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WASHINGTON 
 THE SOLDIER 
 
 BY 
 
 General Henry B. Carrington, LL.D. 
 
 AUTHOR OF 
 
 Battles of the American Revolution," " Battle Maps and Charts of the 
 Revolution," " Indian Operations on the Plains," The Six 
 Nations," " Beacon Lights of Patriotism," etc. 
 
 WITH ILLUSTRATIONS, MAPS, CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX 
 AND APPENDICES 
 
 Th* applause of list ning senates to command ; 
 The threats of pain and ruin to despise ; 
 To scatter plenty o er a smiling land, 
 And read fit s history in a Nation s eyes." 
 
 New York 
 
 Charles Scribner s Sons 
 1899 
 
COPYRIGHT, 1898 
 
 . , ;. BY f . ,, ,. 
 
 , :.;> BAMSON, WOLFE AND COMPANY 
 
 Copyright, 1899 
 , . B,Y .CHARLES SCIIJIJNEK S, .SONS 
 
 All rights reserved 
 
 TYPOGRAPHY BY ROCKWELL AKD CHTTECHILI 
 
 PRESSWORK^BY TkE Uia>SzSlSITY PEESS 
 
DEDICATED 
 
 Sons an& Daugbteys of liberty J6ver?wbcre 
 
 KNOWING 
 
 THAT ALL WHO ASPIRE AFTER INTELLIGENT FREEDOM SHALL FIND 
 
 THE WATCHWORD OF WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER 
 
 "FOB THE SAKE OF GOD AND COUNTRY " 
 
 THEIR LOFTIEST INCENTIVE. 
 
 216948 
 
PREFACE 
 
 TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 SINCE the first appearance of this volume, during the 
 winter of 1898-9, the author has considerately re 
 garded all letters and literary comments- received by him, 
 as well as other recent works upon the life and times of 
 Washington. His original purpose to treat his subject 
 judicially, regardless of unverified tradition, has been 
 confirmed. 
 
 Washington s sublime conception of America, noticed in 
 Chapter XXXVI., foreshadowed "a stupendous fabric of 
 freedom and empire, on the broad basis of Independency," 
 through which the " poor and oppressed of all races and 
 religions " might find encouragement and solace. 
 
 The war with Spain has made both a moral and physical 
 impress upon the judgment and conscience of the entire 
 world. Unqualified by a single disaster on land or sea, 
 and never diverted from humane and honorable methods^ 
 it illustrates the intelligent patriotism and exhaust-less 
 resources of our country, and a nearer realization of 
 Washington s prayer for America. 
 
 Looking to the general trend of Washington s military 
 career, it is emphasized, throughout the volume, that the 
 moral, religious, and patriotic motives that energized his 
 life and shaped his character were so absolutely inter, 
 woven with the fibre of his professional experiences, that 
 
vi PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 the soul of the Man magnified the greatness of the 
 Soldier. 
 
 In connection with Washington s relations to General 
 Braddock, mentioned in the First Chapter, it is worthy of 
 permanent record that Virginia would not sanction, nor 
 would Washington accept assignment, except as Chief of 
 Staff. He was not a simple Aid-de-Camp, but of recognized 
 and responsible military merit. 
 
 HENRY B. CARRINGTON. 
 
 HVDE PARK, MASS., 
 
 September 21, 1899. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 THE text of this volume, completed in the spring of 
 1898 and not since modified, requires a different 
 Preface from that first prepared. The events of another 
 war introduce applications of military principles which 
 have special interest. This is the more significant be 
 cause modern appliances have been developed with start 
 ling rapidity, while general legislation and the organization 
 of troops, both regular and volunteer, have been very 
 similar to those of the times of Washington, and of later 
 American wars. 
 
 His letters, his orders, his trials, his experiences ; the 
 diversities of judgment between civilians and military 
 men ; between military men of natural aptitudes and 
 those of merely professional or accidental training, as 
 well as the diversities of personal and local interest, indi 
 cate the value of Washington s example and the charac 
 ter of his time. Hardly a single experience in his career 
 has not been realized by officers and men in these latter 
 days. 
 
 A very decided impression, however, has obtained 
 among educated men, including those of the military pro 
 fession, that Washington had neither the troops, resources, 
 and knowledge, nor the broad range of field service which 
 have characterized modern warfare, and therefore lacked 
 material elements which develop the typical soldier. But 
 more recent military operations upon an extensive scale, 
 especially those of the Franco-Prussian War, and the 
 American Civil War of 1861-1865, have supplied mate 
 rial for better appreciation of the principles that were 
 
viii WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 involved in the campaigns of the War for American In 
 dependence, as compared with those of Napoleon, Wel 
 lington, Maryborough, Frederick, Hannibal, and Caesar. 
 
 With full allowance for changes in army and battle 
 formation, tactical action and armament, as well as 
 greater facilities for the transportation of troops and 
 army supplies, it remains true that the relative effect of 
 all these changes upon success in war upon a grand scale, 
 has not been the modification of those principles of mili 
 tary science which have shaped battle action and the gen 
 eral conduct of war, from the earliest period of authentic 
 military history. The formal " Maxims of Napoleon " 
 were largely derived from his careful study of the cam 
 paigns of Frederick, Hannibal, and Ctusar ; and these, 
 with the principles involved, had specific and sometimes 
 literal illustration in the eventful operations of the armies 
 of the Hebrew Commonwealth. As a matter of fact, 
 those early Hebrew experiences were nearly as potential 
 in shaping the methods of modern generals, as their civil 
 code became the formative factor in all later civil codes, 
 preeminently those of the English Common Law. The 
 very best civil, police, and criminal regulations of modern 
 enactment hold closely to Hebrew antecedents. And in 
 military lines, the organization of regiments by compa 
 nies, and the combinations of regiments as brigades, 
 divisions and corps, still rest largely upon the same deci 
 mal basis ; and neither the Roman legion nor the Grecian 
 phalanx improved upon that basis. Even the Hebrew 
 militia, or reserves, had such well-established comprehen 
 sion of the contingency of the entire nation being called 
 to the field, or subjected to draft, that as late as the 
 advent of Christ, when he ordered the multitudes to be 
 seated upon the grass for refreshment, "they seated 
 themselves in companies of hundreds and fifties." Tlie 
 sanitary and police regulations of their camps have hdver 
 
PREFACE. ii V ix: 
 
 been surpassed, nor their provision for the cleanliness, 
 health, and comfort of the rank and file. From earliest 
 childhood they were instructed in their national history 
 and its glorious achievements, and the whole people 
 rejoiced in the gallant conduct of any. 
 
 Changes in arms, and especially in projectiles, only 
 induced modified tactical formation and corresponding 
 movements. The division of armies into a right, centre, 
 and left, with a well-armed and well-trained reserve, was 
 illustrated in their earliest battle record. The latest 
 modern formation, which makes of the regiment, by its 
 three battalion formation, a miniature, brigade, is chiefly 
 designed to give greater individual value to the soldier, 
 and not subject compact masses to the destructive sweep 
 of modern missiles. It also makes the force more mobile, 
 as well as more comprehensive of territory within its 
 range of fire. All this, however, is matter of detail and 
 not of substance, in the scientific conduct of campaigns 
 during a protracted and widely extended series of opera 
 tions in the field. 
 
 Military science itself is but the art of employing force 
 to vindicate, or execute, authority. To meet an emer 
 gency adequately, wisely, and successfully, is the expres 
 sive logic of personal, municipal, and military action. 
 The brain power is banded to various shaftings, and the 
 mental processes may differ by virtue of different appli 
 cations ; but the prime activities are the same. In 
 military studies, as in all collegiate or social preparation, 
 the soldier, the lawyer, or the scientist, must be in the 
 man, and not the necessary product of a certificate oi" a 
 diploma. The simplest possible definition of a few terms 
 in military use will elucidate the narrative as its events 
 develop the War for American Independence, under the 
 direction of Washington as Gommander-in-Chief. ,111 
 
 Six cardinal principles are thus .stated: , . >r : i if; \J ! ; 
 
x WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 I. STRATEGY. To secure those combinations which 
 will ensure the highest possible advantage in the employ 
 ment of military force. 
 
 NOTE. The strategical principles which controlled the Revolu 
 tionary campaigns, as defined in Chapter X. had their correspond 
 ence in 1861-1865, when the Federal right zone, or belt of war, was 
 beyond the Mississippi River, and the left zone between the Alle- 
 ghany Mountains and the Atlantic Ocean. The Confederate forces, 
 with base at Richmond, commanded an interior line westward, so 
 that the same troops could be alternatively used against the Federal 
 right, left, and centre, while the latter must make a long detour to 
 support its advance southward from the Ohio River. Federal superi 
 ority on sea and river largely contributed to success. American 
 sea-control in 1898, so suddenly and completely secured, was 
 practically omnipotent in the war with Spain. The navy, was a 
 substantially equipped force at the start. The army, had largely to 
 be created, when instantly needed, to meet the naval advance. 
 Legislation also favored the navy by giving to the commander-in- 
 chief the services of eminent retired veterans as an advisory board, 
 while excluding military men of recent active duty from similar 
 advisory and administrative service. 
 
 II. GRAND TACTICS. To handle that force in the 
 field. 
 
 NOTE. See Chapter XVII., where the Battle of Brandywine, 
 through the disorder of Sullivan s Division, unaccustomed to act as 
 a Division, or as a part of a consolidated Grand Division or Corps, 
 exactly fulfilled the conditions which made the first Battle of Bull 
 Run disasterous to the American Federal Army in 1861. Subsequent 
 skeleton drills below Arlington Heights, were designed to quicken the 
 proficiency of fresh troops, in the alignments, wheelings, and turns, 
 so indispensable to concert in action upon an extensive scale. In 
 1898 the fresh troops were largely from militia organizations which 
 had been trained in regimental movements. School battalions and 
 the military exercises of many benevolent societies had also been 
 conducive to readiness for tactical instruction. The large Camps of 
 Instruction were also indispensably needed. Here again, time was 
 an exacting master of the situation. 
 
 III. LOGISTICS. The practical art of bringing armies, 
 fully equipped, to the battlefield. 
 
PREFACE. xi 
 
 NOTE. In America where the standing army has been of only 
 nominal strength, although well officered ; and where militia are the 
 main reliance in time of war ; and where varied State systems rival 
 those of Washington s painful experience, the principle of Logistics, 
 with its departments of transportation and infinite varieties of sup 
 ply, is vital to wholesome and economic success. The war with 
 Spain which commenced April 21, 1898, illustrated this principle to 
 an extent never before realized in the world s history. Familiarity 
 with details, on so vast a scale of physical and financial activity, was 
 impossible, even if every officer of the regular army had been as 
 signed to executive duty. The education and versatile capacity of 
 the American citizen had to be utilized. Their experience fur 
 nished object-lessons for all future time. 
 
 IV. ENGINEERING. The application of mathematics 
 and mechanics to the maintenance or reduction of fortified 
 places ; the interposition or removal of artificial obstruc 
 tions to the passage of an army ; and the erection of suit 
 able works for the defence of territory or troops. 
 
 NOTE. The invention and development of machinery and the 
 marvellous range of mechanical art, through chemical, electrical, and 
 other superhuman agencies, afforded the American Government an 
 immediate opportunity to supplement its Engineer Corps in 1898, 
 with skilled auxiliaries. In fact, the structure of American society 
 and the trend of American thought and enterprise, invariably demand 
 the best results. What is mechanically necessary, will be invented, 
 if not at hand. That is good engineering. 
 
 V. MINOR TACTICS. The instruction of the soldier, 
 individually and en masse, in the details of military drill, 
 the use of his weapon, and the perfection of discipline. 
 
 NOTE. Washington never lost sight of the set-up of the individ 
 ual soldier, as the best dependence in the hour of battle. Self-reli 
 ance, obedience to orders, and confidence in success, were enjoined 
 as the conditions of success. His system of competitive marksman 
 ship, of rifle ranges, and burden tests, was initiated early in his career, 
 and was conspicuously enjoined before Brooklyn, and elsewhere, 
 during the war. 
 
 The American soldier of 1898 became invincible, man for man, 
 because of his intelligent response to individual discipline and drill. 
 Failure in either, whether of officer or soldier, shaped character and 
 
xii WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 result. As with the ancient Hebrew, citizenship meant knowledge 
 of organic law and obedience to its behests. Every, individual, there 
 fore, when charged with the central electric force, became a relay 
 battery, to conserve, intensify, and distribute that force. 
 
 VI. STATESMANSHIP ix WAR. This is illustrated 
 by the suggestion of Christ, that "a king going to war 
 with another king would sit down first and count the 
 cost, whether he would be able with ten thousand to meet 
 him that cometh against him with twenty thousand." 
 
 NOTE. American statesmanship in 1898, exacted other appli 
 ances than those of immediate!} 1 - available physical force. The costly 
 and insufferable relations of the Spanish West Indies to the United 
 States, had become pestilential. No self-respecting nation, else 
 where, would have as long withheld the. only remedy. Cuba was 
 dying to be free. Spain, unwilling, or unable, to grant an honorable 
 and complete autonomy to her despairing subjects, precipitated war 
 with the United States. The momentum of a supreme moral force in 
 behalf of humanity at large, .so energized the entire American people 
 that every ordinary unpreparedness failed to lessen the effectiveness of 
 the stroke. 
 
 It was both statesmanship and strategy, to strike so suddenly that 
 neither climatic changes, indigenous diseases, nor tropical cyclones, 
 could gain opportunity to do their mischief. When these supposed 
 allies of Spain were brushed aside, as powerless to stay the advance 
 of American arms in behalf of starving thousands, and a fortunate 
 occasion was snatched, just in time for victory, it proved to be such 
 an achievement as Washington would have pronounced a direct 
 manifestation of Divine favor. 
 
 But the character of Washington as a soldier is not to 
 be determined by the numerical strength of the armies 
 engaged in single battles, nor by the resources and geo 
 graphical conditions of later times. The same general 
 principles have ever obtained, and ever will control 
 human judgment. Transportation and inter-comniunica- 
 tion are relative ; and the slow mails and travel of Revo 
 lutionary times, alike affected both armies, with no partial 
 benefit or injury to either. The British had better com* 
 munication bv water, but not bv land ; with the disadviin- 
 
PREFACE. xni 
 
 tage of campaigning through an unknown and intricate 
 country, peopled by their enemies, whenever not covered 
 by the guns of their fleet. The American expedition to 
 Cuba in 1898 had not only the support of invincible 
 fleets, but the native population were to be the auxiliaries, 
 as well as the beneficiaries of the mighty movement. 
 
 Baron Jornini, in his elaborate history of the cam 
 paigns of Napoleon, analyzes that general s success over 
 his more experienced opponents, upon the basis of his 
 observance or neglect of the military principles already 
 outlined. The dash and vigor of his first Italian cam 
 paign were indeed characteristic of a young soldier im 
 patient of the habitually tardy deliberations of the old- 
 school movements. Napoleon discounted time by action. 
 He benumbed his adversary by the suddenness and feroc 
 ity of his stroke. But never, even in that wonderful 
 campaign, did Napoleon strike more suddenly and effec 
 tively, than did Washington on Christinas night, 1776, 
 at Trenton. And Napoleon s following-up blow was not 
 more emphatic, in its results, than was Washington s 
 attack upon Princeton, a week later, when the British 
 army already regarded his capture as a simple morn 
 ing privilege. Such inspirations of military prescience 
 belong to every age ; and often they shorten wars by 
 their determining value. 
 
 As a sound basis for a right estimate of Washington s 
 military career, and to avoid tedious episodes respecting 
 the acts and methods of many generals who were asso 
 ciated with him at the commencement of the Revolu 
 tionary War, a brief synopsis of the career of each will 
 find early notice. The dramatis personce of the Revolu 
 tionary drama are thus made the group of which he is to 
 be the centre ; and his current orders, correspondence, 
 and criticisms of their conduct, will furnish his valuation 
 of the character and services of each. The single fact, 
 
xiv WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 that no general officer of the first appointments actively 
 shared in the immediate siege of Yorktown, adds in 
 terest to this advance outline of their personal history. 
 
 For the same purpose, and as a logical predicate for 
 his early comprehension of the real issues involved in a 
 contest with Great Britain, an outline of events which 
 preceded hostilities is introduced, embracing, however, 
 only those Colonial antecedents which became emotional 
 factors in forming his character and energizing his life as 
 a soldier. 
 
 The maps, which illustrate only the immediate cam 
 paigns of Washington, or related territory which required 
 his supervision, are reduced from those used in " Battle 
 Maps and Charts of the American Revolution." The 
 map entitled " Operations near New York," was the first 
 one drafted, at Tarrytown, New York. In 1847, it was 
 approved by Washington Irving, then completing his 
 Life of Washington, and his judgment determined the 
 plan of the future work. All of the maps, however, 
 before engravure, had the minute examination and ap 
 proval of Benson J. Lossing. The present volume owes 
 its preparation to the personal request of the late Robert 
 C. Winthrop, of Massachusetts, made shortly before his 
 decease, and is completed, with ever-present appreciation 
 of his aid and his friendship. 
 
 HENRY B. CARRINGTON. 
 
 HYDE PARK, MASS., Sept. 1, 1898, 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTEE I. PAGE 
 
 ^ 
 
 EARLY APTITUDES FOR SUCCESS . 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 THE FERMENT OF AMERICAN LIBERTY . 10 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 THE OUTBREAK OF REPRESSED LIBERTY 20 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 ARMED AMERICA NEEDS A SOLDIER . 31 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 WASHINGTON IN COMMAND . 41 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 BRITISH CANADA ENTERS THE FIELD OF ACTION . 50 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 HOWE SUCCEEDS GATES. CLOSING SCENES OF 1775 . 58 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 AMERICA AGAINST BRITAIN. BOSTON TAKEN 68 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 SYSTEMATIC WAR WITH BRITAIN BEGUN 82 
 
xvi TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER X. PAGE 
 
 BRITAIN AGAINST AMERICA. - - HOWE INVADES NEW 
 
 YORK 93 
 
 CHAPTEE XI. 
 BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND . . "; . . . 101 
 
 CHAPTEE XII. 
 WASHINGTON IN NEW YORK . . . . . .114 
 
 CHAPTEE XIII. 
 WASHINGTON TENDERS, AND HOWE DECLINES, BATTLE. 
 
 HARLEM HEIGHTS AND WHITE PLAINS . . .125 
 
 CHAPTEE XIV. 
 THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN. TRENTON . . 134 
 
 CHAPTEE XV. 
 THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN DEVELOPED. 
 
 PRINCETON 150 
 
 CHAPTEE XVI. 
 THE AMERICAN BASE OF OPERATIONS ESTABLISHED. - 
 
 THE SECOND NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN . . .160 
 
 CHAPTEE XVII. 
 BRITISH INVASION FROM CANADA. OPERATIONS ALONG 
 
 THE HUDSON . .. . . . . . . 171 
 
 CHAPTEE XVIII. 
 PENNSYLVANIA INVADED. BATTLE OF BRAND YWINE . 181 
 
 CHAPTEE XIX. 
 WASHINGTON RESUMES THE OFFENSIVE. BATTLE OF 
 
 GERMANTOWN . . . . . . .192 
 
 CHAPTEE XX. 
 JEALOUSY AND GREED DEFEATED. VALLEY FORGE . 198 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xvii 
 
 CHAPTEE XXI. PAGE 
 
 PHILADELPHIA AND VALLEY FORGE IN WINTER, 1778 . 210 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 FROM VALLEY FORGE TO WHITE PLAINS AGAIN. 
 
 BATTLE OF MONMOUTH . . . . . .221 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE TAKES EFFECT. SIEGE 
 
 OF NEWPORT 238 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 MINOR EVENTS AND GRAVE CONDITIONS, 1779 . . 246 
 
 CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 MINOR OPERATIONS OF 1779 CONTINUED. STONY 
 
 POINT TAKEN. NEW ENGLAND RELIEVED . . 255 
 
 CHAPTER XXVI. 
 
 SHIFTING SCENES. TEMPER OF THE PEOPLE. SAVAN 
 NAH 263 
 
 CHAPTER XXVII. 
 THE EVENTFUL YEAR 1780. NEW JERSEY ONCE MORE 
 
 INVADED 269 
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 BATTLE OF SPRINGFIELD. ROCIIAMBEAU. ARNOLD. 
 
 GATES . . . . . . . .282 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 A BIRD S-EYE VIEW OF THE THEATRE OF WAR . . 294 
 
 CHAPTER XXX. 
 THE SOLDIER TTIIED. AMERICAN MUTINY. FOREIGN 
 
 JUDGMENT. ARNOLD S DEPREDATIONS . . . 304 
 
 CHAPTER XXXI. 
 THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN, 1781, OUTLINED. COWPENS. 
 
 GUILFORD COURT-HOUSE. EUTAW SPRINGS . 312 
 
xviii TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXII. PAGE 
 
 LAFAYETTE IN PURSUIT OF ARNOLD. THE END IN 
 
 SIGHT. ARNOLD IN THE BRITISH ARMY . . 323 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIII. 
 NEW YORK AND YORKTOWN THREATENED. CORNWALLIS 
 
 INCLOSED BY LAFAYETTE . ... 333 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIV. 
 BRITISH CAPTAINS OUTGENERALED. WASHINGTON JOINS 
 
 LAFAYETTE .... . 344 
 
 CHAPTER XXXV. 
 
 THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE VINDICATED. WASHING 
 TON S MAGNANIMITY. His BENEDICTION . . 352 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVI. 
 WASHINGTON S PREDICTION REALIZED. THE ATTITUDE 
 
 OF AMERICA PRONOUNCED . 366 
 
 APPENDIX A. American Army, by States . . . 377 
 
 APPENDIX B. American Navy and its Career . . 378 
 
 APPENDIX C. Comparisons with Later Wars . . 380 
 
 APPENDIX D. British Army, at Various Dates . . 383 
 
 APPENDIX E. Organization of Burgoyne 3 Army . 387 
 
 APPENDIX F. Organization of Cornwallis s Army . 388 
 
 APPENDIX G. Notes of Lee s Court-martial 389 
 
 GLOSSARY OF MILITARY TERMS . . . 393 
 
 CHRONOLOGICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL INDEX . . . 397 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS. 
 
 ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 WASHINGTON .... . Frontispiece. 
 
 [Hall s engraving from the St. Memin crayon.] 
 
 WASHINGTON AT FOUR PERIODS OF HIS MILITARY CAREER, 40 
 
 [From etching, after Hall s Sons group.] 
 
 WASHINGTON AT BOSTON ...... 80 
 
 [From Stuart s painting, in Faneuil Hall, Boston.] 
 
 WASHINGTON BEFORE TRENTON .... 143 
 
 [From Dael s painting.] 
 
 WASHINGTON IN HIS ROOM AT VALLEY FORGE . . 207 
 
 [From the painting by Scheuster.] 
 
 MAPS. 
 
 I. OUTLINE OF THE ATLANTIC COAST ... 1 
 
 II. BOSTON AND VICINITY 69 
 
 III. BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND . 105 
 
 TV. OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK . . . 125 
 
 V. CAPTURE OF FORT WASHINGTON . . . 132 
 
 VI. TRENTON AND VICINITY . . 144 
 
 VII. BATTLE OF TRENTON: BATTLE OF PRINCETON . 151 
 
 VIII. OPERATIONS IN NEW JERSEY . . 161 
 
 IX. ATTACK OF FORTS CLINTON AND MONTGOMERY . 179 
 
 X. BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE . . 186 
 
 XI, BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN . . . 196 
 
 xii 
 
xx ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 XII. OPERATIONS ON THE DELAWARE . . . 202 
 
 XIII. OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA . . . 204 
 
 XIV. ENCAMPMENT AT VALLEY FORGE . . . 211 
 XV. BATTLE OF MONMOUTH .... 224 
 
 XVI. OUTLINE MAP OF HUDSON RIVER . -. . ; 255 
 XVII. BATTLE OF SPRINGFIELD : OPERATIONS FROM 
 
 STATEN ISLAND 283 
 
 XVIII. LAFAYETTE IN VIRGINIA .... 339 
 
 XIX. OPERATIONS IN CHESAPEAKE BAY . . . 355 
 
 XX. SIEGE OF YORKTOWX ... . 357 
 
WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 EARLY APTITUDES FOR SUCCESS. 
 
 riHHE boyhood and youth of George Washington were 
 1 singularly in harmony with those aptitudes and 
 tastes that shaped his entire life. He was not quite 
 eight years of age when his elder brother, Lawrence, 
 fourteen years his senior, returned from England where 
 he had been carefully educated, and where he had devel 
 oped military tastes that were hereditary in the family. 
 Lawrence secured a captain s commission in a freshly 
 organized regiment, and engaged in service in the West 
 Indies, with distinguished credit. His letters, counsels, 
 and example inspired the younger brother with similar 
 zeal. Irving says that "all his amusements took a mili 
 tary turn. He made soldiers of his school-mates. They 
 had their mimic parades, reviews, and sham-fights. A 
 boy named William Bustle, was sometimes his competitor, 
 but George was commander-in-chief of the school." 
 
 His business aptitudes were equally exact, methodical, 
 and promising. Besides fanciful caligraphy, which ap 
 peared in manuscript school-books, wherein he executed 
 profiles of his school-mates, with a flourish of the pen, as 
 well as nondescript birds, Irving states that " before he 
 
2 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 was thirteen years of age, he had copied into a volume, 
 forms of all kinds of mercantile and legal papers : bills of 
 exchange, notes of hand, deeds, bonds, and the like." 
 "This self-tuition gave him throughout life a lawyer s 
 skill in drafting documents, and a merchant s exactness 
 in keeping accounts, so that all the concerns of his various 
 estates, his dealings with his domestic stewards and 
 foreign agents, his accounts with government, and all his 
 financial transactions, are, to this day, monuments of his 
 method and unwearied accuracy." 
 
 Even as a boy, his frame had been large and powerful, 
 and he is described by Captain Mercer " as straight as an 
 Indian, measuring six feet and two inches in his stockings, 
 and weighing one hundred and seventy-five pounds, when 
 he took his seat in the Virginia House of Burgesses in 
 1759. His head is well shaped though not large, but 
 is gracefully poised on a superb neck, with a large 
 and straight rather than a prominent nose ; blue-gray 
 penetrating eyes, which were widely separated and over 
 hung by heavy brows. A pleasing, benevolent, though 
 a commanding countenance, dark-brown hair, features 
 regular and placid, with all the muscles under perfect 
 control, with a mouth large, and generally firmly closed," 
 complete the picture. The bust by Houdon at the 
 Capitol of Virginia, and the famous St. Meinin crayon, 
 fully accord with this description of Washington. 
 
 His training and surroundings alike ministered to his 
 natural conceptions of a useful and busy life. In the 
 midst of abundant game, he became proficient in its pur 
 suit. Living where special pride was taken in the cul 
 tivation of good stock, and where nearly all travel and 
 neighborly visitation was upon horseback, he learned the 
 value of a good horse, and was always well mounted. 
 Competition in saddle exercise was, therefore, one of the 
 most pleasing and constant entertainments of himself and 
 
EARLY: APTITUDES FOR SUCCESS. 3 
 
 companions, and in its enjoyment, and in many festive 
 tournaments that revived something of the olden-time 
 chivalry of knighthood, Washington was not only profi 
 cient, but foremost in excellence of attainment. 
 
 Rustic recreations such as quoits, vaulting, wrestling, 
 leaping, the foot-race, hunting and fishing, were parts 
 of his daily experience, and thoroughly in the spirit of 
 the Old Dominion home life of the well-bred gentleman. 
 The gallantry of the times and the social amenities of 
 
 c / 
 
 that section of the country were specially adapted to his 
 temperament, so that in these, also, he took the palm of 
 recognized merit. The lance and the sword, arid every 
 accomplishment of mimic warfare in the scale of heraldic 
 observance, usual at that period, were parts of his panoply, 
 to be enjoyed with keenest relish, until his name became 
 synonymous with success in all for which he seriously 
 struggled. Tradition does not exaggerate the historic 
 record of his proficiency in these inanly sports. 
 
 Frank by nature, although self-contained and some 
 what reticent in expression ; unsuspicious of others, but 
 ever ready to help the deserving needy, or the unfort 
 unate competitor who vainly struggled for other sym 
 pathy, he became the natural umpire, at the diverting 
 recreations of his times, and commanded a respectful con 
 fidence far beyond that of others of similar age and posi 
 tion in society. With all this, a sense of justice and a 
 right appreciation of the merit of others, even of rivals, 
 were so conspicuous in daily intercourse with a large 
 circle of familiar acquaintances, whether of influential 
 families or those of a more humble sphere of life, that he 
 ever bent gracefully to honor the deserving, while never 
 obsequious to gain the favor of any. 
 
 Living in the midst of slave labor, and himself a 
 slaveholder, he was humane, considerate, and impartial. 
 Toward his superiors in age or in position, he was uni- 
 
4 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 formly courteous, without jealousy or envy, but uncon 
 sciously carried himself with so much of benignity and 
 grace, that his most familiar mates paid him the deference 
 which marked the demeanor of all who, in later years, 
 recognized his exalted preferment and his natural sphere 
 of command. The instincts of a perfect gentleman were 
 so radicated in his person and deportment, that he moved 
 from stage to stage, along life s ascent, as naturally as 
 the sun rises to its zenith with ever increasing bright 
 ness and force. 
 
 All these characteristics, so happily blended, imparted 
 to his choice of a future career its natural direction and 
 character. Living near the coast and in frequent con 
 tact with representatives of the British navy, he became 
 impressed by the strong conviction that its service offered 
 the best avenue to the enjoyment of his natural tastes, as 
 well as the most promising field for their fruitful exer 
 cise. The berth of midshipman, with its prospects of 
 preferment and travel, fell within his reach and accept 
 ance. Every available opportunity was sought, through 
 books of history and travel and acquaintance with men 
 of the naval profession, to anticipate its duties and 
 requirements. It was Washington s first disappointment 
 in life of which there is record, that his mother did not 
 share his ardent devotion for the sea and maritime 
 adventure. At the age of eleven he lost his father, 
 Augustine Washington, but the estate was ample for all 
 purposes of Virginia hospitality and home comfort, and 
 he felt that he could be spared as well as his brother 
 Lawrence. With all the intensity of his high aspiration 
 and all the vigor of his earnest and almost passionate 
 will, he sought to win his mother s assent to his plans ; 
 and then, with filial reverence and a full, gracious sub 
 mission, he bent to her wishes and surrendered his 
 choice. That was Washington s first victory ; and similar 
 
EARLY APTITUDES FOR SUCCESS. 5 
 
 self-mastery, under obligation to country, became the 
 secret of his imperial success. Irving relates that his 
 mother s favorite volume was Sir Matthew Hale s Con 
 templations, moral and divine ; and that " the admirable 
 maxims therein contained, sank deep into the mind of 
 George, and doubtless had a great influence in forming 
 his character. That volume, ever cherished, and bearing 
 his mother s name, Mary Washington, may still be seen 
 in the archives of Mount Vernon." 
 
 But Washington s tastes had become so settled, that 
 he followed the general trend of .mathematical and mili 
 tary study, until he became so well qualified as a civil 
 engineer, that at the age of sixteen, one year after 
 abandoning the navy as his profession, he was intrusted 
 with important land surveys, by Lord Fairfax ; and at 
 the age of nineteen was appointed Military Inspector, 
 with the rank of Major. In 1752 he became the Adju 
 tant-General of Virginia. Having been born on the 
 
 O O 
 
 twenty-second day of February (February llth, Old 
 Style) he was only twenty years of age when this great 
 responsibility was intrusted to his charge. 
 
 The period was one of grave concern to the people of 
 Virginia, especially as the encroachments of the French 
 on the western frontier, and the hostilities of several 
 Indian tribes, had emperilled all border settlements ; while 
 the British government was not prepared to furnish a 
 sufficient military force to meet impending emergencies. 
 As soon as Washington entered upon the duties of his 
 office, he made a systematic organization of the militia his 
 first duty. A plan was formulated, having special refer 
 ence to frontier service. His journals and the old 
 Colonial records indicate the minuteness with which this 
 undertaking was carried into effect. His entire sub 
 sequent career is punctuated by characteristics drawn 
 from this experience. Rifle practice, feats of horseman- 
 
(j WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 ship, signalling, restrictions of diet, adjustments for the 
 transportation of troops and supplies with the least pos 
 sible encumbrance ; road and bridge building, the care of 
 powder and the casting of bullets, were parts of this 
 system. These were accompanied by regulations require- 
 ing an exact itinerary of every march, which were filed 
 for reference, in order to secure the quickest access to 
 every frontier post. The duties and responsibilities of 
 scouts sent in advance of troops, were carefully defined. 
 The passage of rivers, the felling of trees for breast 
 works, stockades, and block-houses, and methods of 
 crossing swamps, by corduroy adjustments, entered into 
 the instruction of the Virginia militia. 
 
 At this juncture it seemed advisable, in the opinion of 
 Governor Dinwiddie, to secure, if practicable, a better 
 and an honorable understanding with the French com 
 manders who had established posts at the west. The 
 Indians were hostile to all advances of both British and 
 French settlement. There was an indication that the 
 French were making friendly overtures to the savages, 
 with view to an alliance against the English. In 1753 
 Washington was sent as Special Commissioner, for the 
 purpose indicated. The journey through a country 
 infested with hostile tribes was a remarkable episode in 
 the life of the young soldier, and was conducted amid 
 hardships that seem, through his faithful diary, to have 
 been the incidents of some strangely thrilling fiction rather 
 than the literal narrative, modestly given, of personal 
 experience. During the journey, full of risks and rare 
 deliverances from savage foes, swollen streams, ice, snow, 
 and tempest, his keen discernment was quick to mark the 
 forks of the Alleghany and Monongahela rivers as the 
 proper site for a permanent post, to control that region 
 and the tributary waters of the Ohio, which united there. 
 He was courteouslv received bv St. Pierre, the French 
 
EARLY APTITUDES FOR SUCCESS. 7 
 
 commandant, but failed to secure the recognition of 
 English rights along the Ohio. But Washington s notes 
 of the winter s expedition critically record the military 
 features of the section traversed by him, and forecast 
 the peculiar skill with which he accomplished so much 
 in later years, with the small force at his disposal. 
 
 In 1754 he was promoted as Colonel and placed in 
 command of the entire Virginia militia. Already, the 
 Ohio Company had selected the forks of the river for a 
 trading-post and commenced a stockade fort for their 
 defence. The details of Washington s march to support 
 these pioneers, the establishment and history of Fort 
 Necessity, are matters of history. 
 
 Upon assuming command of the Virginia militia, 
 Washington decided that a more flexible system than 
 that of the European government of troops, was indis 
 pensable to success in fighting the combined French and 
 Indian forces, then assuming the aggressive against the 
 border settlements. Thrown into intimate association 
 with General Braddock and assigned to duty as his aid- 
 de-camp and guide, he endeavored to explain to that 
 officer the unwisdom of his assertion that the very 
 appearance of British regulars in imposing array, would 
 vanquish the wild warriors of thicket and woods, without 
 battle. The profitless campaign and needless fate of 
 Braddock are familiar ; but Washington gained credit 
 both at home and abroad, youthful as he was, for that 
 sagacity, practical wisdom, knowledge of human nature, 
 and courage, which ever characterized his life. 
 
 During these marchings and inspections he caused all 
 trees which were so near to a post as to shelter an 
 advancing enemy, to be felled. The militia were scat 
 tered over an extensive range of wild country, in small 
 detachments, and he was charged with the defence of 
 more than four hundred miles of frontier, with an avail- 
 
8 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 able force of only one thousand men. He at once initi 
 ated a system of sharp-shooters for each post. Ranges 
 were established, so that fire would not be wasted upon 
 assailants before they came within effective distance. 
 When he resumed command, after returning from the 
 Braddock campaign, he endeavored to reorganize the 
 militia upon a new basis. This reorganization drew from 
 his fertile brain some military maxims for camp and field 
 service which were in harmony with the writings of the 
 best military authors of that period, and his study of 
 available military works was exact, unremitting, and 
 never forgotten. Even during the active life of the 
 Revolutionary period, he secured from New York various 
 military and other volumes for study, especially including 
 Marshal Turenne s Works, which Greene had mastered 
 before the war began. 
 
 Washington resigned his commission in 1756 ; married 
 Mrs. Martha Custis, Jan. 6, 1759 ; was elected member 
 of the Virginia House of Burgesses the same year, and 
 was appointed Commissioner to settle military accounts 
 in 1765. In the discharge of this trust he manifested 
 that accuracy of detail and that exactness of system in 
 business concerns which have their best illustration in 
 the minute record of his expenses during the Revolution 
 ary War, in which every purchase made for the govern 
 ment or the army, even to a few horse-shoe nails, is 
 accurately stated. 
 
 Neither Caesar s Commentaries, nor the personal record 
 of any other historical character, more strikingly illus 
 trate an ever-present sense of responsibility to conscience 
 and to country, for trusts reposed, than does that of 
 Washington, whether incurred in camp or in the whirl 
 and crash of battle. Baron Jomini says: "A great 
 soldier must have a physical courage which takes no 
 account of obstacles ; and a high moral courage capable 
 
EARLY APTITUDES FOR SUCCESS. 9 
 
 of great resolution." There have been youth, like Han 
 nibal, whose earliest nourishment was a taste of ven 
 geance against his country s foes, and others have 
 imbibed, as did the ancient Hebrew, abnormal strength 
 to hate their enemies while doing battle ; but if the charac 
 ter of Washington be justly delineated, he was, through 
 every refined and lofty channel, prepared, by early apti 
 tudes and training, to honor his chosen profession, with 
 no abatement of aught that dignifies character, and 
 rounds out in harmonious completeness the qualities of a 
 consummate statesman and a great soldier. 
 
CHAPTP:R IT. 
 
 * 
 
 THE FERMENT OF AMERICAN LIBERTY. 
 
 IN 1755, four military expeditions were planned by 
 the Colonies : one against the French in Nova 
 Scotia ; one against Crown Point ; one against Fort 
 Niagara, and the fourth, that of Braddock, against the 
 French posts along the Ohio river. 
 
 In 1758, additional expeditions were undertaken, the 
 first against Louisburg, the second against Ticonderoga, 
 and the third against Fort Du Quesne. Washington led 
 the advance in the third, a successful attack, Nov. 25, 
 1758, thereby securing peace with the Indians on the 
 border, and making the fort itself more memorable by 
 changing its name to that of Fort Pitt (now Pittsburgh) 
 in memory of William Pitt (Lord Chatham), the eminent 
 British statesman, and the enthusiastic friend of America. 
 
 In 1759, Quebec was captured by the combined British 
 and Colonial forces, and the tragic death of the two 
 commanders, Wolfe and Montcalm, made the closing 
 hours of the siege the last opportunity of their heroic 
 valor. With the capture of Montreal in 1760, Canada 
 came wholly under British control. In view of those 
 campaigns, it was not strange that so many Colonial 
 participants readily found places in the Continental 
 Army at the commencement of the war for American 
 Independence, and subsequently urged the acquisition of 
 posts on the northern border with so much pertinacity 
 and confidence. 
 
 10 
 
THE FERMENT OF AMERICAN LIBERTY. H 
 
 In 1761, Spain joined France against Great Britain, 
 but failed of substantial gain through that alliance, 
 because the British fleets were able to master the West 
 India possessions of Spain, and even to capture the city 
 of Havana itself. 
 
 In 1763, a treaty was effected at Paris, which termi 
 nated these protracted inter-Colonial wars, so that the 
 thirteen American colonies were finally relieved from the 
 vexations and costly burdens of aiding the British crown 
 to hold within its grasp so many and so widely separated 
 portions of the American continent. In the ultimate 
 settlement with Spain, England exchanged Havana for 
 Florida ; and France, with the exception of the city of 
 New Orleans and its immediate vicinity, retired behind 
 the Mississippi river, retaining, as a shelter for her 
 fisheries, only the Canadian islands of St. Pierre and 
 Miquelon, which are still French possessions. 
 
 In view of the constantly increasing imposition of 
 taxes upon the Colonies by the mother country, in order 
 to maintain her frequent wars with European rivals, by 
 land and sea, a convention was held at New York on the 
 seventh day of October, 1765, called a Colonial Congress, 
 " to consult as to their relations to England, and pro 
 vide for their common safety." Nine colonies were 
 represented, and three others either ratified the action 
 of the convention, or declared their sympathy with 
 its general recommendations and plans. The very brief 
 advance notice of the assembling of delegates, partly 
 accounts for the failure of North Carolina, Virginia, New 
 Hampshire, and Georgia, to be represented. But that 
 convention made a formal rr Declaration of Rights," 
 especially protesting that " their own representatives 
 alone had the right to tax them," and " their own juries 
 to try them." 
 
 As an illustration of the fact, that the suggestion of 
 
12 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 some common bond to unite the Colonies for general 
 defence was not due to the agencies which immediately 
 precipitated the American Revolution, it is to be noticed 
 that as early as 1697, William Penn urged the union of 
 the Colonies in some mutually related common support. 
 The Six Nations (Indian), whom the British courted as 
 allies against the French, and later, against their own 
 blood, had already reached a substantial Union among 
 themselves, under the name of the Iroquois Confederacy ; 
 and it is a historical fact of great interest, that their con 
 stitutional league for mutual support against a common 
 enemy, while reserving absolute independence in every 
 local function or franchise, challenged the appreciative 
 indorsement of Thomas Jefferson when he entered upon 
 the preparation of a Constitution for the United States of 
 America. 
 
 And in 1722, Daniel Coxe, of New Jersey, suggested 
 a practical union of the Colonies for the consolidation of 
 interests common to each. In 1754, when the British 
 government formally advised the Colonies to secure the 
 friendship of the Six Nations against the French, Benja 
 min Franklin prepared a form for such union. Delegates 
 from New England, as well as from New York, Pennsyl 
 vania, and Maryland, met at Albany on the fourth of July, 
 1754, the very day of the surrender of Fort Necessity to 
 the French, for consideration of the suggested plan. The 
 King s council rejected it, because it conceded too much 
 independence of action to the people of the Colonies, and 
 the Colonies refused to accept its provisions, because it 
 left too much authority with the King. 
 
 Ten years later, when the Colonies had been freed from 
 the necessity of sacrificing men and money to support 
 the British authority against French, Spanish, and Indian 
 antagonists, the poverty of the British treasury drove 
 George Grenville, then Prime Minister, to a system of 
 
THE FERMENT OF AMERICAN LIBERTY. 13 
 
 revenue from America, through the imposition of duties 
 upon Colonial imports. In 1755 followed the famous 
 Stamp Act. Its passage by Parliament was resisted by 
 statesmen of clear foresight, with sound convictions of 
 the injustice of taxing their brethren in America who had 
 no representatives in either House of Parliament ; but in 
 vain, and this explosive bomb was hurled across the sea. 
 Franklin, then in London, thus wrote to Charles Thomp 
 son, who afterwards became secretary of the Colonial 
 Congress : " The sun of Liberty has set. The American 
 people must light the torch of industry and economy." 
 To this Thompson replied : " Be assured that we shall 
 light torches of quite another sort." 
 
 The explosion of this missile, charged with death to 
 every noble incentive to true loyalty to the mother coun 
 try, dropped its inflammatory contents everywhere along 
 the American coast. The Assembly of Virginia was first 
 to meet, and its youngest member, Patrick Henry, in 
 spite of shouts of " Treason," pressed appropriate legis 
 lation to enactment. Massachusetts, unadvised of the 
 action of Virginia, with equal spontaneity, took formal 
 action, inviting the Colonies to send delegates to a Con 
 gress in New York, there to consider the grave issues 
 that confronted the immediate future. South Carolina 
 was the first to respond. When Governor Try on, of 
 North Carolina, afterwards the famous Governor of New 
 York, asked Colonel (afterwards General) Ashe, Speaker 
 of the North Carolina Assembly, what the House would 
 do with the Stamp Act, he replied, " We will resist its 
 execution to the death." 
 
 On the seventh of October the Congress assembled and 
 solemnly asserted, as had a former convention, that 
 " their own representatives alone had the right to tax 
 them," and " their own juries to try them." Throughout 
 the coast line of towns and cities, interrupted business, 
 
14 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 muffled and tolling bells, flags at half-mast, and every 
 possible sign of stern indignation and deep distress, indi 
 cated the resisting force which was gathering volume to 
 hurl a responsive missile into the very council chamber 
 of King George himself. 
 
 "Sons of Liberty" organized in force, but secretly; 
 arming themselves for the contingency of open conflict. 
 Merchants refused to import British goods. Societies of 
 the learned professions and of all grades of citizenship 
 agreed to dispense with all luxuries of English pro 
 duction or import. Under the powerful and magnetic 
 sway of Pitt and Burke, this Act was repealed in 1766 ; 
 but even this repeal was accompanied by a " Declaratory 
 Act," which reserved for the Crown " the right to bind 
 the Colonies, in all cases whatsoever." 
 
 Pending all these fermentations of the spirit of liberty, 
 George Washington, of Virginia, was among the first to 
 recognize the coming of a conflict in which the Colo 
 nial troops would no longer be a convenient auxiliary to 
 British regulars, in a common cause, but would confront 
 them in a life or death struggle, for rights which had 
 been guaranteed by Magna Charta, and had become the 
 vested inheritance of the American people. Suddenly, 
 as if to impress its power more heavily upon the restless 
 and overwrought Colonists, Parliament required them to 
 furnish quarters and subsistence for the garrisons of 
 towns and cities. In 1768, two regiments arrived at 
 Boston, ostensibly to "preserve the public peace," but, 
 primarily, to enforce the revenue measures of Parlia 
 ment. 
 
 In 1769, Parliament requested the King to "instruct 
 the Governor of Massachusetts " to " forward to England 
 for trial, upon charges of high treason," several prominent 
 citizens of that colony " who had been guilty of denounc 
 ing Parliamentary action." The protests of the Provin- 
 
THE FERMENT OF AMERICAN LIBERTY. 15 
 
 cud Assemblies of Virginia and North Carolina against 
 
 ^ o 
 
 the removal of their citizens, for trial elsewhere, were 
 answered by the dissolution of those bodies by their 
 respective royal governors. On the fifth day of May, 
 1769, Lord North, who had become Prime Minister, pro 
 posed to abolish all duties, except upon tea. Later, 
 in 1770, occurred the "Boston Massacre," which is ever 
 recalled to mind by a monument upon the Boston Com 
 mon, in honor of the victims. In 1773 "Committees of 
 Correspondence " were selected by most of the Colonies, 
 for advising the people of all sections, whenever current 
 events seemed to endanger the public weal. One writer 
 said of this state of affairs : " Common origin, a common 
 language, and common sufferings had already established 
 between the Colonies a union of feeling and interest ; 
 and now, common dangers drew them together more 
 closely." 
 
 But the tax upon tea had been retained, as the expres 
 sion of the reserved right to tax at will, under the weak 
 assumption that the Colonists would accept this single tax 
 and pay a willing consideration for the use of tea in their 
 social and domestic life. The shrewd and patriotic citi 
 zens, however boyish it may have seemed to many, 
 found a way out of the apparent dilemma, and on the 
 night of December 16, 1773, the celebrated Boston Tea 
 Party gave an entertainment, using three hundred and 
 fifty-two chests of tea for the festive occasion, and Boston 
 Harbor for the mixing caldron. 
 
 In 1774, the "Boston Port Bill" was passed, nullifying 
 material provisions of the Massachusetts Charter, pro 
 hibiting intercourse with Boston by sea, and substituting 
 Salem for the port of entry and as the seat of govern 
 ment for the Province. It is to be noticed, concerning 
 the various methods whereby the Crown approached the 
 Colonies, in the attempt to subordinate all rights to the 
 
16 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 royal will, that Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Con 
 necticut, until 1692, were charter governments, whereby 
 laws were framed and executed by the freemen of each 
 colony. The proprietary governments were Pennsylvania 
 with Maryland, and at first New York, New Jersey, and 
 the Carolinas. In all of these, the proprietors, under 
 certain restrictions, established and conducted their own 
 systems of rule. There were also the royal govern 
 ments, those of New Hampshire, Virginia, Georgia, and 
 afterwards Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and 
 the Carolinas. In these, appointments of the chief 
 officers pertained to the Crown. 
 
 At the crisis noticed, General Gage had been appointed 
 Governor of Massachusetts Colony, as well as commander- 
 in-chief, and four additional regiments had been de 
 spatched to his support. But Salem declined to avail 
 herself of the proffered boon of exceptional franchises, 
 and the House of Burgesses of Virginia ordered that 
 ft the day when the Boston Port Bill was to go into 
 effect should be observed as a day of fasting, humiliation, 
 and prayer." 
 
 The Provincial Assembly did indeed meet at Salem, 
 but solemnly resolved that it was expedient, at once, to 
 call a General Congress of all the Colonies, to meet the 
 unexpected disfranchisement of the people, and appointed 
 five delegates to attend such Congress. All the Colonies 
 except Georgia, whose governor prevented the election 
 of delegates, were represented. 
 
 This body, known in history as the First Continental 
 Congress, assembled in Carpenter s Hall, Philadelphia, on 
 the fifth day of September, 1774. Peyton Randolph, of 
 Virginia, was elected president, and Charles Thompson, 
 of Pennsylvania, was elected secretary. Among the 
 representative men who took part in its solemn delibera 
 tions must be named Samuel Adams and John Adams, of 
 
THE FERMENT OF AMERICAN LIBERTY. 17 
 
 Massachusetts ; Philip Livingstone and John Jay, of 
 Xe\v York ; John Dickinson, of Pennsylvania ; Chris 
 topher Gadsden and John Rutledge, of South Carolina ; 
 Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, and George Wash 
 ington, of Virginia. 
 
 During an address by Lord Chatham before the British 
 House of Lords, he expressed his opinion of the men 
 who thus boldly asserted their inalienable rights as 
 Englishmen against the usurping mandates of the Crown, 
 in these words : "History, my lords, has been my favor 
 ite study ; and in the celebrated writers of antiquity 
 have I often admired the patriotism of Greece and Rome ; 
 but, my lords, I must declare and avow, that in the mas 
 ter states of the world, I know not the people, or senate, 
 who, in such a complication of difficult circumstances, 
 can stand in preference to the delegates of America 
 assembled in General Congress at Philadelphia." This 
 body resolved to support Massachusetts in resistance to 
 the offensive Acts of Parliament ; made a second " Dec 
 laration of Rights," and advised an American associa 
 tion for non-intercourse with England. It also prepared 
 another petition to the King, as well as an address to the 
 people of Great Britain and Canada, and then provided 
 for another Congress, to be assembled the succeeding 
 May. During its sessions, the Massachusetts Assembly 
 also convened and resolved itself into a Provincial Con 
 gress, electing John Hancock as president, and proceeded 
 to authorize a body of militia, subject to instant call, and 
 therefore to be designated as " Minute Men." A Com 
 mittee of Safety was appointed to administer public 
 affairs during the recess of the Congress. When Cap 
 tain Robert Mackenzie, of Washington s old regiment, 
 intimated that Massachusetts was rebellious, and sought 
 independence, Washington used this unequivocal lan 
 guage in reply : "If the ministry are determined to push 
 
18 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 matters to extremity, I add, as my opinion, that more 
 blood will be spilled than history has ever furnished 
 instances of, in the annals of North America ; and such 
 a vital wound will be given to the peace of this great 
 country, as time itself cannot cure, or eradicate the re 
 membrance of." 
 
 Early in 1775 Parliament rejected a "Conciliatory 
 Bill," which had been introduced by Lord Chatham, and 
 passed an Act in special restraint of New England trade, 
 which forbade even fishing on the banks of Newfound 
 land. New York, North Carolina, and Georgia were 
 excepted, in the imposition of restrictions upon trade in 
 the middle and southern Colonies, in order by a marked 
 distinction between Colonies, to conserve certain aristo 
 cratic influences, and promote dissension among the people ; 
 but all such transparent devices failed to subdue the patri 
 otic sentiment which had already become universal in its 
 expression. 
 
 At that juncture the English people themselves did not 
 apprehend rightly the merits of the dawning struggle, 
 nor resent the imposition by Parliament, of unjust, un 
 equal, and unconstitutional laws upon their brethren in 
 America. Dr. Franklin thus described their servile 
 attitude toward the Crown : " Every man in England 
 seems to consider himself as a piece of a sovereign ; 
 seems to jostle himself into the throne with the King ; and 
 talks of * our subjects in the Colonies. " 
 
 The ferment of patriotic sentiment was deep, subtle, 
 intense, and ready for deliverance. The sovereignty of 
 the British crown and the divine rights of man were to 
 be subjected to the stern arbitrament of battle. One 
 had fleets, armies, wealth, prestige, and power, unsus- 
 tained by the principles of genuine liberty which had 
 distinguished the British Constitution above all other 
 modern systems of governmental control ; while the scat- 
 
THE FERMENT OF AMERICAN LIBERTY. 19 
 
 tered two millions of earnest, patriotic Englishmen across 
 the sea, who, from their first landing upon the shores of 
 the New World had honored every principle which could 
 impart dignity and empire to their mother country, were 
 to balance the scale of determining war by the weight of 
 loyalty to conscience and to God. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE OUTBREAK OF REPRESSED LIBERTY. 
 
 BRITISH authority, which ought to have gladly 
 welcomed and honored the prodigious elasticity, 
 energy, and growth of its American dependencies, as the 
 future glory and invincible ally of her advancing empire, 
 was deliberately arming to convert a natural filial relation 
 into one of slavery. The legacies of British law and the 
 liberties of English subjects, which the Crown did not 
 dare to infringe at home, had been lodged in the hearts 
 of her American sons and daughters, until resistance to a 
 royal decree had become impossible under any reasonable 
 system of paternal care and treatment. Colonial sacri 
 fices during Indian wars had been cheerfully borne, and 
 free-will offerings of person and property had been 
 rendered without stint, upon every demand. But it 
 seemed to be impossible for George the Third and his 
 chosen advisers to comprehend in its full significance, the 
 momentous fact, that English will was as strong and 
 stubborn in the child as in the parent. 
 
 Lord Chatham said that " it would be found impossible 
 for freemen in England to wish to see three millions of 
 Englishmen slaves in America." 
 
 Respecting the attempted seizure of arms rightly in 
 the hands of the people, that precipitated the " skirmish, 
 as the British defined it, which occurred at Lexington on 
 the nineteenth day of April, 1775, Lord Dartmouth said : 
 " The effect of General Gage s attempt at Concord will be 
 fatal." 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF REPRESSED LIBERTY. 21 
 
 Granville Sharpe, of the Ordnance Department, resigned 
 rather than forward military stores to America. 
 
 Admiral Keppel formally requested not to be employed 
 against America. 
 
 Lord Effingham resigned, when advised that his regi 
 ment had been ordered to America. 
 
 John Wesley, who had visited America many years 
 before with his brother, and understood the character of 
 the Colonists, at once recalled the appeal once made to 
 the British government by General Gage during Novem 
 ber, 1774, when he "was confident, that, to begin with, 
 an army of twenty thousand men would, in the end, save 
 Great Britain both blood and treasure," and declared, 
 "Neither twenty thousand, forty thousand, nor sixty 
 thousand can end the dawning struggle." 
 
 During the summer of 1774 militia companies had been 
 rapidly organized throughout the Colonies. New England 
 especially had been so actively associated with all military 
 operations during the preceding French and Indian wars, 
 that her people more readily assumed the attitude of 
 armed preparation for the eventualities of open conflict. 
 
 Virginia had experienced similar conditions on a less 
 extended and protracted basis. The action of the First 
 Continental Congress on the fifth day of September, 1774, 
 when, upon notice that Gage had fortified Boston, it made 
 an unequivocal declaration of its sympathy with the people 
 of Boston and of Massachusetts, changed the character 
 of the struggle from that of a local incident, to one that 
 demanded organized, deliberate, and general resistance. 
 
 Notwithstanding the slow course of mail communica 
 tions between the widely separated Colonies north and 
 south, the deportment of the British Colonial governors 
 had been so uniformly oppressive and exacting, that the 
 people, everywhere, like tinder, were ready for the first 
 flying spark. A report became current during Septein- 
 
22 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 ber, after the forced removal of powder from Cambridge 
 and Charlestown, that Boston had been attacked. One 
 writer has stated, that, "Avithin thirty-six hours, nearly 
 thirty thousand men were under arms." This burst of 
 patriotic feeling, this mighty frenzy over unrighteous 
 interference with vested rights, made a profound impres 
 sion upon the Continental Congress, then in session at 
 Philadelphia, and aroused in the mind of Washington, 
 then a delegate from Virginia, the most intense anxiety 
 lest the urgency of the approaching crisis should find the 
 people unprepared to take up the gage of battle, and 
 fight with the hope of success. All this simply indicated 
 the depth and breadth of the eager sentiment which actu 
 ally panted for armed expression. 
 
 The conflict between British troops and armed citizens 
 at Lexington had already assumed the characteristics of 
 a battle, and, as such, had a more significant import than 
 many more pronounced engagements in the world s 
 history. The numbers engaged were few, but the men 
 who ventured to face British regulars on that occasion 
 were but the thin skirmish line in advance of the swell 
 ing thousands that awaited the call " To arms." 
 
 Massachusetts understood the immediate demand, hav 
 ing now drawn the fire of the hitherto discreet adversary, 
 and promptly declared that the necessities of the hour 
 required from New England the immediate service of 
 thirty thousand men, assuming as her proportionate part 
 a force of thirteen thousand six hundred. This was on 
 the twenty-second day of April, while many timid souls 
 and some social aristocrats were still painfully worrying 
 themselves as to who was to blame for anybody s being 
 shot on either side. 
 
 On the twenty-fifth day of April, Rhode Island devoted 
 fifteen hundred men to the service, as her contribution to 
 " An Army of Observation " about Boston. 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF REPRESSED LIBERTY. 23 
 
 On the following day, the twenty-sixth, Connecticut 
 tendered her proportion of two thousand men. 
 
 Each Colonial detachment went up to Boston as a 
 separate army, with independent organization and respon 
 sibility. The food, as well as the powder and ball of 
 each, was distinct, and they had little in common except 
 the purpose which impelled them to concentrate for a 
 combined opposition to the armed aggressions of the Crown. 
 And yet, this mass of assembling freemen was not with 
 out experience, or experienced leaders. The early wars 
 had been largely fought by Provincial troops, side by side 
 with British regulars, so that the general conduct of 
 armies and of campaigns had become familiar to New 
 England men, and many veteran soldiers were prompt to 
 volunteer service. Lapse of time, increased age, absorp 
 tion in farming or other civil pursuits, had not wholly 
 effaced from the minds of retired veterans the memory of 
 former experience in the field. If some did not realize 
 the expectations of the people and of Congress, the 
 promptness with which they responded to the call was no 
 less worthy. 
 
 Massachusetts selected, for the immediate command of 
 her forces, Artemas Ward, who had served under Aber- 
 crombie, with John Thomas, another veteran, as Lieuten- 
 ant-General ; and as Engineer-in-Chief, Richard Gridley, 
 who had, both as engineer and soldier, earned a deserved 
 reputation for skill, courage, and energy. 
 
 Connecticut sent Israel Putnam, who had been inured 
 to exposure and hardship in the old French War, and in 
 the West Indies. Gen. Daniel Wooster accompanied 
 him, and he was a veteran of the first expedition to Louis- 
 burg thirty years before, and had served both as Colonel 
 and Brigadier-General in the later French War. Gen. 
 
 O 
 
 Joseph Spencer also came from Connecticut. 
 
 Rhode Island intrusted the command of her troops to 
 
24 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Nathaniel Greene, then but thirty-four years of age, with 
 Varnum, Hitchcock, and Church, as subordinates. 
 
 New Hampshire furnished John Stark, also a veteran 
 of former service ; and both Pomeroy and Prescott, who 
 soon took active part in the operations about Boston, had 
 participated in Canadian campaigns. 
 
 These, and others, assembled in council, for considera 
 tion of the great interests which they had been summoned 
 to protect by force of arms. At this solemn juncture of 
 affairs, the youngest of their number, Nathaniel Greene, 
 whose subsequent career became so significant a factor 
 in that of Washington the Soldier, submitted to his 
 associates certain propositions which he affirmed to be 
 indispensable conditions of success in a war against the 
 British crown. These propositions read to-day, as if, 
 like utterances of the old Hebrew prophets, they had 
 been inspired rules for assured victory. And, one hun 
 dred years later, when the American Civil War unfolded 
 its vast operations and tasked to the utmost all sections 
 to meet their respective shares in the contest, the same 
 propositions had to be incorporated into practical legis 
 lation before any substantial results were achieved on 
 either side. 
 
 It is a historical fact that the failures and successes of 
 the War of American Independence fluctuated in favor 
 of success, from year to year, exactly in proportion to 
 the faithfulness with which these propositions were illus 
 trated in the management and conduct of the successive 
 campaigns. 
 
 The propositions read as follows : 
 I. That there be one Commander-in-Chief. 
 II. That the army should be enlisted for the war. 
 
 III. That a system of bounties should be ordained 
 which would provide for the families of soldiers absent in 
 the field. 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF REPRESSED LIBERTY. 25 
 
 IV. That the troops should serve wherever required 
 throughout the Colonies. 
 
 V. That funds should be borrowed equal to the 
 demands of the war and for the complete equipment 
 and support of the army. 
 
 VI. That Independence should be declared at once, and 
 every resource of every Colony be pledged to its support. 
 
 In estimating the character of Washington the Soldier, 
 and accepting these propositions as sound, it is of inter 
 est to be introduced to their author. 
 
 The youthful tastes and pursuits of Nathaniel Greene, 
 of Rhode Island, those which shaped his subsequent life 
 and controlled many battle issues, were as marked as were 
 those of Washington. Unlike his great captain, he had 
 neither wealth, social position, nor family antecedents to 
 inspire military endeavor. A Quaker youth, at fourteen 
 years of age he saved time from his blacksmith s forge, 
 and by its light mastered geometry and Euclid. Provi 
 dence threw in his way Ezra Stiles, then President of 
 Yale College, and Lindley Murray, the grammarian, and 
 each of them became his fast friend and adviser. 
 
 Before the war began, he had carefully studied " Caesar s 
 Commentaries," Marshal Turenne s Works, " Sharpe s 
 Military Guide," " Blackstone s Commentaries," "Jacobs 
 Law Dictionary," "Watts Logic," "Locke on the Human 
 Understanding," "Ferguson on Civil Society," Swift s 
 Works, and other models of a similar class of literature 
 and general science. 
 
 In 1773, he visited Connecticut, attended several of 
 its militia "trainings," and studied their methods of 
 instruction and drill. In 1774, he visited Boston, to 
 examine minutely the drill, quarters, and commissary 
 arrangements of the British regular troops. Incidentally, 
 he met one evening, at a retired tavern on India wharf, 
 a British sergeant who had deserted. He persuaded him 
 
26 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 to accompany him back to Rhode Island, where he made 
 him drill-instructor of the " Kentish Guards," a company 
 with which Greene was identified. Such was the pro 
 ficiency in arms, deportment, and general drill realized 
 by this company, through their joint effort, that more 
 than thirty of the members became commissioned officers 
 in the subsequent war. 
 
 The character of the men of that period, as in the 
 American Civil War, supplied the military service with 
 soldiers of the best intelligence and of superior physical 
 capacities. Very much of the energy and success which 
 attended the progress of the American army was trace 
 able to these qualities, as contrasted with those of the 
 British recruits and the Hessian drafted men. 
 
 Greene himself, unconsciously but certainly, was pre 
 paring himself and his comrades for the impending 
 struggle which already cast its shadow over the outward 
 conditions of peace. Modest, faithful, dignified, un 
 daunted by rebuffs or failure, and as a rule, equable, 
 self-sacrificing, truthful, and honest, he possessed much 
 of that simple grandeur of character which characterized 
 George H. Thomas and Robert E. Lee, of the American 
 conflict, 18615. His patriotism, as he announced his 
 propositions to the officers assembled before Cambridge, 
 was like that of Patrick Henry, of Virginia, who shortly 
 after made this personal declaration : " Landmarks and 
 boundaries are thrown down ; distinctions between Vir 
 ginians, Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, and New Eng- 
 landers are no more ; " adding, " I am not a Virginian, but 
 an American." 
 
 By the middle of June, and before the Battle of Bunker 
 Hill (Breed s Hill) , the Colonies were substantially united 
 for war. During the previous month of March, Richard 
 Henry Lee had introduced for adoption by the second 
 Virginia Convention, a resolution that " the Colony be 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF REPRESSED LIBERTY. 27 
 
 immediately put in a state of defence," and advocated the 
 immediate reorganization, arming, and discipline of the 
 militia. 
 
 A hush of eager expectancy and an almost breathless 
 waiting for some mysterious summons to real battle, 
 seemed to pervade both north and south alike, when a 
 glow in the east indicated the signal waited for, and even 
 prayed for. The very winds of heaven seemed to bear the 
 sound and name of the first conflict in arms. In six days 
 it reached Maryland. Intermediate Colonies, in turn, had 
 responded to the summons, " To arms." Greene s Kent 
 ish Guards started for Boston, at the next break of day. 
 The citizens of Rhode Island caught his inspiration, took 
 possession of more than forty British cannon, and asserted 
 their right and purpose to control all Colonial stores. 
 
 New York organized a Committee of Public Safety, 
 first of a hundred, and then of a thousand, of her rep 
 resentative men, as a solid guaranty of her ardent sym 
 pathy with the opening struggle, declaring that " all the 
 horrors of civil war could not enforce her submission to 
 the acts of the British crown." The Custom-house and the 
 City Hall were seized by the patriots. Arming and drill 
 ing were immediate ; and even by candle-light and until 
 late hours, every night, impassioned groups of boys, 
 as well as men, rehearsed to eager listeners the story of 
 the first blood shed at Concord and Lexington ; and 
 strong men exchanged vows of companionship in arms, 
 whatever might betide. Lawyers and ministers, doctors 
 and teachers, merchants and artisans, laborers and sea 
 men, mingled together as one in spirit and one in action. 
 An " Association for the defence of Colonial Rights " was 
 formed, and on the twenty-second of May the Colonial 
 Assembly was succeeded by a Provincial Congress, and 
 the new order of government went into full effect. 
 
 In New Jersey, the people, no less prompt, practical, 
 
28 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 and earnest, seized one hundred thousand dollars belong 
 ing to the Provincial treasury, and devoted it to raising- 
 troops for defending the liberties of the people. 
 
 The news reached Philadelphia on the twenty-fourth 
 of April, and there, also, was no rest, until action took 
 emphatic form. Prominent men, as in New York, 
 eagerly tendered service and accepted command, so that 
 on the first day of May the Pennsylvania Assembly made 
 an appropriation of money to raise troops. Benjamin 
 Franklin, but just returned from England, was made 
 chairman of a Committee of Safety, and the whole city 
 was aroused in hearty support of the common cause. 
 The very Tory families which afterwards ministered to 
 General Howe s wants, and nattered Benedict Arnold by 
 their courtesies, did not venture to stem the patriotic 
 sentiment of the hour. 
 
 Virginia caught the flying spark. No flint was needed 
 to fire the waiting tinder there. Lord Dunmore had 
 already sent the powder of the Colony on board a vessel 
 in the harbor. Patrick Henry quickly gathered the 
 militia in force, to board the vessel and seize the powder. 
 By way of compromise, the powder was paid for, but 
 Henry was denounced as a "traitor." The excitement 
 was not abated, but intensified by this action, until Lord 
 Dunmore, terrified, and powerless to stem the surging 
 wave of patriotic passion, took refuge upon the man-of- 
 war Fowey, then in the York river. 
 
 The Governor of North Carolina, as early as April, 
 had quarrelled with the people of that Colony, in his ef 
 fort to prevent the organization of a Provincial Congress. 
 But so soon as the news was received from Boston of the 
 opening struggle, the Congress assembled. Detached 
 meetings were everywhere held in its support, and from 
 all sides one sentiment was voiced, and this was its 
 utterance : "The cause of Boston is the cause of all. Our 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF REPRESSED LIBERTY. 29 
 
 destinies are indissolubly connected with those of our 
 eastern fellow-citizens. We must either submit to the 
 impositions which an unprincipled and unrepresented 
 Parliament may impose, or support our bretheren who 
 have been doomed to sustain the first shock of Parliamen 
 tary power; which, if successful there, will ultimately 
 overwhelm all, in one common calamity." Conformable 
 to these principles, a Convention assembled at Charlotte, 
 Mecklenburg County, on the twentieth of May, 1775, and 
 unanimously adopted the Instrument, ever since known 
 as The Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence. 
 
 In South Carolina, on the twenty-first day of April, a 
 secret committee of the people, appointed for the purpose, 
 forcibly entered the Colonial magazine and carried away 
 eight hundred stands of arms and two hundred cutlasses. 
 Thomas Corbett, a member of this committee, secured 
 and opened a royal package just from England, contain 
 ing orders to governors of each of the southern Colonies 
 to " seize all arms and powder." These were forwarded 
 to the Continental Congress. Another despatch, dated 
 at "Palace of Whitehall, December 23d," stated that 
 " seven regiments were in readiness to proceed to the 
 southern Colonies ; first to North Carolina, thence to 
 Virginia, or South Carolina, as circumstances should 
 point out." These intercepted orders contained an 
 " Act of Parliament, forbidding the exportation of arms 
 to the Colonies," and stimulated the zeal of the patriots 
 to secure all within their reach. Twenty days later, the 
 tidings from the north reached Charleston, adding fuel to 
 the flame of the previous outbreak. 
 
 At Savannah, Ga., six members of the " Council of 
 Safety " broke open the public magazine, before receipt 
 of news from the north, seized the public powder and 
 bore it away for further use. Governor Wright addressed 
 a letter to General Gage at Boston, asking for troops, 
 
30 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 " to awe the people." This was intercepted, and through 
 a counterfeit signature General Gage was advised, "that 
 the people were coming to some order, and there would 
 be no occasion for sending troops." 
 
 Such is the briefest possible outline of the condition of 
 public sentiment throughout the country, of Avhich Wash 
 ington was well advised, so far as the Committee of the 
 Continental Congress, of which he was a member, could 
 gather the facts at that time. 
 
 Meanwhile, Boston was surrounded by nearly twenty 
 thousand Minute Men. These Minute Men made persist 
 ent pressure upon every artery through which food could 
 flow to relieve the hungry garrison within the British lines. 
 
 Neither was the excitement limited to the immediate 
 surroundings. Ethan Allen, who had migrated from 
 Connecticut to Vermont, led less than a hundred of 
 "Green Mountain Boys," as they were styled, to Ticon- 
 deroga, which he captured on the tenth of May. Bene 
 dict Arnold, of New Haven, with forty of the company 
 then and still known as the Governor s Guards, rushed to 
 Boston without waiting for orders, and then to Lake 
 Champlain, hoping to raise an army on the way. Although 
 anticipated by Ethan Allen in the capture of Ticonderoga, 
 he pushed forward toward Crown Point and St. John s, 
 captured and abandoned the latter, organized a small naval 
 force, and with extraordinary skill defeated the British 
 vessels and materially retarded the advance of the British 
 flotilla and British troops from the north. 
 
 These feverish dashes upon frontier posts were signifi 
 cant of the general temper of the people, their desire to 
 secure arms and military supplies supposed to be in those 
 forts, and indicated their conviction that the chief danger 
 to New England was through an invasion from Canada. 
 But the absorbing cause of concern was the deliverance 
 of Boston from English control. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 ARMED AMERICA NEEDS A SOLDIER. 
 
 Second Continental Congress convened on the 
 JL tenth day of May, 1775. On the same day, Ethan 
 Allen captured Ticonderoga, also securing two hundred 
 cannon which were afterwards used in the siege of 
 Boston. Prompt measures were at once taken by Con 
 gress for the purchase and manufacture of both cannon 
 and powder. The emission of two millions of Spanish 
 milled dollars was authorized, and twelve Colonies were 
 pledged for the redemption of Bills of Credit, then 
 directed to be issued. At the later, September, session, 
 the Georgia delegates took their seats, and made the ac 
 tion of the Colonies unanimous. 
 
 A formal system of " Rules and Articles of War " was 
 adopted, and provision was made for organizing a mili 
 tary force fully adequate to meet such additional troops 
 as England might despatch to the support of General 
 Gage. Further than this, all proposed enforcement by 
 the British crown of the offensive Acts of Parliament, 
 was declared to be " unconstitutional, oppressive, and 
 cruel." 
 
 Meanwhile, the various New England armies were 
 scattered in separate groups, or cantonments, about the 
 City of Boston, with all the daily incidents of petty 
 warfare which attach to opposing armies within striking 
 -distance, when battle action has not yet reached its desira 
 ble opportunity. And yet, a state of war had been so far 
 
 31 
 
32 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 recognized that an exchange of prisoners was effected as 
 early as the sixth day of June. General Howe made the first 
 move toward open hostilities by a tender of pardon to all 
 offenders against the Crown except Samuel Adams and 
 John Hancock ; and followed up this ostentatious and 
 absurd proclamation by a formal declaration of Martial 
 Law. 
 
 The Continental Congress as promptly responded, by 
 adopting the militia about Boston, as " The American 
 Continental Army." 
 
 On the fourteenth day of June, a Light Infantry organ 
 ization of expert riflemen was authorized, and its com 
 panies were assigned to various Colonies for enlistment 
 and immediate detail for service about Boston. 
 
 On the fifteenth day of June, 1775, Congress author 
 ized the appointment, and then appointed George 
 Washington, of Virginia, as " Commander-in-Chief of 
 the forces raised, or to be raised, in defence of American 
 Liberties." On presenting their commission to Washing 
 ton it was accompanied by a copy of a Resolution unani 
 mously adopted by that body, "That they would maintain 
 and assist him, and adhere to him, with their lives and 
 fortunes, in the cause of American Liberty." 
 
 It is certain from the events above outlined, which 
 preceded the Revolutionary struggle, that when Washing 
 ton received this spontaneous and unanimous appointment, 
 he understood definitely that the Colonies were substan 
 tially united in the prosecution of war, at whatever cost 
 of men and money ; that military men of early service and 
 large experience could be placed in the field ; that the 
 cause was one of intrinsic right ; and that the best 
 intellects, as well as the most patriotic statesmen, of all 
 sections, were ready, unreservedly, to submit their des 
 tinies to the fate of the impending struggle. He had been 
 upon committees on the State of Public Affairs ; was 
 
ARMED AMERICA NEEDS A SOLDIER. ;}$ 
 
 Constantly consulted as to developments, at home and 
 abroad ; was familiar with the dissensions among British 
 statesmen ; and had substantial reasons for that sublime 
 faith in ultimate victory which never for one hour failed 
 him in the darkness of the protracted struggle. He also 
 understood that not statesmen alone, preeminently Lord 
 Dartmouth, but the best soldiers of Great Britain had 
 regarded the military occupation of Boston, where the 
 Revolutionary sentiment was most pronounced, and the 
 population more dense as well as more enlightened, to be 
 a grave military as well as political error. And yet, as 
 the issue had been forced, it must be met as proffered ; 
 and the one immediate and paramount objective must be 
 the expulsion of the British garrison and the deliverance 
 of Boston. It will appear, however, as the narrative 
 develops its incidents, that he never lost sight of the ex 
 posed sea-coast cities to the southward, nor of that royal- 
 list element which so largely controlled certain aristocratic 
 portions of New York, New Jersey, and the southern 
 cities, which largely depended upon trade with Great 
 Britain and the West Indies for their independent fort 
 unes and their right royal style of living. Neither did he 
 fail to realize that delay in the siege of Boston, however 
 unavoidable, was dangerous to the rapid prosecution of 
 general war upon a truly military plan of speedy accom 
 plishment. 
 
 His first duty was therefore with his immediate com 
 mand, and the hour had arrived for the consolidation of 
 the various Colonial armies into one compact, disciplined, 
 and effective force, to battle with the best troops of Great 
 Britain which now garrisoned Boston and controlled its 
 waters. 
 
 Reinforcements under Howe, Clinton, and Burgoyne 
 had already increased the strength of that garrison to 
 nearly ten thousand men. It had become impatient of 
 
34 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 confinement, and restive under the presence of increas 
 ing but ill-armed adversaries who eagerly challenged 
 every picket post, and begrudged every market product 
 smuggled, or snatched, by the purveyors or officers and 
 soldiers of the Crown. Besides all this, the garrison 
 began to realize the fate which afterwards befell that of 
 Clinton in Philadelphia, in the demoralization and loss 
 of discipline which ever attach to an idle army when 
 enclosed within city limits. When Burgoyne landed at 
 Boston, to support Gage, he contemptuously spoke of "ten 
 thousand peasants who kept the King s troops shut up." 
 Gradually, the peasants encroached upon the outposts. 
 An offensive movement to occupy Charlestown Heights 
 and menace the Colonial headquarters at Cambridge, with 
 a view to more decisive action against their maturing 
 strength, had been planned and was ready for execution. 
 It was postponed, as of easy accomplishment at leisure ; 
 but the breaking morning of June 17, 1775, revealed 
 the same Heights to be in possession of the "peasant" 
 militia of America. 
 
 The Battle of Bunker Hill followed. Each force en 
 gaged lost one-third of its numbers, but the aggregate 
 of the British loss was more than double that of the 
 Colonies. It made a plain issue between the Colonists 
 and the British army, and was no longer a controversy of 
 citizens with the civil authority. The impatience of the 
 two armies to have a fight had been gratified, and when 
 Franklin was advised of the facts, and of the nerve with 
 which so small a detachment of American militia had 
 faced and almost vanquished three times their number of 
 British veterans, he exclaimed, " The King has lost his 
 Colonies." 
 
 Many of the officers who bore part in that determining 
 action gained new laurels in later years. Prescott, who 
 led his thousand men to that achievement, served with 
 
ARMED AMERICA NEEDS A SOLDIER. 35 
 
 no less gallantry in New York. Stark, so plucky and 
 persistent along the Mystic river, was afterwards as 
 brave and dashing at Trenton, Bennington, and Spring 
 field. And Seth Warner, a volunteer at Bunker Hill, 
 and comrade of Allen in the capture of Ticonderoga, par 
 ticipated in the battles of Hubbardton and Bennington, 
 and the Saratoga campaign, during the invasion of Bur- 
 goyne in 1777. 
 
 Of the British participants, or spectators, a word is 
 due. Clinton, destined to be Washington s chief antag 
 onist, had urged General Howe to attack Washington s 
 army at Cambridge, before it could mature into a well 
 equipped and well disciplined force. He was overruled by 
 General Howe, who with all his scientific qualities as a 
 soldier, never, in his entire military career, was quick to 
 follow up an advantage once acquired ; and soon after, the 
 junior officer was transferred to another field of service. 
 
 Percy, gallant in the action of June 17th, was destined 
 to serve with credit at Long Island, White Plains, 
 Brandywine, and Newport. 
 
 Rawdon, then a lieutenant, who gallantly stormed the 
 redoubt on Breed s Hill, and received in his arms the 
 body of his captain, Harris, of the British 5th Infantry, 
 was destined to win reputation at Camden and Hob- 
 kirk s HilJ, but close his military career in America as 
 a prisoner of war to the French. 
 
 The British retained and fortified Bunker Hill, and the 
 time had arrived for more systematic American operations, 
 and the presence of the Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 Congress had appointed the following general officers 
 as Washington s associates in conduct of the war. 
 
 Major- Generals. 
 
 Some of these have been already noticed. 
 ARTEMAS WARD. 
 
36 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 CHARLES LEE, a retired officer of the British Army, a 
 military adventurer under many flags, a resident of Vir 
 ginia, an acquaintance of Washington, and ambitious to 
 be first in command. 
 
 PHILIP SCHUYLER, then a member of Congress ; a 
 man of rare excellence of character, who had served in 
 the French and Indian War, and took part in Abercrom- 
 bie s Ticonderoga campaign. 
 
 ISRAEL PUTNAM. 
 
 Brigadier- Generals. 
 
 SETH POMEROY. 
 
 KICHARD MONTGOMERY, who served gallantly under 
 Wolfe before Quebec, in 1759, and in the West Indies, 
 in 1762. 
 
 DAVID WOOSTER. 
 
 WILLIAM HEATH, who, previous to the war, was a 
 vigorous writer upon the necessity of military discipline 
 and a thoroughly organized militia. 
 
 JOSEPH SPENCER, of Connecticut, also a soldier of the 
 French and Indian War, both as Major and Lieutenant- 
 Colonel. 
 
 JOHN THOMAS, also a soldier of the French and Ind 
 ian War, and in command of a regiment at Cambridge, 
 recruited by himself. 
 
 JOHN SULLIVAN, a lawyer of New Hampshire, of Irish 
 blood ; a member of the First Continental Congress, and 
 quick in sympathy with the first movement for armed 
 resistance to British rule. 
 
 NATHANIEL GREENE, already in command of the 
 Rhode Island troops. 
 
 Congress had also selected as Adjutant-General of the 
 Army, HORATIO GATES, of Virginia, who, like Lee, had 
 served in the British regular army ; commanded a com 
 pany in the Braddock campaign, and gained some credit 
 
ARMED AMERICA NEEDS A SOLDIER. ;jj 
 
 for bravery at the capture of Martinique, in the West 
 Indies. He was also known to Washington, and shared 
 with Lee in aspiration to the chief command. 
 
 If Washington had possessed prophetic vision, even 
 his sublime faith might have wavered in view of that 
 unfolding future which would leave none of these general 
 officers by his side at the last conflict of the opening war. 
 
 Ward, somewhat feeble in body, would prove unequal 
 to active service ; lack the military acuteness and dis 
 cernment which the crisis would demand, and retire from 
 view with the occupation of Boston. 
 
 Lee, so like Arnold in volcanic temper, would be early 
 detached for other service, in Connecticut, New York, 
 New Jersey, and South Carolina ; would become a 
 prisoner of war at New York ; would propose to the 
 British authorities a plan for destroying the American 
 army ; would escape execution as a British deserter, on 
 exchange ; and afterwards, at the Battle of Monmouth, 
 so nearly realize his suggestion to General Howe, as to 
 show that his habitual abuse of Congress and his jealousy 
 of his Commander-in-Chief were insufficiently atoned for 
 by dismissal from the army, and the privilege of dying in 
 his own bed, unhonored and unlaniented. 
 
 Schuyler, devoted to his country, with rare qualities 
 as a gentleman and with a polish of manner and elegance 
 of carriage that for the time made him severely unpopular 
 with the staid stock of New England, would serve with 
 credit in Canada ; organize the army which Gates would 
 command at Saratoga ; be supplanted by that officer ; 
 retire from service because of poor health ; but ever 
 prove worthy of the confidence and love of his com- 
 mander-in-chief. Of him, Chief-Justice Kent would 
 draw a pen-picture of " unselfish devotion, wonderful 
 energy, and executive ability." Of him, Daniel Webster 
 would speak, in an august presence, in these terms : ff I 
 
38 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 was brought up with New England prejudices against 
 him ; but I consider him second only to Washington in 
 the service he rendered to his country in the War of the 
 Revolution." 
 
 Putnam, who had been conspicuously useful at Bunker 
 Hill, would, because of Greene s illness, suddenly succeed 
 that officer in command on Long Island, without previous 
 knowledge of the works and the surrounding country ; 
 would, feebly and without system, attempt to defend the 
 lines against Howe s advance ; would serve elsewhere, 
 trusted indeed, but without battle command, and be 
 remembered as a brave soldier and a good citizen, but, 
 as a general officer, unequal to the emergencies of field 
 service. 
 
 Pomeroy, brave at Bunker Hill, realizing the respon 
 sibilities attending the consolidation of the army for 
 active campaign duty, would decline the proffered com 
 mission. 
 
 Montgomery, would accompany Schuyler to Canada, 
 full of high hope, and yet discover in the assembled 
 militia such utter want of discipline and preparation to 
 meet British veterans, as to withhold his resignation 
 only when his Commander-in- Chief pleaded his own 
 greater disappointments before Cambridge. 
 
 The perspective-glass will catch its final glimpse of 
 Montgomery, when, after the last bold dash of his life, 
 under the walls of Quebec, his body is borne to the grave 
 and buried with military honors, by his old comrade in 
 arms, Sir Guy Carleton, the British general in com 
 mand. 
 
 Wooster, then sixty-four years of age, would join 
 Montgomery at Montreal ; waive his Connecticut rank ; 
 serve under his gallant leader ; be recalled from service 
 because unequal to the duties of active command ; would 
 prove faithful and noble wherever he served, and fall, 
 
ARMED AMERICA NEEDS A SOLDIER. 39 
 
 defending the soil of his native State from Tryon s inva 
 sion, in 1777. 
 
 Heath, would supplement his service on the Massa 
 chusetts Committee of Safety by efficient duty at New 
 York, White Plains, and along the Hudson, ever true as 
 patriot and soldier ; but fail to realize in active service 
 that discipline of men and that perception of the value 
 of campaign experience which had prompted his literary 
 efforts before he faced an enemy in battle. 
 
 Spencer, would discharge many trusts early in the 
 war, with fidelity, but without signal ability or success, 
 and transfer his sphere of patriotic duty to the halls of 
 Congress. 
 
 Thomas, would prove efficient in the siege of Boston, 
 and serve in Canada. 
 
 Sullivan, would also enter Canada ; become a prisoner 
 of war at Long Island ; be with Washington at White 
 Plains ; succeed to the command of Lee s division after 
 the capture of that officer ; distinguish himself at Trenton ; 
 serve at Brandywine ; do gallant service at German- 
 town ; attempt the capture of Staten Island and of New 
 port ; chastise the Indians of New York, and resign, to 
 take a seat in Congress. 
 
 Greene, would attend his chief in the siege of Boston ; 
 fortify Brooklyn Heights ; engage in operations about 
 Forts Washington and Lee ; take part in the battles of 
 Trenton, Princeton, Brandywine, Germantown, Mon- 
 mouth, Newport, and Springfield ; would then succeed 
 Gates at the south, fight the battles of Guilford Court 
 House, Hobkirk Hill, and Eutaw Springs, and close his 
 life in Georgia, the adopted home of his declining 
 years. 
 
 But, during the midsummer of 1775, the beleaguered 
 City of Boston, astounded by the stolid and bloody resist 
 ance to its guardian garrison, began to measure the cost 
 
40 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 of loyalty to the King, in preference to loyalty to country 
 and duty ; while the enclosed patriots began to assure 
 themselves that deliverance was drawing near. Bur- 
 goyne, after watching the battle from Copp s Hill, in 
 writing to England of this "great catastrophe," prepared 
 the Crown for that large demand for troops upon which 
 he afterwards conditioned his acceptance of a command in 
 America. 
 
 The days of waiting for a distinct battle-issue had 
 been fulfilled. The days of waiting for the consolidation 
 of the armies about Boston, under one competent guide 
 and master, also passed. Washington had left Philadel 
 phia and was journeying toward Cambridge. 
 
WASHINGTON AT FOUR PERIODS OF HIS MILITARY CAREER. 
 [Etching from II. H. Hall s Sons engraving.] 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 WASHINGTON IN COMMAND. 
 
 ON the twenty-first day of June, 1775, Washington 
 left Philadelphia for Boston, and on the third day 
 of July assumed command of the Continental Army of 
 America, with headquarters at Cambridge. 
 
 At this point one is instinctively prompted to peer 
 into the closed tent of the Commander-in-Chief and 
 observe his modest, but wholly self-reliant attitude toward 
 the grave questions that are to be settled, in determining 
 whether the future destiny of America is to be that of 
 liberty, or abject submission to the Crown. 
 
 For fully two months the yeomanry of New England 
 had firmly grasped all approaches to the City of Boston. 
 This pressure was now and then resisted by efforts of the 
 garrison to secure supplies from the surrounding country 
 farms ; which only induced a tighter hold, and aroused a 
 stubborn purpose to crowd that garrison to surrender, or 
 escape by sea. The islands of the beautiful bay and of 
 the Nantasket roadstead had become miniature fields of 
 daily conflict ; and persistent efforts to procure bullocks, 
 flour, and other needed provisions, through the boats of 
 the British fleet, only developed a counter system of boat 
 operations which neutralized the former, and gradually 
 restricted the country excursions of the troops within 
 the city to the range of their guns. 
 
 And yet the beleaguering force had fluctuated every 
 day, so that but few of the hastily improvised regiments 
 
 41 
 
42 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 maintained either identity of persons, or permanent num 
 bers. Exchanges were frequent between those on duty 
 and others at their homes. The sudden summons from 
 so many and varied industrial pursuits and callings was 
 like the unorganized rush of men at an alarm of tire, 
 quickened by the conviction that some wide, sweeping, 
 and common danger was to be withstood, or some devour 
 ing element to be mastered. The very independence of 
 opinion and sense of oppression which began to assert 
 a claim to absolutely independent nationality, became im-. 
 patient of all restraint, until military control, however 
 vital to organized success, had become tiresome, offensive, 
 and sharply contested. Offices also, as in more modern 
 times, had been conferred upon those who secured enlist 
 ments, and too often without regard to character or 
 signal merit ; while the familiarities of former neighbor- 
 
 o o 
 
 hood friends and acquaintances ill-fitted them to bear 
 rigid control by those who had been, only just before, 
 companions on a common level. 
 
 Jealousies and aspirations mingled with the claims of 
 families left at home, and many local excitements attended 
 the efforts of officers of the Crown to discharge their 
 most simple duties. After the flash of Lexington and its 
 hot heat had faded out, it was dull work to stand guard 
 by day, lie upon the ground at night, live a life of half 
 lazy routine, receive unequal and indifferent food, and 
 wonder, between meals, when and how the whole affair 
 would end. The capture of Ticonderoga, so easily af 
 fected, inclined many to regard the contest before Boston 
 as a matter of simple, persistent pressure, with no provi 
 dent conception of the vast range of conflict involved in 
 this defiance of the British Crown, in which all Colonies 
 must pass under the rolling chariot of Avar. 
 
 And yet, all these elements were not sufficiently 
 relaxing to permit the enclosed "garrison to go free. 
 
WASHINGTON IN COMMAND. 43 
 
 While thousands of the Minute Men were apparently list 
 less, and taking the daily drudgery as a matter-of-course 
 experience, not to be helped or be rid of, there were 
 many strong-willed men among them who held settled and 
 controlling convictions, so that even the raw militia were 
 generally under wise guardianship. Leading scholars 
 and professional men, as well as ministers of the Gospel 
 and teachers of the district schools, united their influence 
 with that of some well-trained soldiers, to keep the force 
 in the field at a comparatively even strength of numbers. 
 The idle were gradually set to work, and occupation 
 began to lighten the strain of camp life. 
 
 At the date of Washington s arrival to take command, 
 there was a practical suspension of military operations 
 over the country at large ; and this condition of affairs, 
 together with the large display of Colonial force about 
 Boston, gave the other Colonies opportunity to prepare 
 for war, and for Washington to develop his army and 
 test both officers and men. 
 
 In his tent at Cambridge, he opened the packages 
 intrusted to his care by Congress, and examined the 
 commissions of the officers who were to share his councils 
 and execute his will. His own commission gave him 
 all needed authority, and pledged the united Colonies to 
 his hearty support. Confidence in his patriotism, his 
 wisdom, and his military capacity was generous and 
 complete. He represented Congress. He represented 
 America. For a short time he withheld the delivery of a 
 few of the commissions. Some officers, hastily commis 
 sioned, although formerly in military service, had been 
 entirely isolated from opportunities for knowledge of 
 men and of questions of public policy. The emergency 
 required such as were familiar with the vast interests 
 involved in a struggle in arms with Great Britain ; men 
 who would heartily submit to that strict discipline which 
 
44 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 preparation for a contest with the choicest troops of 
 the mother-country must involve. 
 
 Washington s constitutional reticence deepened from 
 his first assumption of command. Frederick the Great 
 once declared that " if he suspected that his nightcap 
 would betray his thoughts while, he slept, he would burn 
 it." Washington, like Frederick, and like Grant and 
 Lee, great soldiers of the American Civil War, largely 
 owed his success and supremacy over weak or jealous 
 companions in arms to this subtle power. And this, 
 with Washington, was never a studied actor s part in 
 the drama of Revolution. It was based upon a devout, 
 reverential, and supreme devotion to country and the 
 right. His moral sense was delicate, and quick to dis 
 cern the great object of the people s need and desire. 
 He was also reverential in recognition of an Almighty 
 Father of all mankind, whose Providence he regarded as 
 constant, friendly, and supervising, in all the struggle 
 which America had undertaken for absolute independence. 
 Under this guidance, he learned how to act with judicial 
 discretion upon the advice of his subordinates, and then, 
 to execute his own sentence. Baron Jomini pronounced 
 Napoleon to have been his own best chief-of-staff ; and 
 such was Washington. Congress discovered as the years 
 slipped by, and jealousies of Washington, competitions 
 for office and for rank, and rivalries of cities, sections, 
 and partisans, endangered the safety of the nation and 
 the vital interests involved in the war, to trust his judg 
 ment ; and history has vindicated the wisdom of their 
 conclusion. And yet, with all this will-power in reserve, 
 he was patient, tolerant, considerate of the honest con 
 victions of those with contrary opinions ; and so assigned 
 officers, or detailed them upon special commissions, that, 
 when not overborne by Congress in the detail of some of 
 its importunate favorites, he succeeded in placing officers 
 
WASHINGTON IN COMMAND. 45 
 
 where their weaknesses could not prejudice the interests 
 of the country at large, and where their faculties could be 
 most fruitfully utilized. 
 
 If the thoughtful reader will for a moment recall the 
 name of some battle-field of the Revolution, or of any 
 prominent military character who was identified with some 
 determining event of that war, he will quickly notice how 
 potentially the foresight of Washington either directed the 
 conditions of success, or wisely compensated the effects 
 of failure. 
 
 Washington never counted disappointments as to single 
 acts of men, or the operations of a single command, as 
 determining factors in the supreme matter of final suc 
 cess. The vaulting ambition, headstrong will, and fiery 
 daring of Arnold never lessened an appreciation of his 
 real merits, and he acquired so decided an affection for 
 him, personally, and was so disappointed that Congress 
 did not honor his own request for Arnold s prompt pro 
 motion, at one time, that when his treason was fully 
 revealed, he could only exclaim, with deep emotion, 
 Whom now can we trust?" 
 
 Even the undisguised jealousy of Charles Lee, his 
 cross-purposes, disobedience of orders, abuse of Con 
 gress, breaches of confidence, and attempts to warp coun 
 cils of war adversely to the judgment of the Cornmander- 
 in-Chief did not forfeit Washington s recognition of that 
 officer s general military knowledge and his ordinary 
 wisdom in council. 
 
 These considerations fully introduce the Commander-in- 
 Chief to the reader, as he imagines the Soldier to be in his 
 tent with the commissions of subordinate officers before him. 
 
 He began his duties with the most minute inspection of 
 the material with which he was expected to carry on a 
 -contest with Great Britain. Every company and regi 
 ment, their quarters, their arms, ammunition, and food 
 
46 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 supplies, underwent the closest scrutiny. He accepted 
 excuses for the slovenliness of any command with the 
 explicit warning that repetition of such indifference or 
 neglect would be sternly punished. 
 
 The troops had hardly been dismissed, after their first 
 formal parade for inspection, before a set repugnance to 
 all proper instruction in the details of a soldier s duty 
 became manifest. The old method of fighting Indians 
 singly, through thickets, and in small detachments, each 
 man for himself, was clung to stubbornly, as if the army 
 .were composed of individual hunters, who must each 
 ." bag his own game." Guard duty was odious. Superi 
 ority by virtue of rank was questioned, denied, or ig 
 nored. The abuses of places of trust, especially in the 
 quartermaster and commissary departments, and the 
 prostitution of these responsibilities to private ends were 
 constant. " Profanity, vulgarity, and all the vices of 
 an undisciplined mass became frightful," as Washington 
 himself described the condition, " so soon as any imme 
 diate danger passed by." To sum up the demoraliza 
 tion of the army, he could only add, " They have been 
 trained to have their own way too long." 
 
 But the good, the faithful, and the pure were hardly 
 less restive under the new restraint, and few appreciated 
 the vital value of some absolutely supreme control. The 
 public moneys and public property were held to belong 
 to everybody, because Congress represented everybody. 
 Commands were considered despotic orders, and exact 
 details Avere but another system of slavery. 
 
 Nor was this the whole truth. Even officers of high 
 position, whether graded above or below their own expec 
 tations, found time to indulge in petty neglect of plain 
 instructions, and in turn to usurp authority, in defiance 
 of discipline and the paramount interests of the people at 
 large. 
 
WASHINGTON [N COMMAND. 47 
 
 The inspection of the Commander-in-Chief had been 
 made. Immediately, the troops were put to work per 
 fecting earthworks, building redoubts, and policing camp. 
 " Observance of the Sabbath " was enforced. Officers 
 were court-martialed, and soldiers were tried, for" swear 
 ing, gambling, fraud, and lewdness." A thorough 
 system of guard and picket duty was established, and 
 the nights were made subservient to rest, in the place of 
 dissipation and revelry. Discipline was the first indica- 
 tion_that.a Soldier was in command. 
 
 These statements, which are brief extracts from his 
 published Orders, fall far below a just review of the situ 
 ation as given by Washington himself. From some of 
 his reports to Congress it would seem as if, for a 
 moment, he almost despaired of bringing the army to a 
 condition when he might confidently take it into an open 
 Held, and place it, face to face, against any well-appointed 
 force of even inferior numbers. That he was enabled so 
 to discipline an army that, as at Brandy wine, they will 
 ingly marched to meet a British and Hessian force one- 
 half greater than his own in numbers, became a complete 
 justification of the patience and wise persistence with 
 which he handled the raw troops in camp about Cambridge, 
 in the year 1775. 
 
 His next care was " the practical art of bringing the 
 army fully equipped to the battle-field," known as the 
 "Logistics of War." The army was deficient in every 
 element of supply. The men, who still held their Colonial 
 obligation to be supreme, came and went just as their 
 engagements would permit and the comfort of their fami 
 lies required. Desertion was regarded as nothing, or at 
 the worst but a venial offence, and there were times when 
 the American army about Boston, through nine miles of. 
 investment, was less in number than the British garrison 
 within the city. 
 
48 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 But the deficiency in the number of the men was not 
 BO conspicuous and disappointing as the want of powder, 
 lead, tools, arms, tents, horses, carts, and medical 
 supplies. Ordinary provisions had become abundant. 
 The adjacent country fed them liberally and supplied 
 many home-made luxuries, not always the best nourish 
 ment for a soldier s life ; but it was difficult to persuade 
 the same men that all provisions must enter into a 
 general commissariat, and be issued to all alike ; and that 
 such stores must be accumulated, and neither expended 
 lavishly nor sold at a bargain so soon as a surplus re 
 mained unexpended. Such articles as cordage, iron, horse 
 shoes, lumber, fire-wood, and every possible thing which 
 might be required for field, garrison, or frontier service, 
 were included in his inventory of essential supplies. 
 
 In his personal expenditures of the most trivial item 
 of public property, Washington kept a minute and exact 
 account. Of the single article of powder, he once stated 
 that his chief supply was furnished by the enemy, for, 
 during one period, the armed vessels with which he 
 patrolled the coast captured more powder than Congress 
 had been able to furnish him in several months. 
 
 Delay in securing such essential supplies increased the 
 difficulty of bringing the troops themselves to a full rec 
 ognition of their military needs and responsibilities, so 
 that the grumbling query, " What s the use of copying 
 the red-coats fuss and training?" still pervaded camp. 
 Plain men from the country who had watched the martinet 
 exactness of British drills in the city, where there was so 
 much of ornament and " style," had no taste for like sub 
 jection to control over their personal bearing and ward 
 robe. A single order of General Howe to the Boston 
 garrison illustrates what the Yankees termed the "red 
 coats fuss." He issued an order, reprimanding soldiers 
 " whose hair was not smooth but badly powdered ; who 
 
WASHINGTON IN COMMAND. 49 
 
 had no frills to their shirts ; whose leggings hung in a 
 slovenly manner about their knees, and other soldierly 
 neglects, which must be immediately remedied." This 
 seemed to the American soldier more like some " nursing 
 process ; " and while right, on general principles, was not 
 the chief requirement for good fighting zeal . 
 
