with Petitions, etc. 
 General Franklin s Letter to General Grant 
 
 PRINTED DOCUMENTS ACCOMPANYING APPEAL: 
 
 Record of Court Martial published by Congress, with Judge- 
 Advocate-General-Holt s Review. 
 
 Mr. Reverdy Johnson s Reply to Mr. Holt. 
 
 Mr. Holt s Reply. 
 
 Volume 9, Rebellion Record, containing General R, E. Lee s 
 Report of the " Operations of the Army of Northern Vir 
 ginia," with Sub-Reports. 
 
 K17896 
 
MORRISTOWN, N. J., June 2lst, 1869. 
 
 General WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, 
 
 Commanding Army of the United States. 
 
 GENERAL : The President of the United States having as 
 sured my friends, who have recently brought my case to his 
 notice, that "if injustice had been done me it should be righted," 
 and intimated a purpose of primarily obtaining the opinion of 
 the Hon. Secretary of War an d yourself, as to the mode of re 
 dress under given circumstances, I have deemed it proper to 
 have put in print the papers relating to my case, with a view of 
 facilitating your examination of them. 
 
 The President, Secretaty of War and yourself, having 
 achieved the highest honors which successful generalship ever 
 receives from our people, I could not covet an investigation, 
 and, if practicable a decision in my case, from any superior 
 tribunal. 
 
 My desire to have the whole case as it now stands, adjudi 
 cated by soldiers, will be fully met by a decision rendered by 
 the President, the Secretary of War and yourself, if such a 
 mode be, as I trust it may be, found practicable. 
 
 I am, General, 
 
 With high respect, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 FITZ JOHN PORTER. 
 
APPEAL 
 
 TO THE 
 
 PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 FOR A 
 
 HP 
 
 w-tsmnhration of the 
 
 T T 
 
 OF THE 
 
 GENERAL COURT MARTIAL 
 
 HIS CASE. 
 
 BY 
 
 MAJ. GEN L FITZ JOHN ORTER, 
 
 WITH ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS. 
 
 M O R R I S T O W N , N . J . 
 1869. 
 
APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT. 
 
 MOREISTOWN, N. J., June 10#A, 1869. 
 
 GENL. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, Head Quarters of the Army, 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 Sin : I apply to you as General Commanding the Army, to 
 transmit to the President, and to recommend to his favorable 
 consideration, this, my application to him : 
 
 1st. To remit the sentence of the Court Martial now in force 
 against me of disqualification " forever to hold any office of 
 trust or profit under the Government of the United States :" 
 
 2nd. To be nominated to the Senate for restoration to my 
 rank in the Army, under the late act of Congress allowing that 
 mode of redress of wrong by a Court Martial. 
 
 I beg to ask, most respectfully, your intervention in my applica 
 tion to the President, because, in the first place, I desire to put 
 my case before him upon its merits unwarped and unencum 
 bered by political or party passion, and, in the next place, be 
 cause I seek to be judged as a soldier, by soldiers whose judgment 
 the country will respect, and history accept as true and final. 
 
 With due elimination from the investigation of all matters not 
 pertinent to the charges, I am prepared to satisfy such a tribunal 
 that my sentence was unjust. I have newly discovered evidence 
 which conclusively establishes how false was the principal ac 
 cusation. 
 
 It is matter of general information that the allegations 
 against me were inspired by the failure of General Pope s cam. 
 paign in Virginia. His friends undertook to maintain that he 
 committed no error ; and to attribute the result of his operations 
 to the defection and treasonable misconduct of certain officers 
 and soldiers of the Army of the Potomac who preferred to be 
 commanded by General McClellan. The formal charges were 
 
6 
 
 OL , of tlu- condition of the enemy in my front was cor 
 rect, I .-mi satisfied that the documents herewith submitted 
 \\ ill convince the President, that the sentence against me was on 
 all points against the clear weight of evidence in the cane. 
 
 As a portion of the documents on which I make this ap 
 plication, through yon, to the President, I submit beside the 
 record of the court, a review thereof by Judge-Advocate- 
 General Holt ; a commentary on the latter by my counsel on 
 the trial, Mr. lieverdy Johnson ; letters from Generals Longstreet 
 and Wilcox and Colonel Charles Marshall, A. D. C., and certain 
 Confederate reports ; a review of this last named evidence by 
 Doctor Guernsey ; and finally General Pope s protest against a 
 rehearing of my case, with my reply thereto. 
 
 I would prefer in offering Mr. Johnson s Review, to modify 
 some passages in which he has expressed warmly his generous 
 estimation of my services, and his strong condemnation of the 
 extreme and unparalled injustice with which I have been treated. 
 But, as I deem it proper also to lay before you, an anonymous 
 pamphlet in reply thereto, written I am informed by Judge- 
 Advocate Holt, I ought not to withhold anything in the kind 
 judgment of Mr. Johnson concerning me and my case, which 
 may be Mr. Holt s provocation and defence for the mode in 
 which I am denounced by him, in his elaborate style of invective. 
 The language used by Mr. Holt will, I am sure, suggest to you, 
 and to the President, that one whose official partiality manifests 
 itself by such proofs, ought not now to deal officially with my 
 case. 
 
 For the vindication of my conduct as a true aud faithful offi 
 cer, and of my name and honor, before the country I have en 
 deavored to serve, I am chiefly concerned to have your judg 
 ment and the judgment of the President. And in this relation 
 I am glad to be permitted to submit herewith a brief but com 
 prehensive opinion on my case by General McClellan and by 
 him handed to me for your perusal. 
 
 I am General, 
 
 Very respectfully 
 Your ob t sv t., 
 
 FIT/. JOHN POUTER. 
 
[No. L] 
 GEN. McCLELLAN S OPINION". 
 
 In the case of Genera,! Fitz John Porter, two points seem to 
 li;i\c been chiefly relied upon to justify the verdict: 
 
 1st. The alleged failure to obey the order of 6.30 P. M., 
 August 27th, requiring him to move his command at 1 A. M. 
 of the 28th. 
 
 2nd. The alleged failure to attack on the 29th August. 
 
 It appears to me that the first point, considered by itself, can 
 be disposed of very briefly. Porter s troops were much fatigued 
 and needed rest; the night was very dark; the road bad and 
 blocked by wagon trains. 
 
 Porter s impulse was to obey the order literally, but his sub 
 ordinate Generals (Morell, Sykes, and Butterfield), were so de 
 cided in their conviction that the march should be delayed, that 
 he yielded to their advice, and started only at three o clock. The 
 result showed that a still greater delay would have been judicious, 
 as giving the troops more rest, and bringing them to their destina 
 tion (mite as early as they actually reached it for they were much 
 delayed on the march. It is not charged that any injury to the 
 service resulted from the postponement, and it may confidently 
 be asserted that no unprejudiced officer of experience would 
 maintain that Gen. Porter s action in the case warrants the severe 
 sentence passed upon him. He simply exercised a responsibility 
 that must sometimes be taken by an officer receiving an order from 
 a superior at a distance. With sufficient reasons, and from good 
 motives, he departed slightly from the literal requirements of 
 the order, while he thoroughly carried out its spirit ; his purpose 
 was to reach the end of the march in the shortest time, with the 
 least fatigue to his men, and to keep them in proper condition 
 for action. This may have been an error of judgment (I do not 
 tli ink it was), but surely cannot be regarded as a crime. 
 
8 
 
 Now, as to the second point, viz. : the alleged failure to attack 
 tin- cnciny on the 29th of August. 
 
 I p to about the hour of noon on that day, Gen. McDowell 
 was with or near Gen. Porter, and, as the senior officer, was 
 vested with the command. He had under his control two divi 
 sions of liis own corps those of King and Kicketts. About 
 noon lie separated himself from Porter, and, with his two divi 
 sions, marched off to join Pope, by a road leading to the left and 
 rear of Porter s position. 
 
 It is clear that up to the hour of noon the responsibility for 
 any failure to attack rested with McDowell, not with Porter. 
 
 1 do not think it, necessary to consider here the question 
 whether Gen. McDowell ought to or could have attacked with 
 the joint commands. I merely say that up to the period of his 
 departure Porter cannot be held responsible. Porter s respon 
 sibility commences, therefore, about noon. The strength of his 
 command, after the departure of King s and Kickett s divisions, 
 was about 12,000 somewhat less. Porter believed at the time, 
 from his own observation, the statements of prisoners, and other 
 sources, that Longstreet was in front of him with greatly supe 
 rior force. 
 
 The positive evidence is now attainable to prove that Long- 
 street was in position with his whole command (more than 
 double Porter s corps in strength) before noon on the 29th ? 
 ready and anxious to be attacked, and, therefore, that Porter s 
 opinions were correct. It appears clear that the only opportunity 
 of attacking, with o- od chances of success and decisive results, 
 was early in the forenoon, and with all the combined forces of 
 Gens. McDowell and Porter. 
 
 As soon as the whole of Longstreet s command was in posi 
 tion, the result of such an attack became doubtful. 
 
 For Porter to have made it, after the withdrawal of McDowell s 
 two divisions, would have been absolute madness; for to have 
 attacked, with less than 12,000 men, a force more than double 
 in number, excellent in quality, and strongly posted, would have 
 ensured the complete repulse of the attacking party, with heavy 
 
 loss. 
 
 That attacks must sometimes be made under such circum 
 stances is no doubt true, for it is sometimes necessary for a 
 portion of an army to sacrifice itself to save the rest of the army, 
 
9 
 
 or an important part of it. But it does not appear that this was 
 such a case. The right of our army was abundantly able to 
 take care of itself, and was not hard pressed at the time in 
 quest ion. The mere position of Porter s command accomplished 
 the very important result of keeping at least double his numbers 
 in front of him, and paralyzed them so far as any action against 
 our right was concerned. The additional evidence now attain 
 able (which could not be had at the time of the trial) proves 
 beyond question that Gen. Pope was mistaken in the belief, 
 which he then entertained, that Longstreet was still remote 
 from thelield of battle, and that Porter had only a small force 
 in his front ; it proves that an attack made by Porter at any 
 time after Gen. McDowell s departure would, in all probability 
 it might be said with certainty, were there any such thing as 
 absolute certainty in war have resulted in a complete repulse, 
 with great and useless sacrifice of life ; it proves that Porter s 
 arrangements were excellent, since they enabled him to hold a 
 greatly superior force in check ; it proves that, far from merit 
 ing the severe sentence imposed upon him, he in fact deserved 
 great praise for his conduct on that day. 
 
 Justice requires that Gen. Porter s conduct on the 30th, when, 
 as is acknowledged, he fought his corps most energetically and 
 desperately, should be kept in mind when forming an opinion of 
 the transactions of the 29th, especially in the light of the new 
 evidence now adduced. 
 
 GEO. B. McCLELLAN. 
 
 June 4, 1869. 
 
[No. II.] 
 
 To THE EDITOR OF THE WORLD: 
 
 In the course of my studies on the history of the war, I have 
 had occasion to investigate minutely the facts in the case ol 
 General Kit/ John Porter. The conclusions to which I have 
 come, and the data upon which they are based, are set forth in 
 the following paper. 
 
 ALFRED II. GUERNSEY. 
 
 NEW YORK, July 2nd, 1866. 
 
 On the 27th of November, 1862, a court-martial was convened 
 for the trial of Major-General Fit/ John* Porter, charged with 
 grave military offences. After an investigation which lasted 
 forty-five days, the accused was found guilty upon both charges 
 and nearly all the specifications brought against him, and was 
 sentenced " to be cashiered, and to be forever disqualified from 
 holding any office of trust or honor under the government of the 
 United Mates" 
 
 I believe, and shall endeavor to show, that this finding of the 
 court was unwarranted by the evidence as presented on the 
 trial, and by the facts in the case which can now be proven. In 
 discussing this proposition, although much unpublished evidence 
 has fallen into my hands, I shall not resort to other than official 
 documents of admitted validity. The authorities which I shall 
 ( .jf c , ;,, v the " Proceedings of the Fit/ John Porter Court-Mar 
 tial," which will be cited as " (\)urt- Martial ; " General Pope s 
 Report of his Campaign, cited as "Po]w*8 7fry>.," which embodies 
 many sub-reports; and General R. K. Lee s Report of the 
 "Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia," cited as Reb. 
 Rec., embodying many sub-reports. The two former documents 
 are published by authority of the Congress of the United States ; 
 the last by authority of the Confederate Congress, and repub- 
 lished in Putnam s Rebellion Record, vol. 9. 
 
11 
 
 The alleged acts of disobedience were committed on the 28th 
 and 29th of August, 1862. Up to that time, it is conceded by 
 the prosecution that the military record of Fitz John Porter was 
 highly honorable. Commissioned as Colonel in May, 1861, he 
 had risen in ten months to the command of an army corps, as 
 Major-General. His services during the Peninsular campaign 
 were certainly inferior to those of no other commander in the 
 Army of the Potomac. Two of the five great battles which 
 marked the " seven days " were fought by him ; and for his ser 
 vices at Malvern Hill, General McClellan wrote to the Secretary 
 of War that, if there were another grade to add to that of 
 Major-General, he would ask it for Porter. I shall have occasion 
 to show that from the 30th of August onward his military 
 conduct did not belie his former reputation. 
 
 On the 27th of August Jackson had turned the right of Pope, 
 fallen upon his rear, captured his principal depot of supplies at 
 Manassas, and endangered his communications with the capital. 
 Porter, with his corps, had just joined the army of Pope. He 
 had that afternoon arrived at Warrenton Station, on the rail 
 road, ten miles from Bristoe Station, where Hooker had just had 
 a sharp encounter with Ewell s division of Jackson s corps. 
 Pope, then at Bristoe, sent an order to Porter, of which the fol 
 lowing is the essential part : 
 
 The Major-General commanding directs that you start at one 
 o clock to-night, and come forward with your whole corps, or 
 such part of it as is with you, so as to be here by daylight to 
 morrow morning. Hooker has had a very severe action with 
 the enemy, with a loss of about three hundred killed and 
 wounded. The enemy has been driven back, but is retiring 
 along the railroad. We must drive him from Manassas, and 
 clear the country between that and Gainsville, where McDowell 
 is. * * * * It is necessary, on all accounts, that you should be 
 here by day-light. ( Court-Martial, 6.) 
 
