Proportional Representation, 
 
 OR 
 
 THE REPRESENTATION OF SUCCESSIVE MAJORITIES IN 
 
 FEDERAL, STATE, MUNICIPAL, CORPORATE AND 
 
 PRIMARY ELECTIONS. 
 
 BY 
 
 CHARLES R. BUCKALEW, 
 
 LATE U. S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA. 
 
 MX it!) an appendix. 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 JOHN G. FREEZ] 
 
 COUNSELLOR AT LAW. 
 
 " In all Free States, the evil to be avoided is tyranny ; that is to say, tne ' swnma 
 perii? or unlimited power, solely in the hands of one, the few, or the many." — Swift. 
 
 "Constant experience shows us, that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it. 
 He pushes on till he comes to something that limits him. To prevent the abuse of power, 
 it is necessary that by the very disposition of things, power should be a check to power.'' 
 — Montesquieu. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA: 
 JOHN CAMPBELL & SON, 
 
 LAW BOOKSELLERS, PUBLISHERS AND IMPORTERS, 
 740 SANSOM STREET. 
 
 1872. 
 
5* 
 
 ■\ 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1872, by 
 
 JOHN CAMPBELL & SON, 
 In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 
 
 3 4 h 9 *- 
 
 "Westcott & Thomson, IIenrt B. Ashmead, 
 
 Stereotypers and Electrotypers, rhila. Printer, Phila. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Editor's Preface vii. 
 
 Preliminary Remarks xi. 
 
 Senate Speech, July 11, 18o7 1 
 
 Philadelphia Speech, November 19, 18G7 31 
 
 Senate Report, March 2, 1869 65 
 
 Social Science Address, October 25, 1870 138 
 
 Borough Supplement Speech, March 27, 1871 157 
 
 The Jordan Letter, November 30, 1871 182 
 
 Choice of Presidential Electors 187 
 
 Illinois Amendments 219 
 
 West Virginia Amendments 226 
 
 Pennsylvania Statutes for Reformed Voting 228 
 
 Local Elections in Pennsylvania 245 
 
 Nominations to Office 256 
 
 Columbia County, Rules of Nomination 258 
 
 Appendix 273 
 
 Proceedings and Debate in Parliament on Limited 
 
 Voting; an Essay on Minority Representation. 
 
 Index 297 
 
 iii. 
 
ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Choice of Representatives in Congress and Presidential 
 Electors : 
 Senate Speech, 1. 
 Philadelphia Speech, 31. 
 Senate Report, 65. 
 
 General Application of Free Vote : 
 Social Science Address, 138. 
 
 In what Elections can be Used, 143. 
 Concerning Fractional Votes, 145. 
 Filling of Vacancies, 148. 
 
 Reformed Voting in Municipalities: Objections to Plan 
 Answered : 
 Borough Supplement Speech, 157. 
 
 Representation of Successive Majorities: 
 The Jordan Letter, 182. 
 
 Constitutional Amendment : 
 
 Proposed for Presidential Electors, 187. 
 Illinois Amendments, 219. 
 West Virginia Amendments, 226. 
 
 Reform in Pennsylvania: 
 
 Statutes for, 228. 
 Local Elections in, 245. 
 
 Nominations to Office: 
 
 Columbia County Plan of Nomination, 258. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Parliamentary Debate on Limited Voting. 
 Minority Representation ; an Essay. 
 
EDITOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 Within the last few years the public mind has been 
 awakened to many questions relating to government, but 
 to no one more important than that discussed in the vol- 
 ume now presented to the reader. The editor believes it 
 to be a necessity of the times, in view of current discus- 
 sions of electoral reform, that the papers now collated and 
 arranged should be put into a permanent and accessible 
 form. For not only in Pennsylvania, but in many other 
 states of the Union, the great evils of the present system 
 of voting and of deficient representation, are being earn- 
 estly discussed. Therefore, whatever can assist in bringing 
 about just conclusions either as to the necessity of some 
 fundamental changes in electoral action, or, that being con- 
 ceded, as to the best method of adapting the changes agreed 
 upon to the needs of the people, may be accepted as fit, 
 timely and useful. 
 
 Although a number of works, more or less elaborate, 
 have been recently published upon electoral and represent- 
 ative reform, no one of them covers precisely the ground 
 covered by the present one. They have dealt mostly with 
 the theoretical and philosophical aspects of the questions 
 treated, whereas the volume in hand is largely devoted to 
 the practical application of the plan proposed in it for 
 popular acceptance. Herein will be found not only the 
 theory of a reform to extend representation, but sundry 
 
viii editor's preface. 
 
 acts of legislation for its enforcement, and the returns of 
 elections which illustrate the practical workings of reform 
 and the results to be obtained from it. This information 
 is believed to be more useful and convincing than abstract 
 arguments with the great mass of persons with whom po- 
 litical power is justly lodged by our American Constitu- 
 tion. And as to theory : If the people shall once be 
 satisfied that a system can be applied whereby in popular 
 elections, nearly the whole mass of those who vote shall 
 be represented in government, they will accept it promptly 
 upon the sound theory of equal and exact justice to all. 
 
 The matter contained in this volume, it will be observed, 
 is arranged, as nearly as may be, in chronological order, 
 thus exhibiting the growth and modifications of opinion 
 in the author's mind, contemporaneous with movements 
 in other states and publications abroad. And although it 
 consists mainly of legislative arguments, popular addresses 
 and casual papers thrown off or produced as occasion in- 
 vited during several years, yet the collected volume has 
 nearly the completeness and symmetry of a regular w T ork, 
 with little of surplusage or repetition. There is a regular 
 development of argument, illustration and thought, and 
 each separate, successive part presents the question in hand 
 from a new or enlarged point of view. 
 
 The haste with which this volume is put to press pre- 
 cludes careful revision, a correction of former errors of 
 publication and slips unavoidable in oral discourse, but for 
 these the intelligent reader will make due allowance with- 
 out prolonged apology. 
 
 As a citizen of the State, and a resident of the town in 
 which the free vote was first applied at a popular election, 
 the editor has felt the promptings of a laudable, or at least 
 
EDITORS PREFACE. i X 
 
 a natural, ambition in presenting this work to the public, 
 convinced as he is that the reform which it presents and 
 vindicates, when accepted generally, will purify elections, 
 establish justice in representation, elevate the tone of pub- 
 lic life and give additional credit and lustre to that system 
 of government by the people which is our proudest boast, 
 and our best legacy for those who come after us. 
 
 J. G. F. 
 
 Bloomsburg, Nov. 12, 1872. 
 
>* OP THE 
 
 'tjn it :ty; 
 
 PRELIMINARY REMARKS. 
 
 Mr. Dutcher, in his recent work on Proportional 
 Representation,* has shown, by elaborate statistics, that of 
 the votes cast at important contested popular elections in 
 the United States, over forty per centum are lost or over- 
 ruled in the computation of results. Of the electors 
 throughout the country who voted for representatives to 
 the Fortieth Congress, no less than forty-two per cent, 
 failed to obtain representation by their votes ; and precisely 
 the same percentage of voters failed in elections for repre- 
 sentatives to the Forty-first Congress, and again in the 
 elections to the Forty-second. For six continuous years 
 the rate of actual representation in the popular branch of 
 Congress was but sixty per cent, of the votes polled. At 
 the session of the New York Legislature, in 1869, the 
 voters unrepresented in the Senate were forty-one per cent, 
 of the whole, and in the House forty-two; and at the 
 session of 1871, in each House, forty-two. 
 
 Mr. Hare is authority for the statement that the per- 
 centage of disfranchisement upon votes cast in Parlia- 
 mentary elections is very nearly as great as in the above 
 examples. He says : " Those who, disagreeing with the 
 majority in their electoral districts, are now in Parlia- 
 mentary elections outvoted and left without representation, 
 
 * " Minority or Proportional Representation, by Salem Dutcher, JV T . York, 
 1872." 
 
 xi 
 
Xll PRELIMINARY REMARKS. 
 
 cannot ordinarily be taken at less than two-fifths of the 
 whole electoral body."* It may be assumed that, in con- 
 tested State and municipal elections in this country, the 
 average proportion of unrepresented voters is as great as 
 in elections for members of Congress and members of 
 Parliament — in other words, that the average rate of vir- 
 tual disfranchisement of voters in our contested popular 
 elections is fully two-fifths of the total vote. This start- 
 ling fact is the first one to be considered, and considered 
 attentively, in any intelligent examination of the great 
 subject of electoral reform in the United States ; for all 
 schemes for the amendment of popular representation in 
 government must be insufficient and illusory which ignore 
 it or underrate its enormous significance. For it means 
 that our popular elections are unjust ; it exposes the princi- 
 pal cause of their corruption, and it may instruct us, if 
 we duly consider it, concerning those measures of change 
 which will most certainly impart health, vigor and 
 endurance to our political institutions. 
 
 The plan for securing Proportional Representation pre- 
 sented in this volume, and other plans similar to it in 
 character or object which have been proposed in recent 
 years, strike at this great evil of disfranchisement in 
 popular elections, and are intended to reduce it to its 
 smallest possible dimensions. But the advantages of the 
 plan set forth in the following pages will best appear by 
 comparing it with the old one, which it is intended to 
 supersede. 
 
 Under the old plan of majority voting, whenever two 
 
 * " Memorandum on the History, Working and Results of Cumulative 
 Voting" (prepared by Thomas Hare at the request of the English Gov- 
 ernment,) p. 14. 
 
PRELIMINARY REMARKS. Xlll 
 
 or more persons are to be elected at one time to the same 
 office and for the same term of service, the law assigns to 
 the voter as many votes as the number of persons to be 
 chosen, and then commands him to distribute them singly 
 among candidates. It restrains and prevents him from 
 exercising his own judgment as to the manner of polling 
 his votes, and, in, fact, undertakes to judge for him and 
 to determine in advance what will be, under all circum- 
 stances, a judicious exercise of his right of suffrage. But 
 in this it must blunder extremely and constantly. For as 
 the law maker cannot know the future, cannot from sheer 
 ignorance take into exact account its ever-changing con- 
 ditions, his injunction or command to the voter must be 
 purely arbitrary, and must be often or commonly unsuited 
 to the circumstances to which it shall come to apply. 
 Hence the virtual disfranchisement and actual non-repre- 
 sentation of a large part of the voters is a common fact in 
 all constituencies, large and small, throughout the country, 
 the inevitable consequences of which are deeply injurious 
 and truly deplorable. Misgovernment, injustice, violence, 
 corruption and discontent are created and increased by an 
 unnecessary and absurd restriction upon electoral freedom ; 
 by a wholly gratuitous and impertinent interference of law 
 with the free action of the citizen ; by an open and 
 palpable violation of the principles of self-government 
 upon which all our political institutions are founded. Only 
 when a constituency shall be unanimous, or nearly so, in 
 opinion and action can the enforced distribution of votes 
 singly among the whole number of candidates operate 
 justly ; in all other cases it must result in the non-repre- 
 sentation of a part of the electors, and in consequent 
 injustice and evil. 
 
XIV PRELIMINARY REMARKS. 
 
 But we turn from this view to the free vote, now pro- 
 posed to us as an instrument for the improvement of elec- 
 tions and amendment of representation. Its advantages 
 over the majority vote may be roughly stated as follows : 
 
 1. It reduces greatly the number of candidates at popu- 
 lar elections, because under it parties will usually nominate 
 only the number they are entitled to and have power to 
 elect. Surplus candidates will not commonly be run, and 
 but few persons will be beaten in struggles for place. 
 
 2. It secures nearly complete representation of the whole 
 body of voters in plural elections, by permitting each con- 
 siderable interest of political society to take to itself its just 
 share of representation by its own votes. 
 
 3. It reduces enormously the expense of election con- 
 tests, — not the legal charges borne by the public, but vol- 
 untary outlays by parties and candidates. These will no 
 longer be required to subsidize the floating vote — the 
 balance-of-power vote — the mercenary or impressionable 
 vote — of a district or constituency, as the indispensable 
 condition of success. Whether applied to legal elections 
 or to primary ones ; to elections to office or to nominations 
 for office, in this regard its effect will be the same — to 
 produce, comparatively, cheap elections. 
 
 4. It is a powerful check upon all forms of corruption 
 and undue influence at elections, because it takes away the 
 motive, or most of the motive, to corrupt or pervert them 
 in rendering all ordinary efforts to that end unavailing 
 and useless. 
 
 5. It produces satisfaction to voters in gratifying their 
 desire for representation, and thus increases their attach- 
 ment to the government under which they live. 
 
 6. It permits the representation of a greater variety of 
 
PRELIMINARY REMARKS. XV 
 
 opinions and interests in legislative bodies, without impair- 
 ing the right and power of the majority to rule. 
 
 7. It will often continue fit and able men much longer 
 in public service than is now possible, because they will 
 not hold their places subject so much to fluctuation of 
 power between parties as to changed preferences in their 
 own party. 
 
 8. It will greatly reduce party violence, and give a 
 kindlier tone to social relations among the people, without 
 producing stagnation or indifference to public affairs. In 
 this, as in other cases, justice means peace, but it does not 
 mean stagnation ; for it is beyond question that reformed 
 voting " wakes to newness of life," to activity and interest 
 in public affairs, large numbers of persons who, under 
 majority- voting, are inert because disgusted or discouraged 
 by their exclusion from representation. Upon this point 
 Mr. Buxton spoke wisely and soundly in Parliament in 
 the Eeform debates of 1867.* 
 
 9. It discourages election cheats, whether in the giving, 
 receiving, counting, or returning of votes, because by it the 
 effect of cheating is greatly reduced. And, for a like reason, 
 it also discourages the trading of votes, or bartering of the 
 electoral privilege. 
 
 10. It is adapted to the bolting of nominations by an 
 aggrieved interest, for such interest, if of respectable size, 
 can represent, by its own votes, without disturbing or 
 changing the whole result of an election.f 
 
 11. It renders elections more independent of each other. 
 No one will much influence another; each one will be 
 determined upon its own merits, or upon the issues directly 
 
 * Appendix, p. 279. 
 
 f See case of Northumberland borough election, post, 251. 
 
Xvi PRELIMINARY REMARKS. 
 
 involved in it, and not with reference to its effect upon 
 other elections. 
 
 12. Lastly, it is a certain remedy for the evil of gerry- 
 mandering in the formation of Congressional districts, and 
 may be made to remedy, partially or completely, the same 
 evil, in apportionments for members of State Legislatures. 
 
 Rightly understood, the free vote is not a plan of 
 minority representation. It is, on the contrary, a plan for 
 the representation of successive majorities in plural elec- 
 tions, by which will be realized, more fully than ever 
 before, our fundamental principle of government by the 
 people.* 
 
 It only remains to add, in this place, that in order that 
 this or any other plan of reformed voting shall be thor- 
 oughly effectual, it must not stop w T ith the legal elections, 
 but must extend to the primary ones also. In fact, upon 
 plans for the nomination of candidates to office must be 
 fought out the ultimate battle of electoral reform. 
 * Letter to Secretary Jordan, post, p. 182. 
 
Proportional Representation. 
 
 A SPEECH, 
 
 DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 JULY it, 1867.* 
 
 The Senate having under consideration Senate 
 bill No. 131, to give effect to an act entitled " An 
 act to provide for the more efficient government of 
 the rebel States," passed March 2, 1867, Mr. Bucka- 
 lew proposed the following amendment as a new 
 section : 
 
 Sec. — . And be it further enacted, That in the election of 
 Kepresentatives in Congress from the said States mentioned in 
 the act of March 2, 1867, each elector shall be entitled to give 
 as many votes as there are Kepresentatives assigned to his State 
 by apportionment of law, and he may give one vote to each of 
 the requisite number of persons to be chosen, or may cumulate 
 his votes and bestow them at his discretion upon one or more 
 candidates less in number than the whole number of Repre- 
 sentatives to be chosen from such State. 
 
 After prolonged debate and a vote of the Senate 
 on a question of order, Mr. Buckalew delivered the 
 following speech for cumulative voting and in vindi- 
 cation of the amendment which he had proposed : 
 
 * Congressional Globe, 1st Sess. 40th Cong. 575. 
 
 1 
 
2 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 Mr. Buckalew. The Senate has furnished me a 
 very good argument against, the passage of this bill. 
 I think no bill of this kind should be passed and 
 placed upon our statute-book which does not contain 
 the proposition covered by my amendment; and I 
 propose to enter upon an exposition of that amend- 
 ment and a statement of the arguments by which it 
 is supported. 
 
 The plan of cumulative voting has been thor- 
 oughly discussed in Great Britain, and is perhaps 
 better understood in that country than in our own. 
 What is it ? Where more persons than one are to 
 be elected or chosen by a body of electors, the first 
 idea is that each elector may have votes equal in 
 number to the number of persons to be chosen. 
 Formerly in this country we elected members of 
 Congress in the several States by what was called a 
 general ticket, under which plan each voter in the 
 State voted for as many candidates as there were 
 Representatives in Congress to be chosen from his 
 State, giving to each candidate one vote. That was 
 the system which obtained throughout the United 
 States. In process of time it came to be discovered 
 that this plan of choosing Representatives in Con- 
 gress by general ticket was a complete and perfect 
 mode of stifling the voice of the minority within a 
 State. A political majority of only five hundred 
 votes in such a State as New York might send 
 twenty-five or thirty members to the lower House 
 of Congress, while the large mass of the minority 
 voters were entirely disfranchised, although nearly 
 as numerous as those who were thus presented in 
 the other House. 
 
SENATE SPEECH. 3 
 
 This plan of electing by general ticket was there- 
 fore abandoned in a number of the States because 
 of its rank and notorious injustice and because of the 
 dissatisfaction which it produced. The habit, how- 
 ever, of so electing Representatives remained in 
 many of the States until Congress interposed by 
 virtue of its power under the Constitution of the 
 United States to regulate this subject, and there is 
 now a law upon our statute-book which provides 
 that Representatives in Congress shall be selected 
 from each State by districts ; each State where more 
 than one are to be chosen is to be broken into single 
 districts and a member elected from each. That 
 action by the States and this ultimate legislation by 
 Congress were for the purpose of doing away with 
 the injustice of the former system. It was to enable 
 the minority, or, to speak in other words, to enable 
 the various political interests of society, to have a 
 voice in the councils of the nation, to be heard in 
 these Halls, where laws were to be enacted which 
 would be binding universally upon the citizens. 
 The establishing of the system of single districts for 
 the election of members of Congress was a great re- 
 form and a great improvement in American politics; 
 it broke the power of the party majority to this ex- 
 tent, that they could not absorb the whole repre- 
 sentation of the State in the popular House of Con- 
 gress. But when you established the system of 
 single districts you retained still the majority rule 
 for elections in the districts. The majority rule 
 which obtained previously for the States was sent 
 clown into these divisions into which the States were 
 broken, and now obtains in the election of Repre- 
 
4 PKOPORTIONAL EEPKESENTATION. 
 
 sentatives from those several districts. But as soci- 
 ety with us has increased in magnitude and in the 
 variety of its interests, inconveniences and evils 
 which formerly were unnoticed or unimportant have 
 grown in magnitude also, and have become exceed- 
 ingly important, and the majority rule which pre- 
 vails in the selection of Representatives by districts 
 operates hardly and badly and requires amendment. 
 At least that is my opinion ; and in vindication of 
 that opinion, before I conclude I will submit such 
 reasons as have occurred to me in its support. 
 
 A majority in a congressional district, although 
 it be a majority of one vote, though it have but a 
 preponderance of one vote over the opposing inter- 
 est, is entitled to select a Representative, and its 
 voice is heard in the Hall of the people's House. 
 In theory the men who do not vote for the Repre- 
 sentative are represented by him ; but that theory is 
 simply a falsehood ; it is opposed to the fact ; it is 
 not true. Instead of representing the men who do 
 not vote for him in his district, the ordinary fact is 
 that the Representative opposes their opinions and 
 contributes all the power which he possesses to ren- 
 der those opinions unpopular and fruitless in the 
 administration of government. 
 
 INJUSTICE TO THE M1NOEITY. 
 
 Now, sir, it is a hardship that large masses of the 
 American people should have no voice in the peo- 
 ple's House, that they should be shut out from 
 representation in the Hall where popular represent- 
 ation is supposed to prevail with completeness and 
 perfection. Everybody admits that the fact is so, 
 
SENATE SPEECH. 5 
 
 that there is such disfranchisement ; and at some 
 times when the cases are very glaring, that disfran- 
 chisement arrests public attention and elicits indig- 
 nant debate. 
 
 But we are told that although a minority may be 
 under our present system disfranchised in one dis- 
 trict, the opposite party may be disfranchised in 
 another; and so taking the whole State and the 
 whole country together a sort of equilibrium is pro- 
 duced ; the party which fails in one district is suc- 
 cessful in another, and vice versa ; so that when you 
 carry this thing throughout the whole country 
 there is some approach toward justice and a correct J 
 result. My answer to that, which is really the ( 
 main plea for the existing system, is this : in the 
 first place I do not see that the perpetration of in- 
 justice in one locality is any compensation for the 
 perpetration of injustice in another ; that because a 
 certain minority of voters in Pennsylvania are 
 without a voice in this Government, therefore the 
 non-representation of a different class of voters in 
 Kentucky is justified and made equitable and 
 honorable and of good repute under a republican 
 system. In short, sir, my idea is that when you 
 show me a multiplication of cases of injustice, you \ 
 have simply swollen your evil in statement and I 
 made it more odious, more deserving of blows in- 
 stead of favor, of opposition instead of support : 
 that the variety of the interests which may be dis- 
 franchised under your majority rule as applied to 
 congressional districts is the very fact which pro- 
 nounces the most weighty condemnation of that 
 rule instead of furnishing it a justification or an 
 
6 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 apology. Then I have another reply to this sug- 
 gestion ; and that is that it is not true in point of 
 fact that the disfranchisements throughout the coun- 
 try taken together, or the disfranchisements in dis-. 
 tricts in a particular State taken together, do result 
 in an equilibrium. The fact has never been so ; it 
 is not likely to occur; the chances are a thousand 
 to one against it. Therefore, even if there were 
 some soundness in this doctrine of set-off, of setting 
 off one wrong against another, the result would not 
 be the production of an equilibrium of political 
 forces or their just distribution. How was it in the 
 last Congress ? Sixteen hundred thousand voters in 
 a particular section of country represented in Con- 
 gress — the North and West — had but thirty votes ; 
 while two million voters in the same section were 
 represented in that same House by one hundred and 
 twenty-eight! Therefore, sir, it is manifestly ab- 
 surd to talk about the equalization of disfranchise- 
 ment. There is no such result ; there is no equal- 
 ization. 
 
 Mr. President, we have all heard a great deal said 
 in our time about the " sacred principle" that the 
 majority shall bear absolute rule. Well, sir, I deny 
 that there is any such principle in our system of 
 government ; and if it could be established, I should 
 deny that it possessed any sacred character. What 
 is our principle, the principle upon which our repub- 
 lican system is founded ? It is that the people shall 
 rule ; that they shall rule themselves ; that we shall 
 have a system of self-government. Does that mean 
 that a part of the people shall rule over another 
 part ? Does that mean that they shall be divided 
 
SENATE SPEECH. 7 
 
 numerically, and that twenty shall absolutely con- 
 trol nineteen ; or does it mean volition and action of 
 the whole mass in the business of self-government ? 
 We have, however, from what we have supposed to 
 be the necessity of the case, a majority rule at elec- 
 tions. It is a simple rule, nothing sacred in it or 
 about it ; an arrangement, a thing of detail, by 
 which we have attempted in a rude manner to appty 
 practically our principle of government by the 
 people ; and this majority rule formerly obtaining 
 in the States and applied to a system of voting by 
 general ticket, yet applies in the districts into which 
 the States are divided. It is the same in its nature 
 and to a great extent it is the same in its effects as 
 before, and the very mischief and evil which led to 
 the abolition of the general ticket plan yet obtains 
 and prevails in elections in single districts. Though 
 mitigated somewhat, it requires, as I think, the 
 vigorous hand of reform. 
 
 I have made these introductory remarks in order 
 to approach the subject in an intelligible manner. 
 What is meant by cumulative voting is this : that 
 an elector in any State, whether he belongs to the 
 majority or to the minority, can give his votes for 
 some candidate or candidates who will be elected 
 and who will actually represent him in the Congress 
 of the United States. That is all there is of it. 
 That is the Alpha and the Omega of this whole 
 plan. It is a device by which there shall be actual 
 instead of sham representation in Congress ; by which 
 men who come here into the people's Hall shall rep- 
 resent the men who vote for them and nobody else, 
 and by which it shall not happen that nearly half 
 
8 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 the people of the United States shall have no effi- 
 cient or fair representation where the laws are made. 
 
 HOW TO CORRECT IT. 
 
 How is this object accomplished ? The manner 
 of accomplishing it is as simple as the thing is itself. 
 Take the State of Kentucky, about which there is 
 some discussion now, I believe, in the House of 
 Kepresentatives as to membership. She is entitled 
 to nine members in that House. What is proposed 
 is, that an elector in Kentucky may go to the elec- 
 tion and vote for nine members, if he choose, to rep- 
 sent his State in that House, giving each candi- 
 date one vote ; or bestow his nine votes upon four, 
 if he choose, or upon one, or upon any other num- 
 ber less than the whole. All the provision of law 
 that is necessary is that the elector may vote for a 
 less number of candidates than the whole number 
 to be chosen, and that he may distribute his votes 
 among that less number according to his judgment 
 and discretion, enlightened or directed by his con- 
 victions of public duty. That is simple. It does 
 not require a long explanation here ; nor to the 
 commonest-minded man in the country is it neces- 
 sary to go into a protracted argument in order that 
 he may comprehend it. The Senator from Kentucky 
 remarked a short time ago that he was in favor of 
 this reform if it were practicable ; he was in favor 
 of some improvement of this kind. 
 
 Mr. Davis. I did not mean to say that it was 
 impracticable. I am very ready to receive informa- 
 tion as to the practicability of it from the honorable 
 Senator. 
 
UN a si 
 
 >, 
 
 SENATE SPEECH. 
 
 Mr. Buckalew. The Constitution of the United 
 States says you may regulate the manner of electing 
 members of Congress ; you have interposed already 
 by law to abolish the evils of the general ticket plan 
 by which a majority could elect all the members from 
 a State. Now what I ask you to do is in the same 
 line of reform with that former legislation ; that 
 you shall go on, and instead of allowing any portion 
 of the people of a State to be disfranchised, you 
 shall permit them so to vote that they shall get 
 actual representation. 
 
 Mr. Davis. If the honorable Senator will per- 
 mit me, I will mention as an evidence of my friend- 
 liness to his principle, that I was a member of the 
 House at the time that bill was passed, and voted 
 for it ; and I was then upon the Committee of Elec- 
 tions, and I made a report in favor of the bill. 
 Some of the States then voted by general ticket, 
 and some did not. Some voted by the district 
 system, with districts entitled to send two or three 
 or four Representatives, as was the case in the hon- 
 orable Senator's State. That measure was deemed 
 entirely a Whig measure ; it was opposed by the 
 Democracy ; and there were four States, according 
 to my best recollection, two of which I remember, 
 Mississippi and New Hampshire, who refused obe- 
 dience to the law, and continued to elect their Rep- 
 resentatives upon the exploded general ticket system, 
 defying the law of Congress. But their represen- 
 tation, elected on the general ticket system, was 
 accepted in the next House by a majority. I merely 
 make this statement of my being a friend to that 
 measure to give some assurance to the honorable 
 
10 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 Senator that I am not hostile to the principle of his 
 proposition. 
 
 Mr. Buckalew. Well, sir, whatever may be said 
 of this measure, it is certainly practicable. It re- 
 quires nothing but an act of Congress of half a 
 dozen lines permitting an elector in any State choos- 
 ing members of Congress to bestow his votes on any 
 number of candidates less than the whole. Nothing 
 further is necessary than that the votes so taken 
 shall be reported, counted by the Secretary of the 
 Commonwealth in a State, and the returns signed 
 by the Governor in the usual way, and sent to the 
 Speaker of the House of Eepresentatives. The 
 scheme requires no machinery; it requires no in- 
 volved legislation; it involves no difficulty in put- 
 ting it into execution. 
 
 ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE NEW PLAN. 
 
 Now, let me show how this scheme would work 
 by a particular example. Take the case of Ver- 
 mont, a State with sixty thousand voters, forty thou- 
 sand of whom are members of the majority party, 
 and twenty thousand of the minority. By act of 
 Congress — the existing apportionment law — that 
 State is entitled to three members. The numbers I 
 have stated are very nearly the exact numbers of 
 voters in that State. Every one at a glance can see 
 what ought to take place. The maj ority having forty 
 thousand votes should choose two members of Con- 
 gress from that State, and the minority having 
 twenty thousand votes should choose one member. 
 Then there would be just representation. Then 
 there could be no complaint in any quarter. Then 
 
SENATE SPEECH. 
 
 11 
 
 our principle of the representation of the people 
 would be applied in the particular case, and no 
 human being can conceive of any argument or 
 objection against the result. 
 
 This plan of cumulative voting renders just that 
 result certain — renders it morally impossible that 
 any other should take place ; and why ? Because \ 
 the minority cumulating their votes upon a single \ 
 candidate can give him sixty thousand votes ; each 
 elector giving his candidate three votes, it would 
 count him sixty thousand. The forty thousand 
 constituting the political majority in the State, if 
 they attempt to vote for three candidates, can give 
 them only forty thousand each. If they cumulate 
 their votes upon two candidates, (which is what they 
 are entitled to,) they can give them sixty thousand 
 votes each ; so that two men will be elected to Con- 
 gress representing the majority and one man repre- 
 senting the minority, and it is impossible for either 
 one of those political interests to prevent the other 
 from obtaining its due share of representation. 
 
 Take the case of Pennsylvania, with twenty-four 
 members. In that State at the last congressional 
 election there were polled five hundred and ninety- 
 six thousand one hundred and forty-one votes. The 
 majority party polled three hundred and three thou- 
 sand seven hundred and ninety and the minority 
 two hundred and ninety-two thousand three hun- 
 dred and fifty-one. It thus appears that there was 
 a majority in favor of one political interest in that 
 State at that congressional election, amounting to 
 eleven thousand four hundred and thirty-nine votes. 
 Multiplying, that by five — one-fifth of the popula- 
 
12 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 tion ordinarily being the voters of the State — and 
 you see that that surplus which one party possessed 
 of votes over the other represents a population a lit- 
 tle exceeding fifty-five thousand — less than one-half 
 the number of inhabitants in the State entitled to a 
 representative in Congress — so that this surplus of 
 votes of one party over the other represents a mi- 
 nority fraction upon a ratio of apportionment of 
 members of Congress to the State. The returns of 
 that election (held in October last) were as follows : 
 
 PENNSYLVANIA CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS. 
 
 Republican. Democratic. 
 
 1 7,728 12,192 
 
 II 12,612 9,475 
 
 III 12,520 11,516 
 
 IV 14,551 12,120 
 
 V 12,259 11,800 
 
 VI 11,447 14,009 
 
 VII 12,011 8,531 
 
 VIII 6,999 13,188 
 
 IX 14,298 8,675 
 
 X 13,186 12,971 
 
 XI 9,121 15,907 
 
 XII 13,274 15,280 
 
 XIII 11,940 10,653 
 
 XIV 14,190 12,675 
 
 XV 12,489 15,830 
 
 XVI 13,589 12,964 
 
 XVII 11,298 9,979 
 
 XVIII 14,734 12,688 
 
 XIX 15,107 12,481 
 
 XX 17,106 15,222 
 
 XXI 13,023 12,669 
 
 XXII 12,720 9,655 
 
 XXIII 14,197 10,012 
 
 XXIV 13,391 11,853 
 
 303,790 292,351 
 
 292,351 
 
 Majority 11,439 
 
 Ratio of votes for a Representative, according to votes polled... 24,839 
 
SENATE SPEECH. 13 
 
 Now, sir, what is the result? Judging by the 
 actual votes polled at that congressional election, 
 there should have been an equal division of Repre- 
 sentatives in the House, standing 12 to 12 ; or, if a 
 Representative should be assigned to the majority 
 interest on account of the excess of its vote, the 
 numbers would stand 13 to 11. But in point of 
 fact, under your single district system, the result in 
 that State is that, the delegation stands 18 to 6, in- 
 stead of being equally divided between parties 
 according to the actual votes which were polled at 
 the election. But under this plan of cumulative 
 voting, what would take place ? As each political 
 interest in the State knows that its vote is .about 
 the same as that of the opposing one, and that 
 if it attempt to obtain more than its fair share 
 of representation, it may actually lose instead of 
 gaining, it will be forced to concentrate its votes 
 upon twelve candidates, or upon thirteen at the 
 most, and it is impossible that by any ingenuity or 
 device whatever it can increase its representation in 
 Congress above about what its actual numbers en- 
 title it to. If it should make the attempt, the 
 opposite party would gain an advantage as the result 
 of the sharp practice attempted upon them. 
 
 I have taken Vermont and Pennsvlvania. Now 
 take the case of Kentucky. There are nine mem- 
 bers of the House elected from Kentucky, all of one 
 political complexion. They are now demanding 
 membership in the House, and they are met by a 
 refusal for reasons which I need not discuss, and 
 which it would be, perhaps, improper to discuss 
 here. Suppose a just system of election had pre- 
 
14 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 vailed in Kentucky, would the whole nine have 
 been Democratic — a clean delegation of one political 
 opinion ? No such thing would have been possible. 
 At that election the majority was about forty thou- 
 sand for the party that prevailed. 
 
 Mr. Davis. Larger than that. 
 
 Mr. Buckalew\ I thought it was about forty 
 thousand. As I make the number of voters re- 
 quired for the election of a member of Congress, 
 that would represent nearly two members. There- 
 fore the preponderance of one political interest in 
 Kentucky over the other would represent two mem- 
 bers. That would leave seven members of Congress 
 to be equally divided between the two political in- 
 terests ; one party having four and the other three, 
 and the result would be that the representation in 
 the House would have been divided, more une- 
 qually, to be sure, than in most cases, but still not 
 with gross inequality between the two parties that 
 contend for mastery in this country. 
 
 Take the case of Maryland at the last election. 
 You find that representation in the House of Rep- 
 resentatives is not just, considering the men who 
 gave the votes by which those Representatives were 
 elected ; that instead of there being but one Repub- 
 lican Representative from Maryland there should 
 be two on account of the actual votes polled in that 
 State. Then, sir, take the case of Connecticut, an 
 election recently held, and a most notable trial of 
 political strength in the North. There, where the 
 vote was a tie substantially, where the preponderance 
 of one side over the other was very slight, not more 
 than about a thousand or twelve hundred, perhaps, 
 
SENATE SPEECH. 15 
 
 the delegation stands three to one, whereas it should 
 be equally divided according to the actual votes 
 polled and returned according to law. 
 
 I cite these cases of recent State elections, and 
 elections which on the whole have been favorable to 
 that interest in the country which when the votes 
 are taken in the aggregate is in the minority, and I 
 cite the other two cases of Vermont and Pennsyl- 
 vania as other illustrations. But nearly every State 
 might be mentioned in illustration of the argument. 
 
 Thus, sir, whether you go to the North or to the 
 West, or confine your researches to the central por- 
 tions of the country, you find gross misrepresenta- 
 tion of the people of the United States in that 
 House which was peculiarly intended to represent! 
 them, and to represent them completely, year by! 
 year. The Senate was intended to be a more per- 
 manent body, and to possess somewhat of a different 
 character. What I propose, then, is the correction 
 of this injustice, whether it exist in the States I 
 have mentioned or in any other States represented 
 in Congress, and to guard against its extension to 
 the States which you are about to restore under your 
 legislation to their former places in the Union, and 
 with regard to which a reform of this kind is more 
 important than it is to the States of the North, the 
 centre, or the West. 
 
 ITS ADVANTAGES. 
 
 Mr. President, I will now proceed briefly to state 
 in succession, not to elaborate, several distinct argu- 
 ments by wdiich cumulative voting can be sustained, 
 vindicated, and made good as I think against all 
 
16 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 objection. In the first place, this plan is one of 
 justice ; it is recognized as just by every one who 
 hears me upon its mere statement ; it will be recog- 
 nized as just by any man in the country to whom 
 you carry the proposition and submit it for his judg- 
 ment. It will deal equal, even-handed justice 
 among political interests in the country, whether 
 they exist now or are created by the exigencies of 
 our affairs hereafter. 
 
 In the next place, this plan would bring into 
 public life and keep in public life many able men 
 who are now excluded under your single district 
 system. A man of ability in a State can never 
 reach the Hall of the House, of Representatives as 
 a Representative of the people unless there be a 
 majority in his district to send him ; and if he com- 
 mence a career in public life, with high ambition 
 before him, and devote himself zealously to the 
 service of the people, and so qualify himself for 
 high statesmanship, and to take rank in Congress as 
 men take rank in the Parliament of Great Britain, 
 he knows that a little shifting of the political scale 
 in his district will leave him out. Those who agree 
 with him in opinion cannot continue him in the 
 public service. The result is that you have no 
 twenty, thirty, or forty-year men in Congress. 
 They are mostly men of the moment ; they are two 
 and four-year men in the House, and the example 
 extends even here. If a member of this bodv sets 
 re-elected his friends think it is a subject for warm 
 congratulation, regard it as a wonderful result to be 
 wrung from a caucus and from managers at home. 
 But, sir, I insist that in this country, as abroad, the 
 
SENATE SPEECH. 17 
 
 House of Representatives ought to be the great 
 House of our Legislature ; its Hall should be re- 
 sorted to for words of eloquence, for profound logic, 
 and for the exhibition of the highest traits of Amer- 
 ican statesmanship. How is it and how must it be 
 as long as you keep members there two, four, and six 
 years only ? They have no opportunity to grow up 
 into distinction ; they have no opportunity to ma- 
 ture their abilities and become able statesmen. 
 
 The result is that the weight of that House in the 
 Government is far below what it should be. This 
 may increase the relative importance of the Senate ; 
 but upon the whole it is not a desirable condition 
 of things, and the continuance of this system of 
 rapid rotation in the membership of the House of 
 Representatives bids fair to be one of those injurious 
 influences which will bring republican institutions 
 into contempt. 
 
 I say then, sir, that this plan of election by 
 cumulative voting will allow electors of a particular 
 party in a State to continue their favorites in Con- 
 gress, and will result in improved statesmanship in 5 
 the House of Representatives, elevating that branch 
 of the national Legislature, and, of consequence, 
 promoting the public interests. 
 
 Again, sir, one great advantage of this plan is 
 that it abolishes gerrymandering in the States, cuts[ 
 it up by the roots, ends it forever. That is one of 
 the most crying evils of the time. Now, sir, I ven- 
 ture to say that from Maine westward to the Pacific 
 Ocean, in the last ten years, in no State whatever, 
 has there been an honest and fair district apportion- 
 ment bill passed for the selection of members of 
 
18 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 Congress. Nowhere, in no State, has there been a 
 fair apportionment, unless, indeed, it was in a par- 
 ticular and exceptional case where the two branches 
 of a Legislature were divided in political opinion 
 and one checked the other ; but ordinarily, as we 
 know, in the course of northern politics, legislative 
 bodies have been of the same political complexion 
 in the upper and lower houses ; and I venture to 
 say that whenever this w T as the fact, unfair and dis- 
 honest apportionment bills have been passed. 
 
 Under the present system the temptation to party 
 is too great to be resisted ; party interest appeals to 
 members of a Legislature, and they yield to. its de- 
 mands and enact injustice into law. The party that 
 does this know T s perfectly well that when a future 
 apportionment shall be made, the opposite party, if 
 it be in power, will retort this injustice, perhaps 
 with increased force. Thus you have a competition 
 between political interests with reference to the ap- 
 portionment of the States continually increasing in 
 injustice, leading to degradation of the Legislatures 
 and the corruption of the people. The plan of 
 cumulative voting, however, dispensing with single 
 districts in a State, avoids altogether this capital 
 evil and mischief of gerrymandering and brings it 
 to an end so far as the selection of members of Con- 
 gress is concerned. 
 
 Well, Mr. President, in the southern country, as 
 already hinted by me, I consider this plan of cumu- 
 lative voting to be indispensable to the harmony, to 
 the welfare of that section of the Union. You 
 have vast masses of voters belonging to two different 
 races there who are to be brought into antagonism 
 
SENATE SPEECH. 19 
 
 to each other at the polls, and that in and through 
 every State of the whole ten now unrepresented. 
 How will you have them vote ? Against each other, 
 voting each other down under the majority rule, 
 producing bad blood and riot and turbulence upon 
 thousands of occasions, with wide-spread discontent 
 and dissatisfaction through the whole social body ? 
 Will you permit the majority rule of elections to 
 have uninterrupted effect there, causing results like 
 these? Will you make no provision for amend- 
 ment, for counteracting and countervailing these 
 manifest evils and dangers ? 
 
 Take the case of Georgia, with seven members. 
 You can see what the result would be under cumu- 
 lative voting following a regular registration of 
 voters. It could be known beforehand about what 
 number of representatives the colored voters and their 
 white allies were entitled to, and how many repre- 
 sentatives under that registration the other elements 
 of population would be entitled to. The election would 
 take place quietly, without collision ; neither side 
 could deprive the other of its Mr share in the result. 
 
 I should like to enlarge on that point, but I shall 
 not do so ; for the reason that the decision of the 
 Senate ruling the amendment proposed by me out 
 of order upon this bill does not render a discussion 
 of the effects of this plan in those States, in connec- 
 tion with the coming elections, as important as it 
 would otherwise be. 
 
 I go over, as briefly as I can, the different heads 
 of the argument, in order that they may be con- 
 sidered here and elsewhere, because this is not the 
 end of this subject. A proposition which is just in 
 
20 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 itself, which is capable of being vindicated by de- 
 bate, which is important and vital to the working of 
 our representative system, cannot be kept down or 
 suppressed. If it be pushed aside at one time it 
 will recur upon us, it will return again and again, 
 until it be determined upon its merits and according 
 to an enlightened public sentiment developed or 
 produced by discussion. 
 
 In the last place, Mr. President, this plan of cumu- 
 lative voting will be a most valuable check upon 
 fraud at elections. No measure ever proposed in 
 this Union would have so extensive and salutary an 
 effect in checking election frauds and corruption as 
 this plan of fair and honest voting which I defend. 
 Do you not discover at a glance in looking over the 
 States of the Union the main source from which 
 electoral corruption issues, the main cause that 
 brings it into existence ? What is that ? Why, sir, 
 the motive put before every candidate in every dis- 
 trict of the country that is anything like close, the 
 strong incentive and the strong temptation is to cor- 
 rupt a few votes in order to turn them into his scale 
 and carry his election over an opposing candidate. 
 And when one candidate resorts to this mode of pro- 
 moting his interests, the opposing candidate feels 
 justified in acting in the same way ; and thus it is 
 that an iniquity perpetrated on one side begets simi- 
 lar iniquity upon the other. There is a pitting of 
 corruption against corruption, in the closely con- 
 tested districts at all events, or most noticeably at 
 commercial points, and our system of government is 
 thereby poisoned at its very fountain. The evil is 
 growing yearly. 
 
SENATE SPEECH. 21 
 
 As the country becomes denser in population, as 
 wealth accumulates, as the various interests of society 
 become more diverse, its affairs more complicated 
 and dependent upon legislation, this evil of electoral 
 corruption must increase and swell in volume. You 
 must correct your arrangements for elections in 
 order to check it. Cumulative voting will check it. 
 There will be no longer a struggle for district ma- 
 jorities, a struggle for a few votes for one man over 
 another, because one party in a State casting its 
 votes for the number of men or about the number 
 of men it can elect according to its numbers in that 
 State will elect them against the whole world, and 
 there will be no motive to corrupt anybody, no 
 turning of the scale by any species of illegitimate 
 influence which may be brought to bear. Then, no 
 little local interest can come to a political party and 
 command terms from it, command its action. Then 
 no man with his pocket full of accumulated gain can 
 go to election agents and through them corrupt a 
 part of the electoral body to turn the scale in his 
 own favor, provoking thereby similar corruption on 
 the other side. Then illegitimate, pernicious, and 
 selfish interests in a State will not use the machinery 
 of your electoral system for the purpose of poisoning 
 the sources of political power, because there will not 
 be a sufficient motive. It is these contests for ma- 
 jorities between candidates that cause the major 
 part of the evil of which we complain. 
 
 COKKUPTION OF THE PKESENT SYSTEM. 
 
 Sir, we have not in this regard attained to the 
 full height and depth and breadth of possible evil. 
 
22 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 But we have declined far below the purity of former 
 times. The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Wil- 
 son] thinks our elections in this country are models 
 of purity, that nobody is corrupted, that there is lit- 
 tle departure from honest principles in their manage- 
 ment. Notwithstanding his opinion, I think that 
 this evil is already extensive enough with us to 
 alarm every patriot and every honest man. I could 
 if it were necessary and time permitted put my 
 finger upon cases in my own State which would 
 establish a very different opinion (at least as to that 
 section of the Union) from that which the Senator 
 from Massachusetts announces. 
 
 Let me illustrate the extent to which, under a 
 system of elections by the majority rule, corruption 
 niay be carried for the purpose of obtaining these 
 local majorities. I take cases from England — some 
 parliamentary boroughs. In the debate in the 
 House of Commons on the 30th of May last a pro- 
 vision of the reform bill was pending which had 
 been proposed by the ministry for the disfranchise- 
 ment of certain boroughs, on the ground of the cor- 
 ruption of the electors therein. Four boroughs 
 were to be struck from the list of those to be repre- 
 sented hereafter in Parliament, (whether the inhab- 
 itants were to be counted as electors of the counties 
 in which they were located or not was not deter- 
 mined at the last accounts.) There had been an 
 examination by a board of commission of the subject 
 of corruption in those boroughs at the previous par- 
 liamentary election. Witnesses were examined 
 under oath ; the case of each borough was thor- 
 oughly investigated, and the facts were laid before 
 
SENATE SPEECH. 23 
 
 Parliament. What did the report of the commis- 
 sion show ? The statement is a startling one, and 
 here it is : 
 
 CORRUPTION IN ENGLISH BOROUGHS. 
 
 Registered Voters. Impure Voters, 
 
 Totness..' 421 158 
 
 Beigate 912 346 
 
 Great Yarmouth 1647 528 
 
 Lancaster 1498 916 
 
 In Totness and Eeigate the corrupt voters were thirty-eight per cent, 
 of the whole ; in Yarmouth thirty-two per cent., and in Lancaster sixty- 
 four ! 
 
 The reason why Yarmouth shows the lowest in 
 this scale of infamy, is that by act of Parliament 
 some years since the freemen were disfranchised, 
 and suffrage was confined to householders ; so that 
 the percentage of corrupt voters is only thirty-two 
 per cent., whereas in Lancaster, a borough of some- 
 what similar character, the percentage amounts to 
 sixty-four per cent. This is shown by a detail of 
 the voters in Lancaster. There, of freemen, there 
 were 980 registered, of whom 708 were proved to 
 be impure ; whereas of the householders, 439 regis- 
 tered, the number of corrupt was only 208. Here 
 three-fourths of the freemen were bribers or bribed, 
 whereas less than one-half of the householders 
 were corrupt. 
 
 These are the facts as proved, and they of course 
 do not include the corruption in those boroughs 
 which was not detected by the commission, of which 
 there may have been a considerable amount. You 
 see here to what length electoral corruption may be 
 carried under the district system — because in Eng- 
 land their boroughs are districts — where the ma- 
 
24 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 jority or the plurality rule obtains, and where there 
 is a motive for a corrupt man to struggle for the 
 balance of power in order to turn the scale. One 
 great objection I have always had to colored suf- 
 frage, and which I have stated upon this floor, has 
 been this : that thereby you cast into the hands of 
 corrupt and ambitious and evil men in this country, 
 a vast opportunity for mischief, for using this mass 
 of votes for their own improper purposes. Looking 
 from the practical point of view upon this question, 
 I supposed that it connected itself with the subject 
 of corruption ; but if you had a system of cumu- 
 lative voting in the South, each political party there 
 would have the power to secure to itself due repre- 
 sentation in Congress in spite of another ; the 
 causes of corruption would be cut off or limited, 
 and you could have a system comparatively pure. 
 Sir, I show you these English examples as a warn- 
 ing, as pointing out to you the great danger to 
 which our representative system is liable, particu- 
 larly in that section with which your measures of 
 reconstruction are concerned. 
 
 Mr. President, I had prepared some time since a 
 complete analysis of the recent elections in the 
 States represented in Congress, from the best means 
 of information within my power, for the purpose of 
 showing the operation of our existing system under 
 the majority rule ; but, sir, it is not necessary for 
 me to go over that. All I shall say upon that 
 point is that you cannot examine the facts as to any 
 State, taking your figures from any authentic publi- 
 cation, without perceiving that your representative 
 system requires reform ; that you must advance 
 
SENATE SPEECH. 25 
 
 from the position you have heretofore maintained 
 as to the manner in which the right of suffrage 
 shall be exercised by our people ; and the farther 
 this investigation shall be carried the more thorough 
 will this conviction be. 
 
 Mr. President, I have done what I supposed to 
 be a duty in calling attention to this question, pre- 
 senting it to the consideration of the Senate, know- 
 ing perfectly well that it will be again before us, 
 and feeling assured that the proposition will event- 
 ually triumph here on this floor and throughout the 
 country, that you will make your plan of taking 
 the sense of the people in the election of members 
 of Congress just, equitable, reasonable, fair; that 
 you will make and shape it according to the infor- 
 mation which you now possess, instead of continuing 
 your present imperfect arrangement ; that as you 
 extend the basis of suffrage, as you make changes 
 in the foundations of political power, you will 
 improve the plans upon which your system shall be 
 worked and made to accomplish its proper objects. 
 
 MILL AND GEEY ON REFORMED VOTING. 
 
 I have in conclusion only to cite authority, which 
 will be brief upon this question. In the first place 
 I will read from an author of the first rank — from 
 John Stuart Mill's work on parliamentary reform, 
 page 28. He is speaking of districts which shall 
 elect each three members of the Parliament, and is 
 proposing the application of improved modes of 
 voting to them : 
 
 " Assuming, then, that each constituency elects three repre- 
 sentatives, two modes have been proposed, in either of which a 
 
26 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 minority, amounting to a third of the constituency, may, by 
 acting in concert, and determining to aim at no more, return 
 one of the members. One plan is, that each elector should 
 only be allowed to vote for two, or even for one, although three 
 are to be elected. The other leaves to the elector his three 
 votes, but allows him to give all of them to one candidate. 
 The first of these plans was adopted in the reform bill of Lord 
 Aberdeen's government ; but I do not hesitate most decidedly 
 to prefer the second, which has been advocated in an able and 
 conclusive pamphlet by Mr. James Garth Marshall. 
 
 " The former plan must be always and inevitably unpopular, 
 because it cuts down the privileges of the voter, while the 
 latter on the contrary, extends them. And I am prepared to 
 maintain that the permission of cumulative votes, that is, of 
 giving either one, two, or three votes to a single candidate, is 
 in itself, even independently of its effect in giving a repre- 
 sentation to minorities, the mode of voting which gives the 
 most faithful expression of the wishes of the elector. On the 
 existing plan, an elector who votes for three can give his vote 
 for the three candidates whom he prefers to their competitors ; 
 but among those three he may desire the success of one 
 immeasurably more than that of the other two, and may be 
 willing to relinquish them entirely for an increased chance of 
 attaining the greater object. 
 
 " This portion of his wishes he has now no means of expressing 
 by his vote. He may sacrifice two of his votes altogether, but 
 in no case can he give more than a single vote to the object of 
 his preference. Why should the mere fact of preference be 
 alone considered, and no account whatever be taken of the 
 degree of it? The power to give several votes to a single 
 candidate would be eminently favorable to those whose claims 
 to be chosen are derived from personal qualities, and not from 
 their being the mere symbols of an opinion. • For if the voter 
 gives his suffrage to a candidate in consideration of pledges or 
 because the candidate is of the same party with himself, he 
 will not desire the success of that individual more than that 
 of any other who will take the same pledges or belongs to the 
 same party. 
 
 "When he is especially concerned for the election of some 
 one candidate, it is on account of something which personally 
 
SENATE SPEECH. 27 
 
 distinguishes that candidate from others on the same side. 
 Where there is no overruling local influence in favor of an 
 individual, those who would be benefited as candidates by the 
 cumulative vote would generally be the persons of greatest real 
 or reputed virtue or talents." 
 
 In his subsequent work on representative govern- 
 ment he has gone elaborately into an investigation 
 of the existing evils of the representative system as 
 shown in Great Britain, and has laid elaborately the 
 foundations of an argument upon grounds distinct 
 from those which I have stated, although in some 
 cases approaching them, for the adoption of this or 
 some other adequate plan of reform ; and in that 
 subsequent work he repeats his recommendation of 
 cumulative voting as one of sensible and material 
 reform. He proceeds, however, to state that his own 
 opinion inclines to a still further reform, the intro- 
 duction of a system of personal representation, 
 which I shall not discuss here because the occasion 
 does not invite it, because I do not suppose it is a 
 system which can be within a twelvemonth or 
 within several years debated and understood and 
 adopted by the American people. It is one much 
 more complicated, requiring perhaps a higher state 
 of political experience, or a more advanced stage of 
 discussion for its comprehension and adoption by 
 our people. 
 
 I have quoted the authority of Mr. Mill in favor 
 of cumulative voting as a convenient, practicable, 
 just, and useful measure of reform, confident that 
 his authority will be accepted both by the Senate 
 and by the people of this country as the highest 
 perhaps which can be produced upon a question of 
 
28 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 this character. Next I quote from Earl Grey's 
 work on Parliamentary Government and Reform, 
 seventh chapter. This is a new edition, iDnblished 
 in 1864. He says : 
 
 " The first of the reforms of a conservative tendency which I 
 should suggest, and one which I should consider a great im- 
 provement under any circumstances, but quite indispensable if 
 any changes favorable to democratic power are to be admitted, 
 would be the adoption of what Mr. James Marshall has called 
 the ' cumulative vote ;' that is to say, the principle of giving 
 to every elector as many votes as there are members to be elected 
 by the constituency to which he belongs, with the right of either 
 giving all these votes to a single candidate or of dividing them, 
 as he may prefer. 
 
 " The object of adopting this rule would be to secure to mi- 
 norities a fair opportunity of making their opinions and wishes 
 heard in the House of Commons. In order that it might fully 
 answer this purpose, the right of returning members to Parlia- 
 ment ought to be so distributed that each constituency should 
 not have less than three representatives to choose. Supposing 
 that three members were to be elected together, and that each 
 elector were entitled to three votes, which he might unite in 
 favor of a single candidate, it is obvious that a minority ex- 
 ceeding a fourth of the whole constituency would have the 
 power of securing the election of one member. It is probable 
 that in general three members w T ould be thus returned, each 
 representing a different shade of opinion among the voters. 
 
 " The advantages this mode of voting would be calculated to 
 produce, and the justice of making some such provision for 
 the representation of minorities, or rather, the flagrant injus- 
 tice of omitting to do so, have been so well shown by Mr. Mar- 
 shall in the pamphlet I have already referred to, and by Mr. 
 Mill in his highly philosophical treatise on Eepresentative 
 Government, that it is quite needless for me to argue the ques- 
 tion as one of principle. But I may observe that, in addition 
 to its being right in principle, this measure would be in strict 
 accordance with the lessons of experience if read in their true 
 spirit. One of the most remarkable peculiarities of the British 
 
SENATE SPEECH. 29 
 
 House of Commons, as compared to other representative bodies, 
 is that it has always had within its walls members representing 
 most of the different classes of society, and of the various and 
 conflicting opinions and interests to be found in the nation. 
 Much of the acknowledged success with which the House of 
 Commons has played its part in the government of the country 
 has been attributed (I believe most justly) to this peculiarity. 
 
 " The changes made by the reform act, and especially the 
 abolition of the various rights of voting formerly to be found 
 in different towns, and the establishment of one uniform fran- 
 chise in all the English boroughs, (with only a small exception 
 in favor of certain classes of freemen,) tended somewhat to 
 impair the character of the House in this respect. The greatly 
 increased intercourse between different parts of the country, 
 and the rapidity with which opinions are propagated from one 
 extremity of the kingdom to another, have had a similar tend- 
 ency ; and there is no longer the same probability as formerly 
 that different Opinions will be found to prevail in different 
 places, so as to enable all parties to find somewhere the means 
 of gaining an entrance to Parliament for at least enough of 
 their adherents to give expression to their feelings." 
 
 And then he goes on with an elaborate investiga- 
 tion and application of this scheme to the House of 
 Commons. There has been, therefore, not only an 
 inquiry abroad, but an assent from minds very dif- 
 ferently or variantly constituted, in favor of cumu- 
 lative voting; from Mr. Mill, a representative of 
 radical opinion, than whom there is no one more 
 eminent in political literature; and then, again, 
 from Earl Grey, representing a more conservative 
 shade of political sentiment in that country. Why 
 has not this plan been adopted in Great Britain and 
 applied in practice, and why has it not been incor- 
 porated in the existing reform bill? Because in 
 that country they have not the same advantages 
 that we have for its introduction. Here our exist- 
 
30 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 ing States offer the facilities for, introducing this 
 plan without inconvenience, whereas in Great 
 Britain, where they have their districts formed, 
 districts which have existed for centuries, where the 
 habits and relations of the people have been formed 
 for long periods of time, until they have become 
 inveterate, it is almost impossible to make up politi- 
 cal constituencies upon whom to apply this plan of 
 voting. In our States, however, in nearly all of 
 which more members than one are to be elected by 
 the same body of electors, the introduction of this 
 plan is both possible and convenient. 
 