 For many weeks it had been the chief concern of the 
 American Coinmander-in-Chief how to make a fair show 
 of military preparation, while all things were in such 
 extreme confusion. Washington, as well as Howe, had 
 his fixed ideas of military discipline, and he, also, issued 
 orders respecting the habits, personal bearing, and neat 
 ness of the men ; closing -on one occasion, thus emphati 
 cally : " Cards and games of chance are prohibited. At 
 this time of public distress, men may find enough to do 
 in the service of their God and country, without aban 
 doning themselves to vice and immorality." In anticipa 
 tion of active service, and to rebuke the freedom with 
 which individuals inclined to follow their own bent of 
 purpose, he promulgated the following ringing caution : 
 
 " It may not be amiss for the troops to know, that if 
 any man in action shall presume to skulk, hide himself, 
 or retreat from the enemy without the orders of his com 
 manding officer, he will be instantly shot down as an 
 example of cowardice ; cowards having too frequently 
 disconcerted the best troops by their dastardly behavior." 
 
 Amid all this stern preparation for the battle-field and 
 its incidents, the most careful attention was given to the 
 comfort and personal well-being of the privates in the 
 ranks. While obedience was required of all, of whatever 
 grade or rank, the cursing or other abuse of the soldier 
 was considered an outrage upon his rights as a citizen, 
 and these met his most scorching denunciation and pun 
 ishment. 
 
 A Soldier was in command of the Continental Army of 
 America. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 BRITISH CANADA ENTERS THE FIELD OF ACTION. 
 
 THE Continental Army about Boston was largely 
 composed of New England troops. This was inev 
 itable until the action of Congress could be realized by 
 reinforcements from other Colonies. The experience of 
 nearly all veteran soldiers in the Cambridge camps had 
 been gained by service in Canada or upon its borders. 
 British garrisons at Halifax, Quebec, and Montreal, as well 
 as at Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and St. John s, offered 
 an opportunity for British aggression from the north. 
 The seizure of the nearer posts, last named, temporarily 
 checked such aggressions, but seemed to require adequate 
 garrisons, and a watchful armed outlook across the border. 
 There had been very early urged upon the Massachusetts 
 Committee of Safety more extensive operations into Can 
 ada, especially as the " Canadian Acts of Parliament " 
 had become nearly as offensive to Canadians as other 
 Acts which had alienated the American Colonies from 
 respect for the common "Mother Country." The Cana 
 dian Acts, however, had not been pressed to armed re 
 sistance ; and differences of race, language, and religious 
 forms were not conducive to those neighborly relations 
 which would admit of combined action, even in emer 
 gencies common to both sections. But the initiative of a 
 general movement into Canada had been taken, and Con 
 gress precipitated the first advance, before Washington 
 became Commander-in-Chief. In order to appreciate the 
 
 50 
 
BRITISH CANADA ENTERS THE FIELD. 51 
 
 action of Washington when ho became more directly 
 responsible for the success of these detachments from his 
 army, for service in Canada, they must be noticed. 
 
 The adventurous spirit of Arnold prompted the sugges 
 tion that the conquest of Canada would bring disaster to 
 Great Britain and fend off attacks upon the other Colonies. 
 He once traded with its people, was familiar with Quebec, 
 and after his adventure at Crown Point, in June, had 
 written from that place to the Continental Congress that 
 Gen. Sir Guy Carleton s force in Canada was less than six 
 hundred men, promising to guarantee the conquest of 
 Canada if he were granted the command of two thousand 
 men for that purpose. On the second day of June, Ethan 
 Allen, who had anticipated Arnold in the capture of 
 Ticonderoga, had made a similar proposition to the Pro 
 vincial Congress of New York. Both Allen and Seth 
 Warner had visited Congress, and requested authority to 
 raise new regiments. Authority was not given, but a 
 recommendation was forwarded to the New York Provin 
 cial Congress, that the r Green Mountain Boys " should 
 be recognized as regular forces, and be granted the 
 privilege of electing their own officers. 
 
 It is of interest in this connection to notice the fact that 
 when Arnold, in his first dash up Lake Champlain, found 
 that Warner had anticipated his projected capture of Crown 
 Point, as Alien had that of Ticonderoga, he was greatly 
 offended, usurped command of that post and of a few 
 vessels which he styled his " Navy," and upon finding that 
 his assumption of authority was neither sanctioned by 
 Massachusetts nor Connecticut, discharged his force and 
 returned to Cambridge in anger. This same navy, how 
 ever, chiefly constructed under his skilful and energetic 
 direction, won several brilliant successes and certainly 
 postponed movements from Canada southward, for many 
 months. 
 
52 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Eventually a formal expedition was authorized against 
 Montreal, and Generals Schuyler and Montgomery were 
 assigned to its command. This force, consisting of three 
 thousand men, was ordered to rendezvous during the 
 month of August at Ticonderoga, where Allen and Warner 
 also joined it. 
 
 During the same month a committee from Congress 
 visited Washington at Cambridge, and persuaded him to 
 send a second army to Canada, via the Kennebec river, 
 to capture Quebec. Existing conditions seemed to warrant 
 these demonstrations Avhich, under other circumstances, 
 might have proved fatal to success at Boston. The theory 
 upon which Washington concurred in the action of Con 
 gress is worthy of notice, in estimating his character as 
 a soldier. He understood that the suddenness of the 
 resistance at Lexington, and the comparatively " drawn 
 game " between the patriots and British regulars at Breed s 
 Hill, would involve on the part of the British government 
 much time and great outlay of money, in order to send to 
 America an adequate force for aggressive action upon any 
 extended scale ; and that the control of New York and the 
 southern coast cities must be of vastly more importance 
 than to harass the scattered settlements adjoining Canada. 
 Inasmuch, however, as New York and New England 
 seemed to stake the safety of their northern frontier upon 
 operations northward, while Quebec and Montreal were 
 almost destitute of regular troops, and the season of the 
 year would prevent British reinforcements by sea, it 
 might prove to be the best opportunity to test the sen 
 timent of the Canadian people themselves as to their 
 readiness to make common cause against the Crown. If 
 reported professions could be realized, the north would be 
 permanently protected. 
 
 Taking into account that General Carleton would never 
 anticipate an advance upon Quebec, but concentrate his 
 
BRITISH CANADA ENTERS THE FIELD. 53 
 
 small force at Montreal, with view to the ultimate re 
 capture of St. John s, Crown Point, and Ticonderoga, and 
 estimating, from advices received, that Carleton s forces 
 numbered not to exceed eight hundred regulars and as 
 many Provincials, he regarded the detail of three thou 
 sand men as sufficient for the capture of Montreal. This 
 estimate was a correct one. Its occupation was also 
 deemed practicable and wise, because it was so near the 
 mouth of Sorel River and Lake Champlain as to be readily 
 supported, so long as the British army was not substan 
 tially reenforced along the Atlantic coast. 
 
 There was one additional consideration that practically 
 decided the action of Washington. The mere capture of 
 Montreal, on the north bank of the St. Lawrence river, 
 and so easily approached by water from Quebec, would 
 be of no permanent value so long as Quebec retained its 
 place as the almost impregnable rendezvous of British 
 troops and fleets. This view of the recommendation of 
 Congress was deemed conclusive ; provided, that the 
 movement against Quebec could be immediate, sudden, 
 by surprise, and involve no siege. Under the assump 
 tion that Congress had been rightly advised of the Brit 
 ish forces in Canada, and of the sentiments of the 
 Canadians themselves, the expedition had promise of 
 success. 
 
 There was a variance of religious form and religious 
 faith which did not attract all the New England soldiers 
 in behalf of Canadian independence. This was sufficiently 
 observed by Washington s keen insight into human 
 nature to call forth the following order, which placed 
 the Canadian expeditions upon a very lofty basis. The 
 extract is as follows : " As the Commander-in-Chief has 
 been apprised of a design formed for the observance of 
 that ridiculous and childish custom of burning the effigy 
 of the Pope, he cannot help expressing his surprise that 
 
54 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 there should be officers and soldiers in this army so void 
 of common-sense as not to see the impropriety of such 
 a step at this juncture, at a time when we are soliciting, 
 and have really obtained the friendship and alliance of 
 Canada, whom we ought to consider as brethren em 
 barked in the same cause the defence of the general 
 liberty of America. . . . At such a juncture, and in 
 such circumstances, to be insulting their religion is so 
 monstrous as not to be suffered or excused ; indeed, 
 instead of offering the most remote insult, it is our duty 
 to address public thanks to those our brethren, as to 
 them we are so much indebted for every late happy 
 success over the common enemy in Canada." 
 
 Washington, however, hinged his chief objection to 
 these distant enterprises, which he habitually opposed 
 throughout the war, upon the pressing demand for the 
 immediate capture of Boston, and an immediate transfer 
 of the Headquarters of the Army to New York, where, 
 and where only, the Colonies could be brought into close 
 relation for the organization and distribution of an army 
 adequate to carry on war, generally, wherever along the 
 Atlantic coast the British might land troops. 
 
 As early as June, Congress had disclaimed any purpose 
 to operate against Canada, and Bancroft says that the 
 invasion was not determined upon until the Proclama 
 tion of Martial Law by the British Governor, his denun 
 ciation of the American borderers, and the incitement of 
 savages to raids against Xew York and New England had 
 made the invasion an act of self-defence. But there had 
 been no such combination of hostile acts when these 
 expeditions were planned, and Mr. Bancroft must have 
 associated those events with the employment of Indian 
 allies during the subsequent Burgoyne campaign of 1777. 
 
 The details of the two contemporary expeditions to 
 Canada are only sufficiently outlined to develop the rela- 
 
BRITISH CANADA ENTERS THE FIELD. 55 
 
 tions of the Commander-in-Chief to their prosecution, 
 and to introduce to the reader certain officers who sub 
 sequently came more directly under Washington s per 
 sonal command. The substantial failure of each, except 
 that it developed some of the best officers of the war, is 
 accepted as history. But it is no less true thiat when 
 Great Britain made Canada the base of Burgoyne s inva 
 sion, his feeble support by the Canadians themselves 
 proved a material factor in his ultimate disaster. He 
 was practically starved to surrender for want of adequate 
 support in men and provisions, from his only natural base 
 of supply. 
 
 It is sufficient, at present, to notice the departure of 
 the two expeditions, that of Schuyler and Montgomery, 
 assembling at Ticonderoga, August 20, and that of 
 Arnold, consisting of eleven hundred men, without artil 
 lery, which left Cambridge on the seventeenth day of 
 September and landed at Gardiner, Me., on the twentieth. 
 Several companies of riflemen from Pennsylvania and 
 Virginia which had reported for duty were assigned to 
 Arnold s command. Among the officers were Daniel 
 Morgan and Christopher Greene. Aaron Burr, then but 
 nineteen years of age, accompanied this expedition. 
 
 As the summer of 1775 drew near its close, and the 
 temporary excitement of Arnold s departure restored the 
 routine of camp life and the passive watching of a be 
 leaguered city, the large number of ff Six Months " men, 
 whose term of enlistment was soon to expire, became list 
 less and indifferent to duty. Washington, without offi 
 cial rebuke of this growing negligence, forestalled its 
 further development by redoubling his efforts to place the 
 works about Boston in a complete condition of defence. 
 None were exempt from the scope of his orders. 
 Ploughed Hill and Cobble Hill were fortified, and the 
 works at Lechniere Point were strengthened. (See map, 
 
56 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 "Boston and Vicinity.") Demonstrations were made 
 daily in order to entice the garrison to sorties upon the 
 investing lines. But the British troops made no hostile 
 demonstrations, and in a very short time the American 
 redoubts were sufficiently established to resist the attack 
 of the entire British army. 
 
 A Council of War was summoned to meet at Washing 
 ton s headquarters to consider his proposition that an 
 assault be made upon the city, and that it be burned, if 
 that seemed to be a military necessity. Lee opposed the 
 movement, as impossible of execution, in view of the 
 character of the British troops whom the militia would be 
 compelled to meet in close battle. The Council of War 
 concurred in his motion to postpone the proposition of 
 the Commander-in-Chief. Lee s want of confidence in 
 the American troops, then for the first time officially 
 stated, had its temporary influence ; but, ever after, 
 through his entire career until its ignominious close, he 
 opposed every opportunity for battle, on the same pre 
 tence. The only exception was his encouragement to the 
 resistance of Moultrie at Charleston, against the British 
 fleet, during June, 1776, although he was not a partici 
 pant in that battle. 
 
 Meanwhile, the citizens of the sea-coast towns of New 
 England began to be anxious as to their own safety. A 
 British armed transport cannonaded Stonington, and other 
 vessels threatened New London and Norwich. All of 
 these towns implored Washington to send them troops. 
 Governor Jonathan Trumbull, of Connecticut (the orig 
 inal "Brother Jonathan"), whose extraordinary compre 
 hension of the military as well as the civil issues of the 
 times made him then, and ever, a reliable and constant 
 friend of Washington, consulted the Commander-in-Chief 
 as to these depredations, and acquiesced in his judgment 
 as final. 
 
BRITISH CANADA ENTERS THE FIELD. 57 
 
 Washington wrote thus : " The most important oper 
 ations of the campaign cannot be made to depend upon 
 the piratical expeditions of two or three men-of-war 
 privateers." This significant rejoinder illustrated the 
 proposition to burn Boston, and was characteristic of 
 Washington s policy respecting other local raids and en 
 dangered cities. It is in harmony with the purpose of this 
 narrative to emphasize this incident. Napoleon in his 
 victorious campaign against Austria refused to occupy 
 Vienna Avith his army, and counted the acquisition of 
 towns and cities as demoralizing to troops, besides enforc 
 ing detachments from his lighting force simply to hold 
 dead property. Washington ignored the safety of Phila 
 delphia, the Colonial capital, repeatedly, claiming that 
 to hold his army compactly together, ready for the field, 
 was the one chief essential to ultimate victory. Even 
 the later invasions of Virginia and Connecticut, and the 
 erratic excursions of Simcoe and other royalist leaders 
 into Westchester County, New York, and the country 
 about Philadelphia, did not bend his deliberate purpose 
 to cast upon local communities a fair share of their own 
 defence. In more than one instance he announced to the 
 people that these local incursions only brought reproach 
 upon the perpetrators, and embittered the Colonists more 
 intensely against the invader. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 HOWE SUCCEEDS GAGE. CLOSING SCENES OF 1775. 
 
 AS the siege of Boston advanced without decisive 
 result, orders from England suddenly relieved 
 Gage from command, and assigned General Sir William 
 Howe as his successor. That officer promulgated a char 
 acteristic order " assuming command over all the Atlantic 
 Colonies from Nova Scotia to the West Indies." He 
 made his advent thus public, and equally notorious. 
 Offensive proclamations, bad in policy, fruitless for good, 
 and involving the immediate crushing out of all sympathy 
 from those who were still loyal to the Crown, were the 
 types of his character, both as governor and soldier. He 
 threatened with military execution any who might leave 
 the city without his consent, and enjoined upon all citi 
 zens, irrespective of personal opinion, to ft arm for the 
 defence of Boston." 
 
 This action imposed upon Washington the issue of a 
 reciprocal order against " all who were suffered to stalk at 
 large, doing all the mischief in their power." Hence, 
 between the two orders, it happened that the royalists in 
 the city had no opportunity to visit their friends and see 
 to their own property outside the British lines, and the 
 royalists of the country who sought to smuggle them 
 selves between the lines, to communicate with those in 
 the city, were compelled to remain outside the American 
 lines, or be shot as "spies." 
 
 Up to this time, the British officers and neutral citizens 
 
 58 
 
CLOSING SCENES OF 1775. 59 
 
 had not been interfered with in the prosecution of their 
 business or social engagements ; and the operations of the 
 siege had been mainly those of silencing British action 
 and wearing out the garrison by constant surveillance 
 and provocations to a fight. 
 
 Supplies became more and more scarce within the 
 British lines. Acting under the peremptory orders of 
 General Howe, Admiral Graves resolved to make his small 
 fleet more effective, and under rigid instructions to "burn 
 all towns and cities that fitted out or sheltered privateers," 
 Lieutenant Mowatt began his work of desolation by the 
 destruction of Falmouth, now Portland, Me. 
 
 In contrast with this proceeding was the action of 
 Washington. When an American privateer, which had 
 been sent by him to the St. Lawrence river, to cut off 
 two brigantines which had left England with supplies for 
 Quebec, exceeded instructions, and plundered St. John s 
 Island, he promptly sent back the citizen-prisoners, 
 restored their private effects, and denounced the action 
 of the officer in command and his crew, as " a violation 
 of the principles of civilized warfare." 
 
 Crowded by these immediate demands upon his resources, 
 and equally confident that there soon would be neither 
 army, nor supplies, adequate for the emergency, Wash 
 ington made an independent appeal to Congress, covering 
 the entire ground of his complaint, and stating his abso 
 lute requirements. He wanted money. He demanded a 
 thoroughly organized commissariat, and a permanent 
 artillery establishment. He asked for more adequate con 
 trol of all troops, from whatever Colony they might come ; 
 a longer term of enlistment ; enlargement of the Rules 
 and Articles of War, and power to enforce his own will. 
 He also demanded a separate organization of the navy, in 
 place of scattered, irresponsible privateers, and that it be 
 placed upon a sound footing, as to both men and vessels. 
 
60 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Congress acted promptly upon these suggestions. On 
 the fourth of October, a committee, consisting of Ben 
 jamin Franklin, Thomas Lynch, and Benjamin Harrison, 
 started for Washington s headquarters with three 
 hundred thousand dollars in Continental money, and 
 after a patient consideration of his views, advised the 
 adoption of all his recommendations. 
 
 A council of all the New England Governors was also 
 called to meet this committee. As the result of the con 
 ference a new organization of the army was determined 
 upon, fixing the force to be employed about Boston at 
 twenty-three thousand three hundred and seventy-two 
 officers and men. Washington also submitted to this 
 committee his plan for attacking Boston. It was 
 approved ; and soon after, Congress authorized him to 
 burn the city if he should deem that necessary in the 
 prosecution of his designs against the British army. In 
 all subsequent military operations the same principle of 
 strategic action was controlling and absolute with him. 
 
 On the thirteenth day of October, Congress authorized 
 the building of two small cruisers, and on the thirtieth, 
 two additional vessels, of small tonnage. A naval com 
 mittee was also appointed, consisting of Silas Dean, John 
 Langdon, Joseph Hewes, Richard Henry Lee, and John 
 Adams. On the twenty-eighth of November, a naval 
 code was adopted ; and on the thirteenth of December, the 
 construction of thirteen frigates was authorized. Among 
 the officers commissioned, were Nicholas Biddle as cap 
 tain and John Paul Jones as lieutenant. Thus the 
 American Navy was fully established. 1 
 
 On the twenty-ninth day of November, Captain John 
 Manly, who was the most prominent officer of this im 
 provised navy, captured a British store-ship, containing 
 a large mortar, several brass cannon, two thousand 
 
 1 See Appendix, " American Navy." 
 
CLOSING SCENES OF 1775. 61 I 
 
 muskets, one hundred thousand flints, eleven mortar-beds, 
 thirty thousand shot, and all necessary implements for 
 artillery and intrenching service. 
 
 As the year drew to its close, the British levelled all 
 their advanced works on Charlestown Neck, and concen 
 trated their right wing in a strong redoubt on Bunker 
 Hill, while their left wing at Boston Neck was more 
 thoroughly fortified against attack. 
 
 Congress now intimated to AVashington that it might 
 be well to attack the city upon the first favorable occa 
 sion, before the arrival of reinforcements from Great 
 Britain. The laconic reply of the Commander-in-Chief 
 was, that he " must keep his powder for closer work than 
 cannon distance." 
 
 On the nineteenth of November, Henry Knox was com 
 missioned as Colonel, vice Gridley, too old for active ser 
 vice. Two lieutenant-colonels, two majors, and twelve 
 companies of artillery were authorized, and thus the 
 American regular Artillery, as well as the navy, was put 
 upon a substantial basis, with Knox as Chief of Artillery. 
 
 The closing months of 1775 also developed the prog 
 ress of the expeditions for the conquest of Canada. 
 The reinforcements required for the actual rescue of the 
 detached forces from destruction, increased the burdens 
 of the Commander-in-Chief. This period of Washing 
 ton s military responsibility cannot be rightly judged 
 from the general opinion that Montgomery s nominal 
 force of three thousand men represented an effective 
 army of that strength : in fact, it was less than half that 
 number. 
 
 Montgomery reached Ticonderoga on the seventeenth 
 of August. Schuyler, then negotiating a treaty with the 
 Six Nations, at Albany, received a despatch from Wash 
 ington, "Not a moment of time is to be lost," and at 
 once joined Montgomery. They pushed for the capture^ 
 
(52 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 of St. John s, under the spur of Washington s warning ; 
 but on the sixth of September and again on the tenth, 
 were compelled to suspend operations for want of artil 
 lery, having at the time a force of but one thousand 
 men present, instead of the three thousand promised. 
 Schuyler s ill-health compelled him to return to Ticon- 
 deroga ; but with infinite industry, system, and courage 
 he was able to forward additional troops, increasing 
 Montgomery s force to two thousand men. 
 
 Ethan Allen, who had been succeeded in command 
 of the " Green Mountain Boys " by Seth Warner, was 
 across the line, endeavoring to recruit a regiment of 
 Canadians. After partial success, regardless of order, he 
 dashed forward, hoping to capture Montreal, as he had 
 captured Ticonderoga. He was captured, and sent to 
 England to be tried on the charge of treason. In a letter 
 to Schuyler, Washington thus notices the event : 
 
 " Colonel Allen s misfortune will, I hope, teach a lesson 
 of prudence and subordination in others who may be too 
 ambitious to outshine their general officer, and regardless 
 of order and duty, rush into enterprises which have 
 unfavorable effects on the public, and are destructive to 
 themselves." 
 
 On the third of November, after a siege of fifty days, 
 St. John s was captured, with one hundred Canadians and 
 nearly five hundred British regulars, more than half the 
 force in Canada. John Andre was among the number. 
 General Carleton, who attempted to cross the St. Law 
 rence river, and come to the aid of St. John s, was thrust 
 back by the " Green Mountain Boys " and a part of the 
 2d New York Regiment. 
 
 The treatment of prisoners illustrates the condition of 
 this army. It was not a part of the Cambridge army, as 
 was Arnold s, but the contributions promised largely by 
 New York, and directly forwarded by Congress. One- 
 
CLOSING SCENES OF 1775.V. 63! 
 
 regiment mutinied because Montgomery allowed the 
 prisoners to retain their extra suit of clothing, instead of 
 treating it as plunder. Schuyler s and Montgomery s 1 
 Orderly Books and letters show that even officers refused 
 to take clothing and food to suffering prisoners until per 
 emptorily forced to do it. Washington was constantly 
 advised of the existing conditions ; and when both 
 Schuyler and Montgomery regarded the prosecution of 
 their expeditions as hopeless, with such troops, and pro 
 posed to resign, the Commander- in-Chief thus feelingly, 
 almost tenderly, wrote : " God knows there is not a diffi 
 culty you both complain of which I have not in an 
 eminent degree experienced ; that I am not, every day, 
 experiencing ; but we must bear up against them, and 
 make the best of mankind as they are, since we cannot 
 have them as we wish. Let me therefore conjure you 
 both, to lay aside SUCA thoughts ; thoughts injurious to 
 yourselves, and extremely so to your country, which calls 
 aloud for gentlemen of your abilities." 
 
 On the twelfth of November, Montgomery reached the 
 open city of Montreal ; and the larger of the two Cana 
 dian expeditions reached its proposed destination. But 
 before the month of November closed, the American force 
 " r wasted away," until only about eight hundred men re 
 mained. Expiration of enlistments was at hand. Men 
 refused to re-enlist. Even the " Green Mountain Boys " re 
 turned home. This was not the total loss to Montgomery. 
 Officers and men were all alike fractious, dictatorial, and 
 self-willed. They claimed the right to do just as they 
 pleased, and to obey such orders only as their judgment 
 approved. General Carleton escaped from the city in 
 disguise, and reached Quebec on the nineteenth. There 
 was no possibility of following him ; and the work laid 
 out for Montgomery, had been done, although at great 
 cost and delay. 
 
64 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Prof. Charles G. D. Eoberts, of King s College, Nova 
 Scotia, in his "History of Canada" (1897), l uses this 
 language : " General Carleton fled in disguise to Quebec, 
 narrowly escaping capture, and there made ready for his 
 last stand. In Quebec he weeded out all those citizens 
 who sympathized with the rebels, expelling them from 
 the city. With sixteen hundred men at his back, a 
 small force indeed, but to be trusted, he awaited the 
 struggle." 
 
 Meanwhile Arnold, after unexampled sufferings and 
 equal heroism, had reached Point Levi, opposite Quebec, 
 on the ninth of November, only to find that the garrison 
 had been strengthened, and that he was stranded, in the 
 midst of a severe winter, upon an inhospitable, barren 
 bluff. The strongest fortress in America, defended by 
 two hundred heavy cannon, and the capture of which had 
 been the inspiration of his adventurous campaign, was in 
 full sight. Every condition which Washington had de 
 clared to be essential to success had failed of realization. 
 On the fifth of October Washington wrote to Schuyler : 
 "If Carleton is not driven from St. John s, so as to be 
 obliged to throw himself into Quebec, it must fall into 
 our hands, as it is left without a regular soldier, as the 
 captain of a brig from Quebec to Boston says. Many of 
 the inhabitants are most favorably disposed to the Ameri 
 can cause, and that there is there the largest stock of am 
 munition ever collected in America." On the same day 
 he also writes: "Arnold expected to reach Quebec in 
 twenty days from September twenty-sixth, and that 
 Montgomery must keep up such appearances as to fix 
 Carleton, and prevent the force in Canada from being- 
 turned on Arnold ; but if penetration into Canada be 
 given up, Arnold must also know it, in time for retreat." 
 And again: "This detachment (Arnold s) was to take 
 
 1 Lamson, Wolffe & Co., Publishers, Boston. 
 
CLOSING SCENES OF 1775. 65 
 
 possession of Quebec, if possible ; but at any rate, to 
 make a diversion in favor of Schuyler." 
 
 But Arnold, on the sixteenth day of October, when, as 
 he advised Washington, he expected to advance upon 
 Quebec, was struggling with quagmires, swamps, fallen 
 trees, rain and mud, snow and ice, about Deer river, 
 and had not even reached Lake Megantic. Men waded 
 in icy water to their armpits ; some froze to death : 
 others deserted. Enos, short of provisions, as he 
 claimed, marched three hundred men back to Cambridge. 
 And Arnold, himself, twenty-five days too late, stood 
 upon Point Levi, in the midst of a furious tempest of 
 wind, rain, and sleet, only to realize the substantial 
 failure of his vaunted expedition. Most of his muskets 
 were ruined, and but five rounds of ammunition remained 
 for the few men that were with him in this hour of starva 
 tion and distress. Two vessel s-of- war lay at anchor in the 
 stream. And yet, such was his indomitable energy, with 
 thirty birch-bark canoes he crossed the river, gained a 
 position on the Heights of Abraham, and sent to the for 
 tress an unnoticed demand for surrender. Then, retiring 
 to Point Aux Trembles, he sent a messenger to Mont 
 gomery asking for artillery and two thousand men, for 
 prosecution of a siege. Montgomery, leaving in com 
 mand General Wooster, who arrived at Montreal late in 
 November, started down the river with about three hun 
 dred men and a few pieces of artillery, and clothing for 
 Arnold s men ; landing at Point Aux Trembles about 
 December first, making the total American force only one 
 thousand men. On the sixth day of December, a demand 
 for surrender having been again unanswered, the little 
 army advanced to its fate. Four assaulting columns 
 were organized. All failed, and Montgomery fell in a 
 gallant but desperate attempt to storm the citadel itself. 
 Morgan and four hundred and twenty-six men, nearly 
 
fitf WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 half of the entire command, were taken prisoners. Only 
 the grand nerve of Montgomery brought the army to 
 the assault in this forlorn-hope affair, for such it was. 
 Three of Arnold s captains refused to serve under him 
 any longer ; and mutiny, or the entire ruin of the army, 
 was the alternative to the risks of ruin in battle. Arnold 
 had a knee shattered by a bullet, and the remnants 
 of the army fell back, harmless, to the garrison, and 
 amid snow, ice, and proximate starvation, awaited future 
 events. 
 
 The treatment of the prisoners by General Carleton, 
 and the burial, with honors of war, of his old comrade 
 under Wolfe, the brave Montgomery, savors of the 
 knightly chivalry of mediaeval times. When his officers 
 protested at such treatment of rebels, his response, lofty 
 in tone and magnanimous in action, was simply this : 
 ff Since we have in vain tried to make them acknowledge 
 us as brothers, let us at least send them away disposed 
 to regard us as cousins." 
 
 Almost at the same hour of the day when Carleton 
 passed through Point Aux Trembles, on his escape 
 to Quebec, Washington having heard of Montgomery s 
 arrival at Montreal, was writing to Congress, as fol 
 lows : " It is likely that General Carleton will, with what 
 force he can collect after the surrender of the rest of 
 Canada, throw himself into Quebec, and there make his 
 last effort," 
 
 With Arnold three miles from Quebec, intrenched as 
 well as he was able to intrench, confining his operations 
 to cutting off supplies to the city and keeping his five 
 hundred survivors from starving or freezing, and Carle- 
 ton preparing for reinforcements as soon as the ice might 
 break up in the spring, the invasion of Canada for con 
 quest came to a dead halt. The invasion of the American 
 Colonies was to follow its final failure. 
 
CLOSING SCENES OF 1775. (M 
 
 There were heroes who bore part in those expeditions, 
 and their experience was to crown many of Washington s 
 later campaigns with the honors of victory. Meanwhile, 
 about Boston, enlistments were rapidly expiring, to be 
 again replaced with fresh material for the master s hand 
 ling into army shape and use ; and the American Com- 
 mander-in-Chief was beginning to illustrate his qualities 
 as Soldier. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 AMERICA AGAINST BRITAIN. BOSTON TAKEN. 
 
 ON the thirty-first day of December, 1775, Admiral 
 Shuldhani reached Boston with reinforcements for 
 its garrison, and relieved Admiral Graves in command 
 of all British naval forces. The troops within the lines 
 were held under the most rigid discipline, although 
 amusements were provided to while away the idle hours 
 of a passive defence. 
 
 The winter was memorable for its mildness, so that the 
 American troops, encamped about the city in tents, did 
 not suffer ; but the in-gathering of recruits, to replace 
 soldiers whose enlistments had just expired, involved the 
 actual creation of a new army, directly in the face of a 
 powerful, well-equipped, and watchful adversary. And 
 yet, this very adversary must be driven from Boston 
 before the American patriot army could move elsewhere, 
 and engage actively against the combined armies and 
 navy of the British crown. 
 
 Indications of increasing hostilities on the part of 
 royal governors of the South were not wanting to stim 
 ulate the prosecution of the siege to its most speedy 
 consummation ; and although unknown to Washington at 
 the time, the city of Norfolk, Ya., had been bombarded 
 on New Year s day by order of Lord Dunmore. 
 
 Impressed by the urgency of the crisis, Washington, 
 on the same day, was writing to Congress in plain terms, 
 as follows, leaving the last word blank, lest it might mis- 
 
 68 
 
AMERICA AGAINST BRITAIN. BOSTON TAKEN, fit) 
 
 carry: "It is not, perhaps, in the power of history to 
 furnish a case like ours ; to maintain a post within 
 musket-shot of the enemy, within that distance of twenty, 
 old British regiments without 
 
 General Greene kept his small army well in hand, 
 watchful of the minutest detail, inspecting daily each 
 detachment, as well as all supplies of ammunition and 
 food ; and on the fourth of January, writing from 
 Prospect Plill (see map of Boston and Vicinity), thus 
 reported his exact position to the Commander-in-Chicf : 
 " The night after the old troops went off, I could not 
 have mustered seven hundred men, notwithstanding the 
 returns of the new enlisted men amounted to nineteen 
 hundred and upwards. I am strong enough to defend 
 myself against all the force in Boston. Our situation 
 has been critical. Had the enemy been acquainted with 
 our situation, I cannot pretend to say what might have 
 been the consequences." 
 
 The reader will appreciate at a glance the real opinion 
 of the American Commander-in-Chief as to his own imme 
 diate future, and the general scope of operations which he 
 regarded as supremely important in behalf of American 
 Independence. He understood thoroughly, that Lord 
 Dartmouth originally opposed the military occupation of 
 Boston in order to prevent a collision between British 
 troops and the excited people, which he regarded as an 
 inevitable result. That distinguished and far-sighted 
 statesman, in order to prevent any overt acts of resist 
 ance to the established representatives of the crown 
 at business or social centres, wrote to Lord Howe as 
 early as October 22, 1775, to "gain possession of 
 some respectable port to the southward, from which to 
 make sudden and unexpected attacks upon sea-coast 
 towns during the winter/ But British pride had forced 
 the increase of the army in Massachusetts Colony, and 
 
70 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 initiated a disastrous campaign. Lord Dartmouth never 
 wavered in the opinion that New York was the only 
 proper base of operations in dealing with the Colonies at 
 large. Lord Howe himself had advised that New York, 
 instead of Boston, should be made the rendezvous and 
 headquarters of all British troops to be sent to America. 
 Only the contumacy of General Gage had baffled the 
 wiser plans of superior authority. 
 
 During the first week of the new year, and while the 
 American army was under the stress of reconstruction, 
 Washington learned that General Clinton had been prom 
 ised an independent command of a portion of the fresh 
 troops which accompanied Admiral Shuldham to America, 
 and would be detailed on some important detached service 
 remote from New England waters. As a remarkable fact, 
 not creditable to the king s advisers, the Island of New 
 York, at that time, was practically without any regular 
 military garrison ; but its aristocratic tory circles of in 
 fluence could not conceive of a popular uprising against 
 the supremacy of George III. within their favored sphere 
 of luxury and independence. 
 
 Washington appreciated the situation fully. He recog 
 nized the defenceless condition of New York and its 
 adaptation for the Headquarters of the Army of America. 
 He was also thoroughly convinced that General Clinton s 
 proposed expedition would either occupy New York, or 
 make the attempt to do so. He acted without delay upon 
 that conviction, although reserving to himself the respon 
 sibility of first reducing Boston with the least possible 
 delay. General Lee, then upon detached service in Con 
 necticut, had written to him, urging, in his emphatic style, 
 " the immediate occupation of New York ; the suppression 
 or expulsion of certain tories of Long Island ; and that 
 not to crush the serpents before their rattles were grown, 
 would be ruinous." 
 
AMERICA AGAINST BRITAIN. BOSTON TAKEN. 71 
 
 Washington was as prompt to reply ; and ordered Lee 
 to " take such Connecticut volunteers as he could quickly 
 assemble in his march, and put the city in the best possi 
 ble posture of defence which the season and circumstances 
 would admit of." 
 
 Meanwhile, every immediate energy of the Commander- 
 in-Chief was concentrated upon a direct attack of the 
 British position. The business capacity of Colonel Knox 
 had already imparted to the Ordnance Department char 
 acter and efficiency. Under direction of Washington he 
 visited Lake George, during December, 1775, and by the 
 last of February hauled upon sleds, over the snow, more 
 than fifty pieces of artillery to the Cambridge head 
 quarters. This enabled him to make the armament of 
 Lechmere Point very formidable ; and by the addition of 
 several half-moon batteries between that point and Kox- 
 bury, it became possible to concentrate upon the city of 
 Boston the effective fire of nearly every heavy gun and 
 mortar which the American army controlled. 
 
 It had been the intention of Washington to march 
 against Boston, across the ice, so soon as the Charles 
 river should freeze sufficiently to bear the troops. Few 
 of the soldiers had bayonets, but "the city must be capt 
 ured, with or without bayonets," and his army released 
 for service elsewhere. In one letter he used this very 
 suggestive appeal : " Give me powder, or ice, and I will 
 take Boston. Upon the occasion of "one single freeze 
 and some pretty strong ice," he suddenly called a council 
 of war, and proposed to seize the opportunity to cross at 
 once, and either capture or burn the city. Officers of 
 the New England troops who were more familiar with the 
 suddenness with which the tides affect ice of moderate 
 thickness, dissuaded him from his purpose ;but in writing 
 to Joseph Reed, for some time after his Adjutant-General, 
 he thus refers to the incident : " Behold, while we have 
 
72 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 been waiting the whole year for this favorable event, the 
 enterprise was thought too hazardous. I did not think so, 
 and I am sure yet, that the enterprise, if it had been 
 undertaken with resolution, would have succeeded ; with 
 out it, any would fail." " P.S. I am preparing to take 
 post on Dorchester Heights, to try if the enemy will be 
 so kind as to come out to us." This postscript is an 
 illustration of Washington s quick perception of the 
 strategic movement which Avould crown the siege with 
 complete success. He added another caution : " What I 
 have said respecting the determination in Council, and 
 the possession of Dorchester, is spoken sub-rosa" 
 
 The month of February drew near its close, when 
 Washington, in the retirement of his headquarters, de 
 cided no longer to postpone his attack upon the city and 
 its defences. Two floating batteries of light draught 
 and great strength were quickly constructed, and forty- 
 five batteaux, like the modern dredge-scow, each capable 
 of transporting eighty men, were assembled and placed 
 under a special guard. In order to provide for every 
 contingency of surmounting parapets, or improvising 
 defences in streets, or otherwise, fascines, gabions, carts, 
 bales of hay, intrenching-tools, two thousand bandages, 
 and all other contingent supplies that might, under any 
 possible conditions, be required, were also gathered and 
 placed in charge of none but picked men. Gen. Thomas 
 Mifflin, his Quartermaster-General, who had accompanied 
 him from Philadelphia, shared his full confidence, and 
 was unremitting by night and by day in hastening the 
 work intrusted to his department. 
 
 The inflexibility of purpose which marked Washing 
 ton s career to its close, asserted its supremacy at this 
 crucial hour of the Revolutionary struggle, when, for the 
 first time, America was to challenge Britain to fight, and 
 fight at once. It had begun to appear as if his submis- 
 
AMERICA AGAINST BRITAIN. BOSTON TAKEN. 73 
 
 sion of a proposition to a council of officers implied some 
 doubt of its feasibility, or some alternate contingency 
 of failure. Washington discounted all failure, by ade 
 quate forethought. Jomini, who admitted that Napoleon 
 seemed never to provide for a retreat, very suggestively 
 added : " When Napoleon was present, no one thought of 
 such a provision." In like manner Washington had the 
 confidence of his troops. 
 
 It certainly is not anticipating the test of Washington, 
 as Soldier, to state some characteristics which were pecul 
 iarly his own. His most memorable and determining acts 
 were performed when he w T as clothed with ample authority 
 by Congress, or the emergency forced him to make his 
 own will supreme. In the course of this narrative it 
 will appear that Congress did at last formally emancipate 
 him from the constraint of councils. Whenever he 
 doubted, others doubted. Whenever he was persistent, 
 he inspired the nerve and courage which realized results, 
 even though in a modified form of execution. Partial 
 disappointments or deferred realization did not shatter 
 nor Aveaken his faith. Washington, the American Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, was in such a mood on the first day of 
 March, 1776. He had a plan, a secret plan, and kept his 
 secret well, until the stroke was ready for delivery. 
 
 And yet, the progress of the siege up to this date, and 
 through two long winter months, had not been wholly 
 spent in details for its certain success. Even after the 
 first day of January, when he became acquainted with the 
 proposed movement of General Clinton, he began to an 
 ticipate such a movement as an indication of his own 
 future action. A selection of guns for field service was 
 carefully made ; batteries were organized and thoroughly 
 drilled. Then, as ever after, during the war, artillerists 
 were few in number, and the service was never popular. 
 The hauling of heavy guns by hand, then with rare 
 
74 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 exceptions habitual, made the service very hard ; and 
 accuracy of fire cost laborious practice, especially where 
 powder was scarce, even for exigent service. Wagons 
 were also provided. Medical supplies were collected and 
 packed in portable chests. He also inquired into the 
 nature of the New England roads when the frosts of spring 1 
 first break the soil, and was informed that they would be 
 almost impassable for loaded wagons and heavy artillery. 
 During the same months the condition of Canada had 
 become seriously critical, through the activity of General 
 Carleton who expected reinforcements from England, and 
 had already threatened the northern border. It seemed 
 to Washington that Congress might even divert a part of 
 his own army to support the army in Canada, upon the 
 acquisition of Boston and the retirement of its British 
 garrison. The ultimate destination of that garrison, in 
 
 o o 
 
 whole or in part, was full of uncertain relations to his 
 own movements. The disposition of the large royalist 
 element in Boston was also an object of care ; but loom 
 ing above all other considerations was the supreme fact 
 that the war now begun was one which embraced every 
 Colony, every section ; and that the conflict with Great 
 Britain was to be as broad and desperate as her power 
 was great and pervasive. 
 
 And yet, under so vast and varied responsibilities, 
 he matured and withheld from his confiding troops the 
 secret of his purpose to capture Boston suddenly and 
 surely, until the day of its crowning fulfilment arrived. 
 
 Just after sunset, on that New England spring evening, 
 from Lechmere Point, past Cobble Hill, and through the 
 long range of encircling batteries, clear to the Roxbury 
 line on the right, every mortar and cannon which could 
 take Boston in range opened fire upon the quiet city. 
 
 But this was only a preliminary test of the location, 
 range, and power of the adversary fire. The British guns 
 
AMERICA AGAINST BRITAIN. BOSTON TAKEN, 75 
 
 responded with spirit, and equally well disclosed to com 
 petent artillery experts distributed along the American 
 lines, the weight, efficiency, and disposition of their bat 
 teries so suddenly called into action. 
 
 At sunrise of March 2d, the American army seemed 
 not to have heard the cannonading of the previous 
 night ; or, wondering at such a waste of precious 
 powder, shot, and shell, rested from the real experience 
 of handling heavy guns against the city and an invis 
 ible foe, at night. And through the entire day the army 
 rested. No parades were ordered. Only the formal calls 
 of routine duty were sounded by fife and drum. No heads 
 appeared above the ramparts. The tents were crowded 
 with earnest men, filling powder-horns, casting or count 
 ing bullets, cleaning their" firelocks," as they were called 
 in the official drill manual of those times, and writing let 
 ters to their friends at home. The quiet of that camp 
 was intense, but faces were not gloomy in expression, 
 neither was there any sign of special dread of the ap 
 proaching conflict, which everybody felt to be immedi 
 ately at hand. As officers went the rounds to see that 
 silence was fully observed, it was enough to satisfy every 
 curious inquirer as to its purpose, " It is Washington s 
 order." And all this time, behind the American head 
 quarters, Rufus Putnam, civil engineer, Knox, Chief of 
 Artillery, Mifflin, Quartermaster-General, and General 
 Thomas, were ceaselessly at work, studying the plans and 
 taking their final instructions from the Commander-in- 
 Chief. 
 
 On the night of the third of March, soon after that 
 evening s sunset-gun had closed the formal duties of the 
 day, and seemingly by spontaneous will, all along the 
 front, the bombardment was renewed with the same 
 vigor, and was promptly responded to. But some of 
 the British batteries had been differently disposed, as if 
 
76 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 the garrison either anticipated an attack upon their works 
 on Bunker Hill, or a landing upon the Common, where 
 both land and water batteries guarded approach. (See 
 map.) 
 
 This second bombardment had been more effective in 
 its range. One solid shot from the city reached Prospect 
 Hill, but no appreciable damage had been done to the 
 American works ; but some houses in Boston had been 
 penetrated by shot, and in one barrack six soldiers had 
 been wounded. Places of safety began to be hunted for. 
 Artificial obstructions were interposed in some open spaces 
 for protection from random shot and shell. No detail 
 under orders, and no call for volunteers, to break up the 
 investment of the city, had been made. No excited com 
 mander, as on the seventeenth of June, 1775, tendered his 
 services to lead British regulars against Cambridge, to 
 seize and bring back for trial, as traitor, the arch-rebel 
 of the defiant Colonists. Red uniforms were indeed re 
 splendent in the sunlight ; but there was no irrepressible 
 impulse to assail earthworks, which had been the work of 
 months, and not of a single night, and behind which 
 twenty thousand countrymen eagerly awaited battle. 
 And on this day, as before, the quiet of the graveyard on 
 Beacon Hill was no more solemn and pervasive than was 
 the calm and patient resting of the same twenty thousand 
 countrymen, waiting only for some call to duty from 
 the lips of their silent Comniander-in-Chief. 
 
 The fourth of March closed, and the night was mild 
 and hazy. The moon was at its full. It was a good 
 night for rest. Possibly such a whisper as this might 
 have pervaded the Boston barracks, and lulled anxious 
 royalists to slumber. " Surely the rebels cannot afford 
 further waste of powder. They impoverish themselves. 
 Sleep on ! Boston is safe ! " Not so ! As the sun went 
 down, the whole American camp was alive with its teem- 
 
AMERICA AGAINST BRITAIN. BOSTON TAKEN. 77 
 
 ing thousands ; not ostentatiously paraded upon parapet 
 and bastion, but patiently awaiting the meaning of a 
 mysterious hint, which kept even the inmates of hospital 
 tents from sleeping, that "Washington had promised them 
 Boston on the morrow." 
 
 From "early candle-lighting" to the clear light of 
 another- dawn, incessant thunder rolled over camp and 
 city. The same quick flashes showed that fire ran all 
 along the line ; and still, the occupants of camp and city, 
 standing by their guns, or sheltered from their fire, 
 dragged through the night, impatiently waiting for day 
 light to test the night s experience, as daylight had done 
 before. 
 
 At earliest break of day it was announced to General 
 Howe that " two strong rebel redoubts capped Dorches 
 ter Heights." The news spread quickly, after the excite 
 ments of the night. There was no more easy slumber in 
 the royal bed-chamber of British repose, nor in the lux 
 urious apartments of the favored subjects of George III., 
 in the city of Boston, on that fifth day of March, 177(5. 
 
 " If the Americans retain possession of the Heights," 
 said Admiral Shuldham, " I cannot keep a vessel in the 
 harbor." 
 
 General Howe advised Lord Dartmouth that " it must 
 have been the employment of at least twelve thousand 
 men." 
 
 Another British officer said, " These works were raised 
 with an expedition equal to that of the genii belonging to 
 Aladdin s lamp." 
 
 Lord Howe said, further, " The rebels have done more 
 in one night than my whole army would have done in a 
 month." 
 
 "Perhaps," said Heath, "there never was as much done 
 in so short a space." 
 
 The reader of this narrative, whether citizen or soldier, 
 
78 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 cannot fail to be interested in some account of the extreme 
 simplicity with which the construction of these works 
 had been carried on. The earth, at that time, was 
 frozen to the depth of eighteen inches, rendering the use 
 of pick-axe and shovel, and all intrenching-tools, of 
 little use ; besides, the noise of their handling would 
 have betrayed the workmen. The secret of Washington s 
 silent preparatory work, and the accumulation of such 
 heaps of material behind his headquarters, is revealed. 
 Hoop-poles, for hurdles and fascines, branches cut from 
 apple orchards, and along brooks, for abatis, even as far 
 out as the present suburban towns of Brookline, Milton, 
 Mattapan, and Hyde Park, had been accumulated in great 
 quantities. Large bales of compressed hay, which were 
 proof against any ordinary cannon-ball, had been pro 
 cured also, so that the merely heaping up and arranging 
 these under the personal direction of Engineer Putnam, 
 according to a plan fully digested in advance, was but 
 easy work for a class of country soldiers peculiarly 
 "handy" with all such materials. Then, on the tops of 
 the improvised redoubts, were barrels filled with stones. 
 These, at the proper time, were to be rolled down the 
 hill, to disconcert the formal array of steadily advancing 
 British regulars. 
 
 The management of the whole affair was hardly less 
 simple. Eight hundred soldiers, not needed during the 
 cannonading, quietly marched out of camp the night 
 before, some between Boston and Dorchester Heights, 
 and others at the east end of the peninsula, opposite 
 Castle Island ; w^hile still others, with tools, and a sup 
 porting party of twelve hundred soldiers under General 
 Thomas, followed the advance. Three hundred carts, 
 loaded with suitable material, followed. 
 
 All this movement was liable to be discovered in spite 
 of the incessant roar of heavy ordnance over the works 
 
AMERICA AGAINST BRITAIN. BOSTON TAKEN. 71) 
 
 of besiegers and besieged. The flash of heated guns or 
 bursting bombs might light up the trail of this slowly 
 crawling expedition, and vast interests were staked upon 
 the daring venture. But, along the most exposed parts 
 of the way, the bales of pressed hay had been placed as a 
 protecting screen ; and behind its sufficient cover, the 
 carts passed to and fro in safety. Even the moon itself 
 only deepened the shadow of this artificial protector, 
 while in position to light, as by day, the steps of the 
 advancing patriots. And there was, also, a brisk north 
 wind which bore away from the city, southward, all 
 sounds which were not already lost in the hurricane of 
 war that hushed all but those of battle. 
 
 But the American Commander-in-Chief had fully antic 
 ipated the possible incident of a premature discovery 
 of his design against Dorchester. The success of his 
 plans for the night did not wholly depend upon the 
 undisturbed occupation and fortification of Dorchester 
 Heights. That silent procession of two thousand country 
 men was not, as at Bunker Hill, a sort of " forlorn- 
 hope " affair. It was not hurried, nor was it costly of 
 strength or patience. Reliefs came and went ; and the 
 system, order, and progress that marked each hour could 
 not have been better realized by day. Instructions had 
 been explicit ; and these were executed with coolness and 
 precision, as a simple matter of fact, to be done as 
 ordered by Washington. 
 
 The silent preparations of the preceding day had pro 
 vided for the main body of the American army other 
 employment than a listless watch of a vigorous bombard 
 ment and its pyrotechnic illumination of the skies. At 
 battery "Number Two," the floating batteries and bat- 
 teaux were fully manned, for crossing to Boston. Greene 
 and Sullivan, with four thousand thoroughly rested 
 troops, and these carefully picked men, were ready to 
 
#0 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 move on the instant, if the garrison attempted to inter 
 fere with Washington s original purpose. 
 
 An eminent historian thus characterized the event : " One 
 unexpended combination, concerted with faultless ability, 
 and suddenly executed, had, in a few hours, made General 
 Howe s position at Boston untenable." 
 
 As soon as General Howe appreciated the changed 
 conditions of his relations to the besieging rebels, he 
 despatched Earl Percy, who had met rebels twice before, 
 with twenty-four hundred troops to dislodge the enemy 
 from Dorchester Heights. The command moved promptly, 
 by boats, to Castle Island, for the purpose of making a 
 night attack. Sharp-shooting, by the American " Minute 
 Men," in broad daylight, behind breastworks, was not 
 courted by Percy on this occasion, nor desired by General 
 Howe. During the afternoon a storm arose from the 
 south, which increased to a gale, followed at night by 
 torrents of rain. Some boats were cast ashore, and the 
 entire expedition was abandoned. 
 
 By the tenth of March, the Americans had fortified 
 Nook s Hill ; and this drove the British from Boston 
 Neck. During that single night, eight hundred shot and 
 shell were thrown into the city from the American lines. 
 
 On the seventeenth of March, the British forces, num 
 bering, with the seamen of the fleet, not quite eleven 
 thousand men, embarked in one hundred and twenty 
 transports for Halifax. The conditions of this embarka 
 tion without hindrance from the American army had been 
 settled by an agreement on the part of the British author 
 ities that the city should be left intact from fire, or other 
 injury, and that the property of royalists, of whom nearly 
 fifteen hundred accompanied the troops, should be also 
 safe from violation by the incoming garrison. As the 
 last boats left, General Ward occupied the city with a 
 garrison of five thousand troops. 
 
WASHINGTON AT BOSTON. 
 [From Stuart s painting.] 
 
AMERICA AGAINST BRITAIN. BOSTON TAKEN. 81 
 
 Of two hundred and lifty cannon left behind, nearly 
 one-half were serviceable. Other valuable stores, and the 
 capture of several store-vessels which entered the harbor 
 without knowledge of the departure of the British troops, 
 largely swelled the contributions to the American material 
 of war. 
 
 The siege of Boston canie to an end. New England 
 was free from the presence of British garrisons. The 
 mission of Washington to Massachusetts Colony, as Com- 
 mander-in-Chief of the Continental Army of America, had 
 fulfilled its purpose. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 SYSTEMATIC WAR WITH BRITAIN BEGUN. 
 
 ~T~YTITHIN twenty-four hours after General Howe 
 V V embarked his army, the American Commander -in- 
 ( hief developed his matured plan to anticipate any design 
 of Genera] Clinton to occupy New York City. The great 
 number of fugitive royalists who accompanied Howe s 
 fleet and encumbered even the decks of battleships with 
 their personal effects, and the necessity of consulting the 
 wishes of very influential families among their number, 
 were substantial reasons for the selection of Halifax as 
 the destination of the ships. But of still greater impor 
 tance was the reorganization of his army, and a new sup 
 ply of munitions of war, in place of those which had been 
 expended, or abandoned on account of the siege of Boston. 
 Time was also required for the preparation and equipment 
 of any new expedition, whether in support of Carleton in 
 Canada, or to move southward. 
 
 Washington did not even enter Boston until he started 
 General Heath with five regiments and part of the artil 
 lery for New York. On the twentieth the Commander- 
 in-Chief entered the city. 
 
 The British fleet was weatherbound in Nantasket Roads 
 for ten days ; but on the twenty-seventh clay of March, 
 when it finally went to sea, the entire American army, 
 with the exception of the Boston garrison, was placed 
 under orders to follow the advance division. General 
 Sullivan marched the same day upon which he received 
 
 82 
 
SYSTEMATIC WAR WITH BRITAIN BEGUN. ( s;>> 
 
 orders ; another division marched April 3d, and on the 
 4th General Spencer left with the last brigade, Wash 
 ington leaving the same night. 
 
 In order to anticipate any possible delay of the troops 
 in reaching their destination, he had already requested 
 Governor Trumbull, of Connecticut, to reenforce the New 
 York garrison with two thousand men from Western Con 
 necticut ; and he also instructed the commanding officer in 
 that city to apply to the Provincial Convention, or to the 
 Committee of Safety of New Jersey, to furnish a thou 
 sand men for the same purpose. In advising Congress of 
 this additional expense, incurred through his own fore 
 thought, but without authority of Congress, he wrote 
 thus discreetly : " Past experience and the lines in Boston 
 and on Boston Neck point out the propriety and suggest 
 the necessity of keeping our enemies from gaining posses 
 sion and making a lodgment." 
 
 The Continental Army had entered upon its first active 
 campaign ; but before Washington left Cambridge he 
 arranged for the assembling of transports at Norwich, 
 Conn., thereby to save the long coastwise march to 
 New York; and digested a careful itinerary of daily 
 marches, by which the different divisions would not 
 crowd one upon another. Quartermaster-General Mif- 
 flin was intrusted with the duty of preparing barracks, 
 quarters, and forage for the use of the troops on their 
 arrival, and all the governors of New England were 
 conferred with as to the contingencies of British raids 
 upon exposed sea-coast towns, after removal of the army 
 from Boston. A careful system of keeping the Pay 
 Accounts of officers was also devised, and this, with the 
 examination of an alleged complicity of officers with the 
 purchase of army supplies, added to the preliminary 
 work of getting his army ready for the best of ser 
 vice in garrison or the field. Two companies of artil- 
 
84 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 lery, with shot and shell, were detailed to report to 
 General Thomas, who had been ordered by Congress to 
 Canada, vice General Lee ordered southward. 
 
 Washington s journey to New York was via Provi 
 dence, Norwich, and New London, in order to inspect 
 and hasten the departure of the troops. 
 
 A reference to the situation in that city is necessary to 
 an appreciation of the development which ensued immedi 
 ately upon the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 William Try on, who subsequently invaded Connecticut 
 twice, and left his devastating impress upon Danbury, 
 Ridgefield, New Haven, Fairfield, Norwalk, and Green 
 Farms, was the royal Governor of New York. It is in 
 teresting to recall the antecedents of this governor. He 
 
 o o 
 
 had been Governor of North Carolina once, and attempted 
 a part similar to that so foolishly played by Governor 
 Gage at Lexington and Concord. Until this day, the 
 people of North Carolina w r ill cite the " Battle of Ala- 
 mance," which was a pretty sharp tight between Tryon s 
 forces and the yeomanry of the " Old North State," on 
 the sixteenth day of May, 1771, as the first blood shed in 
 resistance to the usurpations of the royal prerogative. 
 It was the same William Tryon, in person, temperament, 
 and methods, who governed New York City in 1776, and 
 Washington knew him thoroughly. The royalists and 
 patriots of New York City, in the absence of a control 
 ling force of either British or Continental troops, com 
 mingled daily. A few British men-of-war really controlled 
 its waters ; but the city was practically at rest. There 
 prevailed a general understanding that each party should 
 retain its own views ; that the officers of the Crown should 
 keep within the technical line of their official duty, and 
 that the citizens would not interfere. Congress had no 
 troops to spare, and there was quite a general suspension of 
 arming, except to supply the regiments already in the field. 
 
SYSTEMATIC WAR WITH BRITAIN BEGUN. ,S5 
 
 An extraordinary coincidence of the arrival of Gen 
 eral Clinton from Halifax, with a small force, and the 
 arrival, on the same day, of General Lee, from Connec 
 ticut, with about fifteen hundred volunteers, brought this 
 condition of armed neutrality to an end. Clinton had 
 positive orders to " destroy all towns that refused submis 
 sion." When Clinton cast anchor at Sandy Hook and 
 communicated with Governor Try on, and learned the facts, 
 he judiciously made the official courtesy due to the gov 
 ernor his plausible excuse for entering the harbor at all, 
 " being ordered southward." Lee, doubtful of Clinton s 
 real purpose, fortified Brooklyn Heights back of Govern 
 or s Island, and began also to fortify the city, at the 
 south end of the island, still called " The Battery." 
 Clinton followed his orders, sailed southward, visited 
 Lord Dunniore in Chesapeake Bay, joined Earl Cornwal- 
 lis at Wilmington, N.C., in May, on the arrival of that 
 officer from Ireland, and took part with him in the 
 operations against Fort Sullivan (afterwards Fort Moul- 
 trie) near Charleston, during the succeeding summer. 
 
 Lee, ever arrogating to himself supreme command, 
 whenever detached, placed the Connecticut volunteers 
 whom he accompanied to New York upon a Continental 
 basis of service. In this he deliberately exceeded his 
 authority and came into direct collision with Congress, 
 which had ordered one of the regiments to be disbanded ; 
 and offended the New York patriots, whom he characterized 
 as the " accursed Provincial Congress of New York." His 
 action received the official disapproval of Washington ; 
 and the visit of a Committee of Congress accommodated the 
 formal occupation by the Colonial troops to the judgment 
 of all well-disposed citizens. In no respect was the 
 episode of Lee s temporary command a reflection upon 
 the patriotism of the citizens. He was ordered to the 
 south ; and in the attack upon Fort Sullivan and the 
 
86 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 preparation of Charleston for defence he gave much good 
 advice, but had to be repressed and controlled all the 
 time by President liutledge, who was as resolute as 
 Washington himself in the discharge of public duty once 
 confided to his trust. The attitude of South Carolina, at 
 this time, deserves special mention, and it has hardly 
 received sufficient recognition in the development of the 
 United States. Without waiting for the united action of 
 the Colonies this State declared its own independence 
 as a sovereign republic. John liutledge Avas elected as 
 President, with Henry Laurens as Yice-President, and 
 William H. Drayton as Chief Justice. An army and 
 navy were authorized ; a Privy Council and Assembly 
 were also elected ; the issue of six hundred thousand dol 
 lars of paper money was authorized, as well as the issue 
 of coin. It was the first republic in the New World to 
 perfect the organization of an independent State. 
 
 When Lee was ordered southward, General Thomas had 
 been ordered to Canada ; and the first act of Washington, 
 after his arrival at New York, was the enforced deple 
 tion of his command by the detail of four battalions as a 
 reinforcement to the army in Canada. These he sent by 
 water to Albany, "to ease the men of fatigue." He also 
 sent five hundred barrels of provisions to Schuyler s com 
 mand on the twenty-second. 
 
 The activity of the army about headquarters aroused 
 the royalist element and prompt action became necessary. 
 Washington addressed a letter to the New York Commit 
 tee of Safety, directing that further correspondence with 
 the enemy must cease, closing as follows : " We must 
 consider ourselves in a state of war, or peace, with Great 
 Britain." He enforced these views with emphasis. 
 
 Late at night, on the twenty-fifth, an order was received 
 from Congress directing him to send six additional battal 
 ions to Canada, requesting also an immediate report as 
 
SYSTEMATIC WAR WITH BRITAIN BEGUN. 87 
 
 to "whether still additional regiments could be spared for 
 that purpose." General Sullivan accompanied this divi 
 sion ; and with him were such men as Stark, Reed, AVayne, 
 and Irvine. In reply to Congress, Washington stated 
 that "by this division of forces there was danger that 
 neither army, that sent to Canada and that kept at New 
 York, would be sufficient, because Great Britain would 
 both attempt to relieve Canada and capture New York, 
 both being of the greatest importance to them, if they 
 have the men." 
 
 On the twenty-eighth day of April the whole army in 
 New York amounted to ten thousand two hundred and 
 thirty-five men, of whom eight thousand three hundred 
 and three were present and fit for duty. Washington s 
 Orderly Book, of this period, rebukes certain disorderly 
 conduct of the soldiers in these memorable words : " Men 
 are not to carve out remedies for themselves. If they are 
 injured in any respect, there are legal ways to obtain 
 relief, and just complaints will always be attended to and 
 redressed." 
 
 At this time, Rhode Island called for protection of her 
 threatened ports, and two regiments of her militia were 
 taken into Continental Pay. Washington was also advised 
 that Great Britain had contracted with various European 
 States for military contingents ; that the sentiment in 
 Canada had changed to antipathy, and that continual dis 
 aster attended all operations in that department. On the 
 twenty-fourth he wrote to Schuyler : " We expect a very 
 bloody summer at Canada and New York ; as it is there, 
 I presume, that the great efforts of the enemy will be 
 aimed ; and I am. very sorry to say that we are not, in 
 men and arms, prepared for it." 
 
 General Putnam was placed in command at New York, 
 and General Greene took charge of the defences on 
 Brooklyn Heights and of their completion. On the first 
 
88 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 day of June Congress resolved that six thousand addi 
 tional troops should be employed from Massachusetts, 
 New Hampshire, Connecticut, and New York, to reenforce 
 the army in Canada, and that two thousand Indians should 
 be hired for this same field of service. To this proposi 
 tion General Schuyler keenly replied : " If this number, 
 two thousand, can be prevented from joining 1 the enemy, 
 it is more than can be expected." 
 
 As early as the fifteenth of February Congress had 
 appointed Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Chase, and Charles 
 Carroll, as Commissioners to visit Canada and learn both 
 the exact condition of the army and the temper of the 
 people Rev. John Carroll, afterwards Archbishop of 
 Maryland, accompanied them, and reported that r? negli 
 gence, mismanagement, and a combination of unlucky 
 incidents had produced a disorder that it was too late to 
 remedy." Ill-health compelled the immediate return of 
 Franklin, but the other Commissioners remained until the 
 evacuation of Canada. The scourge of small-pox, to 
 which General Thomas became a victim, and other dis 
 eases, together with the casualties of the service, had cost 
 more than five thousand lives within two months, and the 
 constant change of commanders, ordered by Congress, 
 hastened the Canadian campaign to a crisis. Scattered 
 all the way from Albany to Montreal there could have 
 been found companies of the regiments which Congress 
 had started for Canada, and which Washington and the 
 country could so poorly spare at such an eventful and 
 threatening period. General Sullivan had been succeeded 
 by General Gates, but with no better results. Sullivan 
 had under-estimated the British forces, and when apprised 
 of the facts, of which the American Commander-in-Chief 
 had not been advised in time, he wrote : " I now only 
 think of a glorious death, or a victory obtained against 
 superior numbers." The following letter of Washington 
 
SYSTEMATIC WAR WITH BRITAIiY BEGUN. 89 
 
 addressed to Congress, enclosing letters intimating the 
 
 desire of General Sullivan to have larger command, indi 
 ct 
 
 cates Washington s judgment of the situation, and is in 
 harmony with his habitual discernment of men and the 
 times throughout the war. He says: "He (Sullivan) is 
 active, spirited, and zealously attached to our cause. He 
 has his wants and his foibles. The latter are manifested 
 in his little tincture of vanity which now and then leads 
 him into embarrassments. His wants are common to us 
 all. He wants experience, to move on a large scale ; for 
 the limited and contracted knowledge which anv of us 
 
 O f 
 
 have in military matters, stands in very little stead, and 
 is quickly overbalanced by sound judgment and some 
 acquaintance with men and books, especially when accom 
 panied by an enterprising genius, which I must do Gen 
 eral Sullivan the justice to say, I think he possesses. 
 Congress will therefore determine upon the propriety of 
 continuing him in Canada, or sending another, as they 
 shall see fit." 
 
 Already the St. Lawrence river was open to naviga 
 tion. On the first of June, General Riedesel arrived with 
 troops from Brunswick, and General Burgoyne with 
 troops from Ireland, swelling the command of General 
 Carleton to an aggregate of nine thousand nine hundred 
 and eighty-four effective men ; and British preparations 
 were at once made to take the offensive, and expel the 
 American force from Canada. Before the last of June 
 the " invasion of Canada " came to an end, and the rem 
 nants of the army, which had numbered more than ten 
 thousand men, returned, worn out, dispirited, and 
 beaten. 
 
 Washington had been stripped of troops and good offi 
 cers at a most critical period, against his remonstrance ; 
 and Congress accounted for the disaster by this brief 
 record : " Undertaken too late in the fall ; enlistments 
 
90 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 too short ; the haste which forced immature expeditions 
 for fear there would be no men to undertake them, and 
 the small-pox. 
 
 Gradually the principal officers and many of the return 
 ing troops joined the army at New York. The occupation 
 of New York, the fortification and defence of Brooklyn 
 Heights, the tardy withdrawal of the army to Harlem 
 Heights, with a constant and stubborn resistance to the 
 advancing British army and its menacing ships-of-war, 
 have always been treated as of questionable policy by 
 writers who have not weighed each of those incidents as 
 did Washington, by their effect upon the Continental 
 army, as a whole, and in the light of a distinctly framed 
 plan for the conduct of the war. This plan was har 
 monious and persistently maintained from his assumption 
 of command until the surrender of Cornwallis at York- 
 town, in 1781. 
 
 Operations in Massachusetts, and elsewhere, south as 
 well as north, from the first, proved that the heat of 
 patriotic resistance must be maintained and developed by 
 action ; that, as at Bunker Hill and before Boston, passive 
 armies lose confidence, while active duty, even under 
 high pressure, nerves to bolder courage and more pro 
 nounced vigor. 
 
 The correspondence of Washington and his Reports, as 
 well as letters to confidential friends which have been 
 carefully considered in forming an estimate of his career 
 as a Soldier, evolve propositions that bear upon the 
 operations about New York. The prime factor in the 
 Colonial resistance was, to fix the belief irrevocably in 
 the popular mind, in the very heart of the Colonists, that 
 America could, and would, resist Great Britain, with 
 confidence in success. The inevitable first step was to 
 challenge her mastery of the only base from which she 
 could conduct a successful war. To have declined this 
 
SYSTEMATIC WAR WITH BRITAIN BEGUN. 91 
 
 assertion of Colonial right, or to have wavered as to its 
 enforcement, would have been a practical admission of 
 weakness and the loss of all prestige thus far attained. 
 
 It was well known to Washington that the British 
 Government was so related to Continental rivals that 
 about forty thousand troops would be the extreme limit 
 of her contributions to subdue America. It will appear 
 from official tables, appended to this narrative, that, 
 during the entire war, the British force of every kind, 
 throughout America, exceeded this number slightly in 
 
 o J 
 
 only one year ; and that AVashington s plans, from time 
 to time submitted to Congress, were based upon requisi 
 tions fully competent to meet the largest possible force 
 which could be placed in the field by Great Britain. 
 
 It was further evident that resistance of the first 
 attempt of the British to land, and the reduction of their 
 numbers and supplies, by constant, persistent, and con 
 fident battle, would not only dispirit that army, but 
 equally arouse the spirit of the American army, assure 
 its discipline, and stimulate both Congress and the people 
 to furnish adequate men and means to prosecute the war 
 to success. Prolonged face to face hostilities in and 
 about New York, therefore, indicated not only Wash 
 ington s faith in success, but prolonged the restriction 
 of British operations to a very limited field. 
 
 The Declaration of American Independence, on the 
 Fourth Day of July, 1776, was an emphatic act that 
 enlarged his faith and inspired resistance, upon the plans 
 so carefully matured before that event. And, even if 
 there be taken into account the peculiar circumstances 
 which facilitated the eventual retreat from Brooklyn 
 Heights, it is no less true that the Battle of Long Island, 
 the resistance at Pell s Point, Harlem Heights, White 
 Plains, and about Fort Washington, were characterized 
 by a persistency of purpose and a stubbornness of hand- 
 
92 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 to-hand fighting, which kept his main army practically 
 intact, and enabled him to terminate the campaign of 
 1776 with a master stroke that astounded the world, and 
 challenged the admiration of the best soldiers of that 
 period. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 BRITAIN AGAINST AMERICA. HOWE INVADES NEW YORK. 
 
 IN order rightly to measure the American War for 
 & 
 Independence by fixed standards, it is both interest 
 ing and instructive to notice the systematic method 
 adopted by Great Britain to suppress revolution and 
 restore her supremacy over the revolting Colonies. The 
 recovery of Boston was no longer to be seriously con 
 sidered ; but New England, as a strong and populous 
 centre of disaffection, must still be so restricted through 
 her coast exposure as to prevent her proportionate con 
 tribution to the Continental army at New York. If 
 threatened from the north, New York also would be 
 compelled to retain a large force of fully equipped militia 
 for frontier defence. The occupation of Newport, R.I., 
 which was only one day s forced march from Boston, 
 together with the patrol of Long Island Sound by ships- 
 of-war, would therefore be positive factors in both limit 
 ing a draft and the transportation of troops from Massa 
 chusetts. If to this were added the control of the Hudson 
 River, by a competent fleet, the whole of New England 
 would be cut oft from actively supporting the forces to 
 be raised in the Middle Colonies. 
 
 The fiery spirit and patriotic fervor of Virginia, as well 
 as the lusty vigor of North Carolina and other Southern 
 patriots, must also be subjected to a military surveillance 
 and pressure from the sea, and thus, equally with New 
 England, be deprived of a free and full contribution of 
 its proper quota to the American army. 
 
 93 
 
94 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 The three sections named, using Xew York as the base 
 of all British demonstrations in force, represented so 
 many radiating belts, or zones, of military operation ; 
 and to secure ultimate British success, each of these zones 
 must be so occupied in its own defence that a force from 
 New York could be thrown with overwhelming effect upon 
 each, in turn, and thus render it practically impossible- 
 for Washington to concentrate an effective army of re 
 sistance to each assailing column. To the southward, 
 the waters of Delaware and Chesapeake bays, if once occu 
 pied by a sufficient fleet, would sever the lower Colonies 
 from the American centre of service, as effectively as 
 those of Long Island and the Hudson River Avould isolate 
 New England. This was a sound military policy, and 
 had been fully adopted so soon as Lord Howe received 
 reinforcements and recovered breath after his severe 
 punishment at Boston. 
 
 The adoption of New York as the base of all British 
 supply, as well as service, not only had its central and 
 dominating site for the rendezvous, equipment, and 
 despatch of troops, but through its auxiliary naval sta 
 tions at Halifax and the West Indies, afforded opportu 
 nities for expeditions where large land forces were not 
 required, and still keep such threatened localities under 
 constant terror of assault. 
 
 These considerations will have their better apprecia 
 tion as the progress of the narrative unfolds successive 
 campaigns. 
 
 Sooner or later, in order to achieve absolute independ 
 ence, and vanquish Great Britain in the fight, the Ameri 
 can army must so neutralize the domination of New York, 
 that its occupation by either army ivould cease to be the 
 determining factor in the final result of the luar. 
 
 The prestige of Great Britain was overshadowing ; 
 but could its arm reach the range of its shadow ? Her 
 
BRITAIN AGAINST AMERICA. 95 
 
 fleets were many and mighty, but so were those of her 
 jealous foes across the British Channel. Her armies in 
 America must be adequate for operations in each of the 
 zones mentioned, and be constantly supplied with muni 
 tions of war and every other accessory of successful field 
 service. And, on the other hand, the American army, 
 almost wholly dependent upon land transportation and 
 hard marching, must have a correspondingly larger force, 
 or fail to concentrate and fight upon equal terms with its 
 adversary. 
 
 The British Government having adopted a sound mili 
 tary policy, so soon as the object lessons of Lexington, 
 Bunker Hill, and their expulsion from Boston unveiled 
 their dull vision, did not fail to realize the necessity for 
 an army strong enough to meet the full requirements of 
 that policy. Forty regiments were assigned to the 
 American service. 1 But the militia of New England had 
 already driven twenty battalions (half the number) 
 from its coast. AYashington was no careless observer of 
 European conditions, nor of the straitened nature of 
 the British army organization, however superior to rivals 
 on the sea. His deliberate conviction, ever a rallying 
 force to his faith in deepest peril, that Britain could 
 never spare more than one more army as large as the 
 garrison of Boston, was the result of almost literal in 
 sight of the practical resources at her command. Hence, 
 that Government contracted with petty European princi 
 palities for seventeen thousand men, for immediate deliv 
 ery. These men were impressed and paid wages by their 
 own local princes who speculated on the greater sums to 
 be paid them, per capita, by Great Britain. The former 
 estimate of General Gage, at twenty thousand men, 
 and his significant hint as to the need of more than that 
 force, was no longer ridiculed ; but forty thousand was 
 
 1 See Appendix for regiments designated. 
 
96 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 decided to be the minimum number required for the im 
 mediate prosecution of the war. Taking into account 
 the foreign troops, the British ministry estimated as 
 available for the American service a total, on paper, of 
 fifty-five thousand men. To this was to be added, upon 
 their hopeful estimate, four thousand Canadians, Indians, 
 and royalists. Allowing for every possible shrinkage, on 
 account of weakened regiments and other contingencies, 
 the effective force was officially placed at forty thousand 
 men. 
 
 Two facts are significant in connection with this spe 
 cious estimate of the British army. If the drain of this 
 forcible conscription upon the industry of Hesse-Cassel 
 and Hanau had been applied to England and Wales, at 
 that date, it would have raised an army of four hundred 
 thousand men ; and yet, Britain did not venture to draw 
 from her own subjects, at home, for the defence of her 
 own Crown. 
 
 Washington rightly conceived that the whole scheme 
 would divide the sentiment of the British people, and 
 that the success even of these mercenary troops, against 
 their own blood in America, would prove no source of 
 pride or congratulation. It was his intense love of 
 English liberty, exhibited in its history, that undergirded 
 his soul with sustaining faith in American liberty ; and 
 he read the hearts of the English people aright. 
 
 He did not wait long for its echo. The Duke of Rich 
 mond used this emphatic and prophetic utterance : " An 
 army of foreigners is now to be introduced into the 
 British dominion ; not to protect them from invasion, 
 not to deliver them from the ravages of a hostile army, 
 but to assist one-half of the inhabitants in massacring 
 the other. Unprovided with a sufficient number of 
 troops for the cruel purpose ; or, unable to prevail upon 
 the natives of the country [England] to lend their hands 
 
BRITAIN AGAINST AMERICA. 97 
 
 to such a sanguinary business, Ministers have applied to 
 those foreign princes who trade in human blood, and 
 have hired mercenaries for the work of destruction." 
 His closing sentence foreshadowed the alliance of Amer 
 ica with Louis XVI., of France. It reads thus: "The 
 Colonies themselves, after our example, will apply to 
 strangers for assistance." 
 
 This British army was designed for four distinct, and 
 as nearly as possible, concurrent, operations : one through 
 Canada, down the Hudson River to Albany and New York, 
 with divergent pressure upon New England and central 
 New York ; one to occupy Newport, R.I. ; the third to 
 control New York City and its related territory in New 
 Jersey ; and the fourth against representative centres 
 at the South. 
 
 Reference has been made to the anxiety expressed by 
 Washington as early as February, 1776, lest the siege of 
 Boston might be protracted until Britain could invade the 
 other colonies, particularly New York, with an over 
 whelming retentive force. As a fact, only surmised 
 and not known by him for weeks, Sir Peter Parker and 
 Earl Cornwallis were ready to start from Cork, Ireland, 
 by the twentieth of January ; but did not sail until the 
 thirteenth of February, and then the transports and ships 
 were so buffeted by storms, and driven back for refitting, 
 as not to reach Wilmington, N.C., until the third day of 
 May. Here, as before indicated, he was joined by Gen 
 eral Clinton, and both had the suggestive lesson of 
 American courage in their repulse by the brave Moultrie, 
 at Charleston, on the twenty-eighth of June. 
 
 And now we are to consider Washington s reception of 
 the most formidable of these expeditions. 
 
 General Howe sailed from Halifax on the tenth of June 
 with one hundred and twenty square-rigged vessels be 
 sides smaller craft ; and on the fifth day of July the entire 
 
98 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 force, amounting to nine thousand two hundred men, 
 was landed upon Staten Island, in the lower bay of 
 New York. During the voyage two transports were 
 captured by American privateers, and General Sir Will 
 iam Erskine, with a part of the seventy-first Highland 
 Regiment, were made prisoners. The incident is worthy 
 of notice as materially affecting the correspondence 
 between Washington and General Howe, shortly after 
 the event. 
 
 General Howe reached Sandy Hook in the despatch 
 frigate "Greyhound," on the twenty-fifth of June, and 
 held a secret conference with Governor Tryon, on ship 
 board. His fleet first cast anchor at Gravesend Cove, 
 July 1st, but after conference Avith Governor Tryon, he 
 changed his purpose. He would be too near Washing 
 ton. He wrote to Lord Germaine on July 8th as fol 
 lows : " He declined to land, as being so near the front 
 of the enemy s works. It would be too hazardous, until 
 the arrival of the troops with Commodore Holthani, daily 
 expected. He was also waiting for the return of General 
 Clinton, and deemed it best to defer the possession of 
 Rhode Island until the arrival of the second embarkation 
 from Europe, unless Carleton should penetrate early into 
 this province [New York] ." The letter thus closes : " As 
 I must esteem an impression upon the enemy s principal 
 force collected in this quarter to be the first object of 
 my attention, I shall hold it steadily in view without 
 losing sight of those which may be only considered 
 collateral." 
 
 Admiral Lord Richard Howe arrived on July 12th with 
 a powerful squadron and one hundred and fifty transports 
 filled with troops. On the thirteenth a communication 
 was despatched to George Washington, Esqr., on behalf 
 of the Brothers Howe, Commissioners, proposing terms 
 of peace. Washington, in a letter to Schuyler, face- 
 
BRITAIN AGAINST AMERICA. 99 
 
 tiously styled these gentlemen " Commissioners to dis 
 pense pardon to repenting sinners." Howe s Adjutant- 
 General, Patterson, called upon General Washington, on 
 the twentieth of July, respecting the exchange of prison 
 ers, especially General Erskine, and, " purely to effect 
 the exchange of these prisoners," addressed Washington 
 by his military title. 
 
 Generals Clinton and Cornwallis, repulsed at Charles 
 ton, arrived August first, and Commodore Holthani, 
 having arrived on the twelfth, landed twenty-six hundred 
 British troops, eight thousand four hundred Hessians, 
 and camp equipage for the entire army. On the fifteenth 
 Sir Peter Parker arrived with twenty-four sail from the 
 south. 
 
 The British army thus encamped on Staten Island 
 numbered, all told, thirty-one thousand six hundred and 
 twenty-five men. The effective force, for duty, was 
 twenty-six thousand nine hundred and eight, of which 
 number twenty thousand accompanied General Howe to 
 the attack upon Brooklyn Heights. This was the largest 
 army under one command during the war. 
 
 Washington was fully advised of every movement, and 
 the Proclamation of Commissioner Howe to the people 
 was circulated with his full approval. Sensational rumors 
 were as common then as in modern times. As late as the 
 nineteenth of August General Roberdeau notified Wash 
 ington, in all seriousness, that "a post-rider had told him, 
 with great confidence, that General Howe had proposed 
 to retire with the fleet and army, and was willing to settle 
 the present dispute on any terms asked by Washington : 
 that this came from an officer who was willing to swear 
 to it ; but as it might have a tendency to lull the inhabi 
 tants, he made it the subject of an express." This was 
 based upon another false rumor, that England and France 
 were at war. Such " recklessness of gossip-mongers " 
 
100 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 received from Washington a scorching rebuke which he 
 declared to be the " more important, since many of those 
 who opposed the war, on account of business relations 
 with the British authorities, were most active in words, 
 while lacking in courage to take up arms on either side." 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. 
 
 ONLY a summary analysis of the Battle of Long 
 Island is required for explanation of the general 
 operations indicated upon the map. Almost every hour 
 had its incidents of eventful interest, and few historic 
 battles, from its first conception to the ultimate result, 
 more strikingly illustrate the influence of one regardful 
 judgment which could convert unpromising features into 
 conditions of final benefit. The value of military disci 
 pline, of presence of mind, and the subordination of every 
 will to one ruling spirit, never had a more definite illus 
 tration. 1 The infinite value of small details, in prepara 
 tion for and the conduct of so serious a venture as to 
 meet this great British army, is exhibited at every phase 
 of its progress. 
 
 The American army contrasted unfavorably with its 
 adversary in every respect. Although the British forces, 
 and generally the American forces employed during the 
 years of the war, are to be found stated in the Appendix, 
 the official roll of Washington s army, on this occasion, 
 will add interest to the event. 
 
 On the third of August its strength was as follows : Com 
 missioned officers and staff, twelve hundred and twenty- 
 five ; non-commissioned officers, fifteen hundred and two ; 
 present for duty, ten thousand five hundred and fourteen ; 
 sick, present and absent, three thousand six hundred 
 
 1 See " Battles of the Revolution," Chapter XXXI. 
 101 
 
102 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 and seventy-eight : making a total of seventeen thousand 
 two hundred and twenty-five men. 
 
 Less than one-third of this force had served from the 
 beginning of the war. The artillery battalion of Colonel 
 Knox numbered less than six hundred men, and the guns 
 themselves w T ere of various patterns and calibre, to be 
 handled by men who knew little of their use or range. 
 On the fifth of August Governor Trumbull of Connecticut 
 assured Washington that " he did not greatly dread what 
 the enemy could do, trusting Heaven to support us, 
 knowing our cause to be righteous." Washington s 
 reply, dated the seventh, was characteristic and practical : 
 "To trust in the justice of our cause, without our utmost 
 exertion, would be tempting Providence." Although 
 Trumbull had already sent five regiments forward, he 
 soon sent nine additional regiments, averaging about 
 three hundred men each, in time to be present when the 
 British eventually landed in Westchester County. 
 
 Two regiments under Colonel Prescott, of Bunker Hill 
 fame, were on duty upon Governor s Island. The works 
 on Long Island, begun by General Lee, had been com 
 pleted by General Greene, who had explored the country 
 thoroughly and knew the range of every piece. A 
 redoubt with seven guns crowned the Heights. The 
 exposed point of Red Hook, a combination of marsh and 
 solid land, was supplied with five guns. The intrench- 
 ments, more than a half mile in length, were protected by 
 abatis and four redoubts which mounted twenty guns. 
 Greene occupied these redoubts and lines with two regi 
 ments of Long Island militia and six regiments of Con 
 tinental troops, not one of which exceeded four hundred 
 men, for duty. The line extended from Wallabout, the 
 present Navy Yard, to Gowanus Bay. 
 
 The total nominal strength of the American army about 
 New York on the twenty-sixth of August, including the 
 
BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. ion 
 
 sick, non-effectives, and those without arms, was a little 
 over twenty-seven thousand men. The Connecticut 
 regiments which had just joined brought such arms as 
 they could provide for themselves, and were simply that- 
 many citizens with nominal organization, but without 
 drill. 
 
 Meanwhile, the entire line from Brooklyn to King s 
 Bridge, fifteen miles, with the navigable waters of the 
 Hudson, the Harlem, and East rivers, and their shore 
 approaches, had to be guarded. It was not entirely 
 certain but that Howe simply feigned an attack upon the 
 intrenched position upon the Heights, to draw thither 
 Washington s best troops, and take the city by water 
 approach. Paulus Hook, then an island, was fortified in 
 a measure, but was unable to prevent the passage of two 
 vessels which at once cut off water communication with 
 Albany and the northern American army. 
 
 Washington had previously issued orders for the govern 
 ment of sharp-shooters ; and particularly, " not to throw 
 away fire. To fire first with ball and shot." This order 
 had its specific significance, and was illustrated in the 
 Mexican War, and early in 1861, in America. " Buck- 
 and-ball" scattered its missiles, and wounded many who 
 would be missed by a single rifle-shot ; and the wounded 
 required details of others for their care or removal. " Brig 
 adiers were ordered to mark a circle around the several 
 redoubts, by which officers are to be directed in giving 
 orders for the first discharge." He also ordered "small 
 brush to be set up, to mark the line more distinctly, and 
 make it familiar to the men, before the enemy arrive within 
 the circle." 
 
 The reader will recall the experience of a Washington in 
 his early career, when similar methods made his success 
 so emphatic. 
 
 When advised of the landing of the British on the twenty- 
 
104 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 second, and that Colonel Hand had retired to Prospect 
 Hill (now Prospect Park), Washington sent six regi 
 ments to reenforce the garrison of the Heights. Orders 
 were also sent to General Heath, then at the head of 
 Manhattan Island, to be prepared to forward additional 
 troops ; and five regiments from the city force were ready 
 to cross East River so soon as it should be determined 
 whether the attack was to be made, in force, against the 
 Heights. 
 
 General Greene, prostrated with fever, had written on 
 the fifteenth, that " he hoped, through the assistance of 
 Providence, to be able to ride before an attack should be 
 made, but felt great anxiety as to the result." On the 
 twenty-third, Washington was compelled to write to Con 
 gress, " I have been compelled to appoint General Sullivan 
 to the command of the island, owing to General Greene s 
 indisposition." In a letter written by Sullivan, on the 
 twenty-third, respecting a minor skirmish after the British 
 landing, when Hand retired, he said : " I have ordered a 
 party out for prisoners to-night. Things argue well for 
 us, and I hope are so many preludes to victory." This 
 confidence was hardly less unfounded than his faith in the 
 success of operations in Canada. It was the inverse of 
 sound reason, and made the " less include the greater." 
 He was immediately superseded, and General Putnam was 
 placed in command. 
 
 The following are some of Washington s orders issued 
 to General Putnam on the twenty-sixth of August, when 
 it seemed as if only his omnipresence could compel even 
 general officers to understand their responsibility for the 
 good behavior of the troops : 
 
 " Stop the scattering, unmeaning, and wasteful firing, 
 which prevents the possibility of distinguishing between 
 a real and a false alarm, which prevents deserters from 
 
BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. 105 
 
 approaching our lines, and must continue, so long as 
 every soldier conceives himself at liberty to fire when, 
 and at what, he pleases." 
 
 " Guards are to be particularly instructed in their 
 duty." 
 
 " A brigadier of the day is to remain constantly on 
 the lines, that he may be upon the spot, and see that 
 orders are executed." 
 
 " Skulkers must be shot down upon the spot." 
 
 ff The distinction between a well-regulated army and a 
 mob, is the good order and discipline of the former, and 
 the licentiousness and disorderly behavior of the latter." 
 
 tf The men not on duty are to be compelled to remain 
 at, or near, their respective camps or quarters, that they 
 may turn out at a moment s warning ; nothing being more 
 probable than that the enemy will allow little time enough 
 for the attack." 
 
 rf Your best men should at all hazards prevent the 
 enemy passing the woods and approaching your works." 
 
 These orders were preeminently adapted to the char 
 acter of the American troops. Their neglect disconcerted 
 the entire plan of the Commander-in-Chief for an efficient 
 defence of the works. 
 
 The American force on the Heights, including Stirling s 
 Brigade, which crossed over the river to Brooklyn on the 
 day of the battle, was not quite eight thousand men ; 
 but included Atlee s Pennsylvania Rifles, Small wood s 
 Maryland and Haslet s Delaware regiments, which then, 
 and ever after, were among Washington s " Invincibles." 
 But notwithstanding Greene s designation of suitable 
 outposts, and Washington s orders, the disposition of the 
 American advance outposts was of the feeblest kind. At 
 the time of the first landing on the twenty-second; when 
 Colonel Hand fell back to Prospect Hill (see map), it 
 
106 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 does not appear from any official paper, or record, that 
 he <rave notice of the landing of the second British divi- 
 
 o D 
 
 sion, or established scouts to ascertain and report subse 
 quent British movements. Their landing, division after 
 division, had been as impressive as it was successful, and 
 deserves notice. Four hundred transports were escorted 
 by ten line-of-battle ships and twenty frigates. Seventy- 
 five flat-boats, besides batteaux and galleys, moving in 
 ten distinct, well-ordered divisions, simultaneously 
 touched the beach near the present site of Fort Hamilton, 
 and landed four thousand men in just two hours, accord 
 ing to the Admiral s " log-book," after the signal reached 
 the topmast of the "flag-ship." Five thousand additional 
 troops were landed with equal celerity and order, a little 
 lower down the bay. Before twelve o clock, fifteen thou 
 sand men, with artillery, baggage, and stores, were landed 
 without hindrance or mishap. On the twenty-fifth, De 
 Heister s Hessian command landed with equal skill at 
 Gravesend. 
 
 A glance at the map indicates that the long range of 
 hills between Brooklyn and the sea had four openings 
 available for approach by the British troops ; the first, 
 and shortest, along the bay by Martense Lane ; the sec 
 ond, in front of Flatbush and the American intrench- 
 ments ; the third, by road northward from Flatbush, to 
 Bedford and Newtown ; and a fourth, by road past Cypress 
 Hill, which extended to Flushing, but crossed the Bedford 
 and Jamaica road about three miles eastward from Bed 
 ford. 
 
 General Stirling, who had been awakened at three 
 o clock on the morning of the twenty-seventh, commanded 
 the extreme American right. In front of Flatbush there 
 were intrenchnients, and one redoubt, with one howitzer 
 and three field-pieces. General Sullivan, second in 
 command, was, he stated after his capture, "to have com- 
 
BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. 107 
 
 manded within the lines ; but went to the hill near to 
 Flatbush, to reconnoitre, with a picket of four hundred 
 men, when he was surrounded by the enemy who had 
 advanced by the very road he had paid horsemen fifty 
 dollars for patrolling by night, while he was in command." 
 Miles Pennsylvania Rifles and Wylie s Connecticut were 
 at, or near, the Bedford Pass. The Jamaica road had 
 been overlooked, or neglected. Putnam, already some 
 what impaired in physical vigor, and wholly unacquainted 
 with the outposts, made neither reconnoissance nor change 
 of pickets, upon receipt of Washington s orders. Instead 
 of feeling for, and finding, the enemy, he awaited their 
 arrival. 
 
 Without full details, the following incidents occurred 
 before Washington arrived and took command in person. 
 The British left wing, under General Grant, crowded Stir 
 ling and his small command of seventeen hundred men 
 back nearly to the Cortelyou House ; but they made a 
 gallant fight near the present Greenwood Cemetery. The 
 battalions of Smallwood, Haslet, and Atlee covered 
 themselves with honors. Stirling heard the firing at 
 
 o O 
 
 Flatbush, and hastened his retreat. 
 
 Cornwallis, upon his first landing, on the twenty-second, 
 moved toward Flatbush, but finding it held by the American 
 advance works, dropped down to Flatlands. De Heister, 
 however, moved directly upon Fiat bush, and commenced 
 cannonading the redoubt and intrenchments, where Sul 
 livan, being incidentally present, was in command. This 
 advance of De Heister was in effect & feint attack, to be 
 made real and persistent at the proper time. 
 
 On the British right, General Howe, with Clinton, 
 Percy, and Cornwallis, gained the Jamaica road undiscov 
 ered, rested their forces until half-past eight in the morn 
 ing, and were soon directly in front of the American works, 
 in the rear of Sullivan and cutting off his retreat. Corn- 
 
108 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 wallis gained position near the Cortelyou House, in the 
 line of Stirling s retreat. De Heister, advised by Clin 
 ton s guns that the British right had accomplished its 
 flank movement, advanced promptly upon both Sullivan 
 and Stirling, and captured both, with a considerable 
 portion of their commands. 
 
 The Battle of Long Island had been fought. Wash 
 ington had declared that he would make the acquisition 
 of Brooklyn Heights by the British, if realized, " as costly 
 as possible." It had been his expectation that by the ad 
 vance posts ordered, and careful pickets, he could prolong 
 resistance, if not winning full success. He had taken 
 pains to convince the troops that the resistance at Bunker 
 Hill and Fort Moultrie was a fair indication of their abil 
 ity, and that the British troops understood it well. 
 When John Jay proposed to burn New York and leave 
 it in ruins, Washington insisted that it would tend to 
 demoralize his army, and offer to the people and to the 
 world a painful contrast with the successful restoration 
 of Boston to her own people. 
 
 The Battle of Long Island had to be fought. As soon 
 as it began, Washington crossed the river with three regi 
 ments. If Howe had made immediate advance, Washing 
 ton would have resisted, with quite as large a force as 
 Howe could have handled, in an assault. 
 
 Washington immediately, and in person, examined 
 every phase of the situation. His first act was to organ 
 ize a strong detachment to support Stirling who was 
 opposing the advance by the harbor road ; but the swift 
 advance of the British Grenadiers across the very face of 
 the intrenchments, defeated his purpose. Every man 
 was summoned to roll-call and kept on the alert. At 
 early dawn the next morning he went through all the in 
 trenchments, encouraging the men. Before noon, General 
 Mifflin arrived with the well-drilled regiments of Glover, 
 
BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. 109 
 
 Shaw, and Magee. These organizations, which had been 
 sneered at as " proud of iine arms and fine feathers," as 
 they marched up the ascent with solid ranks and steady 
 step, supplied with knapsacks, and trim as if on special 
 parade, were received by the garrison with cheers and 
 congratulations. The garrison was now nine thousand 
 strong. But a "north-easter" set in. The rain fell in 
 torrents, filling the trenches, and compelling even the 
 British regulars to keep to the shelter of their tents. 
 Washington was everywhere, and took no sleep. The 
 British opened trenches six hundred yards from the face 
 of Fort Putnam (now Washington Park), not daring 
 to storm the position ; but could work only during inter 
 vals in the tempest. 
 
 Washington held his enemy at bay. But upon the 
 same reasoning which enforced his first occupation of 
 Brooklyn Heights, boldly facing the British army at its 
 first landing, he resolved to evacuate the position with 
 out decisive battle. His fixed policy, to avoid posi 
 tively determining issues which were beyond his im 
 mediate mastery, so as to wear out his adversary by 
 avoiding his strokes, and thereby gain vantage-ground 
 for turning upon him when worn out, over-confident, 
 and off his guard, had its illustration now. His army 
 was not versed in tactical movements upon a large scale, 
 and was largely dependent for its success upon the super 
 vising wisdom with which its undoubted courage could 
 be made available in the interests of the new Nation. 
 
 The retreat from Brooklyn was a signal achievement, 
 characteristic of Washington s policy and of the men who 
 withdrew under his guidance. They were kept closely 
 to duty, as if any hour might command their utmost 
 energies in self-defence ; but their Conimander-in-Chief 
 had his own plan, as before Boston, which he did not 
 reveal to his officers until it was ripe for execution. How 
 
HO WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 well he kept his own counsel will be seen by his action. 
 The military ruse by which he achieved the result had its 
 climax five years later, when he so adroitly persuaded Sir 
 Henry Clinton of immediate danger to New York, that 
 the capture of Cor nw alii s closed the Avar, and the sur 
 render of New York followed. And as the month of 
 August, 1776, was closing, Generals Clinton and Cornwal- 
 lis were reckoning, by hours, upon the capture of Wash 
 ington s army and the restoration of British supremacy 
 over the American continent. 
 
 Early on the morning of the twenty-ninth day of 
 August, the following private note was placed in the 
 hands of General Heath, then commanding at Kings- 
 bridge, by General Mifflin, the confidential messenger of 
 the American Commander-in-Chief : 
 
 LONG ISLAND, Aug. 29, 1776. 
 
 DEAR GENERAL : We have many battalions from New Jersey 
 which are coming over to relieve others here. You will therefore 
 please to order every flat-bottomed boat and other craft at your post, 
 fit for transporting troops, down to New York, as soon as possible. 
 They must be manned by some of Colonel Hutchinson s men, and 
 sent without the least delay. I write by order of the General. 
 
 MIFFLIN. 
 To MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH. 
 
 Commissary-General Trumbull, also, at the same time, 
 bore orders to Assistant Quartermaster-General Hughes, 
 instructing him "to impress every craft, on either side 
 of New York, that could be kept afloat, and had either 
 oars, or sails, or could be furnished with them, and 
 to have them all in the East River by dark." The 
 response to these orders was so promptly made that the 
 boats reached the foot of Brooklyn Heights just at dusk 
 that afternoon. An early evening conference of officers 
 was ordered, and Washington announced his plan for 
 immediate return to New York. The proposition was 
 
BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. HI 
 
 unanimously adopted. The Commander-in-Chief acted 
 instantly. By eight o clock the troops were under arms. 
 The fresh and experienced regiments were sent to man 
 the advance works, to relieve the weary troops, including 
 the militia. The sick were promptly gathered for the 
 earliest removal. Every indication promised immediate 
 action ; and intimations were disseminated among the 
 troops that as soon as the sick and inefficient troops were 
 withdrawn, a sortie would be made, in force, against 
 Howe s investing works. The ruse of anticipated ree n- 
 forcements from New Jersey, upon removal of the invalids, 
 cheered both sick and well. No possible method of in 
 spiring self-possession and courage for any endeavor 
 could have been more wisely designed* 
 
 Colonel Glover, of Marblehead, Mass., whose regi 
 ment was composed of hardy fishermen and seamen, 
 had charge of the boats. The regiments last recruited, 
 and least prepared for battle, and the sick, were the first 
 to be withdrawn. As early as nine o clock, and within 
 an hour after the " general beat to arms," the movement 
 began, systematically, steadily, company by company, 
 as orderly as if marching in their own camp. A fearful 
 storm still raged. Drenched and weary, none complained. 
 It was Washington s orders. Often hand-in-hand, to 
 support each other, these men descended the steep, slip 
 pery slopes to the water s edge, and seated themselves in 
 silence ; while increasing wind and rain, with incessant 
 violence, constantly threatened to flood, or sink, the mis 
 erable flat-boats which were to convey them to the city, 
 only a few hundred yards away. And thus until mid 
 night. At that hour the wind and tide became so violent 
 that no vessel could carry even a closely reefed sail. The 
 larger vessels, in danger of being swept out to sea, had 
 to be held fast to shore ; dashing against each other, 
 and with difficulty kept afloat. Other boats > with muffled 
 
112 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 oars, were desperately but slowly propelled against the 
 outgoing tide. A few sickly lanterns here and there 
 made movement possible. The invisible presence of the 
 Commander-in-Chief seemed to resolve all clangers and 
 apparent confusion into some pervasive harmony of 
 purpose among officers and men alike, so that neither 
 leaking boats nor driving storm availed to disconcert the 
 silent progress of embarking nearly ten thousand men. . 
 
 Just after midnight, both wind and tide changed. The 
 storm from the north which had raged thus long, kept 
 the British fleets at their anchorage in the lower bay. 
 At last, with the clearing of the sky and change of 
 wind, the water became smooth, and the craft of all kinds 
 and sizes, loaded to the water s edge, made rapid prog 
 ress. Meanwhile, strange to relate, a heavy fog rested 
 over the lower bay and island, while the peninsula of 
 New York was under clear starlight. 
 