 This order, dated at 6.30 o clock was received by Porter, at 
 about 10 P. M. The distance to be reached was about ten 
 miles. Between the two points was the railway, with a common 
 country road, running sometimes on one side, sometimes on the 
 other, and occasionally on both sides of the track. The region 
 is somewhat broken, intersected by brooks and patches of wood, 
 with here and there a swampy place. The road was also con- 
 
12 
 
 sidi-rably encumbered by wagons. The night was overcast, 
 with no moon visible. About midnight a rain set in, and it be 
 came exln -iii.-ly dark. Porter, after coiiHultution with his gen 
 erals, Morell, Sykes, and liuttertield, decided, for the above 
 reasons, to postpone the commencement of the march until three 
 o clock, so that the troops would be fairly on their way at day 
 light. These essensial facts are proved by the testimony upon 
 the trial. (Sec- Court-Martial ; testimony of Sykes, Morel 1, 
 Griffin, Buttertield, and others, pp. 12:3, 144, 100, 162, 170, 185, 
 etc.) These officers and others testified that Bristoe would have 
 been reached sooner by starting at three o clock than at one 
 o clock ; that is, the fatigue, delay, and disorder arising during 
 the two hours of absolute darkness would have more than coun 
 terbalanced the time which would, apparently, have been 
 gained. As it was, the head of the column, owing to the ob 
 structions, did not reach Bristoe till after nine o clock. It re 
 quired quite six hours, mostly of daylight, to perform a march 
 which the letter of the order required to be accomplished in 
 three hours of extreme darkness. It was, therefore, physically 
 impossible to carry out the order to its full extent. The " dis 
 obedience" consisted of postponing for two hours the commence 
 ment of its execution. This deviation seems to me to have 
 been one fairly within the discretion of a corps commander, who 
 must have been aware of many circumstances which the com 
 manding general, ten miles away, was unaware. The fact that 
 this deviation was advised by officers of such acknowledged ca 
 pacity and zeal, is presumptive evidence that it involved want 
 neither of zeal nor capacity in Porter. In fact, as it happened, 
 it made no difference whether Bristoe was reached at daylight 
 or noon. 
 
 This charge would never have been brought except as a make 
 weight to the far more serious accusations arising from the 
 transactions of the next day. To explain these I must describe 
 thc^situation on the 20th of August, both as it appeared to Pope 
 and Porter, and as it really was. 
 
 Jackson, whose force amounted to something more than 25,000, 
 besides Stuart s cavalry, numbering 6,000, had taken up a strong 
 position near the battle-field of Bull Run. Here he resolved to 
 await the arrival of Longstreet, who, as he knew, was on the 
 march to unite with him. Longstreet s command numbered 
 
13 
 
 twenty-one brigades (Reb. Rec. ix, 574). The average strength 
 of a confederate brigade, at the beginning of these operations, 
 a fortnight before, was about 2,500. Longstreet had as yet lost 
 only a few scores in battle ; but in his rapid march some had 
 doubtless fallen out by the way, but his brigades must still have 
 averaged 2,000, making his effective strength more than 40,000. 
 Pope supposed him to be, on the morning of the 29th, at a dis 
 tance of from thirty to forty-eight hours march; for at that 
 time he wrote to McDowell and Porter : " The indications are 
 that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction 
 at a pace that will bring them here by to-morro\v night or the 
 next morning." (Pope s Rep., 241). This would give him a 
 full day and a half to deal with Jackson alone. 
 
 At this time Pope had 50,000 men, so disposed that half of 
 them could fall upon Jackson in front, while the other half 
 should assail his right Hank and rear ; between these two forces 
 he thought that Jackson must certainly be crushed before Long- 
 street could arrive. (Pope s Rep., 19, 20). Upon this supposi 
 tion were based the orders of the morning and afternoon of the 
 29th, the failure to carry out which forms the ground of the 
 second charge against Porter. But, as I shall show beyond 
 question, Longstreet at that moment, so far from being a day 
 and a half or two days distant from Jackson, was on the point 
 of uniting, and had actually in effect united with him. 
 
 It is no part of my present purpose to criticise Pope s cam 
 paign, except in so far as relates to the special matter in hand, 
 which is the conduct of Porter. But in order to elucidate this, 
 I must endeavor to give a general idea of the topography of the 
 region in which the operations of August 29 and 30 were 
 carried on, and of the position of the forces engaged in those 
 operations. 
 
 The Bull Run Mountains run nearly north and south, and are 
 cloven by two gaps, Thoroughfare and Hopewell, about three 
 miles apart. Jackson had marched up the western side of this 
 range, crossed it at Thoroughfare Gap, and swooped down up 
 on Pope s rear. Longstreet was following upon the same track. 
 From the mountains, the country slopes eastward toward Bull 
 Run River, the distance between the mountains and the river at 
 the Stone Bridge being ten or twelve miles. The intervening 
 plain, known as that of Manassas, is wooded and often rugged, 
 
14 
 
 Tin- \V:iiT< -iitiin turnpike crosses this plain from northeast to 
 soul Invest ; the Mantissas Gap Railroad crosses it from south 
 east to northwest; the railroad and turnpike intersect each 
 other at (Gainesville, a village about midway between the moun 
 tains and river. Let this figure ( ) serve to represent these 
 Ira tu res, now become historical. The line running downwards 
 from right, to left stands for the turnpike; that running upwards 
 from right to left, the railroad. The lower right hand corner is 
 Manassas Junction; the upper right hand corner is the Stone 
 IJridge, five miles distant. At the intersection of the two lines 
 is Gainesville ; at the upper left hand corner, Thoroughfare Gap. 
 Just below the turnpike, a mile from the Stone Bridge, is the 
 first Bull Run battle-field; just above it, two miles farther west, 
 is that of the second Bull Run, more properly called Groveton, 
 from a hamlet there situated. In fact, both battle-fields cross 
 the turnpike, but the first was mainly below, the second mainly 
 above. The distances, as closely as we can measure them upon 
 the large government map used upon the trial, are : Thorough 
 fare Gap to Gainesville, five miles ; Gainesville to Groveton, 
 four miles ; Groveton to Stone Bridge, three mijes ; Manassas to 
 Gainesville seven miles. 
 
 Now, on the morning of August 29, Jackson, with 25,000 
 men, was drawn up, his right at Groveton, his line extending 
 northward about two miles. Directly in his front was half of 
 Pope s force under Reynolds, Sigel, Heint/leman, and Reno, 
 twenty-five thousand strong. The other half, of equal strength, 
 under McDowell and Porter, lay along the Manassas Railroad 
 from the Junction- part way to Gainesville. According to Pope s 
 belief, Longstreet was still west of the Bull Run Mountains, al 
 though, as I shall have to show, he was by nine o clock in the 
 morning east of the mountains as far as Gainesville, and so with 
 in four miles of the battle-field at Groveton, where an artillery 
 contest at long range had been going on for several hours. 
 
 Early on the morning of the 29th, Pope, being then at Centre- 
 ville, farther from Porter than was Longstreet, sent an order to 
 Porter and McDowell, of which the following are the essential 
 portions, the omitted parts being explanantory of matters which 
 do not concern the present inquiry : 
 
 You will please move forward w r ith your joint commands 
 toward Gainsville. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno are moving 
 
15 
 
 On the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from 
 Guim-snille. I desire that as soon as communication is estab 
 lished between this force and your own, the whole command 
 shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run to 
 Centreville to-night. I presume it will be so on account of our 
 supplies. * * * If any considerable advantages are to be gained 
 f>>/ departing from this order, it will not be strictly carried out. 
 One thing must be held in view, that the troops must occupy a 
 position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by 
 morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy 
 is moving in this direction at a pace which will bring them here 
 by to-tnorrow night or the next day. [Court- Martial, 7.] 
 
 General McDowell happened at that time to be in ^he position 
 of a corps commander without any troops under him. Of his 
 two divisions, one, that of Ricketts, had been detached from the 
 main column and sent to Thoroughfare Gap to bar the passage 
 of Longstreet. It was too late, and had been driven back on 
 the previous evening by Longstreet, who was already through 
 the Gap. McDowell s other division, that of King, but now 
 commanded by Hatch, had been temporarily attached to Por 
 ter s corps. McDowell, who had been at Manasses Junction all 
 the morning, came up with Porter about noon, and, in virtue of 
 liis rank as senior general, took command of the whole force. 
 Here some conversation ensued between the two generals. 
 McDowell, as is testified to by Colonel Locke and Captain 
 Martin (Court- Martial, 135 and 141), said to Porter, " You are 
 too far out ; this is no place to fight a battle." McDowell, 
 however, testified that he had no recollection of having said this. 
 The two generals then rode apart, when McDowell gave an 
 order to Porter, respecting which there is an irreconcilable dif 
 ference of statement. McDowell testifies (Ibid, 85) that Porter, 
 pointing in the direction where the joint order directed them to 
 move, said, " We cannot go in there anywhere without getting 
 into a fight." McDowell at the time understood the remark to 
 mean simply that Porter supposed the enemy was in his imme 
 diate front, not that he was indisposed to fight. (Ibid, 89.) He 
 then directed Porter to " put his force in there," while he him 
 self took King s division of his own corps in another direction. 
 Porter asserts that the order was that he should remain where 
 he was. (Ibid, 290.) 
 
16 
 
 While it, must be admitted that McDowell s positive testi 
 mony proves that he gave, or intended to give, the order as 
 stated by him, everything that followed shows that Porter must 
 have understood it as stated by himself. But it is not necessary 
 to dwell upon this point, for the charge against Porter is, not 
 that he disobeyed the order of McDowell, whatever it was, but 
 that he disobeyed the joint order of Pope. McDowell, with his 
 men, left that part of the field, and then, as he himself says 
 (Ibid, 92), Porter ceased to be under his orders, and came 
 directly under those of Pope, their common superior, and espe 
 cially under the joint order, which, being the last received, 
 superseded others previously given. This order enjoined two 
 tilings McDowell and Porter were to move their joint com 
 mands towards Gainsville, so as to form a connection with the 
 forces of Sigel and Heintzelman and others, who were supposed 
 to be near that place ; and they must occupy a position from 
 which they could reach Bull Hun that night. Now, Sigel, 
 Heintzelman, and the others, instead of being near Gainesville, 
 were held in check by Jackson fully four miles to the east, and 
 every rod marched in the prescribed direction would have 
 removed McDowell and Porter further from a junction, besides 
 rendering more difficult the other condition of being able to 
 reach Bull Hun that night. The order expressly provided that 
 either or both generals to whom it was jointly addressed should 
 deviate from it if important advantages would thereby be 
 trained. Both did so. McDowell, instead of moving west to- 
 
 . 
 
 ward Gainesville, moved north toward Groveton. 1 he propriety 
 of his so doing does not appear to have been brought in question. 
 Porter, likewise using the discretion permitted by the order, 
 deviated from its terms by remaining where he was. I shall 
 endeavor to show that he also was fully justified in so doing; 
 and that the same holds good in regard to a later order from 
 Pope, the failure to comply with which forms the real burden ol 
 the charges against Porter. 
 
 The order was as follows: 
 
 Your line of inarch brings you in on the enemy s right flank. 
 1 desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy s 
 flank, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your right in com 
 munication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in 
 the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you 
 
17 
 
 enagage their flank. Keep heavy reserves, and use your bat 
 teries, keeping well closed to your right and rear all the time. 
 In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and 
 rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right 
 wing. ( Court Martial, 7.) 
 
 The joint order left much to the discretion of those to whom 
 it was addressed. The last was peremptory, and failure to com 
 ply with it can be justified only on the ground of urgent mili 
 tary necessity or impossibility of execution. This order was 
 written at half-past four. The aid-de-camp who bore it thinks 
 it was delivered about five, but three unimpeached witnesses 
 (Court Martial, 127, 130, 136) show that the time was about 
 1 in It-past six. 
 
 Both orders are based upon the supposition that the " whole 
 force" of the enemy under Longstreet was full twenty-four 
 hours distant ; that Jackson s corps was the only body to be en 
 countered ; and that the Union force consequently w^as nearly 
 double that of the confederates. Whereas, I shall undertake 
 to show that Longstreet had united with Jackson fully four 
 hours before the last order was written, and six hours before it 
 was received, giving the confederates a preponderance of three 
 to two ; that the line of march prescribed to Porter would have 
 brought him almost directly upon the real confederate centre, 
 instead of upon its right flank and rear, as Pope presumed ; 
 and that the execution of the order would have involved the 
 annihilation of Porter s corps, and could hardly have failed to 
 resujt in the destruction of the entire Union army. I shall show 
 that Porter knew the essential facts in the case, that Pope did 
 not, and that consequently he was fully justified in not comply 
 ing with the order. 
 
 The confederate reports embodied in Lee s Report enable us 
 to ascertain the positions and movements of his force during 
 the 29th of August. 
 
 On the evening of the 28th, Longstreet s whole force bivou 
 acked on the east side of the Bull Run Mountains, the main 
 body passing through Thoroughfare Gap, the others through 
 Hopewell Gap, three miles to the north, having encountered, 
 from Ricketts, a slight opposition at the former place, which 
 cost them only twenty-five men, killed and wounded (Eeb. Ecc. 
 ix, 636). " Early on the morning of the 29th the columns were 
 3 
 
18 
 
 united, and the march to join Jackson was resumed," says 
 Longstreet (Ibid, 570). Hood (Ibid, 633) fixes the hour when 
 the march was begun. He says, " The next morning at day 
 light the march was resumed, this division in the advance." 
 Daylight at this season is about 4.30. The head of the column 
 could easily have reached Gainesville, five or six miles distant, 
 by eight o clock. That it did so is shown by General Buford, in 
 command of the Union cavalry, who at nine o clock saw a large 
 force marching out of Gainesville, directly in the direction where 
 the cannonading was then going on near Groveton, three or four 
 miles distant. He counted seventeen regiments of infantry, one 
 battery, and about five hundred cavalry. He estimated the 
 regiments at about eight hundred each, which would give quite 
 fourteen thousand men then close upon the field. ( Court-Mar 
 tial, 84, 188.) He reported this at once to McDowell, who 
 received the report and communicated it to Porter about noon. 
 (Ibid, 84.) Pope, however, does not appear to have received 
 this report until evening, long after he had given his order to 
 Porter to attack. (Ibid, p. 35.) 
 