 I conclude, Mr. President, by saying that I shall 
 attach, j^robably, to my remarks a tabular statement, 
 summing up the results of representation as they 
 are exhibited by the existing system in the compo- 
 sition of the Fortieth Congress, excluding, possibly, 
 some of the returns which I do not possess. Now, 
 I submit to the Senate, and to whoever in the coun- 
 try may pay attention to our proceedings and see 
 my remarks on this occasion, that upon grounds 
 of both reason and authority this proposition has 
 been sustained ; and that if it be introduced into 
 this country, whether in one State or in many States, 
 or universally throughout the country, in any event 
 it will bear the character of a material, useful, and 
 necessary reform of our political system. 
 
SPEECH 
 
 AT THE 
 
 ASSEMBLY BUILDINGS, PHILADELPHIA, 
 
 TUESDAY EVENING, NOV. 19, 1867. 
 
 Fellow- Citizens of the City of Philadelphia : — 
 
 You have had stated to you the circumstances 
 under which I appear in your presence to speak 
 upon the subject of representative reform. With- 
 out any introductory remarks, without pausing over 
 preliminary topics, I shall proceed to the subject- 
 matter of my discourse. 
 
 Ours is said to be a Government of the people, 
 meaning by that term the whole electoral body with 
 whom the right of suffrage is lodged by our consti- 
 tution. The people, considered in this sense, are 
 said to rule themselves, and our system is therefore 
 described as one of self-government. Those who 
 are bound by the laws are to enact them. Power is 
 in the first instance exerted by them and obedience 
 yielded afterward. All rests upon their voluntary 
 assent and upon their free action. But, as it is im- 
 possible that the whole mass of the political commu- 
 nity should assemble together for the purpose of 
 enacting or agreeing upon those rules of conduct 
 
 31 
 
32 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 which are to bind the citizens, and as it would be 
 impossible for such an enormous body, even if it 
 were convened, to act with convenience or to act at 
 all, we, like the people of other countries in former 
 times have resorted to what is known as the repre- 
 sentative system. 
 
 From the impossibility of convening ourselves 
 together to determine those great questions which 
 pertain to the political and social bodies, and about 
 which government is employed, we have determined 
 to select from among ourselves a certain number of 
 persons with whom shall be lodged all our powers 
 connected with legislation and with government, 
 and whatsoever they shall determine shall be to us 
 and to all men within our borders the law of indi- 
 vidual conduct. 
 
 Well, now, gentlemen, in carrying on this system 
 of representative government the manner in which 
 the agents of the people shall be selected becomes 
 in the highest degree important. Although by our 
 theory, although by our fundamental principle of 
 self-government by the people, all the people are to 
 be represented in the making of laws and in the 
 administration of government, in point of fact we 
 have not attained to this result. We have fallen 
 short of it in our arrangements, and hence it is that 
 men of intelligence and of sagacity, driven to their 
 conclusions by thorough examination and by full 
 inquiry, have been compelled to declare that our 
 system is imperfect, and imperfect to such an extent 
 that the quality of our government is deeply affected, 
 and many pernicious things have place in its admin- 
 istration. 
 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH. 33 
 
 Instead of there being under the representative 
 system, as it is known among us, a representation of 
 the entire electoral body, of all the individuals who 
 compose it, there is in fact a representation of only 
 a part. In other words, representation instead of 
 being complete and coextensive with all those who 
 are to be represented and who are to be bound by 
 the action of government, is partial and restricted 
 to a part only of the political body. 
 
 Well, gentlemen, in the infancy or in the early 
 stages of a Government an imperfection of this 
 la nd may be perm itted or overlooked. The affairs 
 of society when they are not complicated, before the 
 community has become rich, before its affairs, social 
 and political, become involved and intricate, may 
 admit of very rude and imperfect arrangements, 
 and yet the people may be well governed, the laws 
 may be just and wholesome and administered in a 
 proper spirit and with complete success. But, as 
 wealth accumulates, as population becomes dense 
 and great cities grow up, as vices are spread through 
 the social body, and as widely extended and compli- 
 ! cated political action becomes necessary, those earlier 
 and simpler arrangements — imperfect always — be- 
 come positively pernicious and hurtful ; and the 
 necessity arises for their correction, and that the 
 system of government shall be purified and invigo- 
 rated by amendment. 
 
 In your popular elections which are held or taken 
 under the majority or rather under the plurality 
 rule, (which ordinarily amounts to the same thing,) 
 at your popular elections the smaller number of 
 voices which are spoken in the election of represent- 
 
34 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 atives who are to enact your laws are stricken from 
 the count. When the officers charged with the 
 duty of collecting the voices of the people come to 
 make up the count and declare the result, they 
 strike from the poll or the return all those who 
 when numbered are the smaller quantity or the 
 smaller political force. Then after your represent- 
 atives selected in this manner by a majority merely, 
 by a part of the community, are convened together, 
 when they come to act in the business of govern- 
 ment, to enact laws, they again act by a similar rule. 
 The majority in the representative body pronounce 
 the opinion and decree of that body, and what they 
 pronounce becomes law, binding upon all the peo- 
 ple. Now, what is observable in this statement of 
 facts? Why, that in the first place, in selecting 
 representatives you strike off a part of the political 
 body; then, again, in representative action you 
 strike off the minority of the representative body, 
 who represent another portion or mass of the popu- 
 lar electors. The result is that your laws may be 
 made by men who represent a minority of the peo- 
 ple who are to be bound by the laws so made. A 
 representative majority may not be, in point of fact 
 —and often is not — a representative of the majority 
 of the people. 
 
 When we come to consider in addition to this that 
 the representative majority, whether in a State 
 Legislature or in Congress, in modern times or com- 
 paratively corrupt times, when pernicious and selfish 
 interests invade the halls of legislation, ordinarily 
 acts under what is known as the caucus system ; you 
 perceive how far we have departed from those popu- 
 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH. 35 
 
 lar principles upon which we professed to found our 
 system originally, and which we supposed would 
 give vitality and energy to its action. A caucus, a 
 private consultation of majority members, rules the 
 action of the representative majority. That major- 
 ity rules the entire representative body, and that 
 representative body is composed of representatives 
 of only a part of the political community. Is it 
 not then established by this inquiry that instead of 
 our representative system being what we originally 
 intended it to be, .and what Ave had supposed it 
 would be, it is in its practical action characterized 
 by imperfections which must arrest universal atten- 
 tion when the facts are examined and provoke a cry 
 for some measure of amendment and reform ? And 
 if a project of reform and amendment can be 
 brought forward which is practicable, reasonable 
 and wise, it will be our business to embrace it with 
 promptness and with gladness of heart. 
 
 PLANS OF REFORM. 
 
 Now, what do we desire ? We may desire that 
 the whole people, instead of a part of them, shall 
 be represented in the Government, and that is pre- 
 cisely what I propose. In accomplishing this ob- 
 ject, differences of opinion, as in all cases of new 
 investigations, may be expected. One may have 
 one project and another another. In a time of in- 
 quiry, of movement in the public mind, it is not 
 well and it is not to be expected that all minds 
 should run in the same channel, and that out of 
 the inquiries which individuals enter upon the 
 same ultimate proposition should be evolved by 
 
36 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 each. How will we then obtain representation in 
 government of the entire mass of the people? Let 
 us come to that question, and in coming to it inquire 
 into the several plans or projects which have been 
 suggested to secure this object. They may be 
 classed under three heads. In the first place, it has 
 been proposed in various forms that by law there 
 should be a restricted or limited mode of voting. 
 Again, it has been proposed that the elector in all 
 elections of representatives and of other officers 
 where more than one are to be, chosen, may bestow 
 his votes upon a smaller number than the whole ; 
 in other words, may exercise what is known as the 
 cumulative vote. Again, there has been proposed 
 in Great Britain and elaborately defended in that 
 country what is called the system of personal repre- 
 sentation, by which an elector shall be emancipated 
 from the ordinary bonds and trammels of party or- 
 ganization, and shall be as an individual and not as 
 a member of a party represented in Parliament or 
 other body of a similar constitution. 
 
 THE LIMITED VOTE. 
 
 Now, as to the first of these, that is, the limited 
 or restricted vote — I use these words because I have 
 none more expressive or convenient at hand — as to 
 this limited vote : When you pass to your places 
 of election an cU proceed to choose for yourselves the 
 election officers who shall hold elections during 
 the year in your several election districts, what do 
 
 you do? 
 
 Each elector votes for one inspector, and yet two 
 are chosen. Here is a limitation upon the voter. 
 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH. 37 
 
 Instead of voting for both, the law says that he 
 shall vote for but one. What is the practical re- 
 sult throughout the State under this law ? Why, 
 that one inspector belongs to the majority party in 
 each election district, and the other belongs to an 
 opposing one. In other words, both the parties into 
 which our political society is ordinarily divided are 
 represented in the election boards. Thus you secure 
 representation of the entire mass of the electors, and 
 yet you secure it by a limitation upon the votes of 
 individual electors. 
 
 What has been the practical result of this arrange- 
 ment, which is found in your State election law of 
 1839 ? Has the result been good or bad ? Why, 
 there is not a man who hears me, or an intelligent, 
 honorable citizen in this Commonwealth, who would 
 not cry " shame " if that law were repealed. It is 
 a law by which elections are kept comparatively 
 pure, by which fraud is prevented and fairness is 
 secured to the citizen in polling his vote. 
 
 I believe in this city, when you come to choose 
 assessors in your several wards, those interesting 
 persons who have control over your pockets [laugh- 
 ter], who take valuations of your property, whose 
 action as public officers is most interesting to you, 
 each elector votes for one, and yet two are selected. 
 In this case you are secured, I presume, against par- 
 tiality and injustice in the administration of the tax 
 laws by dividing those officers between political 
 parties. 
 
 I am told, also, that in selecting your school direc- 
 tors each school division or ward has twelve directors 
 who have charge of your school system — one-third, 
 
38 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 that is four, elected in each year. In voting, each 
 elector votes for but three, so that it ordinarily hap- 
 pens that the fourth man chosen each year will be 
 of a different opinion politically from the majority 
 of his fellow-directors ; will represent in the govern- 
 ment of the school district one kind of opinion, 
 while the greater number of his colleagues will 
 represent another. 
 
 At the last session of your State Legislature a law 
 was passed which took from the commissioners of 
 counties and sheriffs the selection of jurors for the 
 several courts throughout the Commonwealth. 
 Great complaints were made in this matter, espe- 
 cially in the interior of the State. You had a par- 
 ticular arrangement in the city which has not been 
 disturbed, to wit: the selection of jurors by the 
 judges of the several courts, in order to insure im- 
 partiality and fairness and prevent the intrusion of 
 political interests or passions in the selection of 
 your jurors. But in the interior the duty of select- 
 ing jurors, which was formerly charged upon the 
 commissioners and the sheriffs of the several counties, 
 was taken away at the last session of the Legislature 
 and confided to two officers in each county, who are 
 to be called jury commissioners. The president- 
 judge in each county has some function or duty in 
 connection with these officers — it is somewhat doubt- 
 ful what it is ; the law was badly drawn — but sub- 
 stantially the power of selection heretofore exercised 
 by the ordinary officers of counties to whom I have 
 referred is now to be confided to these jury commis- 
 sioners. 
 
 How are they to be chosen ? As in the case of 
 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH. 39 
 
 inspectors of election, where one candidate alone is 
 voted for, but two are to be chosen. By this means 
 it is to be supposed that there will be fairness in the 
 selection of jurors throughout the State, and the 
 abuse which has heretofore prevailed will be re- 
 moved from our system — the abuse that in Repub- 
 lican counties Democratic citizens were excluded to 
 an unreasonable extent from the jury-box, and that 
 on the other hand in Democratic counties Repub- 
 lican jurymen were unreasonably excluded. Here 
 again is a limitation upon the elector. He shall 
 vote for but one of these officers, who are to select 
 the men who may sit upon questions which relate to 
 his life, to his property, or to his reputation, and yet 
 by this limitation fuller representation of the people 
 and fairness in trials are secured. I think that a 
 much wiser arrangement might have been made 
 than that. If I had possessed power to mold the 
 law upon this subject I would have simply changed 
 the mode in which county commissioners are chosen. 
 I would have had them selected upon the plan of 
 the cumulative vote (which I will presently explain) 
 or upon the plan of the limited vote. We would 
 have obtained substantially in that way the same 
 result without two additional officers and without 
 certain inconveniences which attend upon the exist- 
 ing law. But the object was laudable and the effect 
 which will be produced by that law will be salutary. 
 Public opinion will take hold of it and uphold it 
 hereafter as a just and wise arrangement, compared 
 with the one it superseded. 
 
 Let me illustrate this idea of limited voting which 
 has obtained in our State by a case taken from the 
 
40 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 State of New York. Under the constitution of that 
 State every twenty years the question of reforming 
 the State constitution is to be submitted to a vote of 
 the people, and in case they vote in favor of a con- 
 vention to amend the constitution one is to be called. 
 It happened last year that a convention was to be 
 called, and Governor Fenton proposed to the Legis- 
 lature that in addition to the selection of delegates 
 from the representative districts of the State (one 
 from each) there should be thirty-two delegates 
 selected at large, and in selecting these thirty-two 
 delegates each elector in the State to vote for but 
 sixteen. His recommendation was adopted by the 
 Legislature, so that the existing constitutional con- 
 vention of New York (it has not concluded the 
 performance of its duties) is constituted of repre- 
 sentatives elected from the representative districts, 
 and of thirty-two delegates from the State at large. 
 Of the latter, sixteen belong to each political party* 
 for such was the inevitable effect of the plan adopted. 
 Many men went into the convention and are now 
 sitting in it who could not have been elected in their 
 several local districts, because the party with which 
 they were associated was in the minority therein. 
 In selecting delegates from the State at large this 
 was possible, and able men were selected on both 
 sides — men of great weight and great wisdom. 
 These cases of limited voting in our own State which 
 I have mentioned and this case in New York will 
 suffice so far as our own country is concerned. 
 
 Now, let me carry you to England for a short 
 time to see what has been done there in this same 
 direction. In 1854, under the administration of 
 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH. 41 
 
 Lord Aberdeen, Lord John Eassell introduced a re- 
 form bill which underwent protracted discussion in 
 the House of Commons. One feature of that bill 
 was that in all constituencies electing three members 
 of Parliament no elector should vote for more than 
 two, the result of which would have been to give to 
 the minority class of electors ordinarily the third 
 member. That bill, however, did not become a law ; 
 it fell, and other reform bills introduced since into 
 Parliament have failed. But during the present 
 year a bill was passed through Parliament to amend 
 and reform the representation of the people of Eng- 
 land in the House of Commons. That bill having 
 passed the House of Commons and being under con- 
 sideration in the House of Lords on the 30th of 
 July last, Lord Cairnes moved to amend clause 8 of 
 the bill by adding, " at a contested election for any 
 county or borough represented by three members, 
 no person shall vote for more than- two candidates." 
 This was substantially, if not in exact terms, the 
 same as the clause in the Eussell reform bill of 1854. 
 After undergoing debate this amendment was adopt- 
 ed in the House of Lords by the following vote : 
 contents, 142; non-contents, 51, or by the large 
 majority of 91 in its favor. The bill being returned 
 with this and other amendments to the House of 
 Commons was again considered in that House. 
 Finally, upon the 8th of August, after prolonged 
 and exhaustive debate, in which men whose names 
 are known throughout the earth participated, upon 
 motion to strike out this amendment made by the 
 House of Lords the vote stood— ayes 204, noes 253, 
 being a majority of 49 in favor of retaining the pro- 
 
42 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 vision, and it was retained by that .vote ; and the 
 bill subsequently passing and receiving the approval 
 of the Crown it became and is now the law of Great 
 Britain, (from which country we derive our political 
 descent and many of our principles of free govern- 
 ment, including that of representation.) Hence- 
 forth, in the election of members of the lower house 
 of Parliament, where a constituency select three 
 members, two shall be given to the majority and one 
 to the minority of the electors, assuming that the 
 latter constitute so large a mass as one third of the 
 whole number. This is the most notable instance 
 of the application of the limited vote to secure the 
 representation of the whole political mass , of the 
 community or of a particular constituency charged 
 with the duty and power of selecting representatives 
 for the enactment of laws. 
 
 By these instances, selected in our own country 
 and abroad, it is manifest that attention has been 
 largely drawn to this question of amendment in 
 representation — of mitigating the evils and incon- 
 veniences which must always arise under an un- 
 checked, unmitigated, unamended majority rule. 
 
 THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. 
 
 But, gentlemen, I pass from the consideration of 
 this mode of amending representation to the second 
 form which propositions for that purpose have 
 assumed; in other w T ords, I pass to the discussion 
 of the topic which is most interesting at this time 
 for our consideration. I mean the plan of cumu- 
 lative voting, as it has been named. This was in 
 the first instance proposed, explained, and advocated 
 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH. 43 
 
 by James Garth Marshall, a subject of the Crown 
 of Great Britain ; and, by his proposition and his 
 advocacy of it, he has given his name to the politi- 
 cal history of his country and to the political his- 
 tory of representative institutions everywhere in 
 future times : for no one previously had mastered 
 this subject with such grasp ; no one had looked 
 into it with such intuitive perception of all its 
 characteristics and was able to strike precisely the 
 point where reform could be most safely and effect- 
 ually introduced. It is preferable, infinitely prefer- 
 able, to all propositions for securing the representa- 
 tion of all interests in society by any limitation 
 upon the elector's vote in the manner of the various 
 propositions which I have already described. 
 
 This system or plan of cumulative voting has 
 been indorsed by John Stuart Mill in his work on 
 Parliamentary Reform and in his work on Repre- 
 sentative Government, and since supported by him 
 ably in the House of Commons. It has been 
 recommended, also, by Earl Grey in his work on 
 Parliamentary Reform, edition of 1864. It was 
 proposed during the consideration of the recent 
 Reform bill in the House of Commons by Mr. 
 Lowe, on the fifth of July last, and after debate 
 received the very respectable support of 173 votes. 
 It is beginning to attract in this country that degree 
 of attention which it merits, and which is naturally 
 provoked by the inquiry which has taken place 
 abroad. I shall describe it in a moment. For the 
 present I will simply say that the third proposition 
 of reform, known as personal representation, which 
 looks to other objects and to other consequences, I 
 
44 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 shall not attempt to discuss to-night. It invites us 
 over too wide a field of investigation for the time at 
 our disposal ; and I may add that it involves so 
 many considerations and so much of prolonged 
 debate that, within the ordinary duration of a meet- 
 ing, it would be impossible to exhaust the subject 
 or to come to any intelligent conclusion upon it. I 
 presume, also, speaking generally concerning it, that 
 it will be a considerable time before we shall be in 
 possession of that amount of experience and of dis- 
 cussion which are requisite to its adoption in this 
 country. 
 
 Now, what is cumulative voting ? I propose that 
 what is known by this term shall be applied to the 
 election of representatives in Congress and to the 
 choice of electors of President and Vice President 
 of the United States. It admits, also, of application 
 to the selection of senators and representatives in the 
 several State Legislatures, and to the selection of 
 county commissioners, and many other officers. 
 In what I shall say at this time, however, I shall 
 confine myself, in the discussion of this plan, mainly 
 to the election of Representatives in Congress. This 
 reform can be introduced by act of Congress without 
 any constitutional change ; and the plan can be ap- 
 plied to the election of presidential electors by the 
 Legislatures of the several States, who, under the 
 Constitution, have committed to them the power of 
 providing the manner in which those electors shall 
 be chosen. What, then, is cumulative voting ? It 
 is that where more than one officer is to be chosen 
 the elector in the first place shall possess as many 
 votes as there are persons to be chosen, and next, he 
 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH. 45 
 
 may bestow those votes at his discretion ujdoii the 
 whole number of persons to be chosen, giving one 
 vote to each, or upon any less number, cumulating 
 his votes upon one, two, three, or any other number 
 less than the whole. That is simple in its statement, 
 although its effect, the practical character of the 
 proposition, requires some reflection and prolonged 
 experience to its entire comprehension. What is its 
 effect ? It is that any political interest in a commu- 
 nity, whether in a State or in a division of a State, 
 if it can ascertain about the relative proportion which 
 its strength bears to the whole mass of the vote, or 
 to the vote of an opposing interest, may cast the 
 suffrages of its members in such manner that they 
 will tell upon the result ; and it will happen that 
 every man, or about every man who votes, will vote 
 for a candidate who will be chosen, and there will 
 be no such thing as unrepresented minorities left. 
 They will be wiped out of the system ; they will no 
 longer exist. To speak of this as a plan for the 
 representation of minorities is an abuse of terms, 
 because it conveys no idea which attaches to the 
 plan. Far be it from us to arm a minority with 
 power which we know even majorities abuse ! The 
 proposition now submitted to us is not that there 
 shall be majorities and minorities known in elec- 
 tion returns, but that the men who vote shall vote for 
 those who will be chosen, and who will in point of 
 fact represent them. 
 
 I cannot better illustrate the scheme than by the 
 case of Vermont, which I have used on another oc- 
 casion. There are 60,000 voters in Vermont, of 
 whom 40,000 are members of the Republican party 
 
46 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 and 20,000 of the Democratic party. I speak in 
 round numbers. By law that State is entitled to 
 three Representatives in Congress, because her 
 population, under the Constitution of the United 
 States, authorizes the allotment of that number to 
 her. Now, what ought to take place there ? The 
 majority should elect two Representatives, having 
 40,000 voters, and the minority should elect one, 
 having 20,000 voters ; but can that be so in point of 
 fact at present ? If the electors of that State vote 
 for three Representatives by general ticket the major- 
 ity would elect the whole three. If the State be divi- 
 ded up into single districts, it" is a matter of chance 
 how the result will be, whether all three districts 
 will have majorities of the same political complexion 
 or not. I say it is a matter of chance ; nay, more 
 than that, it is a matter of honesty in the Legisla- 
 ture of the State, and any political majority that 
 has control of the Legislature will very likely form 
 the districts to suit its own interests. We know 
 that these things occur everywhere. By cumula- 
 tive voting, by authorizing the 20,000 minority 
 electors of that State to give each three votes to one 
 candidate, that candidate would receive 60,000 votes, 
 and the majority cannot defeat him. The majority 
 voting for two Representatives can elect them, but 
 they cannot elect the third. Suppose they attempt 
 to vote for three candidates, they can only give each 
 of them 40,000 votes, and the minority candidate 
 has 60,000. If they attempt to vote for two, as they 
 ought to do, that being the number they are entitled 
 to, they can give them 60,000 votes each, the same 
 number that the minority candidate has. If they 
 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH. 47 
 
 attempted to vote for one they would give that one 
 candidate 120,000; but of course they would not 
 throw away their votes in that foolish manner. The 
 practical result would be that the 40,000 majority 
 electors in that State would vote for two candidates 
 and elect them, and the 20,000 minority electors 
 would vote for one and elect him, and results anal- 
 ogous to this would occur all over the United States 
 if this system were applied. In every State the 
 freemen, each possessing an equal right with his 
 neighbor, would each vote for a Representative or 
 Representatives in Congress who would speak his 
 voice and obey his will, and thus you would obtain 
 throughout the country, in each State, an actual 
 representation of the whole mass of people on both 
 sides; honest representation instead of a sham; a 
 government by the majority in point of fact in Con- 
 gress instead of an accidental result, which may be 
 one way or the other, and is just as likely to be mi- 
 nority rule as anything else, and always and under 
 all circumstances unjust rule. 
 
 Oh ! gentlemen, what would happen then ? Some 
 little men in the State Legislature,- destitute of honor 
 but greedy of gain and of personal objects, would 
 no longer gerrymander your States [applause], 
 would no loDger sit in quiet chambers concocting 
 injustice by law, studying how they can prevent 
 their neighbors from being represented in the gov- 
 ernment and get an undue share of public power for 
 themselves and for their friends. That iniquity 
 would be ended, and would be no more heard of 
 among us. Why, gentlemen, at this moment, from 
 the British possessions upon the northeast to the 
 
48 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 Golden Gate of the Pacific, there is probably not 
 one honest apportionment law for members of Con- 
 gress, and you will scarcely ever have one, unless in 
 an exceptional case where one political interest shall 
 have control of the upper branch of a Legislature 
 and another of the lower, holding each other in 
 check, and compelling some degree of fairness in 
 the formation of the law. 
 
 I do not desire to speak on any topic which may 
 bear a partisan complexion. I am almost afraid to 
 cite cases lest I shall be thought to have an object 
 or purpose not openly avowed. Let me tell you the 
 difficulty in this case is in human nature, and you 
 must frame your system so that mischief will not 
 result. "It is necessary," said a great and wise 
 man, " that by the very constitution of things power 
 should be a check to power." What said Dr. 
 Priestly? "There is no earthly power that has 
 not grown exorbitant when it has met with no con- 
 trol." Take these words of men who thought 
 wisely and profoundly, and then look at your exist- 
 ing political action and see whether it is not a 
 struggle for power instead of a struggle for justice; 
 whether it is not a struggle by each interest to ob- 
 tain all it can and to retain all it can, and to keep 
 away from an opposing interest anything like a fair 
 distribution of power or fair treatment. 
 
 It is necessary, then, gentlemen, that by your 
 fixed arrangements in your constitutions and laws 
 you shall curb the injustice of human nature ; that 
 you shall so arrange your system that evil and selfish 
 men cannot pervert it to their own purposes and 
 to the injury of others. A system of cumulative 
 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH. 49 
 
 voting secures the government of the real majority 
 of the people. Instead of striking off a part of 
 them in the popular elections, they are all repre- 
 sented in the representative body, whether Congress 
 or the State Legislature, and there by a single 
 operation the vote is taken, the majority pronounced, 
 and a proposed law is enacted or defeated. Instead 
 of unjust representation and an eventual decision by 
 a representative majority moved and governed by a 
 caucus, you will have fair, equal, extended, complete 
 representation of the whole mass of the people and 
 the proper voice of the majority pronounced in the 
 representative body. 
 
 I repeat, this is no plan for minority representation 
 merely ; it is a plan for the representation of the 
 whole people, a device by which the majority shall 
 rule and shall pronounce its voice in a fair and 
 honest manner. Again, a system of cumulative 
 voting would secure to you in your legislative bodies 
 men of high ability, and secure them for long 
 periods of time, because elections would not be sub- 
 ject to the uncertainties which attend ordinary elec- 
 tions under the majority rule. A political party in 
 Pennsylvania, constituting about or near one-half 
 its electors, assuming that the State would be per- 
 manently entitled say to twenty-four members (the 
 present number), can keep about a dozen men con- 
 tinuously in Congress for a long period of time 
 Just as long as they retain the confidence of then 
 constituents they will be elected, because the meril 
 of this plan is that one part of the community can- 
 not vote down another. Each will get its due share 
 of Representatives, and can keep it always simply 
 
50 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 by giving votes only to the number which they are 
 entitled to have and which they can elect. This 
 system would secure contentment to men constitut- 
 ing minorities, as they are now known, because such 
 minorities would be abolished at popular elections, 
 and, although their representatives should be voted 
 down in representative bodies, they would be heard 
 there, and it is a great satisfaction for a man to be 
 heard even when judgment is pronounced against 
 him. That is what we suj3pose to be one great ad- 
 vantage of courts of justice ; a man has his day in 
 court and he is heard ; judgment is not pronounced 
 in his absence or without a hearing. Just so mi- 
 norities in our country, as they are now constituted, 
 are dissatisfied and they always will be dissatisfied 
 under the present system. Let them be heard, and 
 if the decision is against them in the legislative 
 body they will acquiesce, because they have had 
 fair treatment. This is human nature. Every one 
 can see. that that would be so. Would we not, 
 therefore, be less liable to revolt, to convulsion, to 
 war? Content your people, improve your system 
 so that it will work happily and properly, and you 
 crush out the seeds of political convulsion. [Ap- 
 plause.] 
 
 A CHECK ON CORRUPTION. 
 
 I shall not go over the other heads of the argu- 
 ment at length, because time will not permit me. 
 I insist as a principal argument, however, for this 
 mode of taking the sense of the electoral body, that 
 it would be a great check upon corruption. Now, 
 what causes corruption at our elections? What 
 brings it into being? I submit that question to 
 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH. 51 
 
 you, gentlemen, as men of ordinary experience. 
 What is it? One candidate wants to get a majority 
 over another candidate. The district may be close, 
 or at least each side may have hopes of carrying 
 it ; passion is aroused ; to use a common expression 
 the blood is up; ambition calls, private interest 
 prompts. Here and there we know, for so the fact 
 stands revealed to us, a candidate, or the friends of 
 a candidate, will resort to corrupt means. For what 
 purpose ? To get the balance of power, to turn the 
 scale ; not to corrupt the great body of the electors, 
 but to gain the tenth, the twentieth, or the fiftieth 
 man who holds in his hands the balance of power 
 between political interests. In this manner these 
 contests for local majorities and for State majorities 
 between parties call into existence all the evil and 
 corrupt influences which attend our elections. A 
 man at Harrisburg or at Washington is expected to 
 distribute patronage around his district, so that he 
 can get votes to beat somebody else when he comes 
 before the people again. A man with his pocket 
 full of accumulated gain, the result of his own thrift 
 and cunning or the accumulation of his ancestors, 
 wants a few votes to make a majority against an 
 opposing candidate, and he gives money to election- 
 eering agents and does not inquire how it is applied. 
 After a while great complaints are made in your 
 community of a corrupt election. You hear such 
 expressions as "shocking," "horrible," "what is 
 the. country coming to ; what is the social body and 
 what is the political body coming to ?" Corruption 
 raises its head in America ; it is the danger in our 
 path ; it is the giant we have to fear, whose blows 
 
52 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 will lay low our republican system if it shall ever 
 be prostrated. Does not your majority rule invite 
 all these evil influences? Go out and make 
 inquiry about your last congressional election in 
 certain districts, and you will hear, " Oh, money 
 carried it ; here was a boss who was bought up ; 
 he had control of fifty or one hundred men ;" in 
 another district another had control of fifty or one 
 hundred electors, and the election was turned. It 
 required only a few votes to win, and away goes the 
 victor to his post of duty, to make laws for the 
 American people. I am not talking of things 
 abroad. This cry comes to you in this city. Yes, 
 corruption is increasing in t America. And what 
 invites it? I will answer in a word — it is the 
 majority rule at popular elections which invites it ; 
 it is because you have an unjust or imperfect system 
 by which nearly one-half of the community have 
 their voices stifled; the corrupt man buys a few 
 votes, and thousands of his fellow-citizens have no 
 voice in the Government ; they are outvoted ; five 
 votes will do it, if they create a majority, as well as 
 five thousand. Adopt a plan by which every polit- 
 ical party and every political interest, if it choose, 
 can elect its men and can elect as many men as its 
 numbers entitle it to, and you are done with this 
 abuse of corrupting votes to turn the scale, you are 
 done with this {mrchase of majorities, you are done 
 with this scandal of your system, and you have 
 taken the most effectual guarantee which, with our 
 present information, it is possible for us to secure 
 for its integrity and perpetuity hereafter. [Great 
 applause.] Under a system of cumulative voting, 
 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH. 53 
 
 in the present Congress the delegation from this 
 State would stand twelve Republicans and twelve 
 Democrats. Why ? Because each party has three 
 hundred thousand votes in this State, and each one 
 knowing that its strength was about equal to the 
 other, would have cumulated its votes upon twelve 
 men and elected them, and there would have been 
 a fair representation of the State. Vermont would 
 have had two majority and one minority members 
 as I have shown. Kentucky, which sends nine 
 Democratic members, would have sent at least three 
 Republicans in her delegation, under a sound mode 
 of voting ; and Maryland, instead of one Republi- 
 can member out of five, would have sent two ; in 
 Connecticut, instead of three Democratic Repre- 
 sentatives out of four, there would have been two, 
 because the vote of the State was about a tie ; and 
 so throughout the Union. You cannot take a State 
 and examine the facts relating to it in any authentic 
 publication without seeing this element of injustice 
 entering into your system and poisoning it at its 
 very fountain. 
 
 I need hardly say — and this is, perhaps, a delicate 
 branch of my speech — that if in any part of this 
 Union we are to have two classes of voters, distin- 
 guishable by race or color, a very considerable part 
 of the mischief and evil which the opponents of the 
 extension of suffrage apprehend would be prevented 
 or removed by the adoption of the cumulative vote. 
 Instead of the cry being raised, "one race votes 
 down another and has its heel upon it " — we have 
 heard that all over the North, and we know how 
 powerfully it has influenced the elections — instead 
 
54 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 of that cry it would be announced that each race 
 obtained representation in proportion to its numbers, 
 without direct antagonism or collision. This, how- 
 ever, is an argument for gentlemen in a different 
 position from myself. As to them it ought to be 
 decisive in favor of their rendering support to the 
 plan of cumulative voting which I advocate. 
 
 CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. 
 
 Now, gentlemen, a few words as to the application 
 of this system to the selection of presidential elec- 
 tors. General Jackson proposed that the people of 
 the United States should vote directly for President 
 and Vice President, instead of voting for electors in 
 their several States, and this proposition, at several 
 times, has been brought forward in Congress. At 
 the last session it was again introduced by Mr. 
 Wade, now President of the Senate, and was de- 
 fended by him in an argument. Great complaint is 
 made that the people are not heard directly in the 
 choice of President ; that the electoral colleges are 
 useless or inexpedient ; that they should be removed 
 from our system, and each voter be permitted to 
 vote directly for the President of his choice. 
 
 Gentlemen, a system of cumulative voting by the 
 citizens of Pennsylvania, which can be provided by 
 an act of their Legislature as I understand the con- 
 stitution, would secure to our citizens, if not the pre- 
 cise objects sought by the friends of that reform, at 
 least greater advantages than it would confer. The 
 result would be that each of the political interests 
 existing in this State would select as many electors 
 as they were entitled to by their numbers, and each 
 
if UN T7 
 
 PHILADELPHIA SPEECH^ Cj T 55 
 
 would be felt proportionally in the presidential 
 election. How is it now ? Do you not know what 
 is coming on next year in our State ? Six hundred 
 thousand votes are to be polled for presidential elec- 
 tors. Each party has about three hundred thou- 
 sand. What is going to take place ? From Lake 
 Erie to the Delaware this State is to be convulsed ; 
 a thousand disagreeable circumstances are to attend 
 the election ; men's minds are to be taxed and wor- 
 ried for months ; men of property are to have their 
 attention turned to the security of their investments. 
 All the unpleasant and illegitimate influences which 
 attend elections, and to which I have referred, will 
 be called into existence in that great approaching 
 struggle. And why ? Because whichever interest 
 obtains a majority in this State, though it be a ma- 
 jority of but one vote, secures twenty-six electoral 
 votes for President of the United States, and the 
 struggle will be for the little majority which turns 
 the scale. Now, do we not all see at a glance what 
 the fact is ? Each party is entitled to thirteen of 
 these electors, or about that number, because they 
 are composed of American freemen who are entitled 
 to an equal voice in our common government. But 
 both cannot secure electors ; the whole twenty-six 
 must be given to one side, and perhaps that result 
 will determine the government of this country not 
 only for four years to come but for four centuries. 
 We enter upon the canvass as a game of chances, 
 fearful that the most adroit and unscrupulous inter- 
 est of the two in the State can command the result ; 
 that there will not be a fair struggle between the 
 men who are honest and those who are not. Let 
 
56 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 us have honest voting ; let each party have the 
 presidential electors that its numbers entitle it to, 
 and let them be felt upon the general result ; let 
 the people in each of the other States vote as we 
 vote, and let the majority of Americans decide the 
 contest. 
 
 CONVENIENCE AND JUSTICE OF NEW PLAN. 
 
 Finally, this plan of representative reform is 
 convenient in a high degree ; it is both practicable 
 and convenient. It requires in this State nothing 
 of legislation except simply to permit a citizen who 
 has, say, twenty-four votes for members of Congress 
 and twenty-six for presidential electors, to cast those 
 votes as a freeman, according to his own choice and 
 pleasure; let him bestow them upon any smaller 
 number, for instance, giving two to each of twelve 
 candidates, or four to each of six. Trust the people, 
 and their common sense will regulate their action. 
 You do not need intricate laws, constitutions tink- 
 ered, or a great scheme of reconstruction. [Laughter.] 
 You are simply asked to trust the people, and per- 
 mit them, when they possess votes, to cast them 
 as they think best; as their judgment may be 
 directed by views of public interest or public duty. 
 If we should have that system for electing members 
 of Congress and presidential electors next fall, we 
 could each go to the polls and vote for twelve Repre- 
 sentatives in Congress to sit for Pennsylvania, and 
 for thirteen electors of President and Vice-Presi- 
 dent ; or, if any one should think that the political 
 interest with which he is associated is flourishing 
 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH. 07 
 
 and growing in strength, so that it is entitled to 
 one additional member, he could vote for thirteen 
 Representatives. If he should be mistaken in his 
 calculation, he would fail as to one of his votes ; 
 numbers would be counted exactly, and there would 
 be no injustice. 
 
 Now, I must point out one additional special 
 injustice of the ordinary majority rule at elections, 
 unmitigated by any such plan as that proposed. 
 Observe that the party which prevails at the elec- 
 tion does not merely carry the day, does not merely 
 get its votes counted and get the result appropriate 
 to the counting of them ; but it gets all the power 
 which belongs to the other side in addition to its 
 own. Suppose that the two parties in Pennsylvania 
 are so divided that one has 300,000 votes and the 
 other 301,000. In choosing electors of President 
 and Vice-President the 301,000 who prevail, who 
 have 1000 majority, do not merely get their votes 
 counted in the presidential election, do not merely 
 influence the result in selecting our Chief Magis- 
 trate by their own votes, but they have in effect 
 counted into their vote the votes of their opponents, 
 the other 300,000. Your 301,000, constituting the 
 majority in the State, wield the political power of 
 the whole 601,000 — wield not only their own appro- 
 priate power but a power which does not belong to 
 them but belongs to the political interest opposed to 
 them. 
 
 That is what sharpens this injustice of disfran- 
 chisement, and that is the reason why, in legislative 
 bodies, a little turning of the popular scale gives 
 one party or another, when in point of fact parties 
 
58 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 are nearly equal, such, a mass of preponderating 
 power. 
 
 Take the elections which occurred in 1866 in the 
 States north and west, the States formerly called the 
 free States. In those elections 2,000,000 voters (in 
 round numbers) voted Republican tickets for mem- 
 bers of Congress in the respective States. The 
 other party, the Democracy, polled in those States 
 at those elections a little over 1,600,000 votes. 
 What was the result? To Congress 1,600,000 
 voters chose twenty-eight Eepresentatives only, and 
 the 2,000,000 voters one hundred and forty-three ! 
 The proportion between the two great masses of our 
 electoral population, known by the respective party 
 names, was twenty to sixteen in votes actually 
 polled in the States to which I have referred. The 
 Eepresentatives to Congress selected at those elec- 
 tions from those States, instead of standing as 
 twenty to sixteen, stood one hundred and forty- 
 three to twenty-eight. And why ? Because under 
 the majority rule at elections in those States the 
 majority not only obtained representation in Con- 
 gress for its own votes, but obtained the greater part 
 of the representation that belonged to the other 
 side. Under a system of cumulative voting repre- 
 sentation in Congress would have stood about in the 
 proportion of twenty to sixteen, just as the actual 
 votes ran in those States. Do you not see how the 
 whole policy of your Government can be changed ; 
 how the voice of the people may be stifled; how 
 republican institutions may be made a farce and a 
 sham, and that under a system which you are falsely 
 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH. 59 
 
 told secures the fair rule of a majority as a principle 
 that is sacred ? 
 
 AN OBJECTION ANSWERED. 
 
 Gentlemen, I have already occupied so much time 
 that I must omit any detailed examination of the 
 arguments against cumulative voting. I can notice 
 only one or two of them briefly. It is said that a 
 system of elections such as I have described would 
 deprive particular localities of representation ; that 
 there would be a combination of great and powerful 
 communities within a State against some particular 
 districts, and those districts which now have Repre- 
 sentatives would be disfranchised. This argument 
 has been made in Great Britain ; it is likely to be 
 repeated here, and it is perhaps the only one deserv- 
 ing any considerable attention. Of course my 
 political reading and political thought have been 
 against the undue concentration of power at any 
 particular point, whether Washington, Harrisburg, 
 Philadelphia, or elsewhere, and I have been in favor 
 of its distribution, as far as possible, into all the 
 local communities into which the State or the coun- 
 try is divided. And this objection, from my point 
 of view, deserves respectful treatment and respectful 
 answer. I have to observe, then, that, in my opin- 
 ion, particular localities within a State would have 
 a due voice and due influence in the selection of 
 candidates ; that if they were selected by a common 
 body, by a State convention, any attempt to disfran- 
 chise any particular section of the State would be 
 met by a counter combination in the interest of fair 
 play, and that the practical result would be that 
 
60 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 there would be on the whole a fair distribution of 
 political power in the different parts of the State by 
 the selection of candidates. If, however, any diffi- 
 culty were apprehended on this ground, there might 
 be a rule adopted by which nominations should be 
 made by districts, a thing very often done in coun- 
 ties and also in States. It would be a rule to a 
 party in making its selections that there should be 
 a distribution of its candidates according to district 
 divisions, either those established for other purposes 
 by some general State law or established by the par- 
 ticular party organization for its own purposes of 
 selection or distribution. 
 
 But the conclusive answer to the objection is this, 
 that any important locality would have the power 
 to defend itself against such injustice ; and that is 
 one of the merits of this system of cumulative voting. 
 If there was an attempt to disfranchise the city of 
 Philadelphia, to prevent her returning her four 
 members to Congress, and the thing was gross and 
 glaring, what could she do under a system of cumu- 
 lative voting ? Just combine her vote on her four 
 men and elect them in spite of all the other electors 
 in the State, and thus any attempt at injustice in 
 any section of the Commonwealth might be resented 
 by the people aggrieved by cumulating their votes 
 upon one or more local candidates of their own. 
 They could defeat any such attempt at injustice and 
 defend themselves against it, and the fact that they 
 had such power of defense would always secure a 
 just distribution of nominations. 
 
 Again, candidates being thus voted for by the whole 
 State, there would be opportunities for making bet- 
 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH. 61 
 
 ter selections than are made by the district system. 
 Let me take an illustration on this point. What a 
 misfortune it would have been if the narrow intel- 
 lectualities of our modern political reasoners had 
 controlled in England when Edmund Burke was a 
 candidate before the electors of Bristol in 1780 ; a 
 distinguished member of Parliament, whose name 
 is given to the literature of the world for all future 
 ages. He stood up in the British Parliament 
 defending the just rights of the American colonies. 
 Words in our behalf which yet echo through the 
 world were heard with admiration and pride even 
 by those opposed to him in the House of Commons. 
 But they were heard with other feelings in Bristol, 
 which he represented in Parliament ; and when he 
 went down to his constituents, instead of re-electing 
 they rejected him ; he was voted down ; his own dis- 
 trict had a local majority against him of men who 
 hated America, who were with the king in the war 
 he waged against our fathers. Their passions and 
 prejudices were roused against their eloquent repre- 
 sentative who had defended America in the Par- 
 liament of the empire ; he was defeated under the 
 majority rule and a single district system. Fortu- 
 nately, he was returned to Parliament by another 
 constituency, who thought it an honor to be repre- 
 sented by him, and he continued in the House of 
 Commons as long as he lived, adorning it by his 
 eloquence and his genius, and giving his name to 
 his country and to the world as a cherished recol- 
 lection for all time. In our country, under similar 
 circumstances, such a man would remain out of 
 Congress or out of other legislative body upon a 
 
62 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 defeat in bis district. He would be ostracised from 
 tbe councils of bis country, his voice silenced, bis 
 career would be closed. What does cumulative 
 voting do? It enables the freemen of a State to 
 select their Burkes and their Websters, their Clays 
 and Calhouns, wherever they may be in a State, and 
 to use their abilities so long as they please in shap- 
 ing the legislation and administration of the govern- 
 ment of the country. [Applause.] No ability, no 
 merit, no eminence, no greatness, could be stifled in 
 any of our States under this system. The majority 
 rule, which would seem to have been invented to 
 submerge merit and to lift mediocrity, would no 
 longer operate its course unchecked in American 
 politics ; the freemen of our country would have a 
 breadth of choice which they would exercise, I 
 doubt not wisely, to the advantage of themselves 
 and of future generations. 
 
 Our experience in this State and in other States 
 is not in favor of carrying the idea of single dis- 
 tricts very far. I drew the amendment to the Con- 
 stitution of our State by which your city is broken 
 into single districts. [Applause.] What was the 
 idea of that amendment ? It was that one political 
 interest should not absorb the whole sixteen or 
 eighteen representatives you send to the Legislature; 
 that a little shifting majority one way or the other 
 should not cast that large number of votes on one 
 side or the other at Harrisburg. The idea was to 
 break up the political community, and allow the 
 different political interests which compose it, by 
 choosing in single districts, to be represented in the 
 Legislature of the State. Unfortunately, when that 
 
PHILADELPHIA SPEECH. 63 
 
 arrangement was made for your city (and for Pitts- 
 burg also, to which it will soon apply), this just, 
 equal, almost perfect system of voting, which I have 
 spoken of to-night, was unknown ; it had not then 
 been announced abroad or considered here, and we 
 did what best we could. Now, however, if a change 
 were to be made, I suppose the same current of 
 opinion and of sentiment would have course in this 
 State which has prevailed in New York, where the 
 system of single districts throughout the State for 
 the election of members of the Assembly or lower 
 legislative branch of that State has lost credit. The 
 idea is very generally abandoned by thinking and 
 reflecting men in that State. It is a failure ; it has 
 not produced the results which it was supj)Osed 
 would flow from it. Cumulative voting, however, 
 comes in, and it is a principle which is capable of 
 extended application to popular elections, where 
 more than a single officer is to be chosen. It can 
 be applied to the election of Senators and Repre- 
 sentatives in the Legislature from your city and 
 from each of the counties of the State, or from dis- 
 tricts into which the State might be divided, and 
 you may thus get in the government of your State 
 that fair and equal representation which you ought 
 to claim and which is your due as citizens of a free 
 State. 
 
 After some further remarks, Mr. Buckalew con- 
 cluded as follows : 
 
 Gentlemen, I have said most of what 1 proposed 
 to say this evening, so far as points of argument are 
 concerned. I omit some minor points, and I omit 
 filling up the outline of the argument. I have said 
 
64 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 what I supposed was most essential. And now, in 
 conclusion, let me say that I appear here to discuss 
 this subject before you for no purpose of idle display 
 or of amusement, but with a proper object; with an 
 idea to its examination and discussion by others; 
 and what I shall desire, and what will repay me a 
 thousandfold for any inconvenience in attending 
 here and any effort in speaking, will be the support 
 of the press and people of Philadelphia to a new, 
 improved, and honorable system of electoral action 
 by which our representative system in this country 
 will be vastly improved, and by which the future of 
 our country will receive an additional guarantee and 
 security which will not fail it hereafter in peace or 
 in war. [Great applause.] 
 
 [The foregoing address was delivered before a large and in- 
 telligent audience at the request of some gentlemen of Phila- 
 delphia, who desired the subject of reformed voting to be pre- 
 sented to the people of that city. Hon. Alexander Cummings 
 presided over the meeting and introduced the speaker with 
 appropriate remarks. The address was reported by D. F. 
 Murphy, the accomplished United States Senate Keporter, and 
 was published in the daily newspapers the following morning.] 
 
SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, 
 
 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 MARCH 2, 1869. 
 
 Mr. Buck A lew, from the Select Committee on Representative 
 Reform, submitted the following 
 
 REPORT/ 
 
 [To accompany bill S. No. 772.] 
 
 The bill referred to the committee, and now re- 
 ported by them, presents a question which deserves 
 deliberate examination both because it is important 
 and because it is new. It proposes to secure fair 
 and complete representation to every important po- 
 litical interest in the country ; to strike an effectual 
 blow at corruption in popular elections ; to secure 
 more of harmony and contentment than now exist 
 among the j)eople, and to improve the composition 
 of the popular branch of Congress by facilitating 
 the introduction and continuance of men of ability 
 and merit in that body. That these results may to 
 a great extent be secured by it is, by the friends of 
 the measure, most positively affirmed. If the claim 
 made by them on its behalf be substantially true, 
 
 * Congressional Globe, 3d Sess. 40th Cong., Appendix, p. 2G8. Sen. 
 Com. Keport, same sess., No. 271. 
 
 5 65 
 
66 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 or true to any considerable extent, and the plan be 
 capable of convenient application, it will merit 
 strong commendation and prompt adoption. 
 
 THE PLAN. 
 
 Representatives being assigned to a State under 
 the constitutional rule of distribution, each elector 
 in the State shall possess as many votes as there are 
 representatives to be chosen. He shall possess his 
 due and equal share of electoral power as a member 
 of the political body or State. Thus far we deal 
 with familiar ideas which have heretofore obtained. 
 It is next proposed that the elector shall exercise 
 his right of suffrage according to his own judgment 
 and discretion, and without compulsion of law. He 
 shall bestow or distribute his votes upon or among 
 candidates with entire freedom, and shall be relieved 
 from that legal constraint to which he has been 
 heretofore subjected. He may select his candidate 
 or candidates anywhere within the limit of his State 
 from among all its qualified citizens, and he may 
 exert his political power upon the general represen- 
 tation of his State instead of the representation of a 
 particular district within it. Here is unquestion- 
 ably a large and valuable extension of privilege to 
 the citizen, a withdrawal from him of inconvenient 
 and odious restraint, and a more complete applica- 
 tion of that principle of self-government upon 
 which our political institutions are founded. And 
 what is material for consideration is, that while all 
 the advantages of a plan of election by general 
 ticket are secured, all its inconveniences and evils 
 are avoided. 
 
SENATE REPORT. 67 
 
 FORMER PLANS— THEIR IMPERFECTIONS. 
 
 Formerly when elections of representatives in 
 Congress were had by general ticket, a great incon- 
 venience resulted which became at last offensive and 
 intolerable. For a political majority in a State, or- 
 ganized as a party, and casting its votes under a ma- 
 jority or plurality rule, secured in ordinary cases 
 the entire representation from the State and the mi- 
 nority were wholly excluded from representation. 
 •To avoid this inconvenience and evil which had be- 
 come general throughout the country, Congress in- 
 terposed, and by statute required the States to select 
 their representatives by single districts, that is to 
 divide their territory into districts, each of which 
 should elect one member. This contrivance, dic- 
 tated by Congressional power, ameliorated our elec- 
 toral system, mitigated the evil of which general 
 complaint had been made, and was an unquestion- 
 able advance in the art of government amongst us. 
 But retaining the majority or plurality rule for elec- 
 tions and restricting the power and free action of 
 the elector, it was imperfect in its design and has 
 been unsatisfactory in practice. It has not secured 
 fair representation of political interests, and it has 
 continued in existence in a somewhat mitigated form 
 the evils of the plan of election by general ticket 
 which it superseded. Still, one body of organized 
 electors in a district vote down another; electoral 
 corruption is not effectually checked, and the gen- 
 eral result is unfair representation of political inter- 
 ests in the popular house of Congress. Besides, the 
 single district plan has called into existence incon- 
 
68 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 veniences peculiar to itself and which did not attach 
 to the former plan. 
 
 It excludes from Congress men of ability and 
 merit whose election was possible before, and thus 
 exerts a baneful influence upon the constitution of 
 the House. Two causes operate to this end. In 
 the first place no man who adheres to a minority 
 party in any particular district can be returned, and 
 next, great rapidity of change is produced by fluc- 
 tuation of party power in the districts. 
 
 Again, the single district system gives rise to 
 gerrymandering in the States in the formation of 
 districts. Single districts will almost always be un- 
 fairly made. They will be formed in the interest of 
 party and to secure an unjust measure of power to 
 their authors, and it may be expected that each suc- 
 cessive district apportionment will be more unjust 
 than its predecessor. Parties will retaliate upon each 
 other whenever possible. The disfranchisement suf- 
 fered through one decade by a political party may be 
 repeated upon it in the next with increased severity, 
 but if it shall happen to have power in the legislature 
 when the new apjDortionment for the State is to be 
 made, it will take signal vengeance for its wrongs and 
 in its turn indulge in the luxury of persecution. 
 
 MODES OF VOTING DESCRIBED. 
 
 The manner in which the right of suffrage shall 
 be exercised, always a question of high importance, 
 is one of difficulty also. It has been regulated in 
 various ways in our States and in foreign countries, 
 but must be considered in many respects as still 
 open to debate. We have pretty generally adopted 
 
SENATE EEPOET. 69 
 
 the vote by secret ballot for popular elections, but 
 whether votes be given by secret or open ballot, or 
 by voice, a question will remain as to the manner in 
 which they shall be bestowed upon or distributed 
 among candidates. Where but one representative 
 or other official is to be chosen by a constituency, it 
 is readily understood that a single vote is to be given 
 by each elector to the candidate of his choice, and 
 such is the uniform regulation. But where more 
 than one person is to be chosen by a constituency, 
 the manner of bestowing votes upon candidates is a 
 question of more difficulty, and various regulations 
 have been made or proposed concerning it. Several 
 of these it is necessary to mention and describe be- 
 fore proceeding to the main matters to be examined 
 in this report. 
 
 The vote by general ticket. — By the general ticket 
 plan of distributive voting the elector has assigned 
 to him a number of votes equal to the whole num- 
 ber of persons to be chosen, and is authorized to 
 bestow them singly upon a like number of candi- 
 dates. Upon this plan presidential electors are 
 chosen in all the States except Florida. 
 
 The vote by single districts. — By the single dis- 
 trict plan the general constituency is divided into 
 parts by territorial lines and each part constituted a 
 sub-constituency to vote separately and choose one 
 person. The voter casts a single vote for his candi- 
 date and has no participation in the action of the 
 general constituency beyond the giving of his dis- 
 trict vote. Upon this plan, prescribed by statute, 
 representatives in Congress are now chosen. 
 
 The limited vote. — The limited vote obtains 
 
70 PEOPOETIONAL KEPRESENTATION. 
 
 where the voter is forbidden to vote for the whole 
 number of persons to be chosen by the constituency, 
 but is authorized to give single votes to each of a 
 less number or a single vote to one. 
 
 The cumulative vote. — The cumulative vote is the 
 concentration of two or more votes upon one candi- 
 date or upon each of a greater number. It may ob- 
 tain whenever the voter has assigned to him more 
 votes than one and is permitted to cast them other- 
 wise than singly among candidates. 
 
 The unrestricted or free vote. — The unrestricted 
 or free vote obtains where the voter has assigned to 
 him a number of votes equal to the whole number 
 of persons to be chosen by the constituency, and is 
 permitted to cast them according to his own dis- 
 cretion and choice without legal restraint. In such 
 case he may bestow them all upon one candidate, 
 or distribute them singly among candidates, or 
 cumulate them upon more candidates than one, or 
 cast a part of them singly and a part of them 
 upon the principle of cumulation, precisely as his 
 judgment may direct him and the possibilities of 
 the case may permit. 
 
 SUPEKIOKITY OF THE FKEE VOTE. 
 
 The unrestricted or free vote is more compre- 
 hensive and flexible than the others, and it in- 
 cludes many of their features and may be used to 
 accomplish their objects. It involves or includes 
 the vote by general ticket without the restriction 
 that but one vote shall in any case be given to a 
 candidate. It may be used to accomplish the pur- 
 poses of the limited vote and of single district 
 voting in a just, effectual, and popular manner, and 
 
SENATE REPORT. 71 
 
 it includes completely the cumulative vote, with 
 which it is in character closely allied. In brief, it 
 combines the advantages of other plans without 
 their imperfections, while it is not open to any 
 strong objection peculiar to itself. The ingredient, 
 however, of greatest value and importance contained 
 in it, and the one particularly fitted to regenerate 
 and give credit to elections is the principle of the 
 concentration of votes. In fact for practical pur- 
 poses in dissertation or argument upon the question 
 of electoral reform, the terms "cumulative vote" 
 and "free vote" may be interchangeably used, 
 though the latter is most appropriate and accurate 
 to indicate a plan which commonly involves distri- 
 bution as well as concentration of votes, and some- 
 times even the giving of single votes to particular 
 candidates. 
 
 HOW FAR IT CAN BE APPLIED. 
 
 The bill now reported by the committee applies 
 the unrestricted or free vote to the selection of rep- 
 resentatives in Congress from the several States, and 
 the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the 
 United States reported by the committee on the 29th 
 of January will, if adopted, empower Congress to 
 apply that vote (or some other proper reform) to the 
 selection of electors of President and Vice-President 
 of the United States. 
 
 By the fourth section of the first article of the 
 Constitution power is clearly conferred upon Con- 
 gress to pass a bill regulating the manner of hold- 
 ing elections for the choice of representatives. The 
 times, places, and manner of holding such elections 
 are to be prescribed in each State by the legislature 
 
72 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 thereof, but the Congress may at any time make or 
 alter such regulations. This power was exercised 
 by the passage of the act of Congress which pro- 
 vides that representatives shall be chosen in the 
 several States by single districts instead of by 
 general ticket, which had been the general practice 
 before, and it is equally competent for Congress to 
 prescribe a still different manner for choosing them, 
 subject only to such other provisions of the Consti- 
 tution as may relate to the same subject. The free 
 or cumulative vote or other like reform may, there- 
 fore, be introduced simply by the enactment of a 
 statute. No constitutional amendment will be ne- 
 cessary for the purpose. But as to the choice of 
 presidential electors the case is different, as before 
 stated. The first section of the second article of the 
 Constitution provides that each State shall appoint 
 electors " in such manner as the legislature thereof 
 may. direct." Congress may determine the time of 
 choosing the electors and fix a uniform day on which 
 they shall give their votes, but cannot prescribe the 
 manner in which they shall be chosen. To accom- 
 plish any reform in the manner of choosing them 
 through the instrumentality of an act of Congress, 
 an amendment to the Constitution will be necessary. 
 That such amendment is desirable, and that it is ne- 
 cessary also to the introduction of any reform what- 
 ever in the manner of choosing electors, will be 
 hereafter shown. 
 