 For a few moments, toward morning, a panic nearly 
 ensued. An order to hasten certain troops to the river 
 was misunderstood as applying to all troops, including 
 those in the redoubts ; and a rumor that the British were 
 advancing, and had entered the works, led even the cover 
 ing-party to fall back. Washington instantly saw the 
 error, restored the men to their places, and the British 
 pickets never discovered their temporary absence. 
 
 The military stores, and such guns as were not too 
 heavy to be taken through the mud, were safely placed 
 on the transports. With the last load, Mitiiin, and last 
 of all, Washington, took passage. 
 
 During the day, the troops and stores on Governor s 
 Island were also removed ; and the evacuation was com 
 plete. If the landing often thousand disciplined troops 
 by General Howe, on the twenty-second, over a placid 
 sea, and in bright sunlight, was magnificent for its beauty 
 and system, the safe embarkation of ten thousand men 
 
BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND. 113 
 
 by Washington, on the night of the twenty-ninth, was 
 sublime for the implicit faith of the soldiers and the 
 supreme potency of his commanding will. 
 
 The Italian historian Botta says of this event : " Who 
 ever will attend to all the details of this retreat, will 
 easily believe that no military operation was ever con 
 ducted by great captains with more ability and prudence, 
 or under more favorable auspices." 
 
 At daybreak of the thirtieth, British pickets entered 
 the American works ; and the most advanced were enabled 
 to fire a few shots at the last American detachment as 
 it landed safely upon the New York side. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 WASHINGTON IN NEW YORK. 
 
 "TITTASHINGTON S labors were neither lessened nor 
 
 V V interrupted when he assembled his army on the 
 thirtieth day of August, 17 76. He had been in the saddle 
 or on foot, without sleep, for more than forty-eight hours ; 
 and it would require a large volume even to outline the 
 mass of minute details which had to receive his attention. 
 His own account, as contained in private letters, can be 
 summed up in suggestive groups such as, "tools care 
 lessly strewn about" ; " cartridges exposed to the rain" ; 
 and, " the soldiers, too often the officers, ignorant as 
 children of the responsibility of a single sentry or gunner, 
 wherever located, along rampart or trench." 
 
 On the evening of the thirtieth, he thus described the 
 situation : " The militia are dismayed, intractable, and 
 impatient to return home. Great numbers have gone 
 off; in some instances almost by whole regiments, by 
 half ones, and by companies, at a time. With the deep 
 est concern I am obliged to confess my want of confidence 
 with the generality of the troops." 
 
 He urged Congress to establish a regular army at once ; 
 to enlist men for the war ; pressed the immediate aban 
 donment of the city, and put the plain question, whether 
 it " should be left standing for British headquarters." 
 
 On the second day of September, the number of men 
 present for duty was less than twenty thousand. On the 
 same day he reorganized its formation into three grand 
 
 114 
 
WASHINGTON IN NEW YORK. 115 
 
 divisions, or corps : one under Putnam, in command of 
 the city ; one under Spencer, in the absence of Greene, at 
 Harlem, to prevent a British landing there ; and the third 
 under Heath, at King s Bridge. 
 
 On the third of September, Congress ordered two 
 North Carolina battalions, under General Moore, to 
 march with all possible expedition to reenforce the army 
 at New York ; also a Continental battalion from Rhode 
 Island ; and urged Virginia to forward all the troops 
 within her power to furnish. On the same day, Putnam 
 uro;ed the fortification of Harlem Heights, Mount Wash- 
 
 O O 
 
 ington, and the Jersey shore ; if possible, to prevent 
 Howe s ascending the Hudson River to attack the north 
 ern army. On the next day, the fourth, Washington was 
 again compelled to occupy himself with such minute details 
 as belonged to officers of the lowest rank. Such ff diabol 
 ical practices as robbing apple orchards and gardens, and 
 straggling without aim or purpose, instead of drilling 
 and preparing for their country s safety," were officially 
 reprimanded, and three roll-calls per day were advised, 
 to keep the men near their duty. On the fifth of Sep 
 tember, Greene advised a general and speedy retreat from 
 the city, and a council was called to meet on the day 
 succeeding, for consideration of the proposition. The 
 council did convene on the sixth, and Washington 
 thus announces to Congress its action : The Council 
 was opposed to retiring from New York, although they 
 acknowledged that it would not be tenable if attacked by 
 artillery " ; and adds significantly : " Some, to whom the 
 opinion of Congress was known, were not a little influ 
 enced in their opinions, as they were led to suspect that 
 Congress wished it to be retained at all hazards." Gen 
 eral Putnam, in concurring with his Commander-in-Chief, 
 shrewdly observed : "This dooms New York to destruction ; 
 but what are ten or twenty cities, to the grand object?" 
 
116 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 On the eighth, of September, Washington reported the 
 uiilitia of Connecticut as reduced from six thousand to 
 two thousand men ; and in a few days their number was 
 but nominal, twenty or thirty in some regiments. The 
 residue were discharged and sent home with a recommen 
 dation to Governor Trumbull, "that it was about time to 
 begin dealing with deserters." 
 
 Although Washington coticurred in Putnam s general 
 idea of strengthening the Hudson River shore by earth 
 works and redoubts, he anticipated failure to make them 
 adequate for control of its waters, because of the limited 
 power and range of his guns. The British had already 
 extended their right wing as far as Flushing (see map), 
 with posts at Bushwick, Newtown, and Astoria, and had 
 also occupied Montressor and Buchanan s, now Ward s 
 and Randall s islands. 
 
 Upon appeal to Massachusetts, that Colony made a 
 draft of one-fifth of her population, excepting only certain 
 exposed localities and certain classes. Connecticut was no 
 less patriotic, and Governor Trumbull made earnest effort 
 to place the Colony foremost in support of the cause in 
 peril. That Colony, so closely adjoining New York on 
 the west, and exposed on its entire southern boundary 
 to maritime excursions, was peculiarly in danger. On 
 the fourteenth, Congress at last authorized eighty-five 
 regiments to be enlisted for five years ; and the advice of 
 Greene, when he first joined the army in 1775, and of 
 Washington, after assuming command at Cambridge, 
 began to be accepted as sound policy and essential to 
 ultimate success. 
 
 At this stage of the narrative of Washington s career 
 as a Soldier, it is interesting to consider his own views of 
 the situation as expressed in a letter to the Continental 
 Congress. He thus wrote : " Men of discernment will see 
 that by such works and preparations we have delayed the 
 
WASHINGTON IN NEAV YORK. 117 
 
 operations (British) of the campaign till it is too late to 
 effect any capital incursions into the country. It is now 
 obvious that they mean to enclose us on the island of 
 New York, by taking post in my rear, while their ship 
 ping secures the front, and thus oblige us to fight them 
 on their own terms, or surrender at discretion." 
 
 Again, "Every measure is to be formed with some ap 
 prehension that all of our troops will not do their duty. 
 On our side the war should be defensive. It has even 
 been called a r war of posts. We should, on all occasions, 
 avoid a general action, and never be drawn into the 
 necessity to put anything to risk. Persuaded that it 
 would be presumptuous to draw out our young troops 
 into open ground against their superior numbers and 
 discipline, I have never spared the spade and the pick 
 axe ; but I have never found that readiness to defend, 
 even strong posts, at all hazards, which is necessary 
 to derive the greatest benefit from them." 
 
 Again, " I am sensible that a retreating army is 
 encircled with difficulties, that declining an ensrasrement 
 
 O O O 
 
 subjects a general to reproach ; but when the fate of 
 America may be at stake on the issue, we should pro 
 tract the war, if possible. That they can drive us out is 
 equally clear. Nothing seems to remain but the time of 
 their taking possession." 
 
 The thoughtful reader will find these quotations to 
 l)e very suggestive of some future offensive action on 
 the part of Washington whenever the British might 
 be shut up in winter quarters ; and the reply of Congress, 
 whereby they authorize him " not to retain New York 
 longer than he thought proper for the public service," was 
 accompanied by the following Resolution: " That General 
 Washington be acquainted that Congress would have 
 special care taken, in case he should find it necessary 
 to quit New York, that no damage be done to the said 
 
118 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 city by his troops, on their leaving it ; the Congress 
 having no doubt of their being able to recover the same, 
 though the enemy should, for a time, have possession 
 of it." 
 
 The experience of the Continental army before Boston 
 was now repeated. New recruits came in daily, to fill the 
 places made vacant by expiring enlistments ; but again 
 the army seemed to be "fast wasting away." 
 
 The interval is significant because of another effort on 
 the part of General Howe and his brother, Admiral 
 Howe, special commissioners, to settle the controversy 
 upon terms alike satisfactory to the American people and 
 the British crown ; but John Adams, Edward Rutledge, 
 and Benjamin Franklin, commissioners appointed by Con 
 gress, insisted first upon Independence, and a subsequent 
 alliance between the two nations as friendly powers. 
 This ended the negotiations. Such a settlement, if it had 
 been realized, might have imparted to Great Britain even 
 a prouder destiny than the succeeding century developed. 
 
 At that juncture of affairs, however, and as a key to 
 General Howe s importunity in securing at least " a sus 
 pension of hostilities," he was urging upon the British 
 Government, with the same pertinacity as Washington 
 besought Congress, to increase his army. His figures 
 were large, and worthy of notice. He wanted ten thou 
 sand men for the occupation of Newport, R.I., that 
 he might threaten Boston, and make incursions into 
 Connecticut. He demanded for the garrison of New 
 York twenty thousand men ; of which number, seventeen 
 thousand should be available for field service. He asked 
 for ten thousand more, for operations into New Jersey, 
 where Washington had established a general Camp of 
 Instruction for all troops arriving from the south ; and 
 still another ten thousand for operations in the Southern 
 Colonies. It is not improbable that much of General 
 
WASHINGTON IN NEW YORK. H<) 
 
 Howe s tardiness in following up temporary success, in 
 all his subsequent campaigns, was based upon the convic 
 tion embodied in these enormous requisitions for 
 troops that the war had already assumed a character of 
 very grave importance and a corresponding uncertainty 
 of the result. 
 
 Events crowded rapidly. On the tenth of September, 
 Washington began the removal of valuable stores. He 
 acted as quickly as if he were in Howe s place, seeking 
 the earliest possible possession of New York. On the 
 twelfth, a Council of War decided that a force of eight 
 thousand men should be left for the defence of Fort 
 Washington and its dependencies. Of eight regiments 
 of the very best troops, reporting three thousand three 
 hundred and twenty-two present, the sick-roll reduced 
 the effective strength twelve hundred and nine men. 
 On the fourteenth, additional British vessels passed up 
 East River, landing troops at Kipp s Bay on the sixteenth. 
 Then occurred one of the most stirring incidents of the 
 war. One of the best brigades in the army, and one 
 which had previously fought with gallantry and success, 
 gave way. Washington, advised of the panic, denounced 
 their behavior as " dastardly and cowardly." He dashed 
 among them, and with drawn sword mingled with the 
 fugitives, to inspire them with courage. Tn his report he 
 says : "I used every means in my power to rally them to 
 the fight, but my attempts were fruitless and ineffectual ; 
 and on the appearance of not more than sixty or seventy 
 of the enemy they ran away without firing a shot." In 
 the strong language of General Greene : " Washington, on 
 this occasion, seemed to seek death, rather than life." 
 These same troops, a part of Parsons Brigade, afterwards 
 redeemed themselves ; andi Washington was wise enough 
 to give them opportunity, under his own eye, as espe 
 cially trustworthy troops. This incident found its counter- 
 
WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 part in the career of Napoleon. At the siege of Toulon, 
 one denii-brigade fled before a sally of less than one- 
 fourth its numbers : but afterwards lost nearly half its 
 strength in storming and entering the same fortress. 
 
 Immediately upon this unfortunate affair, the whole 
 army was withdrawn to Harlem Heights. This position 
 was regarded as impregnable ; but the following extract 
 from Washington s report to Congress exposes the deep 
 anguish of his soul : " We are now encamped with the 
 main body of the army upon the Heights of Harlem, 
 where I should hope the enemy would meet with a re 
 treat, in case of attack, but experience, to my great afflic 
 tion, has convinced me that this is a matter to be wished, 
 rather than expect ed.*" 
 
 The British lines were advanced, and extended from 
 Bloomingdale across to Horn s Hook, near Hell Gate : and 
 General Howe made his headquarters at the Beekman 
 Mansion, not far from those just vacated by Washington 
 on Murray Hill. 
 
 And just then and there occurred an incident of the 
 war which made an indelible impress upon the great heart 
 of the American Commander-in-Chief : and that was 
 the execution of one of his confidential messengers, who 
 had been sent to report upon the British movements on 
 Long Island young Nathan Hale. The Rev. Edward 
 Everett Hale, of Roxbury, Boston, furnishes the following 
 outline of service which had greatly endeared Captain 
 Hale to Washington : 
 
 ~ Just after the Battle of Lexington, at a town-meeting, 
 with the audacity of boyhood, he cried out, Let us never 
 lay down our arms till we have achieved independence ! 
 Not yet two years out of Yale College, he secured release 
 from the school he was teaching in New London ; enlisted 
 in Webb s Regiment, the 7th Connecticut ; by the first 
 of September was promoted from Lieutenant to Captain ; 
 
WASHINGTON IN NEW YORK. 121 
 
 and on the fourteenth, marched to Cambridge. He shared 
 in the achievement at Dorchester Heights, and his reffi- 
 
 O O 
 
 uient was one of the first five that were despatched to 
 New London, and thence to New York, by water. On 
 the twenty-ninth of August, 1776, while the garrison of 
 Brooklyn Heights was being hurried to the boats, Hale, 
 with a sergeant and four of his men, attempted to burn 
 the frigate Plimnix ; and did actually capture one of her 
 tenders, securing four cannon. At a meeting of officers, 
 Washington stated that f he needed immediate information 
 of the enemy s plans. When dead silence ensued, Hale, 
 the youngest of the Captains, still pale from recent sick 
 ness, spoke out: I will undertake it. If my country 
 demands a peculiar service, its claims are imperious.* 
 During the second week in September, taking his Yale 
 College diploma with him, to pass for a school-master, he 
 procured the desired information ; but his boat failed to 
 meet him. A British boat answered the signal, and his 
 notes, written in Latin, exposed him. He was taken to 
 New York on that eventful twenty-first of September, when 
 five hundred of its buildings were burned ; was summarily 
 tried, and executed the next day at the age of twenty-one. 
 His last sentence, when in derision he was allowed to 
 speak as he ascended the gallows, was simply this : r I only 
 regret that I have but one life to give to my country. " 
 
 He had become a member of Knowlton s Connecticut 
 Rangers ; and the Beekman House and Rutger s apple 
 orchard, where he was hanged from a tree, located by 
 Lossing near the present intersection of East Broadway 
 and Market streets, were long regarded with interest by 
 visitors in search of localities identified with the Revolu 
 tionary period of Washington s occupation of New York. 
 
 In resuming our narrative, we find the American army 
 spending its first night upon Harlem Heights. Rain fell, 
 but there were no tents. The men were tired and 
 
122 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 hungry, but there were no cooking utensils ; and only 
 short rations, at best. They realized that through a per 
 fectly useless panic they had sacrificed necessaries of life. 
 For four weeks the army remained in this position, not 
 unfrequently engaging the British outposts, and on 
 several occasions, with credit, making sallies or resisting 
 attack ; but the fresh troops, as ever before, had to mature 
 slowly, under discipline. After a brilliant action on the 
 sixteenth, in which Colonel Knowlton, who had distin 
 guished himself at Bunker Hill, was killed, as well as 
 Colonel Leich, and where Adjutant-General Reed, of 
 Washington s staff, equally exposed himself - " to ani 
 mate," as he said, " troops Avho would not go into danger 
 unless their officers led the way," the Commander-in-Chief 
 issued an order of which the following is an extract : 
 " The losses of the enemy, yesterday, would undoubtedly 
 have been much greater if the orders of the Commander- 
 in-Chief had not in some instances been contradicted by 
 inferior officers, who, however well they meant, ought 
 not to presume to direct. It is therefore ordered, that 
 no officer commanding a party, and having received 
 orders from the Commander-in-Chief, depart from them 
 without orders from the same authority ; and as many 
 may otherwise err, the army is now acquainted that the 
 General s orders are delivered by his Adjutant-General, 
 or one of his aides-de-camp, Mr. Tighlman, or Colonel 
 Moylan, the Quartermaster-General." 
 
 At this time, Massachusetts sent her drafted men under 
 General Lincoln. General Greene assumed command in 
 New Jersey. Generals Sullivan and Stirling, exchanged, 
 resumed their old commands. 
 
 The army Return of October fifth indicated a total rank 
 and file of twenty-seven thousand seven hundred and 
 thirty-five men, of whom eight thousand and seventy-five 
 were sick, or on a furlough ; and requiring to complete 
 
WASHINGTON IN NEW YORK. 123 
 
 these regiments, eleven thousand two hundred and sev 
 enty-one men. On the eighth of October, General Moore, 
 commanding the Camp of Instruction (called the " Flying 
 Camp," because of its changeable location) in New Jersey, 
 reported a total force of six thousand five hundred and 
 forty-eight men. 
 
 On the ninth of October, the frigates Phcenix and Roe 
 buck safely passed the forts as for north as Dobb s Ferry. 
 It became evident that General Putnam s methods would not 
 control the Hudson River route of British advance. Sick 
 ness increased in the camps. The emergency forced upon 
 Washington the immediate reorganization of the medical 
 department ; and he ordered an examination of applicants 
 before allowing a commission to be issued and rank coiir 
 ferred. Such had been the laxity of this necessary class 
 of officers, that General Greene reported his surgeons as 
 " without the least particle of medicine"; adding: "The 
 regimental surgeons embezzle the public stores committed 
 to their care, so that the regimental sick suffer, and 
 should have the benefit of a general hospital." Washing 
 ton issued an order, after his own very lucid style, de 
 ploring the fact that "the periodical homesickness, which 
 was common just before an anticipated engagement, had 
 broke out again with contagious virulence." 
 
 The want of discipline, however, was not wholly with 
 the rank and file. Adjutant-General Reed, in writing to 
 his wife, expressed his purpose to resign, for he had seen 
 a captain shaving one of his men before the house ; and 
 added : " To enforce discipline in such cases, makes a man 
 odious and detestable, a position which no one will 
 choose." And Colonel Small wood, afterwards General, 
 and one of the best soldiers of the war, in writing to the 
 Maryland Council of Safety, complains of " the ignorance 
 and inattention of officers who fail to realize the impor 
 tance of that discipline which is so excellent in the Com- 
 
124 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 rnander-in-Chief " ; adding : " It would be a happy day 
 for the United States if there was as much propriety 
 in every department under him." 
 
 At this period, General Howe again wrote to Lord 
 Germaine, that he " did not expect to finish the campaign 
 until spring"; "that the Provincials would not join the 
 British army"; and called for more foreign troops, and 
 eight additional men-of-war. The monotony of these 
 frequent requisitions of the British Commander-in-Chief 
 makes a tiresome story ; but like the successive appeals 
 of Washington to Congress, Provincial Councils and 
 Committees of Safety they form an indispensable part 
 of the narrative of those facts which tested Washington s 
 character as a Soldier. 
 
 Having observed increased activity of the British ship 
 ping in the East River, and indications that Howe would 
 abandon a direct attack upon his fortified position upon 
 Harlem Heights, Washington prepared for the contin 
 gency of more active duty elsewhere, and announced 
 October eleventh as the day for a personal inspection 
 of every company under his command. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 WASHINGTON TENDERS, AND HOWE DECLINES, BATTLE. 
 HARLEM HEIGHTS AND WHITE PLAINS. 
 
 E steady hold of Harlem Heights against Howe s 
 -JL advance on the sixteenth day of September, some 
 times called the Battle of Harlem Heights, was another 
 " object lesson " for General Howe s improvement, and he 
 observed its conditions. His adversary invited and he 
 declined the invitation to attack the American position. 
 His next plan was self-suggestive, to cut the American 
 army from its Connecticut supplies, since his fleet con 
 trolled the Hudson River, and by a flank and rear move 
 ment to pen it up for leisurely capture. He began this 
 movement October twelfth. 
 
 The Guards, Light Infantry, Reserve, and Donop s 
 Hessians, landed at Throgg s Neck (see map). But 
 Hand s American Rifles had already destroyed the bridge 
 to the main-land ; and even at low tide the artillery could 
 not safely effect a crossing. Colonel Prescott, with 
 others, especially detailed by Washington, watched every 
 movement, and held firmly their posts without flinching ; 
 so that Howe placed his troops in camp, " awaiting reen- 
 forcements." OR the sixteenth and seventeenth, several 
 brigades from Flushing, with the Grenadiers, landed at 
 Pell s Point. Even here, Washington had anticipated 
 his advance ; for Colonel Glover made such resistance 
 from behind stone fences, then common to that region, 
 that this last command also went into camp, " waiting for 
 
 125 
 
126 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 reenforcements." On the twenty-first, Howe advanced 
 his right and centre columns beyond New Roehelle, where 
 he again went into camp, " waiting for reenforcements." 
 
 During the week, General Knyphausen reached Staten 
 Island from Europe with additional Hessian troops ; and 
 these, with the British Light Dragoons, landed at Myer s 
 Point near New Roehelle. De Heister also came up from 
 Howe s first camping-ground, and the entire army ad 
 vanced parallel with the River Bronx, to within four 
 miles of White Plains. 
 
 Much had been expected of the Light Dragoons and 
 their charges on horseback, with drawn sabres, to cut to 
 pieces the undisciplined rebels. But they inspired no 
 terror. It was the rebels opportunity. Washington 
 reminded the army, "that in a country where stone 
 fences, crags, and ravines were so numerous, the Ameri 
 can riflemen needed no better chance to pick oft the riders 
 and supply ithe army with much-needed horses." He- 
 offered a " reward of one hundred dollars to any soldier 
 who would bring in an armed trooper and his horse." 
 Colonel Haslet crossed the Bronx and attacked the 
 Queen s Rangers, captured thirty-six, and left as many 
 on the field, besides carrying away sixty muskets. 
 Colonel Hand next had a lively skirmish with the Hes 
 sian Yagers, who, accustomed to marching in close array, 
 met an experience similar to that of Braddock s command 
 years before. 
 
 Besides all that, it was a constant inspiration to the 
 American troops, and not least to the Militia, thus to 
 distribute themselves along the extended British columns, 
 and shoot, when they pleased, at some live target. Howe 
 had already sent ships-of-war up the Hudson, and pro 
 posed to swing to the left at White Plains, and sweep 
 the entire American army back upon the Harlem. 
 
 When Washington learned from his scouts that the 
 
HARLEM HEIGHTS AND WHITE PLAINS. 127 
 
 British army was thus extended along the Sound, he 
 hurried all supplies forward to White Plains ; pushed 
 forward his own army, division by division, along the 
 west bank of the Bronx, always on high ground ; estab 
 lished earthworks at every prominent point, and made a 
 small chain of communicating posts throughout the entire 
 distance. His purpose was to crowd the British army 
 upon the coast, where innumerable sea-inlets made 
 progress difficult ; and by using the shorter, interior line 
 to White Plains, to place himself in position to fight to 
 advantage, upon ground of his own selection. Of course 
 time became an element of determining value. Howe 
 gained a start on the twelfth ; but lost five days at Throgg s 
 Neck, and four days more at New Rochelle. As Wash 
 ington already had a depot of Connecticut supplies at 
 White Plains, he advanced to that point with vigor, so 
 soon as he perceived that Howe would not attack from 
 the east, as he had declined to attack from the south. 
 On the twelfth, General Greene asked permission to 
 join from New Jersey, and on the fourteenth General 
 Lee reported for duty. Some reference to this officer is 
 of immediate interest. On that very morning he had 
 written a letter to General Gates, who, as well as him 
 self, had seen military service in the British army, each 
 holding commissions in the American army subordinate 
 to Washington, Lee, as senior Major-General. The 
 insubordination and arrogance of this letter are patent. 
 The following is an extract : 
 
 FORT CONSTITUTION, Oct. 14, 1776. 
 
 MY DEAR GENERAL GATES : I write this scroll in a hurry. Col 
 onel Wood will describe the position of our army, which in my 
 breast I do not approve. Inter nos, the Congress seems to stumble 
 at every step. I don t mean one or two of the cattle, but the whole 
 stable. I have been very free in delivering my opinions, and in my 
 opinion General Washington is much to blame in not menacing em 
 with resignation, unless they refrain from unhinging the army in 
 their absurd interference. 
 
128 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 On the twenty-second of October, while General Howe 
 was still awaiting reinforcements two miles above New 
 Rochelle, General Heath s division made a night march, 
 reached Chatterton Hill at daylight, and began to 
 strengthen the defences at White Plains. Sullivan s 
 division arrived the next night, and General Lord Stir 
 ling s immediately after. On the twenty-third, Lee s 
 Grand Division joined from New Jersey, and the entire 
 American army, with its best officers and troops, awaited 
 the action of General Howe. McDougalPs Brigade and 
 Lieutenant Alexander Hamilton, with two guns, occupied 
 Chatterton Hill. (See map.) 
 
 Washington s position was not, intrinsically, the best 
 for final defence ; but he had selected an ultimate position 
 which Howe could not assail without loss of communica 
 tion Avith New York. 
 
 The American left was protected by low ground, acces 
 sible only with difficulty. The right was met by a bend 
 in the River Bronx. One line of breastworks controlled 
 the Connecticut road. Two successive lines in the rear 
 were upon a gradual ascent, capable of vigorous defence. 
 Washington also controlled all roads that lead westward 
 to the Hudson River. But more important than all, 
 somewhat advanced to the south-west, was Chatterton 
 Hill, commanding the L of the river, in which angle the 
 army of Howe had taken position. Behind the American 
 army was still higher ground, which commanded the 
 passes through the hills by the Peekskill and upper 
 Tarrytown roads. 
 
 Washington was now superior to his adversary in 
 respect of numbers, and was in one of his moods when he 
 invited attack. On the twenty-eighth of October, the two 
 armies confronted each other. But a direct advance by 
 Howe required first that he dislodge the Americans from 
 -Chatterton s Hill. Otherwise, Howe would leave his 
 
HARLEM HEIGHTS AND WHITE PLAINS. 129 
 
 Supplies exposed, as well as his left wing, to an attack 
 from the rear. He decided to storm the hill. The guns 
 of Hamilton and the steepness of the ascent foiled the 
 first attempt. Then Colonel Rahl, afterwards killed at 
 Trenton, and Donop, with their Hessian brigades, turned 
 the American right by another route, and the Americans 
 retired just as General Putnam was starting other troops 
 to their support. The British brigade of General Leslie 
 lost one hundred and fifty-four men, and the Hessian 
 casualties increased the entire loss to two hundred and 
 thirty-one. The American casualties were one hundred 
 and thirty. 
 
 On the twenty-ninth, both armies rested. On the thir 
 tieth, Lord Percy arrived with his division, and the next 
 day was designated for the advance. But the day was 
 stormy and the movement was suspended. The next day 
 following, Avas named in Orders for advance all along the 
 lines, " weather permitting," the British improving their 
 time by strengthening their own position. 
 
 The next day came. The British army was by itself. 
 During the night, Washington had retired in good order, 
 five miles, to North Castle Heights, from which the entire 
 British army could not dislodge him. Such Avas the his 
 torical battle of White Plains, more properly, the Battle of 
 Chattertoirs Hill, where the fighting took place. 
 
 Howe immediately abandoned New Rochelle as his 
 base, left White Plains on the fifth, encamped at Dobb s 
 Ferry on the sixth, and thus gained communication with 
 his ships on the Hudson. 
 
 On the same day, the sixth, Washington advised Con 
 gress that "he expected a movement of General Howe 
 into New Jersey." He called a Council of War, under 
 that conviction, the same afternoon, and decided to throw 
 a considerable body of troops into that Province. 
 
 The retention of Fort Washington was a question of 
 
130 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 much embarrassment. Even its capture by Howe would 
 not be a compensation to him, or to Great Britain, for 
 the escape of Washington s army. On the twenty-ninth 
 of October, General Greene prepared a careful itinerary 
 for a march through New Jersey, minutely specifying 
 the proposed distance for each day s progress, and the 
 requisite supplies for each. That itinerary furnishes a 
 remarkable model of good Logistics. Washington wrote 
 to Congress, that " General Howe must do something to 
 save his reputation ; that he would probably go to New 
 Jersey" ; and then urged, " that the militia be in readiness 
 to supply the places of those whose terms of service would 
 soon expire." To Greene he wrote: "They can have no 
 other capital object, unless it be Philadelphia." It was 
 then known that General Carleton retired from Crown 
 Point November second, so that there was no danger of 
 a British movement up the Hudson. He again wrote to 
 Greene as to Fort Washington : " If we cannot prevent 
 vessels from passing up, and the enemy are in possession 
 of the surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it 
 answer to hold a post from which the expected benefit 
 cannot be had ? I am therefore inclined to think that it 
 will not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at Fort 
 Washington ; but as you are on the spot, leave it to you 
 to give such orders as you deem best, and, so far revok 
 ing the order to Colonel McGee, to defend it to the last." 
 At this time, more than half of the enlistments of the 
 army were on their extreme limit of service. Howe 
 promised the militia of New York, many of whom were 
 in the garrison of the fort, that " he would guarantee to 
 them their liberties and properties, as well as a free and 
 general pardon." Many decided not to reenlist. On 
 the ninth of November, having in mind the eventualities 
 of a New Jersey campaign, Washington moved one 
 division of the army across the Hudson at Peekskill, 
 
HARLEM HEIGHTS AND WHITE PLAINS. 131 
 
 ;ind ordered a second to move the day following. On 
 the tenth he placed General Lee in charge of the general 
 camp, with careful instructions as to the discipline of the 
 men; and notified him, in case the enemy should re 
 move the whole or the greater part of their force to the 
 west side of the Hudson, to follow with all possible de 
 spatch, leaving the militia to cover the frontiers of Con 
 necticut, in case of need. 
 
 On the eve of his own departure he also notified Gov 
 ernor Trumbull of Connecticut, that " the campaign into 
 New Jersey would withdraw Lee and his division from 
 the Hudson " ; and made arrangements for the " care and 
 storage for the winter, of all tents and stores that might 
 remain on hand after the discharge of enlisted men whose 
 term should expire." 
 
 The following terse order was then issued to all the 
 divisions which were to accompany him in this, his " First 
 New Jersey campaign " : 
 
 " Colonels will examine the baggage of troops under 
 marching orders ; tents and spare arms, to go in the first 
 wagons, then the proper baggage of the regiment ; no 
 chairs, tables, or heavy chests, or personal baggage, to 
 be put in, as it will certainly be put off and left. No 
 officer of any rank to meddle with a wagon or a cart 
 appropriated for any other regiment, or use ; that no 
 discharged man be allowed to carry away arms, camp 
 kettles, utensils, or any other public stores ; recruiting 
 officers, as detailed, to proceed with their duty ; no boys, 
 or old men, to be enlisted, and if so, to be returned at the 
 hands of the officer, with no allowance for any expense 
 he may be at." 
 
 On the twelfth of November, before crossing the 
 Hudson River, Washington placed General Heath in 
 command of the Highlands, and proceeded to Fort Lee, 
 opposite Fort Washington. The British army had already 
 
132 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 removed from Dobb s Ferry to King s Bridge. At this 
 time, three hundred British transports with a large force 
 on board, lay at Sandy Hook, and their destination was 
 suspected to be either Newport, Rhode Island, Philadel 
 phia, or South Carolina. 
 
 Washington established his headquarters about nine 
 miles from Fort Lee. It is not desirable to burden the 
 narrative with the details of the capture of Fort Wash 
 ington. The fort had been built to control the river, 
 and it was weak, landward; depending upon the river, 
 even for water, having no well. The ground fell off 
 rapidly ; but there were neither trenches nor regular 
 bastions, and only one redoubt. Washington wrote to 
 Congress, after reaching Fort Lee : " It seems to be gen 
 erally believed that the investing of Fort Washington, is 
 one object they have in view. I propose to stay in this 
 neighborhood a few days ; in which time I expect the design 
 of the enemy will be more disclosed, and their incursions 
 made in this quarter, or their investure of Fort Wash 
 ington, if they are intended." While the assault was in 
 preparation, Washington took boat to cross and exam 
 ine for himself the condition of the works ; but meeting 
 Generals Putnam and Greene, who satisfied him that there 
 would be a stout defence, he returned without landing. 
 Three assaults were made, Generals Knyphausen, Percy, 
 Cornwallis and Matthews commanding divisions. These 
 repeated charges up the very steep ascents from the 
 rear, and from the open face of the work northward, 
 were very costly to the British and Hessian columns. 
 When their forces first gained the interior lines, sur 
 render, or rescue, was inevitable. To the demand for sur 
 render Magaw replied with a request for five hours delay. 
 A half hour only was granted. Magaw received a billet 
 from Washington stating that if he could hold out 
 awhile, he would endeavor to bring off the garrison at 
 
A. first a/fart undrrGen lKny/thtijrnbv s^H illls, 
 letatfimrntj from ffessians ofhij cor/is, Jjjwfc 
 lhr.BrtffadeafJla.lft ana /liy<afWa{dei-H-jjff//[/ 
 
 a. a. a. a. ffarractsartd 
 forWinler Quarters nfjmeri 
 ^rmy &ur/ttd it/ton udi O/ife tif 
 
HARLEM HEIGHTS AND WHITE PLAINS. 133 
 
 night ; but no delay was permitted, and the garrison sur 
 rendered. It was for many years an unexplained fact, 
 how the British troops appeared so suddenly at the open 
 face of the fort, northward, below which was a deep 
 ravine, itself almost a protection. But William Du- 
 mont, Magaw s Adjutant, deserted, two weeks before the 
 investment, and placed detailed drawings of all the de 
 fences in the hands of General Howe. This fact affords 
 the key to General Howe s otherwise very singular excuse 
 to the British Government for not following Washington s 
 army from AVhite Plains to North Castle Heights, 
 " political reasons " having been assigned by General 
 Howe, as "controlling his action." 
 
 The British loss in the assault was one hundred and 
 twenty-eight ; and that of the Hessian troops, three 
 hundred and twenty-six. The American loss was one 
 hundred and twenty, killed and wounded, and two thou 
 sand six hundred and thirty-four, prisoners. The loss in 
 cannon, tents, arms and military stores, was very severe. 
 
 Fort Lee was of necessity abandoned, its powder and 
 principal supplies being first removed in safety. 
 
 The first New Jersey campaign immediately ensued. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN. TRENTON. 
 
 HISTORICAL accuracy must recognize the First 
 Campaign of Washington in New Jersey, as a 
 masterly conduct of operations toward American Independ 
 ence. The loss of Fort Washington has been a frequent 
 topic of discussion, as if its retention or loss had deter 
 mining value. As already indicated by Washington s 
 letters, there was no substantial benefit to be realized by 
 the detachment of troops to retain it, so long as British 
 ships controlled its water-front. Behind it was New 
 England, which could furnish no base of American opera 
 tions for a general war ; and yet, in order to prosecute the 
 war to success, the American army must be established 
 where it could harass and antagonize British operations 
 at and out from New York. Fort Washington could do 
 
 o 
 
 neither, but, so long as held, must drain resources which 
 w r ere more valuable elsewhere. 
 
 It has already been noticed, that Washington prepared 
 New England for its own immediate defence ; and the 
 assembling of supplies ordered was in anticipation of the 
 campaign of 1777. The new system of enlistments, also, 
 provided for five years of contingent service. The rapid 
 organization of regiments at the South, and the authorized 
 increase of the army, in excess of any possible British 
 accessions from Europe, had induced the establishment of 
 the Camp of Observation before alluded to, and indicated 
 New Jersey as the essential centre of operations for all 
 
 134 
 
THE FIRST NEW .JERSEY CAMPAIGN. 135 
 
 general military purposes. British operations from Can 
 ada, or against the Southern Colonies, could be success 
 fully met only by a closely related and compactly ordered 
 base of operation and supply. 
 
 It is therefore a misnomer to dwell with emphasis 
 upon Washington s next movement, as simply a " masterly 
 retreat/ The extracts, few out of many available, already 
 cited, are declarations of a clearly defined strategic system, 
 which would admit of no permanent failure so long as 
 Congress and the American people completely filled the 
 measure of his demands for men and money. 
 
 A glance at the disposition of both armies is invited. 
 All operations in the northern department were practically 
 suspended with Carleton s withdrawal to Canada. But on 
 the ninth of November, the official returns of that northern 
 army showed a force of seven thousand three hundred and 
 forty-live rank and tile, present for duty ; with three 
 thousand nine hundred and sixty-one sick, present, and 
 absent. Enlistments were to expire with the year, but 
 weeks were to intervene. Lee s Grand Division, at North 
 Castle Heights, at date of the loss of Fort Washington, 
 and as late as November, reported rt seven thousand eight 
 hundred and twenty-four of effective rank and file, present 
 for duty and on command." Enlistments here, also, were 
 near their limit : but Lee ultimately crossed into New 
 Jersey with thirty-four hundred effective troops. Wash 
 ington had the right to expect, and did expect, that this 
 force was available upon call. The division of General 
 Heath, commanding upon the Hudson, with headquarters 
 at Fishkill, numbered, on November twenty-fourth, five 
 thousand four hundred and ten men for duty. Leaving 
 to the governors of New England and New York the 
 responsibility of maintaining their quotas when enlist 
 ments should expire, the time had come for American 
 operations in the middle zone of military action. 
 
136 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Cornwallis was detached from his immediate command 
 and sent into New Jersey, with a strong force, to attack 
 Washington. The American army abandoned the space 
 between the Hackensack and Passaic rivers ; crossed the 
 latter at Aquackonock on the twenty-first of November ; 
 burned the bridge after a slight skirmish, and followed the 
 right bank of the Passaic to Newark, reaching that city on 
 the twenty-third. At this point, a muster of the army 
 was ordered by Washington, and five thousand four hun 
 dred and ten reported for duty. New Brunswick was 
 reached on the twenty-ninth. Here another skirmish 
 with the army of Cornwallis took place. But Cornwallis 
 halted his command under orders of Howe to " proceed 
 no further than New Brunswick." 
 
 Washington moved on to Princeton, and then to Tren 
 ton, where he arrived on the third day of December. 
 He immediately gathered from Philadelphia all available 
 boats, and for a stretch of seventy miles cleared both 
 banks of the Delaware River of everything that could 
 float, and took them into his own charge. 
 
 The reader should appreciate that these movements 
 were not in the original design of the American Com- 
 mander-in-Chief. He would have made a stand at both 
 Hackensack and New Brunswick, if Lee s Division, con 
 fidently expected, had joined him as ordered ; and at 
 least, the enemy s progress would have been retarded. 
 
 Having left the Delaware regiment and five Virginia 
 regiments at Princeton, under Lord Stirling, he moved 
 all heavy military stores behind the Delaware, and 
 returned to Princeton. Meeting Lord Stirling, who was 
 falling back before a superior force of the enemy, he re- 
 crossed the Delaware at Trenton, established headquar 
 ters, and fixed the base for future action. 
 
 In writing to Congress on the fifth, he used this language : 
 "As nothing but necessity obliged me to retire before 
 
THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN. 137 
 
 the enemy and leave so much of New Jersey unprotected, 
 I conceive it my duty, and it corresponds with my inclin 
 ation, to make head against them so soon as there shall be 
 the least probability of doing so with propriety." 
 
 On the twelfth, he learned that General Lee had en 
 tered New Jersey with his division. As early as Novem 
 ber twenty-fifth, he had ordered General Schuyler to 
 forward to him all Pennsylvania and New Jersey troops 
 then in the Northern Department. 
 
 A glance at the plans and movements of the British 
 army is now of interest. Howe reported his move 
 ments as follows : " My first design extended no further 
 than to get, and keep possession of, East New Jersey. 
 Lord Cornwallis had orders not to advance beyond 
 Brunswick ; but, on the sixth, I joined his lordship with 
 the Fourth Brigade of British, under General Grant. On 
 the seventh, Cornwallis marched with his corps, except the 
 Guards who were left at Brunswick, to Princeton, which 
 the Americans had quitted the same day. He delayed 
 seventeen hours at Princeton, and was an entire day in 
 marching to Trenton. He arrived there, just as the rear 
 guard of the enemy had crossed ; but they had taken the 
 precaution to destroy, or secure to the south side, all the 
 boats that could possibly have been employed for cross 
 ing the river." 
 
 Cornwallis remained at Pennington until the fourteenth, 
 when the British army was placed in winter quarters ; 
 rf the weather," says General Howe, "having become too 
 severe to keep the field." 
 
 On the previous day, the thirteenth, General Charles 
 Lee, next in rank to Washington, while leisurely resting 
 at a country house at Baskenridge, three miles from his 
 troops, was taken prisoner by a British scouting detach 
 ment. It may be of interest to the reader to be reminded, 
 that this Major-Genejuat-^?emiired from Congress an 
 
138 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 advance of thirty thousand dollars, to enable him to trans 
 fer his English property to America, before he accepted 
 his commission, and was disappointed that he was made 
 second, instead of first, in command. When captured, 
 he was in company with Major Wilkinson, a messenger 
 from his old Virginia friend, General Horatio Gates, who 
 had just been ordered by Washington to accompany cer 
 tain reinforcements from the northern army, to increase 
 the force of the Commander-in-Chief. This Major Wil 
 kinson escaped capture, but the British scouts used his 
 horse for Lee s removal. On the table was a letter, not 
 yet folded, which the messenger was to convey to General 
 Gates. It reads as follows (omitting the expletives), - 
 
 BASKENKIDGE, December 13, 1776. 
 
 MY DEAR GATES: The ingenious manoeuvre of Fort Washington 
 has completely unhinged the goodly fabrick we had been building. 
 
 There never was so a stroke. Entre nous, a certain great 
 
 man is deficient. He has thrown me into a position where I 
 
 have my choice of difficulties. If I stay in the Province, I risk my 
 self and my army ; and if I do not stay, the Province is lost forever. 
 Our councils have been weak, to the last degree. As to 
 what relates to yourself, if you think you can be in time to aid the 
 general, I would have you, by all means, go. You will at least save 
 your army. 
 
 No comment is required, except to state that repeated 
 orders had been received and acknowledged by Lee, to 
 join Washington ; but he had determined not to join him, 
 and to act independently with his division, regardless of 
 the orders of his Commander-in-Chief, and of Congress. 
 Two extracts only are admissible. Washington had 
 reprimanded Lee for interfering with the independent 
 command of General Heath, on the Hudson. On the 
 twenty-sixth of November, Lee wrote to Heath : r<: The 
 Commander-in-Chief is now separated from us. I, of 
 course, command on this side the water ; for the future I 
 will, and I must, be obeyed." On the twenty-third of 
 
THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN. 139 
 
 November, in order to induce New England to trust 
 him, and distrust, Washington, he wrote the following 
 letter to James Bowdoin, President of the Massachusetts 
 Council : 
 
 Before the unfortunate affair at Fort Washington, it was my 
 opinion, that the two armies, that on the east and that on the west 
 side of the North River, must rest, each, on its own bottom; that the 
 idea, of detaching and reenforcing from one side to the other, on 
 every motion of the enemy, was chimerical ; but to harbor such a 
 thought, in our present circumstances, is absolute insanity. . . . 
 We must therefore depend upon ourselves. Should the enemy alter 
 the present direction of their operation, I would never entertain the 
 thought on being succored from the western army (that across 
 the Hudson, with Washington). Affairs appear in so important :i 
 crisis, that I think even the resolves of Congress must be no longer 
 nicely weighed with us. There are times when we must commit 
 treason against the laws of the State, for the salvation of the State. 
 The present crisis demands this brave, virtuous kind of treason. 
 For my part, and I flatter myself my way of thinking is congenial 
 with that of Mr. Bowdoin, I will stake my head and reputation on 
 the measure. 
 
 James Bowdoin loved Massachusetts ; but no seltish or 
 local considerations, such as were those of Lee, could 
 impair his confidence in the wisdom and patriotism of the 
 American Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 The capture of Lee was thus mildly noticed by Wash 
 ington : " It was by his own folly and imprudence, and 
 without a view to effect any good, that he was taken." 
 
 General Sullivan succeeded to the command of Lee s 
 Division. Gates joined from the northern army, and on 
 the twentieth of December, the Continental Army was re 
 organized for active service. 
 
 o 
 
 General Howe had returned to New York December 
 20th. The British cantonments for the winter embraced 
 Brunswick, Trenton, Burlington, Bordentown, and 
 other places ; with the Hessian, Dpnop,, in_cqmniand at 
 Bordentown, and Rahl at Trenton . 
 
140 WASHINGTON TPIE SOLDIER. 
 
 The month had been one of great strain upon the 
 American Commander-in-Chief. He was, practically, on 
 trial. The next in command, who, by virtue of previous 
 military training, largely commanded public confidence, 
 had failed him, simply because Washington, with the 
 modesty of a true aspirant for excellence in his profes 
 sion, would not pass judgment, and enforce his own will, 
 in disobedience of the will of Congress. But, by this 
 time Congress itself began to realize that a deliberate 
 civil body was not the best Commander-in-Chief for field 
 service, and that it would have to trust the men who did 
 the fighting. It adjourned on the twelfth of December, 
 quite precipitately, but Resolved " That, until Congress 
 shall otherwise order, General Washington be possessed 
 of full power to order and direct all things relative to the 
 department and to the operations of war." 
 
 Repair of bridges below Trenton, by the British troops, 
 led Washington jto suspect that some move might be 
 made against Philadelphia, from the east side of the 
 Delaware River. He therefore divided the entire river 
 front into divisions under competent commanders, on the 
 day of the adjournment of Congress. Light earth 
 works were thrown up, opposite all ferries and places of 
 easy landing, with small guards at frequent intervals ; 
 and constant patrols were ordered to be in motion, 
 promptly to report any suspicious signs of British ac 
 tivity, or the movement of other persons than soldiers of 
 the army. Points of rendezvous were also established, to 
 resist any sudden attempt of persons to cross ; all boats 
 were kept in good order, and under guard ; and rations for 
 three days were distributed and required to be kept up 
 to that standard, by night and by day. On the same day 
 he promulged an order that affected Philadelphia itself; 
 viz., "requiring all able-bodied men in the city, not 
 conscientiously scrupulous as to bearing arms, to report 
 
THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN. 141 
 
 at the State House yard the next day, with arms and 
 equipments ; that all persons who have arms and accoutre 
 ments, which they cannot, or do not mean to employ in 
 defence of America, are hereby ordered to deliver the 
 same to Mr. Robert Tower, who will pay for the same ; 
 and that those who are convicted of secreting any arms, 
 or accoutrements, will be severely punished." 
 
 On the fourteenth, he also definitely resolved to " face 
 about and meet the enemy," a purpose which only the 
 conduct of General Lee had made impracticable before. 
 He wrote to Governor Trumbull, General Gates, and 
 General Heath, in confidence, of his purpose, " to take the 
 offensive." To Congress, he wrote sternly, stating that 
 " ten days will put an end to the existence of this army " ; 
 adding: "This is not a time to stand upon expense. A 
 character to lose ; an estate to forfeit ; the inestimable 
 blessing of liberty at stake, and a life devoted, must be 
 my excuse." 
 
 At this juncture, Washington definitely resolved to 
 establish his permanent base, as against New York ; and 
 selected Morristown, which had already been made the 
 rendezvous of the New Jersey troops. General Maxwell, 
 who was familiar with the country, was assigned to the 
 command of this new position. Three regiments from 
 Ticonderoga were ordered to halt at the new post. On 
 the twenty-third of December, Washington sent a confi 
 dential communication to Adjutant-General Reed, then 
 with General Cadwallader, in which he designated 
 "Christmas night, an hour before day, as the time fixed 
 for an attack upon Trenton." Reed had fully shared in 
 the desire for active, offensive duty, and in one letter thus 
 concurred in the Commander-in-Chief s opinion, that " to 
 repossess ourselves of Xew Jersey, or any part of it, 
 would have more effect than if we had never left it." 
 The purpose of Washington was so to combine tlie 
 
142 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 movements of various divisions, including one under 
 Putnam from Philadelphia, as practically to clear the 
 east bank of the Delaware of all Hessian o-arrisons. 
 
 _ ^ _ , ._ . . O 
 
 Putnam feared that the Tory element would rise during 
 his absence, and that order Avas suspended. The right 
 wing, under Cadwallader, was to cross at Bristol (see 
 map) ; but owing to ice, which prevented the landing of 
 artijlery^jie returned to Bristol, and reported to Wash 
 ington. After expressing regret over his failure, he thus 
 closes : " I imagine the badness of the night must have 
 prevented you from passing over as you intended." 
 Ewing was to cross over just below Trenton, to intercept 
 any reinforcements that might approach the garrison 
 from Bordentown ; but .the. violence of the storm pre 
 vented that movement also. Washington took chanre 
 
 c O 
 
 of the left wing, consisting of twenty-four hundred men, 
 which was to cross at McConkey s Ferry, nine miles 
 above Trenton, accompanied by Sullivan and Greene as 
 division commanders. When preparations were com 
 plete, and Washington in his saddle, Major Wilkinson, of 
 the staff of Gates, notified him that General Gates had 
 gone to Baltimore to visit Congress. This was a delib 
 erate "absence, without leave," at an hour when he knew, 
 and in advance, that Washington intended to force a 
 battle ; but Stark, of Breed s Hill, was there. Glover, 
 the man of Marblehead and hero of the Long Island 
 retreat, was there ; and William Washington, and James 
 Monroe, were there ! 
 
 The Hessian garrison of fifteen hundred and forty men 
 had enjoyed a right " merry Christmas," after the style 
 of their own r old country " fashion ; and the night, in 
 clement without, was bright within, as dance and song 
 with every cheery accompaniment dispelled thoughts of 
 watchfulness of ice-bound Delaware and driving tempest. 
 It was indeed a night for within-door relish, and the 
 
WASHINGTON BEFORE TRENTON. 
 [From Dael s painting.] 
 
THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN. 143 
 
 season of the year was most conducive to the abandon 
 ment of all care nd worry. " Toasts were drank " with 
 gleesome delight ; and the hilarity of the happy Hessian 
 soldiers, officers and men, only ceased when the worn-out 
 night compelled them to seek relief in rest. The garri 
 son were sleeping as soundly when the stormy morning 
 broke into day, as if they had compassed a hard day s 
 march during the night hours. The usual detail for 
 
 O T> 
 
 guard was distributed, but no other sign of life appeared 
 on the streets of Trenton. Before Colonel Rahl s head- 
 quarters, two guns, stationed there more as a recognition 
 of his commanding position than for use, were partly 
 buried in SIIOAV. A battery of four guns was in open 
 ground, not far from the Friends Meeting-house ; but 
 neither earthworks nor other defences had been deemed 
 essential to the security of the British winter quarters. 
 
 General Grant had indeed written from Brunswick on 
 the twenty-fourth : " It is perfectly certain there are no 
 more rebel troops in New Jersey ; they only send over 
 small parties of twenty or thirty men. On last Sunday, 
 Washington told his assembled generals that the British 
 are weak at Trenton and Princeton. I wish the Hessians 
 to be on guard against sudden attack ; but, at the same time, 
 I give my opinion that nothing of the kind will be under 
 taken." General Grant did, it would seem, compliment 
 Washington s sagacity, without comprehending his will 
 power to realize in action every positive conviction of 
 possible duty. And so it was, that the garrison of Tren 
 ton on that Christmas night slept at ease, until morning 
 dawned and Washington paid his unexpected visit. 
 
 Under cover of high ground, just back of McConkey s 
 Ferry, on Christmas afternoon, 1776, Washington held a 
 special evening parade. Neither driving wind nor be 
 numbing cold prevented full ranks and prompt response 
 to ff roll-call," as company after company fell into line ; 
 
144 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 and when darkness obscured the closing day, all was in 
 motion. It had been his design to complete the crossing 
 by midnight, and enter Trenton at five o clock in the 
 morning. He was to lead, in person, and announced 
 as the countersign, "Victory or Death! " The order to 
 march to the river bank, by divisions and sub-divisions, 
 each to its designated group of boats, was communicated 
 by officers especially selected for that duty, so that the 
 most perfect order attended each movement. The few 
 days of mild weather which had opened the ice, had been 
 succeeded by a sudden freeze, and a tempest of hail and 
 sleet that checked the swift current and made a safe pas 
 sage of daring and doubtful venture. The shore was 
 skirted with ice, while the floating blocks of old ice 
 twisted and twirled the fragile boats as mere playthings 
 in their way. But no one grumbled at cold, sleet or 
 danger. The elements were not the patriot s foe that 
 night of nights. All faces were set against their 
 
 o O o 
 
 country s foes. They were, at last, to pursue their old 
 pursuers. The " man of retreats," as Washington had 
 been called in derision by such men as Gates and Lee, 
 was ffuidinff, and leading to "Victory or Death ! 
 
 O C? O / 
 
 The landing of the artillery was not effected until three 
 o clock in the morning, with nearly nine miles yet to 
 march. At four o clock the advance was ordered. The 
 snow ceased, but the hail and sleet returned, driven by a 
 fierce wind from the north-east. A mile and a quarter 
 brought them to Bear Tavern (see map). Three and a 
 half miles more brought them to Birmingham. Here a 
 messenger _from General Sullivan informed Washington 
 that his men reported "their arms to be wet." * Tell 
 your general," replied Washington, "to use the bayonet, 
 and penetrate into the town. The town must be taken. 
 I am resolved to take it." 
 
 From this point Sullivan took the river road. Washing- 
 
THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN. 145 
 
 ton and Greene, bearing to the left, crossed to the old 
 Scotch road, and then entered the Pennington road, only 
 one mile from Trenton. The distance by each road was 
 aTxmt the same, four and one-half miles. Washington 
 moved at once to the head of King and Queen streets, 
 where they joined at a sharp angle ; and here, under 
 direction of General Knox, Forrest s Battery was placed 
 in position, to sweep both streets, even down to the river. 
 ff Tt was exactly eight o clock," says Washington, " and 
 three minutes after, I found from the firing on the lower 
 road that that division had also got up." The en 
 tire movement was with the utmost silence, to enable 
 Sullivan and Stark to pass through the lower town and 
 take the Hessians in the rear and by surprise. 
 
 The battle was over in an hour. The Hessian troops 
 burst from their quarters, half dressed, but in the narrow 
 streets already swept by Forrest s guns, any regular for 
 mation was impossible. The two guns before Rahl s 
 headquarters were manned ; but before they could deliver 
 a single round Capt. William Washington and Lieut. 
 James Monroe (subsequently President Monroe), with a 
 small party, rushed upon the gunners and hauled the 
 guns away for use elsewhere. Sullivan had entered the 
 town by Front and Second streets. Stark led his column 
 directly to the Assanpink Bridge, to cut off retreat to Bor- 
 dentown ; and then swung to the left, and attacked the 
 Hessians, who were gallantly attempting to form in the 
 open ground between Queen Street and the Assanpink. 
 Hand s Rifles and Scott s and Lawson s Virginia regi 
 ments were conspicuous for gallantry. All did well. 
 
 The American casualties were two killed and three 
 wounded, Captain Washington and Lieutenant Monroe 
 being among the latter. The Hessian loss in killed and 
 wounded, besides officers, was forty-one. The number 
 of prisoners, including thirty officers, was one thousand 
 
146 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 and nine. Colonel Rahl fell, mortally wounded, while 
 using his bravest energies to rally his men for an attack 
 on Washington s position at the head of King Street ; but 
 the surprise was so complete, and the cooperation of the 
 American divisions was so timely and constant, that no 
 troops in the world could have resisted the assault. Six 
 bronze guns, over a thousand stand of arms, four sets 
 of colors, twelve drums, and many valuable supplies were 
 among the trophies of war. 
 
 The American army countermarched during the night 
 after the battle, reaching the old headquarters at Xewtown 
 with their prisoners before morning ; having made the 
 entire distance of fully thirty miles under circumstances 
 of such extreme hardship and exposure, that more than 
 one thousand men were disabled for duty through frozen 
 limbs and broken-down energies. 
 
 The Hessian troops were proudly escorted through 
 Philadelphia, and the country began to realize the value 
 of a Soldier in command. Fugitives from Trenton reached 
 Bordentown, where Colonel Donop had already been 
 so closely pressed by Colonel Griffiths in an adventurous 
 skirmish, as to require the services of his entire garrison 
 to meet it. He abandoned Bordentown instantly, leaving 
 the sick and wounded, and the public stores ; marched 
 with all haste to Princeton, via Crosswicks and Allen- 
 town, and started the next day for South Amboy, the 
 nearest port to New York. 
 
 On the twenty-seventh, Cadwallader crossed at Bristol 
 with eighteen hundred men, not knowing that Washing 
 ton had recrossed the Delaware. Generals Miinin and 
 Ewing followed w r ith thirteen hundred men ; but Mt. 
 Holly and Black Horse had also been abandoned by the 
 Hessian garrisons. 
 
 While the American army rested, its Commander-in- 
 Chief matured his plans for further offensive action. A 
 
THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN. U7 
 
 letter from Colonel De Hart, at Morristown, advised him 
 that the regiments of Greaton, Bond, and Porter would 
 extend their term of service two weeks. The British 
 post at Boundbrook and vicinity had been withdrawn to 
 Brunswick. Generals McDougall and Maxwell, then at 
 Morristown, were instructed by Washington rt to collect 
 as large a body of militia as possible, and to assure them, 
 that nothing is wanting but for them to lend a hand, and 
 drive the enemy from the whole Province of New Jersey." 
 On the twenty-eighth, he wrote thus to Maxwell : "As I 
 ani about to enter the Jerseys with a considerable force, 
 immediately, for the purpose of attempting a recovery of 
 that country from the enemy ; and as a diversion from 
 your quarter may greatly facilitate this event, by dividing 
 and distracting their troops, I must request that you will 
 collect all the forces in your power, and annoy and dis 
 tress them by every means which prudence may suggest." 
 
 To General Heath, he wrote : fr I would have you ad 
 vance as rapidly as the season will permit, with the 
 eastern militia, by the way of the Hackensack, and pro 
 ceed downwards until you hear from me. I think a fair 
 opportunity is offered of driving the enemy entirely 
 from, or, at least to the extremity of New Jersey." 
 
 On the thirtieth, having again crossed to Trenton, 
 Washington was able to announce that " the eastern Con 
 tinental troops had agreed to remain six weeks longer, 
 upon receipt of a bounty of ten dollars ; and the services 
 of eminent citizens were enlisted in an effort to use the 
 success at Trenton, as a stimulus to recruiting," and, "to 
 hasten the concentration of the militia." Washington 
 
 D 
 
 intensely realized that in a few weeks, at furthest, he was 
 to begin again the instruction of a new army ; and deter 
 mined to get the largest possible benefits from the presence 
 of four thousand veterans who had consented to remain 
 for a short period beyond their exact term of enlistment. 
 
148 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 On the twenty-seventh of December, Congress clothed 
 Washington with full dictatorial authority in the matter of 
 raising troops, and in all that pertained to the conduct of 
 the war, for the period of six months ; reciting as the 
 foundation of such action, that affairs were in such a 
 condition that the very existence of civil liberty depended 
 upon the right exercise of military powers ; and, " the 
 vigorous, decisive conduct of these being impossible in 
 distant, numerous, and deliberative bodies, it was con 
 fident of the wisdom, vigor, and uprightness of George 
 Washington." 
 
 It was under the burden of this vast responsibility that 
 Washington rested, when he closed the year 1776 in camp 
 near Trenton. He responded to this confidence on the 
 part of the Continental Congress, in this simple manner : 
 " Instead of thinking myself freed from all civil obliga 
 tion, I shall immediately bear in mind that as the sword 
 was the last resort for the preservation of our liberty, so 
 it ought to be the first thing laid aside, when those liberties 
 are finally established. I shall instantly set about making 
 the most necessary reforms in the army." 
 
 Thus rapidly, in as natural and orderly sequence as 
 seemed desirable, omitting incidents, correspondence, and 
 names of persons that do not seem essential in the illustra 
 tion of qualities which attach to the career of Washington 
 as a Soldier, the reader is brought to the midnight hour of 
 December 31, 1776. 
 
 All his struggles in camp, in field, on the march, have 
 closed with one tremendous blow struck at British prestige 
 and British power. The greatest soldiers and statesmen 
 of that period recognized its significance, and rendered 
 unstinted praise to the " wisdom, constancy, and intre 
 pidity of the American Commander-in-Chief." 
 
 But, at that midnight hour, the Soldier who had been 
 the kind and faithful guardian of the humblest men in the 
 
THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN. 149 
 
 ranks, as well as the example and instructor of the proudest 
 veteran, waited with swelling breast and aching heart for 
 the morning s dawn ; realizing the solemnity of its certain 
 ordeal, when the organization of a new army, and more 
 herculean efforts of the British crown, were to test not 
 only his own capacity and will, but test the readiness and 
 fitness of the American people to rise to the emergencies 
 of one supreme issue " Victory or Death ! " 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN DEVELOPED. 
 
 PRINCETON. 
 
 WASHINGTON S surprise of the garrison of Tren 
 ton, equally surprised General Howe at New 
 York ; and he made immediate requisition for twenty 
 thousand additional troops. His last previous requisition 
 for foreign auxiliaries met with little favor on the Conti 
 nent, and only thirty-six hundred men were secured for 
 service, both in Canada and other American Colonies. 
 In the meantime, Clinton made no demonstration from 
 Newport ; and Massachusetts had recovered from the tem 
 porary effect of his occupation of that post. Under the 
 impulse of the success at Trenton, new foundries were 
 established; and systematic effort was made to secure a 
 complete artillery outfit for the army, on the new basis of 
 eighty-eight battalions. 
 
 But on the first day of January, 1777, the Commander- 
 in-Chief did not pause in the use of the means just at 
 hand. He realized that General Howe could not afford 
 to remain passive under the new conditions which his own 
 offensive movement had imposed upon the British army. 
 Lord Cornwallis, on the eve of returning to England, 
 was at once sent with a strong division to reoccupy 
 Trenton. But Washington, instead of retaining his 
 former position on the west bank of the Delaware, estab 
 lished himself behind the small river Assanpink, which 
 enters the Delaware just south of Trenton, on the New 
 
 150 
 
FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN DEVELOPED. 151 
 
 Jersey side. It was a bold act. Below him, toward Phila 
 delphia, were the forces of Cadwallader and Mimin ; and 
 these he ordered to his support. Their arrival, thirty- 
 six hundred strong, on the morning of January second, 
 increased his command to about five thousand men. This 
 little Assanpink River, swollen by the melted snow, was 
 impassable except by a bridge near its junction with the 
 Delaware. Along its steep and wooded banks, the 
 American army was distributed for a distance of two 
 miles. Watchful guards and several pieces of artillery 
 were stationed at every available fording-place, and these 
 were supported by some of the most reliable Continental 
 troops. Behind the first line, and on a little higher 
 ground, a second line was established. 
 
 In order to secure ample w r arning of the arrival of the 
 enemy and delay their approach, Washington established 
 several small posts along the road to Princeton. The 
 first, about a mile advanced, occupied rising ground well 
 flanked by w r oods and supported by two pieces of artil 
 lery. Colonel Hand s Rifles were pushed forward as far as 
 Five Mile Creek; and even, off the road, a small support 
 ing party held a defensive position at Shebakonk Creek, 
 where heavy timber and broken ground afforded a good 
 position for skirmishers to annoy an advancing force. 
 General Greene was placed in command of these out 
 posts. (See map.) 
 
 So many writers have worried themselves and their 
 readers in dealing with Washington s movements during 
 the first week in January, 1777, as so many revolutions 
 of a lottery wheel of chance in which he was remarkably 
 lucky, that it is desirable to understand his own plans, and 
 how far he anticipated the contingencies which actually 
 happened. His mind not only grasped possibilities which 
 aroused confidence, at home and abroad ; but embraced 
 strategic conceptions which affected the entire war. 
 
152 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 The Delaware was still filled with floating ice. Large 
 masses were banked within its curves, so that retreat 
 across the river, in the presence of a powerful adversary, 
 would be impracticable. And yet, he had not hesitated 
 to take position at Trenton, on the east bank of the river. 
 To have remained on the west bank would have made it 
 impossible for him to prevent Cornwallis from passing 
 down the east bank to Philadelphia, or at least from driv 
 ing both Cadwallader and Mifflin to that city, in disorder. 
 To have retired his own army to Philadelphia, would have 
 been the abandonment of New Jersey, and of all the pres 
 tige of his exploit on Christmas night. He resolved to 
 save his army ; and leave Philadelphia to the contingencies 
 of the campaign. If compelled to fight, he would choose 
 the ground ; but he did not intend to fight under condi 
 tions that would force him to abandon the aggressive cam 
 paign which he had planned. During December, he had 
 secured a careful reconnoissance of the roads to Brunswick, 
 had learned the strength of its garrison, and formed an 
 estimate of the value of the large magazines which Gen 
 eral Howe had located at that post. He believed that a 
 quick dash would secure their destruction or capture. 
 
 While awaiting the advance of Cornwallis, he called a 
 council of officers, and this bold strategic movement was 
 fully indorsed by them. But no time was to be lost. 
 The initiative must be taken before the armies were 
 brought to a deadly struggle for the very ground already 
 occupied by his camp. Battle must be deferred until 
 another day. The baggage-wagons which accompanied 
 the commands of Cadwallader and Mifflin, now parked in 
 the rear of the army, were moved to its extreme right, 
 toward Princeton, and the army waited. 
 
 Washington visited the advance posts, where Greene 
 was on the alert, and being advised by him that he could 
 keep Cornwallis back until late in the afternoon, or until 
 
FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN DEVELOPED. 153 
 
 night, returned to headquarters. The advance of Corn- 
 wallis was so successively annoyed by the outposts, that 
 he halted until additional regiments joined him. Greene 
 opened fire with his two guns, under orders from Wash 
 ington to " so check the enemy as to prevent battle until 
 the next day " ; and Cornwallis again came to a halt. 
 He knew that the Delaware River was behind Washing- 
 
 O 
 
 ton, and felt sure of his prey. Already the British had 
 made a tiresome march ; and at this second halt, orders 
 were sent back to Princeton to bring up a part of the 
 force left at that place. Cornwallis had not been neglect 
 ful of his flanks, however, but sent skirmishers along the 
 Assanpink, and even threw both shot and shell into the 
 woods in the direction of the American lines. 
 
 When the day closed, and Cornwallis encamped on the 
 north bank of the Assanpink, his pickets could see the 
 Americans at work throwing up intrenchments behind 
 the bridge, and at one point further up the stream. All 
 along the American lines immense camp-fires burned, and 
 these were abundantly replenished, during the night, by 
 fence-rails from the country near by. The British and 
 Hessians also maintained their camp-fires. A sudden 
 freeze made these fires comfortable. It also hardened 
 the ground, so that the American artillery and baggage- 
 wagons could move more readily than on the previous 
 day. 
 
 Washington hurried a messenger to General Putnam, 
 at Philadelphia, advising him of his proposed movement, 
 and instructing him to send troops to occupy Crosswicks, 
 a short distance above Bordentown, and thus take charge 
 of some baggage which has been sent in that direction. 
 All this time, the army, except its wide-awake and con 
 spicuous sentries at the bridge, and its active fire-builders 
 along the Assanpink, was on the march for Princeton. 
 When the vanguard reached Stony Brook, Washington 
 
154 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 re-formed his columns, and sent General Mercer, who had 
 served with him in the Indian War of 1756-66, to the left, 
 by the Quaker Road, intending to advance with the main 
 army directly to the village, by a lower road, under cover 
 of rising ground, and thus expedite his march upon 
 Brunswick, now weakened in its garrison by the presence 
 of Cornwallis at Trenton. But General Mercer s small 
 command was suddenly confronted by a part of Colonel 
 Mawhood s British regiment hastening to reenforce Corn- 
 wallis. This precipitated the action, known as the " Bat 
 tle of Princeton." As soon as firing was heard, Wash 
 ington hastened to the scene and took part in the fight. 
 A British bayonet-charge was too much for the American 
 advance guard. The officers in vain attempted to rally 
 the men. Washington at once appreciated the ruin that 
 would result from protracted battle ; and, as at Kipp s 
 Bay, dashed into the thickest of the fight, and with 
 bared head urged the men to rally. He passed directly 
 across the fire of the British troops, and the Americans 
 responded to his appeal. Stirling, St. Clair, Patterson 
 and others promptly brought their troops into action ; cut 
 off the retreat of a portion of the enemy to Princeton, 
 and fought them again, just south of Nassau Hall, Prince 
 ton College. 
 
 The short action was costly in precious lives. Colonel 
 Haslet and General Mercer both fell, while endeavoring 
 to rally their men, and the total American loss was about 
 one hundred. The British loss was more than one hun 
 dred, besides two hundred and twenty prisoners. The 
 part taken by Washington in the action requires no 
 further details of its incidents than its result. But the 
 day was not over. At early dawn, at Trenton, the " All s 
 well ! " which had been echoed across the little Assanpink 
 and along its banks the night before, ceased. The fires 
 still crackled and blazed with fresh wood added to the 
 
FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN DEVELOPED. 155 
 
 glowing coals ; but no pacing sentry, nor picketed horses, 
 nor open-mouthed cannon were in view from the British 
 outposts. And yet, the sullen boom of cannon far in their 
 rear, from the direction of Princeton, caught the quick 
 ear of Gen. Sir William Erskine. In an instant he was 
 in the presence of Cornwallis, with the sharp cry, " Wash 
 ington has escaped us ! " The beat " To arms ! " was im 
 mediate. There was no time even to pack supplies already 
 unloaded for battle. The troops were resting, after hard 
 marching at the dead of winter, but the presence of 
 Washington s army at the head of King Street would not 
 have more thoroughly awakened them to duty. The dis 
 tance was only ten miles ; while Washington, by his 
 circuit, had marched sixteen miles. But every moment 
 of delay imperilled their great magazines of supply for 
 the whole winter at Brunswick. All that had been stored 
 in the Trenton depot passed into Washington s possession 
 on Christmas night. They brought with them, the day 
 before, only sufficient for a short morning s capture of 
 their American adversary. Battalions marched toward 
 Trenton singly, as formed ; artillery following so soon as 
 ready. 
 
 The British vanguard reached Stony Brook just as 
 the Americans disappeared up the road, after destruction 
 of the bridge. Cornwallis halted, to bring up artillery. 
 Washington, however, had already reached Kingston, 
 three miles beyond Princeton, and had crossed Millstone 
 River. Here, a council was held as to future action. 
 British fugitives in the direction of Brunswick had, most 
 assuredly, warned the garrison of its danger. At this 
 moment, the sound of cannon at Stony Brook showed 
 that Cornwallis was pressing forward with despatch. 
 The rear-guard left at Stony Brook was not yet in sight ; 
 but the entire army was put in marching order, and 
 General Greene led the advance up the Millstone. As 
 
156 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 soon as the rear-guard joined, the British not appearing, 
 the bridge was destroyed, and the army moved through 
 woods, thickets, and improvised openings, under the lead 
 of well-posted scouts, for the hilly country to the north 
 ward. When Cornwallis reached the Millstone, he had 
 another bridge to build. A few horsemen toward Bruns 
 wick were all that indicated the presence or whereabouts 
 of Washington s army. He pushed his men by a forced 
 march, to save Brunswick, and fight Washington. He 
 did indeed save Brunswick ; but Washington and his army 
 were resting in a strong position near Pluckemin, beyond 
 his reach. 
 
 The American soldiers were foot-sore, unshod, Aveary 
 and hungry. There had not been time to distribute 
 rations, after breaking camp at Trenton. More than one- 
 half of the troops had only just arrived with Cadwallader 
 from Bordentown, when the niofht march be^an. The 
 
 c O 
 
 imagination falters and cannot conceive the experiences 
 of these faithful men, so many of whom instead of return 
 ing immediately home after New Year s day, were volun 
 tarily serving beyond their enlistment, at the simple 
 request of their heroic Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 On the fifth of January, Washington sent his report to 
 Congress, and despatches to others elsewhere in com 
 mand. Two of these despatches are to be noticed. He 
 ordered Putnam, then at Philadelphia : " Give out your 
 strength twice as great as it is. Keep out spies. Put 
 horsemen in the dress of the country, and keep them 
 going backwards and forwards for that purpose. Act 
 Avith great circumspection, so as not to meet with a 
 surprise." He ordered General Heath, then on the 
 Hudson, "to collect boats, for the contingency of the 
 detail of a part of his forces to New Jersey" ; and also 
 instructed him, that "it had been determined in council 
 that he should move down toward New York with a con- 
 
FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN DEVELOPED. 157 
 
 siderable force, as if with a sudden design upon that 
 city." 
 
 On the seventh of January, the American army reached 
 Morristown ; where huts were erected and the Headquarters 
 of the Continental Army of the United States were estab 
 lished. That army was resting, and working ; working, 
 and resting, but its Commandcr-in-Chief knew no rest. 
 On the same day, additional orders were issued to Gen 
 eral Heath ; to General Lincoln, who had reached Peeks- 
 kill with four thousand Xew England militia ; and to 
 other officers, north and south, in anticipation of ulterior 
 movements through every probable field of the rapidly 
 expanding war. This was also the first occasion for 
 Washington s exercise of the high prerogative conferred 
 by Congress, full control of all military operations 
 without consultation with that body. 
 
 Washington could reprimand, when necessary ; while 
 always prompt to commend, when commendation Avas 
 both deserved and timely. Heath was before Fort Inde 
 pendence on the eighteenth day of January. General 
 Lincoln advanced by the Hudson River road ; General 
 Scott by White Plains ; and Generals Wooster and 
 Parsons, from New Rochelle and Westchester. A few 
 prisoners were taken at Valentine s Hill. General Heath, 
 with grave dignity, announced to the Hessian garrison of 
 two thousand men that he would allow them "twenty 
 minutes in which to surrender," or they must " abide the 
 consequences." Twenty minutes, thirty minutes, and 
 gradually, ten days elapsed. This large American force, 
 half-organized, as they were without barracks, in mid 
 winter, under conditions of terrible exposure endured it 
 all, without flinching, and hardest of all, unrelieved by 
 fighting. Suddenly, the Hessians made a sortie upon 
 the advanced regiment, and the whole army was retired. 
 Its fighting pluck had been frittered away. The com- 
 
158 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 bined divisions had arrived with admirable concert of 
 time. The plan was well-conceived and well-initiated ; 
 but failed, because a soldier was not in immediate com 
 mand. As a demonstration toward New York, it did 
 affect Howe s movements, and compelled him to keep his 
 forces well in hand ; but its chief purpose was not realized. 
 
 On the third day of February, the American Com- 
 mander-in-Chief again wrote to General Heath, as fol 
 lows : " This letter is additional to my public one of this 
 date. It is, to hint to you, and I do it with concern, that 
 your conduct is censured, and by men of sense and judg 
 ment who have been with you in the expedition to Fort 
 Independence, as being fraught with too much caution ; 
 by which the army has been disappointed and in some 
 degree disgraced. Your summons, as you did not 
 attempt to fulfil your threats, was not only idle, but far 
 cical, and will not fail of turning the laugh exceedingly 
 upon us." 
 
 During the winter and spring, the skirmishes were fre 
 quent, and often with benefit to the American troops. 
 They began to acquire confidence, and the conviction that, 
 man for man, on fair terms, they were a match for either 
 British or Hessians, and did not care which invited a 
 fight. Washington issued a counter-proclamation to that 
 which Howe promulged when the American army ad 
 vanced into New Jersey ; and then, all offensive opera 
 tions of the British army came to a sudden halt. 
 
 The eminently impartial Italian historian, Botta, thus 
 sums up his description of this offensive movement : 
 
 "Washington, having received a few fresh battalions, 
 and his little army having recovered from their fatigue, 
 soon entered the field anew, and scoured the whole country 
 as far as the Raritan. He even crossed the river and entered 
 the county of Essex ; made himself master of Newark, of 
 Elizabethtown, and finally of Woodbridge ; so that he 
 
FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN DEVELOPED. 159 
 
 commanded the entire coast of New Jersey in front of 
 Staten .Island. 
 
 " He so judiciously selected his positions, and fortified 
 them so formidably, that the royalists shrunk from all 
 attempts to dislodge him from any of them." . 
 " But the British army, after having overrun, victoriously, 
 the State of New Jersey quite to the Delaware, and caused 
 even the City of Philadelphia to tremble for its safety, 
 found itself now restricted to the only posts of Brunswick 
 and Amboy, which, moreover, could have no communica 
 tion with New York, except by sea. 
 
 "Thus, by an army almost reduced to extremity, Phila 
 delphia was saved ; Pennsylvania protected ; New Jersey 
 nearly recovered ; and a victorious army laid under the 
 necessity of quitting all thoughts of acting offensively, in 
 order to defend itself." 
 
CHAPTER XVT. 
 
 THE AMERICAN BASE OF OPERATIONS ESTABLISHED. 
 
 THE SECOND NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN. 
 
 THE narrative of Washington s career as a Soldier, up 
 to the time when he foiled the best efforts of Howe 
 and Cornwallis to capture his weary band of Continentals 
 and militia, has been a continuous story of love of country 
 and devotion to her brave defenders. The most assidu 
 ous care for their discipline, their health, their moral de 
 portment, and their loyalty to duty, has been the burden 
 of his soul. Pleading, remonstrance, and even reprimand, 
 however earnest and pungent, have never worn a selfish 
 garb, nor breathed of arrogance or fitful temper. Pre 
 sumptuous denunciations by his chief antagonist have 
 never impaired the dignity of his carriage, his felicity of 
 utterance, nor the serenity of his faith. 
 
 The indiscretions of his subordinates, their jealousies, 
 and their weaknesses, have been so condoned, or accom 
 modated to the eventful hours of camp or field service, 
 that while he rests in camp, during the opening week of 
 the second year of battling with the might of Britain, he 
 has in mind, only words of thanksgiving for mercies real 
 ized, and a bold challenge to the American Congress and 
 the American people for men and means whereby to make 
 their sublime Declaration of Independence a realized fact. 
 
 And yet, never before has there gathered about his 
 pathway such ominous mutterings of a threatening tem 
 pest. It is no longer the spectacle of a half-organized 
 
 160 
 
AMERICAN BASE OF OPERATIONS ESTABLISHED. [(}{ 
 
 army parrying the strokes of a compact enemy, well 
 equipped for war. He has halted, faced the foe, and as 
 sumed the aggressive. Washington has been fencing. 
 His first lunge in return draws blood. He will fight to 
 the finish. 
 
 Already, he understands that his first New Jersey cam 
 paign indicates the real field of endeavor in which the 
 fate of his country is to be settled. Whatever may be in 
 store of sacrifice, or battle, he must now plan for victory ; 
 and to ensure its happy realization, he must so neutralize 
 the domination of New York, that its occupation, whether 
 by himself or Great Britain, will cease to be a controlling 
 factor in the momentous struggle. 
 
 Even the battle-issue is no longer to be with its strong 
 garrison ; but from Lake Cham plain to Savannah, along 
 the entire Atlantic coast, and wherever great cities or 
 seaboard towns fight strongest for liberty, he is to be 
 their standard-bearer ; and there the people are to bleed 
 and triumph. Like Habib in the Arabian tale, when he 
 drew from its scabbard the talismanic sword of Solomon, 
 and there flashed upon the glittering steel the divine word 
 "Power," so he had the faith to know that " the substance 
 of things hoped for " was to be the trophy won. 
 
 Thus far, the recital of marchings and fightings has 
 proved his ability to command the confidence of his 
 countrymen, of Congress, and of disinterested mankind. 
 Hereafter, the details of battles must be relegated to 
 fuller records ; and this account will be more closely 
 restricted to the potential part borne by him in their con 
 duct, general management, and improvement. 
 
 A reference to the accompanying map will furnish a 
 simple key to the progress of the War for American In 
 dependence. Concentric circles about New York, as a 
 radius point, indicate the immediate sweep of the British 
 arm of offence. Similar circles about Morristown and 
 
162 ,rn< WASHINGTON THE SQLDIER, 
 
 Middlebrook indicate, that as a fortified centre this 
 section, like the hub of a wheel, would endanger 
 along its divergent spokes all operations out from New. 
 Yprk as far up the Hudson River as West Point, and 
 throughout the Province of New Jersey. It would 
 compel Great Britain to maintain a permanent garrison 
 of sufficient strength for all such excursions; and a cor 
 respondingly large, half-idle fotfce for the protection of 
 its own/ headquarters and its general depot of supplies. 
 It was like a mountain peak for an observatory ; and 
 such was the systematic organization of scouts, mes 
 sengers and runners, in the confidence and pay of the 
 American Commander-in-Chief, that almost daily infor 
 mation was furnished him of the minutest occurrence 
 in and about the British headquarters; and a regular 
 Shipping List was supplied by competent spies, of 
 every movement of British men-of-war, transports, and 
 tenders, as far out as Sandy Hook. 
 
 One of the most noteworthy facts connected witli the 
 American civil conflict of 18Gl- 65, was the measure 
 ment of generals on either side by knowledge of 
 their antecedent education, qualities and characteristics. 
 McClellan would have taken Vicksburg, as surely as did 
 General Grant : the mathematics of a siege are irresist 
 ible. But he never could have marched to the sea, as did 
 Sherman, or swept like a tornado to the rear of Lee, as 
 did Sheridan. It appears from the correspondence of 
 Washington, that he carefully studied the antecedents 
 and followed the operations of his chief antagonists ; that 
 in several of the most critical periods of the war he antic 
 ipated their plans as fully as if he had shared their con 
 fidence in advance. But he did not merely interpret the 
 lessons of campaigns as objectives for his own action. 
 He penetrated the secret chambers of Howe s brain. He 
 cross-examined himself: "If I were: in Howe s place 
 
ASSIGNMENTS AND MINOR INCURSIONS. KJ3 
 
 what would I do? " "In his own place, what will Howe 
 do? " " What must the British Ministry do, to conquer 
 America in the way of ships, men, and money?" "Can 
 they do it?" "Can they risk their West India Colonies, 
 by the diversion of adequate means to conquer America? " 
 The expectancies of aid from France , partly realized through 
 the purchase of arms and munitions of war as early as 
 1776, were never out of his thought. To maintain one 
 central army intact, and wear out his adversary, was the 
 pivot on which hinged American destiny. In the hills of 
 New Jersey he worked this problem to its solution. 
 
 Washington remained at the Morristown headquarters 
 until the twenty-fourth of May. 
 
 On the twenty-first day of January, Howe withdrew 
 two thousand troops from Newport, R.I., to reenforce 
 the garrison of New York. Generals Spencer and 
 Arnold, then at Providence, R.I., with about four thou 
 sand troops, were ordered by Washington, whenever 
 practicable, to attempt the capture of Newport ; but they 
 regarded their force as inadequate for the purpose. Gen 
 eral Parsons, then upon recruiting service in Connecticut, 
 was also instructed to make a descent upon Long Island : 
 but his force was hardly equal to the movement, for want 
 of suitable boats. All these external signs of American 
 watchfulness and activity were as nettles to irritate the 
 British Commander-in-Chief, while he sat, powerless, in 
 his sumptuous headquarters at New York. 
 
 Knox was sent by Washington to Massachusetts to en 
 list a battalion of artillery, and during his trip mentioned 
 Springfield. as the proper site for the establishment of a 
 laboratory and gun-factory. General Schuyler, of the 
 northern army, was instructed to draw from New England 
 the entire force required to resist the anticipated advance 
 of Carleton from Canada. Washington assigned as a 
 
 o o 
 
 special reason for this limitation, that "troops of extreme 
 
164 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 sections could not be favorably combined." Besides this, 
 he proportionately relieved New England from sending 
 troops of her own from her borders, which would be most 
 exposed in case the invasion from Canada materialized. 
 General Maxwell was stationed at Elizabethtown to watch 
 tories and the movements of the British. Orders were 
 issued repressing plundering done by the militia, of which 
 complaint had been made. Similar outrages had been 
 perpetrated by British and Hessian troops in the vicinity 
 of New York ; and Washington followed up his .own ideas 
 of civilized warfare, by sending to General Howe a pro 
 test, and a demand for similar remedial action on his 
 part. 
 
 At this period, a correspondence occurred as to the 
 position of General Charles Lee, then a prisoner of war 
 in General Howe s custody. It was for a time quite in 
 doubt whether Lee would be treated as a prisoner of war, 
 or be shot as a deserter from the British , army. The 
 pledge of Washington, that he would hang an officer of 
 equal rank if Lee were executed, ultimately secured 
 Lee s exchange. 
 
 During the month of March, a ship from France landed 
 at Portsmouth, N.H., another invoice of military sup 
 plies ; and a second soon after reached Philadelphia with 
 a large cargo. These timely accessions of material of 
 war amounted to twenty-three thousand fusees, one thou 
 sand barrels of powder, and blankets and other stores. 
 
 On the second of March, Washington communicated 
 to Robert Morris, of Philadelphia, some of his personal 
 studies of General Howe and his plans. The following 
 are pertinent extracts : 
 
 " General Howe cannot, by the best intelligence I have 
 been able to get, have less than ten thousand men in New 
 Jersey, and on board of transports at Amboy. Our 
 number does not exceed four thousand. His are well- 
 
ASSIGNMENTS AND MINOR INCURSIONS. 105 
 
 disciplined, well-officered and well-supplied ; ours, raw 
 militia, badly officered and under no government. His 
 numbers cannot be, in short time, augmented ; ours must 
 be, very considerably, and by such troops as we can have 
 some reliance on, or the game is at an end. His situation 
 as to horses and forage is bad, very bad ; but will it be 
 better? No, on the contrary, worse ; and therefore, if for 
 no other, to shift quarters. General Howe s informants 
 are too numerous, and too well acquainted, to suffer, him 
 to remain in ignorance of them. With what propriety, 
 then, can he miss so favorable an opportunity of striking 
 a capital stroke against a city from which we draw so 
 many advantages, the carrying of which would give such 
 eclat to his arms, and strike such a damp to ours. Nor 
 is his difficulty of moving so great as is imagined. All the 
 heavy baggage of the army, their salt provisions, flour 
 and stores, might go round by water, while their superior 
 numbers would enable them to make a sweep of the 
 horses for many miles around them, not already taken off 
 by us." 
 
 The separate movements suggested by Washington, 
 some of which have been referred to, indicated his pur 
 pose to keep officers in the field wherever there promised 
 opportunity for aggressive action, while at the same time 
 enuring the militia to active field service. 
 
 O 
 
 Although Congress had granted the Commander-in-Chief 
 
 O O O 
 
 full powers for the conduct of the war, it did assert its 
 general prerogatives very freely in the matter of promo 
 tions and appointments without consulting him. Ambi 
 tion for rapid promotion and honorable commands was as 
 conspicuous then as since. The promotions made during 
 the month of March were a source of much jealousy 
 and bitter conflict. Among the new Major-Generals, much 
 to Washington s disgust, the name of Arnold was omitted. 
 General Wooster was at home in command of the Con- 
 
166 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 necticut militia, having resigned his commission in the 
 regular service. Gen. George Clinton was assigned to 
 
 o o o 
 
 command the forts in the Highlands ; and General Mc- 
 Doujjall succeeded General Heath at Peekskill. General 
 
 o 
 
 Sullivan considered these details as so many independent 
 commands ; and fretted over it so constantly and freely, 
 that Washington administered a rebuke which illustrates 
 the directness and frankness with which he handled such 
 provoking interruptions of the domestic harmony of the 
 army. He writes as follows : ff Why these unreasonable 
 and unjustifiable suspicions, which can answer no other 
 end than to poison your own happiness and add vexation 
 to that of others? I know of but one separate command, 
 properly so-called, and that is in the Northern Depart 
 ment ; and General Sullivan, General St. Clair, or any 
 other general officer at TicOnderoga, will be considered 
 in no other light, while there is a superior officer in the 
 department, than if he were placed at Chatham, Basken- 
 ridge or Princeton. I shall quit, with an earnest expos 
 tulation that you will not suffer yourself to be teased 
 with evils that only exist in the imagination, and with 
 slights that have no existence at all ; keeping it in mind, 
 that if there are to be several distinct armies to be formed, 
 there are several gentlemen before you in point of rank 
 who have a right to claim preference." 
 
 General Greene was sent to Congress to urge relief for 
 the suffering army; and all governors were urged to 
 furnish supplies and troops for the ensuing campaign. 
 
 On the twenty-fifth of April, Governor Try on of New 
 York made an incursion into Connecticut with two thousand 
 men, and fought with Wooster and Arnold at Ridgefield ; 
 where Arnold distinguished himself, and Wooster was mor 
 tally wounded. The loss of sixteen hundred tents was 
 also a serious affair at the time. General Greene was 
 despatched to inspect the Highlands and its defences. A 
 
THE SECOND NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN. 167 
 
 British fleet had ascended the Hudson as far as Peekskill ; 
 and as spring advanced, every possible preparation was 
 made for active duty, in all departments where British 
 troops could gain access by land or sea. On the twenty- 
 third of May, Colonel Meigs crossed from Guilford to 
 Long Island, and destroyed twelve brigs and sloops, one 
 of them carrying twelve guns, and a large quantity of 
 British stores, the small detachment guard having been 
 recalled to New York two days before. 
 
 It had become apparent to Washington that General 
 Howe, having withdrawn so many troops from advanced 
 posts, would enter New Jersey in force ; and on the 
 twenty-ninth of May, he moved his headquarters to the 
 well-fortified position at Middlebrook. On the seventh of 
 June, Arnold was placed in command at Philadelphia, to 
 act with General Mifflin in anticipation of Howe s possible 
 movement in that direction. On the twelfth, General 
 Howe, reenforced by two additional regiments recalled 
 from Newport, R.I., marched from Brunswick towards 
 Princeton with an aggregate force of seventeen thousand 
 men. 
 
 This second New Jersey campaign was short in dura^ 
 tion, and of small results. Howe intrenched near Somer 
 set Court House, where the Raritan River was not ford- 
 able ; and neither army could attack the other. He was 
 between Washington and Philadelphia. It was a chal 
 lenge to the abandonment of Middlebrook, risking an 
 open, circuitous march, if the American army intended to 
 prevent a British movement upon the American capital. 
 Howe expected to cut off the division of Sullivan, which 
 was at Princeton, but that officer had moved to the hills 
 to the north-west, near Flemington. Cornwallis advanced 
 as far as Hillsborough, when he found that no enemy 
 remained at Princeton. The British left was on the 
 Millstone, and their right rested at Brunswick. A glance 
 
168 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 at the map " Operations in New Jersey" will show that 
 any movement of the American army to the west or 
 south-west would uncover their defences at Middlebrook 
 to any attack by the road running due north from Bruns 
 wick. Washington, anticipating the possibility of a gen 
 eral action, and resolved to select a good opportunity 
 to bring it on, ordered all of the Continental troops at 
 Peekskill, except one thousand effective men, to march 
 in three divisions, at one day s interval, under Generals 
 Parsons, McDougall and Glover, to his support ; the first 
 two columns to bring, each, two pieces of artillery. 
 
 It certainly w r as General Howe s impression that Wash 
 ington would have such fears for the safety of Philadel 
 phia as to risk an action south of the Rarita.n. On the 
 succeeding fifth of July he wrote to Lord Germaine, that 
 his " only object was to bring the American army to a 
 general action." But Washington only strengthened his 
 works, and never believed that Howe was making Phila 
 delphia the object of his movement. The following letter 
 explains his views : " Had they designed for the Dela 
 ware, on the first instance, they probably would have 
 made a secret, rapid march of it, and not have halted as 
 they have done, to awaken our attention and give us time 
 for obstructing them. Instead of this, they have only 
 advanced to a position to facilitate an attack on our right : 
 which is the part they have the greatest likelihood of 
 injuring us in. In addition to this consideration, they 
 have come out as light as possible, in leaving all their 
 baggage, provisions, boats, and bridges, at Brunswick, 
 which plainly contradicts the idea of their pushing for the 
 Delaware." 
 
 On the morning of the nineteenth, Howe suddenly re 
 turned to Brunswick. Greene and Maxwell were advanced 
 by Washington to a position between Brunswick and 
 Amboy. Howe marched early in the morning of the 
 
THE SECOND NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN. l(jy 
 
 twenty-second. Morgan and Wayne drove in the Hes 
 sian rear-guard upon the main army, after a spirited 
 skirmish. It had been Greene s intention to have Max 
 well strike the column near Piscataway. Washington 
 advanced his entire army as far as Quibbletown, now New 
 market, upon the advice of his officers that the retreat was 
 genuine ; yet not without a suspicion, afterward verified, 
 that the whole was a ruse to entice him from his strong 
 hold. 
 
 On the twenty-sixth, Howe put his whole army in mo 
 tion to resume the offensive. Cornwallis, with the ex 
 treme right, was to gain the passes to Middlebrook. 
 Four battalions, with six pieces of artillery, were to 
 demonstrate on Washington s left. Without further de 
 tails, the action is outlined as follows : Cornwallis found 
 himself confronted by Stirling. A lively skirmish ensued, 
 near Westfield, now Plainfield. The Americans were 
 overmatched in numbers, and lost nearly two hundred men 
 in casualties and prisoners, besides three brass guns, but 
 steadily fought on, while slowly retiring. Washington, 
 comprehending the whole movement, retired Maxwell s 
 Division, without loss, and regained the passes threatened ; 
 and the prolonged resistance of Stirling delayed Corn 
 wallis until too late for him to gain the American rear. 
 On the afternoon of the twenty-seventh, Cornwallis, after 
 a loss of seventy men, passed through Sampton un 
 opposed, and joined Howe who had already retired from 
 Washington s front. The American Commander-in-Chief 
 dictated the choice of battlefield. Howe, representing 
 Great Britain, declined his terms. On the thirtieth, 
 Howe crossed to Staten Island, and his last military opera 
 tions in New Jersey came to an end. He afterwards 
 claimed that his forces were numerically inferior to those 
 of Washington ; but both friends and critics, in the pro 
 tracted controversy which afterwards arose as to this 
 
170 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. . 
 
 costly and fruitless march into New Jersey, admit that 
 the disparity of force, in all respects, was with the Am 
 erican army. 
 
 The simple fact remains unobscured, that as General 
 Howe s acquaintance with Washington s methods matured, 
 he better appreciated his qualities as a Soldier. 
 
CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 BRITISH INVASION FROM CANADA. OPERATIONS ALONG THE 
 
 HUDSON. 
 
 OX the twentieth of June, Washington learned that 
 Burgoyne was approaching St. John s ; and that a 
 detachment of British and Canadian troops, accompanied 
 by Indians, had been organized for the occupation of the 
 Mohawk Valley, west of Albany, under Colonel St. Leger. 
 This would enable them to court the alliance of the 
 Six Nations," and to suppress the enlistment into the 
 American army of the scattered white population of 
 that region. On the same day, he ordered General 
 Putnam to hold in readiness to move up the river, at a 
 moment s notice, four regiments of Massachusetts troops 
 which were then at his headquarters at Peekskill, and 
 also to \ hire sloops at Albany for their transportation 
 northward. 
 
 The briefest possible history of these expeditions is all 
 that can rind space in this narrative. Lieutenant-General 
 Burgoyne left London on the twenty-ninth day of March, 
 and reached Quebec on the sixth day of May. He 
 promptly notified General Howe of his instructions, and 
 recognized Albany as his chief objective point, so soon as 
 he might recapture the posts on Lake Champlain, then 
 occupied by the American forces. The organization and 
 strength of the force with which he undertook his memo 
 rable campaign is noticed elsewhere. 1 His confident 
 
 1 See Appendix. ;. .... 
 
 171 
 
172 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 expectation of obtaining an adequate Canadian force of 
 teams, teamsters, axe-men, horses, wagons, and guides 
 familiar with the country, proved unwarranted. Instead 
 of two thousand, less than two hundred reported for duty. 
 This was not the fault of General Carleton, for of him 
 Burgoyne said, " He could not have done more for his 
 own brother " ; but the Canadians themselves Avere more 
 desirous of peace with their New^ England neighbors than 
 to be involved in war with them. The proclamation of 
 Burgoyne to the people of New England and New York 
 was arrogant and repellant, instead of being sympathetic 
 and conciliatory. Washington at once furnished the 
 antidote by the following : " Harassed as we are by un 
 relenting persecution ; obliged by every tie to repel vio 
 lence by force ; urged by self-preservation to exert the 
 strength which Providence has given us, to defend our 
 natural rights against the aggressor, we appeal to the 
 hearts of all mankind for the justice of our course ; its 
 event WQ leave with Him who speaks the fate of nations, 
 in humble confidence that as His omniscient eye taketh 
 note even of a sparrow that fallcth to the ground, so He 
 will not withdraw His confidence from a people who 
 humbly array themselves under His banner, in defence 
 of the noblest principles with which He has adorned 
 humanity." 
 
 General Burgoyne was equally infelicitous in his nego 
 tiations with the Iroquois, Algonquins, Abenagies and 
 Ottawa Indians, whom he met on the twenty-second day 
 of June. In fact, General Burgoyne had no sympathy 
 with the British policy which ordered the hire of Indian 
 allies. The following declaration stands to his perpetual 
 credit, and should appear in every volume that may ever 
 be published which refers to his campaign in America. 
 His words were these : " The Indian principle of war is 
 at once odious and unavailing, and if encouraged, I will 
 
BRITISH INVASION FROM CANADA. 173 
 
 venture to pronounce its consequences, will be sorely re 
 pented by the present age and be universally abhorred by 
 posterity." And afterwards, in the presence of the Earl 
 of Harrington, when St. Luc claimed that "Indians must 
 fight their own way, or desert," Burgoyne answered : " I 
 would rather lose every Indian than connive at their enor 
 mities." And still another incident is to be noticed, 
 especially as it places before the reader a very character 
 istic utterance of General Gates, his adversary in that 
 campaign. The latter wrote to General Burgoyne as fol 
 lows : "The miserable fate of Miss McCrea, massacred by 
 Indians, was peculiarly aggravated by her being dressed 
 to receive her promised husband, but met her murderers 
 instead, employed by you. Upward of one hundred men, 
 women and children, have perished by the hands of 
 ruffians to whom it is asserted you have paid the price of 
 blood." To this, the gallant general replied: "I would 
 not be conscious of the acts you presume to impute to 
 me, for the whole continent of America ; though the 
 wealth of worlds was in its bowels, and a paradise upon 
 its surface." 
 
 On the twenty-fifth of March, General Gates relieved 
 General Schuyler from command of the Northern Depart 
 ment ; but the latter was promptly restored, after present 
 ing his case before Congress. General Schuyler promptly 
 tendered to General Gates the command of Ticonderoga ; 
 but it was sneer ingly and disrespectfully declined. To a 
 requisition upon Washington for tents, made by Gates, 
 Washington replied : " As the northern troops are hutted, 
 the tents must be used for southern troops until a supply 
 can be obtained." The reply of Gates is an illustration 
 of his ambition and jealousy, and points the trend of his 
 subsequent career. It reads as follows : " Refusing this 
 army what you have not in your power, is one thing ; but 
 saying that this army has not the same necessities as the 
 
174 WASHINGTON THE -SOLDIER. 
 
 southern army, is another. I can assure your excellency, 
 the services of the northern army require tents as much 
 as any service I ever saw." To Mr. Lovell, of the New 
 England delegation in Congress, Gates wrote : " Either I 
 am exceedingly dull, or unreasonably jealous, if I do not 
 discover by the style and tenor of the letters from Morris- 
 town, how little I have to expect from thence. Generals 
 are like parsons, they are all for christening their own 
 child, first ; but let an impartial, moderating power decide 
 between us, and do not suffer southern prejudice to weigh 
 heavier in the balance than the northern." Washington, 
 of course, used the term " southern " simply in its geo 
 graphical sense ; but this subtle appeal to Congressmen by 
 Gates was exactly the counterpart of that of his most 
 intimate friend General Charles Lee ; and both alike, ulti 
 mately, paid the penalty of their unsoldierly conduct. 
 On the ninth of June, Gates took a "leave of absence " 
 and left the department. 
 