 But these troops which Buford saw marching to the field were 
 only a part of the confederate force pressing in the same direc 
 tion. Wilcox, who commanded that portion which had passed 
 through Hopewell Gap, says (Reb. Eec. ix. 641) that his force, 
 at 9.30, united with the others at a point about two miles west 
 of Gainesville. So that, before ten o clock, the rear of Long- 
 street s corps was within five miles of the field, and the head - 
 Hood s division must have actually made a junction with 
 Jackson. Quite half a score of the confederate commanders 
 speak of the rapidity with which this ten miles march, beginning 
 at daylight, was performed. " Early in the day " is the phrase 
 used by several in speaking of the time when they came upon 
 the field (e. g. Hood, in Ibid, 633) ; and D. R. Jones, whose 
 march was furthest to his position on the extreme right, says 
 (Ibid, 636) that he arrived on the ground " about noon." Cita 
 tions to this eftect might be greatly multiplied, all showing that 
 the junction of Longstreet with Jackson was fairly made by ten 
 o clock, and that by noon the line which was now the confede 
 rate right and centre was fully established. John Esten Cooke, 
 in the " Life of Stonewall Jackson," gives the precise statement 
 of the facts in the case. He says : " All the morning General 
 
19 
 
 Longstreet was coming into position." Lee and Longstreet note 
 specifically the positions and movements of eleven brigades of 
 infantry, besides artillery, all belonging to Longstreet s corps, 
 who were posted in this line, and moved in various ways to 
 meet what they supposed to be the exigencies of the moment, 
 ami all considerably before the hour when Pope ordered the 
 grand assault of the afternoon upon Jackson s left. Pope 
 (Report. 21), says he gave the order at 5.30 ; but Grover, who 
 bore the most brilliant part in the attack, says (Ibid, 77) that 
 he received the order at three. The confederate reports place 
 this attack still earlier. Thus Jackson (Reb. Rec., ix. 578) says : 
 " About two o clock, P. M., the federal infantry in large force 
 advanced to the attack on our left, occupied by the division 
 under General Hill;" and Ferno (Ibid, 652) says that his bri 
 gade " occupied the right of our line until after the arrival of 
 Longstreet, when we rejoined our division in the centre ; and at 
 3.30 were ordered to advance, .and soon after engaged the 
 enemy." Jackson says (Ibid, 578): "During the day, the 
 commanding general arrived, and also General Longstreet with 
 his command." Lee says (Ibid, 277): "After the arrival of 
 Longstreet, the enemy changed his position, and began to con 
 centrate opposite Jackson s left, opening a brisk artillery fire." 
 
 These citations show that Longstreet s corps came upon the 
 ground between the hours of 10 A. M. and 2 P. M. That they 
 took no serious part in the action in the afternoon was owing to 
 the fact that Stuart, whose cavalry was charged with the pro 
 tection of Longstreet s right, reported the presence of the 
 federal troops in strong force in that quarter, threatening, as he 
 supposed, Longstreet s extreme right. Lee therefore sent the 
 bulk of Longstreet s command there, instead of sending them 
 to the direct support of Jackson. This force, which prevented 
 Lee from re-inforcing Jackson in the afternoon, was that of 
 Porter. 
 
 But toward sun-down McDowell was ordered forward along 
 the Warrenton turnpike, and had a sharp fight Avith the enemy. 
 Hatch, who commanded the division, tells the story of this at 
 tack : " We were met by a force consisting of three brigades of 
 infantry. These were supported by a large portion of the rebel 
 forces, estimated by a prisoner who was taken at their rear at 
 about 30,000 men, drawn up in successive lines extending a mile 
 
20 
 
 and a half to the rear." (Pope s Rep. 177). The result was 
 tint Hatch \\:is driven back. These three brigades, as will be 
 seen by ex:mmiing the confederate reports of Lee, Longstreet, 
 :ind Ili.od (AW,. Rec. TX, 277, 570, 631), were the two of Hood 
 and the one of Evans; as well as the supporting brigades, all 
 belonged to Longstreet s corps. But they were only a part of 
 it, for Longstreet s line stretched southward beyond the Ma- 
 nasses Railroad, out-flanking Porter. 
 
 Thus the entire " main body" of the confederate army was 
 certainly within three hours march at the very moment when 
 Pope in his joint order placed them at a distance of thirty-six 
 to forty-eight hours ; they were on the field when he wrote the 
 peremptory order to Porter to advance to the attack ; they were 
 preparing to attack Pope at the very hour when this order was 
 received by Porter. (Ibid 633). Fully 40,000 strong, they 
 occupied mainly the very position which Pope supposed to be 
 empty, to which Porter, with 10,000 or 12,000 at most, was di 
 rected to march in order to fall upon Jackson s right and rear. 
 Porter s prescribed line of march would have brought him upon 
 the very centre of this force, strongly posted and greatly out 
 numbering him. The presence of this force, known to Porter, 
 and wholly unsuspected by Pope, so changed all the conditions 
 upon which the order was based, as to render its execution 
 wholly impracticable ; and therefore he would not have been 
 justified in executing this order even had it reached him in time 
 to have made a decided movement practicable, for he must have 
 known that the order was given in utter ignorance of the actual 
 position of affairs. Forty thousand and more men, of whose 
 presence his Commanding-General knew nothing, stood in the 
 way of his executing an order, to carry out which he had but a 
 quarter as many. 
 
 The facts which I have adduced, each one of which is proven 
 bv evidence which seems to be of unquestioned authority, 
 seem to me to show : 
 
 1. That in respect to the order of the 28th, Porter obeyed it 
 in substance; and that in the apparent deviation from its terms, 
 by commencing his march at three o clock instead of one o clock 
 in the morning, he did not exceed the limits of the discretion 
 vested in the commander of a corps ; and that his course was 
 
21 
 
 advised and approved by officers, than whom none in our army, 
 then and since, stood higher in respect to zeal and courage. 
 
 2. That, in respect to the joint order of the 29th, ample dis 
 ci vt ion was, by the very terms of the order, given both to Por 
 ter and to McDowell, to decide whether it should be carried 
 out ; and that in the action under this authority both were fully 
 justifiable. 
 
 3. That in failing to comply with the order of 4.30 o clock, 
 Porter was justifiable on the ground that it would not have 
 been given had his commanding officer been aware of the real 
 circumstances of the^ case ; and that the attempt to execute it, 
 had there been time, would have involved not merely failure, 
 but the annihilation of his corps, and probably the destruction 
 of the army of which it formed a part. 
 
 4. That, therefore, the court-martial should have honorably 
 acquitted Porter upon both charges, and all the specifications 
 under which he was arraigned. 
 
 Here, as far as the court-martial and its finding are concerned, 
 the case properly ends. But the charges, as preferred, contained 
 another specification, assuming that Porter, on the 30th of 
 August : 
 
 Having received a lawful order from his superior officer, 
 Major-General John Pope, to engage the enemy s lines and to 
 carry a position near their centre, and to take an annoying bat 
 tery there posted, did proceed in the execution of that order 
 with unnecessary slowness, and by delay gave the enemy oppor 
 tunities to watch and know his movements and to prepare to 
 meet his attack, and did finally so feebly fall upon the enemy s 
 lines as to make little impression upon the same, and did fall 
 back and draw away his forces unnecessarily, and without mak 
 ing any of the great personal efforts to rally his troops or to 
 keep their lines, or to inspire his troops to meet the sacrifices 
 and to make the resistance demanded by the importance of his 
 position, and the momentous consequences and disasters of a 
 retreat at so critical a juncture of the day. {Court-Martial, 9.) 
 
 This charge was indeed withdrawn, the Judge-Advocate de 
 clining to attempt to prove it. [Though this specification was 
 withdrawn by Judge- Advocate Holt, no evidence of the fact 
 appears in the order promulgating the finding of the court. No 
 such order was given me, nor any order other than that quoted 
 
22 
 
 by Dr. Guernsey, " to pursue the enemy in his retreat, and press 
 him vigorously <lnriii<j the whole day" That enemy was known 
 at the time to be strongly posted in our front, and anxiously 
 wishing an attack by us. F. J. P.] And so the accused was -hut 
 out from any attempt to rebut it. But it stands upon record as 
 having been preferred, and General Pope brings it in substance 
 in his report (p. 24), and in his testimony before the court. I 
 deem it right, therefore, to touch upon the transactions of Aug 
 ust 30, the last day of the series of battles known in history as 
 " the second Bull Run," or " the second Manassas," or, more 
 properly, "the Battles of Groveton." I shall speak of them 
 only in so far as they bear upon the part taken by Porter in that 
 disastrous battle. 
 
 On the morning of the 30th, Porter, in obedience to an order 
 from Pope, came upon the battle-field. At daylight, Pope had 
 received intelligence which made him " feel discouraged and 
 nearly hopeless of any successful issue to the operations with 
 which he was charged." (Report, 23.) But soon after, he 
 wrote to the General-in-Chief that he had won -a victory over the 
 " combined force " of the enemy. He had just been told that 
 the enemy were in full retreat, and he was going to the front to 
 see. He was convinced that this was true. " McDowell and 
 Heintzelman, who had reconnoitered the positions held by the 
 enemy s left on the evening of the 29th, reported that these posi 
 tions had been evacuated, and that there was every indication 
 that he was retreating in the direction of Gainesville." (Pope s 
 Rep. 22.) 
 
 Never was there a more grave mistake. Lee, who had come 
 up on the previous day, and assumed the control of all the op 
 erations on the field, had merely withdrawn Jackson s ex 
 treme left a little ; and during the morning had swung Long- 
 street s corps around directly from, instead of towards Gaines 
 ville. (Reb. Rec. ix, 636). The confederate right, which on the 
 day before had run pretty nearly in a line with its left, HOAV 
 formed almost a right angle with it. Its shape was that of an 
 open Y reversed thus ^. Pope s entire effective force on that 
 morning, as given by himself, (Report 23), was 40,000 men. 
 Lee s, making allowances for losses in action and on the march, 
 was fully 60,000 exclusive of cavalry. 
 
 Pope, although, as he himself says, aware that " by twelve or 
 
23 
 
 one o clock in the day we were confronted by forces greatly su 
 perior to our own, and these forces were being every moment 
 largely increased by fresh arrivals of the enemy from the di 
 rection of Thoroughfare Gap" (Pope s Rep. 24), resolved to at 
 tack, or, as his order of twelve o clock states, to " pursue the en. 
 emy," whom he knew to be advancing instead of retreating. 
 
 " The following forces," says the order from Pope (which is 
 to be found in McDowell s report), " will be immediately thrown 
 forward in pursuit of the enemy, and press him vigorously du 
 ring the whole day. Major-General McDowell is. assigned to 
 the command of the pursuit. Major-General Porter s corps will 
 push forward on the Warrenton turnpike, followed by the di 
 visions of Brigadier-Generals King and Reynolds." 
 
 Of Porter s attack Pope says : 
 
 " It was neither vigorous nor persistent and his troops soon 
 retired in considerable confusion. * * Porter s forces 
 were rallied and brought to a halt as they were retiring to the 
 rear. As soon as they could be used I pushed them forward to 
 support our left, "and they there rendered most distinguished 
 service, especially the brigade of regulars under Colonel Bu 
 chanan." (Pope s Rep., 24). 
 
 A few brief extracts from the reports of commanders of Por 
 ter s corps, who took part in this action, will show the true 
 character of this "feeble attack." 
 
 General Sykes, after describing the strong and sheltered po 
 sitions of the enemy, says : 
 
 " About 4 P. M. I was ordered to support an attack to be 
 made by General Butter-field. This attack was based upon 
 the supposition that the enemy was in full retreat so announced 
 in the orders of General Pope. Porter s army corps was to be 
 the centre of operations. * Butterfield s at 
 
 tack was gallantly made and gallantly maintained until his 
 troops were torn to pieces. My first brigade, under Colonel 
 R. C. Buchanan, moved to his aid, relieved him, and became 
 furiously engaged. The enemy, posted in a railroad excava 
 tion, was as secure as earthen embankments could make him, 
 and as our troops emerged from the woods they were met by 
 withering volleys that decimated their ranks. Their own fire 
 was almost harmless against a sheltered foe. The enemy, seeing 
 the failure, and that one weak point lay on my left, in front of 
 
24 
 
 Warren, poured on his weak command, under cover of the for 
 est, a mass of infantry that enveloped, almost destroyed him. 
 It became necessary to retire from the ground we occupied, 
 chanan s and Chapman s brigades did go in columns of regiments, 
 in line of battle under a severe artillery fire, and never wavered. 
 
 * * The enemy continuing to outflank our left, Buchanan was 
 ordered to the support of our forces engaged in that direction, 
 maintained a gallant and bloody conflict with the foe until, out 
 numbered and badly crippled, I directed him to retire. Chap 
 man, thrown in previous to Buchanan, fighting desperately for 
 three-quarters of an hour, was also ordered to retire. 
 
 * * After my command reunited, I received orders to move 
 on to Centreville, and reached there at midnight, intact and in 
 excellent order." (Sykes, in Pop Js Rep., 156-148). 
 
 I do not find any report by Butterfield of his attack ; but the 
 foregoing, from Sykes, proves the gallantry with which it was 
 made. Warren also speaks in similar terms. He says : 
 
 As soon as General Butterfield s brigade advanced up the hill 
 there was a great commotion among the rebel forces, and the 
 whole side of the hill and edges of the woods swarmed with men 
 before unseen. * * * After making a most desperate and hope 
 less fight, General Butterfield s troops fell back and the enemy 
 immediately formed and advanced. ( Warren, in Pope s Rep, 
 150.) 
 