 ARGUMENTS FOR ITS ADOPTION. 
 
 Recurring now to the question of representative 
 reform raised by the bill reported by the committee^ 
 
SENATE REPORT. 73 
 
 we will proceed to state those grounds of argument 
 which recommend the adoption of the unrestricted 
 or free vote. 
 
 ITS SIMPLICITY AND CONVENIENCE OF APPLICATION. 
 
 The first consideration to be taken into account is 
 the simplicity and convenience of this plan of reform. 
 It is easily understood, convenient of application, 
 and will readily adapt itself to all new or changed 
 conditions of political society. It is self-adjusting, 
 and requires no law whatever to enforce it or afford 
 it a sanction beyond the act which shall simply call 
 it into existence. The number of representatives to 
 which a State shall be entitled being first ascertained 
 under the rule of distribution contained in the Con- 
 stitution, the law will simply declare that each voter 
 of the State shall have as many votes as there are 
 representatives to be chosen from his State, and at 
 that point will stop, leaving the voter perfectly free 
 to cast his votes according to his own judgment and 
 discretion. 
 
 The voter may then exercise his right according 
 to any of the plans relating to the distribution or 
 concentration of votes which have heretofore been 
 the subject of discussion, including those which 
 have and those which have not been prescribed by 
 legal enactment. But inasmuch as our political 
 communities will always be divided into political 
 parties, (or so long as our free institutions remain 
 to us,) it must happen that the voter will exercise 
 his right with direct reference to his party associa- 
 tions — to the interests of the party to which he shall 
 belong. He will vote (as he votes now) as a party 
 
74 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 man, and for candidates who have been selected 
 by some form of nomination — by some agreement 
 or concert of action among men of common views 
 and common interests. The inevitable result will 
 be that political parties and the voters who compose 
 them will obtain fair and complete representation 
 by distributing or concentrating their votes in such 
 manner as to secure it, and nothing can be more 
 certain than that they will be better judges of 
 their own interests than the lawmaker possibly 
 can be. For they will act with a full knowledge 
 of all the facts which pertain to an election — of the 
 relative strength of parties at the time — the prob- 
 able amount of the aggregate vote to be polled, and 
 generally of the effect of their voting in any par- 
 ticular manner. Of all these matters the lawmaker 
 must be profoundly ignorant, or must conjecture or 
 assume them at random. He cannot foreknow the 
 future, nor adapt his arrangements to the ever- 
 changing conditions of political society. 
 
 It is for this reason that imperfection will always 
 attach to the limited vote as a general plan to be 
 applied to popular elections. The lawmaker cannot 
 know that his arbitrary limitation will operate justly 
 and secure his object at some future time. If he 
 could know the exact relative strength of parties 
 in future years, he might apply his limitation to a 
 constituency with confidence. Adjusting it to the 
 facts, he could obtain a proper result. As this 
 cannot be, the limited vote can be but partially 
 applied to elections and must in most cases be un- 
 satisfactory. It has rarely been applied to constit- 
 uencies selecting more than three representatives, 
 
SENATE REPORT. 75 
 
 and can never be accepted as a plan for extensive 
 use and application. 
 
 The unrestricted or free vote, however, is not 
 open to these observations. It will adjust itself to 
 all cases, and it will have the most important and 
 effectual sanction ; for it will be put under the guar- 
 dianship of party interest, always active and ener- 
 getic, which will give it direction and complete effect 
 to the full and just representation of the people. 
 
 ITS CONFORMITY TO REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES. 
 
 The unrestricted or free vote is in strict conform- 
 ity with democratic principles, and realizes more 
 perfectly our ideas of popular government. For 
 by it the whole mass of electors are brought into 
 direct relations with government, and particularly 
 with that department or branch of government (the 
 principal one in power, if not in dignity) which 
 makes the laws. All will participate really in 
 choosing representatives, and all will be represented 
 in fact. Now, the beaten body of electors choose 
 nothing, unless it be mortification, and are not rep- 
 resented at all. For the theory that they are rep- 
 resented by the successful candidates against whom 
 they have voted — that those candidates when in- 
 stalled in office represent them — is plainly false. 
 An elected official represents the opinions and the 
 will of those who choose him, and not of those who 
 oppose his selection. As to the latter he is an an- 
 tagonist and not a representative ; for his opinions 
 are opposed to theirs, and their will he will not 
 execute. And this must always be the case where 
 political parties act upon elections and a majority or 
 
76 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 plurality rule assigns to one party the whole repre- 
 sentation of the constituency. Our present system 
 of representation is therefore essentially partial and 
 imperfect, and our great object in reforming it must 
 be to make it full and complete. If we cannot 
 secure this object perfectly, it will be our duty, as it 
 should be our pleasure, to approach it as nearly as 
 possible. 
 
 Now, inasmuch as by extending to the elector 
 that freedom of choice and of selection which the 
 law has heretofore forbidden, we can strike from our 
 system of representative elections almost entirely the 
 element of disfranchisement and bring the whole 
 electoral body into direct and useful relations with 
 the representative body, we may congratulate our- 
 selves that our reform, while it will be rich and 
 fruitful of results in the purification of elections, in 
 imparting energy and wisdom to government and 
 contentment to the people, will also be strictly re- 
 publican in character and democratic in principle, 
 and will apply more perfectly than ever before those 
 ideas of self-government which inspired our ances- 
 tors when they established our political institutions. 
 
 THE FOUR GREAT REASONS FOR IT. 
 
 But we proceed to state the main reasons for the 
 unrestricted vote, without dwelling upon introduc- 
 tory points or upon those secondary reasons which, 
 while they may commend this plan of reform to us, 
 will not alone command its adoption. Those great 
 reasons (which speak with imperative voice to states- 
 men and to free constituencies everywhere) are four 
 
SENATE REPOET. 77 
 
 in number, and they will be mentioned in their 
 prefer order. 
 
 1. It is just. 
 The unrestricted or free vote should be permitted 
 because it is just. That this quality pertains to it 
 in a high degree and constitutes one of its main 
 characteristics is beyond all question. It gives an 
 equal voice to every elector of a State, secures the 
 elector from the peril of utter disfranchisement, and 
 affords to him also that freedom of choice which is 
 indispensable to his complete and useful exercise of 
 his right. A vote at any point or place in the State 
 is precisely as valuable and as important as at any 
 other point or place ; location of the voter is imma- 
 terial as affecting his right or his consequence in the 
 electoral body, and no preference in privilege or 
 power is given or advantage allowed to one elector 
 over another. Besides, (and this is the great con- 
 sideration,) any material disfranchisement of elec- 
 tors is rendered almost impossible ; for every politi- 
 cal interest, of any considerable magnitude, in a 
 State, will have the complete opportunity afforded it 
 of concentrating its vote upon a proper number of 
 candidates and those candidates will be chosen, not 
 merely because they have more votes than other 
 candidates, (as under our present system,) but be- 
 cause they are the recipients of an adequate support. 
 One mass of voters will not vote clown, defeat, or 
 disfranchise another. One candidate will not beat 
 another in the ordinary sense of that expression. 
 The full comprehension of this point may require 
 reflection by those to whom it is new, but no reflec- 
 tion is necessary to perceive the justice of a plan 
 
78 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 which will substantially strike disfranchisement from 
 our electoral system. Lastly, it is but just that the 
 elector should have a greater freedom of choice than 
 is now allowed him, that his judgment should have 
 freer action, that he should enjoy all possible facili- 
 ties for performing his duty to his country in exer- 
 cising his right of suffrage. At present he is hedged 
 about and constrained by legal regulations which, 
 while wholly unnecessary to the public order and 
 peace, cripple and impede him in the performance 
 of his duty. He is held responsible for the charac- 
 ter and action of the government, for in theory he 
 controls it by his vote, and yet he does not possess 
 all those facilities and rights the possession of which 
 will justify that responsibility and enable him to 
 discharge all its obligations. 
 
 In the matter of selecting representatives from 
 his State to Congress — perhaps the most important 
 of all electoral operations known in our country — 
 he is allowed to participate in the selection of but 
 one out of the whole number. The State may be 
 entitled by 6 to 12 or to 20 representatives, but the 
 judgment of the elector can be exercised upon the 
 choice of one only. As to all the rest, he is ex- 
 cluded from taking part in their selection. Besides, 
 his choice of a single representative must be exer- 
 cised within and for a particular district, arbitrarily 
 established by law, with such boundaries, popula- 
 tion, interests, and political complexion as may hap- 
 pen to be convenient or agreeable to a majority in 
 the legislature of the State. And practically he 
 must select his candidate from among the men of the 
 district and is excluded from all choice beyond it. 
 
SENATE KEPORT. 79 
 
 And when to all this we add that the elections 
 held in single districts are necessarily subjected to a 
 majority or plurality rule, which very commonly 
 renders a large part of the votes cast unavailing for 
 the purpose for which they are given, we have the 
 case fully presented as one of inconvenience and 
 hardship upon the elector. The law has been busy 
 where it should have been inactive, and the voter is 
 bound by inconvenient and injurious restrictions, 
 which he can neither evade nor defy. It is time 
 that the. hand of power be lifted from the citizen 
 and he be permitted to perform his electoral duties 
 with all possible freedom. 
 
 The justice of the proposed reform is therefore 
 evident. It extends popular power upon a principle 
 of equality, limits disfranchisement, and provides 
 the voter with necessary facilities for the exercise of 
 his right. 
 
 With good reason therefore did the London Times 
 in speaking of clause 9 of the reform bill of 1867, 
 (triumphantly carried in both houses of Parliament 
 upon full debate, and similar in principle to the 
 proposition before us,) declare — " that the idea of 
 modifying our electoral machinery so as to secure in 
 three-membered constituencies the proportionate 
 representation of both the great divisions of party, 
 has made its way by its inherent justice." 
 
 2. It will check corruption. 
 
 The unrestricted or free vote will greatly check 
 corruption at elections. It will take away the mo- 
 tive to corrupt, and thus strike an effectual blow at 
 the source of a great evil. 
 
80 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 Now, money and patronage are usually expended 
 upon elections to secure a majority or plurality vote 
 to one or more candidates over one or more other 
 candidates, and are directed or applied to the com- 
 paratively small number of electors in the constitu- 
 ency who hold the balance of power between parties. 
 Those persons being bought or seduced, victory is 
 secured. The importation of voters into a State or 
 district, or their fraudulent creation within it, is 
 with a like object. And such corrupt influence or 
 practice when resorted to by one party, provokes 
 like conduct in an opposing one, until both become 
 tainted with guilt and unfitted for vindicating the 
 purity of elections. This evil grows in magnitude 
 yearly, and it will continue to increase until those 
 motives of interest which produce it shall be weak- 
 ened or destroyed. 
 
 A new right to the elector, whether in the form 
 of the free or cumulative vote, or of personal rep- 
 resentation, or a new protection to him in the form 
 of the limited vote, will check corruption ; but of 
 these remedies the first is most practicable and effect- 
 ual. The limited vote (as will be hereafter shown) 
 cannot have extensive application, and it is but a 
 rude contrivance. Personal representation is a 
 scheme of great theoretical merit ; it has been tried 
 partially in Denmark, and it has received elaborate 
 vindication from authors of distinction in England, 
 in Switzerland, and in France. But it may be put 
 aside from the present discussion, because it is com- 
 paratively intricate in plan and cumbrous in detail, 
 because it assails party organization, and because 
 some of its most important effects cannot be dis- 
 
SENATE REPORT. 81 
 
 tinctly foreseen. It is so radical in character, so 
 revolutionary in its probable effects, that prudence 
 will dictate that it should be very deliberately con- 
 sidered, and be subjected to local experiment and 
 trial before it shall be proposed for adoption upon a 
 grand scale by the government of the United States. 
 
 But why will the cumulative or unrestricted vote 
 check corruption ? It will have this certain effect, 
 it will operate efficiently to this end, because it will 
 render any ordinary effort of corruption useless and 
 unavailing. The corruption of voters ivill not 
 change the result of an election: It will elect no 
 candidate and defeat no candidate in contested 
 States or districts, unless indeed it be carried on and 
 carried out upon a gigantic scale, beyond any ordi- 
 nary example of the past or probable occurrence of 
 the future. 
 
 An average or common ratio of votes for a rep- 
 resentation in Congress, taking the whole country 
 together, is now 25,000, and it will be much greater 
 in future times. Assume then that 600,000 votes 
 are to be cast in Pennsylvania at an election, of 
 which each political party has one-half, and that 24 
 representatives are to be chosen. This is a supposi- 
 tion very nearly conformed to actual numbers in 
 that State. Now it is evident that either political 
 party, by resorting to the cumulative vote, can elect 
 12 representatives, and thus secure to itself exact 
 and just representation, and no art or effort of the 
 opposite party can prevent it. But suppose, further, 
 that corruption shall assail the election, and that 
 some thousands of votes shall be changed thereby, 
 or that in the interest of one of the parties so many 
 
82 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 as 10,000 or 20,000 voters shall be imported into 
 the State, or be fraudulently created or personated 
 within it, in either case there will be no effect pro- 
 duced ; the result will be unchanged ; in short, in 
 the case supposed, a fraudulent increase of its vote 
 (and of the total vote) by a party, to the extent of 
 20,000, will not give to it any advantage, nor will 
 its corrupt acquisition of 5000 or 10,000 votes from 
 the opposite party. It follows that corruption will 
 in no ordinary case be resorted to ; it will be effect- 
 ually discouraged and prevented. And even in the 
 extreme case of the corruption of a large number 
 of voters in a State, the resulting evil will be re- 
 duced to its minimum. 
 
 What has been said concerning the choice of rep- 
 resentatives will apply with equal, if not greater, 
 force to the choice of presidential electors. If the 
 representative presidential electors were chosen in 
 the several States (save those which have but one) 
 upon the plan of the cumulative vote, there would 
 be n s to them due representation of the people in the 
 electoral colleges, and the elections for choosing them 
 would receive a much needed purification. Millions 
 now expended upon those elections would be kept 
 out of the hands of political agents and be applied 
 to better and nobler uses. 
 
 That freedom of the vote will have the effect 
 claimed for it will more clearly appear from con- 
 sidering the manner in which the present plan of 
 elections operates to invite and produce corruption. 
 By considering the evil which exists we will be 
 better able to judge the merits of the remedy pro- 
 posed. Popular elections in the States for federal 
 
SENATE REPORT. 83 
 
 or national purposes are either by a general ticket 
 for the whole State, or by a single ticket in district 
 divisions. As before stated, the former obtains in 
 the choice of presidential electors ; the latter, in 
 the choice of representatives to Congress. But to 
 both is applied the plurality rule and a struggle 
 invited between candidates and parties for prepon- 
 derance of vote. 
 
 Whichever can be made to outnumber an oppo- 
 sition upon the return will win the whole result and 
 will wield the entire power of the constituency in 
 an electoral college or in Congress. Antagonism is 
 thus made an essential element of the jn'oceeding, 
 and the result presents to us the spectacle of victor 
 and vanquished, the former crowned with honor 
 and exultant in his strength, the latter humiliated 
 and powerless. And it is important to observe that 
 the successful party does not obtain merely a power 
 proportioned to its vote, does not merely obtain full 
 representation for itself, but obtains the whole power 
 of the constituency. The whole vote cast against it 
 or withheld from it is virtually counted to it and 
 added to its true vote. 
 
 An issue thus made up for popular elections must 
 be one portentous of evil ; and, so far as it is 
 unnecessary to secure popular representation, must 
 be denounced as plainly unjust as well as injurious. 
 
 3. It ivill be a guarantee of peace. 
 The free vote will be a guarantee of peace to our 
 country, because it will exclude many causes of dis- 
 cord and complaint, and will always secure to the 
 friends of peace and union a just measure of politi- 
 
84 PKOPORTIONAL REPKESENTATIOX. 
 
 cal power. The absence of this vote in the States 
 of the south when rebellion was plotted, and when 
 open steps were taken to break the Union, was 
 unfortunate, for it would have held the Union men 
 of those States together and have given them voice 
 in the electoral colleges and in Congress. But they 
 were fearfully overborne by the plurality rule of 
 elections and were swept forward by the course of 
 events into impotency or open hostility to our cause. 
 By that rule they were largely deprived of repre- 
 sentation in Congress. By that rule they were shut 
 out of the electoral colleges. Dispersed, unorgan- 
 ized, unrepresented, without due voice and power, 
 they could interpose no effectual resistance to seces- 
 sion and to civil war. Their leaders were struck 
 down at unjust elections and could not speak for 
 them or act for them in their own States or at the 
 capital of the nation. By facts well known to us we 
 are assured that the leaders of revolt, with much 
 difficulty, carried their States with them. Even in 
 Georgia, the empire State of the south, the scale 
 was almost balanced for a time between patriotism 
 and dishonor; and in most of those States it 
 required all the machinery and influence of a 
 vicious electoral system to organize the war against 
 us and hold those communities compactly as our 
 foes. 
 
 In those same States the free vote will now allay 
 antagonism of race, and will substitute therefor the 
 rivalry of parties formed with reference to the policy 
 of the general government. The tendency of party 
 is to form upon national issues, and not upon State 
 ones, and this tendency will operate more strongly 
 
SENATE REPORT. 85 
 
 if causes of offence between races shall be removed 
 or lessened. And what can accomplish this more 
 perfectly than the free vote ? For under it one race 
 cannot vote down and disfranchise the other ; each 
 can obtain its due share of j30wer without injustice 
 to the other, and there will be no strong and con- 
 stant motive (as now) to struggle for the mastery. 
 This fact (the importance of which cannot be over- 
 estimated) will allay animosity and prevent conflict. 
 And because the free vote will have this certain 
 effect it will nationalize parties in the south and will 
 be to the whole country an invaluable guarantee of 
 order and peace. 
 
 In extending suffrage largely, in extending it to 
 include many hundreds of thousands of voters of 
 another race than our own, it will become us to look 
 to our electoral machinery and to amend it in those 
 parts which have been found defective, or which do 
 not seem well adapted to the new strain to be put 
 upon it. Unquestionably there is a large mass of 
 honest opinion in the country opposed to colored 
 suffrage, and many of those who support it in Con- 
 gress and out- of Congress, put their support of it 
 upon the ground of necessity — upon the ground 
 that in order to secure the fruits of emancipation it 
 is necessary that the emancipated be armed with the 
 power of self-defence. A majority of this commit- 
 tee hold that colored suffrage is allowable and expe- 
 dient, that the objections to it are to a great extent 
 misconceived, and that the fears felt and expressed 
 by many as to its results will not be realized. But 
 all must agree that this great experiment of ex- 
 tended suffrage, being once determined upon, should 
 
86 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 have a fair trial ; that all the conditions proper to 
 its success should, as far as possible, be established 
 by the government. And those who sincerely be- 
 lieve that the experiment will have bad results must 
 approve a plan of voting which will certainly miti- 
 gate its possible evils. But the salutary effects of 
 the free vote as a guarantee of peace, though well 
 illustrated by the southern States, will not be con- 
 fined to them. Everywhere it will decrease the 
 violence of party contests and create more amicable 
 relations than now exist among our people. 
 
 4. It will improve the character and ability of the 
 
 House. 
 
 The unrestricted or free vote will secure men of 
 ability and experience in the House of Representa- 
 tives. It is believed that changes are now too fre- 
 quent in that House, and that the public interests 
 suffer detriment from this cause. The committee 
 give their unqualified approval to that provision of 
 the Constitution which assigns short terms of ser- 
 vice to members of the House. But frequency of 
 election does not involve rapidity of change. Popu- 
 lar power may be retained over the House, and yet 
 the great part of its members be continued by re- 
 election for a considerable period of time ; in other 
 words, frequent elections and permanent member- 
 ship are not incompatible. 
 
 But, in point of fact, the members of the House 
 are frequently changed so that members of less than 
 four years' service always constitute a large majority, 
 and it is a rare case that a member continues beyond 
 a third term. Under such a system or practice of 
 
SENATE REPOET. 87 
 
 rapid change, the average character of the House 
 for ability cannot be high. Two and four year men 
 can know but little of the business of government, 
 can be but imperfectly qualified to curb abuses in 
 the executive department, and to expose or compre- 
 hend the true character of most questions of domes- 
 tic and foreign policy. 
 
 There are several reasons which account for fre- 
 quent change in the membership of the House, of 
 which the single-district system is chief. The fluc- 
 tuations of party power is next in importance, but 
 is intimately connected with the former. The sin- 
 gle-district system has carried the idea of local 
 rejoresentation to excess, and has produced a class of 
 inconveniences joeculiar to itself. The idea of as- 
 signing a representative by law to a special district 
 within a State is naturally supplemented by the idea 
 of rotation in the representative privilege among the 
 localities within the district. Hence, very com- 
 monly party nominations are made in turn to the 
 several counties, parishes, or other municipal divis- 
 ions of the district, which necessitates the frequent 
 selection of new men for representative nomination. 
 The claim of locality becomes more importunate, 
 and it is often more regarded than the claims or fit- 
 ness of candidates in making party nominations, 
 and this although there is no diversity of interest 
 among the people in the different parts of the dis- 
 trict. The other cause which we have mentioned 
 co-operates with this, though subordinate to it in 
 effect. Changes of party power in districts, where 
 one party does not largely predominate over an- 
 other, are at all times likely to occur, and to defeat 
 
88 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 the member of the House from the district, although 
 his own party may desire to continue him in the 
 public service. These causes of change would have 
 but slight operation if delegations from States were 
 elected by general ticket, and would have still less 
 if they were selected upon the plan of the cumula- 
 tive or free vote ; and the general ticket system 
 being quite inadmissible, upon the reasons which 
 apply to it, we are driven to the cumulative or free 
 vote as the practical and effectual measure of reform. 
 It will continue members of merit for long periods 
 of time in the House, because it will relieve them 
 and those who support them from the causes of 
 change above mentioned. They can be re-elected 
 with certainty so long as the party whose represent- 
 atives they are desire their continuance in service, 
 and it may be reasonably expected that some men 
 of distinction and intellectual power will always be 
 found in the House whose period of service counts 
 by 20 or 30 years. They will be the great rej3re- 
 sentatives of party, and will give lustre and power 
 and usefulness to the House, while they will be the 
 objects of profound attachment and of honest pride 
 in the States they represent. Congress will become, 
 much more than at present, a theatre of statesman- 
 ship and a fit representative of a great people, whose 
 extended territory, diverse populations, and varied 
 interests demand great ability and wisdom in the 
 enactment of the laws. Our present system, admir- 
 ably calculated to repress merit and lift mediocrity, 
 will be supplanted by one which will produce pre- 
 cisely the opposite result. 
 
 At present a member of the House holding his 
 
SENATE REPORT. 89 
 
 seat insecurely cannot devote himself to public busi- 
 ness with that zeal and confidence which his posi- 
 tion demands. He is involved all the time in a 
 contest for official existence, and his energies are 
 thereby absorbed and wasted. If he has a just am- 
 bition to serve the people he must repress rivals at 
 home, must overcome a rule of rotation in his dis- 
 trict, and fortify himself against fluctuations of 
 party power. It will be exjiectecl of him that he 
 shall distribute the patronage of the government to 
 men who will be efficient in his support for re-elec- 
 tion ; and thus appointments to office and govern- 
 ment contracts are to be his peculiar study, and 
 their distribution a leading object of his labor. 
 And he must be liberal in his expenditure of money 
 upon elections to retain his popularity and place ; 
 and the more of political contribution from abroad 
 he can obtain to influence elections in his district 
 the more admired and the more secure he will be. 
 
 In brief, his time and his efforts, instead of being 
 expended for the public, must be expended on per- 
 sonal objects if he desires to remain for any consid- 
 erable time a representative of the people. Un- 
 doubtedly many of the best men of the country 
 must be deterred from entering upon a congressional 
 career, continuance in which requires such sacrifices 
 to an evil system, so much of unpleasant effort, at- 
 tended with uncertainty and probable mortification. 
 
 But freedom to the elector has one special advan- 
 tage, hitherto unnoticed, over single-district voting. 
 Under the district system a large part of the men of 
 a State are absolutely barred from election to Con- 
 gress. They cannot be chosen in districts where 
 
90 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 their party lias not a preponderance of vote. The 
 difference in strength between parties may be slight, 
 but it will virtually constitute a rule of exclusion, 
 which will always be rigidly enforced. But the 
 cumulative or free vote opens the doors of the peo- 
 ple's house to any citizen of a State whenever those 
 who agree with him in oiDinion in his State will give 
 him a competent support. They can elect him to 
 Congress regardless of State or district majorities. 
 This is an advantage of immense value if republican 
 principles be true, and republican institutions be 
 worthy of being carried to their utmost limit of per- 
 fection as fit and proper for the use and enjoyment 
 of mankind. 
 
 . EXAMPLES OF REFORM. 
 
 But let us turn from general argument upon elec- 
 toral reform to particular cases which will illustrate 
 its application. And first of cases in our own 
 country : 
 
 In Pennsylvania and in other States inspectors of 
 elections are chosen upon the plan of the limited 
 vote. Each voter is authorized to vote for but one 
 inspector, and yet two are to be chosen. Thus, 
 whenever the minority party in an election district 
 can poll one-third of the whole vote they can secure 
 one of the inspectors, and obtain representation in 
 the election board of the district. This arrange- 
 ment protects elections from fraud and injustice, and 
 is everywhere within the States which have adopted 
 it strongly sustained by public opinion. In fact, 
 even in districts where the majority has more than 
 a two-thirds vote the attemjit is rarely made by them 
 to choose the second inspector. 
 
SENATE EEPOET. 91 
 
 Iii Pennsylvania also jury commissioners in the 
 several counties are chosen upon the same plan. 
 But one is voted for by each elector, and yet two 
 are 'chosen. 
 
 For selecting delegates at large to the New York 
 constitutional convention in 1867 a similar plan was 
 adopted. Upon the recommendation of Governor 
 Fenton the legislature provided that thirty-two del- 
 egates at large should be chosen by the people — in 
 addition to the delegates from the representative 
 districts — and that in choosing them each voter 
 should vote for but sixteen. The consequence was 
 that each political party obtained sixteen of the del- 
 egates at large, many of whom could not have been 
 chosen upon a district plan, or upon a general ticket 
 devised in the ordinary way. 
 
 These instances in our own country illustrate the 
 principle of reform now in question, and many 
 others might be cited. They show distinctly that 
 successful attempts have been made by our people 
 to break away from an unjust system of voting, and 
 to secure to themselves those advantages which full 
 representation is so well calculated to produce. 
 
 ENGLISH KEFOEM. 
 
 But English authority and example may be called 
 in to aid the argument in a still more effectual man- 
 ner. The papers appended to this report from 
 authors and statesmen of high standing who have 
 in recent years examined this subject of popular rep- 
 resentation with great fullness and power, may be 
 consulted with profit by any one desirous of under- 
 standing the general grounds of argument in favor 
 
92 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 of reform. And the debates and proceedings of 
 Parliament in 1867 upon the reform bill may also 
 be examined in connection with the returns of par- 
 liamentary elections in 1868 for further and most 
 valuable information. 
 
 On the 4th of July, 1867, Mr. Lowe (the present 
 chancellor of the exchequer in the Gladstone ad- 
 ministration) moved the following amendment to 
 the reform bill in the House of Commons : 
 
 POWER TO DISTRIBUTE VOTES. 
 
 At any contested election for a county or borough repre- 
 sented by more than two members, and having more than one 
 seat vacant, every voter shall be entitled to a number of votes 
 equal to the number of vacant seats, and may give all such 
 votes to one candidate, or may distribute them among the can- 
 didates as he thinks fit. 
 
 This amendment (which was for the free vote in- 
 cluding the principle of cumulation and applicable 
 generally to elections where more than one member 
 was to be chosen) was debated on the day when 
 offered and on the day following, and received the 
 very handsome support of 173 votes — a large vote 
 for a new proposition upon its first trial of strength. 
 Mr. Lowe's amendment was identical in principle 
 and almost identical in terms with the bill now 
 reported by this committee. The English proposi- 
 tion applied to the election of members of Parlia- 
 ment, the American applies to the election of mem- 
 bers of Congress, but in both a free vote, including 
 the right of cumulation, is the essential idea, and the 
 object in view more complete and just representation 
 of the people. 
 
 On the 30th July, 1867, the reform bill being 
 
SENATE REPORT. 93 
 
 under consideration in the House of Lords, Lord 
 Cairns moved to insert the following new clause, to 
 come in after clause 8 of the bill : 
 
 At a contested election for a county or borough represented 
 by three members no person shall vote for more than two can- 
 didates. 
 
 This amendment, after an elaborate debate, was 
 adopted by a strong vote : contents, 142, not con- 
 tents, 51 ; and an additional amendment was then 
 also adopted without a division that " at a contested 
 election for the city of London" (which is entitled 
 to four members) "no person shall vote for more 
 than three candidates." 
 
 The success of those amendments (which were 
 concurred in by the House of Commons on the 8th 
 of August) constituted an important event in the 
 history of representative institutions, for they recog- 
 nized and gave application to a principle of justice 
 which will endure the test of trial and of time, a 
 principle which will hereafter receive indefinite ex- 
 tension, and wherever extended will purify elections, 
 insure contentment to constituencies, and elevate the 
 character and improve the action of free govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Mr. Gladstone, speaking in the House of Com- 
 mons, and confining his attention to his own country, 
 declared that the proposition or principle contained 
 in those amendments, if adopted at all, must be 
 adopted with the certainty that " it must unfold and 
 expand itself over the whole country and completely 
 reconstruct the system of distribution of seats." 
 And generally those who supported it in both 
 
94 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 houses of Parliament foretold and rejoiced in the 
 prospect of its future expansion. 
 
 Those amendments constitute the ninth and tenth 
 clauses of the reform act of 15th of August, 1867, 
 and their effect is illustrated by the parliamentary 
 elections of 1868. We give the returns for certain 
 districts : 
 
 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, 1868. 
 
 Herefordshire, three members. Average tory 
 vote, 3360 ; average liberal vote, 2074. Two tories 
 and one liberal elected. 
 
 Cambridgeshire, three members. Average tory 
 vote, 3924 ; average liberal vote, 3310. Two tories 
 and one liberal elected. 
 
 The liberals also obtained the third member in 
 each of the tory counties of Oxford, Bucks and 
 Dorset. 
 
 Liverpool borough, three members. Average tory 
 vote, 16,404, average liberal vote, 15,198. Tory 
 majority, 1206. 
 
 In Liverpool the second seat, previously held by 
 the tories, was attacked by the liberals ; the result 
 was a failure, as shown by the above vote. But the 
 third member was most justly secured to the liberals 
 under the certain operation of the limited vote, pro- 
 vided by clause 9 of the reform act. 
 
 Under the operation of the same clause the tories 
 obtained the third member for Leeds, and they car- 
 ried members also in Manchester and London. 
 
 Blackwood's Magazine, a tory organ, (it has called 
 itself " the oldest of the tories,") although it admits 
 
SENATE REPORT. 95 
 
 that its party lias suffered loss to the extent of at 
 least four seats by the minority clause, says : 
 
 That to the priociple of that clause, fairly and consistently 
 worked out, it has no objection whatever. — Blackwood's Maga- 
 zine, January, 1869. 
 
 This expression of opinion by a leading organ of 
 the party which suffered somewhat under the mi- 
 nority clause, is a valuable testimony in favor of 
 the principle of electoral reform which that clause 
 was intended to promote. 
 
 DIFFICULTIES OF ENGLISH REFORM. 
 
 Mr. Disraeli in debate on the 5th of July, 1867, 
 pointed out one great practical obstacle to the adop- 
 tion of the cumulative vote in England which does 
 not exist in this country. It happens that the 
 Scotch and Welsh districts are nearly all one-mem- 
 ber districts with liberal majorities. The proposed 
 reform is, therefore, inapplicable to those parts of 
 the kingdom as at present organized for election 
 purposes, and if it were applied to England alone, 
 upon an extensive scale, it might give undue influ- 
 ence and power in the House of Commons to Scotch 
 and Welsh members. They would control the 
 house upon all party questions. Full representation 
 in England would tend to equalize the strength of 
 parties in the house, and then the Scotch vote cast 
 wholly on one side would always turn the scale. 
 
 But putting this consideration aside, and taking 
 the English districts as they stand, we find that 
 most of them are not adapted or well adapted to 
 the cumulative vote. A great part of them are 
 boroughs, electing one member each. In Schedule 
 
96 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 A of the reform act are no less than 38 such bor- 
 oughs, added to those which existed before, and in 
 Schedule B, nine additional. Other boroughs 
 choose two members each, as do divisions of coun- 
 ties, 35 of which are fixed in the reform act, 
 Schedule D. The triangular districts, those which 
 elect three members each, are not numerous, and we 
 are not aware that any district elects a greater num- 
 ber, save London, which elects four. The limited 
 vote is now, however, applied to London and to all 
 the triangular districts, whether boroughs or coun- 
 ties, and it is to be expected that by the reorgani- 
 zation and consolidation of districts hereafter, reform 
 will be greatly extended. 
 
 REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 But the difficulties and obstacles which exist in 
 Great Britain do not exist with us. Our States are 
 well suited to the application of the free vote. There 
 are now only six of the whole number to which it 
 will not apply as a plan for representative elections, 
 to wit, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Nebraska, Ne- 
 vada, and Oregon. They constitute the one-mem- 
 ber States, and would be unaffected by the new plan. 
 But from this class Kansas will pass at the next ap- 
 portionment, leaving but five States out of 37 to 
 compose this class ; and as they would select but 
 five representatives out of about 250 who will con- 
 stitute the House, their influence upon general 
 results would be unimportant if not inappreciable. 
 It is to be remarked, also, that these States, in com- 
 mon with the other States, might come under the 
 operation of the free vote if that vote should be 
 
SENATE REPORT. 97 
 
 applied to presidential elections, because each of 
 them will be entitled to choose three electors. 
 
 THE TWO-MEMBER STATES. 
 
 The two-member States are Rhode Island and 
 Minnesota, and both will probably change their 
 position at the next apportionment of rejoresenta- 
 tives. Rhode Island will fall off to one member 
 and Minnesota rise to three. Other States, how- 
 ever, two or three in number, may take their place, 
 and hence it will be worth while to consider the 
 position of two-member States with reference to the 
 plan of the free vote. It has been sometimes said, 
 without due reflection, that the cumulative vote is 
 not suited to elections where two persons are to be 
 chosen by a constituency, because if it have practi- 
 cal effect it will give equal representation to the 
 majority and minority. But the frequent applica- 
 tion of the limited vote to dual elections — as in the 
 cases of inspectors of elections and jury commis- 
 sioners in Pennsylvania — may cause us to pause and 
 examine this objection with some care before we 
 accept it as a sound one. Carefully examined, it 
 may turn out to be more specious than solid, and 
 we may further discover that in the case of the rep- 
 resentation of our States in the Federal Government 
 there is an important fact which bears upon this 
 objection and deprives it of any appearance even of 
 strength or force. In the first place let us test the 
 objection and illustrate its futility by a supposed 
 case. Take a constituency of 32,000 electors, 
 20,000 of whom are tories and 12,000 liberals, en- 
 titled to elect* two members to Parliament. As there 
 
 7 
 
98 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 are 32,000 voters and two members to be chosen, 
 the full ratio or number of voters for a member is 
 16,000. Assign now one member to the tories and 
 the just demand of 16,000 tory voters is complied 
 with and exhausted. They can have no further 
 claim to representation. What have we left ? Why, 
 on the one hand 4000 tory voters, and on the other 
 12,000 liberals, and the simple question for us to 
 determine is whether the 4000 or the 12,000 shall 
 have the second member. The cumulative or the 
 free vote will give that second member to the 12,000 
 liberals ; unjust voting will give him to the 4000 
 tories. 
 
 But let us cite cases of actual parliamentary elec- 
 tions in 1868, for two-member districts, in further 
 illustration : Northeast Lancashire, two members, 
 average tory vote, 3615; average liberal vote, 3458. 
 
 Two tories elected upon a majority of 157. The 
 ratio for a member was 3536, so that 79 tory voters 
 obtained the second member, while 3458 liberals 
 were disfranchised. 
 
 Take next two districts in Kent. Middle Kent, 
 two members ; average tory vote, 3245 ; average 
 liberal vote, 2873. West Kent, two . members ; 
 average tory vote, 3389 ; average liberal vote, 3279. 
 
 Two tories were chosen from each district. In 
 Middle Kent 186 tory votes carried the second 
 member, and in West Kent 55 ; while in the two 
 districts 6152 liberals were entirely disfranchised. 
 
 East Derbyshire, two members; average liberal 
 vote, 2069; average tory vole, 1974. Yorkshire, 
 West Riding, (South,) two members ; ^average libe- 
 ral vote, 8032 ; average tory vote, 7935. 
 
SENATE REPORT. 99 
 
 In these districts four liberals were elected; in 
 one the second member was carried by 48, and in 
 the other by 49 votes; while 9909 tories were 
 wholly disfranchised. 
 
 Where, then, a minority in a two-member con- 
 stituency exceeds one-third the whole number of 
 voters therein, it does not seem unreasonable to 
 assign to them the second member, and thus, in 
 fact, an equality of representation with the major- 
 ity. It is a case where complete or exact justice is 
 impossible ; there must be disfranchisement to some 
 extent ; but that disfranchisement should be reduced 
 to its minimum, and made to press as lightly as 
 may be upon the constituency. What, then, can 
 be said as to two-member constituencies is this — 
 that any rule of voting for them must (in the very 
 nature of the case) be imperfect in result, but that 
 the cumulative vote, or an equivalent plan applied 
 even to them, will be one of reform and improve- 
 ment. 
 
 But an important consideration remains to be 
 mentioned. Our States are represented in both 
 houses of Congress, and not merely in one ; a fact 
 which changes entirely the character of this ques- 
 tion in the two-member States. In Great Britain 
 there is no representation of the people, or even of 
 districts, in the upper house of Parliament. Com- 
 pensation to a constituency for loss of political power 
 in the House of Commons cannot be obtained by 
 them in the House of Lords. With us the case is 
 widely different. The political majority in a State 
 will ordinarily have both the senators from the State ; 
 in other words, the whole representation of the State 
 
100 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 in the Senate. If, then, in two-member States they 
 have but one-half the representation of the State in 
 the House, (as against a minority of one-third or 
 upwards,) the aggregate of their representation in 
 Congress will still be many times over what it should 
 be upon any principle of justice or of numbers. 
 
 THE THREE-MEMBER STATES. 
 
 It is agreed pretty generally that the cumulative 
 or free vote is admirably suited to three-member 
 constituencies. The States which now elect three 
 members each are Arkansas, California, New Hamp- 
 shire, Vermont, and West Virginia. In such States 
 the majority will always have two members, and the 
 minority, if it exceed one-fourth the whole constit- 
 uency and one-third of the majority vote, can ob- 
 tain the third. Upon constituencies or districts of 
 this class — called indiscriminately " three-handed," 
 " three-cornered," or triangular — much of the de- 
 bate in Great Britain as to reform in popular voting 
 has been expended. The question as to them in 
 particular is fully expounded in the papers (drawn 
 from British sources) which are appended to this 
 report. 
 
 THE GREAT STATES. 
 
 Having exhausted the list of States which elect 
 less than four members, we find that 24 remain. 
 Of these, Coimecticut, South Carolina, and Texas 
 each elect four members, and the remainder various 
 numbers, up to New York, which chooses 31. They 
 may be taken together in this examination as an 
 additional, though by far the most important class of 
 States. They choose 218 out of the 243 -members 
 
SENATE REPORT. 101 
 
 of the House. In this class all the great States are 
 before us, and all of secondary rank, challenging 
 the wisdom of Congress to reform and amend our 
 political system in some effectual manner. For our 
 country has in some respects outgrown the system 
 provided for us by the care of our ancestors ; new 
 necessities press upon us ; great evils afflict us, and 
 it has become the duty of statesmen not merely to 
 administer or to carry on our plan of government, 
 but to amend it also ; and to this end we are to in- 
 vite and welcome the best thoughts of men abroad 
 and at home upon political reform, and give them, 
 as far as possible, application and practical effect. 
 
 Xow there can be no question that if parties in 
 the great States obtain representation according to 
 the number of their votes, one of the greatest possi- 
 ble reforms in a republican government will be 
 secured. All the arguments heretofore mentioned 
 apply to those States with special force, because they 
 contribute the main body of members to the House 
 and a defective plan of election operates within them 
 with extensive effect. As to them, reform will be 
 most important and useful, and no reasonable effort 
 should be spared in attempting to aj:>ply it. 
 
 We have in fact as to the great States no point 
 left for examination except the single one of practi- 
 cability. Will the free vote work and work well in 
 the great States ? Those who distrust popular intel- 
 ligence and judgment may deny, while those who 
 confide in the people will affirm, the practicability 
 of the plan. But there is one leading consideration, 
 which in the judgment of the committee is decisive 
 upon this question. It is that where free action 
 
102 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 shall be permitted each political party will pursue its 
 own.interests with activity, intelligence, and zeal, and 
 will inevitably obtain for itself its due share of rep- 
 resentative power. Thus where a party shall have 
 one-third of the popular vote of a State it will 
 cumulate its vote upon one-third the number of 
 representatives to be chosen. Where parties are 
 nearly equal in strength in a State the w T eaker one 
 will cumulate its vote upon one-half the number of 
 persons to be chosen, or within one of that number. 
 Where a party has a small majority in a State, and 
 particularly where it is increasing in numbers, it will 
 cumulate its vote upon one or two more than one- 
 half the number of candidates. And finally, in 
 States with large delegations, a party with so small 
 a vote as one-fourth or one-fifth the whole number 
 will cumulate its vote upon the small number of one, 
 two, three, or more representatives, according to the 
 proportion which its vote shall bear to the total vote 
 of the State. The due working of the plan is 
 secured by the selfish interests with which it deals, 
 and w T e may congratulate ourselves that under the 
 plan the very efforts of parties to secure power for 
 themselves will result in justice — that is, in the 
 division of power between them according to their 
 respective numbers. 
 
 Now, it is idle to say that voting in the great 
 States will be confused and uncertain. On the con- 
 trary, it will run according to party organization at 
 all times, and will adjust itself naturally and in- 
 evitably to all changes of opinion and organization 
 in the political body. And as political parties con- 
 stantly divide society into parts, the relative strength 
 
^n^^^ 
 
 103 T 3T 
 
 of which can at any time be approximately stated, 
 there need not be uncertainty or confusion in the 
 polling of votes. And even in times of transition 
 and change, when popular power is departing from 
 one party and attaching itself to another, or when 
 some third^ party takes ground upon a particular 
 issue, or faction diverts a fragmentary vote from a 
 great party, the amount of disturbance and conse- 
 quent uncertainty produced will not be considerable, 
 and can be readily estimated for all practical pur- 
 poses, in fixing the number of candidates which 
 any party shall support. The merit or practicability 
 of a rule of elections is not to be judged upon a 
 supposition which is unlikely or exceptional ; but 
 even in the cases supposed, the elements of error 
 and mistake will be reduced to their smallest pos- 
 sible quantity. Where the relative strength of 
 party is uncertain — that is, cannot be exactly known 
 or estimated, or where the boundary of power be- 
 tween them is near the dividing line between ratios 
 of representation, it will rarely happen that a mis- 
 take will be made beyond the extent of one mem- 
 ber, and the general result for the State will be but 
 slightly disturbed. 
 
 THE CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. 
 
 The proposed amendment to the Constitution of 
 the United States, regarding the choice of electors 
 of President and Vice-President of the United 
 States, reported by this committee on the 29th of 
 January, (adopted by the Senate subsequently, but 
 lost upon disagreement between the two houses,) de- 
 serves distinct examination, particularly as full de- 
 
104 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 bate upon it in the two houses of Congress could 
 not be had when it came up for consideration, for 
 want of time. That amendment is as follows : 
 
 The second clause, first section, article two of the Constitu- 
 tion of the United States shall be amended to read as follows : 
 Each State shall appoint, by a vote of the people thereof qualified 
 to vote for representative in Congress, a number of electors 
 equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to 
 which the State may be entitled in the Congress ; but no sena- 
 tor or representative, or person holding an office of trust and 
 profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector ; 
 and the Congress shall have power to prescribe the manner in 
 which such electors shall be chosen by the people. 
 
 The amendment has two objects : first, to secure 
 to the people at all times the right of choosing elec- 
 tors themselves : and second, to authorize Congress 
 to prescribe the manner in which this popular right 
 shall be exercised. In other respects the amend- 
 ment follows the language of the existing Constitu- 
 tion and introduces no change. At present electors 
 are to be appointed as the Legislatures of the several 
 States may direct, and there is no uniform rule for 
 the whole country. Although in most of the States 
 the practice has been to choose them by a popular 
 vote, this has not been a matter of constitutional 
 right in the people, but of legislative permission, 
 and liable at any time to be taken away. That the 
 authority to appoint electors should be fixed in the 
 Constitution by a uniform rule, and not be left to 
 legislative discretion is, we believe, a general opin- 
 ion, and it rests upon good grounds of reason and 
 experience. South Carolina formerly chose her 
 electors by a vote of her legislature, and the people 
 had no voice in the proceeding ; but by her present 
 
SENATE REPORT. 105 
 
 constitution, formed under the reconstruction laws, 
 their appointment must be directly by the people. 
 It may be questioned whether a State constitution 
 can take away the discretionary power vested in the 
 legislature by the Constitution of the United States, 
 which is " the supreme law of the land," but this 
 action by South Carolina shows that popular right 
 requires a constitutional guaranty against the ca- 
 price, ambition, or corruption of legislative bodies. 
 Florida has by law placed the appointment of her 
 electors in her legislature, and a recent attempt in 
 Alabama to fix a similar arrangement in that State 
 was only frustrated by an executive veto. It may 
 be apprehended that in some future election of 
 President and Vice-President closely contested, the 
 legislature of a State or the legislatures of several 
 States may take to themselves the appointment of 
 electors, prevent their choice by the people, and 
 change the result of the election. This is a danger 
 to be carefully guarded against, to be wholly re- 
 moved from our electoral system, not only because 
 it contains an element of injustice, but because it 
 may provoke convulsion and civil war. 
 
 The next provision of the amendment that Con- 
 gress may prescribe the manner in which electors 
 shall be chosen by the people is most important and 
 valuable. It is true that this clause only permits 
 and does not require congressional action, but its 
 necessity for the introduction of any reform in the 
 manner of choosing presidential electors is perfectly 
 certain, as will be presently shown. The objection 
 that because this clause will take power from the 
 legislatures of the States and vest it in Congress, or 
 
106 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 rather will authorize Congress to interpose and con- 
 trol the action of State legislatures, it will increase 
 federal power and tend to consolidation, ought not 
 to j> re vail against the amendment, and that for 
 several reasons. In the first place, the choice of 
 presidential electors is a federal question as much 
 as the choice of members of Congress, and may 
 properly be subjected to similar regulation as to the 
 manner in which it shall be performed. In the 
 next place, the original design of the electoral col- 
 leges has wholly failed. They were intended to be 
 bodies for deliberation and free choice; in other 
 words, to exercise judgment and discretion in giving 
 their votes to candidates for President and Vice- 
 President. It was expected that they would not in 
 form and theory merely, but in fact and truth choose 
 the two principal executive officials in the govern- 
 ment of the United States, and it is to be noticed 
 that the " manner " in which they shall choose is 
 carefully " prescribed " by the Constitution. They 
 are to meet on a fixed day in their respective States 
 and vote by ballot for President and' Vice-President, 
 (one of whom at least shall not be an inhabitant of 
 the same State with themselves,) and shall make 
 distinct lists of their votes, signed and certified, and 
 transmit them under seal to the President of the 
 Senate. But the manner in which the electors 
 themselves should be chosen was not prescribed (or 
 authority conferred upon Congress to prescribe it) 
 for two reasons : first, because the convention did 
 not determine what authority should ajypoint them ; 
 and second, because the actual choice of President 
 and Vice-President was intended to be in the col- 
 
SENATE KEPORT. 107 
 
 leges themselves, whose " manner " of choosing was 
 distinctly" fixed. 
 
 These considerations are now of no force. On 
 the contrary, when it is expressly provided that the 
 people shall choose the electors, and it is understood 
 that the colleges shall simply represent them and 
 execute their will, the regulation of the manner in 
 which the electors shall be chosen falls, as before 
 stated, within the same reason which applies to the 
 regulation of the manner of choosing representatives 
 in Congress ; and it falls, also, within the reasons 
 which originally induced the regulation of the man- 
 ner in which the electoral colleges were to exercise 
 their powers. The amendment therefore, is in con- 
 formity with principles already contained in the 
 Constitution, and does not introduce any " portent- 
 ous novelty " into our system. 
 
 But the most important reason in favor of this 
 branch of the amendment remains to be mentioned. 
 It is absolutely necessary to secure reform in the 
 manner of choosing electors. They are now chosen 
 by general ticket in nearly all the States, and the 
 only practical alternative to this plan is legislative 
 choice, which is still worse, and struck at by the 
 prior clause of the amendment. Now, the general 
 ticket plan is very objectionable, as is well known, 
 and yet the States cannot change it. Theoretically, 
 by virtue of an express clause of the Constitution, 
 the State legislatures may direct the manner in 
 which electors shall be appointed at their pleasure, 
 but practically they cannot or will not exercise that 
 power in the direction of reform. Always, Avhen- 
 ever they have not taken to themselves the power 
 
108 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 of appointing electors, they have provided that they 
 should be elected by the people upon the general 
 ticket plan, and that plan, so long as they allow a 
 popular vote at all at Presidential elections, they 
 will not abolish or amend. The explanation of this 
 is not difficult, and it will be easily understood by 
 any one familiar with our political history, and with 
 the character of our political parties. 
 
 By the general ticket a political majority in a 
 State can wield the whole power of the State in an 
 electoral college — not merely a power proportioned 
 to their own numbers, but a power proportioned to 
 the joint vote of their own and of an opposing party. 
 They obtain not only the power appropriate to them- 
 selves, but also the power appropriate to their oppo- 
 nents or rivals. Now it is not to be expected that 
 a party in a State will voluntarily surrender such 
 an advantage, though tainted with odium and injus- 
 tice, or that their representatives in the State legis- 
 lature will surrender it ; for it is a law of party to 
 obtain all the power possible, and to yield no advan- 
 tage except upon compulsion or for adequate com- 
 pensation. 
 
 But if considerations of justice and the general 
 good could have weight with the State legislatures, 
 and overrule with them the suggestions of selfish 
 interest, still reform could not be secured. A 
 change, in order to operate fairly, should be uniform 
 throughout the whole country, and be applied in all 
 the States at the same time. But State action in 
 the way of change must be successive, extending 
 over a period of years, and would not probably be 
 uniform or universal. And so no State could well 
 
SENATE REPORT. 109 
 
 venture to take the initiative, as its political majority 
 would make a certain sacrifice for an uncertain or 
 imperfect reform. If a political majority in the 
 legislature of Indiana should desire to have electors 
 chosen by single districts, they could not afford to 
 adopt the plan alone. For they would discover at 
 a glance that if other States did not adopt it they 
 would weaken their party without any possible com- 
 pensation. While they would divide power in their 
 electoral college with an opposing party, that oppos- 
 ing party, by holding on to the general ticket plan in 
 another State, (Kentucky, for instance,) would ob- 
 tain an advantage which might determine the gen- 
 eral result of the Presidential election. Upon the 
 whole, then, we must conclude that without an 
 amendment of the Constitution, any reform what- 
 ever in the manner of choosing Presidential electors 
 is impossible. 
 
 But it is said by many that the electoral colleges 
 should be abolished and the people be permitted 
 to vote directly for President and Vice-President. 
 An amendment of the Constitution to effect this 
 purpose has been often proposed, but has never been 
 submitted to the States for adoption, and for a very 
 good reason, which is, that they would have rejected 
 it. Nor is it now possible to obtain the ratification 
 of such an amendment by three-fourths of the 
 States. The reason is a plain one. All the small 
 States, and all the States of secondary rank, are 
 interested largely in retaining their representation 
 as States in the electoral colleges. They have now 
 each two electors without regard to population, 
 whereas under the plan proposed they would be 
 
110 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 confined to the principle of numbers and would in- 
 fluence the result of an election only in proportion 
 to their actual votes polled. No less than 24 States 
 out of 37 would lose from about one-fourth to two- 
 thirds of their present political weight in presiden- 
 tial elections by the change. This fact is decisive. 
 Instead of ratifications by three-fourths of the 
 States there would be prompt rejections by a ma- 
 jority of them if this proposition should be sub- 
 mitted. 
 
 But although the electoral colleges cannot be 
 abolished by constitutional amendment, they may 
 be greatly reformed. They may be made to repre- 
 sent more truly the will of the people and the States, 
 or the people alone, by an amendment of the Con- 
 stitution which shall prescribe, or shall authorize 
 Congress to prescribe, the manner in which their 
 members shall be chosen. It may be provided that 
 the two electors of each State, commonly called 
 senatorial electors, who represent the principle of 
 State equality, shall be chosen in one manner, and 
 the remaining electors of the State, who represent 
 the principle of numbers in another, or that all the 
 electors shall be chosen in the same way. If the 
 former plan should be preferred, the senatorial 
 electors might be chosen by general ticket, and 
 then, as to them, there would be no change from 
 the present practice. But it could be provided that 
 the representative electors in the one case, or all the 
 electors in the other, should be chosen by single 
 districts, or upon the principle of the free vote. The 
 single district plan would be a very great improve- 
 ment, and it would be free from some of the objec- 
 
SENATE REPORT. Ill 
 
 tions which lie against it when applied to the choice 
 of representatives in Congress; but the free vote 
 would be infinitely preferable to it, because it would 
 be more convenient, because it would prevent corrup- 
 tion^ and because it would secure a more full and just 
 representation of the people in the electoral colleges. 
 
 It is the opinion of the committee that under 
 their amendment, as reported, Congress would be 
 authorized only to prescribe uniform rules for choos- 
 ing electors ; rules applicable to the whole country, 
 and operating equally in every State. But if this 
 opinion should be questioned, a slight change of 
 phraseology in the amendment would remove all 
 doubt. 
 
 To the suggestion that Congress might attempt 
 itself to district the States in order to perpetrate 
 party injustice, there are several answers. In the 
 first place, it is not at all certain that Congress would 
 form districts more unfairly than they would be 
 formed by State Legislatures. In the next place, it 
 is not at all likely, and hardly possible, that Con- 
 gress would undertake this work, which would be to 
 it both inconvenient and odious. It possesses now 
 the same power of controlling the manner of choos- 
 ing representatives which it is proposed to confer 
 upon it in regard to choosing electors, and yet it 
 has never undertaken to district the States for rep- 
 resentative elections, in which it is more directly in- 
 terested than in those for electors. But again, if 
 thought expedient, the amendment might be modi- 
 fied so as to exclude the direct action of Congress 
 in the formation of districts. It is hardly necessary 
 to add that the adoption of the free vote for the 
 
112 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 choice of electors would avoid this and all similar 
 questions of debate. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 The committee must now conclude their examina- 
 tion of a most important subject. They have not 
 been able, on account of the pressure of other duties, 
 to fill up completely the argument in favor of the 
 free vote, or to answer in form the possible objec- 
 tions which may be made to its adoption. But they 
 have endeavored to present fairly the main argu- 
 ments which should weigh with Congress and with 
 the people in its favor, and by due explanation of 
 its purpose and character to vindicate it against 
 misconception and cavil. As to the objections which 
 may be made that it would delocalize representation, 
 that it would introduce some degree of confusion, 
 that it would decrease j)olitical activity, and that it 
 is opposed to the doctrine that the majority shall 
 rule, they must content themselves with declaring 
 that in their opinion none of those objections are 
 well taken or well suited to undergo debate, and 
 that they were thoroughly answered in the two 
 Houses of Parliament in 1867. The last one, in 
 particular, is preposterous, for it is one of the main 
 merits of reformed voting, that it will secure the 
 true rule of the majority, and give to it a sanction 
 it does not now possess. The whole mass of the 
 electoral population being represented by reformed 
 voting in the representative body, the vote will be 
 there taken upon any question in controversy, and 
 the voice of the majority duly pronounced. But at 
 present minority rule may obtain. For in the first 
 
SENATE REPORT. 113 
 
 place, all minorities at popular elections are struck 
 out of the returns, and next the minority vote in 
 the representative body is overruled when a decision 
 is there made, so that we have, in fact, the rule of a 
 majority of a majority, which very likely represents 
 only a minority among the people, particularly when 
 a plurality rule is applied to the popular elections. 
 
 The argument for reform may be summed up in 
 a few words. By it we will obtain cheap elections, 
 just representation, and contentment among the 
 people ; by it we will also secure able men in the 
 people's House ; by it our political system will be 
 invigorated and purified; by it our country will 
 " take a bond of the future" that our government 
 shall be a blessing and not a curse ; that our pros- 
 perity shall be enduring ; that our free institutions 
 " shall not perish from the face of the earth." 
 