 Schuyler ordered all forts to be put in condition for 
 service ; appealed to the States to forward militia ; and on 
 the twentieth proceeded to inspect each post for himself. 
 Although the garrison of Fort Ticonderoga consisted of 
 only twenty-five hundred and forty-six Continental troops 
 and nine hundred militia, it was deemed advisable to 
 " protract defence until reinforcements could arrive, or the 
 stores be removed." St. Clair "did not consider it prac 
 ticable to fortify Sugar Loaf Hill," which, subsequently 
 occupied by Burgoyne, placed the garrison at his mercy. 
 Meanwhile, the personal inspection by Schuyler realized 
 his worst apprehensions as to the actual condition of the 
 troops in the Northern Department. Supplies, other than 
 pork and flour, had not been accumulated, and there was 
 nothing to sustain the belief of the American people that 
 Ticonderoga had been made a real fortress. Schuyler 
 hastened to Albany, to forward troops and supplies. 
 
BRITISH INVASION FROM CANADA. 175 
 
 St. Clair wrote as late as the last of June : " Should the 
 enemy attack us, they will go back faster than they came." 
 But on the first day of July, Burgoyne was before Ticon- 
 deroga, and St. Clair abandoned the post without pro 
 longed resistance. The absence of General Schuyler at 
 so critical a time was the subject of a Court of Inquiry, 
 called at his own request, in view of very harsh criticisms, 
 chiefly from New England ; but he was acquitted, with 
 "the highest honor for services already rendered." 
 
 The close observation of the American Commander- 
 in-Chief, and the movements of Burgoyne s army, drew 
 from him, when so many were despondent, the follow 
 ing extraordinary prophetic letter to General Schuyler, 
 dated July 22d : f Though our affairs have for some 
 days past worn a dark gloomy aspect, T yet look 
 forward to a fortunate and happy change. I trust 
 General Burgoyne s army will meet, sooner or later, 
 an important check ; and as I have suggested before 
 [letter of July 15th], that the success he has had, will 
 precipitate his ruin. From your accounts, he appears 
 to be pursuing that line of conduct which of all others is 
 most favorable to us : I mean, acting in detachments. 
 This conduct will certainly give room for enterprise on 
 our part and expose his parties to great hazard. Could 
 we be so happy as to cut one of them off, though it should 
 not exceed four, five, or six hundred men, it would inspirit 
 the people, and do away much of this present anxiety. 
 In such an event, they would lose sight of past misfort 
 unes, and, urged at the same time by a regard for their 
 own security, they would fly to arms and afford every aid 
 in their power." This forecast of the Battle of Benning- 
 ton was realized in its best promise: That battle, fought 
 on the sixteenth day of August, in which General Stark 
 and Colonel Warner won enviable renown, brought to the 
 former his well-earned promotion. Other nearly concur- 
 
17(> WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 rent events in the Mohawk Valley the gallant defence 
 of Fort Schuyler and the Battle of Oriskany, aroused 
 the militia to action ; and General Schuyler succeeded in 
 organizing and preparing for the field a force fully ade 
 quate to meet Burgoyne s entire force, with the assurance 
 of victory. That he was superseded by Gates, and lost 
 the command of the northern army on the eve of its antic 
 ipated triumph, was no discredit to him, but an inci 
 dent of political management which Washington himself, 
 at that period, was powerless to control. 
 
 On the seventeenth day of October, Burgoyne surren 
 dered his army, numbering five thousand seven hundred 
 and fifty-three men. The total strength of the American 
 army opposed to him was eighteen thousand six hun 
 dred and twenty-four ; of which number nine thousand 
 nine hundred and ninety-three Continental troops, besides 
 militia, were present. 
 
 Of the incidents most memorable in the entire cam 
 paign, was the monumental daring of Arnold on the 
 seventeenth of September. Tedious discussions have in 
 vain attempted to deny him due credit for bravery at a 
 critical hour of that battle-issue ; as if his subsequent 
 treason were to be reflected back to his discredit. His 
 eventual promotion, and the congratulations of Washing 
 ton when it was attained, and the latest duly authenticated 
 documents, are conclusive in his favor. 
 
 This brief outline of the invasion of Burgoyne only 
 intensifies the interest with which the mind returns to the 
 headquarters of the American Commander-in-Chief. 
 Every possible effort had been made by him, and with 
 success, to supply the northern army with men and means 
 to meet that invasion. The side issues, especially that 
 of Bennington, had, as Washington predicted, imparted 
 courage to other Colonies than those which were immedi 
 ately affected ; for the cause was the common cause of alL 
 
BRITISH INVASION FROM CANADA. 177 
 
 The location of Washington s headquarters in the fastnesses 
 of New Jersey had already so restricted the movements of 
 the garrison at New York, and threatened the city itself, 
 as to prevent the promised support which Burgoyne had 
 regarded as essential to the success of his invasion. A 
 careful perusal of his evidence before the House of Com 
 mons, his field-notes, itineraries, and correspondence 
 with General Howe and the British War Office, leave no 
 doubt that he regarded his movement as having for its 
 ultimate result the entire control of the Hudson River 
 and the practical conquest of New England. But Gen 
 eral Howe, having in vain attempted to force the 
 American Commander-in-Chief to abandon New Jersey 
 and his perpetual menace to New York, or engage in a 
 general action without choice of time and place, resolved 
 to move by sea to Philadelphia and force him to fight for, 
 or lose without battle, the American seat of government 
 itself. His own views as to such an expedition are worthy 
 of notice. While practically ready to sail for the capture 
 of Philadelphia, he made other demonstrations, and wrote 
 a specious autograph letter, which was designed to reach 
 Washington, and put him off his guard. Washington 
 was not deceived by it. It reads as follows, addressed 
 to General Burgoyne : 
 
 NEW YORK, July 2, 1777. 
 
 DEAR SIR : I received your letter of the 14th of May from Que 
 bec, and shall fully observe its contents. The expedition to B 
 
 [Boston] will take the place of that up the North River. If, accord 
 ing to my expectations, we may succeed rapidly in the possession of 
 
 B [Boston] , the enemy having no force of consequence there, I 
 
 shall, without loss of time, proceed to cooperate with you in the de 
 feat of the rebel army opposed to you. Clinton is sufficiently strong 
 to amuse Washington and Putnam. I am now making a demonstra 
 tion southward, which I think will have the full effect in carrying 
 our plan into execution. Success attend you. 
 
 W. HOWE. 
 
178 WASHINGTON THE .SOLDIER. 
 
 The allusion of Howe to General Putnam indicated a 
 better knowledge of the methods of that officer than 
 appreciation of the character of Washington. The head 
 quarters of General Putnam, who then commanded the 
 Highland range of the defences of the Hudson, were at 
 Peekskill. Forts Clinton and Montgomery were located 
 upon a high spur of the range, on the west side of the 
 river, separated by the Poplen, a small creek. Both 
 were above the range of guns from ships-of-war, and 
 so surrounded by ravines and crags as to be difficult of 
 approach, even by land. A boom and heavy chain ex 
 tended from the foot of the cliff to a sharp promontory 
 opposite, known as " St. Anthony s Nose." So many 
 troops had been sent to the support of Gates, that the 
 garrison consisted mainly of militia. Advices had 
 already been received that an expedition had been or 
 ganized at New York for a diversion of troops from any 
 further reinforcement of the American Northern army. 
 Governor Clinton therefore ordered a considerable militia 
 force to report to General Putnam for strengthening the 
 garrisons of the river posts. But General Putnam fur- 
 loughed the men during harvest and seeding, because the 
 New York garrison seemed to rest so peacefully in their 
 city quarters. Hearing of this extensive furlough, 
 Governor Clinton promptly modified his own order, 
 allowing one-half to remain upon their farms ; but for 
 the other half to report at Peekskill and the forts named. 
 Before this modified order could take effect, the expedition 
 of Clinton was under way ; while the entire force assembled 
 at the two forts was less than six hundred and fifty men. 
 
 Clinton s expedition left New York on the third of 
 October, and intentionally " made every appearance of 
 their intention to land only at Fort Independence and 
 Peekskill." Putnam and ; his army, and his immediate 
 surroundings, on the east bank of the Hudson, were osten- 
 
OPERATIONS ALONG THE HUDSON. 179 
 
 tatiously announced as Clinton s objective, and Putnam 
 acted upon that basis. Governor Clinton was not so de 
 ceived, but adjourned the Legislature, then in session at 
 Kingston, and hastened to Fort Montgomery to assist 
 in its defence, and advise its garrison as to the available 
 approaches to the post through the mountains, with which 
 he was familiar. (See map, " Attacks of Forts Clinton 
 and Montgomery.") 
 
 Both Governor Clinton at Montgomery and Gen. 
 James Clinton at Fort Clinton distinguished themselves 
 by a stubborn resistance and great gallantry ; but both 
 posts were taken on the night of the fifth. The American 
 loss was nearly three hundred killed, wounded and miss 
 ing ; and two hundred and thirty-seven were taken pris 
 oners. The British loss was forty killed and one hundred 
 and fifty-one wounded. General Clinton was wounded 
 in a bayonet charge, but escaped to the mountains ; and 
 Governor Clinton escaped by a skiff and joined Putnam. 
 That officer was so confident of attack upon his own posi 
 tion that he had fallen back to the heights behind Peeks- 
 kill. He thought it impracticable to leave that position 
 to attack General Clinton, who first landed upon the east 
 side of the river, but did make a reconnoissance south 
 ward when too late. He says, in his Report : " On 
 my return from this reconnoissance with General Par 
 sons we were alarmed by a very heavy and hot firing, 
 both of small-arms and cannon, at Fort Montgomery. 
 Upon which, I immediately detached five hundred men 
 to reenforce the garrison ; but before they could possibly 
 cross to their assistance, the enemy, superior in numbers, 
 had possessed themselves of the fort." 
 
 The British advanced above Peekskill and destroyed 
 some stores at Connecticut Village, and General Vaughan 
 destroyed Esopus (Kingston). The forts were dis 
 mantled, and General Clinton returned to New York. 
 
180 WASHINGTON THfc SOLDIER. 
 
 General Putnam, reenforced By militia from Connecti 
 cut, New York and New Jersey, soon rcoccupied Peeks- 
 kill ; where he was shortly afterwards strengthened by 
 Continental troops from the northern army. The pres 
 ence of an intelligent commanding officer of reasonable 
 military skill, or the absolute control of both posts by 
 Governor Clinton, would .have prevented their loss. 
 The limited range of this expedition of Sir Henry Clinton 
 confirms Stedman s statement, that he had no intention 
 of pressing north to the aid of General Burgoyne. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 PENNSYLVANIA INVADED. BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE. 
 
 THE British Commander-in-Chief entertained no 
 doubts of the success of Burgoyne s invasion from 
 Canada. His reiterated appeals to Britain for reenforce- 
 nients were not heeded, and he certainly knew that troops 
 could not be furnished up to his demand. But he still 
 hoped that the invasion from the north would so drain 
 New England and New York of their able-bodied militia, 
 as to render it impossible for either section to forward its 
 respective full quota to the Continental army of Wash 
 ington. Two campaigns into New Jersey had sufficiently 
 satisfied him that he never could bend Washington to his 
 knees ; and yet he must get Washington away from his 
 position near New York, and then defeat that army 
 utterly, before British supremacy could be restored. This 
 conviction, once before noticed, was reflected in a letter 
 to Lord Germaine, from which extracts have interest. 
 He had " not overlooked New England," but says in this 
 letter, that " Burgoyne s movement would draw Washing 
 ton s army northward, where the population was dense 
 and the spirit of defence was animated." " In Connecti 
 cut," he continues, "there was no object for which he 
 would be willing to risk a general action ; and only two 
 or three places upon the coast of Long Island Sound could 
 be kept in the winter." But he adds that, if his " reen- 
 forcements had been forthcoming, New England would 
 have had a share "in the general operations of the cam- 
 
 & 
 
 181 
 
182 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 paign, while the main army acted toward the southward." 
 rt To have moved up the Hudson, in force, would have 
 imperiled New York, or sacrificed all other operations 
 to a union with Burgoyne, who was expected to force his 
 own way to Albany." ! To enter Pennsylvania, was not 
 only to assail the capital, but attempted the surest road 
 to peace, the defeat of the rebel army." 
 
 All these considerations, thus tersely communicated to 
 the British Government, were sound in military policy ; 
 and yet all of them had been anticipated by the American 
 Commander-in- Chief, as prudent on the part of General 
 Howe. Even very insignificant incidents were weighed 
 by him, as of determining value in a nearly balanced 
 scale ; so that the number, character and distribution of 
 pickets from the New York garrison became valuable 
 indications to the keen espionage with which Washing 
 ton conducted his search for the real intent of General 
 Howe s published or unpublished designs. 
 
 The British fleet had actually sailed from New York 
 before Washington received Howe s letter of the second. 
 Clinton returned to the city on the tenth. On the 
 fifteenth, an express from Burgoyne informed General 
 Howe of the capture of Ticonderoga, and stated, that tf his 
 army was in good health, and [which was never realized] 
 that Ticonderoga would be garrisoned by troops from 
 Canada, which would leave his force complete for further 
 operations." Howe s expedition southward left New York 
 on the twenty-third of July, and did not arrive off the 
 Delaware until the thirtieth. 
 
 Upon the first disappearance of the fleet, Washington, 
 suspecting some ruse its possible return and a move 
 ment in support of Burgoyne, or a descent upon New 
 England, or even New Jersey, started his army for 
 Coryell s Ferry ; to be ready to march northward, or 
 eastward, in the prospect of an active campaign. When 
 
PENNSYLVANIA INVADED. 183 
 
 assured that the entire fleet had positively sailed south 
 ward, he marched with exceeding celerity to Philadelphia. 
 Active measures were initiated for gathering the militia, 
 sinking obstructions in the Delaware, and picketing 
 every spot along the river which might be utilized for the 
 landing of troops. But the appearance of the British 
 fleet in Delaware Bay, its speedy withdrawal, and its 
 long absence clue to contrary w T inds, foiled all calcu 
 lations of Washington as to its ultimate destination. At 
 a Council of War, held on the twenty-first of August, it 
 was unanimously concluded that Howe had sailed for 
 Charleston, S.C. But, on the twenty-second, at half- 
 past one in the afternoon, Washington received the fol 
 lowing despatch from President Hancock : "This moment 
 an express arrived from Maryland with an account of near 
 two hundred sail of General Howe s fleet being anchored 
 in Chesapeake Bay." 
 
 This information was received with the most intense in 
 terest. In the face of slow enlistments, scarcity of funds, 
 and deficiencies in clothing and all military supplies, the 
 transfer of British military operations from the Hudson 
 w r as regarded as an indication that New Jersey had been 
 substantially recovered from British aggression, and that 
 Washington had outgeneraled his adversary. The opera 
 tions of Burgoyne northward could be taken care of by the 
 rapidly increasing flow of New England militia to resist 
 his advance ; and the Pennsylvania people were wide awake. 
 
 The army of Washington paraded through Philadelphia, 
 gayly decorated with evergreens. The enthusiasm of the 
 soldiers, rank and file, received fresh inspiration from the 
 almost wild demonstrations of thousands who bordered 
 their course of march. Incessant cheering, loud greet 
 ings of encouragement, as well as bountiful gifts of deli 
 cacies and of useful conveniences for the camp or march, 
 sent them forward hopeful and happy. 
 
184 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 The American army which finally marched against 
 General Howe s well equipped force of nearly eighteen 
 thousand men was of the nominal strength of fourteen 
 thousand ; but the entire roster added up not quite 
 eleven thousand " effectives, present for duty." 
 
 The thoughtful reader, of whatever age or training, is 
 prompted to linger here a moment, and catch a parting 
 view of this column of earnest men, so proudly and joy 
 fully marching to meet in battle the magnificent array of 
 Britain s chief captains and most honored battalions, the 
 famous Grenadiers of Hanau, and the dragoons and lancers 
 of Hesse. When all are waiting for the advance, who is 
 that man who swiftly rides past the column to its front, 
 erect in saddle, calm, self-reliant, imposing in presence, 
 and with face radiant in confidence and trust? What sort 
 of faith is that which inspires the utterance, which rings 
 like that of the Hebrew Captain when about to face the 
 horsemen and chariots of the P^gyptian Pharaoh : " Tell 
 the people that they go forward " ? How dare this Ameri 
 can soldier reckon upon chances for victory in such an 
 unequal measurement of physical force, unless he discern; 
 through plainest garb, the proof-panoply of those whose 
 cause is just? And whence the inspiration of those men 
 of brawn, whose nerves seemed turned to steel, that they 
 are so firmly and confidently ready to enter into the try 
 ing ordeal of battle. 
 
 It i8 the Continental Army of America, with Washing 
 ton in command! 
 
 Only short halts at Derby, Chester and Wilmington 
 delayed their march ; and after each halt, that single word, 
 " Forward ! " as it ran down the lines, brigade after brigade, 
 again brought shouts from spectators and soldiers alike. 
 
 General Sullivan, who had been detained in New Jersey 
 to make an attack upon the British posts on Staten Island 
 which failed of its anticipated success, joined; the com- 
 
PENNSYLVANIA INVADED. 185 
 
 luand just in time for Brandywine. There was no timidity 
 in this advancing army. Every heart beat with steady 
 cadence. Maxwell, with a selected corps of one hundred 
 men from each brigade, supplied the place of Morgan s 
 Rifles, then with the northern army. He pushed forward 
 even to Elk River, accompanied by the youthful Lafay 
 ette, hoping to save some stores gathered there before the 
 British could effect a landing, and possibly to obstruct 
 the landing itself. 
 
 This was on September third ; but too late to save the 
 stores, for the British were already encamped. A sharp 
 skirmish with Cornwallis was reported by General rllbwe 
 to have resulted in a British loss of two officers and 
 twenty-two men, killed or wounded. 
 
 On the seventh, the entire army reached Newport, arid 
 took position along Red Clay Creek. On the same day, 
 General Howe occupied Iron Hill, within eight miles 
 of Red Clay, and again the American Rifles hajl a skir 
 mish with the British advance. These picked men delib 
 erately took up position after position, and only yielded 
 to superior force as they slowly retired. The confidence 
 of Washington was everywhere fully realized. On the 
 eighth, the British army demonstrated in force ; with view 
 to turning the right of Washington, and to cut him oft* 
 from communication with Philadelphia. At half-past 
 nine of the morning of the ninth, pursuant to the unani 
 mous vote of a council of officers, Washington took up a 
 new position, selected by General Greene, on the east 
 bank of the Brandywine and on high ground, just back 
 of Chadd s Ford, and commanding the Chester and Phila 
 delphia road. The Battle of Brandywine followed. The 
 space which has been allowed for this narrative can admit 
 only such leading incidents as unfold Washington s gen 
 eral management, and the ultimate results. 
 
 A reference to the map will aid the; reader to under- 
 
180 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 stand the relative positions of the opposing armies. The 
 American army was on the eastern bank of the river, 
 which was quite rugged of approach and easily defended. 
 Its left wing, southward, began with Armstrong s Penn 
 sylvania militia. At the next ford, Chadd s, and nearly 
 as far as Brinton s, are Weedon, Muhlenburg and Wayne, 
 with Proctor s artillery in their rear, behind light earth 
 works thrown up in haste. In their rear, on still higher 
 ground, is the reserve division of General Greene, with 
 Washington s headquarters. Next in order, up the river, 
 are the divisions of Sullivan, Stephen and Stirling, each 
 of two brigades with Sullivan in virtual command, and 
 Stirling, next in rank, commanding the right division 
 and practically reaching Jones Ford. Major Spear had 
 charge of scouts extended as far as the forks of the 
 Brandywine and the adjacent fords, both below and above 
 the forks. The upper ford, Jeffries, was not thoroughly 
 watched, and its distance almost precluded the liability 
 of its use. A road from Jones Ford runs perpendicularly 
 to the riyer, over to the Dilworth and Winchester road, 
 and just before reaching the Birmingham Meeting House, 
 passes high, rough and wooded ground, where the chief 
 fighting took place. The British encampment on the 
 tenth is indicated at the left of the map. 
 
 On the morning of the eleventh, Maxwell crossed at 
 Chadd s Ford ; advanced to Kennett Meeting House, and 
 skirmished with Knyphausen, until compelled by a supe 
 rior force to fall back to high ground near the river. 
 Porterfield and Waggoner crossed at his left and attacked 
 Ferguson s Rifles. Knyphausen brought up two brigades, 
 with guns ; and this force, with the Queen s Rangers, on 
 Knyphausen s extreme right, compelled both American 
 detachments to recross the river. The American casu 
 alties were sixty, and those of the Hessian and British 
 troops about one hundred and thirty. A fog along the 
 
BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE. 187 
 
 river had facilitated Maxwell s operations ; but it pre 
 vented the American scouts from gaining accurate data as 
 to the movements of the British. While Knyphausen was 
 demonstrating as if to force a crossing at Chadd s Ford, 
 Cornwallis was reported to be moving with five thousand 
 men and artillery toward a ford near the forks of the 
 Brandy wine. Bland had crossed at Jones Ford, between 
 nine and ten in the morning, and reported this movement 
 of Cornwallis. Washington ordered Sullivan to cross 
 and attack Cornw T allis, while he intended to cross at 
 Chadd s Ford, in person, and attack Knyphausen, assign 
 ing to General Greene an intermediate crossing, to strike 
 the left of the Hessian general. When the fog disap 
 peared, there was no evidence of the whereabouts of the 
 British column. It seemed hardly possible that it had 
 gone further up the river ; while, if it had joined Kny 
 phausen, the force was too strong to be attacked. Wash 
 ington therefore revoked his orders, and withdrew the 
 skirmish party that had already made the crossing. As a 
 matter of fact, the movement of Cornwallis was but a 
 flanking support to the advance of the entire British 
 army ; while Knyphausen s advance towards Chadd s 
 Ford, although prepared to cross, if opportunity favored, 
 was a ruse to draw attention from General Howe s splen 
 did manoeuvre. That officer left Kennett Square at day 
 light, marched seventeen miles, and by two o clock had 
 crossed the upper fork of the Brandy wine, and was 
 moving down upon the right of the entire American 
 army. 
 
 As soon as advised that the British were advancing, 
 
 o 
 
 Washington ordered Sullivan to bring the entire right 
 wing into position to oppose their progress. The woods 
 were dense and the surface was rocky, so that three divi 
 sions must swing back and present to the British advance 
 a new front, almost perpendicular to that with which they 
 
188 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 had previously faced the river. But it would bring them 
 to the high ground, before noticed, between Birmingham 
 Meeting House and the river. This movement, which 
 practically involved one of the most difficult elements of 
 Grand Tactics, defined in the Preface as the "Art of 
 handling force on the battlefield," was not within Gen 
 eral Sullivan s capacity. The best troops in the world 
 would have found it slow of execution, while no less 
 vital to success in the existing emergency. It required 
 of the division commanders just that kind of familiarity 
 with combined movements of brigades and divisions, 
 Avhich is required of regiments in a single brigade, or of 
 companies in a regiment. Sullivan could not at the 
 same time command the Grand Division, or Corps, and 
 his own division proper, unless able to place that division 
 in charge of a brigadier-general who was fully competent 
 to command a division. It is also to be borne in mind 
 that the woods, rocks, undergrowth, and suddenness of 
 the order complicated the movement. Stirling and 
 Stephen succeeded in gaining the new position, barely 
 in time to meet the assault of Cormvallis, without time 
 for intrenching to any effect. Sullivan s Division fell 
 into such disorder, that after sending four aides, and then 
 a personal appeal, he gave up the attempt to rally his 
 division. He says : " Some rallied, others could not be 
 brought even by their officers to do anything but fly." 
 Only three of his regiments those of Hazen, Dayton 
 and Ogden, ever reliable gained and firmly held the 
 new position throughout the battle. 
 
 The enemy, which had formed behind Osborne s Hill, 
 advanced rapidly, Cornwallis in the lead. The resistance 
 was stubborn and well maintained, as General Howe 
 admitted, from three o clock until sunset. Sullivan, upon 
 finding himself powerless to rally and move his own 
 division, while he was responsible for the entire combined 
 
BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE. 189 
 
 movement, went to the battlefield and was conspicuous 
 for bravery during the day. The resistance of Stirling 
 and Stephen was admirable ; but the brigade of Deborre, 
 a French general, broke and fled, in wild disorder. The 
 absence of Sullivan s Division left a gap on the American 
 left of nearly half a mile, and Deborre s cowardice shat 
 tered the right wing. 
 
 As soon as the right wing gave way, Washington 
 hastened, with Greene, to the front. There was no retreat 
 except toward Dilworth. By a direct march of nearly 
 four miles in fifty minutes, and a wheel to the left, of 
 half a mile, Washington was enabled to occupy a defile 
 from which to open a passage for the retreating battal 
 ions. He then closed in upon their rear, and prolonged 
 the resistance with vigor. In an orchard beyond Dil 
 worth, three regiments made another stand. Night sep 
 arated the tw T o armies. Stirling and Stephen saved both 
 artillery and baggage. Armstrong s brigade, on the ex 
 treme left, below Chadd s Ford, was not engaged : but, 
 together with Maxwell s, and Wayne, who was compelled 
 to abandon his guns, joined the main army, without fur 
 ther loss. They had, however, kept Knyphausen beyond 
 the river. The entire army fell back to Chester. The 
 American casualties were seven hundred and eighty, and 
 those of the British were six hundred. Lafayette lost 
 a horse, and was himself wounded, in this his first service 
 after receipt of his commission. 
 
 Deborre was dismissed for cowardice. Conflicts as to 
 the defective reconnoissance that nearly sacrificed the 
 army arose, which need not be discussed. In justice to 
 General Sullivan, Washington wrote a letter responsive 
 to his request for some testimonial to submit to Congress, 
 which is here given in part : " With respect to your other 
 query, whether your being posted on the right was to 
 guard that flank, and whether you had neglected it, I can 
 
190 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 only observe that the only obvious if not the declared pur 
 pose of your being there, implied every necessary pre 
 caution for the security of that flank. But it is at the 
 same time to be remarked, that all the fords above 
 Chadd s from which we were taught to apprehend danger 
 were guarded by detachments from your division, and 
 that we were led to believe by those whom we had every 
 reason to think well acquainted with the country, that no 
 ford above our picket-lines could be passed without mak 
 ing a very circuitous march." The British army re 
 mained on the field ; and the wounded of both armies were 
 properly cared for by General Howe. His skill as a 
 scientific soldier was again illustrated, as well as his habit 
 ual failure to follow up a first success ; but he was under 
 peculiar conditions which must have influenced his judg 
 ment. His army had left its ships, which had been 
 ordered to go to the Delaware ; as his objective was the 
 capture of Philadelphia, after first destroying the Ameri 
 can army. That army had retreated in remarkable order 
 and under good control. Humanity alone would have 
 persuaded Howe to care for the wounded, and a night 
 pursuit, of the Americans through that country, would 
 have been a wild venture. 
 
 Washington s despatch to President Hancock announc 
 ing his retreat to Chester, was dated from that place at 
 midnight, September 11, 1777. The wonderful presence 
 of mind of the American Comrnander-in-Chief, his aptitude 
 for emergencies, and his extraordinary capacity for mak 
 ing the most of raw troops, were never more thoroughly 
 evinced during his entire public career. The uneven 
 ground, dense woods, and facilities for good rifle-practice, 
 were features favorable to inspire his troops with special 
 resisting capacity : and it is not beyond a fair presump 
 tion to suggest that, if the main army had been allowed 
 two hours for fortifying their position, the British, accus- 
 
BATTLE OF BRAND YWINE. 191 
 
 tomed to fighting in close order, would have been repulsed. 
 It is certain that General Howe had skilful as well as will 
 ing guides, to secure to him, by so long a detour, his 
 surprise of Sullivan s right wing. That was part of the 
 same toryism of that period which a few days later, and 
 not far away, betrayed Wayne s forces, with great loss. 
 But with all the mistakes, and the retreat of the Ameri 
 can army, there was much of hope in the experience and 
 in the sequel of the Battle of Brandy wine. 
 
 NOTE. Lafayette, or LaFayette, makes his first appearance 
 in this battle. At that period " affix-names," derived from fiefs, 
 seigniories, or estates, long held by families, were emphasized. 
 Hence, La villa Faya, in Auvergne, when acquired, was added to 
 the family name Metier. In the parish register, now in the war 
 archives of France, the name is thus recorded : " Marie-Joseph- 
 Paul-Yves-Rock-Gilbert Dumotier Lafayette." He signed his name 
 Lafayette, and his grandsons, Senators Oscar and Edmond Lafayette, 
 followed his example. The permanent acceptance of the spelling 
 Lafayette is therefore fully warranted, and harmonizes with its use 
 for counties and cities in many of the States. 
 
 This gallant young volunteer in the cause of American Independ 
 ence, attended by Baron John De Kalb, and nine others, came to 
 America in the ship Victoire, chartered by himself; and on the 19th 
 of June, Lafayette wrote to his wife of his enthusiastic welcome at 
 Charleston, S.C. On the 27th of July, he reached Philadelphia. 
 He was commissioned Major-General by the American Congress, 
 and took his first seat at a Council of War, August 21st, when the 
 movement of the American army against Howe was under ad 
 visement. 
 
CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 WASHINGTON RESUMES THE OFFENSIVE. -- BATTLE OF 
 GEBMANTOWN. 
 
 "TTJ ASHINGTON marched directly to Philadelphia to 
 V V refit his army and secure ammunition and provi 
 sions, and thence marched to Germantown, " for one day 
 of rest." His confidence was not abated. The brave 
 soldiers who had left Philadelphia with such jubilant 
 anticipations of victory, were conscious of having fought 
 well against a superior force, and were never more willing 
 to honor the confidence of their Commander-in-Chief. 
 And Washington himself was not hurried, but system 
 atic and constantly in motion. On the thirteenth he 
 ordered Monsieur de Coudray to complete defensive works 
 along the Delaware River ; General Putnam, to forward 
 fifteen hundred Continental troops ; and General Arm 
 strong, to occupy the line of the Schuylkill, as well as to 
 throw up redoubts near its fords, in case he should find 
 it desirable to cross that river. 
 
 The left wing of General Howe s army demonstrated 
 toward Reading and Philadelphia. The right wing, under 
 Generals Grant and Cornwallis, reached Chester on the 
 thirteenth. General Howe had taken care of the wounded 
 of both armies, but was compelled to obtain surgeons from 
 Washington to assist in that duty. At Wilmington, he 
 captured the governor, and considerable coin which he 
 proposed to use for the benefit of the wounded of both 
 armies. Inasmuch as Grant and Cornwallis were practi- 
 
 192 
 
WASHINGTON RESUMES THE OFFENSIVE. 193 
 
 callv in the rear of the American army, lie proposed to 
 march to Philadelphia via Germantown ; and both threaten 
 the city, and cut off Washington from retreat northward 
 or westward. But, on the fifteenth, Washington crossed 
 the Sehuylkill at Swede s Ford ; so that Howe s halt, even 
 of a single day, on the battlefield, rendered it useless for 
 him to make a forced march to the city ; and his oppor 
 tunity was lost. 
 
 Washington moved out on the Lancaster road as far as 
 Warren tavern. Howe, watching his keen adversary, 
 advanced toward Westchester, and both armies prepared 
 for battle. Howe made a partly successful attempt to 
 throw the American army back upon the Sehuylkill River, 
 and both armies were prepared for action ; when a heavy 
 rain which nearly ruined the ammunition of the Ameri 
 cans, and " directly in the faces of the British troops," as 
 reported by Howe, averted battle. Washington left 
 Wayne, however, with fifteen hundred troops, in a strong 
 position at Paoli (Wayne s birthplace), with orders to 
 fall upon the British rear so soon as it should break camp, 
 and then moved to Yellow Springs and Warwick ; but 
 upon finding that Howe did not intend to attack Reading, 
 recrossed the Sehuylkill at Parkes Ford, and encamped on 
 thePerkiomy, September seventeenth. On the twentieth, 
 Wayne allowed himself to be surprised at night, through 
 the treachery of the country people, his old neighbors ; 
 and left more than three hundred of his force as prisoners 
 in the hands of General Gray, although saving his guns 
 and most of his baggage. General Smallwood s brigade, 
 left by General Washington for Wayne s support, and 
 encamped but a mile distant, failed to be in time to render 
 aid during the night attack. This disaster took all 
 pressure from Howe s army, and he moved on. Wash 
 ington reports as to Howe s movement : " They had got 
 so far the start before I received certain intelligence that 
 
194 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 tiny considerable number had crossed, that I found it in 
 vain to think of overtaking their rear, with troops har 
 assed as ours had been by constant marching since the 
 Battle of Brandy wine." Colonel Hamilton was sent to 
 Philadelphia to force a contribution of shoes from the in 
 habitants, as " one thousand of his army were barefooted." 
 
 The simplest possible recital of these days of active 
 marching, sufficiently indicates the character of those 
 brave troops whose confidence in Washington seemed as 
 responsive to his will as if his nervous activities embraced 
 theirs as well. 
 
 A small portion of the British left wing crossed at 
 ( Gordon s Ford on the twenty-second, and the main body 
 at Flatland Ford, on the twenty-third, reaching German- 
 town on the twenty-fifth. On the twenty-seventh, Corn- 
 wallis entered Philadelphia. Colonel Sterling of the 
 British army was sent to operate against the defences of 
 the Delaware, and the fleet of Admiral Howe was 
 already on its way to Philadelphia. 
 
 The boldness of Washington s attempt on the rear of 
 Howe s army, and all his action immediately after the 
 Battle of Brandy wine, were a striking indication of his 
 purpose to retain the gage of battle in his own hands. 
 He sent a peremptory order to General Putnam, who was 
 constantly making ill-advised attempts upon the out 
 posts of New York, to send him twenty-five hundred men 
 without delay ; and most significant of all, directed him 
 " so to use militia, that the posts in the Highland might 
 be perfectly safe." Congress immediately adjourned to 
 Lancaster, and then to York, after enlarging Wash 
 ington s powers ; and General Gates was ordered to send 
 Morgan s riflemen to headquarters. This, however, he 
 delayed to do until after the close of the northern cam 
 paign. 
 
 General Howe established his headquarters at German- 
 
BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN. 195 
 
 town, having been one month in marching from the head 
 of the Elk to Philadelphia, a distance of fifty-four miles. 
 x The town of Germantown consisted of a single street, 
 not so straight that a complete range of fire could reach its 
 entire length, nor so uniform in grade that a gun at Mt. 
 Aury, its summit, could have a clean sweep. The head 
 quarters of Washington were near Pennebeck Mills, 
 twenty miles from Philadelphia. At seven o clock of 
 the evening of October third, he moved with two-thirds 
 of his army by four roads which more or less directly 
 approached the British encampments, intending to gain 
 proximate positions, rest his troops, and attack the entire 
 British line at daybreak. The plan of the movement is 
 of interest for its boldness and good method. The inci 
 dents of the morning, which by reason of fog and other 
 mishaps rendered the battle less decisive, will not be 
 fully detailed. 1 The woods, ravines, and difficulties in 
 the way of clear recognition between friend and foe, in 
 that engagement, only enhance the value of the general 
 plan, and of the cool self-possession and control of his 
 army which enabled Washington to terminate the action 
 without greater loss. 
 
 Sullivan and Wayne, with Conway in advance as a 
 flanking corps, were to move directly over Chestnut Hill 
 and enter the town. Maxwell and Nash, under Major- 
 General Stirling, were to follow this column as a reserve. 
 Armstrong, with the Pennsylvania militia, was sent down 
 the Manatawny River road, to cross the Wissahickon 
 Creek, and fall upon the British left wing and rear. Greene 
 and Stephen, led and flanked by McDougalPs Brigade, 
 were to move by the Limestone Road, enter the village at 
 the Market House, and attack the British right wing. 
 Generals Small wood and Forman, with the Maryland and 
 New Jersey militia, were to follow the old York road until 
 
 1 See " Battles of the American Revolution," Chapter LI. 
 
196 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 \ 
 a convenient opportunity should bring them to the 
 
 extreme right and rear of the enemy. (See map.) 
 
 Washington accompanied Sullivan s command ; and 
 was able, from his advanced position, early in the fight, 
 to appreciate that by the failure of an identity of support 
 on the part of the most remote divisions, the withdrawal 
 of the army had become necessary. The occupation of 
 the stone building, known as the Chew House, on the 
 main street, had little significance ; except that it misled 
 the outlying divisions as to the real centre of conflict, and 
 detained the rear-guard and reserve longer than neces 
 sary. The concurrent action of all the assailing columns, 
 in the directions indicated by their orders, would have 
 made the issue a well-balanced question of victory or fail 
 ure. One single incident is mentioned. General Stephen 
 left Greene s command without orders, and moved toward 
 the sound of firing at the Chew House, only to find him 
 self firing into Wayne s command, which was in its right 
 place. He was dismissed, on charges of intoxication. 
 
 General Sullivan was in his best element when under 
 superior command ; and his conduct on this occasion was 
 admirable. His two aides were killed, and his division 
 rendered most efficient service. General Nash was among 
 the killed, and the American casualties numbered six hun 
 dred and seventy-three, besides four hundred and twelve 
 prisoners. 
 
 The British casualties were five hundred and thirty-five, 
 but among the killed were General Agnew and Lieuten 
 ant-Colonel Bird. 
 
 Washington regained Metuchen Hill, very little dis 
 turbed by the small detachments that hung upon his rear ; 
 and Howe returned to Philadelphia, abandoning his en 
 campment beyond the city limits. 
 
 The Battle of Germantown is a signal illustration of a 
 skilful design, and, at the same time, of the ease with 
 
i-4l 
 :! 
 
 /W^ * 
 
 J . J JiS 
 Ji 
 
BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN. 197 
 
 which 11 victory almost achieved can be as quickly lost. 
 Its effect upon European minds was signally impressive, 
 as will hereafter more fully appear. Count de Vergennes, 
 the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in speaking of 
 the report of this battle which reached him December 
 12th, said : "Nothing has struck me so much, as General 
 Washington s attacking and giving battle to General 
 Howe s army. To bring troops raised within the year, 
 to do this, promises everything." 
 
CHAPTER XX. 
 
 JEALOUSY AND GREED DEFEATED. VALLEY FORGE. 
 
 THE struggle for American independence and the 
 career of the American Commander-in-Chief very 
 minutely foreshadowed the experience of most successful 
 soldiers with the political manipulations of partisans in 
 Congress ever since. The " On to Richmond," and the 
 "On to Washington " cries of 1861, and the fluctuations 
 of the popular pulse with the incidents of successive 
 campaigns in the civil war, were used by demagogues 
 for selfish ends. But the same spirit had shown itself in 
 a degree quite as repugnant to devoted sons of liberty, 
 during the throes which accompanied this nation s birth. 
 
 Nothing seemed too exacting as a test of the American 
 Commander-in-Chief. As the war enlarged its scope, 
 and the prospects of success brightened for the moment, 
 clamorous aspirants for office multiplied. The personal 
 bravery of the soldier was magnified at the expense of 
 discipline. The slow progress of the army was charged to 
 excessive caution. Nothing, so far as politicians were 
 concerned, was deemed too hard for the American militia, 
 if only the right sort of a quack administered their action, 
 and led them to its tests. But the consciousness of 
 unselfish devotion to duty, never boldly impeached, 
 and ever unimpeachable, sustained Washington. Amid 
 these clamors for office and preferment from Congress 
 men and politicians, his faith in righteous methods, in 
 patient training, in kind and considerate treatment of 
 
 198 
 
JEALOUSY OF WASHINGTON. 199 
 
 all who took part in the struggle, whatever their ante 
 cedents or rank, never for a moment swerved. His pur 
 pose and his self-control matured, until he attained such 
 calm contempt for jealousy and intrigue that he could 
 move on through the deepest waters, regardless of rest 
 less, dashing wave-crests. 
 
 The Battle of Germantown, and Howe s abandonment 
 of his suburban encampment, naturally suggested the 
 immediate occupation of Philadelphia by the American 
 army. It, like Boston, "must be seized" at once. The 
 " almost " victory on the fourth of October, blinded the 
 vision of many to the broader range of national activity 
 which Washington s supervision embraced. Xews of the 
 surrender of Burgoyne reached his headquarters on the 
 eighteenth day of October. He promptly congratulated 
 General Gates and the northern army, in terms of most 
 gracious sincerity and emphasis. And yet, General 
 Gates presumed to send his Report to Congress direct, 
 and not to his Conimander-in-Chief. Then, the "almost" 
 victory of Washington over Howe, at Germantown, was 
 contrasted with the complete victory of Gates over Bur 
 goyne. The fact that Washington fought with fewer 
 numbers, and these, of hungry, poorly armed men, 
 nearly worn out by marches and counter-marches, while 
 the northern army, three to one of their adversaries, 
 simply penned up first, and then starved out, a force that 
 had not rations for another day, counted little with these 
 pseudo-scientific experts. And yet, let it ever be re 
 membered, that the British garrison of Philadelphia was 
 not panting for any more field-service. The very restric 
 tion of that garrison to city limits and the immediate 
 suburbs, proved not only subversive of their discipline 
 and ejpciency, but ultimately vindicated the wisdom of 
 Washington. He saw distinctly, just how its partial 
 inaction afforded him time to mature his own armv 
 
200 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 organization ; while the garrison of New York must, of 
 necessity, be kept equally passive, for lack of this very 
 strong detachment which idled in barracks, on the banks 
 of the Delaware. 
 
 But while the garrison of Philadelphia limited its ex 
 cursions to plundering farms and the country adjacent 
 for wood, forage and provisions generally, both com 
 manding generals were studying the relations of the 
 Delaware River to the conduct of all future operations 
 upon any decisive scale. The river had been so ob 
 structed that the fleet of Admiral Howe, which had been 
 compelled to land his army at the head of the Chesapeake 
 in September, could not yet communicate with the army 
 since it gained the city. He arrived oft* Newcastle on 
 the sixth day of October. Washington realized that by 
 retaining control of the Delaware he not only restricted 
 the supply of provisions and military stores to the garri 
 son, but retained easy communications with New Jersey 
 and the Camps of Instruction and rendezvous at the 
 adequately fortified posts of Morristown and Middlebrook. 
 
 At Billingsport, chevaux-de-frise obstructed the channel. 
 Just below the mouth of the Schuylkill was Fort Mifflin, 
 on Mud Island. On the opposite shore, at Red Bank, 
 was Fort Mercer. Washington determined to maintain 
 these posts, or make their acquisition by the enemy most 
 costly in men and materials. His foresight grasped, as 
 if in hand, the rapidly maturing facts, that Britain could 
 not much longer meet the drain of the American war and 
 at the same time hold her own against her European foes ; 
 and that America needed only a thoroughly concerted 
 effort to consummate her independence. 
 
 Colonel Christopher Green, courageous at Bunker Kill 
 and during Arnold s expedition to Canada, was assigned 
 to command Fort Mercer, with troops from his own 
 State, Rhode Island. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, of Mary- 
 
OPERATIONS ALONG THE DELAWARE. 201 
 
 land, with Maryland troops, was stationed at Fort 
 Mifnin. These little garrisons were strengthened by the 
 detail of four hundred Continental troops to each. In 
 these details, the same wisdom marked Washington s 
 choice : as Angell s Rhode Island regiment reported to 
 Greene, and a portion of Greene s Virginia regiment 
 reported to Smith. 
 
 The British army was not an idle observer of these 
 movements. On the twenty-second of October, the two 
 Grenadier regiments of Donop and Minnigerode, and two 
 regiments of the line, with the Infantry Chasseurs (all 
 Hessian), Avith eight 3-pounders and two howitzers, 
 approached Fort Mercer and demanded its surrender. 
 They had crossed at Cooper s Ferry on the twenty-first, 
 slightly interrupted by skirmishers, and on the following 
 morning suddenly emerged from the woods, expecting an 
 easy and an immediate victory. Defiance was returned 
 to their demand. Two assaulting columns, already 
 formed, made an immediate and simultaneous advance 
 upon the north and south faces of the fort. The garrison, 
 however, knowing that it could not hold the exterior 
 works, which were still incomplete, retired to the interior 
 defences : but still occupied a curtain of the old works, 
 which afforded an enfilading fire upon any storming party 
 which should attempt the inner stockade. The with 
 drawal of the garrison from the exterior works was 
 misunderstood. The assault was bold, desperate, and 
 brilliant. The resistance was incessant, deadly, over 
 whelming. Colonel Donop fell, mortally wounded, and 
 near him, Lieutenant-Colonel Minnigerode. These confi 
 dent assailants lost, in less than sixty minutes, four hundred 
 men being one-third of their entire force. And still, 
 one more attempt was made at the escarpment near the 
 river; but here also the Americans were on the alert. 
 Armed galleys in the stream opened a raking fire at 
 
WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 short range, and dispersed the assailants. Two British 
 ships the Augusta (64-gim man-of-war) , and the Merlin 
 (frigate), which had been so disposed as to aid the as 
 sault, grounded. On the next day, the former took fire 
 from a hot shot, and blew up, before her entire crew 
 could escape ; and the Merlin was burned, to avoid 
 capture. The American loss was fourteen killed and 
 twenty-one wounded. Colonel Donop was buried care 
 fully by Major Fleury, a French officer in the American 
 service, and his grave at the south end of the old works 
 is still an object of interest to visitors. Colonel Greene, 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, and Commodore Hazlewood of 
 the galley service, received from Washington and from 
 Congress worthy testimonials for " gallant conduct." 
 
 In the meantime, the British had found two solid points 
 of land amid the marshy ground at the mouth of the 
 Schuylkill River, within cannon-range of Fort Mifflin, 
 where they constructed two heavy batteries bearing 
 upon that fort. Four 32-pounders from the Somerset 
 and six 24-pounders from the Eagle, with one 13- 
 inch mortar, were added to works erected on Province 
 Island, to bring a more direct fire upon the fort than 
 could be secured from the batteries at the mouth of the 
 Schuylkill River. (See map.) 
 
 In order to anticipate a possible movement of troops 
 into New Jersey, in case of a successful assault upon 
 Fort Mifflin, Washington ordered General Yarnum s 
 brigade to take post at Woodbury, near Red Bank, and 
 General Forman to rally the New Jersey militia to his 
 support. But the British made no attempt to land. The 
 later assault upon the fort, made on the tenth, was suc 
 cessful. Seven ships of the British fleet joined in the 
 attack ; among them the Somerset, the Roebuck, and the 
 Pearl, which had taken part in operations before Boston 
 and New York. Lieutenant -Colonel Smith was wounded 
 
OPERATIONS ALONG THE DELAWARE. 203 
 
 early in the action and removed to Fort Mercer, Major 
 Thayer succeeding to the command. Major Fleury, who 
 planned the works, was also wounded ; and after a loss of 
 two hundred and fifty men, the remnant of the garrison, 
 on the night of the fifteenth, retired to Fort Mercer. At 
 dawn of the sixteenth, the Grenadiers of the Royal Guards 
 occupied the island. 
 
 The Report of Washington upon this action thus honors 
 the brave defenders of Fort Mifflin : " The defence will 
 always reflect the highest honor upon the officers and men 
 of the garrison. The works were entirely beat down ; 
 every piece of cannon was dismounted, and one of the 
 enemy s ships came so near that she threw grenades from 
 her tops into the fort, and killed men upon the platforms, 
 before they quitted the island." 
 
 On the eighteenth, General Cornwallis landed at Bil- 
 lingsport in force, and Washington sent General Greene 
 to take command of the troops in New Jersey and check 
 his progress ; but the demonstration was so formidable 
 that the garrison evacuated the works. The Americans, 
 unable to save their galleys, set fire to them near Glouces 
 ter Point ; and the British fleet gained the freedom of the 
 Delaware River. 
 
 During this movement, Lafayette, intrusted with a 
 detachment of troops by General Greene, had several 
 skirmishes with the enemy, and on the first of December 
 was assigned to command of the division left without a 
 commander by the dismissal of Stephen. While Corn 
 wallis was on this detached service, four general officers 
 of Washington s army against eleven dissenting voted to 
 attack General Howe. The incident, occurring at such 
 a period, is noteworthy. 
 
 Late in October, the American army advanced from 
 Perkiomy to White Marsh ; General Varnum s Rhode 
 Island Brigade, twelve hundred strong, reported for 
 
204 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 duty, as well as about a thousand additional troops from 
 Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia. Generals Gates 
 and Putnam still retained troops for their semi-independ 
 ent commands ; and General Gates, in particular, only 
 grudgingly sent such as were peremptorily ordered to 
 report to Washington. It was not until Colonel Hamil 
 ton, Aide-de-camp, visited him in person, that Gates 
 sent the troops which were absolutely indispensable at 
 army headquarters, and as absolutely useless at Albany. 
 His ostentatious proclamation of his military success over 
 Burgoyne, and his criticism of the tardiness and non- 
 efficiency of his Commander-in-Chief, began to expose his 
 renewed aspirations to succeed to the chief command. 
 
 On the fourth of December, General Howe with a force 
 of fourteen thousand men, accompanied by Generals 
 Knyphausen and Cornwallis, advanced to Chestnut Hill, 
 within three miles of the right of the American army, 
 and slight skirmishing ensued. On the seventh, the 
 British troops left Chestnut Hill, and took a position at 
 Edge Hill near the American left. Morgan, just arrived 
 from the northern army, and the Maryland militia under 
 Colonel Mordecai Gist (subsequently Brigadier-General) 
 had a sharp skirmish with Cornwallis, losing forty-four 
 men and inflicting an equal loss upon the enemy. 
 Major-General Gray and the Queen s Rangers inflicted a 
 loss of about fifty men upon an advance post of the 
 American left ; and when night came on, the British pickets 
 were within a half mile of the American lines, where bat 
 tle was awaited with satisfaction and hopeful expectancy. 
 But on the morning of the eighth, the British camp disap 
 peared, for Howe had suddenly returned to Philadelphia. 
 
 Howe s Report, dated December 13th, reads as follows : 
 rr Upon the presumption that a forward movement might 
 tempt the enemy, after receiving such a reenforcement 
 [reported afterwards as four thousand men] , to give battle 
 
JEALOUSY AND GREED DEFEATED. ~2()b 
 
 for the recovery of this place [Philadelphia] ; or, that a 
 vulnerable part might be found to admit of an attack 
 upon their camp ; the army marched out on the night of 
 the fourth instant." It was afterwards learned that Howe 
 had full knowledge of the jealous spirit then existing tow 
 ards Washington, and that several of his generals favored 
 an attack upon Philadelphia, against his better judgment. 
 Washington, in noticing Howe s movement, says : " I 
 sincerely wish that they had made the attack ; as the 
 issue, in all probability, from the disposition of our 
 troops and the strong position of our camp, would have 
 been fortunate and happy. At the same time, I must 
 add, that reason, prudence, and every principle of policy, 
 forbid us quitting our post to attack them. Nothing but 
 success would have justified the measure ; and this could 
 not be expected from their position." 
 
 The army of Washington, nominally eleven thousand 
 strong, had, says Baron De Kalb, but seven thousand 
 effective men for duty, so general was the sickness, from 
 extreme cold and the want of sufficient clothing and other 
 necessaries of a campaign. And yet, under these condi 
 tions, Congress placed in responsible positions those 
 officers who were most officiously antagonistic to the 
 American Commander-in-Chief. On the sixth of Novem 
 ber, Gates had been made President of the Board of 
 War. Miniin, withdrawn from duty as Quartermaster- 
 General, was also placed upon the Board, retaining his 
 full rank. On the twenty-eighth of December, Congress 
 appointed Con way Major-General and Inspector-General, 
 and placed him in communication Avith the Board of War, 
 to act independently of the Commander-in-Chief. Lee, 
 then a prisoner of war, through letters addressed to 
 Gates, Mifflin, Wayne and Conway, united with them in 
 concerted purpose to oppose the policy of Washington, 
 and to dictate his action ; and more than this, there was a 
 
206 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 strong influence brought to bear upon Congress to force 
 Washington s resignation, or removal from command. 
 
 Washington, however, established his headquarters at 
 Valley Forge, twenty-one miles from Philadelphia ; and 
 on the nineteenth of December announced his winter 
 quarters by a formal order. On the same day he sent 
 General Smallwood to Wilmington, to occupy the country 
 south of Philadelphia and cut off supplies for that city 
 and its garrison. McDougall was established at Peeks- 
 kill. Putnam was on the shore of Long Island Sound 
 until the middle of December, when he was ordered back 
 to the Highlands. The absence of General Mifflin from 
 the army, and his total neglect of duty as Quartermaster- 
 General, in which he had once been so efficient, 
 " caused," says Washington, " the want of two days 
 supply of provisions, and thereby cost an opportunity 
 scarcely ever offered, of taking an advantage of the 
 enemy." 
 
 It was an hour of deep distress to Washington, Avhen, 
 on the twenty-third day of December, 1777, he felt com 
 pelled to advise Congress of the condition of his army : 
 " The numbers had been reduced since the fourth of the 
 month, only three weeks, two thousand men, from hard 
 ship and exposure. Two thousand eight hundred and 
 ninety-eight were unfit for duty, because barefoot and 
 otherwise naked. Only eight thousand two hundred 
 men were present for duty." He added : "We have not 
 more than three months in which to prepare a great 
 deal of business. If we let them slip, or Avaste, we shall 
 be laboring under the same difficulties in the next cam 
 paign as we have in this, to rectify mistakes and bring 
 things to order. Military arrangements and movements, 
 in consequence, like the mechanism of a clock, will be im 
 perfect and disordered by the want of any part" The con 
 cluding clause, italicized, illustrates one of his peculiar 
 
WASHINGTON AT VALLEY FORGE 
 [From the painting by Scheuster.] 
 
JEALOUSY AND GREED DEFEATED. 207 
 
 characteristics never to slight the humblest man or 
 agency in his country s service, and never to count any 
 duty too small to be done well. 
 
 At this time, the Assembly of Pennsylvania began to 
 snuff up some of the malarious odors of selfish and sense 
 less gossip. They even remonstrated against his going 
 into winter quarters at all. His reply was not wanting 
 in directness and clearness. It reads as follows : " Gen 
 tlemen reprobate the going into winter quarters as much 
 as if they thought the soldiers were made of sticks, or 
 stones. I can assure those gentlemen that it is a much 
 easier and less distressing thing to remonstrate in a com 
 fortable room, than to occupy a cold bleak hill, and sleep 
 under frost and snow, without clothing or blankets. 
 However, as they seem to have little feeling for the 
 naked and distressed soldiers, I feel superabundantly 
 for them, and from my soul I pity their miseries which 
 it is neither in my power to relieve, or prevent." 
 
 On the twenty-sixth, General Sullivan, who generally 
 kept aloof from active participation in the movements of 
 the intriguing class of officers, urged Washington to 
 "make an attempt upon Philadelphia, and risk every 
 consequence, in an action." General Sullivan meant 
 well ; but the reader will recognize the characteristic 
 style of this officer under circumstances of special doubt 
 as to " what is to be done next." But Washington 
 never wavered in his purpose. On the thirtieth of 
 December, Baron De Kalb was appointed Inspector-Gen 
 eral, vice Con way, resigned. Washington closed the 
 year at Valley Forge. The twelve months since he re 
 crossed the Delaware at Trenton and out-ffeneraled 
 
 o 
 
 Lord Cornwallis, had indeed been eventful. Once more, 
 amid snow and cold, surrounded by faithful but suffering 
 thousands, he plans for other perils and exposure ; before 
 the goal of his desire, substantial victory, could bring 
 
208 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 to them and to his beloved country the boon of realized 
 independence. And yet, unknown to him, two days be 
 fore he occupied the barren site of Valley Forge a thrill 
 ing event occurred beyond the Atlantic Ocean, and one 
 which was, in the providence of God, to verify the 
 soldier s faith, and secure for him final victory. 
 
 As early as December 2d, the tidings of Burgoyne s 
 disaster reached the royal palace of George III. Fox, 
 Burke, and Eichmond favored immediate peace, and such 
 an alliance, or Federal Union, as would be for the mate 
 rial interests of both countries. Burke solemnly declared 
 that "peace upon any honorable terms was injustice due 
 to both nations." But the king adjourned Parliament to 
 the twentieth of January, 1778. 
 
 Meanwhile a speedy ship from Boston was on the high 
 seas, bound for France, and the account of Burgoyne s 
 surrender was received by the American Commissioners. 
 On the twelfth of the month it was announced to the 
 Count de Vergennes, Minister for Foreign Affairs at the 
 French Court. The sensation throughout Paris was 
 intense. "Europe need no longer dread the British 
 power, since her very Colonies have successfully defied 
 unjust laws, and equally defied her power to enforce 
 them." This was the public utterance. One pregnant 
 sentence already cited, that of Count de Vergennes, proved 
 the incentive to immediate action. " Saratoga " and " Ger- 
 mantown " were coupled in a message sent to Spain, to 
 solicit her co-operation. Without any real sympathy 
 with America, Spain had already discriminated in favor 
 of American privateers which took prizes to her ports. 
 
 But France did not await reply before announcing her 
 own action. And just when Washington was gathering 
 his weary army into humble huts for partial shelter and 
 rest, and while his tired spirit was pained by the small 
 jealousies which impaired the value of his personal ser- 
 
VALLEY FORGE. AID FROM FRANCE. 209 
 
 vice and sacrifice, and threatened the harmony of his 
 entire command, a new ally and friend had taken him to 
 heart ; and Louis XVI. was dropping into the scales both 
 the prestige and the power of France, to vindicate and 
 accomplish American liberty. On that day, December 
 17, 1777, Gerard, one of the secretaries of Count de 
 Yergennes, announced to Benjamin Franklin and Silas 
 Deane, two American Commissioners, "by the King s 
 order, "that the King of France, in Council, had de 
 termined not only to acknoAvledge, but to support Ameri 
 can independence." 
 
 The declaration of the Duke of Richmond, already cited, 
 which predicted "the application of the Colonists to 
 strangers for aid, if Parliament authorized the hire of 
 Hessians," had been realized. 
 
CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA AND VALLEY FORGE IX WINTER, 1778. 
 
 MR. CHARLES STEDMAN, who served on the 
 staffs of Generals Howe, Clinton and Cornwallis, 
 during the Revolutionary War, in an interesting historical 
 narrative states that Pr the British army enlivened the dull 
 times of their winter residence in Philadelphia, with the 
 dance-house, the theatre, and the game of faro." But it 
 is equally true that this large license which relieved the 
 monotony of garrison life, gradually aroused disgust and 
 positive hatred on the part of the citizens of that city. 
 No diversions in force against the American position, or 
 their chief outposts, were possible, since the garrison must 
 be alert for any sudden attack upon the city. The large 
 number of wealthy royalist families had much to dread 
 from the possible capture of their dwelling-place. Scout 
 ing parties from Washington s army pressed so closely to 
 the city limits, at times, that occasional efforts of small de 
 tachments to secure wood for fuel and cooking purposes, 
 were admonished, that the limit of their picket-lines was 
 their boundary of possession and safe enjoyment. Carriage 
 drives and daily saddle exercise, which were favorite 
 recreations, had to be abandoned. They were unsafe ; as 
 Washington s cavalry, scouts and artillery needed all the 
 horses that were not needed by the farmers for farm use. 
 
 The American army drilled daily, under the patient 
 instruction of Baron Steuben, so far as they had clothing 
 and shoes for that purpose ; while their comrades sat down 
 
 210 
 
PHILADELPHIA AND VALLEY FORGE. 211 
 
 or laid themselves down by log fires and burning stumps, 
 to avoid freezing to death. 
 
 After the camp was fully established, and Washington 
 had asserted his purpose to command, and allow no inter 
 ference by civilians of whatever pretension, or by mili 
 tary men of whatever rank, the antagonism of the 
 previous months gradually retired from public exhibition. 
 It never drew breath from popular sympathy, and the sol 
 diers regarded his censors as their enemies. And so it was, 
 that in spite of sickness, wretchedness, inevitable deser 
 tions and frequent deaths, the soldiers were kept to duty, 
 and acquired toughness and knowledge for future en 
 deavor. A calm reliance upon the future, and a straight 
 forward way of dealing with men and measures, were still 
 vindicating the fitness of Washington for the supreme 
 command. 
 
 To the demand of the British Government for the 
 reasons of the inactivity of the British army, General 
 Howe replied that, he " did not attack the intrenched 
 position at Valley Forge, a strong point, during the 
 severe season, although everything was prepared with 
 that intention, judging it imprudent until the season 
 should afford a prospect of reaping the advantages that 
 ought to have resulted from success in that measure ; 
 but having good information in the spring that the 
 enemy had strengthened the camp by additional works, 
 and being certain of moving him from thence when the 
 campaign should open, he dropped thought of attack." 
 
 During the winter, a proposition for the invasion of 
 Canada was again under consideration ; and General 
 Lafayette, with other officers, visited Albany and the 
 northern army to see what arrangements were both avail 
 able and desirable for that purpose. It was soon dropped ; 
 and was never fully favored by Washington. 1 
 
 1 "Battles of the American Revolution," p. 461. 
 
212 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 During January, Congress sent a committee to visit 
 Valley Forge. As the result, Washington s whole policy 
 was indorsed and their support was pledged. Baron Steu- 
 ben, recommended by the Commander-in-Chief, was con 
 firmed as Major-General without a dissenting vote. 
 Conway started for France early in April. The histor 
 ical " Conway cabal " had lost its most unprincipled 
 abettor. On the fourth of April, Congress authorized 
 Washington to call upon Pennsylvania, Maryland and 
 New Jersey, for five thousand additional militia. On the 
 ninth, General Howe received his recall to England. 
 On the tenth, Lafayette returned to camp. On the thir 
 teenth, General McDougall accompanied Count Kosciusko 
 to West Point, to perfect the fortifications at that post. 
 On the fifteenth, Gates was placed in command at 
 Peekskill. 
 
 When the spring opened at Valley Forge, the proposi 
 tions of the many generals, respecting the approaching 
 campaign, were as diverse and varied as the leafage of the 
 forest. As the mind recalls the relations of these officers 
 to earlier campaigns, it will be seen how essential to any 
 real success was the presence of a strong-willed Com 
 mander-in-Chief. It is especially to be noticed, that men 
 whose judgment had been accredited as uniformly con 
 servative and yet energetic radically differed as to the 
 immediate objective of army action. It settles beyond 
 question the principle that the entire war, and the entire 
 country, had to be made of paramount consideration, in 
 the decision of any important movement. 
 
 Wayne, Patterson and Maxwell recommended an imme 
 diate attack upon Philadelphia. Knox, Poor, Varnum 
 and Muhlenburg advised an attack upon New York, with 
 four thousand regulars and Eastern militia, Washington 
 in command ; leaving Lee to command in Pennsylvania, 
 while the main army should remain at Valley Forge. 
 
PHILADELPHIA AND VALLEY FORGE. 213 
 
 Stirling recommended operations against both Philadel 
 phia and New York. Lafayette, Steuben and Du Portail 
 expressed doubts as to making any aggressive movement 
 whatever, until the army should be strengthened or the 
 British unfold their plans. This wise suggestion was 
 also the opinion of Washington. 
 
 On the seventh of May, the British ascended the Dela 
 ware and destroyed public stores at Bordentown. Max 
 well and Dickenson had been sent across the river for 
 the protection of these stores ; but heavy rains delayed 
 their inarch, and forty-four vessels, including several 
 frigates on the stocks, were burned. 
 
 But the seventh day of May, 1778, was not a day of 
 gloom at Valley Forge. Spring had fairly opened, and 
 the forest began to don its new attire for a fresh summer 
 campaign. At nine o clock in the morning, the entire 
 army Avas on parade, with drums beating, colors flying 
 and salutes echoing among the hills. The brigades were 
 steady in their ranks. No brilliant uniforms were con 
 spicuous anywhere, and many had neither coats nor 
 shoes. The pomp and circumstance of war were missing. 
 There was no display of gold lace, or finery of any kind. 
 Strongly marked faces and tough muscles showed the fixed 
 ness of purpose of these troops. But it was an occasion 
 of rare interest. This American army was in line, for 
 the reception of a visitor from over the sea. The visitor 
 was a herald sent by Louis XVI., King of France, to 
 announce to Washington and the American people that an 
 armed alliance between France and the United States of 
 America had been consummated. The French frigate 
 Le Sensible had landed at Fal mouth (Portland), Me., 
 with this messenger, and the American army was drawn 
 up in battle array to receive his message. The chaplain 
 of each brigade proclaimed the treaty and read its terms. 
 It was one of those occasions, not infrequent during the 
 
214 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 war, and habitual to Washington throughout his mature 
 life, when he had no way through which to express his 
 deepest anxieties or profoundest sense of gratitude, other 
 than that of communion with God. And now, the lis 
 tening army was called upon to unite in one "grand 
 thanksgiving to Almighty God that He had given to 
 America this friend." The scene that followed can never 
 be described. It can only be imagined and felt. Huzzas 
 for the King, of France mingled with shouts for Washing 
 ton, whose face, as described by one, "shone as did that 
 of Moses, when he descended from the Mount." Caps 
 were tossed high in air. Hand-shaking, leaping, clapping 
 of hands, and every homely sign of joy and confident 
 expectation, followed. Washington had dismounted. He 
 stood with folded arms calm, serene, majestic, silent. 
 For several moments the whole army stood, awaiting his 
 action. He remounted his horse, and a single word to 
 his assembled staff quickly ran through the lines that 
 the Commander-in-Chief proposed that all should speak 
 together, by the soldier s method, through powder. No 
 matter if powder were scarce. Every cannon, wherever 
 mounted about the long circuit of intrenchments, roared ; 
 and the hills carried the echoes to British headquarters. 
 Throughout the lines of division and brigade, to the re 
 motest picket post, a running fire at will closed with one 
 grand volley ; and then the camp of Valley Forge resumed 
 the " business " of preparing for battle. 
 
 With the opening of the spring of 1778, General Howe 
 also was moved to action. His winter supplies, as well 
 as those procurable from the fleet and the city, had been 
 expended. * The storehouses were empty." Detach 
 ments, large and small, were sent to scour the country. 
 To cut off and restrict these detachments, General La 
 fayette was intrusted with a special command of twenty- 
 
PHILADELPHIA AND VALLEY FORGE. 215 
 
 four hundred men, and advanced to Barren Hill, about 
 half the distance to Philadelphia. It also formed a corps 
 of observation, and was the first independent command 
 of that officer under his commission as Major-General. 
 He was especially instructed to note signs of the evacua 
 tion of Philadelphia, which Washington regarded as a 
 military necessity on the part of General Howe. The 
 American Commander-in-Chief, although reticent of his 
 own opinions, rarely failed to read other men accurately, 
 and rightly read Lafayette. With singular enthusiasm, 
 great purity of character, unswerving fidelity to obliga 
 tion, and a thorough contempt for everything mean or 
 dishonorable, this young French gentleman combined a 
 keen sagacity, sound judgment, prompt execution, and 
 an intense love for liberty. 
 
 Having taken position at Barren Hill, Lafayette at 
 once introduced a system of communication with parties 
 in the city of Philadelphia. He had with him fifty Indian 
 scouts, and Captain McLean s Light troops. A company 
 of dragoons had also been ordered to join him. General 
 Howe had been relieved from duty on the eleventh, by 
 General Clinton ; who signalized his accession to com 
 mand by a series of brilliant fetes in honor of his pred 
 ecessor, on the eve of his departure for England. A 
 regatta on the Delaware ; a tournament on land : trium 
 phal arches ; decorated pavilions ; mounted ladies, with 
 their escorts in Turkish costume ; slaves in fancy habits ; 
 knights, esquires, heralds, and every brilliant device, 
 made the day memorable from earliest dawn until dark. 
 And after dark, balls, illuminations both upon water and 
 land, fireworks, wax-lights, flowers and fantastic drapery, 
 cheered the night hours, " exhibiting," as described by 
 Andre himself, master of ceremonies, "a coup d ceil^ 
 beyond description magnificent." The procession of 
 knights and maidens was led by Major Andre and Miss 
 
216 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Shippen, the beautiful daughter of one of the wealthiest 
 royalists in Philadelphia. She long retained the title of 
 the " belle of the Michianza fetes" She subsequently 
 became the wife of General Arnold ; and the incidents 
 thus grouped show how felicitous was Clinton s subse 
 quent choice of Andre to negotiate with Arnold the ex 
 change of West Point, for " gold and a brigadier-general s 
 commission in the British army." 
 
 During the evening of this luxurious entertainment, and 
 while at supper, General Clinton announced to his officers 
 his intention to march at daybreak to Barren Hill, and 
 bring back for their next evening s guest, the distin 
 guished French officer, Marquis de Lafayette. At four 
 o clock on the morning of the nineteenth, when the twenty 
 hours of hilarity, adulation and extravagance closed, 
 General Clinton, accompanied by Generals Grant, Gray, 
 and Erskine, and five thousand picked troops, marched 
 to capture Lafayette. General Gray crossed the Schuyl- 
 kill with two thousand men to cut off Lafayette s retreat, 
 in case Clinton successfully attacked in front. Washing 
 ton advanced sufficiently to observe the movement of 
 General Gray, and signalled with cannon to Lafayette 
 of his danger ; but Lafayette, by occupying a stone 
 church and other buildings, and showing false fronts of 
 columns as if about to take the offensive, caused the 
 advance column of Grant to halt for reinforcements ; and 
 then retired safely with the loss of but nine men. La 
 fayette gives an amusing account of portions of the 
 skirmish : " When my Indian scouts suddenly confronted 
 an equal number of British dragoons, the mutual surprise 
 was such that both fled with equal haste." The officers 
 and men of Lafayette s command were greatly elated by 
 his conduct of the affair, especially as he was at one time 
 threatened by a force more than twice that of his entire 
 division ; and the confidence thus acquired followed his 
 
PHILADELPHIA AND VALLEY FORGE. 217 
 
 service through the entire war. The congratulations of 
 Washington were as cordial upon his return, as those of 
 the officers of the Philadelphia garrison were chilling upon 
 the return of Clinton, without Lafayette as prisoner. 
 
 On the same day, General Mifflin rejoined the army, 
 hi writing to Gouverneur Morris of New York, the Amer 
 ican Comma nder-in-Chief, noticing the event, expresses 
 his surprise * to find a certain gentleman who some time 
 ago, when a heavy cloud hung over us and our affairs 
 looked gloomy, was desirous of resigning, to be now 
 stepping forward in the line of the army" ; adding : " If he 
 can reconcile such conduct to his own feelings as an officer, 
 and a man of honor, and Congress have no objection to 
 his leaving his seat in another department, I have nothing 
 personally to oppose to it. Yet, I must think that 
 gentlemen s stepping in, and out, as the sun happens to 
 beam out, or become obscure, isn t quite the thing, nor 
 quite just, with respect to those officers who take the 
 bitter with the sweet." 
 
 By this time, the movements of shipping, and within 
 the city, clearly indicated the design of the British to 
 abandon Philadelphia without battle. A Council of War 
 was convened on the twentieth, to hear reports upon the 
 condition of the various American armies ; and Generals 
 Gates, Greene, Stirling, Mifflin, Lafayette, Armstrong, 
 Steuben and DC Kalb were present. The opinion was 
 unanimous that the army should remain on the defensive, 
 and await the action of the British commander. On the 
 twentieth, also, General Lee rejoined the army. He had 
 been exchanged on the twenty-first of April for Major- 
 General Prescott, who had been captured five miles above 
 Newport, R.I., on the night of July 20, 1777. Lee had 
 been placed on his parole as early as the twenty-fifth of 
 March, and he actually visited York, where Congress was 
 in session, on the ninth of April. 
 
218 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 The relations of Charles Lee to the Avar were as marked 
 as were those of Arnold, except that Arnold rendered 
 valuable service until he turned traitor. During the 
 
 O 
 
 month of February, 1777, Lee secured permission from 
 General Howe to write letters to Congress, urging that 
 body to "send commissioners to confer confidentially con 
 cerning the national cause." On the twenty-first of 
 February, Congress declined to send such commissioners, 
 as " altogether improper" ; and they could " not perceive 
 how compliance with his wish would tend to his advantage, 
 or the interests of the public/ Letters were also written 
 in March ; and in one addressed to Washington on the 
 fifth of April, 1777, Lee had written : " I think it a most 
 unfortunate circumstance for myself, and I think no less 
 so for the public, that the Congress have not thought 
 proper to comply with my request. It could not possibly 
 have been attended with any ill consequences, and might 
 have been with good ones. At least, it was an indulgence 
 which I thought my situation entitled me to. But I am 
 unfortunate in everything, and this stroke is the severest 
 I have ever experienced. God send you a different fate." 
 The answer of Washington was as follows : " T have 
 received your letter of this date, and thank you, as T 
 shall any officer, over whom I have the honor to be 
 placed, for their opinions and advice in matters of im 
 portance ; especially when they proceed from the foun 
 tain of candor, and not from a captious spirit, or an 
 itch for criticism ; and here, let me again 
 
 assure you, that I shall always be happy to be in a 
 free communication of your sentiments upon any im 
 portant subject relative to the service, and only beg- 
 that they may come directly to myself. The custom 
 which many officers have, of speaking freely of things, 
 and reprobating measures which upon investigation 
 may be found to be unavoidable, is never produc- 
 
PHILADELPHIA AND VALLEY FORGE. 219 
 
 tivc of good ; but often, of very mischievous conse 
 quences." 
 
 During the year 1872 George H. Moore, of the New 
 York Historical Society, brought to light a certain paper 
 indorsed, "Mr. Lee s Plan, 29th March, 1777," which 
 was found among the papers of the brothers Howe, Brit 
 ish Commissioners at New York. Lee was at that date 
 a prisoner of war, but at the same time a British officer 
 who had been taken in rebellion to the British crown. 
 This letter is noticed, in order to make more intelli 
 gible the subsequent relations of Lee to the American 
 Commander-in-Chief. The following is an extract : " It 
 appears to me, that by the continuance of the war, 
 America has no chance of obtaining its ends. As I am 
 not only persuaded, from the high opinion I have of the 
 humanity and good sense of Lord and Admiral Howe, 
 that the terms of accommodation will be as moderate as 
 their powers will admit ; but that their powers are more 
 ample than their successor would be tasked with, I think 
 myself not only justifiable, but bound in conscience, in 
 furnishing em all the light I can, to enable em to bring 
 matters to a conclusion in the most commodious manner. 
 I know the most generous use will be made of it in all 
 respects. Their humanity will incline em to have con 
 sideration for individuals who have acted from principle." 
 Then follow hypothetical data as to troops required on 
 the part of Britain, and these passages : " If the Prov 
 ince of Maryland, or the greater part of it, is reduced, or 
 submits, and the people of Virginia are prevented, or in 
 timidated, from marching aid to the Pennsylvania army, 
 the whole machine is divided, and a period put to the 
 war; and if the plan is adopted in full, I am so confi 
 dent of success, that I would stake my life on the same. 
 Apprehensions from Carleton s army will, I am confi 
 dent, keep the New Englanders at home, or at least, con- 
 
220 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 tine em to that side of the river. I would advise that 
 four thousand men be immediately embarked in trans 
 ports, one half of which should proceed up the Potomac 
 and take post at Alexandria, the other half up Chesa 
 peake Bay and possess themselves of Annapolis." The 
 relations of various posts to the suggested movement, 
 and the character of the German population of Pennsyl 
 vania who would be apprehensive of injury to their fine 
 farms, were urged in favor of his " plan " for terminat 
 ing the war on terms of "moderate accommodation." 
 
 The reply of Washington to General Lee s letter is a 
 very distinct notice that he was advised of the letters 
 written by him to Gates and others, derogatory of the 
 action of his superior officer, the Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 The return of Lee to duty found the American army in 
 readiness to bid its last farewell to the camp at Valley 
 Forge ; but the ordeals through which so many brave 
 men passed, for their country s sake, were hardly more 
 severe than were those through which their beloved Com 
 mander-in-Chief passed into a clearer future, and the 
 well-earned appreciation of mankind. 
 
CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 FROM VALLEY FORGE TO WHITE PLAINS AGAIN. BATTLE 
 
 OF MONMOUTH. 
 
 THE abandonment of Philadelphia by the British 
 army, as anticipated by Washington, had become a 
 military necessity. The city was too remote from the 
 coast, unless its army of occupation could be so reen- 
 forced as to be independent of support from the British 
 base at New York. The reinforcements of troops called 
 for by General Howe had not been and could not have 
 been furnished. The recommendation of General Am- 
 herst, military adviser of George III., "that forty 
 thousand men be sent to America immediately," had been 
 positively disapproved. It was therefore of vital impor 
 tance that General Clinton should reach New York with 
 the least possible delay. Any attempt to return by sea 
 was obviously impracticable. 
 
 The incidents of the evacuation of Philadelphia were 
 similar to those which marked the departure of Howe 
 from Boston. The embarkation of three thousand citi 
 zens with their families, their merchandise, and their 
 personal effects, upon vessels, to accompany the retiring 
 fleet, was a moral lesson of vast significance. This with 
 drawal of the British garrison was no ruse, to entice the 
 American army from its camp, for battle, but a surrender 
 of the field itself, without a struggle. It announced to 
 America and to the world, that the British army lacked 
 the ability to meet the contingencies of field-service, 
 
 221 
 
222 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 either in Pennsylvania or New Jersey ; and that loyalists 
 would be left to their own resources for protection and 
 safety. 
 
 Other considerations precipitated the action of Clinton. 
 Congress had publicly announced the impending arrival 
 of a formidable French fleet from the West Indies ; and, 
 as a matter of fact, so immediate was its advent, that the 
 advance frigates entered the Delaware Bay, just after 
 Admiral Howe turned Cape May, on his return to New 
 York. Meanwhile, every movement in the city was 
 hourly reported to Washington by his secret messengers, 
 and by families who kept constantly in touch with all 
 movements of the garrison. Hardly a ball or social 
 dinner, during the entire winter, was without the pres 
 ence of one or more of his representatives, who as 
 promptly reported the secret influences which were 
 making of the city a deadly prison-house for the Brit 
 ish troops. Even at the playhouses, comedians had 
 begun to jest upon the "foraging of the rebel scouts"; 
 and it is said to have been hinted, on one occasion, that 
 " there were chickens and eggs in abundance outside the 
 lines, if the soldiers would take the trouble to go after 
 them," and that " it was hardly the right thing to let 
 Washington s ragged army have the pick of all country 
 produce." 
 
 The actual evacuation began at three o clock on the 
 morning of June eighteenth, and the entire British army 
 was on the New Jersey side of the Delaware by ten o clock. 
 Washington had so closely calculated the movement, that 
 General Maxwell s brigade and the New Jersey militia 
 were already at work burning bridges and felling trees 
 across the roads, in order to delay Clinton s march and 
 afford an opportunity for attacking his retiring columns. 
 General Arnold, whose wound still prevented field- 
 service, entered the city with a strong detachment as the 
 
FROM VALLEY FORGE TO WHITE PLAINS. 
 
 British rear-guard left. Twelve miles of baggage-train, 
 loaded with everything of army supplies that could be 
 heaped upon wagons, formed the long-extended caravan 
 which accompanied nearly eighteen thousand British 
 veterans as they returned to New York, whence they 
 had started only eleven months before. The capture of 
 the American capital and the destruction of the American 
 army had been their fondest desire. Now, they shrunk 
 away from the same American capital as from a pest- 
 house. There was no longer an eager search to find 
 Washington. To make the earliest safe distance from his 
 presence, or his reach, was the incentive to the speediest 
 possible travel. It was no longer the destruction of that 
 one principal American army that engrossed thought and 
 stimulated energy ; but how to save the British army 
 itself, for efficient service elsewhere. And Washington, 
 although fully appreciating the British situation, did not 
 know the fact that the British cabinet were actually dis 
 cussing, at that very time, the propriety of transferring all 
 active operations to the more sparsely settled regions of 
 the South. 
 
 The movements in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, as 
 well as those of Burgoyne, away from the seacoast, recall 
 an emphatic communication from General Howe, which 
 contained this practical statement : " Almost every move 
 ment in America was an act of enterprise, clogged with 
 innumerable difficulties. A knowledge of the country, 
 intersected, as it everywhere is, by woods, mountains, 
 water or morasses, cannot be obtained with any degree of 
 precision necessary to foresee and guard against the con 
 tingencies that may occur." 
 
 Washington was also fully advised of the character and 
 e-xtent of Clinton s retiring column, and of the opportu 
 nity which the country afforded for breaking it up. Haste 
 was the need of Clinton. His delay, however slight, 
 
224 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Washington s opportunity. Clinton reached Haddonfield 
 the same day. The militia of Maxwell made a short 
 resistance, and then retired to Mount Holy Pass. The 
 increased British vanguard compelled him to fall back ; 
 but the destruction of bridges and interposed obstructions, 
 together with the excessive summer heat, made the march 
 of the British troops one of intense strain and exhaustion. 
 And yet, Clinton used such vigor in pressing forward to 
 anticipate more formidable obstructions, that he reached 
 Crosswicks before the destruction of the bridge at that 
 point was complete ; and on the morning of the twenty- 
 fourth, his army crossed the creek. The column of Lieu- 
 tenant-General Knyphausen went into camp at Imlay s 
 Town ; while that of Clinton occupied Allentown, and 
 thereby effectively covered the advance division in case 
 of an American attack from the north. At this point, he 
 learned that Washington had already crossed the Dela 
 ware, and that the northern army was expected to unite 
 with that of the American Commander-in-Chief. Such a 
 combination, just then, would render a direct retreat to 
 New York, via Princeton and Brunswick, extremely haz 
 ardous, if not impossible. With the promptness which 
 characterized him, Sir Henry Clinton consolidated his 
 baggage and sent it in advance under Lieutenant-General 
 Knyphausen ; placed the second division in light marching 
 order, under his own personal command, in the rear, and 
 took the Monmouth route to the sea. (See map.) 
 
 Washington Avas quickly advised of this organic change 
 in the British formation, and acted instantly. He had 
 crossed the Delaware River at CoryelPs Ferry, forty miles 
 above Philadelphia, without assurance of the definite pur 
 pose of his adversary. Any other route of march by 
 Clinton than by Brunswick, would prevent him from 
 receiving military support from New York, and hold him 
 to the limit of supplies with which he started from Phila- 
 
FROM VALLEY FORGE TO WHITE PLAINS. 
 
 dolphia. When, therefore, couriers from Maxwell noti 
 fied Washington of Clinton s diversion eastward, from 
 Crosswicks, it was evident that Clinton would take no 
 risks of battle in reaching New York, or some port on the 
 coast accessible by a British fleet. 
 
 Colonel Morgan was sent with five hundred men to 
 reenforce Maxwell. On the twenty-fourth, General Scott, 
 with fifteen hundred chosen troops, was despatched to 
 reenforce those in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, 
 more effectually to retard their retreat. On the twenty- 
 sixth, Washington moved the entire army to Kingston ; 
 and learning that the British army was moving directly 
 toward Monmouth, advanced an additional force of one 
 thousand men under General Wayne, placing General La- 
 . fayette in command of the entire corps, including the 
 Brigade of Maxwell and Morgan s Light Infantry. Orders 
 were also sent to Lafayette : " Take the first opportunity 
 to strike the rear of the enemy." 
 
 Some writers have involuntarily followed Lee s theory, 
 that the attempt by Washington to stop Clinton s re 
 treat and to defeat so large and so well-appointed an army 
 as that of the British general, was folly from the start ; 
 but such critics overlook the determining facts of the situ 
 ation. Washington never counted numbers so much as 
 conditions. He never swerved from a steady purpose to 
 wear out superior numbers by piecemeal, until they 
 were at his mercy or so benumbed by his strokes as to 
 yield the field. Hence it is seen, that with all his ap 
 proaches to the retiring columns of Clinton, he never 
 failed to hold in complete reserve and mastery every con 
 ceivable contingency of a general engagement. More 
 over, as a matter of fact, his army, reenforced from the 
 north, was not inferior in numbers ; was unencumbered 
 with baggage, and was not exposed to attack. A fight 
 was a matter of choice, and not at the option of the 
 
226 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 enemy. It is therefore of essential interest to notice how 
 systematically Washington advanced in this memorable 
 campaign of Clinton s March to the Sea. It is of equal 
 interest to notice the development of the career of La 
 fayette, under Washington s supervision and confidence ; 
 since America is more indebted to this discreet and gal 
 lant officer than to any other, for the immediate service 
 which assured the surrender of Cor wall is at Yorktown, 
 three years later in the war. 
 
 At half-past four of the afternoon of June 20th, La 
 fayette and Wayne were at Robin s tavern. Lafayette 
 thus wrote to the Commander-in-Chief : " I have consulted 
 the general officers of this detachment, and the general 
 opinion seems to be, that I should march in the night, 
 near them [the enemy] , so as to attack the rear-guard on 
 the march. Your excellency knows that by the direct 
 road you are only three miles further from Monmouth 
 than we are in this place. Some prisoners have been 
 made, and deserters are coming in very fast." 
 
 Second despatch, 5 o clock P.M. : " General Forman 
 is firmly of opinion, that we may overtake the enemy. 
 It is highly pleasant to be followed and countenanced by 
 the army ; that, if we stop the enemy and meet with 
 some advantage, they may push it with vigor. I 
 have no doubt but if we overtake them, we possess a very 
 happy chance." 
 
 Third despatch, dated Ice Town, 26th June, 1778, 
 quarter before seven : " When I got there [referring to 
 a previously expressed purpose to go to Ice Town for 
 provisions] , I was sorry to hear that Mr. Hamilton [Col 
 onel Alexander Hamilton of Washington s staff], who 
 had been riding all night, had not been able to find any 
 one who could give him certain intelligence : but by a 
 party who came back, I hear the enemy are in motion 
 and their rear about one mile off the place they had occu- 
 
FROM VALLEY FORGE TO WHITE PLAINS. 227 
 
 pied last night, which is seven or eight miles from here. I 
 immediately put General Maxwell s and Wayne s brigades 
 in motion, and I will fall lower down, with General Scott s 
 and Jackson s regiments and some militia. I should 
 be very happy if we could attack them before they halt. 
 If I cannot overtake them, we could lay at some distance 
 and attack them to-morrow morning. . . . If we are 
 at a convenience from you, I have nothing to fear in strik 
 ing a blow, if opportunity is offered." 
 
 " Special. If you believe it, or if it is believed nec 
 essary, or useful, to the good of the service and the 
 honor of General Lee, to send him down with a couple 
 of thousand men, or any greater force, I will cheerfully 
 obey and serve him, not only out of duty, but what I owe 
 to that ofentleman s character." 
 
 o 
 
 The explanation of this passage is of interest, as it 
 happily illustrates the spirit with which Washington and 
 Lafayette operated in this important engagement, where 
 very grave discretionary responsibility devolved upon so 
 young an officer as the French Marquis. 
 
 Daily conferences were held by Washington with his 
 officers after leaving Valley Forge, and especially after 
 leaving Kingston. The official Reports of Washington 
 show that Lee positively declined the command of this 
 advance corps, until its large increase rendered it certain 
 that it held a post of honor, and would be pushed upon 
 the enemy. Lafayette was first assigned to this com 
 mand after a hot debate in council as to the propriety of 
 attacking Clinton s army at all ; and General Lee used 
 the following language, when the assignment of La 
 fayette was made with his concurrence, that " he was 
 well pleased to be freed from all responsibility for a plan 
 which he was sure would fail." But when Lafayette 
 gladly accepted the detail, and was so constantly reenfo reed 
 as to have under his command nearly one-third of the army, 
 
228 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 with the pledge of support by the entire army, General 
 Lee, as next in rank to Washington, immediately realized 
 his grave mistake, and when too late, claimed the command 
 by virtue of his rank. He then wrote to General La 
 fayette as follows : " It is my fortune and my honor that 
 I place in your hands ; you are too generous to cause the 
 loss of either." Lafayette, in his Memoirs, thus alludes 
 to this surrender by Lee of claim to command by virtue 
 of rank, after having peremptorily and scornfully declined 
 it : " This tone suited me better " ; and the letter already 
 cited was his response. Washington s reply to this 
 magnanimous waiver by Lafayette of so honorable a 
 command is as follows : ff General Lee s uneasiness on 
 account of yesterday s transaction, rather increasing 
 than abating, and your politeness in wishing to e*ase him 
 of it, have induced me to detach him from this army with 
 a part of it, to reenforce, or at least to cover the several 
 detachments at present under your command. At the 
 same time, I have an eye to your wishes ; and have there 
 fore obtained a promise from him, that when he gives you 
 notice of his approach and command, he will request you 
 to prosecute any plan you may have already concerted for 
 the purpose of attacking, or annoying, the enemy. This 
 is the only expedient I could think of, to answer the views 
 of both. General Lee seems satisfied with this measure." 
 On the evening of the twenty-sixth, the entire army 
 moved forward, leaving all superfluous baggage, so as 
 best to support the advance. On the twenty-seventh, a 
 severe rain-storm suspended the march for a few hours. 
 But the advance corps had been strengthened, as suggested 
 by Lafayette ; and when Lee assumed command it 
 numbered fully five thousand effective troops. The main 
 army also advanced within three miles of English Town 
 and within five miles of the British army. The American 
 forces, now eager for battle, were equal in numbers to 
 
BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 229 
 
 the enemy, with the advantage of being on the flank of 
 ,the long extended British columns which could not be 
 consolidated for action with their full strength. 
 
 A general idea of the skirmishes of the morning, with 
 out elaboration of details, can be obtained from the map. 
 
 At the extreme right, on the Middletown road, Knyp- 
 hausen conducts the accumulated baggage-train, which, on 
 the night of June twenty-seventh, is shown to have been 
 distributed along the road approaching Freehold (Mon- 
 mouth). Upon the high ground, below, Clinton gathered 
 his forces as they arrived from the inarch. Lafayette 
 was near the Court House, and had a sharp skirmish with 
 the Queen s Rangers. He disposed his army northward, 
 Avith skirmishers as far advanced as Bryar Hill even 
 threatening the pass by which Knyphausen had retired 
 toward New York. The baggage column, as early as 
 seven o clock, had passed the Court House. Lee appeared 
 upon the field and practically took command, but exe^r- 
 cised no direction over movements ; gave contradictory 
 orders when he gave any ; and brigade after brigade 
 failed to obtain from him instructions as to their move 
 ments, or their relations to other brigades. At first, Lee 
 announced that the "entire British army was in retreat." 
 When Clinton, after eight o clock, descended from his 
 position to attack the scattered and irregular formation 
 of the American army, Lafayette, full of hope, was first 
 advised that a retreat had been ordered by General Lee. 
 He protested in vain. The brigades were allowed each 
 to seek its own choice of destination ; and all fell back 
 under a general impression, rather than specific orders, 
 that all were to retreat and simply abandon demonstration 
 against the British army. Clinton s continued advance, 
 even so far as Wenrock Creek, is indicated on the map. 
 
 The truth of history requires a statement which has 
 never been sufficiently defined, as to the antecedents of 
 
230 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 this overestimated officer, Charles Lee. As a subaltern 
 in the British army, he had been uniformly insubordinate, 
 and was in discredit when he was allowed to go abroad 
 and fiofht under various fla^s as a military adventurer. 
 
 o o * 
 
 He knew nothing of handling a large command, or com 
 bined commands. Before the Battle of Monmouth, if 
 then, he had never been under fire in the lead of Amer 
 ican troops. He was cool enough and brave enough at 
 Monmouth, to, retreat with his division; but it was saved 
 chiefly by the self-possession of its officers, and the 
 wonderful endurance of the rank and file. He was un 
 equal to the command, even if he had desired battle. To 
 have fought the battle, with any chance of being taken 
 prisoner, would have exposed him to a double penalty 
 for treason at the hands of General Howe. He was in 
 the attitude of defeating his "plan" (before alluded to), 
 and defeating the very invasion which he had so ingen 
 iously advised. 
 
 The increasing cannonading, before noon, aroused 
 Washington to his full fighting capacity. The return of an 
 aid-de-camp, with the information that General Lee had 
 " overtaken the British army and expected to cut off their 
 rear-guard," was regarded as an oinen of complete suc 
 cess. The soldiers cast oft every incumbrance and made 
 a forced march. Greene took the right, and Stirling the 
 left ; while Washington in person, conducting the van 
 guard, moved directly to the scene of conflict. 
 
 All at once, the animation of the Commander-in-Chief 
 lost its impulse. A mounted countryman rode by in fright, 
 a wild fugitive. A half-distracted musician, fife in hand, 
 cried " All s lost ! " Avfew paces more, and over the brow 
 of a small rise of ground overlooking the creek and 
 bridge, toward which scattered fragments of regiments 
 were pressing, the bald fact needed no other appeal to 
 the American Gommander-in-Chief to assure him of the 
 
BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 231 
 
 necessity for his immediate presence. Harrison and 
 Fitzgerald, of his staff, were despatched to learn ^the 
 cause of the appearances of fugitives from their respective 
 commands. They met Major Ogden, who replied to 
 their excited demands, with an expletive : tf They are 
 fleeing from a shadow." Officer after officer, detachment 
 after detachment, came over the bridge, ambiguous in 
 replies, seemingly ignorant of the cause of retreat, only 
 that retreat had been ordered. Neither was the move 
 ment in the nature of a panic. Hot and oppressive as 
 was the dayfthere was simply confusion of all organized 
 masses, needing but some competent will to restore them 
 to place and duty. 
 
 Washington advanced to the bridge, and allowed 
 neither officer nor man to pass him. In turn, he 
 met Ramsey, Stewart, Wayne, Oswald, and Living 
 ston. To each he gave orders, assigned them posi 
 tions, and directed them to face the enemy. Leading 
 the way, he placed Ramsey and Stewart, with two guns, 
 in the woods to the left, with orders to stop pursuit. On 
 the right, back of an orchard, he placed Yarnum, Wayne, 
 and Livingston ; while Knox and Oswald, with four guns, 
 were establishech~to cover their front. When Maxwell 
 and other generals arrived, they were sent to the rear to 
 re-form their columns and report back to him for orders. 
 Lafayette was intrusted with the formation of a second 
 line until he could give the halted troops a position which 
 they might hold until he could bring the entire army to 
 their support. 
 
 It was such an hour as tests great captains and 
 proves soldiers. The ordeal of Valley Forge had made 
 soldiers. In the presence of Washington they were 
 knit to him as by bands of steel. Company after 
 company sprang into fresh formation as if first coming 
 on parade. 
 
232 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 With the last retreating detachment, Lee appeared, and 
 to his astonished gaze, there was revealed a new forma 
 tion of the very troops he had ordered to seek safety in 
 retreat. In reply to his demand for the reason of this 
 disposition of the troops, he was informed that Washing 
 ton, in person, located the troops. He understood that 
 his personal command ceased with the arrival of the 
 Commander-in-Chief, and he reported for orders. He had 
 no time to speak, when he met this stern peremptory 
 demand, "What does this mean, sir? Give me instantly 
 an explanation of this retreat ! " Appalled by the wrath 
 ful manner and awfully stern presence of Washington, 
 as with drawn sword he stood in his stirrups, towering 
 above the abashed officer, Lee could only answer mechan 
 ically, "Sir? Sir?" The demand was repeated with an 
 emphasis that , hushed every observer. Washington s 
 manner, bearing and tone, are described by those who 
 stood awe-bound by the scene, as "more than human." 
 It was as if Liberty herself had descended to possess the 
 form of her champion ! 
 
 All who felt his presence bent their wills as rushes 
 yield to the tempest, so immediate, so irresistible was 
 his mastery of the occasion. When the half suppli 
 ant officer ventured to explain that " the contradictory 
 reports as to the enemy s movements brought about a 
 confusion that he could not control," and ventured far 
 ther to remind his Commander-in-Chief that he " was 
 opposed to it in council, and while the enemy Avas so 
 superior in cavalry we could not oppose him," Washing 
 ton, with instant self-control, replied: "You should not 
 have undertaken it unless prepared to carry it through : 
 and whatever your opinions, orders were to be obeyed." 
 Again turning to the silent officer, he asked one single 
 question. It was this : " Will you remain here in front, 
 and retain command while I form the army in the rear ; or 
 
BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 
 
 shall I remain?" Lee remained, until ordered to return 
 to- English Town and assist in rallying the fugitives that 
 assembled there. It requires more time to outline the 
 events of a few precious moments at such a crisis than the 
 events themselves occupied. The map discloses the final 
 position. Greene was on the right, Stirling was on the 
 left where an admirable position of artillery prepared 
 him to meet the British columns. Lafayette occupied 
 a second line, on slightly higher ground in the rear. 
 Greene sent six guns to McComb s Hill, where they could 
 direct enfilading fire upon the British colujnns, already 
 advancing against the position in which Washington had 
 placed Wayne, Varnum and Livingston. 
 
 The real Battle of Monmouth had begun. The British 
 forces were repulsed at every point. At the hedge-row, 
 three brilliant charges were made, and Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Monckton of the British Grenadiers was among the killed. 
 As the day advanced, Lee reported in person, and again 
 requested "his excellency s pleasure," whether to form his 
 division "with the main body, or draw them up in the 
 rear." He was ordered to re-form them in the rear of 
 English Town, three miles distant. Baron Steuben was 
 also on duty at that point. When, about five o clock, all 
 cannonading ceased in the direction of the battlefield, 
 Colonel Gimat, of Washington s staff, arrived at English 
 Town with an order for the advance of the troops which 
 had been re-formed under Lee s supervision ; announcing 
 that the British were in confusion. Colonel Gimat stated 
 in his evidence before the court-martial which subse 
 quently tried Lee, that when he communicated this order 
 to that officer Lee replied, that "they were only resting 
 themselves, and there must be some misunderstanding 
 about your being ordered to advance with these troops " ; 
 " and it was not until General Muhlenburg halted, and the 
 precise orders of Washington were repeated, that Lee 
 
234 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 could understand that the cessation of firing was occa 
 sioned by the retreat of Clinton, and not by the defeat of 
 Washington." 
 
 During the evening, the American army advanced, 
 ready for a general attack upon the British troops, at day 
 break. Washington, with a small escort, visited every 
 picket. The position was made impregnable, and the 
 army was in the best possible spirits for a complete 
 victory, and expected victory. 
 
 At 10 o clock at night, Clinton silently broke camp 
 and departed for Middletown, where he joined Knyp- 
 hausen, reaching New York on the last day of June. 
 The British and the American casualties were each about 
 three hundred, some of these being deaths from excessive 
 heat. It appeared afterwards, that the desertions from 
 the British army numbered nearly two thousand men. 
 
 European comments upon this battle were as eulogistic 
 of the American Commander-in-Chief as after the battles 
 of Trenton, Princeton, and Germantown. The historian 
 Gordon says of Washington, upon his reaching the 
 battlefield : " He animated his forces by his gallant 
 example, and exposed his person to every danger common 
 to the meanest soldier ; so that the conduct of the soldiers 
 in general, after recovering from the first surprise occa 
 sioned by the retreat, could not be surpassed." 
 
 General Lee was tried for disobedience of orders in 
 not attacking the enemy ; for misbehavior before the 
 enemy ; a disorderly retreat ; and insolent letters sent to 
 the Commander-in-Chief, after the battle, and was sen 
 tenced to " suspension from command for twelve months." 
 A reasonable self-control, which he never had exercised, 
 might, even at this crisis of his history, have saved him 
 his commission. He died ignominiously, and even in 
 his will perpetuated his hatred of religion and his 
 Maker. An abstract of the testimony taken upon his 
 
BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 235 
 
 trial shows that the adjustment of the advance troops 
 by General Lafayette was admirable ; that up to the time 
 when Lee ordered a retreat without consulting him, all 
 the troops were steady in their positions, awaiting some 
 systematic orders from Lee, who had just taken com 
 mand ; that Lee did not intend to force the battle which 
 Lafayette had organized ; that brigades and detachments 
 had no information of adjoining commands, or supports; 
 that when Lee s orders for a general retreat reached 
 brigades, each brigade moved more through example 
 than instructions, without direction or intimation of any 
 new formation, or any reason for the retreat. 
 
 Recent writers have revived the tradition as to Wash 
 ington s alleged profanity at the Battle of Momnouth. It 
 would seem that either Charles Lee, or his witnesses, or 
 the Avitnesses of the United States, under cross-examina 
 tion, immediately after the occurrence, would have tes 
 tified to such words, if spoken, for the sake of vindicat 
 ing Lee, when his commission and honor were in jeopardy. 
 Every Avitness agrees with Lee as to language used ; but 
 none imply profanity. Silence in this respect is, prima 
 facie, the strongest possible legal evidence in disproval of 
 the charge. 
 