 Of the gallantry of Warren s brigade, it is sufficient to say 
 that of his two regiments, numbering but 1,000 men, 431 were 
 killed or wounded. All the foregoing belonged to Porter s 
 corps. King s division was also under Porter s command, and 
 was no less prominent in the attack. Hatch, who now com 
 manded this division, says : 
 
 Porter directed me to post the division on the right of his 
 own troops, and to make the attack simultaneously with himself 
 At the word given by General Porter, the division advanced, 
 with an interval of fifty yards between the lines. The enemy 
 were very strongly posted behind an old dis-used railroad em 
 bankment, where, according to their own statement, they had 
 been awaiting us for two days. * * * The contest for the 
 possession of this embankment was most desperate. The troops 
 on both sides fought with the most determined courage, and I 
 
25 
 
 doubt not the conflict at this point Was one of the most bloody 
 of the whole war. 
 
 The confederate official reports are equally direct and explicit 
 as to the vigor with which this attack by Porter was made. 
 Thus, General Lee says : 
 
 About 3 P. M. the enemy, having massed his troops in front of 
 General Jackson, advanced against his position in strong force. 
 His front line pressed forward until engaged at close quarters by 
 Jackson s troops, when its progress was checked, and a fierce 
 struggle ensued. A second and third line of great strength 
 moved up to support the first, but in doing so came within easy 
 range of a position a little in advance of Longstreet s left. (Reb. 
 Rec. ix. 277.) 
 
 The " lines " thus mentioned were Porter s, for those were the 
 only troops opposed to Jackson s right and Longstreet s left. 
 Longstreet says : 
 
 Just after reaching my first line, I received a message for re 
 inforcements for General Jackson, who was said to be severely 
 pressed. From an eminence near by, one portion of the enemy s 
 masses attacking General Jackson were immediately within my 
 view, and in easy range of batteries in that position. It gave 
 me an advantage that I had not expected to have, and I made 
 haste to use it. (Ibid, 571.) 
 
 The statement that the troops which were pressing Jackson 
 were within view from Longstreets left, and within range of his 
 batteries, shows that they were Porter s, for his were the only 
 ones in such a position. Hood (Ibid, 633), says: "The battle 
 was commenced by a most vigorous attack by the enemy upon 
 the right of General Jackson." ^Jackson says of this part of the 
 engagement : 
 
 About 4 o clock in the evening the federal infantry advanced 
 in several lines, first engaging the right, but soon extending its 
 attack to the centre and left. As one line was repulsed another 
 took its place, and pressed forward as if determined, by force of 
 numbers and fury of assault, to drive us from our positions. So 
 impetuous and well-sustained were these onsets as to induce me 
 to send to the commanding general for re-enforcements ; but the 
 timely and gallant advance of General Longstreet on the right, 
 relieved my troops from the pressure. As Longstreet pressed 
 4 
 
26 
 
 upon (In- riii lit, the federal advance was checked, and soon a 
 general advance of my whole line was ordered. 
 
 The vigor and persistency of an attack may, in a measure at 
 least, be estimated from the loss suffered and inflicted. Porter s 
 own corps numbered that morning, according to Pope, 7,000 
 men. It lost in this action 2,171 men, of whom 333 are put 
 down as killed, 1,323 wounded, 518 missing; but as the field 
 remained in possession of the enemy, many of those returned 
 merely as " missing " were undoubtedly killed. The losses in 
 King s division, which also attacked under Porter, were heavy ; 
 but I find no report of the numbers. 
 
 So much for the attack by Porter, which Pope, in contradic 
 tion to all who bore part in it on either side, declares to have 
 been " neither vigorous nor persistent ; " and which the aban 
 doned charge before the court-martial characterizes still more 
 severely. No wonder that the Judge-Advocate, whom no one 
 will accuse of doing his duty negligently in this trial, abandoned 
 this charge. I think I have shown that on the 30th of August, 
 at Groveton, Fitz John Porter s conduct was worthy of the 
 general who, on the 27th of June, fought the battle of Cold 
 Harbor, and on the 1st of July won, according to McClellan, 
 the chief honors at Malvern Hill. 
 
 There was much matter introduced upon the trial, which 
 should not have influenced the finding of the court. It was 
 apparent from the evidence that there was an unpleasant state 
 of feeling between the Army of the Potomac and that of Vir 
 ginia. Pope, in his general order upon assuming the command, 
 had sneered at the manner in which the war had been conducted 
 at the East. The Eastern officers had little confidence in Pope s 
 military capacity. Porter certainly shared in this distrust ; but 
 there is no evidence that this feeling was expressed in an im 
 proper manner, or that it in the least interfered with his military 
 conduct while under Pope s command. 
 
 Again, it is evident that Porter was warmly attached, both 
 personally and professionally, to General McClellan. But no 
 one will say that this feeling was other than praiseworthy. The 
 student of history, who investigates some subsequent campaigns, 
 will find abundant reason to regret that other corps commanders 
 had not shared in this feeling for the generals commanding. 
 
 The Judge- Advocate, indeed, in his u Review " addressed to 
 
27 
 
 the President, dwelt at length upon what he supposed to be the 
 " animus " of the accused. But, if my conclusions are well 
 founded that there is no criminality, this must all be dismissed. 
 Still, if any one wishes to investigate the question of criminal 
 " animus," I am confident that he will be convinced, even from 
 t he evidence adduced, that the accusation rests upon no tangible 
 proofs, and was unworthy of being mentioned by the Judge- 
 Advocate. 
 
 It has been no part of my purpose to inquire how and why a 
 court-martial came to a conclusion which, in my judgment, is so 
 wholly contrary to fact and justice. But I think I have proved 
 that a great wrong has been done. And for every legal wrong- 
 there is a legal remedy. It is due to the nation, as well as to 
 Fit/ John Porter, that the wrong be righted as far as it can now 
 be done. 
 
[No. III.] 
 
 COFFINVILLE, Miss., September 23d, 1866. 
 F. J. PORTER, ESQ., New York City. 
 
 $ IR : Your letter of the 7th inst. reached me at this point a 
 few days ago. I have no objections to the questions contained 
 in your letter, if my answers are not to be made use of in the 
 public prints, and should have no objection to that but for the 
 peculiar position which I now occupy. So far as I am able to 
 do so I shall answer your questions, relying upon your discretion 
 in the use you may make of the matter. 
 
 Ans. 1st. My command arrived within supporting distance of 
 Jackson s command about 9 A. M., 29 August, near Groveton. 
 
 2d. Do not remember the time at which I heard that my right 
 was threatened. But remember to have moved a column to my 
 right to meet such threatening force, or rather to have moved a 
 column to re-inforce my right. 
 
 3d. My command was deployed in double line, for attack, be 
 tween 10 A. M. and 12 P. M., on the 29th, extending from Jack 
 son s right across Turnpike and Manasses Gap R. R. Do not 
 remember definitely the strength, but all of my command proper 
 was up. R. H. Anderson arrived that night with three or four 
 brigades, and was then assigned to my command. 
 
 4th. My command was ready to receive any attack after 1 1 
 o clock A. M, ; and we all were particularly anxious to bring on 
 the battle after 12 M. ; General Lee more so than the rest. 
 
 5th. My recollection of the ground on my right is that artillery 
 could not be handled on it, and that infantry could not have 
 been handled so as to make a formidable attack. 
 
 6th. If you had attacked any time after 12 M., it seems to me 
 that we surely would have destroyed your army. That is, if 
 you had attacked with less than twenty-five thousand men. 
 
 When I return to New Orleans I may be able to furnish more 
 satisfactory information than I can at this distance from my 
 
 papers 
 
 etc. 
 
 I ;im sir, very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 J. LONGSTREET, 
 
[No. IV.] 
 
 NEW YORK, October 11, 1866. 
 GEX. F. J. PORTER, New York. 
 
 GENERAL : Your letter of yesterday has been received and 
 read, and your quessions propounded in it will be answered fully 
 and cheerfully, and with all the truth possible at this time 
 more than four years after the date of the incidents referred to. 
 
 In reply to your first question, I will state my command left 
 Hopewell Gap early on the morning of the 29th of August, 
 1862, and continued its march rapidly till the other portion of 
 Longstreet s command was encountered marching on the road 
 from Thoroughfare Gap to Gainesville. My troops halted till 
 the others had passed, and then followed closely in the rear. 
 The halt was for a short time, as the troops had been passing 
 for some time. The time of junction of my command with the 
 other portions of Longstreet s command, I gave^in my report of 
 second Manasses, at 9:30 A. M. It is also stated that after ad 
 vancing some three miles beyond Gainesville, my brigades were 
 formed in line of battle on the left of the Pike, and at right 
 angles to it, and advanced near a mile and halted, the enemy 
 being in our front. Several of our batteries were in position 
 on the left of the Pike firing at the enemy, and his batteries 
 replying, most of the balls and shells falling short of my com 
 mand, which was about 1000 yards in rear of the artillery. 
 
 Second question. I think it was near 2 P. M. when my com 
 mand halted in rear of our batteries, and this halt was made, I 
 should say, one and one-half miles short of Groveton, or a little 
 over this distance. Other portions of Longstreet s command 
 were in my front on both sides of the Pike. I was in rear to 
 support. 
 
 Third question. In my report I stated that at 4:30 or 5 P. M., 
 my brigades were moved across to the right of the Pike a mile 
 
30 
 
 or inmv t<> tin- Manages Gap railroad. Here they were fonm ! 
 some inoo yanl> in rear of other troops (D. R. Jones), and to 
 meet a supposed movement of the enemy on this part of the 
 field. 
 
 Fourth question. I did not move up to our front lines, and so 
 had no knowledge from a close inspection of the ground in 
 front, but I have been from the" Pike near Groveton on horse 
 back, both to Manasses Junction and Bristoe Station, in the 
 autumn of 1861, and remember the general features of the 
 country, and should say it would have been very difficult, and 
 attended with much delay, to have taken infantry and artillery 
 over that country. 
 
 Fifth question. As stated in answer to second question, T was 
 in rear as a support, and can t be precise as to either the time 
 of formation on the south side of the Pike, or as to the brigades 
 that were formed on that side. The troops, I think, were two 
 brigades under D. K. Jones, Evans and three other of Long- 
 street s brigades, including, also, Hood s Texas brigade. 
 
 Sixth question. I should think that by 11 A. M., had you at 
 tacked the troops on the Pike, and to the right (our right) of 
 the Pike, you would probably have been repulsed ; 10,000 troops 
 would have been rather a light body for an attack at that 
 point, for our side would have been increased certainly and rap 
 idly until the rear (my command) had come up. 
 
 With reference to the last paragraph of your letter, in which 
 reference is made to evidence given by three officers on your 
 trial, to the effect that none of Longstreet s forces were in your 
 front, or in support of Jackson s right before sundown, I will 
 state that I was the last to form on the right of the Pike, and 
 that I formed at the time I stated above, and when I formed on 
 the right of the Pike there was but one brigade on Longstreet s 
 left Jones brigade, Hood s division. 
 
 1 have read Dr. Guernsey s article in the World, and on such 
 points as I have knowledge of, regard it as quite accurate and 
 just. The strength of our brigades are over estimated, I think. 
 In my three, tw r o had about sixteen hundred muskets, and the 
 other about twenty-two hundred or twenty-three hundred. The 
 distance from Hopewell Gap to Gainesville was, I think, more 
 than five miles. Thoroughfare Gap, I should say, was also more 
 
31 
 
 than that distance. It is, however, only my opinion, formed by 
 marching over the ground but once. 
 
 The attack made on Jackson s right on the 30th was made with 
 great vigor by the leading column. So much as I saw was 
 crc ditable in the extreme to the attacking column. The sup 
 ports to the part of your attacking column that I saw were 
 broken by a close and well directed artillery fire. 
 
 Very truly, &c., 
 
 C. M. WILCOX. 
 
[No. V.] 
 
 BALTIMORE, Mai/ 30?A, I860. 
 GEN. FITZ JOHN PORTER, New York. 
 
 GENERAL: I received your message, through Gen. Field 
 about 1 P. M. to-day, and am sorry that you need the informa 
 tion so soon, as I have to leave home at 4 P. M. to be absent a 
 few days, and will not, therefore, be able to state the force < 
 the confederate army at the second Manassas as accura 
 might do with a little more time. ? 
 
 The infantry of Jackson was in three divisions Jackso 
 Division Ewell s, under Lawton (after 28th), and A. P. E 
 
 Longstreet arrived on the morning of the 29th August with 
 D R Jones division of three brigades, Hood with two bri- 
 -ades, Evans one, Wilcox three, Kemper three. Jackson was 
 reduced by hard marching and fighting before the \ 
 according to the best recollection I have now, his effective info 
 try on the 29th was about twenty thousand. Longstreet had, as 
 you will see, twelve brigades of infantry on the 29th. 
 his effective present was probably not less than thirty thousa 
 as some of the brigades were pretty full. 
 
 There were about two brigades of cavalry, and, I think, abc 
 the ordinary complement of artillery to such an infantry force a 
 we had ; perhaps a little less than we generally used. 
 
 I think it safe to say our total effective present was : 
 Longstreet, infantry,.. < JMJJ 
 
 Jackson, 
 
 Artillery for both, 4 >^ 
 
 Cavalry, / *f? 
 
 The cavalry had been greatly reduced by hard servic 
 
 we got to Manassas. 
 
 The corps organization had not then been completed. 
 
 D. H. Hill was en route from Richmond, as also was McLaws. 
 
33 
 
 R. H. Anderson came up early in the afternoon of the 29th, 
 in time to have re-inforced Longstreet, and was held in reserve. 
 He had about 7,000. 
 
 The arrival of D. H. Hill s and McLaw s divisions after the 
 battle of the 30th, both of which were large, and had seen no 
 service since the battles around Richmond, about restored our 
 effective strength. 
 