 SENATE BILL, No. 772.— (40th Congress, 3d Session.) 
 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
 January 13, 1869. 
 Mr. Bugkalew asked, and by unanimous consent 
 obtained, leave to bring in a bill entitled " A bill to 
 amend the representation of the people in Con- 
 gress;" which was read twice and referred to a 
 select committee consisting of Messrs. Buckalew, 
 Anthony, Ferry, Morton, Warner, Kice, and Wade. 
 
 March 2, 1869. 
 Mr. Wade ? from the Select Committee on Bepre- 
 sentative Beform, reported the bill without amend- 
 ment, as follows : 
 
 8 
 
114 PKOPORTIONAL KEPRESENTATION. 
 
 A BILL to amend the representation of the people in Congress. 
 
 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
 the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in 
 elections for the choice of representatives to the Congress of 
 the United States, whenever more than one representative is to 
 be chosen from a State, each elector of such State, duly quali- 
 fied, shall be entitled to a number of votes equal to the number 
 of representatives to be chosen from the State, and may give 
 all such votes to one candidate, or may distribute them, equally 
 or unequally, among a greater number of candidates ; and the 
 candidates highest in vote upon the return shall be declared 
 elected. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 It lias been thought proper and is found conve- 
 nient to place in an appendix various citations of 
 authority in favor of representative reform from 
 parliamentary debates and from the writings of 
 English authors. These evidences of the progress 
 of thought abroad upon one of the most important 
 and interesting questions which relate to represent- 
 ative government, it is believed are worthy the atten- 
 tion of both statesman and citizen in this country — 
 of all who desire the progress and improvement of 
 free institutions and a satisfactory issue to our great 
 experiment of democratic government. 
 
 A few general observations may fitly precede 
 what follows. In the first place, it is to be re- 
 marked that reform in Parliament as secured in 
 1867, in regard to the mode of popular voting, 
 broke through the lines of party and was obtained 
 independent of party support. 
 
 In both houses of Parliament whigs and tories, 
 liberals and conservatives, independent and radical 
 
SENATE HEPORT. 115 
 
 members, were found together in support of an 
 amendment which was intended to do justice to the 
 people and improve the representative body. In 
 the upper house of Parliament in fact the opposition 
 became at last narrowed almost to the ministry and 
 their immediate dependents — a fact which induced 
 the chief minister of the Crown in the lower house, 
 to abandon the opposition which he had at first pro- 
 claimed. In this country also the question of re- 
 form in the manner of popular voting is not one 
 of a party character, and cannot be made such. It 
 appeals to all good citizens and to all thoughtful 
 men, in whatever political organization they may 
 be found, and demands of them an independent and 
 patriotic support. Already men of different opin- 
 ions upon ordinary questions of party, and others 
 of independent views, have stood forward among us 
 as urgent advocates of reform. Of these, outside 
 of Congress, honorable mention is to be made of 
 Mr. J. Francis Fisher, Mr. Greeley, Mr. D. G. 
 Croly, and Mr. Simon Stern. Mr. Greeley's prop- 
 osition in the New York constitutional convention 
 of 1867, for the division of his State into lo sena- 
 torial districts, each of which should elect three 
 senators upon the principle of the cumulative vote, 
 was one of much merit, and will deserve, upon some 
 future occasion, to be revived, and will also deserve 
 to be imitated in other States. 
 
 AKGUItfENTS IN PARLIAMENT. 
 
 In the House of Commons, July 4, 1867, Rfc. 
 Hon. Robert Lowe, on moving his amendment for 
 
116 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 the cumulative vote to the reform bill, addressed the 
 house at length. He said : 
 
 That he must not be understood as coming forward to argue 
 for any protection to the minority . . . but between the 
 members of the constituency there should be absolute equality ; 
 the majority should have nothing given to it because it was a 
 majority ; the minority should have nothing taken away from 
 it. . . . Let each voter have an equal number of votes not 
 dependent upon the use he makes of them ; let him be at lib- 
 erty to dispose of them as he likes. . . . The tendency of 
 the present system w r as to make that stronger which was al- 
 ready strong, and that weaker which was already weak. By 
 an arbitrary and unreasonable rule it strengthened the major- 
 ity; by the same arbitrary and unreasonable rule it weakened 
 the minority. On abstract justice, therefore, the present rule 
 could not be maintained. The proper way to alter it was to 
 give each elector as many votes as there w r ere vacancies, and 
 leave him absolutely free to dispose of them as he pleased — to 
 give all to one person, one to each of three, or two to one, and 
 one to another. By that means they would be doing nothing 
 unjust or unfair to the majority or to the minority. They 
 w r ould be merely putting them on a level, and leaving them 
 on perfectly fair ground. That was the abstract argument. 
 There were different ways by which the end might be accom- 
 plished. Some proposed to give only a single vote to each 
 elector ; others recommended that when there were three can- 
 didates each elector should have two votes. He preferred to 
 give each elector three votes, and allow him to dispose of them 
 as he pleased. The objection to the two first proposals was 
 that they would operate in the way of disfranchisement, and 
 w r ould take away something people already possessed ; because 
 on the supposition that there were three candidates they had 
 already three votes. The system he proposed had greater flex- 
 ibility and better adapts itself to the general purposes of elec- 
 tions. . . . They would find that in this way opinion in con- 
 stituencies would ripen. Opinion in that house would ripen to 
 changes, and the house would become a more delicate reflex 
 of the opinions of the constituencies. The existence of such a 
 
SENATE REPOET. 117 
 
 system of gradual growth, not only of opinion but in the rep- 
 resentation of opinion, would, to a great extent, prevent the 
 necessity of external agitation, and be a great discouragement 
 to it. There was nothing more worthy of the attention of 
 statesmen in the new state of affairs than anything which 
 would have the tendency to prevent that violent oscillation 
 which they now witnessed. What happened in the United 
 States ? The minority of thousands might as well not exist at 
 all. It is absolutely ignored. Was their country (England) 
 in like manner to be formed into two hostile camps, debarred 
 from each other in two solid and compact bodies ? Or were 
 they to have that shading off of opinion, that modulation of 
 extremes, and mellowing and ripening of right principles, 
 which are among the surest characteristics of a free country, 
 the true secrets of political dynamics, and the true preserva- 
 tives of a great nation ? He said then that what he proposed 
 to the house was in itself just, equal, and fair, founded on no 
 undue or unfair attempt to give a minority an advantage they 
 were not entitled to exercise, and that it was peculiarly applic- 
 able to the state of things on which they were entering. 
 ... He might justly add that the principle of the amend- 
 ment w T as large enough to include boroughs returning two 
 members, as well as those which had three, and if it were 
 worth while he was prepared to contend that upon abstract 
 principle it ought to be applied to both classes of boroughs. — 
 Hansard, Pari. Deb., 3d series, clxxxviii. pp. 1037-41. 
 
 Iii the House of Lords, July 30, 1867, Lord 
 Cairns spoke at length in support of his amendment 
 for representation of minorities in three-membered 
 constituencies. He said he would state the advan- 
 tages of the system he had proposed : 
 
 These must obviously be looked at from three points of view 
 — the advantages to the general legislation of the country, the 
 advantages to the members who would be selected under an 
 arrangement of this kind, and the advantages to the consti- 
 tuencies themselves. Now, with regard to the legislature, the 
 advantages which I think would be gained by this system 
 
118 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 would be these : you would obtain in the persons of those who 
 would be the representatives of the minority in these large con- 
 stituencies a body of men of great intelligence, and of great 
 independence ; you would have those elements of advantage 
 which exist in the representation of small boroughs, and, at the 
 same time, you would be perfectly free from the disadvantages 
 and defects of the small borough system. . . . Questions are 
 constantly arising which in one aspect are questions of general 
 political interest, but which are more or less connected with 
 local interests, and bear upon local claims ; and thus a question 
 which, in a general point of view, is of political interest to the 
 whole country is sometimes colored and affected in many w T ays 
 by the way in which it is viewed in different localities. No 
 doubt, in discussing general questions of political interest, it 
 would be of the greatest possible advantage to hear how those 
 questions were viewed not merely by different localities but 
 by different bodies of men in the same locality. That result 
 you would obtain by the plan which I propose. ... I will 
 pass to the consideration of the advantages which would be 
 gained by the representatives of those large constituencies 
 themselves. . . . You would have from the same constit- 
 uency two members representing the majority and one repre- 
 senting the minority, communicating freely with each other, 
 and without the slightest tinge of jealousy or apprehension that 
 the interests of one w T ould jar or conflict with the interests of 
 the other in the constituency. . . . Again, w r ith regard to 
 the constituency itself — and this is one of the most important 
 views of the case — observe the advantages which w T ould be 
 gained : First, I believe you would gain the greatest possible 
 local satisfaction ; there is nothing so irksome to those who 
 form the minority of one of those large constituencies as finding 
 that from the mere force of numbers they are virtually ex- 
 cluded from the exercise of any political power ; that it is vain 
 for them to attempt to take any part in public affairs ; that the 
 elections must go in one direction, and that they have no polit- 
 ical power whatever. On the one hand the result is great dis- 
 satisfaction, and on the other it is disinclination on the part of 
 those who form the minority to take any part in affairs in 
 which it is important they should take a prominent and con- 
 spicuous part. ... In addition to that, it would do much to 
 
SENATE REPOET. 119 
 
 soften the asperities of political feeling which sometimes, 
 though not often, prevail in. large constituencies. ... Of 
 this I am sure, (and although some treat it as an objection I 
 think it a great advantage of the scheme,) that contests would 
 be very much diminished in large constituencies where contests 
 are most expensive, so expensive that the mind almost recoils 
 at hearing the sums which they cost. Contests practically 
 would come to an end ; and as they did, so would danger of 
 bribery and corruption. You would have great constituencies 
 divided into great component parts; you would have each 
 portion well represented ; you would have freedom from ex- 
 pense, freedom from the irritation of political feeling, and from 
 the curse of all elections, bribery. — Hansard, 3d series, clxxxix. 
 pp. 433-'41. 
 
 The views of Earl Eussell in favor of dividing 
 the representation of large constituencies between 
 parties, have been often expressed. In debate in 
 the House of Commons upon the reform bill of 
 1854, he spoke as follows : 
 
 Now it appears to us that many advantages would attend the 
 enabling the minority to have a part in these returns. In the 
 first place there is apt to be a feeling of great soreness when a 
 very considerable number of electors, such as I have mentioned, 
 are completely shut out from a share in the representation of 
 one place. . . . But in the next place I think that the more 
 you have your representation confined to large populations, the 
 more ought you to take care that there should be some kind 
 of balance, and that the large places sending members to this 
 house should send those who represent the community at large. 
 But when there is a very large body excluded it cannot be said 
 that the community at large is fairly represented. — 3d Han- 
 sard, clvi. 2062. 
 
 In his Essay on the English Constitution, (edi- 
 tion of -1865,) he wrote as follows : 
 
 If there were to be any deviation from our customary habits 
 and rooted ideas on the subject of representation, I should like to 
 
120 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 see such a change as I ouce proposed in order to obtain repre- 
 sentatives of the minority in large and populous counties and 
 towns. If, when three members are to be elected, each elector 
 were allowed to give two votes, we might have a liberal coun- 
 try gentleman sitting for Buckinghamshire, and a conservative 
 manufacturer for Manchester. The local majority would have 
 two to one in the House of Commons, and the minority would 
 not feel itself disfranchised and degraded. 
 
 In the House of Lords, in 1867, he gave a vigor- 
 ous and able support to the Cairns amendment, 
 which now constitutes clause nine of the reform 
 act of that year. He said : 
 
 I believe by means of such a plan you would introduce into 
 the House of Commons men of moderate views, whose influ- 
 ence would tend to reconcile parties on those occasions which 
 now and then arise when neither extreme is completely right, 
 and when the influence of moderate men is of much use in 
 allaying the heat of party passion. . . . Suppose a town has 
 20,000 voters, and that 12,000 are of one side in politics and 
 8000 of the other, would not that town be better represented if 
 both the 12,000 and the 8000 were represented than if only 
 the 12,000 were represented? The gentleman who first im- 
 pressed me with those opinions as to three-cornered constitu- 
 encies, mentioned to me that in a great manufacturing town 
 where there was a very considerable conservative minority, 
 men of the greatest respectability, men of wealth, and men of 
 education were in such a state of political irritation, from the 
 fact of feeling themselves reduced to the position of mere 
 ciphers at elections, that they were sometimes ready to support 
 candidates of even extreme democratic opinions. ... I can 
 well understand men who are extremely intolerant and exclu- 
 sive in politics objecting to give any voice to those whose politi- 
 cal views are distasteful to them ; but I cannot understand such 
 an objection being urged by those who are in favor of having 
 public opinion fairly represented. — Hansard, 3d series, clxxxix. 
 pp. 446-'47. 
 
 Upon the consideration of the reform bill of 
 
SENATE REPORT. 121 
 
 1831 in the House of Commons, Mr. Praed, dis- 
 tinguished as speaker and poet, expressed himself 
 as follows : 
 
 If we desire that the representatives of a numerous constitu- 
 ency should come hither merely as witnesses of the fact that 
 certain opinions are entertained by the majority of that con- 
 stituency, our present system of election is certainly rational, 
 and members are right in their reprobation of a compromise, 
 because it would diminish the strength of the evidence to a 
 fact we wish to ascertain. But if we intend, as surely we do 
 intend, that not the majority only, but the aggregate masses of 
 every numerous constituency, should, so far as is possible, be 
 seen in the persons and heard in the voices of their representa- 
 tives — should be, in short, in the obvious literal sense of the 
 word " represented," in this house — then, sir, our present rule 
 of election is in the theory wrong and absurd, and in practice 
 is but partially corrected by the admission of that compromise 
 on which so much virtuous indignation has been wasted. — 3d 
 Hansard, v. 1362. 
 
 THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. 
 
 BY EARL GREY. 
 
 " The first of the reforms of a conservative tend- 
 ency which I should suggest, and one which I 
 should consider a great improvement under any cir- 
 cumstances, but quite indispensable if any changes 
 favorable to democratic power are to be admitted, 
 would be the adoption of what Mr. James Marshall 
 has called the ' cumulative vote ' — that is to say, the 
 principle of giving to every elector as many votes 
 as there are members to be elected by the constitu- 
 ency to which he belongs, with the right of either 
 giving all these votes to a single candidate, or of 
 dividing them, as he may prefer. The object of 
 adopting this rule would be to secure to minorities 
 
122 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 a fair opportunity of making their opinions and 
 wishes heard in the House of Commons. In order 
 that it might fully answer this purpose, the right of 
 returning members to Parliament ought to be so 
 distributed that each constituency should not have 
 less than three representatives to choose. Suppo- 
 sing that three members were to be elected together, 
 and that each elector were entitled to three votes, 
 which he might unite in favor of a single candidate, 
 it is obvious that a minority exceeding a fourth of 
 the whole constituency would have the power of 
 securing the election of one member. It is prob- 
 able that in general three members would be thus 
 returned, each representing a different shade of 
 opinion among the voters. 
 
 " The advantages this mode of voting would be 
 calculated to produce, and the. justice of making 
 some such provision for the representation of minor- 
 ities, or, rather, the flagrant injustice of omitting to 
 do so, have been so well shown by Mr. Marshall in 
 the pamphlet I have already referred to, and by 
 Mr. Mill, in his highly philosophical treatise on 
 representative government, that it is quite needless 
 for me to argue the question as one of principle. 
 But I may observe that, in addition to its being 
 right in principle, this measure would be in strict 
 accordance with the lessons of experience, if read 
 in their true spirit. One of the most remarkable 
 peculiarities of the British House of Commons, as 
 compared with other representative bodies, is, that it 
 has always had within its walls members represent- 
 ing most of the different classes of society, and of 
 the various and conflicting opinions and interests to 
 
SENATE REPORT. 123 
 
 be found in the nation. Much of the acknowledged 
 success with which the House of Commons has 
 played its part in the government of the country has 
 been attributed (I believe most justly) to this pecu- 
 liarity. The changes made by the reform act, and 
 especially the abolition of the various rights of vot- 
 ing formerly to be found in different towns, and the 
 establishment of one uniform franchise in all the 
 English boroughs, (with only a small exception in 
 favor of certain classes of freemen,) tended some- 
 what to impair the character of the house in this 
 respect. The greatly increased intercourse between 
 different parts of the country, and the rapidity with 
 which opinions are propagated from one extremity 
 of the kingdom to another, have had a similar tend- 
 ency ; and there is no longer the same probability 
 as formerly that different opinions will be found to 
 prevail in different places, so as to enable all parties 
 to find somewhere the means of gaining an entrance 
 to Parliament for at least enough of their adherents 
 to give expression to their feelings. 
 
 " Hence there is a danger that the House of Com- 
 mons may cease to enjoy to the same extent as 
 formerly the great advantage of representing the 
 various classes and opinions to be found in the 
 nation. That danger w T ould be greatly aggravated 
 by rendering the constituencies more nearly equal 
 than they are ; but the simple change involved in 
 adopting the cumulative vote would do much to- 
 wards guarding against it, since w T ith this mode of 
 voting it would be impossible that any considerable 
 party in the country should be left unrepresented 
 in Parliament. The tendency of the alteration 
 
124 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 would be conservative in the best sense of the word, 
 while at the same time, in many cases, it would have 
 the effect of relieving liberal politicians from a dis- 
 advantage to which they are unfairly subjected. On 
 the one side it would prevent the representation of 
 the large town constituencies from being monopo- 
 lized, as at present, by candidates ready to pledge 
 themselves to the support of democratic measures. 
 Even in the metropolitan boroughs we might rea- 
 sonably expect that some members would be returned 
 really representing the higher and most educated 
 classes of their inhabitants, who are now practically 
 without any representation at all except that which 
 they obtain indirectly by means of members chosen 
 by other constituencies. Thus in the large towns it 
 would put an end to the unjust monopoly on the 
 part of radical politicians ; and on the other hand, 
 in those counties where a conservative majority now 
 excludes a strong liberal minority from any share 
 in the representation, it would correct a similar tend- 
 ency in the opposite direction. In both cases this 
 system of voting would be calculated to give more 
 weight to the independent electors, who are not 
 thorough-going partisans on either side, and to favor 
 the return of candidates deserving their confidence." 
 — Parliamentary Government Considered with ref- 
 erence to Reform, edition of 1864, p. 203. 
 
 LIMITED AND CUMULATIVE VOTING. 
 
 BY JOHN STUART MILL. 
 
 "Assuming that each constituency elects three 
 representatives, two modes have been proposed, in 
 either of which a minority, amounting to a third of 
 
SENATE REPORT. 125 
 
 the constituency, may, by acting in concert, and de- 
 termining to aim at no more, return one of the 
 members. One plan is, that each elector should 
 only be allowed to vote for two, or even for one, 
 although three are to be elected. The other leaves 
 to the elector his three votes, but allows him to give 
 all of them to one candidate. The first of these 
 plans was adopted in the reform bill of Lord Aber- 
 deen's government ; but I do not hesitate most de- 
 cidedly to prefer the second, which has been advo- 
 cated in an able and conclusive pamphlet by Mr. 
 James Garth Marshall. The former plan must be 
 always and inevitably unpopular, because it cuts 
 down the privileges of the voter, while the latter, 
 on the contrary, extends them ; and I am prepared 
 to maintain that the permission of cumulative votes, 
 that is, of giving either one, two, or three votes to a 
 single candidate, is in itself, even independently of 
 its effect in giving a representation to minorities, the 
 mode of voting which gives the most faithful ex- 
 pression of the wishes of the elector. On the exist- 
 ing plan, an elector who votes for three can give his 
 vote for the three candidates whom he prefers to 
 their competitors; but among those three he may 
 desire the success of one immeasurably more than 
 that of the other two, and may be willing to relin- 
 quish them entirely for an increased chance of 
 attaining the greater object. This j>ortion of his 
 wishes he has now no means of expressing by his 
 vote. He may sacrifice two of his votes altogether, 
 but in no case can he give more than a single vote 
 to the object of his preference. Why should the 
 mere fact of preference be alone considered, and no 
 
126 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 account whatever be taken of the degree of it? 
 The power to give several votes to a single candi- 
 date would be eminently favorable to those whose 
 claims to be chosen are derived from personal quali- 
 ties, and not from their being the mere symbols of 
 an opinion ; for if the voter gives his suffrage to a 
 candidate in consideration of pledges, or because the 
 candidate is of the same party with himself, he will 
 not desire the success of that individual more than 
 that of any other who will take the same pledges, or 
 belongs to the same party. When he is especially 
 concerned for the election of some one candidate, it 
 is on account of something which personally distin- 
 guishes that candidate from others on the same side. 
 "Where there is no overruling local influence in 
 favor of an individual, those who would be benefited 
 as candidates by the cumulative vote would generally 
 be the persons of greatest real or reputed virtue or 
 talents." — Thoughts on Parliameiitary Reform, '2d 
 eel, 1859. 
 
 OF TRUE AND FALSE DEMOCRACY— REPRESENTATION 
 OF ALL, AND REPRESENTATION OF THE MAJORITY 
 ONLY. 
 
 BY JOHN STUART MILL. 
 
 It has been seen that the dangers incident to a 
 representative democracy are of two kinds : danger 
 of a low grade of intelligence in the representative 
 body, and in the popular opinion which controls it ; 
 and danger of class legislation on the part of the 
 numerical majority, these being all composed of the 
 same class. We have next to consider how far it is 
 possible so to organize the democracy as, without 
 interfering materially with the characteristic benefits 
 
SENATE REPORT. 127 
 
 of democratic government, to do away with these 
 two great evils, or at least to abate them in the 
 utmost degree attainable by human contrivance. 
 
 The common mode of attempting this is by limit- 
 ing the democratic character of the representation 
 through a more or less restricted suffrage. But 
 there is a previous consideration which, duly kept 
 in view, considerably modifies the circumstances 
 which are supposed to render such a restriction 
 necessary. A completely equal democracy, in a 
 nation in which a single class composes the numeri- 
 cal majority, cannot be divested of certain evils; 
 but those evils are greatly aggravated by the fact 
 that the democracies which at present exist are not 
 equal, but systematically unequal in favor of the 
 predominant class. Two very different ideas are 
 usually confounded under the name democracy. 
 The pure idea of democracy, according to its defini- 
 tion, is the government of the whole people by the 
 whole people, equally represented. Democracy, as 
 commonly conceived and hitherto practiced, is the 
 government of the whole people by a mere majority 
 of the people, exclusively represented. The former 
 is synonymous with the equality of all citizens ; the 
 latter, strangely confounded with it, is a government 
 of privilege in favor of the numerical majority, who 
 alone possess practically any voice in the State. 
 This is the inevitable consequence of the manner 
 in which the votes are now taken, to the complete 
 disfranchisement of minorities. 
 
 The confusion of ideas here is great, but it is so 
 easily cleared up that one would suppose the slightest 
 indication would be sufficient to place the matter in 
 
128 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 its true light before any mind of average intelli- 
 gence. It would be so but for the power of habit, 
 owing to which, the simplest idea, if unfamiliar, has 
 as great difficulty in making its way to the mind as 
 a far more complicated one. That the minority 
 must yield to the majority, the smaller number to 
 the greater, is a familiar idea; and, accordingly, men 
 think there is no necessity for using their minds any 
 further, and it does not occur to them that there is 
 any medium between allowing the smaller number 
 to be equally powerful with the greater, and blotting 
 out the smaller number altogether. In a representa- 
 tive body actually deliberating, the minority must 
 of course be overruled ; and in an equal democracy 
 (since the opinions of the constituents, when they 
 insist on them, determine those of the representa- 
 tive body), the majority of the people, through their 
 representatives, will outvote and prevail over the 
 minority and their representatives. But does it 
 follow that the minority should have no representa- 
 tives at all ? Because the majority ought to prevail 
 over the minority, must the majority have all the 
 votes, the minority none ? Is it necessary that the 
 minority should not even be heard ? Nothing but 
 habit and old association can reconcile any reasona- 
 ble being to the needless injustice. In a really 
 equal democracy every or any section would be rep- 
 resented, not disproportionately, but proportionately. 
 A majority of the electors would always have a 
 majority of the representatives, but a minority of 
 the electors would always have a minority of the 
 representatives. Man for man they would be as 
 fully represented as the majority. Unless they are, 
 
SENATE REPORT. 129 
 
 there is not equal government, but a government of 
 inequality and privilege. One part of the people 
 rule over the rest. There is a part whose fair and 
 equal share of influence in the representation is 
 withheld from them, contrary to all just government, 
 but, above all, contrary to the principle of democ- 
 racy, which professes equality as its very root and 
 foundation. 
 
 The injustice and violation of principle are not 
 less flagrant because those who suffer by them are a 
 minority; for there is not equal suffrage where 
 every single individual does not count for as much 
 as any other single individual in the community. 
 But it is not only the minority who suffer. De- 
 mocracy thus constituted does not even attain its 
 ostensible object — that of giving the powers of 
 government, in all cases, to the numerical majority. 
 It does something very different ; it gives them to a 
 majority of the majority, who may be, and often 
 are, but a minority of the whole. All principles 
 are most effectually tested by extreme cases. Sup- 
 pose then that, in a country governed by equal and 
 universal suffrage, there is a contested election in 
 every constituency, and every election is carried by 
 a small majority ; the parliament thus brought 
 together represents little more than a bare majority 
 of the people. This parliament proceeds to legislate, 
 and adopts important measures by a bare majority 
 of itself; what guarantee is there that these mea- 
 sures accord with the wishes of a majority of the 
 people ? Nearly half the electors, having been out- 
 voted at the hustings, have had no influence at all 
 in the decision ; and the whole of these may be, a 
 
130 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 majority of them probably are, hostile to the mea- 
 sures, having voted against those by whom they 
 have been carried. Of the remaining electors, 
 nearly half have chosen representatives who, by 
 supposition, have voted against the measures. It is 
 possible, therefore, and even probable, that the 
 opinion which has prevailed was agreeable only to 
 a minority of the nation, though a majority of that 
 portion of it whom the institutions of the country 
 have erected into a ruling class. If democracy 
 means the certain ascendency of the majority, there 
 are no means of insuring that but by allowing every 
 individual figure to tell equally in the summing up. 
 Any minority left out, either purposely or by the 
 play of the machinery, gives the power not to a 
 majority but to a minority in some other part of 
 the scale. 
 
 The only answer which can possibly be made to 
 this reasoning is, that as different opinions predomi- 
 nate in different localities, the opinion which is in a 
 minority in some places has a majority in others ; 
 and, on the whole, every opinion which exists in the 
 constituencies obtains its fair share of voices in the 
 representation. And this is roughly true in the 
 present state of the constituency. If it were not, 
 the discordance of the house with the general senti- 
 ment of the country would soon become evident. 
 But it would be no longer true if the present con- 
 stituency were much enlarged ; still less if made co- 
 extensive with the whole population ; for in that 
 case the majority in every locality would consist of 
 manual laborers ; and when there was any question 
 pending on which these classes were at issue with 
 
SENATE REPORT. 131 
 
 the rest of the community, no other classes could 
 succeed in getting represented anywhere. Even 
 now, is it not a great grievance that in every parlia- 
 ment a very numerous portion of the electors, will- 
 ing and anxious to be represented, have no member 
 in the house for whom they have voted ? Is it just 
 that every elector of Marylebone is obliged to be 
 represented by two nominees of the vestries, every 
 elector of Finsbury or Lambeth by those (as is gen- 
 erally believed) of the publicans ? The constituen- 
 cies to which most of the highly educated and 
 public-spirited persons in the country belong, those 
 of the large towns, are now, in great part, either un- 
 represented or misrepresented. The electors who 
 are on a different side in party politics from the 
 local majority are- unrepresented. Of those who 
 are on the same side, a large proportion are misrep- 
 resented, having been obliged to accept the man 
 who had the greatest number of supporters in their 
 political party, though his opinions may differ from 
 theirs on every other point. The state of things is, 
 in some respects, even worse than if the minority 
 were not allowed to vote at all ; for then, at least, 
 the majority might have a member who would rep- 
 resent their own best mind, while now the necessity 
 of not dividing the party for fear of letting in its 
 opponents, induces all to vote either for the person 
 who first presents himself wearing their colors, or 
 for the one brought forward by their local leaders, 
 and these, if we pay them the compliment which 
 they very seldom deserve, of supposing their choice 
 to be unbiased by their personal interests, are com- 
 pelled, that they may be sure of mustering their 
 
132 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 whole strength, to bring forward a candidate whcm 
 none of the party will strongly object to — that is, a 
 man without any distinctive peculiarity, any known 
 opinions except the shibboleth of the party. This 
 is strikingly exemplified in the United States, 
 where, at the election of President, the strongest 
 party never dares put forward any of its strongest 
 men, because every one of these, from the mere fact 
 that he has been long in the public eye, has made 
 himself objectionable to some portion or other of the 
 party, and is therefore not so sure a card for rally- 
 ing all their votes as a person who has never been 
 heard of by the public at all until he is produced as 
 the candidate. Thus the man who is chosen, even 
 by the strongest party, represents perhaps the real 
 wishes only of the narrow margin by which that 
 jmrty outnumbers the other. Any section whose 
 support is necessary to success possesses a veto on 
 the candidate. Any section which holds out more 
 obstinately than the rest can compel all the others 
 to adopt its nominee ; and this superior pertinacity 
 is, unhappily, more likely to be found among those 
 who are holding out for their own interest than for 
 that of the public. Speaking generally, the choice 
 of the majority is determined by that portion of the 
 body who are the most timid, the most narrow- 
 minded, and prejudiced, or who cling most tena- 
 ciously to the exclusive class interest, and the elec- 
 toral rights of the minority, while useless for the 
 purposes for which votes are given, serve only for 
 compelling the majority to accept the candidate of 
 the weakest or worst portion of themselves. 
 
 That while recognizing these evils many should 
 
SENATE REPORT. 133 
 
 consider them as the necessary price paid for a free 
 government is in no way surprising. It was the 
 opinion of all the friends of freedom up to a recent 
 period; but the habit of passing them over as ir- 
 remediable has become so inveterate that many per- 
 sons seem to have lost the capacity of looking at 
 them as things which they would be glad to remedy 
 if they could. From despairing of a cure there is 
 too often but one step to denying the disease, and 
 from this follows dislike to having a remedy pro- 
 posed, as if the proposer were creating a mischief 
 instead of offering relief from one. People are so 
 inured to the evils that they feel as if it were un- 
 reasonable, if not wrong, to complain of them. Yet, 
 avoidable or not, he must be a purblind lover of 
 liberty, on whose mind they do not weigh, who 
 would not rejoice at the discovery that they could 
 be dispensed with. Now nothing is more certain 
 than that the virtual blotting out of the minority is 
 no necessary or natural consequence of freedom ; 
 that, far from having any connection with democ- 
 racy, it is diametrically opposed to the first j^rinciple 
 of democracy — representation in proportion to num- 
 bers. It is an essential part of democracy that mi- 
 norities should be adequately represented. No real 
 democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, 
 is possible without it. 
 
 Those who have seen and felt, in some degree, 
 the force of these considerations have proposed va- 
 rious expedients by which the evil may be, in a 
 greater or less degree, mitigated. Lord John Rus- 
 sell, in one of his reform bills, introduced a provis- 
 ion that certain constituencies should return three 
 
134 PKOPORTIONAL KEPEESENTATION. 
 
 members, and that in these each elector should be 
 allowed to vote only for two ; and Mr. Disraeli, in 
 the recent debates, revived the memory of the fact 
 by reproaching him for it — being of opinion, ap- 
 parently, that it befits a conservative statesman to 
 regard only means, and to disown scornfully all fel- 
 low-feeling with any one who is betrayed, even once, 
 into thinking of ends. Others have proposed that 
 each elector should be allowed to vote only for one. 
 By either of these plans a minority equalling or ex- 
 ceeding a third of the local constituency would be 
 able, if it attempted no more, to return one out of 
 three members. The same result might be attained 
 in a still better w r ay if, as proposed in an able pam- 
 phlet by Mr. James Garth Marshall, the elector re- 
 tained his three votes, but was at liberty to bestow 
 them all upon the same candidate. 
 
 [The author proceeds to state his preference for the plan of 
 personal representation propounded by Mr. Hare, over other 
 plans of reform, as more effectual and complete, as securing 
 more fully the objects and avoiding the mischiefs mentioned in 
 his preceding remarks. He expresses regret, however, that 
 none of those other plans had " been carried into effect, as any 
 of them would have recognized the right principle and prepared 
 the way for its more complete application." 
 
 His preference for personal representation arises from the 
 fact that it would provide for all local minorities of less than a 
 third in a constituency, and for all minorities made up from 
 several constituencies. His views appear to be, to some extent, 
 affected by the peculiar character of British districts, and the 
 absence of great State organizations in the kingdom affording 
 free play for the cumulative vote. As personal representation 
 is a question not proposed for examination in the present 
 report, or for exposition in the papers which accompany it, his 
 remarks upon it are here omitted. But two additional ex- 
 
SENATE REPORT. 135 
 
 tracts, relating to general considerations connected with reform 
 in representation, are added below.] 
 
 The natural tendency of representative govern- 
 ment, as of modern civilization, is toward collective 
 mediocrity; and this tendency is increased by all 
 reductions and extensions of the franchise, their 
 effect being to place the principal power in the 
 hands of classes more and more below the highest 
 level of instruction in the community. But, though 
 the superior intellects and characters will necessarily 
 be outnumbered, it makes a great difference whether 
 or not they are heard. In the false democracy 
 which, instead of giving representation to all, gives 
 it only to the local majorities, the voice of the in- 
 structed minority may have no organs at all in the 
 representative body. ... In the American democ- 
 racy, which is constructed on this faulty model, the 
 highly-cultivated members of the community, ex- 
 cept such of them as are willing to sacrifice their 
 own opinions and modes of judgment and become 
 the servile mouthpieces of their inferiors in know- 
 ledge, do not even offer themselves for Congress or 
 the State legislatures, so certain is it that they would 
 have no chance of being returned. ... In every 
 government there is some power stronger than all 
 the rest, and the power which is strongest tends 
 perpetually to become the sole power. Partly by 
 intention and partly unconsciously it is ever striv- 
 ing to make all other things bend to itself, and is 
 not content while there is anything which makes 
 permanent head against it — any influence not in 
 agreement with its spirit. Yet, if it succeeds in 
 suppressing all rival influences, and moulding every- 
 
136 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 thing after its own model, improvement in that 
 country is at an end, and decline commences. Hu- 
 man improvement is a product of many factors, and 
 no power ever yet constituted among mankind in- 
 cludes them all. Even the most beneficent power 
 only contains in itself some of the requisites of 
 good, and the remainder, if progress is to continue, 
 must be derived from some other source. No com- 
 munity has ever long continued progressive but 
 while a conflict was going on between the strongest 
 power in the community and some rival power — 
 between the spiritual and temporal authorities, the 
 military or territorial and the industrious classes, 
 the king and the people, the orthodox and religious 
 reformers. When the victory on either side was so 
 complete as to put an end to the strife, and no other 
 conflict took its place, first stagnation followed, and 
 then decay. The ascendency of the numerical 
 majority is less unjust and, on the whole, less mis- 
 chievous than many others, but it is attended with 
 the very same kind of dangers, and even more cer- 
 tainly, for when the government is in the hands of 
 one or a few, the many are always existent as a rival 
 power which may not be strong enough ever to con- 
 trol the other, but whose opinion and sentiment are 
 a moral and even a social support to all who, either 
 from conviction or contrariety of interests, are op- 
 posed to any of the tendencies of the ruling author- 
 ity. But when the democracy is supreme there is 
 no one or few strong enough for dissentient opinions 
 and injured or menaced interests to lean upon. The 
 great difficulty of democratic government has hith- 
 erto seemed to be how to provide, in a democratic 
 
SENATE REPORT. 137 
 
 society, what circumstances have provided hitherto 
 in all the societies which have maintained them- 
 selves ahead of others — a social support, a point 
 dJappui for individual resistance to the tendencies 
 of the ruling power, a protection, a rallying point 
 for opinions and interests which the ascendant pub- 
 lic opinion views with disfavor. For want of such 
 a point oVappui the older societies, and all but a 
 few modern ones, either fell into dissolution or be- 
 came stationary (which means slow deterioration) 
 through the exclusive predominance of a part only 
 of the conditions of social and mental well-being. 
 . . . The only quarter in which to look for a sup- 
 plement, or completing corrective to the instincts 
 of a democratic majority, is the instructed minority, 
 but in the ordinary mode of constituting democ- 
 racy this minority has no organ. — Considerations on 
 Representative Government, chapter vii., Harper's 
 Edition, 1862. 
 
 [March 2, 1869, the foregoing Report (with Appendix) upon 
 being presented to the Senate was ordered to be printed. The 
 following day it was further ordered that 2000 additional copies 
 should be printed for the use of the Senate. Two editions of 
 it were subsequently published by the Personal Representation 
 Society of Chicago, for distribution at home and abroad.] 
 
 foinv 
 
AN ADDRESS 
 
 ON 
 
 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BY THE FREE VOTE. 
 
 DELIVEKED BEFOKE THE SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIA- 
 TION, PHILADELPHIA, 
 
 TUESDAY EVENING, OCT. 25, 1870. 
 
 Gentlemen of the Association : — I desire my re- 
 marks to-night to be understood as made in con- 
 tinuation of what was said and written by me on 
 former occasions on the subject of Electoral Reform. 
 In a speech in this city on the 19th of November, 
 1867, in a speech in the Senate on the 11th of July 
 of the same year, and in a report from the Senate 
 Committee on representative reform, 2d of March, 
 1869, I discussed the Free Vote in its proposed ap- 
 plication to Federal Elections and stated the general 
 arguments in favor of its adoption. I do not pro- 
 pose to go over again the ground covered by those 
 speeches and by that report, but to present addi- 
 tional views, the product of further reflection upon 
 this question of reform, and to mention the steps 
 which have been taken in this State and in other 
 States, looking toward the submitting of the plan 
 of reformed voting to practice. 
 
 138 
 
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDKESS. 139 
 
 THE FREE VOTE. 
 
 The Free Vote may be applied to elections when- 
 ever two or more persons are to be chosen together 
 to the same office for the same term of service, and 
 it consists in allowing the voter to distribute his 
 votes among candidates as he shall think fit, or to 
 concentrate them upon one. It is here assumed 
 that the voter shall have the same number of votes 
 as the number of persons to be chosen, and that the 
 candidates highest in vote shall be declared elected. 
 
 ITS EFFECT ON SINGLE ELECTIONS. 
 
 It will be observed that the free vote is inappli- 
 cable to the election of a single person ; it can be 
 applied only where two or more are to be chosen. 
 But it will be a great mistake to assume that it will 
 have no effect upon single elections because it can- 
 not be applied to them in form and directly. Due 
 reflection and a careful examination of the subject 
 will convince any intelligent man — any man well 
 acquainted with the practical workings of our politi- 
 cal system — that while its direct operation must be 
 confined to plural elections its indirect effects upon 
 single ones will be very great, and very salutary 
 also, whenever it shall come to be established. For 
 the advocates of the new plan assert with confidence 
 and upon fair grounds of reason, that it will secure 
 absolutely to political parties their just representa- 
 tion in all ordinary cases of Presidential, Congres- 
 sional, Legislative and other elections to which it 
 shall be applied, and will therefore greatly weaken 
 the tendency toward violent and corrupt party ac- 
 tion in the elections to which it shall not apply. 
 
140 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 The election of Governor in a State is mainly in- 
 teresting because of the influence which the result 
 will exert upon the next elections in the State for 
 Presidential electors, members of Congress and 
 members of the Legislature ; such an election is 
 hotly contested, money is expended upon it and all 
 possible means to control it brought into active play, 
 because elections which are to follow will be power- 
 fully influenced if not determined by the issue of 
 the contest. In like manner and for the same rea- 
 son other elections of single officers are assailed by 
 evil influences and become degraded and of evil re- 
 port. In my opinion, our remedy, and a very effect- 
 ual one, will be to make all our Congressional and 
 Legislative elections plural and then apply to them 
 and to Presidential elections the free vote or some 
 other device by which just representation of the 
 people shall be secured. Then Gubernatorial and 
 other single elections will be purified and improved ; 
 they will no longer exert any considerable, much 
 less controlling, influence upon Federal or Legisla- 
 tive elections and will not therefore invite or pro- 
 voke those corrupt and evil influences by which 
 they are now assailed. 
 
 ITS OBJECTS— JUST REPRESENTATION ANP PURE ELEC- 
 TIONS. 
 
 Two capital objects are sought to be accomplished 
 by the free vote considered as an instrument of re- 
 form : First, the just representation of the people 
 in government, and Second, the purification of popu- 
 lar elections. 
 
 How to secure the proportional representation of 
 
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDRESS. 141 
 
 political parties or interests in government is cer- 
 tainly a question of high importance, and we have 
 reason to rejoice that it is now receiving earnest at- 
 tention in our own country and in Europe. We 
 must all agree that the majority vote — as I shall call 
 the old plan to which we have been accustomed — is 
 both insufficient and unjust in the case of many 
 elections to which it is applied, and that in un- 
 checked operation it is positively pernicious and 
 hurtful. Observe, I am not speaking of the ma- 
 jority or plurality rule of elections which in its 
 proper application to returns is a necessity, but of 
 the majority vote, of that instrument of oppression 
 by which government is made unsatisfactory because 
 it is made unjust. The law has said to the citizen, 
 " You shall distribute your votes singly among can- 
 didates although by doing so you will lose them all 
 and stand deprived of all voice in the government. 
 You and your neighbor shall be made to struggle 
 constantly, each to deprive the other of his equita- 
 ble right in the very attempt to maintain his own. 
 And if you shall not choose to vote in this exact 
 manner and to grasp at more than belongs to you, 
 you shall not vote at all ; you shall stand aside dis- 
 franchised and ignored." No wonder that our peo- 
 ple, instructed by experience and scourged by many 
 evils, are beginning to complain of the law and to 
 inquire whether there is not some possible remedy 
 for electoral injustice — some plan of amendment by 
 which all the people can have their votes counted 
 and obtain by them appropriate power and influence 
 in the government. 
 
 Yes, there are remedies for this injustice, and one 
 
142 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 of them I advocate to-night ; a remedy convenient 
 of application and effectual for all our purposes of 
 reform. But it is not proposed in antagonism to 
 other plans of reform, nor as a finality in the art of 
 government. It may stand simply for what it is — 
 a good, useful, workable plan for the improvement 
 of elections and for securing justice to the whole 
 body of our electoral population. 
 
 The second great object of reformed voting — the 
 purification of elections — invites to a more elaborate 
 exposition of an existing evil and of the remedial 
 character of the new plan, than my space and time 
 will permit ; but I cannot pass it wholly unnoticed. 
 Certainly when you shall cheapen elections by 
 taking away the motive or the main motive for 
 spending money upon them, you will purify them 
 also. They will be cleansed and elevated in charac- 
 ter by being made cheap and inexpensive to parties 
 and candidates who are now compelled to expend 
 money upon them profusely as the indispensable 
 condition of success. Now beyond all question the 
 free vote will cheapen elections. It will take away 
 from parties almost entirely two powerful motives 
 which now operate upon them — a greed for unjust 
 representation and a fear of unjust disfranchisement 
 — by the conjoint operation of which desperate and 
 expensive struggles are produced. When a party 
 shall be made secure in its just representation by its 
 oxen votes it need not buy a majority in the corrup- 
 tion market as a measure of necessary defence. 
 When it cannot by the aid of corrupt votes rob the 
 opposite party and take to itself more than its just 
 
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDRESS. 143 
 
 share of representative power, it will become frugal 
 in its expenditures and honorable in its conduct. 
 Thus the free vote destroys or checks corruption by 
 taking away the motives which produce it, and in 
 this respect vindicates itself as a most powerful in- 
 strument of moral improvement and progress. 
 
 THE APPLICATION OF THE FREE VOTE. 
 
 The free vote is proposed for application to the 
 following elections : 
 
 1. To the choice of Electors of President and 
 Vice-President of the United States. 
 
 2. To the choice of members of Congress. 
 
 3. To the choice of Senators and Representatives 
 to the Legislatures of the several States. 
 
 In Pennsylvania it should be further applied to 
 the election of the following officers : 
 
 1. Judges of the Supreme Court. 
 
 2. Law Judges of all Common Pleas and District 
 Courts composed of more than one Law Judge. 
 
 3. Associate Judges of Counties. 
 
 4. Aldermen and Justices of the Peace in wards, 
 boroughs, and townships. 
 
 5. County Commissioners and County Auditors. 
 
 6. Directors for the Poor for counties or for Poor 
 districts whenever their election shall be authorized. 
 
 7. Councilmen of cities and boroughs. 
 
 8. Assessors of taxes whenever two are to be 
 chosen, and Assistant Assessors triennially. 
 
 9. Constables whenever two are to be chosen. 
 
 10. Supervisors of Roads and Overseers of the 
 Poor in townships. 
 
 11. Borough and Township Auditors. 
 
144 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 12. Directors and Controllers of Common Schools 
 in all the School Districts of the Commonwealth. 
 
 The new plan should also be applied throughout 
 the country to stockholder elections for the choice 
 of officers of incorporated companies. One of the 
 amendments to the Illinois constitution, adopted in 
 July last, provides, that in all elections in that State 
 for directors or managers of incorporated com- 
 panies the free vote shall be allowed, so that stock- 
 holder minorities in such companies may always be 
 represented in their management, and abuse and 
 wrong be detected or prevented. And all corpora- 
 tions require and should have this fundamental and 
 most salutary check in their constitution. 
 
 But there is still another application of the free 
 vote, heretofore unnoticed, which I believe to be in 
 the highest degree important ; I mean its application 
 to primary elections or to the nomination of candi- 
 dates. In fact when reform shall have accomplished 
 its work in the legal elections and shall have invigo- 
 rated and purified them, it will be required more 
 than ever in the primary ones. For as all nomi- 
 nated candidates will commonly be elected under 
 the new plan, their nomination must be made upon 
 sound principles and with all possible guards against 
 corruption and abuse. But here it is evident that 
 the same remedy which will improve the one class 
 of elections can be used to improve the other also ; 
 in other words, that the free vote can often be 
 applied directly to the nomination of candidates 
 and always to the choice of delegates to nominating 
 bodies. Give it such application freely, to the full- 
 est possible extent, and you will find that you have 
 
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDRESS. 145 
 
 reached and mastered the ultimate difficulty in the 
 way of electoral reform. 
 
 CONCERNING THE USE OF FRACTIONAL VOTES— THEIR 
 UTILITY AND CONVENIENCE. 
 
 In the Bloomsburg act fractional votes are allowed 
 when three, four, or six persons are to be chosen, 
 and they may be allowed with advantage in other 
 cases. Most commonly they will be convenient and 
 desirable to majorities rather than minorities, and 
 there can be no question that their allowance will 
 popularize the free vote, render its reformatory ac- 
 tion more effectual and facilitate its extension gene- 
 rally to popular and corporate elections. Fractional 
 votes have been used with approval many times in 
 recent local elections in Pennsylvania, they have 
 also been used in national political conventions for 
 the nomination of candidates for President and 
 Vice-President of the United States, and their use 
 will be found essential to the smooth working of 
 representative elections under the amended constitu- 
 tion of Illinois. It is evident that when a voter has 
 three votes and shall desire to bestow them equally 
 upon two candidates, he must divide one of his 
 votes ; in other words, in order to give one vote and 
 a half to each of two candidates he must break one 
 of his votes into two equal fractions. When four 
 persons are to be chosen and the majority of the 
 voters shall desire to vote for three candidates, (giv- 
 ing an equal support to each,) fractions of one-third 
 should be created; that is, each majority voter 
 should divide one of his votes into three equal 
 
 parts, so that he can give one vote and one-third to 
 10 
 
146 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 each of the three candidates. And when six per- 
 sons are to be chosen and the voter shall desire to 
 vote for four, he must (in order to render them an 
 equal support) divide two of his votes into four 
 halves and give one vote and a half to each of the 
 four candidates he votes for. 
 
 Some other numbers involved in elections are 
 less adapted than the numbers three, four, and six 
 for the application of fractional voting ; but many 
 others are as much so, and nearly all admit of such 
 application to a useful extent. For instance, the 
 number five admits of the giving of two and a half 
 votes to each of two candidates, or one and one- 
 fourth to each of four ; and the number nine admits 
 of one and a half votes to each of six candidates, or 
 two and one-fourth to each of four. But as it seems 
 necessary or highly desirable on grounds of conve- 
 nience to avoid fractions of which the numerator 
 exceeds unity or one, we cannot very well divide 
 five votes equally among three candidates, nor seven 
 among five, etc. There is, however, more than one 
 resource in such cases of difficulty. Terms of offi- 
 cial service may be arranged with reference to the 
 new plan of voting, or the body of electors in a 
 State or district, united by party association, may 
 divide themselves for the purpose of casting votes. 
 Take the case of a court of five judges, chosen for 
 ten-year terms : Instead of electing them all together 
 it would be well to elect a part of tfiem every fifth 
 year, say two at one time and three at another, and 
 so on at successive quinquennial elections. And so 
 to a court of seven judges, four might be chosen at 
 one time and three at another. Again, take the 
 
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDRESS. 147 
 
 case of a State entitled to eight members of Con- 
 gress in which the political majority is entitled, by 
 its numbers, to elect five. In a party convention or 
 by a State committee it might be easily arranged 
 that while the great mass or principal part of the 
 majority voters of the State should vote for four 
 candidates, (giving two votes to each,) a district con- 
 taining one-fifth of their strength should be set off 
 or set apart in which the voters of the party should 
 give all their votes to one candidate. And so in 
 Pennsylvania, entitled to twenty-four members of 
 Congress, and where political parties are nearly 
 equal in strength, either party that supposed itself 
 in the majority could vote for a thirteenth member 
 by a district vote, while the general mass of its 
 voters in the State would vote for twelve. No law 
 would be necessary to authorize these and other like 
 arrangements ; they would be made by the volun- 
 tary action of parties whenever their expediency 
 became evident. 
 
 In fact, by the means mentioned, and by others, 
 the use of fractional votes can be dispensed with 
 altogether in our plan of electoral reform, and whole 
 votes alone retained. But I would not dispense 
 with them in all cases, but would authorize them 
 whenever their utility should be evident and their 
 inconvenience slight. At present I am prepared to 
 say that I would allow fractional votes of one-half, 
 one-third, or one-fourth, whenever their use shall 
 be necessary to enable voters to give an equal sup- 
 port to the candidates they vote for under the new 
 plan. 
 
 The counting of fractions in making up election 
 
148 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 returns is a very simple performance as shown at 
 recent elections in this State. Fractions being al- 
 ways attached to whole votes on the tickets may 
 even be disregarded in scoring down votes upon the 
 tally-paper and be added at the end of the score. 
 For instance, when two candidates have been voted 
 for as follows : 
 
 John Jones, 1$ votes, 
 William Brown, lh votes, 
 the first ticket drawn from the box may be copied 
 upon the tally-paper, (omitting the word " votes,") 
 and then that and succeeding tickets marked down 
 in scores of five toward the right according to the 
 common practice. To the sum of the scores for a 
 candidate fifty per centum will be added at the end 
 of the line. Thus if 80 such tickets have been 
 voted, the count for each candidate will be carried 
 out — 80 + 40 = 120 votes. In this case the 
 figures " 1 h " attached to a candidate's name become 
 a sign of value for the strokes which follow, and 
 may be conveniently enclosed in a circle with a pen. 
 If whole votes alone shall be voted on other tickets 
 for the same candidate, they should be scored on a 
 separate line above or below the other and be car- 
 ried out and added at the proper place on the right. 
 
 THE FILLING OF VACANCIES. 
 
 Upon a careful reading of speeches made by John 
 Bright in 1867, at Manchester, at Birmingham, and 
 in the House of Commons, in hostility to cumula- 
 tive voting and to the limited vote as embodied in 
 the Cairns amendment to the Keform Bill, I became 
 thoroughly convinced of the utter weakness of all 
 
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDRESS. 149 
 
 possible objections to minority representation, (as it 
 was then called.) A first-class man, laboring with 
 great earnestness on repeated occasions, was unable 
 to make good a single objection to reform, and was 
 compelled in the final debate on the 8th of August, 
 to plant himself upon purely conservative ground 
 and insist upon the novelty of the proposition before 
 the House. So far as I can remember, there was 
 but one point made by him which reached the dig- 
 nity of appearing plausible, or which seemed to call 
 for explanation or reply. That was that the new 
 plans were defective in regard to the filling of va- 
 cancies that might happen pending terms of official 
 service. Supposing, for instance, that the seat of a 
 member of Parliament from a triangular district — 
 a district of three members — should become vacant 
 from any cause pending his term, neither the cumu- 
 lative or limited vote could be applied at a special 
 election to the choice of his successor. I admit the 
 fact in the case supposed, but I deny the objection 
 based upon it. That objection is wholly miscon- 
 ceived and will disappear upon being submitted to 
 examination. Mr. Bright did not desire the third 
 member for Birmingham to be taken by the Tories, 
 and therefore opposed reform ; but his best point, 
 like all his others, was unworthy of his genius and 
 his fame. Party interest misled him as it has often 
 misled other men of equal distinction and mental 
 power. 
 
 Now as the question of filling casual vacancies, 
 under reformed voting, has never been discussed in 
 this country, nor, so far as I know, been examined 
 abroad, (unless in connection with schemes of repre- 
 
150 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 sentation which do not come within the scope of my 
 present discourse,) I shall proceed to speak upon it 
 briefly, and shall incidentally dispose of the Bright 
 objection just mentioned. 
 
 In the first place I have to remark that if here- 
 after casual vacancies shall be filled by popular elec- 
 tion and by the majority vote, we shall be in no 
 worse condition than we are now ; we shall simply 
 continue, as to such occasional election, the existing 
 rule. In the next place it is to be considered that 
 whenever two or more vacancies shall exist at the 
 same time, the free or limited vote can be applied to 
 an election held for the purpose of filling them. 
 Again, it is evident that most vacancies that will 
 happen, will be of majority members or officers, and 
 that the application of the majority vote to the 
 choice of successors will be perfectly proper and in 
 complete harmony with our plan of reform. But I 
 will take the comparatively rare or unusual case of 
 a minority vacancy standing alone, or the still rarer 
 case of two or more such vacancies (without ma- 
 jority ones) existing at the same time. How shall 
 such minority vacancies be filled ? I answer, they 
 can be filled and filled properly either by election 
 or appointment. In many if not most cases ap- 
 pointments may be made for unexjDired terms, but 
 whenever possible in any case an appointment 
 should be made from among the voters who shall 
 have voted for the officer or person whose place is 
 to be filled. As an illustration I will read the pro- 
 vision concerning the filling of vacancies contained 
 in the County Commissioner bill introduced into the 
 Senate of Pennsylvania at its last session. After 
 
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADBKESS. 151 
 
 providing for the election of three County Commis- 
 sioners and three County Auditors, respectively, for 
 three year terms, the fourth section provides as 
 follows : 
 
 " Sec. 4. Vacancies in the office of County Com- 
 missioner or County Auditor occurring otherwise 
 than by the expiration of a regular term of service, 
 or occasioned or continued by a failure to elect under 
 this act, shall be filled by appointments to be made 
 by the Courts of Quarter Sessions of the Peace of 
 the several counties in which such vacancies shall 
 occur, which appointments shall be for the remain- 
 ing part or time of any unexpired term to be filled. 
 In the filling of any such vacancy the following 
 rules of selection shall be observed, to wit : First, 
 The appointment shall be made from among the 
 qualified electors of the county who shall have voted 
 for the Commissioner or Auditor whose place is to 
 be filled, and Second, The Judges of the Court by 
 whom the appointment is to be made shall receive 
 and consider any respectful petition from qualified 
 electors of the county who shall have voted for the 
 Commissioner or Auditor whose place is to be filled, 
 and shall appoint such fit persons so recommended 
 as shall, in their opinion, be most acceptable to the 
 greater part of the electors by whom the Commis- 
 sioner or Auditor whose place is to be filled was 
 chosen.' ■ 
 
 The power of appointment for the filling of va- 
 cancies may be variously lodged according to the 
 nature of the case or the character of the office to 
 be filled, but no matter where lodged it should al- 
 ways be exercised under a rule of selection similar 
 
152 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 to that contained in the bill just cited, so that the 
 just division of offices between parties shall be at 
 all times maintained. 
 
 But when an appointment cannot well be made 
 to fill a vacancy on account of the magnitude of 
 the office, the long duration of the unexpired term, 
 or because it is difficult in the given case to select a 
 proper appointing power, a popular election to fill 
 the vacancy may be provided for. In such case I 
 would call only upon the voters who had previously 
 voted for the officer or person whose place is to be 
 filled and would confine the right of choice to them. 
 The other voters of the constituency or district 
 ought not to participate in such election for evident 
 reasons and should be excluded. But at this point 
 an objector may say that it will be difficult to dis- 
 tinguish the proper voters from others and to con- 
 fine the electoral privilege to them. I do not 
 think so. The party position of most men is fully 
 known in their own election districts, and in doubt- 
 ful cases the right of challenge will guard against 
 improper votes. The official lists of voters taken 
 down at a former election can be referred to for the 
 prevention of fraud, and any one offering to vote 
 may be called upon to prove by his own oath or by 
 other testimony that he voted at such former elec- 
 tion for the officer or person whose place is to be 
 filled. Besides, as there will be no struggle be- 
 tween political parties for a majority at such elec- 
 tions, the most fertile of all causes of fraud will be 
 wholly excluded from them. In fact where there 
 shall be but one candidate at such an election, 
 (which will be the ordinary case,) there will be no 
 
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDKESS. 153 
 
 motive at all for fraud and its existence will be ren- 
 dered impossible. 
 