 One of the most eminent of American historians, in a 
 footnote, thus attempts to verify this vague tradition 
 respecting Washington: "It is related that when Lafay 
 ette visited this country in 1825, he was the guest of Chief 
 Justice Hornblower at Newark, N. J., and that while seated 
 on his front porch, one evening, Lafayette remarked that 
 the only time when he f ever heard Washington swear, 
 was when he rebuked Lee at meeting him on his retreat 
 at Momnouth. r The late Justice Bradley, who married a 
 daughter of Judge Hornblower, in a letter, thus meets 
 this statement : " Nothing of the kind ever occurred. 
 Lafayette did not stay at Mr. Hornblower s, but at the 
 
230 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 principal public house of the city. There he was visited ; 
 but the subject of the Battle of Monmouth was not men 
 tioned." 
 
 Lafayette does not, in his Memoirs, make such a charge ; 
 nor in letters to his wife, which were voluminous in 
 sketches of his beloved commander. Invariably, he exalts 
 the character of Washington, as " something more divine 
 than human." 
 
 An additional statement, however, is given, to indicate 
 the intensity of feeling and excitement of manner which 
 characterized Washington s deportment on the occasion 
 referred to. The late Governor Pennington, of New Jer 
 sey, afterwards Speaker of the American House of Rep 
 resentatives, was a pupil of Dr. Asahel Green, President 
 of Princeton College, and related this incident of his col 
 lege career : " Dr. Green lectured on Moral Philosophy, 
 and used as his text-book Paley s work on that subject. 
 When engaged on the chapter relative to profane swear 
 ing, after Dr. Green had dilated on the subject, expanding 
 Paley s argument on the uselessness and ungentlemanli- 
 ness of the vice, and the entire absence of any excuse for 
 it, some roguish student put to him this question : Dr. 
 Green, did not Washington swear at Lee, at the Battle of 
 Monmouth? Now, the doctor was present during the 
 battle, in fact, a chaplain in the service, although a young 
 man, and was an enthusiastic admirer, almost worship 
 per, of General Washington. When the question was put 
 to him, he drew himself up with dignity and said : Young 
 man, that great man did, I acknowledge, use some hasty 
 and incautious words at the Battle of Monmouth, when 
 Lee attempted to excuse his treacherous conduct : but, 
 if there ever was an occasion on which a man might 
 be excused for such forgetfulness, it was that occasion ! 
 
 In reply to an insolent letter written by General Lee 
 immediately after the battle, in which he protested against 
 
BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 237 
 
 " very singular expressions used on the field, which implied 
 that he was either guilty of disobedience of orders, of 
 want of conduct, or want of courage," Washington replied : 
 " I received your letter, expressed, as I conceive, in terms 
 highly improper. I am not conscious of any very sin 
 gular expressions at the time of my meeting you, as you 
 intimate. What I recollect to have said, was dictated by 
 duty and warranted by the occasion." 
 
 As at Kipp s Bay, when Washington denounced the 
 panic as " dastardly and cowardly," and tradition called 
 that "profanity," thus, at Monmouth, Washington re 
 buked Lee s conduct. Lee s letter, just cited, conveys 
 his estimate of Washington s words and manner. He 
 also testified, that it was "manner rather than tuords" 
 that gave him offence. 
 
 The Battle of Monmouth, from first to last, was a su 
 preme test of Washington the Soldier. From Monmouth, 
 he marched to Brunswick, where he rested his troops ; 
 thence to Haverstraw Bay ; and finally, on the twenty- 
 second day of July, ho established his summer head 
 quarters at White Plains. 
 
 . Washington s Military Order Book, from the 22nd of 
 June to 8th of August, 1779, in his own hand-writing, contains 
 the following General Order. 
 
 " Many and pointed Orders have been issued against that unmean 
 ing and abominable custom of swearing, notwithstanding which, 
 with much regret the General observes that it prevails if possible, 
 more than ever. His feelings are continually wounded by the oaths 
 and imprecations of the soldiers whenever he is in hearing of them. 
 The name of that Being from whose bountiful goodness we are per 
 mitted to exist and enjoy the Comforts of life is incessantly imprecated 
 and profaned in a manner as wanton as it is shocking. For the sake 
 therefore of religion, decency and order, the General hopes and trusts 
 that officers of every rank will use their influence and authority to 
 Check a vice which is as unprofitable as it is wicked and shameful. 
 If officers would make it an invariable rule to reprimand and, if that 
 does not do punish soldiers for offences of the kind, it would not 
 fail of having the desired effect." 
 
CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE TAKES EFFECT. -- SIEGE 
 OF NEWPORT. 
 
 "I rPON the return of General Clinton to New York as 
 v_J the successor to General Howe in command of " all 
 the Atlantic Colonies from Nova Scotia to West Indies, 
 inclusive," his outlook over the territories which fell 
 under his guardianship must have been that of faith 
 rather than of sight. With the exception of Staten Island 
 and the British supply depot, practically a part of New 
 York, only one other post in the Northern Department, 
 that of Newport, R.I., retained a British garrison. It 
 is very certain that Clinton did not regard his exodus 
 from Philadelphia and his collision with Washington s 
 army at Monmouth with as much enthusiasm as did 
 Charles Lee, who, shortly after that battle, when demand 
 ing a speedy court-martial, informed Washington that 
 "this campaign would close the war." At any rate, 
 Clinton was hardly settled in his quarters, before tidings 
 reached him that, on the eighth, a formidable French fleet 
 of twelve line-of-battle ships and four frigates had made 
 the Delaware Capes ; and that one of them, the Chinier, 
 had conveyed to the American capital Monsieur Conrad 
 A. Gerard, the first French Ambassador to the United 
 States of America. Silas Deane, one of the American 
 Commissioners at Paris, accompanied Monsieur Gerard. 
 Clinton had reason to rejoice in this tardy arrival. The 
 fleet sailed from Toulon, April thirteenth ; but on account 
 
 238 
 
ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE TAKES EFFECT. 239 
 
 of contrary winds did not pass Gibraltar until the fifteenth 
 day of May. A voyage of ordinary passage would have 
 imperiled both Howe and Clinton ; as four thousand troops 
 accompanied the squadron, and its naval force was, just 
 at that time, superior to that of Great Britain in Ameri 
 can waters. 
 
 In order rightly to appreciate the campaign which 
 almost immediately opened, it is interesting to observe 
 how the operations of both America and Britain were 
 controlled by incidents over which neither had control. 
 They also illustrate the contingencies which shape all 
 military and naval operations over a broad theatre of war. 
 A superior British squadron, under Admiral Byron, sailed 
 from Portsmouth, England, as soon as it was known that 
 France would actively support the United States. This 
 was on the twentieth day of May. Upon receipt of news, 
 supposed to be trustworthy, that the French fleet had 
 been ordered to the West Indies only, the order was 
 suspended in time for his return. Admiral Byron, who 
 had been ordered to relieve Admiral Howe, returned 
 to Plymouth. He did not actually sail with his fine fleet 
 of twenty-two ships until the fifth of June. Even then, 
 the ships were scattered by storms ; and four of them, 
 reaching New York separately, narrowly escaped capture 
 by the French just after Count d Estaing left that port 
 for Newport. 
 
 The French fleet, when advised of the evacuation of 
 Philadelphia, immediately sailed for New York. Its ar 
 rival produced intense excitement. The Annual Register 
 (British) of that period reflects the sentiment very fully. 
 The British ships, then in port, were inferior in number 
 and weight of metal to those of France. Every available 
 vessel of sufficient capacity to carry heavy guns was im 
 mediately subsidized for defence. The entire city was 
 exposed to attack as when occupied by the American 
 
240 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 army after its retreat from Long Island. It was a strange 
 change in the relations of the British and American 
 forces in that vicinity. 
 
 Washington, fully satisfied that Clinton could have no 
 possible inducement again to enter New Jersey, hoped, 
 that through the presence of the French ships and the 
 accompanying troops he might wrest Newport from 
 British control, and planned accordingly. He did not, 
 however, overlook the possibility of even striking New 
 York. He had been advised by the French Ambassador 
 of the very perilous relations of France in the West 
 Indies ; and that the fleet which accompanied him to 
 Philadelphia, with the expectation of a decisive action 
 there, must soon be released for service elsewhere. Its 
 change of destination to the port of New York involved 
 an unexpected delay upon the American coast, and con 
 tingencies of a very serious character. American critics 
 constantly complained that the French fleet did not at 
 once bombard New York City. Even some military men 
 of that period, and some historical speculators since 
 that time, would denounce the statement of the French 
 Admiral, that the depth of water was insufficient for his 
 ships to approach the city, as a mere excuse for not 
 doing so. Washington sent Colonels Laurens and Ham 
 ilton, confidential members of his staff, to learn the facts ; 
 and the most experienced pilots were offered fifty thou 
 sand dollars if they would agree to conduct the ships to 
 the city. Hamilton s Report read as follows : 
 
 >r These experienced persons unanimously declared, 
 that it was impossible to carry us in. All refused ; and 
 the particular soundings which I caused to be made my 
 self, too well demonstrated that they were right." 
 
 Washington immediately turned his attention to New 
 port ; and the French fleet sailed at once to Rhode Island. 
 Count d Estaing cast anchor off Point Judith, only five 
 
ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE TAKES EFFECT. 241 
 
 miles from Newport, on the twenty-ninth day of July. 
 As an indication of the condition of affairs at New York 
 after his departure, the following despatch of General 
 Clinton to Lord Germaine, bearing the same date, July 
 twenty-ninth, is of interest, declaring : " I may yet be 
 compelled to evacuate the city and return to Halifax." 
 
 The reader will involuntarily recall the events of July 
 and August, 1776, only two years prior to the date of 
 this despondent letter. Then General Howe and Ad 
 miral Howe superciliously addressed communications to 
 " George Washington, Esqr." Now, General Howe was 
 homeward bound, relieved from further service in Amer 
 ica, because the same Washington had outgeneraled him 
 as a Soldier. And his brother, Admiral Howe, had been 
 granted his request to be transferred to some other 
 sphere of naval service. 
 
 As soon as the French squadron of Count d Estaing 
 sailed from New York, Washington instructed General 
 Sullivan, then in command at Providence, R.I., to sum 
 mon the New England militia to his aid for a combined 
 attack upon Newport ; assigned Generals Greene and 
 Lafayette to the command of divisions ; and ordered the 
 brigades of Varnum and Glover to report to Lafayette. 
 These officers had served with Greene before Boston, and 
 Yarnuni was a member of Greene s old company, the 
 Kentish Guards, which marched with him to Boston at 
 the outbreak of war. The proposed cooperation of 
 French troops also made the assignment of General 
 Lafayette equally judicious. 
 
 The British garrison consisted of six thousand troops 
 under Major-General Pigot. On the fifth of August 
 two French frigates entered the harbor, and the British 
 burned seven of their own frigates with which they had 
 controlled the waters, to avoid their capture. Details of 
 the siege of Newport, except as Washington bore rela- 
 
242 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 tions to its progress and its ultimate failure, are not 
 within the purpose of this narrative. It was unfortu 
 nate that General Sullivan so long detained the French 
 troops on shipboard ; where, as one of their officers 
 wrote, they had been " cooped up " for more than five 
 months. Their prompt landing would certainly have 
 averted the subsequent disaster ; as storms of unprece 
 dented fury soon after swept the coast, with almost equal 
 distress to the land forces and those on the sea. In 
 General Washington s letter, advising of the departure 
 of Admiral Howe from New York for Newport, he thus 
 forecast the future : " Unless the fleet have advices of re- 
 enforcements off the coast, it can only be accounted for 
 on the principle of desperation, stimulated by a hope of 
 finding you divided in your operations against Rhode 
 Island." 
 
 The American force was about ten thousand men. The 
 tenth of the month had been specifically designated for a 
 joint movement ; but General Sullivan, without notifying 
 the Count d Estaing, anticipated it by a day, and failed. 
 Count d Estaing was a lieutenant-general in the French 
 army ; but agreed to waive his rank, and serve under 
 Lafayette. The report was current at that time, that 
 ill-feeling arose between General Sullivan and Count 
 d Estaing because of the precipitate action of General Sul 
 livan on this occasion. On the contrary, Count d Estaing 
 understood that but two thousand troops were in the 
 movement. He promptly called upon General Sullivan 
 to consult as to further operations ; and in a Report to 
 Congress used this language, alike creditable to his judg 
 ment and his candor : " Knowing that there are moments 
 which must be eagerly seized upon in war, I was cautious 
 of blaming any overthrow of plans, which nevertheless 
 astonished me, and which, in fact, merits in my opin 
 ion only praise ; although accumulated circumstances 
 
SIEGE OF NEWPORT. 243 
 
 might have rendered the consequences very unfortu~ 
 nate." 
 
 When he made his visit to General Sullivan, he left 
 orders for the troops that were to join in the land expe 
 dition to follow. He had no knowledge, at that time, 
 that Admiral Howe had received reinforcements, and had 
 left New York to attack the French fleet then at New 
 port. A large number of the French seamen were upon 
 Connanicut Island, on account of scurvy, and the fleet 
 was scattered, without apprehension of an attack from 
 the sea. A fog prevailed on the morning of the visit. 
 D Estaing returned to his flag-ship, and as the fog lifted, 
 there appeared in the offing a British fleet of thirty-six 
 sail. Admiral Howe had been reenforced by a portion 
 of Admiral Byron s fleet, which arrived in advance of its 
 commander ; and this force was superior to that of his 
 adversary. D Estaing was alert. Quickly gathering his 
 ships, in spite of a rising gale, he succeeded in gaining 
 and holding the " weather-gauge " of Howe, who did not 
 dare press toward the land against such an advantage in 
 D Estaing s favor. Both fleets were dispersed by the 
 tempest over fifty miles of ocean, repeatedly meeting 
 with collisions, and after several of his ships had been 
 dismasted, Howe ran the gauntlet of a part of the French 
 squadron, and returned to New York. 
 
 On the twentieth, Count d Estaing returned to New 
 port ; and on the twenty-second sailed for Boston to refit. 
 A protest, signed by General Sullivan and others, includ 
 ing John Hancock, who took an active part in the opera 
 tions of the siege, did not change his purpose. He had no 
 alternative. It is true that much bad feeling, soon proven 
 to have been absolutely unjustifiable, existed among 
 Americans at the date of his departure. Sullivan him 
 self issued an intemperate order, which he speedily modi 
 fied, but not until it had gone to the public ; in which he 
 
244 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 used these words : " The general yet hopes the event will 
 prove America able to procure that by her own arms, 
 which her allies refuse to assist in obtaining." 
 
 Just at this time, a courier from Washington reached 
 Sullivan s headquarters with the information that General 
 Clinton had sailed from New York with four thousand 
 troops to reenforce the garrison of Newport ; and strongly 
 intimated "the importance of securing a timely retreat 
 from the Island." The suggestion was heeded. On the 
 twenty-sixth, the heavy baggage was removed. On the 
 twenty-eighth, a council of officers decided to withdraw to 
 the north end of the island, until a messenger could be sent 
 to Boston to urge the return of the French fleet. La 
 fayette was the messenger, and made the round trip in a 
 few hours. Count d Estaing very properly held, that to 
 put in peril the entire fleet of France, in support of land 
 operations so far from home and upon a strange coast, 
 was a practical disobedience of his orders, and unjust to 
 his sovereign ; but, while he would not return with his 
 fleet, he informed Lafayette, that he " was willing to 
 lead the French troops, in person, to Newport" and place 
 himself "under General Sullivan s orders." In a manly 
 explanation of his course, and notwithstanding General 
 Sullivan s proclamation, of which he was advised, he used 
 this language : " / was anxious to demonstrate thai my 
 countrymen could not be offended by a sudden expression of 
 feeling ; and that he who commanded them in America, was, 
 and would be, at all times, one of the most devoted and 
 zealous servants of the United States." 
 
 By three o clock of the twenty-ninth, the Americans 
 occupied Quaker Hill and Turkey Hill. These localities 
 are still remembered for the gallantry of their defenders 
 during subsequent British assaults. At eleven o clock, 
 Lafayette returned from Boston, and before twelve 
 as reported by Sullivan " the main army had crossed 
 
SIEGE OF NEWPORT. 245 
 
 to the mainland with stores and baggage." As at Brandy- 
 wine, Barren Hill and Monmouth, Lafayette remained 
 with the rear guard, and brought away the last of the 
 pickets in good order, rf not a man nor an article of bag 
 gage having been left behind." 
 
 On the morning of the thirtieth, one hundred and five 
 sail of British vessels were in sight, bringing Clinton s 
 army to the rescue of the garrison. Howe returned im 
 mediately to New York, although Gray made an expe 
 dition from Newport which committed depredations at 
 Bedford, Fairhaven, Martha s Vineyard, and all places 
 from which American privateers were fitted out for 
 assaults upon British commerce. Admiral Howe after 
 wards sailed for Boston, but being unable to entice Count 
 d Estaing to so unequal a contest, returned again to New 
 York. On the first of November, Admiral Byron appeared 
 off Boston with a large naval force, but was driven to sea 
 by a storm which so disabled his fleet that he was com 
 pelled to go to Newport and refit. On his voyage from 
 England he had been compelled to stop at Halifax, and it 
 has been well said of this officer, that he chiefly " fought 
 the ocean, during the year 1778." 
 
 Count d Estaing sailed for the West Indies on the third 
 of November. The first cooperation of the French navy 
 in support of the United States had resulted in no victories, 
 on land or sea ; but it had precipitated the evacuation of 
 Philadelphia, restricted the garrison of New York to 
 operations within the reach of the British navy, and was 
 a practical pledge of thorough sympathy with America in 
 her struggle for complete independence of Great Britain, 
 and of the emphatic determination of France to maintain, 
 as well as acknowledge, that independence. 
 
CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 MINOR EVENTS AND GRAVE CONDITIONS, 1779. 
 
 THE Headquarters of the American Army remained at 
 White Plains until the latter part of September. 
 Upon reaching that post, immediately following the Bat 
 tle of Monmouth, after two years of absence, the Amer 
 ican Commander-in-Chief, profoundly appreciating the 
 mutations of personal and campaign experience through 
 which himself and army had kept company in the service 
 of " God and Country," thus expressed himself: 
 
 r The hand of Providence has been so conspicuous, that 
 he must be worse than an infidel that lacks faith ; and 
 more than wicked that has not gratitude enough to recoo-- 
 
 o o o 
 
 nize the obligation." 
 
 Washington s self-control of a strongly passionate nat 
 ural temper, and his equanimity under most exasperating 
 ordeals, first were due to maternal influence, and then to 
 his faith in some guiding principle of the inner self which 
 enabled him to devote his entire faculties to passing 
 duty, unhampered by the many personal considerations 
 which so grievously worried many of his subordinates. 
 
 Upon the failure of operations against Newport, Sulli 
 van reoccupied Providence ; Lafayette occupied Bristol, 
 and afterwards withdrew to Warren, beyond the reach of 
 the British shipping. Greene, still acting as Quarter 
 master-General, went to Boston, to superintend the pur 
 chase of supplies for the French fleet. It is to be noticed, 
 in connection with the presence of the French fleet at 
 
 246 
 
MINOR EVENTS AND GRAVE CONDITIONS. 247 
 
 Boston, that one of its officers, Chevalier de Saint Sau- 
 veur, was killed while attempting to quiet an affray 
 between the French and some disorderly persons who 
 visited a French bakery. On the next day, the Massa 
 chusetts General Assembly, ordered the erection of a 
 monument to his memory. 
 
 Washington removed from White Plains to Fishkill, 
 ever on the watch for the defences of the Hudson and 
 the assurance of constant communication between New 
 England and New York. On the tenth, he was at 
 Petersburg. On the twenty-seventh, he announced the 
 disposition of the army for the approaching winter. 
 
 The formal assignments of commands to posts and 
 departments, at this time, indicate his judgment of their 
 relative value and exposure : " Nine brigades are disposed 
 on the west side of the Hudson River, exclusive of the 
 garrison of West Point ; one of which will be near 
 Smith s Clove, for the security of that pass, and as a 
 reinforcement to West Point, in case of necessity. The 
 Jersey brigade is ordered to spend the winter at Eliza- 
 bethtown, to cover the lower parts of New Jersey. Seven 
 brigades, consisting of the Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, 
 and Pennsylvania troops, will be at Middlebrook ; six 
 brigades will be left on the east side of the river and at 
 West Point ; three of which (of Massachusetts troops) 
 will be stationed for the immediate defence of the High 
 lands, one at West Point, in addition to the garrison 
 already there, and the other two at Fishkill and Conti 
 nental Village. The remaining three brigades, composed 
 of the New Hampshire and Connecticut troops, and 
 Hazen s Regiment, will be posted in the vicinity of Dan- 
 bury, for the protection of the country lying along the 
 Sound ; to cover our magazines lying on Connecticut 
 river ; and to aid the Highlands, on any serious move 
 ment of the enemy that way. The park of artillery will 
 
248 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 be at Pluckemin ; the cavalry will be disposed of thus : 
 Eland s Regiment at Winchester, Va." 
 
 The significance of this last assignment will be 
 apparent, if it be remembered that the Hessian troops, 
 captured at Saratoga, preferred to remain in America ; 
 so that, when Burgoyne s army reached Cambridge for 
 transportation to England, the foreign troops were sent 
 to Virginia. Some threats had reached the ever-attentive 
 ear of the American Commander-in-Chief, that an attempt 
 would be made to release this command and employ it in 
 the field, at the south. Of the other cavalry squadrons, 
 Baylis was to occupy Frederick, or Hagerstown, Md. ; 
 Sheldon s, to be at Durham, Conn. ; and Lee s Corps, 
 (Col. Harry Lee), "will be with that part of the army 
 which is in the Jerseys, acting on the advanced posts." 
 
 General Putnam was assigned to command at Danbury, 
 General McDougall, in the Highlands ; and general head 
 quarters were to be near Middlebrook. 
 
 No extensive field operations took place in the Northern 
 States, after the Battle of Monmouth. Several restricted 
 excursions were made, which kept the American Com 
 mander-in-Chief on the watch for the Highland posts ; but 
 these became less and less frequent as the year 1778 drew 
 near its close. The British cabinet ordered five thousand 
 of Clinton s troops to the West Indies, and three thousand 
 more to Florida. 
 
 On the twenty-seventh of September, General Gray 
 surprised Colonel Baylor s Light Horse at Tappan, on 
 the Hudson, as completely as he had surprised Wayne 
 at Paoli. Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, accompanied by 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe, confirmed their usual custom 
 of warfare by forays which brought little plunder and less 
 intrinsic cre/? ,t. Cornwallis with five thousand men made 
 an incursion into New Jersey, between the Hudson and 
 the Hackensack ; and Lieutenant-General Knyphausen, 
 
MINOR EVENTS AND GRAVE CONDITIONS. 249 
 
 with three thousand men, operated in Westchester County, 
 between the Bronx and the Hudson, but with small acqui 
 sition of provisions or other supplies. 
 
 On the eighth of October General Clinton, in writing to 
 Lord Germaine, says : " With an army so much dimin 
 ished, at New York, nothing important can be done, 
 especially as it is weakened by sending seven hundred 
 men to Halifax, and three hundred to Bermuda." On the 
 fifteenth of October, Captain Ferguson of the Seventieth 
 British Foot, with three thousand regulars and the Third 
 New Jersey Volunteers (royalists) made a descent upon 
 Little Neck, N. J., where many privateers were equipped ; 
 surprised a detachment of Count Pulaski s American 
 Brigade, and inflicted a loss of fifty killed, but none 
 wounded, including Lieutenant-Colonel the Baron de 
 Bose, and Lieutenant de la Borderie. Ferguson says, in 
 his official report : "It being a night attack, little quarter, 
 of course, could be given ; so that there were only five 
 prisoners." Count Pulaski vigoiously pursued the party, 
 inflicting some loss. This Ferguson was one of the 
 partisan leaders who was merciless in slaughter, as too 
 many of the auxiliary leaders of that period proved 
 themselves to be when upon irresponsible marauding 
 expeditions. 
 
 Meanwhile, Indian massacres in Wyoming Valley, 
 during July, and that of Cherry Valley, on the eleventh 
 of November, afterwards to be avenged, multiplied the 
 embarrassments of the prosecution of the war, and kept 
 the Cornmander-m-Chief constantly on the alert. The 
 condition of Clinton, in New York, had indeed become 
 critical. The position of the American army so restricted 
 even his food-supplies, that he had to depend largely upon 
 England ; and on the second day of December he wrote 
 again, and even more despondently, to the British Secre 
 tary of State : " I do not complain ; but, my lord, do net 
 
WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 let anything be expected of me, circumstanced as I am." 
 The British Cabinet had already indicated its purpose to 
 abandon further extensive operations in the Northern 
 States, and to utilize the few troops remaining in America, 
 in regions where less organized resistance would be met, 
 and where their fleets could control the chief points to be 
 occupied. As early as November twenty-seventh, Com 
 modore Hyde Parker had convoyed a fleet of transports 
 to Savannah, with a total land force of thirty-five hun 
 dred men ; and on the twenty-ninth of December, Savannah 
 had been captured. 
 
 The year 1778 closed, with the Southern campaign 
 opened ; but the American Congress had no money ; and 
 the loose union of the States constantly evoked sectional 
 jealousies. Any thoughtful reader of this narrative must 
 have noticed with what discriminating judgment enlist 
 ments were accommodated to the conditions of each sec 
 tion, and that care was taken to dispose of troops where 
 their local associations were most conducive to their 
 enthusiastic effort. Washington thus forcibly exposed 
 the condition of affairs, when he declared that "the States 
 were too much engaged in their local concerns, when the 
 great business of a nation, the momentous concerns of an 
 empire, were at stake." 
 
 Bancroft, the historian, thus fitly refers to Washing 
 ton at this eventful crisis in American affairs: "He, 
 who in the beginning of the Revolution used to call 
 Virginia his country, from this time never ceased his 
 efforts, by conversation and correspondence, to train the 
 statesmen of America, especially of his beloved State, to 
 the work of consolidation of the Union." 
 
 At the close of 1778, General Washington visited 
 Philadelphia ; and thus solemnly and pungently addressed 
 Colonel Harrison, Speaker of the Virginia House of Bur 
 gesses. After urging Virginia to send the best and 
 
MINOR EVENTS AND GRAVE CONDITIONS. ^1 
 
 ablest of her men to Congress, he thus continues : 
 "They must not slumber nor sleep at home, at such a 
 time of pressing danger ; content with the enjoyment of 
 places of honor or profit in their own State, while the 
 common interests of America are mouldering and sink 
 ing into inevitable ruin. ... If I were to draw a 
 picture of the times and men, from what I have seen, 
 heard, and in part know, I should, in one word say : that 
 idleness, dissipation, and extravagance, seem to have 
 laid fast hold of many of them ; that speculation, pecu 
 lation, and an insatiable thirst for riches seem to have 
 got the better of every other consideration and almost of 
 every order of men ; that party disputes and personal 
 quarrels are the great business of the day ; . . . while 
 a great and accumulating debt, depreciated money, and 
 want of credit, which in its consequences is the want of 
 everything, are but secondary considerations, if our 
 affairs wore the most promising aspect. . . . An 
 assembly, a concert, a dinner, a supper, will not only 
 take men away from acting in this business, but even from 
 thinking of it ; while the great part of the officers of our 
 army, from absolute necessity, are quitting the service ; 
 and the more virtuous few, rather than do this, are 
 sinking by sure degrees into beggary and want." 
 
 There is a touch of the pathetic, and an almost despond 
 ent tone with which the closing paragraph of this utter 
 ance of the American Commander-in-Chief closes, when 
 he adds : " Our affairs are in a more distressed, ruinous 
 and deplorable condition, than they have been since the 
 commencement of the war." 
 
 There was no danger from any extended movement 
 of British armies in force, and a consequent relaxation of 
 effort pervaded the Colonies which had been most largely 
 called upon for men to meet immediate invasion. This 
 partial repose brought actual indolence and loss of en- 
 
252 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 thusiasm in general operations beyond the districts im 
 mediately exposed to British attack. The winter garrison 
 of Philadelphia, like that of Howe the previous year, 
 languished in confinement, grew feeble in spirit, and 
 weakened in discipline. Congress shared the enervating 
 effect of the temporary suspension of active hostilities ; 
 and it was not until the ninth of March, 1779, that the 
 definite establishment of the army, upon the fixed basis of 
 eighty battalions, was formally authorized. 
 
 The inaction of Clinton at New York gave the Amer 
 ican Conimander-in-Chief an opportunity to turn his atten 
 tion to the Indian atrocities perpetrated the previous 
 year in central New York ; and on the nineteenth of April 
 he sent a force under Colonel Schenck, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Willett and Major Cochran, which destroyed the settle 
 ment of the Onondagas, on the lands still occupied by 
 them, near the present city of Syracuse in that State. 
 An expedition was again planned for Canada, but the 
 wisdom of Washington induced Congress to abandon it. 
 Confederate money dropped to the nominal value of three 
 or four cents on the dollar ; and Washington was con 
 strained to offer his private estate for sale, to meet his 
 personal necessities. Congress seemed incapable of 
 realizing the impending desolation which must attend a 
 forcible invasion of the southern States, and Washington 
 was powerless to detach troops from the north, equal to 
 any grave emergency in that section, so long as Clinton 
 occupied New York in force. General Greene, compre 
 hending the views of Washington and the immediate 
 
 O O 
 
 necessity for organizing an army for the threatened States, 
 equal to the responsibility, asked permission to undertake 
 that responsibility ; but Congress refused to sanction such 
 a detail, although approved by Washington. This refusal, 
 and the consequent delay to anticipate British invasion at 
 the South, protracted the war, and brought both disaster 
 
MINOR EVENTS AND GRAVE CONDITIONS, 1779. 253 
 
 and loss which early action might have anticipated, or 
 prevented. The utmost that could be secured from Con 
 gress was permission for the detail of a portion of the 
 regular troops which had been recruited at the South, to 
 return to that section for active service. 
 
 Lafayette, finding that active duty was not antici 
 pated, sailed from Boston for France, January 11, 1779, 
 upon the frigate Alliance, which the Continental Con 
 gress placed at his disposal. 
 
 General Lincoln, of the American army who had 
 reached Charleston on the last day of December, 1778 
 attempted to thwart the operations of the British General 
 Sir Augustine Prevost ; but without substantial, perma 
 nent results. The British, from Detroit, operated as far 
 south as the valley of the Wabash River, in the Illinois 
 country ; but Thomas Jefferson, then Governor of 
 Virginia, with troops raised in Virginia and North Caro 
 lina, strengthened the western frontier and placed it in 
 a condition of defence, unaided by Congress. 
 
 The Middle States, however, had some experience of 
 the desultory kind of warfare which characterized the 
 greater part of the military operations of 1779. General 
 Matthews sailed from New York late in April, with two 
 thousand troops and five hundred marines, laid waste 
 Norfolk and Portsmouth, Virginia, destroyed over one 
 hundred vessels, and returned to New York with seven 
 teen prizes and three thousand hogsheads of tobacco, 
 without serious loss to his command. As if keen to 
 watch for the slightest opportunity of resuming active 
 operations from New York, and constantly dreading the 
 nearness and alertness of the American headquarters in 
 New Jersey, Clinton, on the thirteenth of May, under 
 convoy of the fleet of Sir George Collier, surprised the 
 small garrisons at Verplanck s and Stony Point, re-garri 
 soned them with British troops, and retired to Yonkers, 
 
254 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 leaving several small frigates and sloops-of-war to cover 
 each post. 
 
 The American army was removed from Middlebrook to 
 Smith s Clove, on the ninth. On the twenty-third, 
 Washington removed his headquarters to New Windsor, 
 leaving General Putnam in command. General Heath 
 was ordered to Boston, and General Wayne was sta 
 tioned between the Clove and Fort Montgomery, near 
 Dunderburg Mountain. 
 
 Such were the modified positions of the two armies of 
 the north, at the close of June, 1779. 
 
CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 MINOR OPERATIONS OF 1779 CONTINUED. STONY POINT 
 
 TAKEN. NEW ENGLAND RELIEVED. 
 
 IN Fennimore Cooper s interesting romance, " The 
 Spy," he furnishes graphic delineations of the true 
 character of those minor operations about New York 
 which were parts of General Clinton s military recrea 
 tion, while he had too small a force to meet Washington s 
 compact army in actual battle. Night forays and short 
 excursions, under the cover of small vessels-of-war and 
 assured of safe retreat, were of frequent occurrence. 
 Mounted bands, officially known as the Queen s Rangers, 
 had very large discretion in their movements and methods. 
 They galloped to and fro, at will, sometimes securing 
 plunder, and sometimes barely escaping with less than 
 they started with. As a general rule, some " spy " was 
 on the watch, and their ventures were simply mis-ad 
 ventures. The American " cow-boys " were just as real 
 characters, although less organized ; and each party car 
 ried on a small war of its own, for the plunder realized. 
 Clinton s lucky capture of Stony Point encouraged him 
 to undertake other enterprises which weakened the re 
 sources of the people, without enhanced prestige to the 
 British troops. On the first of July, Tarleton went out 
 for twenty-four hours, and on his return, made report. 
 He had " surprised Sheldon s cavalry, near Salem ; capt 
 ured Sheldon s colors [accidentally left in a barn], 
 burned the Presbyterian church, and received little loss." 
 
 255 
 
WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 He says : " I proposed terms to the militia, that if they 
 would not fire from the houses, I would not burn them." 
 But the militia that gathered in his rear made the expedi 
 tion unprofitable. In less than eight hours Washington 
 learned of the excursion. 
 
 On the third day of July, General Tryon, under con 
 voy of the fleet of Sir George Collyer, which had es 
 corted General Clinton to Stony Point, sailed with twenty- 
 six hundred men for New Haven, Conn. On Sunday, 
 July fourth, when the people were observing the Sab 
 bath and looking forward with enthusiasm to the follow 
 
 er 
 
 ing morning and the observance of " Independence Day," 
 Tryon published the following letter to the people of 
 Connecticut : Pf The ungenerous and wanton insurrections 
 
 O 
 
 against the sovereignty of Great Britain into which this 
 colony has been deluded by the artifices of designing men, 
 for private purposes, might well justify in you every fear 
 which conscious guilt could form respecting the intentions 
 of the present movement. The existence of a single 
 habitation on your defenceless coast, ought to be a con 
 stant reproof to your ingratitude." 
 
 The landing of the various divisions at East Haven, 
 Savin Rock, and other points ; and the vigorous defence 
 upon the New Haven Green, by Capt. James Hillhouse, 
 in command of the students of Yale College, are matters 
 of familiar history. Fairfield, Green Farms, Huntington, 
 Long Island, Greenfield and Norwalk shared in this raid ; 
 but it only embittered the struggle, and on the thirteenth 
 the expedition returned to New York. When Tryon s 
 expedition started, Washington was opposite Staten 
 Island ; being on a tour of personal inspection of all posts 
 along the Hudson and the New Jersey approaches from 
 the sea. On the seventh of July, when advised that 
 Tryon had sailed, he sent an express to Governor Trum- 
 bull, and ordered General Glover, then at Providence, to 
 
MINOR OPERATIONS OF 1779 CONTINUED. 257 
 
 cooperate with the militia in case the enemy should make 
 any descent upon the Connecticut coast. 
 
 Meanwhile, and as the result of his tour of inspection, 
 he planned a counter movement to these demonstrations 
 of the New York garrison. During the six weeks occu 
 pation of Stony Point by the British Grenadiers of the 
 Seventieth Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Webster, 
 heavy guns had been mounted ; breastworks and batteries 
 had been built in advance of the fort, and two rows of 
 abatis crossed the slope leading to the water. Washing 
 ton, perfectly familiar with the post and the additions 
 to its defences, prepared a minute plan for its capture. 
 General Wayne, it will be remembered, had been posted 
 near Dunderburg Mountain, in the distribution of officers 
 made on the twenty-third of the month. Wayne entered 
 into the plan with avidity. The detail of troops made 
 by Washington and the instructions given have interest, 
 as every possible effort was made to avoid failure or pre 
 mature disclosure of the design. Colonel Febiger s Regi 
 ment, followed by Colonel Webb s (Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Meigs commanding) and a detachment from West Point 
 under Major Hull, formed the right. Colonel Butler s Regi 
 ment, and two companies of North Carolina troops under 
 Major Murphy, formed the left. Colonel Lee s Light 
 Horse, three hundred strong, which had been manceuvered 
 during the day so as not to lead vagrants or spies to 
 suspect their destination, formed the covering party, and 
 took a position on the opposite side of a swamp near the 
 post. The troops left Sandy Beach at midnight and 
 marched by single files, over mountains, through morasses, 
 and deep defiles. At eight o clock of the sixteenth, the 
 command was within a mile and a half of the fort. 
 Wayne made reconnoissance in person, and at half-past 
 eleven at night the advance was ordered. In order to 
 prevent any deserter from giving warning to the garrison, 
 
258 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 the purpose of the expedition was not announced until 
 the order to attack could be given personally, by each 
 officer, to his individual command. 
 
 The following order was at the same time communi 
 cated to the men: " If any soldier presume to take his 
 musket from his shoulder ; attempt to fire ; or begin the 
 battle till ordered by his proper officer, he shall be 
 instantly put to death by the officer next him." (This 
 implied, of course, death by the sword.) The advance 
 was to be " with fixed bayonets, and unloaded muskets." 
 Each officer and soldier had been ordered to place a white 
 paper or cloth upon his cap, to distinguish him from 
 an enemy ; and the watchword, to be shouted aloud 
 whenever one detachment reached its point of attack, as 
 an encouragement to the others and a terror to the gar 
 rison, was, " The fort is ours!" Pioneer parties, care 
 fully selected, wrenched away the abatis. The detach 
 ments moved instantly, as if impelled by some invisible, 
 resistless force. The two assaulting columns met in the 
 centre of the works almost at the same moment. Wayne 
 fell, seriously but not mortally Avounded, while passing 
 the abatis. The entire American loss was fifteen killed, 
 and eighty-three wounded. The British loss was one 
 officer and nineteen men killed ; six officers and sixty- 
 eight men wounded ; twenty-five officers and four hundred 
 and forty-seven men taken prisoners ; two officers and 
 fifty-six men missing. The night was dark, and the 
 difficulties of crossing the morass below the fort, at nearly 
 full tide, and clambering up rugged cliffs thick with briars 
 and underbrush, cannot be described. A modern visitor 
 will find it difficult enough to make the same trip, by 
 daylight. The stores, valued at $158,640, were divided 
 by Washington s order among the troops, in proportion 
 to the pay of officers and men. The courteous treatment 
 extended by him to the prisoners received very gracious 
 
MINOR OPERATIONS OF 1779 CONTINUED. 259 
 recognition from the British authorities. The faithful- 
 
 O 
 
 ness, skill, and daring, and the good judgment with 
 which Wayne comprehended and carried out, in almost 
 literal detail, the plans of Washington, were greatly to 
 his honor, and evoked most appreciative commendation 
 from his superior officer. 
 
 General Clinton promptly organized a force, and pro 
 ceeded up the river to recapture the post ; but Washing 
 ton, having dismantled it, decided that its further reten 
 tion was not of sufficient value to spare a garrison for its 
 permanent defence, and left it for occupation by the 
 British at their leisure. 
 
 Another excursion from New York by Tarleton, into 
 Westchester County, about the middle of August, was 
 reciprocated under Washington s orders, with decided 
 gclat and success. On the nineteenth of August, Col. 
 Henry Lee crossed the Hackensack ; moved down the 
 Hudson River, and at half-past two o clock in the morn 
 ing, at low tide, captured Paulus Hook, where Jersey 
 City now stands, nearly opposite Clinton s New York 
 headquarters. Not a shot was fired by the storming 
 party. Only the bayonet was used. The Americans 
 lost twenty, and the British lost fifteen, besides one hun 
 dred and fifty taken prisoners. 
 
 For many months Washington had been watching for 
 an opportunity of sufficient relief from British activity, 
 to punish the Indians who perpetrated their outrages in 
 the Wyoming Valley ; and as early as the sixth of March, 
 he tendered to General Gates the command of an expedi 
 tion for that purpose. In this assignment he enclosed an 
 order for him to assume General Sullivan s command at 
 Providence, in case he declined the expedition. General 
 Gates, then at Boston, thus replied : " Last night, I had 
 the honor of your Excellency s letter. The man who 
 undertakes the Indian service should enjoy youth and 
 
260 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 strength, which I do not possess. It therefore grieves 
 me that your Excellency should offer me a command to 
 which I am entirely unequal. In obedience to your com 
 mand I have forwarded your letter to General Sullivan ; 
 and that he may not be one moment delayed, I have 
 desired him to leave the command with General Greene 
 until I arrive in Providence." 
 
 General Sullivan marched from Eastern Pennsylvania, 
 reaching Wyoming Valley on the thirty-first of July, 
 and Tioga Point, N.Y., on the eighth of August, with 
 a force of five thousand men. Gen. James Clinton 
 joined him from the northern army. The brigades of 
 Generals Poor, Hand, and Maxwell, Parr s Rifle Corps, 
 and Proctor s Artillery, all familiar to the reader, formed 
 the invading force. On the twenty-ninth day of August, 
 the Battle of Chemung was fought, near the present city 
 of Elmira, and the towns of the Six Nations were laid 
 waste, including orchards, gardens, houses, clothing, and 
 provisions, indiscriminately. There was nothing in this 
 punishment of the Six Nations which commended the 
 American cause to their favor ; but they did not regard 
 the details of these ravages as a part of Washington s in 
 structions. When the War for Independence closed, and 
 their alliance with the United States became a fixed fact, 
 Washington represented their ideal of the great soldier 
 " He had made the power of Britain to yield to his arms." 
 Governor Blackstone, Chief of the Senecas, Cornplanter, 
 and Halftown, the famous trio who made the treaty with 
 Washington, were ever known as " the friends of Wash 
 ington." A silver medal presented to Governor Black- 
 stone, which bore the simple inscription " Second Presi 
 dency of George Washington," was long esteemed as a 
 most precious relic. Handsome Lake, known as the 
 "Peace Prophet,"- brother of Tecumseh, made as a 
 tribute to Washington one of the most impressive utter- 
 
NEW ENGLAND RELIEVED. 261 
 
 ances of his mission among the Six Nations. Even as 
 late as the Eleventh United States Census, 1890, Wash 
 ington s name, alone of all the American Presidents, was 
 not found among the children s names of the Six Nations ; 
 so greatly was he held in reverence. They also engrafted 
 into their religion the myth that " he occupies a mansion 
 at the gate of Paradise, \vhere he becomes visible to all 
 who enter its portals and ascend to the Great Spirit, and 
 both recognizes and returns the salute of all who enter." 
 
 o 
 
 This devotion of his Indian admirers is hardly less 
 valuable than the tributes of Frederick the Great and 
 other European soldiers and statesmen to the qualities of 
 Washington as a Soldier ; and it permanently redeems 
 the name of Washington from any responsibility for the 
 excessive desolation with which the Six Nations were vis 
 ited in the expedition of 1779. 
 
 On the twenty-fifth of August, while Sullivan was 
 upon this Indian expedition, Admiral Arbuthnot arrived 
 with reinforcements of three thousand men, and relieved 
 Sir George Collyer in naval command. On the twenty- 
 first of September, Sir Andrew Hammond arrived with 
 an additional force of fifteen hundred men, from Cork, 
 Ireland. At this juncture, Count d Estaing, having capt 
 ured St. Vincent and Granada in the West Indies, sud 
 denly made his appearance off the coast of Georgia. 
 Spain had joined France in war against Great Britain ; so 
 that the whole line of British posts, from Halifax to St. 
 Augustine, was exposed to such naval attacks as would 
 divert the attention of Great Britain from the designs of 
 her allied enemies against her West India possessions. 
 
 Washington, upon the arrival of these British ree n- 
 forcements, strengthened West Point with additional 
 works ; but Clinton, even with his large naval force, did 
 not venture an attack upon that post, as had been his 
 intention when making requisition for more troops. 
 
262 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 On the twenty-fifth of October, 1779, General Clinton 
 abandoned Newport, R.I. ; then Verplanck Point ; then 
 Stony Point : and for the first time since Washington 
 landed in New York, in 1776, the whole of New Eng 
 land and the entire stretch of the Hudson River, was 
 unvexed by British steel or British keel. 
 
CHAPTER XXVI. 
 
 SHIFTING SCENES. TEMPER OF THE PEOPLE. SAVANNAH. 
 
 IF the mind weary of the recital of events which by 
 night and by day burdened the soul and tasked the 
 energies of the American Commander-in-Chief to their 
 
 O 
 
 utmost strain, it cannot but be refreshed by evidence of 
 his abiding confidence and patience in the cause of Ameri 
 can Independence, as the theatre of war enlarged and 
 gradually placed every colony under the weight of British 
 pressure. The issue of two hundred millions of paper 
 money had indeed been authorized, and a loan w T as invited 
 abroad ; but, as ever, men were wanted, and were not 
 forthcoming. Even the States which had longest borne the 
 
 o O 
 
 brunt of battle, and had only just been relieved from its 
 immediate dangers, seemed to weary under the reaction 
 of that relief, as if the storm had passed by, never again 
 to sweep over the same surface. It was also very natural 
 as well as true, that the pledge of French intervention 
 and the gleam of the oriflamme of France, did, in a 
 measure, compose anxiety and lessen the sense of local 
 responsibility for such a contribution of troops from every 
 section as would make the nation as independent of 
 France as of Great Britain. 
 
 There was a sense of weariness, a tendency to fitful 
 strokes of local energy, without that overwhelming sense 
 of need which first rallied all sections to a common cause. 
 Congress also seemed, at times, almost to stagger under 
 its load. But Washington, who sometimes grew weary 
 
 2G3 
 
 1 
 
264 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 and groaned in spirit, and sometimes panted with 
 shortened breath while toiling upward to surmount 
 some new obstruction, never, never staggered. For 
 him, there were " stepping-stones in the deepest waters." 
 For him, though tides might ebb and flow, the earth 
 itself forever kept its even course about the guiding 
 sun ; and for him, the sun of Liberty was the light of the 
 soul. Every circling year but added blessings from its 
 glow, and energy from its power. The intensity of his 
 emotion when he penned those solemn truthful words to 
 Harrison, showed but the impulse of a spiritual power 
 which the times demanded, but would neither comprehend 
 nor brook if from other sources than Washington s majes 
 tic will and presence. From the summit of his faith, he 
 clearly indicated with pen-point the driveling selfishness 
 which postponed triumph and made the chariot-wheels 
 drag so heavily through the advancing war. 
 
 The scenes were suddenly shifted to the southern stage 
 of operations. New characters were to take the parts 
 of some who had fulfilled their destiny ; but many of 
 both men and ships that participated in the siege of 
 Boston itself, were still to act an honored part until the 
 revolution should be complete. The cities of Charleston 
 and Savannah were to be visited, as Boston, New York, 
 and Philadelphia had been visited : not with a paternal 
 yearning for their return to a cheerful "mother-home"; 
 but in the spirit of a master dealing with overworked 
 and fractious slaves. But the slaves had both burst and 
 buried their shackles ; and whether in city or country, on 
 mountain or in valley, in forest or in swamp wherever 
 animal life could exist, there, and everyAvhere, the South, 
 ever generous, ever proud, ever self-respecting, and ever 
 loyal to convictions of duty, were to besprinkle the altar 
 of their country with life-blood, and consummate the War 
 for American Independence upon her consecrated soil. 
 
SHIFTING SCENES. 265 
 
 The short-sighted critics of the North who had tried to 
 
 O 
 
 play upon sectional prejudice, that some one of their 
 self-sufficient number might fill Washington s saddle, 
 began to wonder why he remained at his post in New 
 Jersey ; why he did not surrender the northern command 
 to one of their number, and then go where his ancestral 
 home was endangered and the companions of his youth 
 were to struggle for very life itself. But the greatness 
 of Washington the Soldier was never more apparent" 
 than now. Calmly he sustained himself at this point of 
 vantage; stretching out his arm in turn to soothe and 
 warn, or to hurl defiance in the teeth of foes or strag 
 glers, but ever to nerve the nation to duty. 
 
 There was no costly throne set up at Morristown, or 
 Middlebrook. There was no luxury there. There were 
 camp-cots, and camp-chairs, and usually, rations sufficient 
 for the daily need ; but the centre of the upheaving ener 
 gies of American Liberty was there ; and these energies 
 were controlled and directed, with no loss in transmission, 
 by the immediate presence of the Comniander-in-Chief. 
 
 It will be remembered, at the very mention of South 
 ern Colonies, or Southern States, how peculiar was 
 their relation to the mother country, from the earliest 
 British supremacy along the eastern Atlantic coast. 
 The Eomanist, the Churchman, the Presbyterian, and the 
 Huguenot, in their respective search for larger liberty 
 and missionary work, had shared equally in a sense of 
 oppression, before their migration to America. They 
 had much in common with the early settlers of the New 
 England coast. The Hollanders of New Jersey and the 
 Quakers of Pennsylvania, between the extremes, were 
 not wholly absorbed in business ventures. But all alike 
 had additional incentives to a more independent life, far 
 removed from those social and artificial obligations which 
 reigned supreme in the Old World. There were indeed 
 
266 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 adventurers for conquest, for wealth, and for political 
 power, among them ; and the aristocratic usages which 
 accompanied the royal prerogative were fostered by the 
 presence of slavery, so that they affected the vital 
 functions of the new Republic for generations. But, with 
 the exception of elements earlier noticed, the " ferment 
 of American Liberty " was never more decided, pure, and 
 constant in Massachusetts than in Virginia ; nor more 
 bold, desperate and defiant, among the Green Mountains 
 of Vermont than among the pine woods and palmetto 
 groves of North and South Carolina. 
 
 The closing months of the nineteenth century seem to 
 have been reserved, in the providence of God, for the 
 consummation of that lofty anticipation of Washington 
 which Daniel Webster formulated in one sublime utter 
 ance, "The Union; now and forever; One and Insepa 
 rable. 
 
 And now, in the spirit of this memory of the pioneers 
 of American civilization, the narrative returns to the 
 immediate burdens upon the mind of Washington ; as, 
 in the closing months of 1779, we face the mirror south 
 ward, and catch its reflections. 
 
 As the winter season of 1779- 80 drew on, and the 
 ordinary hurricanes of the West India storm-belt indi 
 cated a very restricted use of the French navy in those 
 waters, an effort was made to induce Count d Estaing to 
 support an American attack upon Savannah. lie re 
 sponded promptly ; and besides sending five ships to 
 Charleston to perfect details for the combined movement 
 of both southern armies, anchored his principal squadron 
 of twenty ships-of-the-line, two 50 s and eleven frigates, 
 outside the bar of Tybee Island, on the eighth day of 
 September. Six thousand French troops accompanied 
 the fleet. Governor Rutledjje of South Carolina so 
 
SHIFTING SCENES. 2(57 
 
 actively aided the enterprise, that a sufficient number of 
 small craft were procured to land thirty-five hundred and 
 twenty-four of these troops at Bieulien, on Ossahaw Inlet, 
 about twelve miles from Savannah. The march was imme 
 diately begun. On the sixteenth, Count d Estaing de 
 manded surrender of the city. The Legislature of South 
 Carolina adjourned. Militia replaced the regulars at Fort 
 Moultrie, and withinfour days, on the eighth, quite a strong 
 force marched for Savannah. General Lincoln left on the 
 tenth. Meanwhile, the British General Prescott had so 
 actively destroyed bridges and obstructed roads, that the 
 Americans did not join the French troops until the six 
 teenth. Trenches were not begun until the twenty- 
 fourth of September, and the difficulty of obtaining 
 draught animals for hauling heavy siesfe-^uns to their 
 
 O O / O O 
 
 proper position, still longer delayed the movement. The 
 enthusiasm of the American officers over the prospect of 
 French cooperation led them to assure Count d Estaing 
 that his delay before Savannah would not exceed from 
 ten to sixteen days ; and upon this distinct assurance, he 
 had thus promptly disembarked his land forces. The 
 French West Indies had been left without naval support ; 
 and already an entire month had passed with every prob 
 ability that a British fleet from New York would take 
 advantage of the opportunity to recapture West India 
 posts so recently captured by the French. Abandonment 
 of the siege, or an assault, became an immediate neces 
 sity, especially as Count d Estaing had undertaken the 
 enterprise, urged by Lafayette, with no other authority 
 than his general instructions as to America, and his deep 
 interest in the struggle. 
 
 The assault was made on the ninth day of October. 
 It was desperate, with alternate success and failure at 
 different portions of the works ; but ultimately, a repulse. 
 The British casualties were few, four officers and thirty- 
 
268 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 six men killed ; four officers and one hundred and fifteen 
 men wounded and missing. The French loss was fifteen 
 
 o 
 
 officers and one hundred and sixteen men killed ; forty- 
 three officers and four hundred and eleven men wounded. 
 Count d Estaing was twice wounded, and Count Pulaski, 
 as well as Sergeant Jasper, so brave at Moultrie in 1776, 
 were among the killed. Colonel Laurens, aid-de-camp 
 to Washington, was conspicuous in the assault, as he 
 proved himself at Newport, and afterwards at Yorktown. 
 
 The French withdrew their artillery, and sailed on the 
 twenty-ninth. The Americans returned to Charleston. 
 The result of the siege affected both northern armies. 
 Washington abandoned an attack upon New York, for 
 which he had assembled a large force of New York and 
 Massachusetts militia. Learning that Clinton was pre 
 paring to go South, either to Georgia or South Carolina, 
 he ordered the North Carolina troops to march to Charles 
 ton in November, and the Virginia regulars to follow 
 in December. Clinton left New York on the twenty- 
 sixth of December for Charleston with seven thousand 
 five hundred men, leaving Lieutenant-General Knyphau- 
 sen in command. 
 
 Washington again placed General Heath in command 
 of the Highlands ; sent the cavalry to Connecticut, and 
 with the remainder of the army marched to Morristown, 
 which for the second time became his winter headquarters. 
 
CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 THE EVENTFUL YEAR 1780. NEW JERSEY ONCE MORE 
 
 INVADED. 
 
 r I 1HE first act of General Washington upon reaching 
 _J_ Morristown was to invoice his resources and bal 
 ance his accounts. He " called the roll " of his army, 
 made record of all supplies, and framed estimates for 
 forthcoming necessities. It was a depressing exhibit. 
 Excluding South Carolina and Georgia troops, which 
 were assigned to their own home department, the entire 
 Muster, including all independent organizations as well 
 as drummers, filers, teamsters, and all attaches of every 
 kind, and upon the impossible assumption that every 
 man on the original Roll was still living, and in the 
 service, footed up only twenty-seven thousand and 
 ninety-nine men. 
 
 The army was in huts. The snow was an even two 
 feet in depth. All defiles were drifted full, and hard- 
 packed, well-nigh impassable. But a few days more of 
 the year remained. On the thirty-first, within a few 
 days, two thousand and fifty enlistments would expire. 
 In ninety days more, March the thirty-first, six thou 
 sand four hundred and ninety-six more would expire. 
 By the last of April, when active operations might be 
 anticipated, the total reduction by expiration of term of 
 service would reach eight thousand one hundred and 
 fifty ; by the last of September, ten thousand seven 
 hundred and nine ; and, during the year, twelve thou 
 sand one hundred and fifty. 
 
 2G9 
 
270 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 The total force enlisted " for the Avar" was but fourteen 
 thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight men ; and from 
 the numbers already given, were to be detailed the 
 necessary number of artificers, armorers, wagoners, 
 quartermasters employees, and all those subordinate 
 detachments which reduce the fighting force of an army, 
 as well as all casualties since their first muster. To this 
 is to be added the fact, that the several States furnished 
 their respective quotas at different times, and for differ 
 ent periods, so that there was a constant addition of raw 
 levies. The army, in fact, had no opportunity to be 
 thoroughly drilled and disciplined, in all its parts. Such 
 was the condition of the Army of the United States, 
 when the second campaign in the Southern States 
 began. 
 
 Some reader may very naturally inquire why Wash 
 ington did not attack the British garrison of New York, 
 after Clinton s departure for Charleston with so many 
 troops. Critics at the time made complaint, and some 
 writers have indorsed their criticisms through igno 
 rance of the facts. An examination of the original Re- 
 
 O 
 
 turns of Clinton, still found in the British archives, gives 
 
 the following result. This estimate was taken at the 
 o 
 
 time when Washington was preparing to make an attempt 
 on New York. The British force of that post and its 
 dependencies was twenty-six thousand seven hundred 
 and fifty-six effectives. There were in Georgia three 
 thousand nine hundred and thirty men ; and in Florida, 
 one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven effectives. 
 At Penobscot, Me., and at Halifax, subject to call, 
 there was an additional force of three thousand four hun 
 dred and sixty, making an aggregated force of nearly 
 thirty-eight thousand men. 
 
 When General Clinton sailed with his seven thousand 
 five hundred men, the British force in the Southern De- 
 
THE EVENTFUL YEAR 1780. 271 
 
 partment became thirteen thousand two hundred and 
 sixty-seven ; but it left in New York an effective strength 
 of twenty-one thousand and six men. And yet this gar 
 rison was not without apprehension of attack. The 
 winter was one of unexampled severity. New York 
 harbor froze until teams could cross upon the ice. Tho 
 British army was almost in a starving condition. Country 
 supplies of wood were cut off, until vessels at the wharves 
 were chopped up for fuel. The American army was not 
 wholly idle. Lord Stirling, with twenty-five hundred 
 men, crossed to Staten Island on the ice, in spite of the 
 extreme cold, to attack that British supply-post ; but a 
 sudden opening in the ice restored British communica 
 tion with the city, and his expedition failed of valuable 
 results. On the twenty-fifth of January, General Knyp- 
 hausen sent a small detachment across the ice at Paulus 
 Hook and captured a company at Newark ; while Lieu 
 tenant-Colonel Buskirk crossed from Staten Island, and at 
 Elizabethtown captured the picket and burned the Town 
 House, as well as the church of the Rev. James Cald- 
 well, Chaplain of Colonel Elias Dayton s Regiment. On 
 the second of February, Lieutenant-Colonel Norton rode 
 in sleighs, to attack a small American post near White 
 Plains; but, otherwise, the British as well as the Amer 
 ican army had enough to do to prevent freezing to death. 
 During the extreme freeze of January, 1780, the suf 
 fering in the American camp is reported as " baffling de 
 scription. The paths were marked by blood from the 
 feet of bare-footed soldiers." Bancroft and Irving have 
 left nothing to add here. General Greene, Quartermaster- 
 General, reported on the eleventh of January : " Such 
 weather I never did feel. For six or eight days there has 
 been no living abroad. We drive over the tops of fences. 
 We have been alternately out of meat and bread for 
 eight or nine days past, and without either for three or 
 
272 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 four." It was a time, also, when the royalist element 
 gained some hope ; and Clinton s Official Return for De 
 cember reports a force of four thousand and sixty-four 
 Provincials then in British pay. The women of New 
 Jersey came to the rescue of the suffering soldiers of 
 Washington in a manner that exhausts all possible forms 
 of recognition. Clothing and feeding the naked and 
 hungry was their constant employment. Washington 
 says of New Jersey, that "his requisitions were punctu 
 ally complied with, and in many counties exceeded." 
 ;. During this entire period there was one supervision ex 
 ercised by the American Commander- in-Chief which knew 
 no interruption, whatever the inclemency of the weather. 
 Every pass to his strongly intrenched camp, and every 
 bold promontory, or distinct summit, that observed or 
 commanded approach, was guarded, and watch-fires were 
 instituted for signals of danger, or warning to the mili 
 tia. The perpetuation of his strongholds in New Jersey 
 saved the Republic. 
 
 During this well-nigh desperate condition of his army, 
 and the increasing peril to. the Southern Department, he 
 made one more Report of his condition to Congress ;, 
 and it belongs to this narrative as a signal exhibit of his 
 
 ~ o 
 
 wisdom and courage, as well as his discernment of the 
 increasing lethargy of sections not in immediate danger 
 from British aggression. It reads as follows : " Certain I 
 am, unless Congress are vested with powers by the sepa 
 rate States competent to the great purposes of the war, 
 or assume them as a matter of right, and they and the 
 States act with more energy than they have done, our. 
 cause is lost. We can no longer drudge along in the old 
 way. By ill-timing in the adoption of measures, by de 
 lays in the execution of them, or by unwarranted jealous 
 ies, we incur enormous expenses and derive no benefit 
 from them. One State will comply with a requisition of 
 
THE EVENTFUL YEAR 1780*: 273 
 
 Congress ; another neglects to do it ; a third executes it 
 by halves ; and they differ in the manner, the matter, or 
 so much in point of time, that we are always working up 
 hill. While such a system as the present one, or rather, 
 the want of one, prevails, we shall be ever unable to 
 apply our strongest resources to any advantage. . . > 
 I see one head gradually organizing into thirteen. I see 
 one army branching into thirteen, which instead of look 
 ing up to Congress as the supreme controlling power of 
 the United States, are considering themselves dependent 
 upon their respective States." 
 
 On the third of April, Washington again wrote in such 
 plain terms of " the mutinous spirit, intense disgust, and 
 absolute desperation of his small, famished, ragged, and 
 depleted command," that after hot debate, a committee of 
 three was reluctantly sent to advise with him as to meas 
 ures of relief. 
 
 That the reader may more fully appreciate the temper of 
 some narrow-minded men of that period, and at so fear 
 ful a crisis, the following extract from a letter to the 
 Count de Vergennes is cited. In referring to the simple 
 question of appointing a committee to visit their Com- 
 inander-in-Chief, this American writes : " It was said 
 that the appointment of a committee would be putting 
 too much power in a few hands, and especially in those 
 of the Commander-in-Chief ; that his influence already 
 was too great ; that even his virtues afforded motives for 
 alarm ; that the enthusiasm of his army, joined to the 
 kind of dictatorship already confided to him, put Congress 
 and the United States at his mercy ; that it was not ex 
 pedient to expose a man of the highest virtues to such 
 temptations." 
 
 General Schuyler, then in Congress, John Matthews 
 and Nathaniel Peabody served on this committee, and as 
 the result, Congress resolved to equalize the pay of the 
 
274 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 army, and make more systematic efforts to recruit and 
 maintain it. 
 
 On the twelfth of February, Congress affirmed the 
 sentence of a court-martial which sentenced Arnold, then 
 commanding at Philadelphia, to a reprimand for giving 
 passes to disaffected citizens and using public transporta 
 tion for private use. The reprimand was mildly admin 
 istered : but it made Arnold very angry. His life of 
 ostentatious display, his extravagant habits, and his 
 loose views of moral obligation, aroused public indigna 
 tion ; and the mere matter of the charges upon which he 
 was sentenced would not have appeared so grave, ex 
 cept that he was universally suspected of using his official 
 position for private emolument." 
 
 During all these struggles to keep his army together 
 and prevent British operations out from New York, 
 Washington was watchful of the operations then in 
 progress at the South. General Clinton cleared the ice 
 without difficulty, and left New York on the twenty- 
 ninth of December, as already stated, expecting to reach 
 his destination within ten days ; but a storm dispersed 
 his fleet, and one vessel foundered. Nearly all of his 
 cavalry, and all of his artillery horses, perished. Although 
 they reached Tybee Island, their first rendezvous, within 
 the month, they did not leave for St. John Island, thirty 
 miles below Charleston, until the tenth of February ; and 
 did not take up their position before Charleston, between 
 the Ashley and Cooper rivers, until the twelfth of March. 
 It appears from documentary data that the retention of 
 Charleston, garrisoned by only two thousand two hundred 
 regulars and a thousand militia, was largely induced by 
 the inhabitants of the city. It is true that Commodore 
 Whipple of the American navy regarded it as defensible ; 
 but Washington did not concur in that opinion. He held 
 that the same force which would be required ;to hold the 
 
THE EVENTFUL YEAR 1780. 275 
 
 city, could do far greater and better service by remaining 
 without the city, besides being more independent in 
 securing supplies and cooperating with militia and other 
 forces seeking their support. Besides this, the defences 
 had been prepared to resist approach by sea, and not by 
 land. An extract from Tarleton s history of the cam 
 paigns of 1780- 81, is as follows, indicating the pur 
 pose of the movement itself : rr The richness of the 
 country, its vicinity to Georgia, and it* distance from 
 Washington, pointed out the advantages and facility of 
 its conquest." 
 
 The British forces broke ground on the first of April ; 
 on the nineteenth established their second, and on the sixth 
 of May, their third, parallel. On the twelfth, the British 
 took possession of the city. The schedule of prisoners 
 prepared by Major Andre, of General Clinton s staff, 
 included all citizens, as prisoners of war. The Conti 
 nental troops, including five hundred in hospital, did not 
 exceed two thousand. General Clinton followed up this 
 success by an absurd proclamation to the people, and 
 wrote a more absurd letter to Lord Germaine, which is 
 valuable to the reader, for the interest which attaches to 
 its terms in connection with subsequent operations of 
 Clinton, upon his return northward. It is as follows : 
 "The inhabitants from every quarter declare their alle 
 giance to the king, and offer their services in arms. 
 There are few men in South Carolina who are not either 
 our prisoners, or in arms with us." On the fifth of June, 
 General Clinton returned to New York, leaving Lord 
 Cornwallis in command. 
 
 During the absence of Clinton from New York, and 
 with the opening of spring, Washington s position 
 became more offensive to the garrison of New York. 
 Amid all his gloom on account of the condition of his 
 army, a bright episode gladdened his heart and nerved 
 
^76 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 him for action. He had a visitor. The Marquis do La 
 fayette, who reached Boston on the 28th of April, by the 
 frigate Hermione, entered Washington s headquarters on 
 the morning of May 10th. He announced, that the 
 Count de Rochambeau was on the seas with the first 
 division of an army, coming to support the American 
 Republic. This French army was not directed to report 
 to the American Congress, nor to take orders from that 
 body. Washington opened the communication which 
 Lafayette was intrusted to deliver, in advance of the 
 arrival of Count de Rochambeau, and the following is a 
 copy of the instructions to that officer: "The French 
 troops are to obey Washington; to admit the precedence 
 of American officers of equal rank ; on all formal occa 
 sions to yield the right to the American army ; and bear 
 in mind that the whole purpose is, heartily and efficiently, 
 to execute the will of the American Commander-in- 
 Chief." 
 
 On the fourteenth, after four days of confidential con 
 ference, Lafayette, bearing a letter from Washington, 
 reported to the President of Congress for duty, preserv 
 ing, for the time, the secret that the troops of France 
 were already on their way to America. 
 
 But what a condition of affairs awaited the arrival of 
 these gallant allies ! The American army had already 
 lost more in numbers than was anticipated by Washington 
 in the official Report, already noticed. On the second of 
 April, his entire force on both sides of the Hudson River 
 consisted of only ten thousand four hundred, rank and 
 file ; and of these two thousand eight hundred had only 
 two weeks to serve. Lord Rawdon had, indeed, taken 
 from the New York garrison two thousand five hundred 
 men as a reenforcement to General Clinton ; but nearly 
 twelve thousand remained behind. Although this increase 
 of Clinton s command afforded Washington small ground 
 
 ~ o 
 
THE EVENTFUL YEAR a78CK, 277 
 
 for hope of success in the Southern Department,, he real 
 ized that it was impossible for him to abandon his present 
 position. But he immediately despatched southward the 
 Maryland and Delaware troops, which had fought in 
 nearly every battle with the skill of veterans, and the 
 First Artillery, all under the command of the Baron 
 De Kalb. 
 
 AVhile sparing these well disciplined troops, Washing 
 ton s position involved vastly increased responsibility. 
 On the twenty-fifth day of May, two iConnecticut regi 
 ments mutinied, declaring that they would " march home," 
 or at least secure subsistence at the point of the bayonet. 
 Handbills were printed in New York and distributed, 
 urging the soldiers to desert. "This mutiny," says Wash 
 ington, most impressively, "has given infinite concern." 
 There was no money except the Continental, and of this 
 he says : "It is evidently impracticable, from the immense 
 quantity it would require, to pay them as much as to 
 make up the depreciation." He further adds : ";This is a 
 decisive moment, one of the most. I will go further, 
 and say, the most important America has ever seen. The 
 Court of France has made a glorious effort for our deliv 
 erance, and if we disappoint its intentions by our supine- 
 ness, we must become contemptible in the eyes of all 
 mankind ; nor can we, after, venture to confide that our 
 allies will persist in an attempt to establish what we want 
 ability, or inclination, to assist them in." 
 
 General Greene thus addressed the Colonel of the 
 Morristown militia: "There are no more provisions than 
 to serve one regiment, in the magazine. The late terri 
 ble storm, the depth of the snow, and the drifts in the 
 roads, prevent the little stock from coming forward which 
 is in distant magazines. The roads must be kept open 
 by the inhabitants, or the army cannot be subsisted. 
 Unless the good people lend their assistance to forward 
 
278 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 supplies, the army must disband. The army is stripped 
 naked of teams, as possible, to lessen the consumption of 
 forage. Call to your aid the overseers of the highways, 
 and every other order of men who can give despatch to 
 this business. P.S. Give no copies of this order, for 
 fear it should get to the enemy." 
 
 There was indeed reason for this considerate post 
 script. The mutinous spirit which had been evoked by 
 sheer starvation, had been misinterpreted by the British 
 officers in New York ; and General Knyphausen must 
 have been very proud of an opportunity to distinguish 
 himself, in the absence of General Clinton, when he con 
 ceived of the poor American soldier as an unfortunate 
 hireling waiting for a deliverer. He would become 
 their Moses and conduct them back to the royal father s 
 embrace. He organized his missionary venture carefully. 
 Accompanied by Generals Try on, Matthews, and Ster 
 ling, he crossed from Staten Island to Elizabethtown 
 Point. (See map.) He had a twofold plan in mind. 
 He would demonstrate to the people of New Jersey that 
 their half-frozen, hungry, and ragged countrymen with 
 Washington, could not protect their homes from hostile 
 incursions out from New York ; and also supposed, in 
 case he were very prompt and expeditious, that he might 
 pounce, like a hawk, upon the coop of the arch-rebel 
 himself. General Sterling led the advance, starting be 
 fore daybreak. The column was hardly distinguishable, 
 company from company, so heavy were the sea-mist and 
 darkness. Suddenly, one shot, and then another, came 
 from, an invisible American outpost. General Sterling 
 received the first, which ultimately proved fatal, and was 
 removed to the rear. Knyphausen took his place at the 
 front. The rising sun dispelled the fog, but disclosed 
 the assembling of Colonel Elias Dayton s Regiment, from 
 various quarters. The anticipated surprise, and a cor- 
 
THE EVENTFUL YEAR 1780. 271) 
 
 responding welcome from the American soldiers, did not 
 occur. The militia retired after a few scattering shots, 
 and Simcoe s Queen s Rangers dashed forward, followed 
 by the British and Hessian Infantry. As by magic, the 
 militia multiplied. Fences, thickets, orchards, and single 
 trees were made available for as many single riflemen ; 
 and at every step of advance, one and then another of 
 his majesty s troops were picked off. During the march 
 to Connecticut Farms, a distance of only seven miles, no 
 friendly tokens of welcome appeared in sight. Puffs 
 of smoke, and the rifle s sharp crack, could hardly be 
 located before similar warnings succeeded, and details 
 to take care of the wounded soon began to thin out and 
 sag the beautiful lines of the British front. Still, the 
 column advanced toward Springfield, and directly on the 
 line of travel which led immediately to Washington s en 
 campment. 
 
 At this point, Dayton s Regiment, which had been so 
 troublesome as skirmishers, hastened step, came into 
 regimental order, and quickly crossed the Rahw ay bridge. 
 But, to the surprise of the advancing enemy, the division 
 of General Maxwell was in battle array, silently inviting 
 battle. General Knyphausen halted to bring up artillery 
 and his full force of five thousand men. He stopped also, 
 to burn Connecticut Farms, because, " shots from its 
 windows picked off his officers and guides." Among the 
 victims to his responsive fire, was the wife of Chaplain 
 Chapman of Dayton s Regiment. The news of her death 
 spread, as a spark over pine or prairie regions. When 
 within a half mile of Springfield, the Hessian general 
 again halted for consultation as to his next order. 
 Cannon sounds began to be heard from various directions, 
 answering signal for signal. The ascending smoke of 
 beacon-fires crowned every summit. The whole country 
 seemed to have been upheaved as if by some volcanic 
 
280 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 force. Maxwell s Brigade was just across the Rah way, 
 and less than one-third the strength of the Hessian s com 
 mand. But General Knyphausen was too good a soldier 
 not to peer through Maxwell s thin line, and recognize, in 
 solid formation, the entire army of Washington, waiting 
 in silence to give him a hearty soldier s reception. The 
 day passed ; and for once, both armies were at full halt. 
 Knyphausen, for the time, was Commander-in-Chief of 
 both, for it devolved upon him alone to order battle. 
 He was filling the part of Pharaoh, and not that of Moses. 
 
 One monotonous sound echoed from a summit near 
 Morristown. Tt was the " minute-gun," Avhich had been 
 designated by the American Commander-in-Chief as a 
 continuous signal whenever he wanted every man within 
 hearing, who had a gun, to come at once to his demand. 
 Night came on, and with it, rain ; but still the minute- 
 gun boomed on, with solemn cadence, and instead of 
 smoking hill-tops, the blaze of quickened beacons illu 
 mined the dull sky as if New Jersey were all on fire. 
 The night covered the Hessians from view, and when 
 morning came they attempted to regain Staten Island ; 
 but the tide retired, leaving boats stranded and the mud 
 so dee}) that even cavalry could not cross in safety. 
 Having heard on the first of June that Clinton was en 
 route for New York, Knyphausen simply strengthened 
 the New York defences and awaited the arrival of his 
 superior officer. 
 
 On the tenth, Washington wrote : " Their movements 
 are mysterious, and the design of this movement not 
 easily penetrated." As a matter of fact, there were few 
 operations of the war which bore so directly upon the 
 safety of the American army and the American cause, as 
 the operations before Springfield during June, 1779 ; and 
 the conduct of both armies indicated an appreciation of 
 their importance. 
 
THE EVENTFUL YEAR 1780. 281 
 
 On the thirteenth of June, Congress, without consult 
 ing Washington, appointed General Gates to the command 
 of the Southern Department. Gates had spent the winter 
 at his home in Virginia, but eagerly accepted this com 
 mand, although he had lacked the physical vigor to 
 engage in the Indian campaign in New York. His most 
 intimate friend and companion, both in arms and in 
 antagonism to Washington, Charles Lee, sent him one 
 more letter. It was a wiser letter than earlier corre 
 spondence had been, and decidedly prophetic. It closed 
 with something like pathetic interest : " Take care that 
 you do not exchange your Northern laurels for Southern 
 willows." 
 
 At this time, it did seem as if the bitter cup would 
 never be withdrawn from the lips of the American Com- 
 mander-in-Chief ; for he had neither provisions for his 
 army, nor the means of making welcome and comfortable 
 his expected allies and guests from over the sea. 
 
CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 BATTLE OF SPRINGFIELD. KOCHAMBEAU. ARNOLD. 
 
 GATES. 
 
 SIR HENRY CLINTON returned from Charleston to 
 New York on the seventeenth day of June, 1780. 
 He must have contrasted his report made to the British 
 War Office, of the " conquest of South Carolina," with 
 that made by General Knyphausen to himself, of the 
 recent experience of British operations in New Jersey. 
 But Clinton was ever a man of action, prompt and ener 
 getic. He felt deeply the long protracted embarrassment 
 of his position, while holding such a vast and respon 
 sible command without sufficient resources for pressing 
 exigencies. He knew, and Washington, with a soldier s 
 instinct, knew that Clinton knew, that there was no 
 safety for New York, and no possibility of effective oper 
 ations out from New York, so long as a strong, faithful 
 American army held the fastnesses of New Jersey, and a 
 vigorous espionage of the Hudson River region was 
 maintained. The sweep of Washington s arm was largely 
 shaping the future destiny of America from very humble 
 headquarters ; but no less firmly and decisively. 
 
 Clinton did not remain idle, nor undecided, a single 
 day. Troops were embarked upon transports immedi 
 ately ; and all suitable demonstrations were made as if 
 an organized movement against West Point were de 
 signed. Washington placed his entire army in motion 
 and advanced one division eleven miles, toward Pompton, 
 
 282 
 

BATTLE OF SPRINGFIELD. 
 
 on the twenty-second, en route for the Hudson, to 
 be prepared for whatever might be the scheme of his 
 adversary. His confidential agents in New York were 
 always quick to report details of British movements. 
 Washington invariably exacted "minute" details; and 
 from these he interpreted the general plans of the enemy. 
 In this instance, the embarking of field batteries instead 
 of heavy guns, which could always be procured from 
 ships, satisfied him that his own headquarters and the 
 destruction of his army were Clinton s real objectives. 
 
 He was prepared for Clinton s choice of the alternate 
 movements. Although one division had been advanced 
 in the direction of the Hudson River, Generals Greene, 
 Maxwell, and Stark, with Harry Lee s cavalry, and u 
 strong force of militia, had been left in position near 
 Springfield. Few battles of the American Revolution 
 have received less attention, as among the decisive battles 
 of the war, than that of Springfield, N.J. And yet few 
 Avere more strikingly illustrative of the strategic wisdom 
 with which Washington had planned the successful prose 
 cution of the war, as early as 1776. 
 
 On the morning of the twenty-third, at live o clock, 
 the British army, having crossed from State n Island in 
 two columns, began its advance. (See maps, "Battle of 
 Springfield," and, " Operations in New Jersey.") Its 
 force consisted of five thousand infantry, nearly all of 
 their cavalry, and eighteen pieces of artillery. General 
 Clinton, with the right wing, advanced along the Spring 
 field road with vigor, but deliberately, as if this were his 
 principal line of attack. Upon approaching the first 
 bridge near the Matthews House, he was obliged to halt 
 until his guns could gain a suitable position, since Colonel 
 Angel s Rhode Island regiment, with one gun, commanded 
 the bridge over the Rah way, and occupied an orchard 
 which gave good cover. At first, the British guns were 
 
WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 aimed too high and did little execution. By fording the 
 stream, which was not more than twelve yards wide, 
 Angel s position was turned, so that he was crowded 
 back to the second bridge, over a branch of the Rah way, 
 where Colonel Shreve resisted with equal obstinacy and 
 bravery. By reference to the map it will be seen that 
 General Greene, as well as Dickinson s militia on a slight 
 ridge in the rear of Shreve, was admirably posted for 
 reserve support. Angel lost one-fourth of his men and 
 was ordered to fall back, with Colonel Shreve, to the high 
 ground occupied by Generals Maxwell and Stark, near a 
 mill. Colonel Dayton s Regiment was also distinguished 
 for its gallant conduct. Washington Irving refers very 
 pleasantly to the part taken in the action by Chaplain 
 Caldwell, whose church had been burned on the twenty- 
 fifth of January and whose wife had been killed on the 
 sixth of June, as follows: "None showed more ardor in 
 the tight than Caldwell the chaplain, who distributed 
 Watts s psalm and hymn books among the soldiers when 
 they were in want of wadding, with the shout: Put 
 Watts into them, boys ! " 
 
 The other British column had for its special objective 
 the seizure of the pass leading to Chatham and Morris- 
 town. Major Lee s cavalry, and a picket under Captain 
 Walker, had been posted at Little s bridge, on the Vaux- 
 hall road, and Colonel Ogden s Regiment covered them. 
 General Greene found that he could not afford to hold so 
 extensive a front, and concentrated his force at other 
 positions eminently strong and capable of vigorous de 
 fence. The remainder of Maxwell s and Stark s brigades 
 also took high ground, by the mill, with the militia force 
 of Dickinson, on the flanks. 
 
 General Knyphausen led this column in person. But 
 the Vauxhall bridge was as closely contested as had been 
 that at Springfield. Greene shifted his position, in view 
 
BATTLE OF SPRINGFIELD. 285 
 
 of this second attack and its pronounced objective, to ai 
 range of hills in the rear of Byron s tavern, where the 
 roads were brought so near, that succor might be readily 
 transferred from one to the other. The movement was 
 admirable, scientific, and successful. In his report to 
 Washington, he says : " I was thus enabled to reach 
 Colonel Webb s Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Hunton 
 commanding, and Colonel Jackson s Regiment, with one 
 piece of artillery, which entirely checked the advance of 
 the enemy upon the American left, and secured that 
 pass." 
 
 The Battle of Springfield had been fought with cool 
 ness and unfaltering bravery, and had been won. General 
 Clinton burned Springfield, crossed to Staten Island at 
 midnight, withdrew his bridge of boats, and reached his 
 headquarters in safety. His loss, as reported by con 
 temporary journalists, was placed at about one hundred 
 and fifty men ; but comparison of his Reports and Musters, 
 before and after the expedition, make the killed, wounded, 
 and missing twice that number. The American lossYwas 
 one officer and twelve non-commissioned officers killed, 
 five officers and fifty-six privates wounded, and nine 
 missing; " Captain Davis and the militia not reporting." 
 
 General Clinton s report says: "I could not think of 
 keeping the field in New Jersey ; and wished to land the 
 troops and give a camp of rest to an army of which many 
 corps had had an uninterrupted campaign of fourteen 
 months." 
 
 For five years, New Jersey had been a constant theatre 
 of active war. It was indeed the strategic centre of the 
 war for American Independence. The bravery of her 
 soldiery, whose homes were constantly menaced, was 
 only surpassed by the heroism of her women. These, 
 constantly exposed to every possible desolation that 
 attended the marching and counter-marching of contend- 
 
286 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 ing armies, never flagged, flinched, nor failed, until her 
 delivery was at last complete. 
 
 On the night of June 24, 1780, the day after the Battle 
 of Springfield, Washington, upon return to his head 
 quarters, addressed another call to Governors of States 
 for their full quota, under new assignments, and awaited 
 with interest further tidings from the progress of the 
 French allies, then on the sea. This Battle of Spring 
 field had vindicated his confidence in the Continental 
 troops ; and, as in all armies, some regiments proved in 
 variably reliable, under whatever conditions they fought. 
 
 On the tenth day of July, 1780, the first division of 
 the French army sent by Louis XVI., in aid of American 
 Independence, consisting of six thousand troops, landed 
 at Newport, R.I. All were under the command of Lieu 
 tenant-General Rochambeau, accompanied by Major- 
 General Chastellux, a relative of Lafayette, and escorted 
 by seven heavy battleships, under command of Chevalier 
 de Ternay. 
 
 Washington immediately submitted a project for the 
 capture of New York ; but on the thirteenth of July 
 Admiral Graves reached that city with six ships-of-the- 
 line, which gave to the British such superiority of ships 
 and guns, that the plan was postponed to wait the arrival 
 of the second French division, of equal numbers, which 
 was supposed, at the time, to be already on its way from 
 France. But Sir Henry Clinton was not inactive. The 
 time to strike was before the French could unite with 
 Washington and take their place in the American army. 
 He planned a surprise, arid advanced with eight thousand 
 troops as far as Huntington, L.I., for a descent upon 
 Newport ; but Washington put his entire army in readi 
 ness to advance upon New York. Clinton, having learned 
 that Rochambeau, advised by Washington, had gone into 
 camp in a strong position, and with the rapidly asseni- 
 
ROCHAMBEAU. 287 
 
 bling militia would ho superior in force, recalled his 
 troops. He converted the expedition into a naval block- 
 ade of Newport, if possible thereby to cut off the second 
 division of the French army, upon its arrival within 
 American waters. 
 
 The Count de Rochambeau, with a soldier s exactness, 
 soon caught the fire of Washington s zeal, and well com 
 prehended the situation of American affairs generally. 
 So intense is his delineation of the condition of things as 
 he observed them, that if penned by Washington himself, 
 nothing could have been added. His letter to the Count 
 de Verge-lines, dated on July sixteenth, only six days after 
 his landing in America, reads, in part, as follows : " Upon 
 our arrival here, the country was in consternation ; the 
 paper money had fallen to sixty for one. ... I 
 spoke to the principal persons of the place, and told 
 them, as I write to General Washington, that this was 
 merely the advance-guard of a greater force, and that the 
 king was determined to support them Avith his whole 
 power. In twenty-four hours their spirits rose, and last 
 night, all the streets, houses, and steeples were illumi 
 nated, in the midst of fireworks and great rejoicing. . . . 
 You see, Sir, how important it is to act with vigor. . . . 
 Send us troops, ships, and money ; but do not depend upon 
 this people, nor upon their means. They have neither 
 money nor credit. Their means of resistance are but 
 momentary, and called forth when they are attacked in 
 their homes. Then they assemble themselves for the 
 moment of immediate danger, and defend themselves. 
 Washington sometimes commands fifteen thousand, and 
 sometimes three thousand men." 
 
 The restriction of the French fleet to Narragansett Bay 
 so immediately after its arrival, led Washington and 
 Rochambeau to postpone operations against New York ; 
 and it is proper to notice the fact that no news was 
 
288- WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 received of the second division of French troops until late 
 in the fall, when it was reported as blockaded in the home 
 port of Brest. A proclamation was made and published 
 by Lafayette, with the sanction of Washington, announc 
 ing to the Canadians that the French would aid them to 
 expel the British troops from their country. The object 
 of this proclamation was chiefly to divert the attention of 
 the garrison of New York from a proposed joint attack 
 upon that city, which Washington kept always in view. 
 The expedition was never seriously entertained ; but 
 General Clinton, on the thirty-first of August, as antici 
 pated by Washington, forwarded a copy of the paper to 
 Lord Germaine, while at the same time he placed before 
 him, in confidence, a proposition of a different kind, from 
 which he derived a strong expectation of British gain, 
 through the acquisition, by purchase, of the principal 
 Hudson River military post, West Point itself. 
 
 Washington had advised General Arnold that he would 
 soon be tendered an active command. But that officer, 
 pleading as excuse continued suffering from his wounds, 
 expressed a preference for the command of a military 
 post. After urgent solicitation of himself and his friends, 
 he was authorized to designate the post of his choice. 
 As the result, on the third of August, he was assigned to 
 the command of "West Point and its dependencies, in 
 which all are included, from Fishkill to King s Ferry." 
 At the date of this assignment of Arnold to a post which 
 was rightly regarded by Washington as most vital to 
 ultimate American success, a clandestine correspondence 
 had already passed between Generals Clinton and Arnold, 
 through the medium of Major John Andre. 
 
 The attention of the reader is naturally retrospective, 
 as the name of Andre reappears in connection with that 
 of Arnold. He had been taken prisoner at St. John s ; 
 was once on parole at Montreal, and familiar with Arnold s 
 
ARNOLD. 289 
 
 habits and the outrageous abuse of his public trust with 
 which, there, as afterwards at Philadelphia, he had been 
 charged. Andre also knew of his gambling, his extrava 
 gance, his ambition, and his reckless daring, generally, 
 His own personal antecedents during the grand ovation 
 tendered to General Howe, upon that officer s departure 
 from Philadelphia, in which he had so conspicuously 
 figured as escort to Miss Shippen, afterwards the wife of 
 Arnold, acquire special interest. He was, and long had 
 been, a confidential member of General Clinton s staff. 
 Neither Clinton nor Andre could conceive, for a mo 
 ment, that Arnold and his wife, formerly Miss Shippen, 
 would betray Andre s confidence ; or, if the proposition 
 to betray West Point failed, that Andre would be allowed 
 to suffer. 
 
 On the twenty-fifth of August, General Clinton wrote 
 to Lord Germaine as follows : " At this new epoch of 
 the war, when a foreign foe has already landed, and an 
 addition to it is expected, I owe it to my country, and T 
 must in justice say, to my own fame, to declare to your 
 lordship that I become every day more sensible of the 
 utter impossibility of prosecuting the war in this country 
 without reinforcements. . . . We are, by some 
 thousands, too weak to subdue the rebellion." On the 
 twenty-seventh of September, Lord Germaine wrote 
 in reply : " Next to the destruction of Washington s army, 
 the gaining over of officers of influence and reputation 
 among the troops would be the speediest way of subdu 
 ing the rebellion and restoring the tranquillity of America. 
 Your commission authorizes you to avail yourself of such 
 opportunities, and there can be no doubt that the expense 
 will be cheerfully submitted to." The British archives, 
 then secret, show that Lord Germaine was kept fully 
 advised of the whole scheme. On the thirtieth of 
 August, Arnold solicited an interview with some respon- 
 
290 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 sible party, in order definitely to settle upon the price 
 of surrendering West Point to Great Britain. Andre 
 was selected, as mutually agreeable to both Clinton and 
 Arnold. On the eighteenth of September, Arnold wrote, 
 advising that Andre be sent up to the sloop-of-war 
 Vulture, then anchored in Haverstraw Bay, promising 
 to send a person with a flag of truce and boat to meet 
 him. Clinton received the note 011 the next day. Under 
 the pretence of an expedition to Chesapeake Bay, freely 
 made public, a body of picked troops embarked on frig 
 ates. Andre readied the Vulture on the twentieth. On 
 the twenty-first he landed, met Arnold, accompanied 
 him first to the Clove, and then to the house of Josiah 
 Holt Smith. (See map, "Highlands of the Hudson.") 
 Smith s antecedents were those of a royalist ; but the 
 secret was too valuable to be intrusted to such a man ; 
 and subsequent investigations failed to connect him with 
 any knowledge of the conspiracy. The terms of purchase 
 were, in so many words : "Pay, in gold, and a brigadier- 
 general s commission in the British Army." 
 
 The terms were settled and the bargain was closed. 
 Besides knowledge of the plans of the post and its 
 approaches, Andre was advised of the signals to be 
 exchanged ; the disposition of the guards ; and the points 
 of surest attack which would be within the immediate 
 control of disembarking grenadiers and sharp-shoot 
 ers. The Vulture had dropped down the river with the 
 tide too far to be promptly reached ; so that Andre 
 crossed the river, and having proper passports attempted 
 to save time by returning to New 7 York by land. While 
 passing through Tarrytown, he was challenged, stopped, 
 examined, and made prisoner. On the second of 
 October, he was executed as a spy. America grieved 
 over his fate, and no one with more of pity than did 
 Washington. His soul still felt sore over the fate of 
 
GATES. 291 
 
 Nathan Hale, and after a solitary hour of anguish in 
 spirit, he suggested to General Clinton a method of 
 escape for Andre. He offered to exchange him for Bene 
 dict Arnold. Clinton could not do this without loss of 
 honor to himself and Great Britain, Andre had to die. 
 Washington, with tender consideration and profound 
 sympathy, gave to Mrs. Arnold a safe conduct and escort 
 to her former home in Philadelphia, and shared the senti 
 ment of all who knew her best, that the wife was not the 
 confidante of her husband s treason. Lafayette most ten 
 derly announced his sympathy in her behalf. 
 
 General Greene was immediately assigned to command 
 West Point and its dependencies. The garrison was 
 also entirely changed. The works were skilfully modi 
 fied and strengthened, so that any plans in the possession 
 of Clinton would be useless ; and Washington took post, 
 in person, at Brakeness, near Passaic Falls, N.J. 
 
 It will be remembered that Baron De Kalb left Morris- 
 town on the sixteenth of the previous April with ree n- 
 forcenients for the Southern army. On the sixth of 
 July, he reached Buffalo Ford and Deep River, N.C. 
 On the twenty-fifth, Gates, who had been assigned to 
 command of the Southern Department, joined him. 
 "Away from Washington," Baron De Kalb experienced 
 deeply the sentiment of unreasonable, but perhaps natu 
 ral jealousy of foreign officers which pervaded portions of 
 the American army ; and General Caswell, in defiance of 
 positive orders to report to Baron De Kalb, marched 
 directly to Camden and reported to General Gates. It 
 had been De Kalb s purpose, as an experienced soldier, 
 to advance by Charlotte and Salisbury, where supplies 
 could be readily obtained. " General Gates," says Irving, 
 " on the twenty-seventh, put what he called the r Grand 
 Army on its march through a barren country which 
 could offer no food but lean cattle, fruit, and unripe 
 
292 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 maize." The Battle of Camden, or "Sanders Creek," 
 which followed, was a complete rout. Baron De Kalb 
 fought with the utmost confidence and bravery, but fell 
 upon the field, after having been eleven times wounded. 
 Any support whatever, on the part of Gates, would have 
 secured victory, or a well-balanced action. Gates over 
 estimated his own force ; refused to examine his Adjutant- 
 General s statement, or to consider the advice of his 
 officers, who understood exactly the true condition of the 
 crude material which he styled his " Grand Army," and 
 fled from the battlefield at full speed. He did not halt 
 until reaching Charlotte, sixty miles away ; and by the 
 twentieth reached Hillsborough, one hundred and eighty 
 miles distant, without gathering a sufficient force to form 
 an escort. He said that he was " carried away from the 
 field by a torrent of flying soldiers." His self-conceit 
 and presumption, like that of Lee, on account of having 
 once served in the British army, and his utter want of 
 every soldierly quality, except the negative sense of 
 pride in having a personal command, were exposed to 
 the American people without delay. He claimed to have 
 made an attempt to rally his troops ; but he had no influ 
 ence whatever. During the Burgoyne campaign, he was 
 never under fire ; and Lee s unheeded warning did indeed 
 secure to his memory the wreath of " Southern willow, in 
 place of that of laurel " which Congress had placed upon 
 his brow, when the laurel had been earned by the brave 
 and patriotic Schuyler. The troops of Delaware and 
 Maryland alone would have saved the battle, if properly 
 supported by Gates. The gallant Delaware Battalion 
 which fought with De Kalb, was almost destroyed. The 
 Maryland troops lost in killed, wounded and prisoners 
 nearly four hundred, out of a total of fourteen hundred : 
 but to their perpetual honor it is to be recorded, that of the 
 number swept away in the final retreat of the whole army, 
 
BATTLE OF SPRINGFIELD. 293 
 
 seven hundred non-commissioned officers and privates 
 reported for duty by the twenty-ninth of the month. 
 
 On the eighth of October, the Battle of King s Moun 
 tain was fought ; and the names of Shelby, Campbell, 
 McDowell, Sevier, and Williams are still associated with 
 descendants from the brave participants in that battle. 
 It partially offset the disaster at Camden, and was an 
 inspiration to Washington in the adjustment of his plans 
 for Greene s movements. It compelled Cornwallis to 
 delay his second invasion of North Carolina ; and Tarle- 
 ton, in writing, says of this people, that "the counties 
 of Mecklenburg and Rowan w T ere more hostile to Eng 
 land than any others in America." 
 
 Gates endeavored to gather the remnant of his army ; 
 and, before his leaving to answer before a Court of Inquiry 
 ordered by Congress, about twenty-three hundred men 
 assembled. On inspection, it was found that but eight 
 hundred in the whole number were properly clothed and 
 equipped. 
 
 The Southern campaign became one of petty operations 
 mostly. Neither Cornwallis, Tarlcton, Rawdon, nor 
 Balfour made progress in subjugation of the people. 
 Sumner, although wounded at Black s Plantation on the 
 
 O 
 
 twentieth of October, gained credit in several lesser expe 
 ditions. But universal British failures disappointed the 
 expectations of the British Commander-in-Chief at New 
 York. The loss of Charleston, in the opinion of Wash 
 ington and the best military critics, was not without its 
 compensations ; and the collapse of Gates was an illus 
 tration of Washington s knowledge of men and his fore 
 sight as a Soldier. 
 
CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 AS a bird s overlook of its wide field of vision can 
 not comprehend all objects within range, except in 
 turn, so must the patient reader comeback again to stand 
 behind Washington and look over his shoulder as he points 
 the glass of observation to the activities which he in turn 
 surveys ; to catch with him their import, and so far as 
 possible strain the eye of faith with him, while with 
 slowly sweeping supervision he comprehends all that the 
 war for American Independence has intrusted to his care. 
 Mountain and valley, ocean and river, marsh and morass, 
 cave and ravine, are representatives of the various scenes 
 of agitation and conflict. The entire land is in excited 
 expectancy, and everywhere war is waged ; but beyond 
 and over all these contending conditions he discerns the 
 even horizon of assured victory. And just now, immedi 
 ately at hand, under his very feet, as well as wherever 
 partisan warfare tears life out of sweet homes for the 
 sprinkling of liberty s altar, there is indescribable pain 
 and anguish. His heart bleeds with theirs ; for he is one 
 with them, and they are one with him, in the willing 
 consecration which generations yet unborn shall forever 
 honor. 
 
 And as the year 1780 came to its close, he drew his 
 sword-girth tighter, and seemed to stand many inches 
 taller, as he embraced, in one reflected view, the suffer 
 ing South and the half-asleep North. Between the two 
 
 294 
 
BIRD S-EYE VIEW OF THEATRE OF WAR. 295 
 
 sections there was some restless impatience over such exact 
 ing contributions of fathers, brothers and sons, to regions 
 so far from home ; and just about his humble sleeping quar 
 ters, were suffering, faithful sharers of his every need. 
 
 Tidings of the failure of Gates, with its disaster and its 
 sacrifices of brave legions, did not reach the Commander- 
 in-Chief until September. But it was impossible for him 
 to send troops in sufficient numbers to cope with the 
 army of Cornwallis. The second French division, so long 
 expected (and never realized), was reported to be block 
 aded at home, and of no possible immediate use to 
 America. The British fleet still blockaded Newport. 
 Lafayette did indeed elaborate a plan for an assault upon 
 New York, Fort Washington, and Staten Island ; but the 
 plan was abandoned through lack of boats for such 
 extended water-carriage. There were few periods of the 
 war where more diverse and widely separated interests 
 required both the comprehensive and the minute consid 
 eration of the American Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 A few illustrations represent the many. Forts Ann 
 and George were captured, by a mixed force of Cana 
 dians, Indians, and British regulars, in October. Fort 
 Edward was saved through the sagacity of Colonel Living 
 ston ; who, having a garrison of only seventy-nine men, 
 averted attack by sending to the commanding officer of 
 Fort George an exaggerated report of his own strength, 
 with a promise to come to his aid. This was designed 
 to be intercepted, and the British regulars had actually 
 approached Saratoga, before their return to Lake Cham- 
 plain. An excursion from Fort Niagara into the Mohawk 
 Valley desolated the homes of the Oneidas, who were 
 friendly to the United States. Some leaders in certain 
 Vermont circles corresponded with British officials in 
 Canada ; and such was the uneasiness which prevailed alon<r 
 the northern and northwestern frontier, that three re<ri- 
 
296 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 inents had to be sent to Albany, to compose the unrest of 
 that single region. On the seventh of November, Wash 
 ington wrote : " The American army is experiencing 
 almost daily want ; while the British army derives ample 
 supplies from a trade with "New York, New Jersey, and 
 Connecticut, which has by degrees become so common 
 that it is hardly thought a crime." 
 
 Early in September, a commercial treaty between Hol 
 land and the United States came under consideration, and 
 Colonel Laurens was sent as commissioner to conduct the 
 negotiations abroad ; but he was taken prisoner and 
 locked up in the Tower of London, to stand trial on the 
 charge of high treason against the British crown. His 
 papers were seized, and on the second day of December, 
 Great Britain declared war against Holland. 
 
 The condition of Great Britain, at that time, was in 
 deed one of supreme trial; and it is well for the people 
 of America to honor the inherent forces of British liberty 
 which vindicated, under such adverse ruling conditions, 
 the very principles for which their brethren fought in 
 America. It was the one solemn hour in British history 
 when America, if fostered as a trusted and honored 
 child, would have spared England long years of waste in 
 blood and treasure. Not only were Spain and France 
 combined to plunder or acquire her West India posses 
 sions ; but Spain was pressing the siege of Gibraltar. 
 Both Denmark and Sweden united with Catharine of 
 Russia to adopt the famous system of " Armed Neutral 
 ity," which declared that " free ships make free goods," 
 and that " neutrals might carry any goods or supplies 
 wherever they pleased, with complete immunity from 
 search or capture." That was a deadly blow at British 
 commerce. Even in the East Indies, her crown was one 
 of thorns. Hyder Ali swept through the Province of 
 Madras, and Warren Hastings was contending for very 
 
BIRD S-EYE VIEW OF THEATRE OF WAR. 297 
 
 life, to save British rule in India from overthrow-: France 
 sent aid to Hyder AH, as well as to America ; and was 
 thus, at this very period, unexpectedly limited in her 
 anticipated contributions to the army of Washington. 
 