 I can speak with some definiteness as to the time of Long- 
 street s arrival on the 29th, though I cannot fix the exact hour. 
 But I do know that his troops came into the turnpike road from 
 the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, striking the turnpike near 
 Gainesville. As they came up to the position occupied by 
 Jackson, some of them were at first advanced to take position 
 on his right, which rested near the turnpike, and which the 
 federal troops appeared to be endeavoring to turn. The appear 
 ance of Longstreet s column caused an immediate change in 
 Gen. Pope s dispositions, and his left was drawn back, so as to 
 bring his line nearly or quite at right angles to the road. Long- 
 street s troops were then pushed forward as they reached the 
 ground, and formed on Jackson s right, extending our line at 
 right angles to and east of the turnpike. Most of Longstreet s 
 troops had reached or were reaching their position, when Stuart, 
 who was on our right, reported the approach of a force from the 
 direction of Manassas, or rather by the road leading by our 
 flank to Manassas, and by the other towards Bristoe. As soon 
 as this report had been received, General Lee sent D. R. Jones 
 division, not yet in line, to the right, recalled part of Longstreet s 
 troops, already formed or forming on the right of the road, and 
 moved them around to support Jones. The result was that the 
 greater part of Longstreet s command changed front from north 
 to east, and remained fronting the troops approaching from 
 Manassas until some time in the afternoon (some of them until 
 night). Those troops, I understood afterwards, were yours, and 
 I am positive that they approached the field after Longstreet s 
 arrival, and that the disposition of his troops had to be changed 
 to meet them, as I have above described. I cannot give the 
 hour, because I did not come from Thoroughfare Gap with the 
 column. I slept the night before at a house west of the Gap, 
 had a chill in the night, and was not ready to go with General 
 Lee, who left about sunrise, but followed him as soon as the 
 5 
 
34 
 
 fever following the chill subsided. I passed the Gap certainly 
 as early as 8 A. M., and took the road through Haymarket to 
 Gainesville. The road was clear of troops, nor did I come up 
 with any until I reached the turnpike, where I found some halted 
 on each side of the road, those at the head of the column at that 
 time moving to occupy the first position as above described. 
 If I can be of any assistance to you in ascertaining the truth, 
 I shall be pleased to do so. I was an eye witness of the circum 
 stances that were afterwards made the ground of charges 
 against you, and do but repeat the sentiment of every officer in 
 our army who was present, when I say that those circumstances 
 were not truly presented before the Court. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 CHARLES MARSHALL. 
 
[ISTo. VI.] 
 
 YORK, September 16, 1867. 
 GENERAL IT. S. GRANT, Secretary of War. 
 
 GENERAL : I am to-day in receipt of a copy of a report sent 
 to me by order of the President of the United States, endorsed 
 upon my application for a Board to re-examine the proceedings 
 in my case. 
 
 From the Report to the President I understand that you de 
 sire " I should demonstrate to the satisfaction of the authorities 
 my ability to controvert by new evidence the testimony on 
 which I was convicted." 
 
 I presume an outline of the testimony I propose to adduce 
 before the Board to be appointed, is all that you either desire 
 at my hands at this time, or your time will permit you to inves 
 tigate. 
 
 In this view of the case I respectfully beg leave to submit, 
 that: 
 
 Under the charge of violating the Ninth Article of War, in 
 not marching at one o clock instead of three o clock on the night 
 of the 27th of August, 1862, upon which I was adjudged guilty, 
 I propose to show by General Patrick, Colonel H. C. Ransom _ 
 a member of Pope s Staff at the time and others, that it was 
 impossible to have made an effective march that night at an 
 earlier hour, and that when I moved no delay attributable to 
 me was had. 
 
 Under the charge of failing on the 29th of August, 1862, 
 
 " To push forward my forces on the enemy s flank and rear, 
 etc., as well as that I did retreat from advancing forces of the 
 enemy, without any attempt to engage them, or to aid the 
 troops already fighting greatly superior numbers, etc.," and 
 that the other portion of the army " were relying on the flank 
 attack I was then ordered to make to secure a decisive victory, 
 
and to capture the enemy s army, a result which must have 
 followed from said flank attack had it been made, etc." 
 
 In as much as the possibility of such action by me as he de 
 sired at any period within hours of the time which General 
 Pope considered available, depends altogether upon the time in 
 the afternoon at which the order was received by me, or the 
 time when action under that order, or the discretion allowed me, 
 would have been of service, I propose to show by the testimony 
 of Generals Longstreet, Wilcox and others, whose letters I place 
 in your hands for perusal, that at no time for hours anterior to 
 the writing of General Pope s order, was there a possibility of 
 my making the movement directed by him, except with the cer 
 tainty of annihilation of my command ; inasmuch as by the 
 testimony of these and other confederate officers, it is shown 
 that the corps of Longstreet, numbering not less than 30,000 
 men (my own command being less than 11,000 men) was in my 
 front hours before the order of General Pope to me was even 
 penned ; and, 
 
 That the position, which was the only tenable one left to me 
 under the circumstances, did accomplish all and more than the 
 strict fulfillment of General Pope s order contemplated, in that 
 I held (as shown by Generals Longstreet and Wilcox s letters 
 before referred to) a large body of the enemy in my front that 
 else would have engaged other portions of our army, already 
 fully employed as has been shown. 
 
 The reports of the Army of Northern Virginia since pub 
 lished in the " Rebellion Record," volume 9 all corroborate 
 the position taken by me (upon information had at that time), 
 as not only correct, but, as General Longstreet now says, " Had 
 you attacked me at any time after 12 M., we surely would have 
 destroyed your army, if you had attacked with less than 25,000 
 men." 
 
 Making little or no reference to my official conduct during the 
 years preceding the period immediately under consideration, I 
 also propose to show that my subsequent conduct, and that of 
 the troops under my command that is, on the 30th of August, the 
 day following the one wherein it is alleged General Pope s orders 
 were disobeyed was of siu-h a character as to prove, in the 
 most conclusive manner, my energy and fidelity. 
 
 I am the more anxious to do this, as the court did not deem 
 
37 
 
 the testimony at the time admissible the specification having 
 been withdrawn under which I had hoped to do so. 
 
 I shall have the testimony of Generals ButterfieldJ Sykes, and 
 others in my behalf. 
 
 I may have occasion to revert to some of the testimony taken 
 before the previous court in the course of the re-investigation, 
 and with the light thrown upon many matters by the close of 
 the war, thus give an opportunity for those who desire to revise 
 their testimony. 
 
 Evidence more or less important 011 other points is at hand, 
 but too tedious to present for your consideration at this time. I 
 propose to bring it forward from time to time before the Board, 
 as circumstances may require. 
 
 I am, General, w T ith high respect, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 FITZ JOHN PORTER. 
 
[VII.] 
 
 HEAD QUARTERS THIRD MILITARY DISTRICT, [ 
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA, Sept. IGt/t, 1867. f 
 
 GENERAL IT. S. GRANT, Washington City: 
 
 GENERAL, As I am one of the principal parties concerned in 
 the case of Fitz John Porter, and as I learn that he is in Wash 
 ington City seeking a re-opening of his case, on the ground that 
 he has come into possession of testimony since the close of the 
 war which has an important hearing on the subject, and as I 
 suppose it is not unlikely that a commission may be ordered to 
 examine that testimony and report upon it, I consider it my 
 duty, as well as my right, respectfully to submit to your atten 
 tion, or that of any commission that may be ordered, the fol 
 lowing remarks for such consideration as they merit. 
 
 It is unnecessary to set out here in detail the charges and 
 specifications on which Fitz John Porter was tried and con 
 victed, but I respectfully ask to submit a few remarks upon 
 them, merely to call attention to the points of the case estab 
 lished by testimony and uncontroverted by the defence. The 
 only answer made by the defence to the facts established is in 
 the way of explanation or excuse. 
 
 To the first charge and first specification (the disobedience of 
 orders being admitted by defence), the answer is, the night was 
 dark, and there was danger of delay and straggling in execut 
 ing the order for the march ; but it will be noticed, and I ask 
 especial attention to this fact, that no attempt was even made 
 to obey the order. It was also established in the testimony on 
 the subject that the whole of McDowell s and Sigel s corps 
 marched nearly all night that same night on a march, but five 
 or six miles north of Porter s corps, and that during the whole 
 night messengers were passing between my head quarters, to 
 which Porter was ordered, and his own and other corps of the 
 army. 
 
39 
 
 How valid such an excuse as darkness is in the face of a pos 
 itive order setting forth that the presence of his corps "was 
 necessary on all accounts," I leave to your judgment; es 
 pecially in the light of the fact that not even an attempt was 
 made under such pressing orders and necessities to bring the 
 corps forward. The whole of the circumstances on this point 
 are fully set forth in the testimony. 
 
 Although the general plea of " not guilty" was made by the 
 defence to all charges and specifications, yet it was not disputed 
 that the orders set forth in specifications to the charges were 
 received. Neither (except in the case of the joint order to 
 McDowell and Porter) is it claimed that the orders were obeyed. 
 Substantially the details set forth in all the specifications ex 
 cept the fourth and fifth specifications of the first charge, and 
 the fourth specification of the second charge remain undisputed, 
 except as to certain phrases and words and the general impres 
 sion conveyed. The only defence set up was in the way of ex 
 cuse, and comprises two points : 
 
 1st. That the ground in front of Porter s corps was difficult, 
 and that the road on which he w r as marching was occupied 
 by the right wing of the enemy, who extended across it. 
 
 2d. That the enemy was believed to be in heavy force, and 
 that an attack would have been unsuccessful. 
 
 To the first of these points it is only necessary to say that 
 the difficulty of ground, even if it existed, is no excuse for fail 
 ing to obey an order, and particularly for failing to try to obey 
 it. 
 
 The fact established in the testimony that the enemy next 
 day moved over this very ground and attacked our left, is suffi 
 cient answer as to difficulty of ground, should such a pretext 
 be thought to have any weight. 
 
 In relation to the force of the enemy in front of Porter, I beg 
 leave respectfully to submit that that question has no bearing 
 on the subject. Whether there were five thousand or fifty 
 thousand of the enemy confronting Porter is a matter not at all 
 affecting the question of his conduct. A general battle was 
 and had for hours been raging on Porter s right, and almost in 
 his sight, certainly in his hearing. He had in his command 
 nearly a third of the whole Union army. His corps had been 
 re-inforced by Piatt s Brigade, and numbered (juite 12,000 men. 
 
40 
 
 One of his divisions contained nearly the whole of the regular 
 army. 
 
 It was abundantly supplied with artillery, and was altogether 
 the most effective corps on the field. It had marched only three 
 or four miles, and was therefore by far the freshest corps in the 
 entire army. Yet it did not fire a gun during the entire battle 
 of the 29th of August, 1862, but lay on the ground with its 
 arms stacked for seven hours of that battle without an attempt 
 either to attack the enemy in front, or to come to the assistance of 
 the other troops elsewhere engaged in deadly conflict, and who 
 (as Porter himself says in his dispatch addressed to McDowell 
 and King) he believed were being overpowered and driven from 
 the field. 
 
 In the face of a positive order to attack he did not move, and 
 when convinced from the sounds of the battle on his right, that 
 that portion of the army was worsted, he retired from the field, 
 not towards the army which needed his help, but in the opposite 
 direction, although the road was open to him, and messengers 
 and orderlies were passing to and fro. These are facts estab 
 lished by the testimony, and undisputed by the defence. If, in 
 a general battle, a corps or a division commander, receiving a 
 positive order to attack a portion of the enemy s line, has the 
 right to disobey this order on the ground that he does not be 
 lieve the attack would be successful, I cannot see how any com 
 binations can be made by the commanding-General, or how he 
 can expect that any of his orders will be obeyed. How can a 
 corps commander know that the General-in-chief expects his at 
 tack to be successful ? How can he know that he is not ordered 
 to attack a particular point of the enemy s line, in order that 
 sufficient force to resist his attack may be withdrawn from 
 other points to render an assault elsewhere successful ? How 
 can he know that his attack is not intended to prevent the 
 enemy s troops in front of him from re-inforcing other parts of 
 their line upon which an attack is being made ? The effect of 
 an attack by Porter, even had he been repulsed, at any time 
 from mid-day to eight o clock, on the evening of the 29th of 
 August, 1862, is clearly set forth in General McDowell s testimo 
 ny in this case. Had Sherman failed to attack the enemy s right 
 at Chattanooga, on the ground that the enemy was in strong 
 force, and he would be repulsed (as indeed, was the fact) what 
 
41 
 
 would have become of Hooker what, indeed, of the entire vic 
 tory at Chattanooga ? In truth, I feel ashamed to offer any ar 
 gument to military men on such a matter. They are potent, 
 and as well recognized as the first principles of discipline. 
 
 I say, then, that whether the enemy s force in front of Porter 
 was great or small, it makes not the slightest excuse for his 
 not obeying his orders, nor can any excuse be found, even ad 
 mitting the above to be one, for an officer who not only diso 
 beys an order to attack but absolutely keeps a larger effective 
 force out of action anywhere during a whole day of battle in 
 his presence. If he was afraid to attack in his front, why did 
 he not bring his corps to the aid of the rest of the army which 
 he says himself (in his despatch to McDowell and King) he be 
 lieves was being worsted ? Why above all did he march away 
 from instead of towards the Union Army ? 
 
 The amount of the enemy s force in front of him, I need not 
 farther say, has no bearing upon the subject, since he knew not 
 for what purpose an attack was ordered; but it so happens in 
 this case that testimony on that point, unimportant and irrele 
 vant as it is, is at hand. I presume it will be admitted that 
 the best authority as to the amount of the enemy s force in 
 iront of Porter on the 29th August, 1862, is the report of the 
 officer in command of the enemy confronting him on that day. 
 This officer was General J. E. B. Stuart, of the rebel army. 
 He is now dead, but fortunately his report is to be found in the 
 volume of rebel reports of the campaign, published by the 
 rebel congress. Copies of these published reports are in the 
 hands of the Government, and easily accessible. 
 