 But I am quite certain that when the free vote or 
 some similar plan of reform shall come into general 
 use, secret voting will be entirely dispensed with 
 because it will no longer be necessary to the pro- 
 tection of the voter against intimidation and other 
 forms of improper influence. The ballot may re- 
 main to us, but it will be an open one — probably in 
 the slip-ticket form — and a large amount of mys- 
 tery, intrigue, deception and meanness will be ex- 
 pelled from elections. And, by numbering the 
 ballots when voted, or by other means easily ap- 
 plied, it will be possible to prove afterwards beyond 
 dispute for whom any voter cast his votes. Pos- 
 sibly we may come at last to a plan of register- 
 ing votes which will still more completely or con- 
 veniently enable us to classify voters and determine 
 for whom they voted. At all events, by dispensing 
 with the secret vote we shall possess greater facilities 
 than now for the proper polling of votes at special 
 elections. 
 
 LOCAL USE OF KEFOKMED VOTING. 
 
 The free vote w^as first used in an election at 
 Bloomsburg, in this State, on the 12th of April last, 
 when six persons w T ere to be chosen members of the 
 town Council for the ensuing year. The result was 
 that three Democrats and three Republicans were 
 elected. It was again used in the same town on the 
 second Tuesday of the present month in the choice 
 of Constables, Assessors, Assistant Assessors, School 
 Directors, and Town Auditors. Altogether, at the 
 
154 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 two town elections, seventeen officers have been 
 chosen under the new plan, and they are all good 
 men and are fairly divided between parties. Not 
 one person among the whole six hundred voters of 
 the town is known to have expressed himself against 
 the change, or is believed to be desirous of return- 
 ing to the old and unfair majority vote. In short, 
 the change has been completely satisfactory and is 
 strongly endorsed by public opinion. 
 
 Directors of the Poor for the Bloom Poor Dis- 
 trict in Columbia county (the district containing 
 one thousand two hundred voters) were also chosen 
 at the October election under the new plan and in a 
 satisfactory manner. The majority elected two and 
 the minority one. 
 
 In the county of Northumberland, in Sunbury, 
 Northumberland and other boroughs, the new plan 
 was also tried at the recent election (principally in 
 the choice of Council men) and with good and sat- 
 isfactory results. 
 
 Certain advantages of the new plan not foreseen 
 or not foreseen distinctly, appeared in these local 
 elections. In the first place, they showed that the 
 number of candidates at an election will be greatly 
 reduced by the new plan ; that in most cases no 
 more persons will run than can be elected, because 
 each party will nominate only the number it has 
 votes to elect. Next, it was shown that blunders in 
 nomination, either as to the number of candidates 
 to be supported or as to individual nominations, 
 could be readily and certainly corrected by the 
 voters at the legal election. Also, that bolting (as 
 it is called) is deprived to a great extent of its mis- 
 
SOCIAL SCIENCE ADDEESS. 155 
 
 chievous character, bolters being only able to rep- 
 resent themselves by their own votes when their 
 number is adequate, without being able to turn an 
 election upside down or prevent a just division of the 
 offices between parties. It was also clearly shown 
 at those elections that the preparation, polling, 
 counting, and return of fractional votes, in cases 
 where their use was found desirable, was quite sim- 
 ple and convenient, occasioning no difficulty, uncer- 
 tainty or confusion. 
 
 PEOGEESS OF EEFOEM. 
 
 The State of New York a few years since used 
 the limited vote in choosing thirty-two delegates at 
 large to her Constitutional Convention. No voter 
 was allowed to vote for more than sixteen. More 
 recently she chose the six Associate Judges of her 
 highest court on the same principle ; no voter was 
 allowed to vote for more than four. But though 
 these were steps in the right direction and resulted 
 in fuller representation of the people, it must be ac- 
 knowledged that the limited vote is an imperfect 
 contrivance and not fitted for extensive use. More 
 wisely instructed, the State of Illinois the present 
 year has adopted the free vote, not only for the 
 election of directors or managers of incorporated 
 companies, as before mentioned, but also for the elec- 
 tion of Representatives in her Legislature. They 
 will be chosen biennially, commencing with the 
 year 1872, three being elected together from each 
 senatorial district. In this State, in August last, a 
 respectable convention in favor of minority repre- 
 sentation was held at Reading. It adopted proper 
 
156 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 resolutions and organized committees for future work. 
 The men concerned in that convention and the 
 friends of reform generally in this State, look for- 
 ward to a Constitutional Convention as the means 
 for securing the main objects they have in view. 
 And they particularly desire that the members of 
 such convention, if one should be called, shall be 
 elected upon a plan of reformed voting, so that the 
 whole people shall be represented in the convention. 
 
 Without a convention, however, much can be 
 done. The Legislature has complete power over 
 municipal elections and can reform them at pleasure, 
 and it can also largely improve the representation 
 of the people in the Legislature itself. 
 
 In conclusion I will say to all friends of reform, 
 be confident and hopeful of the future. It is well 
 for us " to labor and to wait." Great changes are- 
 best made when made deliberately and with due 
 caution ; not in passionate heat, but upon cool con- 
 viction. Electoral reforms may come slowly, but 
 they are sure to come, for their necessity grows 
 every year more evident. 
 
A SPEECH 
 
 DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, ON 
 
 MONDAY EVENING, MARCH 27, 1871, UPON 
 
 THE BILL ENTITLED 
 
 "AN ACT FOE THE FURTHER REGULATION 0! BOROUGHS."* 
 
 Mr. Speaker: — I came to this Senate to serve 
 during my present term with the intention of de- 
 voting myself particularly to the subject of Electoral 
 Reform. I thought that the attention of the Rep- 
 resentatives of the people assembled in the Legisla- 
 ture should be directed to some fundamental and 
 searching changes in our electoral system, by which 
 existing abuses shall be checked or prevented in 
 future. 
 
 Now, sir, in the first place, I propose to call at- 
 tention to what has been done heretofore in this 
 State upon this subject of reform, in the direction 
 indicated by the present bill. 
 
 INSPECTORS OF ELECTION. 
 
 In the Constitutional Convention of 1837-8, Mr. 
 Thomas Earle, of the county of Philadelphia, sub- 
 
 * The bill upon which the above speech was delivered passed and be- 
 came a law. Those sections of it which relate to the election of Coun- 
 cilmen, in boroughs, to the support of which the argument of the speech 
 was directed, will be found at page 229 of this volume. 
 
 157 
 
158 PKOPORTIONAL EEPKESENTATION. 
 
 mitted propositions on two occasions, with reference 
 to the choice of election officers by the people, upon 
 the plan of what is now known as the limited vote. 
 On the 27th of June, 1837,* he addressed that Con- 
 vention at some length in support of his second 
 proposition. It was then submitted to a vote and 
 rejected very strongly ; by a vote of, I think, over 
 three to one, and the majority comprised most of the 
 strong men of the Convention — such men as Wood- 
 ward, Sergeant, Forward and others. The Conven- 
 tion passed off and nothing was done. At the ses- 
 sion of the Legislature in 1839, the Governor of the 
 Commonwealth called attention in his message to 
 the subject of electoral reform. He pointed out to 
 the two Houses that extensive changes had become 
 necessary in our election laws by reason of the 
 amendments to the Constitution. He pointed out 
 the fact that great frauds had taken place at elec- 
 tions in various parts of the Commonwealth, and, in 
 short, that our electoral system had fallen under re- 
 proach and needed amendment. During the course 
 of the session, Mr. Senator Brown, of Philadelphia 
 county, turned his attention to this subject, and, in 
 a Committee of Conference upon the General Elec- 
 tion bill of that year, obtained the insertion sub- 
 stantially of the proposition which had been advo- 
 cated by Mr. Earle, in the Constitutional Convention 
 the year before, and for which Mr. Brown himself 
 had voted, he being a member of that Convention. 
 Well, sir, that proposition will be found among our 
 statutes as one of the most important and useful pro- 
 visions of the election act of 1839. It provides that 
 
 * 3 Convention Debates, 173. 
 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT. 159 
 
 each, voter, at the time when election officers are to 
 be chosen, shall vote for but one person for Inspect- 
 or of elections during the coming year, and that the 
 two candidates highest in vote shall be declared 
 elected. Then follows a provision that each Inspect- 
 or, so chosen, shall appoint a clerk. The Judge of 
 the election^ the only additional officer, is chosen 
 under the old plan of the majority vote. That was 
 in 1839, and it is to be noted that upon debate, this 
 reform was carried in the Senate by a vote of only 
 fifteen to eleven. 
 
 But this law as to the manner of choosing election 
 officers has continued to the present time, a period 
 of over thirty years, and it is well known that it is 
 most salutary in operation .and most satisfactory to 
 the people. I do not know what the whole number 
 of election districts in the State is at the present 
 time; in 1838 the number a little exceeded one 
 thousand. I suppose the number now exceeds two 
 thousand, and it happens under this law that in 
 nineteen-twentieths of the election districts of the 
 Commonwealth, each of the two political parties into 
 which our people are ordinarily divided, has an In- 
 spector in the Election Board, and also a Clerk, and 
 that the majority has the Judge. Sir, it is this pro- 
 vision of the law that has preserved our elections 
 from degeneracy and disgrace. If it were recalled 
 from our statute book, and we should apply to the 
 choice of election officers our ordinary plan of voting, 
 we might expect an enormous increase of fraudulent 
 voting throughout the State, with consequent de- 
 generacy of our political system, and to a great ex- 
 
160 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 tent discredit would be cast upon the political 
 institutions under which we live. 
 
 JURY COMMISSIONERS. 
 
 Some years since, complaint began to be made in 
 various parts of the State that jurymen were not 
 fairly selected by County Commissioners and Sher- 
 iffs to whom the law committed their selection. In 
 some counties they were taken, it was alleged, ex- 
 clusively from the majority party in the county — 
 the County Commissioners and Sheriffs representing 
 the majority and selecting their political friends al- 
 most exclusively, from year to year. Appeals were 
 made to the Legislature, and several local acts were 
 passed for particular counties, providing a new ar- 
 rangement, an election by the people of two Jury 
 Commissioners in the same manner in which In- 
 spectors of Election are chosen under the election 
 act of 1839. Finally the Governor recommended 
 the extension of this plan to the whole Common- 
 wealth. This recommendation was made, I believe, 
 by Governor Curtin. A general statute was passed 
 and approved by Governor Geary in April, 1867, 
 applying this plan of Jury Commissioners to the 
 whole State, and every Senator present is familiar 
 with it. Since that time throughout the State we 
 have had elections for those officers upon the plan 
 of the limited vote. The statute assigns to Presi- 
 dent Judges some duties in connection with the 
 Jury Commissioners. In many of the judicial dis- 
 tricts, the President Judges declined to act, or did 
 not act for some time after the law was passed. 
 They thought, and I suppose thought properly, 
 
THE BOKOUGH SUPPLEMENT. 161 
 
 that they ought to have no part in the selection of 
 men who were to serve in their courts as jury- 
 men ; that it was a duty which ought not to be 
 charged upon them, because it was to some extent 
 inconsistent with their judicial duties and with that 
 entire independence which ought to exist between 
 the Judges and jury who are to try the disputes and 
 differences of the citizen. But presently it came to 
 be understood that in all cases under that law jury- 
 men would be divided equally between political 
 parties ; that in a county where there was nearly a 
 two-thirds majority the minority would have an 
 equal number, which seemed unfair ; and so, from 
 time to time appeals have been made to President 
 Judges to take part and assist their political friends 
 to get their full share, or perhaps more than their 
 share of jurymen. 
 
 One of the President Judges described to me the 
 performance on one occasion when he first attended 
 to select jurors. It was in a county with the inhab- 
 itants of which he was not very familiar, he having 
 previously resided in an adjoining county ; but he 
 was told that he must assist in filling the wheel and 
 he did so. He found a Democratic and a Repub- 
 lican Jury Commissioner sitting on each side of a 
 table, and each of them with a hat full of names. 
 The proceeding was after this fashion : The Demo- 
 cratic Commissioner reached into his hat and took 
 out a name, and put it into the box or wheel ; the 
 Republican Commissioner did the same from his hat, 
 and then the Judge, who happened to be a Repub- 
 lican, reached into the Republican's hat and took 
 out a name and put it into the wheel ; and at the end 
 11 
 
162 PROPORTIONAL PvEPKESENTATION. 
 
 of the proceeding the Judge did not know a single 
 name that he had put into the wheel, but the duty 
 charged upon him under the law had been, after a 
 fashion, discharged. 
 
 What ought to have been done in 1867? Why, 
 I insist that the bill which is lying upon your table, 
 introduced early in the session, ought to have passed 
 instead of the Jury Commissioner act. That pro- 
 vides that in the election of County Commissioners 
 all the voters of a county shall be enabled to repre- 
 sent themselves by their own votes ; that in all or- 
 dinary cases the majority shall be enabled to elect 
 two Commissioners and the minority one, and then 
 that the board, so made up, shall be charged with 
 this duty of selecting jurymen, as formerly. We 
 would, by that arrangement, be enabled to dispense 
 with two unnecessary officers — the Jury Commis- 
 sioners — and we Avould also be enabled to dispense 
 with this clumsy provision in relation to the partici- 
 pation of President Judges in the selection of jury- 
 men. We would have the people fairly represented 
 in courts of justice whenever issues of fact were to 
 be tried, and every object designed to be obtained 
 by the act of 1867 would be fully accomplished. 
 That, by the way, is only one of the advantages, as 
 I think, of this County Commissioner bill which is 
 upon your files. But I proceed : 
 
 LOCAL ACTS. 
 
 At the last session the two houses of the Legisla- 
 ture passed ten or twelve local bills, at my instance, 
 applying reformed voting to certain municipal elec- 
 tions in the counties of Columbia and Northumber- 
 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT. 163 
 
 land. A proposition and arrangement which yon 
 have in the third section of the pending bill in re- 
 lation to boroughs, was applied to the eight boroughs 
 in Northumberland county, to the town of Blooms- 
 burg and the borough of Berwick in Columbia 
 county, and to two poor districts in those counties. 
 Substantially the free vote was applied to them, and 
 it has had successful operation. 
 
 BILLS PROPOSED. 
 
 This constitutes the legislation which has hereto- 
 fore been had in this particular line of reform. At 
 this session the Senate has passed a bill applying 
 the free vote to the choice of Directors of Common 
 Schools, and now it is asked to pass this bill in rela- 
 tion to the election of Councilmen of boroughs 
 throughout the Commonwealth. The provision is 
 that in all boroughs incorporated under or pursuant 
 to general laws, and in all boroughs heretofore es- 
 tablished by special acts which may come under the 
 general laws, there shall be six Councilmen, and in 
 selecting them each voter may distribute or concen- 
 trate his six votes according to his own judgment, 
 without legal restraint. Now, comparatively de- 
 scribed, this provision amounts to this : That, where- 
 as, the existing law, after assigning to the voter 
 his six votes, compels him to distribute them singly 
 among six candidates, this bill will withdraw that 
 limitation, and allow him to distribute them accord- 
 ing to his own judgment, without legal compulsion. 
 Now, sir, the fundamental principle of our govern- 
 ment is that men, or at least American men, are 
 competent to self-government. Our system is said 
 
364 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 to be a system of self-government — that the citizen 
 is able to choose and determine for himself in all 
 matters of discretion where strong reasons of public 
 interest do not interpose to demand legal regulation. 
 What the supporters of this bill ask is, not that the 
 law shall be extended, not that legal regulation 
 shall be increased, not that the law-making power 
 shall interfere, and do more than it has heretofore 
 done, but that it shall withdraw itself from the citi- 
 zen, and allow him a larger measure of freedom and 
 of choice, in strict accordance with the fundamental 
 principles of our government. 
 
 OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED— CHOICE OF MEMBERS OF 
 CONGRESS. 
 
 Now, sir, what objections are there to this plan 
 of voting? Why the Senator from Greene [Mr. 
 Purman] the other day went over some of those that 
 may naturally occur to a candid and reasonable 
 mind upon first approaching this subject. He 
 stated them, and he stated them in a fair and pro- 
 per manner, suggesting the line of argument which 
 it is necessary for me to pursue in vindication of this 
 bill. He suggests that if this plan of voting were 
 applied to the choice of members of Congress there 
 would be no districting of this or any other State ; 
 that the members would be elected by general ticket 
 throughout the whole Commonwealth ; and he 
 seemed to apprehend that there would be some dif- 
 ficulty in executing such a plan. To this I make 
 two replies : I say, in the first place, that the dis- 
 tricting of States is not at all incompatible with this 
 plan of voting; it comports with it perfectly. You 
 
THE BOKOUGH SUPPLEMENT. 165 
 
 might have a plan of plural though not of single 
 districts. But there would be no difficulty if mem- 
 bers were elected by general ticket in the whole 
 State. Representation of different localities in the 
 State even could be easily secured. The reasons for 
 this opinion I have stated upon another occasion. 
 
 CHOICE OF MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE. 
 
 Again, the Senator seems to suppose that it would 
 be necessary, if this plan of voting were applied to 
 the choice of members of the Legislature, that the 
 State should be divided into four Senatorial districts 
 for the choice of Senators, and into four Representa- 
 tive districts for the choice of Representatives. 
 Well, sir, I never heard that suggested before. It 
 never occurred to me that such arrangement would 
 be selected if this plan were applied. The Senator 
 will find, by referring to the present constitution of 
 the State of Illinois, that it provides that each Sena- 
 torial District in that State shall select three Repre- 
 sentatives upon the plan of the free vote. The re- 
 sult is that in that State the Legislature will form 
 fifty-one Senatorial districts, and then their duty of 
 apportioning members of the Legislature will be 
 concluded. By the Constitution, while each Sena- 
 torial District chooses one member of the Senate, it 
 also chooses three members of the House, and each 
 voter may give his three votes to one, two or three 
 candidates for representative, so that the majority 
 will have two and the minority one. Probably, as 
 the result, the Democratic representation in Northern 
 Illinois will be largely increased, while in Southern 
 Illinois the Republican voters will be emancipated ; 
 
166 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 they will send their share of members to the Legis- 
 lature. That case illustrates the manner in which 
 a State may be districted, or in which representatives 
 to the Legislature may be chosen by districts under 
 this plan of voting. 
 
 If the Senator had referred to Mr. MedilPs 
 amendment, introduced into the convention of Il- 
 linois, with reference to the election of Senators, he 
 would have ascertained that a very convenient 
 method could have been applied to their election by 
 the free vote. The Senator's suggestion of this dif- 
 ficulty about districts reminds me of what occurred 
 in 1869. About the month of October, of that year, 
 I had occasion to address a gentleman in the State 
 of Illinois, and mentioned to him this subject of re- 
 formed voting as one that would possess interest for 
 their convention which was soon to meet. He an- 
 swered by saying that he did not see how they could 
 possibly apply such a plan to the election of mem- 
 bers of the Legislature. [Their Legislature was to 
 be composed of a large number of members ; as it 
 meets only every second year, they can very well 
 afford to have large numbers in each House ; there 
 are advantages, or supposed advantages, in large 
 numbers of members in legislative bodies.] He 
 did not see, he could not understand how a plan of 
 reformed voting could be applied to the choice of 
 fifty-one Senators, and to the choice of one hundred 
 and fifty-three Representatives. He was at that 
 time laboring under the same doubts which occurred 
 to the Senator from Greene [Mr. Purman]. Now, 
 sir, that same gentleman went down to the conven- 
 tion in Springfield shortly afterwards, and made a 
 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT. 167 
 
 motion to appoint a Committee on Electoral and 
 Representative Reform, of which he was made 
 Chairman ; and he was the leading man concerned 
 in putting into the constitution of the State the very 
 provision in reference to the choice of Representa- 
 tives to which I have referred, and also other im- 
 portant provisions applying the same plan to the 
 election of directors of incorporated companies, and 
 to the election of judges in the city of Chicago. 
 This supposed difficulty of districting a State for the 
 purpose of applying a reformed plan of voting in 
 Legislative elections is quite illusory. Districts to 
 which this plan shall be applicable are more easily 
 made than districts in ordinary apportionment laws, 
 and if we were compelled, under the constitution, to 
 so district our State that all the people should have 
 representation by this plan of voting, we would not 
 have as much difficulty as we have now under our 
 present system of gerrymandering and disfranchise- 
 ment. Let me say to the Senator that we get rid of 
 the great difficulty and evil of gerrymandering by the 
 free vote ; we cut it up by the roots, or, at least, we 
 reduce it to its smallest dimensions. 
 
 THE MAJORITY SHOULD RULE. 
 
 The Senator says the majority should rule. Well, 
 that is true. Mr. Jefferson said so — that absolute 
 acquiescence in the will of the majority, fairly pro- 
 nounced, was a vital principle of our system, or one, 
 at least, which must be applied and carried out con- 
 stantly, or our experiment of free government would 
 end in failure. To that I assent most fully. But 
 Mr. Mill long ago pointed out the fact that the 
 
168 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 majority vote, as heretofore existing in Great Brit- 
 ain and in the United States, does not secure the 
 will of the majority — that, in point of fact, the rule 
 which we get from it, as we apply it, is a rule of the 
 majority of the majority, or often of a small portion 
 only of the people. Id the first place, at the popu- 
 lar elections you count out all the minority voters ; 
 you count or allow only majority votes and put 
 aside the rest. A large part of the people, then, are 
 virtually disfranchised ; they have no further voice 
 in the government beyond the giving of fruitless 
 votes, which, after being scored down, are in effect 
 scored out again. Then the representatives so 
 chosen, meet in a legislative body, and when any 
 measure of policy is to be voted upon, the majority 
 rule is applied again, and the minority of the legisla- 
 tive body ignored ; so that the majority of the legisla- 
 tive body pronounces the rule of law for the citizen. 
 Besides, in practice in this country, legislative 
 majorities, upon all measures of a political charac- 
 ter at least, and many others, act under a system 
 of consultation — that is, under what we call the 
 caucus rule. The representatives of the majority 
 in the representative body meet together, and subject 
 their wills to the decision of a majority of them- 
 selves ; and that caucus decision, concocted and set- 
 tled in secret, becomes the law of the State. The 
 caucus is in the third degree removed from the peo- 
 ple, and there are three eliminations of popular 
 power before the law is enacted. Therefore I 
 say you do not necessarily secure the rule of the 
 majority under your majority vote, because the 
 majority of the legislative body, made up as I have 
 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT. 169 
 
 described it, and acting as it does, may very likely 
 represent only a minority of the people out of 
 doors, and such, in point of fact, is frequently 
 the case. 
 
 Under reformed voting what do you do ? You 
 do not destroy votes given at the popular elections ; 
 you count them all ; you take them and respect 
 them ; you consider them as sacred and inviolate 
 and give to them full and complete effect. And 
 what is the result ? Substantially that all the elect- 
 ors are represented and obtain due voice and influ- 
 ence in the enactment of the laws. Then, in the 
 legislative body you have all the people represented. 
 Each voter, except in rare cases, has his representa- 
 tive in place on whose attention he has a claim and 
 to whom he can speak as to a friend. There is 
 thorough representation ; all your people are heard. 
 How widely different is the case now ! and because 
 it is different this evil of local or j)rivate legislation 
 is beginning to be exclaimed against all over the 
 State ; and if you do not take steps to correct it, 
 there will be a movement of popular power that 
 will reach over you and beyond you, and through a 
 change of the fundamental law will effectuallv cor- 
 rect the evil. 
 
 The rule of the majority! I agree to the prin- 
 ciple ; we propose to apply it in this bill. We take 
 the vote in the legislative body, and there, the will 
 of the majority is appropriately pronounced, and it 
 can be properly pronounced nowhere else. It will 
 take effect with a sanction that it does not now pos- 
 sess, because when all the people have been heard 
 in the enactment of a law or regulation, they will 
 
170 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 very likely be satisfied with it ; and besides, there 
 will be greater security for the fairness and wisdom 
 of such law or regulation in the fuller consideration 
 to which it will be subjected. 
 
 BALANCE-OF-POWER PARTIES. 
 
 The Senator says that under this plan of voting 
 all the little side parties of the country would be 
 represented and heard. As it is now under the old 
 majority vote they are kept out of Congress, out of 
 Legislatures, and out of other positions in the Gov- 
 ernment. Because they are a small number in any 
 given constituency, you apply to them the maj dirty 
 vote, and you extinguish them or push them away 
 from the high places of power, and do not allow 
 their voices to be heard there. The Senator seems 
 to think that this is an advantage; he seems to 
 think it was proper in the case of the Abolitionists, 
 who were continually repressed by the control and 
 discipline of the old political parties, and were kept 
 down in that way. He might have extended his 
 remark to the South and have said that Union men 
 there were kept out of the local Legislatures and 
 kept out of Congress, by the discreet handling of 
 the majority vote in the hands of the extreme lead- 
 ers of the South. The minority elements in the 
 North and South were kept down by the majority 
 vote ; but, sir, you did not destroy the fire of sec- 
 tionalism by your repression ; it burned and glowed 
 underneath the hollow system of your majorit}^ 
 until it burst out into an uncontrollable flame in 
 which we were all involved. How would it have 
 been, if, instead of repressing them, you had allowed 
 
^ 
 
 THE BOKOUGH SUPPLEMEN' 
 
 them to be represented in proportion to 
 bers, and allowed everybody in the country to see 
 the growth of opinion, and your statesmen to pre- 
 pare securities against it? But you pushed that 
 danger out of sight as much as possible, and shut 
 your eyes to it as long as you could. Nevertheless 
 it was irrepressible ; in spite of your majority vote, 
 the war came and ran its terrific course for four years. 
 
 How is it ? Here you have a small body of men 
 in a State, whose single issue, whose single object is 
 very important to them, so that they will vote with 
 reference to it as the Abolitionists did. They make 
 their single issue superior to all others that engage 
 the public mind. After a time they get strength 
 enough to hold the balance of power between par- 
 ties, as the Abolitionists did in many States. When 
 they get to that stage of growth what do they do ? 
 They say to a political party, "do our work and we 
 will give you power; affiliate yourselves with us 
 and you shall triumph ; repel us, reject us, and you 
 go into a minority or remain in a minority in the 
 State ; your leading men will be struck down at all 
 elections." Why, in Massachusetts, the Democrats 
 allied themselves with the free soil element and 
 elected Charles Sumner to the Senate of the United 
 States ; that element held the balance of power, and 
 the Democracy were seduced into that act of folly. 
 
 The Whig party in State after State was seduced 
 into a similar kind of alliance subsequently, until it 
 became utterly debauched and eventually gave up 
 its own organization and took a creed in which this 
 balance-of-power party had its choice principles in- 
 serted, and thus the movement went forward until 
 
172 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 war came. I insist then, that the best thing you 
 can do in order to secure the peace of the country, 
 is to give all your citizens just representation in the 
 government. If I had time I would go on and 
 prove, as I think I could, that our late war would 
 never have occurred if there had been an honest, 
 fair, and wise system of electoral action in this 
 country — if all the people had been enabled to rep- 
 resent themselves thoroughly in government by 
 their own votes, after the fashion or upon the prin- 
 ciple of a free-handed and just exercise of their 
 electoral power. 
 
 CORRUPTION OF ELECTIONS. 
 
 There was one other point of objection mentioned 
 by the Senator from Greene [Mr. Purman] to which 
 I must refer. It was that in cases that might arise 
 under this bill, there would be greater opportunities 
 or facilities for corruption than under the old plan 
 of voting ; that a corrupt man or one desirous of 
 corrupting electors, when he purchased a voter, 
 would get his whole six votes instead of getting but 
 one vote, and that the tendency of this new plan 
 would be to increase corruption instead of diminish- 
 ing it. Let me answer this point by a few figures. 
 
 The town of Bloomsburg polled in 1868 six hun- 
 dred and forty-six votes for President, of which 
 Seymour had three hundred and twenty-nine, and 
 Grant three hundred and seventeen, being a Demo- 
 cratic majority of twelve votes. That town elects 
 six members of a town Council under the plan of 
 reformed voting. Upon the vote of 1868 three 
 Democratic town Councilmen would be elected. 
 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT. 173 
 
 each receiving six hundred and fifty-eight votes, 
 and three Republican Councilmen would be elected, 
 each receiving six hundred and thirty-four votes — 
 that is, each party can obtain three of the six as a 
 matter of course under this plan of voting, and 
 voting as the people do in that town, the political 
 candidates would have the respective numbers 
 which I have mentioned. Suppose a volunteer can- 
 didate desires to interrupt the regular course of an 
 election in that town, and proceeds to debauch voters 
 in order to appropriate their votes to himself. If 
 he takes his votes from the majority or the De- 
 mocracy of the town, he is required, in order to 
 succeed, to purchase eighty-three voters ; if from 
 the minority, he must obtain eighty ; if he obtain 
 his votes equally from both parties, it would be 
 necessary for him to get ninety-two voters ; if he is 
 to obtain his votes in that corrupt manner as against 
 the regular parties running a joint ticket, he must 
 obtain ninety-three voters. Now, observe two 
 things. In the first place, the supposed corruption 
 of the voters can only extend to the election of one 
 Councilman out of six. The man who buys these 
 voters can only affect the election to the extent of 
 one-sixth of the general result. Again, in no ordinary 
 case, and hardly in any case, can he be expected to 
 obtain so many voters by corrupt or improper means. 
 The number is too great to be seduced, particularly as 
 they are to be taken away from their party allegiance 
 and party associations. They must break over party 
 lines and desert party nominations in order to prosti- 
 tute themselves to the purpose of the volunteer. 
 When you come to look into this point you must per- 
 
174 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 eeive that the clanger of seduction is infinitely small 
 and worthy of but little consideration. What I have 
 always said and now say is, that reformed voting 
 reduces the evil of corruption at elections to its 
 minimum. Of course it will not take hold of 
 human nature and change it ; it will not reorganize 
 the hearts or intellects of the people. I assign to it 
 no such complete renovating power ; but what I do 
 insist upon is that it will reduce this evil of cornrpt- 
 ing voters to its lowest possible quantity, or to use 
 the scientific term, to its minimum. 
 
 Now take the old plan of voting in the same town 
 and with the same vote given to each party respect- 
 ively. Suppose this volunteer desires to defeat some 
 man nominated by the majority ; he has some pri- 
 vate job of his own ; he wants a street laid out 
 through his property or wants a street closed, or 
 water- works established ; he desires something done 
 that will promote his interests, and aims to defeat a 
 certain candidate to that end. What has he to do ? 
 Buy thirteen majority voters and it is done ! There 
 is a majority of twelve in this case — in the case 
 taken. He has only to corrupt thirteen men and 
 his object will be accomplished. Under the ma- 
 jority vote thirteen taken from the majority will 
 change the result of the election, and he may easily 
 draw off that small number as a volunteer. Suppose 
 again, that this man is a member of the minority in 
 the town, and he desires to be elected to the Council 
 for some selfish purpose ; he says to his party 
 friends, "nominate me and I will spend money 
 enough on this election to secure my success, and 
 not only my own but also the success of five other 
 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT. 175 
 
 candidates to be placed on our ticket, and we will 
 take away from the opposite party their whole rep- 
 resentation in the local legislature of the town." 
 His party friends assent ; the ticket of six is made 
 up as proposed, the proposer himself being one. 
 What has he to do under the majority vote in order 
 to elect himself and his colleagues? Buy seven 
 votes only ! The democratic majority in the town 
 is but twelve. Cannot seven or more loose voters 
 be found in any party out of a total of two or three 
 hundred ? He seduces seven voters, and he puts 
 himself into the council, with colleagues to assist him 
 in his ulterior designs. If they put the town in 
 debt, you cannot help it ; if they persecute their po- 
 litical enemies in the town, the injustice must be 
 borne ; a little money in the hands of a base man 
 has secured immunity to the evil. Such elections 
 as this are occurring continually throughout the 
 State in boroughs and other municipalities, under 
 the majority vote. Under the free vote in Blooms- 
 burg you must seduce eighty to a hundred men, in 
 order to affect the choice of councilmen to the extent 
 of one member in six ! Under the old plan seven 
 corrupted voters may change the whole election. 
 
 But there is an additional consideration. The 
 party assailed by the corrupt scheme just mentioned 
 come together and say, "Are we to be cheated? 
 No ! We have money also. We must ' fight fire 
 with fire.' ' And so both parties spend money on 
 the election. Year by year this evil goes on and 
 increases. Your political system is becoming cank- 
 ered at the very core, and gentlemen stand here 
 hesitating and doubting whether electoral reform is 
 
176 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 necessary, and whether a man who talks for it and 
 works for it is not a little visionary or at least some- 
 what ahead of the times. 
 
 There is another thing that is sometimes done. 
 Coalitions are common ; we have what are called 
 " Citizens'," " People's " or " Union " tickets set up. 
 They are very well in some cases, but are often set 
 up in the interest of some man, or of a few. A man 
 of the majority is offended at what his party has 
 done ; perhaps they have done him nothing but 
 sheer justice ; they have declined to put him into 
 office, and he has a dozen men subject to his in- 
 fluence, or he has money, and he goes to the oppo- 
 site party — the minority — and he says to them, 
 " Put me on your ticket, and I will elect it." Or 
 if he does not ask to be put upon the ticket himself, 
 he asks that some personal friend of his shall be put 
 on, and that j)ledges shall be given in favor of some- 
 thing he wants done. Then by turning over a small 
 number of voters from his own party to the other, 
 the coalition is made to succeed. 
 
 I insist, therefore, that these points of objection, 
 or of doubt rather, in reference to this new plan, do 
 not condemn it or render its adoption unwise or 
 improper. 
 
 REFORM IN NOMINATIONS. 
 
 [Mr. B. proceeded to speak upon the application of reformed 
 voting in the choice of delegates to nominating bodies, and 
 particularly to County Conventions, describing the various 
 plans upon which such bodies were chosen, and insisted that 
 the same remedy which would purify and improve the legal 
 elections should be extended to the voluntary or primary ones 
 also. He strongly condemned the Crawford County plan of 
 nomination, and expressed his preference for that recently 
 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT. 177 
 
 adopted in the County of Columbia, under which there was 
 representation of election districts in proportion to their party 
 vote, and complete freedom to the electors in casting their 
 votes for delegates. He concluded by stating that he regarded 
 the bill under consideration as a step in the course of reform — 
 as one well calculated to have a considerable effect in the im- 
 provement of municipal government and to familiarize the 
 people with a new but effectual and necessary plan for the 
 renovation of popular elections.] 
 
 CONCLUDING DEBATE. 
 
 In Senate, March 29, 1871. — Agreeably to order 
 the Senate resumed the third reading and considera- 
 tion of Senate bill entitled " An act for the further 
 regulations of boroughs." 
 
 Mr. Buckalew. Mr. Speaker, if any gentleman 
 desires to make remarks upon this bill I will give 
 place to him ; if not, I desire to say a few words and 
 then have the vote taken. I desire to explain that 
 this bill does not apply to any borough in the State 
 established by special law. It only applies to those 
 that have been or may be incorporated under the 
 act of 1851, or the prior act of 1834. Nor does it 
 apply in many cases where, by special legislation, 
 particular arrangements have been made in boroughs 
 for the selection of Councilmen. There are a large 
 number of laws which provide, for instance, that 
 where there are one, two, three or more wards, each 
 ward shall be entitled to elect a member of Council, 
 or more members than one, for one, two or three 
 year terms ; so that it often happens that only one 
 Councilman is voted for by the same body of elect- 
 ors. This bill does not disturb such arrangements 
 or affect the manner of voting in such cases. It 
 
 12 
 
178 PKOPOKTIONAL KEPRESENTATION. 
 
 applies only to those boroughs which exist under 
 general laws, and to those hereafter established or 
 brought under those laws. 
 
 I desire to add another explanation, and that is, 
 that this plan of voting is very different from that 
 proposed by Mr. Hare, in a work of some celebrity. 
 He proposes a plan of personal representation by 
 means of preferential voting, as it is called, and he 
 announces his leading object to be to emancipate 
 voters from the domination or control of party 
 organization ; to enable them to vote without refer- 
 ence to those associations heretofore known in Great 
 Britain and in this country as political parties. I 
 am' not for his plan ; and I desire it to be distinctly 
 understood that the free vote points to an object 
 quite different from his. This plan now before us, 
 assumes the existence in political society of political 
 parties, and it assumes that they will exist hereafter. 
 It is simply a proposition by which political parties 
 can represent themselves conveniently and justly by 
 their own votes. It does not strike at party organi- 
 zation. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I agree entirely with 
 the main portion of the argument submitted by 
 yourself [Mr. "Wallace] to the Senate the other 
 evening, in which it was insisted that political par- 
 ties were a necessity in free governments — at least 
 that they were inevitable wherever free play was 
 permitted to the political activity of the citizen. 
 This doctrine was laid down by Mr. Madison per- 
 haps as briefly and clearly as it ever was, in the 
 forty-ninth number of the Federalist, in which he 
 said that " an extinction of parties necessarily im- 
 plies either a universal alarm for the public safety, 
 
THE BOROUGH SUPPLEMENT. 179 
 
 or an absolute extinction of liberty." Now, sir, I 
 think that reformers who, in the present stage of 
 civilization, look to political arrangements independ- 
 ent of party organization, must necessarily be vis- 
 ionary and their schemes impracticable ; and I am 
 one of the last men who would assent to the adop- 
 tion of any new system based upon their ideas. I 
 take political parties as I find them ; I take political 
 society, divided fundamentally upon great govern- 
 ment issues, and I assume that so long as free play 
 is permitted to the human mind in political affairs 
 there will be parties, and government must be or- 
 ganized and administered with reference to them, 
 and that all attempts based upon an assumption that 
 it is possible to conduct public affairs without par- 
 ties, are idle and vain ; in fine, that all attempts based 
 on that idea must result in complete and disastrous 
 failure. No such object has been proposed by per- 
 sons in this country, or beyond the ocean, who have 
 supported this plan of the free vote or cumulative 
 voting. All they propose is to put into the hands 
 of political parties an instrument by which they 
 can act justly at elections, by which they can ob- 
 tain for themselves a fair share of power by their 
 own votes and by which it will be impossible for 
 them to take from their fellow-citizens any portion 
 of political power which belongs to them ; by which 
 the principle of gambling (as I call it) shall be ex- 
 tracted from elections, and by which the motive for 
 spending money in order to obtain the majority at 
 elections shall be taken away. 
 
 I think this explanation was due to the Senate, 
 and to those who pay attention to our debates, be- 
 
180 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 cause some distrust or question has been created in 
 the minds of gentlemen who imagine that the new 
 plan proposed here is identical with or similar in 
 principle to the reform proposed by Mr. Hare, which 
 is so complicated, and so far beyond the convenience 
 of political society that there is good reason for op- 
 position to it ; or at least for distrusting it as an ex- 
 pedient in the management of elections. 
 
 Mr. Speaker, I shall not pursue the discussion of 
 this subject any further, as it seems to be admitted 
 that this particular bill is but a reasonable experi- 
 ment — a reasonable experiment by which the merits 
 and true character of this plan of voting can be as- 
 certained and settled before the people. 
 
 [Note: Upon the conclusion of Mr. Buckalew's remarks, 
 Mr. White and Mr. Osterhout addressed the Senate in support 
 of the bill, which then passed the Senate without a call of the 
 yeas and nays. 
 
 Subsequently, upon its consideration in the House of Repre- 
 sentatives, the following letter in stroug indorsement of the 
 change proposed to be made by it in the manner of electing 
 Councilmen in boroughs, was presented by Mr. Strang, a lead- 
 ing member of the House, and read by the Clerk : 
 
 BL003ISBURG, May 8, 1871. 
 Hon. B. B. Strang : — Dear Sir : Observing that on your 
 motion the session of the House on Wednesday evening of this 
 week is to be devoted to the consideration of the Borough Sup- 
 plement bill, which among other useful changes provides for 
 the introduction to a certain extent of the free vote into bor- 
 ough elections, we are induced to address to you a few earnest 
 words recommendatory of the bill. In our judgment the pas- 
 sage of that bill will secure more of reform and improvement 
 in boroughs than any other measure which the Legislature can 
 enact, while it will familiarize the people with the new plan of 
 voting, which has been so successful and satisfactory in our re- 
 
THE BOEOUGH SUPPLEMENT. 181 
 
 cent Bloomsbarg elections. After having carefully observed 
 the working of the new plan when put into practical operation, 
 as it has been here at three elections, we are ready to approve 
 it and to declare our opinion that it possesses great merit. 
 It is readily comprehended by voters when they come to de- 
 posit ballots. It is of complete convenience in all cases, and it 
 is just in its operation, giving to every considerable interest 
 representation according to its relative strength. In addition 
 to these valuable qualities possessed by no other system ever 
 adopted in this State, the tendency of the new plan is to check, 
 if not wholly prevent, improper combinations and corrupt 
 practices at elections, and its certain effect must be to produce 
 reformed administration in municipal affairs. These, with 
 many other considerations which have, no doubt, suggested 
 themselves to your mind, induce us to hope that your efforts to 
 procure the passage of the bill through the House will be 
 crowned with success. 
 
 With great respect yours, &c, 
 
 William Elwell, 
 
 President Judge. 
 
 D. A. Beckley, 
 
 Editor Republican. 
 
 H. L. DlEFFENBACII, 
 
 Editor Columbian.'] 
 
LETTER TO SECRETARY JORDAN. 
 
 THE REPRESENTATION OF SUCCESSIVE MAJORITIES. 
 
 To Francis Jordan, Secretary of the Commonwealth of 
 Pennsylvania. 
 
 Sir : — In a letter of yours recently published you 
 enumerate the several subjects which will be proper 
 for consideration in the approaching Constitutional 
 Convention of this State, and among others " Minor- 
 ity Representation" as one. This term "Minority 
 Representation " is inaccurate and misleading as 
 applied to the several plans of electoral reform 
 which have been proposed in this country and 
 partially applied by statutory enactments in this and 
 in other States and notably by Constitutional amend- 
 ment in the State of Illinois. No one proposes the 
 representation of minorities by the limited, cumula- 
 tive, or free vote, or by list or preferential voting, 
 as those several plans have been explained, advo- 
 cated, and partially applied in Europe and in the 
 United States. They are all plans for the . repre- 
 sentation of successive majorities in plural elections, 
 and all of them are intended to apply the majority 
 principle of government more completely and justly 
 than ever before. Let us not be misled by words 
 ill understood, or perverted from their true signifi- 
 
 1S2 
 
THE JORDAN LETTER. 183 
 
 cation, nor by reasoning which while pertinent to 
 the election of a single person may be quite inap- 
 plicable to the election of several or many. 
 
 It is said, and the remark is quite true in a gene- 
 ral sense, that ours is a system of self-government, 
 but no plan of representation ever devised can make 
 it such completely and beyond the possibility of a 
 disfranchisement of some members of the electoral 
 population. We must content ourselves with an ap- 
 proach to a standard of absolute perfection, without 
 indulging hopes of ever reaching it by the utmost 
 exertion of our powers. But we must approach it 
 as nearly as we can, or we will be false to the prin- 
 ciples we profess and subject ourselves to just re- 
 proach from the friends of free government in all 
 lands. Our country is new and our experiment and 
 trial of free institutions is being made not only upon 
 a grand scale, but under conditions more favorable 
 for success than ever before existed in the whole 
 history of the human race. 
 
 The more complete representation of the people 
 in government is, simply stated, the object of those 
 who advocate electoral reform upon either of the 
 plans before mentioned ; but it'Ms an entire mistake 
 to assume that they intend to subordinate the greater 
 to the less in any of the arrangements they propose, 
 or to subvert or impair any principle heretofore 
 accepted as sound and just in republican govern- 
 ment. On the contrary, they adhere to the princi- 
 ple of majority government with admirable- fidelity 
 and give to it new, useful, and extended operation 
 and effect. They represent more persons — disfran- 
 chise fewer ones — and cut off the main source of 
 
184 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 electoral corruption, by carrying the majority prin- 
 ciple further than it has ever been carried and 
 placing a power for its effectual enforcement in the 
 hands of the people themselves. 
 
 The force of these general remarks will be best 
 exhibited by an illustration of the principle of ex- 
 tended representation to which they refer, and for 
 such illustration I will take the case of Blooms- 
 burg — my own town — where four elections have 
 been held under the plan of the free vote. The 
 town contains, say, 612 voters, 312 of whom are 
 Democrats and 300 Republicans. (These are not 
 far from the exact numbers as shown at recent 
 elections.) 
 
 A President of the town Council is to be elected 
 annually who is the principal executive officer of 
 the town as well as President of the Council. If 
 the 312 Democratic voters unite in support of a 
 candidate he will be elected, and properly elected, 
 upon the sound principle that a greater number 
 shall be preferred to a less in the assignment of 
 representation. A very few voters in this case turn 
 the scale, but the result is perfectly just. There is 
 but one majority to be considered and that in favor 
 of the successful candidate. 
 
 Next, two Assessors of taxes are to be elected an- 
 nually, and here the free vote comes into play and 
 secures their division between parties. Each voter 
 is permitted to give one vote to each of two candi- 
 dates, or two votes to one. Each party, of course, 
 will run but one candidate, because they can elect 
 no more, and the second majority in the town is rep- 
 resented as well as the first. The figures are as fol- 
 
THE JORDAN LETTER. 185 
 
 lows : Divide 612 (the whole vote) by 2, (the num- 
 ber of assessors,) and we obtain a ratio, or number 
 of voters for an assessor, of 306. Give the first 
 assessor to the first majority of 312 Democrats and 
 deduct the ratio ; we have then left, unrepresented, 
 but 6 Democrats to 300 Republicans, and the free 
 vote carries the second assessor to this second, or 
 Republican majority. How much better this is than 
 giving both the assessors to the first majority ! 
 Here but 6 voters are unrepresented instead of 300. 
 And in practical government a clear advantage is 
 gained ; for the possible spite, partiality or incom- 
 petency of one assessor is checked or corrected by 
 the other, and the chances of fair play in the valua- 
 tions of property in the town are increased. 
 
 A similar and salutary division of officers takes 
 place annually in the choice of two school directors 
 and two constables, and triennially in the choice of 
 two assistant assessors. 
 
 But in the election of three persons the improve- 
 ment introduced by the new plan is still more evi- 
 dent than in the case of two. The numbers will 
 run : Ratio, 204 ; first Dem. majority 312 ; second 
 Rep. maj. 300; third Dem. maj. 108, and the gene- 
 ral result will stand 2 to 1 in favor of the party 
 having the preponderance upon the total vote. The 
 disfranchisement of Republican voters will be re- 
 duced from 300 to 96, and this by simply permit- 
 ting each voter to cast his three votes for one, two 
 or three candidates as he shall think fit. In Blooms- 
 burg three town Auditors are elected together every 
 third year. 
 
 Take next the case of the annual election of six 
 
186 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 Councilmen. The ratio for a Councilman will be 
 102 and the five successive majorities after the first 
 will all be represented by the free vote. Although 
 no calculation of them will be made at the election 
 such will be the inevitable result ; for as each voter 
 may bestow his six votes upon any number of can- 
 didates less than six, each party will run but three, 
 all of whom will be elected and but six voters in 
 the whole population will be unrepresented instead 
 of 300. Here we have a very nearly complete rep- 
 resentation of all the voters of the town by follow- 
 ing the majority principle at each successive stage 
 of the distribution. 
 
 The exclusive representation of first majorities at 
 plural elections is a stupid misapplication of a just 
 principle — a crude, unjust and pernicious rule, the 
 inevitable effect of which, if continued, will be 
 the destruction of republican government. For it 
 produces violent struggles between parties and can- 
 didates for a preponderance of vote, with constantly 
 increasing corruption at elections and demoralization 
 of the people. These evils cannot be cured or cor- 
 rected by mere preachment while their cause is left 
 in full operation. We must take away or greatly 
 reduce the motive for corrupting voters in order to 
 introduce reform which shall be effectual and last- 
 ing, and this will be accomplished when w r e provide 
 that all interests in political society, of any con- 
 siderable magnitude, may represent themselves in 
 government by their own votes and in proportion to 
 their numbers, without resort to corruption or other 
 means of undue influence. 
 
 Nov. 30, 1871. 
 
THE CHOICE 
 
 OF 
 
 Presidential Electors 
 
 A SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED 
 STATES, FEBRUARY 17, 1869.* 
 
 [In Senate, January 28, 1869, Mr. Buekalew, by unanimous 
 consent, introduced a Joint Resolution (Sen. Res. No. 209) 
 proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United 
 States in relation to the manner of choosing electors of Presi- 
 dent and Vice-President of the United States, which on his 
 motion was referred to the select Committee on Representative 
 Reform. On the following day Mr. Morton reported the Joint 
 Resolution without amendment, stating that the report of the 
 Committee in its favor was unanimous. {Globe, 674-704.) 
 That Resolution will be found at length in this volume, ante, 
 page 104, in the general report of the Committee on Represen- 
 tative Reform as made to the Senate on the second of March 
 following. February 9, House Joint Resolution No. 402, 
 proposing the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
 United States in relation to colored suffrage being under con- 
 sideration in the Senate in Committee of the Whole, Mr. 
 Morton moved to amend by adding the above amendment, re- 
 ported by him as an additional amendment to the Constitution 
 to be numbered xvi. His motion was lost, yeas 27, nays 29. 
 Afterward, however, the same day, the House Resolution 
 having been reported to the Senate and being under further 
 consideration, he renewed his amendment and it was carried 
 after debate by a vote of 37 to 19. A motion to reconsider it 
 
 * Congressional Globe, 3d Sess. 40th Cong., 1287. 
 
 187 
 
188 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 was lost, and the Joint Resolution was returned to the House 
 with that and other amendments. (Gkfoe, pp. 1041 to 1044.) 
 Subsequently, on the 17th February, the House having non- 
 concurred in the Senate Amendments, those amendments 
 underwent further consideration and debate, when the follow- 
 ing speech was delivered by Mr. Buckalew against receding 
 from the Morton amendment ] 
 
 Mr. Buckalew. The Senator from Massachu- 
 setts [Mr. Sumner] on a former occasion pro- 
 nounced a strong denunciation of electoral colleges 
 for the choice of President and Vice President of 
 the United States. In that he uttered the voice of 
 public opinion everywhere, long formed, about 
 which there is no dispute. These colleges are badly 
 constituted ; they do not operate w T ell nor to accom- 
 plish the purpose of their original institution. 
 With reference to all that I think there is a general 
 agreement. But the Senator went on to make an- 
 other remark, and that was that he preferred a di- 
 rect vote by the people of the United States for 
 candidates for these great offices of President and 
 Vice President. 
 
 Sir, he followed the lead of great men in express- 
 ing that opinion or desire. President Jackson made 
 a recommendation of a change of the Constitution 
 to secure such a popular vote, I think, in six annual 
 messages. It was a favorite question of reform with 
 the late Senator Benton. I believe you, sir, [Mr. 
 Wade,] also a few years ago introduced the question 
 in the Senate, and had a formal proposition for 
 amending the Constitution of the United States con- 
 sidered here. 
 
 Now, Mr. President, theoretically it is understood 
 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. 189 
 
 through the country that the people do choose their 
 President themselves, that they vote for him, and 
 the machinery of the Electoral College is looked 
 upon as surplusage, unnecessary — as the Senator 
 from Massachusetts expresses it, "a sham." It is 
 thought to be a thing superfluous, a piece of machin- 
 ery established by the Constitution which the people 
 have outgrown ; that it is in point of fact obsolete, 
 and that the people themselves do, after a fashion, 
 vote for the candidates for President and Vice 
 President of the United States. 
 
 Sir, this is a very incorrect opinion. The people 
 do not vote for President and Vice President of the 
 United States, and the votes they cast for electors to 
 perform that function to cast actual votes for the 
 election of President and Vice President do not ac- 
 complish necessarily the object for which they are 
 given. I showed some days since, when this sub- 
 ject was before the Senate, some startling statistics 
 to prove this. Among other facts then shown were 
 the facts that in 1860 it required 114,596 popular 
 votes to obtain an elector for Mr. Douglas, who was 
 one of the candidates for President, while it required 
 only 15,144 to obtain an elector for Mr. Bell, one 
 of the other candidates. The figures also show that 
 Mr. Douglas, who was the second candidate before 
 the people, who received 1,375,157 votes, was the 
 lowest of all the four candidates in the electoral 
 colleges, so that if there had been a slight disturb- 
 ance of the actual vote as it was given in a few 
 States, by which the election would have been sent 
 to the House of Representatives — it came nearly 
 going there anyhow — Mr. Douglas, the second can- 
 
190 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 didate before the people in the number of votes 
 polled, would have been ruled out of the House al- 
 together, and the choice of that House would have 
 been between Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Breckinridge, and 
 Mr. Bell ; Breckinridge receiving 847,953 popular 
 votes, (independent of South Carolina,) Bell 
 590,631, and Douglas 1,375,157. What would 
 have been the result ? Why, sir, that House would 
 have chosen — 
 
 Mr. Wilson. Will the Senator explain how it 
 would be that Mr. Douglas would have been ruled 
 out ? The Constitution, if I understand it, requires 
 the House to choose from the four highest candi- 
 dates. 
 
 Mr. Buckalew. The three highest candidates. 
 
 Mr. Wilson. Four. 
 
 Mr. Buckalew. Three. So, in 1824, Mr. Clay 
 was ruled out of the House because Jackson, Adams, 
 and Crawford were above him ; he was the fourth 
 man. Infallibly that House in 1860, if by a mere 
 accident there had been a few votes changed in a 
 few States, would have made John Bell or John C. 
 Breckinridge President of the United States. They 
 could not have elected Mr. Douglas if they had 
 desired. 
 
 Mr. Edmunds. Will the Senator permit me to 
 ask him, for information, a question ? 
 
 Mr. Buckalew. If it relates to this precise 
 point. 
 
 Mr. Edmunds. I should like to have him ex- 
 plain how that happened — whether it was in con- 
 nection with the fact that in the slave States a much 
 fewer number of votes, on account of the slaves being 
 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. 191 
 
 represented in the result, accomplished the election 
 of an elector, and whether, therefore, Bell and 
 Breckinridge, carrying more of the slave States than 
 Douglas got votes in the Northern States, did not 
 come in on that theory ? 
 
 Mr. Buckalew. Undoubtedly that affected the 
 question to a certain extent, but it does not account 
 for the great part of the discrepancy. 
 
 Mr. Edmunds. It accounts for just what would 
 make the difference. 
 
 Mr. Buckalew. Just for the difference it caused ; 
 and I will say to the Senator that it is not a very 
 considerable element in the calculation, although it 
 is a just one to be considered. And it did not affect 
 the vote between Lincoln and Douglas. 
 
 How did the electoral vote run in 1864 ? The 
 result was right that year ; the voice of the people 
 was executed, but not by any necessary operation 
 of our system. Mr. Lincoln's electors were chosen 
 of a ratio of 10,292 ; those of McClellan by a ratio 
 of 86,274. I repeat, the result was right, but that 
 was not the merit of the system, it was a mere acci- 
 dent. So in 1824, when Jackson had one-half more 
 votes than Mr. Adams from the people. The re- 
 turn does not show his full popular vote, because 
 South Carolina chose by her Legislature. He had 
 one-half more than Mr. Adams ; he had more than 
 Mr. Adams and Mr. Crawford combined before the 
 people ; and what was the result ? Why, sir, he was 
 left in a large minority in the electoral colleges. 
 Adams and Crawford together obtained 26 more 
 electors than belonged to them, changing the result 
 bv 52 electoral votes. The election was thrown into 
 
192 PKOPOKTIONAL KEPKESENTATION. 
 
 the House of Representatives, and there a great 
 mistake was made, an affront was given to the 
 American people — or at least they accepted it as 
 such — and it had an effect to a large extent upon 
 subsequent elections. 
 
 I will not dwell upon this point further than 
 simply to refer to the numbers at two other elections. 
 Take the election of 1832. The Jackson electors 
 had a ratio of 3139; the Clay electors 11,228. In 
 1852 the Pierce electors had a ratio of 6242 ; the 
 Scott electors of 32,846. In 1824 the plurality 
 candidate for President was beaten because of the 
 machinery of the electoral colleges. In 1860, that 
 great election which touched the depths of the 
 popular heart throughout the country, the candi- 
 date second in the choice and hearts of the Ameri- 
 can people by the machinery of the electoral col- 
 leges had no possibility of ever entering the House 
 of Eepresentatives as a competitor for the result. It 
 required one hundred and fourteen thousand Ameri- 
 can freemen to give him one vote in the electoral 
 colleges, when twelve thousand could give Breckin- 
 ridge one vote ; and if you made all allowance for 
 the counting of the three-fifths of slaves in the South, 
 it would not have disturbed the ratio more than a 
 few thousands. 
 
 You see, sir, that this old machinery, then, is not 
 a mere sham ; it is an instrument of injustice, and, 
 I will add, of peril also to the future of this coun- 
 try. Any time at the next presidential election, in 
 1872, or at any other future election, a large ma- 
 jority of the American people may vote without 
 avail and without result for their choice for the 
 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. 193 
 
 office of President; and a minority man, a man 
 largely in the minority before the people, may ob- 
 tain a majority of presidential electors. It depends 
 upon the accident of how majorities happen to run 
 in particular States. 
 
 Mr. President, during three years that I resided 
 in one of the Spanish American republics there 
 were revolutions in thirteen out of fourteen of 
 those republics.. Those republics are scourged and 
 desolated by revolutions, beginning with Mexico 
 and going south to the Argentine Confederation 
 and to Chili. What produces these revolutions or- 
 dinarily? A disputed presidential election. That 
 is the cause three times out of four, and has been 
 ever since 1825, when those republics began to take 
 their present organizations. Three times out of 
 four, and perhaps oftener, a dispute about a presi- 
 dential election causes revolt and civil war, and 
 desolates all those portions of the New World. 
 