 Domestic excitements increased Britain s burdens. 
 Flighty thousand volunteers had been enrolled in Ireland 
 in view of apprehended French invasion. A large num 
 ber of her statesmen favored " peace at any price/ The 
 wonderful capacity of Great Britain to withstand external 
 force and to uncover the equally wonderful resources at. 
 her command, ought to have convinced her rulers that 
 on the same basis, and by a legitimate inheritance, the 
 American Colonies were unconquerable. 
 
 On the eleventh of November, General Sullivan, having 
 resigned, took his seat in Congress. Qn the twentieth, 
 Washington thus addressed him : 
 
 f Congress will deceive themselves, if they imagine that 
 the army, or a State, that is the theatre of war, can rub 
 through another campaign as the last. It would be as 
 unreasonable to suppose that because a man had rolled a 
 snow-ball till it had acquired the size of a horse, he might 
 do it until it was the size of a house. Matters may be 
 pushed to a certain point, beyond which we cannot move 
 them. Ten months pay is now due the army. Every 
 department of it is so much indebted that we have not 
 credit for a single expense, and some of the States are 
 harassed and oppressed to a degree beyond bearing. . . , 
 To depend, under these circumstances, upon the resources 
 of the country, unassisted by foreign bravery, will, I am 
 confident, be to lean upon a broken reed." 
 
 At a conference held with Count Rochambeau at Hart 
 ford, Conn., it had been proposed by General Sul 
 livan, " that the French fleet seek Boston, and the French 
 army join Washington " ; but this was impracticable. 
 The stay at Newport prevented the operations of the 
 
298 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 British blockading fleet elsewhere along the southern 
 Atlantic coast ; and thus far, restricted British move 
 ments generally. As early as October sixteenth, General 
 Leslie left New York with three thousand troops ; landed 
 at Portsmouth, Va., and joined Cornwallis at Charles 
 ton late in December. A son of Rochambeau left New 
 port on the eighteenth of October, ran the gauntlet of 
 the British fleet, in a gale, safely reached France, .and 
 urged " immediate additional aid of men, arms, and 
 money " The Chevalier de Ternay died at Newport, on 
 the fifteenth of December, and was succeeded by Chevalier 
 Destouches. Colonel Fleury, who will be remembered 
 as distinguishing himself at Fort Mifflin and Stony Point, 
 joined Rochambeau. These gallant French officers, like 
 their sovereign, were so devoted to Washington, and en 
 tertained such absolute faith in his capacity as patriot and 
 soldier, that the narrative of his career during the war 
 would savor of ingratitude if their faithful service were 
 not identified with his memory. At that time, there was 
 a design under consideration, but never matured, for the 
 association of Spain with France in active operations on 
 the American coast. 
 
 Meanwhile, Washington proposed another plan for the 
 reconstruction of the army, through the consolidation of 
 battalions ; thereby reducing their numbers, but fixing a 
 permanent military establishment. It will appear from 
 a letter written to Franklin on the twentieth of Decem 
 ber, that he had reached a point, where, even under so 
 many embarrassments, he felt that ultimate success was 
 not far distant. The letter reads as follows : " The cam 
 paign has been thus inactive, after a flattering prospect 
 at the opening of it and vigorous struggles to make it a 
 decisive one, through failure of the unexpected naval 
 superiority which was the pivot upon which everything 
 turned. The movements of Lord Cornwallis during 1 the 
 
 c? 
 
BIRD S-EYE VIEW OF THEATRE OF AVAR. 299 
 
 last month or two have been retrograde. What turn the 
 late reinforcements which have been sent him may give 
 to his affairs, remains to be known. I have reenforced our 
 Southern army principally with horse ; but the length of 
 the march is so much opposed to the measure that every 
 corps is in a greater or less degree ruined. I am happy, 
 however, in assuring you that a better disposition never 
 prevailed in the Legislatures of the several States than at 
 this time. The folly of temporary expedients is seen into 
 and exploded ; and vigorous efforts will be used to obtain 
 a permanent army, and carry on the war systematically, 
 if the obstinacy of Great Britain shall compel us to con 
 tinue it. AVe want nothing: but the aid of a loan, to en- 
 
 c_5 
 
 able us to put our finances into a tolerable train. The 
 country does not want for resources ; but we want the 
 means of drawing them forth." 
 
 The new organization was to consist of fifty regiments 
 of foot, four of artillery, and other bodies of mounted men, 
 including in all, thirty-six thousand men, fairly appor 
 tioned among the States. But not more than half that 
 number were ever in the field at one time, and the full 
 complement never was recruited. The prejudice against 
 a regular army of any size was bitter ; and Hildreth states 
 the matter very truthfully when he says, that "Congress, 
 led by Samuel Adams, was very jealous of military power, 
 and of everything which tended to give a permanent 
 character to the army." Mr. Adams was sound in principle, 
 for he not only realized that the Colonies had suffered 
 through the employment of the British army to enforce 
 oppressive and unconstitutional laws, but equally well 
 knew that a larger army than the State needed for its 
 protection against invasion and the preservation of the 
 peace, was inimical to true liberty. 
 
 Money was still scarce. A specie tax of six millions 
 was imposed, and the sixth annual campaign of the war 
 
300 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 drew near its close. John Trumbull, Jr. , became Secretary 
 to the Commander-in-Chief, vice Robert H. Harrison who 
 became Chief Justice of Maryland ; and Colonel Hand 
 became Adjutant-General, vice Scamraon, resigned. Mor 
 gan was promoted, and with General Steuben and Harry 
 Lee s horse, was ordered to the Southern Department, 
 accompanied by Kosciusko as engineer, vice Du Portail, 
 captured at Charleston. 
 
 On the twenty-eighth of November, Washington desig 
 nated the winter quarters for the army, establishing his 
 own at New Windsor. The Pennsylvania Line were near 
 Morristown ; the Jersey line, at Pompton ; the Maryland 
 horse, at Lancaster, Penn. ; Sheldon s horse, at Col 
 chester, Conn., and the New York regiments at Fort 
 Schuyler, Saratoga, Albany, Schenectady, and other 
 exposed Northern posts. This distribution of troops, 
 from time to time indicated, enables the reader to under 
 stand how a wise disposition of the army, when active 
 operations Avere practically suspended, equally enabled 
 Washington to resume active service upon the shortest 
 notice. 
 
 On the eighth of October, General Greene, who had 
 been tendered the command of the Southern Department, 
 vice Gates, submitted to Washington his plan of conduct 
 ing the next campaign. He desired, substantially, " a flying- 
 army " ; that is, " one lightly equipped, mobile as possible, 
 and familiar with the country in which operations were to 
 be conducted." To secure to Greene prompt support in 
 his new command, Washington addressed letters to Gov. 
 Abner Nash, of North Carolina, Gov. Thomas Jefferson, of 
 Virginia, and Gov. Thomas S. Lee, of Maryland, solicit 
 ing their cordial cooperation in the work of the new De 
 partment-Commander. Greene began his journey on the 
 twenty-ninth day of November, attended by Baron Steu 
 ben. He stopped at each capital to urge the necessity of 
 
BIRD S-EYE VIEW OF THEATRE OF WAR. 3d 
 
 immediate action, and secured the services of Generals 
 Smallwood and Gist, of Maryland and Delaware, for re 
 cruiting service in those States. Upon reaching Virginia, 
 he found that State to be thoroughly aroused for her own 
 defence. General Leslie, whose departure from New 
 York has been noticed, had fortified both Norfolk and 
 Portsmouth, and this increase of the British forces had 
 very justly alarmed the people. Washington had already 
 sent Generals Muhlenburg and Weedon to Virginia to 
 organize its militia, and they were endeavoring to confine 
 the forces of Leslie within the range of his fortified posi 
 tions. These officers had also served under General 
 Greene, making their assignment eminently judicious. 
 The matter of supplies, of all kinds, became a matter of 
 the greatest concern, if operations were to be carried on 
 effectively against Corn wall is at the South : while also 
 maintaining full correspondence with the troops of the 
 centre zone, and the North. The consolidation of regi 
 ments left many officers without commands ; but the 
 selection of a competent Quartermaster-General became 
 an imperative necessity. Col. Edward Carrington was 
 selected, and of him, Chief Justice Marshall says: "He 
 was eminently qualified to undertake the task of combin 
 ing and conducting the means of the Quartermaster-Gen 
 eral s department ; obeyed the call to the office ; and dis 
 charged it with unequalled zeal and fidelity." 
 
 For the purposes of this narrative, it is only necessary 
 to indicate the general conduct of operations southward, 
 so far as they illustrate the wisdom of Washington in 
 the selection of officers, and the instructions under which 
 he made use of their services. He concurred with Greene 
 in his general plan ; and the initiative was undertaken 
 with as frequent exchange of views, through express 
 messengers or couriers, as was then practicable. Orders 
 were issued for Colonel Carrington to explore the coun- 
 
302 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 try of the Dan, the Yadkin, and Catawba rivers, and to 
 make himself acquainted with the streams into which 
 they discharged themselves. Kosciusko, Engineer-in- 
 Chief of Greene, was charged with selecting proper places 
 for defending or securing safe fording-places. A princi 
 pal storehouse and laboratory was established at Prince 
 Edward s Court House, and Baron Steuben was charged 
 with maintaining the supply of powder from the manu 
 factories, and of lead from the mines of Fincastle County. 
 Such was the general preparation for the forthcoming 
 campaign. 
 
 General Greene reached Charlotte on the second of 
 December, and relieved Gates, who had been awaiting his 
 arrival for the surrender of his command. After exchange 
 of the proper courtesies, Gates returned to his farm. 
 The wisdom of Washington s choice in the assignment of 
 
 O O 
 
 General Greene may be seen by the citation of some of 
 Greene s letters written at that crisis. 
 
 To Jefferson he Avrites thus : " I find the troops in a 
 most wretched condition, destitute of every necessity, 
 either for their comfort or convenience, and they may be 
 literally said to be naked. It will answer no good purpose 
 to send men here in such a condition. . . . There must 
 be either pride, or principle, to make a soldier. No man 
 will think himself bound to fisrht the battles of a State 
 
 O 
 
 that leaves him to perish for want of clothing, nor can 
 you inspire a soldier with the sentiment of pride while 
 his situation renders him more an object of pity, than of 
 envy. The life of a soldier, in the best estate, is liable 
 to innumerable hardships : but when these are aggravated 
 by the want of provisions and clothing, his condition 
 becomes intolerable ; nor can men long contend with such 
 complicated difficulties and distress. Death, desertion, 
 and the hospital, must soon swallow up an army under 
 such circumstances ; and if it were possible for men to 
 
BIRD S-EYE VIEW OF THEATRE OF WAR. 3Q3 
 
 maintain such a wretched existence, they would have no 
 spirit to face their enemies, and would invariably disgrace 
 themselves and their commander. It is impossible to 
 presume discipline, when troops are in want of every 
 thing : to attempt severity, will only thin the ranks by 
 more heavy desertion." 
 
 To Marion he wrote : fr I am fully sensible that your 
 service is hard, and your sufferings great ; but how great 
 the prize for w^hich we contend ! I like your plan of fre 
 quently shifting your ground. It frequently prevents 
 surprise, and perhaps the total loss of your party. Until 
 a more permanent army can be collected than is in the 
 field at present, we must endeavor to keep up a partisan 
 war, and preserve the tide of sentiment among the 
 people in our favor, as much as possible. Spies are the 
 eyes of an army, and without them, a general is always 
 groping in the dark." 
 
 In all these letters and the measures undertaken, 
 Greene reflects the principles upon which his Cornmander- 
 in-Chief carried on the war, and it was his highest pride so 
 to act, as if under the direct gaze of Washington. On 
 the twentieth of December, having been detained by rains 
 at Charlotte, he abandoned his huts ; and by the twelfth 
 of January, 1781, was encamped on the banks of the 
 Peedee River, awaiting the opening of the final campaign 
 of the war for American Independence. Col. Chris 
 topher Greene, as well as Colonel Washington, Harry 
 Lee, and Morgan, had already joined him, and Washing 
 ton had thus furnished to the Southern army his ablest 
 general and such choice details of officers and men as had 
 been faithful, gallant, and successful throughout the war. 
 
CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 THE SOLDIER TRIED. -- AMERICAN MUTINY. -- FOREIGN 
 JUDGMENT. ARNOLD S DEPREDATIONS. 
 
 "TVTOTHING new or unfamiliar to the American student 
 1 \l can be said as to the military operations of the 
 British, French and American armies during the closing 
 year of the war for American Independence ; but they 
 may be so grouped in their relations to Washington as 
 a Soldier, that he may stand forth more distinctly as 
 both nominal and real Commander-in-Chief. His original 
 commission, it will be remembered, was accompanied by 
 the declaration of Congress that " they would maintain 
 and assist him, and adhere to him, with their lives and 
 fortunes, in the cause of American liberty." After the 
 Battle of Trenton, when Congress solemnly declared that 
 " the very existence of Civil Liberty depended upon the 
 right execution of military powers " it invested him with 
 dictatorial authority, being " confident of the wisdom, 
 vigor, and uprightness of George Washington." And in 
 1778, after the flash of the Burgoyne campaign had spent 
 itself, and the experiences of the American army at Valley 
 Forge attested the necessity for a fighting army under a 
 fighting soldier, Washington was again intrusted with the 
 reorganization of the army, both regular and militia, in 
 respect of all elements of enlistment, outfit, and supply. 
 From the date of his commission, through all his acts 
 and correspondence, it has been evident, that he has been 
 perfectly frank and consistent in his assignments of officers 
 
 304 
 
THE SOLDIER TRIED. 305 
 
 or troops, either to position or command ; and his judg 
 ment of men and measures has had constant verification 
 in realized experience. 
 
 It was very natural for European monarchs, including 
 Louis XVI., to behold in the very preeminent and asser 
 tive force of Washington s character much of the " one- 
 
 o 
 
 man power " which was the basis of their own asserted 
 prerogative ; and there were astute and ambitious states 
 men and soldiers of the Old World who hoped that a new 
 empire, and a new personal dynasty, would yet arise in 
 the western world, to be their associated ally against 
 Great Britain herself. They did not measure the Ameri 
 can Revolution by right standards ; because they could not 
 conceive, nor comprehend the American conception of, a 
 rr sovereign people." 
 
 There was one foreign soldier in the American army, 
 and of royal stock, who must have clung to Washington 
 and his cause, with most ardent passion as well as obedi 
 ent reverence. Nothing of sacrifice, exposure, or vile 
 jealousy, whether in closet, camp, or field, amid winter s 
 keenest blasts or summer s scorching fires, was beyond 
 the life and soul experience of Thaddeus Kosciusko. His 
 name, and that of Pulaski, so dear to Washington, and so 
 true to him, should be ever dear to the American ; and in 
 the history of their country s fall, there should ever be 
 cherished a monumental recognition of ancient Poland and 
 the Pole. 
 
 It was one of the most striking characteristics of Wash 
 ington s military life that he recognized and trusted so 
 many of these heroic men whose lives had been nursed 
 and developed in the cause of liberty and country. Such 
 men as these beheld in Washington a superhuman regard 
 for man, as man; and the youthful Lafayette almost wor 
 shipped, w r hile he obeyed, until his entire soul was pene 
 trated by the spirit and controlled by the example of his 
 
306 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 beloved Chief. Some of these, who survived until the 
 opening of the year 1781, were able to realize that its 
 successive months, however blessed in their ultimate 
 fruition, were months in w r hich Washington passed under 
 heavier yokes and through tougher ordeals than were 
 those of Valley Forge or Yorktown. For the first time 
 during the Revolutionary struggle, the American citizens 
 who did the fighting might well compare their situation 
 under the guardianship of the American Congress, with 
 that of Colonial obligation under the British Parliament 
 and the British crown. 
 
 The fluctuations of numbers in the American army 
 seemed very largely to depend upon its vicinity to 
 endangered sections. Remoteness from the seaboard 
 induced indifference to expenditures for the navy, because 
 British ships could not operate on land ; and seaboard 
 towns, which were constantly in peril, insisted upon 
 retaining their able-bodied militia within easy reach, 
 until armed vessels could be built and assigned for their 
 protection. The same unpatriotic principle of human 
 nature affected all supplies of food and clothing. It has 
 already been noticed that Washington was profoundly 
 grieved that country people courted the British markets 
 of New York, and that British gold was of such mighty 
 weight in the balance of " stay-at-home comfort," against 
 personal experience in some distant camp. Starvation 
 and suffering could not fail to arouse resistance to their 
 constraints. The condition of the army was one of pro 
 tracted agony. Lafayette wrote home to his wife as 
 follows: "Human patience has its limits. No European 
 army would suffer one-tenth part of what the Americans 
 suffer. It takes citizens, to support hunger, nakedness, 
 toil, and the total want of pay, which constitute the con 
 dition of our soldiers, the hardiest and most patient 
 that are to be found in the world." 
 
AMERICAN MUTINY. 307 
 
 Marshall states the case fairly when he asserts that 
 "it was .not easy to persuade the military, that their 
 brethren in civil life were unable to make greater exer 
 tions in support of the war, or, that its burdens could not 
 be more equally borne." 
 
 On Xew Year s Day, January 1, 1781, the Pennsylvania 
 line (Continentals) revolted, and Captain Billings was 
 killed in the effort to suppress the outbreak. Thirteen 
 hundred men, with six guns, started for Philadelphia. 
 Wayne was powerless to control even his own command ; 
 and so advised Washington. The Commander-in -Chief 
 was at tirst impelled to leave Xew Windsor and go in 
 person to the camps ; but knowing that he had troops 
 who would obey him, whatever conditions might arise, 
 he addressed himself to this state of affairs with a dignity, 
 deliberation, and sympathy, so calm and yet so impres 
 sive, that he both retained the full prestige of his posi 
 tion, and secured full control of the disaffection. He 
 allowed passion to subside ; and then resolved to execute 
 his own will, at all hazards. The details of his mental 
 struggle, and the precautionary measures taken by him 
 to master the situation, with eager and excited veterans 
 at his back to enforce his will, would fill a volume. 
 Recognizing the neglect of State authorities to furnish 
 their own respective regiments with food, clothing, and 
 money, he proudly, sublimely, and with a dignity beyond 
 any heroic act of the battlefield, called upon the Gov 
 ernors of the Northern States to send their militia, at 
 once, to take care of Clinton * army in New York, if 
 they wished to prevent the invasion and waste of their 
 own peaceful homes. In other words, as plainly as he 
 could do it, he made the " stay-at-homes " responsible for 
 their own further immunity from battle scenes and battle 
 waste. 
 
 This mutiny was indeed, a natural outbreak, inevitable, 
 
308 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 irresistible ! It did not impair loyalty to country. The 
 emergency overwhelmed every purely military obligation 
 in that of self-preservation of life itself. It did 
 impair discipline, and did disregard authority, for the 
 time; but in its manifestations had many of the elements 
 of lawful revolution. The State first failed in duty to its 
 defenders. For such a cause, the Revolution had its first 
 outbreaks at Lexington and Concord. Washington was 
 never so great in arms, as when with calm trust and 
 steady nerve he faced this momentous issue. Besides his 
 demand upon the States most exposed to British incur 
 sions, for men, he demanded money. Massachusetts and 
 New Hampshire promptly gave twenty-four dollars extra, 
 in specie, to each enlisted man. Colonel Laurens was 
 appointed as special agent to France, to secure a loan. 
 Eventually, he succeeded ; but Count de Vergennes, 
 when advised of his mission, wrote on the fifteenth of 
 February : " Congress relies too much on France for 
 subsidies to maintain their army. They must absolutely 
 refrain from such exorbitant demands. The great ex 
 penses of the war render it impossible for France to meet 
 these demands, if persisted in." Franklin, then at Paris, 
 wrote to his daughter, Mrs. Balche : " If you see Wash 
 ington, assure him of my very great and sincere respect, 
 and tell him that all the old Generals here amuse them 
 selves in studying the accounts of his operations, and 
 approve highly of his conduct." Lafayette also wrote, 
 urging full supplies of men and money ; with most 
 pointed assurances that the American States would 
 surely realize success, and be amply able to refund all 
 advances which might be made by the king." 
 
 Up to this time, the individuality of the States, in 
 spite of Washington s repeated appeals for entire unity of 
 purpose and action on the part of all, had been jealously 
 maintained. A partial relief was afforded, when, on the 
 
FOREIGN JUDGMENT. 309 
 
 second of March, 1781, the Articles of Confederation 
 finally went into effect, Maryland having yielded her 
 assent on the previous day. Four years and four months 
 had elapsed since their formal adoption and submission to 
 the several States for acceptance. 
 
 All the insubordination of the American army before 
 referred to, was well known at British headquarters in 
 New York. That of the previous year had disappointed 
 both Clinton and Knyphausen, who invaded New Jersey, 
 it will be remembered, hoping to reap some benefits from 
 its expression ; but now that it assumed such unmistak 
 able signs of armed revolt, they doubled their interest in 
 its movements. General Clinton, mindful of his error on 
 a former occasion, simply watched Washington. He re 
 ceived information of the general insubordination as early 
 as Washington, and on the morning of the twenty-third, 
 sent messengers to the American army with propositions 
 looking to their return to British allegiance. He entirely 
 misconceived the nature of the disaffection, and his agents 
 were retained in custody. In writing to Lord Germaine, 
 he says : " General Washington has not moved a man 
 from his army [near West Point] as yet ; and as it is 
 probable that their demands are nearly the same with the 
 Pennsylvania line, it is not thought likely that he will. 
 I am, however, in a situation to avail myself of favorable 
 events ; but to stir before they offer, might mar all." 
 
 At this period, the influence of the American Commis 
 sioners Adams, Franklin and Jay, was proving very 
 beneficial to the American cause with the Governments of 
 Spain and Holland, as well as with France ; and Colonel 
 Laurens, upon his arrival at Paris, after release from 
 prison, pretty plainly assured the French Ministry that 
 it " would be much wiser policy to advance money to 
 America, than to risk such an accommodation with Eng 
 land as would compel America, so near her West India 
 
310 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 possessions, to make common cause with England against 
 France." Notwithstanding these negotiations, then in 
 progress, the American army had become reduced to an 
 effective force of barely five thousand men ; and the French 
 army could not be disposable for general service while 
 their fleets were so closely confined to the harbor of New 
 port. The British fleet was wintering at Gardiner s Bay, 
 L.I., so as to watch all vessels that entered or departed 
 from Long Island Sound, and maintained its blockade. 
 Late in January a violent north-east storm made havoc 
 with the British ships. The Culloden, line-of-battle 
 ship (74 guns), was sunk. The Bedford was dis 
 masted, and the America was driven to sea. Wash 
 ington seized upon this incident to make a diversion 
 southward and attempt the capture of Arnold, who was 
 in full commission as a brigadier-general of the British 
 army. 
 
 Arnold had left New York with sixteen hundred men, 
 on the nineteenth of the preceding December, for 
 Virginia. His command consisted of the eighteenth 
 
 O G> 
 
 British (Scotch) regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Dundas, 
 and the Queen s Rangers, Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe ; 
 the latter being a skilful officer, shrewd and cool, but 
 noted, in the heat of battle, for characteristic ferocity in 
 shortening fights, and thus reducing the number of 
 wounded prisoners to be cared for. Clinton seems not 
 to have fully relied upon the discretion of Arnold, since 
 he reports, having fr detailed two officers of tried ability 
 and experience, and possessing the entire confidence of 
 their commander." As with so many naval expeditions 
 of that period, a gale overtook Arnold on the twenty- 
 sixth and twenty-seventh of December, scattering his 
 transports, so that without waiting for those still at sea, 
 he landed with twelve hundred men and moved up the 
 James River on the fourth of January. He landed at 
 
ARNOLD S DEPREDATIONS. ;U 1 
 
 Westover, twenty-five miles below Richmond, and imme 
 diately marched upon the city. On the afternoon of the 
 fifth, he entered Richmond. The militia, under Col. 
 John Nichols, only two hundred in number, assembled 
 upon Richmond Hill, but had to retire before Simcoe s 
 advance. A few men stationed on Shrcve Hill, also re 
 tired. At Westham, seven miles above Richmond, a 
 foundry, a laboratory, and some shops were destroyed, as 
 well as the Auditor s Records, which had been removed 
 from Richmond for safety. Arnold sent a proposition to 
 Governor Jefferson, offering to spare the city if no op 
 position were made to his vessels ascending the river to 
 remove tobacco and other legitimate plunder of Avar. 
 Upon rejection of this proposition, he burned so much of 
 the city as time allowed, and returned to Westover, with 
 out loss. He carried oft seven brass cannon, three hun 
 dred stands of arms found in the loft of the Capitol, and a 
 few quartermasters stores, as his sole trophies of war. 
 Upon information, however, that Baron Steuben was at 
 Petersburg with some militia, Arnold hastened to Ports 
 mouth to put its defences in better condition. 
 
CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN, 1781, OUTLINED. COWPENS. 
 
 GUILFORD COURT-HOUSE. EUTAW SPRINGS. 
 
 BEFORE developing Washington s plan for the capt 
 ure of Benedict Arnold, it is advisable to glance 
 at the military condition of the Southern Department in 
 which Arnold was then serving in command of British 
 troops. Lafayette had been intrusted with execution of 
 the plan. He knew perfectly well that Arnold would 
 not venture far from his fortified position at Portsmouth, 
 and thus incur risk of capture and an inevitable death 
 upon the gibbet. 
 
 The assignment of General Greene to the command of 
 that department was designed by Washington, for the 
 purpose of initiating a vigorous campaign against all 
 posts occupied by British garrisons, and gradually to 
 clear that country of the presence of British troops. 
 He had great confidence in such men as Marion, Sumter, 
 Hampton, and other partisan leaders, who were perpetu 
 ally on the alert, by night and by day, for opportunities 
 to repress royalist risings, and harass the enemy at every 
 possible point of contact. It was very natural, then, 
 to overestimate the British successes at Savannah and 
 Charleston, and even to assume that the British army 
 would be uniformly equal to active campaign service, and 
 would not find it difficult to maintain supplies in the 
 field. In view of the condition of roads, water-courses, 
 swamps, and the limited agricultural improvements of 
 
 312 
 
THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN: COWPENS. 313 
 
 those times, it is greatly to the credit of the British offi 
 cers that so much was accomplished by them, in the face 
 of the partisan operations above noticed. 
 
 Washington appreciated this condition fully ; urged 
 the Southern governors to renewed activity, and fur 
 nished General Greene with instructions respecting what 
 he regarded as the final campaign of the war. The first 
 element of success which he enjoined as a duty was "to 
 avoid battle with fresh British troops, just out of garrison, 
 and therefore in complete readiness for action." The 
 second injunction was, " so far as possible, to give a par 
 tisan or skirmish character to engagements where infe 
 rior numbers could keep their adversaries under constant 
 and sleepless apprehension of attack." The third was, 
 "to utilize and control streams, swamps, and woods, 
 where the bayonet and artillery could not be successfully 
 employed by British troops." The fourth principle of 
 action was characteristic of Washington s early experi 
 ence, and was exemplified throughout the war "never 
 to halt, over night, without making artificial protection 
 against surprise ; and to surprise the enemy so far as 
 practicable, whenever all conditions seem to render such 
 surprise impossible." Caesar s habitual intrenchments, 
 upon a halt, were types of Washington s methods ; and 
 the Crimean War made more impressive than ever the 
 value of slight, temporary cover for troops in the field. 
 The camp-kettle, the powder and lead, the pick and the 
 spade, were Washington s indispensable tools. 
 
 It was therefore with great confidence in the result 
 that he intrusted this Southern campaign to the charge of 
 Nathaniel Greene ; and for the same reasons he sent him 
 his best engineer, and his best corps of rifles and horse. 
 General Greene, immediately upon taking command, 
 removed all commissary supplies from the coast, to avoid 
 liability of their seizure, and to maintain his food-supply. 
 
314 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 He ordered Quartermaster-General Carrington to collect 
 all magazines upon the Roanoke, for ready access when 
 ever he might need ammunition or commissary supplies. 
 He wrote to Baron Steuben, to " hasten forward his 
 recruits " ; to the Governors of Virginia and North Caro 
 lina, to "nil up their quotas of regulars and call in all 
 the militia that they could arm" \ to Shelby, Campbell, 
 and other participants in the Battle of King s Mountain, 
 fought on the eighth of October, 1780, "to come forward 
 and assist in the overthrow of Cornwallis, and defeat his 
 second attempt to invade North Carolina." It is certain 
 from his letters to Washington, that he expected to realize 
 success. The battle of Cowpens immediately followed. 
 
 While awaiting response to his demands for troops, 
 both militia and regulars, Greene promptly detached 
 Morgan, with Colonels Washington and Howard, to learn 
 the movements of Cornwallis and Tarleton, and fritter 
 away their strength by worrying tactics. Morgan came 
 so near Tarleton as to know that he could have a right, 
 if he wanted a fight. This he resolved to have. Few 
 military events on record show superior tact, daring, and 
 success. He placed his command in the sharp bend of 
 Broad River, then swollen by rains, and so deep and 
 swift that neither boat, horse nor man could cross it ; 
 where, as he afterwards reported, " his men had to fight, 
 or drown." All that he asked of his advanced militia was, 
 that they would give two volleys and scamper from 
 his front, and re-form in his rear. He secreted Washing 
 ton s dragoons out of view, for their opportunity. Tarle 
 ton dashed madly after the scattering militia, and before 
 he could rally his impetuous charge of horse and foot, was 
 taken in the rear, utterly routed, and barely saved himself 
 after a sabre-cut from Colonel Washington ; leaving on the 
 field, or as prisoners, seven hundred and eighty of his 
 command, two cannon, fifty-five wagons, one hundred 
 
THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN: ITS CRISIS. 315 
 
 horses, and eight hundred muskets. Cornwallis was but 
 twenty-five miles distant ; but the exchange of sharp words 
 afterwards, between himself and Tarleton, did not lessen 
 the value and prestige of this timely American victory. 
 Congress and various States united in recognition of 
 Morgan s gallant conduct. Broken down by rheuma 
 tism, he was compelled to leave active service. From 
 Quebec, in 1775, to Cowpens, in 1780, he had been 
 " weighed " in many battle-scales, and never " found 
 wanting." 
 
 On the twenty-fifth of January, while in camp on Hicks 
 Creek, a fork of the Great Republic, Greene received the 
 message of Morgan that he " had many prisoners in charge, 
 but was pressed by Cornwallis." It was most tantalizing, 
 at such an hour, not to be able to improve this victory. 
 The Southern army, including Morgan s force, numbered, 
 all told, including four hundred militia, only twenty-one 
 hundred and three men, of whom the artillerists were but 
 forty-seven, and the cavalry only one hundred and twenty. 
 Greene Avrote to Suniter, on the fifteenth of January, two 
 days before the Battle of Cowpens : " More than half our 
 numbers are in a manner naked, so much that we cannot 
 put them on the least duty. Indeed, there is a great 
 number that have not a rag of clothing on them, except a 
 little piece of blanket, in the Indian form, about their 
 waists." But Greene put this force in the best possible 
 order ; and on the twenty-eighth, accompanied by a single 
 guide, one aide-de-camp, and a sergeant s party of twenty 
 troopers, he started to join Morgan. On the night of the 
 thirtieth, after a ride of one hundred and twenty-five 
 miles, he was with him. 
 
 The crisis was immediate. Greene wrote to Varnurn, 
 then in Congress ; to Gist, Smallwood, Rutledge, Wash 
 ington, and others, appealing for five thousand infantry 
 and from six to eight hundred horse. It seemed as if 
 
316 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 this very victory would only precipitate disaster. Wash 
 ington thus replied : " I wish I had it in my power to 
 congratulate you on the brilliant and important victory 
 of General Morgan without the alloy which the distresses 
 of the department you command, and apprehensions of 
 posterior events, intermix. ... I lament that you 
 find it so difficult to avoid a general action ; for our 
 misfortunes can only be completed by the dispersion of 
 your little army, which will be the most probable con 
 sequence of such an event." This letter reflects the wise 
 policy of Washington throughout the war ; ever to reserve 
 in hand a sufficient force to control the time and place 
 for battle ; while incessantly weakening that of his adver 
 sary and compelling him, finally, to fight "against odds." 
 
 As the mind reverts to the contentions for high com 
 mand which characterized the early years of the war ; and 
 as one officer after another disappears from the battle 
 record, it would seem as if the officer who sat by the side 
 of Morgan on the banks of the Catawba, on the thirtieth 
 of January, 1781, must have felt as if a new generation 
 had taken the place of the old comrades of 1776, and that 
 he was simply waiting to pass away also. 
 
 But the hazard of delay was omnipotent to force 
 instant action. Colonel Lee was ordered to hasten and 
 join Greene. The report of the landing of British forces 
 at Wilmington, just in the rear of the small army he had 
 left at Hicks Creek, was a new source of anxious concern. 
 The time of service of the Virginia militia was about to 
 expire, and according to precedent, they would be prompt 
 in their departure. With quick sagacity, Greene placed 
 General Stephens in command, anticipating the exact 
 term of their expiring enlistment, and sent them home, 
 via Hillsborough, in charge of the prisoners of Tarleton s 
 command. He thus relieved Morgan of this encumbrance, 
 and saved the detail of efficient troops for that escort duty. 
 
THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN: ITS RENEWAL. 317 
 
 At this period, Cornwall is had abandoned Charleston 
 as his base of supply, and was confident of a successful 
 invasion of North Carolina. He certainly knew that 
 Phillips, Arnold, and Simcoe could spare no troops from 
 Virginia ; and through the disaster which befell Tarleton, 
 one of the best soldiers of that period, at Cowpens, he 
 began to appreciate Clinton s disappointing experiences 
 about New York. He unburdened his thoughts to Clin 
 ton, in this melancholy vein : " Our hopes of success 
 were principally founded upon positive assurances, given 
 by apparently credible deputies and emissaries, that, upon 
 the approach of a British army in North Carolina, a great 
 body of the inhabitants were ready to join it, and cooper 
 ate with it in restoring his Majesty s Government. All 
 inducements in my power were made use of without 
 material effects." 
 
 On the tenth of February, Greene had a force of only 
 two thousand and thirty-six men ; of which, but fourteen 
 hundred and six were regular troops. A light corps of 
 seven hundred men was organized under Colonels Will 
 iams, Carrington, Howard, Washington, and Lee, to 
 operate in separate detachments so far as practicable, and 
 thus keep the army of Cornwallis constantly under expos 
 ure to attack, and compelled to make many exhaustive 
 marches. Kosciusko planned light earthworks, to cover 
 fords as the army crossed and recrossed the same ; and 
 Greene was thus employing wise strategic methods for 
 future action, when of his own choice he might confront 
 Cornwallis in battle. 
 
 Many vicissitudes of thrilling interest attended these 
 desultory operations ; and when sudden floods, and as 
 sudden abatement of swollen streams, had been success 
 fully utilized by the patriotic leaders, just at the right 
 moment, it is not strange that the American people, as 
 
318 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 well as "Washington, saw in these deliverances the hand 
 of favoring Providence. 
 
 At this juncture, Greene realized also, as well as did 
 Cornwallis, that he could not expect any substantial aid 
 from Virginia. He could hardly keep his immediate 
 force in hand, while w r ear, waste, hunger and sickness 
 began to impair their fighting energy as well as physical 
 capacity. He determined to seek the first reasonable 
 opportunity to join battle with Cornwallis ; and the Battle 
 of Guilford Court-House, on the fifteenth of March, real 
 ized Washington s full anticipations of such protracted 
 inaction. 
 
 The light troops of both armies had skirmished daily. 
 Cornwallis issued a proclamation giving a limit within 
 which the people must return to their allegiance to the 
 Crown. On the sixth of March a skirmish occurred at 
 WetzelFs Mills, which brought nearly the entire army of 
 Cornwallis into action. On the eighth, Colonel Carring- 
 ton and Frederick Cornwallis, acting as commissioners 
 for the two opposing armies, agreed upon terms for an 
 exchange of prisoners. Cornwallis had been in the habit 
 of paroling militia, wherever found, and carrying them 
 on his list, as if captured in battle. In the adjustment 
 made, Greene obtained a few officers who would have 
 been otherwise idle during the campaign ; but the 
 arrangement had no other immediate value. 
 
 The position of the two armies is worthy of notice, be 
 cause of its relations to succeeding events in Virginia. 
 For several weeks Cornwallis had made special endeavor 
 to control all upper fords. On the twenty-seventh of 
 February he crossed the river Haw and fixed his camp on 
 the Allamance, one of its tributaries. Greene adopted 
 a line nearly parallel with that of his adversary, and 
 advanced to the heights between Reedy Fork and Troub 
 lesome Creek, having his divided headquarters near the 
 
GUILFORD COURT-HOUSE. 319 
 
 Speedwell Iron Works and Boyd s Mills, on two streams. 
 Greene had gained the choice of position, entirely revers 
 ing the old relations of the armies. There were no 
 British troops in his rear, or on his eastern flank, and 
 none to endanger his communications with Virginia. He 
 could give battle ; retire as he advanced, or move into 
 Virginia, by the same upper fords which Cornwallis had 
 once so carefully occupied. At this time, the army of 
 Cornwallis was also in great need of clothing, medicines, 
 and all other essential supplies. The strain of so many 
 unequal marches and skirmishes, through woods, thick 
 ets, and swamps, and across innumerable small streams, 
 with no recompense in victories won, was very severe. 
 He therefore pitched his camp between the Haw and Deep 
 rivers, where the roads from Salisbury, Guilford and 
 Hillsborough unite, and thus controlled the road to Wil 
 mington, his only proximate base of supply. 
 
 Troops had already commenced reporting to General 
 Greene, and he decided to offer battle. The command 
 consisted of only fourteen hundred and ninety regular 
 infantry, one hundred and sixty-one cavalry, and twenty- 
 seven hundred and fifty-four militia. The army of Corn- 
 Avallis, which on the first of January numbered three 
 thousand two hundred and twenty-four men, had fallen 
 off, by March 1st, nearly one-third ; and there was reason 
 for Greene s hope that, in case his militia held firmly to 
 positions assigned them, victory might be realized. He 
 felt the enemy with Lee s and Campbell s cavalry ; dis 
 posed his troops in admirable form ; and failed at last, 
 only through the weakness of his raw troops. For the 
 purposes of this narrative, only the result need be stated. 
 The American army retired to the iron-works on Trouble 
 some Creek, a distance of twelve miles, to rally forces and 
 prepare for future action. " It is certain," says Colonel 
 Lee, "that if Greene had known the condition of the British 
 
320 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 forces, he need not have retreated, and the American 
 victory would have been complete." Tarleton, who was 
 wounded in the action, after stating that "the British 
 army lost one-third of its number in killed and wounded, 
 during the two hours of battle," said that "this victory 
 was the pledge of ultimate defeat." 
 
 Greene, writing to Washington, said: "The enemy 
 gained his cause, but is ruined by the success of it." Fox, 
 in the British House of Commons, said : " Another such 
 victory would ruin the British army." Pitt called it "the 
 precursor of ruin to British supremacy at the South." 
 The casualties of the American army were, nominally, 
 including missing, thirteen hundred and eleven ; but so 
 many of the missing immediately rallied, that the Virginia 
 Brigade, after two days, reported as present for duty, 
 seven hundred and fifty-two ; and the Maryland Brigade 
 mustered five hundred and fifty, showing a loss in action 
 of only one hundred and eighty-eight men, instead of 
 two hundred and sixty-one, reported on the seventeenth. 
 Of one militia brigade, five hundred and fifty-two were 
 missing. The British casualties were five hundred and 
 forty-four, and of the general officers, only Cornwallis and 
 Leslie escaped without wounds. 
 
 Cornwallis, after providing for the wounded as well as 
 possible, and leaving under a flag of truce those who 
 could not march, immediately crossed the deep river as 
 if moving to Salisbury ; then recrossed it, lower down, 
 and entered Wilmington on the seventh of April, with 
 only fourteen hundred and forty-five men. He wrote to 
 Lord Rawdon, that " Greene would probably invade South 
 Carolina " ; but the messenger failed to get through to 
 Charleston. Greene was delayed after the battle, to send 
 back to his supply-train for ammunition, lead and bullet- 
 moulds ; but he followed so closely after, that he reached 
 Ramsour s Mills the twenty-eighth, the very day on which 
 
EUTAW SPRINGS. 321 
 
 Cornwallis had bridged the river and pushed on to Wil 
 mington. 
 
 The effect of this withdrawal of Cornwallis was of great 
 value to the American cause, and cleared away obstruc 
 tions to a broader range of operations for the army of 
 the North. Subsequently, on the twenty-fifth of April 
 Greene met Rawdon, at Hobkirk Hill, in an action 
 sometimes called the Second Battle of Camden, as it was 
 fought near that town, in which the American casualties 
 were two hundred and seventy-one, and the British cas 
 ualties were two hundred and fifty-eight. Greene, after 
 the action, withdrew to Rugeley s Mills, and Rawdon to 
 Camden. Stedman says : " The victory at Hobkirk Hill, like 
 that at Guilford Court-House, produced no consequences 
 beneficial to the British army." On the seventeenth of the 
 subsequent September, Greene fought with Stewart, Raw- 
 don s successor, the Battle of Eutaw Springs, the final 
 battle at the South. In this battle the American casualties 
 were four hundred and eight, and the British casualties 
 were six hundred and ninety-three. In dismissing these 
 operations in the Southern Department, a single extract 
 from Tarleton s history of the war is of interest : " The 
 troops engaged during the greater part of the time were 
 totally destitute of bread, and the country afforded no 
 vegetable as a substitute. Salt at length failed, and their 
 only resources were water and the wild cattle which they 
 found in the woods. In the last expedition, fifty men 
 perished through mere fatigue. . . . We must not, 
 however, confine the praise entirely to the British troops. 
 The same justice requires that the Americans should not 
 be deprived of their share of this fatal glory. 
 On the whole, the campaign terminated in their favor, 
 General Greene having recovered the far greater part of 
 Georgia, and the two Carolinas." 
 
 This same Nathaniel Greene led the Kentish Guards to 
 
322 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Boston on the morning after the Battle of Lexington, in 
 1775, and his early announcement of the principles upon 
 which the war should be conducted to ensure final success, 
 had been verified. He had vindicated the confidence of 
 Washington in every line of duty, and in his Southern 
 campaign cleared the way for the crowning triumph of the 
 American Commander-in-Chief, at Yorktown. 
 
CHAPTER XXXII. 
 
 LAFAYETTE IN PURSUIT OF ARNOLD. - - THE END IN 
 SIGH T. ARNOLD IN THE BRITISH ARMY. 
 
 THE diversion of thought from Washington s imme 
 diate surroundings will find its compensation in 
 the development of his plan for the capture of Benedict 
 Arnold. Its execution had been intrusted to General 
 Lafayette, who was already assembling his command at 
 Peekskill, on the Hudson. 
 
 The superiority of the British fleet before Newport 
 having been reduced by the storm of January 22nd, 
 Monsieur Destouches, successor to Admiral de Ternay, 
 deceased, consented to send one ship-of-the-line and two 
 frigates to prevent Arnold s escape by sea. The Count 
 de Rochambeau deemed it unnecessary and inexpedient to 
 send troops, because the movement was to be so rapid in 
 its execution. He assumed that the Continental forces 
 in Virginia were adequate for operations under Lafayette. 
 Letters from Washington, however, suggesting the detail 
 of a considerable land force, did not reach him until after 
 M. de Tully had sailed ; or the entire French fleet, with 
 a strong military contingent, would have joined the expe 
 dition. The three ships under the command of Monsieur 
 de Tully sailed on the ninth of February ; captured the 
 British frigate Romulus in Linn Haven Bay, two pri 
 vateers, and eight other prizes ; but upon arrival at 
 Elizabeth River, Virginia, finding that the depth of water 
 would not allow the passage up the river of his larger 
 ships, he returned to Newport. 
 
 323 
 
324 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 At this point, the beginning of the end of the war 
 becomes apparent. Every fortuitous change in the 
 details of immediately succeeding movements, and every 
 modification of plans previously considered, seem to 
 occur as if the American Commander-in-Chief adjusted 
 characters and events with the accuracy of a master of 
 chess who plays with a clear anticipation of the check 
 mate of Clinton and Cornwallis, his two antagonists. 
 Each of the royal partners attempted, too late, the 
 process of " castle-ing " ; so that New York, first, and then 
 Yorktown, became powerless to protect each other, or 
 the dependent posts, garrisons, and commanders of each. 
 And it is still more dramatic in the result than if Arnold 
 had been captured ; for the expedition of the French 
 Marquis, which was at first regarded as only a temporary 
 absence on his part from the immediate command of 
 Washington, proved to be the vanguard of an advance 
 which, through his extraordinary tact and skilful hand 
 ling, finally inclosed Cornwallis, and made the oppor 
 tunity for his capture. 
 
 Lafayette started from Peekskill immediately upon 
 the departure of M. de Tully s ships, taking with him 
 twelve hundred light infantry, made up of New England 
 and New Jersey troops. He reached Pompton, New Jer 
 sey, on the twenty-fifth day of February ; Philadelphia, 
 on the second day of March, and Head of Elk, on the 
 next day. If the reader will imagine Lafayette as 
 standing upon the high ground overlooking Chesapeake 
 Bay on the evening of March 3, 1781, let him recall 
 Maxwell s visit to the same spot accompanied by La 
 fayette, on the third day of September, 1777, just before 
 the Battle of Brandy wine. On the former occasion, La 
 fayette slept in a log cabin where he had been watching 
 the British landing. At daybreak, that cabin was within 
 the British picket-lines. A suspicion that it was occu- 
 
LAFAYETTE IN PURSUIT OF ARNOLD. 325 
 
 pied by an officer of Lafayette s rank was certainly 
 beyond the conception of the Hessian Chasseurs who 
 bivouacked close by. In a letter written by Lafayette, 
 to his young wife, which was ever cherished by the late 
 Senators Oscar and Edniond Lafayette, grandsons of the 
 Marquis, he humorously contrasts his condition at the two 
 dates. "The landing of Cornwallis, at this particular 
 point" is noticed ; then, "my first wound, in my first battle 
 near Birmingham Meeting House " ; and then, "my present 
 independent command, and my hopeful expectation that 
 the same British General will not much longer bar the 
 way to American Independence." 
 
 From this point, Lafayette sent his advance troops to 
 Annapolis ; but he first made a personal trip, in an open 
 canoe, to Elizabethtown, to accelerate preparations for 
 the capture of the traitor Arnold. He visited Baron 
 Steuben at Yorktown, and learned that the Baron would 
 undertake to raise five thousand militia for his support. 
 He visited Muhlenburg at Suffolk ; and then made a 
 personal reconnoissance of Arnold s defences at Ports 
 mouth. The return of M. de Tully to Newport compelled 
 him to return to Annapolis and there await instructions 
 from Washington. Meanwhile, Washington, following 
 up his own letters to Rochambeau, visited Newport, 
 R.I., and accompanied Rochambeau to the French 
 Admiral s ship. Eleven hundred men had already 
 embarked, awaiting the repair of a frigate before sailing. 
 On the eighth, four frigates and eight battle-ships pro 
 ceeded to sea. This was a profound surprise to the 
 British fleet, still anchored in Gardiner s Bay, as well as 
 to Clinton, then in New York. The French fleet was 
 actually under weigh before Admiral Arbuthnot suspected 
 its design. He sailed promptly in pursuit, with an equal 
 force, and wrote to General Clinton, to "warn Arnold of 
 his danger." On the sixteenth, the British and French 
 
326 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 squadrons fought a well-balanced battle, off the Chesa 
 peake ; but the presence of the British fleet having 
 thwarted the chief object of its errand, Monsieur Des- 
 touches returned to Newport on the twenty-sixth, after 
 an absence of only eighteen days. The inability of the 
 French fleet to control the waters of the Chesapeake modi 
 fied all plans. 
 
 Washington wrote to Lafayette on the fifth of April, 
 as follows : " While we all lament the miscarriage of an 
 
 o 
 
 enterprise [the capture of Arnold] which bid so fair of 
 success, we must console ourselves in the thought of 
 having done everything practicable to accomplish it. I 
 am certain that the Chevalier Destouches exerted him 
 self to the utmost to gain the Chesapeake. The point 
 upon which the whole turned, the action with Admiral 
 Arbuthnot, reflects honor upon the Chevalier, and upon 
 the marine of France. As matters have turned out, it 
 is to be wished that you had not gone out of the Elk ; 
 but, I never judge of the proprieties of measures by after 
 results." This letter, so timely and wise, as well as so 
 characteristic of its author, also instructed Lafayette to 
 return to Philadelphia ; but on the sixth, he was ordered 
 to report to General Greene. 
 
 This order had hardly been issued when Washington 
 learned that Clinton, acting upon Admiral Arbuthnot s 
 suggestion, had forwarded additional troops to the sup 
 port of Arnold, under command of General Phillips. He 
 at once countermanded Lafayette s orders to report to 
 General Greene, and assigned him to command in Vir 
 ginia, reporting, however, both to General Greene and 
 himself. Greene received a copy of this order March 
 18th, three days after the Battle of Guilford Court-House, 
 and he dates his reply as "follows : " Ten miles from 
 Guilford Court-House. I am happy to hear the Marquis 
 is coming to Virginia, though I am afraid from a hint in 
 
THE END IN SIGHT. 327 
 
 one of Baron Steuben s letters that he will think himself 
 injured in being superseded in command. Could the 
 Marquis be with us at this moment, we should have a 
 most glorious campaign. It would put Cornwallis and 
 his whole army into our hands." 
 
 Greene, at this time, knowing the condition of the 
 army of Cornwallis at Wilmington, believed that by the 
 advance of Lafayette from Virginia, and his own coop 
 eration, just as he started in pursuit of Cornwallis, the 
 capture of that officer s entire command would be assured. 
 But in other ways than had been anticipated, the assign 
 ment of Lafayette to command in Virginia did enforce 
 the ultimate surrender of the British army of Virginia. 
 Baron Steuben, with perfect confidence in the wisdom of 
 Washington, gracefully accepted the order as final, and 
 rendered to Lafayette prompt obedience and thoroughly 
 hearty support. 
 
 The troops that accompanied Lafayette, however, did 
 not like their transfer to a warmer climate. Desertions 
 were frequent, and a mutinous spirit was exhibited. La 
 fayette hung the first deserter who was captured. A 
 second was arrested and brought before him for disposal. 
 He sent him adrift, with " permission to return to his home, 
 or wherever he desired to go." He then issued an order, 
 reciting, that " lie was netting out upon a dangerous and 
 difficult expedition; and lie hoped the soldiers would not 
 abandon him; but that whoever wished to go away, might 
 do so instantly." " From that hour," wrote Lafayette, 
 "all desertions ceased, and not a man would leave." 
 
 Washington himself, at this juncture of affairs, was 
 peculiarly embarrassed. Congress had assured him that 
 the new regular force of thirty-seven thousand men would 
 be in the field by the first of January. Marshall, the 
 historian, makes the following statement : " The regular 
 force drawn from Pennsylvania, to Georgia inclusive, at 
 
328 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 no time during this interesting campaign amounted to 
 three thousand effective men." Of the Northern troops, 
 twelve hundred had been detached under the Marquis de 
 Lafayette, in the aid of Virginia. Including these in 
 the estimate, the States, from New Jersey to New Hamp 
 shire, had furnished only five thousand effectives. The 
 cavalry and artillery at no time exceeded one thousand. 
 During May, the total force reached seven thousand, of 
 whom rather more than four thousand might have been 
 relied on for action ; but even these had been brought 
 into camp too late to acquire that discipline which is so 
 essential to military service. 
 
 As early as February twentieth, when the Virginia cam 
 paign was in prospect, General Washington begged Schuy- 
 ler to accept the head of the War Deparment, in these 
 earnest words : " Our affairs are brought to an awful crisis. 
 Nothing will recover them but the vigorous exertion of 
 men of abilities who know our wants and the best means 
 of supplying them. These qualifications, Sir, without a 
 compliment, I think you possess. Why, then, the depart 
 ment being necessary, should you shrink from it? The 
 greater the chaos, the greater will be your merit in bring 
 ing forth order." General Schuyler replied on the twenty- 
 fifth, and declared his intention never to hold office under 
 Congress, unless accompanied by a restoration to mili 
 tary rank ; and added that " such inconvenience would 
 result to themselves [members of Congress] from such a 
 restoration, as would necessarily give umbrage to many 
 officers." 
 
 Washington s diary at this period affords a fair show 
 of existing conditions, and reveals his anxiety better than 
 another can depict it. On the first of May, his record is 
 this : " Instead of having magazines filled with provisions, 
 we have a scant pittance, scattered here and there, in 
 different States. Instead of having our arsenals filled 
 
THE END IN SIGHT. 329 
 
 with military stores, they are poorly provided, and the 
 workmen are leaving them. . . . Instead of hav 
 ing the regiments completed under the new establishment, 
 scarce any State has an eighth part of its quota in the 
 field, and there is little prospect of getting more than 
 half. In a word, instead of having everything in readiness 
 to take the field, we have nothing. . . . And instead 
 of having the prospect of a glorious, offensive campaign 
 before us, we have a gloomy and bewildered prospect of 
 a defensive one, unless we should receive a powerful aid 
 of ships, land troops, and money, from our generous 
 allies, and these arc at present too contingent to build 
 upon. . . . Chimney-corner patriots abound ; venality, 
 corruption, prostitution of office for selfish ends, abuse 
 of trust, perversion of funds from a national to a private 
 use, and speculations upon the necessities of the times, 
 pervade all interests. ... In fact, every battle and 
 every campaign is affected by these elements, and the 
 diffusion of political responsibility still makes the United 
 States only a loose partnership of scattered and loosely 
 related partners." 
 
 At this date, May first, the British troops in Virginia 
 consisted of Arnold s command of fifteen hundred and 
 fifty-three men, and that of Phillips, of twenty-one hun 
 dred and sixty-three men. On the twentieth of May, 
 including the forces of Cornwallis, the entire British 
 force in Virginia did not exceed five thousand effective 
 troops. Arnold, Phillips, and Simcoe made numerous 
 excursions, destroying property, burning buildings, and 
 leaving marks of desolation upon Williamsburg, Peters 
 burg, Osborne, Hanover Court-House, Chesterfield Court- 
 House, and elsewhere. 
 
 Lafayette s command was almost ubiquitous, harass 
 ing the enemy at every point, so that they could hardly 
 make an expedition without being compelled to abandon 
 
330 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 portions of the property plundered, and return to their 
 fortified positions with the loss of some men and horses, 
 every time. So soon as Lafayette learned that Cornwallis 
 proposed to move northward from Wilmington to Virginia, 
 and unite his command with those of Phillips and Arnold, 
 he made an effort to reach Halifax Court-House, and cut 
 him off; but the shorter route enabled Phillips to defeat 
 Lafayette s movement. 
 
 On the eighth of May, he wrote to Washington : " There 
 is no fighting here, unless you have naval superiority ; 
 or, an army mounted on race-horses. Phillips" plan 
 against Richmond has been defeated. He was going to 
 Portsmouth. Now, it appears that I have business with 
 two armies, and this is rather too much. Each is more 
 than double, superior to me. We have no boats, few 
 militia, and no arms. I will try and do for the best. 
 Xothing can attract my sight from the supplies and reen- 
 forcements destined to General Greene s army. I have 
 forbidden every department to give me anything that may 
 be thought useful to General Greene. When General 
 Greene becomes equal to offensive operations, this quarter 
 will be relieved. I have written to General Wayne [who 
 had been ordered to report to Lafayette, with the Penn 
 sylvania line, ordered south by Congress, on account 
 of their mutiny] to hasten his march ; but unless I am 
 hard pressed, I shall request him to go southward." 
 Washington thus replied to this letter : " Your determi 
 nation to avoid an engagement, with your present force, 
 is certainly judicious. General Wayne has been pressed 
 both by Congress and the Board of War, to make as 
 much expedition as possible." 
 
 On the eighteenth of May, pursuant to orders of Gen 
 eral Greene, assigning him to sole command in Virginia, 
 and instructing him to report only to Washington, Lafay 
 ette established his headquarters between the Pamunkey 
 
ARNOLD IN THE BRITISH ARMY. 331 
 
 and Chickahorniny rivers, equally covering Richmond and 
 other important points in the State ; and sent General 
 Nelson with militia towards Petersburg. On the twenty- 
 sixth of May, Cornwallis received reinforcements under 
 General Leslie, and notified General Clinton of his 
 own intention to "dislodge Lafayette from Richmond. 
 General Clinton s letter of the twentieth had contained 
 the following postscript : " Pray send Brigadier-General 
 Arnold h ere, by the first opportunity, if you should not 
 have particular occasion for his services." Cornwallis 
 replied : " I. have consented to the request of General 
 Arnold to go to Xew York ; he conceived that your Ex 
 cellency wished him to attend you, and his present indis 
 position renders him unequal to the fatigue of service." 
 
 In view of the great effort on the part of Washing 
 ton to arrest Arnold, it is well to consider some inci 
 dents that disclose Arnold s true position in the British 
 army. In none of his expeditions in Virginia did he face 
 Continental troops. He attempted to open a corre 
 spondence with Lafayette, and threatened to send any 
 prisoners he might capture, to the West Indies ; but La 
 fayette never acknowledged a communication, simplv 
 forwarding them to Washington. Among papers of 
 General Phillips which came to light upon his decease, 
 was a letter from Clinton showing that Phillips assign 
 ment to duty, on the eleventh of April, was "for the 
 security of Arnold and the troops under his command, 
 and for no other purpose." The reader, familiar with the 
 Burgoyne campaign, will remember the brilliant and 
 explosive burst of Arnold into the British lines, near 
 Bemis Heights. General Phillips, then serving under 
 Burgoyne, was one of the severest sufferers by that 
 assault ; and the relations of the two officers, in Virginia, 
 were of the most constrained character. Upon the death 
 of Phillips an attempt was made on the part of Arnold to 
 
332 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 conceal the knowledge of that fact ; and some direct cor 
 respondence of Arnold with London officials had dis 
 turbed Clinton, so that he desired to have him under his 
 immediate control. The departure of Arnold from Vir 
 ginia resolved the Virginia campaign into a series of 
 spirited marches, counter-marches, skirmishes and sharp 
 encounters, which ultimately drove Cornwallis behind the 
 intrenchments at Yorktown ; and there he was securely 
 inclosed, until all things could be prepared for the pres 
 ence of the American Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 On the thirty-first of May, Washington wrote to La 
 fayette, and thus closed his letter: "Your conduct upon 
 every occasion meets my approbation, but in none more 
 than in your refusing to hold a correspondence with 
 Arnold." 
 
CHAPTER XXXIII. 
 
 NEW YORK AND YORKTOWN THREATENED. CORNWALLLS 
 
 INCLOSED BY LAFAYETTE. 
 
 ON the twenty-first day of May, 1781, which proved 
 to have been that of the arrival of Cornwallis at 
 Yorktown, Washington held a conference with Count de 
 Rochambeau and General Chastellux at Wethersfield, 
 Conn., as to the details of the approaching summer 
 campaign. As one result of this interview, Count de 
 Rochambeau requested Count de Grasse, then in the 
 West Indies, to cooperate for a while with Count de 
 Barras, and close the port of New York. The French 
 fleet could not be very well spared from the West India 
 Station, for the reason that while cooperating with the 
 Americans, and on a foreign coast, it had neither accessi 
 ble docks nor other means of refitting and supply, in case 
 of disaster. Pending the disposition of this matter, the 
 immediate junction of the two armies was definitely 
 settled. 
 
 The American army, with an effective force of a little 
 less than forty-six hundred men, was ordered to Peekskill- 
 on-the-Hudson. The Count de Rochambeau, with the 
 Duke de Lauzun, marched from Newport and took post at 
 Ridgebury, Conn., near Salem, on the road to Danbury, 
 fifteen miles back from Long Island Sound. 
 
 Two British posts, just out of New York, one at 
 Morrisania, where Delancey s Rangers had a station, and 
 from which constant incursions were made into Winches- 
 
 333 
 
334 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 ter county ; and the other at the north end of Manhattan 
 Island, not far from Fort Washington, were designated 
 as the first objects of assault. Clinton had sent a con 
 siderable foraging force into New Jersey, and it was sup 
 posed likely that he might regard the posts named as 
 not in danger of attack, or leave them lightly garri 
 soned. Sheldon s Dragoons and a division under the 
 Duke de Lauzun were to attempt the first of the expedi 
 tions, and General Lincoln was intrusted with the other. 
 Washington advised Governor Clinton of his plan, so 
 that he might concentrate the New York militia at the 
 proper moment ; and signal guns,~as well as beacon-fires, 
 had been arranged to <nve notice of success. 
 
 O O 
 
 General Lincoln left Peekskill with eight hundred men, 
 on the morning of the first of June, proceeded to Teller s 
 Point ; there took boats, and with muffled oars rowed 
 down Tappan Bay by night, hugging the eastern shore. 
 On the morning of the second, he reached Dobb s Ferry, 
 without being discovered by the enemy. At three 
 o clock, on the morning of the second, Washington 
 started, without baggage, and leaving all tents standing : 
 passed through Tarrytown, reaching Valentine s Hill, four 
 miles above King s Bridge, by sunrise of the third, where he 
 gained a good position for the support of either expedition. 
 
 When General Lincoln crossed the Hudson, at Fort 
 Lee, he at once noticed that the British expedition into 
 New Jersey had returned and reoccupied the post near 
 Fort Washington ; and that a British man-of-war had 
 anchored in the stream, near the shore just below that 
 fort. A surprise of Fort Washington became impossible. 
 He had, however, before leaving Peekskill, been supplied 
 with alternate instructions, anticipating this very emer 
 gency. It had been Washington s real purpose, now that 
 the French army was immediately within his control, to 
 draw Clinton, if possible, into a general engagement ; 
 
NEW YORK AND YORKTOWN THREATENED. 335 
 
 and the entire French force awaited his signal for the 
 movement. So soon as Lincoln discovered the British 
 camp, he recrossed the Hudson and landed his troops just 
 above Spuyten Duyvil Creek, near old Fort Independence ; 
 and then moved to high ground near King s Bridge, so 
 as to act in concert with the Duke de Lauzun and cut off 
 any detachment which might attempt to cross the Harlem 
 to support Delancey. Meanwhile the Duke de Lauzun 
 had only reached East Chester, after a hot march over- 
 very rough country, and was several hours later than the 
 hour designated for the assault. The troops of Lincoln 
 were discovered by a large foraging force of fourteen hun 
 dred men which was sweeping over the country from right 
 to left, in search of cattle and other supplies, and a sharp 
 skirmish ensued. The Duke de Lauzun, hearing the fir 
 ing, pressed forward with forced step to join in the action. 
 Washington also moved rapidly to the front, and at his 
 appearance the British fell back rapidly to New York. 
 During the afternoon, after carefully reconnoitering the 
 position, Washington also retired to Valentine s Hill, and 
 then to Dobb s Ferry, as if entirely withdrawing his troops ; 
 but, on the sixth, he was joined by Rochanibeau, and on 
 the seventh, the American camp was fully established. 
 Its right rested on the Hudson, covered by earthworks, 
 and its left crossed Saw Mill River. (See Map, " Hudson 
 River Highlands.") The French army occupied the hills 
 still farther eastward, as far as the river Bronx. 
 
 Washington at once made an effort to force General 
 Clinton to fight for the possession of New York. Pickets 
 were ostentatiously posted. Letters, designed to fall 
 into Clinton s hands, were written, and as early as the 
 sixth, Clinton captured some of these " confidential " 
 papers and enclosed them to Lord Cornwallis, saying : "I 
 am threatened with a siege. Send me two thousand 
 troops ; the sooner they come, the better." 
 
336 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER,. 
 
 The agitation in New York is described by contempo 
 rary writers as " most intense and universal." It was kept 
 under all possible control ; but the coast-guards were 
 doubled, so that no stray boats might pass unchallenged, 
 by night or day, and mounted couriers constantly passed 
 and repassed, to furnish the speediest possible information 
 at British headquarters of any hostile advance. The 
 report published in slips, that ^ brick ovens were to be 
 erected in New Jersey, opposite } Staten Island, to supply 
 bread rations, daily, for thirty thousand men," was 
 encouraged by Washington, and was accepted as true by 
 the country near by, and generally at the north, New 
 Jersey included. 
 
 ; When the carnps were fully established, and guns 
 were disposed for their best effect, Washington, accom 
 panied by Count de Rochambeau and Generals de Boville 
 and Du Portail, crossed to Jersey Heights, and with a 
 small escort of one hundred and fifty Jersey troops, 
 examined all the New York outposts, as far down as the 
 ocean. Neither was this a mere sham hollow in sub 
 stance. The projected attack upon New York was a 
 deliberate alternative ; to compel Clinton to withhold ree n- 
 forcements from the Southern army so that Cornwallis 
 could be overpowered and captured ; or, if he ventured 
 to aid that officer^,; )he , must lose New York. 
 
 This reconnoissance in New Jersey was known to Sir 
 Henry Clinton, and he might have been very thankful to 
 General Washington for information that some of " his 
 [Clinton s] stores were inadequately guarded " ; that " at 
 some posts the small garrisons were doing no watchful 
 guard duty > ; and that there was " no serious difficulty 
 whatever in seizing or destroying all the stores on Staten 
 Island, without material loss or risk." 
 i , A second reconnoissance of the entire British front, 
 from King s Bridge down the Hudson, and along Hell 
 
NEW YORK AND YORKTOWN THREATENED. 337 
 
 Gate channel, occurred on the evening of July 21st. This 
 .was no feeble "feeling of the enemy." Five thousand 
 choice troops took part in the investigation of the British 
 position. General Chastellux commanded one division, 
 and General Lincoln commanded the second. As early 
 as the eighth of the month, Sir Henry Clinton wrote to 
 Lord Cornwallis, as follows : " As your lordship is now 
 so near, it will be unnecessary for you to send your de 
 spatches to the minister ; you will therefore be so good as 
 to send them to me in the future." 
 
 It is a fact that Cornwallis was encouraged by the 
 British War ^ffice and the Ministry to write directly 
 to those departments. He stood high in esteem ; and, 
 as will appear under his name in the Index, was subse 
 quently honored, although captured at Yorktown. The 
 letter of the eighth, thus referred to, was followed by 
 letters on the eleventh, thirteenth, and nineteenth of 
 June, with similar appeals for reinforcements ; and these 
 appeals were forwarded by special couriers or fast frigates. 
 Then came the allied parade of the twenty-second. The 
 troops reached King s Bridge at daybreak. Lauzun s 
 lancers in their brilliant uniform, and Sheldon s Light 
 Corps, scoured the vicinity of Morrisania, and the dra 
 goons went as far as Throgg s Neck. The royalist 
 refugees fled to islands, vessels, and the woods. This 
 demonstration lasted during the twenty-second and 
 twenty-third of June. Then Washington and Rocharn- 
 beau, escorted by French dragoons, examined all advance 
 posts, passing directly within range of fire from both 
 vessels and picket posts. There was no pretence of 
 secrecy in this inquisitive inquiry as to the British strength 
 and British positions. It was a bold, deliberate challenge 
 of the garrison to retire if they so desired, or to fight if 
 they preferred battle. On the twenty -third, the troops 
 resumed their places in the quiet camp. 
 
338 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 On the twenty-sixth, Clinton called upon Cornwallis 
 for "three more regiments," to be sent from Carolina, 
 writing : " I shall probably want them, as well as the 
 troops you may be able to send me from the Chesapeake, 
 for such offensive and defensive operations as may offer 
 in this quarter." Cornwallis had previously offered to 
 send two of the Hessian regiments, then in South Caro 
 lina, "as they could be spared in the hot summer 
 months," and Clinton begged him to " renew that offer." 
 
 A brief glance at the Southern Department is necessary 
 in order fully to measure the designs of the American 
 Commander-in-Chicf, which, on the surface, seemed to be 
 local in their purpose. The army of Cornwallis, with re- 
 enforcements, numbered about seven thousand effective 
 troops when he entered upon his active campaign against 
 Lafayette. It will be remembered that Cornwallis had 
 promised Clinton to drive Lafayette from Richmond. 
 When Lafayette saw that by attempting to hold Rich 
 mond he would risk a general action, with the possible 
 loss of Virginia and consequent ruin to Greene s army at 
 the South, he permitted that city to abide the fate of war, 
 and marched northward to the upper Rappahannock ; to 
 effect an union with the forces of Wayne, approaching 
 from the north. He decided to avoid further contest 
 with Cornwallis, unless on terms of his own dictation. 
 
 The Assembly of Virginia, quickened to new energy, 
 retired to Charlottesville May 24th. But they authorized 
 the " issue of fifteen millions of bills," and also the decla 
 ration of martial law within twenty miles of any army 
 headquarters. That brought Richmond within the mili 
 tary control of Lafayette. The Burgoyne prisoners 
 were t also removed from Charlottesville, over the moun 
 tains, to Winchester. The details of the pursuit of La 
 fayette by Cornwallis, day by day, are full of thrilling 
 interest, but beyond the province of this narrative. 
 
<f \ 
 
 ioiTY I 
 
NEW YORK AND YORKTOWN THREATENED. 339 
 
 On the twenty-eighth of May, Lafayette wrote as 
 follows to Washington : " The enemy have been so kind 
 as to retire before us. Twice, I gave them a chance of 
 fighting, taking good care not to engage them farther than 
 I pleased, but they continued their retrograde motions. 
 Our numbers are, I think, exaggerated to them, and our 
 seeming boldness confirms the opinion. T thought, at 
 first, Lord Cornwallis wanted to get me as low down as 
 possible, and use his cavalry to advantage. His lordship 
 had, exclusive of the reinforcements from Portsmouth, 
 (said to be six hundred) four thousand men ; eight hundred 
 of whom were dragoons, or mounted infantry. Our force 
 is about his ; but only one thousand five hundred regulars, 
 and fifty dragoons. One little action more particularly 
 marks the retreat of the enemy. From the place where 
 he first began to retire to Williamsburg, is upwards of one 
 hundred miles. The old arms at the Point of the Fork 
 have been taken out of the water. The cannon was thrown 
 into the river undamaged, when they marched back to Rich 
 mond ; so that his lordship did us no harm of consequence, 
 but lost an immense part of his former conquests, and did 
 not make any in the State. General Greene only de 
 manded of me to hold niy ground, in Virginia. I don t 
 know but what we shall, in our turn, become the pursu 
 ing enemy." 
 
 On the very next day, after this letter was despatched 
 to the American Commander-in-Chief, May twenty-ninth, 
 Cornwallis did, in fact, abandon pursuit. Tarleton, who 
 rever lost opportunity to express his appreciation of the 
 tact, skill, and " invariable wisdom of Lafayette s move 
 ments," states, that "an American patrol was captured; 
 and among letters of Lafayette to Greene, Steuben, and 
 others, was one to Governor Jefferson, urging him to 
 rally militia during his absence, and using this prophetic 
 expression : r The British success in Virginia resembles 
 
340 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 the French invasion of Hanover, and is likely to have 
 similar consequences, if the governor and the country 
 would exert themselves, at the present juncture. " 
 
 When Cornwallis halted and moved back towards his 
 base, Tarleton was detached with two hundred and 
 fifty troopers, mounted on the picked stock of the best 
 private stables, taken at will, and attempted to capture 
 Governor Jefferson at Monticello. His report says: "I 
 imagined that a march of seventy miles in twenty-four 
 hours, with the caution used, might perhaps give the 
 advantage of a surprise." Tarleton charged through the 
 Riviana River, captured seven members of the Legislat 
 ure and Brigadier-General Scott, and destroyed one 
 thousand arms and four hundred barrels of powder ; but 
 the Governor escaped, and the Assembly immediately 
 convened at Staunton, beyond Tarleton s reach. Then 
 he started down the Riviana to join Simcoe in an attack 
 upon Steuben s depot of supplies at Elk Island. But 
 Wayne joined Lafayette, and Lafayette proceeded south 
 ward. They soon started in pursuit of the retiring 
 column of Cornwallis. The pursued had indeed be 
 come the pursuers. Tarleton thus writes : "The Marquis 
 Lafayette, who had previously practised defensive meas 
 ures with skill and security, being now reenforced by 
 Wayne and about eight hundred continentals and some 
 militia, followed the British as they proceeded down 
 James River. This design, being judiciously arranged 
 and executed with extreme caution, allowed opportunity 
 for the junction of Baron Steuben ; confined the small 
 detachments of the King s troops ; and both saved the 
 property and animated the drooping spirits of the Vir 
 ginians." On the thirteenth, Tarleton reported his own 
 movements and the waste he had accomplished. 
 
 The scouts of Lafayette intercepted the letter, and he 
 published it to the people before Cornwallis himself had 
 
NEW YORK AND YORKTOWN THREATENED. 341 
 
 knowledge of its contents. Cornwallis returned to his 
 headquarters, to find despatches fifteen days old awaiting 
 his attention. One contained this extraordinary informa 
 tion : " The Continentals under Lafayette cannot exceed 
 one thousand ; and the Pennsylvania Line, under Wayne, 
 are so discontented, that their officers are afraid to trust 
 them with ammunition. Postscript. - - This may have, 
 however, since altered. 
 
 On the very day of the receipt of this despatch, Tarleton 
 and Simcoe were actually compelled to cover the picket 
 lines of Cornwallis with their full force, to prevent La 
 fayette s Continentals and the Pennsylvania Line from 
 capturing the supply trains of his command. Cornwallis 
 started for Portsmouth on the fourth. A sharp action at 
 Williamsburg, in which Wayne made a brilliant bayonet 
 charge, and in which Lafayette, having lost a horse, 
 gallantly fought the battle on foot, resulted in a loss of 
 one hundred and eighteen Americans and seventy-five 
 British troops. From Portsmouth, Cornwallis took 
 boats for Yorktown, on the first of August ; and on the 
 sixth, Tarleton says : " I threw my horses into deep 
 water, near shore, and landed without loss," joining 
 Cornwallis on the tenth. Gloucester, opposite York- 
 town, was occupied and fortified. Constant skirmishes 
 occurred between Tarleton and Sirncoe, of its garrison, 
 and the detachments which Lafayette kept active in the 
 vicinity. 
 
 On the eighth, Lafayette wrote to Washington as fol 
 lows : " We shall act agreeably to circumstances ; but 
 avoid drawing ourselves into a false movement, which, 
 if cavalry had command of the river, would give the 
 enemy the advantage of us. His lordship plays so well, 
 that no blunder can be hoped from him, to recover a bad 
 step of ours. Should a fleet come in at this moment, 
 our affairs would take a very happy turn." On the 
 
342 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 thirteenth, Lafayette established his headquarters in 
 the forks of the Pamunkey and the Mattaponey. On 
 the twenty-third, he wrote, in part : " In the present 
 state of affairs, my dear general, I hope you will come 
 yourself to Virginia. Lord Cornwallis must be attacked 
 with pretty good apparatus ; but when a French fleet 
 takes possession of the Bay, and we form a land force 
 superior to his, that army must sooner or later be forced 
 to surrender, as we may then get what reinforcements we 
 please. I heartily thank you for having ordered me to 
 Virginia. It is to your goodness that I am indebted for 
 the most beautiful prospect which I may ever be able to 
 behold." 
 
 On the thirtieth, Count de Grasse arrived in the Ches 
 apeake with twenty-six sail-of-the-line, besides frigates 
 and transports. On the third of September, Count de St. 
 Simon landed with three thousand two hundred French 
 troops, and was joined by Lafayette at Green Spring- 
 on the same day. On the fifth, the allies occupied Will- 
 iamsburg, about fifteen miles from Yorktown. The 
 Count de Grasse had a limited period for operations on 
 the American coast, and united with the Count de St. 
 Simon to urge an immediate attack upon Yorktown, 
 before its defences could be completed, waiving seniority 
 of rank, and agreeing to serve under Lafayette. 
 
 Lafayette thus wrote to Washington : " I am not so 
 hasty as the Count de Grasse, and think that having so 
 sure a game to play, it would be madness, by the risk of 
 an attack, to give anything to chance. Unless matters 
 are very different from what I think they are, niy opinion 
 is, that we ought to be contented with preventing the 
 enemy s forages, with militia ; without committing our 
 regulars. Whatever readiness the Marquis de St. Simon 
 has been pleased to express to Colonel Girnat respecting 
 his being under me, I shall do nothing without paying 
 
CORNWALLIS INCLOSED BY LAFAYETTE. 343 
 
 that deference which is due to age, talents, and experi 
 ence ; but would rather incline to the cautious line of 
 conduct I have of late adopted. I hope you will find we 
 have taken the best precautions to prevent his lordship s 
 escape. I hardly believe he will make the attempt. If 
 he does, he must give up ships, artillery, baggage, part 
 of the horses, all the negroes ; must be certain to lose one- 
 third of his army, and run the greatest risk of losing the 
 whole, without gaining that glory which he may derive 
 from a brilliant defence." On the eighth, Lafayette 
 wrote : " If you knew how slowly things go on in this 
 country ! The governor does what he can ; the wheels of 
 government are so rusty, that no governor whatever will 
 be able to set them free again. Time will prove that 
 Governor Jefferson has been too severely charged. 
 We will try, if not dangerous, on so large a scale, to form 
 a good idea of the works ; but unless I am greatly 
 deceived, there will be madness in attacking them now, 
 with our force. Marquis de St. Simon, Count de Grasse 
 and General Du Portail agree with me in opinion ; but 
 should Lord Cornwallis come out against such a position 
 as we have, everybody thinks he cannot but repent of it ; 
 and should he beat us, he must soon prepare for another 
 battle." 
 
 The time had arrived for the presence of the American 
 Conimander-in-Chief. 
 
CHAPTER XXXIV. 
 
 BRITISH CAPTAINS OUTGENERALED. WASHINGTON JOINS 
 
 LAFAYETTE. 
 
 ~T~r~rASHINGTON was in his tent, where only the 
 W quiet of a few hours at a time interposed their 
 opportunity for other than field duty. At one of those 
 intervals he was compelled to make assignments of the 
 American army for associated operations with his French 
 allies. He had just been advised that three thousand 
 Hessian auxiliaries had reenforced the British garrison 
 of New York. Appeals to the various State authorities 
 had failed to realize appreciable additions to his fighting 
 force. 
 
 It was an hour of opportunity for America. Fail 
 ure to meet French support with a fair correspondence 
 in military force, would compromise his country before 
 the world. Amid such reflections, which were the basis 
 of a fresh public appeal, he was rallied to action by the 
 entrance of a special messenger from Newport, Rhode 
 Island. The frigate Concorde had arrived from the West 
 
 o 
 
 Indies, and the following despatch was placed in hi,s 
 hands : " Count de Grasse will leave San Domingo on the 
 third of August, direct for Chesapeake Bay." 
 
 With imperturbable calmness, Washington folded the 
 despatch, and then consulted with the Count de Ro- 
 chambeau alone, as to the best disposition to be made 
 of the squadron of Admiral de Barras, still at New 
 port. That officer, although the senior of the Count de 
 
 344 
 
BRITISH CAPTAINS OUTGENERALED. 345 
 
 Grasse, promptly expressed hi& readiness to waive pre 
 cedence and serve as best advised by the American Com- 
 niander-in-Chief. He had indeed but seven ships-of-the- 
 line disposable and ready for sea ; but this force was 
 deemed a sufficient convoy for the transports which were 
 to carry heavy artillery and ammunition, for siege pur 
 poses before Yorktown. This courtesy of the French 
 admiral had its important sequel, in changing what would 
 have been a superior British naval force in those waters 
 to a determining superiority on the part of France, at the 
 most critical moment of that final campaign in behalf of 
 American Independence. Every officer of Washington s 
 staff received instant instructions. They were only ad 
 vised, very reservedly, that supplies of heavy artillery 
 would be forwarded to General Lafayette, for his use ; 
 but it began to be realized that with French troops suffi 
 cient to complete the environment of Yorktown, and a 
 French fleet competent to destroy the coast defences, the 
 capitulation of Cornwallis could be enforced. 
 
 Letters were immediately sent by trusty messengers 
 to every Northern governor, to hasten forward their Con 
 tinental quotas yet in arrears, and to rally their militia in 
 force, for the "capture of New York." Confidential agents 
 were also despatched to General Lafayette and the Count 
 de Grasse, with the joint instructions of Washington 
 and Rochambeau, sufficiently embodying an intimation of 
 plans held in reserve ; but explicitly warning them not to 
 permit Cornwallis to escape, nor to receive reinforcements 
 by sea from New York. Other letters were written to 
 the authorities of New Jersey and Philadelphia, quite 
 minutely denning a plan for the seizure of Staten Island, 
 under cover of a French naval force ; while the principal 
 allied armies were expected to force the upper defences 
 of New York by irresistible assault. Some of these de 
 spatches, carefully duplicated, with enclosed plans, as once 
 
346 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 before, were put into the hands of other messengers, 
 designedly for interception by Clinton. Heavy batteaux 
 on wheels, hauled by oxen, made ostentatious movement, 
 together with wagon-loads of supplies, to the seashore 
 opposite Staten Island. General Heath was placed in 
 command of a large camp near Springfield, New Jersey, 
 for assembling and drilling a lar^e force of militia. 
 
 O O O 
 
 Other small camps of Pennsylvania and New Jersey 
 militia, easily distinguishable by the spies of General 
 Clinton, dotted the country. The militia of Connecticut 
 and New York also hastened to participate in the long- 
 hoped-for emancipation of New York from British con 
 trol. 
 
 As late as the nineteenth, in order to give General 
 Clinton fair notice that he might expect no unnecessary 
 or protracted delay in the attack already ripe for execu 
 tion, all roads leading to King s Bridge were cleared of 
 obstructions. Fallen trees and scattered branches were 
 removed so as to expedite a swift assault upon the Brit 
 ish advanced outposts. All these were heaped up and 
 burned at night, as a reminder of the impending crisis. 
 Everything worked admirably as planned, and still, as on 
 the fourth of March, 177G, before Boston, the American 
 Commander-in-Chief kept to himself his secret purpose. 
 
 Afterwards, he thus explained his action : " That much 
 trouble was taken, and finesse used, to misguide and be 
 wilder Sir Henry Clinton, in regard to the real object, by 
 fictitious communications as well as by making a decep 
 tive provision of ovens, forage, and boats, in his neigh 
 borhood, is certain. JSTor, was less pains taken to deceive 
 our own army ; for, I had always conceived, when the im 
 position does not completely take place at home, it would 
 never sufficiently succeed abroad." 
 
 During the nineteenth, while the obstructions were 
 being thus removed from the roads leading into New 
 
BRITISH CAPTAINS OUTGENERALED. 347 
 
 York, Colonel Hazen crossed the Hudson ut Dobb s 
 Ferry and demonstrated for an advance upon Staten 
 Island, from the Jersey shore, immediately opposite. 
 On the twenty-first, a detachment selected by Washington 
 himself crossed the Hudson at King s Ferry, near Haver- 
 straw. The French army followed, and the armies were 
 united on the twenty-fifth. During this brief delay, 
 Rochambeau accompanied Washington to a final inspec 
 tion of West Point ; and the headquarters of the Amer 
 ican army at New Windsor, between that post and; 
 Newburg, were formally abandoned. 
 
 The combined armies of America and France no longer 
 threatened New York ; but they had not been missed by 
 Clinton. The American forces moved rapidly toward 
 Springfield, on the Rahway, as if to strike Staten Island. 
 The great baggage-train and the same batteaux demon 
 strated toward Staten Island. But the French army 
 marched for Whippany, in the direction of Trenton. 
 Washington and his suite reached Philadelphia about 
 noon, August thirtieth. Still they had not been, missed 
 by Clinton. 
 
 But now, for the first time, the American army real 
 ized that it was destined southward, and that a trium 
 phant entry into New York City was not to be the crown 
 ing reward for service so faithfully done. Dissatisfaction 
 was openly and bluntly expressed. Even officers, long 
 in arrears of pay, equally with the rank and file, bitterly 
 complained. Rochambeau, quickly alive to the situation, 
 promptly advanced twenty thousand dollars in gold for 
 the men, upon the simple pledge of Robert Morris, of 
 Philadelphia, that it should be refunded by the first of 
 October. 
 
 Suddenly, Colonel Laurens, just from France, having 
 landed at Boston on the twenty-fifth, only five days be 
 fore, appeared at Washington s quarters with report of 
 
348 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 the result of his mission to the French king. His ship 
 brought clothing, ammunition, and half a million of 
 dollars, as the first instalment of six million of livres 
 ($1,111,111) generously furnished by Louis XVI., with 
 the pledge of additional sums to follow. This welcome 
 visitor further announced to the calmly attentive Ameri 
 can Commander-in-Chief this message : rr Dr. Franklin 
 advised me that he had secured a loan of four million 
 of livres ($740,740) to cover American drafts made 
 before I could arrive in America ; and Count de Ver- 
 gennes agreed to guarantee a loan in Holland, for ten 
 million livres ($1,851,851)." 
 
 If the heavens had opened and reverberating thunder 
 had distinctly articulated : " American Independence is 
 achieved ! " the assurance of a Divine interposition would 
 hardly have appeared more emphatic to the waiting faith 
 of Washington, or have more thrillingly encouraged the 
 weary but obedient soldiers of his command. 
 
 And still this American army, thus refreshed in spirit 
 and joyous in the hope of speedy and final victory, had 
 not been missed from JVeiv York by General, Sir Henry 
 Clinton. Another fast-sailing frigate was speeding 
 through the Narrows, past Sandy Hook, southward, once 
 more to appeal to Lord Cornwallis to come to the rescue 
 of imperiled, beleaguered New York. 
 
 On the second day of September, the American army 
 made its third formal entry into Philadelphia, amid glad 
 acclaims of welcome, and sharing with the people in the 
 spirit of one great jubilee. At that very hour, another 
 courier vessel, in chase of the former, left New York with 
 a message for Cornwallis, which failed to reach him until 
 the fifteenth. It was in cipher, and read as follows : 
 
 NEW YORK, Sept. 2, 1781. 
 
 Mr. Washington is moving an army to the southward, with an 
 appearance of haste ; and gives out that he expects the cooperation 
 
BRITISH CAPTAINS OUTGENERALED. 349 
 
 of a considerable French armament. Your Lordship, however, may 
 be assured that if this should be the case, I shall endeavor to ree n- 
 force your command by all means within the compass of my power; 
 or, make every possible diversion in your favor. 
 
 P.S. Washington, it is said, was at Trenton, this day, and 
 means to go in vessels to Christiana Creek, and from thence by Head 
 of Elk, down Chesapeake Bay also. . . . Washington has about 
 four thousand French, and two thousand Continentals, with him. 
 
 On the following day, the French army, having taken a 
 day for cleaning arms, uniforms, and accoutrements, made 
 a dress parade through the American capital. Every gor 
 geous trapping of their brilliant, sentimental outfit was 
 proudly displayed before the wondering and delighted 
 populace. Contemporary writers could not sufficiently 
 describe the " magnificence of the parade, and the convul 
 sions of joy that animated the entire population." And 
 yet, one eminent French officer, in describing the march 
 of the American army on the previous day, said : " The 
 plainly dressed American army lost no credit in the 
 steadiness of their march and their fitness for battle." 
 
 On the same day, Washington received despatches from 
 Lafayette. One, dated August 21st, reported that "the 
 British troops were fortifying Gloucester, across the river 
 from Yorktown." Others were as follows : " A small 
 garrison remains at Portsmouth"; "I have written to 
 the Governor, to collect six hundred militia upon Black- 
 water"; "I have written to General Gregory, near 
 Portsmouth, that I am advised that the enemy intend to 
 push a detachment into Carolina ; to General Wayne, to 
 move to the southward and to have a column ready 
 to cross the James at Westover ; and that my own army 
 will soon assemble again upon the waters of the Chick- 
 ahominy." Reference has already been made to Wash 
 ington s receipt of Lafayette s letter of August 8th, an 
 nouncing the occupation of Yorktown by Cornwallis. 
 
 Washington made no delay, but on the fifth of Septem- 
 
350 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 ber started for the "Head of the Elk." He had but just 
 passed Chester, when he met a courier from Lafayette, with 
 announcement of the arrival of the Count de Grasse. Rid 
 ing back to Chester, Washington advised Rochambeau of 
 the welcome tidings, and then pushed forward, arriving 
 at the Head of Elk the next morning. 
 
 The previous day had been one of peculiar excitement 
 in the city of Philadelphia. A formal review and rigid 
 inspection of the entire French army took place, and the 
 President of the American Congress received the honors 
 of the occasion. During the evening, the French officers 
 gave a grand banquet in honor of Chevalier Lauzun. 
 The despatch to Washington was read amid cheers. A halt 
 hour later, a second despatch, announcing "the landing of 
 Count de Simon and his junction with Lafayette," was 
 read ; and read a second time, "all standing" in its honor. 
 
 On this memorable date, September 6th, other events 
 of interest are to be noticed. It was Lafayette s twenty- 
 fourth birthday. In a letter to his wife, still preserved 
 by the family, he poured forth from an overflowing soul, 
 his " love for his great Captain " ; " for the American 
 cause " ; appreciation of his " enviable lot, as victory is 
 drawing nigh," and his "longing to tell her, face to face, 
 of thrilling adventures, which had never been interrupted 
 by night or day." 
 
 September 6th, also, Clinton wrote to Cornwallis : 
 
 As I find by your letters, that Count de Grasse has got into the 
 Chesapeake, and I have no doubt that Washington is moving with at 
 least six thousand French and rebel troops against you, I think the 
 best way to relieve you, is, to join you, as soon as possible, with all 
 the force that can be spared from here, which is about four thousand 
 men. They are already embarked, and will proceed, the instant I 
 receive information from the admiral that we may venture ; or that 
 from other intelligence, the commodore and I should judge sufficient 
 to move upon. By accounts from Europe we have every reason to 
 expect Admiral Bigby hourly upon the coast. 
 
WASHINGTON JOINS LAFAYETTE. 35] 
 
 On this same sixth of September, Clinton disclosed 
 his last move to check Washington s advance, and take 
 Cornwallis out of check. Arnold, who had been so 
 summarily withdrawn from the South, landed at New 
 London, Connecticut, wantonly destroying houses, stores, 
 a church, the Court House, ships, and whatever he could 
 damage without personal danger to himself; and made 
 forever memorable the cruel massacre of Colonel Led- 
 yard and the garrison of Fort Griswold after their honor 
 able surrender. He no less permanently made memorable 
 their extraordinary defence, in which the British assail 
 ing column lost one hundred and sixty-three officers and 
 men, a number exceeding that of the entire American re 
 sisting force. It was soon over ; and Arnold did not dare 
 delay, and risk his fate with the yeomanry of his native 
 New England. The secret of Clinton s cipher despatch 
 to Cornwallis on the second of August, respecting the 
 use of Arnold, was thus revealed. But the attention of 
 the American Commander-in-Chief was not diverted from 
 his own supreme purpose, whatever Clinton might under 
 take in his absence. 
 
 The allied French and American armies remained at 
 Head of Elk for transportation ; but during that interval, 
 Rochambeau accompanied Washington to Baltimore, 
 where illuminations and civil honors attested the welcome 
 of these distinguished guests. On the ninth, for the first 
 time in six years, the American Commander-in-Chief vis 
 ited his Mount Vernon home. On the tenth, his own 
 staff, together with the Count de Rochambeau and staff, 
 were his guests. On the eleventh, General Chastellux 
 and aides-de-camp joined the party. On the twelfth, the 
 visit came to its close. On the fourteenth of September, 
 Washington reached the headquarters of General, the 
 Marquis de Lafayette, commanding the Department, at 
 William sburg, Virginia. 
 
CHAPTER XXXV. 
 
 MAGNANIMITY. HIS BENEDICTION. 
 
 THE story of the siege of Yorktown and the sur 
 render of Earl Cornwall! s, Lieutenant-General in 
 command, has been so fully detailed by many writers that 
 only a few features of the general conduct of that cam 
 paign, and some special incidents not so frequently 
 noticed, are within the province of this narrative. 
 
 While the control of Chesapeake Bay and of Vir 
 ginia was essential to British success, Sir Henry Clin 
 ton deliberately proposed to couple with that general 
 design another invasion of Pennsylvania, but from the 
 south. When Cornwallis moved northward from his 
 useless position at Wilmington, he was advised by Gen 
 eral Clinton to make a movement upon Philadelphia. 
 General Clinton must have very feebly remembered the 
 circumstances of his hasty departure from that city in 
 1778, or have overlooked Washington s strategic con 
 trol of that entire region. The movement of Lafayette 
 southward, and the energy with which that officer rallied 
 Virginians to his support, were not appreciated by 
 either of the British Generals in time to be of benefit 
 to either. 
 
 Clinton and Cornwallis alike failed to comprehend that 
 when the American Commander-in-Chief parted with La 
 fayette, and afterwards gave him so large a command, he 
 must have had in view some special service which that 
 
 352 
 
THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE. 353 
 
 officer could perform with credit as a significant factor in 
 the entire campaign. Cornwallis knew, however, that 
 unless he could destroy Lafayette s army, the British 
 cause in Virginia would certainly be lost. But the same 
 profound strategy which had inclosed Clinton at New 
 York, isolated Cornwallis at Yorktown. 
 
 Washington was well aware, that neither Louis XVI. 
 nor Rochambeau wholly favored an attack upon New 
 York. Their objections were substantial. Such a move 
 ment involved the presence of enormous naval forces, 
 which once within the harbor, might be easily captured 
 or destroyed, whenever Great Britain could seriously 
 concentrate ships for that purpose. Neither could a 
 French fleet secure supplies of any kind, so long as 
 Clinton controlled the city. It was the natural naval 
 depot of Great Britain for the American coast, and con 
 venient for her West India dependencies. France, ever 
 willing to aid America, must, however, always have her 
 naval base in the West Indies, which wholly depended 
 upon her naval supremacy for immunity from British 
 aggression. Notwithstanding these considerations, the 
 harmony of the French and American alliance was never 
 interrupted, and mutual confidence was invariably en 
 joyed. 
 
 It is never to be overlooked that Washington cared 
 more for his position in New Jersey than for the posses 
 sion of New York. Its occupation without a controlling 
 fleet, would be as fatal as the presence of a fleet without 
 control of the city. 
 
 On the day after his arrival at Lafayette s headquar 
 ters, he requested the Count de Grasse to hasten the 
 transportation of the American troops from Baltimore ; 
 and yet, added a postscript that " Lafayette already 
 anticipated " his request. On the seventeenth, he em 
 barked with Count Rochambeau, General Knox and Gen- 
 
354 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 efal Du Portail upon the frigate Queen Charlotte; and on 
 the eighteenth, visited the Count de Grasse upon his flag 
 ship, the Ville de Paris. The distinguished visitors were 
 received Avith appropriate honors, and at once took under 
 consideration the plan for the most speedy prosecution of 
 the siege. 
 
 During that interview, Washington was advised of 
 an immediately preceding event which must interest 
 the modern reader, at a time when all maritime nations 
 are interested in naval development and ships of great 
 power. Just before his visit, there had been concen 
 trated, about the entrance to Chesapeake Bay, one of 
 the heaviest armaments known to maritime warfare. 
 Fifty-two ships-of-the-line each with three, or even four 
 gun-decks, and ranging from sixty-four to one hundred 
 and twenty guns, besides frigates constituted that im 
 posing battle array. It has already been noticed that 
 Admiral Barras sailed from Newport in convoy of trans 
 ports which carried heavy guns for siege use before York - 
 town. When Lafayette first moved southward, Wash 
 ington supplied his detachment with twelve heavy guns, 
 including two eight-inch mortars, one twenty-four and 
 two eighteen-pounder guns, for use in arming small 
 vessels, or assailing Arnold s .defences. These were diffi 
 cult of transportation, but no less indispensable as a 
 contingent part of his outfit. The wisdom of these 
 provisions had a twofold fruition. A British fleet had 
 been detached from the West India station for the purpose 
 of supplementing the New York and Newport squadrons. 
 Admiral Hood, in command, crossed the mouth of Chesa 
 peake Bay just before the arrival of the Count de Grasse ; 
 looked into Delaware Bay, and reported to Admiral 
 Graves at Sandy Hook on the twenty-fourth day of 
 August. That officer had but five ships-of-the-line ready 
 for sea. Upon receiving advices from Gardiner s Bay that 
 
^v>- 
 
THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE. 355 
 
 Admiral de Barras had actually sailed southward from 
 Newport, he incurred no delay, but on the thirty-first 
 of August sailed, with nineteen ships, in pursuit of the 
 French. On the fifth of September, he passed within 
 the Delaware Capes without having encountered Admiral 
 Barras at sea, and without the slightest intimation that he 
 was soon to be in the presence of a superior naval adver 
 sary. The Count de Grasse, when notified of the appearance 
 of so many large ships, supposed at first that the fleet of 
 Admiral Barras, already due, was at hand. Seventeen 
 hundred of his seamen were on the James River, planting 
 heavy batteries ; but so soon as the British flag revealed 
 the hostile character of the ships, he moved his first 
 division at once, seaward and southward, ordering the 
 second division to follow immediately. By this prompt 
 and judicious manoeuvre he not only left the northern 
 channel open for the admission of De Barras from the 
 north, but secured the weather-gauge of the British fleet ; 
 and this he maintained with equal skill and intrepidity. 
 These great fleets maneuvered for five days without a 
 general action, but with several sharp encounters in 
 which several vessels suffered severely. The French 
 casualties were two hundred and twenty, and the British 
 three hundred and thirty-six. 
 
 During this exchange of hostilities, Admiral Barras 
 safely entered the bay with seven ships-of-the-line and 
 fourteen large transports, bringing heavy guns for the 
 siege. (See map.) The Count de Grasse slowly retired, 
 followed by Admiral Graves ; but when the latter realized 
 that Admiral de Barras had indeed arrived, and that his 
 own fleet was now greatly inferior in force to that of his 
 adversary, he returned promptly to New York. The Count 
 de Grasse at the same time knew that Admiral Digby had 
 arrived at New York from the West Indies with three 
 line-of-battle ships (reported as six). All these partic- 
 
356 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 ulars of the previous week s operations were communi 
 cated to General Washington and his party, on the Ville 
 de Paris. These officers at once started for their re 
 spective camps. Owing to severe and contrary winds, 
 Washington did not reach William sburg until the twenty- 
 second. All at once, a very grave question, and one 
 which threatened to defeat his carefully matured plans, 
 confronted the American Commander-in-Chief. The Count 
 de Grasse outlined his purpose as follows : " To detach 
 two ships for the mouth of James River ; to leave four 
 frigates and several corvettes, in the James ; then, to sail 
 for New York, and either intercept or fight the British 
 fleet, before it could receive further reinforcements from 
 England or the West Indies ; then, to return and act in 
 concert, each on his own side." 
 
 Against this departure from the concerted plans of 
 Washington and Rochambeau, Lafayette protested in 
 vigorous terms. His influence at that time with the 
 French Court was paramount as to American affairs, and 
 Queen Marie Antoinette was even a greater enthusiast in 
 behalf of American liberty than Louis XVI. The instruc 
 tions of the King to Rochambeau, already cited, which 
 made Rochambeau subordinate to Washington in the 
 use of French auxiliary forces, were produced ; and the 
 Count de Grasse gracefully withdrew his suggestion and 
 accepted the judgment of the generals in command of the 
 land forces, as his rule of action respecting his fleet. 
 
 On the twenty-fifth, the remaining troops en route 
 from the north reached Williamsburg, making a total of 
 twelve thousand regular troops, besides more than four 
 thousand militia. On the twenty-eighth, the entire army 
 advanced and took position within two miles of the 
 British works. On the twenty-ninth, after a thorough 
 reconnoissance, the movement began for the complete 
 investment of Yorktown, and all its approaches. From 
 
o Artiticers 
 a Laboratory 
 o Magazine 
 
THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE. 357 
 
 the opening of the first parallel of approach until October 
 seventeenth, the activity of the allied forces, the spirited 
 and generous emulation of Frenchmen and Americans in 
 repulsing sorties, in storming redoubts, in bombardment, 
 or silencing the enemy s guns, was incessant by night 
 and day. 
 