 He (General Stuart) reports that he commanded on Jackson s 
 right on the 29th August, 1862, with a ridiculously small force 
 of cavalry and some small guns ; that he saw a heavy force, 
 which he estimated at 20,000 men, marching upon Jackson s 
 flank ; that he was made very uneasy, and sent back word to 
 Jackson ; that he disposed of his small cavalry force so as to 
 make as great a display as possible, and made thirty or forty 
 of his men cut brush and gallop up and down the Warrenton 
 turnpike in his rear, so as to make a great dust, and give the 
 impression that heavy forces were on that road ; that his ruse 
 was successful, and that the enemy halted and then fell back. 
 He further states that this force was Fitz John Porter s corps. 
 
42 
 
 I do not pretend to quote literally, but this report can easily be 
 had, and the exact words ascertained. Further than this, 
 Longstreet himself reports of his own corps, the strength of 
 which can be easily ascertained, that he had made forced marches 
 for several days before, and a very long and hard forced march 
 on that day, fighting part of the time with Rickett s division. 
 
 It is certain his corps was in little condition, when it arrived 
 on the field, to contend with Porter s, which, nearly, if not quite, 
 of equal strength, was perfectly fresh, and contained the best 
 troops of the army. To say at this day, that Longstreet s wea 
 ried and almost broken-down corps was able to overpower the 
 fifth corps of our army, is the bitterest commentary upon that 
 corps its worst enemy could make, and, I have no doubt, is 
 utterly groundless. It would indeed be remarkable, if over 
 powering forces of the enemy were all day in front of Porter, 
 that he was not attacked by them as astonishing as his own 
 failure to attack. 
 
 I cite these facts as to the force of the enemy in front of Por 
 ter merely as they seem to be interesting, and not because they 
 have any bearing whatever upon Porter s guilt or innocence. 
 That was determined upon other grounds, which no military 
 man will fail to recognize. 
 
 I beg attention, however, to what will, I think, very fully 
 explain Porter s conduct. 
 
 Despatches sent from him to Burnside, sent before and after 
 he joined me, and intended, as he says himself, for McClellan, 
 are to be found on the records of the court-martial. They indi 
 cate a state of mind, and a hostility and bitterness, I will ven 
 ture to say, unparalleled under such circumstances. They 
 present the grossest and most outrageous violation of discipline 
 and military propriety, to say nothing of ordinary good man 
 ners, which can be found on any official record in this country. 
 That a subordinate officer, in face of the enemy, without 
 knowledge of the number or disposition either of the enemy s 
 forces or our own, and in the midst of a deadly conflict, upon 
 which the very existence of the government and the lives of 
 thousands of patriotic men were at stake, could write such dis 
 patches almost surpasses belief. As I said, it indicates a state 
 of mind capable of anything, and these dispatches themselves 
 
43 
 
 furnish the completes! explanation of Porter s conduct which 
 can ever be given. 
 
 I take it for granted, as the general facts set forth in the 
 specification of the charges against Porter were and are com 
 pletely proved | that the testimony he now brings forward upon 
 which to base a re-opening of his case, is simply testimony as 
 to the amount of the enemy s force in front of him on the 29th 
 August, 1862. 
 
 I respectfully submit that such testimony, even if strictly true, 
 has no bearing upon the findings and sentence of the court- 
 martial in his case, and furnishes no reason whatever for re 
 opening the case. 
 
 I am, General, 
 
 very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 JNO. POPE, 
 JBvt-Maj-Gen., U. S. A. 
 
[No. VIII.] 
 
 NEW YORK, October IGth, 1867. 
 
 To His Excellency, ANDBEW JOHNSON, 
 
 President of the United States. 
 
 S IR :_ I have been permitted to read a communication from 
 Major-General John Pope to General Grant, Secretary of War, 
 in which the former asserts himself to be " one of the principal 
 parties concerned " in my case, and considers it his duty, as well 
 as his right, to enter his protest against the appeal for a re-ex 
 amination of the proceedings which Senators Wilson, Sherman, 
 Harris and Foster, Governor Curtin, General Banks, Hon. Hor 
 ace Greeley and other distinguished citizens, have in my behalf 
 asked at your hands. 
 
 In my application to you for a re-examination of the charges 
 against me, I supposed I had avoided every expression which 
 could offer embarassment to any gentleman connected with the 
 prosecution who felt disposed to revise testimony given by 
 him on the trial, by the light of newly discovered evidence. In 
 what I have done to vindicate my good name everything has 
 been open and in the light of day. I have not endeavored to 
 create public opinion or control it. I have not asked for con 
 gressional or any other final action in advance of facts ascer 
 tained under the forms and sanction of military judicature. I 
 have not asked for the appointment of an inferior commission, 
 but have urged the selection of a Board of Officers so high in 
 rank and in public esteem, that its decision would everywhere 
 carry conviction of the soundness thereof. You are aware that 
 so careful have I been to exclude all possibility of partisan 
 prejudice or political emotion, that I suggested that my appli 
 cation be referred to General Grant for report and action there 
 under. Against this disposition of my case Major General Pope 
 alone protests. He has no willingness to avail himself of * he 
 
45 
 
 opportunity offered to assist in the proposed inquiry for the as 
 certainment of truth, but rises up as an accuser in a case in 
 which, at one time, he only claimed to be an unwilling wit 
 ness. 
 
 Distinguished Senators and upright citizens, familiar with the 
 whole field of military operations during the late war, represent 
 to the President that evidence unattainable at the former trial, 
 pertinent to the issues involved, and now within easy access, is 
 sufficient to warrant the appointment of a commission " to ex 
 amine this evidence and ascertain whether injustice has not been 
 done ?" but Major-General Pope protests against being again 
 required to submit his statements and allegations to such a test. 
 Will your Excellency permit me to so far trespass upon your 
 time as to place on record a few suggestions in answer to the 
 volunteered oommunication of Major-General Pope, which, while 
 they serve to show the errors amid which that officer still wan 
 ders, may perchance indicate to you the importance of the 
 newly discovered evidence now accessible ? 
 
 The main points contained in General Pope s communication 
 may be summed up as follows : 
 
 1st. That no attempt was made to execute the order of 6.30 
 P. M., of August 27th, 1862, to march at one o clock at night, 
 
 &G. 
 
 Answer. I shall show by recorded testimony, to which I pro 
 pose to materially add, that I attempted and did execute the 
 order as far as practicable, the only modification being a change 
 in the hour of march from one to three o clock. This change 
 was induced by the remonstrance of officers next to me in 
 command, whose judgment, skill, and bravery can never justly 
 be called in question. They urged that literal compliance was 
 impossible, and would, if attempted, render my corps wholly- 
 unlit for the additional service specified for that morning ; my 
 troops then being without food, wearied by long, forced, and 
 unceasing marches. It was also urged and agreed that even at 
 three o clock, when the troops did move, no substantial progress 
 could be made till increasing light permitted. 
 
 2nd. That it is established in testimony that both McDowell 
 and Sigel s corps marched nearly all that night (August 27th), 
 a few miles north of my corps. 
 
 , In the spirit in which this allegation is presented by 
 
46 
 
 General Pope, he is in error, for I shall establish by new testi 
 mony that 
 
 The turnpike over which these corps were directed to march 
 that night was of a much better character than the country road 
 my command was to traverse, and that 
 
 During the short time these corps were marching, the same 
 difficulties were experienced as by my troops, and that no sub 
 stantial gain or progress was made in the darkness ; and also 
 that 
 
 Officers, some of them members of General Pope s staff, leav 
 ing my camp at midnight for Bristoe Station (my destination), 
 were forced from the road by obstructions, and lost their way 
 in the darkness, though conducted by an experienced guide, and 
 did not reach General Pope till 8 A. M., on the 28th. 
 
 3d. " That it is not disputed General Pope s orders were re 
 ceived." 
 
 Answer. It is disputed that General Pope s orders were, in 
 any case, received within a reasonable period after they pur 
 ported to have been issued. It can be shown that all of General 
 Pope s orders were delayed in the delivery ; and it is proved 
 by the testimony of General Sykes, Colonel Locke, Captains 
 Montieth, Weld and others, that the order of 4.30 P. M. on 
 29th August, was not received by me till too late to execute. 
 
 4th. That the enemy did, on the 30th August, " pass over the 
 ground claimed by me as impassable, and attack the left of our 
 army." 
 
 Anstcer. The facts are that, "although the enemy did, on the 
 day succeeding that in question, i. e., on the 30th of August, 
 succeed in pushing some troops over a portion of the ground 
 regarded impassable, in the immediate presence of an opposing 
 force, still they were employed from early in the morning to 2 
 o clock P. M., in doing that which even General Pope s own 
 version allowed me less than three hours to accomplish ; and 
 there is the additional fact that no force of ours then opposed 
 the enemy, whereas on the preceding day I was expected to 
 traverse the same ground in much less time, overwhelmingly 
 opposed : 
 
 That no artillery was taken by the enemy through or over 
 that ground, and 
 
 That ? as I shall prove by General Longstreet and others, the 
 
47 
 
 ground, by reason of its broken character, dense woods, &c., 
 was not only impracticable for the handling of artillery, but 
 also for the successful handling of infantry in any large body. 
 
 In a word, the testimony of Generals Reynolds and Morell, 
 Colonel E. G. Marshall and others, as adduced heretofore, is 
 completely established. 
 
 5th. " That a general battle was and had been raging on my 
 right, and almost in my sight certainly in my hearing for 
 hours ; and that I had nearly a third of the whole Union Army 
 under my command at that time, &c." 
 
 " That my troops did not fire a gun during the entire battle." 
 
 " That I did not attempt to assist troops elsewhere, though I 
 had written Generals McDowell and King, I believed our 
 forces were being overpowered and driven from the field, and 
 
 " That I believed the enemy s force in front of me was very 
 heavy, and that therefore an attack would be unsuccessful." 
 
 Answer. I shall show that no general battle was in progress 
 between noon and 5.30 P. M. that day (August 29th), and in 
 addition to the testimony heretofore adduced, I will show by 
 General Pope s ofticial report, that between these hours no more 
 than " heavy skirmishing" was had ; 
 
 That so far from being within sight or sound of any heavy 
 firing between these hours, the woods were so dense and the 
 ground was of such a nature, that no sound of a general or any 
 engagement, other than artillery firing at long range, reached 
 me or my command ; 
 
 That my troops, while but little engaged in action that day, 
 held a position of the highest importance ; for, as stated herein 
 after, they were so disposed as to draw from before General 
 Pope, and to keep the whole of Longstreet s larger forces in 
 front of me, thereby securing all the good effects of a battle 
 without its injuries. 
 
 I shall substantiate the evidence that I was held in my posi 
 tion by McDowell s orders, which, being reiterated, caused the 
 recall of a division of my corps moving to attack, and that it 
 was not judicious, nor admissable upon information in my pos 
 session, furnished from time to time by General McDowell and 
 others, to at any time go to the assistance of General Pope ; the 
 belief, based on rumor, expressed in my note to Generals Me- 
 
48 
 
 Dowell and King, having been, as shown in the evidence, 
 incorrect. 
 
 I shall substantiate the record that General McDowell was in 
 command and present with me at the only time on the 29th 
 August, before 6 P. M., when the sounds of battle (artillery 
 only) were audible ; that my command mainly was there, and 
 remained during the whole day substantially in contact with 
 the enemy ; that General Pope s order to General McDowell 
 and myself was issued on the erroneous supposition that " the 
 whole force of the enemy would not arrive till to-morrow (the 
 30th) or next day ; " that from prisoners then in my possession, 
 belonging to Longstreet s corps, and from General Buford s 
 letter to General Ricketts, shown to me by General McDowell, 
 in connection with other information possessed by General Mc 
 Dowell, it was evident that we were then (twelve o clock noon 
 on the 29th) confronted by Longstreet s forces, and that the 
 object of our combined movement had been frustrated ; that, 
 acting on this belief and on General Pope s instruction that 
 " the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach 
 Bull Run that night," General McDowell, exercising a discre 
 tion authorized in the order, directed me to remain on that 
 ground, and did himself turn back and march away beyond 
 support of me, with the divisions of King and Ricketts (over 
 half our joint forces), to a point close to Bull Run, which he was 
 several hours in reaching ; and that, by thus withdrawing, he 
 prevented all possibility of severing the connection of Long- 
 street with Jackson, which was the object of our combined 
 movement. 
 
 T will also prove by what General Pope considers competent 
 authority General Longstreet himself that I was correct both 
 as to the greatly superior force in my front, and as to the pro 
 bable effect of an attack by me. 
 
 I shall prove that Longstreet desired an attack, and consid 
 ered it would have resulted, after McDowell s withdrawal, ad 
 vantageously to himself, and as suggested that evening by me 
 to General Pope, in serious disaster to my corps ; and that the 
 position taken by me, not only saved my corps, but in the most 
 effective manner served the purposes of General Pope, by hold 
 ing in check a force largely superior to may own, and drawing 
 supports from the troops opposing General Pope. 
 
49 
 
 6th. " That when convinced from the sounds of the battle on 
 the right, that our army was being worsted, I marched away 
 from giving assistance, and went in an opposite direction al 
 though ; the road was open, and orderlies, <fcc., passing to and 
 fro." 
 
 Answer. As I have said above, the opinion expressed in my 
 note to Generals McDowell and King, proved incorrect, and 
 was not acted upon, nor was it designed to be acted upon, as is 
 shown in the note itself, till " I communicated with them." 
 
 I have shown, and will bring additional testimony to show, 
 that at no time did I march away from giving assistance, or 
 give any order tending to do so ; but all day and all night of 
 the 29th, till called away on the 30th by General Pope s orders, 
 the largest portion of my command remained where General 
 McDowell left it, and directed it to be, which was in almost im 
 mediate contact with the enemy, while the remainder was pro 
 perly held, during the same time, massed in rear in support, 
 prepared to go, if called or necessary, to General Pope s assist 
 ance, taking, as it. was then, and had been all day, on the only 
 practicable route, the same road taken by General McDowell and 
 his troops, and by my command the following morning. It is 
 true that General McDowell, in the exercise of his discretion, 
 did march away with his command on the afternoon of the 29th 
 August, whilst my troops did not march away till the next 
 morning, having alone confronted and held the enemy till that 
 time, and most fortunately, as I shall show by competent testi 
 mony, for our other forces. 
 