 Mr. President, the very point upon which I am 
 now speaking is a tender and delicate point of our 
 Constitution, and it has contained in it perhaps 
 more danger to our country than all other political 
 causes combined. You have ho mode of deciding a 
 contested election of President and Vice-President, 
 no machinery provided, no clear grant of power in 
 your Constitution. It is not even positively certain 
 how you shall count electoral votes in case of dis- 
 pute. A surging and rampant House of Represent- 
 atives turns itself into a mob even now when your 
 Constitution is about being executed by the presid- 
 ing officer of the Senate, and it requires days of 
 heat — I had almost said of indecorous debate — in 
 
 13 
 
194 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 that House to compose the waves of passion which 
 are roused upon a mere technicality, with no actual 
 change of the result of the election depending upon 
 the decision. 
 
 It is the point of danger in our political institu- 
 tions, this point of presidential elections. Will you 
 wait until the danger is upon you ; will you wait 
 until civil war is again let loose ; will you continue 
 the old and defective machinery, always unjust, 
 always full of peril and danger, until the crisis 
 shall come? Slavery is gone — the great question 
 which divided our communities of the North and 
 South. It is buried in the tomb of the past; no 
 voice will be sufficiently loud or powerful in all the 
 centuries of the future to wake it or to speak it 
 again into life. It will no more return to vex the 
 councils of this Government or to inflame the hearts 
 of our people ; no blood will be shed to settle the 
 great issues which it raises and which it inflames. 
 But here in the very heart of your Constitution is a 
 defective and weak point. I call your attention to 
 it. I ask you to consider it, and now, in the days of 
 quiet and of peace, before trouble has come, fortify 
 yourselves against future danger; take hold upon 
 these electoral colleges, which are not merely shams, 
 as the Senator from Massachusetts says, but boxes 
 of Pandora from which may issue demons of dis- 
 cord and violence to trouble and scourge your 
 country and your people in future years. Give the 
 opportunity to men of statesmanship and of wisdom 
 to reform these colleges by regulating the manner in 
 which the electors shall be chosen. That is one 
 proposition contained in the Senate amendment 
 
CHOICE OF PEESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. 195 
 
 which went to the House, which that House will 
 adopt if you insist upon it. 
 
 Mr. President, why is it that the recommenda- 
 tions of President Jackson were unheeded, and that 
 other men having the ear of Congress and having 
 the ear of the country since have been unable to 
 secure the adoption of a proposition for the amend- 
 ment of our Constitution to dispense with our elec- 
 toral colleges ? Why is it ? Why cannot you sub- 
 mit at once a proposition that the people shall vote 
 directly for President and Vice-President and ex- 
 pect its adoption ? It is my business to answer that, 
 and I have a complete and satisfactory answer. 
 
 Under the scheme of electoral colleges each State 
 has two senatorial electors, as they are called — that 
 is, has two electors as a State ; and then it has an ad- 
 ditional number equal to the number of Represent- 
 atives from the State. When you provide that the 
 people shall vote directly for President and Vice 
 President you virtually strike off from each of the 
 States the equal power which they now have in 
 choosing senatorial electors. You give to each State, 
 then, in point of fact, in substance, a power propor- 
 tioned to the number of Representatives which they 
 select to the lower House of Congress. What is the 
 effect ? Why, that Rhode Island and other of the 
 small States lose a large portion of their political 
 power in the presidential election. Draw an amend- 
 ment and send it down to the States to-morrow pro- 
 posing this change, and how would it present itself 
 to their reflections ? Here are Delaware, Florida, 
 Kansas, Nevada, Nebraska, and Oregon, six States 
 with three electors each, two senatorial and one rep- 
 
196 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 resentative. Your amendment would mean that 
 each of these States should give up two-thirds of its 
 political power in the election of President and Vice 
 President. Instead of having three electors as at 
 present to count in an electoral college, they would 
 have a popular vote, equivalent to only one to count 
 upon the general result. Then take the States 
 which elect two members, Ehode Island and Min- 
 nesota. Each of these has four electors, and under 
 the amendment suggested they would have what 
 would be equal to two ; they would lose one-half of 
 their power. The State selecting three Represent- 
 atives and having five electors are New Hampshire, 
 Vermont, California, and West Virginia. They 
 would lose two-fifths of their political power in a 
 presidential election. Connecticut, South Carolina, 
 and Texas each elect four Representatives and have 
 six electors. They would lose one-third of their 
 power. Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, 
 and New Jersey would lose two-sevenths. Alabama, 
 Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin would lose one- 
 fourth, as they are now entitled to eight electors 
 each. 
 
 Here are twenty-four States which would each 
 lose one-fourth of their political power or more up 
 to two-thirds by adopting such an amendment to the 
 Constitution. Twenty-four States out of thirty-seven 
 interested by that large percentage of power against 
 the adoption of such a change to the Constitution ! 
 Ten States can defeat an amendment when all the 
 States are counted. These figures are exactly ac- 
 curate, except we are to take into account that the 
 large States would lose their senatorial electors, al- 
 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. 197 
 
 though the percentage of loss to them would be very 
 small ; it would affect the result only to a very small 
 extent. That is, the loss of power to the States I 
 have enumerated would not be quite as large as 
 these figures make it, although it would be nearly 
 that. If, then, you have twenty-four out of the 
 thirty-seven States largely interested in rejecting 
 such an amendment to the Constitution, nobody can 
 doubt that, instead of such an amendment receiving 
 the three-fourths vote of the States necessary to its 
 ratification, it would be rejected by a majority of the 
 whole number, and that whenever submitted. In 
 other words, it is impossible to procure an amend- 
 ment to the Constitution of the United States by 
 which the people of our country shall vote directly 
 for President and Vice President. It is against the 
 interests of too many States, it is against the inter- 
 est of too many State interests, to permit it to take 
 place at all, and therefore it will never be accom- 
 plished. 
 
 This reform, then, of a direct choice by the people 
 being out of the question, what can be done ? Why, 
 sir, you can do what this amendment proposes : you 
 can give to Congress the power to prescribe the man- 
 ner in which electors shall be chosen, and thus you 
 can introduce reform, and in no other way whatever. 
 At present the power to prescribe the manner in 
 which electors shall be chosen rests with the Legis- 
 latures of the several States. In former times in 
 South Carolina the Legislature prescribed that they 
 themselves should choose electors, and that arrange- 
 ment continued until recently. The new Constitu- 
 tion of South Carolina, formed under the recon- 
 
198 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 struction laws, provides that the people shall select 
 them by popular vote. That provision in that Con- 
 stitution is a nullity undoubtedly. It is impossible 
 for South Carolina by an amendment of her Con- 
 stitution to take away from her Legislature a power 
 imposed upon it by the Constitution of the United 
 States. The provision therefore is a mere nullity. 
 The Legislature of South Carolina w T ill be at any 
 time competent to resume her former practice of 
 choosing electors of President and Vice President. 
 The Legislature of Alabama recently proposed to 
 take this power into its own hands, and it was only 
 checked by an executive veto. Hereafter this mode 
 of choosing electors may be resorted to by Legisla- 
 tures of other States, and thus great trouble and 
 difficulty may be introduced. It is a thing which 
 ought not to be permitted. Now, Mr. President, in 
 point of fact, if the Legislatures of the States do not 
 assume to themselves the power to choose electors, 
 they cannot reform the present system of choosing 
 by general ticket, and that will be seen in a moment 
 by any one who will bestow due reflection upon this 
 subject. In all the States, Florida alone excepted, 
 and perhaps Louisiana also, electors are chosen by 
 general ticket — that is, each voter of the State votes 
 for as many electors as the State is entitled to in her 
 electoral college, and the majority obtain the whole 
 number for that State. 
 
 It is impossible to change this system as the 
 power is now located ; and why ? Take the case of 
 the State of New York ; you propose in the State 
 of New York that electors shall be chosen by single 
 districts or according to some other plan of reform, 
 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. 199 
 
 and what will be the answer? " Why,wecannot afford 
 to do that in this State ; we shall only break up our 
 own political power ; our party will lose nearly one- 
 half its strength in this State; therefore we cannot 
 afford to do it, and will not do it. Besides that, if 
 we were inclined to do it, we could not, because 
 other States not doing the same thing we should 
 lose a portion of our political strength in this State, 
 while the opposite party to us in another State 
 electing by general ticket would hold the whole of 
 its power, and thus we should inflict injury on our- 
 selves as a political organization without any com- 
 pensation whatever." 
 
 The political majority in any Legislature any- 
 where in the United States would say this to itself 
 and to you if you proposed to it any reform what- 
 ever in the mode of choosing presidential electors. 
 They would give the conclusive answer, " We can- 
 not afford to do it and weaken our own power ; we 
 cannot control other States ; and as long as they do 
 not adopt the same mode of choosing electors you 
 simply ask us to make a sacrifice ; we cannot do it, 
 and we will not do it." The result is that although 
 the old general ticket system for choosing repre- 
 sentatives was changed twenty or thirty years ago 
 because it was intolerable, the choice of presidential 
 electors is still according to the old plan, because 
 there is no power here in Congress to amend it. 
 The power which does exist in the State Legislatures 
 cannot be exercised, and I venture to say it never 
 will be. Therefore you have fixed in the Consti- 
 tution the electoral colleges, an institution which 
 three-fourths of the States will not change, which 
 
200 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 is imbedded in the Constitution firmly, and then 
 you have a system of election by general ticket of 
 the members of those colleges in the respective 
 States which cannot be changed and will not 
 be changed by the Legislatures, who have theo- 
 retically the power to do it. There will be no 
 change, and what is the result? Here I come to 
 the point which touches us to the quick ; which 
 should make our blood bound through our veins 
 when we think of it. By general ticket your presi- 
 dential election is poised upon the vote of two or 
 three of the larger States, Pennsylvania particu- 
 larly : and the year of a presidential election into 
 those States are poured all the corrupt influences 
 which elections can invite. We are deluged with 
 evils because oar large States have an unjust or 
 badly-arranged power in the electoral colleges. 
 Money is poured into our States in a profuse stream 
 to corrupt and to degrade the elections held among 
 our people. It was because the voice of Pennsyl- 
 vania, under an electoral college system, was likely 
 to rule or influence the result throughout the 
 country that half a million of dollars perhaps were 
 poured out in that State in 1868. 
 
 On behalf of my people ; on behalf of our 
 republican institutions put in peril; on behalf of 
 justice and honesty in elections ; on behalf of the 
 American people, whose voices ought to be heard 
 and counted fairly, I appeal to you to support this 
 amendment, which will permit reform and will 
 secure it. The road of reform is now closed up. 
 The patriot and the honest man must now work and 
 labor in vain. They can do nothing. Here is the 
 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. 201 
 
 golden opportunity. An amendment relating to 
 suffrage is sent here from the House respecting the 
 persons who shall vote in the United States, and 
 here is an amendment proposing that the people 
 shall have secured to themselves the right of choos- 
 ing presidential electors ; that it shall not be taken 
 or snatched from them by intrigue or corruption 
 in the Legislatures ; that their honest voices shall 
 always be heard in the choice of electors ; and next, 
 that reform in the manner in which elections shall 
 be held may be introduced by the Congress of the 
 United States upon due cause shown. Congress 
 can introduce reform, and will do it. It did intro- 
 duce reform in electing Representatives to the low T er 
 House. It ordered the States to break themselves 
 up into single districts ; and when New Hampshire 
 and one or two other States resisted enforced its 
 will, because it spoke by virtue of the power of this 
 Federal Constitution of ours. Give to Congress 
 identically the same power over the choice of presi- 
 dential electors ; say, as this amendment says, that 
 Congress may prescribe the manner in which they 
 shall be chosen. Congress is not obliged to do it ; it 
 only permits it ; and by a simple statute here you can 
 divide the States, or order the Legislatures to divide 
 the States, into single districts for choosing presiden- 
 tial electors, or you can provide what far-sighted and 
 just men now contemplate, and which eventually 
 all will seize upon as a measure of more complete 
 and perfect justice, that the people in each State, 
 according to their party divisions, may so vote that 
 each shall get a due share of powder in the electo- 
 ral college, by simply voting for the number of 
 
202 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 men for which they have an adequate number of 
 votes ; that in my State, with six hundred thousand 
 voters, each party holding three hundred thousand 
 of them, each or either may vote for twelve instead 
 of twenty-four electors, and by uniting their vote 
 upon that smaller number elect them. This is what 
 I hope may eventually be reached. But nothing is 
 commanded ; the future is left open ; and the men 
 who represent the people of the United States, and 
 who represent the States of this Union here assem- 
 bled in council in these two Houses, may reach out 
 their hands to this system of election and reform it 
 so as to secure popular rights, so as to secure honest 
 elections and a just voice and expression by the 
 American people in these great elections of Presi- 
 dent ; and thus you will have a guarantee of ines- 
 timable value against future disturbance, difficulty, 
 and possibly revolution and war in this country 
 from a disputed presidential election. Justice and 
 public safety appeal to you, 
 
 Is there any objection to this? None at all, ex- 
 cept a mere prejudice. Some men say, " Why, you 
 are giving more power to Congress ; you are taking 
 power away from the States; you are increasing 
 Federal power, and the tendency of this measure is 
 toward consolidation." Now, sir, of all the people 
 in the world with whom I have least patience, give 
 me the man of stupidity ; the man who is fighting 
 against his own purpose and object without knowing 
 it ; the man who with good and sincere motives is 
 doing bad and evil work and does not know it. 
 Those people who are shouting State rights and 
 State privilege and State immunity and authority, 
 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. 203 
 
 and doing the work of mischief at the same time, are 
 persons with whom we should have least patience ; 
 perhaps no patience at all. 
 
 The choice of presidential electors is properly a 
 Federal question, rather than a State question. It 
 relates to this Government, and not to the govern- 
 ment of the States. It will therefore be properly 
 lodged in this Government, because it belongs and 
 pertains to it legitimately. In the next place, as I 
 have already shown to you, the location of this 
 power in Congress is a necessity. Located as it is 
 now it will never be exercised ; you can introduce 
 no reform. Being, therefore, Federal in its nature, 
 being necessary to the introducing of any reform 
 in the regulation of the choice of presidential elect- 
 ors, it should be located in the two Houses of Con- 
 gress, where, if it should at any time be exercised 
 improperly, you can introduce change and amend- 
 ments afterward. 
 
 Mr. President, I will read one single passage from 
 one of the best printed and best edited newspapers 
 in the United States, although my opinions are as 
 wide from it as the poles are asunder. In speaking 
 of this proposed amendment it says : 
 
 " It will prevent the entire vote of such a State as New York, 
 for instance, being cast for a particular candidate through the 
 rascality of its chief city." 
 
 I am not indorsing that statement. I am reading 
 what this paper says : 
 
 " It will give more nearly than now the sense of the people 
 for President in the electoral colleges, because each district will 
 have its own representative. If anything was to be done at all 
 with the electoral vote, we should prefer to have had the col- 
 
204 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 leges abolished, that the untrammeled will of the people should 
 be expressed directly upon the question of the fitness of the 
 candidate for President." 
 
 I have already spoken to that point and shown 
 that it is impracticable. This article concludes by- 
 saying : 
 
 "However, this question will not embarrass the suffrage 
 proposition, as the two articles are to be voted on separately." 
 
 Mr. Edmunds. What paper is that ? 
 
 Mr. Buckalew. The Boston Commonwealth. 
 
 From what I have said, Mr. President, it will be 
 discovered that I have very strong opinions, possibly 
 strong feelings also, in favor of this proposition for 
 amending the Constitution of the United States in 
 regard to the choice of presidential electors. I have 
 imperfectly, and without much preparation, stated 
 to the Senate a few of the leading considerations 
 which, in my judgment, demand this reform. It is 
 now within our reach. We can seize upon it ; we 
 can secure it ; we can appropriate it, not to ourselves 
 only, but to the whole American people, and all 
 this can be done without embarrassment in regard 
 to the other proposition of amendment of suffrage. 
 It is distinct in its nature and it is to be submitted 
 distinctly for the action of the several States. One 
 proposition can be acted upon without embarrassing 
 the other in any way whatever. We have now a 
 golden opportunity for presenting this proposition, 
 and presenting it in connection with an amendment 
 which invites it, because it is an amendment for the 
 extension of suffrage, while this is for the regulation 
 of suffrage. 
 
CHOICE OF PEESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. 205 
 
 One point more, sir, and I will leave the subject. 
 Can anything be more evident than that now, when 
 we are extending suffrage in the United States, and 
 extending it largely, extending it as it was not con- 
 templated it ever could be extended until within a 
 few years past, it becomes us to improve our 
 machinery, to improve our constitutional arrange- 
 ments by which suffrage is to be worked in future ? 
 In calling upon the people of the United States to 
 adopt an amendment which shall make this exten- 
 sion, which shall allow the casting into the ballot- 
 boxes, North, South, and West, of hundreds of 
 thousands of votes from a new and hitherto disfran- 
 chised class, will you not present to them some 
 proposition of reform with regard to the manner in 
 which this suffrage shall be exercised, so that it shall 
 have just operation and fair effect, so that the cor- 
 ruption of a few votes in a State shall not turn the 
 whole scale and change elections ? In my judgment, 
 therefore, in addition to all the other considerations, 
 this proposition is most timely. It never could have 
 been presented at a juncture when in poin^ of time 
 it was more appropriate and more deserving of 
 adoption by Congress and by the American people. 
 
 [Eventually the Senate, with some reluctance, receded from 
 its amendments by a vote of 33 to 24, Mr. Morton accom- 
 panying his concession to the House with the declaration that 
 his amendment could not at that time receive due considera- 
 tion in the House, but that it was not of a party character, and 
 he believed it would be submitted and adopted at a future 
 time. It commended itself to the good judgment of the 
 American people, and he believed that hereafter men of all 
 parties would support it. (Globe, 1295.) 
 
 On a prior occasion, on the 9 th of February, when the Mor- 
 
206 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 ton Amendment was under consideration in the Senate, Mr. 
 Buckalew submitted some statistics of Presidential elections, 
 the republication of which, in connection with the foregoing 
 speech, appears necessary or proper to a full view of the im- 
 portant question discussed. We quote below a liberal extract 
 from his remarks as contained in the Globe, p. 1043.] 
 
 UNEQUAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE IN 
 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. 
 
 Iii the Presidential election of 1824, between 
 Jackson and Adams, Jackson, with, a popular vote 
 one-half greater than Adams, received fourteen 
 electoral votes less than his due share, making a 
 difference or change of twenty-eight in the electoral 
 colleges between them. He received more votes 
 from the people than Adams and Crawford com- 
 bined, and yet they outnumbered him twenty-six 
 in electoral votes. 
 
 In the Presidential election of 1828 the Jackson 
 electors were chosen by an average of 3652 votes 
 each, and the Adams electors by 6170 votes. 
 
 In 1832 the result was : 
 
 Popular voto. Electors. Ratio. 
 
 Jackson 687.502 219 3,139 
 
 Clay 550,189 49 11,228 
 
 Wirt 7 
 
 Floyd 11 
 
 The total popular vote of Jackson and Clay was 
 1,237,691, and their electoral votes combined 268. 
 A common ratio for them therefore was 4618, from 
 which it results that Clay should have had 119 and 
 Jackson 149 electoral votes. Clay lost 70 electors, 
 making a change of 140 in the result as between 
 them. Jackson should have had 30 electoral ma- 
 jority, but he had 170, or more than five times his 
 true majority. 
 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. 207 
 
 I will now cite more recent cases. 
 
 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1852. 
 
 Popular vote. Electors. Ratios. 
 
 Pierce 1,585,545 254 6,242 
 
 Scott 1,383,537 42 32,846 
 
 Hale 157.296 
 
 3,126,378 296 
 
 Six thousand Pierce voters obtained an elector, 
 while 32,000 were required for a Scott elector! 
 Now, dividing the whole popular vote by the whole 
 number of electors we obtain the average or com- 
 mon ratio of votes to each elector of 10,562. If 
 electors then had been obtained by the several can- 
 didates in proportion to the reported popular vote 
 for each, the result would have been : Pierce 150 ; 
 Scott 131 ; and Hale 15. By the defective plan 
 upon which electors were chosen, it appears then 
 that Pierce had 104 more electoral votes than his 
 due share, that Scott had 89 less than his share, 
 and that Hale was deprived entirely of electors. 
 And it is to be remembered that the 104 electoral 
 votes to Pierce in excess of his due share really 
 count 208 upon the result in the electoral colleges, 
 because they are deducted from the other candidates. 
 
 Take next the Presidential election of 1860. 
 
 Popular vote. Electors. Ratios. 
 
 Lincoln 1,866,452 180 10,369 
 
 Douglas 1,375,157 12 114,596 
 
 Breckinridge 847,953 72 11,777 
 
 Bell 590,631 _39 15,144 
 
 Total , 4,680,193 303 
 
 Common ratio, 15,446. Lincoln should have had 
 121 electors, Douglas 89, Breckinridge 55, and Bell 
 38. Douglas obtained less than one-seventh of the 
 
208 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 electoral vote which belonged to him upon the pop- 
 ular vote. Though second in choice with the peo- 
 ple, he was the lowest in the electoral vote of the 
 four candidates. If, by a slight change of votes in 
 a few States, the election had gone to the House of 
 Representatives, he would have been ruled out, as 
 the House must choose from the three candidates 
 highest in electoral vote, and Breckinridge or Bell 
 would probably have been elected by the House. 
 
 I might refer to several other Presidential elec- 
 tions. For instance, in 1864, the ratio of the Lincoln 
 electors was 10,292, and for the McClellan electors 
 86,274. In 1868 the difference between the ratios 
 of Grant and Seymour electors was somewhat less, 
 but still very remarkable. In both these elections 
 the popular majority secured the result they desired. 
 But this was fortunate or accidental rather than a 
 certain result under our electoral system as now 
 constituted. . The election of 1824 proves that a 
 plurality as well as a minority candidate may suffer 
 heavy loss of electoral votes, and in fact be defeated. 
 And the subsequent cases must convince us that 
 there is danger of defeat in future elections even to 
 majority candidates. 
 
 The conclusion to be drawn from the facts in our 
 political history is that at any time a candidate 
 with a minority of votes given to him by the £>eople 
 of the United States may have a majority in the 
 electoral colleges." * 
 
 * In the figures given above of popular votes at Presidential elec- 
 tions, no vote for South Carolina is included, as her electors were chosen 
 by the Legislature. But the unavoidable omission of any popular vote 
 from that State does not materially affect the exhibit or argument. A 
 single remark may be added in this place. Can any one doubt, in view 
 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. 209 
 
 THE ELECTORAL COLLEGES, THEIR DEFECTS AND 
 FAILURE, AND REMEDIES PROPOSED * 
 
 BY COL. JOHN II. WHEELER, STATISTICAL BUHEAU, TREASURY DEPARTMENT. 
 
 This nation lias recently passed through an exciting election 
 for President, and the electors have met at the capitals of each 
 State and cast their votes. 
 
 We propose to show that the present mode of election of 
 President and Vice President does not guarantee " a republi- 
 can form of government," or carry out the intentions of the 
 framers of the Constitution, or the will of the people, which is 
 the foundation of our form of government. 
 
 We are aware of the reluctance which exists to disturb the 
 provisions of the 'Constitution or the customs of the nation. 
 But this very Constitution has been amended again and again, 
 and once in regard to this very question. 
 
 Under the second article of the Constitution, the electors, 
 appointed in such manner as the Legislatures of the States may 
 direct, meet in their respective States and vote by ballot for 
 two persons; the person having the majority of the whole 
 number of electors appointed shall be President, and the per- 
 son having the next greatest number of votes shall be Vice 
 President. 
 
 By this mode the first President (Washington) was elected 
 twice, (1788 and 1792,) and John Adams (in 1796) once. 
 
 In consequence of the violence to the popular will attempted 
 to be done through this mode, this article was amended in 1804, 
 (Sept. 25,) and the electors required to name in their ballots 
 the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the 
 
 of the facts shown, that reformed voting is imperatively demanded in 
 Presidential elections to secure the just representation of the people, to 
 check political corruption, and to avoid the fearful danger of a disputed 
 Presidential succession ? Doubtless the electoral colleges are admirably 
 adapted to the workings of a plan of electoral reform. Useless or worse 
 than useless at present, they may be made available and efficient in im- 
 proving our political system and securing to us the just ends of popular 
 government, whenever the free vote or some other appropriate instru- 
 ment of reform shall be applied to utilize and invigorate them. 
 
 * This Essay by Col. Wheeler was contained in the Appendix to 
 Senate Report on Representative Reform, of 2d March, 18G9, {ante,) but 
 is now inserted here as its proper position in this work. 
 14 
 
210 PKOPORTIONAL EEPKESENTATION. 
 
 person voted for as Vice President. They are to make a list 
 of all the persons voted for, and the number of votes for each, 
 ■which they are to transmit to the President of the Senate, who, 
 in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, 
 shall count the votes and declare who is chosen. Thus the 
 matter now stands. We propose to show, as previously stated, 
 that this mode as now used does not carry out the intention of 
 the framers of the Constitution ; that it is not a faithful indi- 
 cation of popular will, and, therefore, is subversive of the 
 principle that lies at the foundation of our government — that 
 the will of the people lawfully expressed should be inviolate. 
 If this is so, this mode should be abolished. 
 
 As to the intent of the framers of the Constitution we are 
 not left in doubt. Alexander Hamilton, of New York, a 
 member of the convention which formed the Constitution, in 
 No. 68 of the Federalist, acknowledged that the mode as pre- 
 scribed for the election of the President by electors chosen by 
 the people was objectionable. He says : 
 
 The convention which formed the Constitution did not desire the 
 appointment of President to depend on pre-existing bodies of men, who 
 might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes. 
 
 The mode was suggested by the practice of the Germanic 
 Confederation ; and this was that the electors or people should 
 choose as their representatives or electors men of high •charac- 
 ter, capable and honest, above influences of place or power, 
 (for no person holding an office of trust or profit under the 
 United States can be an elector,) and these electors, unbiased 
 by party partialities and prejudices, unawed by power, imper- 
 vious to the seductions of place, but guided only by patriot- 
 ism and virtue, should select some citizen of the nation, emi- 
 nent for his services, virtues, and talents, as Chief Magistrate. 
 
 If this be the true intent of the framers of the Constitution, 
 how widely does the practice differ from the intent ! Any one 
 who has ever witnessed the assembling of the electors of any 
 State can but have felt the ridiculous mockery with which, as 
 mere automatons, they carry out the edict which a caucus or 
 convention has already dictated ; and for any elector to vary 
 therefrom, or dare to follow the convictions of his judgment, 
 would be political suicide, although it is his constitutional 
 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. 211 
 
 right so to do. One case only occurs to our memory in the 
 history of our government where an elector has ventured to 
 exercise this unquestioned right. In 1820 Mr. William Plum- 
 mer, elected in New Hampshire as an elector to choose a Presi- 
 dent, voted for John Quincy Adams (who was not then a can- 
 didate or the nominee of any party) against James Monroe. 
 
 He was doomed to political death. This incident was the 
 more singular as it was the only vote cast in any electoral col- 
 lege against Mr. Monroe. This gave occasion to the caustic 
 remark of John Randolph, of Virginia, in Congress, that "Mr. 
 Monroe came in by unanimous consent and went out of office 
 by unanimous consent" 
 
 That the mode now used may be no indication of the wishes 
 of the people, may fail in many instances to carry out their 
 will, and, in fact, be at variance with and in opposition thereto, 
 the examples in our political history, as we will presently show, 
 abundantly prove. 
 
 In 1800 this mode had nearly placed in the Presidential 
 chair Aaron Burr, for which high position it is well known he 
 did not receive a single electoral or popular vote. 
 
 In 1824, under this mode, John Quincy Adams was placed 
 in the Presidential chair against the declared wishes of a ma- 
 jority of the people, for he was in a minority in both the elec- 
 toral and popular vote. We have prepared a table of the 
 popular and electoral vote. The electoral vote is given from 
 the organization of the government ; the popular vote is only 
 from 1824. This vote has no constitutional existence, and no 
 federal record officially presents it. Prior to the adoption of 
 the amendment in 1804 the mode of choosing electors was so 
 heterogeneous, by the legislatures, by districts, and by the peo- 
 ple, that no accurate or perfect compilation concerning it is 
 extant worthy of confidence. Even after the adoption of this 
 amendment very many States continued to choose electors by 
 the legislature, (notably New Jersey, North Carolina, South 
 Carolina, and occasionally Connecticut, Massachusetts, New 
 York, and Vermont.) In the election of 1824 the electors for 
 President and Vice President in Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, 
 South Carolina, New York, and Vermont were chosen by the 
 Legislatures of those States. Of the election of 1820, back to 
 which the table of popular vote extends, Niles's Register, of 
 
212 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 18th November, 1820, has this item : " In Maryland and Vir- 
 ginia the election of electors excites so little interest because 
 there was no thought of opposition that very few votes were 
 cast, only 17 at Richmond." Hence of the popular vote, as 
 before stated, no complete record is extant. The table on the 
 next page is as complete as possible and worthy of careful 
 study. 
 
 (It is to be remembered that the State of South Carolina 
 continued to choose electors by her Legislature down to the 
 time of the late rebellion in 1861 ; so that no popular vote 
 from her is included in the above returns. As she is, however, 
 a State of the third or fourth rank in population, the absence 
 of her votes does not greatly affect the completeness or accu- 
 racy of our exhibit.) 
 
 An examination and analysis of this table, and a compari- 
 son of the electoral with the popular vote, will prove the posi- 
 tions we have laid down, that the mode of the electoral vote, 
 as now used, does not carry out the popular vote, and is not a 
 faithful reflex of public opinion ; and that therefore it should 
 be modified or discontinued. 
 
 Take the first case that occurs in this table, where the popu- 
 lar vote appears — the vote in the election of 1824: General 
 Jackson received 152,899 reported votes, and John Quincy 
 Adams only 105,321 ; yet by this mode of machinery the pub- 
 lic will was violated and Adams chosen. 
 
 The next election (1828) while the popular majority for 
 Jackson was 137,870, in a total vote of 1,162,180, his electoral 
 majority was 95, in a total of 261 ; that is, the popular ratio was 
 as 1 to 8; the electoral majority was as 1 to 2f, a ratio three 
 times greater. 
 
 In the next election (1832) this disparity appears still more 
 glaring. While Jackson's popular majority was 137,313, in a 
 total vote of 1,237,691, or as 1 to 9, his electoral majority was 
 170, a ratio seven times greater. 
 
 In the next election (1836) the popular majority for Van 
 Buren was but 2608, in a total vote of 1,541,318, while the 
 electoral majority was 124, in a total vote of 294 ; that is to 
 say, the ratio of the majority of the popular votes was but as 
 1 to 600, while the ratio of the electoral majority was less than 
 1 to 6, a ratio 100 times as great. 
 
CHOICE OP PKESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. 
 
 213 
 
 Popular and electoral vote of the United States from 1788 to 1869. 
 
 1788 
 1792 
 1796 
 
 1800 
 
 1804 
 
 1808 
 
 1812 
 1816 
 1820 
 1824 
 
 1828 
 1832 
 
 1836 
 
 1840 
 1844 
 
 1848 
 1852 
 1856 
 1860 
 
 1864 
 1868 
 
 Candidates. 
 
 George Washington., 
 
 John Adams 
 
 Thomas Jefferson. 
 
 John Adams 
 
 Thomas Jefferson 
 
 C. C. Pinckney 
 
 James Madison 
 
 C. C. Pinckney 
 
 George Clinton 
 
 James Madison 
 
 De Witt Clinton 
 
 James Monroe 
 
 Rufus King 
 
 James Monroe 
 
 John Quincy Adams 
 
 Andrew Jackson 
 
 John Quincy Adams 
 
 William II. Crawford 
 
 Henry Clay 
 
 Andrew Jackson 
 
 John Quincy Adams 
 
 Andrew Jackson 
 
 Henry Clay 
 
 William Wirt 
 
 John Floyd 
 
 Martin Van Buren 
 
 William Henry Harrison.. 
 
 Hugh L. White 
 
 Daniel Webster 
 
 Willie P. Mangum 
 
 William II. Harrison 
 
 Martin Van Buren 
 
 James G. Birney 
 
 James K. Polk 
 
 Henry Clay 
 
 James G. Birney 
 
 Zachary Taylor. 
 
 Lewis Cass 
 
 Martin Van Buren 
 
 Franklin Pierce 
 
 Winfield Scott 
 
 John P. Hale 
 
 James Buchanan 
 
 John C. Fremont , 
 
 Millard Fillmore , 
 
 Abraham Lincoln 
 
 Stephen A. Douglas , 
 
 John C. Breckinridge 
 
 John Bell 
 
 Abraham Lincoln , 
 
 George B. McClellan. 
 
 Ulysses S.Grant 
 
 Horatio Seymour 
 
 Party. 
 
 Federalist... 
 Republican , 
 
 Federalist... 
 Republican 
 Federalist... 
 Republican 
 Federalist- 
 
 Republican . 
 
 Federalist... 
 Republican . 
 
 Democrat 
 
 Federalist 
 
 Caucus 
 
 Whig 
 
 Democrat 
 
 Federalist 
 
 Democrat 
 
 National Republican. 
 
 Anti-Mason 
 
 Anti-Jackson 
 
 Democrat 
 
 Whig 
 
 Democrat 
 
 Abolitionist. 
 
 Democrat 
 
 Whig 
 
 Abolitionist . 
 
 Whig 
 
 Democrat.... 
 
 Free-soil 
 
 Democrat 
 
 Whig 
 
 Free-soil 
 
 Democrat .... 
 
 Free-soil 
 
 Whig , 
 
 Republican.. 
 Democrat ... . 
 
 Whig 
 
 Republican . 
 Democrat..., 
 Republican. 
 Democrat.... 
 
 69 
 
 132 
 71 
 68 
 73 
 65 
 
 162 
 14 
 
 122 
 
 47 
 
 6 
 
 128 
 89 
 
 183 
 34 
 
 231 
 1 
 99 
 84 
 41 
 37 
 
 178 
 83 
 
 219 
 
 49 
 
 7 
 
 11 
 
 170 
 73 
 26 
 14 
 11 
 
 234 
 60 
 
 17(7 
 105 
 
 163*' 
 127 
 
 254" 
 42 
 
 Hi" 
 
 114 
 
 8 
 
 180 
 
 12 
 
 72 
 
 39 
 212 
 
 21 
 214 
 
 80 
 
 176- 
 
 261- 
 
 303 i 
 
 152,899 
 105,321 
 47,265 
 47,087 
 650,028 
 512,158 
 687,502 
 550,189 
 
 771,968 
 
 I 769,350 
 
 1,274,203 
 1,128,303 
 7,609 
 1,329,023 
 1.231,643 
 
 ' 66,304 
 1,362,242 
 1,223,795 
 
 291,878 
 1,585,545 
 1,383,537 
 
 157,296 
 1,838,229 
 1,342,864 
 
 874.625 
 1,866,452 
 1,375,057 
 
 847,953 
 
 590,631 
 2,223,035 
 1,811,754 
 3,016,353 
 2.706.637 
 
 * In this election (9th term) Pennsylvania, Mississippi, and Tennessee did not cast their 
 full electoral vote. 
 
 f In this election (12th term) Maryland did not cast her full vote. 
 
 X In this election (20th term) Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
 North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, South Carolina, and Virginia cast no electoral votes. J 
 
 \ In this election (21st term) Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia did not vote, and in Florida 
 electors were chosen by the Legislature, and not by popular vote. 
 
214 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 In the election of 1840 Harrison's popular majority was 
 145,900, in a total poll of 2,402,506, a ratio of 1 to 16, while 
 his electoral majority was 174, in a vote of 294, or nearly ten 
 times greater than the popular majority. 
 
 In the next election (1844) Polk received but 31,000 major- 
 ity in a total of 2,626,950, or 1 in 900, while his electoral vote 
 was 170 out of 275, or 1 to 4 ; 200 times the popular vote. 
 
 In 1848 General Taylor was in a minority of the popular 
 vote ; his vote being 1,362,242, and Cass and Van Buren had 
 1,515,173; and yet he received a majority of the electoral 
 votes. 
 
 In 1852 Pierce's popular majority was 202,008, in a total vote 
 of over 3,000,000, a ratio of 1 to 15, while his electoral major- 
 ity was 192, out of 296 votes, a ratio ten times as great. 
 
 In 1856 Mr. Buchanan was in a minority of the popular 
 vote ; he received 1,838,229, while the vote of Fremont and 
 Fillmore was 2,216,789 ; and yet he received a majority of 
 the electoral votes. 
 
 In 1860 Mr. Lincoln was in a minority of nearly a mil- 
 lion of popular votes. He received a total vote of 1,866,452, 
 while the vote of Douglas, Breckinridge, and Bell combined 
 was 2,813,741 ; and yet Mr. Lincoln received a majority of 
 123 in an electoral vote of 303. This election demonstrates in 
 a most conclusive manner the fallacy of the electoral mode, 
 and the possible misrepresentation under it of the popular will. 
 Lincoln received 180 votes, and Douglas only 12, out of 303 
 electoral votes. In the popular vote Lincoln received 1,866,452, 
 while Douglas received 1,375,157 votes. 
 
 In 1864 Lincoln received 2,223,035 and McClellan received 
 1,811,754 of the popular vote, while in the electoral college 
 Lincoln received 212 votes, and McClellan received 21. A 
 ratio of 22 to 18 in one case to 10 to 1 in the other. 
 
 In the last Presidential election (1868) Grant received a 
 popular majority of 309,716 in a total of 5,722,990, a ratio of 
 about 10 to 9, while his majority of electoral vote was 134 in 
 in a total of 294, a ratio of 13 to 5. 
 
 This analysis, carefully made, proves beyond all cavil and 
 error that there is no analogy or community between the vote 
 as expressed by the electoral college and the will of the people 
 as expressed at the polls. In every case they differ. Hence, 
 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. 
 
 215 
 
 the mode by electors is unfair, since it misrepresents the popu- 
 lar will. Justice and truth demand its modification or aboli- 
 tion. By this cumbersome and circumlocutory process the 
 electors may be compelled to elect a candidate rejected by the 
 people, or reject a candidate accepted by the people. The de- 
 feat of General McClellan was complete, for he carried only 
 three States — Delaware, Kentucky, and New Jersey. The 
 whole electoral vote was 233, of which a majority necessary for 
 a choice was 117. Now a change in the popular vote of 
 35,000 from Lincoln's would have changed the vote of every 
 State mentioned below, and carried their full electoral vote. 
 These added to the vote he had received would have elected 
 General McClellan. 
 
 States. 
 
 Lincoln's 
 popular 
 majority. 
 
 Electoral 
 vote. 
 
 New Hampshire 
 
 3,530 
 5,632 
 
 3,407 
 6,750 
 
 20,076 
 7,415 
 
 20,190 
 1,432 
 3,236 
 
 5 
 
 Rhode Island 
 
 4 
 
 Connecticut 
 
 6 
 
 New York 
 
 33 
 
 Pennsylvania 
 
 26 
 
 Maryland 
 
 7 
 
 Indiana 
 
 13 
 
 Oregon 
 
 3 
 
 Nevada 
 
 3 
 
 Kentucky ^ 
 
 
 New Jersev >- 
 
 21 
 
 Delaware J 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 70.665 
 
 121 
 
 The change of 50,000 popular votes in New York in 1848 
 from Taylor to Cass, or giving one-half of the votes thrown 
 away upon Van Buren to Cass, would have thrown the 36 
 electoral votes of New York to Cass, and elected him. 
 
 We have shown that, by the present electoral system, a per- 
 son may be made President by receiving a majority of the 
 electoral votes, who is in a minority before the people. We 
 have shown that Lincoln, in 1860, in a popular minority of 
 more than a million of votes, swept the electoral college by an 
 overwhelming majority ; that Douglas, who received a popular 
 vote equal to two-thirds of Lincoln's, received only one-fifteenth 
 of his electoral vote; that Breckinridge, who was 500,000 
 votes behind Douglas, received six times as many votes in the 
 
216 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 electoral college, and Bell, who was 800,000 votes of the peo- 
 ple behind Douglas, received thrice his number of electoral 
 votes. 
 
 Can any demonstration be more complete and satisfactory as 
 to the utter uselessness and impolicy, if not injustice and iniq- 
 uity, of the present mode of election by electoral colleges ? 
 
 This defect in the machinery of our government has been 
 long seen by the statesmen of the nation. General Hamilton, 
 one of the framers of the Constitution, acknowledges of this 
 mode that it was objectionable, and when the amendment of 
 
 1804 was adopted, he proposed another, as follows : 
 
 f 
 To divide each State into districts equal to the whole number of sena- 
 tors and representatives from each State in the Congress of the United 
 States, and said districts to be as equal in population as possible, and, if 
 necessary, of parts of counties contiguous to each other, except where 
 there may be some detached portion of territory not sufficient of itself 
 to form a district, which then shall be annexed to some other district. 
 
 Thomas H. Benton, during his 30 years in the Senate, again 
 and again brought this subject before Congress. 
 
 General Jackson, in his first annual message, urged an 
 amendment to the Constitution, to secure the election of the 
 President by a direct and immediate vote of the people. This 
 he repeated in five subsequent messages. In his message of 
 1829, he says: "To the people belongs the right of electing their 
 Chief Magistrate. It never was designed that their choice in 
 any case should be defeated, either by the intervention of elec- 
 torial colleges, or by the agency confided in certain contingen- 
 cies to the House of Representatives. I, therefore, would rec- 
 ommend such an amendment to the Constitution as may remove 
 all intermediate agency in the election of President and Vice 
 President." 
 
 President Johnson, in 1845, when a member of the House, 
 and in 1860, when a Senator in Congress, urged similar views. 
 As President, in a message to Congress, dated July 18, 1868, 
 he fully sets forth the injustice and inequality of the present 
 mode, "as virtually denying the right of every citizen of the 
 United States possessing the constitutional qualification to be- 
 come a candidate for high office, and also denying the right of 
 each qualified voter in the nation to vote for the person he 
 deems most worthy and well qualified." 
 
CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. 217 
 
 Senator "Wade, of Ohio, now President of the Senate, at a 
 recent session brought this question as to a direct vote of the 
 people for President before the Senate, and defended the posi- 
 tion by an able argument. In a recent debate on Senator 
 Buckalew's amendment, the present mode of electors was de- 
 nounced by Senator Sumner and others " as cumbersome, effete, 
 and inconvenient." The scene which occurred recently in the 
 counting of the electoral votes in the joint convention of both 
 houses of Congress shows that the system must be altered. 
 Mr. Miller, of Pennsylvania, introduced recently (February 8, 
 1869) an amendment to the Constitution to allow the qualified 
 voters of the respective States to vote directly for President. 
 The amendment to the Constitution (Article XVI.) of Senator 
 Morton, adopted by the Senate February 9, 1869, is a proposi- 
 tion in the right direction — that the people shall select electors, 
 (and not the Legislatures,) and that Congress shall have the 
 power to prescribe the manner in which such electors shall be 
 chosen by the people. 
 
 Connected intimately with this subject, as a useful remedy 
 for the evils of the present system, is the reform proposed by 
 Senator Buckalew, of cumulative voting ; which is, that where 
 there are more persons than one to be chosen, the voter shall 
 possess as many votes as there are persons to be chosen, and 
 the voter may bestow his votes at his discretion upon the whole 
 number of persons to be chosen, or upon a less number, cumu- 
 lating his votes upon one, two, three, or any number less than 
 the whole. The plan introduced into Parliament as early as 
 1854, by Lord John Russell, is nearly similar; that in certain 
 constituencies which return three members to Parliament, each 
 voter should be allowed only to vote for two. This plan was 
 adopted in 1867, and is now the law of England. Still another 
 plan is urged by John Stuart Mill in his work on " Represent- 
 ative Government," (proposed originally by James Garth Mar- 
 shall,) that the elector, having his three votes, should be at 
 liberty to give all to one candidate, or two to one and one to 
 another. This is similar to the plan introduced in the Senate 
 (January 13, 1869) by Senator Buckalew, and commended by 
 Earl Grey in his work on " Parliamentary Reform." The 
 more these works are studied, the more clearly will appear the 
 perfect feasibility of the plan and its transcendent advantages. 
 
218 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 The allied plan of personal representation has also been highly 
 commended. As presented by Mr. Hare in an elaborate work, 
 it contains another great idea ; that those who did not like the 
 local candidates may fill up their ticket by voting for persons 
 of national reputation. This is sometimes done in our country 
 on important occasions of deep interest. In 1835, a conven- 
 tion was called in North Carolina to reform her constitution. 
 It was the first convention for this purpose since 1776, and 
 deeply excited the public mind. The ablest men of the State 
 were chosen without regard to their location or politics. 
 
 The natural tendency of representative governments, in the 
 opinion of Mr. Mill, is to collective mediocrity. This will be 
 increased the more the elective franchise is extended. Ed- 
 mund Burke was repudiated by the electors of Bristol, in 1780, 
 for Parliament, for his advocacy of the cause of the American 
 colonies. He was, however, returned by another constituency, 
 and continued during life in Parliament, contributing to its 
 debates and to the glory of the, nation. In contrast to this, 
 "William R. Davie, who had been a gallant and successful 
 officer in the war, governor of the State, (1798,) envoy extra- 
 ordinary to France, (1799,) was defeated in popular elections 
 in North Carolina, when a candidate for Congress and for the 
 Legislature, by individuals without extraordinary merit or 
 talent. 
 
 There is hardly a State of our Union in which the congres- 
 sional districts are not gerrymandered in the interest of party. 
 This adds to the deterioration of our public service, so that 
 Mr. Mill declares " it is an admitted fact that in the American 
 democracy, which is constructed on this faulty model, the 
 highly cultivated members of the community, except such as 
 are willing to sacrifice their own judgment and conscience to 
 the behests of party and become the servile echo of those who 
 are inferiors in knowledge, do not allow their names as candi- 
 dates for Congress or the Legislature, so certain it is they would 
 be defeated." 
 
 February, 1869. 
 
Constitutional Amendment in Illinois. 
 
 A Convention authorized to frame and submit to 
 the people, amendments to the Constitution of Illi- 
 nois, met at Springfield in December, 1869, and con- 
 cluded the performance of its duties and adjourned 
 finally on the 13th of May, 1870. The amended 
 constitution for the State, as formed by the conven- 
 tion, was submitted to a popular vote for adoption 
 or rejection on the first Saturday in July following, 
 at which time also eight additional propositions of 
 amendment were submitted severally to a like vote. 
 An ingenious and convenient plan was provided by 
 the Convention for taking the sense of the people 
 upon all the questions submitted, by means of a 
 single ticket. The tickets or ballots properly pre- 
 pared were to be distributed by the Secretary of 
 State through the County Clerks, and upon their 
 face were to indicate clearly and separately an affirm- 
 ative vote for each of the propositions to be passed 
 upon — first, the new or amended Constitution, and 
 next, in their order, the several separate amend- 
 ments proposed. Whenever the voter should strike 
 off or erase from his ballot either one of the propo- 
 sitions, his vote was to be counted as given against 
 it, otherwise in its favor. Thus nine distinct ques- 
 tions were passed upon by the people, though pre- 
 
 219 
 
220 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 cisely the same form of ticket was furnished to each 
 voter. 
 
 The work of the Convention is of peculiar interest 
 outside of Illinois, because it included several pro- 
 visions well calculated to secure electoral reform in 
 that State, which were by strong majorities adopted 
 by the people. These will now be given in the 
 order in which they appear in the amended Con- 
 stitution, accompanied by some observations which 
 they respectively invite. 
 
 Election of Representatives in the Legisla- 
 ture. — The Seventh Section of the Fourth Article 
 of the amended Constitution is as follows : 
 
 " The House of Kepresentatives shall consist of three times 
 the number of the members of the Senate, and the term of office 
 shall be two years. Three Kepresentatives shall be elected in 
 each senatorial district at the general election in the year 
 A. D. 1872, and every two years thereafter. In all elections of 
 Representatives aforesaid, each qualified voter may cast as 
 many votes for one candidate as there are Representatives to 
 be elected, or may distribute the same or equal parts thereof 
 among the candidates as he shall see fit, and the candidates 
 highest in votes shall be declared elected." 
 
 Under this amendment a minority of voters in a 
 district exceeding in number one-fourth of the 
 whole vote, can elect one of the three Representa- 
 tives from a district. The principle applied is 
 simply this : that each voter shall be allowed to dis- 
 tribute or concentrate his three votes as he shall 
 think proper, and that candidates highest in vote 
 shall be declared elected. Practically, whenever 
 one party is clearly in a majority in a district, but 
 not able to poll a three-fourths vote, its members 
 
ILLINOIS AMENDMENTS. 221 
 
 will nominate and vote for two candidates only, and 
 the minority will nominate and vote for one, and all 
 the candidates voted for will be elected. No can- 
 didate will be beaten and both classes of voters will 
 be fairly represented. This will be the ordinary 
 case, but exceptional cases are fully provided for. 
 When the majority shall be strong enough to poll a 
 three-fourths vote they will vote for and elect three 
 candidates, or the whole number to be chosen. 
 When parties are about equal in strength, or each 
 may indulge the expectation of obtaining a majority 
 vote, each will nominate and support two candidates 
 and whichever one shall poll a majority of votes will 
 elect both its candidates, while the minority will 
 elect but one. In this case it will be certain from 
 the outset that each party will carry one of its can- 
 didates, and there will be a fair test of strength be- 
 tween them upon the election of a second one. 
 Only one candidate will be beaten and both parties 
 will be represented as nearly as may be in propor- 
 tion to their respective numbers. Again, when 
 there shall be three parties or interests in a district 
 struggling for representation, it will probably hap- 
 pen that each will obtain one Representative, or that 
 one of them will obtain two and another one Repre- 
 sentative, whereas under the old plan of voting one 
 party or interest would be likely to obtain the whole 
 three upon a mere plurality vote ; in other words, a 
 minority of voters might, in many cases, elect their 
 whole ticket and the majority of voters be left with- 
 out any Representative whatever. Finally, the new 
 plan allows the voter to discriminate between candi- 
 dates in giving them his support. He can in voting 
 
222 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 for two candidates express the relative strength of 
 his desire for the election of each, by giving one of 
 them two votes and the other one. In some cases 
 this will be a valuable and convenient privilege, and 
 its exercise will tend- to the certain success of the 
 best men among candidates where all cannot be 
 elected. 
 
 The allowance of half-votes in the new plan is 
 one of its best features, and will secure its conve- 
 nient working and promote its ultimate popularity. 
 This feature, however, is rather for the convenience 
 of the majority than of the minority, and is not in- 
 dispensable to the new plan. The majority can 
 vote in either one of three ways : 
 
 1st. Give single votes to each of three candidates, 
 which is the old plan ; 
 
 2d. Give one and a half votes to each of two ; or, 
 
 3d. Have one-half their voters give two votes to 
 A and one to B, and the other half two votes to B 
 and one to A. 
 
 Whenever their vote shall not exceed three- 
 fourths of the whole vote of the district, they can- 
 not reasonably or safely support three candidates. 
 If with a weaker vote than three-fourths they shall 
 attempt to elect the whole three Representatives, the 
 minority may take advantage of the dispersion of 
 their vote and carry a second Representative. In all 
 ordinary cases, therefore, the majority will support 
 but two candidates. They will not run a third can- 
 didate simply that he may be beaten, and incur at 
 the same time the clanger of losing one of the two 
 Representatives to which they are entitled and have 
 power to elect. 
 
ILLINOIS AMENDMENTS. 223 
 
 Assuming, then, that in all ordinary cases, guided 
 by reason and self-interest, the majority will sup- 
 port but two candidates, the question remains, In 
 which one of the two ways above mentioned shall 
 they vote for them ? It will be quite possible for 
 the majority to divide their votes territorially or 
 otherwise into two equal or nearly equal divisions 
 and use two forms of ticket at the election. Half 
 their voters giving A two votes and B one, and the 
 other half giving B two and A one, the whole 
 strength of the party will be economized and dis- 
 tributed equally to the two candidates. No strength 
 will be wasted or misapplied. But this plan will be 
 inconvenient to the majority even when the proper 
 result shall be secured, which will not always be 
 entirely certain. We think, therefore, that this 
 particular mode of majority voting will be found 
 much less satisfactory in practice than the other, 
 above referred to, which involves the use of half- 
 votes. When every majority voter shall divide his 
 three votes equally between two candidates, giving 
 a vote and a half to each, there can be no doubt that 
 the object aimed at — the full and economical use of 
 party power in the election — will be reached, and 
 reached too without trouble or inconvenience. The 
 preparation of a ticket reading as follows : 
 
 John Jones, I2 votes, 
 
 William Brown, lh votes, 
 will be within the competency of any person who 
 can read and write, and its intelligent use by voters 
 a matter of course. As to counting such votes, (as 
 elsewhere explained in the present volume,) the 
 question of convenience is equally clear. The elec- 
 
224 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 tion officers can copy upon their tally-papers from 
 the first ticket drawn from the box, the names of 
 the candidates with the figures attached (it will be 
 convenient to enclose the latter in small circles with 
 a pen) and will then take down that and successive 
 tickets in scores of five towards the right according 
 to the common practice. The figures 1£ will thus 
 constitute a sign of value for the strokes which fol- 
 low, and after summing up the latter, fifty per cent, 
 will be added to make up the true total of votes. 
 Thus, if eighty such tickets are counted to a candi- 
 date, the score will be carried out — 80 + 40 = 120 
 votes, which will be placed to the credit of such can- 
 didate upon the return. 
 
 Choice of Directors and Managers of In- 
 corporated Companies. — The Third Section of 
 the Eleventh Article is one of the most important 
 ever introduced into a constitution, and is as follows: 
 
 " The General Assembly shall provide by law, that in all 
 elections for directors or managers of incorporated companies, 
 every stockholder shall have the right to vote, in person or by 
 proxy, for the number of shares of stock owned by him, for as 
 many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected, 
 or to cumulate said shares and give one candidate as many 
 votes as the number of directors multiplied by his number of 
 shares shall equal, or to distribute them on the same principle 
 among as many candidates as he shall think fit; and such 
 directors or managers shall not be elected in any other man- 
 ner." 
 
 There are, probably, several thousand corporate 
 companies in Illinois to the elections of which this 
 important amendment will apply; for it searches 
 out all such bodies in the State, without exception, 
 
ILLINOIS AMENDMENTS. 225 
 
 and applies to them the hand of reform. Hereafter, 
 a mere majority, a clique or a combination of stock- 
 holders in an Illinois corporation, will not be allowed 
 to exclude their co-stockholders from all voice in the 
 management of the corporation, nor will a minority 
 of stockholders holding a majority of stock be al- 
 lowed to do so. The mismanagement of corporate 
 bodies, and secresy, intrigue or corruption in the 
 proceedings of their officers, will receive an import- 
 ant and necessary check. All the stockholders will 
 be able to represent themselves in the board of 
 managers, thus securing to themselves at all times 
 full knowledge of the corporate proceedings and of 
 the administration of the funds which they have 
 invested. They will be enabled more perfectly to 
 protect their own interests in the corporations and 
 to prevent the growth of abuses. 
 
 Election of Judges in Cook County. — By 
 the twenty-third section of the sixth article of the 
 Constitution, as amended, the Circuit Court of Cook 
 County (in which Chicago is situate) was made to 
 consist of five Judges, who are to hold their offices 
 for six -year terms. This provision required the 
 election of three new Judges, and their first election 
 was provided for in the seventh section of the sched- 
 ule to the amendments, upon the plan of the limited 
 vote. That section contained the injunction " That 
 at said election in the County of Cook no elector 
 shall vote for more than two candidates for Circuit 
 Judge." The election held under this provision on 
 the first Saturday in July, 1870, resulted in the 
 choice of two Judges by the political majority and 
 one by the political minority of Cook County. The 
 
 15 
 
226 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 provision was found to be satisfactory on trial, and 
 the Judges elected under it were all competent and 
 fit men. 
 
 The men of the Illinois Convention and the peo- 
 ple of Illinois deserve the thanks of the whole 
 country for their action in behalf of electoral re- 
 form. But special credit is due to Mr. Medill, 
 (formerly of the Chicago Tribune and now Mayor 
 of Chicago,) who, as Chairman of the Committee 
 on Electoral and Representative Eeform in the 
 Convention, took the lead in argument and labor to 
 secure the passage of those propositions of amend- 
 ment to which we have referred. He had the cor- 
 dial assistance of Mr. Browning, former Secretary 
 of the Interior in the Government of the United 
 States, and of other able and worthy colleagues in 
 the Convention ; but to him above others the princi- 
 pal honor is due of the good and timely work ac- 
 complished in his State. 
 
 WEST VIRGINIA AMENDMENTS. 
 
 The Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 
 which met January 16, 1872, agreed upon two 
 amendments for the introduction of electoral reform 
 into that State, which were subsequently adopted by 
 the people, along with other amendments of the 
 Convention. One of these was borrowed from 
 Illinois, and constitutes section four of article eleven 
 of the new Constitution of the State. It is exactly 
 like the Illinois provision, already given, for the 
 
WEST VIRGINIA AMENDMENTS. 227 
 
 free vote in all elections of directors or managers 
 of incorporated companies. 
 
 The other amendment referred to is section fifty 
 of article six of the new Constitution, and is as 
 follows : 
 
 " The Legislature may provide for submitting to a vote of the 
 people at the general election to be held in 1876, or at any 
 general election thereafter, a plan or scheme of proportional 
 representation in the Senate of this State, and if a majority of 
 the votes cast at such election be in favor of the plan submit- 
 ted to them, the Legislature shall at its session succeeding such 
 election rearrange the Senatorial Districts in accordance with 
 the plan so approved by the people." 
 