 A careful inspection of the map will disclose the rela 
 tions of the allied forces, and the completeness of the 
 investment. Washington opened the fire in person. 
 The rivalry of the American and French troops became 
 intense. Generals Lincoln, Wayne, Knox, Du Portail, 
 Steuben, Nelson, Weedon, Clinton, St. Clair, Law- 
 son, and Muhlenburg, with Colonels Hamilton, Stevens, 
 Lamb, Carrington, Scammel, and Laurens, were among 
 the American leaders. Generals de Boville, de Viomenil, 
 Chastellux, de Choisy, de Lauzun, de St. Simon, and 
 Colonels de Dumas, de Deux Pont, and Gimat, were as 
 active, on the part of the French. 
 
 The line of redoubts and batteries marked F (French) 
 had been completed, and it was deemed necessary to storm 
 two British redoubts and take them into the parallel. 
 Famous soldiers and corps took part in simultaneous 
 assault, upon rocket signals, at night. Lafayette, with 
 Gimat, Hamilton, Laurens, and Barber, was assigned to 
 the redoubt nearest the river. The Baron de Viomenil with 
 the Count Deux Pont, supported by the grenadiers of Gati- 
 nais, attacked the other. This regiment had been formed 
 out of that of Auvergne, once commanded by Rocham- 
 beau, and long known as the Regiment cV Auvergne, 
 sans tacJie. When drawn up in line, Rochanibeau 
 promised that if they did well, he would ask the King 
 to restore their old name ; and this was afterwards 
 done by Louis XVI. 
 
 Before the signal of attack was given, some light words 
 passed between the Baron de Viomenil and Lafayette as to 
 
358 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 the superiority of the French Grenadiers for these attacks. 
 Lafayette s column succeeded first, and he promptly de 
 spatched Major Barber to the Baron, with a tender of 
 Assistance. Hamilton and Laurens were conspicuous for 
 gallantry, moving over the abatis with unloaded muskets ; 
 and the French officers were equally complimented for 
 daring and disregard of British resistance. 
 
 Clinton, at his New York headquarters, was in the 
 fullest possible possession of the record of events then 
 occurring in and about Yorktown. Space cannot be 
 given, even to a glance over his shoulder, as he reads, 
 day by day, repeated messages and short postscripts 
 from Cornwallis indicating the grave peril of his position, 
 and the conviction that protracted resistance is not to be 
 looked for. An attempt by Cornwallis, to cross the river 
 and gain New York by land, was a failure. On the 
 sixteenth, when he ordered these detachments to return, 
 he closed his correspondence with Clinton in this sad 
 and desperate paragraph : " Our works are going to ruin. 
 The boats are now being returned. We cannot fire a 
 single gun. Only one eight-inch, and a little more than 
 a hundred cohorn shells remain. I therefore propose to 
 capitulate." 
 
 The seventeenth day of October, 1781, dawned, and at 
 10 o clock A.M. two concurrent events occurred, one 
 at New York, and its contrary, in Virginia. Sir Henry 
 Clinton, accompanied by a command of seven thousand 
 choice troops, under convoy of the magnificent squadron 
 of twenty-five battleships, two fifty-gun ships, and eight 
 frigates, sailed past Staten Island, for the rescue of the 
 worn-out garrison of Yorktown. He had previously 
 sailed past Sandy Hook, and the reader will appreciate 
 the involuntary contrast with a similar departure south 
 ward, in the year 1776. 
 
 At the same hour, ten o clock, A.M., a flag of truce 
 
THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE. 359 
 
 bore to the headquarters of the American Commander- 
 in-Chief, the following note : 
 
 YORK, 17th October, 1781. 
 EARL CORNWALLIS To General Washington : 
 
 SIR : I propose a cessation of hostilities for twenty-four hours, and 
 that two officers be appointed by each side, to meet at Moore s house, 
 to settle terms for the surrender of the posts of York and Gloucester. 
 
 I have the honor to be, etc., 
 
 CORNWALLIS. 
 
 The following reply partakes of the dignity, wisdom, 
 and appreciation of existing conditions which have char 
 acterized all letters of Washington previously cited. It 
 reads as follows : 
 
 MY LORD : I have the honor to receive your Lordship s letter of 
 this date. 
 
 An ardent desire to spare the further effusion of blood will readily 
 incline me to such terms for the surrender of your posts of York and 
 Gloucester as are admissible. 
 
 I wish, previously to the meeting of the Commissioners, that your 
 lordship s proposals, in writing, may be sent to the American lines ; 
 for which purpose, a suspension of hostilities during two hours from 
 the delivery of this letter will be granted. 
 
 I have the honor to be, etc., 
 
 GEORGE WASHINGTON. 
 
 At half-past four in the afternoon, the proposals of 
 Cornwallis were received ; but they were so general in their 
 nature, that the Viscount de Noailles and Colonel Laurens, 
 on the part of the allied armies, and Colonel Dundas and 
 Major Ross, of the British army, were charged with pre 
 paring other terms of capitulation, for official signature. 
 These were completed on the eighteenth. On the nine 
 teenth they were signed at Yorktown, by Cornwallis and 
 Thomas Symonds of the Royal Navy, who led the attack 
 upon Fort Sullivan (Moultrie) in 1776; and, "In the 
 
360 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 trenches, before Yorktown, in Virginia," by George 
 Washington and Le Compte de Rochambeau, and by Le 
 Compte de Barras for himself and Le Compte de Grasse. 
 
 At twelve o clock, noon, the two redoubts on the left 
 flank of Yorktown were delivered, one to American in 
 fantry, and the other to French Grenadiers. At one 
 o clock, two works on the Gloucester side of the river 
 were respectively delivered to French and American 
 troops. At two o clock, P.M., the garrison of York 
 marched to the appointed place of surrender in front of 
 the post, with shouldered arms, colors cased, and drums 
 beating a British march ; grounded their arms, and 
 returned to their encampments to await a temporary 
 location in the States of Virginia, Maryland, and Penn 
 sylvania. At three o clock, P.M., the Gloucester garrison 
 also marched forth the cavalry with drawn swords and 
 trumpets sounding, and the infantry as prescribed for the 
 garrison of York. 
 
 The terms of surrender were the same as those ob 
 served when Genera] Lincoln surrendered Charleston to 
 Cornwallis, in 1780; and when General O Hara, on ac 
 count of the illness of General Cornwallis, tendered the 
 sword of that officer to General Washington, as the 
 pledge of surrender, he was graciously referred to Gen 
 eral Lincoln as its recipient, and that officer as graciously 
 returned it. The land forces became prisoners to the 
 United States, and the marine forces to the naval army of 
 France. (See Appendix F.) 
 
 On the twentieth, Washington issued an order of con 
 gratulation to the allied army, in the following words : 
 
 " Divine service is to be performed to-morrow in the 
 several brigades and divisions. The Comniander-in-Chief 
 earnestly recommends that the troops not on duty should 
 universally attend, with that seriousness of deportment 
 and gratitude of heart which the recognition of such 
 
LAFAYETTE AND- ROCHAMBEAU. 361 
 
 reiterated and astonishing interpositions of Providence 
 demand of us." 
 
 The American army which paraded on that Thanksgiv 
 ing Day was not the same army that began the war. The 
 one central figure, Washington, the Commander-in-Chief, 
 is present. Some, crowned with well-deserved honors, 
 are serving in the Halls of Congress. Some, worn out in 
 service, have retired from active duty. All who had 
 inordinate ambition, and cared more for self than country, 
 have dropped from the Army Roster. 
 
 After the surrender of Cornwallis, American and French 
 officers vied in extending courtesies to the British offi 
 cers, as Lafayette describes their visits, "with every sort 
 of politeness, especially toward Lord Cornwallis, one of 
 the men of the highest character in England, who was 
 considered to be their foremost general." In a parting 
 interview 7 , Cornwallis replied to Lafayette : "I am aware 
 of your humanity toward prisoners of war, and I com 
 mend to you my unfortunate army." Lafayette, calling 
 attention to the earlier surrender of Burgoyne s army, 
 answered : " Your lordship knows that the Americans 
 have always been humane toAvards captured armies." 
 In recalling the incident in his "Memoires Historiques," 
 Lafayette says : "In truth, the English army was treated 
 with every possible consideration." 
 
 Washington designated Lafayette as commander of an 
 expedition to Wilmington and Charleston, with the 
 brigades of Wayne and Gist. In his journal he says : 
 " It was to be entrusted to the Marq s de la Fayette, in 
 case he could engage the Admiral to convey it & secure 
 the debarkation. I left him on board the Ville de Paris, 
 to try the force of his influence to obtain these." Although 
 fixed for November 1st, it was dropped, and the French 
 fleet sailed for the West Indies. 
 
 Lafayette obtained leave of absence, and sailed from 
 
362 WASHINGTON* THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Boston on the frigate Alliance, December 23rd, having 
 affectionately parted with Washington ; and after a pas 
 sage of twenty-three days, landed at L Orient, where he 
 was cordially welcomed home by his family and the entire 
 French people. 
 
 Washington s faithful friend, Rochambeau, remained 
 with him, under his command, when the troops of the 
 Marquis de St. Simon and the fleet of the Count de Grasse 
 sailed for the West Indies. Rochambeau wintered at 
 Williamsburg ; in the summer of 1782, returned through 
 Philadelphia, to the Hudson ; thence to New England in 
 the autumn, and sailed for the West Indies during Decem 
 ber, 1782. The American Congress did not fail to appre 
 ciate the services of this distinguished French officer. A 
 
 o 
 
 " stand of colors " (ever since appreciated by his family), 
 and a piece of ordnance, were gifts ; and it was decreed that 
 a marble monument should be erected at Yorktown, fr to 
 commemorate the alliance between France and the United 
 States, and the victory achieved by their associated arms." 
 Even before the departure of Rochambeau from Amer 
 ica, the crowning event of the fraternal alliance between 
 France and the United States had been realized, and 
 Independence was no longer a matter of doubt. On 
 the seventh day of May, 1782, Sir Henry Clinton was 
 relieved of all further responsibility in command of New 
 York, by Sir Guy Carleton ; who assumed command, and 
 immediately announced to the American Commander-in- 
 Chief that he had been appointed as a Commissioner to 
 consider the terms of a permanent peace between Great 
 Britain and the United States of America. If the reader 
 will recall the antecedents of this officer and the spirit with 
 which he paroled the American troops, after the disas 
 trous assault upon Quebec in the winter of 1775, he will 
 appreciate the fitness of his taking part in the final 
 negotiations for fraternity and peace. 
 
WASHINGTON S MAGNANIMITY. 
 
 The negotiations between these officers brought into 
 striking relief certain qualities of Washington as a soldier 
 which have had too slight recognition. The terms f tory " 
 and fr royalist" have been used in this narrative as they 
 Avere specially in vogue at the different times and places 
 where they occur. It has been too often assumed by youth 
 who study Revolutionary history, that Hessian soldiers were 
 always brutal, that Tarleton and Simcoe, and especially 
 the Queen s Rangers, were irresponsible marauders, and 
 that the tories generally were cruel, and deserving no 
 quarter. 
 
 As a fact, the Revolutionary War had, at its start, 
 many of those painful antagonisms among neighborhoods 
 and families which always attach to civil conflicts under 
 the best possible conditions. Among the thousands who 
 adhered to the British cause, and especially among the 
 royalist "Provincial Corps," there were eminent divines, 
 physicians, lawyers, and scholars. All they had in the 
 world was involved in the struggle. Many of these sym 
 pathized with the best British statesmen, and longed for 
 some adjustment of differences which would not require 
 abandonment of their homes in America. By a grave 
 oversight on the part of Great Britain, no adequate pro 
 vision was made by her ministry for this class of Americans 
 who had fought to the last for the Crown. The action 
 of Washington in cooperation with Sir Guy Carleton, 
 respecting these men, disbanded as soldiers, but cast upon 
 the Avorld with no provision for their relief, was so marked 
 by generosity, active aid, and wise relief, that until this 
 day their descendants in Nova Scotia and Xew Brunswick 
 pay glad tribute to his memory. Through the joint efforts 
 of these two officers, five thousand were sent to St. John, 
 Xew Brunswick. The seventeenth day of May, 1 783, when 
 the first large detachment of the Queen s Rangers landed, 
 is honored as the Natal Day of that Province. Simcoe, 
 
364 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 their old commander, became the first Governor of Upper 
 Canada. In 1792, he organized a miniature Parliament 
 of two Houses. He founded the City of Toronto ; and 
 in 1796, governed the Island of San Domingo. 
 
 Professor Koberts, in his "History of Canada," already 
 cited, represents the migration of thirty thousand Amer 
 icans to that country immediately after the Revolutionary 
 War, as " no less far-reaching and significant in its results 
 than the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth." 
 
 There have been those who regarded as the most noble 
 and unselfish act of Washington s public career, his patri 
 otic protest against the demands of his unpaid, starving, 
 and self-sacrificing comrades, that he accept royal dignity 
 or else become the Oliver Cromwell of his generation. 
 But the consideration, firmness, and justice with which he 
 dismissed these mustered-out, disbanded royalists, and, in 
 spite of abuse and outcry, assisted them to independence 
 in a land of their own choice, adds another laurel to his 
 chaplet as the magnanimous, no less than the great, soldier. 
 The subsequent triumphal entry of Washington into the 
 City of New York, on the twenty-fifth day of November, 
 1783, was the crowning military incident of the war. 
 
 The numerous Centennial observances in honor of 
 events of the Revolution, since the second century of 
 American Independence began, have helped to bring to 
 light many family and other historical data which other 
 wise would have been lost ; and all of these relating to 
 the American Commander-in-Chief have only confirmed 
 the world s estimate of Washington the Soldier. 
 
 Words, at best, are feeble exponents of principles 
 which actions so much better reveal ; and battles on 
 paper, however minutely described, can never expose the 
 brain processes through which military orders are matured ; 
 nor can the pen portray the experiences of the " rank and 
 file " of a suffering army, during such an ordeal of war as 
 
HIS BENEDICTION. 
 
 that in which George Washington was both the centra 
 executive force and the sympathetic guardian of the rights 
 of all, of whatever grade of service or duty. Stupidity, 
 jealousy, self-sufficiency, personal ambition, and treason, 
 could not survive their impact upon Washington. His 
 mastery of every antagonistic force, whether professedly 
 military or distinctly political, was due to that unsought 
 but real supremacy which incarnated unselfish patriotism, 
 and made American Independence the sole objective of a 
 righteous judgment and an irresistible will. 
 
 On the eighth anniversary of the Battle of Lexington, 
 April 19, 1783, the American Commander-in-Chief pro 
 claimed a formal " Cessation of hostilities between the 
 United States and Great Britain," as the result of ne^o- 
 
 o 
 
 tiations concluded with Sir Guy Carleton on the previous 
 day. 
 
 This Proclamation, like the Letter of Louis XVI., 
 received at Valley Forge on the seventh day of May, 
 1778, was ordered to be read at the head of every regiment 
 and corps of the army ; after which, as the order reads : 
 
 " The chaplains with the several brigades will render 
 thanks to Almighty God for all His mercies ; particularly, 
 for overruling the wrath of man to His own glory, and 
 causing the rage of War to cease among the nations. 
 
 " On such a happy day, which is the harbinger of 
 peace a day which completes the eighth year of the war, 
 it would be ingratitude not to rejoice ; it would be insen 
 sibility not to participate in the general felicity. 
 
 " Happy, happy, thrice happy, shall they be pro 
 nounced, hereafter, who have contributed anything, who 
 have performed the meanest office, in erecting this stupen 
 dous fabric of freedom and empire on the broad basis of 
 independency ; who have assisted in protecting the rights 
 of human nature, and in establishing an asylum for the 
 poor and oppressed of all nations and religions." 
 
CHAPTER XXXVI. 
 
 THE ATTITUDE 
 OF AMERICA PRONOUNCED. 
 
 blending of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Cen- 
 turies comes at a moment of such marked transition 
 in all that directs human activity and relationship, that the 
 promise of Washington s benediction, with which he pro 
 claimed peace, seems about to be verified with a fuller, 
 grander, and more universal scope of responsibility and 
 example than even his sublime faith encompassed. 
 
 " A stupendous fabric of freedom and empire on the 
 broad basis of independency," has already been estab 
 lished. The present generation and its actors in every 
 department of public duty including Washington s suc 
 cessor in the Presidential Chair ; the American Congress 
 in both Houses ; Governors of all the States ; and respon 
 sible agencies in all sections have seemed to unify their 
 efforts to maintain the empire thus established. Those 
 now living are the heirs to be made " happy, happy, 
 thrice happy," through the legacy of his life ; if they do 
 their part in " protecting the rights of human nature, and 
 in establishing an asylum for the poor and oppressed of 
 all nations and religions." 
 
 Nothing in the career of Washington the Soldier was 
 more sovereign in its sway over citizens under arms, than 
 his constant appeal to a Divine Providence as the truest 
 ally of the soul, in hours of grave responsibility and 
 peril. This narrative would lose much of its value to 
 
 366 
 
WASHINGTON S PREDICTION REALIZED. 
 
 America and to mankind, if the passages reflecting Wash 
 ington s religious faith were to be lightly passed over ; 
 and if he were to be measured only as a distinguished 
 representative of the military profession. 
 
 He has, indeed, been tested by the sternest maxims of 
 the military art. He has been found responsive to their 
 most exacting demands. But all such tests are largely 
 those of mere intellectual power not disclosing excel 
 lence in moral and social relations, except as these illus 
 trate " Statesmanship in War," and complement other 
 qualifications of the Ideal Soldier. But Washington 
 was more than a soldier. It is no ill-conceived paradox 
 to assert that the ideal soldier, the greatest soldier, is not 
 the man who most literally represents knowledge of the 
 military art. It is asserted in the Word of Life, that 
 Tr he that ruleth his spirit is greater than he that taketh a 
 city." It is not to be forgotten that the only proper 
 function of War is, to eliminate disturbants of the public 
 peace. To give life for country is to partake of the 
 Divine prerogative of giving life for humanity. 
 
 And the soldiers who fought under Washington were not 
 mere men, of certain ages, to be handled well in battle, as 
 parts of a machine. They were not hirelings, discounting 
 the chances of life and death for money. Peace and its 
 domesticities represented the goal of their pursuit ; and 
 self-sacrifice, even of life, to secure that peace, was their 
 conscious service to family, to country, and to God. 
 The people, as a people, had no unholy frenzy for war as 
 a source of purely military glory. Only barbarous 
 nations, or the devotees of some great conqueror or fanat 
 ical religionist, can thus pervert the patriotic sentiment 
 to the instincts of the beast. 
 
 Washington s army was strong, because strong at 
 home. Country, was the aggregate of homes many. 
 Never did the term patriotism have a more radiant reflec- 
 
368 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 tion of its intrinsic glory ; and Washington, as " Pater 
 Patrice," was so paternal in his trust, that his army was 
 filial as well as loyal, in the highest quality of duty to 
 their great Captain. His faith in his country s future was 
 based upon the intelligence of the people ; and his army 
 was both intelligent and religious, because respect for 
 law and religion was the basis of the first settlement of 
 the American Colonies as well as the foundation upon 
 which they established all domestic and political concerns. 
 
 In 1780, Thomas Pownall, once royal Governor of 
 Massachusetts, pronounced "American Independence as 
 fixed as fate " ; adding : " North America has become a 
 new Primary planet,, which, Avhile it takes its own course, 
 in its own orbit, must shift the common centre of grav 
 ity." He added this significant inquiry : " Will that 
 most enterprising spirit be stopped at Cape Horn ; or, 
 not pass beyond the Cape of Good Hope ? Before long, 
 they Avill be found trading in the South Sea, in the Spice 
 Islands, and in China. Commerce will open the door to 
 emigration. By constant intercommunication, America 
 Avill every day approach nearer and nearer to Europe." 
 
 But this "independency of freedom and empire," pre 
 dicted by Washington, is not independency of moral 
 obligation, or relation. It carries with its exercise an 
 independent control of both moral and physical activities 
 with which to insist that its inalienable rights shall be 
 universally respected. 
 
 The associated prediction of Washington has also been 
 realized in " the establishment of an asylum for the 
 poor and oppressed of all nations and religions." Amer 
 ica must therefore bear the responsibility of protecting 
 her wards everywhere, and penetrate the earth with the 
 conviction that wrong done to one, is wrong done to all. 
 Oceans are but lakes. Distances are but steps. Neither 
 light nor sound outspeed the cry of suffering humanity ; 
 
THE ATTITUDE OF AMERICA. 
 
 and neither light nor sound must be allowed to outrun 
 the speed of Avise relief. Beneficiaries of this Empire- 
 Asylum, between the great seas, have become elements of 
 our wealth and power. They have ceased to be foreign 
 elements in crystalized society ; and blend, as integral 
 forces in the body politic, just as the elements of air and 
 water invisibly combine. Countless messages of hap 
 piness, prosperity, and peace cross the great seas by 
 every steamship, to cheer their former countrymen with 
 the hope of like liberties, in times not far distant, which 
 they also shall enjoy. The prayers of a Christian people 
 for all mankind, which Heaven doth "gather in vials, as 
 sweet odors," are not lost between earth and sky ; but other 
 peoples, inhaling wafted fragrance, dream of the Land of 
 Washington. 
 
 Whatever may be the jealousies or dislikes of personal 
 or dynastic rule abroad, no truly enlightened nation can 
 lon remain insensible to that exhibition of moral and 
 
 D 
 
 industrial power under which America is fully equipped 
 for the support of her honor and her flag. Her in 
 dwelling peace matures and conserves financial independ 
 ence ; and infinitely multiplies capacity and resources 
 with which to meet every just obligation to all mankind. 
 Her peace, while enriching herself, blesses all nations. 
 Her products of the shop and farm have become indis 
 pensable to the good of all. This new "centre of 
 gravity," has become, as Egypt once chanced to be, the 
 famine magazine, the granary of relief, to the famishing 
 millions of every land. The ability of America to spring 
 from the repose of peaceful industry and protect her 
 rights and the rights of humanity wherever assailed, has 
 compelled the world s consideration and respect. 
 
 The terra incognita of olden times has become the 
 busy field of competitive industry. The vast empires of 
 China and Japan have caught from the American Republic 
 
370 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 their own best stimulus, and a timely suggestion to resist 
 aggressive strangers. From America, they fear no un 
 just demands, no plunder of territory, no violation of 
 sound principles of international law. China, indeed, only 
 feebly responds to the quickening impulse ; while Japan 
 recognizes and accepts her opportunity to become an 
 independent, self-respecting power a truly modern 
 State ! 
 
 At the famous Berlin Conference, Count Schouvaloff of 
 Russia, recently retired from public life, proposed a for 
 mal Resolution, that no modern arms or ships be sold to 
 the empires of the East ; declaring that " if those nations, 
 India, China and Japan, were thus armed, and once 
 began to contrast their millions of subjects and asso 
 ciated poverty, with the smaller populations, but vast 
 treasure-houses of Europe, the cities of Vienna, Berlin, 
 and Paris, would be in more danger, through some tidal- 
 wave of desolation and plunder from the East, than from 
 all the standing armies of Europe." And now that the 
 earth is but a sensitive " whisper-gallery," and every 
 hammer s stroke and every anvil s ring reverberate in 
 every machine-shop where despoilers of the East fabri 
 cate implements for its dismemberment and ruin, those 
 same Eastern nations in part accept, and Japan quotes, 
 the wise maxim of Washington: "In peace, prepare for 
 war." 
 
 Washington s career as a soldier is replete with counsel 
 which finds its crowning opportunity in the present atti 
 tude of America before the world. So long as we deal 
 honorably with all mankind, the buzzing electric energies 
 of peace are our best assurance of success in a righteous 
 war. Only wanton neglect of prudent and adequate 
 preparations for the protection of our commerce, and of 
 our citizens wherever they chance to sojourn for legiti 
 mate business or pleasure, can engender mistrust of our 
 
THE ATTITUDE OF AMERICA. 371 
 
 courage, and invite the very aggressions otherwise beyond 
 the possibility of occurrence. 
 
 But Washington, skilled in the European complications 
 of his times, never imagined that the same European 
 nations, or any of them, would select the extreme East as 
 the arena from which to replenish wasted home resources 
 by force ; and then convert the continent of Europe into 
 one vast magazine of dynamite, until all chief agencies 
 which belong to domestic prosperity and happiness should 
 be drawn into the wild whirl of Colonial adventure, for 
 plunder. And as the reader recalls Washington s earnest 
 appeals for unity of spirit in all national affairs, and is 
 reminded of his Farewell Address to the American People, 
 wherein he deprecated all political combinations abroad 
 which might qualify or compromise our absolute inde 
 pendence as a Free Republic, he will be more profoundly 
 impressed with the great fact, that in the present attitude 
 of these United States before the world, the sublime an 
 ticipations of the " Father of his Country " are maturing 
 to a resplendent and complete fulfilment. The only nat 
 ural alliance, in the event of monarchical combinations 
 to stay the advancing triumph of true liberty, would be a 
 concerted action of the United States and the mother 
 country, through the inheritance of like bequests under 
 Magna Charta. The pregnant future may yet give birth 
 to that fruition. 
 
 There is an awful grandeur, more densely charged 
 with ills than the fiercest spasms of Nature s fury, in the 
 visible armaments which are costing peoples, not thrones, 
 annually, more than enough to feed and clothe every suffer 
 ing member of the human race. The alleged object is, " to 
 preserve the peace," as if every nation naturally antagon 
 ized all others. The peace of the silent grave, which would 
 turn one s neighbor s soil into a vast cemetery, seems 
 to supplant that peace " which passeth understanding," 
 
372 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 when every heart and mind shall enter a condition of 
 happy repose and prosperous industry. The inquiry pro 
 pounded nearly nineteen hundred years ago "From 
 whence come wars and fightings among you?" can be in 
 like manner answered, Avith solemn emphasis, to-day. 
 No uninspired pen can match the imagery of prophetic 
 vision which predicted the outcome of such conditions 
 as now threaten mankind " Woe to him that calleth 
 Peace, Peace, when there is no peace ! " But greater 
 woe shall befall those that " call evil good, and good 
 evil ; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness ; 
 that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter." As with 
 the man who wrongeth his neighbor, and taketh that 
 which is not his, to his own profit ; so shall it be with 
 nations. Only those nations which love righteousness 
 and do justice shall rise above the wreck of all oppressors, 
 and take part in the enjoyment of that destined era of 
 righteousness and peace, when nations shall not " learn 
 war any more." That nation alone will be truly great, 
 Avhose supreme purpose through every armament and 
 armed expression shall be in behalf of humanity, and to 
 punish or repress the destroyers of peace. 
 
 But present conditions had their marvellous premo 
 nition in 1892 when "a Congress of Nations," and " a 
 Parliament of Religions," convened during the World s 
 Columbian Exposition, at Chicago, in the State of Illinois. 
 For the purpose of that Exposition, a miniature city, 
 of more than Roman or Grecian classical beauty and 
 adornment, sprang up as by the power of magic, wherein 
 all the nations of earth blended their contributions, 
 in lines of utility and art. Their representatives, their 
 contributors, and their wise men, beheld "the triumphs 
 of peace," uncontrolled by the prestige of artificial rank, 
 or by the persuasion of bayonet, cimeter, or dagger. 
 They journeyed to and fro in safety ; were treated as 
 
THE ATTITUDE OF AMERICA. 373 
 
 brethren ; as children of one supreme creative Father ; 
 and toolv thence some valuable lessons for thoughtful im 
 provement. No social banquet at their far-distant homes, 
 nor regal display at their national capitals, could have 
 surpassed the cordial welcome or the deep significance of 
 that purely Republican entertainment. The temporary 
 shelter for their pleasure and comfort, costing millions, 
 besides their own generous outlay, had its day and its 
 uses ; and then was set aside, as one gives away the 
 morning daily paper, after its quick perusal. Then 
 mighty warehouses, business blocks, and all the per 
 manent features of a vast inland city, one thousand miles 
 distant from the nearest ocean-port, rose instead of the 
 temporary palaces of entertainment ; while the markets 
 of the world had received a new impulse, never to be 
 lost, 
 
 And such is the Land of Washington ! His retirement 
 from command of the "Continental Army of America," 
 in the spirit of Joshua, the Hebrew Captain, when the 
 people thought no honor too rich for his reward, magni 
 fied his office and immortalized his example. Since his 
 career as a soldier demands no elucidation of his office as 
 legislator, statesman, or as the first President of these 
 United States, there remains little to be added ; except to 
 commend to American youth, and to all patriotic youth, 
 wherever these pages may invite perusal, the exemplar 
 career of one whose unselfish patriotism, moral rectitude, 
 and exalted qualities as an Ideal Soldier can never lose 
 charm nor value. 
 
 Washington based his hopes of success upon the in 
 telligence of the American people. For their proper 
 training in arms, and the contingency of a summons to 
 defend their dearly bought liberties, he designed the Mili 
 tary Academy at West Point on the Hudson. For a 
 uniform system of education in all that develops social 
 
374 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 culture and good citizenship, he proposed, with gift of a 
 proper site, a National University at the National Capital. 
 Since his immediate mission on earth closed, the Ameri 
 can Republic, which, under God, he established, has 
 donated through religious, educational, and benevolent 
 channels, more than three hundred millions of treasure : 
 and found full compensation, in the civilization and en 
 lightenment thereby imparted to less favored peoples 
 throughout the world. The American Census of 1890, 
 disclosed the fact, that American eleemosynary gifts 
 annually exceeded the cost of the largest standing army 
 of the world. 
 
 To-day, America is able, single-handed, to defend her 
 honor and her flag, whoever may deride her peaceful 
 habits and her homely virtues. The words of Washing 
 ton, used upon his return to White Plains in 1778, as 
 emphatically appeal to the American people to-day, as 
 when they were first uttered. 
 
 A Nation of nearly eighty millions stands ready to 
 vindicate the loftiest aspirations and redeem the confi 
 dence of Washington. So surely as the Almighty Father 
 is a covenant-keeping God, whatever may be the scenes 
 of conflict forwarding His purpose, He will emancipate 
 man from error s chain and the oppressor s lash ; and this 
 Republic must be ever prepared to maintain, from genera 
 tion to generation, one sentiment of the great Soldier 
 
 " The hand of Providence has been so conspicuous, 
 that he must be worse than an infidel, that lacks faith ; 
 and more than wicked, that has not gratitude enough to 
 acknowledge his obligation." 
 
APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A. 
 
 AMERICAN ARMY, BY STATES. 
 
 The American Army, after 1776, never equalled thirty-eight 
 thousand Regulars, at any one time. Small, temporary, and 
 unorganized detachments of minute-men were often employed 
 to meet sudden forays ; but the aggregate of those who after 
 wards claimed Revolutionary service was far beyond the actual 
 numbers subject to Washington s orders, or under control by 
 Congress. 
 
 In stating these aggregates as credited to their respective 
 States, under their designated quota, it is to be taken into 
 account, that each enlistment received a special credit, and 
 generally, by years or term of service. Hence, many who 
 served from April 19, 1775, until the nineteenth of April, 1783, 
 counted as eight, in the aggregate. 
 
 In the American Civil War of 1861- 65, the same rule fol 
 lowed. Nine Ohio regiments, for example, and those militia, 
 marched to West Virginia for three months, reenlisted for 
 three years, and then reenlisted for the war. Several " One 
 Hundred Day " regiments, including the Sixtieth Massachu 
 setts, and many in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, became credits 
 to their respective States. The same men were sometimes 
 counted three times that is, for each reenlistment. 
 
 The contributions of the States, during the Revolutionary 
 War, on this basis, were as follows : 
 
 New Hampshire . 
 Massachusetts 
 Ehode Island . . 
 Connecticut 
 
 . . . 12,497 
 . . . 69,907 
 . . . 5,908 
 . . 31,939 
 
 Delaware . 
 
 . . . 2,386 
 
 
 . . . 13 912 
 
 
 . . . 26,678 
 
 North Carolina . 
 South Carolina . 
 Georgia 
 
 . . . 7,263 
 . . . 6,417 
 . . 2 679 
 
 New York . . . 
 New Jersey 
 Pennsylvania 
 Total . 
 
 . . . 17,781 
 . . . 10,726 
 
 . . . 25,678 
 
 
 
 . 233,771 
 
 Also, see Index, " American Army." 
 
 377 
 
378 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 AMERICAN NAVY AND ITS CAREER. 
 
 The original organization of the American Navy is noticed 
 on pages 59-60 of the text. 
 
 On the thirteenth of December, 1775, several frigates, were 
 authorized, the annexed figures indicating their rate, by guns : 
 
 Alliance (32), twice identified with Lafayette (pp. 
 253, 361), and sold after the war. 
 
 Andrea Doria (32), burned in the Delaware to pre 
 vent capture 1777 
 
 Boston (28), captured at Charleston .... 1780 
 
 1 Congress, burned in the Hudson, to prevent capture, 1777 
 
 Delaware (24), captured by the British, in the Dela 
 ware ......... 1777 
 
 Effingham (28), destroyed by the British, in the 
 
 Delaware 1777 
 
 Hancock (32), taken by British ships Rainbow (44) 
 
 and Victor (16) 1777 
 
 1 Montgomery (24), burned in the Hudson to prevent 
 
 capture 1777 
 
 Providence (28), captured at Charleston . . . 1780 
 
 Queen of France (18), captured at Charleston . . 1780 
 
 Raleigh (32), captured by the British ships Experi 
 ment (50) and Unicorn (16) . . . . 1777 
 
 Randolph (32), blown up in action with the Yarmouth 
 
 (64) 1778 
 
 The Confederacy (32), taken by a British ship-of-the- 
 
 line, off the Virginia coast 1781 
 
 Trumbull (28), taken by British fleet, near Cape 
 
 Henry 1778 
 
 1 Never went to sea. 
 
APPENDIX B. 379 
 
 Virginia (28), taken by British fleet, near Cape Henry, 1778 
 Warren (32), burned in the Penobscot, by the Amer 
 icans 1779 
 
 Washington (32), destroyed by the British, in the 
 
 Delaware 1778 
 
 NOTE. John Paul, who took the name of John Paul Jones through grat 
 itude to a citizen of North Carolina who assisted him in securing a naval 
 commission (noticed on page 60 of the text), distinguished himself upon 
 the British coast, and in his capture of the British ship Serapis, Sept. 23, 
 1779. His own ship, the Bon Ifomme Richard, w&s fitted out in France, 
 by the aid of Benjamin Franklin, to war against British commerce. 
 Franklin, in the issue of his " Almanack," with shrewd business and 
 moral maxims at the bottoms of the pages, used the nom-de-plume, " Poor 
 Richard." It Avas graceful in John Paul to name the ship Richard, in 
 Franklin s honor, with a complimentary prefix. 
 
 Of the later navy, that of 1812, the Brandy wine (44), named after the 
 battle of that name, was placed at the service of Lafayette when he visited 
 America in 1825. (See note at end of Chapter XVIII., concerning La 
 fayette as first appearing in that battle.) 
 
380 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 COMPARISONS WITH LATER WARS. 
 
 The analogies between the Revolutionary War and later 
 American wars are noticed in the Preface. Some special points 
 should be noted for further comparisons. 
 
 The field casualties, including killed and wounded, in twenty- 
 six of the principal engagements of the Revolution, do not 
 greatly exceed 9,000 ; but other causes kept the army upon a 
 very unsatisfactory basis in respect of numbers as well as 
 efficiency. 
 
 Operations in Canada, early in the war, irrespective of the 
 expeditions of Montgomery and Arnold, cost, through a visita 
 tion of small-pox, 5,000 lives in sixty days. (Page 88.) 
 
 At the April muster of the army in 1776, only 8,303, out of 
 a total of 10,235, were fit for duty. (Page 87.) 
 
 At the August muster, 1776, 3,678 were reported as sick, 
 either present or on furlough, out of a total of 17,225. (Pages 
 101, 102.) 
 
 At the September muster, 1776, less than 20,000 were re 
 ported as fit for duty (page 114), out of a total of 27,000 
 (page 103). 
 
 At the Battle of Trenton, Christmas night, 1776, more than 
 1,000 out of a force of 2,400 were disabled by frost during the 
 brief march and engagement which gave such fresh vigor to 
 the cause of American Independence. (Page 142.) 
 
 At the October muster of the same year, out of a total of 
 25,735, the large number of 8,075 was reported as sick, or on 
 furlough. (Page 122.) 
 
 The camps at Morristown, Valley Forge, and at the South, 
 were scenes of great suffering, distress, and waste. The suf 
 fering was greater in crowded and stationary camps than when 
 
APPENDIX C. 381 
 
 on the march. Special diseases like measles, then as ever 
 since, prostrated great numbers who suddenly changed house 
 for canvas shelter. In 1862, at one of the healthiest canton 
 ments at the North, near Indianapolis, fully 1,400 were dis 
 abled for duty within four weeks after reporting for muster. 
 A similar experience marked Camps Chase, Dennison, and 
 Jackson, Ohio, and Camp Douglas, Illinois. 
 
 That " three months " service in 1861 was exceptionally 
 effective under existing conditions, and similar service in the 
 war with Spain, in 1898, reads more like some fabulous tale 
 than the faithful record of continuous victories by an impro 
 vised army, with a minimum sacrifice of life. (See Military 
 Notes in Preface.) 
 
 In the Revolutionary War, gardens and orchards, near 
 camps, seriously endangered both discipline and health. 
 Home luxuries from visiting friends became so injurious in 
 their effects that Washington was compelled to deal sternly 
 with this mistaken kindness. Besides all this, quartermas 
 ters and commissaries, ignorant of their duties, speculated 
 upon public stores ; and even surgeons embezzled supplies 
 until some regiments had no medicines for immediate emer 
 gencies. (Page 123.) 
 
 Derelictions from duty were not peculiar to Revolutionary 
 times. Early in 1861, when haste was so urgent, and the 
 North was not prepared to clothe promptly even seventy-five 
 thousand men, the First and Second Ohio reached Harrisburg, 
 en route for Washington, only to find that the uniforms con 
 tracted for and delivered were worthless. The Fifteenth Ohio, 
 after a rain, found themselves at Graf ton, W. Va., just after 
 the battle of Philippi, with soleless shoes, glue having been 
 used in their manufacture instead of pegs or thread. The 
 Adjutant-General of that State, then inspecting Ohio troops, 
 peremptorily forbade their moving until an entire refit could 
 be supplied, and William Dennison, then Governor, sustained 
 his action. 
 
 The Continental Congress, during the war with Great Brit 
 ain, tried to act as Commander-in-Chief, until in conscious 
 impotence it surrendered military trusts to Washington, with 
 
382 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 the impressive Resolution, that " the very existence of civil 
 liberty depends upon the right exercise of military powers," 
 and that "the vigorous, decisive conduct of these" is 
 " impossible in distant, numerous and deliberative bodies." 
 (Page 148.) 
 
 The Revolutionary War, therefore, illustrated every form 
 of distemper which belongs to war in a republic, when its 
 citizens are suddenly called to face camp and battle condi 
 tions without adequate training and preparation in advance. 
 Jealousy of a standing army, greed for office and place, and 
 incessant, selfish, or self-asserting antagonisms, were the chief 
 burdens that grieved the soul and embarrassed the movements 
 of Washington, the American Commander-in-Chief. 
 
APPENDIX D. 
 
 APPENDIX D. 
 
 BRITISH ARMY, AT VARIOUS DATES. 
 
 The British. Official Records show that the entire British 
 force in America, including troops in Canada, Florida and the 
 Bahama Islands, hardly exceeded, at any one time and then 
 not until 1780 42,000 men. Some of the regiments appear 
 upon the maps as participants in battles from the attack upon 
 Breed s Hill until the final surrender of Cornwallis. The 
 colonels of these regiments, under British regulations, held 
 command as general officers ; but the regiments retained their 
 personal relation to the commanding officer, although the 
 lieutenant-colonel commanded the battalions in the field, one 
 recruiting battalion always remaining at the home depot. 
 
 The following Tables have peculiar value, being compiled 
 direct from original sources : 
 
 J. British regiments assigned to America, J776, 
 
 17th Dragoons . 
 
 Preston s. 
 
 43d Foot . . 
 
 . Cray s. 
 
 4th Foot . . . 
 
 Hodgsin s. 
 
 44th Foot . 
 
 . Abercrombie s. 
 
 5th Foot . . . 
 
 Percy s. 
 
 45th Foot . 
 
 . Haviland s. 
 
 10th Foot . . 
 
 Sanford s. 
 
 47th Foot . 
 
 . Carleton s. 
 
 22d Foot . . . 
 
 Gage s. 
 
 49th Foot . 
 
 . Maitland s. 
 
 23d Foot . . . 
 
 Howe s. 
 
 52d Foot . . 
 
 . Clavering s. 
 
 35th Foot . . 
 
 F.H.Campbell s. 
 
 63d Foot . . 
 
 . T. Grant s. 
 
 38th Foot . . 
 
 Pigot s. 
 
 64th Foot . 
 
 . Pomeroy s. 
 
 40th Foot . . 
 
 Hamilton s. 
 
 65th Foot . 
 
 . Armstrong s. 
 
 The above were stationed in Boston, with five companies of the Royal 
 Artillery. 
 
 On their passage from Ireland to Boston : 
 
 17th Foot 
 27th Foot 
 
 Monkton s. 
 
 Massey s. 
 
 Then, in Canada : 
 
 7th Foot . . . Berlier s. 
 
 8th Foot . . . T. Armstrong s. 
 
 46th Foot 
 53d Foot . 
 
 26th Foot . 
 2 Companies 
 
 Vaughan s. 
 James Grant s. 
 
 Lord Gordon s. 
 Royal Artillery. 
 
384 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 lieady to sail for America, from Cork : 
 
 15th Foot 
 33d Foot . 
 37th Foot 
 
 Caven s. 
 
 Cornwallis . 
 
 Coote s. 
 
 42d Foot . 
 54th Foot 
 57th Foot 
 
 Lord Murray s. 
 
 Frederick s. 
 
 Invin s. 
 
 Ordered for Boston : 
 16th Dragoons . Burgoyne s. 
 
 Ordered for Quebec : 
 9th Foot . . . Lagonier s. 
 
 King s Guards . 1,000 men. 
 
 34th Foot 
 33d Foot 
 62d Foot 
 
 Lord Cavendish s. 
 
 Elphinstone s. 
 
 Jones . 
 
 20th Foot . . Parker s. 
 24th Foot . . Taylor s. 
 
 Also, 29th Foot upon opening of navigation. 
 
 Cunningham s Regiment, the 14th Foot, was in part in Virginia ; the 
 residue, with a Company of the Royal Artillery, was at St. Augustine, 
 Florida. 
 
 2. British Army at the Battle of Long Island. 
 
 ADVANCE CORPS. 
 
 Four Battalions of Light Infantry and the Light Dragoons. 
 
 RESERVE CORPS. 
 
 Four Battalions of Grenadiers, 33d and 42d Regiments. 
 
 BRITISH COLUMN. 
 
 IST BRIGADE .... 44th, 15th, 27th and 45th Regiments. 
 
 2D BRIGADE .... 5th, 28th, 55th and 49th Regiments. 
 
 3o BRIGADE .... JOth, 37th, 38th and 52d Regiments. 
 
 4iH BRIGADE .... 17th, 40th, 40th and 55th Regiments. 
 
 STH BRIGADE .... 22d, 43d, 54th and 63d Regiments. 
 
 GTH BRIGADE .... 23d, 44th, 57th and 64th Regiments. 
 
 7TH BRIGADE .... 71st Highland Regiment, New York 
 
 Companies and Royal Artillery. 
 
 Colonel Donop s command consisted of the Hessian Grenadiers and the 
 Chausseurs. 
 
 General De Heister s command consisted of two Hessian brigades. 
 
 TOTAL OF COMBINED ARMIES, INCLUDING FORCE ON STATEN ISLAND. 
 
 General Clinton in his report gives Howe s " effectives fit for duty " as 
 26,980 officers not included; but, including all officers, commissioned 
 and non-commissioned, as 31,625 men. 
 
 3. British effective force in America, June 3, 1777. 
 
 In New Jersey. 
 British Artillery . 
 British Cavalry . . 
 British Infantry . . . 
 Hessian Infantry . . 
 Anspach Infantry . 
 
 Aggregate, 17,090. 
 
 365 
 
 710 
 
 8,361 
 
 3,300 
 
 1,043 
 
 13,779 
 
 In New York. 
 British Artillery . . 
 British Infantry . 
 Hessian Infantry . . 
 
 20 
 1,513 
 
 1,778 
 
 3,311 
 
APPENDIX D. 
 
 385 
 
 On this date, 2,631 men had been sent to Rhode Island, and the total 
 force of foreign troops which had arrived including those of Hesse, 
 Anspach, and Waldeck amounted to 14,777. 
 
 4. British effective force in America, March 26, 1778. 
 
 British . 
 
 German 
 
 Provincial 
 
 Aggregate, 33,756. 
 
 In New 
 York. 
 
 3,486 
 3,689 
 3,281 
 
 10,456 
 
 In Phila 
 delphia. 
 
 13,078 
 5,202 
 1,250 
 
 19,530 
 
 In Rhode 
 Island. 
 
 1,610 
 
 2,116 
 
 44 
 
 3,770 
 
 5. Aug. 15, 1778. 
 
 In New York and vicinity, 19,586; in Long Island, 8,117; in Rhode 
 Island, 5,189; Lord Howe s fleet, 512; making an aggregate of 33,404. 
 
 A later return of November 1, on account of troops sent to Halifax and 
 to the West Indies, reduced the aggregate to 22,494 for duty. 
 
 6. May 1, 1779. 
 
 New York - 9,123 I Halifax 3,677 
 
 Long Island 6,056 Georgia 4,794 
 
 Staten Island 1,344 West Florida 1,703 
 
 Paulus Hook 383 Bermuda and Providence 
 
 Hoboken 264 Island 470 
 
 Rhode Island 5,644 
 
 10,644 
 
 22,814 
 Aggregate, 33,458. 
 
 7. December 1, 1779. 
 At New York and its dependencies : 
 
 British 13,848 
 
 German 10,836 
 
 Provincial .......... 4,072 
 
 Total 28,756 
 
 Halifax and Penobscot 3,460 
 
 Georgia ..... ..... 3,930 
 
 West Florida 1,787 
 
 Bermuda and Providence Island 636 
 
 Total 9,813 
 
 Aggregate, 38,569. 
 
386 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 8. British effective force in America, May 1, 1780. 
 
 New 
 
 South 
 
 Nova 
 
 East 
 
 
 York. 
 
 Carolina. 
 
 Scotia. 
 
 Florida. 
 
 Georgia. 
 
 7,711 
 
 7,041 
 
 2,298 
 
 590 
 
 
 7,451 
 
 3,018 
 
 572 
 
 547 
 
 862 
 
 2,162 
 
 2,788 
 
 638 
 
 316 
 
 1,016 
 
 British . 
 
 German 
 
 Provincials 
 
 17,324 12,847 3,508 1,453 1,878 
 
 Aggregate, including East Florida, Providence Island and Bermuda, 
 38,002. 
 
 9. December \ t 1780. 
 
 West Florida 1,261 
 
 Nova Scotia 3,167 
 
 Bermuda 387 
 
 Providence Island 143 
 
 New York 
 
 17,729 
 
 On an expedition 
 South Carolina . 
 Georgia 
 
 2,274 
 
 7,384 
 968 
 
 
 
 
 28,355 
 
 4,958 
 Aggregate, 33,313; besides Provincial troops, 8,954. Total, 42,267. 
 
 10. May J, 1781. 
 
 New York 12,257 
 
 On an expedition . . . 1,782 
 
 With Leslie 2,278 
 
 With Arnold 1,553 
 
 With Phillips . . . . 2,116 
 
 South Carolina .... 7,254 
 
 Aggregate forces, 33,374. 
 
 27,240 
 
 East Florida 438 
 
 West Florida 1,185 
 
 Nova Scotia 3,130 
 
 Bermuda 366 
 
 Providence Island . . . 128 
 
 Georgia 887 
 
 11. Sept. 1, 1781. 
 
 New York. Virginia. S.Carolina. Georgia. Floridas. 
 British, 5,932 5,544 5,024 920 
 
 German, 8,629 2,204 1,596 486 558 
 
 Provincial, 2,140 1,137 3,155 598 211 
 
 6,134 
 
 N. Scotia. W. Indies. 
 1,745 498 
 
 562 
 1,145 
 
 Total, 16,701 8,885 9,775 1,084 1,689 3,452 
 
 Aggregate, including Providence Island and Bermuda, 42,075. 
 
 NOTE. Stedman has the following estimate : 
 
 Dates. 
 August . 
 November 
 December 
 
 March 
 June 
 
 BRITISH AND REBEL FORCE IN 1776. 
 
 British. 
 
 . 24,000 
 
 26,600 
 
 27,700 
 
 IN 1777. 
 
 27,000 
 30,000 
 
 498 
 
 Rebel. 
 
 16,000 
 
 4,500 
 
 3,300 
 
 4,500 
 8,000 
 
APPENDIX E. 387 
 
 APPENDIX E. 
 
 ORGANIZATION OF BURGOYKE S AEMY. 
 
 To remain in Canada, part of 8th regiment, 460 men ; 
 part of 34th, 348 men ; parts of 29th and 31st regiments, 
 896 men ; eleven additional companies expected from Great 
 Britain, 616 men ; brigade detachments, 300 men ; detach 
 ments from German troops, 650 men, and Royal Highland 
 emigrants, 500 men ; making a total of 3,770 men. 
 
 The army of invasion (see page 171) numbered as follows : 
 
 Men. 
 The grenadiers and light infantry (except of the 8th and 24th 
 
 regiments), as the advance corps under General Eraser . 1,568 
 
 First brigade ; battalion companies of the 9th, 21st, and 47th 
 
 regiments .......... 1,194 
 
 Second brigade ; battalion companies of the 20th, 53d, and 62d 
 
 regiments, leaving 50 of each in Canada .... 1,194 
 
 German troops, except the Hanau Chasseurs, and 650 left in 
 
 Canada 3,217 
 
 Total, with artillery ....... 
 
 To this force were to be associated " as many Canadians and 
 Indians as might be thought necessary for the service." 
 
388 * WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 APPENDIX F. 
 
 ORGANIZATION OF CORNWALLIS S ARMY. 
 
 This force, when fully concentrated on Virginia, Aug. 1, 
 1781, consisted of the following troops : British, 5,541 ; Ger 
 man, 2,148 ; Provincials, 1,137 ; on detachments, 607 ; making 
 a total of 9,433 men. 
 
 The general Return of officers and privates surrendered at 
 Yorktown, as taken from the original Muster Rolls, is stated 
 by the Commissary of prisoners to have been as follows - 
 General and staff, 79 ; Artillery, 23 ; Guards, 527 ; Light In 
 fantry, 671 ; 17th Reg t, 245 ; 23d Reg t, 233 ; 33d Reg t, 260 ; 
 43d Reg t, 359 ; 71st Reg t, 300 ; 76th Reg t, 715 ; 80th Reg t, 
 689; two battalions of Anspach, 1,077 (these two battalions 
 alone had Colonels present), Prince Hereditary, 484 ; Regi 
 ment of De Bose, 349; Yagers, 74; British Legion, 241; 
 Queen s Rangers, 320 ; North Carolina Vols., 142 ; Pioneers, 
 44 ; Engineers, 23. Total, including commissary department, 
 and 80 followers of the army, 7,247 men. Total of officers 
 and men, 7,073. Seamen and from shipping, about 900 offi 
 cers and men. Other authorities increase this number to 
 over 8,000. It is evident that the Return of August 15, cited 
 on page 385, overestimates the really effective force. 
 
 Seventy-five brass cannon, 69 iron guns, 18 German and 6 
 British regimental standards, were among trophies captured. 
 
 The military chest contained 2,113, 6s, sterling. The 
 Guadaloupe 28, the old Foivey, the Bonetta (sloop) 24, and 
 Vulcan (fire-ship), thirty transports, fifteen galleys, and many 
 smaller vessels, with nearly 900 officers and seamen, were sur 
 rendered to the French. 
 
APPENDIX G. 389 
 
 APPENDIX G. 
 
 XOTES OF LEE S COURT- MAETIAL. 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL LORD STIRLING, President. 
 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL SMALLWOOD. COLONEL SWIFT. 
 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL POOR. COLONEL WIGGLESWORTH. 
 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL WOODFORD. COLONEL ANGEL. 
 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL HUNTINGTON. COLONEL CLARKE. 
 
 COLONEL IRVINE. COLONEL WILLIAMS. 
 
 COLONEL SHEPARD. COLONEL FEBIGER. 
 
 JOHN LAWRENCE, Judge- Advocate. 
 
 The Court met July 1, 1778, at the house of Mr. Voorhees, 
 New Brunswick, N.J. 
 
 The charges were as follows : 
 
 First For disobedience of orders, in not attacking the 
 enemy on the twenty-eighth of June, agreeably to repeated 
 instructions. 
 
 Second For misbehavior before the enemy on the same day, 
 by making an unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat. 
 
 Third For disrespect to the Commander-in-Chief, in two 
 letters dated the first of July and the twenty-eighth of June. 
 
 GENERAL LEE PLEAD " NOT GUILTY." 
 
 On the twelfth of August, the Court found him to be guilty 
 under all the charges, and sentenced him to be "suspended 
 from any command in the Armies of the United States of 
 America, for the term of twelve months. 7 
 
 Forty-two witnesses were examined. (See page 235 of 
 text, for their unanimity in vindication of Washington from 
 use of any language not proper, in his rebuke of Lee at the 
 time of his retreat.) 
 
390 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 The following are the letters that concluded with Lee s 
 demand for a court-martial : 
 
 FIRST LETTER. 
 
 CAMP ENGLISH-TOWN, July 1, 1778. 
 
 SIR : From the knowledge I have of your Excellency s character, I 
 must conclude that nothing but misinformation of some very stupid, or 
 misrepresentation of some very wicked, person, could have occasioned 
 your having made use of so very singular expressions as you did on my 
 coming up to the ground where you had taken post ; they implied that I 
 was guilty either of disobedience of orders, of want of conduct, or want 
 of courage ; your Excellency will therefore infinitely oblige me by letting 
 me know on which of these three articles you ground your charge, that I 
 may prepare for my justification, which, I have the happiness to be con 
 fident, I can do to the army, to the Congress, to America, and to the world 
 in general. Your Excellency must give me leave to observe that neither 
 yourself nor those about your person could, from your situation, be in 
 the least judges of the merits or demerits of our manoeuvres; and, to 
 speak with a becoming pride, I can assert, that to these manoeuvres, the 
 success of the day was entirely owing. I can boldly say, that had we 
 remained on the first ground, or had we advanced, or had the retreat been 
 conducted in a manner different from what it was, this whole army and 
 the interests of America would have risked being sacrificed. I ever 
 had, and hope ever shall have, the greatest respect and veneration for 
 General Washington ; I think him endowed with many great and good 
 qualities ; but in this instance, I must pronounce that he has been guilty 
 of an act of cruel injustice towards a man who certainly has some pre 
 tentious to the regard of every servant of this country; and, I think, Sir, 
 I have a right to demand reparation for the injury committed, and, unless 
 I can obtain it, I must, in justice to myself, when this campaign is closed 
 (which I believe will close the war), retire from a service at the head of 
 which is placed a man capable of offering such injuries; but, at the same 
 time, in justice to you, I must repeat, that I from my soul believe, that it 
 was not a motion of your own breast, but instigated by some of those 
 dirty earwigs who will forever insinuate themselves near persons in high 
 office ; for I really am convinced, that when General Washington acts 
 for himself no man in his army will have reason to complain of injustice 
 or indecorum. 
 
 I am, Sir, and hope ever shall have 
 
 Reason to continue, your most sincerely 
 Devoted, humble servant, 
 
 CHARLES LEE. 
 His EXCELLENCY GENERAL WASHINGTON. 
 
APPENDIX G. 391 
 
 SECOND LETTER. 
 
 CAMP, June 27, 1778. 
 
 SIR : I beg your Excellency s pardon for the inaccuracy in misdating 
 my letter. You cannot afford me greater pleasure than in giving me the 
 opportunity of showing to America the sufficiency of her respective ser 
 vants. I trust that the temporary power of office, and the tinsel dignity 
 attending it, will not be able, by all the mists they can raise, to obfuscate 
 the bright rays of truth ; in the meantime, your Excellency can have no 
 objection to my retiring from the army. 
 
 I am, Sir, your most obedient, 
 
 Humble servant, 
 
 CHARLES LEE. 
 GENERAL WASHINGTON . 
 
 WASHINGTON S LETTER IN REPLY. 
 
 HEADQUARTERS, ENGLISH-TOWN, June 30, 1778. 
 
 SIR: I received your letter (dated through mistake, the 1st of July), 
 expressed, as I conceive, in terms highly improper. I am not conscious 
 of having made use of any very singular expressions at the time of my 
 meeting you, as you intimate. What I recollect to have said was dic 
 tated by duty and warranted by the occasion. As soon as circumstances 
 will permit, you shall have an opportunity either of justifying yourself 
 to the army, to Congress, to America, and to the world in general, or of 
 convincing them that you were guilty of a breach of orders, and of mis 
 behavior before the enemy on the 28th inst., in not attacking them as you 
 had been directed, and in making an unnecessary, disorderly, and shame 
 ful retreat. 
 
 I am, Sir, your most obedient servant, 
 
 GEORGE WASHINGTON. 
 MAJOR-GENERAL LEE. 
 
 After the reading of the foregoing letters by the Judge- 
 Advocate, General Lee requested the following letter to be 
 also read : 
 
 CAMP, June 30, 1778. 
 
 SIR : Since I had the honor of addressing my letter by Colonel Fitz 
 gerald to your Excellency, I have reflected on both your situation and 
 mine, and beg leave to observe, that it will be for our mutual con 
 venience that a Court of Inquiry should be immediately ordered : but I 
 could wish it might be a court-martial, for if the affair is drawn into 
 length, it may be difficult to collect the necessary evidences, and per 
 haps might bring on a paper war betwixt the adherents to both parties, 
 
392 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 which may occasion some disagreeable feuds on the continent, for all 
 are not my friends, nor all your admirers. I must entreat, therefore, 
 for your love of justice, that you will immediately exhibit your charge, 
 and that on the first halt, I may be brought to a trial ; and am, Sir, your 
 most obedient, humble servant, 
 
 CHARLES LEE. 
 
 The date of the assembling of the court-martial shows that 
 Washington acted promptly. 
 
GLOSSARY OF MILITARY TERMS. 
 
 Abatis. Felled trees, with sharpened branches, pointing outward 
 
 toward an approaching enemy. 
 
 Bastion. A work of two faces and two flanks, with salient angles. 
 Batteau. An old-style flatboat of large capacity, in form of the modern 
 
 scow. 
 Billet. An old term for a brief letter ; or, an assignment of troops to 
 
 certain quarters. 
 Boom. A chain cable or line of spars bound together to prevent the 
 
 passage of vessels at a harbor entrance, or across a river. 
 Cabal. A plot, or secret intrigue. 
 Cantonment. A lodgment for troops. 
 Cheveau-de-Frise. A cylinder, of iron Avhen practicable, with sharp, 
 
 projecting spears on all sides ; to oppose an invading force, or to close 
 
 a gap in the defences. 
 
 Command. A body of troops, or a separate command. 
 Corduroy. (" Cord of the King.") An extemporized road, a uniting 
 
 cord, by a series of parallel logs across a swamp or soft ground. 
 Countersign. A confidential word of recognition, changed daily or 
 
 more frequently, emanating from the officer in chief command. 
 Curtain. A wall connecting two bastions. 
 Detachment. A fraction of a command, or troops assigned to some 
 
 special duty. 
 
 Detail. An assignment for special duty. 
 Engineering. See PREFACE. 
 
 Fascines. Bundles or faggots of brushwood, or small poles, tied to 
 gether, for defence or for crossing swamps. 
 Fusee. A small musket of early times. 
 Gabions. Cylindrical wicker baskets open at both ends, filled for 
 
 defensive purposes, making a temporary parapet. 
 Galleys. Small vessels of light draft. 
 Grand Tactics. See PREFACE. 
 Hurdles. Pickets about three feet high, united by twigs, to give a solid 
 
 footing for a battery, or for crossing soft ground and swamps. 
 Itinerary. Record of daily marches ; including notes of country trav 
 ersed, streams crossed, and whatever may be valuable for record or 
 
 subsequent guidance. 
 
 393 
 
394 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Line-of -battle ship. A full-rigged ship, with two or more gun-decks. 
 
 Log-book. The itinerary of a ship. 
 
 Logistics. See PREFACE. 
 
 Magazine. A depot of powder or of other supplies . 
 
 Muster. A detailed record of troops, periodical or otherwise, for exact 
 
 information of the force under command. 
 Orderly Book. A record of current orders, whether of commissioned 
 
 or non-commissioned officers. 
 
 Parapet. A work, breast-high or more, for defence. 
 Patrol. A small scouting-party beyond the usual line of sentries ; or a 
 
 detail of search as to the movements of the enemy. 
 Picket. An outside sentry, to guard against surprise. 
 Quota. A fixed apportionment upon the basis of numbers. 
 Reconnoissance. A personal examination of country within the range 
 
 of military movements. 
 Redoubt. An inclosed defence. 
 
 Rendezvous. A designated place for assembling troops or supplies. 
 Roster. A list of officers, or of officers and men ; on any duty, or subject 
 
 to duty. 
 
 Salient. An angle projecting outward, toward hostile approach. 
 Strategy. See PREFACE. 
 Surveillance. On the constant watch, with critical observation- of 
 
 existing or contingent conditions. 
 Taking Post. Occupying a designated position, whether under orders, 
 
 or in the contingencies of a march or an advance. 
 Zone. A belt or stretch of country, indicating the sphere of action of 
 
 the various parts of an army, which secures concert of action in com 
 bined movements. 
 
CHRONOLOGICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL 
 
 INDEX 
 
CHRONOLOGICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL 
 INDEX. 
 
 NOTE. The contemporaries of Washington named in this index are in general only 
 persons so associated with or opposed to the cause he stood for as to influence his mili 
 tary action. 
 
 Events are treated and indexed in chronological order, so that the index becomes 
 thereby a miniature biography of the characters taking part in the events narrated. It 
 may ofteii prove interesting to note the age of a prominent actor in these events at the 
 time, by calculating it from the year of his birth when given below. 
 
 ABBREVIATIONS. For various nationalities: Am. (American); Rr. (British); 
 Fr. (French) ; //. (Hessian). In the biographical notices, b. for birth and d. for death 
 are used; and occasionally, k. for killed, w. for wounded, and like familiar abbrevia 
 tions may be found. The subsequent career of many is indicated thus Cornwallis, 
 sub. gov.-gen. India. 
 
 Acts of Parliament to be resisted, 17 
 
 ADAMS, JOHN statesman; sub. 
 
 pres. twice; b. 1735, d. 1826. 
 
 in first Continental Congress, 16 
 
 on special naval committee ... 60 
 
 commissioner in the interests of 
 
 peace 116 
 
 his influence abroad 309 
 
 ADAMS, SAMUEL orator; b. 1722, 
 
 d. 1803. 
 exempted from the proffered 
 
 pardon ... 32 
 
 his opinion of a regular 
 
 army 299 
 
 AGNEW, JAMES Br. maj.-gen- 
 
 eral ; k. at Germantown. .196 
 
 Alamance, N.C., battle of, May 16, 
 
 1771 84 
 
 Albany Convention of July 4, 
 
 1754 "..12 
 
 ALLEN, ETHAN col. ; b. 1637, 
 
 d. 1789. 
 captures Ticonderoga, May 10, 
 
 1775 30 
 
 tries to capture Montreal, with 
 out orders 62 
 
 captured and sent to England, 62 
 insubordination commented up 
 on by Washington 62 
 
 Alliance frigate, twice takes Lafay 
 ette to France 253, 362 
 
 American army, wholly composed 
 of militia. . . .21 
 
 American army, continued 
 
 call for 30,000 under arms. . .22 
 
 officially recognized 32 
 
 its strange experience, March 
 
 2, 1776 75 
 
 occupies Boston, March 17, 
 
 1776 80 
 
 begins its first campaign 83 
 
 April muster, 1776 87 
 
 August muster, 1776 101 
 
 September muster 114 
 
 85 regiments authorized. ... 116 
 its condition, Sept. 10, 1776, 119 
 
 October muster 122 
 
 its lack of discipline 123 
 
 Lee s grand division 135 
 
 special muster ordered by Wash 
 ington, Nov. 23, 1776 136 
 
 its condition, Dec. 30, 1776, 147 
 
 parades in Philadelphia 183 
 
 August muster, 1777 184 
 
 condition at Valley Forge, Dec., 
 
 1777 205-6 
 
 at Newport, 1778 242 
 
 assignments of divisions, 
 
 1778 247 
 
 fixed at 80 battalions 252 
 
 at Philadelphia, weakened in 
 
 discipline 252 
 
 its condition, Dec., 1779 .... 269 
 its condition, Nov. 7, 1780, 296 
 reorganization proposed. ...298 
 new basis, of 36,000 men. ..299 
 
 397 
 
398 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 American army, continued 
 
 divisions again assigned. . ..300 
 
 its condition, 1781 306 
 
 mutinous elements noticed. .307 
 
 afthe South 315-317 
 
 at Peekskill, 1781 333 
 
 before Yorktown, 1781 356 
 
 by States (Appendix A) ... .377 
 
 American Civil War referred to, 
 
 for comparison (Preface), vii 
 
 policy defined 91 
 
 commissioners appointed in the 
 
 interests of peace 115 
 
 cow-boys near New York . . . 255 
 
 speculators feed the British, 306 
 
 Americo-Spanish War of 1898 illus- 
 
 t r a t i n g the principle of 
 
 " Strategy and Statesmanship 
 
 in War " (Preface) x, xii 
 
 ANDRJ&, JOHN Br. major, sub. 
 asst. adjt.-gen. ; b. 1751, d. 
 1780. 
 
 taken prisoner, at St. John s. 62 
 arranges fete in h o n o r of 
 
 Howe 215 
 
 at capture of Charleston. . .275 
 
 his antecedents noticed 289 
 
 former relations to Miss Ship- 
 pen 289 
 
 executed as a spy 290 
 
 his fate regretted 290 
 
 exchange for Arnold morally 
 
 impracticable 291 
 
 ANGELL, col. ; at Fort Mercer, 
 
 R.I 201 
 
 at Battle of Springfield . .283-4 
 ARBUTHNOT, MARIOT Br. admi 
 ral ; b. 1711, d. 1794. 
 
 arrives at New York 261 
 
 relieves Sir George Collier, 261 
 
 fights a French fleet 326 
 
 Armies of modern times 370-1 
 
 of the Revolution as given by 
 the British authority, Sted- 
 
 man (Appendix D) 386 
 
 Arms from France 164 
 
 ARMSTRONG, JOHN brig. -gen. ; 
 b. 1758, d. 1843. 
 
 at Brandywine 186 
 
 on the Schuylkill 192 
 
 ARNOLD, BENEDICT sab. maj.- 
 
 gen.; b. 1740, d. 1801. 
 takes a company to Boston . .30 
 hastens to Lake Champlain . . 30 
 
 anticipated by Allen 30 
 
 organizes a naval force 30 
 
 loved by Washington 45 
 
 Arnold, Benedict, continued 
 
 returns in angry mood 51 
 
 proposes conquest of Canada, 51 
 his expedition for Quebec. . .55 
 
 his disastrous march 64 
 
 wounded in a bold assault .... 66 
 his captains refuse longer ser 
 vice 66 
 
 the siege of Quebec fails. . . .66 
 
 at Providence 163 
 
 unjustly treated by Congress, 165 
 
 gallantry at Ridgefield 166 
 
 in command at Philadelphia, 167 
 gallantry in Burgoyne c a m - 
 
 paign 176 
 
 finally promoted 176 
 
 court-martialed 274 
 
 is married to Miss Shippen .289 
 suffers from old wound, 222, 288 
 in command at West Point. 288 
 corresponds with Clinton. . .288 
 invites Andre to visit him . . 290 
 dictates price of his treason, 290 
 antecedents in Philadelphia, 289 
 his treason anticipated by Lord 
 
 Germaine 28$ 
 
 his exchange for Andre impos 
 sible without dishonor . . .291 
 leaves N.Y. with troops. . . .310 
 
 overtaken by a storm 310 
 
 his discretion doubted by Clin 
 ton ...310 
 
 plunders Richmond, Va 311 
 
 cannot intimidate Jefferson, 311 
 returns to fortify Ports 
 mouth 311 
 
 writes to Lafayette 331 
 
 treated with silent contempt, 331 
 tries threats to no purpose, 331 
 relations with Gen. Phillips, 331 
 ordered back to New York, 331 
 lays waste New London. . . .351 
 
 his recall explained 351 
 
 ARNOLD, Mrs. (formerly Miss 
 Shippen) ignorant of Ar 
 nold s treason 28$ 
 
 honored by Washington. . . .291 
 
 sympathy of Lafayette 291 
 
 Articles of Confederation finally 
 
 adopted 30$ 
 
 " Art of War " (Preface) x-xii 
 
 ASHE, JOHN brig. -gen. ; b. 1721, 
 d. 1781; declares while 
 speaker of the North Caro 
 lina Assembly, concerning the 
 Stamp Act, " We will resist 
 its execution to the death," 13 
 
INDEX. 
 
 399 
 
 ATLEE, SAMUEL J. col. ; b. 1738, 
 
 d. 1786. 
 
 joins the army at Brooklyn, 105 
 commands Pennsylvania 
 
 Rifles 105 
 
 makes a gallant fight 107 
 
 prisoner with Stirling 107 
 
 Augusta 74, Br. ; blown up in the 
 
 Delaware 202 
 
 Aux Trembles reached by Benedict 
 
 Arnold G5 
 
 reached by Montgomery ... .05 
 reached by Carleton 06 
 
 Baltimore pays honor to Rocham- 
 
 beau and Washington. . . .351 
 
 BANCROFT, GEORGE diplomat and 
 
 historian; b. 1800, d. 1891. 
 as to the invasion of Canada, 54 | 
 his estimate of Washington, 250 
 BARRAS, PAUL FRA^OIS JEAN, 
 Count DE Fr. admiral ; b, 
 1755, d. 1829. 
 
 sails from Newport 354 
 
 enters the Chesapeake 355 
 
 signs capitulation of York- 
 town 360 
 
 also signs for Count de 
 
 Grasse 360 
 
 Bennington unwisely attacked by 
 Burgoyne ; anticipated b y 
 
 Washington 176 
 
 Berlin conference noticed 370 
 
 BIDDLE, NICHOLAS -- appointed 
 
 naval captain 60 
 
 Billingsport raided by Cornwal- 
 
 lis 203 
 
 BIRD Br. lieut.-col. ; k. at Ger- 
 
 mantown 196 
 
 BLACKSTONE chief of the Sene- 
 cas ; friend o f Washing 
 ton 260 
 
 Bordentown occupied by Donop 
 
 (//.) , 139 
 
 occupied by Cadwallader . . . 156 
 
 visited by British troops. . . .213 
 
 Boston massacre of March 5, 
 
 1770 15 
 
 Tea Party entertainment, Dec. 
 
 16, 1773 15 
 
 Port Bill, 1774 15 
 
 surrounded by 20,000 minute- 
 men 30 
 
 deliverance from British control 
 
 a fixed purpose 30 
 
 not a proper British base .... 33 
 bombarded three nights.. 74, 77 
 
 Boston, continued 
 
 evacuated 80 
 
 visited by D Estaing 243 
 
 visited by Greene 246 
 
 visited by Lafayette 244 
 
 visited by Rochambeau 361 
 
 BOTTA, CARLO GIUSEPPE GUGLI- 
 ELMO Hal. historian ; b. 1768, 
 d. 1837. 
 as to Battle of Long Island, 113 
 
 as to Battle of Trenton 149 
 
 reviews New Jersey cam 
 paign 159 
 
 BOVILLE, DE Fr. maj.-gen. ; re 
 connoitres with Was h i n g - 
 
 ton 336 
 
 BOWDOIN, JAMES pres. Mass. 
 Council; b. 1727, d. 1790: 
 addressed by Charles Lee. 139 
 Braddock s operations noticed .... 7 
 BRADLEY, JOSEPH P. Justice U.S. 
 Supreme Court; b. 1813, d. 
 1892 ; corrects a tradition as 
 to Lafayette s alleged remi 
 niscence of Washington s pro 
 fanity 235 
 
 Brandy wine, Battle of IS."} 
 
 British army, at various dates (Ap 
 pendix D) 383 
 
 troops quartered by Britisli Par 
 liament in Boston, 1768 ... 14 
 estimates for troops, by British 
 
 ministry 96 
 
 foreign auxiliaries opposed by 
 
 Britisli statesmen 96 
 
 four military operations pro 
 posed 97 
 
 its movements after Battle of 
 
 Long Island .116 
 
 advances to Horn s Hook (see 
 
 map) 120 
 
 lands at Throgg s Neck (see 
 
 map) 125 
 
 advances beyond New Ro- 
 
 chelle 126 
 
 awaiting ree nf orcements . . . 127 
 
 in New Jersey 139 
 
 invades the Illinois country. 253 
 
 opposed by Gov. Jefferson. 253 
 
 fed by Am. speculators .... 296 
 
 British military policy defined . . .95 
 
 British Parliament urges king to 
 
 arrest Americans, 1769 .... 14 
 
 rejects " Conciliatory Bill," 
 
 1775 18 
 
 restricts New England trade . 18 
 favors certain colonies . . . . 18 
 
400 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Brookline, Mass., furnished fas 
 cine rods 78 
 
 Brooklyn, N.Y., occupied by 
 
 Lee 85 
 
 fortified by Greene 102 
 
 evacuated by Washington . .112 
 Bull Run, 1861, illustrates Bran- 
 
 dywine (Preface) x 
 
 Bunker Hill or Breed s Hill, signifi 
 cance of the battle 34 
 
 BURGOYNE, Sir JOHN lieut-gen. ; 
 b. 1730, d. 1792. 
 
 arrives at Boston 33 
 
 describes rebels as peasants .34 
 calls battle on Breed s Hill " a 
 
 great catastrophe " 40 
 
 reaches Canada from Ire 
 land 89, 171 
 
 issues an unwise proclama 
 tion 172 
 
 responded to by Washington, 172 
 has no sympathy with " hire of 
 
 Indians " 172 
 
 sharp letter from Gates 173 
 
 his noble response 173 
 
 captures Ticonderoga 175 
 
 his diversion to Bennington an 
 
 error 175-6 
 
 surrenders his army 176 
 
 organization of his army (Ap 
 pendix E) 387 
 
 BURKE, EDMUND Br, statesman ; 
 
 I. 1730, d. 1797. 
 BURR, AARON col. ; sub. vice- 
 
 pres. ; b. 1756, d. 1836. 
 accompanies Arnold to Que 
 bec 55 
 
 BUTLER, THOMAS col. ; at storm 
 ing of Stony Point 257 
 
 BYRON, JOHN Br. admiral ; b. 
 
 1723, d. 1786. 
 
 relieves admiral, Lord Howe 239 
 fleet scattered by a storm . . 239 
 arrives off Boston .245 
 
 CADWALLADER, JOHN brig.- 
 
 gen. ; b. 1743, d. 1786. 
 guarding the Delaware .... 141 
 
 fails to cross river 142 
 
 crosses Delaware at Bristol. 146 
 
 arrives at Trenton 151 
 
 at Princeton 156 
 
 at Bordentown 156 
 
 CAESAR, JULIUS Roman general ; 
 
 b. 100 B.C., d. 44 B.C. 
 his campaigns cited in compari 
 son (Preface) viii 
 
 Caesar, Julius, continued 
 
 his methods imitated by Wash 
 ington 313 
 
 CALDWELL, JAMES his church 
 
 burned by the British 271 
 
 his wife shot by the British. 279 
 furnishes hymn-books for gun- 
 wadding at Springfield. . .284 
 CAMPBELL, WILLIAM Am. col. ; 
 b. 1745, d. 1781; at Battle of 
 
 King s Mountain 293 
 
 Canada lost to France, 1763 10 
 
 as a British base 30 
 
 invasion urged by Congress. .50 
 
 Arnold its active spirit 51 
 
 Congress again moves 52-3 
 
 difference in religious faith. .52 
 
 two expeditions planned 55 
 
 did not support Burgoyne ... 55 
 failure of the expeditions .... 66 
 visited by commissioners .... 88 
 
 visited by small-pox 88 
 
 costs five thousand American 
 
 lives in sixty days 88 
 
 British reinforcements come, 89 
 abandoned by the American 
 
 army 89 
 
 the excuse of Congress 89 
 
 Canadian Acts of Parliament ... 50 
 expeditions of Schuyler and 
 
 Montgomery 52, 55 
 
 expedition again suggested, but 
 
 opposed by Washington, .252 
 
 CARLETON, Sir GUY gov. of 
 
 Canada, sub. gov. New York; 
 
 b. 1724, d. 1808. 
 
 Arnold s report of his small 
 
 force in Canada 51 
 
 flees from Montreal in disguise 
 
 to Quebec 64 
 
 pays military honors to his old 
 comrade, Montgomery .... 66 
 his magnanimous parole of Am 
 erican prisoners of war .... 66 
 being largely reenforced in 
 June, 1776, takes the offen 
 sive 89 
 
 succeeds Clinton in N.Y 362 
 
 cooperates with Washington, 363 
 
 surrenders New York 363 
 
 CARRINGTON, EDWARD col., sub. 
 quartermaster-gen. (South) ; 
 b. 1749, d. 1810. 
 indorsed by Chief-Justice Mar 
 shall 301 
 
 explores the Southern 
 rivers.. 302 
 
INDEX. 
 
 401 
 
 Carrington, Edward, continued 
 commissioner to exchange pris 
 oners 318 
 
 CARROLL, CHARLES last survivor 
 of the signers of the Declara 
 tion of Independence ; b. 1737, 
 d. 1832 ; commissioner to 
 
 Canada 88 
 
 CARROLL, Rev. JOHN sub. Arch 
 bishop of Maryland ; visits 
 Canada and reports a terrible 
 
 condition of affairs 88 
 
 CATHARINE II. OF RUSSIA b. 1729, 
 d. 1796; is hostile to British 
 commerce, but favors Amer 
 ican interests 296 
 
 Charleston, S.C., captured by Clin 
 ton 275 
 
 Charlestown Heights, neglected by 
 
 British 34 
 
 occupied by Americans 34 
 
 occupied by British 35 
 
 abandoned 61 
 
 Charlottesville, Va., a Hessian 
 prison-camp, visited by Tarle- 
 
 ton 340 
 
 CHASE, SAMUEL Md. ; b. 1741, 
 d. 1811; appointed commis 
 sioner to Canada 88 
 
 CHASTELLUX, FRANCOIS JEAN, 
 Marquis DE maj. -general ; 
 b. 1734, d. 1789. 
 accompanies Rochambeau to 
 
 America 286 
 
 a relative of Lafayette 286 
 
 marches from Newport to Ridge- 
 bury, Conn 333 
 
 in conference at Wethers- 
 field 333 
 
 commands a division 337 
 
 CHATHAM, Lord (WILLIAM PITT) 
 orator and statesman ; b. 
 1756, d. 1835. 
 
 Pittsburg named in his honor, 10 
 describes the First Continental 
 
 Congress 17 
 
 his conciliatory bill defeated, 18 
 as to making slaves of American 
 
 Englishmen 20 
 
 as to Battle of Guilf ord 320 
 
 Chatterton Hill, battle near White 
 
 Plains i 129 
 
 Chemung, Battle of, noticed. . .260 
 Chesapeake Bay memorable in 
 
 naval warfare 354 
 
 " Chimney-corner patriots " disgust 
 Washington 328 
 
 China stimulated by American ex 
 ample 370 
 
 Civil liberty requires right execu 
 tion of military power . . .304 
 CLINTON, JAMES brig. -general ; 
 
 b. 1736, d. 1812. 
 gallantry at Fort Clinton ... 1 79 
 
 in Indian expedition 260 
 
 CLINTON, GEORGE gov , brig.- 
 gen. ; sub. vice-pres.; b. 1736. 
 d. 1812. 
 commands in the Highlands, 166 
 
 his services noted 178, 190 
 
 CLINTON, Sir HENRY lieut.- 
 gen. ; b. 1758, d. 1795. 
 
 arrives in America 3*5 
 
 urges attack upon Cambridge, 35 
 
 overruled by Howe 35 
 
 expects an independent com 
 mand 70 
 
 anticipated by Washington . . 70 
 visits Tryon in New York. . .85 
 ordered to destroy Southern 
 
 cities 85 
 
 in attack upon Fort Sullivan, 
 
 S.C 85 
 
 returns to New York 89 
 
 in battle of Long Island 107 
 
 expects large success 110 
 
 at Newport, R.I 15O 
 
 in expedition up the Hudson, 178 
 
 outgenerals Putnam 178 
 
 captures Forts Clinton and 
 
 Montgomery 179 
 
 did not intend to join Bur- 
 
 goyne 180 
 
 returns to New York 182 
 
 relieves Howe in command, 215 
 
 gives a fete to Howe 215 
 
 attempts capture of Lafay 
 ette 216 
 
 fails to capture Lafayette . .217 
 
 his policy outlined 221 
 
 evacuates Philadelphia 222 
 
 moves toward Monmouth, 223-4 
 
 followed by Lafayette 225 
 
 prepares for battle 229 
 
 abandons position at night .234 
 
 regains New York 234 
 
 escapes the French fleet. . . .238 
 tries to reenforce Newport. 245 
 reports to Lord Germaine. .249 
 
 inactive at New York 252 
 
 captures Stony Point 253 
 
 reoccupies Stony Point, when 
 
 Washington abandoned it, 259 
 
 declines to attack West Point, 2(51 
 
402 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Clinton, Sir Henry, continued 
 abandons Newport and New 
 
 England 262 
 
 sails for Charleston 208 
 
 reports his force 270 
 
 reports as to Provincials. . .272 
 expedition suffers from 
 
 storm 274 
 
 captures Charleston 275 
 
 issues absurd proclamation. 275 
 
 reenforced by Rawdon 276 
 
 returns to New York 282 
 
 plans a new expedition .... 283 
 
 invades New Jersey 283 
 
 Battle of Springfield 283-4 
 
 burns Springfield 285 
 
 "needs rest for his army ".285 
 plans descent upon Newport, 286 
 writes Lord Germaine as to 
 
 West Point 288 
 
 corresponds with Arnold. . .289 
 again writes Lord Germaine . 289 
 closes bargain with Arnold. 290 
 cannot exchange Arnold for 
 
 Andre 291 
 
 watches the American mu 
 tiny 309 
 
 advises with Lord Germaine . 309 
 sends Arnold to Virginia. ..310 
 doubts Arnold s discretion. .310 
 sends good officers Avith him, 310 
 equally powerless Avith Corn- 
 
 wallis 324 
 
 learns of effort to capture 
 
 Arnold 325 
 
 sends Phillips to support Ar 
 nold 326 
 
 orders Arnold to New York, 331 
 disturbed by Arnold s corre 
 spondence with London offi 
 cials 332 
 
 receives Washington s decoy 
 
 letters 335 
 
 " in a state of siege " 335 
 
 other decoy letters reach 
 
 him 336 
 
 orders Cornwallis to report to 
 
 him 337 
 
 calls for reenforcements . . .338 
 intercepts other decoy letters 
 
 with plans enclosed 346 
 
 outgeneraled by Washing 
 ton 347-8 
 
 writes Cornwallis promising 
 
 help 350 
 
 advises Cornwallis to strike 
 Philadelphia 352 
 
 | Clinton, Sir Henry, continued 
 does not understand Washing 
 ton 352 
 
 hears from Cornwallis 358 
 
 sails for Yorktown too late .358 
 contemporaneous surrender of 
 
 Cornwallis 359-60 
 
 is relieved of command in New 
 
 York 361 
 
 succeeded by Sir Guy Carle- 
 ton 361 
 
 COLLIER, Sir GEORGE Br. com 
 modore, 
 convoys Clinton and his troops 
 
 up the Hudson 253 
 
 his fleet visits NCAV Haven .256 
 relieved by Admiral Arbuth- 
 
 not 261 
 
 Colonial Congress at NCAV York, 
 
 1765 11 
 
 nine Colonies represented ; 
 
 others ratify action 11 
 
 names of Colonies that Avere not 
 
 represented 11 
 
 the Declaration of Rights . . .11 
 denounces Stamp Act, Oct. 7, 
 
 1755 13 
 
 Colonial expeditions, 1755 10 
 
 additional, 1758 10 
 
 Colonial governments and their 
 
 forms described 16 
 
 Columbian Exposition, 1892, 
 
 noticed 372-3 
 
 Commissioners sent to Canada.. 88 
 General and Admiral Howe 
 meet American commission 
 ers in New York 98 
 
 arrange terms betAveen CornAval- 
 
 lis and Washington 359 
 
 Committee of Congress visits Bos 
 ton 60 
 
 Committee of Correspondence, 
 
 1773, and their purpose . . .15 
 
 Connecticut Farms, N.J., burned 
 
 by General Knyphausen. .279 
 
 Connecticut sends 2,000 men to 
 
 Boston, April 26, 1775 23 
 
 assigns Putnam, Wooster, and 
 
 Spencer to command 23 
 
 sends volunteers to NCAV York 
 
 with Lee 71 
 
 her militia greatly reduced. . 116 
 responds to Washington s ap 
 peal 116 
 
 tAvice invaded by Tryon, 166, 256 
 
 invaded by Arnold. . 351 
 
 Continental Army organized. . . .32 
 
INDEX. 
 
 403 
 
 Continental Congress adopts militia 
 about Boston as the Amer 
 ican Continental Army .... 32 
 forms Light Infantry corps . . 32 
 appoints Washington Com- 
 
 mander-in-Chief 32 
 
 accompanies commission with 
 
 pledge of support 32 
 
 sends committee to Washington 
 
 at Cambridge 52 
 
 disclaims purpose to operate 
 
 against Canada 54 
 
 but initiated and pressed every 
 
 expedition 54 
 
 sends a second committee to 
 
 Cambridge 60 
 
 authorizes a navy 00 
 
 urges attack upon Boston. . .61 
 
 sends committee to N.Y 85 
 
 orders additional troops to Can 
 ada 88 
 
 proposes to hire Indian allies, 88 
 appoints commissioners to Can- 
 
 -, no 
 
 ada oo 
 
 authorizes abandonment of New 
 
 York 117 
 
 confers large powers upon 
 
 Washington 140 
 
 imparts dictatorial powers . . 148 
 makes promotions without con 
 sulting Washington 165 
 
 adjourns to Lancaster and to 
 
 York 194 
 
 honors the defenders of Fort 
 
 Mifflin 202 
 
 places enemies of Washington 
 
 in responsible commands, 205 
 
 sends a committee to Valley 
 
 Forge 212 
 
 Continental money worth 3 cents 
 
 on the dollar 252 
 
 CONWAY, THOMAS Irish advent 
 urer,; brig. -gen. at Battle of 
 
 Germantown 195 
 
 promoted major-general and in 
 spector-general 205 
 
 resigns his commission 207 
 
 responsible for the " Conway 
 
 cabal" 212 
 
 departs for France 212 
 
 CORNWALLIS, CHARLES, Lord 
 sub. lieut-gen. India; b. 1738, 
 d. 1805. 
 
 sails for America 97 
 
 lands at Wilmington, N.C. . .97 
 accompanies Clinton to Charles 
 ton, S.C 97 
 
 Cornwallis, Charles, continued 
 
 returns to New York 99 
 
 in Battle of Long Island . . . 107 
 enforces the surrender of Sulli 
 
 van and Stirling 108 
 
 assaults Fort Washington . . 132 
 
 invades New Jersey 136 
 
 halts at Brunswick 137 
 
 on eve of departure for Eng 
 land 150 
 
 ordered back to New Jersey, 150 
 advances upon Trenton .... 152 
 threatens Washington s posi 
 tion 154 
 
 strengthens his own position, 154 
 outgeneraled by Washing- 
 
 ton 156 
 
 retires to Brunswick 156 
 
 again on the aggressive .... 167 
 attempts to gain Washington s 
 
 defences 169 
 
 retires to Staten Island 169 
 
 in skirmish upon invasion of 
 
 Pennsylvania 185 
 
 moves up the Brandywine. . 188 
 leads the advance of Howe s 
 
 army 188 
 
 surprises Sullivan s d i v i - 
 
 sion 187-9 
 
 moves to Chester 192 
 
 enters Philadelphia 194 
 
 lands in New Jersey 203 
 
 compels Americans to destroy 
 
 their galleys 203 
 
 threatens Washington at Chest 
 nut Hill 204 
 
 skirmishes with Morgan. . . .204 
 makes incursion into N e AV 
 
 Jersey . 248 
 
 in command at the South. . .275 
 suspends invasion of North Car 
 olina .293 
 
 fails to subjugate the people, 293 
 sore over Tarleton s defeat at 
 
 Cowpens 315 
 
 presses closely upon Greene, 315 
 informs Clinton of his condi 
 tion 317 
 
 abandons Charleston 317 
 
 expects no aid from V i r - 
 
 ginia 318 
 
 his proclamation to rebels . .318 
 arranges for exchange of pris 
 oners 318 
 
 parols militia as prisoners . .318 
 seeks to control upper fords, 318 
 is outgeneraled by Greene. .319 
 
404 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Cornwallis, Charles, continued 
 
 in need of all supplies 319 
 
 at Guilford Court-House . . .319 
 cannot improve success . . . .320 
 practically a defeat, so judged 
 
 by contemporaries 320 
 
 retires to Wilmington, leaving 
 his wounded, closely pursued 
 
 by Greene 321 
 
 his position, and that of Clinton, 
 
 noticed 324 | 
 
 reminiscence of earlier cam 
 paign 325 
 
 his effective force reduced .329 
 arrives at Yorktown from Wil 
 mington 333 
 
 sustained by British minis 
 try 337 
 
 Clinton wants his troops . . .338 
 promises to expel Lafayette 
 
 from Virginia 338 
 
 in pursuit of Lafayette . .338-9 
 his course described by Lafay 
 ette 339 
 
 abandons the pursuit 339 
 
 is followed by Lafayette . . .340 
 returns to headquarters . . . .341 
 finds old despatches from Clin 
 ton 341 
 
 takes boats for Yorktown . .341 
 his movements reported to 
 
 Washington 342 
 
 is warned by Clinton of dan 
 ger 350 
 
 relations to Clinton no 
 ticed 352-3 
 
 must destroy Lafayette s army 
 
 to hold Virginia 353 
 
 attempts escape by Glouces 
 ter 358 
 
 the movement abandoned . .358 
 graphic report to Clinton. . .358 
 terms of surrender fixed. . .359 
 
 surrender completed 3GO 
 
 courtesies between officers of 
 
 the three armies 3G1 
 
 his interview Avith Lafayette, 3d 
 CORNWALLIS, FREDERICK acts 
 as Br. commissioner to ex 
 change prisoners 318 
 
 COUDRAY, Monsieur DE ordered 
 to complete defensive works 
 
 along the Delaware 192 
 
 Court-martial of Arnold 274 
 
 Court-martial of Lee (Appendix 
 
 G) 389 
 
 Cowpens, Battle of 312 
 
 COXE, DANIEL urges union of 
 Colonies, 1722 12 
 
 Crimean War noticed 313 
 
 CROMWELL, OLIVER Lord Pro 
 tector of England; b. 1599, 
 d. 1659. 
 
 cited by Washington s officers 
 as a precedent for assuming 
 permanent command 364 
 
 Crown Point, expedition against, 
 
 1755 10 
 
 visited by Allen and Arnold. .30 
 captured by Seth Warner. . . .51 
 
 CUSTIS, Mrs. MARTHA I. 1732, 
 d. 1802; her marriage to 
 Washington . . 8 
 
 Danbury, Conn., invaded (with 
 
 Kidgefield) by Tryon 166 
 
 DARTMOUTH, GEORGE, Lord Br. 
 
 statesman; b. 1748, d. 1791. 
 comments upon Lexington and 
 
 Concord 20 
 
 opposed military occupation of 
 
 Boston 33 
 
 advised Howe to attack South 
 ern cities 69 
 
 regarded New York as the true 
 
 British base 69 
 
 DAYTON, ELIAS col. ; b. 1735, 
 
 d. -1807. 
 
 his regiment in battle. . . .278-9 
 DEANE, SILAS b. 1737, d. 1834. 
 
 on naval committee 60 
 
 commissioner to France. . . .209 
 
 returns to Philadelphia 238 
 
 DEBORRE, PRUDIIOMME brig.- 
 gen. ; disgraced at Brandy- 
 wine 189 
 
 Declaration of Independence, July 
 
 4, 1776 91 
 
 D ESTAING, CHARLES HECTOR, 
 Count Fr. lieut.-general ; 
 b. 1729, d. 1794. 
 reaches the Delaware with 
 
 French fleet 238 
 
 sails at once for New York, 239 
 
 unable to cross the bar 240 
 
 arrives at Newport, K.I. . . .240 
 consults Sullivan as to 
 
 attack 242 
 
 not affronted by Sullivan s land 
 ing first 243 
 
 is confronted by British 
 
 fleet 243 
 
 both fleets dispersed 243 
 
 returns to Newport 243 
 
INDEX. 
 
 405 
 
 D Estaing, Charles Hector, Count, 
 
 continued 
 sails for Boston to refit; notices 
 
 Sullivan s protest 243 
 
 his manly course vindicated, 244 
 sails for the West Indies. . .245 
 
 off the coast of Georgia 261 
 
 his siege of Savannah, urged by 
 
 Lafayette 267 
 
 twice wounded 268 
 
 DE FLEURY, Louis Fr. lieuten t, 
 
 sub. col. 
 at defence of Fort Mercer. .202 
 
 planned Fort Mifflin 202 
 
 wounded in its defence 203 
 
 DE GRASSE, FRANCOIS JOSEPH PAUL 
 
 Fr.; b. 1723, d. 1788. 
 arrives in the Chesapeake . .342 
 limited in period of opera 
 tions 342 
 
 urges assault upon York- 
 
 town 342 
 
 yields to Lafayette s judg 
 ment 343 
 
 is visited by Washington . . .354 
 has naval fight with Admiral 
 
 Graves (see map) 355 
 
 suggests a plan of action. . .356 
 
 opposed by Lafayette 356 
 
 sails for the West Indies. . .361 
 his trophies at Yorktown 
 
 (Appendix F) 388 
 
 DE HEISTER //. lieut.-gen. ; 
 lands at Gravesend, Aug. 25, 
 
 1776 106 
 
 captures Sullivan and Stirling, 
 and parts of their c o m - 
 
 mands 108 
 
 advances to support Howe . . 126 
 DE KALB, JOHN, Baron maj.- 
 
 gen.; b. 1732, d. 1780. 
 comes to America with Lafay- 
 ette. Note to Chap. 
 
 XVIII 191 
 
 reports as to the army 205 
 
 appointed inspector-general, 207 
 commands Maryland and Dela 
 ware troops 277 
 
 Southern campaign 291 
 
 k. in Battle of Camden 292 
 
 Delaware troops always effi 
 cient 277 
 
 gallantry at Camden 292 
 
 Denmark and Sweden hostile to 
 
 England 296 
 
 DESTOUCHES, Chevalier succeeds 
 De Ternay, deceased 298 
 
 Destouches, Chevalier, confd 
 
 supports Washington 323 
 
 indorsed by Washington ... 826 
 
 DE TERNAY, Chevalier convoys 
 
 Rochambeau s army from 
 
 France 286 
 
 blockaded by British at New 
 port 298 
 
 dies at Newport 298 
 
 is succeeded by Destouches, 298 
 DICKENSON, JOHN in first Conti 
 nental Congress 17 
 
 DINWIDDIE, ROBERT gov. of Vir 
 ginia; b. 1690, d. 1770; sent 
 Washington as commissioner 
 
 to French frontier 6 
 
 DONOP If. col. ; in the storming 
 
 of Chatterton Hill .129 
 
 abandons Bordentown 146 
 
 k. in storming Fort Mercer, 201 
 
 is buried by the Americans, 202 
 
 Dorchester Heights occupied by 
 
 the Americans 76-80 
 
 DRAYTON, WILLIAM H. b. 1742, 
 d. 1779; chief-justice, South 
 
 Carolina, 1776 86 
 
 DUMAS, MATHIEU, Count DE Fr. 
 
 col. ; sub. marshal-de-camp 
 
 and historian ; b. 1753. d. 1837; 
 
 gallantry at Yorktown . . 357 
 
 Note. He was wounded 
 
 in storming redoubt. 
 DUNDAS, FRANCIS Br. lieut.-col. ; 
 b. 1750, d. 1824; goes to Vir 
 ginia with Arnold 310 
 
 DUNMORE, JOHN MURRAY, Lord 
 Br. gov. Virginia; b. 1732, 
 d. 1818. 
 
 seizes colonial powder 28 
 
 opposed by Patrick Henry ... 28 
 takes refuge on board the man- 
 of-war Foivey 28 
 
 bombards Norfolk, New Year s 
 
 day, 1776 68 
 
 is visited by Gen. Clinton . . .85 
 Du PORTAIL, LEBEGUE Fr. brig.- 
 gen. ; d. 1802. 
 
 captured at Charleston 300 
 
 succeeded as engineer by Kos- 
 
 ciusko 300 
 
 reconnoitres w i t h Washing 
 ton 336 
 
 visits the Count de Grasse with 
 Washington 353 
 
 EFFINGHAM, Lord Br. ; resigns 
 when ordered to America . . 21 
 
406 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Elizabethtown, N.J., visited by 
 
 Knyphausen 227 
 
 Engineering defined, with note 
 
 (Preface) xi 
 
 ERSKINE, Sir WILLIAM Br. 
 brig.-gen. ; captured by Am. 
 
 privateer at sea 98, 99 
 
 warns Cornwallis at Trenton, 1 55 
 attempts to capture Lafay 
 ette 216 
 
 Eutaw Springs the last battle at 
 
 the South 321 
 
 Evacuation of Boston (-fir.) ... .80 
 
 Brooklyn (Am.} 113 
 
 New York (Am.} 127 
 
 Philadelphia (.fir.) 222 
 
 Charleston (Am.} 207 
 
 Yorktown (.fir.) 301 
 
 New York (Br. ) 303 
 
 EWING, JAMES brig. -general ; 
 failed to cross at Trenton, 
 1776, on Christmas night. 162 
 
 FAIRFAX, BRYAN, Lord b. 1730, 
 d. 1802 ; friend of Washing 
 ton 5 
 
 Fair field, Conn., raided by Gov 
 ernor Tryon 255 
 
 FEBIGER, CHRISTIAN colonel at 
 Stony Point 257 
 
 First Continental Congress, at 
 Philadelphia, Sept. 5, 
 
 1774 16 
 
 its officers and members no 
 ticed 16 
 
 Washington a member 17 
 
 honored by Lord Chatham. ..17 
 supports Massachusetts 17 
 
 FLEURY, Louis DE. SeeDe 
 Fleury. 
 