 I shall also show, on this point, that the orderlies passing 
 back and forth, were mainly my messengers carrying informa 
 tion to and in vain seeking instructions from Generals McDowell 
 and Pope, and that so far from bringing information that as 
 sistance was needed by General Pope, the reverse was the fact. 
 
 1th. " That the effect of an attack by me at any time between 
 noon and eight o clock of the evening of the 28th of August, 
 even though repulsed, would have been most beneficial, and 
 General McDowell s testimony before my court is referred to as 
 endorsing this view of the case " arid quoted to sustain General 
 Pope s claim that "my withholding an attack between the 
 hours of twelve and eight prevented the capture or destruction 
 of Jackson on the 29th August." 
 7 
 
50 
 
 Answer. General Pope apparently forgets that General ^Mc 
 Dowell expressed this as a " mere opinion," which is not " ev 
 idence," and that it was based upon the erroneous opinion that 
 Jackson s forces alone confronted our army between these hours, 
 and to the exclusion of official reports from his general officers, 
 which should all have been, as some were, in his possession. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to state, in the light of facts now read 
 ily ascertainable, and, at the time, deemed unnecessary, adverse 
 opinions from the best military sources can and will be given, 
 completely nullifying this opinion of General McDowell, if still 
 retained by him, showing at that time no such opinion was en 
 tertained by those who, having been in contact with the enemy, 
 enjoyed far better opportunities of possessing correct informa 
 tion than either General McDowell or General Pope. It is true 
 that General Pope telegraphed the War Department, and elec 
 trified the country by the information that " the enemy was re 
 treating to the mountains ;" but that assertion unhappily proved 
 untrue, and, as is known, was based upon a total misconception 
 of the enemy s forces and position. 
 
 Sth. That even though the question of a largely supeno 
 force confronting me, were admissable, it is (General Pope 
 claims) shown by the commanding-General of the enemy (J. * 
 B. Stuart, in his official report) to have been very small- 
 he disposed of his small force trailed brushes to cause dust 
 and thus convey the idea of numbers, and that my corps halt, 
 and fell back." 
 
 Answer. I am, perhaps, saved the necessity of imputing 1 
 General Pope a want of veracity in this respect, inasmuch as he 
 claims to quote General Stuart s report from memory. 
 
 Between his memory of the report, and the report itself, the 
 difference will be best shown by reference to it, by which it will 
 
 be seen, . 
 
 That Longstreet s forces were on the field before my an 
 That " the prolongation of my line of march would have 
 passed through Stuart s position," a very fine one for art i 
 lery," and " struck Longstreet in flank." 
 
 That he awaited my approach long enough to ascertain some 
 thing of my strength, dragging brush, etc., to attempt to deceive 
 me notifying the commanding-General, "then opposite me on 
 the turnpike," that " Lonastreefs flank and rear were seriously 
 
51 
 
 threatened, and of the importance of the ridge I held ;" that 
 immediately the brigades of Jenkins, Kemper, and D. K. Jones 
 Avere sent, together with artillery, placed in position, and waited 
 my advance, and, 
 
 That after exchanging a few shots with rifled pieces, this 
 corps (mine) withdrew towards Manassas, "leaving artillery 
 and supports to hold the position till night." 
 
 In explanation of this last paragraph, I shall show by the 
 recorded testimony and confirmatory evidence, that it refers to 
 the division of Morell, sent forward by me after General Mc 
 Dowell retired from that ground, and recalled to its former 
 position under General McDowell s reiterated order, before any 
 exchange of artillery shots. This division was then posted on 
 its original ground (as Morell has testified) in a manner to 
 invite attack, and was there held till daybreak the following 
 morning. 
 
 In addition to the force at that time sent to General Stuart, a 
 division was, later in the day, withdrawn from the support of 
 Jackson and placed in my front, on the extreme right of Long- 
 street s forces, "in case," says General Longstreet s official 
 report, " of an attack against my right." 
 
 Thus it is proven by the enemy themselves that my action 
 and the position retained by my corps drew from General 
 Jackson s support a large force. 
 
 9tk. " That Lonstreet himself reports that his corps had made 
 large and forced marches, and also, on the day in question 
 (August 29th), had made a forced march and fought Ricketts 
 division, and that my troops were fresh, and nearly or quite 
 equal in numbers to Longstreet ; " and 
 
 " That, if Longstreet s corps had so great a numerical superi 
 ority, it is remarkable he did not attack me." 
 
 Answer. A reference to General Longstreet s Report (volume 
 9, Rebellion Record, p. 570) shows the inaccuracy of this state 
 ment of General Pope. Not one word is written by General 
 Longstreet as to his troops having made long and forced 
 marches ; and all references by Longstreet, Hood, and D. R. 
 Jones (a small part only of the latter s division having engaged 
 Risketts) to the encounter with Ricketts division, show that it 
 was only "a spirited little engagement" (loss of twenty-five 
 men), "heavy demonstrations and skirmishing" on Ricketts 
 
52 
 
 side ; and this all occurred <m the 28th of August, some twenty 
 hours prior to the events referred to. 
 
 Gem-nil Longstreet s failure to attack my inferior forces has 
 no pertinency, save to indicate that my troops were so disposed 
 as to deceive him as to my real strength and purpose, arid thus 
 relieve General Pope from combatting an enemy already too 
 great either in number or skill for him to successfully attack. 
 
 It will be proved, however, that the desire of General Long- 
 street was to invite attack, and that, had I fallen into this error, 
 his position and strength were such, whatever the condition of 
 his troops, that my command would probably have been de 
 stroyed. 
 
 10#A. " That I did not even try to pass over the ground be 
 tween me and the enemy on the 29th August, which I claimed 
 as impassable, and also occupied by the right wing of the 
 enemy." 
 
 Answer. I shall show that the movement to pass over that 
 ground was thwarted by General McDowell s orders to me, and 
 most fortunately it was so ; and, also, 
 
 That even an effort to communicate by messengers failed, 
 from the nature of the country and the occupation of it by the 
 enemy. 
 
 Finally, General Pope assumes to explain the cause of what 
 he terms my conduct in the matter, contained in the charges 
 brought before the court. 
 
 In attempting this he but rehearses what was termed the 
 " animus" of my alleged conduct, by the prosecution on the 
 trial. 
 
 A few words in explanation of these dispatches, which seem 
 to have highly incensed General Pope, may suffice for the 
 present. They were confidential (though partly official) com 
 munications to General Burnside, whose tenure near Aquia 
 Creek was dependant upon correct information of our move 
 ments and of those of the enemy. Made at his request, they 
 became official by the anxious call of the President for just 
 such information as I was giving of the Army, communication 
 with which had been cut off, except by the channel I had, at 
 great trouble, and in fear of disaster, established and main 
 tained till eventually called, August 29th, by General Pope to 
 Centreville. This point was nearer and on the direct road tq 
 
53 
 
 Alexandria, through which General Burnside would necessarily 
 the soonest hear of us, and I so informed him. 
 
 They were not designed, as asserted by General Pope, for 
 General McClellan, of whose position and relations to the army 
 I knew nothing. In the haste of dispatch they were carelessly 
 expressed. If they manifested confidence in General Mc 
 Clellan, and a distrust of General Pope s ability to conduct the 
 campaign (as claimed by the prosecution), they but expressed 
 the opinion pervading our Eastern armies. 
 
 Each dispatch covered one of General Pope s orders, and was 
 designed to convey a correct impression of affairs, and to undo 
 the effect of false reports. Should I be blamed if they show- 
 as is now . apparent that General Pope at least misconceived 
 the situation, and that I was better acquainted than he is 
 willing to admit he was, with the position and movements 
 of the contending forces and the wants of the army, and 
 that forseeing the inevitable results of that campaign, I should 
 have tried to provide against its disaster ? Would I not have 
 been justly held culpable had I, knowing the truth, foiled to 
 have expressed it, even without the call of the President, 
 through General Burnside and pointed out, as I did, the mode 
 of guarding against the effects of misfortunes already brought 
 upon us and others to come ? Because I indicated the inevitable 
 results of this campaign, General Pope unjustly claims I de 
 sired and worked for them. 
 
 I have, however, to state that the President, in person, thanked 
 me for my despatches, as furnishing the only reliable informa 
 tion received at that time from the army, and as leading to the 
 happiest results. 
 
 I believed, at the time of the trial, as I do now, that, if at the 
 time and in the manner I desired, all my despatches had been 
 permitted in evidence as well as the occasion of sending them, 
 connected with the desire of the President to have just such in 
 formation, this element so delicate at all times to righteously 
 use probing and deciding upon, as it assumed to do, the secret 
 thoughts and purposes of the human mind that this element, 
 my " animus," so potentially used against me, would have been 
 completely foiled of its purpose, and this, too, without adducing 
 n my behalf, as under such proceedings I should have had the 
 
54 
 
 right to do, :in untarnished record both prior and subsequent to 
 the unfortunate campaign of General Pope. 
 
 General Pope comments upon the duty of subordinate offi 
 cers towards a General commanding; asks what confidence 
 such an officer could have if his subordinates were at liberty to 
 judge of his purposes or plans,*and does not see how any com 
 binations of his could be expected to result successfully except 
 through implicit obedience. 
 
 These, and kindred expressions are interpolated in General 
 Pope s communication. I shall not assume that propositions of 
 the nature of truisms of no pertinency to the occasion, evi 
 dently pressed into service for a palpable purpose, need refer 
 ence at your hands, or that of military men. 
 
 I do propose, if permitted to do so, to demonstrate by compe 
 tent military authority, that in their opinion, but for the action 
 and disposition of my corps during this eventful day of General 
 Pope s campaign, not only would my own corps have been need 
 lessly sacrificed, but his entire army put in such a plight as to 
 be of no avail in the defence of the Capitol itself, which must 
 then have been, in a great degree, left unguarded. 
 
 Although such demonstration is not necessary to my vindica 
 tion as against General Pope s charges, it may awaken sugges 
 tions, the advantage of which I may at least partially claim. 
 
 In general terms throughout his letter, General Pope ignores 
 the testimony given in my behalf of such officers as Generals 
 Sykes, Heintzleman, Butterfield, J. F. Reynolds, Morell, Griffin, 
 Kuggles, Locke, Weld, and others, whose -career before and 
 since my trial would warrant I presume it is not too much to 
 
 sa y as much of credence as either the testimony or the opinion 
 
 of General Pope is entitled to. 
 
 The witnesses on either side, having been more or less in the 
 public service, have each a record that time or circumstances 
 have established. I propose to add to the the list of those here 
 tofore adduced by me, others of like prominence, equal integrity, 
 bravery, and unimpeachability. 
 
 Should the commission I ask for be granted, General Pope 
 will have an opportunity to add whatever of testimony he 
 desires, both as to kind and amount. 
 
 I am aware of the tax a communication so lengthened ne 
 cessarily so imposes upon you. 
 
55 
 
 May I urge upon you to give me the opportunity I ask of 
 vindication at the hands of the Government to which I have 
 given my best years and of doing so promptly while actors and 
 witnesses are yet in life. 
 
 I am sir, 
 
 With high respect, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 FITZ JOHN PORTER, 
 
[No. IX.] 
 
 The following documents, in addition to some of the pre 
 ceding are in possession of the Department. 
 
 NEW YORK, January 14, 1807. 
 
 To His Excellency, ANDREW JOHNSOX, President of the United 
 States. 
 
 SIR : I beg leave to respectfully represent, that by Court Mar 
 tial convened in Washington City in 1862, I was sentenced "to 
 be cashiered, and forever rendered incapable of holding office 
 under the Government of the United States," and that, in ad 
 dition to all the penalties attached to so severe a sentence, per 
 sistent efforts have been made to fix those arising from the un 
 charged crime of treason. 
 
 Seventeen years of my life have been spent in the army of 
 the United States years covering the active events of the Mex 
 ican war, and including the opening and most trying years of the 
 Rebellion. Intrusted at all times with duties of the greatest re 
 sponsibilities, frequently performed at the peril of life, I can assert, 
 without fear of denial, that up to the period of the presenta 
 tion of the charges, no breath of suspicion had attached itself 
 to a reputation which it had been, and still is, my life s study to 
 preserve unsullied. I feel assured your Excellency will appre 
 ciate the motive that induces me to frankly say that, at no time 
 from the presentation of the charges to the completion of the 
 trial, did it occur to me that such a record as my country had 
 generously permitted me to make, could I by any court be 
 judged guilty of willfully neglecting the interests of that coun 
 try in its hour of peril, and to whose reputation, history, and wel 
 fare I was bound by every sentiment of patriotism, gratitude, 
 and interest. 
 
 Conscious of innocence, feeling that, whatever differences of 
 opinion might arise upon other points, there would not and 
 could not be any as to my faithfulness of purpose, I could not 
 
57 
 
 bring my mind to contemplate any other verdict than that of a 
 speedy and honorable acquital. 
 
 It is possible I may have committed an error, both as to the 
 Court and myself in thus assuming much that should have 
 been set forth. I also feel assured that your Excellency will ap 
 preciate the motive that induces me to make reference to the 
 events of my life while in my country s service. The vindica 
 tion of my honor alone compels me to do so in this paper, as in 
 a previous one read to the Court. 
 
 The verdict against me was found January, 1863, at a time 
 of most unusual excitement. The country was environed with 
 perils ; distrust had seized upon many minds ; errors of great 
 magnitude had occurred ; the press and forum vied with each 
 other in responding to a great and growing sentiment that an 
 example should be had by which faithlessness or incompetency 
 should be promptly dealt with. May I not now say with truth 
 that it was my misfortune to be charged and tried at this to 
 me most inopportune of periods ? 
 
 I believe it is safe to say that much of the evidence adduced 
 against me upon the trial would, in the light of the present full 
 information upon the vital, and at the time necessarily disputed 
 points, be either entirely changed or materially modified. Evi 
 dence of the most important character to me, at that time totally 
 inaccessible to either the Court or myself, is now to be readily 
 obtained, and in a form and under circumstances brought togeth 
 er that admit of no dispute. Competent and disinterested per 
 sons, including many of those who deemed my trial and con 
 demnation just, now concur in the completeness of the vindi 
 cation which this "unconscious testimony" has given me. 
 