 Utah Amendment. — In the new Constitution of 
 Utah, adopted March 18, 1872, (preparatory to her 
 application for admission into the Union as a State,) 
 appears the following provision : 
 
 Art. iv., Sec. 25 : "At all elections for representatives each 
 qualified elector may cast as many votes for one candidate as 
 there are Representatives to be elected in the county or district, 
 or may distribute the same among any or all the candidates, 
 and the candidates receiving the highest number of votes shall 
 be declared elected." 
 
 y~ op tup, 
 
 'university; 
 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES 
 
 FOR 
 
 REFORMED VOTING 
 
 I. GENERAL LAWS. 
 
 Choice of Inspectors of Election : Act of 2d 
 July, 1839, entitled "An Act relating to the Elec- 
 tions of this Commonwealth" — Pamphlet Laws, 
 519, sections 3 and 4. 
 
 " Sec. 3. The qualified citizens of the several 
 wards, districts, and townships, shall meet in every 
 year, at the time and place of holding the election 
 for Constable of such ward, district, or township, 
 and then and there elect, as hereinafter provided, 
 two Inspectors and one Judge of Elections. 
 
 " Sec. 4. Each of such qualified citizens shall vote 
 for one person as Judge, and also for one person as 
 Inspector of Elections, and the person having the 
 greatest number of votes for Judge shall be publicly 
 declared to be elected Judge ; and the two persons 
 having the greatest number of votes for Inspectors, 
 shall, in like manner, be declared to be elected In- 
 spectors of Elections." 
 
 228 
 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES. 229 
 
 Election of Juky Commissioners : "An act for the 
 letter and more impartial selection of persons to 
 serve as Jurors in each of the Counties of this 
 Commonwealth" section 1 ; passed 10th April, 
 1867.— P. Laivs, 62. 
 
 " Sec. 1. That at the general election to be held 
 on the second Tuesday of October, A. D. 1867, and 
 triennially thereafter, at such election, the qualified 
 electors of the several counties of this Common- 
 wealth shall elect, in the manner now provided by 
 law for the election of other county officers, two 
 sober, intelligent, and judicious persons to serve as 
 Jury Commissioners in each of said counties, for the 
 period of three years ensuing their election ; but the 
 same person or persons shall not be eligible for re- 
 election more than once in any period of six years : 
 Provided, That each of said qualified electors shall 
 vote for one person only as Jury Commissioner, and 
 the two persons having the greatest number of votes 
 for Jury Commissioner shall be duly elected Jury 
 Commissioners for such county." 
 
 Borough Supplement: By an Act, entitled "An 
 Act for the further regulation of Boroughs," ap- 
 proved 2d June, 1871, (P. Laws, 283,) it ivas pro- 
 vided as follows : 
 
 " Sec. 2. The number of members of any town 
 council of a borough where the number is now fixed 
 at five shall be hereafter six, and in boroughs here- 
 after incorporated under general laws the number 
 of such councilmen shall be six; but the several 
 courts of the Commonwealth having jurisdiction to 
 
230 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 incorporate boroughs may, on granting an incorpo- 
 ration or upon application made to them for the pur- 
 pose, fix or change the charter of any borough so as 
 to authorize the burgess or chief executive officer 
 thereof to serve as a member of the town council, 
 with full power as such, and to preside at the meet- 
 ings thereof. 
 
 "Sec. 3. In elections for members of town councils 
 each voter may at his option bestow his votes singly 
 upon six candidates, or cumulate them upon any less 
 number, in the manner authorized by the fourth 
 section of the act to define the limits and to organ- 
 ize the town of Bloomsburg, approved March fourth, 
 one thousand eight hundred and seventy ; and va- 
 cancies in any council shall be filled in the manner 
 provided in the fifth section of the same act; but 
 nothing herein contained shall be held to regulate 
 or affect the manner of choosing the burgess or 
 other principal executive officer of a borough even 
 where he shall be authorized to serve as a member 
 of town council." 
 
 Constitutional Convention Act of 1872: "An 
 act to provide for calling a convention to amend 
 the Constitution;" approved 11th April, 1872. — P. 
 Laivs, 53. 
 
 "Sec. 1. That at the general election, to be held 
 on the second Tuesday of October next, there shall 
 be elected by the qualified electors of this Common- 
 wealth delegates to a convention to revise and 
 amend the Constitution of this State ; the said con- 
 vention shall consist of one hundred and thirty- 
 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES. 231 
 
 three members, to be elected in the manner follow- 
 ing : Twenty-eight members thereof shall be elected 
 in the State at large, as follows : Each voter of the 
 State shall vote for not more than fourteen candi- 
 dates, and the twenty-eight highest in vote shall be 
 declared elected ; ninety-nine delegates shall be 
 apportioned to and elected from the different sena- 
 torial districts of the State, three delegates to be 
 elected for each Senator therefrom ; and in choosing 
 all district delegates, each voter shall be entitled to 
 vote for not more than two of the members to be 
 chosen from his district, and the three candidates 
 highest in vote shall be declared elected, except in 
 the county of Alleghany, forming the twenty-third 
 senatorial district, where no voter shall vote for 
 more than six candidates, and the nine highest in 
 vote shall be elected, and in the counties of Luzerne, 
 Monroe, and Pike, forming the thirteenth senatorial 
 district, where no voter shall vote for more than four 
 candidates, and the six highest in vote shall be 
 elected ; and six additional delegates shall be chosen 
 from the city of Philadelphia, by a vote at large in 
 said city, and in their election no voter shall vote 
 for more than three candidates, and the six highest 
 in vote shall be declared elected. 
 
 " Sec. 2. The following regulations shall apply to 
 the aforesaid election to be held on the second Tues- 
 day of October next. . . . 
 
 " First. The said election shall be held and con- 
 ducted by the proper election officers of the several 
 election districts of the Commonwealth, and shall 
 be governed and regulated in all respects by the 
 general election laws of the Commonwealth, so far 
 
232 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 as the same shall be applicable thereto, and not 
 inconsistent with the provisions of this act. 
 
 " Second, The tickets to be voted for members at 
 large of the convention shall have on the outside 
 the words, ' delegates at large/ and on the inside" 
 the names of the candidates to be voted for, not 
 exceeding fourteen in number. 
 
 " Third, The tickets to be voted for district mem- 
 bers of the convention shall have on the outside the 
 words, 'district delegates/ and on the inside the 
 name or names of the candidates voted for, not 
 exceeding the proper number, limited as aforesaid ; 
 but any ticket which shall contain a greater number 
 of names than the number for which the voter shall 
 be entitled to vote, shall be rejected; and in the 
 case of the delegates to be chosen at large in Phila- 
 delphia, the words, ' city delegates/ shall be on the 
 outside of the ticket. . . . 
 
 " Sec. 8. That in case of vacancies in the mem- 
 bership of said convention, the same shall be filled 
 as follows : If such vacancy shall be of a member 
 at large of the convention, those members at large 
 who shall have been voted for by the same voters, 
 or by a majority of the same voters who shall have 
 voted for and elected the member whose place is to 
 be filled, shall fill such vacancy ; if such vacancy 
 shall be of a district or city member of the con- 
 vention, those members at large of the convention 
 who shall have been voted for by the same or by a 
 majority of the same voters who shall have voted 
 for such district or city member, shall fill such 
 vacancy ; in either case, the appointment to fill a 
 vacancy shall be made by the members at large 
 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES. 233 
 
 aforesaid, or by a majority of them, in writing; 
 and all such written appointments shall be filed 
 among the convention records." 
 
 Among the other additional provisions of the Convention 
 Act appears the following proviso in the fourth section : 
 
 "Provided, That one-third of all the members 
 of the convention shall have the right to require 
 the separate and distinct submission to a popular 
 vote of any change or amendment proposed by the 
 convention." 
 
 II. LOCAL LAWS. 
 
 The Bloomsbtirg Act : " An act to define the 
 limits and to organize the town of Bloomsburg ;" 
 passed 4th March, 1870.— P. Laws, 343. 
 
 " Sec. 4. To the end that the electors of Blooms- 
 burg may exercise their right of suffrage freely and 
 without undue constraint, and may obtain for them- 
 selves complete representation in their local govern- 
 ment, the plan of the free vote shall be lawful, and 
 is hereby authorized in the elections for officers of 
 said town and for all officers to be chosen by them 
 exclusively : In any case where more persons than 
 one are to be chosen in said town to the same office, 
 for the same time or term of service, each voter 
 duly qualified shall be entitled to as many votes as 
 the number of persons to be so chosen, and may poll 
 his votes as follows, to wit : 
 
 "First. When two persons are to be chosen, he 
 may give one vote to each of two candidates or two 
 votes to one. 
 
 " Second. When three persons are to be chosen, he 
 may give one vote to each of three candidates, two 
 
234 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 votes to one candidate and one to another, one vote 
 and a half to each of two candidates or three votes 
 to one. 
 
 "Third. When four persons are to be chosen, he 
 may give one vote to each of four candidates, one 
 vote and one-third to each of three, two votes to 
 each of two or four votes to one. 
 
 "Fourth. When six persons are to be chosen, he 
 may give one vote to each of six candidates, one 
 vote and a half to each of four, two votes to each 
 of three, three votes to each of two or six votes to 
 one. 
 
 " In every case the candidates highest in vote shall 
 be declared elected. Whenever a voter shall intend 
 to give more votes than one or to give a fraction of 
 a vote to any candidate, he shall express his inten- 
 tion distinctly and clearly upon the face of his 
 ballot, otherwise but one vote shall be counted and 
 allowed to such candidate. This section shall ap- 
 ply to the choice of School Directors and of all 
 officers to be chosen exclusively by the electors 
 of said town, whenever its application shall be pos- 
 sible. 
 
 " Sec. 5. Vacancies in any of the offices of said 
 town may be filled by appointments to be made by 
 the Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace of Co- 
 lumbia County, except as herein otherwise provided ; 
 but any appointment so made shall be of an elector 
 of the said town who shall have voted for the officer 
 or person whose place is to be filled. . . . This 
 section shall apply to vacancies in all the offices 
 before mentioned except those of Justice of the 
 Peace and Director of Common Schools." 
 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES. 235 
 
 By the second section of the same act a Town 
 Council is to be elected annually, consisting of six 
 members chosen by the free vote, and a President 
 chosen by a majority vote ; and by the third section 
 two Constables and two Assessors of Taxes annu- 
 ally, and three town Auditors every third year. 
 By general laws two Assistant Assessors of taxes 
 are to be chosen triennially, and two Directors of 
 Common Schools each year for three year terms. 
 To the choice of all the foregoing officers, except 
 the President of the Town Council, the new plan of 
 voting applies, and it will also apply to the election 
 of Justices of the Peace of the town whenever the 
 two authorized by law shall happen to be electable 
 at the same time for the constitutional term of five 
 years. 
 
 Borough Councilmen in Northumberland 
 County: "An Act relating to the extension of 
 borough limits in Northumberland County;" 
 passed 6th April, 1870.— P. Laws, 1000. 
 
 " Sec. 1. That the number of town councilmen 
 in each of the several boroughs of Northumberland 
 County, to be hereafter chosen, except in the bor- 
 ough of Sunbury, shall be six ; and they shall be 
 chosen according to the provisions of the fourth 
 section of the act to define the limits and to organ- 
 ize the town of Bloomsburg, approved March 4th, 
 1870 ; and vacancies in their number shall be filled 
 by the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland 
 County in accordance with the provisions of the 
 fifth section of the same act." 
 
236 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 Councilmen in Borough of Milton : "An Act 
 relative to elections in the borough of Milton ;" ap- 
 proved 14th April, 1870. — P. Laws, 1177. 
 
 " Sec. 2. That the members of the town council of 
 said borough shall be chosen annually, commencing 
 with the next election, and three thereof shall be 
 chosen from each ward upon the principle of the 
 free vote as denned and fixed in the fourth section of 
 the act to define the limits and to organize the town 
 of Bloomsburg, approved March 4th, A. D. 1870, 
 and all acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith 
 are hereby repealed." 
 
 Officers in Borough Sunbury : "An Act relating 
 to elections in the borough of Sunbury ;" approved 
 Uth April, 1870.— P. Laws, 1178. 
 
 " Sec. 1. That in elections hereafter held in the 
 borough of Sunbury for borough or ward officers, 
 whenever two or more persons are to be chosen to 
 the same office for the same term of service, each 
 voter may at his discretion bestow his votes upon 
 one or more candidates less in number than the 
 whole number of persons to be chosen in the man- 
 ner provided in the fourth section of the act to de- 
 fine the limits and to organize the town of Blooms- 
 burg, passed at the present session, and the candi- 
 dates highest in vote shall be declared elected : 
 Provided, That inspectors of election shall be chosen 
 as heretofore, and that directors of common schools 
 shall be considered and held to be borough officers 
 within the meaning of this act." 
 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES. 237 
 
 Boeough Officers in Berwick: "An Act sup- 
 plementary to the several acts relating to the bor- 
 ough of Berwick in the County of Columbia ;" 
 approved 13^A Hay, 1870. 
 
 "Sec. 1. That the number of town councilmen to 
 be hereafter chosen at elections in the borough of 
 Berwick, Columbia County, shall be six ; and that 
 all elections in said borough for the choice of bor- 
 ough officers and for the choice of directors of com- 
 mon schools, and all appointments and elections to 
 fill vacancies in the offices of said borough, shall be 
 according to the fourth and fifth sections of the act 
 to define the limits and to organize the town of 
 Bloomsburg, approved 4th March, 1870 : Provided, 
 however, That this section shall not apply to the 
 choice of inspectors of election for said borough." 
 
 Directors for the Bloom Poor District : "An 
 Act to regulate the election of directors of the 
 poor for the Bloom district in Columbia County ;" 
 approved 28th March, 1870. — P. Laws, 611. 
 
 "Sec. 1. That on the second Tuesday of October 
 next, and every third year thereafter at the time of 
 township elections under general laws, the qualified 
 electors of Bloomsburg and of the several townships 
 which shall have become a part of the Bloom district 
 for the support and maintenance of the poor, shall 
 elect three persons to be directors of the poor for said 
 district, whose terms of service shall commence upon 
 the first day of April next following their election, 
 and continue for three years. 
 
 " Sec. 2. In all elections of said directors, whether 
 
238 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 for regular terms or to fill vacancies, each voter may 
 distribute his votes to and among candidates as he 
 shall think fit, or may bestow them all upon one 
 candidate; and where three directors are to be 
 chosen he may give one vote and a half to each of 
 two candidates ; in all cases the candidates highest 
 in vote shall be chosen. . . . 
 
 " Sec. 3. Whenever a single vacancy shall occur 
 or exist in said board of directors, the Court of Quar- 
 ter Sessions of the Peace of Columbia County shall 
 fill the same for the whole remaining part of the un- 
 expired term in question, by appointing some fit and 
 competent person from among the electors of said 
 poor district who shall have voted for the director 
 whose place is to be filled." 
 
 School Directors in Certain Districts. — By 
 an act approved 10th February, 1871, (P. Laws, 41,) 
 it was provided, " That hereafter in the election of 
 School Directors in the Twenty-second, Twenty- 
 fourth, and Twenty-seventh Wards of the City of 
 Philadelphia, each elector shall vote for four per- 
 sons, and the six having the highest number of votes 
 shall be declared duly elected to serve for three 
 years from the first day of January next succeeding 
 their election." 
 
 By another act, approved 2d June, 1871, (P. 
 Laws, 1351,) entitled, " An Act to change the mode 
 of electing school directors in certain townships in 
 the counties of Bradford and Susquehanna/' it was 
 provided — 
 
 "That from and after the passage of this act, 
 school directors in Smithfield township, in the 
 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES. 239 
 
 county of Bradford, and Apolorous and Franklin 
 townships, Susquehanna County, shall be chosen by 
 the electors of said districts in the manner follow- 
 ing : Whenever an even number is to be chosen, 
 each elector shall have the right to vote for one-half 
 the number to be elected, and whenever an odd 
 number is to be chosen, each elector may vote for a 
 majority of the number to be elected, and the per- 
 sons who shall receive the highest number of votes 
 to the number to be chosen, shall be declared elected, 
 and of those persons elected, the ones receiving the 
 highest number of votes shall hold their office for 
 the longest term of years." 
 
 Riverside Borough: "An<J.ct to incorporate the 
 village of Riverside, in the County of Northum- 
 berland, into a borough;" approved 4th May, 
 1871.— P. Laws, 1120. 
 
 " Sec. 10. The election of councilmen and other 
 officers of said borough, including school directors 
 and justices of the peace, shall be upon the plan of 
 the free vote, and according to the provisions of the 
 fourth section of the Bloomsburg act of 4th of 
 March, 1870, so far as the same can be applied ; and 
 the filling of vacancies in the offices of said borough 
 shall be, according to the fifth section of the same 
 act, by the court of common pleas of Northumber- 
 land county.'' 
 
 Uniontown Borough : ".A supplement to the several 
 acts relating to the borough of Uniontown, Fayette 
 County;" approved 11th May, 1871.— P. Laws, 748. 
 
 "Sec. 2. That at the next election in said borough, 
 
240 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 and annually thereafter, there shall be chosen by 
 vote at large in said borough, six members of coun- 
 cil, two assessors of taxes and two constables ; and 
 the said councilmen, assessors, and constables shal] 
 be elected under the provisions and in the manner 
 prescribed by the fourth section of the act of March 
 fourth, one thousand eight hundred and seventy, 
 entitled " An Act to define the limits and to organize 
 the town of Bloomsburg ;" and vacancies in said 
 offices shall be filled, pursuant to the provisions of 
 the fifth section of the same act, by the court of 
 quarter sessions of Fayette County. 
 
 " Sec. 3. At the next election, and annually there- 
 after, the voters of said borough shall also elect at 
 large two school directors, who shall hold their of- 
 fices for three-year terms ; and at said next election, 
 and every third year thereafter, there shall be elect- 
 ed three auditors who shall annually settle and ad- 
 just all accounts of said borough ; and the said 
 school directors and auditors shall be voted for and 
 chosen in the same manner as the officers mentioned 
 in the second section of this act." 
 
 Snydertown Borough: "An Act to erect Snyder- 
 town, in the county of Northumberland, into a 
 borough;" approved 26th May, 1871. — P. Laws, 
 1225. 
 
 " Sec. 5. That whenever two or more persons are 
 to be chosen to the same office in said borough, for 
 the same term of service, they shall be voted for 
 and chosen according to the provisions of the fourth 
 section of the Bloomsburg act of 4th of March, 
 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES. 241 
 
 1870 : Provided, however, That this section shall not 
 apply to the choice of inspectors of election." 
 
 Shamokin Borough : "An Act for the division of 
 the borough of Shamokin into two wards, and for 
 the better government of the same ;" approved 19th 
 of Hag, 1871.— P. Laws, 958. 
 
 " Sec. 7. In the election of all borough and ward 
 officers in said borough, (except inspectors of elec- 
 tion,) whenever two or more persons are to be elected 
 to the same office, for the same term of service, they 
 shall be voted for and chosen under the provision 
 of the 4th section of the Bloomsburg act of fourth 
 of March, Anno Domini one thousand eight hun- 
 dred and seventy ; and vacancies in said offices, when 
 the manner of filling them shall not be otherwise 
 provided for by law, shall be according to the fifth 
 section of the same act by the court of quarter ses- 
 sions of Northumberland County ; the manner of vo- 
 ting herein provided for shall apply to the election 
 of justices of the peace and directors of common 
 schools." 
 
 Hulmeville Borough : " An Act to incorporate the 
 borough of Hulmeville, in Bucks Countg ;" ap- 
 proved 8th March, 1872. 
 
 "Sec. 6. That all elections in said borough for 
 the choice of councilmen, town auditors, assistant 
 assessors and justices of the peace whenever two or 
 more are to be chosen at the same time and for the 
 same term of service, shall be according to the pro- 
 visions of the 4th section of the Bloomsburg act of 
 4th March, 1870, and vacancies in the said offices, 
 
 16 
 
242 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 except that of justice of the peace, shall be ac- 
 cording to the 5th section of the same act ; and all 
 elections held in said school district of Middletown 
 township and said borough of Hulmeville for the 
 choice of school directors shall also be subject to 
 and according to the provisions of the aforesaid 
 fourth section of the Bloomburg act." 
 
 School Directors in Conyngham Township, Co- 
 lumbia County : "An Act relating to the election 
 of school directors in Conyngham township, Co- 
 lumbia County ;" approved 8th Mapch, 1872. 
 
 " Sec. 1. That the provisions of the fourth section 
 of an act, entitled ' An Act to define the limits and 
 to organize the town of Bloom sburg,' approved 4th 
 March, 1870, be and the same are hereby extended 
 to the township of Conyngham in the county of 
 Columbia, so far as the same relates to the election 
 of school directors, from and after the passage of 
 this act." 
 
 Borough of Chambersburg : By an act ap- 
 proved 9th April, 1872, (P. Laws, 1011,) Chambers- 
 burg was divided into lour wards, and the second 
 section of the act makes provision for the election 
 of councilmen therefrom as follows : 
 
 " Sec. 2. The town council shall consist of two 
 members from each ward, who shall hold their of- 
 fices for the term of two years ; and in their elec- 
 tion each voter may give his two votes to one candi- 
 date, and candidates highest in vote shall be de- 
 clared elected. ..." 
 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES. 243 
 
 III. A SPECIAL STATUTE. 
 
 A CONTESTED ELECTION COMMITTEE. 
 
 A remarkable case occurred of the application of 
 the limited vote to the choice of an election com- 
 mittee, at the legislative session of 1872. By an act 
 approved 21st February, of that year, supplement- 
 ary to the general election act of 2d July, 1839, 
 provision was made for selecting in a new manner a 
 committee of seven members of the Senate to try 
 the important contested election case of McClure vs. 
 Gray. The act was as follows, omitting matter 
 irrelevant to the present purpose : 
 
 " Sec. 1. . . c That in any case of contested elec- 
 tion now pending in the Senate the committee for 
 the trial of the contest shall be selected and formed 
 by the Senate ... by choosing six members thereof 
 viva voce, each Senator voting for no more than 
 three members, and the six highest in vote shall be 
 declared selected; the remaining member of the 
 committee shall be chosen by lot in manner follow- 
 ing, to wit : The names of all the remaining Sena- 
 tors present except those of the Speaker and sitting 
 member shall be written on distinct pieces of paper 
 as nearly alike as may be, each of which shall be 
 rolled up and put into a box or urn by the Clerk of 
 the Senate or some person appointed by the Senate 
 to act in his stead, and the box or urn shall be 
 placed on the Speaker's desk ; the Clerk of the Sen- 
 ate, or person appointed to act in his stead, having 
 thoroughly shaken and intermixed said papers, shall 
 draw them out one by one, and the names of the 
 Senators so drawn shall be written down on a sepa- 
 rate list by one of the clerks until thirteen names 
 
244 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 shall have been drawn ; a separate list of the thir- 
 teen Senators so drawn shall be given to each of 
 the parties to the contest, who shall, accompanied 
 by the Clerk or other person appointed to act in his 
 stead, immediately withdraw to some adjoining 
 room, where they shall proceed to strike off al- 
 ternately the names upon said list until but one 
 name shall be left thereon ; and the Senator whose 
 name shall remain shall be the seventh member of 
 the committee. 
 
 "Sec. 3. Any vacancy occurring in said com- 
 mittee shall be filled as follows : If such vacancy 
 shall be of a member chosen by the votes of Sena- 
 tors, it shall be filled by a new appointment made 
 in open Senate, by the same or by a majority of the 
 same Senators who shall have voted for the member 
 whose place is to be filled ; if such vacancy shall be 
 of the seventh member of the' committee chosen as 
 aforesaid by lot and challenge, his place shall be 
 filled in the same manner as that in which the said 
 seventh member shall have been chosen, all the 
 names of the qualified members present being first 
 placed in the box or urn for the purpose of selec- 
 tion ; and any member chosen to fill a vacancy shall 
 be duly sworn, and shall perform all the duties and 
 possess all the poAvers of an original member of the 
 committee from the time of his selection : In no 
 case of the selection of a committee or of the filling 
 of a vacancy shall the sitting member be permitted 
 to vote, and in case of the absence or refusal to act 
 of the contestant or of the sitting member, the 
 Senate shall appoint some proper person to act in 
 his stead." 
 
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES. 245 
 
 The foregoing plan for selecting an election committee is 
 believed to be much superior to the Grenville plan, borrowed 
 from parliamentary practice, which has heretofore obtained in 
 Pennsylvania, and is prescribed by the general election law of 
 1839. By the latter, all the members of a committee are 
 drawn by lot and challenge, and it may happen that all of 
 them will be members of one political party, thus exclud- 
 ing all certainty of thorough investigation in the trial, as 
 well as an impartial decision. So, too, the very extended 
 allowance of challenge by the old plan makes it probable in 
 any given case that the ablest members of the body upon both 
 sides will be excluded from service on the committee, leaving 
 the committee to be composed of weaker and less independent 
 members. 
 
 LOCAL ELECTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA 
 UNDER REFORMED VOTING. 
 
 Undeb, the Pennsylvania statutes for reformed 
 voting, just given, there have been numerous elec- 
 tions held within the last two or three years. From 
 among these a few are selected to illustrate the 
 practical working of the new plan. They are cases 
 in which there were disturbing influences, interfer- 
 ing with regular party action, but yet all of which 
 resulted in fair representation of the people. They 
 furnish evidence of the practicability of the new 
 plan under any combination of circumstances likely 
 to occur, and they further prove that not only does 
 the new plan give to every respectable interest its 
 due representation, but it also eliminates from elec- 
 tion contests most of the soreness and bad blood 
 which commonly attend them. It has this latter 
 effect, because under it there are but few beaten 
 candidates, no party or interest usually putting up 
 
246 PKOPOKTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 more persons to be voted for than it has votes to 
 elect. 
 
 If the subjoined cases prove that the new plan 
 works justly and well in the turmoil and excitement 
 of irregular or exceptional election contests, it is 
 manifest that its operation in all ordinary cases must 
 be still more satisfactory and complete. 
 
 Bloomsbueg Town Election for Councilmen : 
 The first election held in Bloomsburg under the 
 new plan of voting was on April 12, 1870, and the 
 following was the result : 
 
 For President of the Council : 
 
 Votes. 
 
 Elias Mendenhall 213 
 
 Robert F, Clark 202 
 
 Majority 11 
 
 For Councilmen : 
 
 William B. Koons 393} 
 
 Frederick C. Eyer 362} 
 
 Stephen Knorr 297 
 
 Joseph Sharpless 392 
 
 Caleb Barton 364 
 
 Charles G. Bark ley 429 
 
 Simon C. Shive 260} 
 
 Scattering 353 
 
 Republicans in italic. The regular Democratic 
 ticket had upon it the names of Koons, Eyer and 
 Knorr, with two votes to each, and was successful, 
 although votes were diverted from the two latter to 
 Shive and Barkley, Democrats, originally named 
 upon the Opposition People's ticket. For originally 
 the People's ticket was formed with the four names 
 
PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL ELECTIONS. 247 
 
 upon it of Sharpless, Barton, Barkley and Shive, or 
 two from each party. 
 
 But as in the course of the voting it appeared 
 probable that a fourth man could not be carried 
 upon the People's ticket, there was a partial drop- 
 ping of Shive and concentration upon Barkley, 
 which accounts mostly for the ultimate disparity of 
 votes between those two candidates. The formation 
 of a people's ticket in the manner above mentioned, 
 with Mendenhall for President of the Council, no 
 doubt resulted in the election of the latter, although 
 it was unsuccessful in defeating any of the regular 
 candidates for Councilmen nominated by the Demo- 
 cratic majority in the town ; but as the President is 
 a member of the Council, the general result was ex- 
 actly right as between parties, the political majority 
 in the town having four and the minority three in 
 the Council, representing fairly the political opinions 
 as well as the personal preferences of the citizens. 
 In the case of this election the new plan was sub- 
 jected to a severe test by reason of irregular party 
 action in the formation of a combined or people's 
 ticket, but it vindicated itself in a just and proper 
 result. The weakest candidate only upon the com- 
 bined ticket was beaten, and each party obtained 
 ultimately its appropriate measure of representation 
 in the government of the town. 
 
 A Second Election in Bloomsbukg : A second 
 election in the town for the choice of other town offi- 
 cers beside Councilmen, was held on the second Tues- 
 day of October, 1870, in connection with the general 
 election. There were to be chosen two Constables ; 
 
248 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 two Assessors of taxes ; two assistant Assessors ; 
 two School Directors and three Town Auditors, be- 
 side the usual officers of election for the two dis- 
 tricts of East and West Bloomsburg, and a Justice 
 of the Peace to fill a vacancy. Omitting the latter 
 officers from further notice, as they were electable 
 under former laws, we proceed to explain how those 
 chosen under the Bloomsburg Act were voted for 
 and elected. 
 
 Each party nominated a ticket in the same form. 
 The Democratic ticket was as follows : 
 
 Constable— Martin C. Woodward, 2 votes. 
 Assessor — John K. Grotz, 2 votes. 
 Assistant Assessor— Frederick C. Eyer, 2 votes. 
 School Director— Charles W. Miller, 2 votes. 
 Town Auditors— John B. Casey, li votes, B. 
 Frank Zarr, li votes. 
 
 The Republican ticket being arranged in the 
 same manner, with other names, it was certain from 
 the outset that all the candidates of both parties 
 would be elected except one of those for Auditor. 
 The majority w^oulcl carry two Auditors and the 
 minority but one. There was, therefore, very 
 smooth work in the election of local officers ; an ab- 
 sence of animosity and sharp management; no 
 trading of votes and no necessity to struggle for a 
 majority in order to avoid defeat and virtual dis- 
 franchisement. Each party obtained its share of 
 the town offices by its own votes. 
 
 We append the vote for the several candidates. 
 
 Constables. 
 
 Martin C.Woodward 753 
 
 BaltzerT. Laycock 368 
 
PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL ELECTIONS. 249 
 
 Assessors. 
 
 JolmK.Grotz 498 
 
 Joseph Sharpless 654 
 
 Assistant Assessors. 
 
 Frederick C. Eyer , 494 
 
 Samuel Shaffer, Sr 640 
 
 School Directors. 
 
 Charles W. Miller 502 
 
 Jacob K. Edgar 628 
 
 Town Auditors. 
 
 John B. Casey 367* 
 
 B. Frank Zarr 366 
 
 F. P. Drinker 490* 
 
 Ephraim P. Lutz 48H 
 
 All the above were elected except the one lowest 
 in vote for Auditor ; the Republicans in italic. 
 
 The very large vote given to Mr. Woodward for 
 re-election as Constable was intended as a compli- 
 ment to an officer of unusual merit, whose vigilance 
 in the preservation of order in the town, and fidelity 
 in the performance of his other duties, had attracted 
 to him a large measure of public confidence and ap- 
 proval. It will be observed that at the foregoing 
 election the ordinary political minority of the town 
 had in fact the majority of the votes polled, as the 
 general election which accompanied the town elec- 
 tion at that time was not an exciting one, and there 
 was a sluggish vote of the majority party. It is 
 evident therefore that under the old plan of voting 
 the party ordinarily in the minority in the town 
 would have swept all the offices voted for except one 
 
250 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 constable, and would have deprived their opponents 
 almost entirely of representation, so far as represen- 
 tation was dependent upon that election. But at 
 the very next election, on the old plan of voting, a 
 similar injustice would have been inflicted, though 
 in exactly the opposite direction ; the Republican 
 minority would have lost every office voted for, and 
 the majority have seized them all, whereas under 
 the new plan, at both elections, each party obtained 
 its just share. 
 
 Sunbury Election of October, 1870 : At that 
 election most of the borough and ward officers be- 
 ing electable under the new plan of voting, there 
 was a partial division of them between parties. The 
 Chief Burgess and the Second Burgess were re- 
 spectively voted for at large, under the majority rule, 
 and were of course carried by the Republican ma- 
 jority of the town. But to most of the other offi- 
 cers the new rule applied. Each of the two wards 
 elect annually two assistant Burgesses and four 
 members of the Town Council, beside their proper 
 Ward officers. We give some results in the West 
 Ward from the election returns, which show, how- 
 ever, only the votes given to candidates who were 
 elected ; (Republicans in italic :) 
 
 WEST WARD. 
 
 Republican, 247; Democratic, 110. 
 Assistant Burgesses, (2) . — John Bourne, 277 ; 
 George Hill, 217. 
 
 Councilmen, (4).— K F. Lightner, 306; J. W. 
 
PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL ELECTIONS. 251 
 
 F riling, 293 ; Jacob Renn, 273 ; Thomas M. Pur- 
 sell, 219. 
 
 Overseers of the Poor, (2). — Fred. Merrill, 
 237 ; P. F. Zimmerman, 210. 
 
 Street Commissioners, (2). — Chas. Gossler, 252 
 Charles F. Martin, 236. 
 
 In the East Ward, (Republican, 210, Democratic, 
 107,) the minority carried one of the four Council- 
 men and one or two of the other officers. 
 
 In the voting given above, the Democrats in each 
 case generally gave two votes to one candidate, but 
 in the case of four Councilmen, the Republicans 
 gave one vote and one-third to each of three, and 
 the Democrats four votes to one. 
 
 Election of Councilmen in Northumberland 
 Borough. — In Northumberland Borough, at the 
 October election, 1870, there was a Republican ma- 
 jority of 10 for Burgess. Very properly each party 
 nominated only three Councilmen, although six 
 were to be chosen, because the free vote applied to 
 the election of those officers. The result was that 
 the Democrats, giving each two votes to each of 
 their three candidates, elected them, but one of the 
 Republican candidates w r as beaten by a Republican 
 Volunteer. As this case illustrates the working of 
 the free vote, the facts will be stated as they are 
 understood to have occurred. At the Republican 
 meeting to nominate Councilmen, a gentleman who 
 expected to be nominated was defeated by the arts 
 or influence of a personal enemy, who immediately 
 afterwards boasted of the achievement. The friends 
 of the beaten man became indignant and concluded 
 
252 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 to rectify the injustice done, by electing him as an 
 independent candidate. The free vote afforded 
 them the ready means of accomplishing their pur- 
 pose, and they proceeded at the election to vote 
 plumpers of six votes for their friend and carried 
 him through the contest triumphantly. Without 
 disturbing the results of the election generally, 
 they carried their man and secured representation 
 for themselves in the council according to their 
 desire. 
 
 Bolting a nomination under the new plan means, 
 then, that commonly the bolters can obtain their due 
 share of power and no more, and that the whole 
 election cannot be turned upside down or changed 
 throughout by them. One-sixth of the voters of 
 Northumberland can elect one Councilman, but they 
 cannot disturb the other voters of the town in 
 choosing the remaining five. Under the old ma- 
 jority rule the bolters would have been compelled 
 to form a combination with the opposite party, or to 
 trade or buy votes, in order to succeed ; the whole 
 election w r ould probably have been muddled or 
 disgraced, and one party or the other would have 
 carried more than its share of the officers to be 
 elected. The new plan insures justice to all, pre- 
 vents intrigue and corruption, preserves the orderly 
 action of parties, cuts off the main mischiefs of 
 bolting, and encourages the selection of good men 
 as candidates. 
 
 We append the vote for Councilmen in full : 
 
 Wm. T. Forsyth 328 
 
 James Tool 301 
 
 A. H. Stone 291 
 
PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL ELECTIONS. 253 
 
 Win. H. Leighow 319 
 
 Benj. Heckert 224 
 
 James McClure 207 
 
 Hiram Young, Ind 561 
 
 Eepublicans in italic. McClure being the lowest, 
 was the defeated candidate. 
 
 Election of Directors of the Poor for the 
 Bloom Poor District. — At the election held in 
 October, 1870, for three Directors of the Poor, under 
 the special act of March 28th of that year, the voting 
 was as follows : 
 
 Miller. Kramer. Tkeler. Schuyler. 
 
 Bloomsburg, East... 232* 222 2261 163* 
 
 Bloonisburg, West... 132 123 223 } 180 
 
 Greenwood 227 235* 346} 127i 
 
 Sugarloaf. 180 180 12 10* 
 
 Scott 115} 145} 3642 12 
 
 923 906 1173 493} 
 
 Stephen H. Miller and William Kramer, Demo- 
 crats, and Johnson H. Ikeler, Republican, were 
 therefore elected for three -year terms commencing 
 on the first day of April following. These officers 
 being chosen on the plan of the free vote, it was 
 inevitable that they would be divided between the 
 two political parties according to a just principle of 
 representation ; the majority in the district would 
 be able to elect two and the minority one. The 
 Democrats therefore voted tickets in the following 
 form : 
 
 " Stephen H. Miller, li votes ; 
 William Kramer, li votes." 
 
254 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 The Republicans nominated two candidates also, 
 and tickets for them were prepared in the same 
 form ; but as they had not votes enough to elect 
 both they finally concentrated their vote mainly 
 upon Ikeler, as shown in the above return. The 
 election at last became to them a question of choice 
 or preference between their own candidates, and the 
 result proved that they preferred Ikeler. It is here 
 shown that the free vote not only divides offices 
 fairly between parties, but enables voters of either 
 party, in certain cases, to choose between their own 
 nominees and to correct any blunder made in their 
 nomination. The truth is, that the new plan of 
 voting is so flexible as well as just that it readily 
 adapts itself to any state of facts at an election, and 
 gives to the voter that complete freedom of action 
 which is necessary to his judicious exercise of the 
 right of suffrage. In this case, where three Direct- 
 ors of the Poor were to be chosen, allowing each 
 voter to give his three votes to one, two, or three 
 candidates, as he might think fit, enabled each 
 party to take what belonged to it and to handle its 
 votes in the most convenient and effectual manner 
 to that end ; and it also afforded the ready means 
 of correcting a blunder made in the selection of 
 candidates. This election also furnishes evidence 
 of the convenience and accuracy with which frac- 
 tional votes may be joolled, counted, and returned in 
 all cases where their use shall be found desirable. 
 
 Scoring of Fractional Votes. — An ordinary 
 and convenient mode of tallying or counting tickets 
 containing fractional votes which has obtained in 
 
PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL ELECTIONS. 255 
 
 the local elections above referred to, and in others, 
 may here be properly presented. 
 
 When tickets containing one and a half votes to 
 each of two candidates are to be counted by election 
 officers, the fraction may be disregarded in the first 
 instance, and the tickets only scored upon the tally 
 lists, the sum of the fractions being added at the 
 end of the score, as already explained in another 
 place. In a given case of forty such tickets polled, 
 the score will stand as follows : 
 
 John Jones, (5) W. M. §& M . . =40+20=60 votes. 
 
 w ml Tm rW Till 
 
 William Brown, @ ^^^^^r 4 ^ 2 ^ 60 votes « 
 
 If in addition to tickets containing fractional 
 votes, a candidate shall have polled for him tickets 
 containing whole votes alone, the latter may be 
 scored separately above the line containing the 
 fractional votes, and be carried out and added at 
 the right. Thus if he shall receive, in addition to 
 votes scored as above, twenty whole votes uncon- 
 nected with fractions, the score or tally may be 
 made as follows : 
 
 TrU W >><2 o 
 
 ml 
 
 til TH1 THJL W 
 
 John Jones, ® ^j^^ I =40+20=60=80 votes. 
 
 Other modes of keeping the tally lists may be 
 resorted to at the discretion of election officers, but 
 those above are given because they have some sanc- 
 tion from practice, and because by their use economy 
 of space is consulted in the making up of returns. 
 
256 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, 
 
 NOMINATIONS TO OFFICE. 
 
 Good plans for nominating candidates to office are 
 almost as important, and deserve consideration almost 
 as much, as good plans for electing them. In this 
 place it is therefore proposed to notice two recent 
 plans of nomination which have been applied in 
 Pennsylvania to the selection of nominees for 
 county offices. They are both popular-vote plans, 
 and the purpose of both is to avoid the evils which 
 ordinarily attend upon representative conventions. 
 The one is known as the "Crawford County 
 System," and the other as the " Columbia County 
 Plan ;" so named from the counties in which they 
 respectively originated and were first put in force. 
 
 By the Crawford County plan, the voters at 
 primary elections vote directly for candidates for 
 nomination ; from each election district a return 
 judge conveys the return of his district to a joint 
 meeting of return judges for the county; in the 
 joint meeting of those judges the returns are cast 
 up and candidates highest in vote for each office are 
 declared the nominees. Of all bad plans, accepted 
 in recent practice, this is unquestionably the worst, 
 and yet to men of little reflection and narrow expe- 
 rience, it seems fair, reasonable, judicious and just. 
 Hence it has been adopted in many counties in 
 place of the old convention plan. The main objec- 
 tions to it are these : That it produces, inevitably, 
 expensive contests for nomination; that it tends 
 strongly to fraudulent voting and fraudulent returns ; 
 that it makes success very often dependent upon 
 
NOMINATIONS TO OFFICE. 257 
 
 intrigue between candidates whereby voters are 
 deceived; that it shamefully disregards and puts 
 ojDen contempt upon the doctrine that the majority 
 shall rule ; that it leads to embarrassment of voters 
 and to blunders in voting by reason of ignorance 
 among voters of the relative strength of candidates, 
 and lastly, that it substitutes a feeble body of 
 return judges (who hardly bear a representative 
 character) for a regular, strong convention, for the 
 transaction of other party business beside the 
 making of nominations. Of course it multiplies 
 candidates, exasperates popular j) a ssions, and de- 
 grades the whole tone of party action. :|: 
 
 But the Columbia County plan of nomination is 
 a popular-vote plan of a different character, and 
 challenges attention and respect, because it retains 
 
 * The -working of the "Crawford County system" as a nominating 
 plan was well shown in the Democratic nominations for Northumberland 
 County, in 1871. It was in force there, at that time, and exhibited some 
 of its worst features. Hundreds of false or unpolled votes were reported 
 to control results, and were, almost of necessity, received and counted at 
 the meeting of the return judges ; for one imperfection of the plan is 
 that it provides no means for the investigation and correction of the 
 frauds which it invites. Upon the face of the returns of votes for the 
 respective candidates for the several offices, at the primary elections, it 
 further appeared that each of the nominees (save one) had less than one- 
 half the total vote and one of them less than one-third. 
 
 Analyzing the vote we get the following exhibit : 
 
 President Judge. — For nominee, 1408, for other candidates, 2399. 
 
 Representative. — For nominee, 1585, for other candidates, 2275. 
 
 Associate Judge. — For nominee, 1349, for other candidates, 2219. 
 
 Treasurer. — For nominee, 983, for other candidates, 2461. 
 
 Commissioner. — For nominee, 1273, for other candidates, 2074. 
 
 This is indeed minority representation with a vengeance ! But it was 
 unavoidable under the plurality rule. 
 
 It only remains to state, that the whole ticket set up in this very 
 objectionable way was beaten, and that the plan of nomination which 
 produced the disaster was forthwith abolished, and the convention plan 
 restored with proportional representation of districts. 
 17 
 
258 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 the feature of a convention well constituted for 
 work, and because it applies the principle of 
 reformed voting very thoroughly to the nomination 
 of candidates. The rules which embody and give 
 form to this plan are not supposed to be perfect — in 
 fact, it is evident that they might be improved in 
 construction, and made much more comprehensive 
 and complete — but as the first formal attempt to 
 secure proportional representation in a nominating 
 body chosen by popular votes, they may claim a 
 place in this volume, and justify the comments and 
 exposition which will follow them. 
 
 Eules of Nomination in Columbia County: — 
 
 Adopted Dec. 26, 1870. 
 
 " I. The annual county convention shall be held 
 at the Court House in Bloomsburg on the second 
 Tuesday of August, at one o'clock, P. M., and the 
 delegate elections shall be held on the Saturday 
 before at the places of holding the general elections 
 in the several election districts, between the hours 
 of three and seven o'clock in the afternoon. 
 
 "II. The representation of districts in county 
 convention shall be in proportion to the party vote 
 of each, as cast at the most recent election for 
 Governor, but the whole number of delegates shall 
 not exceed seventy nor be less than fifty-four, and 
 no district shall be allowed less than two or more 
 than four delegates. 
 
 " III. Until the next election for Governor, dele- 
 gates shall be allowed to districts upon a ratio of 
 sixty voters for a delegate, allowance being made 
 for the largest fractions of a ratio. 
 
COLUMBIA CO. KULES CF NOMINATION. 259 
 
 "IV. The Standing Committee shall, whenever 
 necessary, make an apportionment of delegates to 
 the several districts under these rules, and publish 
 it, together with the rules, in the party newspapers 
 of the County, at least two weeks before each 
 annual convention. 
 
 " V. Voters at delegate elections may give their 
 votes to a smaller number of candidates than the 
 wdiole number to be elected in the manner pro- 
 vided in the fourth section of the Bloomsburg act 
 of 4th of March, 1870. 
 
 "VI. The delegate elections shall be by ballot, 
 and shall be held and conducted by a judge and 
 clerk, . . . and the said officers shall keep a list 
 of voters, and tally of votes counted, to be sent by 
 them to the Convention with their certificate of the 
 result of the election. 
 
 " VII. All cases of disputed seats in Convention 
 shall be disposed of openly by vote after hearing 
 the respective claimants and their evidence. 
 
 " VIII. All delegates must reside in the districts 
 they represent. In case of an absent delegate he 
 may depute another to serve in his stead. . . . 
 
 "IX. The voting in Convention shall be open, 
 and any two members may require the yeas and 
 nays on any question pending." 
 
 Kule 10 authorizes special Conventions to be called by the 
 Standing Committee. Kule 11 provides that all County nomi- 
 nations and appointments of district conferees and delegates to 
 State conventions shall be made in County Convention. 
 
 " XII. The Standing Committee shall consist of 
 one member from each election district, who shall 
 be elected by the people at the delegate elections, 
 
260 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 who shall choose their own Chairman, and any five 
 of them shall be a quorum when called together by 
 the Chairman. 
 
 "XIII. No member of the Legislature shall be 
 chosen by this county as a delegate to a State Con- 
 vention during his term of office. 
 
 " XIV. In Convention a majority of all the votes 
 given shall be necessary to a nomination, and no 
 person named shall be peremptorily struck from the 
 list of candidates until after the fourth vote, when 
 the lowest name shall be struck off, and so on at each 
 successive vote until a nomination shall be effected. 
 
 " XV. Delegates instructed by the voters who select 
 them shall obey their instructions in Convention, 
 and votes given by them in violation of their in- 
 structions shall be disallowed by the Convention. 
 All instructions shall be reported by the election 
 officers. 
 
 "XVI. Conventions shall be called to order by 
 the Chairman of the Standing Committee, or in his 
 absence by some other member thereof, who shall 
 entertain and put to vote motions for the election 
 of a President and two Secretaries for purposes of 
 temporary organ ization." 
 
 Rule 17. No person shall be eligible to a nomination who 
 has opposed the ticket of his party at the next preceding elec- 
 tion. Rule 18. Any voter may be challenged who has voted 
 against his party at a Federal or State election within two years, 
 or opposed his party ticket at the last preceding election, or 
 has taken or agreed to take money or any valuable considera- 
 tion for his vote at the delegate election, or has corrupted or 
 attempted to corrupt any voter of the district at such election. 
 Rule 19. If it shall be made to appear that any candidate for 
 nomination has paid or promised any consideration to any 
 
COLUMBIA CO. EULES OF NOMINATION. 261 
 
 delegate to influence his vote, or that the same has been done 
 by another with his approbation, the name of such candidate 
 shall be struck from the list of candidates, or if already nomi- 
 nated his name shall be struck from the ticket and another 
 nomination be made, and he shall be ineligible as a candidate 
 or delegate for two years. Rule 20. Any delegate who shall 
 receive, or accept the promise of, any consideration for him- 
 self or for another for his vote or influence in Convention, 
 shall on proof of the fact be forthwith expelled from the Con- 
 vention (by a majority vote), and shall be ineligible for any 
 nomination or to serve as a delegate for two years. Rule 21. 
 A two-thirds vote in a regular annual Convention is required 
 to alter or amend any of the Rules. 
 
 In Convention, August 8, 1871, the following 
 additional Rule was unanimously adopted : — 
 
 " XXII. Candidates for nomination may be voted 
 for directly at the Delegate Elections, and shall re- 
 ceive delegate or district votes in Convention in pro- 
 portion to their popular vote in the several districts, 
 upon the same principle on which delegates are 
 electable under the 5th rule." 
 
 OBSERVATIONS ON THE COLUMBIA 
 COUNTY RULES OF NOMINATION. 
 
 Representation of Districts. — The maximum 
 of four and minimum of two delegates to each dis- 
 trict, are judiciously fixed for several reasons. First, 
 The number of districts to be represented being 
 twenty-seven, the result is a representative body of 
 convenient size : Second, The numbers two, three 
 and four are convenient ones for the application of 
 
262 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 the new plan of voting in the selection of delegates : 
 Third, Liberal representation of the smallest dis- 
 tricts, and a limitation upon the representation of 
 the largest ones, gives play to the principle of terri- 
 torial representation, (as distinguished from that of 
 mere numbers,) without carrying it to excess, and 
 in the particular case in hand avoided the dissatis- 
 faction which would have been produced in the 
 smaller districts by a reduction of their representa- 
 tion in Convention. (Before the new rules were 
 adopted in 1870, each district, without regard to the 
 magnitude of its vote, was entitled to two delegates.) 
 But in the case of a county much larger or much 
 smaller than Columbia, good reasons may exist for 
 adopting a different scale of representative numbers. 
 Where the districts to be represented are but few in 
 number, as many as six or eight delegates might be 
 allowed to some of the largest ones ; while in the 
 case of a great county, with numerous electoral di- 
 visions, the smallest districts might be limited to one 
 delegate each. It is true that in such case propor- 
 tional representation could not be secured for such 
 small districts along with separate representation, 
 but the evil of over- representation in convention — 
 of an unwieldy representative body — may be 
 greater than that of partial disfranchisement of dis- 
 trict electors by the majority vote. Besides, it is 
 evident that in the case of single districts, (i. e. dis- 
 tricts with but one delegate,) the evils of the major- 
 ity vote are at their minimum ; the disfranchise- 
 ment is always likely to be much less in such than 
 in plural districts where the total number of voters 
 must be greater. And, practically, in any ordinary 
 
COLUMBIA CO. RULES OF NOMINATION. 263 
 
 case, it will be found that delegates in convention 
 from single districts will constitute but a small per- 
 centage of the whole Convention membership, and 
 will not constitute a great disturbing force opposed 
 to the reformatory action of the new plan. 
 
 That proportional representation of districts in 
 nominating conventions is a great improvement 
 over equal district representation therein, will not 
 be questioned by any one when the objection of 
 minority disfranchisement in large districts has been 
 removed. For if the representation of large dis- 
 tricts is broken up, or divided between parties or 
 candidates by the free vote, the vote of those dis- 
 tricts will not ordinarily overwhelm or swamp the 
 smaller ones in Convention and give to the former 
 absolute control of the nominations to be made. 
 
 The Free Vote for Delegates. — The 5th Rule 
 given above is the first application ever made of the 
 free vote to primary elections connected with nomi- 
 nations for public office, and it has been found to be 
 most satisfactory upon trial. The scale of represen- 
 tation under it is not difficult of ascertainment or 
 remembrance. In a district entitled to two dele- 
 gates, any number of voters exceeding one-third of 
 the whole can elect one delegate, and, exceeding two- 
 thirds, both. In a district of three delegates, any 
 number of voters exceeding one-fourth can elect one 
 delegate, exceeding two-fourths (or one-half) two, 
 and exceeding three-fourths, all three. In a dis- 
 trict" of four delegates, any number of voters' ex- 
 ceeding one-fifth can elect one, exceeding two-fifths, 
 two, exceeding three-fifths, three, and exceeding 
 four-fifths, all four. In each case the denominator 
 
264 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 of the fraction is one number above the total dele- 
 gate number. For the plan upon which votes may 
 be actually cast to realize these results, reference 
 may be had to the 4th section of the Bloomsburg 
 act to be found at a prior page of this volume. 
 
 It is to be remembered constantly that the new 
 plan of voting is not compulsory. It is permissive 
 merely, and need not be resorted to in all cases. 
 Whenever there is an understanding between can- 
 didates, or among the voters of a district, as to the 
 persons who shall be elected delegates, a common 
 ticket may be used by all the voters, and cumula- 
 tion of votes be dispensed with. The right to 
 cumulate must however exist with the voter in 
 order to his certain obtainment in any case of just 
 representation by the concession or agreement of 
 his co-electors of the district. 
 
 Instruction of Delegates. — The 15th rule is 
 superseded in part by the new or 22d rule, but yet 
 invites examination because it presents a clear case 
 of unwisdom in stopping short of the ultimate point 
 to which a sound principle of reform would lead us. 
 The 5th rule having provided a just plan for the 
 selection of delegates, it was seen that the old prac- 
 tice of voting district instructions by a majority 
 would no longer work. It would not do, for in- 
 stance, to allow a minority in a district to elect a 
 delegate and then permit the majority to instruct 
 him. Thereupon, the attempt was made to har- 
 monize the old practice of instruction' with the'new 
 voting rule by a modification of the former, ex- 
 pressed by the words italicized by us in the 15th 
 Rule. " Delegates instructed by the voters who select 
 
COLUMBIA CO. KULES OF NOMINATION. 265 
 
 them shall obey their instructions in Convention," 
 &c. By this clause it was intended that election 
 officers should report separately instructions voted 
 by majority and minority voters to the delegates 
 elected by them respectively and not combine them 
 in the return. But by this device simplicity was 
 sacrificed to some extent, while questions of difficulty 
 connected with the old plan of voting instructions 
 remained uncorrected. 
 
 The Popular Vote for Candidates. — By the 
 new or 22d rule, authorizing a direct vote by the 
 people for candidates, all the advantages of the old 
 plan of voting instructions are retained, while its 
 inconveniences are wholly avoided. It is perhaps 
 the most perfect rule ever devised for taking the 
 sense of the people upon nominations for office ; for 
 it is convenient, effectual, popular and just, and 
 stands free from all the objections which condemn 
 other plans of popular-vote nomination, and espe- 
 cially the plan known as the " Crawford County 
 System." 
 
 But here a brief explanation of its practical 
 working — or of the manner in which it is applied — 
 is necessary to its full comprehension ; and such 
 explanation can be best made by tracing the pro- 
 ceeding of nomination under the rules in its suc- 
 cessive stages from its commencement at the elec- 
 tion of delegates to its consummation in county 
 Convention. 
 
 1. The officers who hold a delegate election in 
 any district are provided with election blanks or 
 papers on which they keep a list of the persons who 
 vote, and score tallies or counts at the close of the 
 
266 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 election of all votes polled, whether for delegates or 
 candidates for nomination, and these papers, with 
 returns certified, are transmitted by the election of- 
 ficers to the county Convention. 
 
 2. The voters at such election vote sheet or slip 
 tickets (ordinarily printed or partly printed) for 
 delegates, and for candidates for nomination to the 
 several offices to be filled ; but as the free vote ap- 
 plies to the choice of delegates by virtue of Rule 5, 
 any voter may cumulate his delegate votes on one 
 or more delegate candidates in the manner provided 
 in the 4th section of the Bloomsburg act. 
 
 3. Returns of the votes cast in each district for 
 candidates for nomination being produced before the 
 county Convention when it meets, it can be readily 
 ascertained how many district or delegate votes in 
 Convention each candidate is entitled to, and in fact 
 the record can be made up from the returns by a 
 Secretary or Clerk and announced by the presiding 
 officer. But if the districts be called over the vote 
 of each must be reported correctly by the Delegates 
 and recorded by the Convention officers, for the for- 
 mer are bound by the loth rule to obey the virtual 
 instructions of the home-voting, and the 22nd rule 
 is imperative as to the principle on which district or 
 delegate votes shall be assigned to candidates by the 
 convention. 
 
 What is material to observe here, is, that the 
 popular vote polled in any district is not reported in 
 order to be itself counted upon the result in Con- 
 vention ; it is simply reported to direct and control 
 the casting of the Convention votes to which the 
 district is entitled. There is, therefore, no motive 
 
COLUMBIA CO. EULES OF NOMINATION. 267 
 
 to swell the popular vote in a district in order to in- 
 crease its power or influence in nominations, and 
 hence a fertile cause of fraud inherent in other 
 plans of popular-vote nomination is entirely ex- 
 cluded. 
 
 4. If upon a report of the district voting through- 
 out the county it shall appear that any candidate 
 is entitled to a majority of Convention votes, his 
 nomination will of course be forthwith recorded and 
 announced. 
 
 0. If no candidate shall be entitled to a Conven- 
 tion majority by virtue of the district voting re- 
 ported, the Convention will proceed to make or per- 
 fect a nomination. This is most conveniently done 
 by calling over the districts in alphabetical order 
 and receiving the vote of each from its delegates; 
 in other words, the vote is taken by districts, as it 
 is taken in national conventions by States. But 
 still the delegates from any district must report or 
 give their votes according to the home-vote in their 
 district ; they must still obey their home instructions 
 and execute the twenty-second rule. But from this 
 obligation as to some of the candidates, they will be 
 at once or presently discharged by the declination 
 or withdrawal of candidates, or by the striking off 
 of names lowest on the list of candidates, under the 
 fourteenth rule. By one or the other, or both of 
 these means, delegates from districts will have some 
 of their votes freed, and can bestow them according 
 to their best judgment, thus securing a nomination 
 within a reasonable time. The idea is, that a can- 
 didate shall be entitled to all the Convention votes 
 which the people have ordered to be given to him, 
 
268 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 so long as he remains before the Convention; but 
 when he is no longer before it, the vote pledged to 
 him may be cast freely for others. 
 