 FORM AN brig.-gen., at Battle of 
 Germantown 195 
 
 Forrest s battery (Am.} at Tren 
 ton 145 
 
 Forts Clinton and Montgomery 
 captured (see map) 179 
 
 Fort I) u Quesne, became Fort Pitt 
 (now Pittsburgh) 10 
 
 Fort Mercer and its gallant de 
 fence , 201 
 
 Fort Mifflin, planned by De Fleury 
 (Fr.} 202 
 
 France retains certain American 
 possessions by Treaty of 
 
 Paris, 1763 11 
 
 makes a formal alliance with 
 America.. ..213 
 
 France, continued 
 
 sends an ambassador to Amer 
 ica 238 
 
 sends a fleet to America. . . .238 
 sends a second fleet to Amer 
 ica 201 
 
 sends an army to America. .286 
 sends a third fleet and troops to 
 
 America 342 
 
 sends money to America . . .348 
 shares in the trophies of York- 
 town 388 
 
 Franco-Prussian war cited in com 
 parison (Preface) vii 
 
 FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN philoso 
 pher, diplomat, and states- 
 . man; 6. 1710, d. 1790. 
 urges a union of the Colonies, 
 
 1754 12 
 
 the convention of July 4, 1754, 
 
 the result 12 
 
 reasons for its failure 12 
 
 on passage of Stamp Act, writ 
 ing to Charles Thompson . . 13 
 Thompson s reply quoted. ... 13 
 describes the servile attitude of 
 
 the English people 18 
 
 chairman Penn. Committee of 
 
 Safety 28 
 
 his opinion of fight at Breed s 
 
 Hill 34 
 
 commissioner to Canada 88 
 
 commissioner to meet Gen. 
 
 and Admiral Howe 110 
 
 secures French support . . . .209 
 writes as to AVashington s stand 
 ing abroad 308 
 
 influence with Holland and 
 
 Spain noticed 309 
 
 secures a loan from Holland, 348 
 FREDERICK II. third king of 
 Prussia (called "the Great") ; 
 son of Frederick William I. ; 
 5. 1712, d. 1786; like Wash 
 ington in reticence 44 
 
 French army at Newport, R.I., 286 
 marches through Connecti 
 cut 335 
 
 joins Washington 335 
 
 threatens New York 330 
 
 supports Lafayette 342 
 
 parades in Philadelphia .... 349 
 reviewed by the president of 
 
 Congress 349 
 
 in siege of Yorktown 357 
 
 competes with Americans, in 
 action . . . . 358 
 
INDEX. 
 
 407 
 
 French fleet off the Delaware, with 
 
 French Ambassador 238 
 
 unable to enter New York. .240 
 
 sails for Newport, B.I 240 
 
 engages fleet of Howe 243 
 
 repairs at Boston 243 
 
 at Savannah, Ga 261 
 
 blockaded at Newport 295 
 
 off the Chesapeake 350 
 
 engages with British fleet. . .354 
 
 leaves America 361 
 
 Frigate La Sensible (Fr.) brings 
 
 French treaty to America, 213 
 La Chinier (Fr.) brings French 
 
 minister to America 238 
 
 Frigates built during the war, and 
 
 their fate (Appendix B)T378 
 
 GAGE, THOMAS Br. lieut.-gen. ; 
 
 b. 1721, d. 1787. 
 appointed gov. Massachusetts 
 and Commander-in-Chief . .16 
 his fatal movement upon Con 
 cord 20 
 
 succeeded by Howe 58 
 
 GATES, HORATIO maj. -general, 
 sub. adj. -general ; b. 1728, 
 d. 1806. 
 
 his antecedents 36 
 
 succeeds Sullivan in Can 
 ada 88 
 
 the confidant of Charles Lee, 127 
 confidential letter from Lee, 127 
 
 another letter from Lee 138 
 
 reports for duty 139 
 
 absent without leave 141 
 
 dodges Battle of Trenton . . 142 
 insolent letter to Burgoyne, 173 
 
 its lofty rebuke ". ... 173 
 
 relieves Schuyler, and himself 
 
 relieved 173 
 
 declines command of Ticonder- 
 
 oga 173 
 
 insulting letter to Washing 
 ton 173-4 
 
 Washington s reply 174 
 
 appeals to congressmen 174 
 
 on leave of absence 174 
 
 supersedes Schuyler 176 
 
 captures Burgoyne s army. . 176 
 congratulated by Washing 
 ton 179 
 
 reports direct to Congress . . 179 
 president of Board of War, 205 
 still corresponds with Lee . .205 
 
 commands at Peekskill 212 
 
 on Council of AVar.. ..217 
 
 Ij Gates, Horatio, continued 
 
 letters to Lee known to Wash 
 ington 220 
 
 declines to fight Indians .... 259 
 " unequal to the command," 260 
 spends winter in Virginia. . .281 
 Congress gives him the South 
 ern Department 281 
 
 sarcastic letter from Charles 
 
 Lee 281 
 
 in command at the South. . .291 
 
 criticised by Irving 291 
 
 routed at Camden 292 
 
 his disgraceful flight 292 
 
 his abject apology 292 
 
 could have saved the battle, 292 
 attempts to gather his army, 293 
 the tidings reaches Washing 
 ton 295 
 
 is succeeded by Greene .... 300 
 turns command over to 
 
 Greene 302 
 
 retires to his farm 302 
 
 GEORGE III. King of Great Brit 
 ain, France, and Ireland, De 
 fender of the Faith; b. 1738, 
 d. 1820. 
 
 does not understand English 
 men in America 20 
 
 hears of Burgoyne s sur 
 render 208 
 
 unwisely adjourns Parlia 
 ment 208 
 
 GERARD (DE RAYVENAL), Monsieur 
 
 CONRAD A. ; d. 1790. 
 pledges to Franklin and Deane 
 
 French support 209 
 
 first Fr. ambassador to Amer 
 ica 238 
 
 GERMAINE, GEORGE ( Viscount 
 SACKVILLE) , Lord Br. Prime 
 Minister; b. 1716, d. 1785. 
 correspondence with Howe ... 98 
 
 with Clinton 249, 289 
 
 Germantown, Battle of, Chapter 
 
 XIX 192-7 
 
 GIMAT, Fr. col. on Washing 
 ton s staff. 
 
 at Monmouth 233 
 
 witness on Lee s trial 233 
 
 at siege of Yorktown 357 
 
 GIST, MORDECAI brig.-gen., sub. 
 
 gov. Del. ; b. 1743, d. 1792. 
 skirmishes with Cornwallis .204 
 recruits for Greene s army .301 
 GLOVER, JOHN col.; sub. brig.- 
 gen. ; b. 1732, d. 1797. 
 
408 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Glover, John, continued 
 
 at Battle of Long Island ... 108 
 
 covers the retreat Ill 
 
 resists British landing at 
 
 Throgg s Neck 125 
 
 at Battle of Trenton 142 
 
 GORDON, Rev. WILLIAM, as to 
 
 Battle of Monmouth 234 
 
 Grand tactics defined, with note 
 
 (Preface) x 
 
 GRANT, JAMES Br. maj.-gen.; 
 
 b. 1720, d. 1806. 
 at Battle of Long Island ... 107 
 watches Washington from 
 
 Brunswick, N. J 143 
 
 compliments Washington s sa 
 gacity 143 
 
 put Hessians off their guard. 143 
 GRANT, ULYSSES SIMPSON Gen. 
 U.S.A., sub. pres. twice; b. 
 1822, d. 1885. 
 
 his example cited 66 
 
 GRAVES, THOMAS, Baron Br. ad 
 miral ; b. about 1725, d. 1802. 
 ordered to burn coast towns. 59 
 counter- action of Washing 
 ton 59 
 
 attempts to capture Lafay 
 ette 216 
 
 sails for the Chesapeake . . .355 
 misses Count de Barras . . . .355 
 engages a superior French 
 
 fleet 355 
 
 returns to New York 355 
 
 GRAY Br. maj.-gen. 
 
 surprises Wayne at Paoli. . . 193 
 in attack upon Washington at 
 
 Chestnut Hill 204 
 
 attempts to capture Lafay 
 ette 216 
 
 surprises Light Horse, at Tap- 
 pan 248 
 
 Great Britain sublimely faces 
 
 world-wide antagonisms . .296 
 
 unjust to her Provincial 
 
 troops 362 
 
 Washington aids Carleton in 
 
 their behalf 363 
 
 GREENE, ASHBEL chaplain at Mon 
 mouth; sub. pres. Princeton 
 College, N.J. ; b. 1762, d. 
 1848 ; as to Washington s in 
 terview with Lee at Mon 
 mouth 236 
 
 See also Washington s letter 
 as to the language used by 
 him . . ..391 
 
 GREENE, CHRISTOPHER colonel; 
 
 b. 1737, d. 1781. 
 in Arnold s expedition to Can 
 ada 55, 200 
 
 commands Fort Mercer. . . .200 
 GREENE, NATHANIEL maj.-gen. ; 
 
 b. 1740, d. 1786. 
 commands Rhode Island 
 
 troops 24 
 
 a Quaker youth and black 
 smith s apprentice 25 
 
 studied by forge-light, after 
 
 work hours 25 
 
 announces principles essential 
 
 to success 25 
 
 thorough work as member of 
 
 the Kentish Guards 26 
 
 antecedents and studies .... 26 
 likened to Grant and Lee .... 26 
 outline of his career antici 
 pated 39 
 
 his brigade noticed 69 
 
 in charge of Brooklyn 
 
 Heights 87 
 
 completes the defences .... 102 
 
 prostrated by fever 104 
 
 succeeded by Putnam 104 
 
 advises retreat 115 
 
 describes Washington at Kipp s 
 
 Bay 119 
 
 assumes command in New 
 
 Jersey 122 
 
 describes corrupt practices of 
 
 surgeons 123 
 
 joins for duty 127 
 
 prepares for campaign in New 
 
 Jersey 130 
 
 regards Fort Washington as 
 
 defensible 132 
 
 at Battle of Trenton 142 
 
 commands advance posts before 
 
 Trenton 151 
 
 leads the advance, Jan. 2, 
 
 1777 155 
 
 visits Congress 166 
 
 advances to meet Howe .... 168 
 
 his plan vindicated 169 
 
 selects position on the Brandy- 
 wine 185 
 
 commands the reserve 186 
 
 with Washington, covers the 
 
 retreat 189 
 
 at Battle of Germantown. . 195 
 
 enters New Jersey 203 
 
 assigns Lafayette to duty . .203 
 
 at Council of War 217 
 
 at Monmouth 230, 233 
 
INDEX. 
 
 409 
 
 Greene, Nathaniel, continued 
 at Boston, as quartermaster- 
 general 246 
 
 describes the winter, 1780 . .271 
 in Battle of Springfield ... .283 
 manoeuvres for position . . . .284 
 scientific movementsnoticed,285 
 succeeds Arnold at West 
 
 Point 291 
 
 submits plan for Southern cam 
 paign 300 
 
 succeeds Gates and goes 
 
 South 300 
 
 relieves Gates 302 
 
 his reports and letters 302 
 
 graphic letter to Marion .... 303 
 " spies are the eyes of an 
 
 army" 303 
 
 acts as if under the eyes of 
 
 Washington ...303 
 
 initiates his campaign 313 
 
 his army without clothing. .315 
 uses blankets, "Indian 
 
 style" 315 
 
 rides 125 miles to see Mor 
 gan 315 
 
 joined by Harry Lee 316 
 
 provides for Morgan s prison 
 ers 316 
 
 his wise strategic methods . . .317 
 expects no aid from Virginia .318 
 decides to fight Cornwallis . .318 
 battle of Guilford Court- 
 House 319 
 
 drives Cornwallis into Wilming 
 ton 320 
 
 his report to Washington. . .320 
 fights Rawdon, at Hobkirk 
 
 Hill 321 
 
 the casualties stated 321 
 
 fights Stewart, at Eutaw 
 Springs, " the final battle at 
 
 the South" 321 
 
 redeems Georgia and the Car- 
 
 olinas 322 
 
 welcomes Lafayette to the 
 
 South 326 
 
 regards capture of Cornwallis 
 
 as settled 327 
 
 his army reenforced by Lafay 
 ette s self-denial .... .330 
 
 Greenfield, Conn., raided by 
 
 Tryon 256 
 
 Green Mountain Boys, Vt., regu 
 larly organized 51 
 
 resist Carleton s advance from 
 Canada.. ...62 
 
 Green Mountain Boys, continued 
 
 decline to reenlist after capture 
 
 of Montreal 63 
 
 GRENVILLE, GEORGE Br. Prime 
 Minister ; I. 1712, d. 1770 ; or 
 dains a revenue system, 
 1764 12 
 
 GRIDLEY, RICHARD col.; ~b. 1711, 
 
 d. 1796. 
 Engineer-in-Chief at Bunker 
 
 Hill 23 
 
 resigns, and succeeded by 
 Knox 61 
 
 GRIFFITHS Am. col.; skirmishes 
 with Donop (//.) 146 
 
 HALE, EDWARD EVERETT clergy 
 man, journalist, and author; 
 b. Boston, Mass., 1822. 
 
 his tribute to Nathan 
 
 Hale 120, 121 
 
 HALE, NATHAN Am. captain; b. 
 1755; d. 1776. 
 
 confidential messenger of Wash 
 ington 120 
 
 executed as a spy, Sept. 22, 
 1776 121 
 
 his memorable last words . . 121 
 
 his career sketched by the Rev. 
 E. E. Hale 120-121 
 
 place of his execution identified 
 
 by Lossing 131 
 
 HAMILTON, ALEXANDER col., sub. 
 eminent financier; b. 1757, d. 
 1804. 
 
 occupies Chatterton Hill, with 
 two guns 128 
 
 is sent to Gates for troops. .204 
 
 w i t h Lafayette at Mon- 
 mouth 226 
 
 reports New York Harbor too 
 shallow for French fleet. .240 
 
 gallantry at Yorktown 357 
 
 HAMMOND, Sir ANDREW Br. 
 commodore ; arrives with 
 
 troops 261 
 
 HAMPTON, WADE col. ; b. 1754., 
 d. 1835; honored by Wash 
 ington 312 
 
 HANCOCK, JOHN statesman and 
 maj.-gen.; b. 1737, d. 1793. 
 
 pres. Mass. Provincial Con 
 gress 17 
 
 advises Washington of Howe s 
 movements 183 
 
 at siege of Newport opposes de 
 parture of D Estaing 243 
 
410 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 HAND, EDWARD col. ; b. in Ire 
 land, 1744, d. 1802. 
 in skirmish on Long Island. 104 
 falls back to Prospect Hill . . 105 
 delays British landing at 
 
 Throgg s Neck 125 
 
 skirmishes with the Hessian 
 
 Yagers 126 
 
 in front of Trenton, 1776-7, 151 
 in Sullivan s expedition . . . .200 
 becomes adjt.-gen., vice Scam- 
 
 mon, resigned 300 
 
 HANNIBAL Carthaginian prince 
 and general; b. 229 B.C., 
 
 d. 183 B.C. (Preface) iv 
 
 HARRISON, BENJAMIN signer of 
 Declaration of Independence ; 
 b. 1740, d. 1791; visits Bos 
 ton on naval affairs 60 
 
 HARRISON, ROBERT H. col. 
 
 secretary to Washington . . .300 
 
 becomes C.J. of Maryland .300 
 
 HARRISON, THOMAS speaker of 
 
 Virginia House of Burgesses ; 
 
 addressed by Washington. 250 
 
 HASLET col. Delaware reg t ; b. in 
 
 Ireland, d. 1777. 
 
 joins army at Brooklyn 105 
 
 makes a gallant fight 107 
 
 attacks the Queen s Rangers 
 
 successfully 126 
 
 k. at Battle of Princeton. . .154 
 HAZELWOOD, JOHN Am. naval 
 officer; b. 1726, d. 1800; gal 
 lantry on the Delaware . . 202 
 HAZEN, MOSES col., sub. brig.- 
 gen. ; b. 1733, d. 1802 ; threat 
 ens Staten Island 347 
 
 HEATH, WILLIAM maj. -general ; 
 6. 1735, d. 1814. 
 
 appointed brig. -gen 36 
 
 his antecedents 36 
 
 subsequent career outlined . . 39 
 describes occupation of Dor 
 chester as " never so much 
 done in so short a space " . . 77 
 
 ordered to New York 82 
 
 efficient at New York 104 
 
 aids in the retreat 110 
 
 makes a night march 128 
 
 commands in the Highlands . 131 
 
 at Fishkill 135 
 
 advised of Washington s 
 
 plans 141 
 
 ordered to take the offen 
 sive 147 
 
 special assignment to duty . . 156 
 
 Heath, AVilliam, continued 
 
 reprimanded for mismanage 
 ment 157-8 
 
 ordered to Boston 254 
 
 again in the Highlands 268 
 
 commands camp in New 
 
 Jersey 346 
 
 Hebrew military and civil ante 
 cedents (Preface) . . . .viii, ix 
 HENRY, PATRICK orator and 
 statesman; b. 1736, d. 1799. 
 
 charged with treason 13 
 
 denounces British Stamp Act . 1& 
 
 in first Continental Congress, 17 
 
 Hessian prisoners taken at Saratoga 
 
 remain in America 248 
 
 quartered in Virginia 248 
 
 Hessian soldiers misunderstood, 363- 
 HILDRETH, RICHARD historian ;. 
 
 b. 1807, d. 1865. 
 criticises Samuel Adams .... 29& 
 Mr. Adams position sound in 
 
 principle 299- 
 
 HILLHOUSE, JAMES captain, sub. 
 eminent lawyer and senator ; 
 b. 1754, d. 1832. 
 resists Tryon s invasion of New 
 
 Haven ". 256 
 
 Hobkirk Hill noticed 321 
 
 HOOD, Sir SAMUEL Br. admiral; 
 b. 1724, d. 1816. 
 
 arrives in America 354 
 
 looks into Delaware Bay.. 354 
 
 proceeds to New York 354 
 
 reports to Admiral Graves . . 354 
 
 HORNBLOWER, JOSEPH C. Chief 
 
 Justice of New Jersey ; b. 
 
 1777, d. 1864 ; misreported as 
 
 to Washington s language at 
 
 Monmouth 235 
 
 HOWE, Lord RICHARD admiral ; 
 
 b. 1725, d. 1799. 
 reaches N.Y. July 12, 1776 . .98 
 joint commissioner with General 
 
 Howe 98 
 
 refuses to recognize Washing 
 ton s military title 99 
 
 does so in order to secure 
 
 Erskine s exchange 99 
 
 returns to New York 245 
 
 sails for Boston 245 
 
 HOWE, Sir WILLIAM lieut.-gen. ; 
 b. 1730, d. 1814. 
 
 declares martial law 32 
 
 offers pardon to all but Sam 
 uel Adams and John Han 
 cock .. . .32 
 
INDEX. 
 
 411 
 
 Howe, Sir William, continued 
 
 established in America 33 
 
 overrules Clinton s advice to at 
 tack Cambridge 35 
 
 his martinet discipline 48 
 
 ordered to succeed Gage .... 58 
 issues an unwise proclama 
 tion 58 
 
 Washington s counter-proclama 
 tion , 58 
 
 orders coast towns to be devas 
 tated 59 
 
 instructed by Lord Dart 
 mouth 69 
 
 " New York is the proper Brit 
 ish base " 70 
 
 overruled by Gage ... 70 
 
 Dorchester Heights seized. . .77 
 his report to Lord Dartmouth . 77 
 fails to recapture the Heights .80 
 
 evacuates Boston. . v 80 
 
 embarks for Halifax 80 
 
 sails from Halifax for New 
 
 York 97 
 
 lands troops on Staten Isl 
 and 98 
 
 confers with Governor Tryon, 98 
 writes Lord Germaine as to 
 
 plans 98 
 
 addresses George Washington, 
 
 Esq 98 
 
 changes the address to secure 
 
 a militar}^ exchange 99 
 
 " dispensing pardon to repent 
 ant sinners," as Washington 
 
 styles Howe s mission 99 
 
 brilliant landing of his army, 106 
 
 the battle outlined 107-9 
 
 negotiations Avith American 
 
 commissioners 108 
 
 advance of his army 117 
 
 makes enormous requisitions for 
 
 troops 118 
 
 movements anticipated byAVash- 
 
 ington 120 
 
 writes Lord Germaine as to a 
 
 long campaign 124 
 
 will not attack Harlem 
 
 Heights 125 
 
 lands at Throgg s Neck 126 
 
 orders storming of Chatterton 
 
 Hill 126 
 
 awaits reinforcements 126 
 
 outgeneraled by Washing- 
 
 ton 129 
 
 crosses to the Hudson 129 
 
 anticipated by Washington . . 130 
 
 Howe, Sir William, continued 
 
 tries to deter American enlist 
 ments 130 
 
 guarantees " liberties and prop 
 erties " 130 
 
 captures Eort Washington. . 132 
 
 knew of Adjutant Dumont s 
 treason 133 
 
 excuse for not following Wash 
 ington 133 
 
 specific instructions given . 133 
 
 sends Cornwallis into New Jer 
 sey 137 
 
 "weather too severe for field 
 service " 137 
 
 returns to New York 139 
 
 winter quarters specified. . .139 
 
 surprised by neAvs from Tren 
 ton 150 
 
 calls for 20, 000 more troops, 150 
 
 hurries Cornwallis to New Jer 
 sey 150 
 
 withdraws troops from New 
 port 163 
 
 plans anticipated by Washing 
 ton " 165 
 
 marches again into New Jersey, 
 with 17,000 men 167 
 
 details of the campaign, 168-170 
 
 will invade Pennsylvania. . . 177 
 
 writes a decoy letter, which 
 Washington detects 177 
 
 no doubts of Burgoyne s suc 
 cess 181 
 
 sails for the Chesapeake, 182-183 
 
 skirmishes with American ad 
 vance 185 
 
 masterly strategy in the Battle 
 of Brandywine 187-190 
 
 cares for the wounded of both 
 armies 192 
 
 his rear threatened by Washing 
 ton 194 
 
 his headquarters at German- 
 town 195 
 
 repels Washington s attack, but 
 does not attack in turn . . . 195 
 
 after battle returns to Phila 
 delphia 196 
 
 threatens American army at 
 Chestnut Hill 204 
 
 explains <the failure of iris 
 movement 204 
 
 succeeded in command by Clin 
 ton 215 
 
 his army in detail (Appendix 
 D-2) 384 
 
412 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Huntington, L.I., raided by Try- 
 on s expedition .... 256 
 
 Hyde Park, Mass., where fascine 
 rods were made available. .78 
 
 Independence, National, proclaim 
 ed at Philadelphia, July 4, 
 
 177G 91 
 
 Independence proclaimed at Char 
 lotte, N.C., May 20, 1774 .29 
 Indian atrocities during the Revolu 
 tion 249 
 
 summarily avenged. . . .252, 260 
 Indian auxiliaries advocated by 
 
 Great Britain 172 
 
 advocated by Congress 88 
 
 denounced by Burgoyne . 172-3 
 
 ridiculed by Schuyler 88 
 
 IRVING, WASHINGTON diplomat, 
 historian, scholar; b. 1783, 
 d. 1859. 
 
 his personal aid acknowledged 
 
 by the author (Preface) . .xiv 
 
 his sketcli of Washington s 
 
 youth 1 
 
 his tribute to Mary Washington, 5 
 
 Japan honors the example and 
 
 teachings of Washington. 370 
 
 JAY, JOHN statesman and jurist; 
 
 b. 1745, d. 1829. 
 in first Continental Congress, 17 
 suggests to burn New York. 108 
 commissioner to France. . . .309 
 
 his services recognized 309 
 
 JEFFERSON* THOMAS patriot and 
 statesman, governor Va., sub. 
 pres. twice ; b, 1743, d. July 4, 
 1826. 
 
 sees basis for a constitution in 
 government of Iroquois In 
 dian Confederacy 12 
 
 protects the western frontier, 253 
 
 advised by Washington 300 
 
 defies Arnold s threats 311 
 
 narrowly escapes capture by 
 
 Tarleton 340 
 
 is vindicated by Lafayette . . 343 
 
 JOMINI, HENRI, Baron DE gen. ; 
 
 chief of staff to Napoleon ; 
 
 aide-de-camp Emperor of 
 
 Kussia; military writer; b. 
 
 1799, d. 1869. 
 
 gives grounds of Napoleon s 
 
 success (Preface) xiii 
 
 as applied to Washington. ... 44 
 as to retreats . . . . 73 
 
 JONES, JOHN PAUL lieut., cap 
 tain in the navy, sub. admiral 
 in the Russian navy; b. 1747, 
 d. 1792. 
 
 appointed in the navy 59 
 
 history of his name 379 
 
 his naval success 379 
 
 JOSHUA the Hebrew captain, an 
 
 antetype of Washington upon 
 
 completion of his mission. 373 
 
 Jubilee, Am., at Valley Forge, 213 
 
 French alliance honored . . .213 
 
 Br. at Philadelphia 215 
 
 General Howe honored . . . .215 
 noted participants 215 
 
 KENT, JAMES chief justice, 
 jurist, and author, N.Y. ; 
 b. 1763, d. 1847; his opinion 
 
 of General Schuyler 37 
 
 Kentish Guards, R.I., identified 
 
 with Greene 26 
 
 their prompt start for Boston, 27 
 their subsequent promotions in 
 
 the service 26 
 
 KEPPLE, AUGUSTUS Br. admiral ; 
 6. 1725, d. 1786; gives an 
 
 opinion of the war 21 
 
 King s Mountain, Battle of, men 
 tioned 293 
 
 Kingston, N.Y., burned by Gen. 
 
 Vaughn 179 
 
 KNOWLTON, THOMAS capt.. sub. 
 col.; b. 1740, d. 1776. 
 
 at Bunker Hill 122 
 
 k. at Harlem Heights 122 
 
 KNOX, HENRY chief of artillery, 
 sub. maj.-gen.; sub. Sec. of 
 War; b. 1750, d. 1806. 
 succeeds Gridley, resigned.. 61 
 efficient in ordnance depart 
 ment 71 
 
 mounts Ticonderoga cannon at 
 
 Cambridge 71 
 
 reports his artillery force . . 102 
 efficient at Trenton with For 
 rest s battery 145 
 
 recruits artillery in Mass. . . 163 
 establishes gun factory at 
 
 Springfield 163 
 
 visits Count de Grasse, with 
 
 Washington 353 
 
 KNYPHAUSEN, WILHELM, Baron 
 VON If. lieut. -general ; b. 
 1730, d. 1789. 
 
 arrives in America and joins 
 Howe . . . . 126 
 
INDEX. 
 
 413 
 
 Knyphausen, Wilhelm, Baron von, 
 
 continued 
 
 in attack upon Fort Washing 
 ton 132 
 
 at Brandy wine 186-7 
 
 conducts Clinton s baggage 
 train from Philadelphia . . 224 
 
 pushes for Monmouth 224 
 
 reaches New York 229 
 
 invades New Jersey 271 
 
 in Battle of Springfield 279 
 
 acts the part of Pharaoh, in 
 stead of that of Moses . . .280 
 
 KOSCIUSKO, TlIADDEUS Polish 
 
 maj. -general; b. 1750, d. 1817. 
 perfects fortifications at West 
 
 Point 212 
 
 appointed chief engineer, vice 
 
 Du Portail, captured 300 
 
 ordered to the South 302 
 
 his efficiency 302 
 
 his antecedents 305 
 
 locates earthworks 317 
 
 LAFAYETTE, or LA FAYETTE, 
 MARIE-JOSEPH-PAUL - YVES- 
 ROCK-GILBERT DUMOTIER, 
 Marquis DE maj. -general ; 
 b. 1757, d. 1835. 
 
 arrives in America 191 
 
 reaches Philadelphia 191 
 
 joins Washington, in coun 
 cil 191 
 
 his first scout 185 
 
 commands a division 203 
 
 visits Albany as to Canadian 
 
 movement 211 
 
 rejoins Washington 212 
 
 concurs with his chief 213 
 
 skilful at Barren Hill 215 
 
 amusing incident of the bat 
 tle 216 
 
 outmanoeuvres Clinton 216 
 
 attends a Council of War, 217 
 
 pursues Clinton 225 
 
 reports progress 226 
 
 his relations to Lee 228 
 
 skirmishes with Queen s Rang 
 ers 229 
 
 protests against retreat 229 
 
 commands second line at Mon 
 mouth 231 
 
 conduct during the battle . . .235 
 alleged statement as to Wash 
 ington at Monmouth dis 
 proved 235 
 
 a letter to his wife . . . . 236 
 
 Lafayette, continued 
 
 on duty at Newport 241 
 
 corresponds with D Estaing, 244 
 makes quick trip to Boston, 244 
 covers retreat to Newport . .245 
 
 occupies Bristol 245 
 
 sails for France 253 
 
 returns to America 276 
 
 joins Washington 276 
 
 reports to Congress 276 
 
 his proclamation as to Can 
 ada 288 
 
 his sympathy with Mrs. Ar 
 nold ." 291 
 
 his estimate of Washington, 305 
 extols the American army. .306 
 intrusted with arrest of Ar 
 nold 312, 323 
 
 starts on his expedition .... 324 
 an interesting reminiscence, 325 
 
 letters to his wif e 325 
 
 wounded at Brandy wine. . . .325 
 
 his active movements 325 
 
 orders from Washington . . . 326 
 has confidence of Greene . . .327 
 how he treated deserters . . .327 
 
 harasses the enemy 329 
 
 his letter to Washington 330 
 
 headquarters established! . . .331 
 ignores Arnold s letters . . . .331 
 complimented by Washing 
 ton " 332 
 
 marches to meet Wayne .... 338 
 
 reports his movements 339 
 
 takes the offensive 339 
 
 joined by Wayne and unites 
 
 Avith Steuben 340 
 
 intercepts Tarleton s corre 
 spondence 340 
 
 in sharp action at Williams- 
 burg 341 
 
 gallantry noticed 341 
 
 writes Washington in full. .342 
 reports landing of French 
 
 troops 342 
 
 declines grave risks 342 
 
 outgenerals Cornwallis 343 
 
 ready for Washington s ar 
 rival 343 
 
 has Cornwallis inclosed . . . .343 
 complains of "rusty 
 
 wheels " 343 
 
 vindicates Gov. Jefferson ..343 
 
 confident of victory 343 
 
 receives special orders from 
 Washington not to let Corn 
 wallis escape 345 
 
414 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Lafayette, continued 
 
 sends despatches to Washing 
 ton 349 
 
 his twenty-fourth birthday, and 
 
 incidents 350 
 
 writes to his wife as to his 
 " thrilling adventures " and 
 
 " enviable lot " 350 
 
 welcomes Washington at his 
 
 headquarters 351 
 
 hastens Washington s a r ra y 
 
 from Baltimore 353 
 
 relations to the French court, 356 
 overrules plans of De 
 
 Grasse 356 
 
 storms a redoubt 357 
 
 pleasantry with Baron Vio- 
 
 menil 358 
 
 relations to Cornwallis 361 
 
 their mutual appreciation . . 362 
 expedition to Charleston aban 
 doned 362 
 
 sails from Boston for 
 
 France 362 
 
 bids farewell to Washington, 362 
 LAURENS, HENRY statesman; b. 
 
 1724; d. 1792. 
 
 vice-president of South Caro 
 lina* 86 
 
 reports New York Harbor too 
 shallow for French fleet. .240 
 in the siege of Savannah . . .268 
 sent commissioner to Hol 
 land 296 
 
 taken prisoner in London . .296 
 in London Tower for high trea 
 son 296 
 
 sent on special mission to 
 
 France 296 
 
 arrives in Paris 309 
 
 speaks plain words at Paris, 309 
 returns to America with funds 
 and pledges of French sup 
 port 348 
 
 LAUZUN, ARMAND Louis DE Gou- 
 TANT, Duke DE b. 1747, 
 d. 1793. 
 
 with Rochambeau 333 
 
 threatens Morrisania 334 
 
 in concert with General Lin 
 coln 335 
 
 his lancers in action 337 
 
 tendered a banquet at Philadel 
 phia 350 
 
 despatches from Lafayette 
 
 read 350 
 
 at Yorktown . . . .357 
 
 LEDYARD, WILLIAM col. ; b. 1750, 
 d. 1781 ; massacred at Fort 
 
 Griswold 351 
 
 LEE, CHARLES retired Br. 
 officer, maj. -general; b. 1731, 
 d. 1782. 
 
 first noticed 36 
 
 his characteristics 37 
 
 how regarded by Washing- 
 
 ton 45 
 
 distrusts American troops. . .56 
 opposes Washington s plans, 56 
 
 is sent to Connecticut 70 
 
 advises occupation of New 
 
 York 70 
 
 writes about " crushing s e r - 
 
 pents " 70 
 
 ordered to New York 71 
 
 fortifies Brooklyn Heights . . 85 
 arrogates authority, and is repri 
 manded 85 
 
 ordered to South Carolina. . .85 
 his conduct at Charleston . . .86 
 
 returns north for duty 127 
 
 abuses Congress 127 
 
 curious letter to Gates 127 
 
 finally joins Washington. . .128 
 in charge of reserve camp. .131 
 his grand division noticed . . 135 
 withholds troops required by 
 
 Washington 135 
 
 finally enters New Jersey . . 137 
 
 is taken prisoner 137 
 
 writes Gates, insulting Wash 
 ington 138 
 
 writes Heath, insulting Wash 
 ington 138 
 
 writes James Bowdoin as to 
 
 Washington 139 
 
 mistakes the man addressed, 
 139 
 
 his capture noticed by Wash 
 ington 139 
 
 effect of his independent 
 
 action 141 
 
 his risks as prisoner of war, 164 
 Washington s firmness in the 
 
 matter 164 
 
 unsoldierly conduct 174 
 
 placed on parol 217 
 
 reports for duty 217 
 
 compared with Arnold 218 
 
 letters to Congress 218 
 
 letters to Washington 218 
 
 Washington s stinging reply, 218 
 
 conferences with HOAVC brought 
 
 to lisrht in 1872. . . ,219 
 
INDEX. 
 
 415 
 
 Lee, Charles, continued 
 
 joins army at Valley Forge, 220 
 opposes Washington s plans, 225 
 
 his theory noticed 225 
 
 relations to Lafayette 227 
 
 declines a special command, 227 
 his contemptuous reference to 
 
 Washington s plans 227 
 
 begs for it, afterwards 227 
 
 writes Lafayette, in grbat dis 
 tress 228 
 
 pretends to be satisfied 228 
 
 commands the advance 
 
 troops 228 
 
 orders retreat against Lafay 
 ette s protest 229 
 
 never handled a command be 
 fore 230 
 
 never under fire during the 
 
 war 230 
 
 is rebuked by Washington. .232 
 
 the incident described 232 
 
 his conduct during the day, 233 
 his trial, suspension, and 
 
 death 234 
 
 vindication of Washington from 
 traditions as to language upon 
 
 meeting Lee 235 
 
 Notes of Lee s Court-martial 
 
 (Appendix G) 389-392 
 
 LEE, HENRY colonel, sub. brig.- 
 
 gen. ; b. 1756, d. 1818. 
 at storming of Stony Point, 257 
 
 captures Paulus Hook 259 
 
 joins General Greene 303 
 
 opinion as to Battle of Guil- 
 
 ford 319 
 
 LEE, RICHARD HENRY states 
 man ; b. 1732, d. 1794. 
 in first Continental Congress, 17 
 in March, 1775, urges Virginia 
 
 to arm 26 
 
 LEE, ROBERT EDWARD eminent 
 confederate general, 1861-5 ; 
 b. 1810, d. 1870; shared pe 
 culiarities of Washington and 
 
 Grant 44 
 
 LEE, THOMAS S. gov. Md. ; ad 
 dressed by Washington. . .300 
 LESLIE, ALEXANDER Br. maj.- 
 
 general ; b. 1740, d. 1794. 
 commands the assault at Chat- 
 
 terton Hill 129 
 
 joins Cornwallis 298 
 
 fortifies Norfolk 301 
 
 at battle of Guilford 320 
 
 in the Virginia campaign. . .331 
 
 LINCOLN, BENJAMIN maj.-gen. ; 
 
 b. 1733, d. 1810. 
 joins the army with Mass. 
 
 troops 122 
 
 reaches Peekskill, with four 
 thousand New England mil 
 itia 157 
 
 threatens Fort Independ- 
 
 ence 157 
 
 at Charleston, S.C 253 
 
 has a fresh command .... 334-5 
 
 commands a division 337 
 
 receives sword of Cornwallis at 
 
 Yorktown 360 
 
 LIVINGSTON, HENRY B. col. ; 
 b. 1757, d. 1823 ; saves Fort 
 
 Edward 295 
 
 LIVINGSTON, PHILIP signer of 
 Declaration of Independence ; 
 b. 1716, d. 1778; in first Con 
 tinental Congress 17 
 
 Logistics defined, with note (Pref 
 ace) x, xi 
 
 LOSSING, BENSON J. historian, 
 b. 1813, d. 1891; gratefully 
 noticed by the author (Pref 
 ace) xiv 
 
 Louis XVI. king of France ; 
 
 b. 1754, d. 1793. 
 officially supports America. .213 
 
 his purpose anti-British 302 
 
 opposed occupation of New 
 
 York 352-3 
 
 LYNCH, THOMAS patriot; b. 1720, 
 
 d. 1776. 
 
 in first Continental Congress, 17 
 at Cambridge . 60 
 
 MAGAW col. ; at Fort Washing 
 ton 130-2 
 
 betrayed by his adjutant . . .133 
 
 casualties of the assault . . .133 
 
 MANLY, JOHN Am. captain ; 
 
 makes valuable captures at 
 
 sea 60 
 
 MARIE ANTOINETTE queen of 
 France; b. 1755, d. 1793; 
 friend of Lafayette and of 
 
 America 356 
 
 MARION, FRANCIS brig. -general; 
 b. 1732, d. 1795. 
 
 addressed by Greene 303 
 
 esteemed by Washington. . .312 
 MARLBOROUGH, JOHN CHURCHILL, 
 Duke of gen.,si^6. field mar 
 shal ; 6. 1650, d. 1722; cited 
 in comparison (Preface) . . viii 
 
416 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 MARSHALL, JOHN chief justice 
 U.S., jurist and historian; 
 b. 1755, d. 1836. 
 as to Asst. Quartermaster-Gen 
 eral Carrington 301 
 
 as to American mutiny 307 
 
 as to troops sent South 327 
 
 Maryland troops always effi 
 cient 277 
 
 gallantry at Camden 292 
 
 at Battle of Guilford 320 
 
 Massachusetts leads resistance to 
 
 Stamp Act 13 
 
 resolves its Assembly into a 
 
 Provincial Congress 17 
 
 elects John Hancock as its first 
 
 president 17 
 
 organizes a force of " Minute 
 
 Men " 17 
 
 organizes a C o m m i 1 1 e e of 
 
 Safety 17 
 
 summons 30,000 men to instant 
 
 duty 22 
 
 drafts one-fifth of her able- 
 bodied men 11G 
 
 orders a monument to Cheva 
 lier de Saint Sauveur. . . .247 
 liberal to troops during a mu 
 tiny 308 
 
 MATTHEWS Br. maj.-gen. in at 
 tack upon Fort Washing 
 ton 132 
 
 lays waste Portsmouth and Nor- 
 
 folk 253 
 
 in Battle of Springfield . . . .278 
 MATTHEWS, JOHN jurist; b. 1774, 
 d. 1802; on special War Com 
 mittee 73 
 
 MAXWELL, WILLIAM brig.-gen. ; 
 
 b. in Ireland, d. 1798. 
 in command at Morristown.141 
 
 on special duty 147 
 
 stationed at Elizabethtown . . 164 
 
 moves against Howe 168 
 
 at Red Clay Creek 185 
 
 accompanied by Lafayette. . 185 
 gallantry at Chadd s Ford. .186 
 
 active in New Jersey 222 
 
 obstructs Clinton s retreat. .224 
 
 in Battle of Springfield 279 
 
 associated with Lafayette . . . 324 
 
 MCCLELLAN, GEORGE BRINTON 
 
 maj.-gen. U.S.A.; b. 1826, 
 
 d. 1885 ; his qualities cited in 
 
 comparison 162 
 
 McCREA, JANE her murder not 
 chargeable to Burgoyne. . 173 
 
 McDouGAL, ALEXANDER brig.- 
 gen. ; b. 1750, d. 1786. 
 occupies Chatterton Hill .... 128 
 fights the battle known as 
 
 " White Plains " 129 
 
 on special duty at Morris- 
 town ". 147 
 
 succeeds Heath at Peekskill, 
 
 166 
 
 in Battle of Germantown. . .195 
 
 established at Peekskill 206 
 
 accompanies Kosciusko to West 
 
 Point 212 
 
 again in the Highlands 248 
 
 MCDOWELL, CHARLES colonel; 
 b. 1743, d. 1815; at King s 
 Mountain, his descendants 
 
 honored 293 
 
 Mecklenburg Declaration of In 
 dependence 29 
 
 County, North Carolina, emi 
 nently patriotic 293 
 
 MEIGS Am. col. ; attacks Sag 
 
 Harbor 167 
 
 at storming of Stony 
 
 Point 257 
 
 MERCER, HUGH brig. -general ; 
 6. 1721, Ar. at Battle of Prince 
 ton, 1777 154 
 
 MIFFLIN, THOMAS brig. -general ; 
 b. 1744, d. 1800. 
 
 efficient before Boston 72 
 
 provides barracks in New 
 
 York 83 
 
 in battle of Long Island 106 
 
 skilful in the retreat, acting 
 under confidential orders, of 
 
 Washington 110 
 
 absence from Valley Forge 
 
 disastrous 206 
 
 rejoins camp 217 
 
 criticised by Washington in let 
 ter to Gouverneur Morris, 217 
 Milton, Mass., where Rufus Put 
 nam found fascine rods . . .78 
 MINNIGERODE 77. col. ; k. in at 
 tack upon Fort Mercer. . .201 
 MONCKTON, HENRY Br. lieut.- 
 col. ; b. 1740, k. 1778, atMon- 
 
 mouth 233 
 
 Monmouth, Battle of, described 
 
 (see map) 229-237 
 
 MONROE, JAMES lieutenant, sub. 
 pres. ; b. 1758, d. 1831. 
 
 at battle of Trenton 142 
 
 helps capture two guns 145 
 
 wounded in battle . . . . 145 
 
INDEX. 
 
 41 
 
 MONTGOMERY, RICHARD Am. 
 
 brig.-gen. ; b. 1737, k. before 
 Quebec, 1775. 
 
 bis military antecedents 36 
 
 subsequent career outlined . .38 
 a comrade of Carleton when 
 
 Wolfe fell 38 
 
 in despair at condition of the 
 
 troops 38 
 
 starts for Canada 55 
 
 reaches Ticonderoga 61 
 
 receives imperative orders from 
 
 Washington 61 
 
 sympathetically sustained by 
 
 Washington 63 
 
 bis Orderly Book 63 
 
 occupies Montreal 63 
 
 tries a forlorn hope assault upon 
 
 Quebec 63 
 
 goes to Arnold s relief 65 
 
 is killed in battle 65 
 
 buried with honors of war. . .66 
 Montreal captured by British, 
 
 1760 " 10 
 
 captured by Montgomery, 
 
 1775 63 
 
 MOORE, GEORGE H. sec. N.Y. 
 
 His. Soc. ; brings to light 
 
 Charles Lee s papers. .. .219 
 
 MORGAN, DANIEL brig. -general ; 
 
 b. 1737, d. 1802. 
 
 captured at Quebec 65 
 
 attacks Hessians in New Jer 
 sey 169 
 
 skirmishes with Cornwallis.204 
 supports Maxwell in N.J...225 
 
 serves under Lafayette 225 
 
 reports to Gen, Greene . . . .303 
 fights Battle of Cowpens. . .314 
 
 is visited by Greene 315 
 
 retires from the army 315 
 
 MORRIS, GOUVERNEUR statesman ; 
 b. 1752, d. 1816; his letter 
 from Washington, 1778.. 217 
 MORRIS, ROBERT financier and 
 statesman; b. 1734, d. 1806; 
 friend of Washington. . . . 164 
 Morristown headquarters de 
 scribed 265 
 
 MOSES Hebrew deliverer of his 
 people ; model legislator ; 
 founder of modern civil codes ; 
 b. about 1570 B.C., d. about 
 1450 B.C. 
 
 the Hebrew Commonwealth 
 and its military system no 
 ticed (Preface) viii 
 
 Moses, continued 
 
 his decimal army organization 
 (Preface) viii 
 
 his sanitary and police regula 
 tions (Preface) viii 
 
 patriotic instruction of Hebrew 
 youth imperative by his laws 
 (Preface) viii 
 
 his general order, " Forward," 
 when he led his people to 
 national independence , 
 quoted, as Washington 
 marched through Philadelphia 
 
 for Brandywine 184 
 
 MUHLENBURG, PETER maj.-gen.; 
 b. 1746, d. 1807. 
 
 at Battle of Brandywine (see 
 map) 186 
 
 active in Virginia 301 
 
 MURPHY maj. ; leads N.C. troops 
 
 at Stony Point 257 
 
 MURRAY, LINDLEY grammarian ; 
 b. 1745, d. 1826; friend of 
 
 Greene 25 
 
 Mutiny of Connecticut troops. .277 
 
 of Pennsylvania troops ..306-7 
 
 a natural outbreak 308 
 
 NAPOLEON I. Bonaparte (Buon 
 aparte), Emperor of France ; 
 b. 1769, d. 1821. 
 his military maxims noticed 
 
 (Preface) viii 
 
 his Italian campaign compared 
 with the First New Jersey 
 campaign in the Am. Revo 
 lution (Preface) xiii 
 
 the basis of his success given by 
 
 Jomini (Preface) xiii 
 
 NASH, ABNER gov. N.C. ; b. 1716, 
 d. 1786; addressed by Wash 
 ington 300 
 
 NASH, FRANCIS brig. -general ; 
 b. 1720, k. at Battle of Ger- 
 
 mantown, 1777 195-6 
 
 New England discriminated against 
 
 by Great Britain 18 
 
 experience in earlier wars. . .21 
 
 her governors in conference 
 
 with committee of C o n - 
 
 gress 60 
 
 finally relieved from British 
 
 hostilities 262 
 
 New Hampshire liberality during 
 
 the American mutiny .... 308 
 
 New Haven, Conn., invaded by 
 
 Tryon 256 
 
418 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 New Jersey seizes the Provincial 
 treasury and raises troops, 28 
 
 the chief battleground 161 
 
 more than meets her quota, 272 
 
 her noble women 272, 285 
 
 a continuous battlefield and the 
 
 strategic center 285 
 
 Newport, R.I. ; Howe s strategic 
 
 objective, 1776 118 
 
 occupied by the British .... 150 
 besieged by Franco-American 
 
 forces../. 241 
 
 abandoned by the British. . 262 
 
 occupied by Rochambeau , .286 
 
 New York city as a British base. 94 
 
 New York Committee of Vublic 
 
 Safety aroused 27 
 
 its assembly becomes a Provin 
 cial Congress 27 
 
 Nook s Hill fortified, March 10, 
 
 1775 60 
 
 evacuation of city a neces 
 sity 60 
 
 Norfolk. Va., laid waste by Mat 
 thews..., 253 
 
 North Carolina " will resist Stamp 
 
 Act to the death" 13 
 
 defies its Provincial governor, 28 
 adopts the cause of Boston . . 28 
 a convention meets at Charlotte, 
 
 May 20, 1775 29 
 
 the Mecklenburg Declaration of 
 
 Independence 29 
 
 sends Gen. Moore with two 
 
 battalions to New York . . 115 
 
 two companies in storming of 
 
 Stony Point 257 
 
 NORTH, FREDERICK, Lord Earl of 
 
 Guilford; b. 1733, d. 1792. 
 British Prime Minister, 1769, 15 
 abolishes all duties except on 
 
 tea 15 
 
 the consequences noted 15 
 
 Norwalk, Conn., raided by 
 Tryon 256 
 
 OGDEN Am. col. ; as to panic at 
 Monmouth 231 
 
 O HARA, CHARLES Br. maj.-gen. ; 
 
 b. 1756, d. 1791. 
 makes the surrender of army 
 of Cornwallis 360 
 
 Onondaga Indians near Syracuse, 
 N.Y., punished ." 252 
 
 " On to Philadelphia," like the " On 
 to Richmond" of 1861, ill- 
 judged 198 
 
 Panic at Brooklyn controlled by 
 
 Washington 112 
 
 at Kipp s Bay, noticed, 119, 237 
 
 at Toulon, compared 120 
 
 at Princeton, controlled by 
 
 Washington 154 
 
 at Monmouth, turned by Wash 
 ington into victory 231 
 
 at Camden 292 
 
 Paoli, birthplace of Wayne, vis 
 ited by British 193 
 
 Paris, Treaty of, 1763, and its 
 
 terms 11 
 
 PARKER, Sir PETER Br. admiral ; 
 b. 1716, d. 1811. 
 
 sails from Ireland 97 
 
 repulsed by Moultrie 97 
 
 joins Howe in New York. . . .99 
 Parliament of Nations, 1892, no 
 ticed 372 
 
 PARSONS, SAMUEL H. brig. -gen. ; 
 
 b. 1737, d. 1789. 
 his brigade at Kipp s Bay. . .119 
 were trusted by Washing 
 ton ". 119 
 
 redeemed their good name ..119 
 a parallel case cited under Na 
 poleon 120 
 
 before Fort Independence. . 157 
 on duty in Connecticut. ... .163 
 
 joins Washington 168 
 
 in the Highlands .... 1 79 
 
 PEABODV, NATHANIEL statesman ; 
 b. 1741, d. 1823; on special 
 
 War Commission 273 
 
 PENN, WILLIAM b. 1644, d. 1718 ; 
 urged a Colonial Union, 1697, 12 
 PENNINGTON, WILLIAM gov. N.J., 
 and speaker U.S. House; 
 b. 1717, d. 1791; as to Wash 
 ington s language at Mon 
 mouth, on meeting Lee. ..236 
 Pennsylvania appropriates money 
 
 for troops 28 
 
 her Assembly corresponds with 
 
 Washington 207 
 
 Penobscot, Me., a British post. .270 
 PERCY, HUGH, Earl Br. lieut.- 
 gen., Duke of Northumber 
 land; 6. 1742, d. 1817. 
 his soldierly qualities noticed, 35 
 fails to recapture Dorchester 
 
 Heights 80 
 
 at Battle of Long Island (see 
 
 map) 105 
 
 joins Howe before White 
 Plains 128 
 
INDEX. 
 
 419 
 
 Percy, Hugh, continued 
 
 in the attack upon Fort Wash 
 ington 132 
 
 Philadelphia takes action, April 24, 
 
 1775 28 
 
 her citizens overawe the oppos 
 ing element 28 
 
 visited by Washington s 
 
 army 183, 192 
 
 mighty ovation to the sol 
 diers 184 
 
 supplies the suffering army. 194 
 
 is occupied by Howe 196 
 
 its winter experiences, 1778,210 
 the Howe carnival and its mag 
 nificence 215 
 
 evacuated by Clinton. . .221-222 
 
 occupied by Arnold 222 
 
 visited by Washington and Ro- 
 
 chambeau 3489 
 
 PHILLIPS, WILLIAM Br. maj.- 
 gen.; 6, 1731, d. 1781. 
 
 sent to Virginia 320 
 
 destroys much property .... 329 
 
 his relations to Arnold 331 
 
 his death and its effects 331 
 
 PIGOT, Sir ROBERT maj.-gen. ; 
 4. 1720, d. 1790; at Newport, 
 
 R.I 241 
 
 POMEROY, SETII brig. -general ; 
 
 b. 1706, d. 1777. 
 his military antecedents ... .,24 
 
 appointed brig. -gen 36 
 
 declines further service 38 
 
 Portsmouth, Va., laid waste by 
 
 Matthews 253 
 
 POWNALL, THOMAS E. Br. gov. 
 Mass.; b. 1722, d. 1805; his 
 
 prediction 368 
 
 PRESCOTT, RICHARD Br. maj.- 
 general; b. 1725, d. 1788; 
 taken prisoner, and exchanged 
 
 for Lee 217 
 
 at Savannah 267 
 
 PRESCOTT, WILLIAM colonel ; 
 
 b. 1726, d. 1795. 
 conducts the Bunker Hill 
 
 (Breed s Hill) fight 34 
 
 Governor s Island, N.Y 102 
 
 safely removes all stores ... 112 
 repels Howe s advance at 
 
 Throgg s Neck 125 
 
 PREVOST, Sir AUGUSTINE Br. 
 maj.-gen.; b. 1725, d. 1786; 
 outgenerals Lincoln but with 
 out substantial results on 
 either hand . . . . 253 
 
 PROCTOR, THOMAS Am. capt. 
 of artillery ; b. in Ireland, 
 1739, d. 1806. 
 with battery at Chadd s Ford 
 
 Brandy wine 186 
 
 in Indian expedition 260 
 
 PULASKI, CASIMIR, Count Polish 
 maj.-gen.; b. 1747, k. 1779, 
 in siege of Savannah .... 268 
 
 dear to Washington 305 
 
 PUTNAM, ISRAEL maj. -general ; 
 b. 1718, d. 1790. 
 
 his military antecedents 23 
 
 conspicuous at Bunker Hill. .38 
 subsequent career outlined . .38 
 
 commands at New York 87 
 
 succeeds Sullivan at Brook 
 lyn 104 
 
 instructed by Washington, 104-5 
 succeeded by Washington in 
 
 person 107 
 
 fortifies Hudson River shore, 115 
 favors retreat from New 
 
 York 115 
 
 his laconic utterance 115 
 
 commands New York city . . 115 
 a division at White Plains . . 129 
 
 at Philadelphia 153 
 
 located at Peekskill 178 
 
 grants unwise furloughs ... 178 
 outgeneraled by Clinton. . . . 179 
 
 regains position 180 
 
 on the Long Island shore. . .206 
 
 returns to Peekskill 206 
 
 at Danbury, Conn, 248 
 
 in command on the Hudson, 254 
 
 PUTNAM, RUFUS col.; b. 1738, 
 
 d. 1824 ; his efficiency as civil 
 
 engineer at Boston 75 
 
 Quebec, captured in 1759 10 
 
 assaulted by Montgomery and 
 
 Arnold, 1776 66 
 
 magnanimity of General Carle- 
 ton at death of Montgomery, 66 
 Queen s Rangers (Provincial), no 
 ticed 204, 255, 279 
 
 Washington s magnanimity tow 
 ard them, reciprocating 
 Carleton s action at Que 
 bec 363 
 
 RAHL (RALL), JOHN GOTTLIEB 
 H. col. ; b. 1720, d. 1776. 
 
 storms Chatterton Hill 129 
 
 commands at Trenton 139 
 
 k. in battle . . . . 146 
 
420 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 RAWDON, FRANCIS, Lord Mar 
 quis of Hastings, earl, sub. 
 
 gov.-gen. India; b. 1754, d. 
 
 1825. 
 
 gallantry at Bunker Hill ... .35 
 reenforces Clinton at the 
 
 South 276 
 
 in battle of Hobkirk Hill. . .321 
 REED, JOSEPH adjt. -general, sub. 
 
 gov. Penn. ; b. 1741, d. 1785. 
 in Washington s confidence be 
 fore Boston 71 
 
 describes the army at Harlem 
 
 Heights 123 
 
 in the secret of Washington s 
 
 attack upon Trenton 141 
 
 Religious distinctions among the 
 
 colonies harmonized 266 
 
 Rhode Island sends 1,500 men to 
 
 Boston, April 25, 1775 22 
 
 her troops under Nathaniel 
 
 Greene 25 
 
 seizes British stores 27 
 
 calls for protection of her 
 
 ports 87 
 
 two regiments in Continental 
 
 pay 87 
 
 sends additional troops to New 
 
 York 115 
 
 RICHMOND, CHARLES LENNOX, Duke 
 
 Br. Sec. of State; b. 1735, 
 
 d. 1806. 
 denounces hire of Hessian 
 
 troops 96 
 
 his prediction verified 209 
 
 Ridgefield, Conn., invaded by 
 
 Tryon 166 
 
 RIEDESEL, FRIEDRICH ADOLPH, 
 
 Baron //. maj. -general ; 
 
 b. 1730, d. 1800. 
 reaches Canada with troops . .89 
 in Burgoyne s command. . . .387 
 ROBERTS, CHARLES G. D. prof. 
 
 King s College, N.S. ; his 
 
 history of Canada cited. . .63 
 
 ROCHAMBEAU, JEAN BAPTISTE Do- 
 NATIEN DE VlMEUR DE Fr, 
 
 marshal; b. 1725, d. 1807. 
 
 arrives in America 286 
 
 appreciates Washington .... 287 
 writes as to American condi 
 tions 287 
 
 confers with Washington at 
 
 Hartford 297 
 
 sends his son to France . . . .298 
 again in conference at Wethers- 
 field . ..333 
 
 Rochambeau, continued 
 
 asks cooperation of Count de 
 
 Grasse 333 
 
 at West Point with Washing- 
 
 ton 347 
 
 moves southward 347 
 
 advances $20,000 in gold to 
 
 American army 347 
 
 parades in Philadelphia .... 349 
 receives despatches from Wash 
 ington 350 
 
 entertained at Baltimore . . .351 
 guest of Washington at Mt. 
 
 Vernon 351 
 
 opposed occupation of New 
 
 York 353 
 
 visits Count de Grasse with 
 
 Washington 353 
 
 signs articles of Cornwallis 
 
 surrender 360 
 
 honored by Congress 361 
 
 remains with Washington . .361 
 
 visits New England 361 
 
 sails for the West Indies . . .361 
 Rowan county, N.C., eminently 
 
 patriotic 293 
 
 RUTLEDGE, EDWARD statesman, 
 signer of Declaration of In 
 dependence ; b. 1749, d. 1800; 
 commissioner with Adams and 
 Franklin to meet Gen. and 
 
 Admiral Howe, 1776 118 
 
 RUTLEDGE, JOHN sub. gov. and 
 chief justice, S.C. ; b. 1739, 
 d. 1800. 
 
 pres. Republic of South Caro 
 lina 86 
 
 controls the conduct of Charles 
 
 Lee 86 
 
 his characteristics 86 
 
 aids in siege of Savannah . .267 
 
 SAINT (ST.) CLAIR, ARTHUR 
 maj. -gen; b. 1734, d. 1818. 
 
 at Battle of Princeton 154 
 
 writes a boastful letter 175 
 
 abandons Ticonderoga 175 
 
 Saint (St.) John, N.B., founded 
 by British Provincials . . .363 
 
 May 17th its natal day 363 
 
 honors Washington 363 
 
 Saint (St.) John s, captured Nov. 
 
 3, 1775 62 
 
 Andre among the prisoners . .62 
 
 SAINT (Sr.) LEDGER, BARRY Br. 
 
 col. ; b. 1737, d. 1789 ; invades 
 
 the Mohawk valley 171 
 
INDEX. 
 
 421 
 
 SAINT (ST.") Luc, LA CORNE DE 
 b. 1712, d. 1784. 
 
 as to hiring Indians 173 
 
 is rebuked by Burgoyne .... 173 
 SAINT (ST.) MEMIN, CHARLES BAL 
 THAZAR JULIEN FAVRE DE 
 Fr. artist; b. 1770, d. 1852; 
 his profile of Washington, by 
 a crayon process of his own, 
 the last portrait of Washing 
 ton taken frontispiece 
 
 SAINT (ST.) SAUVEUR, Chevalier 
 DE Fr. : k. at Boston . .247 
 a monument to his memory or 
 dered 247 
 
 SAINT (S r r.) SIMON, CLAUDE HENRI, 
 Cov.nt DE Fr.; b. 1760, 
 d. 1825. 
 
 arrives with De Grasse 342 
 
 lands 3,000 French troops. .342 
 reports to Lafayette for duty, 342 
 waves seniority of rank .... 343 
 urges immediate assault .... 343 
 yields to Lafayette s judg 
 ment 343 
 
 sails for the West Indies. . .362 
 Salem, Mass., declines benefits of 
 
 Boston Port Bill 16 
 
 Savannah, Ga., responds to call 
 
 from Lexington 29 
 
 intercepts royal letters to gov 
 ernors 30 
 
 Committee of Safety, acts 
 
 promptly 30 
 
 besieged without success. 267-8 
 SCIIOVALHOFF, Count Russian 
 statesman ; his prediction at 
 the Berlin Conference veri 
 fied in 1898 370 
 
 SCHUYLER, PHILIP maj. -general ; 
 sub. U.S. senator; b. 1733, 
 d. 1804. 
 
 appointed maj. -gen 36 
 
 his antecedents 36 
 
 his career outlined 37 
 
 honored by Kent and Web 
 ster 37-8 
 
 ordered to Canada 55 
 
 among the Six Nations 61 
 
 urged forward by Washing 
 ton and joins Montgomery, 61 
 advised as to Allen s misadvent- 
 
 suspends resignation at Wash 
 ington s request 63 
 
 his Orderly Book 63 
 
 again advised by Washington, 64 
 
 Schuyler, Philip, continued 
 is to expect a bloody summer, 87 
 
 ridicules hiring Indians 88 
 
 to resist Carleton s advance. 163 
 
 is relieved by Gates 173 
 
 is promptly restored 173 
 
 offers Gates a command. . . . 173 
 it is sneeringly declined. . . . 173 
 
 his energetic action. 174 
 
 is absent, sick, without fault, 175 
 has a prophetic letter from 
 
 Washington 175 
 
 organizes a large army 176 
 
 is superseded by Gates 176 
 
 returns to Congress 273 
 
 on committee to visit Washing 
 ton 273 
 
 is urged to be Secretary of 
 
 War .328 
 
 gives reasons for declining, 328 
 Second Continental Congress, May 
 
 10, 1775, 31 
 
 provides money and muni 
 tions \ 31 
 
 delegates from Georgia make 
 
 action unanimous 31 
 
 rules and articles of Avar 
 
 adopted 31 
 
 denounces acts of Parliament 
 as " unconstitutional, oppres 
 sive, and cruel " 31 
 
 Second New Jersey campaign, and 
 
 its results 167 
 
 SEVIER, JOHN Am. col. ; b. 1745, 
 d. 1815; at King s Mountain, 
 his descendants honored. .293 
 SHARPE, GRANVILLE Br. phil 
 anthropist; b. 1734, d. 1813; 
 resigns rather than aid the 
 
 war 21 
 
 SHELBY, ISAAC col., sub. gov. 
 
 Kentucky; I. 1750, d. 1826. 
 at King s Alountain, his descend 
 ants honored 293 
 
 summoned to Virginia, 1780, 314 
 SHELDON, ELISHA col.; attacked 
 
 by Tarleton 255 
 
 on expedition with Lauzun, 334 
 supports Washington ..334-5-6 
 
 has a spirited scout 337 
 
 SHERIDAN, PHILIP HENRY gen 
 eral U.S. A.; 6.1831,^.1888; 
 
 his example cited 162 
 
 SHERMAN, WILLIAM TECUMSEH 
 general; b. 1820, d. 1891; his 
 march to the sea cited by way 
 of comparison 162 
 
422 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 SHIPPEN, Miss, belle of the Phila 
 delphia fStes 216 
 
 becomes the wife of Arnold, 289 
 had no knowledge of Arnold s 
 
 treason 291 
 
 .highly esteemed by Washing 
 ton and Lafayette 291 
 
 SHULDHAM Br. admiral; relieves 
 
 Graves at Boston G8 
 
 comments on seizure of Dor 
 chester Heights 77 
 
 Siege of Quebec closed 66 
 
 Boston 80 
 
 Newport 245 
 
 Savannah 268 
 
 Yorktown 268 
 
 Charleston 275 
 
 New York 347 
 
 Signal-fires in New Jersey . . . .280 
 
 SIMCOE, J. GRAVES Br. lieut.- 
 
 col., Queen s Rangers; sub. 
 
 gov. Canada; b. 1752, d. 1806. 
 
 active in forays 248 
 
 in the Battle of Springfield, 279 
 in Virginia with Arnold. . . .310 
 
 raids Virginia 320 
 
 popular misconceptions of his 
 
 character 363 
 
 "Six Nations" (Iroquois) a model 
 for Jefferson s constitution, 12 
 
 as a confederacy 13 
 
 invaded by Sullivan 260 
 
 devastated by Sullivan 260 
 
 their estimate of Washing 
 ton 1 260-1 
 
 SMALLWOOD, WILLIAM brig-gen. ; 
 sub. governor Md. ; b. 1732, 
 d. 1792. 
 with Maryland troops at Long 
 
 Island 105 
 
 makes a gallant fight 107 
 
 deplores ignorance of offi 
 cers 123 
 
 in Pennsylvania, later 193 
 
 in battle of Germantown . . . 195 
 on duty near Philadelphia . . 206 
 as governor, recruits for Greene s 
 
 army 301 
 
 SMITH, SAMUEL lieut. -colonel ; 
 b. 1752, d. 1839 ; with Mary 
 land troops at Fort Mifflin,200 
 
 Sons of Liberty organized 14 
 
 South Carolina denounces the 
 
 Stamp Act 13 
 
 seizes the colonial magazine, 
 
 April 21, 1775 29 
 
 first news from Lexington . . .29 
 
 South Carolina, continued 
 
 intercepts royal packages 29 
 
 declares a Republic, with offi 
 cers, congress, army, navy, 
 and all the accessories of an 
 
 independent state 86 
 
 Spain joins France against Great 
 
 Britain, 1761 11 
 
 SPENCER, JOSEPH N. brig.-gen. ; 
 b. 1714, d. 1789. 
 
 his military antecedents 36 
 
 his subsequent career 39 
 
 attempts capture of Newport by 
 
 Washington s order 163 
 
 " Spies," says Greene, " are the eyes 
 
 of an army " 303 
 
 Springfield, Mass., selected by 
 
 Knox for a gun- factory . . 163 
 
 Springfield, N.J., Battle of. .278-9 
 
 its lesson emphasized 283 
 
 its casualties noticed 285 
 
 tested the Continental troops, 286 
 
 Stamp Act of 1755 noticed 13 
 
 repealed in 1766 14 
 
 STARK, JOHN maj.-gen.; b. 1728, 
 
 d. 1822. 
 in the Battle of Bunker Hill . . 32 
 
 at the Battle of Trenton 142 
 
 at the Battle of Springfield,283 
 Statesmanship in war defined, with 
 
 note (Preface) xii 
 
 as stated by Jesus (Preface) . xii 
 
 STEDMAN, CHARLES Br. staff 
 
 officer and historian ; b. 1745, 
 
 d. 1812. 
 
 as to Burgoyne campaign and 
 
 Clinton 180 
 
 as to loose Br. discipline . . .210 
 as to Battles of Guilford and 
 
 HobkirkHill 321 
 
 as to Br. and Am. forces in 1776 
 and 1777 (Appendix D) . .386 
 STEPHEN, ADAM Am. maj.-gen. ; 
 b. 1730, d. 1791. 
 
 service at Brandywine 189 
 
 at Battle of Germantown . . . 195 
 dismissed for drunkenness . . 196 
 STEPHENS, EDWARD brig.-gen- 
 eral; b. 1745, d. 1820; con 
 ducted prisoners, taken at 
 
 Cowpens, northward 316 
 
 STERLING Br. col., sub, maj.- 
 general. [Should not be con 
 fused with Lord Stirling, in 
 the Am. service, see beloV.] 
 
 along the Delaware 194 
 
 k. in Battle of Springfield. .278 
 
INDEX. 
 
 423 
 
 STEPHEN, FREDERICK WILLIAM AU 
 GUSTUS, Baron maj.-gcn. ; 
 b. 1730, d. 1794. 
 instructor at Valley Forge. .210 
 
 promoted raaj .-gen 212 
 
 acts in harmony with Washing 
 ton and Lafayette 213 
 
 at Battle of Monmouth 233 
 
 ordered to the South 300 
 
 in charge of powder and lead 
 
 supplies 302 
 
 in concert with Lafayette. . .327 
 his depot at Elk Island at 
 tacked 340 
 
 joins Lafayette s division. .340 
 
 in the siege of Yorktown. . .357 
 
 STEWART Br. col. ; succeeds 
 
 Rawdon at the South 321 
 
 fights Green at Eutaw 
 
 Springs 321 
 
 STILES, EZRA pres.Yale College ; 
 6. 1727, d. 1795; friend of 
 
 Greene s youth 25 
 
 STIRLING, WILLIAM ALEXANDER, 
 Lord [his claim to Br. title 
 and estates had been in dis 
 pute] Am. col., sub. maj.- 
 gen. ; b. 1726, d. 1783. 
 in Battle of Long Island. . . 105 
 his brigade of picked regi 
 ments 105 
 
 fights both Grant and Corn- 
 
 wallis 107 
 
 taken prisoner by superior 
 
 numbers 108 
 
 is exchanged and returns to 
 
 duty 122 
 
 reaches White Plains 128 
 
 established at Princeton. . . . 136 
 
 in Battle of Princeton 154 
 
 engages Cornwallis 169 
 
 in Battle of Brandy wine 186 
 
 his good conduct 189 
 
 in Battle of Germantown. . . 195 
 
 at a Council of War 217 
 
 in Battle of Monmouth . . . 233 
 threatens Staten Island. ... 271 
 president at Charles Lee s court- 
 martial (Appendix G) ... 389 
 Stony Point stormed by 
 
 Wayne ....... 257-8 
 
 abandoned by Washington. .259 
 Strategy defined, with note (Pref 
 ace) x 
 
 SULLIVAN, JOHN maj. -general; 
 
 b. 1740, d. 1795. 
 personal notice 36 
 
 Sullivan, John, continued 
 
 his career outlined 39 
 
 sent to Canada 87 
 
 succeeded by Gates 88 
 
 ambitious letter to Washing 
 ton 89 
 
 Washington s discreet reply . .89 
 
 his attitude defined 89 
 
 succeeds Greene on Long Isl 
 and 104 
 
 succeeded by Putnam 104 
 
 a peculiar letter 104 
 
 his specious report 107 
 
 taken prisoner 108 
 
 on exchange, takes Lee s divi 
 sion 139 
 
 accompanies Washington to 
 
 Trenton 142 
 
 incident of the march. ..... 144 
 
 enters the lower town 145 
 
 frets about appointments ... 166 
 Washington s rejoinder .... 166 
 
 again in New Jersey ... 167 
 
 fails in the attack upon Staten 
 
 Island 184 
 
 joins Washington in time for 
 
 Brandywine 184-5 
 
 his position at Brandywine (as 
 
 per map) ..186 
 
 ordered to attack Cornwallis, 187 
 
 flanked by Cornwallis 187 
 
 ordered to change position. . 187 
 movement beyond his capac 
 ity 188 
 
 difficult under best condi 
 tions 188 
 
 loses control of his division, 188 
 personal valor undoubted . . 189 
 treated justly by Washing 
 ton 190 
 
 surprised by Howe 191 
 
 in Battle of Germantown. . .195 
 
 his gallantry noticed 196 
 
 urges attack upon Philadel 
 phia 207 
 
 attempts siege of Newport. .241 
 relations to the Count d Esta- 
 
 ing 242-3 
 
 issues an intemperate order, 243 
 prudently modifies the same, 243 
 advised by Washington to fe- 
 
 treat 244 
 
 manly course of D Estaing. .244 
 
 retires to Providence 245 
 
 devastates the Six Nation re 
 gion with unsparing desola 
 tion ..260 
 
424 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Sullivan, John, continued 
 
 comments upon , that inva 
 sion 2GO-2G1 
 
 resigns and enters Congress, 297 
 laconic appeal to him by Wash 
 ington .297 
 
 SUMTER, THOMAS col.; b. 1734, 
 d. 1882; honored by Wash 
 ington 312 
 
 SYMONDS, THOMAS Br. royal 
 
 navy, 
 led attack upon Fort Sullivan 
 
 (Moultrie) in 1776 359 
 
 signs terms of capitulation of 
 Yorktown 359 
 
 TARLETON, BANESTRE Br. lieut.- 
 
 col.; b. 1754, d. 1833. 
 attacks Sheldon s cavalry quar 
 ters 255 
 
 raids Westchester County, 
 
 N.Y 259 
 
 Washington s counter-stroke, 259 
 makes no progress at the 
 
 South 293 
 
 pursues Morgan 314 
 
 completely routed at Cow- 
 pens 314 
 
 acknowledges the American 
 
 success 321 
 
 makes a raid upon Char 
 lotte 340 
 
 fails to capture Jefferson. . .340 
 compliments Lafayette . . . .340 
 covers the retreat of Cornwal- 
 
 lis . 341 
 
 joins him at Yorktown 341 
 
 skirmishes with Lafayette. .341 
 TERNAY. (See De Ternay.) 
 Thanksgiving Proclamations of 
 Washington 
 
 at Valley Forge 214 
 
 at White Plains 246 
 
 at Yorktown 360 
 
 at New York 365 
 
 THAYER Am. maj.; in defence 
 
 of Fort Mifflin 203 
 
 THOMAS, GEORGE HENRY maj.- 
 gen. U.S.A.;*. 1815, d. 1870; 
 
 his example cited 26 
 
 THOMAS, JOHN major-general 
 (Mass.), Continental brig.- 
 gen.; b. 1725, d. 1776. 
 
 military antecedents 23, 36 
 
 subsequent career noticed . . .39 
 efficient in the siege of Bos 
 ton . . . 78 
 
 Thomas, John, continued 
 
 sent to Canada 84, 86 
 
 a victim to small-pox in camp, 88 
 
 THOMPSON, CHARLES Secretary 
 
 of first Continental Congress, 
 
 and his correspondence with 
 
 Franklin noticed 13, 16 
 
 Ticonderoga taken by Ethan 
 Allen 30 
 
 retaken by Burgoyne 182 
 
 TOWERS, ROBERT, of Philadel 
 phia, to receive and pay for 
 
 arms 141 
 
 TRUMBULL, JONATHAN gov. 
 Conn. ; statesman ; the origi 
 nal Brother Jonathan ; b. 1710, 
 d. 1788. 
 
 anxious about sea-coast expos 
 ure 56 
 
 his correspondence with AVash- 
 ington 56 
 
 always Washington s fast 
 friend 56 
 
 furnishes troops for New York 
 city 83 
 
 sends nine more regiments to 
 
 Washington 102 
 
 TRUMBULL, JONATHAN, JR. col., 
 statesman; b. 1740, d. 1804. 
 
 commissary at Long Island . . 110 
 
 becomes secretary to Wash 
 ington 300 
 
 TRYON, \VILLIAM gov. N.C. ; b. 
 1725, d. 1788. 
 
 his relation to the British Stamp 
 Act ^ 13 
 
 his career in North Carolina, 
 New York, and Connecti 
 cut 84 
 
 holds a conference with Gen. 
 Howe 98 
 
 invades Connecticut 166 
 
 fights Worcester and Arnold at 
 Ridgefield 166 
 
 again invades Conn 256 
 
 resisted by Yale College stu 
 dents at New Haven 256 
 
 in the Battle of Springfield . . 278 
 
 TULLY, Monsieur DE sails for the 
 
 Chesapeake 323 
 
 is obliged to return 323 
 
 his reasons satisfactory to 
 Washington 326 
 
 Union of the Colonies advocated in 
 1697, 1722, 1754 by Penn, 
 Coxe, and Franklin 12 
 
INDEX. 
 
 425 
 
 United States of America, a " stu 
 pendous fabric of freedom 
 and empire," as predicted by 
 Washington, and the fulfil 
 ment 365, 366,368 
 
 " asylum for the poor and op 
 pressed of all nations," as 
 predicted by Washington, and 
 comments 365, 368 
 
 respect for law and religion the 
 basis of Washington s charac 
 ter, and of the confidence he 
 inspired in the American 
 people 367-8 
 
 shares with Great Britain 
 bequests under M a g n a 
 Charta 371 
 
 harmony in that fruition, the 
 possible future 371 
 
 three hundred millions of treas 
 ure, her free-will offering to 
 man 374 
 
 her alms, recorded in the census 
 of 1890, the gauge of her 
 maturing sympathy with hu 
 manity 374 
 
 Valley Forge established as head 
 quarters 206 
 
 special Council of War noticed, 
 respecting u On to Philadel 
 phia!" 212 
 
 French alliance announced in 
 camp 213 
 
 a grand parade ordered. .. .214 
 
 a Thanksgiving proclamation 
 made 214 
 
 special Council of War, April 
 20, 1777 217 
 
 its ordeal made soldiers .... 231 
 VARNUM, JAMES MITCHELL brig.- 
 gen. ; b. 1749, d. 1789. 
 
 his brigade reports for duty, 203 
 
 in Battle of Monmouth 233 
 
 enters Congress 315 
 
 VAUGHAN, Sir JOHN Br. maj.- 
 gen. ; b. 1738, d. 1795; burns 
 
 Kingston, N.Y 179 
 
 VERGENNES, CHARLES GRAVIER, 
 Count DE Fr. minister of 
 foreign affairs ; b. 1717, 
 d. 1787. 
 
 comments on the Battle of Ger- 
 mantown 197 
 
 proclaims the French alliance 
 and the active support of 
 American Independence . . 209 
 
 Vergennes, Charles Gravier, con 
 tinued 
 
 is advised by Rochambeau of 
 American conditions 287 
 
 regards the American Congress 
 as too exacting 308 
 
 guarantees a loan from Hol 
 land 348 
 
 " Victory or Death " the counter 
 sign and alternative pro 
 claimed by Washington. . 149 
 ViOMisxiL, Baron A N T o i N E 
 CHARLES I>E Houx Fr. gen. ; 
 b. 1728, d. 1792, 
 
 storms a redoubt at York- 
 town 357 
 
 pleasantry of Lafayette no 
 ticed 358 
 
 Virginia aroused by the Stamp 
 Act 13 
 
 responds to Patrick Henry s ap 
 peal 14 
 
 includes Washington in her 
 delegation to First Continen 
 tal Congress 17 
 
 catches the news from Lexing 
 ton 28 
 
 excited conflict with Lord Dun- 
 more 28 
 
 called upon for more troops, 
 115 
 
 her troops at Middlebrook. .247 
 
 receives Greene and other offi 
 cers gladly 301 
 
 invaded by Arnold 310, 311 
 
 Lafayette in command, 326, 330 
 
 Cornwallis arrives 331 
 
 adjournment of Assembly to 
 Charlotte 338 
 
 liberal in its enactments .... 338 
 
 Lafayette s gallantry at Will- 
 iamsburg 341 
 
 Jefferson sustained by Lafay 
 ette 343 
 
 arrival of Washington ... .351 
 
 WARD, ARTEMAS maj. -general; 
 
 b. 1727, d. 1800. 
 
 his antecedents 23 
 
 appointed senior maj. -gen . . .35 
 
 his brief career noticed 37 
 
 occupies Boston, March 17, 
 
 1776 80 
 
 WARNER, SETH colonel ; b. 1744, 
 
 d. 1785. 
 a volunteer at Bunker Hill as 
 
 well as at Ticonderoga. . . .35 
 
426 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Warner, Seth, continued 
 
 accompanies Allen to Ticonder- 
 
 oga 35 
 
 his subsequent career 35 
 
 WASHINGTON, AUGUSTINE father 
 
 of the Soldier; b. 1694, d., in 
 
 his son s eleventh year, 1743.4 
 
 WASHINGTON, GEORGE gen., sub. 
 
 pres. t\vice; b. 1732, d. 1799. 
 
 his boyhood, tastes, and training 
 
 as described by Irving 1 
 
 physical appearance as described 
 
 by Mercer 2 
 
 physical accomplishments 3 
 
 personal characteristics 4 
 
 choice of a profession 4 
 
 parentage, and mother s influ 
 ence 4 
 
 first victory won 4 
 
 surveyor, inspector, adjutant- 
 general 5 
 
 commissioner to the French. . .6 
 
 frontier service 6 
 
 with Braddock 7 
 
 military studies and maxims . . 8 
 marriage, and in House of Bur 
 gesses 8 
 
 anticipates revolution 14 
 
 in the First Continental Con 
 gress 17 
 
 predicts a bloody future 18 
 
 appointed Commander-in- 
 
 Chief 32 
 
 his associates in command . . .35 
 
 starts for Cambridge 40 
 
 assumes command 41 
 
 his army noticed 41 
 
 withholds some commissions, 44 
 his reticence compared with that 
 
 of other generals 44 
 
 his trust in Providence 44 
 
 method of assignments 44 
 
 his estimate of Arnold 45 
 
 rebukes profanity 46 
 
 enjoins observance of the 
 
 Sabbath 47 
 
 institutes courts-martial for 
 " swearing, gambling," etc., 47 
 
 skilled in logistics 48 
 
 regard for private soldiers. . .49 
 
 deserters rebuked 49 
 
 games of chance prohibited. .49 
 invasion of Canada forced by 
 
 Congress 50 
 
 visited by Committee of Con 
 gress 52 
 
 risks of Canadian invasion. . .53 
 
 Washington, George, continued 
 denounces religious bigotry. .53 
 after Boston, then New York, 54 
 expeditions to Canada urged by 
 
 Congress 55 
 
 attitude of Gen. Charles Lee, 56 
 
 ignores sea-coast raids 56 
 
 writes Gov. Trumbull 57 
 
 would burn Boston 57 
 
 policy as to holding cities . . .57 
 
 straggling rebuked 58 
 
 appeals to Congress 58 
 
 privateering regulated 59 
 
 visited by Congressmen and se 
 cures a navy 60 
 
 laconic letter to Congress . . .61 
 writes Schuyler as to Northern 
 
 expeditions 63 
 
 writes Congress as to same . .68 
 begs Schuyler not to resign 
 for sake of "God and Coun 
 try" 63 
 
 writes Schuyler as to British 
 
 action 64 
 
 plans operations against New 
 
 York 69 
 
 sends Lee to New York 70 
 
 would cross to Boston on the 
 
 ice, but opposed by Council, 71 
 
 laconic letter to Joseph Reed, 72 
 
 preparations for assault 72 
 
 his inflexibility of purpose. . .72 
 preparations for future ser 
 vice 72-3 
 
 experimental bombardment. .74 
 enforced silence in camp .... 75 
 
 his confidential staff 75 
 
 secret plan near execution. . . 76 
 
 second bombardment 76 
 
 third bombardment and occupa 
 tion of Dorchester Heights, 77 
 
 British criticism 77 
 
 contingency of failure antici 
 pated 79 
 
 a general bombardment 80 
 
 Nook s hill fortified 80 
 
 Boston evacuated 80 
 
 his mission to Boston com 
 pleted 81 
 
 reorganization of the army.. 82 
 movement to New York be 
 gun 82 
 
 advises Congress and Governor 
 
 Trumbull of his plans 83 
 
 disciplines delinquent officers, 83 
 establishes a regular Pay Sys 
 tem . . 83 
 
INDEX. 
 
 427 
 
 Washington, George, continued 
 
 visits Connecticut to hasten 
 troops forward 84 
 
 reaches New York 84 
 
 rebukes Lee and sends him 
 South 85 
 
 forced by Congress to send 
 more troops to Canada .... 86 
 
 details more troops to Canada 
 under order of Congress . .86 
 
 compels citizens to choose be 
 tween Britain and America. 86 
 
 deprecates detachment of troops 
 to Canada 87 
 
 predicts danger to both the 
 armies 87 
 
 warns soldiers not to right their 
 own wrongs 87 
 
 learns of British contracts for 
 Hessians 87 
 
 notes change in Canadian senti 
 ment 87 
 
 writes Schuyler predicting a 
 bloody summer 87 
 
 describes Sullivan s character 
 istics 89 
 
 apology of Congress for Cana 
 dian disaster 90 
 
 strategic conditions at New 
 York 91 
 
 Declaration of Independence 
 and its effect 91 
 
 British plans noticed 93 
 
 correspondence with Howe . . 98 
 
 describes British commission 
 ers, as dispensing pardon to 
 repenting sinners 99 
 
 spreads Howe s proclamation 
 broadcast 99 
 
 denounces gossip-mongers . . 100 
 
 informs Gov. Trumbull that to 
 trust Providence without effort 
 is to tempt Providence . . . 102 
 
 issues stringent orders as to dis 
 cipline 103 
 
 reenforces garrison at Brook 
 lyn 104 
 
 details Sullivan, vice Greene, 
 sick 104 
 
 a remarkable letter from Sul 
 livan 104 
 
 Putnam supersedes Sullivan . 104 
 
 issues orders to Putnam as to 
 wasteful firing 105 
 
 skulkers must be shot down on 
 the spot 105 
 
 an " army " not a " mob "... 105 
 
 Washington, George, continued 
 
 will make battle costly to 
 enemy 108 
 
 omnipresent in tent or 
 trench 108 
 
 plans to withdraw to New 
 York 109 
 
 consummate ruse to prevent 
 demoralization of troops . . 110 
 
 withdrawal consummated. . .112 
 
 its incidents and success ... 112 
 
 comment of historian Botta. 113 
 
 labors without sleep for forty- 
 eight hours while assembling 
 the untrained army 114 
 
 laconic notice of bad habits in 
 officers and men 114 
 
 describes the militia as " dis 
 mayed, intractable, and im 
 patient to return home ". . 114 
 
 notices periodical home-sick 
 ness 115 
 
 its contagious virulence before 
 battle 115 
 
 again demands a sufficient regu 
 lar army .115 
 
 denounces robbing orchards and 
 gardens 115 
 
 orders three daily roll-calls, to 
 stop straggling 115 
 
 writes Congress as to vacating 
 the city 115 
 
 advises Gov. Trumbull to deal 
 with deserters 116 
 
 generous response of Mass, and 
 Conn 116 
 
 describes the situation 117 
 
 initiates retirement from the 
 city 119 
 
 denounces a panic at Kipp s 
 Bay 119 
 
 his personal exposure to rally 
 fugitives 1 19 
 
 a mournful letter to Con 
 gress 120 
 
 Edward Everett Hale s account 
 of the execution of Nathan 
 Hale as a spy serving under 
 Washington s orders 120 
 
 embezzlement by regimental 
 surgeons 123 
 
 offers reward for Hessian 
 troopers and their horses . . 126 
 
 his skirmishers successful . 126 
 
 outgenerals Howe and gains 
 White Plains 127 
 
 is joined by Greene and Lee . 127 
 
428 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Washington, George, continued 
 letter of Lee to Gates, censur 
 ing Washington 127 
 
 operations at White Plains, 128 
 battle of Chatterton hill. . .129 
 British preparations for at 
 tack 129 
 
 retires to North Castle 
 
 Heights 129 
 
 advises Congress of Howe s 
 
 plans 129 
 
 advises with Greene as to Fort 
 
 Washington 131 
 
 crosses into New Jersey. . . . 131 
 
 orders Lee to follow 131 
 
 so advises Gov. Trunibull . .131 
 writes forcibly to Congress .131 
 judicious order in logistics .131 
 boys or old men enlisted at of 
 ficers risk 131 
 
 warns Congress of certain in 
 vasion of New Jersey by 
 
 Howe ..132 
 
 abandons Fort Lee 133 
 
 enters upon his first New Jer 
 sey campaign 133 
 
 a misnomer to call it simply a 
 
 " masterly retreat " 135 
 
 musters his army 130 
 
 skirmishes with Cornwallis. 136 
 controls the Delaware river, 136 
 plans Dec. 5, to take the offen 
 sive 137 
 
 notes the capture of Lee . . . 139 
 Sullivan takes Lee s division, 139 
 
 other letters of Lee 138-9 
 
 his powers enlarged by Con 
 gress 140 
 
 places Philadelphia under mili 
 tary rule 140 
 
 takes the aggressive 143 
 
 battle of Trenton, with map, 144 
 " will drive the enemy from 
 
 New Jersey " 147 
 
 is clothed with dictatorial au 
 thority 148 
 
 his response to Congress . . . 148 
 his motto, " Victory or death," 
 
 retained 149 
 
 reoccupies Trenton 152 
 
 awaits arrival of Cornwallis, 152 
 fights battle of Princeton (see 
 
 map) 152 
 
 instructs officers having inde 
 pendent commands 157 
 
 headquarters established at Mor- 
 ristown . . . 157 
 
 Washington, George, continued 
 exercises with energy his en 
 larged powers 157 
 
 his capacity for reprimand .157 
 
 sternly rebukes Heath 158 
 
 issues counter-proclamation to 
 
 one by Howe 1 158 
 
 review of his career by 
 
 Botta 160 
 
 base of operations e s t a b - 
 
 lished (see map) 161 
 
 appreciates Howe s plans. . . 164 
 the second New Jersey cam 
 paign 167 
 
 outgenerals Cornwallis .... 169 
 learns of Burgoyne .s inva 
 sion 171 
 
 replies to his proclamation . 172 
 tart correspondence with 
 
 Gates 174 
 
 prophetic letter to Sclmyler, 175 
 detects Howe s modified plan 177 
 
 readies Philadelphia 183 
 
 triumphant march through the 
 
 city , 184 
 
 takes position on the Brandy- 
 wine 185 
 
 battle of Brandywine 187 
 
 its lesson 191 
 
 reaches Philadelphia 192 
 
 resumes the offensive 194 
 
 attacks Germantown 195 
 
 lesson from that battle. 197 
 
 operations along the Dela 
 ware 200 
 
 sends Lafayette into New Jer 
 sey ." 203 
 
 hostile attitude of Gates 204 
 
 experience at Valley Forge, 206 
 
 pleads with Congress 206 
 
 clock-work and army discipline 
 
 similar 206 
 
 sharply rebukes the Pennsylva 
 nia Assembly 207 
 
 the Conway cabal 207 
 
 French alliance proclaimed, 213 
 gives Lafayette an independent 
 
 command 215 
 
 a sharp letter to Lee 217 
 
 follows Clinton 224 
 
 increases Lafayette s c o rn - 
 
 mand 225 
 
 advises Lafayette as to Lee, 228 
 advances to his support .... 230 
 rallies the retreating army . .231 
 rebukes Lee on the field and 
 takes command . . . . 232 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Washington, George, continued 
 ^fights the battle of Mon- 
 
 mouth 233 
 
 European comments noticed, 234 
 Clinton escapes him to New 
 
 York 234 
 
 trial and sentence of Lee. . .234 
 
 end of Lee s career 234 
 
 tradition as to profanity at Mon- 
 
 mouth disproved 235-7 
 
 at White Plains again 237 
 
 watches D Estaing 240 
 
 George Washington, Esqr.," 
 
 and Howe 241 
 
 writes Sullivan at Newport, 242 
 warns him against Clinton . . 244 
 suggests a timely retreat. . . . 244 
 officially recognizes the hand of 
 
 Providence 246 
 
 removes to Fishkill 247 
 
 assigns army divisions. . .247-8 
 opinion of Bancroft cited.. 250 
 
 visits Philadelphia 250 
 
 writes Speaker Harrison as to 
 
 corruption of the times .250-1 
 
 social excesses of congressmen 
 
 deplored 251 
 
 opposes another expedition to 
 
 Canada 252 
 
 sacrifices his private fortune, 252 
 
 at New Windsor 254 
 
 watches hostile demonstra 
 tions 256 
 
 plans attack upon Stony 
 
 Point 257 
 
 its success as planned 258 
 
 capture of Paulus Hook. . . .259 
 sends Sullivan to punish In 
 dians 259 
 
 honored by the Six Nations, 260-1 
 
 strengthens West Point 261 
 
 his sublime faith 264 
 
 his trials at Morristown. . . .265 
 postpones attack upon New 
 
 York 265 
 
 reorganization of the army im 
 peratively necessary 269 
 
 praises New Jersey prompt 
 ness 272 
 
 again appeals to Congress, 272-3 
 watches Clinton closely .... 274 
 visited by Lafayette, just re 
 turned from France 276 
 
 gives him a letter to President 
 
 of Congress 276 
 
 sends Southern troops south 
 ward . , . . 277 
 
 Washington, George, continued 
 the mutiny of troops gives him 
 
 " infinite concern " 277 
 
 outgenerals Knyphausen . . .280 
 describes British movements, 280 
 
 new trials at hand 281 
 
 outgenerals Clinton 282 
 
 - Battle of Springfield 28(5 
 
 adroit appeal to governors at 
 
 the North 286 
 
 again threatens New York. .286 
 appreciated by Rochambeau, 287 
 assigns Arnold to West 
 
 Point 288 
 
 -Arnold s treason and the execu 
 tion of Andre 290 
 
 vindicates Mrs. Arnold . . . .291 
 
 takes post at Brakeness 291 
 
 assigns Greene to West 
 
 Point 291 
 
 his outlook over the field . .294 
 his sympathy with the rank and 
 
 file 295 
 
 writes about American specu 
 lators in food 296 
 
 appeals to Sullivan, then in 
 
 Congress 297 
 
 compares rolling small and large 
 
 snowballs 297 
 
 confers with Rochambeau. .297 
 writes Franklin of approaching 
 
 victory 298 
 
 reenforces Southern army. .299 
 temporary expedients de 
 nounced 299 
 
 designates winter quarters . . 300 
 addresses Southern gov 
 ernors 301 
 
 places Greene in Gates place, 301 
 sends his best officers south, 303 
 his powers again enlarged . .304 
 
 as judged abroad 305 
 
 " stay-at-homes" derided. . .305 
 his " superhuman regard for 
 
 man, as man " 305 
 
 his relations to foreign offi 
 cers 305 
 
 treatment of Pennsylvania mu 
 tiny 307 
 
 is judged by French generals, 
 
 says Franklin 308 
 
 individuality of the States, no 
 ticed 308 
 
 keeps away from scene of mu 
 tiny 309 
 
 elements of success in sight, 
 and all plans matured 313 
 
430 
 
 WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER. 
 
 Washington, George, continued 
 
 his specific instructions to 
 Greene 3ia 
 
 his use of " pick and spade," 313 
 
 writes Greene as to Cow- 
 pens 31G 
 
 is advised of Greene s move 
 ments 320 
 
 plans for capture of Arnold, 323 
 
 the war approaches its crisis, 324 
 
 writes Lafayette as to French 
 support 326 
 
 modifies Lafayette s orders, 326 
 
 " never judges the past by after 
 events" 326 
 
 urges Schuyh-r to be Secretary 
 of War 328 
 
 startling extracts from his 
 diary 328 
 
 " chimney-corner patriots " de 
 nounced 328 
 
 " venality, corruption and abuse 
 of trust universal " 329 
 
 indorses Lafayette s strat 
 egy 330 
 
 approves his action respecting 
 Arnold 332 
 
 confers again with Kochambeau \ 
 at Wethersfield 333 \ 
 
 advances toward New York, 334: 
 
 joined by French army . . . .335 ! 
 
 sends out decoy letters and j 
 plans 335 ! 
 
 builds brick ovens in New Jer- j 
 sey 336 ! 
 
 reconnoitres Clinton s out- ! 
 posts 336-7 ; 
 
 challenges Clinton to battle, 337 
 
 hears good news from Lafay 
 ette 339 
 
 second report from Lafay 
 ette 341 
 
 Lafayette ready for his ar 
 rival 343 
 
 good news from Count de 
 Grasse 344 
 
 urges Northern governors to 
 action 345 
 
 swift messengers sent every 
 where 345 
 
 his finesse outwits Clinton.. 346 
 
 visits West Point with Rocham- 
 beau .347 
 
 abandons fixed headquarters, 347 
 
 allied armies in motion not 
 missed by Clinton 347 
 
 grand tidings from France. .348 
 
 Washington, George, continued 
 enters Philadelphia, not yet 
 
 missed by Clinton 348 
 
 despatches from Lafayette re 
 ceived 349 
 
 starts for Chesapeake Bay, 349 
 meets courier from Lafay 
 ette 350 
 
 another courier arrives .... 350 
 welcomed with Rochambeau at 
 
 Baltimore 351 
 
 visits Mt. Vernon with French 
 
 officers as guests 351 
 
 arrives at Lafayette s head 
 quarters 351 
 
 his strategy noticed 352-3 
 
 studies the position with care, 354 
 
 visits Count de Grasse 356 
 
 fires the first gun before York- 
 town 357 
 
 siege pushed with vigor . . . .357 
 terms of surrender settled .359 
 surrender consummated. .. .360 
 issues proclamation for Public 
 
 Thanksgiving 360 
 
 a grand parade of the entire 
 
 army 360 
 
 assigns Lafayette to a Southern 
 
 expedition 361 
 
 the expedition abandoned. . .361 
 parts with Lafayette who re 
 turns to France 361 
 
 retains Rochambeau in America 
 
 until 1782 361 
 
 his magnanimous treatment of 
 
 the Queen s Rangers 362 
 
 still honored in Nova Scotia 
 
 and New Brunswick. . .362-3 
 
 triumphant entry into New 
 
 York 363 
 
 formally closes the war .... 364 
 another Thanksgiving procla 
 mation 364 
 
 predicts a grand future for 
 
 America 365 
 
 his trust in Divine Providence 
 
 emphasized 366 
 
 tested by military art 367 
 
 grounds of his faith in Ameri 
 can destiny 371 
 
 lessons from his career . . . .373 
 founds West Point Military 
 
 Academy 373 
 
 donates sites for National Uni 
 versity 374 
 
 his closing appeal to the Ameri 
 can conscience .. ..374 
 
INDEX. 
 
 431 
 
 WASHINGTON, LAWRENCE brother 
 of the Soldier; b. 17 18, d. 1752. 
 
 educated in England *1 
 
 in the British army 1 
 
 his example and influence. . 1, 4 
 
 WASHINGTON, MARTHA wife of 
 
 the Soldier; b. 1732, d. 1802; 
 
 her marriage (see also Cus- 
 
 tis) 8 
 
 WASHINGTON, MARY mother of 
 the Soldier; 6.. 1706, d. 1789. 
 
 her will-power 4 
 
 her moral training 5 
 
 their permanent effect in her 
 
 son s character 5 
 
 WASHINGTON, WILLIAM colonel; 
 b. 1752, d. 1810. 
 
 at Battle of Trenton 142 
 
 captures two guns at Tren 
 ton 145 
 
 wounded in the attempt .... 145 
 
 at Cowpens 314 
 
 Washington s " Invincibles " . . , 105 
 
 WAYNE, ANTHONY maj.-gen. ; 
 
 b. Paoli, Pennsylvania, 1745, 
 
 d. 1796. 
 
 attacks Hessian rear-guard in 
 
 N.J 169 
 
 at Battle of Brandywine, 186,189 
 
 surprised at Paoli 193 
 
 at Battle of Germantown . . . 195 
 with Lafayette at Mon- 
 
 mouth 226 
 
 powerless at time of mu 
 tiny 307 
 
 joins Lafayette in Virginia, 341 
 makes a brilliant charge at 
 
 Williamsburg 341 
 
 WEBSTER, DANIEL statesman 
 
 and orator; b. 1782, d. 1852. 
 
 his opinion of General Schuy- 
 
 ler 37 
 
 his sublime ideal, " Union," in 
 
 prospect 266 
 
 WELLINGTON, ARTHUR WELLESLEY 
 Br. gen., sub. field marshal ; 
 ft. 1769, d. 1852; cited for 
 comparison (Preface) ...viii 
 WESLEY, JOHN eminent divine ; 
 b. 1703, d. 1791 ; had visited 
 America . ..21 
 
 WHIPPLE, ABRAHAM Am. naval 
 officer; b. 1731, d. 1819, cited 
 
 as to Charleston 274 
 
 WILKINSON, JAMES maj.-gen.; 
 
 b. 1757, d. 1825. 
 with Lee at his capture .... 138 
 
 at Battle of Trenton 142 
 
 his- interview with Washing 
 ton 142 
 
 WILLETT, MARINCS col. ; b. 1744, 
 d. 1826 ; operates against the 
 Onondagas near Syracuse. 252 
 WILLIAMS, JAMES Am. col. ; at 
 King s Mountain, and de 
 scendants honored 293 
 
 Wilmington, N.C., visited by Sir 
 Peter Parker, Cornwallis and 
 Clinton, May 3, 1776.... 97 
 WINTHROP, ROBERT CHARLES 
 scholar, historian, statesman; 
 ft. 1809, d. 1894; gratefully 
 remembered by the author 
 
 (Preface) xi-v 
 
 Note. Mr. Winthrop de 
 livered the oration at lay 
 ing the corner-stone of 
 the national Washington 
 monument, at Washing 
 ton, D.C., and also at its 
 dedication. 
 
 Woman s heroism in the Revolu 
 tion 285 
 
 WOOSTER, DANIEL maj.-gen.; 
 
 6. 1711, d. 1777. 
 his military antecedents .... 23 
 his subsequent career outlined, 38 
 in movement against Fort Inde 
 pendence ._. 157 
 
 at home with the Connecticut 
 
 militia 165 
 
 resigns his commission. .. .165 
 
 is mortally wounded 166 
 
 WRIGHT, Sir JAMES royal gov 
 ernor of Georgia; b. 1714, 
 
 d. 1785, noticed 29, 30 
 
 Wyoming Valley invaded by 
 
 Indians 249 
 
 summarily avenged . . .252, 260 
 
 Yale College students resist Tryon s 
 invasion of New Haven.. 256 
 
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