 Relying on the justice of my government, feeling assured 
 that with the return of peace calm feelings would prevail, and 
 knowing that from the very nature of the case and the sur 
 roundings, time would, however slowly to my impatient honor, 
 prove the best arbiter, I have borne in silence and without com 
 plaint the burden of that sentence. 
 
 I have taken the liberty of enclosing herewith certain docu 
 ments from able and intelligent writers, which bear upon my 
 case.* 
 
 * SWINTON S Army of the Potomac, GREKLEY S American Conflict, an article bv Mr. A. 
 H. GUERNSEY, Editor Pictorial History of the Rebellion. 
 
 8 
 
58 
 
 It is useless to say more than that they bear unsolicited con 
 firmation so far as they go ; and I believe the time is at hand 
 when it is my duty to appeal to my government for a revision 
 of my case, however nearly such a revision comes home to me 
 and all I hold most sacred in my life. 
 
 It is a duty that I owe also to the honored officers who bore 
 testimony in my behalf, to my brave command, whose history 
 has been imperishably written, and to my country, that no stain 
 of injustice shall be recorded against her. 
 
 My appeal is to your Excellency to appoint a court for the 
 purpose of reconsidering the proceedings in my case, composed, 
 as I trust it may be, of the best talent and most approved patri 
 otism in the army. 
 
 I have every reason to believe that, with such a court 
 instituted, and with the full testimony now to be obtained, I 
 can obtain the full and honorable acquittal I know I deserve; 
 and which I shall ever seek at the hands of my country. 
 
 With high respect, I am your obedient servant, 
 
 FITZ JOHN PORTER. 
 
 The subjoined letters are filed with this appeal : 
 
 NATICK, Nov. 26, 1866. 
 To President Johnson : 
 
 SIB, I have been informed that new evidence has been dis 
 covered touching the case of Fitz John Porter, late a Major- 
 General in the volunteer forces of the United States, 
 fully join with others in recommending the appointment of 
 commission, to consist of officers of acknowledged capacity and 
 character, to examine the evidence and ascertain whether injus 
 tice has been clone this officer or not, who, up to the time of 
 the alleged offence, maintained the character of an c 
 courage and ability. 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 (Signed) HENRY WILSON. 
 
59 
 
 I think, with General Wilson, that a careful review, by a 
 competent military commission, of the proceedings of the case 
 of General Porter is an act of justice, and which, in trials before 
 civil courts, is always granted as a matter of right. I trust his 
 request will be granted. 
 
 (Signed) JOHN SHERMAN. 
 
 I cheerfully unite with General Wilson in the within recom 
 mendation. 
 
 (Signed) IRA HARRIS. 
 
 Senate Chamber, Jan. 16, 1867. 
 
 I concur. 
 
 (Signed) HORACE GREELEY. 
 
 I cheerfully concur in the opinions above expressed. 
 
 (Signed) L. F. S. FOSTER. 
 
 Jan. 17, 1867. 
 
 I concur, most cordially, in the recommendations of Senators 
 Wilson, Sherman, Harris, and Foster, and express unreservedly 
 my belief that a re-examination of this case is due to General 
 Porter and the Government. 
 
 (Signed) N. P. BANKS. 
 
 House of Representatives, Jan. 17, 1867. 
 
 Major-General Fitz John Porter was the first military officer 
 sent by the Government to Harrisburg, at the beginning of the 
 rebellion, and of the many who succeeded him, none of them 
 were more zealous, faithful, and useful. I gave him my full 
 confidence, and, from the high opinion I then formed of him, 
 was surprised when his loyalty was doubted. Believing that 
 subsequent events and evidence, not produced at his trial, fully 
 justify a new trial, I very cordially and earnestly unite with 
 Senator Wilson and other distinguished gentlemen* who concur 
 with him in the within paper, in asking for General Porter the 
 appointment of a new commission to hear his case, that justice 
 may be done. 
 
 A. G. CURTIN. 
 
 Jan. 17, 1867. 
 
60 
 
 To the President of the United States. 
 
 " Your memorialists respectfully represent that by a court- 
 martial convened at Washington, Major-General Fitz John 
 Porter was sentenced to be cashiered, and rendered forever 
 incapable of service under the government of the United 
 States. 
 
 That such a sentence is to a gallant officer, in some respects 
 worse than a sentence of death, inasmuch as it makes him the 
 living and conspicuous victim of a terrible penalty. 
 
 That a few weeks before the terrible events which drew upon 
 General Porter this severe sentence, he received the highest re 
 ward which the President can bestow, for skill and gallantry 
 in one of the most important actions of the war. 
 
 Your memorialists are advised, that following the impulses 
 of a controlling love of justice, your Excellency has, on many 
 occasions during the war, reconsidered and revoked the sen 
 tences of court-martials in cases far less grave than the present, 
 patiently employing your time, notwithstanding the urgent de 
 mands upon it, in sifting and weighing the evidence and listening 
 to the explanations and defence of the accused. 
 
 And your memorialists in consideration of the extreme se 
 verity of the sentence in the case of Major-General Fitz John 
 Porter, and of his previous high reputation, honorably earned 
 on fields of peril and death, respectfully solicit you to recon 
 sider the proceedings of the court-martial by which he was con 
 demned. 
 
 This course, they beg leave to suggest, must, in whatever 
 event, be satisfactory to your Excellency. Should the result be 
 adverse to General Porter, it will strengthen you in the convic 
 tion that the original sentence was just. If favorable to the 
 General, it will, your memorialists are confident, afford your 
 generous nature the highest gratification which it is capable of 
 enjoying. 
 
 EDWARD EVERETT, 
 ROBERT C. WINTHROP, 
 AMOS A. LAWRENCE, 
 GARDNER ROWLAND SHAAV." 
 
 BOSTON, August, 1863. 
 
61 
 
 BOSTON, September 21, 1867. 
 
 GENERAL: At a meeting of the officers of the first division, 
 5th corps, called together to give an expression of sympathy at 
 the death of our loved commander, General Griffin, the enclosed 
 petition was presented and signed by all the officers present. 
 
 The duty of forwarding the document to you was entrusted 
 to me, and in so doing I would say that I express the sentiments 
 of most of those who served under General Porter in saying 
 thot they most earnestly desire that his request for a new trial 
 be granted. 
 
 It was my fortune to be in command of a regiment in Gener 
 al Porter s corps, during that unfortuuate campaign which ended 
 in the battle of Bull Run, and having personal knowledge of 
 many of the circumstances connected with his career, I have 
 always felt that he was most unjustly dealt with. 
 
 Very respectfully yours, 
 
 L. STEPHENSOX, JR., 
 Late of 32nd Massachusetts Volunteers. 
 
 BOSTON, September 17, 1867. 
 
 The undersigned, who have served as officers of the fifth corps 
 under General Fitz John Porter, respectfully, but urgently, 
 request that the proceedings in his case may be revised, in ac 
 cordance with the application which, they learn from the public 
 press, he has addressed to the department. 
 
 Wm. S. Tilton, lately brevet brigadier general, United States 
 
 volunteers. 
 
 A. P. Martin, late brevet colonel United States volunteers. 
 George M. Barnard, Jr., late brevet colonel eighteenth Massa 
 chusetts volunteers. 
 
 John W. Mahan, late major, ninth Massachusetts volunteers. 
 Aaron F. Walcott, late first lieutenant battery C, Massachu 
 setts volunteers. 
 
 Francis J. Parker, colonel thirty-second Massachusetts in 
 fantry. 
 
 Geo. A. Batchelder, brevet lieutenant colonel twenty-second 
 Massachusetts volunteers. 
 
62 
 
 Mich. Scanlan, captain ninth Massachusetts volunteers. 
 
 P. T. Hanley, late lieutenant colonel ninth Massachusetts vol 
 unteers. 
 
 John M. Tobin, captain ninth Massachusetts volunteers. 
 
 James F. Moore, lieutenant second Maine volunteers. 
 
 Walter S. Davis, brevet lieutenant colonel twenty-second 
 Massachusetts volunteers. 
 
 Louis N. Tucker, brevet major eighteenth Massachusetts vol 
 unteers. 
 
 Marcus M. Davis, captain twenty-second Massachusetts vol 
 unteers. 
 
 Thos. Sherwin, Jr., brevet brigadier general, late twenty- 
 second Massachusetts volunteers. 
 
 L. Stephenson, Jr., brevet brigadier general, late thirty-second 
 Massachusetts volunteers. 
 
 J. Gushing Edwards, brevet brigadier general, late thirty- 
 second Massachusetts volunteers. 
 
 Chas. K. Cobb, first lieutenant and adjutant, late thirty- 
 second Massachusetts volunteers. 
 
 Edward O. Shepard, brevet lieutenant colonel, late thirty- 
 second Massachusetts volunteers. 
 
 Chris. Plunkett, late captain ninth Massachusetts volunteers. 
 
 Wm. M. Strachan, lieutenant and adjutant ninth Massachu 
 setts volunteers. 
 
 Wm. M. Strachan, late captain ninth Massachusetts volun 
 teers. 
 
 Chas. W. Thompson, first lieutenant thirty-ninth Massachusetts 
 volunteers, formerly twelfth Massachusetts volunteers. 
 
 John F. Doherty, late captain ninth Massachusetts infantry. 
 
 P. E. Murphy, late first lieutenant ninth Massachusetts vol 
 unteers. 
 
 Wm. H. Gerty, late captain thirty-second Massachusetts vol 
 unteers. 
 
 B. F. Finan, late first lieutenant ninth Massachusetts infantry. 
 
 C. C. Bumpus, captain thirty-second Massachusetts volunteers, 
 
 company B. 
 
 General IT. S. GRANT. 
 
63 
 
 HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, September 21, 1867. 
 
 MY DEAR GRANT, Fit/ John Porter writes to me to ask that 
 I will do something to aid him in getting a rehearing of his case. 
 All that I can do is to write you, and give you the reasons why 
 I think it will be an act of justice to give him the opportunity to 
 clear himself from the terrible imputation now resting upon him. 
 
 I saw Porter in Pope s company the day after the latter s 
 defeat at Bull Run, and afterwards, until we arrived in front of 
 AVashington. I know that they were on very cordial terms, 
 and that Pope on some occasions advised with him confiden 
 tially. I talked a good deal myself with Pope, and I think that 
 if he had had at that time any feeling that Porter had acted 
 badly, I would have learned it then ; but I had no suspicion that 
 he felt aggrieved at anything Porter or any one who was then 
 near him had done. At Fairfax Court House, the day that we 
 arrived at Washington, I noticed that Pope was particularly in 
 good spirits and cordial with Porter. I have therefore always 
 thought that the attack upon Porter was the result of an after 
 thought, and that the charges were not original with Pope. 
 
 During the trial, I thought it proper to inform Porter that 
 Generals J. F. Reynolds, George H. Thomas, and myself would, 
 if requested, go before the court and swear that we would not 
 believe Pope or Roberts under oath. I had consulted General 
 Reynolds before I made the proposition. He consented to go 
 himself, and thought General Thomas would have no hesitation 
 in giving such evidence. I was myself well convinced of Gen 
 eral Thomas s opinion of Pope s veracity, from what I had often 
 heard him say before the war. Porter declined to call us up to 
 give this evidence, on the ground that the court appeared so 
 well disposed towards him, and his case was going on so well, 
 that he did not wish to irritate the court by an attempt to break 
 down the evidence of the principal prosecutors. The sequel 
 showed that he made a serious mistake. 
 
 But I think that the most equitable reason for a review of 
 Porter s case is this : The Judge- Advocate-General, Holt, was 
 the judge-advocate of the court. That was right enough. But 
 no one will deny that a judge-advocate of a military court, when 
 a prisoner is defended by able counsel, becomes to a great extent 
 a prosecutor, and as such necessarily is biased against the pri 
 soner. To say that General Holt was prejudiced against Porter 
 is merely to say that he is like other men, and that he was so 
 
64 
 
 prejudiced the whole proceeding shows. Whether it is better 
 or worse for the course of justice that the judge-advocate should 
 be prejudiced has nothing to do with the question. 
 
 But an abstract of the proceedings and finding and sentence 
 of the court had to be made by the J udge-Advocate-General for 
 presentation to the President of the United States, upon which 
 (for he necessarily could not read the evidence) he was to make 
 up his mind as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Was 
 it right, proper, or decent that this abstract should be made up 
 by the very man who had done his best to convict the prisoner ? 
 Did not such a proceeding prevent the President from learning 
 any extenuating circumstance, or finding out anything weak in 
 the evidence, if any such there were ? Did c , not, in fact, take 
 away any chance from Porter which he might have had, had a 
 cool, unbiased person of legal knowledge made this abstract, 
 instead of General Holt. 
 
 The whole business seems to me like a prosecuting attorney 
 passing sentence upon a prisoner in a civil court, immediately 
 alter the speeches of counsel. I think the fact that Mr. Lincoln 
 had only general Holt s abstract to guide him, in making up 
 an opinion on the proceedings of that court, is enough to in 
 validate the whole thing. 
 
 It has been said, and perhaps with truth, that there is no pre 
 cedent to guide in this matter. It may be said with equal truth 
 that never, since the trial of Admiral Byng, was injustice so 
 without precedent done. I think that there never was a more ap 
 propriate opportunity for going beyond precedent, and establish 
 ing the fact that, no matter how or by whom flagrant injustice is 
 done, you, when the power is in your hands, will see the right done. 
 
 For my part, I know that Porter was as loyal as the most 
 loyal soldier now dead, and that no thought of treason or disaf 
 fection entered his brain. He was a victim to Pope failure in 
 Virginia, and it seems to me he has remained a victim long 
 enough. You will, in my opinion, do an act which will not be 
 the least among those which will make up your fame, if you will 
 lend your weight towards giving Porter the opportunity to 
 retrieve his character as a citizen and soldier. 
 
 I am truly your friend, 
 
 W. B. FRANKLIN. 
 
 General U. S. GRANT, 
 
 Commanding Army of the United States. 
 
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