 6. Necessarily the delegates from a district must 
 cast the freed vote or votes of their district accord- 
 ing to the decision of a majority of their number, 
 except in one case, to wit : when all the votes of the 
 district become free, when each delegate may cast a 
 single or separate vote. The only alternative to this 
 would be the allowance of fractional votes to be cast 
 by delegates or reported, which would require a 
 special or additional rule. But mostly nominations 
 will be made before this question can arise. 
 
 Having now traced out the successive stages in 
 the proceeding of nomination, it only remains to 
 remark, under this head, that upon the popular- vote 
 plan, contained in the rules, the principle of the free 
 vote is substantially applied in the nomination for 
 each office to be filled; for the same popular vote 
 which would carry a delegate for a candidate, if used 
 for that purpose, will carry for him a Convention 
 vote when given to him directly. In a district of 
 two delegates a popular vote exceeding one-third of 
 the vote polled will entitle him to one Convention 
 vote ; in a district of three delegates a popular vote 
 exceeding one-fourth of the vote polled will entitle 
 him to one Convention vote, and a like result will 
 follow in a district of four delegates when he obtains 
 over one-fifth of the total vote. In other words, 
 the same number of popular votes is required to 
 secure a Convention vote that is required for the 
 election of a delegate, under the fifth rule. 
 
 The Convention. — This body, when assembled, 
 
COLUMBIA CO. RULES OF NOMINATION. 269 
 
 represents truly the whole mass of voters in the coun- 
 ty who have taken part in the primary elections, 
 and is well constituted for the transaction of business, 
 for the selection of district conferees and delegates 
 to State Conventions, etc., as well as for perfecting 
 nominations which have not been determined by 
 the people ; and in practice it has been found that 
 conventional action under the new rules (and par- 
 ticularly since the adoption of the twenty-second 
 one) has been fair and satisfactory. 
 
 THE PLAN IN AMENDED FORM. 
 
 For general adoption and use the Columbia County plan 
 might be expressed in a series of Rules somewhat as follows : 
 
 RULES. 
 
 A. — Voters at the primary elections may cast their delegate 
 votes for any less number of candidates than the whole num- 
 ber of delegates to be chosen from their respective districts, in 
 the manner authorized by the fourth section of the Blooms- 
 burg act of 4th of March, 1870, and delegate candidates high- 
 est in vote shall be declared elected. 
 
 B. — Each voter at a primary election may vote directly for 
 one candidate for each of the offices for which nominations are 
 to be declared or made in Convention, and all votes so given 
 shall be duly counted and returned by the election officers, to 
 the Convention. 
 
 C. — Any candidate for nomination who shall receive popu- 
 lar votes cast as aforesaid at a primary election in any district 
 shall be entitled to at least one Convention vote of such dis- 
 trict, for his nomination, whenever his popular vote therein 
 shall equal or exceed the number of voters required to elect 
 one delegate therefrom under Rule A; and the number of 
 such Convention votes to which he shall be entitled, when 
 more than one, shall be a number equal to the number of dele- 
 gates who could be elected under said rule by the voters who 
 voted for him at said primary election. 
 
270 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 D. — The Convention votes to which a candidate shall be- 
 come entitled under Rule C shall remain to him so long as he 
 continues a candidate before the Convention, but in case no 
 candidate shall have a majority of Convention votes reported 
 from the districts, the Convention shall proceed to perfect a 
 nomination under the following regulations : 
 
 1. The districts shall be called over, and the delegates from 
 each shall report to the Convention the Convention votes of 
 their district ; first the vote or votes pledged by the popular 
 home-voting to candidates who remain before the Convention, 
 and next any vote or votes unpledged to candidates or freed 
 by the withdrawal of candidates. 
 
 2. Convention votes shall become freed by the voluntary 
 declination of candidates and by striking off the name of the 
 candidate lowest on the list at each vote after the first. 
 
 3. Unpledged and freed Convention votes from a district, 
 when less in number than the whole Convention vote of the 
 district, shall be cast by the delegation therefrom or by a 
 majority of them acting jointly ; but when all the Convention 
 votes from a district shall be unpledged, or shall become freed, 
 each delegate therefrom may cast one vote separately, or have 
 his vote separately reported. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 271 
 
;tj»I7ersitt! 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT UPON LIMITED 
 VOTING IN THREE-MEMBERED DISTRICTS. 
 
 In the House of Lords, July 30, 1867. 
 
 The reform bill being under consideration — 
 
 Lord Cairns moved an amendment, to come in after clause 
 eight of the bill, as follows : 
 
 "At any contested election for any county or borough represented 
 by three members no person shall vote for more than two candidates." 
 
 In supporting this amendment he explained that there would 
 be at least eleven constituencies to which the plan proposed by 
 it would be at once applicable, and he foresaw that if there 
 should be a further alteration in the distribution of electoral 
 power the great probability was that such alteration would go 
 in the direction of increasing those three-cornered constituen- 
 cies. This consideration made him more anxious that some 
 proposition of this kind should be adopted. He then pro- 
 ceeded at length to present the reasons which had occurred to 
 him in favor of his amendment, and to answer and repel cer- 
 tain objections which might be urged against it. 
 
 A debate followed, in which the amendment was supported 
 by Earl Kussell, Earl Spencer, Earl Stanhope, Earl Cowper, 
 the Earl of Carnarvon, Lord Houghton, the Earl of Shrews- 
 bury, and Viscount Stratford de Kedcliffe ; and was opposed 
 on behalf of the administration by the Earl of Malmesbury 
 and the Duke of Marlborough. Lord Denman suggested that 
 the proposition should be made the subject of a separate bill. 
 
 Upon a division the vote stood : 
 
 For the amendment 142 
 
 Against it 51 
 
 Majority 91 
 
 13 273 
 
274 PROPORTIONAL KEPRESENTATION. 
 
 Lord Cairns then proposed the following additional clause : 
 
 " At a contested election for the city of London no person shall vote 
 for more than three candidates." 
 
 The clause was agreed to. 
 
 The London Times the day following contained an elaborate 
 and powerful editorial in support of the proposition and in 
 commendation of the action taken by the House of Lords. It 
 declared that that House had " by a single vote covered many 
 errors and justified the opinions of its warmest admirers. Such 
 a triumph of reason and truth," it continued, " may well star- 
 tle us, accustomed as we have been during this session to 
 the rapid growth of convictions." "The idea of modifying 
 our electoral machinery so as to secure in three-membered 
 constituencies the proportionate representation of both the 
 great divisions of party has made its way by its inherent jus- 
 tice. The verdict of the lords has been decisive, but we do 
 not believe that it in any degree outstrips the independent 
 opinion of the House of Commons, still less that it is at vari- 
 ance with the deliberate judgment of the country. It has been 
 everywhere confessed that the adoption in one form or another 
 of the principle of cumulative voting was essential to main- 
 tain the character of our institutions, and that through it, and 
 through it alone, could the redistribution of electoral power 
 (which all prescient statesmen regard as inevitable) be recon- 
 ciled with the preservation of our representative government." 
 
 " The arguments on behalf of the proposal advanced by 
 Lord Cairns were overwhelming. He himself treated the 
 question in the succinct dialectic style, of which he is a master, 
 and the chain of his reasoning was perfect. But he did not 
 stand alone. In fact every one who took part in the discus- 
 sion, with the exception of the ministers who represented the 
 Government, was on his side. It mattered not whether, like 
 Lord Russell, they spoke from the front bench of the Oppo- 
 sition, or like Lord Stanhope and Lord Shrewsbury, they 
 avowed themselves faithful supporters of the administration 
 and resolute to do nothing which should interfere with the 
 success of the bill ; whether, like Lord Spencer and Lord 
 Cowper, they expressed the views of independent Liberals ; 
 like Lord Carnarvon, they argued from the position of a 
 
PAELIAMENTARY DEBATE. 275 
 
 thoughtful Conservative ; like Lord Stratford, they uttered the 
 sentiments of a man above party ; or, like Lord Houghton, 
 confessed their sympathy with pure democracy, the result was 
 the same. One and all saw in the proposed representation of 
 minorities a suggestion consonant with the strictest principles 
 of justice and equity, and therefore to be depended upon as 
 stable when artificial securities must prove worthless." 
 
 " It is only necessary to remember that the House of Com- 
 mons consults and deliberates as well as votes to see how neces- 
 sary it is to the due performance of its functions that it should 
 contain members representing all sections of the community. 
 The power of decision can never be endangered by the propor- 
 tionate representation of minorities, but the deliberate forma- 
 tion of opinion is exposed to great hazard if the moderating 
 influences of .dissenting minorities be excluded. Parliament 
 itself must be improved by the addition of such men as will 
 be chosen by the wealthy and intelligent merchants and manu- 
 facturers who are now unrepresented in the largest towns, and 
 of the members who will be returned by the Liberal minorities 
 of counties. The effect of Lord Cairns's amendment on the 
 members for three-membered constituencies must be equally 
 beneficial, and its consequences on the constituencies themselves 
 will prove of transcendent importance. The voters who are 
 now hopelessly outvoted and whose political energies become 
 feeble by disuse will start into fresh vitality. Enfranchised in 
 deed, and not merely in name, they will be animated by the 
 consciousness of power. They will be brought into direct 
 relation with the Legislature." " The Lords have shown their 
 independence and their foresight. At a point of the highest 
 importance in the history of the representative institutions of 
 the country they have been faithful to themselves and to their 
 duties. On minor questions they have shown themselves too 
 ready to defer to the decision of the ministers of the Crown, 
 but when the character of the future government of the nation 
 was at stake they asserted their own judgment against all 
 attempts to betray them to a false position." 
 
 In the House of Commons, August 8, 1867. 
 
 On the order of the day for the consideration of the amend- 
 ments made by the House of Lords to the reform bill, the 
 
276 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Disraeli, said that the 
 Cairns amendment "had been opposed on the part of her Ma- 
 jesty's Government in the House of Lords with all the author- 
 ity that a Government can fairly exercise over a deliberative 
 assembly ; but he was bound to say that it was carried by an 
 overwhelming majority ; indeed, he must confess that it was 
 almost unanimously carried by the House of Lords, because, 
 when the minority was told, he observed that it consisted 
 almost entirely of the members of the administration." He 
 therefore, in deference to this strong expression of opinion 
 by the House of Lords, advised a concurrence in the amend- 
 ment. 
 
 Subsequently, the same evening, when the amendment came 
 up for distinct consideration, Mr. Bright moved to disagree 
 with the amendment of the Lords. He expressed surprise at 
 the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in view of his 
 former speech when the same matter had been previously 
 before the House. He wished he could find a suitable word 
 to express his contempt for the proposition without expressing 
 in the slightest degree anything that might be offensive to 
 honorable members on his side of the House. But the mem- 
 ber from Westminster (Mr. Mill) and his friends thought that 
 the plan was in some degree an approach to the principle of 
 the plan under which everybody should be represented and 
 under which such things as majorities and minorities in elec- 
 tion contests should hereafter be unknown. [Hear, hear, from 
 Mr. Mill.] 
 
 Now, he thought those gentlemen who were in favor of Mr. 
 Hare's plan were not in the slightest degree bound to support 
 this plan. There was no intention in the country at present to 
 establish Mr. Hare's plan, and the carrying of this proposi- 
 tion would be an unmixed injustice to the boroughs affected by 
 it. The proposition was not likely to lead to the plan of Mr. 
 Hare, but probably to have a contrary effect by reason of the 
 ill will it would create in these large boroughs and in the 
 country. The change proposed to be made was a fundamental 
 change. There was no precedent for it in parliamentary his- 
 tory. It affected fundamentally the power of not only the 
 constituency but of every individual in it. The alteration 
 proposed had not been asked for. During six hundred years 
 
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE. 277 
 
 the principle of election by the majority had prevailed in the 
 selection of members of the House. He suggested that the 
 House at least suspend its decision in favor of the proposition 
 until it had been a longer time before the country and a fuller 
 opportunity afforded the constituencies of making up their 
 minds upon it. He cited the cases of Liverpool, Manchester, 
 Birmingham, and Leeds. They had been entitled to two 
 members each, making eight altogether. By the bill they 
 were each to have one additional member, and under the plan 
 proposed there would be eight on one side and four on the other 
 upon important public questions, and of course the four on one 
 side w T ould neutralize four of those on the other. Assuming that 
 party ties were adhered to these four great constituencies would 
 be so emasculated and crippled that they would have but four 
 votes to bestow which would affect any of those great ques- 
 tions to which he had referred. The assigning of additional 
 members to those boroughs upon this plan would not increase 
 but would actually diminish their power in the House. He 
 could speak, he was sure, for Manchester and for Birmingham, 
 that the great majority of the constituency and population of 
 those towns would be opposed to the proposition that additional 
 members should be given them, if given under this crippling 
 and injudicious clause. 
 
 Mr. Beresford Hope declared himself unable to rise to 
 the heights of democratic Toryism which had characterized 
 the speech of the honorable member for Birmingham, [Mr. 
 Bright.] Was the case of Birmingham miserable above that 
 of all other boroughs ? Birmingham was the seat of one of 
 our great staples ; Stoke was another. He himself was the 
 majority member for Stoke, and his honorable colleague was the 
 minority member for that borough. The Conservatives were 
 entitled to one member, but he was of opinion that from their 
 wealth, position, intellect, and numbers the Liberals of Stoke 
 were likewise entitled to send a member to Parliament. Well, 
 one Conservative and one Liberal w T ere returned by the 
 borough. Would the honorable member from Birmingham 
 say it was humbled in consequence of that circumstance ? So 
 far was he from taking such a view that he had refused to be 
 concerned in bringing down a second Conservative member 
 because he believed it would be tyranny to do so. There were, 
 
278 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 say fifty-five thousand Conservatives and forty-five thousand 
 Liberals in Stoke. 
 
 Now, would it be fair that either of those parties should be 
 unrepresented ? By the existing arrangement the whole popu- 
 lation of Stoke was better served in that House. So much for 
 the case of the two-handed boroughs ; and if they took the 
 case of the three-handed boroughs it was a juggling with 
 words and a misrepresentation of fact to say that a representa- 
 tion of minorities would deprive the majorities in those bor- 
 oughs of a fair share of representation in that House. If the 
 minority in Birmingham should secure a member who could 
 equal the honorable member (Mr. Bright) in eloquence it 
 would give them a very great advantage indeed ; but he denied 
 that giving the third member for that borough to the minority 
 w T ould be a political injustice to the borough. If honorable 
 members came to the House of Commons merely to count 
 noses at the table there w T ould be something in the honorable 
 member's argument ; but in no other sense would the influence 
 of the two Liberal members for Birmingham be counterbal- 
 anced. The honorable member, whom he was happy to see on 
 the first Opposition bench — (Mr. Bright was in conversation 
 with Mr. Gladstone) — for no man had a better right to that 
 position, and he would be there hereafter, [a laugh,] had 
 drawn a touching picture of four towns who had at present 
 eight members and would have twelve, but who, if this amend- 
 ment of the Lords were adopted, w T ould only have four ; but if 
 he might ask the honorable gentleman to descend from the re- 
 gions of eloquence to those of plain fact, he would invite him 
 to examine how matters really stood on these four boroughs. 
 Manchester had two Liberal members ; Liverpool had two 
 Conservative members ; so that these two boroughs wrote each 
 other off. Leeds had one Liberal member, and one Conserva- 
 tive ; thus its two members wrote each other off. Birmingham, 
 however, had the good fortune to be represented by two Lib- 
 erals ; so that according to the doctrine of the honorable mem- 
 ber the whole four boroughs were represented by his colleague 
 and himself. [A laugh, and "hear, hear."] 
 
 Sir J. Jervoise advocated the proposition for giving repre- 
 sentation to the minority. He observed that if any argument 
 were needed in support of such a proposal it would be found 
 
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE. 279 
 
 in the fact that the Government, though in the minority, had 
 brought in this reform bill. [A laugh, and " hear, hear."J 
 
 Mr. Scourfield had voted for the proposal before and 
 would support it again. He cordially agreed with what had 
 been said by the honorable member for Westminster a few 
 evenings since — that he would not desire to see oppression prac- 
 ticed, even by the side to which he was most attached. When 
 the honorable member for Birmingham said that the liberties 
 of England would suffer detriment if there were no election 
 contests, he could not help thinking that the honorable mem- 
 ber spoke as if the life-blood of all the election agents and 
 lawyers in the kingdom were flowing in his veins. [Laughter.] 
 The fact was, that election contests were frequently unmitigated 
 curses, and many places had been seriously injured by their 
 means. [" Hear, hear."] He was not aware, for instance, 
 that Lancaster, Totness, Reigate, and Great Yarmouth were 
 any better off because they had been the scenes of contested 
 elections. [" Hear, hear."] 
 
 Mr. Buxton wished to touch upon a single argument which 
 had not, he thought, received the attention it deserved. It 
 seemed to him that valuable as the other results would be of 
 the adoption of the proposed arrangement, no one of them 
 would be of greater importance than this : that it would call 
 forth so much political vigor and life in the constituencies to 
 which it was applied. It was curious that those who had not 
 given this subject much consideration often objected to this 
 proposal, because they said that by extinguishing contests this 
 arrangement would destroy political vitality. He was confi- 
 dent that its effect would be exactly the reverse ; that it would 
 be of singular use in preventing political stagnation. That 
 would be clear if, instead of dealing with the question in the 
 abstract, they took a concrete example. Take, for example, 
 the town of Birmingham, in which it was proposed to adopt 
 this plan. Could there be a doubt that if no such arrange- 
 ment were made Birmingham would henceforth return three 
 gentlemen of the same political hue ? 
 
 The Liberal committee would select three candidates, and 
 the majority of householders in the borough w r ould be certain 
 to support them. If there were ever a contest it w r ould be a 
 contest between the Liberals bidding against each other ; but 
 
280 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 in all human probability there would be no contest at all ; and 
 those electors, perhaps a very large and important body of 
 men, but who might not go so far in their political views as the 
 mass of small householders, would be politically extinct. 
 They would feel it totally hopeless to attempt to carry a candi- 
 date, and they would resign themselves with more or less bitter- 
 ness to political death. They would feel that they were alto- 
 gether excluded from any influence whatever over the destinies 
 of their country : not merely that they could not hope to rule, 
 but that they could not even be represented in the council of 
 the nation. They would accordingly sink into hopeless apathy, 
 while the majority having everything their own way, not en- 
 joying the advantage of being opposed and forced to struggle 
 and strive, would themselves also be likely to grow at once 
 apathetic and arrogant. He was not devising this state of 
 things out of his own imagination ; they knew that exactly 
 this had happened in many instances both across the water and 
 in certain constituencies at home, where one party, be it Con- 
 servative or be it Liberal, had held irresistible sway. It would 
 be invidious to do so ; otherwise he could easily remind the 
 House of many boroughs and many counties in which utter 
 apathy and stagnation had actually resulted from the feeling 
 of the minority that any exertion of theirs must be vain. 
 
 But now suppose, on the other hand, that instead of all the 
 three seats being at the disposal of one committee the arrange- 
 ment now proposed were adopted ; immediately every elector 
 in the constituency would be stirred into life. Those who be- 
 longed to the minority instead of giving up the whole affair as 
 a bad job, shrugging their shoulders, and feeling that although 
 they were Englishmen they were as destitute of political influ- 
 ence as if they were so many Indians, would immediately begin 
 to organize themselves as a party to form a committee to look 
 out for a candidate and combine to carry him. He admitted 
 that very possibly no contest would ensue ; but there would be 
 as much demand for strenuous exertions and for individual 
 self-sacrifice on the part of the minority as if a contest were 
 certain. Political deadness would be exchanged for political 
 animation. But to the majority this change would bring no 
 less cause of excitement and vigor. Instead of gleefully ac- 
 cepting their three candidates and carrying them without an 
 
PAKLIAMENTAKY DEBATE. 281 
 
 effort the party would be driven to keep its machinery in high 
 order, to choose the best candidates that could be found, and, 
 in short, to strain every nerve to hold their own. And yet, 
 though each party would thus be compelled to be on the alert 
 and to maintain its vigor, actual contests would probably be 
 rare. The beauty of this arrangement would be that it would 
 give all the political activity that contests are supposed to en- 
 gender, but without that grievous moral injury that contests 
 almost inevitably inflict. Now, it has been shown that these 
 eleven constituencies affected by this proposition would contain 
 2,300,000 persons. If, then, the minority should not be able 
 to carry its candidate no harm could ensue ; but if they carried 
 them all they must represent a body of some 600,000 or 700,000 
 persons. It could only be for the advantage not only of the 
 minority itself but of the majority as well, and of Parliament, 
 and of the nation, that such a body of men, comprising a large 
 proportion of the wealth and intelligence of our largest cities, 
 should enjoy some share of influence over the destinies of their 
 country. 
 
 Sir C. Russell, as a representative of one of the three-cor- 
 nered constituencies, opposed the Lords' amendment, but his 
 remarks were not important nor prolonged. 
 
 Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessest, in supporting the amendment, 
 differed from many to whose judgment he was accustomed to 
 defer. But he was about to give his vote with the sanction of 
 high authority, for the proposition had previously received the 
 support of a large minority of that House taken in about equal 
 proportions from both political parties, and had now received 
 the support of a large majority of the other House, embracing 
 names identified with the growth of liberal principles in the 
 country. The honorable member from Birmingham (Mr. 
 Bright) had said that Birmingham ought to have a larger rep- 
 resentation than Arundel ; but if a third member were given to 
 Birmingham on the plan proposed he would pair against one 
 of the majority members, and the representation would be re- 
 duced virtually to a level with that of Arundel, which had one 
 member. The fallacy of that argument was this : what the 
 honorable gentleman and his colleague represented was not 
 really the whole community of Birmingham, but some 6000 or 
 8000 electors as opposed to some 4000 or 5000 who differed 
 
282 PKOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 from him and were totally unrepresented. But to go one step 
 further. It was true that upon questions in which party inter- 
 ests alone were involved, under the proposed system the three 
 members from Birmingham would go into the lobby, two on 
 one side and one on the other. Yet with regard to all ques- 
 tions affecting local interests as well as those great commercial 
 and manufacturing questions on which Birmingham was pecu- 
 liarly entitled to be heard, the three members would be found 
 voting together and throwing their whole weight into the scale 
 in the interest of that great constituency. 
 
 The honorable member said Birmingham would not have its 
 full weight in the representative body. Did he mean to say 
 that the wealth, the importance of a constituency was derived 
 only from the majority? Had the conservative minority in 
 London nothing to do with the weight and importance of the 
 constituency ? It was plain that they ought to give representa- 
 tion to all the elements that constituted the importance of a 
 constituency. 
 
 He insisted that two great advantages would be secured by 
 adopting the proposed system of representation. In the first 
 place, in times of popular excitement it would insure the return 
 to Parliament of eminent men who would otherwise be excluded. 
 Did the honorable member from Birmingham recollect the re- 
 sult of the China vote and his exclusion from Parliament? 
 [Hear.] Similar cases might occur in time to come, and honest 
 and able men might be excluded from Parliament when their 
 services would be most necessary for the welfare of the country, 
 and when thousands of their fellow-countrymen would be will- 
 ing to combine to secure their return. 
 
 The second great advantage from the adoption of this system 
 was the inducement it would offer to large numbers of persons 
 to take part in the political affairs of the country, who might 
 otherwise be indisposed to give their votes. This w r as neither a 
 party nor a class question, because there were large Liberal 
 minorities in counties, as there were large Conservative minori- 
 ties in towns, which w r ere now unrepresented, and had no in- 
 ducement to vote. He desired to see the greatest amount of 
 intelligence and the largest number of persons possible engaged 
 irt taking part in our political affairs. Such participation was 
 one of the most essential elements of democracy — that every 
 
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE. 283 
 
 man in the community should feel himself to be a component 
 part of the State — should assist in framing the laws which he 
 had to obey, and should throw his whole individual strength 
 and vigor into the constitution. Now, if this principle of rep- 
 resentation was a right one, why should they shrink from adopt- 
 ing it because it was said that, for the last six hundred years, 
 the precedents had been the other way? [Hear, hear.] Eng- 
 land was the foremost in the van of civilization, and why should 
 she not, in reforming her whole representative institutions, in- 
 troduce a plan of this sort, if it were shown to be a good 
 one, and thus render her constitution a model for the w T orld ? 
 [Hear.] But the honorable member from Birmingham had 
 asked why the proposal, if adopted, was to be limited to a 
 few large boroughs, and not be applied to every constituency 
 throughout the country? He would reply, that if it were 
 shown to be good, why should they reject it because its appli- 
 cation was limited ? If it turned out that it worked well, 
 nothing could be easier than to extend its operation hereafter. 
 The vote which he w r as about to give he believed to be a wise 
 and patriotic one, and he knew it to be an honest one, as it w r as 
 founded upon sincere convictions. 
 
 Mr. New t degate supported the amendment. He believed 
 that if it were adopted it would be possible hereafter further to 
 redistribute the representation of the country so as to secure 
 justice both in boroughs and counties. He should vote for it 
 because he hoped the result of it would be to give the people, 
 as they advanced in intelligence, fuller opportunities than had 
 been hitherto accorded them of making their opinions known 
 in that House. 
 
 Mr. Goschen spoke against the amendment, insisting that 
 it had not been duly considered ; that it was an innovation 
 and not conservative in character. The remainder of his 
 remarks was composed principally of criticisms upon the 
 various positions occupied by members who supported the 
 proposition. 
 
 Mr. Hubbard said the bill was full of innovations, that the 
 objection that this proposition was an innovation applied to 
 the whole bill. Was not household suffrage itself an inno- 
 vation ? 
 
 Mr. Gladstone spoke at length and against the amendment. 
 
284 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 A prominent point in his speech was that if the proposition 
 were agreed to it would have to be extended hereafter to the 
 constituencies generally ; and he distinctly indicated that such 
 extension would be made. He insisted upon further time for 
 considering so important a proposition, and repeated the argu- 
 ment that the addition of one member to Birmingham and 
 each of the other boroughs mentioned in the bill would not be 
 advantageous to them upon the new plan of voting ; for the 
 power of majorities therein, instead of being in point of fact 
 increased, would be diminished. His most important observa- 
 tion, however, should be given in his exact language. It was 
 as follows : 
 
 " If adopted at all, this proposition must be adopted with 
 perhaps the knowledge, and at least with the certainty, that 
 whether we admit it ourselves or not it must unfold and expand 
 itself over the whole country and completely reconstruct the 
 system of distribution of seats." [Hear, hear.] 
 
 Mr. Lowe concluded the debate with an animated and able 
 speech in favor of the amendment. He remarked that his 
 right honorable friend (Mr. Gladstone) had said that he con- 
 sidered the constituency and the majority of the constituency 
 the same thing; in those few words summing up the whole 
 fallacy which had pervaded the debate. The honorable mem- 
 ber from Birmingham's speech rested on the groundless as- 
 sumption that when anything was true of the majority of Bir- 
 mingham it was true of the whole of Birmingham. Taking 
 their own arguments, he wondered that gentlemen who refused 
 to give representation to minorities were willing to even admit 
 their existence. He should like to know on what principle 
 they acted in forcing on the Government a third member in 
 the boroughs except as an homage to numbers. [Cheers.] It 
 was said that in introducing personal representation you were 
 doing away with local representation. This is again the same 
 fallacy. Gentlemen have accustomed themselves so much to 
 overlook the existence of minorities that they will not allow 
 them to live even in the places where they actually reside. 
 [Laughter.] He could not in the least understand what there 
 was in a minority that should make it less local because it was 
 less numerous. 
 
 Mr. Lowe concluded as follows : There is a sort of worship 
 
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE. 285 
 
 of the majority which, after all, is a mere political superstition. 
 True representation, the idea of true representation, is to leave 
 no portion of the constituencies unrepresented. [Hear.] We 
 have a specimen of the old and rugged way of doing things in 
 the case of juries. We require them to be unanimous, and as 
 that is not in the nature of human things, we shut them up in 
 " durance vile " until they come to an agreement. That system 
 not having been found practicable under all circumstances, 
 mankind hit upon the plan of representation by majorities as a 
 better mode of settling their differences. Well, there is no 
 absolute reason for stopping there. The art of representation, 
 like other arts, is progressive ; and if means can be found for 
 increasing the number of members, and then adapting your 
 system to that increase by the cumulative vote, so as not to 
 disfranchise minorities and to give some representation to the 
 whole of the constituency, so far from regarding that as an in- 
 novation upon the constitution, I think we ought to hail it as 
 an advance in the science of government. [Cheers.] 
 
 The great difference between ancient and modern societies 
 lies in the invention of the principle of representation. It was 
 from the want of that power of representation that the Roman 
 empire was reduced to place itself under the tyranny of a 
 Cresar. It is only by the existence of that power that large 
 free governments have become possible. This is just an in- 
 stance of the changes which may be produced by the use of the 
 most simple expedients. Instead of regarding this principle 
 with hatred and jealousy, I think we shall act more wisely if 
 we investigate and accept it as a just and necessary improve- 
 ment of that system of representative government which has 
 obtained among us, upon which, in a great measure, the per- 
 petuity and glory of our country depend. 
 
 The House then divided, when there appeared : 
 
 Ayes 204 
 
 Noes 253 
 
 Majority 49 
 
 So the motion to disagree to the Lords' amendment was lost, 
 and the clause stood a part of the bill. The announcement 
 of the numbers was received with cheers. 
 
 The next amendment, that at a contested election for the city 
 
286 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 of London no person should vote for more than three candi- 
 dates, was then, after a brief debate, agreed to by a majority 
 of sixty-four. 
 
 When the reform bill was first considered by the House of 
 Commons the cumulative vote was proposed by way of amend- 
 ment, but rejected. The motion for it was made by Mr. Lowe 
 on the 4th of July, in the following words : 
 
 "That at any contested election for a county or borough represented 
 by more .than two members, and having more than one. seat vacant, every 
 voter shall be entitled to a number of votes equal to the number of 
 vacant seats, and may give all such votes to one candidate or may dis- 
 tribute them among the candidates as he thinks fit." 
 
 This amendment was debated on the day of its introduction 
 and again on the next day, and received the support of the 
 mover and of Mr. Liddell, Mr. Thomas Hughes, Mr. Gorst, 
 Mr. Morrison, Mr. Beach, Mr. Fawcett, Mr. Newdegate, Vis- 
 count Cranborne, Mr. J. Stuart Mill, and Mr. Buxton, while 
 it was opposed by Mr. Shaw Lefevre, Sir Robert Collier, Mr. 
 Adderley, Mr. Bright, Mr. Henley, and the Chancellor of the 
 Exchequer. 
 
 It was lost by a vote of, yeas 173, nays 314. The large 
 number of votes it received upon its first consideration was 
 evidence of its strength whenever it should be subjected to 
 examination and debate, and inspirited its friends to further 
 exertion. In fact, it appeared evident that the opposition of 
 the administration, through the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
 alone prevented its adoption at that time, and such explanation 
 of the result was distinctly stated by the Times of August 9 
 in editorial comments upon the adoption of the Cairns' amend- 
 ment. It is to be remembered constantly in following the 
 debates in the House of Commons that the prominent men 
 who spoke against the cumulative vote and the Cairns' amend- 
 ment represented districts which were to elect three members 
 under the provisions of the bill. Consequently they were 
 deeply interested as political men in securing in their home 
 districts the election of the third member by the majority. 
 Buckinghamshire, represented by Mr. Disraeli, Birmingham, 
 represented by Mr. Bright, and other districts that contributed 
 speakers to the debate in opposition to the proposed reform, 
 
A MINORITY VETO PROPOSED. 287 
 
 are all three-member districts, in which the local political 
 majority could not, under the new plan, elect the third member. 
 It remains to be observed in this review of the proceedings 
 in Parliament that the Cairns' amendment secures substantially 
 the same result as the cumulative vote would in the districts, 
 the counties, and boroughs, to which it is applied. In the 
 triangular districts it will ordinarily secure the third member 
 to the minority, and in London (which elects four members) 
 the fourth member. But it is very evident that it is a proposi- 
 tion which is incapable of extended application, and therefore 
 inferior to the plan of the cumulative vote. The latter will 
 adapt itself conveniently and effectually to all districts elect- 
 ing more than one member, while the Cairns' amendment can 
 hardly be extended beyond the triangular districts to which it 
 has a convenient application. 
 
 MINORITY REPRESENTATION.* 
 
 It must be admitted that Government is, with us, in an un- 
 satisfactory condition. Many evils exist, notwithstanding pop- 
 ular control and the efforts of just men in public life to prevent 
 or repress abuses. It is, therefore, timely and proper to in- 
 quire wherein our plan of Government is defective, and to 
 adopt some amendment of it, which will improve its practical 
 action. 
 
 With us, the people are to govern, instead of one man or a 
 few. They are to govern themselves, constituting ours, a sys- 
 tem of self-government. But this is not to be taken absolutely 
 and without qualification. Sovereignty resides with the State 
 electors, who constitute but one-fifth of the population. But 
 the powers of sovereignty, as exhibited in the laws, extend over 
 the whole. 
 
 The fact is thus, because it has been so agreed upon and 
 settled. For political powers are conventional, being founded 
 in compact or assent. Ours is a Government of the most 
 
 * Printed for private circulation, February, 1862. "Republican" print, 
 Bloomsburg, Pa. 
 
288 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 worthy — of those best qualified, most fit, most capable. Those 
 members of the social body who are incapable, or least capa- 
 ble, are excluded from political power, — as, minors, females, 
 paupers, and unnaturalized foreigners. 
 
 . In the electors, then — a select body or part of the popula- 
 tion — resides the power to rule or govern, and this power is ex- 
 ercised through agents, who represent them. Government, 
 then, in its restricted sense of an organism for legislation and 
 administration, is an Agency, and possesses only such powers 
 as are imparted to it by the electors. And those powers are 
 held in trust, and subject at all times to change or revocation. 
 
 In what manner the electors shall be represented — the rules 
 by which such representation shall bo secured and regulated — 
 and what shall be the laws of representative action, are ques- 
 tions for agreement among those who constitute the sovereignty, 
 and their solution is shown by the Constitution, the funda- 
 mental law established by the electors. A practical difficulty 
 arises in representing a numerous body of electors, from the 
 diversity of interests and opinions which will always prevail 
 amongst them. Identity of interest and unanimity of opinion 
 will scarcely ever be found to exist. To secure action, there- 
 fore, in an electoral body so constituted, or in a numerous body 
 representing them in the Government, it is necessary to adopt 
 the doctrine that a part only may act for the whole. And 
 hence arise practical rules by which the power of the whole 
 electoral or representative body is wielded by three-fourths, 
 two-thirds, a majority, or even a smaller number. A plurality 
 rule is ordinarily provided for popular elections, and a majority 
 rule for legislative action, except in reviewing a measure vetoed 
 by the Executive, when a two-thirds rule is substituted. And 
 the judicial department decide by the majority rule the cases 
 that fall within its jurisdiction. 
 
 But these several arrangements, or rules, are founded upon 
 considerations of convenience and expediency, and involve no 
 fundamental principle of right. It is perfectly competent for 
 the sovereign power to substitute one rule for another, in any 
 of the cases just mentioned, or to introduce one altogether 
 new. The great principle to be regarded is that of the govern- 
 ment of the people by themselves, and the practical rules by 
 which it is attempted to apply this principle, should be adapted 
 
A MINORITY VETO PROPOSED. 289 
 
 to their object, and should be changed whenever shown to be 
 insufficient or injurious, or should be limited or supplemented 
 by other constitutional provisions. 
 
 That arrangement would be most perfect in theory, which 
 would secure to every member of the political body a voice in 
 the government. But this result, or any near approach to it, 
 cannot be attained by a majority or plurality rule for popular 
 elections. And a rule requiring unanimity, or a three-fourths 
 or two-thirds vote, at such elections, would be intolerably 
 inconvenient if not wholly impracticable. 
 
 If, then, no practicable rule among all those named, will se- 
 cure complete popular representation, or any near approach to 
 it ; and if, on the other hand, the virtual disfranchisement of a 
 large part of the electors be objectionable and injurious, (as it 
 certainly is,) it is plain that something further must be pro- 
 
 And such further proposition for the more perfect represen- 
 tation of the people, must be based upon some division of the 
 electoral body into parts, and must deal with those parts sepa- 
 rately and distinctly. Now, the most marked, extensive and 
 permanent division of men in a Republic, is into political 
 parties, usually two in number, and whenever greater in num- 
 ber tending to consolidate into two. For all practical purposes 
 we may assume that there will be, always, a division of electors 
 into a major and a minor party — a greater and a less — each 
 representing opinions and interests different and distinct from 
 those represented by the other, and sometimes, though not 
 always, in conflict with them. But, it is certain (as already 
 shown,) that a majority or plurality rule for popular elections, 
 especially under a system of nominations by party conventions, 
 will cause the disfranchisement of the minority party, and sub- 
 ject it to the will and pleasure of the greater. Any rule, or 
 device, therefore, which will secure to the minority the power 
 of defending itself against the aggression of the majority, will 
 secure one of the main objects of the constitution, to wit : the 
 protection of individual rights, and of all the leading interests 
 of society, against government abuses. Without such power 
 of self-defence, lodged somewhere in the system, a majority 
 rule will change the Government into a despotism of numbers, 
 and prepare the way for anarchy or revolution. For the 
 
 19 
 
290 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 despotism of many is just as intolerable to the individuals and 
 interests oppressed, as that of one or a few, and just as certainly 
 tends to produce resistance and convulsion. 
 
 To secure the community against the despotism of a ma- 
 jority, and against government abuses mainly consequent 
 thereon, our Constitution provides many peculiar arrangements 
 of power, usually described as " checks and balances," as well 
 as prohibitions against the exercise of particular powers. Of 
 all the checks so provided, that of the Veto is most important 
 and useful, and it deserves a particular examination. 
 
 It is secured in the Legislative branch of the Government 
 by dividing that branch into two Houses, and requiring the 
 assent of both to the enactment of laws. Thus each possesses 
 the power to veto any measure originating with the other. 
 
 An Executive Veto is also provided, extending to all acts 
 of the Legislative branch in the nature of laws. But this veto 
 is not absolute, as it may be overruled by a two-thirds vote of 
 both Legislative Houses. 
 
 There is also a Judicial Veto, less extensive but more abso- 
 lute than that of the Executive. It is confined to unconstitu- 
 tional acts of the Legislature, but as to such it has complete 
 effect in any given case, and cannot be overruled. 
 
 But these checks, although useful and proper, are manifestly 
 insufficient to secure wise and just government. In point of 
 fact, they do not secure it, and in consequence wide-spread dis- 
 satisfaction exists in the community. The Legislative Houses 
 will not check each other upon partisan measures when they 
 agree politically, nor upon many others when strong corrupting 
 influences assail both. Nor will the Executive Veto be ap- 
 plied when the Legislative majority and the Governor are of 
 the same party — the very case where a check is most needed. 
 And we have seen that the Judicial Veto is of limited applica- 
 tion. The judges cannot annul an act although shown to be 
 unjust, inexpedient, and profligate, unless it be also unconstitu- 
 tional. 
 
 An additional check is therefore necessary and ought to be 
 provided at once, by an amendment of the Constitution. Let 
 the minority be represented directly, in the Government, and 
 be armed with a power of self-defence against majority aggres- 
 sion. Let ampler representation of the people correct the evils 
 
A MINORITY VETO PROPOSED. 291 
 
 in government, exhibited by experience — by time and trial — 
 and furnish additional evidence of the wisdom of our funda- 
 mental principle of government by the people. 
 
 A proposition with these objects, may be stated in the follow- 
 ing form : 
 
 The candidate second highest in vote at Gubernatorial elections, 
 to become President of the Senate, and possess the power of vetoing 
 bills. 
 
 By this provision the minority, for the time being, would be 
 represented by its chosen chief for purposes of defence against 
 a hostile interest, and the existing vetoes of the Constitution 
 would be supplemented by one which will apply, in proper 
 cases, where they will not. And thus the assent of both politi- 
 cal parties will be given to new laws, and neither one can im- 
 pose upon the other a measure grossly obnoxious or injurious. 
 From which will result greater contentment among the people, 
 an abatement of party violence, and a great decrease of in- 
 justice and corruption in the Government itself. 
 
 Substantially, the proposition is, that the minority shall have 
 power to protect itself. Through its representative, the Presi- 
 dent of the Senate, it may require a two-thirds legislative vote 
 for the enactment of laws. It is not a power to initiate laws — 
 to establish an affirmative policy — to wield patronage — to in- 
 terfere with executive or judicial duties ; but to object to new 
 projects — to defeat, or delay legislation, except against a de- 
 cided public opinion represented by a two-thirds vote. And, as 
 a Constitutional check, it operates where the judicial veto can- 
 not reach, and when the executive veto will not be used. 
 
 As a curb upon legislation, this Protective, or Minority 
 Veto, (as it may be called,) would be efficient, appropriate, and 
 salutary, in a high degree ; as will appear from considering the 
 following results to be attained by it : 
 
 1. (As already stated,) an increased amount of popular as- 
 sent to the enactment of laws, thus carrying more fully into 
 effect our fundamental principle of government by the people. 
 Laws will not go upon the statute book branded by party hos- 
 tility ; they will be more heartily accepted by the community, 
 and be better obeyed and enforced. 
 
 2. Conciliation of the minority, inducing an increase of at- 
 tachment to the Government and a decrease of hostility to its 
 
292 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 administration. Participating in the powers of the Govern- 
 ment, and thereby secured against aggression, the minority 
 would be less passionate and violent, and the peril of insurrec- 
 tion or revolution would be removed. 
 
 3. Increased stability of the laws, and preservation of a con- 
 sistent policy in their enactment. 
 
 4. But the principal utility of the Protective Veto, would be 
 found in its prevention of bad laws. Most of these may be 
 classed as corrupt, partisan, or unconstitutional ; as, the re- 
 charter of the United States Bank, in 1838 ; the Main Line 
 Sale Bill, of 1857 ; the bill transferring the State Canals to the 
 Sunbury and Erie Kailroad Company, in 1858, and its supple- 
 ments; and the Tonnage Tax repeal, of 1861. To which may 
 be added an extensive list of corporation acts, and local laws. 
 Nor are we to omit from mention those offensive and flagrant 
 examples of injustice, called Apportionment laws, which would, 
 standing alone, demand the establishment of a Minority veto. 
 The septennial Apportionments, in 1850 and 1857, of Senators 
 and Kepresentatives throughout the State, were in many of 
 their provisions unjust, and in some unconstitutional. And 
 the most recent Apportionment — that of 1861, for Members of 
 Congress — was an extreme outrage. By a just bill, propor- 
 tioned to the relative strength of parties as shown by the Gub- 
 ernatorial election of 1860, twelve members of Congress would 
 have been assigned to one party, and eleven to the other. By 
 the bill actually passed, the numbers stand nineteen to four, 
 the minority being disfranchised to the extent of seven mem- 
 bers for ten years, and the representation of the people of 
 Pennsylvania, in Congress, being to that extent perverted. 
 
 Were the Protective Veto a provision of the Constitution, it 
 would prevent the passage of laws like those just mentioned, 
 and thus, to a great extent, preserve the purity of the Govern- 
 ment and the integrity of the Constitution, as well as the rights 
 and interests of the minority. Its benefits would not be con- 
 fined to the minority. The whole body of the people would 
 enjoy the advantages of improved action in the Government, 
 which it would produce. 
 
 By our State Constitution of 1776, a Council of Censors was 
 established, whose duty it was to review the action of the 
 several departments of Government, and to declare to the peo- 
 
A MINORITY VETO PROPOSED. 293 
 
 pie all departures from the Constitution by either. It was 
 intended that this body should hold the Government, in all its 
 branches, responsible to public opinion ; that thereby the 
 system of republican rule then established should be preserved 
 from abuse, and, especially, that all minority and individual 
 rights under the Constitution, should be preserved from in- 
 vasion. But that body had no power to enforce its decisions, 
 and from this cause, and from its breaking into factions on ac- 
 count of the number of its members, it fell into disrepute, and 
 was not continued in existence by the Constitution of 1790. 
 
 But, the objects in view in constituting the Council of Cen- 
 sors, were laudable and proper, and can be attained, to a great 
 extent, by the Protective Veto now proposed. Thereby an 
 officer, of the first rank of ability, would be placed in a suitable 
 position to check and limit the action of the Legislature ; to 
 defend the principles of the fundamental law against invasion ; 
 to baffle the agents of corruption in their attempts to prostitute 
 the Government to their purposes ; and to protect those inter- 
 ests of society which would, otherwise, be sacrificed or injured 
 by partisan injustice. Whenever objectionable measures were 
 proposed by the dominant party, it would be the interest and 
 desire of the minority represented by the President of the 
 Senate, to have them sent to the people for examination and 
 discussion, which could be effected by this veto, operating as it 
 would in the nature of an appeal to them from the legislative 
 majority ; while, at the same time, there would be no motive 
 for interposing this power of appeal upon measures of real 
 merit, the discussion of which, before the people, would 
 strengthen, instead of weakening the party proposing them. 
 And if a proper measure were vetoed, its discussion would se- 
 cure a two-thirds vote for it in the Legislature, or an abandon- 
 ment of objection to it by the President of the Senate. It 
 would only be delayed, and it would, eventually, go into effect 
 with an increased weight of public sentiment in its favor. 
 
 That " the world is governed too much," and that " that 
 government is best which governs least," are maxims of com- 
 mon acceptation. And with us, in view of our experience, 
 there is good cause for holding, that laws are supplied to the 
 community beyond its wants and to its injury ; that the influ- 
 ences in favor of legislation are unduly strong in the absence 
 
294 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 of effective checks; and that constitutional limitations and 
 declarations of rights, will not be duly observed in the absence 
 of power distinctly and suitably provided for their enforcement. 
 A majority will be apt to construe the principles and provis- 
 ions of a constitution according to their interests and passions, 
 and there must be, therefore, powerful checks upon them, to 
 prevent over-action, or wrong action of the government they 
 control. 
 
 Our Election Boards in Pennsylvania represent both politi- 
 cal parties, and exemplify some of the advantages of minority 
 representation. A single Inspector is voted for by each elector, 
 but the two candidates highest in vote are chosen ; thus se- 
 curing in all ordinary cases the representation of both parties 
 in the board. This arrangement has proved most useful in 
 practice, and is justly esteemed to be a valuable guard against 
 partisan injustice, as w r ell as fraud. It has, no doubt, con- 
 tributed greatly to preserve our popular elections from de- 
 generacy. 
 
 By the division of the State into districts for the election of 
 Senators and Representatives, minority representation is ob- 
 tained, to some extent, in the Legislature. For the majority 
 party in the State will not have a majority in all the districts 
 into which it is divided ; and a plurality rule for elections some- 
 what disturbs the regularity of results. Upon the whole, how- 
 ever, it is nearly certain that the party in a majority in the State 
 will control the Legislature and act its pleasure in the enact- 
 ment of laws. And it will so district the State by Apportionment 
 laws that the opposing party will be deprived of its due share 
 of representation. And it is certain that in most cases of con- 
 flict between parties in the Legislature, the representation of 
 the minority, resulting from district apportionment, is quite 
 illusory ; except where the two Houses happen to differ politi- 
 cally, the power of the majority will be as complete as its 
 exercise will be unscrupulous. 
 
 Representation of the minority by a negative power or veto, 
 then, stands vindicated by all the considerations detailed in 
 the present paper. And it does not depart from principles 
 already in the Constitution, but only gives to them a new and 
 necessary application. The principle of the veto, and the 
 principle of minority representation, we already possess. 
 
A MINORITY VETO PROPOSED. 295 
 
 What is proposed is that these be combined in a new pro- 
 vision, simple in character, but effective in action, which shall 
 stand as a bulwark of defence against great and notorious 
 evils. Political parties, considered as embodiments of all the 
 main interests and opinions of society, are to be regarded in 
 the distribution of power, and one of them be made to check 
 another. And as such parties are inevitable, and as they 
 thoroughly and permanently divide the mass of the people, 
 what objection can there be to a recognition of their existence 
 in the Constitution? In fact, is it not necessary that these, 
 the most powerful forces which act upon the government, shall 
 be dealt with and regulated, or at least put under a measure 
 of control, by the fundamental law ? If this be not done, we 
 hazard nothing in saying that they will pervert the action of 
 the government, and eventually destroy it. There being no 
 actual balance of political powers, but on the contrary un- 
 checked party domination, violence, injustice, and corruption 
 will come in as a flood, until discord and passion reign su- 
 preme, and a divided and exasperated people be prepared to 
 abandon free government and accept the rule of a master. 
 
 Note. — The election of a Lieutenant Governor would complete the 
 proposition discussed in this paper. But being a subordinate question 
 it is omitted. 
 
 [Editor's Note. — The date of the foregoing Essay shows the early 
 inclination of the author's mind in matters of electoral reform. The 
 proposition of a minority veto, contained in it, is quite novel, but may 
 deserve consideration and development hereafter. It is believed that the 
 writer intended it to be accompanied by provisions looking to the 
 choice of alternates for both the Governor and President of the Senate, 
 so that their offices would always be fitly filled and controlled by the 
 proper political interest.] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Berwick borough, act for free vote in, 237. 
 
 Bloomsburg, town of, act to organize, 233 ; its practical operation, 153, 
 
 163, 180, 246, 247. 
 Bloom Poor District, election of Directors for, 154, 237, 253. 
 Borough Supplement, act, 229 ; speech on, in Senate of Pennsylvania, 157. 
 Boroughs in Pennsylvania, act for free vote in elections of Councilmen 
 
 for, 229 ; acts for same in boroughs of Northumberland County, 235 ; 
 
 in Berwick, 237 ; Chambersbnrg, 242; Hulmeville, 241 ; Milton, 236 ; 
 
 Northumberland, (election in,) 251 ; Shamokin, 241 ; Snydertown, 
 
 240 ; Sunbury, 238 ; Uniontown, 239. 
 
 Cairns, Lord, amendment to reform bill, 41, 273 ; his remarks thereon, 
 
 117, 274. 
 Chambersburg borough, act for election of Councilmen in, by free vote, 242. 
 Columbia County rules of nomination, 258. 
 Committee of Senate, Report on representative reform, 65. 
 Convention, act of Pennsylvania, 1872, manner of electing members, 230 ; 
 
 of New York in 1867, ibid., 40, 91, 155. 
 Councilmen in Pennsylvania boroughs, manner of electing, general act, 
 
 229. For special acts see Boroughs. 
 County Commissioners and Auditors, bill for election of, 151, 162. 
 Corruption in English boroughs, 22, 23. 
 
 Crawford County plan of nomination for office condemned, 256, 257. 
 Cummings, Alexander, presides at Philadelphia meeting, 64, n. 
 Cumulative Vote. See Free Vote. 
 
 Directors or Managers of incorporated companies, choice of, by free 
 
 vote, 224, 226. 
 Dutcher, Salem, citation from, xi. 
 
 Electoral colleges, their defects and remedies for, 209. See Presi- 
 dential Electors. 
 
 Fractional votes, their utility and convenience, 145 ; manner of count- 
 ing, 148, 223. 224, 255. 
 
 297 
 
298 INDEX. 
 
 Free Vote, the, described, 8, 44, 70, 139, 163 ; illustrations of its opera- 
 tion, 10, 45, 54, 58, 97, 172, 184, 245 ; its indirect effect on single elec- 
 tions, 139; its superiority over other plans, 70, 74, 155; its conveni- 
 ence, 73 ; conformity to republican principles, 75 ; its justice, 77 ; 
 will check corruption, 20, 50, 79; will guarantee peace, 18, 19, 83; 
 and improve representative bodies, 10, 8G. 
 
 Its use in stockholders' elections for choice of directors or managers of 
 corporations, 144, 224, 22G ; and in nominations for office, 144, 256. 
 
 Its application to the election of representatives in Illinois, 155, 165, 
 220 ; to Senators in West Virginia, 227 ; and to municipal elections 
 in Pennsylvania, to wit : to Councilmen in boroughs, 229 ; to same 
 in Northumberland County, 235; to town of Bloomsburg, 153, 163, 
 180, 233, 246, 247 ; to borough of Berwick, 237 ; Chambersburg, 242 ; 
 Ilulmeville, 241 ; Milton, 236 ; Northumberland, 251 ; Kiverside, 
 239 ; Shamokin, 241 ; Snydertown, 240 ; Sunbury, 236 ; and Union- 
 town, 239; to Bloom Poor district, 154, 237, 253; bills for applica- 
 tion of, to election of representatives in Congress, 1, 65, 113. 
 
 Gerrymandering, free vote remedy for, 17, 47. 
 Gray, Earl, on cumulative vote, 28, 121. 
 
 Hare, Thomas, citation from, xi. 
 Ilulmeville borough, act for free vote in, 241. 
 
 Illinois, constitutional amendments, 155, 219. 
 
 Incorporated Companies, choice of directors or managers for, in Illinois, 
 
 224 ; in West Virginia, 226. 
 Inspectors of election, manner of choosing in Pennsylvania, 36, 90, 157 ; 
 
 act regulating choice of, 228. 
 
 Jordan, Francis, Secretary of Commonwealth, letter to, 182. 
 Judges, choice of, by limited vote in Chicago, 225. 
 
 Jury commissioners, manner of electing, in Pennsylvania, 38, 91, 160; 
 act regulating election of, 229. 
 
 Limited Vote, the, named, 36 ; defined, 69 ; for choice of election in- 
 spectors, 36, 90, 157, 228 ; jury commissioners, 38, 91, 160, 229 ; dele- 
 gates-at-large to New York Convention, 40, 91, 155; to Pennsylvania 
 Convention, 230; judges of appeals in New York, 155; judges in 
 Chicago, 225 ; election committee of Pennsylvania Senate, 243 ; 
 school directors in Philadelphia, 37, 238 ; and assessors, 37 ; school 
 directors in certain townships of Bradford and Susquehanna Coun- 
 ties, Pennsylvania, 238; Cairns' amendment for, 41, 93; remarks 
 on, 117, 120 ; debated in House of Commons, 275 ; Mill's opinion of, 
 125; Mr. Buckalew's, 74, 80, 155. 
 
INDEX. 299 
 
 Lowe, Plon. Robert, amendment to reform bill, 92, 115; remarks on 
 Cairns' amendment, 284. 
 
 Medill, Joseph, complimentary references to, 226. 
 
 Mill, John Stuart, on limited and cumulative voting, 25, 124; on propor- 
 tional representation, 126. 
 
 Milton borough act for election of councilmen by free vote, 236. 
 
 Minority Representation, an essay, app., 287. 
 
 Morton, O. P., Senator, member committee on representative reform, 113 ; 
 reports joint resolution proposing an amendment to Constitution, 
 187 ; motion to amend House joint resolution, 1S7, 205, n. 
 
 New York, choice of members-at-large to constitutional convention, 40, 
 91, 155 ; constitutional amendment for election of judges of court of 
 appeals, 155. 
 
 Nominations to Office, 256 ; Columbia county rules for, 258. 
 
 Northumberland borough, election in, for councilmen, 251. 
 
 Northumberland County, act for free vote in elections of Councilmen of 
 boroughs in, 235. 
 
 Objections to free vote noticed: 1. That it would delocalize representa- 
 tion, 59, 112; 2. That it would increase effect of corrupt influence, 
 172 ; 3. That it fails in the filling of vacancies, 149 ; 4. That it is op- 
 posed to the principle that the majority shall rule, 6, 45, 49, 127, 
 167, 182. 
 
 Parliamentary boroughs, corruption in, 22, 23. 
 Parliamentary debate on limited voting, app., 273, 275. 
 Parliamentary elections, certain returns of, examined, 94, 98. 
 Pennsylvania statutes for reformed voting, 228 ; local elections in, 245 ; 
 
 representation of Congressional districts, 11. 
 Philadelphia speech, 31 ; choice of school directors in Philadelphia, 37, 
 
 238 ; and assessors, 37. 
 Poor directors, act for choice of, in Bloom poor district, 237 ; election of, 
 
 253. 
 Popular vote for President at former elections, 213 ; for nominations to 
 
 office, 256. 
 President, table of popular and electoral votes for, at former elections, 213. 
 Presidential electors, choice of, 103, 186, 206, 209 ; statistics of elections 
 
 of, 189, 206, 213, 215; Senate report on, 103; speech on, 206; Col. 
 
 Wheeler's essay on, 209; proposed constitutional amendment as to 
 
 manner of choosing, 104, 187, 205. 
 
 Representatives in Congress, speech on manner of electing, 1 ; bills 
 for election of, by free vote, 1, 114; manner of electing representa- 
 tives in Illinois, 220; Utah amendment, 227. 
 
300 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Riverside borough, act for free vote in, 239. 
 
 Russell, Earl, proposition for limited vote, 119 ; remarks on, 120. 
 
 School directors, bill for choice of, 163; acts for, 238, 242. See 
 
 Boroughs. 
 Senate speech, 1 ; Senate report on representative reform, 65. 
 Shamokin borough, act for free vote in, 241. 
 Snydertown borough, act for free vote in, 240. 
 Social science address, 138. 
 Successive majorities, representation of, 182. 
 Sunbury borough, act for free vote in, 236 ; election in, 250. 
 
 Unioxtown borough, act for free vote in, 239. 
 
 Utah, constitutional amendment for choice of representatives, 227. 
 
 Wade, Benj. F., Senator, reports bill for free vote in elections of Rep* 
 
 resentatives in Congress, 113. 
 West Virginia, constitutional amendments, 226. 
 Wheeler, Col. John H., essay on choice of Presidential Electors, 209. 
 
 4% 
 
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